

## CHINA

### COUNTRY READER TABLE OF CONTENTS

Howard E. Sollenberger	1919	Childhood, China
	1947-1950	Director, Chinese Language Program, Beijing
	1950-1955	Foreign Service Institute, Chinese Language Professor, Washington, DC
Charles T. Cross	1922-1940	Childhood, Beijing
James M. Wilson Jr.	1925-1935	Childhood, Shanghai
John Stuart Service	1925-1933	Childhood, Shanghai
	1933-1941	Cherk, Yannanfu, Shanghai
	1941-1942	Language Officer, Chungking
	1971	visit to China
	1973	visit to China
Richard P. Butrick	1926-1932	Consular Officer, Hankow
	1932-1941	Consular Officer, Shanghai
	1941	Counselor, Chungking
	1941-1942	Counselor, Beijing
William H. Gleysteen	1926	Born in China
	1955-1956	Chinese Language School, Taipei, Taiwan
	1956-1958	Political/Consular/Economic Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
James Cowles Hart Bonbright	1928-1929	Vice Consul, Canton
Everett Drumright	1931-1932	Vice Consul, Hankow
	1932-1934	Chinese Language Training, Beijing
	1934-1937	Consular Officer, Shanghai
	1937-1938	Political Officer, Hankow
	1938-1941	Political Officer, Chungking
	1941-1942	Internment, Shanghai
	1943-1944	Consular Officer, Chungdo and Sian
	1944-1945	Political Officer, Chungking
	1945-1946	China Desk, Washington, DC
	1953-1954	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
	1954-1958	Consul General, Hong Kong
1958-1962	Ambassador, Taipei, Taiwan	

Cecil B. Lyon	1934-1938	Vice Consul, Beijing
Ralph N. Clough	1936-1937	Chinese Language Training, Guangzhou
	1945	Vice Consul, Kunming
	1945-1946	Consular Officer, Chungking
	1946	Consular Officer, Nanking
	1946-1947	Language Officer, Beijing
	1947-1950	Chinese Secretary, Nanking
	1950-1954	Political Officer, Hong Kong
	1955-1958	Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1958	Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1958-1961	Advisor, Negotiations with Chinese, Poland, Switzerland, and Great Britain
	1961-1965	Deputy Chief of Mission, Taipei, Taiwan
	1965-1966	Diplomat-in-Residence, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Paul Good	1940-1941	Childhood, Tientsin
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.	1940-1945	World War II Experience
	1951-1952	Office of Information, Bureau of Far East Affairs, Washington, DC
	1952	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Hong Kong
Frederick Hunt	1941-1942	Consular Officer, Shanghai
Henry Byroade	1941-1947	Army Officer, China-Burma-India Theater
Walter E. Jenkins, Jr.	1943-1945	Training Chinese Army, Kunming
	1948-1950	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
	1953-1955	Political Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1969	Talks with Chinese in Poland, Warsaw, Poland
John A. Lacey	1944-1945	U.S. Navy, Chungking/Beijing
	1950-1956	Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
	1956-1957	Economic Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1957-1958	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
	1960-1964	Economic Officer, Hong Kong

Edwin Webb Martin	1945-1948	Chinese Language Training, Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) and Beijing
	1948-1949	Consular Officer, Hankow
	1949-1950	Economic Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1951-1955	Political Officer, Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
	1953-1954	Political Advisor to Talks with Chinese, Panmunjom, Korea
	1955	Talks with Chinese, Geneva, Switzerland
	1958-1961	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
	1961-1964	Political Advisor, Commander in Chief, Pacific
	1967-1970	Consul General, Hong Kong
	John F. Melby	1945-1948
1949		China White Paper, Washington, DC
Oscar Vance Armstrong	1946-1947	Consular Officer, Guangzhou
	1947-1950	Language Officer, Beijing
	1954-1957	China Watcher, Hong Kong
	1957-1961	Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
	1964-1966	Deputy Principal Officer, Hong Kong
	1966-1968	Bureau of East Asian Affairs/Public Affairs, Washington, DC
	1968-1971	Deputy Chief of Mission, Taipei, Taiwan
	1971-1973	Political Advisor, Commander in Chief, Pacific
	1973-1976	Director, China Office, Washington, DC
	1976	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
LaRue R. Lutkins	1946-1948	Chinese Language Training, Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) and Beijing
	1948-1949	Consular Officer, Kunming
	1949	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
	1950-1952	Political Officer, Penang, Malaysia
	1954-1957	Political Officer, Hong Kong
	1957-1961	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
William N. Stokes	1946-1950	Vice Consul and Economic Officer, Mukden
	1972-1975	Inspection Officer, American Liaison Office, Beijing
	---	Remarks on relations with China in Later Years

Harlan Cleveland	1947-1948	Director, UNRRA Mission to China
Robert Anderson	1947-1949	Consular Officer, Shanghai
Leonard L. Bacon	1947-1948 1949-1950	Consular Officer, Hankow Consular Officer, Nanking
Joseph A. Yager	1947-1948 1950-1951	Exchange Program, Canton Consul, Hong Kong/Peking (Peiping)
Richard E. Johnson	1947-1951 1951-1954	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC Economic Officer, Hong Kong
Philip W. Manhard	1947-1949 1949-1950	Chinese Language Training, Beijing Vice Consul, Tientsin
Richard M. McCarthy	1947-1950 1950-1956  1958-1962	Information Officer, USIS, Beijing Information Officer, Deputy Public Affairs Officer, Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Hong Kong Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Taipei, Taiwan
Philip H. Valdes	1947-1949	Economic Officer, Chungking
Earl Wilson	1947-1949	Information Officer, USIS, Shanghai
Elden B. Erickson	1948-1950	Clerk, Mukden
John H. Holdridge	1948-1951  1951-1956 1953-1956 1956-1958 1958-1962 1962-1966 1969-1973 1973-1975  1981-1982	Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute (Washington, DC), Cornell University (Ithaca, New York), Harvard University (Cambridge, Massachusetts) Chinese Language Officer, USIS, Bangkok, Thailand Political Officer, Hong Kong Political Officer, Singapore Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC Political Officer, Hong Kong National Security Council, Washington, DC Deputy Chief of Mission, American Liaison Office, Beijing Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC
John Wesley Jones	1948-1949	Political Counselor, Nanking

Hendrik Van Oss	1948-1950	Political Officer, Shanghai
Charles T. Cross	1949-1950	Junior Officer, USIS, Taipei, Taiwan
Jerome K. Holloway	1949-1950 1952-1957	Consular Officer, Shanghai Political Officer, Hong Kong
Harlan Cleveland	1949-1952	Director, Far Eastern Aid Program, Agency for Economic Cooperation, Washington, DC
David L. Osborn	1949-1953 1954-1957 1958-1961 1967-1970 1970-1974	American Information Office, Taipei, Taiwan Office of Chinese Affairs (Taiwan), Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC Political Counselor, Taipei, Taiwan Deputy Chief of Mission, Tokyo, Japan Consul General, Hong Kong
Lindsey Grant	1950-1952 1955-1958 1958-1961 1961-1965	Consular Officer, Hong Kong Economic Officer, Hong Kong Economic Officer, Taipei, Taiwan Asian Communist Affairs, Washington, DC
Ralph J. Katrosh	1950-1951	U.S. Military Assistance Group, Taipei, Taiwan
Robert S. Dillon	1951-1954	Operations with Nationalist Chinese, Taiwan
Harvey Feldman	1954-1955 1962-1963 1962-1963 1963-1965 1965-1970 1970-1972 1973-1975 1977-1979	Rotation Officer, Hong Kong Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan Political-Military Officer, Taipei, Taiwan Publications/Press Officer, Hong Kong UN Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC Political Counselor, Taipei, Taiwan Office of Republic of China Affairs, Washington, DC
Paul Kreisberg	1954-1955 1956-1959 1960-1962	Chinese Language Training, Taiwan Political Officer, Hong Kong Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of

	1965-1970	Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Washington, DC
	1977-1981	Policy Planning, Washington, DC
Seymour I. Nadler	1954-1956	Information Officer, USIS, Taipei, Taiwan
Frank N. Burnet	1955-1957	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC and Taichung, Taiwan
	1957-1959	China Watcher, Bangkok, Thailand
	1961-1963	Staff Assistant, Bureau of Far East Affairs, Washington, DC
Robert McCloskey	1955-1957	Investigator, Refugee Relief Program, Hong Kong
Richard St. F. Post	1955-1958	Consular Officer, Hong Kong
Derek Singer	1956-1958	Assistant Training Officer, USAID, Taipei, Taiwan
James Mocerri	1956-1959	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Taipei, Taiwan
Norman W. Getsinger	1956-1957	Chinese Language Studies, Taichung, Taiwan
	1957-1961	Commercial Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
Marshall Bremant	1956-1957	Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1957-1959	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC and Taiwan
	1960-1963	Political Officer, Hong Kong
William J. Cunningham	1956-1957	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC
	1957-1958	Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan
	1958-1962	Press Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1962-1965	China Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Marshall Green	1956-1960	Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East, Washington, DC
	1961-1963	Consul General, Hong Kong
	1963-1965	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, Washington, DC

	1969-1973	Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Washington, DC
Thomas P. Shoesmith	1956-1958	Consular Officer, Hong Kong
David Dean	1956-1957	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC
	1957-1959	Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan
	1959-1962	Consular Officer, Hong Kong
	1966-1969	Political Counselor, Taipei, Taiwan
	1970-1974	Deputy Principal Officer, Hong Kong
	1976-1978	Deputy Chief of Mission, Beijing
Joseph Yager	1957-1961	Deputy Chief of Mission, Taipei, Taiwan
Herbert Levin	1957-1961	Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute (Washington, DC) and Taiwan
	1961-1964	Economic Officer, Hong Kong
	1964-1967	Political Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1967-1970	China Watcher, Tokyo, Japan
	1970	Asian Affairs, National Security Council, Washington, DC
Herbert E. Horowitz	1957-1962	Consular Officer/Chinese Language Training/Economic Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1962-1964	China Desk, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1965-1969	China Watcher, Hong Kong
Harry E.T. Thayer	1957-1959	Consular Officer, Hong Kong
	1959-1961	Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1961-1963	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC and Taiwan
	1963-1966	Economic/Political Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1966-1970	Taiwan Desk, Washington, DC
	1971-1975	East Asia Advisor, United Nations, New York, New York
	1975-1976	Deputy Chief of Mission, Beijing
	1976-1980	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
Jacob Walkin	1958-1960	Consular/Security Officer, Hong Kong
Morton I. Abramowitz	1958-1960	International Cooperation Administration, Taiwan

	1960-1962	Economic & Consular Officer, Taiwan
	1962-1963	Chinese Language Training, Taichung
James F. Leonard	1958-1959	Chinese Language Training, Taichung
	1960-1963	Political Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1963-1965	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
Robert W. Drexler	1958-1959	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC
	1959-1960	Chinese Language Training, Taipei
	1963-1966	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
	1968-1972	Political Officer, Hong Kong
Donald M. Anderson	1958-1961	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC and Taichung, Taiwan
	1962-1965	Consular Officer/Political Officer, Hong Kong
	1965-1966	Interpreter Training, Taichung, Taiwan
	1966-1970	China Desk Talks, Washington, DC
	1970-1972	China Expert, Political Section, New Delhi, India
	1972-1973	Talks with Chinese, Paris, France
	1973-1975	Political Officer, American Liaison Office, Beijing
	1975-1977	Political Officer, Hong Kong
	1977-1980	Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1980-1983	Consul General, Shanghai
	1983-1985	Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
	1986-1990	Consul General, Hong Kong
Mark S. Pratt	1959-1960	Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Taichung, Taiwan
William Andreas Brown	1959-1961	Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan
Robert L. Nichols	1959-1961	Chinese Language Training, USIS, Washington, DC and Taiwan
	1962-1965	Information Officer, USIS, Hong Kong
	1966-1968	Chinese Programs, Voice of America, USIS, Washington, DC
	1969-1971	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Taipei,

		Taiwan
Fred Charles Thomas, Jr.	1960-1962	Chinese Language Training, Taichung
John J. Taylor	1960-1965	Chinese Language Training/Political Officer, Taichung
Francis J. Tatu	1961-1962	Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan
Louis P. Goelz	1961-1966	Consular Officer, Hong Kong
Roger Ernst	1962-1964	Deputy Director, USAID, Taipei, Taiwan
Nicholas Platt	1962-1964	Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC and Taichung
William H. Gleysteen	1962-1965	Economic Officer, Hong Kong
William Watts	1963	Chinese Language Training, Washington
Morton I. Abramowitz	1963-1966	Consular/Political Officer, Hong Kong
Natale H. Bellocchi	1963-1964	Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan
	1964-1968	Assistant Commercial Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
Thomas L. Hughes	1963-1969	Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, DC
David G. Brown	1964-1966	Rotation Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
Robert Lyle Brown	1965-1968	Economic Counselor, Taipei, Taiwan
Arthur W. Hummel, Jr.	1965-1968	Deputy Chief of Mission, Taipei, Taiwan
Robert Knopes	1965-1966	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC
	1966-1967	Chinese Language Training, Taiwan
	1967-1971	Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Taipei, Taiwan
	1971-1974	Publications Officer, USIS, Hong Kong
Thomas P. Shoesmith	1966-1971	Taiwan Desk, Washington, DC

Neal Donnelly	1967-1968	Taichung Language School, Taiwan
	1968-1971	Branch Public Affairs Officer, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
	1971-1972	Cultural Affairs Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1972-1975	China Branch Chief, Voice of America, Washington, DC
	1975-1981	Cultural Affairs Officer/Deputy Public Affairs Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
Michael H. Newlin	1968-1972	Senior Political Advisor, USUN, New York City
William H. Gleysteen	1969-1971	Director, East Asia and Pacific, INR, Washington, DC
Morton I. Abramowitz	1969-1971	Special Assistant to Undersecretary of State, Washington, DC
	1972	Bureau of Intelligence & Research, East Asia Division, Washington, DC
	1974-1978	Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Inter-American Affairs, Department of Defense
Winston Lord	1969-1973	National Security Council Staff, Washington, DC
	1973-1977	Director, Policy Planning Staff, Washington, DC
Parker W. Borg	1970-1972	Officer, Staff Secretariat – Kissinger China Visit, Washington, DC
James A. Klemstine	1970-1973	Economic Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
William Veale	1971-1973	Staff Assistant to Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington, DC
Mark E. Mohr	1971-1973	Non-Immigrant Visa Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
	1973-1974	Chinese Language Studies, Taichung, Taiwan
Ward Barmon	1971-1972	Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC
	1972-1974	Economic Officer/Assistant Commercial Attaché, Taipei, Taiwan
	1974-1975	Chinese Language Training, Taipei, Taiwan

William H. Gleysteen	1971-1974 1974-1976 1976-1977 1977-1978	Deputy Chief of Mission, Taipei, Taiwan Deputy Assistant Secretary, EAP National Security Council, Washington, DC Deputy Assistant Secretary, EAP
Stan Ifshin	1971-1972 1972-1973 1978-1980 1980-198?	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC Chinese Language Training, Tai Chung, Taiwan Bureau of Intelligence and Research, China Analyst, Washington, DC American Institute in Taiwan, Commercial Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
Herbert E. Horowitz	1972-1973 1973-1975	China Desk, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC Economic Counselor, American Liaison Office, Beijing
Katherine Schwering	1972-1976	Lending Officer, Chase Manhattan Bank
Nicholas Platt	1973	Liaison Officer, Beijing
Chas W. Freeman, Jr.	1973 1978-1979 1979-1981 1981-1984	Liaison Officer, Beijing China Working Group, Washington, DC Country Director for China, Washington, DC Deputy Chief of Mission, Beijing
Ray E. Jones	1973-1974	Position not specified, Beijing
J. Richard Bock	1973-1974 1974-1975 1975-1976 1976-1979 1986-1989	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan Political Officer, Hong Kong Political Officer, Beijing Chief, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan
Willard B. Devlin	1974-1976	Chief, Consular Section, Hong Kong
Dean Rust	1974-1976	ACDA; Staff Assistant to the Director Fred Ikle, Washington, DC

Mark E. Mohr	1974-1977	Political Officer, Hong Kong
Dennis G. Harter	1974-1978	Political Officer, Hong Kong
David G. Brown	1974-1976 1976-1978	China Desk Officer, Washington, DC Office of the Republic of China Affairs, Washington, DC
Herman Rebhan	1974-1989	General Secretary, International Metalworkers Federation, Washington, DC
Leonard Unger	1974-1979	Ambassador, Taiwan
Edward H. Wilkinson	1975-1978	Consular Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
Frank N. Burnet	1975-1979	Political Counselor, Taipei, Taiwan
Charles Lahiguera	1975-1979	Political Officer (Refugee Office), Hong Kong
William W. Thomas, Jr.	1975-1979 1984-1986 1986-1990	Economic Counselor, Beijing Consul General, Chengdu Science Counselor, Beijing
Gilbert J. Donahue	1976-1977 1977-1978 1978-1981 1986-1987 1989-1992	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC Chinese Language Training, Taichung, Taiwan China Reporting Group, Hong Kong Economic Officer, Beijing Economic/Political Officer, Hong Kong
Walter A. Lundy	1977-1979	Republic of China, Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Walter F. Mondale	1977-1981	Vice President, Washington, DC
Thomas P. Shoesmith	1977-1981	Consul General, Hong Kong
William Andreas Brown	1978 1978-1979	Deputy Chief of Mission, Taiwan Trustee, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan
G. Eugene Martin	1978-1979	Deputy Political Counselor, Taipei, Taiwan
Mark S. Pratt	1978-1981	Political Counselor, Taipei, Taiwan

Virginia Carson-Young	1978-1982	Consular Officer, Hong Kong
David Dean	1978-1987	American Institute in Taiwan, Washington, DC
Charles T. Cross	1979-1981	Director, American Institute in Taipei, Taipei, Taiwan
Anna Romanski	1979-1981	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC and Taiwan
	1981-1983	Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, USIS, Beijing
David E. Reuther	1979-1981	China Affairs, Economic Officer, Washington, DC
	1981-1982	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC
	1982-1983	Chinese Language Training, Taipei, Taiwan
	1983-1985	Chief of American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan
G. Eugene Martin	1987-1990	Economic Officer, Beijing
	1979-1980	Staff Secretariat East Asia – China Policy, Washington, DC
	1980-1981	Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State, Washington, DC
	1985-1987	Deputy Director for Political Affairs, Washington, DC
	1990-1992	Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Asia and Africa, Washington, DC
Howard H. Lange	1992-1996	Consul General, Guangzhou (formerly Canton)
	1979-1980	Chinese Language Training, Taipei, Taiwan
Robert Goldberg	1980-1982	Economic Officer, Beijing
	1980-1982	China Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence & Research, Washington, DC
William Piez	1980-1982	Director, East Asia Bureau, Economic Policy Office, Washington, DC
	1985-1989	Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economics, East Asia Bureau, Washington, DC
James T. Laney	1981	Visitor, China

David G. Brown	1981-1983	Chief of Economic Section, Beijing
Mark E. Mohr	1981-1983	Deputy Director, Office of Taiwan Affairs, Washington, DC
Thomas P. Shoesmith	1981-1983	Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Washington, DC
Clarke N. Ellis	1981-1984	American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan
Donald A. Camp	1981-1982	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC
	1982-1983	Chinese Language Training, Taipei, Taiwan
	1983-1985	Political Officer, Beijing
Marshall P. Adair	1981-1984	Economic Officer, Hong Kong
	1984-1986	Economic Officer, Beijing
Elizabeth Raspolic	1981-1983	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC and Taiwan
	1983-1986	Chief, Consular Section, Guangzhou
	1986-1988	Consul General, Beijing
Robert Knopes	1981-1982	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC
	1982-1983	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Beijing
	1984-1986	Chief, Cultural/Information Office, American Institute, Taipei, Taiwan
	1986-1989	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Hong Kong
	1989-1994	Chief, East Asia/Pacific Division, Voice of America, Washington, DC
Dennis G. Harter	1982-1984	Chief of Political Section, Hong Kong
James R. Lilley	1982-1984	Director, American Institute of Taiwan, Taiwan
Mark S. Pratt	1982-1986	Chief, Taiwan Coordination Office, Washington, DC
William Andreas Brown	1983-1985	Assistant secretary, East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC
Beatrice Camp	1984-1985	Junior Officer Trainee, USIS, Beijing

Russell Sveda	1984-1986	China Desk Officer, Washington, DC
Ruth Kurzbauer	1984-1986 1990	Assistant Press Officer, USIS, Beijing Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Shenyang
Jon M. Huntsman, Jr.	1984	Advance Work, White House Staff, Beijing
Herbert E. Horowitz	1984-1986	Deputy Chief of Mission, Beijing
Harry E.T. Thayer	1984-1986 1986-1989	Director, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan Dean, Language Studies, Foreign Service Institute, Washington, DC
Joan M. Plaisted	1985-1987	China Desk, Economic Affairs, Washington, DC
Marie Therese Huhtala	1985-1987	Political Officer (China Watcher), Hong Kong
G. Eugene Martin	1985-1987	Deputy Director for Political Affairs, China, Washington, DC
Winston Lord	1985-1989	Ambassador, China
Robert Goldberg	1986-1988	China Affairs, Mongolia Desk Officer, Washington, DC
William Lenderking	1986-1988	East Asia and Pacific Affairs, USIA, Washington, DC
Robin Berrington	1986-1989	Director, Junior Officer Training, Washington, DC
David G. Brown	1986-1989	Taiwan Coordination Staff, Washington, DC
Mark S. Pratt	1986-1989	Consul General, Guangzhou (Canton)
Thomas R. Hutson	1986-1987 1987-1990	Mandarin Language Studies, Taipei, Taiwan Chief Consular Officer, Taipei, Taiwan
Richard W. Carlson	1986-1991	Director, Voice of America, USIS, Washington, DC

David G. Brown	1986-1989 1989-1992	Taiwan coordination Staff, Washington, DC Deputy Consul General, Hong Kong
David Dean	1987-1989	Director, American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei, Taiwan
McKinney Russell	1987-1991	Public Affairs Officer, USIS, Beijing
James A. LaRocco	1988-1990	Economic Minister-Counselor, Beijing
William Primosch	1988-1991	Office of Chinese Affairs, Washington, DC
Kenneth Yates	1988-1989 1989-1992	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC Deputy Public Affairs Officer, Beijing
Mark E. Mohr	1988-1990	Deputy Director, Political Section, Beijing
Hortense F. Fiekowsky	1989	Representative for the Department of Labor, Tiananmen Square
G. Philip Hughes	1989-1990	Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, The White House, Washington, DC
Clarke N. Ellis	1989-1993	American Institute for Taiwan, Rosslyn, Virginia
Dennis G. Harter	1989-1993	Consul General, Guangzhou
David Dean	1989-1995	Trustee, Board of American Institute in Taiwan, Washington, DC
Mark E. Mohr	1990-1992	Deputy Director, China Affairs, Washington, DC
Robert Goldberg	1990-1993	Economic Officer, Hong Kong
Greg Thielmann	1990-1993	Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Chief, Officer of Strategic Forces Analysis, Washington, DC
Marshall P. Adair	1990-1992	Consul General, Chengdu
Natale H. Bellocchi	1990-1995	Chairman, American Institute in Taiwan
Michael H. Newlin	1991	Retired Annuitant, Bureau of Political-

		Military Affairs, Washington, DC
Donald A. Camp	1991-1992 1992-1995	China Desk Officer, Washington, DC Consul General, Chengdu
J. Richard Bock	1993-1996	Deputy Managing Director, American Institute in Taiwan, Rosslyn, Virginia
Winston Lord	1993-1995	Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Washington, DC
Michael A. Boorstein	1993-1996 1999-2002	Administrative Counselor, Beijing Director, American Embassy in Beijing Project, Washington, DC
Robin White	1996-1998	Director, Bilateral Trade, Economic Bureau, Washington, DC
Paul P. Blackburn	1996-1997 1997-2000	Chinese Language Training, Washington, DC Public Affairs Officer, Beijing
Robert Goldberg	1996-1999 1999-2003  2003-2005 2005-2007 2007-2009 2009-2011	Economic Officer, Beijing Deputy Director for Economic Affairs, China/Deputy Special Representative for Economic and Commercial Affairs, Washington, DC Deputy Director, Office of China Affairs, Washington, DC Director, Officer of China Affairs, Washington, DC Consul General, Guangzhou Deputy Chief of Mission, Beijing
Donald M. Bishop	1997-2000	Deputy Public Affairs Officer, Beijing
G. Eugene Martin	1999-2000	Deputy Chief of Mission, Beijing
Harold W. Geisel	2001	Chief, Negotiating Team with Chinese for Embassy construction in Washington and Beijing
Lawrence Dunham	2001-2005	Office of Foreign Missions: Assistant Chief of Protocol, Washington, DC
Donald M. Bishop	2002-2006	Public Affairs Officer, Beijing

David J. Kramer	2008-2009	Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, Washington, DC
Beatrice Camp	2008-2011	Consul General, Shanghai
Shanghai Stories: 30 <sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai		
-- Don Anderson	1980-1983	Consul General
-- David Hess	1980-??	Branch Public Affairs Officer
-- Thomas Biddick	1980-1982	Consular/Political Officer
-- Steve Schlaikjer	1980-1982	Consular Officer
-- Tom Lauer	1980-1982	
-Tess Johnston	1981-1986	
-- Stan Brooks	1983-1987	Consul General
-- Kent Wiedemann	1983-1986	
-- Lloyd Neighbors	1983-1986	Branch Public Affairs Officer
-- Ira Kasoff	1985-1987	Commercial Officer
-- Keith Powell	1985-1987	Consular Section Chief
-- Gregoire W. Bujac	1986-1987	Diplomatic Security Officer
-- Charles Sylvester	1987-1989	Consul General
-- Frank "Pat" Wardlaw	1989-1992	Consul General
-- Nora Sun	1989-1991	Commercial Officer
-- Tess Johnston	1989-1996	
-- Jerome Ogden	1992-1994	Consul General
-- Pam Slutz	1991-1994	Political Officer
-- Ronald Deutch	1991-1994	Administrative Officer
-- Joe Borich	1994-1997	Consul General
-- Robert Wang	1994-1997	Pol-Econ Officer
-- Raymond F. Burghardt	1997-1999	Consul General
-- Anthony Sariti	1997-??	Branch Public Affairs Officer
-- Jerry Ogden	1992-1994	Consul General
-- Robert D. Griffiths	1997-2000	Pol-Econ Chief
-- Tess Johnson	1989-1996	
-- Doug Spelman	2002-2005	Consul General
-- Ken Jarrett	2005-2008	Consul General
-- Beatrice Camp	2008-2011	Consul General

## **HOWARD E. SOLLENBERGER**

**Childhood  
China (1919)**

**Director, Chinese Language Program  
Beijing (1947-1950)**

**Foreign Service Institute, Chinese Language Professor  
Washington, DC (1950-1955)**

*Howard E. Sollenberger was born in Indiana in 1917. He attended schools in China and received his bachelor's degree from Manchester College. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.*

*Q: Could you tell me a bit about your parents?*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes. They were both from a rural area in southern Ohio. Grandfathers on both sides were farmers, and ministers in the local church, Church of the Brethren, which is the religious background in which I come, mixed with the Quakers and Mennonites.

*Q: That's a very strong, solid background, heavily rooted in the farming area. What was it like growing up as a young lad in North Manchester?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, I didn't grow up in North Manchester. I was born there, I grew up in China. My parents were missionaries to North China.

*Q: How old were you when you went out to China?*

SOLLENBERGER: Two years old. I don't remember [much of those early days]. I came back to North Manchester later.

*Q: What spurred your parents to go as missionaries to China?*

SOLLENBERGER: I've often wondered that myself. They went to China in 1919, and in those days that was not [unlike] going to the moon.

*Q: No, but damn close.*

SOLLENBERGER: Damn close to it, you're right. There seemed to have been a movement at that time of American church people interested in spreading [the word] and saving the world. They were a part of that movement. According to my father, the impetus came from my mother, and he followed her rather than she followed him.

*Q: Where did they go?*

SOLLENBERGER: They went to north China, Shaanxi Province, Taihang mountain area which is really a rural and very poor area. My father, when they first started, spent most of his time in road construction. There was a major famine in the area at that time and, with the International Red Cross, [he] had undertaken a work for food project and my father was assigned a section of road that he was to supervise the building of for which relief food was handed out.

*Q: What was your mother doing?*

SOLLENBERGER: Basically raising a family. At that time I had an older sister, but both parents went out as missionaries. Part of her function was to try to contact the local women in the area, and to do something with them which ultimately would lead to their salvation.

*Q: I can see coming out of Indiana, not much Chinese is spoken there. How did they prepare themselves? I assume you'd get this from stories when you were older. How did they prepare themselves and how did they communicate?*

SOLLENBERGER: I've been really amazed that the organization of the church that sent missionaries overseas had the foresight to understand that language and some knowledge of the culture was important. The first year that they were in China, they went to the College of Chinese Studies in Beijing to learn the language. They were ahead of the Foreign Service in those days.

*Q: Was there a Foreign Service Chinese school at that time?*

SOLLENBERGER: No, not at that time. That came on later.

*Q: What was it like growing up as a young lad in northern China?*

SOLLENBERGER: For a long time I resented it. The expectation was that I would come back, my home was in the United States, I was an American citizen, I would go to college in the United States. And it seemed that growing up in China did not particularly prepare me for the culture shock you ran into when you came back to the United States. But there were lots of interesting things that happened.

*Q: Could you talk about what you remember? Did you have Chinese friends, that sort of thing?*

SOLLENBERGER: I did have Chinese friends. Being in quite a rural, mountainous area, the contact with Chinese was probably greater than for those that grew up in places like Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, [the major urban centers]. So, I did have that contact, and I've always been amazed at how free my parents were in letting me move around in that area. The earliest memory that I have is going with my father when he was supervising road construction. I was left behind in a room while he was out doing something, and I'd fallen asleep. When I woke up, there was a strange man with a beard, something like you have. He turned out to be a White Russian engineer that the Red Cross had hired for the purpose of road construction, a civil engineer. I, of course, was young enough at that point to not only be worried, but to start yelling for my parents. At which point he brought out a nice big red apple, which was very nice.

There were other missionary children in the area. I had contact with them. We went through the usual childhood experiences of learning how to get along with other kids, and in this case to get along in a different culture. We had Chinese servants, and from the beginning I found learning Chinese easier than my parents did. So in some circumstances, I had to be the interpreter for them.

*Q: There is a long oral history of John Stewart Service who grew up in some of the same*

*circumstances, but he was saying how his mother really kept him away from Chinese. She was worried about catching disease, so he was really not as fluent in Chinese as he later became because of this separation which often happens with both Foreign Service and missionary families. But I take it this was not so with you.*

SOLLENBERGER: It was a little different in our situation. In fact, I'm surprised as I look back on this. For one thing, you could understand the nervousness of parents with little kids. I think a recent study of missionaries and their families overseas indicates that the fatality rate among missionaries is higher than with any other group of people. Largely from disease, but not entirely, because in those days as you know they didn't have all the wonder drugs, etc., that we have right now. I can remember within our small mission group a number of the people that didn't make it. And yet my parents seemed to realize that we were kids, we were in this [strange] culture, and that we ought to have some contact with it. And we did. As a matter of fact, my parents did put me for a short period of time in a traditional Chinese school, which was run by mission people. I was [put with] other Chinese kids, I was the little foreign devil, and had to defend myself on several occasions.

*Q: What Chinese were you learning?*

SOLLENBERGER: It was Mandarin, northern Chinese but with a Shaanxi dialect which is rather strong and well understood.

*Q: In later life did you have to unlearn that dialect?*

SOLLENBERGER: I've never fully unlearned it. As a matter of fact just within the last month I returned from a sentimental journey to China, which took me back to the same area where I grew up. And I had a chance to not only hear but to try to practice, and I discovered that my Chinese has become a mixture of the standard Beijing variety, but all too frequently with the tones of the Shaanxi dialect which raises some eyebrows. But when I talked with the people in Shaanxi, they thought I spoke Chinese better than they did because I spoke the higher social level [vocabulary] that obviously had been picked up while I was serving in Beijing.

*Q: You got out there in 1919 and were there during the '20s. I'm not familiar with Chinese history at that point except to know that there was a lot of turmoil and warlordism. Did that impact at all on you all?*

SOLLENBERGER: It did, but Shaanxi Province was then under the governorship of Yan Xishan, who was referred to frequently as a model governor. But nonetheless he was a warlord, independent, printed his own currency, collected his own taxes, built a narrow gauge railway into his capital so that these outside trains that were on a different width of track could not freely move into his province. But things were relatively under control, although Shaanxi Province has always been considered a strategic province to the defense of the capital, Beijing and the north China plain. So that on several occasions, we ran into military operations in the area that, of course, to a child were exciting.

*Q: Were there any incidents of things that you recall during that time?*

SOLLENBERGER: I should perhaps mention here that foreigners in China at that time had extraterritorial privileges, much like diplomatic privileges, where foreigners were basically a law to themselves. They were not subject to domestic law and control. It didn't take the kids long to realize this, and sometimes would take advantage of it. There are several things as I look back on, I'm ashamed of now, but it shows that kids will be kids wherever they are. I went to boarding school for five years, eighth grade through high school at Tongzhou, which is a suburb of Beijing now. [Editor's note: for another account of Tongzhou School, from a student who also later joined the Foreign Service, see Charles T. Cross, Born a Foreigner: A Memoir of the American Presence in Asia, Rowman and Littlefield, 1999] We would have to go back and forth from home during the summer vacation, and sometimes for Christmas. I remember one Christmas trip that we made on the train, there were several of us missionary kids, we'd purchased some of these concussion firecracker, things that you throw down on a hard surface and they explode. Being poor, although we didn't know we were poor at the time - missionary kids - we didn't have much money, we traveled third class. And in this particular incident there was an old Chinese gentleman that was stretched out on a bench across from two of us who were there, and we had these little concussion bombs. He was asleep. We also had a lot of chewing gum which apparently, as I heard the story, came to China from Wrigley's chewing gum, who when they heard about the severe famine in north China decided it would be a wonderful thing if they could get the Chinese hooked on chewing gum. At that time they were talking about 300 million [people in northern China].

*Q: We still talk in the same terms. There's always those million, or whatever number, potential Chinese customers out there.*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, the Chinese didn't take to chewing gum at that time, but the missionary kids got all the chewing gum their parents would let them chew. We took some of this chewing gum and stuck these concussion crackers on the soles of the old gentleman's feet while he was asleep. And you can imagine what happened when he woke up. And yet a trick like this, I'm ashamed of right now in terms of what I did and the reaction [we stimulated in the] other Chinese in the train, [because we foreign kids did] something of this sort.

On another occasion, we went through the train with punches and punched everybody's ticket ahead of the conductor and got them all mixed up for him. And yet he could do nothing about it, because we were foreign kids. So we had experiences that I'm sometimes ashamed of as I look back on it.

*Q: I think we all do it. What about Chinese when you were in the school outside Beijing, were you still getting Chinese, or was this pretty much a traditional American education?*

SOLLENBERGER: A traditional American education to prepare us for college. We did have a course, but it was Chinese as a foreign language. They did think that we ought to be learning about Chinese, but there were no Chinese students in the boarding school for foreigners. There were several Russian but it was basically a segregated educational experience.

*Q: Did you experience, and you only realized it later, that there was almost segregation between*

*the foreign students, the missionaries, and the Chinese in general... How did your family feel about this separation?*

SOLLENBERGER: There was definitely segregation. The missionaries at that time, and to some extent this was because of the Chinese insistence on it, built little separate compounds. They built American-style structures, that's the only kind of structure they understood and knew. It was difficult, particularly for the women in these rural area to establish any sort of close relationship with [Chinese] women. Partly this was because of the role and status of women at that particular time. I remember one of the missionary women, who was there before we were, talking about the way in which she was finally able to establish contact with Chinese women. And that was through the death of one of her babies. At that point the Chinese women expressed sympathy and came to her to express this. And she often said it was through the death of one of her children that she was finally able to make contact with the Chinese women.

This was, in a sense, driven home to me later on when I was back as an adult and was able on several occasions to see the mission establishments through the Chinese eyes as something that was clearly foreign, clearly from the outside. Something that from the Chinese point of view had a lot of money behind it. Also, foreigners who had special privileges, or appeared to have special privileges in China, before whom the Chinese had to, an expression they use, is to kowtow, which means to lower your head and not look at the other person in the eyes. So we had that separation, but my father was always uneasy, mother also was always uneasy with that sort of relationship and did what they could under the circumstances, as I look back on it now, to bridge that, not only for themselves but for [us] kids.

*Q: While you at boarding school were there any winds of change coming around like the Kuomintang or anything like that? Were you getting any reflections...*

SOLLENBERGER: ...of what was going on in China? Oh, a good deal of that. As a matter of fact there were several occasions where there were military threats to the area. The major one being from the Japanese in 1935 as they made a feint towards north China. They didn't actually invade until '37 but large troop movements in the area, Tongzhou was considered the east gate to Beijing so there were concentrations of troops there. That created a good deal of excitement, and also created some interesting school experiences.

*Q: What were they?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, the major one had to do with a group of boys, there were five of us that roomed together in the same room. With troops [arriving], we wanted to go down to the railroad station and look at this. We were under strict orders not to do so. The headmaster of the school was a Danish gentleman who believed in the old discipline of the Danish navy, he'd been in the Danish navy, and applied that liberally to the students. On this particular occasion, after being denied the privilege of going down to the railway station, we decided we'd go into the city. The gates were locked to the city at that time and we had to climb over the city wall, which we did, [we were young] and had scouted out the area well before hand. And found getting into town rather interesting under these circumstances. We did it three times. And one of the roommates had a girlfriend, she found out about it through him. The matron found out about it

through the girlfriend, or through gossip in the girl's dorm, and the headmaster found out about it. The result was that, since we'd gone in three times, we had to be punished three times. His pattern was, you'd be invited into [his] interchamber, he had a drawer in the dresser, the lower drawer, and he had a variety of instruments there, bamboo canes, hair brushes, straps, and generally you were given the option of choosing the one that you wanted. But after three nights of this we began to get a little sore on the behind, took pillows to school with us to sit on, and the parents finally decided that was a little too much. The gentleman did not stay with the school. But that's school life for you.

*Q: Eventually you ended up in the United States, didn't you, for schooling?*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right.

*Q: When was that?*

SOLLENBERGER: That would have been '35.

*Q: So this is in the midst of the Depression. Where did you go?*

SOLLENBERGER: I went back to North Manchester. I had free tuition there. It was a church college.

*Q: What was the name of the college?*

SOLLENBERGER: Manchester College.

*Q: You were at Manchester College from '35 to '38.*

SOLLENBERGER: [Yes], at which time I dropped out. And the reason for dropping out basically was that it seemed to me that the kids in college at that time were much too focused on their own problems, and were not aware that the world was on fire. From my point of view the world was on fire. In '38 the Japanese had invaded north China and the word that I got back from north China was that [the Japanese] had [implemented a] scorched earth [policy] in much of the area where I grew up. And, of course, things had happened in north Africa and began to happen in Europe. I just felt it didn't make sense to sit in school at that particular time.

*Q: You're about 21 at this time.*

SOLLENBERGER: So I tried to find a way to get back to China to see what I could do to help.

*Q: While you were at Manchester College what were you studying?*

SOLLENBERGER: History and political science. I was fortunate in my education to be with Andrew Cordier, who was the history professor at that time. He later became the Under Secretary for the United Nations, and [acting] president of Columbia University (1969-1970), [and dean of faculty at Columbia's School of International Affairs]. I was his assistant for a

couple of years.

*Q: That's really amazing to find that in a small school.*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right. My education was really from him, as I look back on it. I found a way to get back to China in relief work for both the Church of the Brethren and the Quakers, sort of a joint emergency project. I wanted to go back to an area that I knew, and [I made it]. I spent from the end of '38 to 1940 in emergency relief work.

*Q: Were your parents still in China during this period?*

SOLLENBERGER: My father was there part of the time. My mother was not, her health was such that she remained in the United States.

*Q: You got back in 1938. Where did you go and can you describe how you saw the situation where you were at that time?*

SOLLENBERGER: I went back to the Taihang mountain area. I went to the city where I had spent the years when I was in high school, that was the home base. The area had already been invaded once by the Japanese who had gone through in an effort to weed out, or to destroy the guerrilla base. Of particular interest in that area was the fact that this was area that was under the control, at that time, of the Eighth Route Army, the communist Eighth Route Army. It was not too long after their long march, and they had moved across into Shaanxi, and set up a military base in the Taihang mountain area, and were attempting to operate against the Japanese. The city that I'd set up base in was not destroyed by the [Japanese] scorched earth [policy]. But the villages around and all the way back up to the northern area, Yangchuan, had been pretty well wiped out. The refugees when I got there, the end of '38, were drifting back into the cities. But the problem there was an emergency problem in how to deal with their homes in the rural areas. The Eighth Route Army at that time was not engaging very often with the Japanese, they were being very selective. But they had had several significant engagements in areas not far from where we were. In one of these, [the Japanese] suffered rather severely when they were waylaid in a mountain pass by the Eighth Route Army, and they retaliated by literally destroying two county seats, two walled cities. [it was] in this area we concentrated on trying to do something with the refugees, a drop in the bucket considering the problem.

*Q: How were you treated, both by the Japanese and by the Chinese communists, during this period? Here you were where the line was moving back and forth?*

SOLLENBERGER: It was not only the communists. Yan Xishan was still in the province as the military warlord. He had a deputy who was in charge of southeast Shaanxi which is where we were operating. We had contact with him. We had to because he had authority over all of the magistrates in the area, and relations with him and with [him and] the local governments was very good. I mean, they saw rather quickly that there was an advantage in having some foreign assistance in dealing with the problems that they had. As it turned out the deputy governor, Bo Yibo, was really an under cover communist at the time, and at the appropriate moment in 1939 he turned over, and turned over with the provincial troops that were under his command, turned

over to the communists. He was later rewarded, became, I think, Minister of Finance under the communist regime, and is now probably the oldest senior communist still living in the Beijing area. I had direct contact with him because of the work that I was doing at that time. To begin with, [we had] only minor contact with the Eighth Route Army. I did have to get permission passes from them, [but] there were no problems in getting those. They again, I guess, saw the value of [our work], and at that time they were treating the local people with kid gloves. They realized they couldn't survive in the mountains without at least the tacit approval, if not the help, of the local population. And by contrast the way in which they were treating the people at that time was so much better than the way in which the government troops were treating the people, that they pretty well got the cooperation that they were looking for.

*Q: Did you run into the Japanese at all?*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes. While I was out on one of my relief trips in the mountains taking care of refugees, the city where I was stationed was occupied. I eventually had to go back into the city. They were obviously not pleased, made it clear that if I was going to stay in the area, I had to stay in the city. But basically they would prefer [that] I should leave. And it eventually became clear that I should leave, so I left, but came back again through the back door, going back into free China, trekking up through the Taihang mountains from the Yellow River, back to near the city that was still under occupation by the Japanese.

At that time I had some interesting contact with the communist army. On one occasion trying to get through the Japanese lines, I ran into a group of students that were coming from [the] Beijing-Tianjin area coming back to the mountains in Shaanxi to get into a school. And the communists were running some open air schools literally on the mountain side, in the little villages. It was interesting that they gave a high priority to education. There were about 300 students of them, as the students were coming through the Japanese lines from the other side, they had alerted the Japanese somehow, and all hell broke loose. It was obvious that I couldn't go through at that particular point. But we met some of the students as they came through. Their Chinese guides had gotten scared and run off and left them. They were in a strange area and didn't know where they were at night. I knew the area and knew it fairly well, I trekked over it, had hunted there as a kid. So I started back with them and we ran into some of the Eighth Route Army people who were coming down to see what the chaos was, and they took over and took me and the students back to headquarters. It turned out to be the central headquarters of the Eighth Route Army General Peng Dehuai, who was then the commander of the Eighth Route. I spent three days at headquarters basically getting acquainted, and they getting acquainted with me and finding out what I was doing. Among other things I spent one evening playing chess with the general, Chinese chess which I had learned as a kid and since I could speak Chinese it was interesting to be able to sit down with him, doing something from his culture. As it turned out I could do almost as well as he could, and speak Chinese. Among other things I wanted to get from him his story of the Long March. How he became and why he became a communist. What his view of the world was at that particular point. It was a rare opportunity.

*Q: One hears about the discipline of the Chinese communist troops. Did you find this?*

SOLLENBERGER: Very much so.

*Q: ...as contrasted to the government type.*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right. When I came back from the back door on that trip, I had to come through an area that was under Nationalist control, where the Nationalists had placed one of their most dependable generals and military units, a pretty large one, north of the Yellow River, both to block the communists from expanding south, but also to deal with the Japanese. As it turned out, this was 1939, this was the beginning of the breakdown of the United Front that [the Nationalists and Communists] had worked out to fight the Japanese. There was, in fact, going on minor scimmages there on a three-way front, Japanese versus communist, the Nationalist versus Japanese and communist. A very mixed up situation. I ran into that.

*Q: What exactly were you doing, and where was your support coming from?*

SOLLENBERGER: The support was basically in money. The supplies had to be somehow [transported into] the area. At the beginning, with money, you could buy grain millet which was the stable in that area. And you could distribute it either through work projects, or directly. And because of the emergency nature much of it had to be direct. Clothing was another problem. [During] wintertime, [when it was] cold in the mountain area, the Chinese wore padded garments. The normal commerce did not bring either cotton or clothe in. One of the things that we did was to send refugees from the mountain area into the north China plain with currency to buy both millet and cotton, and to bring it back. The cotton could be used in home industry, women knew how to spin, weave, make clothe. The arrangement there was that by issuing a certain amount of cotton, say to a woman and her daughters-in-law, whoever were about, that by turning this into clothe they would get a certain percentage of this, and the rest of it would come back to us which we would hand out to people who needed it. Part of it was a psychological thing of getting the people back into their villages, even to build lean-to for temporary shelter from the ruins that the Japanese had left. You could do that by issuing grain back then. In other words, it's not hopeless, cooperatively you could get together and do something. But again, it was so frustrating because you'd get it done and the Japanese would come through again. I spent two years, probably the most interesting, and in some respects the best two years of my life.

*Q: Here you were trying to build up villages while the Japanese were trying to destroy them. I would have thought they would have taken a very dim view of what you were doing.*

SOLLENBERGER: They did. That's why I left.

*Q: They didn't arrest you at that point.*

SOLLENBERGER: No, they didn't arrest me. Well, let's back up a little bit. There were risks involved there. We were well aware of these. In another town along the railway which was 100 miles from here, three of the missionaries of this domination, Church of the Brethren, disappeared during the Japanese occupation, and all the evidence pointed towards the Japanese. We were all aware of this, and that we had to be cautious. We wanted to be cautious also because we didn't want the Chinese that were associated with us to be punished by the Japanese. So, it became clear that I couldn't deal with the refugees in the mountains, I couldn't go back and forth

in other words, or I would have been arrested. I decided to leave but to come in by the back door.

On my recent trip back to China I went to the same town, the same city, and I met with an elderly woman who after we had left, probably a couple years after we had left, both her husband, her husband's brother and a third person had been, for some reason, selected by the Japanese to be examples of what happens to people that they suspected of whatever. Whether it was being suspected of communist affiliation, or because of their contact with the foreigners. But these three people had been publicly bayoneted in a demonstration to the populous, a public demonstration of what happens. That sort of thing happened. I've also felt very guilty and I expressed my feeling about that. When I met with them this time, with some of the children, it was interesting that they said it probably would have happened anyhow, and they seemed to hold no feeling or grudge about it. In fact, we were welcomed, we were warmly welcomed by them. One thing the children wanted to know what [was the wartime] situation [like]. The old lady wouldn't talk about it, and had never told them.

*Q: How did money get to you?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, two ways. One way was to take a trip out to Beijing and Tianjin and bring it back. The other way when I came in the back door, arrangements had been made to the Quakers in Shanghai to send money to Xian, to a mission group in Xian, where I picked it up and then carried it into the area.

*Q: What about the other people you were working with? Were there other groups, or was this pretty much an American missionary group?*

This was strictly American. My father and two other missionaries were also involved in doing relief work, but they were basically there as missionaries. I was there strictly on a relief assignment. When I came back through the back door I brought with me a young Quaker, Lewy-Whitaker, then teaching in the Peking American school and when he learned what I was doing and decided that would be more interesting and joined me. He did not make it. When we were crossing the Yellow River coming in, both of us had contracted typhus. We recovered from that and then made the effort again and I made it back up [to where I was before]. But later he, because of the weakness I guess from typhus, he got typhoid fever, and died in Chendu.

*Q: How about the Catholic missionaries, and other groups?*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes, there were a few that were there. But so far as I know, in the area where I was working, we were the only [foreign] group. [You know that the missionary groups] had divided up [China into exclusive] territories.

*Q: By the time you came back was Kuomintang the government at that time?*

SOLLENBERGER: There was a new government. In 1940 was the government and I think everybody recognized that it was the end of the Nationalist and probably Chiang Kai-shek. That they could effectively mount any sort of resistance against the Japanese on a nationwide basis. I think that's basically why when he was kidnaped in Xian.

*Q: By the young marshall, Jiang Xueliang.*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right. Apparently was one of his, or at least allied with him and I believe he was released and according to the information that I had, at least because of the communist insistence that he be released, and their willingness to join the United Front providing he would stop the civil war and focus on fighting Japan. At least that's the story I got from Marshal Peng Dehuai.

*Q: You left in 1940, how did that come about?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, one, I wasn't well, and two, it became apparent [that] what I had been doing in that area, I could no longer do. So I'd spent two years and decided that I should come back and complete my education.

*Q: How did you get back?*

SOLLENBERGER: Evacuation boat at that time out of Shanghai, that took me down through Australia, New Zealand, and back home. There appeared to be enough nervousness at that point about what was happening in the Pacific, even though we were not yet at war with Japan.

*Q: As you came back to the United States in 1940, were you seeing the Japanese as a very real enemy to the United States?*

SOLLENBERGER: I would, very definitely.

*Q: Had you by any chance run across anybody in the American Foreign Service?*

SOLLENBERGER: I did when I got back to Chungking on my way out. I stopped in at the embassy. It was at that time located there, and gave them a report on what was happening up in Shaanxi with the so-called United Front. They had heard rumors of that, but had no direct reports from observers [actually in] the area.

*Q: Did you get any feel from the embassy at that time, what was the interest?*

SOLLENBERGER: Only in a marginal sort of way. I did get the feeling that there was some exasperation in the way in which the Chinese were, [meaning the Generalissimo], in conducting the war, and was not getting the cooperation that they had hoped. And there was interest also in whether the communist would be a reliable temporary ally in dealing with the Japanese, and what the prospects were [the KMT-CCP] getting together. I could not be very encouraging about that from what I'd seen. It wasn't going to work for reasons on both sides.

*Q: Do you have any recollection of who talked to you particularly?*

SOLLENBERGER: One of the people I talked to was Drummond. There were a couple of people that I talked with, but I've forgotten.

*Q: Where did you go when you took this circuitous route down to Shanghai to Australia, to New Zealand, and back to the States? Where did you go?*

SOLLENBERGER: You mean when I came back?

*Q: Yes.*

SOLLENBERGER: I came back to Manchester to see if they would reinvent me to finish my education, undergraduate education. At that point I felt rather, what's the word I'm trying to think of...rather frustrated, at the slowness of the educational process. I tried to work out a deal with my professors whereby if I could pass their final examinations, I wouldn't have to sit through all the classes, I could compress within one semester a year's work. I felt I could do it. Cordier said okay, but some of the other professors felt this would be setting a precedent that they could not live with. But I did manage to finish up [in 1941].

*Q: This is a great time to be a young single man graduating from college. What happened to you?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, the draft came along, and with the background that I had with the Brethren, Mennonites, Quakers, the three historic [peace churches], my feeling at that time was that I could not participate in warfare, and this was sort of re-established by what I had observed going on as a result of war in northern Shaanxi. So I took an alternative, I complied with the draft, and was assigned to alternative service under the draft. I was four years in alternative service in projects in the United States, [Puerto Rico, and] South Africa.

*Q: When you say alternative work, what did this consist of?*

SOLLENBERGER: Almost anything you can think of, depending on what you could agree on as meaningful. It involved conservation work on the farms, environmental cleanup projects, it involved establishing a rural hospital in Puerto Rico. It involved working in hospital wards. And the reason for South Africa on this was that I was determined to try to get back to China to work in that situation. I was trying to join the Friends Ambulance Unit, it was a British operation, operating in China and got as far as South Africa. There were six of us at that time en route [to China] with the war [still] on. [Our route was to go around the Cape to India and up the Burma Road into China.] We got as far as South Africa and an Act of Congress turned us back and I spent about six months in South Africa.

*Q: What was the Act of Congress?*

SOLLENBERGER: Basically, that people not in military uniform could not go overseas. That was the result basically.

*Q: What was the situation that you saw in South Africa? This would be '43 or '44. It was not an official policy.*

SOLLENBERGER: [Yes, in 1943, we saw apartheid even though it wasn't an official policy.] I volunteered while I was there waiting for transportation, first to go over to China, and then coming back and had to return. I volunteered to work in a hospital basically set up for the blacks in Durban. So I had a direct experience with observing the practical [application of] apartheid.

*Q: Was the hand of the British administration pretty heavy there?*

SOLLENBERGER: No. It seemed to me [that one saw] the hand of the local administration in Johannesburg, [rather than policy from London].

*Q: How was that? Could you have social contact with the blacks, or was this pretty much...*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, I had a good deal of contact with them in the hospital, and only on one occasion did I have social contact outside. That was through a special incident, I guess. They assigned me to the emergency room, and one day a Zulu warrior came in, and his ear was almost cut off. He'd been in a fight; it was dangling down. And the European doctor who was in charge, said, take it off. And I said, isn't it possible that this could be put on? Yes, he said, it is but this is a black and minus an ear is not worth the bother, just cut it off, it's much easier that way. I said, would you mind if I tried to put it on? He said, go ahead. I very carefully stitched his ear back on. He came back several times to get it dressed, etc., and it stuck. But he then invited me to his home and his wife gave me some beads. So I had that one memorable social contact. But otherwise it was just [seeing people in] one of the wards, and a few of the Africans and some of the Asians, the Indian doctors were in the hospital.

*Q: You got back when, about 1944 to the United States?*

SOLLENBERGER: I left the alternative service, civilian public service, and was immediately recruited by the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, UNRRA. They were in the process here in Washington of getting people ready to go overseas. The focus had shifted to the Far East, and China, and they somehow learned that I had a good deal of background in China in relief work, and had done some training people to do relief work. So I was recruited [and came to] Washington, College Park actually, and was in charge of training people to go to China with UNRRA, an international mixed group.

*Q: When was this?*

SOLLENBERGER: This was '45.

*Q: So this really started you off in your career of training people.*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right.

*Q: What type of training were you giving?*

SOLLENBERGER: It was very brief. We tried to give them a little language, enough to deal with the social situation, the courtesies. There was great pressure at that time to get people out, as

soon as possible. Gave them something in the way of history, background, and culture. And then on the nature of the projects that they would likely be working in. When that was winding down another project came up, and this was again initiated by the Church of the Brethren that I'd been associated with. This was through a negotiation they had had with the Chinese as to what they might do in terms of relief work back in China because of their historic interest and background [to] understand China. And what they came up with was what turned out to be the forerunner of the Peace Corps. One of the things that was needed was to as quickly as possible return to cultivation of land that had gone out of cultivation as a result of the war. The major area was the area that had been flooded by the Yellow River when Chiang Kai-shek blew up the dikes to stop the Japanese advance. [It was successful], but it washed out several million acres of the best agriculture, [which was now overgrown] with stubble and brush. [The objective was] to as quickly as possible get [area] this back into production. The idea here was to use heavy equipment. The Chinese were not familiar at all with [mechanization], meaning sending some operators. The Brethren said, we [are a rural group and] can recruit fifty young men who can understand the operation and maintenance of heavy equipment, farm equipment. UNRRA said we could put this under the wing of UNRRA, and you can work with the Chinese counterpart of UNRRA which was SINRRA, the Chinese National Relief. And because of my background and I was being freed up at that point, UNRRA said you go out and be our liaison with this unit. I agreed and the Brethren said, you'll simultaneously be the director of the unit. I said, okay. That was another interesting year that I spent in China.

*Q: This would be what?*

SOLLENBERGER: '46-'47.

*Q: How did you get there, and where did you go?*

SOLLENBERGER: We flew from California. At that time the UNRRA people had a special contract, and I guess with the cooperation of some officially associated with the military unit, and military troop transports, we flew to Shanghai, with many stops along the way. At that time I was married, and had a young son, and dependents were not allowed to go at that point, so I went alone. They came about six months later. We were stationed in Shanghai as the headquarters. From there on [we] struggle [with] the bureaucracies of UNRRA, bureaucracies of the Chinese, and the renewed civil war, trying to carry out [our] project.

*Q: You got there in '46. Where was your group concentrated?*

SOLLENBERGER: The headquarters was in Shanghai. We had to bring them into Shanghai, and then disburse from Shanghai. The area that we were most interested in was the Yellow River area, where we thought we could do a concentrated job, a quick job, and move out. The idea at that point was not to try to introduce mechanized farming in China. Some of the major tractor manufacturers donated 2,000 tractors to our project. They probably had in mind eventually maybe...

*Q: For all those millions and millions of customers.*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right. As it turned out for political reasons the Nationalist government, SINRRA, wanted to satisfy demands [for] little projects all over China. [Well], we couldn't operate without their cooperation in China, [so] basically [our] group's [efforts] had to be dispersed which was the first mistake that was made. Although we did get the major operation started in the flooded area, and we got it started in time so that when the dikes were repaired and the river was put back in its course, the area was safe to operate in. We were there with tractors and training and so forth. But by that time the civil war had resumed in the area. [Our] units that were operating in the area were sometimes captured by the communists, and sometimes by the Nationalists. In a few cases they were required to haul military equipment, and we decided because of our [neutral] position, we would pull out. We couldn't operate in a situation of that sort.

Just to jump ahead very briefly. My last trip out I went back to Xian to see the terra cotta army. While I was waiting, in the area with the visitors outside, there was a woman and her young daughter sitting there and I sat down beside them. We got into conversation. Her husband and their older son were continuing walking around the area. I was sitting down because I was tired of walking, and we got into a conversation and it turned out that she came from near this flooded area, a city that I had been in and knew about. She said, after we'd talked a little bit, "You know, my grandfather told us about these foreigners that came in with iron cows, [which is what they called the tractors], in the flooded area [to prepare the land. They were very uncertain about what this was all about, and were wondering whether this another type of Japanese invasion, or just what it was. But they were persuaded to go back," and that he, in fact, had benefitted from this tractor operation, and had gone back into the area to resume his farming. At that point, the daughter, [who was] in the third grade, came around her mother and gave me a little gift, a jade locket. I said, "I can't accept this. Why are you giving it to me?" "Because of what you did to help my grandfather."

It's interesting how some of these things come back, and under circumstances one would never expect. But I think probably the interesting thing about this project was that in a fairly direct way, it became the forerunner of the Peace Corps. Here was a group of people working under an international organization, [a] government type of organization with volunteers [working] for subsistence, [an] agreement [which] was very similar to what the Peace Corps is now. You get your subsistence and your travel, your medical, and things of this sort but basically no remuneration. So when the Peace Corps idea began to blossom, I got involved with it as a consultant.

*Q: How did the young men work? What was your impression of the effect on the young men of doing this type of work?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, last December we had a reunion, the 50th year reunion. Fifteen of the group got together down in Texas and we reviewed what had happened. How it affected the lives of the people. So far as these were concerned, there was a direct relationship between the experience they had, [even though] there were many frustrations and complications, and what they chose to do later on in life, almost inclusively did service type of work in their communities. And many of them as a result of this had gone on. One of them particularly had seen the health problems and decided he wanted to be a doctor. He became a doctor. Interestingly he wanted to

pursue the [holistic] approach on which he had gotten from the Chinese - their approach to medicine.

*Q: So we're talking about 1947 when you had to pull out. What did you do then?*

SOLLENBERGER: I was approached, I think from the consulate in Shanghai. They were looking for somebody to head up a post-war Chinese language training program for young Foreign Service officers in Beijing and would I be interested. They obviously had some knowledge about what I'd been doing in the intervening years. So I went out to take a look at it. Beijing seemed very attractive as a place. My wife at that time was with me in Shanghai. She agreed [to go to] Beijing. [During the fall] of '47, [we] went up to Beijing, [where I] directed a program for young officers specializing in Chinese.

*Q: I was thinking this might be a good place to stop. We'll pick it up next time, we've got you in 1947 starting a language school up in Beijing.*

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*This is December 17, 1997. Howard, let's start with the setting of the language school - what was it called in those days? Beijing or?*

SOLLENBERGER: In 1947 we called it Peking, or in Chinese Beiping, because the Chinese capital was at Nanking. I guess before we get to the school here, I was invited to come up [late] in 1947 by Tony Freeman who was then I think he was the acting CG, Consul General, in Beijing at the time, or maybe he was the consul general. He had been a language officer, perhaps one of the better ones in terms of his facility with the language. He had been instrumental back here in Washington, as I understood it, in talking with the people at the Foreign Service Institute about setting up a field school for advance training in Chinese. Training in Chinese in the Foreign Service had been suspended during the war. [There was the pre-service group]; Tony had been a member of that. He had more or less learned on his own and did very well at it, but he had the feeling that it ought to be an organized program, particularly for adult students who came in, and in the beginning didn't know their way around at all in terms of how to approach the language, or what we saw the priorities were in terms of the different skills that were necessary.

I had an interview with Tony, and a little later when I got back to Shanghai I received an invitation to join the staff, to go down to the consul general's office in Shanghai, and be sworn in, which I did, and found myself to be a member of the Department of State, having never set foot in the Department of State up until that particular time. Not knowing who my bosses were back in Washington. I did not actually open the school. This was done by another person who didn't stay with the program, he was [there only] briefly. But there were some preliminary things that were done, taken care of before I arrived. But my responsibility, as defined to me by Tony Freeman, was to run the school, and design a program training the future Foreign Service Chinese language officer corps. I took that as a responsibility throughout my entire career.

*Q: Could you give me sort of your approach? This is a very important step. Chinese is, I won't say unique, but it has ideograms and it has the language. In most other languages you kind of*

*learn the language anyway you can get it. You did not come to the language really from the academic side, but really from personal experience.*

SOLLENBERGER: Personal experience and some experience in training, but at a much lower level than was required by the Foreign Service.

*Q: You and Tony Freeman, you had to have almost a philosophy and approach. I'd like you to talk about what it was.*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, basically, starting off with the assumption that language is what is spoken. That's what we concentrated on during the first part of the program. There's general agreement on that. And only after you are able to comprehend what is spoken to you and are able to respond to that, we felt only at that point it would be judicious to introduce the characters. We had to decide what characters to learn out of the 50-some thousand that are available. What would be useful to the Foreign Service within the limits of the training period, to be learned within the limits of the training period, and then to gradually build up from that.

The second part of the philosophy, I think, on the training was that it needed to be job oriented. We needed to find out what these officers would likely be doing when they went into assignments as Chinese language officers. And then you begin to prepare them for that. Among other things, we found that the duties that would be required involved reading the Chinese newspapers, at least being able to scan it. You probably couldn't depend on most of them for good translations of that, but at least enough to read to find out whether it was worth turning it over to Chinese translators to be translated in full into English, or whomever needed to review it. The second part of this was documentary Chinese. Documentary styles, as you probably know, have changed and were in the process of changing from the old very formalistic styles that were used, to new formalistic styles that were being introduced and were a much more informal approach basically. And that required specialized vocabulary, and specialized phraseology to be used under appropriate circumstances.

The third thing was to act as interpreters where necessary, and to be participants in negotiations. And this required a vocabulary in economic fields, military fields, and events in the political field, and to some extent in the cultural field.

*Q: Were you at that time also looking at the communist phraseology?*

SOLLENBERGER: At the beginning we were not.

*Q: I was just wondering in the political field there was something which one would have to deal with and what the outcome was, and they have their own special phrases.*

SOLLENBERGER: As the program developed later on, and as it became clear that the communist were in the process of taking over China, that was introduced. For one thing we needed to listen to the communist radio, and to know what they were talking about which we had as part of the program. Another aspect of the philosophy was that language is really a cultural subject, and it cannot be divorced from culture or the area studies side of it. This had not been

emphasized in previous training. It was something that I felt very strongly about myself. Anyone who was going to be a specialist in Chinese would likely spend a number of years either working in or on Chinese affairs needed to have a pretty good background in Chinese geography, history, culture, religions. And the question was how to get that in. We started off by renaming the school, Chinese Language and Area Studies. We gave ourselves a mandate, in other words trying to introduce this into the program.

*Q: In a way you were blessed by the fact, this is 1997, we're celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Foreign Service Institute, so you didn't have an institutional bureaucracy in Washington which was just forming at that time, sitting on you, did you?*

SOLLENBERGER: Not at all, in fact, I felt rather uneasy about not having met my boss back here who happened to be Henry Lee Smith.

*Q: Oh, yes, "Hocksie" Lee Smith.*

SOLLENBERGER: "Hocksie" Smith, the head of the language school, and with whom Tony Freeman had discussed what should be done in Beijing. So I got indirectly, from Tony, as to what the philosophy of training back here was.

*Q: The traditional learning process in the United States was, you sat with a book, and you learn vocabulary. I went through this in Latin and French, Spanish. You sort of learned the vocabulary, and you read and you read and don't talk it, or very little. That was pre-war. Were you picking up the wartime experience of military teaching?*

SOLLENBERGER: Very much so. And the reason for that was that Henry Lee Smith was one of the instrumental people in getting the military program going during the war, and in developing textbooks that would approach language learning from the oral side of learning. I learned a little bit from that from the texts that were used, basically military text at that time, borrowing from some of the material that the missionaries had used, and at that time there was a college of Chinese studies in Beijing, the director whom I knew well, and I was able to meet with him and borrow and use some of the materials that they had. Henry [Finn], the then director of the College of Chinese Studies. My approach was to find out what situations our people would be in, and to develop oral dialogues based on those situations, and to learn the vocabulary that was necessary for those. These ranged all the way from the very simple social meetings, to hiring a [pedi]cab, to getting a train ticket, whatever, hotel reservations, all the way from that on up to the meetings that might be anticipated with officials in the government at different levels.

*Q: You had not serve in the government, so whom were you tapping into to find out what would be the sort of getting around the city.*

SOLLENBERGER: I was tapping into former language officers. I had gotten a good deal of this from Tony Freeman to begin with. There were several others that were around, Edward Rice was one, at my age names slip, but there were several that we contacted, plus we formally sent messages to the embassy in Nanking and various consulates that were still open in China at that time, asking them questions about usage of officers that would be coming in and how they would

be used and what their functions would be, etc. We tried to build dialogues around that. [As to] hiring Chinese staff, [we hired] some old scholars who knew the tradition of China and the classical forms of the language, and [hired] some relatively young people. Had one person who spent part time with us who was a Chinese-English major at Beijing University who spent part of his time with us. We had good help and good assistance in that.

By the time I got to Beijing to start things off, Mr. Oliver Clubb, had arrived and was the new Consul General. I remember my first meeting with him. He was very uncertain as to which direction I should go, but what relationships would be having never served in such a situation before. Mr. Clubb was very approachable and [made it clear] from the beginning that this is your job, you do it, and if you have problems come to me, otherwise I'll keep hands off. That was reassuring because Clubb was a language officer himself, and by reputation was a very precise and well organized, and very focused sort of person. But we hit it off well, had a good relationship during my stay there. The major problem that I had with Mr. Clubb, he was so organized. He was so precise in his timing, [that] he had a schedule that was really based on minutes. And part of that schedule was getting in a half hour of physical exercise early in the morning, and his preference was tennis. And I was the chosen person to get up and play tennis with him in the morning, which was good for me also.

*Q: On the area studies side, what resources did you tap for that?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, first of all, required reading. So we developed, with the help of various scholars that were coming through, a reading list. Asked the Foreign Service Institute back here to provide us some funds to buy the books, or better yet, buy them and mail them out to us. At that time it was hard to get material out there. And then to draw on local resources. Beijing was a cultural center, a center of universities, Yenching University, Beida, Qinghua, so there were a number of people we could call on. People really well versed in their own fields. And then there were a number of Fulbright scholars. I shouldn't say a number, there were several Fulbright scholars who were out there studying in special fields, and we were able to invite them in and to call on them. For current affairs, current events and things of this sort, correspondents liked to come to Beijing and they would usually stop by and we were able to tap some of them.

*Q: Were you at that point concerned about, what in modern terms we call political correctness? For example, thinking of the book Red Star Over China by Edgar Snow, and there were some other books on China that looked somewhat favorably, if not quite favorably, on the communist side. Was this a problem?*

SOLLENBERGER: It was not a problem. What we could get our hands on we used.

*Q: Were there any particular books, we're obviously talking about something 50 years ago, that were particularly good for what you wanted to know?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, for basic history at that particular point, and some cultural contact, [there was] Goodrich that we turned to. But on the geography, Pearl Buck's husband, had done a good deal of work on Chinese geography.

*Q: I was wondering, you talked about correspondents, particularly in this early time. The people who come to my mind are Theodore White, Edgar Snow, and is it Agnes Smedley? And there must have been others. I mean were they involved in what you were doing?*

SOLLENBERGER: Teddy White was. But Agnes Smedley, no. Edgar Snow, no. Although we had Snow's book, Red Star Over China which was there. We were paying attention to what was going on. To some extent also because my own personal experience and background in China, both with the tractor unit, which had been just before this assignment, where we had run into problems with the communists. And in trying to maintain a neutral position [for] UNRRA in the work that we were doing. So I had come into contact with them, and also because I'd had contact with some of the communist leaders in '38 and '39. So I was well aware of what was going on there, and the people that were focused on them.

*Q: How did your school differ from the old Chinese Language School. I think of General Stilwell, Ridgway, and other military. But I suppose with the Foreign Service prior to that. Was there a difference?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, there was a difference and it became quite clear what the difference was. When I took over the job in Beijing there was already an army language school in operation. I've forgotten how many, but there were I guess 20 or 30 people enrolled in that school. My first question really was, why do we need two government schools? Some of the things we have in common. There are some technical things that the military people would need to learn that we don't need to pay much attention to. But there's a lot of overlap and it just seemed to me...but... I was told to stay away. They were determined to have their own and to maintain a separation. I pursued it several times while I was there with the director of the army program in terms of at least when I invited in some distinguished speaker that I could also invite his people and we tried to schedule things in such a way that we could join forces on that, and certainly not duplicate. And I had contacts that they did not have.

*Q: At that point, we're talking about 1947... I'm a graduate of the Army Language School in Monterey in 1950, and frankly the way I was taught there, took Russian, hasn't really differed from both languages I've taken at the Foreign Service Institute. So you're all working out of the same well, weren't you?*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right, we were.

*Q: This might be a point to ask about Henry Lee Smith, because he was really the person who developed the system, wasn't he? Or at least in part.*

SOLLENBERGER: He was certainly one of the king pins in developing the army language system. There were half a dozen, Milt Cowin, I've forgotten the man who did the Chinese.

*Q: What was his background? What did you know about him?*

SOLLENBERGER: I knew practically nothing about him until I came back to the United States. But his background was in linguistics, historical and descriptive linguistics, and his approach to

language training was based on linguistic analysis, and highly focused on the oral spoken language. He was a gregarious person. Had had a radio program at one point, Where Are You From, which at one time was well known. If he couldn't guess where you came from within a certain radius, you would get a free refrigerator or something like that. In those days that was the technique that he used. This was relatively easy to do once you knew the landmarks for this.

*Q: And regional accents were still regional accents, too.*

SOLLENBERGER: I think the strong point for Henry Lee Smith was that he had a lot of contacts in the linguistic community, and was able to attract to the Institute a number of young promising linguists who were able to build on the system that had gone into the military training program, and to adopt and apply this to this Foreign Service. And at the same time to move ahead in really relating language to culture. In doing this, he also recruited a number of anthropologists. And we can talk about that later when we get to the Foreign Service Institute itself.

*Q: We'll stick to China. In 1947 when you arrived, what was the political situation in that part of China when you first arrived?*

SOLLENBERGER: The civil war was a continuing problem at that point. General George Marshall's efforts to arrive at a shared power agreement, something of that sort, did not work. And it became pretty clear that the struggle was going to continue. The communists had acquired a good deal of strength during the period of the Japanese occupation, and immediately thereafter. They were held back to some extent in Manchuria. They probably expected to get more assistance from the Soviet Union in terms of being able to take over the Japanese equipment that was left there when the Japanese surrendered. But the Russians took everything they wanted first, [and the communists got] what was left over. They also took a lot of the factory heavy equipment, industrial equipment out of Manchuria, and moved it into the Soviet Union. That probably held up the communist advance somewhat, we don't know how much, but somewhat. Even when I was there in '47, at least as I look back on it now, it was pretty clear to me and to those I was dealing with, and to Mr. Clubb, that the communists would probably at least take over north China. There was talk at that time that might be a period, maybe an extended period, of a divided China north of the Yangtze River, and south of the Yangtze River. And that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek probably had enough strength south of the river. The frustrating problem that we were dealing with at that time was that Chiang seemed unwilling to put the resources necessary into defending Manchuria. And if Manchuria went, and we were watching to see what would happen, or if Manchuria went, it was pretty clear both in terms of the way history repeats itself and plays out, that north China would soon follow. And that's what happened.

*Q: What about the students who came there? The first crew. Can you tell some of their background and as you were feeling your way around to developing this program?*

SOLLENBERGER: There were several there when I arrived. One of the things I learned pretty early in the game was, we're going to get students with a wide range of backgrounds, and we'd have to accommodate that which probably meant much more individual programming in training than any sort of group training. Ralph Clough was one of the students, and he had spent some

time at the...was it Yale in China?

*Q: I think it was Yale in China.*

SOLLENBERGER: Jerry Stricker was another one. Oscar Armstrong who had some background, having lived in China. It ranged all the way from people who had some experience, some background, and a start in the language already, to those that were complete novices that didn't have any background. One of the things that I tried to work out through correspondence with Henry Lee Smith in Washington was that we try to use the language school [in Beijing] strictly for advanced training, and that certain background could probably be provided for them back here in the States, or at universities, etc., who were using the modern system of teaching. And would come out to us only when they could really make maximum use of living and studying in the culture itself. We weren't in business long enough to get any real system going on that.

*Q: Were you feeling any of the winds of what later became known as McCarthyism there? John Stewart Service is having his problems and this is mainly sourced to former Ambassador Pat Hurley who had very strong feelings. I think in diplomatic terms most of Foreign Service people would describe Hurley as a prime horse's ass. But at the same time he was politically powerful. Were you feeling any of that?*

SOLLENBERGER: Not directly, no. Well aware of it, and well aware of some of the problems that the Chinese language people had gotten into on that. Particularly where there was a feeling of criticism of Chiang Kai-shek. And Theodore White, of course, had his say on that and we got his views on that. We also had the views of some of the Foreign Service people that were coming through.

*Q: I realize we're really talking about a rather short time before the place fell apart, but were you able to tap into people who were coming from the United States to tell about China and the political repercussions?*

SOLLENBERGER: Very little. We got a little bit of that...I used Clubb also who had arrived just about the same time that I did, in terms of what was going on back here in the State Department. I also arranged for him to have briefings with the students as a group periodically to bring them up to date on the information that he was getting through the channels that are open only to the head person there. And he was very good at that, and took an interest in the students, and I think kept them pretty well abreast of what was going on.

*Q: What was the plan for housing and getting the students coming in to get absorbed into the community? How did that work?*

SOLLENBERGER: We had to take the housing that was available. We took advantage of property that I guess had been acquired during the period when Beijing was the...when we had a legation there, and Sanguangao, which had been probably a part of the old Han Institute, the Chinese Board of Examiners in the old days, studying classical Chinese, bordering on that. There were some Chinese style houses that were available there, and we put our students there first and

by preference, because they were a little bit separated from the consulate general, from its main compound. We held our classes there also. It was also easier in a place like that for Chinese who wanted to come in freely to come in. They weren't faced with going past someone guarding the gate so to speak. Later on when things became tense we had to move out of that area, and we moved into what had been the old marine barracks which was converted into office space. I was given space on the ground floor. The Army Language School had the top floors.

The other thing that I did was to have field trips much as you do in the schools here, you take the kids out to museums. So we organized a number of field trips that would take us out to look at things. Plus, and somewhat to my later regret, I argued and got funds to send [our students] on field trips outside of Beijing for two reasons. One, to get a little experience with dialects that were spoken in Beijing itself. The second reason for this was, and this was a personal view that I had, that the Department and our official establishments in China, were too much focused on the urban areas when the majority of the Chinese population lived outside, were rural. And that we needed to know a little bit more about what was going on in the rural countryside. And the only way to get that is to send them out. So we sent them out early on, sent them out with an instructor, so they would have a companion. Later on, go out by yourself and see if you can make your way. Some of them took some very interesting trips. Later on, after the communists took over, I was to learn that they were well aware of this, and considered that I was running a spy ring in Beijing, and that one of the evidence for that was that I was sending these people out all over China, obviously to gather information.

*Q: Which, of course was what...*

SOLLENBERGER: ...which is what I was doing.

*Q: Well, I mean, this is what the Foreign Service does.*

SOLLENBERGER: That caused me some problems later on.

*Q: Before we come to that, was there any debate, concern...could you talk a bit about the thoughts you had, and Clubb and others...is it Chubb or Clubb?*

SOLLENBERGER: Clubb, Oliver Edmond Clubb.

*Q: ...about Mandarin versus Cantonese. I mean the languages of China.*

SOLLENBERGER: There was no question at that particular point as to what we would focus on in the north. For two reasons, one, Mandarin is by far the language that is used by most of the population. At least 70-80 percent of the population could manage at that time to function in the various dialects of Mandarin. Cantonese, a different language basically related, Fukienese, a different language, but related. Hakka, a different language, but related. The minority languages, the mountain people, the Turkic people, the Tibetans, Mongols, etc., were at best 10 percent of the population, and were not of particular interest in terms of political, economic focus. So concentration, no question, was on Mandarin Chinese.

*Q: Was there any problems from the fact that the majority of Chinese in the United States spoke, I believe, am I correct in saying they came from the area around Canton?*

SOLLENBERGER: No. Later on, when we were pushed out of China, or left China, we did begin to focus on some of the other languages, Fukienese because of Taiwan. We never did get into Hakka. But Cantonese, yes, we wanted to train some people in both Mandarin and Cantonese, and Taiwanese. But that was later, that was at a later date.

*Q: Could you describe events, and how they impacted on your operation?*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes, it's hard to know where to begin. It became pretty clear, we'd move when it fell.

*Q: Which is when, in '48?*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes, and when Angus Ward was forced to leave, in other words he was held under less than free conditions while he was there, and was really pushed out. He came through Beijing and we had a chance to meet and talk with him. But it was pretty clear from what was happening in Manchuria, and the fact that Chiang was not willing to commit enough troops. He probably didn't have enough confidence in doing that, he was harboring his strength for events later on. But it became pretty clear at that point that we were a target, and we would probably go down. How that would happen we weren't sure. There was a pretty strong feeling, and Clubb had this, as well as the committee of the diplomats who were in Beijing, and the major countries all left people there to keep a finger in the pie, and then to report on what was going on. And Clubb would meet regularly with them. There was a committee that would meet and they were trying to coordinate their reaction to this about whether when to leave, or not to leave. There was a movement underway, and I think the British probably took the lead in this, and that was to get the city declared an open city so in the event the communist came, it would not be destroyed, [because Beijing was] important internationally as a cultural center. Important to China. I know that Club felt that in a way that was, yes, go ahead with that, but he didn't think the communists would really attack the city. His feeling, I think, was that the traditional Chinese military approach to things would be such that the communist would move in, close off the city, would isolate it, and that a deal would be made with the General defending the city, and that it would be turned over without any major attack on the city.

We began to organize ourselves, obviously in '48, for an eventuality of whatever might come. I was assigned the job of laying in stores and supplies in case we ran short of food, and if there was a siege of the city that went on for a long period of time, there might be a problem, also in charge of medical problems or services. One of the people did help with the evacuation of people that might be leaving because I could handle the Chinese language. We received information from the Department that dependents could be sent home. Among the students, most of us decided not to keep our wives there, and in one or two cases I believe, they decided they would send their families home. I decided to keep mine in Beijing. Again, feeling that the risks were probably minimal, there would be a lot of inconvenience. The personal risks would be rather minimal. And I didn't expect there would be a direct attack on the city.

The other thing was, my wife was pregnant, and we were expecting another child and we didn't want to be separated at that particular time. But the program went ahead, on schedule, without very much interruption. To the extent that we could we continued field trips in areas that were still open to us. In one particular case, without mentioning a name, one of our students who had been a former Marine, this is when we were under siege, decided he wanted to go out and see how close the communists actually were. He borrowed a Jeep from the [motor] pool, and headed off towards the east, towards the city at Tongzhou. He was advised by the Nationalists that were at the gate of Peking at that time, not to go any further. They didn't know where the communists were, but we don't have any more troops out there, it's a no-man's land. But he decided he would go anyhow, he hadn't gone very far and he saw there was nobody in the field that he could see. He decided that he better turn around and come back. He got turned around, but as he started back, there was fire from some of the farm houses on both sides directed at him and his Jeep. A couple tires were knocked out, the radiator was punctured, a bullet through the windshield. He couldn't turn the thing off, it got too hot. He came to my office, white and shaken up. He had found out where the communists were. We had those kind of discipline problems.

*Q: During this time, what was the feeling towards the communists among...I mean, your personal feelings. You'd had dealings with them, but there was this situation in Mukden where Angus Ward was our Consul General and his staff were kept basically as prisoners.*

SOLLENBERGER: ...they were under house arrest.

*Q: Yes, and it was not an easy house arrest at all. We have a long interview with Elden Erickson, who was there as a staff, sort of like a secretary, to Angus Ward. What was the general feeling, and your feeling about almost can we do business with the communists. After all, it hadn't been that long that we'd been allied with the Soviet Union.*

SOLLENBERGER: There seemed to be a general feeling...well, first of all we had a pretty realistic view of the communists just by virtue of the experience that Angus Ward had had, and from reports that we were getting pretty regularly from Chinese who had contacts through family and so on out in the areas that were controlled by the communists. I personally had had some experience in trying to get a tractor operation started in the Yellow River, and knew the problems that were involved in that. I had also, even early on in the '30s, had run into several situations that made it clear to me that the communists, on one hand, could wear silk gloves for a while, and on the other hand, could be extremely ruthless. I'd actually seen and experienced both sides of that. Clubb, himself, was really a scholar, and was really the right person there at the right time. He knew the Soviet Union, he had served in the Soviet Union, his Chinese was good, and his contacts were good. He was realistic, and knew how to deal with them. I think he hoped that we could stay on because he felt it important that we maintain contact with them, that we don't completely lose contact with the communists. He needed to know what was going on in China, and the best way for that would be to maintain some contact there, whether informal or official, dependent on how things would develop. I believe this was the general view of the other representatives from other countries in Beijing at the time also. In fact, the reason for leaving us there, it was clear that Beijing would go, was with I think, the hope that some arrangement could be worked out whereby we could maintain some relations with the [incoming communists] however informal. That was the way we proceeded. Clubb, as I recall, really based his reporting,

and his approach to this on that assumption, and was led in several instances I believe to believe that it might be possible that the communists might not want to put all of their eggs in a Soviet basket. That they might be realistic enough to know that in terms of economic development, assistance and so on, that they would have to turn some place else than to the Soviet Union, that had been through a devastating war period, and who else was there, the United States. But he was a realist, and [knew] there were a lot of problems.

*Q: Were you involved thinking about transferring the school, or did anyone think about transferring the school to Nanking, or southern China?*

SOLLENBERGER: No.

*Q: So how did this play out?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, we stayed on. The communist laid siege in the city, and on several occasions fired shells into the city, but carefully avoiding the old legation area, and carefully avoiding the Forbidden City and cultural places of that sort, which was encouraging to us. But Clubb maintained close contact with the defending General, Fe Zhouyi, and I remember he was probably under siege. He came to dinner at Clubb's house, I was present at the dinner also, was able to talk with his wife. He gave no indication at that point as to what was going to happen insofar as we were concerned, at least verbally he was going to defend the city. But it was pretty clear from other signs that that was not the case. He had already made a deal to turn the city over, in return for which he would be given a position in the new government.

The actual takeover was quiet. We were told to stay in our compounds. Several of us did try to get out on the streets a little bit to see what was going on, and were not bothered. One of our students was taking movies of the liberation parade and they confiscated his equipment and film. But initially there seemed to be no problems. The city was quiet and the staff would still come to work. We kept the school going. So the predictions that we had that they would exercise their initial control with kid gloves on seemed well founded.

*Q: Were you by any chance, prior to this, had you dusted off the books about the Boxer Rebellion, and the siege of Peking?*

SOLLENBERGER: Oh, yes. We were all well aware of that, and were prepared. But the turnover was really quite peaceful.

*Q: Did this do anything to the curriculum of the school?*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes, several things. One, it became harder for us to get people in on the area studies side. We obviously couldn't get the communists, they would not recognize us at all. More of my time was spent on helping Clubb with some of his problems. There were still a lot of Americans that were in the area, and some of them wanted to leave. There were property problems, there were all kinds of problems helping American citizens, and the students decided to stay on and see what was going to happen. The communists refused to recognize Clubb's official position. As far as they were concerned he was a foreign citizen staying on in Beijing,

stay on as long as you mind your business, so to speak. But it presented a problem to him. When things came up that needed to be represented to the local authorities, which was then the communists. He did not want to sort of compromise his position by going himself, so he would use me or a couple of the students to do this for him. It became sort of a game that we played with the Alien Affairs Office, which was our contact.

We would go in with a problem, so and so wants to leave, or has a property that has been occupied, this was American property. First of all, you'd be met by a low level clerk, or officer whatever it was, who would want to know what business you had, and who you wanted to see. We don't know whom we should see, but here's the problem, can you tell us whom we should see. So we would orally tell them what the problem was. Then routinely you would say, well, this was in writing and we knew this and we had it in writing, here it is. They would look it over, oh, this is signed by Mr. Clubb, U.S. Consul General. We can't accept this, we don't recognize his position. So you'd say, you know what the problem is now. Well, would you cross off his name? I'd say, I can't do that, he's my boss and from our point of view he is the American representative here, and that's his title. So, you know what the thing is, I'll just take this letter back. Oh, no, you can't take it back, you've already given it to us. So we'll cross it off. You want to cross it off, all right, then that's still what he is. Then we'd ask is there a chance that we can see somebody and talk about this issue who has some authority. Well, we'll let you know what the outcome is. This was at least a weekly affair.

*Q: Would the problems sometimes be solved?*

SOLLENBERGER: Sometimes it would be. Sometimes the solution would not come back to us. It would be dealt directly to the situation or the person involved.

*Q: Looking at this back from the perspective, what was the American rationale, and what was the Chinese communist rationale for this non-recognition, recognition, and all that?*

SOLLENBERGER: It's hard to say what the communist rationale was. My own interpretation of this was that they were uncertain when they first came in, as to whether they wanted to keep ties open or not. They could easily have made life difficult for us as they did in the south. The fact that they didn't initially do this seemed to be a very clear indication that at least within the hierarchy of the decision makers, that they were uncertain as to which direction to go.

I think the reason why they didn't want to recognize the official position of this was that they didn't want to have direct talks, negotiations, with the foreigners at that particular point. Part of it was also they wanted to wait until their position in China was clearer. Until they had achieved military control over all major parts of the country. Then their dealing with the foreigners, the outsiders would be different than when they were only partially in control. But I think there was a delay for that reason. From our point of view there was nothing we could do about it. But there was the incident that caused us to leave.

Let me build up to that. It was clear that they were moving towards the establishment of a government as soon as they were in control of China as a whole. They would formally announce an established government and the seat would be in Beijing. This was the accomplished on the

first of October 1949. An interesting personal incident that was involved with this. When we established official contact with the Chinese after Nixon's visit...

*Q: This is in '72.*

SOLLENBERGER: ...and to set up liaison offices rather than formal embassies. Han Xu was sent by the Chinese government to Washington to open their liaison office. The Ambassador came later, and Han Xu himself was later appointed as Ambassador. But shortly after he arrived the word came to me from the East Asian desk that it would be nice if we could find a reason to invite him to come to the Institute to show courtesy by recognizing that he was here. So I invited him and he came with several of his staff people. We were in the building in Rosslyn [Virginia] at that point. When he came upstairs in the elevator, following the Chinese pattern I went out to the elevator to greet him. They'd had let me know that he was coming up. He strode over to me, put out his hand, and his English is fairly good, he said, "Mr. Sollenberger, I believe we've met before." I said, "That's possible. I don't know. I was in Peking in such and such a time." He said, "I was the young officer at that time that handed to you at the entrance of the U.S. Consulate General, the declaration of the establishment of the People's Republic of China." I said, "I remember, but I'm afraid I don't recognize you at that particular point."

Back in Beijing in '49, increasingly we were having difficulty as the time went on. The Chinese feeling that they could come into the compound. And this began to cause me to wonder how much longer we could keep this thing going because we needed our instructors, and up to that point they were willing to come in. They hadn't faced any personal pressure or problems. There was another incident that occurred. The gate keeper one night came to the house that I was living in, banging on the door. He said, you've got to come out to the gate, there's a platoon of the Liberation Army out there demanding entrance. I said, all right, but we'd better let Mr. Clubb know about this also. So there had to be time out. I'll go out and see what the problem is. They were out there, and there was a good deal of tension. They were demanding to come in, and I couldn't quite figure out why they wanted to come in. They were trying to explain that they thought that we had done something to the guards that had been stationed in front of the consulate compound. Of course, we'd done nothing at all of that sort. And they wanted to come in and search. Well, Clubb joined us at that particular point, and we're talking back and forth. We finally agreed that we'd let them in, but we would accompany them, not into the buildings, but to the compound. We hadn't gotten very far, following the compound wall, where we found several rifles that had been thrown over the wall. What had happened, obviously, was that their guards had gone AWOL. They thought that we had something to do with that. As a matter of fact, we did. My son, he was then four years old, had a little Jeep and he would regularly go out to the...

*Q: This is a peddle car.*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes, a peddle car. He would regularly go out to the gate that led into the compound, and while the guards were under strict orders not to fraternize with us, a kid was something else. He established pretty good relations with them. I used to send tea out with him, and Life magazines to look at, and he would report back...I ask him what sort of questions they asked him. Well, they wanted to know whether we beat our servants or not. And what kind of

food did you eat? In other words, there were all sorts of questions about our relationship with the Chinese. Apparently they thought we were ogres of some sort. I've always credited him with causing the first defection. One of the guards that was there at this particular time this happened had the same Chinese surname, that I have. So he was "da Su," and my son was "xiao Su." They got on pretty friendly terms on the basis of it, having the same surnames.

*Q: One of the ways the Chinese communist, when they first took over used were very heavy handed in Mukden, but did but later in Shanghai, and I guess elsewhere, to put pressure on us were claims that we either had caned the Chinese, or we'd mistreated the Chinese. This became sort of the lever which was used a lot. Did that hit you?*

SOLLENBERGER: That hit me, yes. Towards the end, various pressure was being put on the Chinese tutoring staff from the outside. They wouldn't talk about it. They wouldn't talk much about it. But when it became clear that after the decision that we move out, made clear that we were leaving, that they had to stay and make their peace. The instructors got together accused me of withholding part of their salaries. And probably several other things having to do with the students' trips.

*Q: Was this cooked up do you think, by the Chinese authorities?*

SOLLENBERGER: It was cooked up. Well, it was cooked up by the Chinese authorities and it was an embarrassment to some of the instructors. They said, we know you haven't done this. You're leaving. We're going to have to stay, and going to have to face it. I had already sent the message back through Clubb, and he certainly supported it, that we ought to be very liberal in severance pay for these people. I was at that time recommending...I've forgotten whether it was six months, a half a year, severance on that service they had rendered, whatever excuse they wanted to use to do this. And the answer came back, no. It was eventually negotiated that they would get, I think, three months. In the meantime they'd taken this to the authorities and I was summoned to the People's Court to explain and fortunately the records that are kept are very detailed in matters of this sort. There was a three man arbitration panel. After laying out the evidence on this for them, and being questioned by them on a number of different things, not on the students' field trips, not on spy charges. This was strictly on the way in which we had dealt with the people we had employed. They finally told the instructors, you better take what you can get, and that settled it, and I had no trouble getting my exit permit.

*Q: Which is interesting because in other cases sometimes the demands, I mean from what I've gotten from other people, the demands of the Chinese employees were one, excessive, two, not really of their own volition. The Chinese communist courts sort of backed them up in order to cause real trouble. It sounds like there wasn't an unified...*

SOLLENBERGER: This is not the case where we were. We got by fairly peacefully. It was only later, as I was leaving, that a piece came out in the Chinese press that I was leaving and called me the head of spy ring.

*Q: When this happened, what was the situation in China overall?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, by this time the People's Republic had been established, there was a government in Beijing. They were in effective control over most of China. In other words, there was really no major resistance.

*Q: And Chiang had gone to Formosa or to Taiwan?*

SOLLENBERGER: The incident that caused us to leave, maybe you have this from other sources, the incident that caused us to close down and to leave was when they announced that they were going to take over the old Marine barracks, which was part of the mission, located in the legation quarter. The American point of view, and our point of view, was that these facilities were acquired by treaty rights, and we stood by that interpretation. They said there was a difference between the old legation quarter itself and the Marine barracks, and anyway we don't recognize these treaties anymore, and we're going to come in and take it over.

*Q: This is where the school was.*

SOLLENBERGER: Yes, at this time. Clubb obviously was in touch with Washington back here and how do we deal with that. And we decided we would stay put as long as we could, and see if they would back down, and it became apparent the day before, and they announced that they would take over, that they were not going to back down. So everybody turned to, and vacated the old Marine barracks building. Files had already been burned, and furniture and stuff like that was hauled over to the legation compound and was stacked up out there, and they came in and occupied the premises. But we had apparently made it clear to them that if they did this, any chance of recognition, or contact, would be erased as a result of this act on their part. It was from our point of view an illegal act in opposition to our treaty rights. So from that point on we began a gradual withdrawal and that incident was the sort of thing that brought the Chinese staff into play. They were concerned about what was going to happen to them, and we were concerned about what would happen to them. We'd had enough stories about the Chinese from indirect sources about what was happening to people who had close contacts and worked for Americans.

*Q: What was happening, what you were getting?*

SOLLENBERGER: First of all, they would put the people through a brain washing process, and sometimes with torture, and sometimes were persuaded. There didn't seem to be a consistent pattern, and to some extent on who was in charge at a particular place at a particular time as to what the pattern would be. We had one person of the staff caught up in this, he'd gone to see about his family and had been picked up and was held for several months and \_\_\_\_, but came back and we got his story. We had a pretty good idea as to what might happen, and what could happen to the Chinese \_\_\_\_.

*Q: As all this was going on, the fall of Nanking and others, did the schools continue?*

SOLLENBERGER: The school continued right up until the end of the year. The schedule was disrupted somewhat from time to time, partly because some of the instructors were having difficulty in getting in. But we kept some classes going right up to the end of the year.

*Q: The end of 1949.*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right. Then we closed down, and it was a matter of getting ourselves organized.

*Q: Let's get to how you got organized and out. How did you? Was there any problem?*

SOLLENBERGER: We had to get permission to leave the city, and you had to have a physical examinations to get out. There was some concern as to whether they would use that rule to hinder us or not. Our son developed pneumonia at the time that we were supposed to leave, and had gotten permission to leave, so we wanted to extend our stay a little bit until he got over it. There was also the problem of getting your household things out. The State Department had authorized an earlier shipment of effects if we wanted to do that before the communists came in. We took advantage of that to some extent, but we still had things that we wanted to ship out. It was uncertain as to what we would have to go through, whether they would take all the stuff apart and go through it and see what we were taking out, and just how they would deal with it, departed by way of Tianjin.

One humorous incident. I had some traveler's checks and they wanted to know if I had any currency, you can't take these out, you can't take foreign currency out. Phil Manhart was then consul in Tianjin and he was there helping me get out. So I said to Phil, "You keep these and see if you can find a way to get them out to me." They saw me hand them to Phil. I didn't hear anything about these traveler's checks for a year or so, until American Express said, "Your checks have been cashed in Hong Kong." I said, "That's news to me. I've already reported that I couldn't bring them out. I had to leave them there with Phil." A couple of years later I got a letter and a check from David Barrett, an assistant military attaché, with a big apology saying that Manhart had entrusted him with bringing the checks out, but he ran into a desperate situation and had to cash them. In the meantime, so many things had happened that he had sort of forgotten about this and suddenly realized what he had done, here's the check to cover everything.

In Tianjin, the Chinese inspectors only opened one box. I had everything very carefully listed. They opened one box and closed it up before we left, and we got out without any problem although there was uncertainty throughout as to whether there would be problems, blocks put in our way. They could have said, your physical exam shows such and such, we'll have to keep you here until you get over that, there were all kinds of excuses to keep us there. But they seemed to be at that particular point prepared and willing and maybe even happy to see us out.

*Q: How did the timing work? Here you were in 1949 declared to be the capital of China. We'd had an embassy in Nanking. Then that fell to the communists. And then I think people moved to Shanghai, and then that went. What had happened at the time you were being expelled, what about our people in southern China?*

SOLLENBERGER: I think the decision had been made back here in Washington at that point that we would withdraw, and that meant everybody. It was a matter of scheduling and timing in order to get everybody out of China. I don't know the details and never looked specifically into this in terms of the record as to what the Department's statement to the Chinese was. Judging

from the results, it became perfectly clear to us in the field that we'd issued an ultimatum saying, if you take this step the chances of any relationships with you are being destroyed by you, and we'll pull out. At least that was the effect of the thing, and I presume that that's actually what happened.

*Q: What was the feeling that you were getting from the officers who were talking to, Clubb and others, about this policy? I mean, here was a sort of a new nation, and in the normal course of things, we'd say, okay, there's been a civil war and these guys have won, and with a little huff and puff, you'd say, okay, let's recognize it and get on with our business. Was there any feeling at that time, or were you so far removed that you didn't get it, about there were a lot of domestic politics within the United States, or was this just because the Chinese communists were being so beastly.*

SOLLENBERGER: We knew that there was a political problem back home with regard to China. The fact that we were being accused of losing China, and not supporting Chiang Kai-shek. The feeling on the spot, as I best recall it, and in talking with Clubb about this, was that we couldn't really ignore...at that time they were still talking about five hundred, six hundred million people, and the government had taken control of that area, and we needed to have a listening base at least in China, and Beijing was the place to have it. We'd been left there with the prospects that this might happen and it had gone sour, we were pulling out. The communists were asking for recognition, but Clubb's position on this, and I think he was right on this, and as it turned out he was right, was that while we might go ahead and decide to recognize them, they might not be willing or able to reciprocate, and that would put us in a difficult position. The British seemed to be more inclined to go ahead and accept the fact that China had been taken over by the communists, and recognized the argument that, because we have to do business, we have to know what's going on. They did extend diplomatic recognition, and as Clubb had sort of predicted, the communists were very slow, with all sorts of obstacles in the way of recognition. I think the French were that way also, and the Dutch.

*Q: You know, there was such a to-do later about France recognizing communist China. They didn't recognize until the '60s, I think, under de Gaulle. But the British didn't get anything out of it this the whole time, I mean, it was still ended up the United States versus China. I mean, this was the big game and the rest of them were kind of there but almost invisible.*

SOLLENBERGER: A trend that we began to pick up even before we left were some reports that all was not well between the communists and the Russians.

*Q: That was then in the Soviet Union.*

SOLLENBERGER: How serious that was, nobody quite knew. But it did become apparent from a geographic point of view, the way in which the Chinese Communists had been sort of short-changed in their takeover of Manchuria, and in the way in which the Russians had been dealing with the Chinese on this. That some of the old feelings of the Chinese, toward the northern barbarians, seemed to be emerging. How serious that would become nobody at that point quite knew.

*Q: What about your young Turks, your students? How were they doing?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, presumably they were studying. [Laughter] One of the problems, after the communist takeover of the city was that they weren't as free to move about, and certainly not to go out of the city. You had to get permission, and they were not likely to get permission to do that. The foreign community was sort of thrown in on itself, and there was a lot of social activity, invitations, etc., to the point where I had to send a letter out to the other official establishments and other countries out there, requesting them to please limit their invitations to our students to weekends. That they had homework to do, and it wasn't that they didn't want to be social, that they would probably rather do that than study. But please understand this, of course the students were not exactly pleased with that.

*Q: So you played the role of the heavy hand.*

SOLLENBERGER: They got along well. We could still go out and have Chinese meals together.

*Q: Well, of course, if you've got to be trapped in a city, and Beijing is not the worst place to be trapped in. While we're still dealing with this period, were there other language schools? I'm thinking of the French, the Germans, the British had something there, were they using sharing of techniques, how did this work?*

SOLLENBERGER: The British had their facilities in Hong Kong, so any training they were doing was confined there. We knew that, but there was really no contact. The question came up at one point about some Australian students maybe joining us. They later joined us in Taiwan at the school there. The College of Chinese Studies stayed open as long as they could, and there were some foreigners that were put in the College of Chinese Studies. The French, I don't know.

*Q: Well, Howard, this might be a good place to stop. We've got you up to going back to Washington. You went to Washington in 1950?*

SOLLENBERGER: There were no people going to China at that point, because our ties there had been cut off. There was a question as to whether we should continue the long term specialized training in China. As that turned out that became really one of the things that I probably fought the hardest for, and maybe had some influence on, in maintaining at least the minimal amount of training on the assumption that sooner or later we were going to have to deal with China, we couldn't ignore what was then considered 500 million people, regardless of who was in charge. And that if we ignored China, then we would be suffering the same sort of gap that they were complaining about because they hadn't given training during the war period, and found a gap of officers at appropriate grade levels. Of course, nobody knew when or how soon, and what the circumstances relations would be to re-establish. It wasn't clear at that time as to what the role of Taiwan was going play in this, although that became clear very shortly.

*Q: Had you looked at the army language school at Monterey or any of the military places as far as a job goes?*

SOLLENBERGER: No, I hadn't. My experience with the army training program as it was run in

Beijing at the same time I was there indicated that's not a place I'd be very happy in.

*Q: When you got to the State Department and you decided to sign on...this was about when?*

SOLLENBERGER: May of '50.

*Q: Because essentially against that on June 25, 1950 interests in the Far East began to heat up again. How did the advent of the Korean war...I mean, you didn't have time to almost find your way to the bathroom before the Korean war started. Did that have any affect on what you were doing?*

SOLLENBERGER: Initially, not very much. It took a little time for it to sink in, and, of course, when the Chinese got into the conflict...

*Q: We're talking about around November or December of 1950.*

SOLLENBERGER: When the Chinese decided to come in, then there was some interest in training, and also utilizing the language officers who had already received training. They stationed them in the key positions around China: Japan, Southeast Asia, certainly in Hong Kong.

*Q: At this time I've interviewed people who were language officers in Burma, Indonesia, Thailand, China-watching jobs. Would this pep up the program at all?*

SOLLENBERGER: It would, except for the strictures within the Department itself of personnel system. The answer we were constantly getting was, if we don't have positions, assignments, there's no point in continuing training. Particularly when the Department, and particularly the Institute, was short of funds, personnel was short, the personnel system felt it was in a tight, tight situation. The Department generally would have been willing to let training slide for a while. I kept insisting that something had to be done, even though they didn't have immediate slots, there would be plenty of opportunity as things went on to utilize these people even in places like London, and different European capitals where there was some contact and interest in China, and what was going to happen in China.

*Q: There's nothing worse in sort of the new boy on the block, and don't know anyone who may have had clout, prestige or anything to build on, and yet you hit at an extremely crucial time. How did you operate?*

SOLLENBERGER: In September 1951, I was given the title of Assistant Professor of Chinese Studies, and was given an administrative job, sort of the executive officer of the language school. I think Dr. Smith seemed reasonably impressed with the way in which I had brought the facility, the school in Peking, and I must have some administrative skills to do that. So that was the job that was given to me. Also the job of looking after the overseas language programs which they were trying to the institute, to get people if they couldn't study the languages in Washington before they left, to study in the field, or if they did study here, to provide continuing training when they got to the post. And I was given responsibility for looking after that.

*Q: There was, particularly at this point, the prestige of the Russian language officers, Bohlen and Kennan, and others. Did you try to use that as a model for saying this is what we have for China...*

SOLLENBERGER: We looked at a variety of different approaches for China. Eventually on the Chinese side we looked at Hong Kong as a possible place to train, there were facilities there, and some very successful models. The British were there training in Hong Kong. We looked at Singapore as a possibility, some place where the students might have a chance to utilize the language outside the classroom. First of all, the few students that were given to us, aside from the universities, get university training here...

*Q: You were mentioning Yale had a good course.*

SOLLENBERGER: Cornell had a training program also, and actually the person who had written the Army ASTP [Army Specialized Training Program] text on Chinese was at Cornell, so that was an option also.

*Q: Was there any problem about using university training for Foreign Service Chinese studies...I've heard at other times and other languages the university programs were designed to train scholars to do research, and were not really very practical for Foreign Service. Was this a problem?*

SOLLENBERGER: This was definitely a problem, and that's why we chose the Yale which is where the Air Force program had been set up which was based on the Army system, and Cornell. As I recall also we looked at some of the California schools, Berkeley principally as a possible place. I was interested particularly not only in giving language, but in giving a few officers a good solid background in area studies, the cultural, historical, economic, political dimensions of the Chinese culture which historically had been dynamic, and from my point of view I thought in the future was going to be and that we should have people who fully understood this as well as people who could speak the language.

*Q: Was it a hard sell? I mean you were talking about the language, but also about what we would call area training. Again, I find the Department of State seems to be an historical organization.*

SOLLENBERGER: It was difficult to sell that. We had a window of opportunity to get that started in the Department of State when the National Defense Education Act was established. Of course, that was tied to Sputnik, it came a little bit later.

*Q: That was around '56, '57.*

SOLLENBERGER: That's right, and there an interagency committee was set up to focus on different parts of the National Defense Education Act. Title IV was the one that we were the most interested in, or I was, because this was the part that dealt with language and area studies. And the effort to beef this up in universities, which we were all for, but also to see within the

government what resources the country had, there was a survey that was required of all of the agencies of the government. They were supposed to identify the language skills and the area skills, background, of people who may within the various government agencies, particularly those who had to do with foreign affairs. Of course, they had no standards for doing this. What sort of a standard would they use. If you used the university standards of A-B grade for second year, or third year, or fourth year, that didn't tell you what they could really do with the language. They certainly had nothing that was useful so far as identifying area expertise. That task fell to the Foreign Service Institute, and this is one of the things that was handed to me by Dr. Smith, who said, see what you can work out.

*Q: This had to be the latter part of the '50s.*

SOLLENBERGER: That came along a little bit later.

*Q: Let's talk here about the language thing. Was there much support from what passed as the China desk, as far as language training?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, there was support, but at that time there was some strain, I think, between the operating bureaus who were constantly pressing Personnel for staff. And the question of releasing people, personnel would go to the bureaus and say, fine training, who are you going to release for training, because that's going to leave one less hand that you have on the job here, for assignment elsewhere. So there was tension there as well as between the Institute and the personnel system. But there was support because Clubb was there and he understood the necessity for this. Tony Freeman who had helped set up the program was around, and he supported it. And the students that we had trained in Beijing, some of them were being assigned to jobs on the desk and in the bureau at that particular time. So there was support, but there was no consistent pressure to continue training.

*Q: How did you see Henry Lee Smith operating within the the Departmental environment?*

SOLLENBERGER: He was an academic. He was frustrated. I think one of the reasons why he turned some of the administrative operations over to me was that he wanted to be free to do some of the research that he was interested in doing on language and culture. And they were working at that time, the professional linguists, on an analysis of language that they thought was a step up from the systems that they'd used before. In a way the Institute was leading the way in linguistic analysis at that particular time.

Not only was Dr. Henry Lee Smith there, but George Traeger, who is a well known linguist was also on the staff, and they brought in some anthropologists who were interested in the linguistic area studies side. Edward T. Hall, who later became famous for the best seller book that he wrote on silent language. Gerard, an anthropologist, Bert Whistle, the kinesologist who was interested in the way in which body language was used. This all was a part of an effort on the part of the Institute to find new ways, better ways of teaching. But also to keep in with the academic community.

*Q: What was the state, as you sampled it at this early '50s, of the field of linguistics? Now it's a*

*big business, but what was it like then?*

SOLLENBERGER: It was rather small. It was rather difficult to find qualified linguists. They hadn't been trained during the war. There were people who had learned the languages, but not done professional training in linguistics. The fact that Henry Lee Smith and George Traeger being at the Institute was an attractive thing. And their approach to recruitment I had to admire, that was that they were trying to hire linguists on the basis of coming for just a limited period of time to the Institute, but with the objective of returning to the academic community for two reasons. One, to build back into the academic community a more practical approach to their language instruction programs. And the other one was, that the government didn't offer that much future for linguists in terms of promotions in government employment, and that linguists would probably generally become frustrated with the bureaucratic problems. I remember Dr. Smith talking to me at one point, he said, your job here in terms of administration is to make it possible for professional people to do their work with limited interference from the bureaucratic system. So anyway you can relieve them of the pressures of the bureaucracy would be helpful. That's good advice up to a certain point, but anybody who works in the government sooner or later has to realize that the matter of getting the resources to do what you want to do, has to be taken into consideration. Otherwise, you can't do your job.

*Q: What were you finding about your results? You were seeing the product of the American school system - elementary, high school, college, of people coming into the Foreign Service. And with the exception of those who happened to have lived overseas, and maybe acquired it with their parents or something, what was the language capability among the new Foreign Service officers?*

SOLLENBERGER: From the point of view of practical use as required in foreign affairs business, it was hopeless, very poor. The recruitment of people from the army who had been through the army language training program, there were a few of those that were coming into the Foreign Service. There were a few from missionary background who had grown up overseas who came in with the language. But by and large the recruitment for the Foreign Service at that particular point did not place any premium on knowing a language, so they were not getting the people who were qualified. And the argument at that time was that if we recruited for language skills, we're going to get people who are basically not very well suited for the Foreign Service because the people that are specializing, majoring in foreign languages, are people that are focused on that one academic thing, and we need broader people, we need to get people who have a broad background in the Foreign Service. And it just wasn't bringing in people who had the skills.

*Q: I took the Foreign Service exam in '53 which was pretty much the recruiting thing then. You took the exam, and you took the language exam in one of five different languages, but you didn't have to pass it. That was just something they'd say well, you've got to get yourself qualified once you're in. You couldn't get promoted. But basically I could see what they were after.*

SOLLENBERGER: Even in getting promoted, it wasn't an important factor at that particular time. What the Department wanted, I think, by giving that exam was to try to find a few people who had the language and could be assigned to the then important posts where it would be

useful. Training became the subject of a study of the Department's personnel system towards a stronger Foreign Service...

*Q: You're showing me a booklet, it was published when?*

SOLLENBERGER: This was published in May of '54. It was the so-called Wriston Report. This is the report really that began to turn things around for the Institute. But part of the problem, as it developed that required something to be done on this, came a little before that. This was the beginning of the problem of McCarthy.

*Q: We're talking about the Senator.*

SOLLENBERGER: Senator Joseph McCarthy and his looking for card-carrying communists in the Department of State. And, of course, this had an effect on the Chinese program also because people were increasingly reluctant - officers - to get into a field if they were going to become targets of an investigation. For the Institute this was probably the most trying period in its history. It came very close, I would say, to putting the Institute out of business. That's because when they started investigating the Department of State, the first team that they sent in was sent to the Foreign Service Institute. I think they suspected they would find the long-hairs there and they seemed particularly suspicious of the anthropologists, people dealing with the behavior of foreign peoples. But it reached the point in the Foreign Service Institute...I can't really remember whether there were 9 or 13 investigators, and the Institute wasn't that large at that point, that took up residence and were at the Institute for the better part of three months.

*Q: Good God!*

SOLLENBERGER: Just an illustration if I can give this, I think it would give you bit of the atmosphere that we went through at that time. I got a long distance call in my office, a call that my secretary should not have put through to me, but she did, so I answered it. I later saw the person, he said, "What was wrong? You didn't sound very communicative during the call that I made to you." I said, "Here's the situation." There were three investigators in my office at that time. One of them was going through the files in the bathroom where I had the Chinese material that had been sent back from Beijing, much of it in Chinese. And, of course, he was very curious about what these things were. You're welcome to have somebody translate them for you if you want them. And I went there and went through them, identified what the different files were, etc. The other person was going through the books in the bookcase that I had, and these were books on China, and linguistics, language training, etc. And he was picking up the books by the covers and shaking them to see if there was anything hidden in the pages of the book. And the third one was sitting at my desk here. While I was trying to take care of these three people, he was also interrogating me on my experience in China, and particularly on the contacts that I had had with the communists back in 1938-'39-'40, and about Mr. Clubb. That was the situation.

*Q: How many investigators were there at one time?*

SOLLENBERGER: Nine or thirteen. They had an office, they were set up there, they were interrogating all the staff.

*Q: To whom were they reporting? This was not the House... the Congress...*

SOLLENBERGER: They sent someone to the Department who...

*Q: This was part of Truman's Loyalty Board. Scott McLeod came in a little later. Scott McLeod was charged with consular and security affairs, so it may have been that.*

SOLLENBERGER: They were also very suspicious of the instructors who were foreigners, not even American citizens many of them. At one point they started to call the tutors over to the Department of State for interrogation. And it was never clear as to whether they were using lie detector tests on them, or whether they were simply recording, but they were at least recording the interviews that they had. They started off at the beginning of the alphabet, and Burmese came up pretty early in that. When the Burmese instructor was called over, who was a well known Burmese in his own country, and his wife worked at the Burmese embassy in Washington, a quiet but very independent person. When they started to interrogate him and ask him, according to his report back to us, how much he had paid Dr. Smith, or me, for the job that he had there. A number of questions of that sort that didn't seem appropriate at all. He got up and walked out, and they didn't know what to do about that. They weren't expecting this. He came back and of course reported to us on what had taken place, and said that if this is continuing, I'm quitting. Well, this was a crisis for us because there were other instructors that were lined up to go over. We were able, through Dr. Smith, to get in touch with Walter Bedell Smith...

*Q: Rooney was one of the institutional memories of the Foreign Service. People having to testify before him, he was always noted for cutting them out of representational allowance, which he called the Whiskey Fund. It was maybe grandstanding, but there was a whole school of people who were trained how to stroke Mr. Rooney. How did you get along with him? Were you appointed a stroker, I mean a stroker trainer?*

SOLLENBERGER: I wasn't appointed as a stroker but I learned fairly early on, being present when Harold Hoskins was testifying, that one of the things that Rooney wanted to do was to make a speech. This was not made for me, it was made for his constituents, and I should not respond to it. So he'd make a speech, we would let it stand, not try to argue with him. Once you started arguing with him, then he would lead you on into a ridiculous situation that would be difficult to get out of. Also, at the time, I got the administration budget office to have personnel respond to the utilization question which came up quite frequently. And it came up with regard to Chinese.

*Q: Oh, yes. A very famous case.*

SOLLENBERGER: Where the director of personnel was talking about the Chinese language officer in London, I believe.

*Q: It was London. Could you give the background to that?*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, the background to that was that there was a language officer in

London because this was one of the possible places of informal contact because of the British having recognized China, and we thought we ought to have someone in London who had some background in Chinese. But, of course, the response that was given by the Office of Personnel was, when he was asked about opportunities to utilize his Chinese, I guess he couldn't expose our real interests. He said, I guess there are Chinese restaurants and places like that that he could use it. And Rooney had a hay day with that.

I very nearly got caught up in a problem of that sort when Nixon went to China.

*Q: This was 1972.*

SOLLENBERGER: 1972, yes. I was asked by Rooney whether we had provided any training for Richard Nixon before he went to China. Of course, we hadn't, and I tried to explain about that we had trained people who went with him, and that these people were utilized, and it was fortunate that we had some people who knew Chinese who accompany the President at that particular point. Then he got off of that, and said, "Did you watch that program that showed the President sitting at the table with Zhou En-lai eating? Did you train the President to use chopsticks?" He was trying to provoke something going along that way. But I guess I squirmed out of that one all right. I didn't make the headlines anyhow.

*Q: Did you find as the Wriston report was implemented, a change in attitude towards training? I'm talking about the State Department personnel, Foreign Service. Not just at the top, but within the ranks.*

*We almost did during the Kennedy administration. We would do Mongolia, if the Soviets would do something else.*

SOLLENBERGER: There were efforts on that sort of thing. But the question was, why do we need to waste the time of an officer, and he wastes his time learning Mongolian when the chances of utilizing it are very slim. My approach on that, both with bureaus and with Personnel, was let's take somebody with Russian background and language and let's add Mongolian to that so that he'll have plenty of posts to use it in in Russia. But he can be the person who focuses on Mongolia. Let's take someone from Japan and give him Mongolian. Let's take someone from China and give him Mongolian. So we actually got several people who eventually were utilized, but it took a long time and I was afraid...

*Q: Did you have a problem? Here we are, particularly during this period, with a policy of strong support, mainly for domestic reasons, of Israel, at the same time we're dealing with a big Arab world which detested this policy. And you would invite lecturers who wanted Foreign Service officers both to understand the policy, but also to understand the Arab world. I can see this would be so sensitive that it would be almost impossible to deal with.*

SOLLENBERGER: Well, it was sensitive but by putting it into a broader perspective, we were able to diffuse most of the problems, not all of them. For example, on China one of the things that disturbed me greatly, almost to the point of resigning from the Foreign Service, was that the Department of State wanted the Institute to clear all of its speakers that it invited before the

invitations were extended. I'll use a name here. When it came to John Fairbanks, the preeminent China scholar, we were told no, you can't hire him because he's on McCarthy's list. That was the sort of thing that I had difficulty dealing with on a personal basis, having high respect for Fairbanks and knowing that he was not what McCarthy had intimated. These were the sort of things that we had to go through.

**CHARLES T. CROSS**  
**Childhood**  
**Beijing (1922-1940)**

*Ambassador Charles T. Cross was born in China in 1922. He attended Carleton College and Yale University and served as a lieutenant overseas in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942-1946. His assignments abroad included Taipei, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Alexandria, Nicosia, London and Danang, with an ambassadorship to Singapore. Ambassador Cross was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.*

*Q: Let us start at the beginning. Where and when were you born?*

CROSS: I was born in Peking, now called Beijing by foreigners also, which is the name that the Chinese used all along. I was born in 1922. I stayed in China - except for a couple of years spent in the U.S. - until I was 18. I spent those two years in Auburndale (Massachusetts) and Oberlin, (Ohio) - a year in each place. Much of the material in this oral history can also be found in my book, Born a Foreigner: a Memoir of the American Presence in Asia - Rowman and Littlefield 1999/2000.

*Q: Tell us a little about your parents and life in Beijing in your teens.*

CROSS: My parents were missionaries, essentially in the education field. My mother went to China first in 1915; she was a music teacher and a professional kindergarten teacher in Beijing. She organized some of the first kindergarten teacher training schools in China. She also established a number of kindergartens in the city.

My father came to China in 1917. His first job, after a couple of years of language training, was at Peking National University (Beida) - then and now China's foremost university. It was an interesting time for him to be there because it was a time of seething intellectual activity in China. Mao Zedong was at the University; Chen Duxiu, one of the founders of the Chinese Communist Party, led some of the discussions that had been organized by my father. So he was very much part of the surging intellectual activity which was part of the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement. That movement was one of the great forces in Chinese intellectual history. A lot of things happened at about the same time. For example, the Chinese characters, which were used in ordinary talk, were substituted for traditional, classical-style characters. That made it possible for many, many more Chinese to be literate. The communists and the nationalists, as well as non-political forces, took advantage of this change since they could then reach much wider audiences.

My father later became the General Secretary of the American Board Mission in North China. That board was part of the Congregational ministry. Both of my parents were Congregationalists. In 1931, we returned to the States for a couple of years, as I mentioned. We returned to China in 1933; we took up residence in what is now a suburb of Beijing - about 14 miles outside the city walls. In that suburb was an American boarding school which I attended.

I attended that boarding school for seven years. During that time, the most important event in my life was the Japanese invasion of North China in 1937, starting on July 7. There was a considerable amount of fighting in our neighborhood; there were sizeable massacres first perpetrated by the Chinese and then by the Japanese. So my last three years in high school were under Japanese rule although we had extra-territorial privileges and therefore did not suffer the hardships that were rained on the Chinese.

*Q: I have been reading an interview of John Stewart Service, who was also an off-spring of missionary parents. He said that his parents kept him away from Chinese kids which resulted in his Chinese not being very good. What was your experience?*

CROSS: I don't think my parents kept me away from Chinese playmates. When I lived in Beijing, I had as many Chinese playmates as American. It is true that our Chinese language skills were not advanced sufficiently. We learned Chinese in school, but we didn't go very far because it was just another academic subject. We also had to learn French and Latin, for example. So I never progressed very far in the written aspects of the language. My accent in conversations has a Beijing flavor and that is an asset.

*Q: Did you, in high school, manage to feel the ferment that was going on - the Kuomintang, which was then relatively new and rather progressive. Then of course came the Japanese.*

CROSS: The Kuomintang had just barely finished the formal unification of China in 1937. In 1931, the Japanese took all of Manchuria. From there, they began to infiltrate south of the Great Wall into the Beijing area. Starting in 1933 and for the next couple of years, they marched inexorably south. The Kuomintang was the national resistance. In December 1936, Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped by General Jang Xueliang, who had been a young marshal in Manchuria where he had been defeated by the Japanese. He stayed in North-West China where he kidnaped Chiang Kai-shek. The latter had come to attack the communists, who at the end of the Long March had reached Yanan. Chiang's release was contingent on his declaration of nationalist solidarity.

I remember that on Christmas night - or Eve - Chiang was released. Immediately, in the area where our home was, the Chinese students from near by schools paraded past our house and the Japanese sentries were stationed on the city walls. They shouted slogans such as "defeat the Japanese" or "long live the Kuomintang," sung to the tune of *Frère Jacques*.

My father noted at the time that this demonstration and those throughout China would remind the Japanese that China was united, which should have been a warning to them. The Japanese read it as a threat and decided to complete the conquest of China, which they started in July 1937.

As high school students, we visited the battlefields and had some contacts with Chinese students. A classmate of mine and I took some money, wrapped in some old clothes, and traveled from Beijing all the way out to Fenzhou in Shanxi province - that is the area from which Art Hummel, later an ambassador to China, came. Carrying that money was illegal under Japanese rule. The train tracks had been blown at a couple of spots, which made the trip quite exciting.

*Q: Did your schoolmates support the Chinese rather than the Japanese?*

CROSS: Oh, yes. We were fanatically anti-Japanese. I was a strong anti-Japan proponent. That is not surprising; they were brutal.

*Q: Did the Japanese occupy Beijing while you were there?*

CROSS: They did indeed in 1937. I graduated from high school in 1940, so that I spent three years watching the Japanese from a close vantage point. The foreigners were not mistreated, but our lives were certainly restricted.

*Q: Do you have any impressions of how the Japanese were acting?*

CROSS: I think they were somewhat less belligerent in Beijing than there were in the rest of China. I remember one time, in the winter, seeing a burning village. During the train trip I mentioned earlier, we noticed the communist forces being very active. In fact, the Kuomintang forces were defeated by the Japanese and had to retreat. That left a vacuum which was rapidly filled by the communists.

*Q: Did your fellow students have any views about the communist resistance?*

CROSS: The communist resistance was all there was opposing the Japanese. So a lot of the foreigners had contacts with them. They were all very tightly organized. Inside Beijing, they had many agents. But if you went to some of the rural areas which had mission stations - some that were less than fifty miles from Beijing - you could meet the communists quite openly. In fact, Chinese students were heading towards "Free China" - the nationalist area where Chongqing is located. They would head that way by foot transiting areas run by the communists, who would help them reach "Free China."

*Q: Did any of your Chinese friends make this journey?*

CROSS: Several of them did. They went to Chongqing. I don't remember any of them joining the communists, but obviously many Chinese did, including some from Yanjing University about whom I learned later.

*Q: How did your parents do their work under Japanese occupation?*

CROSS: They had certain restrictions on their work. Americans had the right to run certain schools; they were not interfered with by the Japanese themselves, but some of their puppets

tried to place some limits on activities. But the schools and the missionaries were handled quite delicately, until Pearl Harbor. My father's travels in China were somewhat curtailed. [Note: See Born a Foreigner for more on the Japanese in China]

**JAMES M. WILSON JR.**  
**Childhood**  
**Shanghai (1925-1935)**

*James M. Wilson, Jr. was born in China to American parents in 1918. He received a BA from Swarthmore College in 1939, graduated from the Geneva School of International Studies in 1939, the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940, and Harvard Law School in 1948. He also served as a lieutenant colonel overseas in the US Army from 1941-44. Mr. Wilson has served abroad in Paris, Madrid, Bangkok and Manila. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Today is the 31st of March, 1999. This is an interview with James M. Wilson, Jr. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Do they call you Jim?*

WILSON: Yes indeed.

*Q: Jim could you tell me something about when and where you were born and something about your family?*

WILSON: I'm a China brat. I was born there of American missionary parents and grew up there.

*Q: Where were you born and when?*

WILSON: I was born in a mountain resort outside of Hangchow in 1918.

*Q: What type of missionary were your parents?*

WILSON: My father was an architect/engineer who went out to China in 1911 to build various things for the American mission boards. He built hospitals, schools, houses, and churches all over China. As a matter of fact, the book on the coffee table right in front of you that I just got from the Old China Press has a piece in it on my father.

*Q: It sounds like they were moving you all around quite a bit?*

WILSON: We lived first in Hangchow, where my father also taught engineering and math at Hangchow College. Then we moved to Shanghai.

*Q: How old were you then?*

WILSON: Let's see, we were in Shanghai from 1925 to mid-1926 and then came back to the States while there was some political unpleasantness in China.

*Q: In '26, what was this? Was this the Kuomintang?*

WILSON: Yes, it was the Kuomintang forces, coming up from Canton and taking over - rather turbulent years.

*Q: It is often a period forgotten I think when people look at China. The Kuomintang was also revolutionary.*

WILSON: Very much so. This was in the days before the great split between Mao and Chiang Kai-shek.

*Q: Do you recall those first years? How did you live?*

WILSON: We lived very well on a college campus - in many respects, as you might on a college campus anywhere else around the world. When we moved to Shanghai, my father went into partnership with a fellow American architect and they planned to take over a lot of the construction that had previously been done by his engineering office in Hangchow.

*Q: What was your mother's background and your father's, too?*

WILSON: He was a graduate engineer from the University of Kentucky and then got a masters in architecture. She was a Phi Beta Kappa from Wellesley, also from Kentucky. During the time that Father was building things, she was usually teaching - first in Hangchow and later on at St. John's University there in Shanghai.

*Q: What was she teaching?*

WILSON: English literature.

*Q: Do you recall sort of life at home? Did you have any brothers or sisters?*

WILSON: Yes, I had three sisters; two older and one much younger. We had quite a number of friends and acquaintances. Many of my pals ended up in the Foreign Service later on.

*Q: When you left Shanghai in '26, you had already gone to school for a year or two hadn't you?*

WILSON: Oh, yes, both in Hangchow and in Shanghai - at American schools which were in both places in those days.

*Q: How long were you back in the United States?*

WILSON: Almost four years.

*Q: Where did you go to school? Where did you live?*

WILSON: In Kentucky, that's where the family is from.

*Q: Did you find that Kentucky was quite a change from China?*

WILSON: It's hard to try to quantify that or qualify that either way. I was rather young, something like eight years old when we came back and 11 when we departed.

*Q: You went back to China?*

WILSON: Yes.

*Q: This would have been 1930?*

WILSON: 1930, yes that is right.

*Q: Where did you go?*

WILSON: Back to Shanghai. My father had gone back to China a couple of times during the period when the family was in Kentucky. Interestingly enough, one of his assignments was with Curtis Wright Aviation, where he had a major hand in building what is now the Hangzhou Airport in Shanghai. When we went back in 1930, the Episcopal Mission Board had asked him to build a major new replacement for St. Luke's Hospital in Shanghai, along the lines of St. Luke's Hospital in Tokyo. That he tried to do manfully for quite a number of years; but as you know, there were many trials and tribulations in Shanghai in the 1930s, including Japanese occupations in 1932 and 1937. This caused all sorts of difficulties.

*Q: You were about high school age when you got there in 1930.*

WILSON: Yes. I went to SAS, the Shanghai American School.

*Q: What was the American School in Shanghai like?*

WILSON: It was very much (and deliberately so) like a private school here. SAS was conceived as a preparatory school for American children going back to college in the States. It has now come back to life, enrolling many more nationalities than just the children of Americans, as it did in my day.

*Q: Were there any Chinese going there?*

WILSON: Very few. They were almost all Chinese-American.

*Q: Did you feel as though you were living a somewhat separate existence in those days?*

WILSON: Of course. This was in the days when so-called extra-territoriality was flourishing. The “white man’s burden” mentality was still very evident.

*Q: What about the presence of the Japanese when they came in, how did that catch you?*

WILSON: As far as family was concerned, it didn’t bother our living arrangements especially; but in terms of my father’s duties it was catastrophic, because the area which had been chosen for his hospital was right in the line of fire for the Japanese troops. It was finally decided to move the entire operation out of the Japanese zone of occupation and start from scratch.

*Q: When did you leave Shanghai?*

WILSON: In 1935 to come back to college. We came back via the Trans-Siberia Railroad and Europe.

*Q: At the American School, what were your favorite subjects or most interesting subjects?*

WILSON: I guess English and history.

*Q: Was there much Chinese history or was it more the European-oriented history?*

WILSON: Mostly European, but I took a couple of courses in Chinese history. They also had courses in Chinese language which, I regret to state, I did not take.

*Q: It wasn’t really pushed at that time, was it?*

WILSON: Not really. The name of the game in those days was to teach the Chinese how to speak English.

*Q: What were the various communities called, cantons?*

WILSON: Settlements.

*Q: Did you get involved with the French or the British?*

WILSON: Not really. There were two different governments in our day in Shanghai, in the settlements that is. There was an international settlement which was made up of what had been the British, American and German concessions, and then there was the French settlement or concession. The French ran theirs, and an international municipal council ran the international settlement. In 1932, when the Japanese came in, however, they took over a large part of what had been the old American settlement. It was called Hongkew. The Japanese relinquished it only very, very slowly. When they came back in 1937 they made that area their headquarters. Surrounding all of this, of course, was the Chinese city, which was under Chinese jurisdiction. It was a strange and wonderful complex in those days.

*Q: Can one go out and go up the Yangtze or do things like that?*

WILSON: Oh, yes, in the days when there was not a war going on.

*Q: You left in what year?*

WILSON: 1935.

**JOHN STUART SERVICE**

**Childhood  
Shanghai (1925-1933)**

**Clerk  
Yannanfu, Shanghai (1933-1941)**

**Language Officer  
Chungking (1941-1942)**

**Visit to China (1971)**

**Visit to China (1973)**

*John Stuart Service was born in China of American parents. He attended school in China and graduated from Oberlin College. He was appointed as a clerk in Yunnanfu in 1933. He was the acting U.S. political advisor to the Supreme Commander, Allied Forces in 1945. In addition to posts in China, Mr. Service served in New Zealand, India and the United Kingdom. Mr. Service was interviewed in 1977 by Rosemary Levenson, Bancroft Library, University of California at Berkeley.*

Background of the YMCA in China: The Principle of Local Chinese Control

SERVICE: I've got a list here, of things that was put out at one time--Oh, here it is. When my father went to China the YMCA here at Berkeley, of which he had been president in his senior year, used to put on an annual Roy Service campaign to help support his work in China. (He was always known as Roy in his family and at Berkeley. But my mother didn't like Roy and called him Bob. So all of his China friends called him Bob, and his early friends called him Roy.)

Anyway, this has got a lot of information about him.

*Q: This is very interesting. [reading] "The University of California's furthest extension work, giving instruction in Bible Study, Sanitation, Engineering, Social Hygiene, and Physical Training--a practical religion."*

SERVICE: Well, that's the old YMCA--it was a practical religion, a contrast to the old-line churches and missions in China. The Y was something quite new and very attractive to a lot of Chinese. The Chinese were not exactly flocking to the gospel, but there were a lot of things about the YMCA that did attract young Chinese students particularly.

At this time the government was just starting the new schools, the new universities. They had just stopped, or were just about to stop, the old Confucian examinations. The new universities were set up in the cities. In the old days if you were studying for your exams you could do it at home or in your own village or town. But now the students going to the universities had to come to the cities. So you had a new group of university students, middle school students, growing up in these new, modern schools. The YMCA catered especially to them. It ran schools. It did a great deal of work in popularizing science, basic science, which the Chinese were tremendously interested in. The solar system, and how a steam engine works, all sorts of things. The YMCA used to set up exhibits. They had basic science museums and ran lectures. They had specialists for this.

They started the idea of public health in China, swat fly campaigns, things like that. Then they had a lot of education, free education schools, night schools, for children, for all ages. Teaching English--a lot of people wanted to learn English. The businesses needed people who spoke English, the post office, customs, these sorts of services.

In education, physical fitness was just becoming popular. The Chinese realized that in order to compete with the West they had to be strong. I mean not only as a nation, but also strong in their own personal physiques. That's the basis of an army after all. So, the whole idea of athletics was just starting in, physical fitness and so on, gymnasiums, even ping pong.

*Q: [chuckle] Foreshadowing ping pong diplomacy.*

SERVICE: Yes. Yes. But we don't need to do a history of the Y in this memoir!

*Q: No, but in context I imagine that for your father to have been sent out to Sichuan, which was way, way out, there must have been a pretty good YMCA base in the Treaty Ports.*

SERVICE: Not really. It was all pretty new, because the Y had really only started in China in 1896. So, he was there less than ten years after it first started. They were still quite small even in the cities. They started first in Tientsin, I think. The Y was relatively small.

The Y was unique among Christian mission organizations in China because it always insisted from the very beginning that it had to have local Chinese support and control. The international Y loaned or provided the services of some foreigners, Americans or a few others, but mostly Americans. It sometimes loaned or had donations of money for buildings and so on. But, in each city the first step was to find a group of Chinese Christians who were willing to sponsor it and lead it, act as directors. So the foreigners were always working for Chinese and the Y depended on local support. You had to get memberships and so on, and it had to be locally self-supporting.

*Q: Do you know what sort of invitation was arranged? How did they know the Y would be welcome in Chengdu?*

SERVICE: The Friends' Mission [Quaker] had someone there named Hodgkin, an Englishman. I forget his initials but he became quite well known later on and eventually came back to England and headed up the English Friends missionary organization. But, Dr. Hodgkin was in Chengdu and he knew about the Y.

Not all missions were keen about the Y. Some missions regarded the Y as being a rival, as not being truly religious because they didn't put the emphasis on proselytizing. Some missionaries felt that their only job was to save souls for Christ, and therefore the thing to do was to preach.

But Hodgkin had been working in Chengdu for the English Friends, and apparently he thought the Y would be a good idea because there was a big Chinese university, a government university, just being established in Chengdu. The missions were also talking about combining their various activities into a West China Union University. Chengdu was becoming an educational, student center. I think Hodgkin was the one that first encouraged the Y, or got in touch with the Y to see if they wouldn't consider starting a YMCA in Chengdu. So, there was a friendly welcome in that sense. Hodgkin was still there when my father arrived and helped him. He had mission contacts, but he also had some student contacts and Chinese contacts, so that he was able to help my father.

#### A Six Month Journey from Shanghai to Chengdu, 1905-1906

*Q: In 1905, six years before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty, did your father comment at all on the sort of turmoil that was going on in various parts of China? How was it in Sichuan?*

SERVICE: My parents didn't get to Sichuan till 1906, because it was a long trip up the Yangtze in those days. I don't know whether Caroline mentioned it or not, but they lost their baby going through the [Yangtze] Gorges, twenty-one days by houseboat with no doctor.

*Q: No.*

SERVICE: Well, traveling was a long, slow business. They got into Shanghai actually while there were riots going on, what were called the Mixed Court riots. So, the first night my father was in China, actually was spent on guard duty, because they were staying in a house that was outside the concession. They didn't know what might happen. Actually, nothing did happen. But, there was a lot of anti-foreign, anti-American feeling.

They had to equip themselves, and then they went up the river by stages. They went by one steamer to Hangzhou, and then another steamer to Ichang. Then, there was no way to go except by Chinese junk, houseboat. Speaking no Chinese, they could not travel by themselves. They found a man who worked for the Bible Society. I think he was taking supplies to the Bible Society, and they traveled with him. Mr. Davey, I think his name was.

They had a small daughter, Virginia, who was born in 1905 before they left for China. She was one of the first children born in Alta Bates hospital. [Berkeley, California] Her picture used to be in the lobby of Alta Bates as one of the first babies born there.

Anyway, the baby got sick--with dysentery, I suppose--and died, I think, five or six days before they got to Chungking.

Then, my father came down with malaria, which he had very badly and continued to have recurrent attacks of. So, they had to stay in Chungking for a long time.

The final stage of the trip was a ten day overland journey by sedan chair. It's about 250 miles from Chungking to Chengdu. They left San Francisco in November, 1905. It was May, 1906, before they finally got to Chengdu.

But, this is a diversion from your question--which was what? Do you remember?

*Q: Yes. [laughter] We're--what--five years before the fall of the Ch'ing dynasty?*

SERVICE: Oh, yes. I think that things were fairly peaceful under the dynasty as far as Sichuan was concerned. My parents went away every summer to various places, to Omei Mountain. One year they made a trip to Tatsienlu, on the Tibet border. I don't think there was much internal disturbance. There were problems of banditry--but that was always there apparently--and poverty.

Perhaps in 1910, but certainly in 1911, there was a great uproar in Sichuan about railways. There was talk of building a railway from the east into Sichuan province. The Sichuan gentry were extremely desirous, extremely anxious, that this not be given over to foreigners to build. So they raised some money to build a railway themselves.

In 1911, Sheng Hsuan-Huai signed an agreement for foreigners to build the railway. This caused a tremendous uproar, riots and so on, locally. This actually preceded the outbreak in Hangzhou and Wuchang on October 10. Some weeks earlier in Chengdu there were riots, and all the foreigners were called into a large compound that was owned by the Canadian Methodist mission. We all lived for some weeks in the new hospital that was just finished.

Then, finally things got so out of hand that there was fighting between various groups. The foreign consuls decided to evacuate everyone. [1911] They all came down river, and eventually my parents ended up in Shanghai. My father was soon sent to Nanking. So he was in Nanking in 1912 for a few months when Sun Yat-Sen was setting up the Republic.

The Y was very much in the center of things because many of the people who were active in the YMCA became leaders in the new government, C.T. Wang and people like that. A lot of the people who were American-trained or active in the YMCA were prominent in the early days of the government. After Yuan Shih-Kai took over, some of them had to take a back seat.

The Far West of China: A Pioneer Life

SERVICE: When my father went to Chengdu, where there had been no Y at all, he had to really start from scratch. At the same time he had to learn Chinese, which he did at home.

He got a teacher who came in every day in the morning. He sat down at a table and read Confucius, the classics, or whatever the textbooks were. The teacher, of course, knew no English and one sort of fumbled or stumbled along.

My father learned to speak extremely well. He was absolutely superb in his spoken Chinese.

Almost at once he was forced to begin speaking. He had to start dealing with workmen remodeling his house, trying to get acquainted with students, trying to widen his circle of acquaintances, trying to call on gentry and leaders in the community because he had to have their support. He had to get people of substance to act as directors and so on. So eventually he became a marvelous speaker of Chinese--local Sichuanese dialect, pure and perfect Sichuanese.

The Chinese used to love to hear him because he was so good and could joke and all the rest of it. My father actually never learned to read and write very well, which puzzles me a little bit because I don't know how he conducted Bible classes. I don't think that he could read enough to read the Bible. How he got along--some way or another. Maybe he had someone else read the texts.

But my mother didn't become very fluent. She could speak to get along socially and with the cook. She had to teach the servants everything they knew. She started with raw country boys from the village, shall we say, who had never seen a foreigner, most of them. She taught them how to cook and make bread. My father loved baking powder biscuits and this and that. So, obviously she could manage. But she never learned to read and write, never really spoke very well.

*Q: Did you eat the nearest approximation to Western food that the servants could manage, or did you ever eat Chinese food?*

SERVICE: [chuckle] We lived Western. Once a week we had Chinese food. It was a big event. Saturday noon we had Chinese food. We all liked it. Later on when I got a little older, every Saturday noon we boys would go over to my father's office at the Y and then go out with him and have Chinese lunch, usually with some of his Chinese colleagues, secretaries in the YMCA. This was always a big day of the week.

We loved Chinese food, but the rest of the time we ate foreign. My mother taught each cook. We had several cooks. Finally we got this one man--Liu P'ei-Yun, who stayed with my parents then for many years--who became a very good cook.

Everything had to be done. It was like living in a pioneer settlement in a way. The local salt was coarse and very black, gray, so that we used to purify the salt. The sugar was coarse and brown. I don't know how we did it, but we actually refined the sugar. I don't know how my mother ever got it crystallized. The salt I think we just beat up with a mortar.

We bought Chinese flour, but we made our own laundry soap from lye and ash and fats. We bought, or saved pork fat.

Of course, there were no electric lights. We used kerosene lamps. There was no running water. There were no telephones. If you went out, you usually went by sedan chair which meant that we kept our own chair carriers.

We even kept our own cow for many years because there was no way of getting milk which was dependable. Apparently, we even took the cows to the mountains in the summer sometimes.

But, you lived a very self-sufficient kind of life that required a lot of work and supervision. If you wanted to communicate with anyone else you sent a coolie with what we called a chit, a note, around town.

We had our own well. But all water had to be boiled. The well wasn't very deep. The water table was maybe ten or twelve feet down. All sorts of unsanitary things were going on around, of course. There were no sewers or anything like that in town. So all water that was to be drunk had to be boiled. You ate nothing that was raw, uncooked.

#### The "Y" as Window to the West

SERVICE: It took my father several years of preliminary work before the Y really got going.

First my parents started by having classes at home. Chinese students came to their home for classes in English and, if they could get them interested, Bible studies. Most Chinese students wanted just to learn about the West. The West was a subject of great interest to this new generation, this modernizing generation.

They had a steady series of visitors, callers, people who just wanted to see foreigners, or get acquainted with foreigners. Mother had a group of Chinese ladies who used to come in. But all this required a lot of tea, refreshments, that sort of thing.

But I think my parents felt that it was desirable for them to try to live in a foreign, Western way. Earlier missionaries had tried to merge in a Chinese community, had dressed in Chinese clothes, worn queues and so on. This was partly because of intense anti-foreignism. They didn't want to be conspicuous.

But, by the time that my parents came along, the great attraction of the YMCA was that it represented new things. It represented the West, and there was a great interest in the West. A lot of these people that came to the house would have been hurt if they had just received some Chinese refreshments. They wanted to see Western things. They wanted to learn about the West.

The foreign community did some relief work during the war (World War I), ran bazaars. One very popular thing they did one time was to run a coffee and doughnut shop, or coffee and hot biscuits I think. Tremendously popular. Chinese would come in, and some people came every

day while the thing was running, because coffee, foreign refreshments, and cakes were something that was new and strange and exotic and exciting.

I'm not sure that my parents were conscious of this. They may not have thought of it. But, certainly they were exemplars of the West and of Western ideas and Western ways of living. So, I don't think my parents felt any guilt about living in a Western way, because this was what they represented and what the Chinese wanted.

Some Chinese came to them and asked them to have a club which used to meet at the house occasionally. A club of men and women together, young men and young women, who were coping with all the problems of getting rid of Confucian ideas of arranged marriages and so on and who simply wanted to meet with some foreigners, my parents in this case, and learn about how man-woman relations, relations between the sexes, were handled in the West, what Western society was like, learning new ways, getting rid of the Confucian ways.

*Q: Was there any opposition that you recall to this amongst the more conservative Chinese families?*

SERVICE: I suppose there must have been. I'm sure that these people themselves were subject to criticism from their elders, yes. There was a lot of generational conflict going on all through that period certainly.

These people, of course, were talking about such things as making their own marriages. Mrs. Chao here in Berkeley is one of the pioneers. She made up her own mind that she was going to marry Y.R. [Chao]. Of course, he apparently agreed too. But, it was quite a famous early case of revolt against the old Confucian family idea, arranged marriages. It was about the time that we're talking about in China. I'm not sure when Y.R. and Buwei got married, but it was probably about this time.

*Q: 1921.*

SERVICE: 1921. Well, we're talking about a little bit earlier than that.

*Q: Both of them had arranged marriages, had engagements that they had to break.*

SERVICE: Yes, yes, that's right. But, I don't remember any criticism that was overt or violent or that involved my parents, at least not that I know of.

*Q: It's an interesting concept when you think of what has been going on at the Y in the 60's and 70's--*

SERVICE: Yes.

*Q: --the encounter groups and so on, that already in the context of its period, back in the 1910's, the Y was facilitating relations between the sexes.*

SERVICE: Oh, yes. That's right. That's right.

*Q: Do you remember seeing Westerners dressed in Chinese style?*

SERVICE: Oh, yes. There were some of the older people, particularly in small outstations, who still wore Chinese clothes. The China Inland Mission, and some of the more conservative groups, still went on that idea.

But in a place like Chengdu, which was a metropolis, I don't think any foreigners wore Chinese clothes by this time.

There were no hotels, of course, in a place like Chengdu. It was the end of the line, so many foreign visitors stayed with us. In a place like Hangzhou or Ichang, which were transit points, the missions would set up a sort of a hostel, a missionary home, or something like that. But, in Chengdu there was nothing like this. People would come to Chengdu for missionary conferences or meetings, or an occasional tourist--but they had to be pretty determined tourists. There was a man named Harry Frank who walked around China and wrote some books about it. A man named Geil visited all the capitals of China and wrote a book about it and also a book about the Great Wall. There was a professor named E.A. Ross from Wisconsin, a sociologist, who wrote a book about China. He stayed there. A lot of people in Sichuan came to Chengdu because they needed dental work or medical care.

*Q: It seems that your mother and your father entertained a most extraordinary number of guests throughout the year, the teas for students--*

SERVICE: Yes, well, this was an important part of their work, particularly in the early phase of getting acquainted. I think it tapered off a good deal as children came along and she became more busy at home. But certainly before the Y was set up, formally set up and they had buildings, a lot of Y activity was getting acquainted with students, university students, and university teachers. A lot of this was done at the house.

Always, of course, Chinese called on formal occasions, such as New Year's time. My father's fortieth birthday was a tremendous affair because in China traditionally when you reach forty, you enter on old age, you become venerable. By forty, one should have grandchildren. So, when my father reached forty there was an all-day-long procession of people that came to congratulate him and fire off firecrackers and so on, and they all had to be fed.

One thing I just remembered. In the early days when I was seven or eight, like most missionaries, we had morning prayers with the servants all expected to come and join in. Then, somehow this practice just stopped. I don't remember when or why, but eventually we didn't have prayers in the morning.

I think that it was somewhat artificial. Most of the missionaries expected their servants to become Christians. My father may have felt that it was a little unfair to put this pressure on them. It did seem a bit uncomfortable and formal.

We had a wonderful old gardener. He may have been a Christian, a real Christian. Some of the others may have gone through the motions. But, I think that the old gardener probably was the only real Christian.

Eventually my father got separate premises for the Y and it gradually grew until it had fifteen hundred members or so and quite an active program of schools and classes of all kinds. The Y was dependent largely on the goodwill of officials, but also on local support. When they finally built a permanent Y the government actually donated the land. It was quite a large site near the center of Chengdu.

Local warlords usually contributed, helped the Y, were friendly to the Y, attended the Y.

Even before the Republic, before the Revolution, the viceroy came to the opening of the YMCA in Chengdu, which was a noteworthy honor in those days. The provincial viceroy actually attended the opening ceremonies in 1910.

*Q: Would you say that was a tribute to your father's particular skills?*

SERVICE: Well, I don't want to blow the horn excessively. I suppose you can say that it was partly because of my father's skill in making friends with Chinese. But the viceroy's acceptance of the invitation was not based on a personal relationship between the viceroy and my father. It reflected the fact that my father had won support of influential members of the local gentry.

#### Strains and Hardships in Grace Service's Life

*Q: You mentioned your sister's death. Was this felt in any way to be China's "fault?" Was your mother bitter?*

SERVICE: I don't think my mother felt that it was China's fault, but it certainly contributed to her very, very strong concern about sanitation and health. Reading things like Golden Inches, the long, unpublished autobiography she wrote in the 1930's, I realize now, much more than I did then, how repelled she was by the lack of sanitation, the conditions of the inns, the pigsty next to where you were sleeping, and all the dirt and filth, the general living conditions.

I think that it contributed to her--alienation is too strong a word. But, she dropped out more and more--partly because she got more interested in other things--from my father's work. She became, I think, disappointed. Embittered is too strong a word. After the revolution [1911], for instance, they should have gone back on furlough to the United States. But the YMCA had not succeeded in getting anyone else to go to West China on a permanent basis. There had been a couple of people who for one reason or another couldn't stay. My father had had to evacuate. [1911] He didn't want to come out, but he had been ordered out. He felt he had to go back to Sichuan. The Y wanted him to go back to Sichuan to get things started again, make sure everything was all right. So, he went back, you see, and it wasn't until 1915, ten years after they went out to China, that he had his first furlough.

He always put the Y first. This is a pattern that was repeated time after time. My mother felt that the family was second, and that he did much more for the Y and gave himself to the Y more than he needed to and neglected the family. It's a pattern that, shall we say, repeated itself later on, in my case I think.

*Q: Did your father become involved with Chinese politics?*

SERVICE: He actively supported the students in the 1920's when the Kuomintang was coming to power, the period of the May 30th incident in Shanghai and all the rest of 1926, '27. He was in favor of the foreigners giving up extraterritoriality and the imperialist apparatus that annoyed, that infuriated, the Chinese so much.

*Q: Did this make him very unpopular with the so-called European community?*

SERVICE: I'm not sure because I was out of China then. But, I don't believe it did. I think most of the missionaries that they were close to tended to agree with him.

Most of the time we were way up west in Sichuan province, hundreds of miles from any guns or any gunboat. We were at the end of the line. Going up and down through the Yangtze Gorges, if soldiers or bandits were firing from the banks at the boat, they would go up and sit behind the armor plate in the bridge, things like that. But, I don't think there was any conflict between my father and other missionaries.

There were some old-line missionaries, I think, that were less inclined to see the merit of the students' arguments because, the students wanted to take over control of the foreign schools and universities. They thought that the Chinese government should set the curriculum and really have effective control of the mission institutions. I think that probably some of the missionaries opposed that. The Chinese weren't ready yet, was the general theme.

But my father didn't have very much contact with the business people--certainly not in Chengdu. It wasn't a Treaty Port. There wasn't any foreign business community there really.

*Q: Did the recurrent violence in China affect your daily lives?*

SERVICE: Well, you see, what happened in Sichuan was that after the Revolution, 1911-12 Revolution, things really fell apart. Sichuan was fought over by a lot of Sichuanese, but also became a hunting ground for people from other provinces, especially Guizhou and Yunnan.

When Yuan Shih-Kai tried to become emperor, the revolt actually started in Yunnan, and the leader Tsai led an army from Yunnan into Sichuan province in 1916 to give battle to the local commander, who had bet on Yuan Shih-Kai. The Yunnan army stayed on and on in Sichuan. Almost every year, in these years we're talking about, there was fighting going on--this was a part of the life. Some of it was very bloody, some of it not so bad; but almost always with looting, first by the defeated or evacuating army and then, of course, by the victorious army. Each side grabbed what it could.

Sometimes they would persuade the chambers of commerce, the leading businessmen to pay them--a ransom, in other words. But, if the ransom wasn't paid, or even if the ransom was paid, there would still be looting and burning.

*Q: Did this affect your day-to-day life?*

SERVICE: Oh, sometimes. There was one period when we all moved down into the ground floor of the house because the compound had mud walls. We moved into the ground floor and lived and slept in my father's library because, in addition to the mud walls, we were surrounded by bookcases. We put mattresses against the windows. There was artillery fire going across the city from one side to the other, from one camp to the other, passing over our area.

There was a mission hospital, an American Methodist Mission hospital which for some reason was not being operated. Whether they just didn't have money or what--I don't know. But, it was empty. The missionary community thought they ought to do what they could. So they opened it on an emergency, temporary basis to take care of the hundreds of wounded soldiers.

I was, I suppose, maybe ten. Anyway, I volunteered. Some of us children volunteered to act as orderlies and fetch-and-carry boys, boy scouts. I remember it was a terrible, terrible thing to see these wounded people. Most of them had been wounded several days before. The fighting was some distance away at that time. The wounds had not been properly dressed or taken care of. So, they were suppurating and so on--awful. I remember having to leave the operating room where the doctor was cutting. I went outside and was sick. I just couldn't take it.

The foreigners did what they could. My father was always helpful in things like this. Several times he actually was able to act as a go-between, mostly to save people that were caught in between the firing. He was known to people on both sides, to officials, to the generals, and so on.

In fact, he was so well known that the British consul general...there wasn't any American consul in Chengdu, never was. The nearest American consul was in Chungking, and that was only part of the time. Most of the time the nearest American consul was six, seven hundred miles away in Hangzhou. But, the British consul general made a protest at one time to the American legation in Peking about my father's having contact with officials. The consul thought that only he should have contact with the officials and resented my father's being on very good terms with the local generals, the top people!

*Q: So, he was doing para-diplomacy.*

SERVICE: Well, he was getting along. He had to.

*Q: You describe so calmly a situation that would be truly horrifying to most people--warlords fighting, bleeding bodies being brought in, et cetera. How did this all affect your mother?*

SERVICE: I suppose it affected her more than us. She was conscious of the dangers. Children can adapt, and like excitement. Let me jump ahead to an episode in the Chungking days. We spent the summers, like most of the foreigners, in bungalows along the top of hills on the south

bank of the Yangtze, across from the city. One summer--I think it was '23--a Guizhou general, from the south, decided to take over Chungking. These wars were usually more skirmish and maneuvering than hard fighting. For several days, the defenders' front line was along our range of hills. Then, one night the attackers made a night attack. Altogether, spread about, there must have been a good many thousands of troops. And Chinese make a night attack very theatrical and frightening. Everyone shouts "Sha! Sha! Sha!" ("Kill! Kill! Kill!") and fires their guns into the air or at anything that looks like a target. The defenders fired a few shots but discreetly fled, long before the attackers got close.

While all this was going on, the servants had come into the house--their quarters were flimsy lath and plaster, while the house was brick. And we were all lying together on the floor to get below the level of the windows. Actually, we children were under the beds. The house was dark (we assumed lights would draw fire) and stood on a sort of elevated terrace. A group of soldiers--I suppose a squad--came charging up the steps to the front door, which had glass in the top half. My father decided he had to go out and tell them we were foreigners. In fact, he was shouting that, but the din was so great that the soldiers couldn't hear him.

Just as my father had his hand on the knob, a soldier outside--the leader, I assume--fired his rifle from the hip. The bullet shattered the glass and passed just in front of my father's forehead. But some of the pulverized glass bounced into his eye. He fell to the floor, and thought he was blind. But he was able to tell them we were foreigners and to ask the name of their general. When they told him, he said, "I know him"--which was true. The soldiers were sorry, but we didn't know for several days whether Dad would lose his sight. He didn't. To go back to your question: this sort of thing was obviously hard on my mother.

*Q: You wanted to tell me about your boyhood in Chungking and an incident that occurred.*

SERVICE: This was in the summer of 1923 I think. It was actually at the same time that my father was nearly shot by this soldier during a night attack. That morning, we three boys had gone down along the range to see some friends. Foreign houses were scattered over several miles up and down the hills. We took with us a Daisy air rifle which our parents had bought from Montgomery Ward. We met a patrol, sort of an advanced patrol. Apparently these were incoming warlord troops from Guizhou. They were very much interested in our air rifle. They thought it was some fancy, new, foreign type of rifle [laughter] which was very much something they would like to have.

So they stopped us and questioned us and wanted to know about that rifle. Naturally, we didn't want to lose it. So my brother Bob tried to explain to them--he spoke the best Chinese of any of us--he tried to explain that it was just driven by ch'i. "Ch'i" is rather a vague word in Chinese but usually means air or gas.

Finally Bob said, "My brother there--" (I was holding the rifle) "I'll stand here and my brother will shoot me in the chest and you'll see what happens." [laughter] He had a khaki shirt on, I suppose. So he stood bravely--I suppose he was eleven or twelve--and I shot him in the chest with the air rifle. We convinced the soldiers that the rifle was not one they wanted. [laughter] They let us go on our way.

That night, of course, things turned much worse.

Speaking of the effect on the kids, after these various episodes of war, we found we could pick up all sorts of stray bullets, stray ammunition. We started a collection of various kinds of gunpowder, various kinds of bullets. We would pull a bullet out of cartridges that hadn't gone off, you know. Of course, we got many different kinds because every Chinese warlord army had arms from wherever they could get them. There might be old Russian stuff, and old Japanese stuff, and locally made Chinese stuff, different arsenals, different sizes, different kinds of powder.

We'd been having typhoid shots. So, we had a lot of these little bottles that typhoid vaccine used to come in. We had these all lined up, different kinds of powder from these various shells which we quite casually had unloaded ourselves with a pair of pliers. [laughter]

Reading my mother's notes, I was reminded of a time when the attackers had seized a peddler, a man who was at least dressed up and acting as a peddler selling food or something, down at the gap below our house. The road came up to a gap in the hills there.

They accused him of being a spy, and they hung him up from a tree this way with his arms behind him [stands and puts hands behind back] and then suspended him, just lifting him off the ground, which is a very painful way, and then they beat him on the back with split bamboo. Of course, he was screaming bloody murder. It went on all day, more or less. We went down and watched. My mother was not very happy about that.

But, you know, China was a cruel place in those days. I think we accepted these things since they were a part of normal, daily life, and they didn't affect us nearly as much as they did my mother or as they did Caroline when she came to China after we married.

Caroline's reactions to China simply surprised me. We were in Yunnan, which was a very backwoods, undeveloped place when we went there in '33. She was much more put off by it than I was. It didn't bother me.

*Q: Jack, you said you had a few things from our last session that you'd like to expand on a little bit.*

SERVICE: Well, I felt after we'd finished talking the other day that maybe I hadn't been quite fair to my mother. I'd given the impression that she had turned sour perhaps, or against, the missionary cause that my father was dedicated to. I don't think that's quite fair.

She had, of course, a harrowing introduction to West China with the loss of her child and then the serious illness of my father. She was plagued by ill health. It's obvious from reading her own account that she was suffering a lot of the time. Years later when she came to the States, the doctors at the Mayo Clinic thought she had probably had gallstones. She also had, I think, two miscarriages after the baby died, before I was born.

Probably I didn't mention the isolation of West China, the other day. It took two months usually to get there. That was before the steamer started running through the [Yangtze] Gorges, when you had to go by junk.

*Q: From--?*

SERVICE: From Shanghai. It was six months perhaps to get an exchange of letters with her parents in the United States, or anybody in the United States. They used to order supplies, but it might take a year for the supplies to get there. Your magazines, your mail, everything, was always much delayed.

There was a lot more housework than I think I mentioned. We lived a pioneer existence. My mother made marmalade from the skins of the oranges that we ate at breakfast. She made mincemeat, and did a lot of preserving.

There were no tailors, so she had to make clothes for all her children, besides her own clothes and the normal things of the house, the curtains and all the rest of it.

We had to do our own laundry, of course, at home. It was the time when men wore stiff collars, and she had trouble getting the servants to starch them properly; so, at times, she did my father's stiff collars and cuffs. It seems incredible to us now that they fussed about these things in West China!

She had to train new servants, really, from the ground up. They had never been in a foreign house before, and they had to learn everything.

So, I think by and large she did have a fairly hard life. Visitors often stayed and stayed a long time, but they were very welcome.

One thing that I remember as a child was that we always ate at the table, the family all together. It was the way my father's ranching family had eaten. They were a big family. My father carved.

It was always an occasion to have guests. I remember hearing my parents ask, "What's the news?" If visitors came from the States that was fine, but even if they came from Shanghai or down river, they had much more news than we had locally. So, there was always a lot of conversation and interest and excitement, having people visit and stay with us.

My mother did go on teaching in the Y even when she had three children at home. She usually taught at home, English, economics, and so on. Also they had night prayer meetings. Sometimes she was asked to teach older people who wanted to learn some English but didn't want to go to the YMCA and join a class with young people. For "face" reasons they would ask her to teach them privately, and this was usually done at home. So she did have quite a busy life.

*Q: In her autobiography, your mother speaks of Chinese women friends, but she doesn't name any of them, as she does her American and other friends. Was she able to form friendships with Chinese women?*

SERVICE: No, I don't think really in any very meaningful way, not in an intimate way. (I have to keep peeling off layers of memory.

In Chengdu when I was small there were very few Chinese women that were educated. Very few of them had gone to school. Even fewer had learned English to any real extent. Practically none of them had studied in the United States or studied abroad so that it was very difficult to establish communications, rapport. My mother, as I said before, never really mastered Chinese very well. She learned household Chinese, but she never learned enough Chinese so she could develop an intimate friendship, I would guess, with any of these women.

Also, entertaining was quite formalized. Most Chinese entertained at restaurants, and women normally were not included. If you were invited to a home it was usually an official home--and the women ate in the back rooms, they didn't eat with the men--so that it was a stilted occasion.

I just don't think that my mother--although she knew some of these women and they were interested in coming to the house--had friendships with Chinese women that took up very much of her time or were intimate.

Now, when she got to Shanghai [after 1925] things were quite different because in Shanghai there were a lot of Western-educated women, women who had either been educated in Western schools in China or had actually studied abroad. When she got into women's clubs and the women's group activities in Shanghai and in the national committee of the YWCA, she was thrown in close contact with many of this type of Chinese woman, and some of them she did get to know very well. Some of them were American-educated or actually American-Chinese women. But, it wasn't really until Shanghai that I would say that she developed real friendships with Chinese.

#### The Service "Hotel": Distinguished Visitors and Occasional Tourists

SERVICE: Going back to what we said earlier--I've mentioned the fact that there were no hotels in Chengdu. I think that our house became a well-known place to stay. It often had people there. Usually they were very interesting people. My father was rather fascinated by Tibet. So, he got to know some of the missionaries up there and was happy to have them stay with us.

My father established contacts with some Chinese businessmen who used to trade in Tibet, for them to bring out Tibetan things and so on.

My mother loved to read and she read everything she could get. She ordered books from Shanghai and America. And the local foreigners exchanged books. Talk around the table was usually interesting.

*Q: What notable "foreign devils" were there, either as residents or as visitors? You mentioned, before we turned the tape on, the [Walter C.] Lowdermilks.*

SERVICE: Oh, yes.

*Q: I don't know whether they were up there at the time?*

SERVICE: I don't think he was, because they got married later on. She, Mrs. [Inez] Lowdermilk, was there in the Methodist mission. There was this E.A. Ross that I was speaking of from Wisconsin. There was a geologist from Oberlin that was out there. There were plant explorers that used to come through, like Joseph Rock, working for the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Occasionally a businessman. There was never anyone there in all the years we were there who represented the American government. No foreign consular officer got up that far.

As I say, we sometimes had a consul in Chungking, but not all the time. But, no American consular man ever got up as far as Chengdu. The British, of course, traveled much more, and they had the British consul there although it was not a Treaty Port.

There were people like [Eric] Teichman and [Alexander] Hosie who traveled for the British and went through Chengdu. They were checking things like the efficacy of the Chinese suppression of opium. But, this was before I remember things. This was the early years when they went through.

There was an American tourist, a wealthy woman named Tracy, Mrs. Tracy from Cleveland, Ohio, who had met my mother in Nanking, in 1912. She came back to China a few years later and went up through the [Yangtze] Gorges and up to Chengdu, which was quite a trip for a tourist in those days. She became a good friend of my mother's. When we came home on furlough in 1915-16, my mother went down to Florida to visit her in Palm Beach.

Friendships with local residents tend to become very close when you are so isolated. My parents made many lifelong friendships with other missionaries that were there, mostly American but some Canadian. I think if you live together in isolated circumstances, you do tend to establish--well, you do in the Foreign Service too. You serve in a foreign post with somebody, then you're a friend for life.

### The Family's Growing Love of China

*Q: Did your father "fall in love" with China in the way that so many people did?*

SERVICE: Yes, I think so. It's a funny thing, how to describe people's attitudes towards something like China. He certainly developed a tremendously strong affection for the Chinese people, the Chinese people he knew and, I think for the Chinese people in general. He felt strongly interested in China, much concerned and involved in China. He was always optimistic about China, that things were going to come out all right. But this was part of his personality anyway.

All of us in China--although we never really were trained or educated in Chinese; we didn't go to Chinese schools; we didn't learn Chinese; we didn't even have Chinese playmates--almost all of us grew up with this strong attachment to China. It is a rather hard thing to account for.

*Q: to account Why is it hard for?*

SERVICE: Well, simply because we led a very different, separate life. I never had any Chinese playmates. I grew up in China--spent all my childhood there--without learning to read or write anything in Chinese. I learned to speak Chinese from the servants, but my parents saw no advantage or necessity, desirability, of having me learn to read or write.

We never thought of going to a Chinese school. We eventually went to an American school in Shanghai which tried as hard as possible to be like a school in the United States. It had no Chinese students. It didn't teach courses in Chinese history or in Chinese language.

We lived in compounds separated, isolated, insulated from China in many ways. And yet, as I say, all of us that I know of, or practically all of us, who were B-I-C, Born in China, ended up with tremendous nostalgia for China, a desire to go back to China, strong feelings of ties to China and particularly the Chinese people.

Now, I think that's the key. I think it's the people. Here's a random speculation. The real contact, clue, key, we had to China was our servants. The servants, by and large, were village people, country people. They came from the countryside into town to find work, and maybe they found work with us.

But, they all had the simplicity and honesty and virtues of peasants, country people. They devoted themselves completely to the family. Well, maybe they were in some ways like the mummies that we read about in the old days of life in the South. But these were not people who had any tradition of servitude. In the countryside they had never acted as servants. When they came to work for us there was never any humility or servility or anything like that.

They were people. They were independent people, and they worked for you, and they looked after your interests. They were completely devoted to the family, regarded themselves as almost part of the family, served the family I would say wholeheartedly. They were just good people. Maybe this has something to do with why so many of us liked China, because really the only China we knew was through our servants.

#### Jack's Early Memories: Western Style in a Chinese Compound

*Q: Do you think that's enough about the background?*

SERVICE: [laughter] Yes, but I could go on and on if you want.

*Q: What else?*

SERVICE: I'm over-prepared!

*Q: Wonderful.*

SERVICE: Where are we? [reading agenda] Oh goodness, "Early memories." All right.

I was born in 1909. I was very late. Apparently, I was born three weeks or a month later than they expected me. My mother always said I had long fingernails when I was born, a sign that I was, what to say, not premature, postmature.

*Q: Postmature, or else a mandarin. [laughter]*

SERVICE: I don't remember anything, of course, until the summer of 1912 when I was three. I mentioned that all the foreigners, including my parents, were evacuated in 1911, late 1911. My father came down to Shanghai, and then went to Nanking.

Then, after a few months in Nanking, he went back to Sichuan. He was very anxious, and the Y was anxious, for him to return to find what had happened and get things going again.

Families weren't permitted yet to return. So my mother went to Kuling which is up a mountain near Kiukiang, near the Yangtze River, and spent the summer there. I got very sick and apparently they thought that I'd had it. I have a vague recollection of a room, a very bare room, which I think was my sickroom. I remember the room spinning around. It's probably my first memory.

Then, after the summer we went down to Hangzhou on our way back up the river to Sichuan to join my father. My mother got quite sick in Hangzhou. She had recurrent bad health. I think that part of the whole picture of her reactions to China was that she was plagued with rheumatic fever, and, oh, various things. I've got some notes here. We don't need to go through them.

Anyway, she was sick in Hangzhou. We had a servant who had been with my mother at the mountain, a Sichuanese, who had come down river with us. He used to take me out to the Bund in Hangzhou every day for a walk. I remember the Bund. I remember walking down the Bund--it was an esplanade on the Yangtze--with my mother along with Liu P'ei-Yun, this cook of ours.

Sometime in here I remember we were out on a little trip or a walk in the countryside. The paths between the rice fields in Sichuan were very narrow, [gesturing with hands about two feet apart] just maybe wide enough for two people to pass. I remember walking along this path and seeing a rather large, stout Chinese coming towards me and then suddenly finding myself in the flooded rice field.

I remember my mother was absolutely frantic about this because, of course, the rice fields were fertilized with what we always called night soil, human manure, which was raw usually. Therefore, everything was supposed to be highly unsanitary, as it really was. Well, my mother was simply beside herself till we could get someplace where all my clothes could be taken off, I could be scrubbed down, and so on.

And her anger that this man had pushed me off the path--I have no recollection of the man actually pushing me off. I just don't remember what happened. He may have jostled me off. He may have just been unfriendly to foreigners. A lot of people were in those days. Or he may have

felt that as a child I should have stopped and waited for him to go by, which probably a small Chinese child would have done, would have waited for the elder person, this man, to walk by.

My father, of course, was not agreeing that the man had pushed me off. My mother was sure that he had, out of meanness.

We came back to the States in 1915. I remember some things about coming back to the States. I remember my surprise, for instance, at seeing white men working on the docks. Of course, I had never seen any white man doing this kind of physical work before. The idea had never occurred to me. To see men on the docks in San Francisco loading and unloading cargo was very strange.

I went to the Panama Pacific Exposition. Then, we went out to Cleveland, Ohio, where my father spent the year working in the Cleveland YMCA. I remember first grade in a public school fairly well.

Most of my memories of Chengdu really are when we went back. We went back to Sichuan in 1916, after the summer in America. We lived in Chengdu then from 1916, and I went to boarding school in Shanghai in 1920. So that most of my memories of Chengdu are of the years when I was seven, eight, nine, ten.

*Q: By then you had a brother, didn't you?*

SERVICE: Oh yes, I had two brothers. Bob was twenty-one months younger. Dick, Richard, was about five years younger than I was.

*Q: You mentioned living in a compound. Was this a single family compound where you lived around the courtyard, or did you live in a Western style house?*

SERVICE: No, it was a Chinese-style house and it was a single family courtyard. It belonged to the Methodist mission. They had had for a while a school, a middle school I think it was, in the next-door compound. So, these two compounds were opened up. They gave that up and the YMCA used it at first for temporary quarters for the Y. Then, eventually, I think we moved over there, and another family came and lived in what had been our house. But, most of this early period we were the only family in this place, the only foreign family.

There were several different mission compounds. The American Methodists, the Canadian Methodists, the Friends, would each have their own separate compounds. Each compound normally had one afternoon a week or maybe one afternoon every two weeks for its "at home" in tennis. Everybody played tennis. They'd have tea. We would all go, of course, to the Canadian Methodists on their day and to the American Methodists on their day and play tennis.

My father and mother were very keen that we children should be independent, not wanting to be catered to or looked after, waited on by the servants. This was a big thing. We always had to pick up our own clothes and pack our own bags when we traveled, wash ourselves, and not let the amah give us a bath.

When we had the tennis at our place we always earned money by picking up tennis balls.

Home Studies: The Montessori and Calvert Systems

*Q: How do you look back on your childhood in China? Was it a happy period for you?*

SERVICE: Oh, very happy. Yes, certainly. It was an odd life in the sense that it seems odd to have lived in a country and spent all your childhood there, and look back and realize that you never had a Chinese friend! We never played with Chinese children. I think for one thing, that my mother was terribly conscious about sanitation and so on.

Most of our servants didn't have children with them. The family was back--if they had a family--back in the village. I think our gateman at one time, or the cow coolie, did have his family with him. They lived out in the gate house. But, I don't think that the children of the servants would have played with the master's children anyway. I don't think there was that normal expectation.

In any case, my mother was simply obsessed that Chinese children were allowed to do things that we should not do, eat things we weren't allowed to do, and so on, so that we rarely saw them. Sometimes on Sundays there might be a visit to some family, university family or somebody in the Y, something like that.

*Q: I've got a question down here on the agenda, what was your sense of identity as an American boy growing up in China? I know that's a hard one to answer.*

SERVICE: Well, how much identity does any child have?

*Q: That's a good question!*

SERVICE: It's a matter of looking back on things now, of course, from a long time and a long distance. Looking back I'm surprised at the Americanness that my parents were so anxious--apparently anxious--to instill. We played mostly with American children, as I said, but also with some Canadians. But, we didn't go to the Canadian school. My mother felt that the school wasn't very good. It was just starting in. It was the equivalent perhaps of a one room or two room school in the early days in the United States. The teachers were usually untrained, whoever happened to be available, maybe some missionary daughter who had finished high school but hadn't gone on to college, or a wife who happened to be available.

My mother was a teacher. She had taught. After she finished at the U[niversity of] C[alifornia] and before she got married she had a couple years of teaching. At any rate, she thought the Calvert School was better.

But, also she wanted us to have an American education. She was very definite that we were coming to America eventually. We were going to an American school, American university. There was that feeling of identity.

The Americans always got together on Thanksgiving for instance. There was always some sort of a program on the Fourth of July. It seems odd that we would have, but maybe it's not odd for exiles far away from home to have put this stress on Americaness.

Obviously we felt very different from Chinese. We couldn't play with Chinese, as I mentioned. The Chinese were dirty and unsanitary. Yet, there was never any feeling of antipathy or hostility, nothing like that. My father obviously, as I said, loved Chinese. We liked our servants, and the servants were almost members of the family in some ways.

But, we did feel, I'm sure, a sort of a separateness, if not superiority, to Chinese. We were used to being considered as rather freakish, because if you traveled you were always surrounded by crowds of people, really crowds, who would keep pushing in closer and closer just to see you, just to look at you.

You were always called yang kuei-tzu, foreign devil, but without any particular animosity, because this was the only name that most of these children on the street knew for foreigners. "Look at the yang kuei-tzu! Look at the yang kuei-tzu! as you went down the street.

Of course, in villages in the countryside, you had no privacy at all. If you had to stop at a restaurant for your noonday meal when you were traveling, they'd keep getting closer and closer till finally my father or somebody would say, "Please move back. Give us some air."

If you stayed in a Chinese inn, they would try to come into the room, but you could close off the room. Then they would wet their finger and poke it through the paper of the lattice windows. [gestures] That lack of privacy bothered my mother, I'm sure, much more than it did we children.

*Q: Were you curious about America? I know you spent that year in Ohio.*

SERVICE: I don't remember being curious about it before then. Yes, I suppose we were curious. We read, of course, about America.

My mother was the political member of the family. She subscribed to The New Republic, I think, about as soon as it started. We got other magazines, Atlantic, and something called Survey or Survey Graphic which was published then. Century magazine was being published then. I think I read all of those. We also got things from Shanghai, The North China Herald, a weekly newspaper in Shanghai, and something called Millard's Review, which later on became the China Weekly Review. I suppose we were interested or curious about the United States, although I don't recall being much concerned.

Let me describe the day. Maybe that's the best thing to do.

My mother had started me when I was five on the Montessori system, which I think is sort of interesting, that she, way up in West China, had written and gotten a Montessori preschool outfit.

So, I had learned how to read and write--read at least--before I started first grade. I was ready for first grade, and I had that in public school in Cleveland, 1915-1916.

My mother had talked to the teacher in the first grade. Because I could read before I started first grade the teacher said, "Well, obviously little Jack can go quite well. I think he can skip second grade."

My mother decided to order the Calvert School [curriculum], which is a home study system. But, it has only six grades. They do the eight grades in six years. She ordered the third grade in the Calvert system. So, in effect I skipped more than a year, you see.

Every morning the first thing to do, first order of business, was your classes, your schoolwork. The Calvert system sent out textbooks, daily assignment sheets, examination questions. You sent the completed examinations back to Baltimore to the head office and they graded them.

I would get up and get to my studies. As soon as you finished your studies for the day, you were free. So, I was very eager on this. I used to finish up, do my recitation, and I might be through by nine thirty or ten o'clock.

Then the day was yours. I was very fond of reading and my parents had the Encyclopedia Britannica, the eleventh edition I think. I was very keen on--I'm talking now, oh, about eight, nine, ten years old probably--very keen on looking up things in the encyclopedia, categorizing things. I remember using the encyclopedia to look up all the Crusades and to study antelopes and various kinds of animals, one thing or another leading you on.

Maybe every other day or so we would go in the afternoon to some other compound, always in a sedan chair when we were small. Later on I would walk, but we always had a servant with us. Eventually we got ponies, Chinese horses, small horses. We'd play with children at this place or that place and come home.

We used to watch, of course, what went on around the house. We'd steal cookies from the cookie jar in the kitchen and watch the cook cooking the meals and so on, play around the compound.

The big thing, I think, was the trips that we used to take. My father was very keen on finding a good place for the family to go in the summer. It was accepted that you couldn't stay in a place like Chengdu during the summer months because it was very damp, very hot and humid. There was a lot of disease, cholera and so on, in the summer time. Almost everyone tried to get away.

The family kept trying to find an ideal place, and finally my father found a mountain which rather stood out from the range that was north of the Chengdu plain. It was about six thousand feet high. The top of it had been a place of refuge. If a mountain was difficult of access, the local people would put a wall around the top, and when there was banditry, civil war, or other disturbance, villagers from the area would go up and take refuge.

Anyway, there was this old chai-tzu, they called it, up there at the top. It belonged to a temple in one of the villages near the foot of the mountain. My father rented this place, took a long-term lease on the top of the mountain. First we, and then quite a few people built small cottages up there on the top of the mountain.

When we took over this mountain--when my father started this summer colony you might say--it was completely undeveloped. So we all helped building trails and paths, connecting the houses and going out to scenic places.

We boys used to have a little secret hideout of our own, a little shack in the woods, a lean-to where we would go and fix lunches. Good fun, not too different from American boyhood in a way, a place in the woods and so on.

So we went there for three or four months every summer. My father would take us up there and then go back to Chengdu--it was two days travel, fifty miles--and then come back, oh, maybe several times during the summer for a weekend or maybe a week or more.

But, always during the summer we would take a trip to the mountains. As I got older, each summer we would go further, explore new mountains.

We were exploring. It was new country. Foreigners had never been to a lot of these places before. Each year we got higher, nine thousand, ten thousand, finally quite high. Eventually we got to fifteen thousand feet.

*Q: You told me you had some footnotes from our last interview that you wanted to add.*

SERVICE: I think you asked me something about why we made these trips to the mountains every summer. I failed to mention what probably was the most obvious of all. That is, that both of my parents loved the mountains. They had a great feeling for nature. My mother, for instance, had John Muir's books--several of them. I remember reading some myself as a boy, particularly one about a winter trip that John Muir made by himself, climbing Mount Shasta.

This love of the mountains was carried over when we came back to the States, because every summer that we were here we went off with some of my uncles to the High Sierra.

Even in 1916, the family had a reunion at a place called Bass Lake which is a resort lake up from Fresno. But, in 1924 and '25, and again in '27 when I came here on the way to college, I went up with my uncles--my father and my uncles--up to Tuolumne Meadows. In those days that was quite a trip, dirt road, gravel road.

The road down to Lake Tenaya was a one-way road, you know, one hour up, one hour down. I drove with a cousin in an old Model T Ford, and the road was so steep at one point that we had to turn around and go in reverse. The gas fed the carburetor by gravity, so that if you had to go up a steep hill, it wouldn't reach the carburetor. Going backward we could make it.

It was quite a trip, but not nearly as much as when the family first started going there. My uncle--Fred Goodsell, who married my father's sister--has told me about going up with the Service family, camping in Yosemite Valley in either 1903 or 1904 when they went by wagon.

The main purpose of these expeditions to the mountains was fishing. They really camped. They took sacks of potatoes and sacks of onions and sacks of this and that. We lived on fish and pancakes. The real purpose was fishing. But, I wasn't very keen on fishing.

Every day we would go off to some fishing lake near the meadows, within walking distance. Then, I would decide what mountain I was going to climb. I would spend the day scrambling up one of the peaks around there. I climbed all the peaks within one-day walking distance of Tuolumne Meadows, I think. In '27 my cousin and I climbed Mount Lyell. At any rate I developed a liking for the mountains naturally.

When I was growing up in China, the best part of the year, really, was the summer and these trips. Then, eventually, as I got older--when I was ten, nine and ten--why, we'd make a trip to the mountains in the winter because there was always snow up there, at six thousand feet. There was never snow in Chengdu. Chengdu was about fifteen hundred feet in elevation but practically never saw snow. We'd go up usually for, oh, five or six days in the winter time and see the snow.

*Q: The topography of Sichuan--I remember Chen Shih-Hsiang telling me--really does look like some of the fantastic Chinese scrolls. Was your sort of mountain like that?*

SERVICE: Well, not so much there. Through the Yangtze Gorges you get some of the scenery that you see in paintings. But, these mountains were really more alpine mountains, Matterhorn type. Hang on. [Brings out framed watercolor by A.C. Morse]

This is painted from our mountain. We were out in front of the main range, and you can see the main range back here in the distance. We gave names to these places. These are the Three Muffins over here and some peak called Chiu-feng up there.

*[Interview 2: April 6, 1977]*

SERVICE: The high point of the summer, was when my father took us on vacation. My mother always said my father never took as much vacation as most other men did. But, he would take a week or ten days or so, and we would take a trip up into the mountains beyond our summer resort.

There were usually temples, incidentally, on top of these mountains, either Buddhist or Taoist temples. Both religions apparently shared the idea that the higher the mountain, the closer to heaven. So, there were old temples. By this time, after years of civil war and disturbance, they were generally in deplorable condition, but usually there were a few old monks there. We would stay at these temples.

#### The Winter Harvest: Ice Cream Making in Chengdu

SERVICE: Yes. Let's go back to China for a minute. You asked me if there was anything else I could think of.

The last two winters in Chengdu we made the trip up the mountain. One reason we made those winter trips was that my father had a passion for ice cream. We couldn't have ice cream. There was no ice, you see, in Chengdu.

He had gotten the idea of building an icehouse up on the mountain. There was a caretaker to look after the bungalows, and he would put away ice, you see, in the winter. Then it would either be kept for the summer or we would send somebody up the mountain to bring it down.

Well, it never worked out very well because for one thing the Chinese just couldn't really fathom the wasteful idea of using--sawdust, mainly, for packing ice. They would never use enough sawdust to preserve it.

So, we went up to supervise the building and the filling of the icehouse. The ice wasn't very thick and the only source we had--there was no pond or anything--was cisterns. We had cisterns and we'd take ice. It was quite thin ice. [about one inch thick, gesturing] It never kept till summer. By summertime we never had any ice.

So, what finally happened was that along in April my father would send a man from Chengdu fifty miles up the mountain to bring ice down to Chengdu. We would know about when he should arrive, and everything would all be ready. The custard would be made, and we would expect the man in about four or five o'clock on the second day.

We had an awful time getting ice cream makers. We ordered stuff from Montgomery Ward. Every year we sent an order to Montgomery Ward, and it would take a year maybe for the order to get to Chungking. The first one, my father decided was too small. It was a two quart or something like that. Then, we got another. Finally we got a six quart freezer.

Before the man arrived the custard would all be ready. Then, the man would come puffing in with what was left [laughter] of the load of ice. Then, we would make ice cream.

Again it was very difficult to get the Chinese to use enough salt. So, this meant we had to really do it ourselves because wasting salt--salt is very valuable and precious.

But we would finally get six quarts of ice cream. There were five people in the family. So, we couldn't eat it all. People would, of course, be invited in to help share the ice cream, the Yards and other friends. We gorged ourselves on ice cream about, maybe twice a year. All this building of icehouses and so on, all it would produce was about three gallons of ice cream!

### A Geographic and Ethnographic Trip into Tibet

SERVICE: In the final year I was in Chengdu, in 1921 when I was just having my twelfth birthday, my father and two other men made a trip that they had talked about for years. It was over the range, and then into the Min River Valley north of Kwanhsien and then into what was called "tribes country" where the people were all Tibetan peoples.

It was quite an intellectually active missionary society in Chengdu. It had a West China Missionary News and the West China Border Research Society which was started in 1922, 1923. I wrote an article for the Missionary News on this trip that I'm talking about.

All these people felt that they were on the edge of things, on a sort of frontier. They were interested in research on the various ethnic groups of aboriginal peoples, Tibet and so on, and a lot of the pre-Chinese groups that were still living in Sichuan, Lolos and others.

Wherever they went, my father and these other people made notes and maps. My father carried a boiling point thermometer, a hypsometer, to get a very precise reading of the altitude, and aneroid barometers--things like that we always carried. Over the high pass, we got a reading of 15,300 feet on the barometer and 15,000 feet on the hypsometer.

All these places we went to in the summer trips were along a range north of where we were, which lay between us and the upper valley of the Min River, which comes down through Kwanhsien and waters the Chengdu plain.

Anyway, there was supposed to be this opium smugglers' trail over this range. My father always talked about trying to cross the mountains into the Min River Valley. So, this year, finally in 1921, we did it.

But when we started we didn't know very much about the height of the mountain or the distance. Our guide claimed that he'd been over it, but later on it turned out he didn't really know much about it. It took us much longer and was much more difficult and higher than we expected.

We expected a trip of about four days from habitation to habitation, four days to cross the range. We had supplies and food, but actually it turned out to take us a week, seven days. So we ran out of food.

#### Boarding at the Shanghai American School, 1920-1924

*Q: When did you go away to boarding school in Shanghai?*

SERVICE: By 1920. I'd gone through the sixth grade of Calvert School. So, the question was what to do with me. The obvious thing was for me to go down to Shanghai to the American school. My mother went down the river with me. It took, I think, six weeks, a little more than six weeks to make the trip.

*Q: Good gracious.*

SERVICE: Anyway, we got to the school late. It was October, late October when we got there. My mother expected me to go into high school because I'd finished the grades. But, I'd just had my eleventh birthday, and I was very late for the school year. The school made me do eighth grade over again, which was very boring. It was a bad idea, but there was no help for it.

This school was for American children. About half were day pupils from Shanghai. There were some missionary, but most of them were business and official children. The other half were boarding pupils, and they were practically all missionaries' children.

As I've said already it was single-mindedly trying to be an American school. There were a few non-American, white children, but there were no Chinese. They taught nothing about China. They didn't teach the language or anything like this.

We even tried to play baseball and American football and basketball, but not sports where we could compete with any other schools, because no one else in Shanghai played baseball except for the American community team. We were rather foolish, I thought, in pursuing American sports. That's when I first saw Harry Kingman because he played for the American local community team.

As soon as Kingman came out to Shanghai as a Y secretary, he began playing for the community team in Shanghai, a local team. Of course, he was far better than anyone else. He was a star. He'd played for the big leagues, I think the New York Yankees. So, he quickly became the star of Shanghai. We were all very much impressed, in fact dumbfounded, to see the way he could throw the ball from first base to third base across the diamond, almost like a bullet, without its rising at all.

He became a pitcher. I don't think he was a pitcher in the big leagues, but in Shanghai he was good enough to be the star pitcher for the local team. So we all knew Harry Kingman, although I didn't see a great deal of him outside of watching from the bleachers.

And football was a similar problem. We had to play against a local pick-up men's team or against the American Navy. If a gunboat or something was in town, they would have a team.

In any case, all these things were quite irrelevant to me, because in eighth grade at eleven, I was still two years younger than anyone else in the class. Also, I got my growth rather late. So, I was very much of a shrimp, and hadn't started really to grow. Furthermore, having grown up in a place like Chengdu in West China, I had never seen a roller skate or ridden a bicycle. I'd never played any ball games. I'd never had any participation in athletics. Being very small and unskilled when it came to choosing teams, I was always the last one to be chosen. I hated ball games and never really participated very much, any more than I had to.

This was why I waited out two years before I went to college because I was fed up with being two years younger than everyone else. I was fifteen when I graduated from high school, and I waited two years before I went to college.

*Q: Apart from hating sports and being bored in your classwork, how was the rest of school?*

SERVICE: Well, it was tough at first because everyone had read about British boarding schools and they had the idea of having fags, smaller boys who did errands for the bigger boys. This I found a little hard to take.

Also, just having so many other Americans, I think, was hard to take. I mean I'd lived in a community where I went over to play with the Davies boys one day or the Canright boys another day. I just wasn't used to having so many of my kind.

The whole business of hazing and fags and so on made the first term rather tough, or at least the first couple of months. My name, Service, sounds like Latin servus, "slave," so some boys tried to call me slave, and I had a couple of fights over that. After I was willing to stand up and fight it out, we outgrew that sort of thing.

I was fairly homesick in those first two or three months but there were YMCA people in Shanghai that kept an eye out for me. My parents had a friend who was a classmate at U[niversity of] C[alifornia], who was working in the consulate there, a man named Sawyer. He used to take me out, for walks on Sundays, things like that.

I was fascinated really--I became fascinated--just by Shanghai. It was such an exciting and, for me, strange place. Transportation, railways--there was a little railway out near us, not far from the school. We were in the Hongkow section of Shanghai, in rented buildings. There was a short railway that ran through Shanghai down to Woosung. I used to go out and just sit and watch the train. If you put your ear to the rail, you could hear the train coming--or I'd listen to the telephone poles, you could hear the whistling in the wires.

Then I found I could go down to the docks and watch the ships. I used to do that weekends, not always alone, sometimes with other boys. The school finally found out about this and were horrified. You read novels about crime, and the docks and the waterside are always supposed to be the worse places! Here we were young lads, [chuckle] eleven and twelve, spending our Saturdays wandering up and down the docks of Shanghai or going across the river to Pootung.

The second year I was there, we lived in what was really a residence, which had been rented and used as a dormitory. There was a heavy, cast iron drainpipe--and we could get out of our window and go up and down the drainpipe. So when friends were leaving for West China, I used to go down and see them off. Their boats left about midnight.

Eventually the school found out about this because someone reported it to the school. They had seen me down at such and such dock seeing some boat off at eleven o'clock. Well, of course, we were supposed to be in bed by eight, I think, eight or eight thirty. So, this got back to the school, and they were going to expel me. But I couldn't easily be expelled because I lived a month away, a month or more travel away. So, they relented.

I enjoyed Shanghai. I learned how to read some Chinese by the numbers on the cars, because the numbers on the streetcars were in English and Chinese. So my first Chinese that I learned was the numbers.

We had a little bit--not very much--spending money. We used to go off to Chinese shops, little tiny sort of Papa-Mama shops, you know, that sold all sorts of things to eat, various things. This was all strictly against the rules, but we used to buy peanuts, buy duck eggs. Chinese were very

fond of duck eggs that had been hard-boiled and then sort of pickled in salt. They were very salty inside. Things like that--

One year there was a big missionary conference in Shanghai. There was a Scout troop, and I joined it as soon as I could. I was very active in the Boy Scouts and eventually became senior patrol leader, although it was rather embarrassing because I could never become a first class scout since I didn't swim. You see, in my boyhood in West China there was no possibility of swimming, no place to swim. I was a second class scout while I was senior patrol leader.

When the school moved to new premises in the French Concession in my last boarding year, 1923-1924, it was isolated, and there were no stores or anything nearby. So, the scout troop set up a little store. We sold candy bars and things like that. We started Saturday night movies. We ran that partly because we had a very, very active scout leader.

But, in any case, a lot of people were coming into Shanghai from other mission stations, interior and so on. Someone got the idea that they might need help in being guided to wherever they were going to stay, missionary homes or some hotel or somebody's home, residence.

So we set up a traveler's aid post in the main railway station and took care of these people. But, in between train times we would wander all around the yards, and of course, we had great larks.

It gave me--I wouldn't say it gave me--I already had the sense of adventure and of charging about and exploring, from the very beginning, from my father. Of course, what we kids were doing charging around the railway yards of Shanghai, I don't know. [chuckle]

But foreigners could do almost anything, you know. No one was going to stop you. Actually, no one was going to touch us, as I found out. Chinese kids would have been stopped, I'm sure, from running around the railway yard. Chinese kids would steal in there, go in there to pick up scraps of coal, half burned coal, or something like that. They'd be chased away. But, no one was going to chase away foreign kids. Foreigners lived a sort of special life, were special persons.

*Q: Well, it seems as though you certainly got away with murder at that school.*

SERVICE: Oh, yes.

*Q: Was the education reasonably good?*

SERVICE: Yes, I think quite good. Fair. Most of us did quite well when we came back to the States. You know, most of the children went on to college. Most of the missionaries were college-trained people. There were some that weren't, Pentecostals and so on. But, in those days they were very much of a minority. So, most of the missionaries--and certainly most of the children that went to Shanghai American School--went on to college, and I think most of us did pretty well.

*Q: What did you do with your school vacations?*

SERVICE: Usually people invited me. I don't think that this was arranged, because some of these people were people my parents didn't know. But, my friends would apparently ask their parents, "Well, here is this boy and he can't go home for Christmas. Can't we invite him here?"

This business of having people visiting you for a long time was accepted. Everyone did it. People had to stay with somebody. So, there was never any problem. I always had invitations for Easter and Christmas vacations to someone else's home.

I went to Soochow one Christmas vacation with a boy named Smart. His father died and his mother moved to Berkeley later on. I went out to Shanghai University once with some Baptist people. Several times I stayed with YMCA friends, particularly the Wilburs who knew my parents.

#### Twelfth Grade and Graduation from Berkeley High, 1924-1925

*Q: I guess your parents finally got a home leave in 1924. Is that right?*

SERVICE: Yes, that's right, in 1924, from Chungking where my father had been asked to start a YMCA. It was my father's second home leave, although he had been in China by that time, what, nineteen years?

The original plan was, I think, that the family was going to go through Europe. But, for some reason that couldn't be done. So, we came straight across the Pacific, to Berkeley. My grandparents' house had been burned down in the Berkeley fire. [1923] It had been on Oxford Street in that block which is now an experimental University garden.

We stayed up here on Spruce Street with an uncle. Then, we rented a house at Spruce and Rose, and I went to Berkeley High for my last year of school.

*Q: How did that strike you after Shanghai?*

SERVICE: Terrible.

*Q: Really?*

SERVICE: Oh, yes. I disliked it very much. It was not a happy year at all.

*Q: What was the matter?*

SERVICE: Well, I don't know. It was just a huge, big school.

*Q: About how big then?*

SERVICE: Oh, it was over two thousand. It was sort of overwhelming for that reason.

*Q: About how many had you had in your school in Shanghai?*

SERVICE: Oh, the whole school had been about four hundred, but that included the lower grades and high school. High school was a hundred, hundred and fifty, something like that. I forget, there were something like thirty people in my class there, my junior class, my last year there.

But, for one thing you arrived from a place like China with your clothes absolutely ridiculous, you know, by American standards. I said my mother made our clothes. Even after we went to Shanghai, Shanghai clothes didn't look like anything here.

We didn't realize in China that boys, by the time they're seniors in high school, wear long pants. When I started to Berkeley--I had just had my fifteenth birthday--I was still very much a runt and I was wearing short pants. I got a lot of kidding about wearing short pants, a senior in high school! So, I got my father quickly to take me out and buy some long trousers, some cords. Everyone wore cords in those days. Of course, they had to be dirty. So, it took me a while to get these dirty enough to be respectable.

I didn't want anyone to know I had been in China because the first time we came to America, when I was six, we were always being embarrassed by being shown off as coming from China.

People would say, "Oh, speak some Chinese for us!" or "Get something we can use for chopsticks. Let's see you eat some rice," and this sort of thing. I made my parents promise not to let anybody know we were from China, not make a big thing of it. So, I tried very hard to keep it a secret that I was [laughter] a strange freak from China.

You have no friends. You come as a senior. Most other people have got their friends. And I worked very hard, maybe because I had nothing else to do.

*Q: Were you behind academically?*

SERVICE: Oh, no. I did very well.

*Q: I didn't mean to suggest that, but I mean how good was your preparation in China?*

SERVICE: I think the preparation in Shanghai was okay. Later on when I started to college I had a problem because I didn't have trigonometry. But, last year of high school here at Berkeley I did extremely well, which was a great boon when I applied at Oberlin which will come along a little later.

## **II AROUND THE WORLD IN EIGHT YEARS: SHANGHAI TO SHANGHAI, 1925-1933**

### Apprentice Architect in Shanghai

SERVICE: The sensible thing to do was to go back with my parents to Shanghai. I had liked mechanical drawing very much. The YMCA had an architectural office in Shanghai because they

had quite a large building program at this time. This was mid-twenties. They were building YMCAs and residences around China. So, they had an architectural office and through a little parental pull I got a job as an apprentice draftsman in this architectural office. I worked there for eighteen months.

I liked it quite a bit, and I thought for a while I would be an architect. For some reason I convinced myself that to be an architect one had to really be an artist and creative and I didn't have that. So I thought I could be a civil engineer which was related to architecture, but more practical.

*Q: How was the office set up?*

SERVICE: An architect named A.Q. Adamson was employed by the YMCA as head of the YMCA Building Bureau. He was a trained architect, but his main function was administrative. He ran the office, made sure things were done.

They also employed a Hungarian architect named Shafer whom my parents had known quite well. He was a refugee. He had been a soldier in the Austro-Hungarian army during the First World War. During the Russian Revolution they broke out of the camps, or no one kept them in the camps. He and a lot of other Czechs and so on worked their way clear across Siberia and finally got to China.

He had come up to Chungking when my parents were there on a contract to survey a motor road from Chungking to Chengdu. So, they had got to know him. One way or another he had gotten a job in this YMCA Building Bureau. He did most of the designing, actual architectural designing.

Then there was a crew of draftsmen, most of them Chinese except myself.

*Q: What tradition did he design in?*

SERVICE: Most of the houses, the YMCA residences, were very utilitarian, perhaps a trace of European. He built the foreign Y in Shanghai which is Italian Renaissance, I suppose.

*Q: Eclectic?*

SERVICE: Eclectic, yes, but more Italian Renaissance than anything else.

*Q: What were your functions?*

SERVICE: I was simply, as I say, a very junior draftsman. I was given jobs of working up floor plans. Shafer would give me the rough layout and the size of the rooms, and I drew the very simplest type of detailed floor plans.

I don't think that we had to conform to any particular building codes, certainly not in Chinese cities. We probably did have to in the [International] Settlement of Shanghai. We were building one building there, and that's what I worked on most of the time, the Foreign YMCA in

Shanghai. It was a big building, I think about ten or eleven stories, which for Shanghai was big. There were several Chinese YMCAs in Shanghai. Then there was a Navy YMCA which was built to take care of seamen, particularly navy seamen.

*Q: Did you get out to the building sites?*

SERVICE: I don't think the Foreign Y was started because I was still working on the plans. [laughter] So I don't think that I actually saw it under construction. I didn't get to any of the other sites because they were all inland or elsewhere.

*Q: I was wondering if it was the custom for architects to supervise the building.*

SERVICE: Yes. I think that the YMCA Building Bureau usually had someone to supervise, just as here.

*Q: Right.*

SERVICE: The bureau made the contracts and, of course, you have to have some representative to supervise, make sure the contractor fulfills the contract. But, who that was in Shanghai I don't know, because there was no one around when I was there. It may have been Adamson himself that would go out and check. I don't know.

*Q: Do you have any idea how the fee system worked? Did you get ten percent or was it on a flat fee for work done?*

SERVICE: This was an office of the YMCA, and people were simply paid by the Y.

*Q: Salaried?*

SERVICE: Salaried, yes. I assume that the Y was having enough of a building program going on that it paid them to hire their own staff, rather than work on any sort of a fee system.

I actually worked in the office building of the national committee of the YMCA. The national committee had a building in the downtown area of Shanghai. We were on one of the top floors of that.

### A Blank Period, A Fairly Quiet Year

*Q: This was an exciting period in Chinese history. How much did you see of what was going on?*

SERVICE: Well, actually, you see, I missed most of the excitement because the 1925, May 30, demonstrations took place when we were still in the States. It was just about the time I was graduating, just before I graduated. I remember my parents being very concerned and very alarmed at what was going on, reading the newspapers. But, by the time I got to China in the fall of '25 the excitement was over.

Then, the Northern Expedition was starting in 1926, coming up from Canton. Chiang Kai-shek was leading one wing. I remember our house boy that we had in Shanghai, our cook boy, being very concerned, very excited about it--he was obviously a patriot of the Nationalists--and talking to him about how good these people were. Most of the foreign press was treating them all as Reds and Bolsbies. Chiang Kai-shek was called a Bolshevik and so on. But our cook was very pleased and excited about it.

Then I left Shanghai in late '26 to come home. I was actually in Shanghai from September 25, 1925, until December 26, 1926. Then, I came on a long, round the world trip to go to college. I actually read about the events of the spring of 1927 when I was in Paris. I remember buying the Paris Herald Tribune and sitting there--in front of the Madeleine, I think it was--sitting down and reading all these exciting things about the attacks on foreigners in Nanking and so on. But on the whole, except for the fact that the Northern Expedition was starting and people were beginning to be concerned about what seemed to be the anti-foreign thrust of the Kuomintang, it wasn't a terribly exciting time.

There was a build-up of foreign troops in Shanghai. There was alarm. Almost every country was bringing more forces into Shanghai by the time I left. But, it really wasn't until '27 that the big crunch came. So, I came in between.

*Q: What did you do with your spare time and how did you live?*

SERVICE: Well, I remember very little about it. It just was not a very exciting period, sort of a blank period.

I lived at home with my parents. I had a bout of asthma, quite a serious bout of asthma. I had jaundice that year, went into a hospital for several days. They didn't know how to treat jaundice. But, otherwise it was a fairly quiet year.

In the summer of 1926, my parents went to Tsingtao where they rented a cottage. Tsingtao was one of the places where people from Shanghai went for the summer. But, I couldn't get that much vacation, of course, so I only went up for a short while.

A friend of theirs, a Methodist missionary who later on became a bishop, was going to Peking. So, I went up to Peking with him, summer of '26, and we had, I forget, maybe a week in Peking.

But, the most exciting part of that trip was that--The fighting had just stopped between Feng Yu-Hsiang's army and Chiang Tso-Lin's army. Feng, the so-called Christian general, who had a very good army, well trained troops, had withdrawn from Peking, had been forced out of Peking by Chiang Tso-Lin. He withdrew northwestward up the railway to Nankow Pass and then fortified himself. Finally after some very severe and heavy fighting he had been driven out of the Pass northward into Inner Mongolia.

The railway had just been opened up. We got on one of the first trains to go. It was terribly crowded and we managed to get ourselves onto the cow catcher of the locomotive. It was a huge locomotive. This was the only railway in China that had American locomotives. It was because

of the very steep grades. They had thought that American locomotives, being heavier and more powerful for the Rockies, would be better.

So, it was a great locomotive with a large platform out front. We had, I suppose, eight or ten people, all crowded on to this platform, in front of this huge, puffing, snorting, double-barreled steam engine, went up through Nankow Pass and so on. That was a lot of fun.

We saw the trenches and saw the battlefields. There had been a lot of serious fighting.

### Some of the Sights of Peking

SERVICE: My missionary guide was very much interested in the plight of the women involved in the night life of a city like Peking. So he took me on a tour of the brothels of Peking. Being dragged around by a missionary--who, of course, was not doing any business, he was just going around and talking to the people, the girls and the madams, and just observing--was a bit bizarre, it seemed to me.

*Q: What did he hope to accomplish?*

SERVICE: Well, I don't know. I assume he had a sociological missionary interest in the conditions. He obviously had done it before.

*Q: How did the situation strike you?*

SERVICE: I think we better take this thing out of this!

*Q: Okay. I'll make a note. Can you really see anything wrong with that? Gladstone did it after all.*

SERVICE: Yes, well, it just seemed like an odd--It seemed to me to be a strange thing to do. I was curious in a young way, I suppose, but I had never really--I knew such things existed, of course, but I had never thought of visiting a brothel before. We went all through the places outside the Chien men [the old main gate of Peking's Tartar City].

*Q: How did you react to the brothels?*

SERVICE: Oh, if you mean was I attracted or excited, no. I was just sort of perplexed as I recall, curious. I don't remember having any very strong reaction.

*Q: What did your parents say about that?*

SERVICE: I never told them. I never told them, [chuckle] just as I never told my parents about these other incidents. My parents never knew about these things in high school I talked about. You feel sort of ashamed that you don't react or don't defend yourself, but it all happens so suddenly that you can't. So, you just feel ashamed of it afterward I think. But, this thing, there didn't seem to be any point in telling my parents about it.

I saw the main sights of Peking. You couldn't see very much of the Forbidden City, but you could see the Temple of Heaven.

The man I was with stayed with someone in the Bible Society, and they had an old Dodge which was a famous car. It was a Dodge touring car, about 1924 or '25 model, which apparently was a very sturdy car. It wasn't a four-wheel drive or anything like that, but it would go on the worst kinds of roads and was very popular in North China and Inner Mongolia. Roy Chapman Andrews was making his trips about that time, and this was the kind of car they used. I remember riding around Peking in this old Dodge touring car.

*Q: Was there anything else you wanted to say about those China years?*

SERVICE: I don't think so.

### A Long, Solitary Tour Through Asia and Europe

SERVICE: I had the idea of studying engineering in college. It was always taken for granted I would go to [University of California] Berkeley. No other place was ever suggested. But if I was going to take engineering, I needed trigonometry and I hadn't had trigonometry. So, we planned that I would come here to Berkeley for summer school.

*Q: This was in--*

SERVICE: Nineteen twenty-seven. I had always wanted to make the trip through Europe. It had been talked of in '24, been impossible. So, it was planned that I would travel alone from Shanghai as far as Ceylon, and at Ceylon I would be picked up by some people from the YMCA coming on a following ship. Then, I would travel through Europe with these people.

But after I left Shanghai their plans were changed by the YMCA. They were told they couldn't take the time for the trip. They had to go directly to the United States. So, my parents telegraphed me, did I wish to go on or did I wish to come back? I could do either one. Of course I decided to go on.

The ship went to Singapore. I left it there and went up through the Malay states. At Penang I got a British India boat to Burma, spent a little while there, went up to Mandalay and back, and then to India.

There were YMCA people in all these places, and my father had written to some of them. So I could always check in with the YMCA people, and they helped me plan my sightseeing.

When I got to India I went to Calcutta and a very nice man there helped me plan my India tour, which was quite an extensive tour eventually.

I traveled alone, had a sleeping bag, a sleeping roll, and I spent nights on trains when I could--a very sensible thing to do.

I got up to Darjeeling. I had quite a trip, Taj Mahal.

*Q: Did you make comparisons in your mind between India and China? How did India impress you?*

SERVICE: I don't remember too much. I remember being very depressed. I did not like India, never have liked India. I'm sure my feeling was the same then, that it was so much more of a hopeless place than China, the attitude of the people.

But, I've been to India so many times since that it's a little unfair for me to try to really analyze what was my feeling at the age of seventeen, except that I never felt the affection or closeness or sympathy with the people of India that I do for the people in China.

*Q: Did it bother you that it was a colony?*

SERVICE: No, I can't say that it did. To be perfectly honest I thought the British did a good job of running it, the railways and so on, were good.

Then I picked up another steamer in Colombo, Ceylon, and went on to Europe. The ship landed in Genoa. I had talked to people on the boat--it was in March--and decided the best thing to do was to take another boat down to Naples, then come north with the spring.

I had gotten a guidebook by this time and looked up pensions, cheap. So I went to a rather modest pension in Naples. At the first meal--they had meals served at a long table, family style--there were two American women right across the table from me, and talking away about San Francisco, San Francisco Bay.

I said nothing because no one said anything to me. But, at the end of the meal one of the ladies leaned across the table to me and said, "Do you speak English?" I said, "Yes, I speak English and I come from the same part of the country you people come from." So, they were quite interested.

We chatted a bit. They had just arrived in Naples and I had just arrived in Naples. So, they said, "Well, we're going out this afternoon to Pozzuoli," I think it was, near Naples. "Would you like to come along?" I said, "Fine." They said, "Well, meet us down here in the lobby in half an hour."

When I came down there was a young American woman with them, a very attractive young woman. They asked my name to introduce me. I said, "My name is Service." One of the women looked surprised and said, "Younger brother of Roy Service?" I said, "No, son."

It turned out that both these women were school teachers in San Francisco and had been classmates of my mother's and father's at Berkeley. The young woman was a ward of one of them, a singer. She'd been singing in the San Francisco opera, minor singer. But, she had done well enough to get a job, a learning job, in the San Carlo opera company in Naples for a year.

She was going to take some time off and travel around Italy with her guardian and her guardian's friend--these old, old ladies they seemed. [chuckle] They were in their mid-forties, I suppose, if they were in my parents' class because at this time my parents would be forty-seven.

At any rate, I sort of tagged along through Italy with these people and then spent a week in Switzerland. It was April and you couldn't do much climbing. It was between seasons.

By this time I had gotten the idea of bicycling through England. I went to France, but I didn't like France because the French that I had had in the American School I found was very little help when I got to a real French-speaking area.

### What to Major in? A Switch from Engineering to Economics

SERVICE: I did fairly well my first year, except with my idea of engineering. I had signed up for a very heavy math course. It had a woman instructor who, I think, was probably just starting teaching. At any rate, I don't think she was a very good teacher.

They had the honor system in Oberlin. You always sign the honor pledge at the end of the blue book, "I have received no help," and so on. On the first blue book that we took in this course I forgot all about the pledge, and I didn't sign it.

So, when I got my blue book back, zero. Well, it was another thing like this mechanical drawing thing business. [Allegation that Jack stole a T-square in high school] I said, "I'm very sorry, but this was the first blue book I've taken, and I just forgot all about it." Well, she finally gave me credit. Anyway, I had decided by that time I didn't like mathematics, not all that much.

This meant that I wasn't going to be an engineer. My college experience really was a sort of a floundering, groping around, not knowing what I wanted to do. After a good start in my first freshman semester, I seemed gradually to go downhill. Then in my junior year I began to get interested again and to come up. My junior year and my senior year I did quite well. But, there was no Phi Beta Kappa key like my future wife got!

*Q: What did you major in?*

SERVICE: Well, this again was a funny business because after I lost interest in engineering, I didn't know what to major in. I ended up with a minimum economics major, because economics just seemed the sensible thing to do--practical.

But, I took courses like economic history of the United States. I liked history. Economic history of the United States was history, but it would count for economics. I had to take a course in accounting. I took a course in foreign trade and things like that. But, I got by with just a barebones minimum economic major.

I actually took my introductory economics in the fall of 1929, right during the crash. I don't think our professor had any conception of what really was happening on Wall Street. Not many people did, except that stock prices were going up. When the market broke, he believed that this was

just another business cycle. This one happened to be worse, but we would come out of it all right. In fact, for a long time he was quite optimistic that it wasn't going to be a very serious one.

I had one professor, a quiet old fellow who I think was probably a Socialist, but he was very discreet about what his real beliefs were. He sometimes would make a quiet remark that indicated that he didn't believe the old classical economics that the head of the department taught--who was sure that the Depression was not a very serious or deep one.

*Q: When you were taking your economics were the theories of Keynes brought in at all?*

SERVICE: Not at all. Well, Keynes may have been mentioned, but none of our professors were Keynesian, and certainly we learned nothing about Keynes' theories. I mean it was pretty much Adam Smith with maybe a little Marshall and Ricardo, but it was not Keynesian.

*Q: What language did you take?*

SERVICE: I offered French. I had had a little French in Shanghai American School, but it was abominable, so I told them I knew some Chinese. They sent me around to see a Foreign Service officer up in the Division of Chinese Affairs, who turned out to be someone my parents had known and I had known slightly in Shanghai.

He was rather busy and surprised. He said, "Well, I haven't spoken any Chinese for a long time." A lot of people didn't keep up their Chinese very well. He said, "Just tell me something about yourself, where you were born, where you went to school, and what you're doing."

So, I rattled on for a while in my terrible Sichuanese. He said, "Well obviously, you know some Chinese." [laughter]

After the oral, the examiners said, "Wait in the waiting room outside, the anteroom." So, I went back there and--I forget--fifteen or twenty minutes later, somebody came to me, a clerk, and gave me a piece of paper and instructions about having a physical examination at the navy dispensary.

Well, this was a tip-off. If you were sent to get the physical, then you had passed. They didn't tell you officially until some days later. I went and passed my physical exam that afternoon at the Naval Dispensary.

Then, there was the question of what to do. I had asked the man who examined me in Chinese for advice. This was January, '33. He said, "Look--there's going to be retrenchment in the department. Appropriations are going to be cut. There are simply going to be no appointments of any Foreign Service officers. You've undoubtedly passed the examination since you took the physical, but I can't give you a clue when you may get appointed, how soon."

I mentioned that I was thinking of going back to China anyway. My father was going then and my mother was going to follow later. He said, "Well, that would be an excellent idea. If you go to China, apply for a clerk's job, a clerkship. You'll probably get one if there is a vacancy because you will have saved the Department of State money by being already in China; and the

fact that you've passed the examinations and are on the waiting list for appointment will also be in your favor.

So that's what we did. I went with my father to China.

*Q: Supposing you had been offered a foreign service position outside of China, would you have taken it?*

SERVICE: Oh certainly. I'm sure I would have. Simply that--A job was critical at that time. Almost any other job probably too. I don't know.

#### Trainee in the American Oriental Bank, Shanghai

SERVICE: My father and I had a difficult time sailing because the Bank Holiday intervened and my father couldn't get the money to pay for the steamship ticket. They weren't anxious to take checks in those days since all the banks were closed. [chuckling] But, he had a brother in Berkeley who had a jewelry store down on Shattuck Avenue, L.H. Service, and he helped out. All the old Berkeley people knew L.H. Service.

Anyway, we got on a Danish freighter and got to Shanghai.

*Q: Were you at that point formally engaged to Caroline?*

SERVICE: Yes. Oh, I'm sure we were formally engaged. After I passed the examinations we had agreed. I'm not sure that I gave Caroline a ring then. I don't think I gave her a ring till later. Even then it was a ring my mother had, that my mother gave me, that I gave to Caroline. But anyway, we considered ourselves engaged.

*Q: Then, you arrived in Shanghai in 1933.*

SERVICE: Shanghai was having a deflation. Things were not good in Shanghai. American firms were letting people off. My brother Bob had been to Berkeley, had dropped out--he didn't like Berkeley, was unhappy--and gone out to China. He had been fired by the company he was working with. He was working as a sales representative for a machinery manufacturer.

There was an American-owned bank in Shanghai, the American Oriental Bank, which was run by a man named Raven. My family knew Raven very well. We also knew a Hungarian who was number two in the bank. Like our architect friend, he was a man who had come out across Siberia from a Russian prison camp. He had stayed in Shanghai and gone into banking.

At any rate, the bank agreed to take me on as a trainee. The salary was \$200 Mex. a month, which at that time was--well, less than \$100.

*Q: Two hundred dollars what? What was the word you used?*

SERVICE: Mexican. We'd say Mex.

*Q: Was that the currency in Shanghai?*

SERVICE: Yes. Well, Mexican dollars, had circulated very widely in the early days of China trade. By this time the Chinese government was putting out its own dollars. But, the word Mexican still was used. You saw Mexican dollars with Spanish, all sorts of different kinds of coins. Most of the coins were now minted in China. But, the phrase when you meant Chinese dollars was always Mex. or Mexican.

*Q: I hadn't heard that before.*

SERVICE: When you meant American dollars you said gold. You never said U.S. dollars. You said gold, even after Roosevelt devalued.

At any rate, I was sort of a trainee in the bank, working with the Chinese clerks as a teller, learning how to be a bank teller.

### III APPRENTICESHIP OF A FOREIGN SERVICE OFFICER, 1933-1942

#### Clerkship in Yunnanfu

SERVICE: Almost as soon as I got to Shanghai I went around to call on the American consul-general, Cunningham, a very elderly gentleman who had been in Shanghai a long time, and applied for a clerkship.

It wasn't too long--I think it was only about six weeks--when Cunningham asked me to come and see him and said, "Would you like a job as clerk at Yunnanfu?"--which in those days was considered the end of everything. I mean to hell-and-gone, a remote and isolated post in South West China. He said, "You don't have to say today." I rushed off and sent a telegram to Caroline.

I didn't get an answer right away, but I went back to Cunningham I think the next day and said yes, I'd take the job. Then, Caroline's cablegram came in saying, "No, don't go!" But, the die was cast. I had committed myself, so I went to Yunnanfu which is now known as Kunming. In fact, to the Chinese even in those days it was known as Kunming. It was only the foreigners who still called it Yunnanfu because that is what it had been before 1912. The old Chinese name was Yunnanfu.

*Q: So, that was your first post. What did it pay?*

SERVICE: The pay was \$1800, U.S. dollars, for that day and age, a very fine job. But as soon as Roosevelt came in the Economy Act cut all federal salaries 15 percent across the board. That still didn't bother me. I had plenty to live on. But then they started devaluing the dollar. This meant that our paycheck went down as the U.S. dollar went down.

It was particularly bad in Yunnan because it was in the French sphere of influence and a lot of prices were based on the French Indochinese piaster, which was a gold-based currency. So, we had a very substantial cut in pay.

Eventually the government got around to compensating us, not for the depreciation of the U.S. dollar, but for the "appreciation of foreign exchange." So, it meant I had eventually quite a nice lump sum payment which I promptly proceeded to deposit in the bank, the American Oriental Bank in Shanghai.

### Duties

*Q: What were your duties? First off, to whom did you report?*

SERVICE: When I first got there there were two officers--two vice consuls actually. The senior vice consul who was in charge was a man named [Charles] Reed. Then, there was John Davies.

Everybody in the Foreign Service was usually sent first to a Mexican or a Canadian border post for a short trial period, usually three months or so. Then, you came to Washington for Foreign Service School which was another three months, sort of indoctrination, orientation, whatever you want to call it. Then you were sent out to the field. So this was John Davies' first field post really. He'd been in Windsor, Ontario and then Foreign Service School.

Very soon after I got there they decided that with two men there--in other words the chief vice consul and me--there was no need for John Davies. They were cutting down everywhere. John then was transferred up to Peking as a language student. You asked who I reported to. Well, there was only one person to report to, and that was the vice consul.

The office, of course, reported to the legation--it hadn't been raised to embassy status. We always said Peking, but actually the capital of the country was Nanking. In 1928, the Nationalist Kuomintang government made Nanking the capital.

This was very unpopular with the foreigners because, well, they loved Peking and they had their establishments in Peking. They had no lovely buildings in Nanking. So, the ambassador kept most of his office--most of the chancery was in Peking. He would make occasional visits to Nanking to conduct business.

So, we would always say that we reported to the legation in Peking. We generally reported by mail which might take two or three weeks, because the only way to get to Yunnan was a long trip through Hong Kong, then down to Haiphong, then by train, the French railway, from Haiphong--which in those days was a three-day trip because they didn't run at night--up to Yunnan. You could come directly overland but it would have taken you weeks and weeks to make the trip. So the only practical way was this two-week trip around.

*Q: When you say direct--*

SERVICE: Well, you'd go up the Yangtze to Chungking and then overland to Kunming, but it would take you about four weeks to do it.

*Q: What were your duties there?*

SERVICE: I did everything. Files, of course. I maintained the files. I did all the filing. I did all the typing and I was not a trained typist. This was to create a lot of grief because--Reed was terribly worried about promotions and much concerned about almost everything, social position, everything else.

But he couldn't stand any erasures or any mistakes on a page. I was always having to retype things so they would go in looking perfect. I myself don't mind little things like that. [laughter]

He had me do trade letters, commercial work. But, there really weren't any commercial opportunities in Kunming. There couldn't be because the French were not about to let any Americans do business--or anyone else except themselves, any other foreigners except themselves--do business in Yunnan. All goods had to come through French Indochina.

We would get trade inquiries--what is the market for beer, for instance, in your consular district? The only real letter to send them back was just, "There isn't any." But not my boss! He insisted that we write them a full dress discussion of the market and procedures for importing and the desirability of getting a local agent, the desirability and necessity of getting a forwarding agent in Haiphong, and all the rest of this. Every trade letter had to be a certain number of pages.

I had gotten eventually to do most of the routine consular work, registration of American citizens, issuance of passports, registration of births, marriages, this sort of thing.

After a year I was commissioned as a vice consul with no increase in pay.

*Q: Your first title was what?*

SERVICE: Just clerk, Foreign Service clerk. But then they commissioned me a vice consul, which meant that I could perform services like passports since I had signing authority. I could do notaries.

### "Bureaucrats are Made, not Born"

SERVICE: My chief was not a China service man. We had a Chinese interpreter in the office who was supposed to call attention to newsworthy things in the [Chinese] newspapers and translate them if necessary.

But, my vice consul didn't think he was doing a very good job. So he'd make poor Mr. Hwang sit down beside him, and he would point at the paper, [sternly] "Now, what is this? What's this?" You know, point at the headlines here and there and make this poor Chinese translate.

Actually, most of his political reporting was from talking to the British consul general who was an old China hand and whose Chinese was excellent. He was eccentric like a lot of British people in remote places. Homosexual and a Muhammadan to boot. He'd served in places like Kashgar.

But he was not alone in being unique or peculiar. In the French consulate, one of their members was a Buddhist.

But, anyway, Charles Reed talked mainly to the British consul general. He'd go to the club and hear the gossip at the club. The commissioner of customs and the commissioner of posts had Chinese colleagues, theoretically on the same level they were. So, they got a good deal of news because they had to know where the disturbances were. The political reporting basically was the sort of gossip Reed got from talking to other people. We had to submit a monthly political report. If anything urgent came along we would make a special report. If it was something really vital we'd send a telegram, but that was very unusual.

I remember one night. I think we were having a Christmas party and a telegram came in--any telegram was an event. We had to leave the party, rush down to the office, open the safe and get out the code book.

The telegram was from the legation in Peking relaying a circular from the Department of State saying that the president had declared December 24th a holiday because of the weekend arrangements or something like that. But, of course, we'd passed December 24th [laughter] by the time we got the telegram. So, we went back to the party.

The political reporting was, shall we say, very low key, very unimportant.

*Q: So, you don't feel you really got any good training in this--*

SERVICE: Negative training, mostly negative.

*Q: In what sense?*

SERVICE: How not to do it. This was a favorite phrase of Mao Zedong, training by negative example.

We ought to go back to Kunming because I rejected out of hand the value of serving there. That really wasn't true, because although I wasn't getting any very useful training in political reporting, I was learning to be a bureaucrat.

This is something that should not be treated facetiously. Bureaucrats are made, not born. Nothing in my background trained me or prepared me to be a bureaucrat. It's very important. It's not all negative. If you're going to get along in a bureaucratic system, bureaucratic organization, you've got to learn what things are acceptable, what you can do, what you can't do. You've got to learn prudence and caution, how to get things done, things like that.

Actually I became, I think in most people's minds, a pretty good bureaucrat. Most of my career was spent as a bureaucrat. I've made a little summary here. Actually, out of my twenty-nine years of service--which were diminished by five and a half by firing, leaving twenty-three and a half years as actual time served in the Foreign Service--I only spent about five years in political reporting.

This is what I'm generally known for, and this is probably why I'm sitting here talking to you. But, actually administrative and consular work, which are usually lumped together, were about fourteen years of my time. So most of my time was, shall we say, in bureaucratic pursuits.

Of course, in the Amerasia case I violated a lot of bureaucratic rules, and I acted in a very unbureaucratic way. That's one of the reasons why I got into trouble. But that's something that comes later.

Also, the business of being a clerk and learning from the ground up how things are actually done--filing, coding a telegram, all the routine operations--was something that always stood me in good stead.

I had it in Kunming. I had it for a while in Peking because after things got busy in China politically, then they needed extra help in the code room, and the language officers were called out for night code room duty.

Then in Shanghai, as we'll see later, most of my work was administrative.

Always in my later Foreign Service career I knew what the practical problems were. I knew the advantages of writing, breaking up a despatch, for instance, into various smaller despatches, because then they would be filed more easily under the appropriate topic. You write a grab bag type of despatch, why the file clerk has got a terrible problem.

Learning how to draft telegrams so that the night duty officer could get the subject right away and decide whether or not it's worth decoding in the middle of the night, and learning how to deal with subordinates. All these and more were improved by having had a basic grounding. Most Foreign Service officers come in and start as a commissioned officer. They never had the non-commissioned, grassroots, down-to-earth sort of experience. Anyway, that covers my addendum.

Incidentally, talking about bureaucracy, I was going to relate an incident in Kunming when I was learning to be a bureaucrat. Every post in those days was required to submit weekly, for the U.S. Public Health Service, what was called a quarantine report. It was supposed to report epidemics for the U.S. Public Health Service.

Generally, most consuls were in seaports. But Kunming was five hundred miles from any water. We didn't even know the population, and there were no medical statistics. So, we simply had a form statement. We would put it on this form each week, "The population is estimated to be 150,000. There are no statistics, but typhoid, smallpox, syphilis, are prevalent, and such and such

diseases are endemic, cholera and so on." When I had spare time I would type these up in advance and have them all ready. It just seemed to me completely absurd that we should do this.

So, I kept telling Mr. Reed that we should explain and object. He laughed at me and he said it was no use. But, I persisted. He said, "Well, okay. Write a despatch and send it in."

So we wrote a formal despatch to the Department of State explaining all the circumstances. We waited months and eventually a reply came back.

[paraphrasing] The Department of State has forwarded our despatch to the Treasury Department which in turn had forwarded it to the U.S. Public Health Service (which was under Treasury). They now had pleasure in transmitting the reply back through the same channels.

The Public Health Service reported they read our reports with great interest, found them of much value, and hoped that the consulate at Kunming would be instructed to continue to submit them.

Reed laughed, of course, when this came in. He said, "I told you so."

But, he also had his foible in bureaucracy because he was trying, all of the time he was there, to get Kunming declared an unhealthy post. In those days you got service credit for time and a half if you served in an unhealthy post.

Kunming was considered a healthy post simply because somebody looked at a map and said, "Well, it's on a plateau; the elevation is six thousand feet, lovely climate." So, we were a healthy post.

But, Shanghai and Hangzhou--Shanghai was a modern city. You lived in a foreign concession. There was sewage, sanitation, doctors, and all the rest of it. But, Shanghai was listed as an unhealthy post.

Reed spent a good deal of his time in Kunming on a campaign to get this changed, but he was as unsuccessful as I. [laughter]

### The Opium Trade

*Q: What sort of trouble did these missionaries get into?*

SERVICE: They were always trying to protect their converts against what they considered persecution by the Chinese. Heavy taxation--opium. The Chinese wanted them to grow opium. How else were they going to get any taxes out of them? This was typical pretty much all over.

I think that the missionaries were gulled at times by their converts. No doubt their people were badly treated. Most of the aborigines were badly treated by the Chinese. The Chinese took the best land. The aborigines either were left in the valleys if they were malarial, or were pushed up on the mountains. Where the land was good the Chinese were in occupation. In taxation, in everything that concerned government, they were discriminated against.

*Q: What about the opium trade? Did that ever come under your official eye or did you manage not to notice?*

SERVICE: You couldn't help but have it under your eye since the poppies were everywhere. Whole fields around the city of Kunming were a mass of poppies in the springtime. There was vacant land inside the city walls, right outside the walls of the consulate, that was planted with poppies.

Did the trade come to our notice? Certainly you couldn't avoid knowing about it. There were certain people there in town, French people, that had no visible means of support. One assumed that they were engaged in it some way or another.

Some foreigners smoked opium. The Frenchman who was the local representative for the Salt Gabelle which was the third Chinese organization run by foreigners, smoked opium [Others were the Maritime Customs and the Posts]. After dinner he would generally retire and smoke.

The whole life style, the daily schedule of a city like Kunming was tied to opium smoking. People got up very late in the morning, and late in the evening they would come out in the streets to get a snack. The whole town was geared to the prevalence of opium smoking.

You saw it everywhere you went. If you traveled, the inns were full of the smell of it. Your chair bearers and so on would smoke. It was a very commonly seen thing.

We took trips on ferry boats on a lake near Kunming. I remember watching an old man, for instance, curl up on deck and then smoke, just taking advantage of the relaxation, quiet on the boat crossing the lake to smoke.

One thing I may not have stressed was the fact that Yunnan was one of the principal opium producing regions of China. It was an important cash crop. The opium was shipped out through various other warlord domains down the river to Shanghai, Hangzhou, and also particularly down the West River to Canton. Of course, some of it went into Indochina, and some of it we suspected was processed into morphine and heroin.

Soldiers and opium were what Yunnan really lived on, exporting soldiers and exporting opium.

The United States government was very much interested, then as now, to stop opium traffic, narcotics traffic. So we were supposed to report on that.

I just happened to pick up recently a Bulletin of the Concerned Asian Scholars, July-September, 1976. I see there's a long article in here, a very good article as a matter of fact, on opium and the politics of gangsterism in Nationalist China, 1927-45. One of the important sources this author, Jonathan Marshall, uses are American consular reports from all over China. I find a number of reports in here that were written by Reed and Ringwalt while I was in the consulate in Kunming and which I myself typed and prepared to be sent out.

They mention in one place a figure of 130,000,000 ounces for 1933.

*Q: From the province of Yunnan?*

SERVICE: The province of Yunnan.

*Q: Doesn't that seem like an extraordinarily high figure?*

SERVICE: It's a tremendous figure but--I don't know. No one actually knew of course. It was a guess, but if you saw the countryside around Kunming in the springtime when it was just a mass, a sea of opium poppies, you could believe an awful lot was produced.

*Q: How did you and your seniors arrive at these figures? This sort of statistics collection has always struck me as a tremendous problem.*

SERVICE: Well yes. You had ideas of the magnitude of the trade through the size of military convoys that would take it out of the province for instance.

*Q: Military convoys?*

SERVICE: Oh yes.

*Q: Whose army?*

SERVICE: Well, it had to be by military to give it safety. Most of it moved in very large shipments. One warlord shipping it through the territory of another warlord, by arrangement of course.

There would be a pay-off. But you would hear, for instance, of convoys of a hundred or two hundred mules. Well, we're talking here about ounces, so you'd convert that to pounds, into mule loads. A hundred mule loads is a lot of opium.

*Q: Of course it is.*

SERVICE: And so, it's actually tons, and perhaps hundreds of tons, of opium that was being produced, that one could actually get very clear evidence of.

*Q: Who counted? Was it direct observation or did you have sources who brought you these reports?*

SERVICE: Sometimes scuttlebutt, rumor. Sometimes missionaries had seen them. Sometimes Chinese reported them. Occasionally something would get in the newspapers, but not very much of that sort of thing. This was generally gossip and rumor. But sometimes if you just happened to be traveling yourself you might see them on the road. We didn't do much traveling, but if a large shipment was being made it would get talked about.

*Q: I look forward to reading that article.*

SERVICE: The thing that's interesting about this article, one thing to me that's interesting about this article, is that in the late 1950s, or around 1960, there was a man named Koen, I think it is, who wrote a book on the China Lobby. This was his Ph.D. dissertation, a rewrite of it, and it was being published by Macmillan. In it he made some accusations, some statements tying the Kuomintang to opium business.

After the book was published Macmillan got cold feet, withdrew the book, tried to get back all copies from libraries and people they sold it to, and simply squashed the book. I've been told, and I think it's probably true, that it was the State Department that brought pressure on Macmillan to withdraw the book.

Yet here is this article written now, much later, all based on U.S. government consular reports showing absolute, complete, and very intimate tie-up of government in China, including the Kuomintang government, with the opium business, deriving income from it.

*Q: On a fairly institutionalized basis.*

SERVICE: Oh yes, sure. And yet the State Department apparently forced Macmillan or scared Macmillan into withdrawing this book. It became a collector's item, of course, until it was reprinted here recently.

*Q: How does the book stand up?*

SERVICE: Oh, it stands up very well. The part on the opium is quite peripheral. It's not at all integral to the story of the book.

*Q: I think that's a very interesting footnote. Did opium users function okay?*

SERVICE: Oh, yes. Opium in moderation is probably no worse than cigarette smoking, and cheaper in those days in Yunnan.

People would smoke usually in the evening. Then, about ten-thirty or eleven o'clock they would want some refreshment, and the streets would suddenly be quite full of people. A great many peddlers selling Chinese-type snacks would be on the street, noodles and things like this, for this post-smoking snack, like the after-theater crowd.

We knew it was just as well not to try to get hold of our number one boy along in the middle of the forenoon, or in the middle of the afternoon, because he was down in his room having a few pipes.

You would telephone people in government offices. We did have telephones, although they didn't work very well. Particularly in Chengdu when I was a boy, if you telephoned somebody or you tried to call on somebody, and they said, "He's out telephoning," it always meant that he was having opium!

### Lung Yun, the Local Warlord

*Q: What relations did you have with the provincial government? Did you have your own warlord or conflicting ones?*

SERVICE: There very definitely was a local warlord named Lung Yun, "Dragon Cloud," who was part aborigine, probably mixed Chinese and aborigine. But, he had gotten Yunnan very firmly in his grip. Of course he worked with the French, but I think the French were quite content to let him govern.

But they had him really under a very tight rein because it was impossible for him to import any arms, buy any arms, except from them. The foreign trade had to come through Indochina. The only outlet to the world that was usable was through Indochina.

I think that they had agreements with him on things like handling of political exiles. There were always some dissidents, Annamese dissidents who were opposed to French rule. So, I'm sure that the French, or Lung Yun for the French, kept a pretty close watch on that.

Then, there were problems like deserters from the Foreign Legion. A good part of the garrison in Indochina was Foreign Legion, and some of them would take off and run to the hills occasionally, end up in Kunming. They always got returned to the French.

But, Lung Yun ran Yunnan as a separate country in effect. There was a representative of the ministry of foreign affairs--

*Q: The Chinese?*

SERVICE: Yes, the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanking. But, he had to be someone who was acceptable to the local people. In other words he was someone designated by Lung Yun and then given a commission by the foreign office.

He was the person we normally dealt with. What little business we had was with this old gentleman who was an old Mandarin holdover from the days of the [Ch'ing] empire who, I'm sure, consumed his share of opium as most people did.

### Assorted Chores

*Q: Was there something further on your notes?*

SERVICE: Oh well, I've got all sorts of things.

We didn't have any dealings with the central Chinese government except for this local representative. We didn't have much business anyway except for missionaries that got into trouble or had complaints, or in some cases a missionary might die.

I remember one missionary who died. She was a very large woman who had lived in a remote city for many years and gotten so heavy she couldn't be carried in a sedan chair. So there was no way for her to leave. She simply died there all alone. It turned out that despite her having been there for ten or twelve years she had no converts, no one to look after her. The local magistrate took charge of her possessions and sent them up to the consulate.

We didn't have a great deal of business. We were there mainly because it was so remote; there was no other way for Americans to get the protection or consular services, passports, and so on, except by having a consulate there.

But, also we were there to watch the French. In earlier more actively "imperialist" days, there had been concern about what were the French up to.

After about a year, Reed was transferred, and a Chinese language officer, Arthur Ringwalt, was assigned to the consulate.

Also, after a year--I think after Caroline became pregnant--we were given a rent allowance, \$150 a year, which was ridiculous.

But anyway, we then moved out of the consulate and rented a house belonging to an Englishman, an English Methodist missionary, I think. They had a small mission hospital there, and the doctor was going on home leave.

Ringwalt was a more pleasant person to work for. I was in charge actually for a while between the two men. Then, Ringwalt did some traveling and left me in charge.

### The Long March Skirts Kunming

*Q: When the Long March skirted Yunnanfu, what advance intelligence, if any, did you have?*

SERVICE: Well, I'm not sure. Of course, the Chinese newspapers had something but not very much. They were strictly controlled and heavily censored. Also, we had only Kuomintang communiques which were always that the enemy is at full retreat. But, very often the enemy is in full retreat toward our rear, you know. [laughter]

*Q: That's a nice expression.*

SERVICE: I think that probably most of our information came from people in the customs and the post office, and also from missionaries, because in those days the Communists were super anti-imperialists. If they had a chance to snatch missionaries, they would hold them for ransom or sometimes try them for imperialist crimes.

Not so much the Mao group, but some of the subsidiary groups actually executed a few, held trials, executed them as imperialist agents, which they could be. If you wanted to talk about passing on information, missionaries did serve in some ways as spies. We'll come to some of that later on.

We got reports from missionaries who were having to flee because of the Communist advance, telegrams and so on. This got closer and closer and people traveling as best they could, began to arrive in Kunming. So, we knew the Communists were coming our way.

Late one night--The consuls were trying to keep in touch. I forget what time this was, but it was quite late. We got a chit from the British consul-general, I think, who was very close to the French consul-general--they were near neighbors--saying that they had decided that all women and children should leave by the morning train.

They'd made arrangements with the railway. There was one train a day, early morning. So I rounded up the few Americans there were, running around knocking on their front gates, got them up and got them off on the train.

There was an American plant explorer there, a rather famous man named Joseph Rock who did a lot of work for the Harvard Arboretum and for the National Geographic Society and the U.S. Department of Agriculture. He was living in Kunming at the time, and a bit of an old maid. He wanted us to tell him whether or not he should evacuate. We said, "Our instructions are women and children should evacuate." He asked, "Did we think it was dangerous?" Well, we didn't know. So he left on the train the day after the women and children did.

The Long March came very close to the city. Some of it did. Of course, an army of that size doesn't all trudge single file on a single road. They move through a country like a cloud of locusts, in a way.

Villages very close to Kunming were told the day beforehand--they had scouts out ahead--"Prepare so much rice. So many people are going to be here tomorrow. You'll be paid." The remarkable thing was that everything worked out just as the scouts had said. So many people did come the next day, rice was prepared, and they were paid.

Of course, they were robbing landlords along the way, seizing what they could in the way of silver. Apparently they did have enough money to pay. It made a tremendous impression because people were not used to being paid for anything that was provided to soldiers.

For an army like this on the move to be so well organized and to pay off made a tremendous impression. This was not in the papers. It was what you heard from talking to people, the grapevine type of news.

Obviously their intent was to make a dash for the Yangtze, which they did. They had completely sidestepped the provincial army which had marched forth to meet them in Guizhou. The Communists were so mobile, so fast in marching, that they simply marched around them.

The night of the crisis some Yunnanese troops dragged into town, dead beat from being force-marched from further west. They would have been poor defenders--Kunming could have been captured if the Communists had thought it worth the time. But they knew their lives probably depended on getting across the Yangtze. So the Communists didn't delay.

*Q: Have you any estimate of the numbers in the Long March at this point?*

SERVICE: We had heard all sorts of figures. I don't think anybody knew. We heard figures from fifty thousand to a hundred thousand, probably closer to fifty thousand.

*Q: Did you see any of it?*

SERVICE: No. No, we didn't try to go outside the city walls. It would have been foolhardy. We went down to the club and consoled ourselves with the Cercle Sportif! [laughter] So, no one saw any of them. They just went by like ghosts. After about a week, we called the women and children back from Indochina. I think it was a week. Caroline probably told you. She remembers those things much better than I do.

*Q: Can you recall your own estimate of what it meant?*

SERVICE: Not really, no. No one really thought that these people were terribly important. Yes, they had held out in Gansu. But, I don't think anyone felt that they were a real threat to the country or likely to take over.

Everybody felt that they were semi-brigands--and some of them were semi-brigands or had been brigands. There was always a lot of unrest and dissatisfaction. Yes, they were legendary for their marching ability, for their deftness in maneuvering.

But, they had been defeated. That's why the Long March took place. They had been driven out. They had lost, I think most people felt that this was sort of a remnant, defeated remnant, that was running for shelter and safety in some far western areas.

*Q: Were leaders' names talked about?*

SERVICE: Oh yes, of course, a great deal. Mao Zedong and Chu Teh and Zhou En-lai were famous names, and they were continually being reported as having died or been killed or died of wounds. Zhou En-lai died numerous deaths. All of them--Mao Zedong was tubercular, at death's door. These names were already legends.

*Q: Amongst the foreign community?*

SERVICE: And Chinese, yes. I don't know how much among the Chinese, but I would guess quite as much.

*Q: I would have thought more amongst the Chinese.*

SERVICE: Yes, My own contacts with Chinese were so limited in those days that I can't speak with assurance, as I could for instance in later days.

It was very impressive though, this organization and their treatment of the people. It made a very real impression.

*Q: Did it linger? What was the effect of the March on the surrounding communities?*

SERVICE: I don't think very much because they couldn't stay very long. They undoubtedly left wherever they went, a memory. People were paid and they treated the people well. In those days they took it from the landlords and gave it to the people.

What they couldn't carry away they said, "Come in and help yourselves." It was sort of Robin Hood.

The ideology didn't have a chance to sink in as far as Yunnan was concerned.

### The Chiangs Visit Yunnanfu

*Q: Was it soon after that Chiang Kai-shek and his wife came to visit?*

SERVICE: Yes. The Kuomintang armies and Kuomintang airplanes were pursuing the Communists. This was how Chiang extended his control to some of the western provinces. Guizhou and Yunnan at this time began to come under central government control. It wasn't really effective until '37 when the Japanese war started. But, organizations like the Bank of China began to get into Yunnan.

The Chiangs came up to Yunnan, and they had a reception for the foreign community. Ringwalt, who was very absent-minded, didn't think about taking us. We found out later that the British consul had taken his cipher clerk, a man who was lower in status than I. But, Ringwalt just didn't think of it. So, we didn't meet Chiang and his lady. [laughing] Did Caroline say we did? I think she's wrong about this.

*Q: No, Caroline remembers it that you went and she didn't.*

SERVICE: No, no. Neither one of us went.

*Q: Do you remember what impression they made? Obviously, you can't speak first person on this.*

SERVICE: No. The big problem locally, the big question, was whether they were going to come before the opium was harvested, the poppies were harvested. If they were going to come before the opium was in, then the Chinese realized they were going to have to do some chopping, at least in the fields close to the city.

But, fortunately the crop was got in all right. Now, how this was arranged or why, I don't know. But the fact is that there were no great losses of the local crop.

*Q: Tact, I dare say, at some level.*

SERVICE: The way the Chinese work things out.

### To Peking as Chinese Language Attaché

SERVICE: We arrived in Peking in December, 1935. I was assigned as a [Chinese] language attaché. That's where we sent all our people for language study. In fact, all the foreign missions sent their people to Peking for language study. I had two years in Peking, which were a wonderful two years, an idyllic place to be with ostensibly no responsibilities except to study.

*Q: Was this your first serious exposure to the written language?*

SERVICE: Yes, that's right. I had sat in on a course here at Berkeley for a while, but not long enough to really learn anything. As I said before, I had learned the numerals from comparing the English and the Chinese on the streetcars in Shanghai when I was a boy. But, I was basically illiterate in Chinese. I spoke a backwoods Sichuan dialect.

The first quarter in Peking we were sent to what was then called the North China Union Language School, which was run by a man named Pettus, mostly for missionaries, but also some business people and scholars.

It was the equivalent in those days of this sort of school in Taiwan now. But, there weren't very many scholars. [John King] Fairbank and Woody [Woodbridge] Bingham, people like that, were in Peking or had been in Peking just recently, Marty Wilbur and so on. All the China scholars went to Peking for a while, and they studied at this North China Language School.

But, the legation sent its people there only for the first quarter for an introduction. After that we studied on our own with our own teachers, following our own course, our own book.

We had a different emphasis. The missionaries were learning to read the Bible and to preach. We were interested in Chinese official correspondence and reading newspapers and being able to translate and interpret for official interviews.

The teachers, as I say, were horrified at my accent, my dialect, and insisted that I try to forget everything I had known and start completely anew.

*Q: Was that very difficult?*

SERVICE: Yes, it was. But, I think I did it fairly successfully.

*Q: That's what I've heard!*

SERVICE: I tried to forget my Sichuanese and just assume I didn't know any Chinese. So, I worked "wo, ni, t'a," "I, you, he," this sort of thing.

*Q: What did you think of the system of teaching?*

SERVICE: It's a very time-wasting system, I'm sure, because basically, after we finished the language school we were just on our own with two or three teachers. We would spend practically all day with a teacher across the table working on the text. But, the teachers knew no English, and at the beginning you knew very little Chinese. I think that the modern methods of using tapes and so on would be far better.

But, we had two years to do it. In the army and the navy they had three years to do it.

*Q: Oh really.*

SERVICE: Yes. So, if you're willing to invest that amount of time and you've got full time to do it, why it works. We could learn Chinese.

*Q: It sounds enormously luxurious to have a one-to-one relationship.*

SERVICE: Oh, yes.

My brother Dick, after my father died, had gotten a job as clerk in the consulate in Foochow. He found out at this time that he had intestinal TB [tuberculosis]. He had an operation for appendicitis in Foochow and the doctor, when he opened his abdomen, found he had intestinal TB.

So, he came to Peking and was in the Rockefeller Hospital, the PUMC [Peking Union Medical College]. They recommended that we find a place outside the city. We went out to the Western Hills, maybe fifteen or twenty miles outside of Peking, and rented a house. Foreigners had bungalows out in the Western Hills. We lived out there for something over six months with Dick after he came out of the hospital.

I only had one teacher, and he came out by bus every day. He'd take a morning bus out to the bottom of the hill--we weren't very far up the hill. Then, he would stay there all day and go back in the afternoon. This was not as good as having two or three teachers. But, we got along all right.

*Q: So, you had no other duties than to study Chinese?*

SERVICE: You had to read. You took an exam at the end of the first year and an exam at the end of the second year. You took exams on Chinese geography, foreign rights in China--extraterritoriality in other words--some Chinese history. You had to know something about China. This was not regarded as terribly important. Your main job was to learn Chinese.

But, I did a lot of reading. I can remember very definitely a milestone in my attitude of knowledge of China was coming across and reading R.H. Tawney's Land and Labor in China, a very good book, still a very good book. But, it was the first, analytical, economic-sociological approach to China that I had seen.

There was a good deal on foreign relations in China. H.B. Morse and Tyler Dermott's Americans in Eastern Asia. Then, there was a two volume compilation by a man named [Westel Woodbury] Willoughby about foreign rights in China, all sorts of things about extraterritoriality because, of course, we had to protect our rights and even to serve as consular judges at times.

Then, the history of China. In those days there wasn't very much. [Chauncey] Goodrich, and the old histories. The succession of the dynasties and Confucianism. You got a fuzzy idea about the wonders and virtues and ethical beauties of Confucianism and the examination system where even the poorest man had a chance, you know.

But, there was not much along the lines of a Marxist approach or any sort of a class analysis of China or what really went on with the peasants. You knew vaguely that there was an elite culture. But, no one really went down to the soil and looked. You had had agricultural people come out and write books, like a man named King, an American, who wrote a fine book, Farmers of Forty Centuries. He was lauding the virtues of the Chinese system of agriculture, how it was self-sustaining and self-supporting and so conserving of everything, like night soil. He wrote panegyrics about Chinese agriculture, but nothing about systems of land tenure or life of the peasants or anything like that.

So, to read something like Tawney's modern, social analysis of what China was all about was quite new.

*Q: Did you come across [Max] Weber's work on China?*

SERVICE: No, not at that time. No, actually it was not on the list, and I don't think it even was in the library at the legation. [laughter]

At the end of the first year we took comprehensive exams. We checked in about once every quarter at the embassy to find out how we were doing. Then, at the end of the year we took the exams. There were three students.

*Q: Who were they?*

SERVICE: Three at first. Two of them--One was Ed Rice, who's out here in Tiburon, and another man named Millet. We had a lot of jokes about Rice and Millet working together. Millet is the staple food for North China and rice for South China, of course. Then the second year another man was assigned, a man named Troy Perkins, who had already been in China, and had served for a while as a consular officer.

*Q: Was there any professional training for your job as political officers?*

SERVICE: Very little. I'd had some introductory political science, political theory, at Oberlin. But, it was a very sketchy course under a Hungarian named Jaszi, who was quite an interesting person who served in one of the early post-World War I governments in Hungary.

But, we really didn't have to know very much. We didn't go to anything like West Point or Annapolis. There wasn't any sort of special training academy.

Normally in the Foreign Service you went to an orientation course in the Department. But, that was only about a six week course. They'd show you what a visa was and what a passport was and a consular invoice was. You learned a little about routine operations.

I never attended the course because I'd been a clerk for two and a half years and I went from Kunming direct to Peking. So, I never had this orientation. But, I'm sure I was much better off than the people who had to rely on that.

You asked whether I'd read any Marxist and Leninist materials. No. I don't think I read anything directly by Marx or Lenin until I got to Yenan.

When I got to Yenan I realized--

*Q: In 1944.*

SERVICE: In 1944 I realized that I hadn't, and so I scratched around and asked the Communists, "Look, haven't you got any of these things here?" [laughter] They did. They found some very dog-eared, old copies that some of them had, some English versions of [Marx's] Communist Manifesto and things like that.

#### A Lotus-Eater's Paradise

*Q: What can you remember about the foreign community there?*

SERVICE: Oh, it was a wonderful place. Peking was a lotus-eater's paradise in those days. The life and the homes, the old Chinese homes that people were able to rent or buy, attracted people who simply wanted a lovely place to live. There was an artist community.

There were people like Harold Acton, a British poet. There were foreigners who were teaching in the universities there. Pei Ta [Peking National University] and Tsing Hua had several foreigners on the staff. Ivor Richards, a British philosopher and linguist was there.

There were people there that just liked living in Peking. There was an American sculptress named Lucille Swan. There was Teilhard de Chardin, the Jesuit archeologist, paleontologist, but philosopher as well.

There was a diplomatic community. There was a missionary community. And there was a community of language students. There were the Marine guards.

For those who wanted it there was horse racing. A lot of people had polo ponies and played polo. We didn't. We stayed away from the club. Of course, we were out of town, living in the hills for a part of the time. But I was more interested in study than in going to the club.

But you couldn't avoid living a fairly busy social life. You met a few Chinese, not very many.

*Q: I was going to ask about your Chinese contacts.*

SERVICE: Hu Shih was there and various other people. Chiang Monlin who later on was president of Pei Ta. Hu Shih was lecturing in Chinese philosophy. I went to Hu Shih's lectures one year, my second year, when I could understand enough.

*Q: How did they impress you?*

SERVICE: Well, it was very interesting. Philosophy is not my subject unfortunately. I'm a nuts and bolts--I'm a facts and figures man, and I don't deal well with abstract concepts. But, the lectures were interesting, history of Chinese philosophy.

*Q: Did you ever come across George Kates who wrote The Years that Were Fat?*

SERVICE: Yes. I didn't know him very well. He was a bit of an eccentric, sort of lived by himself.

People like [Owen] Lattimore were there. [Edgar] Snow was there. There was a foreign newspaper community, a foreign writers' community. As I said, there was quite a large, active artist colony.

We took several trips. I went up to Inner Mongolia with a man in the embassy named Salisbury. A group of us--Phil Sprouse and a couple of Marine language officers--took a trip out in the hills to an old Trappist monastery which was way back about four or five days' travel back in the mountains. They had developed their own little valley, put in irrigation, sort of a Shangri-la type of place.

But a lot has been written about Peking. I think we're wasting our time talking about life in Peking!

#### An Informal Study Group and Edgar Snow's Report on his First Trip to Yen-an (Paoan)

SERVICE: You asked me about Ed Snow as a person. I wasn't an intimate with Ed, although we knew each other in Peking from the December 9 student demonstrations. But we weren't very close. I've said almost everything I know about Ed in a piece that I did for the China Quarterly (John S. Service. "Edgar Snow, Some Personal Reminiscences," The China Quarterly, April/June, 1972, #50, pp 209-229.) after his death. I don't know whether we can incorporate this or not. Ed was a wonderful person, but you really don't want me to spend a lot of time talking about him, do you?

It's actually mentioned in the memoir here, my second year in Peking I joined a group, very informal group, that used to meet about once a month at one of the member's homes.

Generally these were people who were scholars, writers. Hu Shih was a member. Owen Lattimore was a member. There was a Swedish newspaper man--half newspaper man, half scholar--people who were in Peking for postgraduate study or graduate study.

Ed Snow was a member. We knew in the summer of '36 that he was out of town, but nobody seemed to know exactly where. Then, he came back in the fall of '36, and it just happened that that month's meeting was at my house.

So he came and told us about the trip to Yen-an. It was a very interesting, exciting evening.

*Q: Visiting--*

SERVICE: Yen-an, his first trip to visit Mao Zedong, and the Communist army--actually not to Yen-an but Pao-an, which was where they were located then. But, we always lump Pao-an and Yen-an and think of it as the Yen-an period. It was at the beginning of the Yen-an period, but they hadn't yet reached and occupied Yen-an.

What was happening then, of course, was the hope for a United Front. What Ed Snow brought back was the Communist push for a United Front.

*Q: With the Kuomintang?*

SERVICE: With the Kuomintang. The Sian Incident hadn't yet occurred, but it took place very soon after that. (When Chiang Kai-shek was kidnaped by the Chinese Communists, 1936.) I think most of us, and even Ed Snow himself really, didn't seem to feel that the Communists had any chance of coming out on top.

There was this possibility, a rather exciting one, that the civil war might end. But that was the extent of our expectations at that time.

Ed's political views at the time, well, [chuckling] we didn't categorize people by political views, and our political concerns were generally limited to China. Ed was certainly sympathetic with the Chinese left. He'd already published a volume of translations of stories, mostly short stories, by left-wing writers in China. But, then most of the promising young writers in China were left-wing, anti-Kuomintang, Lu Hsun and so on.

We knew that he was a friend of Lu Hsun and Madame Sun Yat-Sen. He was in contact with the left. He and his wife, Nym Wales, had been sort of co-conspirators with the student leaders at Yen-ching during the December 9 riots.

We didn't know at the time the extent of the Communist influence in those riots, but I think the Communist influence moved in very rapidly. It may not have been there as an instigator at the beginning, but certainly the Communists did move in. A lot of those leaders, of course, ended up by becoming Communists.

You ask what information we had on the Communists. Snow's description of his trip to Yenan was really all we knew about the Communists.

*Q: What was the focus of the study group?*

SERVICE: The focus really was whatever study or research people were doing. Owen Lattimore, I remember, was still writing his Inner Asian Frontiers of China. He was doing research on the history of the long conflict between the nomads and the settled farmers.

I remember there was a lot of discussion at one of these sessions about who first invented trousers and the significance of trousers! Of course, you couldn't really develop cavalry until you had pants. [laughter] You could have chariots. But if you were going to ride, as the Mongols did, you had to have trousers. So, there was a lot of discussion as to just when--The Scythians are supposed to have had trousers.

It tried to be scholarly. There were several members that usually had some topic of interest. I don't remember Hu Shih ever giving us a talk, but he used to show up occasionally.

*Q: When you commented on Ed Snow's political views you said that people weren't categorized in those days. Now I don't know to what extent people were being categorized in the United States in the mid-thirties?*

SERVICE: Probably more than we were in China. I think we were much more isolated in China and naive perhaps. But by the mid-thirties certainly there was Communist influence in the writing field and labor unions in the States. But we didn't, as I recall, think much about it in China.

*Q: I just read a review of a book about Norman Thomas and a comment that like many American political activists he despised too much intellectual baggage--political theory. Am I getting the right impression that political theory just wasn't a significant part of the intellectual life of the group you're describing in the 30's in China?*

SERVICE: Yes. I think it was probably felt to be irrelevant. It didn't impinge very much.

I think I mentioned earlier that in 1932, when I was a graduate student here, Norman Thomas came to Berkeley during the presidential campaign. He couldn't speak on the campus. He spoke on the steps of I[nternational] House.

I was one of a large crowd that heard him speak. I voted Socialist in '32 and if you asked me, I probably would have said that I was a Socialist: certainly Ed Snow and his wife were Socialists. But I wouldn't have thought very much about it.

I hadn't met any Communists at this time. I didn't think of people as being Communists.

*Embassies Insulated from Chinese Political Events*

*Q: What political judgments were you able to form? Or were you just so busy that--*

SERVICE: Actually, I think it was a sort of a vacuum. No, that isn't true. The political climate was mainly the Japanese threat. The Japanese were trying by a nibbling process, to carve off North China or at least cut it out from under direct Nanking control. They talked about "autonomy" for the North China provinces, and that would mean the withdrawal of Chiang Kai-shek's own troops and strengthening local people.

There was a flight of Japanese airplanes over Peking the day we got there. They were dropping leaflets in favor of autonomy for what was called East Hopei, where they finally did set up a separate regime, East Hopei Autonomous Region.

Then only a few days after I was in Peking, the students in the universities all demonstrated, December 9 movement [1935]. John Israel has written a book about it.

Of course, I took off. I mean I didn't go to school when something like that was going on. I was the only person really, except for people like the Snows and Jimmy White who was the AP [Associated Press] man--the newspaper people were out--but I was the only American official as far as I know that was in the streets while these demonstrations were going on. I went back to the office and told them about it.

*Q: Was that apathy typical of the diplomatic corps?*

SERVICE: Very much. They'd got enough to do at the office, and they stayed at the office.

At any rate I had a wonderful time following the students all day. That afternoon, they were beaten up very badly by the gendarmes, sprayed with water hoses, and driven into alleys where the police could beat them up. The police had belts with heavy buckles and they used those. I'm sure they learned a lot of these things from the French police. Don't they call them gendarmes?

*Q: Yes.*

SERVICE: Then at the end of '36--just after a year--there was the Sian Incident when the Generalissimo was kidnapped in Sian. Of course, this was a tremendous affair.

I remember seeing Chinese like Chiang Monlin weep when the Generalissimo was released, when the word came that he was safe and coming back. The Chinese felt--people of that kind who were, you know, Kuomintang people--felt very emotional about it.

I had a shortwave radio which really we got for my brother, because when he was sick out in the Western Hills he was in bed most of the time. I was fiddling with it during the Sian affair, and suddenly I realized I was hearing Sian, Sian calling, an English voice. It was Agnes Smedley who happened to be in Sian. She was broadcasting the news.

So, I went down to the embassy the next day and told them about news being broadcast from Sian, and they were absolutely staggered. [laughing]

*Q: Did they not have anybody monitoring?*

SERVICE: No. Things were very simple in those days. People didn't think of these things. The idea that there were news broadcasts in English that they could pick up from Sian was something that no one had ever thought of.

*Q: Was anything done to change the situation?*

SERVICE: I think that they picked up--After all the navy had a big radio station there. All of our communications were by navy radio. So, I assume from then on--when they got the time and wave length from me--that they started listening.

*Q: You assume, but you're not sure.*

SERVICE: No, I don't know.

*Q: That's an extraordinary story.*

SERVICE: I just went in and told them, Agnes Smedley's in Sian, and she's telling us all about it. Zhou En-lai was there, of course, negotiating the whole settlement and the release.

*Q: What did Agnes Smedley have to say if you recall?*

SERVICE: Oh, I don't recall. It was just a news bulletin. I don't remember very much of what she said, but that the Generalissimo was safe and things like that, because people on the outside weren't sure. I think she was just giving an account of negotiations going on and the terms of the Young Marshal, Chang Hsueh-Liang. She was talking from the point of view of Chang Hsueh-Liang rather than from the point of view of the Communists. But, I think she mentioned the fact that Zhou En-lai was there, as I recall. Well, that's enough of that.

*Q: Okay.*

#### The Marco Polo Incident: Jack in Hospital with Scarlet Fever

SERVICE: The war started when we were in Peking, in the summer of '37. Caroline's father and mother came out to visit her. Her father had retired. His last post with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had been in San Francisco. They came out and stayed with us for a while.

Then, they decided to go off to a beach resort, Peitaiho. My mother was also down there with my brother Dick. On the third of July--they were going to leave after the fourth--I had a terrible sore throat. I went to the embassy guard. They had a navy doctor there, a couple of them.

The doctor was amazed at my throat. He called the other doctor over to look at it. "Isn't this a beauty?" So, they told me to go home and gargle with salt water. I said, "We've got a small baby.

How about that?" He said, "Sure, you better stay away from the baby. Don't get too close to the baby. Mustn't give the baby your sore throat."

The next day I went to the Fourth of July reception at the embassy--all Americans were invited, of course, to the embassy on the Fourth of July--and talked to everybody, but I felt miserable.

The next day--the fifth--I had quite a fever. So a doctor finally came to my house, and he said, "You know what you've got?" I said, "No." He said, "You've got scarlet fever."

They sent me immediately to the PUMC isolation ward, which was full of children. It was mostly diphtheria, and they had tubes in their windpipes. Chinese don't go to hospitals until they're in extremis normally. I think I was the only adult in this ward for a while with all these little kids with diphtheria.

Anyway, the family had already gone off to the beach before they knew I had scarlet fever and had to go to the hospital.

Then, the seventh, which was two days after I went in, I could hear the firing at Loukouchiao from my hospital bed. You know, ten miles or so outside of Peking, eight or ten miles, was Marco Polo Bridge. I could actually hear the war starting in the night and then heavy fighting in the days after that.

Germany had just developed the first sulfa drug, sulfonamide.

*Q: Yes.*

SERVICE: The PUMC had just gotten some, and they were trying it out. I was one of the first people that they used it on, and it was absolutely dramatic, the effect. Within twenty-four hours all my fever had gone and I felt quite normal, felt fine.

But they didn't know what to do about the normal quarantine, so they made me stay the full--I think it was three weeks that I stayed in isolation. It was quite a long period. But, eventually I got in a room by myself. There was an American dietician who tried to make me gain weight because she thought I was awfully thin. So, she was stuffing me.

They told me that I could not put my feet on the floor. It was part of this isolation. But, I found I could get all around the room by hopping from one piece of furniture to another. [laughter] From the bedside table to a chiffonier to something else, I could get all around the room without ever putting my feet on the floor.

*Q: Why weren't you allowed to put your feet on the floor?*

SERVICE: I don't know, but the rules were that I wasn't supposed to put my feet on the floor. The nurses came in and found me once perched on top of the dresser.

*Q: Sounds like a Thurber cartoon. [laughter]*

SERVICE: The nurses were all missionary-trained nurses, practically all.

*Q: Chinese?*

SERVICE: Chinese nurses, yes. Several of them tried very hard to find out whether or not I was right with Christ. I finally complained about it and said I thought it was unfair to take advantage of a man in this situation. The head nurse said that she would speak to them, so I was not bothered after that.

*Q: So, then the Japanese had taken over Peking. Is that correct?*

SERVICE: The Japanese took over Peking and I think Caroline came back with her parents from the beach when they were able to travel.

But some time after the occupation--I'm not quite sure why--it was decided that everyone should move into the Legation Quarter, where there were foreign guards. It was an enclave.

So the family moved in and stayed with some of our friends in the embassy. Everybody doubled up, sort of like in the siege of the legations--if you've ever read about that--in the Boxer time.

I was not allowed to go in because of my recent scarlet fever. I stayed in our house which was in one of the PUMC compounds, trying to find out what was happening in the city. I apparently stimulated a few rifle shots. So I gave up exploring.

After a few days, it was decided to evacuate people who could leave. So, Caroline and her family then left and went to Japan.

#### Edgar Snow Smuggles Ten Ying-Ch'ao out of Peking

SERVICE: About this time I took her trunk down to my mother. Trains were just beginning to run. I think I was on the first train after a long break. Ed Snow was on the train, I remember, and he had an amah with him.

I was quite surprised that he had an amah, and he seemed rather solicitous. I said something to him, and he said, "Can't tell you now." It turned out that this was Zhou En-lai's wife, Teng Ying-Ch'ao, whom I met next in Yen-an in 1944. He was smuggling her out of town. She'd been having treatment in a hospital in Peking, I think for TB.

Anyway, the train trip to Tientsin, which normally takes about two hours, took us over twelve hours, because we were always being sidetracked for Japanese troop trains coming south.

I was escorting a couple of American women tourists who had been stranded in Peking. I delivered them to Tientsin and went on to Chinwangtao. This was where my mother was catching a boat south. Because of the delays, I got there--with her trunk--just as the gangplank was being raised.

Mother got to Shanghai precisely as the hostilities were starting there, and was caught on the Bund on August 13 when the bomb was dropped by the Palace Hotel that killed Bob Reischauer and hundreds of other people.

*Q: Were you physically afraid at this point in China?*

SERVICE: I've never thought much about it. Perhaps a part of being an optimist is that one tends not to be very fearful. But things like war, gunfire, and bombing haven't usually bothered me very much. At least, as my mother would have said, I haven't been "frightened out of my wits."

When we came down in the houseboat from Chengdu in 1920, when I was going to school, we had to go past a place on the river bank where there were bandits. We expected the bandits to try to stop us. The baggage in the bottom of the boat was moved over to the side toward the shore, so my mother and the baby could get down behind the trunks.

When we came to the place on the river, sure enough, they started firing with rifles. The boatmen all jumped off the boat, on the far side and held on to the oars. Mr. Helde and I went out on the front deck to row the boat and to persuade the boatmen to get up. I remember watching the bullets hitting the water around us.

But, in the excitement of things like that you're not really afraid. I'd heard much fighting going on, as I mentioned before. In coming down the Yangtze--in '21 I think--there was a big battle in Ichang during the night when some of Wu Pei-Fu's troops came up and tried to attack the city. Our steamer was sort of in between. I heard the firing, but I don't remember being terribly afraid. I stayed in bed.

You don't necessarily want to walk into it. But, if you hear it you know you're not going to feel it. [laughter]

*[Interview 4: May 3, 1977]*

### The Foreign Press Corps

SERVICE: You asked about the caliber of the foreign press corps. Actually, Shanghai was probably more the center of news. Peking was a bit of a backwater. The capital was Nanking, which is accessible and easily covered from Shanghai.

Most of the regular foreign press in China was chiefly interested in developments that affected foreigners, business, the principal political developments, wars, and things like that. They generally had a rather scoffing attitude about Chinese warlord affairs. You know, the Chinese armies always carried umbrellas, and they didn't fight when it rained. "Silver bullets" were what really won the wars, or were the major weapons. It was a sort of a looking down the nose, a slightly sneering attitude.

There wasn't very much real concern with what was going on in China. There were exceptions, of course. Ed Snow was probably the best exception.

When the Sino-Japanese War started they picked up people to be stringers who happened to be in Peking. A young fellow named Haldore Hanson was teaching in a YMCA school there in Peking. He started working for A[ssociated] P[ress], I think.

There were a number of people in China, young Americans. After all these were Depression days, and people were footloose. Some of them had come to China just to try to make a living as well as they could. A lot of these people started working as journalists.

There was a Reuters man in Peking named Oliver who was quite good, but then there were others that just went to the embassy for the handout and talked to a few Chinese.

I think even that people like the New York Times depended mainly on the handout material, contact with the embassy, the superficial news. Generally, they had one or two Chinese friends or Chinese contacts who they hoped could give them the inside story politically of what was going on. But, it wasn't particularly analytical reporting.

*Q: With the exception of Ed Snow, would you say that there were any China specialists who really knew the language and had a detailed knowledge of the Chinese political scene who were working as reporters for the American press?*

SERVICE: Not who really knew Chinese. There were people like Hallet Abend, for instance, who had been for many years with the New York Times. But these people were Treaty Port people, reporting from Shanghai and they didn't really know Chinese. They might have had Chinese informants, but basically their reporting was Treaty Port and foreign interests oriented.

*Q: I think we'll go on with this later when we move to Chungking.*

SERVICE: Good.

We were talking about censorship in the Chinese press. During the suppression campaign against the Communists, prior to the formation of the United Front, there was very little news published about the Communists. It was very heavily censored. The Chinese government news was always, "The Communists are near defeat and are retreating." After the United Front began to break down, you again heard very little about what the Communists were doing.

You asked me a question about circulation of Ed Snow's book. My guess is that that was probably not heavily suppressed at the peak period of the United Front. But, I'm just not sure how much it circulated outside of sanctuaries like Shanghai. In the International Concession of Shanghai, of course, Kuomintang censorship couldn't apply.

Certainly the Communists were never given a good press in China or by foreign correspondents. But, I think there was a period when they were not completely cut out of the news, as they were before and after the United Front.

## Passes Second Year Chinese: Shanghai, a Disappointing Posting

*Q: Let's return to chronology now.*

SERVICE: Yes. We had Caroline being evacuated from China in, I think, September [1937]. She went and stayed in Japan for a while, and then the State Department decided that things were not going to be good for returning to China. So she was authorized to come to the United States. We had two small children. She came to the States and stayed with her parents.

Meanwhile, I stayed on in Peking. I kept the house, a Peking Union Medical College house, in what was called the south compound.

There was an American newspaperman that I mentioned earlier, Haldore Hanson, who had been taken on as a stringer, I think by AP. He'd followed the Japanese army south from Peking on bicycle and had gotten himself into Paoting, which was a city about seventy-five miles south of Peking, and then was found there by the Japanese.

They gave him a very hard time for a while, kept him under detention, and then finally let him out. They were suspicious of what he was doing, of course. Anyway, he was, I think, rather shaken up and he needed a place to stay. He came and stayed with me and shared the house.

He did a good book on the war ("Humane Endeavor;" The Story of the China War, New York, Toronto, Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1939.), but he was one of the people jumped on by [Senator Joseph] McCarthy because of his writings at this period. Some of them were published by Amerasia magazine.

The language exams were supposed to be given in late December. My two other fellow students, Millet and Rice, asked for a little extra time which was granted. Goodness knows, there had been interruptions to our studies. We were having to do night code room duty. So, we got a slight extension. We took the exams and I passed, and then got word that I was assigned to Shanghai, which was a terrible disappointment to me.

*Q: What did you hope for?*

SERVICE: I hoped for a smaller post and one where I would have a chance to do political reporting and to use my Chinese. We had two years of required language study. Then there was a third year optional exam, which you didn't get time off for. You simply prepared yourself for your third exam at whatever post you were at.

I wanted very much to do that. Very few people in those years had been taking the third year exam. But, since I had a good start it seemed to me a shame not to do it.

I figured Shanghai would be a difficult place, and it turned out to be exactly as I expected, a very difficult place to prepare for the third year exam, for various reasons.

*Q: Why?*

SERVICE: For one thing, it's not a Mandarin speaking area. But I met a peculiar situation in the administration of the post. The executive officer, a man named [Richard] Butrick, was very anti-China language service.

This was quite common. There was, I think I mentioned before, some tension between China service and non-China service people. He gave orders that I was not, for instance, to have any access to the Chinese correspondence coming to the office. I had hoped to be able to either supervise the translation--We had a Chinese interpreter, but we always had an officer that checked the translations.

He would not allow me to have any contact with the Chinese correspondence and felt that I was supposed to devote full time to my duties in the office and made it as difficult as possible for me to study for my third year exam. [laughing]

*Q: What a terrible waste!*

SERVICE: He was a very peculiar man. He's famous in the Foreign Service, as I say. Dick Butrick, all sorts of nicknames have been applied to him--"black bastard" probably the most common. He was very dark-haired.

He apparently believed that most China people became effete snobs or went native.

At any rate, I was disappointed going to Shanghai, but of course there was nothing to do except to go.

*Q: Did you enjoy it when you got there?*

SERVICE: Well, yes, a very, very busy life. Caroline came back to China after I'd been there a few months. We had a hassle when I got there. This is again, as we were speaking of, "the science of bureaucracy."

When I arrived, I was not met at the boat, which was rather typical of this man who was executive officer. Anyway, I presented myself to the consulate as soon as possible, and he said, "You'll have quarters in the bachelors' quarters." There was an apartment for bachelors above the office in a big office building in downtown Shanghai. "You'll be up there since your family's not with you."

I was entitled to quarters. There was allowance for quarters. "I am a married officer," I said. "My family--" He said, "Your family is not with you. You'll be up there."

Soon my household effects arrived from Peking. So, I applied for a quarters allowance "to store my effects," and I made sure it got on [Clarence] Gauss' desk who was consul-general. Gauss was sharp enough to know there was some background to this.

He called me and said, "What the hell is going on here?" And I explained the situation and he said, "I'll take care of that." I had very little trouble with our executive officer after that. I got a nice apartment and moved in.

Comments on the Social and Political Backgrounds of Foreign Service Officers in the 1930s

*Q: You said that you voted Socialist in '32. I think we more or less talked about how you stood politically. I don't know what the Foreign Service rulings were on political affiliations for active members of the Foreign Service?*

SERVICE: There were no rules. There were absolutely no rules, as far as I know. How you voted was supposed to be your own business. There wasn't any loyalty, security program, of course, at this time. I doubt if there were any Communists in the Foreign Service. But there was no effort to find out really if there were. The great majority of the people in the Foreign Service were probably good, rock-ribbed Republicans. Basically they came from very conservative backgrounds, usually from families with some money, social position, Eastern establishment.

Probably the Foreign Service in China, the China branch of the Foreign Service, was by and large more liberal than the Foreign Service as a whole. We weren't from this same sort of background. Most of us were either China-born or mid-western, this and that. There were one or two, of course, from the Ivy League schools. But, most of us were not. The group I was with were children of the Depression to some extent.

*Q: Just for the record, did you know any members of the Chinese Communist party before Pearl Harbor?*

SERVICE: Well, Pearl Harbor's hardly the right date to use here. I didn't know any before Chungking. I got to Chungking about the beginning of May, 1941. Almost immediately, as soon as I got to Chungking, I met them because I was introduced to them by a man in the embassy who had been keeping contact with them for the embassy for political reporting purposes.

*Q: Would you still have described yourself as a Socialist--*

SERVICE: Oh no.

*Q: --in the mid-thirties?*

SERVICE: Actually, after the New Deal came in--after Roosevelt came in and the New Deal--most of us considered that Roosevelt was carrying out many of the things that Norman Thomas had been talking about in his speech in Berkeley in '32. So, we all became, I think, good supporters of Roosevelt and the New Deal.

While I always felt that there were a lot of things about Socialism that we should try to work towards, I never considered myself an active member of the Socialist party or an active Socialist.

I figured that Roosevelt was moving us in that direction at a reasonable pace, an evolutionary way.

### Jack's Estimation of the Chinese Political Scene

SERVICE: In the United Front period, which was '37, '38, perhaps the end of '38, most of us felt that the Communist party was willing to accept the leadership of the Kuomintang, work in the United Front; that the Kuomintang itself had liberalized itself and was able to take in or accept other views. None of us--I keep saying "none of us," which is bad; I should speak for myself--I don't think I thought that the Communists were an important threat to the Kuomintang or an imminent rival.

*Q: I feel that this question is anachronistic, but again I'd like to ask it, because after World War II, world leadership of Communism seemed for a while firmly rooted in Russia, with the possible exception of Yugoslavia and Tito. But, now in the seventies we see that Communism is not monolithic and is polycentric. When did the possibilities of polycentric Communism with China as one of the centers seem an alternative worth considering to you?*

SERVICE: Oh, I think not until after we'd been in Yen-an for quite a long time and had gotten to know a good deal more about the situation up there, and the Chinese Communists' relations with the Soviet Union, or rather the tenseness and delicacy of their relations with the Soviet Union, and until we had seen the example of Tito.

I think that this was something that came at the end, when we thought that the Chinese Communists were not necessarily Russian Communists and were really quite likely to pursue their own nationalistic way. But, this came late on.

*Q: Just to wrap up this section--We keep making glancing mentions of the Kuomintang. How much really did you know about Chiang Kai-shek and other leading Kuomintang figures at this time, again, '36, '37, '38?*

SERVICE: Very little. Actually, most of the political reporting in those days was not, as I've already said, particularly penetrating or analytical.

We generally tended to accept Chiang as being what he seemed to be, a leader of China. I don't think most people really gave very much thought as to how he managed to maintain his leadership and control. Internal groups within the Kuomintang, the factions, were not particularly well understood.

This is digressing, but when I came back on leave in early '43, I was in the Department, and they sent me around to talk to an old Foreign Service officer named [Clarence] Spiker who had been consul in Chungking with my parents in 1924. He was the consul in Chungking when my father was almost blinded by the shot through the glass door.

Spiker, as a China service man, had spent all of his career in China. He was in the Department, an old man. He was too old now to send to the field. So, they had him in what was then a research branch in the State Department doing intelligence research.

He had read some of our reports. Apparently he'd asked to see me because he was very perplexed by references in our reports from Chungking that I'd written in '42, '43, about different factions and groups and cliques in the Kuomintang. He didn't know anything at all about them.

So, I had this odd experience of sitting and talking to this man whom I'd known as a boy, when he was consul in Chungking, and telling him almost in A-B-C terms about the Political Science group, the CC clique, the Whampoa clique, all of the congeries of competing factions and groups within the Kuomintang which Chiang was able to manipulate, and how he was able to keep control by setting one against the other.

This poor old guy who spent all his life in China just seemed to be amazed. He didn't know any of this, hadn't really apparently been concerned about it. So, I would say that State Department knowledge of China was fairly superficial.

*Q: Would there have been others better informed in the State Department?*

SERVICE: Oh yes. I picked a rather extreme example.

There were people like Willys Peck who had been counselor of embassy in Chungking before John Carter Vincent, who certainly knew something about these things, understood some of them. But, there wasn't a great deal of reporting on them.

#### Consular Duties, Shanghai: Jack of all Trades

SERVICE: Actually, my posting to Shanghai turned out to be a very interesting, and in many ways, a very valuable assignment. I was used as a relief officer. It was one of the largest offices we had in the world at that time and the largest consulate. There were about twelve officers, I think, which in those days was a big office.

We didn't have "home leave" in those days, but in remote countries, far countries like China, we were ordered home on consultation. It was the only way they could get you home at government expense. When anyone was on home leave or away from the office, then I would move into his chair.

So, I spent three and a half years--I was there almost three and a half years--in a constant rotation from one job to another, usually three or four months in one job.

You know, we were young. Caroline liked the social life in Shanghai which was very busy. We joined the Columbia Country Club. I didn't play golf, but I used to play tennis out there. We had a social life within the consulate. Then, we had a lot of other friends in Shanghai. I had my family's friends.

We knew a few Chinese, but they were all highly foreignized Chinese that mixed in the foreign community. It was a busy life, much too many parties. I was not very keen on it, and for a while I managed to quit going to parties entirely to get ready for my third year language exam.

### Press Survey

SERVICE: The first job I was given--I had just arrived--they were way behind in writing a survey of the press. The office was required to write a press summary of the English language press. This had been assigned to an officer who was in charge of the shipping section.

This was the beginning of '38. I got there just after New Year. The man in the shipping section apparently didn't know how to go about writing this sort of report.

Gauss, who was the consul general, called me in and asked me to do it. It was just a problem of getting the clippings organized. You had an outline of things to cover. And unlike the shipping man, I could give the job full time. Gauss liked my report and I got a very nice note commending me.

Incidentally, while I was in Shanghai the legislation was passed that consolidated the agriculture Foreign Service and the commerce Foreign Service with the State Department's Foreign Service. They used to have their separate--up to that time had had separate attachés abroad. A commercial attaché was responsible only to the Department of Commerce.

I was always the man that was called in when some special job needed to be done, task force and so on. So, I was the person who had to carry out all the routine of the amalgamation of the offices, inventorying their furniture and transferring it to our inventory.

### Visa Section, I

SERVICE: I was assigned soon after arrival to the visa section, which was a normal thing for the low man on the totem pole. I worked under the man named [John B.] Sawyer who was a classmate of my mother and father's at UC, and had looked out for me when I was a boarder at the American school.

He had never passed the Foreign Service examination. He was what was called a non-career vice-consul. But, he was the great authority on Chinese visas. He wrote the manual on issuing Chinese visas, which were a very, very special thing in those days.

We had exclusion laws. Chinese could only come to the United States under certain conditions, as a student or as a merchant trader under Section Six of such and such a treaty. A Section Six trader, we called them.

Anyway, one day soon after I got to the desk a White Russian woman came along, a young White Russian woman, and asked to speak to me.

She told me this heart-rendering story about how her father had been an American engineer in the Soviet Union, been caught there by the revolution--there were American engineers in the Soviet Union, mining engineers and so on--and that she lost all her papers. Her father had died when they were trying to escape the Soviet Union. She had come to Shanghai with her mother, but since her father was American, she had a claim to American citizenship, and wanted a visa to the United States.

I wrote a long memorandum about this. The other men in the visa section said nothing at all until I presented my memorandum. It turned out that she was a case that had been doing this for years and years with every new person she saw in the visa section!

### Political Officer: "How to be a Successful Political Reporter"

SERVICE: I did every job in the consulate except sitting in the consul general's chair--accounts, shipping, invoices. I had at least two spells in what was called the political section.

This, I think, was where I really had my first lessons in political reporting. There were two people in the political section, a man named Ed Stanton--who was a very fine officer and later ended up as ambassador to Thailand--and then quite a brilliant man named Monroe B. Hall who was a Japan language officer. But, he was stationed in China because the Chinese-Japanese war had started, and we were having a great many problems with the Japanese army occupying American properties wherever they advanced in China, molesting American missions, and a lot of protection cases, we called them.

Form is sometimes more important than content. You're not going to be a successful reporter unless your reports are read. So there is some sense in saying that the first thing is to learn to write well. People get typed. They get a reputation as being good or bad, easy to read, interesting, and so on.

Hall particularly was a good writer. He used to kid me unmercifully about what I submitted. "Terrible, tear it up. Do it over again. You're using too many words. Boil it down. Be concise."

Gauss himself was a master of concise, succinct drafting. He did all of his own, sat down to the typewriter. He had been a court reporter before he came in the Foreign Service. He was an excellent typist, and he almost never had to retype. He'd just sit down at the typewriter and be able to do it all. His drafting of telegrams was a model of very brief, concise writing.

So, in Shanghai I at least had a good training in drafting, writing. Most of the work I did was, as I say, protection cases, writing notes to the Japanese. I worked out a sort of progression of letters, the first-second-third-fourth, like dunning letters. [laughter]

For example, "We wrote you on such and such a date about the occupation of this mission chapel. Nothing's happened." The second letter would be tougher.

I finally got so mean in writing these, these final stages, that the Japanese consulate--we had to send them to the Japanese consulate-general, and they transmitted them to the military--sent a

delegate to come around to the consulate and ask us to please not use such rough language because they didn't dare [chuckling] give them to the military.

*Q: Did you get the properties back?*

SERVICE: Oh, generally yes--eventually. The Japanese weren't seizing and holding them, but the military had absolutely no respect for foreign properties. This was partly intentional, part of the way their attitude was. In the Panay case, for instance, the officers on the spot certainly knew that it was an American gunboat. It had big American flags painted all over the top of it.

But there were a lot of wild-eyed, hot-headed, anti-foreign junior officers, I'm sure, that didn't care. We had proclamations and signs, all sorts of things. But in military operations, who cares?

Then also, of course, the missions opened their premises to the refugees. So, all sorts of people came in, and from the viewpoint of the Japanese, they felt they had a right to go in at least to search for Chinese soldiers. Probably there were Chinese soldiers in some cases, not in their uniforms. The Japanese usually raped the women. But, wartime--it's pretty hard to protect property in circumstances like that.

#### Third Year Language Exams: Stratagems for Study

SERVICE: One thing in Shanghai I've already alluded to was this effort to work for my third year exam. The chief interpreter was an old friend of mine. He'd been in Peking, and been transferred to Shanghai because they had a lot of work. I worked out a system where I had an hour lesson early in the morning with a young Chinese woman whom I also had met in Peking. Her family had moved to Shanghai. She came for an hour's class early in the morning before I left the house for the office.

The senior Chinese clerks in the consulate had lunch brought in from a Chinese restaurant nearby. We were very close to Foochow Road, which is a street in Shanghai which is where all the best restaurants are. They had a contract with one of these restaurants to bring in food in containers, hot food.

There was a room where the chauffeurs and so on sat around--where they had a big round table, you know, a collapsible table, which could be set up. That was always set up and the food would come in promptly at twelve o'clock. I went down and ate with the Chinese clerks.

Chinese eat very fast. We'd eat in about twelve minutes, and then I would have a lesson with the interpreter for the rest of the lunch hour. This was a bit unusual, and probably seemed strange to my colleagues. I'm sure it had never been done before.

*Q: Was it frowned on?*

SERVICE: I was never told I couldn't do it. I'm not sure that Butrick knew about it.

But anyway, I had the hour in the morning, I had lunch with the clerks, and then I had an hour's class during the noon hour. Then, in slightly over a year--we had a home leave in there--I took my exam.

A funny thing happened. I wrote to the embassy in Peking and told them I planned to take the exam. The customary thing was to send you a sample of the questions that had been asked in earlier exams.

Between the time that I asked to take the exam, and the time I took the exam, there had been a change of officers in Peking. When I got my exam questions for the exam I thought [chuckling] that they seemed familiar. They sent me the same exam I'd already been sent as a sample. Unfortunately, I had assumed that I wouldn't be asked the same questions, so I hadn't concentrated on them. [laughter]

#### Discovery of Lax Accounting and Lax Security in the Consulate

SERVICE: I think this having lunch with the Chinese staff was probably a good thing in many ways, beside the linguistic one. I was assigned, at one point, to be in charge of the accounting section.

I did all the accounts. We kept the register of fees. The immigration visa was ten dollars--one dollar for the application, nine dollars for the visa itself.

The man in the visa section, the clerk, had to come over to our section to sign in the book. There had to be a record of fees, and the record of fees for the whole consulate was kept in our section. He would come over and make an entry, describe the service, what the fee was. He would get what we called a service number which then would be applied to the document.

A Chinese clerk that was working for me in the accounts section said to me one day that he thought it very odd that so many "no fee" services were being performed by the visa section. I said, "Next time one comes, let me know about it if you think maybe it's peculiar."

Soon he came in my office and said, "Come look." We went and there was a no fee service that had just been put in by a Chinese clerk in the visa section. What the clerk did was to fill out this little slip for the service, and then he handed it to the American officer for initial. The American officer normally never read the slip. He just put his initial on it.

I went over and spoke to the officer who had signed the slip. I said, "Did you just sign a slip for a no fee service?" He said, "No." He recalled it was a visa.

We went immediately to the clerk's desk and asked him to stand aside. We looked in his desk, searched his desk, and there we found a whole lot of nine dollar fee stamps that were bogus. A nine dollar fee stamp was gray, and he had simply gone out and had some photographic ones made, gray. It was quite easy.

What he had been doing, for goodness knows how long, was putting in this slip for a no fee service for a nine dollar one, when the service was really nine dollars. Then, he pocketed the nine dollars and took one of his fake stamps and put it on the visa.

So, we had the goods on him. We asked him to come along and went right up to the consul-general's office--it was not Gauss by this time; it was another man named Lockhart--explained the situation and called the police.

But, Lockhart would not prosecute. He thought it would be too embarrassing. However, in this whole affair we then found out that the Japanese were paying some of our employees, messengers--for wastepaper, for picking up whatever they could and taking it out. But nothing was done about that either.

We had Chinese messengers going in and out of the file room. They could pick up things. They picked up things like office directories, Department of State directories. We tried to tighten up a little but, there wasn't any real security system then.

We don't know that they got anything important, but of course we had to fire a few people. The man who was working for the Japanese was a relative of one of the very senior Chinese employees, so that was a very nasty business.

But at any rate, this possibly wouldn't have happened if it hadn't been for the fact that I had established, shall we say, good relations with the Chinese staff.

*Q: Did it cause trouble when you had the firings of Chinese employees?*

SERVICE: No, not really.

*Q: I meant disturb your rapport?*

SERVICE: Oh, not that I recall. We had the goods on this man. He lost face completely on it. Everybody around saw what the situation was, so that there wasn't anything bad there.

There were some hard feelings about the messenger that we had to fire, but that was the loss of face by his uncle or whoever it was that recommended him. I didn't feel badly about whoever it was that recommended him. I didn't feel badly about it. In fact, I think I felt somewhat self-righteously angry.

#### Home Leave, 1938: A Class VIII Officer

SERVICE: We had home leave in October, I think it was, of '38. This was the first time I'd been back to the States for over five years since I left in early '33. We got a car, picked up a car in Detroit, drove to Washington, and back across the continent, which we subsequently always did on every home leave. We always crossed the continent at least once by car.

I've crossed the continent--I don't know; I've tried to count--something like twenty times.

Being in the [State] Department was interesting. It was my first real appearance in the Department since I'd been a Foreign Service officer, since I took my exams in January, '33. In those days you had to go calling in the Department.

You left a card on the secretary of state and on the under-secretary. You called on the chief of personnel. Generally you had to talk with everybody at that level, have a short talk.

You, of course, talked to the people in the Far Eastern section, Stanley Hornbeck and the other old worthies of the Department.

*Q: How did they impress you?*

SERVICE: Well, I was rather awed, shall we say. I felt somewhat differently later on after I'd come back from Chungking. But, after all, I couldn't claim any great expertise in those days. I'd studied language, but as a language student you were sort of removed from the actual, what was going on. In Shanghai, as I say, I'd been general relief man.

So, I sat and listened respectfully, I think, when I talked to the chief of personnel. He said, "You're doing okay, Service. Don't be worried."

Actually, I was doing quite well because, having passed my third year exam, I was promoted to class VIII. You have three unclassified grades. You start as unclassified C, then unclassified B and unclassified A.

It put me in class VIII four years from the time I was commissioned. That was well ahead of most of my contemporaries--in those days it was generally taking about seven years to reach class VIII.

*Q: Class IX is the last class, isn't it?*

SERVICE: They don't call it class IX. They just call it unclassified. Eight is the lowest numbered grade.

*Q: Right. So that was accelerated promotion.*

### Visa Section II: The Trap Snapped Shut in Europe

SERVICE: By 1940, it began to be obvious that things were headed for trouble in the Far East, particularly after the European war really came to life in April, 1940. As soon as France fell, Japan moved into the northern part of Indochina.

This was a sort of a weather vane of what was going to happen. Japan was going to move in and take over the colonies, Dutch East Indies, French, British, and so on, the Far East if she could.

This really is what changed American policy. It wasn't so much sympathy for China as it was our concern about Europe, what we began to think of more and more by this time as our allies. The Lend-Lease Act was beginning to start.

In late 1940--I think we had already given notice in July of the cancellation of the commercial treaty with Japan--the State Department decided to order families back to the States. They couldn't expect other Americans to do anything unless they set the example of ordering their own back.

So our families were all told. An American ship was brought into Shanghai, one of the Matson liners, to evacuate them. Caroline and the children and my mother and my brother Dick's wife were all on that same ship, the Monterey, in November, 1940, which I'm sure Caroline has told you about.

Then, I became a bachelor, which was--Oh, I didn't carouse as much maybe as some, but there was a fair amount of nightlife.

By this time the Jews in Europe had no other place to go really except China. They could only get out for a while through Italy. From Vienna they could go to Italy. Italy didn't come into the war until after France fell or about the time that France fell.

*Q: Nineteen forty.*

SERVICE: Yes. Up to that time Jews could get out through Italy. Where could they go? Shanghai was one of the few places. So, I forget, twenty or thirty thousand came to Shanghai.

They had all registered for American visas in consulates in Europe, in Paris, or Warsaw, or Vienna, or wherever it was. But, the waiting list [for an American visa] was years and years long. They asked to have their case transferred to Shanghai. But, when the case came in, all we could say was, "five years wait" or something like that.

But then when Italy came in, when the war really started--and France was occupied by Germany--then the Department informed us in Shanghai that we had to start considering these cases, because people who were caught in Europe could no longer have any hope of getting out. Therefore, the Jews that were out of Europe in Shanghai had a right to have their cases considered.

This was a great surprise and shock to Shanghai because our little old visa section under Mr. Sawyer had perhaps handled two cases a day or something like that. Suddenly we had thousands of cases that we had to deal with.

So, I was told to organize a task force to go into the visa section, to set up a special unit in the visa section, and try to handle these cases, which we did. We got in touch with other offices to find out how big offices handled their load, got some hints on how to do it, how to set up an interview schedule--one every fifteen minutes--and how to manage files and records on a wholesale basis.

Unfortunately the American immigration law still contained a check rein in it because of the provision that you couldn't issue a visa to anyone who was "liable to become a public charge." Even though he might be qualified, even though his number had come up, if the consular officer considered that he was liable to become a public charge, you couldn't give him a visa.

This was a hangover from the Depression. We still had a lot of unemployed in the States. American labor unions were powerful.

The consul was always under a kind of sword of Damocles. Because even when he issued a visa, this wasn't necessarily final. The immigration officer, the immigration service at the port of entry, had the final say. Immigration could still turn someone back, even though the unfortunate person had received a visa in the field, in China.

This made you quite cautious in applying this "liable to become a public charge." But we did issue a lot of visas. As you probably know, Max Knight here in Berkeley, who worked for the UC Press for many years, was one that I gave a visa to. I remember him very well.

But, you got an awful lot of pressure of various kinds, emotional pressure and some offers, shall we say, of money and other inducements to get people out. A lot of them were--What I'm trying to say is somebody who'd been in a concentration camp and obviously had the scars of a concentration camp, you might not be able to give a visa to because he didn't speak any English, had no close relatives in the United States, had no trade.

People like a doctor couldn't get any assurance--They couldn't get a license to practice in the United States under many state laws. People who had all sorts of professional training would have to stay in the United States for a long time to pass licensing examinations that were obviously aimed against foreigners and people like this. So there it was--a bad business.

*Q: I'm sorry to upset you , Jack. I've heard you criticized, or rather not you personally but the consular service--*

SERVICE: Oh, of course. Oh, of course.

*Q: --in Shanghai, criticized in your own house here by a guest.*

SERVICE: No.

*Q: Just for the record, I'd like to know what were the stringencies that were imposed on you from Washington. You've told me about the immigration service stringency. But, as I recall, the quotas were tiny at that point.*

SERVICE: Yes, the quotas were fairly small, but that wasn't the basic problem, the size of the quota. Besides, at this time, the war was on, the Polish quota, who could come out on it? The people in Poland couldn't come out. Bona fide Poles weren't immigrating.

The quota is determined by where you're born. If you're a Jew and you're born in Austria or in Poland, you come under those countries' quotas.

The whole quota system was set up on a very arbitrary, biased basis to favor the northern European countries at this time, so that countries like Poland and Russia had quite large quotas.

After the war started and people couldn't leave these countries it wasn't the size of the quota that was so much limiting as much, I think, as this business of having to decide well, is this poor man going to be able to make a living in the States?

Of course, a lot of them could, because they would be taken care of by the community or organization helping refugees. In places like New York there were whole colonies of refugees, and a man didn't need to learn English or know English to be able to get a job in a German butchery in the Queens.

But, we felt under a good deal of pressure on it, certainly. I would say that we tried to apply the law as leniently as we could, as we felt that we could get away with, at least as long as I was running the visa special unit.

But, some of these people were pathetic. They'd been in concentration camps, as I say. But, people like Max Knight--Max Knight had gotten himself a job. He was teaching English in Shanghai and writing for the English newspaper in Shanghai. Obviously a person like this, good God, give him a visa quick.

The visa work ran until the time that I was transferred. What happened was that since my family had left I was living alone in an apartment. Really I'd had enough of Shanghai and enough of this continuous rotation.

I must say I didn't really relish the high pressure--high pressure in every way--visa work.

#### Comments on Gauss and His Tight Ship at the Shanghai Consulate

*Q: Do you have any other comments on Clarence Gauss and the sort of character he built in the consulate at Shanghai?*

SERVICE: He was always thought of as being crusty and cold, sort of hard-bitten, gimlet-eyed. He was very demanding, very hard-working. He had no real interest except his work as far as I could see.

He had a wife and a son, but they were not in China. He and his wife usually lived apart, or did in those years. He ran a very tight ship in the office, expected everyone else to work hard and up to high standards.

The only thing that most of us could criticize about him was that he put up with Butrick. But, Butrick was a hard-working guy himself. No one could call him lazy.

Actually, my relations with Gauss became very close, particularly at Chungking, not so much at Shanghai which was a big office. But, in Chungking I lived in a small house with him and Vincent. He had almost a sort of a father relationship to me.

*Q: What about the rest of the staff? Were any of the other people who subsequently became called "The China Hands?"*

SERVICE: There were several. Oliver Edmund came to Shanghai later on. He was, of course, considerably senior to me.

There was another China man there named Smith, but he was not much of a China scholar and he worked in the commercial section.

#### "Service Transferred Chungking Soonest"

SERVICE: Early in '41--I forget just how I did it--I got myself transferred to Chungking. I think what I did was to write to the ambassador in Chungking, Nelson Johnson, whom I had known from Peking; he'd been ambassador in Peking--and said that I'd welcome an assignment to Chungking, which was then the temporary capital of China.

In those days, it was not a particularly desirable post, and anybody that volunteered got it. Very quickly, soon thereafter there was a telegram came to the department, "Service transferred Chungking soonest." So, I left and went to Chungking.

### IV CHUNGKING POSTING, 1941

*[Interview 5: September 12, 1977]*

#### Background to Jack's Appointment to Chungking

*Q: I'm glad to be back here after the summer, Jack. When we left off last time, you said that you had applied for posting from Shanghai to Chungking. But, in rereading E.J. Kahn's China Hands, he says that your transfer was recommended by [Everett F.] Drumright, "oddly." (E.J. Kahn, Jr. The China Hands: America's Foreign Service Officers and What Befell Them, Penguin Books, 1976, p.67.) What do you think he meant by that?*

SERVICE: Well I can't really speak for Jack Kahn, but when he wrote his book he decided to talk to someone beyond the circle of China hands who were fired. I don't know who suggested it or how he happened to choose Drumright. He knew that Drumright disagreed rather basically, particularly later on, with those of us who were fired.

I think that when Kahn mentioned my coming to Chungking--and this is all my hypothesis--Drumright said that yes, he was in Chungking when Service's letter to Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson arrived. I can well assume that Johnson would have asked around, particularly Drumright, if he knew Service, what do you think of him, what should he (Johnson) recommend?

Drumright probably knew me as an active younger officer. The service in China was very small. Gossip and rumor went around. Everybody had an idea of other people's capabilities, how they stood, how good they were. Certainly Drumright knew that I was the only person since he himself had done it to have taken a third year Chinese exam. I would guess that my reputation was fairly good as a very young officer. He probably said to Johnson, "Why sure, Service is a good, hard worker."

So Drumright could say to Kahn that he recommended me. My transfer was on the basis of my having written and asked for a transfer. I think that Kahn, not really knowing the situation at the time, thinks this was odd. But it wasn't really odd.

At this time, in 1941, early '42, there was no [American] debate going on in China about China policy. There was no real disagreement among people serving the government about our attitude toward the Chiang Kai-shek regime. We were pretty much all of one mind. So there really wasn't anything very odd about it. Later on, as we look back on it--Drumright having served as ambassador to Taiwan and fought many battles for the Taiwan government--now it looks odd that Drumright should have been the guy that said, "Well, yes, you better get this guy."

#### Night Flight, Hong Kong to Chungking

*Q: How did you travel from Shanghai to Chungking?*

SERVICE: In Spring, 1941, there was still a daily flight run by the China National Aviation Corporation, which was jointly owned by the Chinese government and Pan American. Pan American supplied the know how, operations, and so on. Crews were Pan Am. The flight left Hong Kong-- Haven't I described this to you?

*Q: No.*

SERVICE: Very late at night at an undetermined hour-- You never knew what time you were going to leave. You were simply told to come to the airport at midnight or 1 a.m. Then somewhere around two or three in the morning they would take off from the old Kai Tak airport there in Hong Kong and circle above Hong Kong, or actually go out to sea a ways. Then when they got enough elevation--those were DC-3's in those days; the DC-2 was just going out and the DC-3 was just coming in--when they had enough elevation then they would go off across occupied China. They had to head across Hong Kong, head across Canton, and so on, Guangdong, Guangxi, and on up to Chungking.

They would fly across at night. This was before effective radar and night fighting, so there wasn't much the Japanese could do about them. Then they would arrive in Chungking soon after daybreak.

*Q: Before the bombers.*

SERVICE: Before the bombers. I flew up on the same plane with the Luces. We arrived on a misty morning just barely after dawn. Clouds were around.

It was pretty hairy because the airport was down beside the river, high hills on both sides. The pilot knew it well. He got down through and we came in.

You were very, very strictly limited on weight. I was very much annoyed because I knew when I went to Chungking that I was going to have to attend a presentation of credentials by our new ambassador. By that time Gauss had been appointed. The Chinese insisted on all the rigmarole. They had to do it properly. In the American system we've got no diplomatic uniforms. If you go to a presentation of credentials you've got to wear a white tie.

*Q: Tails?*

SERVICE: Tails. [laughter] So I had to take my tail coat, et cetera to Chungking with me because I couldn't expect to borrow anyone else's. I was thin as a rail in those days. I weighed about a hundred and thirty pounds. I had to take my white-tie outfit, taking up valuable luggage. I was allowed forty pounds, something like that.

Then Drumright, who was in Chungking, knew I was coming, and he wrote to me in Shanghai and asked me to bring his flat silver. For some strange reason he wanted flat silver! So I had all of his flat silver in a briefcase which practically weighed me down. Anyway, I got by with the heavy briefcase partly because I was a foreigner.

There was a large Chinese passenger who was being weighed just ahead of me. He just ballooned out all around, sort of like a tent. The clerk in charge of weighing in says, "This won't do. What have you got on? Let's see." So he started to take off layer after layer after layer. He had all sorts of things inside. [laughter] The whole crowd at the airport, all of us who were waiting to be weighed in, got great enjoyment out of this poor fellow's embarrassment.

#### Ambassadorial Styles: Nelson T. Johnson and Clarence E. Gauss

*Q: Then when you came to the embassy you served under two different ambassadors. Would you comment on their different styles?*

SERVICE: I came in just on the tag end of Nelson T. Johnson. He was transferred to Australia. Clarence Gauss, who had been my boss in Shanghai when I first went to Shanghai in '38 was sent to Chungking.

Johnson was very easygoing. We referred to him as a sort of Taoist. "Do nothing and there is nothing that will not be done." He was fairly inactive and passive. At that time we were neutral in the Chinese war. Roosevelt had tried in his quarantine speech in '38 to get the United States to do something. That had been strongly rejected by public opinion. I think the general attitude in Washington was that we should try to not get involved and stay out of the line of fire.

The American embassy, for instance, under Johnson had set up offices on the south bank across the city from Chungking in an area which had been largely taken over by foreign business

people. So it was regarded as a semi-foreign area, not normally a target by the Japanese. All the other embassies were in the city of Chungking.

The embassy had no motor car. We were isolated, and he was quite content to let a very active and very able naval attaché named McHugh maintain close contacts with Mme. Chiang, the Generalissimo, important people. Quite abnormal in most embassies to abdicate the important contacts, the important political reporting, to a service attaché.

*Q: Why not a foreign service officer?*

SERVICE: Well, here was this guy. He was in the navy. He had a car. The navy had a sampan to get across the river. Crossing the river was a problem. He was a very active, aggressive person who had been in China a long time, knew these people, was adept at developing his contacts.

The embassy under Johnson was rather content to take life easy. Johnson regarded Chungking as a temporary office and made no attempt to build up the embassy. He was just, I say, a Taoist, to repeat myself. [laughter] He was a raconteur who took life quite easily, liked to socialize and talk. He played the guitar. He was a rotund, rather jolly person who liked to sit around and talk, had a great fund of anecdotes and stories.

Gauss was the complete opposite. He was a tough, hard-boiled guy, no small talk, no interest in socializing, very touchy and sensitive about prerogatives and about the embassy exercising its proper role in things like political reporting.

He brought in new staff. The old staff was due to go out anyway. They'd been there a long time with Johnson. They'd followed him up from Nanking to Hangzhou and finally to Chungking. So they were all due for a transfer.

Before Gauss came he tried to solve the transportation problem by getting a motor car from the Department. Later on that's why I was sent to Rangoon, because the Department took so long to get the motor car that it was on the high seas at the time of Pearl Harbor. It had been promised early in the year [1941], but they had to wait for the next fiscal year before they had funds, and then they had to get bids and so on, all this sort of thing, a real bureaucratic fairy tale.

Johnson himself never did any official political reporting or drafting of telegrams. Gauss did a great deal of that. He just sat down at a typewriter and would bang out a despatch.

*Q: What was the norm at that point for an ambassador?*

SERVICE: There aren't really any norms. I think that Johnson was nearer the norm than Gauss in many ways. Johnson was a very close and old personal friend of Stanley Hornbeck who was an old character in the State Department, had dominated the Far Eastern branch of the State Department many, many years and was a close friend of [Cordell] Hull.

John did all of his work in personal letters to Hornbeck. He just scorned writing official despatches which were going to be read by a lot of people in the Department. It was all personal letters to Hornbeck who, of course, had the ear of [Cordell] Hull, the Secretary of State.

Gauss had no real, close, personal contacts in Washington. He sat down and wrote official despatches or expected his staff to. So, we had a very much tighter organization under Gauss. It was very soon made known to the naval attaché that the embassy was going to do the important political reporting. It expected to develop contacts with the top people, Chiang's family, and so on.

Gauss was interested in a much more active role in getting his staff out in the country and doing much more reporting. There had been very little traveling by anybody in the embassy under Johnson. Gauss got the Chinese--fairly soon--to agree to let us send people out to various cities as observers, not setting up formal offices but so we could get some feel of what was going on in the country. We were isolated.

Gauss got to Chungking at the end of May, 1941. When France fell [June, 1940], Japan had moved into Indochina. When Japan moved into Indochina and began to threaten Indonesia, the United States became really concerned. Our whole attitude toward helping China began to become much more positive.

The Flying Tigers business was all being set up in the summer of '41, sub rosa. This was a mercenary force originally. But there was an airplane factory that was going to be set up on the border between Burma and China. American experts were being sent out to help advise the Chinese in improving the Burma Road, building it better, paving it, getting more traffic over it, organizing the traffic which was deplorably disorganized.

#### Only Nine Staff Members in the American Embassy

SERVICE: The work of the embassy started snowballing after Pearl Harbor. I got a little picture here which shows the embassy staff in the summer of 1941. You can see that it's tiny.

*Q: Nine.*

SERVICE: We had no women.

*Q: That was something I was going to ask you about.*

SERVICE: There were no women permitted. That was true for the Americans, British and other people had them, but we had no wives, no women allowed. So that four men out of the nine were clerks. Between those four they had to take care of all the coding and decoding, filing, and typing of anything that was confidential, most of it was classified. Then there's the ambassador and four officers.

This, of course, by present day standards is tiny. It's just incredible. The smallest country now has an embassy twice or three times this size. But this was in China, in Chungking. We had the

ambassador, the counselor, John Carter Vincent. We had a second secretary named John Macdonald who was the economics man. He knew no Chinese, never served in China. So, all he could do was to take the handouts.

I was third secretary and a Chinese-speaking officer. Vincent was a Chinese-speaking officer, but his language was weak because he'd been out of China for most of his service. He'd been in Switzerland, at the League of Nations, for a long time. Then there was a very young foreign service officer named Boise Hart who was not a China man.

*Q: How did this staff compare, for instance, with that of the British or the French?*

SERVICE: Oh, we were more or less comparable. Things were all much simpler in those days. Yes, I don't think the British had a much larger staff than we did, although it may have been fancier. The ambassador was a very able man named Clark Kerr, who later on became Lord Inverchapel and was ambassador in Moscow--had a private secretary. That sort of thing. They may have had a slightly larger staff than we did, but it wasn't tremendous. But they did have some wives working and they had some girls in the embassy.

The Soviet embassy I think was considerably larger, but the Soviets always had a big staff because they brought their own cooks and chauffeurs and so on. They didn't use Chinese servants the way we did. They had language people. They had quite a big establishment.

*Q: You commented that Johnson had his own people and that Gauss gradually brought in his people. Was this the usual practice for an ambassador to have a certain degree of control over postings and who he had in his embassy?*

SERVICE: In those days it didn't go down very far. I'm not sure it does now. An ambassador usually had the privilege of asking for the top people. The counselor for instance, the number two man, was usually somebody whom the ambassador felt he could work with. The ambassador could ask for other people.

One of the first things that Gauss did when he got to Chungking was to tell me that he had not asked for me. He didn't want me to be under any misapprehension that he had asked for me, since I had been assigned there almost the same time that he was assigned there. I told him, of course, that I realized that, because I had asked to be assigned there before I knew he was going to be assigned! [laughter]

*Q: What was the implication of that, that he didn't want you to be under an obligation?*

SERVICE: No, no. He didn't want me to feel that I could expect any special preferential treatment. He was absolutely just straight as a die, you know, on anything like that, no favoritism.

Jack as "Chief of Chancery" or General Handyman

SERVICE: Eventually I got to know people in Chungking and to get around more. And then Boise Hart arrived. He took over the consular chores, and I moved more into political reporting, although even that was part-time. It wasn't a full time job. We were always very much tied to the office, tied to the desk.

*Q: That's interesting. How many hours did you have to spend at the office?*

SERVICE: Oh, we spent a full eight hours usually and very often more. We were busy and getting more and more busy. We had to help out in the code room and things like that. The code room staff was very inadequate. Traffic built up. We all had to give a hand at doing telegrams, and this might mean at night sometimes.

*Q: What were your assignments in Chungking?*

SERVICE: It's hard to recount--It was such a small staff, of course, you had to do a lot of things. When I first arrived I think I was just made general handyman. They call you chief of chancery. It's a misnomer, the title, because it just means you're chief clerk, a minor administrative officer, taking care of all the chores that need to be done. Nowadays they've built up administrative officer into a glorious, big job. But in those days, before the administrative sciences had been developed, apparently we got along with very little administration!

When Drumright left--I think some time in the fall, or maybe even before that--I was put in charge of what did they call it? I was made a sort of a Chinese secretary in charge of checking translations and correspondence to and from the foreign office. We had the Chinese translator but someone was supposed to look over it, make sure that everything was all right.

The translator, when he had some time, translated articles from the press or articles that we asked him to do. But I soon found that nothing really was done in any immediate way to check the press. It took the translator a long time. He did laborious, word by word translations. He only did things that he was asked to do generally. He couldn't do very much.

There were about eight newspapers, seven or eight papers, in Chungking. Every political grouping or faction, clique, would have its paper. I don't want to get into a lot of Chinese names here. I started looking at the editorials. We got the papers usually quite early in the morning. I would skim the editorials of all the papers and then write a paragraph or so, just the gist of each editorial.

Later on, of course, all this thing was highly developed. After the war started, the O[ffice] of W[ar] I[nformation] got organized, and they had a whole corps of people doing this, Chinese translators doing it. But for a while it just would take up a couple hours of my morning, just skim the editorials and then try to capture the gist of it in a little capsule.

#### Madam Chiang's Unique American Visa Issued by Jack

SERVICE: I also did consular work, visas and so on. You were asking if there were differences between Gauss and Johnson. Soon after I got there, I was doing these sorts of consular chores--

the embassy still had to do things like passports and visas--the Foreign Office sent over the passport of Mme. Chiang. Mme. Chiang apparently made a practice of keeping an American visa in her passport so she could leave on short notice.

They sent a little note saying that they had sent the passport over many times, and it seemed to be much easier if we could just issue a permanent visa. Well, there's no such thing as a permanent visa, wasn't then. Visas are limited, for a certain period.

So, I took the thing up to Johnson and he said, "Oh, go ahead. [laughter] Just leave out any expiry date. Just give her a visa and don't mention an expiration date." So, I gave Mme. Chiang a unique State Department visa!

Of course, with Gauss this would never have worked. Gauss had written a manual on notarial procedures that was the "Bible" all through the Foreign Service. He would have insisted on the regulations and the law.

#### Embassy Relations with American Army and Navy Intelligence

*Q: So Gauss built up a professional office as quickly as he could. Another thing that you said that interested me is that he told off the navy in no uncertain terms. What sort of liaison did he have at that time with information that the army and the navy were getting?*

SERVICE: Oh, I think quite good. I don't think there was any complaint. Under Johnson, of course, he was reporting [navy] information and giving credit. He would say, "McHugh has seen Mme. Chiang and reports the following," and then send it in. I don't think that McHugh was holding out particularly. The military attaché was Meyer, who had taken the place of Stilwell, who by this time had left China as attaché. I don't think that there was any problem with the army either.

McHugh got into hot water later on when he began to try to play politics a little bit. He sort of joined the anti-Stilwell faction, and this eventually got him in the wringer.

Most of Meyer's contacts were not political contacts so much as military contacts. He watched what was happening militarily in the Sino-Japanese war and gave us copies of his reports.

#### Chungking: A Precipitous City Divided by the Fast-flowing Yangtze River

SERVICE: The American embassy was, as I said, situated very unsuitably and inconveniently on the south bank across the Yangtze. Crossing the Yangtze at night was sometimes a chancy and perilous business. Some nights you just couldn't do it. If the water was flooding the boats wouldn't cross. You had to cross by a little sampan with people rowing, and you'd get swept way down the river and then you'd hang on and pull yourselves up on the boats on the other side.

*Q: How wide is the Yangtze there? It's a confluence, isn't it, of two rivers?*

SERVICE: Yes, two rivers. Oh, I suppose maybe half a mile wide. It doesn't get much wider when it floods because the banks are very steep. The Yangtze flowed down through these very steep shores. The city of Chungking is built on a high rock, like a ship almost, between these two rivers, and any place you go is up. In those days you had a long, long line of steps. People used to say that there were 365 steps at the landing where we normally went. I think that's slightly exaggerated, but in any case it would differ a good deal depending on the stage of the water because the difference between high water and low water level was a hundred feet. So obviously at low water you had a lot more steps to go up.

A lot of people found the steps difficult. Gauss usually had to get a sedan chair to go up. There were no wheel vehicles until you got up onto the top, the plateau at the top. Then you'd have some rickshaws and buses. But there was only one place in Chungking where a motor car could get down to the river. That was where they had a ferry across for trucks and so on.

Along the cliff side as the water went down people built bamboo houses, huts, and when the water came up in the springtime they all had to be torn down. This happened every year. Houses would move down as the water went down and be dismantled when the river came up the next spring.

The commercial airport was an island in the river, a glorified sandbar. But then every summer that was flooded. So then they had to use another airport much further away from town, the military field. But the river was very swift, and when it was rising in flood, it could be quite dangerous.

They had launches, steam ferries, that operated during the daytime, but they quit in very early evening. After that, a sampan, a small rowboat was the only way of getting across.

*Q: Were these rowed by men or women?*

SERVICE: Men. You're thinking of South China where it's women. But in Sichuan it's a man's job. They row by standing up, facing forward, not our way of sitting down, backward.

*Q: I've never been able to figure out how that works!*

### Domestic Arrangements

*Q: Where and how did you live in Chungking?*

SERVICE: The embassy rented a bungalow that belonged to Standard Oil.

In normal times, Standard Oil was a fairly large company in Chungking because it was the distributing center for Sichuan and areas west. So kerosene was shipped there in bulk, and put into five gallon cans to be shipped out by other means from Chungking.

Since fairly early in the war the river had been blocked. It was barricaded just above Ichang to keep the Japanese from being able to come up the Yangtze, so that nothing could come in and

Standard Oil was doing no business. They had one man there, sort of a caretaker. But several of their houses were available and they had a bungalow up in the hills, in what was called the Second Range, the south bank of Chungking. The embassy rented that bungalow, and they also had a house down fairly near the river. That was the house that was right next to the ambassador and the counselor.

When I arrived the man that I was replacing had lived up in the hill bungalow and I went up there. I didn't mind. It was a half hour or forty minutes from the office, but I normally did it by foot. Some people did it by chair. It was more arduous, I thought, by chair than by foot.

But the ambassador and the counselor and the counselor's private secretary lived in the Standard Oil house down fairly near the river, near the office.

We rented a building from a Chinese landlord, which I think was put up in a hurry, for the office, which became very inadequate. Other people rented houses. The rest of the staff lived in a couple of houses that were owned by a widow of an American doctor who had left the mission and gone into business. He started a private hospital in Chungking, a drugstore, and so on. They built several houses which they rented. But we were all there on the south bank.

In the fall of '41 I was asked to come down from my hill house and move in with the ambassador and the counselor, Gauss and Vincent. So I did that. I lived there until I left Chungking in late '42.

*Q: Did you have a Chinese staff, a cook, amah, and so on?*

SERVICE: Yes. Some of the staff had been brought in by Johnson and other people, from Nanking, Hangzhou.

*Q: Who ran the house?*

SERVICE: That was one of my chores really. I was the junior man, and so it was my job to do the accounts and pay the cook, and do things like that, watch out that we weren't squeezed too much and so on.

Coffee was a tremendous problem. These crazy, perverse things that happen in times of scarcity - Coffee became a sort of a fad in Chungking, which was completely cut off from the world. Coffeeshouses sprang up all over town. The in thing to do was to have coffee. Where did they get their coffee? They got their coffee, of course, largely from foreign establishments like ours.

We had an agreement with the cook that if we got forty-five cups of coffee out of each pound of coffee, that was okay. We sort of kept a check. [laughter] How long the coffee lasted. Of course, what they did was to dry the grounds. Grounds were all dried and sold to the coffeeshouses, maybe sweetened a little bit with some fresh coffee. But mostly it was grounds that you got when you went to town. They boiled them to death.

You had to be very careful because things got terribly scarce, terribly expensive. Light bulbs would disappear. You couldn't leave a light bulb out on the porch, for instance, things like that. You had to bring it in at night. You got along fairly well without imported stuff.

The navy had a gunboat there. I think around the time of Pearl Harbor, or maybe even before Pearl Harbor, it was decided to pull the crew of the gunboat out. It couldn't do anything. It couldn't go anyplace. So they sold a lot of their supplies to the embassy staff.

As I mentioned the naval attaché had a car, and the navy had a truck which went on a regular supply run, first to Indochina, when the road was open from Indochina, to Chungking, and then from the Burma Road later on. So they would bring in some supplies. But after the gunboat stopped operating, the truck was discontinued, and we were really cut off.

*Q: Did you eat Western style or Chinese?*

SERVICE: Completely Western.

*Q: Really? Was this Gauss's preference?*

SERVICE: Yes. He had no interest in Chinese food.

One thing that we got from the gunboat was a case of tabasco sauce, and Gauss liked tabasco sauce. We had soup at lunch, we had soup at dinner, and always had tabasco sauce. I learned that eggs with tabasco sauce are very good, so I had tabasco sauce three meals a day. I had eggs for breakfast. [laughter]

But this was normal. Most foreigners were quite nationalistic in that they insisted that the cook prepare foreign style food, bread and so on.

*Q: Were there other residents in that house?*

SERVICE: It was a rather small house and it was just the three of us, Gauss, Vincent and myself. The bungalow up on the hill I always shared with someone else.

#### Japanese bombing rituals

SERVICE: The summer of '41 was the last heavy season of bombing. The Japanese did most of their bombings in the summer in Chungking for some reason. We had very heavy, sometimes almost continuous bombing in the summer of '41, whenever the weather was good.

It was all quite ritualized. If the weather was good the Japanese from Hangzhou would send up a reconnaissance plane to check the weather in Chungking. You could hear it buzzing about. Then you would know that in about two hours or three hours, various alerts would start going off.

The Chinese had a wonderful system of air raid warnings. A lot of credit is given to the Chinese for this. But it was organized by [Claire Lee] Chennault. Chennault then worked for the Chinese. This was before the Flying Tigers, the Fourteenth Air Force.

It was made easier by the fact that the Japanese operated only from one particular locality, Hangzhou. They built their base in Hangzhou. The Chinese had watchers apparently almost beside the field, right in Hangzhou. So they knew when the Japanese were getting ready for a raid, they could tell when they took off, and all the rest of it. The watchers could tell when they got to two hundred kilometers, a hundred kilometers, fifty kilometers from Chungking. By that time you heard them and everybody went underground.

*Q: You had air raid shelters.*

SERVICE: Oh yes. We had one for the embassy. Everyone was instructed, required, you might say, to prepare shelters. Chungking is on soft sandstone, quite easy to dig into.

We normally used to stay outside of the shelter until we could see the planes and see where they were coming from. In the city, because of so many people, police required you to go underground, but we would stand outside and watch the planes. If the planes weren't coming over us then we would normally not go in. Even that was not without some danger because Chinese did have anti-aircraft and you had shrapnel falling around.

The first day I was there-- I came up on a plane with Mrs. Luce, Henry Luce and Mrs. [Clare Boothe] Luce. They came over and called at the embassy and there was an air-raid. I was standing about three feet from Mrs. Luce on the edge of a terrace looking out toward the city, a whizzing sound, and a piece of shrapnel fell right between us on the ground, a small piece about as big as your finger.

*Q: How did she react to it?*

SERVICE: She reacted very well. She was very calm. I made the mistake, foolishly and ignorantly, of trying to pick it up too soon, before it got cold. Shrapnel gets very, very hot.

But anyway we would watch, and then if the planes were in a threatening position we'd go in the shelter. If you had a shelter then you were required to let the neighborhood people in. There were a lot of poor people, ordinary people who couldn't build shelters. So if you had a shelter you had to have open house.

One day we went into the shelter and I noticed a woman holding a child who was obviously quite sick. So I asked her what was wrong with the child. The mother gestured: "Something wrong with his throat." It was mumps. So at an appropriate time after that I got sick. We had a navy doctor there from the gunboat. The navy doctor says, "You've got a fine case of mumps. Get yourself up the hill." I was living up on top of the hill at that time. "Get yourself up the hill and ride a chair." That was the only time, I think, I rode a chair up the hill. "Stay in bed. Don't get up. Don't walk around."

So I went up. I got the Chinese to get me some of these mats--they use them in South China a lot--to sleep on because it was much cooler than sleeping on a mattress and sheets. I unrolled the mat and I spent my two weeks up there. The doctor never came to see me.

*Q: Were you very sick?*

SERVICE: Not really. We had some night air raids. So all of this made staying in bed not exactly comfortable.

But the embassy [staff] used to come up to the hill, to the cottage on the hill when they had day-long alerts. They would come up and they could work up there. The whole staff pretty much would move up--the coolies carried a few typewriters. We worked up there several times when we had these prolonged alerts. The Japanese would send over a few planes every two or three hours to keep the whole city immobilized. Food couldn't come in from the countryside. People would be kept in the shelters.

*Q: What about fires?*

SERVICE: Oh terrible fires, terrible fires.

*Q: Did they have a reasonable firefighting system?*

SERVICE: Well, very poor, very primitive. For one thing there was no water. The river was two hundred feet below, so it was very hard to get very much water. Very often the bombs would destroy whatever water supply there was, the mains and pipes. They had no real adequate water supply.

So that it very often was a matter of trying to stop the spread of a fire by tearing down, making firebreaks. You couldn't do much about putting out the fires. By the time the war was over Chungking had all been rebuilt several times. Most of it was just bamboo and sort of wattle. You know, they split bamboo and would weave it into a mat and then plaster mud on it and then outside a thin coat of lime plaster, white plaster. These things could burn down very quickly, but then they could be put up very quickly.

*Q: What about communication? Was there an operating telephone system?*

SERVICE: Yes but very, very poor. We could telephone to the city, but that again was subject to trouble when air raids came. But there was a telephone. It was almost like, not as bad as Chengdu in my youth, but you sent messages around. We had a coolie or two that spent his time carrying notes. It was sometimes more reliable and sometimes just as fast to send a message by courier.

We didn't try to do much business with the foreign office, for instance, by telephone. Yes, setting up appointments, something like that, with the ambassador, you could do that by phone. But if you wanted to do any business you didn't sit down and do it by telephone. You went over and saw the man.

*Q: How good were Chungking's radio links with Japanese-occupied China?*

SERVICE: They had small radios. I'm sure they had to move them around. In a place like Hangzhou close to the Japanese they probably had small, portable things. You could work them with a bicycle [pedaling], you know. Well, that was one way they often did things. In a city like Hangzhou they may have gotten house current. It was relayed, I'm sure, to some other point and then further on.

*Q: But when you talk about sending telegrams, did you have reliable wire and/or radio service?*

SERVICE: We used the navy, you see. The navy had a gunboat there and one purpose of the gunboat was for the radio. We worked through the Philippines. I'm not sure that we used the Chinese commercial telegraph at all. I don't recall ever using it at that time. I think everything went through our navy. When the gunboat was pulled out we still kept the navy radio staff. They stayed on and set up their station on land.

#### Jack's Evolution as Political Officer and Communist Specialist

*Q: How did you become the embassy's "specialist" on the Chinese Communists? I put that in quotation marks. Again, Jack Kahn says that Gauss assigned you to find out all you could about the Communists, and Joseph Esherick (Ed. Joseph W. Esherick, Lost Chance in China: The World War II despatches of John S. Service, New York, Random House, 1974, p. 169) quotes you as saying that it was a simple career decision, that you weren't an economist and you weren't this and you weren't that, but you could make it as a Communist specialist.*

SERVICE: Well, people are, you know, speaking at different times and for different forums. Or is it fora?

*Q: [laughing] I don't think so.*

SERVICE: What Kahn is doing is quoting in effect from Gauss' testimony when he was testifying before my Loyalty Security Board in the State Department in 1950. Gauss is trying to explain, of course, that I was only carrying out orders. He's gilding the lily a little bit and so on. Certainly, I was assigned political reporting and part of the political reporting I was assigned was reporting on the Communists, maintaining contact with them. So, he's correct, as you say, that he sent me over there to find out all I could about them, I suppose.

Esherick's statement is aimed at a refutation of the general assumption that I reported on the Communists because of a political interest in the Communists. This was a very common attitude. If you reported on something it must be because you're interested in that yourself. In other words you're under suspicion simply because of having reported on it.

I was saying that certainly I was interested in political reporting--the gravy, you know; this was the way to fame and fortune, but it's also the interesting part for most people in Foreign Service work--and that I had been very much impressed by talking to old hands like Clubb, [Edmund O.]

Clubb who had advised me, advised any young man, to make a specialty of something, get to be known as being an authority on some particular subject, some topic.

After I got to Chungking it was quite obvious--to me at any rate--that the big problem in the future, the political issue, was going to be the Kuomintang-Communist thing.

*Q: You say that as though it were self-evident. But from my reading in that period it doesn't seem to have been evident to many people who regarded the Kuomintang, both in China and in the West, as the government and that the Communists were done for.*

SERVICE: Well, yes. I can't say that this was immediately apparent. It became apparent over a period of time. But almost as soon as I got to Chungking, or my very first few weeks there I think, Drumright was having a meeting at dinner with Zhou En-lai and some of the people on Zhou En-lai's staff, and he took me along.

He knew that he was leaving. I was coming in. This was sort of turning over his contacts, introducing me and so on. This was a very proper, thoughtful thing to do. But it was recognition and we all recognized at that time that the Communists were an important factor.

There were very few China language officers in the embassy at that time, so I think it was just taken for granted that the Communist contact would be maintained, and that I would be the one to maintain it.

#### New Fourth Army Incident and the Eighth Route Army: Factions Within the Communist Party

SERVICE: The New Fourth Army incident had just recently taken place in January that year [1941]. The British ambassador Clark Kerr, made some very strong statements on it. We kept our mouths shut. We said nothing at all. Johnson was ambassador and we just saw no evil, heard no evil, and so on.

*Q: Would you put the New Fourth Army incident in context?*

SERVICE: At the beginning of the war--

*Q: Excuse me. What do you mean? Everybody has a different date for the beginning of the war.*

SERVICE: We're talking about the Sino-Japanese war. At the beginning of the Sino-Japanese war in '37 it had been understood or perhaps agreed on, but at least implicitly understood, that the Chinese Communist forces, who at that time were based in north Shaanxi around Yen-an, would be allowed to operate in North China behind the Japanese lines, which they did very successfully. Very quickly they expanded their control in the North China provinces.

But at the same time there were still some remnants, old "Red" guerrillas, in the south Yangtze areas, Gansu where the Communists had operated from 1928 until 1934 when they were driven out. But they'd had a republic in Gansu, and they had left behind a lot of people who were

indoctrinated, who had been in their army, who were fighters, and who had maintained a shadowy glimmer of a guerrilla struggle.

Chen Yi for instance, who later on became foreign minister, remained in that area. One of Mao's brothers had stayed but was caught and killed.

But during the early honeymoon period of the war--late '37, early '38, and particularly when the capital was in Hangzhou--the proposal was made: "Everything to fight the Japanese." Therefore we've got these people down here. They're old, experienced people, guerrilla people. The Kuomintang agreed to allow another Communist force to be formed which was called the New Fourth Army. The Fourth Army had been very famous in the 1926-27 Northern Expedition. So they took the name "New Fourth Army."

This became extremely successful, operating in the areas south and then eventually north of the Yangtze, the lower Yangtze Valley. It became so successful the Kuomintang became very disturbed. Relations from '39 got very bad anyway. So the central government ordered the New Fourth Army to discontinue any operation south of the Yangtze and move all its operation north of the Yangtze.

What really happened and why is still a matter of debate. The Communists promised they would do so. They agreed in principle they would move. Most of their forces did go up north, but they had a very large headquarters contingent with wounded and various people like that, staff, civilian cadres, which were still south. Instead of moving in early January, instead of moving north, they started to move southeast, I think it was, anyway not toward the Yangtze.

They had some excuse that they couldn't cross the Yangtze where the Kuomintang wanted them to because of the Japanese presence. They had to take a roundabout route. But the Kuomintang apparently was ready, and they jumped on them and wiped them out.

Ten thousand or so people were practically obliterated. They captured the commander of the New Fourth Army and kept him prisoner through the war. He was killed at the end of the war.

There was a great outcry. As I say, Clark Kerr the British ambassador issued very strong critical statements of the action.

*Q: To the Kuomintang, to Chiang?*

SERVICE: To Chiang and to the press. It was given to the press. The Kuomintang officially dissolved the New Fourth Army, said that it would no longer recognize any New Fourth Army.

The Chinese Communists, of course, protested bitterly. Both sides put out big stories to the press. As I say the whole incident is still a mystery to some extent, because there was also internal friction within the Communist party. We know much more about these things now than we did then. We knew nothing then, generally speaking.

But some of the leaders of the New Fourth Army were apparently very close to Wang Ming and the Russian-trained faction, the Twenty-eighth Bolshevik faction within the Communist party. They were not Mao Zedong men. The Eighth Route Army people generally were hostile to them.

*Q: The Eighth Route?*

SERVICE: The Eighth Route Army which were the people based in Yen-an.

All this goes back to my point that at some point in here it seemed to me that this was going to be a critical issue. As I began to get more Chinese friends, newspaper friends, they began to tell me this. This perhaps was the summer of '42. So that it seemed to me that I should concentrate on Communist politics.

In that sense you could say, as Esherick does, that this specialization was a career decision. It was not a decision based on my own political sympathies particularly. It was looking for something that was going to be the main--the ball game.

Japanese and American Negotiations, 1941: The American Embassy in Chungking Was Not Informed.

SERVICE: In the summer of '41, things in Washington were warming up between the United States versus Japan. Our War and Navy Departments at that time said that they weren't ready and they had to have delay. They didn't want to have hostilities if they could avoid it. So in Washington there began to be this long negotiation with the Japanese to try to reach some sort of a modus vivendi, it was called.

We in Chungking were kept completely in the dark about this. It was partly the disorganized way that the State Department very often operated. But also it was regarded as a very tightly held secret business, although the Chinese in Washington found out about it. Hu Shih was the ambassador but T.V. Soong, who was very aggressive, very pushing, and also developed excellent contacts in Washington, was there.

Gauss got called in several times by the Chinese foreign minister, named Quo T'ai-Ch'i. Quo was a wonderful old man--I think he'd been ambassador in London as a matter of fact, and educated at Oxford. Quo asked Gauss what was happening in Washington. "Are you getting ready to sell us down the river? Our ambassador has been told by your Secretary of State it's necessary to have these discussions with the Japanese. What are you discussing?" Gauss was completely uninformed, and completely at a loss.

The reason I'm mentioning it is that he always used to take me along. My job was not to participate in the talks, but simply to listen and write the memorandum of conversation when we got home. Gauss almost never changed the memoranda that I wrote. Of course, I would try to get the conversation organized a little bit better. I wasn't trying to make a verbatim thing, but it had to be something that could be the basis of a telegram or despatch.

You asked once about training for political reporting. This was one aspect of reporting. You've got to be able to hear; you've got to be able to listen. So, all through this summer of '41, I was writing the memoranda of conversation at three or four of these meetings.

Last time I was telling you about accompanying the ambassador with his meetings with the foreign minister and my function being to prepare the memoranda of conversation. I'm not sure that I made it clear that I did not take notes. You don't take notes when you're sitting there having an interview with the foreign minister. It had to be pure memory.

It was like the old boy scout game of watching, going past a shop window or being shown a certain number of things and then having to see how much you could remember. It taught you to fasten on to the key facts, dates, numbers. Anything specific, you'd try to fix in your mind.

Later on in New Zealand, to skip way ahead, my ambassador there used to do the same sort of thing. But he would go and talk to the prime minister without me being present and then he would come back to the office. He lived way out in the country: he wanted to get home. He would say, "I said this and Peter Fraser would say this and I said this and Peter said that. Now send a telegram." I would be expected to send a telegram.

But an important part of political reporting is just the ability to listen and to report correctly.

*Q: Do you now have any explanation that makes sense to you of why State kept your ambassador in ignorance of these negotiations with the Japanese?*

SERVICE: No, not really. The Chinese picked up some stuff, obviously, that they were not expected to pick up. I mean I'm sure they had some leaks available. But State did tell the Chinese ambassador something. I think that they may not have trusted the radio, the codes. We were reading the Japanese codes at this time--beginning to. They may not have trusted our codes. We were getting new codes. We knew our codes were not very good.

There was always a fear that Chungking was a bit like a sieve. Of course, this was the thing brought out later at Yalta, that there could be no secrets in Chungking. There was some justification that Chungking was probably more of a sieve even than Washington.

But also these negotiations were being carried on by [Joseph Clark] Grew and by [Joseph William] Ballantine, the Japanese oriented people. Hornbeck was in it. I think that they just didn't think that the ambassador to China needed to be informed. We were discussing this with the Japanese. I think that they really never thought about where this left Gauss, you see, in Chungking.

Gauss had no friends in the State Department as I say. Nobody in the Department really felt any great warmth of sympathy toward him. He was a cold man in many ways. There wasn't this sort of tie with Hornbeck, for instance, that Johnson had had. If Johnson had been there, there might have been something in a private communication, something like that.

*Q: I haven't seen that commented on anywhere in the literature, and it seems, as you talk about it, fairly important in terms of later developments, that our ambassador did not have a good relationship with State or with the executive.*

SERVICE: Oh yes. Yes, this is important, always important.

*Q: Has that been commented on? You know the literature much better than I do.*

SERVICE: I don't recall any comment on this particular episode. In my monograph (John S. Service, The Amerasia Papers: Some Problems in the History of US-China relations, Berkeley, China Research Monographs, University of California, 1971) discussing a later period in 1944-45, I mention that the State Department had no real in with the White House.

People have commented generally on Roosevelt's distrust of the Foreign Service, but in this particular case I don't think it was Roosevelt. I think it was just that Grew and those people didn't feel under any compulsion to keep Gauss informed. They could justify that on the basis that, "Well after all, we're telling the Chinese." But they weren't telling the Chinese enough to satisfy the Chinese. Otherwise the Chinese wouldn't have gotten Gauss on the carpet so fiercely.

*Q: So fiercely, what do you mean?*

SERVICE: Well, the foreign minister was very agitated, very alarmed! "What is going on? What are you people doing? What are you going to do to us?"

*Q: Legitimately, I would say.*

SERVICE: Oh certainly. Chiang Kai-shek made some statement as I recall. But the foreign minister made no bones of the fact that he was talking for the Generalissimo. The Chinese were extremely alarmed.

### Pearl Harbor: Great Chinese Celebrations

*Q: What was the impact of the news of Pearl Harbor on Chungking?*

SERVICE: Well, there was a great Chinese celebration. It was V-J Day as far as the Chinese were concerned, fireworks all over the city, a big celebration. The Chinese were beside themselves with excitement and pleasure because to them this meant assurance of victory. The war was over, and literally almost, as far as active participation in the war went. They sat back after that and didn't do much.

The impact on us was quite different. In the first place we decided we had to do something immediately about increasing coverage. We had to have somebody on duty in the evenings, things like that. We'd never had night duty officers. So immediately we started having someone on duty twenty-four hours in the office. I drew the first night. I spent all of my first night, that first night, decoding a long message that was delayed, telling us what to do in case of a sudden

outbreak of hostilities, destroying codes, burning this and that. This had been delayed in transit through the Philippines and it went on for pages.

### Jack's Dash to Rangoon for the Embassy Mercury

SERVICE: One thing that we realized in the embassy very quickly was that the motor car, which Gauss had gotten the State Department to promise us, was still on the high seas and would never reach us because from where we sat we realized, just took it for granted, that Hong Kong and Burma were going to fall very quickly. Hong Kong, of course, was attacked immediately. There was no hope of them holding out. The Japanese moved immediately into Thailand and began to move toward Burma and towards Singapore.

So we scouted around and found that the British American Tobacco Company had a new car, landed in Rangoon, which they were willing to sell because everybody in Burma also realized that they were in a bag. They had to be prepared to get out. So the car in Burma was a drag on the market. Anyway, we bought the car from the British American Tobacco Company.

I was very eager and the ambassador agreed to let me go down to drive it up. But he thought that it might be a good idea to have two people, partly for intelligence reasons, I suppose. The military attaché wanted to send a young officer along, so he went with me. The Texaco Oil Company also managed to get a car in Rangoon. So the three of us went down by air, oh, just before Christmas in '41, stopped in Kunming.

The Chinese National Aviation Company was just starting this route from China down to Burma. They foresaw the end of the Hong Kong link. We spent the night at the border, Lashio, and then had to rent a car the next day and get down to the railhead and then took the train, came down into Rangoon.

When we were coming into Rangoon it was Christmas morning, which also happened to be a Sunday as I recall. The fields were just full of people, miles out of town, all these people out in the country. We couldn't understand what it was all about. Why should the Burmese all be going out and having a picnic in the countryside?

We got into the railway station. It was almost deserted. There were no porters, no crew. Vegetables and so on were piled up on the platform. We finally found somebody and asked. They said, "Oh, we were bombed yesterday by the Japanese." The Japanese had made their first very heavy bombing of the Rangoon docks.

The population--Burmese and Indian were the majority--just evacuated, just left. They had no interest in the war. The Indians, of course, were trying to get back to India. A lot of them did, overland. The Burmese just went off to the villages. We went into a quiet, empty city.

The hotel had no staff. We went in and we finally found an assistant manager--it was the Strand Hotel in Rangoon--and said, "Can we stay here?" He said, "Well, go upstairs, find a room. You can have it." So we picked out what we thought was the best room, not too near the top, not too near the bottom, no outside windows, interior light well, that sort of thing.

We were just unpacking when the air raid alarm went off in the building right next door to us. So, we went downstairs and found the air raid shelter was a ballroom on the ground floor with mattresses up against the windows. We stayed in the hotel. We had to stay there. They couldn't throw us out. Eventually there were only a few of us that stayed. Sort of a hardcore--a Greek shipowner, a one-armed Frenchman who was trying to recruit for De Gaulle's Free French, some sort of a lady singer, uncertain age, Greek or something like that. I don't know whether she was European. Anyway, we were a very odd group, but we all got to be very chummy.

There was an Austrian Jewish refugee who was a chef. There was a Swiss who was assistant manager. I don't know who the manager was. I never saw him. He wasn't around. There was Captain Cahill and myself, Americans, and these few other people, the one-armed Frenchman. We lived in a little group in the hotel.

The internal phones worked in the hotel. We got a call in our room one night. "Can you come down and help out in an emergency?" The hotel had been called up by British command. "We got a Sunderland flying boat full of VIP's coming through. You've got to put them up. We got no place to take care of them."

It was all Australian brass from Tobruk. The siege of Tobruk had just been raised, and they were trying desperately to get these people--this was most of the high command of the Australian army--they were trying to get them back to Australia because the Japanese were coming down the Solomons. Australia was almost bare of troops.

I'd waited tables in college and washed dishes and so on. We went down and peeled potatoes and helped get ready and then I said, "We'll wait on tables." We set up a private dining room, and we waited on all these officers.

By the end of the meal, they began to get suspicious about these two Yanks. I had said something about "Captain" to Cahill. So they said, "What's going on?" We had quite an evening after that. They drank up most of the case of whiskey which we bought to take up to Chungking!

I ran into one of these guys years later when I was in New Zealand. The Australians felt that their military heroes should be rewarded and given nice jobs. So, he was sent to New Zealand as a trade commissioner. [laughter] Australian trade commissioner. We looked at each other for a long time. Then finally I asked him if perhaps he had passed through Rangoon. He looked at me and said, "My God, that's it. I've got you now, mate! [laughter]"

#### Rangoon to Chungking Via the Burma Road, January 1942

SERVICE: We picked up the car, a Mercury, which at that time was nothing much except a fancy Ford. Unfortunately, New Year's Eve, my friend the army officer went out on a bit of a party and backed up, didn't realize one of the back doors was open. So that door was badly sprung and didn't work very well. From then on, it was better to leave it closed. [laughter] There was no hope of getting it fixed in Rangoon of course.

Gauss smoked twelve cigars a day, which meant a box of twenty-five lasted him two days. When I went down he said, "Get me all the cigars you can." Of course, the stores were closed in Rangoon. Rangoon really was a dead city. Then things opened up a little bit. We got into stores. I finally bought three thousand cigars.

We had to buy spare tires. We had to buy extra springs for spare parts, loaded them all up on top of the car, inside the car. Then we drove up the Burma Road. It was a long trip, more than two weeks, three weeks, as I recall, from Rangoon to Chungking.

*Q: How did you get enough gasoline?*

SERVICE: Before we left Chungking we had to make arrangements with the Chinese National Resources Commission. So we had orders from them to supply us. In all the main cities there'd be a National Resources Commission depot and we'd get gasoline. We had extra cans, of course, to carry spare fuel. No gas stations along the road.

The road was chaotic. Incredible mismanagement and lack of management. Every Chinese government organization that had an interest in transportation maintained its own trucks, own transportation services, no unity or unification. Military, civilian, all sorts of different organizations. There was no policing of the road.

The road was continually being tinkered with. It was in atrocious condition. It was built by poor farmers, minority hill people that had never seen a road! They didn't know what it was all for. They had supervisors but there was no machinery or anything like that. It was carved out of the hillside. Many places were subject to slides. You had to cross the Salween and the Mekong Rivers.

*Q: How high do you go on the road?*

SERVICE: You go up to about eight thousand, but then you run into these tremendous canyons you see. At some of these they had bridges. Sometimes you had to cross by ferry. The Chinese drivers, a lot of them were inexperienced, inexpert. They tried to save gasoline, so they would coast.

You had terrific, hairpin zigzags, guys trying to coast down to save gasoline. They were issued an allotment of gasoline for the trip. So anything they could save, they could sell at the black market. At that time gasoline, you know, was the equivalent of \$5 U.S. a gallon on the market.

The trucks were terrifically overloaded. The Chinese themselves officially would overload the truck, but then the driver would take extra illicit cargo and a lot of illicit passengers, "yellow fish" and so on.

*Q: Yellow fish?*

SERVICE: Yellow fish was what the Chinese called them. So that the trucks were subject to atrocious road, to brutal overloading, and to just horrendous misdriving. Some were wrecked. It was a tough road.

*Q: What was the surface allegedly?*

SERVICE: The surface was just gravel, earthbound macadam. You put in big rocks and then you put a layer of smaller rocks and then you put in fine rocks that have been--

*Q: Tarred?*

SERVICE: --beaten up, no tar. There was no tar except they were just starting to put blacktop on some of it down near the Burma border. There were a few miles down near the Burma border that were black-topped, but the rest of it when it rained--and it rained a great deal--was terrible because a lot of this earth was clay. It would get very slippery and slick. Then, of course, trucks pounding over it kept breaking it up.

*Q: How did the trip go?*

SERVICE: Without any great incident.

*Q: Bombing? Refugees?*

SERVICE: No. Lots of people on the road. There weren't many refugees. As I say, most of the Burmese simply had left Rangoon.

We went up north of Rangoon to a place called Tounggoo where the Flying Tigers had set their base. We spent a night there and went up to Maymyo, which is a hill station in the hills north of Mandalay where the British were training their people for jungle warfare.

It was pathetic to see these poor guys from the banks and the British trading companies who'd spent their life sitting at a desk, now suddenly trying to learn how to be a commando. I don't know how many of these guys came out alive, but they were no match for the Japanese of course, when it came to jungle warfare.

I don't know. It was all sort of dreamlike because no one really thought that the Japanese could be stopped. The Flying Tigers people were shooting down some, but had no way of getting spare parts. They were pretty much cut off. They were only fifty planes or something like that.

The poor British had outdated, old planes. They were no match for the Japanese. The Zeros just massacred them. Our people with the P-40's and Chennault's tactics did pretty well against the Zeros.

We spent the night at Maymyo. They'd hoped that they were going to be able to get parts, but the way things were going, the losses and the attrition, they didn't see much hope. These guys, yes,

they were being very gung-ho and stiff upper lip and "stop in the afternoon for tea" at this hill station. But one felt a little uneasy about them.

Anyway, we got up the road okay without any serious mishap, and made it back to Chungking. Gauss said, "Did you get the cigars?" I said, "Yes, three thousand." And he said, "You'll look better when you get that beard off." [laughter]

## V TRAMPING AROUND NORTH CHINA, 1942

### Building Chinese Contacts

*Q: You told me that when you first arrived in Chungking, Drumright introduced you to his contacts. How did you go about building on these Communist contacts and making a variety of Chinese friends? I was surprised to read that you belonged to Rotary in Chungking and founded a Masonic group there.*

SERVICE: I didn't actually found it. No, that's a misnomer. There was quite an active Masonic group in China, almost all Western trained, educated in America primarily, businessmen, government people, and so on, who apparently liked the whole idea very much. It fitted in with their whole idea of clique, group, faction, secret societies and so on, but it was Western you see.

My father had been a Mason in Shanghai in a lodge where he was one of the very few foreigners. I eventually joined another Masonic network. All Masonic lodges are under a particular Grand Lodge. The lodge my father belonged to was under the Grand Lodge of Massachusetts for some strange reason. Some Americans who were Masons in China long, long ago--decades back in the last century--wanted to start a lodge and they found they could affiliate with the Grand Lodge of the state of Massachusetts.

But later on most of these Chinese who started lodges affiliated with the Grand Lodge of the Philippines which was of course mostly American started.

You can't start a new lodge unless you get a charter. By the time of Pearl Harbor the Philippine Grand Lodge was closed up. This was one of the first things the Japanese did. So, there was no way for the Masons in Chungking to start a new lodge. They couldn't get a charter since the Grand Lodge was out of business.

So we had an informal group of Masons, who were Masons from various lodges in Shanghai, who met occasionally in Chungking. It was something that for a while was sort of fun. Later on I got too busy and drifted away from it.

Rotary was again mostly all Chinese. There were very few foreign businessmen in there. But it was a way of getting to know a lot of people.

I knew already or got to know the foreign newspaper people. There were some Chinese newspaper people that dealt with the foreigners a good deal, administrative information people.

The Reuters man was Chinese. Of course, there were all the missionaries. A lot of them had known my parents. My parents lived in Chungking until '24.

### Jack's Travels Begin: Irrigation Works in Sichuan

SERVICE: One thing leads to another, but I think it was through one of these missionary contacts that I got invited on a trip in the spring of 1942. The provincial government people were very much put in the shade by the national government people. When the national government moved into Sichuan, the Sichuan provincial people had to take a back seat.

There was a very active provincial commissioner of construction or public works man--the Chinese always used reconstruction, but the Chinese phrase really means construction. His department had built several dams and irrigation works in central Sichuan, to try to improve production. Some of these were being opened up. He wanted to get a little bit of notice, a little bit of publicity, a little face.

But also we had some relief funds that we were distributing, not large. We had allotted funds for rebuilding after some of the bombings in Chungking, things like that. Actually one of the fine stairways going up to the city from the river bank had been built with these relief funds.

I think that this provincial commissioner of reconstruction may have had some idea of getting into American funds, making contact with an American dispenser of funds. An embassy person along would add luster to the group he was planning.

He was a very good friend of an old missionary named Rape. One of his sons went to college in the States, and he changed the name to Rappe. But I think he went to Rappe and asked Rappe if he knew any American in the embassy that would like to join the visit to these irrigation works. Gauss agreed, the embassy agreed, so I tootled off for about a ten day trip. They had a special bus. There were several newspaper people and assorted worthies. Rappe was along and I was there from the embassy.

There was a very pleasant correspondent from the Chinese Central News Agency, official government news agency. He and I became extremely close friends. There were a couple of other newspaper correspondents along too. It was a very genial and sort of a jolly trip. Rappe was a person who had a lot of fun and good humor in him and spoke perfect Sichuanese, because most of the government people were from down river. The Central newsman was from Manchuria actually.

### Buildup of U.S. Agencies in Chungking

*[Interview 6: September 21, 1977]*

SERVICE: During this period [1942] there was a buildup in Chungking of new U.S. agencies. Also, there was a parallel buildup in Washington of research organizations, research analysis intelligence, that just hadn't existed before. The State Department set up some sort of a research unit which I don't think they'd had before.

Very early an office was set up called COI--coordinator of information. Then the Army and the Navy--and OSS--set up their R&A branches. They were beginning to ask for information.

Eventually it got very confused because people in China felt they were too busy to be spending all their time sending in information. They were busy with current affairs. Eventually Washington created a "Joint Intelligence Collection Agency" which sent representatives to China to try to make sure that they got stuff.

In Washington there was competition for information and some people did not want to share their information with other people. But we'll hear more of this later on.

The coordinator of information was a predecessor of OSS. Their mandate was to collect publications and documents. It was under General [William J.] Donovan. The first man they sent out was a man named David Rowe. The coordinator of information was set up, like a lot of these very early agencies, directly under the White House. They didn't know quite where to put it in Washington. So, it was directly under the White House.

Rowe came out and got cards printed up in Chinese that he was the China representative of the pai kung, the "White House." This finished him as far as the American embassy, American ambassador, was concerned, because it appeared that he outranked the ambassador, you see! [laughter] David Rowe didn't last very long.

A similar development was American relief. There had been some American relief work before Pearl Harbor, not on a very large scale. But soon after Pearl Harbor and the war started, United China Relief, which had [Henry] Luce as one of its very important angels, started up.

One day in the embassy there I remember we had a visitor, a short, round fellow, quite cheerful, bustling, busy little type of fellow from New York named Albert Kohlberg.

*Q: Uh-oh.*

SERVICE: He was working for something called the American Bureau for Medical Aid to China, which was trying to get supplies for the China Red Cross. He had come to China to see what was happening to supplies they were sending. He'd been down to Kweiyan, the capital of Guizhou province in the south, which was a big supply depot for the Chinese. He found great quantities of their supplies just sitting in warehouses instead of getting out to the troops. He was very unhappy about it. He also found some information that there was leakage of these drugs and supplies to the black market.

So, Kohlberg in those days was very unhappy about what was happening in China and very friendly to the American embassy and quite pleasant to me in contrast to what happened many years later, of course.

Jack Tapped to Write State Department Report on Psychological Warfare and Morale in China

SERVICE: One example of this early increase in demands from Washington was an instruction we got from the Department. Some time in the spring of '42, a very elaborate questionnaire, wanting information on morale, psychological warfare, and propaganda agencies in China. This was very perplexing. It was very un-State Department.

I found out later what happened was that a young professor at Johns Hopkins University-- Everyone in the academic field who had any sort of background on China was recruited into these various agencies. He was a young political science professor and thought that he might as well be a psychological warfare expert as anything else. After all, there weren't any psychological warfare experts in America!

He got a job in the War Department and had to start casting about for information. So, he thought immediately of having the embassy send in a long, elaborate report. I got tapped to do it. Any rate, it involved me in a lot of going around Chungking, talking to people, trying to pull together a lot of information. The Chinese were as disorganized as we were. The party was doing many things; the government was doing things; the army would do things in the propaganda and morale building fields.

*Q: Did that stimulate your interest in what is now called content analysis, lead you to start looking at wall posters and so on?*

SERVICE: Well, it certainly stirred my interest in wall posters and their content. I hadn't ever heard the term "content analysis," I think, till I came to Berkeley as a retired officer and went to the political science department. If you mentioned content analysis, I wouldn't have known what you meant. But yes, it started an interest in that sort of thing.

*Q: What sources did you find most useful?*

SERVICE: It was just a matter really of talking to everyone that you could think of that knew something about the field. I talked to a good many Chinese, but a lot of them weren't terribly helpful. My newspaper people, both foreign and Chinese, were helpful, people like Mac [F. MacCracken] Fisher.

There were several people there who had been in China a good many years working for the news services. The Associated Press and the UP had people that were quite well established in China, had been there a long time, and had a long contact with the Chinese Ministry of Information, that sort of thing. They were helpful. I talked to Chinese in these various departments.

There wasn't very much published stuff. But, it was a matter of pulling together the data. You can't be too precise sometimes. You have to convey a general understanding of what things are like.

*Q: I find I'm a little unclear as to whom psychological warfare would be directed in the Chinese situation. It's clear enough in Europe.*

SERVICE: There wasn't very much. They'd tried to use some of their prisoners. They tried to prepare some propaganda material. There were attempts early in the war to drop leaflets on Taiwan. They didn't have any planes that could reach Japan, and there really wasn't much directed at the Japanese. This was one of the things that you found out.

One thing that interested me was this professor--who later on I got to know--why he was so interested in Chinese psychological warfare. Theoretically he was interested in psych warfare against the Japanese. I suppose his rationale was that he had to find out what the Chinese were doing in psychological warfare against the Japanese, but most of the questionnaire was about propaganda directed toward Chinese. Of course, he was a Chinese scholar and all this was useful material for him in his professional business. Is that all?

*Q: I think so. The only place I can see for psychological warfare would be in Japanese occupied areas of China.*

SERVICE: I finally finished the report in July. It was a long thing. I got a good commendation on it. It gave me an interest in this subject, which later on led to other reports which are in Esherick's book.

#### Chungking: A Kuomintang Cocoon

*Q: You said that you were in a cocoon. How restrictive were the KMT [Kuomintang] provisions on travel?*

SERVICE: You couldn't travel any place without some sort of permission. This was not very easy to get particularly if you were traveling toward war areas or in the war areas.

The newspapers were heavily censored, and it was very hard to get out-of-town papers from other cities. It would take a long time to get them. But by-and-large they didn't have very much news in them. Certainly any war news was heavily censored. The Chinese Ministry of Information and a Central News Agency put out a lot of material in English. It was obviously what they wanted out, what they were willing to have out. It didn't present any gloomy side of things.

There was a lot of gossiping and talking around. Your contacts with Chinese generally were limited to social contacts, dinners. That's not always the best time to talk. Chinese don't have the habit of cocktail parties, so that if you go it's usually to a formal, sit-down dinner. As I say, we were fairly well cut off from that because of our location. We went to some things in the city at night but not very often. We tried to avoid them.

We saw our opposite numbers in the other embassies and if anybody got any news it got around. Everyone was sort of reporting the same thing. You see the same thing with Peking today. I'm sure the embassies are all talking to each other and everyone is reporting pretty much the same thing.

#### A Turning Point: Genesis of Jack as Outside Man: Journey to Gansu

SERVICE: When I got rid of the psychological warfare report, a chance had come to make this trip to the northwest provinces. I left on that in July--I'm not sure just when--ostensibly to attend a China Society of Engineers conference in Lanchow province, in Gansu. But, also the party was going up to Tsinghai province and to the oil wells up in the Gansu Corridor, a newly developed oil field.

I was with a party of about twenty government engineers working for some of the government departments, mainly the Ministry of Resources, some engineering professors in Chinese universities. There were three Chinese newspaper people and myself. I was the only foreigner.

We had a bus assigned to us as far as Lanchow. After that we traveled by truck. But, it was a very, very pleasant experience, and in a sense it's probably a turning point, a watershed.

*Q: In what sense?*

SERVICE: In a sense that I didn't realize of course at the time, but from this time on I was to be very much a sort of a traveling man, outdoors, or outside man, instead of an inside or office man. This led into my becoming pretty much an independent operator, independent reporter, partly because I was traveling, but this led to various other things.

A friend of mine, Han Ming was his name, was apparently very close to the Minister of Economics, Wang Weng-Hao. The ministry was really resources and development, more than economics in our sense.

I think Han Ming suggested that I be included. Wang Weng-Hao, with the idea of getting someone from the embassy involved, approved. The embassy was delighted--a very fine chance.

#### Growth of Chinese Friendships: Filling a Long Felt Need

SERVICE: I was thirty-two when we started, thirty-three soon after we were on the road. The newspaper people were about my age. Some of these professors were a little bit older, but it was a fairly young group. We got to be very congenial. We got to know each other very well. My allowance was fifteen kilos, and I stuck to it. Everyone else was on the same basis. In the nights when we'd stop at an inn, why we'd all sleep lined up on the k'ang [brick sleeping platform heated by flue from kitchen stove] like sardines in a can more or less.

For the first time I was being completely accepted as a friend by Chinese on a very intimate basis. I think that this was something that probably I had, in an unconscious way, missed a great deal in my youth. My parents were devoted to China, were obviously very much interested in China and Chinese culture. My mother's poems and so on, which you haven't seen, indicated something of this attachment for China. But because of the question of sanitation, hygiene, and the fact that we lived on an entirely different plane, I really had no close contact with Chinese.

I've mentioned before I grew up having no Chinese playmates. I knew no Chinese. Then in my experience as an adult in China I had not really known any Chinese, on a very intimate basis,

who were really Chinese. In Yunnanfu we got drawn into that small, compact foreign community. We met a few Chinese who were officials, but on a very sort of arm's length, official basis. We had a few returned students that had studied in America, who were teaching or something. But this was not any close association.

In Peking we met our teachers. My language teachers were men of an older generation--long gowns, old fashioned! One of them had taken the examinations in the old imperial days. They were very much scholars of the old type. We met a few university people like Hu Shin or Dr. Chiang Monlin. Then we met a few officials.

The Chinese young people we met in Peking were attached to the foreign community and trying to be "foreign." The same in Shanghai. The only Chinese one met in Shanghai were Western educated--either abroad or in foreign-run schools in China. They were aping the foreigners, going to the night clubs in Shanghai, the Western social life.

It wasn't really until I got into this milieu, this full time immersion on a long trip that I was completely on a par and accepted by Chinese, sharing their intimacies and their own ideas. These were down-river people--almost all the government people were from the down-river provinces--who were exploring new country. They were as excited about this trip as anybody could be. It was all new country to them.

*Q: When you say down-river, you mean Peking, Nanking?*

SERVICE: Yes, all the coastal provinces. Han Ming actually was from Manchuria, but most of the rest of them were from along the Yangtze. One of them was from Hangzhou for instance. But, they were from Treaty Ports and Shanghai and Peking.

It was tremendously exciting to them to be making this trip from Chengdu up to Lanchow and up to the northwest. China has a lot of two-thousand-year history, and these were people who were educated, college graduates, some of them engineers--there were several Western educated--but they'd never seen-- They read all about these things, you see. To go along and realize that this town here, that little walled city, was a famous place mentioned in the Romance of the Three Kingdoms! We saw the towns where all sorts of things happened in Chinese history.

We crossed over from the valley of the Kialing into the valley of the Han River, the headwaters of the Han. The Han River comes down at Hangzhou. But, there's a narrow gorge and you could see the square holes in the cliff where a famous general during the Three Kingdoms [A.D. 221-265] period had built a road by driving posts into the cliff side and then laying planks along it.

The whole history of the country we went through was very exciting to these people. Along the road, the trees had been planted by Tso Tsung-T'ang's army when he went up in the 1860's or '70's to repacify Sinkiang and put down Muhammadan rebellion.

The cliffs along the way in China, particularly along a famous road like this, have inscriptions of characters. The temples have got tablets--they were built by such and such a person.

These were young Chinese who were modern in every sense, but not aping the West. They were nationalistic. They were for the war against Japan, of course. It was a very stimulating and exciting experience for them as well as for me.

*Q: What was their political orientation?*

SERVICE: Oh well, they were all critical of the Kuomintang. The intellectuals were almost unanimously critical of the Kuomintang. You had a variation among these people, of course, as to how outspoken they would be and how much they felt the Kuomintang should be blamed. Some people felt, well, you know, after all, there's a war on and there are a lot of difficulties. There were some people who would be government apologists.

But no one tried to cover up the facts. The facts were just so plain. We saw recruits on the road. We saw Sichuan recruits being marched over the mountains to Shaanxi province--you had to get your recruit away from his native province so he couldn't run away so easily--dying beside the road, starvation. There were all sorts of things. No one made any attempt to apologize or ignore the shortcomings.

There were differences of opinion. Some of them just weren't much interested in politics. The newspaper people, of course, were very politically interested and politically aware.

We had one American Chinese on the trip. Quite a few Chinese-Americans went back to China during the war for what they saw as their patriotic duty to help the fatherland. He was teaching in a university near Chungking.

He was very amusing because he was very much alarmed, as I had been once, about sanitation. He had to be assured everything was boiled and so on. They laughed and made a lot of fun of him. I was called the Chinese American. He was the American Chinese. [laughter] Well, anyway.

#### Values of Missionary Contacts

SERVICE: Along the way, of course, I made a point, every chance I had, every town we stopped at, of going to see the missionary. If there was a missionary in town--I could find out very easily--and having usually a chat with them. I didn't try to stay with them. I stayed with my own gang.

Missionaries, of course, were glad to see anybody. They were isolated much more than normal. Travel was difficult. A lot of them had not been able to take home leaves on schedule because of the war. They were all anxious for news, anxious to talk to somebody from the outside. In a way, I was from the metropolis, coming from Chungking. And, they all knew who I was or knew my family, knew my parents.

I would simply pick their brains as much as I could, as much as was decent and they were willing, on strictly local conditions. I didn't try to get them onto what might be embarrassing political subjects, what they thought of the government. There was a lot you could ask just on

purely local matters, which they were very often thoroughly informed about, through their own church members.

*Q: We talked about this a long time ago. I think you said at first you found these people, many of whom were politically quite unaware, that their mission in life was a missionary one, and they were not politically interested, and that bit by bit you sharpened your techniques of asking questions.*

SERVICE: Oh yes. Yes. I'd forgotten we had this on the record.

*Q: No, we didn't. This was several years ago.*

SERVICE: Yes, it's quite true. As time went on I certainly became a little more effective perhaps, a little more delicate perhaps, about it. Also, I learned more questions to ask, things that they would know.

They very often had quite thorough details about the taxation picture. Various Kuomintang officials made private estimates that between a third and a fourth of what was actually collected from the people reached the government. These people knew from their own church members a lot of what went on, bribes, entertainment, efforts made to get your land classified in lower categories so your tax rate would be lower.

And conscription. They had had experience with their own people. When I got in a place like Sian where they had large schools, they knew a good deal about secret police activity against the students, political repression, thought reform camps, or schools.

But I didn't usually ask people what they thought about the government. I just asked what was happening locally, what did they know about this and that. What was the current price of a recruit? Was land being abandoned? How about refugees?

I also had ready access to the YMCA people through my father's contacts. In those days, the YMCA was almost completely run by Chinese. The secretaries were Chinese. There were a very few foreigners who served on the national committee in Shanghai.

Then another group that was active in the northwest and practically all over China was the Friends Ambulance Unit. These were conscientious objectors, first from the U.K. and later they had some Americans. They couldn't drive ambulances in China because Chinese just don't let any foreigners get near the battle. They are no roads anyway usually for the ambulance.

So what they did was to transport relief supplies from abroad on highways in China. They had depots in various places. They were another group that I got tied into.

*Q: I imagine they had fairly good intelligence because they traveled.*

SERVICE: Oh yes. They traveled, sure, and they were bright. Michael Sullivan down here at Stanford was one of them, you know. Rhoads Murphey was one of them, who is now at

Michigan. There were all sorts of young chaps. There was a fellow Mel Kennedy who teaches at Bryn Mawr.

### The Only Functioning Chinese Oil Field

SERVICE: The [Chinese] government at that time was planning to ask the United States government to fly in an oil refinery. It would have to be broken down into small segments, and flown from India to Tibet, up to the Gansu Corridor.

*Q: Over the Hump?*

SERVICE: Not over the Hump. Well it might have come in over the Hump, but they expected to take it in a much more direct line north from India instead of east from India. The Hump from India was east into Yunnan.

*Q: Right.*

SERVICE: The transport problem required a refinery that could be broken down into small pieces; it would also require a lot of high-quality steels that were scarce under war conditions.

We got up to the oil fields. They were very cautious about security there. They took away my Leica camera. They took us around the wells, the oil fields. They had a very primitive, small refinery.

They didn't produce lubricating oils. They just distilled out the primary products, kerosene and some gasoline, a very low octane gasoline. It was a very simple distillation process.

I counted paces between the wells. I could produce a pretty good map when I finished, you know, without having a camera. It was on an alluvial fan. You see many of them in Death Valley or in the West, where a stream comes out of high mountains and then there's a very gradually sloping fan or apron of rocks and boulders.

Our party, twenty or so people, were put in a schoolhouse. They'd built a schoolhouse at the lower end of the settlement. The wells were at the top. They had no place to put the oil, so they had just scooped out shallow reservoirs and put the earth around the downhill side. American farmers do it with a bulldozer to make ponds. They were very simple holding basins for oil.

They had brought in a lot of workers, just common laborers. Of course, they had engineers, but they needed a lot of common labor. Wood was very scarce. There were no trees except way high up in the mountains, hard to get at. So, most of the workmen had just dug themselves huts in the ground, dug into the ground, and then got willows and so on and made a roof over it.

Fire!

SERVICE: One of the nights we were there--we hadn't been there very long--second or third night, there was a downpour of rain, just an absolute downpour of rain, sort of a cloud burst. In the evening we were all back in our quarters. Suddenly, there was a great alarm, shouting, noise.

We all went out of the door, and we could see a fire, a big fire going on. I was anxious to see more! Just back of our place was a hill. We were right at the foot of a hill. I was better clothed in some ways than most of the other people. Anyway, I rushed up the hill and could see the oil fire blazing up.

As I was watching it--a tremendous uproar-- An oil fire is a very, you know--I think I'm overusing "exciting"--scary sort of thing. But, watching it I realized--I did a sort of a double take. There was a ditch. A drainage ditch had been dug along the foot of the hill, where the fan came against the steep hill. This ditch emptied right at the playground in the middle of which our school was standing. The ditch just ended there. It hadn't been continued down. Then I realized that it was going to reach our playground which was already covered with water.

So, I charged down into the building, the one room school-house, and shouted, "Save your lives! Save your lives! Get out!" We had bunks there, board bunks. My sleeping roll was spread out. I just threw my clothes into this, bundled it up in my arms and rushed out! Everybody thought I was crazy. But, they quickly decided to do the same thing. Some of them had to run through flames to get out. By the time the last few got out, the fire had reached our playground. The place just went up like a matchbox.

*Q: You saved the lives of the gang?*

SERVICE: We all got out. My own problem was that I only had two pair of shoes, and I forgot that my heavy pair of shoes [laughing] were on the floor under this bunk. So, from then on I had only one pair of shoes. My spare pair of shoes was incinerated.

But at any rate, we got up on the hill and huddled there in the rain, clutching our few possessions, our sleeping rolls and so on. Things calmed down. The fire burned itself out.

What had happened was that the retaining walls around the lower side of one of the oil pools just gave way. The oil then started running downhill, and into the lowest places which were the homes of the workers, who were sitting huddled around their little cooking fires, in the center of their earth hut or yurt. That caught the oil on fire.

The oil wells didn't burn up. They were up higher. It didn't get up to them. Most of the town itself, the main buildings, were not burned because an alluvial fan is higher in the center. So, the oil flowed off to the side and hit the ditch. The buildings and the refinery were mostly in the center and they weren't hit. There weren't many buildings burned except the one where we were staying, which of course was very embarrassing. We spent the rest of the night on wet blankets in one of the office buildings. Well anyway, that's enough of that.

Jack Recommends Against Flying in a Refinery

*Q: How did they get their products out?*

SERVICE: It had to be taken out by truck. But, it was a very long haul. This was one of the reasons why I recommended against our putting a lot of money into this business of flying in a refinery, because--I forget the exact mileage--but from there to Chungking was something like twelve hundred miles by road, atrocious roads, worse than the Burma Road if possible. So that a truck had to carry enough gasoline for the round trip, and there wasn't much capacity left over. And Chungking was still a long ways from the fighting zones. Most of the fighting then was done in Guangxi, and in the southwest. So that it wasn't a very practical proposition.

The oil drums in China were old, and a drum gets old quickly because every trip means continual jolting. It leaks more and more, so you were always troubled by leaking oil drums. We would have had to fly in drums. The Chinese didn't have enough steel. They couldn't make the drums. It was just not a very feasible proposition.

From the oil wells the Chinese agreed to let the party (I was not the initiator--the engineers and the other Chinese asked and I was pleased)--go on further up the corridor to Tunhuang. These are the famous old T'ang dynasty cave temples up at the extreme end of the corridor.

This was a very pleasant trip. We went to the town of Tunhuang. Then the temples are about, oh, ten or fifteen miles out from the town. But this is desert country and terribly, terribly hot. The town of Tunhuang--you've probably seen pictures of Sinkiang--the streets in the summertime are covered with rushes, just arbors above to give you some shade.

We had to leave our truck in Tunhuang. It's sandy desert. Then just at sunset we took off and went in the evening, by moonlight, across this desert to the cliff with the caves. We arrived about eleven or twelve o'clock. Beautiful--that was almost dreamlike.

*Q: Was that limestone?*

SERVICE: No, it's actually a fine buff-colored sandstone. The carvings are well preserved but most are inside so somewhat protected. And it is the murals that are best. Well anyway, that's all very fine and very exciting.

*Q: Did you take your typewriter with you?*

SERVICE: No, no. That's one trouble. I did very little reporting on this whole trip. I hadn't gotten the great urge to report. But, I couldn't take a typewriter. I was limited. I was absorbing and listening and talking, but the only reports that really came out of this were when I got back to Chungking--and I'll talk about that later--a report on the oil wells, because that was a report that was wanted, and a report on the Henan famine which we'll come to.

#### Jack's Message to Chungking Does Not Get Through: Private Code Breaks Down

SERVICE: There was one interesting experience, though, on this trip. We were in the Gansu Corridor, well up the corridor and in one of the towns. We found out that Mme. Chiang and a

bunch of--I think maybe T.V. Soong--but anyway an important official party was flying through, going to Sinkiang.

What had happened was that the governor of Sinkiang, Sheng Shih-ts'ai, was a Manchurian who had gotten--I don't know how, anyway, it doesn't matter now--but he had gotten from Manchuria to Sinkiang, apparently with Russian help or connivance, and had taken over Sinkiang and had ruled it very much under the Russian thumb. He was very pro-Russian, allowed Russians to come in and develop and so on.

For a long time Sinkiang had been really a closed province that had no relation to, no connection with the national government. Foreigners could not travel there. The few people that did try were imprisoned and so on. A very tough regime and very much of a closed preserve.

Anyway, I heard through my Chinese companions that this plane was flying through with the party up to Sinkiang. After the Russian-German war started, Sheng apparently thought that the Russians were going down the drain, as a lot of other people did, and also they could no longer give him supplies and support, or were not willing to.

Hence he decided to turnover, become loyal and friendly to the Chungking regime. This was a party that was going up to do the preliminary negotiations. Well, I was quite excited about this because I didn't know whether the people in Chungking would know about this or not. I thought that this would be something that might have been secret even from foreign embassies in Chungking.

I had a code that I had worked out with the code room staff in Chungking, a private code I could carry in my head. So, I charged off to the telegraph office, [laughing] sent off a telegram to the embassy saying that Mme. Chiang and various other people were going through in this plane to Sinkiang.

They never coded the telegram because-- Well, the cipher ran words together, you see, so that my Chinese names, being run together, looked like gibberish to the code clerk. If they had gotten someone who could read the Chinese and have separated the Chinese names, unscrambled them, they would have been able to make sense out of it. Anyway, they never got the message. But, they knew about it. It was not as secret in Chungking as I had expected.

*Q: Why wasn't the code clerk competent enough to sort out names like Chiang and Soong?*

SERVICE: I forget now what the names were, but Chinese names are polysyllabic. If you take a name like Chu Chao-Liang, which was probably one of the names, and you write it all together, it can look very confusing. If I had Mme. Chiang or something like that--I probably did--she would recognize that, but the Chu Shiao-Liang or these other names he just thought I'd gotten the thing all scrambled.

*Q: What did the embassy expect you to do on this trip?*

SERVICE: It was simply a chance for observation in an interesting and unvisited part of the country.

We drove back to Lanchow. We stayed for some time. Most of the engineers left. I think the newspaper people stayed on for a while and then they left. I stayed on. I'm not quite sure why I stayed on, but I had decided by this time to go from Lanchow to Sian, the capital of Shaanxi province, by bus.

#### Wendell Willkie's One-World Trip: Jack Welcomes Him to China

SERVICE: Anyway, I was in Lanchow when word came that [Wendell] Willkie was coming through, Willkie on his great one-world journey. He had visited the Soviet Union and was coming from the Soviet Union down into China. His plane would stop over-night in Lanchow.

So, I thought, "Well I'm here, I'll certainly be expected by the embassy to welcome him to China." The local Chinese were quite excited and I was called in to help with the translations, prepare the slogans. They had banners across the streets, and they wanted them in English of course. So I helped to make sure the English was correct. The Y secretary, because he knew English, had been called in by the provincial government people. I helped him out.

I went out to the airport to meet Willkie and welcomed him to China--he looked a bit confused and startled--I welcomed him to China on behalf of the embassy and then looked over his shoulder and saw the naval attaché who had flown to Sinkiang to meet him in Urumqi! The embassy, of course, had not told me anything about this. So, I was looking sort of foolish. [laughter]

There was a big dinner given by the governor of Gansu province for Willkie that night and I was not included, an obvious snub which perplexed the Chinese in Lanchow. It was Hollington Tong's doing.

Then Hollington Tong was the Chinese minister of information which in Kuomintang China was a party job, not a government job. He had also gone to Urumqi. Hollington Tong was the Generalissimo's favorite interpreter.

The usual Chinese strategy was to try to isolate these visitors from as much local American contact as possible. This was a standard practice, but Tong used the excuse that Willkie had said that he preferred not to spend all his time with American officials. Anyway he got me taken off the guest list.

This was pretty typical of Chinese tactics with the Luces, and important newspaper people, and foreign visitors, to try to smother them with hospitality and to try to limit as much as possible their chances of talking to local Americans. I talked to some of the people with Willkie, but I didn't have much chance to talk to Willkie. He wasn't much interested anyway.

#### Bus Trip to Sian: The Kuomintang's Permeable Blockade

SERVICE: The bus trip to Sian was interesting because it was through the blockade zone. At that time there was a very heavy Kuomintang military blockade of the Communist border region area where Yanan was located. One of the reasons I wanted to take the trip was that we passed through this area.

*Q: Was the blockade efficiently run?*

SERVICE: Oh no, not really. There was a good deal of going back and forth. There were refugees on the road at this time. There was a major famine going on in Henan, and people were coming west from Henan into Shaanxi. Even up this far north you saw refugees on the road going west.

I asked some of the missionaries about what they knew about conditions. They didn't know anything very much, except that there were more people going in to the Communist areas than coming out. So the presumption was that things were pretty good if people were going in. The missionaries had no contact, but they said there was trade back and forth, some smuggling and so on going on.

There was one interesting episode about this bus ride. Lanchow was very much a secret police town. Surveillance of all foreigners was very noticeable, very obnoxious. I had had a tail when I was in Lanchow that I got to know quite well. When I got to my bus in Lanchow to go to Sian it turned out that he was on the bus, but he was under detention, wearing manacles. He'd been arrested [laughing] for something. He was extremely embarrassed about this. He was in some trouble of some sort, being taken down to headquarters in Sian apparently.

*Q: What was the surveillance? What were they looking for?*

SERVICE: Just tailing you, watching.

*Q: Contacts?*

SERVICE: I'm sure that letters and mail and baggage were searched--I didn't really mind. But I was doing no reporting and had no documents or files. I assumed that I would be searched.

One day on the bus, we saw people beside the road searching and looking beside the road. We stopped to find out what was going on. They were passengers who had been on a bus the day before that had been robbed. They were merchants and had thrown some of their money out of the bus into the weeds. They were trying to see if they could find their valuables!

I got to Sian and it again was a heavily secret police place. I stayed in a China Travel Service hostel, talked to a lot of the missionaries. They had had a lot of experience there--because they had large schools, middle schools--with secret police surveillance of their students, midnight or early morning raids into the dormitories, taking off students.

By this time I had heard a good deal about the famine in Henan province, which was the next province to the east. So, I decided to go there. But, while I was waiting to take my trip, Willkie arrived in Sian. He had been down in Chungking. Then, he wanted to see a war zone.

The favorite place to take people to see the war at that time was near Sian where the Yellow River makes a bend at Tungkuan and the Japanese were on the north bank and the Chinese were on the south bank. They exchanged sporadic artillery fire.

It was a simple and convenient place to take somebody. With binoculars you could look and see Japanese on the other side of the Yellow River.

Again there was a big parade for Willkie, and I was out on the street all morning with the crowds watching the preparations and listening to people complaining about how they had been ordered out and mustered by the paochia organization.

I was treated better in Sian, and was included in the guest list for the dinner that was given by the local government for Willkie.

#### Chinese Interpreters Distort Willkie's Speeches

SERVICE: Willkie gave a speech. We Americans never had, we never used our own interpreters. So, Hollington Tong did the interpreting. It was interesting to see the distortion of what Willkie was saying.

Willkie was trying to talk about [raises voice to paraphrase Willkie], "He'd looked into the eyes of the common man of China and he realized what Chinese aspirations were, what the common man of China wanted." All this was changed in Hollington Tong's translation into Chinese. All the talk about the common man became only China. It was on an entirely different level. My Chinese YMCA friends and others asked afterwards whether or not I had noticed what had been done.

*Q: Was there any way of getting around this?*

SERVICE: We should have done what the Russians did. The Russians would never use a Chinese interpreter. The Russians always had their own. We never trained any interpreters. My Chinese wasn't really good enough to do it. I can interpret conversations by a speech where you've got to have it right at the tip of your tongue, simultaneous speech, is very tough. But, we should have had people who could do it. For somebody like Willkie we should have had an interpreter. When Gauss gave a talk we should have had one of our own people there, but we've always complacently used Chinese.

Nixon did the same thing. Nixon and Kissinger, they didn't want to use State Department interpreters. Kissinger and Nixon would not allow them to play any role except when Rogers [William Pierce Rogers. Secretary of State 1969-1973] talked. But, when Nixon and Kissinger had their talks with the Chinese, they used a Chinese interpreter.

*Q: Why?*

SERVICE: Because they didn't want the State Department to know what they were saying. They didn't trust the State Department.

#### A Catholic Bishop's Links with Tai Li and Secret Police

SERVICE: Loyang was an interesting chance to talk to missionaries, particularly a Catholic bishop, Bishop Megan, who was very outspoken about human and government causes for the famine, the mistreatment of the peasants.

But, at the same time it was interesting that he was using his parish priests, Chinese and foreign, scattered through the occupied areas as an informational intelligence network, for Tai Li. He was cooperating very closely with Tai Li.

*Q: I wanted to ask a little-- You used the term "secret police" and you introduced the name Tai Li. I've seen in various places the term "Gestapo" applied to the Kuomintang secret police. How valid, in your opinion, are the connotations of "Gestapo" to what was going on in China at this time under Tai Li and the Kuomintang?*

SERVICE: There were some parallels but probably not very close. There were several secret police organizations in China. The party had one which was under the "C-C Clique," the Chen brothers, Chen Li-fu and Chen Kuo-fu. Then Tai Li was independent, more or less directly under the Generalissimo. I'm not sure whether he was technically under the military or not, but he operated directly under the Generalissimo.

He imported a lot of German specialists, technicians, and so on, for training. This was one reason why the term "Gestapo" has been used. Some of these Germans stayed on long after relations between the governments were broken. We would still meet some of these German advisers to Tai Li walking in the hills of Chungking.

*Q: When you say advisers, what sorts of people were they?*

SERVICE: They were teaching police methods, that sort of thing. We'll come into this later on, but Tai Li, after the German connection was ended, started the American connection.

Very often there were other secret police. The military had their own police organization. The gendarmerie had its own investigative or police unit. There was a lot of overlap and competition between these various groups.

Their primary concern was Communists and Communism. In places like Shanghai they ostensibly were working against the puppets, the people like Wang Ching-Wei who went over to the Japanese. But, by and large, eventually they pretty much hooked up with the puppets, because the common enemy of both of the puppets and the Chungking people were the Communists. A lot of the secret police organizations were--maybe compromised is not the right word--but anyway they were working fairly closely with the puppet people.

They had prisons of various kinds--political prisons. They had, I mentioned earlier, some thought reform institutions. When foreigners talked about concentration camps in China--which we did; we used the term concentration camp--it was generally in reference to this sort of thing.

Prisoners were generally students, people they thought were left wing. As I said, people who were working for the industrial co-ops would get put in these places. Generally you were required to read proper material, study the San Min Chu I, Sun Yat-Sen's Three Principles, read Chiang Kai-shek's book, China's Destiny, write self-criticism, your own psychological history. If you acknowledged that your thoughts had been wrong and you were going to reform, generally you were let out. If you were stubborn, you might stay.

Some people were undoubtedly tortured, and we'll hear more about that. But, these places weren't at all of the scope of the concentration camps, Buchenwald or anything like that. And the purpose was not extermination.

### Famine in Henan

*Q: I interrupted you. You were talking about Loyang.*

SERVICE: I don't know that there is much to say about Loyang, except that I saw something of the famine. I didn't get out into the worst areas. In the next year after this, the Japanese came down from the north and just walked through. The people turned against the Chinese armies that had been impoverishing them, starving them to death. The famine was partly because of the crop failure, but also because of the tremendous impositions of hundreds of thousands of Chinese soldiers. Anyway, I wrote a long report about it, which Esherick has got. So, we don't need to go into it now.

### Food and Lodging on the Road

*Q: You talk about famine and you talk about living Chinese style. What sort of food did you get in these inns along the way?*

SERVICE: Wonderful! There was no rationing in China. It was purely a matter of having money. Even in the famine areas if you had the money, you could live pretty well. Of course, small inns don't serve Cordon Bleu food. It's simple food. Very often in north China, in small villages or towns on the road, the meal might be dried garlic and mant'ou, steamed bread, which is very nice.

The people up in the Gansu Corridor are mostly Muhammadans and will not touch pork. They wouldn't let us open cans that we had with us or use their cooking pots. But, the food was very good--beef and mutton and round flat crusty loaves of bread baked in large brick ovens.

The north China people eat steamed bread, different kinds of wheat and kaoliang millet, and so on. We didn't get rice except in the large towns. But noodles, in a place like Sian, wonderful noodles. Mien, Chinese mien, of all different kinds.

We ate at the street peddlers' stalls a lot of the time. Especially breakfast, eggs, things like that you could get on the street. We may not have eaten the fanciest food, but it was always good.

*Q: Were your Chinese companions willing to eat off the stalls?*

SERVICE: Yes, except for a few. Some were fussy about it. The "American-Chinese" was squeamish.

Accommodations were simplified by the fact that in the early years of the Sino-Japanese war the Russians had sent a lot of supplies to China down this route by truck, and the Chinese had set up hostels along the road in all the main towns. Each of these old garrison military post towns had a temple, generally a temple to a god of war or some local deity. The Chinese had used these old temples. They'd fixed them up, repaired them, whitewashed them, and turned them into hostels. They had a kitchen and some staff.

So, our group stayed in these hostels all the way up and down Gansu. We slept every night in front of the gods, [laughter] the Buddhist hell, and so on. But, they were very pleasant and comfortable hostels, and they helped to make it an interesting and pleasant excursion.

The hostels hadn't been used for years because '39 was probably the last time that supplies had come down. But, the Chinese, whether from bureaucratic inertia or whether they still hoped that maybe they'd get more supplies from the Russians--had kept the places up, and they dusted them out and swept them out and got them ready for our party. That's it.

#### Currie Requests Letters from the Field, Out of Channels

SERVICE: Also, he wanted me to write him letters from the field. Well, he hoped that I would keep him briefed on things of special interest. What he was particularly anxious for was that if I wrote a report or knew of a report that would be especially interesting to him, to alert him to its existence. A great difficulty for him was that, working in the White House, he had no reporting staff. He had no field agents or anything like that. He felt that the State Department and other agencies weren't really keeping him informed.

The old business, the bureaucratic run-around, "Well, we'll give you anything; you just ask for it." [laughter] But if you don't know what exists, you can't ask for it. So, what he wanted me to do was to let him know so that he could ask for things.

*Q: Was there anything improper in this?*

SERVICE: Well, this was out of channels, shall we say. It was sort of an unusual thing. It surprised me. I didn't mention it to the people in FE at the State Department. I may have mentioned it to Larry Salisbury. I'm not sure. But, I mentioned it as soon as I got back to Chungking, to Vincent. Vincent was my chief, in the sense that he was number two in the embassy.

Vincent didn't seem to be surprised. He said, "Well, this is the way the White House operates. After all, it is the White House, the office of the president. You follow your own judgment; my suggestion would be that if this is the way they want to operate, you might as well go along."

As a matter of fact, I never felt very comfortable. I never wrote very many letters. Later on, when I joined Stilwell's staff and was working under John Davies, I found that John had some contacts established. He already had his communications with people like Currie and with [Harry] Hopkins and various other people including influential senators. So that as long as I was working with John, I usually left this to him.

I didn't do very much after John was removed and I was back in China. In the Hurley days I wrote a few letters, but never very many.

*Q: One of my reasons for asking at this point about your estimate of Currie's general position and ability is that I'm trying to establish the level of information on China that was reaching Roosevelt and what priority he gave it.*

SERVICE: Currie had other responsibilities, I'm sure, besides simply China. He was involved in Lend-Lease, and I think most of these assistants had changing responsibilities. But one of his standing assignments was China.

I would guess, but I really have no way of knowing, that in the overall world picture China ranked relatively low. Sometimes it was more important and a hotter issue than at other times. It was certainly an important issue at the particular moment when I was there because of Mme. Chiang's arrival.

Report on Kuomintang-Communist Situation: Service as Prophet on China's Civil War

SERVICE: The only man I knew well in the Department was a man named Larry Salisbury who had been second secretary in Peking when I was a language student and with whom I had traveled to Inner Mongolia in the summer of '36. Salisbury wasn't directly in China affairs. He was handling special affairs. It was sort of an overall sweep. He was much interested in the fact that I had taken this long trip and also that I had impressions and observations that hadn't been reported. So, he urged me to sit down and write sort of a summary report. This became my memorandum of January 23, 1944.

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From Stanley K. Hornbeck Papers--Box 381  
John Service File  
July 27, 1944

There has come to my attention recently a dispatch from Chungking entitled "The Situation in China" with which there is enclosed a memorandum prepared by an officer of the Embassy under the title "The Situation in China and Suggestions Regarding American Policy."

The Embassy calls attention to the memorandum, states that "while in some respects it may be hypercritical and while we are not prepared to support it without qualification, we consider that it is a very able and thoughtful analysis and we believe that it will be of interest to officers of the Department concerned with the political and military situation in the Far East to read the first 9 pages in their entirety as they delineate concisely the background of the present critical developments generally along lines of the Embassy's concept of what has been happening in free China and why."

The memorandum under reference covers 19 pages of foolscap, single space. The first 9 pages, to which the Ambassador calls attention, consist for the most part of an indictment of the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek. In outline, it lays down propositions as follows: "The situation in China is rapidly becoming critical. The Japanese strategy in China, which has been as much political as military, has so far been eminently successful. The position of the Kuomintang and the Generalissimo is weaker than it has been for the past ten years. The Kuomintang is not only proving itself incapable of averting a debacle by its own initiative: on the contrary, its policies are policies precipitating the crisis. On the internal political front the desire of the Kuomintang leaders to perpetuate their own power overrides all other considerations. On the economic front the Kuomintang is showing itself inept and selfishly short-sighted by progressive estrangement of its allies. On the military front the Kuomintang appears to have decided to let America win the war and to have withdrawn for all practical purposes from active participation. These apparently suicidal policies of the Kuomintang have their roots in the composition and nature of the Party. The present policies of the Kuomintang seem certain of failure: if that failure results in a collapse of China it will have consequences disastrous both to our immediate military plans and our long-term interests in the Far East."

There comes next the proposition: "There are, however, active and constructive forces in China opposed to the present trends of the Kuomintang leadership which, if given a chance, might avert the threatened collapse." This is followed by two pages (10-11) in elaboration of that proposition. Therein there is underscored the proposition: "Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic, and political."

Part II of this memorandum (pages 11-19) consists of suggestions regarding American policy. In outline, it proceeds: "In the light of this developing crisis what should be the American attitude toward China? The Kuomintang and Chiang are acutely conscious of their dependence on us and will be forced to appeal for our support. The Kuomintang's dependence can give us great influence. There are three general alternatives open to us. Our choice between these alternatives must be determined by our objectives in China. We should adopt the third alternative--a coordinated and positive policy. This positive policy should be political. The implementation of this political policy, though difficult in some respects, is practical and can be carried out by many means. There must be effective coordination of the policies and actions of all American Government agencies concerned in these dealings with China. Since all measures open to us should not be applied simultaneously, there should be careful selection and timing. Specific measures which might be adopted in the carrying out of this positive policy include the following. Most of these measures can be applied progressively. The program suggested contains little that is not already being done in an uncoordinated and only partially effective manner. The program constitutes only very modified and indirect intervention in Chinese affairs."

[Note: The material quoted in the two paragraphs above consist of sentences, verbatim and in sequence, which constitute the subheading and, in a few instances, underscored parts of the text of the memorandum.]

Comment:

Seldom if ever have I ever seen any document prepared by a responsible officer of the Department or of the Foreign Service, of no matter what age or length of experience, expressive of such complete self-assurance on the part of its author that he knew the facts, all of the facts, and that he could prescribe and was prescribing the remedy, the one and only remedy, for a bad situation and could indicate and was indicating the way, the only way, to lead from bad to good. In many contexts I have seen and have heard and have read about things wrong with China. Never before, not even in Rodney Gilbert's book entitled What's Wrong With China, have I encountered so sweeping a charge that almost everything--except a certain amount of liberal sentiment in some quarters--is wrong with China. Never before, however, have I heard or read it laid down flatly that "Democratic reform is the crux of all important Chinese problems, military, economic and political."

I have heard before, but not from trained and responsible officials, a suggestion that it might be well for the United States to forget certain outstanding features of its policy regarding China, such as the policy of the "Open Door"; but never before have I heard it suggested by an official that among three general alternatives open to us one is that we might "give up China as hopeless and wash our hands of it altogether." I have heard before many proposals and plans conceived and expounded by authors for the improvement of our policy regarding and our relations with China; but never have I seen one so elaborately compounded of prescriptions regarding what we should desist from or refrain from doing and prescriptions of what /page 4/ we should do, in detail, and with sequence of timing, which indicated so completely the lack on the part of its author of understanding of the difference between that which may be ideally desirable and that which is politically practicable.

Upon finishing perusal for the second time of the memorandum above under reference, I turned to refresh my knowledge of its author.

[See Register, Service, John S.]

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SERVICE: I don't think I need to go into detail about this because it's been published many times. It emphasized the probability of eventual civil war. I didn't come out and say, "The Communists are going to win," but I said that civil war would be a disaster for the peace, stability, development of China, and that the Communists might be extremely difficult to defeat. I urged that we should try to find out something about the Communists by sending people up there, sending officers up there.

John Davies was coming to the same conclusion at about the same time. Even Drumright who was then in China, made a similar suggestion. But somehow my memorandum upset the

established powers a great deal, mainly Hornbeck, who had been in the Department for a long, long time, and was long away from any sort of direct contact with China. He was called adviser to the secretary of state. He didn't have any direct administrative role.

The head of FE, the Far Eastern section, was a man named Max Hamilton. Max had also been in China for a short while as a Foreign Service officer, but also back in the 20's, I think early 20's. He had resigned from the Foreign Service to take an administrative job. In those days you couldn't stay in the Department for any real length of time if you were in the Foreign Service. If you wanted to take a state department job, then you resigned from the Foreign Service, which Hamilton had done. But he was completely dominated by Hornbeck, who was a very overbearing, dictatorial type of person.

The head of China Affairs was a man named George Atcheson, who had been in China more recently but not during the war. He'd been in China most recently during '37-'38 period.

My memo, as I say, caused a lot of waves. Hornbeck's first reactions were apparently vitriolic. He wrote on the margins "ridiculous," "preposterous," "scandalous," and various other characterizations.

I was then asked to rewrite the memorandum, in a less personal way, using embassy despatches where possible. The embassy had said some of the same things in less dramatic or direct ways.

Meanwhile, the Department sent off a telegram to the embassy without telling me.

*Q: The embassy in Chungking?*

SERVICE: Yes. They sent off a telegram to the embassy in Chungking--without mentioning my name--and grossly distorting my conclusions. [laughter] You can see it on page 199 in U.S. Foreign Relations [China 1943]

They say, "A report has reached us,"--not mentioning me, making a mystery--"presumably based on statements made by Edgar Snow and Zhou En-lai." Well I had not seen Edgar Snow for several years. He'd been in Chungking briefly in 1941 at the time of the New Fourth Army incident, and he had broken that story by getting out of China, sending his reports from Hong Kong, I think. But anyway, he'd been persona non grata. So, I hadn't seen Ed Snow for several years. And Zhou En-lai, well, of course, I'd been traveling in the northwest for four months. I had seen Zhou En-lai very briefly in Chungking, but my report came not at all from Zhou En-lai. "To the effect that--" and so on and so on. Then, as I say, they distort my conclusions and ask for the embassy's comments without mentioning who the embassy was supposed to be commenting on.

The embassy came back and quite rightly wouldn't buy, wouldn't go all the way for the rather distorted questions. But, they did say that, "Liquidation of the Communists by the present Kuomintang leadership is a question of when rather than whether" (which, of course, was pretty strong substantiation of what I said), and that most people assumed that there would be a civil

war, probably not during the war against Japan. I hadn't said there would be civil war before the end of the war [with Japan] at all. I talked about after.

FE asked me to rewrite my memo again, which I did. I spent most of the month writing and rewriting this silly memo, based on the Chungking reply. Then Bob Smyth, who was a Foreign Service officer assigned in FE, tacked on a conclusion. I finally refused to sign the thing. I got very annoyed, partly because of the rewriting of my memo by someone else. They finally said, "Well, we'll put both your names on it, Smyth and Service." I think I finally signed it after there had been some toning down and also having his name on it.

But Hamilton made some remark to Ringwalt, who was in the Department then getting ready to go to China I think. Ringwalt had mentioned my memorandum or my suggestion. Anyway, Hamilton said something to the effect: "Pay no attention to Service. Don't take him too seriously. He's young and immature." Ringwalt got some amusement, I think, in telling me about this. I was all ready to go and storm Hamilton's office, but was finally dissuaded from making a fool of myself. [Laughter]

Hamilton's attitude was very odd. It was such a contrast to Currie, who said, "Look, we've got a problem and we've got to do something about it,"--I had lunch with Hamilton, and certainly in the beginning our relations were quite friendly. He was commenting, sort of in a despairing way, about the distorted American impressions of China, how someday there was going to be a rude awakening and this was going to be very bad when Americans found out things weren't as rosy as they'd thought.

I said, "Well, after all, we've got some responsibilities. There's censorship in China. It's very hard for the true story to get out," and that we should be doing something. I argued that we should be taking an active role in informing the American public. We owed it to the public and we had to counter Chinese censorship by helping American newspaper people get the news.

[lowering voice and paraphrasing Hamilton] "Oh, we could never do that, could never do that. It would be very embarrassing and very difficult. If it became known that we were taking an active role in news, it would be very embarrassing."

His whole attitude was a dithering, milquetoasty sort of business.

*Q: This situation was not unique to China. There have been plenty of other places where there's been censorship.*

SERVICE: Oh yes.

*Q: Were there precedents for Foreign Service officers informing the American news corps?*

SERVICE: Oh, I'm sure there had been. Sure! In 1931 in the Manchurian Incident--my trials bring out--the Foreign Service people in Manchuria and in China generally made sure that the newspaper people got the true story.

Hamilton was an unusually cautious, conservative type of person, I think. And perhaps he was prescient enough to expect that I was likely to be indiscreet or controversial. I don't know.

A lot of Foreign Service people were not used to the idea of American government being in news. The O[ffice of] W[ar] I[nformation] had just been set up. The government had never had anything like this before. You know, a lot of people in the State Department are still not very enthusiastic about this role of government. They would much prefer to stick to the traditional role of diplomacy rather than get ourselves involved in public information, propaganda, cultural affairs, and so on. Particularly propaganda, that's usually the bad word that's used.

There was another comment, I remember, by a fellow Foreign Service officer who survived what came later. He read my report, said it was very interesting, and it would be a terrific assignment, this business of going to Yen-an. I suggested sending some Foreign Service officers to Yen-an to observe. But, he wasn't sure that he would want the job because--He said, "Oh, the KMT government would be awfully down on that person." [laughing] "It might not be a very good idea."

*Q: Who was that?*

SERVICE: I think I'd better not mention the name. [laughter]

*Q: What sort of security was put on this document?*

SERVICE: Oh, I'm not sure what the security was. The classification was probably confidential, because everything was at least confidential. There was practically nothing written that wasn't classified in some way or another.

*Q: What sort of circulation did it have?*

SERVICE: I think I showed the thing around to various people I talked to, but then I was talking to people like Donovan and OSS people, Currie. After all, I gave Currie a copy. It was passed around quite widely. The State Department was concerned. What they were really concerned about was the fact that I was talking to other people. This was why they went to these absurd lengths to try to rebut it, because, of course, they knew that I was talking to Currie, and they knew that OSS was interested. I was being called to go to all sorts of debriefing sessions at OSS and the army MIS [Military Intelligence Section], and Navy ONI [Office of Naval Intelligence].

When they got their reply from Chungking, this is on page 205 (Foreign Relations, 1943, China) they circularized to all the head offices of the Department their message to Chungking and Chungking's reply without sending them my memo.

So, this was all sent in, and then Hornbeck put out a memo in reply to mine which is very amusing. This is Hornbeck. It's a memorandum by the adviser on political relations. The State Department historian's footnote, says, "is commenting on memorandum by John S. Service, dated January 23."

I think it's worth reading a little bit of it here.

"We should I think maintain an attitude of intelligent skepticism with regard to reports emphasizing the strength of the (quote) Communist (end quote) forces in China and expressing apprehensiveness that civil war in China may be imminent." Of course, I didn't say in my thing it was imminent. That was circulated to try to offset my memo.

I was talking recently to an English historian, Christopher Thorne, who has written a book coming out very soon now on the relations between the Allies during World War II. (Christopher G. Thorne, Allies of a Kind: the United States, Britain and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945, London: Hamilton, 1978) He's done a lot of research in British cabinet archives and British Foreign Office archives. He was telling me that in the summer of 1943--it was six months or so after this--that Hornbeck asked to go to London to consult with the British to make sure we were together on our Far Eastern policy. He raised their eyebrows in London, Foreign Office eyebrows, by his insistence that the so-called Communists were of no importance and no concern at all and that Chiang Kai-shek, if the need should ever arise, would have no difficulty whatever in coping with the problem.

*Q: Was Christopher Thorne's belief that the British were much better informed?*

SERVICE: Yes. This did not accord [laughing] with their views. [laughter] As I said, Clark Kerr, the British ambassador in Chungking, was the man who was most alarmed about the New Fourth Army incident.

The British had a man named Michael Lindsay living in Yen-an who had been there since Pearl Harbor. There were other people, people named Band who'd come through from Peking, and so on. Anyway the British apparently were willing to be a little bit more realistic than Hornbeck.

*Q: I asked earlier if you'd taken notes on your trip?*

SERVICE: Oh, no. I didn't have any notes. I didn't keep any diary. I was just sort of reporting off the top of my head. Yes, it's been one of my drawbacks really that I never could be systematic enough to take notes. Later on I took some notes at various times. But, on this trip I didn't try to take any.

#### Comments on Developing Relations Between the State Department and U.S. Intelligence Agencies

*Q: You've raised a question indirectly that was on our formal agenda which concerns the relationship between the various intelligence agencies that were developing. You said that you were raising eyebrows by being debriefed by these people. But, when you use a term like "debrief" it implies, at least to me, that there is official recognition that this is part of your duties.*

SERVICE: Oh yes. There was no question about that. An office was set up to inform all concerned agencies about arrivals of people who could be debriefed. Generally speaking, there

was an intent to cooperate. After all, we were all fighting the war. So, word was circulated that I was there and available for debriefing.

But, I think what bothered my State Department superiors was not so much my talking to the lower level analyst groups as the fact that I was being talked to by people like Currie in the White House and by Donovan of OSS and so on. I'm not sure whether they knew it, but I was asked to talk to or taken to see various senators. I talked to Senator [Claude Denson] Pepper. There were a number of people that in one way or another I saw. Michael Straight, who was then the owner-publisher of the New Republic, talked to me.

I soon got beyond the normal--proportions isn't quite the right word--of a third secretary in the field. Anyway, it upset the State Department.

A New Feel for the Need for Information from China and a New Engagement in the Influencing of American Policy

SERVICE: After consultation, and a bit more leave in California, I went back to China: a whole bunch of us took off to China in early April [1943] I think. They were building up the staff in China. People had been repatriated from internment by the Japanese. So, a whole group of us went.

I think that there had been a change in my own situation. Partly because I'd been in Washington, I'd seen the end users of the reports. I'd been complimented a good deal on the reporting from Chungking, including being complimented by Alger Hiss, I remember, who was working then for Hornbeck! I'd gotten a new feel, which I hadn't before, of the need and demand and interest in information from China. I had become engaged by having my own judgment and maturity, shall we say, questioned.

*Q: Engaged in what sense?*

SERVICE: I'd become personally engaged in the sense of being much more involved in trying to make sure that what I thought was the correct picture got back to the States and more interested in American policy.

The whole incident there was a sort of a foreshadowing of what eventually was the final denouement. You can change Hornbeck for Hurley, and you might change Drew Pearson and the press for [Philip] Jaffe. But, the basic issues, our concern, our conviction, our certainty, that civil war in China would be disastrous was there right from the very beginning and that American policy should be to try to avoid a civil war. We should not get involved in supporting one side, which already in '43 I thought might well be the losing side, although we weren't so certain then as we were later on.

We were still at this time thinking that the Kuomintang could be saved and that our efforts should be toward trying to get the Kuomintang to reform. At this point we didn't know much about the Communists and we hadn't gotten to the point--which we eventually reached--of expecting the Communists to win.

At any rate, what happened later on seems to be pretty much foreshadowed in this incident in 1943.

*Q: Did you run into troubles at all with the embassy in Chungking as you wrote more and more?*

SERVICE: No. I think engaged is not the right word. I mean up to that point I had certainly done a very conscientious job. I reported when I was supposed to report. I saw something that I thought was worth reporting and reported on it. But, I didn't have the zeal that I eventually developed. While I wrote a tremendous volume of stuff I was generally, shall we say, an outside observer. I obviously wasn't aloof later on. But I think that the embassy never tried to discourage me or disagree with me. In fact, Vincent saw things very much as I saw them.

Interestingly enough, almost as soon as we got back to Chungking, Vincent was transferred back to the Department. He became head of China Affairs. Hamilton was sent off to the Soviet Union. Acheson then became deputy chief of mission, number two in Chungking.

In the Department during the January hassle Acheson had tried to argue against my thesis by recalling that the Communists were willing, in 1937, to take orders from the national government. It's true that in the early part of the war, the honeymoon period of the United Front, that they had worked together fairly closely. By the time Acheson had been in Chungking a short while, he saw the situation much as everyone else did.

I don't think there was ever any putting the clamp on me or clamping down on me from the embassy.

## VII POLITICAL REPORTING: TRANSFER TO STILWELL'S STAFF

### Posted to One-Man Observation Post in Lanchow

SERVICE: Very soon after I got back to Chungking, we were opening up listening posts or one-man observation posts at various places. They weren't formally called consulates. The Chinese government didn't want us to call them consulates. We weren't expected to perform normal consular functions and duties. Lanchow was one of the posts. I'm not quite sure why I was picked to go. They had more people to fill in in Chungking. Four or five officers went out the same time I did.

I'd been in Lanchow the summer before, so I knew something of the background and the people; I was very happy to go.

One big problem was how to get there. The China Tea Corporation ran trucks up the road to Lanchow to send tea. There was no tea grown in north China. This was a government monopoly. The government set up a lot of monopolies, trading companies, during the war. Tea was one of them. An H.H. Kung enterprise. The China Tea Corporation agreed to allow me to ride in one of their trucks.

### Carries Two Hundred Thousand Chinese Dollars for an OSS Caper

SERVICE: A couple of days before I was to take off, an American navy officer, Commodore Miles, who was always known as "Mary" Miles, got in touch with George Atcheson--never contacted me directly--and said that they wanted me to take some money up to Lanchow.

He just dumped on George Atcheson a suitcase with two hundred thousand Chinese dollars--officially this was ten thousand U.S. dollars at the official rate of exchange. Two hundred thousand dollars in five and ten dollar notes is quite a pile of money! Would I please take this up to Lanchow because the OSS had an expedition coming through Tibet from India through Lhasa, and they were going to end up in Lanchow? They were going to need some money to pay off the caravan.

[laughing] So, Atcheson said okay. And I said, "George, this is the craziest goddamn thing." I'm traveling on a truck just by myself. There was absolutely no guard, no security. People are held up along the roads. Banditry is endemic everywhere. I mentioned before seeing people who had been robbed the day before trying to find their valuables they'd thrown off the bus.

Furthermore, there were perfectly normal channels for transmitting funds. He could do it through a bank. He could do it through the post office. China was an operating country, and transmission of funds was a very feasible business. But, it was absolutely typical of this strange person and the weird ways that he operated. Everything had to be secret. Therefore you didn't want to transmit funds in the normal way.

It's like the Watergate business, laundering funds, and so on. People in Lanchow knew that this expedition was going to arrive. They weren't going to come from nowhere. But, Miles just wanted to operate that way, and so I was stuck with this two hundred thousand in cash.

So, what to do? I was taking some things along, a few minimum groceries. Coffee was worth its weight in gold if you could give anybody a little coffee. I was going to take some presents of tea because tea in the northwest of China is very much more expensive, very prized, and so on, good gifts. I had a few staples and stores I was going to take. I expected to stay in Lanchow for a year or two.

So, I went down and bought a lot more tea from the China Tea Corporation and took the tea out of the boxes, filled the boxes with bank notes, and then mixed them in with my groceries and other stuff in a couple of wooden boxes. When we got ready to go, why they were just thrown in the back of the truck, you see, and then I forgot them, paid no more attention to them.

Before I left Chungking I had talked to Atcheson, who was then number two as I said, about the possibility of trying to get into the Communist areas. He said, "By all means, if you have a chance, do it."

Tolstoy, who was the name of the OSS man--he was grandson or something of the novelist, had been in the Russian cavalry as a young man and then left Russia and came to the States. This was

what made him, I suppose, a prime candidate to send through Tibet, because you had to ride horseback. He was a very nice chap.

Anyway, I met Tolstoy in Lanchow and delivered the money, and he stayed on for a while. He was also very much interested in my idea of trying to get into the Communist areas. We thought we might be able to do it by going down the Yellow River. From Lanchow you can go down the river by inflated skin rafts. They use cow hides, blow them up, and make rafts out of them. You can go down to the city of Ningsia. From there we thought we might be able to get into the Communist areas from the north. There were some Kuomintang troops there, but they weren't very strong and there's a lot of open country.

The news we had was that these Kuomintang troops in the north were really sort of co-existing on a rather cozy basis with the Communists. So, we thought we might be able to do it. But, the Chinese in Lanchow were much too much on the alert for anything like this. [chuckle] They weren't about to let us go down to Ningsia.

*Q: Was there any value, significant value, from the OSS expedition through Tibet?*

SERVICE: None whatever that I know of. It was irrelevant, peripheral to the war. There were various rumors that had started that the Japanese had gotten into Tibet, into Lhasa, and that Japanese agents were active there. There was apparently one Japanese Buddhist who had been in Lhasa for a good many years. But, they didn't really prove that he was a secret agent or that he was very effective or that he subverted the Tibetans. So I don't think the operation accomplished anything. Maybe it accomplished a negative result in proving there wasn't anything to worry about, no Japanese subversion. The Japanese weren't about to take over Tibet.

#### Truck Breaks Down: Two Days on the Grand Trunk Road Listening to Coolies

SERVICE: Several days out of Chungking the truck had trouble, broke down--the trucks were all old and tied together with string and bits of wire--and we spent a couple of days beside the road. The road had curved. We broke down just beyond a curve. At the curve, fortunately, there was a little refreshment place run by an old peasant woman. She made noodles mostly and things like that, just very simple fare, and tea.

Most of the traffic was not truck but two wheel carts pulled by men or sometimes by animals. But this was Sichuan, so it was mostly human pullers rather than animal pullers. Other trucks went by. There were not many on this road north of Chengdu. But, the trucks would go by. I said to the driver, "Why don't you stop them?"

"Oh no. There's no use stopping them. We'll wait for another China Tea Corporation truck to come along, because all the drivers from the China Tea Corporation are from Ningpo." In other words, [laughter] it's the old regional kinsmen business. "When a tea corporation truck comes along we won't need to stop him. He'll just stop anyway and whatever he has we can use, and he won't leave until we get fixed up." Eventually some of his cohorts came along, his colleagues and friends, and they managed to get the truck rolling.

I spent almost two days in this little shack beside the road. It was quite an interesting experience because I would just sit in the back and coolies pulling these carts would come in and have a cup of tea or a bowl of noodles or something, meet others going up or down the road, talk.

*Q: What did you pick up?*

SERVICE: Oh! All sorts of things! What was interesting to them. What are the conditions down the road? Where are the troops grabbing coolies, because if they needed transport, they just grabbed people, hauled them off the streets. Conscription problems-- They discussed all the things that would be of interest to them, sometimes crops, but mostly conscription and impositions by the soldiers. They talked about riots and disturbances which we hadn't heard of in various cities, where there'd been civil rebellion or resistance to some of these things.

Occasionally I would reveal that I understood Chinese and then join the conversation. But it was a very instructive two days. I was rather sorry that we had to get back on the road, although the truck drivers themselves were interesting.

*Q: Why was it done in your opinion?*

SERVICE: Partly I think it was simply the State Department's anxiety to cooperate with the army. It was a request that was put through the highest channels. It came through Secretary of War Stimson to the secretary of state and put in very flattering terms that they wanted cooperation.

Vincent was the man in the Department who handled it. I think Vincent saw that it could be useful. Davies had already been assigned to the army, and Davies was in sort of a freewheeling position which was producing useful reports. There was quite a bad situation in Chungking. Bad maybe is too strong a word. There simply wasn't very good liaison between the army headquarters and the embassy. Gauss and Stilwell were alike in some ways. They were both rather prickly and each took the attitude, "Well, if he wants to talk to me, I'm available. Let him come over." This sort of thing.

It's always a bit of a question in a foreign country whether the ambassador has first rank or the army. I don't think these people were particularly concerned about that. Stilwell's attitude was, "Well, I'm just awful busy." So, there wasn't much liaison or contact between the two. Davies knew that I had good relations with Gauss and thought that I could be useful being a link.

There was a rationale in the case of all the people that were brought over, but I don't think we need to go into all that.

*Q: Well, why not?*

SERVICE: Really?

*Q: Yes, sure.*

SERVICE: It's sort of out of my field. Emmerson was a Japanese language officer. We were getting ready to fight the Japanese in Burma. Davies thought it would be good to have a Japan man for propaganda, psych, warfare and so on, interrogation of prisoners. The army was not very well prepared for it, certainly not in China.

Ludden was a man who was a frustrated soldier and would prefer to have been in the army. I think Davies originally thought that he would be a good man to maintain contact with the forces down in Burma, the army, fighting front.

Davies himself was spending more and more of his time back in India where there were a lot of political problems to worry about. Congress [party] and [Mahatma] Gandhi were opposing the war, famine was coming on.

Then, one of Davies' ideas from about this time was this idea which I had brought up, and Davies also had brought up, of trying to establish contacts with the Communist areas to find out what was happening in north China. Davies apparently always thought that I would be a good man for that.

His original plan was a very fancy one of getting Roosevelt's son, James I think it was, to head up the group. I was to sort of lead him by the hand. But that didn't work out.

*Q: Was the CBI, the China-Burma-India command, established at this point?*

SERVICE: Oh yes. CBI had been set up--well, I forget--in February or March, 1942. Now we're already in August, '43.

There was a fairly large headquarters, Forward Echelon Headquarters, in Chungking which was where I was assigned. The Chungking headquarters actually didn't quite know what to do with me. This had all been worked out, as I say, at very high levels. The people actually on the ground weren't very clear about what I was to do, whether to give me an office and have me in an office job, or what.

For a while I was fairly busy counseling a number of agencies like OSS and Board of Economic Warfare which later on became Foreign Economic Administration. We set up a sort of a psych-war committee there in Chungking, on an inter-agency basis. Actually we spent most of our time talking about American attitudes and propaganda vis-a-vis the Kuomintang [laughing] more than we did about the Japanese. In other words what we should do to try to promote the cause and the spread of ideas of democracy in China. Anyway, that didn't last very long.

This was not a full time job. I was much more interested in doing what came naturally for me--reporting. I did some of that, started that, and kept it up.

#### Becomes "Road Expert"

SERVICE: The head of G-2 at that time was Stilwell's son, Joe. He wasn't particularly interested in political things. He was much more the narrowly military intelligence type, combat

intelligence, nuts-and-bolts type of intelligence. I don't think he was much concerned about Chinese politics.

He found out one day that I'd been over the Burma Road. He was quite excited about this because they were trying to get information, and everybody in headquarters had arrived in China since the Burma Road closed. No one there had been over it. "You drove over the Burma Road?!" So he had me write down everything I could remember about the road, its condition, bridges, ferries, terrain, cover, everything that could be useful as one type of intelligence, [laughter] just very primitive type of intelligence. So, I did the Burma Road, as much as I could dredge out of my memory.

Then he found out I'd been to the northwest. So I did the same for all the roads in the northwest I'd covered, Sichuan to Lanchow and Sian.

#### A Road Reporting Tour Through Guizhou, Yunnan, and Guangxi

SERVICE: Then he decided that for contingent, future planning possibilities, they wanted to find out all they could about all the roads in the southern part of China leading into Indochina. Up until the fall of France most of the goods imported into China had gone in through Haiphong, then on up the railway or by these roads. There were several roads built into China from Indochina. This was after Hong Kong fell, of course.

After the fall of France, the Japanese moved into the northern part of Indochina. All these roads were stopped, and the Chinese had actually destroyed the roads in areas close to the border. Further back, most of the roads had simply been abandoned.

So G-2 dreamed up this idea of having a reconnaissance. They sent an army engineer officer and I was to escort him. We had two jeeps. An overseas Chinese from Singapore was assigned to us as a mechanic and interpreter, but he was absolutely no use as an interpreter. We never used him. [laughter] I don't think he knew Cantonese. His Chinese was Fukienese or something like that.

But anyway, we never got into areas where he seemed to be of any use. Almost always--and even in Guangxi--I could use my Mandarin. My ears are flexible enough so that I could absorb, understand, most any variety of Chinese as long as it's a form of Mandarin.

This is a long story that we don't need to go into in any detail, because it's just another Gee-whiz, boys! great excitement stuff.

Q: One thing I'd like to ask is--Maps were always an enormous problem in the Pacific area I know. What was the reliability or availability of maps from any source for these areas?

SERVICE: Very poor. We didn't have any good maps. Even the air force didn't. We had general maps, but they didn't show things like roads. Of course, we had to get Chinese permission. From each province we would get the maps. There were little maps, extremely primitive and sketchy. They didn't show very much in detail.

We each had a jeep. They fixed up trailers, and we carried two drums of gas. The trailer had an iron box built on it, to enclose it in other words so there was some security.

We spent two months traveling around on these mostly forsaken, empty, abandoned roads. Sometimes the grass had grown up higher than the jeep. We had to push through it. Bridges sometimes were gone. We got across by getting local sampans, sometimes by putting boards across two sampans and then running the jeep out onto the boards and maneuvering the sampans, tied together, across the river.

We did southern Yunnan, Guizhou, and Guangxi, in other words all the arc around the northern borders of Indochina. We went right up to the border. In several places we could see the Japanese posts on the other side.

*Q: Did they bother you ever?*

SERVICE: No they didn't. We were foreigners. The whole frontier was completely inactive, and the Chinese weren't about to let it be otherwise. They weren't anxious to stir up anything.

Generally, we traveled alone, but in Guangxi at one place, we were escorted by some young Guangxi army officers.

This was the most interesting part of the trip, as far as I was concerned, to talk with the Guangxi people. Later on I wrote a report about Chiang Kai-shek's treatment of the Guangxi clique. It's partly from my experience.

I think that the trip was valuable to me; I was seeing a whole, other, big new section of the country. I'd done the northwest, and this was seeing the southwest. If there was no town, we stayed in a farmer's home, in villages. We'd simply find the head man and say, "Here we are. Can you help us?" We had papers identifying us.

*Q: How were you received?*

SERVICE: Friendly. Well, let's not get into that.

#### A Wide Range of Contacts

SERVICE: My contacts were numerous and various. People talk now about how you never got into the homes of Chinese in the old days. Chinese don't live in a way that they can entertain foreigners very well. Certainly in China in those days they were living in a very, very crowded, ramshackle way.

But I was continually in these people's rooms, their lodgings, just as they came to me. We got on a basis of very intimate equality, so that I could drop around and see them and we'd spend evenings talking where they lived. We usually went out for meals because even for Chinese [chuckle], it's easier to go out and get a snack--perhaps even at a noodle stand--than eat at home.

And they weren't set up for entertaining. Most of my meals were in restaurants. Occasionally I would have supper with Adler, but very seldom.

I mentioned last time moving in with Sol Adler, and I think we ought to say something more about that, because I had become by this time very close friends with Adler. He had come out to Chungking for the Treasury Department in the summer of 1941. So he'd been a long time in Chungking.

A brilliant person, he'd worked for a long time in the government, in the treasury, was a very close associate of Harry Dexter White. A brilliant economist, an international chess master, a terrific bridge player. Just a very, very keen, sharp mind who was as interested in Chinese politics as I was and in what was happening in China and how it would affect us.

He knew no Chinese, but all his associates were Chinese. He was an economist in the treasury working with Dr. Kung and with the Ministry of Finance and with the government economists and the top government bankers in China, so that he tapped an entirely different layer from what I was reaching. We compared notes and worked together very closely, so that my moving to a room in his apartment on the second floor was more than just a convenience. It facilitated our own collaboration, which really is the right word to use, on a lot of the reporting that I did.

Things like my comments on, oh, the Generalissimo's book, China's Destiny, a lot of it came indirectly from Adler, from his contacts, and particularly from his friend and very close associate Chi Ch'ao-Ting, who was a Ph.D. in economics from Columbia University and whose book Key Economic Areas in Chinese History, I think was one of the best known books in Chinese economic history at that time.

Then the Generalissimo came out with semi-secret publication. It was not published in China, but it was a textbook for all the party schools on Chinese economic theory. This actually was translated by Chi and then Sol wrote a long comment on it, economic analysis of it, and I gave it to the embassy, to Davies. Chi's translation was the origin of the eventual English publication.

*Q: Did the Generalissimo write it himself?*

SERVICE: No. Chungking was convinced, and I think it was fairly well accepted, that the person who wrote it was a man named T'ao Hsi-Sheng, who was sort of a secretary, a member of the Generalissimo's inner secretariat. He was an extreme conservative, right-wing, traditionalist Chinese scholar.

There were a whole lot of foreigners in Chungking working one way or another in intelligence or intelligence related work. This was the period that I first met John [King] Fairbank. He came to Chungking with what was called the COI [coordinator of information], which then became, or was part of OSS. John was running their office and did a great deal of work collecting printed materials on China.

Fairbank had spent four years in Peking while he was working for his Ph.D. and had done some teaching at Tsing Hua University. As a result of that and because of his own interests and

Harvard work and so on, he had a very, very extensive acquaintance among Chinese university circles.

I saw the people in the embassy, like Sprouse, of course. Most of the embassy contacts were government officials, particularly foreign office but other government--the ministry of economics and so on. We all did a lot of comparing of notes.

There was a man in the headquarters named Linebarger, who had been the psychological warfare guy that had asked for the original long compendium on morale and propaganda agencies. He eventually was sent to Chungking as a captain attached to G-2. Because of his father's connections with Sun Yat-Sen and because of his own predilections, he had a direct contact with people like T'ao Hsi-Sheng and Tai Chi-T'ao, and most of the conservative groups of the KMT.

There were other OWI people like Fisher, Stuart and others, who had been in China a long time.

Also there was a very active press contingent, the permanent group. I'm not thinking of the visitors who came in for a week and left. I talked to them of course. People like Severeid came at that time, and Raymond Clapper. Various people. You remember, this was one of the things that Currie wanted me to do. He undoubtedly told these people to look me up. Perhaps they would have anyway. I don't know.

The residents were people like Gunther Stein, Brooks Atkinson, Richard Watts, who was there for the Herald Tribune. Brooks Atkinson was the long-time drama critic of the Times. He was there for the New York Times. He didn't want to write drama criticism during the war. He asked for a war job, and they sent him to Chungking. It was a coincidence that Richard Watts, also a drama critic, was the Herald Tribune man in Chungking.

Teddy White, and with him was Anna Lee Jacoby. Harold Isaacs was there later on for Newsweek. These people were interested in exactly the same sort of thing I was interested in. They were able to talk to a lot of people I couldn't see.

*Q: Why couldn't you?*

SERVICE: Because I was not given prominent status in headquarters as political representative or adviser. In other words, I wasn't given big face. If I had been treated that way, as Davies was much more in India, then it would have been more possible for me to ask to see T.V. Soong or someone like that, the head of the government. John could go and talk to Nehru, or he could talk to the governor-general.

I preferred it this way. I much preferred to operate the way I did, than to have been put at a desk in a big office. It really didn't hamper me a great deal. Having good relations with the press, they often let me know before they were having an important interview.

*Q: So, you could feed in your questions.*

SERVICE: "I'm going to see so and so. What do you think?" Then, I would read their notes afterward. In many cases I read their despatches and could read what was censored. I was on a

basis of friendly cooperation with some of these correspondents. They were tapping, you see, still a different stratum, than I was tapping.

We were all living and breathing the politics of Chungking. We shared both ways. If I knew something, if I had some rumor I was trying to check out, I shared with them. None of this material was about American policy, what the American government was going to do, military plans. It was all about what was happening in front of our eyes in China, so that although all these things were classified, we got out of the habit of thinking of them as classified, or at least I did.

*Q: We know subsequently that many of these people to whom you've referred have taken very different positions on American-China policy. I'm talking about people who are now, to put it in seventies' terms, pro-Taiwan or pro-PRC [People's Republic of China]. Was there any evidence of splits at that time or any personal friction?*

SERVICE: No, not really. We were beginning to get a difference of attitude toward the Communists. At this time--I'm talking about before I actually went to Yen-an--most of us didn't know much about it. No one knew much about what really was happening up there.

Isaacs, I think, always from the very beginning was critical of the Communists. He himself had had a political background in China. He'd been there as a young man editing a magazine which was regarded as being Trotskyite. He asked Trotsky to write the forward to his book on China. He regarded Mao Zedong, I think wrongly--his anger should have been at Wang Ming and the twenty-eight Bolsheviks--but he regarded him as a tool of Stalin.

There some people working for the Chinese, people like "Mo" [Maurice] Votaw, who was working as an editor for the Chinese Ministry of Information, which as I mentioned before was a party ministry. Mo was restrained in his criticism, shall we say. He didn't try to pretend everything in China was hunky-dory. There were some differences, but by and large we all were talking about what's happening here, and we all saw it pretty much the same way.

Later on, when the Kuomintang started putting out prejudicial information, they made a good deal out of my contacts with some of the press, particularly Teddy White. They even claimed that I used to use his room in the press hostel for assignations with Zhou En-lai's lady press secretary, a woman named Kung Peng.

This, of course, was absurd to anybody who knew the layout of the press hostel, because the press hostel purposely was laid out to facilitate surveillance. It was like a two-story motel, built around two sides of a square. The third side of the square was a dining room, and then at the entrance you all had to go through one gate.

The entrance was where your surveillant sat, the policeman. The doors of all the rooms opened out onto balconies, verandas, so that he could sit there and watch whoever went into any door. So the idea that I would pick this place for assignations is somewhat laughable. But, we'll come back to this subject.

Kung Peng was famous in Chungking. She was a graduate of an American missionary school and Yenching University, had been active in the student movement there in 1935, and went over to the Communist side. Her first husband was killed fighting in the guerrilla areas. Her second husband was a man I knew quite well, who had escaped from Hong Kong after Pearl Harbor and was one of the editors of the Communist paper in Chungking.

He became ill, had an operation, and I found out that she was very distraught because the hospital needed blood and they couldn't get it. Chinese, at that time, weren't used to the idea of giving blood. They somehow think it's their life essence, and they just don't like the idea of having people take it away.

So I went down to the hospital to give blood. My veins are very hard to find apparently. I'm very thin, and the doctors were not in practice, I'm sure, and the needles were very old.

Anyway, they had to probe around so long and make so many futile attempts [chuckling] that I finally passed out cold as a flounder, which alarmed everybody, except me of course. But at any rate, this example encouraged Chinese comrades, and he got a good supply of blood after that. Also, I was able to get him plasma from our army doctor up at headquarters, plasma and antibiotics which they needed desperately. He's the man who later became foreign minister.

*Q: His name?*

SERVICE: Ch'iao Kuan-Hua. He was a foreign minister until, unfortunately, he got mixed up with the Gang of Four. His wife had died some years ago. He remarried and his new wife, who was a vice-minister of foreign affairs, apparently was quite close to Chiang Ch'ing.

People often assume, you know, that intelligence is a matter of paying money and so on. I think it's clear that the type of work I was doing was not at all with paid informants. It was all friendly, people who had the same interests that I did.

The Chinese newspapermen who were the primary people that I talked to, and the Communists were all interested in what was going on, all interested in talking shop, exchanging ideas, pumping each other. Mostly it was friendship. Of course, some people talked to me because of my position. Obviously, my position was an advantage. People knew I worked for headquarters. Some people wanted to influence me, wanted to get their ideas through to headquarters. People like Feng Yu-Hsiang and some government people tried to talk to me at various times, convince me of their views or change my views.

But basically, it was simply a matter of common interest. When we went out I very often paid for meals, but that was not exactly bribery. Most of these people were working for a pittance themselves. When I left Chungking I gave away everything I had practically--this was normal, pretty much--gave away clothes, pens, watches, anything like that. But it was not as payment for information received. They would resent

Ranked as Colonel

SERVICE: This traveling for the army used to raise some questions. At first the army was very casual. They would just say go off and do this or that. Then I found I had to have a little more identification, because the question came, "Mr. Service, what and who the hell are you?"

Boarding planes, they'd start with the highest ranking officer, colonel and then major, captain, lieutenant, sergeant, then private first class, then privates, and then Mr. Service at the end.  
[laughter]

At any rate, I had army orders, which I didn't always want to pull out. But, I got an identification. Let me show it to you here.

FORWARD ECHELON  
HEADQUARTERS U.S. ARMY FORCES  
CHINA, BURMA AND INDIA

19 July 1944

C E R T I F I C A T E

The bearer, JOHN S. SERVICE, whose signature and photograph appear below, is hereby certified to be a Second Secretary of Embassy and Consul of the United States of America, assigned to the American Embassy at Chungking and detailed to the staff of the Commanding General, United States Army Forces in China, Burma and India, and as such staff officer, in event of capture by the enemy is entitled to be treated as a prisoner of war, and that he will be given the same treatment, afforded the same privileges as an Officer in the Army of the United States of the grade of COLONEL, and receive compensation at the same rate as a COLONEL in the army of the detaining power.

By command of Lieutenant General STILWELL:

[signed] EDWIN C. CAHILL

Lt. Col., A.G.D.

Asst. Adjutant General

[signed] John S. Service

The B-29 Bases in Chengdu

SERVICE: During this period I made several trips for headquarters. One was to Chengdu. There were rumors of anti-American feeling there because of the huge bases that were being built for the B-29's. We hadn't yet got far enough in the Pacific to try them out against Japan from Pacific airfields. We hadn't taken Saipan and Tinian yet.

Somebody dreamed up the idea that we'd build bases in west China, from which we could reach Manchuria and the southern tip of Japan, Kyushu and so on. It was done, of course, without any thought to the economic cost, or the problems and disturbance it would cause in China. It was pushed ahead as things were then when the top decided on it.

Large areas of most fertile farm land, rice paddies in the center of the rich Chengdu plain, were taken over for these huge bases. Hundreds of thousands of people were dislocated. Hundreds of thousands of people had to be mobilized to build them.

There were some incidents there. I was sent up by Stilwell to try to find out what it was all about. This was what I was alluding to a while ago, that it was something that I was able to do almost completely without contacting the [Chinese] official sources, because, of course, they would have their own story.

I talked to some local Chinese YMCA people, and through them met some local Sichuanese people, business people, newspaper people, and so on.

I actually went out to see one of the bases, talked to some of the farmers. I wrote a series of reports on it, and I mentioned a number of things that could be done. One problem was that Chengdu had been bombed very heavily early in the war because it had been a base for some of the Russian planes, that the Russians gave, early, 1937, '38. There had been an aviation school set up there, and the Japanese came and bombed it quite heavily. So the populace, very practically and from long experience, were sure that big bomber bases would provoke Japanese retaliation.

One thing I reported that could be done would be to send some Fourteenth Air Force planes up there, detach them temporarily. This was one of the things that Stilwell headquarters fixed on. So they instructed Chennault to send some fighters to Chengdu.

Chennault found out that I was responsible, and this was apparently one of his real big complaints about me, was that I--[quickly and emphatically] "Amateurs that know nothing at all about it making these recommendations!" He deals with this, I think, in his book. (Claire Lee Chennault, Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault, ed. Robert Hotz, New York, G.P. Putnam Sons, 1949)

[Vice-President Henry] Wallace was coming to China. I think Adler suggested that it would be good to do a briefing paper for him. I worked on a long report which has been published very extensively, a June 20th memo I think, which was really for Wallace. I'm not sure that Wallace read it, but the State Department got it and it got very wide circulation in the Department.

#### Permission Granted for an American Military Mission to Communist Headquarters

SERVICE: All this time we had been working on the question of getting permission to go to Yen-an. I don't think we want to go into a history of all that. [Colonel David] Barrett (David D. Barrett, Dixie Mission: the United States Army Observer Group in Yen-an, 1944, Center for

Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, 1970) has written some of it and a lot of other people have written books on the Dixie Mission. It can be dug out.

When Wallace was coming we thought that this would be a good time to try to make one more try. We drafted a message referring to various earlier messages. The White House had earlier sent a request, which the Chinese had agreed to. They would let us go to north China, any areas under Kuomintang control. Of course this was not what we wanted.

Anyway, we drafted a message to the War Department for [General George] Marshall summing up all this and suggesting that Wallace's visit would be a good time for a push. We got a message back which, as I recall, simply said that the White House had agreed that our message could be given to Chiang Kai-shek as being from the White House. In other words, all we had to do was to change the head and tail, you see, and say that this was from the White House.

We were elated at this, but it turned out that that morning--Wallace was already in town--that very morning Chiang Kai-shek had agreed. Apparently he decided that this was something he was going to be hit with. So, he'd agreed without being pushed on it.

Well at any rate, this was a message which had to be delivered and we wanted to discuss details, so I was summoned with the chief of staff, who was General [Benjamin Greeley] Ferris up to the embassy where Wallace was having lunch. We discussed tactics for the afternoon meeting. We arrived out at the Generalissimo's and said that this message had come in, and although it wasn't necessary we wanted him to know that the President thought this very important. But, all this is in Foreign Relations.

*Q: What was your impression of Wallace?*

SERVICE: I was quite impressed. In a small group like this, he was very quick on the uptake, very intelligent, quite well informed. He was very good on absorbing all the details and deciding what was the best way. He would say this, we would say this, and so on. He carried it off very well. I mean he functioned beautifully. He had some fuzzy and wild ideas, and I couldn't support him in his run for the president. But when it came to an administrative sort of thing, he was awfully good.

*Q: How did Chiang Kai-shek respond?*

SERVICE: Like a stick of wood, impassive. They were very surprised when we walked in. Madame showed her surprise at seeing me there. I was there with Ferris, you see. They had expected Wallace. He was due to come out for that afternoon meeting, and Vincent was traveling with him and Lattimore. We were two extra people that they hadn't expected.

She walked into the room. Hollington Tong whom I mentioned before, was there to interpret. She was a bit surprised, and then we explained why we were there. After we'd finished this, Ferris and I withdrew. We weren't there for the last part of the talk.

*Q: Was she at this point hostile to you, do you think?*

SERVICE: Oh yes. By this time they had already decided that I was not a friend. I'd been interpreter when Ferris had to deliver the first messages about putting Stilwell in command of Chinese troops. I had been an interpreter on two sessions, where it was supposed to be "Eyes Alone," which meant that we asked the other people to withdraw. I think the Chiangs by this time had a [chuckling] pretty good idea that I was one of the pushers on this business--I made no particular bones of it--getting up there to Yen-an. That was an unfriendly act as far as they were concerned.

*Q: Do you want to comment at all on those "Eyes Alone" meetings, or do you feel that's been covered adequately?*

SERVICE: There's masses of it in the hearings I think.

I don't think there's much need to talk about Yen-an or plans for Yen-an. I had earlier on had a talk with Stilwell and suggested that the logical man to go was Barrett, and Stilwell agreed.

When we got permission then we immediately canvassed the various operating agencies in the theater to see if they wanted to be represented--the Twentieth Bomber Command, the people in Chengdu, the B-29's, the Fourteenth Air Force, the OSS of course. Then there were various OSS groups that were put under Fourteenth Air Force, air grand rescue service, and photo, something like photo--and specialists that the Fourteenth Air Force didn't have that OSS was able to supply.

Fourteenth Air Force would not officially send anybody to join our group, because Chennault was playing the Chiang Kai-shek game. He wasn't going to do anything that would complicate his relations with Chiang Kai-shek.

#### Impressions of Yen-an: Confidence, Friendliness, and Efficiency

SERVICE: We finally got up to Yen-an on July 22, 1944, and that's all written up in Barrett's book. I don't see the point in going into it very much.

*Q: Well, only to the extent of what you thought and felt. After all, it was a turning point in so many ways.*

SERVICE: Yes, but I've reported on it so fully. You know, you've got my monograph and testimony at great length. I just hate to get too redundant. My impressions of Yen-an are all written down in my reports.

Part of the thing that dazzled us--dazzled us is too strong a word--was the difference in attitude in Yen-an. Chungking was simply waiting for the end of the war to come. Most of the people were from down river, and they were waiting so they could go back to their homes and their families in Shanghai or Nanking.

Here up in Yen-an--they had nothing, and they were poor as anything, off in the boondocks--the whole atmosphere was just full of confidence and enthusiasm. They were absolutely sure that

they were winning. As the Communists always say, the situation is excellent. Talk about your YMCA sort of spirit of optimism and so on, this was it to the nth degree. Everything is positive, everything is good, we're going to win, we are on the winning road.

We hadn't expected this. They obviously expected, as we got to talk to them more, expected to be very important in the post-war era, expected to share power, at least, with the Kuomintang. They were quite confident that, "The Kuomintang can never whip us, can never take away these territories."

Their whole attitude was a very different one. It was very much like my own feelings that I had found, new feelings, with my Chinese friends, of acceptance, of hospitality, of not being guarded, of not holding people off. Their liaison officers came and sat and joined our mess. People would drop in to see you. It was all very informal, as I say, like a sort of a Christian summer conference atmosphere. People were living fairly close together.

Mao Zedong might drop by for a chat in the evening, or we could go over and see them almost at any time or on very short notice. They had some telephones, very poor ones. But, you could call over to the headquarters and say, "Can I come on over?" "Sure." If you came, it might be a "Stay for lunch" sort of thing. It was all a very congenial, friendly, frank sort of an atmosphere. Of course, there were things they didn't tell us, but we didn't know what they were. [laughter]

*Q: You used the word, "dazzled" and then somewhat backed off from it.*

SERVICE: Yes.

*Q: There have been a couple of types of criticism made of you. One was that you went "native." The other that you were seduced or converted or what have you by the Chinese Communists.*

SERVICE: Yes. Well, we tried very hard, I think, to avoid that. We didn't draw our conclusions immediately. We tried to wait a time until people had traveled in the areas and gotten out and seen what the guerrillas were doing and what things were like.

But the confidence that we ran into, the difference in the morale, esprit, this was something that hit us right away. The ways things got done. If you asked for things, yes, they said they'd do it, and it was done, promptly, in fact, efficiently. In Chungking nothing was efficient. Nothing seemed to work and everything took a long time.

If we wanted to talk to Japanese prisoners, "Oh yes, we've got a lot of them down the road. You're welcome." In Chungking it was the hardest thing in the world to get ahold of any real Japanese prisoners. But, almost anything-- "Newspapers, yes, we can get them for you." Pretty soon we started getting newspapers from Peking and other occupied cities in a very surprisingly short time.

All sorts of things. For instance, they had been publishing a paper all through the war up in Yen-an, a party paper; I asked Zhou En-lai whether I could possibly get a set of back copies.

"Certainly!" A couple of days later bales of papers arrived: he sent them up. Almost anything-- They were very outgoing--cooperative.

We had a very elaborate briefing when we first got there. We told them: "We're not in a position to negotiate. We're not in a position to promise. We're here to observe. We want to find out all we can about you, what you've been doing, what the war has been like, what you think of it." So, they arranged a very extensive series of briefings.

Chinese don't seem to mind any length of talk or briefings. Each day we'd have another Communist leader come and spend the whole day more or less briefing us. Sometimes it was two days. Chu Teh, Yeh Chien-Ying, all the top military people, P'eng Teh-Huai, Lin Piao, and then people from the various areas. A lot of them were already in Yen-an.

They were talking about having their seventh party congress, apparently waiting for the opportune time. A lot of people had come in from outlying places. It might take them a month or two months to get there. So, they were already in Yen-an waiting. A lot of these people gave us briefings. I took heavy notes on all this. Then I was interviewing people, going talking to people.

Mao said at one of the very early meetings, "I suppose you want to see me," you know, with a smile on his face. I said, "Why yes, certainly I do." But, he said, "I want to see you also, but I think maybe it's better if we wait till we get acquainted a bit, you see more about us, know more about us, and then our talk will be more useful."

Just a month later I got word, "Could I see the chairman the next day at two thirty" or something. I think it was two o'clock. I said, "Of course, I can." The talk was one that lasted from two till ten at night.

I had notes on all these things, but when I came back from Japan in '50 for the McCarthy hearings, why--Caroline, I think, had always felt that these notebooks were bad things to have around--she threw them all overboard.

*Q: What, all your notes from the Yen-an period?*

### Chungking-Yen-an Contrasts

*[Interview 9: October 3, 1977]*

SERVICE: I thought we'd now go back to Yen-an where we were last time. You asked me something about attitudes, impressions of Yen-an. I think that one thing that you have to remember, of course, is we went to Yen-an--and I'm speaking particularly of myself--from the background of Chungking.

I'd been in Chungking a long time, maybe too long. Maybe I'd lost my perspective a little bit. Chungking was discouraging, a gloomy place to be. People were waiting for the end of the war, or they were trying to do as little as possible in prosecuting the war. There was rampant inflation with all the suffering and dissatisfaction, complaining, that that caused. Rampant inflation with

nothing really being done to check it. There was no rationing, things like that. Wealthy people did not get conscripted. Young people stayed in universities all through the war, because university students were not subject to military service.

You had all sorts of things like this. The attitude of the Chinese officials, generally, that you met was rather resentful. They had a feeling that you were critical of them. There was beginning to be criticism of China at this time in the American press. So they were rather on guard, rather prickly. They felt that we weren't giving them very much, we weren't doing what we should for China. So most of our official relations in Chungking were uncomfortable, uneasy.

### High Levels of Information and Conversation in Yen-an

SERVICE: Well, that got me diverted. Anyway, I was talking about the Kuomintang attitudes. We got to Yen-an and, of course, we were welcomed. They had been isolated, blockaded. They had already gotten some press people up there just before we got there.

Just going there was a form of American recognition, and this was tremendously important and very welcome. We were treated with open arms and red carpet treatment. The fact that Barrett could speak Chinese and I could speak Chinese, the fact that we had, I think, six people in our group who had spent time in China, who knew some Chinese, which was a very high proportion-

*Q: Out of what, fourteen?*

SERVICE: Out of sixteen I think it was. There were quite a bunch of us that had been in China teaching, or had grown up in China.

So that there was immediately a very warm, cordial atmosphere. They were interested in what was happening in the outside world. They'd been completely isolated. They wanted to talk to us. They asked us all sorts of questions.

*Q: This was one of the questions on an agenda I haven't given to you. How much did they know about the progress of the war, and how good was their way of evaluating the information they got, because their frame of reference must have been so antiquated by then?*

SERVICE: They were quite well informed actually as far as the news reports went, because they listened to radio news, they got newspapers from free China, and they got newspapers from occupied China. They got Japanese publications. They had very little in the way of foreign publications. They were very eager to get anything that we could get them. We got Time and Life and things like that, that were very late of course by the time we got them. But this sort of stuff they were very happy to get.

Then tended to follow the Russian line, although they didn't completely on the war because they'd been attacked themselves. In other words, they didn't buy the "phony war" line completely in the '39 to '41 period. They paid lip service to it: it was an imperialistic war. But, they were anxious for the war to reach China. [laughter]

I would say that under the circumstances they were quite realistic. In some ways they had a fairly good understanding of the United States. They realized the effect of the political campaign coming on in the fall of '44, that this was not a time for Roosevelt to make commitments. They said, "We realize this. We'll wait till after the campaign is over." After the campaign was over they wrote to Roosevelt and congratulated him. Roosevelt wrote back. It was quite a cordial letter.

They were astounded at Truman's nomination, but then so were we all. I mean we were dumbfounded when it came over the news that the Democratic convention had nominated Truman as vice-president.

We were having dinner that night with the leaders over at the army headquarters. There were two tables, as I recall, at least two tables. Generally, I was regarded as the civilian leader and Barrett as the military leader. I was generally put at the table or place of honor with Mao Zedong, and Chu Teh gave Barrett the honors.

I could sense that Mao was very impatient to get through with all the folderol about getting into our places and getting seated. So, as soon as we sat down he came out with it. [loudly] "Who is this Too-Lu-Mun? Who is Too-Lu-Mun?" Who is this man Truman? [laughter] Most of the dinner was devoted then to trying to explain how it was possible that someone completely unknown, or almost completely unknown, no great record of war or political service, could suddenly be chosen vice-president.

Wallace, of course, had been vice-president. Wallace had made a trip to China. Everyone assumed Wallace would be renamed. Chinese were worried that Wallace's visit to China had been what did him in, because it was during his visit that we got permission to go up to Yenan.

They were concerned, what this meant, you know, about attitudes toward China, attitudes toward the Soviet Union. They could imagine all sorts of things into it, because they didn't have any comprehension of the domestic political situation in the United States.

Well, we didn't know too much about it either. So we were sort of helpless. It was an amusing incident. Obviously Mao had given a hard time to Zhou En-lai, because they were quite relieved when they found we were about as confused as they were. [laughter]

This is sort of typical of the intellectual atmosphere. Most of them were intellectuals. Some were military men, but even most of the military men had had an intellectual period in their lives. Chen Yi, for instance, whom I got to know very well--did I mention before--always referred to me sort of jokingly as his teacher's son, because he attended the YMCA school in Chengdu.

But they were not tied up with government administration because government and party were quite separate. There was a local government for the border areas. The party was quite separate. Of course, some people overlapped. But people like Mao and so on had no role in the local government.

You had a scattered group--sixteen or so--of these border areas behind the Japanese lines, far away, communications very poor. They had to be there on their own. A lot of these leaders had been called in to Yen-an in expectation of a party congress, which wasn't actually held until spring of '45. But, they were expecting it and waiting for the appropriate time. So, there were a lot of people in Yen-an without very much to do. They were just sitting there waiting, people like Chen Yi from the New Fourth Army and a man from Shandong.

They were quite happy and delighted to sit and talk for hours and hours and hours. But, even people like Mao Zedong-- As I said, my first interview with him was an eight hour interview with dinner. "Of course, you'll stay for supper" sort of thing, pot luck. Pot luck turned out to be just Mao and Chiang Ch'ing and the interpreter.

### Dances, Fun, and Games in Yen-an

SERVICE: I had forgotten completely about Chiang Ch'ing until later on when my reports became available. My notes were destroyed as I mentioned before. But, it wasn't until many years later that these reports were published in Foreign Relations. I was able to see that Chiang Ch'ing had been there.

*Q: Any recollection now of her presence or her personality?*

SERVICE: She was pleasant. I remember more her dancing. We had these dances every Saturday night, which was a sort of a-- I don't know what's the right word-- They were fun. Miserable conditions. Most of them were outdoors--it was the summer time and fall--on packed earth, under some pear trees, a pear orchard. A pickup orchestra would play one fox trot (an alleged fox trot), one waltz, and then one yang-ko, a local folk song. It was like a conga, sort of one, two, three, oomph; one, two, three, oomph sort of a thing. It wasn't only the dances, but there was a sort of a lightheartedness about the place. I mentioned before the confidence, the morale, esprit.

We had been given some games by special services in Chungking, including a game of monopoly. Some of the Chinese who were attached to the liaison offices saw us playing monopoly. The next thing we knew they had gone away and manufactured a game of monopoly, but all based on Shanghai real estate! [laughter] These were all down-river people. It was Nanking Road and the Bund and the Park Hotel and Cathay and all the rest of the hotels. It was all based on Shanghai. They just thought it was absolutely hilarious! Monopoly, by the way, is banned in the Soviet Union.

We had an accident with our plane when we landed, because the landing strip had been built over a graveyard and one wheel of the plane fell into a shallow grave. They decided to improve and extend the airfield. Everyone was contributing a day of labor, so I suggested to Barrett that we do the same since it was being built for our benefit. Barrett agreed.

We went out, but it turned out to be counterproductive in a sense because no one--there were several thousand people out there working--but none of them had ever seen any white men ever doing any work. So, everyone had to stop working and watch us! [laughter]

We played baseball. Barrett was insistent on having baseball, some exercise, some organized recreation. Usually in the afternoon before supper he liked to have a baseball game. There was enough to just get up two teams. I was a very poor baseball player. I never learned in my youth, so I couldn't catch a fly properly. I was always put out in right field, which was out among some apple trees, so that there wasn't much hope of catching any flies anyway. I could only chase them.

There was the Japanese Peoples' Emancipation League. They didn't call them prisoners after they joined the emancipation league, which was being run by Okano, the leader of the Japanese Communist party, who now is called Nosako but used the name Okano at that time. Anyway, they put on an evening benefit for us.

Everybody put on benefits. We had all sorts of theatricals and musical shows. At one of the early ones, we were much embarrassed. It was just after our arrival. After their music, they said, "Now our American friends should sing." We didn't have any choir or chorus. We did some quick consultation and found that there were a few people who could do barber shop quartet or college glee club type singing.

The only song that they knew was "You Are My Sunshine." So, they sang "You Are My Sunshine." The next question was "Translate! Translate!" Pretty silly when you tried to translate! [laughter] Might not be so bad, for the Cultural Revolution though, because "You Are My Sunshine" could apply to Mao Zedong, of course, in the Cultural Revolution.

Going back to the baseball game, we eventually had a baseball game with these Japanese prisoners, which was very amusingly written up by an OWI man, Adie Suesdorf, many years later, in the New Yorker magazine. I expect it was the only baseball game during the war between Americans and Japanese prisoners.

I mentioned we had a long series of briefings by all the military people and top leaders. After that I pretty much was on my own. I went to the briefings, of course. But, after that I went around talking to various people, meeting various people, making my own schedule.

Mao himself was very apt to say on some subject, "You want to talk about economic policy. Well, the man for you to see is Po Ku. Go talk to Po Ku." Or, I wanted to talk about party and party work in the occupied areas. "Well, the man to see on that is Liu Shao-chi." So, arrangement was made for me to go to talk to Liu Shao-chi. As far as I know, I'm the only American that ever really had any lengthy talk with him. None of the newspaper people saw Liu Shao-chi at that time.

But, I talked to lots of people. I went to Lu Hsun Academy. I talked to some of the young intellectuals from Kuomintang China who had come into the Communist area and had been sent out to work in the villages. It's just exactly the same thing that's being done now. The thing was when these people came and wanted to volunteer, "Well, you've got to go out in the villages and stay for a year or two and prove that you can live with the villagers, work with the villagers, sort of prove yourself." These people were pretty starry-eyed about it, a lot of them.

There was a nurse that I met at the dances who had been on the Long March. She was a very pleasant peasant girl really. She was a nurse at the international hospital. She seemed almost eagerly friendly and we used to go for walks occasionally. But, it had to stop there. Apart from a perhaps unusual personal caution, Barrett had set the rule, and we all agreed, that there should be no American-Chinese Communist "relations."

*Q: You were going to tell me more about the nurse whom you met.*

SERVICE: The friendly, cheerful nurse in Yen-an who'd been on the Long March. There weren't very many women on the Long March.

*Q: Briefly, the Long March--most people reading this will know--but that was--*

SERVICE: I assume they will. It was the long trek from the Communist areas in southeast China, mainly Gansu province, all through southwest and west China, finally up to Shaanxi province. The main group that Mao and Zhou En-lai were with started in October, 1934, and they finished up in Shaanxi province in October, '35. So, it was just about a year.

The nurse hadn't been in on most of the fighting. Most of the stories were all about the derring-do and the great exploits and crossing the rivers and things like that. But, one thing that she was still annoyed about was the discrimination against women when it came to the question of bathing, which was terribly important. They had no clothes except what was on their backs. They got very dirty and lousy and so on.

Chinese have no feeling about male nudity, but they're very prudish when it comes to female nudity. So, when they came to rivers and streams, why there was no problem. The men could just strip and bathe. But, because they didn't want to offend the lao pai hsing, the country people, the women weren't allowed to strip down and take baths. It was very difficult for them, and she still resented the difficulty of bathing along this Long March ten years later.

She also talked about the fact that they couldn't do very much for the wounded. If they had wounded, seriously wounded, more seriously wounded than able to walk, they simply had to leave them behind. They tried to find some peasants who would take them in.

But, it was apparently a sad business because the Kuomintang troops were following them all the time, chasing them, and if these people were found by the Kuomintang they would be killed. The expectation was they'd be killed. It was just a continual process of having to abandon their seriously wounded people. That's about all of that.

*Q: We read now of people going to China and resenting the fact that the sort of personal intimacy--that develops normally between people who spend some time together is not now possible. You know the sorts of books to which I'm referring. Was it possible then?*

SERVICE: Oh, absolutely possible, completely possible. In fact this was it. We were experiencing it. I mentioned this in Chungking with my own group of close friends, and it was certainly true in Yen-an.

I think that there were some things that they would have been discreet about. Ch'en Chia-K'ang whose name I mentioned a couple times--he was a secretary for Zhou En-lai--was quite frank even about many of the party affairs, Wang Ming and the background of the rectification movement which was sort of tapering off when we got to Yen-an. We were really close friends, just as I would be close friends with an American. There were very few subjects that we couldn't discuss.

This was one of the reasons why we enjoyed Yen-an because we were able to make very close friends. Koji Ariyoshi, a Japanese Nisei who was with us, became very close friends with some people quite high up in the party.

I'm sure that others also found close contacts. It was an informal atmosphere and everything was possible at the time we were there. Later on things changed of course. It became obvious that we were not going to go ahead and give them anything, that Hurley was going to be rigid and insist on everything being done through Chiang Kai-shek and so on.

The man that was sent to replace Barrett was a military attaché whose reports, I mentioned, I used to have to deflate because he was willing to believe everything the Kuomintang said. He was an incredible choice to send up there.

And then after him Wedemeyer got a man who was a Russian expert because, "By God, we needed someone who knew the Communists." The only thing we knew was that he'd served in the Soviet Union. He predicted that the Soviet Russians weren't going to last--I may be exaggerating--more than ten days or something like that. I mean he was one of the extreme pessimists who said that the Russians can't possibly stop the Germans. So, he had to be taken out of the Soviet Union. He was sitting around in Washington and Wedemeyer wanted a Communist expert, so they sent him out to Yen-an.

*Q: Why was a man like that appointed? Did it represent a relegation of China to a third-class position in terms of American policy?*

SERVICE: By the time Yeaton was appointed--he was the Soviet expert--I think that the idea had really taken hold that they needed to get a whole new crop. In other words, the idea became very fashionable that everyone who had served in China had preconceived ideas, had prejudices, and what was needed was a whole new crew.

In the McCarthy period the theme was: "Where there's smoke, there must be fire." During the Hurley period it was: "Anybody who has served in China already has preconceived ideas." You had to get fresh minds, fresh attitudes.

I think Wedemeyer was quite willing to buy this. I think by this time he was tired of squabbling. So, "Let's get in somebody who's a Communist expert." Everyone assumed--Hurley and I'm sure

Wedemeyer too and even apparently Roosevelt--that the Chinese Communists after all would do what the Russians told them to do.

### Evaluation of the Dixie Mission Team

*Q: Perhaps this is a good point to ask you your evaluation of the rest of the original Dixie Mission team. You had Barrett as leader, and he wrote his own monograph. Does what he wrote jibe with what you recall his impressions to have been at the time, 1944? Did subsequent policy, subsequent historical developments, alter his views?*

SERVICE: I didn't read his reports at the time, but--

*Q: You must have talked.*

SERVICE: I talked to him. He apologizes in his book, sort of apologizes for having been swept off his feet and not having realized the evils of Communism, this sort of thing. He protests a little too much and I think unnecessarily. But, certainly the fact that he does apologize indicates that he was supporting something different at the time, doesn't it?

The group on the whole was a good group. As I said, we had quite a number of people with some background in China. I think the people, the signal people, meteorological people, weather reporting people, air ground rescue, all these people were very competent.

The order of battle man was competent but inclined to go on his own. He tried to operate a bit independently of Barrett, and he had to be pulled in a couple of times. OSS had some people, demolition people, who were competent. The doctor was an excellent man, who had grown up in India. His parents were missionaries. He was a superb person. Ludden was there from the Twentieth Bomber Command.

The Twentieth Bomber Command sent up a colonel, a target man, and he didn't know anything about China at all. Considering that the observer mission was an army operation, it was, I thought, very good.

Most of the people were genuinely interested. We had good people. For instance, Ariyoshi who came up to work with the Japanese prisoners, psych warfare business and propaganda, was very good.

There was a certain amount of milling around and some people didn't know what to do and weren't very much engaged. A couple of them got into the habit of sitting around and drinking. One man's marriage had just broken up. He obviously was not happy, but I don't think that we ought to dwell on that sort of thing.

*Q: No.*

SERVICE: Going back to the nurse, a very nice person, but one could not know whether there might also have been some sort of official connection. I mean she may have been working for whatever secret police the Communists had. I don't know. That's that.

### Service Sent to Washington

SERVICE: Anyway, Davies got me orders. I jumped out of Yen-an very quickly. One night with Davies, and I left on the plane the next morning with my big map, rushed through Chungking, one night in Chungking. I had a number one priority.

Gauss told me about his having suggested, and then been encouraged and approved by the Department, to suggest a War Cabinet, which was a form of coalition government. This really is all described much more in my Amerasia Papers monograph.

Then he told me that he was going to resign. He expected to actually send in the resignation just after the election. After every presidential election each serving ambassador sends in a pro forma resignation. He wanted me to tell the Department that his was not intended to be pro forma, that he really meant that he wanted out. He'd had enough. I was to tell this to the highest person I had a chance to talk to in the Department.

Then I called Hurley, and Hurley said he wanted very much to talk to me. That again is mentioned other places. It was not much of a conversation because Hurley simply held forth and kept saying that he was going to get the Communists arms, he knew what they wanted, he knew all about them, and so on.

### Washington, Home Leave, and a Surprise Reassignment to Chungking

SERVICE: In 1942, I was the first political officer back from China after Pearl Harbor. This time, in '44, I was the first person back to Washington who'd been in Yen-an. So it was the same thing, only double in spades.

I was in much more demand for these debriefing sessions. I had, of course, far more to say. I'd observed far more. It was a frantic business of running around and talking to Currie and more talks with people like [Drew] Pearson, other newspaper people, a lot of them sent to me by the Department. IPR [Institute of Pacific Relations] session again, a much larger one, a crowded one of course.

I was called to Hopkins' office, had about forty minutes with Hopkins, in a little tiny office in the White House, barely enough room on the floor for me to stretch out this map. (Showing the extent of Communist controlled areas of China. He said, as I cite in the [Amerasia] monograph, at the end that, "Well, very interesting, and probably what you say is mostly true," or "Most of what you say is true." "But, after all, they call themselves Communists. Besides, the only Chinese that Americans know is Chiang Kai-shek." That was the end of the conversation.

I tried feebly to do as I had done with Hamilton on an earlier talk, to say something about taking a positive role, informing the public, and so on. I said that when word gets out what the

Communists are really like, the attitude toward them is going to change. But, Hopkins wasn't really very much interested. Very close to H.H. Kung apparently--

*Q: How did you feel about our China policy at this point?*

SERVICE: I was discouraged, but it seemed so completely absurd that I don't think I really took it in. You know, "This can't be," was my reaction.

He asked me about Hurley as ambassador, and I said it would be a disaster. He said, "Why?" I said, "He's in the Kuomintang pocket, working against Stilwell." But Hurley was appointed.

I saw Stilwell over at the Pentagon. He was sitting in the next office to "Hap" Arnold, five stars. Joe was four stars.

I gave him my October 10 memo which I'd never had a chance to get to him before. He said something about hoping that my having worked for him wasn't going to have any harmful effects on me. There weren't any consultations about China policy. All those hopes were finished.

The Department's plan was to send me to Moscow. Somebody had decided that it would be a good idea to have someone in Moscow that knew something about China. I was to be the first "China" man sent there. Davies was going to stay in China. Wedemeyer liked Davies and they were getting along fine.

I came back out here [California] for Christmas, and just before New Year's, there was a phone call from John Carter [Vincent]. "Davies has gotten in a row with Hurley. We've got to get him out. Will you go back? Do you want to go back?" I said, "Sure."

*Q: Were you glad to?*

SERVICE: Oh, of course. Sure, what the hell. After all, there was a war on; we all wanted to do something. It's hard nowadays to remember how patriotic we felt--but perhaps there was also some personal interest.

I asked about Wedemeyer's attitude. He said, "Wedemeyer has asked for you. Wedemeyer wants you. We're going to ask that you be allowed to continue contact with the Communists. This is our main reason in agreeing to your going back."

It was a matter of great haste. I took off New Year's Eve, as I recall, or very near New Year's Eve, went back to Washington. In those days it was a long hop across the country.

When I got to the Department, the chief of personnel, chief of Foreign Service personnel, wanted to talk to me. The chief of Foreign Service personnel asked me to see him. Briefly, he said that he had very serious doubts about sending me back to Chungking, that he'd been told that it would very likely have bad effects on the family. In other words, he knew about the family situation. I said to him that he didn't need to worry, that we had reached a resolution on that, which would

solve that problem. I was not going to go ahead with the divorce, was going to stay with the family, and so that he didn't need to feel the Department was in effect breaking up a marriage.

I said the real problem in Chungking, as far as I could see it, was Hurley, his attitude toward the Foreign Service, and particularly the circumstances that forced John Davies' recall in a hurry.

He said he understood that and knew about it, that I would be working, of course, not under Hurley but under the army, and that the State Department understood the situation and would be in effect behind me. I forget if that's exactly the words he used.

So, off to China I went. Got a telegram I think in New Delhi from my brother Dick and from Dave Barrett. I think they said, "Don't go to Chungking, but if you feel you've got to, stop in Kunming."

I stayed in New Delhi with the man who was head of the American diplomatic mission--we didn't have an embassy; it was called an American commission or something like that--a man named George Merrell who'd been in Peking years before. There I met General Donovan who was head of the OSS, who was flying to Chungking, had his own plane. He was going to Chungking, so he said, "Fly with me," which I naturally did not turn down.

In Kunming my brother and Dave Barrett said, "You're committing suicide. Don't go. Hurley will have your scalp." "Well," I said, "one can't refuse. You can't not go after having accepted the assignment."

So I went. We got off the plane in Chungking. Tai Li had turned out to meet Donovan. [chuckling] The look on Tai Li's face, when I walked out of the plane beside Donovan, helped to make the whole occasion a little more happy.

Well, I think that's probably a pretty good place to quit.

#### Hurley and Wedemeyer Replace Gauss and Stilwell

*Q: There's a new American cast now.*

SERVICE: Yes. The [CBI] theater had been broken. Wedemeyer had taken over the China theater from Stilwell. Gauss had left and Hurley was now ambassador.

*Q: How much did this represent a relegation of China to a second class position in terms of American priorities?*

SERVICE: Partly you've got to remember that Hurley was sent out to do a specific job. He was sent out to negotiate the placing of Stilwell in command of Chinese troops. I don't think that anybody in Washington expected it to be more than that.

But then that ended in a fiasco. Gauss resigned in anger and disgust, and Hurley was on the spot. The Chinese wrote a letter to Roosevelt--it's in my monograph--asking that Hurley be nominated. This would occur to me to be a very poor reason for making a man ambassador!

I can only assume that in Washington they thought, "What the hell. China is a headache and is not very important." (I think by that time it was regarded as not very important.) "He seems to get along with Chiang, and we've had nothing except trouble and friction with Chiang. So, why not name him?" But, I really don't know.

I was in Chungking from January 18 and I left in early April [1945], so I was only in China for a relatively short while. It's a confused and ineffectual period in a way.

Hurley wanted to talk to me, as soon as I arrived, and this was when he gave me the warning that if I interfered with him, he would break me. I said I had no intention of interfering with him. After all, any military or other commander needed intelligence, information, and I felt that was my job. Also I was working for the army, which was something he never really accepted. He felt that he was coordinating all American activity in China including the army.

Wedemeyer agreed that I was to work for him and said not to pay too much attention to Hurley's blusterings. But, his idea of what he wanted me to do was quite different from what it had been under Stilwell.

*Q: Did you feel threatened by Hurley, genuinely threatened?*

SERVICE: Oh, certainly it was a very threatening atmosphere. The whole atmosphere in Chungking was threatening. The embassy staff was operating under very difficult conditions. Hurley had his own little separate embassy really in a sense. He was communicating not with the State Department but with the White House, ignoring the State Department, using the "Mary" Miles navy group communications, not even the embassy or State Department radios. Also, he was threatening the staff and preventing their reporting anything that was unfavorable.

But Wedemeyer wanted, I think, a political agent much as John Davies had functioned in India. He had known John in India and Southeast Asia Command headquarters where Wedemeyer had been deputy with Mountbatten.

I was breaking up with my Chinese friend Yun-Ju. That had to be gone through. Then, Sol Adler was away. He was back in Washington I think at that time. So--and perhaps it was fortunate in a way--I wasn't able to move back into his old quarters.

I stayed for a while, as I recall, in army billets, and then moved in--there was an extra bed at the embassy mess--with the counselor and the secretaries. I moved in with them.

#### Return Trip to Yen-an

SERVICE: In March I got word, and I'm not sure just how the word came to me--Zhou En-lai had returned to Yen-an--word came to me through the Communists that it would be a good time

to be in Yen-an. What I understood from this was that the party congress was about to be held. We had discussed many times the party congress and my hopes of being there.

I talked about it with Acheson and also with the army. Since contact with the Communists had been the principal reason for my going back to China, everyone agreed I should go to Yen-an. I got official orders and went and started reporting again from Yen-an.

The spirit had changed in Yen-an. The Chinese Communists weren't sure just what American policy was. They felt rebuffed. They were angry at Hurley because he had come up there in November and worked out with them their five points and agreed enthusiastically and signed them. Then as soon as he got back to Chungking and found out that Chiang Kai-shek didn't like them, he had gone back on his word and had become in effect a spokesman for the Kuomintang.

Relations had changed as far as cooperation went. They had more or less given up hope there was ever going to be any cooperation with us.

Morale in the [American] group had gone down. The man that was temporarily in charge was very suspicious of me and rather annoyed at my being there. But I made it clear to him that I had army orders and I wasn't reporting through him. I was reporting direct. We don't need to talk much about the reporting. It's all been covered.

#### The Communist Plan to Take Over Manchuria: Service's Despatch Lost

SERVICE: The Chinese were extremely friendly to me and talked very frankly. The congress was still delayed. It didn't actually take place until fairly late April. I'm not quite sure why they kept waiting, mostly, I think, to see what was going to happen in relations with Chungking, what the Generalissimo was going to do about calling a constitutional convention.

People like my old friend Chen Yi, the commander of the Fourth Army, were extremely frank and told me in great detail about their plans for moving into Manchuria, how they were already preparing, getting their cadres ready, getting poised and already moving in, infiltrating people into Manchuria for the attempt to seize it before the Kuomintang could get there.

At any rate, we got these urgent, urgent, urgent orders for me to return to Chungking immediately and go to Washington soonest--

When I went through Chungking--I was only in Chungking for one day--headquarters asked me if there was anything I wanted to dictate, anything that I had in my mind I hadn't been able to write when I was in Yen-an.

I said yes, there was one thing I thought was pertinent, and I sat down and dictated to the chief of staff's secretary, additional information on the Communists' plans for going into Manchuria. I had already written some, but I had more details to write.

Somehow, this has disappeared. We've never been able to find whatever happened to that. It would have been very helpful, in loyalty board and other hearings, to have had it, but it disappeared without a trace, at least as far as the army is concerned.

#### Service Recalled to Washington, April, 1945

*Q: What were you wanted for back in Washington?*

SERVICE: Hurley had found out in Washington that I was in Yenan, and that apparently enraged him. He stormed over to the State Department, demanded I be recalled. The State Department said, "He's not working for us. He's working for the army." Then he went to Stimson. The orders were issued and signed "Marshall," given highest priority. I was ordered home on army orders, and then released.

This was the beginning of controversy and disagreement in Washington, you might say. In 1944 when I'd come home, everyone was interested in what I had to say and there was pretty general agreement. But this time people were already beginning to divide a little bit.

Some people in the State Department--Drumright, for instance--were arguing that there was a civil war in China, the Communists are in rebellion, we can't have any dealings with them. There were people in the Far Eastern section, particularly the old Japan contingent, Grew, Dooman, and other people, who represented the anti-Communist point of view.

The European people were anti-Communist, bitterly anti-Communist. They couldn't believe that there was any difference between Chinese Communists and Russian Communists. So, you began then at this period to have a sort of splitting in the Department.

As soon as I got in Washington I went to the State Department and was sitting in John Carter Vincent's office just after I arrived, when his telephone rang. He picked it up and said, "My God." Roosevelt had just died.

#### Assigned to Committee to Draft New Foreign Service Legislation

SERVICE: My original assignment--I was told--was that I was going to have a liaison job between the State Department and the Pentagon, more or less on handling information, intelligence reports and so on, making sure that each side was informed by the other.

After a couple weeks, before this job started, they said they had changed their mind and I was put on a task force that was preparing to write new Foreign Service legislation.

The Foreign Service was administered under a 1924 act, the Rogers Act, which had set up the modern Foreign Service, taken it out of the spoils and political field, and made it a career service. This was out of date, and it was felt that the Foreign Service needed to be modernized.

So, there was a task force set up, and I was one of the six or seven people, mostly young and reputedly with ideas, put on this group to study various proposals, and produce draft legislation.

In May, rather surprisingly, I got a double promotion. Promotions had been held up during the war, and so to rectify it, some people were given double promotions, which was rather unusual. That came through in May, I think May 18 or 19, the double promotion from grade six to four.

### Feels Exploited by Jaffe, Roth, and Gayn

SERVICE: It had no connection in my mind, but before this change was made I met [Andrew] Roth, and then Roth introduced me to [Philip] Jaffe. [Mark] Gayn had also come into the act.

*Q: These were people, just to put them in context, who were--*

SERVICE: Gayn was a free lance writer who had done writing for Saturday Evening Post, Collier's, magazines like that. He had published articles which were obviously based partly on my reports. One of them was practically a steal of my June 20 [1944] reports. He was getting, as many people were, background information, being allowed to read reports and so on.

Roth was a young chap working for the navy, and he had come to the I[nstitute of] P[acific] R[elations] session I had in the fall of '44, talked to me then. Gayn had written me letters, hoping to meet me when I got to Washington. They were all indicted in the Amerasia case. Gayn had written me letters before.

But all this is gone into in so much detail in all my hearings that I think we don't want to waste time going through it all here. Anybody that's going to be this much interested, I think, is probably also going to have read the transcripts of the Loyalty Board hearings where it's gone into ad nauseam and the Tydings committee.

I began to feel that I was really being exploited by this group of people.

I went to New York and talked to the Foreign Policy Council. [T.A.] Bisson was one of their research people, and he had invited me for the weekend.

I said, "Sure." I was glad to meet Bisson. He'd been in China. He'd stayed in my house in '37 when I was alone in Peking. He'd been in Manchuria and then stayed with me for a while. He lived out on Long Island.

Then it turned out that Jaffe was also invited. He called up and was going to give me a ride out there.

I didn't have any feeling that I was under any cloud or threat or anything. What I had done with letting Jaffe see some of these reports I'd written in China was not different from letting many other people see them. They'd been circulated fairly widely and many people had read them, for instance, in John Davies' office in New Delhi.

On June 6, Vincent asked me to write a memo about something that was happening in the international Communist field. The French Communists had just had a very blunt calling down

by Stalin. It was a signal that they were going to have to stop wartime united front line and start a more independent line. Vincent asked me whether I thought this was going to apply to China. I wrote a memo and said that I didn't think it was going to. The Chinese were going to follow their own line.

I walked up to Vincent's office to give it to him, and I noticed some people hanging around the hall outside. I asked them if I could help them. "Oh no," they said. "We're just waiting for somebody."

Then later on I walked out of the building and walked down the sidewalk--lunch time this was--and saw them coming out of another door very hurriedly. It seemed very odd to run into these guys twice.

I was staying in the apartment of a girl in the Far Eastern division that was on leave. She knew I was alone in Washington--Caroline was still in California--so she said, "Well, just use my apartment while I'm away." She was away for a week or something. After leaving the office, I went to her apartment.

#### "We're FBI. You're Under Arrest"

SERVICE: About six thirty, the doorbell of the apartment rang. I opened the door, and here were the two guys that I'd seen in the State Department. They said, "We're FBI. You're under arrest," and so on.

They came in and I was naturally a bit stunned. They asked if they could search the place, and not being smart or experienced, I said yes. They said, "Where are the papers? Where are the papers?" Well, they didn't find any papers. They thought I had the place stacked full of my reports.

I said, "My reports are all in my desk at the State Department."

Anyway, they searched the place, and they found a sort of private code that Davies and we "advisers" used writing among ourselves. Our letters had to go over Japanese territory in Burma. There was always a possibility of the plane being shot down, so we had an agreed on private code of using fictitious names.

Stilwell wasn't Stilwell. I forget--Just code names, this sort of thing. Sort of silly. This was how Dixie got started. We referred to Yen-an as Dixie, and so it was the Dixie Mission.

I was taken to the FBI offices and we had a long talk. I said, "This is crazy." I was perfectly willing to cooperate. We had a long, long, long session. They kept referring to little notebooks. They obviously knew all of my movements. They kept jogging my memory. "Did you see so and so? When was it?"

Finally I said, [chuckling] "You've got the dates here. I can't remember."

I don't know how long it took, but they wrote out a statement which I finally signed. Later on, of course, my lawyer was very sorry about that. I don't think we need to go into it. We'll include this in the record, can't we?

*Q: Oh yes, we can.*

*This is a terrible question to ask, but how did you feel while this was going on?*

SERVICE: Actually, I felt more terrible after I got in the jail than I did here. At this point I was just sort of flabbergasted and stunned, angry, but mostly just stunned.

Although these people were very clumsy in their tailing tactics--all this business of hanging around outside my office door in the State Department, chasing out another door of the State Department when I was out going to lunch, and this sort of thing--they obviously had instruction on how to interrogate. They were not giving anything away. They didn't ever tell you anything. I kept trying to find out what it was all about. They kept saying, "We're asking the questions."

Then they called up, while I was there, they called up the big cheese. They didn't say it was Hoover, but this was what I was supposed to assume. "Yes, he's being very helpful." I was supposed to be impressed by this and I was somewhat.

They sent out eventually for some sandwiches. I complained it was getting late and I was hungry. I was supposed to have supper that night with a girl that was working in the office. They called her up and told her that I would be unable to meet her.

Eventually we were taken, quite late at night, to the U.S. Commissioner's office to be arraigned. He set bail at \$10,000. All three of us were there, Roth, and [Emmanuel S.] Larsen, and myself, the three people in Washington. The other three people accused in the Amerasia case were in New York.

By this time it was late at night. There's a picture of the three of us sitting like--I made an ill-advised complaint to the commissioner. The FBI likes to get maximum publicity for all this sort of stuff, so they had all the newspapers alerted.

This is Larsen. He tried to talk to me in Chinese, and I said I didn't think it was a good idea for us to be talking in Chinese there, with the newspaper people all hanging around. That made him very angry; he was a strange character. He wanted to find out what I knew, who else had been arrested.

Of course, none of us knew any of the details, who was involved. It was obvious that they were interested in Jaffe. Most of their questioning was about him.

#### Jail. Charged under the Espionage Act

SERVICE: We were taken to jail and processed in. This was very late at night. This is not much to waste time over. Processing into jail is about the same, I suppose, anywhere.

There's an account in Solzhenitsyn's First Circle of a young chap who was a foreign office guy being taken to Lyublyanka, and it's not too different from the District of Columbia jail.

*Q: What did they do?*

SERVICE: You're forced to strip--you take off all your clothes--shoved into a shower room, wash off thoroughly, given a one piece garment. Mine was ripped in the crotch, and I said, "Can't I get another one?" "You better take it. It gets pretty cold up there in the cell block, ha, ha, ha." You know, this sort of thing. The attitude of the people in these places is pretty chilling.

You're put into a cell. You've got a blanket and a mattress, absolutely nothing else in there. They won't let you have a belt or anything like that. This was very late at night by the time this was all finished.

The next morning they took me down to finish the processing, which they hadn't been able to do the night before because the photographers weren't on duty, and I had to be photographed.

By then the jailers were very much interested because the daily papers had come out, big spread, pictures. "Hey, you pretty big guy, huh? What d'ya think of this? Must be hot stuff."--sort of attitude.

You asked a while ago about how I felt: I think that the period in jail, especially when I woke up the next day, was very, very depressing because you felt so completely disgraced. You know, how could one possibly come back from this sort of public degradation? I was pretty low.

I wanted to telephone, but the official rule is that you can only telephone your immediate family. Caroline was in California. I saw no point in trying to phone her. Apart from your immediate family, you can phone a lawyer.

I didn't know a lawyer, so, they said, "Here's a list." They've got a list that they give you. These are lawyers who presumably are interested in taking care of people in on larceny or burglary charges or routine things. But, I didn't want any of these lawyers. I wasn't going to call up just a lawyer blind. My case was not the ordinary run-of-the-mill criminal case that most of these guys were used to handling.

By afternoon my sister-in-law--My younger brother's wife was in Washington. He was in Moscow. She had had a hard time in Moscow. The kids had been sick and there was no satisfactory housing. They had come back to Washington just shortly before.

She had gotten in touch with people in the State Department and they in turn had talked to the former judge of the U.S. Court for China, Judge [Milton John] Helmick, who was in Washington. They had arranged bond and that evening, that night actually--I was only in there one full day--I came out.

The next day I had to go around and talk to the bondsman who was a black man, very pleasant guy. He wanted to meet me, apparently, and get some sort of an opinion of how good a risk I was.

*Q: That's unusual, I think.*

SERVICE: Well, maybe. Maybe he wasn't used to handling espionage. After all, you see, I was charged under the Espionage Act, which is silly because none of us were accused of espionage really. But there wasn't any other act apparently that could be used.

Using the Espionage Act, of course, gave the Chinese Kuomintang press a field day because they cheerfully and loudly printed that I was a Japanese agent, Japanese spy.

### No Help from the State Department

*Q: What sort of help did you get from the State Department?*

SERVICE: None at all. The State Department was almost immediately subjected to a lot of criticism. Roth had a book in the press which was critical of State Department policy on Japan. Roth represented the American left, which thought we ought to get rid of the Japanese emperor because he was a war criminal, had certainly been involved in decisions and couldn't be absolved of all responsibility.

Grew was the other side. We must preserve the emperor as an institution that will help hold the country together.

Jaffe was also sort of left. He was Communist or very close to the Communists. He was a very good friend of Earl Browder, who was the leader of the American Communist party during the war.

Gayn generally was considered liberal.

At any rate, the liberal press, New Republic, which was a newspaper in New York then, Washington Post, Irving Stone, even Winchell and a lot of the columnists, felt that the Amerasia case was politically motivated, the whole thing. And they had good cases--precedents--where classified material had been made available to people like Ernest Lindley who spoke for the State Department point of view.

There was a famous case at this time of Lindley having written some article in Harper's or Atlantic Monthly based entirely on classified State Department materials that were made available to him.

I think Grew was the acting secretary at this time for a short while. James F. Byrnes may have been out here at the UN meeting and Grew was therefore acting in Washington. At the first press conference, Grew made some remark, "Well, it's really nothing to fuss about. We heard a noise out in the chicken coop, so we just went out there and caught the fox."

*Q: The fox being you?*

SERVICE: Yes, I and the others. So, at any rate, I went around to the State Department and asked to see somebody and of course, couldn't see Grew, but I saw somebody in the Secretary's office. I said, "Look, I object to this sort of statement. It's prejudging the case." The man looked as though he'd seen a ghost. He said, "You mean, you're not guilty?"

I said, "Of course, I'm not guilty. I'm going to be cleared, and it is very foolish of the State Department to make this kind of statement."

The State Department discontinued [chuckling] such statements.

#### Choice of a Lawyer: No Common Cause with the Other Defendants

SERVICE: At any rate, to go back to the account, Judge Helmick had made some inquiries, and he'd heard of a man named [Richard Strobach] Munter.

I went around to see Munter. He was very confused by the whole thing, just as the FBI people were confused. They couldn't understand why I had all these Communist materials, why I was interested in Communists, why I was dealing with Communism, and all the rest of it. He couldn't understand all the ramifications of the case. It seemed very complicated to him. He'd never had anything like this. But, he agreed to handle it on a contingency basis. I had to pay him \$2,000 down, which my mother loaned me, as I recall. He made the various appearances that were necessary--you plead not guilty and so on--appearances in court.

Then we waited for a grand jury. The government took it to a grand jury that was about to expire and then withdrew it for reasons we don't really know. They may have had some problems in the case.

In this early period, I was angry. I felt that my career had been ruined. It just didn't seem to be possible that I could come back into the State Department disgraced. I was thinking about resigning, about taking a job as a newspaper man. The New York Post was interested in my working for them.

I went up to New York. Larry Salisbury had just retired from the State Department. He was working for the IPR in New York. I went there. I saw lots of friends in New York, people that had been in China, Epsteins and other people--Gunther Stein was in New York--and talked to a lot of people.

Some of the other people in the case wanted to get in touch with me, wanted to work together. The Field papers, P.M. and the Chicago Sun, I think it was, owned and operated then by Marshall Field who was quite a liberal guy, supplied a lawyer and took over the defense for Gayn because Gayn was writing for them.

They offered to take on my defense, but I thought I'd better not make common cause with any of these other people, just do it on my own.

I had talked to Currie and people like that who were much concerned, Vincent, in the State Department. I had talked to a lot of Foreign Service friends, and they urged me--and it began to sort of sink in--to calm down and to fight the thing out, since I was innocent of anything beyond indiscretion, which was not an uncommon kind of indiscretion. They convinced me that I would win and be able to continue and the public impression would be much better than resigning.

So this was what I finally did. Currie urged me to talk to a man named Corcoran, "Tommy the Cork," who was a very good friend of his. All these people were New Dealers together. It ended up with Corcoran actually as my lawyer, unofficially, with Munter the front man.

I've got a long memorandum here that I had to write in '51 for the lawyers which we'll put in the record. I don't see any point in my repeating a lot of it. (On deposit in The Bancroft Library.)

These are actually two memoranda that I wrote in early 1951. This first one gives a more detailed account of what I was doing after the arrest, and it leads into the Currie-Corcoran contact, Currie putting me on to Corcoran and Corcoran taking over. The second one completes it and goes into specific detail about my relations with Corcoran.

#### Links Between the FBI, "Mary" Miles, and Tai Li: An Early Collaboration to Prepare Jack as Scapegoat for America's "Loss of China"

*Q: Now, more than thirty years later, have you arrived at a judgment as to why you were picked as the prime culprit for American's so-called loss of China?*

SERVICE: Yes. The Chinese were looking for a scapegoat after the Stilwell affair blew up in their face. They'd had it in for me for various obvious reasons.

But there is also, an FBI angle in here that I think--I can't prove it--but I think is quite clear. I've mentioned the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, SACO which was a navy and Chinese secret service, Tai Li, operation. The Chinese wanted to get police instructors, instructors in police methods. They had had this from the Germans, but after Pearl Harbor the Germans had finally departed. So the Chinese wanted whatever the Americans could offer.

"Mary" Miles was quite proud of the fact that he had FBI cooperation. I don't know whether these people were on leave, but he always spoke of them as FBI people working in his outfit, supposedly on police methods, police training. The Chinese Communists say that they were also instructors in methods of torture. There were FBI people there.

According to "Mary" Miles, they taught things like poisons, drugs, and God knows what secret means of murder like we've heard about the CIA trying to use against Castro. "Mary" spoke about this quite freely in his talks with American government officials as one of the advantages of his arrangement.

There was a lot of opposition among Americans and also among Chinese to collaboration of this type with Tai Li. Stilwell was opposed, and Wedemeyer was opposed to it. Stilwell told me once that Marshall had told him you just had to quit fighting it because Admiral [Ernest Joseph] King had put his foot down, insisting that the navy was going to have a piece of the action. So there was nothing we could do about the "Mary" Miles--

*Q: King?*

SERVICE: Admiral King was the chief of naval operations. He was the opposite number of George C. Marshall who was the head of the army.

I had written quite a number of memos about Chinese hatred of Tai Li and the political dangers in our collaboration, some for Wedemeyer and some for Stilwell. I had been asked about this by Jaffe, and I had mentioned something about it. Jaffe knew about it.

Jaffe's telephone was tapped, and the FBI certainly knew about my view, my criticism of the association with Tai Li. But, the interesting thing is that never, in all the accusations and interrogations, has anything of this surfaced.

It's a suspicious fact because the FBI leaked all sorts of things to friendly newspaper people and to friendly people like the counsel for the minority in the Tydings hearings. But this has never leaked, and the fact that it hasn't leaked makes me suspicious.

The FBI told the Department of Justice within a week of my return from China--or I think on the very day I returned from China--that they had solved the Amerasia case and were willing to have it taken to court. This was before I'd ever met Jaffe. When I stumbled into this, I think they obviously wanted to have me included.

In the Tydings hearings, the Department of Justice was asked about my inclusion in Amerasia or the timing, and they made sort of a lame excuse: "Well there was information indicating contacts, and ninety percent of cases are solved after arrest by confession." So, they thought it was worthwhile to arrest me. But they admit themselves that the case against me was very weak.

When Hurley resigned later on [November 26, 1945], he made various accusations about my giving my reports to the Chinese Communists. He and other people spread reports about my contacts with Chinese women and so on, particularly Zhou En-lai's secretary, as I mentioned before.

It wasn't until Hurley agreed to testify in the Davies case in 1953 that we discovered that he'd been fed forged materials by Tai Li, forged materials supposed to be notes between me and Teddy White, who was the Time man, setting up meetings to discuss opposition to Hurley and how we could get Hurley recalled, things like this. These were forged notes. No such meetings took place and no such notes were ever exchanged.

I don't think that Tai Li--who insisted that Hurley not show these to anyone else and then return them to him--I don't think that Tai Li's people, Chinese, were up to doing this in a very convincing way. I think they undoubtedly had cooperation.

*Q: From the FBI?*

SERVICE: From the FBI people or from "Mary" Miles' people who were with the FBI people. I think that the fact that my sister-in-law picked up this story from a wife of a Chinese embassy person that I was going to be in trouble, indicates there was collaboration very early on.

*Q: When did she pick this up?*

SERVICE: It was before my arrest, some time before my arrest.

*Q: Did she alert you?*

SERVICE: No. I didn't hear about it until later.

*Q: Why was that?*

SERVICE: Because I don't think anyone thought anything of it. It was lady gossip, that sort of thing. I think that it is obvious that there was collaboration between the FBI, navy and Justice.

When I was in Japan at the end of '45, Wedemeyer came through, going from China to the States for consultation. He wanted to get hold of me and John Emmerson who'd been out in China. He was very friendly and told us that he'd written commendations for us. I think we already knew about the commendations. But he'd also put in to get us a medal which the army can give to civilians for meritorious actions.

When he came back from the States he did not see us. The only person he saw was a man named [Max] Bishop whom he'd known in Southeast Asia Command. Bishop had been in Ceylon, political adviser down there. He told Bishop--I didn't know this from Bishop directly; I only know it second hand from somebody that Bishop told it to--that Wedemeyer had seen J. Edgar Hoover and had been told by J. Edgar that they had evidence that Service was a Communist but they couldn't prove it in court.

Hoover obviously had a great interest in the case. One of McCarthy's favorite lines was that Hoover had said there was a hundred percent air tight case "against Service." Well, when we pinned Hoover down--he never would reply directly--but he replied through the Department of Justice, he said he'd never made such a statement. This was a statement that I think very obviously he had made or FBI people had made.

All this is not really answering why I was arrested, but describing maybe how it happened. I think unquestionably FBI interest in the case was prompted by FBI cooperation with the Chinese secret police under Tai Li.

Then, Fulton Lewis apparently also picked up something; he was broadcasting then for Mutual Broadcasting Company. This was before the big days of TV, and he was a very popular radio news broadcaster then. Mutual, I think, was very worried about the broadcast. They got in touch

apparently with Corcoran. This was why these memos were written, to try to get the record straight.

We have a transcript of the broadcast which we had in advance. My interlineations are where he departed from the actual script. He adds a word here and there with a very, you know, accented, sarcastic tone. He makes it a much more lively document orally than it appears in the cold print.

*Q: How did you get an advance copy?*

SERVICE: Because Mutual got in touch with Corcoran. Corcoran talked, I think, to Mutual, and the script was more or less agreed on. I'm sure it was not as libelous as it originally was. Also, it does not reveal the fact, the obvious fact, which was that the FBI was tapping telephones. I don't know how many phones. But, the original accusation in the Fulton script would have involved the attorney general of the United States in giving information about the case to Corcoran.

#### State Department Security Entirely in FBI Hands

*Q: Were you aware at the time that your phone was tapped? You say, "of course" now.*

SERVICE: Yes, we assumed by this time that we were tapped.

*Q: I'm speaking about '45.*

SERVICE: Forty-five, yes. After the arrest we assumed we were tapped.

*Q: But, before the arrest--*

SERVICE: No, we didn't--no. I had no feeling of threat or of anything wrong at all. After my arrest, then everybody in the State Department assumed their phone was tapped. Everyone in FE assumed their phone was tapped.

*Q: Do you now, and did you then--sounds like a pickup of the McCarthy style speech--bitterly resent the lack of support you got from the State Department?*

SERVICE: Oh, no.

*Q: I'm sorry. That was a loaded question. I'd rather rephrase it. It's unimaginable to me that you'd be thrown to the dogs in that way.*

SERVICE: Well, the State Department was completely unorganized for anything. They had no security division or security section. They had one man who was sort of liaison with the FBI and a couple other agencies, who was in charge. They just left security entirely up to the FBI.

The FBI apparently suspected everyone in FE, or practically everyone in FE, because in their eyes the whole State Department policy of being agreeable to collaboration, cooperation with Chinese Communists, was just crazy. It was one that they couldn't fathom.

I don't think that anyone at the top of the State Department kept in touch with what was going on or realized what the FBI action was going to lead to. [John Carter] Vincent was head of FE and he was, I think, under suspicion just as the rest of us were.

The security liaison, a fellow named Lyon, just left everything in the hands of the FBI.

I certainly resented the Grew statement which I protested, about the fuss in the chicken coop and catching the fox. Nothing like that happened again. Well, one might say the State Department could have warned me, but I think once things were started, why, there wasn't very much they could have done. If they had known more at the top, they might have educated the guy at the bottom as to what was going on.

I acted in a completely unbureaucratic manner. I was talking to people, very freely and frankly, talking outside the State Department. I loaned reports. They weren't from the files. They were my own reports. This was all a little bit irregular. I obviously felt that I had authority to discuss things with the press, which I had had in China but didn't really have in Washington. It had never been clarified, how much authority I had in Washington to behave in the way I was behaving.

We had already reached a point, as I said, in the Department of having a debate as to what policy should be, whether we should try to maintain a neutral position in China. Some of us were already talking fairly freely that we were backing the wrong horse if we got behind the KMT.

#### China Policy: State Department in Ignorance of the Yalta Agreement for Four months

*Q:* The Yalta agreement was February 11, 1945. According to the resume that appears in the Tydings hearings, the Chinese Communists did not learn about it until much later.

*SERVICE:* Yes, I'm sure they didn't know about it until July or August. Of course, the State Department didn't know about it themselves until July. Chiang Kai-shek named a Communist member to the Chinese mission at the UN conference that established the UN. I saw them in Washington in August, early August I guess it was, and told them about Yalta. I think it was a surprise to them.

The operating people in FE did not learn about the Yalta agreements until they were on the ship going to the Potsdam Conference. Vincent was a member of the group that went with Truman to the Potsdam Conference which was July.

They had been told to prepare papers to guide the delegation's discussion on policy in the Far East. While they were on the ship, Secretary of State Byrnes came down to Vincent's cabin and, according to Vincent's account to me, threw the papers on the bed and said, "Sorry, but these are all no use," and then proceeded to tell Vincent about the Yalta agreements. This of course threw all of our thinking and planning into a cocked hat. Up to that time we'd all been operating blind, all the assumption about American neutrality in China were meaningless.

*Q: What comment do you care to make on that, thirty years past the date?*

SERVICE: Incredible. To keep your own operating people in ignorance is bad. But, the terrible thing was that the Yalta agreement was founded on such completely erroneous reasoning and assumptions. It was based on the idea that if we made a deal with Stalin, the Chinese Communists would very nicely and quietly go along with what Stalin told them to do, which was the exact opposite of what all of us in the field were busily reporting.

Who advised Roosevelt and how he came to the idea is still a mystery. But, it guaranteed the civil war, which was what we all had been working so hard to prevent. We knew a civil war would not only be a long, drawn out, disastrous civil war--but it would result in a Communist victory. I must say by this time some of us weren't sure that was a bad thing, but for American policy it was certainly a bad thing.

#### Jack Cleared Unanimously by Grand Jury on Amerasia Charges

SERVICE: Back to Amerasia. The big issue was whether or not I was to appear before the grand jury voluntarily. If you're the accused and volunteer to appear before the grand jury, you waive all rights, all immunity, and you have no counsel present.

The lawyers were concerned because the case on the surface looked so weak that we assumed that there must be some manufactured stuff or some Chinese stuff in the background. We wanted to find out whether or not it was just what we knew about or whether there was some trap being laid.

Corcoran eventually called me and said, "Okay, everything is all right. You can go ahead." I suppose my phone was tapped, but Corcoran's phone was probably also tapped. The person who Corcoran presumably talked to was Tom Clark, who was the attorney general. This was introduced into the Tydings hearings, presumably based on leaks (or information) from FBI people.

During the McCarthy period there were two very new and popular professions that got a lot of attention, ex-Communists and ex-FBI officers. Ex-FBI people were all over the map and providing all sorts of information and getting jobs as security people, becoming experts and advisers to people running blacklists and so on.

Robert Morris, the minority counsel for the Tydings committee, obviously had information that some sort of--information, I used the wrong word--some accusation, some sort of a fix, was put in. So, he interrogated me in the hearings.

*Q: Jack, at this point I think that I would like to ask you--because I realize that we're only at the beginning of your loyalty hearings--what were the forums and dates of your various judicial and legislative and administrative hearings?*

SERVICE: The easiest way to answer that is to simply insert here a list that I prepared for my lawyer, Mr. [Charles Edward] Rhetts, at one point.

*Q: Good. As far as I can recall, the only case in which there was a jury of ordinary people was the grand jury in the Amerasia case. How did you feel about presenting your case--and I know you appeared voluntarily--before ordinary, non-specialist people?*

SERVICE: [chuckling] Nineteen forty-five is quite a long time ago. Actually I didn't have a chance to present my case. I submitted myself for questioning--is really what it amounted to. The Department of Justice attorney, in other words the equivalent of a prosecuting attorney, asked me various questions about my involvement with Jaffe and the other people, but primarily Jaffe. These were all facts that had pretty well been gone over. I was repeating some of the material that had been in my statement that I gave to the FBI, which I assumed the grand jury had. They obviously were familiar with the general circumstances of the case.

Then the foreman of the grand jury took over and asked some questions. This was not especially hostile. It was not particularly difficult questioning because it related to fairly recent events, and as I say, it had been gone over.

Then the foreman and some of the other members of the grand jury asked some questions about relations between people in my position, the government, and the press, particularly when they had information, as I did, about developments in foreign countries the press people couldn't get to, get direct knowledge of.

It was a fairly friendly--friendly is too strong a word--non-hostile meeting. It was what, twenty people. I don't remember the composition now really, but it was just sort of a cross section. They were neither friendly nor unfriendly I think, certainly not out to get me. It lasted--it's hard to say now whether it was an hour or two hours. It wasn't a terribly long hearing.

I think I mentioned the fact that I'd had a son born that morning, and that I hoped that it was going to be a good day for me. They sort of laughed in a friendly way.

Of course, the Senate committee was quite a different matter. That was divided very strongly. The Tydings committee was two Republicans one of whom, Hickenlooper, was very unfriendly, and three Democrats who generally were on my side I felt.

You had two counsel, one majority counsel who was inclined to try to develop the case in a way that was favorable to you, and a minority counsel who was vicious. He was later the man who was the committee counsel in the IPR hearings, Robert Morris. He was obviously being fed information by the FBI and any place else he could get rumor or gossip and scandal.

*Q: We can talk about that later as we get to that.*

### The Family's Reaction

*Q: What was your family's response to these events? You've described your reaction to your arrest as total disgrace.*

SERVICE: The family didn't accept that. I think all of our spirits picked up pretty much when, as I say, a large section of the press, including the Washington Post, the New York Herald Tribune, and so on, became critical of the way the whole case had been handled, the way it seemed to be politically motivated, to silence critics and so on.

My mother never faltered. I've got correspondence which I think we can put in as papers. We don't need to have them all in the record here. Caroline was obviously distraught. She came on to Washington fairly soon from Berkeley. I'd already gotten a house. I think we were waiting for the children to finish school. She had her baby the day that the first [atomic] bomb dropped and the grand jury met. And the day that the grand jury decision was announced was the day that the Japanese announced they were willing to surrender.

*Q: You certainly were upstaged by a number of enormous international events.*

SERVICE: I forget how I got news of this. The minority counsel on the Tydings committee tried to make something out of it, that I heard it from the Department of Justice. I'm sure I didn't hear it from the Department of Justice--it was probably from one of my lawyers, Munter probably. I was downtown and walked around to the Washington Post--I knew the Washington Post people quite well; they were friendly--and went in to see Herb Elliston the editor. He had been in China in the early days--a lot of newspaper people had wandered to the Far East and worked on English language papers in China or in Japan.

I said, "It's just my luck that the grand jury clears me on a day that all the front page will be about Japanese surrender." He said, "Don't worry, you'll be on the front page," and so I was, in a small story.

#### Pro Forma Probation and a Posting to Japan

SERVICE: The Department then was confronted with having to do something about me. I was asked to appear before something called the Foreign Service Personnel Board, which doesn't meet very often, but is supposed to handle disciplinary cases.

I think they were a little embarrassed. The man who was running it, Julius Holmes, who was I think partly responsible for the way the thing was handled in the State Department--in other words in accepting the idea that all of FE was under suspicion--he said, "Service, you certainly violated this regulation." He showed me a regulation about criticism to newspaper people of officials of friendly governments.

This was a regulation that had been passed during the 1939-'40 years when a lot of Americans were unhappy about American neutrality and very critical of the Nazis. This had been put in the regulations then to stop Americans sounding off about Hitler openly.

I said, "Yes, of course, I violated this." They said, "We'll have to put you on probation." The time was limited. Maybe it was six months.

Then, they said they'd send me to a European post. I said I thought it would be a mistake to send me to a European post since the Chinese Kuomintang papers had made such a field day out of this thing, accused me of being a Japanese spy. I thought that it would be wise of the Department to send me to a place in the Far East, although everyone realized I couldn't go back to China where I would be persona non grata.

So, they said they'd think about that, and in a few days they asked if I'd be interested in going to Tokyo with George Atcheson. He had indicated he'd be willing to have me. I was very pleased. George was being sent as State Department representative with MacArthur. So I went out to Japan with George to be his executive officer, his number two.

Washington Post Editorial: Accused with Maximum Publicity; Cleared with No Publicity

SERVICE: Before that though, Elliston of the Washington Post had called up and asked me to drop by. He asked me what the State Department had done--this was about August 20. I said that I'd been reinstated, I'd gone back to work, and that I had received a letter, I think, from Byrnes and from Grew.

He said, "By God, I think that we ought to say something about this. There's been no publicity." I said, "I'm not sure that I can release these letters to the press." He said, "Don't worry. We'll take care of it."

The next day he had an editorial, quite a nice editorial about doing something about people that get accused with a lot of publicity but cleared with no publicity.

I went down to see Ben Cohen who was regarded as a friend of Currie's. I said that it seemed to me that the State Department ought to let me release the letters from Byrnes and Grew. He said, "Don't do anything. I'll take care of it." This was Ben Cohen who was another one of the New Deal crowd that had come into Washington with Roosevelt in the 30's, been a big figure in the early days and close associate of Corcoran's.

The next day at the Secretary of State's press conference these two letters were given out as a press release. You can have them if you want them, but they've been printed in many places. So then I was officially reinstated.

*Q: Clean as a whistle?*

SERVICE: Clean as a whistle. All right now--I had an odd footnote to that though. [chuckling] Late in August, before I went to Japan, I happened to be in FE when Grew, who was resigning, came around to say his farewells. Of course, he was an FE man originally himself, a Far East man.

I was a little bit embarrassed. I felt this was maybe not the place to be. But everybody was sort of falling in line, so I fell into the tail of the line. Grew was coming along, shaking people's hands. But somehow before [chuckling] Grew got to me, he just changed his direction and went off. Apparently he didn't want to shake my hand!

*Q: Embarrassed?*

SERVICE: I don't know what was in his mind, but we didn't have our meeting at any rate.

Various things happened during my arrest period that were sort of interesting. I don't know whether they're worth mentioning or not.

Stilwell was then out in Okinawa. He'd taken over command of the Tenth Army when commanding General [Simon Bolivar, Jr.] Buckner was killed. His family had me around for breakfast to show solidarity and support.

The Chinese Communists had a member in the delegation that came to the San Francisco UN conference. It was Tung Pi-Wu, an old friend of mine. He was accompanied by Ch'en Chia-K'ang. The delegation came to Washington from San Francisco. Linebarger, who had been in Chungking but was now back here, arranged a supper for them. Some of us who'd been in Chungking came to the supper. I went around also and saw them in their hotel.

When we came out of the room, out of their room in the Raleigh Hotel--a rather rundown hotel in Washington--as soon as we came out of the room, two men came out of another room, a few doors down the hall. It was so obvious--came out and waited for the elevator with us because they were obviously seeing who it was. It's just a very obvious FBI tactic.

I had become more accustomed to the FBI at this time. The FBI used to tail me for a while. Eventually I think they gave up tailing me, but we assumed that our phone was tapped always.

*Q: Were you ostracized, cut, et cetera, by people other than Grew who wouldn't shake your hand?*

SERVICE: Not at all. This was a big surprise. As I said, my first feelings were that this is a terrible, terrible disgrace, to be arrested on espionage charges. The Vietnam War objectors got used to going to jail. It became sort of a badge of honor. But, under those circumstances, it felt like an unmitigated disgrace.

But I remember Vincent introduced me to Dean Acheson, who was assistant secretary at that time I think. Acheson joked about it, "Well, you don't look like such a dangerous man."

I had lunch at the Metropolitan Club with Mortimer Graves, who was the secretary of the American Council of Learned Societies, and he was very much interested. He became treasurer of a legal fund that was started to raise a little money to pay costs.

I don't recall anybody, except people like Dooman and a few Japan types, who seemed to treat me as a leper. Most of the people carried on as normal.

While Out on Bail, Served as Expert Consultant to the Pentagon on Report on the Chinese Communists

SERVICE: One interesting experience. An officer over in the Pentagon called me. He was Wedemeyer's man in the Operations Department, OPD, in the Pentagon. Colonel Lincoln, "Abe Lincoln" he was called. He said, "We've got a big report here," and showed me two big volumes that had been prepared by their research people. They had a big research shop in the Pentagon working on China.

He said, "We've got a summary here that's been prepared. We think it's pretty good, and Wedemeyer thinks it's pretty good, and we'd like you to look it over."

I started looking at the summary and things began to seem odd, mentions of "Soviet-type this and that." So I went back to the basic stuff, and a distortion was clear.

*Q: This was an account of what?*

SERVICE: An analysis of the Chinese Communists.

It had been prepared by the research people in Washington. It was based primarily on our reporting from Yenan, not only mine but all the other army and OSS people sending in reports, various reports from other sources. It was a huge compilation of stuff, as complete information as they could get on Chinese Communists.

Then, the summary had been prepared, I believe, by a man who had lived in China, a naturalized American--originally a Swede--who'd been a free lance newspaperman. He was violently anti-Communist, and wrote his summary on the line that the Chinese Communists were complete appendages, stooges, of the Russian Communists, following the Russian line and methods and model.

I said, "Can I sit down for a while?" He gave me a desk. So I wrote out very hurriedly, some contrasts between what was said in the summary and what was said in the basic report and said, "The summary isn't worth a damn. It's written by someone who is so prejudiced that he just can't see straight."

Lincoln was quite surprised by this. Apparently, from what I heard later on, from people who worked in MIS (Military Intelligence Section), the thing was squashed. It was later on rewritten and published by [Lyman] Van Slyke at Stanford just a few years ago, thirty years or so after the event. (Lyman Van Slyke, The Chinese Communist Movement; a Report of the United States War Department, July, 1945, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1968.)

It seemed odd that here I was, you know, on bail, awaiting grand jury hearings, but the Pentagon still was willing to accept my views!

NORMAL FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER RESUMES, 1945-1950

MacArthur's Japan: Separate Communications Mean Separate Accommodations: Mitsui Bank Building, the Directors' Suites

SERVICE: Atcheson went out to Tokyo as political adviser. An old friend from China, Reynolds, who'd worked with Pan American, was then working with the Navy, helping to operate the Navy Transportation Service, NATS. Reynolds found out that Atcheson and I were going through, and persuaded us to go NATS; it was very nice. [laughter] They were very good to us.

At any rate, we went out and landed at Yokosuka, across the bay from Tokyo. We were flown across in a small three-seater plane, as I recall, over the bay. It was not long after the surrender, and all the navy was there. The whole U.S. navy, and the Japanese navy and the Australian and the British navies, joined, were all lined up there in Tokyo Bay. It was a terrific sight.

Anyway, we landed in Tokyo and our first call was, of course, on MacArthur. He was very cordial, very pleasant. He had refused to have various other State Department people. He'd refused Grew. Then Dooman thought he would get the job, but MacArthur didn't want Dooman.

He'd accepted Atcheson partly, I think, because Atcheson was a particularly well known person, was not going to grab the limelight; and perhaps also because Atcheson was not a Japan man, would not therefore presume to advise MacArthur as an old expert. At any rate, he was cordial.

The question finally came down to communications. MacArthur was very sensitive about any outside people operating under him. He insisted on having control. Our instructions were that we were to have our own communications with the State Department.

If we'd had army communications we would have to send all our communications to the War Department. We were supposed to have our own communications sent direct to the State Department. MacArthur said, "Then you can't be in our office here. You can't be in our headquarters. You'll have to be separate."

We were told to contact the headquarters officer concerned with requisitioning Japanese buildings. John Emmerson was there by that time. He was joining us. We checked the list of buildings and found out the Mitsui main bank building hadn't been taken over. John said, "Why, that's a good building." We went over there. Most of Tokyo was flattened by the bombing and fires.

We went to the Mitsui main bank building, an imposing granite building, went in, found the building custodian--he was bowing and scraping--and said we required some space. He started showing us around downstairs.

I said, "Wait a minute. Have him bring us the blueprints," all this through an interpreter. He found the building blueprints. I said, "Where are the directors' offices?" Seventh floor. So I said, "We'll go to the seventh floor first." We went up. Beautiful paneled offices, each one about twenty-five by twenty-five or thirty by thirty. I said, "This is the space we'll take." The army was furious about it later on. [laughter]

At any rate, we set up shop. The army gave us some clerical personnel. The State Department was finding various people that lived in Japan, that had worked in Japan, some Foreign Service officers.

We had to handle a lot of Nisei Americans who'd been trapped during the war and had American citizenship. They'd been born in the States. We set up a consulate in Yokohama which handled those cases.

I won't go into a lot of detail about the work there. It was not terribly important. John Emmerson was there and worked with the government section of the headquarters, keeping in touch with all the new political parties that were starting up. All the political prisoners were released from jail. It was a very exciting time to be in Japan.

Herb Norman represented the Canadian interest there. He was a wonderful scholar, famous scholar on Japan, Meiji Japan.

#### Max Bishop, Volunteer Aide to the FBI, Photographs Jack's Memos to Acheson

SERVICE: I've already mentioned the Wedemeyer visit and his return. Bishop, who was the man he talked to when he came back, was a State Department man on Acheson's staff from very soon after our office was set up. Bishop was mostly interested in exploring events before Pearl Harbor.

He had been in the State Department in 1941 when they were trying to work out a modus vivendi, when there was talk of Konoye meeting Roosevelt someplace in the Pacific and having a talk. The U.S. named Konoye as a war criminal.

Bishop was furious about this and he became very much wrapped up in trying to prove that we could have averted the war by doing something else in '41. So he wasn't very helpful in the office.

Eventually, after talking to Wedemeyer, he asked one of the army GIs who was working in our office, to bring him documents on which I had made notations. I was executive officer, there was a tremendous lot of material passing through, and to save Acheson reading everything, I would make notations or call his attention to things I thought he ought to see.

Bishop got this GI, who was sort of chief clerk, to bring these notes to him. Then he took them out of the office and was having them photographed by the local secret service people, apparently as a volunteer helper for the FBI.

*Q: Why?*

SERVICE: I think his motivation was mostly patriotic: it was also jealousy. Some of the Japan people in the State Department felt eclipsed by the fact that China men (Vincent, Acheson) had been given the top jobs--even relating directly to Japan. The Japan men seemed excluded. Acheson was China. I was China.

Bishop was particularly bitter. He and I had both been leading our class all the way through. Recently, with a double promotion, I had gone ahead of him. I don't know that this was one of his motives.

*Q: Did he believe you to be a Communist or Communist sympathizer?*

SERVICE: I don't know. He certainly believed me to be either a Communist dupe or Communist sympathizer, one or the other.

### Hurley Resigns, Blasting Service and Acheson: The Press Interrupt a Foreign Service Celebration

SERVICE: In late November the press called the office one day about a flash that had just come over the wire that Hurley had resigned. I went in and told George about it.

Some way or another we had gotten some whiskey. MacArthur wouldn't allow whiskey to be brought into Japan because shipping space was scarce. George had complained about this in the hearing of the "principal naval officer present," whatever the title is, in the dining room at the Imperial Hotel. We lived in the Imperial Hotel, George and I, which was limited to chiefs and executive officers of staff section.

Anyway, soon after that, a case of whiskey, I.W. Harper, was delivered to George's door! For safekeeping we had taken some of this down to the office. We had the whole floor, with all the directors' offices, including the vault. So we had it in the vault.

Without saying anything more, I just went down the hall to the vault and got a bottle of whiskey and brought it up to George's office. The rest of the staff by that time had assembled to join in the excitement. We had some paper cups and were just having good slugs of whiskey when suddenly the press was at the door, because by this time they had gotten more news about Service and Acheson--For instance, they were the principal culprits accused by Hurley in his letter of resignation.

*Q: Accused of--?*

SERVICE: Working with the Communists, opposing American policy and telling the Communists that he didn't represent American policy. Also working with the imperialists and so on and so on.

It's a long blast, a famous blast. There's a whole section in U.S. Foreign Relations for 1945 on the Hurley resignation, which they decided was worthy of handling separately, pages 722 to 744. This contains a lot of telegrams that George sent off.

Poor George was frantic. Well, it was his first experience with anything like this. Also, he was much more at stake. He was already at the top. He was designated as ambassador to Thailand. He

was temporarily in Japan before going on to his post. I think he saw his whole career being shattered.

At any rate, I wrote the State Department a long message answering Hurley's charges which again, I suppose, we can make reference to. It's page 733 to 738 of U.S. Foreign Relations, 1945, volume 7.

*Q: Did you feel dangerously threatened by this?*

SERVICE: No, I don't think so. It seemed to be just a venomous kick from a senile, old fool. It seemed so incredible.

I had come through the Amerasia case and been cleared. Hurley had been frustrated that I hadn't been fired in the Amerasia case, and of course he had failed in China.

By this time the two parties in China were squaring off at each other. Hurley's attempts to bring about a peaceful settlement right after the signing of the Russian-Chinese treaty at the end of the war hadn't worked. What we predicted was coming true. The Chinese Communists were not going to lie down and play dead.

I felt that the Hurley letter, and its patently absurd accusations, was something that would be taken care of fairly soon. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee did hold hearings. Hurley did make a fool of himself. They discontinued the hearings because he couldn't make any case at all.

The hearings were buried until a few years ago when Fulbright dug them out and reprinted them as being of new and timely interest after the Nixon visit [1972] was announced. Up to that time it was sort of collector's item since it had existed only in transcript form.

Caroline was at the hearings. The official reporter was so interested that she was the wife of one of the men being accused that he gave her a copy of the transcript. That was quite a gift because you pay by the page for those things. Jack [George] Kerr brought it out to me in Tokyo.

#### Washington: Promotion to Class II, and Appointment to Foreign Service Selection Board, 1948

SERVICE: You asked about whether I thought the future was okay. In April, 1948 I was promoted to class II. I'd been put on a sort of probation, the pro forma punishment that was given me in 1945. Promotion meant that this had been disposed of. A promotion put me in a very conspicuous spot in a way; I was the youngest man in my class, both in age and in years of service. So this was very good news.

Then, in late '48 I was ordered back to Washington for duty on the Foreign Service Selection Board. At that time they had two panels, one for senior grades, one for the junior grades.

I was to serve on the junior panel and then remain in Washington to take charge of an office called Foreign Service Planning, which was the budget and management office of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service was then quite separate from the departmental service.

In March, '47, the President had set up the loyalty security program officially.

*Q: Now, this is Truman.*

SERVICE: This is Truman, executive order 9835. Already there were beginning to be rumblings of-- I think Whitaker Chambers had already started accusing people, Bentley also, and so on. But, you know, we seemed to be in the clear. The promotion seemed to seal it all, wipe out the past.

*Q: You had your clearances.*

SERVICE: Yes, except I didn't know about these at the time. There were forms sent out when the executive order was put in. Everyone had to fill out some forms. I've got my memo that I circulated to the office staff, instructing them all to fill out [chuckling] these forms and send them in. In fact I've got my own form. It was completely innocuous, you know.

*Q: So, you were cleared in '46, and '47, and again in '49.*

SERVICE: That we know of. This is all put together from testimony that State Department people have given in various committees, because appropriations committees almost yearly later on began to ask them for this sort of information. McCarthy made a great deal of, "How many times have you cleared this man?"

The selection board was to meet in early January. As I recall, I flew direct to Washington because I had to stay in Wellington until my successor arrived. Caroline and the family came home by ship, and then I flew home and went direct to Washington. Caroline and the family stayed out here in California. I think the children went to school. I'm not sure, maybe not. Caroline probably has that sort of thing.

The selection board was an arduous, interesting experience.

#### The Scripps-Howard Press Blasts Service's Appointment to Selection Board.

SERVICE: Very soon after the board met, the Scripps-Howard papers got news of my being on the board and came out with a great blast that Service, that Amerasia character, was sitting on a board that was deciding all Foreign Service promotions and assignments. It was a very exaggerated type of thing, sensational. All this sort of stuff is in the clippings files.

I went to the administrative people and said, "Do you want me to retire from the board?" I was perfectly willing to do it. "Absolutely not! Scripps-Howard is not dictating who serves our selection boards" et cetera, et cetera. So, I carried on.

The Department was very brave about my staying on the board, but they obviously were worried. So, my assignment to the Division of Foreign Service Planning was changed. They felt it better to find an invisible job for me.

*Q: Just one minute. How did Scripps-Howard find out that you were on that board? In the university this sort of committee is very, very confidential.*

SERVICE: I just don't know. I don't know how it got out. Gossip, Washington is full of it. But membership of the Selection Board was not secret. There always have been superpatriots, and the State Department had its share, generally down in the clerical levels. These are the people that became McCarthy's quote, "loyal American underground."

There were some of them in personnel whom we later were able to spot. So, I would guess that that was how it got to Scripps-Howard.

Scripps-Howard had always been very fierce on the Amerasia case. They were the most violent in 1945. Gayn had a suit against Scripps-Howard and one of their specialty writers, who made a sort of a career out of the Amerasia case, a man named Frederick Woltman. It may have been Woltman who picked it up. I've forgotten.

#### The China White Paper: A State Department Boomerang

SERVICE: Meanwhile though, I think before we take off for India, I've got to talk about the White Paper, the China White Paper. In hindsight it's remarkable that intelligent and experienced men in the Department, people like Dean Acheson and so on, had so little realization of what a hot topic China was. They should have known, because China had been a hot topic since '45, and all through the Chinese civil war--the civil war had been going on--the Department had been under tremendous pressure.

Before Truman was elected [1948], and then particularly after Truman was elected, he was bitterly attacked. The critics charged, "We're letting China go down the drain."

By the summer of '49, it was apparent that [Kuomintang] China was finished. All through the civil war we had abstained from anything which could be interpreted as being critical of the central government, Chiang Kai-shek. We couldn't appear to push him out of China.

By the summer of '49, the administration had had enough of criticism. They were going to counterattack and defend themselves, prove that they had done everything they could to support Chiang, that it was not our fault that the Communists were winning. It was Chiang's own failings.

The administration decided to put out a White Paper, but they didn't foresee what the effect was going to be, how this would really boomerang, which it did.

My selection board work was finished, and Caroline and I came out to California and had some vacation.

John Davies was then serving in the Department on the first policy planning staff with George Kennan, when it really meant something, under Acheson.

John called me and said that it had been decided to add an annex to the White Paper, summarizing the views of some of us in the [China] field who had predicted what was going to happen.

Apparently the State Department wanted to have it both ways. First it hadn't done anything to push Chiang Kai-shek, and also it wasn't so stupid that it didn't know what was going on. So they decided to put in some of our field reports.

John wanted to know if I could get back to Washington and help write this annex, since we presumably knew our own reports better than anyone else. We drove rather hurriedly across the country, eliminating some of the visits we were going to make.

In Humboldt, Tennessee, on a hot Sunday afternoon we were driving down the main street of the town, and some black kids in a car coming from a side street ran right into the side of our car. It wasn't badly damaged, but had to be left there to be fixed up. I got a train and went to Washington where I put together annex 47 of the White Paper, which is reports of officers in the field. (United States Relations with China, with Special Reference to the Period 1944-1949. Department of State Publication 3573, pp. 564-576, August 1949)

I would have been happier, maybe, if we had put in some whole reports. After discussion we decided to do it by subject: Soviet intentions, Chinese Communist background, Kuomintang disintegration, and so on.

These are all excerpts from reports that we wrote. It was accepted without change, as I recall, and was incorporated in the White Paper.

At this time, oddly enough, I was also shown a draft of Acheson's long letter of transmittal. It's really an introduction to the book. It's got Dean Acheson's name on it, but the first draft was done by a man named John Melby who had been in China after I was--he came in after I did--whom I knew quite well, who was later fired, primarily because he was the editor of this White Paper, I think. The pretext was different, but I think this was the real reason.

At any rate, I suggested that they had been unduly critical of the national government during the Kuomintang decade, '27 to '37, and I suggested that they had done some constructive things. I suggested some revisions that actually improved Chiang Kai-shek's image.

*Q: It's a formidable volume.*

SERVICE: Oh yes.

*Q: Over a thousand pages.*

SERVICE: It was sensational, of course. It came out in the fall of '49. It was bitterly attacked by [Representative Walter H.] Judd and the China Lobby. It couldn't avoid criticism because it couldn't be the whole record. As big as it is, it had to omit a good deal.

I was critical of it in my Amerasia Papers because, of course, it had to protect the State Department's face in a sense. Thus it doesn't indicate that the State Department agreed with our February 26 [1945] telegram from Chungking. It prints the message, but not until later, twenty years later or more, was it revealed that the Department had sent it to the White House with commendation and support. But, perhaps that was too much to expect.

Gauss Predicts Danger for Foreign Service Officers Identified as Despatch Writers

*Q: In hindsight what could have been done to protect the Department and Foreign Service officers?*

SERVICE: In hindsight--Gauss was the only smart man. Gauss said to me that we made a great mistake in letting our reports be in there. [chuckling] Of course we were pleased. You know, we thought this was fine. We even thought it was good to have it on the record, to prove we were right.

But Gauss said it was a great mistake to put people in the limelight in this way by having the authorship of reports identified. He was absolutely right. This gave information and ammunition for the attacks on us. This was all used later on. It proved to a lot of people that we were the villains.

What could the State Department have done? Well, it's hard to say. I don't think that it was necessarily the wrong thing to do. The character of public opinion and the nature of the issue was something that probably couldn't be predicted, even by a wise man. I don't know if that should have stopped an attempt to clear the record.

The editors had to make some difficult decisions. They eliminated the Wedemeyer report because it recommended a trusteeship for Manchuria. This proposal would annoy and hurt the Chinese. But this allowed the report to become a mystery. Many people assumed the Wedemeyer report had recommended more aid to China, which it really didn't. The mistake was being unduly worried about the susceptibilities of the Chinese.

Maybe they should have had it done by outside people. Maybe they should have turned the material over to scholars earlier. They did eventually. They asked Feis to come in. Feis wrote a book, a privileged book, China Tangle, (Herbert Feis, The China Tangle; the American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the Marshall Mission, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1953) but that was several years later. Perhaps outside people could have seemed a bit more convincing than people who obviously had a self-serving interest, as every government has--it's fairly common.

*Q: There's one more question before we leave the China White Paper. Had it been made clear to you at this point or had you yourself arrived at a conclusion that because of Amerasia and because of the Communist victory in China, that you were not likely to have any further Foreign Service career associated with the Far East?*

SERVICE: No. I was assigned to India, after all. No, I didn't expect to be finished in the Far East, particularly with the Kuomintang government having lost.

*Q: How much active interest were you able to take in FE?*

SERVICE: Oh, I didn't try to. I thought it was much better for my friends in FE for me to stay away. We still had good friends, but it was all personal.

I did have some discussions at this time on a personal basis--about Vietnam, because this was the beginning of our involvement in Vietnam, '49, whether we should supply the French. This was with a young man I had worked with in 1945.

He was a young man going out to Saigon. We had several talks. I thought it was a hopeless cause. He disagreed with me. His background was all European.

Then a younger friend of mine who had served in Chungking--not a China service officer, but an EUR man--was very anxious for me to talk to some of the people from the European area, French types, who were very anxious for us to support the French in Indochina.

They took the line, of course, that France was all-important, and this is what Acheson says in Present at the Creation. It was essential that we support the French in Indochina because we needed French support for our policies in Europe.

FE generally was anti-colonial, trying to end colonialism, and anti our involvement in Vietnam. A little later Melby, whom I mentioned, went out on a survey trip with some Pentagon types, and he recommended the same thing. But FE lost. The EUR was all-powerful in the Department at that time.

When Congress met in early January [1950], there was a leak to the press that some sort of a circular had been sent to posts in the Far East anticipating the fall of Taiwan to the Communists.

*Q: The fall of Taiwan?*

SERVICE: Yes. The mainland had fallen, and Chiang had fled to Taiwan, but he didn't have much to fight with. The National Security Council had decided that we had no strategic interest in holding Taiwan. We would give economic, but no military aid, to Chiang Kai-shek.

Some sort of a circular had been sent out, guidance for information purposes, that we were to minimize, not to maximize, the probable loss of Taiwan. It was not to be regarded as a disaster for American interests. Knowland, who was known as "the Senator from Formosa," jumped on it, and demanded to know who drafted it, was it Davies or was it Service?

Then McCarthy jumped in the Senate and said, "Oh well, Service is the same man that was arrested in the Amerasia case." Judd made similar noises in the House. There was a great furor for several days. The State Department refused to reveal who had drafted this memorandum. It had been approved, of course, by high people.

*Q: Was it you?*

SERVICE: No, of course not. I had nothing to do, as I've been saying, with anything in FE.

#### THE FIRING

McCarthy Opens Campaign Against "Communists in the State Department." Names John Stewart Service

SERVICE: We came out on leave in California, and then McCarthy started his speeches around Lincoln's birthday, early February, Wheeling, West Virginia. All sorts of numbers, 207, 257, 81, 57, and so on.

*Q: Numbers of what?*

SERVICE: Of people employed in the State Department who were Communists or pro-Communist.

*Q: Or traitors.*

SERVICE: Or traitors, security risks, and so on, all sorts of things. Perverts were apt to get thrown in too at that time.

*Q: Perverts then meaning--?*

SERVICE: Homosexuals, but they were usually called some such name, you know.

I assumed, of course, that I would be in the list. McCarthy had already attacked me on the floor of the Senate. So I went every day down to the Berkeley Public Library to see the New York Times. Senators challenged McCarthy: he couldn't just indulge in this sort of wild, random accusations. They wanted some evidence.

He said to protect the rights of people, he wouldn't give any names, but he would give some details. Then he went through eighty-one cases that he said were the real substance, the core of his accusations.

None of these eighty-one cases fitted me. I called up the State Department, called the chief of Foreign Service personnel, my old boss, the man I'd been working for. I said, "Well, what do I do? Here I am. Do I go to India or not?"

He says, [loudly] "You're not on the list. Go! Take off!"--the intimation being the sooner the better.

We were going by freighter from Seattle. As Caroline has probably said, we were in the mid-Pacific, going the great circle route from Seattle to Yokohama on our way to India. The freighter had twelve passengers. We all got friendly with the officers.

We got to know the radio operator. He had taken our son Bob, who was about thirteen at this time, up to his radio shack and the purser had given Bob a job doing this or that.

The radio operator one night at supper said, "Say, is your name John Stewart Service?" I said, "Yes." He said, "There's been a lot of stuff about you on the radio news, talking a lot about you in Washington." This was the first intimation we had. We went up and heard a news broadcast over his radio.

A day or two later I got a telegram from the Department saying I should return because of charges by Senator McCarthy. The family could either remain in Japan or go on to India.

We decided they should go on to India. We expected that there would be a hearing. We knew from the radio broadcast that a Senate committee had been set up--but something that shouldn't take long. So Caroline went on to India to get the children in school and get settled. I flew back from Yokohama.

*Q: How did you feel at this point?*

SERVICE: Oh, hell. We were not well informed. We didn't really know what was happening. The news broadcasts were very sketchy. Certainly annoyed, uncertain of course, about what was going on, but not particularly concerned. After all, I'd been through the Amerasia case and gotten a unanimous clean bill.

Frantic Press Conference. "I Welcome This Chance to Have an Investigation. I Have Nothing to Hide"

SERVICE: I wasn't prepared for the tremendous hullabaloo. But every place the plane stopped, the press were after me. I evaded them once by simply staying on the plane.

*Q: Were they hostile?*

SERVICE: Oh no. Well, not really hostile. They were just sort of pressing, and asking the same foolish questions.

*Q: [laughter] Sorry.*

SERVICE: You keep saying, "I welcome this change to have an investigation to clear the air. I have nothing to hide." You keep saying the same thing. And yet they pursue this at every single stop.

What surprised me was the friendliness of the people on the plane.

*Q: A regular commercial plane?*

SERVICE: Yes, Northwest Airlines. When we got off in Seattle, they all gave me a friendly hand clap. This was true all the way through. With one or two exceptions, you always have friendship from people that know you, even on just a sitting beside you in an airplane basis, or tradespeople, liquor store clerks you deal with-- Anytime anybody has any sort of personal relationship with you, they don't believe any of this garbage at all. They're very friendly and sympathetic.

*Q: What conclusions do you draw from that, Jack?*

SERVICE: You read about somebody in the paper, it's somebody far away. There's no intimacy or humanity. He's just a sort of cipher. You can believe something about somebody like that. But if you actually live next door to a person or see him, why, what you read in the papers doesn't seem to affect you.

#### The Department Turns Out in Force to Meet Jack's Plane

SERVICE: The Department went all out. The Department's policy was obviously to meet McCarthy head on. A big welcome was planned for me. I don't know how much planning. But, word went around, "Go out and meet Service."

The chief of personnel was out there. A lot of people I'd worked with in the Department the year before were there. Some friends in the Foreign Service were there. I think Marshall Green was there; I forget.

I came into the Department--[John E.] Peurifoy, who was the administrative head of the Department, the deputy assistant secretary for administration, or whatever the title is, he greeted me.

There was a Foreign Service lunch on-- The Foreign Service Association had monthly luncheons at that time. I wasn't planning to go. I was busy with other things, and I thought it might be an embarrassment for me to go. Donald Smith and various other people insisted I go. At the lunch I was introduced by the president of the association, who merely said, "We know nothing about Service's case, but he's got friends."

They gave me a big clap, a rising clap. McCarthy soon found out about this and made a big thing about it in the press-- Foreign Service Association members had been ordered to give Service an ovation, and so on.

I don't remember any particular accusation over Department officers meeting me; but the fact that I was given facilities and help by the Department was later criticized in the press. There was sharp criticism of any official help or assistance as favoring the accused.

*Q: At that preliminary meeting was it a sort of adversary discussion to try to probe any possible weak points in your story?*

SERVICE: Oh, yes. He said, "I expect you to be perfectly honest and frank." It was adversary in the sense of being probing, yes-- not antagonistic. But you expect a lawyer to really want to know the truth about the case. I didn't resent that at all.

We became very close friends, so much so that when they went to Europe a year or two later, we were designated guardians of their children in case anything should happen to them.

\* \* \* \* \*

Speech of Senator Joe McCarthy  
Wisconsin Retail Food Dealers Association  
Milwaukee, Wisconsin  
August 6, 1950

Then we come to John Stewart Service. Service was arrested by the FBI in connection with the theft of hundreds of secret government documents. The FBI testified they had microphones in the hotel room of Jaffe, whom they labeled as a Communist, when Service visited him. The microphone recording showed that Service discussed military secrets with this Communist while the war was still on. Service admitted having turned over to him classified State Department documents. At the time Service and his five co-defendants were arrested, J. Edgar Hoover, according to a Washington paper said, "This is a 100 percent air-tight case of espionage." But Service did not go to jail. However, Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew who insisted he be prosecuted, left the Department. Acheson took over and service(sic) was re-hired, promoted and put in charge of placing personnel in the Far East area.

The Tydings-McMahon Committee said he was a bit indiscreet, but that it was oh so unfair to expose him.

\* \* \* \* \*

Letter of Charges: On Salary, with Office Space and a Stenographer

SERVICE: The Department was very helpful. The board gave us a letter of charges. Do you want it?

*Q: Yes, I think so.*

SERVICE: You want to turn that off till I find it here?

*Q: Thanks, I have it, March 24, 1950. (Encl. #1)*

SERVICE: The letter of charges is not very specific, but the basic charges are there. They didn't go into detail, and they said in effect to simply answer everything derogatory that had been said about me, everything that I knew about, everything that appeared in the papers, that they wanted to clean the slate once and for all, and do an exhaustive job.

Excerpt of remarks of Herve J. L'Heureux, Chairman of the Executive Committee, Foreign Service Association, while presiding at its monthly luncheon March 19, 1950:

"I hope you have enjoyed your lunch. There is one thing we have today that is different -- Service! Yes we have Service. By this I mean John Service, who has just arrived from the Far East." (The audience applauded for more than two minutes, before the speaker could proceed). "John Service is a fellow-Foreign Service Officer. He is a colleague. He is one of us. He is a member of our Association. As such, he is a 'fraternity brother' and, as a fraternity brother, he is entitled to our affection, to our esteem, to our confidence, to our best wishes.

"I do not know whether John Service is guilty of the charges that have been made. I have not seen his record. I do not know precisely what charges have been levied. But I will say this: Until such time as the charges have been proven by a court or other body of competent jurisdiction, he is innocent. He is entitled to our respect, to our support, to our assistance. As John Service goes forth to meet one of the greatest challenges of his entire career, let us, his 'fraternity brothers', express to him our every good wish; let us pray that his cause may be righteous, that he may be given facility of expression, strength and courage to wage his defense successfully, and that the cloud that tends to despoil his honor may soon be dissipated." (At this point, the audience rose and gave John Service a tremendous applause that had in it warmth of feeling and of friendliness). Mr. L'Heureux continued:

"I just wish to say one more thing: As a body, our Foreign Service has been pretty free of scandal. We need not bow our head in shame. We are not infallible. We are human. But, man for man, I am prepared to match our Foreign Service with any organization, with any group -- on the Hill or in the valleys -- in intelligence, ability, judgment, integrity, devotion to duty, patriotism, morals and loyalty!"

(signed) Herve J. L'Heureux

\* \* \* \* \*

Kuomintang Propaganda from Taiwan Supplied to United States Senators and Translated by  
Library of Congress Staff

SERVICE: About this time--in February actually I think it was--the press told us that Chinese intelligence reports from Taiwan had been supplied to some senators interested in the question of China policy--the assumption was Knowland and McCarthy--and that they were being translated for the senators by the Library of Congress.

I went up to the Library of Congress and talked to the head of the Far Eastern section, which was old Arthur Hummel [Sr.], you know, compiler of Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period.

*Q: Oh, sure.*

SERVICE: I wanted to get either copies of the Chinese originals, or copies of the translations. He was very sorry, but the Library of Congress couldn't allow me to. It was an agency of the Senate or the Congress, and they could only work for Congress. So, it was something that he couldn't let me have. Whichever senator it was, and I assume it was McCarthy, he leaked the reports to Fulton Lewis. Then Fulton Lewis had a fine sensational series of his reports.

"Chiang Kai-shek had a wily crew of Chinese counter-intelligence agents on his payroll." It describes how they followed John Stewart Service around, and it has the silly garbage about my having an affair with Zhou En-lai's secretary. Chinese Mata Hari. It's just absolutely, absolutely ridiculous sort of stuff. Anyway, that's sort of an interesting exhibit maybe.

*Q: I certainly think so.*

SERVICE: I wrote some corrections and so on, but I didn't try to publish them. Nothing was ever done with them. I just pointed out the many errors and inaccuracies.

*Q: To whom did you send that stuff?*

SERVICE: I didn't send it to anybody. [laughing] There was no use trying to get in a public fight with J. Fulton Lewis Jr. Oh, you have a question?

*Q: Yes, I had a question, Library of Congress and Arthur Hummel. Public funds, light security--how was it that you couldn't get copies?*

SERVICE: Well, this was what he said. A mission had been given to him by whatever senators were involved--he wouldn't even mention what senators it was--and therefore it was confidential. So the only thing we had was what Fulton Lewis Jr. was able to get and publish.

*Q: Were you ever aware of Chiang Kai-shek's counter-intelligence following you around?*

SERVICE: Oh yes, in Chungking certainly.

*Q: But not in Washington?*

SERVICE: No.

*Q: This business of the Chinese Mata Hari, was this picked up by other press people?*

SERVICE: Not at the time. No, the press ignored this. It was so silly I don't think there was very much on it. My press clippings would show. (To be deposited in The Bancroft Library.)

### An Intimation of Trouble

SERVICE: About this time we got an intimation of trouble. I was talking to Tony [Fulton] Freeman, whose family I'd been living with for part of the time. Tony was in the Department.

Some American woman had come to see him in some agitation after she'd had lunch at the Chinese embassy.

By now, it had appeared in the press that Service had been cleared. The wife of the Chinese ambassador had said, "Isn't it terrible how they could clear that man Service?" Then, she went on with the story about my having an illegitimate child in China.

This woman came into the Department, rather agitated, because she wanted to be sure that the "full facts were known." She or someone else apparently also went to the FBI. So, a few days later the FBI came around to interview me.

Anyway, we wrote a long letter to the Loyalty Security Board about this whole business, pointing out absurdities in the story, the claim that Val was a Communist, and so on, and noting that the child was born seventeen months after I left China.

We told this to Caroline, but I don't think we told the children about this at this time because we didn't expect it to become public. Later on it was obvious that it was liable to become public.

When we get to the Loyalty Review Board we'll find that the Loyalty Review Board had this same story, although they never used it in the hearing. But this was very much in their minds. We got more information later on.

*Q: What about standards of evidential validity, the sorts of things that lawyers are supposedly trained in doing, assessing the value of evidence?*

SERVICE: I would say that the most shocking example of that was the Senate later on. I don't remember these people being so outrageous.

*Q: Why, in your opinion, did Humelsine take so long perusing your record? He must have known it backwards and forwards by this time.*

SERVICE: Things did keep coming up, you know. I think I mentioned before that the Loyalty Security Board would make a decision, and then there would be a new evidence. This kept happening. We had the new Chinese intelligence stuff that was put out by McCarthy through Fulton Lewis. Then, we had the Chinese embassy starting the story about my having an illegitimate child. Then, we had changes in the regulations, change in the standards, and every time, it all had to be reconsidered.

Humelsine and the State Department were in a real quandary. The Loyalty Security Board, the State Department board, cleared me, but Humelsine didn't want to have to grasp the nettle because he knew there was going to be a lot of heat. So, I think he put it off and put it off, because they really didn't know just what was going to happen if they publicly cleared me.

He couldn't give his final okay until the Loyalty Review Board had post-audited it. The system then was that the Loyalty Review Board had to post-audit. They had thrown the case back once already before. So that they had to wait for the Loyalty Review Board.

That's probably the most important reason of all really, in practical terms. He felt he couldn't make any sort of final and firm decision until the Loyalty Review Board had acted. The Loyalty Review Board was subject to these same things, the changing of standards, new evidence coming in, and so on.

*Q: Do you feel that you were used as the Department scapegoat in the China matter?*

SERVICE: No, I don't think so. I wasn't used as the Department scapegoat. There's just no basis for that. The Department, as I say, was pretty much on my side. The State Department at the Humelsine level, the top level, tried to cut its losses at the last minute. They weren't going to make any fight about it. But, up to that point they had stuck by me through a lot of thick and thin.

I was a scapegoat in a sense, a whipping boy-- That isn't the right word. I turned out to be an easy, vulnerable target for McCarthy and for the China Lobby and for the Kuomintang and for [Albert] Kohlberg.

*Q: Right. That's the end of what I had prepared.*

*Q: Then, you found for me this Saturday Evening Post article by Drew Pearson, "Confessions of an S.O.B.," 1956. How much validity do you think there was in his comment?*

*"Despite all my precautions I feel that I was responsible for a serious injustice being done to two government servants. One was John Service, a State Department Foreign Service officer, who was fired on the charge of being a poor security risk because he had talked to newspapermen and others. One of those newspapermen, I suspect, was I, for on at least one occasion I went to Service's apartment and talked with him about Patrick J. Hurley with whom he had served...Later, I learned that microphones had been planted in Service's apartment."*

SERVICE: I talked to Pearson a good many times. As I recall that particular incident, at least what I think was that incident, he called me and came around and picked me up. Then we went riding in his car, which I assumed was caution on his part. But, it's true that if our phones were tapped, why, it was known that he called me.

But, he was simply asking about the story that Hurley and [General Robert B.] McClure had almost come to blows at some sort of a gathering in Chungking. He wanted to find out if a story which he'd already heard had any basis in it or not.

*Q: Had it?*

SERVICE: Yes.

*Q: Had you had any opportunity to keep up your spoken Chinese?*

SERVICE: No, none at all.

*Q: What about your reading knowledge? Had you used Chinese material?*

SERVICE: No. I had been completely away. I could still speak some Chinese. I got a 3+, which I think was a tough grade. I think I really deserved a 4, on a grading scale of 5. But, they gave me a 3+, which makes me "reasonably fluent" or something like that.

I'd had no contact with China.

We had collected all of our effects by this time. They'd been stored for years in attics of various people in Washington. We had lots and lots of books including a lot of books on China. We simply lined them up on the big front porch, lined all the books up on edge and let any friends come and help themselves. Passersby on the street would come up and say, "What's this?" Then we'd say, "Help yourself." We gave away nothing really valuable but a lot of books. Of course, I never thought I'd have any more connection with China at all at any time.

First Signs of a Change in U.S.-China Policy: Jack One of Four Americans Who Would be Welcome in China

SERVICE: About this same time, out of the blue, we got a post card from Edgar Snow from Pao-An, where he had gone in 1936 before the Communists set up their headquarters in Yen-an, and where he first met Mao Zedong.

Somehow, to get a post card from Pao-An, China, from Ed Snow seemed like a message from the moon. Of course, things were moving. That was the real reason the Eastland committee brought out the Kubek books--to try to head off any move towards China by the Nixon administration.

Nixon started in fairly promptly with gestures toward relaxing our isolation of China. First he took off the strict boycott and then raised the limit on purchases that could be made, various things like that. Travel restrictions were withdrawn. American subsidiaries abroad, foreign subsidiaries of American companies were allowed to trade with China.

On October 1, 1970, Ed Snow was invited to stand with Mao and the other leaders on Tiananmen during the national day parade. The ping-pong team invitation was a few months later. Kissinger's secret visit was in July, '71. By August, the New York Times had gotten Scotty [James] Reston into China. Reston had a marathon interview with Zhou En-lai, which was broken by an intermission for dinner. At the dinner table, there was some reference to the obvious fact that attitudes were changing from the former rigidities. It was Reston, apparently, who recalled that a number of Americans had suffered rather heavily because of their early views about the Chinese Communists. Perhaps, Reston suggested, it would be especially interesting to them to see the changes in China.

Zhou seized on the idea with his characteristic alacrity, and spontaneously mentioned four persons who would be warmly welcomed in China. "If they should wish to come." I was one of the four. The other three were John Fairbank, Owen Lattimore, and John Carter Vincent. The first I knew of this was a telephone call from somebody at the Times in New York asking what I thought about "being invited to China." The story had just come in by radio from Peking and wouldn't be appearing in the papers until the next day. I collected my wits enough to say that I indeed would like to visit China.

*Q: What did you think of that?*

SERVICE: I thought it was great stuff. I was very pleased, of course. I wrote to Marshall Green, who was assistant secretary for FE and asked him if the Department would have any objection, and got the answer, no objection; to the contrary, they'd be pleased if I were to go. They were obviously fostering contacts.

I then wrote to Huang Hua, an old friend, who was then the Chinese ambassador in Ottawa. Canada had already established relations with China, and he was the first Chinese ambassador in Ottawa. I wrote to him, alluding to the news story and saying that I would indeed be glad to go to China.

He wrote back saying that I was invited. I had asked for Caroline to be included, so he was happy to tell me that we were invited to be guests of the Chinese government for a month or something of this sort.

#### Back to China with Caroline, 1971

SERVICE: I'm not sure that we want to say a great deal about the China trip. It was a very moving experience simply to go back to China and see the changes, see what had happened, see a lot of old friends, not so many Chinese friends as foreign friends, the Adlers, Rewi Alley, people like that who stayed in China or, like Adler, had gone back to China.

The Chinese friends were most of them too old or too high up or their political health wasn't particularly good at the time. Some of them, of course, had died. My very good friend Ch'en Chia-K'ang had died, apparently of a heart attack, in a May 7 school, so I was told. Kung P'eng, the wife of Chiao Kuan-Hua, at that time deputy foreign minister, had died. Another good friend named Wang Ping-nan, who was in Chungking during the war, was apparently in a May 7 school, and unavailable.

Then the older people like Chu Teh, Tung Pi-Wu and others were simply too high or too old. I tried to see Madame Sun, but she wasn't very well, I was told, so I didn't see her.

#### Meetings with Zhou En-lai

*Q: What about Zhou En-lai?*

SERVICE: We had several meetings with Zhou En-lai, very pleasant. First was a session fairly early in October where he talked to all the Americans in China--and there were quite a group of us--and a few non-Americans brought in like Rewi Alley. I kidded him about being an honorary American.

*Q: Was he from New Zealand?*

SERVICE: Yes, legendary New Zealander.

We actually met first at an October 1 dinner. But after a handshake, Zhou En-lai was at a table far away; we didn't have a chance to talk to him. He and Chiang Ch'ing were up at the head table, along with others, of course.

Then we had this interview with the Americans in which Zhou picked me out and said quite a number of things to me or about me. Later on before we left China, Caroline and I were invited to a meeting with him, which happened to be just the day after the Chinese had been accepted in the UN.

I was surprised. We were about to leave, and apparently he determined that he was going to see us. So, we were crowded in although the meeting went on for, I think, almost three hours.

He didn't want to talk very much about the old times. I had hoped to get him to talk something about Hurley and that period of history I was involved in. But, he sort of brushed it aside, [saying], "That's all past. Let's talk about the present."

*Q: Did you have a feeling of an old friendship renewed?*

SERVICE: Very much so. He's a very warm, intent, sincere person. He remembered me very well.

That evening when the Americans were there he started thinking about who was around whom I had known. He suddenly thought of an old, now an old, man named K'o Po-Nien, who had been one of the liaison officers assigned to our group in Yen-an. He later on became ambassador to Denmark and had various other diplomatic posts. He'd been a professor of history at some university before he joined the Communists.

This was eleven o'clock at night, I think, by the time we were at this stage of the interview with all the Americans around in a huge circle in this big room in the Great Hall of the People. He sent a word [loudly], "Call K'o Po-Nien. Get him here!" [laughter]

So poor old K'o was routed out of bed, I'm sure. He arrived sleepy-eyed and blinking. Zhou insisted a chair be brought in so he could be seated next to me.

There was a great deal of warmth, and Zhou made a lot of complimentary references to me. The picture we've got downstairs, I think is quite characteristic.

When we had the private meeting with him he asked about old friends whom he'd known, Fairbank and Lattimore and various other people, about Dave Barrett who, after the Communists took over Peking, had been accused of fostering a plot against Mao's life.

That was a crazy, sort of a wild-eyed intelligence thing. It's a long story which we don't need to go into here. The Chinese had accused Barrett of providing money for the plotters who were supposedly using an old trench mortar from about a mile away to try to hit [chuckling] Mao Zedong while he stood on Tiananmen.

*Q: When was this, '49?*

SERVICE: Yes, this was '49.

At any rate, he said, "Mistakes were made and we're very sorry. Give my best regards to Colonel Barrett."

It was very, very warm and pleasant.

*Q: Did you have any opportunity to raise the question of Mao's supposed request to come to America in '45?*

SERVICE: No. If we had had a chance to talk about that period--this was one of the questions I had in mind. But, he didn't want to have a historical session, so, I never did.

*Q: Was your impression of him that he was well versed in international affairs?*

SERVICE: Oh, very well versed, most certainly.

Zhou was a person with all the intellectual capacities of a Kissinger. I think no one had any better mind than he did. He had traveled a great deal, of course, as premier and as foreign minister. He'd been at the Geneva conference and the Bandung conference and many conferences around the world. He toured Africa. He was not parochial or ill-informed at all.

I think the Chinese do tend to put too much credence in foreign movements that they hope are strong. When we were there some of the Black Panther people were in Peking. They had some Puerto Rican group, the Young Lords from New York. They had one of these splinter Communist groups, a split off from the Socialist Workers Party. The Socialist Workers Party had gone against the Chinese because of their being willing to receive Nixon. Then one group split off, and they were invited to Peking.

You had the feeling that perhaps they gave these people more importance than they really had. But I don't think that Zhou himself was naive at all.

Our private talk was mainly a tour of the horizon kind of thing.

*Q: Briefing you?*

SERVICE: Yes.

*Q: With the idea that you should take a message back with you?*

SERVICE: Well, I suppose so. Huang Hua asked me to come to Ottawa to pick up the visas before we went to China. I had told Huang Hua, so there would be no misunderstanding, that I wasn't going to China as a representative of the government, I wasn't going to China as a writer, but I expected I would probably write something, and that anything I was told or learned should, I thought, also be reported to my government.

So Zhou knew that I would be interviewed. So it's possible that he was talking partly to the U.S. government, but Kissinger had just been there. I guess it was the day after Kissinger left.

#### Kissinger In Peking: An "Invitation" to San Clemente for Thanksgiving

SERVICE: While Kissinger was in Peking, I was asked to talk to him. The way they put it was that Kissinger had heard I was there and asked to see me. Well I doubt that, because the eventual conversation made it quite apparent that Kissinger was very foggy about who I was.

*Q: When you say "they," do you mean Chinese officials?*

SERVICE: The Chinese, yes.

*Q: What was your impression of Kissinger?*

SERVICE: He's a very smart, intelligent, quick person. But I made a mistake. There were two other people there. There was [John] Holdridge and a man named Al Jenkins from the State Department. Holdridge I think was National Security Council, and Jenkins was State Department. They were present and I thought that they wanted my impressions of China. I'd been in China at this time for over a month.

So, I was talking about my traveling and things I'd seen. I was talking mostly to Jenkins and Holdridge, because they had some China background. Neither one of them had spent any time in China to speak of, but at least they were so-called China specialists.

That was a mistake. I was supposed, I think, to talk only to Kissinger. Neither Holdridge nor Jenkins would say a word. They were almost embarrassed by my talking to them rather than directing my talk to Kissinger.

I changed. I got myself better oriented, shall we say, Kissinger asked me at one point, "Were the Chinese serious about Taiwan?" In other words, that they wouldn't have normalization of relations until we broke off with Taiwan.

I said, "Yes, they're absolutely serious."

He said, "You don't think they're bargaining?"

I said, "No, on this question they're not bargaining. It's a symbolic issue. They may be willing to accept some sort of a formula which would still not incorporate Taiwan, unified in the mainland, wholly. We have to recognize Chinese sovereignty, and that means we have to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan."

I think Kissinger found this very hard to believe. He said, "Oh, my people are always telling me something different. They say they're like the Russians. This is bargaining."

I said, "No, this is not a bargaining point."

During this dialogue here I said something about Mao. He suddenly stopped and looked at me, sort of surprised, and he said, "Do you know Mao?"

I said, well yes, I knew him quite well.

Then the wheels went around for a little while, and a moment later he said, "Would you be willing to come to San Clemente?" Kissinger said, "When are you getting back to the States?"

I told him when it was. It was going to be somewhere before November 15.

He said, "Would you be willing to come to San Clemente? We're going to be out there about that time. We're going to be out at San Clemente for Thanksgiving."

I said, "Certainly. I'd be perfectly willing to come to San Clemente." He never mentioned the president's name, but it was obvious that coming to San Clemente, "We'll be there at Thanksgiving"--

I said, "Certainly."

Then he said, "As soon as you get back to Washington I want you to call my secretary and tell her where you can be reached and how we can get a hold of you anytime we want to." He said this twice and saw me out the front door and again made a point of this business of calling his secretary. He said, "She'll know all about it. She'll be briefed. But, we want to know how to get in touch with you."

I agreed to do that, and [chuckling] nothing came of it.

#### Services Mobbed by the Press in Hong Kong

SERVICE: When I was in Peking the New York Times got hold of me and wanted me to write an article for their magazine. I agreed to do that. But I didn't try to write it in China.

When we came out and got to Hong Kong we were really unprepared--I wasn't prepared--for the terrific furor. I should have been. I should have been prepared really. There was a tremendous

interest, you remember, at that period about Nixon's visit which was coming. Kissinger had just made his second trip to China.

When we got off the train in Hong Kong, we were simply swamped. Every newspaperman in Hong Kong seemed to be down at the railway station, firing questions, some of them friendly, some unfriendly.

The French news agency, Agence France Presse had a Chinese who wanted to bring up my old views, and did I still feel China was, you know, paradise, and so on and so on. At any rate, it was very hard to get away from these people.

The main thing, of course, was the Lin Piao affair. In China we heard nothing about Lin Piao. He obviously wasn't visible. There had been this rumor of a plane shot down. That was just before we went into China. All air traffic in China was stopped for a day or two. But, it hadn't yet been tied up in China with Lin Piao's being on the plane.

I had made various random inquiries in China, what had happened to Lin Piao, and was always put off. "Important leaders often disappear for conferences," or something like that, or "Lin Piao's health has been bad; maybe he's not well."

Only one man had said, "Well, later on it will become apparent." I should have perhaps been better attuned to realize that this was some sort of an intimation that the true story wasn't being told. But, by and large, Lin Piao was simply a non-subject. You couldn't find out. Nobody talked about him.

When I got to Hong Kong, just having come out from China, everyone expected me to have information about this business. All I could say was, "In China you don't hear anything; you don't know anything," which made me look like a bit of a fool.

The press club wanted me to come and have a session with them at their luncheon. I declined. I simply wasn't set or prepared for this. I wasn't really trying to make a big thing out of the whole thing. As far as I was concerned it was a personal trip, a sentimental journey, if you want to call it that, rather than a news-gathering thing.

I did talk to the consul-general in Hong Kong, spent a day talking to him and to some of the people on the staff. I didn't ask and I wasn't told who they were. I had told the Chinese that I was going to talk to my government. And I had written out a summary. Right after we left Zhou En-lai I borrowed a typewriter from the Adlers and had written out a summary of the talk. So, I had that.

*Q: Back to old times.*

SERVICE: Yes. Anyway, we just sort of holed up. I'd gotten in touch with Loren Fessler. He used to be with Time magazine and then was working for the Universities Field Service. He found us a room in a small hotel, a comfortable enough room, but not one of the tourist hotels.

We stayed there. Various people tracked us down. I talked to a Newsweek man, Sidney Liu. Several other people, NBC and ABC got a hold of me. I was on the [Frank] McGee show, the Today show. We got out of Hong Kong as fast as we could and came home.

*Q: How did Hong Kong seem after China?*

SERVICE: Oh, it was a terrible shock. It's depressing to come out of China and as soon as you get across the border you start seeing beggars, and filth, the crowded shacks, and all the development in the New Territories. The commercialism and the advertising and everything in Hong Kong is a cultural shock after you come out of China where we'd been for six weeks.

Plus the fact that we felt harried and pursued and unhappy—

The Oakland Tribune had a very enterprising woman that I'd met before I went to China. She called up long distance and interviewed me in the hotel. It was a pretty good piece in the Tribune, apparently was passed by old Senator [William] Knowland himself. He was still alive then.

*Q: That was a turnaround, wasn't it?*

SERVICE: Yes. Incidentally, while we're thinking of it, the big turnaround really came with the announcement of the Nixon visit and the Fulbright hearing, because all the papers and all the magazines, the news magazines, wrote it up quite extensively, wrote up the Fulbright hearing and our interview afterward.

The coverage was astonishingly different in tone. Newsweek had been less antipathetic, less hostile than Time in the old days. But, even Time magazine just fell all over itself to be friendly.

I had promised an article for the New York Times Magazine. I wrote it when I got back and sent it in. They held it for a while and decided not to use it.

There were several things wrong. Partly I simply can't get away from writing State Department reports. Also I think I didn't draw conclusions--didn't do the analysis. I tried to say, "This is what we saw," and let the reader draw his own conclusions.

So they turned the thing down. Harrison Salisbury, whom I had had some contact with before, heard that the magazine section had turned it down. He called me and said that he'd seen it, would like to make some excerpts and use them in the Op. Ed. page. I said, "Go ahead."

So he did, and they ran I think for three days in the Op. Ed. page.

*Q: Under your name?*

SERVICE: Yes. One mistake I perhaps made was in not asking to check his excerpting. He cut out all the qualifying sections where I point out that, of course, the reader will know that it's a

Communist country, that the Chinese don't have democratic freedoms as we know them in this country, that education, propaganda, and the press are all controlled, and things like that.

Well, those weren't interesting so far as Harrison Salisbury was concerned; so the published excerpts are more rosy perhaps than my full picture. It made me look a little bit like a starry-eyed apologist, I'm afraid. However, I can't worry too much about that.

## PROFILES

### Foresight, Nightmare, and Hindsight

"Both before and after his banishment from responsible governmental affairs, Service talked extensively with the highest Communist Chinese leaders, and during the Second World War he was one of a very few American diplomats whom Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai knew well. The fact that this man, whom the future rulers of Peking grew to like and trust, was quiet, dignified, candid, compassionate, and that he represented the very best in America, could have been most helpful to our country."

"Among some of the crueller jabs at Service in his years of limbo, was the allegation that he was somehow personally responsible for the deaths of American boys in the Korean war. The fact is that if he had been listened to, and the United States had taken a realistic view of China and its Communists, there might not have been any Korean war."

"Meanwhile, Stilwell's successor, General Wedemeyer, passed through Tokyo on his way home for consultation. He had a cordial chat with Service, in which he said that Service was being recommended for a medal awarded to civilians for exemplary work during the war. In Washington, Service later heard, Wedemeyer saw J. Edgar Hoover, and afterward there were no more cordial meetings and no further talk of a medal."

"As another friend of Service's has remarked, few men have been so mightily defamed by nasty people and so meagerly defended by nice ones."

"The rendezvous was arranged with typical Kissinger furtiveness, but nothing much came of it; Kissinger, unlike most senior members of the United States Senate, didn't seem to be aware that Service had ever met Mao."

From a Profile of John Service, ex-Foreign Service

officer and political casualty, by E.J.Kahn, Jr.

Appearing this week in The New Yorker. Yes, The

New Yorker.

Generally Low Level of Press and Public Information on China

SERVICE: Fulbright had wanted me to come back for another session after I'd been to China. I couldn't very well refuse, although I wasn't really seeking publicity or press. But I did agree to go. He had [Ray] Ludden at that time and also a man named Warren Cohen who's a professor of diplomatic history at Michigan State University. That was in February of '72. That wasn't much of a hearing actually.

*Q: What was your policy on dealing with the flood of requests you must have had for speaking?*

SERVICE: I turned most of them down. I turned all of them down that I could. I was getting two or three requests a day, lecture agencies, commencements at universities. But I simply didn't want to do it. I made several talks at university centers. I did it where there was some personal tie or personal obligation--I didn't want to talk to the World Affairs Council. Then they said, "Will you talk to the board?" So I said okay. Then it turned out to be a huge mob in a home of Madeleine Russell.

I got sucked into a press conference in Washington, much against my will and against my wishes. I didn't realize what was happening. My old friend Bob Barnett was in Washington, had retired from the State Department, had become Washington representative of the Asia Society. The Asia Society had always been a genteel, cultural organization, and a child of John D. Rockefeller Jr.'s, interested in Oriental art and culture.

Barnett had gotten in touch with me as soon as I came back, along with the Council of Foreign Relations, all sorts of people. I told him I wasn't looking for any platform, I had nothing to sell, I wasn't trying to do this sort of thing.

So, he said, "If you do come to Washington let me know and we'll just have a few people in my office, just people that are interested in the Asia Society, in my office.

I pictured a group of elderly worthies in an ordinary-sized office. Well, I had to go to Washington for this Fulbright thing, and was going on to London. So, I let him know.

He said, "Yes, we'll just have a few people in my office. It will be very informal."

I had told him I wasn't giving press conferences, so I thought he understood that. When I arrived at his office it turns out that he had an office about 40 feet square. At least fifty or sixty people crowded in there, all the newspaper people from Washington, top people, who were just getting ready, a lot of them, to accompany Nixon because it was just before Nixon was due to leave for China.

Anyway, it turned out to be an unpleasant, embarrassing sort of a thing, because I thought the thing was off the record and they thought it was on the record. A lot of them were skeptical about my views of China.

They were extremely put off by the fact that I couldn't give any inside story on Lin Piao. They said, "How could you have been in China while these things were going on? After all, you're

supposed to be a great political reporter, observer," and so on and so on. A lot of these people, of course, had never been in China and didn't know how things are.

*Q: What did this tell you about the state of public information in this country on China?*

SERVICE: Obviously it was very poor, but then I couldn't have given them very much either. My information was also poor. But, I didn't go to China to find out what had happened to Lin Piao!

*Q: No. What I'm trying to suggest is that they were not aware of the restrictions that--*

SERVICE: Oh, no, of course not. Eric Sevareid was there, and he was very disappointed. As one man put it, "It's just as if the whole top floor of the Pentagon had been fired." How could this not be known? How could this not be the subject of everybody's comments? They couldn't understand how a closed society and disciplined party could maintain so effective a control of sensational and important news.

Jack's War-Time Despatches Published. Lost Chance in China...Edited by Joseph W. Esherick

SERVICE: In 1972, I got a call from Random House. I think this was probably just after the profile was published in the New Yorker. They wanted me to put together my reports from China. I said I didn't think it could be done successfully, that the reports were too episodic and a lot of them were repetitious. I didn't think there was enough there really to make a book.

I think the idea had come from Orville Schell. I don't know. Because they had published a book by Orville and Joe Esherick on modern China, sort of a high school textbook. At any rate, they came back after a while and asked whether I would be willing to have a scholar, a historian, look at my reports and see if he could do something. I said, "Well sure." After all, it would be no work on my part. So, why should I refuse? They came up with Joe Esherick and I was delighted. I had known Joe when he was getting his Ph.D. here.

So, Joe did it and produced Lost Chance in China. I think he did an excellent job.

By this time, of course, a great many of my reports had been published in the State Department volumes, U.S. Foreign Relations, my reports or parts of my reports. I had some. John Fairbank had some. Some came from the Lauchlin Currie files.

Kubek's The Amerasia Papers had published a lot of my reports. Then we got many more out of the State Department. Esherick was consulting me and using clues from The Amerasia Papers or from U.S. Foreign Relations. We got dates and despatch numbers to transmit.

The State Department cooperated very nicely. They dug up almost everything that we wanted. Even some of the things that they couldn't find but they said might be in my security file, sure enough, Joe wrote and got them from the security file. I'm not sure why some of them had been in the security files. Probably they were documents that we had used or submitted as evidence in my hearings, some of them.

Anyway, we got most of what we wanted. There are a few things that are missing. They said we could go to Washington and search the files ourselves, but neither Joe nor I had time or wanted to do that. Joe turned out to have far more than enough for a book. His first draft came out to something like 750 pages. Random House said, "You're going to have to cut this down." So he did.

A very nice thing that Joe did was to suggest that the royalties be split since the reports themselves were mine. So, actually I made a little money out of it.

It was the most painless book that has ever been written. Unfortunately I usually get all the credit for it. It's considered my book, although he's the man that did it.

One little embarrassment is the dedication which he put in, which I didn't know about, "to those who chose honesty." [chuckling] A lot of my Foreign Service friends think that it's my dedication and that I'm sort of pointing a finger at other people, which I'm not.

I don't think anyone else has taken the reports they wrote and made a book out of them without rewriting or revising or bringing them up to date.

Oliver Edmund Clubb has had one report published--it's a very small book--a report that he wrote on the Communists when he was in Hangzhou. This was when they were still in Gansu, in 1932 I think. (Oliver Edmund Clubb, Communism in China, as reported from Hangzhou in 1932. New York, Columbia University Press, 1968.) That's been published, but otherwise I don't know of any report that basically is simply reprinting reports that are thirty years old.

*Q: That's remarkable.*

SERVICE: One thing that contributed to making it possible was the fact that I was fired and cut off all connection with the State Department, so that I never had a need to hedge or revise my views. People who stayed in the State Department, who were not fired, had to join the team. Their views, in most cases, changed during the years of estrangement with China. It would be rather embarrassing perhaps for their reports to be published. But, in my case, I can stand on what I wrote back in 1944.

*Q: Is there anything in the despatches that you regret or feel was wrong?*

SERVICE: I wasn't a hundred percent right, certainly not. We didn't foresee everything that was going to happen. We didn't foresee the rapidity of developments in China in the late 40's. We took too much at face value some of the things the Communists were saying. I think we didn't realize that they were stalling and playing for time, in much the same way the Kuomintang was. It just happened that they strengthened themselves by expanding and taking more territory when they could. They weren't really fighting as wholehearted a war against the Japanese perhaps as we thought, things like that.

They were talking of the socialization process in China taking decades. When the Communists got into power, they did it in a very few years. I don't think that I have to feel badly or regretful that I didn't foresee all those things. The general direction was correct. I wouldn't have published them if I felt badly about them.

*Q: What about the word that caused you so much trouble, the "democratic Chinese Communists?"*

SERVICE: You know, we weren't writing political science papers. People like Tang Tsou have written articles and made a lot about our folly in talking about the Communists being democratic. Yes, we were careless. We didn't think we were writing for anyone except the man on the China desk in the Department of State. We were using the language and terms that were being bandied about at the time.

If you read the reports themselves I pretty much explain what I mean by being democratic, giving the people at least a sense that they had a voice in what was going on, a real feeling, in their local affairs. These are difficult issues to grapple with and pin down. We're still having trouble.

The Chinese model of Communism is certainly very different from the Russian. Even critics will agree that people do have more say about things that affect them directly than they have in the Soviet Union. That's democratic in our sense. If you insist on defining democracy as having two parties competing against each other and things like that, it's not democratic.

The fall of the Gang of Four is, in a sense, a working out of popular will in China. Zhou En-lai was very popular, and there was great resentment at the Gang of Four's treatment of him after he died. The demonstration on Tiananmen Square was in a sense a democratic gesture, a popular gesture.

I regret certainly that we weren't more specific or more careful in using [chuckling] these terms. But, it's not all that simple.

*Q: No.*

SERVICE: Of course, the problem is that people simply say, "Oh, Service said they were democratic." They don't read my report, which may be ten or fifteen pages long describing what their policies were.

But, this is, you know, part of my whole feeling about China now. It's disappointing that some of the things that we saw in Yenan have become bureaucratized and the party has become much more totalitarian than it was in those days. The regime is a heavy-handed regime in many ways. We can't even argue that people enjoy the same kind of civil rights that we would like to have them enjoy.

*Q: How was the book received, Lost Chance [in China]?*

SERVICE: Oh, extremely well. It was well reviewed in almost every magazine except Esquire magazine, whose review was by Malcolm Muggeridge, who is a well known anti-Communist.

*Q: Editor of Punch for many years.*

SERVICE: Yes. He ridiculed the book in a very brief, two-sentence review. But, most of the other reviews were very friendly. The New York Times gave it a prominent review by Harrison Salisbury. Also they carried it on the page where they have the bestseller list, and have their editor's recommendations. We were listed for three weeks in that recommended category. It's been reviewed very widely over the country.

Our time had come. It was a sort of a swing back of the pendulum. As I said before, the Nixon visit to China, which was announced just before my testimony before the Fulbright committee, marked the big watershed, although before that my Amerasia Papers had gotten a few friendly reviews.

*Q: Joe Esherick concludes Lost Chance with a statement that if the policies that you and your colleagues recommended had been followed, it's possible that the Korean and Vietnamese wars would not have occurred, but it was necessary for them to have occurred in a sense to prove that you and your colleagues were right. That's a rough and I hope fair summary of what he says.*

SERVICE: Well, I can't disagree. I think there's logic in it, yes. Certainly, we would never have been recognized as having been right if none of these other events hadn't happened since then.

The Halberstam book is a little wrong. Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest argues that if we had remained in the State Department, if we had not been fired, that the Vietnam War would not have happened. This is, I think, more questionable than Esherick's statement, because if we had stayed in the Department, as I said before, our views would have had to become those of the Department. We would have had to change our views.

About this time I was asked to review a book by a Russian who was in Yenan while I was there, a man named [P.P.] Vladimirov, who was there ostensibly representing Tass, but he'd been sent then as a representative of the Comintern. These journals were published in Russian and then they tried to sell them to an American publisher. Doubleday asked me to read it. (Petr Parferovich Vladimirov, China's Special Area, 1942-1945, Bombay-Allied Publishers, 1974, and Doubleday, 1975.)

I wrote them a critique pointing out that I thought that things had been added to the journal--undoubtedly the man had a journal and basically it was material from his journal--but that things had been added.

One of the ironic things is that the journals pay a great deal of attention to my presence in Yenan and talks with Mao Zedong. Vladimirov does me the honor of calling me "the most dangerous American in Yenan," because I was encouraging Mao Zedong in his nationalist tendencies. It would have been very nice, of course, to have had this for the loyalty hearings.

It points up a fact that we simply couldn't convince anybody of in the 50's. John Davies, as well as myself, said our whole approach to the situation in China was basically an anti-Soviet one. We were premature anti-Soviet. It wasn't the fashion in those days. But, we were concerned about the post-war situation, and the desirability of trying to put a wedge between the Chinese Communists and the Russians to separate them if we could, which we thought was possible.

### Three Months in China in 1975

SERVICE: By 1975 we thought we'd like to go back to China. The Chinese had kept mentioning the subject, you know, "Why don't you come back?" every time I saw them. We were in Washington for another set of Fulbright hearings on the future of American foreign policy. I gave a very strong statement on why we should normalize relations with China. Fulbright was interested, but he felt that my views were a little too extreme, that the American public would react in favor of Taiwan. He was right. Anyway, we had lunch at the liaison office, and they came back to the same idea, "Why don't you come to China again?"

I said, "It's a long way to go and it costs a lot of money, and I don't want to go just for a two or three week trip."

So, they said, "Well, what's in your mind?"

I said, "I'd like to stay at least three months."

They were rather surprised. It took some time to get approval, but it did go through.

We said we only wanted to stay in Peking. We wanted to stay in the little hotel, an old, converted Chinese residence, where our friends the Adlers live. So we got to Peking, and we were met at the plane by several of our old friends, including the Adlers and George Hatem, the American doctor. We just settled in and had a lovely month in Peking at the Peace Hotel.

*Q: What did you do when you were in Peking? Did you feel that you were under surveillance?*

SERVICE: No. We had a really wonderful woman assigned to us, a graduate of Tsing Hua University, who had majored in American literature. Her English was very good. She was not normally a guide or interpreter.

She came around every morning. I had said that I wanted to brush up my Chinese, so that she was assigned partly for that purpose. I read the papers, and I'd discuss with her the editorials or an article, something like that, and read various other things she recommended. I read several plays and a novel.

We'd have an hour session and then sometimes we had something scheduled. Once or twice a week we would go to a school or have an excursion of some sort. Sometimes she and Caroline would go out shopping. But most of the day was free.

I would generally go out for a walk or bicycle--I was going to buy a bicycle, then It turned out that Mrs. Adler had a bicycle which she wasn't using.

*Q: Did you go out very early in the morning?*

SERVICE: Sometimes. It depended. I went out early sometimes just to watch the people in the parks doing their exercises, their Tai Ch'i and joggers, all sorts of groups going out in the early morning.

Sometimes I went out in the middle of the day to various parks. I visited all the parks in Peking. I went around the old line of the city wall. I explored Peking probably more on this visit than I ever did when I lived there, because I went systematically each day to a different part of the city.

*Q: Did you ever have any trouble photographing?*

SERVICE: Occasionally, yes. If I was in an old or shabby area. Two or three times somebody would come up and say, "What are you doing?"

It was soon after the controversial Antonioni film on China had been released, and there had been a lot of hullabaloo in China about Antonioni because he was supposedly unsympathetic, unfriendly to China. It was supposed to be a Russian-inspired attack on China. It was the period when the Gang of Four was fairly powerful and there was a certain amount of xenophobia and concern about spies.

If someone objected, I would desist. If they didn't want me to take pictures I didn't insist on taking them. There was never any trouble. I never got arrested or anything like that. By and large, I just wandered free as the breeze. I was quite sure I was not under surveillance. I got a lot of pictures of Peking, and even some that showed old shabby buildings for that matter.

Then they said, "Well surely you want to travel some?"

So we said, "Yes, we would like to do some traveling. Where could we go?" I told them we would very much want to go up the Yangtze by steamer, because I'd done it as a boy many times.

Some visitors had made the trip down the river, but no one as far as we knew, no foreigners, had gone up the river. I said, "Well, boats come down; they've got to go up." It's much slower going up. You don't whisk through the gorges in such a rush. Anyway, they arranged it and we made the trip.

*Q: I've seen your slides of the trip up the Yangtze. It looked marvelous.*

SERVICE: We were lucky. We had a perfect day going through the gorges. It was very clear and sunny. We started going through the gorges before dawn, and ended just about dark, so it was a full day. We were on the boat four days from Hangzhou to Chungking. They gave us de luxe accommodations. We had our own saloon and deck and so on. It was all very nice.

We saw Yunnan again, our old haunts where Caroline first started out in China.

*Q: Do you ever wish to go back to China to live?*

SERVICE: Oh yes, I would like to go back.

*Q: And live there?*

SERVICE: Well, I'm not so sure of living. Certainly to visit and travel. It's much easier to get back and forth now.

I think the people that have settled there are quite happy, people like Alley and Hatem. They lead a special sort of life, though it's not like the foreigners in the old days. The attitude is very different, of course. Perhaps I could do something useful there, editing or something.

### Preconceptions and Prejudices about China

*Q: This is somewhat truistic, but do you think people see what they expect to see in China?*

SERVICE: Oh, of course. This is very definitely true. I've seen some people go to China, I could tell before they went what they were going to write. They've got preconceptions.

*Q: How do you try to counter this in yourself?*

SERVICE: Well, in the first place, I probably wouldn't agree that I had preconceptions, would I? Most people don't. I don't know. I just think that I'm trained to be a little more skeptical perhaps.

What so many people who go to China lack, of course, is a background of what China used to be. Therefore, they believe a lot of things that are told them about the old China, which are exaggerated and not true.

To take an obvious example. We went to Yenan in 1971. There's a historical museum there, quite an important, large one. We went through, and they have guides that take you and give you a spiel, explain all the exhibits and so on. It was a young man that was taking us through.

Although it was after Lin Piao's fall, the museum hadn't yet gotten the word. Lin Piao was still Mao's designated heir, and the whole exhibit was centered around him. People like Chu Teh had disappeared, and Zhou En-lai appeared, but not importantly. P'eng Teh-Huai, who had been number two in the army, the vice deputy commander, just wasn't there at all.

I knew the truth. I knew what really was the situation, so that I was prepared for this sort of thing. But someone who hadn't had any history could have been misled.

When I came out I spoke to our own interpreter, a man that traveled with me who was from the foreign office. I said, "It was very interesting. But, when I was in Yenan there were always two

pictures in every public room, two pictures of equal size, side by side, Chu Teh and Mao Zedong." He knew exactly what I meant, of course.

He said, "Chu Teh is very old now, and Lin Piao is now very important and the public has to be educated," and so on.

My background, shall we say, helped me to not be swept off my feet entirely. I think generally speaking I tend to be a little skeptical. At the same time I've got to agree that my prejudices, my sympathies, tend to be with China. I tend to find an explanation or perhaps an excuse for things.

A lot of the things that strike people that go to China are denial of personal liberties and so on, I can see in a historical context, that after all there never was much individualism in China anyway. They never valued individualism as we did. The clan system was very strong. The five Confucian relationships subordinated women to men, junior to senior, younger brother to older brother, and so on. So that the average Chinese doesn't miss any individual rights which he never knew, never enjoyed.

This may be my prejudice. Somebody like William Buckley, of course, who talked here recently, would say that this indicates soft-headedness or a great prejudice on my part. Maybe it does. I think Caroline's and my reactions to China are somewhat different, partly because she didn't really know the old China well. She had superficial impressions of it, and she didn't like old China very much. She went back this time on a very different basis, where people were friendly and she had much more contact with Chinese, and she saw the good side.

I think I was a little more reserved, although on the whole my reactions were very good, my impressions were good. It was different for me, from what I'd known in Yen-an in 1944 and '45. China has become bureaucratized, and the people that I knew so well and so informally are now much less accessible.

Even talking to Zhou En-lai, although he was very friendly and very kind in many ways, talking to a man who has been the head of state, the premier for twenty years, is a lot different from talking to a man in a cave in Yen-an who's not yet held any real government position at all. It's bound to be very different.

The general atmosphere of secrecy in China now is very different from what it used to be. They won't even tell you, you know, when you're going to see somebody. When we actually did see Zhou En-lai, I was having an interview out at Peking University and got a sudden phone call in the middle of the interview, "Come quick!"

My interpreter said, "We really have to go." He wasn't even going to let us finish up what we were talking about. "We have to go right now!"

So, we had to rush down. I assumed we were going to see Zhou En-lai, but we weren't told that. But all this, of course, is very different from what I remember of China.

People like Jack Belden were quite put off by the lack of openness. You can't really talk to anybody frankly or freely. It was easier in '75 than it was in '71. But by and large everyone tells you the same thing. No one can really say anything except the man at the top.

I don't think there's very much more to say. We'd come back from China on our '75 trip. For some reason I felt now that I'd retired and I'd had the long trip to China, I wanted to be more available for giving talks. I agreed to give quite a number of talks at various places.

**RICHARD P. BUTRICK**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Hankow (1926-1932)**

**Consular Officer**  
**Shanghai (1932-1941)**

**Counselor**  
**Chungking (1941)**

**Counselor**  
**Beijing (1941-1942)**

*Richard P. Butrick was born in Lockport, New York in 1894. He joined the Consular Service in 1921. His career in the Foreign Service included positions in Chile, Ecuador, Canada, China, Brazil, and Washington, DC. Mr. Butrick was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1993.*

BUTRICK: While I was on temporary duty in the Department, Homer Byington who was chief of personnel called me into his office one day and said "We have received a request from China for the assignment of six men. We have carefully chosen them and you are one of them." Well I was very bucked up by that. I thought that was wonderful being chosen among six people. So that is how I went to China. Many years later I found out that the real reason why we had been selected for China was that the Department was short of funds and we were all bachelors so they did not have to send out families.

*Q: So this was in 1926 that you were sent to China.*

BUTRICK: Yes, I think so. I went to Hankow.

*Q: Do you recall at all what happened, the feelings...the Foreign Service Act, the Rogers Act, was signed in 1924 and you were in the Consular Service. How did you feel about the Foreign Service?*

BUTRICK: We were inducted into the Foreign Service.

*Q: Did you think it was a good thing or a bad thing?*

BUTRICK: We thought it was a good thing, but we weren't really affected very much by it because our salaries remained the same, etc. But it did offer a career which probably the old Consular Service did not because the Diplomatic Service was separate in those days. The Diplomatic Service was all appointed, one didn't take an examination for entry.

*Q: When you were in the Consular Service what was your feeling towards the Diplomatic Service? Did you think they were a bunch of fancy boys or something?*

BUTRICK: We had no particular feeling towards them that I can remember. We corresponded with the Embassy when we needed to. They didn't offer any oversight of us. We were completely independent so far as I can recall.

*Q: You went to Hankow in 1926. I assume you went by ship.*

BUTRICK: I crossed the Pacific by ship and then went up the river by ship too. When I went up the river, the Consul at Shanghai asked me to take some papers up to the Consul in Nanking. We were always taught that the consulate should be on the sea coast, so I expected this consulate to be near the river. When I got to Nanking it was not on the river, it was way back in the interior and I took a rickshaw to deliver the papers. I talked to him a little while and by the time I got back to the river, my boat had already left. There I was stuck. Fortunately we had a warship in the port of Nanking at the time and I went out to the warship and they kept me for three or four days until the next river boat came along.

*Q: We had the Yangtze River Patrol there.*

BUTRICK: Yes. So this destroyer, I think it was, was in Nanking at the time. They were nice and took me on and kept me until another boat came. I was left with nothing but a fountain pen. (At that time, the U.S. Yangtze Patrol consisted of several ships, under the general control of a Vice Admiral.)

*Q: What was the post like at Hankow and what was the situation there?*

BUTRICK: In Hankow we occupied one building, a huge building. On the first floor were the offices, on the second floor all the bachelors had living quarters, and on the third floor was the Consul General's residence. The Consul General at that time was Frank Lockhart. So we were all quite happy there. It was a busy time. It was a time of much change because the Communist Chinese were coming up from the south. They came into Hankow while I was there.

*Q: This was the KMT/CCP Northern Expedition?*

BUTRICK: Part of it. We used to see Chinese walking along the Bund tied by a silk cord. They were taken by their captors out near the Hankow Club and all beheaded. Their heads were displayed on long poles so that all going to the Club could see them.

We were next to the old Russian consulate, which was by then occupied by the Chinese Communists. They also had a military group there and they used to exercise out in the yard of the former Russian consulate. They had a captain in charge of this company and he would march them back and forth and finally he got the idea of sitting down on one end of the marching area and directing them by a whistle. He had a whistle that he would blow and they would march back, etc.

We were right next door and overlooked this display. We had a chap named Russell Jordan who was with us. Russell was quite a character. He perceived the idea of getting a whistle and blowing it from a window upstairs. We did that and sure enough the troops all turned around and started marching the other way. We had a lot of fun with things like that. We were always up to some devilment.

It was a busy time. While we were there, the British concession was taken over by the Chinese. We were in the former Russian concession, ourselves. At that time we had the French concession and the Japanese concession in Hankow, but no American concession. But we still had extraterritoriality and were under American law. We had an American court there as well as in Shanghai.

*Q: Did you have anything to do with the court?*

BUTRICK: No, I had nothing to do with the court in Hankow. We had nothing to do with the court in Shanghai either, although we were very friendly with the judge, Milton Helmick, and other members of the court.

So it was an exciting time. One time we slept on board ships in the harbor at night rather than staying in our homes because it wasn't safe to stay at home.

*Q: Well, what was happening?*

BUTRICK: The Communists were taking over.

*Q: The Kuomintang...?*

BUTRICK: If I recall correctly, and I am not sure that I do, the Kuomintang was taking over all of the British concession and we had all the British people in our consulate for a while with their trunks and all their baggage while they were trying to evacuate down to Shanghai on a boat. It was quite an exciting period of time. The French had their own little police force, all Annamese, under a French chief. The Japanese had their own police, too.

*Q: What type of work were you doing there?*

BUTRICK: I was administrative officer for the entire office. Of course we had Chinese language officers that took care of the Chinese. We had Chinese writers, as they were called, because even our Chinese language officers could not correspond with the Chinese authorities in Chinese. We had to have Chinese writers who would do all that. They were a nice group. We had about six

writers. There were as many of them as there were of us.

*Q: Whom were we dealing with?*

BUTRICK: We were dealing with the Chinese authorities there.

*Q: Were they the Nationalists?*

BUTRICK: They were the Nationalists at that time.

*Q: Were there any problems that you can remember?*

BUTRICK: No real problems. It was very amusing to me. I was recently arrived in Hankow and knew nothing about China. One of the officers was a son of a missionary, Gordon Burke was his name. Gordon spoke Chinese fluently because he had been brought up in China. One day he was going to the local branch of the Foreign Office...the Foreign Office in Peking had a branch in Hankow and he said, "Dick, how would you like to come over to the Foreign Office with me?" I said, "Fine, I would love it." We had a case of a Standard Oil boat that had been forced to pay some levies on the river which they were not supposed to pay. They call it the likin tax. So he was going to complain about that and get back the money.

We went over to the Foreign Office and he spoke to the man in charge there in Chinese. I suppose he was giving him greetings or something, I don't know what it was. Then they began discussing the case in English. It turned out that this man was a graduate of Princeton University and spoke English perfectly. In the course of the conversation this man deliberately lied and told a false story about the whole event. It didn't seem to bother Gordon at all.

Finally, the conversation was finished and we were walking back to the office which wasn't far away. I said, "Gordon, how did it go?" He said, "Oh, fine, fine." I said, "What do you mean fine. That man lied to you outright." "Oh, yes, he lied to me, that's all right. It doesn't make any difference." He said, adding, "He knows that he lied, he knows that I know that he lied, and he knows that I know that he knows that he lied. So it doesn't matter," and in reality so it was! Well, that was my introduction to China. I would not have understood at all what Gordon Burke readily understood.

*Q: What about the missionaries? Did they cause a problem for the consulate, particular with the Communists in the hinterland?*

BUTRICK: They got along as well as they could with people. They really didn't cause any trouble.

*Q: What about our Yangtze River Patrol?*

BUTRICK: They were a lot of fun. Sometimes the wives would come out and stay in Hankow, so we got to know the ladies quite well. We would see them at the club, playing golf. We had a very nice club in Hankow. The most unusual club I have ever seen in the world, for a country

club. We had a race track, a nine hole golf course inside the race track, an eighteen hole golf course outside the race track, 12 or 15 tennis courts on grass, a swimming pool which was indoors and in winter was covered over and made into a ballroom.

*Q: That made up for Guayaquil.*

BUTRICK: That made up for Guayaquil, it certainly did. China was quite pleasant indeed. It was exciting and pleasant.

*Q: You were in Hankow from 1926-32. At that time how did we get along with the Japanese?*

BUTRICK: We got along fine with the Japanese. We were good friends. The Japanese consul general would have us out for parties, etc. and we would entertain them. We had no problems at all.

*Q: Then you moved to Shanghai in 1932.*

BUTRICK: Yes. I didn't go home because we had no home leave at government expense. You had to pay your own way if you went home. So I didn't go home until I had been in Hankow for four years. Then I went home and met in Washington the lady who became my wife. Then we went up to St. John...

*Q: Again?*

BUTRICK: No, I was mistaken, I didn't go earlier. As a matter of fact we were married in St. John.

*Q: How long were you in St. John?*

BUTRICK: Oh, a very short time. I couldn't have been there for more than four months.

*Q: Then ...?*

BUTRICK: Then I was brought back to Washington and sent out to Shanghai.

*Q: You were in Shanghai from 1932-42. What were you doing there?*

BUTRICK: I was the number two in the office and ran the office. We had a political reporter, Ed Stanton, and then we had some commercial reporters. The office was pretty well organized along those lines. Jack Service was also there. Jimmy Pilcher was there at that time too. The whole staff was highly competent.

*Q: Things began to heat up with the Japanese while you were there.*

BUTRICK: Yes, they did. You see the Japanese were at war with the Chinese before we got into war with them. It was very amusing because the International Settlement in Shanghai...there

were various international sectors within it...one was patrolled by the British, another was patrolled by the Japanese and another by the Italians, etc. So when the war broke out we used to see these British and Italian troops patrolling in the International Settlement although they were at war with each other.

*Q: Prior to the breaking out of war, there was the International Settlement. Did this mean you had very little dealings with the Chinese authorities?*

BUTRICK: We had dealings with the Chinese authorities too. I remember one case came before the settlement court about a Chinese who brought birds and chickens in huge big baskets. There was some rule that they could put only so many in a basket. We had a Chinese before the court one time because he had too many chickens in the basket. They put him on the stand to explain the whole thing and he said that so far as he was concerned it was not that he had too many chickens in the basket but that the basket was too small for the number of chickens he had to carry. That nearly floored the American judge. I don't remember how the case came out but remember that angle of it.

*Q: What were our concerns in Shanghai at that time?*

BUTRICK: There was quite a lot of American business, including the Standard Oil Company which was all over the country. Then we had other business organizations out there too. For example, the power plant in Shanghai was managed by an American. One of the big businesses in those days was tung oil which was brought down the river from up around Chungking. It was shipped to the United States. We had business with the Philippines too. It was a very busy port.

*Q: Did you get involved in the suppression of the opium trade at all?*

BUTRICK: No, I don't remember anything of that sort. I think the opium trade was pretty well over by that time. Although there were opium dens in Shanghai and the Chinese did go to them and smoke opium.

*Q: What was our navy doing, the Patrol?*

BUTRICK: They were to keep order and make sure that American ships...you see we had private American ships, Yangtze Rapid they called it, that carried cargo up and down the river too...from Chungking down to Shanghai. We had American businesses located along the river in smaller towns.

*Q: When the Sino-Japanese war started in 1937, did that have much of an effect on us?*

BUTRICK: Not to any appreciable extent. It was 1940 when I went out to China again as Counselor of Embassy at Chungking. When I was transferred from there to Peking, I was hoping the war would break out before I got to Peking so I wouldn't have to go there. But I did get to Peking and it didn't break out until three or four months afterwards.

*Q: But the Chinese were already at war with Japan.*

BUTRICK: The Japanese were in charge in Peking, for example. All of Peking was under Japanese control even though we had our Embassy branch office in Peking. Other countries had their branch offices there too, but their principal offices were in Chungking.

*Q: Before we came into the war in 1941, when the Chinese and Japanese were fighting each other, did this have much of an effect on your work in Shanghai?*

BUTRICK: No, I don't think the Japanese bothered us much at all. They certainly didn't bother us at all in Peking. But we didn't have much of an interest in Peking at that time anyway. The National City Bank was there and we had the university there which was run by Americans.

*Q: Were you in China when the Japanese bombed the gunboat Panay?*

BUTRICK: I remember the incident but can't remember just where I was...Hankow or Shanghai. I knew the Consul in Nanking at that time.

*Q: Who took the wounded survivors from the ship?*

BUTRICK: I don't know the details of that.

Many of the British river boats had a toilet on the rear end of the boat. Some member of the royalty was out in China at that time interviewing people. This man had been shot and injured at the time of the Panay incident. She said to him, "Oh, my, how were you injured?" He said, "Well, Madam, I happened to be at the rear of the boat at the time and where I was shot if it had been you, you wouldn't have even been touched."

*Q: Did the Japanese get nastier towards us when you were in Shanghai?*

BUTRICK: They were pushy a little bit, but not nasty. They didn't like us coming into the Japanese area much at all.

*Q: You went to Chungking around 1941. What were you doing up there?*

BUTRICK: I was Counselor of Embassy. Mr. Gauss, who had been Consul General in Shanghai, was the Ambassador at that time. Then John Carter Vincent came afterwards and replaced me. He was a Chinese language officer. In Chungking I felt there was more need to know Chinese than in Shanghai, which was much more cosmopolitan.

*Q: Chungking was not an international city in the way Shanghai was?*

BUTRICK: That's right although many people spoke English, especially the officials. But the general public did not. So it was better to have people there like Jack Service who spoke Chinese fluently.

*Q: So then you were sent to Peking where you served...?*

BUTRICK: I relieved Bob Smyth, who came home on vacation and transfer.

*Q: You were doing what in Peking?*

BUTRICK: I was in charge of the office there.

*Q: Now Peking was not the capital of China in those days. It had been Nanking and then had moved to Chungking.*

BUTRICK: Peking, as I say, was sort of a branch office of the Embassy.

*Q: Did you deal at all with the Chinese or only with the Japanese?*

BUTRICK: There were some Chinese there who we dealt with, but the Japanese were in control of final decisions.

*Q: Was there sort of the feeling among the Foreign Service there that eventually the United States was going to go to war?*

BUTRICK: Oh, we thought that before I even got to Peking. I was hoping war would break out before I had to go to Peking because I thought for sure I would get caught in Peking...and I was.

*Q: What happened to you when the war started?*

BUTRICK: Well, we had to lower the flag. We had Marine guards at the Embassy and they were taken prisoners. The Japanese demanded that the colonel in charge of the Marines surrender, and he came to see me. We agreed that it was absolutely hopeless to resist, the Japanese could have killed every one of the Marines without any difficulty whatsoever. So he had to surrender. Then we had to lower the flag. There happened to be a Marine sergeant there and when the time came to lower the flag I said, "You go up and take down the flag and give it to me when you bring it back down." He said, "I have never lowered a flag this way." I said, "It is very simple. You just lower it and fold it up the best you can and bring it down." He went up and brought the flag down. I took it carefully in my arms and walked back through the crowd of mostly Japanese military to the office and kept it there. I kept the flag for four years and then lo and behold I was sent out to China to reestablish our offices out there and I took the flag back with me and we raised the same flag over the Embassy that we had taken down four years earlier.

*Q: How did the Japanese treat you?*

BUTRICK: Well, we were on very friendly terms with the Japanese before the war broke out and we knew them. One of them was an American, really. He spoke English fluently. We were treated very well by the Japanese. We had no real complaint. The only thing was that toward the end of the six months or so that we were there, we were running out of liquor and it would have been pretty tough after that.

*Q: How did they get you out?*

BUTRICK: We were sent by train from Peking to Shanghai where we were supposed to take boats. As it happened we were in Shanghai for a couple of weeks before we were loaded on the boat to come back home.

While we were in Peking I had a Japanese language officer on my staff, Beppo Johansen, a very fine man. He followed the Japanese newspapers. The Counselor of the Japanese Embassy had made a cryptic speech to the Japanese and that speech was carried in the Japanese language paper. Beppo saw that and said, "This means war." So we immediately sent a triple priority telegram over the Marine radio to Washington indicating that this had happened and that Beppo thought this meant that war was imminent. About five days later we sent a follow up telegram at Beppo's request saying that war seemed certain in the very near future. So, as far as we were concerned, we were in the clear about notifying the Department.

But recently I attended a meeting of the Far East Group here in Washington and apparently there were all kinds of other warnings that had arrived in Washington that the war was imminent. But they stated that Roosevelt thought the war was going to start down around the Philippines and wasn't prepared for Pearl Harbor at all. But I sometimes wonder about that and maybe the American public in order to be thoroughly aroused had to have something like Pearl Harbor.

*Q: It is one of the theories. I find it a little hard to think that we could orchestrate something like that. But certainly the Japanese did exactly the right thing to make us unite.*

BUTRICK: At a terrible cost of American lives and equipment. But it did arouse the American people.

*Q: My brother was on a battleship at Pearl Harbor.*

BUTRICK: What happened?

*Q: He is still alive. Well now, how did they get you out? You were down in Shanghai for a couple of weeks. This would be in 1942.*

BUTRICK: We stayed in a hotel where all the heating arrangements had been taken out. We were shipped out of Shanghai on the Conte Verdi, an Italian ship with an Italian crew. We went as far as Singapore. The Italians were very nice to us. They made fun of the Japanese all the time. We had tea every day on board. We had a swimming pool. We were treated beautifully. In Singapore we joined with the Suna Maru, I think it was, coming from Japan. From then on we had a Japanese captain and no more swimming pool, no more tea, etc. So the trip from Singapore to Lourenco Marques wasn't all that wonderful, but it was all right. The Italian crew talked behind the backs of the Japanese. They didn't like the Japanese at all. And when the boat went back to Shanghai, the Italian crew sank it.

*Q: What I gather was the Japanese diplomats were brought on the Gripsholm to Lourenco Marques and you came on the Italian ship and then there was an exchange.*

BUTRICK: They took the Japanese back to Japan and then we came back to the United States on the Gripsholm. A number of our officers were transferred direct from Lourenco Marques to other posts.

*Q: I remember talking to one person, I think it was Fred Hunt, who was left in Lourenco Marques.*

BUTRICK: Yes, Fred Hunt was there as was Tom Weil. Tom was transferred to Australia I think.

*Q: Then you came back to the United States in mid 1942. Was there much in the way of debriefing you?*

BUTRICK: We were debriefed and had to write up reports. But I don't remember the details of that.

*Q: How did they treat you once you were back?*

BUTRICK: I think all of us had a "looking us over" period to see how we had come through all this. I don't remember exactly, I must have been assigned to the Far Eastern Division, I am not sure. I went on various trips like the one to reset up the Far Eastern offices. Went on a trip around South America with two other people...I was an inspector for a while, too.

**WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN**  
**Born in China**  
**Beijing (1926)**

**Chinese Language School**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1955-1956)**

**Political/Consular/Economic Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1956-1958)**

*Ambassador Gleysteen was born in China of Missionary parents. Educated at Yale and Harvard Universities, he entered the Foreign Service in 1951. After service in the State Department's Executive Secretariat, Mr. Gleysteen studied Chinese and was subsequently posted to Taipei, Hong Kong, and to Seoul, Korea, where he served as Ambassador from 1978 to 1981. He also served in Washington with the National Security Council and in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. The Ambassador was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1997.*

*Q: I am delighted to have this opportunity to talk to my old boss. We appreciate greatly your*

*willingness to participate in our Oral History project. Let me start with the usual question: What is your background - birth, early childhood, education, etc?*

GLEYSTEN: Two obvious influence pushed me toward a Foreign Service career: being raised in Asia and having parents with a very international point of view.

I was born in Beijing (known to me as Peking), China in 1926 just before Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang briefly unified China. My parents were Presbyterian missionaries. While my father was an ordained minister and my mother was also very committed to her faith, they were professionals - school teachers, not evangelists. For a number of years my father was the principal of a large Chinese middle school for boys, which had a variety of self-help schemes permitting bright but indigent students to attend. My parents were great believers in the moral and practical virtues of physical labor for intellectuals, a concept alien to the Chinese scholar class in those days. Although it might have been better for me, I didn't attend the missionary school. Along with most other Americans I was sent to the Peking American School where I received an excellent education. Many of my fellow students were Chinese, but the teachers were American and the language of instruction was English.

I was in China at the time of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese controlled Beijing, having captured it in 1937, and we immediately fell under their control. After a relatively brief period of house arrest, we were released to remain within the city under rules that kept us apart from our Chinese acquaintances. About a year later we were sent to an internment camp in Wei Xian, Shandong - a fairly rugged experience. From there we were eventually repatriated to the U.S. - after a very long voyage on a Japanese troop ship to Goa, India and then the Gripsholm to New York by way of South Africa and Brazil.

After getting back to the States in December 1943, I went to Westtown Friends School in Pennsylvania for one term. Although I had missed most of my formal high school education, I had been tutored by superb teachers and Westtown was very generous in allowing me to graduate after one term. I was in the Navy for about two years first as a V-12 student and then as an enlisted man. After the war, I attended Yale, got a BA in 1949 and an MA in 1951 before going to work for the Department of State. During summers I worked as a laborer to supplement my meager financial resources at school. I was a merchant seaman in the summer of 1947, exposing me during that contentious year to the Taft-Hartley Act and the process of labor unions evicting communist elements within their ranks.

There are several ways my childhood experiences influenced my career choice. My parents were very dedicated to China, and I was taught that service to others - secular as well as religious - was very important. These values were drilled into me as they were into my brothers and sisters. China was a place that easily evoked sympathy in the late 1930s and 1940s. It was poor and economically backward, but the people were friendly, capable, and enjoyed a glorious tradition - even if the old society had collapsed.

I have especially strong memories about the period in the mid 1930s when I suddenly began to comprehend what my parents were telling me about Japanese aggression against China. I became very conscious of Chinese nationalism, which I experienced vicariously through my Chinese

friends. Having learned after the event about the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in 1931, I was politically conscious and saw the devastation when Japan attacked China proper in 1937. At a young age I was convinced that the Chinese had been victimized by inexcusable Japanese actions.

Despite this powerfully negative view of Japanese behavior, I should note that I was exposed to a variety of Japanese during my childhood, both in China and Japan. We knew Japanese - particularly Christians - who were anti-military and anti-war. Some of them visited China from time to time and came to see us. The Japanese as a people were not demonized in my upbringing.

Two foreign institutions in Beijing fascinated me in my childhood - probably because of their privileged status. The first was a large detachment of U.S. Marines, frequently mounted on Mongolian ponies for parades or polo. These remnants of our colonial era were present during my whole childhood, and a residual force was still present at the time of Pearl Harbor. The second was the Foreign Service. My parents were acquainted with many of the American diplomats, and most diplomatic children attended our school. Their lives looked opulent compared to us poor missionary kids. Many Americans raised in China joined the Foreign Service or the Marines. Some did both. Along with my brothers and sisters I was indoctrinated with my parents' world view. My father and mother made a great point of discussing international issues with us around the lunch and dinner table. We talked about what Japan was doing to China, what Germany was doing in Europe, etc. My father went to Geneva in 1932 to observe the League of Nations debates on Japanese activities in Manchuria. Five years later he was very disturbed by events in Europe and sensed war was coming. In 1939 we traveled to Europe on the trans-Siberian railroad. Going through Stalin's Soviet Union was an ugly experience (involving NKVD harassment, scenes of soldiers with bayonets marching prisoners near the tracks, and other manifestations of a police state) that left a deep imprint on my psyche. We visited Germany, Holland, England, getting to the States one month before the Russo-German invasion of Poland.

By the time I went to Yale, I had pretty well decided that I wanted to get involved in something related to international affairs, particularly some activity that might benefit other human beings. Like many others of my age I was enthused by what sometimes seemed to be heroic efforts in the post-war period to construct international institutions, promote development, and (later) cope with Cold War threats. Yet, at this point in my life, I was not focused on the Foreign Service, and I was very depressed by events in East Asia. China was being torn apart by civil war. I had been brought up as a child with a rather benign view of Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang revolution, so as a young man I was particularly discouraged and disappointed by Chiang's corruption and ineffectiveness. I had no romantic notions about the Communists. I saw their assumption of power through a Cold War prism, not the more objective manner of my later years. China seemed to be regressing from the goals that had energized my family. Elsewhere in Asia I was disgusted by the efforts of the British, French, and Dutch to reassert their colonial control.

My strong reaction to these events led me to abandon East Asian affairs. At Yale, I majored in European intellectual history and got my MA in international relations. I did not return to Asian issues until toward the end of graduate school. In the meantime, my older brother Culver had joined the Foreign Service. He had already had very interesting experiences that tempted me. I

also met a number of Foreign Service officers in graduate school who impressed me by their caliber. I had a professor of international relations (and master of Pierson College at Yale where I lived), Arnold Wolfers, who was quite high on the Foreign Service. My parents looked favorably on the Foreign service. The Foreign Service and State Department enjoyed much prestige. However, no one lobbied me or put any pressure on me during my slow drift into the Foreign Service by way of the Civil Service.

After getting my MA from Yale, I was still undecided about the "next step." I had in mind a job at the Department of State or a fellowship to continue my graduate studies. When I naively asked Professor Wolfers to recommend me for both, he told me quite properly that he would endorse me for one or the other but not both. So I chose the State Department. I took and passed the Civil Service Junior Management Exam, a standard test in those days for entry level professional positions. But I was not bent on becoming a China or Asian specialist when I started work in 1951 as a Civil Service clerk typist, GS-3, in the Executive Secretariat, a temporary appointment to get me on the rolls - for a salary of less than \$3,000 a year!

*Q: When did you start in the Department and what were your duties?*

GLEYSTEN: I started in March 1951. I was still in my anti-Asia mood. Although I had relented a little bit by taking a refresher course in Chinese along with a number of Asian related courses at Yale, I was still leery of becoming a Chinese expert.

I had a friend in the Department who told me that there was a vacancy in the executive secretariat (S/S). I had also met with a number of people in INR, who seemed interested in me. So I had a few choices; the secretariat sounded quite interesting and in fact, my job did turn out to be interesting from the start.

I shared a small office with Richard Hennes, a friend who occasionally still drops in on Washington. Our job was to summarize key documents for quick reference. (I later found out that most of the material we were summarizing was destined for Acheson's archives.) We also summarized cables for the "Digest" that went to the president and the secretary every day. Our most awesome responsibility was to review drafts of foreign policy speeches to insure conformance with Administration policy. This function, which was created after Truman and Acheson decided to squelch some of the more free-wheeling appointees, at times put us in direct confrontation with very important people. Secretary Acheson supported us when the official in question went over our heads to complain. I greatly admired Acheson - more in those early years than later.

I might note that I had little Foreign Service executive or management training in my government career, with the possible exception of a year as a fellow at Harvard University and the DCM course toward the end of my assailment as DCM in Taipei. I just got thrown into the jobs. Of course, I learned on the job, but I think I should have been required to take a number of training courses.

After about a year of summarizing and speech clearance, I was put "on the line" in S/S, the equivalent in those days of today's Operations Center. By this time John Foster Dulles had

replaced Acheson. I saw a great deal more of him than I had of Acheson, largely because I often went on trips with him.

The secretariat went through a number of evolutions. In the early 1950s, its basic function was to manage the paper flow to the seventh (actually fifth in my days) floor principals, starting with the secretary. Later, by stages, S/S became a 24-hour activity culminating in the elaborate Operations Center for dealing with crises. During the years in the early 1950s when I was on the line in S/S my main task was to review documents going to the secretary dealing with East Asia and with NSC activities. I kept sensitive files, and I attended most of the secretary's meetings with Walter Robertson and his staff as well as NSC-related discussions centered around Bob Bowie, director of policy planning, and the secretary. My impression is that S/S was probably more actively involved in the decision-making process at that time than during my later service. We were omni-present, although we rarely spoke up, unless there was a question about the files and records.

McCarthyism was an ugly disease that struck the country during my S/S days. Since my family had lived abroad, and specifically in China, I was in a category subject to suspicion. Furthermore, I was married to the daughter of O. Edmund Clubb, one of the prominent China officers pursued by McCarthy's witch hunt. Although Clubb was exonerated in the final analysis, the process destroyed his career and he resigned in disgust at a relatively young age. I also knew John Davies-through my brother Culver; I did not know Service, but had a high regard for him and most of the others.

Let me expand a little on my personal experience. As I said, I was interrogated under klieg lights by our security office, primarily about any connections with communist that I might have formed during my China days. Interestingly enough, they chose not to question me extensively about Clubb. They had a fuzzy dossier on me - I was guilty of being born abroad, in China moreover, I was acquainted with a number of "suspicious" people, and I behaved strangely, for example reading the Communist "Daily Worker" newspaper in the Philadelphia Public Library. In fact, I had done so at the suggestion of a very conservative anti-communist professor for a "content analysis" paper required in his course at Yale. My brother Ted, who had once worked for the FBI, warned me about undertaking this project, predicting it would get me into a lot of trouble. And he was right. The dossier also noted my alleged sympathy for the communists during my Yale days. This was stimulated by a talk I gave to a U.S. Army reserve unit in New Haven while I was a graduate student. I made some disparaging comments about South Korean President Syngman Rhee, stating that when I first learned the Korean War had broken out I was not initially certain whether the provocation had come from the South or North, although it soon became obvious by the massive attack that North Korea was the aggressor. Some time later in a New Haven bar I ran into an army reserve officer who had been in the audience. Quite drunk and failing to recognize me as the speaker, he described to me the terrible talk I had given and branded it as pro-communist. Presumably, he reported that to Army intelligence which passed it on to the State Department's security apparatus. The most amusing accusation was that I had been the leader of a Chinese communist guerrilla unit during WW II. I pointed out that I would have been rather young for such activity.

These and other equally baseless allegations were left to fester in my dossier without analysis

and then took on significance in the McCarthy period. I had been given security clearance in 1951 so that I could join the Department, and I also had no problems obtaining renewed clearance when I was "Wristonized" into the Foreign Service in 1954. But for some reason the allegations against me were given sufficient weight to bar me from a foreign assignment. In 1955, while I was awaiting assignment to the Chinese language school in Taiwan and wondering why the assignment was not finalized, I learned from my boss, Walter Scott, that it was my security dossier that kept me from being assigned overseas. I told Scott the clearance issue had to be resolved immediately or I would be forced to find other employment. He agreed with me. In fact, I was interrogated one afternoon and had my clearance 36 hours later.

Apart from my obvious personal revulsion, I think "McCarthyism" damaged the effectiveness of the Department of State more than most people realize. Many of the best China experts that the department had were either discharged or sidetracked into non- China related work. This deprived China affairs of some very smart, even brilliant people. Even worse, an aura of what today might be called "political correctness" permeated the department, resulting in caution of expression and considerable intellectual cowardice. For example, when I was assigned to our embassy in Taipei in 1956, I found the political section appalling. It was so conservative, so cautious, so wedded to the safe path, that its intellectual contribution to US policy making was almost nil. This was the most unfortunate legacy of the McCarthy era. Any bureaucracy finds it difficult to consider new approaches - much less take them - and when that is combined with fear you have an unthinking institution.

So my first impression of Dulles was rather negative, the views of a fairly "liberal" anti-communist Democrat, working in a very Republican administration. But I generally measure people on how they perform and over time, and my opinion of Dulles rose measurably. Initially, I feared he was an adventurer; he sided with the military in several debates concerning the development and use of nuclear weapons. In the secretary's and deputy secretary's offices during meetings and phone conversations I listened to the arguments dealing with China; I was appalled. Bedell Smith, a fine soldier and good deputy also disappointed me by siding with Dulles. Fortunately, President Eisenhower had the sense to toss out an almost unanimous State and Defense recommendation to use nuclear weapons. This aspect of Dulles jolted me, but as time went on, my anxieties diminished.

I have one story - both amusing and disturbing - about my relationship to Dulles. During one of the off-shore island crises with China - before the well known Chinmen and Matsu crisis in 1958 - the PRC (The People's Republic of China) and Nationalist Chinese had been exchanging artillery fire back and forth in some small islands in the Taiwan Straits, the Da Chen islands, as I recall. We intervened, moving Seventh Fleet ships to the vicinity to deter the mainlanders and eventually evacuate the Nationalists. In the process we demanded the Nationalists cease firing unless fired on. A truce of sorts developed after tough negotiations with President Chiang Kai-shek. I was following the crisis closely. While Dulles was in Europe, the Nationalists resumed shelling and the Communists responded, so that we had renewed hostilities - although at a relatively low level. In a meeting with the assistant secretaries in preparation for an NSC meeting, Dulles asked Robertson whether the truce had held. Robertson assured him that the Nationalists had behaved. In the back benches I created a stir by letting everyone know Robertson was wrong. I think it was Bowie who urged me to speak up. In any event I finally

raised my hand - very much like a school boy. Dulles recognized me and I disputed Robertson's answer, giving the facts, which were in a memorandum already sent to the secretary. Robertson was furious and when I stuck to my guns mentioning the memorandum, Dulles asked O'Connor to check, which he did promptly and confirmed my account. Dulles grumbled an acknowledgment. Bowie, Byroad and Merchant were amused, while Robertson was fit to be tied. The issue was not a minor one since several admirals were in favor of using nuclear weapons against the Chinese. I was baffled by Robertson's behavior. He was too involved to have been ignorant; he wasn't stupid. He must have been suffering from a powerful compulsion to protect his pals in Taipei. O'Connor told me I was lucky to have been right and laughed; Robertson did not talk to me for a month; but my good relationships with his staff in EA continued without noticeable damage.

My attendance at the SEATO ministerial and Geneva meetings generated some prejudices in me about international conferences, reinforced perhaps by my second-hand observation of the negotiations for the Korean War armistice, the peace and security treaties with Japan as well our treaties with Taiwan and Korea. International conferences with their opportunities for high level contact were more important in the 1950s and 1960s than they are today when there are so many venues for personal contact. Now, international conferences are a debased currency. In my time in the secretariat, high level international meetings were rather rare and therefore targeted on critically important matters. Now, they are routine, often very large and frequently frivolous. Their cumbersome size was a drawback in those days, and remains so today.

I found conference preparations very tedious. I was quite cynical about the amount of paper produced by the bureaus and offices; that was particularly true for the Geneva conference where in my S/S capacity I had to read every paper from beginning to end. I knew that the Secretary and his senior assistants would never read most of these documents. Many were not worth reading; quite a few were prepared to fill arbitrary briefing book requirements. Even with all this paper flow, there was not enough attention paid to contingency situations which, for example, dominated at Geneva. Some important papers on critical policy issues were warped by the kind of ideological posturing that obstructed communication with our adversaries. The extremes of these papers were reflected in Dulles' refusal to shake the hand Zhou Enlai extended to him or to communicate directly with the Chinese. Not only did we demonized the Chinese to our own disadvantage but we also complicated our dealings with the Soviets. Today, of course, we have better means of communicating with both countries, but we still like to demonize our adversaries.

*Q: In 1955, you were assigned to the language school in Taipei. How did come about?*

GLEYSTEN: I was "Wristonized" in 1954-55. I was not unhappy by the prospects of joining the Foreign Service. In fact, the process went very smoothly. I worried that some Foreign Service officers might resent my joining the ranks by way of the Civil Service, but I came across no apparent animosity. In the long run, I don't think Wristonization of civil servants hurt the officers who entered the Service through the regular examination process. I transferred at about the same pay level as in the Civil Service: GS-11 to FSO-5 (later reclassified to FS0-7).

About the same time I saw an advertisement seeking applications from officers who were

interested in becoming Chinese language officers through a difficult languages program. I put my name in, and I soon found myself in the first class of the Chinese language school that had just resumed operations in Taichung, Taiwan, having been dormant from the time the Communists captured Beijing in 1949.

I spoke ordinary Chinese quite fluently, but I was only semi-literate. While I knew some characters, I could not read a newspaper or a novel. I had grown up bilingual in English and spoken Chinese and this enabled me to cover the full language course in about one year, less than half the time that a non-Chinese speaker would have taken. I graduated with a high rating-good enough to interpret informally in both directions.

There must have been seven or eight of us at the Chinese language school. Over half were from the Foreign Service; the others belonged to other agencies-USIA, CIA, and Defense. We had to work in makeshift quarters in a rented house. My classroom was a kitchen; there was no furniture so that we sat on the floor until simple furniture finally arrived. By the time I left, the school had appropriate class rooms and adequate furnishings.

There was a lot of comradery among us. We studied hard for long days for many weeks. Then we would on occasion indulge ourselves - sometimes at a resort and some of us drinking too much. That cemented friendships. We had close relations with our teachers; we lived as a small community. Among my colleagues-most of them married-in the first class were Paul Popple (deceased), Bill Thomas, Paul Kreisberg (deceased), Harold Champeau, Frank Burnett, Jim Elliot, and Randy Raven. David Dean arrived about the time I left. Most of them were newcomers to Chinese language. In general, I think the course was very good. FSI did a first class job in reopening that language school. I well remember how hard I worked-sixteen hours each day. I wanted to raise my level of comprehension so I would be able to navigate well in Chinese, and I wanted that done sooner rather than later. The extra hours helped me graduate after the first year. If I had not spoken the language as a child and if I had not had brushed up at Yale, I would have had a much more difficult time.

The faculty was locally hired. Nicholas Bodman was the first head of the school. He was an established linguist -although with little knowledge of Chinese and somewhat impractical. Despite some criticism of his performance and lots of practical problems, he successfully managed to revive the school. He was replaced by Gerald Cox.

I learned Mandarin which is the Chinese dialect that we generally use in our discussions and negotiations. I think we were pig-headed in limiting ourselves to Mandarin, largely because that was what our teachers thought we should be taught. It suited me, of course, because Mandarin was the dialect I learned as a boy, and it was the national language in both the PRC and Taiwan. But the reality is that dialects are used extensively in both places. It would have been very useful to have officers fluent-or close to it-in both dialects. It would have helped me in both my first and second tours on Taiwan - even though it might have resulted in a greater emphasis on the China area in my future career. I recognize practical limitations, particularly finding the extra time to study a dialect.

At the end of my training I was assigned to the Political Section in Embassy Taipei. The political

counselor, Paul Meyer, invited me and my wife to Taipei for an interview and dinner. He was a friend of my wife's family, having been a colleague of Edmund Clubb. After a very pleasant evening with the Meyers, I learned a few weeks later that he arranged with the ambassador to have me shifted to the consular section, because he decided my views were out of line with embassy thinking. Indeed, they were! So I was shuffled off to the consular section without training, reporting to a wonderful, almost always drunken consular veteran who gave me an abbreviated version of the consular course.

I spent six months in the consular Section. I never regretted the assignment; it was good experience. I was a bit disappointed about being diverted from the political Section, but I thought officers should have broad experience in their younger years, including consular work. I learned a lot in the consular section - how to issue visas, how to interview people, the complications of immigration issues, etc.. There were just two officers in the section, so that my exposure to the various aspects of consular work was quite wide. I also was able to use my language skills quite frequently-much more than if I had been in any other section of the embassy. I usually did my own interviews without the help of a translator.

While in the consular section, I worked on both non-immigrant and immigrant visas as well as services to Americans - including protection and passports. In the mid-1950s, Congress authorized a vast increase in the Chinese immigrant quota. The new law allowed people who were refugees from the mainland, who could make a case, to immigrate to the US along with their families. Most of these people were in Hong Kong, but there were also some in Taiwan. A special consular section staffed by State and INS was established in a different building to handle this work-load. By the time I got to Taipei this special program was coming to an end. The residual work fell to the consular section, giving me some exposure to many of the applicants. Some, like Anna Chennault, struck me as hardly fitting the definition of refugee. I didn't have much sympathy for them. Incidentally, Chennault later managed to wangle a visa from someone else.

I refused quite a few applications, both for immigrant and non-immigrant visas. I was reversed in a few cases by the DCM, James Pilcher. I told him it was not his business, and I made sure that he, rather than I, signed such visas and that his action was noted in the files. All of those cases were matters of political favoritism - a not uncommon practice. My genial boss was more willing to bend than I. In the process I learned a negative lesson, and throughout my career I tried not to pressure decisions by consular officers.

My first ambassador was Karl Rankin. He was succeeded by Everett F. Drumright in 1958. The DCM for my whole tour was Jimmy Pilcher, who just died recently. He knew little about substance but had considerable experience as a senior consular officer, including a feel for management. He had served in China, but was not a language officer; I felt his principal agenda was to get along with people, especially the ambassador and the Chinese in Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Rankin was a newcomer to the Chinese scene who had distinguished himself in emergency relief activities and Cold War operations in Greece. He became our ambassador at the peak of our confrontation with the PRC, and he was very ideological about Communists - Greek or Chinese, they were all the same to him. Pilcher echoed him.

Drumright, on the other hand, was a China expert, a language officer with several tours in China. He had been DCM in Korea during the Korean war and had held a number of senior positions in EA area. Although liked personally by most of his colleagues from China days, some thought he was over his head as ambassador. I don't entirely share their uncharitable view, after seeing the variety of characters appointed to ambassadorial positions. Drumright may not have been brilliant, but he was an improvement over Rankin; he had a better grasp of the Chinese situation and reality. He was only slightly more moderate.

About this time I was promoted on the basis on my performance at the language school-a rare occurrence designed to encourage study of difficult languages. I was surprised and delighted but it made me senior to my boss. To solve that problem I was moved to the economic section, which might have happened in any case. Joe Yager, a strong officer and friend, was the economic counselor for the major part of my two year plus tour. He later succeeded Pilcher as DCM.

I had only been exposed to basic economics at Yale. That was not much of a hindrance. My job didn't require fancy training. Essentially, I took care of issues that did not fall clearly within the responsibilities of the other officers. I was responsible for agriculture, which turned out to be a very important function because the Nationalist government had reorganized itself on retreating to Taiwan, making land reform and agricultural development show cases for aid purposes. These efforts were managed by the Joint Commission for Rural Reform (JCRR), which was one of my liaison responsibilities. I got to know certain officials of this agency well. The present president of Taiwan, Lee Teng-hui, was an agronomist and deputy secretary general of the organization, which was a joint American-Chinese enterprise; its commissioners represented both countries, although by the time I started my job Americans were being phased out.

I attended the commission's staff meetings. The secretary general was a member of the Kuomintang Central Committee. My language comprehension came in handy. There were occasions when the Chinese commissioners and staff would argue in Chinese sometimes in order to shut out the Americans present - the commissioner, the head of US AID, etc. I could follow the debate, which often proved to be quite interesting. I reported what I had heard to both my boss and the political section.

I shared the commercial work with another officer. During my last year, Yager allowed me to work on specific projects. I wrote a big report on the forest industry in Taiwan. I had the benefit of very important help from one of our forestry experts and others in AID. My analysis showed that the very expensive assistance we were providing to the forestry industry was being used to sustain a badly run government monopoly designed to keep prices high as a source of revenue with little regard to forest regeneration. Soon thereafter, our assistance was terminated. I was told my report played a role.

Although Drumright was willing to listen to different views, he was unquestionably a hardliner. To make matter worse, we lacked challenging minds in the upper echelons of the embassy's political structure. Paul Meyer, the political counselor was not qualified for his important position even though he was a Chinese language officer and had served in China. Whether from conviction or because he thought his bosses would applaud his views, he was an unimaginative,

unmitigated Cold Warrior who literally censored all attempts to criticize Chiang's regime or deal objectively with Communist China. He had some good political officers under him, whom he kept bottled up doing routine chores. With Joe Yager's collusion, I cheated a little bit to compensate for Meyer. I inserted a good deal of political analysis into the economic section's weekly and monthly reporting. There were occasions when we got bleats from Meyer, because we didn't clear our messages with him. While it was unfortunate we had to resort to this, I felt we were justified in what we did, given the special circumstances. In any event, I'm glad I never served under Meyer.

Part of the staffing problem in China posts was scarcity. A generation of Chinese experts had been decimated by McCarthy; it was not until the next generation came along in the sixties that the Department had an adequate China corps. The other part of the problem was that even though there may have been considerable talent in the pool, the poison associated with China kept many good people away. There were not many volunteers for China assignments. I decided to run the risks of an assignment to Taipei. In fact, I relished the work, and as far as I could tell, it never interfered with my career.

Most controversy about Taiwan centered around assessment of the facts and the almost *verboden* subject of diplomatic relations with the PRC. Assessment of the facts was complicated by more than the divide between communists and anti-communists. The Chinese population on Taiwan was not of one mind. In the first place, there were two Chinese populations on the island. There was the huge majority descended from immigrants who arrived two or three centuries earlier. Known as Taiwanese or "native" people, they were bitterly resentful about the way the Nationalist Chinese had treated them after the Japanese surrender. There were good grounds for that feeling; the Nationalists had been thoughtless, cruel and terribly corrupt. When these unsavory practices were partially exposed by public protest, it caused a drastic crackdown in 1947 involving massacres of thousands of people. So there was a bitterness that you could sense readily in native constituencies. These people wanted development of Taiwan, not a hopeless and costly effort to recapture of the mainland.

The second group of Chinese - about fifteen per cent of the population - were recent arrivals after the collapse of the Nationalist regime on the mainland. Among them were "good" guys and "bad" guys. The most senior "bad guy" was Chiang Kai-shek himself, but there were many others. Even his son Chiang Ching-kuo, who later became one of my heroes, was at that time associated with ugly activities, including police brutality. Although this group was split between reformers, conservatives, and reactionaries, the latter dominated, and naturally most of the group tended to be mainland-oriented.

The Embassy reported these facts, usually with some bias in favor of the controlling regime. I don't think much fault could be found with our reporting on how the Nationalists maintained their control or about the splits within the Chinese community on Taiwan. The contest between groups came through pretty clearly in our reporting. However, the embassy usually short changed the concerns of the Taiwanese and gave excessive weight to the Nationalist point of view. Spiritually, it was defensive of Chiang and his regime. That was a source of friction for me at all times.

Both Chinese communities on Taiwan viewed us favorably. Both had high expectations about US actions: the Taiwanese - and Nationalist reformers - hoped that we would side with them and ease the repression. The ruling Nationalists wanted us to let them go on as in the past; i.e., supporting their attacks against China, minimizing complaints about their heavy handed rule, maximizing our aid, and boycotting significant contact with prominent Taiwanese natives or other opposition groups. During my first tour on Taiwan, the Nationalists were still talking semi-seriously about returning to the mainland.

I want to add a word about views in Taiwan toward the mainland. Those who were hoping for a return to China proper were members of the Nationalist military and civilian establishment who had fled with Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan in 1949. The older these people, the more they wanted to return. Over time, a new generation began to participate in policy making and they were not nearly as interested in return to the mainland as their fathers and mothers. I noticed the beginning of this fundamental change during my first tour.

The embassy under Rankin and to a lesser extent Drumright sided with the older generation Nationalists, favoring intelligence and para-military cooperation with them against the PRC. The embassy leadership and the Washington establishment clung to hope that the Communist regime on the mainland would collapse, somehow allowing the Nationalists to return home. People like Walter Robertson, Rankin, and Drumright didn't know the new generation. They had a skewed image of Taiwan.

Although the Kuomintang and the Nationalist government continued to conduct a number of small operations against the mainland, as time went on, there was less and less support for this activity, especially among the younger generation of mainlanders who tended to think a return to the mainland was a pipe dream. Some of them shared the Taiwanese view that provocative activities by the Nationalists might well back-fire with an armed response from the Communists. In the 1950s, these young people did not yet constitute an alternative to the old guard.

Along with a few other young officers, I sympathized with this emerging group of mainlanders. I believe we conveyed some sense of its importance to our conservative superiors in Washington. While this group downplayed its differences with its parents, its focus was firmly on Taiwan - and how to make it a better place to live - rather than the mainland. Members typically believed that if their stewardship of Taiwan was successful, then perhaps their chances of returning to the mainland would be increased.

As part of their approach, the younger leaders recognized the need to entice elements of the Taiwanese population into collaboration, slowly bringing that majority of the people into the government, army officer corps, Kuomintang, and the policy making apparatus. In a muffled but radical break from his father's failed policies, Chiang Ching-kuo became the leader of co-option. Of course, even in this new group there was a nostalgia for China, but the new generation were far more realistic about what could be achieved in the foreseeable future.

In a political sense, the vast majority of Taiwanese were disinterested in, or actually opposed to, the idea of a military return to the mainland. Their opposition seemed more a matter of self-preservation than ideology. They didn't want to be destroyed by a Nationalist pursuit of a lost

cause. They didn't want to be the soldiers giving their lives for someone else's foolish dream. Incidentally, by the late 1950s Taiwanese were a majority in the army. Virtually all the soldiers on the off-shore islands were Taiwanese. So there was real significance to this tension about a return to the mainland.

In the 1950s the idea of Taiwan "independence" from "China" was not yet a red hot topic, but it was nurtured in certain parts of Taiwan, especially in the city of Tainan. Its subsequent spread came as a reaction to the old Nationalist policies, to the development of opposition politics, and to the long physical separation of the island from the mainland. The most extreme proponent of independence in those days was Peng Ming Min, who recently ran unsuccessfully in Taiwan's first democratic presidential election. Peng's group emphasized the cultural and historical differences between the Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese and urged the establishment of a "Republic of Formosa." These views were fairly popular in Japan, especially in former colonial circles. Peng was allowed to enter the United States where a substantial independence community also emerged. Taiwan "independence" was an anathema to me, an arbitrary action sure to complicate problems on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

In May 1957 we were stunned by an astonishing event in Taipei. The Chinese authorities allowed, or did not prevent, a mob to attack and completely trash the Embassy chancery. At a time of maximum conformation with the PRC, this was hardly what we expected in the capital of our great anti-communist ally. The precipitating event was an American soldier's killing of a Chinese whom he claimed was a "Peeping Tom." The victim, Liu Tze-jan, may have been peeping into the bathroom window but he was also a Chinese intelligence operative, possibly engaged in a black market operation. The American, a master sergeant named Reynolds, was court-martialed. Charged only with one count of murder, he was found not guilty by the American army tribunal. A civilian court might have reached the same conclusion on murder but would have permitted conviction for a lesser offense. All Chinese deeply resented this outcome, particularly when they learned that the court had erupted into loud applause on hearing the "not guilty" verdict and that our military had whisked the soldier out of Taiwan.

Following the court-martial, the embassy was subjected to well organized demonstrations - obviously government approved, if not actually sponsored, since some of the demonstrators were members of the government youth league. Normally, no demonstrations took place in Taiwan; anyone who did so risked his or her life. We were of course concerned and kept asking the authorities to clear the streets. Instead, the demonstrations went on and on, with some participants coming from an unruly neighborhood near the embassy populated with discontented Nationalist ex-soldiers. Also nearby was a community of very poor Taiwanese - slums. Rioting began over the lunch hour when the embassy was normally closed leaving just a skeleton staff-marines, communicators, and a few others in the building. The lunch hour was also the time the demonstrators put on the day's special show of anger. On this occasion zealots tried to lower the American flag and the ensuing struggle raised the crowd's fervor. People, led by a vanguard that seemed experienced, then forced their way into the chancery, smashing everything. In my office, for example, they smashed open the safe and totally destroyed my desk, even unwinding the coils in my telephone. Far more serious, they broke into the communications area breaking open all the classified cabinets and ripping out all equipment, including encryption devices, dumping everything all over the place. After several hours, they found and attacked the eight or nine

Americans hiding in the vault under the protection of our Chinese staff. This included the marine guard who was disarmed by a courier, himself an ex-marine who had the wits to prevent another killing.

By late afternoon the embassy was demolished. As far as we could tell, nothing was stolen, but we couldn't be sure about our documents and considered everything compromised. Fortunately, none of our American or Chinese staff was killed. There were several injuries - Meyer got brutally hit over the head with a hammer and was never the same again. The marine guard and the courier who disarmed him were badly beaten.

While the riot was in progress, DCM Pilcher made several efforts to get in touch with President Chiang Kai-shek. He couldn't be reached because he was "taking his usual walk"; Chiang Ching-kuo, was similarly unavailable. The foreign minister seemed to do his best to get in touch with the military, but nothing ever happened until too late. Eventually, the military deployed hundreds of military police, but never in sufficient numbers to stop the rioters. Late in the day, the demonstrating crowd became increasingly Taiwanese as the riot spread beyond the embassy, particularly to police stations where demonstrators were being detained. By early evening, things were so out of control that the government declared martial law and brought in two army divisions with tanks and truck-mounted machine guns to stop the struggle. Perhaps more than a hundred demonstrators - mostly Taiwanese - were killed. The episode was a humiliating embarrassment to the government.

Inexperience led to some lapses in my own behavior. I was not in the chancery when the riot broke out. When I left for lunch, the atmosphere was tense, but there was no sign of what would happen. Having lunched at my house with the director of the language school in Taichung and dropped him off at the rail station, I noticed a boisterous crowd as I approached the embassy. As a precaution, I left my car outside and tried to walk in the gates, but I was warned away. I tried every other access was known to me, going to the defense attache's office - which had no idea what was going on - and then to the USIA headquarters, where I picked up some intelligence about what was going on, and stayed there until we evacuated just before the mob sacked that building.

The ambassador was in Hong Kong leaving Pilcher in charge. My own mistake was not to report to Pilcher who had set up a make-shift office in his house. I had tried hard to call the senior officers without success, and I also assumed the USIA people would have passed on word that I had been with them. After leaving them I found my car and drove home, because I was very concerned about spreading chaos affecting my family - my wife and recently born baby. So I became one of the "missing" for a couple of hours until I was finally able to get through on the phone to my boss that night. His comments taught me a lesson.

I am not aware of any definitive US analysis of this extraordinary event. It was very apparent to us in 1957 that the Nationalists in Taiwan were competing fiercely for China's national mantle with a PRC that was vaunting its role as China's new national sovereign. Without the prosperity that later mollified them, it was also clear that the indigenous population in Taipei, especially the poorer people, was disaffected from the ruling authorities. Nationalism and discontent were surely the basic ingredients for the riots. In addition, there were obvious misjudgements - on our

side for letting the sergeant go unpunished and on the government's side for allowing the demonstrations to go on when they knew that tempers were running so high.

I accompanied the ambassador when he formally protested the incident to Vice President Chen Cheng who conveniently substituted for the elusive Chiang Kai Shek. Chen, a former general widely admired for the way he cleaned up the brutality and corruption in Taiwan in 1949, apologized and seemed genuinely shocked by what had happened. But neither he nor other leaders provided us many clues. My own speculation was that the Nationalist authorities, faced with both strong competition from the PRC and their own angry countrymen in Taipei, decided to give us a real scare by permitting demonstrations that they cockily assumed they could control. When they finally realized things were getting out of control, they repeatedly miscalculated the amount of counter force necessary, perhaps because commanders were loathe to admit they had lost control.

My explanation did not demonize the Nationalist regime. Coming from a person not known to be enamored of President Chiang, I thought it would appeal to Rankin and Pilcher. Instead, these gentlemen briefly lost their cool about the Generalissimo, accusing him of authorizing a deliberate strike at the embassy by intelligence forces trying to break into our secrets. I rather enjoyed defending the president and his son whom I considered too smart to run such risks against their foreign protector. After a few weeks Rankin and Pilcher resumed their praise of Chiang as a leader of the Free World, and I was also back to my normally critical stance.

Washington was furious about the mob's actions in Taipei - as it should have been. In Taiwan, the story was suppressed, but the regime was chastened. It really bent over backwards to make amends, completely rebuilding the Chancery using its own resources. Washington sent people to help us with the clean up. One of our main tasks was to sort through the material strewn on the floors of the chancery. We decided to burn most of it. Given my S/S experience, I was one of the better trained persons to assess the importance of documents. My impression was that we were not seriously compromised by the mob's actions - although there really was no way to check that impression.

While this was going on, we surveyed all Americans on the island to be sure they were okay and found temporary office space in NAMRU (the Naval Auxiliary Research Unit), an American medical organization. Our move was simplified by having nothing much to take with us. Virtually no equipment escaped destruction. For about six months we had to make do with borrowed furnishings and gradually acquired replacement equipment such as typewriters and communications gear. Although we had our marines, there was no way the temporary building could be made secure; we had to begin from scratch with our files; although we had a few miscellaneous safes that had not been broken into. My memory of our months in those temporary quarters is a real blur.

As I reflect back now on those days in the late 1950s, I would fault the embassy and its mentors in Washington for complacency. We were overly optimistic about Taiwan's alliance and attitude towards us. We did not fully appreciate the agenda of Chiang Kai-shek and his cohorts in the control apparatus. In the intelligence area and military assistance we tended to assume that there was a higher degree of commonality of interests than in fact existed. Of course, we had a shared

interest in defending Taiwan from invasion. We also came to share a common interest in the political stability of Taiwan and its economic development.

Ultimately, our government was not prepared to give Chiang Kai-shek a *carte blanche*, largely because we did not want to risk the dangerous kind of crisis that broke out a year later over the Chinmen-Matsu offshore islands. Yet the behavior of our officials, especially intelligence officers, kept the Nationalists ever hopeful that in one way or another we could be brought to support all of their activities. In sharp contrast to the situation during my second Taiwan tour, our intelligence officials in the 1950s often lacked a nuanced understanding of our policy or pushed it to its limits. They seemed too ready to accept the analysis and information provided by the Nationalist services - after all, they were originally in the same business with the same lingo and aliases during the Korean War period. To make matters worse, by 1958 the CIA Station in Taiwan began to dominate the embassy in dealings with the Nationalists - both in reality and appearance. As a result I suspect we were parties to a number of operations against the PRC that should have been squashed by a strong ambassador. Many of these adventures took place in or through Hong Kong, which complicated our relations with the British.

As for the question of responsibility for the embassy's trashing, I think Ambassador Rankin should have pushed harder and longer for a personal explanation from President Chiang - less for what he might say than to register our deep anger with his behavior as an ally. If we had been more forceful and persistent with Chiang Kai-shek, we should have coupled it with some parallel action against the sergeant, whose trigger happy finger started the whole mess. On the later issue, I was in sympathy with the Chinese-it was justice gone awry.

In any event, I learned that it is healthy to have some suspicion of one's allies, that evacuation and emergency procedures should be written and rehearsed from time to time. The Taiwan experience was later useful to me in Korea. The riot shook me thoroughly; it was a traumatic event in my Foreign Service career.

Let me now go to some other issues. We had a big assistance program in Taiwan, especially military. Much of the earlier aid was in form of budget support, which indirectly provided the resources for Taiwan to pay for imports, including military equipment. By the time of my service I believe military assistance was a mixture of grants and credits, administered by the Military Advisory Group (MAAG) and supervised by the Embassy's Political Section. Economic assistance, including agricultural, was administered by a large contingent of experts in AID in coordination with the Embassy's Economic Section. By the latter half of the 1950s the focus was on project assistance: mostly import substitution, such as fertilizer plants, power plants, and other infrastructure projects. Export industries flourished considerably later when aid was drying up. We provided advisors for a variety of industries, forestry management, sugar and rice production, and rural development (through the JCRR). The "Green Revolution" began in Taiwan.

I concluded that agrarian reforms in Taiwan were highly successful; the program was rather brilliant-one of the best then in existence. Some things were handled better in Japan, but Taiwan was a very good show, much to the credit of JCRR and the agricultural advisors we provided. The genetic work done for the "Green Revolution" was pioneering of the highest standards.

The most powerful hope I had when I left Taiwan was that the younger mainlander generation - more realistic about returning to the mainland and less corrupt than their elders - would coalesce with moderate Taiwanese, so that both groups could work in blending the society together. No thoughts of recapturing the mainland, no false hopes, but a focus on accomplishment in Taiwan. To accommodate this, I favored a "Two Chinas" policy that would recognize two Chinese regimes. I knew Chiang Kai-Shek was violently opposed, but I didn't appreciate adequately the resistance such a policy would also encounter from the PRC. I felt dual recognition was a worthwhile goal; faithful to our allies and realistic about Communist China. At least it would have forced us to face up to the issue of recognizing the PRC.

I left Taiwan with "two Chinas" thoughts very much on my mind. I also felt a distinct loyalty to the people on Taiwan. I felt we had an obligation to them; they were victims of an accident of history - ruled by an emigre regime. But I was firmly convinced any successful policy had to embrace the reality of the PRC.

My first tour in Taiwan left me rather sour about many aspects of Embassy Taipei, which I thought it was a badly managed institution. I needn't repeat my criticism of the Political Section under Meyer; Rankin was aloof and out of touch. I felt strongly that an ambassador should know and mingle with his staff. Rankin kept me waiting a month and a half before he deigned to let me pay a courtesy call. That was just rude, particularly since it was not a large organization. Drumright brought some measurable improvement as did Dave Osborn when he replaced Meyer. Nevertheless, orthodoxy hung heavily over Embassy Taipei throughout my first tour. Joe Yager, who became DCM after my departure, deserves much credit for sheltering us and running an effective Economic Section.

*Q: In 1958, you were transferred to the Political Section in Tokyo. Was that an assignment you had sought?*

GLEYSTEN: Yes, as I recall, I did seek the assignment, although it was one of several possibilities offered by Personnel. I was attracted by the opportunity to work in a political section, and I had an interest in Japan. The combination seemed ideal for me.

As a junior officer in the Political Section, my job was to report on Japan's relations with China, Taiwan, Korea, and East Asia generally as well as to assist the ambassador in a vigorous US effort to promote normalization of relations between Japan and Korea. Like my assignment to Embassy Taipei, my posting to Tokyo began with a jinx. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur complained about the Department's sending him a Chinese language officer who didn't know Japanese. Probably for lack of alternatives, the Department dug in its heels. I survived pretty well for four years despite a very real handicap.

My language deficit was a detriment to my work; I had to use translators and interpreters. I leaned heavily on some my colleagues in the political and economic sections, particularly Al Seligmann and Rick Straus, to help me; they were very kind to do so. Fortunately, most of my contacts in the Foreign Ministry spoke English, and I was able to use my Chinese extensively in my work on China. For example, the head of the China Office in the Foreign Ministry, Okada,

did not speak English; we communicated in Chinese in which we both were adequately fluent.

China and Taiwan were also lively issues for Japan in those days. The Chinmen-Matsu off-shore islands had led to a major dispute in 1958 between the two Chinas. The Japanese were very uneasy about our tough but defensive position; in fact, the issue had caused a semi-crisis in US-Japan relations before I arrived. In 1959 the Japanese were still nervous, though less so once Khrushchev publicly disassociated the Soviet Union from Mao Zedong's militant posture. In general the Japanese favored a softer line with the PRC. Within Japan, there were several voices. The LDP reluctantly supported us; the Socialists opposed us - the left wing Socialists particularly because they were very close to the Communist Party. But within all parties there were cleavages - moderates and extremists. Sorting out who was on which side was sometimes very complicated, but I found it extremely interesting. I had to know which faction favored what if I were to have a dialogue with them.

Despite much sympathy for Taiwan, Japanese generally felt China was more important to them than Taiwan, and if it had been left to a majority vote, the country would have switched recognition long before 1972. However, the conservative, anti-communists who dominated US China policy also kept Japan in line by firm advice and trade offs, beginning with Prime Minister Yoshida during negotiation of the Japanese Peace Treaty, and still continuing while I was in Tokyo. I spent a great deal of time talking to varieties of Japanese in contact with China: officials, politicians, and journalists. From these contacts I tried to convey an accurate assessment of Japanese opinion, and, of course, did my duty in explaining our own policy - even though I was out of sympathy with some aspects of it. My years in Tokyo were a wonderful introduction to the kind of detailed analysis that I had to do when moved to Hong Kong in 1962.

Now let me get into greater detail about the Japan-PRC relationship. They did not have diplomatic relations; Japan recognized Taiwan as the government of China, just as we did. But behind this facade, considerable contact developed. PRC officials came to Tokyo where they visited with foreign ministry officials, politicians, and businessmen. Our rules precluded my seeing them. Generally, our Japanese and foreign hosts took this prohibition into account whenever they invited us to social functions. They accepted it as being a silly rule. There were a number of LDP politicians who visited Beijing in addition to greater numbers of Socialists, often shown making deferential approaches to Mao Zedong. So a substantial relationship was developing. Trade was growing. The LDP was trying hard to prevent the Socialists and Communists from monopolizing relations with the PRC. That approach was not viable with our stubborn policy and got the LDP and government into hot water with us on occasion.

The United States tried vigorously to block Japanese contacts with the PRC, sometimes in feckless ways. We sought to hinder the growth of trade as much as we could; failing that, we tolerated trade in civilian areas, such as agriculture, but correctly we stood firm in our objections to Japanese exports of advanced technology and items that could be used for military purposes.

Our negative posture did not change measurably during the four years I was in Japan, but it was clear to me by 1962 that Japan-China relations would grow closer as time passed - regardless of our policy stance. Furthermore, I felt that the Japanese were right and we were wrong. From the beginning of my Foreign Service career until Nixon's visit, I thought the US was wrong in its

China policy. This made my tasks sometimes very difficult.

The Japanese had been forced to recognize Taiwan as part of the peace treaty process. They maintained better than just "proper" relations with the Nationalists in part because Chiang Kai-shek had forsworn a demand for reparations. In addition, the Japanese had a nostalgia for Taiwan, their former colony. Unlike Korea, the people of Taiwan had a view of Japan that was almost positive. The occupation had been much more benevolent than Korea's, and some compared Japanese behavior favorably to the early years of Nationalist rule.

Although economic considerations helped drive Japan toward a closer relationship with Beijing, the Japanese wanted to get along with the government on the mainland for moral and strategic reasons as well. Following the disaster of the war against China, the prevalent view by this time was that it would be smarter for Japan to accommodate itself to the powerful ruling government in mainland China. They hoped a closer relationship would advance Japan's security and trade interests. The Japanese thought that we should be more understanding of their position, and I thought they were absolutely right.

There were also some sentimental factors at work, although these were often exaggerated by Japanese under the influence of alcohol. Japanese felt indebted to China for its influence on their culture, and quite a few of them were genuinely remorseful about the barbarity of their past behavior. In those days the Koreans didn't fare so well; the Japanese were much more deferential towards China than Korea.

When I was in Tokyo, the Japanese were much less concerned about China's military strength than we were; there was some talk about Chinese power having a negative effect on Japan, requiring perhaps some degree of remilitarization, but the concern was buffered by the alliance with us. Japan-China relations are much more complicated today than they were in the 1950s and 1960s.

We also spent a lot of time on the Soviet Union. Washington in its directives to us tended to assume a relatively monolithic communist world. Most of us in Tokyo felt differently and when talking to Japanese, we tried to express our views in more sophisticated ways than the black and white oratory stemming from Washington. To their credit the Japanese had a rather accurate sense of complex relations within the communist camp. They would stress that the Chinese communists were quite different from those in the Soviet Union and that within the Chinese Communist Party there were divisions about domestic and foreign issues. The Japanese would provide me with the analysis of their intelligence community, which I eagerly reported to Washington. -particularly since I agreed with much of the Japanese analysis. My reporting was well received at least by some factions in Washington. Since strains were becoming so apparent in Soviet-Chinese relations, it is amazing to me that our ideologues managed to hold off a realistic assessment for so long.

I might at this stage talk a little about Japan's international orientation in the late 1950s and early 1960s This is important because it affected Japanese policy on Korea, China and the security treaty. When I arrived in Tokyo in 1958, Japan was a country trying to sort out its past and its future; it was a society in flux. The conservatives were in control - Yoshida was no longer the

Prime Minister, but still influential. Although a conservative, he did not unqualifiedly defend Japan's actions during the war. He was proud of many Japanese accomplishments, including its post-war effort to pull itself up from the ashes. Yoshida was part of the establishment which tended to be internationalist, anti-communist, pro-business, concerned by left wing radical movements - beyond the Communist and Socialist Parties. All of these views were welcomed by us.

The left was much larger than it is today. There was a large Communist Party, an even larger and growing Socialist Party. Ambassador Reischauer and the political section wondered if and when they would take the reins of government. Within the Socialist Party, there was a faction with views close to the Communists. There was another faction which sometimes sounded radical, but was in fact quite moderate. There was an anti-Soviet nationalist faction within the Communist Party. There were even pro-Soviet, pro-PRC, pro-North Korean figures within the conservative camp! A rather complicated pattern. In general, most of Japan fell into a category between the extremes. It was this middle group that was sometimes hard for us to assess - as in the case of the aborted Eisenhower visit.

I don't think the embassy distinguished itself in mapping out the Japanese political scene for Washington. I remember occasional presentations that were excellent, but the ambassadors, especially MacArthur, had a proclivity to doctor assessments to suit Washington's Cold War thinking. We could have had a better understanding of the political process in Japan, and if we had, we might have done some things better. We did not handle our relationship with forces of the right in a very intelligent way; during the occupation we let the war criminals off too easily; we tolerated the presence of the right wing in places where we could and should have removed them. Many Japanese felt that we were letting our concern with communism and the Cold War stand in the way of a proper appreciation of Japanese sentiments. To some extent, I would say this was a fair criticism.

We also failed to appreciate the degree to which the Japanese left had earned credibility in society because of its anti-regime, anti-war positions in the 1930s and 1940s. Although we took note of this in our reporting, we didn't give it enough weight. When I first arrived, I went to a lecture by a semi-academic politician - who had been recommended to me by some of my moderate Socialist contacts on China. His lecture stunned me by its naivete about the Soviet Union and PRC as well as the severe misunderstandings he had about US foreign policy. He had a neutralist vision devoid of reality about the practical world; his policy recommendations were disastrous. I wondered how reasonable Japanese could support such crap, but in fact this man had considerable influence in university and political circles. It stemmed from his *cache* as an opponent of Japan's military governments. Baffling as they sometimes seemed to us, these attitudes affected Japan's behavior - regarding revision of the security treaty, policy toward China and so on.

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, I was worried about the Japanese public's apparent receptivity to left-leaning neutralist ideas. I was more bothered by left-wing of the larger Socialist Party than by the Communist Party that had already demonstrated some genuine nationalistic sensibilities *vis a vis* the Soviet Union and China. Nevertheless, I didn't really fear that the left would come to power in Japan; I thought that the LDP would find a way to block them or that they would come

to their senses before taking power.

On the conservative side, I underestimated Japan's willingness to go along as a sort of junior partner to the US - even though gradually moving along to a more equal relationship. I predicted that by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, the Japanese would become the "Gaullists of East Asia"; a more independent, nationalistic, and possibly nuclear Japan - though no more hostile to us than France. I did not cherish that prospect and urged that we try to forestall it by establishing a web of carefully crafted relationships. I remember writing a number of commentaries along these lines. Reischauer disagreed with me, and so far he has proven right. In the complicated "sorting out" to determine Japan's future policies, the direction and speed of Japan's economic development and trade have played an enormous part, helping the conservatives and damaging the left, which has proved unable to accommodate if not completely incompetent to deal with these matters. Failures of the communist world have further limited Japan's choices. The conclusion of this process has not come as a great surprise to me, but I did not believe that the pattern would be quite as clear or as helpful as it has been to our interests.

Last, I might just make few remarks about the Japanese decision-making process. When I was in Tokyo - and I think this is still very much the case - bureaucrats, all the way down to lower levels, played a powerful role and were exceptionally aware of the political context in which they operated. For example, in making recommendations to the office director, the third ranking officer in the Korean section of the Foreign Ministry would know our views, probably from being the silent note-taker at a variety of our meetings with Foreign Ministry officials. He would also be familiar with opinions of key Diet members, often by having talked to politicians himself as a result of personal relationships. My sense was that Japanese bureaucrats were more knowledgeable of views in the Diet than we were about the Congress. This exposure helped young officials shape decisions to be approved by their bosses. Incidentally the number three on the Korea or China desk was often a marked man expected to rise to deputy foreign minister or ambassador. Many of the senior officials I worked with later started there.

In addition, every level of the bureaucracy was more conservative than the one below - which is not uncommon in any bureaucracy. Decisions made by consensus moving upwards were hard to overturn; sometimes we did succeed but it was always tough sledding. The process gave the Japanese bureaucracy an image of independent power, but it was not quite as self-contained as people imagined. It is interesting to note that much of the consensus building between the government and the politicians was done at junior levels. That these officials could advise their superiors about political sentiment struck me as quite a contrast to the Department of State.

**JAMES COWLES HART BONBRIGHT**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Canton (1928-1929)**

*Ambassador James Cowles Hart Bonbright was born in 1903 in Rochester, New York. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1927. His career included positions in Canada, Belgium,*

*France, and Washington, DC, and an ambassadorship to Portugal. Ambassador Bonbright was interviewed by Peter Jessup in 1986.*

BONBRIGHT: I think in my class there were about 35 out of maybe 750. I think that was about it. They didn't call us up right away; we were passed and then put on ice for the summer. I got called up in September of 1927. I took the oath. Our class was divided. Of course, everybody wanted to go to Europe, and the result was that one out of 35 did. He went as vice consul to Seville, Spain. The rest of us were divided half and half between South America and the Far East. We were asked which we preferred. For some reason, I never cared a hoot or had any interest in South America -- none. So I opted for the Far East. Then we were asked whether we preferred China or Japan. I put down that I would prefer to go to China. So finally when the assignments came along, I was assigned to Nagasaki as vice consul.

*Q: Maybe somebody thought that was in China.*

BONBRIGHT: Possibly, but I don't think so. Anyway, I knew there was some openings in China, so with some trepidation, I went to the fellow who was the head of the Foreign Service school, who had taken care of us, and I said to him, "I'll go, naturally, wherever I'm sent, but I had expressed a preference for China." I wondered why the shift had been made.

He said, "You want China, so we'll fix it." They did; they changed it and sent me as vice consul to Canton.

*Q: Which would be much more interesting than Nagasaki then.*

BONBRIGHT: I would have thought so. I did think so. So that was that. In those days, you went through the Foreign Service school, so-called, before you went abroad. They had this school in the State Department. We all went in together and we were divided into groups and would spend a week in different sections. One week we'd spend in the visa office, one in the passport division, one in the economic reporting division, one in the political office, to give you a taste of what was going on in the Department. Actually, I was late. I got acute appendicitis and had my appendix out that spring, so I didn't get out as soon as the rest of my class, but I did finally get underway in late July of 1928.

*Q: Good morning, Ambassador Bonbright. We will continue. You were approaching Canton.*

BONBRIGHT: I sailed for Canton from San Francisco in late July of 1928. It was one of the President lines. It was a lovely trip, found some time to walk and read and stops at Honolulu and Japan, Shanghai, finally Hong Kong, and then a river boat up to Canton, as I recall, about 90 miles up the Pearl River. It was interesting to see the boats. There had been a lot of pirating at that time and the engine room had been wired off with heavy bars so that if the pirates came aboard, they couldn't get at the vital part of the ship. I think that probably discouraged them.

In Canton, the consulate general was located, along with the consulates of many other countries, on the island of Shamin. It had not been the garden spot of the East; it was originally a sandbar lying close to the native city. It had undoubtedly been given over to the foreigners to use because

of its unattractiveness and lack of value to the Chinese. As so often happened out in the East, western occupation soon turned even a very poor site into a garden, compared to the native part. When I was there, there were some lovely big trees, lovely gardens and walks, and it was a very pretty place. The island was about a quarter of a mile across, I think, and maybe half a mile long, and that was it. It was divided into two concessions: the British concession, which took up about two-thirds of the island, and the other third was the French concession. Our Consulate General was located in the French concession.

It was a strange feeling at first, because when I arrived it was only two years after the British had been having a lot of trouble with the Chinese -- in '26. Things were still moderately tense, so much so that the island was surrounded -- not completely surrounded, but the whole side of the island which faced the canal and the native city was protected with barbed wire and machine gun nests at the two bridges. On the other side of it, on the river side, there were always two or three foreign gunboats, British and French, and sometimes one of ours, from the South China Patrol. At first this gave one a sense of security, but eventually -- and it didn't take too long -- one got a little restless. It's like the feeling of living on a ship, and you wanted to get the hell off of it. We didn't fuss around with the native city, but we did take trips up and down the river by boat, and then also there was a nine-hole golf course, which was some miles outside the city and on property owned by the railroad company, which ran from Canton to Kowloon. We were able to get there without any trouble, and this provided some recreation for those of us who liked golf, as I did.

*Q: Was there a provincial general in charge of the area? Was there a more central government?*

BONBRIGHT: There was a civilian governor, but, of course, there was constant fighting in one part or another down there, one warlord or another trying to take over somebody else's territory. In fact, when you went out on the river at one period there, you'd quite often see bodies of soldiers floating by, though they were never near enough so that we heard any gunfire. The nearest thing to a fight that we saw was when the Cantonese Navy, if you could call it that, mutinied. We went up on the roof of the consulate general and watched the proceedings. There were one or two gunboats of very modest size and equipment, and the rest of the Navy consisted of motor boats with a piece of iron stuck up in front with a pole and the gun stuck through it. I think it was only able to move when the tide was favorable. Not very impressive. Then the government Air Force attacked the Navy and started dropping bombs. I was surprised to see a great splash in the water, but nothing was hit. Since there was very little defense and they could fly fairly low, it looked like extraordinarily poor marksmanship, to say the least.

*Q: Were these old biplanes?*

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I think they were. Some time later, I was talking to a Chinese official at some function or other, and I remarked about this strange thing. He looked at me with some surprise, as though saying, "You idiot. Don't you know that those were the best ships we had? By no means were we going to hurt them." So it was just play.

The consulate general itself consisted of a moderately large building with the offices on the ground floor, and the top floor was a comfortable apartment for the consul general and his wife

and family. The second floor was divided in half: one half was for a married couple among the subordinate officers, and the other side had a mess and, I think, three bedrooms for single officers. We were all very comfortable and very well looked after. I think we had five servants working for us in the mess, keeping the apartment for us. It cost, I think, 100 Cantonese dollars a month for that. That was the equivalent of about 37 U.S. dollars, which, divided between three officers, didn't come to very much. So we lived well.

*Q: Would you say that by that time on were already old China hands, or people who were there about your time who would become the old China hands? In other words, were there officers who had done several tours in China already?*

BONBRIGHT: They always tried to have at least one officer there who had gone through the language course up in Peking. The rest of us didn't know any Chinese. The one who was there when I was, was a man named Newhall from California. He was a delightful companion but didn't stay very long; he retired and went home. This pointed up to me one of the faults of the language system up there. It began with three glorious years of study in Peking, where you became an interpreter for the legation and lived the life of Riley. After those first three years, then you went out to the sticks. You got the cream at the start of the tour instead of at the end, and I think they lost quite a few people because of that process. People were tempted to go into the language school and all because of the pleasant and interesting life. I don't think many of the ones who were at the language school when I was there stayed on, but some of them who had already been through did -- John Carter Vincent and John Davies, a number of them. Most of them had been children of missionaries who already had a start and knowledge of China and the language, and just naturally continued when I was there.

*Q: Missionaries were still there in strength, different denominations?*

BONBRIGHT: Very much so. I remember one coming into the office where I was, and he wanted to check in. I was talking to him about it, and he was going into what seemed a bad part of the country at that time. I asked him, "How are you going to make out? For several days you're pretty much out of touch with anybody."

He said to me, "God will provide." That closed the argument.

*Q: With that conviction.*

BONBRIGHT: I wished him well but wasn't too hopeful for him.

The language problem was difficult. Most officers wanted to work on language of some sort to get along, but it didn't really make any sense to study Cantonese, because it wasn't understood about 30 miles outside the city -- no good. The official Mandarin language that was taught in Peking, that was all right for dealing with officials, but unless you were going to spend your life out there, it really didn't seem too profitable. I thought I'd try to take a go at Japanese, just to study something. I made an arrangement with the Japanese vice consul there; weekday mornings at 7:00 o'clock, I went over to his apartment and took Japanese lessons from him. This didn't last more than a few months, because I became sick later and had to leave. But at the end of it, my

Japanese was very, very elementary, to put it mildly, whereas I thought there was decided improvement in his mastery of English.

In the office we had a consul general who was Douglas Jenkins, a very nice man, with a nice wife. Number two consul was a man, a bachelor, named James McKenna, whom I'm very fond of. I admired him and liked him. He went home on leave fairly soon, though, so he was away for a couple of months. While he was away, the rest of us didn't pay much attention to the servants, except that we did sort of notice that the quarters for the servants, which were separated from our building by about 20 feet with a gangway between, seemed to be getting pretty crowded. We didn't do anything about it. When McKenna came back from leave, the first thing he did, he went out there and saw what was going on. He'd go up to one fellow and say, "Who's that?"

"That's my son-in-law."

"What's he doing here?"

"He's here on a visit."

"When is he going?"

"He's going tomorrow."

And he'd move on to the next fellow. "Who's that?"

"That's my mother-in-law's cousin."

"What's she doing here?"

"She's here on a visit."

"When is she leaving?"

"Tomorrow." So within 48 hours, he had it all cleaned out and in ship-shape again. He was wise enough not to just throw them out. He let them do it themselves. A nice man.

For recreation, there were some tennis courts there, too, and then the thing that we all looked forward to was a trip to Hong Kong, which was like going to Paris. The pouch from the State Department would arrive and be unloaded there.

*Q: In Hong Kong?*

BONBRIGHT: In Hong Kong.

*Q: Was it weekly?*

BONBRIGHT: Yes, I think it was about once a week that one of us would go down. We'd take

turns, because it had to be accompanied, so we'd take turns going down for the pouch and bringing it back. There was no courier service.

*Q: Were those caricatures that you see now and then of them strapped to your hand, did that exist?*

BONBRIGHT: No, I never had one strapped to my hand. You'd carry it and you'd keep it with you, and you'd sleep on the boat with it. But that gave us a chance to get a breather in Hong Kong a night or two. We'd get the courier duty about once in six weeks, and that was great. There was a certain amount of social life, but mostly the same people that you'd see pretty much all the time, rather formal in its strange way. We used to wear -- not tuxedos, which were too heavy, but we wore these white monkey jackets when we went out to dinner, but we always wore stiff shirts still, and it was hot and damp, and all the men would take an extra collar in his pocket, and after dinner he'd go out and change his collar, just soaking wet. No fun, that. Really, it was a miserable climate.

*Q: Did you have Marine guards then?*

BONBRIGHT: No. The French had somebody, and the British. They had troops there that were stationed at the bridge into the native city. They must have been English officers or off the gunboats; I forget which.

*Q: How long did you stay in Canton?*

BONBRIGHT: I was only there about ten months. I felt very poorly all winter; I don't know what I got, but I felt so badly that I'd have to go to bed, and I'd be dragging myself for a week, and then I'd get up and go to the office for a week and drag myself around. Finally, one day I just keeled over in the office. They got a rickshaw and dragged me off to the little hospital on the island. I was in the hospital for about a month under an oxygen tent. They said I'd had some kind of a heart condition, an enlargement of the heart. But I never had any trouble with it afterwards. I was sent home in June of 1929 in a boat, and was met out west by my father and family doctor. They got me home, and I was in bed for six months or more, I guess, and wasn't able to get back to work until the following March of 1930. I hadn't wanted or expected to spend my life in China, but I hoped to last a little longer than that.

Anyway, I was glad, in a way, that I'd been there, and I was glad, too, that I had not tried to make a career out of it, because a lot of those people were very badly burned in the McCarthy era -- the ones I know, I think, quite unfairly.

*Q: Service.*

BONBRIGHT: They reported as they saw things, which we were paid to do. Speaking of pay, my salary was \$2,500 a year, with 5% off for retirement. I think it was several years before I got a big raise to \$2,750. In fact, when I entered the Service, the entire budget for the State Department and all our offices abroad was, I think, \$19 million.

*Q: The whole thing?*

BONBRIGHT: The whole thing. They collected about nine or ten million in transport and visa fees, so it cost the American taxpayer about \$10 million to run the whole Foreign Service. Fantastic.

*Q: And now today?*

BONBRIGHT: That wouldn't pay for a consulate in Sarnia, Ontario.

*Q: The Secretary asked for a separate 2-point-something billion to fortify and strengthen the embassies for security.*

BONBRIGHT: Yes. I might just mention one word about the actual work which I had in Canton, which is not very interesting, nor unusual, either, for a very junior officer. All the political reporting was done by the consul general himself. I had the onerous task of sitting at a desk signing invoices of shipments, tea, rice, and what have you, to the States. When McKenna was home on leave, I took over his work with the visas, or rather, what we called section six certificates in those days, a special part of the immigration laws. The Chinese didn't have regular visas; they got a thing called a section six certificate, which was mostly for students and bona fide merchants who wanted to get over. Just to show how greatly a lot of these Chinese wanted to get to the United States, they would buy part of a business in town and would sit there in the office for a year waiting for a consul to come to investigate. He had a set of books made up to make it look legitimate, when it wasn't at all. I used to go for that, and I was told by the Chinese fellow at the main office, who I went with, that there had been a great opportunity for an aspiring crook to make a lot of money. They figured that you could make about half a million dollars by selling visas and these section six certificates, and if you did this for about six months, that was all the traffic would bear, but that would cover the time that the man would actually get over to the States, get set up somewhere and finally get investigated. By that time, you took your half a million and beat it. I had heard there was one non-career vice consul who did just that, but I don't think he lived to enjoy his ill-gotten gains.

*Q: Was there a gimmick where, if they could indicate they had a relative in the States, that entitled them to come?*

BONBRIGHT: Yes, that helped, too.

*Q: That was very hard to trace whether anybody was a relative, wasn't it?*

BONBRIGHT: I think the students were apt to be more legitimate, that they had been accepted by some school or other, as long as the school was in good standing.

*Q: Was there an embassy in Peking?*

BONBRIGHT: There was a legation at that time, not that there's much difference. As you know, the chief of mission in the legation, the top man can go to the foreign minister, and at an

embassy, of course, the ambassador has access to the chief of state of the other country. At that time I think we only had about eight embassies in the world -- Argentina, Brazil, and Chile in South America, and then Britain, France, Germany, Italy -- I'm not sure that even Russia was. But that was sort of an artificial thing and was resented by some people. Sumner Welles did away with it when he came in. He thought the Latin Americans had been discriminated against and were not being treated as well as they should, so he pushed through, making practically every mission in South America an embassy, including Nicaragua and Honduras. Well, of course, then the lid was off; you couldn't very well refuse anywhere. So now for some time there was only one legation left, I think, in Tangier. Now I think they're all embassies -- even Luxembourg.

**EVERETT DRUMRIGHT**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Hankow (1931-1932)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Beijing (1932-1934)**

**Consular Officer**  
**Shanghai (1934-1937)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hankow (1937-1938)**

**Political Officer**  
**Chungking (1938-1941)**

**Internment**  
**Shanghai (1941-1942)**

**Consular Officer**  
**Chundo and Sian (1943-1944)**

**Political Officer**  
**Chungking (1944-1945)**

**China Desk**  
**Washington, DC (1945-1946)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1953-1954)**

**Consul General**  
**Hong Kong (1954-1958)**

**Ambassador  
Taipei, Taiwan (1958-1962)**

*Everett Drumright received a bachelor's degree in business administration from the University of Oklahoma in 1929. His Foreign Service career included positions in China, the United Kingdom, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Drumright was interviewed by Mr. Lee Cotterman on December 5, 1988.*

DRUMRIGHT: In September 1931, I was assigned back to Washington to take the Foreign Service School course. There I met with about 12 or 14 of my Foreign Service colleagues and we were put through the typical three-month course, from accounting, to immigration, to reporting, political and economic. On the conclusion of the school, which, by the way, was run by James Stewart, I received word that I was being assigned to Hankow, China. Whereupon, I said, "Where is that?" That, in a word, is how I got associated with China.

*Q: May I interject there? I note that you were specialized during your Foreign Service career, then, after that, almost entirely in the Far East. How did that come about? I mean, at your personal wishes, or did the Department take a hand and feel that you should remain in that field?*

DRUMRIGHT: To continue, I proceeded to Hankow. I might interject here that I received a rough reception upon entering China in that there was a very considerable war going on in Shanghai, where I landed, at the time. The Japanese, who had taken Manchuria in September of 1931, when we were at the Foreign Service School, had, again, attacked the Chinese in the Shanghai area.

I recalled we had to wait at the mouth of the Yangtze River for some time before we were allowed to proceed. And it was very fortunate that we were allowed to go into Shanghai at all. While there, I had to stay about two weeks awaiting transport to Hankow by ship. And I do recall, while in Shanghai, meeting George V. Allen. In fact, I put up with him at his flat in the consular building while I was waiting to proceed on up river to Hankow.

After about two weeks, I did proceed to Hankow by a river boat. And I do recall that that river boat was iron-sided. And I asked the captain why. He said, "Why, we're shot at from time to time by these communist bandits that roam along the river banks so we have to protect ourselves." Well, fortunately, in my case, there didn't appear to be any shooting and so we arrived safely in Hankow.

I had a pleasant several months there under the tutorship of Walter A. Adams, Consul General. And while I was there, I think it was about August of 1932, I received a telegram from Washington inviting me to go to Peking to take the two year language course in Chinese. I thought about it. I talked it over with Lewis Clark, a language officer, and Edmund Clubb, another language officer, and also the consul general, who, by the way, recommended against it.

But in the long run, I had found the China that I had gotten to know by that time, after traveling to Sichuan and Hunan and meeting some Chinese in Hankow, to be charming. I found the Chinese to be an interesting and enjoyable people. And, on that basis, I decided I would, perhaps, try to make China my career. Whereupon, I accepted the invitation and proceeded to Peking where I started my language training, I believe on October the 1st, 1932.

I found the study of the Chinese language to be incredibly difficult, but I stayed with it. I worked very hard at it. In fact, one time I was ordered by doctors to leave for a month because of my health. But I came back and, in due course, finished the language. Whereupon, I was assigned to Shanghai.

I proceeded to Shanghai in December of 1934 and was assigned to what we call the land office, which took care of Chinese affairs, and which also took care of the deeds of Americans who had property in the international settlement at the time. And we also had the protection work, which was not inconsiderable in the land office. I worked there under Edmund S. Cunningham, an old line consular officer.

And while I was there, I recall having one rather interesting event occur. I was sent to Swatow in Guangdong Province in Southern China to obtain a release of a Catholic priest who had been kidnapped by Chinese bandits up in the mountains of Guangdong. I did go to Guangdong. And I went up river and I went as near as I could to where the priest was said to be held. And I worked there with the officials and the like, and made some investigation, and started staying put there. Whereupon, one day, I think after about three weeks, I got word that the priest had been released, not to me, but to the consulate general in Canton.

My work in Shanghai did not involve a great deal of politics or economics at that time. Clarence E. Gauss succeeded Edwin S. Cunningham in 1935 in late 1935, I think it was. And then I was put on political work there. I was there at the time of the so-called Sian Incident when Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped by the Northeast General Chang Hsueh-liang. I recall we had some very interesting times endeavoring to obtain information about this kidnaping.

It made a very interesting story with almost no information coming out of Sian that we could obtain, nor could the embassy seem to obtain very much. We did make contact with an advisor to the Northeastern General Chang Hsueh-liang, and did get some information that threw a little light on the kidnaping. But the kidnaping was over, I believe, on December the 26th of 1936.

Details were slow in coming out about it. And probably some items about that kidnaping have never been made public to this day. But it suffices to say, Chang Hsueh-liang, who had been sent to Northern China to launch a campaign to subdue the Chinese communists who were situated to the north, never took any action. And it was then that Chiang Kai-shek had gone there to investigate this situation. He had gone there himself and then, while he was there, he was kidnapped. It seemed that there may have been some influence on Chang Hsueh-liang from the Chinese communist who, evidently, were in some kind of contact with him.

And it also seems, by hindsight, that the Soviet Russians were involved in that they

recommended to the Chinese communists, and probably to Chang Hsueh-liang, that it would be best if Chiang Kai-shek were released. Why? Because the Soviet Russians were very concerned about Japan and the possibility of Japan attacking their eastern borders in Siberia. And they wanted another opponent and the logical opponent was China. Well, that was perhaps the most interesting event that occurred during my assignment to Shanghai.

Then, about March 1937, I received instructions to proceed again to Hankow. I did so and I was doing political reporting up there. I should mention that, when I went there in 1932, banditry, guerilla activity, communist activity, was rife all around that area. But by the time I returned there in 1937 it was quiet. Chiang had actually gone there himself in 1932 and had launched what he called a bandit suppression campaign against the communists, which drove them away from that central China area and enabled the communications between there and Shanghai and on west to Western China to be opened up freely.

I was engaged in some political and economic reporting then at Hankow when, on July 7, 1937, we had the so-called Liuko Chiao (Marco Polo bridge) incident happen near Peking where Japanese military forces attacked the Chinese. That was significant because, rather than being another common, ordinary incident in the annals of Chinese-Japanese affairs, it became the starting point of an eight year war of resistance by the Chinese. That was the main thing in China from 1937 to 1945.

It was not long after the war started that the Japanese also attacked Shanghai in a very large way and started bombing up as far as Hankow. I recall that we had several bombing attacks on the airport, which was just at the outskirts of Hankow. Of course, with the war going full blast and with the Chinese determined to fight a defensive war rather than surrender, we had to think about evacuating, perhaps, some thousand missionaries who lived in the back country of Western, Northwestern, and Southwestern China, which came within our purview at the Hankow Consulate General. I recall we were very busy by the end of July writing letters to our constituents throughout that whole area urging them, unless they had very essential business there, to evacuate or make preparations to do so in case the situation worsened.

Of course, as time went on, the situation did worsen. The Japanese took Shanghai after two months of very intensive fighting and then commenced their offensive toward Nanking, which is about 200 miles west of Shanghai. Again, Chiang Kai-shek threw his very best forces into the fight trying to stop this Japanese offensive. But the Japanese had too much power, and their equipment, their tanks, their artillery, and their very well trained forces, to put up a successful resistance. And so gradually the Chinese were forced back. And it was along about December 10 that they reached the outskirts of Nanking.

That meant that our embassy had to be evacuated and our Ambassador Nelson T. Johnson and part of his staff came up river to Hankow and set up shop in our consulate general. In the meantime, the remainder of the staff, except for one or two, had taken to the U.S.S. Panay, a Yangtze River gun boat of ours, and were moving up stream on about December 12 when that ship was bombed by the Japanese, although they had advanced word that the ship was there and that it was an American ship with official personnel on board. Well, the ship was bombed anyway and it sank, but all personnel managed to get off. We had some injured but, eventually,

they, with help from the Chinese made their way to Hankow. That, of course, was another stirring event in the history of the times.

The war went on, with the Japanese gradually advancing. And I should say here that, along about February of 1938, they did make some advances to the Chinese to settle the war on what might have been regarded as somewhat advantageous terms to a country that was being beaten. But Chiang Kai-shek refused it flat out and said he was going to continue the war. And that, you might say, set the policy for the next seven years. So the war went on with the Japanese.

They had taken Canton about the same time they had taken Nanking. No, I'm sorry. It was later. They took Canton later in 1938. And they advanced on the central front up the Yangtze Valley toward Hankow. And, eventually, in August, the Chinese Government decided to move its temporary capital again, this time from Hankow to Chungking in Southwestern Sichuan Province.

They duly made the move with the result that our embassy, then a small group composed of Ambassador Johnson, and Counselor Willis Peck, and three or four other junior secretaries, boarded the U.S.S. Lausanne, the flagship of the U.S. Yangtze fleet, and proceeded to Chungking. I recall that we arrived there about the 8th of August. We had no place to go, no place to sleep, no nothing. But within a short time we arranged with the Standard Vacuum Oil Company to lease one of their warehouses on the south bank of the Yangtze River and set up our embassy with radio communications with Washington.

And we were able to rent some housing from the British Oil Company that had an extensive compound in Chungking and wasn't using much of it. So the ambassador and some of the other personnel arranged housing. I arranged housing up in the hills behind the river from the Standard Vacuum Oil Company. So we began to settle down and establish ourselves in Chungking. It was a difficult situation. Chungking was a backwards city which had come under government control only a few years before that. And there was a period of some months of settling in there.

Meantime, Hankow was lost in October of 1938, and Canton about the same time. That meant that China no longer had any access to the China seaboard. It had lost all the richest and most industrial part of China and the ports to the Japanese. That meant that China had to rely on the back door through Indochina and Burma for assistance from abroad. I would say that the United States, during the first year or two of the war, complained, of course, to the Japanese about their attack on China but did little else. It was more or less a repeat of what had happened in 1931 when the Japanese had taken Manchuria.

But about the time we went to Chungking or a little after, the U.S. Government began to take an added interest in the future of China. And I recall that in 1939 our relations became closer and we began to give them some financial assistance. Meantime, our relations with Japan began to worsen as we put on an embargo against some of these metals and things that they had been importing from us for use in their war efforts.

By 1940, with the Japanese advance then stalled more or less. I would say during the years 1940 and 1941 we had some intense bombing of Chungking by the Japanese. They bombed the city on

many occasions and very indiscriminately. I am convinced that the purpose of the bombing was to try to intimidate the Chinese into surrender or the making of some kind of a peaceful settlement. But it didn't work. Mind you, there were well over a million people living in Chungking. And the end result of all this bombing was that the Chinese, within a few months, built a large underground system where that million people could congregate in safety during those indiscriminate raids.

Other than that, I would say the war went along more or less in a desultory way. With the Chinese, of course, becoming weaker and weaker in that they could not receive any help but financial help from abroad because of the distances from the seacoast, and with inflation beginning to heat up vigorously.

I recall that early in 1941 back in Washington we were beginning to take a much deeper interest in China and Roosevelt sent one of his advisors, a fellow named Lauchlin Currie, who, by the way, later turned out to have some communist connection. They sent him out to China to advise the Chinese on their inflation problem. Well, ironically, Currie made a suggestion that the Chinese did accept. And that was that China set in motion immediately a tax plan in kind. In other words, they set up a system of taxing the farmers, who were really about the only productive element in the area under the government's control, to pay a good part of their taxes in kind. After it was set in motion in 1941, this plan helped to curb the inflation problem to a considerable extent.

Toward the end of 1941 an American volunteer group began to become active under General Claire Chennault, with the result that the Japanese air attacks in Western China were curbed. That was an important element there. I might say in regard to 1941, that in April, Nelson T. Johnson, who had been Minister and Ambassador to China from 1929 to 1941, was reassigned to exchange places with Clarence E. Gauss. In other words, Johnson went to Australia as minister and Gauss came to Chungking as ambassador. It was a point of considerable change as far as China was concerned.

Nelson Johnson had always been sympathetic to the Chinese effort and had appreciated all that the Chinese had done under the most difficult circumstances to carry out the war against Japan. Clarence Gauss came in with the idea, it seemed, that the cause was lost in China and he had very little interest in doing anything about it. Nevertheless, the United States did continue to make some financial assistance available to China. That was about all we could do, other than help them build the Burma Road and try to ship in some supplies that way. Of course, that proved to be largely a failure because of the distances and the difficulties of the road.

Late in 1941 I had orders to proceed back to Shanghai, which I had left in 1937. I flew to Hong Kong and spent a few days there. I arranged to get a ship to Shanghai. As it turned out, it was the last commercial ship to make the trip from Hong Kong to Shanghai because the British had premonitions that something was going to happen and they ordered their shipping back. In the case of my ship, the radio word was not received and we proceeded on into Shanghai. I arrived December 2, 1941.

The war started early in the morning of December 8th for us. I was sleeping peacefully in the

Cathay Hotel on the Bundt when I heard the opening cannon shots which were directed from the Japanese concession to the American and British gunboats which were anchored down river about a mile from the Japanese settlement. Well, that bespoke the opening of the Pacific War as far as we were concerned.

I went over to the consulate and we burned our papers and were ordered to go into internment in a hotel across the street from the consulate at noon of December 8th. We did so and we were then interned under Consul General Frank Lockhart and his Deputy, Edwin Stanton, until the end of June of 1942, when, with the help of the Swiss and negotiations undertaken through them with the Japanese, there was a swap of diplomats. We and our diplomats in Japan proceeded by ship then to Lourenço Marques, in Portuguese East Africa, where there was an exchange of diplomats.

*Q: Ambassador Drumright, what was your personal feeling toward the host government after you were interned? Did you still have the same viewpoint on the ability of the Chinese to make a good accounting of themselves in this war?*

DRUMRIGHT: I felt when I left Chungking that they could manage to stall out the war. China is a tremendous country and it would take millions of Japanese to overrun the whole country, if there was someone deciding to put up opposition. Chiang Kai-shek was a very determined man. I knew him personally. I had met with him quite a few times. And there was no doubt in my mind that he would continue to prosecute the war as long as it was possible at all.

Mind you, he also had to contend with the Chinese communists. They were utilizing this war -- this was an important matter, too -- to build up their forces, to build up their strength in Northwest China. From the start of the Japanese War Chiang Kai-shek could no longer divert any attention to them up there, so they had a pretty free hand in parts of Northwest China and North China where they very cleverly penetrated behind the Japanese lines and began to build up their forces. In 1938 they were supposed to have reached an agreement to fight the war together, but there was virtually no effort on their part thereafter to do anything to forward the war against Japan. They were 100 percent bent on building up their own forces, of course.

I was not one who was defeatist about it, no. In that way I differed from our ambassador in Chungking. And I still felt that way when we returned to Washington in August of 1942. I was assigned some work there. I helped arrange a treaty whereby we gave up our extraterritorial rights in China. We had had those rights since 1840. And we decided as a gesture, at least at that time, to rescind those rights. And I also wrote some reports on conditions in occupied China when I was there.

I was then reassigned to China. I was told that we were opening some one-man posts in the interior of the country; namely, places like Chengdu, northwest of Chungking, and Sian in Northwest China, and Luichow, further in China, and even Dewai or Urumqi in Sinkiang, and I believe, also, Kueiin in Southwest China.

*Q: Did you identify with the old China hands, as they were called in some places in those days?*

DRUMRIGHT: Well, I might have been considered an old China hand, in a sense, since I went there in 1932 and here it was 1943, 11 years. By that time I had been living there most all those years. Yes, in a sense, although I was not the old China hand of the treaty ports, which largely meant the business types and the missionaries, also, if you want to call them old China hands. People who lived out there for 20, 30 years, yes.

*Q: I ran into many of them in London, where I was in the early 1940's.*

DRUMRIGHT: In when?

*Q: In London in the early 40's.*

DRUMRIGHT: In the early 40's? Well, I went there in 1946, myself. I'll tell you about that later.

*Q: Sure.*

DRUMRIGHT: Anyway, I returned to West China in January of 1943. And I was asked by Ambassador Gauss which post I wanted. And I chose, at that time, Chengdu, where we were about to build a big airport to bomb Japan. I spent a few months in Chengdu, which was on the quiet side. Whereafter, I was told there was an opening in Sian if I wished to go there. I wrote back and said I did like the idea of going to Sian.

So I went up there about May of 1943. I took up my abode there and spent the next 13 or 14 months in the Sian area. Now, Sian was the most advanced area toward the Japanese occupied areas and also the Chinese communists to the North. So it was a place of considerable importance, although we had never had anyone there before. I was busy there reporting, both on the Japanese in the occupied areas, and, as much as I could get, on the Chinese communists about 100 miles north of Sian where they had their headquarters in Yen-an.

During that time I made a long trip to the area east of Sian to look into the situation and investigate our missionaries and that sort of thing. I suppose I spent three weeks or so, including bicycling throughout Hunan Province in central China, and going over as far as the town where exchanges took place between Japanese occupied China and Chiang Kai-shek's China. There was a town there where they exchanged people and goods. It was a rather interesting little town where you could see a great deal of activity going on all the time. I was curious to see this town and I did so. And I wrote a report to the State Department about it later.

One of my main activities in the Sian area was to evacuate American missionaries who had remained there after 1937, and had done so safely until about April of 1944 when the Japanese launched an attack south to open up their corridor there from north to south, between Peking and Hankow. We, fortunately, had a couple weeks word that something was in the wind so I was able to contact our missionaries, mostly by letter, who were over in those areas and to urge them to move out. And virtually all of them did so. I recall arranging for their evacuation to Chungking by special trains and by buses. It turned out to be a successful evacuation.

In about August of 1944 I was instructed to return to Chungking. I spent about three months

there in the embassy doing some political reporting. And during this time we had the changeover from General Stilwell to General Albert Wedemeyer. That is to say, Wedemeyer took over the command of American forces, such as they were, as Chief of Staff to the Generalissimo. The selection of General Stilwell had been an unfortunate one. He had never managed to see eye to eye with the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. And finally, the Generalissimo felt obliged to ask for his recall. It was then that General Wedemeyer came and took over. I would say the atmosphere improved tremendously at once.

*Q: Fortunately, I'm old enough to remember all those names from the World War II press of those days.*

DRUMRIGHT: In the meantime, President Roosevelt had sent General Pat Hurley as his special representative to look in on the situation out there in West China. I have a feeling that his recommendation had something to do with the replacement of General Stilwell. And shortly thereafter word came that General Hurley would replace Ambassador Gauss as ambassador. I recall that occurring about mid-November, at which time I was called back to Washington. As a matter of fact, Ambassador Gauss and I left about the same time.

Now the situation out there had worsened by that time because the Japanese had conducted this further offensive in Central China that I mentioned before. And they also had advanced to Kweilin in South China, and were threatening to advance on Hunan. But that proved to be a bit too much for them. I think Wedemeyer and the Generalissimo working together threw more forces into the action down there and slowed that advance so that it was not effective.

The situation in China was almost verging on the desperate. Many people, including Ambassador Gauss, thought the Chinese had no chance of holding out. And other people, like Theodore White, the writer, were of that mind. Some of my colleagues in the Foreign Service thought we would do better to work with the Chinese communists whose power had advanced very considerably, as I mentioned before. So that was the situation, in a few words, when I left in November of 1944.

I reported in to the Department at the beginning of 1945. And I recall one of my first jobs was to write a paper on the potential for some kind of a settlement in China between the government and the communists. I did submit a paper. I think a few people have looked at it since but I think things turned over a little too rapidly.

Anyway, the war was over in Europe during the spring of 1945. And President Roosevelt died and President Truman came in. I was in Washington when that all occurred, that melancholy era. In the meantime, things continued to worsen in China. Vice President Wallace was sent out there to check into the situation and submitted a report. That's just in passing. It became a question, then, in Washington as to what to do. And about that time the atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and the second one on Nagasaki. And the war in Asia came to a conclusion in August. Whereupon, the situation in China became more and more acute, what to do, how to solve the situation.

Well, at the beginning we helped Chiang Kai-shek and his forces recover the occupied areas of

China. General Wedemeyer was very instrumental in that activity on the military side. Then there came a recall of Pat Hurley and his going before the Congress. Perhaps you might remember that?

*Q: Yes, I do.*

DRUMRIGHT: Anyway, there was the big hoopla about China and should we continue to assist the government, our ally, as we had in the past, or should we try to do something to work a compromise between the government and the communists. And this became a big issue after the surrender of Japan and the return of the Chinese government to East China.

Then, there came along the question of Manchuria. As you recall, there had been the Yalta Agreement which had, unfortunately in my view, returned the Russian rights to all they had given up before in Manchuria and Mongolia. And that meant the Russians had moved in. In fact, they moved into Manchuria a few days before Japan surrendered and made an effective seizure of Manchuria, which under treaty was to go back to the Chinese Government. Well, we made a few stabs at helping the government, but they came to nought.

The Chinese Government actually made a big mistake, and this is, perhaps, hindsight, in sending their main forces into Manchuria to try to seize it from the Chinese communists, who were being put in place there by the Soviet Russians, and handed over all the Japanese military equipment that had been left there. This did not succeed with the result that the Chinese suffered some serious military defeats there. This led, eventually, to their being driven off the Mainland.

Our help had been desultory, to say the least. Perhaps it was more difficult than we certainly wanted to get into. The question then came to what to do about it. And that resulted in the sending of the Marshall Mission to China at the end of 1945. Now I was on the China Desk at the time and I took the position that trying to work out a compromise between those two groups was futile. It would not work and it would probably redound to the disadvantage of the government. My position was that we should assist the government in reclaiming all of occupied China, including Manchuria. But we chose to send the Marshall Mission out with the objective of getting a settlement between the Chinese Government of Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese communists.

General Marshall worked hard on that for about a year out there. And in the interim, after meeting Leighton Stuart -- who was a university president and a real old China hand out there, he'd been born there and then brought up in China, and then educated in the United States and had gone back to China, and was head of the university in the Peking Area -- General Marshall met him and was charmed by Stuart. We had not had an ambassador out there during that critical time. You might say Marshall was ipso facto the ambassador. We had not appointed one after the departure of Pat Hurley. Marshall had been very much impressed with Stuart, and his background, and his talk about China. And he, therefore, recommended that Stuart be appointed ambassador. And that was done. I remember carrying some of the papers around the State Department that accomplished this appointment. It was probably a good assignment.

And Stuart went to Nanking, took over the embassy. And there he worked with Marshall. And as

I said, they worked hard to try to achieve a settlement. I think Stuart, in his own mind, felt that it was not very likely that one could be achieved, but he went along with it. But it failed. Early in 1947 Marshall issued a statement of a "plague on both your houses," and came back to the U.S. And later, not long later, he was appointed Secretary of State.

*Q: During this period, Mr. Ambassador, were the Chiang Kai-shek forces still on the Mainland?*

DRUMRIGHT: Yes. Our help had diminished to nothing. It started diminishing in 1946. I'd say the beginning of 1947 when they sent Marshall out there would be no more help. Because if you gave help that would blast the negotiations for a settlement. It couldn't be done anyway. So there was no help. And as time went on we withdrew our help almost completely. So in 1947 Marshall left China but left Stuart there to be the ambassador and came back. And there was no further help from us to the Chinese Government which had fought this long, hard, eight-year war. As I said, we withdrew our support of China except in terms of hoping and trying to work out a compromise between the communists and the government. But it was to no avail.

Meantime, I was reassigned in October of 1946 to London. I was there until about March of 1948 and my job was to cover the Far Eastern area. Most of our work at that time related to British problems, getting out of Southeast Asia, and that sort of thing. Otherwise, there wasn't very much in terms of China and the like.

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To go back to Washington, my assignment in the State Department was on the China desk [1953-54]. We began to have increasing tensions with the Chinese. And in those, I usually took a fairly strong line, stronger than some of my superiors liked.

So after about a year in Washington I was reassigned to Hong Kong as consul general. My service extended to over three years [1954-58]. Our main jobs there were to report, as best we could, on Communist China. And we were able in that time to report to Washington on some of the main things that were occurring there, such as the famine that was coming up, and some of Mao's moves, which later proved to be disastrous.

Other than that, the main thing that occurred in Hong Kong was the development of a plan to stop the fake emigration that had been going on there for many years. That is to say, Chinese had established ways, and means, and schools to prompt potential emigrants in ways of getting into the United States. We set up a program of investigators. In fact, at the end, we had about 30 who were investigating these cases that were coming to us. And our investigations in the long run showed a great many of them were fakes. We were rather proud of that program there, which was based on a report by one of my vice consuls, Leo Mosher, who, I think, is in Washington today.

After Hong Kong, much to my delight, I was assigned to Taiwan, where I knew the Chinese officials from Chiang Kai-shek on down, and where I felt there was some opportunity for advancement of Chinese aims. I was glad to go there. My wife and I arrived there in March of 1958, following Ambassador Carl Rankin who had been there some six or seven years. He had

done a fine job of establishing the mission there at a time when it seemed, just before the Korean War, that we were going to abandon Taiwan completely. But as a result of the Korean War starting, everything changed and we decided that Taiwan was a very important piece of property as far as our defenses of the area were concerned. And so we resumed a relationship that had been in arrears since the late 1940's in China.

To relate one or two important things that took place, within six months of my arrival we had the offshore island of Quemoy incident, which pitted the Chinese and us against the Mainland Chinese. They opened up a heavy bombardment of Quemoy in September of 1958. And that went on continuously for over two weeks. In that case, I am glad to say that President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles presented a very firm front. We assisted the Chinese as we could, but they did most of the defending there and with the result that, after four to six weeks, the Chinese communists pulled back and stopped their bombardment.

*Q: Tell me, sir, about Quemoy, why was this energetic defense of Quemoy undertaken? My recollection is that Quemoy is a small island very near the Chinese coast, maybe four or five miles away. Whereas, the Formosa Strait there is about what, 40 miles wide?*

DRUMRIGHT: A hundred.

*Q: A hundred miles wide.*

DRUMRIGHT: Well, it's mainly symbolic. They held onto all the territory that they could. In fact, when they retreated in late 1949 they defeated a Chinese attempt at that time to try to take Quemoy. That isn't a well-known event but it happened. And they turned back the Chinese communists. It was largely symbolic. And also it seemed to them a harbinger of, perhaps, a return sometime to the Mainland. So it was something they wanted to hang onto. And they did. And they still have it today.

I recall after that that President Eisenhower made a visit. He was very warmly received in Taiwan, probably one of the warmest receptions he ever received anywhere. Also, Secretary of State Dulles came on two or three occasions. He was very active and instrumental in protecting Taiwan. And, in fact, he had laid the plan, along with the Chinese foreign minister, for the defense treaty that we established in, I believe, December of 1954.

Other than that, I was proud of our military advisory group that was doing a good job of helping to train Chinese forces for defense of Taiwan, and also our economic group, under Wes Haraldson, that helped a great deal in establishing the base for the Taiwan we know today. That started during those years, about 1960, with the Chinese establishing programs or inviting foreign investors into Taiwan, establishing laws and regulations to encourage them to come, and all that sort of thing. Now we helped them, but I think on the whole, most of the credit goes to China itself and the Chinese for what they did at that time and what they're still doing today.

*Q: So I presume that the U.S. Government and the embassy did lend every support feasible to economic progress in Taiwan?*

DRUMRIGHT: We had a program there of about \$100 million of economic aid and a fairly similar sum for military aid during the four years I was there, and it began to show up very clearly before we left. We left in March of 1962 on orders from President Kennedy. I think he felt I was much too supportive of the Chinese there. And there seemed to be an apprehension in Washington that Taiwan would take some step to invade the Mainland, which I always decried as nonsense and so forth. I went back and found I had no further job, so I retired. And that's the end of it.

*Q: I see. Well, now a little reflection there. As one of the four tigers of East Asia, as they call Formosa today, with trade surpluses with the United States every year, how do you see Taiwan's future economic development and activities?*

DRUMRIGHT: Well, they started out agriculturally and that program was remarkably successful. But within a few years of the start, let's say by 1970, they had turned to an industrial society. Now this was an industrial society founded on cheap labor, along with the rest of it. And that had gone on until about the last two or three years when the Chinese have found that they've got to go high-tech. In other words, they don't have the surplus of labor they had when I was there or for several years thereafter -- cheap labor, good, intelligent, hard working labor.

So they have now decided, like Japan, they've got to go high tech. And they're following in the footsteps of Japan in developing a high tech type of industry and economics. And they're probably going to be successful at it and continue their high trade margins and that sort of thing.

*Q: I'm very glad to have your assessment of that, Mr. Ambassador. For the benefit of young research scholars of international and diplomatic history, can you give us your view of the Foreign Service as a career? Can you tell me a little bit about your viewpoints on that?*

DRUMRIGHT: Well, I look back upon my career as having been a most adventurous and interesting one. And I have no regrets whatsoever for having pursued the course I took. I had lots of opportunities in the Service. I was basically well treated throughout. I was given promotions, I think, on the basis of my performance; I hope so. I feel that I made some contribution to the welfare of the United States by my service in some of these countries. And so I'm very happy that I took the course I did. As for people now, I am not very close to the State Department. I know almost no one in it anymore. I have not set foot in it for over ten years.

I think the Foreign Service has a future for those who have an interest in our foreign relations, those who wish to work hard, those who wish to prepare themselves in the fields of the Foreign Service, including languages, and who are willing to take the knocks, as well as the good parts, of being abroad. Yes, but if you want to get to the top, you've got to work hard and do what you're told to do. That's about it.

*Q: Many thanks, Mr. Ambassador, for a very interesting and sharp account of your experiences in China and other Far East areas. You rose to the top of the ranks in your favorite profession and are certainly indicative of a career that was well-founded and of value to your government.*

DRUMRIGHT: Thank you.

*Q:* Thank you. This is signing off here on December 5, 1988, in Poway, California.

**CECIL B. LYON**  
**Vice Consul**  
**Beijing (1934-1938)**

*Cecil B. Lyon was born in New York in 1903. He graduated from Harvard University in 1927 and joined the Foreign Service in 1930. His posts included Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, China, Chile, Egypt, Poland, Germany, France, and Ceylon. He was interviewed in 1988 by John Bovey.*

*Q:* So then after Tokyo you went to Peking in 1934, I think?

LYON: That's right. Of course I realized we'd have to go, sad as I felt about it, because I'd broken the unwritten law of marrying my chief's daughter, and as you know, you're not allowed in our Service to serve with any member of your family -- which I think is quite just. However, anybody who knew Mr. Grew would have known that he would have bent over backward to avoid showing any favoritism, but, on the other hand, his wife would have had Elsie around all the time which probably would have annoyed the other members of the staff. So we set forth in January on the Nanrei Maru. That year they had about the worst storms they'd ever had in the China Sea and the moment we got aboard Elsie collapsed in her bunk -- she is not a very good sailor. I didn't dare tell her that for two days our rudder had been broken, and for about a day our radio had been out of whack so we weren't able to communicate with anyone. Finally we arrived at Taku Bar which was all frozen in and we went crashing through the ice and finally got to the railway station at 2:00 a.m. in the morning and got on the train about an hour later for Peking. On that trip our suitcases were rifled, so all in all we had rather a pleasant journey from Japan to China.

*Q:* How long did it take?

LYON: It took about three days on the boat -- three or four days -- and then about six hours from Taku Bar to Peking. We were met at the station in Peking by some members of the staff plus the Ting-chi, a marvelous fellow who practically ran the Embassy. He was at our beck and call for the next four years and he made our life very much pleasanter. Nelson Johnson was the Minister, we didn't have an Ambassador then, but the Johnsons very kindly took us in and we stayed with them until we moved into a rather lovely house in the San Kwan Miaou compound.

San Kwan Miaou used to be, before the Boxer Rebellion, a temple. The student mess where the Foreign Service Officers studying Chinese in the service lived was part of it. It had a little swimming pool, and also three houses where secretaries lived. It was really a delightful place and we took over from Bob Buell, whom I was succeeding, his very nice house and quite a number of his servants; in fact I don't think any young couple nowadays would end up by having about ten servants as we did on my munificent salary. You had to have a special amah for each

child, you had to have a special maffo, or groom, for each pony and I played polo so I had about four ponies. But enough of the easy life. Do you want to ask me something more?

*Q: Yes. When did the Japanese hit China then? Was it a year after you got there?*

LYON: They were up in Manchuria then and they worked their way down. Then there was the Marco Polo bridge incident which I think was about '34 or '35, I'm a bit vague on dates.

*Q: But you were there then?*

LYON: I was there then and I was there when the Japanese captured Peking. Elsie was at the seashore, Ching Wang Tao, which is about overnight from Peking and I remember going to bed reading Gone With the Wind to the boom-boom-boom of the Japanese approaching Peking. Suddenly I woke up because of the silence -- I was so used to the guns -- and I wondered what had happened. I slipped on some clothes and got in my car and I drove all around the outskirts of the city and found that during the night the Chinese had slipped away towards the south and the Japanese were just about to march in and take Peking.

*Q: You mean the capital was evacuated in effect by the government?*

LYON: Well the troops evacuated. The capital had already moved to Nanking.

*Q: Oh, even before the Japanese came in.*

LYON: The government offices in Peking had already moved to Nanking. Second Minister Johnson used to go down there on business from time to time though we kept the office in Peking and Minister Johnson spent most of his time in Peking.

I had a very funny experience because I was captain of the polo team and we used to play polo, we foreigners, mostly diplomats and the Marine Corps officers. We had a Marine detachment which was the Marine Guard, and they had a mounted squadron or whatever you call it -- platoon, I guess -- and you remember "Captain Jinks of the Horse Marines." Well anyway, we used to play polo on the Glac's, which is an open space which surrounds the city walls. I believe the city walls now have all been torn down, but in our day there was a wall all around the Legation Quarter. We used to play out there, and all the Chinese used to stop as they went along the street, which bordered the polo field, and watch us. The great question was whether we would play polo the day the Japanese marched in to take Peking, and we decided that if we didn't the Chinese would think that if the foreigners are scared things must be very bad. We thought that would stir them up and worry them, so we decided it would have a calming effect if we went and played polo the day the Japanese marched in. And we did and, of course, we were criticized for being heartless, not worried about the poor Chinese. But actually we had considered it very carefully. Perhaps we made the wrong decision, I don't know, but looking back on it I don't think so.

*Q: That's curious. It reminds me of the occupation of Paris. Was there collaboration going on between Chinese and Japanese or whoever was left there? How did it affect life?*

LYON: Actually it really didn't affect life much at all, strangely enough, particularly for the foreigners. I think the Japanese in north China were not very hard on the Chinese. Later on as they went south in Shanghai I think they got very ferocious, but in Peking we really seemed hardly conscious of it. We westerners went about our normal life. People gave parties; some of the Chinese didn't come to our parties because they were nervous with the Japanese around. We used to spend much time out in the Western Hills which was about an hour's drive from Peking beyond the Summer Palace. The foreigners used to rent sections of monasteries and temples where they'd go for weekends. That had to be stopped because the Japanese didn't like us wandering around there, but otherwise there wasn't a great deal of change. Of course, as I say, the government was out and the Japanese were being rather careful, I think, not to do too many things that would get reported by the foreign Legations in Peking. The mass of Chinese people in Peking and its surroundings carried on just as before the occupation.

*Q: But then there was no real underground resistance?*

LYON: Not a thing. The Chinese were used to having invasions from Mongolia. I remember a fellow called Dr. Hu Shih who was quite an intelligent Chinese. I think he later came to this country to teach at some university. He said to me, "Oh, a hundred years from now this won't matter, this will all be forgotten, we will have absorbed the invaders." And I thought, "My goodness! To be able to think a hundred years ahead." It's what you hear about the Chinese and it's what you expect them to do, but usually they're much more realistic than that. We always hear about the inscrutable Chinese...

*Q: But I would say Dr. Hu Shih was quite realistic in the light of what's going on now, yes. Anyway, go ahead.*

LYON: I was going to say, you think about the inscrutable Chinese who never shows his emotions. We had a dog, Kim, an Alsatian, which we'd brought to China with us and we had a coolie who absolutely adored him. He used to groom him and take care of him, and one day he came rushing in -- Elsie had gone to Japan to have our first child, Alice -- and the coolie came in rushing, crying absolutely like a child, "Come quick master, Kim dying, Kim dying." So he certainly showed his emotions, he was deep in tears over the death of a dog. When we were transferred to China, Elsie, who had been there on a visit a few months before, remembered this coolie who had been her rickshaw coolie during her visit. So we sent out and we got him and he became her personal rickshaw coolie. He was fleet of foot, and he always got everywhere ahead of everybody else. He was a marvelous man.

We also had a little Chevrolet convertible, which came with Elsie too. The coolie used to polish it and keep it all shiny and whenever we'd go to a party, to the movies or anything like that, where we had to park the car out in the street -- we'd take him with us so he would prevent people from stealing the hubcaps and all that sort of thing. It was very funny because as I was trying to park, he'd say, "More backside master, more backside, stop it." Well anyway he fell in love with this little Chevrolet and so I said, "Oung-Pu, I'm going to make you a chauffeur." So I'd take him down to the polo field and try to teach him to drive and having pulled a rickshaw all your life, it was as if you'd been a lowly runner in Wall Street and were suddenly made a partner

in Morgan's because it was such an exalted position. But he crashed through the garage door, he did everything wrong and he couldn't learn and finally I hired a man to teach him. And one day he came to me crying and said, "Master, I no want to be chauffeur. I think motor car all time. I can't sleep master. I don't want to." And I said, "Pu, you have to." And so he stuck to it. Eventually he got his license after about three tries, and then he was the proudest man in Peking. One day I was driving back from the country, I'd been out hunting, and just making conversation I said, "Pu, how old are you?" "Thirty year, master." "Are you married?" "No, master." I said, "What? Thirty years old and not married?" which was very unusual for a Chinese. He said, "No master, I no find any girl she like me -- no find any girl I like." He evidently thought about this and thought that I was displeased because he wasn't married. He came to me about six weeks later and said, "Master, I find one girl she crazy about me so I'm going to marry him. You borrow me fifty dollars and I'll marry him." So I "borrowed" him fifty dollars and probably ruined his life.

*Q: Times have changed haven't they? I was going to ask you, the Legations were all in one quarter. So you really had your own forbidden city there?*

LYON: We had our own forbidden city because you see after the Boxer Rebellion when the foreign diplomats were caught there in the trouble, the allies demanded a special quarter. It had a wall all around it, and the Embassies all had guards; as I mentioned we had a Marine Guard, the British had a guard, the Italians had a guard and the French had a guard. It was really rather confining.

*Q: Where was Kai-shek at this point? Was he unknown, or was he...*

LYON: Oh, no. He was already in Nanking.

*Q: Oh, he was?*

LYON: He was president and Madame Chiang Kai-shek...

*Q: He was already president?*

LYON: He was already president then and she came up to Peking a few times. She was always -- I mean the Chinese ladies used to wear dresses with slits way up the side which were rather revealing and rather attractive. Madame Chiang Kai-shek decided that they had to close those slits because she was very puritanical. I guess from her American education, because she was educated in American schools, if I remember correctly.

*Q: That reminds me of Madame de Gaulle. Do you remember that look that used to come over her face when any woman's gown was a little bit too décolleté? Well then, what happened finally? The Japanese, they just stayed there in Peking and meanwhile all hell was breaking loose down south.*

LYON: They were also still in Peking when we left.

*Q: Well, Chiang had to move out of Nanking too at some point, didn't he, or was that much later?*

LYON: Well later on he went, of course as you know, to the island, Taipei.

*Q: No, no, I know, but I thought the capital was moved again too wasn't it?*

LYON: That's right, he moved to Chungking before Taipei, you're quite right.

*Q: Well, anything else?*

LYON: On China? Oh, there must have been a lot more on China. The change from Tokyo in the heart of a devoted family to Peking was rather hard on Elsie. She's a very sensitive person and there was so much poverty in Peking that Elsie wanted to help everybody and I think by the time we left we had 104 people who were being supported by Elsie. Not out of my meager earnings but financed by her mother, who was equally kindhearted and would send Elsie money. This had its sad effects on one occasion. There was a Russian family called Klemm; they were living in Peking -- White Russians -- and they had their son in Berlin and they were longing to join him, but we, of course, didn't have any money to send them there. Elsie appealed to her mother and her mother sent the money for the family to get to Berlin. They got to Berlin just about the time that the Russians got to Berlin, so we've never known what happened to them.

There was a White Russian who played polo with us. He was a horse trainer and he looked like a centaur when he played polo. When we were transferred to Chile he begged me to take him and his wife with us. Of course we couldn't afford to, and he said, "Then when you get to Chile will you try and find me a job there?" Well I did. I asked a lot of the rich Chileans who had big fundos -- plantations -- if they'd hire him and nobody would. So I must say I didn't pursue it too hard and I've regretted it until today, its on my conscience, because when the Japanese came into Peking he fled to Shanghai and then of course the Japanese got into Shanghai, nothing has ever been heard of him since.

*Q: I haven't asked you anything about relations with the Soviet embassies or legations in Tokyo or in Peking. Yes, they were represented there, weren't they?*

LYON: That's a good question but nothing comes to mind particularly.

*Q: Wasn't there a Russian embassy in the compound there?*

LYON: No, there wasn't and I can't think why. There was what used to be a Russian embassy which was occupied by the Austrians for some reason. Was it perhaps that China did not have relations with Russia?

*Q: How about Tokyo?*

LYON: Oh, yes, in Tokyo there were Russians. I mean there was a Soviet embassy and the various embassies had relations, never very cordial, stiff and perfectly correct.

*Q: No, but there were no problems between the Soviets and the Japanese of the terrible kind they have now about the islands and Vladivostok and all that stuff?*

LYON: I can't remember.

**RALPH N. CLOUGH**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Guangzhou (1936-1937)**

**Vice Consul**  
**Kunming (1945)**

**Consular Officer**  
**Chungking (1945-1946)**

**Consular Officer**  
**Nanking (1946)**

**Language Officer**  
**Beijing (1946-1947)**

**Chinese Secretary**  
**Nanking (1947-1950)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1950-1954)**

**Deputy Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1955-1958)**

**Director, Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1958)**

**Advisor, Negotiations with Chinese**  
**Poland, Switzerland, and Great Britain (1958-1959)**

**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1961-1965)**

**Diplomat-in-Residence, East Asian Research Center, Harvard University Cambridge,**  
**Massachusetts (1965-1966)**

*Ralph N. Clough was born in 1917 in Washington. He attended Lingnan University in China from 1936-1937. He graduated from the University of*

*Washington in 1939 with a B.A. He received his M.A. from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940. In 1941, he joined the Foreign Service. His postings included Toronto, Tegucigalpa, Puerto Cortes, Kunming, Peiping, Nanking, Hong Kong, London, Bern, Taipei, and Washington D.C. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

CLOUGH: Well, I grew up in Seattle, born and went to school there. Graduated from the University of Washington, 1939. But I had a brush with China during my college years that really directed my future.

When I was a freshman at the University of Washington, I applied for and received an award for an exchange scholarship at Lingnan University in Guangzhou (Canton), China. I hadn't particularly been interested in China before that, I had been studying Spanish. I had four years of Spanish in high school. I was majoring in foreign trade at the university and hoped to get into business with Latin America. But suddenly came this offer to go abroad, and I was interested in traveling. It happened to be China; it could have been Argentina or Germany or whatever. So I went off to China.

And after a year as a student at Lingnan University, I was hooked. I started studying the Chinese language. I came back and took second-year Chinese at the University of Washington, and finished up with a major in economics and business and a minor in East Asian Studies. I went on for the Masters at the Fletcher School in order to prepare myself for the Foreign Service examination, to fill in some of the gaps that I hadn't had in my undergraduate work. Took the Foreign Service exam in the fall of 1940 and the oral exam in early '41, and was appointed to the Foreign Service in April of '41. I was assigned to Toronto as a probationary post, which we had in those days.

*Q: I wonder, could you talk a little about what you saw, because going to China... In the first place, wasn't your family a little bit nervous about going to China, because the China incident was in full swing, wasn't it at the time?*

CLOUGH: No, it wasn't in full swing. Actually, the Lukochiao incident that set off the full-scale war between Japan and China was in July of '37. I went out in September of '36. There was war, intermittent battling in North China, but it was mostly a kind of encroachment process of negotiation, intimidation and so on as the Japanese encroached from Manchuria into North China, and finally set off the full-scale war by that attack on Lukochiao in July of '37.

But I went in '36, and at that time, the Province of Guangdong had been governed by a warlord, Chung Jitong. Just before I arrived in Canton, or Guangzhou as it's known now, the central government succeeded in prevailing over the local warlord. They sent him on a world tour and took over the province. At that time, Guangdong Province still had its own currency, which was at a different rate with the U.S. dollar from the national currency (it was five-to-one rather than three-to-one), and the process of bringing Guangdong into the national system was underway.

*Q: Obviously, you were a young lad at the time, but what was your impression of the Kuomintang government?*

CLOUGH: In that year, the Kuomintang government was very popular among the students. Although it was felt that it was moving too slowly to resist the Japanese, there was a lot of patriotic pressure. They started an ROTC program on the campus that year. It created some problems, because the officers spoke Mandarin and the local students mostly spoke Cantonese -- they couldn't understand each other. But there was tremendous pressure on the government to stand up to the Japanese, resist encroachment.

In December 1936, when Chiang Kai-shek was kidnapped at Sian by the Communists in an effort to pressure him into a united front against the Japanese, the first reaction on the campus was gloom. People had regarded Chiang Kai-shek as the best symbol of resistance against Japan, the best leader against the Japanese. Now he was captured; no one knew what was going to happen to him. It was a very sad few weeks while he was held by the Communists and by some of his own troops from Manchuria, who were involved also in the sequestering.

In any case, the result was they worked out a deal for cooperation between the KMT and the Communists against the Japanese. Chiang was released, sent back to Nanjing, along with Chang Hsueh-liang, the nationalist general who had collaborated with the Communists in holding him. There was rejoicing in Guangdong. It was around Christmastime when the news came of his release, and there were firecrackers going off all over the city and great joy that Chiang Kai-shek had been released and that a united front of resistance against the Japanese was developing.

*Q: Did you have any feel for incipient Communist movement in the students at the time?*

CLOUGH: No, not at that time. The Kuomintang was the symbol of nationalism. The Communists were far off in the northwest. There was no significant underground Communist movement.

*Q: The enemy was warlordism.*

CLOUGH: No, the enemy were the Japanese. As far as the national government was concerned, the warlords were a problem, because they still hadn't gotten control of the west and the southwest. Even in the south, even Guangxi Province, next to Guangdong, was governed by a couple of warlords with whom the KMT had to make deals. In resisting the Japanese, the KMT had to make deals with the various warlords in order to get the use of their forces against the Japanese. And that's one of the things that, over the long run, weakened the KMT.

*Q: Then we move back to your Foreign Service time. You were in Toronto from '41 to '42. What were you doing there most of the time?*

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*Q: Then in 1945, you were able to get out there.*

CLOUGH: In 1945, the reason I got out was that I was drafted. I had wanted to use my Chinese, and I had written to the China program. The Navy was running a China program in Colorado,

and training people to become China specialists in Naval Intelligence. That attracted me, so I wrote to them and tried to get into that program, but they said my eyesight was too bad. It didn't meet Navy standards.

*Q: The Navy, I recall at the time, was death on bad eyesight.*

CLOUGH: That's right, so they turned me down. And then the next thing, the Army wanted to draft me. So they said report either to the closest place, which was Panama, or your home city, which was Seattle, where I'd originally registered for the draft. So, of course, I chose Seattle, because I had a wife and a small son at that time, and I wanted to take them back and establish them with her parents for the duration, while I went off to be drafted.

So we all went back to Seattle, and I went down and reported to the draft board. They gave me a physical and said, "Well, you're ok for limited service, but we're not drafting anybody for limited service right now, so just wait." And so I waited and audited some Chinese courses at the University of Washington.

Eventually, the State Department was ginning up the San Francisco conference to set up the United Nations. They needed to send about half of their Public Affairs Division out to San Francisco to handle those problems during the conference, and they were very shorthanded in Washington. So they discovered that I was sitting there doing nothing in Seattle, and they said, "Come back to Washington, get your papers transferred to a local draft board in Washington, wait there, and work while you're waiting."

That seemed reasonable to me, so I went back to Washington and worked in the State Department, the old War Navy Building, what's now the EOB. I was there for several months, the spring and early summer of '45.

While I was there, of course, I went around and got acquainted with the people in the China Division. They were shorthanded; they needed people to serve in China. I worked it out so that I would get assigned to Kunming as Vice Consul when I finished my stint in the Public Affairs Division.

*Q: Where's Kunming?*

CLOUGH: Kunming is in southwest China, not too far from Burma. It was the place where the Burma Road ended, and where there was a great airlift going on at that time from India into Kunming. They had a huge airfield there and a large number of American Air Force people stationed there.

*Q: Before we move there, did you have any impression of the China Desk? How were they looking at things in 1945?*

CLOUGH: It was wartime, and I knew relatively little about China or our relations with China. I'd been down in Tegucigalpa for the past three years.

After the end of the war with Germany, of course our efforts were concentrated on the Pacific. One of the things we were doing was bringing in as much material as we could, over the Hump, to supply the Nationalist forces against the Japanese, while we hit them in the Pacific. So our whole China effort was aimed at resisting the Japanese. There was an effort by the Japanese to drive toward Kunming from south China through...

*Q: To wipe out those airfields that were bombing.*

CLOUGH: Yes, they did capture airfields in Guilin, a couple of airfields in Guangxi Province. And they were moving toward Guizho and trying to come toward Chungking and Kunming from the southeast. So that a lot of the air sorties by the American Air Force, which had succeeded the Flying Tigers, were trying to stop that penetration by the Japanese.

*Q: Were you getting any feel while you were in Washington about the Stilwell-Chiang Kai-shek disagreements, because it was about that time, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: Stilwell had been eased out before that. Wedemeyer was in Chungking, along with General Hurley. I did get some murmurings about problems between General Hurley and his Foreign Service staff in China, but not very much. I was pretty innocent when I went off to China.

I got on the plane early July of '45, and I had to go through North Africa and India in order to fly into Kunming. I had a low priority and I was bumped.

*Q: Vice Consuls don't amount to very much in a wartime situation.*

CLOUGH: That's right. I was bumped in Casablanca. I was bumped in Cairo. I was bumped in Karachi. I was bumped in Calcutta. But I didn't mind, because it gave me a chance to see a little bit of those places that I'd never visited before. And then, finally, I flew in over the Hump into Kunming and became Vice Consul there.

*Q: Was it about August or so?*

CLOUGH: No, I got there in July.

*Q: Before the war ended.*

CLOUGH: Before the war ended. I had been there a few weeks when the war ended.

*Q: What was the situation in Kunming as far as your office and your work was concerned?*

CLOUGH: My assignment was Political Officer, which was new to me. I'd maybe written a couple of attempts at political dispatches in Toronto, just to try my hand, but I didn't really know much about political reporting. But that was my assignment in Kunming.

Bill Langdon was the Consul General there, and he had a staff of, I suppose, five or six officers

doing consular work and political work. But it was small, very self-contained.

We lived in a compound that had once been the Governor's mansion. It had a big wall around it, and a huge gate, and a number of separate buildings inside. We used part of the buildings for offices and part were our living quarters. A two-story building in the center was our living quarters. Very simple. We had no flush toilets. We had toilets that had to be emptied every day by the servants. We ate together in a central mess on the first floor of the large building. It was very interesting.

We were next door to a dormitory where a number of professors from the Southwestern United University lived. This was a university that had been set up by Peking University, Tsinghua University, primarily, when they moved. They had to move out of Peking, and they set up again, finally, in Kunming. They were sort of a hotbed of anti-KMT sentiment. The people there belonged to the Democratic League, which was an opposition group promoting a more democratic system, coalition with the Communists of some kind. I think it was not long before I got there, I can't recall exactly when, a well-known professor named Wonido was assassinated in Kunming. It was quite a political sensation at the time. I talked with a number of these professors, did some reporting.

*Q: Did you have any feeling on your reporting that your Consul General was saying: Lay off this? Or was there sort of a world-your-oyster, as far as whatever you saw, you could report on?*

CLOUGH: As far as I recall, he was pretty easy going in that respect. I don't recall his having any fixed... Well, he must have had fixed views. He was a strong-minded individual.

I recall, particularly, we had an American professor who taught English at this university, and he had been there a long time. He had been in Beijing before and then moved with the university. He and Langdon used to argue. They would sit at opposite ends of the lunch table (he ate his meals with us), and they would argue about anything. They both loved to argue, and they always took opposite sides on whatever the argument was. I remember, this fellow's name was Bob Winter, and his favorite remark at some point in the argument was always, "Langdon, you're talking out of McGuffey's Second Reader."

*Q: What was your impression and, you might say, of the others there, of the KMT and its doings in the Kunming area?*

CLOUGH: I wasn't really there long enough to get much of a grasp. I was there July, August, September, about three months, and I was transferred to Chungking, so I was just beginning to establish my contacts and so on, which, in a new environment and a new function, for me takes time.

*Q: It takes time in any case. Now in Chungking, you got there in October of '45?*

CLOUGH: I arrived just a couple of weeks after General Hurley had left, so I never met him. And I was never caught up in that "Hurley versus the Foreign Service, the China Service."

*Q: Were you getting any of the aftershocks of that whole thing?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I began to get that once I got to Chungking and talked to people there. It was evident what had been going on.

*Q: What was the problem?*

CLOUGH: I think the problem was a very strong feeling on the part of the political reporting officers that the KMT was declining, that it was in a very weak position, there was a lot of corruption. It had a big army. Its forces outnumbered the Communist forces by a considerable amount, but it seemed to be so inefficient and so incapable that the reporting that went in from Chungking on the KMT, by people like Jack Service and Ray Ludden and John Davies and so on, was uniformly unfavorable to the KMT. I mean, they saw the feet of clay.

But Hurley didn't like that. Hurley felt it was exaggerated, that it was unfair to the KMT, that the Generalissimo was somebody we ought to support, and by this kind of reporting we were undermining him.

*Q: Did Leighton Stuart take over as Ambassador right after that?*

CLOUGH: No, he didn't, not right away. The first change was the employment of General Marshall, who came in December of '45. He came as a result of Truman's decision for the United States to mediate between the Communists and the Nationalists and try to work out some sort of coalition government. General Marshall was sent to carry out that mission.

Walter Robertson was the Chargé d'Affaires when I arrived. He had been an Economic Officer in Australia during some part of the war, and then he was sent to Chungking as Economic Counselor. He was a former Richmond banker. When General Hurley left, he became Chargé, and was Chargé for several months until General Marshall arrived.

I remember Robertson saying, when he read the instructions about the U.S. function in mediating and trying to set up a coalition government, "Well, we have a variety of means by which we can put pressure on the KMT, but I don't see any way we can put pressure on the Communists." So he was rather pessimistic about the future, although he worked at it. He was named by General Marshall as Director of the Executive Headquarters in Beijing later on when the operation moved up there.

*Q: Was the Marshall mission, was he really going there... Did he become Ambassador?*

CLOUGH: My recollection is that he was, for a short time, before Leighton Stuart was appointed. I think it was a temporary arrangement, but he had responsibility for things beyond just the mediation mission.

I recall my own personal experience. I was a Vice Consul, Third Secretary, so I had rather menial assignments. One of the things I did was to write letters, memos to the Foreign Ministry complaining about invasions or damage done to foreign mission premises by the KMT military.

This was happening here and there around China. The missionaries would complain to the embassy, the embassy would go to the Foreign Ministry and complain about it. That was one of my jobs.

Another job I was assigned in the aftermath of the war, and after General Marshall came, was to work on a project, which he conceived, of turning over to the Foreign Service a lot of the equipment that the U.S. military would be leaving behind in China when they pulled out.

They had all kinds of stuff that they had used for their war purposes, and it wasn't worth shipping back to the United States. We were going to turn it over to the Chinese at one cent on the dollar, or something like that. But General Marshall thought that before we turned it over to the Chinese, the embassy and the six or seven consulates in China at the time ought to have first call on any of that material that we could use. Most of it we couldn't use. It wasn't suited to...

*Q: Anti-aircraft guns and all...*

CLOUGH: No, but there were a few things that could be useful: light bulbs, trucks, Jeeps, pots and pans, a lot of things of that sort. So I was designated by General Marshall to visit the various consulates and to draw up with them a list of the kinds of things that they could use.

So I thought about this, and I thought, you know there is a problem. One of the things that would be most useful to consulates around China would be generators, because the electric power was notoriously bad in China, it was always going off. If we had our own generators, we would be independent of that problem. And that was one thing that the military had quite a few of.

The problem was that I didn't know anything about generators or how big a generator you needed for such and such an installation. So I went to General Marshall and said I needed an engineering officer to go with me, somebody who knew something about electricity, electrical engineering.

And he said, "Well, all of our engineering officers are very busy in China. I don't know that we can spare any."

I said, "I happen to have a brother who is a Lieutenant at an aviation engineering battalion in Okinawa, maybe he could be freed."

So General Marshall said, "What's his name and serial number?"

I gave it. The next thing my brother knew, he was sitting peacefully in a tent in Okinawa, he got this message marked "Gold" from General Marshall: "Report to Shanghai." He didn't know what it was all about. He knew that I was in Chungking, so he suspected that I had something to do with it.

So I went down to Shanghai, and after several days in a hotel there, reporting daily to the headquarters, my brother and I finally encountered each other. I saw him sitting in the dining room in the hotel. It turned out we'd been going to different places and had never encountered

each other. But we finally got together, and we made a tour of various consulates: Beijing, Tianjin, Qingdao, Hong Kong.

*Q: What was your impression of a consular establishment, the people? Here you had a chance. Obviously, you were a junior officer, but you'd been around for awhile. What was your impression of what they were doing, but also the people there and our operations there?*

CLOUGH: I had a chance to meet some of the older China Language officers, people like Bob Smyth, who was Political Counselor in Chungking. Later on, after I went to Beijing myself as a language officer, I met Harry Stevens, who was Consul General in Beijing for a short time before Edmund Clubb arrived. I saw in the *Foreign Service Journal* the other day he just died at the age of 92.

Harry Stevens, I remember him particularly, because in June of '46 I was appointed Language Officer to study Chinese in Beijing. I was the first of the post-war crop of Chinese Language Officers, so I reported to him. His idea of how to learn Chinese was to take the dictionary and memorize each meaning of each character. But he didn't stay long, he was soon succeeded by Clubb.

*Q: We had a very extensive consular establishment in China at the time.*

CLOUGH: We did. We did, but it was still a very disturbed period. It wasn't a normal period. There were still a lot of military around. Our own Air Force was engaged in transferring Nationalist troops across Communist-held areas into Beijing, Tianjin, into Manchuria. There was a unit of U.S. Marines stationed in Beijing and in Tianjin, also, and they were responsible for the safety of that rail line, which was attacked by the Communists from time to time.

On the one hand, there were these negotiations going on at the top level. Zhou En-lai with Chiang Kai-shek. Chang Chun was the chief Nationalist negotiator. They had this elaborate Executive Headquarters set up in Beijing, with a large number of field grade officers whose job was to go out in groups of three -- American, Nationalist, Communist -- and check on reports of clashes between Nationalist and Communist forces.

This was a little later. I sort of jumped ahead of my story. During the period when I was touring the consulates to make up lists of things they required, I didn't have much chance to find out what was going in a political sense in these places, because I was concentrating with the general services officer trying to make lists of stuff. And I spent only two or three days with my brother at each place.

I was struck particularly by Hong Kong, which we reached early, maybe it was January, February 1946. All of the houses above a certain level on the peak had been stripped. Nobody lived there. When the Japanese occupied, they had been abandoned, or the owners, mostly foreigners, had been interned. The houses were empty. The Chinese simply took out the wires and plumbing and everything else that was movable, leaving the shells of the houses. And that's the way it was when I got there in 1946. It was a sad sight.

*Q: After you finished this tour, were you getting any of the rumblings of Hurley making problems back in Washington?*

CLOUGH: Yes, we were getting reports on that. And we were also very much concerned with the negotiations that were going on and the attitude of the Chinese. We had particular contacts, as usually happens, with the Chinese who thought like we did about democracy in China, people in the Democratic League. We had contacts with the Communists as well. Zhou En-lai had an office in Chungking.

We moved down from Chungking to Nanjing. The whole embassy moved in early '46. One of my jobs first was to go down there and take over from the officer who was the first one sent down to Nanjing to rent houses for embassy personnel who would be moving back to Nanjing, which was the capital where the government would be moving. And, of course, there was great competition for housing, everybody was going back at the same time. He did a good job of renting a number of houses.

Then I was sent down to run the motor pool and to handle the shipment from Chungking on LSTs of office furniture and stuff.

*Q: LSTs being landing ship tanks.*

CLOUGH: Yes. They had some on the Yangtze, which were sent up to Chungking to pick up all this stuff. They were good for carrying that kind of cargo. They just let down their front flap on the bank and everything could be carried off. So we rescued all of this pitiful furniture out of the embassy in Chungking, very simple Chinese-made desks and chairs and so on, but we figured it was better to bring it down and use it than junk it and have to buy new. So that was my principal job in Nanjing until I was sent up to Beijing for language study.

So, as you can see, I was not one of those engaged in the political of the embassy, but I did know the people who were more active in that work. John Melby, for instance. I knew John very well. He arrived in Chungking while I was there, and then we were both stationed in Nanjing. And then later, when I came back after my language study, I was assigned to the embassy in Nanjing, so I got to know John fairly well. And Ray Ludden was another Political Officer.

They were, I would say, generally rather pessimistic about the way things were going, The war was continuing sporadically here and there. The Executive Headquarters system had not successfully created a cease fire. Both sides were throwing accusations at each other. And the worst thing that was going on was the terrible inflation, which was already underway in Chungking and spread over the whole country. That continued right up until '49 when the Nationalists were driven off the mainland.

*Q: One of the people, of course, who figured very strongly in our policy for the next decade, really more than that, was Walter Robertson. And you saw him when he was within the service and not a dominating figure. What was your impression of him, and how was he looking at things at that time?*

CLOUGH: I think that quote that I gave you about how to deal with Nationalists and Communists generally typified his view. He felt that we had no effective way of putting pressure on the Communists. If they wanted to create a civil war, we couldn't stop it. He tended to blame the Communists more than the Nationalists when negotiations broke down.

*Q: Did you feel that there was any sort of almost a generational thing in the Foreign Service there?. I mean, the older officers tended to maybe see where the KMT had come from, and the fact that they had initially been a force of reform, whereas the younger officers coming in there were looking at things as they were at the time and finding the KMT being corrupt?*

CLOUGH: I think there may have been that sort of division. I guess the officers that I knew best in Chungking were Bob Smyth and Knight Bickerstaff, who had been my professor at the University of Washington. He was a temporary Foreign Service officer in Chungking doing political work. And they both knew the KMT from the earlier days and had this historical perspective, which, I agree, some of the younger officers didn't have. Although the younger officers, in a way, had a longer perspective, because people like Jack Service and John Davies had grown up in China.

*Q: You went to the language school then in Peking from '46 to '47. How did that operate?*

CLOUGH: We had to start from scratch. There were no teaching materials available. One of the books we were given, for instance, was a two-volume work by a Colonel Aldrich, an Army Colonel who had prepared this, pre-war, for the use of foreigners in China wanting to learn Chinese. It was very ill-designed for the uses of the Foreign Service. It had very little of political or economic interest in it. It mainly dealt with how you run a household in Beijing, how you talk to your Number One Boy and your cook.

*Q: Sort of kitchen Chinese in a way.*

CLOUGH: It was more than kitchen Chinese. Within its realm it was very sophisticated, and it taught you characters that you'd never encounter anywhere else, but not of much use in the Foreign Service.

There was a young China specialist named Thurston Griggs, who had also been an exchange student at Lingnan University. He was also from the University of Washington. He had been there the year before I went, so I met him after he came back, and got some tips on the program at Lingnan. Anyway, he somehow (I'm not sure just how) found his way into the Foreign Service, and he became the director of the language school. He'd had some graduate work in Chinese. He hired about a dozen Chinese as instructors. About half of them were engaged as tutors, the other half were preparing materials, getting extracts from newspapers, documents, and things that would be useful to us in our Foreign Service career. So we had six students, initially, and 12 teachers. Pretty good teacher-student ratio.

Each of us studied in our own houses. Most of us lived in a little compound there called Sankuon Miou, a number of Chinese-style houses in a good-sized compound with a swimming pool.

*Q: Was your family with you at the time?*

CLOUGH: We had our families with us. Actually, I was the only one who had been in China, and I was assigned to language school from a job in China. My family came and joined me when I went to the language school in June of '46. The other students came from other places, and they came with their families.

Our tutors came around to visit us. We had fixed hours each day for tutoring -- one hour with this teacher and another hour with another teacher. About half of our time was tutoring, the other half was independent study. It was a very good program, we learned a lot. We spent a lot of time going to plays, to movies, to Chinese church, any place we could take advantage of to get some practice with our Chinese.

*Q: When one is a language student, in some ways you're a little freer than you are at almost any other time to get out and meet people. Were you getting any feeling from the people you were meeting about the situation and how things were going?*

CLOUGH: Yes, we spent time with students at the universities, for example. Generally speaking, the students were very critical of the KMT. They were also critical of the United States. There was a famous case of an alleged rape of a Chinese student by an American Marine, and that occupied the newspapers for quite awhile. So there was a widespread feeling among the students that the United States and the KMT were in the wrong, and that we were not really backing democracy.

The Communists had considerable appeal. They were seen as more upright, less corrupt. And they had this vision for the future: a peoples' China that would not be at the service of the compradors and the rich people, the Cadence and the Sungs. Compradors were merchants who served as middlemen with the foreign merchants in the Chinese market.

*Q: You then went back to what was now our embassy in Nanking. You served there from '47 to '50. What was the situation when you got there, and what were you doing?*

CLOUGH: I was given the title of Chinese Secretary, which is a title that doesn't exist anymore.

*Q: That sounds like the old British Foreign Service. They had an Oriental Secretary, actually, in Egypt or something like that.*

CLOUGH: Anyway, my job, about half of my time, was taken up with the documents that went to and from the Foreign Ministry. Normally, as you know, in a foreign post, in an embassy, you write to the Foreign Ministry in your language, and the Foreign Ministry writes back in their language, and you have to do the translation.

But in Nanjing we had such a heavy volume of correspondence, in those years, with the Foreign Ministry that they simply couldn't have kept up if we depended on them to do all the translating, we'd be too far behind. So we had a staff of translators, who translated both our notes to the Foreign Ministry and the ones that came back from the Foreign Ministry. That way, we more or

less kept up with the flow of correspondence.

My job, as Chinese Secretary, was to check the translations to make sure that these translators were accurately turning the English into Chinese and vice versa. The rest of my time I was a political reporter, or sometimes high-level interpreter going with one of the Counselors at the embassy to talk with some high-level Chinese official.

*Q: Could you describe a little about the embassy. Leighton Stuart...*

CLOUGH: By the time I was assigned to the embassy, Leighton Stuart was there as Ambassador. He had a strong commitment to try to get this coalition to work out. He was China-born, he grew up in China. He had been president of the university for years. He wanted China to be a peaceful, progressive place.

He had many, many connections, both on the Communist side and on the KMT side. He knew many of these people personally, had known them for years. For example, the head of the Aliens Affairs Office in Nanjing City was a man named Huang Hua, who had been a student of his at Yenching University and then gone over to the Communists and worked his way up in the ranks. He had meetings with Huang Hua on several occasions. This was reported in Stuart's own autobiography and in the dispatches that were written during the period. I'm sure a lot of this is reproduced now in FRUS.

*Q: Were you getting any sort of instructions as you did your reporting? What were you, particularly, looking for?*

CLOUGH: We were looking for rays of light, I suppose, in this gloom that surrounded the political situation. The negotiations were not progressing. Of course, Marshall left long before I came back in '47 to Nanjing. He later became Secretary of State, I've forgotten just the timing of this. [JANUARY 1947]

In any case, we talked to people in the government. We talked to professors and businessmen. We studied the publications of various kinds that came out with all kinds of rumors and stories about politics, much of which was not fact. It was very hard to sort out fact from fiction in this confused period.

And this was the worst period of inflation. People were scrambling to try to make ends meet. I can recall how the embassy had to send a truck to the bank to get a truckload of currency. Each of us got an allowance of local currency, as part of our salary, in order to pay our servants and to buy things that we needed on the local market. We'd line up at the accounting office in the embassy and each of us would get a mail sack full of bundles of notes.

*Q: I understand at that period of time nobody bothered to unbundle notes.*

CLOUGH: That's right. I don't know how many million each bundle stood for. But I'd take my sack back to the house, and I would pass out the appropriate amount to each of the servants (I think we had about three servants at the time), and they would rush off to the market to buy

something before the currency lost any more of its value. They'd try to turn it promptly into rice or cloth or gold coins or whatever. It was a hectic time.

Now the political situation was simply going from bad to worse, because in the middle of '46, the civil war broke out in full scale. The Nationalists, at first, made an advance. They captured Yen-an up in Shaanxi Province. They seemed to be making progress, but it was an illusion, because they had disregarded Marshall's advice about Manchuria. He had felt that they couldn't maintain themselves in Manchuria. They had Shenyang and Changchun, several cities, but the countryside was mostly controlled by the Communists. He felt they simply couldn't keep their supply lines open, which turned out to be the case.

Gradually they lost the battle for Manchuria and then the battle for North China. And finally, in '48 the climactic battle, the so-called Huai-hua battle north of Nanjing, was fought. Millions of men on either side. The Nationalists lost, and that was the end of them. For all practical purposes that was the end of the KMT.

But we could see it coming, you know. We'd go into the embassy and our Military Attaché would put a map up and give us a briefing on the latest military situation. Any layman could see it was going badly for the Nationalists.

*Q: Of course it only came up later, but was there any feeling there was anything we could do about it? A few years later, it was: Who lost China? How did that feel? You were there at the time.*

CLOUGH: I was there, and those of us who were in the embassy and in touch with our American military were strongly opposed to getting any more deeply involved. You remember General Wedemeyer was sent out on a mission to tour China and see what might be done. He went, together with Phil Sprouse, who was the Director for Chinese Affairs at the time.

The Wedemeyer report was so negative, I guess, to the Nationalists that it was not published for a considerable period of time. It became one of the political footballs back here in the United States. But Wedemeyer's judgment was that it would have required an enormous investment of American military to maintain the Nationalists in China. And in the opinion of those of us in the embassy, it was not worth it. We couldn't support this collapsing structure.

I recall one occasion when Congressman Walter Judd came out. We had an evening session with Walter Judd, and he kept saying "What can we do? What can we do?" And none of the embassy officers had any very good ideas. It was a gloomy session, and I think he came away with the feeling that those China specialists in Nanjing are not much good, they can't think of any useful things for the United States to do at this critical point.

*Q: Judd was China-born, too, wasn't he?*

CLOUGH: I can't recall, but of course he was a missionary in China for years and years.

*Q: He was a missionary and then a very influential Congressman on the Right in the political*

*spectrum in the United States.*

CLOUGH: He was a very strong pro-Nationalist, along with Senator Knowland from California. Those two, I think, were the outstanding ones.

*Q: Were we making any effort that you know of to make contact with the democratic groups?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes, we had contact with those people all along. But as always happens in a situation when you have two strong antagonists fighting each other, the people in the middle tend to be very small in number and very weak. They wanted something which the Americans approved of very much, they wanted some democratic, peaceful arrangement. But the two sides who held the power weren't interested in what these people were peddling. They wanted their own views to prevail.

*Q: How about your contacts with the KMT at the Foreign Ministry? What was your impression of how they were operating?*

CLOUGH: They were very professional. Ninety percent of what we did with the KMT didn't have much to do with the high politics of the situation. We negotiated a trade treaty, for example, that consumed a lot of time and effort. We had an aid program going in China. We had a very active cultural affairs program. The Fulbright Program was started in China; it was the first country where we had a Fulbright Program.

*Q: So as things were falling apart, the chairs were being rearranged on the deck of the Titanic. This was a very slow collapse, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: Yes. It tended to accelerate as it got toward the end. In the beginning, when I was in Chungking, I would say the prevailing view in the embassy was that if we could not work out a coalition agreement (and people were rather pessimistic that we could) between the Nationalists and the Communists, then China was in for a long period of civil war. Very long. People did not think the Nationalists could be defeated. On the other hand, they didn't think that they could defeat the Communists, and therefore it would drag on and on. No one, in 1945 or '46, would have predicted that by 1949 these huge Nationalists armies with all their equipment and so on, so much superior in material terms to the Communists, would be reeling back in total defeat.

*Q: Well, you had the climactic battle. It was near Nanjing, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: It was north of Nanjing, a couple of hundred miles.

*Q: How did you all view it there, and then what happened to you after that?*

CLOUGH: We could see that the Communists were winning the civil war. It was very evident, particularly as the Huai-Hua battle developed and the Nationalists began to use desperation measures to try to shore up this place with airlifts and that place. It was obvious they weren't going to be able to do it. Therefore, the government was going to have to move, because Nanjing would be immediately threatened once they couldn't hold the ground to the north. There was talk

of forming some sort of line along the Yangtze River to hold the Yangtze, but it wasn't that formidable an obstacle to the Communists as it turned out.

So we had to divide the embassy. The government prepared to move. It was going down to Guangzhou, Canton. And we sent the larger part of our embassy. I guess this was late '48 when we did this. Louis Clark, who was the Minister Counselor, headed the group that went down to Guangzhou. Leighton Stuart stayed on, along with all the other Ambassadors in Nanjing, with the exception of the Soviet Ambassador who moved down to Guangzhou. I think the senior Foreign Service officer was Johnny Jones, who was a Political Counselor.

So we were there, and we anticipated the Nationalist withdrawal and the Communist arrival, which occurred in late April. I think it was April 25th that the Communists came in. There was an interim of about 24 hours, between the time that the police and military from the Nationalists pulled out and the Communists forces came in, when there was some looting in the city, some disorder. But not too much. It didn't affect any of us.

When the Communist troops came in, they were very orderly, and they informed us that we had to stay in our compounds. For the first few days they wouldn't allow us out. They posted sentries at the gates and wouldn't allow the foreigners out. But within a few days we got a notice from this Aliens Affairs Office, which had been set up.

You have to remember that in April of '49 there was no central government. The People's Republic of China had not yet been established. This was simply a military government, and the Aliens Affairs Office was the office that was set up to deal with the foreigners. We assumed that we could function in a consular capacity, as we had done in Manchukuo. After the Japanese took Manchuria, we never recognized Manchukuo. We never had any diplomatic relations with that government, but we kept our consuls there, and we dealt with the local government on a consular basis. Never had any serious problems. I think the Japanese accepted that. And that's what we had done throughout Latin America. When there was a change of government, we'd keep our consular officers on, and we'd deal with the successor, whoever it was. So we thought we could do that in China, but the Chinese Communists took a different attitude.

They sent a notice around to all the embassies in Nanjing saying: "You people have no official status whatsoever. You're just ordinary citizens, and you're not allowed to leave the city without permission from the Public Security Bureau. There's an eight o'clock curfew. No one is allowed on the streets after eight o'clock. And if you have any business, you have to deal with this office and present your business in the form of a written statement in so many copies in Chinese and English, or Chinese and a foreign language, whatever your language is." So that was the setup that we encountered.

We did have this incident involving Leighton Stuart's quarters. Early on, the first few days of the occupation, some soldiers wandered into his house early in the morning before he was out of bed. They intimidated the servants, and they bulled their way upstairs into his bedroom, actually, where he spoke to them in Chinese and explained that this was foreign government premises, that they were violating the law by coming there and so on. But they didn't pay much attention.

One of my jobs was to go to the Aliens Affairs Office and make a protest of this invasion of our Ambassador's quarters by soldiers. So we wrote it all out, and I went down to the Aliens Affairs Office. The first problem I had was to get in, because you had to fill out a form at the gate, all this in Chinese, saying who you were, what your position was, what your business was, who you wanted to see. So I filled this all out, saying that I was the Second Secretary of the American Embassy.

The gatekeeper said, "No, you're not. You have to say you're the *former* Second Secretary of the American Embassy."

And I argued with him. I said, "No, as far as *my* government is concerned, I *still am* the Second Secretary of the American Embassy."

So we argued awhile, and then he took the paper and wrote "former" in front of it and took it in.

So I went in, and I made my protest to the appropriate official. In fact, this was Huang-hua himself. He lambasted me. He said, "You have no right to make a protest. You have no status. You're just an ordinary citizen."

We found out later that these soldiers were tracked down and they were punished. We heard indirectly, but they wouldn't acknowledge our protest.

*Q: Why did we hang on there?*

CLOUGH: The theory was (and this was a theory widely shared among the foreign Ambassadors in Nanjing at that time) that the Nationalists were on the way out, that they were losing the civil war, that they were going to be driven off the mainland, and that the best way to make the adjustment to the new government that was taking over was to keep our Ambassadors there so we would have some representation. We could begin a dialogue and work out the arrangements. That was the theory, but in fact it turned out to be much more difficult than anybody anticipated.

The British, in January 1950, recognized the People's Republic of China, which had been established on the 1st of October 1949. But they were not allowed, immediately, to set up an embassy in Beijing, which was the new capital. The Communists were not going to use Nanjing as the capital, they were going to set up in Beijing. The British had to send a negotiating team to Beijing to negotiate the terms under which they would establish a mission there after they had recognized.

They had a special problem that nobody else had. They had a consulate in Tamsui in Taiwan, which they didn't close down. Taiwan, of course, was still under the control of the Nationalists. The Communists wanted them to close that down, and they refused. As a result of which, the British were not able to send an Ambassador to Beijing for about 20 years, until the early '70s, when they finally closed their Tamshui consulate. They had only a Chargé d'Affaires in Beijing.

*Q: Did you ever hear anyone talking about: Well, let's get the hell out of here and go back when the spirit is right? This hanging on seems, in retrospect, a bit odd.*

CLOUGH: As far as we were concerned, that's what we did. But we only did it after we'd been there from April '49 until February of 1950 when we finally pulled out. We pulled out because there had been a number of problems. First, we'd had the imprisonment of Angus Ward, our Consul General Shenyang, in Manchuria, and his staff, and they were held for a long time. And then there was an incident involving a Vice Consul Olive in Shanghai, who was mistreated by the police.

So there was concern that, as you say, we weren't accomplishing anything by staying there, that we might as well pull out. Because as long as our people were there, they were to some extent hostages. They could be arrested or mistreated.

The final straw, as far as we were concerned, was when they confiscated a piece of property in Beijing that had been embassy property. They simply took it over. And at that point, we said, "Ok, well, we're pulling out." We moved our people down to Shanghai and closed the embassy.

We tried to negotiate for a ship to come and take us out of Shanghai, but the Nationalists were bombarding Shanghai and Nanjing, sporadically, from Taiwan during that period. The government said: "It's too dangerous to bring a ship into Shanghai, you can't do it." So we finally worked out a deal to bring the ship into Tianjin and take everybody on the train up to Tianjin, and we got the boat out to Hong Kong.

*Q: Were you getting instructions from Washington telling you to keep hanging in there?*

CLOUGH: We were doing useful things, I think. We were reporting on the situation in Nanjing. After the first few days, we could move fairly freely around the town. Not outside the walls, but within the town. We could talk to people, and we could report on what the newspapers were saying. They had taken over the former *Central Daily News* and turned it into the *Shenwa Rebao*, the new China daily published in Nanjing. And we also got newspapers, sometimes, from other parts of the country. We could analyze what they were saying, what campaigns were going on.

*Q: How did you get your communications in and out?*

CLOUGH: We had our own radio. We had our own broadcasting, transmitting set, encoding equipment. So we operated entirely by radio. For months, we didn't get any pouches in or out.

*Q: If somebody left China, they couldn't get back in?*

CLOUGH: That's right. So when Leighton Stuart left, we had to negotiate for his departure. It was decided by June or so, well, certainly by the time that Mao Zedong made his famous "Lean to One Side" speech, which was of July 1, 1949, that there was no point in keeping our Ambassador there any longer. We had an Air Attaché there with an airplane, so we had to negotiate the terms for the Ambassador to leave with the Air Attaché to fly to Okinawa, with some other people from our staff. We reduced the staff considerably.

We had a problem, because the Communists had established a system of guarantors. If any

foreigner wanted to leave China, somebody who stayed on had to guarantee that nothing that he did would be damaging. In other words, they wanted a hostage for everyone who left. And we had to negotiate this for the Ambassador, as well, since they regarded him as only an ordinary citizen.

*Q: I talked to somebody not too long ago who was supposed to be going up to Manchuria and was a guarantor for almost everybody towards the end. And then he stayed. He was a little bit worried about getting out.*

CLOUGH: That might have been Phil Manhard.

*Q: It wasn't Phil Manhard, it was somebody else. We've done Phil Manhard, but I can't remember who.*

CLOUGH: Anyway, that's what we had to do. Have you interviewed Lee Bacon?

*Q: That's who it was. He was the one.*

CLOUGH: After Johnny Jones left, Lee Bacon, the Consul, became the senior Foreign Service officer in Nanjing.

*Q: How did you all feel? Did you feel that this was a transition period and that there were signs that the Communist authorities were probably going to open up? Was this hope, or was there anything to sustain this?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I think we were optimistic. We drafted a telegram, I guess probably the summer of '49, to the effect that the Nationalists were losing the civil war, that it was important for us to maintain some connection. It was a longish cable in which we sort of analyzed the whole situation: the declining fortunes of the Nationalist government, the almost-certainty that the Communists would be taking over as a new government. But we expressed the view that, in time, strains would develop between the Soviet Union and China, in spite of the lean-to-one-side views expressed by Mao on July 1st, and that we should wait for that time, take advantage of what we felt then would be a growing division between the Soviet Union and China.

*Q: Was Washington, did you have any feel for...*

CLOUGH: I think that telegram was later utilized by the Secretary of State when he met the British Secretary, Nevin, at some meeting, mid-Atlantic meeting or something. The British Foreign Secretary and the Secretary of State talked about China, and I think this telegram from Nanjing was one of the exhibits. I didn't know that, until I got to Hong Kong and looked in the files. In one of the Top Secret files I found this telegram right next to the report of the meeting with Nevin.

*Q: You then left, you went to Hong Kong, is that right?*

CLOUGH: We had a lot of problems that maybe Lee Bacon has told you about in more detail.

We had labor problems with the staff at the embassy, who were stimulated by the Communists to organize themselves into a labor union and demand a high severance pay that the State Department was not very keen to pay out. So there was a lot of negotiating going on, on that issue. We finally came to an agreement.

*Q: By the way, what had happened to your family? Had they gone by this time?*

CLOUGH: No, they were still there.

*Q: Still there. So you went out en famille.*

CLOUGH: Yes. Actually my wife died in Shanghai, so I went out with our two sons through Tianjin.

*Q: Well, just as the State Department goes, I'm surprised that with the death of a wife you weren't taken out, no matter what.*

CLOUGH: This happened right at the end. We were on our way out. So I was then reassigned, assigned to Hong Kong.

*Q: Did you go home?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes, I went home. I had home leave and consultation, then went back to Hong Kong, where I was in charge of political reporting, the political section of the consulate general there.

*Q: When you were back in Washington, now we're talking about 1950, what was the feeling there about the situation that you were getting? You were the people who were dealing with it.*

CLOUGH: You were beginning to get this Who-lost-China syndrome by that time. The people in charge of Chinese Affairs, Phil Sprouse, the Director, and Tony Freeman, the Deputy, were feeling it very, very strongly. I've forgotten just when they left those jobs, but after they did, they never again were given an assignment in China.

*Q: In Hong Kong, you were doing political reporting.*

CLOUGH: Primarily, on the mainland. It was our only remaining nearby post where you could get information about China. We also had the Korean War. The Korean War had just started in June, and I arrived in Hong Kong about July or August.

*Q: How did you view the Korean War? China didn't come in until later, in the winter, late fall. How did you view the Korean War, with just the Koreans fighting the Koreans? Did you all at the post in Hong Kong see this as an expansion of Communism and that Chung might be the next...*

CLOUGH: The most immediate question was whether the Communists would stop at the border

of Hong Kong. They took Guangzhou in, I guess it was late '49, and they were moving south in May 1950. They took Hainan Island. They were at the border of Hong Kong, and nobody knew whether or when they might cross the border, because there was no way of defending Hong Kong militarily. The British couldn't defend it. So we had a rather tense period there in which American dependents were advised to leave. The British did not advise their people to leave, but the American Consul General, Walter McConaughy, made that decision.

Then the next question, of course, was: What would happen in Korea? Would the Chinese get involved? We had reports of the Chinese moving troops from south to north, toward Manchuria. These were rather persistent and rather well-established. So that was the main question coming at us from Washington. They wanted any information that we could get on what the Chinese attitude toward Korea was. We scrambled around to pick up every scrap of information we could, bearing on that issue. That was our prime directive at that time.

You may recall that in late September, Zhou En-lai made a speech in which he warned that they couldn't tolerate the destruction of a neighboring country, or something to that effect. At about the same time, we got a warning through Ambassador Pannikar, the Indian Ambassador in Beijing, from Zhou En-lai, to the effect that we should take this seriously. And there began to be reports then of an occasional Chinese being captured in northern Korea.

The question then was: Were the Chinese serious? Were they going to come in, in force, or were they just trying to intimidate us or deter us? MacArthur decided, on the basis of his intelligence, that it was the latter, and he issued his famous statement about getting the boys out of the trenches by Christmas. Went ploughing full steam ahead.

*Q: Over the 38th Parallel and all that. Well, they were already over the 38th Parallel by that time.*

CLOUGH: The Inchon landing was September 15th, and they moved north quite rapidly over the 38th Parallel. The question was whether they should go all the way to the Yalu. I was getting reports. I remember I had one White Russian informant in Hong Kong, who had connections in Manchuria. He had lived in Manchuria, and he would get messages from time to time. I remember once he told me that the Chinese were having people put tapes on their windows in the event of bombing, a suggestion that perhaps they were expecting to get involved in the war in Korea.

The most notable incident was when we had a Chinese, who came down from Beijing. He was known to the consulate general there, particularly to Howard Borman, who was in my section in charge of translating Chinese materials, the Chinese press and magazines. He had known this man, and the man had given them some information about developments in Beijing before the consulate general closed down and pulled out. He turned up one day in Hong Kong, and I had him, with Howie, up to my house (didn't have him come in the office). He told us that there had just been a very important meeting in Beijing at which all of the members of the Democratic League and the other so-called democratic parties had been called in, and they had been told that there was a new slogan: "Resist America. Help Korea." And that there was going to be a full-scale campaign on this all over China. This was the first word we had of it. So we reported this.

We didn't know that this man was a hundred percent reliable, but we had some confidence in him, and we reported it on that basis. Turned out to be accurate. He went back into China and was never heard from again.

I should say that that message from Pannikkar, the Indian Ambassador, was not taken as seriously in Washington as it turned out it should have been, largely because of Pannikkar's own views. He was known in Nanjing as being very pro-Communist, and he wasn't regarded as an entirely reliable intermediary. I've often thought afterwards that if Zhou En-lai had given that message to, say, the Norwegian Ambassador in Beijing, instead of the Indian Ambassador, it might have been taken more seriously.

*Q: In Asian relations, we've always looked on the Indians with a certain amount of suspicion, I think.*

CLOUGH: Particularly in relation to China, because we always felt they were pro-PRC in most issues.

*Q: With Vietnam and all we never... so that as an intermediary they didn't carry the weight. In your reading the papers and all this, were you seeing anything about getting ready to go into Korea?*

CLOUGH: We saw the usual attacks on the United States, of course, but it was very hard to interpret those as to what they would actually do. I remember (you could probably find this telegram in the file somewhere) from time to time we sort of added up the pros and cons as to whether the Chinese were planning to come on a large scale. And we came down on the side that they probably weren't.

I think that was based on a misreading of the Chinese. A feeling that, after all, their country was less than a year old (their government was established just about a year earlier). They still were in the process of consolidating their rule in China. They were poor. They had a long road ahead of them. Was this the time to get involved in a full-scale war with a country like the United States, which was the most powerful military state in the world?

There is an article, which will be coming out in the latest issue of the *China Quarterly*, written by a couple of students who were here at SAIS, Chinese from the PRC, based on interviews that they had with senior Chinese officials and some materials that have been written since then, about the decision to enter the Korean War on the part of the Chinese. Apparently there was a big debate in senior circles in China about whether it was wise to do this. And finally, Mao Zedong made the decision. He had been convinced, ever since '48 or '49, that sooner or later they would have to fight a war with the United States, because it was such an implacable, imperialist enemy. And that if they were going to fight such a war, Korea was the best place to do it. [Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *China Quarterly*, 121 (March 1990), 94-115]

*Q: When you look at this, so that's Mao Zedong, and on the other side you have MacArthur, who also had very firm and fixed ideas, too. So no matter what was being fed into both sides as far as*

*rationale, an awful lot depends on, at the top, the ideas of whoever's leading.*

CLOUGH: That's right. Presuppositions.

*Q: Was there a difference, or were you sharing views from those who were watching China, say, from Japan and MacArthur's headquarters?*

CLOUGH: We got very little of that traffic. We didn't really know what was going on between MacArthur and Washington.

*Q: Washington at the time was relying on you to give everything you had, but there was no real sense of direction that you were supposed to go this way or that way or anything, was there?*

CLOUGH: No, I don't think so. Of course, we heard the rumblings of all the McCarthy attacks on Foreign Service officers. We were concerned, but I never found that that affected our reporting particularly. Perhaps we were in a more fortunate position, because we were in the period of war with China, and everybody was hostile to China.

*Q: So there wasn't the matter of looking at them as peaceful, peasant agrarian reformers. How about Walter McConaughy, who was the Consul General part of the time you were there, what was your impression of him and how he saw the situation?*

CLOUGH: I found him a very good boss, perhaps partly because he gave me a free hand. He very rarely made any changes in the things that I wrote for reporting to Washington. He was not a China specialist himself. He was trained in Japan, initially. But he was a very good officer, I thought, good instincts and good reasoning. He wasn't afraid to make difficult decisions when he had to, as when he advised Americans to withdraw dependents from Hong Kong. It wasn't entirely popular, as you can imagine.

*Q: You were one of a growing corps of new China hands, as opposed to old China hands. Old China hands were more from missionary families and all. Normally, when you become a specialist in something, you have orientations towards different groups in the country. And here you are with the Communists being as nasty as they could be and yet a thoroughly discredited Kuomintang sitting there. It would be very hard for an American Foreign Service officer to identify with and root for one or the other of them. How did you feel about this situation there?*

CLOUGH: I felt that China was a huge country we were going to have deal with one way or another, whether we liked it or not. My job was to find out as much as I could about what was going on, what were the trends internally, as well as in their foreign policy.

This is for our later interview, I guess, when I was in the Office of Chinese Affairs, but I felt that the economic policies followed by the Communists in the late '50s were going to be disastrous for them. If you looked at their demography, if you looked at the very small proportion of budget they were putting in on agriculture, it was clear they were going to have food problems. And, of course, within a few years, they did.

*Q: So while we were looking at the immediate and, you might say, almost tactical, intelligence-type information, we were also looking at the long-term picture. Were you able to get fairly good ideas of what was going on, from the various newspapers and the people who came in?*

CLOUGH: Not really very good. It was spotty. For one thing, they were reluctant, particularly in those early years, to put out any reliable statistics that an economist could use to put together what was really going on. So it was rather impressionistic, what we learned in Hong Kong. And there were also a large number of peddlers of information, who wanted to sell it, who wanted to gain access to American visas or something. They were very troublesome, because there were so many phonies. And it wasn't always easy to spot the phoney.

The CIA was very new in those years. We had a small unit of CIA people in the consulate general, whose job was to gather covert intelligence. They had money to pay people for intelligence. We didn't. As political officers, people would come to us wanting something, and we were never able to offer them anything. Which was probably just as well, because what you got for money was less likely to be genuine.

I recall one case of an individual who had come to me and offered information about what was going on in Guangxi Province (the second province back beyond Guangdong), and this was of some interest to us. The main rail line to Vietnam went through Guangxi. I listened to what this fellow had to say, then, by accident, I was able to get hold of a newspaper that came from Guangxi that told about a severe accident, burning of a bunch of railway cars, that had occurred in the city of Wuzhou. I read about this and the dates and so on. And so the next time this guy came in (he claimed to be able to go back and forth to Guangxi Province), I began to question him rather closely about the dates when he was in Wuzhou. He claimed to have been in Wuzhou when this happened, but he never said a word about it, which pretty well convinced me that he wasn't there. It was too juicy a morsel not to have reported if he had been there.

*Q: A lot of information has come out, obviously. Now, in 1990, looking back on it, how do you feel our reporting was at that time?*

CLOUGH: I'd say it was pretty spotty. It would be interesting to go back now and make a careful survey of what was being said. I think we were fairly cautious. We weren't inclined to be taken in by the more extreme claims of the Communists.

I was there mostly during the Korean War and for about a year after the war ended. I think one of the things we were concerned about, of course, was Soviet-Chinese relations. Those relations, as far as we could see, were getting stronger and stronger, because of the close military relationship, the supply of large amounts of tanks and planes and all kinds of military equipment, which continued after the war.

I recall one occasion, it must have been '54, it was after the Korean War, and I left Hong Kong about July '54, so maybe the spring of '54, Joe Alsop came through.

*Q: He was a newspaper columnist.*

CLOUGH: Yes, but he had also written a big article for the *Saturday Evening Post*, in which he had a new theory. He had been in touch with people in the Pentagon, and he had gathered up some military terms like "division slice," which had to do with the supporting units you needed in order to support a division, and he was following the Soviet resupply of the Chinese military. He had concocted a thesis that at the rate that the Soviets were building up the Chinese military forces, that by a certain date, about a year from then, a year, maybe two years, they would have enough force on the southern border of China so that they could just overwhelm Thailand, Indochina, it would all become part of China.

*Q: There's a little problem of terrain.*

CLOUGH: I took issue with him, I argued with him. I said, "You know, if the Chinese wanted to do that, they wouldn't have to have all this Russian equipment. They've got manpower to burn compared with these countries. They could go down there and take them over. You're building up a house of cards here, based upon a lot of calculations, which really don't... It's the intention of the Chinese that's important, not what they happen to have in the way of military equipment." But he brushed that aside. He'd made up his mind and wasn't going to listen to anybody out there.

*Q: One last question on this, and then we'll have an interview another time. Were you getting anything from the State Department, or by word-of-mouth corridor talk or anything about: Boy, watch this McCarthyism business, I mean, for the China hands?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes. We were getting quite a lot of that. Not formally, but through the back door.

*Q: What was the thrust? What was the problem? How did you see it?*

CLOUGH: It worried us, because, after all, we were China specialists, we were China language people. But we were not caught up in it, because we were not in responsible positions at the time that China was lost. All of us, who were trained after the war, were the new generation, and we were, I think, reasonably confident that nothing serious would happen to us, because the whole attitude of the United States toward China had changed.

We had had the Korean War, which had created a kind of semi-permanent state of hostility between the United States and China. For at least several years after that, we were concerned about the next move on the part of the Sino-Soviet bloc; it was still a bloc in '54. And it was evident that they were already beginning to strengthen the Viet Minh. The Chinese were giving help to the Viet Minh. They had been extending their railroads down to the border so they could get equipment down more easily. That was our main concern, this and a lot of the propaganda that was coming out. In '54, I think the Huk movement was still quite active in the Philippines. The various Burmese civil wars were going full tilt.

*Q: The Red Flag, White, Black Flag or whatever it was.*

CLOUGH: Yes, and the Communists in Malaysia were still fighting very vigorously. Northeast Thailand had its own Communist rebellion. There were Communist rebellions all around. So we

were very much concerned with what seemed to us to be a Sino-Soviet advance into Southeast Asia, the next move by Communism.

*Q: How did you feel, from, you might say, the corps of China hands, about the permanence of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT on Formosa or Taiwan?*

CLOUGH: We didn't have a lot of confidence in the future of the KMT on Taiwan. Of course, once Truman had made the decision to put the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, then it was obvious that the Communists didn't have the military capability of overcoming that kind of obstacle. So, in that sense, the KMT was safe. But I don't think those of us who had been associated with the KMT in China had any confidence that they could turn things around the way they actually did. It was quite a remarkable feat.

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CLOUGH: Well, I stayed interested in China [while in Honduras]. I had the good fortune that sometime during this period the State Department sent a notice around to all the offices saying that the military had developed a series of language records, about 50 or 60 different languages, and they were using these in the program (I can't recall the acronym) that the Army ran in many universities for teaching various languages. One of the languages was Chinese, and they developed a set of records and a couple of booklets that went with them for learning spoken Chinese.

This was very attractive to me, because I hadn't had much spoken Chinese, my Chinese had been written. The spoken Chinese I learned in Guangdong was Cantonese. I had to change my pronunciation to Mandarin in order to take second-year Chinese at the University of Washington.

Our professor of Chinese there, Knight Bickerstaff, was a historian, not a linguist. He was pressed into teaching language courses simply because they had no one else. His teaching of language was to take a sixth grade Chinese primer on the history of China, and we plowed through that, learning the characters as we went along, including some rather unusual characters that you wouldn't normally come across in conversation.

So when I saw this set of records offered to any Foreign Service post, I wrote in and asked them to supply Tegucigalpa with a set of the Chinese records, which they did, no questions asked. I found them very useful in building up some capability in spoken Chinese, because I still had the ambition to go to China.

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*Q: Ralph, may I say first of all that our careers, at this point of your career, began to overlap. You were at the National War College '54-55. I was at the National War College the following year, '55-56. You came out of the National War College and went into the Office of Chinese Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, as they called it at that time. I, when I got out of the War College, went to the same bureau to become the Regional Planning Advisor. Both of us were working for Walter Robertson -- a great man, but a very, very strong, ardent supporter of*

*Chiang Kai-shek and had absolutely no use for the more balanced view that some of us took with regard to Chinese issues. However, he was very much the voice of the Administration at that time and had the strong support of the China lobby, we used to call it. Now, let me go back then to your arrival in the State Department to work on the China Desk, or, at least as I understand it, you were the Deputy Director of Chinese Affairs.*

CLOUGH: That's right. Deputy Director to Walter McConaughy.

*Q: Now in 1955, when you arrived there, I'm wondering if you could tell me a little about your work in the bureau and the problems you faced in that period of '55 to '58.*

CLOUGH: Our China policy had just come through the period of late '54, early '55, when we signed a defense treaty with the Republic of China. The Formosa Resolution was passed authorizing the President to intervene in any attack on off-shore islands, which he considered to be part of or preliminary to an attack on Taiwan. So that had happened in early '55.

*Q: That was after the first off-shore Taiwan Strait crisis.*

CLOUGH: That's right. In January of '55, the Chinese Communists had attacked and occupied Yijiangshan Island, which was one of the Dachungs, and then we assisted the Nationalists in withdrawing their troops and civilians from the Dachungs, because they were beyond...

*Q: Was that the only place where they attacked? They didn't attack Quemoy or Matsu?*

CLOUGH: Later they did. That was the main attack. I don't recall whether at that point they had fired some shells at Quemoy and Matsu, but I don't think so. They occupied Yijiangshan Island. They launched a very effective amphibious assault.

*Q: That's just off the shore of...*

CLOUGH: Zhejiang Province. It's north toward Shanghai, and it was beyond the range of the fighting...

*Q: Are they still there today?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes.

*Q: So they permanently occupied them.*

CLOUGH: These islands have always been considered part of China.

*Q: So what was our military operation designed to do then in '55?*

CLOUGH: In '55, our military operation was designed to help the Nationalists withdraw from those islands, because they were considered too far away...

*Q: How many people did they withdraw?*

CLOUGH: Oh, I can't recall the exact figures, but it was ten thousand or more.

*Q: So that the capture of those people would have been quite a blow, then, to Taiwan and to the Republic of China.*

CLOUGH: Yes. And in exchange for Chiang Kai-shek's agreement to withdraw, with our help... We weren't willing to help him defend those islands, so he had to withdraw.

*Q: So it was a very limited operation.*

CLOUGH: Very limited operation, but it involved, at least implicitly, a greater commitment by us to the other off-shores, the bigger ones, Quemoy and Matsu particularly.

*Q: But it was still left unclear as to whether we would defend those islands if they were attacked.*

CLOUGH: That's right. We would never give an ironclad commitment. What we got from the Congress was the Formosa Resolution, in February of '55, which gave this authorization to the President.

*Q: And only if those islands were attacked as part of an attack upon Taiwan itself would we come to the help of those on those off-shore islands, as I recall.*

CLOUGH: That's right.

*Q: So then in '58, when the Chinese Communists, as we used to call them in those days, launched this artillery interdiction against Quemoy, then they made the declaration that this was the first step towards Taiwan, and thereby gave, really, Dulles the ammunition he needed for invoking the agreement we had with the Republic of China with regard to defense.*

CLOUGH: That's right, although we still did not intervene militarily in defense of the off-shore islands. In other words, our forces weren't involved in combat. We moved the Seventh Fleet in...

*Q: But we escorted them to three miles off shore.*

CLOUGH: We convoyed the supply ships to within three miles, but we did not engage in combat, nor did we agree to the bombing of mainland airfields by the ROC Air Force.

*Q: So this period when you were a Deputy Director really involved these two incidents, although one was pretty much over.*

CLOUGH: I left before the '58 crisis began.

*Q: I thought you left before the '58, because Larry Lutkins, I think, replaced you.*

CLOUGH: No, Ed Martin. Ed Martin came from London.

*Q: But Ed Martin became the Director, didn't he?*

CLOUGH: Well, I was the Director. I became the Director in '58. I had been Deputy, but I was barely in the job before the agreement was reached to open the ambassadorial talks with the Chinese Communists in Geneva.

Secretary Dulles sent Ambassador Alex Johnson to Geneva, August 1, '55, to open those talks with Wang Pingnan, the Chinese Communist Ambassador from Warsaw. Alex was at that time Ambassador to Czechoslovakia. They met in Geneva amid great press attention, hundreds of press people there at the first official relatively high-level meeting between Americans and Chinese Communists.

There had been an international conference in '54, at which there were somewhat distant encounters. That was the conference at which Dulles was accused of having refused to shake hands with Zhou En-lai.

Anyway, I was sent to be the advisor to Alex Johnson at those talks in Geneva, and I was there for probably two and a half months. We reached our first agreement with the Chinese on the return of civilians, which was, from our point of view, the number-one object on the agenda. We signed that agreement in September.

*Q: What civilians are we talking about?*

CLOUGH: We're talking about a group of people who were detained in Communist China, about 40 or so.

*Q: So they'd been there for five years or so.*

CLOUGH: Some of them were missionaries who had been there a long time.

*Q: But I mean they'd been there since the takeover.*

CLOUGH: Many of them had been arrested at the time of the Korean War. And there were also 13 American Air Force people who had been shot down.

*Q: How did you persuade the Chinese to release these people?*

CLOUGH: The Air Force people, they released on their own. They announced, on the day that Wang Pingnan arrived in Geneva, that they were releasing the 13 military people. As Wang Pingnan put it: to create a good atmosphere for the talks, which it did. Then we began negotiating on the return of the civilians. It was a very complex negotiation; took about six weeks.

*Q: That was really the major achievement of these, we used to call them the Warsaw Talks, but*

*the antecedents of these, of course, was Geneva. Were they held in Vienna at any time?*

CLOUGH: No.

*Q: Started in Geneva, then went to Warsaw.*

CLOUGH: That's right. We got this agreement signed. A number of these imprisoned Americans were released, came home, but not all of them. The Chinese then wanted to go on to other subjects. They wanted a Foreign Ministers meeting. They wanted exchange of correspondence between the United States and China. They wanted lifting of the American economic embargo on China.

*Q: I take it that this was all bad news from Taiwan's viewpoint.*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes. Even the fact that we had sat down to talk with them was bad news from Chiang Kai-shek's viewpoint. They were very nervous about what was going on in Geneva, because it was kept very secret. After the first few meetings when some scraps of the proceedings leaked out in Washington, Dulles clamped down and restricted all of the correspondence to and from the State Department and Geneva to a very small number of people in Washington so that this wouldn't happen again.

*Q: Did we keep Congress informed of this?*

CLOUGH: I'm not sure exactly what arrangements we had with the Congress during this period, but we kept them generally informed. We kept Chiang Kai-shek generally informed, but, of course, he wasn't confident that we were telling him everything, which we probably weren't.

*Q: But the principal effort was made to get the Americans released and back.*

CLOUGH: That's right, that was the first order of business.

*Q: That seems to me a very defensible position for us to be taking with anybody. That's the kind of thing we would have to do. If we didn't do it, there would be a lot of questions raised as to why we weren't doing it.*

CLOUGH: Of course.

*Q: So did we more or less explain our talks with the Chinese in those terms?*

CLOUGH: Yes, that was the main emphasis in the beginning, because that was what we were talking about.

*Q: And then Beijing tried to make use of this to expand our relationship.*

CLOUGH: That's right.

*Q: Knowing the discomfiture this would cause in Taipei.*

CLOUGH: Not only discomfiture, but eventually, they hoped, a shift of our diplomatic relations from Taipei to Beijing. But they made a mistake in that they wouldn't release all the Americans. They had evidence that some of them actually were spies. Most of them were accused of being spies.

*Q: And those cases lingered on from year to year.*

CLOUGH: Those cases lingered on, and we took the position that we couldn't go on to talk about other things in Geneva until they had released all the Americans. They had to fulfill their first and only agreement with the United States before we could talk seriously about closer relations.

We soon moved on to the Taiwan issue, and we demanded a renunciation of force with respect to Taiwan, which they would not give. Their position was that the Taiwan issue was composed of two parts: a domestic part and an international part.

The domestic part was their own problem, and they didn't want any foreign interference. That was the problem of reunifying China, ending the civil war, bringing Taiwan under PRC control.

The international part was what they called the U.S. occupation of Taiwan, American interference in Chinese internal affairs, interference in the civil war. Civil war was not over, because Chiang Kai-shek had not been totally defeated and he still occupied a piece of Chinese territory. So they wanted to separate the two. And they said they could not renounce the use of force against Taiwan so long as the United States was interfering there.

*Q: Ralph, did that become sort of the permanent sticking point in these talks?*

CLOUGH: Yes, it did become the permanent sticking point. It went on for years. We put forward a number of drafts. We exchanged drafts (these later were made public) on this issue of renunciation of force. They were willing to sign a general renunciation of force with the United States -- they wouldn't use force against the United States -- but not with respect to Taiwan. We weren't satisfied with that. We wanted it to be specifically with respect to Taiwan.

So as time went on, the intervals between meetings got longer. We had less to talk about. We were just repeating what we'd said in previous meetings. After about two and a half months, I came back to Washington and somebody else was sent to take my place. Ed Martin, actually, became the advisor at one point.

*Q: What was the job of the bureau itself? More or less to write the instructions?*

CLOUGH: Yes. In fact, when I came back to Washington, that was my principal job, to draft the instructions to Geneva for the talks. Then Walter McConaughy and I would take them to a meeting with Dulles and the legal advisor, Herman Flaiger, and Walter Robertson. Usually there were just the five of us in those meetings. Dulles himself went over the instructions line by line, made changes here and there, and approved it. Then the telegram would go out.

*Q: But after the return of this first group of Americans, the talks really didn't achieve much, did they?*

CLOUGH: No, they didn't. They became rather sterile.

*Q: They gave us an opportunity to quiet some people by saying we were at least in touch with them.*

CLOUGH: That's right, and we could say that we'd had more high-level contacts with the Chinese after awhile, say we had more high-level contacts with them than most countries did.

*Q: And the families of those who were still detained in China must have been after the State Department all the time.*

CLOUGH: Of course.

*Q: And so at least, again, we were able to answer them that we were trying to do something about it. There were very compelling reasons, in other words, practical reasons, for conducting the talks, even though they seemed to be going on and on like a broken record?*

CLOUGH: Yes. It got so that really the only thing we'd agree on at the end of each meeting was the date for the next meeting. Even that dwindled off. The State Department wanted to transfer Alex Johnson from Czechoslovakia to Thailand, make him Ambassador to Thailand. Obviously, it wouldn't be convenient to commute from Thailand to Geneva for talks, to have Ed Martin, who had been Johnson's advisor and had the rank of First Secretary at the embassy in London, to represent the United States against a Chinese of appropriate rank to continue the talks.

But the Chinese said no. They said, "We agreed at the beginning these were to be ambassadorial-level talks. We have great respect for Mr. Martin, but he's not an Ambassador. Therefore, we can't continue the talks on that basis." So we had no agreement, and the talks were de facto suspended.

*Q: The Chinese representative was Wang Pingnan at that time?*

CLOUGH: Yes.

*Q: What kind of a person was he? Alex seemed to rather like him.*

CLOUGH: He was a very correct, professional diplomat. He did his job. He repeated whatever he was told to say at the meetings, but there was a little give around the edges. At one point in these talks about the civilians, before we reached agreement, we'd come to a sticking point, and so he and Alex Johnson arranged to have dinner together without the advisors, just an interpreter and themselves, to talk about this, and then they made some progress.

*Q: Now I'm leaping ahead in history, but looking back from the time Nixon went to China, to*

*those Warsaw talks, do you think they had any influence at all on China's decision to enter into talks with the Nixon Administration and the invitation to Peking? In other words, did they have any lasting, subtle effect on U.S.-China relations?*

CLOUGH: I think they had some effect. I think if you read Ken Young's book on the early period, he talks about the Quemoy crisis at considerable length, and the meetings. I was involved in those, too. I had just been in my job at Bern a few weeks, long enough to have our second daughter born there, when I was sent off to Warsaw to be Jake Beam's advisor at the talks there.

If I could go back for a minute, what happened was that the talks were suspended from about December of '57, and there were no talks in the early part of '58. And about June, I was by this time the Director for Chinese Affairs, we decided that we ought to try to get the talks started again.

We looked around Europe for an appropriate Ambassador, and we decided on Jake Beam, who was Ambassador at Warsaw at that time. It would be convenient to have him deal with the Chinese Ambassador at Warsaw, it wouldn't involve commuting. Jake was also a Soviet specialist, a person who knew something about Communism, and had also served in Indonesia, so he knew something about East Asia. He seemed to be the logical choice.

So we were just about to make the proposal in late June of '58, when the Chinese came out with a blast against us for suspending these talks. That caused us to hold off on making the proposal. We didn't want to seem to be reacting to this kind propaganda rhetoric, so we held off a few weeks.

Then we made the proposal later, I think in early August. By that time I'd left the department, Ed Martin had taken over as Director. And the Chinese didn't respond immediately.

The next response we got was the August 23rd commencement of the bombing of Quemoy. So that brought the idea of talks right into center stage. Dulles made his speech at Portsmouth, then Zhou En-lai made his proposal that talks be resumed, and we agreed on Warsaw. And I think it was about the 10th or 16th of September, mid-September sometime, when we sat down in Warsaw to have the first talks.

*Q: While the shooting was still going on.*

CLOUGH: The shooting was still going on, right.

*Q: (Kennedy) Excuse me, I wonder if I could just interrupt for a second. Could you give a little feeling for the atmospherics when you would sit down for instructions with Dulles and Walter Robertson and McConaughy and Flaiger. What was their attitude towards these talks?*

CLOUGH: They took them very seriously as a way to keep in touch with a very important adversary of ours at that period, with the hope that the effort to at least promote a more peaceful atmosphere in the Taiwan Strait would be successful. I don't know what Dulles had in mind as sort of long-term, whether he thought these might lead eventually to a diplomatic relationship

with Beijing. He might have.

*Q: Just one more thing about your role in these talks. You spoke Chinese, were you actually interpreting for our side?*

CLOUGH: No, I was not the interpreter. At the Geneva Talks, we had an Army officer, Bob Eckvald, who had grown up in China, missionary child, spoke Chinese well. He had been interpreter at P'anmunjom at the end of the Korean War, so we drafted him as our interpreter. I was the advisor, I helped to draft statements and messages.

*Q: But you could understand, of course, the conversation both ways.*

CLOUGH: Yes, I could understand.

*Q: That was a big advantage. With your background in China, having served in Kunming, Chungking Nanjing, and Beijing, you must have had a great deal of subjects to discuss with Wang Pingnan's assistant or others on that delegation. Did you have any such?*

CLOUGH: No. There was no outside contact, and that was the difficulty. It was a very formal sort of set up.

*Q: So Alex and you and the interpreter would be on one side of the table...*

CLOUGH: And a note taker from the consulate general in Geneva.

*Q: So there was no contact then, except between the principals.*

CLOUGH: That's right. Occasionally, we might exchange a few words before or after a meeting, but not much.

*Q: That's very interesting.*

CLOUGH: In Warsaw, we were given the Mischleviskiye Palace by the Polish government as a place where we could meet. It was nicely arranged for this purpose, because we had separate entrances. We'd go in separate entrances, and we had little rooms where we could gather and consult about our tactics and so on before we went in, then the meeting room was in the center. We'd go in from opposite ends.

*Q: Having worked for both Alex and for Jake, two of our leading Foreign Service officers who reached high positions, I was wondering if you noticed any major differences in their style of approach to the problem, whether one had a strength the other lacked, or vice versa? Let's put it this way, were they equally effective, would you say, in handling this rather interesting and delicate and unique job? Alex, for one thing, tends to be quite talkative; Jake tends to be rather taciturn. And I was wondering whether the differences in their personalities and the way they articulated made much difference in terms of their negotiating capacities.*

CLOUGH: It's hard to judge, because the situations were so different. In '55, there was no fighting going on. It was relatively calm. The Chinese Communists were in a period just after the famous Bandung Conference, where Zhou En-lai had taken a rather mild attitude toward the United States, so that things were more relaxed. In Warsaw, when we began, it was very tense. Nobody knew how far this war was going to spread, or what the intentions of the Chinese or the Soviets were at that point.

*Q: Do you think that the Warsaw Talks had anything to do, really, with what actually eventuated in the resolution of the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1958?*

CLOUGH: Let me add something to the question earlier about the two Ambassadors. My impression of Alex Johnson was that he was more broad-gauge. He had a sort of broader view of the negotiations, and he did more of the actual drafting of reports on meetings and recommendations for the next meeting. Jake left more of that work to me. There was that difference between them, aside from the more tense atmosphere that just grew out of the situation.

Now, as to what effect the talks had on the conflict. Ken Young gives them considerable credit (I think more than they are actually due) in his book on negotiating with the Chinese Communists.

I've always felt that what really impressed the Chinese was the rapid massing of the Seventh Fleet in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait, and the fact that we were willing to convoy ships. We took a very hard line. I think their effort against the off-shore islands was, in part, a probe to see where the United States stood. Mao Zedong had just come back from Moscow the previous year, where he had talked about the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind. In '58, they were getting their "Great Leap Forward" started. They were in a period of high confidence, and I think he wanted to test the United States on the Taiwan issue.

*Q: Since I was handling this Taiwan Straits crisis as Dulles's principal assistant, working on the problem, I would tend to agree with you, as opposed to Ken Young, with regard to the impact of the Warsaw channel in the resolution of this issue. I would agree with you that the U.S. military commitment and our apparent willingness to go pretty far... We didn't have any air involvement. There were very, very tight restrictions on what we were doing, but obviously we had the capability of extending it. Furthermore, when the Chinese Air Force did start circling around in the combat area, that they were shot down by the Republic of China airplanes that were equipped with Sidewinders. I think that also had a little bit of impact. But, overall, it was an effort to strangle Quemoy and prevent supplies from coming in. When we brought these two large LSTs on station, with all the small craft that could swim out of them, which were manned by "Chinats" as we called them, GROG, it was clear that we had the capacity to resupply the islands at long last. I think that they wanted to take the initiative and not be seen as having lost out, and that's when they came out with their first announcement. Now I don't think that the talks in Warsaw had much to do with the outcome. But what I would like to hear from you is something that has long intrigued me about that second Taiwan Strait crisis, and that is whether the relationship between the Soviet Union and China, which had been rather disturbed by the Sputnik in 1957, had resulted in what seems to be a growing antagonism between Beijing and Moscow, whether that was reflected in any way in the talks, or in the crisis itself.*

CLOUGH: We couldn't sense it at the time, I must say, honestly. Looking back, we know a lot more, of course, about what was happening between those two countries at that time. But we didn't sense this tension, that the Chinese themselves elaborately attacked the Russians for lack of support in '63, when the big polemic exchange occurred.

There was one thing about the meetings in Warsaw that we had considered when I was still on the desk in Washington. We knew that if we selected a Polish building in which to meet, it would be bugged. The Poles would listen in. And we assumed that what the Poles heard, they would pass on to the Soviets. That didn't bother us too much. We thought it was useful for the Soviets to know what we were saying to the Chinese, and what they were saying to us, at this particular point.

*Q: On the other hand, the Soviets had supplied the artillery and most of the shells that were being expended on the islands by what we used to call the "Chicomcs," PRC is a better word to use these days. In other words, the Soviets had the capacity for turning off the supply of these shells, and therefore it could have been a factor in the decision of the Chinese to call off the shelling. But as you say, we didn't know much about the depth of the Sino-Soviet breach. We knew that there were tensions between Beijing and Moscow at that time, but the full flavor of the Sino-Soviet split didn't become manifest for another two or three years. When I arrived in Hong Kong in 1961, it was already clear that this feud was blowing up.*

CLOUGH: Because in 1960, the Soviets pulled out all of their...

*Q: That's right, they pulled out. And the Chinese ability to depict the Soviet Union in the worst possible language was used. In other words, our translator and our political officers in Hong Kong soon ran out of language to use, because it kept intensifying, and the Chinese had ways of describing people in those scatological terms that we just lacked.*

CLOUGH: I've always felt that, in respect to the Sino-Soviet relations, the evidence that we had broken the blockade was of vital importance. Because if you look at the dates of Khrushchev's first message to us and his second message, which was the more intemperate one and the one which the President refused to accept, the more intemperate one was sent after the blockade had been broken. I've always felt that the Soviets felt they weren't taking as much risk then, because the actual fighting was going to diminish.

*Q: Of course, when you say "blockade," you're really talking about an artillery interdiction, and the fact that we were able to get supplies ashore, whereas we were receiving these reports from CIA, largely from their people on Quemoy, that depicted the island as just about running out of supplies and obviously of the Howitzer shells and things like that that they had expended, so that we were at the point ourselves, almost, of yielding and calling for some kind of international approach to it. Dulles had gone up to New York to call for a U.N. resolution calling for the neutralization of the off-shore islands, which I thought was a crazy idea, but it was that desperate.*

CLOUGH: So we were making proposals, too, through the talks in Warsaw for such things as

neutralization, cease-fire. We put a lot of emphasis on trying to get a cease-fire. And all of these ideas were rejected flatly by Beijing.

*Q: Of course, you can't achieve through talks really much. They always reflect the realities, the scene, and that's what was happening. Is there anything else about that particular period of your career, when you were in CA, Chinese Affairs Department and in Warsaw, or shall we move on to your next assignment?*

CLOUGH: There's sort of a link between the two. I was in Warsaw with Jake Beam for three years, from '58 to '61. The first six months, I was based in Bern, but then I was transferred in January to London. Really, I commuted from London.

*Q: So really, your Bern and London assignments, basically, were still China-related assignments.*

CLOUGH: I was still China-related. People often assume, because I was from the East Asian Bureau, that I was doing that job in London (they always had an East Asian guy in London), but I wasn't. Frank Galbraith was there at the time, he was doing that job. I was put in London only to facilitate my commuting to Warsaw. They gave me a job in the political section reporting on the Conservative Party and dealing with relations between Britain and Scandinavia, but that was the lesser part of my job. I had to keep up on what was going on in China, and I had to make a trip every few weeks. In three years, I made 25 trips from Warsaw.

*Q: It's a pretty long, frustrating business.*

CLOUGH: Yes.

*Q: Sort of matches Phil Habib's performance in the peace talks on Vietnam in Paris, where he stayed on year after year going through the same threnody.*

*Q: (Kennedy) Weren't you the subject of a Congressional inquiry at one time?*

CLOUGH: Oh, they got me mixed up with Cal Maillard, our interpreter, who was also stationed in London. The two of us used to go back and forth to Warsaw. He had told some newsman about how he spoke Chinese to some counterpart in the Foreign Ministry, and somebody in Congress decided to make fun of the State Department: Here's this guy specially trained in Chinese, but he's living in London. It didn't amount to much.

*Q: Really tenuous charge. So when we're talking then about your Bern and London assignments, we're really talking still about the Warsaw Talks.*

CLOUGH: Yes, that was my primary function in those places. Although after the talks slowed down and they didn't occur very often, they were able to spare me from London for other jobs.

For example, in 1960, I was sent to the Law of the Sea Conference in Geneva for about six weeks. That was headed by... a lawyer in New York, the name escapes me. Anyway, he headed

the Law of the Sea delegation. It was the last effort to get worldwide agreement on what we called the U.S.-Canadian proposal for Six Plus Six: a six-mile territorial sea and a six-mile fishing zone. This failed by one vote. Anyway, that's beside the point.

The point is, they were able to spare me in London, because the talks in Warsaw dragged out. I had to go once from Geneva while I was on this special assignment to Warsaw and back for a couple of days. And then on another occasion I was sent with the Librarian of Congress to Hong Kong and India to look into the situation of refugees from China. We spent three or four weeks on this round-the-world trip and writing up the results. So that shows you that the demands in Warsaw were not very pressing.

Then I was transferred in July of '61 to Taipei. This is where the two things get linked together. Because when I arrived in Taipei, one of the first things that was going on at that point was the question of the admission of Outer Mongolia to the United Nations. It was linked to the admission of Mauritania. And Chiang Kai-shek was threatening to veto this proposal, because they regarded Mongolia as part of China, not an independent state, just a Soviet puppet, and therefore it couldn't become a member of the United Nations.

But the threat to do this was infuriating a lot of Africans, who wanted to see Mauritania get in. And Africa was a very important area for the Republic of China. To maintain its position in the U.N., it had to have the support of a lot of African countries. They were coming into the U.N. as independent states in increasing numbers, and we needed their vote on the China representation issue. So one of my early chores in the first week or two after I got into Taipei, was to talk to Foreign Ministry people, to persuade them not to take this foolish act.

*Q: They probably agreed with you, didn't they? It was the old man who was holding out.*

CLOUGH: Yes, it was the old man, and he...

*Q: But they must have tried to convey to him that this was a disastrous policy in terms of upholding their position in the United Nations.*

CLOUGH: Yes, I would hope so. Anyway, he finally desisted, and that crisis passed. In early '62, we began to get reports. Drumright was the Ambassador in Taipei when I arrived. I was the DCM, and this Mongolia crisis occurred while he was there. But then in March, the following year, he went on home leave. Averell Harriman had become Assistant Secretary, and he didn't care much for the position that Drumright took on the Taiwan-China issue. Harriman, I think, wanted to see some movement on the China issue. So Drumright proposed that on his way home he stop off in Manila, where there was going to be a Chiefs of Mission Conference, to which Harriman was coming. Harriman said, "No, you go right on. We'll have our DCM in Taipei come to represent you."

*Q: So you were at that Chiefs of Mission meeting in Baguio in 1962. Because you remember I had made a presentation as Consul General, Hong Kong, with regard to what was going on in China and what the implications of this were. It delighted Harriman, because basically what I was pointing out was information that supported the thesis that we should be taking another*

*hard look at what our basic China policy should be. And, of course, Chester Bowles, who was Harriman's superior at that time, being the Under Secretary, also shared that same point of view. And, furthermore, at that Chiefs of Mission meeting, you'll recall that Harriman was really quite dictatorial, and he was very short and sharp with certain people at the conference, particularly Sam Gilstrap, who was our Consul General in Singapore. You must have sensed, in other words, in 1961 when you arrived there, that the Kennedy Administration was taking a rather different look at the China policy, which was very difficult from your viewpoint, because they were leaning a bit in the direction that was going to make it very uncomfortable for our representatives in Taipei.*

CLOUGH: That's right, but I think the experience on Mongolia had a somewhat chastening effect on the Kennedy Administration, because they hadn't realized the strength of the Nationalist views and how it would affect the China lobby. After all, Kennedy had got in by a rather narrow margin. Schlesinger later said in his book that they had a talk about the China issue, and Kennedy said that we haven't got the political support to do very much on China. Let's leave that for the second term. And, of course, he never had a second term.

*Q: So you must have succeeded Rankin, did you?*

CLOUGH: No. Drumright succeeded Rankin. See, Rankin went up there as Chargé in the early '50s, and then he was appointed Ambassador.

*Q: So who did you succeed?*

CLOUGH: I succeeded Joe Yager.

*Q: I see. Well, now tell me about some of the problems.*

CLOUGH: Let me tell you about the problem of '62, because this is where the Warsaw Talks and the situation in Taiwan are linked together.

After Drumright had left we began to get these reports about preparations by the Republic of China to do something militarily about the mainland. You had no doubt reported to the Chiefs of Mission Conference about how bad things were on the mainland. There was starvation and all kinds of problems that the PRC was having after the collapse of the "Great Leap Forward," so Chiang Kai-shek was encouraged to feel that maybe there would be some sort of rebellion on the mainland, and that the time would come for him to move in with his troops.

So he started, secretly. He didn't inform us what he was doing, but we found out. He started getting certain units prepared. He imposed a defense tax to raise money. Of course, the Communists got word of this, and they moved some additional air units into Fujian Province, opposite Taiwan. And this disturbed our government, so that Kennedy, through the Warsaw Talks, informed the Chinese Communists that we did not intend to back Chiang Kai-shek in a military attack on the mainland.

*Q: Or take advantage of their internal problems.*

CLOUGH: Yes. And later he made the same statement at a press conference in public.

*Q: That was really quite an important statement, wasn't it?*

CLOUGH: It was a very important statement, and it cooled the ardor of the people in Taiwan.

*Q: I had forgotten that the statement had been made at that high level.*

CLOUGH: I'm not sure that the Warsaw channel was quoting the President, but he himself made the statement at a press conference.

*Q: See, I get involved in this thing, too, here as Consul General in Hong Kong. The Governor of Hong Kong called me in one day to urge that I get in touch with our government in Washington and our embassy in Taipei with regard to the way Chiang Kai-shek was using Hong Kong as a launching base for certain covert operations against railroads and that sort thing, kind of spoiling operations. That was kind of a lightning rod that might bring the war into Hong Kong somehow. He was very unhappy over this. I sent this message on to Washington and never got very much of an answer with regard to it. And I went up to Taiwan. Actually, I think I must have spoken to you, certainly spoke to Drumright to urge that some action be taken on this, because it was making for a very bad relationship with Hong Kong and the British. Furthermore, these little needling operations, all they were doing was causing the Chinese Communists to be all the more alert and to bring more forces to bear in the area and stirring up, in other words, a dangerous crisis situation. Meanwhile, China was going through the last toils of the "Great Leap Forward." Conditions in China were very, very bad. Refugees were beginning to flow over the border into Hong Kong. That happened in May 1962. So that there was always this concern that China might lash out in desperation. And that's where that assurance came in. Not only that we weren't going to help Chiang Kai-shek in any of his operations, but we weren't going to try to take advantage of their internal problems.*

CLOUGH: So then we get back to your longer-term question: What effect did the Warsaw Talks have on the decision the Chinese made in '69 or '70, '71 eventually, to open up relations with us?

It's interesting that in some of the talks in the early part of the Kennedy Administration, they made some proposals to China. They offered grain to China. Having heard about the famine conditions, they offered grain, which the Chinese rejected. They offered to have an exchange of correspondents, which we had earlier not been willing to do. The Chinese had now shifted their ground. In the early period, they were proposing things, and we were saying, "No, not until you renounce the use of force and release all the American prisoners." In the '60s, it got turned around, and they began to say: "No, we can't have any improvement of relations with the United States until the Taiwan problem is settled." And so they rejected these initiatives that we took in the early '60s, and the talks became very sterile through the mid-'60s. Of course, they were in the Cultural Revolution. For a couple of years there, they practically had no foreign policy.

*Q: When would you say the Cultural Revolution started, '65?*

CLOUGH: It started in '65, and the worst period was through '67 into '68. By '68, the military was taking over and calming things down, but the Chinese date the Cultural Revolution as ten years, running until the death of Mao in '76, because the Gang of Four took over...

*Q: But already by '69, why, things were limited to...*

CLOUGH: The severe fighting between various groups of Red Guards and troops and so on was ended by '69. But the thing that happened that affected the Chinese most, I think, with respect to relations with us, was what the Soviets were doing.

The Soviets began, about '64, to build up their forces on the Chinese border, and this process continued. That disturbed the Chinese, because during the Cultural Revolution, the anti-Soviet polemics became very strong. In fact, they attacked the Soviet Embassy in Beijing. Then in 1969, there was this actual military clash, two military clashes on the Ussuri River.

*Q: But what were the relations between Taiwan and the Soviet Union then? In view of the growing bitterness between Beijing and Moscow, was there an inclination to try to take advantage of that in some way, by either side, that is, by either Moscow or Taiwan?*

CLOUGH: No. No, there were rumors. I mean, people in Hong Kong were passing around rumors about meetings between people from Taiwan and the Soviets, but I don't think there was anything to that. Our relations with the Soviets in those years were such that if we thought that Taiwan was trying to make some kind of deal with the Soviet Union, we would be very upset. And they were very dependent on us.

*Q: But I was thunderstruck when I talked with Chiang Kai-shek in 1969, just before I became Assistant Secretary, to find him thinking that all this Sino-Soviet split was a lot of propaganda designed to fool the Western world. Now clearly that was not the case, and surely that couldn't have been believed by people in the Foreign Office. Did they feel that the old man was sort of losing his marbles, or whether anybody in the professional capacity who shared the Jimo's views...*

CLOUGH: Well, they used to express those views. Of course, I wasn't in Taiwan in those years. I had left Taiwan in '65.

*Q: Yes, but I was just saying that the Sino-Soviet split was clear from '61 onward, and clear to a lot of us before that time.*

CLOUGH: But it wasn't just the Jimo. A lot of people in Taiwan were saying this is just a fake, it's being put on, a show to deceive the West, because it served their interests to get the West to believe that. It would prevent the West from making any move to draw closer to China.

*Q: Oh, yes, the multi-polarization of the world was something they certainly didn't want to see. So as long as you had a Cold War atmosphere...*

CLOUGH: In taking this view, there was an element of wishful thinking. There was also an

element of calculated policy, to convince the Americans and others that nothing was to be gained by trying to improve relations with Beijing.

*Q: Yes, well, of course we were moving in that direction. And in 1962 onward, we were making certain moves to allow certain Americans to travel to Communist China. We had under consideration moves to change our foreign access control regulations so that Americans could buy things that came from mainland China. These things must have been known to the authorities on Taiwan and must have been discomfiting. Furthermore, within the State Department, we had broken up the China Desk so that there were two desks. It was no longer just CA controlling China, where almost all the attention of the desk was focused on Taiwan, but there was another desk set up, called PRCM, which basically was the PRC and Mongolia.*

CLOUGH: And Hong Kong.

*Q: And Hong Kong. That meant that all of a sudden the PRC and Mongolia, you might say, had representation in the State Department, which they had lacked before. Did this kind of thing come to the attention of Taiwan? Caused some concern I imagine.*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes. I think that any move...

*Q: And then Roger Hilsman made this speech in 1963.*

CLOUGH: That was quite disturbing to the people in Taiwan, where he intimated that we would keep the door open to possible improvement of relations with Beijing.

*Q: How did they take the death...*

CLOUGH: It's interesting (this is a sidelight, but if you don't mind my throwing it in, it's current), that since June 4 last year, the government in Beijing has been accusing the United States and the West of trying to promote "peaceful evolution" in China -- the peaceful evolution of Communism into Capitalism. That's the main charge that they make against us. And one of the things that people in the Institute of American Studies have been researching is to find statements by Americans which support that accusation. One of the things they cite is Roger Hilsman's speech of 1963.

*Q: Which, by the way, gave, I think, Dean Rusk considerable agony, because he had not had proper clearance on it. But since the speech had such a good reaction in the American press as a whole and the academic community, Rusk acted as though he was entirely in favor of the speech. But I think it came as something of a shock to him, too. There is an awful lot to cover, of course, during this particular period, but one thing that I would be most interested in is what was the reaction in Taiwan to the assassination of President Kennedy? That occurred, of course, while you were there.*

CLOUGH: That occurred while I was there, and the reaction was shock...

*Q: But in as much as he and his Administration seemed to be moving towards a civil dialogue,*

*discourse with China, and beginning to open up travel and trade...*

CLOUGH: You know, not much of that had happened under Kennedy. That really came later under the early Nixon, those signals.

*Q: No. No, there were certain moves that were already made at that time. I know, because I was the Deputy Assistant Secretary back there, called back by Kennedy to look at our China policy. And I was working with Hilsman and didn't do...*

CLOUGH: So some moves were made in that period, too.

*Q: That's right. So there were moves made in that period. Therefore, if not Kennedy, certainly people like Harriman and Bowles and others who were working under him. And the new Administration, in general, wasn't taking at all the rigid views that were taken under the Eisenhower Administration. And what I was wondering was, when Kennedy's death suddenly occurred, whether this was greeted with any kind of, even relief, in Taiwan?*

CLOUGH: I don't think so. My impression... It's a long time ago and I...

*Q: They could never say so, I was just wondering whether you sensed that there was a...*

CLOUGH: No, I think the main reaction was uncertainty as to how this happened, for one thing. And for another, how this would affect U.S. policy. I don't think anyone was confident that a Democratic successor, Lyndon Johnson, would necessarily be any more friendly toward them than Kennedy had been.

*Q: Well, maybe. Of course, McGeorge Bundy was continuing on with the Johnson Administration, and so were a lot of other people. And so was Bobby Kennedy, for that matter. Now meanwhile, of course, we were getting more deeply involved in the war in Vietnam.*

CLOUGH: Exactly. That's the next thing.

*Q: It seems to me I'd be very interested to know a little bit about what you thought our policy should be with regard to Taiwan and its relationship to the war in Vietnam. In other words, did we look to them to be a source of supply? Did we look to them to be a source of any kind of support of operations?*

CLOUGH: Yes, we did. I was present when we notified them, in '65, that Johnson had taken the decision to put in 25,000 ground troops in Vietnam. Chiang Kai-shek's reaction was interesting. He questioned whether American troops would be very effective in the kind of war which was going on in Vietnam. Of course, he had his own ulterior motives. His view was that you don't really solve things in that part of the world until you get rid of the Chinese Communist regime.

*Q: But basically they must have greeted this American involvement in Vietnam with some relief, didn't they?*

CLOUGH: It became clear fairly soon that we were going to have to depend on them to support the military operations. Early on in the '50s, when I was in the State Department, we had appropriated \$20 million to improve an airfield near T'ai-chung to accommodate the B-52, the big aircraft, in case we might need it. It didn't become an American base, but we created the facilities there so we could use it. And then, when the Vietnam War came, we did base aircraft there. We had refueling aircraft for the B-52s, which came from Guam, and we had transport aircraft to take things into Vietnam. Taiwan was also important as a place for repair and maintenance. They had very good facilities at Air Asia, which had CIA antecedents. They could repair fighter aircraft, overhaul engines, overhaul tanks, trucks and so on.

*Q: Was this capacity used?*

CLOUGH: Yes. Yes, it was quite important during that period. And, of course, Taiwan, Taipei was a very important R&R place for people coming out of Vietnam, American soldiers. So there were various ways in which Taiwan became important, and this...

*Q: Did Taiwan benefit economically from the war?*

CLOUGH: Yes, sure. It benefited economically, and it benefited diplomatically from this. The demonstration of how important Taiwan was in this containment...

*Q: And in as much as China was giving active assistance, not active ground force assistance, but giving lots of supply assistance and encouragement, it would seem to us at the time, to North Vietnam, that, again, it would be greeted with some relief, I would think, in Taiwan to realize that now we saw that really our enemy was Communist China, and that all this propitiating of Communist China was certainly something we wouldn't continue in this atmosphere.*

CLOUGH: Yes, and that was what happened, actually. I was in the Policy Planning Council from '66 to '69, and I was responsible for East Asian Affairs. I came up with a couple of minor things in the field: international relations, dealing with international organizations where we would soften our position a little bit with respect to Communist China and Nationalist China.

But the IO was still dominated by Ruth Bacon and people who still were acting very vigorously against any slippage at all. During the Vietnam War, I think Dean Rusk felt that it would be a mistake to divert any attention from getting that war ended to doing something about China.

*Q: Yes. Well, you bring up the name of Dean Rusk, and of course this looms large in all we are talking about. Because there was a man who was very deeply committed to upholding the position of the Republic of China, diplomatically and otherwise. A man who took a very strong view on the Cold War and also the war in Vietnam. He is not the kind of man who would ever back down. This must have been considerably comforting to Taiwan, to know that Dean Rusk was Secretary of State. Probably just gave them the same kind of assurance that they had when Dulles was the Secretary of State.*

CLOUGH: I think that's true. What was happening in the United States, though, in public opinion and in the Congress, was that the kind of almost automatic support for the ROC against

the Chinese Communists, which had existed in the early '60s, was dissipating. Do you remember the Congressional hearings that were held in '66, at which John Fairbank and Bill Barnett and others testified? What was Doak's phrase? Can't recall, something without isolation.

*Q: Were you aware at that time, either when you were in Taipei or when you were on the Policy Planning staff, of the basic hostile feelings between the Chinese and the Vietnamese? In other words, I had always assumed, even when I was Assistant Secretary during that period, which was '69 to '73, that the relationship between Beijing and Hanoi was, if not amicable, they both recognized the importance of staying in there together. The idea that any kind of latent hostility could break out between the two of them never occurred to me. Did it to you?*

CLOUGH: At some point I began to read some of the history of Chinese-Vietnamese relations. And, as you know, the history is one...

*Q: I didn't have the luxury of reading back in history. Because I think if one did, one recognized that this was always an underlying possibility. Well, just to go back once again to the relationship between the Soviet Union and Taiwan. I recall there was a Soviet merchantman that was seized, I've forgotten what it was...*

CLOUGH: Yes, the Tuopsi.

*Q: It was held indefinitely there. Were you involved in that case?*

CLOUGH: No. I don't think it happened while I was in Taiwan. But those seamen were held there for years and years. I think some may be still there. But I don't think they'd be prevented from leaving now if they wanted to.

*Q: To me, it made absolutely no sense for the Republic of China to hold on to those people, unless they really believed that Moscow and Beijing were working hand in glove, which seems incredible that they should ever have thought that after '61. What about the troop-community relationship? We had a lot of forces on Taiwan, and we had the Taiwan Defense Command there. We had a lot of men in uniform coming in and out. How did the people on Taiwan view our military and our military presence? Was there a kind of a nationalist reaction against it at all?*

CLOUGH: There was some. The attitude was mixed. On the one hand, most people felt that they were threatened by Communist China and that the United States had come to the rescue, and that it was necessary to have these American troops around in order to defend Taiwan. And so they were willing to have them.

And then various elements of society benefitted by running a black market with stuff out of the American PX and commissary and that sort of thing. A lot of people were employed by the American MAG (Marine Air Group) and other American military who were assigned there. We had one of the largest MAGs in the world; I think we had 11,000 people in it at one point.

But there was a certain amount of friction, because the Americans, of course, were far better off.

Their living standards were much higher. They drove cars around. Sometimes they had accidents, they'd run into a Taiwanese.

*Q: And there were red light districts, undoubtedly, that flourished around a base presence.*

CLOUGH: And then there was this case in '57 when an American serviceman shot and killed a Chinese, the Reynolds case, which resulted in the sacking of the U.S. Embassy by a mob.

*Q: That's right, and scattering all these officials papers around the streets, picked up, spuriously, by a newspaper in Bombay which printed all these things. They were very incriminating, but they were false documents. But we couldn't tell the world that they were false documents, because in proving that they were, we'd be giving away some of our secrets. So we just had to live with this situation. That's going back too many years, I was just wondering. I would gather from your remarks that there was sufficient feeling of being embattled, of being pretty lonely, certainly up against a great power of Red China, that to have a friend and to have a trip wire, by having a friend there was very important, certainly from the government's viewpoint. But down the line amongst the people there were these feelings.*

CLOUGH: Yes, there were personal frictions that you get when any large foreign community is imposed on another, but they weren't very strong. For the most part, the people in general were friendly to Americans. There was very little unfriendliness.

*Q: My general impression from meeting Chinese Nationalist officials was that they were pretty decent people to work with, and that it must have been a fairly pleasant experience dealing with the Foreign Office in Taipei. Is that a correct surmise?*

CLOUGH: I think that's right, although there were issues on which we disagreed.

*Q: But they were reasonable, they were rational.*

CLOUGH: Yes, they were rational. Most of the people in the Foreign Ministry were Western-trained, they were graduates of American universities, many of them, and they were friendly and...

*Q: Meanwhile, the standard of living in Taiwan was going up. Was it perceptibly going up while you were there?*

CLOUGH: Oh, yes, it had already started, although the real takeoff had not occurred in those years. It was underway in the early '60s. You were talking about relations, though, between the United States and the Republic of China. The real shock came in '71, when the announcement was made that Kissinger had been to Beijing and that President Nixon would go there, actually.

*Q: Where were you at that time?*

CLOUGH: I was retired. Of course, I was going back and forth to Taiwan frequently. I was writing a book for Brookings on East Asia, and then later I wrote a book on Taiwan. So I have

made a lot of trips back and forth, kept in touch. And the shock later in the Carter Administration, when we actually established relations with Beijing and broke relations with Taipei, was demonstrated by the crowd that gathered when Christopher arrived representing the department, and his motorcade was attacked by people with sticks and...

*Q: But a great deal of your efforts when you were in Taiwan must have centered upon upholding the Republic of China's position in the United Nations.*

CLOUGH: Right. That was...

*Q: That must have taken up a high percentage of your time.*

CLOUGH: It took more of the department's time, I think, because we had to deal with countries all around the world. Every September, or a few months before, we'd send out these messages and try to line up all the support for the annual vote on the Chinese representation issue. Up until about '61, we were able to get support for not considering the issue, just...

*Q: No, but in your position in Taiwan, though, it would have been very important there, from your viewpoint and our national viewpoint, that the Republic of China do all possible to maintain its diplomatic standing, and that it certainly maintain the support of countries, Africa and so forth, who had voting powers in the United Nations.*

CLOUGH: That's right. They spent quite a lot of money on Africa. They sent out these agricultural technical advisory teams to African countries. They had a...

*Q: They called it a Viking program, didn't they?*

CLOUGH: Yes, I think it was, at one point. They had plots of land in Taiwan to which they invited Africans to come and learn about agriculture. They had a steady, very large-scale interchange. I think at one point they had teams in 20 or more countries.  
[Operation Vanguard was the U.S. Public Law 480 Agreement with the Republic of China]

*Q: And they did a good job, too.*

CLOUGH: They did a good job, and this was appreciated by the Africans. And this was a way of maintaining this diplomatic link and getting that crucial vote every year.

*Q: And have fewer white men around in Africa telling the Africans what to do or how to do it.*

CLOUGH: And Hsi-k'un Yang, who was the Vice Minister in charge of the African operations, was very good. He spoke French, and he had a feeling for how to deal with African leaders. He knew them all. He traveled back and forth frequently.

*Q: I know that when I was back in the department, few things impressed me more favorably about the Republic of China than its efforts to maintain its diplomatic position through these kinds of helpful support of African countries. And they had the kinds of agricultural technicians*

*and so forth that were just needed. They knew how to make proper use of manure and things like that, where we were using chemical fertilizers. Their technology, in other words, was a little bit more applicable to...*

CLOUGH: And also, as individuals they were willing to go out there for a year or two or three without their families and live under circumstances which were pretty spartan, whereas American aid people wouldn't do that.

*Q: And they didn't have to have commissaries and other things that tend to create divisions. So you retired, you say, in 1969. But before you retired, I see that you were at Harvard for a couple of years.*

CLOUGH: When I came back from Taiwan, I was there for a year, '65-'66.

*Q: What were you doing?*

CLOUGH: I was a diplomat-in-residence. I was at the Center for International Affairs for a year at Harvard and Associate of the East Asian Research Center.

*Q: And what you were working on basically was China?*

CLOUGH: Yes. Well, I wasn't doing a single research project. I did a paper on China, the Chinese representation issue, during my time there. But mainly it was a sort of place to catch up on the current state of the disciplines. I audited courses from Sam Huddington in political development, from Merle Fainsod in Soviet politics, a course on Japanese politics. Spent my time reading up in these areas.

*Q: And then you went to the Policy Planning Council.*

**PAUL GOOD**  
**Childhood**  
**Tientsin (1940-1941)**

*Paul Good was born in Kentucky in 1939. After receiving his bachelor's degree at Cascade College he received his master's degree from Ball State. His career in USIA included positions in Thailand, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Nigeria, Australia, Yugoslavia, South Africa, Morocco, and Senegal. Mr. Good was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in August 2000.*

*Q: What denomination?*

GOOD: It's from the Methodist branch, but specifically at that time, it was the Evangelical Church. The Evangelical Church was a branch of the Methodists, which had broken off in Germany about a century before. It later joined with the Brethren and those then joined with the

Methodists and that's how you have the United Methodist Church today. His particular denominational branch in Oregon did not. It's now called the Evangelical Church of North America, but that's basically Methodist.

*Q: Where did your father go to finish up his undergraduate study?*

GOOD: He went to Asbury College in Wilmore, Kentucky. He and mother both finished up there and then he went on to Divinity School there

*Q: What mission areas were there?*

GOOD: China.

*Q: China?*

GOOD: It was an organization called the National Holiness Missionary Society, later changed its name to World Gospel Mission because they didn't want to be associated or identified with the Holy Rollers. But they had formed somewhere at the turn of the century. I can remember that when we were living in Chicago, the couple - Maude was a widow at that point with her daughter - living below us had gone out to China with this group in 1910. Above us in that apartment house, was a couple who had gone out in 1925. Dad went out in 1940.

*Q: That's an interesting time to have taken off for China.*

GOOD: It was a very interesting time to be taking off for China, but then I guess most any time was an interesting time to go off for China in the 50 years before that.

*Q: You, of course, were very young now when your father went off in 1940. Did you and your mother go there?*

GOOD: Yes, we did in what I've recently seen to be a very small steamer. We went docked in Seoul and then went on into Tientsin, where he was located for language training. I understand that Mom and I did not get up to Peking, as we called it then. Dad still has his pictures from his unit there and of course we vacationed in Betzha, which is, I gather, still the vacation spot for the elite of the Chinese.

*Q: Yes, I think Mao and company used to head off there.*

GOOD: Yes.

*Q: Obviously this is when you were, I 'd say pretty young; you were very, very young. So what happened?*

GOOD: Well, they didn't stay very long. Mom got sick. They weren't ever sure quite what she got, but it ended up giving her early death when she was 46 from subsequent developments. But they never knew what it was she got there. The story I remember hearing was that she was in the

hospital and she heard a baby crying. She said, “That sounds like my baby.” It turned out I was in for worms in the same hospital; they hadn’t told her. From the pictures that we have, the motion pictures of the time, it was a very dirty, smoggy, or not clear, not many vehicles on the road, two-wheeled rickshaws of course, lots of bags of charcoal being carted around, and lots of people.

*Q: This being the Shantung Peninsula, was it?*

GOOD: Yes.

*Q: This was under, by 1940s, would be under the Japanese, wasn't it?*

GOOD: Yes, the pictures I’ve seen of the times showed barbed wire fences that were set up. Yes, they were in charge then. This was part of the reason of course for the return to the U.S. It wasn’t just the illness, but they were beginning to move the missionaries out. We came back in 1941. Because of Mom’s illness, Dad never went out again as a missionary, but he stayed with the missionary organization for most of his career, retired from it eventually, although he did take a few years as a pastor in Oregon before continuing with it.

*Q: Where did you go?*

GOOD: After we came back from China, we went to the San Francisco area where my grandfather was living in Novato, at that time just a very small town, then back to Chicago, where we stayed until 1944, when Dad took a pastorate back in Oregon for two years and worked for the conference for a year. Then we went back to Chicago in ‘47. In ‘47 we came back to Chicago, October, Columbus Day.

*Q: At any point was there any part of the world you were looking at, for example China or elsewhere, or was this not?*

GOOD: Well, China would be the place I looked at, if I looked anywhere. I was, of course, overwhelmed by the depth of the knowledge necessary to know China. I’d steered away from focusing on Chinese history or anything to do it, especially in Asia, all the way through because I felt that it was too late to learn. You needed to have the language and to know as much as you needed to know; it was a never-ending fight. I remember Dad’s friend Jack Trachsel, whose daughter I dated at Cascade, and who married a Cascade roommate, had wonderful Chinese. I think he’d spent 50 years over there. But he said he never felt that he was fluent, really fluent. He could preach in the language, but he said there’s so much more to know. I remember talking to a professor at the University of Washington when I was teaching high school in Oregon (1959-1961). He was just overwhelmed. The Japanese were publishing a volume a day from the archives of ancient books in Chinese. And he said, “Look at those shelves. I’m getting a new book a day. How am I supposed to read all that information? I can’t read it. It’s too much.” Now he had his Ph.D. (Doctor of Philosophy) in Chinese Studies, so I never felt that I was capable of becoming what I thought you had to become to be a specialist.

*Q: As you were looking over this whole thing, as you’re looking at the map, were there areas in*

*Thailand where you felt that we needed to concentrate more or that were more dubious as far as supporting their cause?*

GOOD: You mean who might be approaching the borders?

*Q: Yes.*

GOOD: There were three areas, one of which, well, four I suppose, although for different reasons, of which two were not communistic in their threats. The border with Malaysia, the Malaysian uprising or revolution or submersion, was...

*Q: Insurgency.*

GOOD: Insurgency they called it, yes. It was really finished by '63, but that didn't mean that there wasn't concern that it might start up again on the Thai side and then work its way south. There was some concern down there, and as a result, we opened up another post in Yala, which was closer to the border of Malaysia on the east side.

The border with Burma was not of the concern it is today, although across from Victoria there was a little bit of concern, because you had water communication, communication between the Thai port and the Burmese port.

The two areas of real concern were up in the Chiang Rai area bordering with Laos and fairly close to China and, of course, in the northeast, bordering with Laos along the Mekong, where we were fairly close to the Ho Chi Minh Trail, almost shooting distance at points. So close, that by the time I got up to Ubol in '64, you no longer could take the river side road that ran from Pakse up to Vientiane. It wasn't secure. Any communications were being done by plane at that point. Air America was acting up then.

*Q: It does sound like these were almost "untalkable to" (not able to talk to) people.*

GOOD: Yes, exactly and even in a social setting you had to be very careful. But remember I said they didn't have a university education generally. They were not truly professional.

*Q: One of the things striking to me would be that as the world is changing, particularly in the technical field, you have countries like China and India which are producing hundreds of thousands, if not more, of highly educated people, particularly in the science fields and all that. Here's Australia sitting down unable to compete on that level or not?*

GOOD: Well, it's true. A couple of other things I should put in for background. New Zealand was slightly more educated by about a tenth of a percentage point. There had been no increase in slots at the universities in Australia from 1972 on, certainly in '85 when I left. The Liberal government had not expanded the system, so there hadn't been a place for people to go. Now this was at the same time it was becoming much more difficult to go to Europe to get your education because you couldn't work with the EC (European Commission) coming in. There was a definite divide between the people in 1981 too, who were 35 and above or 35 and younger. Those who

were over 35 were more likely to have done a year or more in Europe.

*Q: This is, of course, during the Reagan administration and early on when particularly when we were taking a pretty tough line on the Soviet Union and all. How was that plane?*

GOOD: We'd occasionally get campers, protesters in front of the embassy in Canberra, not the Russians usually. It was the Yugoslavs, the Croats accusing us of not being even handed in our treatment. We would be reporting on any Soviet activities there, but no, that didn't seem to be a big problem. Their problem was China, not Russia.

*Q: Yes, you were saying the big problem is China?*

GOOD: Yes, from their perspective China is a threat. They were trying to develop relations. CCA (Canberra College of Advanced Education) which I think is now called the University of Canberra, and the main university in Canberra, the ANU (Australian National University) had exchange programs, bringing students down, sending students up, exchanging professors, that sort of thing. They have a fear of this monster on top of them; this billion-population country that they feel definitely must be interested in this empty country down below. The truth of the matter is that the Chinese aren't. They're not interested in taking it over from a political point of view. It's too far away, it's too empty; they've got resources, but it's easier to buy them than it is to steal them. But if an Australian saw an Asian on the street, it ruined his day, or did back then.

*Q: Oh.*

GOOD: So it was better to be down there on the shore, which was where they had originally been. Ultimately, shortly after I left the project and they started to get some transmitters, then they had a bad fire while it was still under the control of the contractor. So it wasn't something the Voice was responsible for. Unfortunately, Bob, who was in charge of this, suffered career damage from the way it was handled.

There was another particular problem for Sri Lanka, the worries of India that this was going to be broadcasting to India. It took some serious negotiations in New Delhi to calm the Indian government down by pointing out to them that technically this station was too close to India to be broadcast into India. This station was broadcasting up into the interior of China, and I guess the "Stans" (countries north of India whose name ended in S-T-A-N). To a certain extent, that was one of their (concerns). They were aiming into two main directions, into the hinterland of China and into the southern areas of Russia. The primary location, however, was the hinterland of mainland Asia.

**RUTH WALTER CROOK**  
**Job not specified**  
**Philippines, China (1940's)**

*Ruth Crock joined in 1941 what was then called the U.S. information service, which was later absorbed by the office of War Information. Working in the*

*Overseas Branch, she prepared employees for duty in various aspects of the Information Programs abroad during World War II. This involved programs in support of our military operations throughout the world. After the war, she joined the State Department's Foreign Press Liaison Office and worked there until transferring to the Voice of America, where she worked, with minor interruption, until her retirement. Ms. Crock was interviewed by Cliff race in 1990.*

CROOK: Among the things I worked on was obtaining specialties which we shipped out to Australia and were then gotten into the Philippines by submarine. These included such things as chewing gum, sewing kits, pencils – that was before the advent of the ballpoint pen, cigarettes – oh, a great many different kinds of things, all with the slogan, I SHALL RETURN, on everything, because MacArthur insisted on it. These were prepared by the publications division as an adjunct to their work for MacArthur, and this became part of the same program where the leaflets were developed for dropping.

*Q: Were these dropped as well, or just distributed?*

CROOK: At this point, no. The leaflets came later, when we were based on Hollandia before we moved into the Philippines. Then, once we were in the Philippines, when we got a beachhead on Luzon, then they were dropped over the parts of the Philippines still held by the Japanese. So it was a very interesting time.

I remember one set of publications we did was a magazine called Free Philippines, which was the name of the newspaper that had been very popular in the Philippines before all this happened. We had to get a statement, I remember, in one of them, of encouragement from Cardinal Spellman, who was then the archbishop of New York. I remember going over to the cardinal's office and talking to him about it, and getting his letter and then having it incorporated into the magazine.

Once the team finally got into Luzon – they started at Leyte and then worked their way up; they were in the second wave with the troops going in there – they finally got into Manila and commandeered the printing press which had put out the Free Philippines before. Fritz Marquardt had worked on the Free Philippines before he moved back to Chicago. So they began issuing a daily newspaper, in English, called the Free Philippines – the name was kept. And that was publishing all through the rest of the war.

Another thing they did was to go to Santo Tomas University, which was a Japanese POW camp, as early as possible, and they found an NBC correspondent, Bert Silen, who had been broadcasting off the roof of the Manila Hotel as the last broadcaster from the Philippines before the Japanese took over Manila. So NBC was of course immediately interested, and he began his first broadcast again saying, "I take up my broadcasting after having been so rudely interrupted," etc., etc.

*Q: He had been interned?*

CROOK: He had been interned by the Japanese. His daughter had been shot. He had a lot of

interesting but terrible experiences, as did all the Americans who were interned there. Of course they didn't suffer as much as the Bataan survivors, but they had a lot of problems getting food and medical attention. It seems that just before the war, Silen had been hired by OSS to continue broadcasting clandestinely once the war started, if it reached the Philippines. No one was sure that was going to happen right away.

So he came out of the war without anything. Evidently he had resigned from NBC at that point. I had the job of reestablishing the fact that he had been hired by the government and got him back pay and all that. It was very interesting. I made several trips to Washington tracking that down. At that time Arsine Butts, who was our top administrative man, was very helpful, and Bert Silen, needless to say, was very grateful. He went back to work on – I think it was NBC – on the West Coast, and eventually he died very prematurely, and a lot of the things that happened to him during those war years were pretty much responsible for his early demise.

Another thing I worked on which was fascinating was the Phoenix. Did you ever hear of the Phoenix?

*Q: I don't think so.*

CROOK: This was an Italian ship. Remember when the Italian navy all went into Bari, and we got a lot of the cargo ships? I don't remember whether it was before or after the French navy, but anyway, we got a lot of ships at Bari. This was an old ship used to transport food or something, and it was given to the OWI. The purpose of that ship was to go to the coast of China and bombard the Chinese with VOA and other propaganda about the war effort: your friends are coming to relieve you, etc. Also, a leaflet operation was getting into China clandestinely.

*Q: How could they distribute the leaflets?*

CROOK: I don't know. These were people who somehow or other got into China. Don't ask me; I don't know the details. Anyway, there was to be a leaflet operation, because I know one of the things I had to buy was a Webendorfer printing press. Maybe that was to be done once we got on the coast of China.

So I remember OWI getting that ship. It had to go through the Panama Canal, and the crew was all Italian; nobody spoke English. Some of them got into trouble in Panama, and I had to get the Panamanians and the Americans at the Panama Canal to get them out of the jails. Finally we got the ship out to San Francisco, and I was working on the servicing of that ship – meaning getting people who were going to work on it. It had to be completely re-outfitted by the Navy; it was an old ship and needed a lot of work. Then getting rid of the Italian crew and sending them back to Italy, and putting on an American crew – it was a tremendous effort. Then one day word came down that we were abandoning the ship.

*Q: Why?*

CROOK: Because the plans were already afoot for us to drop the atom bomb, which of course none of us knew anything about. At the same time we were also beginning to stockpile for the

Japan landings, and again the word came down: forget about it.

*Q: Overtaken by events.*

CROOK: Overtaken by events. But of course none of us knew what the main big event was. We all found out on August 6th, when the first atomic bomb was dropped.

*Q: I would think that the preparations for Japan would still continue.*

CROOK: Well, they were continuing so far as people were concerned, but the psy-warfare parts of the operation were dropped. And of course there were a lot more people that were to be hired than MacArthur wanted. Once he got control of Japan he wanted his own people every place. Then of course the Philippines became an information program, on which I worked.

**ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.  
World War II Experience  
(1940-1945)**

**Office of Information, Bureau of Far East Affairs  
Washington, DC (1951-1952)**

**Public Affairs Officer, USIS  
Hong Kong (1952)**

*Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. was born to American parents in China in 1920. He received his master's degree from the University of Chicago. His career with USIS included assignments in Hong Kong, Japan, Burma, and Taiwan. He served as the ambassador to Burma, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. Ambassador Hummel was interviewed by Dorothy Robins-Mowry on July 13, 1989.*

HUMMEL: Okay. Let's see, my parents were missionaries and I was born in China, and spent my early years mostly in Peking. I left when I was eight years old.

My father moved to Washington where, being more of a scholar than a missionary, he was asked to be the head of the Library of Congress Oriental Division. He stayed there from 1928 or late '27, I forget which, to 1954. I more or less grew up here in Chevy Chase.

*Q: Do you remember anything specific about Beijing or Peking, as it was then called?*

HUMMEL: Oh, yes.

*Q: By comparison with the more recent --*

HUMMEL: I remember quite a lot of street scenes. We got out quite a bit on excursions to the

hills in the west and so on. However, like a number of missionary kids, I think, coming back to the States was traumatic and I sort of put all that away and didn't even want to speak Chinese anymore.

As a matter of fact, because of the Chinese servants and the fact that my parents were practicing their own Chinese, I spoke Chinese before I spoke English but that withered away considerably.

I went to prep school. My father became a Quaker and I went to a Quaker prep school. I was one of the rebellious young people, like a preacher's son very often will be.

*Q: Preacher's sons are very notorious. My husband is a preacher's son.*

HUMMEL: As a matter of fact, I got kicked out of prep school, but then returned. Then I was a drop-out from Antioch.

*Q: What was the prep school?*

HUMMEL: Westtown, Pennsylvania. I went to Antioch but dropped out for lack of interest, and spent a couple of years roaming around, mostly in the Midwest, doing odd jobs and floating from town to town. I had a great time.

Then my father was invited to go back to Peking for a book buying and research stint of several months, so my parents decided to take me with them and sent me ahead. I arrived in September 1940. Then, their trip was canceled because of tension in the Far East, but I was too dumb to leave.

When I arrived there, I immediately went to a Chinese language school, the same school where my father had been part of the faculty and where I used to live as a child, the Peking Language School. My language came back in a rush but, of course, I had to study the written language for the first time.

I was studying Chinese with a tutor and teaching English to support myself. I was too dumb to leave before Pearl Harbor. I got interned by the Japanese, first, one year in Peking, a very loose kind of internment. Then they shipped all of us enemy aliens - British, Canadians, French and so on -- down to a camp in Weihsien in Shandong Province.

I was there for a year and then eventually escaped with a British friend and joined Chinese guerrillas nearby and stayed with them until the war was over.

*Q: Let me just ask, by reason of policy, were you adequately informed by the Embassy or by the American authorities that it was time to get out? Policy is the reason for asking this.*

HUMMEL: I think so; yes, there was a concerted effort made. As a matter of fact, there were married couples in which the wife was sent home in response to the urging of the American government.

When the man stayed on -- and this happened in many cases -- and was interned by the Japanese, he was eligible for repatriation as a reward for having done what the government said. Those whose wives who stayed with them were not eligible.

*Q: I never knew that difference before.*

HUMMEL: All American women and children were eligible, but men were eligible only if they had obeyed the instructions to send their wives home.

*Q: How tough were those Japanese internment camps at this time?*

HUMMEL: It depends on where you were. I was in the one that was farthest north, closest to Japan, and that meant supervision by the Gaimusho, the Foreign Ministry. The military ran the camp, but the Gaimusho supervised them and ameliorated a lot of the hardships.

So, the camp I was in was much more bearable than the one in Shanghai, which was really quite grim. Santo Tomas in the Philippines was worse and, of course, Borneo was horrible. The farther away you were from Japan, the worse these civilian internment camps were.

In this particular camp, we had more births than deaths but it wasn't pleasant; the diet was substandard, so it was no picnic.

*Q: How did you manage to escape?*

HUMMEL: My friend and I had been trying for a long time to make contact by letter, smuggled letter, smuggled out by Chinese coolies who worked in the camp. We eventually got an answer from a Nationalist guerilla unit nearby, set a date, and got permission from the camp authorities to leave.

The guerilla outfit wanted to be in contact with the Americans, hoping that they could parlay this into some kind of support. The camp authorities felt it would be a good idea to have somebody out in the boondocks nearby, in case of -- well, in case of whatever happened.

Nobody knew whether, at the end of the war, the Japanese would start massacring people or whatever, so they felt it would be a good idea to have some people outside. So, in a sense, we were emissaries from the camp.

The guerilla outfit was very interesting and very self sufficient and very patriotic. It was one of the very few such efficient and patriotic Nationalist guerilla outfits. Communists were all over the place; it was just an accident that we wound up in contact with the Nationalist guerrillas rather than the Communists.

If we had escaped into Communist hands, we could have walked back to Yen'an and gotten out, possibly, but the Nationalists were just in small pockets -- not so small, an area of about ten miles by twenty miles that was in a densely populated flat plain.

There wasn't any running around and riding horses in mountain forests. It was a typical North China plains area and the Japanese didn't come in unless they were in overwhelming force, trying to mop up the place. They did that several times the year and a half that I was living there. That's another story. I've got the memoirs of the guerilla commander and I am translating and annotating those.

*Q: I hope you're going to do something with that.*

HUMMEL: Some day. I've done some of it.

After the war was over, I spent a year working for UNRRA in North China doing survey trips into Communist areas; that was my first contact with the Chinese Communists.

Then I went back to the States and worked for awhile for the United China Relief Organization.

In 1947, I went to the University of Chicago and in two years, got an M.A. in Chinese Studies.

*Q: They must have given you credit for a lot of practical experience.*

HUMMEL: I had to pass some comprehensive examinations that were given to a lot of people whose education had been interrupted by the war; there was a rather lenient program for that purpose. I had to make up a deficiency in Economics 101, I think.

*Q: So, you finally did get your academic credentials.*

HUMMEL: Right after that, when I got my M.A., Phi Beta Kappa, I almost immediately joined ONI, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and worked for them for about six months. Then, through the good offices of people who later became USIS people like Joe Bennett, Brad Connors and others, I joined FE/P (the Office of Information of the Far East Bureau), in the State Department. The Information Function was still at the State Department.

*Q: We've gotten now to what, to about 1950?*

HUMMEL: Somewhere in the 1950s for the State Department.

*Q: What were you doing for FE/P?*

HUMMEL: We were still trying to mop up the tag ends of USIS programs in Hong Kong and establishing them in Taiwan, as far as the China program was concerned. Also, we were engaged in supporting, with research materials, some of the people who were being harassed by McCarthy in the McCarthy hearings period. So, we would help them with background materials and public statements and so forth.

*Q: Did that affect what was going on in FE/P at all, except for your support work?*

HUMMEL: Not particularly. I think because, when the Communists took over in 1949, they

showed, themselves not to be agrarian reformers, and they showed that they were not abiding by their promises to have a multiparty system and accommodate other parties. Also, because of the well-documented killing of landlords and class enemies, there wasn't anybody who wanted to do anything differently in American policy, particularly after the Korean War started.

By the time I joined the State Department, the Korean War was on, so there was no occasion for the dissent. Our relations with China, whatever they were, did not leave room for anybody to be thinking about conciliation or advancing heretical views about American policy. We were all polarized by these events.

Later on, in the '60s, when we began to have tentative contacts during the Laos negotiations in '61 and then the Warsaw talks, there were some possibilities for contact, but the Chinese themselves showed that they were not terribly interested in what we had to offer unless we would simply abandon Taiwan and deliver Taiwan to them. That, of course, wasn't possible.

*Q: Did we have any official offices in China at that time?*

HUMMEL: No, none.

*Q: None at all?*

HUMMEL: None.

*Q: Everything was closed?*

HUMMEL: Our embassy was in Taiwan. For a time afterwards, our people stayed in place on the mainland, but the Communists treated them so badly that there wasn't any hope. I am fond of reminding people that we terminated all assistance to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, military and civilian, and left our people basically in place in the mainland. But the Chinese Communists spurned us in the beginning and then, of course, the Korean War was guaranteed to stop any contact.

*Q: The Korean war presented a whole new picture or it clarified things.*

HUMMEL: Yes, it did. Now, when Chinese troops crossed the Yalu, when we were fighting Chinese troops, there wasn't much point in anybody advocating anything conciliatory.

So, my view is that American analytical reporting about China was not appreciably affected by the McCarthy tide, certainly not after the Communists took over in 1949.

*Q: What about some of the people who became the focus of McCarthy's displeasure?*

HUMMEL: A lot of people continued to have a bad time; Clubb, Remington and so on, those whom I met. Having been cut off behind Japanese lines, I was not part of that group that was back there in Chungking.

*Q: You were a younger generation.*

HUMMEL: A younger generation and I did not have the mainland experience that they had.

*Q: How long were you in that position, then, in FE/P?*

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HUMMEL: Two years. I met my wife in the State Department. She was working on the Near East Information Program. Let's see, I joined in '50, we married in '51, and in '52, we were assigned to Hong Kong.

*Q: That's a good place to go on the first assignment in a family. What did you do in Hong Kong?*

HUMMEL: I was sent out originally to replace Doak Barnett, who had been called the Evaluation Officer, trying to organize evaluations of USIS programs, not only in Hong Kong but on a regional basis; that is, polling, surveys of various kinds, as assets for our USIS planning. Not much of that got off the ground. Doak Barnett, I think, got bored with it and left and so I was sent out to replace him.

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Very shortly thereafter, a few months after we arrived in Hong Kong, Paul Frillman, the PAO, left, resigned, I believe, and they made me PAO. We had such bright lights as Dick McCarthy and Charles Cross, who became Ambassador to Singapore. There were some good men.

*Q: Was Hong Kong a pretty big post, given the situation in China at that time?*

HUMMEL: It was, very big. One of the innovations that I am proud of -- I didn't invent the idea, but I helped to get it started -- was the establishment of a Chinese language magazine called "World Today" which circulated throughout Southeast Asia for the overseas Chinese, in Chinese, and circulated also in Taiwan.

It was so good in its content and format that it was sold through the regular news networks. It was not a give-away.

*Q: Was this in English or in Chinese?*

HUMMEL: Chinese.

*Q: What kind of Chinese?*

HUMMEL: Mandarin, the written language.

*Q: Was this the first of these magazines that USIA published overseas? Subsequently, there were any number of them.*

HUMMEL: I can't be sure it was the first. I honestly don't know. It was an early one, and the key to its success was that it managed to meet newsstand standards and compete with all other magazines.

*Q: What kind of material would you carry in it?*

HUMMEL: News, commentary, anti-Communist stuff about the mainland, things about the United States. It was sort of a generalized magazine, fairly popular, quite a bit of stuff on movie stars, Chinese movie stars.

I remember having the pleasure of getting the absolute top Chinese movie star, a beautiful girl named Li Li-hua, in Hong Kong, getting her together with Clark Gable for a picture for this magazine.

*Q: That's quite a combination, isn't it?*

HUMMEL: They had their picture taken on a boat with the Hong Kong Island in the background. That was on the cover; that was a great issue.

Also, I took the opportunity to travel throughout Southeast Asia to all of the major places.

*Q: But you couldn't get into China then.*

HUMMEL: No, I couldn't get into China. I did surveys of the overseas Chinese, just simply to survey places, and I can't name them all, but Vietnam, including Hanoi and Saigon, at that time still in French hands, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and I didn't get to Brunei, but the Philippines, Burma, doing comprehensive reports of local Chinese populations.

We, in Hong Kong, were publishing materials in Chinese for the whole area, and, of course, visiting Taiwan, too. All that was personally very pleasant.

*Q: This was your first real encounter in these areas.*

HUMMEL: With overseas Chinese, yes.

**FREDERICK HUNT**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Shanghai (1941-1942)**

*Frederick Hunt was born in Maryland in 1927. He received his A.B. from George Washington University in 1935 and joined the Foreign Service in 1938. His overseas posts include Bucharest, Shanghai, Lourenço Marques, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth, Nuevo Laredo and Martinique. Mr. Hunt was interviewed by*

*Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 7, 1987.*

HUNT: I got to Bucharest, the ministers told me there was a telegram transferring me to Shanghai, and he sent one right back saying I couldn't go until they furnished a replacement. That took six weeks. That was the end of my European tour.

*Q: How did you get to Shanghai?*

HUNT: By a devious route. I had a choice. I could go by Trans-Siberian railroad, which would have been interesting, but I took a much better route. I took a real Cook's tour; a mixture of railroad, airplane, and ship. I flew to the Black Sea. There again I had a Romania general friend to intercede with the Luftwaffe who controlled the airport down there and took a ship from there down to Istanbul. Then I stopped to see a friend of my step-father who was a naval attaché; he had an apartment overlooking the harbor. I also had another friend in the legation. I took a train to Baghdad, and a flying boat that the BOAC used to run used to make a horseshoe from Australia around to South Africa. I took that, and stopped at the Bosphorus. There I saw ships bringing troops from India. It was in the paper the next day; I wrote a letter to my mother about it. The censor got it and said I was a terrible guy. They told me it was a secret. Then I went on to Karachi. There I spent nearly a whole week, because we had a Consul and a Vice Consul there at the time. The Consul was also assigned to Kabul. We had nobody in Kabul. I remind you that this was spring of 1941, and no one in Kabul. This guy once a year would go and make a grand march through the Khyber Pass, and come back. The Vice Consul had been stationed in Bucharest, so he wanted to hear all about it. It was the height of the season; it was the time when the racetrack was open, the Governor's Cup -- I was ready for that. I got a bearer from the Thomas Cook Company who -- two famous Americans that he loved dearly. One was Tony Biddle, the other one was Believe-It-Or-Not Ripley. The bearer was modest. I took a train, it was still all one country then, up to Bengali and crossed eventually to Calcutta, but I stopped along the way, so I took about a week. At that time we didn't have any office in New Delhi. In India, we had a large Consulate-General with a very senior officer in charge in Calcutta. We had a fair-sized one in Bombay and a Consulate in Madras.

From Calcutta, I took the flying boat again to Burma, and overnight there was entertained. I flew on down, stopped at Penang, and so forth to Singapore. At Singapore I was around there for a couple of days. There was a Vice-Consul there who had entered the Service with me, then a Dutch ship took me up to Hong Kong. We were supposed to take American transport, so at Hong Kong I decided to wait for the President Lines. So I saw a little time in Hong Kong, and that was my first taste of China. It so happened that we were changing Ambassadors in Chungking then. Swapping with Australia. And a man who was number two...we had a big office in Shanghai. Also, the naval attaché's office was not in Chungking, but in Shanghai. It was a marine officer with a line officer-lieutenant.

The number two fellow, still there, came in and said: "Well Hunt, where have you been, on a world tour?" I said, "Just about." Apparently, to show you how things work, when my minister in Bucharest had sent word back saying I couldn't go until my replacement arrived, the Department agreed with it but they failed...having sent a copy of the first telegram to Shanghai, they failed to send the second one.

So they were looking for me. When I went there, I found that the women and children of our office had already gone home. We'd been telling everybody to get out of China, and of course businessmen and missionaries said when they saw the consuls go, "we'll go". So, Washington decided that the women and children should go. We had one woman officer who took care of the China Trade Act. There were twenty of us, all bachelors.

*Q: What was your job in Shanghai?*

HUNT: There again, I got the economic treatment again. We just began, at this point, to issue export licenses. The commercial attaché was an old China hand. I was put under him, and I took care of investigating who was the importer and what he was going to do. The whole idea was, since that was such a big, cosmopolitan city, the idea was to keep the American stuff out of Japanese hands. Keep them from buying it.

*Q: The situation then was that the Japanese basically controlled that area?*

HUNT: In 1937, the Japanese took control of the Yangtze Valley. The League of Nations didn't do anything when they went into Manchuria, and they did nothing then.

*Q: Shanghai...you were living in the international zone, is that right?*

HUNT: International zone. But the Japanese had taken over what had been the old settlement, which was where all the dock area was. The Suchow Creek drew the line, and our old Consulate-General was over on the other of the creek alongside the Japanese and the Russian consulates. The creek was the No-man's Land.

*Q: Could you get outside of the international zone?*

HUNT: Oh yes. But I didn't go over to the Japanese side very much because they always had guard challenge you at the bridge. They wanted to see health certificates, because they were nuts on that. Occasionally I had to go down to the docks, but I just kept right on going. It was known as the Japanese landing party. That was the name given to it in 1937. They made their headquarters on the , a battleship they'd taken from the Russians in 1905. They were sitting there in the mud in front of the Japanese Consulate-General but so situated, the river made a bend there, that it could see up river and down river. It had the flag of the Chief of the Japanese Naval Landing Party. The International Settlement and the French Settlement were still out of Japanese hands, and the Japanese didn't come around very often. When they did, U.S. marines manned entrances in the International Settlement by that time because the British had left. There used to be double thing. The police were British.

*Q: Sikh?*

HUNT: The cop on the street was a Sikh, but the detective and the chiefs and the top were all Englishmen. The French Consul General wore two hats. He was supposed to be mayor of Frenchtown, as it was called, but there weren't enough Frenchmen to fill the municipal jobs.

Most of them were French-speaking Russians. There was a whole new generation growing up from those Russians who came to Tientsin and Shanghai after crossing over with Admiral . That was the situation in Shanghai.

*Q: You were dealing with economic...you got there in May?*

HUNT: I got there seven months before Pearl Harbor. I was launched into this because there was a special job to be done. Chinese merchants would come in saying how they had to have this thus and so. There you get around to trouble with the English again. The British commercial attaché was also in Shanghai, just as we had...he was an old-timer. The great stupidity back in Washington, as I told you everything was buttons for Britain. Well, you had to have an export license to send something to China, you didn't have to have one to send something to Hong Kong. When I was in Hong Kong, on my way to Shanghai, I noted so many ships with British flags on them, coastal steamers, etc. -- Hong Kong registry, Chinese crews, and they were loading British and American and other goods, going up to Vladivostok, where it was railroaded over to Germany. I learned this, I noticed this in the harbor, and I told our Consulate-General about that. "Oh yes," they said, "that's a sore point." So in my work in Shanghai, the Portland Cement fellow comes in, complaining to me that he can't get his shipment. When I asked him why not, he said: "Now it goes to Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong people route it up here. So the fellow imports from Hong Kong. "Really?" I asked. That was one of the times I went down with him to the warehouse to take a look. There was the American cement -- via Hong Kong. That made me angry. I sent a communication to Washington, and of course being British it was all right.

By July 1, we figured something was going to happen sometime. Things were getting tough. We put our switchboard on 24-hour basis. The Fourth Marines were still there. Everybody will tell you now that they admit to hindsight, as to what they thought then, sure war was going to break out one of these days, but the Japanese were going to go south -- they weren't going to go way off close to Hong Kong. They were going to head for the Philippines and Dutch East Indies. They wanted to get the oil out of the Indies.

So we thought that. As time went on, Admiral Koch soon came as a special envoy, and we used to talk about this among ourselves, all ranks. Sure something was going to happen, but as long as Japanese Peace Delegation stays in Washington we felt safe. But once he gets home, look out. So, another colleague of mine wanted to go to Peking for Christmas. He'd been a language officer up there in the old days, and wanted to show me Peking. We took the trouble to make our reservations through a Japanese travel agent through to Peking. Never happened. But even the day before, which was a Sunday the 7th, to me on the other side of the dateline. I still thought that way. We had been rationing gasoline, bringing small tankers up from Hong Kong, their argument being there shouldn't be more than three days' supply in Shanghai so that if the Japanese took it over, they wouldn't get very much. It was a very generous allowance, however. Fifty gallons a week or something. You couldn't get it out of the city very well.

*Q: What happened when Pearl Harbor was bombed?*

HUNT: It got so that the import-export license business was slowing down to, and it was five

o'clock in the morning when I was awakened by a fellow who worked in my office, Frank Duda. I was sleepy and I said: "What do you mean? You must be drunk. They've been talking about war for ages." I lived in the French Concession, four miles from the waterfront, and apparently about 5:30 the Japanese manned the guns under Hezuma and sent a net to cover the small boats that were heading up the river. What I forgot to tell you was that just about Thanksgiving -- I remember it was my birthday -- the Fourth Marines left Shanghai.

*Q: This is the Fourth Marines regiment?*

HUNT: Yes.

*Q: That was the protection force there.*

HUNT: They'd been there a long time. When they first came, the Chinese didn't like it, but there were many tears when they left. They marched down and got on the President Madison, I think it was. They were to go down to Manila. I remember them marching down that street, everybody cheering and waving and so forth. The next night, I was at a dinner party in the old Cafe Hotel, which is called the Peace Hotel now. About a month before, the gunboat Wake, which had been sitting up in Nanking and really been used as a telegraph office by our Consulate in Nanking, came down to Shanghai to join the others. I noticed that day carpenters working out there in the middle of the river on the gunboats, nailing up big boards all around. Gunboats sit very low in the water, and I thought, "That's interesting, but not on the Wake." That night, about midnight, which was just as the party was going well, the Admiral Glassford, Commander of the Yangtze patrol got up and said he had a hard day the next day and had to go home early. He got up and left. When we came down to the bund the next morning, all the gunboats had gone except the Wake. The Italian gunboats, and the French one, but no Americans except the Wake.

It had been customary for the two flagships of the British and the Americans to anchor side by side with a meter between them. The old rule was that when the whistle went everybody on the American ship went over to the wardroom of the British ship and they all had drinks. Then again the whistle blew and the British came back to the American ship. As usual, the British would have the better drinks on theirs and the Americans would have better food.

So the Wake had pulled up -- it was fairly close -- I guess just behind. The Wake had been instructed by the Admiral, "Now look, if something happens, don't you waste a thing on this hunk of junk. It was an old tub. Don't endanger the life of anybody. Give up." So, when the shooting began, the British ship fired back at the boat bringing the boarding party. They had six casualties, the British did. After that, they were put in jail, but they did not stay there was a barracks there that the British forgot to pull down before World War II, so the Japanese used that as a prison camp.

*Q: What happened to you all after Pearl Harbor?*

HUNT: Nothing that day. Here we all are in our respective places of abode, two people lived in the same building with the Consul General. There was a big building that had a post office and bank on the ground floor that belonged to one of the in-laws of Chiang Kai-shek, one of his sons.

Upstairs, Coca-Cola had an office there, and above that there were apartments. Our number two consul and vice consul both lived there. They were there when everything began. I finally decided that maybe my friend wasn't so drunk and I would pick up the phone and call down. I heard this Chinese operator say: "Aren't you Mr. Hunt?" "Yes." "Plenty trouble, plenty trouble." "Really?" I asked for one of the men there. He told me what had been happening, and the firing there. He said they'd taken all the codes down, and there was a great tall building that had a long chimney through the middle of it. The only trouble we had was with the janitor who couldn't understand why we wanted to put the blower on. It wasn't that cold a day. They wanted to turn the blower on in the furnace to make it burn. I asked if he wanted me to come down, but he said: "No, take your time."

I had a chauffeur, and he lived outside the settlement and he used to come in every day. He'd take the car out of the garage and wipe it off. He couldn't understand what I was doing up without him having to wake me. I told him the Japanese were making war on the Americans. I looked at the front door as I expected to see them come in. Anyway, I told him that when the chauffeur comes, tell him to see me. When he arrived, he had U.S. Air and U.S. on his other lapel. I told him to take them off, and he looked shocked. I told him the Japanese had made war on the Americans and that we were going downtown. We couldn't have the flag on the car or anything like that. He said: "Now I understand. When I came through the barrier, they grabbed me and said 'You're Chinese or American?' I said Chinese, of course."

We did go downtown, about 9:00 am. We parked across the street from the parking lot, across the street from the American Club, and I told him to sit there with the car. I went across and on my way to the office, I saw some Japanese marines coming down the street. I went upstairs and emptied all the stuff that I had of a personal nature. When the U.S. Marines left, they left us an auxiliary radio. They had a big, high tower. This had no trouble getting Manila. Good weather you could go way beyond Manila. We had a sailor from the Wake who could operate it, and we walked the next floor up, put him on the switchboard. This guy was up there just chatting away, giving a play-by-play account to Manila.

I went in and got my stuff, and about 10:00 am Ned Brookheart, a son of the old Senator Brookheart was a colleague of mine, and also in London. I was going to take my stuff to the trunk of my car. Afterward, we noticed the Japanese marines had gotten that far and were going to take over the American Club. We thought we'd go over and check them out. It had a great long bar. Behind the bar was a big, big picture of the cruiser "Houston," showing the 1937 episode when the Admiral had parked himself in the middle of the Whangpoo River and threatened these guys not to hit him so they were shooting over this ship to the other side at the oil tanks and all that. I was a great big picture, seven feet long, I guess. We went in and thought to see about the liquor. I said: "Ned, let's take that picture." "Oh, no. Leave it up there for those yellow-bellies to see it."

The manager of the hotel was shaking, and the major commander of the Japanese marines, a very proper man, was talking to him. He asked if he had a lockup place down below. He answered yes. The major said: "I want you to put all your liquor down there. Lock it up, and don't let my men get to it at all." He took the cigarettes, everything, locked them up. Marines are marines everywhere.

We heard all this and decided we were going to liberate some stuff before it got down below. They were busy hauling cases down there, and so we decided to have a drink. Not usual in the morning, but we had one. We said to the bartender: "You've got some odd bottles and all that, give us two or three bottles." That's how we started out. They brought in carrier pigeons and were stashing them in the ladies' waiting room. In what we call chicken crates. The word had been that everyone had to be out by noon. Well, a lot of American businessmen lived there, and they had zipped out of there early in the morning not knowing the Japanese marines were coming, to get to their offices to get their papers and things. So, I felt badly about them. I remembered a picture. There was a pretty big photograph of the same ship, a little placard underneath it saying "friends of the Army-Navy club, thanks for the hospitality." I took the pigeons down and took the picture, went on over to the car. I put all that stuff in.

Then we decided to go back to the office. We found that there wasn't much we could do except...it was quite late in the morning, mid-morning, when the Japanese came around. You would think they would come there first. They came around; they had Chinese clerks with them with pots of paste and seals with which to seal up all the doors. The fellow who lived in the building called the sailor who was talking on the radio, and asked how he was doing. He said: "Oh, I've got Manila going, we're just fine." He said: "You're going to have to tell Manila that you're signing off because don't look now, but there is a Japanese outside your door. So you tell Manila that's the situation, you're signing off, and you're breaking up the machine." He had an axe there for that purpose. He did. He stepped out and was immediately grabbed by the Japanese since he was a military man. So he became a prisoner of war.

Another fellow from the Wake had been tooling down Nanking Road in a rickshaw about 5:30 that morning, the navy hours begin at 6:00, and a fellow from Jimmy's Kitchen, which was an American restaurant standing in the door way stepped out and stopped him. "Don't stop me now, man. Don't stop me now. If I don't get back by 06:00 the chief will give me hell." "You're going to catch more than that." "What do you mean?" "The Japanese are shooting out there. You'll get more than what the chief will give you if you go out there." He couldn't believe it. He had to go see for himself. This fellow spoke Chinese, and told the rickshaw runner to turn around and take that man back to where he got him, which was a Russian girl's place. That girl protected him. We knew where he was, but nobody else did.

A lot of incidents like that occurred. I went back to my apartment, because I rented from an Englishman who'd gone on leave, and all his personal gear was there. I began thinking what I'd do. I took as much personal stuff as I could to stash in the trunks. I got a phone call after lunch saying I should be down at the Metropal Hotel at 6:00, and I'd better bring a suitcase. I had gone to pick up a girl, a Latvian girl who worked for a Swiss company. I picked her up early and had taken her to lunch. She was helping me with this packing. Her uncle, with whom she lived, he was a Baltic German, married to her mother's sister who was a Latvian. He belonged to the German Club; he had a business that made things out of aluminum. He told me once that if anything happened he could take my car as a business car and the Japanese wouldn't get it.

So, I went back down to the hotel, and said to my chauffeur: "Here is some money. This is the end. Take this lady where she tells you to go. That's it." He did take the car in. Good thing,

because within a few weeks the Japanese were picking up cars bellowing to foreigners right and left. Anything that was more than five years old went to junk, and under five years old they used as vehicles. They didn't get mine.

*Q: What happened to you?*

HUNT: Only the night of Pearl Harbor did we go to the hotel. The interesting thing was that these two men of equal rank, they were put in the same place, and they got in a fight. The British were accusing the American of being a coward, and the American saying the other man...there six families in England who wouldn't be happy with him. The Japanese had to separate them. Put them in different places. I don't know if that story ever got out. So, we went to the Metropol Hotel. It was still operating as a hotel. There were other guests there. My brother was in the navy. He was on a battleship in [?] fleet in Honolulu. I happened to know before the gunboat left that his ship had gone up to Puget sound for overhaul of some kind. I had surmised, when they started naming ships and all, that his ship wasn't there. However, I got a telegram delivered to me at the hotel sent by my mother via Argentina, delivered to me telling me my brother was [?]

*Q: The Japanese then interned the whole...*

HUNT: Only the officers. The clerks could live where they wanted to live. We wanted house arrest, as had been done in small places like Tientsin but there were too many of us. We were all brought to the Metropol Hotel. Then they wanted to consolidate the Belgians and the British. The British were all in there...they had their own enclosure. Belgians, Dutch, Panamanians, Mexicans, Brazilians. All had declared war. So they started looking around for a place. The Park Hotel, across from the racetrack was a good place that the Chinese owned and had a good supply of coal. The Germans knew that too; they moved in and they wouldn't move out. Finally, it was agreed that the only place to go was in the French Concession. They had been picking up everything that was British owed, and the Sassoons owned the two best hotels. That was a British thing they were taking.

The French Consul General was marvelous. The first thing he did on that day as acting president of the French Club was send out word to all members that you couldn't have guests because there was a handful of Japanese [?] He held out. He didn't mind his colleagues occupying that hotel. But, he didn't want any Japanese gendarmes. They went around and around over this. Finally, they came to a compromise in which they could have four gendarmes on duty at any one time in plain clothes. You had to admire that Frenchman for holding out. He had nothing but Tonkinese police, that's all he had.

*Q: How long were you kept?*

HUNT: Seven months. It was much slower than we expected because the [?] had to go back and forth through the Swiss and also, they wanted to trade old, sick missionaries for young Japanese who had been working in our schools and factories.

*Q: Were you kept confined to the hotel?*

HUNT: We were supposed to sign out. A Japanese consular officer was assigned to us around the clock. They did it in 24-hour units. They were supposed to be the buffer between us and the gendarmes, who didn't speak English. One of the Japanese Vice-consuls was born and bred in Billington, Iowa, and spoke with an Iowan accent. He had been our liaison before the war with the Japanese. Another one had been to Oxford. So we got along well with them, but we were supposed to go out to exercise. The Japanese wanted us to take walks and all, but you had to get a pass from the gendarmes and you had to check it in when you came back. I didn't want them to get to know me, so I used to just walk on out.

When we were put in Cafe Mansions and consolidated, the British and the Belgians and the Dutch had all their women and children and everything else with them. They had suites and all, and there we were twenty men. It took a little getting on with them, but finally one of them had a birthday party and that broke the ice.

I was on the ninth floor; the elevator had to stop at the sixth floor. That was where the gendarmes were. Everything sixth and above was [?]. I would walk down the back steps, all that way to get out into town. But that way I didn't have to check in and out. Spring came early, I went to the French club, I had strawberries and cream. We could go to the movies. We had our radios. Every night, about 9:00, you'd hear San Francisco Radio, shortwave radio. Their version of the war was entirely different from what we were seeing, I assure you. They were saying how good things were. They never mentioned the sinking of the Prince of Wales, which we saw on the newsreels. That really hurt our British friends.

*Q: When you look at it, these were two battleships that really shouldn't have been there. They really wouldn't have changed things. But, they were put there, and they got sunk.*

*To end this, how did you get repatriated?*

HUNT: Finally, after all this argument about who would go where, and what ships would take us, the last day of June, 1942...There were a lot of trucks there, but the Japanese Consul General had to hire Swiss trucks to carry our luggage. There was a gloomy, dismal rain and little Mr. Yamamoto from Iowa was shaking hands with everybody getting off the bus.

*Q: This was the Japanese Vice Consul.*

HUNT: Yes. He later married a girl from Los Angeles. I said: "Yamamoto san, you know very well that you should be getting on this ship with us." "I know, I know," he said. I saw him later; we talked about what happened to him. I saw him at the Japanese peace treaty.

Coming back to this, we went on board, there had been some discussion about who would go on board. Of course, anybody with any diplomatic status, and then we had business friends, newspapermen and missionaries. There was a fellow named William Hunt, no relation to me, he had gone out there many years before as a vice consul, decided there was a lot of money to be made -- in the old days in Shanghai. He ended up with William Hunt and Company, he had a coastal ship, and he represented the Philadelphia Banknote Company which furnished all the Nationalists' money. He would talk back to the Japanese. He would run down to Hong Kong,

when he realized the war was coming. He had just gotten a big shipment of banknotes to go up to Chungking, and he spent one night down there with the CNAC plane running back and forth to a point far enough to be inside protective zone. He moved all the money that night. Of course, he was captured there.

We had just the case of these few Japanese marines and some new recruits of the Japanese army, because the Japanese had taken the place before. All the tough army went south. They went to Hong Kong and Malaysia. We didn't have that. Furthermore, Shanghai was so cosmopolitan, nationalistic, and had so much stuff in the warehouses, that they wanted to buy it all up before they did anything. So we really had it soft. Everybody back here was worrying about us, but we had it soft.

In the meantime, our Consul General's wife had left. She was on her way back, got as far as Manila with an inspector. The daughter of the secretary of the international settlement, who happened to be an American, he was half Chinese, half American, his daughter had gone down to see her old girlfriend who had married one of our marines. They got caught down there. The Japanese military brought Mrs. Lockhart and this girl back by military plane to Shanghai to join us. They brought Bill Hunt back from Hong Kong. They had great respect for him because he would talk back to them. So they asked his advice about the ship. There was a big go around. The Conte Verde which used to come from Trieste, make stops all the time back and forth, built for the tropics. The people from Tokyo and Hong Kong went on the [?] which is built for the North Pacific. A much bigger ship, a lot of inside rooms. The number two at our Embassy, Mr. Grew had a fine suite, but the number two did also. He said: "Oh, those poor missionaries and all." He put all the Vice Consuls and all back in the lowest, worst part of the ship. Bill Hunt said to the Japanese, this is a diplomatic exchange so you begin with your number one diplomat. The number one diplomat we had was the Consul General in Shanghai. Give him the best, then work down from him through the lowest of them.

You take your missionaries and you put the lowest one of them and you put him at the lowest place on the ship, and you work up through them. In between you put the journalists and the businessmen. That's what they did. I had a beautiful room. But, that ship made so many stops it didn't make its own drinking. So, we were limited on baths. But it had a swimming pool, and they put in a second swimming pool in the stern. Up in the lido deck, we were determined to keep the missionaries out of it, so we got the girls to dress skimpily and use cuss words when they saw a missionary coming, and put a bottle of whiskey on their table. That settled that. They had their own pool. It was Bill Hunt who really fixed this. The commander of the Japanese naval landing party sent him a note, which he opened in my presence. It said after the sailing, introduce yourself to the Japanese captain. That brings me to telling you that when the Italian wouldn't give them a [?] charter because they had their crew there, they had to take care of their crew. They didn't trust Italians. They didn't trust anybody. There was an Italian frigate in there, they only gave him enough oil to keep his generator going.

So, they had seven naval officer they disguised as NYK personnel so they had somebody on the bridge and somebody in the engine room around the clock, and then one chief. He didn't even have to introduce himself. The next thing you know, the bell hop came along and said the Japanese captain sent this to you. He opened it up. He had a case of scotch whiskey which was

like gold there, and a case of French champagne. My remark was that we Hunts have got to stick together. We were the only people on the passenger list named Hunt.

*Q: You eventually came to Lourenço Marques?*

HUNT: We met the [?] and they stopped in Hong Kong. We did not. The people from Bangkok had all been brought up to Hong Kong. The two ships came together at Singapore, tough Japanese boarded, a Swiss man representing the Swiss foreign office was no good to us at all. That was another trouble we had in Shanghai. They had so much business there, they were not being nasty to the Japanese by any means. But the Italian captain, an old Austrian from Trieste, he stood up for us.

*Q: Did the Department pay you for the time you were interned?*

HUNT: We got our regular pay. We were able to draw local currency as we needed it from the Swiss, which was charged against us. Eventually, when we got off the boat we could then draw all the back pay we hadn't received. We were paid our regular salary. But we did lose things like automobiles and local currency accounts.

*Q: On that financial note we will have to end the interview. Thank you very much.*

**HENRY BYROADE**  
**US Army Officer, China-Burma-India Theater**  
**(1941-1947)**

*Ambassador Henry Byroade was born in Indiana in 1913. He graduated from West Point in 1937. He served in the Hawaiian Islands from 1937-1939. While still in the service, he received a master's degree from Cornell in 1940. His Foreign Service posts included Egypt, South Africa, Afghanistan, Burma, the Philippines, and Pakistan. He was interviewed by Niel M. Johnson on September 19, 1988.*

*Q: Was there experience from the Hump that was used in the Berlin airlift, and were some of the same persons involved in that one?*

BYROADE: Well, you asked for my favorite story in this world, and that's to point out that if we hadn't had the experience of the Hump run into China, I don't think we would have attempted to supply Berlin by air. If we hadn't saved Berlin, my feeling is the whole map of Europe would be changed today. When we got into the Berlin situation, there were enough of us in Washington--now I still was only a colonel--but there were enough of us and some generals, who had gone through the Hump experience, that said, "Wait a minute, we'll supply Berlin by air." Everybody--almost everybody--said, "You're crazy; they need things like coal." We said, "So what, they need coal--we'll fly coal." From Frankfurt to Berlin was just a twenty-minute milk run compared to the hazardous Hump run.

*Q: There were no mountains in between either. You flew coal over the Hump?*

BYROADE: Yes, of course, we flew coal and all kinds of necessary consumer items. I think, I really think, we would have probably lost Berlin, except for supplying the city by air. So that may be the greatest contribution that came out of the whole thing; because keeping China in the war didn't in the end accomplish very much, on the Hump run.

*Q: How long did that go on, that lifting supplies over the Himalayas?*

BYROADE: Oh, about three years. We were trying to build a road, the Ledo road, at the same time, and run a pipeline along the road, which would have been a great project if the war had lasted another couple of years. But by the time we got the road, and the pipeline into China, it was only a matter of months until the war was over.

*Q: That was used, and that still is used, that road and that pipeline?*

BYROADE: It was used some, not enough really to make any big difference. The road is no longer there, most of it isn't, because even while we were building it, the jungle would start taking it over again.

*Q: It was a lot harder to build than the Alcan Highway, I suppose.*

BYROADE: It was a real bitch, and our troops really struggled through that.

*Q: What were your exact duties, or functions, there with that airlift during those three years?*

BYROADE: I was in charge of building the airfield--in charge of supplies for our own troops and lend-lease in China.

*Q: Where were you stationed, mainly, in India?*

BYROADE: I moved up to Chabua in Assam. I built a little headquarters at Chabua and we started with elephants pulling out trees and built our first field at Chabua.

*Q: So you're in Assam. When did you get into China? I mean you didn't fly yourself.*

BYROADE: Well, not legally, but our Air Force friends let me get in lots of flying hours. I guess I could have got my service wings if I'd stayed one more week, but I couldn't do that.

I was in the India end of the Hump, I've forgotten, but I guess for maybe a year and a half. Then I was transferred to the Advance Section No. 4 of the Services of Supply, which was the eastern half of China, in support of the forward echelon of Chennault's 14th Air Force, and old AVG. It was a prewar outfit...

*Q: The Flying Tigers?*

BYROADE: The Flying Tigers had become the 14th Air Force, with General Claire Chennault in command. It was quite a show in Eastern China. I again was in charge of supplies and construction. I was a colonel, about thirty [years of age]. The head of the Air Force was Casey Vincent, who was a brigadier general at 29. They added an Air Service Command. I can't remember the Commander's name at the moment; he was an old guy about 35 years old. Bruce Holloway, a classmate of mine at West Point, was in command of the fighters. He was 29.

*Q: So now you're stationed in China?*

BYROADE: In Kweilin. I got there as one of the first Americans. It was supposed to be the Paris of China, but there wasn't a fork to eat with within a hundred miles.

*Q: Where was that respective to Chungking?*

BYROADE: Oh, several hundred miles southeast of Chungking. It's the southeastern-central part of China.

*Q: How far was that from the Japanese occupied territory?*

BYROADE: When I first got to Kweilin, I guess I was part of a cover plan; I didn't know it at the time. Along with a native, I took a jeep and went from Kweilin up to just outside of Shanghai; went down along the Jap lines from Shanghai to Canton. We were looking for bomber sites. Whether Washington had decided they weren't going to use the mainland of China for major forces, and we were merely a decoy, I never knew. We did our survey, and we were ready to go to build fields, but we never got the orders to build them. I stayed on in Kweilin. It was an exciting adventure in east China with Chennault's P-40s; their ratio was about 13 to 1 to the Japs.

*Q: You mean in the Japanese favor?*

BYROADE: No, in our favor.

*Q: Thirteen to one.*

BYROADE: Well, one reason was that Chennault was a tremendous man to command fighters. He had an intelligence net that was unbelievable, and he was smart enough to not have any American at all in that intelligence net. Normally, it might take three days to place a long-distance telephone call in China. But when the Japanese fighters started their motors wherever they were, the Chinese took over the phone system, and it worked. We were, of course, short of gasoline; we were flying our gasoline across the Hump. So Chennault would sit there in his cave in Kweilin and watch the Chinese plot where the Japanese were. He wasn't going to waste any gas, and when the time came, Chennault would give the okay. Our fighters would go up and get on top of the Japs, and bingo.

*Q: They had cave headquarters there?*

BYROADE: Yes, natural caves. There were a lot of caves; it's a cave country. It was a beautiful country with upside-down ice cream cone mountains, with lots of caves. I built a headquarters there. There was a tremendous cave fifty feet behind my headquarters. We had desks in there and when the Japs came over, my secretary would just take her typewriter and we'd move into the cave.

*Q: Did they bomb our airfields, the Japanese, or did they try to bomb them?*

BYROADE: Oh, yes, a lot. Of course, eventually we lost many of those airfields. I had built about 30. When I say "I," of course, the Chinese did the labor. Some of them were good fields; some of them were just fighter strips.

*Q: When was this? When were you building these?*

BYROADE: Well, this would have been '43 or '44. Eventually, of course, the Japanese came through and we had to abandon some of the fields. I'll never forget abandoning Sichuan, which was in eastern China. We put bombs in the runway and ran the fuses to piles of oil barrels and waste. The last man off fired tracer bullets into the dump and up went the runway, but the trouble was that the Japanese would fill in the holes in three or four days. When I was building that field, [General Joseph W.] Stilwell came through, and he said, "What are you building a field here for?" I said, "Because General Chennault wants it."

Well, he said, "Who's going to protect it?" I said, "My job is to build airfields." That was the great dispute between Chennault and Stilwell. Chennault thought he could hold up the Japanese and really win the war by air power alone, and of course, it didn't work. Stilwell kept saying it would not work, and this was the big bone of contention between them--other than having personalities that just didn't jibe at all.

*Q: Chennault--did he speak Chinese?*

BYROADE: Oh yes.

*Q: Married a Chinese woman, didn't he?*

BYROADE: He did after I left. Anna Chennault is now a very good friend of ours here in Washington, but I never met her in China. Chennault's family was in Louisiana. He was married and had several children, but after I left China in '44, he married Anna.

*Q: You say Stilwell and Chennault had rather conflicting personalities?*

BYROADE: Oh, very much so. On one of my first jobs in China, I received verbal orders from my commanding general, Raymond Wheeler. He said, "In spite of everything else you're supposed to do, see if you can't get Stilwell and Chennault talking to each other." Well, I got them together once, under the wing of an airplane on Kunming airfield, and I rather wished I hadn't because it didn't work.

*Q: We're talking about 1944?*

BYROADE: Probably late '43.

*Q: You're in Chengdu?*

BYROADE: I left Kweilin and eastern China very suddenly. The Air Force took over all construction in China and I was transferred back to the Air Force, a little chagrined at the idea, because I was building things for them and I still could, in my own mind, sort out what made sense and what didn't. Suddenly I was back in the Air Force and told to go to Chengdu, and build fields for our B-29s, which were just coming into being, to hit Tokyo. Chengdu was in northwestern China, too far from Tokyo really. You could use a slide rule and figure out that you couldn't carry very much weight in bombs at that distance. I took about fifteen people with me and we quite secretly designed and laid out four or five, I've forgotten, of the big fields, for the B-29s, and seven fighter fields for protection. I say secretly, because when we moved into an area in China and started construction, the prices of everything went sky high. Pipe was \$1 a foot. Incidentally, we almost set our watches, and everybody went over the area and bought all the pipe all at once. But that was an unbelievable project.

The Generalissimo, of course, drafted the work force, coolies. They would arrive there in groups, walking from as far as a hundred miles away, all organized in groups with their own cook, etc. We had 496,000 laborers on that job. We located the big fields along rivers, as a source of rock, and they would carry the rock on their shoulders and heads up to seven miles in each direction; break the rock by hand. We had no concrete, no cement, in China; we had no asphalt. We had to build these runways for the biggest planes any of us had ever seen; the runways were 24 inches thick, with crushed rock, and then clay and sand on top.

*Q: Well, we have the Marshall mission that we need to deal with. It's apparent that you had experience over in China, but do you recall how and when you were selected to be part of that Marshall mission, and what kind of function you served?*

BYROADE: Well, I remember when I was selected by General [George C.] Marshall to go with him to China, it was a great shock. I didn't know General Marshall. I had briefed him a few times. I was having lunch in the Pentagon with some other officers and there was a newspaperman at the table; I couldn't remember his name. I didn't introduce myself. In the conversation he said to everybody at the table, "The deal on Byroade firmed up this morning." And I said, "I'm Byroade; what are you talking about?" He said, "Well, you're going to China with General Marshall." Well, I said, "No way, I just got back." I went back to my desk and sat there thinking about this. I had been gone for forty months; left a family back here. Went on a bomb-Tokyo mission with one suitcase thinking I'd be home in a hurry and forty months later I got back; and here he was taking me back with him. I just sat there and looked out the window for a half an hour.

A man came running down the hall and said that General Marshall wanted to see me. I walked in and saluted. He said, "Do you want to go back to China?" I said, "No sir." And he said, "Why not?" Well, what do you say? So he said, "Well, I want you to go with me." "Yes sir," I said.

"You have to have a title," he said. "I guess you had better be military attaché to China. You go tell General [Clayton] Bissell, who is head of G-2, you're military attaché to China."

I knew Bissell from the war, and I walked in and told him I was the new military attached to China, and he just about went through the ceiling. He finally calmed down and said, "All right, we'll put you through a six-weeks school." And I said, "I'm sorry; we're leaving in three days."

Well, I was in the attaché office out there maybe an hour total, but it was a good cover.

*Q: You say you had briefed Marshall prior to this?*

BYROADE: Only once or twice. He didn't know me.

*Q: That was on the China operation that you were involved in?*

BYROADE: Yes.

*Q: Had he paid much attention to China, do you think, before he got appointed to this mission?*

BYROADE: Well, in a way, of course, his primary concern and working hours were on Europe and the Pacific up to that point. But, yes, he had been very much involved in the problems of Stilwell and the Generalissimo, and Lord Louis Mountbatten and so on.

*Q: Do you think he got feedback from these people, Mountbatten, Stilwell, maybe even Chennault?*

BYROADE: As far as my selection's concerned, I think it was somewhat Stilwell, probably more Wedemeyer, at that point.

*Q: Had you become pretty well acquainted with General Wedemeyer?*

BYROADE: Yes, in the General Staff in the Pentagon.

*Q: There would be a Wedemeyer mission in China in 1947.*

BYROADE: Well, he was theater commander at the latter stages of the war in China. He was in command of the China theater. I'm not sure how I was picked. I know that Marshall wanted to take McCarthy, his Secretary of the General Staff in the Pentagon. He was very fond of Frank McCarthy who then went out to Hollywood in the movie business.

*Q: Couldn't take your wife.*

BYROADE: That's right. However, later on, when Marshall made a trip back to see Truman, he said, "I'll bring your family back with me." I had a wife and one son. I said, "I appreciate that General, but you can make me the most unpopular man in China, because nobody else has a wife out here." He said, "It doesn't matter; this is a special mission, and I'll do it." And he did.

Well, the Marshall mission to China was something that most Americans have misunderstood. I told Marshall in the beginning I didn't think he had more than a 2 percent chance. I felt sorry for him. Marshall was a winner, and Marshall had never tackled anything he didn't manage to do. I couldn't quite foresee his mission to China working out. Actually, we came a lot closer than I thought we ever would.

*Q: Had you met Zhou En-lai or Mao [Zedong] while you were in China prior to this mission?*

BYROADE: I never met Mao or Zhou En-lai during the war. I saw a great deal of Zhou En-lai, every day in the Marshall mission, for a while. I only saw Mao, I think, twice.

It took us thirteen days to get the truce agreement. Marshall was magnificent in the negotiations. Zhou En-lai was the chief negotiator for the Communists; the negotiators for the Nationalist Government kept changing--they were usually lieutenant generals. We got the truce agreement finally, in 13 days. In the afternoon it was signed and Marshall turned to me and he said, "I want executive headquarters in Peking to be opened and working tomorrow." That is a long ways away.

Part of the truce agreement was that there would be a truce headquarters, which would be manned at the top by three high commissioners. Walter Robertson was the American High Commissioner; he was a banker from Richmond. Yeh Chien-ying, a great old man, who is about 90 now, if he's still alive, was the head Communist. And again the National Government rotated their people. I was made the executive director of the truce headquarters. I was chief of staff to all three of these: the Nationalist Government, the Communist side, and the American. That was in theory. Below me we had a tripartite staff--one section on transportation, one operations, one supply, and so on. Then there were field teams; we had 46 of them in the end. Each was tripartite; they had all three people who were supposed to go out in the field and supervise the cease fire.

There was no way to get this in operation that fast, except to call General Wedemeyer and take every plane he had, except his own. We moved the Chinese Communist staff, the Nationalist Government staff, all up to Peking. We took over two hotels; we couldn't put the Communists and the Nationalist Government in the same hotel. We took over the Rockefeller Memorial Hospital complex, which was about 20 houses, and a beautiful hospital building that was empty. It wasn't being used. We literally had a team in the field the next day. It shocked the Communists; they weren't ready to move that fast. It was a little too fast, but that's what the General wanted.

In the beginning it accomplished a lot of good. The fighting did stop; food and medicine started moving. A lot of sieges were lifted. It looked like progress was being made, and then both sides, but particularly the Communist side, started violating the agreement. They even went so far as to sometimes put the truce team in jail while they took a place, and then after they had taken it they'd let the truce team out of jail. In one place they kept them confined for about a week while they did their military movements and ended up where they wanted to be.

*Q: There are historians who think it was more the Nationalist right-wingers who refused a coalition with the Communists that helped break that truce. But you didn't see it that way?*

BYROADE: Well, I want to answer that rather lengthily. The big problem in China was that a political party, the Communist Party, had their own army. Obviously, there wasn't going to be peace in China, as long as that prevailed. Somehow or other you had to get rid of the Chinese Communist army. Now Zhou En-lai in every meeting, over and over again, said something to us that really didn't make any sense. He said, "We acknowledge the fact that the Generalissimo is in command of all military forces in China." As I say, it really didn't make any sense. So, finally, General Marshall's staff agreed to find out what he meant by this. I remember we didn't sleep for about three nights. We took all the Chinese Communist forces, called Eighth Foot Army then, the bulk of it, and split them up [on paper] and put them under Nationalist Government commanders in areas where it looked safe to do so, and presented this to Zhou En-lai. Now in return for that, if they would do that, give up their army, Marshall was prepared to let Chinese Communist officials, a carefully selected number, into certain slots in the Chinese Government--but being careful not to put them where they really had a veto over total power in the Government. This is why Marshall is accused to trying to set up a coalition government with the Communists.

Well, to that extent, he did, but the other part of that equation was it would have gotten rid of the Chinese Communist army. We felt that if that were possible, and if we gave even more support to the Generalissimo, and got him to put through the reforms that were absolutely vital to stop the trouble in China, reforms which would take the platform away from the Communists and their appeal to the people, that China might be able to swallow this up like they had everything else for thousands of years. That was the plan and I could not believe it when Zhou En-lai agreed. He initialed the agreement. We set the signing for two days later. Marshall flew back to report to Truman. Two days went by and Zhou En-lai refused to sign the agreement.

Now, at the time I thought they had had enough time to check it out with Moscow, and that's what the problem was; I had no evidence of that, but that's what I thought. And again, I have no evidence of this, but looking back on it I think it was Mao himself who probably vetoed the idea. That showed the difference really between Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong. I was caught in a two-days flood with Zhou En-lai--where we couldn't move in either direction, with the rivers on both sides, literally couldn't move--and we commandeered a little hut for the first night. Then, after the rain stopped we slept the second night in a graveyard. That's really when I had my best talks with him.

He said, "Make no mistake about it, we want to communize China. Mao thinks we can do it almost over night. "But," he said, "you know, we really can't. We've got less than 30 really well qualified people. We couldn't even run Shanghai at this moment if you wouldn't help us. As an example, where would we get fuel oil from?"

I said, "Well, you know damn well we will not help you." He said, "Mao has spent most of his life in caves and he doesn't know anything about finance; he doesn't know anything about economics; he doesn't know anything about world affairs; he doesn't know anything about world opinion, but he's a very dedicated Communist and he thinks we can just go right ahead and do

it." And, of course, that's what they did in the end. I'm sure Zhou En-lai was just as surprised as I was how quickly they took over, and for the first time, really in Chinese history, they unified China.

*Q: Well, what were Chiang Kai-shek's main obstacles or weaknesses, from your point of view at the time?*

BYROADE: Well, Marshall thought he was a deplorable military commander. He did everything wrong in his military moves. But the fault was much, much deeper than that. Americans look at the map of China and say, "Well, that's China, and there's Chungking; that's the capital and there's the Generalissimo, and he's in command." This was not really true. The Generalissimo was in power by carefully balancing warlord against warlord. He literally did not have the power to put through the type of reform that would affect the common man and get rid of the Communist menace; I mean give them a better standard of living.

*Q: He had warlords and absentee oppressive landlords to contend with?*

BYROADE: That's right. And John Davies, a China expert, said, "Well, the Generalissimo has lost his mandate from heaven." I think that's a good way to put it. I've seen Chinese Nationalist troops just lay down their arms and walk away. They didn't know what they were fighting for.

*Q: Who said he lost the mandate?*

BYROADE: John Davies.

*Q: Yes, I was going to ask you about these people, the "China hands."*

BYROADE: Yes, well that's a good way to put it, "He lost his mandate from heaven." Now, I thought at the time, even after we failed, that it was worthwhile supporting the Generalissimo even more in hopes that we could really give him the strength to carry out reforms. Looking back on it, I don't think it would have worked.

*Q: It didn't have peasant support--popularity among the masses of peasants--most of whom were landless I suppose.*

BYROADE: That's right.

*Q: The landless peasant was the base of Mao's support?*

BYROADE: That's right.

*Q: You were acquainted then with John Davies and John Service?*

BYROADE: Yes.

*Q: How about John Melby, do you remember him?*

BYROADE: No, I don't remember him.

*Q: John Leighton Stuart?*

BYROADE: Yes. He took over eventually from Walter Robertson as American High Commissioner. Then, later when Marshall left, he became Ambassador.

*Q: Were you acquainted with Hurley, Patrick Hurley?*

BYROADE: I never met Hurley; I've read a lot about him, but never met him.

*Q: What's your opinion of the job that he did? I think he was Ambassador there toward the end of the war in China.*

BYROADE: Well, I didn't think he knew much about China. I thought he was too vain a man, who thought he knew a lot more than he did. I thought he should have listened more to the real experts he had around him, the China experts.

*Q: How about John Davies and John Service? Of course, they got into trouble for the kind of advice they were giving and their apparent sympathies...*

BYROADE: Well, this, of course, ran into the McCarthy era.

*Q: But did you feel that they had a better finger on the pulse of China at the time, or were you skeptical too about their loyalty to America's friends?*

BYROADE: Well, I was skeptical in the beginning before I knew any better, but eventually I became very well acquainted with John Davies. I think the positions he took on China were absolutely right. I felt so bad about the trouble he was in--this was much later on when I was in charge of German affairs in Washington, and Jack McCloy was our High Commissioner in Germany. I went to Jack and said, "Look, you've got to take John Davies on your staff and get him out of Washington. We've got to save this man." McCloy said, "I don't want to do that." I said, "You've got to do it; he's really good. He'll be one of the best men you've got." Jack finally agreed and he took him. A month later I went on a trip to Germany. Davies was in Berlin, and I was amazed at John Davies' knowledge of that situation, just in a month. But the next week he was called back for more hearings and eventually he had to leave the Service.

*Q: When the truce was broken, of course, war broke out again over there, and the Nationalists began losing ground. I guess you could say the Marshall mission eventually did fail.*

BYROADE: Marshall stayed too long. As I explained before, he had never really known defeat; he couldn't quite give up, and a stream of elderly Chinese, very old people, would come to see him, begging him not to leave, that he was the only hope China had. He stayed on and on. I remember flying down from Peking to Nanking, the capital was then Nanking, and seeing Marshall and telling him that I thought we had to accept failure in the mission. I said, "The

important thing left is to explain to the American people why this didn't work. That's got to be done well." I said, "Who can do it?" I said, "I could do part of it, but I was in Peking; you could do part of it, but it's not fair that you have to do it in the beginning. I think we need help. We'll get Til Durdin of the New York Times, Art Steele of the Chicago Sun, or whatever it is, who really know more about China than we ever will, and let's get their newspapers and release them and put them on the job of writing the White Paper, about what happened to the mission." Marshall said, "All right." So I cabled the newspapers and I got them released, flew back to Peking, and came back a week later. They were sitting on a porch, their feet on a coffee table, and I said, "Why the hell aren't you guys working?" They said, "Well, the boss won't let us." So I went in to see Marshall and he said, "Look, if I get in your frame of mind, we have really failed, and I'm not willing to admit that." He said, "They can't start unless I sit down with them and go through it. During the war"--this is something to remember about Marshall--"everybody told me I should keep a diary." And he said, "I could have spent the last fifteen minutes every day dictating what happened. I would have it, but that would have meant I ended every day looking backwards." He said, "When your responsibilities are so great, involving so many lives, you make the best decisions you can and you forget it, and you turn to the next problem, but you don't look backwards." That's what kept Marshall there really too long.

*Q: The gentlemen who were going to write, these were reporters that had been released to write a White Paper?*

BYROADE: That's right.

*Q: But they didn't have a job; once they got over with Marshall they found out they were not able to start it...*

BYROADE: Well, eventually the State Department had to write it and they were a little too far away from it. I didn't think it was very well done.

*Q: At least you missed going to Outer Mongolia.*

BYROADE: I got there before it happened, on a trip. Yes, I've probably seen more of China than any living white man. You see, during the war we built about fifty airfields south of the Yangtze and I got to all those. Then we had forty-six truce teams, all north of the Yangtze, except one in Canton. I got to all of those.

*Q: Were you up there at Yen-an where the Communists had their headquarters, in the caves of Yen-an?*

BYROADE: I was there just once with Marshall. We went up there to call on Mao Zedong; he was still living in a cave with his actress wife.

*Q: You did meet Mao in his cave headquarters in Yen-an, and you got to talk to him personally then?*

BYROADE: Well, along with Marshall.

*Q: What were your impressions of Mao the first time you met him?*

BYROADE: I couldn't believe it; he didn't look like a leader at all. He was a blubbery, misshapen kind of man. He didn't look forceful. He had a very limp handshake.

*Q: Seem to be quite different from Zhou En-lai?*

BYROADE: Well, Zhou En-lai was a remarkable personality. You couldn't help but like Zhou En-lai, personally like him. He was one of the smoothest liars in the world, but you couldn't help but like him as a person.

*Q: You had respect for Zhou En-lai all the time you were there?*

BYROADE: Oh yes, indeed. So did Marshall. Marshall worked very well with Zhou En-lai, probably trusted him a little too much. Zhou En-lai was a very educated, articulate man. I don't know; he's the type of person that an American would slap on the back and call "Joe," which happened to be the sound of his name. But Mao left you cold. It's hard to realize how he had the adulation of millions of people.

*Q: Did you feel at the time that they were more under the thumb of the Kremlin, of Moscow, than they actually were, as it turned out?*

BYROADE: Yes, I did at that time. That was to some extent true, but it was a natural assumption we made in the world at that time, that the Communist bloc was monolithic.

*Q: Of course, the Soviet Government had already made an agreement with Chiang Kai-shek which more or less recognized him as the chief executive of the Government of China.*

BYROADE: Right. Well, I was extremely worried about the long-range Russian intentions. When I went to Manchuria on the trip that I got sick on, I got to Changchun; it was sort of the Pittsburgh of Manchuria. I flew over it and there were all of these big smokestacks, and factory buildings, absolutely impressive. Again, no people.

*Q: Had the Russians gutted those factories, taken them...*

BYROADE: Everything. Absolutely everything! They'd tear out the light switches. Those buildings were just shells, and it left me wondering because had I been given the job as an engineer to destroy that complex, I would have just toppled all those smokestacks. They had left them all standing, so it looked to me like they thought they were coming back someday.

*Q: On the other hand, if they felt that Mao and Zhou En-lai were going to get control of China, this would not be doing them a favor, would it. It would be taking their industrial equipment away from them. In fact, didn't that become a bone of contention between the Communist Government of China, and the Soviets?*

BYROADE: I think it did. Looking back, it looks rather stupid. They moved even blast furnaces, things that are almost immovable. And I don't really know why.

*Q: Especially since that essentially was Chinese property, more than it was Japanese. They were taking it, I suppose, as spoils of war, supposedly from the Japanese. But it would, of course, become part of Chinese property when the war was over.*

*Okay, then after your illness, after you recovered, you came back, and by that time was the mission over?*

BYROADE: No, I had to leave it, I would guess three or four months before Marshall came home. I came home on a slow Navy boat. I was going to San Diego but I kept hearing every night that General Stilwell was dying and I was determined to go see him, because I admired him so much. He was up in Carmel; but he died the day before the boat got in. I came back to Washington; my illness was such that most people back here thought I was going to die. General [Thomas T.] Handy was then deputy chief of staff, and he said, "Since you survived, you can have any job in the military within reason that you want." I wasn't up to working, and so I said, "I'll go down to the Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk." That was the first class at Norfolk. As a general, I already had credit for the course. I went down there, and got back to health, rebuilding a Chris Craft. I really didn't go to school much.

*Q: Council, or maybe to the three-power conferences, that he was too eager to reach agreement with the Russians. He felt the British were a little too eager at this point to come to an agreement with the Russians. My question is, do you think that Stalin himself really miscalculated in apparently giving the green light to Kim Il-Sung who ordered the North Koreans to invade the south, not realizing what kind of backlash there would be not just in regard to Asia, but in regard to the rearming of Western Europe?*

BYROADE: Well, yes, I think it was a mistake on Russia's part. That seemed to be sort of a habit. Every time it looked like we might make some concession that was really important, they seemed to do something stupid, and I think that was one of them. Zhou En-lai later on said that the biggest mistake China ever made was getting into the Korean War.<sup>4</sup>

*Q: He thought that was kind of pulling Russia's irons out of the fire?*

BYROADE: That's right; and they shouldn't have gotten involved.

*Q: Laukhuff also said the State Department seemed to be giving in on a matter of making the demilitarization of Germany a separate agenda item for these Council of Foreign Ministers meetings. There seemed to be a lot of back and forth correspondence going on just on this matter of a separate agenda item for demilitarization of Germany. We did not want that as a separate item; we wanted that to be part of a larger picture. Yet, he thought the British were going too far in accepting the idea of demilitarization as a separate item on these agenda. Yet, I think you have already said that the British did side with us on these issues.*

**WALTER E. JENKINS, JR.**  
**Training Chinese Army**  
**Kunming (1943-1945)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1948-1950)**

**Political Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1953-1955)**

**Talks with Chinese in Poland**  
**Warsaw, Poland (1969)**

*Walter E. Jenkins, Jr. was raised in Texas and New England. He attended the University of Hawaii and graduated from Harvard University in 1941. He served in the U.S. Army during World War II, including two years in China. He joined the Foreign Service in 1950, serving in Bonn, Taipei, Berlin, Poznan, Warsaw, Stuttgart, and Washington, DC. Mr. Jenkins was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on February 20, 1991.*

*Q: Well, did you have any experience of either the Far East or Europe during the war before you graduated from college?*

JENKINS: Well, before graduating from college, the contact with the Far East was basically my early childhood in the Philippines, during which we did visit China, and then my late teens in Hawaii, where I associated with many persons of Japanese, Chinese and Korean heritage at the University of Hawaii as well as during my summer job in the pineapple fields.

*Q: Well, now, you graduated in 1941. What happened to you then?*

JENKINS: Well, I did take ROTC, so I went to summer camp at Ft. Devens during the summer of 1941. And then I was called up for one year of active duty. I thought that would be great -- but of course within a month, Pearl Harbor. And so I went into the Army, field artillery, for the duration.

*Q: Did you get any sort of international experience while you were in the Army?*

JENKINS: Yes, I spent two years actually, until the end of the war, in China with the Stilwell Y-Force and later, the Chinese Combat Command, training Chinese and then taking them into operations.

*Q: Because we're looking at sort of the whole foreign relations field here, not just limited to the Foreign Service, could you tell me about some of your experiences in this as an instructor under the Stilwell command -- I mean, it's a very controversial, very difficult period -- what you were doing and how you saw the situation at that time.*

JENKINS: Yes. The first part of the experience was at an artillery training center at Kan Hai-tze, just outside of Kunming, in which we would train officers and a corps of noncommissioned officers in the basics of artillery, and then take them out to their battalions and help them train their battalions in artillery, and then would accompany them in the mission of opening up the Burma Road, stopping the Japanese offensive in Guangxi or protecting the border with Vietnam.

Well, I did get some very special feelings at that time. In Kunming was one of the best of the Nationalist forces, the Fifth Army. It became quite clear that the Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek, was less interested in using them to open the Burma Road than for keeping an eye on the provincial Yunnanese forces under Warlord Governor Lung Yün. And I began to get the impression that one of the key things of concern to Chiang and the Kuomintang was this separatism of warlords and how you keep them under control. So some of his best units were actually used for that purpose in our region of southwest China.

Then, on accompanying the officers and non-coms of the 18th Artillery Regiment to a training area near the Burma Road, I noted they did a good job in training their troops, but it became quite clear from the lectures of the political officers that what they were really training for was a post-war confrontation with the Communists. This unit never did go down to open up the Burma Road, but was transferred east to Guangxi to face the Japanese there. Thus, I got a second impression that really a lot of this training and preparation was for post-war consolidation of Nationalist authority.

*Q: What was your impression of Stilwell when he was replaced by Wedemeyer?*

JENKINS: My feeling was that Stilwell really knew China but he couldn't harbor any nonsense, either from the "Little Peanut," as he called Chiang Kai-shek, or from us. I remember when we arrived. We had flown over from Miami, and I was the junior officer, the captain. All the others were older lieutenant colonels and colonels. We waited in the headquarters in Kunming, and after a half hour Stilwell came in, with his campaign hat and his riding crop. He looked around, finally saying, "You know, I asked for some first rate officers, and all I get is a bunch of broken-down old brass." This was our first welcome by General Stilwell.

But then we learned to respect him and emulate him, in the military sense -- we too began wearing campaign hats and carrying riding crops.

And so I think that he might have been on target as far as his assessment of Chiang and what we were trying to do; but he didn't fully appreciate all of the political factors involved, like China's tendency to go after local warlords, his felt need to finish things off with the Communists after the war, and so forth. He didn't fully appreciate the political complications in my opinion. He wanted Chinese participation in defeating the Japanese, while Chiang focused on the Communists and warlords and was sure the U.S. could take care of the Japanese.

*Q: You were there for how long?*

JENKINS: A little over two years.

*Q: You left when?*

JENKINS: I arrived in early September 1943 and left China in late September of 1945.

*Q: So the war was over.*

JENKINS: Yes.

*Q: Were you involved at all in, you might say, the preparations for the next war, the civil war there?*

JENKINS: Yes, very indirectly. By this time a Lieut. Colonel, I decided to stay on a while and to take a surrender team to Hankow. We had an OSS team to go in with us. They were to parachute from our plane and make sure the airfield was secure; then we'd land and accept the Japanese surrender and collect a lot of nice Samurai swords. But we never got there, because all of the planes were being used to transport Chinese forces to Manchuria, to counter the Soviet presence there and their support in bringing Chinese Communist troops up there. It became apparent that things were really building up for this Nationalist-Communist conflict at the end of the war. So I had my required points and came home.

*Q: You earn points for military service overseas.*

JENKINS: When you got a hundred points, you were eligible to go home.

*Q: Then what happened? You didn't join the State Department until 1948, so what happened in between there?*

JENKINS: Well, I went back to graduate school, international law and relations at Harvard, and was studying hard, when I got a call from Bill McAfee in Chinese Affairs at the State Department (he had been Wedemeyer's aide). He asked, "Would you be interested in a job in the State Department? There's a job opening up because one of our boys is going over to USIS in Hankow."

I said, "Sure." So I came down for an interview. Fantastic. State was then in what is now the Executive Office Building. I had my interviews. And then the officer in charge said, "Incidentally, our president is meeting the Mexican president across the street at Blair House. Let's go out on the balcony, have tea and watch the parade and ceremony."

I replied, "O.K., let's do it." We did, and my overall reaction was, "Boy, this is the job for me."

But the Congress knocked out the USIA post in Hankow, so I had to wait an additional year, and joined State in '48. By then State had moved to the former War Department Building at 21st and C Streets, so I didn't have tea on the balcony that frequently.

Meanwhile, I spent a pleasant year teaching at the University of Texas in Austin.

*Q: First, you were a civil servant, from '48 to '50, is that right?*

JENKINS: From '48 to '50 I was a Civil Servant and then became a Foreign Service Officer (FSO) in 1950.

*Q: What were you doing? What were your responsibilities?*

JENKINS: Well, Bill McAfee knew my military experience in China, and he wanted a helper. He was political-military. And basically my job was to help him follow the course of the civil war. These were turbulent times in China, of course, and it wasn't going well for the Nationalists.

*Q: Forty-eight was really kind of the end of the line.*

JENKINS: Right up into '49, when they went over to Taiwan. And so we followed the course of the military operations, and also I monitored the \$125 million military aid program we were giving to the Nationalist Chinese. Those two jobs kept me pretty busy, and it was a fascinating period.

*Q: What was the impression at the time? You know, so much has been written about the China hands and all this, but as a practical measure, I mean, here you are on the ground working on the East Asia...it was East Asia at that time I guess?*

JENKINS: Yes, it was the Far Eastern Bureau (FE) and the "China Desk" (CA).

*Q: What was the feeling at the time about the Communists and the Nationalists -- who was going to win, what American interests were and all that sort of thing?*

JENKINS: We were not all of one mind, but I think we were following it very closely. China language officer Jack Service wasn't there, and Edmund Clubb wasn't, but two others, Phil Sprouse and Tony Freeman, were. They were my bosses. We saw various options. As these dispatches came in from the China posts -- from Edmund Clubb, Jack Service, Bob Service, Al Siebens and others-- we began to see the Nationalist side disintegrating and contemplated what could be done about it.

For instance, on the military side, Chiang had taken away command of ten divisions -- American-equipped and trained in China during the World War II -- from Sun Li-jen, who was a VMI graduate but just too objective -- and gave the troops and command to Fu Tso-yi, who had been a warlord. Fu Tso-yi eventually defected, with the 10 divisions, to the Communists.

And then you began to see warlord cliques develop and split off. One was the Guangxi Clique, led by Li Chi-shen and Li Tsung-jen, who was vice president to Chiang Kai-shek at the time. And you got a feeling from the reporting that the Guangxi Clique was trying to join hands with Fu Tso-yi and Governor Lung Yün of Yunnan to provide an alternative to Chiang.

So these reports poured in from the so-called China Hands. But you also had, on this side, the

"China Lobby," led by John Foster Dulles and other likeminded political figures.

*Q: Senator Knowland, Walter Judd, who was at that time a congressman.*

JENKINS: Right. And so you could see three alternatives, at least I could, and you could see people thinking about them. Should there be a support of alternative groupings the Guangxi Clique and other factions? "Look, the Chinese Communists are obviously winning," others would say, "why not establish contact with them, establish diplomatic relations, and wean them away from the world-wide monolithic Communist movement?" And then you had the viewpoint, represented by the China Lobby, "Follow through with Chiang to the very end, even though he had retired to Taiwan, and someday we'll return to the mainland," which became the slogan.

*Q: Were you feeling any particular pressure on you? I mean, was this really some people sitting down and weighing these things and trying to figure out what do we do? Or was there pressure to "think right"?*

JENKINS: Not from the hierarchy. No, I think there was objectivity...from my point of view, and remember, I was a relatively new junior officer.

*Q: Oh, no, I understand. No, but this is important to get this feeling.*

JENKINS: But in the broader political environment you did have the feeling of pressure from the Judds and the Knowlands that we mustn't be "traitors," and you began to feel that Jack Service and others were not exactly welcome in this environment.

*Q: But did you have the feeling that you were getting good reporting out of China?*

JENKINS: I felt we were getting excellent balanced reporting out of China, even including that wonderful jewel from Tihwa, capital of way-out Xinjiang. The consul had just isolated himself out there, and the dispatches came in only once every six months. And it became apparent (because I read the dispatches first) that what he might be writing were chapters of a book about the situation in Xinjiang. The villain of the piece was a Russian named Alexis, who lived in the area. Finally, as the civil war approached its end, the consul had to pull out, with his deputy who was an OSS type, through Tibet into India.

*Q: But you didn't have the feeling at the time, this '48 to '50 time, that you were in a bureau almost besieged by the political right in the United States?*

JENKINS: As a junior officer focusing on the military I was perhaps less aware of the siege. But I had a feeling that Edmund Clubb, the Services and others, and maybe my two bosses, Phil Sprouse and Tony Freeman, were feeling this pressure a lot more than I was. Of course we all know what happened to the Services; and John Patton Davies was another. And Tony Freeman, who was one of the best China language officers I've ever known, of course, left the Far East and became ambassador to Mexico eventually. And Phil Sprouse did go out to Cambodia eventually. But their careers with China or anything important in that region was ended. And you could sort of feel that by 1950.

*Q: When did you leave the China desk and go to Germany?*

JENKINS: Well, both Phil and Tony, who had been encouraging me to go to China language school, realized that it was all over in China, and that young officers would not serve there for many years to come. So something came up with the High Commission in Germany, (HICOG), and they said, "That looks like a good opportunity; if you're interested, take it." HICOG wanted to train a group of young candidates waiting to be Foreign Service Officers (FSOs), to serve in Germany as Kreis Resident Officers, which in essence was to be county representative for the High Commission throughout the American Zone. So after family consultation, I joined 26 other FSO candidates to attend the Foreign Service Institute for three months of orientation and German language study, and then off to Germany.

*Q: So you left about when?*

JENKINS: We left in the spring of 1950.

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*Q: Then you got yanked back there to your China side, didn't you, at that point? I have you going to Taipei from '52 to '55.*

JENKINS: We actually arrived in January '53. I was quite, quite sure I was going to continue to serve in Germany for another tour. And I was transferred to the political section of the High Commission (HICOG) in Bonn in the summer of '52.

*Q: Ah, well, then let's talk a little about that.*

JENKINS: Well, it would have to be "a little." Because HICOG had the authority to transfer us, as junior Foreign Service officers, directly from a Kreis to Bonn, then notify the Department of the reassignment. But the dear administrative officer didn't do it by wire, but by surface pouch. And so I was doing my first job of sorting out files in the political section, when all of a sudden a cable came in stating that I was being transferred to Taipei. Well, John Patton Davies, the old China Hand, who was then head of the political section, wrote a beautiful cable trying to retain me in Bonn. But a fatuous cable came back which said that the Department feels that young officers should have a variety of experiences, and since Mr. Jenkins has already served in China, the Department feels he ought to go back there. There were condolences. One of my friends was sorting through his cables in the file room and said, "I'm awfully sorry to see you go."

I replied, "Well, Pete, it has to be, I guess."

And then, looking at a cable, he said, "I'll be damned, I'm transferred to Taiwan, too!" So we went to Taiwan on the same plane.

*Q: What was your impression, before we leave that, about how the civilian American side was doing, both at...well, it wasn't even an embassy, it was still High Commission, wasn't it?*

JENKINS: It was formally the High Commission because the "contractual agreements" negotiated with the Federal Republic were not ratified until 1955 because of French opposition. But we operated as an Embassy. Within the U.S. Zone the civilian American side was doing well, but internationally there were problems -- East-West problems with the USSR, impact of the Korean War, stalemate over the "European Defense Community", etc.

*Q: Well, then you went to Taipei. What were you doing there?*

JENKINS: Well, in Taipei, my initial job, after several months training in Washington, was to be administrative officer for the embassy, which I did for about six, seven months. And then I replaced the person who was the political-military officer, again because of my background in political-military work.

*Q: What was the situation when you were there? We're talking about '53 to '55, in Taiwan. I mean, the Korean War was going full blast. I'm sure the wounds from the civil war had not really healed at all. How did you see the situation there?*

JENKINS: Well, as you say, it was a pretty turbulent time in the Far East. And of course we were in Taiwan with our military assistance program, and we were also in Korea. And by this time mainland China was also involved in the Korean War: and this had its repercussions in Taiwan. There was much emphasis on "return to the mainland," parading, training, and maneuvers to emphasize that goal. But there was also some internal upheaval and competition for authority on the island.

I remember going over with our navy during the evacuation of the Tachen Islands. Chiang Ching-kuo, the older son of Chiang Kai-shek, was there and I got to know him somewhat. And then I went to Quemoy, which is just opposite Fujian Province on the mainland -- very close, artillery distance -- with Wild Bill Donovan and Maxwell Taylor to look over the situation there in terms of its viability under the Nationalists. There was considerable military tension at that time.

Also, there was internal tension. Chiang Ching-kuo, the older son, was having a struggle with Madame Chiang and her son, Chiang Wei-kuo, for a position of power and influence on Chiang Kai-shek. And it had its impact on the diplomatic corps, too. For example, when Madame Chiang organized a fashion show, supported by Wei-kuo, and invited all the diplomats there, Ching-kuo surreptitiously got his bully boys to disrupt the fashion show, turn over diplomats' vehicles, while appealing to the public that the fashion show was a frivolous event at the time of serious civil and Korean wars with the Communists.

Also, Sun Li-Jen, the VMI-educated general who trained the troops that finally opened up the Burma Road during W.W.II, was put under house arrest in 1954. And two of his generals were sent to Green Island, a detention re-education camp for political prisoners. I remember going to Green Island with a U.S. Army colleague and Chiang Ching-kuo, who controlled security for the Nationalist Government. During the tour of the camp he pointed out that they were reforming the resident political dissidents, and that ninety-five percent of them, after re-education in the Three

People's Principles, returned to Taiwan. Well, that was interesting so my colleague and I asked, "Well, what happens to the other five percent?"

"Oh, we don't hurt them. No, actually, we give them a boat, food supplies and a radio, and send them back to the Chinese mainland. And after three or four days, we start sending radio messages to them asking: "When are you going to report?" And the Communists take care of them."

*Q: Oh, my God.*

JENKINS: Well, he was a very, very clever man. But he was also very clever in a more positive sense: he cultivated the Taiwanese and supported their involvement, developing close relation with them, and not relying exclusively on the mainlanders resident on Taiwan.

Involving the native Taiwanese brings me to the one real positive development during this period. We Americans helped develop a Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR), headed by Chiang Mon-lin, a former university president on the mainland, an inspired, far-sighted person. In essence, JCRR emulated what happened in Japan back at the time of the late 19th century Meiji Restoration, during which land was taken from the feudal lords and dispensed to the peasantry. Similarly, land was taken from the wealthy landowners in Taiwan and given to the peasants, and the government reimbursed the landlords with government bonds. They became the bankers and the industrialists, just like the Mitsubishis and other feudal lords in Japan back during the Meiji Restoration. This JCRR development laid the foundation for the fantastic economic development that has occurred over the past few decades on Taiwan.

*Q: Well, Karl Rankin was the ambassador.*

JENKINS: He was our ambassador.

*Q: What was your impression of Karl Rankin?*

JENKINS: My impression was, he was a nice, even-handed person, and he was like several other ambassadors with whom I have served, believing that you don't muddy up the waters. I mean they emphasize that this is the policy -- the way we're going to do it. To illustrate, I recall one fascinating report prepared jointly by officers of the Political Section. It was a despatch analyzing the feasibility of a military "return to the mainland," concluding that it was most unlikely. It was drafted by FSO China-language experts and sent up to the ambassador. He recognized a problem, with the "China Lobby" now pretty much in control in the Department. He left the analysis intact but changed the conclusions -- this was his report. But the underlying message stood out when it got back to the Department, because the analysis was still there. Ambassador Rankin tried to be fair to his reporting officers and at the same time avoid rocking the boat in Washington. All copies of the report were recalled from distribution by the Department

*Q: Was there any feeling at the time, particularly when you got into the political-military side, that this idea of returning to the mainland just was a non-starter from the very beginning?*

JENKINS: Yes, and I think that most of the political officers, economic officers and most everyone in the embassy felt the same way; but "return to the mainland" like many other slogans of autocratic leaders, seems to help hold things together.

I just read in *The New York Times*, day before yesterday, about Mr. Wu, an elderly Kuomintang legislator, still taking the line, "We're going to return to the mainland in a few years."

Such slogans tended to hold the mainlanders together in a disciplined fashion; and they had their impressive military parades, and we trained them and gave them equipment to maintain the unified posture. So, while I think the analysts thought it was a non-starter, I also concluded that it had its politically unifying purpose among the mainlanders.

*Q: Did you feel under any sort of constraints, at least among the Chinese, not to say, "Oh, come on, fellas, this isn't going to work."? I mean, was this something we talked about among ourselves, but there was no point in displaying our thoughts to the Chinese?*

JENKINS: I'm trying to think if I ever had an opportunity. No, I don't think that we were ever inclined to do that. We wanted our government to know what we felt about the possibility. We had pretty close associations with some people like General Sun Li-Jen and others we had known back during the war, and they didn't seem to believe in the feasibility of a military return to the mainland. But you didn't discuss such things with Chiang Ching-kuo or other inside members of the government.

*Q: What was your impression of Chiang Kai-shek, Madame Chiang and all, as far as their grasp of how to run the government? You know, one always thinks of the tremendous corruption. You've talked about the device of the cliquism. Was there a reform going on within their ranks at that time?*

JENKINS: Well, as I said, it's a very strange source of reform, but Chiang's older son, Ching-kuo, who was, after all, educated in Moscow, took all of the Communist techniques, developed them for the Kuomintang against the Communists. Now that's one side of him. But, as I said, I think under his influence there was a tendency, demonstrated by the JCR land reform, to compensate the Taiwanese with economic prosperity in exchange for maintaining Kuomintang political and military control. That was my impression by the time I left. And Ching-kuo was very good at it; that was his technique: Cultivate the Taiwanese economically, maintain political and military control.

*Q: Were you there during the sacking of the embassy?*

JENKINS: I left, fortunately, three months before that. But it was the same group that was turning over the diplomats' cars at the fashion show, and I think it was Ching-kuo who was a little bit behind that, too.

*Q: This was over a...*

JENKINS: It involved an American sergeant who, as I recall, caught a "Peeping Tom" outside his house and shot him with a .45. Wasn't that it, the way you think it was started?

*Q: I think it was something like that, yes. Well, then, you seemed to have a sort of a split personality here. You left Taipei and back again to Berlin. You were there from '55 to '57.*

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*Q: Walter Stoessel came. He was ambassador there from '68 to '72, so you had him for the first half of his tour. How did he operate? Was there a difference? I mean, how did he use you, and how did you see him heading an embassy?*

JENKINS: He was a wonderful guy. He was not a person who said, "I've got a lot of views on this, and this should be done, and I think our policy should be so and so." He kept things on an even keel, and very, very professionally. He developed very good relationships with other diplomats and Polish officials, because they really recognized him as a competent professional.

Initially, in speaking Polish he had a Russian accent that I used to tease him about occasionally, but it ironed out.

I think the first experience of how we worked together was a cable that came in from Henry Kissinger in early '69 that said: "It's time to reopen our China talks." (They had been discontinued in the mid 60's due to problems in the Far East, including Vietnam.) "I want you to make contact with the Chinese ambassador to reopen these talks." So we talked about it: How should we do it? Ambassador Stoessel asked, "You speak a little Chinese, don't you?"

I replied, "I've forgotten most of it, but I know a little. I know how to say hao bu hao and so forth." Then I added, "I have a good idea. You know, Mr. Ambassador, the Yugoslavs are going to have a fashion show and party early next week, and everybody's invited. I suggest we both go, and we'll sit at separate tables. But when the Chinese ambassador leaves, at the cloak room, I'll go at the same time and sort of bump into him, and 'Oh, excuse me,' and introduce myself. And then I'll tell him, 'I want you to meet my ambassador.'"

"Do you think it'll work?"

I said, "Well, we can try it."

And so we did: Fashion show, cloak room, and I introduced myself. And he was, you know, being very Chinese and bowing hands clasped. I said, "I want you to meet my ambassador." So they were introduced. And then Walter Stoessel said (they found a Chinese interpreter then, I wasn't good enough in Chinese) that he hoped we could meet again sometime soon.

"Hao, Hao, Hao," (OK), said the Chinese Ambassador.

So we invited them over to our embassy. We didn't put it in the old place, one of the palaces in a park across the way, because we found out that it was pretty well tapped by the Poles. And they

showed up at the embassy the following week in one of the biggest black limousines I've ever seen. Anything to be a little bigger than the Russian Zis. They entered and I met them. We had the interpreters and specialists down from Stockholm, who were the China-talks specialists. I had it all arranged with the Marine guards, you know, send us up to the fourth floor to meet with the ambassador in his office. The Marine guard accidentally pushed the wrong elevator button and sent us down to the basement. I think they thought I was kidnaping them at first. But that was rectified, and we went up and had our first meeting. And that was the reopening of the talks with China.

Well, of course, Kissinger was already thinking and had talked a lot...

*Q: He was then the head of the NSC, National Security Council.*

JENKINS: Yes, that's right. And he probably was already thinking about a Nixon visit to China, and the preparation was underway, you know, in his own mind. He had been talking with a lot of people, including Fairbanks.

*Q: This was John Fairbanks, at Harvard.*

JENKINS: Who had mentioned in a number of talks with Kissinger (of course, they were both at Harvard) that this would be a good opportunity to reopen things with China.

So that's how I remember the reopening.

**JOHN A. LACEY**  
**U.S. Navy**  
**Chungking/Beijing (1944-1945)**

**Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research**  
**Washington, DC (1950-1956)**

**Economic Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1956-1957)**

**Bureau of Intelligence and Research**  
**Washington, DC (1957-1958)**

**Economic Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1960-1964)**

*John A. Lacey was born in Illinois in 1917. He joined the Department of State in 1950 and the Foreign Service in 1955. He served in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Australia, and Rangoon. He was interviewed by Henry Precht in 1989.*

LACEY: I then decided I would go to work and earn my living like a real businessman. My family had moved to Chicago. I followed them to Chicago. My first job was selling printing. I quickly despaired of my ability to sell anything including printing. But one day, mid 1938, on a Friday afternoon, there was a heavy rain, and like any good salesman, I spent most of my time in the buildings in the loop of Chicago. The elevator carried me past an exciting eighth floor where I caught a quick glimpse of gold, of cinnabar, and the smell of incense and sandalwood. When I reached the bottom, I said to the elevator operator, "Take me back up."

There I met George F. Ruby, Inc. George F. Ruby was a charter member of the Illinois Athletic Club. Was himself director, owner, and operator of an import/export house that dealt in oriental goods. I was so intrigued that I said to him, "Mr. Ruby, I would like to work for you." That was late Friday. I went to the printing office on Saturday, announced my resignation, and on Monday I showed up at George F. Ruby, Inc.

"I'll be goddamned," he said. "I didn't expect to see you here."

"Well, here I am, I said, but I won't work for nothing."

"How are you on books?" he said. "I need a bookkeeper in the worst kind of way."

I said, "Accounting was the only course in college I flunked, Mr. Ruby."

"Good," he said, "you are just the man I want." And he slapped his hand down on his desk and knocked out his English pipe and shook my hand. And that's how I became further interested in things oriental.

At about the same time, I fortuitously received a letter from the University of Chicago answering an application I had put in maybe three or four years earlier -- three years I guess it was -- saying that yes, indeed, I was eligible for a scholarship. In 1938, I resumed my studies. This time at the University of Chicago of Chicago's Department of Oriental Language and Literature. I got my degree in 1940. Meantime I continued to work for Ruby part time. The customers stole him blind which he was.

*Q: You learned Chinese in that process?*

LACEY: I was learning Chinese. However, Henry, I never did gain a good command of Pai-hua, that's spoken Chinese. My teacher was an outstanding expert in literary Chinese. Though I still can read literary Chinese, I have difficulty now speaking any Chinese at all.

*Q: So by the outbreak of World War II, you were graduated from the University of Chicago with this degree in oriental literature.*

LACEY: And still aspiring to become the United States best teacher of things Chinese. But Pearl Harbor changed all that . . . changed the lives of many, many millions of Americans, a fact that still colors my attitudes towards the Japanese. As soon as Pearl Harbor occurred, I immediately quite schooling. I tried to get into the government service one way or another, fighting those

dirty Japs, as I used to say to myself. The best I could do immediately was to join the Office of Censorship in the Chicago branch where my Chinese enabled me to censor Chinese mail that was picked up, intercepted.

By August of '42, however, I was able to get myself in stream, this time as a Yeoman Second Class at the U.S. Navy Japanese language school in Boulder, Colorado. The fact that I did get in the school at all still is remarkable to me. Because I think, Henry, the gravest shortcoming of American foreign affairs is the general lack of knowledge of foreign affairs among the public at large. In this case, when I protested that I knew nothing about Japanese, the answer was, "Well, they are more or less the same." That has occurred several times throughout my career.

At the conclusion of the Boulder Japanese language training school, I was shipped off to Washington where I served in the Naval Communication Annex on Massachusetts and Nebraska Avenue. It was quite apparent that I was no better in deciphering Japanese codes than I was in my accounting practices. I loathed it. The only thing I had going for me was a greater capacity for coffee than the warrant officer, who served as the chief flunky in the Naval communications office system of personnel. He was a sour man, like most warrant officers, but grudgingly acknowledged that if anyone could drink more coffee than he could, that fellow must be all right. We became good friends. One day he said, "You are interested in China, aren't you?"

"I would give anything to get to China."

He said, "Are you ready to go right now?"

I said, "I will go as soon as I get orders."

He said, "You are off in two weeks."

So he wrote up the orders to send me to the U.S. Naval Group China. And in two weeks, I was off and away.

*Q: What was the U.S. Naval Group in China?*

LACEY: It was a goof-off outfit, a President Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek deal whereby the U.S. services -- in this case, the Navy Group China -- would train Chinese soldiers in the arts of war. My unit trained cryptography and the arts of bicycle riding. By the way, at that time, Chinese could not ride bicycles. They had no sense of balance, they had no sense of speed. It was rather laughable to watch them being trained.

*Q: Where was it based?*

LACEY: It was based primarily outside of Chungking about sixty miles in a place that the Americans called Happy Valley. The official name of the organization was the Sino-American Cooperative Organization, SACO.

*Q: Who was the commander of this overall operation?*

LACEY: Admiral Milton Miles was the --

*Q: Navy commander?*

LACEY: Navy commander, yes, but I believe he commanded all SACO units.

*Q: And he reported to whom?*

LACEY: He reported to Roosevelt.

*Q: I see. Was Stilwell --*

LACEY: Stilwell was sent to China, but he was not involved. He was a separate --

*Q: On a separate command.*

LACEY: In fact, Uncle Sam had a very poor wartime organization in China. As you know, Stilwell fought with the "Peanuts" i.e., Chiang Kai-shek. The U.S. Ambassador to China was --

*Q: Hurley.*

LACEY: Patrick Hurley. He was a stinker, at least that's how I felt he was. He may have been different, but that's the kind of impression I got.

*Q: Did your group fight with Stilwell's command or the ambassador, or what kind of a relationship did you have?*

LACEY: We had an almost independent relationship because our effective leader was General Tai Li Dai Lee, whom you may remember as being the chief of the Chinese gestapo. He was infamous for the rough way in which he herded people around including his influence with Chiang Kai-shek. Through him I saw the innate cruelty of the Chinese people.

Turning back to a more general approach to that period of my life, the good thing about it was, while I had no job, there was no billet for me and took about two months for the authorities to find out what to do with me, they finally gave me a job in which I was able to do some of the things I enjoyed doing. One was to help rescue American pilots, mostly from the "Flying Tiger," the 14th Air Force. Another was to resume my study of Chinese and Chinese ways of life.

That was an exciting experience and one that exposed me to an aspect of China which I never dreamed existed.

*Q: What year was this?*

LACEY: March 1944 to December '45.

*Q: I see. The end of the war.*

LACEY: Yes. Speaking about the end of the war, you may remember, Henry, the false armistice. I think that was on August the ninth. In any case, it was a false armistice, but I was then back in Happy Valley as one of the two best Japanese language officers in the China theater -- in fact, there were only two of us able to be moved -- Lieutenant Roy Wald, who was six months my senior, and myself. As soon as the false armistice was declared, orders came through that Wald and Lacey should be flown to Shanghai to help that aspect of the Japanese surrender.

As it turned out, it was a false armistice, but we ultimately did get to Shanghai the day after the real armistice. I am ashamed at all that we were called upon to do. Americans abroad, especially soldiers, have very little cultural sensitivity. They are so keyed up and ready to believe that the Japanese are dirty bastards, that anything goes. Looking back upon that era, I am ashamed of the way that our little contingent treated the Japanese.

*Q: The Japanese who surrendered in Shanghai and elsewhere in China?*

LACEY: The Japanese generally surrendered overall, but each area general had its own directions to surrender.

*Q: Right. But didn't the Americans have a role in determining how the Japanese would be treated? Weren't the Americans running things with the Chinese taking orders?*

LACEY: The MacArthur syndrome, as I think of it in retrospect, even then was beginning to percolate. There was a sense of superiority, uncalled for I think, but nevertheless exercised.

*Q: Why were you ashamed of the way the Americans performed?*

LACEY: Well, for example, we had caught the Japanese gunboat in the Whangpoo River going downstream en route to safety in Japan. That had been captured and brought back to Shanghai. Commander Martin, a San Diego fire chief, was the senior officer of our Navy group. Under his orders and instructions, Roy Wald and I, shamefully, were among those who stripped Japanese down naked. We went through their photograph albums -- and there were many, many photograph albums -- looking for what was presumed to be secret documents or orders or codes. It was a shameful show. That's what I really meant.

The commander of the Japanese gunboat was held prisoner in his cabin and saved for the last. When Martin was satisfied that nothing was really worth collecting, Martin went down to his cabin with Wald on his right and I on his left. The Japanese officer was sitting on the other side of a big billiard table, a green cloth table like a billiard table, by himself. Martin asked him, among other things, "What do you think of the way we are treating your boys now, as compared to the way you treated us at Bataan?"

I put the question in Japanese to this naval officer. The answer came back, which I interpreted, "That was war, this is peace, now all men are brothers."

Whereupon Martin, a big-armed guy, freckled face, brought his hand down on the table and said, "Lacey, you tell him that is chicken shit." Well, in all of my training that I had at Boulder Japanese language school, I never learned the word, "chicken shit."

So I scowled and said, "Dame des'u'," which literally means, "that's too bad." But Martin couldn't tell the difference. [Laughter]

Then from Shanghai, I had the great joy of being reassigned to Peking. This was around September of that year.

*Q: '45?*

LACEY: '45. And from September to about December 1, I had a heyday.

*Q: Were you assigned to the naval attaché office then?*

LACEY: No, this was still SACO operation. It was our function in Peking to make an inventory of the Japanese military installations in North China.

I remember one day especially that involved General Sun in charge of the Peking area. He was greedy, vain and corrupt. He was responsible to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and like so many generals was more interested in lining their own pockets than fighting the Pa Lu (the 8th Route Army, which answers to Mao Zedong's communism). General Sun made a fortune selling rice and coal from government sealed stores.

Do you recall, Henry, the old fashion way of using a flash pan to take photos?

*Q: Right.*

LACEY: Well, we were in a bunker, and Wald and I were translating the Japanese names on the different ammunitions in the bunker. General Sun was vainly posturing for a camera we didn't see. He had one of his photographers flash off the flash pan, Roy and I hit the deck. We didn't know what was going to happen.

*Q: You thought he might ignite the explosives.*

LACEY: Exactly. Well, it turned out he did not.

Another thing I enjoyed about Peking was our senior Chinese translator was a fellow by the name of T'ien. A very fine person whose main love in life was Chinese opera. He knew so much about Chinese opera that under his guidance, he and I would go off every evening not to one opera but to many, maybe three, four or five, to hit just that one point in time when the famous actor was doing a popular aria. Well, that was quite a fulfilling experience.

*Q: What kind of attitude did you and your colleagues have in the Navy group there towards the Chiang government?*

LACEY: We were by then rather down on the Chiang government.

*Q: What did you think? They were inept, corrupt, what?*

LACEY: It was well-known that, first and foremost, the country was saddled with impossible inflation. I think I can remember having a dinner in Shanghai where the four of us paid for a dinner that cost us seven-million plus local currency. Inflation was so bad that people would carry money around in wheel barrows.

*Q: Suitcases.*

LACEY: In suitcases. Well, they would bag it up and carry it openly. That was one obvious sign of maladministration. But I think the worst thing that we all felt -- at least my colleagues and I felt -- was that Chiang's generals were most interested in lining their own pockets. Chiang's senior minister of finance, T.V. Sung, was well-known to have milked China dry. None of us felt very kindly toward the Sung clan including Madame Sung, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was a Sung girl.

*Q: Did they have any contact with the embassy during that period or were you pretty much without that?*

LACEY: Our contacts with the embassy were very slight. In Chungking, a good friend of mine and still a very good friend and one of our outstanding Chinese language officers -- Harald Jacobson his name is -- was then a commander and served as deputy military attaché in Chungking.

You asked, Henry, about contacts with the embassy personnel. It's very vague in my mind.

*Q: What about the communists at that stage? What kind of attitude or knowledge did you have of the Chinese communists?*

LACEY: I may have had a better knowledge of the Chinese communists than did the boys in Washington. Remember, Roosevelt was still in charge. He --

*Q: Well, not at this time. This is after --*

LACEY: But his policies were still prevalent. At Yalta, among other places, he and his cohorts plus Stalin and Winston Churchill and disgracefully no Chinese representation at all, proceeded to carve up eastern Europe and China according to their plan. The Yalta hangover enabled Stalin to send his own forces into the Far East within one day I think before the war finally ended. I am a little fuzzy on that, but it was a belated gesture to show that Stalin and Russia also had a stake in the treaty, of peace in Japan.

In the meantime, what actually was the case was the Russian communist forces were commanding almost all of North China, and as they retreated, they turned over their arms and

their territory not to Chiang Kai-shek but to Mao Zedong. I could see that going on right within the perimeter of Peking.

Now one thing very much on my mind, even today as China is in turmoil, is that at that time under Mao's leadership the Chinese Communist forces unquestionably were well-disciplined. Unlike the Nationalist forces, the Chinese Communist troops would take over cities and towns and instead of raping the women and looting precious stores, they would take off their shirts and work in the fields. It was a majestic example of how good propaganda can be a partner of diplomacy.

In the meantime, Chiang Kai-shek's soldiers and generals were vainly trying to hold ground. Against the advice of General George Marshall who was sent to China as a presidential advisor, the Nationalist forces went into Manchuria and tried to regain that territory.

Some years later, in '56-'57, when I was assigned to Taipei, China, the then minister of economic affairs, a wonderful fellow by the name of Kiang Piao, himself an engineer, told me several times how he was the chief engineer of a group in Manchuria that was assigned to build a bridge across the Liao River. There were about 200 of China's best engineers building that bridge. Suddenly, out of nowhere, the Pa Lu -- that was the way the communists referred to themselves. Pa Lu meaning the Eighth Route Army -- suddenly the Eight Route Army cutoff retreat of these 200 or so engineers who were on the other side of the river. They captured the bridge, and that was the end of that expedition.

It was also one of the reasons why Communist China was able to get off to such a good start. They not only had some of best trained manpower, but they also had the capacity to --

*Q: Motivate people?*

LACEY: Motivate people, yes. And along with motivating people, they inherited all of the five and ten-year plans which the Chinese government under Chiang Kai-shek had been developing. I've heard from many different sources -- they had blueprints of bridges to be built, of roadways to be repaired, of dams to be erected. These fell into the hands of the Chinese Communists. I think this was a primary reason why initially the Chinese Communists were so successful.

If one were to look into this more careful than I have, one would probably find much of the material achievements of early stages of Chinese Communist rule over the mainland were due to the fact that they just put into place plans that had already been made.

*Q: Right.*

LACEY: But unlike the Chiang Kai-shek's boys, the communists had popular support.

*Q: That's interesting observation. Let's get back to your time in Peking. This is the end of 1945, now, and you and your colleague, Wald was it, were surveying what remained of Japanese installations. Now, what other duties did you have at that time?*

LACEY: That was about it. Wald and Lacey's job was to translate documents that described Japanese installations throughout what the Japanese called the North China area.

*Q: Did you go to visit the Yen-an at that time?*

LACEY: I got to Yen-an earlier.

*Q: Oh, tell us about that incident.*

LACEY: Well, it was very accidental. I spoke earlier about being in China without direct orders, and for about two wonderful months, I could wander around doing what I wanted, visit monasteries and gorge Chinese food. What I remember most was the self-confident attitude of the basically pro-Chinese Communist person.

*Q: This was in 1944, then.*

LACEY: Yes.

*Q: You think they were confident of ultimate victory? Was that the kind of sense you had?*

LACEY: They were not only confident, but they deliberately exploited Uncle Sam's misguided desire to try to bring the two hostile forces together. Mao and his Zhou En-lai and a couple other leaders pretended to fight the Japanese. However, they criticized the Chiang Kai-shek government for failing to fight the Japanese as determinedly as they wanted or as they believed was desirable.

*Q: What was the attitude of the Americans. Did they think the Chinese were a more effective fighting force against the Japanese? How did they look at them?*

LACEY: On this I can only refer you to the wonderful source book called U.S. Relations with China put out by the Department of State, August '49. Remember that the Department of State, especially Dean Acheson, was under heavy criticism from the China lobby for --

*Q: Loss of China.*

LACEY: Yes, for the loss of China.

*Q: Well, you couldn't foresee the momentous changes that were coming.*

LACEY: No.

*Q: No one could. Well, let see. Unless there is something else that you want to say about that China period, you left China then and returned to the University of Chicago and then entered the Department of State?*

LACEY: Yes, I returned to the University of Chicago. I maintained my naval reserve status for a

couple or three years as a source of income. I was already married, wonderfully married. I reentered the University of Chicago determined to, as I said earlier, become the best goddamned teacher of Chinese history and culture in the United States. That was my dream.

Let me tell you quickly a story. For my doctoral thesis, I decided on the functions, the system concerning the Ming dynasty magistrate during the Hung Wu period which was the first of the Ming eras. I really feel that I know more about the Ming dynasty magistrate than most people would ever care to know.

The magistrate was, in essence, the representative of the emperor. He was the local Gauleiter, the father of the people, the principal Confucian in his district. He was the chief policeman; he was the chief tax collector; he was chief enforcer of law and order. His relations with the military were, even as now, uncertain, uneasy. He was the high priest in the district, which is tantamount to a county. He was the officiator at many state ceremonials which the monarchy mandated by customary law.

*Q: Anyway, this gave you a very good understanding of the dynamics of political life in China at that time. But let's --*

LACEY: But, no, the reason why I stress this is that in 1949, I was approached by a Rhea Blue from the Department of State's intelligence research on the Far East to go to Washington. Interestingly, Henry, the Department of State had reason to believe that now that the People's Republic of China had been established on October 1 of '49, that the next move would probably be into Korea. So Rhea Blue was running around the country trying desperately to recruit people who knew anything about China.

At that time, there were only five universities in the United States that taught Chinese. To my knowledge, there were only about 200 who had more than two or three years of Chinese.

*Q: But there were officers in the service who knew China. Had they been discredited because of the debacle with Chiang Kai-shek?*

LACEY: Almost all of them were not only discredited but left the service because of --

*Q: So they had desperately to get new staff.*

LACEY: Yes.

*Q: So you were hired to come down and work in the branch of intelligence and research?*

LACEY: Yes. I resisted at first, but I finally gave in to Rhea Blue the second time she came. Because why? Because I had one daughter already and another one on the way. Can you imagine this, Henry? I had a debt owed to my mother of \$750 which is nothing today, but back in those days, that burnt on my back like a scarlet letter. Anyway, I finally capitulated to Rhea, and I went to Washington in 1950. I remember reporting on March the third in 1950 of that year to a Joe Yager who was then chief of the China branch of intelligence research for the Far East.

I remember -- Joe denies this story, but I will tell it to you anyway because it is true. Joe, in interviewing me, said, "Are you acquainted with Fei Hsiao-Tung?"

"Yes, I was."

"What do you think of him?"

I said, "His analysis of Chinese society and dynamics was excellent."

"You know he's a communist," said Joe Yager.

I didn't know he was a communist. But this was a time when McCarthyism was beginning to rear its ugly head.

In any case, despite that -- and Joe denies this story -- I went to work. I ended up directing the National Intelligence Survey on not only China but later on Indochina. The NIS was a fine effort to get at the fundamentals of civilization, the political and economic dynamics, the military systems, the heart of history.

*Q: Did you feel any pressure during this McCarthy period to cast your analysis in certain directions?*

LACEY: I mentioned earlier Joe Yager's name. Let me mention him again because he was a godsend to me. Joe was a very stubborn, tough-minded analyst. He is still a best friend. Joe Yager insisted that nothing leave his office that he hadn't personally examined. But it wasn't for the purpose of pulling our punches. Joe insisted that we call them as the shots fell, but he always made certain that we worded our analysis in such a way that it wouldn't offend McCarthy. I am always grateful for that. I am also grateful that he honed my writing skill.

On the other hand, some of our best people were dragged through the McCarthy grinder and had to leave the government. It was a very uneasy period, a shameful period in terms of our democratic process.

*Q: What was the assessment that you all came to in this period on the Mao regime? How did you evaluate its longevity, what future did you see for Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan? What was your analysis of the dynamics at work?*

LACEY: Of the two Chinas, there was no question in my mind at that time, that Chiang Kai-shek had had it.

*Q: In China?*

LACEY: In China, first, but then when he came to Taiwan, he was instrumental in a wide purge of what he regarded as commies or leftists or radicals. He and his wife had a very poor reputation except with the China lobby. They played that one to the hilt.

As for Mao and company on the mainland, I remember being the director and writer on public law and order in China for NIS, the National Intelligence Survey. I was glowing in my claim of the Chinese Communist government. I didn't realize then, as I did later, some of their successes were due to just taking over or fulfilling what had already been on the drawing board.

*Q: Now, if you had a positive estimation of the communists and a negative one of Chiang Kai-shek, one, was that view shared by colleagues of yours in the Department of State? And, two, how did that view affect those that were calling the shots at the time, the Secretary of State, the White House?*

LACEY: Actually, you are asking two questions.

*Q: Right.*

LACEY: The rank and file attitude and the top echelon attitude.

*Q: Right.*

LACEY: I think, then and now, the top echelon was more motivated by domestic political considerations than they were by U.S.-foreign developments. The China lobby was a very potent force. It still was for a long time. Pro-Taiwan was built into U.S. policy towards the two Chinas. I disagreed with it then, and I take issue even now with a black-white view of China.

My colleagues, on the other hand, the rank and file working officer, more familiar with the facts of the two Chinas, were inclined towards . . . Well, I would guess that seven out of ten of such people would have opted for Communist China at the time.

*Q: Seven out of ten?*

LACEY: That is a guess, a wild guess.

*Q: Did you then see as their careers progressed that those who were correct in their evaluation of the strengths of the Chinese regime prosper, or did their careers suffer as a result of having a view that was divergent from American policy?*

LACEY: Ralph Clough's name comes to mind. He is a long-standing China watcher, a real expert. Ralph I think would be inclined to view events in both China's in terms of their impact upon the U.S.A. Such is his stature as a scholar, that he has been able to not only write effectively about Taiwan, but Communist China as well.

*Q: But not in the Foreign Service. He was dumped, right?*

LACEY: No, I don't think he was.

*Q: Was it he?*

LACEY: He may have resigned, but I don't think he was dumped.

*Q: I see. Okay.*

LACEY: Because I think Ralph is held in high regard by the people that counted. Bill Gleysteen also comes to mind. Bill was a outspoken critic of Chiang Kai-shek, and yet he rose rapidly in the service, indeed became ambassador to Korea.

*Q: Right.*

LACEY: His career was not unduly affected.

*Q: Okay, what then about the period leading up to the Korean War? You analysts in the Far East division, did you see that coming? Did you see the North Korean invasion as a real danger?*

LACEY: I didn't. Now, Rhea Blue, who I mentioned earlier, Joe Yager, whom I mentioned, a number of my seniors were much more cognizant of what was going on in Asia at the time -- I was just a junior officer. They said as much to me, but I didn't really believe it.

*Q: What about the Chinese entry into that war? Was that foreseen?*

LACEY: Well, that was foreseen because that was why I was brought to the China branch in the first place. There was a hunch in the Department of State, and probably elsewhere in Washington, that sooner or later Mao's forces would move into Korea. Certainly at that time, they had already proclaimed a close friendship or support of the North Korean government. I think what prompted their moving in, however, was not so much preordained as it was prompted by the fact that MacArthur moved his United Nations forces beyond the Ya Lu River.

*Q: Now you stayed in intelligence and research throughout this period of the Korean War.*

LACEY: Yes. Let me mention one specific in my career. First of all, I had gone in as a civil servant not as a Foreign Service Officer. In 1954, John Foster Dulles made his speech on the steps of the old Department of State to the effect that, "Those of you who want to serve Uncle Sam must join the Foreign Service." This was a consequence of Wriston's plan.

*Q: Wriston plan for unifying the Foreign Service.*

LACEY: Yes. A group of us were Wristonized, that's the phrase we used. So I joined the Foreign Service. I remember spending a week of anguished discussion of this issue with my favorite wife. Being brought up in the small town of Ashland, by no means a small town girl, but she felt that the Foreign Service was a life that she didn't know and didn't particularly anticipate. I argued to the contrary because by that time, Henry, I had developed a very keen interest in a phrase that few people use but what I call "the arts of governance." It was fascinating to me to see the bureaucracy in action.

Now going back to my Ming dynasty doctoral thesis, the reason why I spoke at length on that was by the time I hit Washington, I knew the names and numbers of all the players. I knew what the considerations were. I had so studied the dynamics of Chinese government that they were one-for-one similar to the American system. In fact, you probably know, the American system is an indirect copy from the Chinese traditional bureaucracy. So I felt right at home and I think have been able to profit from my application of Ming dynasty politics to current history.

*Q: So, John, you then made the decision, over your wife's reservations, to enter the Foreign Service, but you continued in intelligence research. And I see from your CV you were an analyst of Vietnam, of Indochina, in that period.*

LACEY: That illustrates another continuing point of my gripes against the American public and Uncle Sam's operations in terms of the American's ignorance of foreign affairs. I was called in by my boss, my senior boss, in INR and told that I was now being assigned to Indochina. Why? Well, the battle of Dien Bien Phu, you remember had occurred -- well, I think it started in March and ended in May of '54. In any case, whenever it started, it became a turning point in history, the end of colonial rule and the beginning of America's involvement in Asia.

Uncle Sam suddenly realized that we knew nothing about Indochina. Now, why did we know so little? Because up to that point in time, Uncle Sam was quite content -- and I use Uncle Sam in the sense of Washington leadership -- to leave the administration and problems of Indochina to the French, just as we looked to older colonial powers to administer other Asian countries. Suddenly, we were left with a vacuum.

Of our several people in the Department of State, only Paul Kattenburg -- whose name may ring a bell with you -- had any claim at all of being knowledgeable about Indochina. Now, we did have a couple other people. Conrad Becker was an authority on Burma, Dick Stuart on Indonesia. But that was more of a personal pastime than it was a matter of State. Certainly, when I said to my boss, "I don't know anything about Indochina."

"Well, you know something about China, don't you?"

"Yes."

He said, "That's half the battle."

Well, you chuckle rightly because anyone halfway familiar with the world knows that it is not half the battle at all.

Anyway, I was assigned to the Indochina desk in 1954, about the summer thereof. I remained there until '56. Because of my NIS, National Intelligence Survey, experience I was put in charge of the NIS program for Indochina. That was illuminating, but primarily for me. I am not certain that the product represented anything spectacular.

In any case, I wanted to get abroad. Lo and behold, I had the opportunity in '56 of being assigned to Taipei, Taiwan, which was then the Republic of China. I went off gaily with some trepidation.

My wife, as I indicated, was completely unschooled in foreign affairs. I had two children. We proudly bought ourselves a new Plymouth automobile, our first new automobile to go with us. And we set off. I'll forego some of the personal vicissitudes that happened to me on the way. I had great health problems throughout my Foreign Service career, and that was one of the periods.

But we finally got to Taipei, rather to Chilung (Kee lung), on the good ship AMY LIKES. AMY LIKES was going south and typhoon Emma was coming north. AMY LIKES had just off-loaded cotton in Kobe, Japan, and was bouncing around in the water like a cork. It didn't bother my two children who practiced their ballet dances with regularity and ate the ship's heavy, greasy food with pleasure. Typhoon Emma certainly bothered my wife and me.

In any case, we arrived in the port of Chilung which closed by six o'clock every night because of martial law and the fear that the Chinese Communists might invade across the Straits. The captain of the AMY LIKES got us through the barrier, a long iron chain strung across the mouth of the harbor. He managed to get it lifted on the grounds that a very important envoy was aboard. Of course, I wasn't important at all. I was the second secretary of embassy.

Anyway, we got into Chilung in the pouring, typhoon rain. Looking down on the dock, I noticed only two persons whom I knew, John Stanley and his wife. There was a big hulking fellow whom I didn't know -- later was introduced to him as Phil Davenport, the outgoing chief of the economic section -- and a few others of the economic section. That was a Friday. All week long, we moused and catted each other, but Phil Davenport entertained us as a good Foreign Service officer would a new arrival at the post.

My orders read that I had been assigned to the political section, not the economic section. So when Monday came, I saw the DCM, Jim Pilcher his name was. Ever cheerful. Jim officially let it be known that I was earmarked for the acting chief of the economics section to replace outgoing Davenport. The reason was that Joe Yager, who was slated for that job and who eventually took it over, for personal reasons was then unable to attend. So for '56 and early '57, I was the acting chief of the economics section.

Henry, that was the most fortuitous development in my career. I have never been good at mathematics. I have never been good at figures. But I realized rather quickly that being chief of an economics section was not mastering data, it was -- well, I will use the phrase -- taking advantage of the position in terms of collecting information. Whereas the Embassy Taipei's political section was a prisoner of Chiang Kai-shek's foreign office, I was free and my colleagues were free to wander afield and to really see what was going on and to really report on developments affecting U.S. policies.

That was a fascinating experience including a friendship which I still enjoy with a Martin Wong, who was then in Taipei, the chief of the China-U.S. Organization, or Agency I guess it was. CUSA agency. China-U.S. Administration, that was the correct title. Martin Wong --

*Q: What was that organization?*

LACEY: That was a Chinese government-U.S. collaboration to administer economic --

*Q: Like an aid program?*

LACEY: Yes, economic not military.

*Q: I see.*

LACEY: It was the senior office in China concerned with the administration of U.S. economic aid.

*Q: Oh, I see.*

LACEY: Economic aid and military are so closely intertwined that Martin Wong wisely had invited to attend his weekly meeting a General Chiang Ching-Kuo, who represented the Chinese government military side of the aid program.

*Q: Was he their intelligence or security man or what?*

LACEY: No, not at that time. I think his main title may have been chief of the veterans program. That involved a very major source of U.S. assistance as well as the military side of it.

Anyway, that was my first exposure to Chiang Ching-Kuo. I saw him once a week from 1956 to '57. And I didn't like him one bit. I was prejudiced beforehand, I think, because of my prejudice against his father.

*Q: Was he the son of Chiang Kai-shek?*

LACEY: Yes.

*Q: I see.*

LACEY: But I saw him as a thick-necked Gauleiter, a strong-arm man, not one that I would particularly like to associate with. Fortunately, I got to know him well, at least on speaking terms. In 1953, I think it was, when I was back in the Department of State, Al Jenkins, one of our truly able Chinese language officers, was appointed to be Chiang Ching-Kuo's escort for three weeks when he came to Washington, the invitation being based upon the fact that someone in the Department of State or someone in Washington had foreseen the day when Chiang Ching-Kuo would succeed his father. And it was thought desirable to introduce him to things American.

I was then a very good friend of Al Jenkins. We browned-bagged on the banks of the Potomac. While I was low man on the totem pole and, therefore, not of sufficient rank to be included in the formal schedule of Chiang Ching-Kuo's visit, Al very kindly let me have twenty minutes personal interview with Chiang Ching-Kuo.

*Q: This is before you were assigned there?*

LACEY: Yes. This was in 1953. At that time, I already told you what my impressions of the Chiang family were, and nothing I saw then with my contacts with Chiang Ching-Kuo changed my mind about him as they did not later in '56 or '57 when I saw him weekly in Taipei. Only late in life, 1986 or '87 did I come to admire Chiang Ching-Kuo for his efforts to liberalize the ROC.

*Q: What was his attitude towards you and other Americans?*

LACEY: I honestly can't tell you. It was to his advantage to be friendly, brave, clean, and reverent.

*Q: Right.*

LACEY: But I always suspected that this was more a matter of tactics than it was of genuine feeling. Now I was later proven wrong, and I will come to that later.

In '56-'57, as I said, I was able to do things and to report to Washington information which the political section just could not begin to touch. I don't know with what consequence that was, but it was a lot of fun and enabled me to meet a lot of new people.

*Q: Now, did you see the base being laid down for the kind of prosperity Taiwan has come to enjoy?*

LACEY: Yes, I did. And the base was the very multimillion dollar, multibillion dollar aid program that the U.S. government had with Taiwan. Taiwan, at the time and I think for some while afterwards, was our major aid recipient in the world.

*Q: And you think the aid money was spent effectively?*

LACEY: I do, indeed. My answer was I am fairly confident that it was. Certainly it was on the civilian side. I am less informed about the military aid program. But on the civilian side, Martin Wong, whom I mentioned earlier, and his very able group of colleagues, including people who are still active in aid administration or economic administration, were quite punctilious about making certain that the U.S. economic aid dollar went to a long-range cause. The long-range cause was, of course, then and still now, return of Taiwan to mainland China. Rather, the return of mainland China to Taiwan, because that was their ideal, to establish ROC sovereignty over all of China.

Unbeknownst to many people -- and I think maybe this is the first time it has been revealed, at least to my knowledge, in a semi-public forum -- is that in 1968-'69, or '67-'68, the U.S. aid program had come to an end. And thanks to U.S. aid, Taiwan was off to the startling development progress that it has been making ever since. But unbeknownst to many, it was understood, certainly by those in the know, that our job was to "wean away" Taiwan or the Republic of China from U.S. aid programs.

To that end, I was instrumental in being appointed the senior officer in charge of U.S. technical

relations with the ROC. My mandate was to, first of all, find somebody in the technological community who would be willing to go to Taipei in a special capacity as scientific advisor. Not in the conventional sense of science Attaché to the ambassador, but science advisor to the whole of the Republic in terms of his ability to acquire contacts with various centers of technological expertise in America.

As it turned out that fellow was Bruce Billings. Bruce was basically my selection, although in the end, it was the appointment of the Johnson Administration, by Johnson's science advisor, Dr. Donald Hornig, co-opted from Eastman Kodak. What happened was that I had been cashiered from the Department's Bureau of East Asian-Pacific Affairs (EA/P).

*Q: This is in 19 --*

LACEY: '68. I had taken open exception with our policy towards Asia. The then Assistant Secretary of East Asian-Pacific Affairs, Bill Bundy, was a hard-liner. His brother, McGeorge Bundy, was then National Security Advisor in the White House. The two of them had enormous clout. Vietnam, or rather our growing involvement in Vietnam, had made Vietnam one of the major focuses of U.S. policy concern. Under that concern, many young officers were hired right out of college to go off to Vietnam in various special capacities.

In the meantime, however, back in the Department, I was the fall back position for this U.S.-Republic of China technological mission headed in the field by Bruce Billings. He was a China language man by avocation not by training. He just learned it because it was something to do. He retired as vice-president of Polaroid Camera. So he was well-acquainted with the technological people around the country. It turned out that he was a magnificent selection. Rather zesty, somewhat brittle in terms of temperament. Rather arrogant, probably with good reason, but nevertheless arrogant.

And Bruce Billings was responsible as was any single person for helping propel the Chinese economy into its leadership role that it enjoys today. He introduced something as simple as computers, which back in those days, was still an unknown, an uncharted field.

In any case, that was a signal success and another reason why Taiwan today enjoys the success that it does.

*Q: That's very good. That is something you can well be proud of.*

*Unless you want to make any more remarks about your service in Taiwan, I see on your record you served in the State Department in the East Asian division and then intelligence research again. Then you went out as economic officer in Hong Kong. Anything on that tour that struck you?*

LACEY: Well, before we go off to Hong Kong, I would like to speak about my return to the Department of State.

*Q: All right.*

LACEY: I returned because of my second serious illness. I've had now three major illnesses. In this case, I had an operation on my jaw, and I had to talk for six months like this with jaws wired together. That meant I had to eat liquid foods, thanks to my good wife who prepared them. She, by the way, claims my jaws were wired only three months.

In any case, I was back in the Department and after a brief sojourn, sort of a convalescent leave, I was picked up by the intelligence research bureau as chief of the Far Eastern branch or Far Eastern office of intelligence research.

That was particularly important for this reason. I learned, for the first time, the agony of suffering the ignorance of senior officers regarding the importance of intelligence information on Asia. To make a long, grim story short, Hugh Cumming, who was then the head of the Bureau of Intelligence Research, and Loy Henderson, who was a buddy of Hugh's, connived to nullify what had been up to that point, a magnificent program called the National Intelligence Survey.

We had, over the years, built up a staff in the Far Eastern office of seventy-eight people, trained clerks as well as astute officers. I had the miserable job of overseeing reducing that staff within two months by one-third. The only case of -- what is it you get when you get stomach trouble? Ulcers.

*Q: Ulcers.*

LACEY: The only case of ulcers I ever had occurred during that period. I resisted it strongly. But had no choice as a senior officer in charge to either resign in protest or to carry out orders which I chose to do. But thinking back upon that episode, as I have so many times, it seems to me that what was happening was again a case of American domestic political interests taking precedent over longer-term world-wide interests including, importantly, Asia. I have often regretted the breakup of the NIS staff because that was really the end.

The redeeming part about that was, the CIA in the meantime, had been developing into a mature, professional organization. I worked very closely with senior CIA officers concerned with Asia. They were all very good, very knowledgeable, very savvy, and very gutsy. But the Department of State's role, its intelligence role, was an important counterpoint to that CIA point of view. With the castration of Department of State's intelligence program, which was then aided and abetted by Roger Hilsman, our total grasp of Asian developments was seriously crippled.

*Q: What was the motivation for that? Was it an economy, budget move?*

LACEY: No, I don't think anybody worried about the economy and the budget then as they do today. I think the motivation was more a case of personal aggrandizement, of game playing, of trying to win points, to influence the powers that be, in terms of one's ability to do things the way that seemed appropriate at the time. It was the kind of politics that you have run into also, I think.

*Q: Right.*

LACEY: So I won't go on further with that.

*Q: Okay, well, then you left Washington. You were destined for Hong Kong as chief economic officer.*

LACEY: I might say now that the two best bosses I have ever served under in the Foreign Service were, both in Hong Kong. The first was Julius Holmes, whose name is very familiar to you as the great man -- now deceased -- that he was. And Marshall Green.

But, at the time, it was Julius Holmes who was the Consul General. I was chief of the economics section. Sam Gilstrap was deputy principal officer. Fortunately for me family affairs called Sam home. I don't know what happened, but I was informed by Sam Gilstrap that Mr. Holmes wanted me to be his DPO. I was very excited about the prospect. I called the Consul General's secretary, Emma Johnson, and said with excitement, "How soon can I see Mr. Holmes to find out what I am going to do?"

And she said, "Right away."

So I was ushered into the Consul General's office and Julius -- did you ever work with him?

*Q: No, I knew his son, Alan.*

LACEY: Well, Julius was a small man really who affected height by wearing higher heels than normal. He affected Pince-nez glasses and was every word the English gentleman that he purported to be. He had been Minister Counselor of Embassy in London for six years. So he knew the ropes backwards and forwards.

I dashed in and found him in his office reading a magazine. After exchange of amenities, I said, "Mr. Holmes, how can I serve you?"

He said, "Very simple. I have four rules. One, I am the boss. Two, I am lazy, and I expect you to do all the work. Three, if anything good goes on around here, I want the credit for it. Fourthly, if anything goes awry, I sure as hell want to know why."

Henry, that was the best instruction I ever received from any senior officer because that gave me carte blanche to run the show. I kept Julius' trust. I kept him informed of everything that was important. I drafted some of his personal telegrams, which he always changed because he had a great command of words. I could tell many stories about Julius which I won't take time to relate. Let me tell one though because I think it is indicative of the man and the quality of Foreign Service Officer who best serves Uncle Sam.

Julius and his wife, Henrieta, were expecting their two children for Christmas that winter of 1960. I knew how much they were looking forward to it. I knew also the great disappointment they suffered and felt when they learned that neither child, boy and a girl, were able to join them. So I said to Mr. Holmes, "Well, if you want to celebrate Christmas at the Lacey household, you are certainly invited. But I must warn you, you must be there at least eight o'clock because my

two daughters will be impatient to open the presents."

So exactly at eight, up drove the ConGen's car. I opened the side that Henrieta Holmes was on, and my wife opened the other side. Both of them immaculately dressed. He dressed in morning coat, morning trousers, English cravat, and top hat. He bowed to us each formally by way of greeting but said nothing. Walked into our attractive little house on Shousan Hill Road, where my two daughters were eagerly awaiting him. He stepped before my two daughters, took off his top hat and made deep bows to each. He then put it back on his head tapping the top. And then he turned to Lorene and me and said by way of explanation, "We always wear top hats in Kansas on Christmas." He was a great guy. [Laughter]

My job as deputy principal officer was one of the best jobs I ever had. We had a large Consulate General. I think it numbered 145 officers and secretaries. Now of those 145, only a handful were Department of State. The rest were other agencies, and you could imagine which agencies predominated. And, yet, under Julius Holmes' leadership, we had a very effective group of China watchers. That was our main mission.

Much of our reporting was regarded as gospel in Washington, at least by some people, as the final word on the China scene. I remember a contretemps that we had with the Department of Agriculture, or maybe the Department of Commerce, over China's food grain production. We had aboard a fine officer by the name of Brice Meeker who guesstimated -- not just guesstimated but estimated -- that China's production in 1960-'61 was on the order of 130,000 metric tons of grain. CIA experts disagreed radically. They felt the figure was much too low. But, as it turned out, we were right; they were wrong. That was the quality of our reporting on China, generally.

After Julius Holmes left, we were blessed with the leadership of Marshall Green, whom you know well. You know him to be the ebullient, pun-cracking, wise-cracking serious officer that he is. Of all the people that I have ever served under, Marshall was the only one who studiously reflected on the past. He kept copious notes on his most recent tour which was DCM in South Korea Embassy Seoul. He would go over those notes time and time again, rework them, read them, and discuss them with me. I would offer questions, not criticism, but things that occurred to me. We made a fine team.

Another one of Marshall's traits was his ability to handle visiting congressmen. We had untold numbers of VIPs, mostly congressmen, but also generals and admirals and ICA directors by the dozens. I remember keeping track of the one month that I was chargé over the Christmas season. My wife and I entertained 142 official parties, not including their wives and friends.

*Q: Were most of them there on serious business?*

LACEY: I'm glad you asked.

*Q: Or were they Christmas shopping?*

LACEY: Well, thanks to Marshall Green, primarily, we made it a point of assuming that they were there seriously concerned about China. But first I have to go back to Julius Holmes, who

started the practice. But under Marshall, whose refinements were enormous, we automatically assumed that every single congressional mission, called CODEL, you remember, was there to really learn about China and the U.S. mission in the Far East rather than to shop. Of course, we knew better.

*Q: In your heart of hearts.*

LACEY: But nevertheless, we insisted upon briefing every single group that came to Hong Kong. We had worked out a one-half hour topnotch briefing mission in which we gave the political, economic, sociological, and strategic information available and our interpretation thereof in terms of the U.S. interests in China. And what's more, those CODELs, for the most part, if they weren't asleep welcoming this insight.

*Q: How good was the work of the Hong Kong Consulate General as a listening post? Your frank assessment --*

LACEY: Well, at that time --

*Q: When you looked at the developing Sino-Soviet rift or internal turmoil in China, how reliable was the information? Did it come out through people traveling out of China or what was it? The radio or press? What was it?*

LACEY: It was surprising how much direct information came out of all places, from all over China. There was, for example, in 1962 an extreme drought, a critical water shortage in the South China provinces. It reached the point where the government had to erect cordons of barbed wire, or whatever it is called, around the border of Hong Kong proper to try to hold back the refugees who nevertheless managed to break through regardless because the situation was desperate. Those refugees were interrogated both directly and indirectly by officers in the ConGen and by other contacts we had, including the British by the way.

I can't say enough for the British administration at that time who shared even more vested interest in what was going on in South China than did Uncle Sam because the British colony of Hong Kong was dependent upon water, dependent upon food, both of which came from Mainland China. There was a constant commerce between the two. There are many practical issues that concerned the British administration in the colony of Hong Kong.

They, in turn, shared with us much of their information that they got surreptitiously. Not openly, but they shared it with us. So I would say in terms of our availability to information, the Hong Kong ConGen was probably the center of information as far as American interests were concerned.

Speaking of the American public, we had in Hong Kong excellent working relations with the Fourth Estate. Stanley Karnow was one who was outstandingly good, Bob Elegant another Stan Rich a third, Fessler a fourth. A small group of us had lunch in the old Foreign Service Officers' Club, which was a former house of a taipan, rich Chinese gentleman. "Love is a Many Splendored Thing" was filmed there. Once a week, a group of us lunched including people

interested in China and including, especially, foreign correspondents. The relationship that we officials had with these foreign correspondents was invaluable. Unlike today, one could say, "This is off the record," and give them the background without fear of being trapped in any kind of news leak. They could be trusted. It was another source of information because it worked both ways. They would also repeat stuff to us based upon their many contacts. So to repeat, we had good information.

Now as for interpreting that information, I think we made two grave mistakes. First of all, I for one at least, was inclined because of my earlier NIS exposure in Washington to give the Chicoms too much credit for having more power than in fact proved to be the case. When Khrushchev broke off directly with Mao Zedong, I didn't appreciate the significance of that development both in terms of the effect upon China and also the effect of a threatened Sino-Soviet bloc stance against the United States. I think we should have learned earlier than we did -- or at least it should have been built into our briefing earlier than it was -- the notion that now the Sino-Soviet bloc is broken up, China became a wholly different kettle of fish or kettle of dragons.

*Q: It was at this period also when we began to take the first steps towards our heavy involvement in Vietnam, was it not?*

LACEY: Yes. The Vietnam build-up, under primarily President Kennedy, was something for which I have ever since felt personally embarrassed and personally ashamed. Just this noon when we lunched with the two presidents of Ashland College, former President Glenn Clayton raised the question of the importance of Taoism in China. I pontificated by saying, "Yes, the Te of the Tao Te Ching means virtue. But it also is translatable in terms of power, power not in the military, iron-fist sense, but power in the moral sense of acceptability on the part of the public."

I think going back to the Vietnam War, I was thinking like a Taoist when I argued as I did, and also some of my colleagues did that the only thing that the Chicoms understand is power. We must stand up to them. Well, I fail to translate power in U.S. Pentagon terms because in their terms, power was guns.

*Q: In American terms.*

LACEY: Yes, in American terms. Kennedy was, I think, responsible for transforming what had been a Military Aid Advisory Group (MAAG) in Vietnam into a combat force.

*Q: Why did he do that? Why did we feel it necessary to declare the area of Indochina a strategic zone of high importance to the United States and to invest so much treasure and lives in what turned out to be a futile effort to block the communist-led independence movement?*

LACEY: Henry, I come back to a simplistic answer. I think, then as now and hopefully less so in the future, I think the American people generally and certainly too many of our officials are ignorant of what is really going on in Asia. Therefore, our politicians are able to exploit that indifference or ignorance in terms of responding to domestic pressures rather than to developments in Asia. I think the domestic pressure was caught up in a sort of frenetic, emotional thought that we are going to stand firm for democracy. We are going to stand firm

against authoritarianism.

*Q: Now, your contacts in Hong Kong in the business community there, bankers and government officials, were they supportive of these gradual slow moves in the beginning for the U.S. to replace the French in their involvement with the Vietnamese?*

LACEY: I think the word, "supportive," is too strong. I think the business community of Hong Kong -- which meant both the Americans and the local people, who were mostly Chinese but also Parsi and Jews -- saw this as a moneymaker. They were able to enjoy the prosperity that spun off from our involvement in Vietnam.

As our involvement in Vietnam grew to the hundreds of thousands, the recreational programs that the Army or the Pentagon sponsored for morale purposes involved many R&R trips throughout Asia including Hong Kong. Somewhere I read that only 2 percent of troops sent to Vietnam actually saw combat. The 98 percent "bolstered morale."

*Q: So Hong Kong stood to benefit the same way the Japanese benefited from the Korean War. That is, acquiring capital to help them develop and expand their economy.*

LACEY: Yes, I would say that.

*Q: You went from Hong Kong to serve as consul general. You were your own boss there in Singapore, is that right?*

LACEY: Yes. But I have more to say about Hong Kong.

Marshall Green did me the great honor of remarking that I underplayed my role as a bridge between mainland China and the Colony of Hong Kong. In one respect he was right. One could say that in January, 1960 when I arrived, Hong Kong was a remote outpost of empire, important principally because of the impact of the Colony's textile producers on British industry. The ConGen's principal function up to my arrival was China watching.

But as the newly arrived Chief of the Economic Section I inherited a situation in which the Hong Kong Government authorities were being propelled into radically new situations. The momentum of Mao's revolution showed signs of waning. Instead of fleeing from Hong Kong as did many American firms. Big enterprises like Chase Manhattan were seeking to return and I facilitated those endeavors. Whereas the American business community in Hong Kong numbered at most 200 firms when I arrived that number close to or possibly exceeded 1000 in mid 1964 when I left for Singapore.

And the Hong Kong Government itself was being drawn into the international textile market. Hong Kong's textile industries were dominated by Chinese entrepreneurs who with their looms fled Shannhai from advancing Chicom armies. They joined forces with Hong Kong based manufacturers, making some 45 major textile firms. Textiles represented about 50% of the Colony's exports. As Economic Section Chief I stepped into a heated textile battle between Hong Kong and the USA. Shortly after I arrived -- it may have been my very first day on duty -- the

feisty editor of the Hong Kong Standard, K.T. Wu, printed a heated front page editorial that screamed, "Who Stole Hong Kong's Shirt?"

Hong Kong's ire was directed increasingly at the U.S. government as Uncle Sam turned its fangs away from Japan, which was moving into heavier industry, toward Hong Kong. Fortunately for me, the Lacey's had become close friends of the Hong Kong Financial Secretary, John (later Sir John) Cowperthwaite and his attractive wife Sheila, as outspoken as she was beautiful. John had intimated, despite his fierce belief in laissez faire, that quotas perhaps were not too evil. At least they enabled Hong Kong manufacturers to set garment categories among themselves rather than being subject to New York dealers playing one off against another.

That argument became my battle cry as I wined and dined the leaders of Hong Kong's textile community. I also briefed Under Secretary of State George Ball when he came to Hong Kong (July, 1961?). I arranged a high tea at the Peninsula Hotel in his honor, invited textile leaders and suggested to Ball that frankness was the best course in questions and answers. That occasion helped reduce the ire. (An account of this tea party and Ball's role as the Department's chief textile negotiator is recorded in his memoirs, pp 188-193, "The Past Has Another Pattern.")

One evening as the textile tensions between the U.S. and Hong Kong were reaching a climax over quotas, I strolled in walking shorts down Shouson Hill road to the Cowperthwaites who lived below us. That day the ConGen had received an urgent telegram directing us to expedite negotiations. That was on my mind as I called upon Cowperthwaite. One brandy led to another as our textile discussions became more vague. I left at 3:00 a.m. but before stumbling into bed I drafted my recollections of Cowperthwaite's points. Next morning I reworked my notes and made an appointment to see the Financial Secretary at 10:30 a.m. Said John, to whom I had shown my draft cable to D.C., "Did I say all that?" When I nodded my head in agreement, John made a few grammatical changes but did not change the heart of the cable which was sent to Washington after clearing the content with the ConGen.

I should explain here that one of the several tricks I learned from Julius Holmes was what he called "the art of connivance." The essential purpose of connivance was to establish trust with the host government by first showing contemplated reports to Washington to your counterpart, primarily to insure that your reporting was accurate but also to establish good working relations with the host government.

This particular report was received in Washington as a generally accurate statement of the Colony's position which the Hong Kong government accepted. And that is how the U.S. government signed the first "Long Term Cotton Textile Agreement on the Export of Hong Kong's Products to the U.S.A.

I have much more to say about my Hong Kong tour, but let's move on to Singapore.

**EDWIN WEBB MARTIN**  
**Chinese Language Training**

**Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) and Beijing (1945-1948)**

**Consular Officer  
Hankow (1948-1949)**

**Economic Officer  
Taipei, Taiwan (1949-1950)**

**Political Officer, Office of Chinese Affairs  
Washington, DC (1951-1955)**

**Political Advisor to Talks with Chinese  
Panmunjom, Korea (1953-1954)**

**Talks with Chinese  
Geneva, Switzerland (1955)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs  
Washington, DC (1958-1961)**

**Political Advisor, Commander in Chief, Pacific  
(1961-1964)**

**Consul General  
Hong Kong (1967-1970)**

*Ambassador Edwin Webb Martin was born in India of American parents in 1917. He received his bachelor's degree from Oberlin College in 1939 and his master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1940. He joined the Foreign Service in 1941. His overseas posts include Leopoldville, Peiping, Hankow, Taipei, Rangoon, London, Ankara, and Hong Kong. He was the ambassador to Burma from 1971 to 1973. Ambassador Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 4, 1987 and by William Johnson and Harold Hinton on December 9, 1987.*

MARTIN: I guess I didn't answer the question about Asia. You want to know how I happened to get into the China business. Well, that was one of these almost accidental things. After I got out of the Army -- and I was let out early because all Foreign Service officers who were drafted were let out early, so we could resume our careers of service -- I went to the State Department. They asked me where I wanted to go, and I didn't express any particular preference. They said, "How about Shanghai? We need people there?" I thought Shanghai was interesting. So they sent me up to the Office of Chinese Affairs, and there I met a fairly young vice consul named Fulton Freeman, who was a Chinese language officer and a brilliant linguist. He had been given the job of recruiting Chinese language officers, and he soon persuaded me it would be more fun to be in China if I knew the language. So I was one of the first three post-war China language officers, and they sent me to Yale.

*Q: At that time, mainland China was under Chiang Kai-shek.*

MARTIN: Had been for a long time, yes. That's right. During my tour in China as a language officer, and then subsequently as a vice consul in Hankow, the civil war was raging. While I was in Hankow, not only Manchuria, but most of North China fell to the Communists. This was an interesting period in China.

MARTIN: I was first of all in Peking for about a year and nine or ten months doing Chinese language study. I'd started at Yale. My first post, really, in China as a reporting officer, was in Hankow, now part of Wuhan. Hankow is on the Yangtze River, about 600 miles up the river. There I had sort of a grass-roots view of what was going on in China.

The consular district, which I covered as the Chinese language officer and reporting officer, consisted of five provinces in Central China. They had a population of about 100 million people. To put things in perspective, how many countries in the world in 1948-49 had a population of 100 million? But this was just part of China. I was the only political reporting officer covering that territory.

I might say that in China, as you gentlemen know, at that time, and it had been so for decades, political reporting from the consulates was more important than in most countries, because it was a country where power had been in the hands of warlords and of regional political factions. Even as late as 1948, when I went to Hankow, there was a faction, you might say, in control of Central China -- not in control of it, but it was very important there, namely the Guangxi clique, sometimes called the Li-Pai clique, lead by Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi. It was around early '48, as I recall, that Pai Ch'ung-hsi was installed in Wuhan as the commander of the Central China area. Pai Ch'ung-hsi and Li Tsung-jen, of course, were not the best of friends with Chiang Kai-shek, and we had the feeling that Chiang was often reluctant to call on Pai for support. For example, I think in the Huai-Hai campaign in the winter of '48-'49, Pai Ch'ung-hsi either refused to come to the aid of Chiang or Chiang didn't call on him. There were a lot of troops there that could have perhaps (probably wouldn't have) made a difference, but in any case there was a significant lack of cooperation.

As far as what I could bring to shed light on what was going on, I think perhaps what I call the grass-root reporting that I did was a useful input to the embassy in Nanking and also to the State Department. We could send our reports directly to the State Department with copies to the embassy, and I was rather flattered when I got back to the State Department on a home leave in '49, that Walt Butterworth, who was then in charge of the Far Eastern Department, asked to see me. I came in and we talked about what had been going on in that part of the world. Nowadays, the State Department is such a large bureaucracy that a vice consul coming in from the field would be lucky to see the office director, to say nothing of the Assistant Secretary. [Laughter] Those are the ways things have changed.

I was just going to ask you if you'd like me to describe the kind of field trip that I did and the people that I saw to get information. I don't think I'd have anything substantive to contribute that would enlighten you particularly as to what you already know, but I think it might give you an

idea of how we political reporters went about doing our job.

Of the last couple of trips I took out of Hankow, one was to Sian. This was in the fall of '48, and Sian was the headquarters of General Hu Tsung-man, who was a veteran military commander of the national government, and I called on him, had dinner with him. I called also on the governor of Shanxi and on the mayor of Sian, who was a man named Wang, a rather interesting person who had studied for eight years in the Soviet Union, had once been a member of the Communist Party but was a renegade now, a very strongly ideological anti-communist. I went up to him primarily, at least on the consular side, to try to help some American missionaries there whose property had been occupied by one of the government offices. I went up there to try to help them solve this problem, get their property back, so they could return it to the use they had acquired it for. I called on all the newspaper editors, and on the president of the university and several department heads. I talked to people like the head of the agriculture department of the province of Shanxi and of the commerce and industry department. I talked to, of course, the missionaries and the few other Americans. There were some oil people up there.

In other words, I tried to get an idea of what the situation was from a broad spectrum of people ranging from General Hu Tsung-man at the very top, down to private individuals in universities, in business, in the newspapers, the media, and in this way gather a general picture of how people viewed the situation and particularly how they felt about the government and its activities and how they felt about the prospective arrival of the Communists. And by that time, most of the people that I interviewed were convinced that it was just a matter of time before the Communists would take over, and there was speculation about how they would behave, and whether or not one could carry on. There was no real consensus on that.

The last field trip I took out of Hankow was down in the other direction, down south through Jiangsu province and Hunan province. There I was accompanied a good deal of the time by a Standard Vacuum Oil person, because on the consular side I was trying to help with getting this American company's properties released from the occupation, usually, of Army troops. So, even as the Communists were coming down from the north -- this was the spring of '49, this was March of '49 -- we were still in the business of trying to get our properties back and help American business. But at the same time, this was also a great opportunity to try to take the pulse of people, look at the economic prospects, political and so forth.

Again, I saw a fairly broad range of people. But the thing that I remembered about that trip was that in Hunan, the governor, Ch'eng Ch'ien, unlike other governors that I called on and mayors, refused to see me at all. It wasn't outright refusal, just a put-off -- "He's too busy," and so forth and so on. Well, we had a feeling that I'd gotten from talking to other people that Ch'eng Ch'ien was deliberately distancing himself from this American official (me) and that he would not be one on whom either Li Tsung-jen or Chiang Kai-shek could depend. As it turned out -- I think it was in the summer of '49 -- that Ch'eng Ch'ien just turned over the whole province of Hunan to the Communists. This made the position of Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi, who had retreated down to Guangxi and Kwanglung, untenable, and led to perhaps their earlier defeat than might otherwise have occurred. Ch'eng Ch'ien was duly rewarded, as were other people who turned over, like Fu Tso-Yi and Cheng Chihchung, with various sinecure positions in the PRC. Ch'eng Ch'ien seemed to have lasted longer in these positions than some others.

So I can't say that what we did was all that important, but in this case, I think we did get an advanced signal, for whatever it was worth, at least to our embassy, that here's a governor that is very soft and already showing the direction which he'll probably go.

*Q: Did you witness the Communist troops entering Hankow?*

MARTIN: No, I didn't. Of course, our consulates stayed on there in Wuhan, but I happened to be overdue for home leave for almost a year. I had been separated from my wife and two girls for six months, and during that period my wife gave birth to twin boys in Manila. We were only able to communicate by cable. So I was mercifully granted home leave and transferred to Taiwan in May of 1949. So I got out of Hankow just a few days -- literally a few days -- before the Communists took the city. The situation was, as it was in many places in China at that time, one where it was anticipated that the Communists would take the city. The Nationalists had produced a lot of prefabricated pillboxes, which they put along the railroad line going north, and these were obviously sitting ducks for the mobile tactics of the Communists. In fact, the Communist guerrillas were operating south of Wuhan between Wuchang and Changsha, and I was going to drive a jeep down to Changsha, hoping I could get through. The very morning I had the jeep ready to go, the very morning that I was going to get out, I got word that there was a CAT plane over on the airfield at Wuchang, and if I went there I might be able to get a ride. I might add that all regular airline service had stopped into Wuhan by that time, and, of course, our own military assistance group which had been stationed in Wuhan had long since been evacuated. Anyway, I went over to the airport, and there was an American pilot. I said, "Can I hitch a ride out to the coast?"

He said, "Where are you going?"

I said, "I'll go to any place that will take me to the coast." [Laughter] "I've got orders to go down and fetch my family in the Philippines and go home on leave." So he gave me a ride. He was going to Canton, which was actually the most convenient place for me to go. That's how I got out. But I was not there when the Communists came in.

*Q: If I can just go back over some of this fascinating material with sort of a different angle, while you were still at a junior position by this time. You were there in Peking and Hankow at a rather decisive period.*

MARTIN: Yes, yes.

*Q: From '46 to '49, was the period, after all, when there was apparently some hope of settlement (inaudible end of sentence).*

MARTIN: Yes.

*Q: And a decisive turnaround, however you date it, at least by early 1948 or mid-1948. I'm just wondering, even while you were a language student there, do you recall what your own personal assessment of the situation was concerning the conflict between the KMT and CCP, how that*

*might likely turn out, sort of what the mood was among you junior officers?*

MARTIN: Yes, yes. I think that the mood was one of general pessimism, as far as the government was concerned. I think you're right, at the very beginning -- well, when I got there in September of 1946, the Marshall mission, the Executive Headquarters was still in existence, but General Marshall wasn't very active at that time, and yes, we hadn't given up hope that there might be some way of solving this thing peacefully, entirely. [Laughter] In other words, Marshall went home in January of '47, and he sort of said that his mission was really hopeless and he blamed both sides for their intractability.

As I say, I wasn't active in political reporting or making contacts or anything like that, but there were so-called Third Force people there. Around the universities and so forth they tended to be fairly optimistic about the possibility of doing business (with the Communists) or setting up some sort of a coalition government.

*Q: Did you have the impression that the group that you worked with or the official staff there in Peking placed much confidence with the sort of Third Force group?*

MARTIN: Well, looking in hindsight, of course, it's very difficult, after 40 years, to put yourself back in that period. But I would say that yes, we had more faith in them -- that's a strong word, "faith." We had more hope about the possibility of some sort of a coalition with these chaps in it than was justified, I think, by subsequent events. But anyway, I think so, yes.

*Q: Was there any particular Chinese you remember? Did you associate with that group? This is a long time to remember.*

MARTIN: Yes. No, as I say, I really can't remember names now. I'm sorry. I'll tell you about my own experience. I did a thing which none of my language officer colleagues did that gave me a rather interesting entree into the university, Peita. I attended, audited, a course taught in Chinese, and, I'm ashamed to say, I can't even remember the name of the professor, though I thought he was very good; he was a Chinese professor, of course. It was a course in diplomatic history, really -- Chinese relations with foreign governments. It was an eye-opener to me, because it was obviously from the Chinese point of view, and none of the stuff I had read before was from the Chinese point of view. I found it very interesting.

But perhaps the main value of this to me was that as a student who sat there at a desk with other students, all of whom were Chinese, and I was a little older than most of them but not that much older, I had a chance to become acquainted with a number of Chinese students. I visited them in their dormitories and had some over to the house. My wife was born and brought up in China, and her Chinese accent is beautiful, so that was a great help in talking to people. Certainly the strong impression I had of the Chinese students was that as far as the Kuomintang was concerned, it was just beyond the pale; there was no hope for it really. This was due, in part, to the fact that the economic situation was very bad, and they had very poor prospects for getting jobs and so forth. On the other hand, a number of the students actually left the university and went over the hill to the Communists, where they got some sort of a job. I used to have arguments with these people. Of course, they were very critical of American policy, which was

seen as supportive of the Kuomintang, and I think we did give about \$3 billion in aid to the Nationalists after the war. We used to have arguments about that and whether American democracy and the capitalist system was applicable to China and so forth. They generally felt that it wasn't, that socialism was the only way for China to go. As far as I could tell, the students that I knew and talked to on a very friendly basis were not doctrinaire Marxists; in fact, I think they were fairly illiterate, as far as Marxist literature was concerned, but they looked at it from a point of view of nationalism. To them, the Communists represented Chinese nationalism more than the Nationalists. They also represented what they felt was a hope for the future, but the idea that China would be independent, stand up and be a power in the world was the main attraction, and they felt the Communists offered that more than the Nationalists did at that particular time.

*Q: Did you ever discuss with them the possible relationships between a Communist China and the Soviet Union?*

MARTIN: Yes, yes. I think that it came up in the discussions about which was the better way to go for China. Naturally, I tried to put forth the merits of the American system, which they generally would not argue about, except in this sense, that they would say, "Well, it's all right for America, but it really doesn't apply to China and our situation." I wouldn't say that any of them were strongly pro-Soviet, neither were they strongly anti-Soviet. Their view was, it seemed to me, very Nationalistic and also, in terms of their own future, they felt that the Communists offered them, as young people, a future, whereas the Kuomintang offered them no jobs, depression, and an appearance of weakness, corruption, and really sort of doing the bidding of the United States. I think it's important to realize this, because I think there was a period, as we all know, when China and the Soviet Union were very close, but eventually the sense of Chinese nationalism came out. It's much more complicated than that.

*Q: You mentioned Li Tsung-jen and Pai Ch'ung-hsi and the Guangxi clique. I believe by January, Chiang had resigned, January of '49.*

MARTIN: That's right.

*Q: And Li becomes the president of the republic and is trying to save the situation one way or the other. Certainly much of the literature suggests that there were persons in the American diplomatic establishment who had probably more confidence in the military abilities of Li and Pai Ch'ung-hsi than they did in Chiang. Were there any efforts while you were in Hankow, or did you make any recommendations to the effect that the United States should try to really support in any operational sense or aid? Did we, in other words, identify in any practical way with Li Tsung-Jen, once he had become responsible for the situation in China? Or did we ignore him, in effect? Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with what we were doing in that regard?*

MARTIN: I guess I'd better just be frank with you and say that as a vice consul concerned with this 100 million population and consular duties and what was going on there, that I really don't think we got into that at all. I would try to report the best I could on what the local situation looked like, and I would occasionally get a chance to get some perhaps stories or rumors or reports of what Li Tsung-Jen was thinking or doing. But by that time, things were getting pretty fragmented. The Communists had been on the north bank of the Yangtze, up at Nanking since --

what? -- for some time. In April they actually crossed the river. In March I was away about two or three weeks on this field trip, and I was concerned with the local situation. So I can't say that we got into this.

I might also say that the consul general in Hankow was a very fine old-line consular officer, Leo Callanan. But as far as any feel for the politics of the situation in Central China, he really didn't have it. That wasn't his bailiwick. So we really didn't get into that sort of thing.

*Q: If I could ask one last question. As a political officer, a reporting officer in Hankow, did you get requests or instructions to seek out particular kinds of information?*

MARTIN: No, I can't remember.

*Q: From the State Department at all? Was there any indication that they were interested in finding out certain things?*

MARTIN: No, I don't remember getting anything, especially on the political side. We had our required reports we had to send in on economic business, and I was covering economic stuff as well.

*Q: So that was on your own initiative, what you did or did not report?*

MARTIN: That's right. It was really on our own initiative. Yes. I don't recall. Undoubtedly there were some specific things that happened that the embassy might send us a query on or something like that, but as far as the -- of course, Li Tsung-jen, by the spring of '49, was, as you know, the acting president. He was in Nanking. I don't recall anything significant, really.

*Q: Since we're concentrating on your time in Burma, you went to Burma as a second secretary in 1950 to '51. What brought about this assignment?*

MARTIN: Well, I think that's important, too, because it gives you a flavor of the times. I was in Hankow, as I said, when most of North China fell to the Communists, and because of the threat of a civil war to the safety of Americans, many Americans were evacuated in the latter part of '48, and among those were the dependents or the families of Foreign Service officers in certain posts. I was in Hankow, which is about 600 miles up the Yangtze River and rather exposed, and my wife and our two little girls were evacuated from China, along with families from Nanking, the embassy in Nanking, and Shanghai, by the U.S. Marines. They were flown to Manila, and there they were -- I forget how many, there were certainly 100 or more, including women and children -- and they were put up there in an abandoned U.S. Army camp, under rather trying conditions. So that I was separated from my wife and children, and during our separation, she gave birth to twins there in Manila.

*Q: Good heavens! That brought the number to four.*

MARTIN: That brought the number to four, doubled our children, and I was in Hankow all this time. Our communications were virtually cut off, so that we had to communicate by cable.

Well, all this by way of background to say that when I finally got a transfer, after being overdue for leave for nearly a year, I was transferred to Taiwan after home leave. I managed to get out of China, and I won't take time to tell that story. Got down to the Philippines, and we had a nice boat trip back to the States, for home leave, consultation, and so forth, and on to Taiwan, where I arrived in September of 1949.

Well, by January of 1950, the mainland, having fallen to the Communists, and they were threatening Taiwan, the State Department decided to reduce the staff in Taiwan, in anticipation of a Communist invasion. Since I had been separated from my family already for some period of time, and the twins were then -- they were born in the Philippines -- were less than a year old, they decided that rather than evacuate my wife and family again, leaving us separated, that they would transfer me to Rangoon. I had only been in Taiwan for four or five months.

Now, another aspect of that transfer was that we still had consular and diplomatic officials in China, but in the latter part of January, the Department had made a decision, for reasons which I don't have time to go into now, to pull out of China. So we were facing a prospect of not having the usual flow of information from China, so the department decided to put Chinese language officers, that is, Foreign Service officers who had been trained in the Chinese language, and most of us had served already some time in China, put them on the periphery of China. I was assigned to Burma in that capacity. I was a political officer, of course, but my particular expertise was China and Chinese. My particular job in Rangoon at that time was to become acquainted with the Chinese community, which was very large in Burma, as it is in most Southeast Asian countries, to try to watch what was happening on the China-Burma border, which was the longest border of any Southeast Asian country.

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*Q: When you were in Taiwan, you must have witnessed something of the transfer of the Kuomintang. Can you say something about that?*

MARTIN: Yes. Well, by the time I got there, which was September of '49, most of the troops and so forth had come over. The government was still in the mainland. I don't know whether by that time they were still in Canton or whether they'd gone up to Chungking. In any case, they were over there. The American establishment was very small in Taiwan at the time. In fact, I have a memory -- it may not be accurate -- that the number of Americans on Taiwan was less than 100, including women and children. Bob Strong, who was the designated charge of our embassy to follow the national government around, arrived, I think, in December. He was just one man, and he just came and camped on our consulate, which was quite small at that time. I was there in the capacity, incidentally -- it didn't make much difference what you did then, because lines weren't that rigid -- but I was actually there as an economic officer, the only assignment I had in the Foreign Service as an economic officer, although my undergraduate major was economics and my graduate work at Fletcher School was primarily in economics, too.

But what I do remember about that fall of '49, particularly, was several things. One was the fact that the Communists failed to take Quemoy. That, I think, is something you can't blow up too much, but perhaps hasn't been given enough attention. That was a real morale boost. After all,

the Nationalists, in the last six months, had been swept so easily away. When they got to Chungking, they didn't last very long, and even a shorter time at Chengdu. But you had an American-trained general, in whom we had a good deal of confidence, Sun Li-jen, a graduate of VMI [Virginia Military Institute]. We had some of the, I guess, best equipped troops there in Taiwan and then on Quemoy (or Chinmen). And the Communists obviously underestimated either the will to fight -- maybe it was the combination of will to fight plus the difficulty of making this rather short but still amphibious attack. And they were beaten back, and they didn't try it again.

*Q: Was Sun Li-jen actually in command of the defense?*

MARTIN: I'm not sure he was in command of the defense, but he had been in Taiwan for some time, and he was responsible for training these troops. I think he was given a good deal of credit for the victory there, whether he was in actual personal command or not.

Another interesting thing that happened -- I'm trying to fish back in my memory -- during that period in Taiwan was a rather ambiguous message which came from the State Department at the end of October, effect, which we were supposed to go to Chiang Kai-shek with, which said, in effect, that we thought that the Nationalists had enough materiel and equipment and so forth on Taiwan to defend the island adequately. As I say, the message was sort of mixed, because, on the one hand, it was the first communication we had sent from Washington to Chiang Kai-shek since he'd retired. It was sort of an acknowledgment that he was the head man, although at that time he had not yet actually reassumed his title. He was really sort of unofficial. This was a formal message to him, and so in a sense, it was a kind of a boost, because here we were saying, "Okay, you're it, and we're going to deal with you." On the other hand, it wasn't a very clear-cut statement of just what we were going to do. [Laughter] It more or less said, "You've got enough materiel here and we have confidence that you're going to defend the place."

Jessup came over. Ambassador Jessup came over. I think it was in January of '50. It was right around in there. He had an interview with Chiang Kai-shek, in which I was present. Chiang did most of the talking. He thought it was a matter of time before Japan went Communist, and Southeast Asia was bound to go the same way. War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was inevitable. Conclusion: the U.S. must support his anti-Communist fight. Our own military estimates were that it was just a matter of time before the Communists would attack Taiwan and that they would be able to conquer it. The earliest estimate, as I recall, was something like March of '50 and all the way up to the spring or summer of '50. March may be a little early, but there was a lot of reporting about the fact that the Communists were massing junks on the Fujian coast and things like that. Another indication of what the State Department anticipated, I think I mentioned this in my book, or at least in a footnote in it, was that we evacuated dependents, especially families with children, like mine, and in my case, I was transferred to Rangoon, because we wanted to cut down on the staff in anticipation that there would be an invasion, trouble, and so forth.

*Q: Why do you think the Communists did not actually attack Taiwan during that period?*

MARTIN: I think that they were, as I said, surprised by their failure on Quemoy, and this was a

heck of a lot bigger operation. I think they felt they needed to accumulate a lot of transport and get a lot more training and perhaps try to get air superiority. I don't know, but I think they were primarily military reasons.

Another reason might have been that, after all, they had launched their offensive across the Yangtze at Nanking in April of 1949, and in the next six months they had taken all of South China, and by the fall of 1949, late fall, they had taken most of West China as well. It was enormous territory. And then they had set up their government, of course. It was set up on the first of October 1949, as you know. In other words, they had a lot of things that were preoccupying them and having been set back at Quemoy, I think they probably just hadn't been able to organize and prepare well enough. The outbreak of the Korean War of course, and the intervention of the Seventh Fleet, changed things.

*Q: You said that you accompanied Jessup.*

MARTIN: Yes, I did.

*Q: To have a discussion with Chiang Kai-shek, in which there was this rather mixed message.*

MARTIN: That's my memory. I would have to go look at the documents.

*Q: Did he request a firmer statement of assistance?*

MARTIN: He probably did.

*Q: From the United States at this time, do you know?*

MARTIN: He probably did, yes, but I cannot tell you exactly. I'm sure you can find that in the documents. That was their general request, always for aid. [Laughter]

*Q: Were you puzzled at the time by the rather uncertain stance by persons like Jessup, while, at the same time, perhaps the military estimates are that the Communists would take the island and that the dependents were being reduced?*

MARTIN: Yes, that I remember very well because it's an impression rather than a specific fact. It's something I remember, that we were puzzled. We didn't really know what the signal was supposed to be. It was sort of, you know, "We wish you all sorts of success, and we think you can defend the island. You've got enough materiel here and so forth," but we were very cautious about any kind of support we were going to commit ourselves to.

*Q: Did those of you representing the United States in Taiwan at that time take issue with this, make a counterproposal, a recommendation back to Washington?*

MARTIN: I don't think so. I don't recall. Wasn't it in January of '50 that Truman made his statement? I think we felt rather unhappy that we were getting such mixed signals, that we were not getting more clear-cut -- it sort of left us in a difficult position.

*Q: Did you feel you were in any position to in any way influence policy from Washington at this time?*

MARTIN: Well, Bob Strong was in charge, and I was the economic officer in a small outfit. Bob Strong was a person who was quite outspoken. He didn't hesitate to express his views. Bob Strong had also been up to Chungking, and he had seen the collapse of the GRC, of the Kuomintang. I think Bob Strong was very skeptical of the capabilities of the GRC to do any better and to hold out. In fact -- and I think I mentioned this in my book -- at the time just before he left -- and this is before the Korean War in May 1950 -- he recommended drastic reduction of the staff, even more reduced than it was. He had, I think, very little faith that Taiwan would last. Of course, that was before the Korean War and our Seventh Fleet intervention. So the mood, in other words, I think is well reflected in Truman's statement that the U.S. would keep hands off Taiwan.

*Q: Ambassador Martin, while you were on Taiwan, did you formulate an impression of how well or badly the Kuomintang was administering the place?*

MARTIN: Well, I think that we didn't feel that they were administering it too well, but there was an improvement as compared to the time of Governor Chen Yi, which was, I think, in '47, when they had the riots and so forth. You still got overtones of that -- or undertones, whichever they are -- from the Taiwanese. But in fact, due in large part, I would say, without appearing to boast about my country, to our stimulus, there was under Governor Ch'en Ch'eng (who was the governor in '49, replaced by K.C. Wu about the end of that year or beginning of '50) there was a land reform program going on there which, I think, was one of the best land reform programs that I know of anywhere in that part of the world. And under this land reform program, large landowners were deprived of the land which they had over the minimum, and I forget the exact amount, but it was a fairly reasonable one. They were compensated partly in rice and partly in industrial bonds. This was administered by a joint Chinese-U.S. organization, the JCRR. I think the Chinese side's man was Chiang Mon-lin. He was the Chairman. On the U.S. side there were people like Hunter and others. No, I don't think Hunter was one. Ray Moyer was the principal U.S. member.

I think this turned out to be a -- we didn't know how successful it was going to be, but I was impressed with it at the time. It seemed to me a sensible thing. It gave the Taiwanese a stake in the industrialization of Taiwan, and we all know how successful that's been in the long run. It led also to an increase in agricultural production in Taiwan. So I would say that the program was well administered, and it was probably because the Kuomintang, the Nationalists, were fairly desperate then. Certainly land reform on the mainland, if it had been carried out like this, might have been quite decisive in the future of China. But by the time we came to Taiwan, as I say, the Nationalists were pretty desperate. They were more amenable to do what we advised, and also Taiwan's a small place, and it's much easier to do it there than it was in a very large land mass with a huge population.

Under the Japanese, of course, Taiwan had become more developed than probably any single province in China. I remember being impressed when I first went there by the fact that electricity

was very widely available in small towns and that it was so cheap that people would keep the lights burning in their little shops and so forth all day. I guess they didn't have any meters or anything, so they might as well. [Laughter] They charged by the bulb or something; I don't know. But the whole place was better developed. I think you have to be very cautious about saying, "Well, if they'd only done this on the mainland." [Laughter] It was a lot easier in Taiwan. But they did do it; I think that's important.

But on the other hand, as far as the administration is concerned, perhaps they didn't really have time, they hadn't been there that long, I mean, to try to recover from the very poor administration that they'd had under Chen Yi. I was rather impressed with Ch'en Ch'eng. I thought he was an able guy and, of course, with K.C. Wu as well. I think they were lucky to have people like that there at the time.

*Q: You mentioned earlier that you got to know Chiang Ching-kuo.*

MARTIN: Yes. Chiang Ching-kuo was an enigma in a way. He came there from Shanghai with a rather bad reputation, and at that time -- I'm talking about '49 and '50, January, when I left, the latter part of January of '50 -- I forget exactly what Chiang Ching-kuo was doing. I think it was something to do with the veterans or something like that. He was a fairly young guy, of course. He had studied in Russia, as we all know, and he had a Russian wife. I didn't have a great deal of business to take up with him, and I can't even remember the occasion on which I got acquainted with him, but I found him fairly easy to talk to and less dogmatic, I thought, than his father seemed to be, although I can't say I ever got really well acquainted with Chiang Kai-shek. Ching-kuo was a person that seemed to me to be more realistic about going back to the mainland and so forth. Naturally, that was the line, and nobody was going to undercut it, but he struck me as being a fairly down-to-earth, practical sort of guy. Obviously, he was prepared to execute people, and he did. [Laughter] but he wasn't a dogmatic tyrannical person at all. That was not my impression of him.

*Q: I don't want to interrupt, but what led you to believe he was less doctrinaire about the return to the mainland position? Were there any specifics that you recall that he said, a general tone? That is, I must say, rather surprising that you gained that impression.*

MARTIN: Yes. Well, let me say two things. One is that he was not directly concerned with that. In other words, whatever his concern, it was local and had to do with the veterans and so forth, and that's what we talked about. The other is that the last time I saw Chiang Ching-Kuo was in 1968, when I stopped in Taiwan returning to Hong Kong from home leave and we had breakfast together. By that time, he was in a much more important position. The impression that I had -- and I can't give you specifics that I had from that early acquaintance with him -- was maintained in this private breakfast I had with him. Perhaps it's because we didn't talk about it. He didn't give me the line. I think that's the thing. I'm trying to remember. I think it's that I didn't get a kind of set line from him that I often got from other officials when I visited. We seemed to be on a more practical basis. He just struck me as a guy who was more in touch with the realities of the situation, and I think his record of Taiwan indicates that, at least -- I don't know how much, because I haven't really been in touch with this in the last ten or 15 years, how much you can give the responsibility for the obvious prosperity of Taiwan and the fact that it hasn't gone into

reckless adventures and so forth, I'm not sure how much you can give credit to Ching-kuo, but he's gone up and up until he finally became the top man. So he's obviously been influential. I think his influence grew. I always felt that his influence would be on the side of realism, a more realistic appreciation of the facts of life and the relative impotence of Taiwan compared to the mainland and so forth.

*Q: Given what you said about him, I imagine you've not been surprised that he's spearheaded a movement toward some degree of Taiwanization of Taiwan in the last year or so.*

MARTIN: No, no, I'm not. As I say, I put these views forward simply as impressions, because I got to know him during this period, and I made subsequent visits to Taiwan and he was always very cordial to me and everything, but I found that his -- I don't know. I don't think I can say anything more useful about it.

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*Q: You left Burma in 1951, and then you went back to the State Department.*

MARTIN: When I went back to the China desk, one of the problems which we had among a great many was this question of the KMT troops in Burma, and the fact the Burmese had -- I think this happened after I left Burma -- they decided to kick our aid mission out and so forth.

I had one assignment that covered the whole of East Asia, and that was when I was the political advisor to the Commander in Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) in Honolulu. But because Burma was a neutralist country, a non-aligned country, and had no U.S. military aid, CINCPAC, who was at that time Admiral Felt, did not visit Burma. He had no reason to visit Burma. We visited just about every other country in the area. In fact, I think we did visit every other country in the area in the whole of East Asia Pacific area, except Burma, and North Korea, of course, and North Vietnam.

*Q: I understand. And China.*

MARTIN: And China mainland.

*Q: In your dealings, since you were involved in Far Eastern affairs off and on for a good part of your career, did you find that Burma weighed at all in the balance?*

MARTIN: No. Burma was very unimportant to the United States, except to some extent (especially when I went there as a young Chinese language officer) as a listening post as to what was going on in China. I think that was its principal importance in those days, as an observation post when we had withdrawn from China. It was in some ways a fairly good spot, although it was very remote from the capital of China and what was going on there. Nevertheless, Burma had a long border with China, and there was Chinese interest in the insurgency, in the BCP (the Burma Communist Party), the White Flag Communists. So that was the main importance. But naturally, that was, on a scale of world events, pretty minimal.

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*Q: Could we pass on to the period when you were at CA -- Chinese Affairs?*

MARTIN: Yes.

*Q: That must have been very fascinating. I would assume that roughly the first half of it was dominated mainly by the Korean War in some form or other. Could you tell us what struck you, perhaps something that is not public knowledge?*

MARTIN: [Laughter]

*Q: I mean to include the negotiations, by the way.*

MARTIN: Well, as far as we were concerned, since the Korean War was in full swing -- perhaps I'd better date this so we'll know what period we're covering. I reported into the China desk in December of '51, and by that time things had been pretty well set in Korea. The Chinese had been in it for over a year. Actually, it was January of '52 when I really got into my slot in the Office of Chinese Affairs, so I had a year under the Truman Administration, approximately, and then Eisenhower came in in January of '53.

I guess there's one thing that I could contribute, perhaps, and perhaps not. It's in itself not really new. But the difference between the China policy under Truman in his last year -- and it's the only time of which I can speak, because I was there at that time, that last year -- and the Eisenhower policy toward China was very little, it was mainly cosmetic, and I can illustrate that point. My first job there was chief of political section, and that was during the Truman year. The next year I became deputy director. It had nothing to do with the change in administration; it was just internal bureaucratic things. We drafted an NSC paper on China policy in that last year (of Truman), and there was nothing new in it. It was as many NSC papers are. It was simply a description of what the policy was, and you put it down on paper and you get it approved, the way the policy developed. There was nothing basically new in it, but it did describe, I think, reflected accurately what the policy was that year, that last year. And for some reason or other, it never got through the whole NSC process until the following year, which was the Eisenhower Administration. Basically the same paper went through the NSC, and there was really no basic change.

This business about Chiang Kai-shek being "unleashed" by Eisenhower, again, that was simply when the Eisenhower Administration said, "We will no longer prevent them from attacking the mainland." Well, as you can find in the documents, actually we made very sure that the Chinese on Taiwan understood that we would not support them and we would very much oppose their going to the mainland without our approval, and we had no intention of approving it.

*Q: Lend-leash.*

MARTIN: [Laughter] So there was really no basic change there. Having been in the Department and on the China desk during that particular transition period, the rhetoric got a lot tougher, but

the basic policies -- and, of course, there wasn't much we could change. [Laughter] I mean, we were already committed by Truman to defend Taiwan. I never saw any indication that Mr. Dulles, let alone President Eisenhower, any time were willing to back any kind of mainland invasion. But getting somebody like Walter Robertson in there, who was a very nice guy but a fairly hard-liner, but not an extremist by any means, you had somebody who could go down there and talk to the right-wingers who were pretty strong in the Senate at that time. Dulles' line was pretty hard, but when it came right down to it, I don't think you could find any real difference in the policies. It was because our China policy had been set by the Korean War and by our response to the Korean War, basically, and especially after the Chinese intervened.

I do think that later on, in the mid-Fifties -- and this is pure speculation -- that under Dulles and Robertson and Eisenhower, our response to some Chinese overtures was tougher than it might have been under another administration. But at that particular time, because of the war, we were locked into a situation where there really was no flexibility, and I think that was recognized. But since China policy was a political issue on the Hill, the Republicans had to do whatever they could to make it look like they were pursuing a different policy.

*Q: There have been two main periods. One was in the mid-Fifties, around the time of the Dulles "brink of war" statement and the other period more recently since the publication of the Foreign Relations volumes covering that period, a lot of discussion of the use of nuclear threat by the United States to compel the Chinese to sign an armistice. Do you have anything to say about that?*

MARTIN: No, I wasn't in on that at all. No, I'm sorry.

*Q: I'm sorry to hear that. [Laughter]*

MARTIN: [Laughter] Sorry. That would be an interesting subject. But I guess it was, perhaps, either too sensitive for someone of my position to be in on. I don't know to what extent anybody, even my boss, who was Walter McConaughy, would have been consulted on something like that. I really don't know.

*Q: You were involved in the discussions with the Chinese at Geneva and later Warsaw talks.*

MARTIN: Yes. And also at Panmunjom. I was the only person to be -- it's really of no significance, but I happened to be the only person that was involved in the Panmunjom, the Geneva and the Warsaw talks. So I was in at the very ground floor, you might say, of our first diplomatic contacts with the Chinese Communists after the Korean War, which was at Panmunjom. I don't think there's anything special about that history that isn't known.

The thing that struck me rather strongly when we got together with Arthur Dean, who was our leader and, as you know, is a lawyer, a New York corporation lawyer, not a diplomat, (although he had diplomatic assignments before, going back, apparently to Mexico in the Twenties and Thirties) was that he was very strongly convinced that we must get an agreement with the Chinese for the sake of the Eisenhower Administration. He felt it would be a real feather in their cap. I thought that our chances of getting an agreement with the Chinese was very slim. He was

telling the press we could do it in two weeks. Well, he finally walked out, as you may recall, of the talks. He walked out in December, and I don't think he ever forgave me for being right about that. It wasn't that I wanted them to fail, it's just that I didn't think the situation was one in which the Chinese had that much flexibility. This particularly was true because, after all, we were negotiating there in the DMZ, and also going on the DMZ were these prisoner interrogations. It was pretty obvious, once the prisoners began to opt not to return to China, that the Chinese couldn't let this go on, so there were all sorts of disturbances which prevented the interrogation. Finally, as you recall, in January of '54, the prisoners were released. The Indians were in charge of this under General Thimayya, who was a very, very interesting, very pleasant guy and a very capable guy. He said, "That's the way south; that's the way north," and most of them went south.

Well, all during this hassle in the fall of '53, where the Chinese and the North Koreans were accusing us of sabotaging the armistice agreement and everything, it was just not the kind of atmosphere where they're going to reach an agreement implementing the armistice agreement. It was sort of inevitable, I think, that the thing would just be stalemated, and it was. I think Dean might have handled it a little better, although I think basically he was right. When you're at a negotiation and the people you're negotiating with start attacking your good faith, attacking your credentials and your ability to negotiate, then you might as well fold up. As a minimum in a negotiation, you have to have both sides saying, "Okay, you do represent the other side, and we'll negotiate with you." That's where we got at that particular time. I think that Dean did contribute, because he was a very good briefer and a very good lawyer, to an understanding, to giving a public explanation in his press conferences after the various sessions, which made the U.N. side, the U.S. side, look more flexible, which we were -- there's no question about it -- than the Chinese. I think that's about all we could get out of that. [Laughter]

*Q: What kind of agreement was Dean actually hoping to reach? Was it a peace treaty with the Chinese?*

MARTIN: No, no. This was very limited. This was a very limited negotiation, and maybe that was why he felt we could accomplish it. Under Paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement, the two sides were to meet, to discuss the future of Korea and arrive at some political settlement. Well, our negotiations in Panmunjom were merely to make arrangements to set up the conference: it was not the conference itself, just to make arrangements to set up the conference. And as far as we were concerned, there were only two things to talk about: when would the conference be held and where would it be held. The Chinese and the North Koreans wanted to discuss the composition of the conference. We felt the composition of the conference had already been settled by Paragraph 60 of the armistice agreement, and actually, that language about the two sides was originally introduced by the Communist side. So one wouldn't expect that they would make an issue of this, but they did. They wanted to have neutral countries, and they wanted to have the Soviet Union there. We said, "We don't object to the Soviet Union being there, but we can't call it neutral. It's completely on your side." So this is what we wrangled about, and we eventually divided into two committees.

We did come to one agreement that was on the agenda. [Laughter] But then we divided into two committees. I was in charge of the subcommittee which was discussing the time and place of the conference, and naturally that was just marking time, because the real issue was the composition,

and we never got anywhere on that. But I think it should be pointed out that in Berlin, in January of '54, an agreement was reached to have a conference on Korea and on Indochina to convene in Geneva in April of 1954. Most books refer to this as the Geneva Conference on Indochina. They totally ignore the fact that Korea was discussed. But, in fact, there was a conference of the two sides as provided in the armistice agreement, and Zhou En-lai was there. The only time that I'd ever seen Zhou En-lai in action was at this conference. It was interesting to watch him.

But anyway, that Panmunjom exercise was an exercise in complete futility.

*Q: Forgive me, but my curiosity will not let me let you get away with referring to Zhou En-lai as interesting to watch. Can't you tell us more than that about Zhou En-lai? [Laughter]*

MARTIN: Well, he had been a Chinese opera actor as a student, you know, so he was a dramatic fellow, and he had this high-pitched voice which was perhaps a little . . .

*Q: Women's parts.*

MARTIN: Yes, perhaps that's why he did women's parts. But that came across when he was making his points. I don't know what else to say about him. What he said and so forth was pretty much to be expected. Our main problem at the Korean end (and that's why I was an advisor to the U.S. delegation, because of my experience in Panmunjom), was, as it often was, of getting the South Koreans to go along and to present a united front. We finally succeeded in getting a position which we could offer as the U.N. side's position, and it was rejected by the Communists, which wasn't surprising, and the conference went on to deal with Indochina, where they really did something. So it's not surprising that people forget about the Korean part because nothing came out of it at all.

*Q: Were the South Koreans actually represented in that conference, the brief conference? Because they had not signed the armistice.*

MARTIN: No, they had not signed the armistice, that's true. No, I don't think that they were officially represented, but we didn't want them to denounce our proposal, because it would look very poor: the Communists could always come back and say, "Well, look, the South Koreans don't agree to this." We finally got something or we got them to be still or agree not to denounce our proposal.

Of course, the thing that interested me as far as our relations with China was concerned at the Geneva conference, was that we sat down and had bilateral discussions with the Chinese on the question of the Americans detained in China and the Chinese who had not been allowed to leave the United States. Those two issues really weren't comparable, because we had never imprisoned any Chinese. There had been some who had been refused permission to leave because, (interestingly enough the same argument that is being made by Gorbachev on why he won't let some Jews leave), because they knew secrets. Well, we said, "These people know secrets." During the Korean War whether that was a valid thing or not I don't know: but certainly after the Korean War it was no longer valid, so we had no interest whatsoever in keeping them. In subsequent years we even went to prisons to try to get Chinese that had been convicted of crimes

to say they'd go back to the mainland if we let them go. [Laughter] We just couldn't find anybody. [Laughter] They'd rather stay in this country. In other words, we went to great lengths to try to get Chinese to go back to the mainland. We didn't force anybody, obviously, but if they wanted to, even if they were in jail, they could return. Having bilateral discussions with the PRC at Geneva was a breakthrough. I actually drafted the telegram that went to Dulles. Dulles, by that time, had left the Geneva conference, and Smith, the Under Secretary or whatever he was then at that time, Bedell Smith was in charge, and Robertson was still there. I drafted the telegram which went back to the Department, saying, "We have to sit down and talk to the Chinese." We wanted to try to do it through the British, as we'd done before, but they would have none of it. They said, "You're here talking to us. We're in the same conference with you, and you won't even sit down and talk bilaterally," so we had to talk bilaterally. We brought in Trevelyan, the British charge at that time, as sort of an umpire to begin with, but then we wound up with bilateral talks. So that was the beginning, sort of a preliminary act to the Warsaw talks on the Geneva talks which began later.

In the telegram we just laid it out that, "We're either going to talk to the Chinese or we're not going to get anywhere on the prisoner issue. It's not going to read very well at home, you know, if you say, 'These guys are detaining our citizens and we refuse to talk to them about it.'" Of course, we had tried to talk to them before when we were still in China, and they wouldn't talk to us then. So as I say, I drafted the telegram. It was approved by Robertson and by Bedell Smith, and sent to Dulles. Although he seemed to be a little reluctant, he did eventually agree we would do it, so we went ahead. [Laughter] That was the beginning of that. Alex Johnson was, of course, our secretary general. Wang Ping-nan was the secretary general of the Chinese side, and it was interesting that they were the two negotiators in '55 when the talks restarted. [See FRUS 1955-57 on China for further details]

*Q: What was the reluctance, in your judgment, on the part of Dulles?*

MARTIN: Well, it was because the background of the Geneva conference. It was agreed at Berlin that the Chinese would be there, the Chinese Communists, and we knew Zhou En-lai would be there. Peking obviously played it up: "This shows we're now a great power. We're sitting down with the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, and France." The PRC at that time were trying to get as much as they could in gestures of recognition from the United States. Our policy was very rigid on that, and people like McConaughy and others would make speeches saying, "Just because we're sitting down with them in a conference with a lot of other people doesn't mean we're recognizing them." But sitting down with them bilaterally might seem like a step forward to recognition, at least an appearance of an acceptance, of the PRC. That's why we tried to get the British involved, and we had Trevelyan there for two sessions before to bow out. The talks were finally reduced to the consular level; but the PRC did release some of our people. Then the talks sort of petered out. That was the background to the Geneva and Warsaw talks. You used the word "Warsaw talks," and that's usually what's referred to, but people forget that for two and a half years it was the Geneva talks.

*Q: Can you go over very briefly the issues in the Geneva talks other than the exchange of prisoners?*

MARTIN: Well, that was the only thing we were interested in. Well, I shouldn't say that. That's the first thing we were interested in, and the second was the renunciation of force in the Taiwan Strait. No, the Chinese weren't about to do this. They felt that this was an internal affair because Taiwan was part of China, so they could not enter formally into an international agreement, renouncing force against their own territory. So it was a built-in, total impasse there. That went on. The Chinese used the talks to try to get us to change our policy on travel to China and on trade and so forth. At that time, we were very rigid. I participated in the talks only at the very beginning, in August '55, because I had been assigned to the National War College spent a year there, and I was really out of Chinese affairs for that year.

Then I went to Britain, to London, and at first I was assigned to work on NATO affairs, but then a fellow named Ringwalt, who had been in London for six or seven years working on the Far East, finally departed, and they put me in his place simply because I was available and had the background. Then I worked on the Far East, but not so much on China, really, until '57, when I had to make a flight to Geneva every month, almost every month, to participate in the ongoing Geneva talks. By that time they had been pretty well stalled.

Alex Johnson was the principal negotiator, and I was his assistant. In December of '57 we were instructed to inform the Chinese that Johnson had been assigned to Thailand as ambassador and would be leaving, and I was going to take his place. Well, at that time, I had the rank of first secretary in the embassy at London. So the Chinese said, "These are ambassadorial talks, and we like Mr. Martin, we can't accept him because he's not an ambassador." We had deliberately tried to downgrade the talks; there's no question about it. We felt we weren't getting anywhere. After returning to London, I had some correspondence with the Chinese side trying to get talks going at my level, but it didn't work out. The only significance of that, I think, is that we and the Chinese both decided that these Geneva talks were getting nowhere. We were the ones that took the initiative. I don't know whether they honestly thought in Washington that the Chinese would accept this; I never thought they would.

*Q: Accept the downgrading?*

MARTIN: Accept the downgrading of the talks. Yes, yes.

*Q: You mentioned (inaudible) asked about issues that you were discussing with the Chinese.*

MARTIN: Yes.

*Q: And you mentioned one of the issues was the United States' effort to persuade the Chinese to denounce the use of force.*

MARTIN: That's right.

*Q: Then we jumped up to '57.*

MARTIN: That's because I wasn't connected with the talks in between those times.

*Q: But in '54, in other words, did you have the first discussions with the Chinese, urging them to denounce force?*

MARTIN: No, no.

*Q: When was that first? Was that before the Taiwan Strait crisis or after?*

MARTIN: In June '54, we started these bilateral talks at the Geneva Conference. By agreement they were reduced to the consular level. The Chinese released a few American prisoners, and I think we told them we had some Chinese who were leaving and so forth. These talks were held intermittently, I think, for four or five weeks in Geneva at that level. Now, that's the background of the Warsaw talks.

*Q: So there was no discussion of renunciation of force by that time.*

MARTIN: That was strictly limited to exchanges.

*Q: So there's really no discussion of renunciation of force until after the first so-called Taiwan Strait crisis?*

MARTIN: That's right.

*Q: In '54 or '55.*

MARTIN: As you recall the background of the Geneva talks was that in April of '55, there was a conference of non-aligned countries in Indonesia, and Zhou En-lai said he would be willing to talk to the United States. That put us on the spot, and we agreed. We had communications through the British, and set up the Geneva talks at the ambassadorial level. The renunciation of force then became a theme song of ours. "You can't do anything else until you renounce force."

*Q: That emerges out of the first Taiwan Strait crisis, probably.*

MARTIN: Probably did, yes. Yes.

*Q: Back to the background of the first Taiwan Strait crisis. Can you give me a feel for who was in charge at the time of the first Taiwan Strait crisis and your position? You were deputy director?*

MARTIN: That was '54. I became deputy director in '53. Okay. Walter McConaughy was the director, and Walter Robertson was the assistant secretary. I forget who was his deputy at that time. This was something that also got into the U.N. Well, I should back up further. After the Geneva conference, the Nationalists, of course, were quite unhappy about the fact that we sat down with the Chinese Communists there and actually were having consular-level talks. The Korean War was over, we'd had the Indochina agreement, and so the decision was made in the Department, which obviously was supported by Eisenhower, to substitute for the Truman declaration of, "The Seventh Fleet will protect Taiwan," a treaty, mutual defense treaty, this was

signed by the Republic of China and the U.S. in December of '54. Of course, it came out that we were negotiating this treaty. I don't know to what extent this triggered the bombardments of Chinmen and offshore islands by the Communists, but nevertheless, they were attacking. We were negotiating the treaty.

*Q: I'm confused here. My history is not very good. Are you suggesting that the intention on the part of the administration in negotiating mutual security treaty preceded the growing escalation of tension in the Taiwan Strait?*

MARTIN: They went along together. I can't remember exact dates of when the shellings began. Was it August of '54?

*Q: September 9th.*

MARTIN: September 9th. You're asking me a question I can't answer, whether we had intention of negotiating the treaty before this began or not.

*Q: (inaudible)*

MARTIN: Yes. I'm not sure that that was the cause of it. I'm not sure that it was.

*Q: Do you remember what (inaudible) office?*

MARTIN: I think it was before, probably. Yes, I think it was before. I came back from Panmunjom in February, and I was back in Washington for about six weeks and then went to Geneva. I came back from Geneva in June of '54. So that was a long separation from my family. As I recall, in that period of March and early April, between the Panmunjom negotiations and the Geneva Conference, I was pretty well focusing in preparing for the Conference. I don't remember any discussion about the possibility of the treaty. (The treaty was first considered in March, 1954, but put off because of the impending Geneva Conference.)

*Q: To avoid possible confusion on the record, Ambassador Martin, you referred a minute ago to reassurance of the Chinese. You meant the ROC on Taiwan.*

MARTIN: Yes, yes. I meant the Nationalists, the ROC, reassurance that we really intended to support them, and that was policy. That was written into the NSC papers, and it was publicly declared. There was no secret about it. I can't remember whether anybody seriously argued against it. I think doubts were raised, and perhaps legitimately, that, you know, "Do you want to go this far?" But in CA, we supported the treaty, because we felt that if it is, indeed -- and it was -- U.S. policy to defend Taiwan and the Pescadores, let's make that completely clear to everybody, including the Chinese Communists, so they won't make a mistake and feel that we really don't mean it.

Now, Dulles, as I recall, was not opposed to it, but he was somewhat skeptical that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists would accept a treaty under the conditions of which we would have to impose, which would be that it would be strictly limited to Taiwan and the Pescadores, and, as I

recall, he said words to the effect of, "Well, you know, this puts some limitations on them. Why would they accept it?" Our judgment in CA, which turned out to be completely right for a change, was that, "He'll accept this. As far as he's concerned, a guarantee by the U.S. for his protection in Taiwan is the most important thing he can get. Despite all the talk that's going on, Chiang Kai-shek, basically, in his whole military history had been a very cautious person, and the idea that he is going to go back to the mainland without some sort of support from the United States is just not a practical one, and he knows it."

*Q: I feel a little unclear as to whether you think -- and there may be no basis for a judgment -- that the Chinese might have started the crisis in part as sort of retaliation, in an effort to create alarm and prevent the signing of such a treaty.*

MARTIN: Well, yes, I think it's possible. I think it's possible that they did. I don't know whether it's the chicken or the egg here, but the more I think about it, the more I'm convinced in my own mind that we had this idea of a treaty for the reasons I've mentioned before any specific attack on the offshore islands, because, after all, the Chinese Communists' position, the Peking position, was, "We're going to liberate Taiwan, and we're going to do it by force." They had continued to say this, so there was no question that there was a threat. Now, the offshore island business is always a very, very tricky one, and all I can say is -- and, again, I don't want to say like, "I told you so" -- but we in CA constantly felt that the dangers of the offshore island position were exaggerated by the critics, and maybe it's just luck, but it turned out here it's more than 30 years later, and there has not been a war resulting from the offshore island position.

But as you recall, we signed the treaty in December, and then, of course, the Communists understandably made a tremendous stink about it, and there were further threats. We took it to the U.N. I must confess I'd have to refresh my memory, but in January '55 was the New Zealand resolution, which I hesitate to even mention, because I can't remember the contents of it. But it had to do with the offshore islands of January '55. We helped the Chinese to evacuate the Tachen islands, and they evacuated another island which we felt was beyond air cover and beyond their ability to really protect. They did it. But, of course, Quemoy and Matsu were always the focus of this offshore island contention, because they're right in Amoy harbor, practically, and they have great political symbolism, of course, for the Nationalists.

*Q: May I ask you one question? The Nationalists later claimed that in exchange for their agreement to evacuate the Tachen islands, we'd given them a private pledge to defend Quemoy.*

MARTIN: I don't know anything about that, I really don't. I'm very skeptical.

*Q: I am, too.*

MARTIN: I think that we have never gone beyond the congressional resolution or whatever it was that said it's in the area. We've always deliberately left it vague; we never gave them a specific pledge. I don't think we ever did. I'm sure we never did. (There is documentary evidence to partially support the Nationalists' claim of a pledge.)

*Q: Just to see how things were being done in the government, the procedure and process, you*

*said, for example, that you always felt that the critics' concern about policy toward the offshore islands was somewhat exaggerated, that there was not the danger they had envisioned.*

MARTIN: There was a danger, obviously, but they would say, "It's going to drag us into a war with the Communists and everything else." Yes.

*Q: Were the cost benefits of the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu sort of broadly and widely considered within the Office of Chinese Affairs at this time?*

MARTIN: Well, I would say this, and, again, my memory is trying to dredge 30-year-old -- more than 30 years ago. But I think that our position was -- again, I would consider it a pragmatic position, and that is that, yes, if we had our way, we'd get off the offshore islands. They are dangerous. They're not as dangerous as people say, but they're not a good place to be. But the only way we could get the Nationalists off would be possibly even some resort to force, to force them off. They were determined to hang on. It meant a great deal to them for its political symbolism, having a little toe on the mainland. We had no commitment, and we felt that -- and I think this was expressed to the Nationalists on a number of occasions, "You've got far too much out there. You're risking too much. This is not a good thing to do." So I think definitely we did not feel that it was a good policy as far as the Nationalists were concerned, but it was their policy, and we were not willing to take our opposition to the point of using force or some drastic leverage against them to pull out.

*Q: Was it actually discussed in those terms, let's say within your office, that, "It will require us to go to that point"?*

MARTIN: Oh, I think . . .

*Q: Do you recall?*

MARTIN: Well, something like this, of course, let me say this, especially under the Eisenhower Administration, and that's when I spent most of my time on China desk, the NSC -- a thing like this, we would perhaps make an initial draft of the policy, but all of this sort of thing was handled by NSC committees. I chaired one on China, but it had representatives from the Pentagon, the CIA, even in some aspects of China policy, the Treasury Department. In other words, these decisions and these discussions took place in the context of NSC papers, NSC meetings, subcommittee meetings, and that sort of thing. The funny thing is, just on a personal note, that my last 12 years in the Foreign Service, I was never stationed in Washington, so I can't compare how it was under Johnson and Nixon and so forth. But my feeling is that in the Eisenhower years, there was more sort of committee work, there was more interdepartmental exchange and working than there was under subsequent administrations. But that's just a personal thing. Certainly in my time, there was.

*Q: Did this lead to a reduction in the direct influence upon policy formulation of the Office of China Affairs, for example?*

MARTIN: No, I don't know. Again, I don't think so, because we chaired the committee, we

usually drafted the stuff, and then it was just a question of getting through. But in the years that I was in the Department in Washington, we had two very strong Secretaries, Acheson and Dulles. That basically is what gave our State Department more clout than I think it's had recently. I was in a number of meetings in Dulles' office when he would call up Eisenhower, while we were having a meeting, to discuss something with the President. My feeling is we had as much clout as we've ever had in those days.

*Q: You speak of two very strong Secretaries. Did you feel that someone like Secretary Dulles relied upon your office for a source of ideas or did he have other sources?*

MARTIN: I'll give you an example. I can't remember whether it was this offshore island crisis or the one in '58. Let's see. Dulles died in '59, didn't he? He was still there in '58. Anyway, to give you an example, in the particular crisis situation, I remember being in a meeting. I used to go up there and back up Robertson. He certainly had a lot of trust in Robertson, but at this particular meeting on the offshore island crisis -- I guess it was probably '58, because he turned to his Counselor at that time, Freddy Reinhardt.

*Q: MacArthur?*

MARTIN: No, it was after MacArthur. Anyway, people were supposed to produce some sort of a position for him, and he would say to Robertson, "You do so and so." Then he'd say to his counselor, "You do so and so." And so forth. What happened, Robertson would call us up and say, "Will you do this for us?" And the counselor would call us up and say, "Will you do this for us?" So Dulles didn't turn to us as an office directly, but Robertson, the Counselor, and there was somebody else -- I remember there were three people calling us. He thought he had about three different people to do it, but we had the expertise, so they all asked us to do it. That was one of the problems in a crisis like this, because we'd get tremendous overload, and then we'd have the press, the press people. Our press office would want us to be available to answer questions. In other words, the power of an office like Chinese Affairs was in its expertise and the fact that it had been following the details and keeping track of it. So to come up with a paper or a position, you had the input. To that extent, we had influence. Now, you know, it had to go through the counselor, and he may have changed it with Robertson and so forth.

But it seemed to me that the committee system, which perhaps did become a little cumbersome, the OCB committee and subcommittee system under Eisenhower, did have the advantage of getting a lot of input from -- we called ourselves working level -- from the working level at Pentagon, at CIA, and so forth. The working level types, we maintained good contacts with each other, and naturally, on our intelligence estimates, I suppose there were estimates that I wasn't cleared to see, but I saw some pretty sensitive stuff and so did other people. We were getting all these inputs. So I think we had about as good a basis as anybody could have for making judgments. As I say, our judgments on some of these things, I think, not necessarily on policy, but of what the situation was, what was going to happen, that the offshore islands weren't going to lead to war and so forth, I think those judgments have stood the test of time pretty well.

*Q: Could we perhaps move on to the 1958 crisis?*

MARTIN: Yes, yes.

*Q: Would you like to add something?*

MARTIN: Yes. I would like to point out that -- let's go to July first. Well, let's go back to December '57. I was appointed the U.S. representative to the Communist side. The Chinese said, "You're not an ambassador," so we did deliberately downgrade it. Washington, I think, didn't give a damn, really, at that time for continuing the talks, although, as I said, I carried on some correspondence under instructions of Washington from London with somebody -- I can't remember his name -- who was my opposite number on the Chinese delegation, saying, "We'd like to get the talks going." I knew they weren't going to do it, and I didn't blame them, really.

But in July of '58, we did send a message saying we would like to resume the talks. We did take the initiative, and I think that should be kept in mind. We informed the Chinese that we would like to resume the talks at the ambassadorial level, and we appointed Ambassador Beam, who was our ambassador in Warsaw to represent the U.S.. That's when the Warsaw talks began. But in August of '58, they started very heavy shelling of Quemoy, the largest and heaviest shelling that had taken place anywhere in recent history, it was said. I was just being transferred back from London. I was on home leave before taking up my job as Director of CA, and I was called back because of the crisis. I remember a number of meetings, particularly with Herter, who was Under Secretary at that time. "What are we going to do about this offshore island crisis?" The estimates were really quite pessimistic as to the Chinese Communist capabilities. I was rather surprised at the -- I wouldn't say panic, but they were almost pushing the panic button. "What could we do in this situation?" And it turned out that -- and I can't remember the exact decision, but I think we decided we would convoy, but that's as far as we would go.

*Q: To the three-mile limit.*

MARTIN: Yes, to the three-mile limit. That's right. The Nationalists would pick it up there. Well, a fairly decisive development was that the Nationalist Air Force, using our heat-seeking missiles, knocked down a number of the Communists' planes, and I think that probably had quite a chastening effect on them. I think after the experience way back to '49, they felt they needed air superiority. So the Communists agreed to resume the talks in Warsaw, and from then on they were the Warsaw talks. That crisis calmed down, but there was an aftermath which was rather interesting, and that is that Dulles and Robertson -- I think McConaughy, too, yes, because I was in charge of the desk -- no, let's see. They went out to Taiwan and talked to Chiang Kai-shek and got him to agree that he would not use force against the mainland. Here again, I think Dulles might have been surprised that he would agree to this, but, again, I think it shows his basic caution. In other words, despite all their talk and everything, the Nationalists really knew that they could not get back on the mainland unless they had active U.S. support, and that they would do it without our support was never a serious threat. But that's the kind of threat that people kept worrying about. Maybe you can't blame them. But as I said before, the whole military history of Chiang Kai-shek, if he erred on any side, it was on the side of caution rather than the side of boldness.

*Q: I remember talking to one of your colleagues in the CA when the offshore islands crisis of '58*

*was at its height, and he was convinced that the Soviet Union was absolutely behind the PRC and was facing a serious sort of monolithic threat there. Was that the general perception?*

MARTIN: No, I don't think so. We were perhaps rather slow in seeing the beginning of the split, but certainly one of the factors -- and I didn't mention this -- that may have made the Chinese back down on this was the Soviets gave signals that they were not going to get involved. This may, in turn, have exacerbated the coming split between the two partners, the two allies. Yes, I think that we eventually did pick this up, because I remember it quite clearly, but it took a while. We had been, of course, seeing them as pretty monolithic. It took a while, perhaps too long, longer than it should have, to see that the frictions were getting very serious between them. We were entertaining the possibility, but were cautious about it.

*Q: Do you have a sense of when this perception did begin to dawn to the working level at State and maybe other agencies?*

MARTIN: Yes, I think probably about the time of the Great Leap Forward, because it was pretty obvious. The Russians -- was it early '60 that they pulled out all of their technicians, and they were obviously not happy about the Great Leap Forward? I remember one reaction we had, and it may have been a good one or it may not have been a good one, there's sort of a doubt about it now, but I gave a lecture at the National War College on China in January of -- in fact, it was on inauguration eve, January of 1961 -- and the thrust of my lecture, which I think, looking back on it, seems to me to be somewhat exaggerated, but it seemed like a good thing at the time to me, was, "Just because there's a Sino-Soviet split, don't underestimate the threat of the Chinese." And I went on and on about the terrible threat of the Chinese.

The idea was, I think it was exaggerated; I don't think it was completely wrong, but the thrust of my thesis was that the Chinese are really more dangerous than the Soviet Union, not because they're more powerful, but because they're more uncertain. You don't know what they're going to do, they're more unreliable, they're having these problems internally that might affect their external policy, and if you look at their propaganda, they're very belligerent and so forth. But it was to offset the idea that because there's a Sino-Soviet split, not to worry about the Chinese anymore, you see. So we were at that time definitely aware of the split. I would say the thing that stands out in my mind is when the Soviets pulled out their technicians and so forth. It was pretty obvious then, perhaps.

*Q: This is a continuation of our interview. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy, the director of the Foreign Service History Center, and Ambassador Martin and I were talking at lunch. It's still the 17th of March. And we thought there might be one other question or series of short questions, we might put. And that's concerning the Kennedy years and our attitude towards China.*

*Ambassador Martin, what job did you have during the Kennedy years, dealing with China?*

MARTIN: Well, when Kennedy was inaugurated in January of '61 I was, and had been for several years, director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. And there was some expectation that with the new party coming in, the Democrats, and with JFK of course the youngest president and so forth, there would be new things happening. And of course there were new things that

happened in his administration. But in the China posture of the United States, not as much changed as some people thought might change. The innovation which occurred during my few months as director of the Chinese Affairs during the Kennedy administration.

*Q: What were the dates, about?*

MARTIN: Well, as I say, Kennedy came in on January 20.

*Q: '61.*

MARTIN: We're talking about '61. And I was the director until that summer. That summer I went to become political advisor to CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific]. Well, the innovation I was talking about was apparently Bowles', Chester Bowles' idea. Bowles had been appointed by Kennedy as the Under Secretary of State. And the Secretary, of course, was Dean Rusk. And the idea came down, I think, from Bowles' office that we should now recognize the People's Republic of Mongolia and this initiative did not come from the Office of Chinese Affairs, the Far East Bureau, which actually opposed it although not very strongly. And I think the reason for opposing it was that we didn't think there was really much to be gained by it and it would simply succeed in antagonizing the Nationalists.

*Q: Nationalist Chinese?*

MARTIN: The Chinese, yes, with whom we had diplomatic relations of course. In any case, it got to the point where I was instructed to go down to the Hill and brief Chairman Morgan, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, which I did. And as I recall, Dr. Morgan was not particularly disturbed by this, didn't think there would be any real problem on the Hill with it. And then I was transferred out of Chinese affairs and later on I gathered that this whole idea was squashed, presumably in the White House, and that it was not one that had White House backing. Apparently it had been Chester Bowles' pet project. I think one thing that did come out of it was the admission of Mongolia into the U.N. We obviously did not veto it. As I was saying to you at lunch, one casualty of this whole episode was that George Yeh, who was the Chinese ambassador to the United States at the time, was fired by Chiang Kai-shek apparently because Chiang was unhappy that Mongolia had been admitted to the U.N. But this happened after I left.

But also, I'm sure that this was just one illustration of the way Bowles was reputed to operate, which was rather independently. I'm not exactly sure but I think he lasted less than a year as Under Secretary of State. And I think this was perhaps an example of the kind of thing that he initiated that he had obviously not cleared with his bosses.

*Q: Chester Bowles is described as what?*

MARTIN: As a -- and I don't know who said it, but it's one that sticks in my mind because I thought it was an apt description, as a giant flywheel that went round and round without any real connection with the rest of the departmental machinery.

*Q: One further question on this. Rusk has been reputed to have been very much an Asia-centric*

*person. He looked towards Asia and left Europe in the hands of George Ball for the most part. But did Rusk make any noises that you know of about recognizing Communist China?*

MARTIN: No. I don't think he did. And the business -- I'm not sure, I didn't operate very much at the Rusk level as an office director, but I don't think there was any real pressure. I think there might have been a public expectation, which obviously wasn't very well founded, that Kennedy would do things differently. And even as late as the year after he'd been in office, people were surprised that our ambassador, who had been appointed by the Eisenhower administration, Everett Drumright.

*Q: As ambassador to Taiwan?*

MARTIN: Our ambassador in Taiwan, our ambassador to the Republic of China, was still there. And again I can't give any inside information because I don't know. I wasn't privy to any. But the speculation was that the Kennedy administration had other fish to fry and did not want to move on the China thing in any decisive way or any radical way because they didn't want to upset the applecart or they had other things that they gave greater priority to.

And, as a matter of fact, of course during the Kennedy administration while the Warsaw talks continued and there was a certain amount of flexibility there on our part, nevertheless they didn't get anywhere. And that was mainly due to the fact that in the '60s, first with the "Great Leap Forward" and then after an interim period, with the Cultural Revolution, the People's Republic of China was in a very radical period. And it was not a period in which they would have been very receptive to any moves. So I feel that whereas certainly from the mid-'50s on the United States had a -- well, from the Korean War on, from '51 on, the United States had a pretty rigid position on China, in the '60s we had a more flexible position (we could have been more flexible), but the Chinese simply were not in a position to respond and didn't.

*Q: Did you have, being in charge of Chinese affairs, did you have tucked in your lower file cabinet drawer a plan for recognizing China in case somebody called upon you?*

MARTIN: No, no we didn't. I don't think it ever came close.

*Q: Just as a professional foreign service officer, you didn't even think this was worth making a contingency plan?*

MARTIN: No, I don't think so. Now there might have been more thinking along the line, and I think that would have been a more appropriate place in some ways, in the Policy Planning Staff. They were supposed to be thinking about long-range plans and so forth. We were all bogged down, as many desks were, with handling day-to-day things and reporting and briefing. Certainly we didn't see anything like recognition close enough to make any plans. As I said earlier on this tape, it wasn't until after the '69 Sino-Soviet clashes and what looked to us then as sort of the end of the Cultural Revolution and various other developments that we thought now is the time when we can start changing our relations with China, and the Nixon administration of course coming in January of '69, said right off the bat that they felt our relations with China should be adjusted. As I said earlier, the Chinese weren't in any mood for change with the Cultural Revolution and

so forth, and the United States after all, from '64 on was more and more deeply involved in Vietnam and the Vietnam war and the Chinese were backing the North Vietnamese. So again our preoccupation was with Vietnam. China was on the other side. We were certainly not, I was not in the Office of Chinese Affairs at this time, I might add, but just looking at it from this perspective, you might say that in the '60s neither the United States nor China were in a posture where recognition was going to be seriously considered. It just wasn't in the works, that's all.

I might say one other thing while we're on this tape that is of interest, again as sort of a footnote. One of the things that I did in May of 1961 when I was still director was to make an around-the-world trip with Lyndon Johnson and his wife and several other people. He was then vice president. And I was told off to go and brief Johnson about the trip. As a matter of fact, we weren't sure it was going to be an around-the-world trip when we started out. It was supposed to be just a trip to the Far East mainly. But I recall particularly his reaction when I said we were going to Taipei. And he really balked at that suggestion. Now the Democrats were just back in office after being out of office for two terms, for eight years. And Johnson obviously remembered the very controversial China policy and so forth, in that he thought that going to visit Chiang Kai-shek was not going to be very good for his political career. And he really balked at this idea. And I tried to explain why under the circumstances -- he was going to visit a number of countries -- that he ought to go to Taiwan. And he interrupted me and said, "You know, Ed, I want to tell you a story about the man in Texas who had a drinking problem. And he also had a hearing problem. And he went to his doctor about the hearing problem and the doctor said, 'how much do you drink, Joe?' And Joe said, 'I drink about a pint a day.' And the doctor said, 'You better cut that out if you want your hearing to improve.' So about a month later the doctor encountered Joe on the street and he was reeling a bit. And he said, 'Joe, didn't I tell you to cut that drinking out?' And Joe said, 'What did you say?' He said, 'Didn't I tell you to cut that drinking out or it was going to affect your hearing?' And Joe said, 'Oh, yeah, well I did that for a while, Doc, but I found that I like what I drink better than I like what I hear.'" So that's how Johnson felt about going to Taiwan. But we finally persuaded him to go. And he, as he was in other places, was more interested -- the thing he was interested in most as soon as we got to a place was what the joint communique was going to be like. But he did meet with Chiang and we had a dinner party at Chiang's residence.

It was interesting to me in a way because I don't think Lyndon Johnson -- of course he was a Roosevelt protégé in a sense, I suppose, but I never thought of him being particularly a liberal Democrat, I guess he was, but that sort of reaction, almost visceral reaction -- I don't want to be associated with Chiang Kai-shek -- I thought was rather interesting.

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*Q: Today is March 17, 1988. This is the third of a series of interviews with Ambassador Edwin W. Martin concerning his Chinese experiences. This interview is being conducted on behalf of the Foreign Service History Center of George Washington University and the Association for Diplomatic Studies. Professor Harold Hinton will be conducting the interview.*

*Ambassador Martin, I think we've now reached the point where it's appropriate to begin talking about your tour of duty in Hong Kong, 1967. And you were Consul General at that time. I myself*

*visited Hong Kong during that period more than once. Of course the period coinciding with the Cultural Revolution, at least the heroic days, so to speak, of the Cultural Revolution on the mainland, but first I'd like to ask if you could tell us something about your view of the utility of Hong Kong as a listening post with respect to China. If I may add, we now of course have an embassy in Beijing which we didn't then, and yet we still maintain considerable listening facilities in Hong Kong. Why is this?*

MARTIN: Well, let me go back to my time there before we had an embassy, before we had any kind of office. Before we even had the liaison office that we set up after Henry Kissinger's visit to Beijing in the spring of 1973, Hong Kong was a kind of window on the world for the Chinese and it was one that those countries such as the United States which did not have any official representation there, really any private representation of any kind in China, it was a window that we could look through to see what was going on in China.

And we got our information there through interviews, some very extensive interviews, with people coming out of China, refugees, people who were able to go in and out on business, and also the diplomats of other governments who were stationed there. And we were able during the Cultural Revolution -- as you pointed out, I went to Hong Kong during the height of the Cultural Revolution -- we were able to expand our sources of information because there was an increased flow of refugees. There was a lot of factional fighting among Red Guards and other communist groups who delighted in exposing what they would consider past crimes of the Party. They published their own little papers, they published documents. So there was a real explosion of information at that time about what was going on in China. And we also were able to supply even some of our diplomatic friends in Peking with information which they didn't have.

They were of course fairly restricted in the information they were able to obtain in China. And most of them had fairly small establishments in Beijing at the time. We had a very large establishment in Hong Kong. Our consulate there was larger than most embassies in terms of numbers of personnel, and we had a lot of people who were specialists in China, spoke the language, and we were able to monitor radio and monitor newspapers.

So on the whole this was a, especially when I was Consul General there, was a very fruitful source of information. And of all the sources that we had, it was the most important.

Now I don't know as much about, from personal knowledge, about the value of Hong Kong as a listening post now since we have an embassy in Beijing and we have consulates, but I can still imagine that there are certain types of information which we can get from travelers, and we maintain an expert staff there. I think we've considerably reduced, and we should have reduced, the size of the China- watching staff in Hong Kong, but we still have them there.

*Q: May I ask whether you found the British authorities in Hong Kong helpful in getting information?*

MARTIN: Yes, they were. The British were helpful. And they could supply information from first-hand observation, of course, which we didn't have. That was helpful. They could talk to Chinese officials, Chinese government, PRC government, and so they could get a certain angle

that we couldn't get on the news. On the other hand, we could get a certain volume of information which they didn't have access to, or if they did they didn't have the facilities to utilize it, as we did. I'm speaking here of British officials from Beijing who came through Hong Kong.

*Q: In view of all the controversy we've heard in recent years about CIA, is there anything you could say about CIA as a source of information.*

MARTIN: Well, as you can imagine, I can't get into detail, but it was, the operation there in Hong Kong was an intelligence collection operation. It wasn't a covert operation. And naturally they played an important part in the information that we got.

*Q: There was quite a lot of radical activity in Hong Kong while you were there?*

MARTIN: Yes.

*Q: Did you either personally or did the consulate general in general feel threatened at any time physically?*

MARTIN: Well, I don't think we did except in this sense -- and I'll give you an illustration. When I arrived, which was the beginning of October in 1967, to take up the post of Consul General, we went to the residence from the airport by a rather circuitous route. And I recall that on the road when we were going to the Consul General's residence, there was a paper bag in the road and the driver of our car very carefully skirted this because the radicals or the terrorists or what you want to call them, were sort of randomly leaving bombs around on the roads and on the trolley tracks and so forth. And a number of people were killed.

I recall specifically that a police inspector who was trying to defuse a bomb was killed and the British in their inimitable style staged a very showy funeral with the bagpipes and the slow march and all the rest of it, learning from their long years of imperial experience how to put on a show like this. And of course the British stiff upper lip and all the rest of it. But there was another person who was murdered in a rather gruesome way, kind of a talk-show person on a Hong Kong radio and the Communists didn't like him for some reason or other, or the radicals didn't like him, so he was wiped out.

I think there was a certain feeling of insecurity, but there were never any direct threats against us or against the American consulate. When I went over to Macao, because I was also accredited to Macao, to the colonial government there, I remember seeing the vestiges of demonstrations there. The governor of Hong Kong at that time was David Trench, Sir David Trench. And the Colonial Secretary, sort of the number two man in the government, was a fellow named Gass, and there were slogans painted on the wall, "Hang Trench and Burn Gass."

Of course there had been a good deal of fright in Hong Kong during '67. And I think perhaps my predecessor, Ed Rice, experienced more of that than I did, although things were still pretty hot in the fall of '67. But one thing that rather brought this home to me -- well, perhaps I should say first that quite a few people evacuated Hong Kong and there was a good deal of capital flight in

'67. A couple of personal experiences: My wife was asked by the International Rescue Committee to supervise a number of daycare centers for refugees children, which she did most of the time we were in Hong Kong. And the reason she was asked to do it, partly it was because she had the background in this profession, but the person who had been doing it before was one of those who had left Hong Kong. The other illustration is one of the first official public acts that I was requested to do in Hong Kong was to open a small oil blending plant that Mobil Oil had constructed. And it was one of these things where I was asked to go and make a little speech and cut the ribbon. This was played up, it made headlines in the Hong Kong papers. There are something like a dozen papers in Hong Kong. And it was played up as an expression of American confidence in the future of Hong Kong. And that really brought home to me the extent of the jitters there.

And as a matter of fact, this was, I think, mainly coincidence but in '68 there was a steady recovery of confidence in Hong Kong and the number of incidents tapered off. And of course in China, I think, the army was beginning to crack down a bit on the radicals. But of course this oil blending plant had been planned and financed long before the panic, but the fact is that Mobil went ahead with it, while some other companies didn't go ahead with plans that they had. Early in '68 another American company, insurance company, asked me to come and do the same thing, cut the ribbon, and I did that. And that again was played up as an example of American confidence. So the Americans were among the bolder, more confident people of Hong Kong.

*Q: I think it's rather obvious that Hong Kong could have been taken over by some combination of internal and external pressures, say in '67. I realize this is a simple-minded scenario, but why didn't this happen, in your opinion?*

MARTIN: Well, pure speculation of course. The one thing that I used to emphasize to America businessmen -- and in '68 and '69, I don't know how many dozen presidents and vice presidents of corporations and so forth would come to my office and ask my opinion about whether they should invest in Hong Kong. And I would say, I certainly cannot make up your mind or the mind of your company whether you should invest, but I can try to give you a picture of how we see the picture in Hong Kong and on that basis you can make up your mind. And the main thrust of it was that Hong Kong is very important, at least at this stage, to China for economic reasons. Ninety-nine percent, roughly, of the people of Hong Kong are Chinese. Most of what they eat and what they wear comes from China. And Hong Kong's currency is a good hard currency. And China makes a great deal of important foreign exchange out of Hong Kong. Also I think Hong Kong is important to the PRC because of what I mentioned earlier, it's sort of a window on the world. And they had there the Bank of China, they had the people who sort of took the place of diplomats or consular officials -- the NCNA people, the news agency people. And it's a place that is obviously valuable to the Chinese, and it's so valuable, as a matter of fact, that although one would think that in this radical period particularly that Hong Kong would have been a target, even then they left it alone.

Now I think, however, that if the radicals had prevailed that they might have --

*Q: You mean prevailed in Beijing?*

MARTIN: In Beijing, yes. That's what I mean. If they had prevailed in Beijing conceivably they would have gone for Hong Kong, I think they might well have. But they didn't.

*Q: Of course they did in fact burn the British mission in Beijing.*

MARTIN: They burned the British mission, yes, and there were incidents like that all over the world, as a matter of fact. But that was the radicals who did it. Not only that, but they even took over the foreign ministry for a short time in Beijing. So things were pretty haywire as far as China's foreign relations were concerned. But of course they were also very preoccupied with their internal affairs, which may be another reason that Hong Kong survived.

*Q: If we could go for just a minute beyond your experience in Hong Kong down to the present, since obviously Hong Kong is still important to the Chinese for the reasons you mentioned, this hasn't really changed, why have they been so insistent on taking it over when presumably that will degrade some of its utility?*

MARTIN: Yes. Well, that's a good question. I would say that in -- what was it, '86 they decided this?

*Q: '84.*

MARTIN: '84, okay. As long ago as that, time goes so fast. Probably the main reason was that they were sort of on the spot. The 99-year lease which they made for the New Territories in 1898 expires in 1997. And there was a lot of speculation, has been for some years, what are they going to do then. It was a kind of deadline that they had to face. And they would have had to have some kind of excuse if they hadn't done anything about it. So I think perhaps that was the thing that triggered that.

Another reason is that comparatively, I think, Hong Kong is probably not as important on the economic side -- it's still important but not as important as it was in the earlier years. They've developed their trade much more elsewhere and so Hong Kong doesn't have quite the relative importance. And the same thing goes for the window on the world function of Hong Kong. They've gotten into the U.N., they've expanded trade. They've expanded their diplomatic relations. And so it just isn't that important. Whether or not the Taiwan situation had anything to do with it I'm not sure, but of course Hong Kong is a piece of Chinese territory, just as Taiwan is, and if they hadn't done anything about Hong Kong, one wonders if they could have pressed the Taiwan issue as much.

The other side of that is that they say they're going to treat Hong Kong in a way that will show the people of Taiwan that they have nothing to fear. So -- and I must say, I think this is pertinent, during my time in Hong Kong I asked, especially toward the end -- I left there in 1970 -- some of my British friends in the government about the future and what would happen. The Chinese presumably would take it over eventually or want to take it over. And I was told that the British at that time would have been glad to negotiate for the turnover but the Chinese were not interested. The Chinese simply were not interested.

*Q: If I could go back to Hong Kong as a listening or watching post with respect to the Mainland, you witnessed the hectic days of the Cultural Revolution, what would you say was the major turning point, as you saw it there in Hong Kong. For example, the rise and fall of the Red Guard movement. Were you able to chart that with some accuracy?*

MARTIN: Yes, pretty well. I really can't remember very many specifics. The things that stand out in my mind are that we felt that the Cultural Revolution more or less came to an end in '69 with the Ninth Party Congress in April of '69 and Lin Piao's ascendancy, and that the army really was then pretty much in control. And we wrote in this -- in fact I think this was fairly widespread -- that after '69 people talked about the Post-Cultural Revolution activities and so forth. And so it came as a surprise to me, and maybe to other people, when the Chinese began talking about the Cultural Revolution ending in '76. So to go back to '69, I would say that it really seemed to us to be a turning point internally with the army really assuming a very large role and Lin Piao being proclaimed the heir apparent.

And then another turning point in a sense, although it was sort of a culmination, was the 1969 Ussuri River Sino-Soviet clashes. That really triggered almost a panicky reaction in Chinese media. And I think that as far as the PRC was concerned they really began to feel frightened about the possibility of a war with the Soviet Union. So I would say that the spring of '69 was a real turning point. It was from then on that in Hong Kong we began to see minor signs of the Chinese being interested in getting into some sort of contact with us. It was at a low level, nothing at my level, but several of our China experts on our staff were invited to parties where the NCNA people would be and so forth. It was all very low level, but nevertheless you could see that the Chinese in Beijing were reacting to the perceived threat.

*Q: I remember having a friendly argument with your successor in Hong Kong in his office a couple of years later. He was quite convinced that the Chinese opening to the United States, whatever one chooses to call it, was motivated overwhelmingly by a desire to get concessions in Taiwan. I said, all well and good, but they've got the Soviet problem, which I think is primary.*

MARTIN: I think the Soviet problem was primary. I also think that by 1970 the Chinese were observing our interest in getting out of Vietnam. And this also provided somewhat of an opening. And just to give a footnote to this, following my assignment as Consul General in Hong Kong, I went to the Claremont colleges, specifically to Claremont Graduate Center, in Claremont, California, as a diplomat in residence and visiting professor. And of course this academic scene you know a lot better than I, but in the early '70s, in the spring of '70 it had been pretty bad.

*Q: Cambodia.*

MARTIN: Well, by that fall things had calmed down a lot but I went to a faculty meeting -- it wasn't a faculty meeting, it was a meeting of some members of the faculty who apparently had been meeting and were very upset about the Vietnam situation. And they were carrying on about it as though nothing had really changed. And I said, well, I just came from Hong Kong. And for the last three or four years we've had between 350 and 400 U.S. naval vessels a year in Hong Kong harbor -- I mean visiting Hong Kong -- and we've had a great deal of R & R and so forth. And I can assure you that the Vietnamization is going on and the statement of the Administration

that they wanted to pull out of Vietnam is the policy. Those at the meeting were saying, oh, that's baloney. I said, it's not baloney, it's true. This is happening and I've seen the concrete evidence of it in the last few months that I was in Hong Kong. So the Chinese are not dumb, they could see it, too. So I think that was a factor. Now I really don't think Taiwan had anything to do with it, at least very little. It was primarily -- after all, you know better than I, just as well anyway, that during the Cultural Revolution how isolated the Chinese were. There was one point where they only had one ambassador in a foreign post, and that was Huang Hua in Egypt. In this situation the realistic and hard-headed people in the Chinese government (and they still continued to be there despite the radicals), especially with the Ussuri River clashes, obviously have to look around for some way to break China's isolation.

So I think those are the factors, and that was our judgment there, too.

*Q: Was it your feeling that Zhou En-lai genuinely wanted some sort of relationship with the United States really for its own sake, but number one perhaps used the Soviet threat, which of course was real, as a way of leveraging his colleagues into it and perhaps the colleagues like Mao were more resistant? Or did you have any way of forming impressions?*

MARTIN: It's hard to know what the internal situation was there. I don't know whether we speculated on that. What we did do was act on the belief that the Chinese would be more receptive. Of course the Nixon administration when it came in immediately said we must do something to try to get China more involved in the world. We certainly weren't ready for anything like recognition, but we were willing to take small steps. And we in Hong Kong as early as the summer of '69 began to recommend, and into '70, recommend the kinds of steps that actually were taken, such as allowing tourists to buy Chinese-origin goods in Hong Kong, which had always been a real headache for us. And eventually allowing American-subsiary companies to trade with China. That had been a very difficult thing, of course. And easing up on travel restrictions. I'm not saying that we were the ones that recommended them and the government acted on it, that's not true. Because they were also thinking the same things in Washington. And as you know, there were a whole series of small steps that occurred in the latter part of '69 and early '70 of the kind that I mentioned which preceded the famous invitation to the American ping-pong team.

I'm sorry, I really didn't answer your question because I don't know what the internal situation was there and I don't remember that we speculated on that much. We just saw what was happening.

*Q: I think the point you just made is very important and interesting, more so than the one I was talking about earlier, because there still seems to be an impression in American China-watching circles, I mean academic China-watching circles, that the opening really came wholly from the Chinese side. Which is obviously not true.*

MARTIN: Yes, if they just look at the record there and see the things that we did. And another sort of footnote, in August of '69 the new Secretary of State, Bill Rogers, came out with Marshall Green and a small entourage, Mrs. Rogers, to visit Hong Kong among other places. And we had a very good session at my house after we gave them a dinner one night, about what things were

happening, things that were changing, our relation with China, what we could do. And we had a discussion, he was very open about it, and so were we, and Marshall, and we all agreed. So these kinds of steps that we took were concrete steps. And the Chinese could read them as such and did.

It's funny. I don't know what it is, academia or the press, but they picked up the Chinese invitation and they sort of ignored the steps that we'd taken. I really think that we took the initiative. But on the grounds that we thought the Chinese would be receptive, whereas in the '60s the Chinese really weren't very -- not that we did very much, but in the Warsaw talks we offered things like exchange of correspondents and easing up on travel restrictions. At one point we offered pharmaceutical supplies and grain and so forth. This was all turned down by the Chinese because in the '60s they were in no shape to do anything like this.

*Q: In May of 1970 the Chinese interrupted the Warsaw talks that had just resumed earlier that year, with a great blast over Cambodia, I'm sure you remember that. Was it the feeling of yourself and your staff at that time that this was a very serious and possible termination of the process, or did you expect it to be resumed later, or did you have any sense of it?*

MARTIN: Well, I don't think I did. And there again I must say that the Warsaw talks were something that we were not, and I think this was a mistake, but we in Hong Kong were not kept informed about them at all.

*Q: Really?*

MARTIN: No, we were not, which I think was too bad. We should have been. But in any case, the Cambodia thing I don't remember much about except in a kind of personal way. In the spring of '70, I don't know, maybe March or so, I was invited by Art Hummel, who was then ambassador in Burma, to come over to Rangoon and to brief, or to talk to, some of the Burmese officials about how we saw the situation in China. Because the Burmese, as you know, are very nonaligned nonaligned people and we didn't ever get very close to them on an official basis. They kept us at arms length. But he thought, well, if I have a visiting fireman come in it might provide an opening to get across our point of view. Well, as a result of his invitation, the department asked several other embassies if they wanted me to visit. Besides Burma, I went to Malaysia, to Singapore and on to Djakarta.

And the Chinese press picked this up when I got back and accused me of being the guy that was responsible for this Cambodian business. And I didn't know a damn thing about it, I hadn't gone near Cambodia or anything. But it was just one of these -- they picked up the fact that I visited these countries, although there was no publicity about it. Obviously they were able to do that without much trouble. And they said I was a conspirator responsible for Sihanouk's ouster -- was that what it was?

*Q: That's right. That started it.*

MARTIN: I had somehow engineered this.

*Q: It sounds as though your trip to Burma in early '70 might have had something to do with your appointment as Ambassador the following year.*

MARTIN: Well it might have. But of course I had served there before, too.

*Q: Oh, that's right. Of course. Yes.*

MARTIN: I'd been there before. But I think that was just because I had -- you know, as Consul General in Hong Kong, it was a much more demanding and important job than Ambassador to Burma. And it was considered by the department a Chief of Mission assignment. It's only because Hong Kong is not an independent country that you have to be a Consul General there, but in terms of the department, you get all the perks of a Chief of Mission, such as flying first class and all that stuff. Of course all consulates general, practically, have to report to an embassy. In other words, they're under the supervision of their embassies, but in Hong Kong you are as independent as any mission, you report directly to Washington.

*Q: To the bureau. Did you report to London?*

MARTIN: No, never reported to London. Had nothing to do with London. Unless it was something to do with British policy. But otherwise we had no more connection with London than we had with Manila or Paris or any other place. It was a totally independent post. And much larger than most embassies at that time. I had 400 people on my staff.

*Q: That is big.*

MARTIN: Well, another thing. It wasn't just, of course China-watching. That was important and I was the last Consul General there before we had some sort of an office in China. But in '68 or '69, we became the second largest immigration visa-issuing office in the world, because the U.S. had changed immigration laws so that more Asians could immigrate. So we had a huge visa staff. And while I was there, they established an American Chamber of Commerce for the first time in Hong Kong's history. I was the first honorary president. And for the first time our two-way trade with Hong Kong went over \$1 billion U.S., so there was a big trade expansion, big -- as I was saying, I myself didn't have much opportunity to do much China-watching. I was engaged in dealing with all these visiting firemen from businesses, from the military, Seventh Fleet ships in there all the time, and we had an awful lot of congressmen, many more than usual because the Vietnam war was still going on. And Congressmen would go down there and they'd come up to Hong Kong to get a breather or to do shopping before they went back to the States. So I really had a seven-day-a-week job on that kind of thing. I had some good people on my staff. Allen Whiting was the deputy my first year and then Harald Jacobson took over. And they were both very good on China-watching.

*Q: Is there anything else you think we should cover from your Hong Kong days?*

MARTIN: No, I can't think of anything in particular. I might say just as a footnote that among the visiting firemen I had and entertained were Ronald and Nancy Reagan and their two children. He was then governor of California. And California having the largest Chinese population of any

state, he had a special interest in Hong Kong. He was on his way to Manila as a representative of President Nixon to be present at the inauguration of President, I guess it was Marcos.

*Q: President Marcos, yes.*

MARTIN: Marcos at that time.

*Q: Shall we move on to Burma?*

MARTIN: Yes, sure. But before we do, I would like to say a word about an important aspect of the work of our Consulate General in Hong Kong that I have neglected to mention: its publications. It published a daily survey in English of the China mainland press, and, less frequently, a translation of important Chinese documents called Current Background. These publications were not only widely used by China-watchers in the U.S. government but by many private individuals, especially academics, both in the United States and in other countries. Monthly publications in English and Chinese were also put out without attribution to the Consulate General. Its Chinese publication was said to have the largest circulation of any Chinese language magazine in the world outside of China itself.

*Q: Burma must have been kind of a rest after Hong Kong.*

MARTIN: Yes, well I had that year in between as diplomat in residence. And that was an interesting year. I did some lecturing for the Council on Foreign Relations at various West Coast foreign affairs groups. That was a fairly good rest for a year.

I remember being at a conference in the spring of '71 and talking about how you could see the relaxation and the easing of relations between the PRC and the United States beginning to take place. One of the professors at the conference was absolutely incredulous. He pointed to all the wicked things that the Nixon administration was doing and said, how do you expect the Chinese government to improve relations with such a reactionary administration? His question showed how some people don't realize that the Chinese Communist leadership is pretty hard-headed when it comes to what they think is in their interest. They're not swayed by some things that people think they're swayed by.

*Q: Henry Kissinger has called Mao Zedong the most realistic statesman he ever encountered except de Gaulle.*

MARTIN: Sure. Well, I think Zhou En-lai was, but I don't know whether de Gaulle was or not. But they are. They are capable. It's amazing how people can be ignorant of this fact, and that they are willing to deal with anybody if they think it is in China's interest no matter how ideologically opposed they may be.

Okay, I can't think of any more Hong Kong at the moment.

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*Q: Your position as consul general in Hong Kong was actually, within the State Department, considered to be chief of mission.*

MARTIN: Chief of mission, yes.

*Q: A major chief of mission.*

MARTIN: Yes. Well, at least I got the perks of the chief of mission and was considered chief of mission because, unlike other consul generals, I was not under the general supervision of an embassy. I was independent, in an independent post that reported directly to Washington. At that time, particularly, Hong Kong was in the category of a chief of mission job because we had primary field responsibility for reporting on the whole of mainland China. I was there during the height of the cultural revolution, when we began to get far more information than we'd been able to get before, so that we had an important assignment beyond just Hong Kong. U.S. trade with Hong Kong exceeded \$1 billion -- and this was back in '69 -- for the first time in history, when I was there. We at one time, I think it was the Immigration Act of '68, was it, that opened up Asia? Asians -- I think it was about that.

*Q: '67.*

MARTIN: '67, maybe. It probably was '67, because it was '68-'69 that we suddenly jumped into the forefront of visa issuing offices. I had a total staff there of 400, which was about four times what I had in Rangoon, and much larger than most embassies. So it was, in terms of importance, and especially at that time, I think, well deserving of being a chief of mission.

**JOHN F. MELBY**  
**Political Officer**  
**Chungking/Nanking (1945-1948)**

**China White Paper**  
**Washington, DC (1949)**

*John F. Melby was born in Oregon in 1913. He received a bachelor's degree from Wesleyan and a master's degree and doctorate degree from the University of Chicago. He entered the Foreign Service in 1937. His career included positions in Mexico, Venezuela, the Soviet Union, and China. He was interviewed in June of 1989 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*Q: Then, we'll move on to your China experiences. You were assigned directly from Moscow to China?*

MELBY: No. From Moscow, I had been assigned to the San Francisco conference.

*Q: This was within the summer of '45?*

MELBY: Yes. I left Moscow when Roosevelt died, the morning after.

*Q: April of '45.*

MELBY: Yes. I went directly to San Francisco. In the meantime, Averell had been talking about having officers with some Russian experience to various obvious spots around the world. And one of those, of course, was Chungking.

He originally suggested that maybe I'd want to go to Budapest. Well, I didn't want to go to Budapest. He finally came up with Chungking. "Why don't you go there and see what the Russians are up to? It's no question of becoming a China officer. Just go out and look, and see what they're doing."

In my case, there was also somebody else involved. Ed Flynn, who had been the political boss of the Bronx, and whom Roosevelt had brought out to Yalta with Stettinius, after Yalta, came to Moscow, Flynn came along with him. Stettinius went back to Washington, but Flynn stayed in Moscow.

He had a secret commission from Roosevelt. "Stay and talk to Molotov about a possible Vatican-Kremlin concordat." Flynn was a prominent Catholic layman, close to Spellman. And I was sort of assigned to Flynn. The OWI thing was finished when Joe Phillips, who'd been editor of Newsweek, came out to relieve me. So I didn't have much to do then.

Averell just assigned to me to sort of look after Flynn, who had a drinking problem, and he liked the ladies. Mostly, Averell just wanted me to see if he was drinking. But he wasn't. He was on the wagon, and he never did take a drink again. But Ed and I became very good friends!

He spoke to Molotov, who said, "Why not? When you go back, on your way, you're going to stop off at the Vatican. Talk to the Pope about it." He said, "Why shouldn't the two of us have some sort of concordat? Time means nothing to either of us. Try it and see what happens." Molotov said, "I suspect the Pope will be a little less interested than I am. But maybe Spellman can do something with him." So Flynn then did stop off and he did talk to the Pope. And before he left, he said, "When this thing is set up, I'm going back to Rome as the President's representative to be in charge of this concordat. Would you like to come with me?"

I said, "Sure."

He said, "All right. We've got to get you out of here."

And this is where the Chungking thing came up. I, more or less, suggested that myself. Because Roosevelt then died. But Flynn still thought that Truman, once he did his homework -- which Truman was very good at -- that the agreement between Molotov and the Pope would still be worked out. So Flynn said, "You go to Chungking, and have a look at it. When I get this thing set up, I'll send for you." He said, "In the meantime, you cannot tell the Department about this."

Averell knew about it, of course. Averell sometimes told the Department things, and sometimes he didn't. This one he didn't do. So, I did finally get out to China.

*Q: First, did you take part in the U.N. San Francisco conference?*

MELBY: Yes. I was in the group of Foreign Service officers that were assigned to various delegations. Delegation liaison.

*Q: What did you do?*

MELBY: Oh, it was getting them California neckties and running errands for them.

*Q: It was really a "meet her and greet her," in a way?*

MELBY: That's right, and keep them happy. If they got in trouble or didn't know where they were, arrange things for them and show them around town. Just generally make yourself useful.

Now, I was the only one of the whole group who had nothing to do. Because the Russians, right from the beginning, let it be known that they didn't want any help. And I was never even permitted on the floor where the Russian delegation was at the St. Francis Hotel! They wouldn't let me up there. Molotov came. He was head of the delegation. So I didn't have, really, anything to do. But I had an awfully good time. It was three months.

*Q: Could you discern a real change in the Russian-Soviet attitude towards the United States? From the rather friendly open thing to, now the war, at least in Europe, was over --*

MELBY: Little things in the cold war hadn't really started. But, there were indications that it was going to be tough. And on our part, too. It was as much our fault as it was theirs.

*Q: Well, how did you get to Chungking? Could you describe the situation in Chungking?*

MELBY: I got to Chungking by going through Europe. Because the war was over. Japan had just surrendered. The Pacific was hopeless. So I went the other way; I went eastward.

I stopped off in Rome on my way. My brother had been in Switzerland all during the war. He was in the Foreign Service, too. He came down from Bern to see me in Rome. We spent a week there.

Then I went from Rome to Karachi, Calcutta, over the hump into Kunming and then down to Chungking.

*Q: Who was the ambassador in Chungking and what was the situation at that time? By this time Japan had surrendered.*

MELBY: The ambassador was one Major General Patrick J. Hurley, that perfect model of a modern major general. Happily, by the time I got to Chungking, he was gone. He'd gone back to

Washington on leave.

I say "happily" because I'd known Hurley before. He and I, believe it or not, are fraternity brothers. At the time of my first meeting with him, he was grand consul of the Sigma Chi fraternity, when I was consul of my chapter at Wesleyan. And I'd met him a couple of times since. And just as I left Moscow, Hurley showed up. I don't know what he was doing; I've forgotten now. But he stayed with us at Spaso and huffed and puffed his way around. So I didn't particularly want to see him.

*Q: What was his reputation, for those who wouldn't be familiar with him?*

MELBY: Well, you see, he had been in China. The President sent him out, mainly, I think, to get him out from under foot in the White House. To work on a coalition between the communists and the Nationalists. And Hurley arrived all pro-communist. He said, "They're just like a bunch of Oklahoma Republicans with guns." And he went scooting to Yen-an, which was communist headquarters at this time, and he produced a draft agreement. Or rather, Mao Zedong had produced an agreement. And Hurley said, "This is fine. Except it's missing something." So Hurley added the American Bill of Rights. Mao looked at it, and his eyes bugged out. He said, "Chiang Kai-shek will never buy this!" And Hurley said, "Yes, he will, if I tell him to."

Mao said, "Okay, go ahead, if you can sell it, it's fine with us."

So they all signed it. And Hurley took it back to Chungking with him and showed it the Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. His eyes bugged out, too. He said, "You must be crazy to bring me this! I'll never sign anything like this." And at this point, Hurley started getting very pro-Nationalist.

*Q: Why was that?*

MELBY: Hurley was crazy. I think he was beginning to get a little senile. And he stayed on. He came out originally just as special envoy. He was made ambassador when Clarence Gauss resigned, in frustration. And he wasn't ambassador for very long. He certainly raised a lot of hell while he was there.

*Q: You arrived there just after he had left?*

MELBY: I arrived after he left to come back on consultation. He thought he was returning.

*Q: What was the feeling at the embassy? Here you arrive, you're the new man on the block, you're not an old China hand.*

MELBY: It was absolutely incredible. Everybody jumped on me, the new man, everybody to tell me his story of the skullduggery going on, or the corruption going on, of Hurley's behavior, of everyone trying to undercut everybody else.

*Q: This was within the embassy?*

MELBY: Yes. It was an incredible introduction to things.

*Q: You had been in a wartime embassy in Moscow where at least you had no problems.*

MELBY: No internal problems.

*Q: This was a squabbling embassy? It was not "us against Hurley," it was "us against us?"*

MELBY: Well, it was a squabbling embassy. All the political officers in the embassy, after Hurley had left, all joined with George Acheson, who at that time was chargé d'affaires, in signing a telegram to Washington protesting Hurley's views on what was going on in China, and what should be, and what our policy should be. And Hurley was simply furious when he saw it, when he got back to Washington.

And it was all that group. Davies, Service, Acheson, Emerson, they were the ones in the Foreign Service who had the trouble. All the trouble with the China officers has been Hurley's doing. Those of us who came after Hurley never had any trouble because of China.

*Q: So, really, this is a slightly different focus. Because at one point, the focus was, "All right, a group of officers lost China." But it was a more focused group than that. Hurley had a Foreign Service hit list.*

MELBY: The cohesion within the embassy wasn't bad at all. The Foreign Service officers got along all together. They weren't trying to cut each other's throats.

But there were all sorts of people floating around. There was the Milton Miles business out in Happy Valley. He was an American admiral who was advising Tai Li, who was head of Chiang Kai-shek's secret police, on how to torture communist prisoners and so on.

And one mission after another was coming out and going off in all directions, and another mission would come, and so on. And none of this was coordinated within the embassy. Clarence Gauss never managed to get control of those outside his own immediate embassy family.

So that when the special advisors came out for Chiang Kai-shek, or when Vice President Wallace was out there, Lauchlin Currie came out on a special mission. Roosevelt was a great one for sending missions out.

*Q: How about Truman?*

MELBY: Truman never did that.

*Q: So this is before your time, that all this was happening?*

MELBY: The hangover was still there. The Army was fighting the Navy, and the Navy was fighting the Marine Corps. Everybody was into everybody. When George Marshall came, later

on, that ended right there.

*Q: You were there when George Marshall came?*

MELBY: Yes. I had been there a couple of months.

*Q: Did he have much to do with the embassy?*

MELBY: He had nothing to do with the embassy. Literally. We were around, and we briefed him from time to time. Initially, of course, we did a great deal more than we did later on. After he got to know his way around, he really had nothing to do with us at all.

*Q: You were the new boy on the block, you had these China hands, people who really were experienced in China. What were they saying about the situation and what we should be doing?*

MELBY: They saw the situation and said, "It's hopeless." All the career officers, without exception, agreed that the communists were going to win. Didn't mean they looked on it with any great favor.

On the other hand, they just thought the Nationalists were hopeless. They were corrupt beyond measure. They were going to get worse. And as John Davies put it in one memorandum, "The fact is that the future in China belongs to the communists."

So what were we going to do about it? Are we going to live with it or are we going to fight it? And how can we fight it? And, are we prepared to take on the whole Chinese community?

Obviously, the answer was, "No!" Just saying, "the future belongs to the communists," didn't mean that you agreed with it. "It" being the idea, or with them. It was simply that you saw that at that time, they were absolutely incorruptible. They were dedicated. They knew what they were doing. They were in touch with the masses.

That's one thing that Mao insisted on: always stay in touch with the masses. Chiang Kai-shek had lost touch completely. We were backing a dead horse. We might as well get used to it, learn to live with it.

*Q: Well, there were some changes within six months of your arrival in October of '45. So by spring of '46, your embassy had moved to Nanking and you had a new ambassador?*

MELBY: No, Dr. Leighton Stuart wouldn't come on board until late summer.

*Q: Why did you move to Nanking?*

MELBY: Because the government moved there.

*Q: Was this closer to the scene of action?*

MELBY: Well, it didn't matter that it was closer to the scene of action. Diplomatic corps always move with the government.

*Q: Who was the new ambassador? And can you describe how he operated?*

MELBY: John Leighton Stuart. He'd been a missionary in China for 50 years. The last 20 or 25 years, he'd been president of Yenching University, which was one of the model universities of China.

General Marshall asked him to be ambassador because most of the leaders, prominent people, not only the Kuomintang, but the communists, too, had all been students of his. And considering the special Chinese relationship between teacher and student, the general thought that perhaps Dr. Stuart could persuade the Chinese to sit down and talk to each other, and maybe this way you could work out their differences.

And Dr. Stuart agreed with him. He thought it was worth the chance. So he took the job. He didn't know anything about American foreign policy. He couldn't care less! He was interested in China. He wanted to see the fighting, civil war ended in China. It just killed him to see what the Chinese were doing to each other.

*Q: How did he operate?*

MELBY: Well, he felt himself responsible to Marshall. And then, of course, when Marshall left, to the Department, in a sense. Particularly since -- by this time Walt Butterworth, who was minister-counselor, had gone back as head -- Marshall took him with him -- of our Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. So there was that connection Stuart had with the Department.

But, beyond that, nothing. He never moved into the chancery. He never had an office there.

*Q: You were mentioning your later career as a teacher. Could you explain about this Chinese student that you had?*

MELBY: Well, he wasn't a student. He was an older man who was getting his Ph.D. at Notre Dame, Yu-ming Shaw who's now head of the Taiwanese Information Service. And I met him in Toronto at either a meeting of the American Historical Association or the Association for Asian Studies. He was just finishing his doctoral dissertation, which was a biography of Dr. Stuart. He was puzzled by the meaning of the initials on telegrams. He'd been going through Foreign Relations, and of course, as usual, everything that came out -- whether they were telegrams or dispatches -- were always signed by the ambassador. And Shaw was confused that somehow Dr. Stuart's views didn't seem to be consistent, about China and so on.

But what he didn't understand was the way the embassy worked. Most of that stuff, Stuart would sign; he signed everything, of course. Just usual things. That didn't mean he'd seen it, let alone read it. All that was done in the chancery.

Sometimes Butterworth did it, sometimes the rest of us in the political section did it. Or we did it

together and it would be a collective work. Sometimes our initials would be on it, and sometimes it wouldn't. But it all looked as though it was Dr. Stuart.

*Q: But he was not a hands-on ambassador?*

MELBY: In no sense of the word, no.

*Q: You were in the political section. What were you doing, when we got to Nanking?*

MELBY: Not only was I in the political section and doing political reporting, but also I had set up our press translation service, which was an idea I had picked up in Moscow. And I organized that, and I was running that. I was also the embassy liaison with USIA. I was the embassy liaison with our cultural affairs office. I was the embassy press officer. In fact, I had a half a dozen jobs that I was doing.

Unfortunately, I was just doing too much. I was "China" in there for a while. Particularly since I was the only one left in the embassy who had served in Chungking. So every new person who came in to Nanking, in the diplomatic corps, from any embassy around town, the first you had to do was come talk to me. "What was it like in Chungking?" Which took up a lot of my time.

*Q: This is always something that is forgotten. I know that, at one point, I was the old hand in Yugoslavia. And I spent a great deal of time in our embassy giving the background of what we were doing.*

MELBY: And then also, the last year I was there, I negotiated the treaty that set up the Fulbright Foundation, which was the first Fulbright Foundation to be set up.

*Q: This was in the midst of the civil war?*

MELBY: Oh, yes. The civil war was coming to an end, but we still were setting up the Foundation. And I'd negotiated the treaty. And therefore, I was made the first director of the Foundation, and I operated that first year, too.

*Q: Could you describe how the embassy was reacting to this civil war that was moving, seemingly slowly, but in an unstoppable way, towards Nanking?*

MELBY: Fatalism. "It's coming." It just felt like the grave-watchers, watching the whole civilization, 2000 years of history going down the drain.

*Q: Did you have any feeling at the time, "Gee, we better be careful how we're reporting this"? Were you under any, sort of, "Be careful, fellows"?*

MELBY: No. It didn't touch us there.

*Q: You reported it as you saw it? Nobody was saying, "These reports aren't going very well"?*

MELBY: We knew they weren't going over very well, but we did it, anyway. We recorded what we saw.

*Q: Were you getting anything back from the Department of State saying, "Would you re-examine this issue? Isn't there a bright side to what you're reporting?" Or something like that? You didn't feel there was much backwards and forwards --*

MELBY: We were reporting, and the people to whom we were reporting had, at one time, been in the embassy. That was the way the China service operated. John Carter Vincent was the head of the bureau before Walt Butterworth took over, and he knew as much about China as anyone. George Atcheson had been there, too. So an awful lot of stuff we might have reported, we didn't, because we knew the people to whom we were reporting, we knew that their experience was similar to ours and therefore there wasn't any point in repeating the obvious. A lot of the, shall we say, local color, didn't get reported. Not for lack of interest, but just simply because we assumed that they knew it already. Therefore, why repeat it?

*Q: Did you have much contact at that time with the Kuomintang government?*

MELBY: Oh, sure. Continually. Day to day. As a matter of fact, Dr. Stuart's Chinese secretary, who had been with him for many, many years, Philip Fugh who died only a few months ago at the age of almost 100, was very close to Chiang Kai-shek. This was one reason that we didn't encourage the old gentleman to go around the chancery, because we knew that the minute Dr. Stuart got a telegram, he would show it to Philip. And the first thing Philip would do would be to read it, and then call for a car and go over to Chiang Kai-shek's office and show it to him!

The world's worst security leak was going on, and Marshall knew it and Butterworth knew it. In order to protect ourselves, insofar as we could, we just simply got where we didn't show the old gentleman any telegrams. Or Walt would take the telegrams over to him and let him read them, and then he'd take them back. He wouldn't leave them with him. Dr. Stuart knew why he was doing it and was kind of amused by it.

*Q: But he was interested in other things?*

MELBY: Sure. He didn't really care.

*Q: Were there any repercussions from bad reports about the situation that would somehow, either through Philip or through reports getting out of Washington, get to Chiang Kai-shek? With Chiang Kai-shek or his officials saying, "What do you mean, reporting that we're corrupt?" You know, sometimes when you report on something, the word leaks out, so that the people you're reporting on know and will call you to task.*

MELBY: The Nationalists didn't do that, because they knew that what we were reporting was the truth. And in a sense, they didn't care. The way the corruption was going, it was every man for himself, anyway.

*Q: How did you view Madame Chiang Kai-shek?*

MELBY: I didn't take quite as dim a view of her as a lot of people did. I felt kind of sorry for her. I didn't know her at all well. She belonged to two worlds. She had been educated in the States, southern-belle type. Chinese didn't trust her, because they thought she was too Westernized. Westerners thought she was still too Chinese. So that she really didn't have many friends. She had a few old Chinese missionary ladies -- biddies -- who used to come around to tea. But otherwise, she was pretty isolated.

However, the GMO did trust her, in the sense that he relied on her as interpreter. He didn't speak a word of English. He didn't even speak Mandarin, for that matter. He had to conduct Cabinet meetings with an interpreter, because his dialect was Fujian which is a hillbilly dialect, if there ever was one! He didn't even speak good Chinese. But she was very useful to him, that way. I know that General Marshall thought that the GMO really relied on her a great deal. And he, too - - although he didn't much like her -- in a way, felt kind of sorry for her. She was an impossible woman. Very demanding, like all the Soongs. The whole clan were like that. But she was a very beautiful woman. Very interesting to see her. When she was with Chinese, she was the demure Chinese lady, with the high dressed neck, and flat-chested, and so on. When she was with Westerners, she suddenly was all full-bosomed and so on, and her skirts were slit up to her hip. She had very good-looking legs, too.

She was very adept at using her feminine wiles. She took them all into camp. I think the only one who was never affected by her, was General Wedemeyer . He really didn't like her. And he didn't react to her at all.

*Q: Did she try anything on him at all?*

MELBY: No. With him, it just didn't work. But even Marshall, who was a fairly austere kind of person, he softened up a bit with her. She didn't fool him.

*Q: You were doing an awful lot of what we would call, USIA work there, cultural exchange and all this. How about the press corps? Was there much of an American press corps there?*

MELBY: Oh, there was a large one there.

*Q: Things really got nasty with the press corps and the embassy in Vietnam. But this was almost a different era. Were you all on the same side?*

MELBY: Oh, yes, the American press corps, including a lot of foreign newspapermen who weren't American, they had pretty much the run of the embassy.

The New York Times men, Tilman Durdin and Hank Lieberman, the whole crew of them, we would show them telegrams and talk to them.

We only had one newspaperman, once, who betrayed a trust with me, who broke a confidence, but he's the only one. He's now dead -- John Roderick. Drowned in Tokyo Bay. The only one who I ever had any reason to question.

We talked to them quite frankly. They were all disgusted with the regime. We all felt the same way.

*Q: Were they able to get to the Chinese armies and see what was happening?*

MELBY: They did a lot better job than we did. Anybody from the embassy trying to go out just couldn't do it. It was too obvious. And people like me, we didn't speak the language. We didn't have very many language officers, and they didn't speak the local dialects, anyway, either.

But even the press people, sure, they got out with the armies a good deal. And they did quite a bit of field work. But one of the things that came out -- we had a reunion of newspaper people from the '30s and '40s in Arizona, about four or five years ago. I was invited to go with them and be with them. The thing that we all agreed on, that John Fairbanks pointed out, who at one time had been head of the OWI office in China, "After all, we have to face the fact that no Westerner ever really got out and knew the peasant. Nobody really knew what was going on in the villages. Only the communists knew that."

*Q: How did you view our constituent post? We had a consulate in communist held territory for some time, didn't we? When they took over, how about in Mukden?*

MELBY: That was when the civil war was over. They were there under house arrest. Angus Ward was in Mukden. He was in real trouble. He was accused of espionage, which, frankly, he was guilty of! He'd been working with what was known as ESD-number something or other, which was a CIA outpost. He was up to his eyeballs, working with the crew that he had up there with him in Manchuria. The people in --

*Q: Tsingtao?*

MELBY: Tsingtao was closed down. But, Peking was open. We had a consul general there. Edmund Club was consul general there. He was under house arrest. Not bothered.

The people in Shanghai had trouble. We had a lot of trouble in Shanghai. The mobs got out of control. It wasn't the government; it was just random looting going on. Fortunately, nobody was killed. Shanghai was a different city. It was a lot of foreign interest, in the international settlement, in the French quarter. All these were fair game under the communists. When they took over . . .

*Q: Can you describe what happened as the People's Liberation Army was beginning to take over close to our embassy? What happened, as far as our embassy was concerned?*

MELBY: We evacuated people. I was head of the committee to decide on the evacuation. Sort of by default. Butterworth, back in Washington, probably set up a committee in the embassy, composed of Fred Schultheis who actually was CIA, who was against evacuation at any time. He couldn't bear the idea of being separated from his wife. And Lewis Clark, who was minister counselor, who'd gone through the rape of Nanking in 1937.

*Q: Didn't want to have that. That was with the Japanese troops.*

MELBY: God knows that we should have evacuated a month ago. Which left me, who had no connections there, with the final vote.

*Q: May I ask, were you married at the time? Was your wife with you?*

MELBY: Yes, I was married at the time. She was not with me. I had no attachments in China at all.

So I had to make the final decisions. And we were under a lot of pressure from the GMO. "Please don't evacuate!" Because he knew we were considering it, and we were going to do it. He said, "Don't do it, because it will just give the advantage to the communists."

Finally, it got to the point where I just had to make the decision, "Look, I'm sorry, but we've got to do it." I didn't want to get all these people -- we warned Americans, private citizens, to get out. Which meant mostly missionaries. Most of the business community had left.

*Q: How did the missionaries respond?*

MELBY: Oh, as usual, missionaries don't do it. They never want to go. And then they get into trouble, and start yelling because the embassy doesn't get them out of trouble. The usual thing.

Embassy dependents. Finally, I just ordered them out. We sent them all over to the Philippines.

*Q: What's the timing here?*

MELBY: October '48. What finally decided me on it was we weren't getting very good information out of Manchuria. I decided to go up to Mukden again and have a look at it myself. I was going up with Dave Barrett, who was assistant military attaché, who was absolutely bilingual in Chinese. Even gutter Chinese! We were waiting for a plane in the airport in Peking. The planes started shuttling in from Mukden, unloading. Dave Barrett just looked at them and said, "John, I don't have to go to Mukden. When the generals start to evacuate the gold bars and concubines, the flap is on." And he didn't go. But I did.

I got there, and it was clear that Mukden was going to fall. The communists were in the outskirts of Mukden. It was just a matter of time and they were going to take it over. And once Manchuria was gone, then you knew that all China was gone.

*Q: Why was this?*

MELBY: Traditionally, he who controls Manchuria, controls China. It's always been the case. There was the famous book by somebody, back in the '30s, Manchuria, the Cockpit of Asia.

I got out on one of the last planes out of Mukden. I went right back to Nanking and issued the

evacuation order: "Get the people out and get them out fast."

*Q: When we're talking about getting the people out, who are we talking about?*

MELBY: Embassy dependents, which we had a lot -- we had a staff of 100 people in Nanking, plus dependents. So it was a large contingent.

*Q: The ambassador wasn't playing much of a role in the evacuation?*

MELBY: Not in the evacuation, no. We would talk to him about it. Actually, his secretary then, whom Walt Butterworth had brought with him from Madrid, held a (inaudible), whom later on I married, Dr. Stuart's secretary. She was wonderful with the old gentleman. She even got along with Philip.

*Q: I'm trying to get some of the dates here. So the evacuation came in October, '48. What happened then?*

MELBY: They left, and there was a skeleton staff in the embassy. And finally, people like me were ordered out by Washington.

*Q: When was that?*

MELBY: I left in mid-December of '48. The Department's rationale was that they didn't want to take a chance on anybody who, by any stretch of the imagination, had been connected with any kind of intelligence activity to be caught by the communists.

*Q: This was after Ward?*

MELBY: No, this was long before Ward.

I was perfectly willing to stay and be occupied. But I could understand how the Department felt about it. Because we didn't know! Things were so bitter at this time, there were incrimination so bad. We had long lost contact with the communists. We didn't know what they were thinking, what they were doing.

*Q: In your time there, with the Marshall mission and all, had you had any contact with the communists?*

MELBY: Oh, yes. They had an office in Chungking, and one in Nanking. And we all used to see them quite regularly. I knew Zhou En-lai very well. He was the head of the communist office. In fact, Zhou En-lai was the first Chinese I ever met. I had lunch with him the first day I was in Chungking.

*Q: How did they deal with you, yourself?*

MELBY: Fine. We got along all right.

*Q: Talk about "Where are we going, our two countries?"*

MELBY: Sure. They were quite open, frankly. No problem. It was easier to talk with them than with the Nationalists. You knew the Nationalists were lying most of the time. The communists never lied.

*Q: Were you able to keep up these contacts as the war got worse?*

MELBY: Marshall left in January, '47. The summer of '47, Chiang Kai-shek outlawed the communist party. So all these offices in Nationalist China closed. From then on, we had no contact whatsoever.

*Q: Were you ever having Chinese coming in from the street saying, "I'm an unofficial emissary of this, and would you do this?" Were there any kind of undercover contacts with you?*

MELBY: Well, once the communist party was outlawed, no; they weren't coming into the embassy. Fred Shultheis, who really was CIA, he had a network. People were coming to him, he had his contacts.

*Q: How was he calling it? Did he have a different view than anybody else?*

MELBY: No. He used to sit in our embassy meetings. He used to draft our telegrams for us, too, sometimes.

*Q: So he was reporting: "Hear they come. They're irresistible. This is a corrupt Latin regime."*

MELBY: No.

*Q: So, it wasn't a matter of hawks and doves, or hardliners?*

MELBY: Mr. Shultheis had impeccable Chinese. He could sit and read comic strips in Chinese. He would read cheap fiction; just sit in a rickshaw and read it, just to keep in practice. He was absolutely fluent in it. His contacts were extraordinary.

*Q: But again, there was unanimity within the mission.*

*Were you having any people from the United States, from the left, coming over saying, "This is a great thing"? And trying to make contact? And you, particularly in your USIA capacity, were you finding yourself dealing with people who were looking forward to this great change in China?*

*You're shaking your head.*

MELBY: No, they weren't coming. We had a raft of visitors coming. But they were people like Eisenhower, when he was Chief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Colonel Lindbergh came out at one

point. Henry Luce used to show up. Bill Bullitt came. People of that sort. We had an endless stream of that kind of visitor.

*Q: We've both been attending a historian's paper on Henry Luce. Could you describe your impression of Henry Luce? He was a very influential person in our China policy for some years, as a publisher of Time and Life magazines.*

MELBY: I had only met him once. I finally met him once in Nanking. I ran into him on the street in Nanking. He was headed in to see Dr. Stuart. He stopped me -- he knew who I was -- and we stopped and talked about China. He was giving me a pathetic lament. I believe he said, "Those of you who criticize people like me for our stand in support of the Nationalists, you've got to remember that we were born here. This is all we've ever known. We had made a lifetime commitment to the advancement of Christianity in China. And now you're attacking us for it. You're asking us to say that all our lives have been wasted; they've been futile. They've been lived for nothing. That's a pretty tough thing to ask of anyone, isn't it?"

I said, "Of course it is! I'm still asking it of you. Because things have changed."

I think Henry Luce was a very troubled man. I think he beginning to have real doubts -- this was in the fall of 1947 -- as to what had happened in China, and had he been wrong after all. Particularly he had them when he was in China. He'd go back to New York, I suppose, and he'd just mirror-image a bit, and he'd revert back to the old China lobby syndrome.

*Q: Did any of the members of the conservative wing of the Republican Party come and visit during this period? Or was their criticism pretty much limited to being back in Washington?*

MELBY: No, they used to come out. In the summer of '47 we had one group or another. We had some 40 or 50 congressmen who came out. Walter Judd was always dropping in or out. They weren't just criticizing. Wedemeyer came out on a fact-finding mission.

*Q: When they came out -- you were all seeing one thing. Weren't they seeing the same thing?*

MELBY: Yes. And while they were there, they would be saying, "Isn't it dreadful, the things that are happening here!" Then they'd go back to the States and go back into the old pattern again.

*Q: Why is this?*

MELBY: I don't know. Don't ask me.

*Q: Was this puzzling to all of you?*

MELBY: Life is a paradox.

*Q: You left again, at the end of January, 1948. When did Nanking fall?*

MELBY: Nanking didn't fall until late spring of '49. It took quite a bit of time. Peking had

already fallen; not by the time I left, but it did fall in January.

The battle of Huai Hai had already started, which was the final engagement. Which I happened to be witnessing because I'd taken one last trip to Peking, mid-December. We were having lunch with Dave Barrett. We began to hear the thuds. One of the mess boys ran in and said, "If you want to get out of here, you'd better get out, because the communists are shelling the airfield!"

So we left lunch right away, and sure enough, they were shelling it. It was a beautiful day, beautiful as only Peking can be in the fall, with the sunshine on the persimmons. It was a clear day and we flew high over the battle of Huai Hai, over the China plain, and you could see out there so clear.

You could see exactly what Lin Piao was doing. This huge enveloping movement that was broken up into literally hundreds, maybe thousands of small pincer movements. Each one moving in, pinching off one group of Nationalist troops after another. It was magnificent! It was fascinating. At the same time, it was horrible. You could imagine the death and destruction that was going on as villages were burning and people were dying. And when it was over -- that particular campaign lasted for two months -- there was no Nationalist Army left. The communists had destroyed them all.

Some they captured; there was something like 900,000 prisoners before it was all over, living prisoners, to say nothing of those who had been killed. It was the only real conventional battle the communists fought in the civil war.

*Q: The rest was just guerilla warfare?*

MELBY: Except for the hundred regiments campaign in 1943, which was a disaster for the communists. They weren't ready for it. It was their Tet offensive, so they say.

*Q: You went back in 1948, then, to Washington. Did you go back to the State Department?*

MELBY: Yes. I was assigned to the Philippine desk. I had leave coming. So I took the leave and went to Texas.

When I came back, that was about the time we finally decided to do the China White Paper. So I was still officially assigned to the Philippine desk, but I was asked to take charge of the White Paper. It took about five months to do.

*Q: Could you explain what the China White Paper was?*

MELBY: The White Paper was a decision on the part of the Department, Secretary of State, with the approval of the President, who was enthusiastic about it, to write the record of our relationship with China. With special reference to the period since 1944. And set forth the record, and set it straight. And tell it as it was, no matter who got hurt.

It was not to be a propaganda job, presenting one side. It was to set the record out as we, I, saw

it. And that is exactly what we did.

I must have gone over several hundred-thousand documents, picking out essential ones, and writing it, and getting people -- I wrote about half of the White Paper myself. Other people wrote other chapters. We worked on it 18 hours a day, from March until August.

We produced this 1,500-page document, which came out August 8, 1949. George Kennan, who at this point had gone to the hospital with another attack of his stomach ulcers, took the White Paper with him to the hospital and read it straight through. He said that it was the greatest state document ever produced by the American government!

The purpose was to call the dogs off from the China lobby. And it didn't work.

*Q: It was a group that was not particularly interested in the facts, was it? They essentially had political fish to fry in the United States.*

MELBY: The China lobby, insofar as you can define it, was the antecedent of the so-called Committee of a Million Signatures. It was composed of people from a whole political spectrum, from the far right to the far left, who had only one thing in common: for whatever their reasons, they were in complete support of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationals. That was the only thing they were united on.

*Q: Did you ever puzzle out why so many people were so entranced with this admittedly, in retrospect, obviously corrupt, not very pleasant regime?*

MELBY: If you can define it, I think it was anti-communism. The American obsession with communism. It drew together an awful lot of people.

*Q: From all spectrums. How did you feel? You produced this paper, and then it just didn't seem to have the effect. Was this a great disappointment to you?*

MELBY: Oh no, it was just the opposite. It just accrued more fuel for the fire. I thought, "Well, at least the communists are going to be able to say there's something to it. Maybe they'll like it, and so what." And so help me God, Mao Zedong read the damn thing and proceeded to write five editorials for the official communist newspaper attacking it as proof of how imperialistic American policy had been.

So I figured, "Yes, you can't win." [Laughter]

**OSCAR VANCE ARMSTRONG**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Guangzhou (1946-1947)**

**Language Officer**

**Beijing (1947-1950)**

**China Watcher  
Hong Kong (1954-1957)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Washington, DC (1957-1961)**

**Deputy Principal Officer  
Hong Kong (1964-1966)**

**Bureau of East Asian Affairs/Public Affairs  
Washington, DC (1966-1968)**

**Deputy Chief of Mission  
Taipei, Taiwan (1968-1971)**

**Political Advisor, Commander in Chief  
Pacific (1971-1973)**

**Director, China Office  
Washington, DC (1973-1976)**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian Affairs  
Washington, DC (1976)**

*Oscar Vance Armstrong was born in China to American Parents in 1918. He received his bachelor of science degree from Davidson College in 1939. Subsequently, he served in the U.S. Army during World War II. His Foreign Service posts included Canton, Peiping, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, London, and Taipei. He was interviewed by Willis Armstrong in March 1991.*

*Q: Oscar, it is nice to have a chance to get on tape your recollections, reflections and philosophy about your long experience in dealing with particularly Far Eastern affairs on behalf of the U.S. Government. How did you happen to get into the Foreign Service in the first place?*

ARMSTRONG: I guess it goes back to the fact that I was born in China of missionary parents.

*Q: It makes a difference.*

ARMSTRONG: It does make a difference. But I didn't go directly from that background into the Foreign Service. I had a detour after college and went into actuarial work for a couple of years. Then the war came along and I was in the Army Air Corps and ended up in a POW camp in Germany. I had a lot of spare time to think and like a lot of people decided that I didn't want to go back to what I was doing. I preferred the Foreign Service instead.

*Q: What was your first assignment in the Foreign Service?*

ARMSTRONG: This was back in the time when we had a 3-months training program at what used to be called the Lothrop House (wasn't it?) up there on Connecticut Avenue where it splits. We were all given a chance to express our preferences. I logically enough expressed China, and I got Canton.

*Q: They got it right that time. So you went to Canton in 1946?*

ARMSTRONG: Went there towards the end of '46. I was assigned to what I guess all officers nowadays are assigned to Consular work. There was a huge backlog of Chinese who wanted to come to the States from that part of China which was the area from which most Chinese-Americans in the past have come. There was also a long history of fraud in that area. So there was this huge human tide waiting to sweep into the consulate and we had very few resources to cope with it. I probably let more people into the United States with a claim to citizenship who didn't have a valid claim than any other officer in the Service.

*Q: Statute of Limitations will protect you now.*

ARMSTRONG: Thank you. But it was an interesting period there. The area was still very much affected by the Japanese war-time occupation, of course. There was not much political activity in that area when I was there that I was aware of, even though Canton traditionally has been one of the areas of revolutionary activity.

*Q: It was an area more affected by Westernization, wasn't it, than some other parts of China?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, partly because of its proximity to Hong Kong, or course. It was also the place from which Chiang Kai-shek started on his 1926 Northern March to unify the country.

So I had a year there. Only a year, for reasons that I don't know are relevant to this operation -- I almost got fired from the Foreign Service then.

*Q: Did you now. I assume it was not for cause.*

ARMSTRONG: Well, there were about three of us who got into trouble with a senior officer. Finally the embassy sent somebody down to find out what the problem was and decided the best thing was to clean house. So I came out, smelling like a rose, assigned to Peking -- to the language school in Peking.

*Q: That was 1947.*

ARMSTRONG: The end of 1947. I stayed at Peking just long enough to have Mao Zedong establish the People's Republic of China. We left in November of 1949. The consulate general then stayed on and was finally forced out by the Chinese who said they were going to retake some of the buildings that at one time housed the U.S. Marines and at our time housed the consulate general.

*Q: That happened when?*

ARMSTRONG: It was April of 1950.

*Q: So you were three years in...*

ARMSTRONG: Well, I left earlier having finished language school in November of '49. I spent about two years there.

*Q: But you had had some childhood training in Chinese.*

ARMSTRONG: I grew up speaking the language but left China, as many missionary families did, in 1927 and then because of family medical problems we stayed in this country for three years. At the age of 8 or 9 when you are trying to be an American in an American community you don't retain your Chinese very well.

*Q: That was exactly my wife's experience. She was a missionary's daughter in Japan and she grew up speaking Japanese and came back at the age of 8. She lost it.*

ARMSTRONG: I don't know if it is relevant to this, but you might be interested in telling her this. At a social function many, many years later, I found myself sitting next to a woman who turned out to be a clinical psychologist. Somehow we got into the usual opening conversational gambit of where are you from? I said, "Which do you want, the simple or more complex answer?" She said, "Well, give me the complicated one." I told her about China. We talked about that and then I said, "You know, I lost a lot of my language. I went back to China, but most of the time I was in Shanghai then where there is a different dialect than I had known. Is there some way that you or others could expedite the process of relearning the language -- bringing some of that memory back up to the surface -- perhaps hypnotism?" She said, "Yes, probably, but not completely successfully depending on the subject. But it is risky because you don't know what other memories you are going to bring up."

Anyway, I finished language school in Peking and was authorized to leave. The Communists took Peking, if I remember correctly, in January of '49 so we had a little less than a year there after they took over the city.

*Q: What were your impressions of the initial impact of the Chinese Communists taking over at that point?*

ARMSTRONG: Well, in the first place the takeover was not by military action. The communists had been moving down into the area and eventually the Chinese general commanding the armies in the area, General Fu Tso-yi, in effect defected with all of his forces. So Peking was under siege for a while but it was not shelled.

I would say from the point of view of the Chinese people there, in the first place a lot of the younger people, students, etc., had already been slipping out through the Nationalist lines joining

with the communists, probably not knowing too much about communism, but they wanted a change. They didn't see a change being promised by the Nationalist regime. I have always felt that Chiang Kai-shek lost China partly because of some serious military mistakes he, himself, made...

*Q: But they were basically political mistakes.*

ARMSTRONG: Basically he did not have, and was unable to project a vision of a changed China. Many, many Chinese did not want the old China, the old corrupt regime. So, whether you call it political or ideological, or what, he was just unable to break away from the way he had done things in the past or the circle of people he had around him.

Going back to the Peking takeover, I think it was rather a complex mixture of relief that they were not going to be caught up in the fighting, and hope that some sort of change was going to occur. This was at a time when the communists were still talking about what they called "new democracy." They were not implementing, whenever they got to a city, the harsher measures they adopted later. They essentially took over the administrations and kept them doing what they were doing, etc. So, some hope for some change, but also some concern because they didn't know much about these people.

*Q: The capital was not in Beijing...*

ARMSTRONG: Right. At that time it was not called Beijing, it was called Peiping, which means "northern peace" rather than "northern capital" -- a term which those of us who in government were involved in Chinese affairs had to continue to use for many years, because we did not recognize Peking as the capital, once the communists established it as the capital. We kept saying Peiping. I still say Peking frequently and when people ask me, "Shouldn't you say Beijing?" I say, "Yes if you feel you must say 'Pa-ree' rather than Paris."

So, it was an interesting period. Those of us in Peking did not suffer unduly. There were some inconveniences and some humorous aspects of them. I don't know if you want that sort of anecdotal material. Elsewhere there had been serious problems. Angus Ward up in Mukden had been in prison accused of spying. He was eventually released.

*Q: Those of us who knew Angus and had served with him in Moscow were sure that he had beaten those Chinese to an inch of their lives. He was a rough man.*

ARMSTRONG: Was he? I was there when he came out. Our travel was obviously circumscribed. We couldn't go outside the city without getting permission. There were some other minor hardships. The communists, of course, didn't officially recognize the diplomatic status of the consulate or of the people assigned to it. One historical footnote: Howard Sollenberger was the head of the language school; he later became head of FSI here; and many years later, after the Chinese had established their liaison office here, the number two at the office, a fellow by the name of Han Xu, was interested in taking a tour of FSI. As soon as they met, Han Xu said, "It is nice to see you again." Sol couldn't figure this out. It turned out that Han Xu had been the city government official who had come to the consulate general on October 1,

1949 to officially, although they didn't recognize us officially, notify the consulate general that the People's Republic of China had been established and turned the document over to Sol at the gate of the consulate general. Many, many years later they re-established contact. So I left in November.

*Q: That is when they closed out.*

ARMSTRONG: Well, I left before they closed the consulate because I had finished the language study.

*Q: You weren't assigned to the consulate per se.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, I was assigned to the consulate but we had our own...

*Q: But you were doing language study.*

ARMSTRONG: Doing language study essentially.

*Q: Were there any unpleasantness when they finally did close out the consulate or was it a peaceful departure?*

ARMSTRONG: Relatively peaceful. I think there was some minor harassment. There was a little bit when we left, but we managed to get all of our belongings out. Earlier the Department had authorized us, as the communists were closing in on the region, to ship out both our families and furniture. Almost everyone shipped their furniture and almost nobody shipped their families home. But we still had a good bit left -- in fact acquired some more as things were so cheap. We managed to get our personal things out. There was harassment at the station because they wanted to look at everything, etc.

*Q: You came out by train?*

ARMSTRONG: Went down to Tientsin by train and then by coastal steamer to Hong Kong and back to the States.

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ARMSTRONG: I left in 1954, I guess. Either '54 or '55. My next assignment was Hong Kong to become part of the rather sizeable China Watching group which was one of the main functions of the consulate general there.

*Q: How many people did you have in the China Watching group?*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, goodness. I have a bad memory for that sort of thing. I would say probably about, leaving the Agency aside, about ten Foreign Service officers at that time. We also had, and this was what I did for a while when I first arrived, a very large press monitoring and translation unit of Chinese. And a publication procurement operation. The good entrepreneurial

spirit of the Hong Kong Chinese pretty soon learned that the U.S. government was willing to pay good money for publications from the Mainland, newspapers, magazines, etc. So we had a good bit of success in getting that kind of thing.

The translation unit supplemented what FBIS was already doing, which was monitoring the radio.

*Q: Go back a minute. When the consulate was shoved out of Peking in 1950, all other consulates were also removed weren't they?*

ARMSTRONG: Not simultaneously.

*Q: Within that time frame...*

ARMSTRONG: Within that time frame there was no more official US representation. There is still controversy, incidentally, in academia and elsewhere, over whether or not there were some Chinese communist overtures that we, the US, failed to pick up and respond to. One in particular I remember but I won't go into detail here. But that debate to some extent continues.

*Q: One could always, of course, point out that, if one were arguing that case, that as long as you had Walter Robertson as Assistant Secretary of State, no....*

ARMSTRONG: Well, that was later, of course.

*Q: This was later. When was he out?*

ARMSTRONG: Leighton Stuart was then still our ambassador to China, the former head or President of Lingnan University up in Peking, a former missionary. And it was during that period that there were supposedly some of these overtures.

*Q: I see, this was in an earlier stage.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, an earlier stage. Later, once the Korean War broke out, there was no possibility of obtaining a rapprochement. But, before that, my own view is that there was not a real interest in China, and at that time when they were adopting a policy of leaning to one side, as they put it -- that is you can't be neutral in the cold war between the US and the USSR, you have to take sides. It would have been extremely difficult to establish any kind of diplomatic relations.

*Q: So there are a whole multitude of reasons as to why that was unlikely.*

ARMSTRONG: I think it was unlikely. But you recall that we sort of shifted our position on the Chinese civil war, the US government did.

*Q: After the Marshall Mission.*

ARMSTRONG: After the Marshall Mission failure and after the Chiang Kai-shek withdrawal to Taiwan and so on. We initially did not come out for full support of the Nationalists in Taiwan. We said in effect that we were not going to get involved. But then, of course, June, 1950, the Korean War, and the Chinese, so-called volunteers that came in that year....

*Q: Refresh my memory. When was it that McCarthy got into guys who had served in China, like....*

ARMSTRONG: I was trying to... I saw Jack Service recently out on the West Coast.

*Q: Oh, did you. His son joined the Foreign Service and worked for me in the State Department. A good officer.*

ARMSTRONG: Oh, did he? Is he still in the Service?

*Q: I don't know. That was a long time ago.*

ARMSTRONG: I was trying to remember the other day and I said I would have to refresh my memory and get the dates right here, but I haven't done it. Early 50's.

*Q: I was thinking the McCarthy era when it went hammer and tongs was primarily under the Eisenhower Administration.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right.

*Q: So it had to be 1952 on.*

ARMSTRONG: I guess Eisenhower came in the '52 election. So '53 or '54.

*Q: Of course, by that time, the fat was in the fire as far as the Korean War was concerned and there was no question about the US position towards Communist China.*

ARMSTRONG: No, there wasn't. By that time we began to give strong support to the Nationalists on Taiwan.

*Q: As well as continuing support to the Koreans.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, yes, of course. So I was in Hong Kong for about two years. I always seemed to have stayed at posts two years. The idea of double tours never quite caught up with me.

*Q: It was kind of hard on your furniture.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes it was.

An interesting period in China because not only the Korean War aspect, but developments within

China itself. That was when they had completed their land reform program, at great human cost, and they were trying to develop their economy with a modicum of success and a good deal of Soviet assistance.

*Q: This was well before the break.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. And they were doing some rather sensible things given the overall context in which they forced themselves to operate. So it was interesting to be there.

*Q: Your work with that group -- were you looking primarily at political matters?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, mainly political. We also had some who were looking at the economic effort.

*Q: I remember the intelligence reporting that came out of Hong Kong and that area. I was involved in COCOM and trying to keep things away from the Chinese. So naturally we read what was going on and tried to evaluate what that meant in terms of what we should try to withhold. We had a special list on China which had more simple technology than in the case of Russia. People used to argue that the Russians could buy it and sell it to the Chinese. My own judgment at the time was that that was too complicated for the Russians to handle. The bureaucracy would render any major transaction impossible.*

*Then, after Hong Kong?*

ARMSTRONG: After Hong Kong I stayed in China Watching, being assigned back to the Department to take over the China Office in INR. I was there for four years -- one of the longest tours of my career.

*Q: From '57 to '61.*

ARMSTRONG: Again, that was a very interesting period in China. You had, I don't want to put too much into China Watching jargon, but you had what was then known as the Hundred Flowers Campaign. This was to relax the atmosphere and tolerate some criticism. It got out of hand and they immediately clamped down. You had the anti-Rightists campaign then. One of the earlier manifestations of what later became a very consistent pattern in China under the Chinese Communists, suspicion of the intellectuals.

*Q: When was the so-called cultural revolution? Was that....*

ARMSTRONG: That came later. That came in the mid-60s. But this earlier Hundred Flowers campaign, when Mao was surprised by the volume and vehemence of some of the dissent and decided to crack down, wasn't the first, but was the first time that they really threw the fear of Marx and Lenin into the intellectuals of China. Then you had the Great Leap Forward in '58, one of the world's craziest experiments. Then the communes as part of the Great Leap Forward.

*Q: That was when they took the intellectuals out and put them in pig sties.*

ARMSTRONG: That was a part of it. The main thing was when they...back tracking just a little bit. China needed land reform because you had eighty percent of the Chinese working the land who were deeply in debt to the landlords, etc. The Chinese carried it out in a very violent manner. Nobody really knows how many people were killed, but I suspect the figure is in the millions.

*Q: By collectivization.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. But they did distribute the land. Then gradually they started with mutual aid teams, then cooperatives, then collectives and eventually they moved into communes by which time the peasants had lost all the land. They had no land or implements to work with, everything had been communalized. And the system didn't work. Together with the Great Leap Forward, the commune system and some bad weather, China came closer to the type of traditional famine for which China was infamous than any other time of the communist rule.

*Q: That was 1950...?*

ARMSTRONG: That would have been '58, '59 and the really bad year was 1960-61. The Chinese popular parlance still refers to it as the Bad Years. Nobody really knows how serious the problem really was. One demographer later said that China should have 28 million more than they seem to have. That doesn't mean 28 million died, but there were many deaths through starvation and malnutrition. Infant mortality rate was very high.

*Q: Also, probably the statistical methods were questionable too.*

ARMSTRONG: Sure.

*Q: I remember doing the Russian census which came out about 1940. The growth rate of the population by 1940 was much less than you would have expected given the normal indices in Russia.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes.

*Q: We attributed that in large measure to the loss of people during the 1930 collectivization. Millions of people died there, nobody knows how many. We suspected in the embassy in 1940 in Moscow that the Russians had fiddled the figures and raised them higher than the actual count to cover up some of the losses. We had no way of proving that, however.*

ARMSTRONG: The other major development during my time in INR...as a matter of fact I was down at a West Virginia State park with the family taking a vacation when it happened...was the Taiwan Straits Crisis in 1958, when it appeared that the Chinese were trying to oust the Nationalists from the islands right off the mainland's coast -- Quemoy and Matsu. Quemoy, being only three or four miles off the coast, was heavily fortified. One issue for the United States was "Are they actually going to start an invasion of the islands? If not, are they going to try to interdict the islands and if so what should we do about that?"

*Q: I remember. I was in the Department until April of 1958, and then I was in Ottawa. I remember that very tense time.*

ARMSTRONG: There was another issue, although I never thought it was a serious issue. That is whether or not, if we got involved in some way, were the Soviets going to get involved. There were some who felt we had edged towards nuclear war. I never felt that way. Partly because the Soviets, although giving a reasonable amount of support to the Chinese, didn't come out with their real sort of vigorous support and threatening language vis-a-vis the West until it became apparent that the whole thing was going to calm down. Many years later we learned that one of the problems of the Sino-Soviet relationship was the failure of the Soviets to give China as much support as China thought it should have.

*Q: The Russians don't like the Chinese very much. They are scared of them because there are more Chinese than there are Russians. And they have been scared of the yellow peril more than anybody else for years.*

ARMSTRONG: You may have heard the Polish joke about the genie that appeared to a Pole with three wishes. He said, "I want the Chinese to invade Poland and then withdraw." So they did. "Okay," said the genie, "You get another wish, what do you want?" "I want the same thing," he said. So it happened again. When he asked for the same thing the third time, the genie said, "Okay, but why do you want this?" He said, "Well, every time they attack us and withdraw they have to cross the Soviet Union."

So I was in INR until 1961. Then I had a year at the National War College.

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*Q: After 1964 what did you do?*

ARMSTRONG: I went to Hong Kong as deputy principal officer. I was there for two years. That particular position was not a China Watch position but the post was still China watching, although Hong Kong itself was becoming more and more important.

*Q: Hong Kong, itself, was beginning to assert its own identity. We were getting all of that tremendous economic activity.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right. Therefore, mainly on the economic side, there was a good bit of American interest. I had a lot of American companies coming in. But the China watching activity at the post continued because we didn't have any post closer to China proper. As many of the number two jobs were in many places, one of my main function was to keep wheels turning smoothly.

*Q: You performed the DCM functions which is to make sure that you do everything that needs to be done that other people are not doing.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right. And not inject myself unduly in what they or the consul general are doing. Again it was an interesting two years.

*Q: Who was the consul general?*

ARMSTRONG: Ed Rice.

*Q: I knew him, sure. He and I were neighbors here.*

ARMSTRONG: Ed subsequently had a Diplomatic-in-Residence job during which he started a book. He produced a carefully researched book about Communist China up to that time. Recently I heard he has just come out with a new book about...well the title is something like "Wars of A Third Kind." I am not sure.

Anyway it was a very pleasant two years.

*Q: Oh, it is a very attractive place.*

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ARMSTRONG: I came back to Washington to take over the public affairs job in FE. That was rather a tough period, because the Vietnam war was going then and was the main issue, of course. I think the name was changed by then to EA.

I worked under Bill Bundy who was Assistant Secretary during that period.

*Q: Oh, yes, I remember that.*

ARMSTRONG: He was a very bright guy with a rather short temper. The main activity I found myself in was with the press. I was constantly being contacted by journalists who were trying to get some background information or something they could use. Things were not always going well in Vietnam. The Tet Offensive occurred while I was there.

*Q: Your tour was from....?*

ARMSTRONG: 1966 to 1968. As did many others, I had great respect for the fellow who was our spokesman at that time, Bob McCloskey. He was in a tough position at a tough time. He did a good job.

Then I went from there to DCM in Taiwan.

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*Q: That was when we were officially recognizing Taiwan.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right. Walter McConaughy was our ambassador. It was an interesting

period, but not as interesting as it became, because I had left by the time we made our first open overture, the Kissinger trip to China. What was interesting about Taiwan, of course, was seeing the rather remarkable achievements -- one of the worlds best land reform programs, etc. There was not yet political liberalization, that occurred later and is still going on. Chiang Kai-shek at least had enough sense to let some of the well-trained and imaginative technocrats do something about the whole economic thing beginning with land reform. They did a very impressive job, with our assistance to be sure. By the time I got there most of our direct assistance had ended.

*Q: They were on their own by then.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. Since then they have become an economic powerhouse. Second or third largest foreign reserves in the world. We have an enormous trade deficit with them which has become a problem. And interestingly enough in the more recent years, beginning to get an international position again, mainly because of their economic clout. They rather astutely use that sometimes to, in effect lure little countries, because sometimes they can get more out of Taiwan than they can Peking, so they establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan. There have been five of those recently.

*Q: There is an opening for Albania, isn't there.*

ARMSTRONG: It was interesting to see a Nationalist government that had done so poorly on the Mainland doing so well in Taiwan. Now the order of magnitude was so different that you couldn't say, "Why didn't they do it on the Mainland?" They didn't relax their political control, which they now have started, beginning with Chiang Kai-shek's son when he became president.

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*Q: I visited there in 1972, after the Chiefs of Mission meeting in Hong Kong. I stayed with McConaughy. You had left. I saw you on the way back, you were at CINCPAC.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right.

*Q: I was introduced to the president, Chiang Kai-shek's son. Had quite a nice conversation with him -- some of it in Russian.*

ARMSTRONG: He studied in Russia and has a Russian wife. A delightful person. She was very quiet and very much behind the scenes. He was cut from quite a different cloth than his father. He was a much more forward-looking person than his father. Not nearly as hidebound. His father was very austere, reserved. The son was quite outgoing. Before he rose to very high positions, he liked to have informal parties. He liked to drink until his health got to the point where he couldn't. He was one of the world's masters at the Chinese finger game. This is where you throw out a certain number of fingers and try to guess the total. The usual thing was that if you lost you downed a small glass of wine. He couldn't do that any more for health reasons so he had what the Chinese called a "dai biao", which is a drinking representative. Occasionally he felt he had to lose just to give the other person some face. Then his aide would knock one off.

I had left by the time of the big political shock to them, the Kissinger and Nixon trips. I moved on to CINCPAC as political adviser under two admirals. You couldn't find two more different admirals. Admiral McCain...

*Q: I knew Admiral McCain in London.*

ARMSTRONG: He was a gutsy guy, not an intellect but he knew how to play the political field.

*Q: Nobody's fool in any respect.*

ARMSTRONG: Theoretically MACV in Vietnam reported to him and he instructed MACV what to do, but he knew perfectly well that was not the way the war in Vietnam was being handled. And where some people would have a hard time finding his proper role in that situation, he did. It wasn't a very major role, but he played it well.

*Q: He went from London out there, didn't he?*

ARMSTRONG: I don't remember.

*Q: Because I left in '67 and he must have gone quite directly to CINCPAC.*

ARMSTRONG: He retired while I was there. Much to his regret, he didn't get extended and had to leave. He was replaced by Noel Gayler. A very different sort; the new type of admiral. More like Bud Zumwalt. Remember that Zumwalt came in as CNO and started shaking things up? Well Gayler is more of that type. And he had as J-5 a fellow who was even more "gung ho." That created some problems. Occasionally one of the more junior officers would come to me and say, "Hey, look, this fellow is off on this wild idea, can you get involved and reel him in?"

We did a lot of traveling out of there which was good. I got a chance to visit a lot of areas. McCain was a workaholic and if he wasn't doing something he became very nervous. One of the things he could do was to travel, so he spent a good deal of time traveling around.

*Q: Did he have his wife's sister there too?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, Rowena. There is a wonderful story. Jack is not known for a great sense of humor. The two of them were almost identical twins. Unless you got to know them well you could easily mix them up. She spent a good deal of time living with them. I think she had been divorced or something. Somebody once said to Jack, "How do you tell them apart?" Jack said, "That is their problem."

*Q: I knew that story too. They were both very nice women.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, they were.

*Q: Were you able to reel in the other admiral now and then?*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. He was a nice guy, just a bull in the china shop always trying to get something new done.

*Q: Of course his subordinates couldn't talk back to him whereas you could.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. I learned more about how the military operated there then I did at the War College.

*Q: Yes. You were in an operational command, so to speak.*

ARMSTRONG: I was impressed by many of the officers. Two things impressed me. They had some excellent officers despite the fact that assignment to a unified command was not a sought after post, because you were losing your service identity.

*Q: Don't you think this is changed under General Powell now? It seemed to me one of the great examples of the recent war was inter- service cooperation.*

ARMSTRONG: I think it probably has changed. The other thing that impressed me was that....we at the State Department have a great deal of resources, I mean people, etc...the Pentagon has enormous resources and plenty of people and the automatic tendency is to use them. So it will throw 30 people at it.

*Q: So does the CIA.*

ARMSTRONG: Yeah.

*Q: They throw people at it and it is good if they throw the right people.*

ARMSTRONG: So it was a very pleasant two years. From my point of view two years is enough, because you are in an advisory capacity not in a chain of command position. So you keep having to find ways to work yourself in to things that are going on -- they don't automatically come to you.

*Q: You were there from ....?*

ARMSTRONG: 1971 to '73.

*Q: I stopped to see you there on my way back from Hong Kong in '72.*

ARMSTRONG: Then I was asked if I would come back and head up the China Office. By that time Nixon had been to China. Incidentally, that news was a bomb shell for Jack McCain. For one thing, he loved to give slide illustrated briefings and every once in a while there would appear on the screen a map with all the communists area colored red, with tentacles going out to grab the rest of the world. And all of a sudden China couldn't be a huge red blob with tentacles menacing the rest of Asia.

*Q: Those are our new friends.*

ARMSTRONG: So I came back to Washington just about the time we were changing...

*Q: I was in the Department then. That was in '73.*

ARMSTRONG: I came back in the summer of '73. We had agreed to the establishment of Liaison Offices. David Bruce was the first.

*Q: Yes, I talked to him before he went out. I also talked to him when he came back. He said he was glad to be back because there really wasn't anything to do there.*

ARMSTRONG: That is true. Initially that was a period when the Chinese had achieved what they wanted -- a relationship with the US, essentially for anti-Soviet reasons. They were not going to give much to the US until we went further.

Kissinger, of course, was interested in the relationship primarily for strategic reasons, not for sort of normal bilateral reasons. But he was interested in the bilateral thing to show that the relationship was healthy. At times he was pushy, trying to push the Chinese for that reason. And it didn't get very far. The bilateral relationship remained, things like trade and an issue called the old claims-assets issue, if you remember what that was. That was the blocked Communist Chinese assets that we had blocked at the time of the Korean War, and American claims against China. Eventually there was the trade-off between the two. We would negotiate that at times and think we were very close to it, when all of a sudden they wouldn't approve the final step. I'm sure it was because the Chinese had said, "Not until you take another step toward diplomatic relations."

Exchanges were negotiated but at a non-official level.

*Q: It was an anomalous situation because we officially were doing business with both countries - - both Chinas. And both Chinas were saying you can't have a two China policy.*

ARMSTRONG: And essentially we were having one, of course.

*Q: Yes we were. I have forgotten how long that period was. It started in '73.*

ARMSTRONG: It started actually with the Nixon visit in '72. The Kissinger secret visit was in 1971.

*Q: But the Chinese ambassador came here. I was in the Department and used to have lunches with him. Bill Rogers would have him in for lunch and some of us would attend.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, that was in early '73. It lasted until President Carter took the decision to recognize Peking.

*Q: The two Chinas carried over into the Carter Administration.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, if you want to call it that. We then took the final step of derecognizing the Nationalists on Taiwan; recognizing Peking as the government; establishing full diplomatic relations with them; letting our security treaty with Taiwan lapse; and withdrawing what military we had there, which wasn't very much. So it lasted up until January 1, 1979, which I believe was the official date. It was announced in December, 1978.

*Q: It was really from 1972 until 1979. A long period.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes it was.

*Q: As Director of the China Office you were dealing with both missions.*

ARMSTRONG: No, EA established a Taiwan Office, so I was the Mainland office. I think that was done so that one wouldn't have a conflict of interest, so to speak.

*Q: Who did Taiwan when you were in the China Office?*

ARMSTRONG: Well, let's see. I think Tom Shoemith had it for a while. And I think Burt Levin had it for a while. I was not there. I had left by the time.....

*Q: You were there until....?*

ARMSTRONG: I was there until '76, I guess. Then I had a period of some months, 4 or 5 months, as one of the Deputy Assistant Secretaries in EA covering China, Korea and Japan. Art Hummel was then Assistant Secretary.

*Q: He is a very fine guy.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes, he was. He ended up, I believe, as the senior ranking officer in the Foreign Service when he retired. He had made Career Ambassador and had been Career Ambassador longer then any other CA then serving.

Incidentally, an interesting little historical record is being set here with respect to China. Art was born in China; then Win Lord, whose wife was Chinese; then Jim Lilley who was born in China and is ambassador now.

*Q: I didn't realize he was born in China.*

ARMSTRONG: Yes. And the rumor is that he wants to retire and will be replaced by Stape Roy, who was born in China. If that happens, I don't know of any other country in the world where we have had three out of the four last ambassadors born in that country. Amazing. I think it will end with Stape just because of the passage of time...

*Q: The line of missionaries is running out. Your father was with the...?*

ARMSTRONG: Presbyterian Church.

*Q: Presbyterian Church.*

ARMSTRONG: It was an interesting period. You had a closer contact with Kissinger than I had. But part of the interest was working in the context of the Kissinger tight control.

*Q: My encounter with Kissinger was over a Chinese matter.*

ARMSTRONG: I think you mentioned that. That was the Rolls Royce engines or something?

*Q: The Spey engines plant. I think I recorded that in my own text. That was a case where he had sold the pass. He told the British that we didn't mind. Then he wanted me to be the guy who would be the goat. He wanted me to recommend that we wouldn't buy it and I wouldn't do it. So when he became Secretary I figured I wasn't going to be there very long and I wasn't. He let me stay on until Tom Enders came just because he needed somebody there.*

*You were DAS for how long?*

ARMSTRONG: About four or five months. And then the new team came in with the Carter Administration. The new Assistant Secretary wanted to set up his own new team.

*Q: Who was your Assistant Secretary when you were DAS?*

ARMSTRONG: Art Hummel.

*Q: Oh, yes. And he went to China as ambassador.*

ARMSTRONG: Later. Art has had four ambassadorships, Burma, Pakistan, Ethiopia and China. I think he went to Pakistan after EA. And then to China in 1981 and was there until '85.

*Q: That was after the Reagan Administration came in.*

ARMSTRONG: That's right. He followed Leonard Woodcock, the head of the auto union.

*Q: Who was Carter's Assistant Secretary?*

ARMSTRONG: Dick Holbrooke.

*Q: Wasn't Harriman in as Assistant Secretary for a while under Carter?*

ARMSTRONG: No, earlier under Kennedy. Back in the early 60s.

**LARUE R. LUTKINS**

**Chinese Language Training  
Yale University (New Haven, Connecticut) and Beijing (1946-1948)**

**Consular Officer  
Kunming (1948-1949)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs  
Washington, DC (1949)**

**Political Officer  
Penang, Malaysia (1950-1952)**

**Political Officer  
Hong Kong (1954-1957)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs  
Washington, DC (1957-1961)**

*LaRue R. Lutkins was born in 1919 and raised in New York. His career with the State Department included assignments in Cuba, China, Malaysia, Japan, Hong Kong, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and South Africa. Mr. Lutkins was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 18, 1990.*

LUTKINS: At that point, I again expressed my interest to Personnel in being assigned to China. It was renewed interest, because I had done it earlier while I was in Havana. I had kept in touch with the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, particularly the Office of Chinese Affairs, about my interest. And they were interested, particularly after the war, in rebuilding their Chinese language officer strength. So when I got back to Washington, I guess it was in January, they put in a plug with Personnel to have me go into Chinese language training.

It was not my original thought. I had thought I could be sent out to one of our China posts. During the war in Havana, I had applied for such a posting and actually been assigned to Chungking, but I never got there because Havana wouldn't release me until my replacement came. By that time, I was in the Army.

So, as a result of the intervention of the Office of Chinese Affairs, Personnel agreed to post me to Yale University, where they were beginning to put officers through what amounted to eight months of preliminary Chinese language training, following which we went out to Peking, or Peiping as it was then known, for another year and a half.

*Q: So you then went to Peking from '47 to '48?*

LUTKINS: Let's see, yes. The better part of '46 was at Yale, and then I got out to Peiping or Peking at the Beginning of '47. The language program training lasted till mid- 1948. Had a couple of months just attached to the Consulate staff there, and then was sent down to Southwest China to head up the Consulate at Kunming.

*Q: Were there any other Foreign Service officers taking Chinese at the time?*

LUTKINS: Oh, very much so, yes. As I said, they were rather depleted in their Chinese language officer corps strength, so they were engaged in quite a program of building that up. At Yale, while I was there, in the term or class before me, there was Ed Martin (China Ed Martin, not the South American economic Ed Martin). He and another fellow, Jim Spear, were already there. Spear subsequently resigned. When I was there, there was a chap named Bob Rinden. We were in the same group. We were soon followed by others including Doug Forman, Al Jenkins, Ralph Clough, Oscar Armstrong, and Jerry Stryker group.

*Q: I wonder if you could give just a little feeling about this. There's nothing like a group of relatively junior officers getting together and studying a language. I mean, they look at the society to which they're going and all. How did they feel? This was, of course, a tumultuous time in China. How did you all, or you particularly, feel about the Kuomintang, the Communist side, and Chinese society as a whole?*

LUTKINS: Well, that's a big question. Sure.

Incidentally, that group of Chinese language officers (and we have remained very close, because we tended to associate throughout our careers and still see a lot of each other, at least those in the Washington area) came from different sources. But a good many of them, well, certainly Oscar Armstrong was brought up in China of an American missionary family. Both Ed Martin and Doug Forman were of missionary families, although their families had been in India, not in China. But Ed Martin's wife was of an American missionary family in China. I had, of course, no previous contact at all with China except general interest. Ralph Clough had been out there as an exchange student at Lingnan University. And then some of the older language officers like Tony Freeman had also been at Lingnan.

Well, to get back to your basic question. I think we all were very sympathetic to China, through background or reading and so forth, and had read a lot about what was going on there during the war. For instance, one of the books that was current at the time was called *Thunder Out of China* by Theodore White and Annalee Jacoby. It painted a rather disillusioning picture of what was going on there, and so did most of the reports coming out of China. We also were, of course, aware of the problems that some of the older Chinese language specialists and Far East specialists had been facing. This was even before the McCarthy accusations, but they were already under attack by people like Ambassador Hurley.

*Q: Patrick Hurley was a particularly vehement antagonist towards the Foreign Service, wasn't he?*

LUTKINS: I never had any personal contact with him, so I couldn't comment on that too accurately. But certainly, from what I've heard from older colleagues who associated with him, they didn't regard him quite in the same sense as McCarthy. I think they felt he just wasn't terribly bright, and also that he was rather boastful and so forth, and sort of a loose cannon more than anything else. Many people thought that Roosevelt sent him to China to get him out of the

way. In any case, after reading books like Barbara Tuchman's *Stilwell and the American Experience in China* and other books of the same sort, Hurley doesn't come off terribly well. Some of my friends certainly found him very difficult to work with. But in any case, this colored our general approach.

In addition to that, it wasn't too difficult for anybody with a reasonably open mind, when once one arrived on the spot, to see that the situation was a very difficult and unhealthy one. It wasn't so much that we were hostile to or critical of the national government, the Kuomintang government. They faced extraordinarily difficult problems. The war had weakened them badly. It forced them into the interior, where they lost their foundation with western middle-class roots and were forced back into the old China, depending on warlordism and this sort of thing. Inflation was rampant, which again was not by any means entirely their fault; it was just a wartime situation. The bottom line to all this was that the regime was very obviously weak, it lacked control over much of the country. There was the usual traditional Chinese corruption, both in the military and in the civil government. The regime really lacked the ability to do anything effective economically on behalf of either the middle class, to which it really owed most of its support, or to the peasantry around the country.

And then, contrasted with this, you had the Communists under Mao Zedong who, whatever their methods, seemed to have a real conviction and spirit, and to be, at that time at least, fairly self-sacrificing in making efforts to do something on behalf of the people and not merely being interested in enriching themselves.

So one couldn't help be rather skeptical of the claims of the national government that it was reasserting its control, and also a little pessimistic as to how things were going to go.

*Q: Was there, within the Foreign Service family while you were in Peking, any what could be called a generational gap? I mean, the younger officers coming in and saying this is a mess.*

LUTKINS: No.

*Q: This happens in some other places, but it didn't happen?*

LUTKINS: Well, it was a generational gap, but I'm pretty sure it wasn't true in Nanking. I didn't serve there, that was where the Embassy was. It most definitely was not true in Peiping. When we first got there, the Consul General was Tony Freeman, and then Tony went back to Washington. He was succeeded by Edmund Clubb, who was certainly a generation older than us, but he very definitely had the views of most of the Foreign Service specialists on China, and as a result got into trouble himself.

Actually, the only generational gap, in the sense that you were referring to, that I ran into, was really later. The man involved I met in Washington originally, and I was in a sense recruited by him, and then later he was my Consul General in Hong Kong, and that's Everett Drumright, who was a very staunch supporter of the Kuomintang and inclined to think that, whatever its faults, we had to support it to the end. Perfectly good argument to be made for that, but he was regarded by the other language officers as, I won't put it in terms of right and left, because it really wasn't

that, but certainly more vigorously anti-Chinese Communist than the younger generation, and more inclined to feel that it would be a tremendous mistake to allow them to take over the country or, later on, to retain their control of the country.

*Q: When did you finish your training and then what was your first assignment? Where did you go and what were you doing?*

LUTKINS: Well, actually, as I said, there was a slight interlude there. I guess I concluded my training around June of '48 and was temporarily detailed to work in the Consulate for a couple of months. They were making arrangements for me to go down to Kunming in the southwest to head up the Consulate there. But in terms of the personnel shifts involved, it involved a brief delay. So I went down to Kunming, I guess it was...

*Q: Kunming is where?*

LUTKINS: Southwest China. It's the capital of the Province of Yenan. The western border of Yenan abuts Burma, and it became very important during World War II, because Kunming was the Chinese terminus of the Burma Road, also of the flights over the Hump. They brought their supplies in to the American and Chinese forces from India. So during the war it experienced quite a bit of development. It had always traditionally been a bit of a backwater in China, controlled by warlords and so forth. But during the war it spruced up quite a bit. Then after the war it reverted a bit. Not to the extent before the war, but as soon as the war was over, everything went back to Nanking and Shanghai. Incidentally, I might just mention, during the war, of course, as you probably know, many of the Chinese universities from the coastal areas were relocated, both in Yenan and the other province to the north, Sichuan, where Chungking is located.

*Q: What were you doing? Why did we have a post there?*

LUTKINS: Of course, we had a network of posts in China, pre-war. I can't give you the exact number, but it must have been ten to fifteen, which were scattered all around.

Kunming (which in the old days was called Yenan-fu, but Kunming's easier) was of some strategic importance, because it was really in a sense part of a French sphere of influence. They had a railroad coming up from Indochina to Kunming, so the French were always fairly important there. The British were interested in it also.

Just as we had Consulates in Chungking, which was really a more important place because it was on the Yangtze River, it was considered desirable to have a Consulate in Kunming. I couldn't begin to tell you when it was first opened, but certainly it must have been ever since the 1920s and possibly a little earlier. There were certain American commercial interests there, but it wasn't a major field of American commercial activity.

*Q: So what were you doing?*

LUTKINS: Primarily political reporting, because that was a very crucial period there, '48 to '49,

when things began to crumble. First in Manchuria, where, incidentally, I had taken a language officer field trip in 1947. Got sort of marooned up there, because of one of the Chinese Communist offensives. Had to fly back to Peking since the rail line was cut. But, as I say, you had this gradual crumbling of the Nationalist position, first in Manchuria, then in North China. We left Peiping in October '48, and it fell to the Communists in December, if I'm not mistaken. I think it was Tientsin first and then Peiping, but I'm not positive. And then, of course, during most of '49 the Communists were sweeping southward. There were some climactic battles north of the Yangtze River, in the spring of '49, if I recall correctly. Then they took Nanking, and the government evacuated to Taiwan.

We were, of course, uncertain which way things were going, so naturally we wanted reporting from various parts of China. Canton was reporting on South China; Kunming was reporting on Southwest China; Chungking, of course, on West China; Hankow on the vital Yangtze basin. Those were the main Consulates at the time. So primarily, really, it was political observation.

*Q: How was your area in Southwest China? It was pretty far removed from where the Red offensive was coming down. How were they reacting as this went on, as far as you saw it?*

LUTKINS: After the end of World War II, the national government took the local warlord to Nanking as a hostage in effect. But another local military man, a man named Lu Han, became governor. He was more amenable to control by the central government. There certainly were no overt or evident pro-Communist sympathies in that area.

To begin with, it was a political backwater. Nobody really thought that it would ever play a vital role in the national picture but believed that it would really be a reactor rather than an active participant. As I say, the local government, headed by Governor Lu Han, plus whatever there was in the way of a political-economic elite in Kunming and in Yenan, very strongly favored the central government against the Communists. But, of course, they weren't dumb; they knew what was going on and were a little worried about what was going to happen to them if the Communists succeeded in defeating the Nationalists and taking over. And they also, of course, were uncertain as to what the attitude of the United States would be.

As you know, even pretty much at the end we were ploughing considerable military aid and other aid into supporting the Nationalists, up until probably pretty late in 1949, when the famous China White Paper appeared. As the situation deteriorated in 1949, it was fairly obvious that the local people were going to have to start thinking about what was going to happen there. The only organized opposition to the central government and to the local government was in the form of local banditry. There were no Communist units operating in the area.

*Q: This was the endemic local banditry?*

LUTKINS: Right, yes. They might call themselves Communists, but they really weren't. I'm sure that it had never been established there was any contact whatever between them and the main Chinese Communist command. But the roads were a little unsafe to travel on over long distances, because you might be stopped by some of these bandits. In fact, one of my vice consuls was stopped on a trip, but all they wanted was medicine. And they always said that they

had nothing against the United States in any case.

But, as I say, things deteriorated badly in the course of 1949. Nanking fell, and the government evacuated to Taiwan. In territory unoccupied by the Communists, that left three Consulates: Chungking in Sichuan; Kunming in the southwest; and Canton down in the south. We, of course, still had our Consulates in Communist-occupied areas, which weren't closed down until 1950.

But the department in Washington was, in effect, engaged in some soul-searching as to what the position should be with respect to Chungking and Kunming and Canton. I think part of the Embassy relocated to Canton briefly before going on to Taiwan. But for awhile, the decision was to hold on and keep those Consulates open -- Chungking, Kunming, and Canton -- and await developments. Later on, I guess it would have been somewhere around July or August...

*Q: 1950.*

LUTKINS: No, '49, because the Communists didn't complete their occupation of the whole mainland until the end of '49. Later on, about July of '49, we got a message from Washington advising that it would probably come down to closing down the posts, and instructing us to start making preparations. One of the steps ordered was to evacuate all dependents. My wife and two young children and the vice consul's wife were sent out. I think that was early September of '49. And then we were told to go on a standby basis and make all preparations so that we could get out on short notice.

Meanwhile, elsewhere in China, the Communists were continuing to advance. And it became clear that the local government in Yen-an would have to decide what they were going to do. Whether they would turn over to the Communists or try to maintain some sort of resistance.

This was certainly classified at the time, but so much time has gone by I don't think it could be considered classified now.

*Q: I'm not sure from that period that there is anything classified.*

LUTKINS: I was approached by a leading local citizen, who obviously was speaking on behalf of the local power structure, including the governor, asking if they could count on American support if they tried to resist the Communists, and whether we'd be willing to put in any military forces and so forth. The expected reply came back that under no circumstances would we be prepared to do that. So when they received that answer, obviously they had to start thinking in terms of saving their own skins; I'm talking in retrospect here, because I had no pipeline to what was going on. In consultations between myself and my British and French colleagues, we all expected that some sort of deal would probably be struck.

Arrangements were finally made to close up the Consulate early in December. I and my vice consul were all set to fly out to Hong Kong. However, the day before our scheduled departure local Yen-anese power structure staged a coup against what remained of the rather limited national government force there. I guess it was mostly Air Force. They took over the city and the airport. There was a lot of firing going on, although I don't think there was much in the way of

casualties. The city was under martial law and the control of the local forces.

I managed, through one of our local employees who had very good connections, to get through to the governor, who assured us that we would be allowed to leave safely. There were no commercial flights coming in any more, and we had to go out on Claire Chennault's Civil Air Transport, CAT. They happened to have a plane at the airport.

So the following night we managed to make our way out to the airport, through gunfire, and get out on the last flight out of Free China. It was rather exciting, a lot of turmoil going on. It turned out to be after dark by the time we actually boarded the plane. It was an old C-46, bucket seats and that sort of thing, and very heavily loaded with machinery and whatnot. And I happened to notice something under the bucket seat. There was a man there. He turned out to be one of a group of Chinese Nationalist military personnel (I'm not sure whether it was Air Force or not), trying to stow away aboard the plane to get out. Otherwise, they faced a very uncertain prospect in Yenan. They were bundled off the plane, the ones we could find, and we finally took off.

For those days, that was a very long runway, about 8,000 feet, built during the war for the Hump run. But I thought we'd never get off it. We made it with only a few feet to spare. It turned out we were very heavily loaded -- more than we realized. Because once we got airborne finally, more Chinese Nationalist personnel, 20 maybe, came up from the baggage hold where they had stowed themselves. All my baggage got lost; they must have thrown it out. Anyway, it was rather an exciting exit.

*Q: While you were in Kunming, did you feel any constraints on your reporting? This was before the McCarthy era, but things were still getting kind of... Were you just too far removed, or were you feeling any pressures?*

LUTKINS: No, I may have been naive, but I felt no constraints whatever. I wrote exactly what I thought was going on. Actually, I continued to do so subsequently, in Hong Kong, when I was in charge of the political section there. I think the constraints were felt more by people in Washington than they were in the field. At least that was my impression.

*Q: But you didn't feel that you were getting gunfire from both sides, from Washington? There was no feeling of, well, here's a policy that's going down the drain and we're being stuck with it?*

LUTKINS: No, I didn't. There was no effort, certainly from Washington, to dictate to us what we should be saying. And no complaints about what we were reporting that I recall. Certainly at the receiving end at the working level, in Washington, were people with much the same views. In any case, we weren't trying to be tendentious or anything, we were just trying to report what we saw.

*Q: Well now, you got to Hong Kong when?*

LUTKINS: From Kunming?

*Q: Yes.*

LUTKINS: Well, that was somewhere around December 10, 1949.

*Q: And then were you immediately reassigned? Did you go back to Washington?*

LUTKINS: I went back to Washington, because I'd been away for three years and I was due some home leave. The department very nicely actually let me take a little local leave, to have a chance to go down to Bangkok and Angkor.

After I got back to Washington, I was assigned on a temporary basis to the Office of Chinese Affairs. Normally speaking, Chinese language officers, after leaving their language training program, would have been assigned to various Consulates all over China. But this wasn't possible any more, because we had by that time severed relations.

So we were scattered around the periphery, with a view to keeping an eye on China from the perspective of the surrounding areas. As you know, there were very important Overseas Chinese communities, particularly in Southeast Asia, and that was also something we were supposed to be keeping an eye on and reporting. We were scattered everywhere, from Seoul, Korea, to Japan, Manila, of course Hong Kong and Taiwan, Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Burma, even India.

And it so happened that it was decided that we were going to beef up our presence in what was then called Malaya before it became Malaysia. One Chinese language officer, Oscar Armstrong, was assigned to Singapore. And I was assigned to reopen a post in Penang, Malaya, in northern Malaya near Thailand. So I went out there in the summer of 1950, reopened the Consulate there, and served there for two years.

*Q: Malaya was then still under British rule?*

LUTKINS: Right. It remained under British rule until 1957, when they gave independence to Malaya.

*Q: You went with your family, I take it?*

LUTKINS: Oh, yes.

*Q: What was your main job while you were there from '50 to '52? The Korean War broke out about that time. Relations were nasty. What were you doing?*

LUTKINS: I'd say it was 90 percent political reporting. A couple of years earlier, around 1948, what they called, euphemistically, "The Emergency" had broken out with the local Chinese Communists in Malaya. They were not connected with the Chinese Communists on the mainland, but they were ethnic Chinese, part of the very substantial Overseas Chinese minority in Malaya, who had their own Communist Party. Actually, during the war they worked with the British against the Japanese, during the Japanese occupation.

Shortly after the war, they staged this uprising, killed a lot of British rubber planters and people

in the tin industry, and made life very difficult. The British had quite a substantial military force there combating this emergency. It was a difficult period. At one point, the British governor general was assassinated on his way up to a weekend in one of the hill stations. And then they sent out a really tough man, by name of Sir Gerald Templar, to head up the thing and bring it under control. There were various efforts made by the army and the police to cordon off the dispersed Chinese farmers, gather them together in secure, guarded villages, and keep them from contact with the guerrillas in the jungle. It was a long, hard process.

I'm no expert on Malaya, but in retrospect I think probably they were only able to really get on top of this once they granted independence to Malaya in 1957, and undercut the argument of the Chinese Communist guerrillas that the country was a foreign colony and should be liberated. And the Malays who dominated the country, both demographically and politically, certainly never had any love for the Chinese, so that they were then also able to collaborate a bit more with the British forces in bringing the thing finally under control. But it was a rather tense period.

Penang itself was not affected. It seemed to have been regarded as a rest area by both sides. With the exception of one or two assassinations of some rather staunch anti- Communist Chinese newspaper and academic people there, there really were no incidents on the island itself.

My area included the whole of northern Malaya. At that time, we had no embassy, of course. The main office, the Consulate General, was in Singapore. And we had two consulates: one in Kuala Lumpur, which is now the capital, and in Penang. Both Kuala Lumpur and Penang had rather fairly loose supervision from Singapore. So, from the point of view of a junior officer, it was an ideal situation. We had a big and interesting territory to travel around and report on, and only rather tenuous control from Singapore.

*Q: It varied from place to place, but here, this was obviously an emerging situation, with the emergency on and all. Were you constrained because of British rule so that you couldn't talk to the other elements, particularly the Chinese or the Malays, or not?*

LUTKINS: Not at all, no, no. I think they (the British) kept an eye on and knew what we were doing, but in fact they encouraged me. Having just come from language school, I was eager to try to continue my Chinese (although the Chinese spoken there was not what I had learned in Peking). So I did have contact, to a certain extent, with some of the Chinese leaders, who were really not very political. It was a commercial class. But I made one or two speeches in Chinese at some of the Chinese schools in Penang. The resident commissioner, a Britisher, congratulated me on it, even felt delighted because I was taking an anti-Communist line. They obviously knew what I was doing. I made it a point, of course, of working very closely with the British, obviously, because they knew far more about what was going on there than I could ever hope to know.

Penang happened to have been a place where the population was predominantly Chinese with almost no Malays. There were only a few Indians. The rest of the area, however, the provinces on the mainland like Perak and Kelantan, were the two main ones that I had supervision over. And I made a point of traveling to them and meeting the Malay officials nominally in charge,

although the British still held the reins of power. I had to work with them, too.

*Q: Were you beginning to feel any of the heat from attacks on our China policy, because you'd been associated, or on your reporting? I'm talking about McCarthyism.*

LUTKINS: No, none whatever. Never that I experienced. I was too junior, for one thing, and not in a very controversial area, for another. But I was certainly reporting freely and as honestly as I could.

*Q: How did you see the situation there? What was the thrust of your reporting? That the British were eventually going to get out, or that they could keep it?*

LUTKINS: I think I would have been presumptuous to have tried to comment on that. The main focus of British rule was in Kuala Lumpur, where my colleague, Hank Van Oss, was doing that to the extent that he could, plus Singapore. No, my main thrust was just interviewing and seeing the people who were in present control, the British, plus some of the leading Malays who promised to be leaders in the future.

It was impossible, at the height of the emergency, to predict when, if ever, the British were going to grant independence. I know many of the British certainly were resisting this idea -- the usual idea that the Malays couldn't stand on their own, and that if they left the country, the Malays and the Chinese would be at each other's throats.

I had no vision that the thing was going to happen quite so quickly as it did. In fact, when I left there in '52, I was rather pessimistic, frankly, as to how things were going to develop. I felt fairly sure they would get on top of the insurgent problem, but I was pessimistic as to the future of Malaya in terms of the difficulty of the Chinese and the Malays getting along together. There had been, of course, a long history of problems there, with the Chinese dominating the industry and commerce to the extent that the British didn't, and the Malays being rooted to the land and having some of the old traditional power of the Malay rulers, plus a favored position in the British local bureaucracy.

The Malays were very fortunate in getting a man as their first prime minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman, who was on good terms with the Chinese, and who was enlightened enough to realize that it was important for the two communities to work together. So that even if the Malays have dominated the situation politically and militarily since independence, the Chinese have been willing to go along.

Interestingly, I think I was one of the first official Americans to meet Tunku Abdul Rahman, who came from the royal family of the State of Kedah, which is near Penang. I think I may have been one of the first American officials to entertain him after he was elected as head of this fairly new organization called the United Malay National Organization. Most people regarded him as a bit of a lightweight and a figurehead, but he certainly turned out very well in the final analysis.

*Q: Well, you left Penang in 1952, is that right?*

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LUTKINS: This was in 1954, and it was late summer, early fall. I must have arrived in Hong Kong probably September, '54, and I was assigned to Hong Kong as chief of the political division, replacing Ralph Clough, who was going back to Washington to serve as the deputy director of the Office of Chinese Affairs.

*Q: Who was the consul general then?*

LUTKINS: When I arrived, it was Julian Harrington, but he was transferred after a period of three or four months. And he was succeeded by Everett Drumright, who was a career Chinese language specialist.

*Q: Yes, we have an interview with Everett Drumright. What were you doing? What was the political section doing? After all, it was a large political section. What were your goals?*

LUTKINS: Well, it was summed up under the term of "China-watching" and continued up until the time when the United States resumed relations with the People's Republic of China in the early 1970s. Hong Kong was *the* place where China-watching occurred and where all the China-watchers gathered. Whether they were governmental, in terms of the Foreign Services of the different countries, or whether it was academic, or the various press and media, that was *the* place to be to try to follow what was going on, interpret what was going on inside China.

But interestingly enough, even with governments like the British and the Dutch, Australians, I'm not sure about the Australians, but I know the Dutch, who like the British, had relations with the Chinese Communists and an office in Peking. But even in their cases, they thought it was helpful to have a specialist stationed in Hong Kong. Since their people in Peking were circumscribed in their movements, they felt it was useful to have somebody outside who could see the picture from there.

*Q: Well, you talk about seeing the picture. I mean, after all, the refugees were mostly from one area around Canton, I would imagine.*

LUTKINS: That wasn't entirely true. It's true that, if you're talking about the overall influx of refugees, they were very much of a lower class, usually peasants, small business and that sort of thing, who came in almost exclusively from the area adjoining Hong Kong, the Province of Guangdong. But certainly when I was there, in the '50s, you still had a trickle of other people coming out: American and other missionaries who had been detained after the takeover of the Chinese Communists who were being released from time to time; certain foreign businessmen who were operating there, not Americans but other businessmen who were operating in China, British and others who came out; and newspapermen from other countries who were allowed to travel there, European and otherwise. So that there was a small but constant flow of interesting potential sources of information who were coming through Hong Kong and who were eagerly grabbed on by the few people who wanted to talk to them.

*Q: What other sources did you have?*

LUTKINS: The Chinese press, of course, was a major source. We had organized, even before I got there, and further developed while I was there, a very substantial operation translating the China mainland press. Some of it was readily available, other publications that we obtained by a clandestine procurement program.

*Q: Was this a joint translation service with the British?*

LUTKINS: No, no, it was entirely American. The British, and others, found it very useful, but they had nothing to do with it.

*Q: I'm surprised, because we had a joint translation service in Belgrade and, I think, in Poland, where we did it together. But there was no effort made to...?*

LUTKINS: No, it was entirely American and a very large-scale affair. Among others who were in charge of it for awhile, Oscar Armstrong, whom you may or may not have talked to. I'm trying to remember how many people, we might have had twenty or thirty Chinese local employees who were engaged in this, under our supervision.

*Q: Well, why would the press be useful? I mean, supposedly this was a tightly controlled regime where everybody was spouting the party line and all that.*

LUTKINS: That is true, but you mentioned Eastern Europe and having contact with the Soviet Union, I believe there was a great deal of similar work done in trying to read fine nuances into what was being said in the press and if one paper differed slightly from another. Of course, you had the major organs controlled by the Chinese Party, but then you had one by the military, and then you had, theoretically, a youth paper and so forth, and you could pick up interesting little tidbits. And, in any case, we were relying on it not only for major trends but for factual information as to what the regime itself was saying in terms of statistical information on production and that sort of thing.

And then it was also extremely important when they were engaged in one of their major campaigns, such as one that occurred while I was there called "Let The Hundred Flowers Bloom," which lasted for awhile, and then the "Great Leap Forward," which also occurred during the mid-'50s. I sometimes have a hard time distinguishing the exact times, because I went on to work in the Office of Chinese Affairs in Washington where we were the recipient of a lot of this product. We used the Chinese press as a source of information in both cases, as a basic source to be analyzed.

*Q: Well, here you were, and you had been dealing more or less with Chinese affairs, and you were really right at the center of where we were looking at it. I mean, it was the closest thing we had to an embassy in mainland China, really, at that time. How did you see China? Where were they going? How was the thing working?*

LUTKINS: Well, that's a very good question. I haven't gone back to review the reports that I wrote during that period, and I wrote a good many. Of course, in addition to our Chinese press

translation program, we had the small corps of Chinese language officers and others, including one Soviet specialist, who was sort of on loan. We were doing quite a bit of varied reporting on developments in certain different fields in China. But as the head of the political section, I did the overview reports that we had to submit every three or four months, plus the contributions to the WEEKA and that sort of thing.

As I saw it at that time, and as I reported it (and this ran against certainly the wishes or the wishful thinking of certain people back in Washington, and even to that of our Consul General, Mr. Drumright, who wanted to really believe that the Chinese Communist regime was only a temporary aberration, a temporary phenomenon and that it wouldn't last) it seemed to me definitely that the new government had entrenched itself pretty securely. That by and large it governed with the support of the mass of the people. That it had brought some improvements, which were not necessarily due to Communism but to the mere fact that it did exercise authority over the whole country for the first time in fifty years or more, and therefore was in the position to take purposeful action in terms of preventing famine, in getting supplies from one area of the country to the other, in getting production back in shape after a period of the war years in which everything was disrupted. In other words, it seemed to be a fairly stable government.

And, what was possibly more important, the people in charge of the government showed no signs whatever of either disunity or lack of confidence in their ability to govern. This all pointed to the fact that they were there to stay for the foreseeable future. We couldn't look ahead to the 1980s, but at that point it seemed to be a fairly stable, secure government enjoying popular support. And we reported that, as such, to Washington. I guess, of course, in Washington we were still trying to deny that picture and to work for the undermining and downfall of the Communist regime.

*Q: Could we talk a little about... I sound like I'm harping on the McCarthyism.*

LUTKINS: No, no, no, that's very important.

*Q: There's more than the McCarthyism. But you were a reporter during the period. Dulles was in command. Walter Robertson was a key figure.*

LUTKINS: Yes, we can get to that when I get to Washington.

*Q: When you were in Hong Kong, you had a man who had very fixed ideas about whither we should be going, as Consul General. How did you operate? What sort of pressures were on your reporting? How did you feel working in this atmosphere?*

LUTKINS: By and large, completely free. There were only minimal constraints. And, although I disagreed with Mr. Drumright on his basic outlook, to his credit he never tried to tell us that we should report differently. He may have reported under separate channels himself. If so, I wasn't aware of it. I don't, frankly, think he did.

I remember one rather amusing little thing that involves a Chinese nuance between the two names for the Chinese city: one, being Peking and the other, Peiping. Traditionally it was

Peking, which means, in Chinese, "Northern Capital." And during the Nationalist days, in the late '20s and '30s, when they moved the capital down to Nanking, which means "Southern Capital," Peking became Peiping, because they couldn't have two capitals, so it was "Northern Peace," Peiping.

It was a corollary of our support of the Nationalist government, even after they moved to Taiwan, that when the Chinese Communists took over and restored the name of Peking, we refused to call it Peking. We called it Peiping. I thought this was a little silly, so when I got posted to Hong Kong, in charge of the reporting there, I started calling it Peking in our telegrams, which Mr. Harrington didn't object to. Washington didn't object to it. But as soon as Mr. Drumright got here, he said, "In Washington, we call it Peiping, not Peking." So we had to go back to the old method. As I said, it's not important at all, but it shows the Washington mindset at the time.

*Q: Were you getting any private letters or visitors coming through, saying Come on, fellas, get on the team, you've got to take more of a line that this is a regime on the verge of tottering, or something like that?*

LUTKINS: No, absolutely not. I'm not aware of anything along those lines whatever. You might want to ask Ralph Clough, if you haven't already, whether he did, because he was there for a year or two, in charge of the political section, before I was. But I'm 100 percent confident that there was never anything done like that.

There was one other thing involving policy, a very minor one which I was reminiscing with Arthur Hummel about recently. When I went there first, in 1954, he was in charge of USIS in Hong Kong. That was before he shifted over to the Foreign Service proper. It would have been at the end of '54 or early '55, when they were going to have a conference down in Indonesia, I think it was the Bandung Conference.

I think it was our own initiative. We felt that it would be desirable to give Washington the benefit of our views on what our attitude and position should be at this conference, particularly because we knew that Chinese Communists were going to be involved there. Art and I, I guess in a staff meeting, suggested that we send out a joint message from the Consulate General giving our views. And Everett Drumright nixed the idea.

But there are more ways than one to skin a cat, so Art Hummel, through his own channels, went back to Washington and had them send out a message requesting that we should send them a telegram with our views. So we were able to get one in to Washington as desired.

*Q: At that time, how did you, and maybe the people around you, view the China-Soviet bloc?*

LUTKINS: Very interesting. Good question. I think the answer is that we very much (probably unwisely as it turned out) saw it as a monolith at that particular point.

I guess we should have been alert. Maybe it was because not enough of us had been steeped in Chinese studies and Chinese history to remember that there had been very long-lasting and bitter

relations between China and Russia that predated Communism, and that the Chinese resented the Russians taking over territory that they regarded as Chinese and that were, in fact, I guess, subject to Chinese suzerainty.

But, as I say, at that particular point, probably because of the Korean War and pressures on Vietnam and whatnot, we definitely regarded the Sino-Soviet alliance as a pretty firm and fixed thing. I don't recall, either during that period or subsequently when I was in Washington before the Sino-Soviet split, which occurred somewhere around 1961, any of us who had enough sense to have second thoughts and say, "Well, we should take a second look at this. Is this going to last? Are there really cracks?" They were not overt certainly. It would have taken a bit of imagination and prescience on our parts to realize the possibility that that would come.

*Q: Looking at my own view, and others around me, I think we did tend to see everything in East-West conflict, and that somehow or another this Communism was a completely new phenomenon, which superseded nationalism. And even though our noses had been rubbed in it, for example, in Yugoslavia and some other places, we saw things as Communism in the Arab world, looking at it later on. I mean, this was obviously nonsense. I think of Arab... But it was a viewpoint.*

LUTKINS: Sure, world communism, world spirit of... I seem to recall when Tito broke away, when was it, around 19...?

*Q: '48, '49.*

LUTKINS: '48, '49, that there were people who refused to believe that it was real. They thought it was a conspiracy to deceive us.

*Q: What sort of reporting were you getting? What were your relations with our embassy on Taiwan at that time?*

LUTKINS: Close. I don't know whether we did much official travel back and forth, except that Ambassador Rankin used to come over from time to time. I'm not sure whether Mr. Drumright went over to Taiwan. Of course, he was later to succeed Rankin as ambassador there. Most of us, for one reason or another, took trips over there, but for personal reasons rather than business reasons. But we were certainly aware of an exchange of information; we always received their reports and they received ours.

*Q: But you didn't feel as though you were reporting with maybe a different view of China than they were reporting, because of local... or something like that?*

LUTKINS: I don't think so. There was really no independent China-watching reporting from Taiwan. It was all in terms of what the Nationalist government believed and what the national government was doing. Whatever some of the more junior officers in Taiwan may have felt, there was no independent reporting, or doubts about the Nationalist mission to recover the mainland and our commitment to help them do so.

*Q: Obviously, this is an unclassified interview, and we are talking about thirty years plus. Were you getting good information or much information from the CIA? And how did you evaluate that?*

LUTKINS: Again, I have a hard time separating what was happening then from what was the case when I went back to Washington. We did have, of course, a large Agency operation in Hong Kong. I'm sure we saw some of what was coming out of there. I don't know how much. Again, I don't know to what extent the chief of station reported to Mr. Drumright, and to what extent he operated independently. You'd have to ask somebody like Mr. Drumright about that, I just don't know. I have a feeling that they were pretty freewheeling, but I'm not sure. We used to see some of their raw reports.

*Q: But you didn't have the feeling that they were reporting a whole different situation or that they were really plugged in. At least from what I gather, they were reporting more or less in the same stream that you were.*

LUTKINS: I honestly couldn't recall at this point. I don't ever recall having been impressed that we were on different wave lengths.

I might mention another source of information we had. Of course, there were so few of us trying to pick so few tea leaves that we had a sort of informal group there. We were in very close contact with the representatives of other governments, particularly the British, French, Dutch, Australian, Japanese. Both on a day-to-day basis and in regular evening sessions, we would get together. And that included people from the press as well. There was quite a large press presence there. A certain number of academics, such as a fellow named Doak Barnett, whom you probably know of, a very eminent authority on China, who happened to be there part of the time. We were all trying to exchange ideas, pick each other's minds. And we did see some foreign government reports. Particularly I recall the British reports and, in their case, that they were ones written by their embassy in Peking, which they made available to us.

*Q: You left Hong Kong in 1957 and came back to Washington, was it?*

LUTKINS: Yes. Ralph Clough had moved up to be acting in charge of the Office of Chinese Affairs, and I replaced a fellow named Dave Osborn as his deputy. That was within the bureau of what was then called Far Eastern Affairs, now East Asian Affairs.

*Q: Did you have any particular area that you were dealing with during this time up until 1961?*

LUTKINS: No, I think the way it operated was that we had the director of Chinese Affairs, who, as I say, at first was Ralph Clough. He went off to Switzerland, and I was acting for a period of a few months. Then Ed Martin came in, was brought back from London to be the director, and I was deputy director. And then below that we had three or four officers who were working more or less on special areas and special projects. So mine was more or less like the director's, sort of an overall...

*Q: Did you find a difference in perspective of China from Washington? You had been at the*

*preeminent overseas post looking at China, now you were back at the home office.*

LUTKINS: The perspective was different largely because of the people who were in charge back in Washington.

*Q: Could we talk about that, please?*

LUTKINS: Yes, sure. There was no question that the policy was very rigid, representing the position and views of Walter Robertson and possibly Secretary Dulles. I think possibly Robertson was more rigid than John Foster Dulles. But Dulles, for political reasons and because of general sympathy with his position gave Robertson a free hand on this and didn't try to buck him on it. There was no question in Robertson's mind that we should be 100 percent pro-Nationalist government on Taiwan and 100 percent anti-Communist government in Peking. There was no suggestion that he would be prepared to even consider the possibility of regularizing our relations with the Chinese Communists. He was certainly an intelligent man, a very charming man, too, and an able man. I don't know whether he ever, in the back of his mind, considered that at some point or other we would have to adjust our position. But as far as I could make out, the Communists would have had to have ceased being Communists to make him shift.

*Q: Well, it's interesting, because I came in as a very mild liberal Foreign Service officer in 1955. And I actually was a Korean War veteran and had served on duty across a small island from the Chinese, so it wasn't as though I were wildly in love with the Chinese.*

LUTKINS: Where was this then?

*Q: This was up in northern Korea near Chengdu. But my point is, that I came in, most of my group that came in, and we thought Well, you know, what the hell, China's there, we're going to have to recognize it. I mean, it was a fact of life. It wasn't through admiration, it was just, well, let's get on with it. And it always seemed like it took us an awful lot of time to get around to it. Was this the attitude of those who were dealing this?*

LUTKINS: Yes, I think in terms of foreign policy or realpolitik the feeling was that this was a regime that was entrenched, it was going to be there for the foreseeable future, and that we were going to have to deal with it.

Mind you, I'm in contrast to many of the revisionist historians and still am basically persuaded of the accuracy and truth of the State Department position, as expressed in the 1949 White Paper, that we behaved, after the Chinese Communist takeover, in the traditional manner of keeping our posts open on the ground and being prepared to deal with the new power. And that it was not us, but the Chinese Communists who did not want those relationships and, in effect, forced us out. But, as I say, the revisionists dispute this.

Be that as it may, assuming that that is correct, I think those of us who were on the spot during the period recognized that it takes two to tango, and that we couldn't just automatically recognize the Chinese Communists. There would have to be some negotiations and some terms involved. But I think most of us felt that it would be sensible policy to start preparing for that, laying the

groundwork for it, and perhaps doing some probing to find out on what terms it could be done.

Whereas the official attitude in Washington was that these people were beyond redemption, we couldn't possibly ever consider having relations with them, and that, in addition, we would be betraying our friends on Taiwan.

*Q: Here you were, getting reports from posts saying China is going on, it's developing (I'm talking about the Communist side), it has control of the country, it doesn't seem near collapse. They may be doing silly things such as the Great Leap Forward and all, but, you know, there it is. And the reports must have been flowing in, speaking of the solidity of this regime. Now that you were back in Washington, was there any effort by Robertson to say cut this, get them to talk more, or did he look for all...?*

LUTKINS: No, I think he just discounted the reporting. It didn't agree with his mindset and he just ignored it. But anyway, I think he thought it was of secondary importance compared to the need to combat Communism and to stand by our wartime allies and friends in Taiwan. And then I think you can't ignore the domestic political aspect of this, that the Republicans...

*Q: The China lobby.*

LUTKINS: ...and the China lobby had made such a big thing about our "losing" China -- as if it were ours to lose. And so it had become a matter of political orthodoxy. I think that's why it's so ironic, it really took a Republican president to make the shift. A Democrat couldn't do it, because he...

*Q: You're talking about Nixon.*

LUTKINS: A Democratic president would have been immediately vulnerable on the subject of being soft on Communism. Actually, it's rather interesting (I think I had moved on to the Senior Seminar at that point), but it was very early in the Kennedy years, in '61, that very gingerly tentative moves were made toward opening up of relations with Outer Mongolia, which, of course, then was very much still under Soviet domination. They didn't get very far on this. And part of the reason was that the Nationalist government on Taiwan, of course, had always regarded Outer Mongolia as Chinese territory that had been taken away from China. They and the Chinese lobby made their opposition felt, so that it just wasn't considered important enough by Kennedy to make an issue out of it, and they dropped it.

*Q: Did you feel any particular pressure (once again I'm asking this question) on the reports that went out, or you just did you business and...?*

LUTKINS: In Washington?

*Q: In Washington.*

LUTKINS: Well, of course, we weren't reporting.

*Q: But you must have been making reports to Congress and to the president.*

LUTKINS: Well, I can tell you something there. When I came back at the end of '57, Ralph Clough briefed me on the general situation. I guess I must have misunderstood what he said a bit, because I got the impression that perhaps the Department was a little more flexible in our thinking about the future than actually was the case.

I was up in New York on a visit, and my father, who was in Wall Street asked me to have lunch with a number of his friends and say a few words about China, which I did. About a week later I got called into Robertson's office and raked over the coals, because one of the people who had been present had the impression from what I said that our policy toward China was changing. And Robertson made it be known in no uncertain terms that it wasn't changing, and that if I wanted to stay on board I'd better mind my manners. I think I had said something along the lines that, "Well, surely at some point or other we'll have to probably make an accommodation with the mainland."

I don't know whether you've interviewed Jeff Parsons, J. Graham Parsons, yet.

*Q: No, I haven't.*

LUTKINS: He would certainly be very important. He lives up in Massachusetts. I guess he comes to Washington occasionally, might be willing to one day. He had a very eminent career. He'd been my DCM in Tokyo, then he went to Laos as ambassador and then came back to Washington as deputy to Walter Robertson. He was a very savvy guy, and I'm sure he must have found it difficult working under Robertson, and yet, being very professional, he adjusted and did his best at it. Then later, I guess during the Kennedy years, I think he went off to finish his career as ambassador to Sweden. He really had a meteoric rise in the service, a very fine officer.

Well, that's about it. I mean, we were very much under wraps as far as any suggestions of any changes in policy. We just had to operate within that framework.

*Q: There were always a set of Quemoy-Matsu crises. Were there any when you were there?*

LUTKINS: Oh, very much so, yes. In fact, I was acting in charge when that erupted in the fall of '58, because Ralph Clough had left and Ed Martin hadn't come back yet. I was working extremely closely with Marshall Green, who, really, Robertson had put in charge of a task force dealing with that problem. Marshall spearheaded the whole thing.

*Q: What was the problem at the time?*

LUTKINS: You had these tiny little pieces of territory, these two islands in the south, Quemoy and Matsu, and then a few others up a little closer near Shanghai. They were a thorn in the flesh to the Chinese Communists, having these Chinese Nationalist military outposts overlooking their territory. I don't think we were really ever given any reason why they chose that particular time, which probably was early September of '58, to start this campaign. But they started to bombard the two islands, and it became a cause célèbre.

I remember Secretary Dulles was up in the Thousand Islands on vacation at the time, but he came back shortly. And then there were all sorts of high-level discussions over a period of a month or six weeks, involving, of course, at a very high level, the Pentagon, Admiral Arleigh Burke, who I think was naval chief of staff at the time, or joint chief of staff. And there were discussions as to whether we might ultimately have to use nuclear weapons or not. It didn't come to that. It was a question of helping the Nationalists get supplies into these beleaguered outposts. I think it was on that occasion that there was the first use of air-to-air missiles called Sidewinders, which proved quite effective. We didn't have any of our own forces involved, but we were supplying the Nationalists with weaponry.

Ultimately, after several months, the Chinese Communists backed off, instituted a cease-fire, and proposed talks at an ambassadorial level.

There had been some earlier talks, held in Geneva, following the Geneva Conference in '55. I think Alex Johnson did the talking for the United States's side. And they had petered out, because they weren't getting anywhere; both sides just reiterated their grievances. We complained about the Chinese holding American citizens against their will. And they complained about our supporting the Nationalists and thus interfering in Chinese affairs.

As I say, at a certain point they broke off, but when the truce was reached in the Quemoy-Matsu offshore island crisis, we and the Chinese agreed to resume these talks. They were held in Warsaw, where their ambassador, who I think was Wang Ping-nan, talked to our ambassador, Jake Beam, who I'm sure you've interviewed. And Ralph Clough, who was DCM in Switzerland, used to go down to Warsaw and act as Beam's political advisor in these talks. For a period of a year or more these talks dragged on, getting absolutely nowhere. Both sides repeating the same positions. We had to spend a lot of time in Washington preparing the talking points for the sessions.

*Q: How did you personally feel about Quemoy-Matsu and then the talks? How did you see these things in relative importance?*

LUTKINS: Well, I don't think any of us regarded Quemoy and Matsu of any overreaching importance. But, at the same time, they were Chinese Nationalist outposts, and we were committed to the defense of the Chinese Nationalists, so that we really had no choice but to help them resist the attack.

*Q: Were you there when the Kennedy administration took over in '61?*

LUTKINS: I guess I was there for the first six months, but then I went off to the Senior Seminar.

**WILLIAM N. STOKES**  
**Vice Consul and Economic Officer**  
**Mukden (1946-1950)**

**Inspection Officer, American Liaison Office  
Beijing (1972-1975)**

**Remarks on relations with China in Later Years**

*William N. Stokes attended the University of Chicago and Columbia University specializing in mathematics and physics during World War II. After joining the Foreign Service in 1946, Mr. Stokes served in China, Japan, Morocco, Tunisia, Thailand, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by William Knight in 1992.*

*Q: The examiner didn't know about that.*

STOKES: Well, whatever. But anyway, I think the important thing here is that I began as a maverick in the foreign service. I always felt myself a maverick.

*Q: You mean all the way through?*

STOKES: Yes, because the patterns of thought, the ways of thinking, the motivation just all seemed to me that I was never quite in sync with what the mainstream of the foreign service was. But it was a creative tension. I was accepted. I felt accepted and I felt I had a contribution, but I always saw it as something which would be like a grain of sand in the oyster. I think in retrospect the foreign service might have been more open to the utility of making use of persons of scientific attainment, not in some highly specialized job, necessarily, but in ways of thinking about broad issues of foreign affairs in which scientific elements would have some point. In any event, at the Foreign Service Institute we were asked what assignments we wanted, to illustrate this maverick sort of thing, I asked for Mukden, China because I saw it as a place where five or six cultures were in contest and very likely the flash point for the conflict of great power interest. Again as it had been before.

*Q: Now those were China, Japan, Soviet Union, who else?*

STOKES: The United States, Korea, Mongolia, not as great powers but as participating cultures that would be effected by what happened in that cockpit. I was the only one in the class to get the request fulfilled because people had asked for Paris, Rome, London. In any case it was a time of enormous shortage of personnel so that there was no time to train me at all in language or anything.

*Q: So you had zero Chinese at that stage.*

STOKES: Zero. I remember a seminal month spent in Chinese Affairs with Art Hummel's cousin, I forget his first name, John Carter Vincent and Jim Penfield and many of the greats and I remember being given an old desk and when I opened it to get a piece of paper I saw George Acheson's commission that he had forgotten, left there.

*Q: You mean Dean?*

STOKES: George Atcheson. He was political advisor to MacArthur. In any event, the only way to get to China in those days, well let me back track. I have a wonderful memory of being entrusted with the great seal of the United States and a book of drafts on the Secretary of State and I was free to write a check in any amount at any time theoretically. It was an enormous sense of power to have been selected to go forth and to accomplish this. It was the fulfillment of my hopes. And there had even been some semblance of that in my trainee status. I remember one night John Carter called me in and said the President wants to release the Pauliy report about Russian removals of equipment in China. I'd like you to look through it and by tomorrow morning tell me if there is anything that we ought not to release. This was a 1500 page report, so I stayed up all night feeling very powerful and significant and at 5:00 a.m. as I was rushing back to the State Department to deliver my report, I heard the newspaper boy saying extra, extra, read all about it, President releases the Pauliy report. So that's a metaphor for a lot of things that happened between the White House and the State Department.

*Q: So you returned to your usual height, you were no longer a giant.*

STOKES: Right. We had to arrange our own travel to China in those days all I could find was a freighter leaving New York via the Panama Canal and the whole trip took 32 days. I remember as we pulled away from the pier I went down to my little midshipman's cabin there was a one-armed gentleman there. He asked me who I was and where I was going and he said "You're going to China", and he addressed me in Chinese. And I said, "I'm sorry I don't know any." He said "You don't know any Chinese and you're going to northeast?" He said, "Sit down in that chair over there" and for the next 32 days I received non-stop force feeding in Chinese. I hated that gentleman's guts when the ship was tilting 30 degrees and wallowing in heavy seas and my stomach wanted to go one way and I the other. On and on it came, but I revered that man. He transformed my life in China from being one of a bored outsider to being one of a participant and it heightened my awareness and gave me eyes to see with and ears to hear. It was a priceless gift.

*Q: He was another passenger?*

STOKES: Yes. As I learned later, Dr. Rubin Torre. You see what an impression he made in me. He was a famous, renowned Presbyterian missionary in China. He was returning after a long period of prison camp under the Japanese and he's widely known and I'm happy to record my thanks to him.

*Q: Is it '45 still or '46 now?*

STOKES: '46. I landed in Shanghai. I remember getting up before dawn and standing in the bow of the freighter coming in up the Whangpoo. And before we hit land you could see the dark fishing boats go by with the great big eyeballs on the prow, and as we came up the Wusong in front of the Bund in Shanghai I could see the relic of the scuttled Italian battleship, the Balboa. In Shanghai I was asked to remain for three months to issue visas to the German Jewish refugees in Hong Kong. That was a crash program. We issued a thousand emigration visas a month. John Stegmaier, John Stutesman and J.B. Pilcher was the Consul General. We all lived together in a flat underneath T.V. Soong's flat in a development building because at that time the power of the

dollar was such that when even six impecunious American Vice Consuls pooling their dollars could buy a good portion of the city. But there again since I spoke some Chinese I could immediately make Chinese friends and began thinking as the Chinese would think or getting an insight into how they would think. At the end of three months I flew up the coast in a Navy plane, stopping at Tsing-tao at the naval base and Dick Service was Consul there. I became just airsick and he took me in and we spend some time there at his home, I think two or three days, memorable days. The Navy then flew me up to Mukden on a regular supply run. I remember being met at the plan as we landed by a young American lieutenant who leaped into the plane and looked around ignoring me and looked at the cargo and said, "Damn it, where's our beer, what's all this stuff?", kicking the personal effects of the Consul General that I had carefully seen was loaded on board instead of his shipment of beer. That lieutenant was John K. Singlaub who later became Deputy Commander in Korea and was canned by President Carter for insubordination and became leading spokesman of the American right wing. More about Singlaub later. He was commander of external survey detachment number 44 which anybody can guess correctly what that was. Mukden turned out to be everything that I had hoped for in terms of strife and struggle. At that time the American consulate had been open for only about six months. Because while the Soviet Army had occupied Manchuria it refused to allow American representation there. The Soviet Army was obliged to withdraw by United Nations remonstrations and the Nationalist Army had been flown up into Manchuria and brought up by rail with US Marine guards and was in conflict with the Chinese communist armies that circled around from Yen'an through the provinces bordering on Mongolia and had to fill the vacuum left by the surrender of the Japanese.

*Q: Exactly when are we taking about now?*

STOKES: We're talking about the period immediately following VJ Day and the Japanese surrender.

*Q: The Fall of '45.*

STOKES: Yes. When I arrived, the Civil War was in full tilt. The Chinese armies were the American-trained crack armies from the Burma road, the Stilwell trainees and American equipped armies and the Chinese communists were not yet fully understood to be as redoubtable as they later proved to be. But in any case my entire assignment there was in the midst of civil war which as events turned against the government, became more and more in the immediate environs of the city in which I was living and working.

*Q: What were you actually doing in the office?*

STOKES: I began as Administrative and Consular Officer and then later became Economic Officer and then as our staff dwindled, I was really the right hand, or in effect if the consulate had a DCM, that's what I would have been considered. You remember in those days career officers succeeded one another in charge of the office without regard to the seniority of staff officers and I was after the Consulate General, Angus Ward. I was the only career officer there, I was brand new. In any case, I should mention that Secretary Acheson, and this was highly classified at the time, certainly cannot be now, was interested in exploring the possibility of a

motis vivendi with the Chinese communists when it became evident.

*Q: He would have been Under Secretary then wouldn't he?*

STOKES: I think he became Secretary of State by that time.

*Q: Still in '45?*

STOKES: No I arrived in December of 1946. I've skipped over a lot of time. So Acheson is Secretary at that time.

*Q: So then you had Burns, and then Marshall...*

STOKES: So then the Marshall executive headquarters team was there while I was there and General Wedemeyer came. As the Nationalist armies and government experience was turning sour, there were more and more high level American missions trying to ascertain why this was the case. Incidentally, I studied Chinese assiduously at this time informally, at my own expense and my teacher was the daughter of the Kuomintang mayor in absentia of Harbin. She was a very gifted woman, by the way, very gifted, and she made learning Chinese a delight. Entirely platonic, of course, I don't say, of course, but it was. In any case, to illustrate something of the tenor of the times, she said "have you ever thought of holding a dance in your house?" I said "Well, I don't know." She said "There are a lot of Chinese who would like to come." and I said "Well what would I do, just play these records?" She said "Yes, that's all, move the furniture back and so forth." So I did this thinking of maybe 10 or 12 people and she said "I'll invite my friends." Well about the time of the party all of a sudden limousines and all kinds of vehicles began appearing in front of my house. There was the Garrison Commander, a three-star general and his wife, the president of the central bank and his wife. It was something absolutely incredible, and they seemed to have some arrangement themselves where they rotated through the house. By midnight we must have had 200 people at various times in this little, modest, rundown house, and what I realized later that the Generalissimo had decreed that in time of civil war there would be no frivolous activities like dancing. The leadership's families were very restive under this, but then they decided in a very Chinese way that well, of course, they were absolutely dutiful to the government's instruction. The government had also instructed them to be nice to the Americans. And so they felt that the greater good was served in this way.

*Q: But weren't there a lot of American military units around?*

STOKES: No, no American military units.

*Q: So you were the only American, official presence?*

STOKES: Yes, except for this shadowy external survey detachment which we can all guess what it was. In any case, Secretary Acheson had wanted to seek a modus vivendi or explore the possibilities of a modus vivendi with the Chinese communists. So we were all secretly asked if we wanted to volunteer to remain behind in case the city should fall to the communists. And I volunteered. In the Fall of 1948 I was on a mission to Shanghai and I remember being

hospitalized there for some attack of nausea, something I ate I guess. In the middle of the night I remember seeing a light coming down the hall and it was the orderly and an MP and there was a telegram from Consul General Ward asking me to buy \$12,000 worth of foodstuffs and to fly them up the next morning to Mukden. The MP gave me a message from the naval commander at Tsing-tao telling me that C 46's would be landing at first light on the Shanghai airport. I had four hours to spend \$15,000 dollars. I got the Navy OD and we raced in a truck to the warehouse and I went through saying \$1,000 worth of that, \$1,000 worth of that, \$1,000 worth of that. This convoy of trucks arrived at the airport just as the planes were coming in. It was all thrown in. We flew to Tsing-tao, and then on to Mukden. At this time the city was falling and at the pre-flight briefing, Admiral Badger appeared on the flight line to the consternation of the pilots and he put his nose about one inch away from each pilots nose and turned and said "You are not to be captured on this flight, do you understand me lieutenant?" And they said "Yes, Admiral, Sir!" So we got in the plane, and we were flying there, and the pilot said to me, "I'm going to give this sucker once quick once over and if the agreed flare signal is not fired, I'm turning around and coming back and not even poking my nose in there. I looked down as we arrived and I could see there was my wife and Reeberg, the Administrative Officer there on the field, I said "It's alright, go in, go in." He said "Not until I see the flare." No flare, but to make a long story short, I prevailed on him to make a touchdown at least, one plane, and as we were rolling along, Reeberg came standing up in the jeep at a braked neck pace and he said "The damn thing won't go off, you see" and pulled the trigger, and a green flare went between the engine itself and the pilots right ear. Well, this tape would not stand a reproduction of what the pilot said. But anyway, we got in. In pursuit of our instructions from the Secretary to try to make an opening to the communist authorities as soon as the hubbub died down of the occupation by the Chinese, I telephoned the mayoralty and I managed to raise a clerk or some appropriate person and to my astonishment they accepted the offer of the Consul General to call on the mayor.

*Q: The communist mayor.*

STOKES: The communist mayor. We were not at all sanguine that there would be any willingness on their part to do this because we had the optic of the monolithic world communism and the subservience to the Soviet Union of all communist parties everywhere. When the Consular General and I arrived there we were ushered into a waiting room and we saw on the couch opposite us the head of the Soviet Trade Commission and his deputy who was the senior Soviet official there. And there were a lot of cigarette butts around showing that they'd been there a long time. We thought we're in for one of these interminable waits. Well, the door opened to the mayor's office, and the Russians all stood up and the man in the mayor's office walked right by them as though they didn't exist and said Mr. Consul General and Consul, would you please come in. Well, you should have seen the look on them. I could hardly look at the Russians as I went by because they'd have spit nails if they could have. The mayor said yes, we are interested in a reasonable, mutually respectful relationship. We have to rebuild this country, most of the equipment is Japanese, you are occupying Japan. The reality is we need to get along. So the Consul General pressed his luck and talked about a diplomatic courier and talked about the rights of American businessmen and there was a reasonable response to all of this. So when we came back to the consulate we could hardly contain our euphoria and we sent off reports of just exactly what had been said. Then the phone rang and to my astonishment the mayor wanted to pay a return call on the consulate. And he did come. The conversation continued. And the next

day, we wanted local currency, so I went down to the central bank and asked to speak to the new head to the central bank and he gave us more of the economic reasons for collaboration and promised to expedite our reasonable needs. So when we went back to the consulate we were making all kinds of plans and in came a special messenger with a notification from the Garrison Commander to surrender all of our radio equipment. And we thought, well, you know, that's in the context of what's happening, this is nothing threatening, but we sent the proper reply as requested but explained that we could not release the equipment because it was the property of the US government and we needed to ask instructions and see that this was the right thing to do. Following which came a phone call telling us that the former Consul General must appear within 30 minutes before the Garrison Commander. And we went over wondering what was happening. What did this mean, former Consul General? The Garrison Commander turned out to be Wu Shu Twang, who was later the foreign minister of the communist government and the man who at Lake Success threw the riot act. He looked at the Consul General. "You have one hour to have all the radio equipment in your office in the hands of my staff." The Consul General remonstrated, at which the Garrison Commander got up and walked out. So the next day was a work day, we were all fully at work, at noon, there were visitors to the consulate, and staff was fully at work.

*Q: You didn't deliver the equipment?*

STOKES: No we didn't, but the Consulate General said I promise to send a message reporting this to my government and the governments will speak to each other. The next day as we were at work, someone excitedly came up to me from USIS, saying some of our guests in the library went to walk out and there were troops there forcing them back in. And then someone came in saying there are commissars here to see you and we were informed that we were violating the laws, we were under house arrest. And there began 13 months incommunicado. The lights went out, the telephones went dead, the water stopped, and there we were 75 people in an office building. Chinese, foreigners, locals, Americans, anyone who was there, an 85 year old money trader named Bodinghouse, I remember him very well. And he said "On my way home for lunch, I thought, I am five minutes early, I will stop in and read that article in the Atlantic Monthly that I could not finish last week. And then I will be just in time for lunch." So he put it down and said "Ach, das is a gut article." And he went out the door and a bayonet was in his stomach. That was 13 months that you'd just sit there. He and I played thousands of games of chess, it got so that when he raised his right hand I could tell where he was going to move. But in any case, what I was able to put together after the whole event was that a great struggle was going on in the central committee of the Chinese communist party. On one side the President Yu Sho Gee and Zhou En-lai, the moderates, and Mao on the other.

*Q: Was Zhou a moderate, theoretically, at that point.*

STOKES: Yes.

*Q: So he represented what the mayor had told you.*

STOKES: That's right, exactly. And the overall commander in the northeast at that time, military and political, was Gao Gang who was a member of the central committee. And the new mayor of

Mukden was the personal assistant of Gao Gang. He was certainly not acting on his own. Chinese never act on their own. In this case we could trace why. Gao Gang was later imprisoned and executed and one of the reasons was related to this, I'm sure. And what had happened was that Mao Zedong I believe aspired to leadership of the communist world to succeed Stalin. He was planning a visit to Moscow to arrange this with Stalin because, triumphant after the victory in China, he felt this was what he was entitled to. I won't go into all of this because I wrote it in extent in an Industrial College paper called the Future between America and China.

*Q: So that is available in that library?*

STOKES: That is available in the Industrial College library. There are also articles based on that in various places including one in the Foreign Service Journal in about 1965.

*Q: By you?*

STOKES: Yes, But the key thing I wanted to point out is that the struggle that came out in the open once again on the death of Mao the Deng Xiaoping reforms of 1978/79 and what has followed, the anti-Mao campaign. All of this had its roots in that period, it had its forerunners. It was a constant struggle that was going on within the Chinese leadership and it was manifested in the events that we were encountering.

*Q: Is it your impression that that same struggle is still continuing basically?*

STOKES: Yes, I think Li Pong and Yong Shon Kun are now presently in power are clearly the inheritors of the Mao tradition. In fact, when Ed Vig and I were in China last January and we were in the city of Si Yang, we were accompanied by two members of the Chinese travel service, who were always employees of state security.

*Q: This was last year?*

STOKES: In January 1991 and I deliberately engaged them, though I could have traveled on my own, because I wanted to avoid any sense that I was up to anything. Because I have a long history going back that we'll see later. I remember reading with consternation one morning that the general secretary of the party Jon Ju Min had spoken to the leaders of the Liberation Army and said it's important that the Army follow the dictates of the party and the way you can do this best is by following the thoughts of Mao Zedong. If I'd had false teeth I'd have swallowed them because nothing good had been said about Mao Zedong for ten years, the ten years I'd been working in China for AT Karney as their director. It's as though the Pope had suddenly exposed Marxism. It was the way you'd think of it. And the members of the China travel service, when I asked them if they'd seen this, and I told them what it was, they looked as though I'd gone out of my mind. And when I showed them the paper they talked excitedly for half an hour in Chinese about what did all that mean. It was as unthinkable to them as it was to me. So we're going back again. It's a constant back and forth. I'd like to return for sake or orderliness the narrative to this period of house arrest which to shorten things, when on for some thirteen months. Later when I asked the people, Mr. Butterworth, the Assistant Secretary, what their feelings had been when they had heard that we were under arrest, he said, "Well, we didn't want to act too stridently

because your reports of your success in creating a modus vivendi were so exciting, so promising, that we didn't want to act in the dark until we knew better." But then of course after several months of absolute silence and no communication of any kind.

*Q: You weren't permitted any communication?*

STOKES: No, even if you came near the window a sentry would point a rifle at you and arm the device.

*Q: No additional food?*

STOKES: Nobody in or out, nothing. They took out the Chinese one by one and gave them a going over, and finally ordered them all under pain of whatnot, not to have anything to do with us. So at that point I had to do all of the interpreting between the Chinese and Consul General.

*Q: He did not have Chinese?*

STOKES: No, he didn't know any. Trained language officer, Ralph Rinden had, the day before the last plane went out, just left on the last plane without orders because he could see that things, I guess, were just going bad. Again, this was very helpful to me to gain some insight into the Chinese way of thinking. The Consul General found it frustrating that they were speaking in a language that he couldn't grasp so I remember at one crucial moment he addressed them in Russian, which he spoke fluently, having been Consular in Moscow, and Consular General in Vladivostok. And you can almost never see the Chinese blush. I mean that's very difficult, I mean that's very difficult for a westerner to recognize but I could see the ear of the leading Chinese redden when he heard the Russian. Whether he understood it or not he turned to me and shifting from polite to very vulgar Chinese he said something in the effect of "What is that old son-of-a-bitch trying to say to me?" So the issue of language and rapport was really very crucial.

*Q: So he was blushing with anger, not with embarrassment?*

STOKES: No, fury, I think. October first, 1949, the Chinese communists set up a government of the people's republic. We remember that we could see what was happening in the streets although we were under house arrest and there were great parades and everything else. We had no radio but I could tell from the Chinese papers generally what was happening and they sent a circular note to the Western missions in Beijing asking for recognition. The United States organized a response saying not as long as you are holding diplomats hostage.

*Q: Where there other foreigners being held hostage in Mukden?*

STOKES: No, the French were free, the British were free, you could see them walking in the street. I'm sure they were followed and harassed but they were free. So just about this time an old Chinese who had been caught asleep by the Consul General and was ordered out to some remote part of the consulate came in one day to ask for his retirement money. I was talking to Mr. Ward at the time in his office, he got up, he was told that this man was coming and Ward went out and took him by the ear and led him down the stairs and the Chinese was frightened and began

screaming and when Ward got to the bottom of the stairs, there was the mass Chinese staff confronting the Consul General and the door then burst open and in came the Chinese guards and they arrested Ward and any Americans that were close to him, carried him off to jail.

*Q: Because of that incident, or did they use that incident just as a pretext?*

STOKES: In the context of the Chinese desire for recognition in Beijing and the response in retrospect the Chinese decided, okay we're going to get rid of the Americans. Now this isn't worth it any more, its been going on too long, and what will we do with them anyhow, eventually. So they wanted some kind of pretext in order to get rid of us. And here's how it happened. Ward was in jail and there was going to be a trial and I was in charge of the office, such as it was, while he was away. For a year we had been sending messages of protest signed by the Consul General addressed to the Secretary of State with succeeding numbers and everything else and what we could do is give them to the Chinese to send.

*Q: To the officer outside the door.*

STOKES: Yes, you would never hear anything, they were never sent. So I wrote a message saying all is well and I am confident that the Consul General is being well treated, signed Stokes and I give it the next number. And this one, unaccountably, they sent. So the State Department when they got it, that it was signed by me and not Ward and that my statement that I'm sure the Consul General is well, it looked innocuous, I guess, to the Chinese but it said a lot to the department. In any case there was then a trial, the Consul General was sentenced to ten years at hard labor.

*Q: That was all public then, his trial would have been public so people in Washington knew about it right?*

STOKES: Well there were no reporters or anything, but I kept sending reports, because I was invited to be an observer at the trial. I went and they were now sending what I sent, although what I sent was meant trying to get through the censorship.

*Q: But they did send them to Washington?*

STOKES: Yes, and I'll never forget they were giving the sentence in Chinese and then it was being translated in English and while they were reading it in English for the detainees they were reading the next in Chinese at the same time. And Ward said "I heard my being sentenced to ten years at hard labor and I saw a silly grin appear on your face, Stokes, I thought, this kid will do anything to earn Chargé pay." But what I was hearing in Chinese was that but because of the particular heinousness of the office the additional penalty of immediate expulsion from the peoples republic is levied and we were. In fact, when the Consul General got back the next day, a Chinese came to the door and said there is going to be a trial of American spies, do you wish to attend? You're free to attend or not. And I checked with Ward and he said well why not go and see what it's about. And there was a trial of personnel who were allegedly left behind by the external survey detachment headed by Lieutenant, then Captain, Singlaub and they had masses of one-time pade, gold rings, Army/Navy type transmitters and camouflage gear and everything

else you could imagine. The attempt was made to sort was made to sort of link the consulate to this work. We were then taken by truck at midnight to the railway station and put under guard on a train and it took us three days to reach the city of Tianjin. We were turned over to Al Wellborn who was Consul General there and then sent out. While we were hostages Mao made his famous visit to Moscow for his meeting with Stalin in which I think we had this contributory role in some way. Stalin treated him very shabbily and the agreement that came out of that was even worse for the communist government than the agreement in 1945 that Stalin had negotiated with Chiang Kai-shek. So the myth of Chinese/Russian solidarity and eternal friendship under the banner of communism was to my mind absolutely unraveled by the time all of this experience had come to a head. There is and always has been a latent hostility between the Chinese and the Russians. It's cultural, it's visceral. It goes way back.

*Q: Old fashioned nationalism, a contest over territories?*

STOKES: I think it has to do with it, like the relationship between the British and the Irish in many ways. History has poisoned us in so many ways that it's hard to say what comes first, but certainly the Chinese feel that Siberia was seized from them when the Russian Army came to Manchuria. Just before we arrived there they seized all kinds of Japanese assets and they transferred them to Russian ownership, put Russian signs on them and tried to keep it as property.

*Q: They physically shipped them out too.*

STOKES: Well then factory equipment they stole, the Chinese don't have to invent any reasons to. But Mao was prepared to swallow all of this until his confrontation with Stalin. And then when he came back, of course, it was such a loss of face because he had put down Zhou En-lai and put Gao Gang to death. The people that wanted to work with the Americans, to build up Chinese industry when we had promised to do that, and probably would have, and of course the chairman of the communist party is never wrong, so Mao then felt the need to move on to things like the Great Leap Forward and the cultural revolution, all the final errors that demolished the last vestige of his historical reputation in an attempt to salvage the earlier mistake.

*Q: What was the year of the Great Leap Forward?*

STOKES: '62. And by that time they had asked the Russians to leave and when Khrushchev replaced Stalin there was the final split between the two. The ironic thing though is that the split had been with Stalin. It's just simply that Khrushchevism, that is the idea of a movement to demystify and expose the faults of the great leader, was something that Mao Zedong could only view at with horror because the exposure of the faults of Mao would have been the analog to that and of course we had the great expose of the faults of Mao in 1978 and '79 when Mao had died and Deng Ziaoping came in. We had the same kind of Khrushchevian thing Chinese style. But now poor Li Pung and Yung Shung Koon are trying to put all that back again, it won't work. And in talking to Chinese at all levels of life in 1991 and today I can tell that is not going to wash. I think the present situation in China is like the situation follow the death of Brezhnev. The series of meaningless, statureless figures trying to pursue a moribund policy that has utterly no credibility even in the party. So you say what is holding it together? It's inertia. A Gorbachev hasn't surfaced yet. Zaus Yang who has all of the tremendous qualities of Gorbachev is a

prisoner. It's important, I think, useful to recall how things appeared in June of 1990. China had introduced private enterprise into agriculture successfully, China had become self-sufficient in grain. Remember how it used to import millions of tons from the United States. It had a reform program to invite foreign capital, it was succeeding in building up its exports. Gorbachev came to China in order to try to gain lessons, would never say so because the Russians presume themselves the elder brothers, but there was everything to learn. All that Gorbachev wanted to do in a communist context while keeping a communist regime in political power was being done in China. However at the same time without Gorbachev knowing it, the leaders of the great state enterprises that were being threatened by Zaus Yang of curtailment of their subsidies mounted a palace coups and succeeded in getting Zaus Yang secretly deposed as General Secretary of the party in May of 1990. When this happened, some of his followers sent word to the students, your free to express your frustrations in the street, and so the demonstrations that lead to the Tiananmen massacre were not the pivotal event which caused the change in China, but they were only a kind of post-event manifestation, the part of the iceberg that could be seen above the water. Zaus Yang, when he appeared to the students in Tiananmen said, "It's too late, I've come too late", (inaudible) and the full meaning of that wasn't understood by the students because there is an absolute rule of (inaudible) or silence in the Cosenostr, which is the communist party leadership of China. So now China is a house of cards waiting for some kind of collapse.

*Q: Do you have any personal guess as to the time frame towards further major changes in this scene?*

STOKES: Well, anybody could give a number, but it will depend on factors of readiness and the like, I think. It's widely said that the death of Deng Ziaoping will do it. That's possible, but I can't really attach a lot of significance. I'd like to add here for the record that following my release from being a hostage I went on, Alexis Johnson invited me to go to Tokyo to do peripheral reporting on China and I spent two years there, among other things, being interested very much in that I never lost an interest in China.

*Q: So that took you to '51 more or less?*

STOKES: '52, yes and I'm trying to center this around China and not talk about career movements. But I then went to Thailand as head of the counterinsurgency effort and was dealing with a manifestation of Maoism because the insurgency was Chinese sponsored, had Mao badges and Mao books and all of that so that was another seven years of study.

*Q: Bill, what was the level of your Chinese as this story played itself out. Did you reach an S4 level for example?*

STOKES: Can I pause in answering that to just sort of finishing the sequence. I'd like to just outline my interest in China as they unfolded. After that experience in Thailand, you know we were inspectors together, and one of my assignments was to inspect.

*Q: But the inspection was '72 - '75, it was a lot later.*

STOKES: Well I came out of the six years in Thailand, ended in '73, then I became inspector.

But one of my inspection assignments was to inspect the liaison mission in Beijing. Now President Bush was the head of it. When they submitted my nomination at the State Department they were wondering what, in light of all the previous excitement, would be the Chinese reaction because this was the early period, Mao was still alive and the Chinese said why do you send us someone connected with former events of this kind. They said, well we have confidence in Mr. Stokes, and they accepted me then, for this limited purpose. But when I left, the day I left was the 30 anniversary of the trials in Mukden, and so on. This was printed in the Chinese press and you could see it seemed to be another manifestation of the struggle of two groups within China whether to let me in or protest it. The hard-liners and the cooperators were constantly manifested. Not long thereafter, I left the foreign service and then I spent five years in China traveling to China frequently for AT Karney and its industrial development work, and wrote a book about manufacturing equity joint ventures in China. I visited some 200 factories and spent days at each and all over North China, gave seminars in all the big Chinese cities on how to modernize industry and develop a market economy. I must say this was a priceless way and period to get to know what is going on in Chinese society below the surface and I think that some way we need to think of innovative ways to conduct diplomacy on many planes other than just contacts with a foreign ministry, and to do this by providing services and information. I have some ideas. There's no time here to present them, but the idea of assigning this to intelligence services and having people operating in a clandestine way I think is totally discredited. It has residual toxins in it that lead, as did our experience in Mukden, to poisoning the possibility for other collaborations. But we can find overt and open ways to conduct diplomacy on many different functional levels so that we are building something that can endure rather than hiding things that for short term gains lead to long term loss. So the whole relationship between China and America is an absolutely fascinating one and I think in the long run is going to be pivotal in determining the future of the Pacific Basin. I have great reservations about the concessions to the paper leadership that's in power now. I don't feel that we need to go out of our way to pick quarrels, I think we should have a clear idea that China is not represented by the individuals that are being sent abroad by this regime. I feel very uneasy about sending Eagleburger and Scowcroft clandestinely to Beijing at a time when the publicly announced policy of the government was not to have any contact with the Chinese leadership at or above the Assistant Secretary level. All this meant is that we were telling the Chinese that we will tell our own public one thing and do other things with them. That idea of clandestine maneuvering has profoundly adverse long term implications for our real interest. And the Chinese don't listen to what you say, they listen to what you do and they draw conclusions from it that we don't intend them to draw, but they do. So the important thing is not knowing the Chinese language, it's understand how the Chinese interpret what happens. As far as the level I attained, when I was using it in China, it was good, there was never any chance to measure it, but I felt perfectly free. It was doing all it needed to do and I had never a moment's classroom instruction. I think the big thing in the language for me is to feel free to use it and there didn't seem to be any hang-ups over misinterpretation of words. (That might be a good place to pause)

*Q: We suspended at that point and we're now resuming on the 12th of February 1992 and so we'll go on from there.*

STOKES: I recall that in our previous session we were interpreting the experiences that I had in Manchuria with the divisions within the leadership of the Chinese communist party. Although it

was a consulate and not the embassy we were pursuing as the lead office Secretary Acheson's desire to search for a modus vivendi with the Chinese communist leadership and Shenyang or Mukden was the first city to fall under the Chinese communist sway. So, consequently, we were dealing with the Chinese leadership as an object test on both sides of what would be possible in terms of a modus vivendi.

*Q: The US embassy was already in Beijing at this point?*

STOKES: No, it was in Nanking while I was in Chen Yang. There was a Consulate General in Beijing under Edmund Club. The Ambassador, Leighton Stuart was in Nanjing credited to the national government. We recall that what we perceived was at first in Chen Yang was the friendly manifestation and expression of desire for defacto relationships including businesses and courier and exchange of visits between the Consul General and the mayor. The mayor was the right hand man of Gao Gang who was the overall military and political leader in northeast China, the most important part of China economically and politically, and the place where the victory was won that broke the back of the national government on the mainland, in fact, in the Daudung marshes. So we were not dealing with some local uninstructed functionary. Gao Gang was a member not only of the central committee, he was one of five of the top leaders. Gao Gang in retrospect, and is manifested to us, clearly represents the international wing of the party which included President Yu Show Gee and Zhou En-lai and the sudden reversal of Gao Gang's policy that had us suddenly, one day without warning, surrounded by troops and the electricity and water cut off and the beginning of an incommunicado arrest, was clearly the result of Mao Zedong's personal decision and stemming from his desire presumably to prepare for his meeting with Stalin and his desire to obtain the overall leadership of the world communist movement as a result of his successful revolution in China. But in an internal sense, Mao has always represented the leader of what I would call, as opposed to the internationalist wing, the continental wing. Someone who always saw the peasants as the basis for success of his party and the idea of movements within China was his expertise. The little red book is all about how to conduct guerrilla warfare against a major land power that was in charge of the territory in which you were located. What was very interesting was to see how adroit Mao was in areas that involved awareness of international realities - for example, what broke the back of the Chinese economy was the Great Leap Forward which was Mao's belief that the whole array of economic problems that China faced and this desire for modernism could be addressed purely by the will and the discipline of the people as guided by the central committee, mainly Mao himself. So the Great Leap Forward was manifested largely by an order from the central committee, that every village would have its own steel mill. And so crudely they began everywhere throwing scrap iron onto fires stocked with soft coal. It produced unusable stuff, of course. Tremendous pollution and diversion of effort and everything else. It was at that time that the Chinese Air Force began reporting a breakdown in its Soviet provided air fleet and Chinese copies of MiGs needing spare parts, maintenance, supplies and lubricants and so on and Mao's reply to that was, that isn't the way you solve problems, read the little red book and apply the thoughts of Mao Zedong and don't ask us these things. So with this background I'd like to recall some of my experiences beginning in 1964 that dealt with an external view of the struggle within the Chinese communist party. Experience in Mukden was seeing it from the inside of the country, the other was from the outside.

*Q: Just one question before we go on to that phase. In the period when the local communists were first making their approaches to you, were your activities under the close guidance of the embassy in Nanking and was there any difference of view as to how the approach should be handled.*

STOKES: We had very little guidance from the embassy. We had guidance but Consul General Ward was not really interested in following it. Mr. Ward had made the friendship of Mr. Bullet during the Hoover relief mission in Russia. And Mr. Bullet was Thomas Dewey's choice to be Secretary of State and Mr. Ward expected to be the leader of the department under Bullet that is the top career man, so he took a very reserved view to guidance he got not only from the embassy but from the department. and Mr. Ward's Consul Generalship sort of was a constant running battle with the department and the embassy over a whole range of things including whether his wife should be there or not, including matters of policy as well.

*Q: I wondered particularly because the embassy would still be in close contact with the Nationalists and the Nationalists might have been twisting their arms as to what you should or shouldn't do with the communists.*

STOKES: Yes, although by that time the administration was even more convinced that the national government was going to collapse. Mr. Ward represented the conservative wing of the Republican party which felt more that the national government should be strengthened at all costs and General Wedemeyer came out to regulate this issue or to investigate this issue and there were divisions within the consulate over this of course. Mr. Ward was the boss but if you asked the young officers like Al Sebens and myself what our view was. Interestingly Mr. Ward let us go on and write dispatches and so on. In fact, with the defeat of Dewey he rather lost interest in what was going on. And by that time it was very close to the actual collapse of the government so there was very little guidance that Nanjing could provide anyway by that time.

In 1964 I was assigned to the Industrial College in the armed forces for senior training and the centerpiece, as you know Bill from your experiences, is the time you have to write a thesis. Although I had been in the meantime in Japan and then in North Africa, I never lost the fascination for what was happening within China and I wrote my thesis on the future between America and China involving a study of what two great powers facing each other over a whole array of divisive issues. What, underneath all the tactical differences, was there in the way of a common interest that might be explored in some reopening because the mutual hostility that had dated since the Korean War obviously brought a sterile deadlock on both sides on what they were able to accomplish.

*Q: You probably could not do a field trip to China in connection with that thesis.*

STOKES: No, I wouldn't have been personally welcome there at all. As later events turned out because, just parenthetically I mean, that when the department wanted to send me to China as Inspector during the time of Mr. Bush's tenure there were remonstrances from the Chinese foreign ministry which were overcome by the way, but that's for a later part of the sequence. The thrust of this thesis was that in fact there were major interests on both sides that had manifested themselves earlier at the time Secretary Acheson's desire for (inaudible) and that as China was

also in a cul-de-sac and Mao had in fact been gravely disappointed in all the reasons that he had had for frustrating this modus vivendi he had been repelled by Stalin and so forth. Interestingly, when I asked permission to publish this article and send it to the department for review, the Voice of America with my permission, in fact my enthusiastic preference, for that rather than publication was to translate it into Chinese and then broadcast it in installments to the mainland.

*Q: Did they do that?*

STOKES: Yes they did that, I still have the text, and later, when I was in private business with AT Karney, I met two Chinese officials who had been part of the external political interpretation apparatus that said that they recalled such a broadcast and a general conclusion of the party that the United States was signaling a desire for better relations and looking for the beginning of the resumption of some talks about a new relationship. That was really quite satisfying and I think Dick Donalds who was in the VOA picked up this idea and saw it through deserves a lot of credit for that.

*Q: Has that been cleared with the Department of State so that in effect there was a deliberate decision.*

STOKES: Yes, well, all that I know is that I saw a copy of a decision by the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs approving a request by VOA to do this. To what extent they had an ulterior motive or whether they just saw that no harm would be done. I'm inclined to think the former because there was a general disbelief among career officers that the systematic hostilities at China was the right idea.

*Q: A disbelief in that.*

STOKES: Yes, and a desire, other things being equaled, to find a relationship but an unwillingness to be seen as the author as an initiative to this effort because so many China service officers have been crucified by McCarthy and others.

*Q: This was only 10 years after McCarthy, wasn't it.*

STOKES: Yes, but there was still plenty of that around. Mr. Robertson, and there were many who were important political figures that had been assigned in Asian Affairs, held that same view. So I think it was seen as a harmless way to try to do something, that is, an undangerous way, to start to do something to cast bread on the waters and see what would happen. Following that year at the Industrial College I was assigned to the Air Force planning staff on loan from the State Department. And one of my early duties I recall was to assist in the negotiation for base rights in Southeast Asia and East Asia as a result of the needs rising out of our increasing involvement in Vietnam. And so I was involved in the negotiation with the Taiwan government for the Jin Guan Gan airfield in Taiwan. It was to be used by B52s for the U Te Pao base in Thailand. One of the most interesting and ultimately significant assignments for me was to plan the response from the Air Force's point of view of the Thai government's request that a United States helicopter fleet of 100 Hueys and pilots be sent to Northeast Thailand to help the Thai government deal with the Chinese sponsored insurgency in Northeast Thailand, which

coincidentally was just in the, not so coincidentally, but was in the same vicinity as the place where our air base network in Thailand was being located - near the Lao frontier which is an easy reach of the Ho Chi Minh trail. At this time the State Department manifested the beginning of what was to be the core of what I'd like to talk about. An unwillingness to see reproduced in Thailand the same kind of direct involvement and direct assumption of military responsibility that the United States was conducting then in Vietnam.

**HARLAN CLEVELAND**  
**Director, UNRRA Mission**  
**China (1947-1948)**

*Ambassador Cleveland was born in New York City and raised in the United States and Switzerland. He was educated at Princeton and Oxford Universities. During World War II he served on the Board of Economic Warfare, after which he held a number of senior positions dealing with Italian economic recovery, US and UNRRA assistance programs in China and Taiwan and NATO issues. He also served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations and as US Ambassador to NATO. Ambassador Harlan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Well, when you left in 1947, where did you go?*

CLEVELAND: I went to China and became the head of the UNRRA mission in China, which was by far the biggest UNRRA mission, spending about 2/3 of a billion 1947 dollars in 2 ½ years. The decision had been made in the UNRRA headquarters that they would wind down the European programs in 1947, but that the China program would be run for one more year. The head of that mission was an American major general of engineers who at one time had been the governor of the Panama Canal. That was partly because one of the biggest single projects there was rebuilding the dikes in the Yellow River Valley, which was an enormous earth moving job. The engineer in charge told me it was the earth moving equivalent of building the Panama Canal, and therefore, he said tied for second in history behind the Great Wall. It was a huge endeavor. This fellow, General Edgerton, became ill and wasn't able to stay, and they had another year to run.

The thing at UNRRA was that an appointment to UNRRA was no longer a prestige thing; you just had to find somebody that could do the job. So I get a call one day from Jacko, Commander Jackson, out of the blue asking would I be willing to go to China for a year. Well, I obviously would need a job if they were going to wind down. On the other hand, Lois and the kids were with me, and it made for family complications. I didn't think I should take them to where there was a civil war going on. But it was a huge job. It was a much bigger job than I had; more responsibility and a much bigger staff. There were 3000 people scattered all over China in the middle of a civil war.

*Q: I'm thinking we might stop at this point because, I'd rather start; I'll just put it on the tape*

*here that we are going to pick up, you had been offered this job in China in 1947. It was a very big job, and you have given a little background about why you were offered the job, and we'll pick it up at that point with what you agreed to do and why you went there and what it was.*

CLEVELAND: Right. We hadn't gotten very far along in my life. At this point I was still only 29.

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*Q: This is the first of April, 1999. Well, you are 29 years old and you are off to China. What did the job consist of as you saw it then and when was this?*

CLEVELAND: This was May of 1947.

*Q: How did you see the job as you went there?*

CLEVELAND: Well, it was obviously a very big job especially for me at that age. It was the largest country program in the UNRRA setup. In the course of a little bit more than two years, that program put something over 2/3 of a billion 1947 dollars into China. I once wrote a long paper called "China is Hard to Help," discussing the difficulty of solving problems by throwing money at them. The war was over, but the civil war was going from bad to worse from the point of view of the nationalists.

I didn't bring Lois and the children over because I didn't want to have them there in the middle of a civil war. I had to go rather suddenly. When I came back from Europe, I had not more than a couple of weeks to get things set with Lois and then to do some consultation in Washington. I was able to make an arrangement in Washington that I would have the same authority that the heads of the European missions of UNRRA had. They were, of course, going through reduction in force procedures. I, fortunately, got the same authority so that I was able to release people if I didn't think they were contributing or if there was some cloud of corruption over them, as there was with some. I was able to get rid of people fast without proving anything against them. So I got that authority and I was still working closely with the deputy director general of UNRRA, Commander Robert Jackson, a really delightfully bright and vibrant person.

I got there and found there were theoretically over 4,000 people working for me, 1,000 expatriates, non-Chinese, and 3,000 Chinese. They were scattered all over China in the middle of this civil war 15 regional offices dealing with both the communists and the nationalists. We were the UN; we were supposed to be neutral. Many of our employees were actually working inside the Chinese government to sort of help them do their jobs. I brought just two people with me, an economist and a minister of assistance that I had worked with in Italy. Otherwise it was all new people as far as I was concerned. It was a little like my taking over the job in Italy during the war where I was young and didn't have a military ranking which was just as well because it would have been a low one. Just as the military, they were inclined to take me seriously because I was in the job; the same thing sort of happened in China. There had been quite a long hiatus where the chief of mission had been sick. He had been brought home, actually. So anybody who looked as he was in charge was sort of automatically popular, at least for a honeymoon period. We were

operating all over China. The only way to find out anything -- for example, if there was a flood in southern China -- was to hop in an airplane and go and look. So we did a good deal of that, getting around in China on unscheduled airplanes, mostly former Flying Tiger planes and pilots. General Chennault had set himself up as a civil air transport company. Many of the Flying Tigers found their first post war jobs that way. So, I had the experience of sitting next to a pilot, who says, "I think I'll have a nap. Why don't you take over for awhile." He showed me how I should do it. Of course, I had neither the authority nor the credentials to do that sort of thing, and he didn't have the authority to turn it over to anybody either. But it was an informal time. I got around China a lot.

*Q: What was UNRRA trying to do? How do you try to do something for China at that time?*

CLEVELAND: Relief and rehabilitation. Trying to recover from the war. The biggest single project was a huge dike-building project in the Yellow River, where the Yellow River had been diverted from its old bed, its long historic bed, had been diverted by the Chinese as a defense mechanism against the Japanese. It wandered all over the country, destroying villages, and it seemed very important to get it back into its old bed so the power arrangements could be reconstructed and the country saved from this really huge river with its enormous silt content of the water. I was in one village where the only thing you could see of the village that had been there was the roof of the only two story building that had been there. Everything else was just sand like a desert. I went up and visited the Yellow River project several times. I said it was our star accomplishment.

On one visit I walked past a whole series of rusting bulldozers. I asked the young engineer in charge why they had all these Chinese going up and down this dike they were building with two baskets of dirt instead of using the bulldozers. He said, "Well come to my shack here and I'll show you." He did the calculations that demonstrated that it really didn't make sense to send heavy intricate machinery to an area like that if there were no machine shops within 1000 miles that could ever make a new part for them. Apparently one of the things that went out first was the clutch assemblies. He said Chinese drivers tend to ride the clutch. You remember what that meant in the old days when we had clutches on cars. So I watched 1,000 people going up and down with dirt, and laying the dirt on top of the dike and coming down and getting some more dirt, an extraordinary operation which in the end did divert the Yellow River back into its old bed. The engineer in charge of that operation, a wonderful older man named O.J. Todd, said it was about the earth moving equivalent of building the Panama Canal. Therefore, he said, it tied for second in world history behind the Great Wall of China which is apparently recognized to be the greatest earth moving job ever.

Another big crisis came over some very modern fishing boats that had been programmed and sent before I got there. They were the kind of boats they fish with off Seattle and Vancouver: two-way radios, power driven trolling nets, that sort of thing. They were enormously successful in bringing in a huge catch. They were so successful that they bothered the people who ran the fish market in Shanghai, the local Al Capone character.

*Q: The mob.*

CLEVELAND: The mob of that time and place. They declared a boycott on the catch of these beautiful boats. We had some problem getting the boats working. I found that these imported engineers mostly got seasick and really didn't want to go fishing, so we finally developed the idea of getting some Australian fishing captains to come in and be the expatriate bosses and got some real Chinese fishermen as their crew. These new skippers were very good at teaching the fishermen what they needed to know about the machinery. So, the problem was more human than machinery, though it was diagnosed first as a machinery problem. That was wrong.

*Q: When you were looking at plans, were you able to, bring bulldozers to a place where they can't repair them? We tried to think in sort of western terms. Were you able to sort of modify what you were trying to do because of the Chinese situation?*

CLEVELAND: Well, most of the heavy and complicated equipment had already been brought in before I got there. My problem was to adapt the situation to what we had. In this case, for example, of the fishing boats, we had to have a big negotiation with the fish market people and with the ministry of food of the nationalist government in Nanking.

We had a meeting in my office, I remember, at which, of course we didn't have air conditioning in those days, and we weren't very far from the market, so all the stench from the fish piling up that they weren't willing to sell was readily received by our noses. The minister of food asked one of his assistants to go and shut the window. I said, "No, I'd rather keep it open please," thinking that would help speed up the negotiations. Anyway, what we finally did was a typical Chinese compromise. Half the boats would be used for fishing, and the other half, I don't remember how many there were exactly, were being diverted to river transport because they were well equipped for it. They had too much equipment for that. They didn't need the trolling equipment, but the two way radios were useful. That reduced the amount of the catch sufficiently so that the market was prepared to absorb it.

We had a major agricultural industries service, so-called, which was developing small industry in the rural areas. This was to prevent a situation where farmers would go broke and come into the city, and the cities would be overwhelmed with unemployed peasants. The sort of thing that happened in American history and the history of other countries, but in China it was really threatening the cities. So we had a group of very bright young engineers who invented all sorts of ways of doing processing locally instead of bringing it to big centers. That was one of the most durable kinds of relief and rehabilitation projects I thought we did, that, and the bank building. We had people helping with the water and power systems of the country getting them back into shape. We had a big import of food which we used for wages. All the people on the dikes, they didn't want the money, because the money by that time was almost worthless. The interest rate from Shanghai I remember was about 30% per month. They didn't want the money, so we would import this wheat flour, and stuff like that, and deliver it to people as wages. We'd bring flour all the way across the Pacific, and from Shanghai to the Yellow River Valley, to the port of Tientsin. Another big distance. I mean like putting in at Cherbourg and taking it to Warsaw, something like that. It was an expensive operation in modern cost-effective terms.

*Q: Well how did you deal, I mean you were there from 1947 to when?*

CLEVELAND: Until early '48.

*Q: How did you deal with the civil war that was going on?*

CLEVELAND: Well, we had several people who went back and forth to negotiate with the communists, and we did import some stuff that they needed and wanted. We had great difficulty getting them to agree that none of it would be diverted to their military. They regarded their military as just other citizens, you know. So in practice the lion's share of what we brought in went into the nationalist areas, and of course, the lion's share of the country was still under at least nominal nationalist control. There was a big problem just keeping the Yellow River project going because it was just in that area that the civil war was heating up the most when I first got there in the spring of '47. We got so frustrated by the fact that the workers would just disappear into the countryside every few days because they didn't want to be shot at. A quite normal motivation I thought. So we talked about it in our mission, and we decided to do something that I am really surprised looking back on it any of us had the guts to do. Without notice to either side and without notice to our headquarters, I declared a "cease fire" in the Yellow River Valley, with a sort of eloquent statement saying that we were trying to rebuild China for whomever governed it. That wasn't our problem. We wanted to rebuild it, and one of the things was this huge Yellow River thing, and we couldn't do it if they got shot at, so there had to be a cease fire.

This was such a surprise that both the nationalists and the communists took it seriously. I got very strong confidential support from my boss, Commander Jackson, in Washington. Some of the foreign office people who were representatives to UNRRA and the UNRRA council were grumbling about it. It was precisely for that reason that had I tried to clear it; it never would have happened. So it held for several weeks, and people got back on the job.

Then one night a communist raiding party knocked over a local nationalist unit, and the civil war was back on. But the interesting thing was they had gotten the idea, and thereafter they tended to lay off the areas where the dike-building was actually going on, so the drama of this cease fire initiative actually got through and became sort of a public fact, even though the cease fire itself went into history rather rapidly.

*Q: What about the problem of the nationalist government particularly in that period, that was extremely corrupt. Was this a problem for you?*

CLEVELAND: The problem wasn't much of a problem in dealing with the government people we dealt with. The man who was sort of my opposite number, the cabinet the head of what was called CNRRA, the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, was honest and dependable. He knew that I meant what I said, and I knew he meant what he said. And Chiang Kai-shek himself, his family and friends, were heavily corrupt. But he actually lived a very austere life. For example, he'd only have three courses, he'd invite people to dinner and only have three courses, when the normal thing was about 20 courses at that time. We had some people in the mission who were lining their own pockets, or helping their Chinese opposite numbers do so. We conducted a number of investigations, and I had this authority to just say, "Okay, this is your last day of work." So, in most cases, I just did that. We didn't try to make a federal case out of each of them because we would have done nothing else. People got the idea after awhile that that

was not going to be tolerated. After the first few firings of that sort, that sort of thing settled down a good deal. Some Chinese family members and others were really getting rich. It was bothersome, but there was also nothing I could do about it. It was also helping the nationalists to lose the civil war. We just had to watch and wait, rather than try to mastermind the whole situation.

We did have several rather dramatic incidents of confrontation. We needed to talk to a delegation of Chinese communists. We wanted them to come to Shanghai. We got the mayor to agree and to put them under his protection. The mayor was a very good friend and a very bright figure, one of the most honest people I met in China. K.C. Woo was his name. So we had this delegation come in. It was a strange series of events. I made sort of a welcoming speech to my opposite number in the negotiations. You could see him getting red in the face and mad at what I was saying, even though I was using my most flowery language. So I declared a recess and went out and talked to my Chinese assistants about what was going on here. They said, "Well this translator is translating all of your pretty words into the nastiest language he can think of as it goes through."

I learned my lesson. Everything I said would be translated by my own translator. At the end of that negotiation, we said good-bye to them, and they were to leave the next morning. The delegation left and it developed that their translator had decamped and had turned up in Hong Kong. He was sort of the KGB guy in the mission, but he decided he had had enough apparently. I never found out what happened but he was obviously escaping from the communists.

There was also a lot of what the nationalist government was doing was of course deeply affected by how the war was going. It was not well. There was an incident that I remember there which illustrates that. On one visit that Commander Jackson came over from Washington, we managed to negotiate with the government and the central bank that our proceeds of sale-fund would not be expressed in local currency but in bales of cotton because we didn't want it just to disappear with inflation. That was a very important invention, the proceeds of sale-fund in UNRRA. That idea was that you bring in dollar goods, and the government has to put the equivalent of that in local currency in a special fund under the joint control of the government and the UNRRA mission. That same principle was written into the Marshall Plan legislation later on. They called it counterpart funds. It had a very important role to play in the Marshall Plan. I must give you a copy, by the way, of a keynote speech I gave on the Marshall Plan during the 50th anniversary year a couple of years ago. It explains a lot of what I thought about the Marshall Plan.

Anyway, we made this deal that the local currency fund would be expressed in bales of cotton. Then Commander Jackson went back to Washington. I was getting weekly reports from the central bank of how much money we had in there and so on. I started looking at these reports very quizzically because the numbers were going up so fast. I finally called up the governor at the central bank who by that time was a good friend of mine, partly because I had said I didn't want the house they had allocated for the chief of the UNRRA mission to live in because I wanted to be downtown right near the office, living in a hotel. He turned out to be the next person on the priority system, and so he got the house. So, he always thought I was a good friend of his, you see. Anyway I called him up and said would you look at these figures because I think there is something wrong with the picture. He called back in about an hour splitting his sides with laughter saying you know what happened was that I told them to make it bales of cotton and

I assumed it would just apply to them a normal interest rate without the inflation factor. They were continuing to apply the 30% per month. He said I have been doing some pencil work on my desk here, and I figure it won't be very many years before UNRRA will own all of China if this goes on. He was laughing and making a big joke of it. But he then told me a few weeks later about having been called up to see Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at the sort of summer residence like Camp David in our set up. He said he was confronted there with a whole plan for changing the currency. Instead of being called the Chinese national currency it was going to be called the gold Yuan. They had an outside consultant do this without telling the central bank about it. Then they confronted the governor of the central bank with this plan. Dr. Jien Jienal, the governor of the central bank, said, "The Generalissimo asked me whether I thought the plan would work." I said I felt the plan would work just fine if he could hold Shandong because the communists were then threatening Shandong province.

*Q: Which is a peninsula that sticks out into the Yellow Sea.*

CLEVELAND: Once they had Shandong, they would be threatening the Yangtze Valley. In other words he was a banker and knew perfectly well that money was a factor of confidence. So he came down and the Generalissimo decided they would change the currency anyway. They changed the currency, but it didn't have very much effect on the inflation. as it was bound not to.

So there were many ways in which the situation in China was impacting our program. We just had to weave and bob and duck to try to make sense out of the really enormous bonanza we were putting into the country. It was hard to know exactly what proportion of their GNP. I developed the first calculation of Chinese balance of payments. We figured that about half of the balance of trade at that time in '47 was actually smuggling, so there was no way to get a series of figures that made any sense, that you could do the kind of planning we do now.

So, as you can see, it was a lively time. When there was a flood in Canton in the whole Kwangtung area, the only way to find out about it was to get an airplane. So we got an airplane in the morning we first heard about it, got the door taken off because we could see better that way. We flew at about 500 feet all over south China to get a feel for where the water had gone and how many people are being displaced, and that sort of thing, and where we should try to deliver food. That was all in a day's work. I have to say it was a very interesting job.

*Q: Well, you left there in early '48. What was the reason for leaving? Was it impossible to do relief?*

CLEVELAND: No, the program was just finished. It was going to be finished in the next couple of months. We worked out a way of trying to transfer to non-governmental organizations most of the equipment and supplies that were lying around that hadn't been delivered yet, so that we wouldn't be overtly taking sides in the civil war. So we worked out a transition of that program, and the U.S. government at the same time was developing a new China aid program in support of Chiang Kai-shek. In effect we sort of married our program to that in terms of we'd stop the supply of certain kinds of equipment or certain kinds of food. But the American aid program would pick it up just at the point where we dropped it.

I came back to Washington which was the only place where I knew how to work. But the UNRRA program was finished at that point. That was even the end of the UNRRA agency. It was actually the largest operational thing the UN has ever done, though some of the more recent peacekeeping operations may have been more costly.

*Q: But nothing like restoring the Yellow River to its riverbed, and all.*

CLEVELAND: And all the stuff we did in Italy and Yugoslavia and the Ukraine, and so on. It was just a gigantic operation.

**ROBERT ANDERSON**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Shanghai (1947-1949)**

*Ambassador Robert Anderson entered the Foreign Service in 1947. His career included posts in Shanghai, Bangkok, New Delhi, Bordeaux, and Paris. In addition, he served as ambassador to Benin, Morocco, and the Dominican Republic. Ambassador Anderson was interviewed by Horace Torbert in 1990.*

ANDERSON: I went to Shanghai. As you and I discussed before this interview, your early posts are essentially training; that's when the Service finds out if you've got it or not, and if you can develop and progress. So I started out in Shanghai, in the General Services section, as the fellow that was told to move all of the household and office equipment that was arriving in Shanghai -- to reopen all of our posts in China. There were about a dozen of them. And there was no commercial transportation whatsoever, air or sea. So I had a problem. What I did was make friends with our Air Force people. I would find a space on this C-47 or this C-46, and go and have drinks with them. And I had all of our things moved at no expense to the State Department, to establish all of our posts.

*Q: Sounds like a first-class dog robber. [Laughter]*

ANDERSON: That's what it was. They gave me my first job in the political work. And at one point they sent me on a trip to prepare an economic report.

Then a very unusual man showed up one day. His nickname was "the walrus." He became one of the closest friends I ever had in the Foreign Service. He was William Walton Butterworth, whom I absolutely adored, and his wife, Virginia. He had sent word, before he arrived as our Minister in China, that he would appreciate it if his lift vans would not be dropped in the Yangtze River, and would not be pilfered by anybody. I was told that this was a rather formidable person, and that it might be a good idea if I saw to it that his lift vans arrived from Shanghai to Nanking with no mishaps.

I went down on the Yangtze River, at the harbor in Shanghai, and I stayed with those vans until they arrived in Nanking. Nothing was broken; no damage. The Minister came down to Shanghai

afterwards and said he wanted to meet the person who shipped his effects to Nanking. This is not a very nice thing to say, but I have to say it. Our Consul General was Monnett B. Davis. I had never met Monnett B. Davis, though I had been in his Consulate General for damn near a year. And Butterworth asked him, "Would you find out the fellow who got my effects up to Nanking? I'd like to meet him." And I was escorted, for the first time in my life, into the consul general's office. And I had never met Monnett B. Davis.

*Q: My gracious! How big a consulate general was it? I mean, how many American officers were there?*

ANDERSON: Put it this way, Tully, it wasn't that big. [Laughter] I think it was the personality of the Consul General. I introduced myself to the Consul General in front of Mr. Butterworth. And I said, "I'm delighted to meet you, Sir."

And Butterworth said to me afterwards: "You never met this man before?"

I said, "No, Sir, I haven't." And then he told me: "Look, I want you up in Nanking. You know, this is ridiculous." I guess the only reason I'm mentioning this little story is for younger people who come into the Service. I maintain that every officer gets a chance, gets an opening, but a lot of people don't recognize it. If you meet a challenge successfully, something is going to happen and you're going to go up. And that was the first one I had; it was getting those lift vans to Nanking. I did the job.

There's a fellow named Jim McKenna I have to mention to you. He was the first Foreign Service officer I ever met in Shanghai, when I arrived on a weekend. I was all charged up and said, "Boy, they can't wait to see this young, vigorous vice consul come to set the affairs of Shanghai and China straight." And I walked into this fellow's office. And he had a hat on at his desk. He was the number two in the Consulate General. He's smoking the biggest cigar I've ever seen -- Jim McKenna, from New England. He was there with a big pile of telegrams, going through them.

He looked up over his glasses at me and wondered what I was doing there. And I told him I was assigned here. And he didn't know who I was. I didn't have a room; they didn't have a room for me, nothing. I slept on a couch at the Cathay Hotel; at the foot of twin beds, where two other officers were sleeping. That's how tight things were. I found out later that McKenna spent as much time as he could in his office, because his wife wouldn't let him smoke cigars at home. He was a wonderful guy.

I went up to Nanking. Butterworth, a very foresighted man, felt that we should start a major biographic data program for China. And I was put in charge of that, started it right from scratch, had a full-time gal working who was a specialist and who came from Washington. And we built up a mammoth biographic program for all of China.

I went around to different offices and taught people how to make reports, and not just these old-fashioned, formal full reports, but little squibs; cutting out items from newspapers and other publications. I was sent over to Taipei in Formosa to get things started. Later we managed to get all that information out, which gave us a tremendous amount of background on the Communist

regime that eventually took over. We wouldn't have had anything but for that.

Washington still hadn't figured out whether the Chinese Communists were agrarian reformers or communists. So they split the embassy in half. And seeing that I was young, single and expendable, I guess, I was told to stay behind with John Wesley Jones, who was one of the dearest friends I ever had.

*Q: Still is.*

ANDERSON: And who was partially responsible for my marriage. He was very close to the Italian ambassador in China, whose daughter I married. But Johnny was sort of a father to me out there. He was a dear, dear person.

We stayed behind after the communists took over. They took over on April 21, 1949, and we were essentially locked up until we got out in October. When we tried to go to the office a couple of times, they'd ram bayonets through the radiators of our cars. So a couple of us were dumb enough to say the heck with this, and we'd creep around and go through back alleys, because we wanted to get over the chancery so we could send a telegram or two. We were finally evacuated in October, that year, from Shanghai.

Now, there were two other people in Nanking I wanted to mention to you. One was Livy [Livingston] Merchant. He was a very close friend of Walt Butterworth; they went to Princeton together. And Livy had been a very, very successful investment banker, living in New Jersey. And then he, as you probably know -- you know him better than I do -- decided to get into the Foreign Service at a rather advanced age.

A lot of us couldn't figure out why a successful investment banker, with everything in the world, would come out and live in Nanking, China, with a beautiful wife, Betty, and children.

He told us that he just got absolutely fed up with spending most of his life on the train, between his house and his office. He said: "I would leave in the morning and wouldn't see my children before they went to school. And I would come back at night and they'd already be in bed. That's no way to live." Well, of course, he turned out to be one of the top people, we've ever had in the Service; I think he's just absolutely wonderful.

The other fellow is Philip Crowe.

*Q: I hadn't realized he was out there.*

ANDERSON: Phil went there as Roger Lapham's man. Do you remember the China Relief Mission?

*Q: Yes.*

ANDERSON: Phil was the head of it in Nanking. That was our first post-war aid program, really; right after the war, as I recall. Phil was administering that. We became very close friends.

He managed somehow to have an embassy every time the Republicans came into power; I think he had five throughout his career. He had his first heart attack when he was out there, just as the communists were coming. The question was how to get him out.

We had an old Army ambulance, that we received from the military a while back -- and I drove him through the retreating Chinese Nationalist lines to the last plane to leave Nanking. I must say, I wasn't worried about the communist troops coming in, but I was very concerned about the retreating Nationalist troops. They were much nastier than the victors coming in, who weren't quite as nervous, they were on top of the world, as it were. And it was a fairly hairy little ride in the ambulance, but we got Phil there, thank God, and put him on the plane. We waved goodbye and off Livy and Phil Crowe went.

But after that, I came back to Washington with a rather bad case of amoebic dysentery. There were no medicines left in Nanking so it was pretty well advanced, and they, the doctors, were concerned about it. So I spent about three months or more, every day of my life, at Walter Reed Hospital. I became the second guinea pig, if you will, for Aureomycin, the medicine they were just developing.

*Q: Thank God for it. They used it on me some years later.*

ANDERSON: They hadn't really figured out the right mixture. I went through more courses than you can shake a stick at. But I finally got rid of it and then got married in February of '50, in Florence, Italy.

*Q: At that time, was your father-in-law in Washington by then?*

ANDERSON: No. He didn't come until the '60s.

I came back to Washington. I worked temporarily in the Far Eastern Bureau, where Walt Butterworth was Assistant Secretary. Livy Merchant was the Assistant Secretary for Europe.

ANDERSON: I resigned from the Foreign Service from about May or April until August, 1950, because my father came down to Washington and he said that he really had to have me take over the family business, that he was getting too old and he couldn't do it anymore. He really was quite emotional about it. My dear wife, who didn't marry me to go and live outside of Boston to run a paper box business she said: "Well, look. Your father needs you. You go and do it. Come on, we have to do it."

**LEONARD L. BACON**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Hankow (1947-1948)**

**Consular Officer**  
**Nanking (1949-1950)**

*Leonard L. Bacon was born in New York in 1907. He joined the Foreign Service in 1945 and served in Switzerland, China, Germany, Laos, and Washington, DC. Mr. Bacon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

BACON: Yes, I really did. What I'd seen, of course, in Switzerland was pretty attractive and I felt competent in many ways, particularly speaking German and French, and I'd also taken a little Russian instruction in Zurich which I never got to use anywhere. And I'd seen enough of the personnel of the Foreign Service to feel that that was where I wanted to be too. So I passed the examination and went back to Switzerland and was notified shortly that my next post was Hankow.

*Q: Did this come as a bolt out of the blue, or had you made any noises to that effect?*

BACON: I've forgotten now whether I made...I don't think I was asked for any preferences, but at this time generalization was in everybody's mind. The world was divided into three major areas: one was Europe; one was East Asia, South Asia; and the third was Latin America. Africa hardly figured.

*Q: Yes, it was all colonial and we had practically nothing in there.*

BACON: That's right. South Africa would have been part of the British Empire, at least from our point of view. And the Arab world was more or less South Asia, from our point of view, at least Middle East where it was centered. So the idea was that everybody should spend a substantial part of his life in at least two of those three areas. And I had no interest at all in Spanish America, so I wasn't particularly surprised it was the Far East.

*Q: How did you get to Hankow? You went there in 1947.*

BACON: We went by air -- Zurich to Geneva, Geneva to Cairo, Cairo to Bombay, Bombay to Calcutta, Calcutta to Kunming, Kunming to Hankow.

*Q: What did we have in Hankow, and what were you doing?*

BACON: We had a Consulate General there; very, very small. Had a Consul and his number two, and a Vice Consul. Hankow had become a small town from our point of view. The Chinese, or some people, used to refer to it as the Chicago of China, which was nonsense. It was the head of ocean steamship navigation on the Yangtze River. But following the war all foreign shipping was excluded from the river, and the city was run by an administration which seemed to be interested almost entirely in what could be made out of it. For example, practically all of the industries had been nationalized during the war, or immediately afterwards. That included the steelworks and other factories across the river, and, of course, the ferry system. Well, the ferry system constantly lost money because there were too many people stealing rides on it, no fares being collected. Some of the factories were profitable, so the government made every effort to sell off the ferry system to private operators who probably could make it pay, and retain the profitable industries which had nothing to do with government.

*Q: Had Hankow been occupied by the Japanese?*

BACON: Oh, yes.

*Q: What was the situation there as far as the city went? Was it in bad shape?*

BACON: It was not in very bad shape. It had electric power -- not enough, but some. One of the problems was that all of the cast iron, and wrought iron, had been removed to be sent to steel mills, and that meant that none of the elevators worked anywhere because the cables had gone, and most of the fences were gone and the gratings over the gutters were gone. So if you weren't careful your right wheel would drop two feet when you got too close to the curb. I, of course, had never been before in Hankow and I'm not sure what it looked like pre-war but it had a university which had one or two American teachers there. It depended almost entirely, apparently, on monthly weather reports which were paid for by the U.S. That seemed to be its sole source of income outside of tiny Chinese government grants.

*Q: What were you doing there?*

BACON: When I came the Consul had been waiting for somebody to show up so he could take a vacation. I filled an empty spot, that was Kenneth Krentz, who later went to Taipei. So I acted during his absence and he did come back briefly but got his assignment to Taipei and left, and then for most of the time I was there I was the acting Consul and was succeeded by "China" Ed Martin -- whom I see on your list.

*Q: What type of work were you doing?*

BACON: Just general consular business which was mainly looking after the interests, safety and well being of Americans there who were almost entirely either missionaries or oil company personnel.

*Q: How were your relations with the government -- at that time it was Chiang Kai-shek?*

BACON: They were pretty good. No problems inside Hankow itself. It was the missionaries scattered around the country who were in difficulties. For one thing the local police had a habit of seizing their passports and holding them, for no reason. So I had a big stamp made covering a whole page of the passport saying that this passport is the property of the Government of the United States, and must not be taken except for examination, or inspection, and then immediately returned to the holder. I reported that to the Department which was somewhat incensed. They said, "You have no authority to make such a stamp." But the missionaries were very grateful because it worked.

*Q: I might add that I'm an old consular hand and made one bad mistake. You never report this sort of thing to the Department.*

BACON: I was new.

*Q: Did you have problems...were you reporting on the situation there?*

BACON: Yes. We made reports, especially of the election which took place, I think around June of '48. It took days, and days, and days to get any results from the authorities, and Nanking was mad because Hankow hadn't reported.

*Q: Nanking being our Embassy, which was located in Nanking?*

BACON: Nanking, yes. And finally, what you would call the confidential clerk -- the Chinese number one employee who spoke English as well as Chinese -- said, "The real reason is that the so-called opposition party -- Democratic Youth, or something like that -- had such a small turnout that they don't dare report the enormous support for the Kuomintang because it wouldn't look reasonable, and they're trying to adjust the returns enough to make a credible return out of it." So finally they did, and I reported it including the information that we got from the Chinese clerk. So, of course, Chiang Kai-shek was very successful but you could never tell. It was either more or less successful -- in some cases the results were altered in favor of the opposition to make the report look real. In other cases, where there seemed to be some strong opposition, it was probably toned down.

*Q: At that time was it your impression, and the impression of Consulate Hankow, this was real support for Kuomintang?*

BACON: It's very difficult to say because the government around there was almost entirely military. It was the Hankow headquarters of the Generalissimo. And there was a four-star General who may have been the son of Sun Yat-sen, I'm not quite sure of that. In some of the correspondence it's mentioned; three lieutenant generals, and half a dozen major generals under him. I gave a party once and I didn't invite anybody under the rank of major general except for some colonels who spoke English, and could be scattered around to do some translating. People were rather light-headed. They couldn't see that the situation would ever change. It didn't seem at all likely that the communist could ever get that far south, and there was no very heavy fighting going on then anyway. Following late that year after I went to Nanking, and of course through '49, the communists made their really big advances in Manchuria, and then in taking Peking, and then everything north of Yangtze, and then everything south.

*Q: How did you feel about the impression of the communists?*

BACON: I can talk about that better of the time when I was in Nanking.

*Q: I was just wondering, in Hankow, I take it, it didn't play much of a part?*

BACON: No. It did not seem to be anything that was imminent. We had stories from missionaries. Some missionaries had been murdered, not entirely clear by whom but probably by communists, and their bodies sent to Hankow for transshipment. The general impression though was not so much of fear, or support for communists, but a general feeling that things were going slowly worse, and worse, and worse under the Kuomintang. I can tell you a little bit on that. On

everybody's mind, of course, was inflation. It was enormous. The Consulate had difficulty getting the money out to pay the staff every week. It would come in -- these yuan notes tied in bundles. Nobody ever counted the notes in the bundles, it would take too long for what they were worth. As soon as we paid the staff each one would run out on the street and buy salt, which was simply something that had some stable value. At one time the plane from Shanghai which carried the money, failed to arrive and the Hankow police didn't get paid. What they did was to take direct action which didn't get them any money either, but they went to the branch of the Bank of China and demolished it. They simply tore it down, leveled it to the ground.

*Q: This was obviously...you were looking at a situation that was unstable because of this.*

BACON: There was almost no support for the Kuomintang except something that might stave off the communists for a while. But in the course of the year even that changed where people looked forward to the arrival of communists as putting an end to an almost impossible life that they were leading.

*Q: This obviously becomes much more of a factor when you moved to Nanking. You went there when? and what were you doing?*

BACON: I went there in July of '48, and I had several titles -- the Chief of Chancellery, and Head of the Consular Section, and also suddenly Chief of Protocol. The Consular Section was very small because there were few Americans in Nanking outside the diplomatic corps, and those attached to the University of Nanking. It did have some business preparing diplomatic visas for the diplomatic corps wishing to go to the United States. Most of the consular business, of course, was concentrated in Shanghai, and Canton. There was no recognizable American business in Nanking.

*Q: What about missionaries?*

BACON: There were quite a few, and some of them were on the faculty of the University, which was a Christian university. Also there was a women's college, Ginling, which was an affiliate of Smith College. It had some missionaries there too. The head of the school was a Chinese woman, and it was a very good school. After the communists came they had to adopt rather anti-American pose and put on a skit showing Uncle Sam in a stars and stripes hat, and a big nose, and doing some pretty ridiculous things but everybody recognized their heart wasn't in it. They had nothing against Uncle Sam, certainly not against Smith College.

*Q: Here you were...I mean you had been in the war, you were not a young man at this time, and you had your Hankow experience, and you were then in Nanking. The Ambassador was Leighton Stuart, you had the other old China hands who later became a focal point of an awful lot of conservative wrath. What was your impression of the staff in the Embassy, its attitude at that time. Because you were somewhat a disinterested outsider. You were not part of any group.*

BACON: Yes. Well, nobody took me as a political expert there, of course, and we had a number of people on the staff who were Chinese specialists -- Ralph Clough was one. He is somebody you might get in touch with. He's at the Brookings Institution. And Joe Bennett who is married to

a Chinese girl. He was in USIA. George Harris who is long retired and now living in New Hampshire. He had a very rough time because his first wife had belonged to some communist organization in the U.S. and this was thrown up to him over and over again especially after McCarthy. People made affidavits supporting him -- so did I, of course -- the business was dropped but he felt it best to resign and taught at American University for a while. That was a very sad affair because he was a very good man.

*Q: He's where at the university?*

BACON: At American University for a time after he retired from the Department. Then he and his present wife moved to New Hampshire about ten years ago.

*Q: Were you getting any feel for how...in the first place, what was Leighton Stuart like as an Ambassador?*

BACON: He had been appointed, not because of any diplomatic skills really, but because he actually did know almost everybody of importance in China. He was very well liked by the Chinese, he was born in Hankow.

*Q: He was president of the...*

BACON: ...of Yenching university in Peking, the American University there. Many of the leading figures -- not the top figures -- but many of the non-military figures had been former students of his, and he believed that he had a gateway to the communist government through them, that he could, if not get things done, at least find out what was going on and what they were thinking. This turned out to be a considerable mistake. There were one or two people who would talk to him, usually not directly but through a third person to preserve their skins. Other people there on the Embassy staff, although not China specialists, nevertheless had been there before, and had been there for years since the war and knew exactly what needed to be done. The difficulty was that our government was slow in fulfilling its undertakings of aid. I'm not so sure that it would have made any difference at all anyway because so many agreements to provide actual cash and supplies were delayed. The supplies were slow in coming, the cash did come but very little of it ever got out of the hands of the Chinese hierarchy. And some extraordinary things happened. I mean, we provided a plane for the personal use of one of the leading Chinese generals and at the time we departed the plane had never even been uncrated. It was still sitting in a warehouse. He presumably had an idea he would sell it to somebody -- I've made that up out of my head but the fact is much of what we sent was never used, much that was used was either wasted or simply lost and abandoned to the communists as the communists came forward.

*Q: Let's go to the time when you first got to Nanking. You already had Hankow, the Kuomintang, and this government really wasn't operating except for the rich men of its hierarchy. Was this the impression we were getting?*

BACON: Yes. You got that impression pretty strongly because what we asked them to do, what they said they would do, did not get done. The people we thought we could rely upon would give us assurances without having any intention of carrying them out. There was a general feeling of

despair really, that since the whole thing was going down the chute, the best thing to do was to look after yourself and your family. Generally in China it's true the family does come first. Your first loyalty is to your family, your parents, and your descendants.

*Q: And this, of course, also is one of the reasons for not only safety, but for distribution of money and everything else. I mean money that came in is not just for your own personal use, but to the glory of Sun Yat-sen or what have you.*

BACON: To do all you possibly could to see that their lives were liveable, which was scarcely true of many millions of people. As a result depression was enormous. We had staff meetings every day and I would go to them. Most of the information would come from the Military attaché, General Soule. He later was the general for the Second Division, I think, in Korea. They constantly were hoping that the Chinese military, the Nationalists, would have some successes but city after city kept falling; first in Manchuria -- that was the second big one there. Then cities around Peking, and finally Peking and it was felt that, "Well, they'd be stopped at some places between Peking and Nanking. We can hold them for a while." But the Nationalist army had the idea that if they could hold the cities they could eventually tire out the communists. But this had been a failing policy for years, and years, and frequently instead of holding the cities, they would abandon them at the approach of the communists. This happened, of course, at Nanking. It was generally supposed that the Yangtze River being a mile wide would be an absolutely impossible barrier if there were any kind of defense at all. Well there wasn't any defense, and I recall very well as I guess most of the people Embassy do, the morning when we discovered that the communists were already in town.

*Q: This was about when?*

BACON: This was in April 1949. The walls of Nanking are over 20 miles in circumference, 30 to 40 feet high -- of course, they're made of bricks so they could have been blown up but there was no need to do that. The gates were left open, the communists walked in. The Chinese government, and the police, had left town the night before knowing what was going to happen. There was a certain amount of looting that went on, some rather comical. I remember seeing some poor Chinese coming away from the Chief of Police's house with a water closet on his shoulders -- absolutely no use to him, he had no water supply but it was a pretty impressive object. What was really comical was that a few weeks later in the fall, the communist government decided to make a historical event out of the capture of Nanking. We could see the cameras being placed on the top of the walls, the army approaching with scaling ladders, soldiers climbing up and getting on top of the wall, waving the flag, and everything else -- something like the Berlin wall thing. And none of which, of course, had ever happened. They just walked in.

*Q: Going back a bit, what was the attitude and preparations of the Embassy as they saw city after city falling. Was it pretty much, "Ok, here it comes. Let's get ready to welcome the conquerors. Or what were we going to do." Or was it false optimism that something would happen and that the communists would not take over?*

BACON: First of all we were concerned about, of course, the missionaries scattered around northern China, and wanted to get messages out to them saying, "It's probably time to pack up

and get out." This, however, would have created a certain amount of panic, and also greatly offended the Nationalist government which was maintaining that there was no danger, everything was secure. So there was a great problem of getting out a message which would indicate that while the situation is unsettled, and so forth, anybody who is planning shortly to leave for the United States on leave or whatever, should do so promptly and trust that the situation will otherwise clear up. Well, we'd already done this a year before in Hankow, and I'd sent out a similar message there to the northern part of the Hankow area which was gigantic. Almost everything between Sian and Hankow and half way to Nanking in the northern part -- there's somewhat over a hundred million people in the consular district. And finally when I got leave to do so I notified missionaries in certain places that it was probably time to move, and I got one or two hot replies that said, "Why didn't you tell us sooner? We've been waiting to hear from you. We expected to be warned." But our position had been just reversed; we didn't want to warn too much because that would result in collapse of morale of the Americans there and consequently of Chinese too.

*Q: Well, there were determinations made -- I mean, this is always a major problem of telling Americans for purely practical reasons, "Get the hell out." At the same time we feel beholden to -- if it's a friend of our government -- to say to pull the rug from underneath them.*

*Mr. Bacon, my question initially was, how did the Embassy as the communists get closer and closer, what was the attitude, or mood, of the Embassy?*

BACON: Our attitude officially was that nothing much to worry about -- no cause for alarm -- don't get panicky. The time came, of course, just before the capture of Nanking, when the government itself moved to Canton. Our Minister Counselor, Lewis Clark, moved there with a small staff. The Ambassador and the rest of the Embassy stayed in Nanking mainly because, I think, we wanted to be in touch with the communists if they came right in.

*Q: Were you getting the feeling from your daily meetings that this was Ambassador Stuart's job, that they were saying, "Ok, they are going to come and we're going to maintain relations."*

BACON: We wouldn't, of course, treat them as the government of China until Washington decided, but that was considered to be pretty much a foregone conclusion, and whether it happened or not Ambassador Stuart felt that he would be in a very strong position to inform Washington as to what the communists were thinking, what their plans were. Because at this time it seemed possible apparently that a kind of a modus vivendi could be reached between the Nationalists and the communists. There might be a national congress composed partly of communists and partly of Kuomintang. After all, that's what the elections had been supposed to anticipate. But, of course, with increasing successes the communists were less and less interested in that, and it became apparent to them if to nobody else, that before long they'd have the whole country. So Ambassador Stuart remained in Nanking and saw, as I mentioned, a number of his former students and then eventually decided that he would have to go to Washington on consultation. And then we had this great problem of exit visas.

*Q: What did the Embassy do...the Kuomintang officials had all left. This was in...*

BACON: The summer of '48.

*Q: And here the communist forces...*

BACON: I'm sorry, the summer of '49.

*Q: I was thinking it probably was the summer of '49. The communist forces came in...here's the Embassy sitting there, we don't recognize them. Well, we had not had an Embassy in Peking at that time.*

BACON: No, we had a Consulate General.

*Q: So how did these two forces meet? How did you deal with them?*

BACON: It was a kind of minuet. We had almost no direct contact with communist officials for weeks and weeks. They opened their "office for aliens' affairs," they wouldn't call it a foreign office. People had to go, when the railroad was reopened, to Shanghai for medical attention or something like that. It wasn't just us, but all the embassies there. Almost all of them remained with their personnel in Nanking. To get an exit permit you would firmly assert that you were the Ambassador of Jutland, or whatever. The clerk would take it and insert, "Former Ambassador of Jutland," because they didn't recognize us, but we insisted that our diplomatic status, of course, continue. Sometimes they would write, "Bogus Ambassador." This happened to the Dutch Ambassador, Van Aerssen, he was a Baron Van Aerssen. So they inserted, "Former Ambassador Van Aerssen, and the Former Baroness Van Aerssen." We all congratulated her that it wasn't "Bogus Baroness."

This also produced an interesting event. We were having labor troubles, of course, especially the USIA staff, who, I believe not really voluntarily, but anyhow they were used as a front, were demanding tremendous settlements in lieu, or in anticipation of, their retirement allowances. And since everybody was likely to have some claims outstanding, possible claims by Chinese employees, personal employees, possible debts to local suppliers, everybody of course, paid up -- it didn't amount to much. But the communists demanded that a guarantor be provided for each person departing who could be held liable for any claims that might arise after the member departed. And I was chosen to be the guarantor probably because I had already been assigned to Dairen. Our Consulate there was in terrible trouble.

*Q: This is Dairen up in Manchuria?*

BACON: Yes. This had been undertaken several months before, but I could never get a visa to pass through Vladivostok, which was then the only way to get to Dairen -- the Russians didn't reply. After the communists came in we thought we'd try to renew this effort since it wouldn't involve the Russians anymore. You could go directly from Manchuria to Dairen. That didn't work out either. And in the meantime I'd been signing all these guarantees even though likely to be out of the country myself, and therefore... And this was pointed out to me at once by the Chinese communists, that, "Aren't you the man who signed all these guarantees?" And I said, "Yes, but I'm not leaving China. I'm only going to Dairen. That's in China, isn't it?" They said,

"Well, yes, but it's a little far." Actually it was still occupied by the Soviets. Anyway, I signed altogether upwards of 30 such, but when they finally wanted us all out, bingo. Nothing more was said about these things. They were very anxious to get the whole kit and caboodle out of Nanking. In fact, it was quite clear in the beginning of 1950 that they wanted all foreigners out of the interior of China. A few, necessarily, in Shanghai and Canton for trade, but otherwise the whole of China was going to be a closed box, with no foreigners except Soviets admitted.

The actual recognition of China began in October of '49 -- I think, it must have been about the 1st of October, or maybe the 10th of October. The Chinese government announced that it had been established as the sole government of China, and the following day the local papers announced that the Soviet Union had now recognized it. And then over the next few days different allied countries -- Soviet allies -- came with their recognitions. One of the early ones was, Yugoslavia, announced in the Chinese press -- that had to be recalled as a mistake. Yugoslavia was not in good order, of course.

*Q: Oh, yes. That's right. This was after the Tito break.*

BACON: Yes. Long after but the Chinese hadn't been aware of that. So when the telegram came they proudly announced it, and then said it was a mistake, they never did. But the Yugoslav personnel told me, "Yes, they had recognized it."

*Q: Then what happened?*

BACON: We were in the midst of these enormous labor negotiations with our employees and the settlement there. It became apparent that the communists wanted partly to demonstrate to the population that they were in charge, they could make the Americans jump over hoops, and call them to account for whatever they'd been doing. Also, they wanted hard currency any way they could get it, trying to levy fines on us for this and that, and so on. We had long negotiations with the USIA employees union, first before a mediation board. I recount some of this in these papers.

*Q: We're speaking about some papers that we will append to this interview.*

BACON: ...and it went on day after day, obviously not getting any place, or going to get any place. And one morning instead of breaking at the usual time around 12:00 for lunch, the discussion continued and I pointed out that it was after the usual lunch break, and they said, "Things are going pretty well, maybe in another half hour we'll all reach an agreement." And I said, "That's not the way I look at it. Everybody is entitled to eat lunch. I have a chauffeur downstairs and he's entitled to his lunch hour, and it's already past it." This sort of set them back but they said, "He's not a party to the dispute, so his opinion doesn't count." This really got me, and I said, "If we don't break for lunch in five minutes, I shall consider myself under arrest." And, of course, you're not supposed to lose your temper and make foolish statements but this created almost a panic. At that time William Olive had been arrested in Shanghai in connection with a traffic accident.

*Q: Who is this?*

BACON: William Olive, had been jailed by the Chinese for several days until he was released. This, of course, was a tremendous sensation -- a consular officer jailed for a traffic accident which wasn't serious, and wasn't his fault. Anyway, what I said created a certain consternation and shortly after that they said, "All right, we'll break and come back at 1:15." What had upset them was that if I maintained that I'd been arrested, even although there was nobody else to support that claim, still a report would have to be made as to what happened, and a number of people would be involved -- all the people on the mediation board. And whatever the outcome, the reports and the decisions would all go into their personnel folders, and could be brought out years later and say, "Why did you do this at this time? And let the man out, or whatever?" So they decided apparently the best thing to do was to remove the cause for my displeasure and we broke off. Nothing ever came of it anyway because we went on to arbitration, which was the last stage before a trial, and we weren't permitted to go to trial because that really would have been a waiver of immunity. Arbitration was considered not exactly binding on the U.S. government. Those proceedings were even more public in a big room in a government building. I was on one side with my interpreter, and on the other side were all the complainants, and from time to time bunches of school children would be brought in to watch the proceedings, and to see how the local authorities -- the communists -- were bearing down on the Americans. So I decided I needed somebody on my side too, and invited some embassies to send representatives. Well, a young girl from the Dutch embassy said she'd like to come, and she came, and shortly afterwards was thrown out on the ground that there was no claim against the Dutch government, so she had no business there. That went on for several days but everything depended on the outcome of similar discussions in Shanghai, which involved scores and scores of employees, and they finally came to an agreement under which lump sum payments were to be made in lieu of annual monthly pension payments, provided however the payments, of course, would be made in U.S. dollars directly in the presence of communist officials. As soon as the payments were made, the Americans were excused and we know, of course, the dollars were immediately confiscated and probably local currency substituted. But this was again an example of the extreme shortage of foreign exchange in the hands of the communists. They would do almost anything, no matter how petty, to get their hands on U.S. currency.

*Q: Did you feel that you might not be able to get out? Were you concerned about getting out?*

BACON: Not too much because there was evidently so much pressure to get us out. We weren't welcome. The only possibility was the possibility of actually being held hostage for the sake of collecting some more money.

*Q: How did you get out, and when?*

BACON: This was in March of 1950. By that time the Consulate General in Peking had been closed. All the Consulates in the interior of China had been closed. Our staff, what was left of it in Nanking, had proceeded one by one to Shanghai awaiting shipment and as it turned out I was evidently the last one to leave Nanking. We had some thermite...

*Q: Thermite being a chemical for causing fires.*

BACON: It can burn metal. We used the thermite to destroy our coding machines and other

equipment of that nature -- a big black cloud of smoke which resulted in some agitated inquiries from outside as to what was going on, but it was too late to do anything about anything. I had shipped most of the documents we had -- put them in the hands of the British to hold in safe keeping until we could get them again. Also, our currency, both paper money and gold, turned over to the British who gave us receipts -- at least, a receipt for boxes "said to contain so many gold dollars." The Afghans wanted to know if they could store some of their furniture in one of our buildings, and we said, "delighted", feeling that if another Asian country were occupying them they might somehow be helpful. Afterwards the property was seized and the Afghans asked us to reimburse them.

So finally we were all in Shanghai and waiting for transport out. The Kuomintang had said they'd mined the mouth of the Yangtze and the harbor of Shanghai. It was probably not true, I don't think they were capable of doing it, but they said they had. And as a result no commercial vessel would venture in, no matter what. So finally it was arranged that the General Gordon, which had been a troop carrier, would pick us up at Tientsin. A train was arranged -- a regular train with some Chinese carriages -- took us up one night to Tientsin where we waited for two or three more days. Passing through customs they were anxious to see that we weren't taking any valuables out of China. I had some little wooden statuettes of Manchurian warriors -- I don't know what they came from, a restaurant, a tomb, or where, but they were for sale in a curio shop. We had to have lists of all of our possessions and I thought these might be too attractive. Anyway, they were listed as toys so there was no demand to see them.

The General Gordon, of course, couldn't come to the dock in Tientsin, it was too big a boat, so we boarded lighters to take us out to the ship. It was too rough for the lighters to approach so we waited overnight -- some of them came back to shore. And eventually within 24 hours we were all on board the General Gordon which went to Hong Kong, and at Hong Kong the President Wilson, I think was the ship that carried us back home.

*Q: Could you describe what was your reception back in Washington? Here you'd been through this at a time when our China policy was under great scrutiny.*

BACON: This was a very nervous time in Washington. I think there must have been more than one Congressional committee that was interviewing people right and left trying to find as much as possible to lay against the Democratic administration. Truman was re-elected in '48, wasn't he? So he was still in office until '52, and this was still 1950. So anything that could be pinned on the Democrats for having lost China was hunted down, and people who had just come out of China especially so. I had found out already that I'd been assigned to Strasbourg in order to look over the affairs in the Saar which would eventually have a plebiscite there as to whether they wanted to stay under French control, or revert to Germany. And almost everybody in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs seemed to be concerned with meeting in Congressional committees, and defending what had been done, and trying to enlighten the committees on what could be done. My own experiences were not of any very high political level. And as I mentioned, I was not debriefed by anybody.

*Q: Before this interview started you mentioned this is the first time you've talked to anybody about this. I mean nothing was put on the record and that was 40 years ago.*

BACON: That's right. A friend of mine, Frank Kierman, who is still teaching at Ryder College near Princeton, once remarked to me (he made this remark 10-15 years ago) that it was simply extraordinary that there had so far not been any published account of what actually went on in China during the first year of communist occupation. Which is rather amazing, except that under the circumstances there was nothing much good that could be said as far as our government was concerned.

*Q: We were just hanging on.*

BACON: Just hanging on and hoping against hope that things might turn out.

*Q: Just what overall impression -- was it your impression that really the United States as a power or something, really had much control over what was going on in China at the time. There is a phrase, "Who lost China?" and it seemed to be that it was somehow the attitude of the American Government that we lost China*

BACON: The thing is, in some respects we may have done it, contributed to it. It seems to me that whenever we try achieve a political end by using aid, either cash, or trade, or goods to strengthen the government that we favor, we always over do it by an enormous amount. And it soon becomes apparent to the locals, that if the U.S. is willing to throw money around like this, why should we bother? Obviously the U.S. has such a huge stake in the outcome of our difficulties that we can rely upon them to take care of the situation. In the meantime, we'd be fools not to take advantage of it personally. I think this is perfectly obvious in Southeast Asia -- Vietnam, for example -- and in large parts of Africa. In Japan, and in Western Europe, nothing like that happened because you're dealing with governments which had themselves plenty of experience in managing their own affairs, and in collecting and spending money on a big scale, with the consent of the population. There was a time -- this sounds almost incredible -- the Chinese currency went through the roof at least three times when I was there; shortly after I arrived and again in '48 when the Chinese government abolished the old currency and said, "We're instituting a gold yuan, and everybody is supposed to contribute any gold and silver he has, and we'll give him gold yuan notes which will be redeemable in gold, not right away, of course, but you can rely on us. Trust us." That went through the roof within a few months. There came a time, and I was told -- I don't have it on paper, and I never saw a paper supporting it -- that somebody in the Chinese government said, "Why don't you buy up all our currency for U.S. dollars and then we can start fresh again." In other words, at that time it would be the U.S. instead of the local population which would sacrifice all their ready cash for another round of that inflation. I don't know if that was actually said or not, but it sounds perfectly possible.

*Q: Can we talk about your next assignment because it sounds quite interesting. You were sent to Strasbourg, is that correct? And what were you doing there? This was from 1950 to '54(?).*

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Attachment 1

December 11, 1985

Dear Dr. Zimmerman:

I had been looking forward very much to your remarks last night on The Hostage Crisis, and when the meeting broke up I felt richly repaid. As I mentioned, I had had a very mild exposure to the business in Nanking in 1949-50. If you will permit, I have a couple of anecdotes to dispose of.

1) After the fall of Nanking in the Spring of 1949, the first of a series of reductions in the Embassy's American personnel began. To our surprise, permits of leave were withheld by the authorities until guarantees of payment of all personal debts were given. Guarantees by me were acceptable, being the principal consular officer, even though such titles were not recognized. There were to be no exceptions. When Ambassador Leighton Stuart was called home for consultations after failing to establish contact with high Communist authorities, he was denied an exit permit until a guarantee should have been provided. He replied that his persona was its own guarantee, and that he would remain until allowed to depart freely. The authorities backed down, but guarantees were still required for others until my own departure in March, 1950. In the meantime we were restricted to the diplomatic compounds, then given the freedom of the city, but no more, except for medical attention in Shanghai. I had earlier been transferred (on paper) to Dairen, but the Soviets had withheld a transit visa via Vladivostok, and now it seemed I might be able to go directly from Manchuria. But exit permission was denied; I had signed upwards of 30 guarantees, hadn't I? and how could I ever be made to pay? I objected that Dairen was still in China, WASN'T IT? Well, yes, certainly; but it was a little far away. As far as I know no claims were ever presented on the guarantees except for separation payments (usually one month's pay for each year of service by personal domestics, and the whole operation seemed pointless to me -- until by chance I discovered that in the 18th century a Russian diplomat has been asked to leave the Hapsburg court because of his wild life and generally unsuitable behavior, but his passport was withheld until he produced an Austrian to guarantee payment of his personal debts. Among his friends were the Liechtenstein and Rasoumovsky princes, and the guarantees were provided. (You could look it up in Oppenheim.) But what a comedown, to have to settle for me! Anyway, I have no doubt that the Soviets put the Chinese up to it; they have long memories, and they could always point to the precedent.

2) To reduce the Embassy's Chinese staff it was necessary to fix their separation allowances. The authorities demanded lump sum payments (which they could seize) in place of the monthly pension payments provided by U.S. law. Until Congress should act, we couldn't comply even if we wanted to, so there was an immediate stalemate. Nevertheless, there had to be daily negotiations from August into October. My interpreter and I sat at the center of one side of a very long table, the other side being occupied by a string of officials, augmented by a number of militant USIA employees. One day at noon I suggested that it might be time to separate for lunch. This caused a little stir; evidently the American was getting tired as well as hungry. After a brief huddle they declared that we seemed to be so near agreement that in thirty more minutes it should be possible to settle our differences completely. I disagreed; we could work better after the usual break. Response: We would take a vote; this was the democratic thing to do. I objected that the majority opinion would have nothing to do with my physical requirements; furthermore,

I had a driver downstairs who was a laborer like anyone else and was entitled to regular working hours and mealtimes. Response: He was not a party to the dispute and therefore his opinion didn't matter.

Now at this time Angus Ward, our consul general in Mukden, had been thrown into jail; William Oliver, a vice-consul in Shanghai, had also been jailed; and the administrative officer in Shanghai had been imprisoned for several days in his own office by a sit-in of some of the Chinese staff. So I lost my temper, which we all know is the last thing a diplomat should do, and said, "If we don't break for lunch in five minutes, I shall consider myself under arrest."

This produced another huddle and agitated whisperings. If the foreigner was determined to become a prisoner, then a written report would have to be made to higher authority; and obviously no one had been empowered to make an arrest. And a report would not only create an immediate little stir, but would also be placed in several personnel folders for possible extraction years later for some unpleasant purpose or other. So a one-hour recess was declared. Nothing was accomplished one way or another because Nanking had become a small backwater after the departure of the Kuomintang; everything was decided in Shanghai or Peking. Still the charades went on. Our military attaché, General Soule (who later commanded the 2nd Infantry Division in Korea) was simply denied an exit permit for obscure political reasons; this time we went to mediation and then to arbitration. If we had failed there, we would have had to give up because the next step would have been the People's Court and consequent surrender of our supposed diplomatic immunity (or so we thought). But settlement was suddenly reached, apparently because the authorities couldn't agree themselves on what their position in court should be. Meantime, whole platoons of grammar and high school children had been brought in, day after day, to see how the People's government could humiliate the foreigners. I thought I should have some witnesses of my own, and a young female secretary at the Netherlands Embassy agreed to come, which she did, full of curiosity. She was denied admission on the ground that the Netherlands was not a party to the dispute.

Hostage-taking, Chinese style, seemed to require justification in Western precedent, if not law. The aims appeared to be (1) acquisition of foreign exchange as quickly as possible; (2) demonstration that foreigners (especially Americans) had been atrociously exploiting Chinese labor; (3) humiliation of American officials to prove to the Chinese public and officialdom that Mao was a much more powerful man than Chiang; (4) that the USSR was China's only important friend and the only one she needed. In this Russian tutelage seemed pretty evident. The establishment of the People's Republic was announced on October 1, 1949; recognition by the USSR on October 2, followed on October 3 and successive days by Bloc countries in the order of Russia's affection: namely Bulgaria and Romania, then Hungary and North Korea; then Czechoslovakia and Poland; then Outer Mongolia. Albania was said on October 22 to have sent greetings "recently" and recognition on November 21. Yugoslavia's recognition was reported among the very first, but a hasty attempt was then made to correct the record; it seemed that nothing had been received from Yugoslavia after all. Obviously all of these telegrams had been received within the first 48 hours, with the possible exception of Albania's.

And the whole hostage exercise had been just a preliminary to the expulsion from inland China of all non-Bloc foreigners, private and official. Some favored few might be allowed to reside in

Canton and Shanghai, and possibly Tientsin, to facilitate a little trade. This was a near total surprise to us; in 1917-18 Lenin had done his utmost to persuade Americans not to abandon their posts in Moscow and Leningrad, and in the 1930's the Spanish anti-fascists had done the same with regard to the American consulate in Bilbao, all in the hope of proving the legitimacy of their cause and of obtaining needed aid -- or at least a benevolent attitude on our part. But the opinion in China was that they could obtain all they needed from the Soviets, and it can hardly be doubted that the Soviets had assured them of this. On the other hand, it was probably the Soviets who restrained the Chinese from excesses such as have been seen in Iran, Pakistan, and Libya. After all, at that time we had the Bomb, and the Russians didn't.

You must forgive this garrulity, and I should know better than to give way to it. In 1944-45 I would from time to time interrogate POW's, and I know quite well how eager they are to spill a lot more than they should into a willing ear.

Very sincerely,

Leonard Lee Bacon

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Attachment 2

[To Harry Grier, Director, Frick Museum, N.Y.C.]

THE FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE  
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN CONSULATE  
Strasbourg, France

January 10, 1954

Dear Harry,

Your extremely welcome Christmas card -- 1952 -- was delivered to me last May, which accounts for 5 months delay; the remaining 7 are unaccountable. Since I am not sure that I've given any news of myself since September 1945, will you put up with a quick tabulation:

1945: July-August -- Loitering around State Dept corridors; signed up for investigation of German assets concealed in Switzerland -- the ill-fated "Safehaven" operation (the Swiss wouldn't really play ball);

September -- Simultaneous exit from Ft. Meade and the AUS; declined reserve rating;

October -- FBI clearance completed; assigned to Zurich; get Helen out of Rochester and install my mother as real estate manager;

December -- Depart on Vulcania for Le Havre; loudspeakers reminding us that ship is an Army transport; that civilians there are on sufferance; food entirely C-rations but goosed up by Italian cooks; all hardware stolen by Germans, which made for intimate living;

1946: January-December-Safehavening in Zurich and Bern, enlivened by having to take a deposition from two International Red Cross workers on behalf of SS-Gen. Kaltenbrunner, did him no good; he came to a sudden end as foreseen in the verdict, with which I wangled a trip to the Nuremberg trial to deliver same; inspected with interest Goering, Hess, Schacht, Ley, von Schirach, etc.

1947: January -- Notified that I was eligible to apply for appointment as Foreign Service Officer if I could pass oral examination;

February -- Did so.

June -- Appointed FSO-4 and assigned to Hankow. (Where the hell is that?) Instructed to proceed "soonest".

August -- Helen and I complete cholera, yellow fever, malaria, tetanus, typhoid, paratyphoid shots; depart ex-Geneva for Cairo by plane, over Rome, Pompeii, Corinth, Athens and Alexandria in one day which gives you the feeling of having reduced a long and expensive classical education to an absurdity; in Cairo one day, long enough to fall into the clutches of a dragoman; off again for Bombay where an extra horse-dose of antitoxin (India dimensions) knocked us out; a week later Calcutta by Indian Viking plane (choice of box lunch -- vegetarian. or non-vegetarian.); a few hours of darkness in Calcutta in the world's worst hotel, the Great Eastern, built 1810 and not kept up; over the Little Hump by China National Airways to Kunming (one night); taxi freight plane next day to Hankow (so that's where it is); brought into town by kindly Britisher; quite hot on Yangtze; principal officer surprised to see us; telegram announcing our approach delivered following day. Settled down in Terminus Hotel, Chinese run; actually the worst hotel in the world.

September -- Principal officer confided that reason for "soonest" in my travel orders was fact one vice-consul was sick and other had resigned in disgust; whereas he himself wanted to take a month's leave in a cool place like Peking; which he immediately did. Left in uneasy charge of office. Made acquaintance of innumerable Chinese generals composing Hankow Headquarters of the Generalissimo; also of Standard, Shell, and Texas Oil people; also of missionaries (Polish, Irish, French, British, Belgian, Swiss, and American, ranging from Adventists and Beth-El missions to Anglican and RC). Learned to throw pants and coat as well as shirt and underwear into laundry every day.

October -- Principal officer returned and left on transfer within a week for pleasant post in Formosa. New principal officer assigned from Shanghai. On day of expected arrival sent telegram he was obliged to return to the U.S., much as he regretted wife's illness prevented him from seeing one of his first posts again. Dept non-plussed, but in view impossibility getting any experienced officer into Hankow, left indefinitely in charge.

November -- Raised my own salary in accord. with regulations by ½ the diff. between mine and that of last previous officer-in-charge.

December -- Communists arrived within 30 miles of Hankow, but went away. Two American and 1 Finnish missionaries murdered by "bandits".

1948: January -- Bodies of murdered missionaries arrive. Open coffins to ascertain cause of death and report same. Cause of death evidently bullet holes under base of skull (rear).

March -- Communists come near, but go away again.

April -- Transferred to Embassy, Nanking (on paper).

May -- Helen and chattels depart for Nanking on Army plane, while I wait for replacement to arrive. Cardinal Spellman and Msgr. Sheen hit Hankow, joint party thrown in Consulate with Roman clergy (Archbishop of Hankow, Portuguese; Bishop of Hanyang, Irish-Boston; Bishop of Wuchang, Polish) because only Consulate had the space and only the clergy had the liquor required. Contracted streptococcus infection in foot as result of walking barefoot from bedroom to bath. Inspector arrived, out of sorts because Consular sedan hadn't met him at airport across river and skeptical of reply that only the jeep could make the grade on the Wuchang side in the low water season. Banquet for Generalissimo's Headquarters; guests were General (full) Sun, 3 lieutenant-gens, 7 major-gens (where we drew the line. After all!) plus a half-dozen educated cols and Lt-cols spotted around the table solely as interpreters. Great success; served brandy, whiskey and creme-de-menthe as cocktails. Creme-de-menthe the most popular, on account of its pleasing color... Recovered from infection with help penicillin administered by Chinese doctors and nurses.

July -- Replacement (brand new graduate of Dept language school at Peking) arrived. Departed for Nanking. Receive reserve commission as captain.

August -- Appointed Chief of Chancery (which seemed to mean needling everyone behind on his work) and Protocol Officer (oh for God's sake, what'll we do now) and Chief of consular section. Same Inspector arrives to inspect Nanking. No casualties.

Sept-Oct -- Having made some real advances, Commie situation much worse. Navy sends converted destroyer to evacuate people's stuff. Wives with children go to Manila. Truck detail loading destroyer.

November -- Destroyer makes several trips. Truck details every few days. Army Advisory Group departs. Come down at month's end with infectious hepatitis.

December -- Having turned yellow, hepatitis is identified for what it is and original theory of malaria discarded. Deposited in Army hospital; next day hospital is evacuated and Marine plane takes me to Navy hospital ship "Repose" at Tsingtao. The best month in my life -- air conditioned, nice Navy food, nice nurses & all. Helen arrives two days later in RAF plane, but

not allowed to sleep on ship, so digs in at Tsingtao club.

1949: January -- Right after New Year's, "Repose" ordered away because of imminence of Commie capture; Helen takes physical exam and finds an operation necessary; is flown to St. Louis. I try to pay "Repose" bill for her and me and am told they'd really rather I'd drop it; no one knows the procedure for billing patients. Air Attaché flies me back to Nanking.

February -- Convalescent period indicated for four weeks; materialized for two. Embassy wives sneaking back from Manila, which was too G.I.

March -- Assigned to Dairen to relieve wretched consul, who couldn't get downtown without seeing his chauffeur arrested every time. (This assignment was perhaps supposed to benefit my small store of Russian, which had been acquired in Zurich and Hankow.) Agreed, provided Helen could come too. Dept agreed to that, probably unaware of fact Helen was already in the U.S. Apply for Soviet visa at Soviet Consulate in Shanghai, since only permissible entry to Dairen was by Soviet ship from Vladivostok. No encouragement.

April 10 -- Helen arrives by plane.

April 20 -- Communists move in fast and take Nanking. No fight whatever, but no one allowed to leave compounds in which Embassy situated.

May-June -- Commies ignore us completely, except to prohibit movement out of town.

July -- Ambassador's attempts to establish communication with local authorities having failed, Dept recalls him on consultation and orders 2nd reduction in force at Embassy. Nationalists start bombing power plant, etc, which they failed to blow up on leaving. Embassy gets a little shrapnel; no damage.

August -- Separation of part of Chinese employees turns out to be difficult; although they are civil service on same terms as anyone in Washington (except for wage scale, naturally) they refuse to accept separation allowances provided by law. Maneuver is Commie inspired, in order (1) to embarrass us (2) to make propoganda about how Americans exploit Chinese (3) to realize some dollar exchange, since separation payments involve purchase of Chinese funds at National Bank. As only lawyer in Embassy, all labor trouble negotiations fall on me.

September -- Labor troubles worse after Ambassador goes. Department orders 3rd reduction in force, this time including counselor of embassy, 1st secretaries. I am promoted by attrition to senior officer in charge, with total staff of eleven. Air, Army and Navy attachés leave. Marine guard goes. Separating Chinese staff of attachés falls to me.

October-December -- Hell of a time with Chinese labor, Labor Union, Labor Ministry, especially regarding employees of Foreigners' club. Army attaché refused exit permit (he was General Soule, later commanding 2nd Inf Div in Korea). Dispute goes to mediation board, then to arbitration board. Just when we thought we'd have to give in, because submission to People's Court would have meant renunciation of our supposed diplomatic immunities, settlement reached because Commies themselves uncertain what to do next. Army radios me a commendation. (By

this time all officers were learning cryptography.)

1950: January -- Just ready to relax, with everybody out that's supposed to be out, when Commies proceed to seize our old Legation premises in Peking. Result: All U.S. establishments in China ordered closed. More trouble with remaining Chinese employees, including domestic servants. Commies try to fine us for not having paid duty on American goods imported under Nationalist privilege years before. No soap. Everything wound up by end of February; as each member of American staff received exit permit (but only to go to Shanghai) Casablanca (that's me) put him or her on the train. Finally my own was issued, but then canceled until a little matter of motor pool supplies cleared up. Permit re-issued on a Saturday; spent Sunday destroying radio equipment after sending farewell telegram; and took off Monday hoping Commies wouldn't hear about that for a day or two.

March-April -- Goldbricking around Shanghai, waiting for transportation out. Nationalists claimed they had mined Shanghai harbor; Commies unable to sweep harbor or prove it unmined; no foreign shipping would come in. After all sorts of schemes cooked up, none of which worked, Commies authorized departure by Tientsin. 36-hour trip on train to Tientsin, bring your own food and drink. Water soon gone. John on our car had to be locked shut, entailing long journey by women and children to Chinese end of train. Recall wife of naval attaché seizing my arm and saying, "Have you seen Sam (her husband)?" I said No, why? Reply: "I've got to go to the john, and he's wearing the rubbers." Everybody in unspeakable condition on arrival. But things went fairly smoothly from then; in a few days boarded lighters to take us out to "Gen. Gordon" (army transport run by President Lines) lying off Taku Bar. Too rough to come close, so spent night bouncing around; some lighters went back to shore for shelter, which alarmed passengers more than storm could have. Magnificent reception early next morning on board Gordon; crew briefed that China was starving, hence the foreigners must be practically litter cases. Treated accordingly; but in fact we'd been eating steak till it came out of our ears because the farmers, unable to buy fodder, had been slaughtering their cattle for months. But Navy Sam was grabbed by a steward who urged corn flakes and milk on him, saying he must be famished, what with all that starvation. Sam said, Well, it wasn't too bad; although sometimes truffles were hard to find. Steward: "Truffles -- what's dose?" Sam: (embarrassed) "Well, it's hard to explain; truffles you have to dig up out of the ground." Steward: (awed): Jeez, you mean to say you really ate dose tings?"

May-June-July -- Hong Kong, then on the Wilson to Tokyo, Honolulu and San Francisco; blissful. Never saw the Coast before, nor the Grand Canyon, so sight saw all the way to St. Louis. Found a letter for me at Washington from the Personnel Section; conveyed the news that my efficiency rating put me in the lowest 10% of my class. Noticed a few minutes later that the letter was more than a year old and that the rating was for the year 1947-48, immediately following my appointment; the usual rating for newly appointed or promoted men. Found few people to talk to about China; those immediately concerned were tied up with Congressional committees. Accepted appointment to Strasbourg to look after the Saar, and thankfully took off.

August-December -- Strasbourg, learning about the Saar and the Council of Europe.

1951: January-October -- Reporting on same. Motor trip to North & Central Italy.

November-December -- In Washington as member of Selection Board, rating others for promotion up or selection out, and hoping to do as little harm as possible, either way.

1952: January-December -- Saar, Council of Europe, and standing in for U.S. delegate to Central Rhine Commission, an ancient supranational organization in which we participate (originally as trustee for German interests). Motor trip to Yugoslavia (car abandoned at Fiume, a/c roads; boat and plane thereafter; Dalmatian coast not quite what you'd expect, unless maybe the extreme south; but Split and Dubrovnik and Julian Alps in North and the mountain scenery between Sarajevo and the coast are. Ran into Tito's motor convoy on the road between Bled and Ljubljana. Curious contrast between Commie bad manners in China and Commie stiff politeness in Yugoslavia.

1953-January-December -- Still Saar and Council of Europe, seem to have permanently replaced U.S. delegate in Rhine Commission. Motor trip to Spain; thrown out of Toledo Cathedral for indecent exposure -- elbows clearly visible. Sign in Granada hotel lobbies warning foreigners that if they wear clothes cut so as to "reveal their interiors" they may well incur the "just indignation of the populace". Spent two nights in a Government hostel within the Alhambra (a remodeled little monastery); Alhambra and Generalife unexpectedly illuminated at night, since they were trying out the floodlighting for a music festival to be given a few days later. Our mouths hanging open in most Spanish churches, sometimes more in surprise than admiration; usually nothing but admiration for Spanish domestic and civil architecture. For taste and effect I think the Barcelona city council house is almost unexcelled. Moreover I think both Italian and Spanish early gothic has a kind of astringency (if the word is allowed) and unregulated originality -- usually resulting from the disposition of the rooms within -- which keeps it always fresh. Look at the palaces in Siena and Perugia. -- Army invited me to convert 5-year commission into an indefinite one; declined; Army renewed invitation in June, a couple of weeks before expiration date; accepted, feeling embarrassed at my own lack of enthusiasm; received new diploma for indefinite commission and immediately afterwards warning that a board would meet to recommend my dismissal for having failed to earn points entitling me to promotion, but that even though I was not in a critical occupation I could show cause why I shouldn't be dismissed, as for example impossibility of attending lectures and training courses. Replied I didn't intend to show any cause, and have since heard that I am out, as soon as I turn in my identification card. Haven't any, and never had. Inglorious end to an inactive career (Res). But the original idea of applying for a commission (under the regulations in force in 1947-48) came from a residue of vexation at the blessed old CIC, in which you had been good enough to recommend me for a field commission, later approved by Corps, and (so far as I know) finally denied because the Table of Organization didn't allow for it. So I got it, and now it's been summarily taken away; easy come, easy go; and anyway I must have been overage in grade, at least in this Air Force era.

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### Attachment 3

#### Behind the Bamboo Curtain: a Nanking Diary

[1949]

April 21: It seems clear that it is only a matter of days before the Communists enter the city. The compound where we live, which adjoins the American Embassy, now has a tank destroyer against the gate as a barricade. The electrified barbed wires which run around the top of the high wall enclosing the compound have been re-tested. The Embassy's military, naval and air attachés have gone into civilian clothes. Mob violence and looting are to be expected in the interim between the old authority and the new. But war and violence seem an improbability, - the weather has never been more beautiful. From our living-room window we can see Purple Mountain to the East, bulky and handsome, a number of fresh, green hills running southwards from it, three of them crowned by the observatory, the Drum Tower and the pagoda tower of Nanking University. The sky is a wonderfully clear and delicate blue.

April 22: Went to Ambassador Stuart's house last night to see the weekly movie, - this time, Boyer and Bergman in The Arch of Triumph. We got home about a quarter of ten. A short time after we had gone to bed, we heard the noise of guns to the north. Looking out of the window, we could see large orange flashes against the sky. The explosions seemed to be getting louder. Looking at his watch, Lee estimated that the firing was coming from about two miles away. We were rather apprehensive, but finally fell asleep about two o'clock. Today is coolish and overcast. I heard that Major Gelwicks and Captain George had gone off in a jeep on some mission which took them into Communist infiltrated territory. In the afternoon, I was in a car with Mary Lou Clough on Chung Lu. We passed a huge truck, filled to over-flowing with Nanking policemen. The truck was blowing along at a breakneck clip. "They're probably on their way to quell a riot!" said Mary Lou, swinging her car out to give them a wide berth.

April 23: Sunny and warm. Last night we heard gunfire again, but not so much as the night before. Just after breakfast while I was bargaining with the flower-seller, George Harris came out of his apartment saying that during the night, all the Nanking police had evacuated. It was a great truckful of them on their way out of town that Mary Lou Clough and I had seen on the previous afternoon. The city now had no protection. The looting had already begun. Mrs. Soule, the wife of the Military Attaché, said that mobs had broken into the house of the Mayor of Nanking, who had flown from the city. The looters had run off with all the furniture and were now ripping up the floor boards. The Mayor's house was just two blocks away. I walked over to the Embassy. Several people were saying hasty goodbyes, as a car was waiting to take them to the airport to catch what proved to be the last American plane out of Nanking before the take-over. At lunch, Lee said that Major Gelwicks and Captain George had probably been captured by the Communists. From our veranda we could see a large amount of black smoke to the north, -- undoubtedly the location of the large, modern railway station. We had heard that the Kuomintang soldiers had set fire to it before they evacuated the city. It was a beautiful day, and I went for a walk in the grounds of the Embassy Club adjoining our compound. Silky fluff from the budding willow trees was blowing everywhere in feathery masses. I walked under some great heavy fronds of blossoming wisteria, deliciously fragrant. Beyond the grassy slope shaded by big trees was the swimming pool, not yet filled. Behind the little bath pavilion, where last summer had been a tidy cutting-garden, was now a great quantity of crates and Jerry cans. On my way home, I ran into Dr. Packard, the Embassy doctor, who had just gotten back after a hard and hazardous

trip. He had gone in a jeep to give medical help to the wounded British sailors on the Amethyst, out of commission since it had been fired on some distance down the Yangtze. Late in the afternoon, two large fires could be seen to the northeast. The smaller of the two had a steady orange glow, but the larger one, farther to the east, tossed up frequent rocket-like flares, accompanied by muffled explosions. In the deepening blue of the twilight, the flares lighted up huge, billowing clouds of smoke with fluctuating, flame-colored light. It was an ever-changing show, a fascinating and awesome sight. Dr. Packard telephoned and asked if I could spend the night at the Embassy hospital with Mrs. Meyer, and her baby daughter, who had been born at five o'clock that morning. Miss Poon, the Embassy nurse, who had helped Dr. Daniels, of Kou Lou Hospital at the time of the delivery, hadn't had any sleep for thirty-six hours, and no other nurse was available. I told him I'd be glad to help out.

April 24: About a quarter of eight last night I took a flashlight and made my way to our little hospital on the second floor of the Embassy Club. The lights had already been dimmed for the night. Miss Poon introduced me to Mrs. Moyer, who, with her baby, was on a large, glassed-in porch adjoining our hospital "ward." Miss Poon prepared the mother and baby for the night and then retired to her own apartment in another part of the building. Mrs. Moyer was the 21-year old wife of an army Major who had been studying Chinese in Peiping. She had been with the group of wives evacuated to Manila several months ago, then had come to Nanking, where her husband was to join her. Having still been in Peiping at the time of the Communist take-over, he had only very recently obtained permission from the Communist authorities to leave. At the moment, he was thought to be in Korea or Japan. I had never touched so young a baby, but I put on a mask, and Miss Poon showed me how to shift its position, change it, give it warm water and burp it. Shortly after Miss Poon retired, the baby began to hiccup. Holding it against my shoulder and patting it smartly on the back didn't seem to help, - it kept right on, - and on. So I telephoned Miss Poon. She turned the baby this way and that and the hiccups magically subsided. Around ten o'clock the Club generator stopped working - no lights - so I had to operate by lantern and flashlight. About 10:15, Lee dropped in to tell me good-night, and say that it was thought that the Communist troops would be in the city about seven o'clock in the morning. During the night occasional loud explosions rattled the window panes. Gunshot in various directions could be heard frequently. The shots were very near. The noise of the firing didn't disturb Mrs. Moyer. She was tired, and slept well until about three-thirty. She woke then and took the tablet and water Miss Poon had left for her, and slept on till morning. The baby cried a good deal during the night. I frequently got up from my cot to take care of it, donning the mask each time. I was very awkward. It was so tiny, and its little head so remarkably wobbly. It seemed a miracle that it could cry to lustily, and sneeze and hiccup in such miniature but perfect fashion. About a quarter of eight in the morning, Miss Poon came in, and I went home through the little gate between the Club compound and the compound in which we live. It was a beautiful fresh morning, but I longed more than anything for coffee and a bath and a little sleep. When I got to the apartment, Li Shank-I, houseboy, told me that the Communist troops were already in possession of the town, they had come in very early in the morning. Everything was very quiet. There wasn't the accustomed obligato of peddler's cries and rattles, Chinese conversing, and chant of people carry loads. The servants were obviously relieved that the take-over hadn't been a shooting matter in our area, anyway. Some ice-cold fruit juice, a feather-light omelet and some fragrant coffee quickly appeared, and while I was eating Lee came in. He said that at about 5:15 in the morning Hank Lieberman, the Nanking New York Times correspondent, had telephoned that the

Communist troops were coming into the city through the northwest gate. There had, apparently been no resistance to speak of.

April 25: Yesterday we had lunch at the George Harris'. Jo and Nancy Bennett (Jo is the United States Information Service man here), were there; also Shirley Duncan (she is connected with the United States Educational Foundation in China as is George Harris, who is also the Embassy's Cultural Attaché). Nancy is Chinese; she and Jo met when they were both at Yenching University in Peiping. She is a bright girl, and her comments are refreshingly astringent. Someone remarked that at the airfield the day before, it was amazing to see the tremendous quantity of abandoned shoes, strewn all over the place. (When the Nationalists crowded onto the planes in the panic of evacuation, it had been necessary to reduce the weight of the overloaded planes in every possible way; hence shoes had been shucked off wholesale and tossed out onto the ground as the motors warmed up for the hasty and hazardous take-off.) This lunch at the Harris's was the first gathering together of Americans we had been to since the "liberation" a few hours before, and there was much speculation on how events would shape in the next few days. Shirley had been interned during the last war by the Japanese, so that "disturbed conditions" were no novelty to her. The Harrises have an excellent cook, who, incidentally, has two wives. The change in regime which had just taken place did not distract him in the least from producing one of his pieces de resistance, - thinly sliced cold breast of chicken covered with a creamy aspic, cut to resemble playing cards, with hearts and diamonds of pimento, and spades and clubs of ripe olive, superimposed thereon. I was enchanted with this manifestation of Oriental calm and whole-souled absorption in art. After lunch, Lee and George drove around town to see what they could see. The town was full of Communist soldiers. They were in good physical shape and marched well. Their uniforms were of a more brilliant mustardy-Chartreuse than those of the Nationalist soldiers. They had paid no particular attention to the car with the two foreigners in it. The Chinese chauffeur, however, showed obvious relief when the drive was over.

April 26: Lee was awakened by a telephone call at seven o'clock yesterday morning. Communist soldiers were in the Ambassador's house "going over things". Lee dressed hurriedly, swallowed a cup of coffee and rushed off. About ten o'clock he came back for a bite of breakfast. It was true. Several Communist soldiers had brushed by the Ambassador's servants, and broken into his bedroom while he was still in bed. After blustering awhile, they departed, one of them saying, with a large gesture "All this will soon belong to the people!" In the afternoon, Lee accompanied General Soule, the Military Attaché, in his attempt to find the commanding officer of the occupying troops. General Soule wished to deliver a vigorous protest from our government over the morning's incident. He received no cooperation from a Communist captain, who was the only officer he was able to contact. It proved to be impossible to find out who was in charge of the military forces in the city. The Gordhamers invited me to drive around with them and see how the city looked. Everything was very orderly. There were some, but not a great many, Communist soldiers to be seen. However, there were armed guards at the entrances of all banks and public buildings. We saw the roofless, fire-gutted Judicial Yuan on Chung Shan Lu, once a large, impressive building. It had been looted and burned by Nanking citizenry on Saturday, between the time the Kuomintang police fled and the time the Communist soldiers came into the city in the early hours of Sunday morning. We also visited a little park, on high ground, which had been adorned with some attractive pavilions in Japanese style. The place was a shamble. It was obvious that most of the looters had had no tools, - nothing but their own two hands to

wrench things free. Nevertheless, the devastation was appalling. Much of the attractive planting and a long double row of lantern posts had been hacked away for firewood, and the substantially built pavilions were gutted. On our way back to the Embassy, we stopped for a few minutes at the home of the former mayor of Nanking. The handsome house was utterly ruined, - furniture gone, windows broken, floor boards ripped up, plumbing torn out. In the garden, were two radiators, which, having been wrenched out, were abandoned because they were too heavy to lug away. In the road were three others, left behind for the same reason. Inside the house, several children were playing among the debris. One was walking, tight-rope fashion, on an exposed overhead beam, with loose electric wires dangling around him. Another was handily binding together the few remaining splintered floor boards to take home for firewood. Mr. Gordhamer said that he had talked with some of the looters on Saturday when they were busiest. They showed no qualms of conscience about what they were doing; they merely said they were poor people and needed the things. Most of the property left unguarded between the time the Nanking police left and the communists took over were badly looted and partially or wholly destroyed by the Nanking citizenry themselves. The condition of the mayor's house was a particular shock to me because I had been there several months before to a large meeting of the International Women's Club. Then the house had been beautifully ordered, and servants in immaculate white gowns had passed tea and frosted cakes to the guests, and Madame Shen Yi, the mayor's wife, had been a gracious hostess. While we were at supper, someone telephoned that a Communist soldier was at the Embassy gate. Lee put down his knife and fork and rushed out into the dark. However, it developed that all the man wanted was a piece of wire and permission to get electric current from the Embassy's generator. He was told to refer the matter to his commanding officer. It was then we learned the Communist soldiers, brushing by the caretaker, were now occupying the empty Embassy house at 5 Nighsia Lu, formerly occupied by Carl and Phyllis Boehringer.

April 27: We have heard that Major Gelwicks and Captain George reached Shanghai safely, but now can't get back here where their families are. About ten o'clock, Mrs. Soule came to call. Her daughter, Ginsky about fourteen is at the Shanghai American School. Communication, of course is now cut off between Nanking and Shanghai, and it is thought that Shanghai will be the next big objective of the communist troops. She is very anxious. She said she just couldn't settle down to anything. No one is now allowed to leave the compound where the Ambassador lives, however, I heard that Frank Kierman succeeded in reaching the Embassy on foot, coming by a back way. When Lee came home to lunch, he said he had gone with General Soule and Captain Frankel, the Naval Attaché, in another attempt to find the commanding officer of the soldiers occupying Nanking. The car had gotten only a few blocks from the Embassy when it was turned back. In the afternoon, I wandered over to the Embassy Club. Captain Frankel, the Gordhamers and one of the members of the orchestra were engaged in a game of doubles. Hank Lieberman had just finished a game. He had on a shirt with a plunging neckline and shorts of the same printed material. On his head was a khaki cap with a long searching eyeshade - all very picturesque. He ordered drinks all around. I learned that Seymour Topping, the Nanking Associated Press correspondent, was under house arrest, or, as his newspaper colleagues might call it, in "homeside pokey".

April 28: At first two, and later six B-24's made bombing runs along the south bank of the Yangtze, to the north of us. They were trying to hit the city power plant. We had a fine, wide view of it all from our roof. The servants were clustered on the upper back porches and roofs of

the three houses in this compound, and followed the operations with excited comments and pointings. We could hear the explosions of the bombs and see the grey smoke arising from what they hit. There was a chatter of anti-aircraft fire and we could see the black puffs of smoke from it high in the air. Apparently some machine guns were being used, too, which, of course, were completely futile. The show went on all morning. Quite a crowd of people collected on the roof, including Colonel Dunning, the Air Attaché. There were intervals of some minutes between the bombing runs. The tantalizing aroma of the curry our cook was preparing for lunch was wafted upwards and made everyone hungry. The whole foreground of this air display was a typical Chinese rural scene. There were rolling hills, knobby with old graves, covered with the chartreuse green of early spring. There was a pond with two ruffly brown ducks swimming on it, an old man in a coolie hat cultivating rows of cabbages. Mudwalled huts roofed with dried grass stood here and there in the patch-work of vegetable plots. The bright yellow of the flowering grape was in sharp contrast with the blue-green of the young cabbage. The bombs hadn't touched the power plant, but, I heard later, a school was hit and a number of children were killed. Shortly after lunch, Lee telephoned that Communist soldiers would not allow Major Beebe to go into his house, that he was bringing him home to stay with us for the time being. That morning, a Communist soldier had walked into his house and got to his bedroom while he was still in bed. The soldier was a simple country lad, and had apparently invaded the house out of an overpowering curiosity. Satisfied after a few minutes, he departed without taking anything or doing any damage. We heard that the Counselor of the French Embassy had had a pistol held to his stomach by another Communist soldier, and another member of the Embassy staff had also been threatened with firearms. The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires was confined to his compound; no one was allowed to go out or in, even to bring food. Mr. Jones, the Counselor of our Embassy, had attempted to come to the Embassy offices from his house, on foot, had almost reached the Embassy when he was rudely turned back. We listened to the news at 9 p.m.. The Chinese Communists were converging on Shanghai, and British planes were alerted at Hong-Kong to evacuate British Nationals from Shanghai should the need arise. Nothing was said about Nanking. The focus of interest is now elsewhere!

April 30: Heard that a Kuomintang plane had dropped leaflets saying they would bomb the city tomorrow, May 1st, when a big Communist celebration had been planned.

May 1: There was a little Embassy church service this morning just for the people in this compound, as no one else can get here. Mr. Long had just begun the 23rd Psalm, "The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want" -- when Bomb! went a big bomb, -- quite close, rattling the window panes. Mary Lou Clough and I exchanged glances. Mr. Long went right ahead. The communists decided against having their big celebration that day.

May 2: People are now being allowed out of their compounds, and the foreigners' playground in the Embassy Club. The two tennis courts and the swimming pool are enthusiastically patronized. There are bridge tables under the trees. The children of the diplomatic group, followed by their amahs, chase all over the grassy slopes. One or two babies, parked in carriages, are in shady places under the lofty trees. The Chinese boys, shite-coated, with their trousers bound neatly around their ankles with strips of wide cloth, pass around trays of cool drinks. The enforced leisure does not appear too hard to take, at the moment, anyway. I heard that during the past week, when the American Embassy people living at 84 Shanghai Lu had been confined to their

compound, the Volley Ball and Gimlet Club had been organized. Gimlets are the favorite Nanking summer cocktail. Hank Lieberman said with some truth that really the greatest hardship sustained by the diplomatic group during the days following the take-over was the growing dearth of Rose's Lime Juice, one of the essential ingredients of a good Gimlet. John Beebe has now been allowed to go back to his house. We understand that the troops that took Nanking were former Nationalist troops that defected at Tainan, last fall.

May 11: To the Canadian Ambassador's for lunch. Miss Tincolli, of the Italian Embassy, was the only other woman present. I was dazed at the amount of rank present, -- The Egyptian and Belgian ambassadors, the Papal Nuncio, and the Polish and Turkish Charges d'Affaires. Everyone seems to be enjoying the forced vacation. One August diplomat said that when the Mayor's house was looted, he had seen a coolie making off with three W.C.'s. Heard that the Communists soldiers had been borrowing cooling utensils from foreign diplomats' establishments, but so far, had always returned them afterwards.

May 13: Walked to Shanxi Road Circle. The occupying soldiers seem very much at home. When I was returning, a soldier guarding a driveway, ordered me, with a preemptory gesture, to walk in the road. I felt a sense of shock and outrage at being ordered to do something by someone holding a gun. It was a sensation I had never had before, and it was very unpleasant. We are awakened very early in the morning these days by bugle reveilles, very loud, oft repeated, with many sour notes painful to hear. The bugles begin as soon as there is the faintest suggestion of dawn. The bird, whose call sounds like someone say, "One more bot-tle!" also makes noisy the early morning hours.

May 26: Shanghai has been taken.

June 7: Had a small lunch for the Canadian Ambassador, with the Jequier of the Swiss Legation, Mrs. Van der Hoeven of the Dutch Embassy and the Harrises.

June 15: Lunch here for the Liebermans, with the Bennetts and Mary Lois Kierman (Frank is in Shanghai). I had not been able to go to their wedding last Saturday at the Ambassador's because of the inflamed eye. Kay wore her wedding dress here to lunch so I could see it, and brought me a big hunk of wedding cake. They are going to Shanghai as soon as they can make arrangements. Somehow they have to get the New York Times jeep there, and don't know if it is best to drive it, put it on a train, or take it down the river on a Chinese junk. It is still most unclear what the Communist authorities will permit. Hank said, "This is going to be a honeymoon with some special gimmicks to it!"

July 4: Fourth of July Reception at the Ambassador's house for just the Americans in town. It was very pleasant, but a great contrast to last year's huge affair, with the whole diplomatic corps, members of the Army Advisory group and great numbers of Chinese officials attending.

July 12: Ambassador Stuart here for lunch. Other guests - the Philippine Chargé d'Affaires and Mrs. Adeva, the Cloughs, the Kiermans and Dr. Packard.

July 15: For some days, now, I have been doing volunteer teaching at the American School which has been reorganized since the Communists came in. Since the former school building is full of war refugees, an empty house at 1 Pu Tu Lu belonging to the Embassy is being used. The school furnishings have come from the most amazing number of sources. Jack Wolf, of Caltex, found playground equipment in the yard of the house he was living in. Being a bachelor, it was a constant source of wise-cracks, so he was more than glad to hand it over to the school. Seymour Topping of the Associated Press donated a piano. The school hours during the summer are from 8:30 a.m. to noon. There are about thirty foreign children of several different nationalities, mostly from families of the diplomatic group. Some of the children have only a partial knowledge of English, but they are unusually intelligent and get on wonderfully well together. We had our first air raid the other day. When the warning siren sounded, the school assembled in the large ground floor room where the library and piano are. Above the children's hubbub, a number of planes could be heard overhead, bomb explosions, and very near, loud anti-aircraft fire. Only one or two of the very young children appeared to be frightened. I asked the children around me what they'd like to sing, and they said "America" and "Old Black Joe". It seemed very strange to have two little girls from India, one from France and one from England singing lustily, " -- sweet Land of Liberty, I love thy rocks and rills, thy woods and templed hills" right in my ear during an air raid with Kuomintang planes droning loudly overhead. "Old Black Joe" with its "I'm coming, I'm coming, to a better land I know", to an Adult would hardly have seemed a cheerful choice under the circumstances, but it was just what they wanted. They all sang with so much noise and fervor that we didn't hear the "All clear" when it sounded. There were several in the school who had been in London during air raids, and they were the most philosophical of all.

July 17: Had the William Olives for lunch. They are going on the plane with the Ambassador to America, as soon as arrangements can be made for its departure. William Olive was the vice-consul in Shanghai, who was unjustly imprisoned by the Communists from July 6 to July 9, mistreated, and made to sign a "confession" under duress. Mr. Cabot, the Shanghai Consul General also arrived in Nanking yesterday, and will go on the Ambassador's plane also, as will Mr. Hinderer, the Embassy's Administrative Officer. The crew will be: Colonel Dunning, the Air Attaché, pilot; Major van Ausdall, who is also a pilot, Sergeant Menczer, radioman, and Sergeant Fillingame, mechanic.

July 21: It is terribly hot now, with the oppressive Nanking summer humidity in full swing. The season of the one More Bottle Bird is over. He has been replaced by the shrill cicadas. On a hot summer night, the voice of insect life has amazing volume. At lunch time, Li Shang-I told me there was a big fire at the Military Attaché's Office, which is near the 84 Shanghai Lu compound, where the Ambassador lives. It was not until we were at dinner at Tom Cory's and Bob Anderson's that night that I heard that Corporal Ryan, one of the Marines, had been seriously burned when a can of gasoline exploded. A bamboo fence on fire near a quantity of gasoline had menaced several cars and the building. Someone said that eighty percent of Corporal Ryan's body was burned -- first, second and third degree burns.

July 23: Mrs. Franke telephoned me and asked me if I could be at little Embassy hospital from 11 a.m. to 2 p.m. the next day to help nurse Corporal Ryan. Everyone had been taking turns. Lee had been asked to be there from 12:30 to 2:30 a.m. as George Harris relief. Lee, in turn, would be relieved by Ralph Clough, who would be there from 2:30 to 5:30 a.m. Lee left the house with

a flashlight about ten o'clock. He was going to work at the Embassy until time to go to the hospital.

July 24: I didn't hear him when he came in, and he slept late. He said he had cracked ice for the many ice bags. Two English nurses had been secured, a woman, and a man, a Quaker, who was here on his way to the hospital far inland, when the Communists came in. I heard that the other Embassies and Legations had offered to do volunteer nursing -- they wanted to do anything they could to help. I put on my white dress and low white shoes and went over. Miss Poon, the Embassy nurse, Mrs. Frankel, and several other people were there. Poor Ryan was in the large adjoining glassed-in room. He was all bandages except for the top of his head where one could see his short, boyishly tousled blondish hair and his strong, sturdy young feet. (He had been wearing only shorts and shoes at the time of the fire, and those were the only parts of him that had been somewhat protected.) Someone told me that his eyes had not been hurt and that if he recovered there would probably be no scars on his face. There were slits in his head bandage for his mouth and his nose and he was being given oxygen through a rubber nose tube. On his left ankle, just beyond the bandages was a cruel-looking blister. The area over his heart, which did not appear to be badly burned, was left free of bandages, so that Dr. Packard could apply the stethoscope from time to time. I had been told that his pulse had to be taken in his foot -- his wrists and temples were buried deep in bandages. There was an unburned area on his right side where Miss Poon gave him injections of penicillin and morphine. Electric fans were blowing cool air, and there were about twenty ice-bags of various sizes against his legs, arms, sides, shoulders and head. It was my job and Mrs. Glycer's to fill and re-fill these bags as the ice melted (it was very hot). A Chinese was kept almost constantly busy in the adjoining bathroom cracking off pieces of ice of the proper size from a big block. Gensy Soule, General Soule's daughter, was there, and had been helping almost continuously. Ryan would occasionally speak and Gensy would lean down to find out what he wanted. Although his voice wasn't loud, it sounded normal and full of vitality. His chest rose and fell evenly. He seemed so young and full of soundness and health. That the burns could conquer seemed incredible. From time to time, people dropped in to see how he was, -- Mrs. Soule, Captain Frankel, Colonel Dunning and a number of others. Lt. Deering came in with some boards to elevate the foot of Ryan's bed. Later, the nurse wanted him to drink. He said: "I'd like to have a drink, in New York!" He didn't want to drink, and it was vitaly necessary. Orange, pineapple, apple juice; broth or coffee were suggested. Then someone said, "How about some gingerale? Mr. Davis, the Canadian Ambassador sent it over for you. It's right here." Finally, he drank a little through a glass tube. Mrs. Glycer said to him: "Come on, drink with me -- we'll click glasses!" He protested; "I've drunk such a lot, I can't drink any more."

July 25: We have heard that Ryan is much better today, -- his temperature has gone down, and that he is able to take plasma again. (For some reason, it had become impossible for him to take it two days ago.) I said to Lee: "He's going to get well now, and everyone who's helped with the nursing is going to feel a proprietary interest in him!"

July 26: We are having air-raids every day or so now. I thought of the extra helplessness of Ryan at such a time.

July 27: Yesterday afternoon, the sky became very dark, and a torrential rain beat down.

Suddenly, Ryan's temperature went up and up and up - over 108. At seven in the evening, he died.

July 28: Corporal Ryan, was buried today in the presence of his comrades and the diplomatic Corps, in the little foreign cemetery, near others who have died far from home.

August 1: We continue to have air-raids, -- there were about five today. All the arrangements are complete for the departure of the Ambassador's plane, -- it is scheduled to take off at eight tomorrow morning. It will go to Okinawa, where the passengers will change from the C-47 to the B-17; thence to Kwajalein, Johnston, Honolulu and San Francisco. I'll continue to keep this informal diary, and put down things as they happen -- and there doesn't seem to be much doubt things will keep on happening!

**JOSEPH A. YAGER**  
**Exchange Program**  
**Canton (1947-1948)**

**Consul**  
**Hong Kong/Peking (Peiping) (1950-1951)**

*Mr. Yager was born in Indiana and raised in Ohio. After earning a degree at the University of Michigan, he joined the US Army, where he served in China until joining the State Department in 1946. Mr. Yager became one of the Department's China specialists, serving in Canton, Hong Kong (Peiping) and Taipei, as well in Washington, where he continued to be involved in Chinese economic and political matters. Mr. Yager was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

YAGER: I was sent to Canton. After 16 days, Charlie Stelle sent me a message saying, "Congratulations, you have stayed there more than 16 days." I went to Canton under an exchange program under which people in the Civil Service could get some foreign experience. It was quite educational. The post at Canton was rather disorganized at that time. The consul general, Harvey Boucher, was an old hand, but not an Asian hand. He was a class two officer, which in those days seemed higher than it does now. He had had a mental breakdown from which he supposedly had recovered and then he was sent to this high stress post. His number two was a real old China hand named Gordon Burke, the son of a Methodist missionary to China, who was unfortunately an alcoholic. Also, despite having been raised in China and being able to speak both mandarin and Shanghai Chinese fluently, Burke was very anti-Chinese. The economic officer, Bill Wright, was ill. He spent most of the time in his quarters in bed. It was a place full of vacuums. I had all the opportunity in the world to do pretty much what I wanted to do. I got on well with Boucher. Because of a shortage of space, he put me in a little cubicle within his own office. I would sit there doing my work, and callers would come in and talk about all kinds of confidential things. Here I was, listening to the naval attaché complaining about the Army attaché, that kind of thing. It was a strange place.

The best part of my assignment there was a one month trip into the interior using my own travel money. You mentioned the question about American sources. I had written letters before I made the trip to American missionaries that we knew about. As I look back on it, the letters were quite indiscreet. They, in fact, asked the missionaries to collect information for us, which was a poor idea. So, I traveled to western Hunan and back to the railroad at Hengyang and down the railroad into Kwangsi. I stopped at American missions along the way, going all the way to Lung-chou, which is about 10 miles from the Indochina border, and then back to the West River at Wuchow and back by a boat to Canton. I borrowed a jeep from CNRRA, the Chinese adjunct to UNRRA. That helped me a great deal. I talked to a lot of Chinese, and I also talked to the missionaries. Some of them were quite informative. I learned a lot about American missions, including the rivalry between the Catholics and the Protestants. The Catholics were critical of the Protestants, because they would go out to China with their families, build an American-style bungalow, and live an American-style life. The Catholic missionaries would go into the dirty villages and live in crummy little houses right with the people.

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*Q: As we move into 1950, "Who lost China" and all that was beginning to heat up. Your organization must have felt some of the heat about interpretation. As the political winds became quite strong from the right, I would have thought that anything dealing with recognition of communist China or that they're doing something right or anything like that would become almost a political anathema and be sure to be leaked out. It must have inhibited you.*

YAGER: I don't think I was inhibited. I don't know for sure that anybody else was. It was a problem. Some people who worked for me were being interviewed and charged with some kind of subversive connections. By chance, I had an insight into the way that the security organization sometimes operated. I learned from a member of SY, security, that at least some of their agents in cases where they didn't really have enough evidence to prove that somebody should be dismissed would try to bully the person in question into resigning. The guy who told me this thought that that was a very poor practice, as I did. When anybody told me that they were being interrogated by SY, I would say, "I assume that you have nothing to be ashamed of. You just stand your ground. Whatever you do, don't resign. They may try to make you resign, but don't do it. If you don't do it and if they really don't have anything on you, you will get out all right." But the questioning had a bad psychological effect. People were unhappy about hearing about people who were in trouble and thought, "Why is he in trouble? There is nothing wrong with him," which was usually true. So, it was more than a bit of a cloud. I don't remember that it influenced the work on China. I think that it may have gotten some of the Southeast Asia people into unjustified trouble. One senior person left for an academic job. I think it was probably because she was under intensive interrogation.

*Q: June 25, 1950.*

YAGER: My family and I arrived in Hong Kong sometime in the summer of 1950, so it wasn't very long after the war had started. My family was evacuated at the turn of the year when the Chinese had come in. If I had been back in my job in Washington and had been asked whether the Chinese would intervene, I would have come up with the wrong answer. I would have said,

"No, they just won a very difficult war. They haven't consolidated their power in all parts of China. Their military must be in pretty bad shape. They are just not going to take on the United States," but they did. How wrong can you be?

*Q: You were in Hong Kong this next time from when to when?*

YAGER: The summer of 1950 to the summer of 1951. It was roughly a year. Maybe I bring bad luck, but this post was in not very good shape either. When I arrived there, Carl Rankin, an excellent man, had been the consul general, but he had just been made ambassador in Taipei. His number two, a strange man named James R. Wilkinson, was in charge but was beyond his depth. He was told that Walter McConaughy, the consul general in Shanghai, was going to be consul general in Hong Kong. There was very little difference in rank between the two. McConaughy was a lot younger than Wilkinson. Wilkinson felt, "Well, I came out here to work for Carl Rankin, a very senior man, and here I'm supposed to work for this young guy, McConaughy." He was churning around unhappily about that while a great scandal was unfolding in the consulate. It was a mixture of homosexuality, which in those days was grounds for dismissal, and visa and passport fraud.

*Q: The pressures there were just a mess.*

YAGER: Oh, it was a terrible mess. A special inspector, Julian Harrington, came out to deal with this scandal. Garity from SY also came out to prepare the case against Vice Consul John Williams, who was charged with visa fraud.

Harrington, expanding his mandate a bit, thought he could settle the Wilkinson problem. He got Wilkinson made an inspector in charge of the Consular Section. That was the solution. Because Wilkinson was backing out of his assigned job, I was made the acting number two. In those days, the number two in a consulate was called executive officer, a term we got from the Navy. So, I had eight months under quite a good boss, Walter McConaughy. I was way beyond my age and grade. I was in my mid-30s and here I was the number two in a big consulate general. I learned a lot. I had large general responsibilities. I reviewed everything that went out. I got into a lot of contacts. I had Macao as my personal sideline. Except for when my family moved out from under me, I was happy.

*Q: I am an old consular hand and I know that visa and passport problems in Hong Kong were endemic. Did you get involved in this at all?*

YAGER: I had to be aware of them because the tail end of the investigation was still going on. Vice Consul John Williams was still in Hong Kong, although he had been told not to come to work. I don't think I ever met him. This was his first post, strangely enough. Lindsey Grant, an excellent junior officer, had had some hand in uncovering the fraud. He had been in the Consular Section. I learned quite a bit from him and Magarity told me a lot more. It was a nasty mess.

*Q: Was it money or sex?*

YAGER: For Williams, it was mostly money, but not entirely. His first official act as a vice consul of the United States was to issue a visa for which he received \$50. So, the idea that this boy from the Carolinas was corrupted by the evil Orient just was not so. He was a corrupt fellow when he arrived, ready to get any money he could. Of course, he raised his prices. His main Chinese accomplice was named Humi Chu. There was another one whose name was, of all things, Peter Pan.

**RICHARD E. JOHNSON**  
**Office of Chinese Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1947-1951)**

**Economic Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1951-1954)**

*Richard E. Johnson was born and raised in Winnetka, Illinois. He attended Harvard University and served in the U.S. Navy. Mr. Johnson joined the State Department in 1947 and entered the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in Hong Kong, Canada, Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Brazil. Mr. Johnson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.*

JOHNSON: I think my Navy experience gave me a taste for working for an organization that I felt had some fairly high objectives, a U.S. government organization that I wanted to be a part of. I was proud of my service in the Navy, and to go from that into the world of trade was, for me, a rather boring prospect. I don't think it would be now; I have probably different outlooks on these things. But, then, I wanted to be a part of the process of post-war recovery. And so I joined the State Department and eventually was one of the officers in the Office of Chinese Affairs.

*Q: You came into the department in 1947, and you worked there, I guess as a civil servant, until 1951. Could you describe a little of the environment? It was a time when the State Department was sort of trying to read its way into the role of being a world power, wasn't it? And also being a major organization within a world power.*

JOHNSON: Yes, I think things were a good deal simpler then, needless to say. There was a small number of major issues around the world, rather than a whole basketful of them, that we felt we needed to be involved in. The one that I was most directly involved in was the process of Nationalist China going down the drain. I was in the Office of Chinese Affairs, and of course these were McCarthy days, so that, in a way, conditioned the mood in the State Department, which was a very cautious one and one of considerable concern, even seeping down to the lower levels in the Civil Service. You never knew when you were going to show up on some list for some crime you really didn't commit.

*Q: Really, this McCarthy period was of concern?*

JOHNSON: It certainly was in the sector that I was working in, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs

on the China desk. I worked for a time for several old China hands who were hit by McCarthy and their careers were seriously damaged. They later recovered and they're now highly respected as Sinologists, but, at that time, McCarthy had succeeded in creating a good deal of fear in the ranks.

*Q: What were you doing in Chinese Affairs?*

JOHNSON: I was a junior professional assistant, I think they called them in those days. I worked mainly with the economist for Chinese Affairs, who was concerned with the question of aid to China. At that time, Chiang had retreated to Formosa, and he was raising the Nationalist China flag from Formosa. And he had a lot of support in those days in Congress, as you remember. And there was a major debate going on as to whether the U.S. should continue to support Chiang Kai-shek with large-scale aid. As you may remember, there was a White Paper put out, sort of illustrating how our assistance to Chiang had been wasted. There was reluctance in the United States government at that time to endorse large-scale aid programs for Chiang. And this put the Executive Branch in sort of a running duel with the Congress on many counts.

*Q: Again, we're talking about junior level, but, still, how did you find the reporting on the economic situation? I suppose, at that point, you were concerned about the economic situation on Taiwan, but you're getting from both. I mean, how'd you find...?*

JOHNSON: I don't remember there being much, Stu. Of course, we had no posts in mainland China then. What reporting was done was mainly a sort of intelligence-type reporting, through posts like Hong Kong, and we weren't too much interested in the economy of Taiwan. It was mainly a political matter.

*Q: Did the Korean War, which started in June of 1950, which was right in the middle of the time you were there, change much of what you were doing?*

JOHNSON: Yes, I think it intensified the battle between those who were in support of Chiang Kai-shek and felt we should demonstrate that support by large aid programs, and the more conservative forces that didn't see much benefit for the U.S. in further supporting the Gimo. I say that because, when General MacArthur came back from Korea, a great deal of this sentiment coalesced around him. He was a very strong exponent for helping Chiang Kai-shek, because he felt that was a good hope for getting at the Chinese Communists.

*Q: Well, then, you moved to Hong Kong in 1951 and you were there until '54. Was this still with the Civil Service?*

JOHNSON: No, I joined the Foreign Service.

*Q: Why did you do that?*

JOHNSON: That's a good question, and I've often wondered. I was having a fascinating time in Chinese Affairs and enjoyed it. And I had the feeling, which persisted throughout much of my Foreign Service career, that it's in Washington where the decisions were made, and that was a

fun place to be, it's where the action was. I took the Foreign Service exams while I was in the Office of Chinese Affairs, partly just to see how I'd do, without much intention then of going into the service. And I was deferred on the orals because my knowledge of U.S. history wasn't very good. Even before that, I was deferred because my German was not up to date. So I repaired my German, took the language exam again, then I spent a year studying U.S. history, because it was just a challenge to me to get through this thing. And I passed the oral exam easily the second time. Thereafter, I think I just felt I'd put so much effort into this thing that I ought to give the Service a try. And my people in Chinese Affairs wanted me to go to Hong Kong to help in the commercial section with the trade controls that we had then, if you remember, very intensive controls to prevent goods from Communist China getting into the United States, and, conversely, to prevent U.S. exports from getting into Communist China.

*Q: It's interesting from a historical point of view to think how much effort has been put into the United States commercial controls, not spreading trade.*

JOHNSON: Absolutely.

*Q: During World War II, an awful lot of our officers were doing nothing but trying to stick it to the, particularly the Germans, to keep them from getting stuff out of Latin America. And we sort of went right back into that mode again.*

JOHNSON: You're so right, we did. And we expended a tremendous amount of money and effort. And I was in the middle of that when I was in Hong Kong.

It even got kind of amusing, the depth of our concerns. For example, in trying to prevent Chinese Communist products from arriving in the United States, we got into some very detailed definitions of what is a Chinese product. There are a lot of Chinese products based on egg and chicken, food products that were exported to the U.S. traditionally. And, of course, exports from Hong Kong we were happy to let in, because this was a friendly British colony, but nothing from Communist China. Well, the border between Hong Kong and Communist China runs through a swamp, and there were a lot of Chinese vegetable goods produced in that swamp, on both sides of the border, and there was no way of detecting, for example, a litchi nut produced in Hong Kong from one produced in China. And it got even more technical when you got into egg products. It was clear that if the egg had been hatched in Communist China, even though the egg was brought into Hong Kong for processing, it was a Communist product. But how about if the chicken comes from Communist China and is brought across the border into Hong Kong live and lays the egg on the Hong Kong side, is that then a Communist product?

*Q: These were matters of debate?*

JOHNSON: These were matters that had to be answered, defined, because we were policing this sort of thing.

And, looking the other way, there was a tremendous effort to keep U.S. goods from getting into Communist China. And in the commercial section I did a lot of export checking. You know the old export checks, where you try to decide what will happen to this particular product -- if it's

brought in, will it be reexported?

That is really a battle of wits in Hong Kong, because a Chinese company that is importing and perhaps does intend to send it to Communist China, would find all sorts of ways of evading these eager-beaver American vice consuls. As you came up the steps, with the sign of the U Fong Company on somebody's desk, and they saw you coming, the sign would be quickly removed and another sign would be put up there. You'd ask, "Is Mr. Chin around?" And they'd say, "He is not here right now, maybe he'll be back later."

But I remember particularly one export check that I was asked to make on, of all things, prophylactic rubbers. And the question was: What are Hong Kong's requirements for prophylactic rubbers? And I had to go all around Hong Kong, talking to importers of prophylactic rubbers and asking: How many do you think Hong Kong uses? And how many are reexported to China? And I wrote about a ten-or-twelve-page airgram, which received commendations from Washington. Then I got a further communication saying, "Please update this carefully. We have heard that the Chinese Communists are using prophylactic rubbers to protect the muzzles of their guns from moisture."

*Q: We did in Korea.*

JOHNSON: That's what Washington said. They said this is being done in Korea.

*Q: I remember it distinctly.*

JOHNSON: And so I was double checking, and then I got another telegram from the Pentagon that said, "Forget all about it. Our experts have said that if you do try to protect your gun muzzles that way, it will simply rust and pit-out the muzzles themselves because moisture will collect, there is no air in the muzzle. So any prophylactic rubbers that want to go to Communist China, okay."

*Q: So you didn't look at the strategic value of trying to keep the Chinese population down.*

JOHNSON: No, that wasn't part of that check. So that was challenging, but a tremendous expense of time and effort, as you said. We had a commercial section of, I would guess, four or five officers. And they didn't do any trade development work, it was all this kind of control.

I think at that time we had some concern that maybe the British patrols, patrols that were designed to prevent smuggling from Hong Kong to China, were not sufficiently efficient. To reassure us, they said I could ride on British patrols at night and watch them intercepting junks smuggling -- steel plate was a big item and tires -- to Canton. And I spent several very exciting nights patrolling Hong Kong waters. They'd pull junks over and go aboard and search for contraband. And a few of these junks tried to evade the patrols. It was exciting and interesting.

*Q: I was wondering really how the Consulate General observed things in China. Did you have the feeling they were getting much information from talking to others there, or was it a group of Cold Warriors really hunkered down at that time?*

JOHNSON: No, Stu, they had some really good China hands. These were people who had served in China before and knew the country, State Department Foreign Service people. Of course, there were CIA people there, too, who were very good. And there was a great deal of interviewing of people coming across the line -- university professors from China and business people. And there was a great deal of reading of anything that was published that came out of China. It was the principal listening post for China. It was one of the very largest American posts in the world at that time, larger than most embassies. We had forty-two vice consuls, just vice consuls alone. It was known as a marrying post -- I met my wife there -- and we counted a total of six weddings that developed from contacts in the consulate there.

*Q: My God. Was Pat, your wife, was she...?*

JOHNSON: She was there as a consular assistant, having joined the Foreign Service before I did.

I spent about two years in the commercial section, and then a couple of years in the consular section, which was also very colorful and also involved a great deal of detailed effort that produced little in terms of the interests of the U.S. citizenry.

Here the effort was to keep Chinese from entering the U.S. illegally. And the base of the problem is that, in China, at least then, they didn't have civil documents. There was no such thing as an official birth certificate or an official marriage certificate. So you had to rely on informal evidence if you were a Chinese and you wanted, for example, to prove that you were the son of a Chinese and therefore entitled to nonquota entry. And very often the Chinese father would be in the States and he would be asking that this young man come in as his son. Well, there was a great deal of illegal importation of Chinese young men into the U.S. for various labor purposes, so in the visa section we had to be extremely careful. And the "son" would come in with what was called informal evidence. This would be, oh, say, badly worn letters from "Dad," sent to this kid supposedly when he was such and such an age -- but sometimes the ink wouldn't be too dry on them. Or they would unroll a beautiful certificate, and you'd say, "What is that thing?"

And he'd say, "That is the announcement of the marriage of Mom and Dad, and it's signed down here by the Chinese gentleman who presided at the wedding."

And you'd feel it and say, "This paper feels pretty new. This doesn't look like the certificate that was used when your father was married."

And then he'd pull out a photograph of him with old "Dad" alongside, to prove the relationship.

And you'd say, "Why is it that the left-hand side of this photograph is light, whereas the right-hand side is so dark? Looks almost as though something had been pasted together here. Why don't you try again and come back in a few weeks."

I felt for the poor Chinese.

Then they developed blood testing as a means of tripping things up. Because, of course, a blood

test can prove that by anything known to medical science you cannot be the result of the union of these two people. "Mother," of course, was often a part of this. She would come in with this alleged son, to testify that yes, I remember well when Jimmy here was born, and his father is, sure enough, this guy in San Francisco. And you'd take a blood test on all three, and it would come out that Jimmy just couldn't be the son of this union. And you'd not only have to turn him down, but you'd...this was the hardest, really the hardest thing I had to do in all my consular work, you'd have to turn down this poor, aging woman because she had lied under oath. And you'd have to tell her that under no circumstances could she rejoin her husband. And that is just a real, real hard thing. A lot of human interest stories in that work.

I remember...I'll get off this subject soon, but it is colorful. The citizenship section worked on somewhat the same problems, although here the young man was trying to prove that he was entitled to U.S. citizenship. There the effort was based principally on his trying to prove that he was born in a certain village at a certain time. He would come into the consulate with a "witness," a friend from the same village. And both of them had been very carefully coached at a school set up in Hong Kong to brief guys who were appearing before the U.S. consul so they would know what to say. The examination consisted of getting a piece of paper and drawing a sort of an informal map of the village. And the examiner would say, "Now in your village where was the, let's say, the place where the gentlemen bathed themselves?" And you'd ask them separately. The witness would come in and say it was over here; and the applicant would put it over here. And you'd say, "Well, you two don't seem to be from the same town really." And then you'd check out with them the place where the small market was in the village -- tremendous detail. If you passed this oral quizzing, there was a place in Hong Kong where you could buy healthy, warm stools before you came in for your physical exam. Colorful assignment.

*Q: Yes. You then left there for a much more mundane world, didn't you?*

JOHNSON: Yes, I went to Toronto after that.

**PHILIP W. MANHARD**  
**Chinese Language Studies**  
**Beijing (1947-1949)**

**Vice Consul**  
**Tientsin (1949-1950)**

*Ambassador Philip W. Manhard was born in Massachusetts in 1921. He received his bachelor's degree from the University of Southern California in 1943. He served in the US Navy (1943-1944) and the US Marine Corps (1944-1966). His overseas postings include Peiping, Tientsin, Pusan, Seoul, and Tokyo. Ambassador Manhard was interviewed by Marshall Green on December 1, 1988.*

MANHARD: Marshall, I had always been interested, since high school, in the Foreign Service. I went to college with the idea of preparing for the Foreign Service. World War II arrived while I

was still in university. I ended up studying Japanese in the Navy and served in the Marine Corps during World War II. I came back after the war, took the Foreign Service exams, passed them with not the highest grade in the world, and was put on a waiting list.

*Q: What year was this?*

MANHARD: 1946 and '47. I took the written and the oral, and was waiting on the waiting list, the Foreign Service then having very little money to appoint all those that had passed.

Not being a person of independent means, I had to earn a living. Standard Vacuum Oil Company of New York came along and said, "We're recruiting for our marketing division in China."

I said, "That's exactly where I've always wanted to go," and I went.

*Q: You went there knowing Japanese?*

MANHARD: I studied Japanese during the war and also studied some Chinese in college before the war. I went to China with Standard Vacuum Oil Company in Peking, whereupon, after I'd been there for about six months, I received a letter saying that my appointments had been made and I was to report to the State Department actually one week before they condescended to send the letter to me, which was by surface mail to China from Washington.

So I went to the then Acting Consul General Fulton Freeman, Tony Freeman, in Peking, who later became ambassador to several countries. I said, "Tony, what do I do now? My lifelong ambition has been to join the Foreign Service and come to China, and now it is too late."

He said, "We have an opening in the Chinese language school here. Would you like to take that position?"

I said, "Certainly. That would be perfect from my point of view."

He said, "I'll fix it."

I said, "How in the world can you fix it, since the term for my eligibility for appointment is already expired?"

He said, "Phil, I'll introduce you to the Foreign Service by explaining something very basic to you. I will send a telegram to the Department explaining to them they can save \$422, i.e., the (then) cost of your trip from Washington to Peking. They will do anything for \$422, regardless of regulations." He did, they did, and I was sworn in, if not uniquely, at least a very rare occurrence in the field, in Peking, by Tony Freeman.

Then I attended the Chinese language course, an 18-month course.

*Q: I wonder if you could describe a bit how the Chinese language training was done. What was the routine, and how effective was it? How did you live in 1948?*

MANHARD: From March of 1948 until early October 1949. The Foreign Service Chinese language school at that time was located in Peking, in a Chinese compound, a Chinese-style building, small. That office and the quarters in which the students were put, which were private apartments, if you will, in a rabbit warren of interconnected little houses right near the city wall in the southeast part of Peking, had existed back through the twenties. I think at one time even George Marshall had attended school there in that place with the Army, way back, so it has a long history and tradition.

All the teachers were Chinese, recruited in Peking. They spoke the northern dialect, which was the preferred brand of Chinese and always has been, even though it's slightly Bostonian, in American context. We would usually have mornings with a tutor, and we were almost all one on one with Chinese tutors, one hour with one, one hour with another. Texts were prepared, but they were the basis of our learning, and it was both written and oral, some writing, less writing than reading and speaking. It was very intensive. We'd spend usually three to four hours each morning, five days a week, and then you would prepare for the next day's performance that afternoon. Your time was your own in the afternoon and evening, but it was strenuous.

*Q: Had your study of Japanese and Japanese characters been much assistance to you?*

MANHARD: Yes, very much, because the Chinese and Japanese characters have basically the same meaning in both languages. Chinese, of course, grammatically, and the sequence of thought in Chinese is comparable to English, as Japanese is to German. So they're very different, but the written language is very similar.

*Q: That's one of the difficult things about the Japanese language, the sentence order.*

MANHARD: One time when I was out in a language course, a friend of mine was a middle-aged woman Presbyterian missionary, who was in a little town outside Peking. This was during the investment, I guess you'd call it, in military terminology, of Peking, the surrounding of Peking during the period of negotiation for the peaceable surrender of Peking by the Nationalists to the Communists in August and September of 1949 and before the occupation -- the end of '48, the beginning of '49. I took a consulate jeep out on a Sunday to see her, because a Chinese friend of mine had told me she was sick out in this little town, which was in between the lines, I thought. It turned out the Chinese Communist Party lines were closer. I got out there on a road and got sniper fire from the Chinese Communist side, turned around and came back on the road, whereupon I met machine gun fire coming at me from the Chinese Nationalists. It destroyed the front end of the jeep. I drove it into the consulate compound. It was a diesel engine by that time because all the water had drained out of the engine block. I had to wait for the gas to run out for the engine to stop. Then I was told that I would have to pay for the damage, of course, because it my own personal affair on the weekend. (Laughs)

*Q: Did you actually ever pay for it?*

MANHARD: I had some friends in the Army language school, which was just closing down. They were leaving the city, and they had extra equipment. They said, "Phil, we'll give you a jeep

so you can pay your difficult Foreign Service folks who count the pennies." (Laughs)

In the end of January 1949, the Chinese Communist Army occupied Peking by negotiation with the local Chinese Nationalist commander. Then life changed radically for all of us in China at that time.

*Q: Does that mean that you had to stop your Chinese language studies in Peking? Did you stay on in Peking, or were you then send elsewhere?*

MANHARD: I stayed on through my course in Chinese, from which I graduated in October of 1949. I was then immediately transferred as a vice consul to Tientsin as a language officer in our consulate in Tientsin.

*Q: Did you operate there as a regular vice consul, or were you studying the language?*

MANHARD: No, I was operating as a regular vice consul.

*Q: What were your duties?*

MANHARD: Consular duties and monitoring the Chinese press. Actually, my main duties, as it turned out, were to try to assist Americans, both official and private, to leave north China, all of whom exited through Tientsin. So my duties evolved into constant negotiation, assistance, support, coordination between departing Americans and local Chinese Communist government officers.

*Q: Were you aware that you'd have to be departing pretty soon, too?*

MANHARD: The major event that bore on that for all of us in China at that time was, first, a telegram from the Department signed by the then-Acting Secretary Levitt, telling everybody in China that we were the indispensable eyes and ears, we could not be replaced, that China policy was still under very serious debate in Washington, and they wanted us to stay at all costs, and only those with a dire emergency should ask permission to return to the United States.

*Q: Were dependents, meanwhile, taken back to the United States?*

MANHARD: Dependents remained in China at that time. Apparently, the Department was mindful of what they hoped, I guess, to be a precedent of what we did in Manchuria in 1932, when the Japanese occupied Manchuria, i.e., we kept our consulates there and they did consular work by tolerance of the Japanese, even though we did not recognize the Japanese conquering and occupation of Manchuria at that time. They were allowed to remain and to function consular duties. We thought, I guess, that we could do that again in China temporarily, at least.

*Q: What was the atmosphere like then in Tientsin during those days that you were serving as vice consul? The Chinese authorities were obviously Communist authorities. Did they act towards you in a hostile, surly way, or were they cooperative, or what?*

MANHARD: It varied from official to official. Mostly very bureaucratic and quite non-cooperative. For example, they tried to apply all their regulations affecting foreigners that they promulgated after they came to power officially as of October 1, 1949, when they established their national government. They insisted, for instance, that we fill in various bureaucratic forms, residence permits and various things, declaring all previous permits or any other documents that we had used previously under the Chinese National Government to be null and void under their government. Each form, for example, had a space for occupation. So in my case, I would write down "vice consul." They would reject it. It boiled down to a long, rather sterile negotiation over whether . . .

*Q: What type would they prefer?*

MANHARD: They would only accept "unemployed" or "former vice consul." Since we claimed that we were not unemployed and we claimed that we had our official title, finally we ended up putting down "vice consul" and letting them fill in the word "former."

*Q: Just refresh my memory, though. At that point we had diplomatic relations with the Chiang government?*

MANHARD: And we still maintained full diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalist Government, which by that time, of course, had moved south and then finally to Taiwan. Everyone was aware that there was a debate raging in Washington about our policy toward China.

*Q: The situation you faced in Tientsin at that time, was that a similar situation faced by our other consulates? How many consulates did we have operating in China at that point?*

MANHARD: I can't be sure exactly now, Marshall, but we had our consulate general in Peking, we had a consul general in Mukden, we had our embassy in Nanking, we had a consulate general in Shanghai and in Canton. We had several others in central and south China, but they were evacuated, I believe, just before the Chinese Communist fully occupied the mainland.

*Q: When you went to Tientsin, what was its importance to the United States?*

MANHARD: It was the port for most of north China.

*Q: We had Marines stationed there at one time.*

MANHARD: At one time, yes. We had them in Peking, too, of course. It is the main north China port. It was then, and it was for a long time, through which most of the foreign trade affected both ways all north trade.

*Q: Still true today.*

MANHARD: Yes, as far as I know, it's still true.

*Q: You've mentioned the American missionaries. What was the relationship of the consulate, while you were there, with the American missionaries in Tientsin?*

MANHARD: Not much, because most of the missionaries had departed. They didn't dare remain. The few that were still there, most of them, I think, came out before. A couple of them I assisted.

*Q: They were in a much more exposed position, because they didn't have diplomatic status. Not that you had, but in a way you had international law.*

MANHARD: They were entirely dependent on their Chinese colleagues. The Communists tenets against religion and so forth, they felt that they would have very little opportunity to continue to exist, so most of them, as far as I can remember, had pulled out before we finally got out.

*Q: You alluded to your role at the consulate as being free-wheeling. I wonder if you could talk a little about how the consulate was organized, what the other officers were doing. Would you comment on the leadership there, how you felt it was operating under very difficult conditions? Not just your role, but the rest of the organization.*

MANHARD: We had a consul. It's very hard to remember now. We had two vice consuls, the consular vice consul and one was administrative vice consul. We had several junior staff members who were mostly clerical, a code clerk and two secretaries. I can't remember precisely now. It was a very small staff and had been reduced considerably before I got there, people getting out, knowing they could only maintain a skeleton staff at that time. The consular work, the normal issuing of visas and so forth, was practically non-existent because nobody was going anywhere, except outbound with a permit from the Chinese. So I only issued one consular visa to a White Russian lady, while her daughter and mother came, because of a request from a U.S. admiral, which I never quite figured out, which the State Department indicated it would be very tactful if I would cooperate.

*Q: The consul was Wellborn.*

MANHARD: He was responsible for the running of the overall office.

*Q: Which was largely a question of self-preservation.*

MANHARD: It was self-preservation. I feel great sympathy for Al, because his wife and their young child, maybe two years old, was there, and several times I know I and others on the staff, I'm sure, tried to ask Al didn't he think that his wife and child should go home right away, even though we were asked to stay. He said, "We're going to stick it out until we have orders to go." So they did, but I think it added burden on him psychologically.

*Q: This all occurred during the occupation of Japan. This, of course, gave you kind of a backup. When they said you wanted a ship to take people out, there was one available, which raises the question about the Japanese and the legacy of Japan during this particular period. I gather some 7 million Japanese had been returned from overseas, mostly from north China and from*

*Manchuria, so there were no Japanese in the area when you were there. They obviously left a legacy. Did you come across that? Was there a great deal of bitterness displayed about the Japanese, or distrust?*

MANHARD: In general, I'd say if you mentioned Japan to the Chinese there, they had a very bitter memory because it had been a tough occupation in that area, particularly, I guess.

*Q: And humiliation, too.*

MANHARD: Yes. Sometimes some remarks of a very negative nature about Koreans, because the Japanese in north China for quite a while did use a lot of Koreans as their military police up there, which was pretty tough. So the Chinese had very bad memories of both the Japanese occupation and the Koreans who worked for them in the occupation.

*Q: The Korean collaborators.*

MANHARD: Yes.

*Q: Just as a matter of historical note, it is interesting that in the early 1930s, we had more consulates in China than any other country in the world by far. After that came Mexico. So we had very close communications that had a great deal to do with our missionary activities, too, as I recall.*

MANHARD: Yes, that's true.

*Q: Going back to the events in 1949, when you were in Tientsin, what were some of the particular problems that arose that are of historic note and importance?*

MANHARD: Shortly after I got to Tientsin in October 1949, the news had come just before I got there that our consul general, Angus Ward, and his entire staff and dependents in Mukden had been placed under house arrest, i.e., in a compound in which they lived between the office and residencies in the city of Mukden, the capital of what the Chinese called Northeast, formerly called Manchuria. No one knew what was going to transpire there. The communications were closed down with that office.

Incidentally, I should mention that when I got to Tientsin, we had no radio, no communications directly with the outside world through our own means, and the only way we could send any either classified or unclassified messages was by laborious one-time pad code work sent through the Chinese Communist mail to our Consulate in Peking, which still had a radio and was allowed to operate its radio.

Mukden was out of communication, no one knew their condition, what was happening. At that point we were totally dependent on what we could pick up, at least as far as I knew, in Tientsin from the local Chinese language press. I followed that closely, and I noticed that the male members of the staff had been put in jail. There was a trial before what they called then the People's Court, and they were finally convicted of sabotaging the revolution. Angus Ward

himself was convicted of supposedly attacking and assaulting a Chinese citizen and conducting various spy activities against the Chinese Communist regime. Finally, they were sentenced to execution. Shortly thereafter, it was announced in the press again that due to the lenient policy of the Chinese Communist regime, that their sentence was being commuted to deportation.

At that point, I simply decided that I would try to -- war game is not an appropriate name, but I would try to simply analyze for myself what I would be expected to do if I were a Chinese Communist official handling that situation. The first thing that seemed obvious to me, my own personal speculation, was that they had no way of physically carrying out the sentence of deportation from China mainland unless they had the cooperation of the United States or some other foreign power. They had no aircraft, there was no commercial transportation coming in or out of north China, at least. We knew that. We doubted there was any transportation anywhere in or out of China, at least of a regular nature.

So I decided that I'd take the initiative to go down to see the head of the Public Safety Bureau in the Chinese Communist regime, which was the equivalent of the internal and external gestapo. The head of that office, I was informed by a Belgian businessman who had long residence in Tientsin before and after World War II, was the son of a Chinese commercial family in Shanghai that was doing a lot of business with foreign business, and he had joined the Communist Party at a very early age and was a very senior member of the Chinese Communist Party. Perhaps partly by his background, he had rebelled against his father and family and was extremely, bitterly anti-foreign and specifically anti-American, a very difficult, tough, elderly, and senior Communist official. But he was the one with whom I had to deal. So I went down, insisted on seeing him.

*Q: You took the initiative on this?*

MANHARD: I took the initiative.

*Q: You were in charge of your own office?*

MANHARD: No, I was just a vice consul in an officer which consisted of a consul and several other vice consuls.

*Q: Did you get the consul's permission to do this, or did you do this entirely on your own?*

MANHARD: At this point, I can be frank, Marshall. I did it on my own. I simply went down and said, "I've seen from the paper that Angus Ward and his party have been sentenced to deportation.~" I asked him first if his government intended to deport them via the Soviet Union. I asked that question clearly because I was curious. I personally believed that the Chinese Communists were having great difficulties with their relationship with the Soviet Union. This was late October 1949. I did that, one, to stimulate an answer with regard to the Soviet Union; two, I was primarily concerned about what I could do to help the case of Angus Ward and his party.

*Q: You had reason to think that the Soviet-Chinese relationships were not all they should be because of the way the Soviets had left Manchuria, taking with them some of the equipment.*

MANHARD: Yes, there had been a lot of discussion in some quarters about the Soviet rape of Manchuria, cleaning out materials, taking people and so forth. Whether that was entirely the opinion of Chinese Nationalist officials and their government's attitude, or whether this was shared by the Chinese Communists, of course, no one knew for sure. But I'd seen many low-level indications in my dealings with lots of Chinese Communists officials and maybe officials who were not members of the Party, as well, in Tientsin, that I just detected an atmosphere and undercurrent of restiveness and unhappiness toward the Soviets.

So I asked him that question first and got the answer that I really expected. He glowered and bristled and said, "Certainly not. Absolutely not."

I said, "Perhaps Diren," which was then the port in the Ludien peninsula of Manchuria at that time, which was still occupied.

*Q: Now called Dalian.*

MANHARD: Port Arthur. So I asked him about that place, which was even by implication at issue in the Chinese Communist press, which their slogan at that time was, "Lean to one side, learn from our big brother," ostensible good relations with the Soviet Union. But restiveness and some criticism about the continuing Soviet occupation of that port. Total extraterritoriality, by the way, is the way they ran it, apparently, as a military base.

He again gave the same answer, "Absolutely not." He wouldn't think of it.

I said, "Then I assume the only way that you can send this group out of China is through Tientsin, and either directly from Tientsin to the United States, or perhaps go down to South China somewhere, a long and perhaps unnecessary trip."

At that point he backed up and said, "I'm not authorized to discuss this in any way with you."

*Q: Was this conducted in Chinese?*

MANHARD: In Chinese. "I'm not authorized to discuss this." He indicated that he'd like me to leave immediately, didn't want to talk to me.

So my parting shot at that point was simply, "Well, I trust you and your superiors realize that there is no way you can carry out the order of your court unless you have the cooperation of the United States. We are prepared." I operated as a free-wheeler, which is not in the best tradition, I guess, of the Foreign Service, but I'm sorry, that is my personal makeup and I can't help it. I decided I might as well strike while the iron was hot, feeling that there was nothing to lose and perhaps something to gain, and my personal career didn't matter.

So I said, "The United States Government is prepared to send a ship to Tientsin."

*Q: You said that?*

MANHARD: Yes. "We're prepared to cooperate and send a ship."

*Q: And you knew that we were?*

MANHARD: I did not know any such thing. We had no instructions whatsoever. Whether Peking or Nanking had instructions that were not divulged to low-ranking officers like myself at the end of the line, I had no way of knowing. But it seemed to me that I was actually in an impeccable position, because it seemed to me it was quite clear that the United States Government, the American press, the American Congress, and everybody else was very agitated about this issue, and was bound to cooperate if they had a chance to rescue this group of our representatives.

So I assumed that this was going to happen. I said, "We can't do this by ourselves. You have to do your share. You have to bring them to Tientsin, presumably arrange somehow to get them to a ship, because we can't come in over Cacubar, which is a navigational obstacle to a large ship coming into the wharf and docks in Tientsin." I said, "But we are prepared to cooperate, and I hope that you and your superiors will do something about this." Whereupon I was rather unceremoniously removed from his office, and left.

*Q: He made no indication of yes or no?*

MANHARD: He wouldn't speak. He ushered me out. Perhaps a week or ten days went by, and a call came through my Chinese staff. I had several people working for me in the consular business there, of which there was none practically of a normal sort at that time.

These Chinese on our staff in Tientsin, incidentally, were remarkable people. They had served, in many cases, for 25 or 30 years as local employees of our consulate in Tientsin. They had served before World War II, some of them had been put in prison and perhaps tortured by the Japanese during the Japanese occupation of China, and they were extremely loyal to the United States. They served through thick and thin.

*Q: Did you have any way of telling if they were pro-Communist or otherwise?*

MANHARD: We didn't ask them. We didn't think it was fair to ask them.

*Q: No, but they were suspect. They must have been suspect.*

MANHARD: We assumed that probably the Chinese Communist would put pressure on them to become informants and so forth, and they had to live with their government somehow. In any event, they were very experienced, very loyal to the United States, I felt, and proved their worth to our service for a long time. Two of them, the most senior in our office, came to me very ceremoniously and very seriously, and said, "Mr. Manhard, we're sorry to say that we have just received a call from the Public Safety Bureau, asking us to tell you that they request that you come to their office right away."

I said, "Fine, I'll do so."

They said, "Oh, no, please don't."

I said, "Why do you say that?"

They said, "As is typical in China, we have a cousin who has another relative, who has a relative who works in that office. They tell us that once you get there, you are going to be put in prison as an example to the rest of this office, just like Angus Ward and his party were treated in Mukden. So we think you shouldn't go."

So my obvious reply to them was, "I thank you for your sympathy and support. However, there is no way that I can prevent them from coming and getting me if they want to. We have no way of defending ourselves here. So I might as well go, not sit here and wait to be taken away, right?"

So they nodded. They lined up in old Chinese ceremonial fashion at the door as I left, and bowed, implying that that was the last they were going to see of me.

So I got in the car, a station wagon that was assigned to me, in which I had been followed everywhere day and night in the city of Tientsin, for all the months I was in Tientsin, with two leather jacket-clad, without insignia, young men, reminiscent of motorcycle gangs in the United States at some later date, I found out. They followed me. I went down there, and I was very surprised to see the head of the Public Safety Bureau seated behind his desk, slightly to the rear of two much younger men with very high-quality cloth uniforms, neither of whom had insignia. They did not give their name or rank or title. But the two young men were obviously in charge. The old man, the senior, the one that I had talked with, was very respectful toward them, even though they were much younger. So they were obviously of considerable rank.

They paid very little attention to him, and they simply addressed themselves to me, and said, entirely in Chinese, that their comrade, meaning the head of the Public Safety Bureau, had reported to them the conversation I had with him earlier, and that they were responding to what I had told him. They wanted to inform me that they represented the central government in Peking, and wanted me to know that what had happened to Mr. Ward -- they still didn't use the title -- and his group in Mukden did not reflect the policy of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Government. They went so far as to say that what had happened in Mukden was unfortunate -- "k'e-hsi," in Chinese, probably a different Romanization by modern Chinese, but I'll stick with what I was taught.

I was very surprised, because that was about as close to an official apology as I think any American official could ever get from the Chinese at that point under those circumstances. They said, "However, this case has gone too far. There is nothing we can do to change what has happened in Mukden now, but we wish to cooperate with the United States in every way possible to make some smooth arrangements for him to leave China with your help and assistance. What do you propose?" they said to me.

I almost fell off my chair at that point. I wasn't prepared. So I decided I'd better get prepared and

ask for everything I can think of. So I said, "First of all, where will he be coming?"

"East station, Tientsin," which was the main railroad station where I had been meeting all kinds of Americans leaving China before.

I said, "Fine." I made a number of requests, in which I said, "When they arrive here, we will arrange all the housing for them in our homes here. I request that none of their luggage be opened, either official or personal. Any large quantities of material that are too big to carry in our cars could be put in the warehouse under lock and key, to which we will have the key. They will have the freedom of the city, and we will provide local transportation. Then you will provide the transportation from the dock in Tientsin down the river, over the sandbar," which blocked a lot of heavy ships, "to the ship, which we will send from the United States.

They said, "Fine. Do you have anything else you'd like to suggest?"

I couldn't think of anything else at that point. I said, "There will be no personal harassment of any kind. They will be free to move throughout the city at any time, in any way they want, and conduct business as normal, whatever personal business they need to do while waiting to leave."

They said, "With only one condition. Who will be the guarantor?"

At that time in Communist China, I'd had this experience many times, the Chinese insisted that as American citizens were leaving China, that there had to be someone who remained behind in China to be their "guarantor." What that meant was that if subsequent to their departure anything were found that they considered criminal or anything a misdemeanor to something serious, anything illegal on their part, that the guarantor would be held responsible, and that guarantor would still be in the hands of the Chinese Communists. By force of circumstances, I had signed many guarantees for Americans already.

*Q: So he allowed you to be the guarantor?*

MANHARD: I suggested that Mr. Ward was consul general of the United States Foreign Service and he was perfectly capable of being his own guarantor. They said, "Not satisfactory."

I said, "My superior officer is consul here."

"That's not satisfactory.

I said, "Why?"

"He does not speak Chinese."

I said, "Oh, you mean me."

"Yes. If you'll be the guarantor, everything's all right."

I said, "Fine."

Then we sent a message. As it turned out later, in December the State Department not only sent one ship, they sent two.

*Q: You said you sent a message. How did you send a message?*

MANHARD: I forget if it was classified or unclassified, in code or not. We sent it from Tientsin via the Chinese Communist Postal Service to our consulate in Peking. They then probably sent it unclassified by radio to Washington.

*Q: The Chinese Postal Service included telegraph.*

MANHARD: Yes. So we had the alternate of sending something by surface or by telegram.

*Q: How long did it take, then, to get the message to Washington?*

MANHARD: I don't know, Marshall.

*Q: How soon, then, did you get word that a ship was coming?*

MANHARD: I think within a week. I can't remember precisely. They were prepared to cooperate in any way.

*Q: Where did the ship come from?*

MANHARD: It turned out, as I understand it, they leased a passenger freighter from American President Lines, which was apparently available in Yokohama at that time, and it came from Japan over to off Tientsin.

Things did not go totally smoothly. The first night the party was there, we had one of the Chinese guards that was always stationed outside my house 24 hours a day, came in and started demanding to see their passports and other documents. I was over at the consul's house at the time. My house boy managed to sneak outside the place and make a phone call to me and tell me that they were giving trouble. I had put up about 12 of the consulate people in my house, including two wives and one child. So I raced back to my house and raised hell, got the guy out of my house. That's the only time I'd been able to go down and reprimand the Chinese Communist Public Safety Bureau, and they never bothered the group again after that.

*Q: You were a vice consul. What was the consul doing, and who was he? Did he know that you were going to talk with the Chinese officials?*

MANHARD: Al Wellborn was our consul at that time. He did not speak Chinese. He knew that my main function had to be helping Americans get out of Communist China. After I had the initial conversation with this guy, I told Al that I had discussed this. He was a little nervous about it, but he said, "We don't have authorization for such a pitch."

I said, "I think we had to do what we could do." I guess he accepted that.

Then when the two senior officials came from Peking, then we reported that fully. From then on, the thing moved ahead and Washington responded as we knew they would.

*Q: That important initial meeting with these high officials that you had, Wellborn knew that you were going?*

MANHARD: Yes.

*Q: Did he also share the views of your Chinese subordinates, that this might be the farewell?*

MANHARD: I didn't tell him about that. I didn't ask him about that. I figured I was going anyway.

*Q: How long was the Angus Ward party in Tientsin?*

MANHARD: Here the memory fades a little bit. I would say ten days, roughly.

If I may go into personal reminiscence, the heartbreak and the human tragedy and trauma at that time was illustrated by several things. One of the local employees of the consulate general in Mukden was named Tatsumi.

*Q: That's a Japanese name.*

MANHARD: He was a Japanese-American born on the West Coast of the United States, but he had gone to work for a Japanese commercial company in Manchuria before 1941, before Pearl Harbor. He stayed there during the war. He lost his citizenship by U.S. law, because he apparently had made no effort to try to get out or to report to an American consulate at the time. He later married a Japanese woman. They had this little baby, and they lived in Mukden. He was the motor pool officer. He was also put in prison in Mukden, along with the rest. They were all put in solitary confinement.

The Chinese Communist interrogators told him that Chigona, who was an Italian citizen, the radio operator in Mukden, also a local employee, a big strapping six-footer, Tatsumi about five-foot, very small, that while Tatsumi was in solitary confinement in their prison, Chigona, meantime, according to them, was living in the compound and had raped Tatsumi's wife. Whereupon Tatsumi completely, I think, mentally collapsed. He signed all kinds of documents, I gather, that said, "Yes, I've been a spy for the Americans and the Americans have done everything terrible, and all the accusations are correct." In fact, he broke down so totally, apparently he became almost useless to them.

When the party arrived in Tientsin and Tatsumi's wife and little baby daughter, and Chigona and his wife and other junior staff members were in my house, the first night they were there, other staff members from Mukden told me, "Be careful, because you don't understand what's happened

between Chigona and Tatsumi. Tatsumi still does not recognize his wife." All the way on the train ride, all the way from Mukden to Tientsin, he still would not accept the wife that his wife was still alive.

I said, "But she's sitting right here in my living room."

*Q: He'd gone off his rocker, had he?*

MANHARD: Yes. Well, the net result was that by the time they left, we treated them well, of course, and he began to relax a little bit. Finally, he recognized his wife the day before they left Tientsin. This is the kind of experience some of the people had gone through, which was very, very traumatic.

In any event, one point I wanted to make, Marshall, about policy in those days. From the time the Chinese Communists entered Peking, where I was in January of 1949 until we left in April 1950, in my case, from Tientsin, I received two letters from home. One was a bill and one was an advertisement. They cut off all our personal mail. We had no diplomatic privileges of any kind. Of course, their official excuse was, "You don't recognize us and we don't recognize you, so why should you have any privileges?" That was part of the background of how we lived. So we had to depend on radio.

*Q: Did you depend at all on colleagues, like your British colleagues?*

MANHARD: Oh, yes.

*Q: They had relations with Peking. Wouldn't they be helpful?*

MANHARD: Oh, they were very helpful. In fact, in Tientsin, the British consulate and British consul was our main reliance on a lot of news and helping us.

*Q: If you wanted to get a message out, couldn't you always go through the British?*

MANHARD: We could, yes, but some messages we tried to go through our own channels.

*Q: For example, when you had the initial meeting where you put your life and career very much at stake, did your British colleague know about that? Had you consulted him at all?*

MANHARD: No, I did not. I felt this was really a U.S. concern.

*Q: This whole Angus Ward thing is a very interesting episode. Were there any other episodes that occurred there?*

MANHARD: Marshall, let me put one what I consider historical footnote on this business about Angus Ward. They did get home, and everything worked out all right in the end, as far as safe departure. But I also suggested to my consul, "I think that this indicates to me that there is a serious split. Aside from what we're doing about getting Angus Ward and his party out of China,

it seems to me that we're getting a clear indication that there is a very serious split at the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee at the top level about policy toward the United States."

Because they repeated this twice about, "We want you to understand clearly that what happened to Angus Ward and his party in Manchuria do not reflect the policy of the central government in Peking," which seemed to me very clear. Of course, the biographic background of Gao Gang, who was the head of the Chinese Communist Party and administration in Northeast China, i.e., former Manchuria, was famous among Chinese Communist leaders as one of the leaders of the pro-Soviet clique in the Chinese Communist Party.

I said, "It seems to me that what we're hearing here is a repudiation of Gao Gang and perhaps his whole faction in the Chinese Communist Party, which I think is very important, and we ought to report it." I was turned down from sending cables, because my boss, I guess, felt that it was only my personal speculation and I really had nothing more to go on than this comment, which technically was true. So that never got reported.

*Q: By the way, you keep using the word "Mukden." The Chinese call it Shenyang. Did they call it Shenyang at that time?*

MANHARD: Yes, they did, but Mukden was the old traditional name.

*Q: Any other episodes that occurred there that you think have some historic interest?*

MANHARD: Yes, if I may revert back to something I mentioned earlier. About Christmas of 1949, we got this round robin telegram to all the posts in China, signed by then Acting Secretary Levitt, about "You're the indispensable eyes and ears. Please don't leave China. Even though you may be overdue for home leave and so forth, we only want to agree to let people come home if there's a dire personal emergency. So please stay until we can find a way to send out replacements, because we need your eyes and ears."

Approximately a week later, just after the first of January, we get another telegram to all the China posts saying, "Get out and get out immediately." So evidently, at the very end of December or the first few days of January 1950, policy had been decided that we were not going to recognize Communist China and, "We'd better get people out. We don't want any more potential hostages in China." We can only assume that from these two very opposite messages.

*Q: What was the date of that second message?*

MANHARD: I would guess it was the first week of January 1950. I can't remember precisely, but it was early January 1950.

*Q: Did you get that yourself?*

MANHARD: Yes, everyone.

*Q: You stayed on for several months after that.*

MANHARD: Yes, Marshall. Your question is well taken. Immediately, the next day, I took the lead, since I was dealing with all the local officials on leaving. I walked in first to the customs office. There was a very gentlemanly, probably non-Party member, as head of that office, whose specialty was dealing with foreigners leaving. So I said, "I would like to request the customs forms for our belongings and so forth we want to take with us."

He said, "Why?"

I said, "Because our entire office is leaving China as soon as possible."

He looked like he'd been hit by a thunderbolt. He was very alarmed, unhappy, and I could only interpret his reaction to mean, "Oh, my God, are we going to go to war?" He was well into his sixties, I would estimate, and he'd been through a lot. He'd been through, I'm sure, the Japanese occupation and everything else, and he'd seen war conditions. He looked dismayed, unhappy, and very sympathetic in a sense. He said, "Are you sure you're not going to say?" He didn't say, "I hope you'll stay," but he implied that.

I said, "No, we have orders. We have to leave right away." So he gave me the forms, and I left. Then I went and made my rounds, the People's Bank of China, to the famous Public Safety Bureau, asking for all the permits. Marshall, you asked what happened when we got the second message about leaving China immediately. We immediately began to make all the preparations we could to request the necessary documents to leave China. At that time they required that anyone leaving China, foreigners, at least, I presume also Chinese, had to have an exit permit. We applied for it, we submitted it, we never heard another thing. I would say we did all that within a few days from the time we received the telegram.

*Q: And all the other consulates were doing the same thing?*

MANHARD: We assumed so. I don't know exactly.

*Q: You had no way of cross-checking with them?*

MANHARD: No, we did not. I would go down frequently to each of these offices and ask them, "Is there an answer?" and they would simply brush me off and give me no answer at all.

So after maybe two or three weeks, we got another telegram from the Department, "What are you doing to get out of China? Why aren't you obeying our directives?" We tried to patiently explain that we were trying to obey it, but there were certain serious problems that we could not leave without permission of the Chinese Communist authorities, which didn't seem to be very well understood in Washington, D.C. In fact, a lot of things were not very well understood in the Department of State in those days, but that's another story.

We got two or three more reminders that we were derelict in our duties to leave China.

*Q: Wasn't it the responsibility, though, of our embassy, or at least the officials that we had in*

*Peking? Wasn't that our principal post*

MANHARD: Nanking. I've forgotten now when Nanking evacuated, but I think at that point Nanking had managed to shift all the remaining personnel to Shanghai. I'm a little vague about that, Marshall, because I wasn't in the direct loop.

*Q: An issue like this, when you have to take personnel from all over China and get them out, would really have to be conducted at one point by the senior official representing the United States and the top officials of the Chinese Government.*

MANHARD: That would seem logical. However, as far as I could tell, every single post -- and there were not very many, there was only Nanking, Shanghai, I believe Canton, I've forgotten exactly how they stood at this point, Peking, and Tientsin. That's all we had. We closed down everything else already. In each case, we had to deal directly with the Chinese officials in each city. As far as we could tell, we couldn't send our requests to Peking and they would present it on our behalf.

*Q: You presumed that they were probably dealing with some central authority.*

MANHARD: The Chinese probably were, but we had to deal with each individual locality.

*Q: So how long was it? In your case, it wasn't until April that you got out.*

MANHARD: My memory is that we finally left on April 20, 1950.

*Q: When you say "we," did all the consulate leave together?*

MANHARD: All during this time, other Americans were getting permits and leaving from Peking, for example, with which I was familiar. At the very end, the only people left in Peking were Mr. and Mrs. Edmund Club, consul general and his wife, and Mr. and Mrs. Howard Boorman, who was the vice consul, like myself, also a Chinese language graduate, and they both come down to Tientsin. When they finally closed everything in the office in Peking, they came to Tientsin. The Clubs stayed with the Wellborns, and the Boormans stayed with me. So at least we were close to the exit point, but we still didn't have permits to leave China. They allowed them to come to Tientsin, but they didn't give them or us permits at that point. We didn't know when we were ever going to get it or what was going to happen.

Finally, what was to me almost a 007 kind of affair, one night -- I'm trying to remember the date, which has faded now, I guess -- but early April 1950 -- I have to back up and give you the circumstances. I lived in a very large house with six bedrooms, designed obviously for an officer with a family. I was a bachelor, but I was occupying the house because it was owned by the consulate. Jerry Warner used to live there, by the way. Diagonally across the street was another house. This was all in the former German concession of the days of territoriality back in World War I to World War II, really. They were foreign houses, very large, private compounds, walls all around, but it was a sparsely settled area, a lot of empty lots between the houses, on the outskirts of Tientsin.

My house was constantly under guard, all of us were, and had an armed guard outside our gate 24 hours a day. In my case, I was followed. I guess they used me as the example -- bad example, perhaps. I was followed wherever I went by a car with the Chinese Communists, with non-uniformed people in it. So they knew where I was at all times, and I think they pretty much knew where everybody else was, too.

Howie Boorman and I were old friends because we'd studied Japanese together in the Navy in World War II. He and his wife and their little baby son were staying in my house waiting for the hoped-for exit permit.

One night about 9:00 o'clock that evening, a young man knocked on my front door. A Chinese knocking on my front door, dressed in civilian clothes, was almost unique. I had never had that happen, because the guard would always prevent people from coming in, unless an American or someone had business with me. He said, "Could you please come to dinner tonight at my father's house right across the street?" Well, all I knew about his father was that he was an official in the Chinese Communist export and import corporation. He dressed in the Mao jacket and cap uniform of the dark gray-blue, which was Chinese Communist civilian uniform, a government official. I didn't really know anything about him, but I had seen a lot of traffic, Chinese, going in and out of his house from time to time. I paid rather little attention and had no business dealings with him. He said, "My father would like you to come to the house for dinner."

I said, "It's 9:00. We've had supper. Thank you."

He said, "It's very important that you come anyway, whether you've had supper or not."

So we looked at each other, and I said, "You realize there's a guard out front who watches everybody coming. Do you really want us, terrible people like us (I was kind of joking with him) to come to your father's house while this guard is watching?"

He said, "If you will just delay about ten minutes before you leave your house to come across the street, he will be gone." Well, that had never happened up to that point.

We said, "All right, we'll come."

*Q: Obvious collusion.*

MANHARD: Ten minutes later, we walked out. For the first time in all the time I was in Tientsin, there was no guard anywhere to be seen.

We looked in there and it was a very strange scene in the dining room, a Western-style house. As a concession to the Chinese tradition, there was a large dining table with a lazy Susan in the middle, and there were approximately eight or nine people sitting around the table, none of whom we'd ever seen in our lives, with all kinds of the debris of a large Chinese meal lying on the table, people picking at a few things, but obviously they'd long finished their supper.

We had a few pleasantries, small talk, and we allowed as how we'd had supper, so he pressed some tea and something on us. All kinds of other people came in and out while we were there. In the first ten or twenty minutes, I think perhaps three people came in, apparently very urgently. They would go to his side, hand him a little piece of paper, and he would look at it and write something on it, or shake his head, or nod his head, give it back to them, and off they'd go. So all kinds of little messages were running in and out of the house at the same time we were sitting there. So we didn't know what we were into at this point, but having had some difficult experiences up to that point in China, and mindful always of the overhanging background of Angus Ward and his party and what could happen if things went wrong.

He turned to us both and said, "When are you leaving China?"

We said, "We don't know. We've been trying for months to leave, and we have no exit permit."

He said, "Oh, well, don't worry about that. You'll have one very soon."

*Q: What date was this, roughly?*

MANHARD: I can't remember exactly. I would say the first few days of April 1950, but I can't remember exactly.

So this came as quite a surprise, because here someone that we don't know that has any particular authority in this field telling us that we're going to get an exit permit, after we had done everything possible for months, with no result. He said, "Don't worry about that. You'll get one very soon. Where are you both going? What's your next assignment?~"

Howie had received an assignment, a direct transfer to Hong Kong, and I had been transferred to Washington. So then he devoted his attention to me. The next crack out of the box was, "You know the war in Korea is about to start."

*Q: For heaven sake! This was two months before the war actually started. It was June 25th when it started. So you're talking about something that's more than two months in advance of the event.*

MANHARD: That's correct.

*Q: And what did he say?*

MANHARD: He said, "I hope you are aware that the war in Korea is about to begin."

Going through your own mind at this point, not talking to him. He said that, and this is the instant reaction I had: one, I had seen in the Communist press for months, for quite some time when I was in Tientsin, articles from time in the press, frequently describing the valiant efforts of the People's guerrillas in South Korea resisting and fighting against the "terrible tyranny of the Syngman Rhee regime in Korea," your old stomping ground, Marshall. But I took this as largely propaganda that was probably very little to it. So I didn't pay much attention to it, plus the fact

that we were too busy with the things we were trying to do in managing our own daily life and getting out of China. Korea was pretty much over the horizon as far as we were concerned. I paid very little attention to those articles, but I had seen them.

He said, "Don't you realize how important this is?"

We both had kind of frozen faces and didn't say anything. Finally, Howie Boorman and I, having been old friends, by instinct, I think, without a chance to cross-reference with each other, we both looked at him and almost simultaneously said, "We don't know anything about Korea."

Later I compared notes with Howie, after we got back to the house, and our thought processes were exactly the same: this is a setup, all we have to do is say, "Yes, tell us all about this very important matter of intelligence," whereupon the guard would come in, grab us as spies, and off we'd go. That's what I thought was going to happen next at that point. I thought it was a setup, and so did Howie. So we played as dumb as possible.

*Q: Do you still think it was a setup?*

MANHARD: Now I don't because of what happened afterwards.

*Q: Do you think this was a government-authorized warning?*

MANHARD: No, I don't. Before we walked over to the house, I said to Howie, "Who is this guy? Did you know anything about this guy in Peking, for example?"

He said, "Yes, he did talk to Tony Freeman up there," our mutual friend. Tony Freeman, in the meantime, had returned to the United States before the Chinese Communists came into power in Peking. He said he did talk to Tony Freeman before in Peking, but nothing of any great significance.

I said, "I don't know anything about him." Howie had no direct knowledge or sense of him either.

Our host said, "You should pay attention to this. It's very important." He turned to me, having found out I was going to be transferred to Washington, and said, "When you get to Washington, will you please tell what I'm going to tell you to Tony Freeman?"

I said, "All right, I'll do so."

He said, "You go off into East Station, the railway station?"

I said, "Yes."

"You must have seen two weeks ago (or something very recently) the first movement of Chinese troops." Balujun, the 8<sup>th</sup> Route Army, is the term. "Going north for the first time through East Station."

I said, "No, I didn't see any such thing."

He kind of looked at me suspiciously, as if I must have seen it but I was not willing to admit it. I hadn't actually seen it. He gave a date, two or three weeks earlier, that one entire division of the Chinese Communist Army had moved north through Tientsin on the way to Manchuria, northeast China. He said, "There will be very soon, we don't know exactly when, an all-out offensive against South Korea. There will be more Chinese forces coming through Tientsin en route to Manchuria." That was the main rail line in that direction. "We don't know whether they will participate in the initial offensive against South Korea with the North Korean troops, whether the North Korean troops alone will end conduct the initial offensive with the Chinese troops in backup positions within North Korea, or whether the Chinese troops in that case would be held on the Chinese side in a back position in the case of need. Please tell my friend Mr. Freeman."

*Q: We want to come back to how you got out of Tientsin and so forth, but follow up on this particular story. When you got back and you saw Freeman, what happened?*

MANHARD: A slow boat from Tientsin to Yokohama broke down, started going backwards to China, finally got to Yokohama, took a boat, along with everybody else, evacuated from China across from Yokohama to the West Coast, saw my family very briefly in Los Angeles, on to Washington, and got there on the third of June 1950, finally, at the air-conditionless National Hotel. If I've got my dates straight -- I'm pretty sure I have -- Monday morning, the fourth of June, boiling hot, opening of business on Monday morning, I went straight to see Tony Freeman. I had a little hard time getting him to listen, because he wanted to tell me about my next assignment. I said, "I think this is more urgent." We were good friends, but he finally got off the personnel business, and I told him the story. He said, "Phil, what do you think of this man?"

I said, "Tony, I don't know the man from Adam. I thought you did."

He said, "I know him slightly, but I don't really know what kind of credibility to give him or this account that he's given you."

I said, "Well, I don't know." At that time I was just starting out in the Foreign Service and had no influential friends of any kind in Washington, I didn't know anybody here. I considered him to be the most senior Foreign Service officer I had ever met in my life, and a very fine person. I said, "Tony, you must have ways that you can check this out."

He said, "Okay, I'll check it out. If I hear anything about it, I'll let you know."

So off I went to the basic officers' training course to learn how to become a Foreign Service officer at this point in the FSI, which I found a little bit boring and artificial. In any event, I didn't hear anything from Tony. Finally, about a week later, I went back and said, "Tony, what have you heard about this?"

He said, "I checked it out with the Korean desk, and they said there was nothing to that because there's no indication of anything happening in North Korea, and our main problem now is to

prevent Syngman Rhee from marching north. That's our main problem in Korea."

What could I say? What could I do? I felt that maybe you get prejudiced about your source, even though you don't know them very well, but I felt that maybe something might happen, but I had nothing more to go on. All the people in Washington, the few that I met who seemed to know, INR, said, "Oh, no, there's nothing to this."

*Q: As you look back on this event, do you think that what your Chinese friend was telling you in Tientsin had anything to do with what you earlier said with regard to the relationship between the Chinese and the Russians in Manchuria, that the Chinese might have had some indications of a rapprochement or close ties between North Korea and the Soviet Union, which they obviously did? That the build-up that was going on in North Korea, which obviously was occurring, largely through the Soviet Union, that this might have been a Chinese effort to forewarn us because of an antipathy on the part of this particular official and his group towards the Soviet Union? Is that too far-fetched?*

MANHARD: Marshall, I don't think it's too far-fetched at all, but it didn't occur to me at the time, and there's no way that I can judge it from my own experience. I think it's not a bad speculation. This is really another story that we could talk about on some other occasion if you want to. Two things happened when I was in Korea later, because my next assignment was in Pusan, Korea. The reason I dragged Korea into this, when I got to Korea, I was assigned by the personnel division in the State Department to be junior political officer in the embassy. At the same time, INR gave orders to me to go interrogate Chinese prisoners of war in our camps in South Korea, which got me in a lot of trouble, which seemed to be often the case in my career. I mean in trouble with the embassy.

In my experience with the Chinese military prisoners captured by us in the Korean War, this experience was on and off over a period of early 1951 to early 1953, and many of the Chinese -- this is low level, mostly illiterate, uneducated, peasant people, for the most part, who were captured during the war in Korea -- many of them had been in Chinese Nationalist units captured by the Communists, converted and integrated into the Chinese Communist Army after they occupied the mainland. Many of them had been stationed with units in the lower Yangtze River area, Jiangsu province and nearby. They had been told -- this is just shortly after the Korean War started -- that their training mission, including practicing landing craft going across the Yangtze River and so forth, was to go liberate Taiwan, and that was what they thought they were getting trained for.

But suddenly, without any preparation or warning, they were told, "Get on a train. Your unit is going to the Northeast." When they got to the Northeast, they crossed the Yellow River, and they realized that they were going to fight in Korea. It came as a great surprise to these young men, they said. So this doesn't respond directly to the hypothesis, or whatever you're expressing here, but it seems to me that from reactions I got from some of the Chinese prisoners in the Korean War, that the Chinese Communist priority at the time was occupying Taiwan and eliminating, presumably forever, any competition from the Chinese Nationalist Government anywhere. They had no more territory to claim. That was their priority; Korea was not. When some decision at some level was made to go and pull the fat out of the fire in Korea, it was, in my opinion, more

logically a Soviet priority than a Chinese priority.

There's slippages of time here. For instance, the initial thing indicated by our informant in Tientsin is one thing.

*Q: Yes, I think that's a logical conclusion that the Chinese priority in Taiwan, once the Russians and the North Koreans were involved in a war against us. Meanwhile, we were changing our policy with regard to Taiwan, and this is where I can't remember exactly what the timing was. President Truman, as I recall, made some declaration with regard to what our position was going to be with regard to Taiwan and our priorities. So there's a correlation of our actions and the Chinese and the Russian actions that escape me at this time.*

*It would be interesting to go back and look at Alan Whiting's book on China crosses the Yalu or for you to talk to him sometime. I don't suppose he knows what you just said now. This is the first time I've ever heard it.*

MANHARD: I don't think so. I remember Alan Whiting's book. He mentions me in the book, I think, if you're referring to China crosses the Yalu. But part of the material he used in that was based on some of the things I discussed with him, as well as others discussed with him, about the Chinese prisoner experience. Some of the distillation of Chinese prisoner reports in the Korean War was part of his book.

*Q: I can imagine that it would be rather upsetting to the Chinese to see the Russians having a dominant influence.*

MANHARD: Yes, absolutely.

*Q: On the whole Korean peninsula.*

MANHARD: Frankly, Marshall, one of the things that dismayed me -- it's always easy to look back and say, "I was right," and that's kind of sterile, I guess -- but when I got back to Washington and had my conversation with Tony Freeman and went off to my little FSI basic officers' training course, I had talked to a number of people I knew, junior officers around Washington. I got the impression from INR and others who had made a specialty of studying, analyzing, and researching China, that at that time this was an absolute fantasy, ridiculous, absolutely impossible to conceive of that there was any difference of view between China and the Soviet Union, because the conventional wisdom at that time all over Washington, as far as I could make of it, military, civilian, State Department, CIA, whatever, was, "It's a monolithic Communist bloc," and anybody who had a different opinion was way out in left field. I had a different opinion and found nobody who agreed with me.

*Q: Speaking of left field, of course, Tony Freeman at that time was pretty embattled.*

MANHARD: Oh, yes, absolutely.

*Q: He, Jack Service, John Davies, and all the others who had been our prime China scholars*

*had come under fire. This was just the beginnings of the McCarthy period. We had prepared the White Paper on China. Our bureau back in Washington, by the way, I was regional planning advisor while these events were going on.*

MANHARD: That's where I first met you, I think.

*Q: We were embattled simply to preserve the Foreign Service, really, against all these attacks.*

MANHARD: Absolutely. Tony Freeman, as I remember, shortly after I had that conversation with him, it wasn't long thereafter when he was entangled by the McCarthy attacks, having been associated with China, that he had to have two-thirds of his stomach removed for a bleeding ulcer, it was such emotional stress, what he was accused of.

I would like to make one footnote here, Marshall, that in my conversation with Tony, I certainly don't want to leave any implication in anybody's mind that he was not interested in this report from any prejudice or anything. He was interested. He just didn't know how to assess it, and he tried to find out from others in terms of what's going on in Korea, and that's the answer he got. In my opinion, I think it's a very honest reaction on his part to try to check it out.

There's one additional footnote I would make. I mentioned that when I got to Korea, there were two things that happened while I was in Korea. One of them I described in terms of some of the reactions of Chinese prisoners in our hands in Korea, in terms of preparing for Taiwan and being sent to Korea to fight.

The other thing, I can't give a date, unfortunately. I was in Korea from April 1951 until late '53, and this would have occurred in 1952 at some point, I think. I just happened to note in an FBIS [Foreign Broadcast Information Service] article, it monitors Communist block radio transmissions around the world and on China, I was reading it in the embassy in Pusan one day, and I noticed the announcement by the Chinese in Peking on their radio that Gao Gang had been executed for treason or disloyalty to the Party in Mukden.

*Q: For goodness sakes.*

MANHARD: He had been liquidated. I thought to myself, "Well, I tried to analyze that, and I think I was right, but what's the use now?" Still, he was liquidated.

*Q: That supports the case.*

MANHARD: In less than two years after I had that conversation.

*Q: That supports the argument that this had a lot to do with the Sino-Soviet differences.*

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*Q: A professor of diplomatic history, Norman Graebner, who is a consultant to our organization, said to try to ask how perceptions developed. This is of great interest to diplomatic scholars.*

*Where did you see the monolith of Sino-Soviet developing? Looking back on it, it's hard to believe these two very dissimilar, basically enemies, they might be Communist, but the thought that they were working in absolute lockstep.*

*Q2: For my part, it began out of World War II and the fact that the Chinese Communists holed up in Yen-an were trying to carry the war against the Japanese, and the Japanese occupation, particularly of northeast China, was a very vicious one, and a main objective of the Chinese Communist government, when it came to power, was to consolidate its position throughout the country. The Russians, who had succeeded in overrunning Manchuria and helping to bring the war to a rapid close, did get out. But in getting out, they took with them a lot of the equipment. It left a legacy of some bitterness. I think this is interesting that there should have been a governor up there in Manchuria who was pro-Soviet. Quite clearly, his views and probably his position was very much one that was bolstered and supported by the Russians, and that the Chinese were increasingly dismayed by his actions.*

*Ambassador Manhard's account, I think, brings out very clearly that this, in fact, was the case, because this man was countermanded, really, by the officials that he talked to in Tientsin and later on, as he learned from FBIS broadcasts in 1952, he was executed. I think all this shows that there were early origins to the Sino-Soviet controversy and dispute.*

*The conventional wisdom is that they were pretty much in lockstep, certainly in their foreign policies, and that the first evidences of the split between Moscow and Peking occurred in 1957 after the Sputnik was put up, and when the Chinese sent two delegations to Moscow to try to benefit and participate in this breakthrough, getting certain kinds of technical support from the Russians. But the Russians, in turn, gave them the cold shoulder.*

*At that point, I was regional planning advisor for the Far East. I was in very close touch with scholars, particularly Alice Dunning Hsia, working for RAND in Santa Monica. They had a team out there that was following these events very closely. I do recall very clearly that we timed the real break between Russia and China as occurring in 1957. What Ambassador Manhard is saying is that there are earlier origins to this thing. They may be ones of rather major consequence to scholars, I don't know. But if what he says correlates with other evidences, I think it's a very interesting line of inquiry.*

*Q: Having us look at this as a government, it seemed to be not only conventional wisdom, but pretty much accepted wisdom that these two powers were going to be working together for the foreseeable future. We're talking about in 1950.*

MANHARD: Oh, yes. One thing that occurred to me was that when you read the Chinese Communist press in those days, from before and after they established their government at Peking, in those years the Chinese poured out a tremendous quantity of propaganda characterized by such expressions as "lean to one side," and "learn from the example of the Soviet Union. They are our mentor, our leader of the Communist world," and the Chinese just laid it on with a trowel, very thick. So just reading their propaganda line, one would naturally assume, "They're just the younger brothers of the Soviet Union and they're just going to be like this indefinitely in the future."

But that's just a propaganda line that they were using for the time being, and underneath it, the human relations, the personal feelings and attitudes of their own officials was quite different. I saw that.

*Q: I think another thing that's very important to note here is that we're talking about China in 1950, when things were in a chaotic state, where the central government obviously hadn't composed an established line, where the personalities dominated the old warlords, you might say who was lingering on in China. It wasn't until well after the time you left that they established the line and everybody got the line and this is what it was. So what we're talking about is a period when there perhaps more open expression of how individual leaders might have felt, than was to occur later on when the fine line was clearly established and everybody had to tow it.*

MANHARD: Yes, tighter controls all the way down the line.

*Q: Looking at it from the other side, we had mentioned McCarthyism. Was there a line in Washington that felt communism is bad, communism is not split, it's a monolith, and we have to fight the monolith, and if you started talking about different types of communism, this would tend to weaken it as an enemy and maybe make you look soft on communism? Do you think this was behind any of this?*

*Q2: Certainly this is the line that was being parlayed by Chiang Kai-shek. Even when I saw Chiang Kai-shek for the next to the last time in 1969 -- 1969! -- long after we all knew that the Sino-Soviet rift was real and vicious and all the rest of it, he told me that he believed that this was a ruse that was being pulled off by both Peking and Moscow, that they were trying to delude the West into thinking there was a split, so that it would cause splits in our ranks and weaken our ranks, whereas they were solid, and we were being galled and lured.*

*I'm saying that, because obviously it's wrong, but it shows that that was the line of the Chinese Nationalists that this was all a monolith. The Chinese Nationalists had a tremendous power in Washington, the so-called China lobby. Of course, it weakened over time, but at the time we're talking about, back in 1950-52, they were very strong. So the line was coming through very hard from Taipei that this was the situation.*

*Q: Would you say there might have been an inhibition on our thinking differently within the State Department?*

*Q2: There were differences at that time, as you know, between the hard line pro-Chiang group and the China scholars and Foreign Service officers who served out there, who knew the situation much more and who remembered the role of Chiang Kai-shek during World War II, and all of his shortcomings, the state of life in China, and the misery that the people were undergoing, that they obviously were not on the same wavelength as these hard-liners. I would imagine that a man like Acheson, working for Truman, had misgivings about the hard line we were taking.*

*What I can't remember historically is exactly what the line was that we were about to take in the*

*time when the Korean War broke out. I think we were beginning to consider quite seriously at that time whether we shouldn't move our policy towards recognizing the realities of mainland China, that the Chinese had taken over, and that they did represent one-quarter of humanity, and that we had to have some kind of relationship with them. I think Acheson was thinking that way. I'm sure that this was a line of thought that was widely shared. I'm sure that men like Walter Butterworth, who was the Assistant Secretary for State for East Asian Affairs at that time, thought that way. I was very close to him. I was working on Japanese affairs; that's why I'm not completely clear as to what all the details were.*

*But had the war in Korea not intervened, it is possible that our China policy could have moved in a different direction.*

MANHARD: Marshall, I think that's true. I mentioned these two telegrams at the end of '49 and beginning of '50, a total contrast, you know: "Stay, stay stay." "Get out." Obviously something happened in those two weeks between those two telegrams in Washington. But I've never done research afterwards as to just exactly what happened in Washington at that time.

However, going back to this incident about Angus Ward, a cat's paw in this whole business, I think, the conclusion I personally draw from that experience was that the last thing the Russians wanted to see was, one, they were afraid of a flexible policy by the United States toward the new regime in Peking as a potential attempt by us to wean the Chinese Communist regime away from or be coursed away, whatever you want to call it, to Soviet influence. The Soviets at that time, under Stalin, I'm sure wanted to absolutely, totally dominate China, absolutely at that point. Anything that would potentially be a threat to that total untrammled domination by the Soviet Union, they tried their best to undermine. To me, that was one of their little tactics, if it wasn't a grand strategy. Mukden alone was a tactic, but it worked rather well in the sense that it irritated the hell.

I've seen press reports many years later saved by the widow of one of the survivors of this Mukden incident, in her hometown in Kansas. Some friends sent them a lot of clippings from the U.S. press at that time, all during the incarceration of Ward and his party, the after-effects and so forth, in which they played it up tremendously in American press about, "This is what you can expect from the Communists, these awful people," and so forth and so on. I mean, it was natural indignation on the part of the media.

*Q: A duplication of the Iranian hostage crisis.*

MANHARD: There are similarities, yes. I think it's the only duplication in my experience that matches that closely. The media just leaped on this thing. This played into the hands of people with a very conservative view of foreign policy in the Congress and in Washington, that even if certain people in the State Department, for instance, Acheson or Butterworth, whoever the people were you were mentioning, even if they'd been inclined to adopt what I'd call a more pragmatic approach to the new Peking regime, this kind of incident provided a lot of fodder for the grist mills of agitation about, "This is how they're treating official Americans in this regime." If the Russians had expected to have some irritating effect both in Peking and in the United States, it worked very beautifully.

*Q: That's a very valid point.*

MANHARD: Whether they were that smart, I don't know, but I do believe that that was part of the Soviet effort.

*Q: I think you're right. I think the Soviets were doing all they could to harden the deep freeze in U.S.-Chinese relationships and to keep Peking and Washington apart.*

MANHARD: Looking back historically -- and I wish I could give you reference here; I don't have it in mind now -- there have been accounts, I believe, in the literature in the United States and elsewhere, to the effect that Mao had serious misgivings after his first trip to Moscow just after he established the central government in Peking. That first visit to Moscow, he came back less than satisfied, to put it mildly. The Soviets, therefore, were probably already concerned about where Mao was going to go, policy-wise, in China.

*Q: This is very interesting, of course, getting into a highly speculative field.*

*In winding this up, I want to make a couple of observations about all the things that you've been saying. They bear very importantly on the real shaping of events as they occurred, as seen by somebody who was in the midst of them all, in terms of relationships between the Chinese officials and the Americans in China at a very critical moment, and also casts a good deal of light on what might have been the true relationship between the Soviet Union and China at that particular period of time.*

*I wanted to close this conversation by making two observations, more or less for the record. One, I think your story is not only interesting from the point of view of a historian who is trying to analyze events, but I think it's also interesting from the point of view of a Foreign Service officer who is placed in a very difficult position, where he had to make decisions on his own and to bear the consequences. You undertook not only to make decisions for your government that might have been denied by your superiors, but you also really put your life on the line when you went to talk with those officials, and when your Chinese subordinates thought that that was the last time they were ever going to see you.*

*I do think it shows the kinds of challenges that can occur in the life of a Foreign Service officer, and it reminds me a little bit of those lines of Oliver Wendell Holmes, "Once to every man and nation comes a moment to decide." You had to face some very difficult decisions.*

*It's not totally unconnected that many years later on, when you were presidential advisor in Hue and were taken prisoner by the Vietnamese, taken to Hanoi, where you were in isolation for five years, one of the longest POW records on record, that you maintained your sanity through your own inner intellectual resources, as I remember, by making a chess set out of bread crumbs that you were given. I think the record of your career shows a man with lots of guts, and I'm awfully glad that we had this conversation, because it not only attests to what, in fact, went on as seen by a participant, but also attests to the character of a man who participated in those events.*

MANHARD: Marshall, I thank you for your generous comments. I can only say that part of the rich rewards of a Foreign Service career, at least in the time I spent in the Foreign Service, was the opportunity to benefit by, and grow with, the inspiration and counsel of my colleagues, for instance, Ambassador Marshall Green.

*Q: Thank you.*

**RICHARD M. MCCARTHY**  
**Information Officer, USIS**  
**Beijing (1947-1950)**

**Information Officer/Deputy Public Affairs Officer/Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Hong Kong (1950-1956)**

**Public Affairs Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1958-1962)**

*Richard M. McCarthy grew up in Iowa and received a bachelor's degree from Iowa State University. He enlisted in the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Navy during World War II. Mr. McCarthy joined the Foreign Service in 1946 and later became part of USIS. He served in China, Hong Kong, Thailand, Vietnam, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by Jack O'Brien in 1988.*

MCCARTHY: I come from Iowa, a graduate of the state University of Iowa, was in the Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy during World War II. I took the Foreign Service exams in December 1946. To my surprise and the surprise of other people, I was accepted. I came to Washington and was assigned to Beijing, or Peking -- or, in those days, Peiping -- China, arrived in November 1947.

*Q: What was your job there, Dick?*

MCCARTHY: I was a vice consul stamping visas. Then I became administrative officer with the consulate general. Then, it must have been in 1948, Brad Connors came up from Shanghai, Director of the USIS China, took me for a swim in the consulate pool, and in the middle of the pool -- must have been the deep end -- asked me whether I'd like to work for USIS. Since I was tired of stamping visas and doing inventories of consular furniture, and also happened to be a major in American literature at Iowa, I hastily accepted. I became the number-two man in a two-man post, working for Dyke Van Putten.

I remained in Peiping until we were all more or less kicked out in the spring of 1950. There are several highlights I can mention. One was the presidential election in 1948. Dewey versus Truman. The Nationalists, who still held on very tenuously to Peiping, saw the handwriting on the wall if the Democrats continued in office. So to a man, there were all pulling very vigorously for Tom Dewey. USIS had a big election chart on the outer wall of our premises in Peiping -- I

wish I could remember the address, but I can't -- to chart the returns as they came in over the Voice of America. The crowd was so big that it eventually blocked traffic on the street outside. Most of the crowd was composed of university students, Nationalist military officers, and government officials, who all had a personal stake in the selection. They cheered at the early returns which show-ed Dewey in the lead, and they were very much crestfallen when Harry Truman eventually turned out to be the winner.

The final year in Peiping under the Nationalist regime was a fairly hairy one, partly because Nationalist troops, several hundred-thousand strong, poured into Peiping after they were defeated up north. They were under no discipline, they hadn't been paid, they were ragged, and most of them became marauders.

The military situation in north China developed very rapidly. Eventually Peiping was surrounded to the Mao Zedong forces. The only means of communication into the city was by an air strip built on the old polo field inside the city walls. There was some sporadic shelling of the city, and I recall one day being home at lunch and receiving a call from the librarian, saying that the USIS library had just been struck by an artillery shell. I went back there. Little damage to the building. The only people left at that point were the staff members; everybody else had taken off very hastily. Unfortunately, a student from the next compound was killed.

So we weren't quite sure what was going to happen, but six of the consular officers, including myself, were asked to stay after the Liberation. I can recall going down to one of the main avenues and watching the Communist forces move in. I guess at that point at least 80% of the population was delighted to see them come on, because they figured that nothing could be worse than what they'd gone through in the last couple of years.

After the Liberation USIS did continue in business for a while and there was a very brief honeymoon period of several months, when we maintained our normal operations. We had people in the library. As I recall, we also distributed the Wireless File. We discovered that our employees, most of whom, I think, were glad to see any kind of change in the local circumstances, proved to be immensely loyal to us. One person I'd like to mention is Chang Tung, who moonlighted as one of Peiping's leading political cartoonists, working, as I recall, for the Catholic newspaper there. Chang Tung had been imprisoned by the Nationalists because of one of his political cartoons. Within a couple of months after the Communists arrived, he was interned, jailed by the Communists for several weeks, finally got out, but was subjected to some pressures which he did mention to us. However, he did remain entirely loyal to us, and I'm happy to say that when we withdrew from China, he made his way down to Hong Kong and served in Hong Kong for USIS for a great many years, until his retirement.

*Q: Wonderful! Have you covered the main points you'd like to there, Dick?*

MCCARTHY: Eventually, subtle pressures and some not-so-subtle pressures began to be exerted upon students. I worked a great deal with students. In fact, I taught an English class at one of the local universities. They were afraid to come around and see us, because the military posted guards at the door, and people had to show their residence permits when they entered, which discouraged a great many of them from coming to see us. We ended up pretty much isolated.

The Communists came in at the end of January 1949. In the summer of 1949, I was sent down to Tientsin to take charge of USIS, because Sam Yates had departed for the States. Within two weeks after I got there, a 15-year-old soldier on a bicycle came around and handed me a proclamation which closed us down. At that point, I found it difficult to get back to Peiping, although my wife was expecting a baby, incidentally, who was the first American child born in the new capital of Communist China after it became the capital -- Debbie McCarthy, born November 14, 1949.

But I had difficulty getting back there because I was taken into the People's Court, and our employees were asking for two years' severance pay, which seemed a bit steep since some of them only worked for us for six months or so. Even these employees were more loyal to American interests than I would have expected, because they would come around in advance and tell me what the authorities were making them do, and then I'd go to court and know pretty much what to expect. But I was also frequently interrogated by people coming around to my house, either early in the morning, around 6:00, which is early for me, or 10:30 or 11:00 at night, asking me where I'd been, whom I'd talked to, and that sort of thing. So there was increasing pressure on us.

However, we stuck it out back in Peiping, which was, I think, a marvelous chance to see a new Communist government established first-hand, until early in 1950, when they seized most of our consular property in Peiping on the grounds that it was former foreign military property. We told them we'd leave if they closed us down. They closed us down, and so we departed. I think I departed in April of 1950.

*Q: Did you go directly back to the States then?*

MCCARTHY: No, I caught a small Butterfield and Swire coastal steamer over to Inchon, Korea, got off, took the train down to Seoul, partly because I wanted to visit John Muccio, who was then ambassador to Korea, and who had been on my board of oral examiners when I came into the Foreign Service. I did travel around Korea for several weeks to get a look at the country, came back on home leave to Webster City, Iowa, in June of 1950. Got up one morning, read the headline in the Des Moines Register that the North had invaded South Korea. I predicted to my dad that since I'd seen some South Korean troops on field maneuvers, they were the best troops in Asia, and I didn't think the Korean War would last six weeks, the invaders would be repelled. Dad was unkind enough to remind me of that when I came back on home leave again in 1953. (Laughs)

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I went back to Washington, was assigned to Hong Kong as information officer, and spent six of the best years in my life in Hong Kong, where I was successively information officer, deputy PAO, and then when Art Hummel left, became PAO. Those were the days of the CRP, the China Reporting Program, one of my principal efforts, where we were producing material in English and other languages for worldwide consumption about what was happening on the China mainland. We also started a very successful Chinese language publication for Taiwan and

Chinese and Southeast Asia called World Today magazine, which lasted for over 25 years before somebody put it to sleep.

*Q: I remember that very well. So six years in all, in Hong Kong. Can you remember a few highlights of that part of your career?*

MCCARTHY: I think I mentioned the China Reporting Program, which was our major excuse for being in Hong Kong. We did run, of course, a fairly extensive local program, a very extensive book translation program. I think at one point we did around 60 titles in a single year. We did achieve some publishing success in English. We discovered Eileen Chang, who many people regard as probably one of the two or three top Chinese writers of the second half of the 20th century. She wrote a couple of books for us called Rice Sprout Song, and I frankly forget the title of the other one, but they were both published in the United States and had some critical acclaim.

We also did a fair amount of work supporting film makers who were producing anti-Communist pictures in Hong Kong, and Chinese language pictures in Southeast Asia. So we were very much involved in the Chinese motion picture industry.

*Q: Was Raymond Chow one of your employees?*

MCCARTHY: I'm glad you mentioned Raymond. Raymond, who is now one of the principal movie tycoons of Asia, runs an outfit called Golden Harvest, is the man who is largely responsible for the craze in Kung Fu movies. He was the one who discovered Bruce Lee. Raymond was our VOA reporter until the bright lights and a lot of money beckoned. Very, very capable guy.

Other local employees worth noting, I think, are Richard Lee, who ran our book translation program, and Tommy Dunn, our principal Chinese employee who had both attractive attributes and some that weren't quite so attractive. Tommy is still alive and kicking and writing a twice-weekly column for Taiwan's English-language newspaper, published in the United States.

Again, I'd like to say a word about the loyalty of our Chinese employees. Richard Lee, whom I thought a lot of and a lot of other people thought very highly of, came to me and told me that he was under pressure to report on our activities to the Chinese Communists in Hong Kong. They put considerable pressure on him because his wife and family were back in China. He told us and was told what to tell them; he was taking a considerable chance. His family eventually got out of China, but even after so many years, I have to honor Richard Lee for his loyalty. Another employee was approached. He finally came and told us after we'd found out from other sources already.

A footnote on Richard. Much later, during some of its periodic economy drives, the agency was going to drop off some of our old-time employees in Hong Kong, including Richard Lee. Ed Martin happened to be the consul general there. Ed had served as consul in Hankow during the Chinese civil war. It was necessary to evacuate Hankow. Richard got them down the river at considerable personal risk. Their ship was shelled. He talked them past gunboats from both sides.

When Ed learned, as consul general, that Richard was going to be one of the people terminated, he announced firmly that Richard Lee would have a job in Hong Kong as long as he was consul general, or, in fact, in the Foreign Service. This happened. Richard Lee eventually retired in due course, with full honor and served out his career.

*Q: Dick, what was your post after Bangkok?*

MCCARTHY: I was PAO in Taiwan. Actually, I still regret the fact that my tour in Bangkok was so short. It was only one and a half years, but I happened to be in Taipei on leave in August of 1958, when the Quemoy Straits crisis broke out. There was no PAO in place because Ambassador Drumright had just removed a good friend of mine, Ralph Powell. So Drumright, with correspondents coming in from Hong Kong and Taipei to cover the story, asked me to stay for 30 days as the mission's spokesman. I did. The crisis continued. He asked me to stay another 30 days, and I finally ended up staying there for four years as PAO.

*Q: My memory of the Quemoy Strait business is fuzzy, but was that a troublesome problem for you for most of that period, or how long?*

MCCARTHY: Of course, the thing started when the Chinese Communists began shelling Nationalist supply vessels going into resupply the Quemoy garrison. We decided that the offshore islands were essential to American interests, so we announced that we were going to escort these Nationalist supply ships into this very narrow body of water. You can see the mainland from the island of Quemoy. There was considerable trepidation. In fact, some day it will be worth writing about. I was down in the atomic bomb-proofed command center with Drumright, the senior Chinese military commanders, Vice Admiral Smoot, who was running an American carrier task force, which was ready to go. I think it was a Sunday, the day that we sent several destroyers in with the Nationalist supply vessels. I'll never forget watching all the lights in this control center, which was a very futuristic thing with a great big table, airplanes and ships and a relief map of the islands, Amoy and the surround mainland. Because all up and down the China coast, the Chinese Air Force sent up fighters. We had three carriers on the other side of the island of Taiwan, on the east side, away from the mainland. We launched fighters, and they patrolled back and forth for several hours before the Chinese fighters landed to refuel, and they did not come up again. And the Communist forces did not fire on the American vessels.

This was a fairly prolonged crisis. We did have a great number of American and other foreign newspapermen, mostly from Hong Kong and Tokyo, to cover the story. The job of mission spokesman was a little bit tough, because we were doing a number of things that we didn't want the press to know about on Quemoy. So we couldn't permit them on the island. For several weeks, Quemoy was off limits to them. We couldn't explain why. One reason was that we were installing batteries of 120-millimeter guns with atomic shell capability. Some old friends in the press I'd known for a dozen years at that point were threatening to get my job.

*Q: All during this time, you had a fairly normal USIS program going on?*

MCCARTHY: No, it wasn't normal, because a year or two years before, the USIS building had been destroyed in a demonstration. When I arrived, USIS was housed in a private residence, a

rather dilapidated private residence. Not even the screens worked very effectively, and we didn't have air-conditioning. It was something of a slap in the face to us, because the house had previously been occupied by General Sun Li-Jen, who was in deep disfavor with the Chinese National government. In fact, I think at that point he was under house arrest someplace outside of Taipei.

So the staff was a bit demoralized. Several people had been hurt in the riot. I'm sitting here desperately trying to remember the cause of the riot. (Laughs) We had obviously done something that the Chinese Nationalists did not like, because students invaded the place and damaged it so severely that we were moved into this private house by the Taiwan government until they could prepare proper quarters for us, which happened about six months after I arrived.

I think then we ran a normal USIS program, branch posts in Taichung, Kaohsiung, Tainan, information centers in several other places. Pingtung is the only other one I remember.

But I think the most notable thing about the time I was there, which was from August of 1958 to July of 1962, was the work that we did with young writers and artists. We sponsored and, indeed, worked upon a large number of English-language translations of the work of younger Chinese writers. We published the work of books of art by the more advanced avant garde Chinese painters and Taiwanese painters in Taiwan. One reason for doing this was competition with the outpouring of works in English translation, art work from the Foreign Languages Press in Peiping. This stuff was designed for distribution to the rest of the world, some of it through commercial channels, some of it through USIS posts elsewhere.

Another reason was that we were particularly anxious to get to know the younger generation in Taiwan, which was composed partly of mainlanders and partly of Taiwanese. We learned fairly rapidly that at least among the people we were dealing with, the real battle wasn't between Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese; the main battle was between the generation that held power, somewhat disparagingly called "the long gowns" by these younger people. The student generation, both mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, was pretty much united by the fact that they felt held back and restrained by the older generation. They were a force for change, a force for progress. We did identify some very capable people. A great many of them went to the United States to study writing. In fact, I would argue that the interest of the University of Iowa, of which I happen to be a graduate, in Taiwan writers was one of the main reasons for starting the very successful international writing program, which celebrated its 20th anniversary back in 1987.

In fact, the original director of the international writing program, Paul Engle, who, of course, for many years led the Iowa Writers' Workshop, actually met his future wife at USIS in Taiwan, a very successful Chinese woman writer, Nieh Hua-ling. Nieh Hua-ling was older than the students, but she was regarded by the students as a leader because she was the editor of the literary page of Free China, which was a Third Force liberal publication in Taiwan, which had to suspend publication when its editor went to jail for his too-liberal sentiments. Nieh Hua-ling was our principal editor for this book translation program. She married Paul, and for the last 15 years, she has been the director of the International Writers' program at Iowa.

*Q: After Taiwan, where were you assigned?*

MCCARTHY: I was assigned to the agency, and found myself as Chief of the East Asia and Pacific Division of the Voice of America.

**PHILIP H. VALDES**  
**Economic Officer**  
**Chungking (1947-1949)**

*Philip H. Valdes was born in New York in 1921. He received both a bachelor's degree in 1942 and a master's degree in 1947, both from Yale University. He was a 2<sup>nd</sup> lieutenant overseas in the U.S. Army from 1943- 1946. Mr. Valdes entered the Foreign Service in 1947, serving in Chungking, Seoul, Moscow, Frankfurt, Paris, Bangkok, Berlin, and Munich. He was interviewed by William Knight on July 11, 1994.*

*Q: That's about when I retired. Well, to me there are all sorts of interesting areas there. Let me start out with Chungking. What was your assignment there?*

VALDES: It was a post which had between two and five people assigned to it, when I was there. While Chungking had been the capital of [the Republic of] China during World War II, the capital had subsequently moved to Nanking. Chungking had become a small Consulate, pretty much out of the way. I did economic reporting. Sichuan [Province, where it was located] was well-known for its production of tung oil, silk, and oranges, among other things.

*Q: All strategic materials.*

VALDES: And hog bristles, as well, which were actually flown out, part of the time that I was there. They were pretty valuable things. I was there, I think I said, a year and a half. Then I was transferred to Nanking [in April, 1949], some three weeks after Nanking fell to the Communists.

*Q: So you were one of the people who "lost" China, then?*

VALDES: Well, I "lost" it, but it didn't really get lost until after I'd left. So I think that I can weasel out of that.

I was transferred to Nanking, along with a friend from the Foreign Service Institute course, who had been assigned to [the Embassy in] Seoul. A series of telegrams was sent from Seoul, Nanking, and Canton, where a branch of the Embassy in Chungking had been set up, asking how we get Rozier and Valdes to Nanking. It didn't seem very feasible. The branch of the Embassy in Canton pointed out that it, too, was the Embassy and would welcome both of us. The remnant of the Embassy in Nanking said that they'd like to have us, but they didn't know how we could get there. The Department of State, in its wisdom, simply "swapped" us. So I went to [the Embassy in] Seoul, and Rozier went to Chungking, where he lasted about five months before he had to leave when that city also fell to the Communists.

This was obviously an interesting period in China, even though we were off in the periphery of anything that was happening there. We did see a lot of the problems that the Chinese were going through, including the inflation. The Chinese currency went from around 100,000 or so Chinese Nationalist dollars [to US\$1.00] to 12 million, I believe, during the first year I was there. Then the authorities divided all prices by three million to arrive at the "Gold Yuan," so named, although it had no gold backing for it. The Gold Yuan then went up from four to US\$1.00 to 15 million to US\$1.00. We used to figure out our salaries in terms of Gold Yuan. It was very exciting.

*Q: Did you speak Chinese?*

VALDES: I tried to learn it.

*Q: But you didn't have any formal training in it.*

VALDES: I had three weeks of training -- an hour a day in the morning. I was being taught Mandarin, which was somewhat helpful in Chungking, but the local people spoke the Sichuan dialect. They reversed the tones and had a slightly different vocabulary. So I never did get very far with it.

To me the highlight of my time in Chungking was a trip I made with A. Doak Barnett, a classmate [at Yale], who was in China on a study program. We went out to the Tibetan grasslands.

*Q: Doak Barnett was born there.*

VALDES: He was born there of missionary parents and was 15 or so when he left Shanghai. He was going out to Sikang Province in western China, west of Chungking. He came through Chungking and asked if I wanted to go along. Since Sikang Province was part of our consular district, I was able to do that. It was a fascinating time.

*Q: How did you actually travel?*

VALDES: We went in a jeep belonging to the Consulate. I took the jeep up to Chengdu and then to Yaan, which was pretty much on the border of Sikang Province. There had been a road from Yaan to Kangting, the capital of the province, but it had long since washed out. So we walked. We had a collection of coolies with us, carrying sedan chairs. I have to admit that we rode for a good part of it, although most of the time we walked. Fortunately, the coolies carried our suitcases.

**EARL WILSON**  
**Information Officer, USIS**  
**Shanghai (1947-1949)**

*Earl Wilson was born in 1917 and raised in Washington, DC. He attended the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and George Washington University. Mr. Wilson joined the IICA (USIS) in 1947 and spent his career in China, the Philippines, France, Thailand, Mexico, Hong Kong, Spain, Malaysia, and Washington, DC. This interview was conducted by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1988.*

WILSON: When the war was over, the general in charge of public information asked me to go to China and take over North China public information for Marine aviation. I had always been fascinated with China, I agreed, even though I had more points to get out than you could shake a stick out. My wife let me go. For six months I learned a lot about China. Fortunately, I had a roommate who was a Chinese language officer, a missionary kid, born, raised, educated in China, who showed me everything.

Then I came back to the Post. I applied to the publisher, Eugene Meyer, told him I wanted to be a foreign correspondent, wanted to go to China. He hemmed and hawed and finally said he couldn't afford that. So I went back to being a feature writer.

After about a year, I was having lunch at the Press Club with an old Marine buddy, John Thomason, son of the famous Marine Corps writer and artist, Colonel John Thomason. He said he was going to Calcutta. I said, "My God, what's up?"

He said, "The State Department is hiring people with newspaper experience to go overseas."

Well, I hustled over there. I thought about going to Latin America because I had been specializing in Latin America at Georgetown.

I forgot to mention that on the newspaper, I got a four-year scholarship to G.W. I went to G.W. for over a year. When the war broke out, I had to quit. So although I had five years of college, I didn't have a degree. Georgetown claims I'm an alumnus.

So I went over. They said, "We've got an opening in Shanghai."

*Q: What year was that when you got the job with USIA or its predecessor?*

WILSON: They took a reasonably long time for security clearance in those days. I actually went aboard around March of 1947. The training was very, very rudimentary at that time. Headquarters was the old building at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue. We were a part of State. I think it was called the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs. Everybody knows the State Department didn't really want this propaganda organization attached to it. OWI had folded.

For part of the training I went to an old red-brick building next to the Bureau of Printing on 14th Street where the OWI photo files were left. That building has since disappeared. I think it's where the Holocaust Museum is to be located. They had literally thousands upon thousands of OWI negatives in file cases, and two little old ladies creeping about trying to find things. Harry

Casler, who had been photo editor in New York on one of the papers, was in charge.

In a building by State, various ambassadors and Foreign Service officers gave us talks on one thing or the other. It was totally useless. We got a little exposure to the different branches of what would become the Agency. We soon left.

To get to Shanghai, my wife and I had to go to Mobile and catch a freighter. We were both in our late twenties, married nine years, had our two little girls, April and Ronby, with us. The freighter was delayed and delayed before we finally boarded her. It had not been converted from wartime uses. Our cabin was simply an a large, bare, steel-walled area. They used to have a lot of bunks, but had thrown out all but four. We used our trunk for a table. I think we got a chair from someplace. My wife had never been abroad before.

We set sail, and the third night out, when we were laying off Panama, there was a murder on the ship. We were on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal. Someone, in the early hours stepped up on a steam pipe, reached through a port hole, stabbed our cabin steward. He was a very nice young man. He was stabbed with such force it ripped part of the bunk. The guy fell off of his bunk. The second mate, on duty on the bridge, just happened to come below, saw his buddy, blood gushing from his body. He ran up and blew SOS on the steam whistle. I heard this in the middle of the night. I jumped up, ran out on deck to see what the heck was going on. From my own wartime experience, I thought we were on fire, a collision course or something, but I didn't see anything. It wasn't 'til morning, when we went for breakfast. We found the police aboard. They took off a suspect screaming and cursing, another one of the stewards.

We went through the canal. The newspaper's banner headlines called us the "murder ship," said it was the most sensational crime to have happened there. While we were on deck trying to look at the canal, people were on the locks, looking at the "murder ship." We got to the other side. The crew weren't convinced the murderer had been taken off. They slept in groups on the deck at night, with one of them standing guard with a bat or pan or something. It wasn't a very happy time.

Then, finally, the inquest was over, and we set sail. Incidentally, that suspect was later released. They never did find out who did it because it was circumstantial evidence. I'm pretty sure he was the one.

We sailed across the Pacific without any stops, except Hawaii, but we couldn't get off the ship. I was acting purser on the ship because the captain, who was like an old farmer, didn't have one, and I volunteered to help him with his paperwork. It let me know what was going on on the ship. Actually, the trip in some ways turned out to be quite nice. The seamen were more than kind to our children. They made them a swing, a pond with the fire hose, and I made a six-foot high kite which we flew from the stern.

Everything was going along pretty good until we got to the China Sea. There we hit a typhoon. Our ship almost went over. Some did. In the middle of it, our daughter, April, had a weird high fever. My wife was worried sick. I wanted to see if the ship could head to Japan.

*Q: I suppose they didn't have any doctor on board.*

WILSON: No doctor. They had 12 passengers, all missionaries except us and one other guy, a young banker. In the evenings, we would sit on the port side of the boat deck, drinking rum and Coke, singing folk songs or whatever. They were on the other side with their Bibles and dominoes.

We had that terrible typhoon, and fortunately, April got better. Lorane, like all good mothers, had built-in medical instincts, I guess.

We arrived in Shanghai about June of 1947. Brad Conners was in charge. Tommy Linthicum met us at the dock. He was the administrative officer. He's now out in San Diego, where I saw him last year. He took us to what was to be our temporary quarters, the flat of a man who on home leave. It was in Hamilton House, right in the heart of Shanghai, across the street from a bank building where our consulate general was located. The USIS office was on the second floor of Hamilton House. In Washington we were called the U.S. International Communications Agency. There were a lot of name changes before we got to the U.S. Information Agency. But always USIS abroad.

Our new flat was on the sixth floor. My wife, when she saw this dingy, crummy apartment -- compared to the nice clean one in Bethesda we had, with a nice park outside, and here, no place for the children to play, she began to slowly go into culture shock.

USIS was on the second floor. I went in to report to Brad Conners. He told me he had some bad news. Congress had made a very severe budget cut. He had to close five branch offices, and had to lay off 75% of the local staff throughout the country. Brad was quite an interesting person. He had a photographic memory, absolutely, remembered every cable he ever read. Partly as a result of that, he became very good at picking people, and their brains, he went right to the top. Unfortunately, he died young of lung cancer. I never saw him without a cigarette in his mouth. He said I was going to be in charge of motion pictures and all the audio-visual stuff.

The news of the closing of so much of USIS, brought a flood of telegrams, letters, and phone calls of protest. Here I'm referring to notes. A leading newspaper, the Chungking Daily, said, "USIS is our only source of news from America. It is essential to the maintenance of Sino-American relations." The English-language Shanghai Evening Post said the budget slash was a crying shame. And so on. Tilman Durdin, a very respected foreign correspondent of The New York Times, wrote, "The United States is fighting an uphill battle to make itself understood and to win good will in China in face of bitterly critical propoganda of the Communists. The U.S. Information Service has been contributing much to the American cause at a critical juncture in U.S. relations with China."

I was beginning to get a little bit of a feeling for what was going on. At the end of the war, of course, our attention was focused on the enemy, on Japan, and I had no contact with China. Then, when I went to China, my eyes began to open a little bit. First of all, there were a million Japanese in north China. Naturally, we thought we were going to have a lot of trouble. But when the Emperor spoke, there were absolutely no difficulties whatever. As a matter of fact, they gave

some of them their rifles back and put them to guard different places.

But the Communists were something else. Our aircraft were flying under very difficult conditions weather-wise with poor communications. When a pilot would go down, we usually knew where he was. We had this tremendous combat-ready force, ready to send out to get him, pick him up.

*Q: Is this while you were still in the Marines?*

WILSON: Yes. I'm just giving a little insight of my learning something about the Communists. To "bring the boys home" was a demand from our citizens. Ranks were being thinned. If a Marine lieutenant platoon leader got out to the village and said to the head man, "Okay, bring out Captain So-and-so, we know you've got him." The man would just look blank. Someone would say, "If you don't bring him out in five minutes, we'll shell the village." They knew perfectly well these Americans weren't going to do anything like that. As a consequence, you had to bargain. Chinese language officers had to get in there, gold would be exchanged and things like that. So the lesson I was learning was that military force, which we've learned in many conflicts since, doesn't necessarily solve the problem.

Then in the city of Tientsin, where I was based, one or two movie theaters were showing, I suddenly realized, Russian films in Chinese about how they won the war and defeated Nazi Germany. The few American films were old films. I suddenly realized quite a propaganda thing was under way.

I had met some of the White Russians. They were fun people, as a rule. Then I went to a celebration of a Red Russia holiday at a big auditorium to see what was going on. They had a ballet, written to show how they won the war. They had a cabled message from Stalin.

With USIS a few years later, I realized, of course, that China was a very large country with about 500 million people. It was poor, had been ravaged by war, had virtually no transportation system, and, of course, they were having a civil war with the Communists. The U.S. was under fire in a skilled manner with the Communists attacking us in every way. It was difficult for people to get much information about the United States.

Despite closing five offices, we still had branch offices in Nanking, Peiping, Mukden, Chungking, Hangkow, Canton, and Taipei. With my arrival, we had 13 Americans.

I want to comment a little bit about our USIS program at that time and with that small number of American officers and local staff, what we tried to do.

First of all, news. The Associated Press and the United Press were business organizations, and business was bad in much of the world. They were servicing less than 30% of the estimated 600 daily newspapers in China. That's AP. UP reached about 70%. Those papers served directly the American news services were concentrated in the Shanghai-Nanking area, about like Washington, D.C., and New York. In other words, only about 10% of the Chinese daily press was receiving news directly from American wire services. Of course, the Kuomintang Central

News Agency subscribed to AP, but through a filter, which was quite a filter. We were trying to take up the slack.

In Shanghai we received from Washington the daily wireless file. It ran about 3,500 words daily. John Henderson was our number two man, Brad's deputy. Mary Barrett, who later married New York Times foreign correspondent Walter Sullivan, was handling the press and the wireless file. That would come in, be translated into Chinese, then put it into what was called the Chinese number code using Morse signals and transmitted to our branches for decoding, mimeographing, and distribution. About 70% of our material was printed in Chinese newspapers and read by a daily audience of an estimated 25 million Chinese. Even in Shanghai, where AP, UP, Chinese Central News, Reuters, Agence France Presse, Tass, were all available, about 60% of our stuff was published in the newspapers.

*Q: I suppose the foreign news services weren't giving much about the United States, but to some extent, I would think AP and UP would, where they serviced the papers.*

WILSON: It's interesting. I haven't ever read or made a study of this, but I'm sure somebody has. Particularly in those days, AP and UP were servicing a lot of very bad news about the United States, because they thought that was what different markets wanted.

*Q: Can you give an example of what you say was bad news?*

WILSON: Race relations, anything with race relations, murders, anything about the poor. Just any negative story that you could think of. At one time I thought about clipping a batch to show to Congress, but then I said, "To hell with it."

On the radio, Radio Moscow came in loud and clear to China, and the Chinese Communists made daily broadcasts from up in the north. VOA was quite weak by comparison. It went over our heads directly to the Chinese. We didn't have too much to do with VOA, but we backed it up with loans of phonograph records to radio stations. These were mostly old OWI (Office of War Information) records. OWI had been well financed during the war. We inherited a lot of their stuff. I had stacks of OWI radio records, some beautiful Metropolitan Opera, things like that.

Margaret Thompson, who had been with the Red Cross in China, was in charge of our libraries. In Shanghai, fourth largest city in the world, there was only one free library, and that was ours. It was on the second floor of Hamilton House, where we had American books and magazines available for free loan. Of course, we had libraries in various branch posts. She was our only trained librarian. Also, we had a grant of \$100,000 to buy books for Chinese libraries and universities. That was made possible by a grant from the American Library Association.

*Q: I presume these were all in English.*

WILSON: I'm not sure. I wasn't much involved with that program. But probably.

The first Fulbright Agreement was signed with China, the first in the world. They had \$20 million earmarked from the sale of surplus war equipment to China to send American teachers

and students to that country, and Chinese to our country. Bud Harris in Nanking handled that program. The Soviets had an exchange program, and they took hundreds of Chinese students and teachers to Moscow. And the Chinese Communists took a great many up to their capital at Yenan for training.

I was to be in charge of all the audio-visual programs and USIS publications. Brad said, "Don't expect much help from Washington," and that was true. We got very, very little material from Washington, practically no guidance. The way the thing was set up, our embassy was in Nanking, our USIS headquarters in Shanghai. Brad had to travel to Nanking once a week and spend a night. That was very demanding on him. Really, I got practically no guidance whatever from Brad or anybody else, just on my own, with very little out of Washington.

*Q: What month was this that you're talking about in 1947? What I'm trying to do is to coordinate this with the time that the Smith-Mundt Act was passed, which finally gave us the authority to establish a full-fledged what became U.S. Information and Education Program under State.*

WILSON: The time I'm talking about would be the summer and fall, I think, of 1947, more or less.

*Q: I think the Smith-Mundt Act was enacted in '48, so they were probably pretty badly coordinated in Washington until they got that authority.*

WILSON: Yes. What I'm talking about is sort of a general period from '47 to '48. In my area of responsibility we were largely living off the fat of OWI. When the Japanese surrendered, a lot of the OWI World War II material that had been in Chungking came down the Yangtze to Shanghai.

My office in Hamilton House was one large gloomy room. I shared it with ten Chinese artists, writers, translators, and clerks, our desks all jammed together. There was a lot of jabbering in Chinese which I didn't understand. But little by little, I began to comprehend, almost by osmosis, a lot of what was being said.

On the motion picture side, we were operating with OWI films of Americana in Cantonese, Mandarin, and Turki. We reached about 3 million people a month through these films. I had one American officer working for me, Loren Reeder. He was a big specimen, like Joe Palooka, very good natured, hands were like hams, and quite a character. He had come over in World War II to drop in a parachute, he thought -- he'd been a bricklayer or something as a civilian -- but instead, he wound up in OWI as a printer technician photographer. Joining USIS, he ran our photo lab and was in charge of printing. Our photo lab was a converted closet, and once again we had a great many negatives of Americana from OWI.

One reason I'm going into this is it was the beginning of the later development of the regional production center in Manila, and from that, the various ones in other parts of the world. We also had a Chinese newsletter, made up of reprints in Chinese of American magazine articles. The press section put this out periodically, just pages of type, no illustrations. I thought it very unappealing, so I brightened it up, gave it a cover, made it like a magazine with line drawings

and so on. We began to reach 13,000 schools, universities, selected groups, and 75% of that material was reprinted. We did get a nice response to this from Washington. They congratulated us on the Chinese magazine. This also was a sort of precursor to a number of magazines that came out later in the Far East.

I'll just mention one other thing. Ever since I was young, I've always painted. I loved to draw. That has made me interested in artists. In all my posts, I usually wound up knowing a lot of them. In Shanghai, there was a restaurant called Sun Ya. In the back room, the owner maintained a salon for writers and artists, mainly artists. I was invited to join this group, it turned out not because I was an artist so much, but because he wanted my help to do a cookbook. I didn't have time to get into that, but I enjoyed meeting these artists.

One was Chin San-long, called the "father of Chinese photography." He studied classical Chinese painting, but decided he couldn't paint good enough. So he got one of those early old cameras with the glass plates. He would make three shots, put them together in the dark room. The end product looked like a Chinese classical painting. He might have the mist of the mountains in the background, and in the middle ground, maybe a bird sitting on a branch of a tree, and in the foreground, perhaps some bushes or whatever. Beautiful stuff.

I sent a bunch of his paintings to New York, to a magazine called Coronet, no longer published. they ran his photos in the entire center section, called it "Eternal China." Years later, after the Communists took over, he took a trip to the U.S. and to Europe. We'd become friends. I told him to try to capture the U.S. the way he'd captured China, and he did. This man, incidentally, had won prizes all over the world for his work in salon photography. He gave me a photograph he made of the Statue of Liberty. It's very interesting, like a Chinese painting. It has the fog, the sun dimly seen. The statue was like the mountains.

I want to say another thing about art. You know, UNESCO held its first art exhibit in Paris right after the war. Harry Truman was President at this time. These paintings had been selected by museum directors in the U.S. It turned out they were all abstracts. The Europeans wanted very much to see what American artists had been doing during the war. I think it was Look magazine that ran photos of some of these abstracts, very derisive, "This is what foreigners are being shown as American art," they said. It created quite a furor in Congress. Harry Truman ducked it. He said, in a press conference, he liked "ham-and-eggs" art. The consequence of all this was the word "art" became a four-letter word in the Agency. There was no way they were going to get involved with this; it would cut the throat of their budget.

The one thing I had been doing in my so-called training in Washington over in that old photographic section was to write captions for an art exhibit. The exhibit was of traditional American paintings, black and white photographs, you know, things like John Steuart Curry or [Edward] Hopper or [Thomas Hart] Benton or Winslow Homer, Norman Rockwell, Grandma Moses, that type of thing. So I'd written these captions. With the Paris uproar, it was stored away.

When I got to Shanghai, I began to go to art exhibits. Boy! They had more art exhibits than you could think of. I wrote back to a friend in the Agency, asked him to get that art exhibit I'd

worked on, stuck away somewhere, and send it to me. He did.

In our library, I planned to have what turned out to be the first American art exhibit after the war in China. We pushed back files, book stacks, and things in the library and made a makeshift exhibit hall. We had recorded music playing in the background. With our \$25 representation fund we got some cookies and tea. We sent out invitations to the elite -- the teachers, artists, writers, and so on -- and they came. Almost everyone we sent an invitation to came, and they were fascinated, looking at these black and white photographs which we had framed and matted.

The interesting thing is, earlier in Canton, a mob, Communist-led, had burned down the British consulate. The consul escaped with his life by hiding under a bed. This unrest then surged up to Shanghai. Barbed wire was all around the entrance to our consulate. Chinese Nationalist troops with helmets and machine guns were on guard. Crowds were in the street. I'll never forget, there I was, standing, talking with our guests to our art exhibit who were drinking our tea, eating our cookies, looking at our pictures, while looking out a window, I could see the street mobs. One team was writing with tar on the wall of the Cathay Hotel, "Get out filthy American beasts."

*Q: You spoke of the riots in Canton, but you are still talking about the exhibit being in Shanghai, aren't you?*

WILSON: That's right. But I mean, the Communists could play these things like a piano, up and down.

A bit later, a young student came to my office and said they were having an international art exhibit sponsored by university students. Would the U.S. participate? He told me the Russians had agreed, the French, the British, and so on. Without stopping to think how, I said, "Sure." Then I started looking for paintings at the Agency, as I said, art was a four-letter word. Nothing there. First of all, I contacted all of our branch posts.

By the way, a marvelous thing we had left over from the war was a communications system. We, the USIS, had this. One way old Brad could throw his weight around a little bit is that he could do favors for people by communicating. I'm talking about legally within the consulate. Looking for paintings, I tried the American Club, the American School, and the American bookstore. I got absolutely nowhere.

I tried the other Far East posts, Manila, Tokyo and so on. Tokyo, because of the occupation, had it all. They sent me, on loan, a beautiful set of color prints, just what the doctor ordered. We put those up. The Russians had heroic-size statues, large paintings of Lenin and all the rest. The British and the French had nice exhibits, but ours, I thought, was better.

After that, I had to send that exhibit back to Tokyo. But my black and white exhibit began to travel in China from post to post. Hundreds of thousands of people saw it. I was happy about that. I claimed that we had the first art exhibit in China and the last for a generation, because when China went down the drain, it wasn't until later, 25, 28 years later, that the Agency could hold another there.

*Q: I'd just like to make one comment and ask you what your reaction is. From what you have said, I gather that you felt the art that you had, even though it was limited, got you "in" with a great many very important people in China at that time. It wasn't only the artists, but it was probably people of fairly high standing in various fields of business and government and so forth. Is that a correct assumption?*

WILSON: Oh, absolutely. I found that in post after post, art was a conduit to all kinds of influential people.

*Q: The reason I say this is because I recently interviewed Alan Fisher. Alan was a very talented man. He was an artist in painting and in music and in several other fields. Although he was generally apolitical, he made all sorts of contacts among high Brazilian people, particularly, where he spent the larger part of his USIS career. He and I felt that he had made an impact which many other people didn't, with ordinary USIS type of programs. He had everybody, from governors and presidents of the country, as his personal contacts and knew them on a first-name basis. I don't think you can equal that kind of an approach and that kind of an impact, as far as American efforts informationally abroad are concerned.*

WILSON: Yes, I would agree.

I want to turn to another subject. During the war, OWI sent to Chungking, among other things, high-speed Webb leaflet presses. One of these later came to USIS in Shanghai. I found, despite what we were printing with it, we had a lot of press capacity left over. We also had tons of excess OWI paper. We had all these Americana negatives. So the thought occurred to me, why not make paper shows, posters, based on this material, with captions in English and Chinese, see if I could get some relevancy to Chinese problems. I began to produce these poster exhibits just a few months after I arrived.

The first exhibit was about American elections and voting in a democracy. The Chinese angle was, China had adopted its first Constitution in 5,000 years. They were about to hold their first national election. So I got an OWI booklet, and we copied the excellent drawings and diagrams on the American system. The posters were a great success. We began to reach more millions of people. These posters were being put up all over the country.

We were going along merrily with this, and I was quite happy about it, when I picked up Time magazine one day, and to my astonishment, there was in a box, was a story, datelined Lukden, very critical of my posters. It was called "The Glory of Plumbing," and said, "In that bleak and cheerless place up there," meaning a Nationalist prisoner of war camp where the writer happened to go and see posters on a wall, they "looked like dark blossoms on the snow," all in good Time magazine style prose. The whole point of the story was the ineffectiveness of telling hard-core Communist POWs about American plumbing.

I wrote a letter to Time. I'd like to summarize it here. I said, "I suggest the story entitled 'Glory of Plumbing' should have been called 'The Glory of Sewage Disposal,' for such was the subject matter. In disease-ridden China, few people argue with the fact that proper sanitation would be a tremendous step forward. Our exhibit tried to tell some of the basic facts of sewage disposal as

practiced in the U.S. It even contained a U.S. Public Health Service plan for a cheap, sanitary outdoor toilet, as well as photographs of sewage disposal plants in large towns and cities. In brief, it offered the Chinese work for the present and plans for the future. Its usefulness can be measured by the fact that from public health groups, hospitals, universities, and libraries in every part of China we have received hundreds of letters of praise and enthusiasm, wanting more of this type of thing. It wasn't intended for POWs, for God's sake."

I mentioned the American ballot box, our first poster exhibit. I said, "In Mukden, the very area from which your story was datelined, and which you call one of the world's most important cities, 10 million Chinese saw our voting posters there, just for an example." I said, "Our job, as outlined by the President, is to present a full and a fair picture of America, and we're trying to do that through this and other means." I said, "In this we include in Mukden, among other Chinese cities, the opportunity for anyone to go into our library and get free loan of books and magazines, including your own." Well, I blew off steam.

I sent my letter through the State Department. It never appeared in Time. I doubt if they forwarded it.

Another little aspect of this. Brad called me to his office one day to meet a fellow named J. Hall Paxton, who was going to Tihwa in Sinkiang province as consul. Paxton, incidentally, later made a very dramatic escape from there by going through Nepal, walking out, to get away from the Communists.

His deputy, Doug McKiernan, months later, tried to do the same thing. Unfortunately, he was shot and killed by Tibetan border guards.

Paxton told me that day he wanted very much to do USIS work out there in that remote part of China, but language was a problem because most of the 5 million Muslim inhabitants spoke Turki. I said, "No problem." We found a Turki guy living in Shanghai, hired him to translate. So we began having trilingual captions, Chinese, English, and Turki for this far Western province.

Not long after Paxton arrived at his post, cholera broke out. I received an urgent cable from him. The authorities wanted very much to spread word about immunization to the populace. He wanted to know if I could furnish him with posters. There was only one plane a month from Shanghai that went there. We had 48 hours. One of my Chinese staff knew a Chinese Public Health doctor. We got him to the office, huddled with him over the desk with an artist and Turki translator. We soon had a dramatic poster urging inoculation against cholera. Bundles of these posters were rushed to the airport just in time for the last flight in the winter to be canceled. So we struck out on that.

But that gave birth to something else. This doctor was Director of the Anti-Tuberculosis Coordinating Committee for China. He asked if we could do an anti-spitting TB poster for him. I figured I owed him something, so we designed a "don't spit" poster. This guy got those posters plastered all over Shanghai, even on the back of rickshaws and the sides of streetcars.

The demand was so great, we could have spent the next six months printing nothing but those

posters. That came to an abrupt halt, because in Nanking the Minister of Health had complained bitterly about this to Brad. He was losing face. We had to stop that. But I claim it's another first. AID later began to do this kind of poster around the world.

One last bit about that period in Tihwa. The New York Times correspondent Walter Sullivan wrote from there an article favorable to USIS. He wrote this, summarized: "In the heart of Central Asia, in the great hinterland that lies between India, Tibet, and Russia, the United States Information Service is at work." He said posters and movies were the backbone of our program and that daily, a mobile film unit would leave Tihwa to screen films in one of the 28 schools of the provincial capital. He said 832 schools were on the poster mailing list. Many of these posters and other things were carried by caravan of donkeys.

Paxton and his wife would drive to remote areas, and the word somehow would get out about our movies. In the loneliest areas, a crowd of 100 would assemble in a few hours, riding in on horseback, to see a little bit of America. He did say it was unfortunate our films were inferior to the excellent Russian documentaries being shown. They invited audiences of Chinese officials in the larger cities. Of course, there were no American commercial films within 1,000 miles. He said that Russia was very much ahead in the radio field, that VOA was weak. It was nice to hear something about our efforts.

Also, I was pleased by now -- this is 1948 -- to know that our posters were reaching all over China from Manchuria in the north to Hainan island in the south, and out to Central Asia and the borders of Russia.

I experimented, incidentally, with two other posts. One was Manila, where Hal Goodwin was, and printed some posters for him down there, and also with Saigon. So those germs were in the back of my mind about RPC when we get to that later.

I want to mention a couple of things, too, on the family side. One young officer, leaving, gave my oldest girl, April, a little Tibetan poodle. She would take him to the parking lot below for a walk. One day, I got a call from my wife. I was on the second floor of Hamilton House. I ran up to our flat on the sixth floor. The dog had been run over, but he hadn't just been run over. April had him down there off the leash. The cab that ran over him backed up to make sure he had run over him properly, and ran over him a couple of times. The only place our children had to play was a little yard of a church where you had to bribe the guard to open the barbed wire gates and let them in.

I want to mention a trip I took Lorane on and our librarian. We went to Soochow, about 90 miles from Shanghai, called the "Venice of China" because of its canals. We were going to take a lot of books out there to present to the university library. We took a big vehicle, and we had to go through a checkpoint on the road because the Communists had the road at night pretty much. We went along, and we got to the Methodist university, a very pleasant-looking place with a lot of missionaries living a pretty nice life, with nice living quarters, servants, food and all the rest of it.

We had presented the books, were dining with the president, when an urgent message came. Someone had stolen the chop he used for the tickets being given out for the movie we were to

show that night in the auditorium. We got up from the table, went down to the auditorium where this film was to be shown. It was almost a riot, students all over the place, angry, demanding to get into the place. I told them to relax, we would give a second showing if they would calm down.

We went into the auditorium, and thank God there wasn't a fire official there. The place was so densely packed, you could barely move. I had told the projectionist to show a film about the United Nations, as it was United Nations Day. We sat with the president. The projectionist was up in the balcony. When the film came on, I realized he had put the second reel on first, but these people were so interested, it didn't seem to make any difference. Actually, a part of it was the Boston Symphony Orchestra led by Toscanini, playing the Hymn of the United Nations. These students were starved to see anything. How much of it penetrated their brain, I don't know.

The next day we went up on a nearby hill, Tiger Mountain, to a temple, outside of which we had a lunch. With us was a professor from the college. He was the husband of a Chinese lady who had been on our freighter. She had graduated from Columbia University with a Ph.D., and was involved in a project to try to reach the peasant women of China. They were working in separate places. This guy, who spoke excellent English, told us his wife was pregnant. I've forgotten how the topic came up, but he was very angry, very emotional, "I'll never let him be a teacher." I remember that on the ship, this lady had told us her husband's salary as a professor was the equivalent of about \$15 a month. That's less than we paid our cook.

One thing very interesting about that period in China was aviation. Of course, Chennault formed the Flying Tigers, after World War II, CAT. A lot of American pilots stayed in China to fly with Chinese airlines. I knew many of these pilots. As a matter of fact, after our wives were evacuated, one of these pilots lived with me. They flew literally everything you can think of around the country -- animals, or you name it, steel ingots, whatever. It's a piece of aviation history that has very few counterparts.

I progressively visited our branch posts. I'll tell you a few sentences about each one. The first was over in what was then called Formosa, now Taiwan, the Republic of China. Dick Conlin was there. He lived in Taipei in a Japanese-style house on Grass Mountain. There were very few tourists. The Japanese had occupied the place for years. It had a very distinct Japanese feel. Of course, Nationalists, after the war, when they took it over, had mistreated a lot of the people. They were not liked at all.

I went to Canton, but when I went there on a military plane, it was covered with fog, so we landed at Hong Kong, my first visit. No place to stay, but one of my pilot friends put me up in the crew's quarters. Hong Kong was a very small British outpost, indeed, at that point.

*Q: What year was that, Earl?*

WILSON: That would be about '48. The next day, the wake-up person didn't call me. I grabbed a cab. My plane was at the end of the runway with the prop turning over. I told the guard at the gate I was a diplomatic courier. They let the cab in. We drove out on the runway and chased the plane. I got on, and we went over to Canton, 30 minutes away, where Elmer Newton, a very

dignified guy, was waiting to meet me. I was a little embarrassed, because I hadn't shaved or anything. Canton is where one of the first bad incidents with the Communists had happened, burning of the British consulate.

I went to Nanking. Our branch public affairs officer there was Joe Bennett, a longtime student of China. Then I went on to Hangchow, where our office was being run by Marian Jenkins, who had married an oil man and whose job now was in Hangchow. She continued to be our branch PAO there.

Then I went to Chungking where the BPAO was Art Hopkins, a missionary child. The military hired a lot of these people because of their language ability, and then USIS hired a lot of them after the war. One of my recommendations, when I finally got back away from the Communists, was to recommend to the Agency they stop hiring people on the basis of language but also look at what their abilities are, because sometimes they can just communicate their stupidity more fluently. But I don't mean this about Art. It just brought to mind that he was a language guy, and he lived up on a mountain in a palace that was falling apart. It had been built for Chiang Kai-shek at one time. He and I played tennis. The mayor there was a tennis nut, had 13 concubines, and they said he married them because of their tennis ability. Art and I were playing tennis, and the mayor showed up. He sicced some of his wives on us, and we played practically all afternoon. We were exhausted.

Finally, I went over to Kunming in West China, where one of the consuls was doing our work for us as they were in other places. His wife, incidentally, had been quietly helping in a leper colony there. They were leaving. A lot of these lepers scraped their pennies together to put an ad in the local paper thanking her. I thought that was very nice.

I'll give an example of how the Communists were operating. Their cells in the universities and the schools were a very important part of their apparatus. Students held innumerable strikes and demonstrations, demanding the Nationalist government to stop fighting the Communists, for example. But in 1948, they shifted their line and began to demonstrate against American imperialism, alleging that we were rearming Japan for reconquest of China. This propaganda campaign started one night at the American School, where my daughter, April, was a student. We went there for a program depicting the birth of the United Nations. The school had 50 nationalities, so they had a lot of native costumes. Just as the program started, a grotesque figure suddenly appeared on the stage as Uncle Sam, wearing a suit covered with dollar signs. Then another figure came on the stage dressed in a baggy Japanese Army officer's uniform, carrying a large bag covered with dollar signs. It took only a moment. Uncle Sam put an affectionate arm around the servile Japanese, while slipping him dollars. A third figure dressed as a Chinese peasant armed with a stick dashed out and drove Uncle Sam back in confusion. Then someone pulled the light switch.

The next day was Memorial Day. We went to the American cemetery in Shanghai, where our consul general, John Cabot, spoke. He referred to the incident, contrasting the spirit of many of the men buried in the cemetery, who had died fighting to liberate China from the Japanese, with the misguided Chinese students who were insulting the best international friend the country had. Up in Nanking, the American ambassador, Dr. John Leighton Stuart, who had been a lifelong

missionary teacher in China, who had educated thousands of young Chinese, spoke along the same line.

But then in the various universities, suddenly there was an exhibit of photographs. At Episcopal St. John's University in Shanghai, one of the best, there was one on the theme of America imperialism rearming Japan. University authorities ordered the exhibit removed. Demonstrations broke out there and at universities across the country, carefully orchestrated, spread like a prairie fire. The students were able, at St. John's, to force the resignation of the president of the university. These demonstrations peaked in Shanghai with a gigantic anti-American parade. Americans were told to stay off the streets.

Then all of a sudden, the Communists, for whatever their tactical reasons, simply called that particular campaign off. It was very disturbing to see how they could manipulate things.

I want to tell one other quick anecdote about family. I had a jeep. It was a surplus military jeep. When we got it, it had grass literally growing out of the engine block. But nonetheless, it was transportation. We had moved to French town, had a very nice flat there. One night, we had to go to some official function and didn't take the jeep. I came back with my wife, and the elevator operator was excitedly chattering about something. He led me out back to the parking lot. My jeep's windshield was broken, spider webbed. There were hammer marks on the hood. He made a motion of hammering, I said, "Who?" He pointed upstairs, said, "He go your place." I said, "My God!" So we rushed to the elevator. The door opened on our floor, a very elegant place. The glass partitions had all been smashed, glass scattered about the floor. There were hammer marks all over our front door. Our children were in there. I called the servant. He peeked out, then opened the door.

It turned out it was a British guy who lived on the floor below us. His brother -- and I called the British Embassy -- had gone to Hong Kong to arrange to have him shipped back to a mental institution in Great Britain. This guy had a big beard, he was dressed in his pajamas, had a belt, with a golf club like a sword. He'd gone to a cocktail party at a flat below us, we learned where he'd gone into the middle of the crowded room and yelled, "Bullshit!" Then walked out. Nobody paid any attention. You know cocktail parties.

*Q: He was the guy who had smashed up your place?*

WILSON: Yes, I learned his wife had gone off with an American pilot. He was anti-American and psychotic. He heard our American voices. That set him off. His brother, who was quite well-to-do, had a big limousine and a driver. This guy, next morning, called the car, and in his outlandish costume, told the driver to take him to the British Embassy. On the way, he periodically would lean out the window and clunk somebody with this golf club. When he got to the British Embassy -- you know, in those days we all had Sikh guards, and they were very big physical specimens -- he ran up to this Sikh guard and clunked him. That's not the kind of person you clunk. So the guard went after him. My contact at the British Embassy said this guy cowered back in the car, wanted to be taken to a mental institution. That's what they did.

My wife was very much a victim of culture shock. Like many Americans, she had thought of

Chinese as being extremely gracious and well mannered. Of course, many of them are, but times were hard and out there in the streets you had a lot of situations.

Lorane became pregnant. The Communists were beginning to advance in the north. Our consul general said if Americans didn't have something of importance to keep them there, they should leave. Many did, but many didn't. Of course, American dependents were ordered evacuated. The government enabled us to ship our personal effects out. Then Lorraine flew on a military plane to Manila with a number of the dependents on December 7, 1948. They put them in an old Army camp near the university to wait out until they could come back to Shanghai.

*Q: Did she go back to the States then?*

WILSON: No, she waited. The theory was this. Up north, during the interval between the Communists taking over after the Nationalists had left would be a period of anarchy. So that's one reason they wanted our dependents out. The other thing, they said, was to wait until the dust settled. Then they could come back. Some dependents went to Japan. Brad Conner's wife went to Japan, where she had her child.

Some admiral loaned us husbands a plane, and we were able to fly over to Manila at Christmas time, take presents and see our wives and kids. Then later, when our third baby, Mark, was born, I was able to get on the flight over. Then I hitchhiked back on a military plane to Okinawa, then Shanghai, where things were beginning to heat up.

It was mid-February of '49. The Communist armies had one-fourth of China. They were halted on the banks of the Yangtze. The Nationalist government had gone to Canton in the south. From there they went on over to Taipei. Brad Conners went with our embassy, following them down. Some of us were asked if we would stay behind. The idea was to see what could be done with the Communists because, actually, we'd never had any official experience dealing with the Communists. So Brad asked me to stay, John Henderson and one or two others.

We had an evacuation plan. I'll just tell you about that for a minute. Shanghai was divided into sections, and various members of the consulate were leaders of some section. Each section had a collection point, like the Columbia Country Club, the American School, and the consulate general itself. Each section team had a squad of Marines, plus a couple of men from the consulate who were familiar with visa work and at least one American who spoke Chinese. Some of these were businessmen. They had radios. My responsibility was to work with one of these as a general "go-fer" or whatever. The idea was, if there were an emergency, trucks would collect these people, take them through the back streets to a place down from Shanghai on the Whangpoo River, where they'd be shipped out to a waiting hospital ship. One of the things that they asked me to do was print bilingual posters with the American flag in English and Chinese, stating this was American property. These posters went up all around the city.

Many old China hands were saying, "Oh, you're going to see a compromise in the usual Chinese way. The war's over." One thing that came out of it, USIS got better office space. The consulate moved to a nearby building on the bund owned by the U.S. We took over the ground floor of the building across from Hamilton House. It had been a bank -- high ceilings, a balcony. We had our

USIS offices up on the balcony, with the library down below. I wrote back to an old contact in Harry Casler's office where I remembered they had a gigantic camera that could make huge photographic prints. I had these huge photographs of Americana mounted as murals around our balcony. It was very striking. You could see them from the street, through the windows. We used the windows as show cases advertising our products. One of the photographs I have that I call "lowering of the bamboo curtain," is a nice shot of the window advertising our free magazines and free book loans. Right in front are barbed wire barricades that have been pushed aside. Three or four Communists soldiers with their rifles are advancing. So that was the bamboo curtain coming down.

Even though the Red Army was getting closer, we managed to open a new USIS branch in the German School. Our military had suddenly left, because there was this incident, you may recall, of the British frigate, Amethyst. It went up the river to Nanking, gunboat diplomacy, to help safeguard British citizens during this period of anarchy. But instead, the Communists, with the heavy artillery on the banks, caught them in the narrow river and blew the hell out of them. That word wasn't lost on our Navy, because immediately the military cleared out. We were left with the responsibility of looking after military property. They told me, "You can have anything you want." I went over there with Loren Reeder. My God, here were warehouses! I mean, acres of warehouses filled with everything imaginable. I didn't want anything except some photo paper, as I recall. Even then, good old bureaucracy. Brad said they had to transfer the cost from their budget to our budget. Meanwhile, Chinese thieves were getting in and stealing millions of dollars worth all the time.

The pilot I was living with left a note on an envelope that said, "I'll get in touch with you. I had to leave, going to Hong Kong." So he flew off with a plane. All pilots were flying transport planes to safety. Then, as they came back, they'd sit out at the airport with the propellers turning. I ran my roommate's personal possessions out there. He couldn't leave his plane and come into the city.

*Q: After he left permanently, did he lose the plane? Did he keep it in Hong Kong?*

WILSON: They kept them based in Hong Kong and Taipei, but they wouldn't leave anything. They'd just fly back up 'til the last. The population influx to Taiwan was astonishing, people going there and to Hong Kong and everywhere else.

We had an American amateur theater group in Shanghai, and they put on "Boy Meets Girl" while all this was happening. (Laughs) One of the guys, a friend of mine, an oil man, had a reading for a play at his house out in the suburbs, and he wanted us to drink up his champagne because he didn't want to leave it for the Communists. He had a couple of cases of champagne. So it was quite incongruous, we were out there in the garden, seated in a circle, the house boys in white jackets serving cold champagne while we were reading comedy lines, and you could see the lines and lines of refugees going by. For some reason, the Nationalist authorities had a fence built, a 35-mile long fence around the city. There was a cash famine. The streets were lined with people trying to trade whatever they had or whatever they manufactured -- flashlights or vacuum bottles or whatever. This was quite a difference from previously, when we had to deal with inflated currency which was up into the millions and millions and millions of dollars. You could

take a paper grocery bag with you just to have a little money to buy a newspaper or something.

John Henderson and I were living together in my place, and we knew, of course, that the Communists were coming. They'd been fighting near the city, and we heard the thunder of artillery all the time. Then one day we saw Nationalist soldiers retreating. They went right past our place on Avenue Joffe.

*Q: Named for the French marshal.*

WILSON: Yes. They were retreating to get on boats down south. The very last of that bunch was an armored car that raced down the street, firing in all directions. It hit one of our windows. It had been raining. That night around midnight, we were watching from our windows. We saw some shadowy figures hugging the walls and coming in. Of course, the phones worked, so we were in touch with the labor downtown. He saw them take over the police station and take down the Nationalist flag.

The next morning, John and I went with the consul, Walter McConaughy, who lived in our building, had a car and a driver. We got in the car. On almost every corner there would be a Communist soldier with his weapon. Of course, the crowds would start coming out of the doors or the side streets. When necessary, they'd fire over their heads and they'd go back. Meanwhile, we went driving down fairly deserted streets. Then we heard a lot of firing. It got more intense, so we decided to get out of the car and hug the buildings to get to the office. There we found out we'd gone through the battle front. Our consulate was now in no-man's-land.

The Communists had set up, along Soochow creek, a rear guard. There was a park almost opposite us where they had a lot of machine guns and troops. The Communists were coming down from the other direction. McConaughy asked me to put up some American flags so they'd know who we were. Loren Reeder, this big guy, held my belt, and I put some on different sides of the building. Then over the front entrance. We had a Sikh guard. The flagstaff went out over the sidewalk. I got on a table and put a chair up on that, and the guard held it while I climbed up to hang this flag. I called it my "poor man's Iwo Jima." Right in front there was a mailbox, a Nationalist soldier, a 15-year-old kid, the last of the Nationalists' rear guard was hiding behind that mailbox. I have a picture of my putting up that flag up because Loren went out in the middle of the street and took it. It was foolish, bullets were flying around, but I'm glad to have the picture.

I saw the fire fight in an unusual way. It was like being on the 50-yard line of a football game, instead of as usual in combat, with your nose in the dirt.

We were in that building, the consulate, for several days. We did have some cots and food. One German, who was shot and had a broken leg, crawled about five blocks to our place. We were able to help him. One morning, I was up in the naval attaché's office, had borrowed his field glasses, was looking down on this park. We wanted to know whether the park was abandoned. This Nationalist soldier came out, yawned, scratched himself, picked up his rifle, looked up, saw me, and KABOOM! I was looking right at him with the glasses. The barrel of his rifle looked as big as a tunnel. I jumped just in time.

Actually, what happened as the Communists approached, they didn't fire on us. But the Nationalists, on the other side, frantically began firing all over the place. Bullets were coming around the office. We were crawling up and down the corridors. One secretary left her desk to go to the bathroom or something. She closed the door. She thought, you know, sometimes people seem to think that will protect them. This .50-caliber came through the door, through her desk, and blew a hole in the wall. I believe she got that bullet and wore it later as a good luck charm.

Our consulate cabled the State Department to cable to Canton to get the Nationalists to contact their troops in Shanghai and tell them, for Christ's sake, to stop shooting at us, that we were friends. Finally, it was over. The car we came in had been parked across the street. It had a bullet that went right through the trunk, up through the seat, into the dashboard, and still it would operate, so we used it.

For a while, we were able to run a restricted USIS program. Communist soldiers would visit our library. We were doing various things. But in July 1949, John Henderson was asked to come over to this Communist's office. They asked him to describe what he was doing, his operations. He knew, of course, they knew, and he gave them a nice briefing on what USIS was doing. They said, "That's fine. Stop it. No more." So we had to close up. The bamboo curtain had fallen.

Shanghai, 1949. I want to describe how the so-called bamboo curtain fell, how they shut off contact with the West, and how they established their own propaganda lines.

The U.S. was going to be the main target for vilification. Propaganda techniques were varied. In the press, for one thing, letters were planted asking straightforward questions, like "Why can't newspapers continue printing AP and UP stories?" And the Communist answer, in part, "Because they are the mouthpieces of imperialism." So the Communists could ask and answer their own questions.

The Communist Press and Publications Department of the Cultural and Educational Control Committee called a meeting of key Shanghai editors for a discussion forum. They were told that news and feature stories produce ideological and political effects, and the role of newspapers and magazines under the Communists is to serve the interest of the people. But the curious thing is, the editors received no specific guidance on how to treat stories, and so they began to find, in practice, it was not easy to satisfy the Communists and play their game. After three months, the editor of the Ta Kungpao, the Chinese New York Times, printed a public apology on the front page for his inability, despite trying hard, to manifest to the fullest degree the propaganda and educational value of the paper.

*Q: In other words, then, you were still there, even though you were not permitted to operate any longer. You were still in Shanghai after the Communists had taken over.*

WILSON: That's right. I was there almost six months because they wouldn't let us leave.

*Q: They wouldn't let you operate, but they wouldn't let you leave.*

WILSON: No. I'll get to that, too, because just to deviate for a second, the Communists did not have the technical expertise to run the factories and do many things associated with this city. They wanted the foreigners to stay around and run these places until they could properly take over. They didn't want to drop everything overnight. They wouldn't let anybody out. That was part of the problem -- it was the problem. I'll describe that in a little bit.

Back to the press. The newspaper editors were having a hard time. They were trying to print and make the newspapers serve the Communists, or serve the people, as they said. News from the outside world had to come through a Communist screen. I read a translated article in the press tracing Sino-American relations for a century, the object to prove there was no such thing as traditional friendship. In this article, the writer used the epithet "American imperialist" 32 times; "American aggressors" 18 times; "American reactionaries" eight times, and so on. It was very boring to read this stuff, but that's the way it was.

They had an editorial in one of the papers, commenting on USIS of the past. We were the "megaphones of the imperialists," and it said we had been ordered to cease our activities, and although on the surface, USIS looked like a cultural liaison in public relations such as movie shows, library services, concerts, photo exhibits, giving advice to students going to America, the article said that in fact, the center of work was the dissemination of official news dispatches and the gathering of information concerning public opinion reaction to America. Our posts were filled with Secret Service men trained by the FBI, and we were just megaphones of imperialism.

The radio editors of Shanghai were called in for a lecture. They didn't understand how things worked under Communists. Worst of all, some of them were still relaying the Voice of America. That was a no-no. Motion picture people and producers were called in and told their films had to reflect the policy of the government, that films should educate the people, reform their thoughts, encourage production. American commercial films, which had been very popular, now another technique, they had the movie industry workers union demand that the government immediately impose censorship on the poisonous American-made pictures. As these movies disappeared, it was announced that 200 Russian films with Chinese lip sync had been imported. Anything American was erased. Street names, like Wedemeyer Road named after the American general, were changed; brand names, products, soaps, cigarettes. In every element of society, the Communist control mechanism was taking over.

The old China hands were mystified by the behavior of the Communists. First of all, they had never really thought they had good troops. Overnight, right after they took over, the city was plastered with thousands of posters, reassuring the populace that their property would be protected, and it was. Unlike the Nationalists, the Communist soldiers slept on the sidewalks, rather than intrude into any home or building. They refused to accept so much as a cigarette without paying for it. There was no doubt, given the turbulence of the past, when the Nationalists soldiers did exactly the opposite, that many people in the city were happy to see the Communists come as a promise of peace and order.

I had my first direct contact with one of the Communists when I went over to pick up a suit at my tailor on the grounds of Broadway Mansion, where the Foreign Press Club used to be. Right after I had the fitting, I stepped outside and found myself face to face with a Communist soldier

who had a Tommy gun, and he stuck it in my stomach and said something in Chinese. I couldn't understand him. I began backing toward the tailor shop, because I knew the tailor spoke English. The soldier followed. Of course, the usual crowd gathered. In the old days, always a crowd would gather and the police would tell them to go away, but they wouldn't do it. In this case, the guy noticed the crowd, just turned around and waved his gun, said something like, "Beat it!" and they did. They knew he meant business. Well, my tailor came, and basically what the guy simply wanted was for me to write in his notebook my name, address, where I was going, and why.

They had not announced a curfew. The Nationalists had a curfew. We decided we'd better keep observing the Nationalist curfew hours. I was coming home one night when another soldier flagged me down and escorted me to a wooden shack. While in there, a roving patrol came up and surrounded the shack with fixed bayonets. This time, I finally found out they wanted me to turn my headlights down. They also wanted to know who I was, where I had been, and going.

The Communists had no diplomatic relations with the U.S. They referred to us as a bogus American consulate general, and refused to deliver any mail addressed to the consulate general. So my letters from Lorane were returned before I could get word to her that she had to use the street address of the consulate.

To celebrate their victory, the Communists formed a huge victory parade. I watched this forming from the roof of the consulate. There were hundreds of thousands of people, red banners all over the place.

Meanwhile, they were telling employees to demand various things. Our military had let their Chinese employees go. They formed a group to demand higher separation settlements than they were entitled to under our regulations. Consul General John Cabot said he would negotiate with a committee, not with all of them. They turned that down, blocked the entrances. We were prisoners inside our own consulate. We were there for several days. Cabot got us to put our hands in our pockets to break out of there via a back alley which led to the street. When we all went out, the parade was beginning to pass. These workers had used bicycle chains to lock the gates. As the parade passed, they stopped the trucks in front of us to let everybody in the truck shout, "American imperialists!" and so on. We had to go back into the consulate again, losing much face.

They went away, the workers, but a few days later, a small group of them came, gained entrance and got hold of our administrative officer, Reuben Thomas. They locked him in his office, put the chains back so we couldn't get out. For a day and a night they kept Reuben at his desk, they wouldn't give him anything to eat or drink and wouldn't let him go to the toilet, while they negotiated. It was blackmail, and in the end, the U.S. had to pay these people to get them off our back.

There was another aspect of their propaganda against foreigners. They felt the Chinese man in the street had too much respect for foreigners. They wanted to break this up. So they began picking different nationalities to create an incident on which to focus. They got a British consular official and accused him of beating up his house boys, forced him to write a public apology; then a German, claimed he had abused a dye works employee; they had a Frenchman, accused him of

knocking a Communist officer from his bicycle, make him spend two weeks sweeping the streets, pay a fine, medical expenses, public apologies, wear a sign around his neck, all that.

Then it was the American turn. We had a young vice consul by the name of Bill Olive. He was a very slight, unassuming man. He had just married one of the secretaries. He went out just before this parade in his jeep. He stopped to get gas and disappeared. Three days later, he came back to the embassy. He had been physically beaten. Mentally he was in very bad shape. We got his story. He had been arrested. They took him to a police station, charged him with driving on a street closed for the parade, even though there were no signs. By accident, he had knocked over a bottle of ink, they said, on the desk of the sergeant, so he was attacked from behind, beaten into insensibility with rifle butts and boots. He was locked in a cell without food, water, or medical attention, while two guards kept bayonets thrust through the bars at his throat. He wasn't permitted to move a muscle, and then every few hours they'd take him out, put him in front of a blinding light, and harangue him. They wanted him to write a confession, which he wrote. They'd look at them, crumble them up, throw them back in his face, and say, "Write a better one." And so he wrote, under their tutelage, a confession which then was published on the front page of the newspapers, which included such things as saying, "I am grateful to the People's Government for the consideration given my case, for the lenient and kind treatment accorded me."

The thing is that none of us knew what the hell was going to happen at any point, because there was no way to get any help from our own government or any other government. The so-called knock on the door at night.

Some American correspondents still there seemed sympathetic to the Communist side. They thought the Communists were doing a lot of good things. We called them in, John Henderson and I, to show them, with the doctor, Bill's cuts and bruises and let him tell his story. It did help to change some minds, I think.

Meanwhile from Taiwan, the Nationalists claimed they had mined the Yangtze River entrance. They sent bombers over with 500-pound bombs. One of the first ones hit a little foreign cemetery across from the old German school which we had made into a USIS library for that part of town. The Nationalists flew other flights for propaganda, too high to be hit. The Communists, as a counter propaganda move, put machine guns -- they didn't have any aircraft -- on the roofs of the buildings, so that when these planes were up there, all of a sudden the machine guns would go off, and you'd have to watch out for falling lead. Then the newspapers would claim the "bandit" planes had been driven away by the valiant troops.

John and I, driving from our home to the office, periodically would have to stop and abandon our jeep, run into a doorway as the machine guns started suddenly blasting. There was no warning. Right across from my office window, they had one of those things on the roof. Here I would be sitting, and all of a sudden the guy's firing and swiveling around. (Laughs)

*Q: Did any of them ever come through your window?*

WILSON: No, fortunately. Between the iron bombs, the Nationalist dropped propaganda leaflets.

You'd see the leaflets spreading in the air. Some fell in the street, where police very efficiently collected them.

This made the Voice of America increasingly important. It was the only way we could reach the people. We found one thing. When there was something really important said over the Voice of America, that word got around rapidly by word of mouth.

Then there was another problem. The Communist currency, in effect, cut our dollars in half, so we could no longer afford servants. We told them. The servants were dumbfounded. They said all their life, no matter what kind of hardship, they could at least get enough money for rice, and now they couldn't. To make a long story short, they turned us over to a Communist labor negotiator, who, in turn, made us go in front of the People's Court.

We went to a desk in this place. John and I stood in front of the Communist official while the servants and others stood around. The labor negotiator yelled at us for four hours. We had to wind up paying them four months' pay. Also pay for the rickshaw fare to get them to the place. Our baby Amah was the only one who wouldn't take part. The poor woman had converted to Christianity. Before I left, I found her a little room. All I could do was pay for it six months ahead, give her some food and money. I don't know whatever happened to her. She was a very good woman.

A big typhoon, the worst in the city's history, hit Shanghai, blew out the picture window in our flat. The city was flooded. John and I had to wade up to our waists in that filthy water with corpses floating about.

Meanwhile, our USIS staff, now were demanding more separation pay. John was handling these negotiations. A few of these people were Communists under cover. The sister of the man who did our book translations became the deputy mayor of Shanghai under the Communists. Most of them, however, were good people caught up in a nightmare. They would come secretly in my office to apologize, say goodbye, or whatever. Some would break out crying.

Finally, when we agreed to settle to their satisfaction, we had them write a letter to the officials that everything was settled, because earlier, they had written a letter to the officials saying we should not leave China until we'd settled this up.

In August 1949, the Communists said they would begin giving 25 applications a day for exit visas. They knew thousands wanted to leave. At night, around 2:00 o'clock in the morning, there would be long lines waiting. The first time I went, I waited eight hours in the rain. They'd open the door and let in so many. The Communists also wanted the populace to see the spectacle of foreigners lined up, sort of begging, especially the Americans.

So we decided we could play that game another way. We began to go downtown late at night with camp stools, cards, magazines, sandwiches, coffee, and just sit around and enjoy ourselves. The Chinese have a good sense of humor, and many of them were amused to see us out there gossiping, munching on sandwiches, as though at a picnic. So the Communists were losing face.

They said, "You have to have a guarantor to get out." One of our employees, Tommy Dunn, was my guarantor, and I was very happy about that. I remembered that later when he was an employee of ours in Hong Kong.

When I finally got in, the man behind the desk had some kind of list. He had on his Mao uniform and said I had to go to another office down the hall. I went there. Another man in a Mao uniform looked at his list and said, "You're not to leave China."

I said, "What are you talking about?"

He said, "You've got labor problems."

I said, "Oh, that. That's all settled. It's all done with."

He said, "I have this letter here from USIS employee. You have labor problems." So he said he had no record of any clearance. I would have to go to the Central Labor Bureau. That was over in Broadway Mansions, across Soochow creek.

I headed for that office. The man over there, I finally got to see, said, "Yes, they had been notified. Yes, I was correct." So I said, "Will you please give me a copy of the letter or else send it to the guy?"

He said, "No. I told you it's taken care of. It's taken care of."

So I went back to the first guy, and he was huffy. Here I was caught like a yo-yo between these two officials. Meanwhile, going back and forth, the machine guns would go off, I'd duck into a doorway. I remember once -- I'm tall -- and this short soldier with a bayonet, people all jammed together, had that damn bayonet practically in my throat.

Finally, I got one of our ex-employees to go out and round up enough of them to write another letter. I gave that to the official. So that was that, or so I thought.

We were only permitted to take out \$10 with us and one footlocker. It had to be inspected. When I took my footlocker down, my clothes were covered with a layer of three-by-five cards. I had planned to write a book about aviation in China. I knew many of these pilots. I had a lot of information about flying in China. Down at the wharf, one of the Communist officials came up, opened my footlocker, saw the cards, picked one up, looked at it, got a fistful, and three or four others came over. I could see the card he was holding. It was a description of an airfield, measurements, everything. I said, "Oh, Jesus Christ. That's going to do it." But this was one of those lucky things. They just threw the cards back and sealed it. Maybe they couldn't read it, I don't know.

The steamship, General Gordon, which had been a troop ship during the war, finally was permitted to come and get us. They had painted an enormous American flag on the top to keep off bombers. I had sailed on her once during the war. I went down and got in line to get on the ship. I had just got one foot on the gangway when a Communist got hold of me and said, "You've

got to come back here to a shed." In the shed was an official. He had a list. He said, "You're not supposed to leave China."

I said, "What?"

He said, again, about this labor thing. But I had a copy now of this precious letter, which I showed him. I was looking at him, this one man between me and freedom. Fortunately, he let me go.

We had decided, we men from the consulate, we would give our bunks to the women and children, so they assigned us way the hell down in the hold, some lousy spot. I decided I'd sleep on deck on top of some life preservers. We sailed away down the Yangtze River, didn't hit any mines. On the ocean it felt, as people always say, like the air was cleaner, that you could breathe. You were back in freedom.

I caught a plane in Tokyo and flew to San Francisco. My wife had boarded one of the President ships in Manila. I managed to get on the pilot's boat and run out under the Golden Gate and meet her and the children.

After I left China, it was estimated the Communists had established a domestic net of over 3 million full-time propagandists, not counting other millions of part-time workers. The Central Committee planned ultimately, I read, for party propagandists to form 1% of the Chinese population. The people call them mind doctors. The Communists had basic themes carried through every means of communication, tailoring materials to different localities and situations; finding new techniques to reach illiterate masses; blackboards put in every village in China for news and cartoons; town criers, men with megaphones spread the message; newspaper reading groups; plays; street plays; letter-writing campaigns; cartoon books, very effective; and they produced in 1950, 1,000 titles and over 5 million copies. Mukden, which before the takeover had 40 cartoon book stalls. Within two years the Communists had installed 459.

The thing of symbols was interesting to me. For example, the atomic bomb. They had a symbol for the atomic bomb. They were trying to say we were guilty of germ warfare. They had a retort with a skull to represent that. They did all kinds of things with the American flag -- skulls with stars, the stripes could become a cage for a prisoner, the Statue of Liberty could be wearing atomic bombs for a hat. These symbols were given to the people right down to every level so they'd understand them. It's rather amusing, if that's the word, from those days to this, how a lot of American protesters have picked up on these varied type symbols.

I returned to Washington in the fall of 1949, Prior to the takeover, there hadn't been much press coverage of China. The American people were utterly stunned by the Communist takeover. Of course, when I got back, as usual, nobody knew anything about USIS or our work over there, no matter whether a college president or a taxi driver.

**ELDEN B. ERICKSON**

**Clerk  
Mukden (1948-1950)**

*Elden B. Erickson was born in Kansas in 1919. He served in the U.S. Air Force and in the U.S. Army during World War II before joining the Foreign Service in 1946. His career included positions in China, Algeria, France, Laos, Japan, Lebanon, the Netherlands, Canada, and Germany. Mr. Erickson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1992.*

ERICKSON: In the Army I had taken a trip to Rome. I remember the price was \$21 for the whole round trip, including hotels, etc. It was sponsored by the military. I went to the Embassy in Rome on the Via Veneto and thought that would be a nice place to work. That gave me the idea so while I was teaching I wrote to the State Department and asked about overseas jobs. They sent me some kind of publication. It didn't say anything about the Foreign Service examination. I am not sure they were even giving it at that time.

Anyway, I filled out an application and within just a couple of months I got back a letter offering me employment as an FSS-14 at \$2160 a year plus approximately a \$1000 allowances. I was just working at the college and getting \$3000 a year and thought "Gee, that is \$160 more than I am getting now and I get to travel." So I sent a cable back and said that I would be happy to do this but had a contract with the college in Emporia until the end of the school year. They came back and said that was fine, just come when you are finished.

So, I did. They were just desperate for young people to go to China at that time. They were recruiting anyone off the streets practically...single men. So that is how I entered the Foreign Service.

*Q: Did you know when you came that you were going to go to China?*

ERICKSON: No, not at all. But as soon as I got to Washington I was put into a training course in the code room for people going to Russian-occupied China. We had to transmit messages through the Soviet Union at that time...from Manchuria. I was assigned to Dairen.

*Q: Basically you were going as a code clerk?*

ERICKSON: Well, it was clerk-general but we all had to have this code training. I thought I would go to China for a year and if I didn't like it I could go back to teaching which I knew I liked. I had no intention of pursuing a career at all.

*Q: You ended up in Mukden, how did you get there?*

ERICKSON: We had to have a visa for Dairen from the Russians. Personnel suggested that I take a ship to China because it usually took a long time to get a visa. They arranged everything for me. It took 45 days from New York via the Canal, Hawaii and the Philippines. I finally got to Shanghai in October 1947. I just waited there to get the visa. I was made the "meeter and greeter" so I met everybody who came into China via Shanghai. Also I was put in charge of the

Commissary and just worked as a general services officer in a sense to help out while waiting for the visa.

The visa never ever came. Again, I heard it was because of my problem with the communists that I had fired when I was military government officer. There was never an explanation or anything. Finally in February the Department gave up trying to get the visa and I was sent to Mukden.

*Q: Dairen was part of the old Port Arthur area of which the Soviets had control. What was the situation in China when you arrived?*

ERICKSON: The Communists had still not taken over any major city. The long march had taken place and they were moving out from there. By the time I arrived they had just captured Changchun in northern Manchuria. Edmund Club and Al Siebens were the two officers there so they had to be evacuated. Club went to Peking and Siebens came to Mukden. So they were already moving down from the north with the support of the Russians, of course. After Changchun fell, they kept coming closer to Mukden.

*Q: How did you get to Mukden?*

ERICKSON: Military plane.

*Q: When did you get there?*

ERICKSON: February 1948.

*Q: Was it a Consulate General?*

ERICKSON: Yes.

*Q: What was it like...the staffing, etc.?*

ERICKSON: There were five of us young fellows...clerks, plus a vice consul, Bill Stokes; another vice consul, Fred Hubbard and his secretary; Angus Ward, who was consul general; a Japanese-American who was maintenance officer. Angus wanted to maintain as large a staff as possible in case we were taken over. He wanted to be able to send one person out as courier every couple of months. We were all volunteers. He wouldn't keep anybody unless they volunteered to stay on.

*Q: I take it from what you are saying that you were getting ready for a long difficult spell?*

ERICKSON: Yes, it was obvious that that was what was coming. The government figured that we would be able to work on some sort of scale with the Communists or we would just be expelled and that would be it. They didn't anticipate what actually happened.

*Q: How long was it before the Communists came into Mukden?*

ERICKSON: I arrived in February and they didn't come in until the first of November. We (the Chinese Nationalists) had a million troops in the city so it was pretty active and congested. The Communists would move up to the perimeter of the city and then be forced back. It was just a kind of expanding and contracting of the defense perimeter.

*Q: What were you doing before the Communists took over?*

ERICKSON: Well, we had regular dealings with the Nationalist government -- political, military and economic. We had an aid program at the time too. We were flying in grain to try to support them. So it was a busy time. We weren't idle at all during this period.

*Q: I realize you were pretty much tied to the office but what was your impression of the Nationalist regime in that particular area?*

ERICKSON: We had very little confidence in the Nationalist regime. One, because of corruption and also, whenever the defense perimeter would get broader and Chiang Kai-shek thought he could have a major victory, he would come up to take charge and whenever he appeared everything collapsed, every single time. So as far as the Nationalists were concerned we really didn't have any confidence at all that they would keep the territory.

*Q: Was this sort of reporting going out?*

ERICKSON: Never.

*Q: What about Angus Ward at this time? How did he strike you the first few months you were there?*

ERICKSON: Well, he was very much in charge. Very imposing and autocratic. He had good contacts with the Chinese authorities. He was busy constantly either with the office or working on his dictionary. You probably have heard about that.

*Q: Yes, the famous dictionary which was in...*

ERICKSON: He had already done it in Chinese and Mongolian, and was in the process of making it trilingual to include Japanese. He employed, himself, a Japanese teacher to help with the Japanese side. But the whole thing was handwritten...big volume-like ledgers. It was really amazing. He had a card file that was unbelievable. All done by hand.

*Q: As the defense perimeter expanded and narrowed, how did you feel about the situation? As far as you know were there any feelers put out to the Communists forces?*

ERICKSON: Not as far as I know. I don't think we did.

*Q: What was your impression and view and experience in November 1948 when things changed?*

ERICKSON: The Communists came in on the first of November and we were very apprehensive. We were on the roof of the Consulate General when they came in. We could see them coming down the main street.

*Q: Had the Nationalist Army just plain pulled out?*

ERICKSON: They just evaporated. They were nowhere to be seen.

We went up to the roof of the Consulate and watched them start taking over the communications building which was about two blocks down. Then they came up to our area. I remember there was an old lady that they just shot and went right on. They saw us looking over the top of the building and they started shooting at us. Of course we then ducked down. They didn't at that point come into the building.

*Q: How had the Consul General prepared for this eventuality.*

ERICKSON: We had lots of food in tins and sacks and sacks of flour. Angus was afraid that we would get bored so we would have to take these 48 pound sacks of flour from one room to another. And then in a month or two we would move it all up to the second floor. A couple of months later we would move it bag by bag somewhere else. He said it was to keep the mites out, etc. But it was really to keep us busy. As much as we disliked doing that it really was a good idea. But it didn't make him all that popular.

*Q: Was Mrs. Ward there at that time?*

ERICKSON: She was there the whole time. They lived about four blocks from the Consulate General. The rest of us had moved into the Standard Oil Compound.

*Q: What happened?*

ERICKSON: That is another thing you mentioned ...preparation. We had had several houses and also apartments in the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank building. When we knew the Communists were coming in we all consolidated in the Standard Oil Compound.

*Q: When they came in how was contact made?*

ERICKSON: They just ignored us totally the first few days.

*Q: Did you walk out?*

ERICKSON: Our compound was just about two blocks away. We walked back and forth for the first 20 days. We were just totally free to do whatever we wanted.

*Q: Were we trying to make contact?*

ERICKSON: Yes, Angus was trying to make contact but he couldn't.

*Q: Were the British there and any others?*

ERICKSON: British and French. That was all.

*Q: Were they doing anything?*

ERICKSON: They didn't leave, but they didn't plan to leave. Even when we left a year later, they allowed us to turn over everything in the compound to the British. We had a walk through with Steventon, who was the top Brit at the time. That was the first contact we had had with the British except to wave over the wall or the gate or something like that.

They came in on November first. On November 20 they threw a cordon of guards around the Consulate building and around the Standard Oil Compound and Ward's residence. From then on we could only go with them. To go to the office they would come to the compound and march us with pistols in our back to the Consulate. We would have to show our lunch and they would inspect it, etc. Then they would bring us back in the evening. Only half of us would go each day so no one was isolated.

*Q: What were you doing?*

ERICKSON: Nothing, but we were showing the flag, pretending to be carrying on normally. We were moving flour part of the time.

They always gave us the newspapers. In the beginning the Chinese staff still came to work. We were translating. It was very interesting what was in the press at that time. So we were doing that. And we sent messages the first twenty days, but after that, nothing.

*Q: How about that? Didn't we have wireless connections?*

ERICKSON: We had transmitters.

*Q: Was that forbidden after that?*

ERICKSON: Well, they came and took all the equipment away. They went into every house, every room, everywhere and got any radios, anything electronic. That was the pretext for clamping down. That we were doing unauthorized transmitting.

*Q: Wasn't there some kind of accusation against Angus Ward?*

ERICKSON: That came later.

*Q: Was there any protest?*

ERICKSON: There was protest but they didn't recognize the American Consulate, the American Government, that America even existed. They stated that they didn't recognize America or the

Consulate General. They just flatly said so. After the 20th they would come to the office and demand the radio equipment and this and that. And, of course, Angus stood absolutely solid against their commands.

*Q: Was there any way to get word out at all?*

ERICKSON: Not at all. We were totally incommunicado after the 20th. Nothing in or out.

*Q: How did you feel about this after a while?*

ERICKSON: Well, mostly apprehensive. We were afraid at times too, but it was more a wondering of what would happen.

*Q: How long did the Chinese staff stay?*

ERICKSON: I can't remember exactly. They were told very soon after we were locked up to not have any more communication with us. They still lived in the servants quarters in the compound and they would bring eggs and various things because we had no way at that point to go to the market. Although we did have canned food in the commissary. The servants would leave eggs and fresh vegetables in the basement and we would go down and find them in the morning. But we couldn't talk to them or have any communication with them. They didn't dare, and we didn't want to jeopardize their status.

*Q: How was Mrs. Ward during this period of time?*

ERICKSON: She stayed at home at the residence all the time. As long as Angus was there he went home every day.

*Q: Were you still being marched back and forth?*

ERICKSON: The whole time. But you weren't sure when they would come or if they would come. Sometimes they didn't and you just didn't go.

*Q: You waited for them to escort you?*

ERICKSON: We got very snotty with them. I would make a sandwich to take and would shove it in front of them to take a look at it and say "Hsiao palu" ("little Communist"). They were furious but couldn't do anything with us without instructions.

*Q: Were there any anti-American demonstrations?*

ERICKSON: Oh yes. Every single day. Singing and parades all along the side of our compound. I still can sing their little chant -- without communism there will be no China. Two or three hours every day in the beginning.

Another thing that was rather terrifying in the beginning was that every night we were bombed

by the Nationalists. That was ironic too. Here we were being bombed by our own planes. We were hit one evening, quite a few of the windows blown out. Ralph Rehberg was hit and also Franco Cicogna. I remember picking glass with tweezers out of their lips, etc.

We had a regular drill to put water in the bath tub and open all the windows because of concussion. It was already getting cold.

*Q: And, of course, that is a very cold area up there. Did you get the feeling that nobody cared or knew the situation?*

ERICKSON: Yes. We had no knowledge otherwise. It was an eerie sensation. It went on and on. Then they cut off our electricity which cut off our water supply. And we had no fuel. You couldn't take a bath because there was no hot water. You just put on layers of clothing like the Chinese did. They didn't take our clothing away. Each week we were permitted to write a list in Chinese of what we wanted and give it to a couple who would come to the gate. But we couldn't speak to them. We kept ordering needles because our clothes were wearing out. The servants had done all the mending before. So that really became an important thing, to have a needle. Thread was another item.

But it was really the cold that I remember the worst. It would get 40 below and that was really cold. Then the pump would freeze. We didn't have any running water, of course. We would bake bread and the cockroaches would practically line the bread pans as it was rising. We would bake it with the cockroaches in it and then just slice the sides off...they didn't get inside the bread.

What did we do? We played bridge. We didn't have any electricity and nights start very early in the winter time. We did get candles and that was all we had. We played pinochle five days and couldn't stand it any longer so started playing bridge. They always let us buy Vodka. The vegetables -- carrots and cabbage -- we got most of the time... meat, from time to time, but it would be full of straw and dirt. However, we would just wash it up and boil it well. We were never hungry. And I think that is important in maintaining at least a modicum of morale. If you are cold and hungry that is a lot worse than being just cold.

*Q: Did the authorities ever try taking a person out and threaten to kill them?*

ERICKSON: They did the Chinese. They would even accuse them of taking "capitalist" baths. Eventually one night they were all taken away. We never were able to say goodby. We had no idea, as far as I know, what happened to any of them.

*Q: You mentioned that there was a Japanese-American there.*

ERICKSON: He was an American citizen, Tatsumi.

*Q: Yes, but obviously being oriental. Did this cause him any particular problem?*

ERICKSON: There is another time frame when Angus Ward and four others were taken away and put in solitary confinement, Tatsumi was treated much worse than any of the others. They

would tell him that Angus Ward was killing his wife and his children and they would have people outside, women, who would scream pretending that all of this was going on. So as far as mental torture was concern, he was probably the worst off. The five of them were in solitary confinement for four weeks. They were taken from the compound, put in solitary and then returned after four weeks. Then they were tried as criminals for assaulting one of our Chinese employees. There was lots in the Communist paper about that.

*Q: This a very common type of accusation.*

ERICKSON: There was nothing to it. He, Chi Yuheng, had been put up to it. He was a very nice man. He wouldn't ever have done this. But he came up to demand his severance pay. Ward said that he had quit and escorted him out. The press said that Ward was so rough on him that he lost control of his bladder. Also that Ward had mistreated him, etc. This was a criminal charge according to the Chinese. I think that was in April 1949.

*Q: What happened when they came in and took five people away? How many of you were left?*

ERICKSON: There were nine of us including the dependents, no, thirteen.

*Q: What were your thoughts?*

ERICKSON: We didn't know if they were coming back. When Angus was taken out to the truck, he insisted I come along. I still did my shorthand. Every time he had a meeting with the Communists I took it all down in shorthand. So when he was taken out forcefully from the Consulate with the other four, he said, "Erickson, you come along with your notebook." I had my notebook and went out the front door and towards the weapons carrier, or whatever, and the Communists kept saying "You can't go. You can't go." And to him, "You go, move on. You go, move on." We got finally just to the truck and they took their bayonets and pushed me right back into the Consulate. Angus said, "You better go back." So I escaped all the trouble, really.

*Q: This must have left you feeling very isolated, even more?*

ERICKSON: Yes. We had no idea what would happen to us, to them, to anybody. They were tried as criminals. So we were very surprised to see them back four weeks later.

*Q: Was anyone in charge during that time?*

ERICKSON: Well, Bill Stokes was in charge.

*Q: But you were reading about this in the Chinese papers?*

ERICKSON: No, not at that time.

*Q: But you really had no feel as to what was happening?*

ERICKSON: We were just too isolated.

*Q: When they came back in April, then how long did you remain?*

ERICKSON: In June we were charged with espionage. Up to that time we were just there, not charged with anything. I made some notes at the time:

June 1 - the radio announced that we had been closed.

June 6 - we got a telephone call and letter from Shanghai. I don't know what that said.

June 7 - a letter from Club.

*Q: Were these your first letters from anybody?*

ERICKSON: Yes. We hadn't heard anything from anybody until that time.

June 20 - we were charged with being spies and read about it in the newspaper.

Then there was a trial and we were charged with espionage and Bill Stokes was permitted to attend the trial.

*Q: You were involved?*

ERICKSON: Yes, I was charged with espionage. They had the finding ready before the trial so it went very fast.

*Q: How did this trial work?*

ERICKSON: Only Stokes was there. They just read off all the charges and the findings and that was it. All of it was bilingual in Chinese and Japanese.

We didn't know when Stokes left for the trial what would happen to him either.

The economic and administrative people got three years in prison. Angus and the political people -- Stokes, Hubbard -- got five years, as I recall.

All the sentences were commuted to immediate deportation and banishment forever from the Peoples Republic. That was it.

But time went on and on...

*Q: Stokes came back with the results. Were you feeling that you were going to end up in jail at that time?*

ERICKSON: Well, we felt we would, yes. That was the decision.

*Q: At this point, what were you thinking about a Foreign Service career?*

ERICKSON: I thought I would decide after a year in the Foreign Service as to whether I would stay in, well, I was locked up the whole second year. I wasn't thinking about my career at all, just of staying alive.

*Q: So this trial came in June. Then what happened?*

ERICKSON: We just sat there and waited. Occasionally we would get a message or something from Club in Peking. But no movement one way or another. When they did finally come I think we said that we wouldn't leave without our things. They said, "You can't take your personal belongings."

But finally one day they came in December 1949 and said to be ready to go in 24 hours. We could take 20 kilos each. Everything else was to be left behind. Of course we had to take the cats and dogs. Our captors came early one morning in December and it was cold. We got into an open personnel carrier with soldiers at all four corners covering us with rifles. After we climbed in three more came with pistols to cover us from behind. We got down to the railroad station and there was a big semicircle of military or police. We got on board this horse car with six big stalls in it and cold as the devil.

*Q: This was the entire staff including Angus?*

ERICKSON: Well, before that the Communists came one day around noon and said that all of the foreign staff that we had had to leave within the hour. We were not able to speak to them, so they all left. This included people we had lived with for a year. We had grown very close and fond of all of them. We could not even say goodbye to them. All of us broke down and cried, even Angus.

*Q: Who were these people?*

ERICKSON: There was a Russian administrative assistant, Elizabeth Butinski; accounts and disbursing assistant, Vladimir Petukhov; a German; a Czech; and another Russian, Sibagatoola Muhamedzan.

*Q: A man in USIS...*

ERICKSON: Yes, Mr. Bodinhaus, a German who was married to a Chinese and lived outside. He came and used the library a lot. When we were surrounded and locked up he was included. He never was permitted to have contact the whole period with his family.

The Communists said that the authorities of their countries asked that they be turned over to them.

*Q: I take it most of the Russians were White Russians?*

ERICKSON: Oh yes, very anti-Communist.

*Q: So this was...*

ERICKSON: They had all come with the Army to the East and when the Revolution succeeded they came into China and had been there since the First World War.

*Q: Did you hear whatever happened to them?*

ERICKSON: Petukhov, the disbursing agent, managed to get out and go to Australia.

The Russian, Sibagatoola Muhamedzan, was one of the nicest persons I have ever known. He and his wife used to take children off the street who were starving and I think they had 11 or 12 children they had picked up and were boarding. He was just a maintenance man, a low paid employee. We heard that when he got out, when he was taken away, he committed suicide because the authorities wouldn't give him anything to eat for the children and the only way to get stuff for the children was to have him commit suicide.

But that was the worst, saddest day of the whole incarceration, when they all were forced to leave the Consulate.

*Q: Well, then all the Americans left. Was Ward and Mrs. Ward with you then? Did you all go together?*

ERICKSON: Yes. When he was in solitary confinement for those four weeks I went over and stayed with her. They permitted me to do that.

*Q: Then you were put on a train...*

ERICKSON: We went to Tientsin. It was forty hours. There was an aisle and six stalls. All the windows were open despite the cold. Guards walked back and forth the whole time. We didn't know where we were going when we were put on the train. We thought we might actually be going to Siberia. We were told to bring enough food for 48 hours. Fortunately we did go to Tientsin rather than Siberia.

*Q: What happened in Tientsin?*

ERICKSON: All the consulates in China were still open at that time. They had sent Phil Manhard over from Peking to Tientsin. The Chinese made one person be responsible that we would not commit any crimes, etc. He was made that person. When we arrived at the train station, one by one we got off and had to go through a little building and sign documents that we had been well treated and had all our belongings. None of us could read it, but Phil Manhard said to go ahead and sign. We all got out and were turned over to the custody of the Tientsin Consulate General. We had to stay in their homes and promise not to go out. We could have no communication with anybody.

So we were there just a couple of days and then we had to go down to the waterfront and board a little tug. There had been an arrangement for the Lakeland Victory to pick us up out at Taku Bar but we had to go up the Hai River out to open water to board.

*Q: There was an interview that was done by Marshall Green of Phil Manhard on this. He talked about first there was reluctance on the US part to get a ship. He said, "Listen you had better get a ship in here or otherwise your name will be mud."*

ERICKSON: We got in the tug. We had to go down into the hold and it was dark and small and we were seated around like this. We got on Sunday afternoon and didn't get out to the ship until Monday morning. We couldn't move. My knees swelled. There were no toilet facilities. It was just a totally miserable trip. When we finally got there they let Angus Ward get off and go on board the ship with the Chinese. The ship was loaded with reporters who had all the good quarters. We had to take what was left over.

When some of the photographers started taking pictures, the Chinese then said they had to return the film, otherwise they were going to take us back. In the meantime, all except Angus were still stuffed in the hold. Time went on. We thought we weren't even going to get off now. We never knew what the next step was going to be throughout this whole affair. Finally one of the photographers ripped his film out and handed it over to the Chinese with a big gesture and that satisfied them, face saving for them. Finally they let us get out of the tug and go on board the ship.

*Q: What sort of reception did you get? Were you hemmed in by news people?*

ERICKSON: They were after us the whole time. We resented it because we had to double up in small places so that they could have the nicer rooms. They would come at midnight to ask questions.

*Q: Had you been put under instructions not to talk?*

ERICKSON: Yes. Don't talk about anything because it would endanger the people who were still there. We still had Hugh Redman, CIA, there. He was in the detachment at Mukden, but the rest had pulled out long before. But he stayed on for some reason. He finally died in prison there. I think his mother went over a couple of times to see him.

And Tientsin and Peking were still staffed, etc. Anything we said really could endanger people. We were told that right in the beginning. I think Angus probably had instructions to tell us. Especially when we got back to Washington. We were told to be careful to just tell the facts and not speculate.

*Q: How did you find your reception back at Washington? I think we are better now, but there has been a tendency that if any people get into trouble because of the situation, to sort of avoid them. Did you feel any of that when you came back? Or maybe you were too new to the Service to sense this?*

ERICKSON: I was new to the Service and hadn't held a very high position. The publicity was tremendous. We stopped in Korea and got to Yokohama and there MacArthur turned the military inside out to help us. We were met with a band at the pier. We were all given cars and chauffeurs, cards to the PX and the drivers were told to take us anywhere we wanted to go. We were really treated like top VIPs. They had flown in special cat food for Jeep, Saki, Saihan and Ranger, the Ward's cats.

*Q: You might talk a little about them to give a feel for Ward's cats.*

ERICKSON: Well, the Wards adored animals, but especially these four pets. My house mate, Wally Norman, and I would go occasionally to the Wards to lunch. They had a long wooden table. The cats would eat at one end and we would eat at the other end. We had cat hair in the soup, etc. They had a Chinese scroll with pictures of pheasants on it and the cats would race across the room and claw the pheasants.

*Q: You were mentioning before we were on tape about a telegram that went out.*

ERICKSON: Oh, about the cat house. He wanted to be able to transport the cats when we left Mukden and he sent a cable to Shanghai saying, "Request whereabouts cat house left Shanghai such and such a date." I don't remember the reply.

Another perennial telegram going out to Tehran was, "What happened to case number forty eight of a certain kind of salmon?"

*Q: He had been to Tehran before?*

ERICKSON: Yes, that was his post before. It was the Cat Lovers Society of America who had flown in this cat food to Yokohama especially for Ward's cats.

*Q: What was Angus Ward's background?*

ERICKSON: He was from Allegan, Michigan. A kind of backwoodsman type, but very intelligent. I don't know how he got interested in Russian. He was a Russian expert. Irmgard was Finnish, and had gone to school in Leningrad. She often said, "A royal school for noble children."

*Q: Mrs. Loy Henderson also...*

ERICKSON: Was she Finnish or Russian?

*Q: I think Estonian, but she had also gone to the same school.*

ERICKSON: Well, it was THE school.

That is all about the cats except that when I was back in Washington and they were still in Michigan, he called me and asked me to find a place to stay when they came to Washington that

would take the cats. I went to every hotel in downtown Washington and never found a place that would take the cats. Finally they left them with his brother in Michigan.

*Q: When you got back were you getting any feel for the advent of McCarthyism or had this started at that time?*

ERICKSON: No. That didn't happen until I went to Algiers, my next post.

*Q: What did you do when you got back to Washington?*

ERICKSON: First, I checked into Personnel because I needed to get back to Kansas. It was two or three days before Christmas of 1949. So I went to Personnel and they said, "Well, we can't give you home leave because you haven't been out of the country for two years." I said, "Where have I been?" They said, "According to your records you have only been...." I then became rather sarcastic and showed them I had been out two years. I don't know if they didn't count Mukden as being overseas or what.

Two of us flew back. All the rest took a ship back to the States. Jack Feigal and I wanted to be home for Christmas. When we got here Assistant Secretary Butterworth called us in and welcomed us home. I don't feel that there was any ignoring of us. I think they were so glad to have the problem settled.

At the press conference for the two of us they kept asking hadn't it affected us, how did we feel, weren't we nervous? I said, "No." And the next day the Washington Post had a big headline: "Erickson says nerves on edge." I kept insisting that was not true.

Afterwards I flew to Kansas City and my brother and his wife met me there. Again there were reporters at the station but we avoided them. We drove the 200 miles to Concordia. We even stopped for lunch...my picture was in every local paper in Kansas and the people recognized me and wanted to give us a free lunch. It was a very well-known incident at the time. It was before TV.

*Q: At that point how did you feel about the Foreign Service?*

ERICKSON: Well, it is foolish now as I look back on it, but I became very idealistic and very anti-communist and wanted to do anything to really eliminate communism. When they asked me where I wanted to go I said, "I will go to any border country and do anything I can..."

*Q: I think this is one of the things we are trying to do, to reconstruct the period. You had a heavy dose of what we saw as the problem with a communist regime. Most of the people of our generation, this was essentially what their careers were about.*

ERICKSON: Well, they laughed at me. They really did think I was foolish to want to go back. They thought there must have been something wrong with me. And there probably was. Anyhow that is how I felt at the time.

**JOHN H. HOLDRIDGE**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Foreign Service Institute (Washington, DC), Cornell University (Ithaca, New York), and**  
**Harvard University (Cambridge, Massachusetts)**  
**(1948-1951)**

**Chinese Language Officer, USIS**  
**Bangkok, Thailand (1951-1956)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1953-1956)**

**Political Officer**  
**Singapore (1956-1958)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1958-1962)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1962-1966)**

**National Security Council**  
**Washington, DC (1969-1973)**

**Deputy Chief of Mission, American Liaison Office**  
**Beijing (1973-1975)**

**Assistant Secretary, Bureau for East Asian and Pacific Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1981-1982)**

*Ambassador John H. Holdridge was born in New York in 1924. He graduated from the US Military Academy in 1945 and served as a 1<sup>st</sup> lieutenant overseas until 1948. He joined the Foreign Service in 1948. His overseas posts include Bangkok, Beijing, Hong Kong, Peking, and Singapore. He was the ambassador to Singapore from 1975 to 1978 and to Indonesia from 1982 to 1986. Ambassador Holdridge was interviewed by Marshall Green and Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989 and by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.*

*Q: John Holdridge has had a remarkable career. He is one of the two people I know who is a West Point graduate and who ended up in the State Department. Hank Byroade is the other one.*

*Ambassador Holdridge has been my colleague on three occasions. First, I was regional planning advisor for East Asia back in the late 1950s. During that time, he was the Department's intelligence officer dealing with that part of the world.*

*My second encounter with him is when I was consul general in Hong Kong from 1961 to 1963. He was chief of the political section all during the time I was there and for some time after that.*

*The third encounter was quite a famous one. It had to do with the time when he was working for Henry Kissinger in the National Security Council as specialist on China affairs. He also helped to arrange for Henry Kissinger's miraculous visit to China, behind the backs of most of us in the State Department. During that time, I was the assistant secretary for that part of the world. He and I eventually accompanied President Nixon out to China. Thereafter, John and I visited all the posts in East Asia to enlighten the leaders in that part of the world with regard to our China policy.*

*John remained in the Service. Subsequently, he served as ambassador in Singapore, assistant secretary of state, and ambassador to Indonesia, retiring finally in January 1986.*

*John, as a West Point graduate and as one who had fought in World War II with the Army, how did you get into China specialization?*

HOLDRIDGE: It was a rather circuitous route. Unfortunately, I graduated from West Point in June of 1945 and I missed the fighting. What I saw was the aftermath of World War II -- the picking up of the pieces.

My first introduction came through Army connections. My father was an Army officer stationed in the Philippines. In those days, all good Army officers were paid enough and saved quite a bit on the Philippine economy. They saved up their money and went up to China just before they returned home.

It was possible to pick up the Army transport at Qinhuangdao Shandong. We went first to Hong Kong, Canton, and Shanghai. We then went to Japan for a couple of weeks --

*Q: How old were you?*

HOLDRIDGE: I was eleven. Then we went to Beijing via Tientsin for the period of early March to early May. This is all in 1937, just as the Japanese war was beginning to generate. In fact, we traveled on a Japanese ship serving as a troop transport from Osaka to New Port, or XinGang as it is now called. It was just loaded to the gunnels with Japanese troops. It was an Osaka Shosen Kaishan ship, which I am sure you are familiar with.

In the city of Beijing itself you could feel a sort of tenseness. We stayed at a place called the College of Chinese Studies, which was cheap. We always looked for something less expensive. Missionaries and businessmen came there to learn to speak Chinese. It was located in the Tartar City in the northeastern quadrant of Beijing, very close to where the foreign ministry today is, in fact.

One of my early memories of that place was seeing the Japanese troops marching through the old city walls, since torn down, for exercises. The Japanese presence was all over the place. I ran

into some Chinese Army language officers at that time and fell in love with Beijing. I resolved that, if I ever had the chance, I would learn Chinese.

After graduation from West Point, I was sent to Korea and spent two and a half years there and came back. I had taken my Foreign Service exams while in Korea, thinking that this might be something --

*Q: This is Korea before the war?*

HOLDRIDGE: This was in 1947. I spent those several years in Korea primarily as an engineer officer. Dick Ericson, whom you may recall, was the only other member of the group of several hundred who took the exams and who passed, as far as I know, and who came into the Foreign Service.

Coming back to Washington, I had been informed shortly before my time was up in Korea that I had passed the exams and that I could go in, if I could pass the orals. I went from Fort Belvoir, where I was assigned, to take the orals in Washington, D. C. Old Joe Green was the head of the Board of Examiners and I passed. It took me two months to get in instead of the two years that it sometimes takes now. Shortly after I became a Foreign Service officer, I was asked if I wanted to take Chinese language training. I was in the FSI at that time. I jumped at it.

*Q: So they gave you the offer of Chinese? You didn't go to them?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes.

*Q: This is early 1948 that you are talking about.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. I joined the Foreign Service in May of 1948 and left the Army in March. While I was in the FSI, the usual problems cropped up. They had money for instruction but no money for travel. They couldn't send people back from overseas. They snatched up some of the younger guys who were available and asked if they wanted to take Chinese language or other languages. In fact, I found myself in a class essentially with Japanese language officers, Owens Zurhellen and Dave Osborn and Ed Seidensticker.

*Q: A lot of my colleagues with whom I had gone to Boulder (U.S. Navy Japanese Language School).*

HOLDRIDGE: That's right. They were graduates of Boulder, to a man. I was the only Chinese officer among them. I went on from FSI to Cornell and then to Harvard, studying Chinese all this time. That is how I got into the business. I had this predisposition going back to 1937. In 1948, the Foreign Service gave me the opportunity, which I took gladly.

*Q: You really had three years of language study, didn't you? It was FSI, Cornell, and Harvard.*

HOLDRIDGE: Well, I did because the FSI course was a compressed one-year course into a couple of months. Then I went on into Chinese at Cornell. That included literary Chinese. We

were studying the characters in newspaper Chinese and the works.

*Q: Was Harvard the same thing?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. Again, we studied Legg's Classics.

*Q: You really had a good immersion in Chinese language, didn't you?*

HOLDRIDGE: The problem was that, in my judgement, they concentrated too much on the literature and the written Chinese and not enough on the spoken. It took me quite a while to fit into --

*Q: That was exactly my problem with studying Japanese. Your first assignment was to Bangkok.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. There I was Chinese language officer for, of all things, USIS. I was the most junior officer in the embassy there, but I had an area of concern which was the very large Chinese population in Thailand. At that time, they thought it was useful to make a distinction between the Thai Thai and the Chinese Thai.

*Q: They got along pretty well with each other, didn't they?*

HOLDRIDGE: It's the only country in Southeast Asia where you find the religious situation is compatible. That is, the Thai are Buddhists. They happen to be Theravada Buddhists. The Chinese are Buddhists who happen to be Mahayana Buddhists. There is no prejudice on religious grounds. The practices aren't, of course, exactly similar.

*Q: Didn't they force the Thai Chinese to take Thai names, that is, to give up their Chinese names?*

HOLDRIDGE: They did that. Indeed, the Chinese were much more separate until 1926 when the then king of Thailand -- I think it was King Prajaitipok -- decided that this was intolerable and that there had to be a reduction in Chineseness and an increase in Thainess. This is when they took Chinese names, and language instruction in Chinese was curtailed rather drastically.

*Q: That went way back to 1926?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. That started in 1926.

*Q: Were you able to do much in terms of foreign policy?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. I issued pamphlets. They were all very strongly anti-Chinese Communist at that time, which is rather ironic considering what came later. We probably made the egregious error of raising the Chinese Communist threat to the point where it seemed like a big bugaboo -- "Stick with us fellows and we'll take care of you." However, there was always that little question mark.

*Q: You were there for three years and then went on to Hong Kong.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. There I started out as one of the interviewers of people who were then leaving China mainland in large numbers -- businessmen and quite a few of the Catholic padres. This was in 1953.

*Q: Most of the people had fled China already, hadn't they?*

HOLDRIDGE: The missionaries stayed on as long as they possibly could. Do you remember Bob Aylward? Well, their good friends were the Ricketts. They had stayed on even though they had been on house arrest. They were teaching out at Yenching , later Beijing Daxueh, or University, in Beijing. They came out at that time, around 1954.

*Q: Was your job as a political officer in Hong Kong related to this problem of getting missionaries out of China?*

HOLDRIDGE: It was not getting them out but to pump them of their information as to what was going on in China. I was a debriefer essentially. Later on, after that phase was over, I became in charge of the press monitoring unit.

*Q: Yes. This, I think, served a great purpose in foreign policy. When I was in Hong Kong, I recall that we had about 21 people in that translation unit, and several times a year we were putting out about 800 copies of translations. Was that true back in 1953?*

HOLDRIDGE: That was true then. We were the beneficiaries of some very fortunate circumstances. Quite a few of the Chinese analysts and interpreters/translators, who had been with the consulate general in Beijing and even in Shanghai, were able to make it out. They set up shop with the American consulate general in Hong Kong. We had, in effect, an institutional memory.

*Q: You were also getting lots of newspapers, magazines, letters, and things like that.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. It was mostly newspapers and magazines. Part of the press monitoring unit at the time was publications procurement. We had one officer on the staff, Al Harding, who was the publications procurement officer. We went around and managed to get papers from all over.

*Q: The British authorities in Hong Kong were also debriefing the Chinese refugees who were coming in, weren't they?*

HOLDRIDGE: That's quite right.

*Q: Did you have access to their information?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. Since it is 30 years and more since that time, I can say that we cooperated quite fully.

*Q: We really had a tremendous wealth of information about what was going on in China, which was probably superior to anything outside of China anywhere in the world.*

HOLDRIDGE: That was our feeling. One of the things I always felt is that, during this period when we didn't have relations with China, we did not lack for actual information as to what was going on. We were able to keep up with the internals and some of the problems quite well, even though it was like the old Chinese doctor treating one of the emperor's concubines. He couldn't see the woman directly, but he sat behind a screen and she described her symptoms to him. Then he had this little carved ivory doll which he could use. . .[Laughter]

*Q: It's interesting because, when you were in Hong Kong getting this flow of information, I was in Sweden. I was the first secretary of the embassy in Sweden. I had very good contacts with the Swedish foreign office, whose ambassador in China was picking up magazines -- such as railroad magazines, etc. and things which were unclassified -- and making them available to me. I would then make them available back to the Department. I was contributing a little bit to this flow of information about the great mysteries of what was going on inside of China.*

HOLDRIDGE: I claim credit for one piece of reporting which I think was rather foresighted. In 1956, before I left Hong Kong, I was transferred to Singapore as political officer and head of the political section.

In April of 1956, the Chinese established what was called the Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet. They had quite a conclave of senior people -- the Chinese leading official whose name I can't remember, the Dalai Lama, etc. The Dalai Lama made a speech which was carried intact in the Chinese press which we, of course, translated. It was also released in English version, in the New China News Agency version in English.

A comparison of the two, which I made, showed that there were some very significant omissions from the Chinese in the English version. For example, the Dalai Lama was quoted as saying that the Chinese had built many roads in Tibet, and he was very grateful for this development of his country. He went on to say, "However, in the course of the construction of these roads, many of our people gave up their valuable lives, and we send our sincere condolences to the families of these people."

In other words, there was something wrong there. There were a number of other spots in that where you could see that the Chinese had overridden religious scruples. They had changed the social system, and there were deep resentments.

Before I left in 1956, I wrote this one dispatch -- we don't write dispatches anymore since everything goes by cable. I came to the conclusion that the Chinese were having a real problem in maintaining their control in Tibet. If they thought they had it hand, they were "whistling in the dark."

Later on, I saw a British evaluation of my report. They said, "No, no, no. This guy is way off base."

But this was three years before the Dalai Lama -- the Khambas -- revolted in Tibet and the Dalai Lama fled with his whole entourage. He's been in India and other places in the world ever since. I feel that this is the kind of thing you could do --

*Q: Don't you think, John, in retrospect that writing these dispatches contributed a great deal to the maturing of your own judgement by focusing in greater depth on the issue, rather than by flashing off these telegrams one after the other.*

HOLDRIDGE: Absolutely. This was because you had to think. You couldn't just look at the superficial aspects of it. You had to stop and ponder, considering what this was going to mean now, in a few years from now, or later on down the road.

*Q: Then there was a studious effort by the State Department, too, to commend those officers who turned in meritorious reports. Therefore, you realized that there was some recognition. There was a kind of incentive, in other words, to work hard in your job because it was rewarded in the form of Departmental recognition which, obviously, led to possible better jobs.*

*In Singapore -- again, you had a Chinese community. I assume that is why you were assigned to a city seventy-three per cent Chinese.*

HOLDRIDGE: That's right.

*Q: Did you conduct much of your work in Chinese?*

HOLDRIDGE: I tried to keep up with my Chinese as much as possible. In Singapore, English was and remains the language of government and business. When I first got there, though, the big problem was the clash between exponents of Chinese culture and education and the British colonial establishment -- essentially, the schools that had been set up by the British missionaries or others who taught in English. An example is Raffles College. I hadn't been there but a few weeks when the riots occurred in 1956. It was then that the Chinese community challenged the colonial authorities, who would have none of it, over the issue of Chinese education and culture. They (the British) had battalions they brought in from all over Malaya, despite the emergency. They were not at all reluctant to use force. They put that Chinese disturbance down very promptly.

*Q: What was that disturbance aiming to achieve?*

HOLDRIDGE: It was to establish Chinese as an accepted language of business, commerce, and government in Singapore.

*Q: Many years later you were ambassador to Singapore. By that time had English and Chinese become co-equal officially?*

HOLDRIDGE: The funny part of it was that, once the Chinese won the battle, they did get Chinese accepted as an equal language, along with English, Tamil, and Malay. Then Chinese became an official language.

Once that was accomplished, the Chinese began to send all their kids to the English track because that was where all the money was to be made.

*Q: Of course, back in 1953 Singapore was not a separate country. It was part of Malaya.*

HOLDRIDGE: We used to have great arguments. Elbridge Durbrow was my consul general for a good part of the time. Derby, of course, is a very strong personality. In theory, Singapore was responsible for the consulate general in Kuala Lumpur. The two consuls general did not get along very well. There was some real tension there. In August of 1957, Malaya became independent. Singapore was not a part of it. It remained a British crown colony.

The problem has always been in that area of the world the population, the communal difficulties between the Malays who, in theory, are the preponderant race, and the Chinese who had moved in and established a very strong position in the business commercial world. Economically speaking, the Malays were way behind.

Singapore was kept different. When Malaya was established, the Malayan leaders, the Tungku did not want Singapore in. This was because it might tip the balance in favor of Chinese preponderance. The way that question was eventually resolved was that Sarawak and North Borneo were also brought into Malaysia. This was somewhere in 1965. All these various components were brought in so that there would be a Malay, or a non-Chinese, majority.

*Q: This brings us back to roughly 1958 when you went back to be in charge of Chinese affairs at the State Department.*

HOLDRIDGE: I wasn't in charge. I was one of the spear carriers. [Laughter]

*Q: How long were you back there?*

HOLDRIDGE: That was 1958 to 1962. I was in the old Office of Chinese Affairs.

*Q: Who was the head of the spear carriers at that time?*

HOLDRIDGE: Ed Martin was for a good part of the time. Larry Lutkins, who had been my boss and head of the political section in my first tour in Hong Kong, was the number two.

*Q: This was in FE.*

HOLDRIDGE: This was FE -- Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and Office of Chinese Affairs. Ed Martin was the head for a period that was the most extensive and the most important, because the Taiwan Strait crisis came along about that time.

*Q: The focus was so much on Taiwan. China almost meant Taiwan in those days. Hong Kong was, obviously, directed towards the mainland. Otherwise, in the Bureau most of the officers were working on Taiwan.*

HOLDRIDGE: Well, we were defending the integrity of Taiwan. I hate to think of how many thousands of man-hours went into defending Taiwan's position in the United Nations and other international organizations, as well as making sure that the budget carried a sufficient amount of military assistance for Taiwan. We also had the AID program going, which was remarkably successful development assistance and which eventually reached the point where Taiwan became self-sufficient, economically speaking.

*Q: When you get back to the period of 1958 to 1962, that was the time of Walter Robertson. He dominated the China field. He was very much of a Sino-centric when it came to East Asian policy. I found that, while writing speeches for him, they would only pass muster if I pledged allegiance to Chiang Kai-shek.*

HOLDRIDGE: Walter Spencer Robertson III, a Richmond lawyer, was a devoted, dedicated anti-communist. In those days, that was quite all right. In fact, it was the thing to do. I can remember Walter Robertson always talking about the Chinese Communists and how they had killed 20 million people. This was the era of the Committee of Two Million in the United States, Congressman Walter Judd, Senator Knowland from Oakland, California, and Admiral Radford, commander of the Seventh Fleet. Actually, he was CINCPAC at that time. This is the environment in which we labored. Of course, McCarthy was floating around in the background.

We had at this moment the Taiwan Strait crisis in this period 1958 to 1962. The first element of it was the Chinese Communists threatened to take the Dachen Islands, which are a little chain of islands in the Taiwan Strait. They were terribly exposed, and the United States persuaded Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate the Dachens in 1953.

In 1958 there was the second crisis. Marshall Green was very much involved in this one as regional planning adviser. I have to give Marshall credit for an enormous contribution to American foreign policy, and that was the Dulles-Chiang Kai-shek communiqué that came out in October of 1958. I have always admired this. This is the one in which the wording was something along the lines that Taiwan was the repository, in effect, of the values of the Chinese people, but it was not, in effect, China. This was a kind of parenthetical statement that wasn't there. It went on to say that we supported Chiang Kai-shek's ambitions to restore freedom to the people on the mainland, but this was to be accomplished mainly by political means and not the use of force. That is Marshall Green's contribution.

*Q: I am glad you mentioned this because I did not mention it in my contribution to the oral history. I do recall very well drafting that. The return of the mainland lay in the hearts and the minds of the Chinese people. The idea was that Taiwan was the temporary repository of the culture, wisdom, and history of China. It would eventually be embraced in all of China.*

HOLDRIDGE: In drafting this and giving this particular thrust to it, was there opposition or forces who were trying to get us to say something different?

*Q: No, there wasn't. The problem here was that Dulles was about to go out on a trip to Taiwan. This is at what appeared to be the end of the firing on the offshore islands. There had been a*

*complete lull. He was going to sign a communiqué with Chiang Kai-shek. What kind of language could we put into this kind of communiqué that Ambassador Holdridge was referring to that would be acceptable to Taiwan while, at the same time, making it clear that we had a long-range interest in the restoration of the whole of China. Also, we wanted to make clear that we just didn't see Taiwan as a separate appendage hanging out there in the distance and that it was unrelated to China. It was very important that it be regarded as an integral part of China.*

HOLDRIDGE: We were not supporting Chiang Kai-shek's return to the mainland by use of force.

*Q: We tried to discourage the use of force, making them realize that, if they could live a life of virtue, this would radiate out and, in time, would have a favorable impact on all of China. In a way, this has happened.*

HOLDRIDGE: Marshall, I've got to add something else. We were on another track from 1954 on, as well. That was that we tried to resume some degree of contact with the Chinese Communists. Zhou En-lai was the instigator or initiator of that at the Bandung Conference in April of 1955. He proposed that the United States and China get together to resolve their differences -- to talk about resolving them, anyway. There had already been a contact in 1954 at the Geneva Conference which addressed the resolution of Indochina. Ed Martin was along on that and met some of his Chinese friends from earlier days.

In 1955 we began the ambassadorial-level talks which went on, off and on, between 1955 and 1970. The idea was to try to keep some degree of contact with the Chinese Communists. Alex Johnson headed up the team which was sitting in Geneva. He was actually in Prague. Wang Ping-nan, who was his opposite number, was in Warsaw. They used to come down and meet in Geneva. In the beginning, these meetings occurred weekly, and then they became more sporadic. I sat in on them for a few weeks in 1956. We came awfully close to having some degree of accord with the Chinese over Taiwan at this time.

The whole thing rotated around the wording of a joint communiqué in which we looked to resolve the dispute between us by peaceful means. John Foster Dulles, the good old Presbyterian elder of the church, had put in a comma after this "by peaceful means" and said, "Including the dispute in the Taiwan Strait."

This made life extremely difficult. Alex Johnson has probably recounted that period, too.

*Q: The 1954 meeting was famous because Dulles refused to shake the hand of Zhou En-lai.*

HOLDRIDGE: That came up somewhat later in my own contacts with the Chinese. They never forgot that, and they haven't forgotten it yet. This is probably lingering around in the minds of some --

*Q: That's why, when Nixon came out of the plane at Beijing in February of 1972, the first thing he did was to dramatically shake the hand of Premier Zhou En-lai. This was the beginning of the new era.*

HOLDRIDGE: May I skip ahead a few years in this regard. When I came in with Kissinger to Beijing in July of 1971, we were met at the airport by Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, accompanied by Huang Hua, the man who later became ambassador to the United Nations and then to the U.S. The old marshal, Yeh, was the senior man to meet Henry Kissinger. He and Henry got in the first car, a Hung Ch'i or Red Flag, and drove off. I found myself with Huang Hua in car number two, also a Hung Ch'i with the usual drapery on the sides.

The first thing Huang said to me was, "You know, in 1954 at Geneva, your Secretary of State refused to shake the hand of our premier, Premier Zhou En-lai."

I thought to myself, "Ah-ha! Is this what we're working up to. They don't want to have a repetition of some silly situation such as that."

I hastily assured Huang that we had not come all these miles, through such a circuitous and secret route, simply to have this situation recur as had occurred in 1954.

I said, "There will be no problem."

It was interesting when Kissinger was there at the guest house in Beijing, waiting for Zhou En-lai. There were a host of photographers around. Zhou drives up in his limousine, gets out, and extends his hand. Kissinger extends his hand, handshake, and boom, boom, boom, boom -- flashbulbs all over the place, videotape, etc. This was an historic handshake.

*Q: Getting back to this period of 1957, 1958, and 1959 when we were both working for Walter Robertson, this was also the time when we had the first indications of the Sino-Soviet rift. Do you have any recollections about when you felt a clear indication of such a rift occurring?*

HOLDRIDGE: The first sign of it was in 1959 during the anniversary of Lenin's birthday. In Beijing's media, out comes this big editorial on "Long Live Leninism." This, in effect, took to task the "modern revisionists" for having deviated from the true course, saying that it was impossible to really bring about the victory of communism by peaceful means, that there had to be bloodshed. Later on, we found that he had also said elsewhere, in another context, that if 20 million Chinese died in the course of a nuclear war, there would be many, many more Chinese to carry on the tradition.

This was a real break with the Soviet Union, although they did not make it, as such. They called it an attack on Yugoslav modern revisionism to begin with. It was only later that they dropped the "Yugoslav" and began to attack the Soviets directly.

A lot of people, when this editorial came out, couldn't believe it. They thought that we kept saying that the cohesive factors are more important than the divisive factors in the Sino-Soviet relationship. It didn't work out that way.

*Q: Actually, back in 1957 when the Soviets put up Sputnik there was a Chinese reaction. They sent two or three delegations to Moscow with a clear intention of trying to share in this*

*breakthrough and to, somehow, have it contribute to the glory of China. They were rebuffed. Shortly after that, the Soviets were pressing China on trying to declare a nuclear-free zone in the Far East. This was a better line for the Chinese to take than to try and participate in the development of nuclear weapons.*

*I was following this very closely with Alice Cia, who was with the Rand Corporation in California. I took about two or three trips there. It was very interesting because already there were clear indications the Chinese nose was out of joint. We know that the Chinese nose was out of joint at the time when the Russians walked into Manchuria; and the yellow peril attitudes of the Russians towards the Chinese go way back.*

*When you talk about 1959, then it was becoming really much more out in the open. In 1962, you went to Hong Kong.*

*Q: Did you feel under any particular restraints about thinking right concerning China and overall communism within the Department, or could one raise the issue of when could we recognize them? Could you talk about the split without running across ideology from up above? How did you feel?*

HOLDRIDGE: I think there were some cautions in the minds of people. You remember Josiah Bennett? He was the director of the political section in the old Office of Chinese Affairs. Shortly before the Taiwan Strait crisis erupted in 1958, he came out with a white paper, which he had written, on U.S. policy toward China, which was support down the line for Taiwan.

Then, at the very last, he said, "However, should the situation on the Chinese mainland change to the point where China would begin to live in peace with its neighbors, we would be willing to take another look at China policy."

Even then, we always had this feeling in the back of our minds -- through the Geneva talks, the ambassadorial-level talks, and in various ways -- that we didn't want to foreclose any opportunities which might open in the future. We wanted some kind of a relationship. In addition to that, Dulles was very upset by the second offshore-islands crisis, and the fact that Chiang Kai-shek insisted on keeping a large percentage of his forces on those highly exposed islands. This was a strong temptation for the Chinese Communists, as we called them in those days, to knock them out. In so doing, they could destroy effectively all the will to resist on the part of all of Taiwan. Therefore, it was a pawn that the Chinese Communists could take advantage of. Therefore, there was a great deal of disagreement and problems that we had with Chiang Kai-shek over the disposition of his forces, and their unwillingness to withdraw them.

Dulles said, "Never again are we going to get ourselves involved in one of these things."

This began to have another effect of making us more and more wary of becoming too much the protagonist for the causes of the Chinese nationalists, and not taking a broader view of the total problem of China. I think that Dulles, who had been one of the strongest pro-Chiang Kai-shek types when he first came aboard in the State Department, by the time he died in 1959, he had a rather different view of the problem -- a much more comprehensive understanding of the total-

China problem.

*Q: Meanwhile, of course, Walter Robertson, who had been such a strong protagonist of the Chinese nationalists, was soon to leave the stage. He left by 1960, and Jeff Parsons took over. Jeff was a career Foreign Service officer who had a very balanced view of the total problem. The atmosphere was already beginning to change by 1960.*

*You went to Hong Kong in 1962. I was already in Hong Kong when you arrived. You became head of the political section.*

HOLDRIDGE: At that time it was first the political section. Then it became the mainland reporting unit. We discovered that it made very little sense to differentiate between politics and economics. The two sections that were reporting on mainland China, economic and political, were merged into a mainland China reporting unit, which also included the press monitoring unit and the publications procurement effort that we had. We had quite a number of people working hard on analyzing what was going on in China economically and politically.

*Q: We divided because we had responsibilities for (1) Hong Kong and Macau, which had both a political and an economic aspect to it, and (2) mainland China. I would say that one of the things that struck me about that year of 1962 when you arrived was that Heyward Isham, who was in your section covering Sino-Soviet relations, found it impossible to find words strong enough to convey the tone of Chinese broadcasts against the Soviet Union. The language was so scatological, so intense and vituperative, that he despaired on being able to show that it was getting even worse than it was yesterday. [Laughter]*

HOLDRIDGE: This all began with that "Long Live Leninism" editorial, but it got worse and worse. Then it became a personal diatribe. On the one hand you had Mao Zedong who, if he didn't write these editorials, was certainly the one who said that this is what you will put into them. On the other hand it was Mr. Khrushchev up until 1964. Then, when he was replaced by Brezhnev, the Chinese didn't change the tone one iota. They simply said that the new leaders were even worse than Khrushchev because they were smarter. [Laughter]

*Q: One of the things that I recall -- and I'm very interested in your comments on it -- is that Chiang Kai-shek, or the Chinese nationalists, were using Hong Kong as a base for operations in the areas of mainland China, not too far from Hong Kong which caused great distress both to the British authorities as well as to the consulate general. I do recall going up to Taiwan one time -- of course, we sent messages to Washington about that and to our ambassador in Taipei urging that somehow we put a restraint on this because the British were getting very upset. Also, it wasn't doing us or anybody any good. These little pinpricks, if anything, were being used by the Chinese Communists to steel their people and make them all the more vigilant, driving them more into their little shell. Our thinking in the consulate general was the other way around.*

*I was wondering if you recall those particular episodes. There was one particular episode that I remember fairly well which was at the time of the breakdown of law and order in Guangdong Province in May of 1962 when all these refugees came flowing into Hong Kong. It was quite clear there was a breakdown. At that time, the Chinese Communists were trying to get the young*

*people in the cities back into the rural areas, to reconstruct their attitudes. A lot of them refused to go, and they came down to Hong Kong.*

*In this period of inner turmoil in China, there was a kind of an opportunity for us to exploit -- at least, for the Chinese nationalists to exploit. We were very careful not to do that. I remember putting a staying hand on the wrist of our embassy in Taipei in order to tell them not to stir things up and that it wouldn't do any good. More than that, we wanted to convey to Peking that this was our position. Do you recall that?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. I recall that we took a very dim view of some of the things that the nationalists were doing. For example, they para-dropped a unit of several hundred men into Hainan. Of course, the Chinese Communists rounded these people up in short order, and they all were discovered with American equipment still with the U.S. ordinance device stenciled on the outside of the crates. It made our position very shaky. The Chinese would come out from time to time and blast that Hong Kong was being used as a base for espionage by the American imperialists. It didn't help our situation any. The British were uncomfortable. They may have withheld some of the cooperation, as a consequence. I think that some of the people who worked on another floor in the consulate general were rather bothered in their relationship with the special branch as a consequence.

*Q: I remember you, John Lacey and I, as well as others in the consulate general were already beginning to see our problems with China in the long range as involving a first stage of entering into a more civil discourse with the Chinese and relieving them of any kind of fears that we were trying to exploit their internal problems. We were very active in this field, not under instructions from Washington although we reported our actions to Washington. It was because we felt that this was in our long-range interests. We were trying to calm down their vicious anti-Americanism and make them engage in at least a more civil discourse with us. This point about conveying to Peking the fact that our government was not trying to exploit their internal problems and trying to set the stage for a long-term, better relationship -- realizing that it was going to take some time -- this was conveyed to their representative. As you know, they had a number of business representatives in Hong Kong. Who actually transmitted this information? I know it was authorized, because I got the authority from Washington. Who actually did it to whom, I don't recall.*

HOLDRIDGE: Frankly, I don't. I do believe that, in the course of our ambassadorial-level talks, something of this sort was also conveyed. As I said, these things went on from 1955 until 1970 sporadically. For a long time, they were bogged down. The Chinese wanted to talk about major issues and the major relationship. We said we had to settle the lesser issues first, such as non-repatriated Americans, etc. This is a familiar one.

I believe, in the course of these -- and you would have to check these with Jake Beam or with Alex Johnson -- that we did make it plain that we were not seeking to try to change the situation on the mainland. In fact, our conclusion in Hong Kong was that, despite problems such as floods, droughts, or problems generated by the collapse of the Great Leap Forward, which began to fall apart by 1962, China was going to be remaining under the control of the communists. There wasn't anything that anybody from the outside was going to be able to do about it, certainly not

Taiwan.

*Q: Don't you think that, in this period of 1962 and 1963, there was a little bit of an opening in the clouds. You talked about the end of the Great Leap Forward. Clearly, it had been a disaster, and the Chinese knew that. Meanwhile, they were more and more concerned with the Soviets and the Soviet threat. Our interventions, both in Geneva or Warsaw, as well as in Hong Kong, were conveying the impression that we are not trying to exploit their internal problems. It seemed to me that there was an opening there. We were trying in the consulate general to make best use of it. We were trying to allow Americans to travel to China, to end our foreign assets control regulations. Obviously, this was a great nuisance and had nothing to do with our overall relations with China. It was more of an irritant. In other words, we were creating irritants for American businessmen, for American scholars who wanted to go to China. They couldn't get into China because China wouldn't let them, but it would appear to the world that we were the ones who were keeping them out.*

HOLDRIDGE: As a matter of fact, I think that, to an extent, we were. We tried very hard, for example, to suggest that maybe some sales of humanitarian items to the Chinese would be in order. We finally allowed American journalists to travel. However, by that time the Chinese were so angered over the whole situation, they refused to give any visas.

*Q: That's true. We anticipated that might be the reaction, but we generally wanted to have people go in to find out what was going on. On the other hand, we were still up against a dead-head attitude back in Washington which was part of the cold-war mentality. They still saw these things in very rigid, red and white terms. In the consulate general, we saw opportunities -- not just to gauge in a more civil discourse with China, but also possibly to be removing irritants, at the same making it clear that it was China keeping them out and not us keeping them out. That is one of the things we succeeded in doing.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. We were, of course, the forward-most element in the United States-China policy at that time. We were the listening post, and we could make a lot of recommendations which, you might say, forecast the future. There wasn't anybody else, really, that they had to pay attention to.

*Q: In 1962, we had a more sympathetic audience, you might say, back in Washington. Governor Harriman became assistant secretary in 1962. Chester Bowles was the Under Secretary of State. Both of them were very interested in a change in our China policy. What we were saying in Hong Kong had a very responsive resonance in Washington in the form of the new Under Secretary, as well as President Kennedy. He was interested in some of the things we were saying and doing in Hong Kong. It resulted in my being asked back to Washington in the early fall of 1963 to take a new look at our China policy. While all this was going on, Ambassador Holdridge was in Hong Kong. You were there all during this period until 1966.*

HOLDRIDGE: I saw the breakdown of the Great Leap Forward. Incidentally, our political analysts were able to predict the Chinese attack on India in 1962, because of the tenor of the sound of the Chinese pronouncements about the border clashes. Blood debt had been incurred, and the debt had to be repaid, etc. During all this period, I was able to witness the collapse of the

Great Leap Forward, Mao Zedong being shoved into the background, and as you say, there was a more rational attitude for a period on the part of the leadership, headed essentially by Liu Shao-chi, who was really the second man under Mao. Liu Shao-chi and Xiaoping were people who were trying to run a much more realistic policy with the old ideology sitting in the background, glowering and waiting for a chance. This chance finally came in August of 1966 with the Cultural Revolution. In the meantime, there obviously had been some real problems inside China.

In September of 1965, for example, Lin Biao, then the minister of defense, had come out with a long diatribe saying, "Long live the victory of people's war."

Mao was still keeping up this barrage against the Soviet Union on behalf of his version of the future, and how to bring about the victory of communism. The other people seemed to be much more interested in running a country in a realistic, pragmatic, practical way. They had a lot of problems they had to face. At this time, it is conceivable -- had it not been for Mao coming out of the wilderness again in August 1966 with the great proletarian Cultural Revolution -- that there might have been an easing of the tensions, but there wasn't.

The whole thing was deferred until -- I could give you a watershed -- first of all, the election of Nixon. Marshall may have contributed to Nixon's view of China with his long chat with Nixon in Jakarta in 1967. This is prior to the issuance of a Foreign Affairs Quarterly article in October of 1967, which advocated a restoration of a relationship between China and the United States. Then, when Nixon came in, among the first things he did was to order a restudy of China policy. That was subsequently followed up by removal of a considerable number of our trade controls, removal of the certificate of origin -- which used to be an onus to us in that any item that was brought into the United States had to show that it was not produced in mainland China -- as well as the removal of restrictions on travel, provided the Chinese wanted to give visas to Americans who wanted to go. All of this occurred with Nixon.

I came back from Hong Kong in 1966. I went into an office in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. I was number two. Eventually, a year or so later I was the office director of the Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, known as REA. My job, on the one hand, was briefing senior people such as Bill Bundy, then the Assistant Secretary of State, on significant developments. The other thing was trying to keep up with what was really happening and analyzing these developments in ways which could be contributory to foreign policy. This is a period in which we saw a lot of changes begin to materialize. I think we worked very closely, INR, with the Bureau at that particular time. We never did anything that wasn't really working very closely together.

*Q: Let me go back on this period because it is a very interesting landmark. I felt that the death of Kennedy in late 1963 put a great damper on all that we were trying to do to bring about a new attitude towards China. Also, things were going on in China. You were in Hong Kong in 1964 and in 1965. There was this socialist-education campaign, the precursor of the Cultural Revolution. It was clear that, not only was the end of 1963 a watershed for those of us who were hoping to bring about a modification of the rancor in our U.S.-China relations -- it was also our deepening involvement in Vietnam. The new President was totally wrapped up in Vietnam. Those*

*of us who were hoping that we could have some kind of openings to China -- I remember this was a real damper --*

HOLDRIDGE: I'll tell you why. That was the influence of a predecessor of mine, once removed, as the office director for Research and Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific -- Allan S. Whiting. Allan had written a book, going back to the Korean War which was entitled China Crosses the Yalu. He was convinced that, in a situation where China's territorial integrity was being threatened by the approach of hostile forces from the outside as happened when the U.S. went north of the old DMZ, the 38th Parallel, and then China entered the Korean War, the same was going to happen in Vietnam. Here we were, deeply bogged down or beginning to get deeply involved, shall I say, in the Vietnam War. Allan kept telling Averell Harriman that, "The Chinese are coming. The Chinese are coming."

I can recall watching on television, for example, the then-Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, having his innings with Fulbright on this whole question of China. Rusk kept saying, "Well, the Chinese are going to come in. That's why we have to keep a hard line, keep our guard up, etc." The repercussions of this Vietnam situation really affected our China policy. It put it in a state of semi-paralysis for a while.

I can remember Fulbright's reaction to Dean Rusk saying something about the Chinese are coming -- "They wouldn't do that."

This was said in his best Arkansas accent. In fact, they didn't. The Chinese for a while were actually impeding the shipment of Soviet war supplies across China to Vietnam. They were so jealous of the Soviets for having the inside track, and they were worried about Soviet encirclement of China, as a consequence of this big diatribe between Mao and whoever happened to be in power in Moscow at the time. It began to look to the Chinese as if they were being surrounded, not by the American imperialists, or the Japanese militarists, or the Taiwan revanchists, but by the allies of the Soviet Union -- the Soviet Union and Vietnam.

*Q: This is a very relevant point. I remember Bill Bundy, many years later, looking back and thanking me and John Holdridge for taking a view contrary to Allan Whiting. If only they had listened a little more attentively to this viewpoint. I felt the way you did. I didn't think that the Chinese would come massing down into Vietnam unless, of course, we carried the war up towards the borders of China. That was different. But, to be conducting a war the way we were -- raiding parties and that kind of thing against North Vietnam -- that certainly wasn't going to bring them in.*

*The question to me was, how far could you go? I was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at that time. In 1964, we spent a great deal of time trying to figure out how far we were going to conduct this war into Vietnam. Would we bomb the North? Would we bomb Hanoi? Would we mine the harbors? Would we mine the dikes?*

*With strong pressure from the press and the Congress, critical of our war effort, we kept making self-restrictions -- imposing restrictions on our own course of action. We said that we would not bomb Hanoi and Haiphong, we would not mine the harbors, and we would not mine the dikes*

*and flood the country.*

*Every time we did this kind of thing, of course, it gave the enemy assurance. We just bargained ourselves out of the war.*

HOLDRIDGE: Which we eventually did.

*Q: Of course, while this was going on, Peking was getting a clear impression that there were very distinct limits to our actions. Therefore, they were not so concerned about North Vietnam.*

HOLDRIDGE: They did their bit as an ally. They did send logistical troops, line of communications, to help keep the roads and railways open. They also sent anti-aircraft units, but they never acknowledged the presence of Chinese forces. They used to talk about the "lips-and-teeth" relationship between China and Vietnam, but this was unacknowledged in terms of actual public announcement of the presence of Chinese forces. The Chinese were being very discreet.

When we would invade what they called their territorial waters or air space, they began this series of serious warnings that they would issue -- serious warning number one, number two, violation of Chinese territorial air space on such and such a date over such and such a bit of Chinese-acclaimed territory, such as the Paracels. We actually had some aircraft, that strayed into China on raids to the north, which were shot down or went down over Hainan, for example. The Chinese really didn't make anything much of it. They played it very carefully, not to bring themselves directly into the conflict.

Our analysis on this was to look at what happened in India in 1962. The Chinese took on the Indian forces after Krishna Menon said he was going to drive the Chinese out of the disputed territory along the Indian border with China. The Chinese really hit the Indians very hard in the Northeast Frontier Agency's area -- the NEFA -- drove the Indians out and down to the Plains of Assam. Having done so, they turned around and marched up the mountain again -- back up the Himalayas. They were not about to be involved in a major conflict at a time of deep, internal problems and contradictions.

I felt that the same thing was true during the Vietnam War. They had their internal situation to resolve. Along comes the great proletarian Cultural Revolution, and this threw China into a real convulsion while a lot of the Vietnam War was going on.

*Q: Don't you think, John, in retrospect, that we tended to regard the Chinese as ten-foot tall. The fact of the matter is that they were far weaker and far more concerned with their internal situation than with any kind of external adventures.*

HOLDRIDGE: We did have an intelligence break on that. Do you recall the Tibetan Papers?

*Q: No. The name is familiar, but I can't remember what it was about.*

HOLDRIDGE: It turned out that a group of Khambas, operating out of Nepal, crossed the border into Tibet, and managed to shoot up a Chinese military convoy, one of the trucks of which

contained all of the workbooks of the political officer. When put all together, the upshot of these books was to show that the Chinese People's Liberation Army was in a terrible state. This was as a consequence, primarily, of the Great Leap Forward, and the siphoning off of energies into all sorts of non-productive things. It was a hollow Army.

*Q: I do remember that very well, now that you mention it. This simply confirms the fact that we tended to magnify the threat that China posed.*

HOLDRIDGE: Well, the people who were watching China did not agree with the assessments of people like Allan Whiting, that the Chinese were going to be charging in -- "watch it, fellows, because you'll have another Korean War on your hands."

*Q: Was there another side to this? The tremendous antipathy of the Vietnamese to the Chinese gets played up a lot now in the post-Vietnam period. They've been fighting them for centuries. Were you talking to Vietnamese experts who were saying that they may get together, but that China would not expand this way because the Vietnamese hate the Chinese?*

HOLDRIDGE: That was known. I can't recall any specific individual who came up, waving a piece of paper. It was generally accepted that the Chinese and the Vietnamese were ancient enemies and not friends, and that their relationship could hardly be congenial.

*Q: May I say, though, that they may have been clear to you, John, but it was not clear to me. I was deputy assistant secretary at that time, and later on I was assistant secretary. I never really adequately appreciated the depth of Chinese-Vietnamese animosities. Never. What I did know was that we were exaggerating the threat that China posed, and the fact that China was expansionist. When you talk about the attack on India, it was basically because China was trying to settle its border problems with all the countries around its perimeter. They had succeeded in the case of Pakistan and the Hindu Kush, etc., but they came up against the Indians who refused to settle the Akusai Chin and the northeast frontier territorial dispute. The Chinese just gave them a lesson or two.*

*Basically, the Chinese were not this kind of expansionist force we perceived to be. That lingered on and on.*

*There is one other thing here that is important. While all this was going on in 1965, you were back in the Department dealing with intelligence. I was in Indonesia. The collapsed effort of the Indonesia Communist Party, PKI -- in cahoots with Peking to pull off a successful coup that would put up a Nasakom government under the titular leadership of Sukarno, who was very compliant and working closely with the communists. That failed. It was a tremendous setback to China in terms of its external policies. This, of course, caused something of a breakdown of democratic centralism in Peking, etc. It sent shockwaves all over the communist world -- far more than people have recognized.*

HOLDRIDGE: Bob Martens, who was running the Soviet research area when I was running the East Asian side, has written a book on this. He was one of your political officers. He has maintained that this was a crucial factor in the whole sequence of events which followed -- the

Indonesian coup and its failure.

I don't quite agree. I don't think the Chinese were that deeply involved. I think that they were supportive of Sukarno and the CPI. There is no doubt about that. I don't think that they were as deeply involved as Bob Martens says they were.

*Q: I think Bob Martens has made a very important contribution to the understanding of this problem, though, by accenting the fact that Sukarno was a willing tool. Whether or not Sukarno was designing to establish a communist government, or thought that he could control such a government, etc., that is beyond my ability to evaluate.*

*There were a series of blows to China at that time, which had a great deal to do with Chinese attitudes and with the problems that we had in our relations with China.*

HOLDRIDGE: I think the Chinese became even more surly and churlish as a consequence as some of these setbacks. The "victory of People's war" was certainly not being clearly achieved in various places. The Vietnam War went on for years, and Indonesia was no great plum for the concepts of Mao such as, "Long live the victory of People's war."

As a matter of fact, the collapse of the coup came in the same month, only a few weeks after Lin Piao had issued this little pamphlet on, "Long Live the Victory of People's War."

Along comes the Cultural Revolution, and Mao is now trying to set things straight -- what was wrong was that the younger generation didn't know how to struggle, didn't know how to shed blood, and he was going to fix that. The Red Guards were going to storm the party headquarters and get rid of those people such as Liu Shao-chi, who were trying to turn China away from communism and back toward capitalism. The whole country went into a convulsion. This is precisely the period when we were becoming most deeply involved in Vietnam.

The idea of the Chinese -- at a time when they were going through these throes internally -- engaging in some kind of an external war of major proportions was absolutely ridiculous.

*Q: This is how your unit and people dealing --*

HOLDRIDGE: This is how we were telling people such as Bill Bundy, for example, whom I briefed. The first thing in the morning, I would come in and read the overnight from the intelligence channels, get together the stuff from other agencies, cart it down there, put it into some kind of a form, and make a fairly cohesive picture of it for Bill Bundy. I never felt that the Chinese were going to be charging in. This was after Averell Harriman and Allan Whiting had both left.

*Q: Going back to this period of 1963 and up to 1965, I think the Chinese clearly had a position of considerable standing and ambition in terms of influence -- not military, but political influence -- in Africa. They were putting a major effort in Africa. They were also making a major effort in the non-aligned countries of the world. They posed as a non-aligned country. Clearly, they were the biggest and most powerful "non-aligned country." They were willing to let Sukarno*

*be their cat's paw. They had these big meetings in Bandung. They made a major effort to make the PKI the dominant party -- which it already was by the time I arrived there in 1965 -- definitely pro-Chinese. The Chinese had a great deal of influence in Jakarta. They were putting up a new CONEFO (the Committee of the New Emerging Forces) complex right outside Jakarta. It was a huge building built with Chinese money. Millions of dollars went into it from China. They were just nearing completion when all this PKI effort collapsed.*

*I do think that this meant, in a way, the end of Chinese efforts to have influence in the outside world -- not necessarily military, but ideological influence in Africa, Southeast Asia, etc. In a way, they were competing against the Soviet Union in these areas, too.*

HOLDRIDGE: It was quite plain. Indeed, they were making a deliberate, direct challenge for the leadership of the world communist movement, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. The Soviets actually resented it, which led to this whole situation. The changes, which then occurred, we were wise enough to attempt to exploit.

*Q: China simply wasn't that kind of an externally-aggressive country.*

HOLDRIDGE: Ideologically, it was on the offensive.

*Q: Ideologically, it was out to make marks all around the world.*

HOLDRIDGE: But, militarily it was extremely defensive.

*Q: In China at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, did you feel that this was a power struggle, or was this ideology?*

HOLDRIDGE: It was power struggle in part. Mao was taking after some of the people who had thrust him back at the end of Great Leap Forward into what he called "the second line." These were the ones who wanted to run China in a pragmatic, realistic way, with a diminished, ideological content, as opposed to Mao who wanted to carry the revolution forward to the end, both at home and abroad. There was an expression for it, "Ke ming tao ti". This was, "Carry the revolution, through to the end."

This was what Mao was trying to propose and, in fact, to conduct. It didn't work.

I saw on the television last night a young Czechoslovakian woman said, "Look. Marx was a romanticist. What he proposed was not suited to human endeavor." [Laughter]

*Q: This brings us up to the time when you served on the NSC under Henry Kissinger in 1969.*

HOLDRIDGE: I want to add one thing: the perceptible change began during the events which the Soviets have now repudiated. This was the movement of the Soviet-bloc armed forces into Prague on August 21, 1968, under the Brezhnev Doctrine. Earlier that year, Brezhnev had come out with the Brezhnev Doctrine, which was that the vanguard party, to wit the Soviet Union of CPSU, since it had been through the revolutionary experience first, was in a position to define

the ways which all other communist parties should go through the process of seizing power and building socialism. If they didn't do it the right way, then it was the internationalist duty of all these other good Marxist parties to come and set the errant country or party straight on the way it should go.

The Chinese got the message that the Yugoslavs were way off the reservation at this time, in one direction. They were becoming more capitalist all the time. Here was Mao and company in the other direction, becoming more screwball and extremist. Indeed, Lenin would call it, "A left-wing extremist, infantile disorder." This is what the Chinese were guilty of in the eyes of the Soviets. So, the relationship became very strained, starting in 1968.

August 21 was when the Soviet tanks moved in. I don't know who the genius was in EA, or FE at that time, who suggested a resumption of the Warsaw talks, which had been languishing. The ambassadorial-level talks had been moved as of the end of the Taiwan Strait crisis, September 11, [1958], from Geneva to Warsaw. They languished and hadn't gone anywhere for a long time.

Somebody in EA/FE proposed a resumption of the Warsaw talks. They sent a letter to the Chinese through whatever channels were available -- I suppose the Brits or whoever -- this was on September 17, 1968, proposing a resumption of the Warsaw talks. The Chinese responded. A Chinese friend of mine in the embassy said it was 48 hours. It was almost instantaneous for the Chinese.

They came almost right back on the heels of the letter and said, "Well, if you want to have these talks, we might as well go ahead."

They responded in a rather condescending way. Then they added something which was very significant. It was, "It has always been the policy of the People's Republic of China to maintain friendly relations with all states, regardless of social systems, on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence."

The Chinese had first brought up these five principles of peaceful coexistence with the Indians back in the good old days of "Hindi-Chini bhai bhai" -- "Indians and Chinese are brothers"; Nehru, Zhou En-lai, etc. This was about the era of the Geneva Conference in 1954.

Later on, the whole concept of peaceful coexistence became a basic element in this terrible fight and diatribe between Mao and the Soviets. The idea that you could have a peaceful transition to communism, with a peaceful relationship between the capitalist world and the communist world while this transition was going on, was abhorrent to Mao Zedong -- a basic element in his whole attack against the Soviets. Then, all of a sudden, for the Chinese to bring up the five principles of peaceful coexistence -- boy, bells bonged all over.

*Q: What date were the five principles first brought up?*

HOLDRIDGE: This goes back to the meeting that Zhou En-lai had with Nehru which was before the Geneva Conference of 1954. They met to talk about Tibet, in fact, in which the Indians were supposed to lay off Tibet and relinquish all claims, territorial and otherwise. This is where it first

came out.

After the Bandung Conference, they came out with ten principles, five of which were the ones which the Chinese favored -- non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, etc. Peaceful coexistence, itself, was the last of the five principles of peaceful coexistence -- undefined.

At any rate, this was a formula which they had used for quite a while, until the time that they became involved in this whole fuss about revisionism, long live Leninism, etc. It kind of dropped out. Then, to see it suddenly revived after years, we thought that something was really afoot here, and that it ought to be taken up.

*Q: I do want to get into your problems working with Henry Kissinger in the NSC. This began in 1969?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. I didn't really want to go. I was happy in my position as the office director of INR/REA. In fact, I had been interviewed by Kissinger in the very beginning of the Nixon Administration. I had indicated that I didn't really want to go, so he picked Dick Sneider to go over as his EA man, or FE, senior staff member for East Asian affairs. I don't know what the problem was specifically between Dick and Henry. Maybe their personalities did not jibe. Dick had his own ways of doing things. They were not compatible.

Eventually, Dick got the job of being Minister in Tokyo. He was primarily responsible for the reversion of Okinawa treaty. So, off he went, and then I came. I was transferred over in July of 1969. I had participated as INR representative in the SIG, Senior Inter-Governmental, Inter-Departmental Group, discussions of changes in China policy. I helped to contribute to some of the NSSMs, National Security Study Memoranda. NSSM 14, as I recall, was the one that called for another look at China policy early on. I contributed to that in my previous capacity.

*Q: Was your capacity one of handling only China, or were you dealing with East Asia and China?*

HOLDRIDGE: No, I had the works. I had everything, except that Henry kept Vietnam and the resolution of the Vietnam problem pretty close to his chest. I was perfectly willing to let him do that. As Henry himself said, "There is no glory for anybody in Vietnam."

If he wanted to have Vietnam, he could have the "no glory" part of it, as far as I was concerned.

I did have a lot to do with China. In fact, in July of 1969, just a few weeks after I came in, these early changes in travel and trade with respect to China were made. Nixon then took a round-the-world trip. First, he went to see the splash-down in the Pacific of the moon landing.

Then, he went to Guam, and made a statement there which caught me by surprise. We had been used to an advanced military posture with respect to East Asia. Nixon came along and said that the security of an individual country was up to that country itself, primarily. He said that we would help with the wherewithal, but we weren't going to contribute the manpower.

*Q: I had written the scope paper for this Nixon Doctrine. I am very familiar with why it was. Did you accompany the President on this trip?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes, as far as Bangkok. My beat extended through East Asia, of course. I went to Vietnam, too.

We had the splash down, Guam, Philippines -- where we had some fun with the Marcos people. I am not even going to get into that now. Then we went down to Indonesia and to Bangkok.

As I recall, it was between Jakarta and Bangkok where Henry came back to me on the plane, Air Force One. The NSC had a little enclave just behind the Presidential compartment. Henry asked me to draft a cable to the Chinese, proposing that we get together to talk about the improvement in our relations.

I very happily sat down and worked on this thing. I said that we should not look to the past, but look to the future. There were many things that we had in common. There were many issues that were of mutual value, and we should address them, and let's get together. I gave the draft to Henry. He looked at it, gave his characteristic grunt, said nothing, turned around, and went back into the Presidential compartment.

That is the last I saw or heard of it. I have no doubt that a message, somewhere along the line, was, in fact, sent to the Chinese during this trip. There were two places it could have been done. One was in Pakistan. Ayub Khan was the head of the Pakistani government then. Pakistanis and the Chinese were very close in the wake of what had happened in India in 1962. The other place was in Romania. I rather suspect that they would have done it through Pakistan. With Ceausescu, in Romania, even though he was not exactly in the best of light with Moscow, there were probably enough guys running around in Bucharest who would have slipped the word to Moscow. We didn't want this information to become public that we were trying to reestablish contact.

*Q: Do you think that that message you drafted was pretty much the one that he sent?*

HOLDRIDGE: I have no idea, but I suspect that that was essentially what was said.

*Q: You have every reason to believe that that was the first of the real sounding out.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes.

*Q: Had there been any intimations or discussions prior to that with Henry Kissinger?*

HOLDRIDGE: No, except that we had seen the developments, since Nixon took office in January of 1969, that he wanted to improve relations with China. We had seen these sequential developments.

*Q: I had had many conversations with President Nixon about China. I knew he was interested in it. This is the first time, right now, that I have heard from you, John, this very interesting fact that*

*Henry asked you to draft this telegram. You then left the party at Bangkok, which then went on to India, Pakistan, and Romania. In any of those places this could very well been --*

HOLDRIDGE: Subsequently, the communications all went through Pakistan. I think that it was probably Pakistan only. Even though Ceausescu was not exactly a favorite of Moscow's, there must have been enough Soviet KGB-types running around in Bucharest. Henry would be afraid that this would come out into the public domain.

*Q: Of course, we had had another clear interest, too, other than China. That was Vietnam. It is quite possible that, when he went to Romania, Ceausescu might have been somebody he sounded out with regard to terms under which we might --*

HOLDRIDGE: That's quite possible. As I told you, I didn't really get myself drawn --

*Q: Well, we weren't in that part of the trip, so we don't --*

HOLDRIDGE: I was not on that part of the trip, so I really don't know what happened. We went back, and not much took place. Things seemed to be on top, dead center. Walter Stoessel, ambassador in Warsaw, was back in Washington later that year for some reason, and he had a little chit-chat with Henry over in the NSC. He was told by Henry, "Let's see if we can't jog these guys' elbows and get somewhere."

The year 1969 was a very critical year for China. In March of 1969 were those very interesting clashes between the Soviets and the Chinese over this little island in the Ussuri River -- Chenpao, as the Chinese called it, or Damansky as the Soviets called it -- in which the Chinese came out second best. The Soviets, I have reason to believe, really clobbered that island with one of the most extreme artillery barrages in modern history, leaving it looking like the surface of the moon. That shook the Chinese.

In April of 1969, they had a party congress. I think for a period, the Chinese tried to reestablish a better relationship with the Soviets. It didn't work. The reason I think so is that, for about two weeks, all of the polemics seemed to stop. The nasty words that the Chinese had been using against the Soviets diminished to zilch. It picked up again later on.

Then, in the summer of 1969, there was a rapid Soviet troop build-up along the Chinese border. They went from something like 17 divisions up to 20, 30, 40, to a total of 54 over a period of time. There was a very rapid build-up. There was a lot of word floating around, to the effect that the Soviets were going to take care of these people who were getting so far off the reservation. It did look to me -- doing my own analysis and drawing on the resources of the Department -- that there was probably some debate going on in Moscow over whether military force might not be used as a surgical strike to take out the Chinese nuclear capability.

*Q: I recall that, in 1969, that chances were considered is one out of three by CIA, that the Russians would, in fact, try to knock out with iron bombs any Chinese nascent nuclear facilities.*

HOLDRIDGE: That's right.

*Q: The Chinese obviously got wind of this and went underground. That was the time that they started building all of these extensive underground shelters. Also, the Chinese must have remembered what the Soviets did in Czechoslovakia. This must have left a very deep impression of what the Soviets were capable of.*

HOLDRIDGE: They hadn't forgotten. In 1956 in Budapest, the Soviets at that time were capable of utter ruthlessness in putting down any form of dissent. The Chinese, of course, were still going through the throes of their Cultural Revolution, and they were in a terrible state -- economically, politically, and militarily.

*Q: Assuming that Henry did, in fact, send out the message or a feeler in July of 1969, it would have been a very receptive China that would have gotten that message. At that point, they were pretty terrified by the chances of attack.*

HOLDRIDGE: It wasn't that easy. I think there was a terrible debate going on inside China as to the merits of what to do about the relationship with the U.S. It went back to 1968. I mentioned that they had accepted a resumption of the Warsaw talks. This was in September. Yet, the whole rest of the year of 1968, there were many attacks against Liu Shao-chi, probably already dead by this time, for having espoused peaceful coexistence. Clearly, there was not a common line in Beijing.

Then, in early 1969, when we were supposed to have a resumption of the Warsaw talks, the chargé of the Chinese embassy in The Hague defected. He dropped out of a second-story window and ran to the U.S. Embassy, asking for refuge. We, of course, granted it to him. He turned out to be a real dud for any kind of intelligence or political value. He was a psychotic.

I think that the opponents of resumed contacts between the U.S. and China in Beijing used that episode as an excuse for cutting off the contact, so nothing happened. You see, we had to pick up the thread again. Even though we were going to have Warsaw talks in early 1969, the Chinese canceled them. Then a cable comes, sent from the Presidential aircraft, I presume.

In the meantime, there had been the Chenpao-Damansky Island episode, then the Soviet build-up. Clearly, along about the latter part of 1969, the Chinese were beginning to take a good, hard look at their world situation, quite apart from the ideology of the thing, to wonder about whether it was a good idea to have two major enemies at the same time. By the way, we had already convinced them that we were not going to carry the war in Vietnam up to the point of attacking China.

Walt Stoessel, being back, was asked by Henry to convey the message -- I think it went through Department channels -- to make contact with the Chinese in Warsaw. Indeed, he was again to propose a resumption of the Warsaw talks, which Walt did at a Yugoslav fashion show where he caught the chargé -- the ambassador was out of town. He proposed the resumption.

The Chinese chargé said, "I'll come over and discuss it with you at your embassy. How about that?"

A few days later, a Hung-chi (Red-Flag) limousine, flying the Chinese flag, shows up at our embassy in Warsaw, unmistakably to the great excitement of the press. The next day or so, Walt went back in his Cadillac to the Chinese embassy, flying the American flag. So we were back on track.

Back in the Department, Paul Kreisberg was head of the China desk at this time. Win Brown was the deputy assistant. The question was, what instructions would we send to Walt when he resumed the contact. We talked over all sorts of things.

The proposal was made that there be an exchange of high-level representatives to talk about the resumption of some kind of a relationship, up to and including opening missions of some sort -- trade missions, etc. -- in each other's capitals. That was presented to the Chinese at the first Warsaw talk in January of 1970. It really took the chargé there aback.

He said, "Well, I'll have to call back to my people at home on this one."

He did. The next meeting was in February. There was a sort of a cautious acceptance on the part of the Chinese for this proposal. This was to have high-level exchanges leading up to some kind of a mission.

Now, I have to say that the Department got cold feet the second time around, and they wanted to back away from that business of missions. We in the NSC did put it back in again.

*Q: You were a Foreign Service officer in the NSC under Henry Kissinger. How did you relate to the Department?*

HOLDRIDGE: As best as I could, personally, knowing that I had my old friends over there. Henry would have had a fit if I'd run around and kept the Department informed about every little things which was going on. I would have been fired. There was no doubt about it.

I recall in the latter part of 1969, after his around-the-world trip, Nixon produced a Report to the Congress on Foreign Policy of the United States. It was the first time that it had ever been done from the White House, not from the Department of State. He got all the NSC staff in there. We sat around in the Cabinet room, and Nixon gave us a little harangue about what our jobs were and how, by God, he was going to run foreign policy.

In the course of this he said, "If the Department of State has had a new idea in the last 25 years, it is not known to me."

That was a lot of nonsense, of course, knowing what Marshall had said to him. Half the people in that room were Foreign Service officers. But Nixon had this thing about the Foreign Service. Those of us who were on detail from the Department had to be very cautious. We tried to be as open as we possibly could, to keep in good, personal contact with Marshall, Alex Johnson, old friends and acquaintances, but it was not the easiest thing in the world. This was because of Kissinger, himself. I think the only time he resolved this problem was later in 1973 when he

became Secretary of State himself, and Brent Scowcroft took over as the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. I think we worked it out pretty well.

*Q: I remember that, on a number of occasions, I would call up John Holdridge over in the White House if something came up and I wanted to get it to Henry's attention. Sometimes I would call up Henry directly. I still have quite a bit of correspondence with Henry about various items. They were always very nice letters, nothing nasty. Nastiness was always done behind your back.*

*Nixon, when he concluded this trip around the world -- I learned this from somebody who was at the meeting at Camp David -- had the Cabinet and other people up there who were big-wigs. He told them about his trip around the world. In the course of this, he made many nasty digs about the State Department and the Foreign Service -- especially the Foreign Service.*

HOLDRIDGE: Let me say one reason why I think it might have happened. Nixon preferred one-on-one in his meetings with chiefs of state and heads of government. In one place, Bangkok, the ambassador, who is a very dear friend of mine and a man I respect enormously, Len Unger -- he wasn't personally involved in this, but his deputy, Norm Hannah was -- went again and again to the mat with Kissinger about Len going in and attending the meeting, as he should have. There is no reason why the ambassador of the country should have been excluded. The same thing, incidentally, happened in the Philippines.

*Q: It happened in Indonesia, too, where our ambassador spoke Indonesian. He would have done a better job than the Indonesian Interpreter they used.*

HOLDRIDGE: I thought Frank was in that meeting.

*Q: He was not in that meeting, and he clamored to get into that meeting. Henry took me aside several times and said that, if Galbraith once more brings that up, he is out.*

HOLDRIDGE: This is what I think ruined Norman Hannah's career.

*Q: It has been traditional that ambassadors attend these meetings.*

HOLDRIDGE: That's right, but Nixon would not have it.

*Q: No. He didn't have that, but he didn't have a Secretary of State present. Therefore, we had no record, except what Henry chose to recall, and what he then chose to tell us he recalled. Increasingly, we in the State Department realized that we didn't know all that was going on. When that happens, you begin to lose confidence.*

*This brings us back to the point you were making, indicating that there were certain differences that existed between you and me with regard to how we should carry on for the Warsaw talks. Should we go in for a high-level meeting, etc.? What was the next move?*

*I remember very well that Henry sent over and asked our views on this, for whatever they were worth. We would give them. One of the things that I mentioned to him was that I trusted, before*

*we were committed to a high-level meeting, one of our high-level people would have some advance indication that it would result in something that was constructive. Nothing would be worse than to go out there, and then get slapped in the face. It would be the end of all that we hoped to achieve in our U.S.-China relations.*

*That kind of thing has been distorted in his account in his White House Years. He implies that we were throwing cold water. It was not true at all. All we were saying is that we didn't know all of the pieces in the puzzle. This is the first time I'd heard from John Holdridge about the telegram he had composed on the plane --*

HOLDRIDGE: This is the first time I had heard of the problems that faced the State Department with respect to having a high-level representative go to Beijing. This is very interesting. We are, at long last, cross-referencing. [Laughter]

*Q: We weren't in communication with each other. John knew certain things. He was under strict secrecy not to tell us. We knew that we didn't know all of the parts. It created a distrust. Naturally, old friends maintain the same kind of ties we preserve all our careers -- John and me -- but it put it to the real test, to be dealing with the same problem and for me not to be privy to all the information that he had access to.*

HOLDRIDGE: I wasn't always privy, either. You know, Henry would have three different groups working on a problem in the National Security Council, which might even include China. Not one of the members of those groups knew that the others were working on the same problem. That is the way he did it. It was a paranoiac way of doing things, which I hated. I detested it.

*Q: This is a very key point here, because we recently had this trip of Scowcroft and Eagleburger to China. I think it would be the instinct of anybody in the State Department to say, "If they go to China, we trust that there would be some advance understanding with regard to what they might achieve out of such a visit."*

*To go there and make this highly visible toast, etc., forgetting all the recent, well-remembered incidents in Tiananmen Square would be unthinkable, unless there was some definite result expected out of this thing. We would probably have had some advance indicators that, perhaps, they might make some concessions on this or that, etc. Therefore, it would be worth investing our reputation on such a visit.*

HOLDRIDGE: Maybe there had been an advance indicator.

*Q: We don't know -- still don't know -- because the White House still operates in this kind of highly-secretive way.*

HOLDRIDGE: Let me tell you why. This brings up a little bit about the surroundings of the Kissinger trip to Beijing in July of 1971. The reason that there was no publicity given on this is -- the way Henry Kissinger put it -- if it came out, we would be trying to negotiate our China policy, not with the Chinese but with the Washington Post and the New York Times. He felt that

this would be absolutely unacceptable. That is why there was so much secrecy attached to it. Not that we were worried about how people would view it, etc. The question was that advance publicity might have even killed the whole opportunity, because the Congress or the press would have been hanging caveats all over, to the point where we couldn't move. The only way that he saw it was, if you are going to do something like that, you've got to do it in such a way that there are no prior limitations on what you can discuss or how you can go about it.

*Q: I am prepared to accept that, but I have some caveats, too. I think the Assistant Secretary of State in charge of that area should be informed.*

HOLDRIDGE: I was shocked that Dick Solomon, who is my successor, twice removed, was not present.

*Q: That's right. Not to inform me about Henry's trip was almost disastrous. When I was told at a staff meeting in June 1971 that it had just been announced on the radio that Dr. Kissinger had suffered an attack of flu at Islamabad and was taking several days off to recuperate in Muree, I told my staff that no one suffering from Delhi belly would ever drive up into the mountains.*

*I just said to my people, "well, he's probably gone to China."*

*I suddenly realized that maybe he had gone to China. So I swore them all to secrecy about our conversation just in time to prevent the leak. What I was saying in my demurrer in early 1970 about having a high-level emissary go to China was that there ought to be some kind of advance indication that it succeed. That was exactly what Henry was doing. He was going out there, in secret. When he got to China, he didn't know whether this was going to result in a Presidential visit, did he?*

HOLDRIDGE: Let me say that there had been enough from the Chinese through Ayub Khan in Pakistan to suggest that there would be a positive response. He was not going blindly into outer space.

*Q: What I'm saying is that it is terribly unjust for him in his book to be criticizing the State Department on this issue.*

HOLDRIDGE: He, of course, was absolutely unjust.

*Q: In fact, what he was doing was exactly what we are suggesting he should do. Find out one way or another whether or not this trip would result in something --*

HOLDRIDGE: I feel confident that there was something there. When we were talking about the Warsaw talks in 1970 and the whole question of a high-level emissary, all this became moot. In May of 1970, the U.S. military went into Cambodia and Mao Zedong cut off the Warsaw contact by a piece that was signed by Mao, himself, on the front page of the People's Daily. The whole thing languished. There may have been some efforts by Henry via Ayub Khan or whoever to reopen, but nothing really happened.

Then Edgar Snow visited China in the latter part of 1970. He stood next to Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Square for the October 1, 1970, ceremony. I think some word came back through Edgar Snow that there was some receptivity. In March of 1971, there was an issue of Life Magazine, in which Edgar Snow gave some of his accounts of his visit. In this issue, which became almost our Bible, Edgar Snow reported how Mao said a visit by Nixon to China would be welcome, and if he wanted to bring his wife and daughters, too, that would be fine.

*Q: By March of 1971, it was very clear that the Chinese had made up their minds. Of course, we had ping-pong diplomacy shortly after that. You made an interesting point about 1970 that I overlooked. That point was our involvement in land warfare against the Vietnamese in Cambodia and bringing Cambodia into the war. There was a very strong Chinese reaction to this thing, and it clearly set back everything.*

*In the latter part of 1970, it must have been a period in which the Chinese were doing some very serious reevaluation of their total strategic position. By the beginning of 1971, maybe by March, when Snow reported his meeting with Mao, they had already made up their minds that they were going to have to change their policy.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes, I think so. Actually, apropos the strategic threat, about the same time that we started in 1968 to propose the Warsaw resumption, Zhou En-lai was hosting an Albanian military delegation. He took them out to Shuang-changtzu, the missile-testing base, and announced to the world -- to our great interest -- that there had been over 2,000 violations of China's territory by the Soviet Union. In other words, this is a sense of the magnitude of the Soviet threat as the Chinese perceived it.

After a decent interval and after the furor over the Cambodian exercise had died down, the Chinese could once more take a look at their strategic needs, the idea of having one enemy rather than two, and resume the contact with the U.S.

In the early spring of 1971, Henry called me in and said, "We're back on track. I want you to start working on a book." (A "book" meant a collection of issues and talking points on these issues for use by our representatives at high-level meetings.)

*Q: There is another interesting point here which is the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural Revolution, as you say, started in 1966. I would say 1965. In any case, it was beginning to peter out in 1971, wasn't it?*

HOLDRIDGE: It had already thrown China into such turmoil, that even Mao Zedong had repudiated the Red Guards and thrown 30,000 of them from Beijing out to Yenan, where they were supposed to be able to steel themselves through revolutionary struggle.

*Q: In other words, internal events in China were also bringing it to the point of a rapprochement with the United States.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. I think that the voice of those who preached a less-ideological policy and a more realistic one were beginning to be heard again. Zhou was able to save some of his people

from purgatory, keeping them out of jails --

*Q: They had their kind of McCarthyism that was now lifting, where people began to say what they thought.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. I think there was still an intense debate going on in China over the whole merits of this, and they probably continue right to this day. Nevertheless, the strategic considerations were uppermost at that time.

*Q: Tell me about the preparations for Henry's trip. At what point were you cut in on it? What was your role in it?*

HOLDRIDGE: My role was doing the books. As he said, "Start working up position papers on all the issues that would be discussed with the Chinese."

Except for Vietnam -- I didn't draft those. I drafted the relations with Japan, with Korea and the Korean problem, Southeast Asia, all the various areas in East Asia and the Pacific, which were mine. Henry wanted to talk about Vietnam himself. Of course, I heard what was going on. He took Dick Smyser along on that trip. He was his resident expert on Vietnam, although Dick didn't open his mouth the whole time. [Laughter]

My job was to think up the positions. The way we worked it out is -- first of all, there was a three-inch paragraph which indicated the issue involved. Next came the anticipated Chinese position, and then "your response."

*Q: Whose clever idea was it of having -- the United States says and the Chinese say, and then where both agree? To me, the format of the eventual Shanghai communiqué was a stroke of genius. I don't recall seeing any kind of communiqué drafted that way, where you were able to get in your independent positions and differences and then show where you agreed. Where did that idea crop up?*

HOLDRIDGE: That came out after the return from the first trip, in preparation for the second. I think that the second visit in October of 1971 brought this formula into play. The Chinese had to say their say. We wanted to make it very plain that we were supporting South Vietnam. The way it worked out is that each laid out his position -- we declared this, the Chinese side declared that.

*Q: It is a reflection, I suppose, of your first talks. Henry said that the Chinese sounded off -- I assume it was Zhou En-lai -- for the better part of two days about all of the injustices that China had suffered at the hands of the West. They had to get it off their chest.*

HOLDRIDGE: We expected that. At the same time, Zhou was very pragmatic, too. We worked from the early spring of 1971 -- and I made a trip down to Key Biscayne once with the books to show Nixon, who was down at his Florida White House. We finally arranged the take-off and all of this correspondence through the back channels. Again, Kissinger was hypersensitive about any leaks on this. In this particular respect, such a dramatic break with the past, I think he was correct. He didn't want to have our China policy defined by the New York Times and the

Washington Post. He wanted to do it himself.

*Q: The only thing there is that, as I heard it later on, the Chinese insisted on the secrecy. The fact of the matter is that we insisted on it.*

HOLDRIDGE: Henry never intimated that the Chinese laid it on, although they were quite prepared, of course, to accept. We went public on July 15, after we got back. The only problem was making sure that there was some forewarning to everybody concerned.

*Q: You wanted to be sure that, when the news broke, that it broke at the same time in Peking as it did in Washington. That was critical.*

HOLDRIDGE: We did that. It was at 8:30 or 9:00 at night in Los Angeles. The President was making a speech before the World Affairs Council. That would have been roughly 9:00 A. M. in Beijing, so it was no problem.

The Pakistanis were very helpful in this regard. They were not only the conduit, but they provided the means of transportation.

About the reassurance factor -- we were stepping into the infinite. Getting aboard the airplane around 4:00 A. M. in Rawalpindi, who should we meet aboard the airplane but Chang Wenjin, Wang Haijung, Nancy Tan (Tan Wanshuang), the interpreter, and the guy from the protocol department, Tang Wangbin. Chang Wenjin later was ambassador to Washington. He was one of the senior people in the foreign ministry in Beijing, and had been associated with Zhou En-lai since the time of the Marshall mission. Wang Haijung was Mao Zedong's grandniece. There were four Chinese, plus a Chinese air crew aboard this airplane who would navigate the aircraft once it got into Chinese territorial air.

Chang Wenjin made it very plain that he had been sent by Premier Zhou to reassure us all that we would be well received, and that there would be no problems about security.

*Q: You stayed in that compound?*

HOLDRIDGE: We stayed in the Tiao Yü Tai. We landed, in fact, at an airport which was south of Beijing. I believe it is adjacent to where China makes its MRBMs and which nobody else has visited. We thought very little of it, of course. We were whisked off the airplane and into those Hung Chi's (Red Flag limousines).

*Q: Your presence in Peking was all secret?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. No one knew.

*Q: Were the blinds drawn on the car?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. People were looking at this cortege. Just like Gorbachev going to Beijing in April of this year, we went in a small door in the Great Hall of the People, underneath the main

steps. We went into the Great Hall of the People to talk to the Chinese, to Zhou En-lai. We went up in an elevator about the size of a telephone booth, all crowded together.

I took the opportunity while we were there -- I thought Kissinger ought to know more about China than just seeing the inside of the guest house or the Great Hall -- to suggest to the Chinese, since Beijing is a beautiful city and we were there at a good time, that we take a little time off to see one of the major attractions of Beijing. I suggested the Summer Palace, the Temple of Heaven, or the Forbidden City. The Chinese were nice enough to give us a tour of the Forbidden City one morning. They closed the whole thing off. Nobody else was there. Just us. It was an eery sensation.

*Q: If there had been any foreign newsmen around, thought, that probably would have broken it, wouldn't it?*

HOLDRIDGE: In fact, the correspondent of the New York Times was there.

*Q: How did you keep him quiet?*

HOLDRIDGE: Well, he was in the hospital having his appendix taken out. [Laughter]

*Q: He was under heavy sedation. How much time elapsed between Henry's trip and the President's announcement?*

HOLDRIDGE: We got there around July 7. We had about two-and-a-half days there. They were tense, by the way. Zhou En-lai would say, after we had had a long afternoon of conversations followed by a dinner -- we would be sitting just among ourselves -- "I will join you at 9:00 when we will resume our talks."

Nine o'clock came, nobody came, nothing happened. Ten o'clock, eleven o'clock, midnight -- Henry really was going through all sorts of paroxysms here, "What is happening? What is going on?"

So we would go out and take a little stroll around the gardens of the Tiao Yü Tai, where we didn't think we could be bugged. He would ask me, and I said, "Well, they are probably debating it."

I had assumed that maybe it was the People's Liberation Army was dragging it's feet, but in retrospect it was really the ideologues, the people who are the kind we see who have been challenging the reform program in Beijing today. These are people who later showed up as the Gang of Four, etc., who challenged this whole idea of an opening to the United States. It was very tense.

Finally, we reached an accord. They came out with a communiqué which talked about both sides renouncing and rejecting hegemonism, which could only mean the Soviet Union. [Laughter] Since we were there, we couldn't be hegemonists because we were renouncing it, and the Chinese weren't hegemonists, either. The only persons who could be were the Soviets.

*Q: How far would you say you went in actually framing the positions that were eventually taken in --*

HOLDRIDGE: Not very far. This was only the opening gun. That is why the second trip was necessary --

*Q: So, what you were really saying is that you were getting the okay on the President's visit, and getting a clear indication that it would result in something.*

HOLDRIDGE: That is correct.

*Q: You came back knowing that the President was welcome, and that that would be the real opportunity for a new era in our relationship.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes.

*Q: Then you went back again in October. What was the purpose of that trip?*

HOLDRIDGE: The purpose of that one was to start framing the joint communiqué. I started this whole process by doing a draft. I looked over some other joint communiqués which had been done, and I used that as a skeleton outline and went on from there. What emerged was still quite different, but at least it started the whole process going. This was in September.

*Q: Were you using this concept -- the Chinese say, the United States says, where we agree? Were you using that kind of format?*

HOLDRIDGE: To an extent, yes. I noticed that it was reflected in other joint communiqués.

*Q: What would you say were the difficult points?*

HOLDRIDGE: The difficult point was Taiwan. There was no question about that.

*Q: You were trying to find the right language.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. To jump ahead a few months, the night before the Shanghai communiqué was issued, we sat up until the wee small hours of the morning at the hotel in Hangzhou. Chang Wenjin and Foreign Minister Chiao Kuanhua were on one side of the table and Henry was on the other side. They were going back and forth about the wording. It was a very tedious thing.

You are familiar with the last-minute changes on the morning that the communiqué was issued.

*Q: I precipitated them.*

HOLDRIDGE: Alexander Haig, who was on the National Security Council, made a trip in January of 1972. He said that he also negotiated some more about the joint communiqué. He may

have, for all I know.

*Q: The idea of that trip was the logistics.*

HOLDRIDGE: The logistics, the communications, and all the rest of it. I think that Al, characteristically perhaps, may have made more of it in his book, Caveat, than was actually the case. I don't want to dispute what he has to say.

The process was involved, and it was complicated in October by the fact that the Chinese had just undergone this reputed coup d'etat against Mao Zedong by his formerly-designated heir apparent, Lin Piao. It was an eerie situation in Beijing. The streets were very nearly deserted, as they were when we got there in July. (It struck me then that it was a city like Warsaw, having been bombed out, because it was so still. People looked dazed. It was the Cultural Revolution coming to an end.)

In October, the problem was the military presence. I remember we went to a function at the Great Hall of the People, in which Madam Mao was hosting Henry Kissinger. We saw one of these revolutionary dramas of which Madam Mao was so fond -- and authored, perhaps. On the way back to the Tiao Yü Tai, which was a distance of some four or so miles, at every street intersection along the main road there, there was a lamp hanging down. I think it was a normal street lamp. Under every one there was an armed soldier, standing with an AK-47. It was kind of weird. We had wondered whether, in fact, in the light of the reputed coup, which took place just before the Kissinger mission went, the Chinese would actually follow through with it. They did. Zhou En-lai seemed his usual self, and there didn't seem to be any problem.

In fact, we went out to see the Great Wall. This was going to be one of the high points --

*Q: There was no secrecy on this trip?*

HOLDRIDGE: No. There are some interesting by-play there, too, in that the Chinese took great care to publicize it, and to show that Yeh Chienying, the old marshall and presumed leader of the PLA, was the one that was squiring Henry around.

*Q: That brings us to the president's trip itself. You and I were fellow passengers in the plane going out there. As a matter of fact, so was Scowcroft, Win Lord, and a lot of other people who were featured in China-policy issues.*

*When we got out to Peking, you were in one building and we were in another. In other words, State and NSC were kept --*

HOLDRIDGE: The sheep were separated from the goats, Marshall, I am sorry to say. [Laughter] How Bill Rogers put up with that nonsense as long as he did, I don't know.

*Q: Henry would touch base with us occasionally with regard to progress in the talks he was carrying on with the vice foreign minister. I assume that you were very closely involved.*

HOLDRIDGE: Actually, it wasn't the vice foreign minister. It was with Zhou En-lai.

*Q: The negotiations, I gather, at the working level were more or less conducted by the vice foreign minister.*

HOLDRIDGE: We did have some talks about some of the issues, which are "lesser included issues." Those were not much taken up on the Presidential visit. They were taken up on subsequent visits.

*Q: What were you doing, then, during those days when we were in Peking, prior to the Shanghai communiqué? We were in Peking for the better part of three or four days, as I recall. We were in one guest house, and you were in the other.*

HOLDRIDGE: He managed to sneak off and see Mao Zedong without me, which I hold against him. Again, his propensity for trying to keep it down to --

*Q: He saw Mao Zedong twice?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes, it was Nixon, Mao, and Henry, but not yours truly. I said, "What the heck."

I did sit on the conversations that Henry had with Zhou En-lai.

*Q: Was there much done in terms of the Shanghai communiqué's framing and wording during that Presidential trip, or had the document been pretty well done?*

HOLDRIDGE: It had largely been done. I did one little bit while I was there, and that was on exchange of persons -- a paragraph that was added about newsmen, scientists, etc.

*Q: When the President went out there, the Shanghai communiqué was pretty well formulated.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. The big problem was the wording of that one paragraph on Taiwan.

*Q: People on both sides of the Strait -- you eventually did come up with a satisfactory one.*

HOLDRIDGE: We changed it from "all people" to "all Chinese." That was on the morning of the communiqué, just before it was issued. There was a last minute scurrying around. This was because there were many people on Taiwan who do not call themselves Chinese. They call themselves Taiwanese. If we had said, "all people," this would mean that the Taiwanese had also maintained a position of one China and that Taiwan as a part of it, which is not necessarily the case. If you said, "all Chinese," this gets you into something else again.

*Q: This was not my major intervention. The major intervention had to do with the fact that, in the communiqué, as I saw it, at Hangzhou, it had already been approved by the President and by Zhou En-lai, that it contained language in which we listed all of our existing commitments, and that America would stand behind them. It left out our commitment to Taiwan. I reminded Rogers, when I saw it, that this would certainly revive in people's memories the fact that Dean Acheson*

*similarly left out Korea as one of the places for which we had a commitment and for which he was held responsible for the Korean War -- very unfairly, of course, but there it was. This could really unravel the whole document.*

HOLDRIDGE: I don't know that it was all that unfair, Marshall. Harry Truman said the same thing. There were two speeches within a few days of one another in the early part of 1950.

*Q: All I'm saying is that this, to me, would have been a great opportunity for Kraslow and others just to pull the whole document apart at a time when we released the Shanghai communiqué. It would have riled up the defenders of Taiwan back in the Republican Party -- people like Vice President Agnew and the Secretary of the Treasury, who had many reservations about the President going out to Peking in the first place.*

HOLDRIDGE: Let me add that, when this was presented to the newsmen in Shanghai at the Chin Chiang Hotel, Marshall did a brilliant job of presenting it. He was the briefer, even though he had not been deeply involved in the drafting of it. He was stuck with the job of presenting it to the press. Bringing up that one point, he did orally what we did not say in wording.

*Q: Let me just say that you are giving me too much credit. All I did there was to present what had gone on in the counterpart talks, where I had been present. Then Henry took over. Meanwhile, Henry had worked out -- presumably with Zhou En-lai or somebody -- that same night when we were in Hangzhou, an alternative way, leaving out this language about which security treaties we'd stand by, simply leaving it out. But then he said, in response to a question from Kraslow of the Los Angeles Times, that no mention was made there of our commitments to the Republic of China on Taiwan or of our other commitments. These were all covered in the President's state of the world message that he had made earlier on in the year. In that, we said that we stood behind all of our commitments, including to the Republic of China in Taiwan. Henry added this. He hoped this, in view of where this press conference was being held, there would be no further discussion of this point. There weren't.*

*The way that Henry handled it was brilliant. He did, once and for all, dispose of the problem. I give him credit for it. What I will not give him credit for is the fact that, in his memoirs, he treats my intervention as being lots of silly little, minor nitpicks, very typical of the State Department.*

HOLDRIDGE: Henry is a brilliant man, but he is a [expletive deleted] when you really get down to it. [Laughter] He is not the most lovable personality in the world. He is terribly arrogant, and he wants to make sure that nobody else can shed any rays of light on any subject. He does not give credit where credit is due.

*Q: I do think that the greatest things that we do sometimes in diplomacy are the things that don't happen. This didn't happen because of my intervention. Since it didn't happen, nobody ever notices. When somebody says exactly the opposite of what you did in his memoirs that everybody reads, clearly it is a time to speak up.*

HOLDRIDGE: I read his memoirs, and there are a few other episodes which do not accord with my own memory.

*Q: In all this work in the NSC, was the Russian card ever mentioned? What I mean is, was the China card being played as opposed to the Russian card?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes, of course. We did not do it in ways which brought up the Russians as the bugaboo, but we simply pointed out what the Soviets were doing worldwide, and the problems that this posed for both of us. Therefore, we pointed out the advantages which we could gain mutually by recognizing the problem and working together to resolve it.

*Q: In many ways, the Soviet problem was the glue that held it together.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. This was the point from which we started. To give Henry some more credit, from the very beginning our thought was that, in addition to the strategic elements in this relationship which we hoped to develop, we also wanted to assist China in turning away from its inward-looking positions -- its policies which had taken it apart and away from the relationship with the outside world and which had turned it inward. We thought that, maybe by opening up to the United States, this would help to turn China outward, to make it more a normal member of the world community, and something that would be a benefit to the Chinese people as well as to everybody else. This element was there from the very beginning. It was not simply the strategic value.

*Q: When was the idea of the U.S. liaison office in Peking? Was that agreed to during the President's visit, earlier during your visits with Henry in China, or did this occur after?*

HOLDRIDGE: It was after. It was in January of 1973. We had managed to have a number of visits to China, subsequent to the President's visit. There was one in June of 1972. There was another in the fall when I recall Henry spent some time in Japan. Japan was feeling deeply hurt, having been let out of all of this situation. There was one in January, and then we really got down to brass tacks. In some of these others, we had addressed the issues. Some were claims versus property, the sequestered funds which we had in the United States -- the Chinese assets versus the claims of Americans against the Chinese for property seized, etc. We resolved a number of issues.

By this time, by the way, the State Department was very much a participant. Al Jenkins went along on the October trip and all subsequent ones, to my knowledge, including the President's trip.

In January of 1973, we began to talk about the future relationships between us and the advantages of having a mission. I personally thought that maybe the Chinese would balk at going too far. It was my thought that maybe something in the nature of a trade mission might be more acceptable to them. To my astonishment, it was Zhou En-lai who proposed going on up to the level of a liaison office which, of course, we immediately accepted.

*Q: So he was the one that really made the suggestion.*

HOLDRIDGE: Again, this is a follow up to the position we had taken as far back as 1969 that

we wanted to set up missions. The question was, what kind of a mission would be possible under the circumstances. What would be acceptable? We were willing to go as far as the Chinese were. I didn't think they would make this quantum jump into something which was as advanced as a liaison office. To all intents and purposes, we were a diplomatic mission.

*Q: It was really justified in the eyes of the Chinese on the grounds that this was a stepping stone to full recognition. We had to go through the antics of liquidating our relationship with the Republic of China on Taiwan and having a new relationship there. That would take time. During that time, it was important to have a continuation office.*

HOLDRIDGE: In the Shanghai communiqué, in fact, there is a paragraph which talks about the ultimate goal of normalization of relations.

*Q: It was a seven-year period, then, that we had a liaison office.*

HOLDRIDGE: We opened in May of 1973, and it turned into an embassy as of January 1, 1979.

*Q: So it was a six-year period. How long was it before the liaison office was actually started? You were one of the first people there.*

HOLDRIDGE: Al Jenkins went in several weeks ahead of time to set up shop in the Beijing Hotel. He went in and came out again. We all then went in together. Martha Jenkins came along at that time. My wife was unable to leave. We had to liquidate the house. We had left on such short notice. We went in from Hong Kong in May of 1973 to get to Beijing in time to read (in the Chinese press) that, as of May 1, Deng Xiaoping had been brought out of hiding and had reappeared on the scene, resuscitated.

*Q: Zhou En-lai, meanwhile had died?*

HOLDRIDGE: No. He was still very much in evidence. He didn't die until 1976. We went in and set up shop, first in the Beijing Hotel. The Chinese were working overtime to finish up a mission for us. It was intended for somebody else, but the Chinese redid it to our specifications, which meant extensive remodeling of the communications section, as you can well imagine. Other things had to be adapted to our needs, but they were very cooperative. To begin with, there were no problems, really.

The Chinese seemed to be going out of their way to be accommodating. That didn't last too long. After a while, I think, we were still catching the backlash of differences within the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party about the merits of opening up to the United States. Our relationship would blow hot and blow cold. Sometimes we would be doing very well, indeed. We would see Chiao Kuan-hua, the foreign minister, who helped to draft the Shanghai communiqué. He would be very congenial. Then we wouldn't see him for a long period, and we would only see the deputy director of whatever office we were working with in the foreign ministry.

We would be summoned from time to time. The phone would ring, and one of the little voices at

the other end of the line from the foreign ministry would say that so-and-so would like to see you.

We would say, "What for?"

They would say, "Something involving the liaison office."

This always meant that we were going to be hit between the eyes with some sledgehammer blow. They were going to discipline us for something. It was rather interesting.

*Q: Were you head of the office?*

HOLDRIDGE: I was deputy. There were two deputies. Al Jenkins was there, but Al took himself out of the running.

*Q: Who was the representative, then?*

HOLDRIDGE: I usually went.

*Q: Who was the chief?*

HOLDRIDGE: At that time it was David Bruce, one of our most distinguished diplomats. He was a very great man.

*Q: How did he endure all of this? It must have been a very unusual experience.*

HOLDRIDGE: Stoically, with great interest. His feet hurt much of the time, but he was fascinated. He thought it was just great. He made the mistake of having his corns removed by a Chinese foot doctor. That was not the most clever move he had ever made in his life. [Laughter] He had to wear Chinese slippers around the office for quite a while thereafter.

We had this on-again, off-again relationship. We were often zapped. I would be called on some kind of a protest given. David would go along sometimes.

On one occasion, for example, one of our young officers from Hong Kong was allowed to visit. He stayed with one of the people in the liaison office and went out bicycle riding. He rode his bicycle right into a compound which was off limits and which said so on a sign. He was stopped by a PLA soldier. We didn't know about that. Two days later, he was down in Hang Zhou, and he called us.

He said, "Something happened which, perhaps, you might be interested knowing about. I was stopped by the Army for going into a proscribed zone."

We winced at this. Sure enough, within several days the phone rang and, Lin Ping, the deputy director of the American department from the foreign ministry, wanted to see us. He always loved to give us the business.

In this particular episode, we thought, "Now, what could it possibly be? Oh, it must be that bicycle episode."

We had already reported it. As soon as he told us, we reported it to Washington. We took note of the problem which could arise. Sure enough, when David Bruce went in to see the Chinese, Mr. Lin Ping delivered this admonition about one of our people going into a military zone. We told him that we had already taken note of it, that he had told us about the episode two days later, and that we had reported it to Washington. We assured him that it would not happen again.

Another problem which we dealt with in the early days was the Chinese exhibition of archeological articles dug up during the Cultural Revolution. They had a special exhibition which they eventually called "cultural artifacts." It was quite an exhibition, including jade body suits, Tang dynasty figurines, all really beautiful things. It was making a tour of the world, and it was going to come to the United States. One of the things we were negotiating with the Chinese was the terms, the agreement, that we would have between our two countries on this exhibition.

The Chinese presented us with an agreement which they had used in every other country worldwide where this thing had been visiting. Lo and behold, when we sent it back, the people in the legal division of the Department objected strenuously. There was not enough protection, etc. We had to go back to the Chinese to try to change certain paragraphs. Each time we suggested a change, the Chinese would toughen up, until the terms were stiffer than ever before which were even more objectionable to the people in "L" (the Legal Division).

Finally, I got to the point where I wrote a cable back saying, "We have to determine whether we want this exhibition to come to the United States or not. If we want it to come, we are going to have to accept the Chinese terms the way they are. They are not going to change. The alternative is no exhibition. Now, what do you want?"

Ultimately, the exhibition came to the United States and was a great success. But the Chinese had, meanwhile, used this little episode to teach us a lesson -- Chinese love to teach lessons.

*Q: Looking back over the span of years between the time you were in the liaison office, when you went to Singapore in 1975, and then later on when you were assistant secretary, have you seen the Chinese much easier to deal with? Do you feel that their exposure to us developed a greater mutual understanding and trust than there certainly existed at that time?*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes, to an extent. There has undoubtedly been quite a change up until the present and the reaction to the Tiananmen situation of June. Starting with normalization and now more recently, the Chinese had begun to function as normal members of the world community. They joined the IAEA, the World Bank, IMF, have applied for the GATT, and begun to function just like any normal country. They sent 40,000 students to the United States.

People were accessible at various levels of the government -- you could talk to them as individuals and not as ideologues. It used to be so bothersome to me when I talked to Lin Ping. There was always this consciousness of the superiority of China -- the "outer barbarian" versus

the "middle kingdom" kind of concept. Lin Ping used to rub it in. He was always smug about the value of the thought of Mao Zedong.

*Q: In Singapore, you had a close relationship with Lee Kuan Yew . He has always had an ambivalent attitude towards China. He has had close relations with, and he still visits and spends a week or two every year in Taipei. At the same time, he is the premier of a Chinese city. They have normal relations with Peking, and yet they have this personal relationship with Taiwan.*

HOLDRIDGE: Actually, they don't have normal relations yet. They are waiting for Indonesia to take the first step. In fact, when I left Beijing and Lin Ping gave me a farewell lunch, he asked me, "Now that you are going to Singapore, when do you think that normalization between China and Singapore will occur?"

I said, "Well, it is going to have to await Indonesia."

Lin then said, "Ah, then it will take a long time."

*Q: Why do they take this stand?*

HOLDRIDGE: It is because Indonesia is hypersensitive --

*Q: I know why Indonesia feels that way. Why do they feel they have to play second fiddle to Indonesia?*

HOLDRIDGE: It is because of the Chineseness there. If these uppity Chinese, as perceived by the Indonesians, were to run ahead of Indonesia and to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing, this might be a touchy, political problem in Singapore's relationships with Indonesia, which Lee Kuan Yew didn't want to have. He had enough problems left over from "Confrontasi" (the confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia) as you remember. The Chinese in Singapore did not wish to advertise Chineseness by establishing relations with Beijing before Indonesia.

*Q: Are you aware of any desires on the part of Peking to have relations with --*

HOLDRIDGE: Certainly. Indeed, there is a trade mission there now, operating in the Bank of China. To all intents and purposes, it is like a liaison office.

*Q: When I was in Jakarta last year and talked to Suharto, we didn't talk about China. We talked about population issues, basically. I gave a talk in front of an audience of diplomats and other leaders, and during the question and answer period -- this was all open to the press -- they asked me whether I thought that Indonesia should normalize relations with China.*

*I said, "Well, since we have good relations both with Indonesia and China, I would say yes. I personally hope very much that there would be a restoration of normal relations."*

*It touched off a storm in the press. The latest word I heard on that is that they are seriously*

*considering --*

HOLDRIDGE: They are working on it now, but you were probably a little premature, Marshall. When I was there, I knew it was a little more than premature.

My position on restoration of relations was that it was a question which they will have to decide for themselves, in the light of their own determination of their national interests. As far as we were concerned, we believed it was in the interest of both the U.S. and China to have this relationship, helping to open China to the outside world, to turn it outward, etc.

*Q: Basically, that is what I said. I also said, "You asked me the question. I'm answering your question."*

*I didn't raise it. They raised it.*

HOLDRIDGE: I pointed out the advantages which we perceived, but said that they will have to make up their minds themselves.

*Q: I remember talking with Lee Kuan Yew one time back in 1964. He said, "We are a rich country, surrounded in a sea of poverty."*

*He was pointing to Indonesia.*

*"We are also a Chinese city in a sea of Moslems. We are very lonely. We, therefore, welcome our relationship with the Western world."*

*I never could quite understand the position that they took in Singapore with regard to nonrecognition of Peking. This is the first time I've ever heard it from you that it was because they were deferential to the Indonesian position. I always thought Lee was worried that it would create tensions amongst the Chinese in Singapore, between those that favored Taiwan and those that favored Peking.*

HOLDRIDGE: I'll grant you there is some element of value in that perception, as well. Singapore has only been a nation since 1965. It has only had 25 years of nationhood. Since over 75% of the population is Chinese, Lee wanted to have time for Singapore to develop a sense of national identity. There is also that element in his calculus. He was principally concerned about not rushing ahead of Indonesia.

As to this nationhood or national identity, shortly after we got there, I was talking to one of the Singapore ministers. He mentioned that there had been a soccer game in the Kallang sports stadium between a Chinese team and a Singaporean team. The place was jammed. The minister said that they were holding their breath in the Singapore government to see which team the Singaporeans cheered for. It came as a great sense of relief when the crowd was cheering for the Singapore team. [Laughter]

*Q: We have not covered your years with the Agency, or in Indonesia, and as assistant secretary,*

*as well as your years in retirement. These years covered the important years where the United States and China were getting together.*

HOLDRIDGE: My last accomplishment regarding China was the communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan on August 17, 1982. Al Haig picked me as his Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific. I sat in that chair, even though not confirmed until May, as of January 21, 1981. There was no one there to do it since everyone was in a state of disarray. We were having problems about having politicians being appointed to deputy assistant secretary positions, etc. I just picked up, walked over from CIA, and sat down in the chair and functioned.

I ran into some interesting problems about Ed Reischauer's memoirs coming out, talking about nuclear ships visiting Japan, etc.

*Q: It was ships with nuclear weapons on them. There were American ships coming into Japanese ports.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. There was also the time when the United States submarine managed to ram and sink a Japanese fishing vessel, a small freighter, with some loss of life. It didn't stop to pick up the casualties. These are some of the things that I had to deal with.

The very first thing I had to deal with was Taiwan. Our friends in Taiwan saw their great and good friend Reagan come along. Remember, Nixon sent Reagan to Taiwan to explain what was happening after the Shanghai Communiqué. You and I visited and saw Chiang Ching-Kuo in early March of 1972. Later on, to keep things on track, especially over the whole question of the United Nations' membership, Reagan was sent by Nixon to reassure Chang Ching-Kuo that we would stand firmly behind Taiwan and its position internationally. In comes President Reagan, and Taiwan thought that it was going to have it home free. The first thing that I had to worry about was who was going to attend the inaugural ceremony. It was made public by Anna Chennault that there was going to be official representation from Taiwan. The governor of Taiwan, the secretary general of the Kuomintang Party, and the mayor of Taipei were all included to represent Taiwan, the Republic of China, at the inauguration. Chai Zemin, the Chinese ambassador let it be known that if these people showed up, he wouldn't. The last thing we needed in the world to start the Reagan Administration off with was a big fuss over China policy.

The way I resolved that one was first to go to Anna and tell her she had made a dreadful mistake, and that she should do what she could to pull back on the reins. I then made an international phone call in the clear, assuming that ears would be listening all over, to Chuck Cross, the head of our American Institute in Taiwan. During that telephone call, I told him what dreadful consequences would ensue in the relationship with Taiwan if we started out the Reagan Administration with a big brouhaha over China policy.

The word got through, and the secretary general of the Kuomintang Party, who was here, got a diplomatic illness. Jim Lilley, who was in the CIA at the time and was our AIT representative later on, and I went over and called on the poor, ill gentleman in his hospital room over in Alexandria. This was to show that our hearts were in the right place. That was issue number one.

Issue number two was this whole constant arm-sales issue which they had created. Taiwan had been told earlier at some stage in the process that they would get an aircraft which would be an upgrade of the F5E/F series, which they had. It was known as the F5G, and it was carefully designed by Northrop so that it did not have a kind of a range or a loiter time capability which would allow it to be an offensive weapon against the mainland. It would be a fighter interceptor and useful for defensive purposes. Along comes the F5G and Taiwan begins to talk about it all over the place -- in the New York Times, the head of the Chinese nationalist Air Force, and various other leading figures talked about it.

Immediately, this whole arms-sales issue became inflamed. The Chinese fired back their responses. Over a period of time, it became known to us through actual diplomatic representations that they could live with what was there -- the F5E/F -- but they could not accept an upgrade. This they would not go beyond.

Al Haig had reassured them in 1981, when Huang Hua, as foreign minister, visited Washington after a visit of Cancun and to the U.N., and told us that we were going to have to set a deadline on the cessation of sales to Taiwan. Al very strongly resisted that idea, but said across the table that we would be willing to accept limitations on quantity and quality -- keep it at an existing level. We had a big problem about what Taiwan's actual needs were. Various government agencies labored long and diligently to come up with the idea that Taiwan did not need an upgrade. The F5E/F was perfectly adequate for anything which China, at that time, was able to put into the air. They still haven't finished their F-8 which Grumman, I understand, is working on along with a few other subcontractors. The best they have is the MiG-21. That is no great threat to Taiwan, nor was it at the time.

*Q: How was it resolved?*

HOLDRIDGE: It was a reformulation of the joint Shanghai communiqué in which the Chinese stated that Taiwan was a part of China. This was their long-held position, and we said that we had agreed with this position. There was no problem with that because it was in the Shanghai communiqué. The Chinese then expressed a resolve to continue to pursue the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland by peaceful means -- continue the policy.

We said, "Under these circumstances, we would then find it possible to conduct arm-sales policy toward Taiwan, which would result in no increases in either quantity or quality, and looking to an ultimate resolution of this question."

*Q: Wasn't there a congressional resolution at this time with regard to this issue?*

HOLDRIDGE: There could have been.

*Q: In any case, that resolved the issue.*

HOLDRIDGE: Yes. I had to present this joint communiqué. We didn't know until about three days before it became ok to have something, that we were going to get one. The problem was

this August 21 date which came up. By August 21, 1982, the Air Force was going to have to notify Congress of the continuation of the F5E/F line. If we didn't have a joint communiqué to resolve this whole question of arms sales to Taiwan by this time, our whole relationship could have been plunged into chaos, if not worse. We had a tight deadline.

Al Haig admits in his book that the best thing he did for his country at this time was to take himself out of the position of Secretary of State. He was so disliked in the White House -- the suspicions were so intense -- that anything that Al would have sent over would have been thrown back into the teeth of the Department of State. Time would have been wasted.

In fact, Al actually opposed the visit of Vice President Bush to China in May of 1982, which happened to cut the Gordian knot. Maybe this is some explanation for why Bush was willing to send Scowcroft. Somebody has to take an initiative. In the course of a visit to other places in Asia such as Korea, Japan, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, etc., the Chinese had agreed to accept the Vice Presidential visit, which was at the tail end. He went and was able to convince the Chinese that we were absolutely sincere in trying to find a resolution. We weren't trying to do them in, but we had our own domestic problems to take care of, as well.

*Q: In looking back over the years, there has been a very stormy relationship with China. We've been dealing with a country that has had very much of a Sino-centric view of the world and still does. What you are saying, in essence, is that a constructive relationship between the United States and China is very fundamental. This is not only in dealing with the problems of today and in the long range. Cooperation between two such important nations -- the most populous nation in the world and the most powerful nation in the world -- is absolutely essential for all of humanity. But we are the ones that have to make the first move every time.*

HOLDRIDGE: The Chinese are very much in the mood today -- as they were, in fact, over the years in which I have known China -- as Japan was prior to World War II. You were there as Ambassador Drew's secretary. You know that the Japanese had this terrible chip on their shoulder. They felt that they were being looked down on by others, that they had their own consciousness of their national heritage and national worth. The Japanese were in a very bellicose and belligerent mood -- stripping American women in Tientsin, etc., which occurred at the time of the war between China and Japan in 1937. They had to show the outside world that they weren't going to be pushed around.

China is in something of the same state of mind now. If they were confident of themselves and of their own system and situation, they wouldn't be so difficult to deal with. But, at a time when they are still going through what John Fairbank calls "China's long revolution," which began in 1800 with China finding it necessary to come to terms with the outside world, it is up to us, I am afraid, to make the first move. The Chinese are not likely to do it themselves under the circumstances of the psychological conditions which prevail in Beijing.

*Q: In essence, you think that President Bush did the right thing by sending --*

HOLDRIDGE: I think it was a very courageous move. I think it was correct, and I hope it succeeds. I hope the Chinese understand, though, for it to succeed, they have to respond.

*Q:* Could you explain what the situation is right now?

HOLDRIDGE: The sudden appearance of Scowcroft and Eagleburger in Beijing -- unannounced -- like the circumstances surrounding the Kissinger visit to China in July of 1971, has inspired enormous criticism in the American press, the liberal wing, and the conservative wing.

*Q:* Why has this inspired criticism?

HOLDRIDGE: This is in the wake of the Tiananmen episode last June 4, when the Chinese used military force to suppress the student demonstration. I don't know how many Chinese students were killed, but there were numerous killed. There is revulsion and abhorrence on the part of the United States --

*Q: It is whipped up all the more by the presence here of tens of thousands of Chinese students from the Chinese mainland.*

HOLDRIDGE: There are 40,000 Chinese students. Now the President has vetoed a congressional bill which would have allowed these people to stay on indefinitely, pending some kind of a return to normalcy on the mainland. I think the President was quite correct in vetoing it. He can handle this problem administratively.

The same thing is true about sanctions. If you codify into law measures which are regarded by the Chinese as hostile to them -- anti-Chinese, which interfere in their own internal affairs -- the Chinese are bound to take note and respond vigorously.

*Q: This was so true of the Japanese with the Oriental Exclusion Bill back in 1924. The Japanese never forgot that. That is why I continually pointed out the dangers of the position that we took at the World Population Conference in Mexico City when we identified the Chinese as being the principal culprits, etc. This is a kind of slap in the face that these Oriental countries remember forever.*

*There is, however, a kind of xenophobic attitude. There is also a feeling, in the case of the Japanese, that they are unique and different.*

HOLDRIDGE: That is one of our great problems in dealing with Japan today, and why the Japanese are more competitive. A Japanese businessman, going out into the world, thinks of himself as a samurai, serving the interests of the shogun. He is doing his bit, not just for his company but for Japan. The American is out to make money. If he can't make money under existing circumstances, he throws in the sponge and goes elsewhere. Not the Japanese.

The Chinese have something of the same attitude. I was at a conference just the other day when a young lady was talking about Southeast Asia and the climate for investment there. She began to wax eloquent on the talents of the Chinese. She happened to be from Singapore, married to an American. I thought to myself that she was really laying it on pretty thick. There is this chauvinism on the part of the Chinese in which they think that they can do anything, given the

right conditions, and probably better than the rest of you people can.

*Q: They also have a very strong sense of the injustice at the hands of the imperial West. They have never forgotten that. That is understandable.*

HOLDRIDGE: That was the first issue we ran into after opening up the liaison office. We brought American Marines along with us.

*Q: In other words, we had an awful lot of baggage --*

HOLDRIDGE: We had a lot of impedimenta we have to shed. The American Marines, in their uniform --

*Q: I think this is what President Bush understands. Having been our there in charge of our liaison office, he recognizes that we really have to make the first move. After a while, if you just sit back there and nurse your grudges -- where do you get? You just go into a long, frozen relationship and it doesn't help the Chinese people. It doesn't help the world at a time when we are going to have to have understandings with China on environmental issues, etc. A large segment of the world's population is involved here. I think the President is right in making the first move.*

HOLDRIDGE: Not only is it in the interest of the United States, but it is in the interest of the Chinese people that the ideologues, who seem to have regained prominence, be cooled down. I have told you all along of the struggle between the more ideologically inclined and the more realistically inclined people in Beijing that we've dealt with over the years. After Beijing, the Tiananmen episode, the ideologues seem to have regained, if not the upper hand, certainly a lot more prominence. If we take this hard line, we run the danger of isolating those who would like to see progress continue toward a normal relationship with the outside world -

*Q: And the flow of students continues to come here. This is terribly important --*

HOLDRIDGE: They'll cut off the flow of students --

*Q: It was the students that came to the United States for postgraduate training that saved Indonesia economically. By the same token, these students that are here now are China's hope. I think that's what the President understands.*

HOLDRIDGE: We cannot afford to isolate ourselves and to let this situation continue -- to isolate the Chinese and force them back into a kind of a situation somewhat akin to what it was under Mao. That would be most egregious error.

*Q: John, thank you very much.*

**JOHN WESLEY JONES**

### **Political Counselor Nanking (1948-1949)**

*Ambassador John Wesley Jones was born in Sioux City, Iowa in 1911. He received a bachelor's degree from George Washington University in 1930 and joined the Foreign Service in the same year. His career included positions in Mexico, India, Italy, and Washington, DC, and was ambassador to Libya and Peru. Ambassador Jones was interviewed by Horace Torbert in 1988.*

JONES: In 1948 after three years in Rome I was transferred to Nanking, China. This of course came as a great surprise to me and to most of the old China hands. But I learned when I got back to the Department that some of my old friends in EUR felt that Johnny Jones had been in Italy long enough, practically since 1935 - from 1935 to 1941 - then four years on the Italian Desk in the Department, and then back in Italy again for another three years, so all together it was about 13 years of unbroken Italian service. So they decided that I should have a change. Also, there was an effort in China to resist a Communist takeover with the increasing Communist influence there. It was felt that someone who had lived through the defeat of Togliatti in the elections in Italy in the 1940s might be a useful member of the staff to point out all the dangers and difficulties of permitting China to become another Communist power.

*Q: And also you'd had some China training from your first boss, perhaps.*

JONES: Not really. No.

*Q: That's interesting. Could Kitty go with you there - to China?*

JONES: Oh, yes. Because the Communists were still off in the west. All of the east coast of China was under the control of Chiang Kai-shek and his government.

We were given home leave en route to China in 1948 and for at least one month my wife and three children and I visited my family in Sioux City. My mother was still living there and my brother and his wife were there and were our hosts. Then we proceeded by train to San Francisco and then from San Francisco took a ship -- Dollar Line, I think it was, from San Francisco to Shanghai. In Shanghai we were met by Jack Cabot, who was the Consul General in those days, put on a train and proceeded to Nanking which was the capital of the Nationalist government in 1948.

Dr. Leighton Stuart was the Ambassador there in those days and Lewis Clark was the Minister Counselor of the Embassy. We were promptly moved into very attractive quarters of the Embassy compound just across the road from the Ambassador's residence and the residence of the Minister Counselor, Lewis Clark. Our next door neighbor in the Embassy compound was Livingston Merchant and his wife, Betty. Livy was the Counselor of the Economic Section and I was head of the Political Section.

However, in December of 1948 the Communists under Mao Zedong captured Peking where we had a Consulate General. And when this happened the Ambassador felt so concerned about the

wives and children and about the imminent danger of Nanking as the next target of the Communist army that he ordered all wives and children to be evacuated to the Philippines. So within a very short time Kitty and the three children flew in a C-47 with the other wives and children to the Philippines where they were stationed in a kind of temporary camp on the grounds of the Philippine University. I visited them there Christmas of '48 and realized that they were not very comfortable living in rather cramped refugee quarters. My wife always referred to the place disparagingly as Camp P.U.

In any event, in January I was still in Nanking in the Embassy. My wife's family (my father-in-law was with IT&T after his retirement from the Marine Corps) had been transferred to Rome, so my wife and children sailed back to Rome to join her parents in Italy and I was left in the Orient by myself.

*Q: You had to keep Jones in Rome as much as possible.*

JONES: That's right. That was a long, difficult summer for me. Finally in August of 1949 Ambassador Leighton Stuart was evacuated, went out on a military plane back to the U.S. - Lewis Clark had moved with the government to Canton, which was where Chiang Kai-shek had established his government when the Communist armies kept moving nearer and nearer to Nanking. So while I was not the Chargé d'Affaires, Lewis Clark was the Chargé d'Affaires in Canton, I was in charge of what was left of the Embassy in Nanking after August 1, 1949.

I'm sorry I don't have my dates straight but I think it must have been in April of '49, I was there when the Communists took Nanking. To my astonishment, the Nationalist government had all left so that for 24 or 48 hours, (first time in my life) we were a city without any authority, no one to appeal to. By that time I had moved into Lewis Clark's former house in the Embassy compound, where the Ambassador's residence was as well. That was fairly well walled-around, a well fortified, well protected compound, and we still had some of the Marine guard with us. The thing that was the greatest danger was not the incoming Communist troops who had already crossed the Yangtze, but looters.

I remember standing on the high ground just inside the Embassy compound wall looking out over the city of Nanking and being horrified at all of the fires that had been set, most of them in empty houses belonging to officials of the Chiang Kai-shek government who had fled to Canton leaving their houses with some provisions and some furniture but empty and unoccupied. And after the local populace had ravaged these houses and looted them, they then set fire to them. We were advised by someone who had lived through incidents like this formerly in the Far East that the best way to keep looters away was to assure them that the place was occupied and that there were firearms inside. So, every 15 minutes or every half hour or whenever it seemed appropriate, the Marine guards would shoot their guns off into the air to let prospective looters know that this was not a place that was easy to attack. Because it was occupied and because it was armed, we were really never in any danger of looters coming near because they had so many other unoccupied places that they could go to. I never would have thought that I would welcome the advent of Communist troops into a city where I was living, but I can assure you that it was with some joy that I saw the Communist troops come into Nanking the next day. Order was very quickly restored.

It was possible for me, after a few days, to go out and go to the Chancery, which was outside the Embassy compound, and to continue to conduct business there. I used to walk back and forth to the Chancery during the days that the Communists were in occupation there, never with any concern or fear from local populace or from them.

*Q: Did you establish some sort of a relationship with the commanding officer of the Communist groups? Or was it just a stand-off, so to speak.*

JONES: It was a stand-off. No, I did not. Because we were still accredited to the government of Chiang Kai-shek so therefore I did not have instructions other than on local or personal basis to be in touch with the local military group, who were there in charge.

This was in April, I think I said.

*Q: April of '49.*

JONES: April of '49, yes, that was when the Communists took Nanking. And in September I received orders to report to the Department of State.

*Q: One of the things that seems very interesting to me about this period is what did you do to keep yourself from going crazy during this time when you had no relations with anybody and in a sense not much work to do other than housekeeping?*

JONES: We had a much smaller staff, of course, by this time because most of the staff had been taken by Lewis Clark to Canton. But we did have enough of a staff to keep this little section and what was left of the Embassy in Nanking going and what we did was report. And we were permitted, interestingly enough, to send out coded messages and to continue to use our communications system.

*Q: Was this your own radio facility in those days or did they go out over commercial wires?*

JONES: Tully, I think they went out over commercial wires. I must confess that I don't remember. This is probably written someplace in my letters home which I will read someday. [N.B. the U.S. and British Embassies in Nanking had their own radio facilities so they did not use commercial wires] But we were permitted to continue to communicate with Shanghai and with Canton and with the Department on what was developing in this area and what our British and French and Italian colleagues were doing. As the Communists moved south and took over Shanghai and then moved on toward Hong Kong, the Department decided that it should close its mission in Nanking and this decision was taken along with most of our allies, including the British government and the Italian government. So an evacuation ship was sent into Shanghai and most of us, the American Embassy and the British Embassy -- Leo Lamb was the British Chargé d'affaires, and the Italian Ambassador, Sergio Fenoaltea, and his staff, we all went out on the same train to Shanghai to board the evacuation ship which was sent there for all of the Western diplomats.

I can remember when I went to the Chinese Communist authorities in Nanking to get passage from the country and my train ticket to Shanghai, I showed them my diplomatic passport and I said that I was the American Chargé d'affaires in Nanking. And they said, we don't recognize you as the Chargé d'affaires. We do not recognize your government or any of its officials. But we will give you a permit, a pass, as an American citizen living in China, to get to Shanghai. So I left Nanking as Mr. Jones, as a non-official of the U.S. government.

When we got to Shanghai we still had a Consulate General there; they had not all been evacuated, some of their staff went out with us. I'm afraid I don't remember the name of the ship now but in any event we went on an evacuation ship to Hong Kong, which was still untouched and still a British colony. The first class on the ship was for the Chiefs of Mission. Since I was the Chargé d'affaires in Nanking and Leo Lamb was the Charge of the British Embassy, we and the Italian Ambassador were all put in one cabin which I think had four bunks. So first class was four bunks and the poor Third Secretaries and Vice Consuls were down in the hold of the ship. I went down once and decided I never wanted to go down again. When I got back up, I couldn't really complain about four to a cabin.

In any event, it was not a very long trip and when we got to Hong Kong we were welcomed there by --

*Q: Whoever the Consul General was at the time.*

JONES: Yes. And I know his name perfectly well, but --

*Q: We can look that up.*

JONES: I stayed in Hong Kong long enough to arrange my travel to Italy because I wanted to join my family there. I believe that my home leave orders covered enough of my travel ticket that I was able to pay for the rest of it to join my family. I arrived in Rome at the airport on October 3, 1949.

**HENDRIK VAN OSS  
Political Officer  
Shanghai (1948-1950)**

*Hendrik Van Oss was born in 1917 in Pennsylvania and graduated from Princeton University. He joined the Department of State in 1942 and the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Austria, Uganda, Mozambique, New Zealand, the Congo, and Washington, DC. Mr. Van Oss was interviewed by Lillian Mullins in 1991.*

*Q: You were a Foreign Service officer in Shanghai in 1948-50. I understand, Mr. Van Oss, that this was your first post.*

VAN OSS: Yes, it was our first post abroad. I had been in the Department for six years before that. I was newly married to Anne and we arrived as freshmen knowing nothing about what a post is like. I knew only a little bit about China.

*Q: That harbor was and still is an important one on the east coast of Asia. Do you remember whether it was used very much when you were there?*

VAN OSS: I don't recall that it was used very much for trading purposes, but don't forget that in 1948 China was in the last stages of a civil war. People weren't sending much in. However, Shanghai, itself, the post, the Consulate General, was a huge post. It was one of our biggest establishments in the world. I think only Paris and London were larger. It had a large economic section, so they must have been covering something. Probably by this time it was mainly what was going on in the rest of China, not so much worried about actual exports from and imports to Shanghai.

Shanghai was an important city. A cosmopolitan city. The Communists later said it was an excrescence or goiter on the body of China proper. It was different from any other Chinese city except that there were a lot of Chinese there, of course. There were also lots and lots of non-Chinese. There were many German Jewish refugees, White-Russian refugees, Iraqi Jewish refugees. It was a polyglot and fast moving city. A naughty city. A wicked city. A busy city.

*Q: When you arrived in June 1948 the Nationalists were still there and all their ships were still there in the harbor. In 1949 didn't they withdraw all the ships out of the harbor and take them to Formosa? Do you remember that?*

VAN OSS: I think you have to be aware of what it was like. There weren't many ships in Whangpoo River harbor. The harbor was very extensive and from what we saw in the Bund area, there were very few ships that came in. And when they did come in, like the General Gordon, a great to-do was made over it. So there wasn't a big fleet of commercial vessels just waiting there. Now there may have been in an earlier day, but certainly not in the time we were there.

On the other hand in Soochow Creek there were many, many sampans and other small craft with people living on them and things like that. But big ocean going vessels, there weren't very many. There were ferries that went across the river harbor.

*Q: There were French and British zones I understand. Were they north of the city near the race course?*

VAN OSS: Well, it is hard to remember. As I recall the old city north of the international city, which is where we had our offices and most of the large buildings and banks were, there was a French section and a British section.

*Q: I have put the two race courses up here (pointing to a map of the city). I thought that might pin point something.*

VAN OSS: Well, all I know is that we used to go to the race course and to get to where we lived

we went past the race course on Bubbling Well road, but I would have thought it was more to the west.

*Q: So you arrived in Shanghai in June 1948. The Nationalist hadn't left. What was your assignment?*

VAN OSS: I was in the political section. I was a vice consul, third secretary...probably the only one in the Service at that time. My boss was a China hand named A. Sabin Chase who was pretty fluent in Chinese. There were several other people in the section besides myself including Fern Cavender, who was a staff officer doing political work. I can very well remember arriving in Shanghai on the President Cleveland, getting off on a crowded dock. There were no long lines or efficient treatment of passengers. You just got off the boat, made your way through a throng of people to the gate. As you had been warned you kept one hand on your wallet and the other hand on your wife and made your way as best you could. Everything was in great confusion, there was lots of noise. It was quite an experience.

*Q: You mean there was no one to meet you at the dock?*

VAN OSS: There was but you had to get through that initial throng to get to the place where they were waiting for you. We made it.

*Q: Weren't you quite the envy of your colleagues in Washington going to such a romantic place?*

VAN OSS: Oh, I don't know. I think they pitied me, thinking we would get killed in the war that was going on.

*Q: You didn't have any Chinese language?*

VAN OSS: No, but I had applied to be a Chinese language officer and had been accepted as such. But since I had already spent six years in the Department it was felt that I should get going on my so-called career. They told me I could take up the language in Shanghai after I got there. Well I did. I started studying it and got a couple of hundred words under my belt and then I was sent on a temporary assignment to Seoul, South Korea, to help gather documentation, microfilm documents, and other reference material in the government prior to the turning over of control by the U.S. occupying forces to the first South Korean independent government in August, 1948. I was part of a team of four persons. My job was to handle the biographic material. So I spent about six weeks there (Korea) right in the beginning of my tour in Shanghai.

When I got back to Shanghai I found that I had contracted hepatitis in Korea so I spent another six weeks or so in the American military hospital. By the time I got out of the hospital all hell was breaking loose. The Communists were advancing. They had taken Peking and were advancing down towards the Yangtze River and Nanking, which was then the capital of the Nationalist government. A lot of wives were being sent home from the Consulate General. Fortunately for me, Anne was working for the military attaché, so she was allowed to remain. But many people began to leave Shanghai at that time.

So really there was no chance to study the language properly, and I couldn't devote much time to it. Besides many people spoke English.

*Q: You were reporting...?*

VAN OSS: We were reporting the news of the progress, or lack thereof, of the war as we saw it from Shanghai. Of course there was a big political reporting section in our embassy in Nanking. And we had posts in Hangzhou, Mukden, Tientsin, Tsingtao and Peking, and all of them were reporting too. Peking fell just about that time. So we knew pretty much what to expect. In other words the Department was not dependent on Shanghai for everything it learned about what was going on in China. But I dare say we reported just about as much as anybody else.

*Q: Do you recall anything particularly that you were assigned to? I am just trying to get a picture of what a junior officer would be given.*

VAN OSS: Yes. It is a little difficult to say. I did a number of things. First of all I handled all the biographic stuff because that was what I had done in the Department. I was the so-called "expert". Then I was the main liaison with what they called the Third Force...the liberal non-communist Chinese who we hoped would be friendly to us and a bridge between what we thought even then certainly would become a Communist government and the United States.

There was one fellow, Carson Chang, for example, who was the chairman of one of these third parties. He was an old man, a scholar. I remember his house was just filled with books. The rooms were like the stacks in a library. You had to weave your way between shelves of books. I used to go to see him and get his views on what was happening.

There was another liberal leader, Lo Lung-chi, who had tuberculosis. We were keeping him alive by sending him antibiotics. He was kept under detention by the Nationalist government in a hospital and we would visit him from time to time to deliver the antibiotics and find out what was going on with him.

Also I was protocol officer. John Cabot, the Consul General, appointed me protocol officer. That meant that I had to arrange the seating at tables for his parties. I had to meet people who were not quite important enough for him to meet but important enough so that somebody had to meet them. One of the things that I had to do was whenever Ambassador Leighton Stuart came down from Nanking I had to escort him back to the plane when he left. He came down quite frequently. He was a delightful old gentleman, a scholar and as you probably know a former president of one of the colleges in Peking (Yenching University). He probably knew as much about China as any man alive. So I got to know him reasonably well.

The other job I had to do was take care of Japanese repatriation. The Japanese who were either living in Shanghai or had been caught in Shanghai were being repatriated on a systematic basis back to Japan.

*Q: Who was paying for that?*

VAN OSS: Well, I guess we were to some extent. We were still very much in control of things in Japan. General MacArthur and his retinue ran the country. The repatriation was quite interesting because it was something I really didn't know much about. I would be in my office and a Japanese would arrive with a long list of names of candidates for repatriation that he would hand to me for approval. I would look at the list very studiously for as long as I thought was decent and then I would give my approval and he would leave. Then the listed Japanese would be shipped out on some ship that would take them back to Japan.

The most interesting development in that connection, and this was something that nobody else paid any attention to...as the Communists came closer to Shanghai there was a great deal of concern as to what should be done with Japanese prisoners of war. There was a prisoner of war camp right outside Shanghai which had all sorts of interesting people in it, including General Onama (commander of Japanese land forces in China) if I remember his name correctly, and a number of admirals. The whole command structure of the Japanese army and navy that had been left in China after the close of the war. So this became quite a negotiation. General MacArthur sent a Colonel and a troop ship to pick these people up. I had to take the Colonel out to the prison camp and help him negotiate the prisoners' release with the Chinese general in charge. One of the important problems was that Onama and some of the higher ranking Japanese had been tried in a Chinese court for war crimes, and had recently been acquitted so legally they were no longer prisoners of war, even though they were still in the prisoner of war camp because there was no way to get rid of them. The Colonel said he had been given orders to pick up the prisoners of war and nothing had been said about people who were not prisoners of war. He was not quite sure whether he was authorized to take them. The Chinese General was involved in this and thought they should be included. I expressed the view that it would be very difficult if they were still here if and when there was a change of governments as might happen soon. I suggested to the Colonel that he cable his superiors in Japan and check this out. He did so, indicating that the Consul (he promoted me) strongly recommended that the acquitted officers be taken along with the real prisoners. Of course, MacArthur was smart enough to see that this was the thing to do and agreed.

Another interesting thing was that one of the Japanese generals had suffered a stroke and was very seriously ill. One of the diplomats among the prisoners said that he thought we might lose him if we transported him out of his bed. We arranged for an ambulance to come and pick him up. We had to transport all of these people from the prison to the ship before dawn because we didn't know what the reaction of the crowds in Shanghai would be when we appeared with a lot of ex-Japanese prisoners of war.

*Q: They would recognize them?*

VAN OSS: Oh, they would know they were Japanese, yes. For all we knew they might attack them. We didn't have any soldiers as escort for protection. So we got some huge trucks and buses and drove them out of the prison while it was still dark. The Japanese command structure was still very much in evidence in the prison. The generals had their aides who carried their luggage. They had furniture, baggage, and quite a lot of possessions. It was like a tour. The prisoners and their belongings were all loaded on the trucks and I remember asking the Chinese General, "Have you any lists of names? Aren't you afraid that some one might be left behind?" He

laughed and said, "Don't worry about that, they'll all be on those buses."

We got them out at dawn and over to the dockside. They were all lined up on the dock. The generals were very old men, I was surprised how old they were. They must have been in their sixties-sixties -- to me then that was old. They seemed feeble. They were taken on board. But all the others were lined up and had to go through the degrading experience of being sprayed for vermin, lice, etc. Then they were taken on board. I can remember that an American Brigadier General, whose name I have forgotten, came up to me and asked if General Onama was part of the group. I said that he was and was already on board. The American General said he wanted to go on board and shake Onama's hand because he was a fine soldier. So he did.

That was an interesting little episode as part of my duties.

It is a bit harder to talk about the political reporting because this was the sort of thing that the newspapers were doing. One thing of interest was that we were worried what would happen when the Communists came and took over the city. Mind you, I don't want to go into all the business of whether the Communists would win or lose because this was much more of an issue at home in the U.S. than it was in China. Over there there was no question about the fact that the Communists were winning. The arms and materials we were sending to support the Nationalists were being wasted. They were given to troops which eventually surrendered with all their weapons, so the Communists probably had more of our stuff than the Nationalists had.

So it was quite evident from the time I arrived that it was just a question of a few months. It wasn't just I who felt that way. It was evident to all of us including the Consul General. Of course we had to be a little careful how we expressed this view because there was a very powerful China lobby at home and a number of U.S. Congressmen were very much interested and very strong supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists. We couldn't just make it appear that we were selling him short. So we couldn't report as frankly as I am talking to you, although it was quite evident that we found ways of expressing our views that were more acceptable than these words would have been then.

We were worried about what would happen in the interim between the time that Chiang Kai-shek left and pulled out his troops from Shanghai and the time that the Communists came in. The specter that hovered over our heads was the thought that the Chinese in the old city, all the Chinese poor people and everybody would rise up and plunder the wealthier parts of the city. We were all issued carbines. It was a worry.

So a lot of what Sabin Chase and I were doing was trying to make contact with forces in Shanghai that would be able to exercise some form of control. This was expected to be just a matter of security for a day or a few days at most. We didn't expect that the turn over process would be lengthy. Sabin did most of this work because he spoke fluent Chinese and I did not. I did a lot of the reporting. He formed a contact with a Chinese Colonel who had close contacts with the so-called Red Gang of Shanghai.

To go back a bit...it is quite well known that there were secret societies in Shanghai generally referred to as the Triad. The most powerful group was called the Green Gang, and that was

headed by a person called Tu Yueh-shun, a mysterious figure who controlled crime, drugs, the underground, and who was one of the powers behind the political scene in Shanghai. A sort of "godfather". He was also close to Chiang Kai-shek and his henchmen. There was a rival underground group which we called the Red Gang. I can't remember the name of its leader. But the Colonel whom Sabin Chase had contacted was in deep with the Red Gang leader and we arranged through him after a long process of negotiation that the Red Gang would take over and have its men out to keep things under control, prevent rioting, etc. Also, very important was the fact that Lo Lung-chi, whom I mentioned before, needed special protection. We felt that his life was in danger because he was under "protective" care by the Kuomintang. He was confined to a hospital room and the KMT had by this time put a companion in with him, an army officer who was supposed to keep an eye on him at all times. In fact we went up to see Lo while the army officer was there, just to see that he was all right and show the KMT and the army that the American Consulate General was interested in Lo's well being. We were worried lest in the final flurries of pulling out the KMT authorities would start shooting and kill him along with other opposition leaders. They actually did kill some people. People were shot on the street in the last moments of departure.

As it turned out the turnover was relatively quiet. The Nationalist Army and the police pulled out. The city was very quiet. The next morning the Communists came in. The only fighting that took place was between the Communists and the Nationalists at the point of embarkation where the Nationalists were getting on ships to retreat to Formosa. Lo Lung-chi was rescued, I presume, by the Red Gang because I have a picture of Sabin Chase, myself, Lo Lung-chi, the Red Gang leader, the Colonel and various other Chinese, all standing in somebody's garden celebrating Lo's safe escape. He was a very important man and later became a minister in the Communist government.

Lo Lung-chi was not a Communist; like Carson Chung he was a member of the Third Force we were courting hoping that they would remain friendly to us. When the Communists first took over they set up a coalition government. They obviously had their Communist hierarchy but they also appointed people like Lo Lung-chi and various other liberals. Lo Lung-chi was made minister of cultural affairs or something like that. Then when Mao Zedong years later encouraged criticism by suggesting that 100 flowers should bloom, Lo Lung-chi was one of the "flowers" who bloomed. He didn't have his bloom cut off, but he was ejected from the government and that was the last I or anyone else I know of heard of him.

The end of all this was typically Chinese. I think it was about the 23rd of May when the Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek held a "victory" march in which he paraded all his troops through the streets of Shanghai with their weapons. There were dancers, bands and all sorts of noise makers. It was called a victory march.

*Q: You mean Chiang had a victory march in May of 1949?*

VAN OSS: Yes, on May 23, one or two days before the Communists entered. So he had his face saving victory march and then pulled out. That night, the night after the victory march, we saw the police...the police station was right down the road from our apartment house which was right across the street from city hall...we saw trucks loading files and driving off into the distance. The

next morning we got up and had breakfast as usual. It was very, very quiet in the city. Doug Foreman, a young language officer who had come in from some other post in China...a lot of our diplomatic personnel were leaving China at the time and going out through Shanghai so this was a collection point for people from other posts and Doug Foreman was among them, living in the apartment above ours in Hamilton House.

He and I decided to go down to the office, about a fifteen minute walk. We started walking down the street and heard a call. Anne was calling us from our balcony which was about eight floors up. She said, "Come back, there is shooting around the Consulate and they don't want anybody going to work." So we came back and went out on our balcony. Our apartment building (Hamilton House) was on one side of a square. On the other three sides of the square were the Metropole Hotel, the building that formerly housed our Consulate General, and the city hall, so it was an important square. The Nationalists had put a sandbag fortification right in the middle of the square, where the cross streets met. There were still some police manning that. We were looking over the wall of our balcony and saw some figures coming down one of the streets from a great distance. As they got closer we could see that they were armed and very much on guard, looking from side to side with guns at the ready. One man was unwinding a big spool of wire as he was coming along...this was for communications, not explosives. They didn't know what they were facing. They didn't realize that this part of the city was theirs for the taking.

They came to the sandbag barricade in the crossroads and lined up on all sides leveling their weapons at it. At a signal they ran over it, took the policeman into custody and disarmed him. Then they realized that they were home free and sort of relaxed. By that time a lot of bystanders had appeared on the scene, and the newly arrived Communist soldiers started to harangue the crowd.

That was the takeover. The only dangerous part was that shooting was still going on close to the Consulate General office which was quite near the point in the harbor at which Nationalist forces were boarding ships in retreat. I think about 30 bullets penetrated the Consulate, but nobody was hurt or injured in any way. The closest person to being injured was Doug Foreman and that was the night or day before. In the weeks before the takeover there was a lot of shelling going on and a lot of military activity. The Communists were advancing steadily and at night you could see explosions on the horizon. Very foolishly we used to go up onto the roof of our building and watch the tracer bullets and explosions in the distance.

*Q: Like Baghdad today?*

VAN OSS: Yes, very much like Baghdad today. In fact exactly like it except the explosives were not quite as big. On one of the last mornings I remember being wakened by several very loud explosions. Things that just rattled the windows and the bed. I thought we were being shelled. I got up, got my binoculars and tried to find a safe place on the roof to see what was going on. I saw that the Nationalists had blown up the docks, or some installations at the docks, possibly some ammunition dumps.

Towards the end we were on our balcony when we heard a bullet hit our building right up above us. A few seconds later Doug Foreman came down looking rather sheepish and bleeding from a

number of little cuts on his chin. He had been standing by the window in the apartment above us and this bullet had hit the metal rim of his window and had shattered the glass. Tiny pieces of glass had cut his chin. That was the one casualty we suffered.

*Q: How long did the fighting around the Consulate last?*

VAN OSS: The fighting took about a day and a half, maybe less. But we were open for business, so-called, after that. You see, when I say we were "open for business" that is a euphemism because the U.S. government did not immediately jump to recognize the new state of affairs. Since we didn't recognize them, the Communist Chinese did not recognize us. We were no longer members of the American Consulate General, we were simply American citizens. While various things happened that made it necessary for us to contact Chinese Communist officials they never acknowledged that we were doing so in an official capacity. They would always ask, "Why are you complaining about so and so, why doesn't he come and complain himself." And we would say, "Because we are members of the American Consulate General and part of our job is to protect American citizens." They would reply, "Well, we will take note of what you say as American citizens and will take whatever action we see fit."

*Q: Did they try to get you to leave?*

VAN OSS: No, indeed. They were simply trying to put pressure on us to recognize them. If we didn't recognize them we had no business to transact with them.

*Q: So they were well aware of what was going on in Washington?*

VAN OSS: Oh, of course. They knew it and we knew that they knew it. This was all part of the game. We held on to our rights to the best of our ability, but we really didn't have any rights.

*Q: But you said a lot of our officers had already left other posts. Did we actually close any other posts?*

VAN OSS: Yes. We closed Hangchou...

*Q: When did we close them, as the Communists came through?*

VAN OSS: Yes, when the Communists came through. As I recall, the Communists were bombing Hangchou as one Consul left that city. In fact, I think one of the bombs came close to hitting his ship on the river.

We had problems in Mukden. Angus Ward, who was our Consul General in Mukden was put in jail for allegedly striking a Chinese citizen.

*Q: Didn't he take his two dogs to jail with him?*

VAN OSS: I would not be surprised if he tried. He was a character. His wife was there too if I remember.

*Q: But we were not planning to close Shanghai?*

VAN OSS: As of the moment we are talking about -- May, 1949 -- we still hoped, I think, that we could find some way of making contact with the new government, and seeing if we couldn't repair relations. We had hoped that for a long time but as the Communists advanced Mao Zedong had become increasingly anti-American in his pronouncements. One of their big slogans was "leaning to one side." This meant leaning towards the Soviets; that became a big thing with them.

We expected to be open for business and we proceeded on that basis. We tried to make contacts with the Communists but really didn't succeed. Then at some point around November, 1949, the Communists took over our Marine Barracks in Peking. The Marine Barracks had been awarded to us as a result of the treaty at the end of the Boxer Rebellion so we considered it American property. Our government issued a general ultimatum that either we would keep our property and our rights should be respected, or we would have no recourse but to withdraw all of our diplomatic and consular personnel. Of course the Communists had no intentions of giving the Barracks back and didn't, so we announced around December that we would withdraw our people.

From that time on just about all of our activities were related to closing down the Consulate General and arranging for our evacuation. We also announced to all American citizens in China that the bell had now rung and if they wanted to leave China we would take them out with us. Once we were gone we couldn't guarantee the safety of or be responsible for any Americans remaining in China. We couldn't answer for what might happen to them afterwards.

Some of the missionaries announced to us they they would stay. One of the things that I had to do was to help wrap up the USIS operation. There were a lot of books and information materials that I had to dispose of, including the USIS library. We turned most of the books over to the missionaries. They were just delighted to have them. As things turned out they too had to leave eventually. This was after I had left so I don't know much about their circumstances.

The business of trying to leave certainly was not easy because as American citizens, not as official personnel, we had to obey all regulations. And these were incredibly complicated. First of all you had to get an exit permit. To get an exit permit you had to have a residence permit. To get the residence permit you had to go and stand in line and get it...

*Q: In person?*

VAN OSS: Oh yes. Before this all you did was send one of the Chinese local staff down and they did everything for you. But this was where I learned to carry a paperback book with me wherever I went. Standing in line I got a lot of reading done. Once you got your exit permit you had to put an advertisement in the paper stating that you were going to leave on such and such a date. You had to have an exact departure date. This advertisement was supposed to indicate to anybody who had any claim whatsoever on you that you were going to leave and that you would settle all claims.

Now this wasn't as easy as it sounded because a lot of servants held their masters up and forced them to pay a year's separation pay and so on. A lot of the businessmen were being very brutally treated by their labor force. Kept awake all night bargaining, etc.

Fortunately we didn't have that trouble because we were on good terms with our cook and amah and gave them as much as we could...a lot of foodstuff and clothing...so they left relatively happy and they were decent enough not to hold us up for ransom. And a lot of others had similar relationships. But many of the businessmen and people who had been in Shanghai for a long time did not.

If the ship, or whatever it was we hoped to go out on, didn't arrive, then we had to redo the whole business every month. So we had to go through roughly the same procedure on a monthly basis. This was a not too interesting and rather painful process.

*Q: How did you get a departure date?*

VAN OSS: Well now this was another laborious process. It wasn't very easy because the Nationalists had imposed a naval blockade on Shanghai and were bombing Shanghai in a rather desultory fashion. They would send a plane or two over every day and drop one or two or five or six bombs. They had armed ships out beyond the harbor entrance to enforce the blockage. And, what was worst in our eyes, was that our own government didn't want to break the blockade even to help get us out. They were on the side of the Nationalists. We were sort of annoyed. We felt that our lives and welfare should have been uppermost in our government's mind and that it should have insisted that an evacuation ship be allowed to enter.

Well at one point we arranged for an old LST to come into Shanghai harbor, but somebody pointed out in one of the Shanghai newspapers that this was really a U.S. military vessel so the Communist officials said that they could not allow a military vessel to enter the sacred waters of China. So that plan was shot down.

Finally we worked out, after a long hard negotiation, a scheme whereby we were to go by train to Tientsin, leave Tientsin harbor by barge which would take us out over the bar where we would transfer from the barge to the General Gordon. That was quite an adventure. The exodus finally took place in April, 1950. We, the remnants of the Shanghai Consulate General, the Embassy in Nanking and one or two other posts, plus several hundred other American residents all descended on Tientsin by train.

This train trip was really some experience. We were in a first class parlor car with a table between every two seats. Anne and I were on one side of a table and Leonard and Helen Bacon were opposite us. There might have been two or three berths made up in the car which were used by some of the children. There was no water in the car and the toilet broke down. We had to go to another car to use the toilet, which was the oriental bomb-sight type which I am sure you are familiar with. If you aren't, there is nothing to sit on, it is just a hole in the floor.

The water eventually came back on but was apparently the only water on the whole train so

Chinese and others from other cars would troop through our car in long lines to get water. The trip took about 48 hours so we had to spend two nights on the train.

I remember one night I let Anne sleep on our seat while I slept on top of some luggage in the baggage room. Leonard Bacon delighted himself by finding a ladder which he put on the aisle floor to keep himself up from the filth, and slept on that. General Soule, our military attaché, slept standing up, giving his wife and daughter his seat.

Eventually we arrived in Tientsin and spent a couple of days there doing all sorts of chores including getting exit permits, having all our papers examined and our jewelry checked through customs, etc.

*Q: Was there a hotel?*

VAN OSS: Oh yes, there were hotels. This was no problem. Once we were in Tientsin we thought we were through free. But on our final morning we were gathered on the dock side with all the others and everybody was searched. Some women were taken into barge cabins, and were strip searched. We later found out that they were suspected of smuggling out jewelry. I was very nervous because I was not going to stand for that happening to Anne. I had made up my mind if it came to that I would raise as much hell as I could, diplomat or not. But fortunately it didn't happen. In fact we inflicted more damage on the Chinese than they did on us because we had a dachshund named Bao-Tse which we were taking out with us. He was in a little cage. The customs man ordered us to open the cage. We opened the cage; he struck his finger in and Bao Tse tried to take a nip out of it but fortunately missed. That gave us a great deal of satisfaction.

Anyway we got on the lighter and barges eventually. I remember at the last minute when we were all just about ready to embark there was a great commotion outside the gate to the dock. A man appeared who shouted in English that he was an American. He said, "They won't let me out. Take me with you." There was nothing we could do. Somebody went over to see who he was but the Chinese authorities took him in charge. He made a great fuss and eventually they led him away. He had his hands handcuffed and he raised them over his head so that we could see what had happened. I never did find out who it was, although somebody must have. One of the Chinese officials in the very calm, super-quiet manner that Communist authorities adapt when they know they are in control said, "You mustn't worry about them, we will take care of him and give him some education so that he can understand more how he should act toward the People's Republic of China," or words to that effect.

So then we embarked, there was nothing we could do to help this poor fellow. A number of us were on the tug boat which pulled two barges, loaded with the remaining evacuees. We got out over the bar into open water and there was the U.S. troop ship General Gordon waiting for us. But there was a minor storm brewing and the sea became turbulent. We tried to unload one of the barges. Captain Sam Frankel, our naval attaché, almost fell trying to make it up the ladder. So the tug boat and barges pulled away and we decided there was no point in trying to transfer people in the rough water. We spent the night on the tug and barges and waited out the storm. Nobody had expected this, nobody had any food or warm clothing. Anne and I were fortunate in having a blanket available which we shared with someone. The tug had no facilities for

passengers and only one toilet. A lot of the women and children were below deck and practically all of them were sea sick.

*Q: There were no seats or anything.*

VAN OSS: No, we were lying right on the deck huddled under a blanket trying to keep warm and from getting sick.

*Q: This was April?*

VAN OSS: This was April, 1950. Walter McConaughy, who took John Cabot's place as Consul General, was a very fine leader. He later became one of our leading ambassadors. He set a fine example for us all. During the whole episode he was dressed immaculately with his necktie and jacket, but looked just miserable and grim, and I thought angry. I went up to him and said, "Walter I suppose you are trying to compose a telegram about the outrageous procedures that we have been subjected to?" He said, "No, Hank, I am much more concerned with the contingencies of the moment." He then walked over to the boat railing and punched his lunch, as they say. It was a miserable experience.

The next morning, the storm had abated. We climbed aboard the General Gordon and that was the end of the story.

*Q: Not quite, you weren't in Japan yet.*

VAN OSS: No, we didn't go to Japan, we went to Hong Kong.

*Q: How long did that take?*

VAN OSS: Oh, several days. On the General Gordon, we were living as the troops did, in stacked up bunks, with men and women in separate dormitories.

*Q: And where was the dachshund?*

VAN OSS: The dachshund was with us on the boat on the upper deck somewhere. I went up and exercised him every day.

*Q: And there were about a thousand of you?*

VAN OSS: Oh, I would have thought so but don't hold me to that.

*Q: Give me a number.*

VAN OSS: Probably more than that.

*Q: Does that mean that everyone was gone? The Embassy was closed?*

VAN OSS: All the official personnel were out. I would say almost all of the American citizens were out. But some were not. Some of the businessmen stayed. For example, there was a man named Bill Orchard who was head of the American Express bank in Shanghai. He had to stay because many Chinese had deposited money in his bank years before. In the meantime inflation had taken its toll. The bank wanted to return to them the actual amount they had originally deposited. But they said they wanted what the original deposit was worth now. So they wouldn't let him leave. He stayed in Shanghai quite a while.

Bob Bryan was a well-known lawyer and judge who was employed in the International section of Shanghai. He stayed and eventually was jailed for several years. He had a terrible time. His hair turned white and I think he got beriberi.

*Q: To go back before you evacuated, can you tell us how the Department prepared for this Communist takeover which you said looked inevitable?*

VAN OSS: Well, obviously by evacuating families and most wives and reducing personnel, cutting what had been a 200 man post down to about 30 or 40. I was lucky enough to be allowed to keep my wife; one other wife stayed. Both Anne and the other wife were working for the Consulate General and the military attaché, which was the reason they were allowed to stay.

*Q: Was that Patsy Turner?*

VAN OSS: Yes, Patsy Turner. Her husband was Vice Consul Dick Turner.

They also pulled out John Cabot, who had been our Consul General when I first got there. John Cabot was one of our best Foreign Service officers. He was a brilliant officer. A patrician in every sense of the word, which is obvious from his name. He was from Boston, of course. He had been ill for about a year before the Communists came in. The first few weeks or months after the Communists came in were particularly harrowing ones for various reasons. He was under great tension. So eventually the Department decided that it was time to bring him home. So he was transferred. He went out with Ambassador Leighton Stuart.

The person who should have taken charge after him was Sabin Chase, who was the next senior officer. Not only was he the highest ranking, he was also a Chinese language officer. But the Department in its wisdom, and I think in retrospect they were right to do this, decided that instead of putting Sabin Chase in charge, they would appoint Walter McConaughy who was the next highest ranking man at the Embassy, although ten or fifteen years younger than Sabin.

Walter McConaughy was a very fine leader and an excellent Foreign Service officer who eventually became Assistant Secretary of State for Chinese Affairs and Ambassador in various places, including Taiwan.

Sabin Chase was also a very fine officer but a very shy individual and rather soft spoken. He was not an administrator. He readily acknowledged that he knew nothing about it and wasn't really interested. He was a Chinese language officer, a political officer, an analyst, a scholar and those were his fortes.

McConaughy was put in charge and remained in charge until we evacuated the post. Sabin remained the entire time too and relations between the two of them were completely harmonious. Walter took Sabin's advice on all matters of substance and was meticulous in doing his best to keep Sabin from feeling hurt by having been passed over. I think probably Sabin was quite relieved not to have the responsibility of personnel, evacuation and countless administrative details that had to be handled.

So the Department pared the post down to the bone and kept those who they thought would be most able to withstand the tensions that were obviously coming up.

The interesting thing about this whole experience was that it gave me an insight into just what it is like to be in a communist country where the communist government starts from scratch. There are various impressions that I have and I will ramble on about them.

One of them is the noise factor. There were loudspeakers on every street corner and they were turned on incessantly. If it wasn't Chinese music and opera, it was propaganda. We had propaganda in loud Mandarin at all times during the day or night.

Another impression I have is the extreme thoroughness of the Communists. They intruded into every walk of life. They made people attend infinite numbers of political meetings at which Communist officials talked for countless hours repeating endlessly the same slogans and general theories.

The early stages of the Communist takeover didn't have much impact on us except for the fact that our government didn't recognize them and we thus had no official status. But we were not molested, cursed or pelted with mud. On the other hand we had to be very careful because one of the things they did early in the game was to take measures to inform foreigners, white men if you will, that they were no longer on a pedestal, were no better than anyone else. In fact, they were a little bit worse than the citizens of China.

Where this comes into play is that there were still quite a few beggars in Shanghai. Eventually I understand the Communists got rid of them, but they certainly hadn't at this point. The beggars were a nuisance even for the Communists. They would come up to you and would clutch you and do just anything you would allow them to get away with. In the old days you sometimes were forced to push them aside and go about your business. It was about the only thing you could do. Once the Communists had taken over this was no longer possible. The minute you so much as touched a beggar, no matter what he did to you, a policeman would appear and you would be taken into custody. This didn't happen to me but it did happen to a number of Americans and other foreigners. The routine was that they would be hauled before a political commissar, not a judge, and would be asked why they had molested a peaceful citizen of China. Then they would give their case. After that they would be fined or told to write a letter of apology and then allowed to go. But this was unpleasant. It was not great fun.

And, of course, one of the notorious episodes at the time was the Olive case. Bill Olive was a communications officer. On the day the Chinese Communists held their victory parade (without

prior notice) -- about a month after the takeover -- Bill Olive happened to be in one car and Anne was following in another car to get gas at the godown where we had our gasoline supply. They had to cross one of those steep road bridges that goes over the canal or creek. Two soldiers jumped out at Bill Olive, who was in the lead, and tried to stop his car. They held up their hands. He either ignored them or didn't see them, drove over the bridge and was stopped on the other side. But Anne was fortunate enough to stop. Bill Olive's car then was sent along the canal on the other side and stopped. Bill put his hand out and motioned to Anne to get out of there, which she did. This was the last we saw of Bill Olive for a while. We didn't know where he was, he had just disappeared.

Eventually we found out that he had been taken to court, in fact was in jail. He told me this story afterwards. He was taken to the police station. All was well. He explained what he was doing. A police officer quizzed him. He asked if he could call the Consulate and just then the police officer was joined by one of these political commissars. The latter took over and claimed that Bill was trying to brush past guards of the Peoples Republic of China and interfere with the victory parade. By this time Bill was a little nervous and asked again to call the Consulate. The commissar said something like there isn't a Consulate any more, he couldn't call.

Then he told Olive that they were going to retain him for a night or two. Olive protested vigorously and the commissar ordered the guards to take him away. Bill struggled and grabbed the bench in front of the desk and knocked over a bottle of ink which, I guess, spilled onto the political commissar. He was then pulled back, thrown to the ground and beaten severely by the armed guards. They then took him and flung him into a jail with a lot of other detainees. That is how we found out where he was.

Later I think they put him into solitary confinement. I am not sure about that but anyway they wouldn't let him sleep. They kept the light on and kept taking him out for interrogation. This turned out to be the first instance of "brainwashing" that any of us had heard about first hand. They told him that the United States was worse than Nazi Germany and had committed grievous sins against the Peoples Republic of China. He, Bill Olive, as a representative of the U.S. government was just as guilty as that government. The grilling went on incessantly for several days. By the end of those days he was so beaten down...oh, and they made him write out endless numbers of confessions. By the end of those few days he could write out exactly what they wanted him to say, and almost believed he was as guilty as they told him he was. This was all in his mind, obviously. He was in pretty bad shape at that point.

Anyway to cut this short, I don't know exactly how long he was in jail but it was something like four or five days, perhaps a week. Eventually Sabin Chase and Bill Supple, our security officer, got him out. They almost got themselves arrested in the process, but they were able to get him released and bring him home. Olive was eventually evacuated from Shanghai. I am not sure what happened to him afterwards. I think he had psychological problems from then on.

This was a rather ominous event.

*Q: So our diplomats were really in a very precarious situation?*

VAN OSS: The Olive case was the only episode of that sort at the time and you could say that the authorities had some flimsy excuse because he did ignore their original instruction to stop his car. Later on, of course, after we Americans had left, the British stayed behind and were subjected to all kinds of embarrassing experiences. They were jailed, forced to kowtow, frog hop across the room and so on. Terribly humiliating.

*Q: But the British recognized Red China and still they had this treatment.*

VAN OSS: Yes, but it didn't come right away. It developed over time.

The other thing I wanted to mention about the Chinese Communists was the fact that they would take up several issues at a time and would go all out in support of these issues.

For example, if they were trying to stop dealing on the black market for silver dollars, they would make numerous speeches saying it was sinful to deal on the black market. They would write articles in the newspapers; children in the schools would sing songs about the sins of dealing in the black market. "Leaning to one side" became one of their slogans. Everything had to lean to one side. They would carry it to extremes in their parades by leaning with one shoulder...physically leaning to the left as they marched. Another slogan was "two steps forward, one step back."

*Q: What did that mean?*

VAN OSS: That is an old Leninist Communist slogan. Two steps forward, one step back. In other words every once in a while something might not work out, but then they would move forward even more.

*Q: A great way to excuse your mistakes.*

VAN OSS: Yeah. Again in their parade marches their drums would beat, dum, dum, boom; dum, dum, boom. You could see the people marching going two steps forward and then actually taking one step back, then two steps forward again and so on. It became a kind of dance.

Another policy aim, of course, was to go across to Taiwan, defeat the Nationalist forces and capture the "running dog," Chiang Kai-shek. Little kindergarten kids instead of playing ring-around-the-rosy, performed little skits about rowing across the straits, catching Chiang Kai-shek, and then pretending to beat up the child playing the part of Chiang with pillows.

*Q: And, yet they never did it.*

VAN OSS: No, they never did it. But that was still one of their aims at the time.

*Q: What happened commercially? Did stores stay open, was food available?*

VAN OSS: The economic situation in Shanghai had become deplorable during the last months of the Nationalists' regime. Inflation was just terrible. The rate would go from say one million yuan

to one American dollar one day, to two million to one the next day. At one time Chiang Kai-shek put his son Chiang Ching-kuo in charge of Shanghai. Ching-kuo put in a new exchange rate and forced everybody to turn over gold in exchange for this new currency. He shot a couple of reputable businessmen who patronized the black market in currency. Of course by doing that it meant that nobody could buy anything in Shanghai because the shelves were empty since merchants could get more money by selling their products outside the city at black market rates than inside at the official rate. Eventually Chiang Ching-kuo was forced to lift the limits on the currency and inflation zoomed again.

When the Communists came in they tied the currency to the price at any one time of basic commodities...rice, cotton, tobacco and gold. So if you put a certain amount of money in the bank on a given day, you were credited with the amount of rice, cotton, etc. that that original amount of money could buy. So no matter what happened to the actual currency exchange rate you could always get the same quantity of the basic commodities as you were credited with when you had originally deposited. That pretty well did away with inflation within a very short time.

*Q: One of the smarter things that I have ever heard doing.*

VAN OSS: Yes, I often wonder why we don't do something like it? Of course our inflation rate has never been that high.

During the period of inflation we used to call home in the U.S. at the beginning of the month. The bill would be equivalent of say U.S. \$35 in Chinese currency. We would actually pay the bill at the end of the month. By that time the bill was only equal to about 35 cents.

Another thing the Communists did. They put a severe tax on all vehicles. So if you owned a car you were expected to pay something along the lines of \$50 per month tax on that car. This doesn't sound too unreasonable today, but back when a vice consul's salary was something like \$4000 a year, it was a heavy sum. So we sent our car home as did most other people and had to take pedicabs.

That really was one of the best things we ever did because we saw more of Shanghai that way than we ever would have seen in a car. In those days I think the Foreign Service spent a great deal of time dealing with other officials, driving in cars and living with the upper crust with very little idea of how the peasants, the poor, the lower classes lived. We used to take walks outside Shanghai and into the villages but there was very little Peace Corps-type community activity, which now I think every young Foreign Service officer probably does without thinking twice about it. We used to do that later at our African posts. But in our days in China we dealt mainly with the people who could give us the information we wanted and didn't worry too much about wandering about in the villages. And, of course, we couldn't; with the Communist war going on we couldn't travel very far beyond city limits.

*Q: Did the Communists make any efforts to keep you from contact with the people?*

VAN OSS: No, I don't think they made any conscious efforts but the mere fact that we no longer had access to cars except the official cars which took us to work, meant that we just

couldn't...and we weren't allowed to travel. We had to have permission for any travel. The war was still going on in the south and we couldn't go down there and there was no point going out west. It was just a time when we were very severely limited as to where we could go, so that inhibited our contacts. And, of course, many of our contacts were afraid to come to us because they were afraid that something would happen to them. And many of our contacts were genuinely trying to get along with the new government, so they wouldn't have phoned us. They began to accuse us of the same things the government was accusing us of doing.

*Q: Well, they were probably having to go to these political training classes and learning what to say.*

VAN OSS: Yes, a lot of them were.

*Q: What about the men in the street, the peasant class, did they seem to welcome this new government?*

VAN OSS: I think anything was better for most of them than what they had under the Nationalist government.

*Q: Except nothing did become better for them.*

VAN OSS: Well, I don't know that I could dogmatically say that. I think probably economically they were better off in some ways. China was not Europe; its average standard of living was much worse than Europe's. The average person in China was poor. There certainly were many poor in the cities. In Shanghai after a typical winter's night the authorities collected bodies off the street of people who had to sleep out and had frozen to death. We saw a bundle in the street outside our house one time coming back from a walk. Our dog started sniffing at it. I went over to see what it was. It was a dead baby. The watchman at our place said it was probably a baby girl that the poor family had not wanted and had thrown out on the street.

There were wealthy businessmen who did very well under the Nationalists, but the man in the street didn't. So I can't say dogmatically that the peasants were worse off under the Communists. They were worse off in the sense that their lives were controlled; they had to obey regulations and couldn't do what they wanted to do, but they couldn't do everything they wished under the Nationalists either. Don't forget Chiang Kai-shek's KMT party structure was very similar to the Communist Party structure. Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang's son, was trained in Moscow. The people who were affected adversely under the Communists, of course, were those who had money and owned land.

In the early months it wasn't all that bad for us personally. We were not treated the way we felt we should be as American consular representatives, but we weren't harmed.

*Q: There was food.*

VAN OSS: There was food. I know that soon after we left the beggars were disposed of in some way. They just disappeared from the streets.

*Q: Not only was there bombing of the harbor during that time you mention, but also any number of factories.*

VAN OSS: I wouldn't put too much stress on the bombing, it didn't amount to very much. It wasn't nearly as severe as the shelling just before the city fell, for example, although the Communists didn't have any planes so there was no bombing from the sky. After Shanghai fell to the Communists, the Nationalists sent over a few planes periodically to drop a few bombs. But we used to go down to the coffee bar in the basement of our Consulate office and use that as our bomb shelter when the sirens went off. Sometimes we would be upstairs and a plane would appear without a warning siren. On one such occasion, I watched a Nationalist plane bombard and sink a vessel in the river.

Carrying on about what life was like under the Communists, there wasn't very much in the way of entertainment, but there were a few Chinese operas we could watch. One of the good things that I can still remember was seeing one of the most famous old Chinese actors, Mai Lan-fang. He was in his declining years as an actor, in his late fifties, I guess. In traditional Chinese opera the female parts were taken by men and Mai Lan-fang was one of the most famous of all female impersonators. We saw him twice. He really put on a tremendous performance. He was graceful slender, made up to look like a woman, sang in a high falsetto, had all the stylized gestures that actors have in Chinese opera. The only trouble was that whenever he turned his profile you could see that he had at least two or maybe three double chins. That was the only sign of age.

Another thing we did for entertainment...there were a number of refugee musicians -- White Russians, German Jews, etc. In particular there were two Czech brothers who played the cello and the first violin, a Chinese female pianist who was very, very good, and an old White Russian violist. Walter McConaughy was a very accomplished clarinetist. Our hosts, the Abrahams, were Iraqi Jews who had made a small fortune as merchants in Shanghai. They used to have, I think once a week, chamber music sessions where people like us attended and played Beethoven, Mozart, Bach. Sometimes they would invite others in and play octets. That was very soul satisfying.

The rest of the entertainment was done by ourselves. We had parties, played bridge...

*Q: Then you went to the race course I suppose?*

VAN OSS: We did, but we went to the race course to play softball. I never saw a horse race in Shanghai. But I did play a lot of softball.

Oh, another thing we did...there was an American Club and a British Country Club. These combined forces after the Communists came in. The British Country Club was used in the winter because it had an indoor pool and various other indoor recreational activities. The American Club was used in the summer. The British would come out and join us. We had the usual contests in softball where the British played our game, and then we would play the British in cricket. I remember the cricket game particularly because the British came to bat first and hit the ball very far, but they didn't realize that as baseball players we Americans knew how to catch, so

we caught all their long balls. They made only about five runs. We made about fifteen and won the first innings. But in the second innings the British had learned from their experience, kept the ball on the ground and made about 200 runs while we continued to make about fifteen.

*Q: Was there a golf course anywhere around?*

VAN OSS: There was, but I didn't play golf in those days. I did a lot of swimming in the American Club outdoor pool.

*Q: I wonder who laid out the golf course? How long had it been there?*

VAN OSS: I have no idea. I seem to remember that there was a golf course in the race course grounds. But I may be thinking of something else. But at any rate I didn't play golf. I have played golf since but not at that time.

*Q: It just stays in my mind because I remember a diplomat who also had done a lot out in the Far East and was with us in Bucharest in the fifties and we had this little six hole golf course left over. The Communists had been persuaded to leave six holes of King Carol's eighteen holes. This diplomat used to say that this was the last golf course going East until you get to Shanghai. So that is why I ask, there must have been a golf course in Shanghai.*

VAN OSS: One of the other things I might mention is that we lived quite remarkably well for a few months in Shanghai after the Communists took over because we had quite a large number of houses that we had acquired...German property that we had taken over after the war. We wanted to maintain these houses so a number of us who had been living in an apartment building were awarded houses. I got Ruben Thomas's house, he was the administrative officer who had left by this time. A delightful house out on what we called Amherst Avenue. It had lovely furniture, a walled yard, just a very nice comfortable house with a fireplace in each bedroom, central heating, etc. All officers had comparable quarters for several months. Then as the time approached for us to leave, and as things began to get dicier and less pleasant, we were all brought together so that we could be taken out more easily. We were collected into an apartment house owned by the Consulate General. That was all right too but not nearly as elegant as our Amherst Avenue dwelling.

*Q: Did you get your personal belongings shipped out?*

VAN OSS: Yes, we shipped them out when we left Hamilton House, the first apartment house.

*Q: So ships were still coming in at that time?*

VAN OSS: Yes, they were, but they had to run the Nationalist blockade. We thought we were very clever, and I guess we were, because we used a Soviet packing company. We figured that it would be more likely to be able to get our stuff out than an American company, although I don't think there was one there at that time.

*Q: I wonder why there was a Soviet one?*

VAN OSS: Well, this was owned by a Russian and Russian firms were beginning to come into evidence in Shanghai. There had been a Soviet Consulate General there even under the Nationalists.

*Q: They had diplomatic relations with...*

VAN OSS: Well, I think they still had some relations with the Nationalist government because I can remember one of the Soviet military attachés joshing Fern Cavender. Anyway, we used this Soviet packer. He packed up our belongings which didn't amount to very much in those days...mainly books. They were shipped out to Saigon which was our next post. We had hoped to be sent home on leave after Shanghai because we were all pretty tired out from being under considerable tension and working long hours. But we were assigned to Saigon. In fact, we were assigned to Saigon and ordered to leave at once at a time when there was no way any of us could get out of Shanghai.

*Q: Was it that the Department was just unaware of what you were going through?*

VAN OSS: I think certain clerks in the Personnel Section were told that I was being assigned to Saigon, so they went through process B and then sent the usual form cable. We still had some cables coming in through U.S. Naval ships that were still anchored outside Shanghai and able to relay them to us. This was about six months before we got out.

*Q: Until when could you keep cable traffic to the Department?*

VAN OSS: The Navy kept a ship offshore and we had our communications for quite a while, perhaps several months, after the Communists came in. One day we saw a police car and a bunch of soldiers in a truck approach the Consulate General...(We had already destroyed virtually all our files except the ones that we needed for our daily work. We burned stuff that had been in the Shanghai Consulate files for many years, including old narcotics records among others. It took us a couple of days to get rid of them. The neighbors complained because of all the smoke and ashes. Unfortunately, by this time it was too late to ship any of the stuff out. Anyway we still had our code room. We were allowed to send letters to our parents in fifty words or less by cable through the Navy services.)

We saw this car pulling up and knew at once that the police were coming in to close our code room. At that time we didn't know how far they were going to go. So I went up on the roof where we had an incinerator and took all the classified files left and burned them. As it turned out they didn't impound our documents, they just put a seal on the code room. So that pretty well shut us down. From then on we sent letters out whenever we could get them on a ship or whenever anybody left the place, in any way we could. Sometimes we tried the open mail and strangely enough most of our letters apparently got home.

*Q: So then you had no communications with the Department?*

VAN OSS: It seems to me we had people in Canton which was still open and we were able to get

some stuff to them. But I just don't know how we did it after the code room closed. I don't think couriers were coming in. It may be that the Department just telegraphed through open wires and we did the same.

I remember at one point officers had to take turns sleeping in the code room for security.

*Q: We now move on to the period of 1951-53 when he was Consul and Principal Officer in Kuala Lumpur, Malaya.*

**CHARLES T. CROSS**  
**Junior Officer, USIS**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1949-1950)**

*Ambassador Charles T. Cross was born in China in 1922. He attended Carleton College and Yale University, and served as a lieutenant overseas in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942-1946. His assignments abroad included Taipei, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Alexandria, Nicosia, London and Danang, with an ambassadorship to Singapore. Ambassador Cross was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.*

*Q: When did you join USIS? What were your first assignments?*

CROSS: June, 1949. I started in Taipei. We had been assigned to Chungking, but just before we boarded the ship on our way to Hong Kong, we were told that the assignment had been changed to Taipei because the State Department had withdrawn all our personnel from Chungking.

We were in Taipei from August, 1949 to January, 1950. My wife had gotten a job at the university. The tour was cut short for a very interesting reason. Matters were progressing quite well in Taipei. The U.S. had bombed the city quite heavily during the war, but the Taiwanese and the nationalists were moving along quite smartly in reconstruction. But the Department became rattled; it thought that the island would fall into communist hands. It sent a fellow by the name of Krentz, who had been in Taipei as consul general at one time. His task was to get us all to leave. The staff had met together and had assessed the situation in Taipei. We sent a message to the Department saying that in our view, the Chinese on Taiwan had decided to stick with the Nationalists. We called them "the distillation of defeat" in that they could have joined the Communists on the Mainland but did not. That suggested that they would oppose any communist takeover and that in our view, there was not a danger of Taipei falling into the wrong hands.

The Department, of course, did not accept our view. I said that I would remain in Taipei, but I would send my family to Hong Kong. That was not acceptable because the Department saw Hong Kong as also falling to the Communists. I then suggested Japan, but that was also turned down because it was under the Occupation. It suggested that my family be repatriated to the U.S.; that was not acceptable to us because we had no place to live there.

Finally, all of us who had families were transferred to other posts - all of which were by any standard far more dangerous than Taipei. We went to Jakarta in the middle of the transfer of power from the Dutch to the Indonesians. One family went to Saigon; one went to Rangoon where the Red Flag Communists and the White Flag Communists were engaged in a war. One family went to Seoul - just before the end of the Korean war. Ed Martin went to Burma. Dave Osborn went to Japan, I believe. Some of the CIA officers were sent to other posts. Some people sent their families to the U.S. and then sat in Taipei for many months - in perfect safety and comfort.

*Q: This is a very interesting story. You said that it was the Department that misread the situation.*

CROSS: Indeed. The decision was made at the highest levels of the Department.

*Q: When you first arrived in Taipei, what was your assignment?*

CROSS: My first job was to open some branch libraries throughout the island. I went first to Taichung and Kaohsiung to talk to owners of some stores. We opened USIS libraries in both places with locally-hired librarians. We gave them books and they were in business. On one occasion, I was sent around Taiwan - I was one of the first people in the consulate to travel all around the island. Now it can be done easily, but in 1950 the roads on the east side of the island were cut right into the cliffs. They were very narrow and some parts were still unpaved. Traffic had to be directed so that passage was open only in one direction - changing that direction every two hours or so.

Everywhere I went I was treated royally, as if I were the ambassador himself. The Chinese refused to accept the idea that even one as low in rank as I would not have some goodies to bring them. But our policy was that we were not going to do anything to support the Nationalists - at that time, anyway.

I took notes. I remember one case in which a Chinese army communications officer asked for some equipment. I told him that I thought we would not honor his request. He replied that when we sent communications equipment to Taiwan, we should make sure it got to him. By the time I finished this five day trip around the island, I found that we were again sending a lot of equipment to the Nationalists - some of which was communications material.

*Q: Was there in late 1949, an obvious distaste for the Nationalists? Did people think they were losers who didn't have a chance? Was our policy under review?*

CROSS: I think there was a desire to write them off, so that we could start all over again. There was a feeling that they would lose Taiwan because they had given up on the mainland. You have to remember that many of the losses on the mainland had much to do with defections. I think that experience weighed heavily on our policy makers. They didn't believe our "distillation of defeat" theory. The hard-core Chinese - Chiang Kai-shek, some intellectuals, some doctors, the western trained - didn't see it as we did. These people were less pro-Nationalist than they were anti-Communists. They were scared.

*Q: Were there any signs at the time of frictions between the mainland Nationalists and the native Taiwanese?*

CROSS: When I arrived, we talked to the Taiwanese in Japanese and to the mainlanders in Mandarin. I still had enough Japanese to carry on a conversation. The Taiwanese had been treated very badly by the nationalists, including massacres. The consulate was in a difficult position because we were under surveillance all the time. Yet we had to have contacts with the Taiwanese. We tried to discourage them from coming to our homes where they might be arrested. We would meet them casually in a variety of places.

*Q: The nationalists were pretty tough.*

CROSS: They were, but they were also tough on their own members. Any sign of doubt, particularly if it might result in a defection, was immediately squelched. The Nationalists had learned a lesson from their experiences on the Mainland. Even today, in China, you will find people who will do the right thing. Then and now, these people find ways of doing what they consider right even if the authorities don't permit it. They will pursue their education regardless.

There were some who worked for the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR) - a joint American-Chinese endeavor which had been in existence on the mainland and was continued on Taiwan. They proceeded without government support and developed a land distribution program which became one of the most effective U.S. assistance programs anywhere in the world.

I think that the top KMT officials behaved in one way, while some of their subordinates behaved somewhat differently. Then there were the Taiwanese. The more enlightened KMT officials and the Taiwanese began to meet and slowly the two began to merge. That is the situation today; Taiwan has a Taiwanese president.

*Q: You mentioned that your wife was teaching. What were her experiences?*

CROSS: She taught at Taiwan Nationalist University - a large school. She taught American literature - novels. There were no American novels available on the island, so she typed out the "Red Badge of Courage" on a little typewriter and made 14 copies. Her classroom was without a ceiling - it had been blown up; a tarp was used instead. She also participated in an English language radio program; she was "Mrs. Chase." The role of a Mr. Lee was played by David Osborn, who at the time was also employed by USIS. The core theme of the program was that Mrs. Chase would meet Mr. Lee some place where they held a conversation. They would pronounce the words slowly at first and then in normal rhythm. At the start, they had no audience. After two or three broadcasts, their listeners totaled 20-30,000.

*Q: Did you or your wife try to reach out to the Taiwanese or was it policy to focus on the Nationalists?*

CROSS: We tried to meet as many Taiwanese as possible, but in her university class there were

only a couple of Taiwanese students. The other dozen or so of her students were mainlanders who had already progressed some ways to knowledge of English.

*Q: After you and your colleagues left Taipei, did we have any residual representation there?*

CROSS: Indeed and it proceeded quite well with just the remnants of the consulate.

**JEROME K. HOLLOWAY**

**Consular Officer  
Shanghai (1949-1950)**

**Political Officer  
Hong Kong (1952-1957)**

*Jerome K. Holloway was born in Pennsylvania in 1923. He received his bachelor's degree from Catholic University in 1947 and his master's from the University of Michigan in 1959. He served in the US Navy during World War II. He joined the Foreign Service in 1947. His overseas posts include Rangoon, Shanghai, Bremen, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Stockholm, and Osaka-Kobe. Mr. Holloway was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 16, 1989.*

*Q: Now we might move to your next assignment, which was Shanghai. This was when?*

HOLLOWAY: This was in the spring of '49.

*Q: How did you feel about this?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, I was, frankly, exhilarated. Rangoon wasn't really all that exciting a post, and here I was being thrown into one of the world's greatest revolutions.

*Q: Could you describe what the situation was at the point when you set foot in China?*

HOLLOWAY: It was collapsing! The Nationalists were retreating everywhere. There was some talk of making a stand at the Yangtze, or south of the Yangtze. But as we later found out, the communists crossed the Yangtze with remarkably light losses.

There was, as you remember, the fight back at home was the China lobby. The Republicans, having lost the '48 election, decided to win the Chinese revolution instead. And there was tremendous pressure on the administration to do something to save the Chinese Nationalists.

*Q: Well, what was our consul general? Who was running it? What was the staffing like?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, the consul general was John Cabot, who, of course, had been deputy chief of mission in Yugoslavia. And as you probably know, our long-range policy, which was a very

astute one, was to hope that Mao became a Tito, which, of course, he became a Tito in spades eventually. So we were right. "We," I mean the United States was right.

*Q: Was this feeling transmitted to you and others? I mean, was he talking to you about Yugoslavia, or did you have much contact with him?*

HOLLOWAY: No, relatively little contact with him. No, I don't ever recall. I was so far down the totem pole that nobody, I guess, paid much attention to me.

*Q: How big was our staff?*

HOLLOWAY: Oh, it was huge. We had had one evacuation, but I think there were still over a hundred Americans.

*Q: What were you doing?*

HOLLOWAY: I was doing consular work at the first part. I was pulled into economic work later. But the question was, what's going to happen? Here's Shanghai, one of the world's largest cities, a very complex city. It was the biggest city in the communist world, bigger than Moscow. How was this going to be run by these people who had come out of caves in the northwest of China?

I think we all made a mistake, the old China hands in particular, in thinking that they couldn't run this, that they weren't sophisticated enough. Fortunately for them, there was a very, very low level of economic activity. Because the Nationalists claimed to have mined the Yangtze. No one ever found any of these mines. And then, of course, they had a blockade, or port closing as they called it -- self-blockade, I guess you would call it in international law.

So that economic activity slowed, and this made, I think, Shanghai easier to run for the communists. They had many, many handicaps. They had a bias against cities, as you probably know. They'd been out in the boondocks for ten years, and they thought cities were sinkholes and cesspools.

*Q: Of course, Shanghai was the sinkhole of sinkholes. I mean, we still think of it in those terms. [Laughter]*

HOLLOWAY: And remember, extraterritoriality had only been given up in '43, and it was only given up because the Japanese had thrown us all out of those cities! [Laughter]

But the general level of the competence of the communists, heck, was higher than we expected. It was also a great relief once the city was captured, because there was some law and order returned. The last days of the Nationalists were pretty chaotic.

*Q: What were you doing the last days of the Nationalists?*

HOLLOWAY: Basically, putting signs up on American property, saying in Chinese and English that this was an American-owned house. We were looking at it as a matter of protecting

American interests in China, which, of course, were extensive in Shanghai. Americans owned houses, businesses, and banks.

*Q: Had these private Americans all left by that time?*

HOLLOWAY: A great many had, but a great many had stayed. This was, of course, the big question, where we split with the British and where the split was to continue for years. Do you stay and try to do business with these people, or do you declare them beyond the pale and get out?

The British, who had never gotten along with the Nationalists as well as we had, they thought the communists might work out. We thought otherwise. But as you know, we were left there after the thing, after the capture, with the hope that there might be some eventual development.

*Q: What sort of instructions were you getting? In the first place, we had rather strict immigration controls. So we trying to do anything to help Chinese Nationalists get out and go to the States, or was this pretty much just --*

HOLLOWAY: No, but the main effort in the visa side was with Russians and particularly Central European -- Germans, Austrians, Czechs, most of whom were Jewish -- who had come to China in the '30s, and now, of course, wanted out. This was the main effort.

*Q: Were you under any standing instructions to be more liberal? Because our rules were still pretty stringent.*

HOLLOWAY: No, I think the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee was very active, and I think they managed to put a little pressure on Washington, and Washington would then instruct us to issue this visa or that visa. But as far as I could tell, not having anything to do with the visa business -- thank God! -- it was a very, somewhat poignant -- as many of these people had just escaped with their lives from Hitler's Germany, and here they were about to be thrown back into the, under a Communist regime. It was not a very happy situation.

*Q: What about the instructions? I mean, obviously at the time when the Nationalists were fleeing, the communists were coming in. Did the consul general call you together and say, "All right, batten down the hatches, here we go!" or "We're going to do this"? How did the consulate face this situation?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, I think we tried to put a good business-as-usual face on it as we could. Except for one thing. And that was, we were not to, in effect, recognize the Chinese communists by any official act. And they, by their token, said "Well, you are no longer vice consuls or consuls. You are ex-vice consuls, or ex-consuls. You have no authority." Of course, we never were accredited to any government; we were still accredited to the Nationalist government.

Now, this kind of situation can go on, as the British did in Taiwan. They kept a consulate open there for ten years after they had opened an embassy in Peking on the grounds of the consul is assigned to a provincial authority, not to national authorities. So that had there been any political

will to reach an agreement with the Chinese communists, we had plenty of time. Shanghai fell in May -- May 24th.

*Q: Of 1949.*

HOLLOWAY: '49. And the People's Republic was proclaimed on October 1, '49. So we had plenty of time to make up our minds whether we wanted to recognize them. We chose not to, as you know; we were going to let the dust settle, as Dean Acheson said. It was all, of course, tied up with the China lobby politics in the United States, and it became politically impossible for Truman to take that step.

*Q: Did you get any feel for this battle back in the States?*

HOLLOWAY: No. We saw very few newspapers. The English-language papers in China were very careful about what they printed. We relied on the Voice of America and the BBC. But I don't think we had any idea about the virulence of the China lobby fight.

*Q: Although you officially weren't there, what was your view, as you were going through the streets of Shanghai?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, first of all, as I said, a certain amount of relief that law and order had been restored. The Chinese Communist soldiers never bothered anyone. They occasionally were helpful. I can remember being out New Year's Eve with a Russian girl, and we were both in evening dress. We went to a party at the British Country Club. And afterwards she wanted to say hello to her father, who was out at the Soviet Club. And we took a pedicab out there. And when we were leaving -- it was about 2:00 in the morning -- the fellow was obviously -- the girl spoke Chinese, I didn't -- the fellow was obviously, literally going to take us for a ride. And a communist soldier came over and told him, "Look, you take these people where they want to go, and no nonsense." Now, maybe he thought we were Soviets coming out of the Soviet Club. But there were many incidents like that. They were there, they were country boys. But they were told to keep law and order and they did.

*Q: Consulates deal with the local government, and at this point, of course, the local government was communist.*

HOLLOWAY: We, at that time, required consular invoices for goods shipped to the United States. That was one of my jobs before I was put in the economic section. Well, the communists had taken a certain amount of tungsten and hair and Tung oil and all that, and they wanted to fulfill the old Nationalist contracts, state trading companies. Well, they sent somebody over to get a consular invoice on this shipment. Well, they paid the two dollars and fifty cents, and we put the consular invoice on it.

*Q: You weren't going under any sort of harassment, to put pressure on you, at least at the beginning?*

HOLLOWAY: Not at that time. Now, there were problems. We had some labor problems. The

Navy had not paid off some Sikh guards, and they locked us in the consulate one day. But that was eventually solved.

It got a little dicey when the Nationalists started air raids on Shanghai. These were American planes, American bombs, American gasoline. They were B-24s; that's a fairly potent plane. And the Nationalist Air Force, which had never shown any capacity for accurate bombing in the fighting, suddenly became crack bombers, bombardiers! They hit the --

*Q: Was there a suspicion that this was somebody else flying the planes? Were they?*

HOLLOWAY: No. I'm fairly convinced that they were not. Just the Nationalist Air Force chose to -- not to make a pun -- to be above the fight, as far as the communists were concerned. But they were certainly -- they hit the American power plant in Shanghai. American Foreign Power had a plant at Riverside, a big plant. They knocked out the French power plant, which meant there was no light or heat in Shanghai in the winter. That, I think, had to create a problem.

In October of '49, we had not responded to Mao's call for recognition. And in retrospect, that was a mistake.

*Q: If you had Americans there and all, somebody must have gotten in jail. I'm speaking as an old consular man.*

HOLLOWAY: Yes, one of our vice consuls, Bill Olive. The day of the Chinese Communist Victory Parade, which I think was July 7, '49. Very impressive parade. He got arrested for going down a one-way street. There was some altercation. It wasn't altogether clear that he acted with all the discretion he might have, and they threw him in the poky and roughed him up. But then they released him the next day.

*Q: So there wasn't a matter of someone being in jail, and the consul general, or somebody, have to go to the authorities, "I want access to him or her," or something like that?*

HOLLOWAY: No, we had no problems like that. As you know, the Nationalist blockade was run by Isbrandtsen. American ships were coming into Shanghai. Isbrandtsen was running the Flying Cloud --

*Q: Isbrandtsen being a shipping line?*

HOLLOWAY: A shipping line, yes. Sir John Franklin, the Flying Independence. And these were fired on and hit and put on fire by the Chinese Nationalists outside of -- more outside of Shanghai. And our Navy would do nothing to help them. Isbrandtsen and Acheson got into a newspaper war, taking ads out, insulting each other. And in the end, Acheson got the Coast Guard to, in effect, say that the masters were hazarding their ships by going into Shanghai, and if they went in they might lose their ticket. And the Department said quite -- it's now been published in Foreign Relations -- that we would take no action which would lessen the effect of the Nationalist blockade of Shanghai. So we were taking sides by then.

*Q: Things were beginning to develop. How did this play out in Shanghai and on the consulate there? We were helping the Nationalists and we were not recognizing this.*

HOLLOWAY: Well, the final act came when the Peking authorities attempted to requisition French, British, Dutch and American property, which had been turned over as a consequence of the Boxer conventions at the turn of the century, for military barracks. And they wanted them back. We claimed they were American property and that they were confiscating American government property. And if they were going to do this, we were going to withdraw our consuls from China. Now, frankly, the political sophistication that came up with that kind of an argument is pretty low. The British, Dutch, and French figured a way to finesse it. We chose to make a stand on that issue, and Acheson was a lawyer, and he fought a good legal case. But it was a very bad political case. On the other hand, given our backing of the Nationalists, it was obvious there was nothing for us to do.

*Q: Were you feeling that what you were doing was drying up? I mean, the invoices were going down?*

HOLLOWAY: No, all that was ended. That was when I was switched to the economic section and then it became very interesting watching what the Chinese Communists were doing, particularly their attempts to stop inflation.

*Q: How would you do that?*

HOLLOWAY: You had access to all the commodity reports. We had our Chinese staff with all the newspapers being published. Prices were there. We were interpreting the Chinese Communists regulations for banking, for carrying on of export-import business. It was a whole new game, and you had to stay up with it. For instance, they introduced something called the parity deposit unit, which is sort of a commodity dollar. And they linked wages to an interest rate, to the price of four commodities: rice, cloth, coal, and firewood -- briquettes. And this worked. I later found out that the commodity dollar had been advanced as an idea in the United States, back in the Depression. But where the Chinese Communists got the idea, I don't know. The Hungarians had a tax that at one time that did this. But their ability to control inflation was impressive.

*Q: Obviously, you were reporting on sort of factual things.*

HOLLOWAY: They allowed us to keep our radio going. We had two Navy chiefs and a warrant officer running our radio. We had no problem communication-wise.

*Q: Those who were reporting on political developments, were they beginning to get worried about the problem that later became to the old China hands, "Who lost China", and all that? I mean, were you feeling any pressure? Was there any, "I'm not going to report this"?*

HOLLOWAY: Not that I know of, not that I was aware of. I was very impressed with the Chinese-language officers in our political section.

*Q: Who were they?*

HOLLOWAY: Sabin Chase was the senior one, who had been around for a long time in China. Doug Forman was one of the younger officers. These fellows were very smart. And at that time, I don't think they felt any pressures whatsoever.

*Q: The consular general as a unit, did you get called together from time to time to sort of brief you in where we're going, and what you're doing?*

HOLLOWAY: What happened was that, in July-August, Leighton Stuart was transferred back. He was the ambassador. At that time we had a large safety evacuation, and the only staff that was left, I think, was seven American officers. And that was the group that was to ride it out. So by that time, we were down to the bare bones. Walter McConaughy became consul general. He had been the deputy to John Cabot. And there were just very few officers left.

*Q: You were one of those?*

HOLLOWAY: I was one of those who stayed, yes.

*Q: Well, had the Angus Ward thing happened up at Mukden?*

HOLLOWAY: Mukden, yes.

*Q: I think it was the tradition then was to get rid of all the married men, wasn't it, in times of trouble? I know, as an aside, when all hell broke loose in Palestine, when it broke, they got all the married officers out and sent all the single officers in. I mean, that's how we dealt with things in those days, and I guess you were --*

HOLLOWAY: I was single.

*Q: Or at least that, or you had a girlfriend on the side [Laughter]. So this was one reason why you were --*

HOLLOWAY: I think that was one of the reasons I was sent there and one of the reasons I was kept there. I mean, I was cheap, I was expendable.

*Q: This was very much an attitude at the time. A married man was a very movable commodity. Did you sort of keep a bag packed at that time, with the idea of, "They're going to do it us at some point"?*

HOLLOWAY: All of the old China hands kept telling us, "It's going to be just like it was under the Japanese when Pearl Harbor came along. They're going to scoop you all up in the bag and you're going to be in the wardroom jail," or something like that. And everybody kept one bag that he could grab at the last moment.

*Q: But you were continuing reporting?*

HOLLOWAY: Continued reporting. We were then working very hard on the question of American businessmen who wanted to get out. And of course, as you know, the Communists squeezed them in some very, very elegant ways with taxes, or wage claims, or alleged pre-war deposits. Labor troubles. I found myself going around under instructions almost every day, to go see the fellow from Northwest Airlines and the fellow from Chase Bank, and what was the situation.

*Q: Well, were we telling them to get the hell out?*

HOLLOWAY: We never really did until we were ordered out. Then we really felt that they should go.

*Q: When were you ordered out?*

HOLLOWAY: In February of '50, We didn't get out until April or May of '50.

*Q: But this was not the Chinese telling you to go. This was Washington.*

HOLLOWAY: No, this was the State Department withdrawing us. And of course, we couldn't get out through Shanghai. We had to go up through Tientsin.

*Q: Could you travel around anywhere prior to this?*

HOLLOWAY: No.

*Q: How about Shanghai?*

HOLLOWAY: There were no restrictions on that. You could go out for a walk out towards (Inaudible), or anything like that. I had no problems with that. But you couldn't take the train to Hong Kong for the weekend or anything like that.

*Q: Did you have contact yourself with Chinese officials? I mean, one can survive quite well without this in a way for a long time, and most work of consulates, although it's a credit to them, we really operate with the business community, and with the individuals.*

HOLLOWAY: Individuals, the missionaries, business community. We didn't have any tourists, thank God. We had a few newspapermen and, of course we had the resident American business community.

*Q: How about the missionaries? What was your impression of the American missionaries and how did you all deal with them?*

HOLLOWAY: You have to distinguish in the missionary movement between the headquarters group, let's say, in Shanghai, and the missionaries out in the field. And they were two different breeds of cats. The missionaries in Shanghai, the headquarters, were pretty sophisticated,

politically astute people, who were well aware of the power they had behind them in Washington. The missionaries in the field tended to be good-hearted, somewhat naive, but certainly men of good will, who were genuinely shocked. I talked to a lot of them when they came into Shanghai, after they lost their churches, and the Chinese had turned on them. They were quite shocked. I remember one doctor saying he was going back and go help, go to work for the UMW, the United Mine Workers. They needed doctors. "I'll treat Americans now. I won't treat anymore Chinese." And there was a profound disillusionment.

The Catholics were a little different. I knew Bishop Walsh, who, of course, stayed for twenty-one years.

*Q: Yes. In jail, mostly.*

HOLLOWAY: They had no families, of course, and they looked upon it as just a cross to bear, if I could put it that way.

*Q: Were we trying to get the missionaries out?*

HOLLOWAY: Yes. But after we were leaving, we pointed out that we could no longer protect them. Not that we could protect them very much when we were there. And we advised Americans to leave China. Obviously, some businessmen stayed. And in the case of one banker, Bill Orchard of American Express, he stayed for three or four years before he could get out. But Chase and National City kept on functioning to a limited extent. Many of these men, of course, this was their lives. They didn't have an institution like the State Department to go back to which would send you out to another job.

*Q: We are a movable thing, so we can observe these things with a certain amount of objectivity. How did it come about that you left then?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, we wanted to bring a ship into Shanghai. There were all sorts of problems about that, because, again, the Nationalist blockade, which had by that time been dissipated somewhat by the appearance, frankly, of Soviet fighter planes, and had chased off the Nationalist bombers, which was a great relief. This is something that's happened afterward. I mean, the Soviets have had to help their allies out with fighter planes in more than one place. And pilots. We were trying to bring the General Gordon of the American President Lines into Shanghai, and the State Department was going to charter it and take everybody out. And they just never could get permission from the Communists, or could solve the problem of whether the harbor was mined. It wasn't. The Chinese Nationalists had used this as a ploy in Changsha in 1930. They had said that they had mined the Yangtze. So we took the train to Tientsin, and got out through Tientsin.

*Q: But in this time you were waiting, you weren't under a restraint or anything?*

HOLLOWAY: No.

*Q: It was just a move?*

HOLLOWAY: Until the last couple of days, we had our radio and our coding facilities.

*Q: Were you getting instructions that were trickling down to you from the Department of State about how -- was it kind of business as usual and you were left on your own? Or was there any attempt to sort of fine-tune from the State Department what we were doing there?*

HOLLOWAY: No. I got the impression -- again, I was very low on the totem pole -- and the impression was confirmed when I got back to Washington, the State Department in the China desk was in a state of shock, and they just didn't know what to do. They had people in a half a dozen posts in China, and they just had to get them out. The amount of guidance they were getting from the Secretary or the President was minimal, because the administration was under fairly heavy fire from the China lobby.

*Q: What was your attitude towards the situation in China when you left? I mean, personally.*

HOLLOWAY: My own personal view was that this was one of the great events of history. I mean, good, bad, or indifferent, whatever it's outcome was going to be, I would have liked to have stayed around a little longer and watched it. [Laughter]

*Q: Were some of the other people feeling somewhat the same way? I mean, glad to get out or really wanting to stay around and see what had happened?*

HOLLOWAY: I think the younger officers would just as soon stayed around to see what happened. Obviously, the older, more mature fellow with family interests or career interests, something like that, they thought it was probably time to get out. It probably was time to get out! After all, the Korean War started in June of '50.

*Q: That's right.*

HOLLOWAY: Had we still been there then, we'd have been there until --

*Q: A long, long time.*

HOLLOWAY: A long, long time.

*Q: Jerry, when you left Shanghai, what was your reception back in the Department and where did you go?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, obviously the people in Chinese affairs, who didn't seem particularly interested in my experiences, as I said, I had a feeling that they were kind of shattered.

*Q: This was 1950?*

HOLLOWAY: This is just before the Korean War. And I was ticketed to go to Hong Kong, to continue my China reporting, the economic reporting, which I'd been doing, and was told by a

senior officer in personnel that it might not be a bad idea if I gave China a slip for the next couple of years. He thought it might be uncomfortable. Of course, he was right. He suggested I go to Europe and pick up another language and then take a look at the situation, which is precisely what I did.

*Q: Yes. What was the situation? You went to Hong Kong in 1952?*

HOLLOWAY: Yes.

*Q: What were you doing and what was the situation?*

HOLLOWAY: The situation was that you had a China reporting unit in the consulate general in Hong Kong. It was, for the most part, made up of people who had served in China and in Communist China. I had the highest respect for the fellows who were in it. They were great fellows. It was about my best post. We played tennis, golf, squash, hiking. Beer was cheap. It was just -- everything was cheap. Hong Kong was a bit confining, but not all that confining. And everyone seemed to me to have a real interest in China and what was going on in China. And it was a very professional group.

*Q: Who was the consul general then?*

HOLLOWAY: When I first went, it was Julian Harrington. And he was succeeded by Everett Drumright. We talked about Drumright. As I said, the China reporting, I remember a fellow named Dick McCarthy started the translations of the China press, which had become an essential tool for anyone doing scholarship or research on Communist China. We had certain jobs to do. We were running the export control program on China. One officer, Bob Eller, was following the Americans who were trapped in China, were trying to get out. There were certain sub-specialties, but by and large, we were focused on -- we were the eyes and ears of the government for China.

*Q: What were you doing?*

HOLLOWAY: I was doing economic work, which I had been doing in Shanghai. It was during that period that the security apparatus seemed to me to be operating.

*Q: You're speaking about the American concern about anybody having dealt with China, whether they were a security risk?*

HOLLOWAY: That's right. I'll show you the sort of clumsy thing they did. The security officer would come around and start asking me about a fellow I'd served with in Shanghai, and what did he do in Shanghai and all that sort of thing. And then the next day, he'd go to that fellow, who was working in say the political section, and say, "Now, you served with Jerry Holloway in Shanghai. What did he do there? What was his ideology? Did he have any Chinese girlfriends or anything like that?" It was very clumsy, but enough to make things uneasy. And there were some incidents that were not very pretty.

*Q: Can you describe any?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, one fellow was asked to take a lie-detector test when he went back on leave, although I think that was the military that insisted on that. There seemed to be -- I wouldn't say an attempt to set us against each other, but Big Brother was looking over your shoulder in a way that he didn't used to. See, I was there in '52 to '57, and that was a bad period.

In the end, we were all cleared, no problem or anything like that, but it left a sour taste.

*Q: You were obviously all part of the reporting unit, both on the economic side, which is yours, but on the political side. Did you have any feeling that you'd better make these reports, you had to be very careful about how you wrote these reports so it didn't sound like "Gee, they've come up with a good new idea in economics"? This wouldn't sit very well in Washington.*

HOLLOWAY: Don't say that they're doing too well.

*Q: I mean this was part of the ethos, or whatever it is.*

HOLLOWAY: And for instance, there was this organization called ECAFA, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East, which was a U.N. subsidiary. It puts out an annual economic report on Asia. The State Department arranged so that we had a veto. We went over it in draft, to take out anything too favorable to the People's Republic. As you know, our policy was, as Walter Robertson, the assistant secretary expressed it, to keep pressure on the mainland in the hope that a revolt would ensue there, which we or the Nationalists could take advantage. Dulles spoke quite openly. You can read it in Ridgeway's memoirs, of how to invade China through Hainan, up thorough Korea. This was part of the keeping the Li Mi and the Chinese Nationalist Divisions in Burma resupplied.

It was our aim -- we were hoping for the overthrow of the Chinese Communist government, and to suggest that this government was fairly permanent was to fly in the face of policy.

*Q: So although it wasn't explicit -- it was implicit -- you had the feeling that you were watching your reporting?*

HOLLOWAY: It was easier on the economic side. On the political side, I think you weren't going to do any speculative pieces.

*Q: One can read, as we say in the United States, the tea leaves. [Laughter]*

HOLLOWAY: Yes.

*Q: Despite this, did you find the morale good? Was it an intellectually lively group of people you were dealing with?*

HOLLOWAY: Yes. One of the problems in Hong Kong was that the consular section was under a tremendous workload. You had 25,000 Chinese claiming American citizenship, that they had to deal with. And you had the refugee relief program. Those people really did work very, very hard,

and without, as you know from consular service, not a great deal of thanks. It was a tough job, and it sort of divided the consular general into two sections: the consular section with this horrendous workload, and the political and economic, which was a fairly nice job.

*Q: Almost an ivory-tower type of situation, as compared to the working stiffs. I might add for the record, that these 25,000 Chinese claiming American citizenship, many of these were fraudulent. They were fake documents, and they were coming from various towns in and around Canton.*

HOLLOWAY: They were coached. It was just one gigantic fraud.

*Q: They used to have hit squads of our people who would break into their houses with the Hong Kong police to grab their kochi books, telling which village they lived in and all this.*

HOLLOWAY: Where the school was --

*Q: Where the school was. It was very elaborate.*

HOLLOWAY: The best story, though, were the Canadians, who required that you have no amoebic dysentery. No amoebas. Which required you were required to submit a clean stool. There was a place in Hong Kong that guaranteed a clean stool.

*Q: They had stool producers, yes. Somebody at one point figured that there were very few Chinese women at the time, and each one of them had to have produced -- I think this was before the 1906 San Francisco earthquake -- each one would have had to produce something like 200 children or something like that, in order to produce the number of claimants to American citizenship.*

HOLLOWAY: You mention the San Francisco earthquake. These Chinese knew every town in the West where the courthouse had burned town and there would be no records! [Laughter] "Oh, I'm from so and so, Montana, 1923."

"Oh, that burned down. We don't have any records."

*Q: Yes. [Laughter] Did you get any instructions from the consul general, bringing you together? Did you have weekly meetings or something, where you would sort of chew over the China situation?*

HOLLOWAY: Yes, particularly with Drumright, who, of course, had served in China, served in Chinese affairs. Drumright was very right wing, very conservative, and was a strong believer in Robertson's policies. But he was also intellectually interested in the problems. He had no sympathy for the Chinese communists, but he was certainly not prepared to say they don't exist.

*Q: What was the thrust of your feelings from '52 to '57, about the survivability of -- were you, as a group, convinced that this outfit was here to stay? Or that the Nationalists are going to --*

HOLLOWAY: No. Whatever was going to happen in Communist China, I think there wasn't one

of us who had any illusions about the Nationalists. Even those who served in Taipei. They weren't going back to the mainland.

*Q: What was the feeling about the Nationalists? You were getting obviously, pretty well second-hand. But the other people, what was the general feeling about perception of the Nationalists at this period?*

HOLLOWAY: That they had not improved a great deal over their performance on the mainland. Now, this was not held by many of the top folks, particularly the ambassador in Taipei. He was in our staff meeting, visiting Hong Kong, telling us that, "Oh, our relations with the Nationalists are fine. Everything is great." And one of the clerks came in and called him out. There was a message that the Nationalists had just broken into his embassy and, among other things, had dropped the safe on his car!

*Q: This was after an incident of --*

HOLLOWAY: An Air Force sergeant, named Reynolds, was acquitted of murdering a Chinese. And the ambassador was there telling us --

*Q: This is ambassador Rankin.*

HOLLOWAY: Rankin.

*Q: Yes, Carl Rankin.*

HOLLOWAY: Carl Rankin. That this was all going to pass and blow over! [Laughter] And at that moment, his embassy was on fire!

*Q: At the staff meeting, was anybody saying, "Well, this is all very good, Mr. Ambassador, but it looks like the regime is here to stay"? There was a certain keeping one's head down?*

HOLLOWAY: No, nobody was going to tell him -- we weren't going to say the Nationalists were hopeless. But we were telling him that things were better on the mainland than perhaps our propaganda was making them out to be.

Now, you've got to realize that we were fooled, too. In '57, there was a bad famine in China and thousands died. We had no inkling of that.

*Q: Because you were relying on papers and broadcasts.*

HOLLOWAY: The British would interview Hong Kong, the Hong Kong police would interview Chinese refugees. We were allowed to interview non-Chinese, who were still coming out -- that was the division of labor -- but the British made available their reports. But this was very low-level stuff; as you know, these were mostly from Guangdong.

*Q: Yes, which is the Canton area, the traditional --*

HOLLOWAY: The traditional hinterland of Hong Kong. The foreigners were more interesting, particularly the White Russians, most of whom spoke Chinese and had gotten some fairly good insights. We were hearing that the Chinese and the communists and the Soviet advisors were not getting along from '53 on. They would detail arguments in this factory or that factory, where the Soviets said "Do it that way," and the Chinese said --

*Q: The Soviets weren't there en masse at that point? Or were they?*

HOLLOWAY: Yes, in '53, '54, '55 they --

*Q: Did you view the Soviets as a great monolithic brotherhood with the communists at that point?*

HOLLOWAY: No, no. As I mentioned earlier, our original policy was very sophisticated. We say that Mao was going to be a Tito. And this was done at the very highest levels in Washington. And it's been published in papers. Afterward, that's '49, you get into the mid-'50s, you had to start asking yourself, "Haven't we pushed the Chinese into the Soviet arms?" But we certainly did think of them as monolithic.

*Q: But you didn't see, in your reporting and the others, any sort of rift coming between the Soviets and . . .*

HOLLOWAY: No, except for these reports that the Soviet advisors couldn't get along with the Chinese. Now this turns out to be indicative of much deeper disagreements.

*Q: Could you just quickly summarize where you went afterwards, so the reader can get an idea?*

HOLLOWAY: Well, I decided that Chinese affairs was a dead end. And in '57, the Department sent me to the University of Michigan. Spent a year and got a Master's degree in East Asian Affairs; went to Japanese language school in Tokyo, was assigned to the embassy in Tokyo, then was consul, principal officer in Fukuoka. Went back to Washington, was in charge of INR, on charge of Ceylon, India and Nepal. Was then switched over to German affairs when the wall was built in August of '61. And stayed in German affairs and European affairs for another three years. Then went, as counselor of political affairs, to Stockholm and spent four years there. Came back and spent a year at Harvard at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. Went down to Washington as Director of Regional Affairs for East Asia. Then went out and spent four years as consul general in Osaka. Then came back to the War College as the State Department advisor to the Naval War College.

My wife died, I retired and stayed on at the Naval War College. Been there for fifteen years now.

**HARLAN CLEVELAND**  
**Director, Far Eastern Aid Program, Agency for Economic Cooperation**

## Washington, DC (1949-1952)

*Ambassador Cleveland was born in New York City and raised in the United States and Switzerland. He was educated at Princeton and Oxford Universities. During World War II he served on the Board of Economic Warfare, after which he held a number of senior positions dealing with Italian economic recovery, US and UNRRA assistance programs in China and Taiwan and NATO issues. He also served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations and as US Ambassador to NATO. Ambassador Harlan was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Well did you find yourself being somewhat cautious about shipping too much stuff to China because of the thought you were watching the front coming and seeing how this might not...*

CLEVELAND: Yes, we had to be careful about that. We were mostly helping the areas that were clearly under nationalist control and Taiwan which was. But the general assumption was they were going to get pushed off the mainland, so when they did take over the Yangtze Valley and chased Chiang Kai-shek out, we then had the very delicate problem of making sure that our people got out in time but not bring them out prematurely so it would look as if we had torpedoed the nationalist boat. For several years thereafter I was given credit in some of the right wing magazines like Human Events for having helped lose China. The person that I'd helped lose China was this Republican businessman named Paul Hoffman, so the whole thing was hard to take seriously.

On the other hand, that was the Joe McCarthy period. I had in my files a wonderful picture, a very good photograph, of being awarded by the nationalist government a high decoration when I left. The communists didn't do anything similar, but the nationalists did. The picture was of Madame Chiang Kai-shek pinning this medal on me with the Generalissimo standing by with a broad smile on his face. I thought that at the first whisper of McCarthy trouble, I would rush down to the Washington Post and give them this picture and say please print it. Anyway, I never had to use it as it happened, but that story did follow me around for quite awhile. Even when I came back into the government in 1961 some of that was still hanging on and held up my security clearance for awhile.

*Q: Were you having any problems with people under you who wanted to hang on until the very last in China? I mean, was there a problem getting the people out?*

CLEVELAND: No. We had two very bright and sensible people there. The chief of our mission was the former mayor of San Francisco, Roger Lapham, a very delightful person, but also a very canny person. Our sort of chief operational guy had gone on a mission for us to China and then was hired as my successor in what was by then the Far Eastern Aid program. I'll come back to that in a minute. Those two were both realistic, business oriented people with a high sense of politics. So we didn't have any sort of sentimental hanging on in that business. We were very much on the same wavelength.

One of the things that happened while I was still responsible for the China aid program was that

we had to narrow our sights to concentrate just on Taiwan.

*Q: What type of things were you doing toward the end there to help Change Kai-shek?*

CLEVELAND: Importing still a lot of food, and agricultural machinery. We were still supporting the dike building which hadn't been quite finished by then. We had people operating in agricultural industries service all over the country. We took that over as part of our program. It was a major program and we had several hundred million dollars of appropriated money. When we had to narrow our program to focus on Taiwan, we decided it would be a good idea to start aid programs in some of the other countries around China for the political purpose of shoring up any possible domino effect of the Chinese communists taking over most of China. We went up to the Hill in one of the strangest things I ever saw happen in government. Paul Hoffman and Dean Acheson went up to each of the four committees that had authorized and appropriated money for the China aid program. I went up with them carrying the briefcase, to make the case as Acheson said to one of the committees, "What you really meant when you said China in this legislation was the general area of China wasn't it." Well they said, "I guess that is right. I guess that is what we meant."

On the basis of those hearings, without any further legislation, we took a hundred million dollars of our China appropriation and diverted it to the Philippines which had a small program already, also Indonesia, Burma, and the three associated states of Indo China as they were then being called, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were included. We also put some more money in the Korean aid program which was already a big deal. This happened before the Korean war started, but there was already a sizable economic aid program in Korea, in South Korea. So the far eastern aid program was formed. It included the China-Taiwan responsibility and for these others as well. I was assigned to start these other programs and continue to manage the China program, so I became head of the Far Eastern aid program.

*Q: You were doing that from when to when?*

CLEVELAND: Well, it must have been from probably late '49 to sometime in the fall of 1950. Until after the Korean war started.

*Q: It started in June of 1950. Was there any sort of priority for where the money would go? I mean when you were looking at this to help?*

CLEVELAND: Well, the priority, of course, the biggest part of the money was going to Taiwan and Korea; particularly after the North Koreans had rumbled across the 38th parallel in their Soviet made tanks, it became very important to shore up the event as a security matter, to shore up the South Koreans with economic aid.

So for awhile I was responsible for a rapidly enlarging Korea aid program and a still very large Taiwan program as well as for the Philippines, Indonesia, Burma and so forth. The Taiwan program was being managed primarily through a thing we had developed and put into the legislation the year before called the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction which was a board of three Chinese and two Americans, which had begun to operate on the rural projects on

the mainland quite successfully with land reforms.

But when the nationalist government got onto Taiwan, they were in a shocked condition. They were willing to apply much more radical measures to development. We helped persuade them to start a real land reform program and to combine it with a couple of other gimmicks that worked wonderfully well. The way it worked out, they would take the land from the landowner and actually give it to the people who were on the land doing the farming. They gave the landowner not money but shares in the industrial companies. The industrial companies were all nationalized, so this was before the word was invented, a privatization program. The land owners were baffled to be paid with this piece of paper saying they owned a machine tool company or something. So, they would stand around saying anybody, "Want to buy this paper?" That created a capital market. So in one fell swoop you had land reform, privatization of industry, and the beginnings of a major capital market in Taiwan. The Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction also had a vigorous social program featuring a birth-control effort through the rural health clinics that were run by the JCRR. Women could come and get information and the primitive equipment that was available at the time, which was mostly, if you can believe it, sponge and vinegar. That was the main thing to prevent having babies. But I have really learned from that operation that if women are given the chance to and the information to decide if they want to have babies or not, they will definitely decide not to have so many babies because it sure turned out that way in that case.

The result of all these efforts in Taiwan was to make Taiwan almost a cameo case of successful economic development. Even the yields of rice in Taiwan in some places were better than Japan's. We had the advantage of an educated population because the Japanese had been willing for the Chinese on Taiwan to be educated even into higher education. Whereas, in their Korean colony, they were not willing to have them get anywhere beyond elementary school. What happened in Korea was that the government, as soon as they found themselves in the middle of this big war, realized that it was a technological war full of military technology; the generals in charge figured they had better get everybody educated so they could handle this stuff. So they decreed universal education for everybody up through high school and some help even for people getting into college.

Two or three years later, I was no longer involved in it directly, the Korean government of the day which was still dominated by the military decided they really didn't need to spend all this money on education now because the war had tapered off. So, they tried to turn it off. By that time the parents in South Korea had unanimously come to the conclusion that all their children were going to go to college, and it was just politically impossible to turn off. The result of that mandated universal education was like the result of a similar policy in the early 19th century in the United States. We became a great country not because of the amber waves of grain so much as because we were an educated population.

**DAVID L. OSBORN**  
**American Information Office**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1949-1953)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs (Taiwan)  
Geneva, Switzerland and Washington, DC (1954-1957)**

**Political Counselor  
Taipei, Taiwan (1958-1961)**

**Deputy Chief of Mission  
Tokyo, Japan (1967-1970)**

**Consul General  
Hong Kong (1970-1974)**

*David L. Osborn was born in Indiana in 1921. His career with the State Department included assignments to Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, and an ambassadorship to Burma. He was interviewed by Bert Potts on January 16, 1989.*

*Q: Why did the Department send you from Tokyo to Taiwan, in February of '49?*

OSBORN: This, again, was probably a matter of language. The situation in China was disintegrating badly in 1949. It was becoming obvious that the government of Chiang Kai-shek - the KMT -- would very likely end up going to Taiwan; or at least that was a strong possibility. So it was of interest to the United States, and the Department of State, whether the situation in Taiwan would be stable enough to allow Chiang to take refuge there. The KMT's misrule in Taiwan, in 1947, had already provoked an uprising there, in which some thousands of people were killed; and there was some possibility that the Taiwanese might not exactly welcome Chiang Kai-shek.

At any rate, the Department of State wanted to get a fix on the situation in Taiwan. Now the people in Taiwan, at that time, spoke Japanese. They had been through the Japanese educational system, and it was possible to communicate with them in Japanese. I happened to be, probably, the most available Japanese language speaker at that time, so I was sent to Taiwan, where I was sent on detail down to the USIS Library, in Tainan. Tainan was the old capital of Taiwan, and a good place for establishing contacts with the Taiwanese population. So I went down there, and observed the situation, and began to get my feet on the ground in Taiwan.

*Q: Would you like to remind our listeners when Chiang came over from the mainland?*

OSBORN: Well, Chiang didn't come over from the mainland until December of '49. I was sent down there in February of '49. The situation on the mainland, from the standpoint of the Republic of China -- Chiang Kai-shek's forces -- continued to deteriorate. In December of '49, he finally brought his government to Taipei. At that time the situation looked very dubious still, but with the move to Taiwan the KMT forces pulled up their socks, and it began to look possible that the situation there might survive for some time. Although, at that point in time, almost nobody would have thought it would last as long as it has.

*Q: When did your active engagement in foreign policy come about?*

OSBORN: I became emotionally and intellectually "seized of" the Taiwan problem, by virtue of this assignment in Taiwan. It was impossible, in the Taiwan of 1949 and '50, not to become involved, virtually for one thing, the Taiwan problem -- that is to say, the China problem -- who had lost China? -- had begun to dominate the American political scene in 1949 and '50. So it was during this assignment that we were all -- on Taiwan -- debating the pros and cons of a United States commitment to Taiwan; the argument being between those who felt that the United States had been pouring sand down a rat hole in trying to help the forces of Chiang Kai-shek; and on the other hand, the forces of the China lobby -- loosely identified as such -- who argued that we had never aided Chiang Kai-shek enough, and we should now do more.

This debate was so powerful that we all became engaged in it. And then on top of that, in 1950 the Korean War broke out. This had the effect of freezing the positions on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We feared an attack, so we put the Seventh Fleet in the Strait. The Chinese on the mainland saw the action as a United States declaration of hostility towards China, as a step towards seizing Taiwan.

*Q: When did the Taiwan Straits issue actually surface?*

OSBORN: That surfaced in its concrete form, with the positioning of the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait, immediately following the outbreak of war in Korea. It's important to note that from the Chinese Communist standpoint, we put the Seventh Fleet in the Strait before they -- on their part -- had challenged our position on Taiwan, militarily certainly. We put the Fleet there in anticipation of a Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan. So that was the origin of the question, from the Chinese Communist side. From our side the question also had a strong domestic-political component. That is to say, people were still arguing whether we were doing the right thing to support Chiang Kai-shek, or whether we should write him off as a bad bet.

The old China hands had -- during the war -- tended to favor working toward some kind of mutual understanding with the Chinese Communists, which would avoid conflict there. Whereas there were many people who assumed that conflict between us and Communist China eventually was inevitable, and that we should simply prepare ourselves for it. These debates were going back and forth, and that's how the Strait issue assumed its most urgent form.

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OSBORN: By February of 1954, it happened that there was an opening in the political side of the Taiwan desk. They were in need of someone to fill it, because the question of the Mutual Defense Treaty -- with the Republic of China, on Taiwan -- was coming up; we had to negotiate that treaty. And the Department needed people with experience in Taiwan. Not many people knew the ins and outs of the Taiwan question as well as those of us who had been there during the formative period.

The fact that the desk was headed by Al Jenkins, at that time -- Al Jenkins being a person I had

gotten to know during my assignment to Taipei -- probably helped. Anyway, I was picked up and put on the desk.

*Q: And you stayed there . . . ?*

OSBORN: On paper, I remained assigned to the Office of Chinese Affairs until the end of 1957. Actually, I stayed on the desk in the Department until 1955, when I went to Geneva.

*Q: I was going to ask about this point in your career, in Chinese Affairs; what led the Department to post you to Geneva?*

OSBORN: There it gets back to the Taiwan question. In 1954 there was a conference on Indochina and Korea, at Geneva. This was an important conference, and it was hoped that it would clear away a lot of the underbrush that had grown up between us and China, among other things. At the end of that conference, the Chinese Communists -- whose hostility to the United States had been somewhat reduced as a result of that conference -- and the United States -- which was hoping to at least put the blame for any hostility between us, clearly onto the Chinese Communists -- had a common interest in opening this conference, to deal with the issues between us.

On our side, we were concerned about the issue of American prisoners, some of whom had been taken during the Korean War, others had been taken in various ways on the periphery of China, and were being held by the Chinese. We wanted to seek their release. The Chinese -- for their part -- were most keenly interested in the status of Taiwan. So the talks were set up to deal with these issues.

The issue of Taiwan, which was labeled "The Renunciation of Force in the Taiwan Strait;" the issue of the detained Americans; and an additional issue was that of the exchange of newsmen. The Chinese -- for their part -- were urging the United States to permit American newsmen to go to China -- to permit the exchange of newsmen. Favoring the exchange of information was the popular side of this issue, so we and the Chinese jockeyed for position on it. We feared that dropping the bars would tend to erode domestic support for our own position on China. The Chinese were looking for "leverage" on Taiwan.

*Q: Why in early 1957, did you leave Geneva and go back to the Department? It sounds as though this should have been a very busy period in Geneva.*

OSBORN: By 1957, the Chinese had become fed up with the lack of progress on Taiwan. This coincided with powerful frustrations in China's domestic programs and its relations with Russia. China "put us on hold" and decided to try other means of attaining its objectives. Putting it another way, the Chinese lost faith in our good faith in seeking an answer to the Taiwan question. But they didn't want to abandon the talks because they still had hopes that at some future time it would be possible to resume progress toward a solution to the Taiwan issue. So they didn't drop the talks all together.

Now we -- for our part -- wanted the talks to keep going, as a kind of mailbox, where we could

drop messages to the Chinese, when we felt the need to communicate with them. And this helped us to withstand political pressures at home. When people demanded that we negotiate with the Chinese, we could say, "Well, we're talking to them at Geneva -- or Warsaw," after the venue was shifted -- without any of the pitfalls of actual negotiating, which would have been difficult politically because of our right-wing in the United States.

*Q: So you did go back to the Taiwan desk in '57?*

OSBORN: I went back to the Taiwan desk, yes, that's correct. And I was still there when -- in the normal course of personnel processing -- I received a tentative assignment to Dacca.

*Q: Now what happened to this assignment to Dacca, in as much as so far you were in Chinese and Japanese Affairs?*

OSBORN: There was an incident in Taiwan, called "Black Friday," in which Chinese demonstrators sacked our embassy, and rioted and destroyed USIS; the usual round of incidents. It was a sensational affair, because the Chinese on Taiwan had been considered -- by everyone, ourselves included -- to be model clients of ours. And no one could imagine why they were doing this, especially since the Department of State had not received any adequate forewarning from the embassy in Taipei. It is not likely to make any embassy popular, if the embassy gets wiped out without warning.

It was felt that the embassy's political section probably needed a shake-up; at least some changes were needed. I was one of the changes that took place; I was sent out to be the head of the political section. That is to say, the political counselor.

*Q: So upon your return to Taiwan, what were the highlights of this second tour?*

OSBORN: The highlight of the second tour in Taiwan was the Taiwan Strait Crisis, of 1958. This was the time when the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu became household words. Despairing of negotiating an end to the Taiwan standoff, the Chinese Communists tried to pressure the KMT forces to withdraw, and abandon the islands. They apparently believed that if they put enough pressure on the Nationalist forces, then the Nationalists would defect or surrender; and this would have such an impact on the Nationalist government, that there would be a possibility of its collapse.

At any rate, the Chinese were putting terrific military pressure on the offshore islands, particularly Quemoy (Chinmen). And the United States became involved in trying to shore-up the position of the Chinese Nationalists. I was the fellow in the embassy -- as the political counselor -- who was responsible for following this situation, and sending the daily reports on it, as they developed -- to the Department. That was certainly the highlight.

*Q: Was there one more highlight you'd like to discuss, during that tour? I think you had a nice visit from President Eisenhower?*

OSBORN: Yes, we did, and we had some visits from Secretary Dulles. I recall particularly one

thing about Secretary Dulles' visit of October, 1958. This was toward the end of the Strait Crisis. When Dulles talked to Chiang, the "Gimo" urged him to take a very stern military posture against the Chinese Communists. According to accounts circulating within the embassy, Secretary Dulles said to him, "Well, you know there's a limit to what we can do against them, without the possibility of having to use nuclear weapons, and of course, nobody wants that." Reportedly, from the Gimo's lack of reaction against this suggestion, Secretary Dulles got the impression that Chiang Kai-shek was not averse to contemplating this possibility -- if necessary. I think Dulles was quite taken aback by that. At any rate, from about that time on, we put increasing pressure on the Taiwan Chinese to accept their position in Taiwan with good grace; and to stop continually harping on returning to the mainland. The Chinese Nationalists -- for their part -- while they accepted the position, and did not really try to attack the mainland, or really seriously threaten to do so -- they would not commit themselves to accepting what they considered a two-Chinas situation. They became very strongly committed to maintaining their identity, as the one sole government of China. That was one highlight.

The other one, which you mentioned, was towards the end of that time, in 1960; the visit of President Eisenhower in 1960, en route to Japan. The President's visit, the first ever by a sitting President, had been scheduled to coincide with the ratification of the revised security treaty with Japan. The visit touched off unprecedented student demonstrations in Tokyo; Zengakuren -- the name of the student union in Japan -- became a household word in the United States. Television, the news reports, were full of these mobs of student demonstrators in Tokyo, surrounding the embassy, and so on -- besieging the Japanese government. At one point in the demonstrations, a Japanese female student was accidentally killed -- trampled by the demonstrators -- and her death led to an intensification of the rioting, and the protests. As a result, the visit of President Eisenhower had to be canceled.

I happened to be at the luncheon table when President Eisenhower's advance man -- Jim Haggerty, his press secretary -- was passing through Taipei on his way to Tokyo. Haggerty asked what was going to happen in Tokyo, whether the President's visit would go off smoothly or not. I told him not to worry; surely the Japanese police, who were very expert in these matters, would be able to take care of any problem. This was a case of "famous last words."

The cancellation of the visit was a big trauma. One incidental result was to put me back on the trail towards another assignment in Tokyo. One, it reminded me that I was supposed to be a Japanese expert, and I had just shown in my remarks to Haggerty, that I was in need of updating. Also, those riots, and the cancellation of the President's visit -- were among the things that led to the assignment of Ambassador Reischauer to Japan.

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*Q: Even though you're sitting in Tokyo, with all these exciting things going on around you, you never lost your interest in China policy?*

OSBORN: No, it was impossible for me to lose my interest in China policy. China policy questions were so much a part of the whole cold war period. And certainly from the standpoint of Japan, China policy was a very important component of their relationship with the United States.

The Japanese conservatives had developed an odd interplay with the United States in regard to China policy. Conservative Japanese -- for political reasons, their own domestic political reasons -- did not wish to have to recognize Communist China. This would have been a victory for the Japanese socialist party; it would have caused all sorts of problems for the conservatives. But they could not oppose it publicly, because it was very popular with the Japanese people. This was a very interesting situation, that we had to monitor, and live with.

*Q: You personally were deeply interested in what you liked to call the one-China policy?*

OSBORN: Well, as far back as 1965 -- while in the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs -- it had occurred to me that the United States really should get off the dime on China policy, and start moving to work out a fundamental solution to the problems in our relationship. The only way to do that, I felt, was to find a way to set aside the Taiwan question.

So in 1965 I had tried to circulate a memo within the Department, urging that we declare a one-China policy; that is to say, we satisfy the Chinese Communists by accepting the fact that Taiwan is inalienable part of China, while simultaneously making it clear that we did not look with favor, and would not tolerate, a military resolution of the problem, on Chinese Communist terms. This I felt would probably be a minimum provision to satisfy the Nationalist Chinese, and their supporters. So I had been trying to promote this solution off and on, since that time.

In Tokyo, I also circulated memoranda, drafted "Mr. X" type articles, and talked to visiting Congressmen and others about this issue. But the fear of the Chinese Communist bugaboo was a very large part of the context of the Vietnam War, so nobody was willing to confront the Taiwan question, with the necessary determination, during that time. They were preoccupied with other matters.

At any rate, I had not lost my interest in the Taiwan question; certainly not.

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*Q: And then you were finally chosen to be consul general in Hong Kong? You went there in 1970?*

OSBORN: This was a delayed fulfillment of personnel planning which had been underway before. Ed Martin had moved on from Hong Kong, to be ambassador in Burma; and I was sent out to take Ed Martin's place.

Also, certainly one of the reasons why I was interested in the Hong Kong assignment, was the fact that Hong Kong was considered a post of China watchers. I was sent to Hong Kong to be a China-watcher watcher. I spent a lot of my time agonizing over the Chinese representation issue, and over the issues of our relationships with China.

This was the period of the cultural revolution, which at one point made it seem as though the Chinese Communists were about to take over control of Hong Kong militarily. So it was a rather

tense period.

*Q: You were there, of course, for almost four years. It seems to me, I remember some very important visits?*

OSBORN: Well, as I say, the pressures for a solution of the China problem had been building up, and building up. And finally, something had to be done about our relationship with China. President Nixon saw that, and of course, Secretary Kissinger saw that. This was the period during which Secretary Kissinger peeled off from a world tour, and went up to Peking; and held the initial consultations looking toward President Nixon's visit and the normalization of relations.

*Q: You had been sent, of course, to Hong Kong to relieve Ed Martin when he was named ambassador to Rangoon. Did the same procedure happen to you?*

OSBORN: Yes, in a way it did; I was sent to Rangoon in 1974, to relieve Ed Martin. For a brief period of time, it's my understanding that I was considered by Secretary Kissinger to be one of his staff aides; that is to say, to be the head of INR, in the Department of State. In October 1973, I was called back to meet with Secretary Kissinger in his office, as I was told, to see whether I would be given that assignment.

As far as I, personally, was concerned, I tried to make it clear -- and I think I succeeded -- that I would prefer assignment as ambassador to Rangoon, rather than having a Department assignment, at that time. Like most Foreign Service officers, I was conditioned to prefer overseas assignments. At any rate, that's what happened.

**LINDSEY GRANT  
Consular Officer  
Hong Kong (1950-1952)**

**Economic Officer  
Hong Kong (1955-1958)**

**Economic Officer  
Taipei, Taiwan (1958-1961)**

**Asian Communist Affairs  
Washington, DC (1961-1965)**

*Lindsey Grant was born in North Carolina in 1926. He joined the Foreign Service in 1950 and served in Hong Kong, Taipei, India, and Cyprus. He was interviewed in 1990 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

GRANT: I was in the Navy briefly at the end of World War II, and joined the Foreign Service, took the exams in '48. I came in -- you had to wait those days -- in 1949. I had been at Cornell

for my undergraduate degree, specializing in history, specifically Chinese history.

*Q: What had attracted you towards a career in foreign affairs?*

GRANT: I was particularly interested in China, and this seemed a good way of working on China.

*Q: Had you had any China experience in the Navy at all?*

GRANT: No, my experience was in destroyer gunfire control in the Navy.

*Q: You didn't shoot at anything around China?*

GRANT: No. And there's very little application for that specialty in peacetime. [Laughter]

*Q: You entered the Foreign Service in 1949. What was the situation at that point, as far as training to be a Foreign Service officer?*

GRANT: I guess the best comment on that is that I had already picked up some Chinese before I joined, while I was at Cornell. I had to come in as a staff officer because of the wait to be an FSO, and I served in Washington on the Board of Examiners, as a matter of fact. Then when I went to Hong Kong, I had to pay for my own lessons, because they didn't have any money to pay for Chinese lessons, even as desperately as they needed Chinese speakers.

*Q: You went to Hong Kong in 1950.*

GRANT: March of 1950.

*Q: You were there until 1952.*

GRANT: I was there until 1952, went to Singapore, came back, and was there from 1955 to 1958, and in Taipei from 1958 to '61. All that period I was working on China.

*Q: What were you doing in Hong Kong?*

GRANT: I started out, actually, as a consular, as a staff officer, then got into political. I did economic reporting the second tour.

*Q: How did you view China? If you were looking at the situation in China in 1950, this was the time of great turmoil and all. From the Hong Kong vantage point, how did we see the situation?*

GRANT: Do you want me to talk about how we felt then, or how I see that period now?

*Q: The main thing is I want to know how you felt at the time. Not what happened, but how you felt at the time.*

GRANT: How I felt probably is somewhat irrelevant. I was very junior, just came out.

*Q: What were you picking up?*

GRANT: I came out, remember, of the environment of American universities in the 1940s. So I assumed that the communists -- I don't think I was under any misapprehension as to whether they were communists or not -- but I assumed that they were the wave of the future, and that's what most people did. I didn't have much respect for the Kuomintang when I got to Hong Kong. I slowly educated myself about both.

*Q: How did this education take place? What were you absorbing and where were you absorbing this information?*

GRANT: I was dealing with the Americans coming out mostly during that first tour, after I got into political, doing reporting on what they knew about the situation on the mainland. Also, incidentally, trying to figure out on behalf of the consular people who was still left up there. So my primary source of information was the departing Americans in that first tour, plus other nationalities that wanted to talk, and some Chinese who were knowledgeable and willing to talk to Americans. That was basically our source of information.

*Q: What was the picture that was emerging for you there? We're talking about the education of a young officer seeing the situation, looking at the communist side and how you felt about them and how this perception changed.*

GRANT: The situation we were in, in Hong Kong, was pretty dicey from a number of standpoints. One, you had this great unknown beast on the mainland that might or might not want to do what it talked about. That is, forcibly communize the world as fast as it could. You had, in the United States back in 1950, the beginnings of the 1952 election, in which the Republicans were running in part on the charge that the Democrats were soft on communism, had lost China to the communists. This assumes, of course, we ever had it. You had [Joseph] McCarthy, Senator McCarthy, the first McCarthy, accusing the State Department of being full of communists. I discovered recently that a lot of young folks don't know that there was one before Eugene.

*Q: You think of Eugene, who was completely the other side of the spectrum.*

GRANT: Yes. We were listening to missionaries and other Americans, White Russians, foreigners, generally, who were coming out of the mainland, leaking out. We had tried to get the Americans to depart long before the communists took over, but a number of them insisted on staying there. Our information was coming largely from these people, who were now being chased out of China by these so-called work teams, teams of young fanatics that the communists were sending in to consolidate their control of the countryside. China, remember, is 80% rural. They were getting rid of everybody that represented an alternative source of authority, including the old landlords, any natural alternative leadership. The technique was to mobilize the most radical poor peasants, to radicalize them, and to get them to accuse these people at huge accusation meetings.

One of the sources of authority, obviously, in a rural Chinese scene might very well be the missionaries. So they were setting them up, charging them with all manner of things, organizing the peasants to go by, and show themselves sufficiently pro-communist by spitting on the poor missionaries and so on. It was a rough experience, and they were coming out very shaken. But we were beginning to learn both of the roughness of the regime and also to recognize how totally they were extirpating any source of challenge.

The result was that those of us reporting -- I can remember feeling this very acutely -- figured it was our obligation to tell Washington that what we were seeing was a regime that was establishing itself very effectively in power, even though it was not a very attractive one in many ways. At the same time, you wondered whether your dispatch might suddenly turn up on the Senate floor being quoted or misquoted, quoted out of context by Senator [Joseph] McCarthy. Although I don't think any of us trimmed -- I certainly don't remember any trimming -- we wrote our dispatches with great care, and what we were saying was: "We feel this crowd is very rough - - I think I overestimated the degree to which they were communist, and underestimated that they were also Chinese -- but they are going to stay there."

*Q: This is something that I think one should understand. I don't want to put words in your mouth, but our general thinking at the time was that there was such a thing as "a communist," almost all communists were alike and they were a menace, rather than thinking in terms of nationalities and then communism.*

GRANT: This was certainly true, and this was, in a sense, the thing that legitimized the extreme anti-communist positions in the United States. They really did talk as though they wanted to take over the world. They had all that rhetoric -- I could quote it chapter and verse -- saying that they were going to get rid of us. This does encourage an adversarial relationship. Even after I should have recognized it -- it was much later -- it must have been about 1959 or '60 that I finally said to myself, "These guys, the Russians and the Chinese, really hate each other." And yet the schism really came when Mao went to Moscow -- it must have been 1956 -- '55, even -- and said to Khrushchev, "We can't afford your liberalization. We've got to keep the whip, got to keep discipline." And Khrushchev went ahead and did it his way.

I think that this triggered the schism, but in a sense, aside from a deep sense of cultural antipathy, the Chinese looked down on the Russians, as they looked down on other people, and felt themselves the civilized people on earth. At the same time, the Russians had the techniques and the Chinese had to use them. Even their economic organizational techniques were very much in the Russian mode.

It was only when that schism became evident, even to the slowest reader, that there was any real chance of American policy moving. This was long before that.

*Q: You were mentioning that you were getting some glimmers of statistics and all coming out of Hong Kong. Could you talk a little about how you saw the reporting? Before the tape recorder was turned off, you mentioned cotton production.*

GRANT: That was, actually, in the mid-1950s when I went back to Hong Kong from Singapore, 1955 to '58.

*Q: As an economic officer.*

GRANT: That's right. The first tour, there were really no data on China. The Chinese communists themselves had, I think, only the crudest of data. Later on, we learned that in spades. We didn't know how little they knew at the time. When I went back and was doing economic reporting, I guess the two things that one quickly learned is that the Chinese use statistics for political purposes. They admit it. They say, "Statistics must serve politics." They have a propaganda output that says, "We're doing this, this, and this," which you do well to take very much askance.

Things were, however, beginning to change by the mid-1950s, the Chinese -- I think it was December of 1955 -- put out the first tiny, slim volume of economic statistics. I remember it. It was like stout Cortez spying the Pacific, when all of a sudden this little book came into the office, right after Christmas, in Chinese.

I put all hands to work translating it and getting it to Washington. We began to get some data. We were also getting enough Chinese materials, like provincial newspapers for domestic consumption, not the propaganda stuff, which would give you an idea as to what the rations were in the market towns for pork, cotton, things like that. From this we began to construct some idea as to how the Chinese were doing. They were doing better than our official estimates admitted.

We had, I think, been too much misled by hope and by some old anti-communist reporting people, including our Chinese locals, who hated the communists, into thinking that the Chinese were doing much worse than we finally concluded. I remember this cotton report to which you refer, in which I finally put a covering memorandum on his long annual cotton report, and said, "Feng, the employee, is a loyal and capable fellow. I don't take him on lightly, but I really believe that the Chinese are producing a lot more cotton than his estimates show -- out of which you get the point that they may not be quite as cold and bare as his data would suggest." That was about 1956.

But the other thing we were also beginning to learn was that the official data did not necessarily mean what they claimed. Just after I left in 1958, the great leap forward started. I got back to Washington and found a lot of people believing their claims. I remember saying at the time -- I was horrified -- "They can't do it that way -- that simplistic effort to mobilize labor -- these people are putting out these data because they're trying to create a bandwagon." They claimed that they doubled wheat production in a year and things like that. I think we understood this in Hong Kong earlier than a lot of people in Washington did.

*Q: You went to Taipei and you were there from 1958 to 1961. Our ambassador was Everett Drumright. Would you explain how he operated and looked at the situation?*

GRANT: Everett Drumright was the most conservative of the pre-war crop of China specialists. As a result, [he was] about the only one who did not get rusticated in the McCarthyite

movement. All of our bright shining young lights were forced out of the Service or forced like John Patton Davies off to irrelevant assignments. "Drum" was very much pro-Kuomintang, and I think he really hoped and perhaps believed that the Kuomintang was going to be able to go back.

For myself, I was doing economic reporting then and I was tremendously impressed, as I think anybody should be who looks at the performance, as to what they (the Chinese Nationalists) were doing even then.

You asked the question before as to how Chiang Kai-shek, with his dismal record on the mainland, did so well in Taiwan. I think the fact is that Chiang Kai-shek was a lot more astute than people thought. He was inarticulate in any language, including Chinese, but he did know that he had to make Taiwan work.

The Chinese Government had basically been frozen into immobilism during the anti-Japanese war, while they were up in Chungking. They couldn't move because powerful interests, including his in-laws, H.H. Kung, T.V. Soong, were skimming the economy of Free China and were not about ready to be interested in revolutionary movements to motivate people. They didn't come to Taiwan. He came on his own, by the way. We had really basically pretty clearly written him off in early 1950, and it was only the Korean War that turned that around. He arrived from the mainland on Taiwan. He had a free hand, and he knew it had to work, and he appointed some brilliant guys. Chiang Monlin, the head of the JCRP, (the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction), was really one of the great men I've ever dealt with, and Chiang Monlin earned the faith of the Taiwan peasant. They carried out a land reform, a very effective one. They did all the things that are needed to make land reform work, setting up marketing cooperatives, credit cooperatives, seed purchasing organizations. In other words, really mobilizing the farm sector. That was a tremendous advantage for Chiang Kai-shek. The Taiwanese anti-Kuomintang movement, the people who were trying to get the Kuomintang out of Taiwan, had very little support in the countryside because of Chiang Monlin.

They had a brilliant financial man, and I was trying to think of his name. Lord, I've forgotten it.

*Q: You can fill that in.*

GRANT: Yes. K.Y. Yin. He was the one who forced an honest system of foreign exchange control on Taiwan. He dismantled the preferential rates that encouraged those who could get their hands on money to get it out. He made it very difficult to move money out of Taiwan. He managed to force Taiwan's capital to stay right where it was, and he priced the Taiwan NTU (new Taiwan dollar) at a level that made Taiwan competitive economically. That's when their export drive began, based at first on processed agricultural goods.

I remember they learned about mushrooms, and their exports of mushrooms to the United States went from something like a couple of hundred thousand in one year, let's say 1957. They saw what they could do. They went up to about \$6 million the next year. The next year it was heading for glory. Kennett Square -- the mushroom town in Pennsylvania -- was beginning to scream to their congressmen. I remember going to the Chinese and saying, "Listen, cool it. Move out. Diversify so you won't generate these resistances." But those two things, I think, the agricultural

policy and the financial policy coupled together, and Chiang Kai-shek made sure -- he had some Neanderthal generals who would like to skim the system, a very popular custom among Chinese generals -- and he kept them in check. I think that that combination, along with a very educable and hard-working people, is what started what we see now. Now I believe Taiwan has the third largest gold holdings in the world.

*Q: How did you see the American policy towards the problem of the two Chinas during the time you were there?*

GRANT: I was in economic section and a bystander, but I think that the really critical turn was 1958, the straits crisis, created Chinese communists initiation of heavy bombardment of the offshore island by Quemoy, which, as you remember, is within short artillery range of Amoy Harbor. The Chinese communists, I think, saw this as a technique. If they could humiliate the Nationalists, they might begin to create enough political instability in Taiwan to get the Kuomintang to fall or at least become more amenable to some role for them in Taiwan.

I think that several things became very clear. I don't know how long it took me to learn them. I think it took me a year or two before I absorbed them. But one of them was rather amusing. The Nationalists had been taking Americans on tours of Quemoy and saying, "This is impregnable. We could last forever." As soon as the shelling started, they said, "We have just so many weeks left of shells and supplies. If you don't get in there and help us, it will go down. It will be terrible." This was a lesson, but I don't think that the administration of Eisenhower and Dulles was particularly anxious to lose Taiwan, having said what they had about the Democrats.

Several things happened. First off, we began to put pressure on the Nationalists to force them to do as much of their own supply as they could, but we did start moving to give them enough protection so they could save the island. When the communists saw the U.S. coming into this close proximity, I think memories of Korea were very clear on both their side and ours, and neither one of us wanted it repeated. They lifted the bombardment, without admitting it, away from the beaches so that we could get the supplies in, so that a crisis was not precipitated.

Meanwhile, we had finally to face the anomalies of our own position. By the way, on the politics of this, I would definitely refer you to others who I'm sure you've been interviewing. But the upshot was that Dulles had to say publicly what had always been privately clear, and that was we did not commit ourselves to the Chinese Nationalists retaking the mainland, nor even to them forever. In some very tough arm-twisting, before he left the island, he forced the Generalissimo to sign a joint statement saying that the Kuomintang would rely primarily on political means to recover the mainland. In other words, "Don't rock the boat." I think this was very important, because then it finally got us off this rollback syndrome. We couldn't talk rollback after that, after that and Eastern Europe in 1956.

*Q: You're speaking of the Hungarian revolution.*

GRANT: Precisely.

*Q: In which we did not intervene, although there had been a lot of rhetoric about rolling back*

*communism.*

GRANT: Precisely. So in a way, both we and the Chinese communists had to learn to live publicly with the realities of the situation. That was a lesson that at least I derived from it.

You asked me whether this was generally the "school answer" in the embassy, and I would say no. I don't remember anybody drawing that publicly. Certainly with Everett Drumright, he was not about ready to make that leap, I think, personally.

*Q: In your contacts with Chinese economic people, did you sense any feeling of, you might almost say, relief, now that they could get on with going about business and not take the great leap into the unknown?*

GRANT: There were a lot of people in Taiwan who were delighted with that communiqué. One thing happened within weeks. We began to notice people started fixing up their residences. They obviously had read it and they said, "Uncle Sam ain't gonna put us back there. We are not going to be able to get back on our own. We're going to be here." I think that movement was just palpable. It went right through the community. Sure, my economics-oriented friends laughed about it. They said, "That takes care of the diversion. Now we can get on with it." I think that even for the hardest bitten return-to-the-mainland types, they learned it and they began to recognize that they'd better make their peace with Taiwan.

*Q: What about the effect, as you saw it as an economic officer, both economic and political effect, of this very large-standing military force on Taiwan? Was this tolerated or was this a problem?*

GRANT: They were getting so old that they finally had to retire. You'd see old sergeants that looked like they were in their fifties and sixties, and some of them were. Some of them began to melt into the countryside. I remember picking one up -- way back in a little village where I'd been out walking -- and taking him back to his base. He was a funny little character. He had a wife and a family in that village and was favorably known. I'm sure as soon as he could get out, he just retired to his village. There were a lot of old soldiers. There were hundreds of thousands. The Chinese, again, approached this rather well in some respects, under Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of the Generalissimo and his successor until his recent death. Ching-kuo is a wonderful politician and nobody's fool. He realized that you had to do something with these servicemen as they grew old. They created VACRS, we called it. I forget its title now, but it was an employment system for retired servicemen. They put them to work in the mountains, for instance, building roads, logging. They settled wherever they could find some niche for them, yet kept them in a group context. It was a barracks-type existence, except those like my friend who managed to get out. In this sense, they handled it quite well. They kept the people from becoming totally a drag on the society. They kept them, on the other hand, from competing too directly. So it was an effective operation.

*Q: It sounds a little bit like the old Roman system of putting the retired legionnaires out on the borders, but having them cultivate and raise families and create loyal cadres in places where they might be needed.*

GRANT: Taiwan isn't Romania. It wasn't 2,000 years ago. There wasn't that much space. There wasn't much to cultivate. But they did, actually, a little bit of special cultivation in the mountains. They created a mushroom farm. I told you about that. They did find ways of keeping them together and they did have that by-product. They had a loyal cadre that they could still turn back to if they needed. It probably minimized the cost. Sure, to carry several hundred thousand soldiers on an island economy of 15 million people was very difficult. I figured it out at one time -- I've forgotten the exact conclusion I came to -- but certainly the burden of carrying that military in economic terms, was not all that different in size from the amount of aid that we gave them. There would be differences, The aid was in foreign currency -- and so on. But it was a burden that they succeeded in handling, I think, very well.

*Q: You left Taipei in 1961, the advent of Kennedy. In your reporting prior to that, which was during the Eisenhower Administration, had the concern about the McCarthyites and their later people pretty well died, as far as reporting it as you saw it?*

GRANT: Oh, yes. As I say, after Quemoy, the Republicans felt enough tarred so this was no longer an issue. What had been becoming very clear, there were misconceptions on both sides, misconceptions as to what China was, misconceptions about our own policies. As for China, despite the rhetoric, they were pretty cautious. The longer I watched them, the more I was aware of this Chineseness. They feel themselves the center of the earth. "Chung Kuo" means "the central kingdom." They expect respect from others. They thought they should be playing a big role, even when they had no money to give away. They spent, I think, a billion dollars U.S. equivalent on the Tanzania-Zambia railway, which was strictly a prestige project. In other words, they were pulled by this image. But there were other things that even the slow reader could read. Take the Portuguese colonies of Macau on the China coast and Goa on the Indian coast. The Indians, whom we always think of as being a major democracy and so on, simply walked in and took Goa. The Chinese did not take Macau, and even kept the overzealous local communists from doing so, partly because they didn't want to rock the boat for Hong Kong. And they didn't want to rock the boat for Hong Kong because they were earning money through Hong Kong.

So there was a very strong strain of practicality, which I began to recognize once we saw the schism with the Soviet Union, and realized it was there, and once we recognized -- as a bureaucracy -- that the Great Leap Forward had not been a leap at all, it had been a disaster, and that the Chinese had a long way to go.

This was all coming together about the time that the Kennedy Administration came in. This was also the time when I first really became involved in policy. I was simply a junior officer out reporting. I got back in 1961 at the end of the year. We created first the mainland China desk, at the division level. Then within eight months, Joe Yager had come back from Taiwan and was running this area. We carved off the mainland China desk and made it the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, thereby giving it office-level status and beginning to admit that the Chinese communists existed. That created a place for a focus. This was all happening right then under the new Kennedy Administration. There was a feeling in the air that Kennedy would like to do something about China, but they hadn't really focused on it, so it was a wonderful time, in a way, the sense that people wanted something done, but didn't know quite what they wanted.

There were a number of things we began to do then. One of them was to put to rest this McCarthy thing you're talking about, about losing China. There was still a so-called Committee of One Million, which was a non-governmental organization, proclaimed itself a million strong - I thought it probably was lucky if it had a few thousand -- which was diehard pro-Kuomintang. You had people like Senator Knowland from California, who was sometimes called "the senator from Taiwan." There were a lot of redoubtable people who managed to sort of freeze this situation. One of the things that I focused on early on was: how do we break this myth? It seemed to me that if you could challenge the Committee of One Million and the extreme pro-Kuomintang people, directly, and they couldn't mount much of a counterattack, that you'd clear the way towards a more realistic policy towards China. The instrument came along. A fellow named Jim Thomson, who has been up at Harvard for years, was an assistant to the Assistant Secretary for the Far East, we called it then, Roger Hilsman. Jim and I and several others saw it very much in the same light. Jim saw an opportunity in a speech coming up in San Francisco to make the challenge, to throw down the glove, if you will.

*Q: San Francisco is a good place to do it.*

GRANT: That's right. This was the Commonwealth Club of San Francisco, a good, respectable forum. He told me about it. There had already been a speech prepared, a standard 1950s-type rhetoric speech. We agreed, "Let's deep-six this and see if we can now say something about China." The Hilsman speech was December 1963, and it sounds real timid now. What that speech did was to say, "We don't love the Chinese communists. We think that they would be happier, and the world would be happier, if they had a more relaxed view of other people's rights to select their own government. But we think these people are going to be around and we're going to be dealing with them."

Now, there wasn't anything really new. Right from 1954, we'd been having ambassadorial-level talks with China. They started at that meeting in Geneva where Dulles refused to shake hands with Zhou En-lai, which has become a part of history. Sure, that was Dulles all over, this dramatic public position, but allowing the opening of ambassadorial-level talks. So we weren't saying anything very new, but we said it publicly. "These guys are going to be around. We plan to deal with them." In a sense, we challenged the conservative lobbies to do something about it, and they couldn't raise a whimper.

There was a pretty good press-alerting campaign under way. A fellow named Alan Whiting -- who was actually in the Research Bureau and shouldn't have been in press contacts at all, but he was quite a wheeler-dealer -- got the press alerted to this, so the press was ready and waiting. We got a tremendous reaction. If you're interested in how decisions are made, by the way, it's rather amusing. We cleared that speech with Governor Harriman, the number three officer in State, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, cleared it actually with his special assistant, who didn't spot what was so important in it, and said, "Sure, that looks innocuous enough." We never cleared it anywhere else.

*Q: I think this is very important, because this is just what we're trying to bring out. In other words, this was something that was generated relatively low down within the bureaucracy, but*

*the idea was using almost boilerplate-type language, but changing the emphasis and all, things we had been saying.*

GRANT: That's right, to admit that they're going to be around and we're going to deal with them publicly, and just put it out.

*Q: But then the idea, I take it, this was not just to say this, but this was also to get the press and say, "Look at it, fellows. Look at this speech closely. It means this."*

GRANT: Right. Yes. Actually, one of my current pursuits has been decision-making in government, or foresight. I use this as an example. I speak of a couple of greased pigs with an idea. The government is full of greased pigs. If the listener to this tape thinks that government decisions are made in organized or rational ways, this is a good lesson.

We started it. He immediately, of course, told Hilsman what we were working on.

*Q: In other words, he told Hilsman, "Look, this is real policy, although it may not seem like it"?*

GRANT: Hilsman understood it. There was no problem there. We told Hilsman, "We're going to do a speech for you that's going to open it up."

Hilsman said, "Fine. Go ahead and work up the draft." He had his special assistant, Joe Neubert, take a look at it, had us keep him informed. But aside from that one clearance, as I say, we didn't go over to the White House and say, "We're about to really unload one on China." If we had, everybody would have probably wanted to get in the act.

What we did do was to create something that flew, and the Committee for One Million was barely heard from. There wasn't a whimper. Nobody complained. Everybody said, "Finally, the United States is getting its act in order."

It was right in line with what the Kennedy Administration liked, I mean Kennedy and his Irish mafia. This was forward looking, this was new. It was their kind of thing. They were quite happy with it, and we never heard any complaint from the White House of not having checked it out with them.

Anyway, that was the way we were trying to move it. We were trying to bring public policy into line with our recognition of the diplomatic realities.

*Q: How did this fly? What reflections were you getting after all this of preparing the American public and all? What response was coming from the other side, from the Chinese?*

GRANT: By the way, one of the things I was doing, I was out on the lecture circuit, talking wherever I could to TV, radio programs, to national organizations, meetings, and so on, to try to explain what we're about and getting good vibes from them. So there was quite a little operation going.

What we were also trying to do with the Chinese communists was to adjust the tone of our Warsaw talks a bit. We got very little response, to answer your question directly, but I'll expand on that a bit. I had, as were a lot of us young people at that time, been deeply impressed by [George] Kennan's containment policy for the Soviet Union. That was, I think, 1949. It was a very impressionable time for me. I remember believing, even from day one when I was in Hong Kong, that in a real world, the only way to deal with a threat like the Chinese communists is just that, to make foreign adventure -- real foreign adventure against our interests -- expensive and dangerous, but to make an evolution towards a less unfriendly condition promising -- to offer them that possibility.

We ran the preparation of the Warsaw talks from our office. David Dean, by the way, is back in town and could talk to this, because he was the one who actually did the drafting. It was the devil's own time to keep on finding things to talk about every month or two. I forget how often we met. But what we did was constantly pick up little themes. Like there was an epidemic in China. We had an embargo, of course, on trade with China. We said to them, "We are going to lift the embargo so that drugs can be shipped if you'll need them or are interested in having them." We had, of course, an embargo on travel with China. We got this lifted so journalists, if they could get in, could go. We were trying to find as many small ways as we could, just suggesting, "Sure, there's room here for dialogue."

The Chinese communists' standard reply -- and it was said in a thousand ways, a thousand times -- was, "There can be no progress on secondary issues until the primary issue, your occupation of our Taiwan, is resolved." But I remember writing to Marshall Green when he came in as Deputy Assistant Secretary -- my immediate boss -- that, "Unless we do this, we're in the worst of both possible worlds. We're scotching the snake, but not killing it, as Shakespeare said. We're avowedly hostile, but not willing to do anything about Chinese communist control of China. This will simply mean a hostile and not necessarily weak China. So we have got to move towards an explicit containment type of dialogue."

This was the language we were playing during 1962, '63, '64, until, unfortunately, the Vietnam problem came to intervene and you simply could not move very far on China, with us on opposite sides of the Vietnam issue.

*Q: During this time, what was happening in China and how did we see developments within China? We're talking about 1961 to 1964.*

GRANT: Basically 1961-1965, something like that. We were very slow to pick up the changes. In 1961, when I first got back, China had just been through the complete collapse of the Great Leap Forward. As we know now, millions of Chinese died. I think the total population even plummeted. The birth rate just slid down to nowhere, and this is all in more recent data. We didn't appreciate any of that. Again, I think that the field probably had a better sense of China than Washington. I, of course, had been working strictly on Taiwan for three years, but was in regular touch with our Hong Kong people. There was a lot of coming and going. Also with Chinese scholars. I was not nearly on target as to how bad things were, but I discovered that CIA was directing a national intelligence estimate which showed Chinese GNP still rising in 1960. I said, "This is absurd!"

So I think that there was a differential between the field and Washington, at least in my case. There wasn't the beginnings of a real understanding as to what was happening as we now know it from documents that have come out in the turbulence of recent decades. But it was very clear that a counterattack had been launched by the economic rationalists, if you will, and we were beginning by this time to recognize that it was by no means a monolith. There were these divisions. You could see Zhou En-lai coming back into prominence, and some of the other more conservative leaders. They went back and resurrected the vilified birth control efforts. They shifted their focus. I think their first one was on light industry and industry serving agriculture. There were several formally during the period, and I've now forgotten which ones came in what order.

But basically, this was a recognition that massive capital-intensive investment was eating up the resources, and they needed to get less capital-intensive solutions out faster. That was, I think, by everybody's standard, the reason. And it was true that during the early and mid-1960s, there was a quite rational discussion within China, and you could see this in their output, their regular international reports and reports of their meetings and so on, that they were trying in pragmatic terms to deal with their problems -- leaving, of course, the ideologues and the old ideologue Mao Zedong more and more frustrated with this descent of the revolution into the practical.

Again, we very seldom predict -- I think now or then -- what the Chinese are going to do. All the expert can do is get there faster with an explanation as to what just happened. It was a period of retrenchment and sanity, and we recognized it as such, and we spotted the cultural revolution for the insanity it was, much faster than we had the Great Leap Forward.

*Q: Why is it that we have trouble understanding what's happening in China? Were there discrepancies coming, say, from our reporting, from covert sources and the ones we were getting from the Central Intelligence Agency? Did they have a different line than we had? Was this a problem?*

GRANT: In that particular instance, that national intelligence estimate, the more optimistic view was coming out of the Langley bureaucracy.

*Q: Langley being where CIA has its headquarters.*

GRANT: In the field, I'm not so sure that there was that much of a divergence. I think that it would depend on the individual. I think we tended to be in communication and probably think very much the same way.

As to why we don't guess right, it's just an opaque society. I remember going to Cyprus after I had worked on China for years, and just being astonished. Or India. India was much more open. You could tell what was brewing. These people managed to keep it so close that we really didn't know.

Now, I've been annoying my old China-watcher friends since I've been out of the business, by saying, "We never guess right." This offends them. In fact, we did guess right on their external

behavior, which has been much more consistent through all these periods than their internal. We recognized belatedly, as I mentioned -- certainly knew it by the early 1960s -- that the Chinese were going to be rather cautious in their foreign policy. We did guess right, certainly our office did -- Asian Communist Affairs -- and I did personally, when the dispute flared up with India in 1963, (I guess that was) the Indians having belatedly discovered that the Chinese were in a part of Ladakh that they thought was theirs.

*Q: This is up in the Himalayas.*

GRANT: That's right. It's the western tip of Tibet and the eastern edge of Kashmir. The Indians claimed it, but they hadn't been there enough even to realize that the Chinese were there and building a road through it. Then they tried to push the Chinese out. The Chinese were not to be pushed, and retaliated by the attack in NEFA, the northeast frontier territories of India just to the east of Bhutan. I can remember in that instance we said to ourselves, "The way the Chinese have been behaving, they have no advantage in getting too far into NEFA, certainly not in getting onto the Indian plain."

This was November, as I recall. The winter was coming on. Their supply lines were extremely extended. All they were trying to do was to warn the Indians, "If you won't make a deal that accommodates our interests in the west, we can cause you trouble in the east, where you're very vulnerable."

I remember saying, "They'll probably pull out. They don't want to spend the winter in that forward position. They don't want to get dug into it." That was a very wise move on their part. In Quemoy, they had seen the difficulty of how you back off an embarrassing situation if you can't stay there. So they just simply turned around and walked away. In that sense, we did make a prediction.

Also, the fact that they did not move overtly in Vietnam. Over this there was a tremendous debate. I was very much a dove on Vietnam, but not because of China. It was because I didn't think we could win. I had to take the responsibility for North Vietnam when we created the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, and North Vietnam, North Korea, and Outer Mongolia became part of my watching area. I then began to inquire about what we knew about the table of organization, the basic facts of life in Hanoi, and discovered we knew nothing. I thought this was catastrophic, and I was convinced by other friends that, in fact, we were in a very bad situation.

But I did not think that the Chinese were going to come in overtly. As a matter of fact, there was a very good intelligence estimate, or war game. It had a Greek letter -- I think it was Omega -- run out of the Pentagon, but with State, CIA, a lot of other participation. They played the game through sometime in the mid-1960s, and the way they played it, the Russians and Chinese kept putting in enough to counter our efforts, but just enough, and not moving beyond that, and we kept bogging down. If we had paid attention to that war game, we'd have gotten a very good steer as to how we should have behaved in Vietnam. It would have saved us a lot of heartache later on, because that's exactly what they did. So on external policy, I think we did better.

*Q: Just to get an idea on policy. The Chinese were giving the Indians a bloody nose. You in your*

*office were saying, "This looks like that's just what it is. This is not something that's going on." There has been the perception for years in the United States (or was in this period) that we're talking about a force that would go anywhere at any time and take anything. We were talking about communism. Were you having problems selling the idea of a limited punitive engagement in India to others within the State Department or the government?*

GRANT: Carol Laise was my counterpart at the time. She was running the Office of Indian Affairs, whatever they called it. As I remember, she bought this as very possible. I don't remember an argument. For another thing, the Chinese did what we said they were going to do within a matter of ten days or so, so the issue was resolved.

*Q: That's one nice thing about policy: it takes so long. [Laughter]*

GRANT: What we had there was rather interesting. Galbraith, who was ambassador in India at the time, this is about the only time I'm aware of that he actually used his old White House connection effectively at all, but he was just dying to come down on the Indian side of this whole argument. He managed to force through a U.S. Government position endorsing the Indian view of the border, whereas our view -- and I think the India desk rather shared it -- was that this was none of our business, that we should have left that whole question of borders for much longer resolution between them. So in that sense, even though Galbraith was associated with Kennedy and with this whole new school, his instinctive view -- I guess it was probably "localitis" -- he simply wanted to take the Indians' position. He wasn't about ready to give a nickel to the Chinese.

*Q: We had a secret agreement with the Indians that we would supply air support if the Chinese came barreling on. This came after the fact. Do you recall that?*

GRANT: I don't, and I should have been aware of it. If I've forgotten it, that's rather odd, because that would be very important. See, in 1965 I went to India. I swapped jobs with Jake Jacobson. He came back to my job in Asian Communist Affairs.

*Q: The reason I say that, this Monday, just two days ago, I had the first of what will be several interviews with Nick Veliotos, and he mentions this, this secret treaty which nobody seems to know about, when the Indians were saying, "We might want to take you up on this, because the Chinese are making noises." He referred to it and said we had this.*

GRANT: I'll be seeing Nick again shortly. I'll ask about that, because I certainly don't recall there being anything, certainly nothing like a treaty.

*Q: Maybe it was an agreement.*

GRANT: I'm not even aware of an agreement. There may have been some sort of message at a very high level of classification that I was simply never briefed on when I got there. That is conceivable. The U.S. did some contingency planning, but I'm not aware we ever told the Indians. Maybe Galbraith just took it on himself to tell them. Nick was in Delhi.

*Q: You might talk to him, because he brought this up.*

GRANT: I am unaware of it. There were a bunch of things going on at that time, in which we had one sort or another of dealing with the Indians, but a lot of that is, I think, still classified. It's conceivable that this was some sort of exchange in this area. But I was aware of so much of it that I am surprised if there was anything really said.

*Q: You might mention it to him. Again, looking at the Chinese external relations, a very important thing was, of course, the relations with the Soviet Union. How were we seeing it at the time?*

GRANT: How were we seeing the Chinese relations?

*Q: With the Soviet Union.*

GRANT: I have never had any reason to question that once we recognized the schism, we read it fairly close to the facts. Generally they behaved toward the Soviets about the way we expected. For instance, in the troublesome Xinjiang problems and little border problems along the Amur River, the Chinese behaved towards the Russians about like we expected, which is to say, quite hostile. They weren't about ready to do anything with the Russians to resolve these little issues. The Russians were actually the ones who were probing periodically to see whether they could soften the confrontation one way or another. The Chinese kept saying, "Get your troops away from our border and maybe we can talk."

*Q: How did this schism manifest itself and first come across your radar, you might say? You were in various jobs, but dealing with China. At one point, we felt that this was an indivisible bond, that communists were communists, and they were both together. Yet you're saying we hadn't realized how Chinese the Chinese Communists were. How did this show itself? When did you first see the reflections of the schism?*

GRANT: I forget whether it was in the part of the tape that we lost that we touched on this before.

*Q: I don't think we have.*

GRANT: Okay. Yes, that's a central issue, because as long as the Chinese and the Soviets seemed to be part of a monolithic communist movement that was out -- as it regularly said it was -- to replace capitalism and us, anybody arguing policy had a very good reason to say, "You've got to do everything you can to make life more difficult for these people, to weaken them." The Hilsman speech moved, for instance, the whole slow opening up of U.S.-China policy, became possible only once we had recognized that that was a false view of the world and that this was not a monolith.

The Chinese had very grave differences with the Russians over policy. I think that they really were terribly bitter that they paid the price to save North Korea, and the Russians were the ones who became the tutelary power because of their ability to provide more aid. But it's an ethnic and

national sense. The Chinese are very proud and do consider themselves to be the most civilized people on earth, and the Russians not. To have been, during the early 1950s, in this secondary relationship was terribly galling to them.

We can now date the schism pretty much to when Mao went to Moscow in 1955 or '56 (I forget which) and said to Khrushchev, who was embarking on liberalization, "Don't do it. It makes problems for us and we can't afford liberalization now. We've got to keep the screws on to get our problems solved, to get our economy going." And Khrushchev turned him down. That was undoubtedly the watershed out of which it all came.

We didn't perceive this -- at least I didn't -- and I don't remember even a serious statement within our government of the idea that there was a schism until -- and here I'm fuzzy. I wouldn't have been seeing a lot of this till I got back in 1961, but by the time I got back in '61 from Taiwan, I remember I was already convinced of it. I would say that it was probably in 1958 or '59 that I personally came around and said, "Yeah, this is real. I'm pretty sure it's real." And that probably was on the basis of conversations in Hong Kong or with people from Hong Kong.

*Q: Was this slow to dawn on the State Department, do you think?*

GRANT: I think that others were probably moving at somewhat the same speed. By the time that the Kennedy Administration came in -- I don't recall -- the best litmus of this would be whether you had other agencies or other people within the Department of State objecting to what we were doing in 1962 and '63, things like the instructions for the Warsaw talks, or the Hilsman speech itself after it came out, or various other policy moves.

I think that others perceived the split to be as we did: real. Consequently, they were willing to go along with it. When objections were taken to our policy proposals, it was usually for very different reasons. For instance, I was very anxious in the U.N. Chinese representation issue to see us get out of the way of what I thought was an inevitability. That was that the Chinese, despite their rhetoric, were not doing anything, really, to upset other people. I mean, after all, Burma. We've already spoken of Macau and Hong Kong. They leave them there simply out of self-interest. They learned their lesson very quickly about Taiwan. Burma, they never have given, until the present day, the Burmese Communists the kind of support they easily could have. Northern Thailand offered opportunities and they didn't exploit them. They did not move into Laos against the Vietnamese, although they were obviously looking at it, even building roads.

The fact that they weren't doing anything meant that more and more countries would leave us on the Chinese representation issue. The Third World was growing, more countries coming into existence who remembered colonialism, but didn't have anything against the Chinese, and thought of them as Third World. So I figured that we probably were not going to be able to hold our line for very long in the U.N. I thought it was anathema to adopt two Chinas, because neither the Republic of China nor the Communists would accept that; both of them would excoriate us. So I was trying to find a way to get others, in effect, to weld Republic of China into its position as best you could do it, while you let the Communists in. One of the techniques I proposed, one of the slogans, was "two contenders. We're not arguing that there are two Chinas; we're just saying that there are two people, both of whom say they're China, both of whom control some

land; we're willing to let them both in."

I had resistance to that, but not from the whole China, the Far Eastern area. I had some problem with some of the more conservative people on the Republic of China desk, but a lot of people liked that idea. It was the German desk at EUR, European Affairs, that objected because of the parallel for East Germany. So by that measure, I would say that the world had turned, that the monolith image had gone enough so that except for a few sort of diehard redoubts, there were very few people arguing the unified communist threat by the early 1960s.

**RALPH J. KATROSH**  
**U.S. Military Assistance Group**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1950-1951)**

*Ralph J. Katrosh was born in 1927 and raised in Kingston, Pennsylvania. He attended Virginia Military Institute. From there, he joined the military and became a part of the Third Army Palace Guard. It was here in Europe that he developed a desire to join the foreign service. Upon returning to the States, he entered the Foreign Service School at Georgetown University. He then went to the State Department to work with China in Taiwan. He has also served in Burma, the Philippines, Malaysia, Israel and Vietnam. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 28, 1992.*

KATROSH: That's right. While in Switzerland I was invited to a party given by the American diplomatic establishment there. I was sitting in a hotel in Interlaken with an Air Force lieutenant. We had just finished playing some bridge, and this fellow came up in a polished Ford and said, "Would you fellows like to go to a party?" "Of course." So we went. There was a beautiful buffet and a lot of glitter. I thought this wasn't a bad life, the diplomatic business.

That is not as flippant as it sounds because I always excelled in history. If I got less than a 98, I was upset. And geography. There are members of my family who were professional military who spent years roaming around Europe and China. I have always thought of these places, when a youngster, as being very romantic. That, plus the fact that I like history and geography, plus this display of rather nice living, prompted me to write a letter to my Dad saying, "Well, when I get out I think I would like to try to join the American Foreign Service." This was in August 1946.

In October 1946, the trials were over and I was getting ready to separate from the Army at the convenience of the government. I received a letter from Dad who said, "Look, friend, if you are going to do anything about a career you had better forget about this business of bouncing around Europe and get back home. I have a place for you at Georgetown and you probably could get into the February 1947 Foreign Service School class."

So I did. I came home and went to Georgetown and entered the Foreign Service School in February 1947, with every intention of joining the Foreign Service. Between 1947 and the early part of 1950, the stress, from my point of view, at the Georgetown Foreign Service School, was

economics rather than the impending conflict between Communism and the Western world.

So between 1946 and 1950, I thought Foreign Service was all right, but if I went into business abroad I could make more money and still have all the ambience anyway. In 1950 I used some of Dad's contacts and applied for a job with General Motors. They said, "Fine." However, I wanted to go to China or to some other place in the Far East. I had been to Europe and didn't really want to go back there and count stones. General Motors said, "Sorry fellow, there is going to be a war in Korea and we are not sending anyone to Asia right now, but you can go to Latin America if you want to." I said, "I don't think I want to do that." I still know nothing about Latin America.

In 1949-50, Chiang Kai-shek was being driven from the mainland. The Chinese Nationalist government was looking to the United States for some succor but we weren't really ready to make a strong commitment. If you research US domestic politics at that time, the cry of the Republican Party was "Who lost China?" Of course, the Democrats got the blame for that.

At any rate Chiang Kai-shek left the mainland and arrived in Taiwan with absolutely nothing. The United States Government didn't want to make too much of a public move towards Taiwan at that time, so it agreed with China to set up a purchasing commission in the Department of the Army. The Department of the Army would furnish the Chinese government certain people who were expert in buying and selling things the Chinese would need to establish themselves in Taiwan. US personnel also would go to Taiwan and organize the Nationalist military remnants, which were disorganized. Believe me, it was a mess.

I applied and was accepted for this job. There were about 30 of us and we packed off to Taiwan in 1950-51. The State Department had an excellent attitude for dealing with Chiang at that time. The basis of our policy was, "Look fellow, we will protect you on Taiwan, but we are going to support you only to a degree that will allow this protection to be realistic. You have got to do the rest."

Lo and behold, Chiang Kai-shek did it. The first and most important thing that he did was to institute an agricultural reform program. If he had done so on the mainland, the Chiangs would still be ruling the place. What he did was to break up the landed estates on Taiwan, gave the land to the peasants, gave the landlords money and said, "You can't buy the land back, but you can do anything you want with it in terms of industry, banking and making money. But you can't have the land back." Well, you see what Taiwan is today. I maintain that it is all because of US policy goals in 1950.

*Q: Did you have anything to do with the people who were helping doing this? We had gone through somewhat the same thing in Japan. Was this an offshoot? Was Chiang looking at Japan or we just putting an awful lot of pressure on him?*

KATROSH: This was first. This preceded Japan. Taiwan was pretty much a going concern before Japan got into its program.

We put pressure on Chiang in that "this was the only option you have Jack." That was one of his nicknames, "Jack." "There is no other option for you. This is what we are prepared to do and this

is what you must do if you are to receive US aid."

When I arrived in Taiwan there were four paved roads.

*Q: This was in what year?*

KATROSH: 1951. ...four paved roads. One in from the airport into the city, one running from the Grand Hotel through the city to the eastern side of the city. There was one taxi. The foreign journalists and top officials had some sedans. The rest of us drove either Willys panel trucks or Jeeps. There was absolutely nothing. The Chinese, though, I must say, fed us well and gave us quarters, field clothes, etc.

*Q: In the midst of this Chiang Kai-shek was apparently trying to use the Korean War, which was really very hot at this time, to his advantage. There was an offer of "give us the training, the equipment and the money and we will put so many divisions into Korea." How did you all respond to this sort of talk?*

KATROSH: Not a chance. That was strictly propaganda. Propaganda even in Chiang's eyes. His army when it came off the mainland was absolutely worthless and in 1951-53, he couldn't put together two divisions that would go anywhere. They had no uniforms, a minimum amount of ammunition, no artillery, no transport. They just had rifles, and some of the troops didn't even have that. Their navy...I think they had two or three LSTs, one of which I rode one time, and I think two DEs that sometimes sailed.

One of the things that did happen...there was just enough of the Chinese Air Force left on Taiwan and just enough of our fleet in the Formosa Straits...at that time we had a policy of physically separating the two sides...to force the Chinese Communists to keep a good number of their divisions in Fujian and Zhejiang Province. Also, the Chinese Nationalists held a number of offshore islands, many of which they still hold. On those offshore islands the Nationalists built up a guerilla force which raided the China coast and captured small Chinese Communist and other flag merchant vessels.

*Q: This is Quemoy...?*

KATROSH: Quemoy, Matsu, Wu Chen, Poichuan. There is a string of them, most of them lighthouses, but the sizeable one, of course, was Quemoy. Tachen was very small but very strategically located off the coast of Zhejiang just outside the port of Wenchou.

There was a rather effective blockade of the Fuchou and other Fujianese ports. Butterfield and Swire used to love to run blockade runners into the Formosa Straits and try to cut into Amoy or Fuchou on a dark night. The Chinese Nationalist guerrillas would bring these ships to one of the offshore islands and steal their cargo and send the ships back to Hong Kong saying, "Don't try it again."

The guerrillas on the islands would take the cargo that they stole from the steamers to Hong Kong and sell it. They then would buy provisions. They were fully self-supporting...they weren't

going to get a heck of a lot out of Taipei.

The British complained to us that the situation was getting expensive and they didn't want to confront the Chinese Nationalists or us with a military escort for these ships. They wanted us to tell the Chinese to back off. Eisenhower did and that silliness, up to a point, ceased.

But at the same time the people on the offshore islands became even more dependent on Taiwan, because most of those islands...I have been on a number of them and they are not self-sufficient, particularly if you have more than the basic population in residence. If there is a military unit or guerrillas, then you have to send additional supplies to the islands.

This went on all through the Korean War. The Taipei government, of course, when we had tens of thousands of Chinese Communist prisoners in Korea, went up there to try to entice as many of them as they could to defect. My recollection is about 12,000 of the hundreds of thousands did. But this action had no real effect on the Korean War.

The Chinese Communists tried to take Quemoy soon after Chiang left the mainland. An old Chinese general, Huien, one of the few good ones, beat them back. Quemoy is in Amoy Harbor and it is like holding Manhattan against the United States Army. The Chinese Communists didn't try to take Quemoy all through the Korean War, which surprised many of us in the area at the time.

In 1954, the first heavy Chinese Communist bombardment occurred. This was not the 1958 one when President Eisenhower sent in the troops. The public knew less about this earlier bombardment, although if you read the US foreign affairs records you will find an awful lot about it. They didn't invade, but they bombarded it quite severely. They could do that because of the location of the island.

China did retake the Ta Chens, the northernmost of the Nationalists' island chain. The Communists did that, I think, to free up any nonsense around the Shanghai approaches and Zhejiang ports.

They never bothered Matsu. It is a little bit tougher nut...it is a piece of rock sticking out of the water.

By April of 1955, Taiwan was a going concern and it was time for me to leave the "purchasing group." On reflection I thought the Foreign Service might be a nice place after all.

*Q: What was your impression of the Chinese officialdom that you dealt with?*

KATROSH: There were some brilliant exceptions, particularly the younger men educated in the United States, as well as some of the older businessmen. The military was hopeless, except for two or three generals who would fight. The military was still very corrupt, the troops had as yet no real stake in survival of the Chinese Nationalist government other than, for whatever reason, they would be shot if they defected to the Communists. Taiwan was the only refuge available to them.

I think by 1955 that began to change. The older group was moving out. Some of the younger men were taking the middle level positions. The army was beginning to induct younger people, even Taiwanese, at the enlisted level, not yet the officer level. We had a MAAG there and it was beginning to have an effect.

*Q: The military assistance group.*

KATROSH: Right. It was a very small group, I don't think more than 20 officers. They made sure that the Nationalist troops had uniforms, received pay, food and medical care. To the Chinese soldier at that point of history, this was very important, this was good living. A better living than many of the peasants.

Then we, the US, re-equipped the Chinese Air Force. Also a cadre was organized and trained for the Chinese Navy. Things began to look up for the Chinese military. So I would say from about 1955 on, they became a more reliable force. But prior to 1955 they were absolutely worthless, really.

In 1955 I came back to the United States. By that time I had married and had a son born on Taiwan. I took lateral entry into the Department of State, which was expanding because this was the build-up years for the Cold War. I stayed in the States for a little while getting trained and acquainted with Departmental discipline and procedures.

**ROBERT S. DILLON**  
**Operations with Nationalist Chinese**  
**Taiwan (1951-1954)**

*Ambassador Robert S. Dillon was born in Chicago, Illinois in 1929. He received a bachelor's degree from Duke University in 1951 and joined the State Department in 1956. In addition to serving as ambassador to Lebanon, his career included positions in Venezuela, Turkey, Malaysia, and Egypt. Ambassador Dillon was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

DILLON: My family came from the Middle West. My mother and father were both born in Coffeyville, Kansas. I was born in Chicago during a brief sojourn for the family. I came to Washington when I was three weeks old and have always lived either in Washington or in northern Virginia. I mention the Middle West because there must be some of that in me, but I really consider myself a Washingtonian. I went to a Washington high school -- Western High School, as did my wife, Sue, whom I married in 1951. It is now called Duke Ellington School. In those days Western was one of the preeminent schools in the District. I would guess that a third of the student body when I attended Western came from the Virginia suburbs. Of course, the suburbs then were not as heavily populated as they are today. In the 1940's, Washington was a city different from today in the sense that people from the suburbs came to the city to "do everything" -- shopping, entertainment or as in my case, education.

So I grew up with people whose fathers worked for the government. Among them were a surprising number of politicians and congressmen and military officers, and even a few Foreign Service Officers. My father was a lawyer in private practice. But joining the Foreign Service was almost a natural consequence of my environment; certainly it was much more natural than for many people because I grew up in a government atmosphere.

I started my college career in 1946 at Washington and Lee University in Lexington, Virginia. After my freshman year, I went into the Army for eighteen months. After discharge, I decided not to continue at W&L -- it was an all male school at the time -- and transferred to Duke University, joining my future wife, from whence I graduated in 1951. That was during the Korean War. I had planned to go to law school -- "planned" is perhaps too grand a word. In fact, I considered law school but didn't have strong feelings about what I wanted to do. Just before graduating from Duke, I came to Washington, having decided to re-enter the military service because the Korean War was on. Having served for eighteen months as an enlisted man in a rifle company, all of it in the U.S., I was going to be careful about what the military might be willing to offer. I was looking for something more interesting than my previous experience. In the course of discussing options for officers' training programs I was recruited by a U.S. government agency for a program in Taiwan that assisted Chinese Nationalist irregular forces. They were looking for civilians or for officers who could be seconded to a civilian status, so that there would be no direct connection with the American military services. I qualified because I had some military experience -- I had been a small arms instructor for the last six months of my Army tour.

We went through training and then to Taiwan. I spent the last year of the war on one of the small off-shore islands on the China coast -- Tachen. Others went to Quemoy and Matsu. My island was the most northern one near the mouth of the Hangchow Bay. We trained and advised Chinese irregulars in raiding operations along the China coast. The idea was to deflect the Chinese communist army from Korea. Half of us were civilian and half were serving military officers. There were no distinctions among the group. We all wore Chinese military uniforms; our counterparts were Chinese officers. The major I worked for -- Robert Barrow -- who later became a full General and Commandant of the Marine Corps.

In most career services, including the Foreign Service, and certainly the military services, when members of those services are detached to work for another organization, you have to be very suspicious because the best officers will not be volunteered. The exception will occur if there is a senior service officer who is personally interested in the project and wants to do his best to make it succeed. The Marines are not perfect, but they had a philosophy which I always liked. They believed that if they were going to be represented in non-Marine groups or organizations, they would put their best foot forward and make their best officers available. Barrow was a good example of this philosophy. He had been an outstanding company commander early in the war in Korea. In World War II, he had been with an organization called SACO in China, behind Japanese lines. So he was well versed in irregular warfare operations and was recognized as an outstanding officer. In general, all the people I worked with were good.

*Q: What was your impression of the nationalist irregulars?*

DILLON: Mine was a worm's eye view. We were all very young -- I was one of the youngest. I was not greatly impressed by the Nationalist officers. They were scornful and inconsiderate of their troops. The troops were brave and suffered hardships with extraordinary good nature. I always think of the Chinese soldier as a little guy walking up a steep hill with a big mortar plate on his back. His officer walked up the hill, breathing heavily, staggering under the weight of a sidearm. We were not impressed with the Nationalist officers. There were occasional good ones.

We quickly became very cynical about political statements that we would hear. We were not of course very sophisticated, but we would hear unrealistic statements about how the Chinese Nationalists were prepared to unleash these mighty forces. Many of these statements came from American Republican conservatives. General MacArthur talked about landing a couple of divisions on the mainland. My group was involved on the ground, and indeed, in combat, with irregular Chinese nationalist troops. It was our considered judgement -- coming from a bunch of men the ages of 23 to 31 (we considered the latter to be a very old man) -- that no Nationalist intervention would have any effect on mainland China, except perhaps to get us into a lot more trouble than we were in already. None of us believed that the Nationalist government really wanted to fight.

One interesting aspect of our little operation was that we spent a lot of time trying to persuade the Chinese to do battle. We also had a hard time convincing them to attack "hard" targets. They preferred "soft" targets. Once when we did succeed in convincing General Hu Sung-nan to attack a truly significant target, our troops took a terrific beating. It was disaster, primarily due to the tactical incompetence of the officers who led the attack. They landed on the wrong beach -- events like that do occur. The reconnaissance was faulty, the maps were wrong. We landed on a sandbar across the river from our target and became exposed to enemy fire without cover. The Nationalists took a lot of casualties. This confirmed to them that it was dumb to do anything the Americans suggested. It made it that much more difficult to persuade them to attack hard targets although we continued to attack soft ones. My own duties were primarily reconnaissance and intelligence gathering.

The Korean war ended in July, 1953. Stalin died in March and I remember sitting at our camp listening to that announcement on the radio. Our immediate feeling was that his death was significant even though we didn't know precisely how. The end of the war a few months later gave the Americans an opportunity to end these irregular operations. It was then that the Nationalists became very active. Indeed the largest raid conducted by the Nationalist irregulars occurred after the war in August 1953. No Americans participated directly in that operation; it was disaster despite the bravery of the troops involved. The Nationalists were afraid that peace would break out. I talk about this period of my life because it is important to remember that my generation was very much influenced by the Cold War and the Korean War. Most of the Americans I was with on the off-shore islands were veterans of World War II, some not as combat troops, but certainly as members of a military service then the Korean War came along very quickly. As a consequence, even though I have just vented some cynicism about the Chinese Nationalists, we grew up with the strong feeling that we lived in a world constantly in conflict and in a sense war seemed very natural to us. As my colleagues and I went on to other careers, we never forgot this conflict between "good" and "evil" with us being "good", and our

conviction that somehow, the "good" guys would win. It took me years to see the world through a different prism. Eventually, and I would guess that this was over twenty years ago, I came to see that the view of the world in East-West conflict terms was misleading and it was dangerous for us to see it in those terms. The United States constantly made policy mistakes, for example in Vietnam because of that mistaken view.

I had never heard of the "regionalists", but in recent years, I have been told that there were "regionalists" in contrast to the "East-West conflict" believers. I am essentially a "regionalist". Most of the problems I have been involved with over the years were essentially regional problems. One of the constants was Washington's tendency, especially at the senior political level, to see the world in east-West contest terms. It could have been Cyprus, Lebanon, Palestine, whatever. The tendency was to view each of these issues in an East-West context. Henry Kissinger was one of the preeminent policy makers who fell into this trap.

**HARVEY FELDMAN**  
**Rotation Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1954-1955)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1962-1963)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1962-1963)**

**Political-Military Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1963-1965)**

**Publications/Press Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1965-1970)**

**UN Affairs, Department of State**  
**Washington, DC (1970-1972)**

**Political Counselor**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1973-1975)**

**Office of Republic of China affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1977-1979)**

*Harvey Feldman was born in New York in 1931. He graduated from the University of Chicago. He entered the State Department in 1954 serving in Hong Kong, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Taipei. Mr. Feldman was interviewed by Edward Dillery in 1999.*

FELDMAN: That led to a conversation about the Foreign Service. It sounded interesting; so I asked how one became a Foreign Service officer. He told me that you had to take an exam given once a year in December; if you passed it, you would be called in for an oral interview; if you passed that, you would be given a commission as a Foreign Service officer. I asked how one applied and he told me.

So I wrote a letter and in the fullness of time took the exam and passed it. I had never expected to join the Foreign Service, but once having passed the written, I went on to the orals. I went to Washington at my own expense. At that time, candidates had to arrange their own travel and accommodations - this was 1954. I remember that I stayed in a rooming house called the "Allen Lee" - probably at the corner of G and 20<sup>th</sup> or 21<sup>st</sup> or 22<sup>nd</sup>. You have to remember that I really didn't care whether I was going to join the Foreign Service or not; my plans at the time were to get a Ph.D. in Chinese studies from the University of Chicago. I do remember that my panel was chaired by someone with the wonderful name of Cromwell T. Riches. I thought that that was a perfect name for a Foreign Service officer. The first question that I was asked was whether "Red China" should be recognized. I thought about an answer for a bit. I decided to tell the panel what I really thought. So I said it that I thought it should be recognized. Several of the panel members became very upset with my answer. They wanted to know why I thought we should recognize that country. I pointed out that the Chinese were fighting us in Korea, but that no one seemed to know why they had done so. I suggested that it would be preferable to be able to talk to them directly to try to understand their motivations, rather than to guess what they might be willing or wanting to do. So we got into a good discussion, which seemed to flow pretty smoothly for the rest of my time. Eventually, the examination ended and I was asked to wait outside the room for a few minutes. After about 15 or 20 minutes, Mr. Riches emerged and told me that I had passed, although he said "There were some committee members who did not like the way you slouched in your chair. I thought for sure that the issue of "Red China" would be the problem; I was quite surprised by the comment about my demeanor.

After having received my MA, I decided to move forward to try to get a Ph.D. I didn't know whether I would ever get into the Foreign Service. It turned out that I had a major disagreement with the Chairman of the Chinese Language and Literature Department at Chicago - a professor named Herlee Glessner Creel. His specialty was early archaic China and especially interpreting oracle bones, which are inside tortoise shells, which were used for divination - one would carve on them in ancient Chinese characters questions like, "If the King goes hunting today, will he be successful?" Then the questioner would throw the shell on a fire and the results would be interpreted by the cracks in the shell. Creel was famous for a book that he had written called "The Birth of China."

So Creel was indeed a great scholar in oracle bones and in trying to decide what the culture of ancient China might have been. He wanted me to join him in his research since I was the departmental fellow who was going to be working directly with him for my Ph.D. I didn't think that this was the most interesting avenue to pursue. I told Creel that I really wanted to work on 19<sup>th</sup> Century treaty ports in China. That turned into something of a dust-up. This all took place early in the fall of 1954.

About this time, I got a phone from the Department of State asking me how soon I could be

available to enter the Service. I said: "How about in two weeks?" That was too quick for them, but the caller said he would be back in touch with me. I should mention that at the time, I was married with one little child about a year old. We were living in a small, rented apartment. No one had told me that when you went overseas your furniture would accompany at Department expense. So we sold our furniture and waited for the call from the Department. And we waited; and we waited. We went from early October to mid-November waiting for that call.

The call came and I was asked to report for duty immediately. I was informed that my first assignment would be Hong Kong as a Refugee Relief Program investigator. I said "Okay." A couple of weeks later, at the end of November 1954, I found myself in a 19<sup>th</sup> Century Treaty port called Hong Kong.

When I arrived, to my great delight, I was told that I would not be a Refugee Relief Program investigator, but rather that I would be a Vice Consul - the passport officer.

*Q: Let's go back in the story. Did you ever stop in Washington on your way to the Far East?*

FELDMAN: I did; I had a one week program for secretaries and clerk typists. During the course of this orientation, one of our lecturers asked whether there were any Vice Consuls in the class. I raised my hand; I was the only one. All the rest were staff personnel. The lecturer expressed some surprise. After that one week, I was given airline tickets for my wife, my son and myself. We flew on a Boeing Stratocruiser - the one with the sort of belly lounge. We had bunks; my wife and son were in a lower bunk and I was in the upper. We took off from Washington; it was an incredible flight. From Washington, we flew to Pittsburgh, then Chicago, Minneapolis, Portland - or somewhere on the West Coast - someplace in Alaska, and finally Misawa (Japan). Unfortunately, my son got real air sick and threw up all over my wife. When we debarked in Misawa, she got off wearing a bathrobe. When the plane was cleaned, we got on board again and flew to Tokyo where we got off again. We stayed there for a day in a hotel. Then we reboarded, flew from Tokyo to Okinawa, then to Taipei and on to Hong Kong. The whole trip took about two and a half days.

*Q: Did you any have feeling for what a Consulate General was like? How it was organized?*

FELDMAN: I had no idea. I didn't know what to expect. I was simply delighted to be going to a 19<sup>th</sup> Century Treaty Port which was after all what I wanted to study. I guess first posts are always very special and Hong Kong will always be very dear to me. In those days, Hong Kong was one of the most delightful cities in the world. The population was about a million. The tallest building in town was probably 16 stories high. The air was clear - no smog. When one swam at night, the water was phosphorescent. It was beautiful. There were wild monkeys and deer on the island. It was truly like being in heaven.

The only problem was that when we arrived we were put up in a "leave" flat - a CG rented apartment that happened to be vacant because the tenant was on leave. This was the beginning of December. Now I was just 23 years old, first time out of the U.S. with a wife and one year old child. We were essentially left to our own devices in this apartment on the Peak - No 9, Coombe Road. We had no idea how we would survive - where to get groceries, etc. No one told us

anything - no welcome wagon.

Fortunately, there was an American family in the same apartment house - Robert and Meg Aylward. There were experienced hands and had been in the FS for at least a dozen years. The first thing they did was to lend us a crib for Ross Christopher - who is now 45. They gave us the phone number of something called the "Welcome Company" - a grocery store which delivered on the Peak. We could order everything by phone, which we did. Pretty soon, we settled in another apartment because the tenant of the one we occupied returned from leave. We moved to a place in Kowloon - 222 Prince Edward Road. Living in Kowloon was like living in the Bronx - only Chinese. It was a horrible place - far worst than the student housing at the University of Chicago. It was later condemned as unsanitary by the U.S. Public Health Service.

So I made my views known to the administrative officer; I just wasn't going to live there. I complained loudly and strongly enough that I was told that I had a housing allowance and could go to rent a place. We looked and found a place that we liked, which was within our housing allowance. We had no furniture, but it turned out that our allowance included an amount that could be used to rent furniture. We did that; we rented a little two bedroom flat in Repulse Bay - five minute walk to the beach. We rented furniture and it was like being in heaven. It felt as if we were living out in the country. We listened to the cry of barking deer at night and sat on our balcony and watched the stars. There were all sorts of wild birds that I had never seen before. Carol and Ross Christopher could go to the beach at Repulse Bay every day. We had lovely neighbors. It was great.

*Q: Probably the best housing you ever had in your career.*

FELDMAN: I had better housing later, but there was something very, very special about that apartment in Repulse Bay. As a matter of fact, there was something special about going to Hong Kong as a very young officer, with a wife and year old son. It turned out that for Ross Christopher, his first language actually was Cantonese, which he learned from a Cantonese amah whom we hired shortly after our arrival - English was his second. We also hired her husband who was a cook from Shanghai. I think that illustrates better than words what prices were like in Hong Kong in those days. There, I was - a brand new Vice Consul - starting out at the magnificent salary of \$4,200 per annum - something like that - we had a great apartment and for \$50 per month were able to engage the services of a fantastic cook and a Cantonese amah.

My wife, Carol, would toddle off with Christopher almost every day to the beach; I was picked up by car and driven to the Consulate General - 26 Garden Road - where it is still today, although it has been remodeled a couple of times since. I was lucky enough to live along Island Road; some people lived as far as Stanley which was way beyond Repulse Bay. So the person who lived the furthest out drove a car - an office station wagon - along Island Road and picked up other members of the CG and took us to the office building.

*Q: How did you get around when you weren't picked up by your colleagues?*

FELDMAN: By bus. It was an easy way to get around.

*Q: When you got to the CG, what kind of orientation did you get?*

FELDMAN: None. I was in the Passport section; I was given a number of cases to review. These were primarily cases of Chinese who were claiming American citizenship because their parents had either been born in the U.S. or had emigrated and become U.S. citizens. There was a considerable amount of fraud in Chinese immigration. I was to review the cases, interview to applicant and forward a recommendation to the Department on whether it was a legitimate case or not. I did that for about my first three months; I actually got a commendation from the Department for a judgement that I had made on a particular case - I don't remember anything about the case except that I got a commendation. I do remember that my judgement on this case was to grant the passport.

I think it is worth remembering the mind-set of the times. A large number of people doing visa and passport work had a definite bias against issuing either visas or passports. They wanted to keep the foreigners out of the U.S. at all costs - everyone is a fraud; all visas applicants will overstay; all passport applications are fraudulent - the slots on the waiting list are sold. The theory was that a grown male would have been let into the U.S. - around the beginning of the century or at least before WWI before the various exclusion acts went into effect; he would settle down in the U.S. and return to China every couple of years; when he re-entered the U.S., he would be asked by the INS officer whether he had children in China. The answer would invariably be "Yes;" for every nine months he spent in China, he would have a child - or if he had been in China for less than nine months he would say that his wife was pregnant. That was called "creating slots" - i.e. making someone, presumably his child - eligible for an American passport. These "slots" then stimulated a thriving business because they were sold; the necessary documentation was then provided which allowed other people to enter the U.S. illegally. This was the nexus of Chinese immigration into the U.S. The vice consul's job was to pass judgement on whether the application was legitimate or fraudulent.

On the basis of my work in the Passport section, I was moved into the Visa section which was considered to have more responsibility because it was the area which attracted the greatest fraud temptation. In the Visa section, the attitude was, as I said, that anyone going to the U.S. would try to stay and therefore should be kept out entirely. I didn't quite take that attitude. I generally tried to figure out whether there was some reasonable basis for issuing the visa. The cases I was given, at least at the beginning, were those of wives and children of American citizens. They were not too hard to figure out.

Later, when I was assigned to non-immigrant cases, that was a bit more difficult. As it happened, one day I got a call from the Consul General - Everett Drumright. He was from Oklahoma. He said that I had turned down an application from the child of one of his friends. He asked me to reconsider and issue the visa. I argued with the CG over the phone. I must say that I don't remember now whether I did issue that visa; I just remember having the argument with the CG - everyone thought I was crazy to do so.

As it happened, a few weeks later, a circular instruction came from the Department saying that all posts should have a program for rotating junior officers through the various sections, so that they would not be stuck in one job for their whole tour. In particular, the circular emphasized

that it would be very useful to transfer officers from consular work into political or economic work. Very shortly thereafter, I got a call from the CG's secretary asking whether I would be interested in working in the political section. I was delighted; in retrospect, I think the reason I was offered this opportunity is because I was the only vice consul's name known to Drumright.

So I joined the political section; I think I was the sixth American officer in the section. It was headed by an FSO-3 - Larue (Larry) Lutkins - an old style Foreign Service officer. His deputy was Bill Magistretti. These people seemed to me to be like semi-gods. They knew some Chinese, although not as much as I did. Magistretti was a Japanese language officer, but his Chinese was not great. One interesting aspect was that all of the other five officers spent all of their time on mainland China matters. I, as the most junior member, became the Hong Kong-Macao reporting officer. That meant that all of the others did their analysis based on what was printed by communist China's newspapers - particularly the "Peking's Peoples Daily" and "Gulangming" and other newspapers. Occasionally, as a treat, they were allowed to go to the railroad station to interview recent arrivals from the mainland.

This seemed incredibly dull work to me. I was delighted with my assignment, in part, because I got to travel with the CG. When he went to call on the Governor, for example. I was the note-taker. I got to interview senior members of the Hong Kong government - all on my own. Once every six weeks or so, I would go on my own on the ferry to Macao where I would meet with the Governor and other interesting personalities. I could tell stories about Macao forever. That was just a marvelous experience. It was one of the best assignments I ever had in 32 years in the Foreign Service; it was truly a delight.

*Q: Before we hear the stories, tell me what you produced?*

FELDMAN: In those days, it was despatches and airgrams; occasionally, I would draft a telegram. There was also the WEEKA - a weekly summary of events and analyses. Having just left the University of Chicago, I was used to doing research; that was second nature to me and I think I was pretty good at it. I produced a large number of fairly lengthy despatches. Some one recently called to my attention one that I had drafted in 1956 on Triad Societies in Hong Kong. The Triads were the Chinese versions of the Mafia. I wrote a major analysis of the Triads which apparently became well known in the Department. I drafted other messages on various topics; in general I reported on what was going on in Hong Kong.

*Q: Did you get any commendations for that?*

FELDMAN: I don't remember, but I did get promoted in 1956. That was considered pretty rapid.

*Q: How about Macao? How was that?*

FELDMAN: Macao was a little sleepy Portuguese enclave, sort of a museum-like depository of Portuguese hopes for an empire. Macao, something like Hong Kong, was full of the zaniest characters that one could imagine. The "dictator" of Macao, the man who ran Macao, was Pedro Jose Lobo. When I knew him, he was probably in his late 50s; he had been a foundling who was discovered on the porch of a house occupied by a Portuguese Army captain in Timor. The

Captain was later transferred to Macao; Pedro was raised there in a series of Catholic schools. When he was old enough he became an apprentice in a local bank - the Banco Nacional Untramarino. Pedro was a person of innate skill and cleverness; he rose in the ranks. In the 1930s, the Governor of Macao was looking for some one to take over the opium monopoly - which was legal at the time. The previous incumbent had exceeded the allowed limits of "skimming." The job went to Pedro.

I heard all of these storied from Pedro himself because we became very friendly over the course of two years. Pedro "skimmed" the opium trade enough to accumulate enough wealth, but stayed within allowable bounds. With his income, he bought other monopolies in Macao - the water works; the salt monopoly, the tobacco monopoly and ultimately he bought Macao's sole radio station - Radio Villa Verda.

When WWII came along, Pedro was nominated by the Portuguese to negotiate with the Japanese. He was successful; he managed to buy the Japanese off so that Macao was never occupied. It was during this period that he became enormously wealthy by buying Hong Kong dollars at discount; he then just hoarded them, probably in his garage. On the side, he and his Chinese gangster partner, Y.C. Leung, ran an air-rescue service for downed allied airmen. He assumed that the allies would win in the end and would feel some kind of obligation to him. He was of course right in his bet. After the end of the war, Y.C. was duly decorated by the British - an MBE, I think. Both accumulated great wealth and lived happily ever after.

One of Pedro's most charming characteristics was that he composed music. He did this without being able to play any instrument. He had a musical "secretary;" when he was in the mood he would hum a tune and the secretary would transcribe it into notes. After it was orchestrated it would be played for the private entertainment of his guests and then later played on his radio station. He composed all sorts of music, including a five act opera based on the founding of Macao; it was called "Avanti Lusitania." Before I was transferred to Japan, as a sign of affection, Pedro presented me with his collected works on 78 rpm records; they must have weighed fifty pounds at least. Unfortunately, it was so heavy that we left the collection behind in our apartment in Repulse Bay when we left Hong Kong in 1957.

That station was used for other purposes as well. Pedro became a gold smuggler. He would buy gold at one price in China or the Philippines or Hong Kong, wherever it was cheap, and then flown by his private plane to India and sold there by his agents. It was what today might be called "arbitrage." That added to his wealth.

There was of course an official government in Macao run by the Portuguese, but Pedro was the power. He was the Minister of Economic Affairs working theoretically for Portuguese governor - whom I would see periodically. There was a senate - "the Leal Senado" (the loyal senate).

We didn't have much of an interest in Macao, except insofar as it was suspected to be a way station of the heroin trade route out of Southeast Asia. I don't think it was, but there were American officials who were very suspicious. Macao was involved in so many other things that it probably didn't have time for heroin.

It was a very corrupt place. One of my earliest experiences there - on my first trip there, I think - I was approached by a cop who offered to sell me his service revolver.

*Q: Back to Hong Kong. What were the domestic policies there?*

FELDMAN: In those days, Hong Kong was a very tightly run ship. The governor was Sir Alexander Grantham, who was, until the last governor, probably the most famous Hong Kong governor, although even more famous at the time was Sir John Copperthwaite, the Financial Secretary. It was he who laid the foundation for Hong Kong's great prosperity. He was a disciple of Ludwig Von Mises and the Chicago school of economics - although Sir John would never have called it that. Both he and Chicago supported minimal government, minimal interference, minimal taxation, *laissez faire*. It worked very well.

Copperthwaite was once asked why he did not collect more detailed business statistics. He asked: "Why would I want them? I have no intention of using them." Up to today, Copperthwait's *laissez faire* philosophy ruled in Honk Kong to the point where it became clearly the freest colony in the world. Hong Kong's economic development is a marvel since the territory is essentially a rock across a narrow channel from Kowloon, a peninsula. The city couldn't feed itself; it couldn't even provide its own drinking water. When I first arrived in Hong Kong, we were allowed to open the tap for drinking water for a half-an-hour each day. By the time, I left, we were allowed to open the tap for an hour every third day because water was so scarce. It wasn't until the 1960s, when Hong Kong concluded a deal with mainland China to import water, that there was potable water every day.

But this shortage made very little dent in the fascination of the place. It was the most delightful place. Hong Kong was full of the wildest and most improbable characters who had come from China to get away from the Communists. So the city was filled with Chinese, Americans, British and White Russians. Among the Chinese the most prominent were the Shanghai manufacturers. The city was enormously lively; everybody had a story and they were all fascinating.

*Q: Were there any signs at the time about the possible relationships between Hong Kong and the mainland?*

FELDMAN: No. In fact relationships were tense. The feeling was that the Chinese might invade at any time. In the 1950s, no one in Hong King was really sure how long the territory would survive as an independent entity. Some thought it might last until the 1960s; others were even more pessimistic than that. So there was a sense of contrived gaiety about life in Hong Kong.

*Q: I assume that there were informal contacts with the mainland Chinese?*

FELDMAN: I don't know that in fact there were. The police were pretty strong; the British Army had a garrison there. So I don't think there was very much smuggling. In those days, the U.S. had an embargo against Chinese goods. So one of the CG's principal occupations was to verify the origin of goods being exported to the U.S. from Hong Kong. That function and the consular services were really the bread and butter of the CG. Honk Kong is a major port; we provided shipping and seamen services. In fact, for a brief period, I was the shipment and

seamen officer; that was a sort of delight. I had two local employees working for me - actually I worked for them. Between the two, they had more than 50 years of U.S. government service; I had maybe fourteen months. George Efrimou came from Qingdao; when we evacuated that town, he was not able to join the evacuees. Later, a U.S. Navy destroyer was sent to Qingdao to pick up Efrimou and his family - that is the way the old Foreign Service used to work; it hasn't worked like that for a long time.

*Q: How big was the consul general at the time?*

FELDMAN: I would guess 50 or 60 people. It was a pretty big post, although nothing compared to today when we have probably 300 or more employees there. I think it is still our largest CG in the world.

*Q: I know that it and Jerusalem have an independent status. Both are headed by officers with the rank of Chief of Mission.*

FELDMAN: Right. In my days, Drumright had the personal rank of ambassador.

*Q: Of course, in those days there was no U.S. ambassador in China. Theoretically, Hong Kong was a UK dependency, but I gather we didn't do much business through London.*

FELDMAN: We never communicated with London. It did get carbon copies of what we sent to the Department, but we never communicated through London the way messages from a normal CG go through an embassy on the way to Washington. We were quite independent.

*Q: How long were you in the political section?*

FELDMAN: I was there from sometime in 1955 until I transferred in the summer of 1957 - almost two years. It was a great time; I enjoyed it enormously.

*Q: Thank goodness, you had that argument with the Consul General. How were your relationships with Drumright after you transferred to the political section?*

FELDMAN: Actually, we got along very well. As I said, I became the notetaker for his meetings with Hong Kong's government. Drumright was very wealthy. He came from a town in Oklahoma named after one of his predecessors. The family owned oil wells. One day he asked me what clubs I belonged to. I must have looked at him blankly because he repeated the question. I told him that I didn't belong to any clubs. He said, "Well, join some!!" That I did; I joined the Foreign Correspondents club and the Yacht Club. In fact, I am still a member of the Royal Hong Kong Yacht Club because when I left in 1957, one could purchase a permanent lifetime membership which was valid while you were not in Hong Kong - a non-resident member. The price was 100 Hong Kong dollars. My membership reflects this; it reads "F07."

*Q: I assume that means you were the seventh non-residential member.*

FELDMAN: Correct. So I had a very merry time in Hong Kong. In those days, Hong Kong had a

population of about 1 million. The cream of society was about 10,000 people - Chinese and British and a few others. You could get to know them quite quickly. Having a grand official position, "American Vice Consul," gave one all kinds of entree - never mind that a vice consul was at the bottom of the totem pole. Nevertheless, I was an official representative of the U.S. Government and that was worth a lot. We made many friends, many of whom we still have. One of my closest friends in those days was a Chinese named Bobby Ho. He was the grandson of the first Chinese to be knighted - Sir Robert Ho Tung. His father was a general, who had attended Sandhurst. He had some bad experiences with British racism and renounced his British citizenship and became a Chinese Nationalist general - General Hosailai. He was the Quartermaster General of the Chinese Nationalist Army during WWII. After the war he represented the Republic of China on the UN Military Affairs Commission. He was one of the Chinese representatives at the Japanese surrender on the battleship "Missouri." His son became my very good friend.

Bobby went to Hamilton College in New York and the University of Pittsburgh. Later he joined the family newspaper in Hong Kong - "The Hong Kong Commercial Daily." He was also active in insurance and real estate and other ventures. He is now retired and lives in Vancouver. He left Hong Kong shortly after the British signed the agreement on the return of Hong Kong to China.

*Q: What things led to your next assignment?*

FELDMAN: I knew some Chinese, although I must say that which I learned at the University of Chicago was classical Chinese, which is of little practical use today. I decided that I had enough Chinese for a while and thought that it would be very useful to study Japanese. So I applied for Japanese language training and the Department agreed with the stipulation that I first serve a tour in Japan - to see whether I really wanted to specialize in Japan.

So I was assigned as economic officer and vice consul in Yokohama. We sailed from Hong Kong - I think it was on the "President Wilson" - up to Yokohama on the way to the U.S. for our home leave. When we got to Yokohama, the Consul General - Lionel M. Summers - got on board because he too was returning to the U.S. for home leave. Naturally, I introduced myself as his new economic officer. During the course of the voyage, Summers asked whether my wife and I played "Scrabble." In fact, Carol and I were sort of "Scrabble" demons. So I said that indeed we did play the game. That began a series of "Scrabble" games between the Summers and the Feldmans.

We made the mistake of beating them very badly several nights in a row. That ended the "Scrabble" games. When I got to Washington, I was informed that my assignment had been changed. I was no longer going to Yokohama, but rather to Tokyo as a visa officer. I protested, but I was told that it was an "appropriate" assignment. There is a marvelous line in American literature from a short story by Ring Lardner called "Alibi Ike." It goes: "Shut up, he explained." That is what Personnel said to me.

After home leave in Chicago, we sailed to Japan - I think it was the "President Hoover" - and reported for duty at our embassy in Tokyo as a vice consul and visa officer. I went to work for a Virginia Ellis, who was in charge of the visa section. We became rather friendly; in fact, one

afternoon during a cocktail hour, Virginia remarked that if she had full powers, she would never issue a visa to a Chinese, or a Japanese, or a Jew or an Italian - and maybe a Greek as well. I pointed out that I was Jewish. Her response was: "Present company excepted." But these comments represented her attitude toward visa work.

One of the matters which took up much of my time in Tokyo was the pre-clearance of Japanese brides of GIs. In those days, if a member of the U.S. military wanted to marry a foreigner, he had to get military permission to marry. Before that permission was granted, the fiancée had to fill out an application which was sent to a visa officer to review whether there were any grounds for ineligibility. There often were because many of these hopeful brides were found in brothels by a GI. There was a prohibition - in law - at the time against issuing visas to women who had been prostitutes. Later on, a waiver of ineligibility was adopted, but in 1957 no such waiver existed and those women were ineligible.

There were an awful lot of women who were ineligible. After the waiver came into effect, we could deem the applicant to have participated in prostitution, but that fact could be waived, allowing the GI to marry the foreigner.

The most interesting visa case I had in my tour did not deal with a Japanese bride, but something that grew out of Chinese history. You may have heard of the "May 4th" movement. In 1919, on that day, there were huge student demonstrations in Peking occasioned by the Minister - Tsao Rulin - responsible for mining. He had been accused of having received bribes from the Japanese who were interested in a "sweetheart" deal on some important coal mines in northern China - the Kailan mines. This set off a series of student demonstrations protesting the deal with the Japanese, the Versailles Treaty, which confirmed foreign "concessions" in China, China's weakness, and foreign pressure. The "May Fourth Movement" remains a watershed in Chinese history. One day, a visa application was given to me; it was from a father of an American citizen - Tsao Rulin. Tsao had lived in Japan after he left China in the 1920s. During the war, he lived as a house guest of Shigeru Yoshida who was later to become a Prime Minister. Tsao had several children; one, a daughter, after the war married an American soldier, moved to the U.S. and became an American citizen. She later petitioned for her father to come to the U.S.

When the visa application came to me, I saw no reason to turn it down. He hadn't committed any crime under American law. He was one of the most notorious figures in contemporary Chinese history, but I didn't see any part of the law that might lead me to reject the application.

I had had a similar case in Hong Kong - that is, one involving a famous historical figure. One of the visa cases I had there was from a Chinese citizen who was using the name De Vee Sing. I didn't recognize the name in the Shanghai dialect, but when I saw the Chinese characters, I knew that the applicant was Tu Yueh-sheng, who had been the head of the "Green Gang" in Shanghai in the 1920s. That gang was notorious for prostitution, drugs, protection rackets, etc. In this case, I was delighted to refuse this application.

*Q: There were no repercussions?*

FELDMAN: No repercussions.

*Q: What were the arrangements when you arrived in Tokyo? Had there been any improvement from what you experienced when you arrived in Hong Kong?*

FELDMAN: By this time, I was an “old” hand in the Foreign Service. I had served one tour. I knew consular work. I didn’t need a whole lot of schooling. I moved into the Nonomiya apartments. You arrived sometime after I did and we had adjacent offices. That was the beginning of a friendship that has lasted some 42 years. You and we lived in the same apartment buildings; our children grew up together. I think you were the first to describe those apartments as “shabby genteel.”

*Q: Did you see any improvement in the care and feeding of FS personnel from that which experienced in Hong Kong?*

FELDMAN: None that I remember. You must remember that when I joined the Foreign Service, I didn’t have the foggiest notion of what it would be like and therefore had no expectations. I was just coming out of graduate school and I would be paid \$4,200 - that was an incredible sum of money - especially how far it went in Hong Kong.

I don’t remember what my salary was while in Tokyo - probably \$1,000 more. I had been promoted to FSO-6 on the new pay scale. I was one of the FSO-6s who had to go back to FSO-7 and then I was promoted back to FSO-6.

*Q: Before we leave your Japan tour, what are your feelings about the differences between Japanese and Chinese people?*

FELDMAN: They are completely different. For example, although the Japanese language uses Chinese characters as one of their three writing systems, the fact is that the languages are entirely different. Japanese is a polysyllabic agglutinative of language with a highly complex grammar - e.g. adjectives have tenses. Chinese is monosyllabic, not agglutinative, and had practically no grammar at all. As you might expect, people who grow up with these different languages think completely differently; their social systems are very different. There is no similarity between the two.

Japanese and Chinese may physically resemble each other, but so do Americans and Turks. But in both cases, the people are completely different. What motivates one will not motivate the other and vice versa. There is just no similarity between the Japanese and the Chinese.

*Q: Might that lead you to believe that close relationships between the countries is not likely to ever happen?*

FELDMAN: I wouldn’t necessarily reach that conclusion because just as I was able to learn enough about Japanese and Chinese culture to be able to act in either culture, establishing rapport with both and able to negotiate with both as I did later in my career, so a Chinese or Japanese can also. That is what diplomats do. I guess one of the things diplomats have to do is to take themselves outside the boundaries of their own culture and learn how to operate across cross-

cultural divides. American diplomats do that; Russian diplomats do that and so do Chinese and Japanese diplomats.

*Q: Let's go back a second. What can you tell us about the Prime minister's visit?*

FELDMAN: One thing I remember about that was the discussion about the exchange of gifts and the toasts. For some reason, I was chosen to write President Kennedy's toasts and the welcoming speech. As I mentioned, I had a degree in classical Chinese so that I knew some of the "tag" phrases that were loved by both the Chinese and the Japanese. I worked these old proverbs into the text because I knew that the Japanese would recognize their origins and meaning. I had read Japanese texts extensively as well and that enabled me to stick in all sorts of quotations and references. That was fun; that was the first time I had ever heard the president of the United States pronounce my words. That was a special thrill.

*Q: Let's talk a little about the Chinese language training.*

FELDMAN: It began with approximately nine months of training at the Foreign Service Institute which was then located in a revamped parking garage under Arlington Towers. Our teachers were Miss Oyang and Mr. Li Mi. After that period, I went to the FSI field language school in Taiwan for another 15 months. The school was in Taichung, a city in central Taiwan. It was then a pretty rural environment; I don't know what the population was then. I would guess a couple of hundred thousands which for Chinese cities makes it only a village.

We rented a house; houses were sort of passed on from student to student. It was on Gold Mountain Street which was surrounded by rice paddy fields. I still remember that every couple of weeks or so, the farmers would dump night soil on the paddy fields around the house. The odor was just awful. Taichung was in the part of Taiwan which has a year round hot climate. Nevertheless, we had to close all the windows and tried to breath as shallowly as we could. We had no air conditioning. The Department did not provide it.

*Q: What was the school like? How many students?*

FELDMAN: I guess that we had ten or twelve students. Harry Britain, a USIA officer, was there. Don Ferguson, an FSO, was there. Harry Thayer who later became the director of the office of Chinese affairs and after that, ambassador to Singapore and later director of the American Institute in Taiwan, was a student. Roger Sullivan, who became a deputy assistant secretary in EA/P and later was an NSC staff member, was there. Peter Colm, Bill Durker - who quit early on and last I heard was a professor of Southeast Asian history at Penn State.

It was a good group of people. We had some good teachers, several of whom were Manchu from Peking - now Beijing. They spoke a kind of Beijing slang and that is what they taught us. They also taught more formal Mandarin, but we learned a lot of Beijing slang because that was what these teachers spoke. I can still amuse Chinese by inserting some Beijing slang - circa 1945-1950 - into a conversation; that always get a laugh.

*Q: In Hong Kong, we used Cantonese. I remember you saying that we really didn't do anything*

*in Cantonese. Was Mandarin that different?*

FELDMAN: Mandarin is a totally different language. Mandarin is as different from Cantonese as for example, German is from Swedish. In fact, it is probably more dissimilar than that. We speak in terms of Chinese dialects; in fact there are four major Chinese languages - not dialects, but distinct languages. Each of these four languages has its own dialects. The Chinese language that I learned was Mandarin, which is probably spoken by more Chinese than any of the other languages. The other three languages are the Shanghai language - sometimes called "Wu," Cantonese which in Chinese is called "Yush," Min, which comes in two major languages - "Minan" spoken in the south and "Minpei" spoken in the north. There are several million people who speak those languages; the language spoken in Taiwan is actually "Minan." So there all these different languages - all distinct and very, very different from each other.

*Q: But if you speak Mandarin, can you get along everywhere in China?*

FELDMAN: Not necessarily. You can get by in most of China, but there are places where you would not be understood. These languages are not mutually intelligible. You have to learn them as separate languages the way a Frenchman learns Portuguese. Very often, when Chinese from different provinces speak, they will draw Chinese characters on their hands to aid intelligibility.

*Q: But if you would learn only one Chinese language, it would be Mandarin?*

FELDMAN: Yes because that is the official language of China. But if you wanted to live in Hong Kong, for example, you certainly want to learn Cantonese because a lot of the natives don't speak Mandarin. - all they speak is Cantonese. In fact, some will speak Cantonese and English and not Mandarin. There are very few who can speak both Cantonese and Mandarin and practically none who speak only Mandarin unless they are very recent refugees from China. Similarly, if you visited Singapore, you would have to know Hokkien, which is a variation of "Min."

*Q: How did "Min" get from Fujien to Singapore?*

FELDMAN: Fujien is on the coast and people emigrated from there to other South Asia countries.

*Q: What was your evaluation of the program after you finished learning the Chinese language?*

FELDMAN: Chinese ought to be an easy language to learn. But as I said before, the teaching material was not terribly good. I was not impressed by that material as I had been by the Japanese teaching material. The Chinese texts were unnecessarily complicated.

There was another difference. I had never really learned to read Japanese, but had to spend a lot of time learning how to read Chinese. Chinese is easy to speak, but very difficult to read because it is ideographic. All one can do is to memorize characters, which have multiple meanings. They work in sets because in Mandarin there are only 600 sounds you can make. So you have to have combination of characters - each character is only one syllable. But because there are so many

words which sound the same - so many homonyms in Mandarin - it becomes very difficult to work with it. You spend a lot of time memorizing; we had to memorize something like 20 characters each day. So at the end of the two years, you are able to read not only all of the newspapers, but also diplomatic notes. In fact, I could even write a diplomatic note. I could do simultaneous translations, because we had a special course for that.

But these are skills that evaporate very, very quickly if you don't keep them up. For about three months after graduation from the school, I could do simultaneous translations, but not after that. I could only do consecutive translations after that. As I said, I could translate diplomatic notes; in fact, I did that on my next assignment which was with the embassy in Taipei. But once you stop doing that, you also forget because Chinese diplomatic notes are written in even more stilted form than those written in English.

*Q: So you were then assigned to Taipei. Was the move easy?*

FELDMAN: The move was easy. It was essentially pack up and move from Taichung to Taipei - a distance of approximately 100 miles. The family - my wife Carol and our two children - moved up to Taipei. We had a very lovely house with a red moon gate in an alley off Renai Lu - "renai" means "loving humanity." It was a very pretty house.

I was assigned as the political-military officer in the embassy, at a time when a "Status of Forces" (SOFA) agreement was being negotiated. That was an interesting assignment, which I enjoyed. My boss was Robert Lindquist - the head of the political section. He wasn't particularly attractive, either as a person or as an officer. I was negotiating with Frederick F. Chien-Chien Fu - who was then the junior officer in the North American affairs bureau in the Foreign Ministry. He later became foreign minister; he also served in Washington as the director of Taiwan's unofficial office and later became chairman of the Commission of the Economic Planning and Development; he also served as Speaker of the National Assembly. He is now the president of the Control Yuan, which in Taiwan is a combination of our General Accounting Office and a government wide Inspector General.

Fred and I did the basic work negotiating this "Status of Forces" agreement. Our respective bosses - Lindquist and Tsai Wei-ping - took credit for it. But still it was a very interesting assignment.

*Q: What was the involvement of the respective military?*

FELDMAN: I chaired a U.S. drafting committee which included the legal officer of the Military Advisory Assistance Group (MAAG) in Taiwan as well as the legal officer of the Taiwan Defense Command. In those days we had a very elaborate military structure in Taiwan. The MAAG was involved in providing military assistance and training. Then there was the Taiwan Defense Command because under the Mutual Defense Treaty that we had with the Republic of China we basically assumed responsibility for defending Taiwan from the People's Republic of China (PRC). We had several military bases on the island; we had an air base in Tainan; we had a major air base outside of Taichung. We had the 13<sup>th</sup> Air Force located on Taiwan. We had naval bases in Kaohsiung, in Tsoying and in Chilung. We patrolled the Taiwan Straits with ships

from the Seventh Fleet. They would come in and out of Taiwan ports. U.S. aircraft would patrol the Straits. There were a lot of joint planning and many joint exercises.

In terms of drafting the agreement, naturally the military had a very large input.

*Q: Had there not been any "Status of Forces" agreement before that?*

FELDMAN: No.

*Q: How long had the U.S. military been on the island?*

FELDMAN: The U.S. military came in right after the Korean War. So there had been about 10 years without agreement. Basically, what had happened was that in January, 1950, President Truman had said that we would not get involved with Taiwan and that we were out of the Chinese civil war and would stay out. But then on June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea. One of the first things that happened after that was that Truman interposed the Seventh Fleet between Taiwan and the mainland because it appeared at the time that the North Korean invasion might herald a total attempt by the communist world to take aggressive action in the Far East, including an invasion of Taiwan. General MacArthur had argued very strongly that the PRC must not be allowed to control Taiwan. So the Seventh Fleet was ordered into the Straits. By the end of 1950 and the beginning of 1951, we began the negotiations for a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with Taiwan. The senior U.S. negotiator was John Foster Dulles who became secretary of state in the Eisenhower administration. I believe that the MDT was actually signed in 1953.

*Q: How come it took so long to think about a SOFA?*

FELDMAN: The ROC was pleased to have us on the island under any guise that it wasn't until much later that it began to think about such matters of whether its courts shouldn't have jurisdiction over crimes committed by GIs etc. At the beginning, the ROC was so overjoyed to have an American military presence on the island - so happy to have American troops to protect them from the PRC - that it didn't raise any of the issues for many, many years.

*Q: When did your assignment to the embassy start?*

FELDMAN: It started in 1963. The negotiations had already been underway for a few months by the time I got to the embassy. So I was very close to the beginning of the process. I did not get to complete the negotiations because I was transferred to Hong Kong in 1965. By that time, we had just about finished the draft treaty.

*Q: Were the problems created by our military presence make the negotiations difficult?*

FELDMAN: You must understand the Chinese view of themselves. As far as the negotiations were concerned, there was an awful lot of nationalist fervor on the ROC side. They still regarded themselves as the sole legitimate government of all of China. They were very careful to assert themselves in every possible way. So the negotiations were not the easiest, but they were not that

difficult because we always had the trump card of withdrawal from the island if the ROC made things too difficult - which of course was the last thing they wanted. So on any issues that were crucial to us, we got our way.

*Q: How about the internal politics on Taiwan at the time?*

FELDMAN: Taiwan at the time had pretty much a one party dictatorship - quite stern at that. The Kuomintang (KMT) - the Nationalists party - was the only legal party other than a few tame offshoots. The island was under martial law. The Taiwan Garrison Command, which was responsible for the enforcement of the martial law, could essentially do what it wanted. Although there was a sign at the airport which said "Welcome to Taiwan: the home of free China," Taiwan could not be considered "free." It was a one party dictatorship. It had been called a "soft" authoritarianism; it actually became that some years later. Under Chiang Kai-shek, who was in charge at the time, it was a fairly hard authoritarian regime; it was not "bloody" minded - it didn't kill opponents - at least not very often. There were a lot of political prisoners kept on a place called "Green Island." There were few executions and those were people whom the regime had reason to believe that they were PRC spies.

*Q: What about the indigenous Taiwanese? Were they even in sight?*

FELDMAN: Of course there were in sight. They were 85% of the population. Although my official dealings were with the government, of course, and particularly with the North American Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, I and most of my colleagues in the embassy felt considerable sympathy for the ordinary Taiwanese.

Essentially, the "mainlanders" (that is the people who had come from the mainland with Chiang Kai-shek after they lost the civil war) - the 15% of Taiwan's population - ran the Taiwan government. They staffed nearly all of the positions. All the senior military positions in the military were occupied by "mainlanders." Only the draftees were Taiwanese. indigenous.

The Taiwanese ran the economy. Taiwan was just beginning to change from a wholly agrarian society into one built on light industry. What had happened was that the Nationalist had pushed through land reform. This was billed as one of their greatest democratic innovations. It was that, but a major reason for land reform was to break the power of the wealthy Taiwanese land owners. That is what happened, but unlike the mainland, where the land owners were executed, the Nationalist bought off the Taiwan land owners. They gave them government bonds and shares of government-owned corporations. So, in fact, the Nationalists transformed the Taiwanese land-owning gentry into a Taiwanese entrepreneurial class. These were the people that were the pioneers in the industrialization of Taiwan. Initially, they focused in textile production and other exportable items using the resources they had received from the government.

That is the origin of Taiwan's transformation from an agrarian society to a light industrial production nation. By the time I left in 1965 - the same year during which we ceased economic assistance to the ROC (it was "graduated") - this transformation was well established, after only four or five years. Another thing happening was the return of students from American

universities and graduate schools. They transferred both government and economy.

*Q: Is that because most of the “mainlanders” were of bureaucratic inclination - not entrepreneurs - or was there some other reasons?*

FELDMAN: Most of them were government officials and military officers. The “mainland” entrepreneurial class had come to Hong Kong, not Taiwan. They developed Hong Kong as light industry exporting base. Within the cadre of the government bureaucrats that fled to Taiwan were people who did become involved in economic issues because the Nationalist government, when in power on the mainland, had operated banks and some industries. They transferred those skills to Taiwan and replicated what they had done on the mainland. The government established banks on the island; it founded the China Steel corporation, China Petroleum, Taiwan Sugar and something called Taiwan Tobacco and Alcohol Monopoly corporation which made beer and cigarettes. So some of the bureaucrats also became economic powerhouses.

*Q: Was there a conflict between government owned industry and privately held industry?*

FELDMAN: Not much. The government part of the economic sector is just beginning to fade out starting a couple of years ago as the government began to privatize the major government corporations. There are still many that are still government controlled. Many will continue to be quasi-government controlled. For example, in the telecommunications industry, the government will continue to control a 30-40% interest in China Telecom.

*Q: Did the land owning class have an affinity for business?*

FELDMAN: What happened was that it sent its children off to be educated in the U.S., as did the “mainland” government bureaucrats. Pretty soon, these students returned from Wharton, Harvard, MIT etc with MBAs or other degrees. That started the second transformation of Taiwan’s industry from a mainly import-substitution one to an export driven powerhouse. I am now talking about the late 1960s and early 1970s.

*Q: On the political side, did you in the early 1960s, observe a Taiwan independence movement?*

FELDMAN: The Taiwan independence movement existed primarily outside of Taiwan because anyone on the island suspected of being associated with it was subject to arrest and imprisonment on Green Island as a political dissident. There was a Taiwan independence movement (“TIM”) and something called “World United Formosans for Independence (“Wufi”). “Wufi” was mostly a U.S. based organization and TIM existed mostly in Japan.

*Q: There was no pretense of democracy?*

FELDMAN: There was a pretense of democracy. There were local elections - village and county - but there always was a question of who could enter the race. Essentially, only KMT members and independents approved by the KMT, could get on the ballot. The elections tended to be pretty much rigged.

The parliament is called the “Legislative Yuan.” Most of seats in that body were held by those who had been elected on the mainland in 1947. As I said, the government in Taiwan still considered itself to be the government of all China; so I would be invited to have tea with the “Senator from Chingdao” or another town or province on the mainland. This was 1964. But Chinese live a long time. What would happen is that if the representative from Chingdao died, the person who had been the runner-up, if still living and on Taiwan, would take that seat. That is the way things were done until much, much later in the 1980s.

*Q: Who was the ambassador?*

FELDMAN: Our ambassador when I was at the language school was Everett Drumright, who had been my CG [consul general] in Hong Kong. By the time I joined the embassy, the ambassador was a former admiral, Jerauld Wright. In between, Alan Kirk had served as ambassador; he was also a former admiral and had been appointed by President Kennedy - and FSO Roger Kirk’s father. Kirk ran afoul of Chiang Kai Shek who refused to receive him; so in the end the U.S. government had no choice but to remove Kirk and replace him with Wright.

*Q: How large was the embassy?*

FELDMAN: I really don’t know. The political section had about five people; the economic section about the same. The consular section was somewhat larger - six or seven. There was a fairly large CIA station, headed by Ray Cline. Then there was the MAAG, and AID mission until it was phased out.

Ray Cline had the closest relationship with the ROC government. He had a particularly close relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo, the “Gimo’s” son and heir, who became president in 1975. Jerauld Wright never seemed to do very much or be around very much. Essentially he would go to the officers’ club and drink with his old Navy buddies. He was not much of a presence in the embassy. Ralph Clough, the DCM, pretty well ran things. Ralph now teaches at SAIS.

*Q: Besides the Status of Forces agreement, were there any other major issues between the two governments? They undoubtedly encouraged us to keep our hard line on the PRC.*

FELDMAN: They did. They also periodically would stage a commando raid on the China coast. Usually, their commandos would be entirely wiped out, but the ROC always claimed major success. They had troops on off-shore islands - Matsu and Quemoy - and a number of smaller islands. We kept trying during my tour to convince the ROC to withdraw from these islands. They did from the smaller islands and they reduced the number of the troops on the two main ones. But in fact, there are garrisons on Matsu and Quemoy still today.

*Q: Are there any other comments on your Taiwan tour that you would like to make?*

FELDMAN: There is one other item I might mention. In 1965, there was a tie vote in the UN on the “important question” resolution. This declared that any change in deciding who would represent China was to be considered an “important question.” The movement to admit the PRC had started earlier and build up to the tie vote in 1965. But the great “Cultural Revolution” took

place in 1966 - the era of great madness on the mainland. At that point, China seemed to be in such disarray - chaotic and insane - that the votes in support of seating it in the UN dropped precipitously.

*Q: Was diplomatic representation in Taiwan at that point affected by some countries which recognized the PRC?*

FELDMAN: Yes. For example, there was never a British embassy in Taiwan. They had a consulate in Tanshui (Tamsui), which was a little town about 20-30 minute drive from Taipei on the seacoast. That consulate had been there for about a century. The British were one of the first to recognize the PRC and never established an embassy in Taiwan, primarily to protect their interests in Hong Kong. Also the Labor Party was in power in 1949; it may have felt some affinity with the Chinese communists.

*Q: The British have always been in the forefront of accepting the fait accompli and accepting de facto situations.*

FELDMAN: I guess that is right. But in the Chinese situation, the British had had some bad experiences with the Nationalists going back to the general strikes of the 1920s which spread to Hong Kong. The strikes took place in major cities, like Canton, Shanghai and Hong King. So the British never really liked the Nationalists from that time on.

*Q: How about some of other allies, like the French?*

FELDMAN: De Gaulle changed French policy in 1965 after the tie vote in the UN. He shifted recognition from ROC to the PRC. The French left Taiwan that year and that was the first major defection. The ROC in those days had its own version of the Hallstein doctrine; that is if a country recognized the PRC, the ROC would break relationship with that country. Twenty years later, the ROC was not so picky; it was glad to have relations with any one that would do so. But in the early 1960s, it still maintained that countries could have relationship with the ROC or the PRC, but not both.

The French broke their relationship, but no others did, again because the “Cultural Revolution” on the mainland gave everybody pause, particularly when the Red Guards surrounded foreign legations and even assaulted some of them. So no one was going to establish a mission in Beijing. The “Cultural Revolution” started in 1966, after I had left Taiwan. I was by then in Hong Kong which became a locus of the “Cultural Revolution.”

*Q: So after your tour in Taiwan, you were appointed to a position in Hong Kong. How did that come about?*

FELDMAN: I mentioned that Hong Kong was our first post and one is usually in love with his or her first post. My wife, Carol, wanted desperately to get back to Hong Kong. In those days, there were discussions of a unified Foreign Service encompassing both State and USIA personnel. Volunteers from USIA were solicited to take State Department assignments and vice versa. I volunteered on the understanding that I would be assigned to Hong Kong. And that is what

happened in 1966.

We had home leave in 1965 and at the beginning of 1966, I was assigned to USIS-Hong Kong. It as a very mixed experience. It was a tour of five years which combined great difficulties and sadness and some elation as well.

I was first assigned as “book publications” officer. The PAO, Ken Boyle, had been a classmate at the Taichung language school. His wife, Betsy, had been the linguist at Taichung. But I was assigned to work for someone whose name I have forgotten. I was the junior publications officer and he was the senior book officer. In those days, we were actually writing books and commissioning books from others. It was part of the anti-PRC propaganda effort by USIS-Hong Kong.

I didn't fit into this program terribly well. I did write a book, after a contract with a Brit named George Patterson fell apart. It was to be a book on border conflicts between the PRC and the USSR. He turned in a manuscript which was pretty much unusable. I had to re-write the whole book. It was entitled “The Unquiet Frontier.” Patterson's name was kept on it, but I actually wrote it.

But I didn't get along with my boss and he gave me a terrible efficiency rating. It was sufficiently bad so that I ended up in the lowest 5-10% of my class - for the first time ever. I received a warning letter. I was obviously very unhappy. Ken Boyle reassigned me to be the Press Officer, which suited me very well. I enjoyed that assignment.

Shortly thereafter, Ken Boyle was replaced by Sandy Marlowe. Sandy and I got along splendidly. We just had a great relationship - almost like a father-son relationship. He was considerably older and was on his last assignment prior to retirement. He had no China experience; his last post had been in Germany - I think he was the PAO (or deputy PAO) in Bonn. We got along like gang-busters. I was the Press Officer during the Vietnam war. There were approximately 110 correspondents residing in Hong Kong. Some of them would dart off to cover the war on the ground. Others covered Vietnam from Hong Kong from their hotel rooms.

Sandy was a real “Vietnam hawk.” I was not much of a “hawk”; in fact I was not a “hawk” at all. I enjoyed dealing with the press; it was great fun. I became a sort of “big wheel” in the foreign correspondents community.

*Q: What did the Press Officer do?*

FELDMAN: The Press Officer issues press releases, but most of his time is taken up by fielding questions from the local and the foreign press. There was also a lot of “schmoozing.” I would go out and have lunch with Chinese editors or western foreign correspondents. I had a wide circle of friends and I really enjoyed being the Press Officer.

My Book Officer job lasted about nine months - or a year. In 1967, I became the Press Officer and did that for about a year.

*Q: Let me interrupt for one moment. In the posts in which I have served, the Press Officer was a pseudo member of the political section because so much information comes to that section. Did you have responsibility as being the spokesman on Hong Kong matters?*

FELDMAN: I was the spokesman, but our Consul General, Ed Rice, essentially believed that if you saw the name "American Consulate General" in a local newspaper, it indicated that the Press Officer was not doing his job. As far as he was concerned, the Press Officer's primary responsibility was to keep the American Consulate General out of the press. I thought that was rather difficult to do. Whether his policy was good or bad, was immaterial. The world does not work that way. Ed would inevitably be upset and I was the one who would get angry telephone calls, but there was nothing I or anyone else could do about the press.

But I did have a lot fun in many ways. I might just relate one story as an illustration. Congressman Passman came to Hong Kong. He was a powerful member of the House Appropriations Committee. For some inexplicit reason, I was assigned to take Passman to Macao. His excuse for going there was that we had a refugee operation run by the Catholic Relief organization and funded by the U.S. What he really wanted to do was to look for a Chinese prostitute. To do so in Hong Kong would have run the risk of discovery; Macao was much safer. So to cover his real purpose, he also visited the refugee center.

When we got back to Hong Kong on a Friday evening, he wanted to hold a press conference the next day. He didn't care about the local press; he wanted the American correspondents. To hold such a conference on a Saturday morning, was just not realistic - they were just not going to attend a Saturday press conference for Passman or almost anyone else. So I phoned around to some of my friends. I got the local representative of Bulova Watch Company, who happened to be from Boston. So he came under the guise of being the correspondent for the "Boston Globe." I got other friends also to attend and to play the role of correspondents and introduced them as representing one or another American newspaper. They were great; they gloated in their newfound glory. They asked question after question. I must say they were tougher and more interesting than the regular working correspondents. At the end of the conference, Passman wiped his sweat from his brow and said to me: "That was a great press conference and you said it wouldn't happen!"

Another story concerned the time that Richard Nixon came through on his way to Vietnam. This took place in February, 1967. The presidential campaign - for the party nomination - had already started. Ed Rice, who was an old China hand, despised Nixon; he was not going to have anything to do with him. So he sent me to the airport to meet him - former Vice President and senator. I went to the airport and met Nixon. I had been clever enough to burrow the Rolls Royce from the Mandarin Hotel to take us from the airport. That put me in his good graces. He was staying at the Mandarin, so to get that service was no great feat, but I am very glad that we did that.

He liked being taken to the hotel in the Rolls Royce. He was accompanied by Ray Price who was his speech writer. Nixon stayed for a couple of days. He left on a Sunday. I asked the Mandarin to make the Rolls available again. We went to the airport. Nixon was supposed to fly on an Air France flight to Saigon. It was supposed to leave around 9:30 a.m. We got to the airport at about 8:30 and went to the VIP lounge. We were then told that the flight was delayed for about a half-

hour or an hour at the most. Nixon turned to me and opined that we would not leave before noon. When I asked him why he thought that, he said:” If anything bad can happen to me, it will.”

The three of us set in the VIP lounge and waited. Nixon was right; the plane did not leave until noon or even later. Every once in a while we would walk around the airport which on a Sunday morning was essentially dead - even the shops were closed. So there was really nothing to do, but sit in the VIP lounge and chat. He asked me a number of questions about China after he found out that I knew something about it.

*Q: Let me ask you about your house during your second Hong Kong tour.*

FELDMAN: It was a lovely house. When we returned to Hong Kong in 1965, we were told that the second floor of a two apartment house might be available, but we might have to wait a bit because the tenant, the Agricultural Attaché, would be moving out in about a month. We looked at the quarters; they were absolutely marvelous. It had three bedrooms, three baths, a large living and dining rooms, nice kitchen, but what attracted us the most was that the house was on a little rise in the Stanley area - in the back of Hong Kong. It was on Stanley Mound Road - ”Mound” because it was smaller than a hill, but elevated nevertheless. It was elevated enough so that with the gorgeous wrap-around veranda that the apartment had, we could see both bays - Stanley is a peninsula and we could see the waters on either side.

That was truly marvelous. I would come home from work in the evening and I could see fishing boats on the water, even in the dark when they turned their lights on to attract the fish. I would sit on the veranda with a drink and watch for a long time those lights bobbing on the bays. It was quite beautiful. There was also a very large garden and for the first time in my life I tried hard at gardening, which I’ve come to love in retirement.

But I should add that something very sad happened in Hong Kong. My first marriage came apart. Carol had been a ballet dancer before we were married and before we joined the Foreign Service. She loved to dance, but she couldn’t perform as the wife of Foreign Service officer, in light of our constant moves. She would get started with a teacher or by forming a troop, but it became increasingly difficult as we got older - in our thirties. Physically, it just became too tough. She became very depressed. There was even an automobile accident which just might have been a suicide attempt. By the end of the second Hong Kong tour, she had decided that the Foreign Service life was not for her. When we returned to Washington for my next assignment, we separated and subsequently divorced. That was very sad, particularly because we had two children - Ross Christopher and Peter Dylan. Although both were away at school, it was tough on both, particularly on Peter. It had a major and harmful effect on his life.

*Q: That really illustrates the difficulties of Foreign Service life, especially in the days when the spouses wanted to have their own careers. These days, many do that, but not in the 1960s.*

FELDMAN: These days, the Foreign Service is a bit better, although it is still tough for parents. In the old days, the officer’s efficiency report very often commented on the spouse and her suitability for Foreign service life. It was particularly difficult for a spouse interested in the creative arts. Within that category, I suspect it is particularly difficult for a dancer because of the

physical demands.

*Q: I think you are right because not all posts offer opportunities for a dancer. Let us go to the next assignment.*

FELDMAN: I was assigned to Washington in the Office of UN Political Affairs. I was to work particularly on the question of Chinese representation in the UN. This was 1970 when the U.S. was still supporting the membership of the ROC on Taiwan and trying to keep the PRC out of the UN. The tactics that we used was our insistence that the representation issue was “important question.” We would lobby our friends and allies each year to support our position that the issue of which of the two governments would represent China in the UN was an “important question” within the meaning of the Charter. The Charter stipulated that an “important question” required the approval of two-thirds of the UN General Assembly members.

I should mentioned that the ROC even in 1970 still claimed to be the sole legitimate government of all of China, just as the PRC made the same claim. In both cases, all of China included Taiwan, as the PRC still claims today. The ROC no longer makes that claim; it restricts its sovereignty to the territory it actually governs - Taiwan and some islands.

My responsibility in 1970 was to organize support for our “important question” position; we did that through representations in various capitals, using demarches. Then I was to go to New York to coordinate strategies.

It quickly became apparent that our policy was receiving less and less support. The number of countries that were switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC was growing each year. By 1970, a majority of UN members recognized the PRC; that made it even more important that we stick to the “important question” position which required the two-third majority. It was also clear that the day when we could not muster a two-third majority was rapidly approaching. So I began to write a series of internal memoranda addressed to other members of the Bureau of International Organizations (IO), suggesting that we switch to a policy of dual representation. In fact, we would say that both the ROC and the PRC should be both represented in the UN.

In 1970, my suggestion was flatly rejected. We held to our usual position that year, although several of our allies, like Belgium and Canada, urged that we switch to dual representation. We didn't and we won very narrowly. Our weak position became even clearer as we entered the spring of 1971; it was by then certain that unless we changed our policy, we would be outvoted in the next General Assembly session.

The NSC asked us to study the question - a National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) - which we did. We provided the options: a) we could continue our past policy and probably lose (that might have been ok because we would have gone down fighting); b) try something new like dual representations. In our view, these were the only two options; there were not the expected “three options.” It was either sticking to our position and being out-voted, or try dual representation. There might have been a variant, which Kissinger might have liked, which was to follow the old policy, but not to try too hard. Unbeknown to us, while we were writing the NSSM, Kissinger was already working on the details of his “secret” trip to China to be worked

out through the good offices of Pakistan.

When we had finished the study, we sent it to the White House. Our recommendation was for option “b” - dual representation. We made a strong case for that course saying that both governments should be seated pending some final resolution of the two governments’ dispute - e.g. reunification of China. We cited the example of what had been done for North and South Korea, and East and West Germany. We believed that these models could be replicated in the China situation and that we could muster enough support in the UN to pass our resolution of dual representation.

We waited for an answer. We waited, and waited and waited. Finally in early July 1971, I asked permission from the head of IO-UNP, Jack Armitage, to take some leave. He approved my request because nothing seemed to be happening on the question of China representation. I went to Chincoteague with the family. One day as I was sitting in the kitchen of our cottage, I heard on the radio that Henry Kissinger had been in Beijing and that Nixon would be going to China the following year. I was absolutely flabbergasted and shocked and wondered what would happen to our UN policy.

I hurried back to Washington. Still we had no answer from the White House. Instead we were told that the president was going to send a special envoy to Taiwan to see Chiang Kai-shek to discuss with him the dual representation policy and to hopefully get his agreement. Robert Murphy, the former ambassador, was chosen for this task. He was very distinguished and crusty. Murphy went, only to be told by Chiang Kai-shek that he would rather be a piece of broken jade lying smashed on the floor than a whole tile on a roof. Murphy said that he agreed with the Generalissimo’s position. So instead of giving an objective analysis of the situation, Murphy basically bolstered Chiang Kai-shek’s belief that if the U.S. worked hard enough, the ROC position would win again.

It was fairly clear that regardless of how hard the U.S. might work for the “important question” resolution, it would not win enough support. But we were still stymied at the end of July. If we were going to be successful in selling the dual representation proposal, we had to start very quickly, making demarches through out the world. It wasn’t until sometime in early August that we got the go ahead from the White House to start the process to gaining support for dual representation in the General Assembly. We raised the question of what was to be done in the Security Council - who would get the China seat there? We were bound to be asked that. The answer was that we would cross that bridge when we come to it. That was not enough guidance; we had to know what we would say to countries who wanted to know what would happen in the Security Council. The answer came back that the Security Council would decide on its own membership. We then noted that we would have to vote on the question; what would be our position? The NSC told us to say that we had not yet made up our minds.

It was also unclear whether the ROC would help us in our efforts. That they didn’t have too many friends, but they had some.

*Q: I would like to make a point at this juncture. The timing of all actions on China representation hinge on the meeting of the General Assembly which starts in early September.*

FELDMAN: That is right. The General Assembly convenes on the third Tuesday or Wednesday in September each year. So here we were in August, without clear directions. We were prohibited from saying anything definitive about our future position in the Security Council. It was unclear whether the ROC would help us in our efforts, but we were told to proceed.

So we did. A task force was formed under the chairmanship of Martin Hertz, the deputy assistant secretary in IO. He was nominally in charge, but the actual day to day operations of the task force was my responsibility together with Linwood Starbird, another FSO and a Chinese language officer, who at the time was working on the ROC desk in Bureau of East Asian Affairs (EA). I was also helped from time to time by Tom Shoesmith, who was the country director for ROC affairs - later ambassador to New Zealand. But essentially Starbird and I did all the work; we were the ones who held the meetings with representatives from just about every embassy in Washington. We were trying to explain our policy.

Basically the issue was framed not as the expulsion of a member (ROC) and the admittance of a new member (PRC). The question for years had been framed as "How is China to be represented in the UN?" In earlier reiterations, the next question would have been "Is it to be represented by the ROC or the PRC?" In 1971, we reframed the issue to "China exists in two parts: one government in Taiwan, one on the mainland. Each of these parts should be represented in the UN, until some resolution of the status of the two was found." We used, as I said earlier, the East-West Germany model.

That is what we explained. The immediate question asked us was what position would we take on China's Security Council seat. Our answer was that the Council would have to decide its own membership and we would make our decision when the issue was to be discussed in the SC. It wasn't until the General assembly had already convened in September, that we were finally allowed - by the White House - to say that the SC would decide the issue of representation, but that we felt that the PRC should properly occupy the SC seat. That made our sales job a little easier.

Then there were technical questions such as "Should we do the "important question" resolution again or should the GA just vote on the two competing resolutions - i.e. the Albanian resolution which called for the expulsion from the UN of the "representatives of Chang Kai-shek" - it did use the term "The Republic of China" - or the U.S. and others resolution, which called for the seating of both the PRC and the ROC. We finally took the position that the issue should remain an "important question."

Then came the issue what would happen after the passage of the "important resolution." Was it advantageous to take up the Albanian resolution first and have it fail to gain support of two-thirds of the UN membership which make the passage of our resolution much easier? Or should our resolution come first and hopefully gain the two-thirds majority? We consulted with most of the governments in the world; I was working around the clock and so was Starbird. These were heady days for a mid career FSO (I think I was an FSO 3 at the time.) My home phone was linked by the White House Communications Agency (WHCA) so that I could receive directly calls from all over the world at all times of the night - and I got lots of those. This was great stuff

for an FSO who had not too long before been placed in the lowest 5% of his class. I was giving daily instructions to our representative in New York; his name was George Bush. I used to say :”George, we would like you to do this or that” or “George, please go see so and so.”

One day, towards the end of September, John Holdridge, a member of Kissinger’s NSC, asked me to have lunch with him. This was very unusual; I had never been invited by Holdridge, whom I had known for years, to break bread with him. So we met in a little sandwich shop near the old Executive Office. He wanted to know when I thought that the vote on dual representation would come up. It is always difficult to figure out what the GA’s schedule might be, but I said that if I had to guess, I would say the first or second week in November. I later learned that Kissinger decided to make his second visit to Beijing sometime late in the first week or early in the second week in November. It was announced that he would be there at the time; it was exactly when the UN vote on dual representation took place.

We lost on the “important question” issue by 55 countries in favor, 59 opposed, 15 abstained. If we could have switched two voted from the “opposed” column to the “in favor” one, there would have been a tied vote which under the UN rules would have given the victory to the proponents. We came that close even with Kissinger in Beijing negotiating with Zhou En-lai. Someone asked me later what it was like to live through these days. I said that it was like being in a race with the coach having instructed you not to leave the starting line even while the other runners were off. Then when the others had taken a good lead, the coach allowed his runner to go. Strangely enough the late starter caught up and in fact even took a slight lead when the coach called the runner to the sidelines and instructed him to put on a weight belt. Again, the late starter catches up again, only to have the coach stop him to add more weight to the belt. That was about the way our UN process went. I think that except for Kissinger’s visit, we would have won the “important question” issue and then we could have won on the dual representation question.

People have asked me that if we had won on these two questions, would the PRC have joined the UN? - it had in fact rejected our compromise. If they had not joined, the issue of UN representation would have been left unresolved. My answer was that even under those circumstances, a lot would have been resolved. We would have made it clear that U.S. policy was to have relations with both PRC and the ROC. That would have had a major effect on what our situation is today - which I will discuss later. We recognize the PRC, but not the government on Taiwan. We refuse to recognize Taiwan as a state - as it is. So had we won on dual representation, history would have been far different. I think that ultimately, had we insisted on dual representation, the PRC would have joined the UN just as we had East and West Germany and North and South Korea. But that is not what happened.

*Q: Let me go back in the story to the time when you made your initial recommendation. What were the internal dynamics in the Department when you went to the NSC with your recommendation for dual UN membership? What did EA think of it?*

FELDMAN: EA at the time was headed by Marshal Green; his senior deputy was Winthrop Brown. They weren’t completely sold on the idea, but they didn’t oppose it. They were guardedly in favor of dual representation. Later, after we had permission to proceed with that proposal, I toured a number of countries in the company of that very elegant and distinguished

FSO, Winthrop Brown. In those days, a deputy assistant secretary of State was a mighty and powerful figure. A DAS was a very senior officer and probably had served as ambassador once or twice, as Brown had - not like today when a DAS tends to be a 32 year old refugee from Capitol Hill or a White House intern.

There was opposition to the proposal primarily from Louise McNutt in EA. She was the daughter of a former secretary of the interior and governor of the Philippines. Louise felt very strongly that this was a terrible thing to do to an old ally - the ROC. I could not persuade her that the proposal was not an insult to the ROC; we were trying to preserve a place for it in the UN.

*Q: I just want to note for the record here that Louise McNutt was a relic of earlier days when Ruth Bacon was around. She was there when I first came into EA which was then headed by Walter Robertson. I thought then the first priority in EA was to keep mainland China out of the UN. That explains McNutt's position.*

FELDMAN: We used to joke that the role of Ruth Bacon and Louise McNutt was not only to keep China out of the UN, but to keep it out of everything including the International Jock-strap Convention, had there been such a thing.

The other bitter opponent was Jay Long, a colleague in IO in the same office that I was in (UNP). His position was more nuanced. Jay simply felt that it was unbecoming to switch from complete support of the ROC; he wanted the U.S. to continue its old policy and if that meant a loss in the UN, so be it.

Those were the two principal voices in opposition. Louise fortunately could not persuade the assistant secretary or his deputy to oppose the proposal; neither could Jay Long persuade the IO leadership - Martin Hertz or Sam De Palma, the assistant secretary.

*Q: What were the repercussions after the vote?*

FELDMAN: On the day when our position on the "important question" was defeated, the ROC delegation announced it was withdrawing from the General Assembly. This was a typical Chinese ploy - "you can't fire us; we quit." But that didn't stop the GA from approving the Albanian resolution - by a very large majority (something like 75 in favor and 30 opposed). The technicalities of this outcome were interesting. A vote in the GA applies only to the GA; it does not apply to any other UN body, except those which are essentially sub-groups of the GA - certain committees and commissions. All the UN specialized agencies are independent of the GA. So what happened thereafter, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim - of odious memory - sent out a memorandum to all of the specialized agencies summarizing the actions of the GA and requesting that each of the specialized agencies consider whether they wished to follow suit. Just about all of these agencies, over the period of the following two years, did oust the ROC except two: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund - both only loosely related to the UN. These financial institutions use weighted voting; i.e. the number of votes depend on the amount of the contributions. The U.S. today has 17% of the vote; I think in the 1970s, we had 20%. For the next nine years, the ROC remained a member of these two financial institutions even though it was no longer a member of the GA or the Security Council or any of the specialized agencies.

*Q: What about relations between IO and the UN mission? What was your view from Washington?*

FELDMAN: During the CHIREP debate, there were no problems. At the conclusion of the 1970 GA, I had been asked whether I would take an assignment to our UN mission because it was clear that there would be a major battle in China representation in the following meeting. I had first agreed, but then I had to change my mind because it was during this time that Carol and I were going through marriage counseling in the hopes of saving our marriage. I just couldn't go to New York. I was asked to find someone who could fill the China portfolio in our UN mission. I asked Harry Thayer, a distinguished FSO, a Chinese language officer - he was a fellow student at the Taichung school. Harry did go and joined the political section. We worked very closely in the following twelve months and we never had any problems - unlike what I saw later when I was one of the ambassadors in New York. We worked very cooperatively. George Bush was an easy person to work with. He never took umbrage at the fact that a mid-career FSO was in effect giving him his instructions each day. So I had a very good relationship with our UN mission.

*Q: Then what was your next assignment?*

FELDMAN: As soon as the vote had taken place in the UN, I was assigned to a working group which dealt with President Nixon's February 1972 visit to China. I was asked to write the background papers on U.S. relations with the ROC. I was hoping I would be invited to go on the trip. The Secretary of State was William Rogers, a very nice guy, who I would have to say understood almost nothing about China and our policy. He had, as is well known, been cut entirely out of the action by Henry Kissinger.

Rogers was going to go on the trip as was Marshall Green. As a member of the working group, I had to brief Rogers on the situation and what issues might arise in Beijing. Alexis Johnson, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, was also one of the briefers as was Al Jenkins, the director of the Office of Mainland Communist Affairs - i.e. the China desk. Marshall Green briefed A/SO. I was obviously the most junior member of this group. Rogers would postulate different scenarios - "If they say this, can I say that?" It was a total clanger. Johnson would sort of hem and haw as did Jenkins. Marshall would sort of dodge the question. So it was left to me to tell Rogers that his answer was not quite appropriate; he then wanted to know what was wrong with his answer. So I would try to explain while the others would just sit and nod. But I was left exposed as the "expert." In the end, I was cut from the list of the people who would go to Beijing. The special working group disbanded at the end of January.

*Q: What happened next?*

FELDMAN: In 1972, I was invited to join the Policy Planning Staff (S/SP) to be the China expert. I accepted and stayed there for about one year until early 1973. Then I was assigned as political counselor in our mission to Taiwan.

*Q: What was the role of S/SP in 1972?*

FELDMAN: The role of S/SP depends on who the secretary is and who the director of the staff is. In my time, we did very little policy planning. This was the grand era of quantification. I forget what silly acronyms we gave to these exercises, but we had to assign numerical values to everything the Department did. We had to break down all the embassies' tasks and assign numerical values to them. Somehow, we were supposed to make these numbers add up to something meaningful, but I have yet to understand what they were supposed to do. That was what S/SP was deeply involved in 1972. It also wrote speeches for the secretary. It didn't do much else.

This was not my cup of tea. I was never a math major. I participated fitfully in the number exercise and occasionally I would even have a chance to write some policy papers on U.S. relations with China and Taiwan. This did not happen to often.

Sometimes I would get dragged off to a meeting in some other part of the world. In late 1971, I remember Bill Cargo, the director, took me to a NATO planners' meeting because one of the subjects to be discussed was China. That meeting took place in Germany. It was my first time in Germany - or Europe for that matter. We were taken to a castle (a Schloss) somewhere down the Rhine. This did not look like a Disney version of a castle; it looked more like a large house. It had belonged to the Hohenzollern family - the home of the former rulers of Germany. It was a very pleasant sojourn.

This was during the days of the Bader-Meinhoff gang and the "Red Army faction." So we had a tight security process to protect all of these NATO planners. There were a lot of hard-looking Germans with crew cuts walking around carrying briefcases with one hand stuck inside them. I kept on thinking how strange this situation was; under other circumstances, I, as an American Jew, would not have been guarded by some German security types. But it was fun. I remember that at lunch and dinner each table had a pitcher of local wine. That was great.

*Q: How did your assignment to Taiwan come about?*

FELDMAN: Bill Gleysteen, to whom I use to call the "finest Foreign Service officer of his generation" was the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) in Taiwan. (In 1973, we still had an embassy in Taipei.) He asked that I be assigned to Taipei as political counselor. I was delighted with the assignment; my marriage was over and I was divorced. In fact, during my S/P days I was living in a basement apartment in Adams-Morgan - I referred to it as my "cave." I was just scraping by since most of my income went to my ex-wife. I also was paying for private school for my two children. So I was happy to get an overseas assignment where my housing would be provided by the government.

I was very happy to work with Bill. The ambassador was Walter McConaughy, who was a strange person. He had been involved with China for many, many years. He had begun as a junior FSO in China in the 1930s. He had worked in many consulates in China. During the war, he remained in the Service and held a number of different jobs. After the war, he became director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. So he had been involved with China for about 40 years; he never learned a word of Chinese. I referred to Chiang Kai-shek as "Chee-Ang." McConaughy was from Alabama and that didn't help his pronunciation. The basic Chinese "thank you"

(Hsieh-hsieh) would be pronounced as “Chi-Chi.” That was somewhat disconcerting when one realized that he had been working in the Chinese vineyards for 40 years.

He was on old line FSO. At this point, he was not too deeply involved; Gleysteen ran the show - fortunately. I had a strange political section. The best officer - Joe Lake - in the section was also the most junior. Much later, he became the DCM in Bulgaria, ambassador to Mongolia and then Albania. He retired about a year ago after a stint as “Diplomat In Residence” at the University of Texas at Austin.

Joe was the most junior and most valuable member of the staff. My deputy was not much good; I had a integrated “spook” - CIA man who had a marvelous gift of gab, but never did any work. Whenever I would ask him to do something, he would say that he would love to do that, but that he was really tied down by his other job. I said I understood; one day, the CIA station chief came to me to say that I had to stop loading his man down with so much work; he was so busy that he couldn't do any of the CIA work. I don't think I ever learned what this officer was doing, but he was a “good old boy” from Arkansas; he taught me how to hot-wire a car.

*Q: What were the issues at the embassy at the time?*

FELDMAN: President Nixon had been to Beijing; the Shanghai communiqué had been signed and issued. The key phrase in that was that the U.S. recognized that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits agreed that there was only one China of which Taiwan was one part and that the U.S. did not contest this conclusion.

By 1973, 18 months after the presidential visit, after several Kissinger's visits to the mainland and after the PRC's entrance into the UN, most countries had switched from Taipei to Beijing. Only a few continued their formal relations with the ROC. Those that had established relations with the PRC had recognized the PRC as the sole legitimate government of all of China, including Taiwan. The PRC insisted that this phraseology be included in all recognition communiqués.

What the embassy was doing was essentially trying to get the people on Taiwan used to the idea that the day was coming when “we would complete normalization.” - a euphemism that indicated that we would switch recognition ourselves from Taipei to Beijing. That was U.S. policy. An illustration of the consequences of this policy was the departure of the 13<sup>th</sup> Air Force which moved its headquarters from Taiwan to the Philippines.

When I arrived in Taiwan, we had major Air Force units on the islands. By the end of 1973, they were gone. We had a large MAAG in 1972 - something like 6000 officers and men - ; by the end of 1973 it was down to 2000 and declining. We had nuclear weapons on Taiwan which were stored on an Air Force base in the south. By the end of 1973 or the beginning of 1974, I was assigned to oversee their removal and their return to U.S. territory - probably to Hawaii.

So it was quite clear that we were reducing our presence on Taiwan in major ways. We had established a liaison office on Beijing; we had appointed David Bruce, a senior and distinguished diplomat, to head that office; he was followed by George Bush. So I thought it was quite clear

that had “Watergate” not intervened, normalization would have been completed by the end of Nixon’s second term. There was no doubt that that was what was going to happen. So part of the embassy’s task was to prepare the people of Taiwan prepared for that day.

*Q: How did they take to our efforts?*

FELDMAN: We had go through a funny dance. Every time we would hint that “normalization” was coming, the government would issue a statement denying that such action would ever take place. So we had a push-pull situation with us saying that it was going to happen and the ROC denying it. The result was confusion for which both the ROC and we paid a price during the Carter administration when we did break relations with the ROC, because the people in Taiwan were not sufficiently prepared for this break - nor were we, I should say.

Walter McConaughy was replaced in the spring of 1974 by Leonard Unger who had been our excellent ambassador in Thailand. He did a very good job in Taiwan.

I had a very good time at the embassy. I was in Taiwan as a bachelor. I had remembered Taiwan as a straight-laced society of the 1960s, when I first served there. By the 1970s, it was different standard. I was having a marvelous time dating Chinese women or expatiate foreigners. Ultimately, at a volleyball game, one Saturday afternoon at a home of a friend, Tony Tidei (which sounds like “today,” which in Chinese is Jintien; so he was known as Tony Jintien)... He had a house in Tanshui, a suburb of Taipei. We had constructed a volleyball court and a swimming pool on his property. For the swimming pool, we dug a monster ditch and lined with a tarp and filled it with a hose. It was a primitive swimming pool, but it felt good after a hot day at volleyball.

One day, I met an American graduate school, Laurie Sherman, who had received her BA in Chinese studies from Cornell University. She was in Taiwan working on her Chinese language at a local Chinese teachers college. We dated a couple of times. During one volley ball game, she sprained her ankle severely. So I took her to a hospital and that was the beginning of an increasing friendship and she ultimately moved in with me. Not only was that acceptable in Taiwan, but even the Foreign Service accepted it. Not many objected to the fact that we were “living in sin.” I would take Laurie to embassy parties and dinners; no one said anything about it and it worked our very well. In 1975, when I was transferred to Washington, we got married.

*Q: What was embassy life like after all of the other missions were closed?*

FELDMAN: We never had that much to do with other missions. So we may have missed them, but we were certainly not lonely. Also, by 1973, there weren’t that many left. Fortunately, for the political, economic and commercial sections, our focus was all on the Chinese of Taiwan. We just didn’t spend much time with other missions. We spent a certain amount of time with other U.S. government employees, such as the MAAG, the Taiwan Defense Command, which still existed, but most of our time was devoted to the local people.

The local people could be divided broadly into two groups: The Taiwanese and the mainlanders. The Taiwanese were descendants of Chinese who had immigrated to Taiwan in the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup>

centuries - and a few in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. But most of their ancestors had come to the island between roughly 1640 and 1820.

The mainlanders were those who had followed Chiang Kai-Shek to Taiwan in 1948 and 1949 after the Nationalists lost the civil war.

This different ancestry resulted in a division of labor. The mainlanders ran the government and occupied the higher positions in the military and security services; the Taiwanese ran the economy.

That had occurred in a strange historical process. The Chinese Nationalist took over the island after WWII when General MacArthur authorized Chiang Kai-Shek to accept the surrender of Japanese troops on Taiwan. Taiwan had been ceded to Japan by the Chinese empire after the Chinese lost the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 (under the Treaty of Shimonoseki). This treaty stipulated that Taiwan was ceded “irrevocably” by the empire of China to the empire of Japan. Thereafter, it was ruled as a Japanese territory in the same way that Hawaii and Alaska were U.S. territories.

After WWII, Nationalist troops accepted the Japanese surrender and were warmly welcomed for the most part by the people of Taiwan. That warm welcome did not last very long because the Chinese troops behaved very badly - plunder, rape, robbery. There were a series of incidents culminating in the February 28 incident of 1947. That incident started when some Chinese Nationalist troops roughed up some Taiwanese street hawkers. A crowd gathered, surrounded the troops and roughed them up. That started communal fighting. Ultimately, the Nationalist garrison was reinforced with more troops from the mainland. A large number of Taiwanese were arrested and shot.

As may have guessed, there was a certain amount of bitterness between the two people. During the communal fighting, about 10,000 Taiwanese were massacred, including intellectuals, middle class, etc. When Chiang Kai-Shek arrived in Taiwan, he and his government tried to smooth things over. One of the actions the government took was land reform. It hoped that through this, the allegiance of the small farmer could be enlisted. At the same time, land reform would have broken the power of the land magnets. It worked very effectively. The government did not confiscate the land, but actually purchased it from the owners using government bonds and in some cases, stock in government corporations.

We have always referred to Taiwan as having a “free economy,” in fact it was not. It was at best a mixed economy with major government corporations in many sectors. For example, there was a Taiwan Power - government owned - the only electric utility on the island. As I mentioned earlier, there was a Taiwan Sugar monopoly, China Petroleum, the Taiwan Wine and Tobacco Monopoly corporation; some banks were government owned. So many land owners were paid in shares in these government monopolies making them sort of joint public-private enterprises - with the major stockholder always being the government.

This government action created a Taiwanese entrepreneurial class which over time used its investments wisely and created the entrepreneurial economy of the island, leading to the division

of labor I mentioned earlier, which by 1973 was quite evident. A principal function of the embassy was monitoring Taiwanese-mainlanders relations. Of course, that was not that easy since in the political section we only had one officer who spoke Taiwanese. As I said, 85% of the population of the island is Taiwanese, who spoke their language either as their first or only one. The American Embassy, in its political section, had just one officer who spoke the native language. As a matter of fact, he was the only officer in the entire embassy who spoke Taiwanese.

*Q: I am kind of surprised that we had any officers who spoke Taiwanese. How did that happen?*

FELDMAN: Earlier wisdom had decided that some officers should be trained in Taiwanese. I might mention that we never had trained anyone in Cantonese despite our large presence in Hong Kong - the world's largest consulate. I mentioned earlier that Cantonese is Hong Kong's principal language. Until sometime in the 1970s, we never trained any officers in Cantonese; we taught them Mandarin, which was not spoken in Hong Kong. That is the State Department's logic. It is part of the Department's drive for irrelevance.

So we had the one officer who spoke Taiwanese. He was very proud of that fact, but he was thoroughly lazy; he never did a lick of work. That was too bad.

*Q: Was there any unrest while you served in Taiwan?*

FELDMAN: Yes, but sub-rosa. It didn't really boil over. No political parties were allowed on the island except for the Chinese Nationalist Part (the KMT). Taiwan was under martial law which was enforced by the Taiwan Garrison Command General Headquarters. Chiang Kai-Shek was president and there was no question he would remain so until his death. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was the deputy prime minister who ran the day-to-day operations of the government.

His other son, Chiang Wai-kuo, had a leading role in the military. He had been trained in a German military academy in the 1930s. He had been commissioned as a second lieutenant in the *Wehrmacht* and had taken part in the invasion of Poland. He was then called back to China.

The Chiangs ran a pretty tight ship. The press was totally fettered; all the media was captive. There were only three TV stations: one was owned by the national government, one was owned by the provincial government and one was owned by the Chinese Nationalist Party. There was press censorship. Taiwan had all of the attributes of an authoritarian martial law state. It may not have been as harsh as the regime on the mainland. A friend of mine described the Taiwan situation as "soft totalitarianism". People were not usually assassinated; there were midnight knocks on doors resulting in time in jail, but you weren't killed. The prisons were not harsh; they were far better than the dungeons on the mainland. Political prisoners were not mingled with murderers so that they weren't beaten bloody. Nor was a political prisoner put in the same cell as inmate with tuberculosis, as was the case on the mainland. There were political prisoners on Taiwan; as I said, they were usually sent to Green Island - not hard, but jail.

*Q: Did the embassy ever get into trouble dealing with the Taiwanese?*

FELDMAN: Oh, yes. We usually dealt with rich Taiwanese businessmen; that was ok with the government. If we dealt with known dissidents, the government would complain. Very often, I or Bill Gleysteen would be summoned to the Foreign Ministry to hear their complaint about this or that officer having been seen in the company of some notorious “criminal element” - i.e. political dissident. We did of course see some of those dissidents; we did not regard them as “criminal elements.” In the pursuit of our mandate to report on political developments on the island, we felt we had to speak to a wide variety of political opinions.

*Q: How would you characterize our relationship with the government at this time?*

FELDMAN: By this time, the UN action that I described earlier had already taken place. They could see that “normalization” with the PRC was moving forward. We had pulled the nuclear weapons off the island; our military presence was being diminished. It was fairly clear what was happening. So our relations were rather touchy. The ROC was highly suspicious. Human rights was not yet a major part of our foreign policy, but every once in a while we would mention to the ROC that we considered the arrest of people just because they held views contrary to those of the government or the KMT as not “comporting with the traditions of free China.”

*Q: Was there anyone in the government who could foresee the day when more Taiwanese would participate in the discussions of their future?*

FELDMAN: There were people in the government who knew that that would have to happen. One of the principal people who recognized the future was Chiang Ching-kuo. That is a whole story in itself. In fact a friend of mine, Jay Taylor, former FSO, has written a book on Chiang Ching-kuo; I saw the manuscript which was 850 pages long. It is being published by Harvard University Press and will be out by the end of this year. It is a marvelous book. I want to talk at great length later about Chiang Ching-kuo because he more than anyone else laid the foundation for the democratization of Taiwan.

Chung Ching-kuo had come to the conclusion sometime in the 1970s that the Kuomintang (the Chinese Nationalist Party) could not be the kind of Leninist vanguard party that it had been. Had it done so, it would have atrophied and withered. He thought that the KMT had to become a majority party which meant that it would have to be a Taiwanese party to reflect the population on the island. So he began to bring Taiwanese into the party, promoting them to positions of responsibility. His senior assistant in this process was Li Huan. Together the two worked assiduously to identify promising Taiwanese, one of whom was Lee Teng-hui, the former president of Taiwan. Lee had studied in Japan at the University of Kyoto. When he returned, he finished college after the war at National Taiwan University. He did graduate work in the U.S. at Cornell. Then he went to work for the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. This was a joint ROC-U.S. commission. Eventually, he became one of the senior staff members; he was then identified as a “comer” by CCK and Li Huan. He became Minister without Portfolio; later was appointed as mayor of Taipei and subsequently governor of Taiwan. Then in 1986, when CCK became president, he made Lee his vice president. In those days, the president and vice president of the ROC were not elected by popular vote; they were elected by the National Assembly. Lee was not the only Taiwanese that CCK promoted; he brought a whole bunch into the KMT and the government and indeed increasingly into the military - which previously had

been the exclusive preserve of the mainlanders.

As time passed, CCK, finding himself growing old and more infirm, came to the conclusion that his legacy would have to be a democratic system in Taiwan. He wasn't going to move very rapidly toward this goal, but he wanted to get there step-by-step. So in the middle 1980s, he began tolerating - not encouraging - opposition political activity. Opposition parties were still banned on Taiwan which was still under martial law. But opposition elements were allowed to contest elections as independents. These people became to be known as the Tang Wai literally "those outside the party." They could not organize officially as a party, but they did form an association of like-minded political figures. They first tackled local elections. Then came the question of the Legislative Yuan - the Parliament. This legislature was essentially the one that had been elected in 1947. The same people occupied the seats; for those who had died, the runner-up in that 1947 election took the seat - or the runner-up-runner-up, etc. As I mentioned earlier, the Taiwan legislature was still one that represented cities and provinces of the mainland. It was very strange.

The government started a system of supplementary parliamentary elections to increase the number of Taiwanese in the national legislature. But the "old thieves" were still in majority collecting their pay-checks. Most of them were old and feeble and very few would show up for the parliamentary sessions. In October 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo, in an interview with Meg Greenfield of the Washington Post, said that martial law would be ended by the end of the following year. And it was. He died in January 1988. He had been very ill having suffered from diabetes and insomnia; he was growing blind; so that in the last few years of his life he was in very bad health. But his mind was still sharp. He basically planned the step-by-step procedure transforming Taiwan from an authoritarian one-party dictatorship to a full fledged democracy that it is today.

As I suggested earlier, CCK had chosen Lee Teng-hui as his vice president and heir. I wonder if he knew that Lee in his youth, as a student, had been a member of the Communist party. But then so had Ching-kuo himself, who had been sent to Moscow for education in the 1920s. Lee carried the reforms forward, but the guiding spirit and the inspiration was clearly Ching-kuo. He had come to the conclusion that democratization was the only way which would allow Taiwan to survive. It had not only to liberalize its own internal political processes, but had to be a model for the mainland. Ching-kuo was not a Taiwanese patriot; he was not Taiwanese at all. He was a Chinese patriot. He did not believe in dictatorships - at least in theory. He did like to run the country as he saw fit, but he also saw himself and his legacy as the leader that transformed first Taiwan and then subsequently all of China to a more democratic system. He hoped that Taiwan was to be the model which the mainland would emulate.

He knew all the mainland leaders. He and Deng Xiaoping had been students together at Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. So he knew the entire communist leadership, as well as the Soviet Union leadership. He had negotiated with Stalin on behalf of his father. He felt very strongly that communism in China had to be replaced by a more democratic system. I don't think he thought that China would become anything like the U.S.; his idea of democracy was much closer to that of Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, but he wanted to end KMT dictatorship on Taiwan, as well as communist dictatorship on the mainland.

*Q: Did he want reunification?*

FELDMAN: Absolutely, but under his version of a democratic system. He was a very remarkable man. He was a skilled politician, far smarter than his father, who was best known for his stubbornness. His father regarded himself as the heir to the long line of Chinese emperors. Ching-kuo was sent to the Soviet Union in his youth and had worked there in an automobile factory. He never saw himself as an emperor of China. When he returned to China in 1937, he immediately started cooperatives. He later he was assigned to administer provinces under his father and was quite successful for the most part - to the degree he was given any flexibility. We in the U.S. government did not foresee CCK as the herald of a more democratic ROC. But that was in fact what he became. He worked at it and left it as his legacy which was continued by Lee Teng-hui, who was a very idiosyncratic person - to some degree, more autocratic than Ching-kuo. Lee is a deeply religious Presbyterian who believes that God selected him to be the president and who talks to him. Ching-kuo never believed that God had selected him. He was far too skeptical and pragmatic for that. He was not a "true believer." He had been disowned by his father for many years and isolated in the Soviet Union. He married a Russian woman. So he was totally different from his father. He had a much appreciation of the world than his father did and I think he also understood the world better than Lee Teng-hui. CCK was not self-righteous; Lee is. He certainly did not believe that he was God's anointed. He had an idea of what ought to be and that was his goal.

Chiang Ching-kuo was a very fascinating character. There is an absolutely marvelous biography which I read in manuscript which is to be published at the end of this year. It was written by Jay Taylor, a former FSO. He is a Chinese language officer; he did a lot of interviewing and had access to a lot of personal papers. It is a thoroughly marvelous book.

*Q: What did CCK think of the U.S.?*

FELDMAN: He regarded the U.S. as Taiwan's protector, preceptor, and model and Taiwan's great problem. I think he probably sympathized with that marvelous saying of Benito Suarez: "Alas, poor Mexico, so far from God; so near the United States." CCK had to depend on the U.S., but the U.S. was on occasions not dependable. Our withdrawal from Vietnam was deeply disturbing as was the way we treated Taiwan during the Nixon-Kissinger years and the Carter-Brzezinski years. It was shameful; no question about that. But CCK was stuck with us and there wasn't much he could do about it.

*Q: After Taiwan, where were you assigned?*

FELDMAN: I was assigned to Bulgaria. One day, I got a telephone call in Taipei from Personnel asking me whether I wanted to be "GLOPed" to Bulgaria

*Q: So then you were transferred to Washington?*

FELDMAN: At the end of summer of 1977, having been in Sofia for just two years, I was transferred to Washington as director of the Office of the Republic of China Affairs. I had been

specifically requested for this position by the man who had been my DCM in Taipei, Bill Gleysteen, whom I mentioned earlier. As I said, I think Gleysteen was the finest Foreign Service Officer of his generation. Bill was then the senior deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs (EA). The assistant secretary was Richard C. Holbrooke. That was a very interesting assignment. It was in this period that we completed the “normalization” process and created the new institutions that now regulate America’s relations with Taiwan and with the PRC.

On my first day on the job - very shortly after Labor Day, 1977 - I was called to Holbrooke’s office, where I met him for the first time. I was informed that my principal task was to create a way of maintaining all the necessary U.S. relationships with the ROC, without having any official U.S. representation on Taiwan. Subsequently, I learned that the reason for this was that in August, 1977, Secretary Cyrus Vance had been in Beijing and had told China’s “maximum” leader, Deng Xiaoping, that the Carter administration was prepared to move rapidly toward “full normalization” of relations. That meant the recognition of the PRC as the sole government of China. But Vance added that the complexity of our relations with the ROC meant that we would have to maintain a small office - e.g. a liaison office or a consulate or something like that.

Deng immediately denounced this. He called for the “record of conversation” between President Ford and himself, along with Secretary Henry Kissinger, which had taken place in 1975. He asked someone to read to Vance in English the section of the Chinese transcript in which President Ford had promised that upon normalization of relationship between Washington and Beijing, the U.S. would have no official representation of any kind on Taiwan. So that was the reason for the marching orders I got from Holbrooke. I was told that I had six weeks to come up with a scheme; I was further told that I should not consult any one at all - not even a lawyer. I was to do this all by myself.

So in between handling the normal tasks of a country director, dealing with a country which was an active trading partner for the U.S., where we had a significant number of U.S. military (a large MAAG) and a large CIA station and a sizeable consular work-load, I had to come up with this scheme.

I did come up with something. The Japanese when they had derecognized Taiwan and had recognized the PRC, had established a small “unofficial” office, called the Japan Interchange Association on Taiwan. So I took that as a model and modified it in recognition of our much more complex relationships. The three or four person office that the Japanese had would not be nearly enough for our workload. Sometimes people have told me that all I did was copy the Japanese; that was not quite correct.

I designed an non-profit organization, chartered somewhere in the U.S., that would have a Board of Directors, appointed by the secretary of state - and who could also be removed by the secretary - funded as a line item in the State Department budget. It would be staffed by government employees - primarily Foreign Service officers - who for the period of service in this new entity, which I called “The American Institution,” would nominally be on leave-of-absence from their agencies. I divided the “Institution” into various sections taking the basic template of an embassy, but changed the names of the sections to give it a somewhat different character. For

example, the political section became the general affairs section; the economic section became the commercial and business section; the USIS became the cultural and information section; and so on.

I assumed that we would continue military sales. U.S. laws requires that when you sell military end -use items to another country, we have to have some kind of military presence there to monitor the use of these items. I therefore maintained a MAAG, but gave it a different name.

So within about a month after my conversation with Holbrooke, working at night and on week-ends and during the few minutes available during the day, I wrote a about 20 page description of the new entity and how it would function. I gave it to Holbrooke who patted me on the back and said that this was fine. I didn't hear another word about it for a long time.

My principal problems in trying to manage our relationship with Taiwan, were threefold: 1) economic and trade where we had a substantial trade deficit (I think we were doing annually about \$40 billion worth of total trade with Taiwan and our deficit was running \$15-17 billion per annum). So I had to plea with the ROC to buy more U.S. goods. I remember particularly that at one point Taiwan's flag carrier, China Airlines, was trying to decide whether to buy DC-10s or a Airbuses. I lobbied very hard for the DC-10 which they finally bought. Shortly after that, there was a series of crashes of DC-10s around the world which made me feel somewhat queasy, after the hard twist I had applied to China Airlines.

That was one area of difficulty. Another concerned the stream of CIA reports about ROC's attempts to develop nuclear weapons. This was done secretly at a facility called the Cheng Shan Institute. We had tackled this issue once before; we had told the ROC that they had to discontinue all of their efforts in the nuclear area. It promised it would, but we later found that the program had restarted. My deputy, David Brown, was particularly knowledgeable in this matter. We tightened the screws very hard on the ROC; we threatened all kinds of dire consequences if the program was not terminated.

One of our threats fell in the area of arms sales, which we used as a club in the nuclear arms issue. I think that the promised squeeze in this area was one of the principal reasons for the dismantling of the project. In general, arms sales was a problem because it was quite clear that there had been a pattern built up in the Kissinger era which continued under the Carter administration. This pattern called for the denial of any arms and military supplies to Taiwan that the administration believed would offend or create problems with the PRC. This was another example of the State Department's pension for premature capitulation, especially when it came to dealing with Beijing. Bureaucrats would sit down and decide for themselves if an action might offend Beijing; that would put an end to any proposal that ran into such guesswork. We didn't hold consultations with the PRC; this was only an intuitive feeling that the PRC would react negatively to a particular action. In the case of arms to Taiwan, this meant that the ROC Air Force was stuck with the F-104G (the Lockheed "Starfighter" which the Germans had called the "Widow Maker") and the F-5E and F.

The F-104G plane had been designed in the early 1950s; in fact, I was vice consul in Nagoya in 1958 when the Japanese made their first buy of this plane. It was a fine plane for its time; it had

very good speed, but it was not maneuverable and it had no all-weather capability. The F-5 was a very nifty light-weight fighter, also of the 1950s era. It was very short range and also did not have all weather or night capability.. Neither of these planes could fire a stand-off missile. Both would have to come close to their target before firing and engage in a “dog fight.” They had a fairly rudimentary capability of firing a “Sidewinder;” the ROC pilots had to climb on the enemy’s aircraft tail; then the missile could be fired once it had accessed the heat of the enemy’s plane exhaust. The version available to U.S. pilots enabled them to fire the “Sidewinder” from anywhere around the enemy plane; it was “smart” enough to hit the enemy from any angle.

So the ROC did not have an all weather fighter capability; it could not fire a “stand-off missile” and had a rather crude version of a “Sidewinder.” Yet its principal defense need was in the air, over the Taiwan Straits and perhaps even over Taiwan itself. To break the bureaucrats’ mindset on such issues was a real task. Even simple kinds of arms, such as a long range/slant range reconnaissance camera, was a fight. The ROC had been asking for such devices for many, many years; for one reason or another, the Department kept denying the request. This made no sense at all. Without such a camera to do aerial reconnaissance, you had to fly over what it was you were reconnoitering in order to get pictures. With a slant angle camera, the ROC pilots could remain over the Straits. So there was an awful amount of nonsense in our arms sales policy to the ROC. The assumption in much of the bureaucracy was that whatever the ROC wanted, it probably should not get. This was the mind-set that I found when I became country director.

When I discussed my role as chief of the political section in our embassy in Taipei, I mentioned the draw-down of American forces and the reduction of installations on the island. This process was still continuing when I became country director for the ROC. At this point the Taiwan Defense Command - the entity responsible for defending the island against attack - was down to a handful of people.

As I suggested before, the Carter administration maintained the policy of getting “into bed” with the PRC. The one major difference between the Kissinger approach and the Brzezinski one to the U.S.-PRC relations, was that Kissinger saw this issue as part of a global strategy. Brzezinski was really interested in some form of military-to-military relationship even though the PRC was militarily rather weak. But I don’t think that Brzezinski ever saw this deficiency; he thought in terms of PRC military forces on Soviet borders actually distracting the USSR. He foresaw a far closer military-to-military relationship than anyone else had or did. So the question of arms supplies to Taiwan was even a more fraught problem as far as he was concerned. Brzezinski put all kinds of pressure on the State Department to simply deny whatever it was that the ROC wanted, unless it was something like rifles and hand grenades.

This raised another interesting conundrum. The ROC at this time was still an authoritarian dictatorship, with all of the attributes to such a regime - political prisoners, government controlled press, etc. That ran directly against the Carter administration’s human rights policy. So from that point of view, even the rifles and hand grenades should not have been approved even if Brzezinski was prepared to allow it. I should note that, although Taiwan was undoubtedly an authoritarian regime, the PRC was a totalitarian state, under repression far worse than Taiwan, but the Carter administration never took notice of their violation of human rights.

One of the black marks against President Carter personally, as well as the entire administration, was his failure to do anything about the case of Wei Ching-sheng. He was one of the people who had put up posters during the “democracy wall” of Europe, which had been put up in Beijing. He was the one that called for a fifth “Modernization”, in addition to the four that Deng had proposed. That fifth would have been democracy for China. Wei, who was an electrician, but not the descendant of a working class family - his parents were members of the senior cadre of the Communist Party - was tried, convicted of sedition for daring to suggest that democracy was necessary for China, and was sentenced to fourteen years in prison. The Carter administration was almost silent on this obvious violation of human rights. It said nothing when Wei was arrested; it issued a very weak statement when he was sentenced expressing regrets that Wei was given such a long prison term. No regrets about the conviction.

So as far as human rights were concerned the Carter administration took an entirely different track when it came to the situations in Taipei and Beijing.

*Q: How did the criticism of the human rights policy manifest itself?*

FELDMAN: It provided “excuses” - I use that term deliberately - for not supplying defensive arms that Taiwan needed so that a military balance of some sort could be maintained in the Taiwan Straits. I call it an “excuse” because the real reason why these arms sales were not approved was because the Carter administration was concerned about upsetting the relationship with the PRC that Brzezinski had considered so important.

*Q: What were the violations the ROC was accused of?*

FELDMAN: It was political prisoners, repression of attempts to develop an opposition party, control of the media, although I must point out that the press on Taiwan was freer than that on the mainland. While the ROC owned one newspaper, there about twenty others that the government did not own. These papers operated on a self-censorship basis rather than pre-censorship. Basically, there were well-known parameters and as long as the media did not criticize the Chiang family, as long as there was no call for Taiwan independence, as long there was no protest against media control, the press could say almost anything it wanted to say. The media could certainly criticize the government’s economic policy, it could criticize foreign policy; those subjects were not off-limits. So the Taiwan press was far less tightly controlled than that on the mainland, but the Carter administration never raised a peep on what was happening in the PRC.

One can work this arms sales-human rights nexus in a totally different way. I got very friendly with the head of the ROC military purchasing mission in Washington, General Wen Hai-hsiung (known usually as Pat Wen.) He had graduated from Virginia Military Institute - as had his father who had also been a general in the Nationalist army. Pat had been a military assistant for Chiang Ching-kuo who by now was the president of the ROC. He had in fact a direct line to Chiang. So I would tell Pat, whenever there was a violation of human rights, that here was little or no chance of the U.S. approving whatever arms sales was being considered at the moment. It would have been foolish for me even to try to get approval if some dissident had just been arrested or if there had been any other violation of human rights. Pat would immediately report

this back to Chiang Ching-kuo and others in Taipei; sometimes the arrested person would be released and I could then submit my memorandum requesting approval of the arms sale under consideration at the time. It was through this kind of process that I managed to get the slant camera approved as well as some of the other more minor systems and supplies. And of course, several people who might have been in serious trouble were released.

The big issue, as I mentioned earlier, was the fighter plane. The ROC wanted F-16s, which had been brought on line earlier on the decade. It was the hottest plane in the U.S. Air Force inventory. I knew they would not get the F-16. Northrop was the builder of the F-5; so I met with its representatives. I asked Northrop what could be done to give the F-5 an all weather capability and to give it the avionics so that stand-off missile could be fired from the plane. The Northrop folk thought about my questions and came back telling me these features could be added without too much difficulty. It would replace the present two engines with a more advanced GE engine. The one to be used in the next U.S. fighter model - the F-18. It would require a slight enlargement and reconfiguration of the fuselage, but that was doable. Then the wings would have to be strengthened and given different hard points; the new avionics could be added and so could the new missilery. In fact, the new F-5 could be given the features that the ROC found lacking in the standard model. I asked whether the new design would still make the plane look like an F-5 so that it could be still sold as such a plane and be designated as an F-5G. Northrop saw no problem with that; the F-5E and F which were being sold looked different from the original A and B models.

I began a major drive to have the Department approve the F-5G. At the same time, I also pushed for better command and control facilities and equipment for the ROC Navy and for a more advanced missile - the "Harpoon" - which was an anti-ship missile which could be fired from shore or a ship. These three end-use items became the center of the arms sales package that I was preparing for White House approval. This was an exception to the normal arms sales approval process; in the case of sales to the ROC, all had to be approved by the White House.

The first battle was to obtain approval from my colleagues in the Department. There were a number of offices, including the PRC desk, which wanted to oppose sales of the magnitude I had in mind. I worked very hard on my friend Harry Thayer, then the PRC country director. I finally managed to get his concurrence. Then I had to convince Roger Sullivan, the deputy assistant secretary in charge of the Northeast Asia area. He finally also agreed. Holbrooke was prepared to submit the memorandum.

Then I had to tackle the toughest problem of all: Michael Oxenberg, the NSC staffer responsible for China affairs. It took me a long time to persuade Oxenberg just to allow this proposal to go the president. He could have just returned the memorandum to the Department saying that the proposals were not consistent with U.S. policy. I suggested that if he disagreed with our recommendations, he could say so in his transmittal note to the president, but at least we should give the president an opportunity to make a decision.

I finally got the package approved by State, in a big high level meeting. I was not present at that meeting but I was briefed and read the minutes. Vance and Brown, the secretary of Defense, chaired this meeting. Les Gelb, the director of the Bureau of Politico-Military affairs, and Dick

Holbrooke attended. The decision of this meeting was that the memorandum could be forwarded to the White House. It then landed on the NSC's doorsteps. One of the NSC staff members was Jessica Tuchman Matthews, daughter of the famous author, Barbara Tuchman. Jessica is now the president of the Carnegie Endowment Institute. She added a memorandum of her own to my package opposing the sale of the F-5G. She called it a violation of presidential policy as the development of a new weapon system for export-only since it was a plane that the U.S. Air Force was not planning to buy. That was a violation of Carter's policy. The U.S. Air Force was not going to buy this or any version of the F-5 was that it was inferior to the F-16. Of course that was exactly the reason why we had recommended the sale. The F-16 would certainly not be approved, so it had to be a less capable plane. And if it was, USAF would not buy it. Catch 22.

The memorandum came back for the president disapproving the sale of the airplane and the sale of the "Harpoon." There was also a note from the president suggesting that we suggest to the ROC that it initiate discussion with Israel on the possible purchase of the Kfir, which was a modified version of an F-4 - a 1960s design. In any case, the Israelis were not going to sell any major weapons systems to the ROC because they were working very hard on improving relations with the PRC. So there was no way the presidential suggestion would fly. Carter did approve some of the more minor parts of the package, but the major items were turned down.

The memorandum had been sent to the White House sometime in June, 1978. It had taken me almost a year to get to that stage. It sat in the White House until the end of August; I think it was in early September when it came back with Carter's decisions. That was a real heart-breaker. After my tour as director of the ROC desk, the issue arose again during the Reagan administration. In January 1982, the advanced fighter proposal again was turned down because of fears of the PRC reaction. Instead, the ROC was given a co-production agreement to manufacture more F-5s (which they were already doing) and was told that the U.S. would assist them in designing a fighter plane of their own. Thus was born the Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF). The ROC has in fact produced a couple of hundred of these planes. It is a greatly inferior airplane. For example it did not have an all weather capability and had some other major deficiencies. It is not much of a weapon.

*Q: Is that what they are using today?*

FELDMAN: No. The situation finally reached the point at which the discrepancy was so great that people at last began to see that this weakness was tempting the PRC to begin an air campaign over the Straits. So the question re-emerged in the Bush administration. At that point, the choice was either an F-16 or an even more advanced plane. Matters came to a head in 1992; shortly before the Republican Convention, at which Bush was to be nominated as a candidate for president for a second term. General Dynamics informed the White House that if there were not be any approval of the sale of F-16s to the ROC, it would have to close the production line in Texas, where the F-16s were built. GD said it would close the line in June - the convention was scheduled for July; at the same time the company was going to buy ads in Texas newspapers explaining why it was taking such action. That gave the White House some pause and later in June, 1992 it announced it was considering an F-16s sale to the ROC. The production line was not shut down.

I should note however that the F-16s approved for Taiwan was not the latest version of the aircraft, but an earlier version called F-16 A&B. What the ROC finally got was an F-16A&B with an advanced package which brought it close to an F-16C&D, but allowed the administration to say it was an inferior model. The game goes on.

Let me go back to 1978 and talk about what else was going on. My memorandum on the establishment of new institutions to carry on ROC-U.S. relationships had gone to Holbrooke, as I have mentioned, in October 1977. There was nothing going on the “normalization” front. My work consisted of the usual duties of a country director. I traveled to Taiwan a couple of times - 1977 and 1978. I had the usual conversation with the government and the embassy. But nothing seemed to be moving on getting U.S.-ROC relations on sounder footing.

There were a couple of other things going on. For one, the Panama Canal Treaty was being renegotiated and secondly, the Middle East problems loomed large. It is very difficult for any administration to handle one major foreign policy challenge at any one time, much less two. It didn't have time for anything else, including “normalization.” I think that in September the Panama Canal Treaty was ratified by the Senate; at the same time, Camp David took place. With these two triumphs behind him President Carter turned his attention to the China issues. I think that is probably one of the reasons why the F-5 proposal got turned down. I learned later that in September, 1978 negotiations toward “normalization” re-started in Beijing.

On December 15, 1978 I arrived at the office around 8 a.m. - my usual time. As I began to pour myself a cup of coffee, I was summoned to Holbrooke's office. I was told to call Ambassador Unger in Taipei and instruct him to seek an immediate appointment with President Chiang Ching-kuo in order to inform him that around 9 p.m. in the evening (our time) the U.S. president was going to announce that negotiations on “normalization” had been concluded and that the U.S. on January 1, 1979 would de-recognize the ROC and would recognize the PRC as the sole legal government of China.

I had some inkling that something was going on because starting sometime in September, under instructions from Secretary Vance, I and the legal advisor, Herb Hansell, went to New York secretly once every couple of weeks to discuss the terms of “normalization” with Herbert Brownell, who had been a close advisor to Thomas Dewey. He was a well known Republican lawyer; the Attorney General under Eisenhower. Vance thought that if a prominent Republican would testify on behalf of the administration's China policy following “normalization” and the various actions that followed it, the storm against the policy might be abated. He had talked privately to Brownell and had found that he was sympathetic. That led to Vance's instructions to consult with Brownell on aspects of what later became the “Taiwan Relations Act,” including my ideas about the American Institute on Taiwan. Hansell and I held three or four consultations with Brownell from September to December. He was generally in agreement with our proposals.

That was not a surprise to me. What was the surprise came when Holbrooke told me that the president would be announcing that night - December 15, 1978 - that negotiations had been completed and that we would be de-recognizing Taiwan on January 1, 1979. Previously, Ambassador Unger and I had argued very strongly, with Holbrooke and others, that we would have to give Chiang Ching-kuo at least two weeks' notice so that he could prepare his people for

the bad news. He had to have at least that much time to convince his people that the sky was not about to fall and we had to have the time to explore with the ROC what institutions and structures would be established to continue a relationship and how they would work.

Instead, I was told that there would be no advance notice, no discussion of alternatives, but we would be making a public statement of our position, giving Taiwan a two weeks' public notice before de-recognition. That was hardly what Unger and I had argued for. As soon as I left Holbrooke's office, Roger Sullivan and I got on the telephone to try to get in touch with Unger. This was about 9:30 a.m. our time which would have been about 9:30 p.m. in Taiwan. Unger, who had always been very careful to let his staff know where he was going to be, on this day had not told the Marine Guard where he was to be found. The duty officer had no idea where the ambassador was. Later, Unger insisted that he had left word where he could be found, but that some snafu must have happened in the embassy. I don't know what the truth was, but in any case we could not talk to ambassador.

In fact, Unger was at a dinner dance at the American University Club; that was not a private affair nor was there any reason for the staff not to know. When he returned to the residence at about 11 p.m., he was found by Mark Platt, the political counselor. We talked to him on the phone and asked him to get in touch with Taiwan's president to alert him to Carter's announcement. Unger's first question was : "What happened to the two week's notice?" He was told by Sullivan the same thing that I had gotten from Holbrooke, namely that we were giving a two weeks' notice; it was just not secret.

Furthermore, the "normalization" and de-recognition communiqué declared that the U.S. acknowledged the PRC's claim that there was only one China of which Taiwan was a part. This has been greatly misunderstood especially by successor administrations. When the U.S. said that it acknowledged the PRC's position, it did not say that it accepted it. Those are two entirely different policy expressions. An acknowledgment of the PRC position was a polite way of saying : "We hear you; we understand that this what you claim. We will not contradict it, but we make no statement on our own position." The usual way this U.S. statement would be translated into Chinese was to use the three character phrase "renshr dao" ("we acknowledge") The PRC tried to pull a fast one; in their Chinese version of our communiqué, they used a two character phrase cheng ren (or "recognized"). This a phrase that is used when speaking of a recognition of a government. When the two character phrase appeared in the PRC text, the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing should have immediately expressed its disapproval of the PRC text. The head of that Office was Leonard Woodcock, formerly of the United Automobile Workers' Union. The DCM, J. Stapleton Roy, at the embassy at the time was someone who had been born in China, had grown up in China and was therefore bilingual; he had served in Chinese language positions for most of his career. He was completely aware of the difference between the two phrases. Roy should have immediately pointed out that the PRC had mis-translated the American text, but I am firmly convinced that because he was so keen to achieve "normalization," he did not point out this very important mistranslation. So the official Chinese text of the communiqué included the phrase cheng ren ("recognized"). This has created no end of mischief in the PRC-U.S. relationship because in effect the two versions of the same communiqué say different things. The Chinese version uses the word "recognition" of the PRC claim of one China, whereas the English version says "the U.S. acknowledges the PRC contention."

As time went on, even the word “acknowledges” has been misinterpreted by spokespersons of various administrations, including the present one. The Clinton administration has said from time to time that the U.S. has “accepted” the PRC view that Taiwan is a part of China. In fact, officially, the U.S. has never “accepted” the PRC view; we have only “acknowledged” it.

Unger tried to get in touch with the Foreign Ministry’s duty officer immediately. That took a while, but he finally got to him, he told the officer that as a matter for great urgency he had to see President Chiang. Ching-kuo suffered from insomnia. In fact, he was not in the best of health - he was diabetic, etc. No one wanted to really wake him up if he fell asleep. So Unger had some difficulties conniving the president’s staff that he really needed to be awakened to get the U.S. announcement. Finally, about 2:30 a.m., Unger got to see the Taiwanese president. He told him that in approximately seven hours, President Carter would be announcing “normalization” with the PRC and the de-recognition of Taiwan. It was an awful way to treat a loyal ally, as the ROC had been.

For example, when Nixon and Kissinger had negotiated their deal with the Vietnamese in Paris, which theoretically was supposed to end the war, we had stated that on a date certain, there would be a cut-off of arms to the South Vietnamese. We then turned to the ROC and asked it to give all the arms it had to Saigon. The ROC agreed and they sent practically all of their F-5s (which we later replaced.) But the ROC did not argue with our request; it did what had been asked of it. It fully cooperated; so our de-recognition action and the way it was done was hardly acceptable. It was pretty bad; no question about it.

A political storm broke out in the U.S. as well. There were many people in Congress that were furious with the Carter administration. One of them Senator Dick Stone (D-FL). He had in the past been consistent in his objection to “normalization.” As a Democrat, it was thought that he should have supported the administration. If Democrats were going to criticize “normalization” that was not a good omen. Holbrooke instructed me on Saturday morning - December 16, 1978 - to rush to Miami to try to placate Stone. I left on Sunday morning; I was met at the Miami airport by my father and step-mother - she recently had a hip operation and was therefore walking with a walker, while my father used a cane. They drove me to the downtown Miami hotel where I was to lunch with Dick Stone and his wife, Marlene. So I walked in very slowly followed by my parents. The Stones were waiting for me. He looked up at me and said, “Where did you find these people? In central casting?” I then introduced my father and step-mother. Stone wanted to know in what condominium they lived. He was told that it was “Jade Winds.” Stone, of course, said that that was his favorite condo in all Miami. My father suggested that it should be because he (my father) “had gotten all of the tenants to vote for you in the last election.”

*Q: That is very funny. You obviously carried out your mission better than Holbrooke could have expected.*

FELDMAN: Right. I think that was a very amusing story.

In any case, it was not surprising that the ROC reacted very badly. It was a bitter pill to swallow and we didn’t force it down their throats in the most understanding way. The ROC was angry

and felt that it had been treated very badly. It was deeply concerned about the future. There was immediate capital flight; the stock market crashed; the real estate market crashed. The economy nosedived - all because the Carter administration had mishandled the process.

A few days afterwards, the Carter administration decided that it would have to send a special emissary to tell Chiang and the ROC that the world had not come to an end. It was decided that Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state, and Roger Sullivan would go to Taiwan for consultations. I argued very strongly against this action. I thought it was a grave mistake; the ROC was so ferociously angry that Christopher would not get a good reception. I thought a far better idea would have been to invite the ROC to send a high level delegation to Washington for discussions. I was over-ruled; Christopher and Sullivan left for Taipei. On the ride in from the airport to the embassy, they were assaulted by mobs. The car was stopped and pelted with eggs and other debris; the car was rocked and mobs shouted at its occupants. I am told that it was a very frightening experience. That demonstration was undoubtedly organized by the Taiwan Garrison Command - no demonstration would have been possible on Taiwan without government approval - if not active participation. But it reflected general public sentiment.

The discussions were not fruitful, to put it mildly. In the end, without admitting as much, the administration followed my advice by inviting an ROC emissary to Washington for negotiations. Taiwan sent the senior vice minister for foreign affairs, Yang Hsi-kun, a wonderful gentleman. We negotiated with him the arrangements which essentially still govern today's relationships between the ROC and the U.S. The ROC efforts at this juncture were motivated largely by the desire to deal with the panic that had erupted on Taiwan with the economic consequences that I mentioned earlier. The way the Chiang administration felt it could deal with the situation was by continuing to assert that despite the shift in diplomatic relations, there was still an official relationship between the U.S. and the ROC.

Yang Hsi-kun's marching orders were to somehow get us to say that whatever was being said about the new relationship, there remained some official connection. We, on the other hand, were aiming to get the ROC to accept the new situation - e.g deal with the U.S. through the American Institute on Taiwan (the new name for my American Institution proposal) - by establishing a parallel institution in Washington. The relationship after January 1, would have to be conducted through these two nominally unofficial organizations. At the same time, we were negotiating on such things as the continuing of treaties and agreements, continuation of arms sales, enriched uranium fuel for their nuclear power reactors, etc. Under our arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), after the ROC's expulsion from the UN, it was only the U.S. which could sell enriched uranium to Taiwan because IAEA inspectors were technically not allowed to inspect atomic energy installations in non-UN member states. Somehow, we worked out a new arrangement with the IAEA which allowed us to include IAEA inspectors in U.S. delegations which periodically went to Taiwan to inspect the ROC's nuclear power plants. That was how an international inspection regime was maintained allowing the ROC to claim that it was still under an IAEA regime. But this convoluted scheme allowed only the U.S. to sell the enriched uranium and U.S. law allowed such sales only to "friendly" governments.

U.S. law allowed arms and military supplies to be sold only to "friendly" states. There were similar restrictions in respect to Ex-Im Bank loans, to Overseas Private Investment Corporation

(OPIC) guarantees and other U.S. government programs. The problem was of course that we had just de-recognized the ROC; legally, we did not recognize it as a government nor Taiwan as a separate nation. We decided that these anomalies had to be fixed by new legislation, which became known as the "Taiwan Relations Act." I mentioned earlier our conversation with Herbert Brownell on this issue. Now the challenge was to convince the ROC that these problems could and would be taken care of in the legislation.

The sticking point was whether the relationship had "qualities of officiality," which was what Yang Hsi-kun's orders were to insist upon. We could not accept such a formulation because we had promised the PRC that we would not have any official relationship with Taiwan. I should point out that the PRC would not accept "normalization" if in addition to de-recognizing the ROC, we did not also agree to three demands: 1) that we would withdraw all American forces from Taiwan; 2) that we would withdraw all official governmental institutions from Taiwan and 3) and that would abrogate the Mutual Defense Treaty.

The Carter agreed to demands (1) and (2), but said that the U.S. could not abrogate the treaty. We would terminate the Defense Treaty in accordance with its provisions - i.e. giving one year's notice. And that is what we did; on January 1, 1979, we informed the ROC that we no longer recognized it and that we were withdrawing from the Mutual Defense Treaty in a year's time. When Deng Xiaoping heard this, he swallowed hard and pointed out the obvious - our defense treaty would remain in effect until December 31, 1979. We told him that there was no other way out. He demanded that for that year we would not approve any new arms transfers or sales. We accepted that compromise. So in 1979, we had a defense treaty with an entity which we did not recognize and we would not sell or transfer any new arms. Thereafter, we would sell arms to a government we did not recognize. That was "creative" diplomacy or complete idiocy - I don't know which is the most apt description.

We convinced Yang Hsi-kun that we would take necessary measures to take care of government loans and to continue our sales of enriched uranium. We also promised to sell arms after the expiration of the Mutual Defense Treaty. That left the question of "officiality." We argued about this over and over again; at one point I said to Yang - privately in the corridor - that he and the ROC could say whatever it wished about our relationships; we could not control that. We had to say that there was no "official" relationship. I also told him that if the ROC insisted on defining its representation in Washington as "official," U.S. government officials could not talk to it. But if the Taiwanese institution were deemed to be "unofficial", we could of course have discussions with its staff.

It was on this basis that we eventually came to an agreement. Each side said what it wanted to say. The other question that had to be resolved was the question of names. We asked what the ROC would call its "unofficial" office in Washington. They said that since we were calling our entity "The American Institute in Taiwan", they would call their institution "The Republic of China Institute in America." We had to say that that would not work; we could not deal with any entity with the name "Republic of China" in it. We suggested that they use the name "Taiwan" as in "The Taiwan Institute in America." That was not acceptable to the ROC which said that it represented the Republic of China, not Taiwan. We discussed this matter at great length. Finally, the ROC delegation, in the corridor again, asked for our suggestion. I had a brain-storm. I said

that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was a good model; the division that handled U.S. relations was called the “North American Affairs” bureau, not “American Affairs.” So I suggested that the institute be called something like “The Institute for North American Affairs.” I noted that it could even be headquartered in Canada. The ROC delegation took my suggestions half-way; it finally called its institution “The Coordinating Council for North American Affairs.”

Subsequently, I and my colleagues were blamed for the ROC’s decision. They said that we had given them the name for their entity; we allegedly had insisted on the phraseology “Coordinating Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA).” So we forced on them a very unwieldy name. I had to repeat that the decision was the ROC’s, not mine. I did admit that I suggested a name or two, but the final name was their invention. Much later, the ROC obtained our permission to rename the Institute as “The Taipei Economic and Cultural Relations Organization (TECRO),” which is the current appellation. The ROC saw that as a great advance and improvement over CCNAA. When the announcement was made, I commented that I thought their entity represented a country and not just a city.

I might mention that starting in mid-December, 1978, Hodding Carter would have me brief the press from time to time on the negotiations, the new arrangements and what might happen. At one of those briefings I was asked by Lester Kinsolving, a well known correspondent, the following question :” You have said that on January 1, 1979 we would not longer recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan and that we would then recognize the People’s Republic of China in Beijing. I note that that when it is here 11:59 p.m. on December 31, 1978, it is already 11:59 a.m. of January 1, 1979 in Beijing. Does that mean that for that 12 hour period, we recognize the PRC in Beijing and the ROC in Taipei simultaneously?” I looked at Carter and asked whether I could go off-the-record. Carter agreed. So I said: “Kinsolving, it beats the shit out of me!” This became known as the “Feldman exception.”

While these negotiations were going on, our embassy in Taiwan was in limbo. It had ceased to be an embassy on January 1, 1979. Leonard Unger, our last ambassador, left Taiwan on January 19, 1979. So the embassy was in a nebulous state. Bill Brown or Mark Pratt should be asked how that felt. That situation continued for more than 3 months (January 1-April 10). Then the Taiwan Relations Act was passed by Congress; that converted our representation from an embassy to AIT. That allowed the Executive Branch to pay its employees in Taiwan; for the three months period, there was a hiatus during which we could not make major expenditures; e.g. rent on embassy housing. We had to persuade the ROC, whose housing we were occupying and whom we had just mortified, to let our people remain in their quarters without due compensation being paid. There were other U.S. debts that had to be left unpaid for this three months’ period. We also had to obtain ROC permission to allow our people to drive in cars displaying diplomatic tags, etc.

It was a totally weird situation. Until the necessary legislation was passed the situation of our people in Taiwan was pretty bad.

*Q: No diplomatic immunity?*

FELDMAN: Technically, they did not have diplomatic immunity. In fact, we did work out an

arrangement which allowed their personnel in the U.S. to keep their diplomatic immunity and our people in Taiwan were treated the same way.

Let me now turn to the Taiwan Relations Act. I mentioned earlier I had done some initial work on designing the entity that would represent us in Taipei after “normalization” with the PRC. That became the American Institute in Taiwan. I also mentioned that my proposal laid fallow waiting for something to happen, but that in the meantime we were consulting secretly with Herb Brownell on the possible shape of the new legislation. When Carter announced “normalization”, no draft legislation actually existed. We had some ideas, some which had been written down in memoranda by me to Hansell and some which had been generated within the Legal Advisor’s Office by Lee Marks, who was the senior deputy to the legal advisor. But we did not have even a draft of a legislative package.

So the first thing that had to happen after the Carter announcement was to draft the necessary legislation which would allow us to maintain contact with Taiwan, albeit on an “unofficial” basis. There were some 60 agreements between the U.S. and the ROC dealing with mutual defense, double taxation, commercial arrangements, airline arrangements, etc. The question was what would happen to these agreements following “normalization”. As the prospects for “normalization” had improved over years, legal scholars had written all kinds of papers. For example, Jerry Cohen, a friend, made the rather absurd argument that following “normalization” all treaties and agreements the U.S. had with the ROC would cease to apply to the ROC but would instead apply to the PRC. I teased Jerry about this position which I considered ill founded. For example, did he mean that we would automatically have a mutual defense treaty with the PRC? Other scholars had postulated that all agreements would lapse with our de-recognition of the ROC. We didn’t want them to lapse. In the end, we said that they would continue in force unless amended. No one objected. No court case challenging this view ever took place.

The next question was whether our position on these agreements could be supported under international law. To test that, some one would have had to sue the U.S. By whom and where would this suit be filed? Lee Marks and I had written a memorandum on this issue which became the basis for the provisions included in the Taiwan Relations Act.

Furthermore, we were the only country that was able to sell to Taiwan enriched uranium fuel, as I mentioned earlier. I have described the arrangements we finally developed to enable the IAEA inspectors to participate in an inspection regime. Our legislation had to amend U.S. law which limited sale of uranium to “friendly states.” Same went for arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act stipulates that “for all purposes, including actions in any court of the United States, the Congress approves the continuation in force of all treaties and other international agreements, including multi-lateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979.” That was based on our draft.

We also put into our draft that “nothing in this Act nor the facts of the President’s action in extending recognition to the People’s Republic of China, the absence of diplomatic relations between the people on Taiwan and the United States or the lack of recognition by the United States and attending circumstances there to, shall be construed in any administrative or judicial

proceeding as the basis for any United States government agency, commission or department to make a finding of fact or determination of law under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 in order to deny an export license application or to revoke an existing export license for nuclear exports to Taiwan.”

We did something similar in regard to arms sales. In fact, we included a general catch-all phrase which in the section on definitions said, ” The term Taiwan includes, as the context may require, the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands, corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under laws applying on those islands and the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979 and any successor governing authority including political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities thereof.”

These omnibus authorities which would come into effect upon passage of the legislation and would allow the U.S. to maintain the treaties and agreements in effect between the U.S. and the ROC prior to January 1, 1979. We also added language which said that for the purposes of the Immigration and Naturalization Act, Taiwan would be considered separately from the PRC. But what our draft did not include was anything about a security commitment to Taiwan on our part nor did it spell out in law our intention to continue to sell arms and military equipment to Taiwan.

We sent to Congress our draft legislation, which we called the “Omnibus Taiwan Act” - or something innocuous like that. It was drafted essentially in the legal advisor’s office, by a committee co-chaired by Lee Marks and myself. Our draft was sent to Congress about the middle of January. In the meantime, the ROC government had been talking with its congressional friends, including Senators Stone and Goldwater (along with Terry Emerson, his staff aide), Congressman Lester Wolfe, who chaired the East Asia sub-committee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and others. Some of these conversations took place directly between the ROC representatives and the members of Congress, but more often it was done through intermediaries, like Ray Cline whom I mentioned earlier. Ray had also been director of INR in the Department; he had been a national intelligence officer and had been a senior CIA officer. At this time, he had his own consulting firm. I am sure that there were others as well. This group of congressmen were considering all sorts of amendments to our draft legislation. When our package landed in Congress, it was firmly denounced - Congress was still angry with the Carter administration for the way it handled “normalization” particularly the way it handled the Dole-Stone amendment. That amendment was attached to the State Department authorization bill of August, 1978. It said essentially that any alterations in the status of U.S.-ROC relations “shall be” a matter of prior consultation with the Congress. Carter ignored this entirely, even though it was in an Act of Congress, that he had signed. That was one of the reasons why Congress was particularly angry.

Congress took our draft and began to add to it. In effect, it created, by legislation action, a treaty between the U.S. and the ROC. In a very clever way, amendments were added that we should always be aware of. They defined the parameters of the three cornered relationship - the U.S., the ROC and the PRC. In the section called “Findings and Declaration of Policy,” Congress said, ” It is the policy of the United States to declare ( that) the peace and stability in the area are in the

political, security and economic interests of the United States and are matters of international concern.” That phrase “international concern” is very important because the PRC had and continues to argue that whatever it does with regard to Taiwan is a matter of China’s domestic policy. Congress refuted that argument in 1979 by saying that it was an international concern.

Furthermore, the bill says: “To make clear that the United States’ decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China rests on the expectations that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means. To consider that any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States.” The language “threat to the space and security” is taken directly from Chapter VII of the United Nations’ Charter, and applied to the area. It provides a justification for taking action to halt aggression.

It goes on to say :”To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the social or the economic system of the people on Taiwan.” I have heard Kurt Campbell, the present deputy assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, cite that portion of the Taiwan Relations Act as requiring the maintenance of the forces that we now have in the Pacific area. I had never heard that theory before from any senior official in either Defense or State. Note the use of the phrase “the people on Taiwan.” This is a phrase that was inserted in the omnibus bill by Chas Freeman. Chas took the position that if we said “the people of Taiwan” that implied that Taiwan was a state. So we should not use that phraseology. Of course we would not use the words “the people (or government) of the Republic of China;” so Chas came up with the final wording. Roger Sullivan and Dick Holbrooke approved.

This history came back in a rather amusing fashion during the hearings on the Taiwan Relations Act. Senator Stone asked Herb Hansell, the legal advisor, who was testifying on the bill, who the people on Taiwan were - ”why was that phrase used? If we are selling or leasing a destroyer to the people on Taiwan, who are we selling or leasing it to? Is it the chamber of commerce? Is it six or seven people on the street? Who are the people on Taiwan?” Hansell stumbled and hemmed and hawed and was finally forced to admit that the phrase at least included the governing authorities on Taiwan. I always thought it was a dumb phrase; it was one of the egregious interventions that really accomplished nothing, but held us up to a certain amount of ridicule. It is a prime case of an FSO employing the strategy of preemptive capitulation.

Let me talk about some of the other key aspects of the Act that were inserted by Congress. For example, “Nothing in this Act shall contravene the interests of the United States in human rights, especially with the human rights of all of the approximately 18 million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.”

Then there is a section called “The Implementation of U.S. Policy in Regard to Taiwan”(Section III). This is particularly important and says :”In furtherance of the policy set forth in Section II of this Act, the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense

services in such quantities as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a self-defense capability.” That language was not in the Department’s draft, but was added by Congress. What Congress was concerned about was that the Carter administration and succeeding administrations would in effect negotiate with the PRC what might or might not be sold to Taiwan. In fact, the PRC has on many occasions attempted to insert itself into such negotiations. The law says :”The President and the Congress shall determine the nature and quantities of such defense articles and services based solely on their judgement of the needs of Taiwan in accordance with procedures established by law. Such determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the Congress.” (That was the message to keep the PRC out of the arms sales to Taiwan). Furthermore, the Act says: “The President is directed to inform the Congress promptly of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan and any danger to the interests of the United States arising therefrom. The President and the Congress shall determine in accordance with Constitutional processes appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.” What is interesting here is that successive administrations have never informed the Congress of any threat to the security or the social or economic system of the people on Taiwan, not even when the Clinton administration sent two carrier task forces to the Taiwan Straits area in March, 1996 because of the direct threat to Taiwan by Chinese missile tests which had missiles landing within fifteen to twenty miles of Taiwan’s ports. The Clinton administration did not state that there was any danger to the security of Taiwan because it did not want Congress involved.

I could go on and on. The key is that the Act shows what Congress was thinking. It was writing a treaty, as I suggested earlier. It was delineating the parameters that would limit the future relationship of the U.S. to the PRC on actions that the latter might take against Taiwan. This was especially necessary at the time because Brzezinski’s view (as well as Michel Oxenberg and many others) was that Taiwan was really of secondary importance to the U.S. and its future was not really of no concern to us. In fact, the best thing that could happen, in their view, was a Taiwan acceptance of PRC terms for reunification - a rather cavalier dismissal of the fate of 18 or 19 million people. I always viewed this position as a kind of racism that we would not be concerned with the fate of these 18-19 million people at a time when the U.S. was making strong representations to the USSR with regard to human rights in its own country, its treatment of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, etc. The Carter administration showed great concern for the fate of Europeans and Soviets, but didn’t seem to give a damn for the orientals who lived in Taiwan. I found it offensive and essentially racist.

*Q: Tell us a little about the dynamics of sending the draft legislation to Congress? I assume that there was a debate about that in the State Department. Who were the major players in Congress?*

FELDMAN: The key Congressional members were: in the Senate: Alan Cranston, who was I believe the Democratic whip; Edward Kennedy another good Democrat; Claiborne Pell, later the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee; Bob Dole, the Republican minority leader; Barry Goldwater; Jake Javits, a delightful senator from New York and the ranking minority member of the Foreign Relations Committee. He was also the major player; Cranston and Javits in fact managed the legislation in the Senate. Frank Church, who chaired the Foreign Relations

Committee, basically ceded to Cranston and Javits. I think the latter was the key senator in the passage of the Act.

On the House side, Clem Zablocki, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, was a major player as was Lester Wolff, the chairman of the Asian sub-committee, who became the floor manager for the bill. Also Dante Fascell, the next ranking Democrat on the Committee; Ed Derwinski, a Republican, played a key role. I should note that the Democrats were trying to pass a bill against the Administration, allowing the Republicans essentially to watch from the side lines.

There were some key staffers who were very active: Chris Nelson and Jim Przustup, of Wolff's staff - the latter is now professor at the National Defense University; before that he was the director of Asian studies at the Heritage Foundation and earlier a member of the Department's Policy Planning staff during the Bush administration. Nelson now writes a newsletter on Washington politics for a number of clients - particularly Japanese. Jon Holstein was also a player; he also was a member of Wolff's staff; he now works with Wolff in his consulting business. Goldwater's staffer, Terry Emerson, was also deeply involved and helpful.

Interestingly enough, the State Department nominated two people to represent it in the negotiations leading up to the passage of the legislation. One was Jim Michel, the deputy legal advisor; he later went to AID and then became our ambassador to Guatemala. I was the other Departmental representative. If Brzezinski and Oxenberg had followed our negotiations very closely, they would have yanked me out, torn the epaulets off my shoulders and broken my sword across their knees. Essentially, I was agreeing with the language that the Congress was drafting which I don't think was really what the White House wanted. Jim would usually defer to me but he did question on occasions whether certain words would really be acceptable to the Administration. I would assure him that it might be a hard sell, but that I thought it would be approved. In fact, Brzezinski and Oxenberg - and to some degree even Holbrooke - were horrified when they saw the final product, but by then it was too late.

The PRC was furious and denounced the bill as it was being written. President Carter threatened to veto the legislation, but the Congress passed it overwhelmingly - something like 350 for and 50 against in the House and 85 to 2 in the Senate. It was obvious that any veto would be overridden. On the tenth or twelfth of April 1979, the Act was signed into law.

Ever since, there has been a great tension between what the Act specifies and the three communiqués signed by three Presidents and the PRC. The first was the Shanghai communiqué of February, 1972; the second was the "recognition" communiqué of January 1, 1979; and the third was signed on August 17, 1982 by President Reagan. These documents are basically at odds with the Taiwan Relations Act. Successive administrations have maintained that their policy towards the PRC was based on the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, but this is somewhere between difficult and impossible because of the inherent contradictions in the documents.

This is most manifest when you watch the present administration - Clinton's. For example, look at the three "nos" that Clinton enunciated before a Chinese audience in Shanghai in June, 1998.

He said that U.S. policy was to support the “one China” concept; that we would not support Taiwan independence; and that we would not support Taiwan’s efforts to enter any international organization that requires statehood as a basis for membership. The White House have argued that this is just a continuation of past policy. It is right in part, but only in part. The Reagan communiqué says that the U.S. would follow the “one China” policy, not a “two China” policy - Taiwan and the PRC - and would not support Taiwan’s independence. But it doesn’t say anything about Taiwan’s membership in international organizations.

Let me read what the Taiwan Relations Act says on this issue. In Section 4 (d) Congress wrote :”Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization.” At the time this was written, the ROC was a member of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It had continued this membership for all the years following its expulsion from the General Assembly, making the point that a country did not have to a GA member or indeed the UN to be a Bank or IMF member. It had continued this membership primarily because it had the support of the U.S., which in light of the weighted voting system, gave the U.S. a great percentage of the votes. I think in those years our vote equaled 20% of the total - now it is down to 17%. It was in the year following “normalization,” when we ceased supporting the ROC’s membership, that Taiwan was expelled from the international financial institutions.

The language in the Act is written in negative terms, but it has to mean that Congress considered that Taiwan was fully qualified to be a member of all international organizations. That should have been U.S. law. But the policy of the Clinton administration runs completely contrary to the law of the land. Furthermore, the Act says in many points that as far as U.S. law is concerned the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized as the ROC before January 1, 1978, shall be considered as a government of a nation. So in law the government on Taiwan is considered to be the government of a state. That raises the question on what basis can the Clinton administration follow its policy? It can because the Executive Branch does what it wants to do, but it is in direct contradiction with the Taiwan Relations Act. So we have a basic conflict between the communiqués and the Act; it has been left to each administration and each Congress to deal with these contradictions. I submit that one of the reasons why such a situation exists - i.e. the conflict between administration policy and congressional sentiment criticizing U.S. China policies as expressed in the Taiwan Relations Act and resolutions approved by lopsided margins - is because of the disconnect between the law and the communiqués. The tendencies of administrations after January 1, 1979 has been to conclude that the relationship with the PRC is so supremely important that the law has to be ignored. You can also see that theory at work in the way the administration ignores laws applying sanctions to missile sales by the PRC.

*Q: What was the reaction of the ROC to the passage of the Act?*

FELDMAN: Interestingly enough, it considered the Act to be totally inadequate because it did not restore an official relationship between it and the U.S. That was the initial reaction. As time went by, it grew to love the Act to the point when five-ten years ago, it began to suggest to countries that broke relations with it and established relationships with the PRC many years earlier that they adopt legislation and institutions similar to what the U.S. had done. We are now

in May 1999 and last month we celebrated the twentieth anniversary of the Taiwan Relations Act with praise heaped upon it by the ROC and all commentators, including President Carter who visited Taiwan at the end of March of this year during which time he took credit for the Act - despite the fact that he had 20 years earlier threatened to veto it.

*Q: What about the PRC?*

FELDMAN: It still damns it as a direct contradiction of the communiqués as it describes as the sworn word of the U.S. Of course, it doesn't make any difference how many times the situation is explained to it, it doesn't quite sink in that a communiqué is a statement of administration policy, whereas the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land.

*Q: What about implementation? What happened after the Act was passed?*

FELDMAN: It has been spasmodically implemented. As I pointed out, administrations completely ignored the legal requirements of the law as it applied to the ROC's membership in international organizations.

We had after the passage of the Act final negotiations with the ROC on the establishment of the new institutions required to conduct bilateral business. Sometime in early February, we concluded these negotiations with the ROC agreeing to establish the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, but we could not proceed in establishing the AIT until the TRA was passed in mid-April. Then we could formalize the transition of an embassy to the AIT. In February, I think, our staff moved out of the embassy compound to what had been the MAAG and the CIA (called something like the Naval Auxiliary Communications Center) compounds - a symbolic gesture to show that our embassy had ceased to function. We had not made any changes in personnel by this time; after AIT was established the Department selected Chuck Cross to head it up - he had retired from the Foreign Service sometime in 1971 after he had completed his tour as ambassador to Singapore. David Dean became the head of AIT's Washington office. Finally, the staff was paid.

*Q: Did the staff just continue, although in a new status? Did you and your staff just moved over to the AIT?*

FELDMAN: No, we stayed in the Department. The Office of Republic of China Affairs was folded into the Office of Regional Affairs and thereby ceased to exist as a separate directorate. It was renamed some thing like the Taiwan Coordination Staff. I had argued very strongly against Chas Freeman whose proposal was to fold the ROC office into the Office of Chinese Affairs. I won that argument and therefore I and my staff became part of the Regional Affairs Office in EA. I stayed on briefly; it was made eminently clear that in the interest of smoothing relations within the Executive Branch and to give further indication of our break with Taiwan, I should move on.

**PAUL KREISBERG**

**Chinese Language Training  
Taiwan (1954-1955)**

**Political Officer  
Hong Kong (1956-1959)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of Intelligence and Research  
Washington, DC (1960-1962)**

**Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs  
Washington, DC (1965-1970)**

**Policy Planning  
Washington, DC (1977-1981)**

*Paul Kreisberg was born in New York in 1929. He received his master's degree from Columbia University in 1952. His overseas posts include Bombay, Hong Kong, Karachi, Dar es Salaam, and New Delhi. Mr. Kreisberg was interviewed by Nancy Bernkopf Tucker and Warren I. Cohen on April 8, 1989.*

*Q: In that case, let's go on to the period where you were in Taiwan studying language. I assume that with your interest in China, that you were an observer of what was happening around you, and you weren't just studying language. What were your impressions of Taiwan in that period? Economic conditions, political conditions, strains between the local population and the mainlanders, anything like that.*

KREISBERG: Well, first was that it was a period of intense public propaganda. Everywhere that you went, there were posters and signs to support the government in Taiwan, to oppose the People's Republic of China, to "Gloriously Return to the Mainland" [Kuang Fu Ta Lu].

There was a considerable degree of tension between Taiwanese and mainlanders, very little speaking of Mandarin in the streets. And few of the people that I knew didn't speak Mandarin at all, or if they did, with a very strong Taiwanese accent.

I had been divorced just before I went there, and I was going around with a young Chinese woman at the time. Her Chinese was absolutely execrable. I mean, it was just dreadful.  
[Laughter]

*Q: Your contacts were mainly Taiwanese, then?*

KREISBERG: Those were the people who were mainly in Taichung. The concept that the embassy had was they would put us into a place where there were not a lot of foreigners, so our Chinese would not be polluted. But they hadn't really thought about the fact that there weren't many mainlanders there either. So the main good Mandarin was being spoken at the language school.

There were military around, and we saw a fair number of them but not socially. But there wasn't any violence. We never saw any overt expression of tension between the mainlanders and Taiwanese.

It, of course, was a period of very low development in town. Very few cars. Most people rode bicycles or bicycle driven rickshaws. The outskirts of the town where the language school sat at the edge of a rice paddy, was about half a mile from the very center of town. The whole population of Taichung at that point was probably under a 100,000, and now it is a city of well over a million, an industrial and major administrative center. It is the contrast and the change over the last thirty years that is striking.

*Q: Tunghai University hadn't been built yet, had it?*

KREISBERG: It had just been built, and opened while I was at the language school. We were able to go out and speak to people there because there were more Mandarin speakers in Tunghai. It was, of course, very difficult to, and absolutely illegal, to listen to Radio Beijing or any of the other Chinese communist radio stations. It was illegal to have materials from China. We weren't able to look at the People's Daily. We weren't able to have FBIS there. So my knowledge of what was happening actually in China was that the language school was sharply curtailed. I picked it up only when I went up to the embassy where the people briefed us.

*Q: Rankin was still there, wasn't he?*

KREISBERG: Karl Rankin was the ambassador for part of the time. [Everett] Drumright, who had been my Consul General in Bombay a few years earlier, was there subsequently as Ambassador.

*Q: Do you have any recollections of impressions? Did you meet with Rankin or Drumright?*

KREISBERG: My relations with Drumright were not good. He was an aloof and chilly person, intensely anti-communist and anti-PRC.

I violated his instructions at one point in Bombay by allowing an American newspaperman on a Fulbright scholarship to return to the United States via Europe to keep some appointments he had made there, even though we had been instructed to amend his passport so he would have to go directly back to Washington in order to testify before the McCarran Committee. He had been suspected of spying for the Chinese Communists or the Soviets. I thought this was probably absurd but in any event he said he had a brief commitment at the University of Rome or the University of Bologna. I said I didn't see any reason why he shouldn't fulfill those commitments for a few days. Drumright and I had a big fight about that. The newspaperman was eventually cleared but the experience dramatically affected his later career.

*Q: I don't know if it is really important, but do you remember the name of the journalist, by any chance? We can probably find that out.*

KREISBERG: Yes, it was Amos Landman and his wife Lynn. He and his wife were wanted

because they had written a book together in Shanghai in the late 1940s and were being accused of having had connections with a Soviet agent in Shanghai at the time.

*Q: Yes, I have read the book, indeed.*

[The book referred to is Profile of Red China (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951).]

*If I were to ask you to reflect a bit on what sort of an officer Drumright was, is that typical of the way he ran...*

KREISBERG: Very rigid. He ran things absolutely by the book. Very conservative. He, of course, had been one of the staunchest opponents of the communists and strongest supporters of the KMT national government while he was in Nanking. The man became a strong policy enemy, and, I think, not a personal friend of any of the China officers who subsequently were dismissed, or cast into oblivion, by Senators McCarthy and McCarran.

*Q: Did you ever have a sense, you may not have heard it at the level that you were able to penetrate, but I know that Washington was sometimes unhappy with Karl Rankin for giving too much support to the Kuomintang and forgetting which government he represented? Were there similar concerns about Drumright?*

KREISBERG: I don't remember.

*Q: When you went to the embassy, did you deal with other officers there? Is there anyone else that you recall that is worth mentioning?*

KREISBERG: No, not really. I can't remember any of the people who were active at the embassy at that point.

My reasons for going up to Taipei, basically, were just to pick up some food -- the supplies in Taichung were much more limited than they were -- or packages or mail. I was only there for ten months. I was not there for the full two years because I had had two years of Chinese before I went to Taiwan. So I was the first graduate from the language school in the post-China language school years.

*Q: Did you have any contacts at all with the American military mission in Taiwan in that period?*

KREISBERG: No, not at that period.

*Q: Being in Taichung, perhaps you would have had an opportunity to observe Taiwan independence movement activities, if there were any.*

KREISBERG: There was nothing to be seen at that point. I mean, there was a great deal of consciousness of what had happened back in 1947, but everyone was very quiet, they had really been cowed and there was virtually no discussion of it in any language that I understood.

[Laughter]

My guess is that there probably was a certain amount in Taiwanese or Japanese. That was a period in which a fair number of people spoke Japanese. And you heard a good deal of it in the streets.

*Q: Were you at all sensitive to any tensions between the Taiwanese or Chinese and Americans?*

KREISBERG: Between Taiwanese and Chinese and Americans, no. No, I saw or at least felt none.

*Q: Because, of course, by 1957, you had riots against the Americans, but you...*

KREISBERG: That's right. At that point -- this was 1955 -- there was nothing to be seen of that sort.

*Q: Not even after the withdrawal from the islands and the Strait crisis and the anger about it?*

KREISBERG: No. I literally saw nothing and heard nothing about it. In retrospect, we were really quite isolated at the school!

*Q: Was there any other fallout of the Taiwan Strait crisis of '54-'55 that came to your attention while you were there? Were you actually there during the latter part of it?*

KREISBERG: I was there, quite frankly, because, although I had been drafted into the Army to go to Korea, my draft board thought that going to Taiwan was as brave and heroic at the time as going to Korea. And I didn't disabuse them of that. [Laughter]

Taichung really was a backwater. It was as if the politics of Taipei and international relations just skimmed right over it. I learned much more after I left Taiwan and went to Hong Kong about what had been going on then than I ever was conscious of in Taichung. It is a marvelous illustration of how one can live in a middle of a tense area and really have no awareness of it.

*Q: Okay, then, why don't we move on to the period that you were political officer in Hong Kong. Perhaps we could start with a brief discussion, and then if you want to go back to explore some of these, what the major issues were that you were following while you were in Hong Kong.*

KREISBERG: We, of course, were not terribly much involved in U.S.- China relations. There was virtually nothing going on at the time. The consulate was engaged in two things. One, in monitoring internal unrest in Hong Kong. Shortly after I arrived, there were major demonstrations, rioting in Kowloon directed at foreigners and at the British, and in which it was assumed that the Chinese communists had played a major role.

But the major work that I did was in evaluating Chinese internal domestic developments and change. So the principal period on which I was writing was during the period of full cooperativization of agriculture, the 100 Flowers Movement and the anti-rightists crackdown

after that, and then the beginning of the commune movement and the Great Leap Forward of '59 and '60.

*Q: Can I go back and pickup just a question that occurred to me when you talked about the internal situation in the colony of Hong Kong? The riots that you observed and then subsequent efforts towards the end of the '50s and early '60s when the Chinese allowed large numbers of refugees to cross the border...*

KREISBERG: Right.

*Q: Because of their food shortages. These seemed to Americans as efforts by the communists to destabilize Hong Kong. And yet the Chinese never took Hong Kong back. Do you have any sense of why they would have been encouraging this kind of activity?*

KREISBERG: It was a period, of course, in which the United States was very hostile to China. The interpretation that the British encouraged, and that we accepted at the time, was that China wanted to make life as uncomfortable for the British as possible in the hope that this would increase the willingness of the British to negotiate an early withdrawal from Hong Kong. Now whether there were ever any direct feelers to the British on this or not, I don't know.

If you haven't interviewed Harvey Feldman, you might want to do that, because Harvey was much more involved and directly responsible for the internal Hong Kong scene than I was.

*Q: As long as you mentioned Harvey Feldman, who else was there at the consulate at that period, and what other sorts of things might they have been doing at the time? What were their responsibilities?*

KREISBERG: Well, the head of the political section was Harald Jacobson. His predecessor was LaRue (Larry) Lutkins. Larry was there just briefly after I arrived. He lives in Fairfax.

Robert Yoder, who lives up in Vermont, was there at the time. Thomas Ainsworth, who is retired from the Service and lives here in the Washington area, was there. Let's see. Drumright was also the consul general in Hong Kong. Drumright and I kept following one another around.

*Q: Whiting wasn't there, was he?*

KREISBERG: Alan Whiting was there much later. He was there six or seven years after that in the mid-1960s.

Edwin Fried, who was at Brookings, was the head of the economic section. Lindsey Grant was there; he was my predecessor as the Director of Chinese Affairs. But those were the key people who were there.

*Q: Do you have any idea where Grant is these days?*

KREISBERG: Grant lives in Bethesda.

*Q: Was the entire attention of the consulate really focused at internal affairs on the mainland?*

KREISBERG: [Kreisberg shook his head negatively.] No, the consular section was extremely busy with visa applicants and there were moderately active commercial and USIS sections. But the bulk of the work of the political, economic, attaché offices and of the CIA station was on the mainland.

*Q: How did you get information? What were your primary sources?*

KREISBERG: Well, there were four. One was the China mainland press and the Soviet-China mainland magazines, which we were responsible for. I was in charge of that activity for a year and of buying that kind of publication, and of maps and telephone books. The second was, most of which could not legally be exported from China, the FBIS, which, of course, was the broadcast system. The third were the British interrogations of refugees and other people who came across, which were made available to us. And the fourth were miscellaneous "walk-ins", people who themselves had either got into China to do business and then came out and talked to us, or who came in to try to sell us something, and at the same time, were telling us things that were going on. Those were the four key ways. And, of course, more covert intelligence information.

*Q: Did you have your own refugees? Did you have a program for interviewing them yourselves?*

KREISBERG: The refugees all came to the British. The only people who came to us were incidental "walk-ins". Sometimes the people were then passed on to the CIA and were then rehired but I almost never saw them then.

*Q: I was thinking of a later time when Dick Solomon and Mike Oksenberg were going in and talking to refugees. You didn't have anybody who was going in to do that?*

KREISBERG: There was little of that going on at this time.

*Q: How extensive was the cooperation with the British?*

KREISBERG: Very, very close.

*Q: And that would be both at overt and covert levels?*

KREISBERG: Yes.

*Q: Were their assessments of what was happening inside of China very different from American views, since their policy towards China was fairly different?*

KREISBERG: No, I don't think so. I think that the general assessment of the community tended to come together around a fairly common center. There, of course, were a lot of other people who were following China. Father Ladany was turning out his China News Analysis at that time.

The university, whatever it is called...

*Q: Research Center.*

KREISBERG: Well, I'm not sure it was called that at the time. It kept changing its name. It was relatively small.

*Q: Field Services.*

KREISBERG: Something like that. And they were following it. But there was a fairly common center of interpretation of what was going on, certainly in the period from, I would say, '56 to '59. There began to be some divergence after '59 over what had been responsible for the turn to the Left and the crackdown by Deng Xiaoping and Mao on the rightists and then the movement toward the Great Leap Forward.

There was a lot of uncertainty as to what one could believe about the Great Leap Forward. At that time, the viewpoints really began to diverge quite widely. It centered around what people's own personal ideologies were in part. That, I think, continued for much of the early part of the 1960s.

*Q: Did the British themselves ever give you a sense that they were trying to convince you that their approach to China was a better one? Was there any discussion of the difference of American and British policy?*

KREISBERG: I never got a sense that there was a strong difference when I talked to people in the intelligence side of the British community in Hong Kong. But I admit I saw relatively little of the senior British political levels -- the Political Advisor, the Chief Secretary, or the Governor. That was left to the Consul General, or the head of the Political Section. But I saw nothing in our reporting that suggested serious differences.

*Q: You arrived in Hong Kong after the event, but was there any continuing impact of the Bandung Conference and China's effort to reach out to other Asian nations? Did that have an impact in Hong Kong?*

KREISBERG: I didn't sense it. It wasn't the area that I was working on. I mean, we were all following Chinese foreign policy. But what you really have to remember is that we in Hong Kong knew what was going on in Chinese foreign policy from our reading of what the Chinese were telling the rest of the world. So none of us had any sense of confidence as to the accuracy of our interpretation of Chinese foreign policy. It was obviously what the Chinese wanted us to know. There were other places where people had better information on Chinese foreign policies, or thought they had.

*Q: Where?*

KREISBERG: Well, I think in different embassies -- Delhi, Paris.

*Q: From local contacts?*

KREISBERG: Yes. Hong Kong was really far away from Beijing. It wasn't really used by China as its center for international foreign policy activities.

*Q: Did you have any contacts in Hong Kong with people known to be from the mainland who were attempting in any way to...*

KREISBERG: No. We were instructed to stay far from them, and they were instructed to stay far from us. One of the "great moments" in U.S.-Chinese diplomatic relations was when permission was given -- I think this was in the mid-1960s -- for someone from the consulate to meet with Fei Xiaotong, the Publisher of the Communist-controlled Ta Kung Pao newspaper in Hong Kong. The degree of isolation that was imposed was almost complete. We knew no one and were supposed to know no one from the Bank of China or from New China News Agency. It was a period of great ideological intensity. Not as great as between 1950 and 1955, but the instructions were still, "You will not have contact with, discuss, shake hands with anybody from the People's Republic of China."

*Q: You know, Alan Whiting has said -- I interviewed him -- and he mentioned that it could be perilous to your career within the State Department if you could be heard speaking of Peking or Beijing rather than calling it Peiping. So that same sort of sense was true in the field?*

KREISBERG: Yes, if you used it in written reports. My recollection is that in the office we often used "Beijing" simply because so much of the material we worked on used that form.

*Q: A related question since you were monitoring radio and articles closely. One of the things that we have come across is a question over whether there were efforts by Zhou En-lai and the government to devise a peaceful solution to the Taiwan problem along the lines of "one China, but not now," in the late-1950s. There is a speech that Chen Yi makes that Rod MacFarquhar has in his book that indicates some interest in following that sort of a line. Did you come across that? [Sino-American Relations, 1949-1971 (Newton Abbot, England: David & Charles, 1972)]*

KREISBERG: I don't recall that now, Nancy. I mean, the one speech that Chen Yi made that -- and it is conceivable that it was the same one -- but I remember a different part of it which struck me. I thought it was about 1960 or '61, which would be a little after this. It was when Chen Yi, in effect, had adumbrated the coastal development strategy and gave a speech in which he spoke of Shanghai as a prospective international center for trade and commerce, which would be opened up in ways that would be broader and more favorable than other parts of the country. It was a one-time speech he made. It was never repeated. Obviously, it was Zhao Ziyang before his time. I don't remember the Zhou En-lai speech, no.

*Q: Since your main focus was domestic affairs, I wasn't intending really to ask about that. But did you have a sense that, in watching these major developments going on in China, was there a feeling that the Chinese government was going to be so destabilized that there might indeed be a change or that anything of that magnitude was going to happen?*

KREISBERG: Never. Nor from any interviews that we ever got.

*Q: So there was a conviction then, amongst the officers, that China was going to be a continuing presence and that you would have to go on dealing with China?*

KREISBERG: Absolutely. A broad consensus, I think, among most of the professionals that the sooner the United States began dealing with China, the better. The question was always how we were going to be able to create a strategy that would enable us to achieve this. But with Walter Robertson as the Assistant Secretary of State, it was a subject that one could not possibly put in writing.

*Q: So discussions on the subject were going on in Hong Kong?*

KREISBERG: Yes, no question about it. We were aware -- although some of us were aware later than others -- of what had been happening in Geneva with Alex Johnson [U. Alexis Johnson, U.S. Coordinator for the Conference and Ambassador to Czechoslovakia 1953-1957] specifically proposing normalization to John Foster Dulles in his bathroom. A great bathroom story.

*Q: Would you elucidate us on that?*

KREISBERG: At one point during the Geneva talks when -- what was it, '54-'55 -- Dulles was in his bathroom taking a bath, and Alex Johnson came in to describe the conversation he had been having with, I guess it must have been, Wang Bingnan at the time. He essentially said that the Chinese were willing to strike a deal on normalization, which would involve release of prisoners and meeting of virtually all the conditions that we had set. He recommended to Dulles that we accept it and begin the negotiations on that. And Dulles categorically and said, "No, we will not do it."

*Q: Was there any understanding at that point on what would happen with Taiwan?*

KREISBERG: You probably ought to go and talk to Alex Johnson because I don't think Alex put this story in his book.

*Q: No.*

KREISBERG: That was an issue that was simply going to be resolved. How had not been set. It would have meant that we would have broken our relations with Taiwan, or that we would have some other kind of association with Taiwan. Conceivably where we are now except twenty years earlier.

*Q: When did this occur?*

KREISBERG: Well, it was obviously when Dulles was in Geneva, so it must have been '55. I love the image of Dulles lying in his bathtub while Ambassador Johnson is sitting on the toilet. It was obviously one of these large Swiss bathrooms.

*Q: As far as you know, did Dulles give any reasons for not willing to explore it?*

KREISBERG: No. One could reconstruct what all of his reasons would have been. Having refused to shake Zhou En-lai's hand, it is not surprising that he would not be interested in normalization.

*Q: One of the things I was going to ask in a moment, so I will do so now and came back to some other things, but as sort of a summation of your '56 to '59 service. Some recent work that is being done by scholars in the U.S. and indeed some scholars in China as well beginning to look at this, too, and some of my own works indicates that Dulles was not quite as inflexible as, at least the historians, have portrayed him until now.*

*He entertained a considerable degree of distrust and dislike for Chiang Kai-shek and found the association with the Nationalist Chinese uncomfortable. He was willing to be a bit more flexible on Communist China. That he did, indeed, explore possible ways of getting China into the United Nations without having to throw Taiwan out. That he was moving towards what we would call a two-China policy.*

KREISBERG: That is interesting. I never heard that. Miss Ruth Bacon, who, of course, was for years the eminence grise in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs for keeping PRC out of the U.N., never gave me any hint that she had ever been asked to consider alternative contingencies. This was a subject that she and Louise McNutt -- have you interviewed Louise -- felt they had categorical assurances of support on from Dulles and Dean Rusk.

*Q: I haven't interviewed her. I know her.*

KREISBERG: Louise is the great residual memory on everything having to do with U.N. policy toward China. Ruth Bacon, I think, either has died or at least retired out of Washington. But your comment is new to me; that is interesting. When was that? When would that have been?

*Q: Well, it is sort of an ongoing process, particularly the most notable occasion I can think of right now is just before -- was it Senator George -- he retired as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and just prior to that. So it should have been '56. Dulles talked with him about the possibility of his introducing the subject in the Senate and working at it.*

KREISBERG: That is fascinating.

Q (TUCKER): *Then George decides not to run again, retires, and Dulles doesn't pursue it.*

*Q: And we found some collaboration of that, because Rusk told me that Dulles approached him to go to the Democratic leadership and see if they would join him in a bipartisan effort.*

KREISBERG: And was Rusk supportive of that?

*Q: Apparently; he discussed it with the White House.*

KREISBERG: That is funny.

*Q: It fell through because George was challenged in the primary by Talmadge and withdrew and just dropped out of it altogether.*

KREISBERG: Totally inconsistent with Rusk's great comment to one of the senior officers in the secretariat of the Department back in 1967 -- '66 or '67 that there are some young officers in the Department of State who are trying to persuade us to change our China policy, and we are not going to do it.

*Q: Yes. We actually want to come back to talk about Rusk, but a little later.*

*Before we go on, what does happen around 1957 is a breakdown in America's efforts to isolate China on trade policies. There is some indication, now that we have gotten into the records, that Eisenhower actually was in favor of dropping the embargo entirely. Dulles was less inclined in that direction, though persuaded that in certain cases, trade might, in fact, be a good idea. Did this have much impact in Hong Kong?*

KREISBERG: It doesn't ring a bell in my head. This is the kind of thing that Ed Fried is probably worth talking to about. My guess is that policy musings of that sort, and at that level, never got to anyone in the field, or even very far down into the Washington bureaucracy, anymore than it does now.

*Q: One other sort of related question to Bandung which you mentioned not having thought of very much. But one thing that does become a bit of an issue in Hong Kong itself is there was an alleged effort to assassinate Zhou En-lai as he flew to the Bandung conference. There is some indication that the Kuomintang was involved with that and that the CIA may have been involved.*

KREISBERG: I remember the incident and discussion of it. But I do not remember ever having seen any intelligence information that shed any light on what actually happened in that incident. I never talked to any of the British intelligence people about it.

*Q: We saw some British intelligence records last summer. It seems quite clear that it all happened, and that all these different people were involved. But then we haven't been able to make the next step on that.*

*What did you know about covert operations against the mainland? To the degree that you can talk about it.*

KREISBERG: Before I joined the Foreign Service, I was interviewed for the Central Intelligence Agency. One of the many reasons I didn't join was they tested me on my loyalty and my commitment by asking whether I would be willing to be dropped by parachute into Sichuan. My target would be to organize a group of anti-communist Kuomintang soldiers who remained up in the hills in Sichuan and work with them in a number of operations and then exfiltrate myself, if necessary, out through Burma. They looked at me, and they said, "Would you be willing to do that?"

And I said, "No." And that was the end of my interview. [Laughter]

*Q: If you said yes, you might have had to do it.*

KREISBERG: Right! The plausibility of it was that this was about a year before [Richard] Fecteau and [John] Downey had a parallel experience, but at the other end of China.

I don't know anything about the details of what CIA was doing. But there was a very active program involving infiltrating people into China with specific targets -- largely military, not surprisingly, at that point.

*Q: Sabotage might have been...*

KREISBERG: No, I don't think there was sabotage. I think it was largely intelligence. What do the Chinese have? Where do they have it? Is there any indication they are working on nuclear -- even at that point, obviously, this was a constant source of concern -- nuclear weapons? Where troops are being based. It was a standard semi-war kind of intelligence operation that we engaged in.

*Q: Run out of Taiwan, I assume?*

KREISBERG: Some things were run out of Taiwan. Some of those, obviously, gave us the documents. There was a lot that was run out of Hong Kong. Hong Kong was a very big station at the time. The person who you might want to talk to about that is Peter Sichel and Claire George.

Claire George lives here in Washington and was, until about six months ago, the Deputy Director for Operations at CIA. But at the time, he was a junior officer in Hong Kong.

Peter Sichel was the head of station, and he is now in the wine business in New York.

*Q: You mentioned documents. Could you explain what those documents are?*

KREISBERG: The Lienchang documents?

Q (TUCKER): Yes.

*Q: The ones John Lewis...*

KREISBERG: Yes, John Wilson Lewis. The materials that were picked up as a result of a Chinese Nationalist operation into Fujian against the county seat of Lien-chang county. This produced what at the time, and perhaps even still, was one of the most useful collections of documents on Chinese policy. It enabled people to have a sense of the difference between implementation at grassroots and policy directives at the center. It focused on the enormous gap between what the government wanted to do, and what was actually being done.

*Q: Who were the operatives that were being put in? You mentioned that they asked you whether you wanted to go in and train a group covertly. I would assume in information gathering, that it was difficult to drop an American in who wouldn't be spotted quickly.*

KREISBERG: I have no idea whether they did much of that. This was during the Korean War. My impression is that certainly after Downey and Fecteau, they were extremely cautious about having any Americans directly involved.

*Q: You can find some stuff in the Koo papers on who the Americans are [Ambassador V.K. Wellington Koo Papers, Columbia University]. Not that were going in, but that were going over to Taiwan and preparing groups to go over.*

Q (TUCKER): *Do you know anything about the operations that were going on? You mentioned that they would have pulled you out through Burma. Anything about the operations that were going on with the Kuomintang irregulars in Burma at the time?*

KREISBERG: No.

*Q: Anything about a company called Sea Supply that was dropping...*

KREISBERG: No, I don't know. You have now exhausted my operational knowledge.  
[Laughter]

*Q: Did you know Ray Cline in that period?*

KREISBERG: Yes. I have known Ray Cline for, oh, 35 years. Ray was in Taipei while I was studying Chinese. On one of his many tours in Taiwan.

*Q: Why was he so successful at what he did?*

KREISBERG: Gosh, I don't know. I mean, he obviously has a very reassuring personality and is very low-key. I assume that he was, in classical operational terms, an effective person on the ground. His career, of course, was primarily as an analyst. What always struck me as being curious about Ray is that he didn't know Chinese. But he was nevertheless...

*Q: He didn't know any Chinese?*

KREISBERG: No.

*Q: I didn't realize that. I thought he had established a fairly close relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo.*

KREISBERG: Always through interpreters.

*Q: Interesting.*

KREISBERG: Pat Wen probably was a key interpreter when he was over there. Although Pat mainly worked, I think, with the Generalissimo.

*Q: I got set up with something Jim Ireland introduced me to when I worked there. Trying to set up something where I would write a biography of Ching-Kuo, and Pat was the go-between on that. This would have been about '65 or '66.*

KREISBERG: Harvey Feldman was, I believe, considering writing a biography of Chiang Kai-shek. They agreed to open up all the Kuomintang archives to it. But he has not committed himself to do it. What is worth knowing is that the KMT is prepared to open up those archives to the right person.

*Q: Interesting. Before we go on, one last area of concern, a major one, is the Quemoy and Matsu crisis of 1958. I imagine that even though you were focusing on internal issues, this was something that you also paid some attention to at the time.*

KREISBERG: Yes. But, you see, what we were doing is, essentially, reporting on, analyzing, and picking up through intelligence and interviews information on the Chinese intentions during the Quemoy- Matsu crisis. The operational side of it was, obviously, out of Taipei since that was there the main policy was being developed. We were not, to my knowledge, doing anything on this other than informing them of what our judgments were of Chinese policy. Our judgments were, as I recall it, that they, in fact, did not intend to seize the island. That the effort was to try to frighten the KMT off the island and was to test...

*Q: We are just talking about perceptions of PRC and tensions in the Quemoy and Matsu crisis. You were saying that the Chinese were not planning to take it violently, but were hoping to scare...*

KREISBERG: That was our judgment.

*Q: ...Chiang Kai-shek away. There are some very recent indications, some research by a young scholar named He Di...*

*Q: He is He Kang's son, so he has got access to the actual participants.*

KREISBERG: He Kang is the guy who has taken...

*Q: The Minister of Agriculture.*

KREISBERG: The Minister of Agriculture. What is the He who has taken Huangxiang's place?

*Q: I don't remember offhand.*

KREISBERG: It is another He.

*Q: Yes. This young man is with the Institute of American Studies at CASS [Chinese Academy of*

*Social Sciences], and he has done some research on this period which suggests that the Chinese did not want the islands and wouldn't have wanted Chiang Kai-shek to evacuate.*

KREISBERG: That was our judgment at the time. Politically, if there had been a severance of the offshore islands from Taiwan, it would probably have intensified the probability of a political separation of Taiwan from the mainland. What the islands represented was the link of China with Taiwan. So it was a question of intimidation.

Then the question is what Beijing would have done had the KMT actually decided to pull out. We could never quite figure out where that was going to take them. And, of course, it was never clear to us precisely why they were running this risk. There is some evidence, as I recall it -- which came out later, but I don't think we thought it at the time -- there were differences inside the party over this whole exercise between the Minister of Defense...

*Q: Who was Minister of Defense? Peng Dehuai?*

KREISBERG: Peng Dehuai, yes. Between Peng Dehuai and Lin Biao and Mao at the time.

*Q: And Zhang Aiping had some ideas about what should be done. Were there concerns about any Soviet involvement at the time?*

KREISBERG: Well, subsequently, obviously, it became clear that that was one of the key issues, whether the Soviets were going to support China. All that we were able to see was what the Soviets were actually saying. And our interpretation from what the Soviets were saying was that their support was very lukewarm. That, obviously, was the key issue. And, subsequently, I gather, this was one of the key concerns for Mao in his ultimate break with the Soviets. But we knew nothing more than what we were reading in the press at that time.

*Q: One of the interesting questions that I've pursued with a number of different people was at what point the Sino-Soviet split and the growth of serious tensions in the relationship begins to be a serious consideration in the minds of American analysts of China. Was the evidence that you saw in relationship to this crisis something that made you start thinking about...*

KREISBERG: Well, we began thinking about the serious problems in Sino-Soviet relations back in 1956. There had been a widespread assumption that Sino-Soviet relations were strained as early as 1952 coming out of the Gao (Gang)-Rao (Shushi) case, in which it was widely assumed there was Soviet involvement. Before that, although I wasn't there, I had been told by people that there was an assumption among professionals, but not at a high political level in the U.S. Government, that something had gone wrong between Mao and Stalin in the long Mao stay in Moscow, without publicity, and almost by himself, in 1950-1951.

Certainly the way in which the Chinese handled the disturbances in eastern Europe in 1956. The very fact that Zhou En-lai was involved. Who else? It was Zhou. Who else went off to Eastern Europe at that time? Was it Deng Xiaoping? No.

*Q: No, I don't think so. I'm not sure.*

KREISBERG: It wasn't Deng. There was another Chinese who had gone off to eastern Europe besides Zhou. But the degree of involvement by the Chinese in the eastern European crisis suggested to us that there was likely to be considerable tension between the Chinese and the Soviets over that issue even though Zhou was supporting the Soviet Union in its effort to regain control, both in Hungary and in Poland.

So the issue of Sino-Soviet relations being strained, I think, was one that we were watching with great care throughout the latter part of the 1950s.

*Q: How far did you expect those strains to go? Did you really expect a rupture?*

KREISBERG: I don't think any of us expected it to go to the point of Soviet withdrawal, which it did in 19...

*Q: '60.*

KREISBERG: '60. And then, of course, when the ideological war began in the pages of Pravda and the People's Daily, then it was clear that the relationship was almost out of control. And the astonishing thing was, in spite of all that, that for several years, there continued to be a great reluctance inside the U.S. Government to acknowledge that there was a Sino-Soviet split. There was a widespread view that it was all a fake. It was a fraud being perpetrated for western consumption, an argument that drove the professionals out of their minds.

*Q: You mentioned earlier the problems with having Walter Robertson at the helm. Was he one of those who shared that sense that it was all a fraud?*

KREISBERG: Yes.

*Q: Was he hostile to reporting of the kind that would suggest this was real?*

KREISBERG: He just shrugged his shoulders and said, "These guys just don't understand." There is an ideological affinity. They are arguing, but that doesn't change the fact that there is a Sino-Soviet conspiracy, which then went on well into the Vietnam years with Dean Rusk being convinced as late as 1963 or '64 that what was going on in Vietnam was simply part of the Sino-Soviet expansion of communist power.

*Q: What about Walter McConaughy? Does he share Robertson's...*

KREISBERG: Yes. There was this cable of Drumright, McConaughy, Rankin, Robertson and Rusk. There were the five of them who really dominated American policy toward Asia between 1950 and 1968. It was only after that group passed from the scene, that it became possible even to begin talking about a change in policy.

*Q: Did you, sitting in Hong Kong, have any sense that there was a real danger of a larger war with China in 1958?*

KREISBERG: No. None of us saw any possibility of a larger war.

*Q: Did you take serious...*

KREISBERG: I have read the studies that have been done by Mort Halperin, and [Mort] Abramowitz and a lot of other work that has been done. I don't think any of us sitting in Hong Kong saw war as being on the horizon. In fact, it may well have been closer than any of us thought it was. But at the time, we didn't see it.

*Q: We just finished off with the Hong Kong years, and we wanted to talk a bit about the coming of the Kennedy Administration. We were interested in whether you saw any real shift in American policy with the incoming administration, perhaps even after Dulles' death at the very end of the Eisenhower period.*

*There is a debate in the field between a practitioner and a scholar. Jim Thompson essentially blames Dean Rusk for the lack of progress in Chinese policy. That is something that you alluded to in the earlier interview. Whereas Warren, in the writing that he has done on Rusk as Rusk's biographer [Warren I. Cohen. Dean Rusk (New York: Cooper Square, 1980)], points the finger elsewhere and says that really the blame for the lack of progress belongs with John Kennedy. What would be your sense of that?*

KREISBERG: I have no sense of Kennedy. What I said about Rusk was what I remembered about Rusk. Rusk was sufficiently closed mouthed, and I was sufficiently junior that I don't have any recollection of Rusk ever giving any hint that he would have liked to have gone further than Kennedy would let him. My most active conversations and dealings with Rusk on this issue were after Kennedy had died.

*Q: When you were director?*

KREISBERG: Right. So in that period from '61 to '63, I don't have any sense of this whatsoever. There is theory, which some people have described as fact in some of the Kennedy biographies that you know better than I, that Kennedy was going to move on China after 1964. I had never seen anything to support that other than the allegation by biographers. My recollection is that nobody has ever come up with a letter or memorandum or anything in writing from either of the Kennedys.

*Q: No, I have been looking, actually, assiduously for that.*

KREISBERG: I bet you have. I would have thought that if there was something in writing, somebody would have found it.

*Q: Again, maybe you were too junior at the time and not directly involved, but do you have any recollection -- there was, apparently, in 1961, a secret promise by John Kennedy to Chiang Kai-shek that if the issue of Chinese representation became a serious one at the United Nations, that the United States would use its veto power to keep the People's Republic out of the U.N. Do you*

*know anything about that?*

KREISBERG: I don't. I remember having heard that, but I don't have any recollection of where it appeared. The person who would know the answer to that is Ruth Bacon. I assume you have asked her.

*Q: That is something for the future.*

KREISBERG: Ruth Bacon or Louise McNutt. They were the keepers of that kind of information.

*Q: So you wouldn't know any of the background on why that promise would have been made?*

KREISBERG: I would not have been surprised by it. I mean, it was totally consistent with everything else we were doing.

*Q: Who, in your recollection, were the key figures in China policy making at the time in the Department that you were dealing with?*

KREISBERG: We are talking about the INR years?

*Q: Yes, the INR years.*

KREISBERG: You really have to remember that I was still really a junior officer. I had been in the Foreign Service for eight years. I was just a drone down in INR writing papers essentially on internal Chinese politics. I dealt with Oscar Armstrong, who was the head of the office at that time, and rarely with the people on the desk.

*Q: Really? Because when I was in the Department...*

KREISBERG: We were in a different building. We were in the old INR offices on 23rd Street -- a building which was subsequently torn down -- where the WHO building is.

*Q: So there wasn't much cooperation between INR and the desk?*

KREISBERG: Such interchange as there was was at the Lutkins-Joe Yager level. Again, you might ask Joe Yager or Armstrong.

*Q: What sort of an officer was Armstrong? What was he like to work with?*

KREISBERG: He is a very capable guy, very cautious, very careful, meticulous. I never had a strong sense of what his policy preferences were. There is a whole generation of Foreign Service officers who had gone through that terrible period at the beginning of the 1950s who were more cautious than young officers in voicing their views on policy.

*Q: One of the things that occurred to me as I was reading some of the memos that we'll talk about in a little while was the position of [W. Averell] Harriman vis à vis the Laos negotiations*

*in Geneva. There were suggestions in some interviewing that we did in China in 1988 that Harriman was a good guy coming out of those negotiations, and that the Chinese had really appreciated his position. Did you have any sense of that?*

KREISBERG: No, I have none.

*Q: One final thing perhaps then. There was an article written about a year ago in the Journal of American History by a young Chinese-American scholar in which he talks about John Kennedy's preoccupation with the development of the Chinese atomic capability. He suggests that Kennedy and his people were so concerned about that that they actually considered a joint military expedition with the Soviets to prevent its development. [Gordon Chang "JFK, China, and the Bomb," Journal of American History, 75 (March, 1988)].*

KREISBERG: Well, the expression on my face tells you that I had never heard that before.

*Q: Were you doing studies of the Chinese development of the bomb?*

KREISBERG: We never did anything on it in that period from '61 to '63. It was done elsewhere, in CIA's office of National Estimates where, I seem to recall, the expectation in the early 1960s was that China was 5-10 years away from a nuclear test.

*Q: A final question on this period. In this packet of documents that you have shown us, there is a memo in March of 1970 from you to Winfred Brown, which is one of the most interesting, which talks at some length about the negotiations on Laos and the series of stages through which all of this had gone. It gives the distinct impression of considerable Chinese cooperativeness on the subject. We were wondering, in light of that, was there ever any attempt to capitalize on that? Were there questions asked of you to see how this could be...*

KREISBERG: No. The issue was never raised.

*Q: When did you find out about those Wang Bingnan informal coffee chats? I assume not when you were in INR. That was something you heard about later?*

KREISBERG: My guess is -- and I really don't remember, Warren- -that they appeared in files.

*Q: That you went through afterwards.*

KREISBERG: Yes, which we went through. One of the things that we did in the late 1960s in OSA and which is available somewhere -- and I have not asked for it -- is a comprehensive history and review of all the conversations with the Chinese in Geneva and Warsaw, which we worked our way through, both by subject and by time. We had those in two large binders that we used as our basic reference books.

*Q: Do you remember when those were pulled together?*

KREISBERG: They were pulled together in '68 or '69. I think '69. Then we kept them up to date

until the Warsaw talks closed down in '71. Now they may have been kept up after that, but I suspect not. Those would be useful to have, I would have thought.

*Q: Yes. I doubt though that they would give them to you on the grounds that this was foreign government material.*

KREISBERG: That may be.

*Q: After your INR period, you go off to the University of Pennsylvania, and you are studying about Pakistan from 1963 to '64, and you are posted to Pakistan itself.*

KREISBERG: I was in INR while the Sino-India War was going on, and a constant series of meetings and discussions and arguments with Rhea Blue, Alan Whiting, and Oscar Armstrong about the whole Sino-Indian border issue.

*Q: On those discussions in those meetings, what were the key points of contention?*

KREISBERG: Well, the basic issues were, first, who had started it, who was responsible for precipitating the crisis? What we should say to the Chinese about it in Warsaw, what involvement we should have in the conflict? Was it an area where we should become involved? How dangerous was it? And what were the Chinese objectives and motives?

Basically, the INR position through that whole time -- which, as I recall it, all of us who were involved shared -- was that it was unlikely that the Chinese were (A) going to thrust down into the plains of India; (B) try to hold on to most of the territory that they seized in the eastern sector or even a number of the areas in the western sector; and (C) as a result, that we should limit whatever engagement we -- some of the people in the Department, including Rusk and, I think, Kennedy -- were pushing for.

We, of course, ended up, in the Harriman mission, in proposing that we provide some substantial assistance to the Indians. But I don't think that anyone at the professional level in the State Department ever believed, ultimately, that the Chinese saw this as a major way of extending ultimate control down into India, which was the line the Indians were trying to push.

*Q: Was there very much conflict between, let's say, the China desk and the India desk over what all of this meant? Did the India desk feel the threat was more serious than the China people?*

KREISBERG: The India people saw it more seriously. They saw it as a political opportunity to strengthen ties with the Indians. It was complicated by the Taiwan Strait crisis of '62 as well. So there was a question as to whether we were seeing a variety of Chinese moves to push outward. My recollection is that INR did not think that's what we were seeing.

*Q: So this is a more isolated conflict?*

KREISBERG: That's right. Each one of these as having their own causes. There, obviously, was also, I think, the beginning at that time of some question as to whether -- particularly as the

Soviets backed off from supporting the Chinese -- there might be a possibility of moving the Chinese and the Soviets further apart from one other. But my recollection is that that was not a big theme. It was not pursued in any major way.

*Q: Did the White House push very hard? You mentioned that you thought Kennedy and Rusk both saw this the same way. Did the White House push this?*

KREISBERG: They saw this as more threatening. Rusk's view consistently was that the Chinese were expansionists. I have a less clear picture of what the NSC staff saw. My guess is that Jim Thompson, who handled Asia for McGeorge Bundy at that time, would not have seen it in that way. But Rusk saw every Chinese move as part of a broad conceptual Chinese expansionism.

*Q: Could you reflect for a moment on the 1962 Straits crisis? How seriously was that taken? Was it seen, again, as a momentous thing that the United States had to respond to?*

KREISBERG: Well, it wasn't seen as serious as the 1958 situation was. It was much shorter in duration. At this point, honestly, I do not recall personally aside from the sense that there was a Rusk view that we needed to swiftly exhibit our strength and show our support for Taiwan. There were, inevitably, conversations in Taipei about the opportunity that this might pose, particularly given the economic distress in China in '60, '61, and early '62. But I don't recall that it was an issue on which a great deal of concern was exhibited.

*Q: I gather that the Warsaw talks were used to alleviate the crisis. Do you know anything about...*

KREISBERG: I really should remember that, and I don't. That's one of the things that I remember is in those files that I remember having looked at at the time. Fortunately, when you are doing history, you are looking at things more intensively in the past than when you are doing current policy. In State, you are looking at what's around you at the moment. So I just, honestly, don't remember that other than my recollection is going back and looking at all of those files is conviction that the Chinese never really were fully committed, at any point, to taking the offshore islands. Indeed, they saw the disadvantage of taking the offshore islands in terms of severing the link between Taiwan and the mainland.

*Q: But your major focus wasn't Taiwan, so perhaps you don't have a sense of this.*

KREISBERG: It was all done in the same office, but I wasn't working on Taiwan.

*Q: Yes. My impression of the crisis in '61-'62 is that Taiwan had a large role in initiating that whole process. Does that, in any way, worsen relations between Washington and Taipei?*

KREISBERG: Not that I recall. Nothing could worsen negotiations with Taiwan in those periods.

*Q: [Laughter] Because it was too important, or because it was so bad already?*

KREISBERG: No, they were good. There just wasn't anybody who wanted to see the relationship get worse. It was a very protected relationship.

*Q: Do you have a sense of people's opinion of Chiang Kai-shek and the government? Was it a question of overlooking problems, because it was so important? Or the people just didn't see...*

KREISBERG: My sense was that there was a great sense of disinterest in what was happening on Taiwan except in terms of stability. The only interest we had was stability.

*Q: When you go off to Pakistan, is your focus there on Chinese-Pakistani relations, or are you concentrating on Pakistan?*

KREISBERG: I'm across the board.

*Q: Can you say anything about the development of Chinese-Pakistan relations in that era?*

KREISBERG: Pakistan is a very bad personal period in my life. It was just not a period that I have a deep, abiding affection or memory for. So scratch Pakistan.

*Q: Can you talk about the creation of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs? From what you said last time, one of the main reasons for that decision was unhappiness on Taiwan's part about having a PRC desk. Were there any problems created by the separation of the ROC from the mainland in terms of the bureaucratic handling of these issues?*

KREISBERG: Yes. The consequence of abolishing the China desk, which covered everything, was to turn the focus of policy attention much more on the People's Republic of China in terms of a gradual move toward normalization. That was not the reason it was done. There was a question, of course, of dealing with North Vietnam and North Korea at that time. The concept was that there ought to be an office that dealt with all the communist countries. In a way, it was a backward, more conservative way of looking at it. "These commies ought to be dealt with separately than good countries like China. So we will deal with the China desk, which will be our friends, and then we will have this other desk over here, which are the enemies."

But the consequence, obviously, was that once you set up an Asian Communist Affairs Office, there then became, if you will, a lobby that was primarily interested in that area and not just in dealing with it as an enemy, but expanding and broadening and increasing the levels of contacts with it. A few things began happening as a result of that.

Lindsey Grant in the Asian Communist Affairs Office argued very strongly on the dangers of the escalation of the war after '63. Essentially, North Vietnam was taken away, in a de facto sense, from Asian Communist Affairs by the end of '64.

Lindsey Grant was moved out of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, because of a blowup that he had had with Bill Bundy. He kept sending memos up saying, "You know, what you are doing is wrong. It is going to lead to disastrous consequences. We are not going to be able to control the escalation. This isn't a Chinese-Vietnamese-Soviet move to expand power. The

dominoes theory doesn't work." The subsequent analysis of the Vietnam War, I think, was anticipated by a number of these memos that Grant had written.

Eventually, Bill Bundy said, "You are spitting straight into the wind, and it is blowing back in my face. Quit it."

Lindsey said, "As long as I am here, I feel the need to continue to say what I think about the policies." So they moved him out. He was replaced by his deputy, David Dean, who stopped spitting even though he shared Grant's view, as did I.

But the basic responsibility for dealing with North Vietnam was moved over to the Vietnam task force. For similar reasons, although less dramatic, much of North Korea was moved over to the Korean desk, which made a lot of sense, because no one was doing anything with North Korea anyway. That turned the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, essentially, into a Communist China, Mongolia, Hong Kong office. The consequence of that was that we increasingly focused all our attention on what we could do to moderate, improve, change our relations with China and Mongolia.

We worked equally on China and Mongolia. We got awfully close to normalizing relations with Mongolia, working with the Soviet desk, which was also sympathetic with that goal. So we got a group of young foreign service officers, Stapleton Roy among them, sent off to Mongolian language training at the University of Washington. We got permission to bring a Mongolian minister down to Washington from the U.N. and had him talk to a number of people down in Washington. Actually, by the end of the 1969 we had gotten approval to go ahead with the move to normalize relations with Mongolia. The Mongolians, who originally were enthusiastic, turned us down, apparently because the Soviets didn't want it to happen.

But in the meantime on the China side, first David Dean and then myself began, as I said, focusing primarily on China. We felt we had to move incrementally, in small steps. If we could move in largely symbolic steps that gradually began to signal to the American public and the Chinese a change in the background noise on China, we might eventually get to the point of moving on substance. So we concentrated on tiny things like changing the use of Beiping to Beijing, which seemed a great victory at the time. It was in fact seen as an important symbolic move both by Taiwan and China. It was very hard to do. It was incredible the amount of energy you had to put in order to change two or three consonants and a vowel.

*Q: I would like to come back to that, but let me ask you a couple of things about the bureaucracy before we talk more about the substance. Given that the Asian Communist Affairs became sort of the commie desk in the Asian area, was there any negative side effect of being posted -- did people not want to be on the desk? Were there any negative career implications?*

KREISBERG: Not that I ever saw. There was much more interest in coming to what you call the commie desk than there was to the China desk (Taiwan).

*Q: How about flow of information? Was there much cooperation between the two desks on China?*

KREISBERG: There was a great deal of tension between the two desks. The people who were on the China-Taiwan desk saw everything that we were doing as, essentially, a threat to U.S. relations with Taiwan. The embassy in Taiwan was constantly staffed by very strong conservatives who did everything they possibly could to encourage -- and backed in the Department by Ruth Bacon and Louise McNutt from the Office of Regional Affairs. Ruth had the advantage of a long, personal relationship with Dean Rusk going back to the early '50s. So there was a constant sense, which we could never fully document, that whenever things looked as if they might be about to shift in the process of going through the EA bureau that Ruth would go up and have a drink or lunch with Dean. Rusk would have a chat with Bill Bundy and back it down. It was obviously made more complicated by the Vietnam War, which Rusk saw as his overriding policy priority.

I have never been able to fully decide -- and you guys may have a better sense of this than I, especially you, Warren -- as to whether Rusk genuinely believed what he said about the China-Vietnam relationship and this being part of a global communist thrust. Rusk was, on the face of it, extremely reluctant to acknowledge the Sino-Soviet conflict longer than almost anyone else that I knew. Whether he genuinely believed that or whether it was a face that he put on his analysis and his policy in order to rationalize the deeper engagement in Vietnam to which he was committed is simply not answerable by me.

So global communist expansionism then was equally bad whether it was China by itself or China and the Soviet Union or China and Vietnam.

*Q: It didn't make a lot of difference to us. There was no way to play them against each other. They were all hostile to us.*

KREISBERG: But he saw China genuinely pushing Vietnam?

*Q: As far as I can make out.*

KREISBERG: We were never able to convince him that the Chinese were no more enthusiastic at the idea of a spread of Vietnamese power and influence in Southeast Asia than we were.

*Q: I never got any sense that he saw that. The only thing that comes up at all that Nancy, I think, has gotten in her questions is the business of calling in Alan Whiting and trying to signal the Chinese that we were not going to go after them with our stuff in Vietnam. We were trying to avoid drawing them into the war in Vietnam. The indications are that it was a successful exchange of signals. So that you have come to terms with the fact that the Chinese are not terribly concerned about what's going on as long as you don't threaten them. If that is, in fact, true, and we have some doubts, then it would seem that something had gotten through to him that Vietnam was not an extension of China.*

KREISBERG: Yes. I never got that.

*Q: He would still probably say, "It doesn't make any difference. The Chinese are hostile to us.*

*The Vietnamese are hostile to us. We've got to stop them both."*

KREISBERG: Yes.

*Q: One final question along those lines. Was there much interchange of personnel between the two desks?*

KREISBERG: Very little.

*Q: So people tracked separately.*

KREISBERG: We got their cable traffic, and they got our cable traffic. But that's only the tip of the information iceberg.

*Q: What was your cable traffic? I mean, since we don't have anyone in China.*

KREISBERG: Hong Kong.

*Q: You are getting your traffic from Hong Kong?*

KREISBERG: Yes.

*Q: Are you getting traffic at all from, let's say, the British, who do have people in China? Was there much of that?*

KREISBERG: We got a fair amount of information from the British through the intelligence net. We got the full flow of interviews with refugees from China into Hong Kong. It's interesting. I, frankly, have never thought about this. I don't remember having seen much British telegraphic traffic relating to policy issues at all. If it was coming through, it wasn't coming to the desk in '65, '66, '67. Now we, obviously, were following the British experience with the embassy being taken apart and partially burned. But I don't remember policy traffic.

*Q: You spoke just a few moments ago about a policy of incrementalism, trying to make small changes to build towards a relationship. When you became, first, deputy director and then director of the office, was there a point at which you got some sort of a policy mandate from above that said you will go this way or that way?*

KREISBERG: None. Everything that we did we, basically, initiated ourselves. Either it went through, or it didn't go through. But there was never anything that came down from above saying do this, do that. That was true even in the Nixon period, '69, '70. Whatever we did, we did. There was never any guidance from the White House that, you know, it's time to move on this or that or the other thing, with one exception. That was the renewal of the talks in '69 chasing the Chinese ambassador down the staircase.

*Q: Could you elaborate on that?*

KREISBERG: That was -- let me see. Our ambassador was...

*Q: Jacob Beam?*

KREISBERG: No. After Jake Beam.

*Q: Was it Stoessel?*

KREISBERG: Yes. Walt Stoessel was sent instructions by the White House -- in this particular case, we saw them -- saying that he should inform the Chinese ambassador immediately that we were prepared to renew talks in Warsaw. He got these instructions on the day that he was going to a concert to which the Chinese ambassador was also going. His plan was to pass the message to the Chinese ambassador quietly after the concert. But the Chinese ambassador left early! This was in November '69. Walt saw him leaving, ran out of his box, and chased the Chinese ambassador down the stairs of the concert hall, catching him as he was about to get into his car. He passed him this message saying that the US was prepared to renew the talks.

The Chinese ambassador took the note and took it away in the car with him. He didn't read it until he got into the car. He then sent back a note to us a few days later, obviously after he had checked with Beijing saying he agreed to resume the talks.

*Q: That's interesting. That's not quite as low-key, I think, as Washington. [Laughter]*

KREISBERG: It was very dramatic. [Laughter]

*Q: Was, then, this decision to renew the talks, one that originates in Washington in the White House?*

KREISBERG: That originates in the White House. We had wanted to do it, but we had not been able to get the Chinese to pick up the ball again. That the contact was renewed was a result of the exchanges, such as they were, between the President and [Nicolae] Ceausescu and the President and Charles de Gaulle, which were not made available to anybody in State. We, at the desk level and, I think, at the Assistant Secretary level, were totally unaware of what was going on. Bill Rogers was the Secretary of State, and my guess is Bill Rogers may not have known. I never asked Bill Rogers.

*Q: So this came as a surprise to you?*

KREISBERG: It came as a surprise to us that -- well, the message was sent out through State channels, so we knew that the message was being sent. It was one of those cables that simply said, "Text received from the White House." I had talked with people that were in the National Security Council. Their view was, "Why don't we try and renew these talks?"

Our response was, "Fine." We were always willing to make a try. We had been trying on several previous occasions. Remember, the Chinese had broken off the talks early in the year. We had, I think, on at least one occasion, maybe more than that, suggested that we renew talks, and there

was nothing going on on their side. Then this erupted on our side, and they accepted and then we went straight into the two meetings in January and February.

*Q: Can you say anything more about those Nixon-de Gaulle, Nixon-Ceausescu talks?*

KREISBERG: No, I know nothing more about those than I have read in other people's writings and what Kissinger and Nixon described. I have no idea beyond that. Maybe Ceausescu's files will tell us more about it.

*Q: From the packet of documents that you loaned us, there were a couple of them in the spring of 1970, which, I think, I'm not sure if in both cases, you drafted. One was from Rogers to the White House. The other was from Marshall Green to Rogers.*

KREISBERG: I drafted all of those.

*Q: Okay. Both of which seem to suggest that Nixon was out in front, and that perhaps there was some effort to slow things down, or at least get more of a quid pro quo, for what was happening.*

KREISBERG: Yes.

*Q: Could you reflect on that?*

KREISBERG: My recollection at the time is that there were two things. First of all, I don't want to remember more than I think I do remember, but there were two or three key issues that strike me. One is we really were not sure what was driving the Chinese at the time. We were surprised when they seemed much more interested in moving ahead in January, than we anticipated. And because we didn't really know how far they were going to go. We were more cautious in how far we wanted to go on our next step than the White House was. Partly I suspect, our imagination wasn't leaping quite this far. We had said, "Well, let's move the discussions to a higher level in Warsaw. Let's send a special emissary, which, frankly, I did anticipate would be the Secretary of State or the National Security Advisor, to Beijing. John Gronouski thought it would terrific if he could go to Beijing. I remember that. Or Walt Stoessel would want to go. The White House was the place from which the suggestion of focusing on a high-level representative to Beijing came from. They said, "That's really where we want to have this focused."

*Q: So from the White House rather than from the Chinese?*

KREISBERG: From the White House. The Chinese came back and said, "We are prepared to have a high-level emissary."

And the White House, basically, said, "Fine." That came as a surprise to us in State.

Marshall Green, as the Assistant Secretary, was actually shocked at the pace at which this was moving. Marshall had two main concerns. One was that State not get in front of the White House. He thought that we were pushing faster than the White House was pushing. The reality was the other way around.

And, secondly, he was very reluctant to have us go one step further unless it was clear that we were going to inform the Japanese, because he saw this as seriously damaging our relationship with Japan if we changed policy toward China with no advance warning. He argued back and forth with the Secretary and with the National Security Council staff for a month on whether we should have our third meeting with the Chinese in March.

The meeting was not held in March in large part because of the argument that Marshall was having with the NSC over whether to move forward. Then it was put off until April. But we would suggest a date, then Chinese would suggest another date. That was part of the tit-for-tat style Beijing used. We knew that no matter what date we ever proposed, the Chinese would always propose another date. I concluded that even if it turned out to be exactly the date they were thinking of, they would still pick another date so the initiative would then be in their hands. We, basically, had no problems with their dates except for the question of a Chiang Ching-kuo visit in April. That was an area of sensitivity and a lot of pressure from the China desk, the Taiwan desk.

*Q: The question of the Japanese. It only arises in these documents, I think, twice. It comes up that we really should, perhaps, be telling the Japanese more. Where is the decision coming from not to tell the Japanese more and on what grounds?*

KREISBERG: It is coming from the NSC. The NSC is basically saying, "We want this held on an absolute need-to-know basis. When the Chinese, Taiwanese come in, when the Japanese come in, when the French or the British come in, tell them nothing. No one should know what we are doing." That is the instruction from the NSC.

That makes us all at State very uncomfortable for three reasons. One, none of us particularly liked lying. Second, we all saw this as being absolutely critical politically to the Japanese. No disagreement on that among any of us. Third, we saw the political problems being magnified with Taiwan given the support that they still had on the Hill if this simply came fresh out of the air with no prior warning. The other side of it was that we knew that if we briefed Taiwan, they would leak it. We would then have a major problem. So we were unhappy about Taiwan, but willing to hold on.

But on the Japanese side, I remember, there were a number of fierce arguments over whether the Japanese had ever leaked anything. Basically, people at State were saying, "None of us recall a single instance where we had ever told the Japanese anything really secret which they had then leaked." And with the NSC saying, "We can't trust the Japanese, so we don't want them to know."

*Q: Would you say that the people at NSC were less aware of what the potential implications of not telling them were, or was secrecy so dominant that it didn't matter?*

KREISBERG: Secrecy was so dominant that it didn't matter.

*Q: Largely Kissinger's personality, I assume.*

KREISBERG: Yes. I think it was Kissinger and Nixon. I am not sure who was the more paranoid about secrecy. My guess is that Nixon is probably more paranoid about secrecy than Kissinger. I have been reading the biographies of these people.

*Q: It's hard to keep track of which one seems worse. What about the Soviets? It is clear, again from these documents, that you are aware that the Soviets are nervous and unhappy about what they think is going on here.*

KREISBERG: Yes. You see from some of these memos that we flag the fact that there is a Soviet dimension to the question of moving forward with China. But one of the key differences between State and the NSC is that we in ACA saw the process of normalization with China as mainly being beneficial to us in an Asian context. It is clear, in retrospect, that the Asia context was minor from the White House point of view. They saw it mainly in Soviet terms. That was an issue that never surfaced in debate. The European bureau was totally out of this. There was never any engagement with the Soviet desk in anything we were doing with China. My sense is that they didn't know anything about what Kissinger had in mind in terms of using this as a China card.

*Q: So they were really uninvolved in it entirely?*

KREISBERG: The strategic approach that we in State were taking and that Kissinger was taking was really quite different. We saw the Soviet Union as one factor, but not the driving one. He, obviously, saw it as the driving one. I have subsequently argued with people who were on the NSC staff -- with Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland and with Henry Kissinger himself and with Dick Solomon -- over how important, in reality, the China card was in our Soviet relations. I have never been totally satisfied with their arguments, and they, obviously, have always shrugged their shoulders and said, "Kreisberg, you really don't understand anything about geopolitics."

*Q: From where did the new formulations on Taiwan come? You suddenly get new language about force reduction and about the need to acknowledge that there is only China.*

KREISBERG: We made it up.

*Q: Again, was that from within or from the White House?*

KREISBERG: Totally in our office. All of that language and that whole conceptual approach was invented in the office. What we were looking for was language that would enable us to bridge the positions that the Chinese had been holding for the previous decade without, ultimately, giving away the store so far that it would be totally unacceptable on Taiwan or on the Hill. So we just played these word games. Eventually, obviously, we found that if you played the right word games, it would work. Essentially, each side was holding on to its own position, but changing around the way that you talked about them in such a way that everyone's face was being saved. That was our intent, and, ultimately, it turned out to be successful.

What was interesting about this is that throughout this entire game, I never met Kissinger. I would talk from time to time with Solomon. But the first time I ever met Kissinger was in Delhi. Kissinger came over there, and we were all receiving him at the airport. Pat Moynihan introduced Kissinger to me, and Kissinger stopped and said, "Ah, yes, Kreisberg. I know your name well." There was the typical enigmatic Kissingerian smile. He nodded and then went on. That was the end of the dialogue. [Laughter]

We were going in the same direction as the White House. They saw that. All they really needed to do was watch what we were sending over and see whether it meshed with things that they wanted. As long as it did, they were prepared to let it go forward. You can see in some of the draft cables words were crossed out, and new words were written in. The words that were written in were basically NSC changes. There are not a lot of them. But they are NSC changes, and they are interesting changes.

*Q: You referred once or twice in passing to Congress and the need to be concerned about the China lobby types.*

KREISBERG: We never talked to anybody in Congress.

*Q: There was no effort to cultivate those people who were more favorable on...*

KREISBERG: No. We went our own way. It is possible that someone on the White House staff was doing briefing, but to my knowledge, nobody in State was.

*Q: The Congressional Liaison Office (H) did not come to you and say...*

KREISBERG: They weren't involved. They weren't cleared for this. This is all Secret/NODIS stuff. There was nobody in H who was cleared for it. It is conceivable that the Secretary was doing it, but I doubt it. That Secretary of State was also not that deeply involved and was not being used for congressional contacts. And Kissinger was never that close to people on the Hill. As far as I am aware, there was nobody on the Hill who was aware of this, which may be one reason why when it all finally broke, there was a lot of surprise and a certain amount of broken crockery.

*Q: Kissinger used Fulbright a lot. It might be worth checking that one out. Given that things seem to be moving the way they are and that the Chinese seem to be responsive, and all of this is going on, why was it necessary, ultimately, to use Pakistan to get Kissinger into China?*

KREISBERG: I never understood that.

*Q: [Laughter] Oh. I wanted a revelation.*

KREISBERG: No. I could never figure it out. You obviously want to talk to Winston Lord, unless you already have, and get his personal view of why they went that route. I think in large part it was Kissinger's obsession with secrecy and the feeling that if he went into China by the back basement door, that it was more likely to be secret than if he went in any other way. That

may be true. I mean, if he went in from Hong Kong, it was more likely to surface. If a Kissinger plane took off from Hong Kong or Korea and disappeared, people would know about it. I guess, in theory, he could have flown out of Kadena in Okinawa or out of one of our air bases in Korea. It sure as hell wasn't the most convenient way to go. But I think the only reason for it was secrecy.

And the only reason for the secrecy was amore propre. Once you've decided to make the visit, and once it is clear that the Chinese are willing to have you come, it is inconceivable you can hold the secret indefinitely. But they wanted it to come as a great headline. I think part of the strategy was that by having it emerge that way, public excitement would sweep away a lot of the uncertainty, suspicion, hostility, criticism that might otherwise have accrued.

*Q: To go back a little bit to the pre-Kissinger visit. I was under the impression that Nixon had hoped to use better relations with the PRC to help get out of Vietnam. Yet, in these memos...*

KREISBERG: Nothing of that appeared.

*Q: No. In fact, there seems to be a specific effort to avoid raising Southeast Asia as an issue with the Chinese. Do you have any idea why?*

KREISBERG: No, I don't. This question has also occurred to me. The only explanation that I can make is that it's something that Nixon may have thought that he could do directly or do indirectly through Kissinger, and he didn't want to involve State again. This, then, comes down to this whole question of secrecy. But it doesn't come out in Kissinger's book. There is no sense from Kissinger either that we were going to use the China talks directly with relation to Vietnam.

There was a sense that somehow it was thought that if we were able to improve relations with China, that we would indirectly diminish the Chinese interest in supporting the Vietnamese. That it would happen, not that it was an objective to talk about Vietnam a lot with the Chinese. Every time we did talk about Vietnam with the Chinese, the Chinese said the standard things, as you see in the cables and memoranda on the talks with the Chinese. That's literally all that I know. The subject never came up in instructions. Winthrop Brown, the Deputy Assistant Secretary handling Vietnam in the Far Eastern Bureau were raised. Nobody ever asked us to do much on it.

We looked at Laos, as you saw from that Laos memo. The decision, essentially, was made not to do much on Laos.

*Q: Was there an awareness that there were problems between Vietnam and China that might diminish the Chinese ability to serve American purposes, were that to arise? I mean, how was the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship seen?*

KREISBERG: By whom?

*Q: By people in ACA.*

KREISBERG: Well, as I said, this was at a time when, for several years, ACA had been taken

out of the Vietnam net. I never had a sense, however, that there was a consciousness in State of the growing level of Vietnamese-Chinese tension.

*Q: And not at the White House then either?*

KREISBERG: Not at the White House either. I mean, the Chinese were continuing to give the Vietnamese aircraft refuge. There were Chinese anti-aircraft gunners and logistics people in North Vietnam. In principal, there was no reason why anyone should have seen tension growing.

*Q: We mentioned it before, and perhaps we answered it -- tell me if we did -- Alan Whiting has talked about the process of signaling between China and the United States. That nobody wanted to go to war over Vietnam or in Vietnam with each other. Were you involved in any of that at all? Were you aware of what was happening?*

*Q: Wang Bingnan seemed to be confirming that in our interviews with him.*

KREISBERG: Well, we constantly were saying in the Warsaw talks and in public that what we were doing was not designed to threaten China.

*Q: You say reference to reassuring the Chinese.*

KREISBERG: We said this over and over.

*Q: The Warsaw talks are a vehicle for that.*

KREISBERG: Yes. The idea that we are telling China we are not threatening them is one that we are using continuously. It is less clear to me how the Chinese are using the Warsaw talks to communicate on Vietnam to us. Although in things that they write, the Chinese led Alan Whiting and, I think, others to conclude that the Chinese are defining what the terms are under which they might feel compelled to become involved. Everybody is setting limits. I think that is right. So I think that we were all aware when we saw things that the Chinese said, what they were telling us. In part, that was one of the reasons we kept telling them that we do not plan to expand the war.

Part of the issue is that after 1966, certainly '67, and until the great Hanoi-Haiphong bombing raids in the early '70s, I don't think any of us were terribly concerned about that issue. I mean, we didn't see the Chinese coming into the war in Vietnam in any deeper way. As a matter of fact, most of us were surprised as we found out to what degree the Chinese had engaged themselves. It was a surprise that the Chinese were doing as much as they were doing on the ground. Basically, we didn't anticipate that the Chinese wanted to expand the war or to become engaged. We certainly didn't want a fight with them.

And when occasionally there would be discussions over whether to we take out the Chinese airfields in Yenan where Vietnamese planes were being stashed -- this was always a clear question: do we want to bring the Chinese in? How dangerous are those fighters? How effective are they being used? Obviously as the war went on, they were less and less effective. Even the Defense Department never really made a big issue of it.

So, no. I think we all saw the Vietnam-China issue as one that we needed to flag, but one that was, essentially, peripheral. Because most of us, I think, on the desk and at the EA bureau level saw the Chinese, at most, as wanting to use the Vietnam War as a lever to weaken the United States, but not to expand the war and not to risk war with us. And when we talked about it in Warsaw, they never wanted to say very much about it other than to support the Vietnamese and say, "You've got to get out of Vietnam." It was never a terribly productive issue for us to talk about.

Since the issue wasn't productive, we on the desk tended to put Vietnam to one side and say, "Now where are the areas where we may be able to signal that we want to make progress?"

*Q: How important were the Warsaw talks?*

KREISBERG: I am probably the wrong person to ask, because we were running them, so we thought they were important. At the same time, they were frustrating, because so much of the time we were just talking past one another. I guess I saw them as being important primarily in 1970.

And they were important in a negative sense in that when the Chinese suspended talks and let long periods go by without any taking place, this left us feeling that the prospects for making any progress were low. And, obviously, the rationale for our arguing for moving forward on policy change with Beijing diminished. It was very hard, if they wouldn't even meet with us in Warsaw, to make the case that there was a possibility for making progress. So '68 and '69 were very bad years, primarily because of the Cultural Revolution. That was really a great setback for any strategy aimed at stabilizing and normalizing the relationship.

*Q: Were there any plans in your days with ACA for taking out the Chinese nuclear facilities?*

KREISBERG: None.

*Q: Rusk's concern with a billion Chinese...*

KREISBERG: No. If that was discussed, it was never discussed with us.

*Q: The whole question, I guess, is one in Kissinger's memoirs: the idea that the Soviets approached us to talk about doing precisely that. Had you ever heard anything about that?*

KREISBERG: I heard about it after the fact. I knew about it while I was there. That contact and the response were handled in the National Security Council, not at State. I think if I were to sum up what State did at that point, the White House clearly had its own agenda, which they wanted to conduct with the Chinese. What we were used for is as an idea factory to provide language and provide some conceptual approach to moving the relationship forward, but without telling us why they wanted to move it forward. To let us make up our own rationale, and make up our own reasons, but using the language that we produced, because nobody over there had the time or maybe they didn't have the confidence. Solomon probably could have done it, but perhaps he had

a lot of other things to do more important than that. So they used a lot of our ideas in substance.

At the time, we thought we were driving the car. But it was kind of like learning how to drive on a dual-controlled car. In reality, it turned out that somebody else was doing the driving, and we were only turning the wheel. Whenever we didn't turn it far enough, someone would turn it a little bit further. And when we were not going fast enough, someone else would put his foot on the accelerator.

*Q: You mentioned before we got on the tape something about the draft of the Shanghai communiqué. Could you talk a little bit more about that?*

KREISBERG: That is one of the things that does not appear in here. What we did was to draft, essentially, much of the key language on Taiwan that ultimately was pulled out into the Shanghai communiqué. And at one point, John Holdridge told me that when they were drafting the communiqué, they had gone back to what we produced in early '70 and literally, lock, stock and barrel, plugged it into the Shanghai communiqué, which was the "Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits" language and "As tension declines, forces will be removed" language.

Our intent had been, at the meeting scheduled for March and then subsequently for April, to float that language with the Chinese. And we never had a chance to do it. So the first time it saw the light of day, actually, was in '72. I don't whether Kissinger used it in '71.

I never actually went down and read the memoranda of conversation on the Kissinger and Nixon visits. I kept meaning to go down when I was...

*Q: I wish you had.*

KREISBERG: On the policy planning staff. They pulled the stuff aside, and they had it in a file in the East Asian Bureau. I cannot actually tell you from my own memory what he did and didn't say.

*Q: So all the credit that Deng Xiaoping has gotten for "one country, two systems," really should go to your office?*

KREISBERG: No. The "one country, two system" line we never thought of. It would be interesting if we had, but I don't think we would have come up with "one country, two systems." We might have come up with a concept of "one sovereignty, two governments" kind of thing. Something that looked like the British Commonwealth. I mean, if we had actually gotten to that point.

The other line we designed that appeared in the Shanghai communiqué was on the settlement of the Taiwan issue by peaceful discussions between both sides and by the two sides themselves. Our concept of how we should proceed on Taiwan was to disengage the United States from direct involvement in resolving that problem. If the whole thing was going to work, it was that Taiwan was to be put to one side. It was no longer to be an issue. If we could get to that, then we saw how we would be able to work our relationship with Taiwan and with China.

The concept of how we dealt with Taiwan itself was -- well, we can get to that later. That was an issue on which there were a lot of arguments, but that didn't surface until the late '70s. The Policy Planning Staff had a different view from the East Asian Bureau and the White House at that time. We lost. Cy Vance was on our side for a period of time, and then he backed away. But we can get to that.

*Q: I would like to come back to that in just a minute. Before we leave this slightly earlier period, I guess, I would be interested in knowing in terms of the Warsaw talks over time. You have Gronouski, you have Cabot, you have Beam.*

KREISBERG: With Cabot, it was...

*Q: Cabot first.*

KREISBERG: Cabot, Gronouski, Stoessel, Beam. I think.

*Q: I think that's right. Do you think that those personalities have any real affect on the way the talks worked? Do you see anything that is worth recording on these various people?*

KREISBERG: They were such totally different characters. My guess is that the Chinese probably felt most comfortable with the career people, with Cabot, Beam, and Stoessel. Gronouski, I think, constantly threw them for a loop, because he made jokes. He just had a personality that, I think, they never could quite figure out. But I don't think they made much difference, any more than the Chinese ambassadors made any difference. These were really "made in Washington and Beijing" conversations.

There was no free dialogue whatsoever. People made their presentations, then they commented on their core presentations in set pieces. Then they commented on the comments of the presentations in set pieces. The only time they began to shift a little bit was when we began to have a private dialogue after the meetings in '69, '70.

All that the talks did, in retrospect, after the early days -- they were really quite substantive in the 1950s, because we were dealing with some very concrete issues. But after that, in the 1960s when they moved to Warsaw, they were simply means of a private conveying of messages. That's all. It could have been done anywhere, and it could have been done in a lot of other ways.

The fact that we were meeting face-to-face was important, I think, in and of itself. It was the only way in which Americans and Chinese were able to talk to one another, since everybody was under instruction not even to say hello in any other context. But as a substantive channel, it was probably about as low a level of substantive diplomatic exchange as you can find.

*Q: I spent some time last year reading John Cabot's diaries, and he was quite upset when Gronouski replaced him, both, I think, for career reasons and because he thought Gronouski was totally inappropriate. That kind of thing didn't matter in the Department.*

KREISBERG: It didn't make any difference. The Chinese must have raised their eyebrows at this Pole and wonder what a postmaster general had to do with bilateral negotiations. It might be interesting to ask whether the Chinese thought the negotiations were being downgraded by bringing in somebody like Gronouski or upgraded by bringing in somebody who was a personal or political appointment of the President.

*Q: They probably debated that for two weeks. Again, you mentioned also that the personality of the Chinese representatives probably didn't matter much. Did you have any sense of Wang Bingnan as an individual?*

KREISBERG: I never dealt with Wang Bingnan. David Dean and Lindsey did. But my sense, from reading the memorandums of conversation and of the talks and from talking to them, was that he couldn't have made much difference. When the Chinese wanted to express nastiness, nastiness was expressed. When they wanted to be relaxed, relaxation was expressed. That was true whether they had a chargé d'affaires or an ambassador. I don't think we ever conducted these with chargé d'affaires. We never, I think, thought that was an appropriate thing to do. The Chinese didn't give a damn.

*Q: Well, we did, at one time, lower the level in the '50s when Ed Martin was involved for a brief period of time.*

KREISBERG: That's right. Ed Martin, of course, was a minister at the time.

*Q: I am inclined unless you have, again, some China side to it, to skip over Dar es-Salaam. Is there anything --*

KREISBERG: The only funny thing about Dar es-Salaam was that there was a widespread speculation in the diplomatic corps that when I went down to Dar es-Salaam, that we were shifting our talks down to Dar es-Salaam. I was being sent down there because there were 20,000 Chinese in Tanzania, and we saw that as a major point of importance for us. That did not last very long. I mean, it was incredibly stupid, and I thought more funny than anything else.

Aside from that, I had no contacts with the Chinese. They refused to talk to me in Dar es-Salaam. I'm sure they must have been under instructions not to. So let's skip over Dar es-Salaam.

*Q: That takes us to the period, 1977 to 1981. I guess the basic question to ask is what was your role vis à vis normalization with the People's Republic.*

KREISBERG: Well, the Policy Planning Staff was deeply involved in the process of putting together a strategy. The person to talk to about the initial drafting of that was Alan Romberg since it began in January of 1977, and I arrived in Policy Planning in the middle of April. So a good deal of the drafting had already been done by Alan and Stape Roy.

My sense was that, at that point, there were no serious issues. The decision to move ahead and exactly the way we eventually did move ahead, with one exception. The only issue which

became a point of major debate and major controversy was what relationship we were going to have with Taiwan.

It was clear that we were going to have to break relations with Taiwan. We were going to have to terminate the treaty, withdraw the few military forces that remained there. But it was also clear that we were going to have to find a way to maintain all the substantive relationships that we had with Taiwan. How were we going to do that? The bottom line was whether we dealt with Taiwan in a totally informal way -- as we eventually did -- or whether to try to maintain some form of official representation by having a consulate general or some other presence -- an "interests section" -- there. And, basically, tell the Chinese, "We recognize you as the sole government, but there are other places in the world where we have had consulates where we have not had diplomatic relations. And that is what we intend to do."

My preference, and that of the Director of Policy Planning Tony Lake and the case that we argued strongly with the support of the legal bureau to Cy Vance, was that we ought to try to hold on to a consulate general or some formal status. That we might, ultimately, have to back away from that was clear, but the issue that we felt we should put to the Chinese was that we wanted to hold on to a consulate, and see if we could make that wash. The bureau view, supported by Mike Oksenberg in the NSC, was they didn't want to get involved in that. It wouldn't work. They wanted to go to a clean break and establish the kind of relationship that the Japanese, the French, other countries had with the Chinese. Travel agencies and whatever else you want to have.

That issue was very hotly argued. Cy Vance, as a lawyer and seeing that an American institute in Taiwan format was getting us into absolutely new, fresh, uncharted, highly peculiar, and very complex legal waters, also thought it would be preferable "to see if we can do it with a consulate general?" Eventually, Cy changed ground and said, "Well, I guess if we try to do it with a consulate, it really is going to be very hard to make the case that the U.S. doesn't have an official relationship with Taiwan." "The official relationship," the opponents argued, "would be the key single issue with the Chinese."

My view at the time was that that was right, but that we should not let the Chinese view on this totally drive us without at least trying it. If we tried it, we could have made the case on the Hill that we had made an effort, and we eventually had had to back away. But that was not the way in which it went. So that was the only issue on which there was a major debate.

The second point at which the issue became heated was what the Taiwan relations act should look like. The Dick Holbrooke-Roger Sullivan version was that it should be leaner, sparer and vaguer than it turned out to be. Again, the Policy Planning staff and the legal office and H argued that wasn't going to work.

*Q: Congress wouldn't buy it?*

KREISBERG: Congress wouldn't buy it. But the East Asian Bureau decided, again, with Oksenberg on board, to try because at this point -- although Holbrooke and Oksenberg detested one another -- there was an agreement that we ought to go for the deal that would be easiest to

work with the Chinese. The Chinese weren't going to like anything, so the less it looked as if we were perpetuating the language of the treaties, particularly those relating to security, the one that bothered them the most, and the less there was that implied a continuing U.S. commitment to Taiwan, the better off we would be. So that was the version that eventually the President signed off on.

Eventually, the executive branch backed up the entire nine yards and bought on to whatever Congress wanted, which, essentially, was all the U.S.-Republic of China treaty and agreements language less the references to an official relationship.

*Q: Before we go on, let me just go back on the question of Vance shifting his position on whether to go for a consulate or an informal relationship. Do you have any idea what pushed Vance over the edge? Was it White House pressure, or was it his own judgment?*

KREISBERG: I don't know. The meeting at which he changed his mind was one that I didn't sit in on. It was with Tony and Dick Holbrooke and probably Peter Tarnoff and a couple other people.

*Q: What were their positions at the time?*

KREISBERG: Tony Lake was the director of the policy planning staff. Holbrooke was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. Peter Tarnoff was the Executive Secretary for the Department. My guess is that Warren Christopher as Vance's key legal and Congressional advisor and the Deputy Secretary of State, was probably engaged in this as well, Christopher was Vance's key man on the Hill on all major issues involving treaties and agreements. While the drafting was done in EA, the negotiations were largely done through Christopher. Herb Hansell, as the legal advisor, was involved as well.

*Q: Again, to go back to something you just had said before we go on. The Holbrooke-Oksenberg dislike, how important a factor is it? You say that, nevertheless, they ended up on the same side of this particular question. Is it an important factor in the normalization process?*

KREISBERG: In the last analysis, it is not. Bureaucratically, it is important, because they were constantly working behind one another's backs and hiding information, being devious in the way in which they dealt with information. It in part personal, in part protection of bureaucratic turf with Oksenberg protecting Brzezinski and Brzezinski's direct links with the President, and Holbrooke protecting Holbrooke. Less Holbrooke defending Vance. A lot of the issues were petty. Some involved substance.

The question, for example, of what kind of security relationship we wanted to have with China was one of those. The White House wanted to build a security relationship with China. State, in this case both SP [Policy Planning Staff] and the EA bureau and Vance, were much leier about the risks of doing that. And, certainly, the Soviet bureau was very leery about it. The White House wanted to move ahead on China first and foremost. Holbrooke thought we could move ahead on Vietnam and get Vietnam and still get China.

So in September and October, there was an enormous amount of tension with the White House constantly pushing to put China first and with Vance and Holbrooke trying to work out something with the Vietnamese. Holbrooke's conversations with the Vietnamese in September were intentionally designed to try to tell the Vietnamese that it was now or never. He felt that he had gotten the go-ahead from them. That was one of the key issues.

Then Brzezinski and Oksenberg had been consistently arguing that we needed to be able to promise the Chinese that there was going to be a substantive security relationship for two reasons. One is it was in our interest to know more about what the Chinese military was doing. And, ultimately, perhaps -- this was coming in part from Defense as well -- to be able to use China as a base against the Soviet Union. The Air Force wanted landing rights in China. The Navy wanted to call at Chinese ports. The question of aerial and electronic reconnaissance that might be conducted over China and targeted at the Soviet Union was raised in the U.S. Government. The idea of flying over China in order to get to Pakistan, without going all around Southeast Asia, en route to the Middle East was attractive to the military. The possibility of more intelligence facilities -- all was being actively discussed, but at very secret levels in Defense and with NSC support and encouragement. State's view on this was much more conservative.

Oh and finally, the concept, from the White House side, that in the long run, a major constituency that you needed to have on your side in China was the military. By offering supplies, cooperation, training, and equipment, whatever, that you would, in effect, engage the Chinese military with the interest of U.S.-Chinese relations.

Some of these arguments washed in State, and some of them made everybody very nervous. Several made me very nervous. I was simply not that confident that in the long run, our interests with the Chinese would be so much in parallel that I wanted to strengthen the Chinese military. Moreover, the view of the European bureau, which I shared, was that it was not in our interests to build up Soviet fear of China by strengthening the concept of the U.S.-Chinese global strategic alliance. That what we wanted to do, when appropriate, was to move in parallel with China, not in alliance.

This is one of the reasons why Vance was attracted by the idea of moving first with Vietnam and then going on to China. It wasn't that he was so engaged on Vietnam, but he was engaged with the Soviet Union. And he would have preferred to put off the China connection until after the meeting that he had scheduled with Gromyko in December. But Vance kept losing each time with the President who clearly wanted to move ahead on China as the great new, fresh capstone in his foreign policy initiatives.

*Q: How does Vietnam get lost in all of it?*

KREISBERG: Well, Vietnam gets lost simply because the Vietnamese waited too long to make up their minds, and the President made the decision that were going to move first on China. That was precipitated by Deng Xiaoping's in effect saying in late November, I think, "This is the time to move, and we want to move now. You better move now or the door will close." That, then, was followed fairly quickly on Deng's trip to Washington by an indication of the Chinese plan to move against Vietnam after Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia, a step which totally turned

everybody off on Vietnam.

And, of course, the NSC staff was able to argue, "You see, we saved you guys, because if you normalized with Vietnam and then they had moved into Cambodia, wouldn't the President have looked like an absolute fool?" Which he might have, in fact.

*Q: He did, anyway. How much influence would you say that SP had in that period?*

KREISBERG: SP was engaged and had some influence because of Tony Lake's direct tie with Vance. But the key player was the East Asian bureau and Dick Holbrooke, an absolutely outstanding bureaucratic gunfighter. He fairly consistently won on all Asian issues. Tony Lake had made a decision he was not going to fight Dick Holbrooke on most issues in Dick's area, and there were only a few on which he was willing to take him on. Tony wanted to move ahead on Vietnam, and if something could have been done in October, he would have pushed very hard on that. As it was, the Vietnamese, as you know, kept stumbling over their own feet, and they kept thinking they could get more out of us than we had given so far, and ended up by losing it all for a decade. Whenever push came to shove, Tony basically backed off.

*Q: You mentioned a few moments ago the concern on the part of the Department and Vance about not making the Soviets nervous about an increased strategic relationship between China and the United States. Was that not one of the motives that the White House was pursuing?*

KREISBERG: Sure. That was the major point of tension between Vance and Brzezinski. No question about it. Vance saw the possibility of improving of Sino-U.S. relations. Brzezinski saw the Soviet Union as becoming increasingly threatening, and argued the focus of U.S. policy should be on surrounding, weakening, and diminishing Soviet power. It was the fundamental issue of the administration and fought out in arena after arena.

*Q: How much warning did you have that you were going to end up with the Taiwan relations act? You mentioned that the Department was engaged in drafting something. Who initiates that process?*

KREISBERG: The drafting was done by L and EA. I mean, Vance basically saw this as a technical policy issue and assigned Hansell and Holbrooke the responsibility for doing it together with the congressional bureau. Policy planning was, essentially, out of that loop except when we saw the drafts as they went through, and we put our nickels and dimes on the table. But it was just nickels and dimes. The really strong currency was in the other bureaus.

*Q: Was there much White House concern about this? Did they care?*

KREISBERG: The principal thing the White House wanted was that it be done without a lot of blood on the floor. As happened repeatedly in the Carter Administration, their intelligence on what was going to be necessary on the Hill was bad. I think the Carter White House probably handled the Congress about as badly as any presidency that I can recall in the last forty years. Anybody who really had their heads screwed on should have seen the way the wind was going to run in the Congress. And they would have seen it if they talked to enough people about it.

But it was a draft that was done in secret and put together in State and in the NSC. Again, with Brzezinski and Oksenberg, along with Holbrooke and L, driving a simple version. It had the consequences that you saw.

*Q: And there is no effort to deal with the congressional staff on the drafting stage or any of that?*

KREISBERG: The initial draft was brought over to the Hill as a draft without congressional input. As soon as they brought it over, they began getting a lot of flak, and a lot of people saying, "This doesn't go anywhere nearly far enough. We are going to have to totally rewrite this." There was an effort on the part of the administration to fight for and defend the draft that it sent over.

*Q: When you finally get a relations act that looks quite different, there must have been consternation on how to present this to the Chinese and how to make the Chinese realize that, you know, it is not our fault, Congress did it.*

KREISBERG: The Chinese are screaming at this all along. I mean, they are seeing this process. It is out there in public. They've got a liaison office, and they are coming around and saying, "We really don't like this. This is a real problem." I do not have a personal knowledge of the conversations that took place on that.

*Q: I guess part of my curiosity is that it seems to me that, until really quite recently, the Chinese haven't fully understood the division of powers between the Hill and the Department.*

KREISBERG: Nobody understands the division.

*Q: [Laughter] Okay.*

KREISBERG: Including in this country. That is absolutely right. I constantly have foreigners come to me and ask me questions or ask why Congress was doing this and can't you do that, which reflect absolute, total ignorance of the way in which the Congress functions. To this day, many Chinese do not understand what the Administration's role is on legislation attacking China. They are convinced that the President can turn off Congress.

*Q: We did get a fairly sophisticated analysis from Li Peng on the Tibetan question in '86 in which he said, "Oh, we understand that's Congress." We were surprised at that.*

KREISBERG: That is interesting. It is totally unclear to me, and has never been clear to me, whether Kissinger and the President, Oksenberg and whoever else was involved, thought about what the effect would be on China in sending troops to Cambodia in 1970. You know, I have never asked Oksenberg that question. It would be interesting.

*Q: This would be Dick Solomon then.*

KREISBERG: Dick Solomon, sorry. I have never asked Dick Solomon or Kissinger that question. It would be interesting to know. It so irritated to me. I mean, that was the reason that I

asked to leave the bureau. I knew that the Chinese would come back on to the scene eventually. But I also knew that it was going to be at least nine months or a year. After five years, I'd had enough of that. I specifically asked to be sent as far away from China as possible, which is the reason they sent me to Dar es-Salaam. The irony is of sending me down where there were more Chinese outside of China than any other place in the world outside Asia and North America.  
[Laughter]

*Q: This reminds me of one memo that you drafted -- I think dated May of '70, it might have been a little earlier -- in which you say something about the importance of improving relations with the People's Republic of China as being one of the driving forces for all of this. I was curious as to whether there was something in particular in April or May of 1970 that you had in mind.*

KREISBERG: The reason for writing that memo was to write a broad conceptual piece on what we are up to, what the reason for all of this was. There is another memo that they did not declassify, as I recall it -- or maybe it is also part of that memo, which they took out -- in which I said that there is a down side to this. It is possible that having normalized relations with the Chinese, that the Chinese could feel that they were now free of danger from the United States. They could take a more active, and not necessarily friendly, policy stance in Southeast Asia in dealing with Cambodia, with Thailand, other countries in ASEAN.

But the principal argument that I was making was that in the long run, which is, I think, the principal case now for maintaining good relations with the Chinese, is that the principal reason for viable and friendly ongoing relations with the Chinese is that they are important to the stability and security of the region as a whole. That is overwhelmingly the long-term primary objective we had. It is not the great global role that China will play, because China is not really playing a great global role. This was the reason for my arguments, subsequently, with Kissinger and Solomon and the people on the Soviet side. That whatever short-term gains we might make vis- a-vis the Soviet Union, the long-term interest was Korea, Japan, Southeast Asia. The stability of China and China's foreign policy was critical in that area and secondary elsewhere. So that was what I was trying to say in that piece.

*Q: Is there anything that we should have asked you about?*

KREISBERG: No. You have asked me more than you should have asked me. I probably told you more than I know. [Laughter]

I wish my memory on some of these things was better.

*Q: It's been great.*

KREISBERG: I really think you ought to try to do these things as soon as possible after people leave the government and not wait for ten years. I should have actually sat down and taped what I knew.

*Q: Did you keep diaries? No?*

KREISBERG: If you go around the Foreign Service, you will find among retired Foreign Service officers that virtually everyone regrets that he didn't keep a diary. There is just so much going on. I have never been able to understand how people have the time to keep diaries.

*Q: Pre-World War II they all did. It was wonderful.*

KREISBERG: That's right. Well, the answer is that the total flow of information in those days was so much less that you could have the time to do it. But as useless information proliferates in boundless form, you don't have the time to do more constructive things. You spend all of your time reading this incredible detail that has no long-term value at all and not much short-term value. The opportunity to sit down and write ten thoughtful pages a week on policy issues just isn't there. So, no, I did not, and I don't know anybody who has.

*Q: If it is any consolation, I have read hundreds of these things, and your memory is better than 99%.*

KREISBERG: God help the historians. Most of it really is in the files. The most important files are the internal agency-to-agency files. I mean, if we could get copies of all of the memoranda that went between State and NSC and all of the memoranda that went internally within State, you would know a lot more. Those are the ones they will not give up. Memoranda that I wrote for Tony Lake or that I wrote to Dick Holbrooke or that Holbrooke wrote to Cy Vance really will reflect much more of the tensions in the system than things that are formal papers. I am surprised that they did free up some of these things that State sent to the NSC. I have asked for all of the stuff from the NSC to State, and I asked for that three years ago. None of that has surfaced.

**SEYMOUR I. NADLER**  
**Information Officer, USIS**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1954-1956)**

*Seymour I. Nadler was born in New York in 1916. As a Foreign Service Officer, his assignments included Taiwan, Washington, DC, Argentina, and Turkey. Mr. Nadler was interviewed by Jack O'Brien on November 21, 1989.*

NADLER: In early 1947, I was a vice consul in Tientsin, China, in charge of the visa section and also working for another agency. I returned to the U.S. in early 1949 and in 1951 was given another dual assignment, this time in Singapore. The other part of the dual assignment was with USIA and I discovered that I was liking this part of the work more and more.

I returned to the States in mid-1953. In 1954, I became CPAO in Taipei, Taiwan. This was not a dual assignment, and I suppose it could be considered my formal entry into USIA.

*Q: Was there at that time in Taipei a well-established USIS establishment?*

NADLER: Yes, there was a well-established post, actually three posts. The main one was in the capital, Taipei. We had our own two-story building, apart from the embassy, complete with library. We had an active exchange program the works.

*Q: During that period was there a difficulty between relations of the Republic of China as it was then now and still is and the United States that caused you difficulty, special difficulty?*

NADLER: I wouldn't say it caused us special difficulty except from time to time, when the Chinese understandably were very sensitive to anything that might be perceived as a change in the U.S. attitude toward what they called the Republic of China on Taiwan and support for their military operations, political plans, and so forth. At that time, one of the worst things that could have happened -- did happen a bit later -- was adoption by the U.S. of the concept of "two Chinas."

*Q: As you pointed out, we had three posts there. Was each one a post with a library and the usual facilities for press releases and so on?*

NADLER: I suppose you could say yes, but the major activity was out of Taipei, the capital, and one of the three posts, Kaohsiung, in the south, was primarily the locale of the State Department's FSI Language

*Q: Oh, right.*

NADLER: People who had studied Chinese in the States were sent to Kaohsiung to complete their studies. Thus, the activity of USIS there was of a more modest nature, but it did rely very heavily, as I think back, on the library.

**FRANK N. BURNET**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC and Taichung, Taiwan (1955-1957)**

**China Watcher**  
**Bangkok, Thailand (1957-1959)**

**Staff Assistant, Bureau of Far East Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1961-1963)**

*Frank N. Burnet was born in New York in 1921. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Burnet was interviewed in 1990 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

BURNET: Let me go back a moment in my career. When I was in the basic officer's training course, I was drafted into sort of an experimental Chinese language course.

I don't know whether you know Sollenberger. He used to be the head of the FSI. Anyway, he had a deep China background, and he had gotten some oriental linguists together to teach a course in a dialect of Chinese, which was a southern Chinese dialect, not Cantonese but the Amoy/Hakka dialect.

Anyway, I did this five days a week for six weeks. And so, without any written materials, we had all of this spoken Chinese thrown at us, and we learned a certain amount of it.

In my case, the theory behind drafting me was that this dialect of Chinese is the one spoken by overseas Chinese in the Philippines. So I had that background. And Sollenberger and Nick Bodman (the linguist) encouraged me, at the end of that six weeks, to apply for long-term training in Mandarin, which I did do later on. So I had applied for it, and six months after I arrived in Paris, this approval came through. After the loss of China mainland in 1949, the new Chinese language school was organized in 1955, and I went to Taiwan with the first group to attend this school.

*Q: Could you describe a bit about how this first group that you were with felt about China and all. What did you expect when you were doing this?*

BURNET: Well, let's see this was way back in 1955. When I was finally brought back from Paris, it was the end of '54, and the course started in January '55, as I remember.

We were a small group, six or eight of us, and we all thought it was possible, within five years, maybe, at the most, ten years, China would be opening up again. (And of course it was far from that. Our time scale was off by at least ten or 15 years.) So we were all enthusiastic.

Most of us did not have any background in China. We were sort of starting out fresh. We realized that whereas you could study many Oriental languages which would have very little applicability outside of the country which speaks them, but studying Chinese could prove useful almost anywhere in the world. That's indeed the way it turned out.

*Q: In the first place, it was Mandarin, is that right?*

BURNET: Yes.

*Q: How did you feel, because you hear about all these different dialects, and people in the south don't speak Mandarin and all that. Was that a bone of contention with the officers who were being trained or not?*

BURNET: No, this is what you would want to do, because Mandarin is the official or national language. Any Chinese with any education is a speaker of Mandarin. It is the lingua franca of all of China, so that wherever you run into Chinese people you can turn on the Mandarin and you can make yourself known and feel comfortable doing it. Also, those Chinese who are not native-speakers of Mandarin look up to anybody who speaks the national language, so we automatically, if undeservedly, got their immediate attention and respect.

*Q: Your first assignment then was where and when?*

BURNET: Following the language training?

*Q: Yes. Could you explain a little, what did the language training consist of?*

BURNET: We started off. In Washington, about three months of really basic Chinese, learning the patterns of the language.

But, when we were sent out to Taiwan to this small town in the center of Taiwan, called Taichung, where the American Language School was set up (this was the very first class), we spent about six hours a day in classroom work and two or three hours at home at night.

The drill, of course, in classroom in those early months, was largely spoken. But, at a fairly early stage at the language school we started learning Chinese characters. And that took an awful lot of just bone-work, just memorization, and doing an awful lot of writing of characters over and over again, like a child.

The FSI system which we used is to try to replicate what a child does when he learns the spoken and written languages, by repetition, by "internalizing" sentence patterns and through drills. An awful lot of class work was involved in drills. It was sort of fun. We had five or six people in the class. You have, I'm sure, been exposed to this.

*Q: I went to the Army Language School for a year, taking Russian.*

BURNET: So you know the method that's used. It's the drill method, the basic sentence method.

You have to stay on your toes. Because, if you've got a good instructor he goes right around the room, sometimes not even in order, taking a sentence pattern through a substitution drill, and if you haven't paid attention to what the guy before you has said, you could be quite embarrassed if you forgot -- "What was that, sir? What were we doing?" So you have to stay alert.

*Q: How did you feel when you came out? Did you feel pretty good about the grasp you had of it?*

BURNET: I felt very good about it. I think that they had done a good job in training us to use both social and political Chinese. We were able to do our job.

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*Q: Your first post was then to Bangkok from '57 to '59. What were you doing there?*

BURNET: I was in the political section, and we had an assignment there which was called the Chinese Language Officer slot. There had been several incarnations before me.

So my job was to get in touch with the local Chinese communities. Something that I very quickly got into, because my predecessor was being given a number of farewell entertainments by

members of the Chinese community, and those were usually large affairs.

I remember when I got to Bangkok, it was six, seven, eight nights in row, feting my predecessor's departure and my arrival. And, as you know, at these Chinese affairs there's an awful lot of drinking and eating.

One thing you'll have to say about the Chinese is that they don't believe in drinking without eating, so that nobody really gets into trouble. But you have to have a cast iron stomach for all of the ganbei-ing, the chug-a-lugging of warmed rice wine -- or even Scotch -- that you'd do.

It was kind of hard on me physically, but I quickly got to know who the leaders were in the Chinese community.

*Q: What was the importance of the Chinese community in Thailand to us?*

BURNET: You see, this was in the period of the Cold War. And Southeast Asia and Thailand, being among the dominoes, we were interested in at least keeping the status quo.

We were worried about the Chinese community. We thought that this was a group of people who could easily be used by the mother country for subversion, in all kinds of ways, to bring about a change of allegiance in this part of the world. And we were there to try to see that Southeast Asia would hold together.

So we were interested in the way China, the mainland, Beijing was working on the Chinese community to make some headway with them. Taiwan, on its part, was trying to do a little bit. And our job was largely to try to work with those Chinese who were more or less favorably disposed to us and keep them in our camp. So we had to know them, know what was going on, see who was making the inroads and to what effect, and report this back to Washington.

*Q: Well, how did you view the Chinese community there? Was it a strictly business-type community, really had very little connection with the Thai community, and did it play much of a role in Thailand?*

BURNET: It played a very large role. All of the Chinese, even the formal community leadership, were deeply involved in business, and deeply involved with Thai Government officials.

They sort of wore two hats you could say: they had their Thai hat and their Chinese hat. I think the bigger and the fancier hat was the Thai hat, because this was where all their money was made.

All the Chinese knew each other and they monopolized trade. They were also connected by networks all the way back to China. There was a symbiotic relationship between the Thai and the Chinese as they needed each other.

The Chinese, being the superior businessmen, knew how to do business with one another, but they all had partners or associates who were Thai. So they could do business with one another in

a way which really had nothing to do with the formal Chinese organization but be protected from arbitrary acts of the Thai Government.

But yet it was in the Chinese associations, the communities, that you got to know these people. My language and area training gave me easy entrée into that, but you had to know both sides of these Chinese leaders' lives.

*Q: Well, did you feel at the time that the Peoples Republic of China, the Communist Chinese were making serious inroads into this group one way or another?*

BURNET: They really weren't. There were not too many positive signs that they had any great effect on the general Chinese population. But yet you never knew for sure which way they were going. There was always the fear that they could get an inroad, maybe take over a newspaper or a Chinese school, so that we weren't too comfortable-feeling. Washington put a lot of time and effort into devising programs to keep the overseas Chinese lined up with the free world. But the attitude of the Thai Government was by far the most important factor in determining their loyalty.

*Q: Well how did the political section view the stability of the Thai government? We're talking now from '57 to '59.*

BURNET: Well of course when I arrived it was very unstable, because you had a very strong and powerful leader, who was long since past his peak, Pibul Songgram. And you had younger people coming up in the military, more ambitious and very powerful in the number of troops they commanded.

About two months after I got there, there was a coup (called a "coup de repos" because it was peaceful) which overthrew Pibul, and Marshal Sarit and his group came in. So there wasn't a feeling of stability when I arrived. There was a very definite feeling that a coup was coming, that there were going to be big changes in the works. So we were very anxious to report this to Washington.

There was a problem in that the then-Ambassador, having been there almost two years by that time, had become very close to Pibul.

*Q: Who was that?*

BURNET: This was Max Bishop. I remember one of the first things that I heard when I arrived in the political section was: Look, we've got a problem. We can't really report what's going on, because the Ambassador won't approve any reporting which is critical of Pibul or suggests he's on the way out.

The way we were to get out the story of what was going on in Bangkok and elsewhere in Thailand was to write memcons, because no one interfered with getting your memcons back to Washington. So the chief of our political section said, "I want you to get out lots of memcons and get the word across as to what's going on."

*Q: The idea of a memcon, you're making no judgment. This is, you're talking to somebody, this person said we've got a problem here, and so you're just reporting the facts, ma'am, type of thing.*

BURNET: It's legitimate reporting; however you hoped that there were things said in these conversations that would obviously lead to a conclusion of some sort.

*Q: And you would be picking the people, too, to some extent.*

BURNET: Oh, yes. You picked them, and then of course you knew what you wanted to ask them. So you pointed them in the direction, perhaps, where you were seeking information.

*Q: Well now, often when you have an Ambassador who you feel has gone so committed to almost one side as you see another situation, there is not only the memcon route, there are other ways. When the desk officer comes to visit, or... Did you find there was much of this going on, too? Were people going on home leave and would...?*

BURNET: You know, I don't remember that there was much contact back and forth in those days. I don't know just why there wasn't. I remember the chief of the political section had just returned from home leave, and... But still things were very unsettled in Bangkok. We were all concerned about what was going to happen, although in the event it went fine.

A continuing embarrassment for the political section was that up to the moment Pibul fled Bangkok in his sports car (to Cambodia) we could not send any reporting cables to Washington. By that time we should have sent many "Flash" cables! Finally, the Ambassador sent one which said simply, "Trust Department has seen reporting in other channels." A further irony was that a prominent U.S.-financed facility in Bangkok -- widely believed by the Thai press to be a CIA activity -- was attacked and wrecked by elements of Sarit's coup group. This was because it was a symbol of American support to the national police which was led by Sarit's arch-rival for power, Colonel Phao.

*Q: How about when Sarit came in. Did that make much of a difference?*

BURNET: Well, it certainly did. The Ambassador at that time realized (I think he realized) that he had made a mistake in not giving us a little more head in our reporting. So there was really no problem after that. Of course it was a totally new situation. There was lots of work for everybody to do to get to know the new crew. So we had a free hand. It was not long before Bishop was replaced by U. Alexis Johnson.

*Q: How did you view Sarit and company when they came in?*

BURNET: I think we had no particular animus against him. And we were certainly disposed to burrow in and to get to know him and the people behind him. Of course the Chinese were doing a lot of shifting of ground in the same way. I was interested to see how the Chinese were viewing Sarit, and how they were making their accommodations and so on. So it all fit. Every Thai leader

certainly had his Chinese who associated with him, a whole group of people who had sort of made his money for him. The new military leadership were also involved heavily in business and had their Chinese associates.

*Q: You left there in 1959 and you came back.*

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*Q: Well then you moved from there to the Far East Bureau. Was the division called the Bureau of the Far East then? When did you move out of INR? I have you going as Staff Assistant to Governor Harriman in the Far East from '61 to '63.*

BURNET: Yes, I went to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. We then called it that instead of East Asia and Pacific as it's now called... Jeff Parsons was Assistant Secretary. Dick Ericson, who was sort of a chief of mine in INR, had become his Staff Assistant. In those days, the Assistant Secretaries had only one Staff Assistant, as opposed to today when they have several. He told me that there would be a vacancy after Jeff Parsons was replaced by Walter McConaughy. Then Dick went off to become a special assistant in one of the Deputy Secretary offices. And so there was a vacancy there, and he said, "How would you like to be Staff Assistant for Walter McConaughy?"

And I said, "Sure."

So I went and had an interview and eventually got the job. And then Averell Harriman replaced McConaughy. I was there for the two years that Averell Harriman was the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

*Q: In two of our interviews we discussed from two points of view the situation in Korea in '61. I have an interview with Marshall Green in which he talks about being left without instructions of what to do when there was a coup that overthrew the government that succeeded Syngman Rhee. It was a democratic government, and Park Chung Hee took over. Then we have an interview with Donald McDonald, who was the Korean desk officer, and talking about, as it was termed, almost the near-paralysis of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs about what to do to our man in Seoul when there was a rapidly changing situation. How did you see it?*

BURNET: I, of course, was kind of a little bit off on the side there, but I was reading all of this traffic back and forth. And I had the feeling that Seoul, or rather the Charge or whoever was writing the cables, felt that they were kind of left a little bit high and dry.

*Q: That was Marshall Green who was Chargé, because actually McConaughy had gone back to Washington and had not been replaced. Sam Berger eventually was sent out there.*

BURNET: That's right. I had forgotten that. I think there was sort of a softness in the leadership back in the Department. I can't give any specifics, though.

*Q: I was wondering whether you had any feeling for this initial period, because the Kennedy*

*Administration had just taken over, and it was often at that time sort of the Foreign Service contingent was waiting to find out what their new masters want. And it was unclear to begin with, because Harriman was Ambassador-at-Large, or was not in charge of Far Eastern Affairs at that first point.*

BURNET: No, but he was heading the negotiations going on in Geneva over Laos. He left Bill Sullivan in charge 1/ and came back to become Assistant Secretary in FE. Of course I became associated with him when he came aboard since I was in place as staff assistant under Walter McConaughy. McConaughy leaves; John Steeves is Acting for a while; Harriman arrives. I stayed on as the Staff Assistant. By the time Harriman came in I think we were pretty well settled in for this new Administration in Seoul. This was before Park Chung Hee. I can't remember now exactly when. I think it was about a year later, well after Rhee was thrown out, that Park pulled his coup. I'm a little bit... [RHEE RESIGNED APRIL 27, 1960. PARK TOOK OVER AS ACTING PRESIDENT MARCH 24, 1962]

Only a few months before the Governor had rather suddenly made Sullivan his deputy chief of delegation, replacing John Steeves. We heard that the Governor was very displeased when told that Steeves had given the Soviets a tongue-lashing when he was Acting Head in Harriman's absence.

*Q: I think that was it, but they had a democratic, but a very weak democratic...*

BURNET: A civilian, John Myon Chang, headed the new government, I remember.

*Q: And then the coup came. And for about three days you had Marshall Green, who was saying, "We support democracy." But he was getting no particular support from Washington, because there were those who thought: Maybe they need a strong military dictatorship there. Although Park Chung Hee was an unknown factor. It was a lack of instructions from Washington. This was before Harriman was in there. It was McConaughy.*

BURNET: Yes, it was before.

*Q: Did you have any feeling when Harriman came on board, replaced McConaughy, that he was coming in to sort of sweep things clean or to really take charge? How did you feel about this?*

BURNET: I think there was a feeling that at last we had somebody who had some political clout, particularly vis-à-vis the White House. So there was this feeling that at last we'll be able to get something accomplished and we will get things done, because Governor Harriman could really see that these things were done. Laos was a bone of contention with the USSR and it was thought that the Governor, knowing the Russians, could work out a compromise.

Although it's funny, this is in the period when we were worried about dominoes falling in Southeast Asia, and the Geneva Conference on Laos (1961-62) was ongoing. Harriman was trying to compromise with the USSR in Geneva and McConaughy was Assistant Secretary with responsibility for the ongoing negotiations. Bill Sullivan, who later on became our Ambassador to Laos, used to joke around the Bureau that we had two choices at this point in our history: We

could either "falter with Walter or cave with Ave!"

*Q: "Walter" being Walter McConaughy.*

BURNET: So there was the changeover, you see, between the two. That crack was just for our own amusement. There was a good feeling about Harriman's coming in. Of course he was much too senior a gentleman and, really, to take that job. He had once been Governor of New York and was Secretary of Commerce in Roosevelt's cabinet after all.

Harriman, I think, really thought that here we were in a struggle with the Soviet Union over a little corner of Asia and that he, Harriman, knew the Russians and knew how to deal with them. And he knew how to strike a bargain. So that was his job.

*Q: Of course he had been Ambassador during most of World War II.*

BURNET: Yes, he said, "The President [Kennedy] has given me this job, because we can get along with the Soviet Union and we need to buy some time in Southeast Asia." This is what he set out to do. He succeeded, eventually, in achieving modus vivendi with the Soviets on Laos at the Geneva Conference of '62.

*Q: There was a tremendous concentration on affairs in Laos in that period, wasn't there?.*

BURNET: Yes, because this same view of Laos was seen from Moscow. Moscow was putting in a lot of effort, a lot of material, and a lot of people into that scene too. They had a supply line going into Laos, just as we did. They were flying things in: ammunition, equipment, and God knows what prestige was engaged on both sides.

*Q: At that time why did we think of Laos as being so critical?*

BURNET: Well here you had a situation on the periphery of China. This is where the Free World sort of rubbed up against the Communist world. And we thought that if we showed any sign of weakness we were going to lose out and bring the domino theory into play. And if we didn't show some strength, stand up to the Russians some way, we were going to lose the whole area.

*Q: So it wasn't Laos per se.*

BURNET: It was not so much Laos per se. Laos, you might say, was sort of the point man in the group of countries out there.

*Q: You were around when people were thinking about things there. How did we see the Soviet Union and China? This would be '62, '63. Did we see them walking in lockstep?*

BURNET: I'm afraid we saw them pretty much as a Sino-Soviet Axis. That they were working in lockstep, as you say. That they didn't make many moves without consulting the other, and that there was such a thing as a monolithic view of Communism. So I don't think that we really understood the long adversarial history behind these two great powers.

*Q: In a way, after all, we'd gone through the process of Tito, back in '48 or so when Tito broke off. Here was the equivalent to Mao Zedong and a world leader. Obviously a much smaller country, but still. We have a good example of the forces of nationalism coupled with Communism. America has a long history in China, and studies and all. Were people talking? If not in the State Department with the China experts, were we talking about this, or had we sort of been fixated or something?*

BURNET: I think we were fixated. I mean here's Governor Harriman, who had an intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union. He loved to talk about his wartime relationship with Stalin. He also knew something about the Chinese, although academically speaking he wasn't an expert on China.

But he had, after all, been there, I think before World War I, maybe, with his father. His father was in the railroad business. So that he was just a young man in that period.

But I don't remember Harriman's making a pitch that there are good reasons why China and the Soviet Union should not get along together. You know, Stu, they're ancient enemies, they occupy parts of the same huge land space, and so they're natural adversaries. I think that the idea of a Sino-Soviet Axis was very deeply imbedded in our world outlook. It was a convenient way of looking at the problem and it also reflected our fears.

*Q: Well this continued, despite all evidence to the contrary, in our whole involvement in Vietnam. Inability to realize the enmity between the Chinese and the Vietnamese, which was the same...*

BURNET: That's right. The same phenomenon there. Absolutely the same phenomenon. Despite lots of evidence to the contrary, which had been accumulating since about 1960 when the Soviets pulled their aid, lock, stock, and barrel, out of China. There were beginning signs of friction, but that didn't seem to make any difference. We kept to our view. Once you've made an investment in the opposite view, it's very difficult to change your mind in the middle of this process.

*Q: Again, you had taken Chinese studies. Were any of these ideas perking within the Chinese group?*

BURNET: They were. And the seeds were certainly planted early on in my Chinese training in the Foreign Service Institute. We were in touch with academics there who said, "Now look, you don't hear much about it now, but there are great sources of friction between China and the Soviet Union."

And they went back into some of the problems in history in the areas along the Manchurian border, where there are great unresolved border issues. The fact that they share the same land mass creates a natural kind of enmity between these two people.

So we were exposed to these ideas from the very beginning in my Chinese studies. But I'm not so sure that it made a very strong impression on many of us.

*Q: What was Harriman's operating style, from your vantage point within the department and elsewhere?*

BURNET: He's not a man of words. I think he's pretty much a man of action, in the sense of getting hold of the person who was vital to a particular problem or job that you had to do. Getting the right word to the right person at the right time. He's very good at that. He, of course, is extremely well connected all over Washington.

As part of the job, he made it very plain to me that I was going to be asked to do certain things. He didn't say so in so many words, but when he wanted something done, it was to be done.

And if it meant sneaking a piece of paper outside of the normal chain in the State Department directly to the White House, he'd say, "Frank, I want you to get this over to so and so in the White House right away." And he said, "Don't mention this to anybody in SS."

*Q: "SS" being the secretariat which normally covers the distribution of papers.*

BURNET: The paper chain would go from the Assistant Secretary level on up to the Secretary in SS, where it would be properly recorded and reproduced, and then sent in proper fashion, in their own sweet time, to the White House.

Well, lots of times in a fast-breaking situation there wasn't enough time for that, so he would ask me to take this over to Brom Smith, or whoever, in the White House right away, and I'd do that.

But he was frequently on the telephone to the White House, or telephone to God-knows-where. He was quite a doer. Lots of meetings held in his office. We'd have people coming in almost every day from CIA, certainly from AID. In those days, Laos took up an inordinate amount of time. That was the hot spot and involved all of us quite a bit.

*Q: Well then, you went to the hot spot, didn't you?*

BURNET: Following that, that's right. It was '63. I was coming up for an assignment again. Governor Harriman was moving up to Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and it came clear to me that whoever came in to succeed him would bring in his own staff. So it was a natural time for me to go. I was interested in going back to Asia. I kind of thought that Harriman had the right idea in what he was trying to do. And I thought I'd like to go to Laos. I had the French language background, so that it seemed to me a good assignment.

**ROBERT MCCLOSKEY**  
**Investigator, Refugee Relief Program**  
**Hong Kong (1955-1957)**

*Ambassador Robert J. McCloskey was born in Pennsylvania in 1922. His Foreign*

*Service career included positions in Hong Kong and Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Cyprus, The Netherlands, and Greece. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.*

MCCLOSKEY: A member in Congress, who I used to cover up there in Easton, Pennsylvania, and who I was chatting with about how nice it would be to be an American correspondent in Europe, said, "Why don't you think about the Foreign Service?" Then that was the start of something that lasted about 26 years. Then I got back to newspapering when I retired from the Foreign Service in 1981, by going to the Washington Post as the news critic of the paper. But I was never very far away from the newspaper business, or as news took on that awful word "media," because for something like ten or eleven years, I served as the spokesman for the Department of State. So I have some understanding of both sides of the street.

*Q: What was your first assignment in the Foreign Service?*

MCCLOSKEY: To the American consulate general in Hong Kong, as an investigator in the old refugee relief program in 1955.

*Q: With Lorrie Lawrence and company?*

MCCLOSKEY: Lawrence and others, yes. By a funny turn of events have been associated now for the last four and a half years with an agency that used to be exclusively a refugee agency, a private American agency, Catholic Relief Services. So I have a way of returning to earlier concepts and pursuits.

*Q: While you were in Hong Kong, I wonder if you could just explain a little of what you all were doing -- I speak as a formal consular officer myself -- of consular work that was unique, that Hong Kong operation?*

MCCLOSKEY: Yes, in 1953 the Congress passed some new refugee legislation that set quotas around the world for a period of three years. The total ran into several hundred thousand. In Western Europe, the quotas were broken up among individual countries. That's where the larger numbers were. There was one quota, however, to embrace all of the Far East, and Hong Kong had its share. It was on the order of fifteen hundred to two thousand, I believe, who were eligible for admission through the refugee relief program as part of the Hong Kong quota. These were mainly Chinese refugees from the mainland, who had made their way into Hong Kong beginning in late 1949 when the communists took over. The refugee program began in 1953. The special refugee program ran until the end of 1956. Other than Chinese nationals, there were a few more of the more exotic people of the world, white Russians, and others of European origin who had made their way into and lived in mainland China up until 1949 or the early '50s.

We processed the applications for visas. The regulations were that the individual or the family had to demonstrate that there was a sponsor in the United States who would look after the person or the family. I believe there had to be a certificate from the Labor Department that showed there would be work available to the individual or the family leader, mother or father.

*Q: What was your impression of government operations of that sort and at that level?*

MCCLOSKEY: I had the sense that the quotas were not very well balanced around the world on that particular program. It got me to wondering for the first time, I suppose, how much politics played in humanitarian issues. Surely, there were greater populations who were made refugees as a result of World War II in Europe than there were in the Far East, particularly with regard to China from 1949 on.

I had the sense, and this is hindsight, understand, that if this is the way government is run, it's damn near as chaotic, at times, as putting a newspaper together. That specific program brought in a lot of people, who stayed for only the life of that program, and then left government. But it worked, however untidy it was at times, and again from that vantage point, that part of the world could have used many more numbers than were allotted to it.

*Q: I say this because I started out in 1955 as a refugee relief officer, and in Europe a significant proportion were given to refugees who, of all places, were in Italy, which was not a refugee place, and to The Netherlands, mainly because of Congressional pressures from people who had relatives there. How did you end up in the press business, starting off in this other field?*

MCCLOSKEY: I had a desire to stay longer in Hong Kong. I arrived there in 1955, and this program expired with the legislation at the end of 1956. I had undertaken to learn Chinese. I was quite satisfied and, in fact, sought to stay on there as a USIA officer. That did not work, not because the people there didn't want it, but the people in Washington couldn't agree on it.

I came back, and was assigned to the UNESCO relations staff, which made me seriously consider leaving and getting back into the newspaper business. But I stuck it out for about a year, when I was asked whether I would be interested in joining the staff of the office of news in the Department, and said, "Yes, I would." And that's the beginning of a long association with the news operations of the State Department.

**RICHARD ST. F. POST**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1955-1958)**

*Richard St. F. Post was born in Spokane, Washington. He graduated from Harvard University and entered the Foreign Service in 1952. His career included positions in Somalia, Hong Kong, Swaziland, Lesotho, Angola, Canada, Portugal, Pakistan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Post was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

*Q: You had a tour from '55 to '58 in Hong Kong. What were you doing.*

POST: As I said, we were all interchangeable parts, and that was my consular duty. I was still picking posts by their exotic name.

*Q: What was the impression of the People's Republic of China, as far as you saw it?*

POST: It was a nasty piece of work. They were a hostile presence. A very large hostile presence. Looming over us. We had virtually no contact. Except of course the Communist Chinese bank was right in the middle of Hong Kong. They had put it right up next to the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, which had been the tallest building in Hong Kong. They put it up right next to it and had it two stories above the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank. We were conscious that there were Communist Chinese there. One was more aware of their presence when you went on trips to Macau, the Portuguese colony. To get there you had to take a ferry boat. Now they have hydrofoil. But in those days it was an overnight trip, generally, but very pleasant. You get to Macau and I remember the first time we went there, we were in a Chinese hotel, of course you are never very far from the water in Macau, and all night long, there was firing going on as Chinese refugees swam across that harbor from the other side, which was the Chinese side. The closest thing I came to have anything to do with China was interviewing people who came back, one or two Americans who had been imprisoned in China and who had been released while I was there. I then had to go up to the Lowu border, Lowu is a little town on the train station, the train comes down from Canton, stops at Lowu. I had go up there and certify to the British authorities that the person had not lost his or her American citizenship. And then take them back to the Consulate and ask them what had been going on. It was a pretty grisly picture that they painted.

**DEREK SINGER**  
**Assistant Training Officer, USAID**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1956-1958)**

*Mr. Singer was born in New York City and graduated from NYU and SAIS. He served in numerous USAID missions in Zaire, Kenya, Ecuador and Cameroon. He was interviewed by W. Haven North in 1999.*

*Q: What was the position in Taiwan?*

SINGER: I was going to be a program officer, an assistant program officer, to begin with, which was something my SAIS MA and brief field experience seemed to qualify me for. I knew that this would be a challenge, but I was enthusiastic about it. Indeed, when I got off the plane in Taipei, a few weeks later, the person who met me said, "Oh, great, we are really happy to see our new Assistant Training Officer." I said, "No, I'm supposed to be the new Assistant Program Officer. Here is the letter that identifies my new job." So my new boss said, "That is okay, but the training position is more important right now, since the man who had it before had to leave very suddenly, and Washington can't replace him immediately. As a result, we have decided to give you that job." When I heard that, I began to wonder about AID's comparative advantage in its staff planning and career development. However, I agreed, and it turned out to be an excellent job and a good introduction to the foreign service. I was working for an extremely good person career officer named Cameron Bremseth who, at the time, was the Mission training officer. I

don't know if you ever met him.

*Q: No.*

SINGER: Cam was a very good man, indeed. At that time, in the 1950s, in particular, AID was putting a lot of emphasis on human resources, training and education as a package that we had a significant number of senior as well as mid-level American staff, filling Mission positions in this area. Rather than today, where most, if not all, training positions are filled by nationals.

*Q: This was when?*

SINGER: This was in 1956.

*Q: So, this is with ICA?*

SINGER: Right.

*Q: What was the situation in Taiwan at the time?*

SINGER: A large, well-staffed American AID mission doing all kinds of things in fields such as civil engineering, construction, agriculture, a lot of health work, and even some food for peace work was underway. Taiwan was an ex-Japanese colony, recently liberated after World War II. But, the Japanese had occupied it and kept it pretty rural without economic development, much less industrial development, being on their minds at all over those decades. They didn't want competition with the home islands of Japan. They had, in fact, occupied Taiwan, calling it Formosa for 50 years, since 1895 when they took it over. Today, Taiwan is obviously a vastly different place - big, bustling, prosperous and definitely industrialized. We wouldn't think of having an AID Mission there today (not even considering the politics).

*Q: The reason we had a big program there was?*

SINGER: Because they needed it and after World War II, we wanted to show, of course, that we were perfectly capable of and interested in picking up and helping develop the ex-Japanese colonies around Southeast Asia. So, the Taiwan Experiment, as it was called, was a big one. It was an interesting one, certainly to cut my teeth on in terms of development work. They had a lot of American military there as well, a big American military presence. So, there were a lot of Americans all over the place. Nevertheless, much of the time, we would get around in rickety old taxis because we didn't have our own car for the first year or so, or even in pedicabs or rickshaws. As a matter of fact, they were quite prevalent in this rural little country, with a rural little town as its capital, where we lived for two years. Our second child was born there, by the way. So, we also have particularly fond memories of Taiwan. I mentioned Japan a couple of times. I was sent on TDY, temporary duty, to Japan for a four-month period during my two year assignment to Taiwan. We actually had an operating AID mission in Tokyo, though a good deal smaller than Taiwan's. Partially, it was there for political purposes, but basically it was for training purposes. We were very interested in providing advanced, technical training to the Japanese and, as time went by, "third country training" in Japan to other Asians. Since I was, in

fact, a training officer, I was sent on temporary duty to replace the regularly assigned American training officer in Tokyo. That was also very interesting.

*Q: What did a training officer do in a place like Taiwan?*

SINGER: Well, one of the big things I did was to run an English training program. I did that both on Taiwan and, in what turned out to be my next assignment, in Costa Rica, for much of my time. I also did a lot of screening, interviewing, selection, and placement of Taiwanese and Chinese participants. Of course, the Taiwanese were the people actually born there, while the Chinese were those who came over from the Mainland, escaping the Communists with General Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. Anyway, it was a very busy job. We also did follow-up studies to try and see what was happening and how well the participants had been doing after they came back.

*Q: You sent them to the States?*

SINGER: We sent them to the States and sometimes to third countries.

*Q: Were there any particular fields that were prominent?*

SINGER: Once again, the same field as I stated a moment ago, which reflected our Mission's country priorities. We were especially heavy in such technical areas as engineering, municipal construction, road building, dams, water supply, health and agriculture.

*Q: Any people stand out in your mind that you were involved in sending for training?*

SINGER: Well, there are several with whom we do keep up still on sort of a Christmas card basis. Perhaps, the most interesting thing there though, now that you bring it up, was that there was also something called the "Chinese Army Officers' Language School." I remember "China" was used, not the word "Taiwan" or "Taiwanese", since at that period the people in control insisted that this was the "real China" (and many still do). This was "Free China", represented by the legitimate Chinese leadership that had escaped with Chiang Kai-shek in 1949. These people were convinced they were really still running China, and they just happened to be temporarily in exile from the Mainland to which they would soon return. Generally, the Mainlanders ran the country. In any case, my wife became a teacher at this school. She spent a lot of time, four or five days a week, teaching, and she got to know a lot of young Chinese officers.

*Q: Teaching English?*

SINGER: Teaching English, yes. Though other subjects were being taught, of course, by our own military mission, which was sizeable in Taiwan at the time. One day Ruth brought home an officer student. The young man took one look at our Taiwanese, I mean Taiwanese (not Chinese) maid, Skekko. She was about 16 or 17 at the time, he was about 21, and he asked her out. They fell in love, got married and we still keep up with them. They have several children. He rose through the ranks to become a top army general. My wife took a trip back to Taiwan a few years ago, while we were living in Kenya, as a matter of fact, and was wined and dined and shown all around the island there by our ex-maid, the General's wife, in a chauffeured car - basically

treated like royalty. So, that was one of the unexpected pay-offs with people whom we got to know and meet on that beautiful island.

*Q: What kind of numbers are you talking about, of the people we sent for training?*

SINGER: Oh, well. As far as I can remember, we were into the hundreds on a yearly basis, several hundred a year, in different fields and areas. So, adding them all up, we are talking about trying to follow and setup records for several thousand people by the time I got there. The mission already had been operating for five or six years. We must have trained the majority of the future technical industrial, scientific and engineering leaders, in particular, that now run that country.

*Q: You say, they are running it now?*

SINGER: Right. They are running it now. We obviously tried to lean over as much as we could to train Taiwanese, native born Taiwanese, along with the mainlanders from China, and I think that strategy worked. It contributed, in an important way, towards an overall policy now, whereby the Taiwanese and the Mainland Chinese are now sharing power in Taiwan. I think the Mutual Security Mission to China did our best to help bring this about.

*Q: Were there any particular issues that stood out in your mind that you had to address during that time?*

SINGER: Well, let's just say that Taiwanese and Chinese, alike were very cooperative with us. I mean we had very few problems compared to some that I did have later on in the training and education field, in which I stayed for a number of years. But, we had very, very, few problems in Taiwan. They were all extremely eager to study abroad. They worked diligently to prepare themselves, particularly in acquiring the English they needed to have to gain acceptance at most American training institutions, especially the universities, which in the 1950s were not accustomed to many foreign students. They were not really welcoming, perhaps, of those who had language problems, in particular, when they sought to get into graduate study programs. We tried to stick to graduate students as much as we possibly could because, even then, in its sort of rural post-Japanese colonial state in the 1950s, there were a number of undergraduate institutions, colleges and universities that Taiwanese could go to. We are including Japan, by the way, where they were still welcomed. So, the mission tried to stick to graduate studies and, as I said, we were pretty successful.

*Q: Do you think they were pretty well prepared before they went for training?*

SINGER: They were quite well prepared. Their basic grounding in their professional fields was good. Most came from these national institutions, which had been founded by professionals during the 50 year Japanese occupation (1895-1945). So they had a pretty strong undergrad education, but mastering English sufficiently was the trick. Little or none was taught during the long Japanese occupation. That is why there was so much emphasis, not only in that Army Language school, but in our AID and USIA-run language schools, as well. The British Council had a big program as well, and there were many small private schools to teach English that were

also springing up, too. Training students in the English language was extremely important, and they realized it was the key to getting into good graduate schools in the English-speaking world.

*Q: Any particular views about the Taiwanese culture?*

SINGER: Well, it was a tapestry of many cultural artifacts, rich local cultural traditions, with many changes also introduced from the Mainland when the hundreds of thousands of Chinese came who had escaped in the late 1940s (ending in 1949 with the evacuation), the Japanese heritage, and an interesting aboriginal culture native to the island. Overall, yes, there was plenty of "culture." There is also an indigenous Taiwanese culture, derived from the few thousand indigenous Taiwanese, fairly primitive people who lived in the mountains. I'm sure there still are. They had a certain amount of cultural, artistic tradition as well.

*Q: What were the characteristics you saw in those days that might have suggested why Taiwan blossomed so rapidly and so successfully?*

SINGER: Well, that is an excellent question. Frankly, I was not clever enough to foresee, although perhaps others did, what was going to happen. Our assistance programs, military and civilian, of course, helped a great deal to rebuild the infrastructure within that island that eventually gave it the chance to industrialize and to become strong and diversified.

*Q: You're talking physical infrastructure?*

SINGER: Yes, physical infrastructure. Training programs and those of many other countries and activities also helped to prepare the human infrastructure necessary, and investment capital was available.

*Q: Were we involved in local education institutions, as well ?*

SINGER: We were, particularly the missionary groups which were quite active in Taiwan, especially after they had been thrown out of the Mainland by the Communists when they took over. In the late 1940s, early 1950s, they threw them out. Many of them came to Taiwan, started school, most of which were subsidized by those who contributed from American churches to their missions' operations overseas. Obviously, they were out to proselytize, but they also educated, provided health care, and imparted technical training as well to a lot of Taiwanese. That helped a lot. There was a big missionary infrastructure.

*Q: Was our foreign assistance program supporting development of any indigenous educational institutions ?*

SINGER: Well, now you are taking me pretty far back here. As I recall, yes, we were. I know that there was an active education office, but it was not the same as mine. We had such a big mission there. We must have had, I don't know, 40 or 50 direct hires, as such, at that mission, at the time. We were spread out and we were, to some degree, compartmentalized. Obviously, we all concentrated on our particular concerns. My concern was preparing people for international study of one kind or another through our well-staffed training office. It was not the same as the

in- country education office. I didn't get that deeply into knowing what they were doing, but I do know there was support for building up local training and education organizations, teachers' colleges, etc.

*Q: Anything else on that experience? That was quite a beginning.*

SINGER: Well, towards the end of my first two year tour at MSA, our Mission Security Mission to China, specifically, MSM/C was the name of our mission. It may have been part of MSA, overall, but that is what we were called. Anyway, towards the end of that first two year tour I had with AID, I was asked whether I wanted to sign up for another tour, because four years at an AID post was not the standard it later became. Still, it was normally a question of an officer just saying "yes", if a mission wanted you to stay. That was they way the system worked at the time. Well, I preferred to go to the "real" Southeast Asia. Remember, I had studied places like Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, and so forth. I was particularly interested, intellectually at least, in Southeast Asia somewhere to the south of where we were in Taiwan. We had missions in all of those countries at the time. So, I said, "I would kind of like to find out whether there is anything open there." I had met a fellow named Lee St. Lawrence, I don't know whether that is a name you remember or not.

*Q: Yes.*

SINGER: He turned out to be the Director in Laos at the time. I wrote to him saying, "I am kind of interested, if you have a slot open there in Laos, to join you there after Taipei." He wrote back, "Sure, that would be fine. I am interested and we are building up our mission here." So, I told Ruth and the two children to get ready for Vientiane, and we sent sort of a courtesy message to AID Washington (or MSA Washington), to tell them, you know, "Singer is interested in a switch." The mission in Taipei said, "We would like him to stay, but we would release him." We figured that would be a quick turnaround, that Washington would come back and say, "Okay, fine." That is the way it had happened before: if everybody was happy, no problem. This time, though, Washington came back and said, "No, we want Singer to go to Costa Rica. We have looked up his record and found that he speaks Spanish, and we need a Spanish speaker with some background in international training to go to Costa Rica now as the Training Officer." Again, remember training was a pretty important at AID missions, most of which had one or two American direct hire training officers. So, I looked up Costa Rica in the atlas and, as it looked like a pretty nice place, I said yes. My boss said, "This is the first time we ever heard of Washington interfering in a field-arranged transfer when everybody else had agreed. But, if you are happy with that, go ahead." So, we decided to go back to Latin America, and San Jose was certainly worth it!

**JAMES MOCERI**  
**Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1956-1959)**

*James Moceri was born and raised in Washington, DC. He entered into the USIA*

*in 1951. His career included positions in Bari, China (Taiwan), Sudan, and France. Mr. Moceri was interviewed by G. Lewis Schmidt in 1990.*

MOCERI: Well, so much for my Italian reminiscences. In 1956 I knew that if I remained in the Italian program I could expect nothing more than a third tour of duty as a branch PAO, regardless of Nordness's high regard for my capabilities. I also sensed that there were people in the service who thought of me as a narrow Italian specialist. More importantly, I was convinced that I had to learn and understand a good deal about our Washington operations before returning to the field in whatever position of responsibility. And I was very much concerned about the problem of guiding my daughter, who was just turning sixteen after seven continuous years in Italy, through a probably difficult reentry into American life and the American school system. I expressed all these concerns to Ned Nordness and emphasized that I needed a firm commitment that I would be assigned to a position in Washington. In due course I received the assurances I sought from Nordness. I left Italy at the end of 1956 with great regret, especially in the wake of the Hungarian and Suez crises, but with peace of mind over the prospect of a Washington assignment.

My travel orders read "for home leave" to be followed by consultation in Washington. When I returned to Washington in 1956, I was dismayed to learn from the personnel office that there was no assignment for me in Washington. In fact I was being scheduled to go to Bombay as the cultural affairs officer at that branch USIS office. The news outraged me, and I boiled over with anger. I flatly refused to go. Such a personnel action was utterly senseless. It was idiotic to send me back into the field, still with so little knowledge of, let alone experience in, Washington operations. My performance in Italy had been openly praised by people whose opinion I valued. To the considerable satisfaction of the country PAO and the Ambassador I had for more than three months managed and in some respects improved a USIS country program with a staff of 48 officers (almost all of whom outranked me) and a \$6 million budget. Why in the world should I accept a position ranking below the one I had occupied in Florence (with all its complexities) for virtually five years? After much fruitless discussion I was summoned to the office of the area director for the Near East and South Asia, Hunt Damon. A lengthy, icy discussion failed to change my mind. Ending the discussion, Damon angrily informed me that he would see to it that I would regret my refusal to the end of my Agency career.

While the Office of Personnel was working out my personnel problem, I was assigned to a seminar on communist theory and practice. Nothing about that three-week course, including the appearance of Lyman Kirkpatrick reputed to be the governmental authority on communism, served to alter my rather low estimate of the level of intellectual discourse in the Agency. I had, after all, spent a rather considerable part of my graduate work on the political and intellectual history of Europe in the 19th century, including the origins and growth of Marxist thought and influence in pre-Fascist Italy; and I had lived for seven years in virtually daily proximity to the communist presence, polemics and threat to the democratic institutions of Italy.

Finally, the Director of Personnel, L.K. Little, called me in to inform me that I was being offered an overseas assignment that took care of most of my previous objection. The position was that of deputy PAO in Taipei. L.K. Little informed me that the PAO, Ralph Powell, had such extraordinary access to the highest levels of the Chinese Nationalist government that his

intelligence information and political advice were vitally important to the ambassador on a virtually daily basis. This was summed up in the rather crude phrase, "Powell practically sits on the Ambassador's lap." The enormity of the claim would have been apparent to anyone who had the slightest acquaintance with Ambassador Rankin. I was also reminded how important all this and anything that strengthened this relationship were to the success of the Dulles-Robertson policy on China. This argument I found absurd: I had long held the opinion that our China policy was as meaningless as the Dulles "rollback" policy for Eastern Europe. Nevertheless I finally realized I had no realistic alternative. For once I received a decent set of country program briefings from an area office, IAF, particularly from Jim Halsema and Jack O'Brien. Everyone, especially George Hellyer, the Area Director, impressed on me the importance to the Agency that I run the entire USIS Taipei program on a daily basis for Ralph Powell. Unfortunately, I soon learned, at no little cost to myself, nobody bothered to convey that message -- delicately or indelicately -- to Powell.

After an exhausting 26-hour flight from Seattle (attributable to powerful head-winds over the North Pacific) we arrived at the Taipei airport at 8:30 in the morning. We were met by Powell and his wife. Powell rushed us through customs because it was imperative that I be at the Ambassador's 9:00 o'clock staff meeting. I never did understand why. Mrs. Powell insisted that after checking into the Grand Hotel my wife begin her rounds of diplomatic calls that very morning. When I asked for assistance in locating housing, both the Embassy administrative office and Powell, himself, told me to check the English-language China Post newspaper and have my wife order a pedicab through the hotel. If I thought all this strange indeed, I was only beginning to learn how really weird was the environment in which I would have to work.

The USIS staff initially regarded me with some suspicion, the outsider, the newcomer who had to prove himself to them. I quickly realized that I would have to prove to each staff member, as tactfully as possible, that I knew his work and the nature of his responsibilities as well as he did. And I soon learned that with the exception of the executive officer every member of the American staff was new to the Agency and on his first assignment. I found it inconceivable and unconscionable that Washington could ever have allowed such a situation to happen. Within weeks I felt I had won their confidence as they began to understand that I cared about their work and their problems. Neither then nor later was the Chinese staff a problem.

Within days of my arrival I had my first intimation of the difficulties I would have to anticipate in carrying out the USIS program in the name of Ralph Powell. He came into my office one day holding in his hand a copy of a routine cable from Washington on a rather minor program matter. He informed me that this was a personal message to him from the Agency Director and I should handle the matter in that context. I soon discovered that he indeed believed that any communication from USIA Washington bearing the name of the Director was a personally directed message to Powell. The day after his first trip away from Taiwan since my arrival in Taipei he stormed into my office to accuse me of concealing a telegram from him. I patiently explained why the Embassy system of handling telegraphic traffic made it impossible to conceal a telegram for a senior official. I realized that he found my explanation unpersuasive. Before long Powell began accusing me openly and sometimes in the presence of others of systematically turning the staff against him. Our relations became increasingly strained during the rest of his tour. Because there was so much in the relationship that struck me as irrational and almost

unbelievable I decided never to give as much as a hint of these problems to anyone in or from Washington. Well after Powell's departure from Taipei, Jim Halsema told me privately that IAF had been well aware of the difficulty and had been impressed by the fact that I had maintained a total silence on the subject. And I mention the matter here only because it is so illustrative of the consequences of errors in personnel selection.

Despite these problems I did over time succeed in giving our USIS program some shape, substance and coherence. I had to establish as an operational reality the concept that USIS Taipei was not an appendage of the USAID to satisfy whatever public relations whim it entertained. Learning that the single largest charge against our program budget was the cost of publication materials extolling the accomplishments of the Chinese Nationalist regime and sent to our Southeast Asia posts for distribution to the overseas Chinese communities, I determined to check this out with other S.E. Asian posts. Visits to those posts and discussions with the PAOs convinced me that the materials were neither wanted nor used. The most frequently adduced reason was that the host government for nationalistic motives resented the distribution of such materials. I succeeded in abolishing the program and diverted the funds to other program needs.

Perhaps my most important and enduring accomplishment -- certainly the most time-consuming - - was the design and refurbishing of new USIS facilities, both expanding and increasing the efficiency of our program capabilities. In the wake of the destruction of our USIS offices allegedly by a "rioting mob" just two months after my arrival in Taipei, the Taipei regime eventually ceded to USIS the use of the long-abandoned great fortress headquarters of the former Japanese governors-general of Formosa. The huge building was in such a state of disrepair that it had to be stripped to the skeleton frame and the entire interior reconstructed to serve efficiently our staffing and programming requirements. Because the Embassy building interior had been effectively wrecked in the same incident, the Embassy administrative staff claimed it could give me no assistance in the task establishing our new USIS headquarters. The entire burden of that task fell on my shoulders: locating and hiring a local Taiwanese architect-consultant, contracting for and supervising the extensive physical alterations, establishing all our design needs, scouring and acquiring in the Hong Kong markets all the furnishings and equipment. The final results were judged even by the Embassy staff to be impressive and handsome.

A word of explanation is required here to rectify the gross misconceptions surrounding the incident in which the Embassy and USIS quarters were destroyed on that Black Friday of May 1957 and the events leading to that incident. The incident had its origin in an event that had occurred a very few weeks before: an American sergeant had shot and killed a "Peeping Tom" Chinese coolie. Publicly, it appeared to be a commonplace, minor tabloid story with only two mildly titillating aspects, a glimpse of sex and the resulting confrontation of a white American soldier and a non-descript Chinese male. The facts were quite different: the Chinese was a colonel in the intelligence organization headed by Chiang-ching-kuo, son of the President, and he had been shot in the back, probably as a result of a quarrel over the division of spoils from an illegal activity. A subsequent Ambassador's staff meeting dealt entirely with the question of how to handle the episode discreetly and with the minimum damage to American-Chinese relations. After listening to much discussion and very conscious of my position as an absolute newcomer, I suggested and argued for a two-step solution: first, the Embassy should make a formal apology to the Chinese government, extend its deepest regrets to the widow of the colonel and offer an

appropriate monetary compensation in accordance with Chinese tradition and practice; and second, the American should be tried as soon as possible in an American court-martial in Taipei, found guilty of murder, removed immediately from Taiwan, and at an appropriate time allowed to appeal the verdict in another military jurisdiction. The Ambassador seemed at least interested in my proposal, but the military present rejected it in the most vehement terms, draping themselves in the honor of the American flag and the military code of justice.

Within a very short time the court-martial, open to the public, was convened. A verdict of "not guilty" was brought in. The Americans, the great majority of the public present, rose to their feet and cheered. According to all reports, the few Chinese present maintained a stunned silence. The next day, Black Friday, the Chinese authorities took their revenge or, as I put it then, taught a lesson the Americans could neither ignore nor forget. At about ten that Friday morning a group of about twenty stalwart Chinese males, armed with crowbars, entered the Embassy building and proceeded to smash everything in sight. A few Americans, who tried to hide in the building rather than attempting escape, were injured. In the meantime a large, orderly and very quiet crowd of Chinese gathered around the perimeter of the Embassy ground to watch the unfolding spectacle. For that day and the entire weekend the American community was rife with reports of a rioting Chinese mob in the tradition of the anti-foreign Chinese riots around the turn of the century. The American media, as far as I could tell, indulged the same fantasy. There was not a shred of evidence of any rioting anywhere in the city.

On hearing of the activity at the Embassy, I decided to keep the USIS facilities open as long as possible without endangering the staff or Chinese in our facility. Late that afternoon at about four o'clock I was informed that the Chinese "wrecking squad" (as I even then referred to it) was leaving the Embassy and apparently was headed in the direction of our building. Quietly I ordered our office closed, sent everyone home, secured the building and left the premises at four-thirty. Half an hour later the wrecking crew arrived, accomplished its mission and vanished. It could hardly escape my attention that the USAID building was not a target. The following week I began an intensive search for photographic evidence of the behavior of the Chinese crowd at the Embassy. I soon had a collection of twenty or twenty-five photos, collected from various sources. From that evidence the only conclusion that could be drawn was that a group of perhaps two hundred Chinese men, women and children had gathered or been gathered to watch -- without the slightest sign of emotion -- an interesting spectacle. I sent all the photographs together with my report on the damages to USIS to USIA Washington. When I left Taipei two years later and checked into Washington, I asked about the photographs. They could not be found.

Because I took very deliberate care not to circumvent my PAO, I saw little of Ambassador Rankin during these events and for the remainder of his tour. My impression was that at least outwardly he did not display the agitation and outrage that much of his staff wallowed in.

I had established, I thought, a good working relationship with him. I had developed respect for the man because he was judicious and calm and, I think most importantly, he knew what the limits of embassy influence really were. He had no illusions on that score. On my final meeting with him, a courtesy call just prior to his departure -- I'm jumping ahead, now, chronologically -- he said to me, "This has been an interesting tour, but the decisions affecting the fate of this island

are not made here. They are made in Washington, Moscow, and Peking." Here was a man who understood clearly the limits of his power and the influence of the American Embassy.

I mention this because I'd been urged by members of the political section of the embassy to turn my attention and USIS activities to the Taiwanese people, as distinguished from the mainland Chinese, and convince them about the value of democracy and the institutions of democracy and so on, and how America was really their friend. All of which, I regarded as utter nonsense, because there was no way that the Chinese Government was going to allow me to approach the Taiwanese population, which, at that point, was being held down very, very firmly.

On the other hand, there were taking root within that society, a number of rather important democratic patterns or practices, at any rate. These became possible because Chinese mainlanders were carrying out in Taiwan what they failed to do on the mainland: a very aggressive and effective land reform program, and setting up agricultural cooperatives, because no peasant could own more than approximately three acres of land.

The agricultural economy had to have credits if it was to rise above the subsistence level, feed a burgeoning population and generate foreign exchange. Through the cooperatives, the farmers themselves started pressing for measures. They needed credits. They needed fertilizer. They needed seed and tools. And pressuring the Chinese Government -- the Chiang Kai-shek government -- brought them such returns. This was democracy in action at that level. It was shaping the practice of democratic discussion and debate and the arts of exerting pressures on governmental entities. I regarded that as something that had to come out of the soil of Taiwan itself. It was not something any USIS operator was going to instruct a foreign populace about. [Laughter]

*Q: Was the Chiang Kai-shek government at all responsive to those pressures?*

MOCERI: They had to be, because they needed the food supplies for them and for the fastest growing population in the world and they needed the export earnings.

*Q: So they really did give them some break, then?*

MOCERI: Oh yes, they did. And that is why the Taiwanese Nationalists, who called for the overthrow of the government and so on, all from the safe haven of the Japanese islands, were, I think, off base. Democratic practice cannot be imposed even by an exile movement, because the democratic practice has to have grass roots. It has to be born in the soil and be nurtured in the soil, in the land and the spirit of a nation. And in Taiwan of the fifties it was slowly, in this way, forming. And we can see the evolution of this process even now for I think what is happening in Taiwan today goes back to those early roots.

*Q: I was just going to say, that was laying the groundwork and the foundation for the economic miracle that has been wrought in Taiwan.*

MOCERI: Precisely, you see. Because it was those exports, the exports of that food, because they proved capable of producing far more than the needs of the island, far more. You know,

they could routinely get three crops of rice every year. This fueled the exporting to Japan and to Korea and so on.

An interesting aspect -- another aspect that I'd seen -- of the agricultural revolution, was that the landlords, the great 300 families -- and I don't know whether they were 300 more, plus or minus something -- were given what seemed to be worthless bonds by the Chinese Government. These were, in effect, holdings in paper enterprises that then became the capitalist vehicles responsible for creating the light industry of Taiwan. These were the people who then became the owners and managers of the new industrial enterprises.

So there's a displacement of a class. And that displacement eventually created the opportunity for a different type of economic adventure, which then became the basis for Taiwan's remarkable industrialization, none of which people in '57, '58, and '59, when I served in Taiwan, could have foreseen.

*Q: Not only could they not foresee it, but I don't think they fully understand, yet, what the base of that sudden explosion of industrial accomplishment has been or from what it came. I don't think it's fully realized to this day.*

MOCERI: Well, that leads me into another thought. I wanted to get...

*Q: Before you get into the other thought, just as a matter of curiosity, where was Ralph Powell in all this, during that time? And what happened?*

MOCERI: Well, Ralph Powell's tour came to an abrupt end in 1958, during the Far Eastern Ambassador's Conference, which that year was held in Taipei. George Hellyer came out. Drumright was then the ambassador. The director of the Agency came out.

*Q: By that time, Larson had probably been replaced?*

MOCERI: Yes, he'd been replaced.

*Q: It was George Allen that came out?*

MOCERI: Yes, of course.

*Q: He was the new director.*

MOCERI: Well, I had asked my wife to set up a luncheon for Allen and Hellyer and the entire USIS staff at our house. We had luncheon there, in a fairly modest house, prepared by Modesta. And we knew, we all sensed at that luncheon, that all was not well. Of course, Powell was there.

What happened? About midway in the conference, Drumright called in George Hellyer and George Allen and said, "I want this man removed and I want him removed immediately."

Well, then it couldn't be done during the conference, so they asked for a week's time to get him

out. Drumright simply could not tolerate him. He wanted him out of his hair. Now, I think that both Allen and Hellyer, reluctantly, had to abide by his request because Ambassador Drumright said he'd take it up with the Secretary of State if they weren't prepared to satisfy his wishes. That marked the end of Ralph Powell's career in Taipei.

*Q: I think it marked the end of his career in USIA.*

MOCERI: Yes, it was very brutal and very sad, in a way. I'd had terrible difficulties but, you know, I felt sorry for the man. But I later learned that we as a government do not do these things very gracefully. [Laughter] I learned that, particularly, in the Kennedy Administration, by the way.

*Q: But then did you become the PAO?*

MOCERI: I was made acting PAO. So I functioned with that transitory title for the remainder of my tour because, I think, Drumright may have made it known he wanted eventually to bring in USIS people he knew. And after the Quemoy crisis broke out, he brought in Dick McCarthy on a special detail and John Bottaeff as his deputy. I was phasing out, by that time. They were there, presumably, to help. But I couldn't quite understand why I needed that help. [Laughter] I and my information officer, Lucien Agniel, could have managed quite well. I knew the problems and knew something of the Quemoy crisis and the reasons for it and what the Chinese were trying to do.

Now I am reminded that I must refer to certain earlier episodes including a terrible dispute with Ralph Powell and the deputy chief of mission, a man named Pilcher, who was our chargé d'affaires for the period between Rankin's departure and Drumright's arrival.

*Q: Oh, Jim Pilcher?*

MOCERI: Jim Pilcher.

*Q: Who had been the supervising consul general in Japan when I was in Japan, 1952-56. So I knew Jim very well. A Georgian.*

MOCERI: Well, I don't know what your feelings are, so I hope you won't be offended by anything I say.

*Q: I liked him personally, but I had reservations about his capabilities.*

MOCERI: One of my early introductions to official American attitudes toward the Chinese occurred at an evening in Pilcher's home with the director of Chinese information and several other dignitaries, Powell, and myself. I was appalled to hear Pilcher, at one point, as we sat around after dinner, telling the Chinese about the glories of their own civilization and how civilized they were when we, in the West, were still swinging from the trees by our tails. You know, this is not conversation at some casual bar. This is the American deputy chief of the American mission, talking to a representative...

*Q: Representative of the government.*

MOCERI: ...foreign government. I'd never heard anything like this in my life. I couldn't believe what I was hearing. And I thought to myself, "Well, this is a consequence of the Dulles-Robertson line. We have to kowtow, in the traditional terms, to representatives of the Chinese Government.

*Q: What did Ralph Powell say to that, by the way?*

MOCERI: Nothing. Nothing.

*Q: Nothing?*

MOCERI: Nothing. When I gave vent to my surprise the next day, he couldn't understand what I thought was wrong about this. Now I really began to wonder whether it was really to be my fate in the foreign service to be repeatedly caught up in some very odd situations. I must recall here a couple of the odd things that had happened to me in Italy. An inspector-general recommended in 1953 that I be sent back to the United States for re-Americanization -- a recommendation based solely on a conversation during the course of a luncheon that he arranged for me to have with him in Rome, in a cafe in Rome. The luncheon was to be in place of the inspection he had not done at my post in Florence because his wife had wanted to use that day for shopping. He started out with a question about Italian politics. So I proceeded to lay out for him all the essential elements of the Italian political structure and what was happening in the world of Italian politics. Assuming from the questions he kept addressing to me that he really wanted to know something of the political geography of Italy I went on at some length. And on that basis, he decided that I was much too involved in Italian affairs, I reflected an Italian attitude and needed to be re-Americanized.

*Q: Who was the inspector?*

MOCERI: Fred Oechsner.

*Q: I don't think I knew Fred.*

MOCERI: He had been head of the AP bureau in Berlin, if I'm not mistaken, in the 30s. A very fine gentleman.

*Q: Was he the public member of the inspection team?*

MOCERI: No, he was with the State Department. He was the State Department inspector with the responsibility of inspecting USIS activities in Italy. There was no team.

*Q: I see.*

MOCERI: Then later, before leaving Washington for Taipei, a woman in the Office of Personnel

suggested I look in my personnel file. That's how I learned about this. I also learned that after I had been in Rome as acting country PAO for three months -- or at that time, and in spite of what people knew about my relationship with Mrs. Luce -- an Embassy panel sitting in Rome had recommended that I be discharged from the Service.

At any rate, these incidents may help, in fact, to understand why I took so intransigent a position in two clashes that I had with Ralph Powell and Pilcher over what I viewed as the proper execution of my own responsibilities. I invoked my rights, as a Foreign Service officer, to report to Washington what I had observed and been told, that was of direct concern to U.S. policy interests.

One of the reporters -- I don't want to confuse names, so I'll leave them unnamed -- had been given very rough treatment by the Chinese Government. He had a solid reputation as one of the best American correspondents in the Far East. Based in Hong Kong, he had come to Taipei to cover Taiwanese developments in a series of articles for the New York Times. The Chinese did everything to keep him from getting out of his hotel in Taipei.

I thought, you know, "This is idiotic on the part of the Chinese." Here is a correspondent who has an excellent reputation in the Far East. And he's writing for the most important newspaper in the United States. Give him assistance. You know, maybe there are certain things you don't want him to get into, but there are ways of handling this.

He was absolutely livid. He had planned to spend a considerable amount of time on this particular assignment. And he realized that they weren't going to let him get out of Taipei for anything. He voiced his complaints to our press officer, Lucien Agniel. Agniel came to me with this story and I said, "Well, this has got to be reported. It's too serious. Washington ought to know about this. Because, obviously, the correspondent is going to get in touch with his home office. And there are going to be inquiries. Both USIA and the Department ought to be aware of this."

Well, neither Powell nor Pilcher would let me send the message. I had drafted it over my signature and I wanted it forwarded. Well, I insisted on what I felt were my right as a Foreign Service officer and said, "Look, I'll file a protest on this." So they gave in and finally sent it in.

Not very long after that the question of Drumright's appointment as ambassador to Taipei came up. The Chinese Government had given its agrément to his appointment, but he made some unfortunate remarks in Hong Kong, before coming to Taipei. Reportedly he had indicated that the Nationalists would not find him the soft touch that Rankin had been. They'd find him very hard to deal with. They certainly weren't going to get the fighter planes that they'd asked for and that Rankin had promised them. Rankin was great at delaying tactics and he just kept delaying, delaying, delaying, which was proper because they couldn't take offense at that. He'd cite complications, difficulties, bureaucratic procedures, all kinds of reasons, you see.

Well, obviously, the Chinese in Taipei got wind of what was being said in Hong Kong. They had very good sources in Hong Kong. They came to Lucien Agniel and me to express their dismay and their disappointment. The editor of the Chinese Post, which was the local English-language

paper, and other informal emissaries, were sent to the two of us.

So I drafted a message about this and wanted to send it to both State and USIA. Obviously, this development had to be of concern. Washington has to know about these things. The Chinese had wanted very deliberately and quite unofficially to get their unhappiness on the record. It was inconceivable to me that the information I had should or could be withheld from Washington. Our people there had to know that, as I put it, "there's a buildup of resentment here and this is a problem that's going to have to be dealt with."

Powell and Pilcher categorically refused to let me send the message. We had a long, heated argument, which degenerated into a shouting match. I had stopped smoking; it had been three years since the last smoke. When Powell accused me of treason -- and the word "treason" was used -- I was so outraged that I smoked three cigars and two packs of cigarettes that day.  
[Laughter]

I promptly wrote an undated letter of resignation. I said, "I want this letter to be on the ambassador's desk, Drumright's, when he arrives. If he thinks my action has been wrong he can put a date on it, and my resignation will be effective as of that date." I said, "I can't work like this."

Well, you can imagine the acrimony. They finally came up with a shrewd, diplomatic solution for the problem, because I was so adamant. They said they would send my message to Drumright in Hong Kong. And then Drumright could do with it as he pleased. Well, on that I caved in because I felt I couldn't -- beyond a shadow of a doubt -- call them liars. I didn't believe they would, but I also couldn't prove that they wouldn't. So the matter ended there.

You can imagine the acrimony on both sides. And I thought, you know, here was another bitter lesson to me on the problems of getting distasteful information back to Washington. It's a question of reporting -- what do you report? Do you report only what the people in Washington want to hear? Or what needs to be known? And I felt my information needed to be known. The ambassador needed to know it. And the State Department needed to know that there was Chinese resentment. It wouldn't have taken much to figure this out.

Well, I'm, I suppose, casting the net of my recollections too wide for you. But I think USIS officers do find themselves in positions like this.

*Q: I think they do.*

MOCERI: And this raises some real questions. This is why I always felt we should be integrated with the State Department. There should not be the division between the political and the information, cultural; we should be integrated physically and functionally, as well.

*Q: Well, you know, I don't thoroughly agree with you on this point. I think that had you been within the Department, you would have been subject to the same kind of repression and, perhaps, more so, because then you would have been in deliberate opposition to and in contravention of your superiors' recommendations and decisions. I don't think you'd have been as well off as you*

*were as an independent. And that, of course, was the whole basis for the separation of State and USIA.*

MOCERI: You may be quite right about this, in terms of the practicalities of the problem. But my experience, as other experiences I've had, do raise this question as a problem that has to be addressed, and addressed in fairness to the United States Government itself. It has to be addressed in whatever other kind of relationship is established.

*Q: I think that the situation is not nearly as bad today as it was 25 or 30 years ago. What you were seeing, at that time, was the last gasp of a whole bunch of the old-line ambassadors, many of whom you know were holdovers from the pre-war years. They were ending their careers, and they felt like that. And that's the way they were always going to feel.*

*The newer ambassadors, who have come on since, and that includes some of the political ambassadors, have been much more accommodating; not only accommodating, they have insisted that USIA take a very definite role in the determination of policy and in the explanation of what was going on. And they have respected the PAO's analyses, sometimes to the detriment of the political section.*

*So I don't think that the condition holds to the same extent today that it did then. But I, also, encountered situations where you, simply, could not make a recommendation to an ambassador. He would not have it. That was all there was to it. And one of our best PAOs, Willard Hanna, who was in Japan at the time, resigned over that very kind of a conflict with John Allison, when Allison was ambassador there.*

MOCERI: Well, to the second of the two episodes worth mentioning: the Open Skies exhibit. I insisted that the Agency was promoting it for all it was worth. It was very important to us. I insisted that we schedule this exhibit. I went over considerable opposition on everyone's part in the embassy. I did stage the exhibit. And the Chinese were fascinated by it; fascinated by the photography involved, and the potential of the Open Skies exhibit.

See, there again, determined opposition. The Chinese information office finally agreed to it. And we did have it. And it was, probably, the most successful -- in terms of audience attendance -- the most successful exhibit we ever staged in Taiwan. This leads me quite naturally into mentioning the assessment that the Chinese made of my own position and work there. Shortly before I left, two CIA officers -- you know, there was CIA all over the place...

*Q: Their CIA or our CIA.*

MOCERI: Our CIA. [Laughter] And they came to me and they said, "Now that you're leaving, you may be interested in what the Chinese think of you. And we've talked to a lot of officials." I assumed they had. [Laughter] By the way, Ray Cline was the head of the CIA operation in Taiwan at the time.

And these two said to me, "They say you're a very hard man to deal with. But you're also very fair. You won't do anything that you're not convinced is in the interest of your government. But

the one thing they like is that they can count on your word. If you've said you'll do something, you do it." I thought it was high praise.

*Q: Did you say, "Would you put that in writing?" [Laughter]*

MOCERI: I never thought of that at the time. [Laughter] Well, from there I went -- I thought I was going back to the States. I had talked to Bill Copeland, who was at the moment our new area director, then visiting us in Taipei on his first visit to his field posts. He wanted to know what I wanted to do. This was the first time any Washington official had expressed an interest in what I might like to do in terms of possible assignments. So I told him about the things I wanted. He asked me to write a memorandum to him, sort of a personal letter, outlining my background and my interests and what I would like to do.

You know, I considered myself, I believed what I was told when I came into the Agency, "You're available on a worldwide basis." I felt it wasn't up to me to stay in one particular area. I certainly welcomed the prospects of experience in different parts of the world.

The problem with that is that you don't build up the ties with a group of people who gravitate in a given area, as in South America, for instance. You remember that for all practical purposes we had a Latin American junta in the Agency that made South America its province.

**NORMAN W. GETSINGER**  
**Chinese Language Studies**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1956-1957)**

**Commercial Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1957-1961)**

*Norman W. Getsinger was born in Michigan in 1919. He graduated with a BA from Harvard University in 1941, and served in the U.S. Navy overseas from 1941 to 1946 as a lieutenant overseas. His assignments abroad have included Cairo, Rome, Taichung, Taipei, Ankara, Seoul, and Hong Kong. Mr. Getstinger was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.*

*Q: You were in Taichung from when to when?*

GETSINGER: From 1956 to 1957.

*Q: How did you find the course at that point?*

GETSINGER: Excellent. The language school was great. The important thing was to have it in Taichung, and to keep it away from Taipei, so that the ambassador couldn't call upon our services. That isolation was so important. We really did value that. At that point, our wives were allowed to come back into the language school at night, and study Chinese, using the instructors

that we used during the day time. They became very proficient.

*Q: Well, that was very important. Well, when you take language studies, you are not only learning a language, but you are learning a culture. What were you getting from your teachers about China?*

GETSINGER: The language school, of course, was under the control of teachers who had come from Beijing and they were all extreme nationalists. We would, every now and then, snicker about the communists. They would be forced to show us how the communists were altering the language. So, when we would go to our posts, we would be equipped to handle the language, not only spoken by the nationalists, but by the communists as well.

*Q: This is always a problem when you have... I got Serbian training from some Serbs who would have been happy with Milosevic. We were going to Tito's Yugoslavia and they were rejecting words that we knew they were using. Chiang Kai-shek was in full force at that point. Were you getting any feel for how things were going in Taiwan, at that time?*

GETSINGER: Very much so. We certainly were. You can't work on a small island, even if you are isolated, and have studied the language, without getting in touch with the ferment among the Taiwanese, and their feeling about the overlordship with the mainland group, that came over with Chiang Kai-shek. There was one incident I think I should get into. There was the sacking of the American embassy in Taipei by the nationalists. This was at a time when the offshore Islands crisis was pushing on it, and we needed to have this kind of togetherness if we were going to face up to that crisis. The reason the embassy was sacked, of course, is well known. We had a military advisory group, a Chinese officer was accused of spying on the wife of one of our officers, and he was shot. Then, the American officer was acquitted and sent out of the country. I don't know whether this is in the official record, but we know, at that point, the Chinese mob boiled over and it was Chiang Dinghai, who was then the president's son, who was in charge of intelligence, who decided there should be a demonstration in front of the American embassy to protest this. The demonstration got out of hand, who got into the demonstration, we are not quite sure. But, there were inflammatory broadcasts over a tape, to the mob, and the mob took over. That was the most complete destruction of an embassy we have had in many years of Foreign Service history. It was completely shattered. The officers and the staff took refuge in the bomb shelter and thank God, they were able to shut the bomb shelter door, but they were buttoned up in there by a steel door. Eventually, they opened the door to get out, because of course they were trapped in there. They were beaten up, and you could see American personnel of the embassy with bandages all over them. When we came up from the language school to clean up the embassy, you could sweep up top secret documents in the courtyard of the embassy. They threw the safe out of the code room and burst it opened, and scattered stuff all over. But, that is just an indication of the fact that you cannot push the Chinese too far. You cannot rob them of their self respect.

*Q: You sort of learned that with your mother's milk, at least, that the language thing... Of course, you had had this before, working with UNRA, that dealing with the Chinese was really a different matter than most other countries.*

GETSINGER: Oh, absolutely. I feel so sorry for people who are involved in Chinese affairs, who

don't have the language. I think Chris Patton, who wrote this remarkable book about how he was trying to make a home...

*Q: He knew he was the last governor of Hong Kong.*

GETSINGER: He was very good at understanding the Chinese, but throughout the book, he is apologetic and shamefaced about the fact that he didn't speak Chinese. He would have been a much better governor, and certainly would have written a better book if he had the language.

*Q: Did you have much contact with Taiwanese, as opposed to mainland people?*

GETSINGER: I went from the language school to the embassy, and I was four years in the embassy.

*Q: We will pick up that on the next session.*

GETSINGER: But, certainly all of us on the island, whether we were in Economic Affairs or USIS, or anything else, were working with the Chinese, both the Taiwanese and the mainland.

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*Q: Today is the 25<sup>th</sup> of February 2000. Norman, we are going back to 1957. We have already talked some about it, but could you talk about how the embassy operated and what was driving American policy in Taipei, when you got there, and how did you operate it?*

GETSINGER: I think the central feature of where we were with the Kuomintang, with Taiwan, at that point, is that we were working hand and glove with them. We have seldom worked as closely with the foreign government, as what we were working with, in Taiwan. One good example is the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR). That had representatives appointed by Chiang Kai-shek and our president. They worked side by side to revise the whole of the agricultural policy in Taiwan. It was very, very close. Those of us who were there at that time were very excited at the idea that we were helping to build a new kind of Chinese society on that island.

*Q: Let's take reconstruction, at that point. I would think that, and correct me if I'm wrong, something into the favor of being able to do this was that this has not been an area where Chinese landlords have been able to get their fingernails into, because the Japanese had been there. In a way, it had been protected from mainland Chinese power people coming in and grabbing off the best pieces of land, or am I wrong?*

GETSINGER: A little bit. Actually, what had happened is that the Japanese had decided to build up a land of aristocracy of the local people. That this was the way they could have control. When the nationalists came over, there were large landed estates, belonging to the Taiwanese. Then, the question came up of how to do a land reform. The land reform in Taiwan was remarkable because it changed the whole economy around. They disenfranchised the landlords, and they gave them pieces of the industrial establishment that the Japanese were leaving behind. So, they

kind of turned their hats around, on being landlords to industrialists. This was done completely bloodlessly, whereas on the mainland at the same time, they were accomplishing their land reform by shooting all the landlords.

*Q: Well, I suppose it was handy in the way you could come in and the Taiwanese, at this point, were basically a separate group, and going down, their leadership didn't have that much at stake in this property. So, they could sit back and say, "Let's have some reform over here," because it wasn't going their particular way.*

GETSINGER: I happened to be on the island during a very early period. I was over there in 1947, and I arrived there just after the first troops had come over from the Kuomintang, and were having trouble with the Taiwanese. There was a revolt by the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese all refer to it as "RR Bong," February 27, 1947. What happened was that the gentleman who was in charge of Chiang Kai-shek's troops decided to eliminate this kind of opposition, because at that time, Japanese was the language of the island. After 50 years, everybody brought over the Japanese to occupy the island. So, the natives looked Japanese, spoke Japanese, and had collaborated with the Japanese in World War II. So, he took this as a revolt that had to be put down, if he was going to establish a base for Chiang Kai-shek. So, there were a large number of executions. We don't know how many, but something in the neighborhood of 20,000 Taiwanese. It was all of the intellectuals, the people who had established this ferment. So, here were the Taiwanese, even at that time, trying to establish some kind of independence.

*Q: Now, what was your job at the embassy, to begin with? What were you doing?*

GETSINGER: Oh, I was very lucky to come up from the language school to one of the posts where they put Chinese language officers, where they spoke Mandarin. I decided that the best job, and it was kind of open at that point, would be to be the commercial officer. I was excited at the idea of helping with the transformation of the economy, and getting American participation started in Taiwan. So, that was my job for four years.

*Q: Who was the ambassador when you arrived?*

GETSINGER: I believe it was Everett Drumright.

*Q: He was an old China hand.*

GETSINGER: Yes. He had been to the language school in Peking.

*Q: You mentioned this 12-school operation of the Kuomintang. Was there any feeling among the embassy people you dealt with, you included, that Chiang Kai-shek was our boy, but he sure blew it, and did a terrible job in China, and this is not a terribly good horse to be riding?*

GETSINGER: Yes. My view, and I think most of us who worked with the Kuomintang at that point, was that they had learned their lesson in China. What we had was a new Chiang Kai-shek and a new Kuomintang, and in a very real sense, it was. He agreed to pass, and we were all working on this, a foreign investment law, which in affect says that foreign devils are welcome

to enter the central kingdom and exploit our resources and take out exorbitant profits. That is what it mandated in a way. Yet, he passed it, because he knew that if his regime was going to survive on that island, he was going to have American participation needed.

*Q: Let's talk about the investment policy, which you were trying to promote. Was there a difference between the mainland Chinese, who were political leaders, military people and all, and the Taiwanese? They were all of Chinese origin. When you say Chinese, you always think of entrepreneurs par excellence, but did you see a difference in the approach, toward investment business and all?*

GETSINGER: Not really, because I think that is part of the economic culture of the Chinese. The Taiwanese were very good businessmen. I let a number of American companies join investments with the Taiwanese. But, as an example, Stu, of how well we worked with the Kuomintang regime there, is that I decided one way to get investment problems solved was to set up what I call the investment lunch. I would sit down once a week with the leading investment authority of the KMT and I would have a little menu of the problems that American companies were having in Taiwan. We would go over this menu and he would send instructions to with his number two person, who would be there, that these things would have to be fixed. That is the way we did things. We sat down, had lunch, and jointly resolved the problems.

*Q: One hears about the Kuomintang before, about it being a vast bureaucracy and an awful lot of squeeze included in this. Were you seeing people who were trying to do it differently?*

GETSINGER: Absolutely. I think the proof of that, of course, was the very rapid increase in productivity in the economy of Taiwan, and how, even then, it was beginning to show tigerish traits. They moved up very rapidly. In fact, it wasn't simply because we were doing things in the embassy with helping an investment, but it was because we had a very successful aid program, possibly the most successful aid program that the U.S. has ever had. Dollar for dollar, in terms of results, it was marvelous in Taiwan. It was because we had this very close working arrangement, so that we could make things work. It didn't take the Taiwanese very long, I mean the Chinese in Taiwan, before they had reached the takeoff stage. We finished our aid to Taiwan. It was one of the first places we did. So, it's a complete success in that regard.

*Q: You mentioned a takeoff stage; this refers to a small book by Eugene Rostov, I think, who talked about countries achieving economic growth with a certain amount of literacy, and expertise in investment and all that. At a certain point, they no longer needed assistance, they could generate their own.*

GETSINGER: Exactly, and that is what happened.

*Q: Who was investing? At that point, you were trying to get Americans to invest. How did you go about this?*

GETSINGER: We had, with the Chinese, established an investment center. I spoke about the investment lunch, which was promising. But, one thing we were able to do was to establish an investment center. When a potential investor came to my office, we would take them down to the

investment center, in downtown Taipei. They would indicate what they needed in the way of utilities, labor, raw materials, semi-manufactured, and the whole process of the investment was laid out right there. They never had anything like that on the mainland, I can assure you. But, we could do that stuff.

*Q: How about the overseas Chinese? Were they interested in Taiwan, or were they sort of playing a watching game, at this point?*

GETSINGER: We had a lot of interest, of course, from Hong Kong. At that time, most of the money in Hong Kong was pro-Taiwan. So, there was a very good connection there.

*Q: How about in America? Was there much of a Chinese community with money in the United States, at that time?*

GETSINGER: It's interesting. The one thing we Americans were always fighting, at that time, in Taiwan, was the rivalry between Taiwanese and mainland people. The Taiwanese were pushing for independence. They were pushing for the idea of having an opposition party. Chiang Kai-shek's police would keep arresting them. We, the Americans, would give them refuge. So, here we were, working with an autocracy, but trying to push it toward a democracy. The way we would do it was to give [assistance] to the Taiwanese. So, when you speak of what kind of activity there was in the U.S. in relation to Taiwan, there was a lot of agitation. The Taiwanese would escape Chiang Kai-shek's police. They would find refuge in the United States. The Chinese community in the United States, with regard to Taiwan, was clearly divided between the pro-Kuomintang and the pro-Taiwanese. So, there was a civil war within the civil war, going on.

*Q: How did you feel about Drumright? Was he too close, just right, or distant from Chiang Kai-shek and the way he was leading the embassy at that time?*

GETSINGER: I would say that he was just about right. Drumright was beloved by the Chinese. He was so close to the Chinese, but he needed to be because this was the way we were operating. We were not operating at a distance. We were embracing those people. We had, in addition to the embassy and the aid mission, a huge military advisory group and a tremendously large intelligence station. The intelligence station in Taiwan was as big as stations we have ever had abroad. They, in a sense, were helping Chiang Kai-shek operate some of these raids on the mainland. So, at that time, the policy was kind of supporting Chiang Kai-shek return to the mainland. At the same time, supporting the Taiwanese' desire to be independent, and that's important.

*Q: The Korean war had ended not too long before, around 1953 or so. Did Korea serve as any example, or have any influence there, South Korea, or was it just something over the horizon?*

GETSINGER: I think it was quite far up the horizon. Between Taiwan and Korea, of course, there is Japan. The Japanese influence on the island was still very strong. Most of the trade, at the beginning, was with Japan, because here was an ex-colony. That is what happens with colonies; they have this tremendous trade.

*Q: Did you get involved in visits? In the United States we had our own., I don't want to call it Civil War, but difficulties. You had the China lobbies, representative Walter Judd and others. Then, you had the "Who lost China," the McCarthy thing, which was petering out. Were you feeling the effects of either of these things, with visitors or watching how you reported, or anything like that?*

GETSINGER: I think we probably did have, Stu. I don't really have too strong a view on that.

*Q: I meant, did you have quite a few visitors from the United States?*

GETSINGER: Yes, they were pouring in. This was our China. This is what we had to work with, in the way of China.

*Q: On the part of the American investors, was there concern that they would take a look and say, "Is this place going to fall to the mainland Chinese?" Was that something you had to address?*

GETSINGER: It certainly was. Of course, the Taiwanese and the Chinese, themselves, were very concerned. At that time, there was absolutely no economic connection with the mainland. Of course, then things began to change.

*Q: But, really quite a bit later.*

GETSINGER: Quite a bit later, and of course, still more or less indirectly through Hong Kong. There is no direct trading.

*Q: How about the Quemoy-Matsu business, during this 1957 to 1961-period?*

GETSINGER: As you recall, I had been involved, when I was down in Tai Taijung at the language school, in evacuation preparations. This was 1957, 1958. Then, the big problem, which was out of my sphere, was to get Chiang Kai-shek to remove so many of the troops from Quemoy, which sits in the harbor of mainland China, and get them back to defend Taiwan. It gradually developed that mainland Chinese on Taiwan felt that they should keep the troops Quemoy, because that represented the connection to the mainland.

*Q: Did you find, for investment and all, were you working with the Department of Commerce much, or was this pretty much it, of self-sustaining operation?*

GETSINGER: Of course, we had good connections with the Ex-Im Bank. At that point, Ex-Im Bank thought that this was their job to develop the economy in Taiwan. So, there was a lot of Ex-Im money that came in.

*Q: Were we at all concerned, at that point, that we might build up Taiwan to be a rival of the United States? I think, particularly with something like textiles... I mean, at that point, we had substantial textile business, particularly in the Carolinas, and all. Was this a concern?*

GETSINGER: I don't think so. But, we did have with Taiwan all of the problems that we have had with the mainland of China. There was, initially, a great textile industry in Taiwan. There

was the question of whether the Taiwan textiles were undermining our textile industry, but that is occurring now with China. That was a very labor intensive type of industry, which eventually moved out of Hong Kong, and over to the mainland, but we had trouble with copyright and patents. That was a terrible problem. The first time that the Encyclopedia Britannica was pirated was in Taiwan. They did a marvelous job of taking the whole Encyclopedia Britannica and reproducing it.

*Q: I remember, I think, most of the Foreign Service profited by having these pirated editions, which they had picked up in one place or another. But, what were you doing? Were you going down and trying to ferret it out, or pounding the paperboard?*

GETSINGER: Oh, we had remarkable success in just facing up to the authorities in Taiwan, and making them change their regulations. Who is this old gentleman who is so involved in Hollywood? This is a gentleman who pushes motion pictures. He came over a number of times to Taiwan, and I worked with him to try and raise the admissions in Taiwan.

*Q: Jack Valenti?*

GETSINGER: Jack Valenti, yes. Jack came over maybe a half-dozen times, because this was one of the major outlets for Hollywood.

*Q: They were pirated films?*

GETSINGER: They were not only pirated films, but the main problem was that they were not charging the admission price. You could get in for a few pence or a chopstick. That didn't make sense. Hollywood was really looking forward to making some profit over there. So, we got them to jack up their prices.

*Q: During 1957 to 1961, was the embassy sacked during this period, or did this come a little later?*

GETSINGER: Yes, remember that is what we discussed at our last meeting.

*Q: We did discuss it, that's right. That was early on. While you were the commercial officer, were you keeping an eye on political developments?*

GETSINGER: Oh, we all had to get involved because... LBJ came over and we had to put together a control group for LBJ. I remember a wonderful scene. He was the Vice President. When he came over, he loved to press the flesh. He would get in a pedicab and start down the main street of Taipei, headed for a mob of Chinese, and they would see this great huge Texan coming along with a 10-gallon hat, and sitting in the back of a pedicab, and he would jump out of the pedicab, and would rush forward to shake hands. The mob would melt. He couldn't get to a single hand.

*Q: You were there during the Kennedy-Nixon debates, which centered at one point on Quemoy and Matsu. There were peculiar little things that happened, and all of a sudden he became the*

*center of the universe, as far as political candidates were concerned. How were Kennedy and Nixon seen from the Chinese perspective?*

GETSINGER: At that point, because Taiwan was our China, we were pouring everything into China. Eisenhower came over as the President, and we were in the control group for him. They just loved having this American attention. It looked, at that point, as if Taiwan would be our China forever. I remember one of the problems that occur with Foreign Service officers in the control group with a presidential visit is that some of the guys who came over with the president wanted to find out where the girlies were. So, you have to measure whether you can do anything pimping as a Foreign Service officer. But, you can do it by indirection, just indicate that...

*Q: I'm told, you sort of point them toward the embassy drivers, or something like that.*

GETSINGER: I remember there was a hot spring's resort, just outside Taipei, and you could put them up that way. Let me tell you about one incident that is rather interesting.

*Q: Yes, please.*

GETSINGER: To show you how close we were and how Drumright was as an ambassador, Drumright was giving a very large cocktail reception. It was getting down toward the end of his period there. He assigned me to stand at the door as one of the junior Foreign Service officers. He said, "A lot of these Chinese, I don't know, but they all know me. They will all come rushing forward, and I won't know their names. I tell you what I want you to do. You stand at the door, and you stop every one of them as they come in, introduce yourself, get their name and then pass the name to me." Well, it was going very well, until a rather short, stocky Chinese came in and he tried to walk right around me and rushed by me. He started toward the ambassador. I knew what my instructions were, so I kind of lined him up against the wall, and said, "I don't believe I have gotten your name." He said, "It's Chang Ching-kuo." Well, Chaing Ching-kuo was the president's son. Chaing Ching-kuo was head of the secret police. I said, "Pass, friend."

*Q: How did you find, during this time, the hand of the secret police and all? Was it a heavy hand?*

GETSINGER: Oh, it was a very heavy hand, very ubiquitous. To equate Taiwanese independence types with the communists was very easy. In fact, at one point, Kuomintang was trying to find a connection between the communists in Beijing and the Taiwanese independence types seeing it as a way to weaken Chiang Kai-shek's regime, so he couldn't recover the mainland. Oh yes, they were all over the place. My wife, who at that time was married to someone else, and so was I, and we both lost our mates later; but her husband at the time was with the CIA in Taipei. At one point, there was a midnight knock at the door and it was Henry Gau. Henry Gau is one of the leading Taiwanese independent types. He said that they were after him, and asked if we would let him in for a while, until his people could get him away. He stayed with us for 24 hours, until he was able to exit through the back door. Six months later, Henry now became the mayor of Taipei. What the Kuomintang had to do was to permit some freedom of expression and some freedom of candidacy, even though there was no opposition party. But, you could be an independent. The Taiwanese kept developing these independent candidates. So,

here was this guy who was taking refuge, and six months later, he was the mayor. They called it a democracy holiday. If you, as a Taiwanese could get yourself elected, then they couldn't arrest you. But, if you failed in your candidacy, you were lucky if you ended up in Green Island.

*Q: Speaking about the officers in the embassy, how seriously did you take the slogan of "back to the mainland?" Were you seeing that Taiwan would develop its own government, and it would go on that way, or were you seeing a fairly early collapse of mainland Chinese and communists or what?*

GETSINGER: I think, during the period I was there, still very early, we were very much caught up in the idea that Chiang Kai-shek might have a chance to get back, because after all, the communist rule on the mainland was failing miserably. They had the great leap forward and terrible starvation that occurred there after. So, it looked like the thing would be falling apart, and Chiang Kai-shek might have a chance to get back. Then again, our agency people on the island were helping them develop a spy network and an infiltration at work that went in and the intelligence in Taipei was very good on what was happening on the mainland. The possibility that Taiwan would find itself independent under self-rule only came when Chiang Kai-shek's son, years later, decided that the only way they came to keep power was to share it with the Taiwanese.

*Q: There was a remarkable change around, a gradual move, so today we are waiting for an election which will probably put the final stamp on an independent Taiwan.*

GETSINGER: Of course, those of us who are interested in the island, can go back and look at a lot of the history, but there was a point when after the island was ceded to the Japanese, the Treaty of Chimwini Decree in 1895, the Japanese came down to take over Taiwan, and there was a resistance. There was a short period, I think it lasted for 45 days, to free Taiwan. It was the Republic of Taiwan who established it, and the Japanese troops came in in the north and just marched down the island and eliminated it. But, here was an island that was 50 years under the Japanese, 50 years under the Kuomintang. During the period when it was a province of Taiwan, it was a very big period, only something like 30 years. The Dutch were there on the island.

*Q: How well were you informed of what was going on on the mainland? This was during the period of the great leap forward, and we had our consulate general in Hong Kong, which was processing this. Did we have a pretty good idea of what was going on in China?*

GETSINGER: Oh, I think so. I think the intelligence network that Chiang Kai-shek had established, together with our Central Intelligence Agency support was an excellent one. We were really getting information. That changed by the time I went to Hong Kong, later in my career. Hong Kong has become the center, and the network was established through that area.

*Q: By the time you left in 1961, was there a pretty free enterprise system in place, at least as far as small entrepreneurs?*

GETSINGER: A very good free enterprise system. It was really moving ahead very rapidly. I think this was why assignment to Taiwan at that time was so exciting for Foreign Service

officers. You were part of something that was happening because you were part of the governmental structure as well. It is the kind of thing we had later in Korea, when we were working so closely.

*Q: 1961 or 1962 was when things really started moving there. I take it that during this time, you weren't seeing a solid leftist movement, a communist sympathizer. This just wasn't on Taiwan.*

GETSINGER: No question, but there was a very strong developing Taiwan independence movement. The Taiwan independence types would be under house arrest, and then they would escape and flee to the United States to join the Taiwan independence movement there. So, Chiang Kai-shek could never really suppress it. That's why his son, when he took over the presidency, decided that the only way they were going to get anyplace with strengthening the position of that island, was to accept the Taiwanese in the government.

*Q: But during this time, it was pretty much mainland Chinese, Kuomintang people were running everything.*

GETSINGER: These were the people who were chasing, by their mainland experience. These were people who were basically anticommunists. They really hated what was going on on the mainland. They really felt they had to create something different on Taiwan.

**MARSHALL BREMENT**  
**Bureau of East Asian Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1956-1957)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC and Taiwan (1957-1959)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1960-1963)**

*Ambassador Marshall Brement was born in New York in 1932. He received a bachelor's degree from Brooklyn College in 1952 and a master's degree from the University of Maryland in 1955. Ambassador Brement joined the Foreign Service in 1956. His career included positions in Hong Kong, the Soviet Union, Singapore, Indonesia, Vietnam, and an ambassadorship to Iceland. Ambassador Brement was interviewed by Thomas S. Estes in 1989 and by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

*Q: Well, fine. I took that old three and a half-day test so I know what you missed. The old biographic register shows that you entered the Foreign Service in 1956. You began to study Chinese at the Foreign Service Institute and in 1958 you were sent to the FSI field school in Taiwan. Can you tell us something about why you decided to study Chinese?*

BREMENT: Well, again, it was sort of an accidental turn in my career. I came in, in March of '56, and took the old A 100 course for beginning officers and then was assigned to the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. I'd asked to go overseas but they said, "No, you have to go to Washington," and I was simply assigned to FE where I was the assistant staff assistant. The staff assistant was first a fellow named Newt Waddell, and then Owen Zurhellen, to Walter Robertson who was Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs and a very dynamic and polished Virginia banker gentlemen who'd been in Chungking during the war and then worked for General Marshall when he had his mission to China and had very, very strong views about China.

In any case I worked on his staff, partly as a staff assistant and partly as the author of the Far East Section of the daily secret summary, an old publication of the Department where I essentially summarized cables on a daily basis -- important cables on the Far East to be read by the principal officers of the Department; and also wrote a weekly item on subjects of interest dealing with the Far East, an internal publication the Department put out at the secret level called "Current Foreign Relations". This was an excellent introduction to a Foreign Service career because it gave me the full range and the full sense of what was going on in a major geographic bureau of the Department. I was mildly interested in the Far East when I came in but I was pointing towards Europe. But this indeed awakened an interest in the Far East for me and so I applied for Chinese language training, and had a great deal of trouble getting in, by the way. It was only that I was working for the Far Eastern Assistant Secretary which allowed me to get into the course. Mostly because the head of Personnel at the time, whose name escapes me, had been an inspector and he'd inspected the language school in Yokohama and he found that of the four graduates two of them had decided it was a terrible mistake to study Japanese and wanted to go somewhere else. And I'd never even been overseas -- I'd never been anyplace outside the United States except Canada or Mexico. And he decided that before I do something like take two and a half years of the taxpayer's money to study...

*Q: That's why I asked. It's unusual.*

BREMENT: ...I'd better at least look around and get a sense of the area, which was sensible enough. But there were no particularly attractive assignments at that time and indeed I felt that my exposure to the Bureau and to the general area was such that I knew what I was doing. So Walter Robertson, who was quite a desk-banger, and could handle a meeting, I would say, better than anybody I've ever seen in the U.S. Government...

*Q: Yes, I knew him.*

BREMENT: ...in terms of getting his way, he almost always did. He got his way. So I entered Chinese language training and spent nine months at the Foreign Service Institute and then 18 months at the field school in Taiwan where we studied Chinese every day.

*Q: That interested me because I studied Mandarin in Peking, China when I was in the Marine Corps. And then after that you...*

BREMENT: After that I was assigned to Hong Kong. I had wanted to go to Taipei actually, but I couldn't complain too much about being assigned to Hong Kong. My first year in Hong Kong I

was assigned to the Political Section of the Consulate working on China. Of course, in those days we had no relations with China and Hong Kong was the premier China watching post of the Department. In my first year I was in charge of the unit which published the survey of the China Mainland Press which was the standard source of reference both for the government and for the academic community on current developments in China. I had ten translators and 20 typists and we had a subscription list of about 600 and we turned out 60 or 70 single-spaced sheets of paper a day. I found that great fun and a great way to learn about China and my translators were an enormous source of knowledge. I only spent a year at that, then went off on home leave, and came back. And then I spent two years in the Political Section working on internal political developments in China.

*Q: Do you still keep up your language?*

BREMENT: Well, it's difficult. I've been learning languages wherever I've been for so long and they sort of drop away when they're not being used. But I would say that I certainly have day-to-day Chinese. I will always have that because I've raised three small children in a house where the servants spoke nothing but Chinese. So I'm still a pretty good man in a Chinese restaurant. But in terms of reading political editorials I'm not what I used to be.

**WILLIAM J. CUNNINGHAM**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1956-1957)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1957-1958)**

**Press Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1958-1962)**

**China Desk Officer**  
**Washington, DC (1962-1965)**

*William J. Cunningham was born in California in 1926. After serving in the Navy from 1944-1947, he received his Bachelor's degree from the University of New Mexico in 1948 and his Master's in 1950. He joined the Foreign Service in 1949 and his career has include positions in Prague, Paris, Tokyo, Taipei, Phnom Penh Saigon. Mr. Cunningham was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 17, 1997.*

*Q: Tell me about your duty in the active Navy.*

CUNNINGHAM: I was assigned in July of 1946 to the USS Incessant, AM-248, a steel hulled seagoing minesweeper. It was built on what was called a PCE hull, or patrol craft or escort. I reported to the ship at Terminal Island, California in July of 1946.

*Q: This was in San Francisco?*

CUNNINGHAM: No, it was in Long Beach Harbor adjacent to the Port of Long Beach. I reported to the ship and I was told that we were to take the ship to Shanghai and turn her over to the Chinese navy under the assistance program the U.S. had with the Nationalist Government of China at that time. The civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists was in suspense at that time. General Marshall was in the midst of his ultimately futile effort to mediate the conflict between them and to persuade them to form a coalition government. This ship had been captained on most of its previous voyages by a man who was described to me as an eccentric individual and who was no longer the commanding officer at the time I reported aboard. Just before relinquishing command of the *Incessant* he ordered the shipyard to remove all of the sweep gear, and all of the armament from this ship. When I boarded this ship it was essentially a nice yacht. It had no functional purpose whatsoever. We couldn't lay mines. We couldn't sweep mines. We couldn't shoot at anybody except with a couple of Garand rifles and side arms that we had on board.

Anyhow, I went on board this ship and we were to set sail a couple of weeks later for Hawaii with a crew of four officers and one third the number of ratings that was authorized for that kind of vessel. We had one quartermaster, one storekeeper, one engineer, etc., etc., all down the line. Off we went with a flotilla of three other vessels, the same class, the same type, except they were equipped for minesweeping. It took us two weeks to get to Pearl Harbor. We went through a terrible storm outside of the port of San Pedro in the California channel there. I was never so sick in my life. I had to stand watch and I was absolutely delirious. Somehow after a couple of days things calmed down, and I did too, and the rest of the trip went off all right.

I don't think people nowadays realize what bad shape the U.S. armed forces were in at that time. The shortage of qualified personnel in all ratings on our ship was just one example. An Essex class aircraft carrier was berthed just opposite the *Incessant* in Terminal Island. That carrier had a rust spot that went from water line to the top of the conning tower and spread over nearly the entire side of the ship. It was less than a year after Japan's surrender and the end of hostilities, but our ships could barely get underway and the U.S. did not have a single combat-ready division. The speed of demobilization had a disastrous effect on our combat readiness.

It took the *Incessant* two weeks to get to Hawaii. I think I was the first guy on the ship to sight land on that cruise. We went into Pearl Harbor and we were told that we were to sail for Shanghai in three days. I was the supply officer and before the last mooring line was made fast to the wharf I hit the dock running to find a warehouse from which to restock the ship. We were there a month, as it turned out, and at the end of that time we were told that we were not going to Shanghai though the other ship three ships in the group were. We were being sent to Bremerton, Washington to decommission the ship.

We left for Bremerton I guess some time in August or September in the company of two other ships. On the way up there one of the other ships - - the *Pirate* - - lost main power completely. They had a complete engine breakdown. We were three or four days out of Bremerton at that point on the high seas. Since the *Incessant* had a clear after deck, thanks to the removal in

Terminal Island of all sweep gear and armaments, we were designated to take the Pirate under tow on the high seas. Thank God it was a calm day. We had to get a thousand foot steel hawser across to the Pirate, which we did, although our crew of mainly first and second class seamen had no training for this sort of operation or experience with it. We started the operation about noon and just before sundown everything was secured. We made our way safely into Bremerton where we did decommission the ship in November of 1946. It took them a month or so to decommission the ship.

Finally toward the end of November, about Thanksgiving, I got orders to report to Tiburon, California to the Harbor Defense School where I went to learn how to manufacture anti-torpedo and anti-submarine nets and how to put them down. That training period lasted about three months. Again, there was a long hiatus from the end of the training period until onward assignment. It was very boring hanging around the BOQ and the officers club there. It was not far from San Francisco but we were not able to see it and it took a long time to get in there by bus, the only means of transportation available to us. I was finally assigned to the USS Cohoes, AN-78, a seagoing net tender. Two officers only were assigned to these ships, so I was the Executive Officer, barely 21 years of age.

I arrived in Seoul about a week before Thanksgiving and I remember the Thanksgiving edition of Stars and Stripes. The banner headline was "We Stand on the Yalu" and that was the point. That was the high tide of the U.N.-U.S. military campaign into North Korea. They had gotten all the way up to the Yalu River, the border between Korea and China, about that time. We stood there for about 24 hours and then the Chinese came in and the whole retreat began. As I said, I spent the first two weeks in this personnel office trying to get things set up to ship people into Korea and staff the embassy. After the retreat from the Yalu began, things turned around and I spent the rest of my time in Korea shipping people out as fast as I could.

I remember from that time, and it was quite a traumatic experience, seeing truckload after truckload of U.S. army trucks of soldiers coming through Seoul, right through an intersection about one block from the Embassy, headed south - - across the Han River. You have to understand that the ground freezes by the end of November in Korea. It is a cold place. These soldiers were standing up in open trucks being moved from the north of Seoul, through Seoul, and across the Han River. These poor fellows were dazed. Here was the great victorious American army and they did not know what had hit them with the Chinese coming into the war in the north. It was a very disturbing experience to see this happening.

*Q: For the Far East?*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, for the old Far East as we called it, the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, now the Bureau of East Asian Affairs. I worked there in some administrative capacity backing up the general services people in the area of Southeast Asia of which I had been familiar. We had an office in the old temporary buildings along 23<sup>rd</sup> Street. I was living somewhere up on Meridian Hill in a rooming house and sort of pondering what my future was going to be. I was getting ready to take the Foreign Service exam again.

One night November about 11:00 P.M. I was sound asleep and the phone rang. I answered it and

it was David Osborn who at that time was serving on the China desk. He said, "Bill?" I said, "Yes?" "How would you like to study Chinese?" I said, "David, I've always wanted to study Chinese. I've wanted to study Chinese for several years." I'd been putting that in on my preference report as the language I next wanted to learn. I had decided that when I was back in Hokkaido working for David in the early '50s. He said, "That's good because there was a meeting this afternoon to select the next class of Chinese language officers and I put your name in." That was the second class to be selected after the Foreign Service Institute reinstated its field language school and its own internal Chinese language program. Up until that time they had been sending people to universities to take Chinese language training. One class had gone through in 1955, and I was to be in the class of 1956. I said, "That's great." I hung up and went back to sleep.

The next morning I woke up and I thought, did I dream something? I called up Osborn and said, "Did you call me last night and tell me I was going to be studying Chinese?" He said, "Yes, I did. Have you changed your mind?" I said, "No, no, no, absolutely not. I definitely want to do it."

There is a little aphorism in Chinese about the great Taoist scholar, Zhuang Ci. Zhuang Ci falls asleep and has a dream that he's a butterfly. He is a beautiful butterfly and he flies all about, samples all the flowers, and so forth. It was an extremely realistic dream. Then he wakes up and from then on Zhuang Ci, the teacher, says I do not know whether I am a butterfly dreaming that I am Zhuang Ci or whether I am Zhuang Ci who dreamt that he was a butterfly. That was sort of the way that I feel about this conversation that I had with Osborn that late night.

*Q: Tell me, you had not taken the...*

CUNNINGHAM: I had not taken the Foreign Service exam. It is a mystery to me how as a staff officer, at that time I was an FSS-9, I was selected for Chinese language training. There were six of us in the class. There were four of us Foreign Service people, Dick Donald, Dick Nethercut, Jim Rousseau, and myself, plus Fred Fisher who was a USIA Foreign Service officer, and Bill Rhoads who I think was a CIA officer. I was Foreign Service staff. I must have taken the Foreign Service examination that fall but I don't think I had the results yet; this becomes important for the following year. In any case I began Chinese language training in January of 1956 as a Foreign Service staff officer, class nine. It was, I reckon, the influence of David Osborn who had become a mentor of mine by that time and whose work I very much admired and respected, that I got into that line of work and got that opportunity. I started studying Chinese and I did sort of all right.

That December something else very important happened. I attended a Christmas party late in December here in Washington that was given by three young women who were working at VOA at that time. A friend of mine who had been with me in Korea and Cambodia, Donald Riley in USIS, was invited and he said, "Why don't you come along?" I said, "I don't feel like it." He said, "Oh, come on, you'll enjoy it." So I went.

It was up in an apartment house on Connecticut Avenue. There was a very attractive young lady at that party whom I wanted to meet, and I did get to meet. Her name was Patricia Sloan. She

was on home leave from Florence where she was the assistant cultural officer. She had been staying with some people who worked at VOA where she had been employed before going overseas with USIS, and who were also invited to this party so she came along with them. We met at that party. I engaged her in conversation and invited her out to dinner afterwards. To make a long story short, we were married the following July, and we still are. She's here with me this week in Washington and we are going to our granddaughter's eighth grade graduation tonight.

Anyway, I went into Chinese language training in January of 1956 very deeply in love with Patricia Sloan, studying this hard language, distracted by this, and I was up for the oral boards in April of 1956. I had passed both the language and the written portion of the examination by that point and I think by then it had been reduced from a three-day to a one-day operation. I came up for the oral boards in April of that year and they started asking me all kinds of questions about American history, economics, economic analysis and so on. I wasn't prepared and I failed.

It was the worst experience of my life. Here I was, I had met the girl of my dreams, I was going to get married the following July, and I was in Chinese language training which is something I had always wanted to do. I had been in the Foreign Service seven years. I liked it and I wanted to continue in it and I failed this. I was absolutely crushed. I didn't know what I was going to do. I must say my wife, at that time my fiancée, could have said to me at that point, "Sorry, where you are is not where I hope to be." She could have gotten out of it at that point but she was very loyal and she did not desert me. She encouraged me.

After about a week of hearing me moaning and moping around she said, "You've got to get your act together. You've got to do this thing and do what it takes to get through." I went to see Max Krebs, the Executive Director of the Board of Examiners at that point, who was I guess on the Board of Examiners. He said to me, "Bill, we've got to have Foreign Service officers who know American history, who understand our economic system. If they are going to represent us abroad they are going to have to know those things, and you didn't do well. Everybody thought it was going to be a very easy interview so we are just as disappointed as you are. It's up to you. You've got to correct it." I said, "What do I do?" He said, "Night school. Take a course in economics at American University or GW." I said, "But I'm getting married in July." He said, "If you want to be a Foreign Service officer, you've got to do it. There are some books you should read, too. Henry Steele Commager."

: *American Civilization I think.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, right. "So get to work." I went back to FSI and told Howard Sollenberger what had happened and what I would have to do. I got Commager's book. I found a night course in macroeconomics at American U. We completed our wedding plans. The other five who were in the language course were sent on to Taiwan in June. There would only be six months training and that would be the end of it. Another class was not to begin until the following January. I was kept in FSI and there I think I am grateful to Howard Sollenberger who saw some potential. Howard even arranged for my fiancée, later my bride, to have some limited Chinese instruction during her lunch hour. She worked in the old Walker Johnson Building on New York Avenue. The FSI in those days was located in the three little apartment buildings at the corner of 21<sup>st</sup> and C Streets, NW.

I was doing all right in the language by that time. I was doing all right in the language by that time. As a matter of fact I was one of the best students in the class. Maybe not the best but they liked my work and they saw potential. They saw that I could make it. Sollenberger arranged for me to continue to study one-on-one with a Chinese tutor there in FSI while I got my status worked out.

At this time also the Wristonization program was going on and somebody said it me, "Apply for Wristonization. You are eligible." I thought I would really like to be a thorough Foreign Service officer and do it the way everybody else has, but I'll do that to have a holding spot. I put in my application for Wristonization. I got married.

I came up for the oral board for the Wriston exercise in about September of 1956. By this time I was married, I had completed the summer night course at GW, I continued my Chinese language studies, and I had been reading American history. They put me through an oral examination the likes of which I had never had before or since. It seems to me there was a board of three or four of them, and it was over in the old Walker Johnson Building, a Marine Corps building at one point in its history, on New York Avenue where USIA was headquartered. By the time that interview was over, my head was spinning. I felt like I had been put through the third degree. I think even the lighting effects in the room were almost like that. It went on, and on, and on. It felt like it was three hours that I was in there, and they asked me everything.

*Q: Do you recall some of the questions?*

CUNNINGHAM: They asked me about American history, the economy, and the acquisition of the Florida territory. I guess they asked me about what I had been doing in the Foreign Service, my career experiences in Asia, and all sorts of other things. I guess they were testing my powers of analysis as well as my general knowledge. It was rigorous and by the time I got out of there, I had the worst headache I ever had and I almost didn't care whether I passed or failed because I was so washed out by the experience.

Then I heard nothing. Weeks went by and I continued to study Chinese. We were settling into our marriage and going through all that adjustment. My wife continued to work at USIA in the exhibits division. We worried about this thing and finally come November, I still hadn't heard anything so I went to see Randolph Kidder who was in some position in the Department at that point. I had known Kidder in Indochina. He had been in Saigon as first political counselor, and then as DCM when McClintock was sent to Cambodia.

Kidder was in some part of this Wristonization process so I said to him, "Here is my situation. This has been dragging on. I don't know what is going to happen. I don't know where my career is going but whichever it is, either in or our, I would just as soon know as soon as possible. If it's out, I have to make other plans. I am resigned to that if necessary." He said, "Well this is supposed to be a merit process and it is not supposed to be subject to any kind of personal intervention." I said, "Can you find out what's going on and what the time line is on this thing?" He said, "Well, let me see." About a week later on a Saturday morning I received a phone call at home. He was calling me from home and he said, "This conversation is not supposed to take

place but don't worry about your status; you will be Okay." And that is all he would tell me, so I said, okay, and I thanked him. That was typical of Kidder. He was considerate of the staff people, the younger ones who were coming up. I don't mean that he was an easy mark, or that he held us to a lesser standard. But he did look out for his people, as any good leader or supervisor should.

A few weeks later I received transfer orders to go to the language school in Taiwan and join my class. I was still a Foreign Service Staff then; that had not changed. After I arrived in Taiwan in January of 1957 and reported in to language school, official word finally came through that my appointment as a Foreign Service officer had been approved. Then I had to have the oath administered so that my pay status could be changed. Nicholas Bodman, the Director of the Language School, apparently was not authorized to administer the oath. Paul Popple, with whom I had served in Saigon and who had been a good friend there, was the senior officer among the language students, so I asked that he be designated to administer the oath, which he did between classes on a gloomy, chilly January morning in the little front office of the language school. The surroundings were, if anything, less pretentious than those in which Marvin Will had first administered the oath to me in that old temporary building in September 1949. There was no ceremony. I went back to class right afterwards. It was very much in contrast to my first commissioning ceremony in the Navy at Albuquerque ten and a half years previously. After almost seven and a half years and many attempts, I was finally a Foreign Service Officer.

I also - and this is very important to me - during this interlude I took the Foreign Service written examination one more time. It came along again in December and was administered at Georgetown University. I took the exam because I didn't know how this process was going to turn out. Even if it turned out okay I still wanted to say I passed the Foreign Service examination all the way through. I took the written exam - by then only a one-day affair - in December 1956, and I did pass it. By then it was not necessary to have a language qualification to be appointed an FSO, but I had met the qualification in French and was training in Chinese, I had been through a rigorous oral board, and through a written examination, which I passed at least three times. I figured that I had covered all the bases, at least to my satisfaction. I had made the record that I was qualified to be a Foreign Service officer.

*Q: You were where in Taiwan?*

CUNNINGHAM: Taichung.

*Q: You were there from '57 to when?*

CUNNINGHAM: I was there from January of 1957 until the end of July 1958. The language training program at that time was somewhat longer than it is now. In those days we took six months initially in the U.S. and two more years at the field school in Taichung.

*Q: Could you tell me a little bit about your impression in how the school worked then?*

CUNNINGHAM: The headmaster was Nicholas Bodman who was a Ph.D. in linguistics from Cornell, as I recall. He was a specialist on languages of south China, but he also knew Mandarin.

It was a very good program. Bodman was a very strict scholar. He was not a career Foreign Service officer. FSI hired scholars to run the school in those days. It was pretty rigorous training. I think the school operated well, and operated effectively.

We used standard texts that were produced by Yale University, and there were more materials that were produced by the faculty there. The teachers were all young Chinese who were university graduates for the most part or were university people in the sense that they had university education though they may not have been able to complete it. They were all from north China because that was the approved standard for the Chinese language, the official language.

We attended class in groups of three and four for four hours a day, and these were usually in the verbal language. Later on we also had some courses in learning to read Chinese characters; we had been studying that in Washington as well. I guess we all had a command of somewhere on the order of 300-500 characters by the time that I got to Taiwan. I was able to catch up with my class relatively quickly. I was a little bit stronger on some points, and a little bit weaker on others. They were there and of course they had more exposure to the spoken language than I had in Washington. I had a little bit more exposure to the written language than they had by that point, but I was not out of sync with them. We had two hours of one-on-one tutorials. We also were expected to do about four hours of homework every evening.

We were also expected to do some reading on the area, on China. There were certain books that were recommended but there was no standard requirement, which I think, was probably a mistake. There should have been certain core books that we all had to read. We were given a choice among a wide array of books to read. There weren't so many books on China in those days. The literature is vast, enormous now, by comparison.

We had speakers come in. Bodman used to arrange for speakers to come in, people from the embassy to brief us from time to time, or other travelers from Washington who might be coming through, or people from Hong Kong, and sometimes local people would come in. I don't recall that any of those were in Chinese. Occasionally we would have a field trip, about three or four a year, to go out and visit villages or some locality and get exposed a little bit to Chinese life and institutions.

It was a very enjoyable experience. We were not part of the embassy. We were not a functioning diplomatic post. We were a school and we didn't have responsibilities that took us away from our studies. It was a comfortable and enjoyable life.

*Q: In all of this language training one of the big things is learning from your teachers about the culture and all of that. Were you getting any feel for the Nationalist, the KMT regime in Taiwan, and then what was happening in China itself?*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes. Well so far as the culture is concerned, the language text incorporated a lot of cultural material into it like behavior and how to conduct yourself in dealing with people. We did study political questions when we got more advanced. When we got to the point where we could read Chinese newspapers they became part of our daily text so we picked up a lot of

contemporary political information from that, and we had periodic briefings at the embassy.

First of all it was illegal in Taiwan at that time for anyone to be in possession of anything that was printed or published on the mainland. One of the big questions was how were we going to learn simplified characters and the literary style of mainland publications if we couldn't study them? The school by the time that I arrived there had worked out an arrangement with the local authorities that made it all right for our instructors to use *People's Daily* in the school as a textual material but it could not leave the premises.

The teachers for the most part were pretty interested in what was published in *People's Daily* and they weren't necessarily accepting of it. They all had their own bitter experiences at the hands of the communists, but they hadn't always had good experiences at the hands of the Nationalists and they had their reservations and objections. These were intellectuals, well informed people, well educated people, so they had their criticisms of the KMT and its policies particularly in China, but also some of the things that it was doing in Taiwan. That didn't mean that they were pro-Communist, but they credited some of the critiques of the communists with being accurate and on point when it came to the Nationalists.

In class you could get them to talk a little bit about this, some more than others, but everybody was very cautious about it. Not only that, there were some among the faculty who were considered to be pro-KMT, though not necessarily agents of the regime. That meant that some faculty would not discuss certain matters in the presence of other faculty and it had to be understood among us that we should not attribute things, certain comments, to certain members of the faculty when talking with other members of the faculty. You had to be somewhat circumspect. This was kind of a constant undertone in the school.

I remember one time later on when I became the Director of the Language School, Yeh Kung-chao (aka George Yeh), who had been foreign minister and then was the ROC ambassador to Washington, was home on a visit and he came to the school. We were showing him around. Edgar Snow had recently been to Beijing and had interviewed Chou En-lai.

*Q: He had been a left wing correspondent in Britain.*

CUNNINGHAM: No, Snow was an American citizen, a native, I believe of Kansas City. He was the author of *Red Star Over China* and others. He had been a correspondent in China for the *Saturday Evening Post* in the 1930s and had very close ties to the PRC regime and the Chinese communists, dating from the days that he had known them as revolutionaries. He was a well-known authority on conditions in China at that time but with a particular point of view. In any case, he was considered a leftist in American circles as well as in international circles.

Anyway, Snow, on one of his visits to mainland China, had a long interview with Chou En-lai, which had been published in *Life* magazine. One of our jobs at the Language School was to train interpreters for the Warsaw talks, which were going on at that time. This is a later period in 1961 to 1962 but it is germane to the point we were discussing. At that point I was Director of the language school so I instructed the two teachers, who were preparing our interpreters, to take this article and to translate it into Chinese in order to get the flavor of how the PRC would discuss

relations with America and the kind of line they would take, so the teachers had done that. They then developed a simulated dialogue between Snow and Chou that would be used in the special interpreter training course that we were developing.

I was taking George Yeh around the school, and we came to the classroom where this text they was in use. I explained to Yeh what was going on. This caused a pall in the classroom for a moment there and then Yeh said something like, "That's very interesting. You can certainly get their line in that way." He was a sophisticated enough man to understand what we were doing. But his hesitation, and the hint of discomfort in his expression, was emblematic of the constant undertone of tension in the school about issues involving U.S.- PRC relations.

*Q: When you were sitting around having a beer with your fellow students and all, what was the feeling at that point about eventual relations and all with communist China and all?*

CUNNINGHAM: We expected in those days that they would come about fairly soon. As I say, I was in the second group to go into language training. The FSI was taking in roughly six officers a year into language training on the assumption that relations with the PRC would be reestablished soon one way or another, and I'll come back to that in a minute. We had 14 or 15 consulates in China prior to the Communist take over and all of us in training assumed all of these posts were going to be reopened so the U.S. would need a lot of Chinese language officers. We thought there was a sky-is-the-limit sort of opportunity for us.

This was 1956-1957. The Korean War had ended in an armistice in '53. The war in Vietnam had ended in an armistice in 1954. The Warsaw talks had begun soon after that in 1956 or 1957, and they were regarded as an avenue towards the resumption of relations with the PRC. The thought was that we were moving closer to this.

It was very clear by then that the United States was not going to back an invasion of the mainland by Chiang Kai-shek. That was not fully accepted by the Nationalist Chinese establishment at that time. It did not become fully accepted until after the Quemoy bombardment in 1958. There was also a feeling that the Nationalist regime on Taiwan was not really fully established; it was kind of in a precarious situation and it might not last, and Taiwan might very well be absorbed into the PRC in some fashion. It is not that the United States was supporting that by any means, in fact quite the contrary, but no one in the mid 1950s expected that the Republic of China would still be around in the 1990s. You couldn't get anybody to take a bet on that at all. Taiwan in those days was an agrarian economy with a very limited industrial base. The standard of living was very low. It was a poor area. People did have enough to eat and they had reasonably good housing, shelter and clothing, but this was a backward area. No one in those days had the vision of what Taiwan has become today.

We were preparing in the expectation that within our careers we would be serving in the People's Republic of China. It was not until two things occurred, principally the great leap forward and the hard-line campaigns that began to come out in the PRC at that time, and the escalation of hostilities in Vietnam – and this was after we were out of training and into regular diplomatic work – that it became pretty clear that it was going to be a long time until any relationship with China was restored. In those days we sort of expected that we were going to be serving

someplace in China in our careers and that it would be within a few years.

*Q: I take it that as far as the officers were concerned who were taking this, there was sort of - maybe it is wrong to characterize it - a certain distance between the new Chinese language officers who were coming out and the Nationalist government. Yes here it is but this is not necessarily something that you want to embrace whole-heartedly.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, that is a very good point. Most people finishing their language training had wanted to be assigned to Hong Kong, or one of the other watching posts that we had.

*Q: Burma, Indonesia.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, something like that. It was not the first desire or preference of anybody in the embassy at that time to be assigned to the American embassy in Taipei. The Chinese language officers in the embassy in Taipei when I arrived in Taichung had gotten their Chinese earlier on. Bill Gleysteen, the consul general, was one of them. He may have taken a little bit in this program but that was just brush-up. I think Bill Thomas might have been there in the economic section but I'm not sure of that. Paul Miller, Sandy Peaslee, Carl Nelson, there were very few people in the embassy in Taipei who were products of the Foreign Service Institute's Chinese language program at that time.

By the time that I finished I wanted to go to the embassy in Taipei. The reason that I wanted to go there was that I felt the opportunity to further improve the language would be greater there than it would be in going to Hong Kong, which was the major other alternate preference of most of the people. Most of the other people in the class wanted to be assigned to Hong Kong because then they would be getting into PRC affairs. They would be watching China, and they would further improve their knowledge of what was going on in the PRC. The main interest on the part of the group was in the PRC; it was not in the Nationalists, not in Taiwan. They weren't interested in that situation.

*Q: When you got out in July of '58, what happened?*

CUNNINGHAM: I was sent to the American embassy in Taipei and put in charge of press translations in the embassy there. Once again, I was serving under David Osborn, my mentor from my assignment in Hokkaido eight years previously. Osborn was the Political Counselor, and I was Second Secretary of Embassy. I was also to be responsible for reporting on domestic politics in Taiwan. Ten days after I arrived, the bombardment of Quemoy broke out. By this time Everett Drumright had been assigned to Taipei as the American ambassador. The American embassy had been attacked by a mob the previous year and sacked. Karl Rankin, who had been chargé for a long time, had been named ambassador, left in some disgrace as a result of this, and Drumright was brought in.

Drumright's influence was very important in that embassy in two or three ways. First of all, he was regarded as a strong supporter of the Nationalists and he had had that identity all the way through his career. I think there were two other important contributions that Drumright made to the operations of the embassy. One of them was that as soon as he got there he said, "I want as

many Chinese language officers in the embassy as we can possibly have.” He wanted every substantive position filled by a Chinese language officer. There were six at the time that I reported in August of 1958. As I recall, they were David Osborn, the Political Counselor (he knew Chinese well, but was not as fluent in it as in Japanese) the First Secretary in the Political Section Alexander C. (Sandy) Peaslee, Carl Nelson, Norman Getsinger in the Commercial Section, and two others, whom I do not now recall. By the time I left there were 13. Drumright was absolutely right about having the number of language officers he demanded. It made a significant difference in the way that the Embassy worked, in the conversations that went on among us, in the way that we worked among ourselves, in the way that we exchanged views and perceptions of issues and personalities in Taiwan, and in our perceptions of what was happening in China. By the time Drumright had been there a couple of years it became commonplace for us to work in terms of the Chinese language in discussing what was going on in Taiwan. The communication among us, and the way in which our analyses developed, were very much improved as a result of that. So was our rapport with the Chinese community, with the government, with officialdom, and everybody else with whom we worked. All of that was much stronger as a result of Drumright’s emphasis on language capability. He set a high standard in that regard.

He did another thing that strengthened our relations with the government and the Chinese community. There were frequent automobile accidents in Taiwan involving usually American official vehicles, but sometimes vehicles driven by private Americans, where somebody would get injured. It was a very crowded city. The traffic situation was very bad in Taiwan at that time. There was a lot of mixed traffic with ox carts, bicycles, cyclopedes, trucks, and automobiles. There was very little regulation. People would get injured. They would be hospitalized. There would immediately be an outcry against the Americans that somebody had been irresponsible. They were very sensitive about this. The viewpoint of the Chinese was, you have this enormously powerful machine at your command and you should be able to make it behave. You have so much power you should be able to control that power and not allow accidents to happen. In Chinese mentality the accident is always the fault of the more powerful figure. It is not the result of your conduct; it is the result of who has the greater power advantage.

This was a very sore point in our relationship with the Chinese community there. Soon after Drumright arrived he said, “We are going to do two things. First of all whenever somebody is injured by an American vehicle of any type, an official vehicle of any kind or anybody in the American official family driving, we are going to immediately visit that person in the hospital and offer condolences. This is not an admission of guilt, we are just going to say we are sorry that this happened and show our compassion in that way. Second, we are going to make an ex-gratia payment. That is to say it is sort of like *noblesse oblige* in our system. It doesn’t represent admission of guilt or responsibility, but it recognizes that someone has been injured and that we want to show our compassion in that way.”

He arranged for a fund to be set up which was financed by liquor sales through the commissary so that there was in effect a kind of surcharge that came off of this. That went into a fund, which was then used for the purpose of these ex-gratia payments. It was a set-aside, you might say.

He became known for that and often times when such incidents did take place the newspapers

would publish a picture of the representative of the ambassador and whatever organization it was that was involved in the accident, calling on the person in the hospital, presenting flowers, and making an expression of condolences. I think in a few instances Drumright made some of those visits himself. That did a great deal to promote good relations with the community as a whole in Taiwan. I think Drumright deserves a lot of credit for all of that.

These were things that Drumright instituted because he realized that the Chinese should not perceive us as a kind of imperial authority or colonial authority. He felt that some of the things that had gone on prior to that had given that perception.

*Q: Extraterritorial privileges.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, the extraterritorial privileges and all of that. He wanted to erase that kind of stigma, or at least blemish, or at least counteract that to the extent that he could. He was very insistent on that kind of an approach toward the Chinese.

*Q: Was this also to diffuse the riot that had sacked the embassy?*

CUNNINGHAM: Oh yes, definitely.

*Q: Could you explain how that came about and if it had any reflection down at the school?*

CUNNINGHAM: This is pretty sketchy because I was not involved in this; I was at the language school at the time. What happened was that one evening an American sergeant who was in the provost marshal's office in the American military advisory group in Taipei, shot and killed a Chinese whom he accused of being a peeping tom who had been peeping in the window at the sergeant's wife in their quarters. He went out, shot this man, and killed him. It turned out that the man who was shot was a member of the intelligence service of the Taiwan Garrison Command, the supreme military authority at that time, which was under the direction of Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of the President, Chiang Kai-shek. The Nationalists had declared martial law when they moved their capital to Taipei in December 1950. Their rationale was that China, including Taiwan, was in a state of civil war, warranting suspension of civil rights.

The sergeant was subjected to a court martial by a U.S. military court in Taipei. There was a great outcry that he should have been tried in a Chinese civil court, but under the US – ROC status of forces agreement that could be done only if the U.S. waived jurisdiction. The U.S. would not waive jurisdiction and therefore this man would be tried in an American military court and subjected to a court martial. He was not convicted of homicide. The trial was witnessed of course by members of the man's family and others. There was a very strong feeling in the Chinese community that he was guilty and should be convicted of homicide.

As soon as the verdict had been handed down U.S. military aircraft evacuated the sergeant from Taiwan immediately, I think within hours of the verdict. That effectively removed him from any possibility of being subjected to a judicial process under the Chinese system. There was resentment about this and the next day a crowd gathered outside of the American embassy compound protesting this action as unjust on the part of the United States and accusing the

Americans of all kinds of bad deeds.

The protest was very interesting because it was about six months after we arrived in Taiwan and the students at the language school were scheduled to make a field trip to Hong Kong. We had all traveled to Taipei and had been in hotels the night before when all this build up was going on. I think it was the night of the day the trial took place and the sergeant was evacuated from Taiwan. There were an awful lot of people in the streets the following morning as we were going to the airport to get on the plane.

In order to make the field trip, I had driven up to Taipei with my wife in my 1956 Plymouth Coupe purchased through the American Foreign Service Association's diplomatic purchasing program. We had arranged with a chauffeur from the American embassy to drive us in my car to the airport so we could board the plane, then he was going to drive it back to the embassy and put it in the compound for safe keeping. Well he did. He got it back to the compound, and drove it in the gates about 15 minutes before the mob came over the wall. It was safely inside the American compound. It got beat up a little bit in the ensuing disturbances but it was not burned or basically damaged. I did receive damages from the Nationalist government and bought a replacement automobile as a result of that.

Anyway, the mob came over the wall and they sacked the American embassy, in effect. They didn't burn it but they smashed it up very badly. The thing that was particularly symbolic was that the ambassador's limousine was parked in the port-cochère. The car was moved out, turned upside down, and a three-way combination safe was pushed out of an upstairs window and dropped onto the overturned ambassador's limousine. I think this was a definite symbolic act on the part of the people who had taken over the embassy. Embassy order was restored and the people were evicted from the compound. Americans have always been told that hooligans committed this sort of thing.

Of course by this time all of us from the language school were in Hong Kong, and the next morning we were reading in the newspapers that the American embassy in Taipei had been sacked immediately after our departure. Everybody in the consulate general wanted to know what in the world was going on, and what this signified for the relationship between the United States and the Republic of China, and the PRC as well. That is sort of a thumbnail sketch of the story.

*Q: What was the general belief? That this was done with the tolerance of the Nationalist government?*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, the general belief was that nothing like that would happen in Taiwan unless the government was willing to allow it to take place. Now the government may not have intended that it go as far as it did. They might have intended for it to be a protest demonstration that would not get out of hand. It may have gotten out of hand and gone somewhat farther than they intended. You have to understand that emotions were running very high over this. This man who had been murdered had been a member of the intelligence service and there were a lot of people who felt strongly about his death and about the way the whole affair had been conducted. As to the merits of the case and as to whether the sergeant should have been convicted or not, I

can't really comment because I don't have a clear enough recollection of it.

*Q: Just one question before we finish this language school time. Were there any sort of half-life lingering problems about being a China hand from the McCarthy times by the time you came in or was that pretty well over?*

CUNNINGHAM: I think there still are, frankly, in a manner of speaking. Everybody in my time who specialized in Chinese was conscious of what happened to those people. I don't think very many of us knew them personally though some of us had the opportunity to get to know some of them later on. I think that there was the unspoken feeling that there was a line that you had to be very careful about, particularly in the 1950s, in dealing with Chinese affairs, in dealing with the PRC.

I remember very well that this was the period of the so-called three Walters: Walter Robertson, the Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs in the Eisenhower Administration; Walter McConaughy, the Director of Chinese Affairs after Edwin Martin, and Walter Judd, former American medical missionary in China, a close friend of the Chiang family, and then U.S. Representative from Minnesota in the Congress. All three of them had very strong views about the People's Republic of China, the Chinese communists, so one wrote and analyzed in consciousness of what their attitude was. That doesn't necessarily mean that you slanted the reports, but what I think it means is that if you are going to recommend a particular line of action or a particular policy, you had to work very hard to have the documentation, the support, and the argument for it lined up. Drumright was regarded as being sympathetic or congenial toward, or receptive to, compatible with, the thinking typified by the "Three Walters". We felt that probably the United States did not challenge or question the basis of ROC policy and the kind of line the ROC wanted us to take.

*Q: ROC being?*

CUNNINGHAM: The Republic of China, the Chinese Nationalists of Chiang Kai-shek. They didn't want to challenge that as objectively as we might have, had this whole period been absent from the relationship.

*Q: There was a very strong China lobby too, particularly in Congress with Senator Noland of California, Walter Judd of Minnesota, and others. Walter Judd was from a missionary background.*

CUNNINGHAM: Medical missionary, yes. I met Walter Judd in Saigon during the time that I was there. Walter Judd knows China and knows the Chinese people, there is no question about that, but he had a particular point of view. I guess that is it; we were conscious of the point of view in doing our work and in doing our reporting and analysis.

You mentioned the China lobby. The China lobby was very strong, very influential. You had to reckon with it also. That is to say you had to be conscious of the atmosphere in which your reports and analyses were going to be read in Washington and that in the background were the lingering influences of the 1940s China lobby. In fact also in the background was the continuing

influence of the successor to the 1940s China lobby, and that China lobby still operates today. In fact we've got at least two China lobbies that are operating in the United States, not as an organized entity, but as a body of opinion. That has an influence upon the thinking, or at least attempts to influence the thinking, of the United States government and the American people with regard to China.

*Q: I might just add a footnote. In a way it is similar to the one other one, which would be dealing with Israel. It is the same sort of understanding about the atmosphere in which you are dealing, a highly political, a highly charged atmosphere that one has to understand.*

CUNNINGHAM: That's right, politically charged, and sensitive, and you have to be conscious of that, absolutely.

*Q: It only is interesting in developments later on, was there much contact between the embassy during this time that you were with the embassy in Taiwan, and the Taiwanese?*

CUNNINGHAM: I was the first Taiwanese language officer in the embassy. The last four months that I was in Taichung in the language school, I asked to spend half my time studying Taiwanese because I knew by then what job I would be going into. The last month that I was there I lived in Lu Kang, one of the first villages settled by people coming across from the mainland in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The Taiwanese that was spoken was considered as the authentic version of the language. My Taiwanese was never as good as my Mandarin. I continued my Taiwanese studies in the embassy and had a tutor, as a matter of fact.

I got to know many of the leading Taiwanese opposition figures very well. I was the only embassy officer that ever was in contact with some of them. These were senior people who had also fought Japanese rule in some instances, though not all were in that category. But they were all united in their opposition to the undemocratic rule of the ROC in Taiwan. Again that was the sort of thing my KMT Chinese contacts often questioned me about, this work that I was doing. At one point I had to be somewhat circumspect about this because the intelligence services of the KMT were constantly feeding stuff back to the embassy saying, "Cunningham was seeing certain people and we wonder what is going on? Does this represent a decision by the United States to support the Taiwan independence movement, Thomas Liao and other people overseas who were Taiwanese Nationalists?"

Yes, that was a sensitive area but it is to Drumright's credit that he did not tell me to not have contact with these people. I think that Osborn, who on an earlier tour to Taiwan developed some of these contacts and was conscious of their views, felt that it was important to know these people and to at least allow them to be in contact with the U.S. government and feel that they were getting their point of view across. I think that he persuaded Drumright to allow that, but at the same time the word would come back to me that this kind of report had been coming into the embassy and that they were wondering what was up and maybe I should back off a little bit for a while.

As an example, there was one time when Lindsey Grant, an economic officer in the embassy and a Chinese language officer for whom I worked later on, and a couple of other fellows from the

embassy and I, took a cross-island hike on what was known as the power line trail; it followed the Taiwan Power Company's east-west transmission line across the island. The mountains are very high. You got up to 10,000 feet. Lindsey is a great hiker and so he said, "We've been talking about doing this," so we finally took the power line trail hike across the island.

After this hike when we got back, the report got back to the embassy that Cunningham had been up in the mountains and he had been talking to people up there so he must also know how to speak mountain languages. Mountain languages are the aboriginal languages of the Melanesian people who had migrated to Taiwan even before the Chinese had arrived in the 15<sup>th</sup> century. It was that kind of fantastic thing that was coming back to them. I was regarded as a questionable character in that respect by the KMT authorities.

*Q: Just to finish up this part, and then we will wrap this up for this session, you started in '58 going to our embassy in Taipei?*

CUNNINGHAM: I was assigned to the embassy in August of 1958. I was put in charge of press translations. My job was to produce a consolidated press translation comparable to the summary of the China mainland press produced by the Consulate General in Hong Kong in those days. I did that and I ran it for about three years. In 1961 I was sent back to Taichung as Director of the Language School. That came about because the then Director, Howard Levy, who also knew Japanese, was transferred by the Foreign Service Institute on an emergency basis to Yokohama to take over FSI's Japanese language school there. There was a sudden, unexpected vacancy there. I went for one year as Director of the language school to fill in until FSI could get a professional scholar to come out and run it.

*Q: We'll pick it up the next time at that point. What are some of the subjects that we might pick up next time about Taipei?*

CUNNINGHAM: One of them is the change or the affirmation of the policies of the KMT with regard to return to the mainland in the wake of the Quemoy bombardment. Also Secretary Dulles' visit in the fall of 1958, including what happened at the state dinner for Dulles. That was one of his last overseas trips by the way. We should also cover the China Democratic Party and its rise and what happened in opposition politics during those three years when I was covering that. The establishment of what was involved in setting up the daily press translation service in the American embassy from 1958-59. The visits of Eisenhower and Lyndon Johnson, both of which occurred during this period of time. One of them happened after I had gone to Taichung and I came back to work on it. Those were some of the things that I can think of now. Also, the whole business of Taiwan's economy taking off during this period and the decisions in regard to the economic development of Taiwan during that period, and the encouragement of a consumer economy in Taiwan by the U.S. government and USAID.

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*Q: Today is the 22<sup>nd</sup> of March 1999. This interview is taking place in Houston Texas. Bill, before we move on to the taking over of the Chinese training in 1961, you had some remarks you wanted to make prior to that about things that had happened.*

CUNNINGHAM: If I can remember them in order. The first was the affirmation of the return to the mainland policy of Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT in the wake of the Quemoy bombardment. I think I may have said previously that I arrived at the American embassy in Taipei on transfer from Taichung, which is only 100 miles away, about ten days before the outbreak of the bombardment of Quemoy on August 24, 1958. The date sticks in my mind; it is unforgettable.

The bombardment of Quemoy caused great alarm at the time particularly because it was not clear whether the PRC was attempting to reduce the fortress of Quemoy preparatory to conducting an amphibious operation against the islands, particularly against Quemoy, which is right in the mouth of the harbor of Amoy and effectively blockades it. It is only about a mile and a half offshore. That whole question of whether an actual invasion was going to take place; the issue of whether or not under the treaty of mutual defense that the United States had with the Republic of China on Taiwan at the time, was applicable to Quemoy or not; and the obligations of the United States to its ally, the Republic of China, under those circumstances; all of those things were very much at issue.

Of course it is important for people to understand historically that every incident that occurred in the Cold War, particularly any incident involving the use of armed force, was automatically regarded as a litmus test of the reliability of the United States as a supporter of its allies all around the world in all of these mutual defense treaties that we had concluded from Europe to Japan and Korea by that time. What we did in the Taiwan Straits inevitably would be looked upon by every other ally of the United States as a test of the reliability of the United States under any kind of armed attack. Nowadays in 1999, the eve of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, it is very hard for people to understand the atmosphere of that time, so it is important to put that in context.

*Q: What was our analysis at the time out of our embassy on Taiwan about what was the intention of the People's Republic of China?*

CUNNINGHAM: Actually what we were concentrating on more was what would the Republic of China do in response to it? It was this kind of situation where in the technical sense, in terms of international relations, the legitimacy of the Republic of China was under attack by the PRC. The position of the Republic of China's government, Chiang Kai-shek's government, the Nationalists at that time, was that China was in a state of uncompleted civil war and the PRC regime in the legal sense, in the juridical sense, was a rebel rump organization that was attempting to overthrow the legally established constitutional government of the Republic of China. Therefore the Republic of China had the obligation in defense of its national sovereignty and constitutionality to suppress this rebellion. That was the official position. So long as there were no on-going hostilities between the two sides that was simply a formal position without an actual policy of implementation, you might say.

Not only that, the U.S. Seventh Fleet was "patrolling" the Taiwan Strait. Initially it had been sent there to prevent the outbreak of hostilities initiated by either side back at the time of the Korean War. The situation had changed by 1958. By 1958 the treaty of mutual defense between the United States and Taiwan had replaced the earlier order to the Seventh Fleet of President Truman. In effect the Seventh Fleet was acting more as an ally in defense of Taiwan's territorial

integrity and immunity from attack than it was as a buffer. Its mission was no longer as it had been at the outset to prevent the Nationalists from initiating an attack on the mainland so much as it was to protect Taiwan from an attack by the PRC against Taiwan.

*Q: Who was the ambassador at that time?*

CUNNINGHAM: The ambassador at that time was Everett Drumright. Drumright had arrived the previous May having previously been consul general in Hong Kong.

*Q: An old China hand.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, an old China hand from the 1930s, trained in the language school in Beijing. Interestingly enough Drumright was in China at the embassy in Chungking during the Second World War in the 1940s when Clarence Gauss was the ambassador there and when John Stewart Service, John Carter Vincent, John Paton Davies, Jr., and all of the other famous China hands were serving there. During part of that time the Dixie mission was sent from Chungking to Yen-an. It included John Stewart Service and I think Raymond Ludden and David "the dog" Barrett the military attaché, a very colorful guy, and I think John Carter Vincent though I'm not sure. During this same period they were in Yen-an, the wartime headquarters of the Communist Chinese Party, in the winter of 1944-45, Drumright was in Sian at the U.S. Consulate there, perhaps as principal officer. Sian is not far from Yen-an; both are in Shaanxi province.

In fact many years later - - in 1980 - - when I visited Sian I happened to go to a restaurant for dinner with a senior Communist Party provincial official, and he said, "This is the restaurant that Chou En-lai used to like to come to when he wanted to get out of Yen-an and come down to town."

But Sian at that time was under Nationalist control. It was the Nationalist outpost for watching what was going on in the communist headquarters in Yen-an less than 100 miles away. Drumright's formation in Chinese affairs during the winter of 1944-45 while the Dixie mission was in Yen-an was very much under the influence of the Nationalists. So it was the Chungking and Sian experiences and relationships developed at that time, as well as the policy positions in the late 1940s with which Drumright, then in the Department, was associated that made him very much a welcomed figure when he arrived in 1958 in Taipei from Hong Kong.

*Q: During this '58 to '60 period, were the expectations that the Nationalists would try to do anything, launch any attack, or was that pretty well over?*

CUNNINGHAM: That was the key question in August of 1958 when the attack began. There were people in the leadership of the Kuomintang who saw this attack upon Quemoy as a military provocation that would justify military action by the Nationalists against the China mainland. In other words, here was an opportunity that would provide them the political cover necessary to actually implement the campaign for recovery of the mainland that the Generalissimo said was his obligation and constitutional mission. In the embassy in Taipei at the time, we were very much concerned as to whether the Nationalists were really going to try to do this.

One of the first things that happened was additional units of the U.S. military were moved to Taiwan soon after the attack began. We beefed up our units there from about 10,000 men to about 13,000. We moved some combat air force units from Clark Air Force Base into air bases on Taiwan. That was intended as a warning to the communists, the PRC, not to try to attack Taiwan.

There is something that is very important to understand here historically. The treaty of mutual defense concluded in 1953 between the United States and Taiwan covered only Taiwan and the Pescadores. The Pescadores are about one-third the way across the Taiwan Strait to the mainland, and juridically are part of Taiwan. China had ceded them to Japan in 1895 along with Taiwan itself. The mutual defense treaty did not cover the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Those were the responsibility of the Nationalists and the Republic of China.

The other interesting thing about it is that under the doctrine of the United States at the time the juridical status of Taiwan and the Pescadores were “undetermined.” This came from John Foster Dulles, the great international lawyer. There was absolutely no question about the juridical status of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu; they are juridically Chinese territory and everybody recognizes that. They are not part of the province of Taiwan. Quemoy and Matsu are part of the provinces of Fujian and Zhejiang on the mainland. The treaty of mutual defense did not cover Quemoy and Matsu. Militarily they were the responsibility of the Republic of China.

Also, if the PRC were to take those two islands militarily, in a symbolic sense they would have removed from territory that, as part of the mainland provinces, was indisputably Chinese. That would not of itself have destroyed the Nationalist, or ROC, government, but would have left it in control only of territory which both claimed, but which had not been retroceded to either Beijing or Taipei by the San Francisco and related Peace treaties. In a conceptual sense separate status for Taiwan, including the Pescadores, would have gained some moral legitimacy. You can see how that line of argument could have developed. This kind of symbolic issue was part of the mix at the time.

Our job in the American embassy was on the one hand to shape the response of the Republic of China, the Nationalists, in such a way as to discourage any attack upon Taiwan itself by the PRC. In other words we did not want to get into a situation where we would come into armed conflict with the Chinese. That was the first thing. The second thing is that in encouraging the Republic of China, or dissuading the Republic of China from doing anything that would involve us with direct combat with the PRC, we also wanted to leave the responsibility for the defense, for actually military combat, with the PRC entirely in their hands. But we didn't want them to use the military action as a pretext for committing themselves to a military campaign against the mainland. It was all very complicated and very delicate.

*Q: How about at your level, and other officers at your level, were you trying to make this point or were you leaving this to the ambassador?*

CUNNINGHAM: We were following it very closely. We had a very small political section. There were four officers there. David Osborn, now deceased, was the counselor for political affairs, and Sandy Peaslee, also now deceased, was his principal deputy. A man by the name of

Carl Nelson, who is still living in Florida, was the third officer, and I was the junior officer. Dealings with the ROC leadership all was being carried out by the ambassador, the DCM at the time who I think was Joseph Yager, and David Osborn. They were the people who were dealing with the top levels of the ROC, and I should make it clear here that Ambassador Drumright, despite his antipathy toward the PRC and his sympathy for the ROC, was loyal to U.S. policy and carried it out effectively. Most of us in the Political Section were following the popular reaction to this. I was very new on the scene. I was really trying to get my bearings at this point trying to figure out what was going on.

The main point right here is that in October 1958 things got very tense. This bombardment went on and on. At one point the Republic of China was accusing the United States of disloyalty to its allies. As long as the bombardment went on the question came up, how was this garrison on Quemoy going to be sustained? These guys had to be resupplied. Artillery was being fired off at a great rate. The PRC was attempting to blockade the island of Quemoy by bombardment. How were supplies going to get out there?

What it really came down to eventually after a lot of back and forth between Washington and Taipei, and also between the embassy and the Nationalist government, the ROC government, was the ROC's responsibility to resupply Quemoy. The ROC's response to this was, what the hell kind of an ally are you? Here our soldiers are in danger out there on the front lines and you are not going to help with the resupply? You are not going to help send in ammunition? We said, "Well, that is the other side of the Strait and it is not covered by the Treaty." This really helped to define the application of the Treaty very clearly.

What finally happened was that it was decided that the vessels of the Seventh Fleet - I think it was probably one destroyer escort - would convoy the resupply vessels of the ROC navy from Taiwan up to a certain line in the Strait of Taiwan. From there on they had to make the run for the beach, basically, on their own with whatever protection they were able to provide.

Then the question came up, where do we draw the line? Is it the territorial seas? Well all right, the U.S. decided to draw the line at the territorial sea limit. We could convoy these vessels so long as they were in international waters but the demarcation point then came to be the territorial sea limit. Well, whose territorial sea limit?; according to what interpretation? At the time the U.S. interpretation was three miles. Three miles from where? Three miles from the beach line at Quemoy, or three miles from the beach line over on the other side of the strait on the mainland? If we got that far over it was certain that any U.S. vessels would come under fire from shore batteries on the mainland. We didn't want to get involved in this thing so we didn't want to go that far. There was some talk at that time about the six mile limit and I think the U.S. was pushing this as a compromise to the proposal for a twelve mile limit advocated by some countries at the time as an international standard, but that hadn't really been recognized yet. Even the, again it was the same thing, six miles from where?

I think at this point this dispute became public and Beijing came up on this, the New China News Agency, and pointed out that so far as they were concerned the territorial sea limit was 12 miles. Well again it was 12 miles from where? Could it be the beach line at Quemoy or could it be the beach line on the mainland. In retrospect, and perhaps at the time, I think this PRC

announcement was intended as a signal to the U.S. that Beijing did not want to have a military encounter with the U.S. Setting the twelve mile limit from the point on the most extreme seaward point of Quemoy at low tide would, if respected by the U.S., put American navy vessels at just about the extreme range of PRC shore batteries, if not beyond their range.

Frankly I can't remember how all of that sorted itself out, but at any rate at the time that it was finally sorted out, U.S. vessels did actually escort the re-supply vessels from Taiwan out into the Taiwan Strait and they stopped at a certain point. I do not remember now how that point was defined but in any case it was very carefully calibrated to take into account all of these conflicting interpretations and it was done in such a way that it did not commit the U.S. to recognize any particular territorial sea limit. In other words it was a political decision and it was made pretty clear. I'm pretty sure that by this point the PRC understood that we weren't going to put ourselves in any situation that would compel their shore batteries to take our vessels under fire. We avoided it in that way. We fuzzed it up in that true American diplomatic sense.

The second thing is that while all this was going on there was a contest for control of the air over the Taiwan Strait. We supplied the Republic of China air force with sidewinder missiles, which they used to great effect. I think the kill rate was something like 30-to-one in the air battles over the Taiwan Strait. That meant then that very early in the battles it was not possible for the PRC air force to attack any re-supply lines from the air. I think that helped us in our negotiations with the ROC to determine this political demarcation point in the waters of the Taiwan Strait. It was very complicated business.

The media in Taiwan was controlled so they would release statements by "political" figures, leading military strategists and so forth, in the press there intended to psychologically coerce us into adopting the position most favorable to them. It was not always the one that our military wanted to adopt. The military did not want to get into a fight with the PRC at this point.

Drumright's job was very delicate. On the one hand he was recently arrived, he had very good credentials with the ROC, they liked him. He was on good terms with the Gimo. They thought he was okay. He was reliable. He wasn't one of the China crowd in the State Department that was trying to sell out the Gimo. He didn't have that identity at all. In order to maintain his access to them he had to retain that image with them.

On the other hand he had to utilize it to cool off the hot heads, most particularly a fellow by the name of Tiger Wang who was the commander of the ROC air force at that point and was a real gung ho sort of a person. He talked publicly as though he was ready to order his forces to go across the Strait and lay PRC military installations waste. He seemed to figure that they could. Of course when the ROC air force got the sidewinder air-to-air defense missile, which proved extremely effective in dogfights with the PRC air force, that made them feel even more invincible. Drumright had to sort of cool off that element within the ROC military establishment; I think there were a lot of generals who wanted to gain favor with the Gimo (Chiang Kai-shek) and avenge the defeat they had experienced on the mainland ten years earlier.

It is very difficult for a soldier. Your comrades are under attack and you want to protect them; you want to show that you are tough and strong and you're militant and all the rest. On the other

hand I think there were some cool heads among the ROC military who realized that this could be a pretty sticky operation if they really got into ground combat with the PRC. They weren't itching for it but on the other hand they had to look like they were really going to make a big scrap out of it if it really took place.

For a period from the beginning of the artillery battle in August until October when John Foster Dulles came out on his trip in 1958. Dulles was ill with terminal cancer at the time. He had either just been to Rome for the funeral of Pius XII or he was going there after his stop in Taiwan. Three months later he resigned and Christian Herter became secretary of State. Dulles was a sick man and he came out at a crucial point when this whole matter of the outcome of the battle was undecided; that is the political outcome, the military outcome. Would it be extended to the mainland? Would we get involved? By this time we had units of the Fifth Air Force, combat units, on Taiwan. We had beefed our military up by about 3,000 people. In effect we were saying to the PRC, if you are going to make a fight out of this we are ready to go.

Dulles came out for these negotiations with the Generalissimo. I remember this period very, very well indeed. I do not know the content of his conversations with the Generalissimo but they were very intense, and of course the Nationalists greatly trusted Dulles. The fact that he made the trip, it seems that it was necessary for him to go and say to them, on the one hand we are not going to abandon you, but on the other hand you must understand that we are not looking for a new opportunity to enter into combat with the PRC. We understand that you have to protect the position that you have adopted and we are not trying to in any way diminish that or detract from it but we are not going to back you up militarily if you carry this fight to the PRC on the mainland. That was the implicit message, I believe, Dulles came out to convey. He left and the issue was still in doubt. No one really knew whether the Generalissimo had taken this on board and was going to go along with it, or not.

At that point, I believe it was after Dulles had left, the Generalissimo called in the AP correspondent in Taipei, a man by the name of Spencer Moosa. Moosa was a man of uncertain nationality who had been covering China for the AP for a very long time, including on the mainland. Some people say he was Lebanese. Some people say he was Russian. He had a wife who had another nationality and all. He was one of these strange people who floated around in the atmosphere of the 1930s and 1940s China.

Moosa was a seasoned and responsible journalist, and he had the trust of Chiang Kai-shek. When the Gimo had something that he wanted to get across indirectly, he would do it through Moosa. We had learned to watch Moosa's reporting very carefully. Most of the time it was pretty mundane and there was not much in it, but every once in a while there was an important story. Moosa would be the reporter to cover it, and of course we would interview Moosa to get a fuller background on this sort of thing. As I remember Moosa was not particularly forthcoming. He would dissimulate very skillfully under those circumstances in part to protect his access to the ROC.

At any rate after Dulles left the Gimo called Moosa in for an interview that was put out in question and answer format – and this was very unusual. I think it was put out on the 20<sup>th</sup> of October 1958 if I'm not mistaken. It seems to me that's the date, right about then. I'm not sure

whether Moosa actually saw the Gimo or whether he submitted questions in advance and then called on the Gimo and the Gimo said in response to question number one this is my answer, etc. It was quite lengthy. Ten to 15 questions were asked and responded to in question and answer format. It was put out by AP, the Central Daily News, and the Central News Agency of Taipei.

We had a big debate within the political section over this interview as to what it meant. I was in on it. Carl Nelson was in on it. Sandy Peaslee was in on it. I don't know if Dave Osborn was in on it or not. We disputed it back and forth. The reason I remember this is that it came out on a Friday and in those days we were always doing the Weeka every Friday.

*Q: That's the weekly report, a round up of the week's news.*

CUNNINGHAM: Everything. Political, economic, psychological, military, and so forth. We had a big debate over this. This came out just as we were preparing the week-up so we had to get out a report on it, and we also had to get it into the week-up. Because it came out on a Friday we had to get it right for that weekly report that had to go out every Friday afternoon. It had to be ready about 3:00 for all the top levels to sign off on.

We had this furious debate over it and I can't remember the particulars of it, but I'm going to take a little credit for it myself here as the junior officer of the embassy, newly arrived, less than three months on post by that time. Carl Nelson was on one side of the argument. Carl is a man I like very much, a wonderful man, and a good friend. Carl put a particular interpretation on the interview and I won't try to characterize it now because I don't remember it exactly. What I remember saying in this debate that we had in the political section was, "But Carl, if that was what Chiang Kai-shek meant, he would not have said this," and I pointed to a particular paragraph. It turned out that I had spotted the key phrase in the paragraph which maintained the Generalissimo's political position vis-à-vis the PRC, but he plainly wanted it to be inferred that no broader ROC military action was going to take place. That is to say that no attempt to extend military action from Taiwan on the offshore islands to the mainland was going to take place.

That interview is absolutely vital to understanding the outcome of the Taiwan Strait crisis. The interpretation that was sent in from the embassy was the interpretation based upon the sentence that I had identified. It amazes me still that all the officers in the political section, far more experienced than I, didn't see that, but I was the guy who saw it so I will take a little bit of credit for myself on that one. Soon after that took place and after this was made clear and became the prevailing interpretation within the diplomatic establishment, the gun battle began to taper off. In other words both sides got the message that nothing more was going to happen and eventually it came down to the alternate day shelling, propaganda shells, lengthening periods - such as holiday seasons - of suspended shelling, and all that kind of thing.

The other thing that happened, and it is very important to remember during this period of time, the deputy chief of mission was not Joseph Yager. The deputy chief of mission was a man by the name of Sterling Cottrell. Cottrell was a Latin Americanist. He had never been in Asia. I don't know how it was that he came in or how he was assigned but he arrived more or less simultaneously with Drumright. Cottrell was the kind of guy who liked to ingratiate himself with the embassy staff. He did all kinds of things that, now I realize as I've learned more about Latin

America, were kind of in the Latin America macho style which really doesn't go over in East Asia, and it didn't go over with Drumright either.

At any rate, the last thing that happened before Dulles went home in October of 1958 was that the Generalissimo had him to dinner up at the residence. It was very formal. Of course the ambassador was there, Cottrell was there, the commander of the Taiwan defense command, and the head of the military advisory group were there. All of the top brass were there and I've forgotten who else. There were toasts exchanged. I guess first the Generalissimo as the host offered a toast. This was done in a very formal way and of course there was an interpreter, a prepared text, and all the rest. The secretary did not have a prepared text so he extemporized in response. The exchange was substantive. It related to what was going on at the time, and was very important. Drumright of course with all of his years of experience recognized this and recognized the importance of the nuances in this exchange.

After the dinner was over everybody came back to the embassy still in black tie. Drumright turned to Cottrell, his deputy and said, "Okay, write up the report of this exchange particularly the secretary's statement." Cottrell said, "I'll do the best I can from memory." Drumright turned to him and said, "You didn't take notes?" Cottrell said, "No, I didn't take notes." Drumright had just about had it with Cottrell by then. He was furious and said, "That means now that we have to rely on their version." (End tape)

There's another thing about my responsibilities in the embassy that I ought to cover. I had two responsibilities. The first was to set up the daily translation of the Chinese press.

In Hong Kong there was the daily translation of the China mainland press, the summary of the China mainland press, as it was known. It was a very distinguished operation, well established, and highly regarded. Drumright had been accustomed to that as consul general in Hong Kong. When he arrived in Taiwan he found that there was no comparable publication in the American embassy in Taipei.

There were at the time seven or eight daily newspapers. Six of them were morning papers and two of them were evening papers. They ran the gamut the Central Daily News, the official organ of the Kuomintang party, to an independent paper called the *Ta Kung Pao*, the great public newspaper, which was an opposition organ to the extent that one could have an opposition organ at the time. The other newspapers fell somewhere in between the two. Some were independently owned. Some were pro-government. One was an economic daily newspaper. Two of them were evening papers.

The Taiwan Defense Command, the Naval Auxiliary Communications Center, which was the CIA operation in Taiwan at the time, the American embassy, and the U.S. Information Service, each had a press translation operation and each was publishing its own summary of the Chinese press. Some were publishing them twice a week, some once a week, some three times a week, and so on. They were all independent publications.

When the bombardment of Quemoy broke out in August of 1958 right after I had arrived, Drumright turned to me and he said, "I want a single daily summary of the Chinese press. You do it." My Chinese was reputed to be very good at that point. I said, "Yes sir." I sent out word to

the supervisors of the translators of what the ambassador said, and then I called in these translators from all these different organizations.

The translators were all very highly educated Chinese. I believe they were all from the mainland. Many of them were graduates of foreign universities; St. John's in Shanghai and other Western-established universities. Some of them had advanced degrees. Their English was really superb in all cases. I told them first of all what the ambassador's wish was and they all said, "But our press translation is the best one so why don't you turn this over to us?" I said, "No, the ambassador wants this to be an embassy operation and he has directed me to take charge of it." You must understand that many of these people not only were highly educated but several of them were older than I, and a few were old enough to be my father. This was a very Chinese relationship. I said to them, "But this is what the ambassador wants and we have to cooperate with the ambassador." They were unhappy with this and they said, "We have to go talk to our chiefs," and I said, "Of course."

They went back and they talked to their chiefs. We were going to have another meeting in a day or two. In the meantime the ambassador was wondering where the hell was this consolidated daily translation of the Chinese press. I kept saying, "We're working on it. It takes a little while to get it organized."

One of the big problems was, were they all going to be concentrated in one location or not? If so, who was going to be the number one among them because there were four number ones here in this situation and somebody was going to lose face. It all took a great deal of negotiation. We hashed this thing around for a couple of weeks.

Finally the situation that we hit upon was that the embassy would produce the daily translation of the Chinese press. The Naval Auxiliary Communications Center had the superior publications facility so they would be the publishers of it, but the embassy would be responsible for editing the summary of the daily Chinese press. The translators would continue to identify articles that were important, intrinsically and particularly for the missions of their respective organizations. There would be a morning consultation by telephone among all the chief translators in these respective organizations and we would reach a consensus as to which articles were going to be translated, which group would do each, and then published. All the copy would be relayed to the Naval Auxiliary Communications Center by a certain time so that it could go into the publications operation that they had over there. That is the way we resolved it.

The other thing was that at one meeting with the translators I said, "Now I would like to conduct our meetings in Chinese." They all looked at me and said, "But our English is better than your Chinese." I said, "That's right it is, but I've worked very hard to learn Chinese and if I don't use it, it is not going to get better. It is going to deteriorate." They insisted that we should work in English because that would be more convenient for me. I said, "Well, if we work in Chinese it is more convenient for you." "Yes, but your Chinese is not up to our English." We discussed this back and forth also and we decided not to try to resolve it on the spot.

Eventually the resolution of that was that when it became convenient for us to work in Chinese, we would work in Chinese. When it became convenient for us to work in English, we would

work in English. There was really no formal decision to go one way or the other but each of us would respect the sensitivities and wishes of the other parties. That was very good for me because then I was able to spend about 40 to 60 percent of my working day working in Chinese with the interpreters. If we had to go into English we would go into English in order to get the point across, but I would learn and they would learn. It became a mutual exchange, very professional. My Chinese benefited a great deal from it. And I believe that we all developed a close personal and professional relationship based on mutual respect. We produce an excellent publication, one that all the users regarded highly and of which the translators and I were proud. It was a first class operation and the Ambassador was pleased with it. Nearly all the complaints we ever got were when some breakdown made the summary late in reaching the reporting officers. Those instances were rare. We were proud of meeting our deadlines.

For three years I scanned every day eight Chinese newspapers selecting articles for translation, and we would put them through this system. It worked very well, in fact so well that by the time Vice President Johnson arrived almost three years after it went into operation, we were able to turn out this 30-page edition in which his aides found a potentially offensive article. I don't think it was offensive.

*Q: You mentioned Bill about the visit of Eisenhower. This was the trip he made where things didn't go right in Japan and all. Could you talk about that?*

CUNNINGHAM: That was October of 1960 and Eisenhower came. By that time things had improved a good deal in the overall China situation. That is to say the every other day bombardment of Quemoy was taking place; just a few shells a day. By that time they may have even been down to a point of firing propaganda shells only. In any case Americans were visiting Quemoy regularly and within any fear of danger. It was not exactly a tourist stop but a routine visit spot for visiting congressmen and people like that.

Economic conditions in Taiwan had also begun to improve by then, very, very modestly I must say because the standard of living was still quite low in 1960. Taiwan was beginning to develop export trade zones and there was beginning to be a little bit of improvement in the living standards of the middle class. People were kind of settling in.

It was also pretty much accepted by that time that while the government would continue to talk about recovering the mainland and eliminating the bandit regime in Beijing, it wasn't going to do anything militarily. While it would maintain a very strong military force, the military force would have a defensive configuration and not an offensive configuration.

At that time we were also having regular conversations in Warsaw with the PRC; the ambassadorial level private talks were taking place. The war in Vietnam had not really begun, had not really heated up at that time. There was no fighting in Korea; the DMZ was stabilized. In general there was an atmosphere of well-being and peace in most of Asia. The main issue at that time, which is somebody else's responsibility to talk about, was the revision of the security treaty with Japan which of course led to the failure of Eisenhower's visit there; it didn't take place.

Eisenhower arrived in Taiwan; it was to be his next to last stop before the planned visit to Japan.

It had been programmed as part of the trip. It was very important. A sitting United States president had never before visited any government of China. The highest ranking sitting U.S. official ever to visit a government of China had been Henry Wallace who visited Chung-king in the 1940s while still Vice-President in Roosevelt's third administration. We might note parenthetically that Ulysses S. Grant visited China after leaving office, so he technically was the first U.S. President to visit China, though not a sitting President at the time.

*Q: His round the world trip.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes. Roosevelt sent Wallace out to find out what was going on out there and to try to keep the Nationalists in the war against the Japanese.

Eisenhower's trip was a very big deal. Of course Eisenhower was very well liked and respected in Taiwan. I am sure there were things of some substance that took place on that visit but it was largely symbolic. After all Eisenhower had less than a year to go in office and he was too prudent a man to make any long-range commitments for the United States.

The whole thing was an opportunity for the Republic of China to show itself off internationally. There was a big international and American press corps following Eisenhower. There was very heavy coverage. There were parades and there were rallies. It was all very friendly. And the weather was excellent for all the outdoor activities of the visit. Eisenhower laid a wreath at the tomb of the unknowns, or the war heroes in Taiwan. Someone remarked to me, one of our Chinese staff from the American embassy, said, "Well this is a great show. It is two old soldiers getting together and kind of carrying off the ceremonial functions in that manner."

Eisenhower helicoptered in from a cruiser - I think it was the Helena that he was traveling on at the time - from off the East Coast of Taiwan. The Helena did not come up the Taiwan Straits. It stayed well clear of any provocation of the PRC. I think that looking back this was after all only two years after the bombardment across the Taiwan Straits so there were great pains taken to reassure the PRC that while this was a visit of solidarity, it was not meant as a provocation to the People's Republic of China. I don't remember anything in particular of substance in the case of that visit. It proved useful as a dress rehearsal for Lyndon Johnson's visit the following May when he came through Taiwan.

*Q: How did that one go? By that time he was vice president.*

CUNNINGHAM: By that time Johnson was vice president. He was sent out by Kennedy in April or May to find out what was going on in Vietnam because by '61 the situation was beginning to deteriorate somewhat there. Johnson came out and came to Taiwan. He did not go to Japan because the whole business of the failure of Eisenhower's visit was still too tender for him to risk that. He came to Taiwan. I think it was his first stop in Asia because then he went to the Philippines, Vietnam, and someplace else in Southeast Asia, probably Bangkok, which would have been a logical stop with Thailand being a SEATO ally at the time. I've forgotten what the rest of the itinerary was.

By the time that Johnson arrived, I had begun my duties as Director of the language school in

Taichung. I had not moved my family to Taichung yet, and this was fortunate. Drumright called me back to Taipei to serve as Johnson's interpreter on the trip and also to coordinate special editions of the summary of translations of the daily Chinese press coverage of Johnson's visit. Because three years previously at the time of the Taiwan Strait crisis I had set up the daily translation of the local Chinese press at Drumright's direction I knew all these translators, the whole operation. I had run it for three years and this was kind of the final act. We ran an expanded version of some 30 pages or so.

This visit was quite unlike the Eisenhower's sedate, formal program. Johnson arrived in his campaign style, and he wanted to press the flesh with everybody. It was a very hot day. I was at the airport when he arrived.

One of the first things that happened involved the first edition of our special translation summary. The Johnson party, the Secret Service, took over the Grand Hotel, which was the only respectable hotel in town at the time, for the vice presidential party. Because Johnson arrived on somewhat short notice, that meant that the reservations of several other people, who had been booked into the hotel, had to be canceled. We were told to cover everything in the press summary, and every article that was related to Lyndon Johnson. Everything. Those were the orders that came down so I passed the word along to the translation staff. They loyally gathered up everything and they translated it.

Our initial edition of these translations, the arrival one you might say, we included a little article that some enterprising reporter from one of the six Chinese newspapers in Taipei had written concerning his interview with American visitors who were asked to vacate their rooms in the Grand Hotel for Lyndon Johnson. While they grumbled a little bit about it, one of them said – and this was highlighted in the story – “Well after all he is the vice president and this is an important visit. I guess as American citizens it's inconvenient for us but we ought to give way for the vice president of the United States.” This article appeared on the last page or the next to last page of this multi-page edition which came off the press just a couple of hours before Johnson was going to touch down. Before it was printed, the senior editor, Donald Wu, called the article to my attention and asked whether it should be included. In light of the orders we had received, I decided we should go with it. Donald, who was a veteran journalist, I suppose told the publications staff to bury the article in the back of the edition.

We rushed 30 or more copies of this edition out to the airport and somebody on the staff made sure that there was at least one copy in every vehicle in the presidential motorcade. Somebody on Johnson's staff looked through this translation edition and found this article on the next to last page. A howl went up and they said, “Oh my god, Lyndon will go through the roof if he sees this. Retrieve all of those. Get them out of there. Get them out of the vehicles.” Somebody else had to run around and gather all these things up and get them out of the motorcade. I think despite this desperate precaution some newspaper guy who was in the traveling party got a hold of one copy and put the story on the international press wires so it was played back to the U.S. press.

At some point in the visit or before everybody who was accompanying Lyndon Johnson had finally left, one of the Johnson retinue went to see Joseph Yager, the deputy chief of mission at

the time, and upbraided him for including this article in the press summary. “Why did you do this?” and so on. Joe Yager looked this thing over and he said, “After all it was published and it wasn’t uncomplimentary to the vice president. I think we did the right thing by putting it in.” The matter stopped right there. There was no further consequence after that. My career did not end at that point, thanks to Joe Yager, who was one of the best bosses I ever had.

As head of the translation section, the guy in charge of translation, there were three other things that happened. I was told to arrange for the translation into Chinese of the joint communiqué to be issued at the end of Johnson’s visit. Johnson was in Taiwan about 36 hours as I recall. The night before the day that he was to leave I went up to the Grand Hotel and started asking around, “Where is the text of the joint communiqué?” I was told it was up there some place. I looked around, and looked around, and finally somebody said, “Well, Horace Busby, Johnson’s speech writer, is up there and he’s got it.”

I went up and found Busby in his room at the Grand Hotel, which had been turned into kind of a workshop at that point with half a dozen people sitting around, going in and out. Busby was sitting there under a lamp with his typewriter, which was not electric as I recall, typing away at something. I said, “I’m here to get the joint communiqué.” He said, “It’s not ready yet. You just wait.” So I sat down and waited. This was about 9:00 at night. I waited while Busby was working on other things.

Finally he pulled out a piece of paper and came to me and said, “I’m working on this speech that the vice president is going to give tomorrow at 2:00 in the afternoon to the youth rally,” or something like that, “why don’t you look it over?” I looked it over. I read the speech and thought, I don’t know how this is going to go down. I was supposed to interpret for the vice president at the speech too so I had to know this text. Lyndon Johnson, now that I’ve been to Texas and know more about his personal background, carried on at great length about how poor the people in Taiwan had been and how much better their life had become. He talked about “you didn’t have this, and you didn’t have that, and you didn’t even have shoes!”

I thought this particular line, “you didn’t even have shoes,” was not going to wash to the audience that he’s going to be talking to because the Chinese have got a thing about shoes and feet and so on, the whole bound foot syndrome. Lyndon Johnson was simply not attuned to the sensitivities of Chinese culture, so I just deleted that sentence from the text without saying anything. I just crossed it out so that it wouldn’t get translated into Chinese. I think I gave it back to Busby but I’m not sure. I believe we handled the translation of that text into Chinese also, so perhaps I just sent it downtown to my staff. It did not appear in the text that the vice president used nor was it in the version published in the Chinese press, I know that.

The second thing that happened was along about 2:00 in the morning I was still sitting there wondering where this joint communiqué was. I kept calling my translators saying, “Don’t let anybody go home because I haven’t got it yet. Make sure somebody is there because I am going to bring it down. The deadline is very short and we are going to have to get it out, press lines and all the rest.”

Bill Crockett who was undersecretary of State for administration at the time, or deputy

undersecretary of State, a high-ranking official, had come in from the state dinner about ten thirty or eleven p.m. and had fallen asleep sitting in a chair, still in his dinner jacket, just about two seats from me in the room there. He had a piece of paper in his hand when he fell asleep. I didn't pay much attention to it. At 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning, Busby got up from his typewriter, walked over, took the piece of paper out of Crockett's hand (Crockett was sound asleep and didn't know this had happened at all.), gave it to me and said, "Here is the joint communiqué. I guess you had better go get it translated." I said, "Fine. Thanks very much," and off I went. Only much later did I realize that I had the only existing copy of the joint communiqué. I have no idea how it got into the room or why it had been given to Crockett. He surely was not the appropriate member of the party to review it.

Downtown I went to where my translators were and I said, "Okay, here it is. Translate this thing and get it out. Let me know when it is finished and I'll get a copy of it and get it back to wherever it is supposed to go." I wasn't given any instructions about this by Busby. I wasn't told to bring it back to him. Busby just said here it is, go get it translated, so off I went. Anyway, then I went home. It was getting toward dawn by this time. I had a shower. I was going to have other things to do. I was going to have to interpret for Johnson later in the day. I didn't even get to bed. I went home, had a shower, and had something to eat.

About 7:00 in the morning the telephone rang and it was Joe Yager, the deputy chief of mission. He said, "The vice president wants the joint communiqué and I understand that you've got it." I said, "Yes, Busby gave it to me and said go get it translated. I've taken it down and they have it and are translating it." Yager said, "The vice president wants the joint communiqué." I said, "Okay, we'll get it up to him." By that time fortunately there were photocopy machines, Xerox, so we could make a copy of it.

Physically the joint communiqué was in downtown Taipei at the USIS press office where all the translators were and the vice president was 45 minutes away at the residence of the president, the Gimo, up on Grass Mountain east of town. I said, "Okay." I called up my head translator and I said, "Photocopy that thing. Get a driver, send it out to Mr. Yager at the president's residence in Tien Mu, and make sure it is delivered to him." I thought it would all be okay, and I resumed my breakfast.

Ten minutes later the phone rang again. It was Joe Yager again. "The vice president wants to know where the hell the communiqué is." This was obviously a direct quote, because Joe Yager was not given to hard language, especially when dealing with his staff. I said, "It's been copied. I've given instructions and it is on its way. You guys are 45 minutes away. It will get there in due course." I got three more calls I think before that thing finally arrived, and I assumed the vice president was satisfied.

There is a follow-on to this. My assumption was incorrect. Johnson was upset and stayed that way. Three years later Lyndon Johnson became president of the United States as a result of Kennedy's assassination. By then I was working on the Republic of China desk in the Department of State. My boss at that time, Paul Popple, now deceased, my neighbor and friend from my days in Saigon and Taichung. Paul had been on Lyndon Johnson's staff when he was a senator, and when Johnson became president he gathered up as many of his former staff

members as possible to join the White House staff. He wanted Paul to handle his correspondence, so Popple did.

After Paul had been there a couple of months he said to me, "Bill, the president keeps talking about this mishandling of the joint communiqué in Taiwan. What is this all about? You were there." I said, "Paul, let me tell you, this is what happened." He said, "The president keeps inquiring about that and he is determined to find out who was the bastard that STOLE," and those were Johnson's words "the communiqué in Taipei." For the rest of the time that I worked in Washington I feared that the next telephone call was going to be Lyndon Johnson on the line saying, "You bastard I've found you now!" From time to time I would hear this feedback that Johnson was still looking for the guy who stole the communiqué; and he never found me thank God. It says something about his ability to retain the tiniest details and the way in which he reacted to things when they didn't go as he wanted.

There were two more things that happened on that visit. The afternoon that Johnson arrived after we got him to the hotel I was to escort him. We were to take him down island to a nearby town where the headquarters of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction was located. They had a big display hall there. This was a joint U.S.-ROC organization set up to bring about the improvement of agricultural methods - crop methods, improvement of livestock, and all that sort of thing - in Taiwan. It worked very well. It was very effective. It was one of the best organizations that we ever set up under the mutual assistance program.

I had scoped out the place a couple of days ahead of time, or a week or so ahead of time, and I knew the whole lay of the land. I had been there with the advance party and knew what the vice president was going to do, and so on. We arrived in the town. Johnson leapt out of the car, started working the rope line, and shaking hands with people. I was alongside of him interpreting for him.

The first thing, he said to some young woman who was there, a high school girl, "How do you get along?" What he meant was how do you survive here, what is your livelihood, and that sort of thing? I tried to interpret that for him and he was firing questions right and left. The girl said, "We don't do anything." I interpreted that back to him and he couldn't quite grasp that. It was sort of a non-conversation but he was trying to be friendly. His style was so aggressive in the way that he approached people that it put all of the Chinese on their guard just automatically. He was eager to show that he was pressing the flesh campaign style and I could see immediately this chemistry was not working.

We then started up towards the exhibition hall where the director and staff were waiting to show him what the Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction had accomplished. The crowd was lining the streets and the Chinese police officers were shouting to everybody, "now don't move; stay where you are." They didn't want any spontaneous demonstrations there. Johnson looked at this big street with people lined up on both sides and he turned around and said, "You all come on!" as he headed up. The Chinese police immediately began shouting, "Don't move! Don't move!" in Chinese. Johnson turned to me and said, "Why won't they all come along?" I said, "Well, they are being very polite," not trying to tell him that the police were telling them to stay put. He said, "Well, how do you tell them to come on?" I said, "You say lai, lai." So he started

shouting, “Lai, lai.” The Chinese police began shouting even more loudly, “Don’t move! Don’t move! Stay in your places!” I could see what was going on so I said, “We had better hurry up there Mr. Vice President and get into the exhibition hall because they are waiting there.”

We went through this exhibition hall with Johnson firing questions, me interpreting. The poor guy who was supposed to explain everything to him was absolutely petrified by the whole experience and was attempting to respond, I was interpreting. It got done, let’s put it that way. I’m not sure that the vice president learned anything from it. I think that the poor guy in charge of the exhibition hall went home, went to bed, and had a drink immediately after it was all over because it was such an overpowering experience. That was the second thing that happened.

The last thing that happened was that when it came to 3:00 the following afternoon, time for Johnson to make this big speech which I was supposed to interpret, Drumright looked at me, looked at the speech, and said, “I think we had better get Commander Wei to do this.” I was a bit crestfallen at the time because I had been preparing very hard to interpret for the president. I think Drumright made the right decision at that point because although my Chinese was very good - I was a four-four on the FSI system at that point – it would have been a challenge to interpret for Johnson, a very difficult challenge as a matter of fact because his style was so colloquial. I think that Drumright made the right decision.

It is always best in interpreting to be going into the native language of the interpreter. That is to have someone interpreting into his or her native language rather than into a foreign language. I feel strongly about our people, particularly in dealings with the Chinese, having their own interpreters present but I think in retrospect that Drumright was wise. I was tired by that point and I think he understood the kind of stress. I think Drumright was also kind of stressed from dealing with this vice president, this Texas original so-to-speak. Commander Way did a splendid job. He was well known. He had been educated in the United States, and all the rest. He carried it off and gave it the right kind of flair for the audience and the people who were there. I don’t think again that anything of political importance other than the symbolism of Johnson’s visit occurred at that time. I don’t think that he made any particularly important substantive statements in the course of his visit. Everybody was very much relieved when it was all over because it was kind of a whirlwind trauma.

I was the first guy to experience Lyndon as an interpreter on the trip. The stories that came back from all the people who had the responsibility in other countries down the line, very much reflected the kind of experience that I had with Lyndon Johnson. It contrasted with the Eisenhower trip in the sense that the Eisenhower trip was very well organized, very smooth, there were no incidents of mix-ups over joint communiqués. It ran in a very orderly and disciplined fashion whereas the Johnson trip was kind of serendipitous. We were fortunate in the sense that Eisenhower had come there only six to eight months previously because as I say it was a dress rehearsal for what we had to do for Lyndon Johnson.

The other thing that happened during my assignment in Taiwan was the suppression of the China Democratic Party. I was the first Taiwanese language officer in the embassy. The regimen at the language school in Taichung was to take two years of Mandarin language instruction after having an initial six months in Washington. I knew by the spring on 1958 that I was going to be

assigned to the American embassy in Taipei. I asked to be assigned there as a matter of fact. The political counselor was David Osborn, with whom I had worked in Japan and who had been responsible for me starting Chinese language studies. I went to him and I asked for an assignment there, and that was arranged.

My reason for asking for that was I wanted to continue to develop my Chinese. I had learned by then that the officers who were sent to Hong Kong worked mostly in English. Hong Kong was mostly a Cantonese-speaking city in the 1950s, not a Mandarin-speaking city, and the language officers assigned there didn't have very much opportunity for the use of the spoken language. Their facility in the spoken language would gradually begin to deteriorate the longer they stayed in the consulate general. They relied very heavily on the translation staff there so they didn't work in the written language a great deal of time either.

That wasn't really what I wanted to do. I wanted to be more a part of the local scene. I may have been influenced somewhat by my earlier experience in Southeast Asia, where - particularly in Cambodia - I had become accustomed to getting around in the local community and associating with the people. The thinking among many of my colleagues at that time was that someday the mainland was going to open up and if we go to Hong Kong we are going to be right into what is going on in the PRC, in the big China, and this was a way of preparing for that experience. I acknowledged certainly the importance of that argument and also the importance of learning about the PRC from a professional standpoint, but I was attracted more to the experience of Chinese culture in so far as I would be able to participate in it in Taiwan, and it looked to me like that was a better chance. So that was why I asked to be assigned to Taipei.

The second thing was that I knew that when I went there I was going to have to cover what was called domestic politics, which meant opposition politics, which meant Taiwan politics. I thought I ought to learn Taiwanese in order to be effective as a reporter and an analyst on domestic Taiwan affairs. For the last three months that I was in the language school I devoted my study to Taiwanese. The last month that I was there I went down to a little town on the west coast of Taiwan, a place called Lukang. Lukang had been one of the earliest ports on Taiwan settled by people coming across from the mainland in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. The Taiwanese there was said to be of the purest sort, so I went to live down there for a month in order to immerse myself in that. My Taiwanese was never as fluent as was my Mandarin and I relied much more on my Mandarin for my work in Taiwan than on Taiwanese, but the knowledge that I had of Taiwanese represented something to the Taiwanese people in Taiwan, the natives of Taiwan. It served as an icebreaker for me to establish relationships in my reporting responsibilities in the next three years that I was in the embassy.

The thing that I want to mention at this point is - and it is important for what is going on right now in 1999 - when I was in Lukang one man I met was a man who was the secretary general, that is to say the chief aide, to a man by the name of Koo Hsien jung. I've forgotten the gentleman's name now though I probably have it someplace in my files. Koo Hsien jung was a very wealthy Taiwanese who had prospered during the Japanese occupation. He had owned lots of sugar plantations and other things in Taiwan. His principal residence, his manor you might say, was in Lukang. He was a native of that town.

This gentleman whom I met took me out there one time and took me through this house, which dated back to sometime in the 1930s. It was one of those houses that was representative of the Asian, and principally the Japanese, taste in European style furnishings, decorations, home design, and all that sort of thing. It was a very elegant house with very nice things in it. It was a little bit run down at that point but still you could see that there was a great deal of class and wealth in this house.

When the Japanese arrived in Taiwan in 1895 after acquiring it as a result of the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the Sino-Japanese war, Koo Hsien jung was one of the Taiwanese collaborators with the Japanese. He had helped guide them in finding their way, so to speak. He was the pathfinder, that's how it was described to me, for the Japanese. He of course prospered and profited greatly in the economic sense from that association with the Japanese during all that period of time.

He had four sons and one of them was a man by the name of Koo Chen fu. Koo Chen fu was the one who remained in Taiwan; the other three brothers went overseas. Koo Chen fu had had a Japanese education. He is fluent in Japanese. I think the other sons probably had a Japanese education also in Japan at Tokyo Imperial University. Koo Chen fu was also fluent in English. He had very good, very polished English.

In the 1960s Koo Chen fu was president of the Taiwan Cement Corporation. It was a government corporation in which landowners had been given stock during the land reform program in exchange for the surrender of their lands in Taiwan so that land could be distributed to those who were actually tilling the land. The Koo family lands were exchanged for this stock, and as a consequence of the large holding he acquired in Taiwan Cement Corporation, Koo Chen fu became general manager of the Corporation.

I also knew Koo Chen fu through the Taipei West Rotary Club. There were five Rotary Clubs in Taipei. As you know Rotary always invites local diplomatic officials to become members. The Taipei West Rotary Club was the Taiwanese-speaking Rotary Club. The other four were Mandarin-speaking Rotary Clubs. There was east, north, south, central and west. All the members of the Taipei West Rotary Club were Taiwanese-speaking. Since I was attempting to cultivate the Taiwanese community as a Taiwanese language officer at the embassy, I joined that club and they very much welcomed me there. Koo Chen fu was a prominent member of the club.

What was very interesting was whenever he made a trip to Japan, which he visited frequently in a business capacity, he would come back and he would report on his trip to the members of the Taipei West Rotary Club. He would do this also when he went sometimes to Hong Kong or sometimes to Korea, or other places. He would come back and make a report to our club, which used to meet on Saturdays at noontime. He was always listened to with very great respect. He was identified in the Taiwanese community as somebody who was a prominent Taiwanese with very close ties to the KMT, the Kuomintang - I think he is probably a Kuomintang member, as a matter of fact, and had been – but also with close ties to the Japanese establish, particularly the conservative wing of the Liberal Democratic Party, the wing of Nobusuke Kishi and Eisaku Sato, two prominent post-war prime ministers. He had good access to those people and with the leadership of the KMT, and to the prominent figures in the Taiwan opposition, not the

independence movement but the opposition movement, the non-KMT, or what they called the non-party party. He is a very smart man. I got to know him well and interviewed him. He has become an extremely successful financier in Taiwan.

Koo is now the chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation in Taiwan, the private organization set up to conduct the talks with the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits. The SEF is closely affiliated with the Mainland Affairs Council, a government organ with a mission comparable to that of the SEF. It is Koo who visited the PRC in his capacity as SEF chairman last fall. He called on President Jiang Zemin in Beijing and told him he really ought to learn more about democratic systems if he wants to understand how things are going in Taiwan these days. Koo has also represented Taiwan as two or three APEC heads of government meetings.

I think this family history is extremely interesting. I don't think that this is widely known at all. I think that I am one of the very few people who know. I am sure that there are many Taiwanese who know Koo Chen fu's background. It is public knowledge privately kept in Taiwan. It is very interesting that someone whose father was the chief collaborator with the Japanese and helped them establish themselves in Taiwan, now has become designated by the Kuomintang as a principal go-between in their negotiations with the PRC. I think that his position gives him a great deal of resonance among older group of the Taiwanese community although I don't know about the present active generation.

*Q: What was your feeling with this non-party party at that time?*

CUNNINGHAM: First of all I got to know many of the political leaders in various parts of Taiwan and in Taipei also. I was introduced to them in some instances by my chief, David Osborn, who had known them when he served in Taipei earlier. I was also introduced by some of the CIA people. My job was, first of all, to be in touch with them so they would feel that their views were known in the American embassy and known to the U.S. Department of State, the American diplomatic establishment. My job was not to encourage them in any way in their political ambitions.

Now there were splits among them. Some of them of course were very plainly in favor of making Taiwan an independent country and displacing the Kuomintang rule there. They were in effect anti-Kuomintang, but they could not say so publicly. Many of them were very skillful in criticizing policies of the Kuomintang and of the Nationalist government, and at expressing their disaffections without going so far as to expose themselves to the charge of treason.

In the 1950s a gentleman by the name of Lei Chen, who was a publisher and journalist, established a weekly newsmagazine in Taipei called *Free China, Tsu Yu Chung Kuo*. This magazine was a vocal and open critic of the Kuomintang and the Nationalist government. It was very well written and edited and highly regarded for its literary quality and journalistic quality. It was widely read by the intelligencia in Taipei and in Taiwan, as well as by the people who were not members of the Kuomintang and who were critical of Kuomintang rule. The magazine reflected their views. It was a considerable irritant to the Kuomintang and most especially to Chiang Kai-shek.

I never met Lei Chen. Lei Chen was a vocal critic, an avowed critic of the Kuomintang and he did not hesitate to make his disaffection known. What he was criticizing was the inconsistencies of policies of the Kuomintang, particularly the limitations upon personal freedoms that were guaranteed to people in the constitution under the martial law conditions in Taiwan at the time.

In 1959 soon after the Taiwan Strait crisis had moderated, Lei Chen became active in the formation of an opposition political party called the China Democratic Party, Tsu Yu Min Chu Tang I think it was called. In effect *Tsu Yu Chung Kuo*, his journal, became the organ of the nascent political movement. I think in fact they actually attempted to register the party or maybe they even did register it as a legal party in China. It showed signs of becoming a very powerful party. That is to say it would be a party that would have a mainlander leadership, non-KMT leadership, of people like Lei Chen or other intelligencia and the very few opposition politicians of a mainlander nature that there were in Taiwan at the time, and a very large Taiwanese constituency. By large I mean running in to the hundreds of thousands. It would have a considerable following among those who identified themselves as the “non-party party,” which was pretty evident soon after it got going. That was very alarming to the KMT and also particularly to the Gimo.

The formation of this party coincided also with a constitutional crisis in Taiwan. The KMT was operating under the 1947 constitution that had been adopted in China in a popular referendum carried out through most of China, and with officials elected to public office under that constitution at that time who had traveled to Taiwan with the Gimo. In effect they used to say, they were following the practice of the Long Parliament of the reign of Charles the II and Oliver Cromwell, although the KMT did not follow policies comparable to those of the Long Parliament.

The KMT held that it had been elected constitutionally to office. It was not possible for the Government to hold elections in the territory of China. The constitution, adopted by referendum in 1947, said that elected officials shall continue in office until duly elected representatives are able to take office. Well you couldn't have elections, so nobody could be elected to take their office, so therefore they continued in office and that was the logic that they were using.

*Q: And everyone in it was quite happy.*

CUNNINGHAM: Everyone in office was quite happy with that. However, under the terms of the constitution the president was limited to two terms and his term was expiring in 1960. The question came to be, what can we do about this situation? It was inconceivable, most particularly to the Gimo, that anyone else could be president at that time. An amendment to the constitution would be required to remove this impediment. The National Assembly, a directly elected body roughly comparable to our Electoral College, had the authority to amend the constitution. But the membership of the National Assembly living in Taiwan or overseas, was less than the quorum specified by the constitution.

This is all covered in our reporting from the embassy in Taipei by the way. I did much of the reporting on this: how the constitution was “legally” or constitutionally amended despite the lack of a sufficient quorum in the amending body which was the national assembly; how this was

done and judged to be legal so that the Gimo could succeed himself for a third term and indefinitely thereafter and in effect become president for life. That was all “handled” at that time. There is reporting to document it so we need not go into that.

The formation of this party came along just at this time when everybody was conscious of the constitutional crisis that was arising and before it had actually been resolved. Needless to say, Free China Magazine and the China Democratic Party were highly critical of this entire procedure and denounced it as another symptom of the undemocratic nature of the KMT regime. In that sense the formation of this party was a politically threatening development to the KMT. Taiwan was not a democratic society in those days, and opposition to its policies or to Chiang Kai-shek was equated with subversion at the behest of the Chinese Communists. It made no difference that the PRC was at the time in the midst of the Great Leap Forward, which was for it a political crisis, and not really in position to interfere directly in the political life of Taiwan. The perception of real opposition was enough to provoke the Gimo’s paranoia.

The upshot was that Lei Chen was arrested on charges of communist subversion. It happened on a Sunday afternoon, and a friend of mine, Dr. Chang Yen-tien, a U.S. educated professor of agricultural economics at the National Taiwan University, and his wife were visiting us that afternoon for tea. Somehow the radio was tuned in - or perhaps at some point that afternoon the cook came in to tell us - and we heard that Lei Chen had been arrested. My friend, who I believe was a party member, a KMT member, or at least he was not in opposition to the KMT, was absolutely aghast. I can still see his expression when we heard that Lei Chen had been arrested. It just ended the conversation. Nobody said anything more and he and his wife excused themselves shortly after that and went home.

It had a profound, shocking effect on the intellectual and political class regardless of party in Taiwan at the time. It had been a long time since anything like that had happened under the Gimo and it was a severe warning. I think very quickly the publication of *Free China, Tsu Yu Chung-kuo* ceased. Maybe it has reappeared since then, but it stopped publishing at that point. That whole intellectual and political community around Lei Chen more or less dissolved and evaporated.

He was taken into custody. As the guy who was doing domestic political reporting it was my responsibility to follow this case and report on it. Lei Chen was tried in a military court. I did about a 50-page report on that trial. It was difficult to do because word came down from Drumright that no one in the embassy – though I think it was specially intended for me – was to have any communication at all with Lei Chen’s adherents and supporters, and the intellectuals around Lei Chen; there were several particularly at National Taiwan University. I operated under those restrictions but I nevertheless had to find out about the trial. The other officers in the political section, and I think particularly David Osborn the political counselor, in effect tacitly approved of reporting on the case. It was accepted that the case had to be reported and they more or less said, here’s what the ambassador says, just be circumspect in the way in which you collect the information.

I did not live in an American compound. I had made that decision when I moved to Taipei in 1958. I lived in a Chinese neighborhood. One of my neighbors was a magazine editor. One was a

university professor. One was a national assemblyman. One was a police officer. One was a customs official. I had many contacts in the community of that sort. Also, I happened to be living just a short distance from the language program operated at that time by Cornell University under a Ford Foundation grant for American graduate students who were studying Chinese. Most of them were studying Chinese at this school but they had a lot of contact with National Taiwan University and with the faculty and intellectual community out there.

Relying upon all of these second hand and third hand accounts of what was going on, I was able to put together the details of Lei Chen's trial and the arguments that were going on. Word of mouth communication is wonderful. It operates. It is very reliable in China and you just have to be very scrupulous in collecting all of this and in doing your analysis and comparisons. Also the newspaper *Ta Kung Pao*, the great public daily which I had mentioned earlier as one of the papers that I scanned every day, somehow or another was able to obtain the transcript of the trial and published it verbatim, which I used then as part of my reporting.

What it comes down to is this: Lei Chen was convicted of communist subversion upon the testimony of one single government witness who said that he had conveyed a letter from somebody in the PRC to Lei Chen. This contact was sufficient to prove a violation of the martial law decree under which Taiwan operated at that time and which categorically forbade contact of any kind - - direct or indirect - - with the PRC or the CCP. Lei Chen was convicted and sent, I suppose, to Green Island where most political prisoners were imprisoned in those days. He was sentenced to 20 or 25 years. I remember reading of his release, or impending release, many years later, and I think it may have even been after Chiang Kai-shek died. I don't know whether he is still alive or not. That trial was a real kangaroo court, and the verdict really ended the China Democratic Party.

There were a couple of meetings afterwards of the remaining leadership of the party, one in Taipei and one in a place called Feng-Yuan, at that time a remote rural town down in central Taiwan, at the home of one of the movement's leaders. That was an important meeting. I learned through my sources of the people who had been present at that meeting so I went to interview them discretely. They were very reluctant, of course, to talk about any of this at this time. It took a lot of effort on my part to assure them that I would respect their confidences.

After the suppression, Lei Chen's arrest and conviction, there was a split in the movement. There were actually three components to this split. Taipei was mainly a Mainland Chinese city at that time although the Taiwanese population of Taipei was the majority population, it was about 60-30. But they were not the power holders in Taipei. Those leaders of the movement for the new party who lived in Taipei were very conscious of the pressure of the government. They thought that the suppression made clear that it was time, in effect, to just call off, not to continue to push things, to lie low and wait for a better day, and to more or less keep the structure of the party intact but not to push for any further agitation or activity of any kind. The people in the south, particularly from Tainan southward through Kaohsiung and into Pingtung Prefecture, all of which is heavily Taiwanese, were the ones who said, "No, this is the time we ought to push harder. We ought to really try to push our cause. We think that the arrest of Lei Chen shows the fear of the government, so we shouldn't let up the pressure at this point." There were some vocal people in that group whom I knew also who were advocates of that, particularly the mayor of

Tainan at the time, the Yeh Ting-kuei.

I did a report also on this meeting and in my analysis after and we labeled these factions the “go-fast” and the “go-slow” sections with the go-slow people being the northerners, so to speak, in the capital, and the go-fast people being the southerners elsewhere. The southerners, the go-fast wing, was egged on by a group known as the Taiwan Independence Movement that was based in Tokyo and led by a man named Thomas Liao. There was a Liao family and three Liao brothers who go back to the uprising against the government in 1947 and who had to go into exile afterwards. There were remnants of that movement in the United States and in Japan still. They were all in favor of course in pushing the independence line. They were out and out for the independence of Taiwan. They were in favor of supporting the go-fast wing, the southern wing, of this new opposition movement.

The northern wing prevailed. It prevailed in part because economic conditions in Taiwan began to improve as a result of the U.S. economic assistance programs and as a result of the policies of the government, which at that point began to shift first of all towards industrial development and offshore manufacturing. In other words it was like what we call the Maquiladora program here in Mexico and in Texas. They were setting up export production zones where the components of foreign products could be brought in, finished, and then shipped out. It would provide employment to excess labor in Taiwan and bring earnings into the local economy but it would not add to the imported consumer goods on the local markets. There were still very heavy duties and restrictions on imports at that time. The infusion of that money into the economy along with the U.S. assistance program provided much of the capital that was necessary to develop Taiwan’s economy.

The other component of this is that at that time in 1960-1961, but particularly in 1960, U.S. economic assistance policy in Taiwan shifted toward encouraging the government to develop a consumer economy. There was a very important speech given by Wesley Haraldson, the head of the AID mission, at what was called the Friends of China Club, one of the other principal hotels in Taipei. It was to a civic group. I don’t think it was to a Rotary Club meeting but it was to something like that. It was a forum where Haraldson very strongly advocated the merits and the benefits of a consumer economy and in effect he said, “You’ve got to develop a consumer economy. You’ve got to become consumers.”

His advocacy of that point was very important because it gave encouragement and support to an element within the ROC government at the time that also saw this as the way to improve Taiwan’s economic condition and to get away from the sort of situation where you were attempting to develop a garrison state; an austerity economy where you sacrificed everything in order to support a military establishment whose purpose was going to be to recover the mainland. Of course local Taiwanese business people were in favor of this also, and that is where much of the wealth was as a matter of fact; in the hands of the Taiwanese, not in the hands of the mainlanders. It used to be commonly said in those days that the mainlanders have the power and the Taiwanese have the money. There was a great deal of truth to that in that comparison.

We were very fortunate in that time in Taiwan because the leadership in the economic elements of the government, the government organization that was set up to handle U.S. economic

assistance, the ministry of Economic Affairs, the finance minister, and so forth, were staffed by people who had been educated at the London School of Economics, Columbia, Harvard, Yale, in Europe, and in various places like that. They were forward thinking. They were Keynesians. They had been exposed to the Keynesian idea of economic development and expansion. Haraldson I think in that sense was a Keynesian also. Philosophically the leadership of our economic assistance mission, our AID mission, and the economic leadership of the ROC government, were in tune with one another. They both were, of course, out of sync with the KMT's political philosophy of austerity and sacrifice, which was of a different order, but these "Keynesians" managed to prevail.

By the way, Haraldson was also supported by Joseph Yager, the deputy chief of mission. Yager was not a China specialist. He was an economist. He was one of those people who were Wristonized into the Foreign Service in the 1950s. After his service in Taiwan he became the director of East Asian Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, as it was then called, in the Department of State. Yager and Haraldson were very much both of the same mind as economists as to what the economic future of Taiwan should be. Yager was very much trusted by Drumright. I think that trust between Yager and Drumright was very important in influencing the development of American policy at that point and in helping Taiwan to become an economic powerhouse that it is today.

We talked at that time – and I mentioned it in an earlier tape – about the “takeoff” of the Taiwan economy. Walt Rostow had published his book.

*Q: Which was a series of indicators, Iraq was one of those ready to take off.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes. And Taiwan was identified as an economy that was on the verge of takeoff, by many people, Rostow included, at that point. It is very interesting because a man by the name of Paul Sturm, whom I had known in Vietnam ten years previously and who was an old time Foreign Service officer, was the head of Embassy Taipei's economic section. Sturm had been consul general in Hanoi, as a matter of fact, in the 1950s and then somehow got to Taiwan. He was not a China specialist. He was not an Asia specialist. He was one of those people who was a Europeanist. French was his language; that's how he got to Vietnam. That's the way things worked in the Foreign Service in those days.

I remember very, very clearly in a staff meeting in the embassy conference room in Taipei, a large meeting involving most of the substantive officers at the embassy, chaired by Paul Sturm on the question of Taiwan's economic takeoff. Sturm said very clearly, “I do not see this happening at all. I think that Taiwan's economic takeoff is going to be like the gooney bird on Midway Island. It runs down the runway flapping its wings but never gets airborne.” He made that pronouncement about the fall of 1960 or the spring of 1961. Well, God bless Paul Sturm, rest his soul in peace, but here is Taiwan today one of the “Tiger economies of the 1980s and '90s and one of the few economies that has survived the East Asian economic crisis of the last two years very successfully indeed. They seem to know how to make economic policy out there very, very well.

*Q: I want to go back to the arrest of Lei Chen. Today in the 1990s, or in the 1980s even, we*

*would have been all over the Kuomintang government protesting saying this isn't the way to do this. You couldn't have sat still for it. What about at that time, was there any effort or movement at all to say really we should tell Chiang Kai-shek that by doing this he is squelching democracy and that this is a bad thing?*

CUNNINGHAM: I'm glad you asked the question because it reminds me of something that I should have mentioned earlier. I know that it was certainly widely recognized among the Chinese intelligencia that this was an unjust accusation and action. Even for my translators with whom I worked on a daily basis and who helped me a lot with gathering information on this case felt this way. Although it was never explicitly said, they were very quick to point out those things that were clearly unjust about Lei's case, as were other people with whom I came into contact. There was a lot of head shaking among my peers, that is to say second secretaries and so forth in the American embassy, over this thing.

I think at the time when the trial was either nearing the end or when the verdict had been delivered and sentencing was going to take place, I've forgotten exactly at what point it was, but near the climax of this trial, I sat down and I wrote a short memorandum to David Osborn, the political counselor. (I was second secretary in the embassy at this point) I wrote to the effect that "We claim to be supporting democracy against totalitarianism and repression all over the world. We claim that this is a democratic state in Taiwan and yet this blatant injustice is taking place." I don't know if I put it this eloquently and I'm probably embellishing it a bit but the thrust was this, "Very clearly here is this unjust decision. Clearly this has been a rigged trial. It's a kangaroo court. It is a judgment that would not stand up in any court of law. I believe that the American embassy has the obligation to say something to the Chinese government about this and we ought to do something." My memo wasn't very long; it was just a short paragraph less than a third of a page. It was very clear from all the reporting and all that data as to what was going on.

I wasn't very clear as to what we might do or could do. I remember I typed this up myself on those letterheads that we had at the time for internal office memorandums. I took it up to David's office. A short time later he brought it back to me in my office. That in itself was unusual because I was located in a wing of the embassy building separated from the suite where most of the Political Section was located. David handed the memo back to me and said, "This isn't going to go anywhere. If I send it on through, you know how the ambassador (Drumright at the time) is going to react to this. It is just going to cause a lot of trouble for yourself. I think you ought to pull it back."

Drumright had a point of view that simply would not allow any questioning of the conduct of the Nationalist government on points of this kind, or any challenge to them. He just couldn't see that it would lead to anything productive and he couldn't see that there was any U.S. interest in making any objection to that. He really had wanted us to stay far away from this trial and not become involved in it. My reporting on it, which I am happy to say was supported and encouraged by David Osborn and the other officers in the political section, nonetheless had to be very circumspect. That's why I say if you did any reporting it had to be well documented. I worked hard to prepare a thorough, objective, and completely documented report, but I had to gather my information in a very circumspect way and in a way that did not show or indicate any intervention on the part of the United States government into this proceeding. This was one of

those sad examples of the reluctance, even resistance, all too frequently in my experience at least to consider analysis, opinion, or views advanced in good faith and in loyalty to our government, but critical, or at least, questioning of our policies.

I did take my memo back from Osborn. He was realistic I suppose. I have never been happy about that. I have no doubt as to how Drumright would have reacted if it had gone through. I don't know what would have happened but I felt vulnerable at the time. That statement by Osborn, I don't think that there was a chance that the ambassador would have accepted it. I don't know whether the ambassador would have referred the question to Washington at all. He could have said a member of my staff thinks there is something wrong here and we ought to look into it and maybe say something. I don't think Drumright would have done that. I think Osborn was correct. There wasn't any dissent channel in those days at all. There was no way that a junior officer who thought that somebody in the government ought to have a second look at this, could get that kind of a recommendation through, so there it was.

A year or two later when I came back to Washington, my colleagues on the desk and I had a chance to talk about it among ourselves. Everybody recognized that this was a rigged trial, it was a trumped up charge, and the verdict was a foregone conclusion. It was entirely political. It was unjust. It couldn't be defended under any terms whatsoever.

Drumright was not highly regarded by the China specialists in the service at the time. They thought that he was overly swayed by the Nationalist's position; that he wasn't able to see what was truly happening in social and political terms in China as a whole; and that he was overly partial to the Nationalist's position. That's a judgment of history. He was certainly well liked by the Nationalists and regarded as somebody who was friendly to their cause. Most of the China specialists did not think that Drumright was realistic in his analysis of the Chinese situation from the American viewpoint.

*Q: This of course is part of the reason why Ambassador Drumright had the reputation of being a hardliner as far as China was concerned, and in a way a bit of a dinosaur.*

CUNNINGHAM: Overly subject to the line of the Kuomintang.

*Q: Yes. But it also points out something that maybe he was representing. I've heard it said that when John Kennedy came into office President Eisenhower said to the effect, "I'm going to support you in foreign policy but don't mess with China." Kennedy came in with a very small majority. He barely made it and it was sort of disputable. It was felt that Kennedy didn't feel that he could fight many battles. The China lobby and all this was just not one of those battles that he was going to fight, and he didn't.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, and it's very interesting. We should talk a little bit about that episode because Drumright lost his job soon after Kennedy came into office. Johnson came to Taiwan early in the Kennedy administration, May or June of 1961, and Drumright was the ambassador at that time. Drumright stayed on until about 1962.

Somehow or another it was told to me at the time (and this needs to be investigated) that the

administration decided that the right move for us at that time as a way of showing some kind of opening to the PRC, some desire to get through to them, was to recognize Mongolia as an independent country. Donald Zagoria had published his book on the Sino-Soviet split and there was a certain community within Washington who believed that the Soviets and the Chinese were falling apart. This rupture was as a result of the Quemoy bombardment in 1958, of Mao's wish to use nuclear weapons at that time, Khrushchev was horrified by this, and so on. There was some thinking along those lines and the idea of recognizing Mongolia was seen as a way of exploiting this split between Beijing and Moscow. The administration decided that it wanted to recognize Mongolia and this became the first big irritant in the relationship between the Kennedy administration and the Republic of China.

Everybody in the China business at that time, regardless of political persuasion from Drumright to the most leftist, knew that the quickest way to offend any Chinese is to somehow or another interfere with their claim to sovereignty over part of what is considered sacred Chinese territory. I think by that time, 1961 or 1962, the PRC had probably recognized Mongolia and established diplomatic relations with them as a way of gaining access to the international community, but Mongolia at that time was not a widely recognized country at all. I think it was only Soviet bloc countries that maintained diplomatic relations with Mongolia. And the KMT considered it sovereign Chinese territory, and still does today. The latest yearbooks published by the government on Taiwan contain maps showing Mongolia as part of China.

*Q: I think it was also in the UN.*

CUNNINGHAM: No, I don't think so at that time. Anyhow, so far as the Republic of China was concerned, Mongolia was a Chinese territory and that was certainly true of the entire KMT establishment. There was no sympathy in the Republic of China for the U.S. establishing diplomatic relations with Mongolia. I think the people in the Kennedy administration just did not understand. They were looking at the PRC-USSR relationship and they were thinking only about that. They did not realize the explosiveness of this question in terms of our relationship with Taiwan. Drumright tried to explain this and in that respect I think he had the support of everybody in the embassy because we all- (end of tape)

Drumright made it pretty clear in his reporting to Washington that this was a no-no. By that time I was director of the language school in Taichung so I was not involved in this. Well you know how it is with new presidents, new administrations, new parties in power, and so forth, they don't really welcome reporting and analysis that is critical of something that they have decided is going to be a leading point of their policies.

Meantime the ROC ambassador in Washington was George Yeh Kung-chao, a very distinguished man who had been foreign minister. He was a very urbane guy and was very much respected by everybody. He was trying to explain to his government, to Taipei, why the Kennedy administration wanted to do this, what their thinking was, and to recommend ways to them to deal with it.

I think at one point the vice president of the ROC, Chen Cheng, was sent to Washington to try to explain the situation to Rusk, or Kennedy, or Mac George Bundy, or somebody at this point, "the

best and the brightest” of those who were in Washington at that time. Well, they didn’t get it. They weren’t understanding it at all. Meantime back in Taipei the ROC was not understanding it either. There was a complete mutual non-communication on this whole question.

From the standpoint of Washington, Drumright was doing a lousy job of putting the point across to the ROC. From the standpoint of Taipei, Yeh Kung-chao was doing an equally lousy job of putting the point across to Washington. I think it was one of those situations of what the hell kind of ambassadors are you people if you can’t get this across? The problem was that both of them were holdovers from a previous time. Yeh Kung-chao was a holdover from the Eisenhower time in Washington and Drumright was a holdover in Taipei from the Eisenhower time. On the part of both capitals, our ambassadors were not persuasive the way ambassadors were supposed to be; they weren’t turning the other party around.

The first thing that happened was that George Yeh was called back for consultations, presumably for a week. He had this week of consultations in Taipei and then while they thought about that he decided to take a tour of Taiwan and just do a little sightseeing. He came to Taichung and visited the language school. I thought this was a marvelous opportunity for the Chinese ambassador in Washington to talk to these language students. I took him all through the school and showed him around then he talked to the students.

He did not bring up the question of Mongolia specifically but he said, “You know it is very difficult being a diplomat because the problems that come up for us in diplomacy in many cases are just a lack of communication. My advice to you as diplomatic officers is to work very hard maintaining good communication. If you’ve got good communication then problems will take care of themselves. It is just a matter of understanding things clearly.” I think what he very clearly had on his mind was that he understood that both sides just weren’t getting it and there had been a breakdown in communications between Washington and Taipei on this question.

It is very poignant because Yeh Kung-chao, to my knowledge, never left Taiwan after being recalled. He was a calligrapher and a bamboo painter, and so as many Chinese gentlemen do, he went into a sort of gentle retirement in Taipei and devoted himself to bamboo painting and calligraphy. Several years later he was made a minister without portfolio of the government but he never went abroad again, even for a short visit. He had offended, or failed, the Gimo, and was thereafter confined to Taiwan. Later he did become a Minister without portfolio in the ROC government, perhaps in the administration of Chiang Ching-kuo.

Almost concurrently Everett Drumright was recalled to Washington. There was a big sendoff for him. One of my colleagues, a man by the name of Sherrod McCall who was a Chinese language officer and who at that time was assigned to the embassy in Taipei as a second secretary in a different capacity from what I had (I think he was deputy chief of the political section) told me about Drumright’s departure at the airport when he was leaving for Washington. He said, “Bill, you know Drumright just did not understand what had happened to him. He was uncomprehending of the situation. He was breaking down.” Sherrod was Drumright’s principal aide and briefcase carrier. He said, “I had to say to him, ‘Mr. Ambassador wipe your nose.’ He was becoming very emotional over this thing and he simply didn’t get it.” Of course Drumright was recalled and he never came back to Taiwan in an official capacity, although he did make a

number of trips there and always was well received. He was replaced as ambassador by Alan Kirk who was a Kennedy protégé, so to speak. As a footnote, I recall that some years later Sherrod told me that while serving as Drumright's aide he had a chance to review the files and papers that the ambassador kept for his personal reference. Sherrod remarked on that occasion that he came to see a side of Drumright that the rest of us did not see, and Sherrod remarked, that the insights so gained caused him to "respect and sympathize with Drumright." Sherrod never said more than that, so I don't know to what he had reference.

*Q: It wasn't Admiral Wright? It was Kirk?*

CUNNINGHAM: Admiral Wright succeeded Kirk. It was Alan Kirk. Alan Kirk had been commander of the allied flotilla in the British Channel on D-Day and got to know the Kennedy family in that way. He was long retired. (There is a little more to the Mongolia story too, by the way.) The administration made the judgment that they wanted a senior military officer out there as ambassador to establish communication with the G-Mo. In other words the Gimo would look upon a military officer as a kind of professional peer, not a State Department diplomat. That was the reason for the selection of Kirk. He went out there at some point.

When I was working in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs later on in the '60s while Harriman was assistant secretary for East Asian Affairs, there was some point at which Kirk questioned one of our policies. I've forgotten exactly what was the question at that point. Harriman blew up and said, "Send Kirk a telegram and tell him it is time to get on board American policy."

On the Mongolia thing, this question continued to come up throughout the Kennedy administration. It did, by the way, make good policy sense to recognize Mongolia if we wanted to exploit the Sino-Soviet split, once that became clear and was accepted as a reality in Washington. Mongolia was definitely a Soviet satellite, but with the Soviets and the PRC at loggerheads, Ulaanbaatar could have been bolstered somewhat by greater international acceptance. So there was a rational basis, at least in hindsight, for promoting this idea. Recognition of Mongolia would not have helped our relations with the ROC, but it couldn't afford to protest overly, and it would not have been seen by the PRC as an overture from us to a better relationship.

I remember very well, I think I was working on the Mainland China desk in the later part of the 1960s sometime between 1965 and 1967, and again we revived the question of recognizing Mongolia. Now this was after the Chinese had detonated their nuclear device, after the signing of the partial nuclear test ban treaty in 1963, and after the split between the Soviet Union and the PRC as acknowledged by everyone. Again this issue of recognizing Mongolia arose and we actually sent a fellow by the name of William A. Brown to study Mongolian at the University of Washington where there is a Mongolian language course.

*Q: A colonel and drew the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel.*

CUNNINGHAM: And drew the 38<sup>th</sup> parallel and had that kind of exposure. It may be there that they looked to him for policy advice. Averell Harriman was appointed as assistant secretary for East Asian Affairs and was in that capacity when I reported into the Department of State in 1962.

He obviously didn't know anything about it either. His dad had built railroads in China but I don't think that Averell Harriman had that much knowledge about it. His principal deputy at the time I think was Ed Rice, now living in Tiburon, California, long retired. He was a China specialist – one of the old timers, trained in Beijing in the 1930's. I think it was Rice, though I'm not sure. Above the working level there really wasn't anybody that I can think of who was really up to it on Asia and had had the experience on the ground and knew things.

That is the legacy of the McCarthy period and the clean sweep that was made of Oliver Edmond Clubb, John Stuart Service, John Carter Vincent, and all the rest of them at the time. There wasn't anybody left to come to that level. Bob Barnett was the deputy assistant secretary for Economic Affairs in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs and he is one of the trio of Doak Barnett...

*Q: Who just died ten days ago.*

*Q: It's about three feet.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes. Then Hilsman, with cigar in his left hand, briefing memo in his right hand, and Tsiang to his immediate right, put his left foot up on his right knee with the sole of his shoe pointing in T.F. Tsiang's face. This was Hilsman's awkward way of attempting to be at ease with a visitor, whom I suppose he realized was a man of some distinction in his own right. Hilsman started on his spiel, and the subject had something to do with China's representation in the United Nations - - our constant operating preoccupation. After making a few opening remarks, Hilsman turned to me and said, "This is what you wanted me to say isn't it?" I said, "Well sir, you had the memo." T.F. looked at me and looked at him, and I suppose wondered just how much reliability there was to U.S. backing for the ROC. It was an extremely graceless exchange, even rude. I don't think Hilsman - - in his own self-consciousness - - had any understanding that his effort and bonhomie was not only transparently artificial, but tasteless as well.

Hilsman used to go around the bureau and he spoke of everybody in Washington by their first name: Jack, Bobby, Mac, Chet, Chip, this, that, the other, as though he had a personal and intimate relationship with each. You were supposed to know by his first name dropping that he was very close to the high level people in the Department then and in the Administration. He would speak about everybody very familiarly.

After Kennedy's assassination, it quickly became clear that Hilsman's manner was complete sham. He delivered a major speech mainly on China policy in December 1963. This speech was mainly drafted by Lindsey Grant on the Mainland China desk, but evidently was not fully cleared by the White House, newly taken over by Lyndon Johnson. When Hilsman made that speech, which contained language more forthcoming to the PRC (I have it somewhere in my files I'm sure) than had been the case up to then and at that level. Everything hit the fan in the White House, and Roger Hilsman was very quickly replaced by Bill Bundy as assistant secretary for East Asian Affairs. I think at that point Hilsman went off to Columbia University or something. He was out of the government.

McNamara in his book had also stated that we didn't know what was going on in Asia.

*Q: I've had other people say the hell he didn't. Some of the stuff he was told but he just chose not to listen.*

CUNNINGHAM: A fellow by the name of Lou Soros, I think, who was in INR at the time wrote an op-ed. piece for the New York Times soon after McNamara's book was published saying, "I sent these memoranda up and this was our analysis and recommendation at the time. They were rejected, disregarded, whatever, but our analyses were being sent them." It was there. The point is I think, at the time there was the knowledge available in the Department of State, and it was good and sound. The language and area training program had been ongoing throughout the 1950s and had been producing capable China specialists who were all over East Asia at that point, but all were at the working level, none at the policy level. The knowledge was available. Then there were people like Art Hummel. I've forgotten where Art was during the Kennedy administration but he was someplace out there. There were people who knew, who understood, and who could have provided advice but somehow it wasn't getting through; it wasn't received.

*Q: There was a certain arrogance too as there is in an awful lot of administrations, I have to say.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes.

*Q: I think we might stop at this point. I'll put at the end here that we covered a little bit of when you moved back to Washington. We're talking about the early '60s, '61, '62 when you came back to be on the China desk. Is that right?*

CUNNINGHAM: That's right. I came back to Washington in July or August of 1962 to take up my duties on the Republic of China desk, which we had at that time. We also had a Mainland China affairs section. We have ever since the 1960s, I believe, had two China sections, and still do in effect in the Department of State.

*Q: We'll talk about that. We've already covered Taiwan, the Mongolian situation of should we recognize it or not during the time when you were on the China desk, and we've talked a bit about Roger Hilsman. We'll pick it up then.*

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*Today is the 3<sup>rd</sup> of June 1999. Bill you were on the Republic of China desk from when to when?*

CUNNINGHAM: From summer 1962, I think probably the first of July though maybe a little earlier, until 1964 or 1965 at which time I switched to the mainland China section and served there through 1966. I went off to Columbia University for a sabbatical year at the East Asia Institute in January of 1967.

*Q: We're not sure whether we've covered it or not but you might talk about the representation problem.*

CUNNINGHAM: My main responsibility during the time that I was on the Republic of China desk was to ensure that the Republic of China retained its seat in the United Nations and in other international organizations both within the UN family, as we call them, the 13 specialized agencies, and other international bodies that were not related organically to the UN system but nonetheless which had a symbolic political importance in the international scheme. The thinking at that time was that if the PRC gained a toehold in any international organization no matter how insignificant and unrelated to the United Nations, that would be the first domino so to speak. We looked at it more as subverting the international system from the bottom up getting into the roots and gradually getting all the way up into the branches and the trunk of the tree, of the system.

Of course every year our big push was to deal with the annual challenge to the credentials of the Republic of China in the United Nations General Assembly. By the time that I reached the desk in 1962 this process had achieved a standard rhythm and a routine scenario. Along during the summertime the ROC embassy would approach the Department of State to say that the General Assembly session is coming up and we want to make sure that everything is in order. This was a discreet way of reaffirming the assurance of U.S. support for the ROC's position as the legitimate representative of China in the United Nations. This approach usually was made at the desk level – and to me when I got into the job. That routine demarche would trigger a circular telegram generated by the Republic of China desk, which had to be cleared with every bureau in the Department as well as with the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs. A man by the name of Bert Wabeke in the IO bureau was my counterpart, and I worked with him on this China representation question. We would circularize all of our posts abroad to warn them that the General Assembly session was coming up and that there would be a challenge to the credentials of the delegation of the Republic of China to sit in the General Assembly.

Now the Security Council was never an issue in these circulars because China is a permanent member of the Security Council and the UN charter in fact identifies the Republic of China as the permanent member of the Security Council. It is a continuing body and there would never be an issue of the credentials of the representative of the Republic of China in the Security Council unless there was a change in permanent representatives. We'll come back to the Security Council and the difference in a moment and continue with the General Assembly.

Our circular telegram would go out instructing our embassies abroad, those that were in capitals of countries friendly to the Republic of China and friendly to the United States, were known supporters of the position of the Republic of China or opponents of the PRC, to go into the Foreign Ministry and say, now we are counting on you to support the credentials of the Republic of China delegation in the forthcoming General Assembly session and this is why we think you should. We would fashion a series of arguments to support our position that the Republic of China should be the representative of China in the United Nations, usually citing the misbehaviors of the People's Republic of China as one of the principal arguments against this. Their conduct had shown that they were not peace loving people and that they were not entitled to represent the Chinese people in the General Assembly.

*Q: I would imagine that one of your jobs on the desk would be to collect the problems of each year, to keep a list. Every time you read that something had happened in someplace you would sort of jump up and down and add this to your list.*

CUNNINGHAM: That's right. Burt Wabeke and I kept a running log of the misbehaviors of the People's Republic of China and the things that they were doing that we thought that we could use as arguments against a change in the representation of China. Now the period that I was there in 1962 to 1964, a period of about two or three General Assemblies, of course was the end of the great leap forward and the beginnings of the Cultural Revolution in China, so it was easy to come up with all kinds of evidence saying, "Look how these people treat their own. Can you imagine what harm they are going to do to world peace if they get into the United Nations?" We would send this out and we would ask for responses.

Then of course we would tally everything that came in. We had several categories: those that were very firm and that we could count on and that were reliable; those that were perhaps wavering a little bit and indicated some uncertainty; those that were sitting on the fence; and those that we knew were a lost cause, the Warsaw bloc for example and the Soviet Union. I think India was a strong supporter of the PRC, as were Indonesia, third world countries, members of the African-Asian bloc, and so on. Anyway we would tally all this up and we would sometimes go out with a second round to the ones that looked a little bit shaky or uncertain and follow-up with them. Our objective was to get as many firm commitments as we possibly could by the beginning of the General Assembly session.

We also would look very carefully at those that we counted upon for support to see whether they had paid up their assessments to the United Nations and thereby would be able to vote. There were some countries that would fall in arrears. Another track that we would follow was, "Make sure that you pay your UN dues. We are going to count on you for this vote and you had better get your payment in there." We would follow up on that. We would then of course lobby the delegations at the General Assembly in New York. Normally the bureau would deploy a liaison officer to go up there. I had that duty during the 17<sup>th</sup> General Assembly. One of the principal duties for that officer of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs was to go around and lobby all of the delegations on the Republic of China question.

What would happen in the General Assembly is that the reports of the credentials of all delegations would be sent to the credentials committee of the General Assembly, which would then examine them to ensure that the credentials of each delegation were in good order. I think that committee was appointed by the president of the General Assembly. Our delegation would be in touch with the president of the General Assembly to find out who was going to be on the committee. We wanted to make sure that we had the right balance in terms of China representation on the committee so we would get a favorable vote out of that. Of course, all General Assembly committees have to be carefully chosen to reflect the balance of persuasions in the United Nations by region, stage of development and political outlook. The committee would consider the credentials during the entire session and finally toward the end of the General Assembly session the credentials committee would make its report to the plenary of the General Assembly. The General Assembly normally does not overturn committee reports; it rubber-stamps them for the most part. It is very difficult to open up a committee report in the General Assembly; the rules make it difficult to do so.

Of course the report of the credentials committee of the General Assembly would be the

occasion for the debate on the legitimacy of the Republic of China to sit in China's seat in the United Nations. We would have to prepare the U. S. delegation with a statement, and arguments, and respond to whatever challenges would be brought up by other countries and supporters of the PRC in the General Assembly debate. My job was to maintain close contact with the ROC embassy in Washington D.C. to keep a running tally on all the members of the General Assembly, to follow up on the instructions to the field, to make sure that the right instructions went to the delegation in New York, to work with the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs on that, and then to do all of the back stopping that was involved and that was in two dimensions. One was to watch what might be going on in let's say, if there is such a thing, the International Rose Fanciers' Club where there are national representations of some kind or other just to make sure that somebody didn't try to sneak a Chinese communist delegation into whatever seat was legitimately occupied by the Republic of China.

The other thing that we followed very closely during this time was the policy toward China of newly independent countries because the decolonization process was going on. I got so good at all of this that I knew the names of every foreign minister in Africa and the capitals of every country there. I could reel them off in my sleep because I was sending off telegrams all the time to our embassies out there saying, "Now make sure that the foreign minister understands who are the good Chinese and who are the bad Chinese and that they work very closely and establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of China." Of course the ROC was doing its bit during this time too. It wasn't all up to us. They deserve credit.

My very good friend Yang His-k'un, whom I saw in August of '98 when I visited Taiwan, very old now and fully retired, was the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs of the ROC. I believe he was Director of UN affairs Bureau in the foreign ministry when I served in Taipei and then later on he became a Vice-Minister and Ambassador to South Africa. He was the best known Chinese in Africa, better known on a personal basis than Chou En-lai. This was because Yang had been in the UN Secretariat in the 1950's and had been a member of UN visiting missions going out to these countries while were still colonized, helping them prepare for independence. The UN sent out these missions to help set up their governments and prepare them for self-government. Yang got to know all those people who were leaders politically in those days, but were nobodies internationally, and who later on became foreign ministers, prime ministers, etc., etc. He was great friends with all of them. Yang would go off every year on a grand tour of Africa and other countries, but particularly Africa, seeing all his old friends and jollyng them up. Yang was an extremely good diplomat. He was a very effective man.

As the economy of the Republic of China improved it also introduced a number of aid programs, particularly agricultural assistance programs, in these countries. The Republic of China government had had very good success with land reform and agricultural development in Taiwan. They had good, legitimate programs to show like crop improvements, livestock improvements, pest control, seed development, land use methods, and so on. They extended technical assistance to a lot of countries in Africa to build cordial relations with them. There was kind of a competition which I monitored very closely.

I worked on three levels. On the General Assembly level, on watching the international organizations with governmental representation that were not UN related but nonetheless were

official organizations in the international community. I worked with the Republic of China embassy to follow up and to coordinate our efforts with them and to consult with them. It was a full time job as liaison with the ROC embassy, monitoring the UN agencies and other unrelated international organizations, and working with our embassies in the developing countries as they established diplomatic relations upon independence. I also was just kind of monitoring what was going on in China and what was going on internationally as it related to this China representation issue.

*Q: You moved over to the Mainland China desk from '65 to '67?*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes. From early '65 or late '64. I was essentially two years on each desk.

*Q: What was going on in mainland China because I get confused about when the Great Leap Forward stopped and the Cultural Revolution started? What were we seeing in China and how were we interpreting it? How did we see it developing at that time?*

CUNNINGHAM: There were three issues involved at that time. The first was that the Great Leap Forward had ended about 1962 or 1963 catastrophically, as we now know. There was a famine during the last years of the Great Leap Forward and according to some statisticians the population of China shrank by a couple of million during that period of time from 1960 to about 1963 or 1964. Then of course there were recriminations within the Chinese political structure and inner councils as to what had caused this setback, the failure of this policy, and what the remedy should be.

The upshot of that was the great Cultural Revolution in which Mao Zedong went over the heads of the Politburo and the political leadership of the PRC to the populace as a whole in an attempt to do two things. One was to counter the criticisms of those who blamed him for the failures of the Great Leap Forward, this utopian scheme that he had, and secondly to reinvigorate what he felt was the flagging revolutionary spirit of the population. He launched the Red Guard movement and the little red book studying the thoughts of Mao. Of course he had lots of people helping him who were dependent on his success for the future of their own political careers. I suppose some people – there are in every organization and every society – were true believers in the doctrine.

*Q: How did we see Chou En-lai at this time?*

CUNNINGHAM: Chou En-lai was highly regarded in the community of China specialists, that is to say within the government and also within the scholarly community. Chou was looked upon as the moderator, the urbane, the cosmopolite, the man who understood how the world worked and who knew how to accommodate the relationships between societies that were different ideologically, economically, and politically, from China, always to China's advantage. He was seen as the go-between, the mediator, and he was idealized in this role by a lot of people including myself at that time.

*Q: Did we see him as a creature of Mao's?*

CUNNINGHAM: No, we did not see him as a creature of Mao. We saw him as a partner. As somebody whose advice was very influential with Mao Zedong and as somebody who could not act on his own, but who exercised a great deal of influence over the direction of Chinese policy and in a way as a counterbalance to the ideology and the utopianism of Mao Zedong. The main interest I think in the Department of State, and particularly on the China desk, was Chou En-la's role in international relations and in China's foreign policy, not so much his role in domestic policy. Obviously he had a great deal to do with domestic policy and had an important role there because he was the Prime Minister, but we emphasized more what he was doing in the international field than what he was doing in the domestic field. The transition from the Great Leap Forward to the Cultural Revolution was one major preoccupation, one of the major centers of attention of the Mainland China desk at that time.

The second concern of the Mainland China desk was China's policy towards the war in Vietnam because it was in 1964 that things really began to heat up in Vietnam. We were moving towards the decision to commit ground troops there. The Tonkin Gulf incident, the alleged firing upon the USS Turner Joy, I think took place in the fall of 1964 if I'm not mistaken. I get a little bit mixed up on the sequence of events. That was a watershed event; the retaliation and the air strikes against the North Vietnamese in retaliation for the firing upon the Turner Joy. We were moving into that and we were watching very closely. Would the Chinese come into the war or would the Chinese not come into the war? How would they behave towards this? The backdrop for that was the Sino-Soviet split, which was worsening all this time. How the Chinese- (end of tape)

The second preoccupation was what the Chinese would do with or in opposition to the Soviets with regards to supporting Vietnam. It was a triangular game there. The Chinese obviously did not want the Soviets to gain the predominant position in Vietnam and in effect outflank them and become the second major player in Southeast Asia in counterpoint to the United States. On the other hand, the Chinese were weakened by the Great Leap Forward. They were in the throes of the Great Cultural Revolution and things were going haywire all over China. The transportation network was severely stressed. The Vietnamese were pleading for material support of all kinds, logistical support. The Chinese were shipping a lot to the Vietnamese by various means. And then the Russians were expecting the Chinese to ship the Russian logistical support through China to support Vietnam. The Chinese were not up to handling all of that. Their capabilities were strained by domestic requirements and there was an overburden that they simply could not handle. But, if they protested too much or resisted too much on those grounds, this would be looked upon by the Soviets as failing to support a fraternal socialist people against the imperialistic American aggressors and would be looked upon by the Vietnamese as a betrayal and provide an open door for Soviet influence to increase in Southeast Asia, which the Chinese did not want.

This whole triangular, complicated relationship was going on there and we were paying a lot of attention to trying to figure out what the Chinese were going to do and how they were going to behave in this situation as it affected our interests in Southeast Asia and Vietnam. I participated in a couple of war game exercises relating to this program. Two of them in the Pentagon during that time. They took place down in the basement of the Pentagon where people tried to project certain scenarios of one sort or another. Much of it was directed towards what would the Chinese

do if...?

*Q: What was our feeling then. Here you have a China which you describe as not being able really to take care of its own and yet in the Vietnam War we were projecting a China that was in a sense trying to increase its empire. We considered it a threat all over. It wasn't just Communism, but the Chinese themselves.*

CUNNINGHAM: Well, there were two trains of thought and I think each gave some credence to the other. One was that China was too weak, did not want to confront the United States, had done so in Korea and learned the difficult lesson militarily, and just did not want to go to war with the United States. So, the Chinese could be expected to support the Vietnamese as fraternal allies against the "American imperialists" but would not commit their own forces or get themselves into a situation where Chinese blood would be shed as a result of American weaponry or military action. They would avoid that contingency.

On the other hand, there was a great deal of extremely hostile propaganda coming out of China at that time directed at United States policy in Vietnam. Much of this propaganda was whipped up by the fervor of the Great Cultural Revolution that was going on in China at the time. The Great Cultural Revolution was a rejection of all things Western and led to the destruction of every vestige of Western influence that anyone could find in China including the destruction of all pianos. Anything that was corrupt, bourgeois, alien, Western in any way was either criticized and denounced or destroyed. People were hounded to denounce such ideas. That campaign meshed with the tenor of the Chinese propaganda or pronouncements with respect to the American involvement in Vietnam.

So, it was puzzling. You could make the argument that the Chinese were whipping themselves up to get involved militarily in this thing and at the outset you really couldn't be sure because you could see both sides of this equation and either scenario had a certain amount of credibility to it. So, we had to play it by ear and keep testing this thing as we went along.

One of the main ways of testing it was through the ambassadorial level conversations in Warsaw that went on at that time. During the early part of the 1960s, the period that I was on the Mainland China desk, those conversations were held pretty regularly about once a month. I was not involved in the preparation of the instructions for our representatives at those talks. It was Ambassador Cabot who conducted them at that time. But, I would see them as they went out and I would see the readout as the reports came in. I was not involved in briefing the Republic of China embassy, which we regularly did at the deputy assistant secretary level. As soon as we got the report from Warsaw, the embassy would get a call to come over to get briefed on it. So, I was close to all of the output and input to it. These conversations, when the transcripts become available, are going to be pretty polemical on both sides. What we were doing on our side was countering, debunking, and denouncing the arguments that the Chinese had made in the previous round. You know, "You said so-and-so and here is our response to that." These transcripts, particularly the Chinese, then were very carefully analyzed. to see what clues they might give us toward the direction the Chinese were taking in regards to Vietnam and in regards to their relationship to the U.S.

But, there were other things that we did through Warsaw to make sure that after a while nobody stumbled on the trip wire. For example, there was one instance in which a U.S. aircraft flying a mission over the South China Sea fired a missile and the thing went astray and went into Chinese airspace. The Pentagon let us know about that right away and we fired off an urgent message to Warsaw to inform the Chinese embassy that a missile had gone astray and entered Chinese air space and probably landed somewhere in China. It was a mistake and there was nothing intentional about this. Please understand that it was not an attack on the PRC but just a misfire. I think there was an incident where a U.S. pilot either overflowed Chinese territory in South China or was downed by anti-aircraft fire or something. We very quickly notified the Chinese of this also. What we began doing was working very hard to reassure them that we had no hostile intent towards the PRC.

In the meantime, of course, there were some people in China who were talking about the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear capabilities and making very strong statements in this regard. But, now in retrospect we realize they were of a defensive nature and were not intended to be threatening or illustrative of Chinese intentions towards the U.S. and Vietnam. But, at the time that attracted a lot of attention. We were trying to figure out just what they meant by making such volatile and inflammatory statements.

I would say that a considerable part of the energies of the Mainland China desk during those years was directed towards the Chinese policy in Vietnam. I used to prepare every morning a short memorandum digest for the assistant secretary based upon incoming overnight telegrams and FBIS readouts. I would get in before the opening of business, the Department used to open about 8:30 in those days and Bill Bundy, the Assistant Secretary for East Asia, had a 9:00 am staff meeting. I would try to get in before 8:00 and pick up the overnight take from FBIS and pick up the telegrams. I would skim through to see what there was in there that should be drawn to the assistant secretary's attention and provide a little bit of interpretation or précis - this is what this means. Some of my memos were good and some were bad, but it was a kind of daily grind that you had to go through. The key thing in all of those was what's new in regard to Vietnam today from the China standpoint. That was the main thing that I worked on.

Other things that we worked on, and I am reminded of this because I saw Art Dornheim yesterday at lunch. Art was on the desk with me and he was the guy who was responsible for monitoring the embargo on trade with the Peoples Republic of China. Of course, when we instituted this embargo in the 1950s it was as hermetically sealed as you could possibly make it. In fact, it was so tight that afterwards people realized that it didn't allow us to buy the "Peoples Daily" in Hong Kong, so we couldn't translate the thing to find out what the Chinese were saying. There had to be exceptions granted.

Another thing that was going on during those years on the China desk, and it influenced me later on, was that we were trying to find small ways in which to gradually ease the limitations upon contacts with the PRC because we felt that if the PRC were too confined, too constricted in its contact with the outside world the new generation rising up since liberation in 1949 and gradually taking positions in the bureaucracy there would not have a true perspective on the United States and the outside world. It was considered unhealthy for the future of China's relationship with the world for it to be completely sealed off from what was going on.

For example, and this is an extreme example but it is representative of both the restrictions and of the lengths to which we went. Art was responsible for monitoring the embargo on trade with the PRC, which was total. There was an instance in which a 12 or 14 year old boy, who was a pheasant fancier out in South Dakota, sent a letter to somebody in the Department of State, probably the secretary, and it ended up on Art Dornheim's desk. In the letter this boy said that he knew there were pheasants in North China, as there are pheasants in South Dakota on the prairie. He had been corresponding with a counterpart in North China who was a pheasant fancier and this counterpart was willing to exchange pheasant eggs with him so that South Dakota pheasants could be hatched in North China and North China pheasants could be hatched in South Dakota. The boy wanted help in getting an export license from the Department of Commerce that would lift the ban for strategic purposes on trade with the Peoples Republic of China to allow a non-monetary exchange of pheasant eggs between the U.S. and the PRC by this young boy and his pen pal in North China. That is illustrative of the extremes to which we went to prevent any commercial contact whatsoever with the Peoples Republic of China under the Trading with the Enemy Act. Art Dornheim worked on this thing and succeeded in getting an export license for the exchange of pheasant eggs. He did things like that periodically. There was a little tally that we kept there in the office. Each one of these successful cases represented a further step in removing barriers to contact between the U.S. and the PRC. Very incremental barriers.

Of course, there were times when there was a natural disaster of some kind or other in the PRC and we offered humanitarian assistance, medicines and food assistance. In most instances the Chinese declined those offers, but in making them we were assured we would be able to obtain an exception to the ban on commercial exchanges or exchanges of any kind with the People Republic of China to permit that sort of thing to go forward. And, I'm sure there are other instances, but I don't recall them offhand now, of steps that we took to increase communication with the PRC.

We also used to assiduously scoop up every scrap of information we could from any traveler who went to the PRC of any nationality who had had contact with people at the top levels. For example, Felix Greene, who I think is a British or New Zealand correspondent, made a couple of trips into China in the 1960s and when he came out he would be contacted by the consulate general in Hong Kong and be debriefed fully. They would report back and we would have some questions to be put to Felix Greene wherever we could find him. We used to debrief Edgar Snow, who made a couple of trips to China, in Hong Kong, and I think in the U.S. He was exhaustively debriefed each time. There was a Yugoslav correspondent in Beijing whose reports we used to find very, very informative. He had good contacts in the establishment there and his news reports and analyses were very useful to us in understanding what was going on in the PRC. But, all of this was a laborious process, not only on our desk but in FBIS, INR, the CIA and every other open source we could possibly find to help construct from all the available information some kind of a picture of what was going on in the PRC, what they were thinking, what they were believing, who was important, who was under attack within the establishment, etc. Then to attempt through third parties to validate, verify or discount some of these impressions. It was like diagnosing a patient whom you couldn't see or touch.

*Q: What was the attitude on the China desk about eventually recognizing China? I would have*

*thought with the turmoil within China this didn't feel like a good time that you could really get very far with anything.*

CUNNINGHAM: There were two schools of thought, both, I think, within the Mainland China section and more broadly within the bureau and particularly between the Mainland China section, the Republic of China section....we can broaden it out a bit more. There were really four, maybe five, corners to this analysis. The Republic of China section, the American embassy in Taipei, the U.S. consulate general in Hong Kong, and the Mainland China section in the Department of State. I think you might say the body of China advisors, scholars and analysts who are close to the diplomatic establishment in Washington, including the intelligence community. People like Doak Barnett at the Brookings Institution, other respected people who were very good analysts, had spent time in China, devoted their lives to studying it, provided much of the background material and were in regular communication with the Department of State, particularly with the Mainland China desk. There were some who were cordial to the idea of actively seeking to broaden contact with the PRC with the eventual goal of establishing formal relations. Cognizant, of course, of all the difficulties that would be involved in that in terms of our relationship with the Republic of China, in terms of symbolism with regard to the cold war as a whole, in terms of perceptions of the PRC and what our motivations were, and everything else that you can think of. And then there were other people who were very wary of this idea and did not see any redeeming features in the PRC establishment that would warrant initiatives on the part of the United States. Did not even think they would be reciprocated by the PRC. They weren't necessarily against the idea.

I was one of those who was wary and had serious reservations about this. My reservations were very strong at the time that I joined the Mainland China desk, but over the two years that I worked there those reservations moderated when I understood better what was going on. So, using myself as an example of those who were very conservative and reserved about this idea, initially when I first joined the China desk in late 1964 ...I wanted to work there in order to be a true China specialist, but I did not go there with the expectation or intention that I would contribute towards the development of a relationship with the PRC. Rather, I would go there with the expectation that I would be working in a very guarded fashion with regards to the initiatives and what the PRC might try to do. But, the more you worked in that field, regardless of your persuasion, the more you came to realize that this is a country that cannot be ignored. It is there, you have to deal with it, you have to cope with it some how, and I did not leave that job with any understanding of how that might be done, any formula for doing that, but what I did leave there with was the belief that things would have to change and we would have to move in that direction. Somehow or other an accommodation of some kind was going to have to be reached in dealing with the PRC.

So, I believe that is a fair description of the classifications. I do not recall that there were ever accusatory relationships among the people who were the China specialists of my generation who worked on this problem. We were a special generation because for the most part, almost all of us had had no experience on the PRC mainland. Our only contact and understanding of Chinese personalities and attitudes was formed through study in graduate schools at universities in the United States such as Columbia, Harvard and Yale. Burton Levin, for example, a very good friend of mine and colleague of this period, is an example of that. Burt is a graduate of Brooklyn

and did graduate studies at Columbia University in the East Asian Institute, a very fine institution. And there were others like Morton Abramowitz, who got his training at Harvard. So there were people who had that kind of background. There were some people like myself who didn't have that academic background but had some kind of experience in Asia and then came into the Chinese language program under FSI auspices studied Chinese and did area studies, which was more or less self-selected reading and some lectures in the Foreign Service Institute at that time. That was true of several dozen of the China specialists who came into the service in the 1950s or at the end of the 1940s and worked all through this period ('50s, '60s and into the '70s) to some extent under the guidance of people like Al Jenkins and Graham Martin and others who had served in China as very junior officers in the 1940s. We had the benefit of their wisdom and viewpoints. And people like Ed Rice, who was trained in the 1930s and worked on China in the 1940s. What we were deprived of was the experience, and the vision and viewpoint and understanding of people like John Stuart Service, John Davies, John Carter Vincent and others who were very strong China specialists but who had been eliminated through the McCarthy purges of the early 1950s. We didn't have the benefit of that kind of guidance and mentorship in developing our points of view. That was a handicap.

I don't mean by that that we necessarily would have bought their viewpoint, but it was a gap in the development of our capabilities. All the time that I worked on China affairs I was always very conscious of what I didn't know. From what I learned through my contacts and work in Taiwan and my studies and other experiences in Asia I think I developed a pretty good understanding of the Chinese mentality and personality, their outlook and philosophy. I have great respect for my colleagues with whom I worked during that period and many of whom have very fine minds and understanding of things, but I don't think that there were any "greats" among us on the scale of people like George Kennan with regard to Russia and the Soviet Union, not that level of thoughtfulness, and probity and understanding. Maybe there never will be, I don't know.

*Q: Speaking of the Soviet Union, from the China desk, how seriously did we at that time look upon the differences between Red China and Red Soviet Union?*

CUNNINGHAM: I don't think that we accepted the Sino-Soviet split until the partial test ban treaty was concluded in 1963. Donald Zagoria had published his book about 1960 or 1961. It came out just at the beginning of the Kennedy administration. Even by the time that I reached the China desk in 1962, this thesis was very widely disputed and discounted within the Department of State.

*Q: His thesis being?*

CUNNINGHAM: That the Chinese and the Soviets had reached an irreconcilable division between them and that they should not be looked upon as common allies but rather as potential adversaries of one another. That point of view was very widely questioned. It was not accepted as the basis of our policy, certainly, at the time I arrived on the China desk. We still saw areas of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, but then when the test ban treaty took place and Harriman went to Moscow to sign the treaty, the Chinese denunciation of the Soviets for entering into that convention was fierce. From that time on, I think the general

view changed and it became accepted that the Chinese and the Soviets had reached a point where they could not be regarded as working hand in glove with one another any longer. There were serious points of dispute between them. There were border clashes. And, of course, in October of 1964 the Chinese detonated their own nuclear device, which the Russians did not like at all and which exacerbated Soviet fears of China. Again, this background became very important in the analysis of Chinese and Soviet behavior in regards to the Vietnam War. I think people have to understand it was a very complex puzzle that we were trying to figure out at that time as to how each party would behave and how this would affect the outcome of our war in Vietnam.

*Q: Were you on the China desk ever sitting together with colleagues on the Soviet desk and running through notes to see if there were any changes on how things were going, or was this each done on its own?*

CUNNINGHAM: That is a very interesting question. We did not have a lot of communication with the Soviet desk on a regular basis. That is to say, we didn't get together with them daily and hash things over. But, we did have contact with them. I think at some point we deployed a China specialist to the embassy in Moscow.

*Q: Yes, I think Bill Brown was one.*

CUNNINGHAM: Bill Brown was one. Stape Roy was another.

*Q: But at the desk level? You were in the same building.*

CUNNINGHAM: That's right and around the corner from each other. I remember going over there from time to time with telegrams to clear and getting kind of a quizzical response from people on the Soviet desk. It was sort of, well, you people don't really understand the Soviet mentality because what you are saying in regard to this particular problem is a little bit out of the context of our understanding of the Soviets and the Soviet mentality. And, our comment was that they didn't understand the mentality of the Chinese. This was not a hostile relationship, but there was a clear perceptual separation, you might say, that I think to some extent militated against a close coordination of effort on the part of the U.S.

*Q: I was just thinking. The State Department and the Department of Defense usually had one of their assistant secretaries having breakfast together once a week or so. I would think that you should have had almost the equivalent of that at some place with a relative senior person in the China and Soviet areas. Just getting together and talking to each other once a week or something like that.*

CUNNINGHAM: There wasn't a rivalry, but I cannot recall any systematic coordinated attempt to cultivate on the part of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs a relationship with the Soviet desk. Obviously we cleared telegrams back and forth and obviously we communicated with one another, but I cannot recall that we ever made a systematic effort to understand the point of view of the other and to talk it over and to get together on a regular basis. In fact, I do not recall on the part of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs any systematic, organized attempt to compare, discuss or contrast our understanding of what was going on in our region with the understanding held by

officers in other regions like South Asia. After all there were Indian-Soviet border clashes during this time. We didn't have a cross cultural approach at that time to the fashioning of our policy. Maybe that is one of the weaknesses of our organization institutionally of the Department of State that by dividing the world into regions we have to some extent compartmentalized the development, fashioning of our policy with the countries of those regions.

*Q: From your perspective at the time, what was the role of Dean Rusk? He obviously had concerns in Asia, but one has the feeling that he was working so hard with Vietnam that the rest of Asia kind of fell by the wayside as far as his focus was concerned. Did you have any feel of input there?*

CUNNINGHAM: As the 1960s went on, Vietnam more and more took over the foreign policy agenda of the U.S. Rusk more and more devoted himself to being the prime defender of the administration's policy in Vietnam. Part of that was the personal relationship that Rusk had with President Johnson. My understanding at the time was that there was a very strong bond of trust and fraternalism you might say between the two of them. Rusk could be counted upon any time that the question of Vietnam came up to go right down the line in the most rigorous defense of the U.S. position in regard to Vietnam. The prime example of that was the hearings in the Senate foreign relations committee conducted by Fulbright on the Vietnam War. At one point I think Rusk was up there perhaps two full days, maybe longer. He was questioned in exhaustive detail by Fulbright principally but also by other members of the committee as well. He was staunch and unyielding in defense of the administration's position in those hearings.

I suppose that more and more our relations with other countries in Asia came to be measured by their attitude towards our policy in Vietnam. It is not that we had no bilateral interests, obviously we did and attended to them, but the Vietnam War became an all-consuming consideration in setting the tenor of our relations with the other countries in the region.

*Q: In January 1967?*

CUNNINGHAM: In January 1967 I left the Bureau of East Asian Affairs and went to Columbia University under the FSI auspices to do a year of study on East Asia. I was there for the entire year. Normally people go at the beginning of the fall semester and stay through the academic year, but our 5<sup>th</sup> child was due in October 1966 so I had the opportunity to do this sabbatical year but I asked to have the beginning of it deferred until the spring semester began so that I could be home for the birth of our 5<sup>th</sup> child and help with things around the house. That was granted and as a consequence I had not only the spring semester and fall semester of 1967 at Columbia, but also the summer session there.

*Q: Columbia, 1967. Everything went explosive the next year didn't it?*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes.

*Q: How did you find it from your perspective and what you were doing at that time?*

CUNNINGHAM: The Vietnam teach-ins had already begun the previous year. The campus

movements of opposition to the Vietnam War got underway in 1967 and there was evidence of that all over the campus. Of course, other things were going on, too. This was the period of the civil rights movement in the United States and that was picking up a lot of steam. The civil rights act had been passed two years previously, so there was a lot of agitation about that. and the two tended to play into one another in some respects among student activists. I can't recall ever being personally confronted by anybody over our policy in Vietnam, but there was obvious growing of dislike for it both among faculty and students on campus. Among the faculty at Columbia there was again a difference of opinion about what we were doing in Vietnam, where this was leading, and I can't recall too clearly now, what the various opinions were. I personally was cordially received by all the members of the faculty in the East Asian Institute and elsewhere and got to know many of them very well. There were a few occasions when I was called upon to discuss U.S. policy in Vietnam, about which I had serious misgivings, myself. After all, I had been in Vietnam during the French war against Vietnam and I saw how that turned out. And, as I think I said previously when I was called up to Bill Bundy's office one day in the '60s and was told that the marines were going to be landing, we were going into Vietnam with ground combat forces, I had a sinking feeling that this thing was not going to work because of what I had observed during the earlier period when the French were fighting on the ground against the Viet Minh. So, I had mixed feelings about it. When called upon to explain the administration's Vietnam policy, I, myself, had serious reservations about the wisdom of that policy and what the outcome would- (end of tape)

I left Columbia University and went on to my post at Tokyo in 1968 just before the Tet offensive, which was the big turning point in Vietnam. There was obviously rising discontent and it was quite evident on the Columbia University campus, particularly in the fall of 1967 academic year. By that time I was getting busier with my studies and I decided to do a monograph on the attitude of the Chinese Communists towards the United Nations in the period prior to liberation leading up to the beginning of the Korean war. So, I was pretty well buried in research on that and going home on weekends to help out with the family and a lot of personal preoccupations. So, I wasn't seeking opportunities to get involved in foreign policy discussions up there.

I do remember one time when I was asked, to go up to Providence, Rhode Island with two others to speak about our policy in Vietnam to a church group on the campus of Brown University. This was in the fall of 1967. I agreed to do that. It was a trying experience. My point was that our main motivation for getting involved in this action from my own personal observation and what I understood of U.S. foreign policy was to counter a force that was hostile to the ideals and purposes of American democracy. We were fighting people who were inimical to our way of life.

One of the other two people on the panel who had been sent either by Washington or was from Washington complimented me on the presentation that I had made and thought it was very good and that I would have to write it up, because it was extemporized, and send it into the State Department, which I did. I don't know if it ever went anywhere or saw the light of day again.

Also, coincidentally, during that time, I made a month long trip in January to Australia. The International Congress of Orientalists was holding a meeting in Canberra, Australia. This is a

conclave of all the people who specialize in Asian studies from all around the world. It is a venerable organization that goes back to the 19<sup>th</sup> century. I had attended a session of the Congress that was the first one to be held in the United States at the University of Michigan in 1967, when I was at Columbia. I thought this was a neat organization, they were meeting in Canberra, and I had never been to Australia. I decided that I would like to attend the Congress and present a paper on the manuscript that I had done while at Columbia University on sabbatical in 1967. My topic was Chinese Communist Party attitudes towards the United Nations up until the time of liberation in 1949 and the Security Council vote on Korea in December 1950. My proposal was accepted. I got a conference rate on an airline ticket and worked out a lot of things and flew to Canberra about January 3. I also wanted to take advantage of this trip to visit other places in Southeast Asia and was gone about a month. I went to the Philippines, where I had never been, Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, etc.

Two interesting things happened on that trip. One was when I presented my paper at Canberra. We knew from Foreign Service reporting that the Romanian consul general in Sydney at that time was a well-known China specialist who had served in Beijing. We were interested in his views of what was going on in China. Romania was one of the countries that Nixon was cultivating and thinking about using as a channel to China, although none of us knew that at the time. It turned out that this consul general's wife was in the audience when I gave my paper and she had been with him when he was in Beijing and was to some extent a China scholar in her own right. She was interested in my paper and we had a little conversation about it afterwards. She and some others were interested in whether or not this was some kind of a signal that we were sending to the Chinese, since it was the first secretary from the American embassy in Tokyo who was presenting the paper? Well, it was no signal, but on the other hand since I was a China watcher and specialist, I was not averse to taking advantage of any opportunity that came along to use my little paper as a vehicle for having broader discussions about China. The Romanian lady invited me to visit her and her husband in Sydney after the Congress. When I got to Sydney, I called the Romanian Consulate, but I was not able to make contact with the Consul General or his wife, so no conversation ensued.

On the way back to Tokyo from that conference I stopped in Taipei. Walter McConaughy was the American ambassador to the Republic of China at that time and Bill Thomas was the DCM. I went around to the Foreign Ministry to see my old friend, Yang His-k'un, the Vice Minister who had for so long worked so hard in Africa for so long to retain support for China's representation in the United Nations. He welcomed me and we had a long conversation in his office, during which he said, "You know, this situation in the General Assembly is a real worry to us and the vote is getting awfully close and we are not quite sure what to do. We have to think of something. You know, if someone at the level of the U.S. vice president [who was Spiro Agnew at the time] could propose or float the idea of two seats for China in the general assembly as a way of addressing the problem that is coming up, that would open up this alternative for discussion here in Taiwan." I believe that Agnew was to make a visit to Asia a few weeks later, and Yang's idea was that Agnew would raise the idea in the course of his trip. I was quite surprised that Yang made this statement. Of course, he was talking to me as a friend. I was not from the embassy or on any official business. I had just dropped in to see an old friend. We had about a half-hour of conversation.

I immediately went back to the American embassy and saw Bill Thomas and said, "This is what vice minister Yang His-k'un said to me," and Bill said, "Let's go in and see the ambassador about this." So, we went into the ambassador's office and he said, "Mr. Ambassador, Bill Cunningham has been over to see his old pal vice minister Yang." McConaughy knew who I was and said, "Yes. Tell me what he said." So, I recounted the whole thing. McConaughy said, "We have to report this right away. This is a very important conversation, Bill. I am very glad you came back to tell us about this." The interesting thing about that was that McConaughy did not resist the idea at all. Now, you know, I've earlier described how we in the China crowd used to speak about the policy of the three Walters--Walter Judd, Walter Robertson and Walter McConaughy --all hard-line supporters of the Nationalists and resolute opponents of the Chinese Communists. So, it was quite surprising to me that Walter McConaughy was receptive to the idea of a two China maneuver in the general assembly as a way of saving the position of the Republic of China in the United Nations and addressing this problem - - surprising because it would mean a radical departure from the official ideology of the Nationalists and entry for the Chinese Communists onto the world stage. .

So, that telegram went off to the Department of State. I think as a matter of fact Bill Thomas asked me to sit down and dictate it to Sally Smith, his secretary at the time and another able Foreign Service trouper who had served with other China specialists and me from Tokyo to Singapore. I dictated the cable, and then Bill signed off on it. Of course, by the time I got back to Tokyo, everyone in the Embassy everyone was asking questions about what I had been doing being gone a month and then monkeying around in China policy. My answer was that I was just visiting an old friend. After I got back to Tokyo people came out from Washington and the buzz was what are we going to do about China in the United Nations, etc. So, that was what I was focusing on.

This brings us to the 7<sup>th</sup> of April 1971. Three o'clock in the afternoon I am sitting in my office when the phone rings. It is a telephone call from Frank Donovan, now deceased, who was the press officer in USIS. Donovan said to me, "Bill, the Italian press agency has just moved the story to the effect that the PRC table tennis team playing in the international matches in Nagoya has invited the U.S. table tennis team to visit China." I said, "Yes." Frank said, "Well, we are going to be asked about this. What should we say?" I said, "Frank, just tell them we know about it." He said, "That is not enough. We've got to say more." By this time something had begun to percolate in my mind and I said, "Okay, Frank, tell them we know about it and that if they decide to go it will not be against United States policy." I stopped and started to say, "Well, we can elaborate that a little bit." And Frank said, "That is enough. We don't need to say anymore." I said, "Okay," and hung up.

Then I thought to myself, "I better be able to back this up. I know I have seen something in print somewhere to this effect and I think I am sure of my ground." I started looking around and found in my bookshelf the statement I was looking for. It was in the annual report on the foreign relations of the United States from the President to the Congress. This is a series that Kissinger started up when he was the National Security Advisor, and there are three or four volumes in that series, one for each year of Kissinger's tenure. The Department of State put out a parallel report, a thicker and more detailed report also for each of the same years after the presidential reports started coming out. Well, there in the report of the President to the Congress was the statement

that the United States is open to educational, cultural and athletic exchanges with the Peoples Republic of China. Just one sentence to that affect. I thought, there it is. Table tennis is a sport, an athletic event, and we have said that it is okay to have exchanges with them. They have invited the American team, and there is no policy reason why it shouldn't go. I was right. Then, as I further looked at this I thought, "Well, you know, I hadn't really focused on this sentence before." I then recalled the pheasant egg exchange I spoke of earlier. I thought to myself that my colleagues back there on the mainland China desk in the Department of State have been working away in incremental fashion to develop language that would open the door just a little more to contact with China, and had finally managed to get this short sentence inserted into a high level statement of the U.S. government. This was the sort of thing that the desk would try to do to gradually and more or less below the radar to open up channels and opportunities for communication with the PRC." That is all I thought it was at the time. I had no knowledge of anything that Henry Kissinger was doing through back channels with Yahya Khan, the president of Pakistan.

Okay, I had just found this statement and hadn't even sat down at my desk yet when the phone rang again. It was Alan Carter, who was the public affairs officer in Tokyo. Carter said, "Frank told me about his conversation with you and what you said." I said, "Yes." Carter said, "Don't you think you have gone awfully far?" I had the text in front of me by now, and I read the sentence to him. He said, "I don't know about that. It has gone very far." I said, "Alan, this is an official, public statement of United States policy." By this time I was getting a little bit assertive about this because having found this sentence I couldn't see any basis for the Embassy to issue a statement saying the team can't go or throwing cold water on that. It would be the wrong thing to do and would be denying the validity of a statement of the government and that would send the wrong signal to the Chinese. I said, "I think this is what we should say. Here it is. It's a public statement. How are you going to go against that?" Well", Carter said to me, "You had better talk to the ambassador." I said, "Okay, I'll go talk to the ambassador."

So, I hung up and started out my office down the corridor to the ambassador's office. I walked in and said to his secretary, "Is the ambassador free? I have something I want to ask him about." She said, "Oh, you might as well go on in, everybody else is in there." I thought this was a rather strange statement but went on in. The ambassador's office was a room at least 50 feet in length. It had been the formal waiting room when the embassy was built and the secretary's office had been the ambassador's office. But the rooms had been switched around at some point.

Ambassador Meyer was standing behind his desk at the far end of the room just hanging up the telephone as I walked in. Seated in a corner to my right on a couch were two full bird colonels of the United States Army, both in full uniform. The two colonels looked up, startled by my bursting into the ambassador's office. They looked at me, then looked at him. I started to say something to the Ambassador and he said, with more than a hint of exasperation in his voice, "All right, go ahead and put out the statement." I said, "Okay," and turned to leave the office. As I was going out the door, I heard Meyer almost shout "And, you know what you might do when you put it out is ask why they don't invite the Republic of China too. A bunch of damn Communists." I said, "Yes, thank you, sir," walked out, and closed the door.

I never asked Alan Carter, at least I don't recall asking him, but I assume that I no sooner walked

out of my office than Carter called the ambassador to tell him before I got there what was going on. I never had the opportunity at that moment to discuss this matter with Ambassador Meyer at all. Walking down to his office, I must confess that I was a little bit apprehensive about what he might say and how I was going to present this thing to him. So, I was quite taken back by his response.

Not only that, Meyer's comment about inviting the ROC players to the Mainland reflected an awareness of a controversy in Nagoya over the participation of the Chinese teams in the table tennis championships. The Japanese were hosting this event and the PRC players wanted to attend, and I recently have found out that the Japanese wanted the PRC to attend because the Chinese were the world champions, and if they didn't attend the matches would be a dud. Again, this was 1971 and the Japanese were trying to promote their position internationally and they did not want to have a table tennis match that was going to be a flop, meaningless because the world champions were not present. So, they had made a demarche to the Chinese to encourage them to attend. But, I didn't know any of this at the time. I did know that when the PRC indicated that they would attend, that then the question of the attendance of the ROC team became an issue. The ROC team, which had been invited, was then dis-invited from the matches and did not attend. I knew this subliminally, but I hadn't been paying any attention to it. Meyer apparently was clued in to all of this and was familiar with it. How, I don't know and I am going to have to ask him about that because I am now getting back to doing research on this episode.

So, I walked out of the Ambassador's office and back to my office and sat down waiting for the phone to ring. I waited for somebody to call and say that such-and-such a paper had noticed this story and wanted to know the position of the United States government, etc. Nothing happened. Nobody called. I was expecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to call up to ask what we were going to say. I finally called Frank and asked if any of the press had called. I think he told me no, nothing has happened. Then I began to worry a little bit. I thought that when this thing bursts I want to make sure that we get the line out that I have authored and has been approved by the Ambassador, because it was beginning to dawn on me that it would be important in terms of the relationship with the PRC. In other words, I didn't want the PRC to get a negative answer on this because that would cut against the public statements that had been made by the White House and the Department. I didn't want somebody who was uninformed responding to this question either. So long as it was a business day and we were in session we could be pretty sure the question would go to the right place and the answer would come out right, but beyond that I didn't know. Only four people, Ambassador Meyer, Alan Carter, Frank Donovan, and I knew and had agreed how to respond.

Also time was running and I began to realize I had better get a report to Washington on this, but at that point it was a non-story. There was a press report that was available to Washington DC through FBIS to the effect that an invitation had been extended which begged the question of what the response had been or would be and I had nothing to report in that regard. I couldn't even report that we had been asked and had said something which would more or less set the tone for this matter. So, I was in a bit of a dilemma. The day ended, people went home, I was working late cleaning off my desk. About 6:30 Bob Immerman walked into my office and handed me a slip of paper and said, "Call this telephone number and ask for this person." I said, "What is this all about?" He said, "Just a minute ago I was walking out of the embassy, crossing

the lobby and the marine guard was muttering something about people wanting to go to China.” Now, Immerman had known what had been going on during the afternoon. That word had gotten around because I had informed the other people in the political section as to what was happening. So, it was sort of the buzz in that part of the embassy at the time. And, I guess Sneider was aware of it also. Nobody had told me boo except Alan Carter who said he thought I was going awfully far.

So Immerman heard this marine guard was muttering something about people going to China. (Parenthetically, I should note that at that time the marine guard was not encased in a bulletproof pillbox in the middle of the chancery entrance. He sat behind a desk to one side of the lobby, and his mutterings were perfectly audible to anyone walking across the lobby.) Immerman went over and asked the marine what this was all about. He said, “Oh, some guy called up and wants to go to China and was looking for the duty officer. I gave him the number.” Immerman said, “Did you get the man’s name and telephone number?” The fellow said, “Yes.” Immerman said, “Write it on a piece of paper.” The marine did and handed it to Immerman who brought it up to me.

I called that number in Nagoya and got Graham Steenhoven, who was at the time the President of the U.S. Table Tennis Association. I told him who I was. He said, “Thank God you called. I have been trying to reach the American embassy and I can’t get a hold of anybody. We got an invitation to go to China and I want to know whether or not it would be against U.S. policy for us to accept.” He said he was barricaded in his hotel room, and the team was outside excitedly pounding on the door. I said, “Mr. Steenhoven, I am aware of the press report that you had gotten the invitation, and if we are asked by the press, this is what we will say.” I repeated to him what I had told Frank Donovan. I read the two statements to him. He said, “You are saying that we should go.” I said, “No, I am not saying that you should go. You are private American citizens and it is up to you to make up your minds for yourselves as to what you are going to do. You make the decision. I am not making it for you. The U.S. government is not going to tell you what to do about this. What I am saying is that the U.S. government has said that we are open to athletic exchanges with the Peoples Republic of China.” He said, “Okay. It won’t be against U.S. policy if we go.” I said, “No, it will not.” He said, “Thank you very much and hung up.”

Then I called Armin Meyer at his residence and said, “Mr. Ambassador, I have just now talked with Mr. Steenhoven, President of the U.S. Table Tennis Association, in Nagoya.” I started to tell him more when the Ambassador interrupted and said, “Bill, can you speed this up, I’m late for a reception.” I said, “Okay, Mr. Ambassador, this is the bottom line. I read him the statements and he said, ‘If they go it is not against U.S. policy?’ and I said, ‘That’s right.’” Meyer said, “Fine. Call Al Jenkins in Washington.” Alfred LeSesne Jenkins was the Director of Mainland China Affairs at the time. It later turned out that Al Jenkins as a foreign service inspector had inspected Armin Meyer in Teheran and the two of them had hit it off very well and Meyer knew that Jenkins was the China desk officer. I said, “Mr. Ambassador it is early in Washington, they are not at work yet.” He said, “Call him anyway.” I said, “Okay.”

So, I called Jenkins. I called the Department of State’s operation center and as I was doing so I thought that this is going out over the international telephone net and everybody will pick it up. The Japanese will pick it up. Do we want that? Well, we want them to know in some way or other and this is kind of a face saving way for them to find out and maybe they will call me so

that I can tell them what is going on. I wasn't going to take the initiative to call anybody in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and tell them what we were doing. That would look like we were pushing it and I didn't think we should give that kind of a signal. I will come back to this in a minute.

Then I thought the Russians are going to find out about it for sure, but that is okay. We don't mind if they know that we are getting closer to the PRC. In fact it has been part of our policy over the last few years to exploit differences between the Soviets and the PRC. And then I thought, well will the PRC know about it, hear about it? Well, maybe and maybe not, depending on their technology. But, if they do so much the better because they will know that we are positive to this idea. Then I wondered if the ROC would find out about it. I thought maybe they will because they have good enough technology by now that they can and if they do, so much the better also because it saves us the pain of breaking the news to them out of the blue. So, I saw no reason not to make this phone call, which I did.

The operations center answered and I told them that I wanted to speak to Alfred Jenkins who is head of the China desk. The fellow said to me, "Sir, you know it is 5 o'clock in the morning in Washington and he is at home." I said, "Yes, I do know that." He said, "You want us to wake him up?" I said, "Yes, I do want you to wake him up." He said, "Okay," and patched me over to Al Jenkins home phone out on MacArthur Blvd somewhere in DC. The phone rang and rang and rang for a long time. This was in the era before answering machines. I'm not sure what would have happened had one of those devices been attached to Al's phone.

Finally a very sleepy but recognizable voice answered the phone. I said, "Al, this is Bill Cunningham in Tokyo." He said, "Yes. It is early morning here." I said, "I know. The PRC has invited the American table tennis team to visit China after playing in the championships in Nagoya." He said, "Yes." I said, "Ambassador Meyer wanted me to call you and tell you about this." He said, "Yes." I said, "I have talked to the head of the table tennis association and told him that if they decided to accept the invitation it will not be in violation of U.S. policy." Al said, "That sounds about right," and hung up.

I thought to myself, "My God, he doesn't know what I said. He hasn't gotten it because he very clearly hung up without reacting to the most important event in U.S. - China relations since the Warsaw talks began." So, I thought now what do I do? Do I call him back? I was very worried because Jenkins would go into the office, and any telegram that I send or press report that gets there is going to be waiting for him when he arrives. His telephone is going to be ringing off the hook and all kinds of people are going to be asking him what the hell is going on. The White House is going to be after him. At this time I was still thinking of Richard Nixon and the White House in the anti-Communist hard-line mode. I didn't know about the Kissinger back channel thing and I hadn't really focused on the "Foreign Affairs" article Nixon wrote in 1967 either. I assumed that this news was headed toward an environment where it would be welcomed only on the Mainland China desk, and only there would there be people who could manage the implications and repercussions in constructive fashion. This all sounds very peculiar thirty years later, but the political atmosphere in the Washington of the Vietnam era was highly charged and volatile with respect to dealings with any of the communist countries.

I was really concerned now, but I figured I had to prepare a telegram to send out to report. Then it suddenly dawned on me that Herb Levin, who had worked with me and was my China colleague, now was on the national security council staff in Washington. So I called Washington again and asked to be patched over to Herb Levin's home. I got Herb who was fully awake, in fact finishing his breakfast and soon to go out the door to get in the White House car to go to work. I told him what was going on and he said, "Hah!" Great! Send your telegram, mark it this way, say this, say that, and I will take care of everything at this end of the line." So, I said, "Okay, that's great."

I called my wife to say I was going to be late that evening and prepared my telegram. By this time everybody had left. I was alone in the offices, the secretaries had gone, etc. It was before optical character scanners for transmitting telegrams had come in so I prepared to type up the telegram on a green telegram form neatly enough so that the guys in the code room could encrypt it. I set to work preparing what turned out to be the first of several telegrams that evening. I was working on the first one and all of a sudden here appeared my wife in the office with my supper. When she came in I told her what was going on and she was excited and thrilled to hear about it but I told her we couldn't talk about this to anyone. We have to keep it to ourselves. She, of course, is very trustworthy and discreet.

So, I prepared my telegram and it seems to me there were two or three that I sent that evening and I can't recall why I was sending that many and included the whole circuit – Hong Kong, Taipei, Moscow, London, where we had a China watch, Paris and a few other places – and sent this thing off slugged for Washington in the way Herb had told me to send it. I think I may have sent more than one. I think I sent one just to say that there was a press report and that we were going to respond in a certain way based upon the statements in the president's report and the secretary of state's report because that was more or less kind of an open unclassified sort of thing. The press report and the statements were unclassified and our response would become unclassified anyway so there is no reason to make that highly classified. I also wanted to be sure that the line we had decided upon in Tokyo (and by then with Herb Levin in the White House also) would get the widest possible distribution and thus become the governing statement for all U.S. sources. Then I did a more in-depth, classified report on my conversation with Steenhoven in Nagoya.

I had given Steenhoven my telephone numbers and told him to call me any time if he needed any help. It may have been that evening that he called back and said, "Well, now, if we go to China, accept their invitation, they are going to expect a reciprocal invitation from the United States. Can we invite them to come to the United States and tell them they will be able to come?" I said, "Well, that's a problem. I will have to put that one up to Washington." Steenhoven was a very experienced man and had been in international table tennis activities for a long time and he was aware of the section of the McCarran Act, at that time the governing version of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act. It required a prior clearance by the Department of Justice of anyone coming from a Communist country to the United States to verify that it would be in the national interest to admit this person and would not represent a threat to the security of the United States, or something to that effect. So, I knew you couldn't invite anybody from one of these countries to come to the U.S. unless prior approval had been obtained from the Department of Justice. Well, how do you get prior approval from the Department of Justice if we hadn't told

the Chinese yet that we were going to accept their invitation and in return invite them to the U.S. So, I said, "I cannot tell you that they indeed will be admitted to the U.S. if you extend an invitation. I understand the issue here, but I do not have the authority to answer your question. I will put it to Washington." So, another telegram to Washington.

Finally, about midnight I managed to get home and went to sleep. At three o'clock in the morning my telephone rang and it was Al Jenkins now fully alert saying, "We got your telegrams in here and we understand the problem concerning reciprocation and are working on them. We will be getting something out to you but we wanted to let you know that this will be managed." I guess he asked me a few questions and I said, "Okay. Thanks for telling me." I didn't know that I really needed to know this at 3 o'clock in the morning, but I didn't complain; Al Jenkins, now deceased, was a decent fellow.

In the morning then, about six or seven o'clock, either I got a phone call from Steenhoven or I called him. I think I called him at his hotel in Nagoya and told him that I had heard from Washington. That they were aware of the invitation and concurred in what I had told him and that they were also aware of the problem of the reciprocal invitation and this matter would be worked upon during the day and I expected to have fresh news later on. I asked him where could I get a hold of him. He said, "Okay. Thank you very much." He was excited about all of this.

I got myself to the office and I think sometime that day a suitably worded instruction came in from Washington with regard to the matter of clearance in advance of the invitation of unknown people who might be coming to the United States to play table tennis with Americans. I passed that information on to Steenhoven. In other words, giving him the green light to go ahead and extend the invitation, he wouldn't be embarrassed, somehow we will work this thing out.

Then I started getting telephone calls. I was asked by the Foreign Ministry, Hiroshi Hashimoto, who was the head of the China desk at that time, if this was a change in our foreign policy towards China. I said, "No, it is not a change in U.S. policy. Our policy has been publicly stated for some months." In other words, you guys should have been doing your homework; here it is in an open text. So, when the invitation came from the PRC side it was obvious that the American table tennis team was completely free to accept the invitation and as a matter of fact I spoke with them and told them it was their decision as private American citizens whether they should go or not. We are not telling them what to do. Well, I was questioned up and down by the Foreign Ministry several times that day about this statement.

Then, of course, the press began to call and in particular Bernard Krisher, who at that time was the "Newsweek" bureau chief in Tokyo. We got into a whole lengthy discussion of U.S.-China relations over the last 20-25 years. Bernie, who is a very good personal friend, was trying to get me on the record. He wanted to quote me by name. I said, "No, you can't quote me by name." "Well, then on background a U.S. government official?" I said, "No, I won't agree to that either." "Well, senior foreign affairs observer?" I said, "That's okay." My reasoning was this. I did not want in any way to identify at that point official representatives of the U.S. government with the response the table tennis team was giving to the Chinese. My fear was that the Chinese might think that it was some sort of a put up job in some way to lure them into a relationship that they did not want. At that point I did not know what the PRC wanted. I didn't know the

background of this invitation. I had no way of evaluating it. I didn't know its significance and I didn't want to scare them off and spoil the opportunity. I felt we had made this statement and said we were open to it for the purpose of precisely broadening contact with them and opening something up. I thought that if the PRC got the impression that we had put the U.S. table tennis team up to it in some way or even encouraged them in any way, the Chinese would back off.

One has to understand the context of the time. After all, the Vietnam War was at its height and there was an extremely bitter relationship between the U.S. and China over the Vietnam War. The Warsaw Talks had been suspended for over a year. There was almost total non-communication between the two sides and there was an antagonistic atmosphere. The UN representation question was on the downhill. So, we were operating in very uncertain waters at that point and I didn't want to do anything to disturb matters. I was very careful to avoid any sort of official identification with what the table tennis team was doing. I wanted to make it appear entirely and completely a private initiative. Bernie Krisher has been to this day that I would not allow him to quote me by name because it tended to spoil his story. He reminds me of this every time I see him. But, that is okay, he is a good friend. And, of course, the foreign diplomatic corps began coming around and asking me what was going on.

Then I realized that none of these people on the table tennis team has ever been to China and they don't know what to expect. I thought to myself, I have to talk to them and give them some kind of a briefing. They may just think they are going to play table tennis over there. They don't understand the significance of this trip. They don't understand that they are going to be the first group of Americans to get into the PRC for a very long time. Somewhere along the line I contacted Steenhoven or he contacted me, and I said, "By the way, we will have to validate your passports for travel to the Peoples Republic of China because you have a prohibition in your passports for travel there." He said, "Yes, we are aware of that." I said, "I would appreciate it if the passports could be brought around to the American embassy in Tokyo before you leave." They were going to have to come back to Tokyo in order to leave for China via Hong Kong. We made a date and he said that they would come in around 10:00 on Friday morning to bring the passports to be validated. That was a way of getting them into the embassy, again ostensibly of their own volition, and for me to have the chance to talk to them about the trip to China.

Somebody in the embassy said to me, "Aren't you going to go down to the gate and meet them?" I said, "No. Why go to the gate and meet them? That makes it appear as if the U.S. government was pushing this thing publicly and that is not what we want to do because I don't know how the Chinese are going to react to it." As you may know the consular section of the embassy was down the street, two blocks away from the chancery up on the hill. Ordinarily, somebody who wants to get his passport validated would not have come to the chancery at the top of the hill; they would have gone to the consular office two blocks down the street. But, I had carefully instructed Steenhoven to come up to the chancery. Someone said to me, "Why are they coming here on consular business? Why not send them to the consular section?" I said that I wanted an excuse for them to come to the compound so that I can see them privately and without having to go down there. We can get a consular officer to come up here to do whatever has to be done. I was under the assumption that something formal would be done to validate these passports for travel to the Peoples Republic of China. There might be a seal attached and a signature of some kind, statement or what not. Well, somebody did come up from the consular section with a felt

pen and just crossed out words “those parts of China under the control of the Communist Party” and did not initial it or put a seal on the passport. Anyone could have done the same thing without coming into the American embassy. That was a bit of a let down but somewhat beside the point.

Steenhoven was shown up to my office together with a man by the name of Rufford Harrison, who was the U.S. delegate to the International Table Tennis Federation. They came into my office and sat down. I had one hour only to talk with them about this event and explain the significance of it to them. The first half hour was entirely consumed in responding to their questions about logistics of the trip -how they would be treated, how to conduct themselves, etc. - completely off the political subject all together. I was impatient to tell them, “Look, you guys are embarking upon a mission that is of very high importance to the United States and to our relationship with China.” So, we discussed for a half-hour these mundane things about the food, water, hotels, shots, diseases, etc. I answered them as best I could. They were particularly concerned because it was after all toward the end of the Cultural Revolution and there were a lot of very visible manifestations of anti-Americanism in China and they were afraid of being attacked in some way by the Chinese. They didn’t know how they would be treated. I said, “Look, you would not have been invited if they wanted to abuse you. You are going to be very well taken care of. The PRC has an excellent record of being extremely hospitable to anyone whom it invites and this is in effect an official invitation because sports in the PRC are under the control of the ministry of sports of the government. I think you will have a very enjoyable time.” They were much relieved by this.

The American press corps, there were only a few in Tokyo at the time -- John Rich of NBC, who was an old timer, a veteran reporter in Asia and knew the area very well, and, I think Bernie Krisher and one other correspondent -- wanted to talk to these two before they left. I saw no problem with this if they were amenable to being interviewed by the press and Frank Donovan actually brought John Rich up to the second floor of the embassy. He was in the corridor just outside my office. So, when I finished talking to Steenhoven and Harrison there was sort of a handoff to John Rich. They went out the door and he took them to be interviewed some place else after which they left immediately for the airport to meet up with the rest of the delegation and to have a lunch with their Chinese hosts before boarding a plane to fly to Hong Kong and enter China.

In the conversation with me, Steenhoven said, “You know, they are going to give us gifts when we get over to China and we have to have something to give them in return. We haven’t got anything. We have handed out all the souvenirs that we brought with us at the tournament down in Nagoya. Can you help us in any way? We don’t even know what they might like.” I thought a minute. At that time ballpoint pens were a big deal in China and if you could have an American-made ballpoint pen that was really great. Steenhoven and Harrison were thinking of going out and buying something in Japanese shops somewhere. I said, “No, no, no. You want to have something that is American to give to them. Something that has an American brand name on it. That would be very significant because they haven’t got anything like that in there.” “Where are we going to find that sort of thing?” I said, “Wait a minute.” I called up the administrative officer of the embassy and said, “Danny, we have to get all of the American trademark ballpoint pens we can find anywhere in the Tokyo region to send with a group of people who are going China.”

I gave him a brief explanation and asked if he could take care of that. He said, "I will handle it." I said, "Okay. I will send somebody to pick these things up and deliver them to the delegation." So, I told Steenhoven that we would have ballpoint pens for him and I think there was something else I thought of too, but I can't remember what it was now.

Danny wanted to deliver these ballpoint pens to me to take to the delegation out at the airport. I said that I couldn't do that because we didn't want an American official doing this and I would have to find someone else to do it. So I called our number one Japanese assistant in the political section to my office and said, "I have something that I want you to deliver to the American table tennis team that is going to China. Go down to the administrative office and pick up a package that will be there for you and take it to J. Graham Steenhoven who is president of the U.S. Table Tennis Association. You will find him either at the Tokyo Prince Hotel or out at Haneda airport in the passenger lounge or some place like that." He said, "Okay." He didn't ask me too many questions about what was going on although he had a rather knowing look. Off he went.

The follow up to that story is that it was just before Easter and I heard from some source later on that there were complaints all over the Tokyo region that no ballpoint pens were available in any of the post exchanges or navy commissaries.

Then the storm really broke and everybody was after me to find out what was going on. The press, the Japanese Foreign Ministry were calling me. We were monitoring the Japanese press reports of what was going on with the table tennis team in China as well as the Chinese press reports. We were reporting all of this stuff. The American reporters all asked to go with the American table tennis team but they were not able to get permission from the Chinese and were terribly disappointed. The American press corps in Hong Kong had a similar turndown. Meanwhile the whole Japanese press corps managed to get into China and follow these people. Krisher was very smart. He had somebody on his staff who was Japanese but fluent in Chinese and managed to get him to go along. Therefore, Krisher was getting first hand reports back from China, which he then used to scoop every other American publication.

The team was in China a week and then came out traveling from Hong Kong back through Tokyo on its way back to the U.S. Before the team had left for China, Kissinger sent out a top secret instruction to the consulate general Hong Kong that told them to stay away from these people going into China and departing China. The consulate general and my good friends there were all geared up to interview these people going in and coming out and here they get an instruction from the White House saying to stay away and have nothing to do with these people. If I'm not mistaken I think the instructions said that all contact should be confined to the channel that has already been established with the table tennis team, which meant me. I made an arrangement with Steenhoven that he would call me when he came back through Tokyo on his way back to the U.S. so that I would get a readout of what happened in China. Of course, the Chinese publicized everything that went on very heavily. They treated this group royally with hearts and flowers all over the place and cheers everywhere they went in China. The Chinese table tennis team arranged for them to win many of the matches. They were fed very well.

They arrived back in Tokyo on a Saturday evening. Steenhoven called me at home and told me he wanted to see me - - that he had an important message. They were leaving the following

afternoon to return to the U.S. They were going to have to leave the Imperial Hotel around 11:00 in the morning to get out to the airport. I said to Steenhoven, "Let's have breakfast tomorrow morning. I will come by the hotel in a taxicab. I will not come in to find you in the lobby. You wait for me on the street corner. We will then come back to my house and have breakfast here and you can tell me what happened. Then I will take you back to the hotel and you can then go on your way." So, that is what we did. I pulled up to the hotel and Steenhoven was there and jumped into the cab and off we went to my house. I didn't want to use an embassy car, again not wanting to give any hint or public evidence of U.S. official interest in this event. When he got in the cab the first thing he said was, "They want to come to the United States and have accepted our invitation to come to the United States. Not only that, they gave me a message to take to the president." I said, "Okay." When we got back to my house, we had breakfast and Steenhoven gave me the full readout on the visit. I got him back to the Imperial Hotel and then went to the embassy and wrote up the report of my conversation with him.

He asked me if I could arrange for them to have the courtesy of the port upon arrival in Los Angeles because they were not bringing anything back of any value but everybody is terribly tired and worn out by this whole experience, emotionally and physically, and if we don't have to go through the long customs routine to get back into the United States it would be a relief. So, I included that in the telegram. Whether they received the courtesy of the port, I don't know. I think they probably did.

They left Tokyo and John Richardson, who was assistant secretary of state for cultural and educational affairs, flew out to Los Angeles and welcomed them at the airport. There was the evidence of the Department of State, the U.S. government, at an official level welcoming this gesture on the part of the Chinese. I think that was finally appropriate at that point. There had been many other statements out of the Department of State and the White House in the course of the week or two that they were in the PRC.

My experience with this whole thing was not over yet because then I had an endless stream of diplomats from the diplomatic corps coming around to interview me about how was our policy towards China changing. What I was telling them was what I had said all along. This is just an athletic exchange. There is no political significance to it. The United States has said it is open to these things in the President's and Secretary of State's reports. I was interviewed exhaustively by the foreign diplomats and the ministry of foreign affairs. I left Japan on June 21, 1971 on transfer to the U.S. I was fully truthful with everyone with whom I talked about this table tennis exchange and what I said it was and meant. Yes, it did indicate a warming of the relationship between the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China. The Chinese were indicating that they wanted a closer relationship. It was a significant development, but it was simply a people-to-people exchange not something organized by the U.S. government in any way. It was spontaneous. We particularly assured my colleagues in the ministry of foreign affairs that this was the case. So, I went home.

In the middle of July on home leave I was sitting in my mother's kitchen in California, and the evening news came on. It was announced that the President would have an important statement to make. The President came on and said that he wanted to let us know that Henry Kissinger was just back from a secret visit to China and he has done this, that and the other. I thought, oh my

God, everybody I told in Tokyo that this was an ordinary people-to-people exchange will not believe me at all. That was one of several of what the Japanese call "Nixon shocks".

*Q: And you were lucky you weren't in Tokyo.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, but I felt sorry for my colleagues who were left behind holding the bag that I had set up for them. However, that's life.

I am planning to write all of this up because a lot is being written on the whole ping pong exchange, mostly by Chinese. I will say here on the record, again you asked about Chou En-lai and how he was regarded. The standard interpretation in "Henry Kissinger's White House Years," and in John Holdridge's "Crossing the Divide," which is the account of the rapprochement between the U.S. and the Peoples Republic of China, is that Chou En-lai was responsible for this exchange. That he is the one who had promoted it, engineered it, and worked it all out. This is not true. This is not to say that Chou didn't have a hand in it, but I have from three separate, independent sources, two of them PRC sources, that it was Mao Zedong who promoted this- (end of tape)

-exchange. One of my sources who at the time was the Deputy Director of the U.S. desk in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, told me that in a meeting he attended, Chou En-lai promoted all the arguments against doing this. I think that this shows something about Chou En-lai. I think he was a guy who knew how to play it safe and that he was not a risk taker and that he was not a policy initiator on the part of the PRC. He read the mind of Mao Zedong, to whom he was very close for many years. He read it accurately all the time and he survived because he was so good at reading Mao Zedong's mind and he was very careful to protect himself against any repercussions that might come out of decisions that Mao made or indeed against having gotten out in front of Mao's thinking and taken some initiatives on his own in advance of what Mao intended to do or different from what Mao intended. So, I believe as more study is done that the role of Chou En-lai will be shown to be somewhat over rated in respect to U.S.-China relations.

There is also something else here that I have got to run down and I am going to see Rufford Harrison about it in a few weeks. Harrison is of the opinion that the whole thing was a put up job. He recounts an exchange with the Chinese about the invitation that I never heard about at all. In other words he says that he was the first one to be sounded out by the Chinese with regard to the invitation, and it was not Graham Steenhoven or somebody else who received the invitation from the Chinese. There is a story to the effect that one of the U.S. table tennis players was the one to receive the invitation, or that it was floated to one of them, something of that kind. But, according to Harrison he was the one who was first approached by the Chinese.

*Q: Who was Harrison?*

CUNNINGHAM: Harrison was an official of the U.S. Table Tennis Association who at that time was the U.S. delegate to the International Table Tennis Federation. Steenhoven was the president of the U.S. Table Tennis Association.

The odd thing about this is that John Ehrlichman's book, "The China Card," according to

Harrison, recites verbatim both the circumstances and the content of the exchange between Harrison and the Chinese side with regard to extending the invitation. Harrison says that this account is accurate. But, I never knew about it and I don't know how it came to the knowledge of Ehrlichman, through what channel. What I also don't know about is that Harrison said that upon receiving this overture from the PRC that he called the American embassy during business hours and talked to someone who said that it was no big deal to go ahead. There was no registered surprise at all at the invitation. I have no knowledge of who he talked to. I was not the one to whom he talked. So, I am going to see him the week after next and interview him in great detail about all of this and try to figure this out. I am not really ready to say that it was prearranged as is alleged in Ehrlichman's book, "The China Card," because I don't quite see how that could come about and to say it was prearranged does not square with some other things that I have heard about this exchange. But, I also don't know how to account for what happened to the telephone call from Harrison. I was the China watcher in the embassy. That was widely known by the spring of 1971. I had been there three years. Anything regarding China should have come to me if it went to anybody in the embassy. The embassy was a very professional place and we didn't have slip ups of that kind.

*Q: Such is oral history not only on tape but also people's memories.*

CUNNINGHAM: Anyway I am going to go into this and see if I can ascertain what actually happened. There are some odd things. I go back to the point that the ambassador made to me when I walked into his office. He didn't ask me why I was there. I assumed it was Alan Carter he was talking with but I don't know that. When I walked in he had some understanding of why I was there and before I said anything to him he told me to go ahead. If he was taken as unawares by Alan Carter's call as I was when I got the call from Frank Donovan, to me it would have been somewhat out of character for Armin Meyer to respond as he did. Eventually I will talk with Armin Meyer also about this because I'm curious about some of these things. Maybe there is really not anything there and maybe Harrison's assumptions will hold no water at all, but I want to find out a little bit more about this. In any case I want to write up as accurate an account of my experience as I can. So, that is more or less all there is to the Tokyo story.

*Q: Okay. Where did you go when you came back?*

CUNNINGHAM: Let's just recount quickly what happened to me in the balance of my career. From Tokyo I came back to the senior seminar on foreign policy. I had received notification in the spring of 1971 that I was nominated for it and asked whether I would accept the nomination. I was inclined to decline the nomination because I wanted another overseas assignment. I wanted to move up to a political counselor job some place. I thought I was ready for it. Bill Sherman told me in no unmistakable terms that I should accept the invitation because, he said, that it is an honor. So, I went into the senior seminar on foreign policy. It was enlarged by five officers that year because it had always been 25 and our class was 30. I was one of the first class-3 officers in the old system to be appointed to senior seminar. After that I was deputy director of the senior seminar for one year. Sam Berger was the director.

From there I went to CU (Bureau of Cultural Affairs) and was on the East Asia desk for a year. That was my out of area tour under Kissinger's global outlook policy. At the end of one year

there the director of that office was transferred and I was expecting to move up from deputy director to director. I was moved up but not to head of that office. David Hitchcock was brought in instead. He is a fine man, I respect him, and well qualified for the job. I was instead put in charge of the Office of Youth, Non-sponsored Student and American Specialists program in CU, which I did for three years. During that time I negotiated the incorporation of the East-West center in Honolulu as a public, non-profit corporation.

From CU, in 1977, I was sent to New York to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations where I was assigned to the resource management section. That is the section that deals with UN budgets and personnel issues and represents the U.S. in the 5<sup>th</sup> committee of the UN general assembly. A counselor headed the section and I was his assistant. David Stottlemeyer was the counselor of mission for resource management and I was his number two. David Stottlemeyer was not well received by the new administration in 1977 and the new leadership.

*Q: The Carter administration.*

CUNNINGHAM: Yes, and Andrew Young was the new UN representative. Someway or other David Stottlemeyer was not looked on favorably by them or they wanted to move him aside in order to bring in one of their favorite people. Soon after I arrived Stottlemeyer was sent to Washington, so I filled two jobs, the deputy job and the number one job for a year. At the end of that year I was hoping again to move up to the chief position but that was not to be because the Young team had someone they wanted to serve in that position and he was brought in July 1978.

By then I had almost thirty years in the Foreign Service. I had over three years of creditable (for retirement) service in the Navy. There was a pay cap in effect and salaries were frozen. I had tried when we opened up the Liaison Office in Beijing to get posted there and was told that everyone else who was a China specialist hoped to get posted there and there were five or ten officers applying for every job. In the senior grades they had 20 for every job. I was not one of those selected to go. I can't quarrel with that because the people they chose to go were very good people, some of whom I had helped train when I was running the Chinese language school, so I respected the choices. The Department of State had initiated the outplacement program. We had an over abundance of senior officers. My family situation was changing so I decided that maybe it was time to think about retirement and I went into the outplacement program in 1979, after one year as acting director and one year as deputy director of resource management. It became very complicated for me and I did not have any really significant policy experience for the rest of my time at the U.S. mission to the UN. In fact, for most of that time I was on detached duty working in the outplacement program from New York where the company that was running it for the Department was headquartered. Rather than be brought back to Washington to go through the process I thought it would be more practical for me to look from there.

The short of the story is that in 1981, I received an offer or indication from the University of St. Thomas in Houston that they might be interested to receive an application from me for the directorship of their newly established center for international studies. I did that and was brought down for an interview that August, was asked for references in September, and in October I was offered a contract which I signed at the end of the month. I retired in January 1982 and went to Houston and immediately went to work as director of international studies.

*Q: Looking at the time and the fact that you are up from Houston, why don't we concentrate on one aspect if you don't mind. That is about resource management at the UN. Management of the UN is a big problem. What were you doing and how did you view it?*

CUNNINGHAM: Good. The 5<sup>th</sup> committee is the best seminar on the United Nations going because every unit of the UN has to come down and present a budget request and justify that request. I was in position to learn what every single part of the UN secretariat does and to get to know the heads of each of those organizations.

At the end of my active duty Foreign Service career I had one last encounter with China. After the PRC took China's seat in the United Nations Security Council several peace-keeping resolutions were presented for Council action. Usually the Security Council approved these resolutions by consensus. The U.S. and the Soviets had given up making peace-keeping an issue between them in the Security Council. Toward the end of the 1970's the Security Council adopted the practice of having informal, closed door consultations on major issues, such as, for example, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1977-78.

Each time a peace-keeping resolution came before the Council, the PRC Permanent Representative would abstain. Early in the 1970s, the Chinese also would explain their abstentions. As time went on, they continued to abstain, but stopped making statements in explanation. In the Fifth Committee, where I had been assigned, the PRC delegate would speak against the requests of the Secretariat for funds to finance peacekeeping missions, and he would consistently vote against them also. Then, late in 1981 the PRC, without explanation or comment of any kind, stopped opposing requests in Fifth Committee for peacekeeping funds, stopped voting against them and stopped abstaining in the Security Council.

The matter had gone almost completely unnoticed in New York, except among a few careful observers, and I suppose it was thanks to one of them that this change came to my attention.

It was not my responsibility to report on Security Council matters, but I was very curious about it and intrigued, so I did a little study of it. Then, and I do not recall how, I learned that the change was a calculated decision and that Pakistan had somehow been involved in it.

During the time that I served in the Fifth Committee India and Pakistan were represented by professional diplomatic officers, both of whom had been trained in Chinese, as I had. This became a bond among the three of us, and got to know one another very well. Both of my colleagues were very capable officers. So when I learned that Pakistan had something to do with this change of Chinese behavior on peacekeeping issues, I went to my Pakistani colleague, whose name I do not now recall. It turned out that he had been personally involved in bringing about the change. He told me the whole story, and I prepared full report to the Department on the matter. I also complimented him on his initiative and his accomplishment, which was indeed a genuine and important contribution to the strengthening of the United Nations. My Pakistani colleague told me that what finally brought the PRC around was the argument that China's opposition was depleting its political capital among developing nations, who generally favored and supported the peacekeeping role of the United Nations because it reduced the risk of superpower conflict.

The press did not notice this change until some weeks or a few months later. Some weeks or a few months later I noticed a New York Times report on the change in PRC behavior. By then I was in Houston and well into my new career. It gave me some satisfaction to know that in just about the final act of my Foreign Service career I had scooped the New York press corps and, apparently, most other missions and delegations to the United Nations.

*Q: I think we might close at this point. Thank you very much.*

CUNNINGHAM: You are welcome.

**MARSHALL GREEN**  
**Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East**  
**Washington, DC (1956-1960)**

**Consul General**  
**Hong Kong (1961-1963)**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East**  
**Washington, DC (1963-1965)**

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*Marshall Green was born in Massachusetts in 1916. He received a bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1939. Mr. Green joined the Foreign Service in 1945. His career included positions in Sweden, Korea, Hong Kong, Australia, Indonesia, and Washington, DC.*

This manuscript which is almost entirely based on personal diaries, memoranda, letters and notes, almost all of them preserved and filed by my invaluable assistant and secretary over the years, Emma Johnson.

I am also greatly indebted to a number of Foreign Service China language/area specialists -- especially Jack Service, John Lacey, Lindsey Grant and John Holdridge -- with whom I served at one time or another and from whom I learned much. Bob Martens, a Foreign Service Soviet specialist who interviewed me for my oral history, deserves special mention for his enlightening assistance. However, any errors or shortcomings in this manuscript are certainly my own.

It is to be hoped that this record, along with those of other Foreign Service Officers involved in China policy, will be made widely available to scholars, diplomats and others. Perhaps, some day, a complete record of the Foreign Service's role in China policy can be assembled, from the dark days of World War II and subsequent McCarthyism to the brighter days of the 1970's and 1980's brought on by the rise of pragmatism in Peking and of maturity in Washington.

## Chapter I

### Working with Robertson and Dulles; the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958

My involvement in China policy dates back to 1956 when, on leaving the National War College, I was assigned as Regional Planning Advisor for the Far East working in the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. The Bureau at that time was dominated by Assistant Secretary of State Walter Robertson, the quintessential Virginia gentleman, a banker by profession, who had powerful connections in the Administration and Congress. Robertson's overriding interest in world affairs was to uphold the position of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as President of all of China, even though Chiang and his defeated Nationalist forces had fled the mainland in 1949 to take refuge on Taiwan, China's island-province.

Because of Robertson's Sino centrism and because I had to draft a number of his speeches, I was automatically drawn into China-policy issues -- especially those relating to the defense of what we called Free China or the Chinese Nationalists (Chinats) or, most correctly, the Republic of China (ROC), as opposed to the Chinese Communists (Chicoms) or the Chinese Reds, or, most correctly, the People's Republic of China -- a term we rarely used in those days.

For me, this was not an assignment I contemplated with unalloyed joy. I liked Robertson personally. He was kindly and thoughtful towards all members of his staff. He was also a strong defender of the Foreign Service at a time when many Foreign Service Officers were still reeling from the effects of McCarthyism. All 14 of the Ambassadors in his area (East Asia and Australasia) were careerists -- a record never before or since achieved by any bureau in the State Department.

I was also fortunate in having Ambassador J. Graham Parsons as my immediate superior. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State at that time, and was to replace Robertson in 1959. Jeff Parsons was one of the ablest officers in the Foreign Service, articulate and a master of diplomatic practices, so essential in our business. On the other hand, Walter Robertson's single-minded dedication to upholding the position of Chiang Kai-shek as the President of all of China was one I could not altogether share, and writing acceptable speeches taxed my New England conscience to its limits.

We also expended vast amounts of diplomatic capital on upholding the ROC's position in the United Nations as the sole legal representative of all of China; and our highly visible military presence on Taiwan, especially in Taipei, was bound to affront the nationalistic feelings of people on Taiwan. It certainly affronted the sensibilities of foreign diplomats like the Japanese Ambassador who was billeted in a U.S. military area in the center of Taipei identified on large billboards as "Freedom Village."

I happened to be visiting Taipei in May 1957 as a member of a Presidential Mission headed by Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense, which was looking into problems related to our world-wide base presence. Just as we were being reassured by the U.S. Chargé d'Affaires in Taipei that there was no problem with the public over our base presence in Taiwan, our Embassy

was attacked by a mob which sacked the Embassy, beat up some of our personnel hiding in the basement, and scattered official U.S. files all over the streets of Taipei. This mob action was touched off by the shooting of a Taiwanese peeping-tom by an American sergeant, who was then acquitted by an American military court in Taipei amidst the cheers of his compatriots and in the presence of the peeping-tom's weeping widow and her friends.

Armed with evidence like this, the Frank Nash mission came up with convincing conclusions and recommendations that did much, world-wide, to help lessen friction over the presence of U.S. bases overseas.

Another China-related issue of major interest to my office at that time was evidence of a growing split in Sino-Soviet relations. I twice visited the Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California, where a team of experts was analyzing Peking's reactions to the launching of Sputnik in 1957. It was increasingly clear to these experts (including my former State Department colleague Alice Hsia) that China efforts to share in, and benefit from, Soviet technological break-throughs were being rebuffed by Moscow. Two China delegations returned to Peking empty-handed. This was briefly followed by Chinese propaganda broadcasts calling for a nuclear-free Far East, but it was clear that this line, probably parlayed to Peking by Moscow, was in conflict with Peking's own aspirations to become a nuclear power.

It was not until the following year that I became directly involved in the formulation of U.S. policy toward China. This occurred during and after the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1958 when I fortuitously became Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' action officer at the working level dealing with the crisis.

I will undertake to describe this incident in some detail because existing accounts (at least the ones I have read) are incomplete with regard to how Washington policymakers grappled with the crisis.

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For several months before the Chinese Communists (Chicom) opened up their artillery barrage against Quemoy on August 23, 1958, I had been chairing a working-level interagency task force (State, Defense and CIA) which was one of several established by the White House to examine U.S. capabilities to cope with two or more simultaneous military crises in various parts of the world. One of the scenarios our task force had just completed related to a Chicom aerial or artillery interdiction of the Quemoy island group (Big Quemoy, Little Quemoy, Tatan, Ehrtan and Tungting) held by the Nationalists but located just a few miles off the shore of mainland China.

So when in fact an artillery interdiction was launched against the Quemoy group where one-third of the Nationalist forces was stationed, I was able to submit to Jeff Parsons that same day our agreed task force recommendations on U.S. countermeasures. These recommendations called for a cautious escalation of U.S. naval and air support operations as necessary to protect Taiwan from a Communist take-over. Parsons and, subsequently, Robertson approved the recommendations which were forwarded to Dulles. However, Robertson commented to me that

the U.S. would, of course, never make first use of nuclear weapons. I found this remark rather astonishing coming from one of our leading hawks.

Dulles, flying down from his vacation retreat on Duck Island in the St. Laurence River, immediately called a meeting in his office. He had obviously read our recommendations but his first concern was legal. What were our defense obligations towards the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu? What restrictions applied to the involvement of U.S. forces in their defense?

These small offshore islands were not included in the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty's definition of the treaty area, but a subsequent joint resolution of Congress in January 1955, at the time of the first Taiwan Straits crisis, authorized the President to employ U.S. armed forces in the protection of not just Taiwan and the Pescadores but also "related positions and territories in that area."

Dulles had no difficulty in making a legal case that the joint resolution covered the offshore islands in this crisis, since Peking, in attacking them, announced that its objective was Taiwan. The President and Congressional leaders agreed. Establishing rules for the engagement of U.S. forces was more difficult.

The Quemoy group of islands was so close to mainland shore batteries that they could be blanketed with enemy shells, although there was no evidence of any impending Chicom landing operation against those islands. In fact, the shelling occurred immediately before the typhoon season when amphibious operations would have been most precarious. It was fairly clear that Peking did not want to take the islands unless, in doing so, it brought down the government on Taiwan.

Peking's evident intent was interdiction of the offshore islands: to prevent provisions, including food and ammunition, from reaching the defenders, thereby wearing them down to the point of surrender which in turn would precipitate a collapse of morale on Taiwan and a takeover from within by the Communists.

The problem therefore came down to one of resupplying the embattled Quemoy group, a task that was beyond the capability of the Nationalist Navy which was not only poorly led at that time but had to contend with incessant bombardment of the Quemoy group by Soviet-manufactured artillery, rough seas and alleged 27 foot tides which further complicated the landing of supplies on the islands. Thus it was arranged that the U.S. Navy would escort Chinese resupply convoys to a point three miles offshore from Quemoy but would not enter Quemoy's territorial waters. Nationalist vessels had to cover the last three miles on their own, loaded with supplies including shells for Quemoy's 8" howitzers and other guns.

Secretary Dulles, acting under President Eisenhower's instructions, decided against U.S. air operations in the Taiwan Straits and reached agreement with Taipei that U.S. and Nationalist planes would not overfly mainland China, thereby ruling out air attacks on Chicom shore batteries. One important reason for this decision was that there was no way of silencing these batteries short of use of nuclear weapons or extensive air-drops of napalm bombs, actions

President Eisenhower strongly opposed. It was also increasingly apparent that Chicom air capability was being used with great restraint, there being no bombing of any Nationalist-held territories.

Our limited rules of engagement reflected awareness of the lack of support in the United States for getting involved in a war over distant islands that "weren't worth the life of a single American boy." Nor did we have international support beyond that of the Republic of China on Taiwan, South Korea and South Vietnam. Governments of key nations allied to the U.S. like Great Britain and Japan were correctly restrained in their criticisms, but public opinion in these countries was highly averse to U.S. involvement.

Secretary Dulles was accordingly bent on finding some diplomatic course of action to bring the fighting to a halt. He set little store by what the periodic US-PRC ambassadorial-level talks in Warsaw could achieve on this issue, though he appreciated that their publicized existence offered relief from criticisms that the U.S. was out of diplomatic contact with the Peking government on this and other issues.

Very early on the morning of September 7, 1958, I received a phone call from Dulles, who had evidently had a restless night, suggesting that it might be best for the U.S. to take the issue to the United Nations, since the General Assembly would be reconvening the following week. Dulles mentioned the possibility of having the British and French introduce a resolution in the UNSC calling for a UN-supervised cease-fire and neutralization of the offshore islands.

I was strongly opposed to this suggestion which both Peking and Taipei would reject out of hand, and it would impose great strains on our relations with Taipei which in turn might strengthen the case for Peking occupying China's seat in the UN. However, I said nothing about all this to Dulles over the phone but replied that he would have our Bureau's reactions as soon as possible. I forthwith prepared a memorandum, approved by Jeff Parsons and signed by Robertson, pointing out the negative factors entailed in Dulles' suggestion and alternatively recommending that we ask the British and French to introduce a UN resolution welcoming Washington's and Peking's discussions of this issue at Warsaw and urging that the issue be resolved between Peking and Taipei without further resort to force. Also included in Robertson's memorandum was a suggestion that our side might at some point in the near future take unilateral and unannounced moves such as shifting our regular Taiwan Straits patrols further away from Chicom territorial waters, and the Nationalists suspending artillery fire from Quemoy, to see whether this invited any reciprocal moves from the Communist side.

However, before any of these strategies could be pursued, our attention focused on the immediate, urgent issue of Quemoy running out of supplies. The daily consumption of supplies by the 80,000 military and 45,000 civilians on the Quemoy group was estimated at 700 tons and yet, since August 23, only 125 tons had been delivered to Quemoy. This appalling record was ascribed to all the usual reasons -- bad weather, tidal conditions, heavy shelling -- but it also occurred to some in Washington that Taipei was deliberately holding back, or providing us with false figures, in an effort to get the U.S. more involved in the islands' defenses.

Our Joint Chiefs of Staff could see no reason why, with the exercise of guts and ingenuity, the

Nationalists, under existing rules of engagement, could not off-load up to 1,000 tons of supplies a day under favorable weather conditions. Admiral Arleigh Burke recommended new ways of delivering supplies, including floating them ashore.

Over the next two weeks there was some improvement in deliveries but not enough to prevent, according to Taipei's reports, an alarming run-down in the availability of food and ammunition on the Quemoy. By September 28, Taipei reported that only a few days of supplies remained. Cables from the American Embassy in Taipei were full of dire warnings.

It was at this point that Secretary Dulles decided to go to New York to take the issue to the UN along the lines he had suggested over the phone on September 7. However, the very day he left for New York, I received word from a colleague in CIA that a reliable report had just been received from Quemoy stating that its supply situation was nowhere near as desperate as we had been led to believe. There were several weeks of supplies on hand, most of them stored in the extensive network of tunnels on Quemoy.

Robertson asked that I deliver this information in person to Acting Secretary of State Christian Herter who immediately called a meeting in his office. There it was decided that I should go to New York to bring these developments to Dulles' attention, with a recommendation from Herter that Dulles might wish to postpone any UN initiative.

I was met in New York by Ambassador Philip Crowe of USUN who took me to Dulles' suite in the Waldorf. When Dulles heard our reports, he canceled scheduled meetings with the British and French Ambassadors to the UN, returned to Washington, and called a meeting that evening at his house. The star performer at that meeting was Admiral Burke who was very up-beat on prospects for resupplying the Quemoy, mentioning for the first time in my hearing the fact that two of the Navy's LSDs (Landing Ship Docks) were about to arrive on station in the Taiwan Straits. These huge landing ship docks could contain dozens of amphibious landing craft, manned by trained Nationalist crews, which would run up on the shores of Quemoy with supplies.

Meanwhile spirits on Taiwan had been lifted by the deadly effectiveness of several Nationalist fighter aircraft on patrol, whose U.S.-provided Sidewinders downed five MiG 17s.

It was against this background that Peking radio announced on October 6 that it was temporarily suspending its bombardment of the offshores, emphasizing that its action was taken to spare the lives of Chinese compatriots inhabiting those islands. Our side immediately reciprocated by suspending U.S. convoy activities and modifying our naval patrol routes in the Taiwan Straits.

The outlook remained unclear, and when Dulles departed on October 20 for Taipei, via Italy and England, Peking announced the end of its cease-fire on the alleged grounds that one of our LSDs had intruded into the territorial waters of Quemoy (Dulles included Italy on his itinerary to attend DeGasperi's funeral. His brief stop-over in England prompted a black-bordered box on the front page of the London Times headlined "England's Darkest Hour" and reading as follows: "Asked today why he had come to England, Secretary Dulles replied that his plane came here to refuel.").

On October 25, following the issuance of a joint US-ROC communiqué at the conclusion of Dulles' visit to Taipei, Peking announced its intention to observe a cease-fire on the offshore islands on odd-numbered days. Taipei retaliated by firing on occasional Chicom vessels from batteries on Quemoy.

This curious arrangement left each of the Chinese governments with the satisfaction that it was master of the situation, but we had no idea of how long this arrangement would continue. Thus, when Dulles returned from Taipei, his first concern was to preserve the relative calm while doing everything he could to get the bulk of Chiang's forces off the offshore islands. On the other hand, we felt we had to be careful in handling this effort, lest sharp open differences between Washington and Taipei tempt Peking to renew the bombardment.

I well recall Secretary Dulles' comments on his return to Washington: "If nothing is done now and then a year-or-so hence the Chicoms again attack the offshores, it will be extremely difficult for us to give the ROC any military support. Already we have had to strain our relations with Congress and foreign governments to the breaking point. Our experience with the offshores was agonizing enough in 1955. It is worse today. We can't go through this a third time."

Our efforts to effect a drastic reduction in the garrisons on the offshore islands never succeeded. There was an eventual sizeable reduction, but meanwhile we came to appreciate that the Chinese in their own peculiar way had found a solution of turning their hot war into an endless propaganda battle -- of propaganda shells, blaring loud speakers, and balloon-delivered leaflets. Peking also issued a long series of "serious warnings" to the U.S. every time one of our naval patrols in the Taiwan Straits came within Chinese mainland territorial waters as defined by Peking, but not by Washington. The serious warnings had nearly reached the thousand mark by the time President Nixon's trip to China was announced in 1971. Thereafter the warnings ceased.

In retrospect, I have often wondered whether Moscow had any hand in Peking's decision to halt the heavy bombardment of Quemoy. We know that almost all the 580,000 shells fired on the islands were produced in the Soviet Union, and that the first signs of serious Moscow-Peking differences appeared soon after the Soviets launched Sputnik in 1957, about a year before the 1958 Taiwan Straits crisis. It is possible that Moscow imposed conditions on its support of Peking's offense. However, we assumed during that crisis that Peking had Moscow's unqualified support. Moscow said little to suggest otherwise. In fact, Khrushchev warned on several occasions that any use of nuclear weapons would not go unanswered by the USSR. (Peking exploded its first nuclear weapon in 1964.)

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Finally, a few comments about Secretary Dulles' handling of the crisis. I was deeply impressed by his excellent working relations with President Eisenhower, as well as with his associates in State, Defense, and CIA (headed by his brother, Allen). On several occasions, near the conclusion of meetings in his office, Dulles would pick up the secure phone and tell the President of our conclusions and solicit his comments or, where relevant, his approval. Dulles thus made it clear to all present that he was acting under Eisenhower's orders. That, in turn,

strengthened Dulles' position with all his associates.

I was also impressed by the way Dulles took charge of the problem, making it his personal responsibility to work out a peaceful solution, losing many hours of sleep in the process. Yet he sought advice from his associates. I recall how Gerard Smith, at that time Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, used to argue almost instinctively against the emerging consensus of several of our meetings. Dulles seemed to welcome the ensuing debate which helped to fine-hone the final decisions.

Diplomatic biographer Sir Harold Nicholson once wrote that the worst kind of diplomatists are zealots, lawyers and missionaries; and the best kind are humane skeptics.

In his first years as Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles seemed to fall clearly in the first category. He was a dyed-in-the-wool lawyer with a cold-war missionary zeal. For him, countering Soviet aggressive acts gave rise to a new term in diplomacy: "brinkmanship." He stonily refused to shake the extended hand of Zhou En-lai at Geneva in 1954 -- an insult never forgotten by Zhou. He was also associated in the minds of many of us Foreign Service Officers with Senator McCarthy and his ilk who pilloried the Foreign Service and hounded out of office several of our best China specialists whose only "crime" was the accuracy of their reports out of China during World War II, predicting the decline of the Chinese Nationalists under Generalissimo Chiang and the rise of Mao's Communists.

John Foster Dulles may be remembered by history as one of our most zealous, hard-line Secretaries of State, especially in his dealings with Moscow and Peking, but from my vantage point, in the next to last year of his life, he appeared as a man of moderation and reason, an able practitioner of diplomacy as well as of law.

## Chapter II

### Hong Kong 1961-63

#### Need for a New Look at Our China Policy

After two stormy years in Korea, I arrived in the relative political calm of Hong Kong where the U.S. Consulate General served as our government's eyes and ears covering events inside the vastness of China. The steady stream of refugees from mainland China provided a wealth of information about economic conditions in China -- information made available to us through Hong Kong government and private sources -- as well as receiving an assortment of sometimes useful information contained in the masses of periodicals, newspapers and letters that reached Hong Kong from all parts of China. We had on our staff 21 people whose sole function was to translate and analyze these written materials.

For me, being head of a large staff comprising some of our most experienced Foreign Service Officers in Chinese affairs, provided a unique opportunity to listen and to learn. I well remember my first lesson, shortly after my arrival in November 1961, when India seized the Portuguese enclave of Goa. I was alarmed that China would now feel impelled to seize the Portuguese enclave of Macao, some 30 miles from Hong Kong. Since I was also U.S. Consul to Macao, my

responsibilities to the several dozen Americans there would seem to involve ordering and assisting in their immediate evacuation. But the head of our Political Section at that time, Dr. Harald Jacobson, recommended otherwise. In fact, he was completely confident, as was Jack Friedman, our Macao expert, that Peking would not take Macao, for such a seizure would precipitate a collapse of business confidence in Hong Kong and a resulting loss of almost a billion dollars a year which Peking was making at that time (today it is many times that) through its business ties with Hong Kong. In other words, Peking was not about to kill the goose that laid the billion dollar golden egg and which was China's principal source of foreign exchange. So, abiding by Jacobson's recommendation, I wired Washington our conclusions in order to head off likely pressures from the State Department for evacuating all Americans in Macao.

The early 1960's was a period of deepening turmoil and economic disaster in China, due in part to Mao's ill-conceived Great Leap Forward -- a desperate effort to achieve rapid modernization through forced-draft industrialization, including a program for building thousands of small furnaces designed to produce steel. Agriculture was badly neglected in the process, resources squandered, and the whole effort collapsed leaving ruin in its wake.

Analysts in our Consulate General estimated that China's grain production (including potatoes) in 1961 was 160 million tons which was some 30 million tons short of levels required to provide China's teeming population with an adequate diet. Our analysis, based on a variety of sources (especially comprehensive weather reports and interrogations of thousands of refugees about their daily food consumption) was challenged by Joe Alsop in his syndicated columns as being too high, but we were vindicated a year later when Zhou En-lai told Lord Montgomery that grain production in China in 1961 was 160 million tons.

I arrived in Hong Kong thinking of China as a powerful threat to its neighbors -- purposeful and single-minded in its expansionist design. But I soon learned that the Communist regime was floundering, and that its attempts to disperse "surplus" urban dwellers to the farms had deepened discontent among urban and rural dwellers alike. The touted public discipline of China was decaying, as evidenced by signs of growing corruption, bureaucratic indifference, and general laxity that permeated even the youth and armed forces. Of course the capacity of the Chinese people to endure privations was legendary, and China's ability to exploit troubles along its borders unchanged, but it was clearly not the fearsome dragon conjured up in the minds of many Americans.

More importantly, China no longer had an ally in Russia. The Sino-Soviet rift that made its first appearance after the Sputnik launching in 1957 had, by early 1962, reached the stage where it was beyond the ability of our Consulate General translators to find expressions in English equal to Peking's scatological denunciations of the Kremlin.

Many of us in the Consulate General felt that we overly advertised our concern and worry over China's aggressive power -- and that this invited bluster, threat and intervention from the Communist side. Psychologically we would be in a stronger competitive position if we appeared to be less harried and worried over Peking's threat. We would also stand to gain greater international support for our position if our views were expressed in more objective, factual and unemotional terms.

At the same time, we fully supported continuation of a U.S. policy of firmness in the defense of "free world" positions and maintaining adequate capabilities for pursuing that policy successfully. We did, however, weigh in strongly against unnecessary provocations of Communist China, such as the occasional sabotage operations being conducted by the Chinese Nationalists from Taiwan against targets on the China mainland. These operations were not only fruitless, but they damaged the Republic of China's international standing. Moreover, such operations, to the extent they involved Hong Kong, could endanger Hong Kong and were deeply resented by the Hong Kong government.

A golden opportunity to present these views to key figures in the new Kennedy Administration occurred in the Spring of 1962 at a meeting of all our East Asia/Australasia Chiefs of Missions at Baguio in the Philippines. This meeting was presided over by Under Secretary of State Chester Bowles and Assistant Secretary Averell Harriman, both of whom reacted favorably to my presentation of how we in the Consulate General evaluated the scene in China and its implications for U.S. policy. This established a useful meeting of minds between our Consulate General and policymakers in Washington.

One of the effects of economic setbacks in China was the way it stepped up the flow of refugees to Hong Kong. This problem continues today, but at no time did it reach the levels of mid-1962. A principal reason for the great surge of refugees into Hong Kong from the adjoining province of Guangdong in 1962 was a severe drought in South China coinciding with a temporary breakdown in the ability (or willingness) of PRC officials in Guangdong to restrain the flow of refugees -- many of them young people who had been forced out of the cities to live in rural areas. It appeared for a while that the Chinese authorities had decided to allow them to flee to Hong Kong, if only to ease pressures on food supplies and to lessen problems for China created by these disgruntled elements.

The numbers of refugees got so large that the Hong Kong government constructed massive barriers of concertina wire all along its land frontier with China. But every night the refugees merely threw planks across the wire and swarmed in, only to be rounded up by the Hong Kong garrisons and forced back into China (although many eluded the Hong Kong police and managed to get into the city of Hong Kong).

At first, the Hong Kong Government forbore from making any representations to Peking on this appalling situation, evidently fearing that Peking would reject Hong Kong's protests, and Hong Kong would then have to live with the results. Besides Hong Kong had only the status of a colony, and had to deal with Peking through London. Meanwhile, I was receiving expressions of concern from the State Department which was torn between wanting Hong Kong to accept refugees as a matter of principle, and a sober awareness of how such huge numbers of refugees could turn Hong Kong into another Gaza Strip (Curiously, U.S. media gave this dramatic human interest story almost no coverage. This included the New York Times whose managing editor, Turner Catledge, visited Hong Kong just as the refugee crisis ended. When I told him what had happened, he turned to his Hong Kong correspondent to ask why this wasn't reported. The correspondent answered that evidently the New York Times editors did not consider the story newsworthy because he had filed daily reports to New York.).

Washington was quietly urging London to take the issue up with Peking, but Hong Kong recommended otherwise to London. As I learned from Murray Macle hose, at that time political adviser to Hong Kong's Governor Black (later Macle hose became one of Hong Kong's most effective governors), Hong Kong had reason to believe that Peking would soon, on its own initiative, restore controls along the Hong Kong frontier because of the bad press China was receiving world-wide, with millions of Chinese seeking to escape China. Governor Black's policy proved successful, but not before 170,000 Chinese refugees had succeeded in sneaking permanently into over-crowded Hong Kong in the period of one month.

It was instructive to observe the interrelationships between authorities in Hong Kong, Peking and Canton (with whom Hong Kong transacted most of its business with China). Many practical issues had to be addressed on a day-to-day basis between Hong Kong and Canton relating to trade, transportation, migration, water supply and finances. All these issues were handled by Hong Kong officials with low-key common sense in a way best designed to avoid affronting its giant neighbor. There was recognition on both sides of the compelling material advantages in peaceful co-existence, even though Hong Kong's spectacular economic success story on the very doorstep of backward China was, in itself, an affront and provocation. Hong Kong was at pains to pay for the water piped in from China (about 20 to 25 percent of Hong Kong's requirements), even though China offered to provide this water free of charge. Hong Kong wanted to ensure that China had a material stake in continuing the water supply in order to minimize chances that China might cut it off at some point in order to impose pressures on Hong Kong for whatever reason. To me, this was convincing evidence that constructive relations with revolutionary Communist China were possible for the United States provided Peking came to see compelling material (especially strategic) reasons for such relations.

Not only were we mighty busy those days with refugees, consular work, textile negotiations, and countless visitors, but I had to meet, wine and dine the many Congressional delegations who were attracted to Hong Kong. We also put on some good briefings for VIPs on developments in China, including our policy conclusions. We found that almost all the Congressional visitors shared our views on U.S. policy implications. (One of these visitors, Congressman John Rooney, who was Chairman of the House Subcommittee handling State's finances, indicated to the State Department that he would welcome my appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. I was called back to Washington where I resisted pressure from the top brass of the Department to take the job. I resisted because I had no qualifications for it other than Rooney's blessing. I returned to Hong Kong, rather apprehensive as to my future career.)

During my 21 months in Hong Kong, I had lengthy discussions with my deputy, John Lacey, who was not only an excellent administrator and negotiator on U.S.-Hong Kong textile issues, but whose views on China policy were practical and forward-looking. We drafted a message to Washington in February 1963, in which we posed the question whether we were missing any opportunities to abet forces in China that might be seeking pragmatic changes.

We then recommended seven specific ways for enhancing our capacity to influence attitudes in China in a desirable direction, though admitting that even their combined effect might be very slight in the immediate future.

The final two paragraphs of our airgram came close to being prophetic.

"Distasteful as it has been for Mao and his cohorts, they have already been obliged to make some concessions basically in conflict with their ideologies. When the hard-line doctrinaires no longer dominate the scene, the influence of pragmatism may well intensify. Our present containment policy should be aimed at abetting that process.

"All this argues for a policy of continued constraint which allows and encourages change with mainland China..." We also urged a review of American regulations relating to Americans wishing to travel to mainland China and to do business with China.

Many of us in the Consulate General were struck by the folly of American policy preventing our newsmen and scholars from visiting China -- not that they would likely be admitted, but a relaxed U.S. policy would make it clear that it was China's fault, not ours, that China was closed to much of the outside world.

We also were critical of the U.S. foreign assets control regulations which we had to administer in Hong Kong. These regulations made it illegal for any American individual or corporation to buy, even in Hong Kong, any article originating in mainland China.

On one occasion I had to phone the Texas owners of the new Hong Kong Hilton to point out that they already had on the walls of their new hotel (which was about to open) Chinese mainland artifacts which would have to be removed under U.S. law. It was to the credit of the Texas owners that they uncomplainingly agreed, even though, in disposing of the artifacts, they took a considerable financial loss.

As mentioned earlier, there were officials in the State Department who shared these views, and it was a pleasant, but not an altogether unanticipated, surprise when I was called back to Washington in August 1963 to be named Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, charged with taking a new look at U.S. policy toward China.

### Chapter III

#### Efforts in Washington (1963-65) to Modify U.S. Policy Towards China

On returning to Washington in September 1963, I was named principal deputy to Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East, who had an extensive background in research and intelligence and was a personal friend of President Kennedy. Hilsman wanted me to devote most of my initial time to a China policy review, naming as my principal assistant, Lindsey Grant, a brilliant young China specialist. We also received generous help from Jim Thompson (on detail from Harvard) and Joe Neubert, Hilsman's assistant. We held periodic meetings with leading American scholars knowledgeable about East Asia, a practice our Bureau was to continue for many years.

Our first move was to reorganize State's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs in order to give greater

attention to Communist Asia. At that time we had only two officers (out of the hundred or more in our Bureau) who were devoting their full time to Communist China and none of our officers were giving much time and attention to North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia, even though Communist Asia comprised two-thirds of the land area and population of East Asia. We accordingly established a new office called ACA (Asian Communist Affairs) whose four officers were responsible for mainland China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia. We also managed to have two able Foreign Service officers sent to Moscow for several years of instruction in Mongolian, but our recommendation for establishing U.S. relations with Mongolia, accepted in principle by key officials like Governor Harriman, encountered years of delay in implementation.

U.S. diplomatic contacts with the Chinese Communists at that time were confined to the ambassadorial level talks at Warsaw which had been going on intermittently ever since they started at Vienna in 1954. These talks achieved only limited results but they ultimately succeeded in bringing about the release of all but two of the Americans held in mainland China. They further provided a forum for clarifying our position on certain issues, especially a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem. Above all, they enabled the U.S. government to say quite truthfully that we had, in Warsaw, more opportunities to meet with Peking officials than had most governments which recognized the Peking government.

Maoist doctrine sharply circumscribed what new courses of action were open to us, and our ability to influence events inside China were almost nil. But, over the longer range, opening China's contacts with the outside world could have more of a salutary impact than a negative one; and it seemed important that we at least demonstrate to the world that Communist China's isolation from the world was self-imposed and not the result of U.S. policies to contain Chinese Communism. This was not easy to do. The United States had taken the lead year after year in trying to keep Peking out of the United Nations. We had also taken the lead in establishing COCOM controls designed to prevent any strategic materials from reaching Communist China from the Free World. Carrying out these policies involved constant pressures on friends and allies, contributing to a rather widespread impression that it was U.S. policy to cut off Chinese contacts with the outside world.

This, in fact, was not our policy. In 1959, the U.S., at long last, allowed 25 selected newsmen to have restrictions removed from their passports to permit them to visit mainland China. For months they sat it out in Hong Kong seeking Chinese visas. None were granted. In 1962, we announced that we would give favorable attention to any bona fide Chinese request for purchase of U.S. wheat or other grains. Peking never responded.

The first substantive policy recommendation which Grant and I made to Hilsman on October 10, 1963 was that our government should seek to lift all U.S. travel restrictions. This would be a world-wide change in travel policy, and would not be presented as an initiative to "liberalize" U.S. policy towards Communist China (or other Communist countries) for this would be immediately interpreted as a softening of the U.S. position. Nor did we proclaim that our efforts to broaden contacts with mainland China were based on the assumption that they would probably be rejected. We did these things because of their intrinsic merit -- to break down barriers between nations and peoples, to broaden knowledge and understanding. Privately, we could

explain that our changes in travel policy were designed to show our strength and confidence at a time when China was fearful of outside contacts because of the ferment brewing behind the curtain.

Recommendations for liberalizing rules governing travel of Americans was not a new idea. The Legal Adviser's Office (L) and the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs (SCA) had already favored the idea when it was first advanced in a more modified form by Hilsman in June, 1963. However, Governor Harriman (Under Secretary of State) believed that a formal modification of existing regulations would stir up too much adverse attention. He recommended that the State Department quietly adopt a more permissive policy governing exceptions to the current travel ban, and that is where the matter stood when Lindsey Grant and I became involved.

When we met with representatives of the Legal Advisor's Office (L) and of the Bureau of Consular and Security Affairs (SCA) on November 4, it was concluded that any attempt to issue passports without travel restrictions to only those applicants approved by the State Department would raise constitutional questions. The Legal Advisor also felt that any changes in existing practice would require consultation with appropriate committees of Congress.

Abba Schwartz (SCA) and I agreed with L's reservations. We also felt that a great deal of the advantages we sought would be lost through a surreptitious approach.

Early in December, 1963, the matter was brought by Mr. Chayes (Legal Advisor) to the attention of George Ball, Acting Secretary of State. Mr. Ball enthusiastically supported a proposal for a total removal of travel restrictions and obtained telegraphically the approval of Secretary of State Rusk. The issue was now up to the White House.

I recall attending a meeting later in December attended by top State Department representatives and by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. At that meeting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Edwin M. Martin, convinced the Attorney General and the Secretary of State that an exception would have to be made in the case of Cuba because of an existing agreement among members of the Association of American Republics banning travel to Cuba. This effectively ended our efforts to change travel policy, because the administration did not want to change travel policy unless it could be done on a world-wide basis. Moreover the death of President Kennedy had an overall dampening effect on any proposals for policy change.

All we could do at that stage was to press for liberalizing exceptions. In that regard we succeeded in having U.S. passports validated for travel to mainland China for three categories: representatives of accredited news gathering organizations; family members of Americans in prison in China; and, in 1965, U.S. doctors and public health experts.

Our Bureau was similarly frustrated in its efforts to ease restrictions on U.S. trade with China, starting with putting medicines and foodstuffs on general license. We did not think China would make any U.S. purchases in the light of its "buy anything but American" policy, but it would create a useful precedent if at some future date the Chinese would wish to move away from their present frozen hostility.

In one important respect we succeeded. That was in recommending that our public treatment of Communist China be more moderate, civil, and factual. This was reflected in a key speech made by Roger Hilsman at San Francisco on December 13. At first Secretary Rusk was annoyed over Hilsman's failure to get top-level clearance, but public and press reactions to the Hilsman speech were so overwhelmingly favorable that the Secretary reflected the same points of view in a speech he made on February 25, 1964. Meanwhile, we sent guidance to our Embassies on the importance of making it clear that it was the Chinese Communists, not the U.S., who were bellicose and unwilling to accept a world of diversity, as well as the importance of U.S. officials speaking more coolly, factually and civilly about Communist China in order to gain maximum credibility.

In retrospect there is little question but that our efforts in 1963 to liberalize U.S. policy toward mainland China failed due to major events on the other side of the Pacific.

Even if President Kennedy had served out his full term in office, it is unlikely that any major revisions in existing China policy would have occurred during that term. It is true that his thinking about China paralleled that of his associates like Harriman, Bowles, Ball and Hilsman. On the other hand, he was being drawn more and more into the vortex of Vietnam, and Vietnam was to claim the full attention of President Johnson. With Peking evidently giving strong support to Hanoi, it seemed all the more unlikely that any U.S. Administration would or could make substantive changes in China policy.

More importantly, in 1964 Mao Zedong and his entourage of ideologues were intent on revising the across-the-board liberalization of the early 1960's. The Socialist Education Campaign -- a precursor of the Cultural Revolution which was launched in late 1965 -- sought to carry out class education of youth, eliminate bourgeois influence, and stamp out "the spontaneous tendency to capitalism." This coincided with China's successful nuclear weapons test in 1964. The opportunities we saw in 1962 and 1963 for improving long-term U.S.-China relations were now fast disappearing. U.S.-China relations were about to enter the deep freeze of the Cultural Revolution which lasted until the early 1970's.

In a well-publicized speech I made at Princeton University in May 1965, I said: "Peiping's policy toward the U.S. is very simple. It is one of avowed hostility. It does not allow even for the working out of lesser problems in our relations... As a Chinese Communist document puts it, 'we do not wish to settle our disputes with the United States on a piecemeal basis; else we will undermine the revolutionary fervor of our own people. When the time comes for a settlement, it will be done all at once.'"

I did not realize at the time how prophetic that underlined statement proved to be: China, in 1971-72, decided it was time for a settlement with the U.S. "all at once" in the form of the Shanghai Communiqué of February 1972.

A further obstacle to U.S.-China relations in the period 1964-65 was the war in Vietnam. As I wrote in May 1965 in a memorandum to Bill Bundy who had succeeded Hilsman as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs: "The Chinese Communists see the U.S. as caught on the flypaper of South Vietnam, and they do not want to see us wriggle off through negotiations

and settlement." On the other hand, Peiping was concerned that the Soviets were moving into Southeast Asia in a way designed to rob Peiping of the fruits of victory. What we didn't appreciate in Washington was the growing tension between Hanoi and Peking.

As usual, our Consulate General in Hong Kong had the clearest view of trends in Communist Asia. On returning in late 1964 from a meeting with Consul General Ed Rice and his Hong Kong staff, I reported their view that Hanoi was definitely opposed to any large presence of Chinese Communists in North Vietnam -- "in fact a threat of their coming in might be a major inducement for Hanoi to come to terms with us." The Consulate General also believed that "our bombings of the north are making the North Vietnamese even more tough and resistant, and the only merit of the bombings is temporarily to bolster morale in the south." The Consulate General foresaw little likelihood of any real settlement of the war being reached at the Conference Table, given the positions of Hanoi and Peking.

The following month (June 1965) I was named U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, an assignment that unexpectedly was to involve me, once again, in U.S. China policy.

#### Chapter IV

##### the Aborted Communist Coup in Indonesia -- the China Connection

At the time of my appointment to Indonesia in June 1965, the U.S. was deeply preoccupied with Vietnam. Washington never did focus on Indonesia as a potential Communist country, even though it was headed in that direction.

It is true that President Sukarno's words infuriated Washington as did Indonesia's armed confrontation with Malaysia, the attacks on foreign missions in Jakarta, plans for expropriating foreign companies including Caltex and Goodyear, Sukarno's raging at my predecessor Howard Jones "to Hell with your aid," Indonesia's walking out of the United Nations and its agencies, and its increasing alignment with China and other forces hostile to the United States. But these were considered by many in Washington to be the antics of a vainglorious man -- a dangerous man, to be sure, but not a very serious man, rather one who sought the world spotlight.

The Chinese Communists took Sukarno far more seriously than we did. They recognized Indonesia to be a significant potential Communist state and ally. By 1965, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had become the largest and most influential political force in Indonesia, as well as being by far the largest Communist party outside the Sino-Soviet blocs. The PKI favored Sukarno, and he them. On one occasion when Sukarno was referring to PKI leader Aidit, he shouted before the crowds at Senayan arena: "I wish I had a thousand Aidits." Sukarno's drift toward Communism also related to Indonesia's imminent economic collapse due to inept policies, extravagance and mismanagement.

Even though Sukarno's avowed goal was to establish a NASAKOM government (acronym for Nationalism, Religion, and Communism), Washington continued to see Indonesia as a fractious element, not as a potential hostile force in the constellation of world power.

By late 1964, Sino-Indonesian relations were converging both at the PKI-CCP level and at the governmental level. At the party level, the PKI had sided completely with the CCP in the latter's view that revolutionary prospects were highly favorable in the former colonial world (especially Southeast Asia) and that the leadership of the world revolutionary movement was passing from Soviet to Asian hands. Differences with the Soviets were also reflected in positions taken by Sukarno's government, even though it continued to receive considerable Soviet aid, especially military hardware.

At the governmental level, Sukarno announced to the million or more people crowding Merdeka Square on August 17, 1965, (Indonesia's national day), the formation of the Peking-Jakarta-Pyongyang-Hanoi axis. This announcement was made in the presence of top officials of Communist Asia, including Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi. I realized in advance of this occasion that it would be used by Sukarno to blast the United States in a way that normal diplomatic practice would require my walking out of the pavilion where all the diplomatic corps was seated. But I had already decided, with Washington's telegraphic approval, not to give Sukarno that satisfaction, so I stoically sat it out, with press cameras trained on me.

During Indonesia's confrontation with Malaysia and the U.K., Peking was urging Sukarno to accelerate the radicalization of his policies, especially to use the confrontation as a means of establishing and arming a "Fifth Force," largely composed of Communist organizations, to be a counteragent to the Indonesian Army. All these developments polarized differences between the Indonesian Army on the one hand, and the Communists (PKI), supported by Sukarno, on the other. Sukarno became seriously ill in late August 1965 which immediately raised fears among the Communists (and probably the Air Force which was led by leftists) that, should Sukarno die, the Army would move in and crush the Communists. It was in that setting that the PKI planned a coup against the Army, almost certainly with the knowledge of the Chinese Communists and possibly with their approval.

On the night of September 30-October 1, 1965, the PKI hunted down and killed six of Indonesia's eight top army generals and seized control of Jakarta, announcing over the radio that the "September 30 movement" had taken control of the government in order to forestall a CIA-supported plot by the Generals to oust Sukarno and establish a military government. (There was no CIA or other U.S. foreknowledge of the Communist coup or of any General's plot to oust Sukarno. Army generals deplored Sukarno's Communist leanings but they would not challenge him or refuse to take orders.)

However the Indonesian army moved quickly against the Communist coup and suppressed it within a day or two. This left Sukarno weakened and suspect, and he eventually was replaced by Suharto, one of the two ranking surviving generals. Meanwhile the PKI was shattered and tens of thousands of suspected Communists, including a disproportionately high number of Chinese ethnics, were assassinated by anti-Communist forces mostly in the rural areas of Java and Bali. Here it should be pointed out that the Indonesians had a racial bias against the 3 million Chinese living in Indonesia. The Chinese were mainly resented because of their control of money-lending and retail trades.

The aborted coup was a devastating set-back for Communist China whose role in the coup was

highly suspect. Twelve separate Indonesian delegations were in China at the time of the coup, including delegations headed by the Deputy Prime Minister, the Head of the Air Force, and the Head of the National Defense Institute. There was also a large PKI delegation which, unlike previous PKI delegations sent to China, did not include any of its top level officers who evidently remained in Indonesia because of the critical events about to unfold.

Most significant of all was the evidence, subsequently received, that the Chinese knew what to expect. According to Robert Martens, our Embassy's expert on Sino-Soviet affairs who has spent many months researching the events of September 30-October 1, 1965, the Chinese leadership at that critical moment, showed itself to be remarkably well informed. The Chinese reportedly had a complete list of the assassinated generals by 11 a.m. October 1, which was 5 hours before this information was announced in Jakarta. The list included the name of General Nasution (who had escaped assassination but whose inclusion suggests that the Chinese had an advance PKI target list.)

October 1 was also China's National day and it was apparently to be not only a day of celebration of past victory on the China mainland but it was also to coincide with a far-reaching new victory that would add the world's fifth most populous nation to the Asian Communist Camp.

The Communist failure in Indonesia was a severe setback for China, shattering its alliance with Indonesia and its hopes for a radical tide sweeping over all the developing world led by China. The famous Lin Piao speech of September 1965 had boasted that the world village was surrounding the world city, which meant an Asian Communist encirclement of the U.S. and USSR. A successful Sino-Indonesian alliance would also have created a giant pincer of China to the North and Indonesia to the south within which the American forces in Vietnam would have been caught. On the contrary, Indonesia under General Suharto crushed the PKI, gradually removed Sukarno, established a New Order in Indonesia with close ties with its neighbors and the West, rejoined the United Nations, and, along with Thailand, took the lead in forming the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Indonesia also severed diplomatic ties with China.

The extraordinary reversal in Indonesia in the period 1965-67 never received the international attention it deserved, especially in the United States, which was so totally preoccupied with Vietnam. Our Embassy in Jakarta was also at pains to warn Washington against taking any credit for what happened in Indonesia. The aborted coup was entirely an Indonesian performance in which we played no role whatsoever. Any U.S. government efforts to take credit for the reversal would only bolster Communist claims that the U.S. was involved in a plot to remove Sukarno and the PKI.

It is beyond my ken to estimate how the aborted Communist coup impacted on the Chinese Communist leadership. In the short run, it seems to have spurred China's self-destructive course toward the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, putting U.S.-Chinese relations in an even deeper freeze. But in the long run, these setbacks and excesses strengthened the hand of the pragmatists led by Zhou En-lai.

One other event occurred while I was in Indonesia that came to have a bearing on U.S.-China

policy. That occurred in the form of Mr. Richard Nixon's visit to Jakarta in April 1967 where he was my wife's and my house guest for two days. When Mr. Nixon and I called on President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik and others, Mr. Nixon took down notes on key points they made and when we got back to my residence, we had a long conversation on events in Indonesia and the rest of East Asia, especially China. Our conversation was tape-recorded by Mr. Nixon, and when I asked him what he did with all these notes and tapes, he replied that he had them transcribed, filed and cross-filed for later reference. For example, I told him that the rate of inflation in Indonesia in 1965 was 635%. He included that obscure fact in his Guam Doctrine press interview on July 27, 1969. His tape-recording was, of course, to lead to his eventual undoing, but I remember him as the best informed on foreign affairs of all the luminaries who visited Jakarta during my four years there.

This opinion of Mr. Nixon was reinforced when I read the article he wrote for the Foreign Affairs Quarterly's October 1967 issue. In that article, which began with a tribute to Indonesia's new leadership, Mr. Nixon made a strong case for the U.S. improving its relations with the Peoples Republic of China, a country with one-quarter of the global population and with extensive strategic, political and economic influence.

During my last few months as Ambassador to Indonesia, I was assigned to serve concurrently on the U.S. negotiating team to the Paris talks on Vietnam; and in March 1969 to being assigned as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, a position I held for four years.

This brought me back into the center of U.S.-China relations, working for a President who was destined to make those relations his greatest foreign policy triumph.

## Chapter V

### The Real Beginnings of Washington-Peking Rapprochement 1969-71

Three months service on our Paris delegation provided opportunities to meet President Nixon, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger (for the first time), and it was clear from the moment I met the President in Paris that he recalled our conversations in Jakarta two years earlier, calling me "low-profile Green" because of the emphasis I had placed on maintaining a low-profile American presence in Indonesia. I had also given a publicized talk to the American Chamber of Commerce in Paris advocating more "Modesty, Mutuality and Multilateralism" in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.

Shortly thereafter, I was named Assistant Secretary of State, returning to Washington to replace my old friend and Yale classmate, Bill Bundy. But before I took over Bundy's job, I requested an opportunity to say farewell to friends in Indonesia -- especially Suharto and Malik. At the same time, I figured such a trip to Indonesia would give me an opportunity to visit other countries in my area of responsibility, and that, as the first emissary of the Nixon Administration to be sent to that area, I should be in a position in conversations with Asian leaders to reflect accurately the views of our new President.

I accordingly requested a private White House meeting with the President, which was granted.

But before going over to the Oval Office, I co-drafted with Ambassador Win Brown, my deputy, and with Bob Barnett, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Economic Affairs (who had also been of invaluable assistance to me in Indonesia), an informal three-page memorandum setting forth what the three of us regarded as President Nixon's viewpoints on key policy issues of interest to Asian leaders. This memorandum was based on things the President had said or written or which we believed reflected his viewpoint (or should).

President Nixon approved my use of the memorandum but, just as he did so, in walked Henry Kissinger who was visibly annoyed by my having by-passed him in getting to the Oval Office.

Upon my return from a long Asian trip in April 1969 that included meetings with top leaders, I included in my written report to Secretary Rogers a statement that there seemed to be a universally held judgment among all the Asian leaders I met that China had never been in such a negative, truculent mood as it was at that time. Asian leaders felt that any hope of progress in establishing a constructive dialogue with China was out of the question until the Cultural Revolution subsided.

President Nixon pencilled "this is great" on my trip report when Secretary Rogers sent him an abbreviated copy, and the President directed Kissinger to circulate copies of the report to top officials in our foreign policy community.

The President showed continuing interest in achieving a breakthrough in our frozen relationship with the PRC. I recall that on our return from his meeting with Vietnamese President Thieu at Midway Island in early June 1969, President Nixon invited me to his cabin on Air Force One where for nearly two hours we discussed China and other Asian issues. The President was interested in the history of our efforts to achieve some thaw in U.S.-China relations. I also told the President about my recent meeting with the old Gimo on Taiwan, where President Chiang seemed out of touch with reality, at least on the Sino-Soviet dispute which he regarded as a collusive effort by China and Russia to delude and divide the West.

The President stressed that we should try to remove unnecessary irritants in our relations with China, but that we should not do this in a way that would unnecessarily provoke the USSR, or that was designed to exploit Sino-Soviet differences.

Shortly thereafter in late July 1969, I accompanied President Nixon on the Pacific-East Asian phase of his round-the-world trip. I had co-authored with Bob Barnett the so-called "scope-paper" for that phase of his trip, and much of the scope-paper's contents were reflected in Nixon's famous press backgrounder on July 25 at Guam, the first stop of his trip. In the scope-paper I had emphasized the great economic up-surge of East Asian countries and the growing ability of most East Asian countries to assume greater burdens for their own defense. I also said that our general position in East Asia should not be one of trying to solve East Asia's problems but rather of helping East Asia's problem solvers.

The President made several references to China in his backgrounder, including modifications he hoped to see in permitting travel of Americans to China and allowing limited tourist purchase of Chinese products.

But what undoubtedly interested Peking most in the Guam backgrounder was the President's thesis that (a) the U.S. would stand by its treaty commitments, (b) the U.S. would provide a shield if a nuclear power threatened any U.S. ally or a nation whose survival we considered vital to our own survival, and (c) the U.S. looked to the country threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its own defense.

The President also left it clear that the U.S. should learn from the experience of Vietnam and not get caught in another comparable situation of "creeping involvement." "I want to be sure that our policies in the future, all over the world...reduce American involvement."

In retrospect, it is fair to assume that these statements of America's role in the world helped set the stage for the Chinese-American rapprochement that was to occur within two years of the Nixon Doctrine (I did not attend the President's press backgrounder in a hotel in Guam, but Nixon told the press that I would answer any questions they might have on the backgrounder.

The President also asked me to brief the large press corps accompanying him at our next two stops in Manila and Jakarta. This assignment was one I could scarcely handle since I did not attend the President's meetings with President Marcos or President Suharto. No one from the State Department was included in these meetings, not even Secretary Rogers or our Ambassadors.). During 1969, the Administration made a number of statements and moves, beyond those already mentioned, to create a better climate in U.S. Chinese relations. We publicly expressed our willingness to renew bilateral talks with the Chinese in Warsaw or elsewhere; and Ambassador Stoessel in Warsaw was authorized by the President to tell his Chinese colleague of the President's wish to discuss an improvement in relations. All these statements and positions, including liberalization of American travel and tourist purchases of Chinese products, were favorably received by the great majority of our newspapers and members of Congress.

Whereas the Chinese early in 1969 had castigated the Nixon Administration in the harshest terms, Peking attacks moderated in the course of the year. Previously, Chinese representatives conveyed to a number of foreigners their awareness that U.S. policy toward China was under review. However they also made it clear that the issue of Taiwan, including U.S. military forces deployed there, created a major obstacle to any Sino-U.S. rapprochement. We also received indirect official word from Peking that China appreciated U.S. restraint in not seeking to exploit the Sino-Soviet dispute and that the U.S. obviously did not see a Sino-Soviet war as being in its interests.

In late 1969 it was announced that the U.S. would automatically validate passports of persons in six categories for travel to the PRC. These categories were members of Congress, journalists, teachers, scholars, medical doctors and Red Cross representatives. On December 19, it was announced that foreign subsidiaries of American companies would be permitted to sell China non-strategic items of foreign manufacture, while U.S. companies were permitted to buy or sell Chinese goods within or between foreign countries but not to import Chinese goods to the U.S. U.S. tourist purchases of Chinese goods were allowed without limit.

All these and other moves to ease restrictions on U.S. travel and trade with China were instituted

either by our bureau or by the NSC where a Senior Interdepartmental group chaired by my deputy, Ambassador Winthrop Brown, prepared a policy study for Dr. Kissinger as the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Our bureau was encouraged by the interest shown by the President in all these moves to ease restrictions on U.S.-Chinese trade and travel, although we were pressing for a complete lifting of all travel restrictions on Americans desiring to visit China, and on all restrictions on Chinese bona fide visitors to the U.S. These steps were finally approved by the White House in March and April of 1971.

In the President's Foreign Policy Message to Congress in February 1970, Mr. Nixon declared that the U.S. aim was to establish a "more normal and constructive relationship with Communist China. He asserted that the U.S. had "historic ties of friendship with the Chinese people, and many of our basic interests are not in conflict."

1970 was not a significant year (like 1969 and 1971) in terms of changes in U.S. policies towards China, but 1970 must have been an important year for Peking's policymakers in determining the future course of China's relations with the U.S., Japan and the Soviet Union.

We concluded at our Chiefs of Mission meeting in Tokyo in July 1970, attended by the Ambassadors serving in the Western Pacific region and by Washington policy makers concerned with that area that:

- (1) Peking is on the defensive, being acutely concerned over the Soviet military build-up in Siberia.
- (2) Peking is worried that the U.S. will be pulling back militarily from the Western Pacific, and is much concerned over future Japanese capabilities and interests.
- (3) Peking is determined to heal the scars of the Cultural Revolution, and rebuild the Party and the economy. The latter will entail a trade relationship with the U.S. which advances China's development.

These and other conclusions of the Conference, which was attended by Secretary Rogers, were forwarded to President Nixon in a memorandum I drafted which concluded:

"We have no reason to apologize for the past. The very protection we extended to the nations of Asia these last two decades has now permitted us to draw back somewhat and, indeed, to focus on the dangers of our over-involvement (as in Vietnam) and unwarranted tutelage. This is not a question of getting out of Asia, but of finding the right way and right degree of staying in Asia.... We accept the risks -- and yet the ultimate safety -- of involvement."

All during 1970 and early 1971 we continued to pursue our talks with the Chinese in Warsaw -- to no avail. Kissinger raised with the State Department the possibility of sending a higher level emissary to Peking, but we questioned whether the Warsaw talks could ever produce such a result. Furthermore, in the absence of any clear signal from Peking that it would react favorably

on any of the issues we had raised in Warsaw over the years, it was doubtful that any emissary would accomplish much. It never entered our minds in the State Department how far the President would be willing to go in personally involving himself in this politically sensitive issue.

All the back channel soundings that the President and Dr. Kissinger were making to Peking through third countries and various intermediaries in early 1971 were carried out under the strictest security precautions -- leaving us in the State Department completely in the dark, except for the Secretary of State who was kept informed.

On the other hand, we recognized that the massive build-up of Soviet military power in Siberia, hard along the northern frontier of China, was profoundly disturbing to the Chinese leadership. This would entail a re-evaluation of China's policy towards the great powers.

The first overt indications of a new Chinese policy towards the United States took a curious form. During an international ping-pong tournament in Japan in April 1971, the Chinese team invited the American team to visit China -- an invitation the U.S. accepted and reciprocated. Shortly thereafter, the White House authorized the State and Commerce Departments to liberalize foreign assets control regulations affecting U.S. trade with China. Win Brown and Bob Barnett spent many days with their Commerce colleagues working out necessary changes in the Federal Register.

U.S. policy towards China, and the Chinese representative issue in the UN, were major topics for discussion at our Chiefs of Mission meeting which I chaired in Baguio, the Philippines, May 17-20, 1971.

Walter McConaughy, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of China on Taiwan, reluctantly concluded that a change of U.S. tactics would be required if there were to be any real chance of preventing the ouster or walk-out of the GRC at the UNGA session in October. Eight more countries had recognized Peking during the previous few months, and even the GRC itself realized that perhaps a dual representation formula (seating both Chinas in the UN) was its only chance for survival in the UN. However the GRC was adamant, according to McConaughy, on the subject of the GRC representing China in the UN Security Council -- a solution Peking would almost certainly reject.

Our Consulate General in Hong Kong, represented by Consul General David Osborn, made what turned out to be a remarkably prophetic analysis of the terms under which a Washington-Peking rapprochement could be achieved without the U.S. abandoning its commitments to the Republic of China.

According to our official account of the Chiefs of Mission Conference in 1971, Consul General Osborn said:

"Regarding the status of Taiwan, we should say that we do not disagree with claims of both parties that Taiwan is a province of China. We are deluding ourselves if we believe we can have good relations with the PRC without such a declaration."

As a second point, Dave Osborn said he did not believe we need remove our military forces from Taiwan completely to have better relations with the mainland. We must, however, start moving in that direction.

As a third point, he said we should de-emphasize verbally our bilateral security treaty with the GRC, while continuing to keep that treaty in force.

In the fourth place (Osborn concluded) we should continue to favor a peaceful resolution of GRC-PRC problems through direct talks, but we should low-key this in our public output. Usually it is better for us to say nothing and let the countries directly concerned work out their own problems.

Osborn and I agreed that Peking was now moving in a more pragmatic direction, making it probable that Peking would accept a U.S. position embodying the above four points.

Meanwhile, as earlier stated, unbeknownst to all of us in the State Department (except Secretary Rogers), Henry Kissinger and a few key White House colleagues were involved in highly secret preparations for Henry Kissinger's trip to Peking in June 1971.

The President had a passion for secrecy based in part on his distrust of the bureaucracy. Never was secrecy more strictly pursued as it was over preparations for the Kissinger trip, and with considerable justification. Had word leaked out, it might have raised all kinds of criticisms from the right wing of the Republican party, not to mention deep concern in Taiwan, Japan and other countries affected.

So I am not faulting Nixon and Kissinger for their secret diplomacy, although not informing people who are expected to be informed can give rise to some real dangers. Let me cite a specific example. I recall meeting one morning in June 1971 with several key members of my staff, one of whom mentioned that it had just been announced over the radio that Dr. Kissinger, who was in Pakistan on a round-the-world trip, had contracted a case of intestinal flu, and was therefore planning to take several days rest by motoring up from Islamabad to the Pakistan mountain resort area of Murree.

I commented to my staff that this was ridiculous -- that no one with what we used to call "Delhi belly" would take off on a long bumpy motor trip. I then observed blandly that Henry was probably off on a secret trip to China.

As soon as I said those words, it occurred to me that my impromptu speculation, if true, would immediately spread to the newspapers, and I would be responsible for the worst leak of the Nixon administration. So I quickly excused myself from my meeting, dashed up to Secretary Rogers' office, and told him what had happened. The Secretary paled visibly, for I had uncovered the truth. On his instructions, I rushed back to my office and swore all present to utter secrecy about my speculation. They kept the secret.

Such are the dangers of not telling officials of events occurring in their area of responsibility.

Right after the President amazed the world with his widely televised revelations in the summer of 1971 about Henry's trip to Peking and plans for the President to visit China the following February, I received a telephone call from Secretary Rogers who was with Nixon in San Clemente. He asked what I thought of the announcement. I said it was great, but that we were going to have problems with the Japanese. Secretary Rogers seemed surprised, pointing out that we had given Prime Minister Sato several hours advance notice of the President's announcement (as indeed we had to other allies). I said that the announcement nevertheless left Prime Minister Sato in a most embarrassing political position. For years we had been urging restraint on other countries about opening relations with Peking; and the Japanese, largely out of deference to us, had continued to vote in the UN against the seating of Peking's representatives in China's UN seat. And now we had secretly reached Peking before Japan (known as Sato's nightmare), exposing the Japanese government to the first of what were to be several "Nixon Shockus" that rocked U.S.-Japanese relations.

Anyway, I told Secretary Rogers that Dick Ericson (Director of Japanese Affairs) and I would work immediately on a draft message from Nixon to Sato explaining the reasons for tight security and apologizing for any embarrassments this might have caused our most important Asian ally. Our draft message, telexed the next morning to San Clemente, was approved by the President, but I doubt it did much to allay Sato's concerns.

In his memoirs published in 1984, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson, a former U.S. Ambassador to Japan and close friend of Sato's, revealed that he had been alerted by Nixon to fly out to Tokyo to give Sato advance notice in a way that would show special consideration for Japan. But, for some reason, the White House canceled the Johnson trip.

The President's announcement was an even greater shock to President Chiang Kai-shek and to the Republic of China on Taiwan -- but there wasn't much we could do to allay the shock. Indeed, the President's impending trip to China had the effect of completely undermining the position our government had taken year after year in marshaling international support for the Republic of China (Taiwan) retaining China's seat in the UN.

Not that I found this to be any great loss -- the eventual seating of the PRC was inevitable -- but we in the State Department were nevertheless under orders from Nixon in 1971, even after the President's China trip was announced, to do all we could to preserve the GRC's position in the UN. It took a lot of our time and effort -- and eventually we lost.

During the autumn of 1971, Jack Service, who in the 1940's was the most able of all the State Department China-language officers and who was later hounded out of the service by McCarthyism, made a trip to China with his wife, Caroline, as personal guests of Premier Zhou En-lai. I, as Jack's close friend from the days back in 1946-47 when we had served together in New Zealand, visited the Services on their return to Berkeley, California, where Jack gave me a blow-by-blow account of his China trip, as we walked all over the hills of Berkeley.

Jack met with the top leaders whom he had known from the World War II days when they were together in the Yen-an Caves. He found the Cultural Revolution rapidly subsiding. It was clear

that Zhou En-lai, in particular, was preparing the way for serious productive talks with Nixon. The key issue would be Taiwan. Zhou recognized that the U.S. could not switch its policy overnight and that some evolution over time would be required. From Peking's viewpoint, it was absolutely essential that the U.S. not promote or encourage any Taiwan independence movement. If the U.S. looked for a successful outcome of President Nixon's trip, it must accept Taiwan as an integral part of China. Of less immediate consequence was the removal of U.S. forces on Taiwan.

Jack Service's account was of interest in many regards, especially his account of the notable improvements that had taken place in the lives of most Chinese people over the last two decades. Jack reported Zhou's surprise over the PRC victory (October 25, 1971) on the UN seating issue. The Chinese clearly had not anticipated this favorable result. During his conversation with Zhou En-lai on October 27, 1971, there were constant staff interruptions with regard to developments in New York and hasty arrangements for China's participation in the UN. I reported Jack's views to the White House, State and CIA.

Also during October Henry Kissinger made another trip to China to prepare for the Presidential visit and to do some initial work on the final (Shanghai) communiqué which was to set forth what was agreed to at the summit meetings.

## Chapter VI

### President Nixon's Trip to China, 1972

Nearly 200 people accompanied the President to China, including security personnel, administrative staff, press and others. The official party numbered 13, ranked as follows: President Nixon, Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, Presidential Assistant Bob Haldeman, Press Secretary Ron Ziegler, Presidential Military Adviser Brent Scowcroft, Assistant Secretary Green, Presidential Deputy Assistant Dwight Chapin, Speechwriter Pat Buchanan, Personal Presidential Secretary Rose Mary Woods, State Department Director of Asia Communist Affairs Al Jenkins, NSC staff member Foreign Service Officer John Holdridge, and Special Assistant to Kissinger, Winston Lord. But it was clear from our initial seat assignments in the Presidential plane that the White House was going to dominate the show and that the State Department was to take a back seat literally.

While in Hawaii en route to China, I had a useful meeting with Dr. Kissinger who gave me the benefit of what he had learned about negotiating with the Chinese, based on his two recent visits to Peking. Kissinger suggested our meeting in Hawaii since I would be assisting Secretary Rogers in handling what were known as the "counterpart talks" with the Chinese Foreign Minister and his staff. The counterpart talks dealt essentially with specific problem areas like trade, travel, consular affairs, property rights, while leaving broad strategic issues to the top level, namely Mao, Zhou En-lai, Nixon and Kissinger.

"Never," I recall Henry Kissinger saying to me, "use the language of the marketplace in dealing with top Chinese officials. Don't talk about deals or quid-pro-quo. Always talk about principles...That as a matter of principle we are prepared to do so-and-so, and that we would trust

that you as a matter of principle would do this or that..." "The Chinese," he added, "are real puritans -- not like you New Englanders."

"Another thing," Henry added, "is that the Chinese have a lot of things to get off their chests -- decades of humiliations at the hands of the imperialist West. The Foreign Minister may well spend two full days sounding off on that subject before he is willing to get into substance. Don't interrupt him. Let him get it out of his system. If you interrupt to rebut him, he'll start all over again -- and you'll get nowhere." (He implied that this is what almost happened to him.)

That was Kissinger at his best -- astute, articulate, a master of manoeuver. But he was also a megalomaniac, and as long as he was in the White House he lost no opportunity to build his power base at the expense of the State Department, undercutting the Secretary of State and shamelessly exploiting President Nixon's long-standing suspicions and prejudices against careerists in the State Department (despite our loyalty to all Presidents and our high respect for Nixon's extraordinary grasp of strategic issues).

For Secretary Rogers, the China trip had many humiliating moments, especially not being asked to accompany President Nixon (and Kissinger) to their only meeting with Chairman Mao Zedong. Secretary Rogers was uncomplaining because he did not want to add in any way to the President's problems.

The crowning achievement of the Nixon China Trip was the final communiqué -- known as the Shanghai Communiqué -- which was to become the charter of our new relationship with China. The format of the communiqué was in itself unusual. Each side -- first China, then the U.S. -- presented its contrasting view of the world scene and the main tenets of its foreign policies. This was followed by identifying areas of understanding and agreement. In this section the U.S. acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The U.S. does not challenge that position." On the thorny issue of withdrawing U.S. forces and military installations on Taiwan, the U.S. stated this to be its ultimate objective, but related it to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves: meanwhile the U.S. would progressively reduce its military presence on Taiwan as tension in the area diminished.

Credit for the negotiation of this document must go largely to Henry Kissinger and his Chinese counterpart Vice-Minister Chiao Kuan-hua. Dr. Kissinger went through the motions of consulting Secretary Rogers and the rest of the State Department contingent. From time to time Rogers and I would meet with Kissinger or we would receive sections of the draft communiqué for our comments, but at no stage did I ever see the entire draft until it was already approved by the President, Kissinger, Rogers and the Chinese leaders.

The first opportunity I was given to read the approved draft was on February 26, the day we left Peking for a one-day rest stop at the scenic city of Hangchow before our final day at Shanghai. When we reached our hotel in Hangchow, Secretary Rogers showed me the approved text. I read it rapidly, detecting a major flaw which I immediately drew to Rogers' attention. He agreed with me, and so did Al Jenkins. The flaw was simply this: although the U.S. reaffirmed in the text of the Communiqué its support for U.S. security treaty obligations to Japan, the Republic of Korea,

the Philippines, SEATO and ANZUS, no mention was made of our treaty obligations to the Republic of China on Taiwan. This would almost certainly be seized upon by the world press, and especially by those in the Republican party who were opposed to the President's trip, (Even top cabinet officials like Vice President Agnew and Treasury Secretary John Connally had privately expressed strong concerns over the President's trip to China.) to charge that the President had sold the Republic of China down the river, that the U.S. had unilaterally terminated without advance notice its treaty obligations to the ROC, and that this could even be interpreted as suggesting to Peking that it could attack Taiwan without involving the U.S.

Rogers could see my point right away. He, too, remembered how Secretary of State Dean Acheson had come under heavy fire for excluding South Korea from a map showing those areas in East Asia of primary defense concern to the United States.

Secretary Rogers immediately put in a telephone call to the President who was staying at the nearby government guest house, but he got Haldeman on the phone instead. Haldeman refused to disturb the President who was resting -- besides, he said, the President had already approved the draft.

I was in a black mood that night at the dinner party given in the President's honor by the Hangchow Revolutionary Committee. Ziegler noted my mood and asked what had happened. When I told him, he evidently then got in touch with Haldeman.

Around 1 or 2 a.m., John Scali beat on my door and said that "all hell had broken loose in the Presidential suite." Evidently Haldeman or Rogers had got to the President about the issue, and the President was enraged.

According to Henry Kissinger's memoirs, the President was furious at the State Department for belatedly coming up with a long series of nitpicks about the Communiqué, and yet failure to correct these nitpicks, the President allegedly feared, might result in the State Department bad-mouthing the Communiqué. Henry depicted the President as "storming about the beautiful guest house in Hangchow in his underwear," swearing that "he would do something about that State Department at the first opportunity -- a threat he made at regular intervals since my first interview with him...."

Well, of course, there was no series of nitpicks -- just one major objection -- a point which, amazingly, no one had spotted until I drew it to Rogers' attention; and it is quite possible that the President's fury was directed at Kissinger for having put him on the spot.

The following morning, at breakfast, Secretary Rogers told me that he had managed to reach President Nixon late the previous evening to express our concerns. He said he didn't know what the President would do. After breakfast, we left for the airport to go to Shanghai. While proceeding to my plane, Henry Kissinger intercepted me. He was angry about what he termed my "poor-mouthing of the Communiqué."

For the first time in my three years of association with Henry, I did not hold back. "Since when was the Secretary of State offering constructive criticisms defined as poor-mouthing?" I further

reminded him of the constitutional responsibilities of the Secretary of State to advise the President -- especially on an issue as critical as this, one that could affect the whole outcome of the President's trip.

"But you've been talking to Scali, who has no right to be involved," was Henry's weak retort, to which I replied that Scali had a right to know as press adviser to the President. Henry then did an about-face. He asked with a seeming genuine warmth if I would join him that evening in briefing the world press at the time of the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué.

I replied that I would do so if the President so ordered. I was not happy about the prospect of being conspicuously identified with a communiqué I found badly flawed, and it was left unclear whether that flaw would remain in the communiqué.

So I arrived in Shanghai in an angry mood until it was revealed to me later in the day that Kissinger had worked out with the Chinese Vice Minister late the previous evening a way of handling the problem I'd raised.

I was also told that the President specifically asked that I accompany Kissinger to the press briefing and that I participate to the extent of summarizing what had gone on in the counterpart talks between Secretary Rogers and the Chinese Foreign Minister.

Kissinger never told me specifically what arrangements he had concluded with the Chinese side regarding the critical objection I had raised, but during our briefing of a large press gathering in Shanghai at 6 p.m., February 27, it simply took the form of an agreed removal of the offending sentence from the Communiqué and of Henry stating in answer to an anticipated question from the press, actually Mr. Kraslow of The Los Angeles Times who asked, "Why did not the U.S. government affirm its Treaty commitment to Taiwan, as the President and you have done on numerous occasions?" Kissinger answered that this issue was an extraordinarily difficult one to discuss at that time and place, but, he then added the key passage: "we stated our basic position with respect to this issue in the President's World Report, in which we said that this Treaty will be maintained. Nothing has changed on that position." Kissinger said he hoped that that would be all he would have to say on that subject -- and his request was respected.

Thus was adroitly averted what could have been a serious setback. Neither Henry nor the President ever thanked me for my initiative. President Nixon understandably acted as though the event never occurred, while Kissinger took it upon himself to leave history with a self-serving account of the incident -- one that is misleading and damaging to the State Department, and one that I am now, many years later, moved to refute.

In any event, this red-letter day concluded on a most pleasant note. I was asked to meet with President Nixon in his hotel room at 10:30 p.m. to discuss the trip which I was about to undertake with John Holdridge, in which we would call on the top leaders of all East Asian and Australasian countries in the course of two weeks to explain American policy in the wake of the Shanghai Communiqué and to answer questions.

The President was warm and gracious. He gave me instructions as to what I should say about his

talks in China -- their frankness, their lack of double-talk, the fact that there were no secret agreements or understandings -- it was all out in the open as presented in the revealed record. He also urged that I stress America's constancy of purpose and its continuing search, in consultation with our allies, for "finding the right way to stay in Asia," and that under all circumstances we would stand by our commitments. He also gave me special instructions regarding Korea and Thailand.

In assigning John Holdridge to be my assistant, he ensured that we would be in a more authoritative position to answer certain questions relating to the top level talks with Zhou En-lai which John had attended as an NSC adviser to Kissinger and as an interpreter.

That was the last full day of the President's trip to China. He took off the following morning from Shanghai with all his party (save for John Holdridge and me) direct for Washington by way of Anchorage, Alaska.

For me, the most exhilarating and important moments of the trip all occurred that last day -- my final meeting with Henry Kissinger which turned out so satisfactorily, our joint briefing of the Press (in which he did almost all of the talking and answering of questions), and my final meeting with the President late that evening (February 27). But there was one other event that day which deserves special mention.

In the course of the afternoon, Premier Zhou En-lai made a personal call on Secretary of State Rogers in his hotel room which I was asked to join (Secretary Rogers' suite and mine were on the 13th floor, Kissinger's on the 14th floor and the Nixons were on the top floor, the 15th. The symbolism escaped no one.). In the course of this call, the subject of my flying direct to Tokyo from Shanghai was raised by Secretary Rogers. Our earlier application to the Chinese government for permission for this flight had gone unanswered. We realized the uniqueness of our application, for no plane of any nation had flown either way between China and Japan in the preceding 23 years. So when Bill Rogers raised the question with Premier Zhou in our hotel meeting, Zhou just smiled and said through his interpreter: "Mr. Secretary, you just go ahead and do what you think is right."

Zhou never gave his permission, but he never denied permission. He thereby established no precedent which someone else could invoke (The thought later occurred to me that Zhou's unusual courtesy call on the Secretary of State might have been prompted by concerns expressed to him by Nixon or Kissinger over the State Department's "poor-mouthing" of the Communiqué. In other words, Kissinger, in justifying to Chiao.).

It all worked out fine, and when, the next day, following President Nixon's departure, I took off in the President's back-up plane for Tokyo, Premier Zhou actually drove down to our plane to say farewell to John Holdridge and me. For the first time, in my hearing, Premier Zhou spoke English: "Goodbye, Mr. Green, have a good trip. Good luck." He knew I faced some difficult moments, especially when I reached Taiwan where I was scheduled to meet with President Chiang Kai-shek. I left China feeling that Zhou En-lai was perhaps the most remarkable of all leaders in terms of his broad command of world events and yet his extraordinary attention to detail.

## Chapter VII

### Aftermath of Nixon Trip -- Asian and U.S. Reactions

Arriving in Tokyo on February 28, John Holdridge and I were met by my wife and by special assistant, Paul Cleveland. We four were to make the long journey from Tokyo to Seoul, Manila, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok, Singapore, Jakarta, Sydney, Canberra, Wellington and back to Washington. From Tokyo to Singapore, we traveled in a small executive jet provided by the Commander in Chief of the Pacific. The rest of the trip was by commercial airlines.

The most challenging talks I had were in Tokyo and Taipei. As The New York Times put it on the day of our arrival in Tokyo: "The Japanese press is beside itself in frustration -- and the government is not far behind -- that Japan's overtures toward normal government relations with Peking have been spurned; while President Nixon has been welcomed. China professes to fear revived Japanese militarism and Japanese economic hegemony in Asia."

My meetings with Prime Minister Sato and Foreign Minister Fukuda were nevertheless warm and friendly, based on many years' acquaintance, even though they were under criticism in Japan for the way the U.S. had overtaken Japan in the race to Peking. They were also anxious for "inside" information regarding what had transpired in the summit meetings in Peking beyond what was already announced. This placed me in a bit of a spot because I had not been directly involved in the top-level negotiations with Zhou -- a fact known to the Japanese press. On the other hand, Kissinger and President Nixon had given me background and guidance, and John Holdridge had attended most of the summit meetings.

The Japanese government had already made favorable official statements about the Shanghai Communiqué before our arrival in Tokyo, and the government's statements after my departure would indicate that our talks in Tokyo had gone well in the sense of removing suspicions that there were secret deals in Peking, perhaps involving Japan, in reaffirming our defense commitment to Taiwan, and in suggesting that we had no desire to beat Japan in any race toward diplomatic recognition of Peking.

The two things I remember most vividly about our busy schedule of calls in Korea were: (1) the 90-minute grilling I had from the Korean Foreign Minister with regard to every detail of the President's China Trip, plus my assessment of each detail's implications, and (2) the friendly solicitude expressed by my old friend (and one-time adversary) President Park Chung-Hee regarding my personal safety when visiting Taiwan in view of the strongly adverse reactions he anticipated there.

I accordingly prepared careful talking points during the Seoul-Taipei flight in our 4-passenger jet -- points that I later checked with Ambassador McConaughy in Taipei before our meetings with top ROC officials. President Chiang Kai-shek refused to see us, but his able, level-headed son, Chiang Ching-kuo, who was Premier at the time and later President of the ROC, was our gracious, albeit dismayed host. I assured the Premier and Foreign Minister Chow that, while we had modified our policy toward Peking, we had not changed our policy toward the ROC with

which we continued to have diplomatic relations and a defense commitment. We also expected to do even more to encourage trade and investment in Taiwan. In the Shanghai Communiqué we made explicit our view that there is but one China, rejecting any suggesting that we favor a two-China policy or a one-China, one-Taiwan policy. We do not pretend, I added, to know how the Taiwan issue will eventually be settled. This is a problem to be resolved by the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. We only insist on the issue being resolved peacefully.

After a busy day of meetings in which these themes were stressed, and many questions answered by John Holdridge and me, I said to the Foreign Minister at our final meeting that I hoped his government would not convey an impression of dismay and bitterness over President Nixon's China initiative, for that would only give satisfaction to those who are enemies of the ROC and instill fears on the part of Taiwan's business contacts. The ROC has many strong friends in the U.S. and elsewhere, and it must remain that way.

Subsequently our Embassy reported that reactions in Taiwan remained skeptical but the "GRC leaders were impressed with Green's reaffirmation of the defense commitment and most interested in his comment that he believed Peking is prepared to accept the status quo in Taiwan for an indefinite period. Most important of all, the GRC leaders did not engage in a further public quarrel with the U.S. Private comments also indicated relief and a shift from earlier sharp criticism."

With the help of Walter McConaughy and John Holdridge, my difficult mission to Taiwan succeeded.

Our next stop after a scary flight through a tropical electrical storm was Manila, a scene of utter confusion. Mrs. Marcos was taking off for Peking just as we landed. Our ashen-faced Ambassador, Hank Byroade, explained that Mrs. Marcos was looking for new relations with Peking, now that the U.S. had allegedly changed its policy. Byroade also said that I was being served with a subpoena to appear the following day before the Philippine Senate to answer questions about "how the U.S. was reneging on its 2-China policy," which Foreign Minister Romulo had thought we were pursuing. The Philippine press reaction was shrill and irrational, urging that, since the U.S. had jettisoned Taiwan, the Philippines should now negotiate a deal with Peking.

According to the Embassy's telegraphic reports of my 36 hours stay in Manila, my meetings with Marcos, Romulo, the Philippine Senate, the press, etc. had been "indispensable in halting the snowballing erosion in Philippine confidence in U.S. Asian policy."

Our meetings in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were held in a calmer atmosphere and went off without incident, except for President Lon Nol's unexplained absence from Phnom Penh. I had little regard for him anyway and was glad to have my meetings instead with Sirik Matak, the Foreign Minister, a wise and courageous man.

The King of Thailand, reflecting the sentiment of his government and people, expressed to me profound skepticism of PRC intentions and of U.S. ability and preparedness to deal realistically with the Chinese. However on our departure from Bangkok after long separate meetings with the

King, the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, the National Executive Council, the SEATO Secretary General, and the press, the Thai government released a statement describing our talks as "most satisfactory to both sides while at the same time creating excellent mutual understanding." The usually critical leading newspaper The Nation said I had done a "superb job in allaying suspicions." During my talks in Thailand I was in a position to provide private assurances that Peking was likely to reduce, and possibly terminate, material support for Communist insurgents operating in Thailand.

Our stops in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore were relatively uneventful but entirely satisfactory.

Indonesia posed a special problem in terms of Indonesia's deep suspicions of the Chinese, who were regarded as co-conspirators with the Indonesian Communist Party in assassinating 6 of Indonesia's top 8 generals in the aborted coup of September 30, 1965. On the other hand, President Suharto, Foreign Minister Malik, and the Army leaders welcomed Nixon's China Trip as offering hope for peace and stability. Press coverage emphasized my assurances that there had been no change in U.S. commitments and no secret deals.

In Australia there was no need to explain or justify the President's trip to China. It was widely accepted as a sensible move. However, Australia posed an interesting challenge since the leader of the Labor Party opposition, Gough Whitlam (who was Prime Minister during my assignment to Australia 1973-75) had adopted the position that Australia should now establish relations with the PRC. The leader of the Country Party was similarly interested in early recognition of Peking as giving Australia a diplomatic advantage in selling wheat and other farm products to the huge China market. I found myself in something of a quandary in justifying the President's opening to China on the one hand and advising caution regarding any Australian move to recognize Peking on the other. All I could do was suggest that Australia might be best advised to adopt a wait-and-see policy before any moves to break relations with the GOC on Taiwan in order to recognize Peking.

New Zealand, our last stop, was delightfully relaxing. After a useful 2 hour talk with Prime Minister Marshall and Foreign Minister Holyoake, the Prime Minister suggested that we conclude our talks on the Heretaunga Golf Course, which we did. Sir Keith Holyoake told the press that my "briefing was the best one he had ever heard in his life." This was a pleasant note on which to end a trip that had covered a dozen countries in fifteen days.

In looking back on this trip, my wife remarked on the wisdom of President Nixon in entrusting this mission to Foreign Service officers who were not only well-known personally to leaders of the Western Pacific region, but who were seen by them as careerists with no political axes to grind.

On our return to Washington, I reported to the House Foreign Affairs Committee and to the White House, before going on the nation-wide NBC program "Meet the Press." The President, when I met with him on March 23, along with Al Haig, Deputy Head of the NSC, and John Holdridge, was anxious that I play down the Taiwan aspect as much as possible in my "Meet the Press" appearance. He did not want me to make any headlines -- and I did not disappoint him in that regard. Al Haig called me up after my NBC performance on March 26 to say "they didn't lay

a glove on you" which was the highest compliment I received for what I fear was a lackluster TV performance, given my instructions.

There was one further development in which I was involved in 1972, relating primarily to our relations with Japan, but also involved U.S. policy toward China.

Prime Minister Sato resigned in mid-1972 and was replaced by Prime Minister Tanaka who had already announced his intention to negotiate later that year with the Chinese on normalizing Tokyo's relations with Peking.

On August 30, 1972, I accompanied President Nixon to Hawaii where Nixon and Tanaka met for the first time, largely to get to know each other and to discuss issues of concern.

I recall that on our flight from San Clemente on Air Force One to Hawaii, there was a long meeting in the President's cabin attended by the President, Secretary Rogers, Dr. Kissinger, Under Secretary U. Alexis Johnson and myself, in which Alex did most of the talking. He had previously been our Ambassador to Japan and felt strongly that President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger had unnecessarily affronted the Japanese in the way we had suddenly shifted our policy toward Peking in 1971-72 without adequate consultation or even notification of Japan.

It was clear that Prime Minister Tanaka was now going to move rapidly, under strong internal Japanese political pressure, to normalize Tokyo-Peking relations. Some concern was expressed in our Air Force One meeting that Tanaka might normalize on terms adversely affecting U.S. interests, but President Nixon seemed surer than the rest of us that Tanaka and Zhou would act responsibly and that we should not press the Japanese on this issue at our forthcoming meeting at Kuilima, Hawaii.

Since the President's main meetings in Kuilima with Tanaka were strictly private and separate from the plenary talks, I have no way of knowing whether China-Japan issues were discussed. But, in any event, when Tanaka did go to Peking several weeks later, he was evidently under no pressure from the Chinese to accept terms that would create difficulties in U.S.-Japanese relations. In fact, China seemed to be at pains not only to improve relations with Japan, but also with the United States and between Japan and the United States.

Commencing then, in 1972, for the first time in memory, a foundation was laid for a constructive relationship between Washington, Peking and Tokyo; that is to say, between the world's most powerful nation, the world's most populous nation and the world's most economically dynamic nation -- all three of them having been at war with each other at some point earlier in this century.

## Chapter VIII

### Concluding Observations

When future historians contemplate the events of this century, few things will stand out more prominently than the interface between China and the United States. Barbara Tuchman's Stilwell

and the American Experience in China captures all the frustrations of our war-time allied relations when she writes in her final sentence: "In the end, China went her own way, as if the Americans had never come."

Thereafter, for over two decades, U.S. relations with mainland China remained in a deep freeze. There was a brief period between late 1961 and early 1964 that offered some hope that relations might thaw a bit due to Chinese reactions to the excesses of the Great Leap Forward and to initiatives from the American side to enter into a more civil discourse with China. This period was marked by U.S. efforts to relax certain restrictions on American travel to, and trade with, China. It was also marked by U.S. pressures, known to Peking, to restrain our Chinese allies on Taiwan from raids against the mainland, especially during the period of economic and social unrest resulting from the collapsed Great Leap Forward.

However, it takes two to tango, and there was no evidence of Peking's willingness to relax tensions with the U.S. even during the 1961-64 period. The U.S. was nevertheless able to demonstrate that it was Chinese, not U.S., policy that was principally responsible for the continuing deep freeze in our relations.

The Chinese government was obviously averse to any gradual improvements in its relations with the U.S. As I pointed out at Princeton in mid-1965: The Chinese Communist leaders have remarked that when the time comes to improve relations with the U.S., "this will come all at once, inasmuch as to improve relations piecemeal would have a harmful effect on the Chinese people's revolutionary fervor."

Partly as a result of the setback to China caused by the aborted Communist coup in Indonesia in 1965, China entered into another dark period of left-wing fanaticism known as the Cultural Revolution which did not abate until 1969. Intensified efforts were made by China during that period to cast the U.S. in the devil's role in order to whip up mass fears of an external threat and thereby achieve national cohesion.

A major reversal of Chinese strategic policy occurred in the period 1969-71, brought on by increasing Chinese nervousness over Soviet intentions. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, followed by the rapid build-up of Soviet military power in Siberia, especially in disputed areas along the Chinese frontier, created an atmosphere of war-panic in China. Air raid shelters were built on a massive scale. A CIA estimate of October 1969 placed the chances of a Soviet effort to knock out China's nascent nuclear weapons factories at about 1 in 3. Meanwhile, ever since Khrushchev came on the scene, China had been nervously observing U.S.-Soviet relations and was increasingly concerned that China might face U.S.-Soviet collusion.

It was against this background -- plus the growing influence of Zhou En-lai and the pragmatists - - that President Nixon's initiative was realistically possible of achieving success.

Just a few observations on why the President took this extraordinary initiative on China. Certainly it was out of line with the thinking of many in the Republican party. It also involved a lot of risks -- risks that secret preparations might leak to the press, risks that the highly publicized summit meeting might fail, risks of bad reactions in Japan, Korea, Taiwan or elsewhere.

Moreover, he was undertaking this trip at a time when the war in Vietnam was raging and when the U.S. was suffering heavy casualties at the hands of an enemy supported by Peking. Finally, his approach to China could be seen as a bit premature. Why not wait until Mao passed from the scene -- which seemed fairly imminent?

The very fact that the President took all these risks underlines the great importance he attached to a U.S.-China rapprochement. As he said to me on one occasion: "We simply cannot go on indefinitely in a hostile relationship with one-quarter of mankind, especially as the PRC grows in military power." There was a need to move promptly at a time when the Chinese leaders were fearful of a Soviet attack and when we could not allow the Soviet Union to take Sino-U.S. hostility for granted in its policy calculations.

The President also had sound internal political reasons for his China initiative which was widely popular in the U.S., especially in academic, press and other circles critical of our role in the long, bloody, fruitless war in Vietnam. For many months, China took the headlines away from Vietnam. It cast U.S. foreign policy in a positive light during a critical year for the Nixon Administration.

It must be remembered that President Nixon also had a strong sense of the mark he would leave on history. That was evident from my first meeting with him in Jakarta, with all his note-taking and tape-recording of conversations.

China's affirmative response to Nixon's initiatives related overwhelmingly to its fears of Soviet aggressive intentions and of possible Soviet-U.S. collusion against China. But other factors were also undoubtedly involved. One of them was the perceived advantage to Peking in having closer ties between Peking, Washington and Tokyo, both in economic terms and in terms of better ensuring that Japan's military capabilities would remain limited and confined to Japan's self-defense through its defense ties with the United States. This point came through to me loud and clear in a conversation with a top Chinese official in Peking during the Nixon visit. The Chinese have long memories, and surely one of the most painful of these memories is Japan's harsh occupation of North China and its half-century colonization of Taiwan.

President Nixon failed to recognize Japanese sensitivities in the sudden announcement of his trip to China. For years the Japanese had followed the American lead on China policy, even though they were anxious to get into the Chinese market through early recognition of the Peking government. It had been the nightmare of at least one Japanese prime minister that he would wake up one morning to find the Americans in Peking and the Japanese left in the lurch. It would have been possible to soften the blow to Prime Minister Sato and his government had President Nixon sent a personal emissary like Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, who was well known and trusted in Japan, to explain the President's initiative at least a day in advance of its announcement. This would have given the Japanese government time to ready its public response, while underlining our respect for Japan's special interests in this important strategic move. I sensed that both Nixon and Kissinger compared the Japanese leadership unfavorably with the Chinese, seeing the Japanese as preoccupied with economic issues while the Chinese leaders thought in Nixon-Kissinger global strategic terms. It was not until Nixon returned to Washington from China that I learned that his obsession with keeping his China initiative secret

was not, as alleged by Nixon, out of consideration for the wishes of the Chinese but for his own.

Some time after the President returned from Peking, I suggested through Under-Secretary Alex Johnson and Henry Kissinger that President and Mrs. Nixon might show their respect for Japan (and make amends for the Nixon shocks) by flying to Alaska to greet Their Imperial Majesties, the Emperor and Empress of Japan, who were stopping over at Anchorage for refueling en route by polar flight to Europe. This was the first time in history that any reigning monarch of Japan was to set foot on foreign soil -- and it was to be American soil. President Nixon took warmly to the idea (which he probably assumed was Kissinger's) and Japanese reactions were highly favorable.

A black mark in the President's China trip was the shabby way he treated his old friend and loyal supporter, Secretary of State William Rogers. American presidents in recent memory have had a tendency to rely considerably more on White House Staff than on government departments, but in Nixon's case it was carried to extremes, abetted in large part by the power-seeking Henry Kissinger who played on President Nixon's longstanding distrust of the Foreign Service. Ironically it was we in the Foreign Service dealing with Far Eastern affairs who were the most enthusiastic supporters of the President's China policy. After all, we had long striven for the goals reached during the Nixon Administration.

It was a curious coincidence that my 17 consecutive years (1956-1973) in dealing with U.S. China policy should have started and ended by working for two right-wing Republican lawyers -- John Foster Dulles and Richard Nixon -- both of whom started out their public careers as anti-Communist zealots with simplistic solutions to international issues, but both of whom ended their careers as international statesmen. It remained for President Nixon to shake the extended hand of Zhou En-lai in 1969, in dramatic contrast to Dulles' refusal to do so in Geneva in 1954, a slight Zhou never forgot.

U.S.-China relations had come a long way.

**THOMAS P. SHOESMITH**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1956-1958)**

*Thomas P. Shoemith was born in 1939 and raised in Pennsylvania. His career in the State Department included posts in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korean, and an ambassadorship to Malaysia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.*

*Q: You went to Hong Kong in 1956. Had you entered the Foreign Service by this time?*

SHOESMITH: I was "Wristonized" [lateral entry into the Foreign Service under a program recommended by Henry Wriston, then Dean of Princeton] in 1955 and was assigned to Hong Kong as a consular officer. As I recall, that was something of a disappointment at the time,

because other people who were working in my office in OIR [Office of Intelligence Research] and who were also Wristonized received appointments to Embassy Tokyo, doing political or economic work. I felt that I was being shunted off to Hong Kong to do consular work and, more specifically, to do citizenship and naturalization work. At that time there was a great effort being made to crack the problem of fraud in Chinese immigration. There were a great many Chinese coming to the United States. They were making application for citizenship, based on claims which had been established -- parentage claims that had been established -- in the prewar period. And it was apparent that there was a great deal of fraud involved in this. Of course, the U. S. Government was involved in a number of suits where these persons had been denied citizenship. So I was assigned as a citizenship and naturalization officer to interview people who were making claims for U. S. citizenship.

*Q: That was quite an operation, wasn't it? You had almost unofficial police powers.*

SHOESMITH: Well, we worked very closely with the Hong Kong Police. I don't think that they worried about search warrants and things like that. They used to go in and try to get papers and documentary evidence which showed that these people were not who they claimed to be. But that was a separate unit within the Consulate. Our work was more routine: examining people who claimed to be children of somebody, or examining parents, and asking long lists of questions to try to establish kinship or establish that there wasn't kinship. I did that for a year and then was transferred to Special Consular Services, working with Americans. When I got this assignment, as I said, I was disappointed, at first. I saw myself as being a political officer in an embassy somewhere. And that would have been great. In point of fact, it proved to be a very useful experience, because I got to know a good deal about consular operations and the whole range of consular services. Sometimes the work was very difficult and even unpleasant, because of these poor people who were trying so desperately to get to the United States. And my job really was to shake their story, if I could. Because many of these stories were fraudulent. But nonetheless it was a good experience. I was also accredited to Macao. We had an American, a young guy and his family who felt they would like to defect to China. They went to China through Macao. We were sent down there to find out what had happened. Those were interesting experiences.

Then, toward the end of that two years and in the expectation that my time in Hong Kong would be extended, I was reassigned to the Political Section. Of course, Hong Kong at that time -- this was 1958 -- was a very important listening post. It did a lot of political work on China, about which I knew virtually nothing. But there were lots of materials available to do the kind of research and analytical work that I had done in OIR.

But I was only there for about four months when I was told that I was being reassigned to Seoul.

**DAVID DEAN**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1956-1957)**

**Chinese Language Training  
Taichung, Taiwan (1957-1959)**

**Consular Officer  
Hong Kong (1959-1962)**

**Political Counselor  
Taipei, Taiwan (1966-1969)**

**Deputy Principal Officer  
Hong Kong (1970-1974)**

**Deputy Chief of Mission  
Beijing (1976-1978)**

*David Dean was born in New York City in 1925 and graduated from Harvard. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in numerous posts including Kuala Lumpur, Rotterdam, Taichung, Hong Kong and Taipei. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.*

*Q: What business was your father in?*

DEAN: My father started off as a cotton broker with Clayton Bowers and traveled extensively in East Asia to China and other places. Then he became a stockbroker until the crash of 1929.

*Q: Grammar school, too?*

DEAN: At first I went to schools in Stanford and Darien, Connecticut, and New York City. Then I went to the middle school and the upper school at Riverdale. It was a boarding school. After I finished, I went to Trinity College in Hartford, Connecticut for a year and then went into the Navy's V-12 program. The Navy sent me to Harvard. I stayed there for about a year or so and then opted for flight training. I returned later to graduate from Harvard in 1949. I went into flight training and finished as the war was ending, just as the Japanese surrendered in fact. I later served on the USS Atlanta and the USS Toledo as a naval aviator. Our ships were in the Pacific, based in Qingdao, China, with the Seventh Fleet.

*Q: Had you had any opening or interest in the international world from school or your father's trade or anything like that?*

DEAN: Yes, from my father's trips to East Asia, there were various artifacts around the house, but most of my schooling at Harvard was in English history and literature. I went to graduate school after the Navy at Columbia and studied in their School of International Affairs in Latin American studies. Before entering the Foreign Service, I never had any formal education on China or Chinese studies.

*Q: In grammar school and at Riverdale while you were there, what sort of books interested you?*

*Did you read a lot?*

DEAN: Yes, I read a lot, but mostly fiction. I read Sir Walter Scott, Robert Louis Stevenson, Conrad, Alexander Dumas, Kipling and G.A. Henty.

*Q: Oh, yes, The Dash to Khartoum, With the Allies to Peking. It is interesting how many of a certain generation were inspired by Henty who was really for the British Empire, but it caught a lot of us, myself included.*

DEAN: They were stirring books at the time for that age. I read mostly about American and European history and not a great deal about China.

*Q: Did you get much shore leave when you were in these places?*

DEAN: We were based in Tsingtao, which is in Shantung Province. There is a small seadrome there just between the outer and the inner harbor, and we worked there. That was the first time I met Chiang Kai-shek because the Chinese had one half of the seadrome and we had the other half. He came to inspect the Chinese half and we were introduced to him.

At that time, I was on the USS Atlanta. Coming in to the outer harbor, we had a pilot on board, but we misjudged the speed of the current, and when the pilot ordered the engines stopped and the anchor let go, the momentum of the ship was so great that all the anchor chain ran out and the pentails broke. They are used to hold the chain inboard, but they broke. In cases like that, there is always a buoy with a line attached to it which will bob up and show where the chain and the anchor are. But, some Chinese in a sampan came rowing out, cut the line to the buoy, put the buoy in his boat and rowed away! It took our divers three days to find out where the chain and the anchor were! They are really heavy. We recovered them eventually, but it was a very embarrassing introduction to Qingdao.

*Q: Well, did you get much shore leave?*

DEAN: Yes. Being based at the seadrome, we stayed at the Edgewater Mansion, which was a hotel and, of course, we observed what was happening in the city. By the time I got there, it was toward the end of '46 and beginning of '47, the communist forces were beginning to encircle the major cities, not only in Shantung but also in the northeast provinces. The Generalissimo's troops controlled the cities but the countryside was controlled by the communists. Of course there was martial law and a curfew every night. If you happened to be in a cafe or a bar or a restaurant, Chinese soldiers would come in at the curfew hour with fixed bayonets and drive everybody out on the streets and home. You may have seen some of these pictures with crowds of people fleeing from a policeman wielding a big bamboo stick. They really had enormous numbers of people inside the city. Qingdao had been ruled by the Japanese, and by the Germans before. They had many white Russians there. There were thousands of people from the countryside who came in to seek refuge, so it was really a crowded place. We weren't affected by the shortages or anything like that, but there were many poor people without food, and without shelter, so the conditions inside many parts of the city were not good. Our cruiser division would only stay for perhaps two or three weeks before we went on another voyage somewhere else, but during those

times, I got to know what the city looked like and at least developed a real interest in learning more about the Chinese.

*Q: What was the situation when you went up the Malaysian Peninsula?*

DEAN: When we went ashore in Hong Kong, it was virtually a ghost town. Before the war, lots of the inhabitants had fled inland. Those who remained under Japanese control had taken almost every piece of wood out of the big mansions on the peaks and the hills surrounding Hong Kong. They had used the wood for firewood. They had taken out the window frames, the parquet floors, the doors, everything they could use to burn. When I got there, you would go up to the peak, and at certain times of the year, there is a lot of mist and fog. The fog was going in and out of these old houses which were vacant, and it really looked like a ghost town. I guess Hong Kong then had a population of maybe three or four hundred thousand people as compared to more than six million today. Anyway, things were very depressed in an economic sense as well. Further south was Singapore, a crown colony, which had also suffered under Japanese occupation. It was a very old-fashioned place. Raffles Hotel was the only place to go, the economy was flat. The British ruled it like a typical overseas possession. Singapore, Malaya, Borneo, and other places like that, truly had an old-fashioned society, almost like something out of the beginning of the century as described by Somerset Maugham.

*Q: Did this pique any interest in you?*

DEAN: Yes, indeed it did. After I left the Navy, I finished school at Harvard and then went on to Columbia for a master's degree. I then applied, at my brother's recommendation, for the Foreign Service. I got into the Foreign Service after I passed the examination. I went to the usual training course in late 1951. I guess it was two or three months later that I was assigned to Kuala Lumpur. I hadn't been to Kuala Lumpur in the Navy because it is an inland city, and my ship did not stop at Port Swettenham, which is the closest port. It was too small then. I was very pleased to be assigned to Kuala Lumpur. The Chinese must have been about 40% of the population, with about 50% Malay and 10% Tamil. The Chinese businessmen were running most of the economy.

*Q: Do you recall how the oral exam was conducted in those days? Do you recall any of the questions?*

DEAN: First they wanted to know what I had been doing. I told them that I was a naval aviator, that I had been out on the China coast. They asked what books I had been reading, in American literature particularly. They were interested in what sports I did. They had a big argument among themselves about the virtues of tennis and squash because I happened to play squash at the time. There wasn't a great deal of grilling. It was a very civilized and pleasant meeting. I guess it must have lasted an hour or so. I can't remember. Then they asked me to wait, and a little while later one of their secretaries came and said, "All right, they have accepted you." I think that was in the summer of '51, and I went into the class around October with people who became some of my closest friends.

*Q: Who came in with you that you recall?*

DEAN: Well, Paul Popple was one of my really close friends. He went off to Vietnam; and I went to Kuala Lumpur, but later we were in Hong Kong together. We lived in the same duplex. He lived upstairs; we lived downstairs. We were either dining at our place or having cocktails at his or vice versa. We became very good friends, with him and his family. He has passed away, but his widow, who lives in Italy, and my wife keep up a correspondence. We see their children whenever they come to the States. There were others, too whom I remember. It was a very short, intensive orientation course. Then I went off to Kuala Lumpur, and everybody went their separate ways.

*Q: What about in the Malay group, I was wondering if you saw a political class begin to emerge?*

DEAN: No, not then. The British were occupying all of the positions, not just of power but also administrative positions in the civil government, the police, almost every other aspect, including immigration control. Malays were not then a major power. That came later when the various Malay leaders were helped by the British to come to the fore. The British were running everything as far as government went at that time. It wasn't the Malaysians and it wasn't the Chinese.

*Q: Were the British people you talked to sort of making noises about leaving at some point?*

DEAN: No, I don't think they were thinking in those terms. This was early, you see, in 1951-'54. They were not really that much aware of the big forces going on around them in Southeast Asia and China, except by reading the newspapers, but they really weren't thinking in those terms.

*Q: You left Holland in '56.*

DEAN: Yes, just at the end of '56. Our son Ken was born in Rotterdam shortly before we left for home leave at Christmas time of '56. I went into Chinese language training. That is why I had to smile when you said our facilities here were so much better; my training was in the basement garage of the Arlington Towers.

*Q: You are talking about this interview which is taking place at the new Foreign Service Institute. Why Chinese?*

DEAN: Because I had been interested in China through my service in the Navy traveling and staying in Qingdao, traveling along the China coast, meeting the Chinese in Malaysia, getting to be interested in their history and their culture. I had begun to take some Chinese lessons on my own in The Hague from an overseas Chinese who had come from Djakarta. His father had an automobile agency, and every time there was some economic downturn, Indonesians would come by with iron bars or even troops with machine guns and smash the windows of his automobile agency. They are still doing that with the Chinese. Today, with conditions as bad as they are, the Indonesian are still taking it out on the Chinese merchants who own most of the rice mills and most of the shops. Back then my teacher had received a scholarship from the Dutch government to come to Holland to study English. I was giving him English lessons and he was giving me Chinese lessons. So I applied for Chinese language training, went back to Washington

at the end of '56, and went to the Foreign Service Institute for six months. It was a marvelous type of training they gave us, not only the language training which was very good, but also area studies. We had Doak Barnett, who became a famous figure among China scholars. He brought all of his friends down to lecture to us, every leading scholar you could think of at the time in the field of Chinese studies except John Fairbank who was ruled out by the Department.

*Q: As a Foreign Service officer, what did you feel would be your future taking Chinese since we didn't have relations. The communist Chinese ruled the mainland, so what did you think about as a career?*

DEAN: I felt it was inevitable that we were going to have relations with China and that indeed, for our national interests we should have them. I felt that very early on, and I feel it today. It just seemed to me to be common sense. But we also had other Chinese posts. We had our embassy in Taiwan then. I had visited it while on board the USS Atlanta when it was a Consulate General. We had Chinese language officers stationed in Singapore and various other places. We had talks going on with the Chinese in Geneva and then Warsaw. Later I was to be the counselor for those talks and write the instructions for them for four years. It just seemed to me it was an important enough place to have more attention paid to it.

*Q: While you were doing this, this is pretty early on in terms of our developing a China corps. Were there any characteristics of the new China hands that you could see at that time?*

DEAN: No, it was hard to see. In fact, in my own class, my friend Paul Popple had gone to the Chinese language school in the class before mine, and others who I came to know went there. My own class was a very mixed group. Some were from the agency. One was more interested in consular work rather than political or economic work and went on to specialize as a consular officer. One was an economic officer, but he left the service after awhile; he got fed up with it. Initially there were five of us. Four of them were left-handed. I was the only right-handed person in my class. It was difficult at Chinese dinners because our chopsticks would duel with each other.

*Q: You say you were getting outstanding scholars, that Doak Barnett was bringing them in. What was the picture you were getting of China at this point?*

DEAN: A pretty clear picture I think. Most people realized that Mao had purged the landlords, that there had been an enormous number of executions and deaths. They realized that he had first given the land back to the peasants and then took it back again from them. They realized that he was ruthless, that our own relationship was very poor, that China had forged a relationship with the Soviet Union, which at that point had not started to crack apart although a lot of people like John Fairbank said it would because they believed the Chinese leadership would eventually reject the Russians. I think they had a pretty clear idea of China. It wasn't a rosy picture by any means. It is just that there wasn't enough information, I think, to give one more than a general picture.

*Q: Not too long before there had been the McCarthy attack on the China Hands. At the time you were talking about, was this something that you were all looking over your shoulders or was the*

*topic of conversation or concern?*

DEAN: Sure. I wasn't looking over my shoulders. I think all the people I spoke to were indignant about McCarthy and felt that it was really the fault of our own government to allow something like that to happen, one of the weaknesses of our government and the weakness of his colleagues in the Senate. Of course he eventually was discredited. By that time, by '56, he had gone.

*Q: But what about with China, this is during the Eisenhower administration, Walter Robinson was in charge.*

DEAN: Yes, he was very pro-Taiwan you see. He knew and liked the madam, Madam Chiang Kai-shek, and the Generalissimo. He was a strong defender of the GRC (government of the Republic of China), but there were other strong defenders as well, such as Walter Judd, whom I later came to know and to like very much. We weren't on the same political wavelength, but he was a really nice man. He had been a medical missionary in China. He developed his political point of view from the circumstances in which he had lived, and he kept the same points of view until he died. Just the same, he was a very fine person and very good friend. I didn't know him at that time, and I didn't know a lot of the other Foreign Service officers who had served in China, some who had come under McCarthy's fire. Even Doak Barnett: the State Department wouldn't give Doak Barnett a permanent clearance. His brother Bob served in the State Department for many years, and both were suspect during the McCarthy period because of their views and contacts. Very unfair.

*Q: Again, trying to capture the period when you were taking Chinese at the FSI, what was your impression of the situation on Taiwan, the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek?*

DEAN: It is hard to say. We spent much of our time studying very hard. Some of our speakers would talk about what was happening in Taiwan. Some of the people from the Department would tell us about conditions there. It didn't seem to be very gripping to tell the truth. Not a lot was happening in Taiwan at that time. It is true that later on the offshore island crisis occurred, but that was a couple of years later. Our relationship with Taiwan had already been firmed. We all read the White Paper, read all the background documents. We knew that our government had intended to let the chips fall where they may as far as the Generalissimo and his government were concerned when he left the mainland and came over to Taiwan. It wasn't until the outbreak of the Korean War that brought the government of the Republic of China back into the fold again and caused the Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait to help protect them. It wasn't until then that a very close relationship began to develop. By 1957, the relationship had become very close. But people in the Department were divided. Most were very positively in favor of Taiwan and very negatively disposed toward the mainland because it was communist and allied with the Soviets. That was the prevailing cold war view. I remember going in to the old East Asia Bureau and saying, "Why don't we start something going with the mainland?" They said, Shhh. Don't let anybody hear you say that."

*Q: I know. I came into the Foreign Service in '55 and had nothing to do with that area except having been an enlisted man in Korea during the war, but you know, it just made sense. You have got China sitting over there and that is what diplomacy is all about. Talk to them.*

DEAN: We were talking to them you know. At that time talks were continuing in Geneva. We were talking to them, but it wasn't getting anywhere. Both sides were just talking past each other. There was some prospect of getting an agreement on the renunciation of force, but we were afraid to accept it. Now the roles are reversed. We are trying to get them to accept a renunciation of force and they won't. Against Taiwan, I mean. For myself, although I was thinking and hearing and reading about these things, I really wasn't focused on them as I was trying to learn more Chinese and reading more about the background of China and its history in the civil war then on current conditions. I was spending a lot of time focused on that, and not as much, I would say, on policy. Indeed we students weren't involved in policy at all in those days. That was also true later when we went out to the language school in Taichung where I studied for a couple of years.

*Q: You went out to Taichung at the end of '56.*

DEAN: No I stayed in Washington at FSI for six months and then went out to Taichung in July of '57, for two years.

*Q: You were learning basic mandarin weren't you?*

DEAN: That's right.

*Q: What was the atmosphere like in '57-'59 in Taichung?*

DEAN: Our Embassy had been sacked by the Chinese in early 1957 because a MAAG [Military Army Advisory Group] jury found a U.S. serviceman not guilty of a killing, but better relations were quickly restored.

*Q: MAAG is military assistance advisory group.*

DEAN: Yes, but our languages school didn't have a great deal to do with our embassy or MAAG. The Chinese were expanding the CCK [Chiang China-kuo] airfield near Taichung with American contractors, so they were there in some numbers. The atmosphere was tense because the communists had bombarded the offshore island of Quemoy and Matsu in 1958 and the U.S. Seventh fleet broke the blockade. The head of the language school, Howard Levy, tried to keep us focused on the Chinese community as much as possible in order to learn more Chinese. He introduced us to many Chinese officials. Some were retired mainland officials who had come over in 1949. Some were scholars; some were local officials. Or, we would go off and spend a week at one of the universities living there and talking to the students and the professors. Levy tried to get us to interact as much as possible with the Chinese society. Then, of course, we had our lessons, and we did what reading we could in addition. We really concentrated on the Chinese language and our studies to the exclusion of contacts with the Americans or the Embassy. Occasionally we would get a visitor from the Embassy, but very rarely. Occasionally we would get an inspection team coming by, but that was our only contact with officialdom. We were left to ourselves and our studies. People worked very hard.

*Q: Were your Chinese teachers in a way sort of pushing the Taiwanese line?*

DEAN: No. The teachers mostly were from the mainland, mostly from Shantung. The reason we used them is that they were mainlanders who had come over to Taiwan in 1948 and they had the same mandarin accent as people in north China. People in Taiwan speak a Minnan dialect which comes from southern Fujian. Their forefathers came over from southern Fujian two or three hundred years ago. They were fisher-folk who settled down and became farmers and gradually prospered. They are the basic population. There is an aboriginal population which lived in the mountains who were the earliest inhabitants. There are perhaps only three or four hundred thousand of them left. But, 85% or more of the population of Taiwan are these Taiwanese whose forefathers came over from Fujian. The teachers at the school spoke the Mandarin dialect from northern China, which is the dialect we learned. We didn't have anyone at that time speaking the Taiwanese dialect. This was a great mistake. Even the Chinese officials, the mainland officials who occupied all the jobs in government, local and central, didn't speak Taiwanese. Only one. I met, a vice minister of foreign trade who told me he spoke Taiwanese. He made a point of learning it. He said he was the only official he knew of who spoke Taiwanese. This of course was in the mid-'60s when he said that. But it was true. It is a difficult language in the first place even for mandarin speakers. There were some mainlanders who had come from Fujian who naturally spoke the dialect, but very few.

*Q: Were you getting any impression of the KMT government?*

DEAN: Sure. There were lots of impressions. We lived in Japanese houses that the Japanese had built for their officials, with tatami floors and with little gardens. They were quite nice houses on the broad unpaved street, with no telephone. There was one telephone at the director's house which was way down at the end of the street. Naturally no television. On the next street down there was a general under house arrest, named General Sun Li-ren. He had been accused of conspiring against the Generalissimo and plotting a coup. This was not true as it later turned out, but he had been sentenced to house arrest. He did stay there most of the time, but they gave him a chance to get out, and occasionally we would see him playing tennis on public tennis courts with his guards. We never met him but we knew about him and we knew the circumstances. We also heard about General Sun from some of our teachers who weren't too sympathetic to the mainland government. There were one or two of them, even though they were from Shantung, who had come to Taiwan earlier and had been protected by the Taiwanese when there was such a wave of hatred against the mainlanders after the incident of February 28, 1947, when there was an uprising. The mainlanders put it down brutally, killing over 20,000 people. Some say as many as 30,000 people were executed. So, there was no love lost between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders. One of our teachers described the circumstances, having been there then. This was ten years earlier, but it burned deeply in his memory. To this day, the incident is a governing force in politics in Taiwan. Anyway, with those undercurrents, we knew that the security forces would come in and break down people's doors and drag people away in the middle of the night, imprison them, execute them for alleged communist sympathies or other acts. So, we knew what kind of a society it was. On the other hand, we had a lot of friends among the local populace, mostly mainlanders, because they were the officials, and they were the educated people. A certain group of Taiwanese had been educated in Japan by the Japanese, mostly doctors and engineers, during their occupation. but they hadn't established universities in Taiwan. The

Japanese built up the infrastructure, the agriculture output was designated for Japan. Taiwan was a breadbasket for Japan during the war years and before. We knew what the score was at any rate. There was a Sino-American friendship society, but all the members were mainlanders, mostly generals and officials. We become very close friends with some of them. To this day, one of our closest friends was then in charge of the armored brigade in the Taichung area. That must have been 45 years ago. He and his wife attended our Taiwan born son Tom's Man Yue Party in 1958. We have been to the Hu children's weddings, and to all sorts of family birthdays, and affairs like that. Even last December, I went to Mrs. Hu's 80<sup>th</sup> birthday in Taipei, with her whole family present. So we got to know some people very well indeed and became very close.

*Q: What about this '57-'59, I'm not sure exactly but I think the great leap forward was underway at that time, were we getting much in the way of information?*

DEAN: Later I found out more about developments in China because after two years in Taichung, I went to Hong Kong and was in charge of our economic section analyzing developments on the mainland. In '57 the Hundred Flowers Bloom campaign had been launched by Mao Zedong. But he found the criticism was too intense, so he stopped it and purged all of those who had been rash enough to criticize him. Then he began his commune system, taking agriculture producer cooperatives and forming them into large communes. Then he began the Great Leap Forward program, trying to substitute manpower for capital investment. In other words, he was trying to use labor instead of capital investment, to lift China off its feet and move it into a new economic era. People were melting down all sorts of slag in backyard furnaces, none of it usable, and being drafted for projects elsewhere and leaving the old men and women to work in agriculture. They were told to deep plow. They broke through the fields where you would have your rice growing, usually very thick clay, they would break through the bottom with their deep plowing and all their water would run off. They had a terrible time. But I'm getting a little ahead of myself.

*Q: It wasn't overly apparent was it?*

DEAN: Not at first, because in Taichung we were really sort of isolated. We weren't in the thick of what was going on. We knew of the offshore crisis, the communist attack on the islands of Quemoy and Matsu had taken place. Tensions rose, and people were concerned that this would be the beginning of an attack on Taiwan itself. But then the Seventh Fleet came in and broke the blockade and Taiwan was able to re-supply its soldiers on Quemoy so that crisis died down. We had earlier signed a mutual security treaty with Taiwan in 1954 after an attack on Little Quemoy. In a sense, under that treaty, we were obligated to help them although there was a big argument, later made famous by Nixon and Kennedy in their 1960 debates for the presidency, about whether our treaty should cover these offshore islands. There was a Formosa Resolution and all sorts of argument about this point. It is really hard to tell you how isolated we were in the language school from matters of policy.

*Q: Were alarm bells ringing during the Formosa Strait crisis for you all too? Were you thinking maybe we are going to be in the middle of an invasion?*

DEAN: We polished up our evacuation plan to try to decide how to evacuate our families, just as

we had in Kuala Lumpur. In Kuala Lumpur we had a great big bag full of gold coins and some machetes we planned to give our people. We were planing to go through some of the jungle paths over to the other side of Malaysia. It was a very foolish plan. You would never be able to get people across. I don't know if you ever read Neville Schute's book A Town Named Alice. Anyway this is about captives of the Japanese going across Malaysia and the travails they went through. We never would have been able to use this plan. Anyway there was a similar plan for Taichung. I think that had us going up the mountains to the silver line trail along the plateau and coming down into Hualin. Of course, that is okay if people are pretty fit. I have gone up that trail two or three times, but it is very steep. If you were thinking about carrying little kids, Mary and I had two by then, and any food supplies, to say nothing of clothing, it would have been an almost hopeless task, but at least we had a plan. So there was some thinking as far as that went about evacuation.

*Q: When you were getting out in '59, oh, by the way, besides language studies were you having any of what might be called area studies?*

DEAN: No it was almost completely language with good concentration and excellent teachers. People who finished the course had a very good working knowledge, I think, of Chinese, at least a three plus, but of course, you needed more. Anyway we had good teachers, good morale and a good school. I went from there to Hong Kong.

*Q: Did you have any choice or where did you want to go?*

DEAN: I don't know whether I had any choice or not. I was assigned to Hong Kong and was happy to go there.

*Q: Hong Kong was the pre-eminent China watching place wasn't it?*

DEAN: That's right and that is the job I got, in the economic section. My friend Paul Popple, it happens, was the head of that section. Later he left and I took his place.

*Q: By the way, you were there from '59 to...*

DEAN: '62. That was a fascinating time because I did get involved in what was happening on the mainland and saw the results of the Hundred Flowers Bloom campaign.

I also saw the results of the commune policy and of the Great Leap Forward, which was an abject failure. Coupled with very bad weather, it created famine conditions in many parts of China. There was a steady stream of refugees coming into Hong Kong. One of our jobs was to study the refugee interviews that the British special branch conducted and to find out about conditions in China. Most of these people were refugees for economic reasons; it wasn't for political reasons. It was because of their livelihood; they had none and they had to find some way of feeding their families. Literally thousands and thousands of refugees came into Hong Kong until it got so bad that in 1962 the British army and the police put up barbed wire to keep people out as they just couldn't take any more. People were swimming across the bay, trying to avoid the sharks, trying to get smuggled in by so-called snake boats. They were trying everything.

Once they touched base in those days, they were home free. The British would not expel them if they landed. That wasn't true later.

*Q: Can you talk a bit about how the economic section worked, I mean what you were looking at in China and how you were getting your information?*

DEAN: We got our information from a whole series of sources. We produced a translation of the Chinese press. It was quite an elaborate group that translated articles of interest from various papers. We'd get those papers from all sorts of places, even from the market, a fish wrapped in paper. It might be an old provincial newspaper which we could use. We did a big translation service of the Chinese press and distributed it to universities and academicians and others for their research, too. Later we had to charge them for it, but at that time I believe it was free. Then we used the FBIS translations of Chinese radio, the Foreign Broadcast Information Service. That was based on Okinawa and we got a lot of their published material. Then we used, as I said, the Special Branch reports of the refugees, and we tried to use whatever other sources of information we could get. I would say that our general overall assessment of what was going on in China was reasonably accurate. It may not have been specifically accurate, but it was reasonably accurate for the economy in the various provinces. We had a very good agricultural officer, Bryce Meeker, who worked with us. He was really expert. He had been in Hungary during the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Later, he was to go on to Russia. He was very capable and hard working, and he added a great deal to our assessment. A lot of the problem really wasn't in the industry but was in the agriculture sector and he followed those developments very carefully. We followed also their foreign trade such as it was at that time. Of course, we had this stricture against Americans buying anything from China so we had a Treasury official in Hong Kong, Charlie DeSevalas, who made sure that everyone at the consulate general or even the public, Americans living in Hong Kong, knew the Treasury Department strictures against buying things from China. I would say it was an exciting period for us because, although a lot of what we did was analytical, we did see enough people who had been in China for one reason or another and we had enough sources of information to put together a pretty good picture of what was happening. Of course we liaised with Australian intelligence and British intelligence, and we had a very large contingent of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] in our consulate general. The consulate general was huge, with a staff of several hundred Americans and Chinese.

*Q: Who was the Consul General at that post?*

DEAN: Well, there were different Consul Generals from 1959-63. Marshall Green was Consul General for part of the time and then Julius Holmes was Consul General for part of the time. My wife had worked before we were married in London for Julius Holmes, so she knew him quite well. She was his secretary there. So we became very friendly with him and with Marshall Green, too. They were interested in what was happening on the mainland, and our section was putting out a great deal of the information.

*Q: In many ways what you were putting out, the economic side was the real story wasn't it?*

DEAN: Yes it was, but there was a problem here because a lot of people, analysts back in Washington, were believing the Chinese claims about their economic success during the Great

Leap Forward. We were debunking these claims, you see, so there was a certain amount of tension between those people who thought China was doing just marvelously and those who knew from talking to people who had seen the situation that it was doing very poorly, in fact tragically. It wasn't until later that the numbers of 30-40 million people dying during this period were confirmed. It was very interesting. There were lots of good newspapermen. Joe Alsop was there hovering around thinking China was going to break up because of the crisis resulting from the failure of the Great Leap Forward. Stan Karnow was there with Time Magazine, Jerry Schecter, Bob Elegant, all of whom later became quite well known, all writing about what was happening in China. The focus of our Consulate General was really on China although we were negotiating with Hong Kong on the first textile agreement limiting the shipment of textiles to the U.S. We negotiated that. Our economic section had two parts. One was the China analysis section, the other dealing with Hong Kong issues. Then, later I became head of both of these sections. We dealt a lot with the British government on textile restraints and a lot of other issues. Of course at that time, our navy was using Hong Kong as an R and R base. Navy ships were always in port and as a result, we had very good relationships with the British military. They were very hospitable to our men and we would always go around to the functions they hosted. It was a very lively scene at that time. I think more and more people were concentrating on China. I remember one of my friends was a British police officer, who later became a civil servant. In '62, the police were busy trying to keep Chinese refugees out of Hong Kong. He was involved in that effort, trying to keep people out and also interrogating people. Later on, in '66, he was abducted by a radical group during the Cultural Revolution, which, in spite of orders from Peking, was spilling over into Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government got him back, I think, with an apology, but it was a tense time for him and for his family and friends.

*Q: I wonder right now, I am reading this book by Dr. Lee on the personal life of Chairman Mao. In a way you find it incredible, going to something like the backyard furnaces. They were melting down pots and really not turning it into anything. You have the feeling that nobody was able to ask the question, well, this is all fine but what does this mean? Were you wondering about the thought process of these people who were going so crazy?*

DEAN: Yes. You see, Mao Zedong was great for theory but terrible for practice, partially because his theories were so bent. That book will indicate, if you have gotten far into it, that he was like the Chinese emperor. No one would dare approach him with a complaint or criticism. Frankly, they were even reluctant to approach him to ask him for instructions. Once he laid down the general line, they would go out and scurry and try to do what they thought he meant, and lots of people just didn't know. It is a most amazing book. I would suspect, based on what little I know, it is fairly accurate.

*Q: I am told you knew there were some problems, but I was wondering, here is a China watcher, you are looking at these people who are considered the Han race, great merchants and all this - it is as though they have gone nuts.*

DEAN: Well, some of the Chinese knew this. For instance, in '62, Peng Dehui, who was one of their most famous marshals, objected to what they were doing. He said the statistics everybody was putting out from the communes and from the factories were just unbelievable. During that time Mao dismissed the whole state statistical bureau because it had also objected, but Peng

Dehui was a very important official. However, he was purged in an anti-rightist campaign. Even though he was purged, others of similar view, like Liu Shaoqi, who very soon took over from Mao as the president, also believed that the Great Leap Forward was a terrible mistake. Later on, Liu was purged for his views. A lot of people in China understood, just as we did in Hong Kong, that things were going crazy. It was just a terrible waste and a terrible tragedy. We knew that and reported it. I think gradually people came to understand, even in China, that it was just dreadful. There was a period around '64 when the rightists had come back in after the anti-rightist campaign that had dismissed Peng Dehui, but then they got purged themselves. That is a later story.

*Q: Could you talk about the problem back in Washington. I mean, there were talks about how well the Chinese were able to mobilize, in the United States, mobilize all their people and maybe they are on to something, even barefoot doctors.*

DEAN: People thought they might be on to something but, you see, I think that it was wholly inaccurate and based on just wishful thinking and not on the facts. People who had consulted any of our reports knew they wouldn't succeed. Of course we couldn't prove that what maybe 1,000 people said in their debriefings was accurate, that they portrayed developments in the rest of China. It is like picking up a handful of sand and counting the grains and wondering if they can count for the whole country. But it was an indicator. Also the provincial newspapers were indicators, as were the reports of visitors.

*Q: Did you find some people in the academic world or the political world wondering maybe "This is pretty marvelous?" There is always this love affair between the United States and China.*

DEAN: You always get some people who believe that. Sometimes people draw up their opinions without enough facts to substantiate them. You are always getting differences of opinion in the China field. Look at today. So, that has been sort of normal, since 1949. I think that, looking back on that time, our Consulate General people did a very good job of using what information they had to project an analysis of what was going on. And, we had good relations with the Hong Kong government and the intelligence services., so we were able not only to carry out our analysis of the mainland but also our mostly economic work pertaining to Hong Kong.

*Q: What about in this '59-'62 period, you did have the election of 1960. One always thinks of Nixon and Kennedy and the Quemoy debates. When one looks back, I can't remember who was doing what or why it was such an issue, but it was one of those things that cropped up. Did that play at all with you?*

DEAN: No, it didn't really seem to have too much resonance. Most people felt that Kennedy had won that debate primarily because of the way Nixon looked. I mean he had very poor make up and a dismal look, so it wasn't really the substance that made Kennedy win, it was the PR part. When Kennedy came in, there was some thought that he might be thinking of changing policy toward China, but if he had been thinking of it, nothing came out of it. There wasn't, as far as I know, much going on. The reason for that rumor is that Walter McConaughy was the Assistant Secretary for East Asia Affairs at that time. I worked for him later. He is a fine gentleman, but he

was thought of as being a very strong supporter of Taiwan. He was moved from his job. I think Roger Hilsman was put in his place. It was thought that the move was part of a rethinking the China policy. If my recollection is correct, that is what gave some credibility to those rumors.

*Q: Someone in one of these oral histories said, and this is of course third hand, that Eisenhower when he talked to Kennedy after Kennedy was elected said, you know in international affairs I am going to support you. If you make a move toward China, I'm not going to. I don't know if there is any truth to that, but Kennedy really won the election by a hair and wasn't really very adventurous on this.*

DEAN: I guess he inherited the Bay of Pigs. Of course, it took place on his watch, but I think it was already in train. But, I don't know if you would call Vietnam adventurous or not.

*Q: No, it was sort of a reaction.*

DEAN: Maybe he inherited that, too.

*Q: Yes, Dien Bien Phu was in '54, but I mean things sort of grew, it wasn't as though he...*

DEAN: But that is how all these international crises develop. They just don't usually flare up unformed; they take root, and they gradually appear.

*Q: Well, you were somewhat removed, but did the enthusiasm for government and all that that came with Kennedy, infuse the Foreign Service where you were or were you just too far away and too...*

DEAN: I think it was an uplifting time. People felt hopeful about the future. I'm not talking about just China policy but the future in general. To a lot of youth, it was a breath of fresh air; people felt that this was a good omen for the future, but I don't think it affected our day by day work or changed anything in Hong Kong.

*Q: What about Hong Kong and these textile agreements? Hong Kong by this time had reached the stage where textiles seem to be a moveable thing going to poor areas.*

DEAN: Before then, you see, when the communists took over on the mainland in 1949, many of the Shanghai textile magnates moved down to Hong Kong. Very fortunately, a lot of the new equipment they had ordered was on the high seas, and they had it diverted to Hong Kong, so they were able to start business right away. They built up an enormous business to a point where our economists were worrying a great deal about the flood of textiles that were coming into the States and driving our own textile industries out of business. So, we focused on Asia, although a lot of the textiles were coming from Italy and other places. We concentrated on Hong Kong and decided on an agreement that would limit the amount of increase of Hong Kong textile exports per year. After a lot of heartburn in Hong Kong, because the textile magnates there didn't want to be limited, the British decided they would sign an agreement for doing this. They gave quotas to each of the textile manufacturers. Those quotas have been bought and sold in subsequent years. It has worked very well except that a lot of these businesses established factories in Thailand or

Taiwan or other places, even Africa, and started manufacturing textiles for export to the United States. In a way, we may have cured the Hong Kong problem but then we had to make textile agreements with Korea and Thailand and everybody else. It is like suddenly 1,000 heads were springing up and you have to deal with all of them.

*Q: When you were doing this at this time, you were dealing with the British, and how were the British dealing with the magnates who were mostly Chinese?*

DEAN: That is right. We were dealing mostly with the British. They usually would have some Chinese staff too. In their legislative counsel or executive council meetings, they would have several Chinese bankers as well as prominent businessmen. They would discuss these things to the nth degree. Gradually the British were able to persuade everybody that there was no alternative, that they had to do this, and in the long run, it wouldn't be bad because they had a guaranteed increase. That has worked quite well for them. So, the industry prospered. They didn't overproduce; they knew what the limits were and they ran up to them. They would negotiate with us frequently on different categories, taking things from one category and putting them into another or expanding the categories; gloves, hats, different sports apparel. So, they did very well with the textile agreements. It seems restrictive and against free trade on the basis of it, but in many ways it benefitted their industry.

*Q: Did the dynamics here, the British were doing the negotiating, did you had the feeling that the Hong Kong Chinese merchants were part of the process.*

DEAN: Yes, they had to bring them into some of the negotiations. We dealt with the British Director of Commerce and Industry and with the Financial Secretary and with the Chief Secretary. I think that negotiations were pretty hard, but from our point of view, they were successful. John Lacey, my predecessor, did a lot of these negotiations. He was very even tempered and kept to our position and wore the others down. Eventually they saw the light.

*Q: I thought we might stop at this point, and we'll pick it up next time when you are leaving Hong Kong in 1962. Where did you go?*

DEAN: I came back to the Department.

*Q: You left Hong Kong and you came back to Washington. What job did you have?*

DEAN: I was a desk officer in the Office of Asian Communist Affairs in the East Asian Bureau. Asian communist affairs had the responsibility of following developments in China and in North Korea and in North Vietnam, and also Mongolia.

*Q: You were doing this at the beginning of each session from 1962 to when?*

DEAN: '66.

*Q: '66, a good solid time.*

DEAN: I started out as one of the desk officers. Later I became the officer in charge of Mainland China affairs. Then I became deputy of the office and then acting head of the office during this four year period.

*Q: Did you have a piece of either North Korea or North Vietnam or was it all China?*

DEAN: Mostly China, but we had everything. I had China at first, but later took North Vietnam and North Korea. Of course, the focus at that time was both on China and North Vietnam.

*Q: Why don't we talk about China first and then move to North Vietnam. We have already talked about it before, but when you came back, how were developments in China seen and what were developments in China?*

DEAN: Well, it was a very curious period from '62 to '66. 1962 saw the end of the Great Leap Forward and the beginning of the rightist movement. I should say the anti-rightist movement. People like General Peng Dehui, who had protested about the Great Leap Forward, said it was just a terrible waste. Of course, the country was suffering a great deal because besides taking all the able bodied men from the agriculture sector, leaving old men and women and children to work there, they also suffered from three bad years of weather so there was widespread hunger and serious famine in some places. Later on we learned that between 30 and 40 million people died during this period. So, General Peng Dehui and others felt very strongly that Mao's policies were wrong and they protested. They were able to end the Great Leap Forward, proving that it was a disaster, but they suffered for being correct. Mao was able to purge them, so this was the anti-rightist movement of 1962. But, in spite of the fact that there was an anti-rightist movement and Peng DeHui was purged, people who had similar views, Liu Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and others formed a group in the bureaucracy that also supported Peng Dehui's position, and they gradually gained more influence to the point where Mao Zedong felt more and more threatened. It was then at the end of '65 and beginning of '66 that he launched the Cultural Revolution. We were following these developments, the purging of Peng Dehui and the formation of this coalition around Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, an anti-Maoist coalition, so we used all the information that Hong Kong provided and other sources to try to analyze what was happening in the mainland and to decide what our policy should be.

*Q: Now 30 years later we are all over China, lots of books are coming out and all that, but looking back, how well do you think we understood the forces within China and the role of Mao at that time?*

DEAN: I think we had a very general idea, not a specific one, but we had a lot of sources: their own broadcasts, their own newspapers, the attacks against individuals, the purges. This gave us a pretty fair idea of what was happening in China. As I say, it wasn't until some time later that we knew the extent of the damage of the Great Leap Forward and the effort to remove ownership of the land from the peasants. They had given them ownership of the land shortly after 1949, but then they took it away and formed these smaller agriculture producer cooperatives, then the larger ones, and then the people's communes. This time and the Great Leap Forward coincided. Both proved to be disastrous ventures.

*Q: I'm wondering not just to capture the mindset in Washington but in the academic community. I suspect at the time there is a tendency to say maybe the Chinese are right for the Chinese. Maybe they are on to something. It turned out they weren't.*

DEAN: That wasn't our tendency but in European and some academic quarters and some government quarters, there was a tendency to say the Chinese were really substituting labor for capital investment and pushing ahead to industrialize China in a very rapid way. We knew from my experience in Hong Kong seeing the refugees and the reports that had revealed conditions in China, of the utter impossibility of their claims about agricultural production, and we knew from attacks on various members of their own elite in Hong Kong that things were in very bad shape. Granted our analysis was very general, but our views in Washington at the desk were similar. I don't believe we had any false expectations about what was happening in China, in fact, quite the opposite. Nevertheless, we still felt that we had to deal with the Chinese, and one of my jobs was to write the instructions for the Warsaw talks with the Chinese. I wrote them for the first couple of years and then I would go to Warsaw every month to advise, first Ambassador Cabot and then Ambassador Gronouski in the actual talks with the Chinese. We gradually tried to change the tenor of these talks.

*Q: Could you explain what the Warsaw talks were?*

DEAN: These talks were started initially in Geneva with Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson. They came about through an agreement between Zhou En-lai and John Foster Dulles in 1954. We started talks in Geneva with the objective of trying to get the Chinese to renounce the use of force against Taiwan and to try to get some newspapermen, academicians, and other types of exchanges with the Chinese. They always said in those talks that the subject of Taiwan would have to be resolved before they could advance other aspects of the bilateral relationship. This is very interesting, and there is some new research. Jay Taylor, who has just written a new biography of Chiang Ching-kuo has found that initially the Chinese were willing to renounce the use of force. U. Alexis Johnson sent telegrams to the Department that are now public saying he recommended that this be accepted. It was too all embracing for Washington, so they turned it down. Later on we came back to a more narrow definition of the renunciation of the use of force against Taiwan. It is very interesting to speculate what might have happened had we come to an agreement much earlier with the Chinese about the renunciation of the use of force. But we didn't and we spent a lot of time and effort. The talks become quite sterile. We would say our piece and they would say theirs. They would issue the 272nd serious warning about over flights by American planes of the Chinese mainland and we would pay no attention.

*Q: They were actually U-2's piloted by Taiwanese weren't they?*

DEAN: Not necessarily. Some were flights by our own planes and some were the Chinese Nationalist patrols that were going up and down the Strait. U-2's were more for intelligence gathering. These others were the normal patrols in the Strait to maintain their air superiority and also to see if anything was developing on the coast. Sometimes they would fly too closely inland and we would get another serious warning. The talks were not getting anywhere. The Chinese wanted to resolve Taiwan first; we wanted to exchange newspapermen and academicians.

*Q: What about people in prison. We had at least two. Could you talk about Americans in prison there and what we were trying to do about that?*

DEAN: There were many American citizens still in prison, religious leaders, and also some people left there from the Korean War, and others who had been on intelligence missions and who had been imprisoned when their plane had crashed. I went to the border when I was in Hong Kong to greet Bishop Walsh. Bishop Walsh was released from prison after being held since 1949.

*Q: This was about when?*

DEAN: If my memory serves me correctly, this would have been in 1962. Bishop Walsh was a really remarkable man. He was bedridden but later recovered. He had been in prison for many years, since '49. There were many others like him, who claimed American citizenship. Later on they were to suffer a lot more because of the Cultural Revolution. At the time I was in Warsaw the talks had been moved from Geneva. They were held in a small Polish palace in a park. We would come in; the Chinese would come in. When I first got there, neither side would acknowledge the other; they would sit down and start their talks. When I got there, after I had spoken to Bill Bundy who was the Assistant Secretary, we tried very hard to change the atmosphere of the talks, to shake hands and begin to change the language. Instead of referring to their "regime," we referred to their government." We got rid of a lot of pejorative expressions in an effort to make it a little more civil. I also started to go over to the Chinese Embassy at the end of each talk or on the following day to see if there had been any problems with the translation (each side translated their own Ambassador's talk) to see if there were any questions or anything like that, but it was mostly an ice breaking type of situation. We tried quite hard to get some agreement on newsmen and on academic exchange saying if it was difficult to solve these major problems, why don't we put them to one side and go on with more practical ones in the interim. We didn't stage any breakthroughs, but we did change the atmosphere quite a bit. These talks were electronically bugged. One of our security men had his van a few blocks away, and he picked up the talks on his radio. We knew the Polish government was listening but plainly the Russians wanted to make sure the Poles told them the exact truth, so they had installed their own bugs in the chandeliers, so the talks were actually broadcast at least to a small circle around the palace. I think that things began to get a little better, but then the Cultural Revolution broke out, and that prevented any type of movement at all by the Chinese.

*Q: When one looks at this whole thing, the Kissinger breakthrough, in a way it wasn't a matter of initiative on our part, it was really the Chinese just weren't ready for this sort of thing. I mean the thought of Americans having relations with China during the Cultural Revolution during the height of it is almost impossible to envisage.*

DEAN: No, I think we were doing our best in the period from '62 to '66, but the Cultural Revolution broke out in 1966. There were too many tensions within the Chinese government. Later on, one of the reasons I think they were receptive was the Soviet action against Czechoslovakia in '67. This caused enormous consternation in China because they, of course, thought they might be another victim of the Soviets. It was at this time, or a little before, that they began digging underground shelters underneath Beijing, Shanghai and other cities. I went

down into one later; it was a complete underground city. They were building them with the idea that this would protect their people from Soviet nuclear warfare. They had air purifiers and everything. They had flour mills down there, hospitals, dormitories, workshops, all sorts of things. They were really quite large. Of course, it would not have stood up against nuclear warfare of the kind they had in mind, but it shows you how much labor was involved in all these places. Digging so many underground cities was unbelievable. They did it for fear of the Soviet Union.

*Q: Now we are talking about constraints on the Chinese because in '62-'66 they are sort of sorting things out, moving from the Great Leap Forward to their rightist movement and Mao is sort of glowering in his cabana by the swimming pool, and then he came back with the Cultural Revolution.*

DEAN: Mao was locked in a power struggle with Liu Shaoqi and with Deng Xiaoping and the party bureaucracy, and in fact he did lose the presidency. He kept the chairmanship but he lost the presidency to Liu Shaoqi during this period. Mao was determined to purge Liu and Deng, also who supported him, as well as anyone else who opposed him.

*Q: Did we have a fix on Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping and that sort of thing?*

DEAN: Yes, I mean they had been very prominent, it was very clear. The only thing that wasn't clear was Deng Xiaoping's position; whether he was fully in Liu's camp or whether he was staying with Zhou En-lai somewhere in the center or had moved over to the left. We didn't know that; we didn't know the exact manipulations Mao was making. We didn't know for sure, but we knew there was a power struggle going on. Liu had been purged and arrested. We knew that Deng had been purged. We knew that many people at the top felt that the Great Leap Forward was a disaster and it was Mao's fault. It was not clear in 1966 where things were going to go, and we didn't predict the outbreak of the Cultural Revolution. I don't think anybody predicted that.

*Q: What about constraints on our side because during the Eisenhower period, in a way one has the feeling that the China policy was tossed to the rightists in our Senate and you had Robertson and all who were going to make sure we weren't going to go anywhere with China. It was a pretty rigid China policy I would characterize. Then you came back here in '62 under Kennedy and Johnson. Within the East Asian Bureau, were you picking up a feeling of, well maybe now we can do something?*

DEAN: I think when Kennedy was elected and assumed the presidency, the East Asian Bureau thought he was going to make some overtures toward China and to change our policy. I would like to think it is true, that he had been thinking of this, and he changed the leadership of East Asia and the Pacific Bureau. I'm not positive about this, but it was thought that he was interested in going ahead. But then he stopped. There were too many other problems. There was Cuba and there was the burgeoning Vietnam situation, so we didn't move ahead. Then when he was killed in '63, I was back in Washington. I remember when I hear about it. I went to get a hair cut at the barbershop. Elwood Williams, who was a friend of my brother's on the German desk, told me about it. Kennedy's death ended the prospect of any movement. I don't think that Lyndon Johnson (whom I got to know a little better later), was on the verge of doing anything, so things

were certainly in abeyance at that time. Vietnam began to take a much more prominent role in the work of the State Department and in our work and in the government's work. I would have to go around, for example to many schools and universities and colleges talking about the administration's position on Vietnam. The students told me that the President was lying and the government's position on Vietnam was wrong, all of which was part of the early stages of campus unrest and opposition to our Vietnam policies, so it was very difficult to talk to people.

*Q: Sort of our cultural revolution.*

DEAN: Yes. It was a very difficult period. It was almost impossible to explain the government's position particularly since I, myself, felt it was questionable whether we would be able to impose a solution on the Vietnamese people. I felt that quite strongly. In fact, I went over to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and participated in several studies at the time to see what we could do against the North Vietnamese. I was opposed all the time to the use of U.S. armies being sent into North Vietnam because I felt that it would bring the Chinese in with even greater force. The Chinese were already involved; they had already been manning missile, batteries, and other anti-aircraft batteries. They already had battalions of troops on road-making duty in North Vietnam. Later on I found, from a graduate student who was getting his Ph.D. at Peking University, that during the course of the Vietnam War, the Chinese had something like 900,000 troops in North Vietnam, mostly doing road-building and anti-aircraft, not all at one time, but at various times during the course of the war. Anyway, my feeling was that if we sent U.S. ground forces into North Vietnam, the Chinese would respond. And so, of course the studies went further than that. I would repeat that the Chinese would respond and naturally the subject of nuclear weapons would come up. I had to take footnotes protesting some of these reports as I felt that the use of tactical nuclear weapons would not deter the Chinese. Mao said that China had about a billion people and if they lost half of them, they would still have 500 million. Even if we devastated them and used other than tactical nuclear weapons, this would be a festering sore, not just the question of the use of nuclear weapons, but on the Chinese themselves. It would be a festering sore and eventually they would recover their economy and their people, and then they would be an enemy forever. It seemed to me it was wiser not to spread the war. Some, like Ambassador Graham Martin, didn't think the Chinese would come in. Of course, I didn't know, but I was almost positive that they would feel that they would have to. Anyway as you know, instead we bombed North Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos.

*Q: We are talking about U. S. ground troops in North Vietnam because that was one of the options that we could do.*

DEAN: That was one of the options, and that is why these JCS studies were being made, to find what the Chinese reaction was, and that is why I was there.

*Q: What were you getting from our military about putting ground troops into North Vietnam*

DEAN: What I just described, the JCS study on this. Some people wanted to know what the results would be. Tommy Thompson was the one who pushed the JCS study.

*Q: I was just wondering when you talked to the military or with the military individually, were*

*they saying "Hell, no?"*

DEAN: Some of them. They were divided too. Some were saying they didn't want a wider war. Some were very upset at the constraints put upon them by the conduct of the war, no troops in the North, initially no bombing of the North, no bombing of the ships bringing goods in, the Russian ships, the Chinese ships. They felt as though their hands were tied behind their back and they couldn't really fight a war like that. Of course, they were right. But, also on the ground in Vietnam things were not settled; things were not proceeding that favorably. People, I think, were giving exaggerated reports of body counts, and all sorts of other misinformation. Then Washington wanted to use Robert Thompson's ideas. Robert Thompson had been in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. I had known him at the time. He was trying to suggest that the British experience in Malaysia be transferred to Vietnam which was, however, a completely different situation. I argued at length about that, without too much success. There were lots of arguments going on within the Department about this plan and about policy. I was in charge of the peace initiatives with North Vietnam. There were lots of these peace initiatives, both on the part of other governments and on the part of individuals who would come into see us, and even some feelers on the part of their own government. I was very interested in this and hoped that we would find some way of bringing at least a pause in the war allowing us to reflect and to find a way out. I had earlier served in the White House for Lyndon Johnson. He had been elected in '64 and I was there for about two months working on his inauguration primarily because my friend, Paul Pople was his Chief of Correspondence and had asked me to come over and help him. So I did and I got to meet Johnson frequently. He would come in and pick up his correspondence from the pile on my desk and say this guy is a good friend of mine, you should give him very good treatment. He was a very suspicious type of person. He was suspicious of me until he got used to me. But anyway, he was a very interesting man. I think that if he had better advice, he might not have committed the U.S. so thoroughly to the Vietnam War. At the end of '65, he did declare a bombing halt in Vietnam. This was after the Gulf of Tonkin alleged attack. I say alleged because I talked to Senator Fulbright later about this, and he said that it appeared dubious. Then Johnson started the retaliatory bombing. He declared a pause in December '65. He sent Governor Avril Harriman, myself and Chris Squire to visit several heads of state to see if we couldn't prolong the 1965 bombing pause of North Vietnam into a possible peace negotiation. That is where I got introduced to Air Force One. We traveled with two crews and the three of us to several different countries. They asked me to go because the first stop was to be Warsaw. We were going to try to persuade the Poles to intercede with the Soviet Union. Then we were hoping also at the same time to see the Chinese there. At the time, although I didn't know it, there was an argument within our government between Dean Rusk and McNamara. Rusk was opposed to this initiative.

*Q: Yes, I remember. I was Consul in Belgrade then.*

DEAN: Harriman, Ambassador Elbrick and I and someone else from the Embassy went up on this special train to see Tito. We spent the night on the train and got there the next morning and had breakfast with Tito. He insisted everybody have several slugs of brandy. He said he would try to help. We went off to Egypt to see Nasser, who was the other co-chairman of the non-aligned movement. Nasser also had the opinion something should be done. We met at his military encampment outside Cairo. He seemed sincere, saying that he wanted to do something.

Then we flew off to Iran to see the Shah, and later to Pakistan to see Ali Khan. We saw Prime Minister Shastri in New Delhi right before he went to Tashkent to meet with Ali Khan, where he died. Anyway it became more like public relations than anything else. Then we went to Australia to see Prime Minister Menzies because the Australians were involved in Vietnam. Next we went to Japan to see Sato, who was Prime Minister, and we went to Saigon and to Laos. But, because we couldn't see the Chinese or the North Vietnamese, we only achieved the result of getting the Soviets interested. At that time the Soviets and the Chinese were pretty much at loggerheads with each other. We thought that the split between them really happened in the late '50s, and by the time things had developed in the early '60s they really were at odds with each other, including over supplying arms and materials to North Vietnam. The Chinese would deliberately hold back the train shipments coming through China carrying Soviet munitions and goods to North Vietnam. They deliberately delayed then for weeks, sometimes even longer. The Soviets had to resort to shipping many of their military supplies through Hanoi. So the Chinese were, in effect, blockading some of the Soviet aid to Vietnam. The Chinese didn't want the Soviets to get a foothold in Vietnam and be on both of their borders. This is why later on they were so annoyed at the Soviets taking over Camh Ran Bay after the U.S. withdrawal. There was really bad blood between the Chinese and the Soviets. We thought that we possibly could play on this antagonism and deep antipathy. So we tried. Harriman and some others wanted to see if we couldn't exploit this rift.

*Q: I'm trying to figure out what the game would have been if the Soviets were going to support. In a way we wanted both the Soviets and the Chinese to join together and say let's...*

DEAN: We wanted both of them to agree to a bombing pause and influence Hanoi to that effect because they were both supplying Hanoi. Our view was that if they could use their leverage on Hanoi, then it would be valuable. Now, we thought that the Chinese might do it because they didn't want the Soviets to get more influence there. We thought the Soviets might do it because they were angry at the Chinese and concerned about the growing Chinese power there. This was just a wish, but, of course, none of this happened. After the bombing pause in '65 we committed more and more troops to South Vietnam and suffered tragic consequences.

*Q: What was your impression of Harriman at this time? He was a very important figure; it was logical that he should have been Secretary of State and yet Harriman was cast in sort of this East Asian role.*

DEAN: He had been Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs and then Under Secretary. I think that might have been before they had a Deputy Secretary, and he didn't become Secretary of State. I think people listened to him. When I say people, I mean people in our own government and also foreign governments. He was really respected very highly. You could see that very clearly in all of these meetings, and he was very persuasive and knew all the details and facts. I thought he was a good emissary, and if we had been given permission to see the Chinese and the North Vietnamese, who knows? Of course, it is quite possible that Hanoi might have refused to enter into any negotiations at that point, but it really depends on what they would have gotten out of it. They wouldn't refuse to look at it I think. They might have gotten a lot out of it without the destruction which they themselves suffered. I think of it as one of life's great opportunities lost.

*Q: What was your impression on how Harriman was treating these constraints that were put upon him? Where was it coming from?*

DEAN: It was really coming from the Secretary and indeed the President, so he was feeling let down. It wasn't a matter of others trying to restrain him. He didn't try to go off on his own; he waited for authorization before he did anything.

*Q: Did he sort of talk to you all as he went around? I mean what were you getting from him?*

DEAN: Yes, we had several discussions about whether we could manage to talk to the Chinese or the North Vietnamese, if the bombing pause could be extended, what the outcome could be if there was a negotiation. There were always discussions of this type, and of course, what the Chinese motives were, what the Russian motives were, whether the South Vietnamese (at that time they weren't even drafting their own people into their armed forces,) whether they were able or willing to stand up for their own government. Whether or not the split in the communist camp, which was so obvious by then, although some people still didn't believe in it, whether that was going to make the domino theory less viable. Of course I thought it would. I thought it was rather unlikely that the domino theory, which represented a monolithic communism advance, was sensible. We saw China and the Soviet Union at each other's throats. The North Vietnamese hated the Chinese and had for 1,000 years or more. They had been occupied and ruled by China for many centuries, and they didn't like the Chinese. Later on the border war between them in 1979 was an acute expression of that dislike. The Chinese didn't like the Vietnamese either. But, also Thais didn't like the Vietnamese or the Cambodians. It is very hard for me to see why we did not pay much more attention to these fractures in international communism.

*Q: Were these fractures well known and part of sort of the body of your knowledge? I mean yours and the other people who were dealing particularly your dealing with a variety of countries.*

DEAN: Sure, anybody who had read any Vietnamese history would know about the relationship with the Chinese and the Vietnamese, documented over the centuries. Anybody who had been following developments since 1958 with China and the Soviet Union would know that they had really come to a parting of the ways as early as 1960. It seemed to me that this knowledge was discussed in papers, but people in the Department really didn't focus on them. Many in Congress, but also some of our own policy makers, didn't really factor the implications into account. It is not hindsight to say that the Sino-Soviet split was so real and that the Vietnamese hated the Chinese.

*Q: What were you getting, I mean you had North Vietnam as part of your responsibility, how did we see the North Vietnamese government? What were they, were there factions within it?*

DEAN: We were getting very little from North Vietnam. I think we knew much less about North Vietnam than we knew about China, and our knowledge about China as I have described was very general.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that Johnson in a way was calling the shots or was this Rusk calling*

*the shots?*

DEAN: In the long, run it was Johnson. Even when Fulbright and other Congressional leaders came to see him after the Tonkin incident, he told them he was not going to run away like a cur with his tail between its legs, that he was going to stand up for America. I think that what he lacked was more farsighted advisors. Bill Moyers was one of them, but not on foreign policy. Dean Rusk was a strong advocate of our policy in Vietnam. I admire Dean Rusk. I think he was a great man, but when it came to the Chinese, he was staunchly anti-communist, anti-Chinese. He had been Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs before, and he had served in the Burma campaign and his views were deeply affected by the KMT's loss of China.

*Q: He had been a planner for the...*

DEAN: That's right, so he had some knowledge of this. He was a very knowledgeable man. He was definite in his principles and his views; he was almost unswervable. He was very persuasive, and straightforward person. In many respects a very admirable man. I just happen to think that he was wrong.

*Q: What did we see in it for the Chinese to support the North Vietnamese, because this doesn't raise itself as being a major policy consideration. Maybe I'm wrong but...*

DEAN: Oh, I think so. Vietnam is on their border just as Korea is on their border. I believe very strongly that they were very concerned about security, their national security. There is a book that is out recently. I think it is called The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress. It describes Chinese history in terms of their concern about their border areas and their effort to secure those border areas as a means of protecting their own country and civilization. This book depicts these objectives as primarily defensive in nature and describes the Indian border wars and the border war later with Vietnam and the Russian border wars as being essentially defensive in nature. I think that anything that happened in North Vietnam which involved foreign forces possibly going into North Vietnam would have been of extreme importance to their national security and defensive posture. I still believe to this day that they would have reacted with massive amounts of troops and that we would have embarked on a war with China if we sent troops into North Vietnam.

*Q: Looking at China, were we looking at any divisive elements there, warlordism or something like that?*

DEAN: There were some people who thought that maybe (they always thought that and still think it today), China might break apart. I don't think that is a likelihood, although, who knows what will happen in the future. It didn't seem a likelihood to us then because the country had been unified quite completely by the communist rulers. If Mao had retired, stepped down in 1950, he would still be revered as a great man. Now for many people, particularly among the intellectuals, he is vilified. A lot of the ordinary people, taxi drivers, farmers, still remember his name and remember the mass movements, so he is still a name to be reckoned with as far as they are concerned. It just seems to me that China is such a huge, vast place and our knowledge about it is so comparatively small. It is like picking up a handful of sand from the beach and counting

the grains and from that determining how many grains there are in the rest of the world.

*Q: How did we see Zhou En-lai during this '62-'66 period?*

DEAN: We saw him as a sort of a mediator, as a person who stood between Mao, between the wrath of god, and the rest. He tried to keep things running on an even keel. Actually he catered a lot to Mao. If he hadn't, he would not have stayed in power. But he was responsible later on for bringing Deng Xiaoping back, and he was responsible, I think, for shielding some of the officials from the Red Guards and the terrors of the Cultural Revolution. Essentially he was a positive image in our minds at that time in the early '60s, and later, too. I think most people felt that Mao was a fanatic and Zhou En-lai was a pragmatist. Most people felt that Liu Shaoqi was pragmatic and Deng Xiaoping, too. It later turned out to be true. Of course, it is easy to say if we had known more in the '60s we would have reacted differently both toward China and toward North Vietnam, but one gets drawn into these things, particularly if you are not very clear-sighted about what our objectives are. One get drawn into them and they become bigger and bigger and then it is hard to extract oneself with any degree of honor. People get committed arguing one side or the other in Congress or in the public, and so this whole Vietnam venture really fragmented our society in many different and disturbing ways.

*Q: Did Senator Fulbright play any role during this '62-'66 period particularly regarding our China policy?*

DEAN: No, I don't think so. He was focused on Vietnam. Not too many people were talking about changing our China policy at that time. He may have said this in his memoirs or publicly, but I don't recall it in any of his speeches or statements. When I spoke to him later, we were talking mostly about Vietnam.

*Q: How about the CIA? I mean this is sort of what you have the CIA for, to find out what is happening in difficult places, in those days North Vietnam and China.*

DEAN: They were good analysts, their analytical side on China had very good people. I remember several of them. I thought they did quite a good job of trying to describe what was happening at that time. They were using the same sources which INR [Bureau of Intelligence and Research] and the Consulate General in Hong Kong were using. They may have had some human intelligence sources, but basically they had the overt radio broadcasts, the provincial newspapers, the refugee reports from the Special Branch in Hong Kong, and diplomatic dispatches from other countries that were represented in Beijing. So, using those sources, they came to, I think, fairly sensible conclusions about what was happening in government circles. Vietnam was a much more difficult thing because nobody had focused much on it before, and nobody really had nearly as good sources. We were sort of groping around more blindly without intelligence in Vietnam.

*Q: In the office for dealing with these affairs, were there any discernible splits about what we should be doing and all that?*

DEAN: Because it was a crisis, policy decisions had risen to the top. Decision making was at the

Secretary's level and the Presidential level; McGeorge Bundy at the National Security Council. His brother, William Bundy, was the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. It was at William Bundy request that I was following the peace initiatives. We tried to see if there was some way of getting good channels and developing one of these initiatives into something meaningful. I think we didn't get very far with them because there wasn't a really burning desire to follow them up much from on high, even with the Harriman initiative. Which is not to say that we didn't try.

*Q: Well, moving over to sort of the other side, more about difficult places, what about Kim Il Sung and North Korea? What were we getting out of that?*

DEAN: Nothing but what you have heard about and known about for some time. Just complete adulation of Kim Il Sung, and the fact that their society was such a closed dictatorial society even after the Sino-Soviet split. Before, both the Chinese and the Soviets had supported North Korea, particularly in its war against the south. Now the split was a big question for the North. Would they be able to obtain military support from Moscow or Beijing? North Korea was playing them both off against the other. It was getting more support from one because it claimed that the other was going to send support, so the Russians would hurry up and do it, or the Chinese. So, as far as Chinese and Soviet support was going at that time, they were doing quite well. The North still harbored designs against South Korea. There were still constant incursions of intelligence groups and tunnels under the demilitarized zone, all sorts of actions abroad and at home to further their aims. They were a true danger. The question is, would they take advantage of what was going on in the South? You know several units from South Korea went to Vietnam.

*Q: A whole division*

DEAN: A whole division was sent to South Vietnam, and they proved to be very effective. Would the North Koreans take advantage of their absence to try something; would the war spread? This was a real worry, and we didn't know the answer at that time. We had a morass that was quickly developing in Vietnam. It had been developing for some time already, but it was getting worse. We had the uncertainties about what was happening in China, and we had the danger from North Korea, so it kept us busy.

*: During this time, looking at mainland China, what was the feeling of its intentions toward Taiwan?*

DEAN: Well, judging from the Warsaw talks, Chinese insisted as it had from day one of these talks and even from the day they declared the People's Republic on October 1, 1949, that Taiwan was part of the People's Republic of China. It was a province; it was part of their territory. They were never going to give up this claim, and in my view, they will never do so. It is a territorial imperative that is very strong in China and with other countries too. It seems to me their attitude toward Taiwan was expressed in the Taiwan talks when they refused to renounce the use of force. Their rationale for doing so, of course, is that this would be surrendering their sovereignty and their claim that Taiwan is part of their country. They believe they have a right to quell internal disturbances themselves. Therefore, they weren't going to give up the use of force. Their attitude toward Taiwan was very tough on that stance. But, I can't think of a time that it hasn't been tough except for a period in the '80s when we had better relationships with Deng Xiaoping,

and at the same time, we had good relations with Taiwan, and Taiwan and the mainland were beginning to trade, to invest, to travel. Tensions in the Taiwan Strait at that time, I would say between '82 and '89 when Tiananmen occurred, were the lowest they have been in history. At other times, of course, there have been high threats. In '62-'66 Taiwan was doing a lot of these lightning jabs at China, sponsored in part by the CIA, but also sponsored by some of our far-out military units. They would send rubber boats onto the mainland with a few infiltrators. Usually they would be captured within days. They would send balloons over with messages and with little gifts from the offshore islands. They would do lightning raids here and there. Of course, the CIA helped the Kampa Guerillas in Tibet. This was the time of the Tibetan uprising and the Chinese crackdown in '59. At any rate, there had been a lot of that type of thing which provoked the Chinese and didn't get us anywhere. In fact, it just created more tensions. The over-flights I speak of, not the spy flights but the others, were not a deliberate goading of the Chinese, but they were more from navigational problems. China was so troubled, roiled internally, that I think they didn't have that much focus on doing something about Taiwan. Things were tense but not critical.

*Q: You left there in '66 just about the time of our great buildup in Vietnam. Where did you go then?*

DEAN: I went to Taipei.

*Q: You had been focused almost completely on the mainland and the communist side. Had there been anyone within the East Asian Bureau, who looked after Taiwan?*

DEAN: It was the Office of Chinese affairs. Asian Communist Affairs had broken away from the old Office of Chinese affairs. Taiwan, and I think Korea and Japan, were handled by a separate office, so I didn't have much to do with it at that time.

*Q: I was wondering you kind of did your own thing; it wasn't as much involving China.*

DEAN: No at that time they were separate. We didn't have much to do with what was happening in Taiwan. I recall quite clearly. It had been a very important desk in those days, but it was beginning to enter a decline, partly because of the Vietnam War and partly because of what was happening in China, and partly because there wasn't much happening in Taiwan at that time. My next posting when I left the Department and went to Taipei was as Political Counselor. I think you have already done a session with Arthur Hummel, a talented professional. He was the Chargé at that time. Then Walter McConaughy became our Ambassador, and we didn't have a Chargé after Art left. When Walter went away on leave and for promotion boards and things like that, I became the Chargé, but for most of the time, I was the Political Counselor.

*Q: You were there from '66 to...*

DEAN: '69.

*Q: When you arrived in '66, what was the political situation and the economic situation in Taipei?*

DEAN: Taipei was just starting to move into the boom years of their economic development. They already had their land reform, where the land was turned over to the farmers, private ownership of the land. The landowners were compensated by shares in some of the government corporations, sugar, petroleum, etc. That phase of the economy already had gone very well. Agricultural production was up very high. Light industries were beginning to grow very rapidly. In a few years heavy industry also began to grow, the China steel corporation, China Shipbuilding, electric power, things of that type. So, their economy was in pretty good shape, but still the agricultural sector was leading in importance at that time. The Generalissimo was in complete charge. The mainlanders who had come over with him were ruling Taiwan from the top down. A few Taiwanese had been brought in to lower ranking jobs in the government, but essentially the mainlanders were calling the tune and they were disliked by the Taiwanese because, as I mentioned earlier, of the very cruel and arbitrary way in which they had been ruled from 1945 until the Generalissimo came over in '49. In 1945, the Gimo sent General Chen Yi to take over Taiwan. Chen Yi created a crisis between the mainlanders who came over and were grabbing everything like carpetbaggers and the Taiwanese populace, to a point where there was an enormous uprising against the mainlanders by the Taiwanese which was brutally suppressed with as many as 10,000 people killed arbitrarily by General Chen Yi in 1947. The Taiwanese have never forgotten that. The mainlanders were ruling them in every aspect. They didn't have any say in what was going on. So they committed their energies primarily to the manufacturing and economic and industrial sector. When I got there two-thirds of the large companies were owned by the Taiwanese, and of course, they owned the land. The farmers owned their land. They owned most of the small and medium sized companies, so they were a very important economic power even if they weren't a political power. That was the scene when I arrived in Taiwan. The mainlanders made sure that dissent was punished. There was, I remember, a man named Po Yang who was a dissident. He was a mainlanders himself. He drew some derogatory cartoons about the Generalissimo, and he was imprisoned for several years for those cartoons. Various others, like Li Ou, had spoken out and had been jailed. There were several other intellectuals who were jailed for their dissident views. Some were mainlanders; not Taiwanese. But the Taiwanese were gradually becoming independent oppositionist politicians. One of them, Henry Kao, won the election as an independent Mayor of Taipei City, and the Generalissimo decided not to intervene. Kao served out his term. There was a-lot of Congressional interest in Taiwan. Many visitors coming in because of the old days. They came to see the Generalissimo or the Madame. They were entertained by the Chiangs, who were very intent on maintaining U.S. support and the U.S. connection. Indeed they offered up the island facilities for the Vietnam war effort. Tankers for the B-52s were based in southern Taiwan. They would fly up and refuel the B-52s that were coming from Guam or Okinawa on their way to bomb the North or South. At that time there were over 10,000 U.S. service personnel in Taiwan and lots of the dependents of those serving in Vietnam were also there. I forget now what the total number of Americans were. It was a huge U.S. community in terms of the PX and special privileges and everything. We were negotiating a Status of Forces Agreement with the Foreign Ministry. There had been some incidents where our military had insisted on trying the army culprits themselves.

*Q: There had even been a sacking of the Embassy.*

DEAN: That occurred much earlier as a result of one of these incidents in 1957 before I got to

the language school. Anyway, in '66 we were still negotiating, and during the time I was there, we did arrive at a final agreement on status of forces which included an agreement on who would try whom for what type of offense. It was more necessary then because there were so many Americans. I also set up with the general in charge of the Political Warfare Department a bi-weekly meeting on developments in China. They had much better intelligence than we, and for once, it wasn't propagandistic. We met with representatives from their military and from their navy and their intelligence service, and we would meet once every two week with our own team and find out what they thought was happening with Liu Shaoqi or with Deng Xiaoping or Zhou En-lai and what was Mao doing? This was the start of the Cultural Revolution and it was really of considerable interest, so we reported back to the Bureau. I think that time has proved their analysis was pretty accurate on what was happening. They had a much better feel for these things than we did. We kept up these sessions with them, and also at that time with Chiang Ching-kuo who was the Generalissimo's son and who would later become president. At the time he was Defense Minister and Vice Premier. He had not had much to do with the diplomatic community. He had been in the background mostly in the '50s and early '60s as head of the intelligence and security. He was a shadowy and rather negative image to foreigners. We agreed, it would be good if he became better known and met more newspapermen and diplomats and became better known internationally. Once when I was chargé, he came to my office and said, "You know I followed your advice. I had a meeting last night with a newspaperman representing The London Evening Star." It turned out that the newspaperman was a Russian KGB agent, Victor Louis, masquerading as a reporter for this London paper. Louis had come to Taiwan to stir up trouble because the Soviets and the Chinese were at odds with each other. The Russians were trying to fish in troubled waters and Victor Louis came back a few times to see if Taiwan might be willing to have an unofficial relationship with the Soviet Union. Taiwan was so anti-communist at that time that they rejected it, but just the same, it was an interesting type of situation.

*Q: What was your impression of Chiang Kai-shek?*

DEAN: He was a very charismatic figure. Say what you will about his stubbornness or inability to do what Americans wanted, he was a very charismatic figure. When he entered the room, he really made a difference. I dealt with him a few times, not through informal conversations but to deliver messages or to get messages back for Washington. He had, I think, a very traditional Chinese upbringing and a very conservative, even for a Chinese, traditionalist point of view, and a relatively narrow horizon. His son was much different. Ching-kuo had a very broad horizon, a much different education and much different outlook. Anyway, I think the Generalissimo really believed in the Confucian ethic. He believed it was the duty of the people to respect the government and the duty of the government to serve the people, but he didn't brook any interference and he was totally opposed to any type of liberalization. I think he was a figure, we would say, of "yesteryear," of the previous decades; whereas, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo was a figure of the present and future. The Madame, of course was very evident in relations with Americans and frankly played a major role with policy towards the U.S. At that time, we had stationed on Taiwan some of our planes with nuclear weapons. Later these were withdrawn. We also were supporting as you mentioned earlier, the Chinese Air Force U-2 planes and a lot of their other intelligence units. We had just come to the end of our aid to Taiwan, but we were still giving them access to a lot of military surplus material from Vietnam. Our MAAG Chief would go to Vietnam and send ships just loaded with all sorts of surplus equipment. The Chinese

military did very well during that time by offering to help the Air Force with the refueling of B-52's, with the repair of some of the military equipment that had been broken or destroyed and getting large quantities of material for themselves. As a result, during that period, Washington's relations with Taipei were quite positive. Walter McConaughy, our Ambassador, had very good relations both with the Generalissimo and other top leaders. They had a remarkable group of officials in Taiwan, some of whom are still alive. These were people who had come over with the Generalissimo, who had occupied positions of real power in the bureaucracy in China. Some were very able and capable people. Taiwan got an infusion of upper level very talented people who were responsible for the land reform, for agricultural progress, for light industrialization, for the heavy industrialization, and for the economic progress of the island. They deserve a lot of the credit for it; they handled things well.

*Q: One of the great deficits of the Chiang Kai-shek regime prior to that had been the corruption which had initiated many of the attacks on his government and the Kuomintang. Had that been pretty well dissipated by the time you got there?*

DEAN: I think they made a definite effort to wipe out corruption from the very moment the Generalissimo came. You see, C. H. Kung and the Soong family didn't come to Taiwan, they just retreated to New York. So a crowd of people like that who had been so involved in corruption on the mainland didn't come to Taiwan with the Gimo, but they took their ill-gotten gains and decamped elsewhere. The Generalissimo came over and really cracked down on top-level official or even mid-level corruption. I'm sure there was some corruption on the street, paying off policemen, customs officers, things like that, but it was really very low-level and not important to the economic development or to the well-being of the society. So, the Gimo kept a very sharp eye on that. People were afraid to transgress. His son was even stricter. His son fired his closest friend and advisor because his advisor's mistress had gotten involved in a banking scandal. Ching-kuo was even more adamant against corruption. During that period the transgressors knew that punishment would follow, so I think that kept corruption down to a bare minimum.

*Q: You mention all these visitors. The China lobby had been equivalent to what the Israeli lobby is today. With the China lobby, these were not people of Chinese descent but California conservatives mainly, sort of the conservative wing of the Republican party. I would have thought that they would have in a way gotten in the way of our relations because with the charismatic Madame and the Generalissimo would get them to manipulate our political process so we couldn't deal with them on a level playing field. I think in terms of the Israeli lobby today in the United States. Did you have that problem?*

DEAN: The China lobby has a long history. It goes back to "who lost China?" It goes back to the McCarthy period. It goes back to the WWII days where China was an ally and Madame Chiang Kai-shek and the Generalissimo were heroes. The China lobby was not as much in evidence in 1969. But it was still there, and they were still close friends. The Generalissimo and his foreign ministry made a strong effort to invite prominent Americans to visit Taiwan, and there was a steady stream. It seemed to me that from '66 to '69, the China Lobby wasn't as powerful as it had been before, partially because everybody was focused on Vietnam. I think that Taiwan was fairly confident of U.S. support.

*Q: Johnson was still in the White House at this point.*

DEAN: Yes.

*Q: But this would change. Nixon was elected in '68 and the administration started in '69.*

DEAN: But Nixon had been to Taiwan during this earlier period when he was not in office, and they felt that in him, they had a very close friend. He had been there earlier on various visits. I remember once he had come to Kuala Lumpur while I was there in '54 while he was Vice President and he had been to Taiwan on that trip also so he was well in favor. There were other people like that who had come to visit the Generalissimo and the Madame. Walter Judd was still a Representative. He was a frequent visitor, and the Madame liked him very much as did the Generalissimo and they welcomed him. So, the China lobby was there, but it wasn't as active. They had been able to keep mainland China out of the United Nations, and by one way or the other had prevented it from taking Taiwan's seat. This went on until 1971 when China did get in and Taiwan was expelled. But, in '66-'69, things were still going along pretty well, and I think the relationship was reasonably smooth. There were, as I say, status of forces negotiations going on. We ironed out other problems, and they were cooperating with us on Vietnam. The Generalissimo was advising not to send American troops there because he knew that a lot of casualties would cause heartburn at home, but to use other troops like the Koreans. Easier said than done. We didn't want to use his troops just as we didn't want to use them in the Korean war for fear of bringing the Chinese in, but he helped in other ways. I think that essentially during that period of time, the relationship was quite friendly.

*Q: How did you get on with Walter McConaughy because he was sort of not the old China hand but you might say to the right of the old China hand?*

DEAN: Well, that was his reputation, and it was true. I also think that he was one of the finest gentlemen for whom I have ever worked. He was really honest in his opinions and very courteous. I think that he did have strong views, and I would feel somewhat differently. We would talk about our differences. I would write something, and he would say let me think about this for the next day or two. He would take it home with him and then he might come back in a couple of days and say, "I understand what your argument is, but I just can't bring myself to agree." He would say it in a very nice way. We had several discussions of this type. We had a very good relationship, and I liked him very much, even though as I say, our views were different. Our Economic Counselor and I had very different views, too.

*Q: Who was economic counselor?*

DEAN: Bill Morell. At first it was Bob Brown, then Bill Morell. Bill and I are close friends to this very day. Walter McConaughy is still down in Atlanta. Unfortunately he is almost blind and he is not too well. His wife is looking after him. He had one special attribute which I will never forget. He had a remarkable, phenomenal memory. He would go in to see the Generalissimo and they would have a conversation for an hour and a half. He would come back and dictate it, the whole thing, and he would remember it exactly. Some weeks or months or years later, he would still remember the whole conversation in its entirety. His own experience was with China. He

was Consul General in Shanghai when the KMT was defeated. He had a lot of experience in the East Asia Bureau concerning China. So, he had a very good background, and he knew what he was talking about. It wasn't as though he was making up his mind without any grounding in facts. It is odd to say this, but he seemed to be the perfect representative to Taiwan at that particular time, because our policies were meshing; our relationships were good. He had a very positive relationship, not only with the Generalissimo and the Madame, but with other top level officials. I think he was respected and liked. I don't think people were manipulating him. He drew up his own views from his own resources, not from outside pressures.

*Q: You mentioned Bill Morell, the economic counselor was coming out of a different view. Was there any sort of different outlook on the economic side?*

DEAN: Not really. I was just saying philosophically that our views on China policy and the authoritarian rule on Taiwan and Vietnam were different. On the economic side of things we saw developments quite clearly in the same direction.

*Q: Were we making an effort to see on Taiwan that the Taiwanese were going to take over eventually. I mean this is an aging generation of mainland Chinese. We were looking at sort of a new breed that were being sort of, in place. Was this something you were seeing and how were we dealing with it?*

DEAN: It was not clear then how things were going to develop because there was a second generation of mainland Chinese like Fred Chen, James Soong and many other people of their age and even younger who were taking high positions at that time, so it wasn't clear where things were going. It was still an autocracy, but we dealt extensively in our Embassy in the political section with what you would call the independent oppositionists. They weren't allowed to have an opposition party. That was illegal, but they could run as separate individuals independent of any party organization. We had one very good officer, Jerry Fowler, who would go off and talk to some of these people, go to some of their parties and make close friends. Through him we kept up with a large number of oppositionists who are now in positions of power today. Fowler brought our political section in Taipei in close touch with oppositionists like Wu San- Lien, the head of one of the independent newspapers. Wu had to steer a rather clever line to keep his newspaper from being closed down. But, he is a revered name in the opposition movement in Taiwan because he did oppose the KMT. We felt that the Taiwanese were 85% of the public, that inevitably more of them would come into government. Chiang Ching-kuo who was rising into prominence then, was bringing in more Taiwanese into the party at the mid levels and into the government, too. So, it seemed clear that if you were looking forward at their history, the Taiwanese would have a much more important role. We tried our best to establish relations at that time with as many Taiwanese as we could.

*Q: Was there any concern with the mainland Chinese making any inroads with the Taiwanese?*

DEAN: Yes, there is the General I mentioned, General Wang Sheng, with whom we had these weekly meetings. He was also the head of security and counterintelligence. One of his jobs was to ferret out spies and subversives. After the Korean War about 15,000 Chinese prisoners of war opted to come to Taiwan instead of going back to the mainland. He found out that several

communist cells had been planted among those soldiers. He did the same with other infiltration that occurred even with people who came over with the Generalissimo. Taiwan didn't let many other people in after that. Some of those were communist spies who had been planted, and he uncovered them, too. There were quite a number of people that he had arrested who were either executed or imprisoned.

*Q: At this time the Cultural Revolution was really cranking up. It was in full swing. This must have been a big turn off for the Taiwanese on both sides. I mean were they getting a pretty good picture of what was going on?*

DEAN: I think they got a reasonably good picture. In some cases better than ours. I think the Cultural Revolution was pretty well publicized; at least the more glaring activities of the Red Guards. This made the Taiwanese feel that they didn't want to have anything to do with the mainland. It made the mainlanders on Taiwan wonder if they should take advantage of this, and there was some advice going to the Generalissimo that maybe he should persuade the Americans to do something. Of course the Americans were so deeply involved in Vietnam that they weren't about to get involved in the mainland, too. Caution prevailed in Taiwan among the Chinese mainlanders themselves. They decided to wait and see how this was going to play out. It was a pretty lively and stimulating time for all concerned.

*Q: What about Japan? Was Japan just sort of a big evil that had left them.*

DEAN: They hadn't left them yet. They didn't break relations until later. At the time, the Japanese DCM's name was Hara. He had served with my brother in Prague. When I got to Taiwan I met him, and he immediately made the connection, and he became a very good friend, to the point that we were discussing the recognition of Outer Mongolia which our government was planning. I discussed this with him and, the Japanese government, not wanting to be left behind, went ahead and recognized Outer Mongolia. Then, because the Generalissimo had written to President Nixon, we decided not to do it. So, the Japanese were left out there hanging. It was very embarrassing for a while. Anyway, they never wanted to be following in our footsteps. They wanted to be a little bit ahead of us but not so far out ahead that they were dangling. During that time, they still had ambassadorial relations, and in a way, Japan was very popular among the Taiwanese, because unlike in Korea where they were at each other's throats, in Taiwan the Japanese had acted with strictness but with fairness. A glaring contradiction to the mainlanders who originally came over and who acted very unfairly. If there was an offense under the Japanese, it was punishable by a definite penalty and nothing else. The Japanese had occupied Taiwan for some 50 years. They had been there since the Sino-Japanese war of 1895. So the Japanese had rewarded those Taiwanese who spoke only Japanese not only in the workplace but in their homes. They had educated Taiwanese leaders in Japan. These were mostly engineers and doctors. They had built up the roads, the factories, the railroads, what have you. So they were not unpopular. Frankly a great deal of Taiwan's trade is still with the Japanese and the older generation still speak Japanese. So Japan has maintained close ties with Taiwan, and they have been fairly beneficial to Taiwan traders and Japanese entrepreneurs as well.

*Q: Were we much involved in economic promotion as far as trade with the United States and all that?*

DEAN: The U.S. was Taiwan's major export market, but we really didn't get into serious trade problems until a few years later. We did negotiate textile agreements as we did in Hong Kong, and we got into some other agreements. But, the real problems blossomed in terms of intellectual property rights. This first manifested itself in book pirating. Book publishers would get a best seller, pirate it, and sell it for a pittance, usually locally, but then the Chinese began to send them abroad, books like the Encyclopedia Britannica. You could buy the whole set for \$50. This was true in the late '50s and through the '60s. Finally we were able to clamp down on pirating and copyright infringement by the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s. Still, it was a really big problem, particularly when you get to cassette tapes and music, and then video tapes and CDs and software. The billowing trade surplus became an enormous problem until in the '80s. In 1987, we had a trade deficit with Taiwan, a deficit just in our bilateral trade, of \$19.4 billion in that one year. This was building up. When I was there, it wasn't nearly that way in the '60s, but through the '70s and into the '80s our trade defect really began to blossom, and it was a serious issue. I can get into that later.

*Q: Yes, I was thinking this would be a good place to stop. So in 1969, you left Taiwan; where did you go?*

DEAN: I went to the senior seminar at the Foreign Service Institute.

*Q: Well, in 1970, you were back in the world again.*

DEAN: That's right. Even before I had gone to the senior seminar the EA Bureau asked me if I would go to Hong Kong as the Deputy Principal Officer, and I agreed to, so I was back in Hong Kong in 1970 and stayed there until 1974, mostly doing my best to help manage a very large office. We must have had several hundred people if you combine the 250 Americans with several hundred Chinese. It was a big operation. A large part of it was concentrated on analyzing what was happening politically and economically and militarily within China. It was at that time, our largest China watching post. I have spoken earlier about some of our sources. Some of them were the same, but we had additional sources by then. There was more travel by American citizens to China. We had opportunity to interview them and to see many other foreign travelers who came through Hong Kong who had been on visits to China, so we had more information. Many of them had spoken both to central and local officials, so we found out quite a bit more about what was happening. It was pretty obvious there was an easing of tensions between the U.S. and China. This was even before Kissinger's visit.

*Q: Kissinger's visit was during this period.*

DEAN: That is right. It was in 1971. Kissinger had secretly visited China. John Holdridge was with him. Holdridge's book, Crossing the Divide, details that trip. Kissinger had ostensibly been on a trip to Pakistan and allegedly became ill, but actually he was spirited away to the airport and flew to Beijing where he met with Zhou En-lai. Of course, most people in the Department, including Marshall Green who was the Assistant Secretary and ourselves in Hong Kong who were supposed to know what was going on, knew nothing of Kissinger's trip or the results of it. However, one of my friends in Hong Kong was L.P. Sung, a newspaper publisher of a very small

paper. He had previously been in the intelligence service for the Nationalists and then the communists. He could have been working for both of them for all I know. We were having lunch in a small restaurant where we used to meet periodically. He said, "You know, there is going to be a very high level visit from Washington to Beijing." I said, "Oh?" He said, "Yes, the highest level." My friend was well connected with the NCNA people. They were the Chinese communist newspaper and intelligence arm. He said, "Yes, I have got this on very good authority." Of course at this time that was sort of a big shocker. Nobody thought that things would move as quickly as that. We all read President Nixon's article in "Foreign Affairs," but we hadn't realized things were moving that fast. We weren't in the loop on that type of closely held information. So, I went back to the Consulate General. It just so happened we were having our country team meeting, and I told them what I had heard and asked, "Should we report this to Washington?" Then it was decided by David Osborn, who was our Consul General, not to do so." He said, "they probably know about it if it is true." David Osborn was, I think, one of the most brilliant people I have ever met in the Foreign Service or elsewhere. He was a great linguist. He had served in Japan and spoke excellent Japanese and excellent Chinese. He also spoke the Cantonese dialect which he learned in Hong Kong to such a degree that he would go on the radio program and indulge in banter, a humorous dialogue, with the radio station host. Later, when he became Ambassador to Burma, he learned Burmese, too. He always thought that everybody else had the similar type of keen mind as he did. He would send reports or ideas or suggestions back to the Department that would go from one logical point to the other without filling in the valleys or thought processes in between and expect his readers to be equally as intelligent as he was, so that he didn't need to fill in all the argumentation. I kept on telling him that his assumption that everyone would understand wasn't necessarily the case. I got several comments or feedback from the Department saying they didn't understand why he had gone from point A to point B to point C. It was a pleasure to work for him. But, getting back to Kissinger's visit and the aftermath.

Shortly after L. P. Sung had told me that an important top level visitor was coming from Washington to Peking, we received a flash message. It was about three or four days later, telling us to listen to the radio in twenty minutes. That was Nixon's famous radio and television address here in the States, in which he revealed that he was going to go to China to bring about a change in U.S. relations with China. Well, this was exciting news, and pretty soon we were involved in preparations for the visit. Then, after the visit, there was subsequently an agreement that we would set up an official liaison office in Beijing. David Bruce was the first ambassador. He was given the personal rank of Ambassador for his new job. It was a new concept in diplomacy, the Liaison office had all the diplomatic privileges and immunities and what have you, but the U.S. still didn't have diplomatic relations with China. We just had an official liaison office and they had their official liaison office in Washington, both represented by an ambassador. The Consulate General in Hong Kong was involved with getting David Bruce and his wife up to Beijing and provided a lot of administrative backup for them as they were just getting started. We were involved in helping with the establishment of the liaison office. They were rather short staffed, so they called on us for various things. For example, for the first time an American official was to be permitted to go to the annual Canton trade fair, so I went to represent the U.S. from the Consulate General because the liaison office couldn't spare anybody at that time. The Chinese reluctantly agreed that I could go. It was an eye opener for me because at that time Guangdong (Canton) looked like a very old fashioned city that time had passed by, there was very little traffic. It reminded me of Kuala Lumpur in the '50s in many ways. It certainly was not

the bustling industrial center that it has become today with massive traffic jams, huge numbers of people crowding the streets, and fantastic pollution in the air and in the water. It has greatly changed in such a short period of time. I'm talking about the great change from 1973 until today. At any rate, a great deal of our effort was designed to try to help our office in Beijing get settled, but also we continued our reporting because the liaison office was not ready yet to take over a large amount of the China reporting.

*Q: Also I would suspect that being in Hong Kong in those days, you were in a better place to report rather than being trapped in the capital.*

DEAN: True, and that proved to be the case even later on. John Holdridge went to Beijing as the deputy. He was Kissinger's nominee. Kissinger was the National Security Council advisor to the President. But, Alfred Jenkins went as a second deputy. He was Secretary of State Rogers' appointment. The two, Kissinger and Rogers, couldn't agree on who should be the DCM, so they sent two DCMs. It shows you a little bit about the bureaucratic push-pull between the National Security Council and the State Department. I think the State Department really had not been informed at all about Kissinger's private visit and the President's intention to move ahead. The White House kept that very close and under wraps. No one knew about it except Kissinger and Richard Solomon and Holdridge. I think this shows the beginning of the divide between the National Security Council and the State Department. Later on Kissinger became Secretary of State, but he diverted most of the State Department officials who dealt with China by tasking them to write NIE drafts and other papers while he merrily went his own way with his own policy without waiting for any conclusions from Department desk officers. It was a very interesting way to keep the bureaucracy busy, but rather disheartening.

*Q: Let's talk a bit about this period '70-'74. What was happening in China at that time?*

DEAN: Beginning around the end of 1965 and into '66 China had embarked on the Cultural Revolution. It was, as I said earlier, Mao's efforts to strike down bureaucratic opponents and his opponents in the party, so he used young high school and even elementary school students, the young Red Guards, to storm the headquarters of the party and the bureaucracy and to drag out the responsible officials, vilify them, and pelt them with mud. In some cases, they were killed. Even in 1970, the Cultural Revolution had up and down, and additional surges of terror. Zhou En-lai was apparently trying to calm things down. Deng Xiaoping had already fallen and so had Liu Shaoqi and many other important officials. Things were in a relatively chaotic state. Dr. Lee, in his book about Mao Zedong, goes into that at some length. We were following developments, trying to find out where the Cultural Revolution would lead. Eventually it went on for 10 years. The universities were closed. The libraries were sealed. Nobody got an education. Everybody was busy on trains going from one place to another to storm one center of the party or to destroy temples. The slogan was, "Knock down the old and up with the new," so they destroyed a lot of China's most beautiful artifacts. It was really a terrible crime committed against their own civilization. We were seeing the results of this, and we had many reports from relatives and visitors.

*Q: This was not a closed society in this regard.*

DEAN: No. It was widely publicized. It was in their papers, on their television, and broadcasts on the radio. It was everywhere. Everyone knew. Visitors, relatives would be just distraught at what was happening to the intellectuals who were being purged. The economy was really suffering because the government's attention was focused elsewhere, on the Red Guards and their task to destroy Mao's enemies. It was a very crucial period and we were reporting on all these events. Eventually, when John Holdridge and the others were established in Beijing, we kept reporting Zhou En-lai was under attack because he had advocated once again resuming the examination process to get into the university. The papers were attacking him, not by name, but were saying Confucius was trying to restore the entrance examinations for the universities. Some of the provincial papers up in Liaoning were leading this attack, and we were reporting on all of this. It was very clear from our analysis of what was going on in Beijing that the left wing of the party led by Jiang Qing (Madame Mao), and her cohorts were really trying to oust Zhou En-lai and the recently returned Deng Xiaoping, so that the leftist policies of supporting constant revolution, and constant struggle to prevent backsliding into bourgeoisie thinking and practices would prevail. They were really vicious in their attacks on Zhou. Zhou En-lai was ill; he was suffering from cancer. A couple of years later, he died. It was so obvious to us in Hong Kong that this infighting was going on. John Holdridge kept sending emissaries down from Beijing to our Consulate General in Hong Kong. He sent Fitzgerald, the Australian Ambassador, and he sent Howland, the New Zealand Ambassador, with messages for us to calm down, not to make such an issue of in-fighting. He said everything was peaceful on the streets of Beijing, that their people didn't think anything was going on and that we were unnecessarily alarming Washington. Of course it was clear, that at the liaison office everybody wanted the new relationship to work, and it would work much better if everything was stable.

*Q: And they had their contacts, and they didn't want to see these contacts knocked down.*

DEAN: Well, they thought that we were exaggerating. They didn't have many contacts, which I discovered when I went there later myself, the only contacts our office in Beijing had were the other diplomats. They might get some information from a fellow citizen who happened to be a businessman or someone passing through. Basically they had few, if any, Chinese contacts on whom to base their views. They didn't get the provincial papers that we were getting either. Later on in John Holdridge's book, Crossing the Divide, John said that he knew from the very moment he got there that there was this attack on Zhou En-lai and constant internal strife. This is, I think, memory failing him because he protested so much that when the new Consul General, Chuck Cross, came out to replace David Osborn, Cross said the Department thought that Hong Kong was wrong in its assessment of what was happening. I think the CIA analysts were the only ones who thought we were right. But in this case the Department, the people on the desk and in the INR thought we were wrong. When I was in Beijing some years later, and the Gang of Four had just been arrested, big wall posters went up all over the city and they explained with excruciating detail all the ins and outs of the attack on Zhou En-lai for restoring the examinations, or doing everything that Chiang Qing and company had criticized him for, so we had a complete, detailed account of that period which I think proved without a slightest doubt that Hong Kong's analysis of the leadership in Beijing was completely accurate. We had a very good staff. We had Bob Drexler, an excellent draftsman, very concise and succinct; Jay Taylor, who was very good on projecting things into the future, and Sherrod McCall, who was excellent on short term projections. It was a terrific group of officers. Jay Taylor is in this area now. He is writing a

biography of Chiang Ching-kuo and has sent the final draft to the Harvard University Press. Sherrod McCall is on the west coast, in San Francisco. He is guest lecturer on Chinese ships along the China coast and southeast Asia. Getting back to the point I was making, pretty soon Chuck Cross understood where we were coming from and he didn't try to interfere or change our analysis.

*Q: I think it is an important thing to look at because dealing with China and visions of what happened to the old China hands, here you were reporting essentially chaos.*

DEAN: Yes, a real serious leadership struggle. It was probably the beginning of the struggle for succession.

*Q: By this point halfway through at least, Kissinger became Secretary of State. When you got these pleas from Peking and Washington, did this interfere with your reporting?*

DEAN: No, we felt we were right, and we had newspaper evidence and some hearsay, but then radio broadcasts and other things that seemed to indicate our analysis was correct. We didn't change it nor did, Chuck Cross try to get us to change it. We just carried on. This was in '74, and just two years later, history proved that we were right.

*Q: I'm trying to capture the attitude of the China hands. Here you have this immense nation which was not our friend which was going through a very chaotic time which meant it was very badly weakened. Was there any shout of almost pleasure at China's chaos because what is bad for this country means that it is essentially less of a threat for us.*

DEAN: No, that was not our motive in reporting on the leadership struggle. I think most people who were working in the Consulate General at that time were very much in favor of better relationships between Washington and Beijing. Most people also believed that if China just dissolved into chaos, it could create many more problems for us than if it had a reasonably stable government, even though it was a communist one at that point. So, I think people were positively inclined toward China, at least those with whom I was working. There was no desire to create problems for the Washington-Beijing relationship. On the other hand, we felt Washington should know what was happening, so that they could base their assessments on facts instead of on hopes.

*Q: Well now, as you were doing this reporting, were you seeing any of this encourage a Chinese xenophobia and criticism of the opening to the United States which had been sponsored by Mao? Still, I think this would be a turn that could have happened.*

DEAN: Well, it was happening to a certain degree because all Chinese who had had an education in the United States or had some contact with the U.S. were dragged out and criticized. There was one professor named Robert Winter at Peking University. He had been teaching English there since 1926 or '27. He was a very elderly man at that time. They dragged him out and criticized him, imprisoned him in his room. Several other Chinese professors at Peida either committed suicide or were thrown into the pool at the university and drowned. It was a serious attack on the intellectuals and a really tense time for all the people. People were worried about

what was going to happen as a result of these clashes in the top leadership. Were they going to spread as the Cultural Revolution had already spread over the country, was Madame Mao's influence going to prevail and would their future be even worse than the past had been?

*Q: Was Madam Mao (Chiang Qing) pretty well identified as the leader there?*

DEAN: She was well identified as the leader of the extreme left. There is no question there. She and her Shanghai clique really held a lot of power, and she had much influence because of her close connection with Mao Zedong. Mao was rather mercurial, too. At one point he would swing over one way and then swing over the other way. She tried to keep him influenced to the most extreme policy. I think at that time he was beginning to fail mentally, too. So she was a dangerous woman and perceived as such, not just by the leadership but by large numbers of the populace, who knew what was going on. Of course, hundreds of millions did not know, and had no idea, living in the countryside or in far-off places. Others who were in Beijing and the larger cities, such as Shanghai, had a pretty clear idea of the big power struggle.

*Q: How were your contacts in Hong Kong? I mean how was Hong Kong responding to this, both the government at the British level and down below?*

DEAN: I think they were responding with alarm. They could see a repeat of the 1962 situation where they had to set up barbed wire and have the police and the army push back masses of people who were trying to cross the border into Hong Kong as a result of the failure of the Great Leap Forward. They foresaw that similar things would happen again if the Cultural Revolution did leak over into Hong Kong. It was mostly during the period when I was in Taipei. During that period my friend Trevor Bedford was snatched. He was a high ranking policeman who was kidnapped by the Red Guards and later released. In Hong Kong there were bombs left in certain places and some prominent individuals had live snakes put into their mailboxes in packages. Open them up and there is a poisonous snake. So, there were all sorts of threats and things like that. The regime in Beijing was trying to prevent the Cultural Revolution from affecting Hong Kong. Hong Kong was still the source of a great deal of China's foreign exchange and their trade, so they wanted to preserve it, but it proved impossible to control everybody. Things just became chaotic. People were worried about the future. Was their future going to be one of disintegration and chaos, or were they going to be able to ride out this period? It was a tense time, I think, and for the intellectuals it was a period of extreme worry.

Many of them were sent down to the countryside to work in pig sties. I remember one woman I met some years later. She had been sent to far-off Inner Mongolia. The local peasants hated the people who came down from the cities. Mostly they were intellectuals; they had no idea how to farm. Their hands weren't ready for hard work nor their health, and they were just extra mouths to feed, so they were really not received very well. They were set to the most menial work. She was cleaning out pig sties and all sorts of the rotten jobs you can find on a farm, but she did it willingly and built herself a reputation. Some years later, they voted to send her back to school teaching. She had been a school teacher in Shanghai. But it was true of everything. Children were betraying their parents, denouncing them as bourgeoisie capitalists or denouncing them for having said this or that, and the parents would be sent down to the countryside to slave away on farms. The whole place was so disrupted.

I don't know if I mentioned earlier, but I went to Jinan, which is the capital of Shandong province. There is a hill, called the 1000 Buddha Mountain outside the city. Over the centuries Buddhist statues, huge ones and small ones, had been carved in the stone. The Red Guards had smashed off the heads of every single one of these statues using dynamite if it was a really big one or axes if it was smaller, so the whole place was destroyed. Many other cultural sites were destroyed as well. In some cases the army came out and protected temples and other buildings on orders from their local commanders. Sometimes army units were fighting against each other. Many temples, many priceless scrolls, and all sorts of artifacts were destroyed during this period. I think that the human destruction, destruction of their history, and the fact that the schools were closed for ten years, made this period one of the darkest times one can think of in Chinese history. It had such a major effect on the future in terms of losing a great pool of educated people, and also the attack on the intellectuals left China without much guidance in that area. It has taken a long time to build back. So, I think China really suffered enormously during the Cultural Revolution. In my view, you have to blame it completely on Mao Zedong and his policies. It is just as you see in Dr. Lee's book, Mao acted like an emperor, aloof and isolated. People were even afraid to approach him. When they did, it took months to get him to focus on any policy that would improve the lot of China's people. In Hong Kong at that time we were just doing the best we could to give an honest assessment of what was happening in the mainland. As for Hong Kong itself, we had very good relations with the British government and with the Chinese members of that government, as well as with Chinese merchants, bankers, lawyers, either professionals and with the media as well. We worked hard on all of these contacts, and one of our major targets was the American Chamber of Commerce. They had good information and we would exchange ours with them, and we tried to build up really close ties with the Chamber and to help them as much as we could. I feel Hong Kong and Taiwan were two places I have been where the relationship with the American Chamber was very close indeed, and invaluable.

*Q: Was the Consulate General feeling the pressure of the people of Hong Kong, particularly those with money, to make sure they had American passports and green cards?*

DEAN: Yes. A lot of them tried to do that. They could get E-visas if they were investing in the United States, because Hong Kong was a British crown colony at that time, so they could get treaty trader visas. Many of the wealthy Chinese had children in the United States, and it was easy for them to get permanent residence. For tax reasons, most of them did not, but they all had visitor's visas to go if something happened.

*Q: They were all keeping their...*

DEAN: That's right. Some of them had their seagoing yachts ready to get on and go. They could reach the Philippines or elsewhere. Most people felt they would have enough warning. Except for the incidents I mentioned when the Cultural Revolution spilled over but was contained by the police and the army, there wasn't that feeling of panic in Hong Kong or the fear that Hong Kong was going to be overwhelmed. The incidents I spoke of happened in '67 and '68. By the time we are talking about in the early '70s, Hong Kong was more worried about its trade and its economy. The stock market had fallen through the floor, having gone up very high, it had come down very low. Many people lost their money. But, things on the mainland seemed to be settling down.

Zhou En-lai was back. His influence seemed to be apparent, and the flow of the Red Guards was beginning to recede. The frenetic sending of people off to the countryside was beginning to stop, but people hadn't come back. Things seemed to be calmer, and this is the period when we established our Liaison Office. But, under the surface, as I mentioned, things were seething and bubbling and ready to break open again. It was a fascinating period of time. We were very busy, as you can imagine, in the Consulate General, not only with the visa applicants and the business interests, but with the analysis of what was happening economically as well as politically on the mainland, and with our support of the new Liaison Office in Beijing and our efforts to help as much as we could.

*Q: Did the war in Vietnam play any part in what you were doing?*

DEAN: Yes, of course. It was a major factor. We had an enormous number of ship visits. Hong Kong was an R&R place for the navy. Ships that had gone down to the Vietnam area had come back, so their crews had R&R. It was an R&R post for lots of people from Vietnam, too. Soldiers and others came from Vietnam for rest and recuperation. That was an important area. I think Hong Kong merchants benefited a lot. They were making equipment for the military in Vietnam. Everything from web belts to buckles and boots, everything you could think of, so in a way they prospered with the Vietnam War. Of course, behind all of this was the reason for the Nixon-Kissinger opening to China. They not only wanted to use China as a barrier to the Soviet Union's expansionism, but as a way of trying to resolve the Vietnam War. That was one of their primary reasons for the new policy. I think everybody understood that, at least in our office, so Vietnam was tied in to everything that was happening at that time, and Hong Kong did have a role in the ways that I mentioned.

*Q: With China hands, of which you were one, Hong Kong was always the greatest concentration, was there a new rise in morale and chomping at the bit because all of a sudden China was opening up?*

DEAN: I think most people in Hong Kong were pleased that China was opening up, as was the American public. I think there was a great wave of approval when President Nixon made his announcement about his forthcoming visit, but I think we were sort of realistic because the Chinese are not that easy to deal with. We found that even during Nixon's visit there were hard negotiations going on about the Shanghai Communiqué. Marshal Green by that time had been brought into the net with John Holdridge and others, and the Chinese were really very tough on the question of Taiwan and other specific issues. I think that no one thought it was going to be easy. I had a great deal of experience dealing with the Chinese in Warsaw already. I didn't think it was going to be easy. The Chinese government wasn't settled then. It was impossible to see smooth sailing. The best we could hope for was gradual incremental progress in the relationship, and that is what we did hope for. I think most people in our Embassy in Taipei, as well as Hong Kong and most of the Department, felt these moves were good for the United States, that it was in the U.S. national interest to move in this direction, so I feel there was almost a unanimity. There were a few people, of course, who kept thinking about the past instead of the future, but they were in a very distinct minority at that time. Still, some people were suspicious about China and whether the relationship would work, what China would do in the future, and whether it would be able to recover from the Cultural Revolution. Who knew? There really was a lot of

guesswork going on then.

*Q: Well, you left there in '74.*

DEAN: That's right, I went back to the Department.

*Q: Doing what?*

DEAN: I went to personnel. I got a job as the chief of the junior officer division in personnel.

*Q: You were doing that from '74 to...*

*Q: Was there much emphasis in the '74-'76 period one to recruit women and two, to get them into jobs that would be challenging?*

DEAN: There was some emphasis then, but it wasn't as much as it later became. We were delighted to get any woman applicant who would come in through the examination process or who was a mustang, but there weren't very many, very few to tell the truth. I think later there was a bigger push to try to recruit more women, but at that time, there weren't many at all. I remember trying to help in some cases like Tip O'Neill's daughter who was a reserve Foreign Service officer; she wanted to transfer in. I thought she had a lot of potential and tried to get her assignments that would help her. There were some officers who had been brought in from cultural affairs. The question was whether we could convert them to Foreign Service officers or whether they would have to go back to USIA. One was a really good linguist who had been the director of our Chinese language school out in Taipei, George Beasley. I tried to get him regularized as a Foreign Service officer. In several individual cases like that we tried to find really good people, and he was excellent. He had a good background and excellent capabilities. He could have competed with anybody. We were doing our best, but it was on a really small scale. I think the big push came later. There was a lady Foreign Service officer, Allison Palmer, who would come frequently to our office on behalf of some applicant or other saying the reason we hadn't brought them on board was because of discrimination or she would claim someone hadn't been promoted. She was a very tough person, but I don't think she was right, because we would have been happy to help women officers.

*Q: She was talking about somebody who had not come into the Foreign Service?*

DEAN: Right.

*Q: You left this assignment in '76.*

DEAN: Yes, I almost left early. Bill Sullivan asked me to go and be his deputy in the Philippines, but I felt that I had made a commitment to the Department to serve the two years I had agreed on in personnel. Also I was interested in what I was doing, and I didn't want to just drop it and go off and leave everything in the lurch, so I courteously declined and stayed there. Later, Bill Gleysteen in EAP came down and asked me when my two years were up if I would go to Beijing to our Liaison Office. I said I would and that is where I went after my stint in

personnel

*Q: You went, is it called Beijing?*

DEAN: Yes, the Chinese call it Beijing.

*Q: You were in Beijing from when to when?*

DEAN: I was there from '76 to '78 for a two year tour. I was working first with Bill Gates, who had been chairman of the Morgan Guarantee. He also had been Secretary of the Navy and briefly Secretary of Defense. He was a fine man. He had been appointed by Gerald Ford who, as you know, had taken over after Nixon when Nixon resigned. Ford was an old friend of Gates and had appointed him to this job with the idea that we would move forward with formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, and that is what Bill Gates really wanted to do. When I got to Beijing in June 1976, it was still a very difficult post because our people were isolated. There was the diplomatic community with whom we could interact, but not with the Chinese. The Chinese wouldn't have anything to do with the foreigners, not just the U.S. but with other foreigners also. So, one's whole life was with the other foreigners and not with the Chinese. It seemed so odd, so strange to be in such a huge country with so many hundreds of millions of people and to have your circle of both work and social contacts be limited to the other foreigners only. We were also treated in a somewhat different way because we were not part of the diplomatic corps. The Chinese every year, for example, would have a big tour through China for the diplomatic corps. We got our own private tour. It was much better, frankly, with a smaller group. We traveled all over. It was a really interesting opportunity to see the country. Shortly after I got to Beijing, Zhu De, the famous marshal, one of the survivors of the Long March, died, so we all went to his funeral. Earlier in that year, Zhou En-lai had died in the spring. Then there had been a serious riot in Tiananmen in April of that year when lots of people came to pay their respects. The government forbade a funeral for Zhou En-lai. This was very unusual and everyone knew it was Madame Mao (Chiang Ching), his enemy, who was responsible. Deng Xiaoping had been purged just shortly after that for the third time. So, Chiang Qing and her cohorts seemed to be coming to the fore. Anyway, there was trouble in Beijing. Zhou En-lai was now gone; Zhu De was gone. Then the Tangshan earthquake erupted, the most devastating earthquake in recent history.

*Q: A quarter of a million people.*

DEAN: Yes, hundreds of thousands of people were killed and many more were casualties. The estimates of the dead were even higher than a quarter of a million, they were closer to half a million, 500,000 at one time. The real number is somewhere in between those two figures, but there were literally hundreds of thousands killed. I saw the city of Tangshan later. It had been leveled to the ground, huge cement structures were smashed to the ground, trains had been set on fire. The coal mines nearby had all been flooded; the miners lost their lives. It was a terrible tragedy. The whole effect of the earthquake which was about 8.2 to 8.4 on the Richter scale, spread to Tianjin. The Australian prime minister, Whitlam, was visiting there, and in the hotel in which he was staying, the building separated, there was a big gap; you could see all the way down to the bottom floor.

Lots of buildings in outlying Tianjin were destroyed. Even in Beijing where we were, many the old mud brick houses, high walls with heavy tile roofs, just collapsed because the shock waves were so great. In the apartment I was living in there were great big cracks in the wall right above all the doorways, and in some of the other apartments where our staff were, some of the balconies had fallen off. The authorities made everybody evacuate the hotels and the apartment buildings. The whole population of Beijing moved out to the streets, and people were living in shelters along the streets. Fortunately it was summer, but it was hot. There they were, all these millions of people living out in the streets. The streets were wide and the sidewalks were also wide, so they built their shelters on the sidewalks. We had to evacuate all of our dependents because we didn't have any place to keep them, so we sent all of the women and children off to Japan or Taipei or Hong Kong.

We kept the nucleus of our staff; we lived in the office building and in the Ambassador's residence because they are both low two story buildings. We brought a lot of mattresses down from storage and put them in the dining room and had sort of a dormitory, 10 people there, 12 in the living room, some in the offices and elsewhere. At the time we had a Congressional delegation visiting. It was a problem for them; we had to put them up, too, because they had been kicked out of the hotels which were closed, so we had about 15 or 20 of them take care of and to house and feed. There were severe aftershocks going on all the time. It was an extremely tense period of time. Like all things, gradually order was restored. After people had lived on the streets for something like six weeks, they gradually were able to move back into their buildings, some of which had been repaired or partially rebuilt. Gradually things came back to normal. The significant of this earthquake was identified by some Chinese as Mao Zedong losing the mandate of heaven, a sign that he was going to lose power. Sure enough, very shortly thereafter, he died. This was a very tense period because who was going to replace him? No one knew! Earlier, after Zhou En-lai died, Hua Guofeng had been appointed premier. He was not to last long in that job. I remember James Schlesinger had been invited for a visit. He arrived just as Mao died. The Chinese didn't want to cancel his visit, so they sent him out to the provinces, mostly in the northwest, for a tour, and then he came back a couple of weeks later for talks.

*Q: He was what at that point?*

DEAN: He had been Secretary of Defense. He was in China in a private capacity, but he had been invited by Mao, so they wanted to honor his visit. This period of time was so crucial because after the earthquake, and Mao's death, Madam Mao and her cohorts tried to seize power. This was the Gang of Four; who had their base in Shanghai. Madam Mao had sent orders to the Nanjing regional military commandeer, whose area also included Shanghai, ordering him to open up the Shanghai arsenals and arm the militia. The militia was loyal to her. She wanted the militia to be armed and to take over the city while she went to Beijing and negotiated with the other leaders. She wanted to use Shanghai as a major lever. What happened, and we all found this out from the big character wall posters after she fell, was that the Center heard about her plan and they ordered the Nanjing military commander, General Ding, not to arm the militia. He was wavering so they sent the former military commander, Xu Shiyu, who had been posted to Canton a few months earlier, to come back and assume charge. Most of the top military commanders in the Nanjing region owed their promotions to General Xu. He was really very popular. He came back and ordered General Ding to guard the arsenals and not to arm the

militia. The commander refused. Xu Shiyou, according to the big posters, drew his revolver and shot him and then sent regular military troops to guard the arsenals. Chiang Qing (Mrs. Mao) in the meantime was in Beijing thinking her militia was in control or would be shortly, but she was seized and imprisoned by the top leadership. That was the end of Chiang Qing. You should have seen the public reaction when the news broke. I was at a dinner with the British Chargé and the German Ambassador and a few others in the Sichuan Restaurant (one which Deng Xiaoping really liked). Arthur Burns was visiting at that time and it was a dinner for him. I had heard earlier from a young Chinese student, an American who had come to visit his grandfather, who was a member of the National People's Congress. The grandfather had heard, strictly through the grapevine, of the arrest of Chiang Qing and the other members of the Gang of Four, and he told his grandson. The grandson told one of the wives of our officers (That was when our people still stayed at a Beijing hotel) and she told us. So, we had that information, and at the dinner, the British Chargé told me that his driver had told him that Madame Mao (Chiang Qing), had been arrested. So we put these two things together and it seemed just too good to be true. It was a development that I think everybody had hoped for. Two or three days later, this information spread over the whole city. I have never seen such a huge roar of popular approval. Huge numbers of people came to Tiananmen Square and started snake dances all through the whole square, beating drums, setting off firecrackers. It was the biggest spontaneous celebration I have ever seen in my life. Chinese military officers and others who had always shunned foreigners were grabbing people from our staff who were down there observing and were having their pictures taken with them. It was a really complete, absolute turnabout in the attitude of the people. They obviously felt so happy and so pleased that they weren't going to fall under the constantly left-leaning struggle and the revolutionary zeal of Chiang Qing. It was a big boost for the city. Then, gradually Deng Xiaoping came back to power. He had been purged after Zhou En-lai died, but he came back for the third time and gradually began to take over power as vice premier. He had ties all over the country with the military, with the top bureaucracy, with everyone, so it didn't take him long to consolidate his power. We had several meetings with him because various groups of congressmen and senators would come, and he would always give them a big banquet in one of the restaurants near the Forbidden City, which no foreigners had been able to visit before. He was a short feisty man; very interesting, and very practical. He said, "It doesn't matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice." "Learn truth from facts." He knew of all of the distortions that happened during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. He was a practical person but still very authoritarian. He was a communist, but he was very sensible.

*Q: Were you finding a change, outside of the Tiananmen Square demonstration, for foreigners particularly you and others?*

DEAN: Yes, absolutely. After Deng Xiaoping's return there was a great change in the foreign ministry people we dealt with and the academics, intellectuals and government officials. Much different. Before, for example, the only Chinese we could ever invite for a dinner were the head of the Diplomatic Service Bureau and his colleagues. We would invite them to a dinner at my place, ply them with drink and they would have a really good time. Then the next few days, as they were in charge of dispersing apartments or drivers or cooks, and it was like a jackpot. We would get a whole series of these things. But, those were literally the only people we could invite.

*Q: That was your connection for survival as opposed to finding out what was going on in the country.*

DEAN: That's right and that was done for administrative reasons. We couldn't talk to anybody else. Later we really had much franker conversations with the foreign ministry people and other officials, or the Chinese at the universities began to tell us all the things that had happened to them during the Cultural Revolution. I mentioned the wall posters. They went into great detail about how Zhou En-lai had been attacked by Madame Mao. They revealed all sorts of other things; it was fascinating. Of course we went to Mao Zedong's funeral. They built, in an exceptionally short period of time, a huge mausoleum for him in Tiananmen Square. There he was lying in state. I think history will prove that if he had stepped down in 1950 when he ended the civil war, he would have been thought of as a great man instead of more of a monster. He caused so much damage to China, economic and intellectual and physical damage, it was unbelievable. At that time I was working for Leonard Woodcock.

*Q: You were what, the DCM?*

DEAN: Yes. Tom Gates had wanted to stay, but the new administration wanted its own man, so Leonard Woodcock came, and I also worked for him. He was very interested in his job, in the Chinese, and in trying to move ahead with diplomatic relations. Tom Gates had been very disappointed that there weren't any moves on his watch about regularizing relationships. He even sent me back to the Department with a letter to the President asking why we weren't moving ahead and making use of his recommendations to do so. I went back and took the letter to Habib and asked him to proceed as he thought best. It was pretty clear that we weren't ready right then to move further ahead. Both Tom Gates and I would have liked to, but I didn't think that Washington was ready. Later on that summer, Secretary of State Vance came to Beijing in late August '77. He proposed to Deng Xiaoping that the U.S. switch its Liaison Office from Beijing to Taipei and its Embassy from Taipei to Beijing. He said either a U.S. Liaison Office in Taipei or a U.S. Consulate General in Taipei would enable us to establish our Embassy in Beijing. Deng Xiaoping characterized this proposal as a step backward in the negotiations with the U.S. because he claimed that both Ford and Nixon-Kissinger had claimed that the U.S. would not have any official relationship with Taiwan, and what Vance was suggesting was an official government office of one type or another in Taipei. Therefore there was no progress during that visit. Leonard Woodcock and I were both disappointed at the time.

*Q: Disappointed in the Washington proposal or the Chinese reaction?*

DEAN: Disappointed that the Chinese had turned him down, because it would have saved a lot of heartbreak and problems later on in the relationship with Taiwan. We still had an official relationship. Taiwan would have been happier to have an official liaison office there with an Ambassador rather than the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), which they eventually got. But anyway, Vance was not able to reach any agreement with the Chinese. Later on Brzezinski became very interested in doing something which was anti-Russian in scope, anti-Soviet.

*Q: Brzezinski was National Security Advisor and was looking at everything with a certain*

*amount of Polish view.*

DEAN: Yes, that's true. He was a bright and engaging person and who knows, perhaps the idea of using the Chinese against the Russian was an attractive one at that time. We are talking about May 1978. By that time the Vietnam War was long lost, but we were still locked with the Soviets in the Cold War, and Brzezinski felt that China would be a really good ally against the Soviets. So, he wanted to move the U.S. forward into formal diplomatic relations with China, and make them a formal ally against Moscow, but at least use them in the game against the Soviet Union. Brzezinski went out to the Great Wall and brandished an AK-47 and said, "This is for the polar bear." He had his discussions with the Chinese and they agreed to start negotiations later on in the summer between Washington and Beijing. These negotiations were kept very secret. They were run by the National Security Council and by the USLO, the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. They weren't disseminated among other people. At that time, my tour was up, and I left for a job in the Department in INR as head of the East Asia section. My replacement, Stapleton Roy, was the one who did most of the work with Woodcock on the negotiations with the Chinese. I came back leading a group of Congressmen and Senators in the fall, just before Thanksgiving, and Stapleton Roy and Leonard Woodcock gave us a good briefing. But, at that point there had been no breakthrough on the crucial question of continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to bolster their defense against any mainland attack. The Chinese were adamantly opposed to the U.S. continuing arms sales, even of a defensive nature, and the U.S. side would not move ahead unless there was some agreement that we would continue arms sales. After our visit to Beijing, I traveled all over China with this Congressional group. They were interested and interesting people. Senator Muskie was there, as was Senator Stone, Packwood, and several others. Muskie has died, and the others are no longer in Congress. It was a very good trip. The Chinese made a major effort to accommodate their interests. Stapleton Roy gave us an excellent briefing in Beijing. But as I said, there had been no breakthrough.

The breakthrough came shortly afterwards in early December. The Chinese decided they wanted to go ahead with formal relations. They reserved the right to raise the arms sales issue at a later date. They were putting it to one side and letting diplomatic relations proceed, and we did establish diplomatic relations. President Carter, on the fifteenth of December, 1978, said that as of the first of January, 1979, two weeks later, the U.S. was to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, that we were to break all relations with Taipei, that we were to withdraw the remainder of our military forces in Taiwan, which at that time were just a few hundred, and that we were to give one year's notice to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty that we had with Taiwan. In 1954 the treaty's revision said that it could be terminated with one year's notice. We were to do all of these things, and of course, not too many people in the State Department or in the whole bureaucracy knew anything about this. Very little preparation had been made. The breakthrough came suddenly; the announcement came shortly after that. The negotiations had been kept secret because the administration did not want Taiwan's friends in the Congress to disrupt them or to hinder them, so here was a *fait accompli*, but what were we going to do with Taiwan? Well, "L's" (Bureau of Legal Affairs) Jim Michel drew up a quick version of the Taiwan Enabling Act, or what later became the Taiwan Relations Act. It didn't deal with arms sales. It didn't deal with protection of economic interests on both sides. It didn't deal with a lot of issues which Congress, when they got the draft, felt were important. So, on a bipartisan basis Senator Frank Church and Senator Jacob Javits got together in the Senate and Zablocki and

Lester Wolfe and others in the House, and they worked on a bipartisan plan to bring about a Taiwan Relations Act which did include a large section on arms sales, which included language very similar to the Mutual Defense Treaty, that any attack on Taiwan would be viewed with serious concern by the United States. They stopped short of saying what our response would be. They protected economic assets on both sides; they gave Taiwan, in effect, the status of a foreign country to argue its cases in U.S. Courts. They gave all sorts of protections of immunities, not diplomatic immunity but functional immunity, which later was similar to immunity given to foreign consulates or organizations in the United States. They added many provisions like that. For example, they gave Taiwan 20,000 immigrant visas annually, similar to the quotas of other countries. This was something Taiwan hadn't had before. They treated them in many respects like a foreign country, but they said the relationship would be unofficial and would be conducted by the American Institute in Taiwan, a non-governmental private organization. That is where I came in. I had been in INR just for a few months, and I volunteered to Dick Holbrooke to help build up this new American Institute.

*Q: Dick Holbrooke was...*

DEAN: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. We were concerned that AIT not be politicized, that it become a professional organization subject to the Department's guidance in terms of policy. The American Institute in Taiwan was not established to originate policy; it was to carry it out, and that is what we did. So, the Institute was started in a little basement room where the old FSI used to be. We had a room smaller than this. It was about 12'x12'. We jammed three desks in there and we had one secretary and three officers.

*Q: Well, when you started, was there a concern that somehow this might turn out to be one of these things where they would haul some political figure out as a very strong proponent of Taiwan, and this would sort of muddy the waters and set a precedent. Was this a concern?*

DEAN: Yes, it was a concern, and that person might go directly to the White House, for example, or might be at odds with the State Department over what policy we would pursue. We emphasized in our negotiations with Beijing that we would have only unofficial relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act added on a lot of things that were apparently official, but they gave the President certain leeway. President Carter, when he signed the Act, said the Congress had given him certain leeway, and he would interpret that in light of the negotiations with Beijing on diplomatic recognition. Of course, AIT was just an idea. We had to borrow the \$15.00 to go down to the District of Columbia and register AIT as a nonprofit organization. We didn't have any money. I got into an argument with the Department administrative people because our people out in Taiwan had been put on administrative leave. Later we were going to turn them into AIT employees. The Taiwan Relations Act said that AIT employees may not be U.S. government employees, so we had to separate them from the Department. In the meantime, they were on administrative leave. Some of the administrators in the Department wouldn't let me send air pouches out there with their letters and credit card bills and everything because the Department didn't have any money for the American Institute in Taiwan. I had to go to a higher authority and say, "Can't you just please pay for them anyway and send them out," and they did. It was that type of little problem that was multiplied a hundred fold in every little thing you could think of. Because the Taiwan Relations Act said we were private, nongovernmental, and our

employees were not to be U.S. government employees, we had to deal endlessly with personnel and administration, and not just with the Department, but with other departments and agencies to resolve problems. We wanted everybody in Taiwan to be converted to AIT employees regardless of which agency they had come from; USIA, Agriculture, Commerce or elsewhere. We gave them the same allowances, the same types of leave as Foreign Service Officers.

Every single department had different rules for allowances, shipment of household goods, school allowances and home leave and whether they could ship an automobile and the type of housing they could have. We wanted to treat everybody the same way, and we wanted them all to report through the Director of AIT, and not individually, to their departments. Initially, for the first few years, we were able to hold the line, and everything worked out very well in terms of employee morale. Everybody was being treated the same way and got the same benefits in terms of working together and in terms of our relations with their parent agencies and departments back in Washington and everyone enjoyed a harmonious relationship. Things from that point of view went very smoothly. It was working out the details back here that was really frustrating. Eventually Washington's bureaucracy's insisted on regaining their separate controls. We didn't have any problem with EAP, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Their policy guidelines were very clear, and we understood them. We followed them, and that pleased Department policy makers. They wanted us to be as unofficial as possible. But the administrative side complained they had no experience dealing with an unofficial organization that was carrying out U.S. foreign policy abroad. Our director was just a private citizen; he was not an Ambassador. So we continued to have difficulties of different sorts up until the present day with the administrative side of things, although we tried hard to resolve them.

*Q: How did you, I mean here you are in this organization; did you have a State Department badge and all of that?*

DEAN: Because the State Department lawyers said it would be a conflict of interest if I signed the AIT contract with the State Department, while still being a State Department officer, I retired from the State Department, early in January of '79 in order to take over AIT, to help found AIT, and to manage it and sign the contract with the Department. The contracting officer had never had a contract of this type before. The legal provisions kept defeating him and us. We kept trying to modify and simplify it, but it wasn't easy because nobody had dealt with a situation of this type before, so there was a lot of confusion. Anyway we eventually got things working. Fortunately, we had a terrific administrative officer, Jack Connally. He is still on contract with the Department. He has retired, but the Department calls him back and sends him to different spots to try to solve administrative problems. He was really an experienced, positive thinking officer. We were so lucky to have him because the problems were so enormous and so frustrating. He did a marvelous job. We also had Joe Kyle who had been economic counselor in Taipei and had served in the EA Bureau. He came on board in January as our economic officer. Joe was experienced and a good negotiator with both the U.S. bureaucracy and the Chinese. He negotiated many agreements with Taiwan and kept track of economic developments there.

*Q: You say you couldn't pay anybody. Most people who work for the government, and I speak from experience, don't have a back log. I mean we need our monthly check.*

DEAN: That's right, but we couldn't do anything about that until President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979. Once he signed the Act, we signed a contract with the Department, and the Department started to fund us. Fortunately, because our staff in Taipei had been put on administrative leave and had not converted yet to AIT, the Department was able to pay them.

*Q: I am a bit confused. Let's take fisheries. There are fishery people who know fish, and you don't know fish. There are fishery people in Taiwan who know fish.*

DEAN: And we would bring them together.

*Q: You would act in what would be known in Hollywood parlance as the beard. The man who takes somebody else's mistress to a party so somebody else can get together with her. That was known as the beard.*

DEAN: We were the beard plus! What we would do is bring the fishery delegation from Taipei to Washington, not the other way around usually. Then the fisheries experts would meet with each other. If we could spare a person, we would have them there, if not they would meet by themselves in a place that we would arrange at AIT, or a hotel room, or it could be anywhere at that time, but not in the office of our fisheries experts. So they would meet; they would negotiate. When they got to an agreement we would have to sign it. We would sign it, and there was a provision in the Taiwan Relations Act that we had to report all of these agreements to Congress. We were also the repository of all of these agreements. If anyone in the public wanted a copy, they would have to come to us. They were also printed in the federal register. Yes, in a sense we were the beard, but in another sense, we served as the unit that coordinated people and cut through a-lot of red tape. You know if there is to be a meeting of people from the State Department, the Defense Department, Treasury, Commerce, they dance around with all sorts of briefing papers and clearances. We would just pick up the telephone and say we are having a meeting here tomorrow, please send a representative. They always did. We didn't have a lot of paperwork, so we cut through a lot of red tape. We facilitated a lot of agreements; we got things done much faster than the normal process worked. The Taiwan representatives were amazed that things like that were happening. Of course Taiwan didn't like the setup; they wanted an official office, not an unofficial one. They wanted to go to the State Department and the National Security Council and talk to everybody in the various departments and they couldn't do that. They wanted to have high level visitors coming from Taipei, and from Washington to Taipei, and they couldn't have that either. There were lots of things they couldn't have that made them unhappy, but in terms of the substantive work, getting agreements done, cutting through red tape, facilitating real work, then AIT did a pretty good job.

*Q: How about the representation of Taiwan in Washington. What was your role in that?*

DEAN: We had to make all their official appointments for them. We were the interface for them in Washington. They would come to us if they needed to see someone, and we would meet either in our office or arrange a luncheon or a dinner or a breakfast. We had lots of breakfast meetings, and we would get someone from the Department, maybe the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and a few others to discuss a particular problem. We would discuss it over breakfast and get a

solution usually, I mean if a solution could be reached, or at least they would pass their messages back and forth and hope they would reach the proper recipient. So, they had that type of contact, and when visitors came from Taiwan, legislative groups or others, we would brief them in our office, make their schedule, including calls with the Congress. At that time, the State Department was shy of having these people in the building, but later on legislators could go in, but no Chinese officials, in the State Department or the National Security Council or White House. So things worked out. If I had to do it again, I would have made a memorandum of conversation for every single discussion I had with the Department's administrative people, because we didn't have a good record of what had been agreed upon as the years went by and that was unfortunate. Other than that, under the circumstances, we did the best we could, and we tried to help Taiwan's Coordination Council. Taiwan's office in the U.S. was called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. Subsequently, in '94, they changed their name to TECRO, which was Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative's Office in the United States because they had to have Taipei or Taiwan in there so people would know where to go to get a visa. In those early days, we did our best. There were lots of embarrassments. In the beginning the State Department was very tentative about dealing with Taiwan at all. They felt that Taipei and their friends in Congress wanted to throw a spanner in the new gears of the relationship with Beijing. Taipei wasn't helping itself at that time because it was always saying that the relationship with the U.S. had some elements of officiality in it, or when we signed the privileges and immunities agreement, Taipei claimed it was diplomatic privileges and immunities. Before you could say Jack Robinson, the PRC Embassy would be in there protesting about a diplomatic agreement, and about the names Taipei used, the Republic of China, and all this type of thing. Washington was really tentative in dealing with Taiwan and worried about Taiwan's attitudes and what they would try to do. They were worried about the new relationship with Beijing. We tried to soothe these feelings both on Taiwan's side and on the Department's side and to build a bridge between the two so they could communicate in a less frenzied, uptight way. I think that helped a little bit. For one thing, I had a very good relationship with President Chiang Ching-kuo. I had served in Taiwan before, so I had met him much earlier. We had become, I would say, good friends. I admired him and respected him, and I think we had a level of confidence in our conversations with each other. I went to Taiwan soon after AIT got started early in '79 and saw him. He had determined he would do everything he could to make the relationship with Washington work. He saw relations with the U.S. as vital to Taiwan's security, although a lot his countrymen and high officials were livid about the break in the relationship and the U.S. diplomatic relations with China. He himself calmed them down and tried to rebuild the relationship. He really did a great service to his country by doing that. Unfortunately, right after the break in relations, on December 27, 1978, Deputy Secretary Christopher and Roger Sullivan, a Deputy Assistant Secretary in EAP and others in EAP had gone to Taipei on a special mission to work out the new relationship. When they got there, the whole cavalcade was met by a mob of students and workers who smashed the windows of the cars, jumped up and down on the roofs, forcing the roofs down on the seat backs with passengers crouching on the floors. Some of the passengers were cut by the flying glass. I think that this riot had a profound impression on the victims. Christopher and the others who came with him became sour about Taiwan and the relationship. It was foolish of us to have sent a mission to Taipei at that particular time because we should have anticipated some public outrage. We should have met in Guam or Hawaii and worked out things in a calmer atmosphere. Partly it was our own fault and partly it was a demonstration that got out of hand, and partly the fault of the foreign minister and others in Taiwan. Things were pretty

tense. Eventually President Chiang sent his ablest negotiator, his vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Hsi-kun, to Washington. He was highly respected here. He was an independent thinker, but really brilliant. He worked very hard with the State Department. He got the agreement we now have with the American Institute in Taiwan, its functions in Taipei, its functions in Washington, and the Coordination Council's functions in Washington. The Chinese set up an office in Taipei too. So the agreement was worked out and both sides began to move ahead with the relationship. I think that it has worked reasonably well. At the very beginning, some people thought this would be a short term solution, that things would change in five or 10 years at the most. The unofficial relationship has been going on for 20 years. The 20 year anniversary will be next April. It looks to me that it will go on for a long time after that, perhaps, another 10 or 20 years. So we have this organization, the American Institute in Taiwan. It has had its ups and downs, but I think it has tried very hard to carry out its responsibility, and it had some very good people. Chuck Cross was our first director in Taipei. We had Jim Lilley and then Harry Thayer, Stan Brooks, and then myself later. I'll get to that.

*Q: How did it work? I mean we had our office in Taipei. Somebody would sit down and write the equivalent to a political telegram reporting this. What would they do, send it?*

DEAN: Send it to me. The telegram would be addressed to AIT Washington, and our telegrams to Taipei, all telegrams that went out to Taipei were from me. I would sign them; I mean my name would be on them. They would be sent by various organizations. The EAP Bureau would send them to other bureaus, after clearance.

*Q: In other words these were basically State Department communications.*

DEAN: Yes. We had a circuit to the State Department. I am only telling you what the form was. The form was put that way in case unclassified cables got into the public realm and it would be seen very clearly that they were being sent between AIT Washington and AIT Taipei. But, in the Department, in the communications sector, when AIT/Taipei telegrams came in, they would be distributed to all the departments and agencies according to subject or there even could be a byline on them, pass to so and so. We had the usual protection of our confidential materials. The Sea Bees came from Manila and built up our communications room and everything else with the normal type of equipment that an Embassy would have. We had full scale cooperation from the State Department in those respects. I mean you couldn't ask for better cooperation, in communications and technical support, things of that type. It worked out very well.

I think there was a lot of concern in Congress about Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act said that AIT had to report to Congress annually for the first three years, which we did. We would give Congress a report which would use the Department's resources as well as our own, a mutually agreed upon statement. Then I would speak at an open hearing about the relationship. I went up to testify several other times for several other reasons, particularly before Congressman Solarz, who was the chairman of the House Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific. He was concerned about several human rights and other cases, some of them just terrible. There was a big riot in Kaohsiung in 1979 at the end of the year. Elections had been postponed the previous year because of the break in relations. It was Human Rights Day so the oppositionists were demonstrating on both of these counts. The demonstration got out of hand. Something like 183

policemen were beaten up. Several rioters suffered some injury too. No one was killed, fortunately but several organizers were arrested. Congress and the Administration were concerned that the Taiwan government was going to give the death penalty to some of these people. Taiwan was still under military rule and martial law, and most of those arrested were going to be tried in a military court. In early January 1980 I was sent to Taipei to speak to President Chiang. This was three weeks after the riot. After we discussed it at length President Chiang assured me that none of the prisoners would get the death penalty, and that most would be tried in civilian court not military courts. In the final analysis, that is what happened. The Taiwan authoritarian government controlled the courts. President Chiang realized the impact on American public opinion if the prisoners were executed. He was a very unusual and farsighted man. He made it clear to me that he wasn't going to do this, and subsequently that proved to be the case. All of the prisoners who were given jail sentences are now out. Their jail sentences were shortened. President Chiang followed through on his promises to us. Some of those who were released from prison are now among the most prominent leaders of the opposition party in Taiwan, and they have played a major role in Taiwan's march toward democracy.

We worked hard, both in trying to restore confidence in our relationship with Taiwan through our military sales which were very important to them, but also through our conversations, negotiations, and other aspects of the relationship to reassure them that the U.S. was not just washing its hands of Taiwan and walking away as we had in 1949-1950 before the Korean War broke out. They had some experience with that. They were afraid we were going to take Taiwan and hand it to the mainland on a silver platter in pursuit of our own national interests. That suspicion was with them then, and I am afraid it is still with them today.

*Q: In a way, this early period was helped by the fact that Taiwan was not a democracy and the mainland China was not a democracy so we didn't have an emotional stake of withdrawing our support from a "Democratic" country and pushing them into the jaws of a communist one.*

DEAN: You could say that, but on the other hand we had had a long, close, and friendly relationship with the Republic of China, both on the mainland and Taiwan. They had lots of friends in the U.S. and in the Congress, and their economic ties with us were becoming more and more important as well. They had really good links with our military because many had gone to our various military training schools at the highest level. As well as low ones. We had trained their aviators, and had given their navy old destroyers and other ships. It was a very close relationship. We had a joint command, the Taiwan Defense Command, and joint war planning. There was a lot to the relationship which was suddenly brought to an end. This is the first time I can recall that we just broke diplomatic relations with a friend and ally, though we did have a mutual security treaty, in pursuit of our interests elsewhere. I think there was a feeling of guilt on our part for the way we had managed this relationship.

*Q: I have done an interview with Nat Bellocchi who held your position somewhat later. I mentioned that the ROC, the people representing there, had an incredible network of friends. They really knew how to network, I mean they already had it through their mercantile interests and their military interests and all this. We are talking now about the early 1990s, the mid-1990s, the mainland Chinese just didn't have this type of relationship. I was wondering whether you found yourself running into that network.*

DEAN: Oh, yes. Even in a lot of my testimony before Congress. There were those in Congress who resented the fact that the U.S. had broken relations with Taiwan and asked really pointed questions about the new relationship which they resented, I remember Derwinski, who was a Congressman from Illinois, while we were in some grain sales conference (Taiwan had sent us a grain purchasing mission that was in Chicago.) seated on the same platform saying to me in an aside, "If I had my way we would send our battleships to Taiwan, restore diplomatic relations, and put the U.S. flag back up on the embassy there." He was speaking from the heart; that is what he really felt, and lots of others felt that way. It was a delicate time in the State Department's relationship with Congress, its relationship with Taiwan, and frankly in Taiwan not everybody was going the same way the president wanted to go. There were those who wanted to embellish the relationship and restore officially, but carefully, so as not to offend the U.S. Administration.

*Q: Well now, you must have felt you were the greatest nuancer in the world as far as having to deal with this. I was thinking that the Taiwan representation in the United States, particularly in those early times, were trying every way to almost exacerbate the problem.*

DEAN: What they had done was to compensate for the lack of official relations by sending over all sorts of missions, purchasing missions, sports groups, cultural groups, and inviting to Taiwan, congressmen, senators, staffers, governors, educators, mayors, everyone you could think of. There was a constant stream of visitors, and still is.

*Q: They paid their way.*

DEAN: Yes, of course. This is still going on. They use the alumni association of Tung Hai University to invite people, or Suchow University or other private universities. They did this to compensate for the lack of other types of official contact, and quite successfully. They had very good congressional relations through people in their offices in Washington. They got to know all the staffers, all the congressmen. They were dropping in all the time giving them information about what Taiwan was doing. That has continued, but at the time, it was quite delicate and the new relationship made it even more so. It was very touchy with Beijing, and Congress was intent on following up to make sure things were run as they saw fit. Everybody had a different agenda and a different perspective. We tried to bring them all together.

*Q: What about the mainland Chinese? Were they rattling rockets and doing much during this period?*

DEAN: Well, of course, right after the announcement of diplomatic relations they were still very sensitive. I mentioned they flew off the handle when we signed the privileges and immunities agreement, and Taipei characterized them as diplomatic privileges. They were on the lookout for anything like that. On any showing of the Republic of China flag in the U.S., any sign of officiality, anything, they would protest right away. There were lots of protests to the State Department those first couple of years. Things got even more tense when President Reagan campaigned, when he was the candidate, because he said on several occasions that he would restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

*Q: This was in 1980.*

DEAN: Yes, that's right, the 1980 election. President Reagan gave several speeches. He said, "We will have an official government office in Taiwan. The relationship with Taiwan has many elements of officiality in it." He was known as a good friend of Taiwan. He had been there several times as Governor of California, and Richard Allen was writing a lot of his speeches for him. Richard Allen later became the National Security Advisor and worked in the word "officiality". I counted it eleven times in one speech. This drove the Chinese on the mainland up the wall because they were afraid Reagan would restore U.S. official relations with Taiwan. A lot of Republican visitors to Taiwan at that time, before the election, were promising Taiwan that relations would be upgraded. So here again we had a really tense and difficult situation.

I recall that various invitations for the inauguration had gone to Taiwan. Anna Chennault was the National Republican's Women's Committee leader. She had gotten the senate organizers of the presidential inauguration swearing-in ceremony to invite a delegation from Taiwan led by Y. S. Tsiang, Secretary General of the KMT, and several officials from Taiwan. The Chinese Ambassador heard about this and said that he would boycott the ceremony if Y.S. Tsiang came to it. So, I had to go along with John Holdridge to tell Y.S. he was disinvited. Fortunately he had checked himself into an Alexandria hospital with a "diplomatic illness." Earlier we urged Taipei to tell him not to come. Then Anna Chennault said, "Don't pay any attention to them. Come anyway." We again urged them not to come, but finally they did arrive. Y.S. was here. He knew that he wasn't going to be able to attend the ceremony. He checked himself into the Jefferson Hospital with the flu, and we went to the hospital to give him our commiserations. Anyway, he didn't go; the Chinese Ambassador did come, and the Reagan administration decided they would not upgrade relations with Taiwan.

Even so, the Chinese were really upset and they pressed the Reagan administration. They pressed us hard on arms sales, on the FX fighter plane, on all sorts of issues. Finally the Reagan administration decided that besides not upgrading the office in Taiwan and leaving things as they were, that they wouldn't sell the FX aircraft to Taiwan. We negotiated an arms sales agreement, signed on August 17, 1982, which said that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would gradually decrease and that they would not exceed the quality or quantity of earlier arms sales. This agreement was made under the assumption that there would be a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan situation. The domestic repercussions were so severe that they affected Alexander Haig, who was Secretary of State in the early parts of the negotiation, and his pressing for this agreement was partially responsible for his resignation.

The entire conservative establishment in Washington reacted with cries of outrage and horror. Senator Barry Goldwater and Walter Judd, a former head of the Committee for One Million, went in to see President Reagan. Of course, this was orchestrated over several weeks and months, through the months of May, June, and July, really up to the August signing in '82. When Haig had gone to China in June, he had to use these words, "We will not exceed the quantity or quality of arms sales." This was not in his brief but they represented what he thought. They were written into the August '82 agreement. President Reagan was upset by his friends' reaction. He sent a letter to President Chiang Ching-kuo in July with six points in it concerning arms sales.

Two of the points are still important in other areas. One is that we would not be a mediator between Taipei and Beijing, and the other is that we would not press Taipei into talks or negotiations with the mainland. He sent the letter as a way of reassuring them. He said we had not discussed Taiwan arms sales in advance with Beijing and would not discuss them, would not agree to a certain time for ending arms sales, would not change the TRA, and would not change our position on Taiwan's sovereignty. So Reagan sent the letter in July and went ahead and authorized the signing of the Communiqué. I think by that time we had been backed into a corner and had no other option other than to sign it. But it has caused a lot of dissension. I think that whenever you have a document like that which one side is being forced into, you really can't expect it to last forever, and I think we have to say not only the spirit of the Communiqué has been violated, but several of its terms have been violated by us.

*Q: When you talk about quality, what is quality.*

DEAN: We had a rule of thumb. If something is no longer being produced, like a M-48 tank, then we were willing to sell the next higher production model. But that wasn't an agreement with China. Every time we did something like that, they would object strenuously. So we had a lot of trouble with China in the early Reagan period, during the campaign, during his first year in office, up to August of '82.

*Q: Did you as an Institute have, I mean I would have thought you would have wanted to brief and really sit down and talk to the Reagan people around him. These were people coming in, there always is a learning curve for a new administration but particularly for one coming in as the Reagan one did. These were not old government hands who knew their way around. This was a brand new crew.*

DEAN: That's right. On the other hand, they had some experienced people, John Holdridge, for example became Assistant Secretary for East Asian Pacific. Jim Lilley, whom I had known for a long time, went to the National Security Council. They knew what the score was, but you see they had two motives. They wanted gradually to improve relations with Beijing for our own national interest, and at the same time, they wanted to improve unofficial relations with Taiwan. And, this is exactly what they did. After the '82 Communiqué, the Reagan administration began to do both of these things. Relations with the mainland improved markedly. Relations with Taiwan improved markedly. From the summer of '82 until Tiananmen, we had good relationships with both sides. I won't say terrific; there were lots of problems with both countries. But they were solvable, and the trend was a positive trend. We did a lot with Taipei. Washington had a very good policy team. For once the National Security Council, the State Department and the Pentagon worked together. It was a pleasure to see because at other times they were so often at odds with each other, and I have seen that. In this case, there was Jim Lilley and Gaston Sigur, and Rich Armitage over in Defense. They were all friends. They were representing different organizations but could resolve whatever problems they had and present a unified position very well, and they achieved a great deal, both with Beijing and with Taiwan. That is where I had a hope things would continue to improve, but who could foresee Tiananmen.

*Q: Tiananmen was in 1989, which we will come to. Before we end this, you left Washington in '87.*

**JOSEPH YAGER**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1957-1961)**

*Mr. Yager was born in Indiana and raised in Ohio. After earning a degree at the University of Michigan, he joined the US Army, where he served in China until joining the State Department in 1946. Mr. Yager became one of the Department's China specialists, serving in Canton, Hong Kong (Peiping) and Taipei, as well in Washington, where he continued to be involved in Chinese economic and political matters. Mr. Yager was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: So you were in Taipei from 1957 to when?*

YAGER: 1961. Most of that time was as deputy chief of mission rather than economic counselor.

*Q: You got out there about when in 1957?*

YAGER: It was the middle of the year.

*Q: How would you describe the situation on Taiwan at that particular point?*

YAGER: We had had something of a disaster. The embassy had been attacked by a mob and looted and partly destroyed. So, when I arrived, the embassy was located in some excess space provided by an agency attached to the Navy called NAMRU2 (Naval Medical Research Unit). I had read all the information about that rather sad episode. The riot had been set off by a case where an American sergeant had shot and killed a Chinese who he said had been peeping at his wife taking a shower. He was tried in an American military court. We had an agreement with the Chinese there that made that the appropriate thing to do. He was acquitted. When he was acquitted, the Americans in the audience all stood up and applauded. All this was reported in the Chinese press. There was widespread indignation over this case. That led to this looting of the embassy. I would say that our relations were in a slump. There was great suspicion that Chang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was behind the looting of the embassy, but that was never proved. Certainly, some Chinese intelligence agency was involved or took advantage of it. Someone broke into the code room and got at the code machines. This had forced the changing codes all over the world. I think that that kind of action indicates some knowledge of where the code room was and a strong desire to get into it.

*Q: Yes. Well, who was the ambassador when you arrived?*

YAGER: Karl Rankin.

*Q: I understand he was pretty shaken by this whole episode?*

YAGER: Well, he had a minor problem with it. He had previously been stationed in Hong Kong. He and Mrs. Rankin had friends in Hong Kong. They liked to go there occasionally, which was done very easily. But when an ambassador leaves his post, he is supposed to notify the State Department. In this particular case, for some reason, Rankin just popped off to Hong Kong and did not tell the State Department. His deputy had to try to handle the riot and its repercussions. It wasn't excusable that Rankin was away, so he was criticized, but he stood quite well in Washington. Rankin was a good ambassador. He was a very intelligent man, very organized in his work. Everything that came along, he got on top of very quickly and efficiently. Under the circumstances, there was really no way for us to push Chiang Kai-shek to become more democratic. Perhaps, there was better opportunity a little later, and we did do a little bit of that later. Some people, including some members of his staff (not me), thought that Rankin was too accepting of the Chiang regime.

*Q: I think this often is a division in embassies, where the more junior people think we should be doing more, which is easy, because they don't have the responsibility or see the repercussions. It's just "We should have more influence" or something like that. Actually, an embassy is there to deal as best it can with what is in place.*

YAGER: The younger people had this feeling. They were quite good officers. I think they probably wanted to have the reporting be a little broader. The political counselor was very far right wing. Interestingly enough, at the time of the riot, his servants came back and expressed their sympathy with the riot. He had had some difficulty. Somebody had hit him over the head and he was bleeding. They expressed their pleasure that he had been hit. He shifted his attitude a little bit because of that experience.

*Q: We're still talking about when you arrived. The China lobby, which was right wing, which had Congressman Judd, Walter Robinson, all were coming out of the right wing of the Republican Party. Did you feel under constraints about what you could report about the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan?*

YAGER: As economic counselor, I felt no constraints. There was more to report than I and my small staff were able to report. So, that was not a problem. After about a year, I became first acting and then was confirmed, in the job of deputy chief of mission. From that perspective, I didn't feel any pressure from the China lobby. When I had been back in Washington as chief of the Division for Far Eastern Research, I didn't feel any constraints. I was never approached by the China lobby. I did come to know Mr. Walter Judd. He visited Taiwan frequently. I came to respect him. He was a very intelligent man. His views were not as right wing as is sometimes portrayed. He was a great one for rural development. That would be done in quite a democratic way. I would not put Judd in any negative light. I liked him.

*Q: What about economic development during this period? Later, Taiwan had become an economic miracle, an economic powerhouse for a small country. Were the seeds there at the time?*

YAGER: Oh, yes. Physically, even bureaucratically, some of the elements were already in place.

The Japanese had a system of farmer's associations that the Chinese had maintained and greatly improved. This was a system that could be used and was used to transmit technology down to the farmers and help them adopt better methods of growing things. The government included some very able people in the economic field. The vice president, Chen Cheng, was given a fairly free hand by Chiang Kai-shek in the economic field. He was one of the better Chinese nationalist generals. He was a very capable man. I got to know him quite well. He allowed the technocrats, the modernizers, to control economic policy within the limits set by Chiang. Chiang gave budgetary priority to the army. But with what was left, these modernizers were pretty free to do what they wanted to do. The AID agency and the embassy worked very closely with them. Even after I became DCM, I was heavily involved in this, because I was an economist.

*Q: You talked about during the war. One of the earmarks of the Chiang Kai-shek regime in China proper during the 1930s and during the war was its corruption. Was that under control? How did we see that by this time?*

YAGER: I don't think that corruption was a major phenomenon at the time we're talking about. Chiang himself was never accused of corruption. He was in fact anti-corruption, although unfortunately, the first criterion that he had in dealing with subordinates was loyalty. Competence and even honesty were less important. I don't remember any serious corruption cases. I did hear of petty bribes down the line. I think that the nature of the migration screened out some of the bad elements, though not entirely. In general, the professional class was made up of people who believed in a fresh start for their government on Taiwan. Of course, that was Chiang's own position. He unfortunately had the illusion that somehow he could get back to the mainland.

*Q: Did you see a change or a problem with the difference between the mainland Chinese who came over and were the KMT cadre and the native Taiwanese? How was this working out during this 1957-1961 period?*

YAGER: Oh, yes. The mainlanders were dominant. We quietly tried to encourage smoothing out these tensions. We felt that some progress being made, but the Taiwanese, as we called them then, were definitely in a very subordinate position. All the important jobs in the government and in state-owned enterprises were filled by mainlanders. Now, there were a few Taiwanese businessmen and industrialists who became important and who were allowed to prosper. I think that on a policy level, the mainlanders said, "Yes, they're all Chinese. We must treat them equally." But I think there was some feeling of superiority, that "These people had been under the Japanese for 50 years and they don't really know how to do things. We have to bring them along. We know how to do things. They really don't." They were a little contemptuous of them. They were also suspicious of them. They knew that some of them actually liked Japan, so the government prevented any Japanese newspapers from being carried into Taiwan and severely limited the showing of Japanese motion pictures, practically eliminated them. Actually, the Taiwanese had been allowed so little influence by the Japanese that they really didn't have many people that could occupy very high level positions. Take the military. The military before long became mostly Taiwanese draftees. Taiwanese were allowed into the military academies. But they would enter the army as a second lieutenants. How long would it be before you'd have a Taiwanese general? Quite a long time.

*Q: Rankin left. He went to Yugoslavia, didn't he?*

YAGER: Yes, he did.

*Q: Who took his place and what was your role during this transition?*

YAGER: Everett Drumright did. At the time that Drumright came in, I was acting DCM and I continued in that role for about three months. Drumright and I got on quite well. He wanted to have me permanently in that job. Robertson was pushing for Stirling Cottrell, who had been on detail to Indonesia. Why he wanted Cottrell so strongly, I don't know. He didn't know me. He just overruled Drumright and Cottrell came along. But of course, he was working for a man who hadn't wanted him. Cottrell, though a nice fellow, was a bit odd. He had some notions of tightening the administration in the embassy. He wanted the responsible section chief to tell him what he was going to do about every telegram that came in that required action before he did it. Well, that didn't go down very well. The political counselor, a different man than the one I mentioned earlier, and a smarter one, quickly undercut that policy. He created a mimeographed form listing a series of general things which might be done with a telegram and he would just check an item on this form and send it to Cottrell. So, Cottrell just didn't fit in very well. When he went off on leave after about three months, Drumright got me in the DCM job permanently.

*Q: Could you talk a bit about Drumright? He is an old China hand. I think you served with him in Hong Kong, hadn't you?*

YAGER: No.

*Q: Oh, you had missed him. He was an old China hand.*

YAGER: Yes. In Hong Kong, I was under McConaughy.

*Q: How did you see Drumright relating to Chiang Kai-shek, to the situation there?*

YAGER: Drumright was an old China hand, but an outsider. He was always more conservative than many people his general age and rank. He was a much better officer than his detractors claimed. He ran a very good embassy. When I became his deputy, I knew that he was known to be difficult and I said to myself, "Well, I am going to absorb the heat rather than pass it on." I followed that policy and it worked pretty well. It was a little hard on me, but still it worked. I found him quite capable and I respected his way of doing things, which were perfectly alright with me. He was known to Chiang as a friend of nationalist China and he got along with Chiang very well. On the other hand, I was an unknown, but I also got along with Chiang and Madam Chiang very well. They viewed themselves as historic characters, as I guess they were. Nevertheless, they treated my wife and me in a very friendly, helpful manner.

*Q: How did you see Chiang Kai-shek's son, Chiang Ching-kuo?*

YAGER: He was under a cloud because of the riot. He gradually became rather pro-American

and more accessible. I got to know him quite well. I was a little surprised that when he came to power he was as democratic as he turned out to be. But I found him intelligent, pretty capable. I remember, he took a group of Americans on a bus tour across the East-West Highway. We stopped at one of the highest points of the highway overnight. I am not an early morning sleeper and neither is he, so I was up walking around and so was he. We went down a rather steep trail into an aboriginal village. He knew the people there, and they knew him. They talked to him in Chinese. I was quite impressed by his touch with people. I came increasingly to think that he was not a problem, but to some extent an asset.

*Q: Yes. So often, the son just does not carry the weight that the father did and is just a weak reed, but in this case, he turned out to be a real plus in the whole political equation.*

YAGER: He did eventually. He was really groomed for high office. His father moved him gradually up. He started out working with retired army personnel. They had an organization for that, whose name I now forget. Early on, he was given a leading role in the intelligence field. Then he was gradually moved up to better and better jobs. He learned that way. On the mainland, he had not been a great success. He was, in fact, quite a failure on the mainland.

*Q: Let's talk a bit about the Quemoy Matsu Crisis, which sort of focused Americans' attention during the Kennedy-Nixon debates. How was that going? Could you explain what the Quemoy Matsu Crisis was conceived to be?*

YAGER: I think except at the very beginning when the civil war was still going on, a communist threat to these islands was not seen as a prelude to an attack on Taiwan, which the Chinese communists really did not and probably still do not have the capability of mounting. It would be such a large amphibious operation over 100 miles of sea, even wider at some points. So, we thought the shelling was an effort to take these islands and thereby to weaken their nationalist adversary and possibly to drive a wedge between the Chinese nationalists and the United States. That was the kind of thinking that we had. The shelling came as quite a surprise. I was at a dinner in the official guesthouse with some senior Chinese officials and a number of other Americans when the news came of the beginning of the bombardment. It was totally unexpected. The nationalist minister of national defense was, by a bad coincidence, on Chinmen and he was caught in an open field by the bombardment. It was lucky he wasn't killed. Later analysis by the U.S. Army attaché of the bombardment concluded the bombardment was not a prelude to the landing of troops. It was not directed appropriately for that purpose. It was more kind of hit everything and raise a big storm, but it wasn't directed carefully against the main nationalist artillery positions and the beach defenses. You might say it was a big political bombardment rather than the prelude to an invasion of the islands.

*Q: When this thing became a matter of domestic politics in the United States, did that surprise you all and did that cause any particular problems the way the debates were going and all?*

YAGER: Surprise? I am a pretty phlegmatic type. I don't react to surprises very much. So, I can't honestly say that I was surprised. I guess I did not anticipate it. I welcomed the congressional resolution because I felt that that was a way of quieting things down. The U.S. had played an important role in ending that crisis successfully. It was basically a Quemoy crisis.

Matsu got a lot of shells at it, but Matsu is farther from the mainland or from any other island that can be used by the communists. So, what happened in Quemoy was really what mattered. We had escorted supply ships to Quemoy up to the old three mile limit. This really constricted the Chinese communists from doing anything. They might conceivably have had some idea of landings and maybe gradually bringing more and more troops ashore and taking the islands. But our close involvement constrained what the communists could do.

*Q: Within the embassy, were we debating whether we should tell the Chiang government to abandon Quemoy and Matsu? Were we strongly supporting holding on?*

YAGER: We didn't want the communists to take those islands. We thought it would be a political blow to the nationalists and something of a blow to us. There wasn't any debating in the embassy, because most people were not that informed as to what was going on. We did later get Chiang to reduce the amount of troops he had on Quemoy. He had more there than he needed to defend the island and we felt that made the island a greater prize for the communists. Getting him to withdraw part of his garrison on Quemoy was consistent with our efforts to get him to reduce the size of his army overall, which was larger than he needed and was costing money that might otherwise have gone into economic development. We made a deal with him. We gave him some very heavy artillery that the U.S. Army no longer could see a use for, but it fit the Quemoy situation. Quemoy is just full of caves and a lot of artillery was placed in caves that had small apertures through which they could fire. These heavy guns were just the thing that the Chinese could use.

*Q: In our estimate, was the idea of a return to the mainland basically out of the question?*

YAGER: Yes. One year there was a policy statement by the State Department which implied support for a return to the mainland and I wrote a critique saying that "This is the objective but I don't see any policy measures that would be designed to achieve this objective." Marshall Green told me privately he didn't like that comment, but the Department never criticized it in writing.

*Q: Tell me, within the embassy, you obviously had people who were following China. Were you, the China experts, following developments on the mainland? Were you pretty well informed as to what was going on on the mainland?*

YAGER: Oh, we relied on Hong Kong. In Hong Kong, you had access to a variety of people coming and going.

*Q: But were you getting that information?*

YAGER: Yes.

*Q: Were there any internal debates about whether to recognize at any particular point mainland China in some configuration, maybe Taiwan being separate from China? Was this a subject that was discussed?*

YAGER: No. I'd say that we saw the U.S. role as trying to keep things calm, avoid any renewal

of the civil war, and make Taiwan more and more prosperous and defensible.

*Q: But there wasn't the underlying bubbling up, saying, "Gee, we've got to recognize this communist regime at some point?" Or was that understood?*

YAGER: I thought that we would recognize the communists eventually, but I couldn't see any basis for doing it at any early time. It certainly was not a subject of discussion. It wasn't that somebody said, "Don't you talk about that." It just was that nobody talked about it.

*Q: Also, events in China were not very conducive to thinking about dealing with that. At this time, they were undergoing the Great Leap Forward.*

YAGER: We rather liked the fact that Chinese communist economic policy was failing. In their first few years, they had done pretty well, and the policies on Taiwan which we were promoting also seemed to be succeeding. The embassy in Taipei was inevitably in a rather parochial position. I don't know whether the consulate general in Hong Kong in this period was talking more about the issue that you're talking about. When I was stationed in Hong Kong, which wasn't for a very long period, we certainly talked about the possibility of recognition, but that was cut off by the Korean War and even more so when the Chinese came into the Korean War. It took a long time for that experience to sink back into history and for people to take a new look at the China problem. The Chinese behavior in Korea was a defining action. They were really our enemy and what we had to do was to keep them from breaking out.

*Q: I thought we might stop at this point. We've come to 1961. Where did you go?*

YAGER: In 1961, I came back to be chief of Chinese Affairs and then they reorganized and I had China, Japan, and Korea. This was in what used to be called the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

*Q: We'll pick it up at that time.*

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*Today is December 13, 1999. You said there were some things that you should cover that we didn't before when you were in Taipei. Let's go back. What would you like to talk about?*

YAGER: One thing was the problem of preventing a new outbreak of the civil war. This was not too easy, because CIA was continuing to send teams into China. The Chinese communists, of course, didn't like that. The military situation when I first went there was that the Chinese nationalists had air control over the Taiwan Straits, and the Chinese communists had not yet moved any substantial amount of air force to the China coast opposite Taiwan. When the Chinese communists did move more planes there, we were afraid the Chinese nationalists would attack the communist air bases. I'm not sure whether Ambassador Drumright was away or whether he just asked me to do it. Anyway, I went to the foreign ministry and told them that we were aware of this new situation and we also were aware of the fact that the chief of their air force had threatened to attack the communists if they moved planes forward. I said that we

thought this would be a very poor idea, that there was no point in restarting the civil war and so on. The government on Taiwan did not attack these bases, so maybe our demarche had some effect. One minor amusing part from my point of view was that a couple of days after I had made this demarche, my boss, Ambassador Drumright, said, "Chiang Kai-shek is angry with you." I said, "He is?" He said, "Yes. He doesn't like what you said in the foreign ministry about not attacking those air bases." Drumright didn't really feel that I had done something wrong, so I didn't take his remark seriously.

A somewhat more serious situation arose later. I can't really put a date on it. I don't think this has ever been published. The Chinese nationalists infiltrated 4,000-5,000 elite troops into the Thailand, Laos, and Burma border area without our knowledge. They called these troops "special forces," although they were not special forces as the U.S. uses the term. They were really just especially good infantry. The Burmese army, unfortunately for them, discovered this force back in the jungles and the Chinese gave the Burmese a bloody nose, because they were quite superior to the Burmese in their capabilities. This let us know that these troops were there. Drumright was away at the time. The Department sent us an instruction to tell the government on Taiwan that they must get those troops out of there immediately and that the U.S. government would take any necessary action to insure compliance with this request.

This gave me the opportunity of delivering an ultimatum, which very few Foreign Service officers have had the pleasure of doing. I was instructed to see the foreign minister, but he was away, and I realized there was some urgency to my instructions, so I went to Hsu Shao-chang, the political deputy foreign minister who was the senior deputy. I delivered my instructions and Hsu said, "Joe, that is very hard language." I said, "I am giving it to you verbatim." After I delivered the ultimatum, things moved rather rapidly. We called in the chief of MAAG and got his full cooperation. MAAG set up a training exercise for the transport component of the Chinese national air force to bring the troops back. It went off very smoothly. The only mishap was one plane blew a tire on landing at the airfield in Thailand, but it did not damage the plane otherwise.

*Q: How did they get into Burma?*

YAGER: The connivance of the Thai military. I don't know exactly what was done because of that, but I imagine that there was probably some unpleasantness between our embassy in Thailand and the Thai military.

*Q: With the CIA, did you run into any problems with U2s? It has come out now that we were training nationalist Chinese pilots with U2s and they were flying over China.*

YAGER: I didn't have any knowledge of that at the time, despite the fact that I was the DCM. I had some knowledge of the operations by sabotage and espionage teams. I had lunch every week with Ray Cline, the CIA station chief on Taiwan. We would discuss the political situation and exchange information. He never told me very much about his operations. I think he told Ambassador Drumright somewhat more. I had quite serious reservations about those operations, but I felt that it was not up to me to complain. I knew that they were totally unsuccessful, that the communists were snapping up these poor people shortly after they landed and that they had no effect except as an irritant to the communists. Ray was a very capable man, extremely intelligent.

He got on very, very well with Drumright. I felt that he quietly moved too far into Drumright's sphere of authority, but since Drumright seemed to like it, there was nothing I could do about it.

There was a problem with the way the Chinese handled senior U.S. visitors. The Chinese liked to divert these visitors - let's say, a senator - and handle his schedule while on Taiwan. Drumright and I decided that we were going to stop that. Soon thereafter, I struck a blow for that policy, when I met Senator Monroney of Oklahoma at the airport. General J.L. Huang, a very large man, tried to take Senator Monroney's bag away from me. Somehow, I kept the bag, and I was then able to take the Senator to the embassy for a discussion of his schedule.

*Q: I served in Korea from 1976 to 1979. By that time, the Koreans had a (This is speaking of these official visits, particularly of congressmen and all.) very sophisticated technique of dealing with these... There were some essentially tame congressmen, but important ones, both senators and representatives. For some of them, they would come over and practically bypass the embassy. There would be a tailor waiting for them to whip them up some clothes. It was assumed, but we didn't get into it, that there was probably female companionship involved, presents. It was damn close to bribery. It was almost blatant. Of course, this is very Oriental, but it's also not unknown in American business practices. But it was very disturbing to us. This is 20-odd years later. Was there that type of thing going on?*

YAGER: Yes, there was. There was some of it. We certainly didn't encourage it, but some members of Congress were notorious for this kind of thing and we felt that they traveled in large part because of this kind of treatment during their trip.

I think that I should cover a few more things on my assignment in Taiwan. Two of the most important events were the visits of President Eisenhower and Vice President Johnson. President Eisenhower had not planned to stop in Taipei, but his stop in Tokyo was canceled because the embassy in Tokyo reluctantly concluded that it would be dangerous for him to come there. The Japanese government had warned them that they could not ensure the security of the visit. The President shifted to added stops in Taipei and Seoul. We had just a few weeks notice. That sounds like a lot, but it isn't. Luckily, Embassy Tokyo sent up its plans for the visit, which gave us an idea of what we should do. We also got very detailed instructions from the Department, which we endeavored to follow. It was a totally new experience. I was in charge of coordinating the President's visit from the American side.

I think that the breakthrough in my managing the visit was when I said to myself, "What you are doing is planning for a pageant." That is precisely what it amounts to. You have to plan every detail, where every car is in the sequence of moving people around, who sits in every seat in every car, who stands where at various points during ceremonial parts of the visit, who walks this way, who walks that way. Everything is planned to the last detail. We worked out a pretty good plan, and it went off well. I remember one part of the planning that was rather interesting. A Chinese general, a friend of mine, and I had to put on a performance of what would happen when President Eisenhower arrived. I had to play the role of President Eisenhower and this Chinese general had to play the role of Chiang Kai-shek. So, we ran this thing off at the airport and it went smoothly, as did the actual event later. In this case, I didn't go to the previous stop, which was Manila, but I went by helicopter to the cruiser that was bringing Eisenhower to various stops

on his tour. I was met on the deck of the cruiser by a classmate from the National War College, which was rather pleasant. I was also met by Assistant Secretary of State Jeff Parsons, who was a friend of mine. Jeff said, "I am going to take you down to the ward room. A discussion is going on. I must tell you that this is the first substantive discussion we've had with the President on this trip." So, I went down. I forget what they were discussing, but after that was over, I was asked to present the schedule of the President's visit to Taipei to him and I did so without any trouble. The whole visit went over very well, because Eisenhower was a soldier, and he could accept detailed instructions, contrasting later with Johnson, who, of course, was not a soldier, far from it.

*Q: I'd like to ask a question on the visit. Was there any concern in the embassy that Chiang Kai-shek might try to get something out of Eisenhower, commitment, support, or something of that nature?*

YAGER: I don't remember that concern. I think we felt that Eisenhower could take care of himself. I believe that was probably our basic point of view toward Eisenhower. We were not so sure of Johnson. In any event, there wasn't anything of that nature. The Eisenhower administration was quite firmly committed to the Chinese nationalists.

A few days after Eisenhower had left, a Chinese colonel in their equivalent of our Signal Corps came to an American colonel in MAAG who was the Signal Corps representative and said, "A very embarrassing thing has happened. I want to clarify it. We know that the Secret Service thought that we were trying to listen in on Eisenhower's conversations in his hotel room. The fact is that all of our telephones work best when they are set so that they are live when they are on the hook. The Secret Service discovered this and they adjusted the telephone so it was not live on the hook. I can show you in the warehouse that all of our telephones are like that and that we use the adjustment of making them live on the hook just to make them perform better. I want you to know that we were not trying to listen in on President Eisenhower." Of course, this story was a futile effort to cover up. It was quite clear that the Chinese government on Taiwan had listened in on Eisenhower's conversations in his hotel room.

*Q: What about the Johnson visit?*

YAGER: Well, this should have been easier. We knew what to do, because a visit by a Vice President is treated in the same way as a visit by a President. It was not as easy because of Johnson's personality. In this case, as DCM, I had to go to Manila and ride back on the plane from Manila to Taipei so that I could be available to brief the Vice President on his schedule. So, I went down to Manila. The main episode there was that my wristwatch was stolen, but so be it.

I was riding in the back of the plane on the way to Taipei. This was not a very long flight - maybe an hour and a half - and I was getting nervous, because I hadn't been called forward to brief the Vice President. Finally, I was called forward. He was chewing out his speechwriter, who was sitting there quivering. I remember, Johnson's final attack on this speechwriter was, "If you don't stop giving me this crap, I'll get up there and say what I really think." A rather serious threat, I might say. So, I gave the Vice President his schedule. He read the first item: review honor guard. "That is the way we are losing the world." So, Assistant Secretary of State for Administration Bill Crockett, who was standing there, very obsequiously said, "Well, Mr.

President (He was the President of the Senate.), we will call it off." I had to be the poor fellow to say, "Mr. Vice President, we can't call it off because they are already there." So, he suffered through the honor guard, but on departure, there was no honor guard.

Johnson was carrying a letter from President Kennedy to President Chiang Kai-shek. After we had landed, he gave me that letter and said, "You put this letter on 3x5 cards and give them to me before I talk to Chiang Kai-shek." So, I dutifully did that. When we went out for his interview with Chiang Kai-shek, he arrived early, to my surprise, and he said, "Where are those cards?" I had them in my side coat pocket. I gave them to him and he read them over and gave them back. Then he followed them meticulously, which is really quite important. When you're delivering a letter and you're going over the same ground orally, you don't want to deviate or the recipient will say "Why did he deviate? What is going on here? Maybe there is a little more to this than the letter says" and that kind of thing. But to Johnson's great credit, he handled it beautifully.

Johnson was a bit hard to handle. He couldn't sleep well. He was up and down all night in the hotel, waking people up. We had a duty officer there, and at one point Johnson asked the duty officer for a can of chocolate Metrical, which was in that period a diet drink. The duty officer, to his great credit, knew an embassy secretary that was on Metrical. He woke her up and got a can of chocolate Metrical for the Vice President of the United States.

*Q: Did you have to get him a masseur and black out his windows? I am told it was quite a production.*

YAGER: No, we didn't have to do that. There was a story in the press about whiskey in which they got things backwards. The story said that we had to ask the consulate general in Hong Kong for a bottle of Cutty Sark, a brand of scotch. It was the other way around. We had an embassy shop in Taipei that had better supplies than Hong Kong had. So, when Johnson went to Hong Kong, we had to get a bottle of Cutty Sark for him. I am sure Johnson didn't like that publicity. In that period at least, southern politicians were not supposed to drink scotch. They were supposed to drink bourbon with branch water, but Johnson liked scotch.

*Q: Did Johnson pay much attention to the political aspects? Later, people said that this trip that Johnson was sent on was really almost to get him out of Kennedy's hair.*

YAGER: Yes, he was very political in an amusing way. He was met by Vice President Chen Cheng and they rode in the limo together from the airport. Johnson kept stopping the car and getting out to shake hands with the crowd just as if he was trying to get votes in Taiwan. His schedule called for going to a nearby county seat to see a display about land reform. On the way there, when he would see a farmer in the field, he would stop the car, get out, and shake the farmer's hand. I can't imagine what a Taiwanese farmer would think of this. Johnson was a very big man, much larger than most people realize. To see him striding across the rice paddy, which was dry at that season, hand outstretched, wearing a red sportshirt, it must have been terrifying to the farmers, but that's just the way he was.

*Q: You came back to be in charge of Chinese and other affairs.*

YAGER: Chinese Affairs.

*Q: That was from when to when?*

YAGER: That would have been from August to December of 1961. Very shortly after I arrived, I was given a top secret document on relations between the Chinese communists and the Soviet communists. I knew that there was some evidence of a split between the two, but I had no idea how serious it was until I read that document. I was utterly convinced after reading that that the split was real. Some right-wing people, particularly in Congress, were then contending that the split was just a big act to deceive us. Of course, it was not.

I think the next memorable thing that happened to me was, I was confronted with a very long paper written by Ed Rice, who later became both a boss and a friend of mine, who was then in the Policy Planning Staff. He had written this paper under George McGhee, the director of that staff. McGhee sent it to Walter McConaughy, the assistant secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, and he wanted a reply within two days. So, McConaughy gave it to me to look over. Well, it was a paper that deviated quite a bit from current policy in ways that I thought were not very wise. Somehow, we stopped it. It is always easier to stop things in the U.S. government than it is to get things done.

*Q: How was it deviating?*

YAGER: Rice wanted to try to move closer to the Chinese communists. I think that he had the idea of trying to move toward recognition, which was then not in the cards. Rice later became the senior deputy to Harriman in Far Eastern Affairs and therefore my boss. Although we often disagreed, we had a very good relationship.

*Q: When you came to Chinese Affairs in the latter half of 1961, was there any thought within the bureau about recognizing China or was it just not politically doable from our side and also maybe that in China itself, there was too much turmoil?*

YAGER: I don't think there was too much turmoil, but I think that we felt that they were pretty well committed to an anti-American policy. The Korean War had changed the American outlook on China. Before the Korean War, I think that the prospects for recognition of China were very high. This has just been borne out by people who studied papers of Secretary Acheson. In 1961, that just wasn't politically feasible.

My approach to China policy after I got into Far Eastern Affairs was that I didn't think that our present totally rigid policy could survive. A new, maybe democratic administration would not support it. It might get us into more trouble than we wanted. Our allies would not support it. So, I tried to promote a policy of somewhat softening the relationship. I got a little bit done in that regard. I was thinking in terms of allowing some trade and some visits. But it was hard going.

After I became director of Chinese Affairs, I reorganized the office. There had been an economic section and a political section, and I divided the office into a mainland section and a Taiwan section. I put John Holdridge in charge of the Taiwan section, to his chagrin, and Lindsey Grant

in charge of the mainland section. Quite recently, John spoke to me with some resentment about what I had done then. I explained to him that I felt that he was a very good administrator and that all of the programmatic work was on the Taiwan side and I felt he could handle that very well. I said I felt that Lindsey was less of an administrator, but that he was rather innovative and wanted to think through new things and he would have that opportunity on the mainland side. Maybe that placated John. I don't know. In any case, Lindsey and I worked together and did our best to moderate China policy. But anything that involved China policy would be bounced by the Department to the White House and killed. The Kennedy administration was utterly terrified of being caught in a position where it appeared to be doing something pro-Chinese communist.

*Q: I heard somebody say that when Eisenhower was talking to Kennedy before the takeover, he said, "Look, I'm going to support you in everything, but if you move on China, I won't." I don't know if that's true or not.*

YAGER: I didn't know that at that time, but certainly, as far as the Kennedy White House was concerned, it was very cautious. There really was a political problem. Later, Nixon, the right-wing Republican, was able to make a move that no democratic president could have made.

*Q: Was there a "Mr. China" over at the White House?*

YAGER: No, there was a Mr. East Asia, Mike Forrestal. He was very close to Harriman.

I suppose that a few words about Harriman are in order. Harriman was a good man. He was well motivated. He was not mean. He wanted to do the right thing on every level. He wanted to be fair to people. He wanted to do good things for his country. He was quite effective. He was unusual in that he couldn't really predict what he was going to do. He said to me more than once, "I don't know how I arrive at decisions, but somehow they come out and I must say that they are usually right." I think that he was correct in that self-judgement. To a subordinate, he was sometimes a bit difficult. If he disagreed with you, you couldn't really have a discussion with him. He would say something like "No, that is wrong. You are absolutely wrong. I know about that and you are wrong." You can't get any hooks onto that kind of an argument. I developed a policy of coming back at him once. I felt twice would not be wise, so I didn't do that. I remember one very rare occasion when he actually flipped and agreed with me. He said, "Well, I was just trying to see if you were serious."

*Q: What about this Chinese-Soviet split? Was this a problem to the goals dealing with China policy or not?*

YAGER: I don't remember that. There probably is a public conception that the China lobby was just everywhere and was pressuring the State Department. I know there was something called the China lobby. That is, there were members of Congress who were very pro-nationalist and were quite publicly saying so, but no one ever came around to me when I was the officer in charge of Chinese Affairs, subordinated to Harriman and the Secretary. I never had any contact, any pressure, from the so-called China lobby. It was part of the political background in which I operated, but it wasn't something that was actively there that I had to cope with in a serious way.

*Q: How did you find the nationalist Chinese embassy operated in Washington at this point?*

YAGER: I really have no complaints about them. They have a good Foreign Service. I don't think that I had any serious problems with them. I was really quite fortunate in the countries I was dealing with. The Japanese have an absolutely first-rate foreign service. If you deal with a Japanese foreign service officer, he will be very professional, have done all of his homework, know exactly how to do business. The Chinese were almost at that level. The Koreans were not.

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*Q: Let's go back now to this period of 1961-1963 of dealing with China, Japan, and Korea. Were there any particular developments during this time with Chinese affairs on Taiwan?*

*How about military activity on the Straits of Formosa? At one time, the nationalists were shooting the communists out of the air.*

YAGER: I don't think there was that kind of trouble. There had been a crisis when I was in Taiwan. I think I mentioned that in our previous session. That was when the communists bombarded Quemoy and Matsu.

*Q: What about internally within mainland China? What was the situation at that time?*

YAGER: I think that the Great Leap Forward had failed and there was a famine. We, of course, watched this with great interest. I don't know whether Mao's Cultural Revolution affected us much.

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**Foreign Service Institute (Washington, DC) and Taiwan (1957-1961)**

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*India. Mr. Levin was interviewed by Mike Springmann in 1994.*

LEVIN: Yes. My MA in Fletcher was in Economic Affairs.

*Q: And then you went from there, you said, to Taiwan?*

LEVIN: My freshman roommate at Harvard was a Chinese Communist, Ji Chaozhu. He went back during the Korean War when Premier Zhou En-lai asked loyal Communists to return. Though a devoted patriotic Chinese and a Communist, when Americans who had doubts about Communism discussed this with him, he would give answers such as -- "if we had in China what you have in the United States we wouldn't need Communism; we've tried other things and they don't work." We stayed in contact over the years, with the State Department security people quite content to have me exchanging letters with him through Pakistani friends and that kind of thing.

*Q: Was this State Department security or the folks behind it, our friends at the CIA?*

LEVIN: This was strictly State Department security. I don't recall being asked for copies of the letters or anything like that. It was simply that we had to report contacts with Chinese Communists, this was a contact and they said go right ahead.

*Q: But they would have been hysterical at your dealing with a real dyed-in-the-wool Communist.*

LEVIN: I don't think they were. Obviously I was writing to him. The letters were either carried or they went by mail through censorship. I wouldn't write him anything that would get him in trouble. The letters that he wrote to me often had a beginning and an end which would sound politically nice to anybody else reading them, and then the center would be something personal about family and that kind of thing.

*Q: Did you get a good picture on what was happening? We're talking about your Chinese Communist contact over the years, to whom you'd be writing letters.*

LEVIN: This friendship was part of the reason that I became interested in Chinese language and area study. I was interested in going into the Foreign Service for the reasons we already discussed, but the particular Chinese interest came out of this fortuitous assignment to the same dormitory room my freshman year in Harvard. Then we stayed in touch and State Department security didn't have any problems with this. We exchanged fairly innocuous letters back and forth.

*Q: What happened to him eventually, do you know?*

LEVIN: Ji was Zhou En-lai's interpreter in Zhou En-lai's capacity as Foreign Minister not as Prime Minister. The Chinese combined those jobs as many countries did at that time. Ji was a Chinese Foreign Service Officer and served in Washington twice. He retired from the Chinese Foreign Service in '91 to become Under Secretary General of the United Nations. He asked me to come up and work with him.

*Q: That's amazing.*

LEVIN: So that's why I was in the UN Secretariat.

*Q: That's incredible. You were in Taiwan, you said, initially in Chinese language school.*

LEVIN: That's right, in Taichung, Taiwan.

*Q: This is about the time that the Quemoy-Matsu business was going on.*

LEVIN: Right. The Quemoy-Matsu shelling would have been in '58; I went in '59.

*Q: What was that like; both Taiwan and the People's Republic insisting there is only one China? What was it like working at that point, saying "there is only one China" from the small rump state of Taiwan.*

LEVIN: Getting to Taichung in 1959, ten years after Chiang Kai-shek's government had evacuated to Taiwan, it was quite clear that Chiang was not going "to reconquer the mainland," the phrase in use then. At the same time, many of the people who came from the mainland didn't have any other rationale for their preferred position. They felt they had moved a national government to Taiwan. In their eyes, to dissolve a national government and to turn it over to the local provincial Taiwanese Chinese was both legally and personally anathema. Some of them were motivated by selfish reasons. They wished to retain their politically justified positions which provided them with authority and money. Others were motivated by a kind of patriotism. They thought that communism was bad and that they should hold out an alternate for China. After all, who knew what opportunities the future would bring the Chinese people.

The Chinese have a long history and they sense history when viewing a contemporary problem. On Taiwan, some felt that Communism would dissolve or fall apart in the future and they would have preserved another Chinese system. Others felt that the Nationalist -- Kuomintang -- government of Chiang on the mainland had done a bad job. It had been corrupt, it had been inefficient, it had been warlord ridden, and so forth, and they would show in a different place, in a different time, when they weren't fighting the Japanese, that non-Communist China could do a good job with the local people. So among the mainland Chinese in Taiwan, there was a whole range of rationales for their situation.

The Taiwanese majority viewed things differently. Along with the rest of China, Taiwan had been under the Manchu Dynasty. The Manchus were foreigners to the Chinese, though highly Sinicized towards the end. In the 19th century the Chinese in Taiwan had not liked being ruled from Beijing. Then they were under the Japanese, who had been an efficient but not a cruel colonial regime the way they were in Korea. It was a relatively benign civilian colonial regime. And since 1945 they were again under the mainland, so the Taiwanese had a long history of adjusting to people from outside their province ruling them. Many of them resented this but historically there were relatively few Taiwanese martyrs in these situations. Perhaps more a demonstration of adaptability than cowardice.

Taiwan was a relatively prosperous place. After the economy got going in Taiwan, due both to a great deal of American aid and a lot of educated, highly motivated people who were anti-Communist from the mainland, both Taiwanese and mainlanders saw their daily lives improving. Also, the people from the mainland were not a monolith. In addition to the Kuomintang -- Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists -- there were a lot of other minor political parties and individuals who came from the mainland to Taiwan who were anti-Communist but were also highly critical of the Nationalists.

For politically minded Taiwanese, this meant that they were dealing with a non-monolithic ruling group. The situation has evolved the way optimists thought it would, relatively peacefully into a kind of Chinese democracy. Of course, Foreign Service Officers whose reports suggested the possibility of this benign outcome received much less attention than those predicting Taiwanese-mainlanders violence like that which occurred in 1947, or a Communist invasion, or other dramatic events.

*Q: You were in language school for a couple of years?*

LEVIN: In those days, FSI had sufficient money so that the first year in Washington was half language and half area training, which was a sound investment. FSI discontinued this shortly thereafter because they didn't have enough money. We had full-time at FSI, Professor Harold Hinton, a distinguished scholar of China who died very recently. This was important because an FSO who doesn't know a great deal about China and speaks good Chinese, is more dangerous than someone who doesn't speak Chinese and doesn't know about China. It was excellent that we had a full year in Washington, serious area studies and language instruction. In addition to his own rigorous efforts, Hinton brought in leading China scholars from all over the U.S. to lecture and meet with us -- historians, economists, etc.

And then to Taichung. The Taichung assignments were approximately a year, some were longer, depending on when you were needed at a post.

*Q: Is this at the university there?*

LEVIN: No. This was a separate institution, the Huayu Xuexiao. This was the descendent of the language training that the State Department had started in Beijing in the 19th century to train in those days what were called "the student interpreters," before there was even a career Foreign Service, starting in 1926.

*Q: How would you describe your language training? I've had people tell me that they took German in FSI, and could discuss the gross national product in German but they couldn't get their hair done.*

LEVIN: Chinese language training took a long time, and most of it took place in Taiwan where you had to get a haircut. You had training to discuss the GNP or agricultural reform, etc., in Chinese. We developed technical vocabularies in the classroom and went downtown in a pedicab to try and buy aspirin. We didn't have the kind of a problem you describe. Quite clearly, language training should take place in the country where the language is spoken so you do both

of these things simultaneously. The German problem you cited was not a problem for us.

*Q: Then you went from there to the then Embassy in Taipei as an Economics Officer?*

LEVIN: No, I went from Taichung to the Consulate General in Hong Kong. In Hong Kong I first worked on the Chinese mainland economy. We realized that even though our Hong Kong commercial officers were doing important work in trying to stimulate American exports to Hong Kong, separate analysis of the Hong Kong and Macau economies would provide insights into the Chinese economy.

For example, the Chinese prefer to eat fresh rather than frozen pork and therefore you had railroad carloads of live pigs coming into Hong Kong. When there were suggestions that there were food shortages and crop failures and so forth in China, you could see what provinces the carloads of pigs were coming from, whether they were coming like previous years, whether they were thinner or fatter, and all that kind of thing. This gave you some idea of what was going on in different parts of China which supplied food to Hong Kong.

There were literally hundreds of thousands of Chinese in Hong Kong who were exchanging letters with their families all over China. There were also visits of Hong Kong Chinese who were Cantonese to nearby parts of China which was always relatively easy. Visits to the North in those days were a bit more difficult, but nevertheless there was an enormous flow of people, mail and information between China and Hong Kong.

If one was immersed in the local Chinese community, not just studying paper about the mainland, we could do a better job and that's the way we worked.

*Q: How much pressure was there at the height of the Cold War to shade reporting, to show that China was worse off than it really was? We were allied with Chiang Kai-shek and the Republic of China, was there any of this kind of pressure in there? Because for example in Germany, people didn't want to report what the Kubla Khan were doing because it made the German government, Helmut Kohl, look bad.*

LEVIN: In Hong Kong, at the time I was there, there was absolutely none of that. Because the purging of the people who had been on the mainland was so recent, some of these people were personally known to us, like Jack Service. There was not only a lack of pressure, there was a strong effort to make sure that everybody should know that there was no pressure of that kind.

Most of the time I was in Hong Kong, the Consul General was Marshall Green. Marshall Green had come into the Foreign Service in Japan before the Second World War and he was personally and intellectually a very stimulating and honorable person. Under him, there were no improper pressures of any kind -- personal or professional.

However, in Hong Kong we were conscious of one situation of that kind not in Hong Kong. We were the R&R point for that part of the world. People liked to come to Hong Kong, because it was pleasant and in those days it was relatively cheap. We had a constant flow of people to and from Saigon. There were always a couple of Chinese language officers assigned to the Embassy

in Saigon because of the importance of the Chinese community in Cholon and its ties all over the country. These people did mostly political reporting but they often were slotted in the economic section because it made it easier to justify their having access to the business oriented Chinese community.

The reporting by the Chinese language officers in Saigon, based on what the Chinese community was saying, was that the government in Saigon was extremely corrupt, that it was not becoming more effective, that there was a tremendous gap between the urban elite origin South Vietnamese army officers corps and the bulk of the ordinary soldiers of the Vietnamese army composed of peasant youths from the countryside. Based on their contacts with the Cholon Chinese business community who traded all over South Vietnam, the Chinese language officers generally did not take an optimistic view of the abilities of the Saigon government to mobilize the country against the Communists.

The dominant group in the Embassy, the Ambassador and others in Saigon often were people assigned from France who were French speakers, because we didn't have enough Vietnamese speakers. They considered that the Chinese Language Officers, though they had not personally been on the mainland, were so conscious of the reasons that Chiang Kai-shek had failed against the Communists, that they insisted on looking at the Vietnamese situation through Chinese eyes, so to speak. They felt that the Chinese Language Officers were so intellectually overwhelmed by the recent Chinese historical experience with Communists that they couldn't judge Vietnam on its own merits. They gradually pushed these officers into the Consular and Administrative Sections and then decided that they really didn't need them at all. There were a number of Chinese Language Officers who had very bitter professional experiences in Saigon. Others, who served in operational roles in the provinces were not involved in this brawl.

I can not say for how many years this was the case in Saigon, but during the period that I was in Hong Kong there was a phasing down, and perhaps out, of the "need" for Chinese Language Officers in Saigon.

*Q: So they sent them primarily to talk to members of the local Chinese community of which there were a substantial number?*

LEVIN: Cholon, part of Saigon, was a vast Chinatown. It was the dominant economic force in the country, particularly after the diminution of French interests. These people were involved in rice milling, the movement of crops and commodities around the country, trucking companies and so forth. The Vietnamese government in Saigon and sometimes the U.S. military would tell the American Embassy that a province was loyal and pacified and completely under their control. The Cholon Chinese would tell the Chinese Language Officers that they had to pay enormous taxes to the Communists who actually ran the province, or that it was no longer possible to operate in a province where the Communists had taken over complete controls and they were pulling out. So Embassy Saigon would have this kind of reporting quite different from what it was being told by the Vietnamese government and the U.S. military.

The Chinese in Vietnam were anti-communist bourgeois minded, merchant-class Chinese. The Chinese community as a conduit for Communism was not a problem in Vietnam as, for example,

it had been in Malaysia in a previous period where the Communist effort was largely through a minority of ethnic Chinese.

*Q: And then from Hong Kong you went to?*

LEVIN: From Hong Kong I went to the Embassy in Taipei in Northern Taiwan. (The language school was in Taichung in the middle of Taiwan.) There we watched a government which was interestingly embittered over the fact that it was not going to attack the mainland of China. Obviously, it could not succeed, and the U.S. Government was firmly opposed to their trying. Trying to maintain a rationale for keeping the levers of political and military power in their hands was therefore the principal preoccupation of the mainlanders.

They could see that their children, for the most part, were not interested in succeeding them in this role. They either emigrated to the States or married a Taiwanese and merged into the more numerous and increasingly more affluent Taiwanese community. You could see the clear beginnings of this process which was unsatisfactory to some mainlanders and acceptable to others.

Taiwan was an interesting place. There were people from all over China who were quite concerned with what was going on in Sichuan and Shandong. There was little tourism in Taiwan in those days, but you moved around easily and people were generally friendly. Americans came to Taiwan from Vietnam on R&R. They had their families there so the men in Vietnam could easily visit their wives and their children. Living in Taiwan was safe and relatively quiet.

At the time, the Taiwan economy was becoming increasingly intertwined with the Japanese economy.

*Q: The Japanese were setting up car assembly plants there at that time?*

LEVIN: The Japanese were just starting to make investments. The Taiwanese were quite happy to resume their pre-WW II ties with the Japanese. The mainlanders preferred the Americans for both political and historical reasons. There was a kind of a competition, whether the Japanese or the Americans would be more acceptable. This probably was good for the Taiwan economy.

*Q: What position were you in the Embassy in Taipei?*

LEVIN: When I arrived I went into the Economic Section, and then in about a year I was transferred to the Political Section.

*Q: Did this reflect your interests or did somebody just say, Herbert Levin you go and be a political officer next week?*

LEVIN: Going first into the Economic Section was useful because I got a good grounding in the economic forces that were at work in Taiwan and providing a basis for its growing prosperity. American AID ended while I was there and the U.S. AID mission was closed.

This was good background for moving over to the political side. The Political Section was becoming much more active. The American government was criticizing the Chiang Kai-shek government for lack of democracy, for violations of human rights, arrests and imprisonment without trial, etc. We made representations against this kind of thing. I enjoyed the political work. Arthur Hummel set the tone during my time in Taipei as a long time Chargé d'affaires and DCM. He was outstanding.

*Q: How much of a difference did you see in the situation on the Island from the time you were studying language in Taichung to the time you were a political/economic officer in Taipei. Was there much of a difference?*

LEVIN: You could see the increase in prosperity. The government in Taipei, because of its experience of loss of the mainland, was anxious to have the rural area prosperous. Chairman Mao used to say that the relationship between the Communists and the peasants was like the fish and the water.

Chiang Kai-shek's government decided that if they were to maintain themselves in Taiwan they had to have a satisfied "peasantry," so they had a whole system of devices to favor the rural areas. There weren't too many privately owned cars in those days, but bicycle and motorcycle licenses were cheaper in the countryside than they were in the city. There wasn't television but there was radio. As in many countries there were radio licenses and those were cheaper in the countryside than they were in the city. Bus fares were subsidized in the countryside but the buses in the cities had to pay for themselves.

They also had a system of population control. You needed a permit to move your residence from the country to the city but they didn't want to do it by police control. They had inducements for people to be happy and remain in the countryside. Loans for houses from government sponsored housing banks were cheaper in the countryside than they were for apartments or houses in the city.

People going through the teachers colleges were obligated for a certain number of years of teaching in exchange for their tuition free education. In many places in the world where you have systems like that, the rural areas are not the choice of the best teachers. They want to stay in the cities and you tend to get the teachers who did not do as well in school going to rural areas. The National Government turned this around by offering higher salaries and other subsidies so that good teachers would be attracted to go to the countryside at least for the first few years after they got their degrees.

The Nationalists wanted to maintain the Taiwanese population on the land but they wanted to do it by economic and societal inducements rather than police coercion. However, they certainly used police power if anybody really seemed to threaten their control. It was just interesting to watch them operate this kind of a system where the mainlanders considered themselves to have failed if inducements -- and threats -- did not work and they had to use force. Similarities to Beijing's rule are obvious.

*Q: Was Marshall Green the Consul-General in Hong Kong?*

LEVIN: Correct.

*Q: Who was the Ambassador in Taipei at this time?*

LEVIN: When I was in Taichung in language training the Ambassador in Taipei was Everett Drumright who previously had been the Consul-General in Hong Kong. Then there was Walter McConaughy who came to Taipei after being Ambassador to Pakistan. McConaughy was a pre-war officer of Marshall Green's generation who had actually served in the then-American Consulate in Taipei -- Taihoku in Japanese -- before the war. I imagine Taihoku must have been his first assignment in the Foreign Service. Admiral Jerauld Wright also served as Ambassador while I was in Taipei.

*Q: How did the Embassy work? I keep thinking the Cold War, the good Chinese and the bad Chinese. Was there any of this filtering through the Embassy? Did you have people you were allowed to see and not allowed to see because it might upset the local government?*

LEVIN: In Taipei, we didn't have any acknowledged Communists to deal with, but the government would get upset over other things. They were upset when our China Language Officers also learned to speak the local dialect, Taiwanese or Minnan; they grumbled and asked why we were training people in that language. All the schools were in Mandarin, the government spoke Mandarin, so why were we bothering with this local dialect? Since most of the people spoke better Taiwanese than Mandarin it was obvious why we were doing it. Interestingly, few of the Mainlanders ever became fluent in Taiwanese at that time.

The government tended to focus its attention on our officers who spoke the local dialect. Our officers would of course meet with Taiwanese who were critical of government practices. The government would grumble about that -- why are you Americans meeting with that fellow, he is just a loudmouth, he is not important, you are giving him status in the community by having your people meet with him, etc. Our Ambassadors were pretty sturdy in saying that there were no restrictions placed on members of the Chinese Embassy staff in Washington meeting with Americans of all political attitudes, and they assumed that this would be reciprocated in Taipei, and we would not pay official attention to their grumbling "advice" to reduce contacts.

At the same time, our guys had to be careful because if they met with a Taiwanese, and he then disappeared and was found to have "volunteered" for farm work on a remote island off Eastern Taiwan, this wasn't very good either. We had to weigh carefully how valuable these meetings would be to us, and how dangerous they might be for the other fellow. The other fellow might think that since he'd been meeting with the Americans, the Americans had the ability to protect him from his government, which of course we couldn't. That element of danger to our contacts was always on our minds.

Since I was not a Taiwanese speaker, I rarely got into that kind of situation. Sometimes I would be at a meeting with them along with other Embassy officers but I rarely got into the most delicate contacts with Taiwanese. I did take the lead in some direct not entirely pleasant encounters with the security authorities both in Taipei and at some remote locations.

*Q: Did the Ambassador get his fingers into every section or did he pretty much leave you all to do your job?*

LEVIN: I would say that both Drumright and McConaughy were both very professional and had good balance in the extent with which they worked through the chain of command, through our superiors, as distinct from calling somebody in directly. Hummel was superb in balancing discipline and informality. It was a small Embassy and you had daily direct contact. The chancery was a ramshackle building between the main freight railway line and the wholesale fish market. Everybody met on the stairs daily. It wasn't a stuffy place. Admiral Wright also adapted easily to this -- as if he were serving again on a small ship.

I don't recall resentment of any of our Ambassadors for the way they operated. Just about everybody in that Embassy in Taipei, from the DCM on down spoke Chinese. I think our senior economic persons sometimes did not speak Chinese because it was most important that they had strong technical backgrounds. But almost everybody including consular officers spoke Chinese, had been through Chinese language training, had an interest in the Chinese people and so it was a motivated staff.

Not everybody loved everybody but it was a pretty congenial group; we were concentrating on trying to understand a society that was evolving with some very unusual problems. So I would say that most of the Ambassadors seemed to be quite pleased with the qualities of the staff and we got along. Hummel had been born in China -- he was a missionary son and fought with the Nationalist guerrillas behind the lines against the Japanese. His Chinese was fluent and we all learned from him both how to get along with the Chinese and how to argue with them.

*Q: Were most of these positions language designated or were people assigned to Taiwan out of an interest in things Chinese?*

LEVIN: I would think that every position in the political section must have been language designated as they were always filled by language officers. Probably in the economic section, some were and some weren't. Probably in the consular section the same. But certainly the Embassy was dominated by Chinese language officers. This was necessary because in those days Taiwan, not yet a substantial international trading entity, was looked upon in much of the world as sort of the last life boat for Chiang Kai-shek, who lost the mainland and probably would eventually lose Taiwan. There weren't a lot of foreigners around. I don't know if the educational system in Taiwan at that point even encouraged learning English. You could not have operated in Taipei in those days without speaking Chinese except in a very narrow area of senior bankers and the small numbers of international traders.

*Q: Then you went from there to the National Security Council.*

LEVIN: No, I went from there to Tokyo to the Political Section. The Embassy in Tokyo in the Political Section always had a Chinese language officer. Not exclusively to utilize the language skill but because Japan's relations with China, both the mainland and Taiwan, were of importance to the United States. You had to have someone with a strong background in Chinese

affairs to have any kind of serious dialogue with the Japanese government and Japanese business people and scholars on China. There was always someone in Tokyo doing this job.

*Q: What was your title at this point?*

LEVIN: What was I? I guess I was a First Secretary.

In the Japanese Foreign Ministry, the China Section was headed by a very able, active person who later was the Japanese Ambassador to China, among other places. His name was Hiroshi Hashimoto. There was a great deal of interest in China in both the U.S. and Japan. We both were trying to understand what was going on there.

The Japanese were more forward with China than we were in terms of trade, travel and everything else. At the same time, they had no desire to play a prominent political role with the Chinese. The last thing they wanted was a brawl with the United States over China policy. So I worked on China and Taiwan, North and South Korea. It was really Japan's relations with Asia, including Siberia and Vietnam.

*Q: What kind of insight did you get into the workings of the Japanese government on their China policy? Did you get that out of them by conversing with these guys or did they kind of play it close to their chest?*

LEVIN: I would say that they were quite open. After they accepted that we would be discreet, that they weren't going to hear themselves quoted back either by other Americans in my Embassy or, worse yet, by people in the State Department in Washington, they were quite helpful in trying to get you to understand what was their system of decision making and what the various forces were which affected the outcome.

Since the Liberal Democratic Party was in office and was likely to remain in office for the foreseeable future, they weren't going to have changes in policy due to elections. Factions within the LDP and also bureaucratic and business groups had distinct interests. The Japanese were quite helpful in describing these and what goals they were striving for. I found them quite frank in that respect.

Let me describe one incident which might help explain the atmosphere in Tokyo at the time. The United States had decided to recognize Mongolia. This had been an off-again on-again thing for many years, with the Russians repeatedly vetoing the Mongolians desire to have an international relationship with the U.S. The Japanese wished to normalize relations with Mongolia whenever the U.S. did.

The long-standing U.S. arrangement with the Japanese was that when the U.S. had reached the actual point of decision with the Mongolians, we would tell them in advance and permit them to announce their recognition of Mongolia first before the U.S., as a courtesy. This was done. We informed them in advance when we were going to announce, perhaps it was to be a week later, that it was all decided. The Japanese promptly made their recognition announcement, as agreed with us.

The Americans had also notified Chiang Kai-shek in Taipei that they were going to do this. The Nationalist government in Taiwan claimed that Mongolia was part of China and they energized their friends in the U.S. Congress, in the Republican right wing, to cancel our agreement with Mongolia to enter into diplomatic relations, and actually got the President to turn around.

The U.S. then had to go to the Japanese and say, forget what we told you, we've changed our minds. The Japanese, not looking for public fights with the Americans and being a country where forms of courtesy are observed, avoided any public reaction. At the same time the Japanese were shocked and in a fury that the Americans, after literally years of working on this, could be reversed by Chiang Kai-shek and accept this kind of humiliation from him. The question was also privately raised, "Could Japan really count on anything the Americans could say when something like Mongolian recognition could be changed?" What was more important to Washington, the assurances that the American government had given the Japanese or Chiang Kai-shek's ire? Since I agreed with the Japanese that Washington was guilty of poor judgment, I had little difficulty in meticulously reporting Japanese anger to Washington.

I felt this was significant because it showed that the Japanese wanted to trust the United States. They wanted to be able to rely on us and we had been unreliable without any really compelling reason.

Another interesting responsibility was in regard to a series of incidents along the northern border of China with Russia, around Damansky Island in Russian, Chenpao in Chinese, and the question of who was provoking who in minor skirmishes and shootings reported. It was obviously part of the world where there were not too many travelers. It was also a situation where satellite photographs couldn't really tell you much because these were small groups of people involved with small arms fire.

I asked the Japanese if they had any views on this. They made available the Japanese Imperial Army archives and retired Imperial Army officers who talked about their skirmishes with the Russians when they had been "defending Manchukuo" in exactly the same place. They explained that this island was really a mudbank and it moved around depending on the spring floods. Sometimes it was attached to one side of the river, sometimes it was attached to the other side. Recent military academy graduates on first patrols could rush out there in the spring when the water was low and plant a flag and say, "It's ours." If the counterpart new lieutenant on the other side wanted to show that he too was a hero, defending the soil of the Motherland he would shoot at them. It was really a kind of a crumbly little game over an insignificant wandering mudbank.

This didn't mean that Beijing or Moscow might not be choosing to push the other, and a small number of casualties was reportedly involved. But it really wasn't a situation wherein there was an agreed border and one side was engaging in calculated belligerency, acts of war, by crossing it.

I think this information from the Japanese may have been helpful to Washington to understand that though one side or the other was letting their patrols be resolute, it was a muddy area in both senses of the term, where there could be people blundering into each other on patrols and other

local confusion. The Japanese were cooperative and helpful in trying to figure out what was the real intent of Beijing and Moscow.

This was also the time when the Non-proliferation Treaty was being negotiated.

*Q: This is early '60, '61, '62, '63?*

LEVIN: No this was late '60s. The Soviet Union and the United States were the co-chairmen of the international committee that was negotiating the Non-proliferation Treaty. The Japanese were obviously not about to build nuclear weapons. Indeed, they probably have the greatest anathema toward nuclear weapons of any country in the world, because they're the only country that was bombed with nuclear weapons. At the same time, the Japanese were having difficulty in accepting the Non-proliferation Treaty draft because the Washington and London naval disarmament conferences before World War II had put Japan in an inferior position in terms of numbers of battleships and cruisers to the Americans and the British.

It appeared as if an international treaty was coming into existence which would permanently label Japan as a second class country. While on one hand they weren't going to develop nuclear weapons, and they were prepared to commit themselves to this, on the other hand to sign a multilateral treaty which permanently put them in an inferior category was something they were having trouble with. It was necessary to have a long and difficult negotiation with them to put wording in the Non-proliferation Treaty about the commitment of the nuclear countries to denuclearize and to eventually become equal to Japan, and a lot of other things to make it more palatable. (I think that Germany may have taken a similar stance.)

In the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, there was an individual who had been assigned to Tokyo because due to the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, the Soviet embassy in Beijing had reduced its staff. The Soviet system had these people coming out of Chinese language training. They didn't have a Consulate in Hong Kong, they didn't have anything in Taipei, and they couldn't go to Beijing, so somebody said, go to Japan and be a China watcher.

This was a period of detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. When this fellow arrived in Tokyo, he found out that there was somebody who spoke Chinese in the American embassy. He did not speak any Japanese or much English and he was kind of isolated even in his own embassy. He gave me a call and asked if he could come over and see me. I agreed. When we met, he told me the background for his unexpected assignment to Tokyo and said he wanted to be a China watcher. I told him that was not too easy from Tokyo but he could be a Taiwan watcher. He said, "Great." I got to know this Soviet officer and he was a responsible and serious person in terms of trying to understand China. His name was Valentine Kovalenko.

At any rate, at one point in the NPT negotiations, an instruction came out that the Soviet and American Embassies in Tokyo should make a joint demarche on the Japanese in regard to one point in the negotiation. Both the American and Soviet Ambassadors, Alex Johnson and Troyanovsky had the same reaction which Kovalenko and I did. This was that if you wanted to increase Japanese resistance, the best way was to have a joint Soviet-American demarche. To have Japan's only ally and its long-standing enemy (there was still no Soviet-Japanese peace

treaty to end WW II), going in together would drive the Japanese crazy.

We concluded we were not going to have the two Ambassadors go in and make the joint demarche. However, we could say to the Foreign Ministry that in order to save the Japanese time, the American and the Soviet representatives could drop in together because they had the same instructions. So Kovalenko and I did all the NPT negotiations. We later had American technical negotiating teams coming out. This took a great deal of my time, and was very worthwhile.

All of my work on the NPT in Japan with Kovalenko was done in Chinese. In the Foreign Ministry, when we discussed things, it was in Chinese. The Japanese would have one of their Chinese language officers participate. But it was an unusual interlude. It was a period of detente with the Soviet Union when people in the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo, who clearly wanted to have normal relations with the United States, were allowed by their system to have them. They came forward and some of them were personally interesting and professionally useful to work with. They stood out clearly from the more usual Soviet types around them.

*Q: And you went from Tokyo to where?*

LEVIN: I went from Tokyo to the National Security Council staff where I was responsible for Japan and the Koreas, and worked on devising the opening with China. We had a person full time on Vietnam, and I assisted him by doing Cambodia and Laos, since Vietnam was a very demanding job and he was traveling with Kissinger on the secret peace negotiations.

*Q: Could you maybe talk a little bit about how the National Security Council staff operated and the origins of this opening to China because it hit the world like a thunderbolt.*

LEVIN: In terms of the opening to China, Henry Kissinger has written about this. I read his book when it came out, and recall it as quite accurate. This preparation was very closely held and my role was modest. I recall Kissinger laid it out in his book the way it happened.

The part that I worked on the hardest was a review of all of the controls we had on our relations with China. There was legislation in Congress, there were State laws, there were formal federal regulations which had been published and registered, there were various U.S. Government statements on the record, and then there were simply practices -- how we refer to "Communist China" on the VOA or in the State Department spokesman's statements -- that sort of thing.

I ran an exercise with people from throughout the government to put together a compendium of all of this. It was amazing to us that we got all of this done and it didn't leak. We didn't want it to leak because it would alert Chiang Kai-shek that the United States was about to recognize China, which we were not about to do. Or it would tell Beijing that we were about to recognize them even though they were doing things that we didn't like, which was not the case. There were many sound reasons for trying to keep this quiet. It remained quiet, though a lot of people were involved in it.

When we completed this compendium, we recommended that some of the easier steps be taken,

such small things as having the VOA and the State Department spokesman no longer refer to Red China or Communist China, but the "People's Republic of China." We periodically reemphasized that you could send food and medicine to the PRC under certain circumstances. All of this came under the heading of "signals" to the PRC.

Also, I participated on behalf of the White House, in a scholarly group which was seeking to get permission from the U.S. government to have scholarly interchange with China. Scholarly materials could be sent and individuals could travel because we thought this was a good non-government way to start contacts going. A great deal of preparation was done through these scholarly discussions. These were scholars, not government officials. They were discreet but obviously they would talk about this on their campuses to the biologist who wanted to exchange specimens, that sort of thing. This was fine because public opinion could then see that there was U.S. Government interest in opening to China.

I think it had the desired effect in that it fostered non-hysterical, non-polemical public discussion. Clearly, people who either accepted Taipei's view of the world or felt this could endanger Taiwan were unsympathetic to this process. People who felt that you "Could not continue to ignore 50 percent of the world's population etc.," argued for going in the other direction. This was really healthy.

When the Chinese ping-pong team in Osaka invited the American ping-pong team to go, my successor in the Chinese job in Tokyo, Bill Cunningham, not only reported this but phoned me. We were able to get quick approval because we had made this thorough preparation. We had been pleased at the generally positive public discussion of the possibilities of non-government contact and travel, so those people were able to go. We certainly had not anticipated that this would begin with a ping-pong team in Osaka.

It also happened to turn out fortuitously that the people on the ping-pong team, the coach and the manager and the players, were the kinds of Americans that you pray to be involved in something like this. As you know, you can have American sports figures who can be disappointing as personalities or representatives of the United States. This was not true, this was just a wonderful bunch of people who had good common sense, and conducted themselves with dignity. It was fortunate, and we were very pleased. We couldn't have picked a better group.

Things moved from there. As I believe was laid out in Henry's book, the formal contacts, the trip and so forth, this was done through the Pakistanis. A number of countries had offered to be helpful but the Pakistanis had good relations with both countries, they were discreet, and they were the actual channel.

*Q: Did they know what we were doing in a general way or were they just trying to open doors between the United States and the Peoples Republic?*

LEVIN: Pakistan? They carried the mail. They did not read it, they did not comment on it. They were reliable and modest.

*Q: They came to us first?*

LEVIN: A lot of countries who had decent relationships in both Beijing and Washington made offers. I think that Henry felt that some of them would seek to aggrandize their positions, either with us or the Chinese. Some countries wanted to be brokers, to get involved in the exchanges, and he didn't feel this was necessary. The Pakistanis wanted to be just a discreet channel of communication. They weren't about to tell the Chinese how to handle the Americans or tell the Americans how to handle the Chinese. They simply wanted to help, which they did. They did it with great discretion and care, nothing ever leaked. They wanted to be the channel to help us get together, and they handled that well and we were grateful to them.

*Q: How do you characterize the relationship between the NSC and the State Department, because Kissinger went from being National Security Advisor to being Secretary of State. Sort of, if you have a State Department why do you need another shadow organization pulling the strings on the President's staff.*

LEVIN: I would say that the story has been documented in their books -- Kissinger's book, Nixon's book, Secretary of State Roger's book -- about the kind of personal and political rivalries which they had. At that time this did not filter down to the staff level in the specific area that I'm talking about. I am not suggesting that just because nearly everybody involved had been through Chinese language training, this made them a band of brothers. At the same time, these were all experienced professionals, different from the National Security Council staff today or the previous administration which includes inexperienced people with strong political views brought in from outside the government, frequently with personal factional backing from groups of the left or right. Henry looked to his staff to be professionally competent individuals, not spokesmen for political or ideological points of view.

The National Security Council staff in the area I was working, the "Asian cluster," were all professionals from different institutions, and the people in the State Department, CIA, Defense, USIA, were all professionals. The Nixon administration rarely put political appointees at that level, as is the case today. Yes, we were aware by rumor or innuendo that our masters had disagreements and rivalries but this simply did not affect the kinds of judgments we made, or operationally the way we did things.

We knew there was a competition going on but it really didn't have a direct effect on what we were doing. In the area that I'm discussing, whether it was trying to support the secret and the non-secret negotiations to end the Vietnam War or the opening to China, there was a pretty clear problem to be solved or goal to achieve, and there were many different views as to how to do this. But we had a responsibility to try and move proposals forward which were pretty specific. The fact that our bosses may not have loved each other or they were competing didn't really affect what we were trying to do. We sent our best efforts to the ultimate decision-makers.

**HERBERT E. HOROWITZ**  
**Consular Officer/Chinese Language Training/Economic Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1957-1962)**

**China Desk, Bureau of East Asian Affairs  
Department of State (1962-1964)**

**China Watcher  
Hong Kong (1965-1969)**

*Ambassador Herbert E. Horowitz was born in New York in 1930. He received his bachelor's degree from Brooklyn College in 1952. He received a master's degree from Columbia University in 1964 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1965. He served in the US Army from 1953-1955. His overseas posts include Taipei, Hong Kong, Peking, and Sydney. He was ambassador to the Gambia from 1986 to 1989. Ambassador Horowitz was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 9, 1992.*

*Q: What was the oral exam like?*

HOROWITZ: The impression that I had was that they were more interested in how I handled myself under pressure -- being asked a lot of questions about things that they hoped I didn't know much about to see how I responded. The written exam was pretty comprehensive and I did fairly well. So I think they were looking at personality and character. As soon as they hit a subject that I didn't know anything about, they hit me again with the another question -- like a lot of stuff about American geography, name three ports on the Mississippi River. We talked a little bit about the economy of the American south, they wanted me to expand on that which wasn't exactly my area. However, the interesting thing about the oral exam to me was that at the end they told me to come back in a couple of hours -- they had a few other people to give orals to -- and I took a walk, went to Macy's, and when I came back they congratulated me and said I had passed. They asked me when I was prepared to begin. At that time they were recruiting for people, the Foreign Service was taking in junior people and expanding. I said, "I don't know, I hadn't really thought about it seriously yet." They said, "Well, we will give you a little time; let us know in a few weeks." I said that I would like to think about it. Then one of the oral examiners called me aside and we went into another room -- his name was Raymond Paul Ludden and he was one of the old China hands who had been one of those heavily criticized in the McCarthy years. He explained who he was and said, "You know I am very interested in China, I spent a lot of time there; it has been a terrible period we have gone through. Now they will send me to Latin America -- they are not going to send me to China again. But if that is the reason you are hesitating, because of the McCarthy, period, I want to reassure you. The Foreign Service needs young people and we need people who are interested in China and East Asia and I hope that it is not the persecution of the McCarthy period that makes you reluctant to come into the Foreign Service." I was tremendously impressed by that. As a matter of fact that was not a reason why I was hesitating; I knew people who were affected by McCarthy, and of course at that point a lot of academics were. But I was very impressed by that, I have always remembered it. After a few weeks of pondering, I decided that I would do the foreign service.

*Q: So you came in when?*

HOROWITZ: The fall of 1956.

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*Q: Then you went off to the preeminent spot for looking at the other side of the moon. I have you going to Hong Kong from 1965 to 1969. What were you doing?*

HOROWITZ: China watching. By that time our China watching apparatus or organization had become more sophisticated and in Hong Kong at the Consulate, which was very large, there was a separate China mainland section which did no business with Hong Kong at all, it focused only on the China mainland. This section was broken down into two halves and I was in charge of the economic side.

*Q: Which was particularly important at that time. The tremendous concern was whether China was going to do something.*

HOROWITZ: It turned out that that was a tremendously interesting period. Hong Kong was an ideal place for China watching. People who at that point came out of China as refugees or escapees would come to Hong Kong. People going in to China for business or trade, for whatever purpose, would enter via Hong Kong and come out via Hong Kong. It was a gateway in and out of China. In part by Chinese design because the Chinese like the idea of restricted gateways. So we could pick up a lot of information about China. Some of the radio monitoring of China was done there, but monitoring that was done elsewhere was easily cabled to Hong Kong. There were lots of other China watchers there.

*Q: How did you interface with these people?*

HOROWITZ: Oh, there was a whole China watching community all to itself, and very little contact with other people in Hong Kong. A lot of informal exchanging of views back and forth, discussion, small groups getting together and exchanging ideas. You established relationships. I established a good friendship with a businessman in Hong Kong, a westerner, Caucasian, who was doing business with China. I got to know him well enough so that I could call him when he came back from the visit to Peking and say, "How's business doing? Come over, Herb, and have a drink." So everyone was picking up bits and pieces of information. The British were sensitive about it, but they were picking up a lot of information too and we were exchanging our take with them, and to some extent with others. Even with the non-governmental people; there was a missionary who put out a publication on analyzing developments in China, Father ..(?).. Some of the media people, newspaper people, who were in Hong Kong were good China watchers on their own. We would get together and trade stories, impressions. So it was a very vital place for China watchers.

*Q: What was your impression at the time of the Chinese economy? What were we saying and how were we looking at it?*

HOROWITZ: Our impression as of about 1965 was that the economy had substantially recovered from the Great Leap collapse, the Great Leap tragedy; that agricultural production had

come back to the pre-Great Leap Forward level, where it was in 1958 or 1959.

*Q: Perhaps you could explain the Great Leap Forward.*

HOROWITZ: The Great Leap Forward, roughly 1958 to 1960, was a Maoist led effort to stimulate the economy by getting away from the Soviet model which the Chinese had followed in the first five year plan and which focused on heavy industry. Mao said, "We are going to walk on two legs, we are going to give attention to agriculture as well as to industry." In the rural areas communes were formed, the cooperatives were transformed into communes which were much larger units. The idea was that there would be this massive application of labor; everyone would get out in the fields and work; private plots were abolished. In some communes there were dormitories, cafeterias, nurseries for the kids. By the sheer exertion of human labor and the proper revolutionary spirit they were going to build small industry -- backyard steel furnaces, for example. It was a great failure! The gross national product dropped by more than a third. Unfortunately there was some bad weather over a couple of the years and because of the disorder generated by the Great Leap Forward, the regime was unable to cope with it in terms of famine relief. It was just a disaster; a starvation situation existed.

In the early sixties the pragmatists were in command. We didn't call them pragmatists at the time but they have now become known as the pragmatists. Mao had lost some of his influence over the party and the country; he was still the main person but had lost some of his influence. The people who were in charge of the government in a day to day way were trying to get the economy going again. We felt by 1965 that this had been achieved. Agricultural production was up again, industrial production was moving ahead and they had begun to buy some small amount of machinery and equipment from abroad which was a reflection of some of the growth. By about 1965 they were in better shape than they had been for a number of years.

*Q: What was our feeling...*

HOROWITZ: Let me explain about China watching, it was a very esoteric art. With the failure of the Great Leap Forward, the Chinese stopped putting out statistics. Since there were no data to deal with, a lot of estimating was by the seat of one's pants. For example, in the agriculture area we had an FAS, Foreign Agriculture Service, person who worked with my unit a lot. I used to write the reports; often he would explain the agricultural issue to me and I would write it up and then he would critique what I wrote. The experts knew what China's historical agricultural pattern had been -- how much area was cultivated, how much rice was planted -- and with that background of information and with fairly good communist statistics in the fifties and knowledge about weather in different parts of the country, the experts were able to make some sort of judgments as to whether the crops were going up a little bit or down a little bit. Then you could match this with what the communist propagandists were saying. If they said, "Oh, we had an excellent crop last year," that meant it was terrible; if they said it was a "super, bumper crop" it might have been better. So after awhile you were able to key what they were saying, the phraseology they were using, with the information that you were gathering elsewhere. The trouble is, the further you get away from the base year of reliable information the more right or wrong you might be.

*Q: Were we getting anything out by way of intelligence from people coming out, escaping?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. Along with other evidence that agricultural production had gone up, people coming out of China complaining about famine had decreased. It was clear from the refugees that the true situation had improved somewhat. So you had all these bits and pieces of information. Of course, one of the problems with the refugee information was that it was mostly about south China, you didn't get too much about north China. In other areas of the economy it would be a similar kind of guesswork. Part of it was feel, part of it was impressions of visitors, part of it was what China was buying or trying to buy from abroad.

On China's foreign trade, we would compile the data from China's trade partners. We knew which of the trade partners were most important, extrapolate the partners' figures for a whole year -- e.g., if we only had eight or nine months -- convert f.o.b. to c.i.f. and c.i.f. to f.o.b...

*Q: What do those mean?*

HOROWITZ: Cost including freight, or free on board. If you want to get a picture of what China's trade was, from their perspective, you have to do this. There was a lot of guesswork involved. Then we would come up with some estimate as to trends in China's trade and what this told us about China's economic situation. It was part data and part guesswork. On the political side there was also a lot of reading between the lines. A lot of the Chinese radio broadcasts or the China press reports would be standard, they would repeat the same thing. Then all of a sudden the slogan would change and it would be a hint that something was happening. A slogan doesn't change by the whim of a broadcaster. We also learned in due course, rather later, that this was what the Chinese on the mainland over the years were doing; they were listening to their own radio broadcasts and reading their own newspapers, and reading between the lines trying to figure out what was happening. It was a very specialized field this China watching.

*Q: Did you find that there might be somewhat different mind sets between say the British, who did have an embassy in Beijing, and the French, who by that time had established some trade? Did they have a different mind set than we did?*

HOROWITZ: To some extent and we benefited by exchanging views with them. If China was interested in some equipment and some foreign technicians went in we might learn something indirectly about one industry or another and the French would pass it along to us, or the British would, and vice versa. We were very interested in what the Russians were saying about China because after all in the 1950's there were a lot of Russian advisors there. The Russians withdrew all of their engineers and technicians in 1960, the time of the Sino-Soviet split. Many Chinese before the split studied in Moscow and many Russians had been in China. We were interested in what the Soviets were saying in their Encyclopedia about China. One of the interesting things we found is that after a while they were using our figures in a lot of sectors. But in some areas, like iron and steel and oil production, they had different figures. We gave credence to that in industries where they might have had some first hand knowledge. We were always interested when Embassy Moscow could get us a copy of the China section of the Soviet Encyclopedia.

*Q: Here you all were, China watchers, and I assume that you were all talking to each other, the*

*political and the economic side. One of the great questions in looking back today -- we wonder, were we right -- was the extent of the Chinese communist threat to the area. How did you see this at that time?*

HOROWITZ: At that time, after the failure of the Great Leap Forward and during this period of recovery, we felt that China was very inwardly focused. They were having a lot of economic problems and we did not have at all the feeling that China was looking to expand her borders or get involved in problems outside. The Sino-Soviet split having occurred, this was the period when China was emphasizing an independent foreign policy that was anti-Soviet and anti-U.S. Sort of a pox on both your houses, we will do it ourselves. China was weak and even though the economy had improved we didn't see China as a threat in the sense of it trying to do something about Taiwan, at least in the immediate future. China seemed much more inwardly focused.

*Q: Well Vietnam was hot and heavy during this time.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, beginning to become important. A lot of people who were going to and from Vietnam -- American government officials, American and other western reporters -- would come through Hong Kong and stop there. And some of the foreign correspondents in Hong Kong also had responsibility for Vietnam and Southeast Asia; they would go over on visits and come back. So we were conscious of this and one of the things we focused on was: How important was Chinese assistance to the hostile Vietnamese? I do remember that many of us felt that a lot of Americans had exaggerated the cost to China of the help it was giving to Vietnam. For example, our estimates of the amount of grain that China was sending into Vietnam was only a fraction of China's total; even though China was not rich it was just a fraction of China's total resources. Obviously a certain amount of small armaments and other help from China was going to Vietnam but I think we felt then that the amount of Chinese aid was limited and the threat from China exaggerated. You remember that there was a period when the Vietnamese situation was being portrayed as "the real enemy is not the Vietnamese, it is those Chicoms." We felt that that was exaggerated. It is important to remember that while their economy may have recovered by 1965, the next year the Cultural Revolution began. There was another inward looking serious period.

*Q: And this lasted for how long, about five years or so?*

HOROWITZ: No, the worst years were 1966 to 1969.

*Q: Which were the years you were in Hong Kong.*

HOROWITZ: But technically the Cultural Revolution didn't end for a decade. It was declared at an end in 1976 after Mao had died and the Gang of Four had been purged.

*Q: Were you getting reflections of this Cultural Revolution, or was there a lag there?*

HOROWITZ: I think there was a lag in our understanding of it. The analysis that we and others were doing was pretty good, but there were a lot of things that came to light later on which we did not quite see in the same light at the time. For example, before the Cultural Revolution there

was a big propaganda campaign called the Socialist Education Campaign, one of the big political emulation campaigns. We didn't fully understand at the time that it was Mao and some close associates who were trying to reinvigorate the revolutionary ardor of the country and to win back some of the influence and control from the pragmatists who were running the country on a day to day basis. Only later on, by what developed in the Cultural Revolution, did we realize that those people were indeed pragmatists -- people like Deng Xiaoping who still lives and is active in Peking. At the moment we didn't perceive it, it was only later on reflection. Many elements of the Socialist Education Campaign became important elements of the Maoists during the Cultural Revolution.

*Q: Looking back on this what would you say was the problem with trying to conduct something like this when you can't get on the ground but have to rely on emanations from the country?*

HOROWITZ: It is hard because you have to rely on data and information from a lot of different sources and make seat of the pants guesses. I think it is important to have an open mind and be prepared the next year to revise your estimates or your judgments from the year before. It is difficult. Later on, and I think this is interesting, when we were in Peking at the time of the Liaison Office from '73 to '75 -- and I think we did some good reporting from Peking but it was very Peking centered -- in many ways the people in Hong Kong were getting a better view of some of the things that were happening in China. There were still travelers coming out through Hong Kong that they could talk to, they were getting information from provincial newspapers. In some ways some of the reporting and analysis in that period from Hong Kong was better than some of the reporting we were doing in Peking.

*Q: You have what we call in Washington an inside the beltway viewpoint.*

HOROWITZ: That is possible, yes.

*Q: Were you getting any feeling of concern then about the reversion of Hong Kong to China?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, there was. Hong Kong has always gone through these phases of great worry and concern followed by huge optimism. In 1967 there was a period when the Cultural Revolution was spilling over into Hong Kong and there were pro-Mao activists and there were some demonstrations. The British had to reinforce the border; they brought in some Gurkhas. Some bombs were going off in the streets, mostly propaganda bombs; also bodies were floating in to Hong Kong waters, the result of Cultural Revolution fighting. The people in Hong Kong got worried and began looking elsewhere. All of a sudden there was an overabundance of office space and apartments. (Even we moved during that period; we got a better apartment and lower rent.) Chinese families were laying out the future. One son would be sent off to Singapore to open a branch of the shop, another would go to the U.S., another to Taiwan. So there was a period of agitation and concern in Hong Kong during the Cultural Revolution. But that passed when the worst part of the Cultural Revolution was over.

*Q: Looking over the people, were there any that stood out in your mind as being really good as China watchers or was it mostly a collegial effort?*

HOROWITZ: I can think of a lot of people who were outstanding reporting officers and good analysts but it was really very much a collegial effort. I think we all benefitted from this going back and forth and discussing and reexamining. During the Cultural Revolution, for example, so much was happening -- there was the Chinese media to look at, there were wall posters and pamphlets that people were smuggling into Hong Kong because there was a market for this stuff, there were some Cultural Revolution type publications that were coming out, there were refugees that might be interviewed. So in our China mainland section we would have a meeting every morning, first thing in the morning, and sometimes another meeting at the end of the day, and we would decide for that day who was going to do what. Who was going to follow up this lead, who was going to contact the British about that, who was going to look at that new editorial that just came out, and then we would fan out and come together and decide what we...

*Q: It must have been a very exciting and stimulating time.*

HOROWITZ: It was. It was also a little unreal sitting in an office and doing all this analysis of a country when you are not there.

*Q: It reminds me a little of being an astronomer during a meteor shower.*

HOROWITZ: After Hong Kong I went back to the Department in Washington and was in the Office of Aviation.

**HARRY E.T. THAYER**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1957-1959)**

**Bureau of East Asian Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1959-1961)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC and Taiwan (1961-1963)**

**Economic/Political Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1963-1966)**

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**East Asia Advisor, United Nations**  
**New York, New York (1971-1975)**

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**Beijing (1975-1976)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs  
Washington, DC (1976-1980)**

**Director, American Institute in Taiwan  
Taipei, Taiwan (1984-1986)**

**Dean, Language Studies, Foreign Service Institute  
Washington, DC (1986-1989)**

*Ambassador Harry E. T. Thayer was born in Massachusetts in 1927. He received his bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1951. He served in the US Navy from 1945-1946. His overseas posts include Hong Kong, Taipei, and Beijing. He was ambassador to Singapore from 1980 to 1984. Ambassador Thayer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

THAYER: I had planned to work as a newspaper man and was hoping to go to work for the *Hartford Courant* in Connecticut, but at the last minute was offered a job with Alaska Airlines as assistant to the chairman of the board in New York. So I went to New York for Alaska Airlines, stayed there for six months and decided to go on with my original plan. I got a job at *Newsweek* as a copy boy, stayed there for a couple of years. And that was during the [Senator Joseph] McCarthy period. During this time my interest in Chinese, which had started at my senior year at Yale intensified. Even though I hadn't majored in it or taken any Chinese courses at Yale, I began at Yale to read into China. At *Newsweek* I continued my interest in things Chinese, although I worked there on other subjects, especially medicine and science writing.

This interest increased during the two years at *Newsweek*, which was '52 to '54. Then I went to Europe with my wife for three months, used up our savings, just wandered around Europe. After we came back, I went to work for the *Philadelphia Bulletin* at the same time as taking the Foreign Service exams, worked for the *Philadelphia Bulletin* as a police reporter for a year and then as a rewrite man in general assignment for a year, which ended in 1956. Then I went into the Foreign Service September of 1956.

*Q: What attracted you towards the Foreign Service?*

THAYER: I first got attracted to the Foreign Service by interest in things Chinese, in what was happening between the U.S. and China. And this was during the time of the issuance of the *White Paper* in 1949. When I was at college, my interest was boosted also by a major article in the *Reporter* magazine about the China lobby, by the rise of Senator Jenner and others...

*Q: Knowland.*

THAYER: Knowland, the senator from Formosa, McCarthy, the whole shebang. And I just became more and more aware of things relating to U.S.-China relations. And, at the same time, I was stimulated further by our trip to Europe, where, among other things, I stopped in at embassies and talked to Foreign Service officers as I could. And I agonized about trying to go to the Foreign Service as soon as that trip was over but decided to put a little more newspaper work

under my belt, take the exam to keep my options open; so I took the exam but went to newspapering.

When I came into the Foreign Service, I came in with also a lot of the romance of the Foreign Service. I liked the idea of traveling abroad. As a kid, I traveled a lot around the United States, taking all kinds of different jobs in a variety of states. And I had a lot of the romantic attraction of the Foreign Service, in addition to this rather unfocused but nevertheless strong interest in getting involved somehow in China.

There was another factor in this interest. In 1951, while I was working for the *Philadelphia Bulletin* -- let me back up a minute. During all this period, the Korean War was very much a part of our lives. And I expected to be called back in the Navy for the Korean War. I had been an enlisted man 1945-'46. So when I went to join a reserve unit, I took the examination for a commissioned officer. The Korean War and things Asian had also come very much in our consciousness. I thought I was going to be called back in with my unit. In the end, for some reason, the unit wasn't called, and I went on with my civilian life.

While I was at the *Bulletin*, which was during the '54 to '56 period -- I guess that must have been '55 -- the Chinese announced that they had a number of prisoners of war, including a friend and guy with whom I graduated, Jack Downey -- John Downey -- one of the CIA men who was captured after he was shot down on a mission into Manchuria. Not shot down, but he had landed in a small plane, and he was captured along with a fellow named Fecteau. In any event, the announcement by the Chinese of John Downey's capture had a terrifically strong impact on me, and it intensified my desire to get involved somehow.

I remember picking up the phone in Philadelphia the morning I read this in the *New York Times* and calling Pete Braestrup. Peter more recently was editor of the *Wilson Quarterly* and now is with the Library of Congress in another capacity. But Peter was then with *Time* magazine and a journalistic friend. And I remember saying to Peter, "Peter, isn't there something we can do about Jack? Can't we do something about Jack?" And internally I thought to myself, one of the things that I can do is to get involved, not as an act of charity, but just as an act of -- I just felt I wanted to do something. I felt I wanted to be a part of that rather than observing. It increased those desires of wanting a piece of the action rather than observing the action. So Jack's capture intensified my desire, or the announcement of his capture intensified my desire to enter the Foreign Service.

Actually, Jack's capture came back into my life after I entered the Foreign Service. I still had more to do with Jack in a very direct way after going in. We can come to that at a later stage.

*Q: In the first place, when you entered the Foreign Service, was there any attempt to channel you off towards the USIA side with your newspaper experience or not?*

THAYER: No, there wasn't any attempt, as far as I remember. I remember being asked by one of my Washington- resident Yale classmates why didn't I go into USIA. And I remember answering him -- this was at a party -- "If I'm going to go into the State Department or the government, I want to be a part of the real action. I don't want to be helping to comment on the action. I want a

part of the real action." But no, no attempt was made to recruit.

*Q: Did you have regular training and all that?*

THAYER: I was a member of the Class of September 1956. It's a class that Loy Henderson, former under secretary of state, is alleged to have commented on during a 1960 or '61 visit to Vientiane. He supposedly asked one of my classmates when he had come into the Foreign Service. He said "1956."

And Loy Henderson said, "Oh, that was the year they took everybody in."

Anyhow, that was when I came in, September '56. And we were given a choice of assignments, asked to list preferences, one, two, three. I listed Hong Kong as my first preference for reasons that had more to do with the romance of the Foreign Service and China than everything else. I remember listing Beirut as second. Beirut was then one of the great posts to serve in.

*Q: The pearl of the Middle East. The Paris of the Middle East.*

THAYER: And what is now known as Kinshasa, Leopoldville in those days, as my third choice. Luckily, I got Hong Kong.

*Q: What were you doing in Hong Kong?*

THAYER: I started out as a visa officer, and I was on the visa line handling particularly spouses and minor children of American citizens. I did that for most of the two years I was in Hong Kong, two and a half years. I also served, for about six months, as the American Services officer. Although I'm basically a political officer, I really enjoyed the visa work. Although I never felt it was as prestigious as the political work in the big consulate in Hong Kong, I learned a tremendous amount because we were dealing face to face with people coming out of China. I just learned one hell of a lot about China.

*Q: Could you give a little idea of the atmosphere of what a visa officer was doing? Because Chinese visas in those days were always a very difficult job.*

THAYER: In Hong Kong, virtually all the immigrant visas I handled were the M-1 and M-2 visas. Virtually all of my cases were from the south. The majority of them were from Taishan County.

*Q: Taishan being near Canton?*

THAYER: Being near Canton. Hong Kong being near Canton, most of the people coming into our consulate were from Taishan on their way to the States. Taishan was the traditional origin of Chinese immigrants to the States. There was a study done a year before or two years before I arrived, which included a calculation that about 85 percent of the cases we were working with were fraudulently based. That is to say, the petitioners in the States had come in on phony slots opened by their fathers presence in the States, and their parents' declaration to the Immigration

Service that they had a certain number of sons back in China. But they had sold off those slots to a lot of the people, the next generation. This group had gone to the U.S. before I got to Hong Kong. They were, at that time, filing petitions in turn, for their wives and children. The petitioners had gone to the States with false names, most of them. So their wives and children, with false names also, had to make up all kinds of paper stories in order to be legitimized as the subject of the petition. And so they were coming to us with all kinds of lies. Even though the basic relationships, by the time I got there, were mostly correct, the names, the identities, claimed home villages -- many of them were false.

When I was there, the consulate was in the second year of a million dollar anti-fraud program where a bunch of security officers were hired to work with local authorities to get to the bottom of the fraud in the Chinese applications. So there was an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust that exceeds the situation in most places.

Illustrating this, the kind of mentality that was around in our consulate, I went off on a raid in Macao with one of our investigative officers and his Chinese local investigator. We went off to Macao, and we raided. We literally charged up the back stairs of a rickety old house to raid, in the first case, an apartment on the third or fourth floor where we tore the place apart looking for documents demonstrating the real identify of applicants that were before us applying for visas. We had no warrant. We had nothing at all. I went along as an observer. But my moral outrage at what we were doing only came in retrospect. At the time, I wasn't sensitive to this, quite to my shame today. But this is the kind of thing that we were doing in those days.

But I got to Hong Kong in May of '57, and Hong Kong was still quite a primitive place, nowhere near as crowded as it is now, and very much a place for refugees. We were processing refugees, basically, is what we were doing.

*Q: What did this do to you and your fellow consuls? Did this have an effect? I mean, when you've got 85 percent fraud or something like that, did it turn you all into cynics and pretty nasty people to deal with as bureaucrats?*

THAYER: My guess is that most consular officers, if they haven't served in China, have served in comparable places where the fraud is very, very high. And I certainly went through stages, and I think most of my colleagues went through stages -- initially of sympathy, then of an outrage at being lied to day after day after day, and ultimately passing through that sense of outrage to a feeling of resignation and compassion. I certainly went through all three of those periods in Hong Kong.

But the fraud was permeating before I got there. An American consular officer had been jailed for selling visas, quite a sensational case at the time. Fraud was a way of life. Yet we became quite good friends with some of the immigration attorneys who came in. In fact, while I served in Taiwan, this 1980's decade, I again saw one of the old immigration attorneys for Hong Kong cases, Jack Chow, who had some pretty bad cases but always managed to keep up good relations with the visa officers.

But, yes, it created attitudes that, in retrospect, were regrettable, are regrettable. And it created a

certain degree of arrogance, a colonialist mentality. And in those days, Hong Kong was very much a colony. People called Chinese "boys." The Foreign Correspondents Club and the American Club were two main scenes of activities, and they had a "colonialist" flavor. While there were friendships, certainly close friendships between many of the consulate employees and the Chinese, the Chinese intellectuals and their senior local employees and so forth, there was, on the visa front, a different set of relationships, and they were, in many respects, mutually hostile -- the visa officer angry at being exploited himself and his country being exploited from his perspective; the visa applicant, as is still the case, simply anxious one way or the other, ethics be damned, to get to the States. It's still the situation.

*Q: Did you get any chance there to get into the political reporting side or anything like that?*

THAYER: As visa officers, we were encouraged mildly to send along political information to the political officers. And I made good friends in the political section, several of whom are among my good friends today, and would quite often confer with them about things that I had found. Occasionally I would send up a report. But we were pretty overwhelmed with visa work, as is the case most places, and there wasn't as much production out of the visa section for political or economic purposes as there probably could have been. However, there wasn't an intersectional disdain as there is in some embassies, and there was a good deal of cooperative work.

*Q: What was your attitude at that time towards the People's Republic of China, in other words Red China, at that time?*

THAYER: Well, my attitude was based, you have to understand, mostly on ignorance, because I'd never had any formal study of China. But I read the FBIS and I...

*Q: FBIS being?*

THAYER: The Foreign Broadcast Information Service translation of Chinese broadcasts. I read that every day, along with the consulate's own translations and other material. I otherwise tried to keep up with what was going on or learn about what was going on in China. I took a course at Hong Kong University in the economy of China. A lot of my attitude, I remember, could be illustrated by a conversation I had with Ambassador Bohlen, now dead, whose wife's name was Thayer and is a second cousin of my father. He was ambassador to Manila at that time, having been shipped out by Dulles for a variety of domestic political reasons. He and his wife, Avis, came over to Hong Kong. And I remember they asked me to lunch, a very kind thing. I didn't know them well at all, but we were distantly related. I remember talking to Bohlen about my attitude toward China. I said, "Reading the FBIS every day, it makes me really despair at the U.S. and the Chinese ever working out some livable arrangement. The generation that is being schooled today" -- that was in the '50s -- "is hearing nothing but very vituperative anti-American propaganda. And so these kids are going to grow up with great antagonism, perhaps irreversible, toward the United States."

Ambassador Bohlen, in a kindly way, pooh-poohed this, saying that he didn't think that the effect would be permanent. And he said, "Anyway, Harry, you ought to remember something." He

said, "Governments deal with governments, and the function of the diplomacy is to deal with the government, not with the people. And governments will not always see things in the same way as the people do." That was an interesting comment.

But my attitude was one more of curiosity rather than of hostility. I remember asking Consul General Drumright when I was on duty one Saturday morning -- Drumright being an old-line, rather right-wing Foreign Service officer who escaped the purges. And I asked him did he ever think we would go back to China during my professional lifetime. And he said, "Oh, yes." He said, "I have no doubt that we'll go back. The Chinese will become democratic again, or at least the communists will fall, and we'll reopen the same number of posts that we used to have." But my attitude was more of curiosity and learning. I really was learning, didn't pretend to be an expert. It wasn't hostility. It was interest.

*Q: You were around the China hands. This was the time when it was absolutely an untouchable subject to talk about recognizing, as we all called it in those days, Red China. But what about within your cohorts and all? Did you see this as being a worthy -- I mean, not a worthy goal, but that we were probably going to recognize Communist China, or we're going to have to wait for the great revolution that was in store or whatever you want to call a non-communist government?*

THAYER: I don't remember clearly any single conversation I had on this subject with my colleagues there. I think there was a general acceptance of the impossibility of doing anything with the Chinese under then current conditions, that there were a lot of tangled knots that had to be untangled. And the beginnings of that were taking place in Europe: in Geneva, then Warsaw (our bilateral ambassador-level talks). But I don't think anybody that I was aware of saw a near-term solution to it. So we were just living with it.

But, at the same time, I think most of us young fellows were in the business because we wanted to deal with the China problem and were interested in the China problem as a diplomatic problem and implicitly a problem to be solved, implicitly someday we would solve it. So I think that was the context in which we were working.

I remember some conversations about the possibilities of Chiang Kai-shek retaking the mainland, somehow going back to the mainland. Still that wasn't an important part of our thinking. The important part of the thinking was there's a problem there that had to be solved. We didn't quite know how it was going to be solved.

*Q: Did you feel sort of a heavy hand at all? I mean, obviously you were at a much lower level, so you wouldn't, but that one had to really watch what one said about China? I'm thinking because of the McCarthy era and all this, that you couldn't really express how you felt.*

THAYER: I didn't feel that terribly myself, because I wasn't that important. But I remember some discussion by others, older Foreign Service officers there, who did feel that they needed to pull some punches specifically because of concern about the psychology of Washington. And whether this amounted to not reporting things that they felt rather than reporting -- I don't think it meant not reporting facts, it's just that one was cautious. And I remember at about the same time,

although it was in Washington, either just before I was in Hong Kong or just after, there was some concern about being seen reading a communist publication on the bus, for example. But I wasn't terribly conscious of this as a factor in Hong Kong.

*Q: Then your first tour was over and you went back to the Department in 1959. What were you doing there?*

THAYER: Well, I went back to the Department to be a post management officer in the executive office of the East Asia Bureau with responsibility for personnel and funds for Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, for the embassies and the consulate general there. I might say that about halfway through the Hong Kong experience my then wife and I talked over what we would do next and whether our experience in Hong Kong had confirmed sufficiently our interest and willingness to devote a career to Asia and China. We explicitly came to the decision that, yes, our interest was genuine. We wanted to stay in it. My wife had gotten quite a lot of interest in Chinese art and other things. I applied for the Chinese language program in Taichung (Taiwan), and was accepted in that program, the Foreign Service Institute's Chinese language and area training.

I was accepted for that program, but at the last minute, when I was to leave Hong Kong for the U.S. on home leave, they changed my assignment to go back to East Asia Bureau and serve as a post management officer. I was then over thirty and felt my language-learning capability was going to fade pretty fast. I had been studying an hour a day in Hong Kong religiously and doing quite a bit of homework. But I was outraged at this sudden deprivation and consignment to administrative work in Washington instead of proceeding on the China track and, before leaving Hong Kong, fought it by telegram and letter and every way I could. But I was deemed indispensable for post management and went back as a post management officer.

*Q: How did that play out then?*

THAYER: Well, it played out like so many things. I got interested in it, and I learned a lot about how the Foreign Service is run. They put me in the East Asia Bureau while Walter Robertson was still there, which gave me kind of a taste of things. And it was quite instructive. I learned a lot about the Foreign Service and working in the bureaucracy. And I learned a lot about management and all these things, learned a lot about Congress, writing justifications for funds to the Hill. That was all quite instructive. I also met a lot of the personalities involved in China and Asia affairs. I also, in May of 1961, suddenly got yanked off to go on a trip as a coat-holder for LBJ when he was vice president, went around the world as an aide to this LBJ first around-the-world trip.

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THAYER: That summer of '61, I went direct to Taiwan to start training in Taiwan. And I ended up staying there two years, partly because of an accident I had. It put me out of training for a while. At the end of those two years in Taichung, which I loved, I had initially expected to go to Phnom Penh in one of the China-watching posts, combining French and Chinese. I had French and I had learned Chinese. But something happened about the Phnom Penh assignment. I ended

up opting for Taipei, and I went down to Taipei as my first assignment in 1963 after language school.

*Q: Were you getting any indoctrination as you went through your training? I went through Serbian training, and we had Serbian teachers who were trying their best to turn us into real strong anti-Titoists. Really it didn't have much effect. But I was wondering whether because of the training, were you getting the KMT side of things from your language teachers?*

THAYER: To some extent. And we were conscious that everything we were doing was being reported to the regime in Taipei. Some of the teachers were hard-line. Some of the teachers were very, very anti-KMT, and that came through in the teaching. The language school even then, however, was allowed to teach from original communist materials. We learned from Mao's writings, and the *People's Daily*. These Materials weren't allowed to go out of the building, but we were allowed to consult them. So it was a reasonably balanced thing. But I will say, from the experiences of my last job as dean of the language school, the problem of getting native speakers to train without giving a little free political indoctrination one way or another is still with us.

*Q: Oh, yes. [Laughter] Well, it sounds like you had it a little better. There is nothing more stubborn than a Serb, and these two were cousins, and they were very strong.*

*What were you doing in Taipei? You were there from '63 to '66.*

THAYER: I was there from '63 to '66. I went down there as an economic commercial officer covering industry -- textiles and book piracy were the two main things I covered. But I also did odds and ends of other things. And we did our first bilateral textile negotiation a few months after I arrived. It was a tremendously instructive experience for me being the embassy person on this beat.

I will say that my newspaper background reared its historic head just before I went down to Taipei. The PAO in Taipei at that time tried to persuade the DCM and myself that I should go to USIS and help him put together a weekly newspaper and work full time in USIS. I fought this very hard in a long memorandum written from the language school to the DCM in which I gave my background and aspirations and said that I'd been derailed once from Taichung, I was over thirty, I'd never done any substantive work, and I wanted to get on with my substantive career, and I figured USIS would be a diversion.

That view was finally accepted, and I went as an economic commercial officer, served in that job for a year, as the only Chinese language officer in the section. After home leave I came back and worked in the political section.

*Q: Harry, could you tell me a little more about these textile negotiations? Then we'll come to the book piracy issue. Because both of these seem to be, in many ways, the very core of our relationship with Taipei. I mean, these are not minor subjects, are they, in those days, anyway?*

THAYER: Well, they weren't minor subjects in those days. We had completed a textile agreement with Japan. I think we had not done so with anybody else at that point. The

importance of the negotiation, the commercial importance is well understood, the domestic pressures here, perhaps, are well understood. To me, the really enlightening part of that effort was the problem of coordinating and getting a consensus among U.S. domestic interests as manifested in the various departmental representatives who were there -- the Labor Department, the Commerce Department, the State Department. These were all participants in the negotiations.

The relationships with the Chinese seemed to be a lot less acrimonious than the relationships among the American negotiators. As a State Department officer, I was very much a creature of the chief negotiator who was a State Department officer himself. And I was quite flabbergasted as a relatively naive Foreign Service officer to find the American side conniving with the Chinese side to bypass one of the American negotiators. Well, this isn't a new idea to older hands, but to me it was an eye-opener. It was also, to me, very satisfying that, as a Chinese language officer, I could use my Chinese, and that was useful. I mean, that was rewarding for me. Parenthetically, I'll say that in that same job I worked on a PL 480 agreement.

*Q: Would you explain what the PL 480 agreement was?*

THAYER: Public Law 480, which allowed for the sale of American agricultural commodities repaid in foreign currencies which were normally spent, of course, in the host country. The thing I most remember about the PL 480 agreement was that I was charged with verifying that the Chinese version conformed with the American version. I was able to find that in a number of respects the Chinese version was imperfectly translated and was able to get it translated correctly. As a language officer, that was very gratifying that I could do that.

Anyhow, the textile negotiations have been followed by many bilaterals with Taiwan. Subsequently I, twenty years later, when I headed the PRC desk, was involved in our first textile negotiations with the Communist Chinese.

*Q: Well, how did the book piracy issue come up? Could you explain what the problem was?*

THAYER: Yes. The problem of the book piracy in those days was that the Chinese were not only copying without authorization American books, including the encyclopedias, but were exporting these publications back to the United States. And it did not sit well with the American publishers to find their prices undercut by, say, 90 percent in their own territory.

*Q: I think many of us benefitted by these overseas. I mean, they were tut-tut. But I have several books which...*

THAYER: Well, that's what we all did. An encyclopedia from Taiwan was a very well-known commodity available to Foreign Service officers. In any event, in 1963 and 1964, when I worked on this problem, I took it quite seriously. We were getting a lot of flak, Congress and so forth. I worked with a department director at the Taiwan Ministry of Interior, who, himself, was convinced that Taiwan for its own image had to do something about the problem. And he and I worked very closely together.

At the same time, when I came back to the United States on consultation I went to New York and

met with the American Publishers Association to try to encourage them to work with us and take the Chinese bureaucracy in good faith, treat them in good faith, and together, as the saying goes, we could make progress. In fact, we did make some progress when I was there, and within a year or two, exports to the United States had stopped. The Chinese had instituted procedures to stop the export to the United States of Taiwan-pirated books. And I don't mean it all halted completely, but the Chinese regulations were in place and firmly enough so that the embassy issued strict instructions against any of our personnel taking stuff back as being against both U.S. and Chinese laws. I don't know that it was ever implemented properly, but the Chinese customs and the American customs both inspected for pirated books, and pirated books that were attempted to be taken out of Taiwan were confiscated, and I think there were some penalties imposed.

So that was a rewarding thing. It taught me something about negotiations. It also seemed like a worthwhile thing to put some imagination and energy into, which I did. And it was also, if I may say so, a palpable kind of problem that had some sex appeal to it. Our ambassador gave me a lot of support.

*Q: Our ambassador at that time was?*

THAYER: Was Jerauld Wright.

*Q: Admiral Jerauld Wright.*

THAYER: Retired admiral, who is still in Washington and quite active, a very nice gent, and he gave me terrific support -- demarches to the foreign minister and so forth -- in effect, giving support to the Chinese department director whose name I still remember was Hsiung -- a Chinese character for bear -- who actually, more or less, single-handedly reversed Taiwan's position. Mr. Hsiung was a very fine gent. But the ambassador was supportive, and it was one of those things that Foreign Service officers put a lot of energy into, get a lot of satisfaction from, but it passes and nobody remembers what you did. But it's part of the fun of being in the Foreign Service.

*Q: Then you worked on the economic side, and then you moved over, you say, to what, the political side?*

THAYER: To the political side. We had a five- or six-man political section.

*Q: Of course, in those days, that was our representation to China.*

THAYER: Right. And Embassy Taipei was a lot more important in the '50s and the '60s, particularly in the early '60s than subsequent to the [Secretary of State Henry] Kissinger. As a political officer, I was covering two things. One was some of the central government organizations, including the KMT central committee, and the other was the Taiwanese and local governments.

In this connection, I began to study Taiwanese. So I studied one hour a day Mandarin, Monday, Wednesday, and Friday, and one hour a day Taiwanese, Tuesday and Thursday. Taiwanese was

important because part of my job, I'm delighted to say, was to get out of the embassy and go around the island and meet the local politicians, the magistrates, the KMT county chairmen, the newspaper publishers and so forth. That was terrific fun. I would just go off on my own for a week and wouldn't have a necktie on, and go around the island and meet people and use my Chinese full time. It was terrific fun.

*Q: I wonder if you could give, at this point, how you saw the situation on Taiwan, I mean, both with a central government but also relations with the Taiwanese and the effectiveness, and lack thereof.*

THAYER: Well, I didn't see it as clearly then as I do now. But I saw the Taiwanese probably as a lot more meaningfully discontented than they were. That is to say, Taiwanese did feel exploited. Chiang Ching-kuo was just beginning to have some effect in bringing Taiwanese into the...

*Q: Who was he?*

THAYER: Chiang Ching-kuo was the son of Chiang Kai-shek. He became deputy defense minister when I was there, became defense minister, too, when I was there. But he was responsible for opening the KMT more and more to Taiwanese. Taiwanese were very much in the KMT when I was there, but there was a lot of anti-KMT sentiment, particularly among the Taiwanese intellectuals. There was a good deal of apparent sentiment, nostalgia, for the Japanese. Some of this was phoney. Some of this was real. In any event, in the 60's I think I exaggerated the importance of the anti-KMT sentiment in terms of the ability of the Taiwanese, anti-KMT Taiwanese, to turn their antagonism into dramatic pressure against the regime.

I remember postulating in a paper (that I never did send forward because I didn't really believe it in the end; I talked myself out of it in the process of writing) that, if Chiang Kai-shek then were suddenly to die and there was some kind of economic downturn, the Taiwanese would actually riot to the point of using physical power against the regime. And I had come to the point, I thought, of believing that. But when I wrote it out, I realized I didn't believe it.

*Q: This raises a point I think that's interesting. I'd like you to comment on it. Going back to the time you were there and how you saw things, when one reads newspaper columnists now fifty years ago or something, they tend to see things in apocalyptic terms. I mean, if this doesn't happen, very horrible things or major things will happen, rather than things sort of working their way out. It's easier to get a handle on these things if you're just writing. Do you think that this, sort of in political reporting, too -- I mean, the same process of not seeing things maybe in as gradualistic terms as they might be in more sort of black and white?*

THAYER: I saw things more in black and white than, in retrospect, was accurate, certainly. But I found the process of writing, particularly a long think-piece, helped mature my own thinking. I would say, incidentally, that when I got to Taiwan, well, I had had four or five years of newspaper experience and supposedly a good education and so forth, but I was really quite naive about foreign policy and diplomacy. And when I was in the economic section, I participated in drafting the first part of an annual posture statement for the embassy in which I went along with

a rather wild and simplistic set of recommendations for U.S.-China policy, a paper which I hope never surfaces, because I think, in retrospect, it was so bad -- so bad and so simplistic. Well, I just make that point. I imagine many officers have gone through the same thing. But this was not a good paper even while I was an economic officer.

As a political officer, I saw a lot of the Taiwanese, sympathized with them, and let myself be influenced, I think more than a more mature officer would have, by their description of the facts and by their perspectives, although I discounted a great deal of what they said about their economic well being, because I could see how well they lived compared to how I know they had lived ten years earlier, and the statistics were there also. So I wasn't taken in entirely. But my sympathies certainly were with them, and, therefore, I probably exaggerated, in my own thinking, their importance. I don't think it affected my reporting at all except that by my interest in the Taiwanese, in the local politicians' attitudes, I was able to get better access to them, and, therefore, I was able to report more fully what they were thinking and what they were saying.

It's when the judgment came as to how important this was that -- others were making these judgments in any case. I was a junior officer, and there were level heads around, and I wasn't pushing a particular line. I was just reporting. I loved reporting. I loved getting out and talking to people, figuring out what they were thinking, trying to write it in an understandable and interesting way and drawing some small conclusions from it. I enjoyed that part of it, throwing light on dark corners.

*Q: How did the political section, particularly, and yourself look upon the KMT -- the Kuomintang -- as a government, its effectiveness, its value?*

THAYER: Well, I think we thought it was effective. We believed and said in our briefings to newcomers and newspapermen and so forth how important it was for the free world to have a strong Taiwan, a viable economy, a military force, Taiwan as a major part of the Pacific chain of democratic or at least non-communist states. We believed in the unpleasant nature of the communist regime, indeed. I think all of us saw the imperfections of the Taiwan regime at that time, as did many in the regime itself. I think we had a rather healthy attitude. We weren't in the bag of the regime. That is to say, our embassy was not a spokesman for the regime, although there were times, particularly in the evolutionary period of the early '60s, when, for example, on the issue of Mongolia, which occurred just before I came down to Taipei...

*Q: The issue being?*

THAYER: Being Mongolia's seat in the U.N. Ambassador Drumright, I think, got into a big rhubarb with the Kennedy administration over that. And there were other times when our embassy as a whole, I think, saw things a little more sympathetic to the KMT regime than perhaps Washington did. But I don't think egregiously so. We had some very smart and able people at the leadership of the embassy when I was there.

*Q: Who were they?*

THAYER: When I arrived, Ralph Clough was the DCM, and Ralph was one of our best China

language and area professionals. His spoken Chinese is terrific. But he's a tremendously wise person and was not going to be anybody's fool. I'm sure that his advice to our series of ambassadors was always good. He was in charge a lot of the time. He was a very good man, is a very good man still.

*Q: Yes, we had a good interview with him. Marshall Green did it, by the way.*

THAYER: Well, Ralph was there, and then he was succeeded by Art Hummel, who has had a wonderful career. Art was a very good DCM, very able with the Chinese, also a very level-headed guy. So we weren't a bunch of patsies for the regime. We very much had our eye on U.S. interests. I think I say this collectively. I'm speaking more of the others senior to me who were in the embassy.

*Q: How about a view of Red China in those days? It was going through tremendous turmoil at this point in the mid-'60s. How did you view this? Did you think of this as an awesome power or a disintegrating power? What did you think?*

THAYER: Well, you have to remember, in those days, China had its first nuclear test in 1964, first nuclear device. It had beaten up the Indians in '61, I guess. We had the Quemoy issue in '58. Communist China was a threat, and we saw it as a threat. We saw -- at least I did -- the KMT as, at that point, the only sensible part of China to support. Maybe eventually something else would happen, but in those days there wasn't much doubt as to what we needed to do in our relationship with the KMT. I think there was a fair amount of discussion of the need for our relationship with the PRC to evolve more, and that was manifested in things that were done during the Kennedy administration, including the Hilsman speech in '63 -- Assistant Secretary Hilsman -- in which he said, in effect, that Communist China was there to be dealt with. So there was a degree of realism, but we didn't see any rapid evolution about to take place.

*Q: Do you recall how you felt about China and the Soviet Union? Was it still as close as a lips-to-teeth type situation, or how did you see it then?*

THAYER: I think I understood that the split had taken place. The Soviets had withdrawn personnel and all that. I never saw China as a creature of the Soviet Union, anyhow, and we certainly didn't, in those days, think that it was. There were, you know, obvious rifts. I can't remember all the details now. But there were problems within the PRC, within the Chinese Communist Party, and there were the tremendous economic problems in the early '60s, the aftermath of the Great Leap Forward.

We saw the PRC as a threat but also knew it was in trouble. But there wasn't much doubt -- I don't think there was much doubt in those days -- that our alliance with the KMT was important to U.S. interests. I saw it in too simplistic terms, but I think that, generally speaking, people were sophisticated about it.

*Q: Were there any major incidents that you were involved in or anything during this time you were on Taipei?*

THAYER: No, the riots of '57 were...

*Q: That's when they sacked the embassy.*

THAYER: When the Chinese sacked the embassy -- were a very important memory to us all, and part of the memory of our embassy institution. We were all sensitive about that. When I was in language school, there were a lot of rumors that Chiang was going to attack some piece of Fujian and there was a big excitement, seen the distance from the language school. But, actually, the three years I was in the embassy, there weren't any really dramatic incidents that I can remember. We didn't go through a major change of regime. There were no other major events that took place. I wouldn't call it a placid time, but relatively so.

*Q: You came back and you were in INR [Intelligence and Research] then, weren't you?*

THAYER: No, actually I came back to be on the Taiwan desk.

*Q: You left in '66?*

THAYER: Left Taiwan in '66 and came on the Taiwan desk, which was a four-man desk, and I was the low man. Then I became deputy director for my second year there. Much of the time I was handling economic questions as well as being the desk-level authority on the local politics side because of my own experience in Taiwan.

*Q: Was there any residue of the old China lobby from Congress? Did you feel this breathing down your neck or not, or had this pretty well been dissipated?*

THAYER: By that time, the China lobby had pretty well dissipated, but it was still there, and some of the well-known figures of the China lobby were around. And because of our dealing with the Taiwan Embassy, the Republic of China Embassy, we saw a lot of these folks -- Walter Judd, for example. When I got to the U.N. in 1971 during the Chinese representation effort, the China lobby was exemplified by the Committee of One Million, which was the new manifestation of the China lobby. It was still very active. But as a desk officer, no, there wasn't much involvement.

*Q: You then spent a while with the Intelligence and Research Division?*

THAYER: No, I went back to serve on the Taiwan desk for two years, and then I went over as deputy director of PRC affairs. So '66 to '68 I was on Taiwan and Taiwan affairs, and '68 to '70 I was on PRC affairs.

*Q: How did we view the PRC? This was the time of our major commitment in Vietnam. How did we view the role of the PRC at that time?*

THAYER: Well, we viewed the PRC as supporting Vietnam, of course. But we also -- I say "we," the people on the desk before I got there as well as when I was there -- we were concerned that our hostilities with Vietnam did not spill over unduly into the U.S.-PRC relationship. The

Warsaw talks were continuing at that time. We also had other things in mind to do with the PRC that would reduce the tension between us. We sought to avoid gratuitously exacerbating a relationship with the PRC, exacerbation as a corollary to our hostilities with Vietnam.

*Q: You must have then gone a bit head-to-head with the military from time to time, didn't you? Because we were flying bombing raids very close to the Chinese border.*

THAYER: Well, there were.

*Q: The military, from what I understand, felt the State Department was trying to get a little too precious.*

THAYER: Perhaps so. My recollection of what actually we did with the military is not so clear. But I remember a pilot being shot down over Hainan, for example, and he evidently had gotten off course. We didn't think this contributed to U.S.-PRC relations. And, as I remember, we let our views be known about that. It was also during this period that the Seventh Fleet patrols between Taiwan and the mainland which were merely symbolic, were reduced. I can't remember at which point they were eliminated, but they were reduced, in any case.

In those days, we were looking for ways to improve the relationship with the PRC and were trying various things, including in the Warsaw channel but also in other ways to reduce the tension with the PRC. I was deputy to Paul Kreisberg, who was the director, and Don Anderson was the number three man and was our interpreter at the Warsaw talks. And he and Paul would go off to Warsaw talks while I ran the office. But Vietnam was still very much in the way of improvement of U.S.-PRC relations.

*Q: Did the idea crop up from time to time of somehow using the Republic of China's troops at all as a factor in the Vietnam thing, or was this something that we --*

THAYER: I don't remember any specifics on this, but I think it was well understood by everybody that we didn't want to complicate the Vietnam exercise or U.S.-PRC relations by the introduction of KMT troops. I will just mention parenthetically that while I was still in Taiwan, I did accompany the ambassador in to see the foreign minister to ask for Taiwan secondary support of some kind, contribution of medical supplies, I think. And, of course, there were some well-known refueling activities that took place out of Taiwan in those days, I think involving KC-135s. So that was there.

But back to the period of '68 to '70, there were various things that were happening, of course, especially the Sino-soviet clashes on the Ussuri River which occurred in the later period. We were looking for opportunities to improve our relationship with the PRC and did everything we could to keep the Vietnam thing from interfering with that.

*Q: Did [Secretary of State] Dean Rusk reach in and tap any of you? Did you get any feel for his attitude towards the PRC?*

THAYER: Yes, but I would say my feel was secondhand, very much so. I was in his presence

from time to time, I guess, but didn't have much direct dealings with him. He was pretty hard-line, articulating the line including the PRC threat to Southeast Asia and so forth. We were also trying to open relations with Mongolia in those days, and he, I remember, did not support certain memos that were sent up proposing we do this or that to open negotiations or relations with Mongolia. But, generally, I think we understood that the secretary's posture was hard-line against the PRC.

*Q: Then you moved to the United Nations from the War College?*

THAYER: Yes. I went to the War College for a year and then moved to the U.N. in '71. I actually expected to go to Africa on my post-War College tour and so I took the War College African trip. But I ended up not going to West Africa as I thought I was going to. I ended up going to the U.N.

*Q: What were you doing with the UN?*

THAYER: I went to the U.N. as the deputy counselor for political/security affairs under Mike Newlin, with global responsibilities. But I went there initially to be the staff coordinator for all the Chinese representation issue activities. I went the summer of '71, just about the time that we put forward our proposal for dual representation; that is, presence in the U.N. General Assembly of both the PRC reps and the Republic of China reps. The Security Council seat -- this evolved a little later -- the Security Council seat was to be given to the PRC.

*Q: The political context at this time, [Richard M.] Nixon was the president, but we had not yet made our overt opening to the PRC, had we?*

THAYER: That's right. Nixon was the president when I went to New York in early July of '71. It was in the context of the U.N.'s support for the PRC increasing, so it was questionable that we would be able to hold the line on the PRC. With our dual representation proposal we were adjusting to this political reality. Very shortly after I arrived on duty in New York, Kissinger's trip to the PRC was revealed, and that put the dual representation issue in a new context where the U.S., on the one hand, was trying to preserve a seat for the Taiwan regime at the same time as actively playing footsie with the authorities in Beijing. So that was a complicating factor in the so-called "Chirep" issue as it played out in 1971.

*Q: How did you operate? The Chirep problem was something that absorbed our United Nations activities and also many of our relations abroad of getting people to make sure that the PRC was not represented in the United Nations. This went on for years, and you were there at sort of the end of this whole thing. How did you find this work at sort of the seat of the whole thing in the United Nations? How did you operate in this?*

THAYER: Well, you're right. The Chinese representation issue had been with us forever, and I can remember, in 1961, Paul Kreisberg, when he was in INR, telling me that INR and others were then exploring some new possibility for a formula for Chinese representation. In 1971, my philosophical context was that Taiwan was a viable entity; I didn't expect Taiwan ever to regain the mainland, but it was a viable entity and a good member of the U.N. and so forth, and it was

appropriate that it continue to be represented in the U.N.

On the other hand, the PRC -- whatever kind of shambles it was in -- it was also, in the end, an entity, a quarter of the world's population and so forth, and it should be represented in the U.N., too. So the dual representation issue seemed to me to conform with reality at a certain level, at a logical level. It was not reality at the political level, because the PRC didn't want to put up with dual representation, and the PRC increasingly held the cards. But it was a worthy goal if we could have pulled it off, and we came close -- within two votes -- on the important question resolution. We came within two votes of pulling it off that year. Now, if we'd pulled it off that year, certainly there's a good chance the next year we would have lost it. But, nonetheless, it was worth it and also a matter of good faith. It was worth our trying to do it.

*Q: Was there ever any feeling on the part of the Republic of China representation to say, "Okay, the hell with this. We're a separate country, and we're Taiwan," or something like this?*

THAYER: It was never manifested, any inclination toward going for a status of an independent Taiwan.

*Q: Because that would have probably been much more sellable, wouldn't it?*

THAYER: Well, it might have been. But, in the end, no, because the PRC was against it, and the majority of U.N. members recognized the importance of the PRC and were not prepared to cross the PRC. But the leadership of Taiwan and certainly the mainlanders, who were their diplomatic servants, diplomatic officers, from the ambassador on down, adhered to a one-China view with their government as being the legitimate government of that one China.

They swallowed hard with the idea of the Security Council seat being taken over by the PRC. They saw everything as in a one-China context. This was a very deeply felt conviction on the part of the representatives of Taiwan. We worked very intimately with the Taiwan group and with Japan, as well as a whole group of co-sponsors. But the group in Taiwan worked hard to preserve their seat. And then-Ambassador [George] Bush and others worked extremely hard. Eighteen hours a day was nothing in those lobbying exercises. I might say a word about the lobbying.

*Q: I'd like to hear that, yes.*

THAYER: It was the largest lobbying exercise we'd ever undertaken. I was coordinator of this in the New York side. Harvey Feldman, also a Chinese language officer, was in IO/UNP (U.N. Political Affairs). He was one of the people who had put together this dual representation proposal. We were lobbying like hell in New York, and we were lobbying like hell in capitals abroad. And our job, among others, was to coordinate this lobbying. So one of the problems that I had was simply to keep track, to make sure that we knew what the hell we were doing and had done. We developed a system of three-ring binders for telegrams, keeping track country by country, of all our instructions, discussions in New York, Washington and capitals. One of our USUN political officers (who normally was responsible for our UN relations with Eastern Europe) for the duration of the Chirep battle did virtually nothing but keep the telegrams in

order.

*Q: Because obviously you weren't going to get anywhere in Eastern Europe.*

THAYER: Well, in any case, we co-opted him to do nothing but keep track of those damn books. And then we would lobby, maybe, at the ambassadorial level several countries a day and report to Washington, to the capital, what had been said by the permanent representative of that country in New York. This would be coordinated with what we were saying in Washington to the foreign ambassador and also coordinated with what instructions went out to the field for our ambassador to say to the host country foreign minister or prime minister on Chinese representation. So this was a tremendously complicated thing. And by the time we finished it, we had about a half a dozen or a dozen of these three-ring binder books just packed with telegrams.

I met every day for the last month of this lobbying effort, every evening, with the Japanese political counselor. We would sit together and compare notes on what we were doing. Because the Japanese were in this, they had committed themselves to the project, and they were lobbying very hard themselves on the part of this issue. For them it was domestically politically...

*Q: I was going to ask, what was the drive on the Japanese side?*

THAYER: Well, we sought their support. And, of course, their relationship with Taiwan was long standing and very close. The political leadership, the LDP, committed itself to going with us on this Chinese representation question. Therefore, in addition to their interest in the dual representation issue and doing their best to keep the faith in their relationship with Taiwan, the Japanese leadership couldn't afford as a domestic political matter to be on the losing side on this issue. And particularly when you throw in the shock, to the Japanese, of the Kissinger visit to China.

*Q: This happened when?*

THAYER: In July. I forget the exact date. July 15th was the president's announcement from California that Kissinger had just returned from Peking. That had shaken the Japanese government pretty badly, and so they had a lot at stake in winning this dual representation battle, and, therefore, not only sought to coordinate with us but to make damn sure that they -- including the diplomats in New York -- made damn sure that they knew what the United States was doing. But also Tokyo was extremely hungry for information on what was happening and for reassurance that the U.S. wasn't dropping the ball or playing any more games or whatnot.

So nightly I met with the Japanese counselor, with whom I became very good friends, to exchange notes. He would tell me all the lobbying they did, and we would decide on what recommendations to give our respective capitals on who should be lobbied in third countries the next day and so forth.

*Q: These interviews and the transcripts are really designed for people who are not overly familiar with how one works. When you say lobby, I mean, it's all very nice to talk to the ambassador or somebody at the United Nations, but one has said that countries don't have*

*friends, they have interests. And on this China thing, I wouldn't imagine that words would have an awful lot of persuasion. I mean, but how did you operate?*

THAYER: Well, we operated on the assumption that words do have some persuasive value, that the logical argument carries some weight. We also operated on the assumption that in the real world an argument made by the greatest power in the world has especially significant weight. Therefore, when we would tell a European country or a Third World country who valued the United States' friendship, they would listen with great care. When the United States says a vote in a certain way is of tremendous interest to the Americans, it's not a small matter for another country to say no. So one of the factors in lobbying is logic. But there are other factors involved, too.

In fact, neither the Canadians nor the British, for example, joined us in this. They made clear early on they wouldn't join. But the Canadians, as I recall, didn't make it quite as clear as the U.K. I can remember shortly after my arrival, shortly after the dual representation proposal was floated, having a long talk with a Canadian officer trying to sell him on the logic of supporting us in this. But the lobbying in New York was done often by then Ambassador Bush; by Chris Phillips, who was his deputy; by Tap Bennett, who was number three; by Bill Schaufele, who was number four -- they were all ambassadors -- by Mike Newlin, who was political counselor; by myself; by others in various ways in New York. And I often would go out with one of the other ambassadors, and having given them a briefing paper which they soon mastered, because with slight changes for each country it was pretty well something they could draw on. And I would take notes and duly report it back, copies to our embassy in the capital and our other relevant embassies. This was the main activity of our mission to the U.N. for part of July and all of August, September, right through to the vote on October 24th.

*Q: You say by two votes you missed this. Were there any votes you thought maybe could have been gotten? I mean, were there any crucial votes that didn't go our way?*

THAYER: There were, I think, five votes that went differently than we had expected -- I mean, differently against us than we had expected. There were other surprises the other way. (One of the things you do at the U.N. at vote time is to make sure the delegates are not hiding out in dark corners or not in the bathroom, that they're in their seats where they can commit themselves to the vote.)

There was some sentiment that we were "betrayed," by those who changed to vote against us despite promises to the contrary. I was never comfortable with this posture of crying "betrayal". I think we did pretty well, and if it hadn't been those five, it would have been something else. History had caught up with us, and we lost the important question resolution by two votes. And having lost the important question resolution, which required that any vote on Chinese representation was a substantive issue and therefore require a two-thirds majority, having lost the important question procedural vote and everybody knowing that we didn't have a plurality for the substantive issue, the final vote was overwhelmingly for the admission of the PRC and the expulsion of the Republic of China (Taiwan).

The permanent representative of the Republic of China -- in fact, the foreign minister was there. I

guess the Republic of China foreign minister had the seat. He walked out before the final vote was taken once the important question resolution was defeated.

*Q: Did you feel any sort of pressure from the China lobby, from Congress or anything that maybe this was the end of us and the U.N., or had history caught up with that, too?*

THAYER: There were some threats at that time. I don't remember the precise threats, but there were some in the Congress. There may have been a sense of Congress, a resolution of some kind, that if Taiwan got thrown out of the U.N. that the U.S. should stop paying its dues or something.

But the fact is that the Administration made a tremendous effort to win that vote, and nobody could have asked Ambassador Bush to have done more, with the exception that there were many who said that the timing of the Kissinger visit in the early summer of '71 undercut our position on the dual representation issue. There are many who said that the second Kissinger visit to Peking -- Beijing, as we now call it -- the announcement of which came just before the final vote in October, also undercut the impression of sincerity on the part of the Administration in pushing the dual representation issue. One might say that there's some validity to that argument.

*Q: I was going to say, one of the accusations that has cropped up not only, obviously, in the press and all, but also in the interviews is that if Henry Kissinger is not the bride, there's going to be no other wedding anywhere else. Did you have any feeling that once Kissinger -- and obviously with Nixon, but Kissinger was very much a central figure in this -- had moved to doing things with the PRC that the Republic of China, the Taiwan thing, had sort of dropped off the interest?*

THAYER: Well, a lot of people were saying this. A lot of people whose votes we were soliciting were saying this. And, of course, the Japanese were upset, and the Taiwan group was upset because, on the face of it, it did give the impression of the United States being less than 100 percent behind supporting Taiwan. The fact is that the dual representation did embody letting the PRC in, did incorporate that. So it wasn't totally antithetical for Kissinger to make the trip at the time he did. Although, the second trip coming just before the final vote in the U.N., that timing was bad, but I'm not sure it was intentional. It may have been just sloppy.

*Q: Were we making noises from the United Nations, or was this an operation that was happening sort of without much connection between our units?*

THAYER: I think it's fair to say that we were not consulted closely! Certainly the U.N. wasn't consulted, and it was a surprise to Ambassador Bush. Kissinger's first visit to China was a surprise to the China desk. It was a surprise to everybody. I remember the night that Kissinger's first visit became news, I telephoned from my New York apartment to Bill Brown, now ambassador to Israel, who was then deputy director of the China desk, my old job, called Bill and asked him what the hell was going on. Bill's answer on the phone that night, "Harry, I don't know what's going on. It's news to us." In fact, the Kissinger visit was presaged by many recommendations made by us on the China desk, even in my day, a year or two earlier. So its concept wasn't original. It was the timing.

I'm straying a little bit from your question, so bring me back.

*Q: Well, it was really whether you felt that we did have basically a dual -- I mean, not only a dual policy but an undercutting policy.*

THAYER: I don't think that we were cynically trying to undercut the policy of dual representation. That has yet to be proved, that we were doing it cynically. It's quite conceivable to me, in our government, that we were so badly coordinated that when the Chinese and the U.S. side were negotiating the timing of Kissinger's second visit, it's quite possible that we failed to think through what the implications of the second visit, coming just before the China vote, would be.

*Q: During particularly this period of the United Nations, George Bush was the ambassador. Is that right?*

THAYER: Right.

*Q: I wonder if you could give your impression of how he operated and impressions of the man, since he now, as we talk, is president of the United States.*

THAYER: Well, being, naturally, a conservative Foreign Service officer, I won't say very much new about it. Incidentally, I also served as his deputy in Peking, so I maintained an admiration for him in both places. I think that in the U.N., particularly on the Chinese representation issue, there was no question that Bush was convinced that this was the right thing to do. And I was there when Bush learned about the dual representation policy as had been proposed by Washington or there shortly after. I was in discussions with him about what the policy was. He became convinced that this was a good policy and one that he could put his heart into and his vigor into, which he did. He was indefatigable in lobbying for this policy. He believed in it. He made a lot of public speeches. He saw a lot of people, shook a lot of hands, entertained a lot of people, gave a lot of his time both at home and in the office to this. And his sincerity was never in doubt.

As an operator at the U.N., he was very effective. In the first place, his credibility was very high. He made genuine friends with everybody, and he had a marvelous touch in dealing with the human beings behind the title, invited them out to his hometown, Greenwich, to seats at the baseball game, made personal connections with everybody. He's a good politician. But he also had a sincerity that went with this. People believed him. So when he said we, the United States, will do this or believe that and so forth, people believed him. When he asked to see somebody, people would see him. There weren't any groans that, "Here comes Big Foot Super Power banging on our door." They received Bush as a human being they could relate to and who treated them with dignity and respect. And this counts a lot, particularly in multilateral diplomacy. It counts in all diplomacy, but it was very evident there.

Just to continue to answer your general question about the way he performed, my impressions, he was terrific on staff morale. He knew everybody. He wrote those little notes of appreciation for everything that was done. I remember when Mike Newlin and I negotiated in the Security

Council context a hijacking agreement with the Chinese. This was the first agreement that we had negotiated in the U.N. with the PRC. Bush sent us down a little note, you know, "Congratulations for your great work on this." That kind of little touch makes a lot of difference. But he was that way with the people he was relating to in the U.N. secretariat, the secretary general, the other missions. He was very friendly with the hostiles as well as our friends. I think people had a lot of respect for him.

*Q: So what was the fallout? We lost this vote. You stayed in the U.N. until '74, is that right?*

THAYER: I stayed in the U.N. until '75, actually. But the immediate fallout was that the PRC came in. And turning from working to exhaustion on the lobbying effort on behalf of Taiwan, immediately I became the Chinese specialist in New York who was on the spot to coordinate how we handled the new group coming in. And the first thing of importance that I handled was getting the new group in safely without being shot, otherwise crucified by bureaucrats or assassins, into the airport in Laguardia Airport and into New York. And that was an enormous effort. You can imagine the desk was fully involved in it, getting clearances for a China Airlines plane to fly into Laguardia, pilots who had never made the trip, and all kinds of special deals that were worked out. And we had lots of meetings, I and the U.N. security guy, Joe Glennon, whose name I still remember, with the Port Authority, the Airport Authority, the local police, the state police, every conceivable bureaucratic entity gathered in huge rooms out at Laguardia Airport trying to coordinate every aspect of the flight clearance, the security, the motorcade, everything.

My responsibility was to represent the State Department and to report all this, acting on behalf of Ambassador Bush, whose instructions were, "Do it. Do it right. We're going to welcome these people. They're members of the U.N. We're going to deal with them." He was immediately on board with that. But also reporting to Washington -- we used the phone a lot to Washington -- making sure that Washington's various diplomatic interests were being preserved. I mean, I was not making policy; I was simply trying to make sure that everything went smoothly. And the desk, two or three days before Deng arrived, sent up one of their officers to be sure that Washington's interests were fully represented there. He was Phil Lincoln, who is now consul general in Sydney, a Chinese language officer, an able officer.

In any event, we worked hard to get the Chinese in smoothly. They bought a hotel -- I forget what the name of the hotel was -- for their permanent representation in New York. We did our best to deal with them effectively from the start.

*Q: Were you making contact with them all the time?*

THAYER: Yes. After they arrived, I was the contact guy. And I went over to their mission quite a bit. The Chinese sent a very strong delegation. Their "PermRep", head of mission, was Huang Hua, who eventually was foreign minister, but very early on -- in the revolutionary period -- was an America specialist. We bent over backwards to be hospitable. We were the host country, and Bush took this very seriously, made sure that all entities of both the local government and the federal government were doing their best to make our new guests comfortable.

*Q: Were there any problems from the fact that we didn't recognize them? I mean, that just really*

*wasn't a factor then?*

THAYER: No, it was not a factor. In the multilateral context we dealt with them. We didn't deal with them on bilateral issues except those having to do with their U.N. presence. But it was not an inhibition at all. The main thing that distinguished our dealings with the Chinese was that they were a sexy new commodity, and there was tremendous interest in Washington, including by the secretary and the president, that the thing be done right. And so there was a lot of pressure on all of us to make sure it was done right. But we all agreed that it ought to be done right, so it was.

Just to add this one tiny illustration, there were hostile acts against the permanent mission. One day a mixture of Caucasians and Chinese -- I guess Chinese-Americans and ROC citizens -- threw rotten eggs against the wall of the Chinese mission. Well, the Chinese mission got appropriately outraged about that, and as soon as Ambassador Bush learned about it, he gave me a message for the Chinese. (I had called him from home to tell him this had happened; it was a Sunday, I think, and I had been informed by our security office.) Bush gave me a message for the Chinese. I immediately went down to the PRC mission and asked to see the deputy PermRep or whoever and extended the ambassador's personal and the U.S.'s national apologies that such an insulting thing had happened to our guests. It was just part of the game.

*Q: You saw the PRC delegates right from the beginning. Did they feel they were in a hostile country? What was their reaction when they came? A generation had been brought up as we were the great Satan, to use present Arabic terminology.*

THAYER: Well, referring back to my conversation with Ambassador Bohlen in Hong Kong in '57 or '58, they came in not hostile, not taking a hostile position. I can't say what was in their minds, but I can tell you what their posture was. Their posture was learning, and they were very cautious and prudent when they came in. They were, I think, unprepared to win the U.N. vote that year, and so they weren't completely up to snuff, and they were in a learning posture the first year or two that I was there. If I can recall correctly, in early 1972 at the end of the 1971 General Assembly session -- a couple of months after the Chinese came in -- we did a wrap-up on their performance. I remember using the metaphor that the Chinese did not, as many people expected, come in breaking up the furniture in the U.N. Far from it. They came in very quietly, very politely, very much asking questions and hearing the answers, taking notes and acting upon them. So they were not a hostile presence from our point of view. They were not a pain for us. They were learning.

*Q: Where were they learning? In other words, obviously, they were not in a position to turn to their old mentors, the Soviets, to say, "Well, how should we act on this?" I'm not talking about on substantive things, but I mean organizational things like that.*

THAYER: Well, they leaned very heavily on the secretariat, and they moved, in due course, to see that some of the more pro-Taiwan elements in the secretariat were replaced by some of their own people, part of the game. They drew heavily on the non-aligned who had supported them and they could ask advice from. But they also drew heavily on our expertise, and if they wanted a briefing -- I can't remember specifics -- but if they wanted a briefing on the history of this or that issue or the legal ramifications of this or that issue, they would go to the legal advisor of the

U.N., but they might also pick the brains of our very excellent legal advisors in New York.

There were other issues on which we were in different camps. One of them was the Korea question. And another big issue we had during my time was the Cambodia question. On those questions, the Chinese were on the other side, to begin with, anyhow, and they wouldn't come to us for any advice about these, but they were going to their like-minded friends and asking, "How does this work? What is the history of it?" This kind of thing.

*Q: Did you get any feel for Huang Hua while he was there and how he operated and how he viewed things?*

THAYER: Well, certainly how he operated. He operated in a low-key, polite way. He's a very complicated guy, and I don't claim to have ever understood Huang Hua. He has a long, well-documented involvement in U.S.-PRC relations. He's a student of Leighton Stewart, who used to be head of the university in China and was our ambassador. Huang was quite capable, though, of being outraged at the United States.

*Q: We have some interviews. He gave a very difficult time down in Shanghai in 1948, very hard-nosed.*

THAYER: Well, he's quite capable of being hard-nosed. On such issues as Cambodia where our position was very strongly opposite to the Chinese position, the Chinese were quite capable -- and Huang Hua, personally -- of attacking us vociferously, even nastily. But his posture toward us generally was quite friendly. And I remember, for example, when the Chinese foreign minister, Chiao Kuanhua, who lost his job at the time the Gang of Four fell, when the foreign minister came to New York for the opening of General Assembly one year, Ambassador Bush invited Chiao and Huang Hua and a couple of their officers out to Bush's mother's place in Greenwich, and they all went out there. And Huang just couldn't have been more affable on that occasion. His relations with Bush were very good. There was a younger female officer at the U.N. at our mission who spoke some Chinese, and he took an interest from day one encouraging her to speak Chinese with him, and he had that kindly touch. But in the end, I think we felt that he was more of a creature of his mission than a heavyweight politician in his own right.

*Q: You were there until '75. Who replaced Bush? When did Bush leave?*

THAYER: Bush left in 1972 for the Republican National Committee, John Scali replaced him. John was a former ABC correspondent. He was on the Nixon White House staff, and he came up, his first entry into diplomacy, following Bush.

*Q: How did he operate?*

THAYER: Well, he is not the instinctive politician that Bush was, and he also felt, I think, a great deal more hostile pressure from the non-aligned than Bush had. For both him and his successor, Moynihan, I think, our issues with the non-aligned, both economic and political, intruded more into their consciousness and psyches than they had in the case of Bush. Scali was very much involved, though, in all the political issues, and there were some rough ones when he

was there.

*Q: You were there when Moynihan was there, too, is that right?*

THAYER: No. No, I'd left before Moynihan came.

*Q: In your particular field as sort of the China man, were there any major issues that you dealt with, say, while you were at the U.N.?*

THAYER: Well, more in the capacity as the Asia person. It's an important distinction because there weren't many China problems in the U.N. There were, however, the Korean issue -- the perennial Korean issue was with us -- the Cambodia issue for two years was there then Sihanouk was in Peking and the Lon Nol regime in power in Cambodia. We were supporting the Lon Nol government. There was very heavy lobbying on the Cambodian issue, where we were at loggerheads with the Chinese. On Vietnam, I remember accompanying Bush to see Waldheim on instructions to explain why we were mining the harbors of Hanoi.

We were involved with the Chinese on a variety of Security Council issues. Shortly after the PRC came in, the India- Pakistan war of '71 consumed the Security Council, and that was a major issue there. There were similar things that went on during the Scali years. But there were not Chinese issues in the U.N. so much. For example, one of the big issues, I guess, was during the Scali period -- or maybe it was still in the Bush period -- was the reduction of our contribution to the U.N. from 33 percent to 25 percent. Well, it doesn't sound like much of an issue now, but that was a major issue. And former Senator Gale McGee, who was part of our delegation that year, handled that issue in the financial committee. But I think the Chinese were supportive of us in reducing our contribution, having expenses more shared by others. The Chinese, like the Soviets, were also, as I recall, quite conservative financially with the U.N. and didn't want to see some of the non-aligned ideas resulting in the U.N. undertaking expenditures that weren't appropriate.

*Q: In a way, I would have thought that there would have been almost a sigh of relief after twenty-odd years of fighting the China issue, which was the representation of China, to have that over with. Was there almost a feeling, "Okay, now we can get on with other business"? Because that must have permeated everything.*

THAYER: Yes, I think there was that psychology. I mean, you get caught up in lobbying for the Chinese representation issue and policy is right and so forth. But all of us knew that inevitability the U.S. had to find some relationship to the PRC, some way to deal with the PRC. And the PRC entry into the U.N., for all the anomaly it helped contribute to in Taiwan's status, it had the effect of a catharsis. It opened up the possibilities -- as the Kissinger visit did, too -- of a more normal relationship. So, in that way, it was quite as you describe it.

*Q: How about with the United Nations? What was your relationship to both the NSC and later? I don't know if Kissinger was secretary of state or not, but was there much interest on the part of Henry Kissinger with the U.N., or did you feel this in direction or pressure or competition?*

THAYER: Yes. I kept up direct ties with the NSC staff, and this was partly at the initiative of the NSC staff. But it was partly my own initiative, as a way, for my part, to ensure that what we were doing was not eventually going to run into problems with the NSC. So I was in direct touch with various NSC staffers during that period, and their interest, of course, reflected Henry Kissinger's interest during his NSC tenure.

When we did have one problem with the PRC -- we had more than one problem -- and it's one I can't go into here, but just to say that at Ambassador's Bush's request, as a result partly of my own proposal, I went down to the NSC to see Winston Lord to brief him directly on behalf of Bush about an issue that had come up. It involved host country relations and the running of their mission. This was because anything that happened with China was of direct interest to Henry Kissinger and in this case was quite a sensitive thing. Bush wanted to be sure that the national security advisor had the full facts.

But we -- at least, I -- didn't then get caught up in any battle between the NSC and the State Department. My contacts were mostly a matter of coordination among the bureaucratic entities that needed to be informed. Later, when I was Chinese affairs director, 1975-79, NSC-State battles were a daily problem for me.

*Q: You didn't have the feeling that the NSC was undercutting the U.N. mission to pursue whatever their policy might be or anything like that?*

THAYER: No, I did not. There were issues where there was a lot of contention between a number of elements including the NSC. I was not so conscious of those as I'm sure that Ambassadors Bush or Scali were. And I can remember feelings of outrage about what NSC was doing on some issue or other, but I can't remember what the issues were. I mean, I just can tell you it was there.

*Q: You wanted to make an addendum to your interest in the Foreign Service, because of your connection with Jack Downey.*

THAYER: I had mentioned in our earlier discussions, too, that the Chinese announcement that Jack Downey had been captured had a big impact on me. That happened while I was working for the *Philadelphia Bulletin*, and it was an added incentive for me to go into the Foreign Service and to focus on China. Jack was a CIA operator who had reportedly been captured when the small plane he was on landed in Manchuria. In any event, that Chinese announcement, which I read in the *New York Times*, did have a big impact on me, as I mentioned in the earlier conversation.

Subsequently, when I went to Hong Kong, where I served from '57 to '59, my friendship at Yale with Jack -- not an intimate one, but still a friendship -- was known in the consulate. When his mother and brother, Bill, came out for a historic first visit to Jack in 1957 or '58, I was assigned as their control officer and was able, in the small ways that one does, to help Jack's mother and Jack's younger brother through the problems of Hong Kong and the transit to China, as well as seeing them on their way out and so forth. That meant a lot to me in a small way, contributing to my sense of not only supporting Jack but also being a part of what was going on.

That sense of being a part is also in the context of another facet of my background, having worked for *Newsweek* for a couple of years -- '52 to '54 -- I did most of the cover story which appeared in the *Newsweek* medical section, actually, on the twenty- one prisoners of war who "stayed behind." They were those prisoners of war from the Korean War who chose to stay in Korea or China instead of being repatriated at the end of the war. I went to the homes of many of these prisoners of war -- and received correspondents' reports on others -- and tried to investigate their backgrounds, what kind of people they were, and so forth. As reflected in the POW story, most of these people who chose to stay behind had, not surprisingly, come from troubled homes and had other reasons to be not enthusiastic about returning to their former lives in the States.

But, again; that story was another link for me with China. And then Jack's imprisonment and helping his family coming through Hong Kong was another aspect of that. A further aspect was when I was deputy head of the China desk, '68 to '70, we then, as always, wrote the instructions for the bilateral ambassadorial talks between the American and Chinese ambassadors in Warsaw, our only official channel of communication for many years with the Chinese. In those talks we never failed to raise the question of the release of the remaining American prisoners, including Jack.

*Q: Did you find that you were pushing it? Were you giving a little more impetus to making sure that it was included every time?*

THAYER: I can honestly say that I did not. But the reason I did not was because the release of American prisoners had always been high on our agenda in Geneva and Warsaw and remained high on our agenda in Warsaw, and it took no extra push for me to have it stay high on the agenda. But it gave me extra satisfaction every time I participated in instructions that were drafted for those meetings where we pushed for the release of prisoners. So those are the aspects of the Downey case I wanted to follow up on.

*Q: You left the U.N., or getting ready to leave it, towards the end of '74. Your next assignment was to Beijing as deputy chief of mission. But I wonder if you could tell us how that job came about, because I'm sure it's a very competitive one.*

THAYER: I guess the topic sentence really was because I had worked with [George] Bush on Chinese affairs when I was in the U.N. -- as we've covered in earlier conversations. But also being a good professional, I sought that job through normal State Department channels. In fact, what happened was when Bush was named by [Gerald] Ford as the envoy to Beijing to replace David Bruce -- and Bush was then head of the Republican National Committee -- I called Bush's special assistant, Tom Lias, since dead, whom I knew quite well. I didn't want to bother Ambassador Bush directly about this, but I called Tom and simply told Tom that I wanted him to know that I was applying through State Department channels to go to Beijing in any capacity, and since Ambassador Bush was going to Beijing, I wanted him to be aware of that. I told Tom that I didn't expect Ambassador Bush necessarily to do anything about it, but I wanted to be sure that he was aware of it.

I applied through the State Department, let it be known in the ways you do, that you're interested

in a job. I also telephoned PRC affairs director Oscar Armstrong from New York to inform Oscar, with whom I worked a lot, that I had informed Ambassador Bush that I would like to go to Beijing, that I was doing nothing more about it through Ambassador Bush, but that I wanted Oscar to be aware of what I had done. I had told the State Department I was ready to go out to Beijing in any capacity. I had said that pretty much right along, and in any case doing anything. I actually expected, if I did get chosen to go, it would be as political chief, chief of the political section.

I learned of my assignment some weeks later, sometime in 1974 before George Bush went out to Beijing. He came up from Washington to New York to a farewell party given by then PermRep John Scali, to which I was invited, a send-off party. Bush took me aside just at the beginning of this dinner in the U.N. PermRep's Waldorf apartment to tell me, "Well, Harry, it's all set. You're going to replace John Holdridge as soon as John finishes his tour." John was DCM, and I had really not expected to be DCM. I was kind of dumbfounded by this, but obviously thrilled. And the prospect of going out to Beijing, in the first place, was, for me, terrific. Second place, going out, working with Bush, whom I liked very much, and third place, going out as the top professional in China. I never had really expected to get to China. Going out in that capacity was a prospect that I was really eager about. So that's the background of that.

*Q: You got out there when?*

THAYER: I arrived in May of 1975.

*Q: This was, of course, a rather difficult time as far as American foreign policy is concerned because this is just when we had pulled out of Vietnam in a pretty inglorious manner. Did this impact at all on how we were dealing with the Chinese, or was this considered, in a way, an opportunity? How did you view it from your particular working viewpoint?*

THAYER: Well, really, in all honesty, it was a very quiet time in U.S.-PRC relations, and I did not make any dramatic contribution to those relations that I'm aware of. I think that Ambassador Bush would, in all honesty, say the same thing, because the relationship was really quite cool; what we were trying to do was to keep the ship -- the ship of bilateral relations -- from rocking too much.

It was the Gang of Four period. Relations, trade, everything else had cooled from the high points of the rising curve of '72 and '73 and the first part of '74. By the time I got there in '75, the relationship was on a downward curve or had flattened at a low level, however you want to look at it. Our contacts were limited. We did a fair amount of travel, but travel was limited, nevertheless. And the relationship was correct. We had some cancellations of cultural exchanges because of supposed impolitic statements on one side or another, trivial things that the Chinese chose to use to eliminate certain contacts. It was really a cool period. But we, nevertheless, had quite a few dealings with the Chinese, if for no other reason because there were a fair number of visitors, both official and unofficial. There were such things as unofficial visitors, but except for those promoted by the Sino-U.S. Friendship Association, we came in contact with most of them. Most of them sought us out. The Friendship Association visitors did not.

Bush's relations were very good with the Chinese. I think there were good vibes left over from his New York service, where he, as we talked about earlier, was the leading host for the Chinese coming to New York. His personal relationships were quite good, and they always treated Bush politely and respectfully. Bush's man-in-the-street reputation in Peking was quite good, mostly derived in my encounters with taxi drivers or shop clerks who would volunteer nice things to me about Bush. So we had our contacts with the foreign ministry, and we attended banquets with visitors. Two high points of my service as DCM out there were the visits of Henry Kissinger in October of 1975 and of President Ford in December.

*Q: He was then secretary of state.*

THAYER: Then secretary of state. And then that was followed by the visit of President Ford in December of 1975, two months later. Those were really quite important events during the first half of my tour in Beijing.

*Q: You say they were important times. Was it protocol-wise, or was this a lot of work, or were things changed at all?*

THAYER: Kissinger had regularly visited China since '71, and he had not visited at all in '75 because relations were fairly cool. In a situation where symbols are in some ways the substance of the relationship, a visit by the secretary of state to Beijing was an important event in itself and said something about the relationship. It said that the relationship was continuing, and that, in itself, in the strategic world of the time, was an important fact. Even though trade was down, cultural exchanges were down and so forth, the fact that the secretary of state was visiting Peking was very important. But there were various issues to be settled that weren't settled by the Kissinger visit or, for that matter, by the president's visit, because the Chinese were so tangled up in their own domestic problems, among other reasons, that it was very hard for them to make any decision that was favorable to the relationship.

*Q: This is still when they were trying to sort out the post- Mao period, wasn't it?*

THAYER: Well, this was before Mao's death, but the Gang of Four was riding high. Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wen Yuan, Jiang Qing were all in prominence. So President Ford's visit was also an important symbolic event at the time. That helped balance off his earlier meeting in Vladivostok with the Soviets. So Ford's visit to China was important in itself. The symbolism of the presidential visit was significant. But there were no great advances substantively that came out of that visit. Then Bush himself left China almost immediately after the Ford visit. He left on December 7, 1975, I think, to go back and run the CIA.

*Q: Let's talk a little about Bush. After all, we're talking about the man who is now president of the United States. But it does seem like there was a criticism during the campaign when he was first running for president which was essentially that he was "Mr. Résumé." He'd been the ambassador at the U.N., and then he'd been with the Republican National Committee, and he was ambassador, really, for a very short time. Did you have the feeling that he was somebody sort of passing through and looking at it, but not taking control? How did you feel?*

THAYER: Well, to be explicit, no, Stu. I had the impression of somebody who took the job very seriously. I can illustrate that in various ways. But just to pick two ways: when I was still at the U.N., Bush came back for consultation, back to Washington, and he got some kind of a bug. He had come back through Pakistan, he got a bug there, so he was hospitalized in Georgetown Hospital. And he asked me to come down from New York to see him, or it was arranged that I would come down from New York to see him. I remember very clearly Bush, in his hospital bed recovering at Georgetown, his telling me that he was eager to have me come out. He said all the nice things. But then he said, "I really feel that we've got to work harder to get to know these Chinese leaders, and we don't know enough about this group who now seem to be making decisions. Specifically, I'm determined to have a meeting with Zhang Chunqiao. Nobody's met him. We don't know enough about him, and I want to do something about it." He said nice things about John Holdridge's work. He didn't mean there was any change when I was coming, but he just was indicating his anxiousness to understand more about what was going on in China. That was one illustration.

Another illustration was that he really worked hard on his spoken Chinese language when he was there. He took lessons virtually every day from our resident Chinese teacher, Mrs. Tang, who was, of course, assigned by the Diplomatic Services Bureau to teach us all Chinese. But Ambassador Bush worked hard at the language, and he used it. He's one of these people, unlike most introverted Foreign Service political officers, he didn't mind making a mistake in the spoken language. So he practiced his Chinese every chance he'd get, but he studied it also.

Well, these are not the marks of somebody who was just passing through. He traveled in China. When he traveled, he learned. He took notes. He took notes in his own hands. When he attended meetings he took notes, and he would come back and faithfully, much to our gratitude, report to the staff. Normally, of course, at official meetings he would have somebody accompany him, very often myself. But when he had conversations that somebody else attended, he would make notes of these conversations, and he would pass them around among the staff.

*Q: What was the position of Zhang Chunqiao?*

THAYER: I think he was a vice premier.

*Q: But he was part of the Gang of Four?*

THAYER: Yes.

*Q: Were you able to get him there?*

THAYER: Never did. Although he appeared for athletic and other events, and we could see him lined up like you see the Russian leaders lined up. But, no, we had no contact. But Bush was very persistent in inviting people to the residence, and he did get everybody he could get to the residence, perhaps for just a small supper. He'd always take care to include myself and one or two others, for example. Bill Thomas, who was then chief of the econ section, or Stan Brooks, political chief.

I remember a fascinating evening at the residence one night when Bush invited the then-head of the Chinese Association for Friendship with Foreign Peoples -- whose name will come back to me -- but he also had been the Chinese ambassador at Warsaw, our chief interlocutor for many years. He had been Zhou En-lai's man at the time that Chiang Kai-shek was captured at Xian in the '30s. And it was marvelous fun for a bunch of China specialists to sit around hearing one of the prime players in the Xian incident describe at first hand everything that happened.

Well, that wasn't getting at the key power structure. This guy was on the edge. But it was the kind of thing that Bush did a lot of. Deng Xiaoping liked Bush, and he gave a farewell lunch for Bush. In the charming way the Chinese have, they gave the lunch in the "Taiwan Room" of the Great Hall of the People. But this was, nevertheless, a very warm send-off that Deng gave to the ambassador. The Chinese did have a certain respect for Bush, I think partly because he wasn't hesitant to speak out firmly to the Chinese, too. He wasn't a patsy for the Chinese.

I was going to illustrate this in a very modest way by recalling an episode involving one of our officers from Hong Kong, whose wife, I think, was of Vietnam-Chinese origin. They had both come to Beijing, visiting there for a few days. The wife came to the front gate of the liaison office compound to visit the office, as any Foreign Service wife would do, and showed her American passport to the Chinese Army (PLA) gate guard. But because she had an Oriental face -- the Chinese have a very hard time thinking of Americans as anything but white-faced Anglo-Saxons -- the guard refused to let her in. She insisted, and the guard continued to refuse. One of our officers went out and checked into the problem. Then the consular officer went out and argued with the guard that this woman had a right to come into the embassy. And, again, the Chinese refused.

Ambassador Bush heard about this, and Bush was clearly outraged by the idea that the Chinese would have the gall to prevent an American citizen from coming into the American liaison officer compound to say nothing of an American diplomat. Bush hit the roof. He was really furious. We discussed what to do about it and decided that we would, in the next stage of this battling, have an officer go out and talk to the PLA guard, insist he make a call to his superiors. That didn't work. Then he decided to unleash the political counselor, who was Stan Brooks, to call the equivalent of the assistant secretary for American affairs, a guy by the name of Ling. Stan is tough and hard-nosed, among the more stubborn of our colleagues. Stan called and, in Bush's name, just raised holy hell about the guard's performance, the principles involved and so forth. The result was that the woman was let into our compound within about thirty seconds.

But the point to be made here was about Bush, who was often accused of not being able to stand up for himself, being a wimp or so forth, this kind of thing. His genuine outrage really came through, and he was prepared to pull out all the stops and be as hard as necessary. He would have gone much further if necessary to support this principle that the Chinese were not going to interfere with American diplomats or, for that matter, with Americans.

We learned later of a humorous denouement of that episode. As I recall, a senior Chinese representative in Washington visited the White House a day or two later. He was to meet his wife separately at the White House. For some reason, the guard initially refused to let the wife of the representative into the White House. We understood at the time the Chinese were convinced that

this was a swift American retaliation for the episode at our gate in Beijing.

*Q: And you just kept your mouth shut.*

THAYER: We kept our mouth shut, because, as we all know, the American government has never been able to be this responsive. [Laughter] But this episode was also considered important enough and Bush's remonstrations were effective enough so that I think Deng Xiaoping also apologized to President Ford when he came out to visit, apologized for having kept this person out.

*Q: While we're talking about relations between the two countries, as a China specialist, did you find it was a problem, not just in the official but the non-official relations between the two countries? There seems to be an infatuation by Americans with China, and I'm wondering whether you found that this infatuation led to what infatuations do, sometimes not asking for as much or expecting as much as we might from other countries. Did you find this sort of a problem in our relations?*

THAYER: I think it became later in the overall U.S.- China relationship. This takes us ahead to the period after I left Beijing, after the death of Mao. (Mao died in '76.)

Incidentally, between Bush's departure and the arrival of [Thomas] Gates six months later, I was chargé in Beijing, and as a China specialist, one of the rewarding things was to be the man in charge carrying the American flag in China, where I was never sure, for the first 20 years of my career, I would get to. As our relationship began to pick up during the Carter presidency, which was coincidental with the post-Mao period, there began, as you will recall -- it didn't begin, perhaps, but there was an acceleration of "China euphoria." Bloomingdale's had its China-style furniture and its China days, and China was really a sexy item in the United States. As we moved toward normalization -- this is a time now I was country director for China between about September 1, 1976 through the normalization period to the summer of '79 -- there began to be, partly by accident, partly nurtured by the Carter administration, a feeding of the American tendency to display a special emotion toward China. This was most illustrated, in my judgment, during the visit of Deng to the United States. In a gala at the Kennedy Center, Deng came onto the stage and greeted a bunch of small children who had just done a dance of some kind. Shirley MacLaine got up and made an absolutely inane speech about what a great people the Chinese were, and she also had the ignorance to say what a terrific thing the cultural revolution was, as I recall.

In any event, there was this euphoria about Chinese. American business was crawling all over each other to get a piece of the China action, and I felt at the time that the administration was overselling China to the American public. It was important that we help contribute to an atmosphere of increased warmth in the relationship in order to bring both sides of the normalization equation up to the point of willingness to regularize the relationship. But China was oversold in 1978-79, just as we had oversold Chiang Kai-shek in World War II. Americans were especially upset by Chiang Kai-shek's corruption and so forth, because they expected something different. Americans were offended by the fact that in the post-'79 period, as the '80s moved along and then climaxed by the Tiananmen massacre, the Chinese turned out not to be

saints and perfect partners after all. This is a longstanding problem in the relationship.

Not to digress too much, but to pick up on your question, I've always felt that part of our problem with dealing with the post-war period and the Chinese civil war was that we had so oversold Chiang Kai-shek in World War II. President Roosevelt insisted, perhaps for good reasons at the time, that Chiang and his country hold one of the permanent seats in the Security Council. We treated the Chinese as a major power. It wasn't just Henry Luce; it was a lot of other people, in the government and out, who sold Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT as the greatest thing that ever happened to democracy in China, etc., and we oversold them. So when Chiang Kai-shek turned out to be something less than we had sold ourselves on his being, we overreacted in bitterness and anger at and derision of Chiang Kai-shek. In the same way, we oversold ourselves about the promise of the U.S.-China relationship in the period of the '70s and the '80s. We're seeing the fruit of that now in the reaction to Tiananmen.

*Q: What would you do as chargé to a country where you say our relations were not really moving in any direction? What does a chargé do with a major country such as China?*

THAYER: Well, that's a very good question. Compared to being a chargé in a normal relationship, the chargé's work is not heavy in Beijing. But, there were a lot of things to do. There were, of course, visiting delegations to be supported.

*Q: Visitors, I assume, were a terrible burden, weren't they?*

THAYER: I wouldn't call them a terrible burden, but they were very much a part of our work. We also had Americans who were working at fertilizer factories and others that needed protection, welfare. There were various consular problems. We had the cultural exchange going on. We had occasional complaints of a political nature that had to be dealt with. We had the endless negotiations you had for high-level visits. There was kind of a routine external, but not every active external activities. But you did travel and you reported on factories you'd visit, call on the party stalwarts, call on other prominent people in various cities, report that. The demonstrations at Zhou En-lai's death took place when I was charge, an exciting time.

There was a lot of content analysis. The *People's Daily* and other press was read every day by all of us who had the language. We also had agriculture and commercial reporting to do, the kind of routine things that are done in any embassy. We had a very small staff. So considering the size of our staff, we had enough to do. But there was in Beijing, like you read about in the stories of China in the time of the boxer period or all through the '20s and '30s, an awful lot of back-scratching among the foreign diplomatic corps, the endless dinners by the various chiefs of mission for the various other chiefs of mission. And when a foreign ambassador left, there were endless farewell parties. There were endless arrival parties. And they were a real pain, too. It meant that almost every night was tied up socially because you really had to show the flag, have friendly relations with third-country counterparts. But that was a really down side of the job, as far as I was concerned.

Also, national days. Everybody had a formal national day celebration. (The Americans, because we did not have a normal relationship, had two celebrations, one to which Chinese officials only

came; another for everybody else.) But the national days were, in practice, one hour long. They normally lasted from 5:00 to 6:00 or 6:00 to 7:00, and they normally were in the International Club. They normally served the same liquor -- I won't say out of the same bottles, but they served the same liquor, had the same glasses, the same hors d'oeuvres, the same often unpleasant waiters and waitresses passing things around, and the same people to talk to. When Bush was there, incidentally, we often went to these national days on our bicycle. At least that was one activity. We spent a lot of time bicycling around Beijing on weekends.

But the best about being chargé for me in Beijing was running my own post for six months, carrying the flag, and working with a bunch of very high-quality FSO professional China specialists. Having that team work together was a great joy for me.

One other thing I did while I was chargé was to greet former President [Richard M.] Nixon on his first foreign foray after his resignation. You may recall that the Chinese invited Nixon to come to Beijing in the middle of the 1976 New Hampshire primary, and there was a good deal of speculation in the American press at the time that somehow the Chinese were trying to interfere with that primary, where Ford, among others, was on the ballot. The fine tuning of the U.S.-China relationship required even finer tuning than when the decision about meeting Nixon came. Should the chargé of the liaison office go to the airport to greet a disgraced president, as normally was done to greet a high-level person? This was kind of a hot potato at the time.

*Q: I assume you went.*

THAYER: I went. When I went out to the airport to meet Nixon, standing around with the Chinese at the time waiting for his special plane to come in, the chief of protocol asked me to come over and meet under the wing of some aircraft on the tarmac. Hua Guofeng, who was then an obscure guy with a security background, who became the next powerhouse in the Chinese government. But that was the first sign. When Nixon came, Hua came out to meet him, and that was the first sign that Hua's star was on the rise. It didn't stay up past 1980.

*Q: What was your analysis of this? Was this too much of a hot potato even to consider about the invitation by the Chinese to Nixon?*

THAYER: It was a hot potato at the time because of its domestic political sensitivities. I felt the Chinese were not just trying to embarrass the Americans. I think Chinese motivations in inviting Nixon were twofold, basically. First, they really do make a big point of being true to their old friends, and they consider Nixon an old friend. But there was a political point to be made, too. And that is that the relationship after Nixon left the presidency (starting before Nixon left, in fact) was not moving forward as well as the Chinese perhaps had hoped. So it was a way of sending a message to the Americans: "We're inviting Nixon to symbolize what a good guy he was in beginning the process of normalization, and you guys who are now in charge in Washington aren't doing as well as our friend Richard Nixon." The Nixon visit, incidentally, was preceded by a visit of his daughter, I think Tricia Nixon, and her visit was given front-page play in the *People's Daily*.

I might mention one quick little thing to give the flavor of life in Beijing at the time. I got a call

at about one o'clock in the morning from the foreign ministry protocol office saying that they wanted me to know that Tricia Nixon and her husband were arriving the next morning at the Beijing Airport at seven or eight o'clock, whatever it was. They assumed, they said, that I'd want to know so I could be there. Well, the fact is that the way we had to operate in Beijing was that our drivers were completely under the control of the Public Service Bureau. I had absolutely no way of contacting my driver in the middle of the night, and there was no way that I was going to get out to the airport unless I took a taxi. And the Chinese knew this. So I had to tell my Chinese telephone caller that I was regrettably going to be unable to make it to the airport to greet Tricia Nixon.

When former President Nixon came, I was included in the arrival and the farewell banquets for Nixon. I told his principal assistant -- and I mentioned to the former president also -- that he was welcome to come to the liaison office to see the brick and mortar fruits of his original opening to China. But I said that I hoped that he would understand that, while I would like to welcome him to the liaison office, it would have to be without any publicity when he came. Nixon did not come to the liaison office, but at the farewell at the airport he went out of his way to thank me for the invitation. It was an awkward situation at that time.

*Q: Nixon, at that point, was not what you'd call rehabilitated or anything like that.*

THAYER: That's right. Nixon was really a bad name in the States. It was in the middle of political happenings in the States having to do with the next election, and it was a very sensitive time.

*Q: How were we reading what was happening in China? I'm talking about the political leadership. How did you go about it, and where did you see things going? This was a time of change. Mao died while you were there, didn't he?*

THAYER: Mao died, I think, in November '76.

*Q: He was pretty much out of it, wasn't it?*

THAYER: Well, he was out of it, but he was still there. The Gang of Four was riding high during most of the time I was there. There were the riots or demonstrations at Tiananmen and at the Martyr's Shrine subsequent to Zhou En-lai's death in April of 1976. People were going up and people were going down, but most of this was obscure to us. I mean, there was some very esoteric tea leaf reading done by our analysts who were very good, particularly Stan Brooks and Lynn Pasco. Lynn is now DCM in Beijing to Jim Lilley. (Stan subsequently went to Taipei as AIT director.) We saw China leadership in flux, and there was not much we could do about it. This was manifested to us in various ways in trying to get progress on the claims assets issue and trying to get certain cultural visits accomplished, certain other things.

The Chinese were just themselves tied in knots. How we discerned this was the way people would speak to us, the jargon they would use in briefings, toasts, what was printed in *People's Daily* and in other publications. But we didn't really understand a lot that was going on very deeply behind the scenes.

*Q: Henry Kissinger was secretary of state while you were there. Did you have the feeling that, having broken through to China, his focus of interest was really more on the Soviet Union now?*

THAYER: No, I did not have that feeling. But the fact was that Kissinger, as secretary of state, was trying to keep the relationship with China moving, but it was hard to move forward at that time. It was just a period in history when progress was not going to be made.

*Q: Were there any other developments at that time, or should we move on to your next assignment?*

THAYER: Well, there were a lot of developments, but I guess we ought to move along.

*Q: How about Thomas Gates? What was his background, and did he make any changes?*

THAYER: Gates made no change in the basic policy. There was no change to be made. Gates was selected after a long delay. He was a secretary of the Navy, and then secretary of defense under Eisenhower. He was chairman and CEO of Morgan Bank in New York. Also from Philadelphia, in fact. Our families had known each other before. He was selected, I think, because, among other things, Ford had confidence in him, he was a non-controversial "political figure," that is, a non-professional. We wanted to have a political figure for symbolic purposes in China. Gates, of course, had government experience and prestige, but he didn't have any background in China.

He did not make changes when he got there, but he worked very hard at learning and getting around as best he could. He just carried on the relationship on a more or less even keel for the rest of the Ford administration. Very dramatically, the Tangshan earthquake happened when he was there, when there was something like 200,000 people killed, and virtually the whole liaison office staff moved into the Residence out of the hotels and apartment houses and so forth. Gates did a great job in keeping the U.S. operation on an even keel at that period.

But, no, things didn't change much. They didn't really start to change until the Carter administration, and that was partly because the situation in China changed then. A leadership came into place with the demise of the Gang of Four, the death of Mao, the rise of Deng Xiaoping and others who saw the value of an improving Sino-U.S. relationship. With a new U.S. administration in place the relationship then began to move forward.

*Q: It's been mentioned in some of these interviews that really it wasn't a matter of the United States doing something early on that really would have opened up things; it was a matter of events in China, the cultural revolution, the Great Leap Forward, etc., etc., all of which would have precluded any real opening. Is this your feeling that political paces in China really govern a lot of things?*

THAYER: That is very substantially true. There may have been things that we could have done in 1949 that would have made a difference, '48 and '49. There may have been things that we could have done in the mid-'50s that would have made a difference. But basically the Chinese

were not fully prepared, even at the time before the Korean War, to enter into a relationship with us. In the '50s certainly there was some lack of enthusiasm for relations with the Chinese under the Dulles administration, but the Chinese were not behaving very well either toward the United States.

In the '60s under [John F.] Kennedy, we made very direct, explicit efforts to improve relations, and the Chinese were simply not prepared to go forward for some of the reasons that you cited. So it was really not until the late '60s, when the Chinese were prepared, that we also had moved along to that point. Nixon became president. So the time was right for the relationship to begin its movement, and that was also because things had changed in China. The context of Sino-U.S. relations had changed, and we had the good sense to seize upon this. President Nixon, in his 1967 *Foreign Affairs* article, made pretty clear what his strategic view was and presaged in that article the opening of a U.S.-China relationship. But it had to wait until the Chinese were ready.

*Q: You left Beijing in 1976 and you went back to Washington. What were you doing?*

THAYER: I went back to Washington as country director for Chinese Affairs as Oscar Armstrong moved up to deputy assistant secretary, replacing Bill Gleysteen who went over to the National Security Council staff.

*Q: What did Chinese Affairs encompass in those days?*

THAYER: The office used to be called the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, encompassing Vietnam as well as, I guess, North Korea and Mongolia. By the time I came into that job, it was only Mongolia.

*Q: And China.*

THAYER: And China, of course,

*Q: And the PRC, but not Taiwan.*

THAYER: Not Taiwan. Taiwan was a separate office, right.

So I came into that job in the summer of 1976. Two of my brothers had died while I was in Beijing, and after the second brother died, I felt I had to come back. So I asked for an early transfer, remaining long enough to help Ambassador Gates get settled. David Dean came out to replace me, and I came back to take over the job that Oscar Armstrong had held. That was in the late summer of '76.

In the fall of '76, these events in China took place. We also had the U.S. election. It seemed to me, and to others, of course, that we could begin preparing for the new administration to move the relationship along, which we did.

*Q: Had Carter, during the campaign, made any campaign promises about relations with China?*

THAYER: I think there had been generally positive things said by the candidate.

*Q: But nothing that gave you real marching orders?*

THAYER: Well, frankly, I don't recall exactly what he said, but he had people advising him who were very sympathetic with moving the relationship along. Dick Holbrooke was one, and Dick became assistant secretary of state for East Asian Affairs. Mike Oxenberg, I think, also contributed to some briefings for Carter. He came on the NSC as Brzezinski's China guy. So there was a general feeling that all wanted to move the relationship along. It wasn't a new idea. But we all felt that perhaps now was the time that we could do a little bit more.

*Q: The reason I ask, I was in Korea at the time, and Carter had made the specific thing about withdrawing American troops from Korea, which was, to all of us, a lousy idea. And I think it became apparent to him, too, because they weren't withdrawn. But you didn't have that sort of albatross hung around your neck?*

THAYER: No, but I might mention that the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea was an albatross for U.S.-Korean relations, but it was the kind of signal that could be helpful to U.S.-China relations.

*Q: Let's talk about this time you were there. Let's talk about what you were doing prior to the actual change of administration.*

THAYER: We were just continuing the routine cool relationship with the Chinese, nothing very fancy. That didn't last once the new administration came in. I took over in September, I think -- late August or September '76 -- and the election was November '76. We were in a marking-time period until the new administration came in. I don't want to exaggerate my role in preparing for a policy change. It was just part of the discussions about what we would do next.

But I will say that I had in mind at that time and mentioned to Art Hummel, who was then assistant secretary, the possibility of forming a team made up of Al Romberg, who was then a National Security Council staffer under Gleysteen, a China specialist, and a very bright guy, now with the Council on Foreign Relations, and the other half of the team would be Stape Roy, who was my deputy, had been Armstrong's deputy and is now executive secretary of the department (later Ambassador to the PRC). I had in mind those two guys. In fact, as we moved into the normalization negotiations, Roy and Romberg became key players in reviewing the record of the Kissinger-Zhou En-lai talks, formulating the policy memos that the State Department produced first for Secretary [Cyrus] Vance and later for the President. The team of China specialists working on U.S.-China relations was led by Bill Gleysteen who came in as senior deputy assistant secretary under Dick Holbrooke, who was Vance's assistant secretary. Dick took a very strong interest in developing U.S.-China relations, as he did U.S.-Vietnam relations, which is, of course, another subject.

(Dick Holbrooke was an exceedingly able, controversial but able -- I consider him a good friend -- advocate of moving on U.S.-China relations, and he arranged, before inauguration, for a group of us to brief Secretary Vance on U.S.-China relations and made certain proposals to him before

Carter took over, about where we should go on U.S.-China relations.)

Mike Oxenberg in the NSC was very high on and instrumental in moving the relationship along. We had some very good people. Burt Levin and Harvey Feldman on the Taiwan desk. Paul Kreisberg, the deputy head of policy planning staff at that time, had a role also. Mort Abramowitz, originally a China specialist, was deputy assistant secretary for International Security Affairs over in Defense; he had a role, too. Later, on the China desk, Don Anderson and Lynn Pascoe were valued players, as was Charles Freeman, who was a key player on the task force set up after December 15, 1978, to coordinate the follow-on actions, including the Deng visit. There were some extremely able, highly motivated people involved in putting together a China policy, elements of a China policy, as the Carter administration began to get in gear. Incidentally, there was a national security decision memorandum which ended up on the front pages of the *New York Times* because of some dispute allegedly going on about arms sales to the Chinese, where they named myself and Bill Gleysteen and Mort Abramowitz and, I guess, Mike Oxenberg as having particular viewpoints on this issue. That was early in the administration.

We got into a diversion with the Chinese over the settlement of the claims-assets issue. This was U.S. property seized by the Chinese, held by the Chinese, and Chinese assets blocked by us. That was an issue that came prematurely on the front burner, and we wasted a lot of time actually trying -- but failing -- to get that settled before we moved into the serious normalization negotiations.

Secretary Vance along with Holbrooke, Gleysteen and others, I accompanied on his first visit to China in August of '77, which basically opened the negotiations.

*Q: Can you give a little feel for the atmosphere of the change-over from administrations from your particular point of view in the China field? Was this a hostile takeover? Was this, "Let's try something else"? How did you feel about this new group coming in and they feel about you?*

THAYER: Dick Holbrooke personified the administration in the East Asia Bureau. Dick was the new assistant secretary for East Asia and Pacific, vigorous, aggressive, intellectually very alive, clearly anxious to make his mark. So there was no doubt who was running the East Asia Bureau in the policy sense. Bill Gleysteen was chosen by Dick as his senior deputy, and that was a blessing for the bureau, Bill being one of the ablest Foreign Service officers of his day.

*Q: He was later ambassador to Korea when I was there and a China hand.*

THAYER: And also a China hand and a great public servant. So when Holbrooke took over, Dick made clear to us he was interested in moving on China policy, and he was interested in drawing on the professionals to do so. It was two very happy combinations. He came down to the China desk early on, along with Bill Gleysteen, and met with myself and Stape Roy, who was deputy, and one or two others in my office, and we discussed China policy. Right from the beginning Dick Holbrooke was a strong advocate on the policy question.

In fact, Dick, in the end -- this may be irrelevant to this project -- but in the end I was the only country director who remained from the former regime who was still in place three years later.

This was not anything particular about me so much, I think, but symbolized that Dick was determined to work constructively with the China professionals; he needed them, and we shared pretty much the same goals. Our communications were first rate. With Bill Gleysteen, our China man in the front office, later to be replaced by Roger Sullivan when Bill went off to Korea, direct with Dick Holbrooke or with the seventh floor -- all these channels were always first rate.

One thing I'll say for this historical record is that one of Dick Holbrooke's great virtues -- and he's taken a lot of beating from a lot of people who don't like him -- was that he was eager to hear dissent. I never hesitated to disagree with Dick Holbrooke, and did so in handwritten notes, in more formal memoranda, on the telephone, in person. I remember once catching him on the elevator to berate him for something that he was trying to do in China policy. Dick had the self-confidence and the open-mindedness never to take offense. He didn't feel his rank being challenged at all. He liked the intellectual give-and-take. And the result of this facet of Holbrooke's personality was that he picked brains and made creative people more creative. I don't count myself as a particularly creative person, but if I had any contribution to make there, it was helping to manage a creative process, keep the paper moving and keep people moving constructively, asking questions, making the best use out of talent. And with Stape Roy and Al Romberg and others, there was ample talent to go around there. But Dick was, for me, almost always a pleasure to work for.

U.S.-China, U.S.-Vietnam, and U.S.-Soviet policy all were entangled there, and this made the policy aspects of Dick Holbrooke's job a lot more complicated than one would ordinarily think, because to some extent these three strands of policy were crossed, occasionally short-circuited or blocked each other, and that was an important element.

But to come back to your question, how did I, as a professional, feel when this new group took over, I felt very comfortable with it. There were, however, in the course of the three years, a lot of problems. We had a lot of problems with the National Council staff. You're familiar with the Brzezinski-Vance problems. Whatever the facts about that, there were some problems -- Brzezinski and Vance, as we all know -- and there were lots of tactical bureaucratic operational problems between, on the one hand, the National Security staff, and, on the other, the State Department staff, the Foreign Service China specialists and others.

*Q: Can you give some illustration of the types of things that were working to effect your operations vis-à-vis China?*

THAYER: Well, I'll be a little cautious here, but just to say that often the Brzezinski agenda was not the same as the Vance agenda. And, therefore, the Oxenberg agenda was frequently not the same as the Thayer agenda or the Holbrooke agenda.

*Q: Oxenberg was the China man in the National Security Council staff.*

THAYER: So oftentimes not all the cards were on the table between NSC staff and the East Asia Bureau, and it took quite a lot of extra effort to keep track of what Mike Oxenberg, on his own or on Zbig's behalf, was up to at any given time. I just want to add that since those days, Mike Oxenberg and I are still talking, and we both recognize this was a problem between us. To some

extent the problems were almost endemic in that kind of a situation. In any event, we had the common goal of a China policy that best served U.S. interests.

*Q: What would be a problem? With a policy towards a foreign country, why would the two people responsible in the NSC and in the State Department be moving in different directions?*

THAYER: I think it's fair to say that there were differences between Vance, Holbrooke and Brzezinski, for example, on how fast we should move on U.S.-Vietnam relations, and that had some impact on how we perceived the pace of U.S.- PRC relations. Nayan Chanda covers this to some extent in his book *Brother Enemy*.

Because of differences in perception of the desired pace of these respective relationships, there were various tactical things that went along with that, differences between what the NSC would like to do and what the East Asia Bureau would like to do. I am being elliptical because some of these issues are still alive to some extent.

*Q: Well, particularly with China, can you say there were those that are dealing with China, either in the NSC or in the office of Chinese affairs, ones that were saying, "Let's go slow with firming up relations"? Because obviously at this particular time we had this emotional and strong political tie -- I'm speaking of American internal politics related to Taiwan -- and to recognize the People's Republic of China fully would mean the diminishing of our official relationships with Taiwan. How was this playing out? Were there sides on this, or were you saying, "That's a Democrat-Republican problem and that's not ours. We'll tell you the way it should be," or something like that?*

THAYER: There were surprisingly little differences within the government, within the executive branch, relating to Taiwan. There wasn't a manifestation of the China lobby in my office or in the East Asia Bureau or in the legal advisor's office. At least it wasn't an important factor. Every one of us were convinced that we had to retain some kind of relationship with Taiwan, that the continuation of arm sales was important and that American businesses must have access and so forth -- even though these things were not all covered fully in our initial presentation of the Taiwan Relations Act. But there was a unanimity about the overall project. The project was to normalize relations with the PRC, to retain some kind of relationship between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan, because it was pretty well understood we would have to break diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

Some people on the Hill didn't agree with that, as we know from the public record. But within the planning group, there was no disagreement on the essence. There was a lot of discussion, quite a high intellectual level, it seemed to me, about what we should be doing, what we should be using as a basis for negotiation with the PRC, how we should go about retaining those things that were essential in our relationship with Taiwan. This was a group of people who cared tremendously about doing the right thing by Taiwan as well as pursuing the U.S. interest with the PRC.

So the level of intellectual discourse in moving on this policy over a two-year period, was very high. And it was, in many ways for me, a thrilling experience to be involved in this process of

trying to move history along but doing it in an honorable and a productive way, that is to say, productive for the long run. So it was a matter of working from a common bias, a shared vision of what we wanted to achieve. The real differences were in how we best go about it, and that was a natural and healthy process.

The first part of this process, incidentally, was to analyze the many, many hours of conversations between Henry Kissinger and Zhou En-lai and Mao dating back to the first 1971 visit. The State Department had not had access to the records of those conversations until the Carter administration. So when Carter came in, one of the first things we were able to do was to get access to these records which were held by the White House, and analyzed them to give us the platform from which we could then figure out how to move ahead.

*Q: Was this because of secrecy? Was this a normal thing, these documents being held so tightly? Or was this Henry Kissinger in operation or what?*

THAYER: A lot of the above, I would say. But the nature of the situation when Kissinger first went to the PRC to some extent required an absolute confidentiality. And Kissinger didn't trust the State Department. He didn't trust many people. So these records were kept very carefully. And even today, you will have seen very little reference to the particulars of the Kissinger-Zhou En-lai dialogue. I will say here only that the dialogue was elegant, and it showed two marvelous minds at work toward a common purpose with great historical and philosophical sweep.

In any event, the first documentary analyses that we did were based on these records of the Kissinger meetings, which we kept extremely carefully, double locked, and double sign-in and sign-out, and so forth, read only in one room with a light off, etc. We were determined also that it was important to keep the confidence of the Chinese that we were serious in our purpose and not going to use these historic records loosely.

*Q: Harry, on something as sensitive as changing our relationship basically with Taiwan, did you keep Congress informed? Did you have a dialogue with staff members? Because this would strike me that if there's any issue -- well, also the other one was the Panama Canal issue, that the Carter administration really was making two major difficult political foreign policy --*

THAYER: SALT, also.

*Q: SALT, yes, and really the Camp David thing. I mean, this was really the administration coming in, wasn't going to sit around and react. It was going to try to do things. But what was the approach towards Congress as you went about this?*

THAYER: Dick Holbrooke is very much a political animal and worked hard to maintain and develop personal ties on the Hill. For example, he invited the head of the East Asia and Pacific Affairs Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee -- Lester Wolf, in those days, Congressman Wolf of New York -- to sit with us at a weekly East Asia staff meeting. So he was very sensitive about the need for congressional support and consulted carefully with a whole range of people on both sides of the Hill. Our consultations on China were informal, and we talked often, at all levels, with individual members of both houses and their staffs.

*Q: On both sides?*

THAYER: On both sides, Republican and Democrat. We also testified in informal committee sessions. Harvey Feldman and I, I remember once, went up and testified together. Harvey was then director for Taiwan, having replaced Burt Levin. We went up and testified informally on the relationships there and touched on possible outlines of a normalization agreement. But State did not have what the Congress felt was appropriate consultations with China. And the Hill raised holy hell with us and with the president when he announced the normalization of relations with China, explicitly accusing that we had not consulted Congress adequately.

In fact, we had told them virtually everything in substance, but we hadn't said, "And we plan to do this so-and-so at such-and-such a time, and we are negotiating these things right at this very time." But to any reader of the newspapers, it was obvious that there was a lot going on in the relationship, a lot of signs of progress in the relationship. Brzezinski visited China in May 1978. Others in the Executive Branch went. And also there were congressional visitors, a lot of them, going to Beijing at the time. We encouraged a lot of this. So there was no question that the Congress could get the message, but formal consultations, consultations that the Congress felt were adequate, no. I think the record shows that plenty of congressmen felt that they were not consulted adequately about normalization.

*Q: Was this a political game that was played of outrage when they knew what was going on, or were they really being kept from significant facts, and was there a reason for this?*

THAYER: Congress has all kinds of people in it, and there were plenty of people in Congress who were very strong supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan, quite a substantial constituency, although not as much as before, who held the same view. There was obviously a lot of resistance to any break in relations with Taiwan, which was one of the results of the negotiations and one that we anticipated. We did not want to derail the normalization negotiations by tipping our hand too much on the Hill in terms of timing or details of an agreement. That was an important factor.

*Q: What was your impression of President Carter at the time regarding this? Was he a player? Was he a pusher or what?*

THAYER: President Carter was very much a player. I think he was so on many issues. But in the China thing, memoranda that we drafted went to the president, he read them, marked them -- very much a player. It was his personal decision -- at least he was one of those who made the decision -- that the access to the facts of the normalization negotiations, knowledge of that, be extremely restricted. And we restricted it within the State Department in 1978, kept it entirely in the East Asia Bureau, knowledge of negotiations, handled the paper extremely carefully. So the way we handled the Congress and the public side of normalization, the president was very much aware of and in favor of -- encouraged it. The president absolutely knew of the degree to which we were limiting our formal consultations, to come back to that point.

*Q: Were you involved or aware of how we were keeping the Taiwan side informed of what we*

*were doing?*

THAYER: Yes, but we were not keeping them informed in any detail as to what we were doing. We had, in earlier years, informed the Chinese, the Republic of China Chinese Embassy, about the outlines of progress in the Warsaw talks or lack of progress in the Warsaw talks. But we were then in a different mode with the PRC. By 1977, we were not keeping Taipei fully informed about our discussions with the PRC. By 1978 we were not even keeping State's policy planning staff informed.

*Q: Did you have the feeling -- you and also those dealing with China, and I'm speaking about both sides of the equation -- that the Republic of China government was really preparing itself and had braced itself for a new type of relationship, but, having little choice, they were ready, after a lot of unhappiness, to accept something as long as there was a solid relationship with the United States?*

THAYER: Well, the Chinese from Taiwan -- the "Republic of China" Chinese -- were not in favor of normalization of U.S. relations with the PRC. They saw our peaceful relations with the PRC probably as constructive, but they certainly were never in favor of U.S. breaking relations with the Republic of China. However, they were aware that plenty was going on. Any reader of the newspaper would know that there was plenty going on, and that goes for people on the Hill as well as people in Taiwan. So they were aware. The signals were there, but we were not spelling it out for them.

*Q: As this went on, did things fall out the way all of you thought they would who had been dealing with this when you first opened this? The Institute for China, or whatever you call it with Taiwan, keeping that relation -- was that more or less how you saw the thing coming out or did that grow?*

THAYER: Well, in the end, we sought, as part of the normalization plan, to establish a relationship with Taiwan something along the so-called "Japanese model," which was an unofficial relationship but carrying out pretty much the same functions as in an official relationship. And so the Japanese model, which we examined very closely, was the basis for our approach.

As it turned out, we needed -- much more than the Japanese had needed -- to do a lot more U.S. internal legal adjustments to be in a position to carry on a relationship with Taipei parallel to the Japanese model relationship. We needed a legal structure, and we needed laws to make it possible for Foreign Service officers to be separated from the Foreign Service and work unofficially in Taipei, because we were determined, among other things, to be as good as our word. That is to say: our relationship with Taiwan was going to be conducted on a non-official basis. Well, we needed a lot of laws for that, and we put together the Taiwan Relations Act which would establish the American Institute in Taiwan and its legal structure. We sent a draft Taiwan Relations Act to the Hill after the president's announcement on December 15, 1978. We sent to the Hill a Taiwan Relations Act which would enable us to carry on this unofficial relationship, this people-to-people relationship implementing commercial, cultural, and other elements.

The reception to the Taiwan Relations Act on the Hill was outrage. What we did was to send up a package which covered the legal requirements of establishing this unofficial relationship but did not have the political elements such as security concerns and so forth in it that the friends of the Republic of China, in particular, but also many others of a more neutral stance, thought was appropriate for the circumstances.

So to put it succinctly, the administration -- I think it's pretty clear -- badly underestimated what the Hill reaction was going to be to this skeleton of a Taiwan Relations Act. It wasn't broad enough for the Congress. We didn't present it in the best possible way. Our testimony was not good. And we got torn apart by the Congress for this. It simply was a case of just not estimating correctly how this package that we put together would sell.

*Q: What happened? To follow through, from your perspective, did Congress strengthen it, harm it, skew it, or what?*

THAYER: Well, Congress took our skeletal Taiwan Relations Act designed for specific operational purposes and made it into a political document which went far beyond what the administration had intended. But the administration was able to avoid the most troublesome aspects being proposed that would, you might say, tend to re-officialize the U.S. relationship with Taiwan. For example, we did not want in the Taiwan Relations Act any reference to the "Republic of China," for perfectly obvious reasons. We didn't recognize the "Republic of China;" therefore, it would be inappropriate to refer to it by that name.

One of the things that we did in normalization was to give a one-year notice of abrogation of our Mutual Security Treaty. We would not have a formal defense commitment to Taiwan at that time, and we sought to not have any formal security commitment introduced into the Taiwan Relations Act. So there was a lot of dispute over this, a lot of very hot, heartfelt outraged dispute with many of those opposed to the administration policy absolutely convinced that the administration was engaging in an immoral act by breaking relations with Taiwan. The administration was equally convinced, as I was -- quite low on the totem pole -- that what we were doing was very much in the national interest, entirely appropriate, and moral. As long as we maintained these people-to-people relations with Taiwan and fulfilled the other commitments embodied in the skeletal Taiwan Relations Act in the announcement of normalization in the president's statement, so long as we did everything we said we'd do, we were acting morally.

But this was a matter of hot debate, and there was a lot of blood on the floor in the process. I wasn't on the front lines of this aftereffect. My role was to continue to work on developing U.S.-PRC relations, and others were taking most of the heat on the Taiwan Relations Act.

*Q: How did the PRC react? We said we'd do this, and then it got into Congress and really the things were changed, weren't they? How were they reacting?*

THAYER: Well, we had made clear to the PRC Chinese all along that there would be certain legal steps we'd have to go through. They didn't like that, but we hadn't explained to them the kind of Taiwan Relations Act that there would end up being because we didn't know the kind of

Taiwan Relations Act there would end up being. The Chinese were not happy about what was produced by the Congress.

*Q: What was your impression of how the People's Republic of China were dealing with Congress? Do you think they were getting good reports so that they were pretty well informed about how the system worked and the pressures and all this?*

THAYER: I think they were pretty well informed, but not very. The Chinese liaison office, as it was at that time, was staffed by people who were pretty competent. Some of them had been educated in the States. Others had served for a long time in the liaison office. The liaison office had quite good relations with and access to the Hill. I'm sure they were surprised by the amount of activity for continued support of the Republic of China on the Hill, and they didn't expect the kind of Taiwan Relations Act they would get. But the reporting was fairly good.

I think it's pretty damn hard for any country to understand how our political system works, and it's particularly difficult for a China that had been so out of touch with the U.S. for so long. But they had people following U.S. affairs in Beijing over the years, and they had their American experts and so forth. But it's quite a different thing in understanding the dynamics of Congress. After all, the Carter administration misread the strength of the Congress's reaction.

*Q: You're saying the State Department, even the Carter administration, really misjudged the vehemence which Congress would react to this.*

THAYER: Well, it seems to me we did, anyhow, and so did the PRC. But the PRC consistently made it clear that it was our responsibility to keep our own house in order, and the PRC quite understandably did not want to take responsibility for the way the U.S. Congress behaved.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that at any time our new establishment of relations was being jeopardized by the Congress and the backwards and forwards as we worked on the Taiwan Relations Act?*

THAYER: There were risks there if some of the language proposed by the -- for want of a better term -- right wing in Congress, if some of the language proposed had stayed in the Taiwan Relations Act, it would have violated certain specific and implicit undertakings to the Chinese. I mean, for example, the use of the term "Republic of China." Now, whether that would have led to the derailing of the whole process or not, I can't say. But surely we were worried that some of the efforts might succeed, and that would be a problem.

*Q: You left in '79.*

THAYER: I stayed on until the summer of '79, and the last thing I did was to write a scope paper for Vice President [Walter] Mondale's pending trip to China which took place in June or July of '79.

*Q: How were things at that time? When you left, did you see a new relationship?*

THAYER: The relationship had begun to settle down pretty well. The episode of the Taiwan Relations Act left a lot of bad feelings on the Hill, and I won't say that those bad feelings had wholly dissipated. But things had calmed down a lot, and the relationship was beginning to move along.

**JACOB WALKIN**  
**Consular/Security Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1958-1960)**

*Born and raised in Brooklyn, Mr. Walkin was educated at Cornell, Yale and the University of California. Entering the Foreign Service in 1952, he studied Serbo-Croatian at the Foreign Service Institute and was assigned to Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Subsequent assignments took him to Hong Kong, Jakarta and Surabaya. Following an assignment at the State Department in Washington, Mr. Walkin retired and began a new career as professor at Auburn University.*

*Q: Well, let's move on. In 1958 you went to Hong Kong.*

WALKIN: I was assigned as general investigator of Chinese fraud, there were quite a few of us, and this is what I did for one year. I made periodic trips into Calone and talked to various Chinese. I learned Cantonese, by the way, while I was there and that is what I did for one year. But they had a security officer who proved to be drunkard and they just sent him home, they had to, and the Consul General at the time, Jerry Lewis Holmes had to pick somebody to replace him. I thought nothing of it at the time, but it so happens that he picked me. Among the general investigators of Chinese fraud there to replace him and that is what I did during my last year in Hong Kong there and I was the security officer doing all the same jobs that security officers do, including by the way, lecturing to newcomers on particular security problems that we had in the consul general.

*Q: What were the major security problems that we were concerned about?*

WALKIN: There was a general question of general security and Chinese spies for the area but also the usual security officer duties of investigating particular employees, employees to be, to ensure that they were not spies or working in any way for the Chinese communists and I also gave periodic lectures on the particular problems affecting us in the Consulate General in Hong Kong. I had quite a crowd and it is worth mentioning and when we were through, they just didn't want to leave, they wanted to hear more of what I had told them. I well...

*Q: You are back to France now.*

WALKIN: Pardon?

*Q: You are talking about France now?*

WALKIN: France yes. No, in Hong Kong...

*Q: You mean the people who were being told the security problems?*

WALKIN: The particular security problems to watch out for because they had come to work for the Consulate General in Hong Kong. This has nothing to do with France.

*Q: What particular, as an investigating officer, were you working on American or/and Chinese employees in the Consulate General or were you working on the visa/fraud side?*

WALKIN: No, I was not in the visa/fraud side as a security officer. Well I did the general work of a security officer, investigating, and as I started to tell you, this lecture I gave periodically to newcomers on the particular security problems that they should look out for while they were employed in Hong Kong. I certainly remember the fact that this group, I don't know, there were quite a few people in my office listening to me talk about the particular security problems of Hong Kong, they just didn't want to leave. They wanted to hear more. I am sure this fellow reached Consul General Holmes and all the other people with whom I worked while there. I mention it as something likely to remember quite vividly, this particular incident. I did general security work and I continued to make trips into Hong Kong. I caught the attention once of Holmes when I reported back to my reporting officer, who was Sam Gilstrap, the Deputy Consul General, about an incident of which I had run into an American Chinese in Calhoun who had been sent there by, it may have been ATS who sent him there, to check on, as a secret agent so to speak, of there's, checking on potential spies. He spoke Cantonese fluently. I probably started talking to him in Cantonese and when he learned that we were Americans, we started talking in English but he had been sent there without the knowledge of the Consulate. When I reported this to Sam Gilstrap, when I got back and he reported it to Holmes, Holmes immediately sent for me and I told him in detail, just what I had learned that he was an American and they had been sent by some agency other than State and was working secretly there and Holmes exploded because he had not been told about this. He just listened to me and I know that I never saw that young man again. He was probably immediately withdrawn.

*Q: Were we concerned at that time with attempts of the Communist Chinese to place employees in the Consulate General?*

WALKIN: Oh, no question about that, before anybody could be employed, I as the security officer, engaged in long investigations of individuals and wrote reports on individuals who had applied to work in the Consulate General

*Q: Did we get much support from the British?*

WALKIN: Oh, yes, I personally didn't have much contact with the British but I am sure we did. We were generally sympathetic to them and their own administration of Hong Kong as a colony of theirs.

**MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ**  
**International Cooperation Administration**  
**Taiwan (1958-1960)**

**Economic & Consular Officer**  
**Taiwan (1960-1962)**

**Chinese Language Study**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1962-1963)**

*Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.*

*Q: When did you take the Foreign Service exam?*

ABRAMOWITZ: In 1957, in Washington, DC. I passed it. Marshall Brement, who also entered the Foreign Service, was sitting next to me. I took it in Washington because that is where I was at the time. I passed the oral in 1958. After leaving Harvard, and having no job, I took a management intern appointment at the Labor Department. I knew when I accepted that position that I would not stay at Labor very long, but I needed the income. This appointment also required passing an exam – the junior management intern exam – which allowed various departments to offer special jobs to those who had passed. It was the sought-after way into the government for recent college graduates. I took Labor’s offer for a position in its international affairs division. An additional complication was the fact that I knew that I would be called soon for military duty.

Just as I was about to be drafted, the government opened a new program which allowed people to serve in the active forces for six months and then in a reserve status for seven years. I had been accepted for naval officer training at Newport, although I must say that I had a hard time imagining myself in that role. Then this new program opened, I opted for it, a week before I was to report to Newport. I left Labor after six months and joined the Army.

I was first assigned to Fort Dix for two months of basic training and then to Fort Chaffe in Arkansas for six months as a clerk-typist, during which time I managed to catch pneumonia. I still don’t understand how I managed to last that long, much less being nominated as “soldier of the month” at Fort Chaffee. My friends and I chuckled at this. I was still a clerk-typist when I joined the Reserves. (Ironically, when I took a Presidential appointment – as a FSO – I was automatically discharged from the Reserves. So I was on active duty for six months and in the Reserves for eighteen months.

When I was discharged from active duty, a position in ICA (AID’s predecessor) opened up and I

took it. I also took the oral exams for the Foreign Service in 1958, but State stopped hiring new FSOs in that year. I did not get appointed as a Foreign Service officer for two years, I spent one year at ICA's headquarters in Washington in 1958 and then one year with the ICA mission in Taiwan in 1958 as an assistant program officer. In 1960, I was finally appointed an FSO and moved across the street, so to speak, from the ICA mission to the embassy.

In ICA I started in the Office of Chinese Affairs – i.e., working on Taiwan. I stayed in Washington for one year, participating also in a training program. Most of my time was spent working on the “desk.” I learned a good bit about the operations of the Washington foreign affairs bureaucracy.

My boss at ICA was a wonderful woman, Laura Hughes, who taught me a lot about operating in the USG. She devoted considerable amount of time to my training and development – she even asked for my views on occasions. It was a small office – only three of us. I was really an add-on to the regular staff; that is there was no formal position for me.

In ICA Taiwan, I became responsible for the management of the commodity import program, which was a large part of our assistance effort to that country. I analyzed Taiwan's needs, proposed which commodities to finance, and worked with the Taiwan government to make sure all came to pass. I also prepared that portion of the mission's annual AID request.

The Taiwan program was a large one. We must have had about 1.000 employees in ICA headed by Wes Haraldson an FSO and a very good and determined AID director.

I liked the Taiwan assignment, one I had prepared for. It was sort of the “Promised Land.” I was finally in a Chinese environment, learning the language and culture and traveling around the island. I had the opportunity to put my academic training to use, which was not always relevant. I met with many Chinese officials, learned a lot about doing business with bureaucracies in Taiwan and the U.S. It was my first overseas experience. Many of Taiwan's officials of course were refugees from the mainland; in fact, they made Taiwan the economic success it became. They were outstanding technocrats and their consistent contributions provided the essential spark to Taiwan's economic success story.

The principal aim of the assistance program was to reduce the rate of inflation. It was a real economic challenge. The economy had been running out of control because of huge defense expenditures. This was the main justification for the commodity import program; i.e., importing goods at low prices would drive down the price of all commodities, thereby dampening inflation. The commodities covered the whole range of economic activity, but especially agricultural products. In addition ICA helped develop and finance Taiwan's new infrastructure and expanded farm production. On the whole, our assistance program was well thought out, executed with skill, and instrumental in starting Taiwan on its way to become one of East Asia's “tigers” – like South Korea and Singapore. The Taiwanese economy far outpaced economic development efforts in most countries.

*Q: You seem to credit the Taiwanese officials for much of the economic success.*

ABRAMOWITZ: Absolutely. The top ones were honest, smart, and dedicated to making things happen. Most, but not all, came from the mainland. One of the principal institutions involved in this economic development process was the JCRR (The Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction). That was run by a very prominent Chinese intellectual, but was a joint U.S-Taiwan organization which managed a nation wide agricultural development program which turned out to be very successful and often held up as a model for other countries. It was actually started on the mainland but fell a foul of the Chinese civil war.

I am not suggesting that economic development by itself produced political growth. When I was there Taiwan was a very authoritative country run by the KMT (Kuomintang). There was a huge divide between the native Taiwanese and the “mainlanders” who followed Chiang Kai-shek from the mainland after the Communist take-over in 1949. That divide still remains but has been significantly reduced by Taiwan’s overall development and the very significant rise in incomes of the whole population.

I arrived in Taiwan after a terrible incident in 1957 when a number of Taiwanese were killed by the Nationalist forces. Chiang Kai-shek ran the country from the day he landed until 1975 when he died. The military which had followed him from the mainland were his enforcement mechanism. On the other hand, the economy grew and grew. The U.S. tried to encourage more democratic approaches to political development on the island but not very aggressively. We treaded carefully in the political landscape. As Embassy officials we were instructed to be careful with whom we talked publicly. Some of our contacts had to be “out of sight.” We could not be viewed as encouraging a Taiwanese political identity. Such activity was frowned upon by the Nationalists and by our own ambassador, Everett Drumright. In my perhaps unfair view he had a strong case of “clientitis.” It was not simply a matter of caution. I think he felt the nationalists would one day return to the mainland.

The ICA-Embassy relationship was very good, conducted mostly at higher levels than mine. We far outnumbered the Embassy and our building was much larger. The embassy Political Section had four or five officers. Same for the Economic Section. Perhaps more importantly, ICA had the resources to dole out which made us key players for the government. The Embassy, of course, had an important role in the AID program; it had to approve the level and composition of the assistance program and at times requested changes. I don’t remember much friction between the two organizations; they seemed to work cooperatively and present a united front to the KMT government.

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*Q: When did you decide to move to the State Department?*

ABRAMOWITZ: As I mentioned, I waited for two years to get my security clearance and more importantly, for State to find the funds to hire me. I kept getting letters from the Department telling me that I was still very much on their minds, but that they wouldn’t be able to hire me in 1959. Finally, in 1960, I got a letter that the Department was ready to embrace me and that I could join the A-100 course (the introductory course offered to incoming officers) when I returned to Washington. I was appointed as an FSO-7 rather than FSO-8. I was given credit for

my previous employment as well as my graduate school work.

I was sworn in as a new Foreign Service Officer in Taipei and assigned to the consular section of the Embassy. It was supposedly part of a rotational training program, starting with consular work and then being assigned to other sections of the embassy.

Many new officers, including myself, viewed an assignment to the consular section with some skepticism. In fact, I found that time in the consular section to be of enormous help. For one, I wrote a number of messages to Washington on our concerns regarding visa problems we were encountering in Taiwan. At the time, these messages received considerable attention; I don't know if they would today.

My second fortuitous circumstance came because my boss knew how to write and taught me what he knew. He was a very smart Foreign Service officer, but not an ambitious one. He really didn't care much about his career; he just wanted to reach retirement age having enjoyed what he had done regardless whether he had accomplished much or won any recognition. He had been a political officer but somewhere along the line had drifted into the consular business. His name was Tom Dehart and he had been the head of the embassy's consular section for a few years. We became friends and he really helped me immensely to sharpen my writing – systematic organization, clarity of thought, etc. I think his talent was wasted, but he preferred a sort of easier life. I have always owed him a real debt for his tutoring.

The consular section was a very busy one due primarily to some very serious visa fraud problems. Chinese students would get a short-term student visa and never return to the island. I must say that I had great sympathy for them – jobs in Taiwan were hard to come by then. Nevertheless they were clearly in violation of U.S. law. I was a very lenient visa officer! I must say that no one complained about my actions or attitude. Whether others were in sympathy with my views or whether there was little oversight, I don't know, probably both. In any case, my generosity seemed to be acceptable. I never violated U.S. laws, but where I had some leeway, I was lenient.

It was not my visa issuance work that attracted the embassy's attention, but rather my writings in that section. I focused on broader policy issues which individual or groups of visa applications raised. For example, one dispatch was on the pervasive problem of visa fraud in Taiwan. A lot of people on that island made money from the visa issuance process. It was these think pieces, plus my background in economics, which eventually led to my early reassignment to the economic section. That had been part of the original rotation plan which allowed me to use my economic background.

Of course, at the time, even though the economy was obviously beginning to grow, the “grass seemed greener” on the other side of the fence. Now of course, the trend seems to have been reversed. Many, probably most, U.S. trained Chinese return to Taiwan to seek their fortune.

*Q: What did you do in the economic section?*

ABRAMOWITZ: I had a good time. I talked to all sorts of people, high and low. I didn't talk to

the president or his son, but I talked to many senior government officials. I had a pretty free hand in selecting subjects I wanted to focus on. I covered financial issues – one of the major disputes between Washington and the embassy concerned inflation. Louis Marks was the Department's expert on the subject – a very smart guy. He was convinced that Taiwan had licked inflation and he was right. Many in Taiwan and the U.S. did not agree with that analysis. I wrote a number of pieces on the subject, one, I remember, when the Taiwanese introduced a 100 Taiwan dollar bill the previous highest note was 10 Taiwan dollars. That was an indicator used by many to show that inflation was really creeping in; it was not the case.

My boss was Paul Storm an very interesting and unusual fellow. He pretty much left me to my own devices and I picked what I thought was important. There were some mandatory reports, such as the weekly economic report, to which we all had to contribute. We also in those days had something called CERP (Comprehensive Economic Reporting Program) was required periodically with listed reports. But in general, I was pretty much able to pursue economic issues which were timely and of real interest to me. There were four officers in the section. Two of us were junior officers, Herb Horowitz and me. We divided up the reporting.

Taiwan was a very interesting economic post and had enormous activity and dynamism. The place was changing into a modern economy. You could see the change right in front of your eyes. You didn't have to watch the grass grow; it boomed.

The political progress, to the extent that it existed, was not noticeable from the outside. The KMT and the President ran the place. But improvement in education and a growing economy was creating intellectual and psychological change in Taiwan.

For me good governance, dedicated people, and free-market oriented policies were the driving sources of the expanding economy. I would particularly give credit for this phenomenon to the effective and determined governance. It turned out to be a key to changing society. The ability of people to run their own affairs and to make things happen impressed me tremendously; that impression of a superb economic team has stayed with me for these many years.

Taiwan had an excellent intellectual and physical infrastructure. Most other countries at a similar stage of development did not have such an infrastructure. The Japanese provided Taiwan an effective agricultural system, and good transportation. Many of the mainlanders who fled to Taiwan were highly educated and the school system was quite modern for its time and place. So Taiwan had the good fortune to be a "new" country with a reasonably effective economic structure. Too many other "new countries" started with a low-base and were forced to deal simultaneously with major political problem (or problems) and economies that were barely functioning. Taiwan could develop its economic base and it had an established if authoritarian political system. In retrospect, I think the Taiwanese managed their entrance into the family of successful countries pretty well.

Political development was gradual. It was a dictatorship. The expansion of democracy came slowly but it came. The economic dynamism, the benefits of rising incomes helped expand the middle class, which stimulated a growing interest in political issues. The improving educational system – education was widely respected as it is in much of East Asia – contributed enormously.

All this provided a basis for a remarkable change in the KMT, which continued and accelerated after I left. Eventually, the KMT turned itself into a democratic party. Many hope that will be repeated on the mainland.

*Q: Did the rise of a middle class have any impact on the development of a democratic political system?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Yes, as I said it was beginning to expand. There were many middle-class people who had come from the mainland. The Taiwanese themselves had something of a middle-class primarily in rural parts of the country, where agriculture had been developed by the Japanese. By the time I arrived, whatever devastation had been created by the war had pretty much become history, so that the native population was able to partake in the economic boom. I think the economic expansion started in the early fifties. By the time I arrived, one could see clear evidence of an “economic success story.” And that visible improvement continued while I was there and vastly enhanced the middle class with ensuing political benefits. That was one benefit of serving in Taiwan. Many of my Foreign Service colleagues would go to a country for two or three years and see no change in the economic situation.

On the political side what we mostly watched was the growth of a communist state on the mainland, (then) in bad economic shape. That further increased the division between Taiwan and the mainland. The mainland was a one-party country, but one which fought and won a civil war.

While I was there we witnessed the last gasp of Taiwan’s “return to the mainland” policy. That of course was Chiang Kai-shek’s dream. In 1962, in light of the serious problems Beijing was encountering in the country especially in the agricultural sector and the policy squabbles in Washington about our China policy, Chiang Kai-shek decided or wanted to convey the notion that he was preparing to attack the mainland. Our Station Chief, Ray Cline, was very supportive. Finally, Washington told Cline to shut up and conveyed to Taiwan the need for caution. I don’t think anyone thought that Chiang Kai-shek would actually do what he threatened, but we were concerned enough to throttle it. We didn’t want any trouble in the Straits or in the area for that matter. We supported Taiwan’s economic development program, but not its stated ambitions to return to the mainland. We would not publicly state such policy, but I don’t think the Taiwan government had any doubts about what the U.S. would support and what it wouldn’t. In retrospect, it might have been Chiang’s effort to muster a stronger U.S. commitment to Taiwan.

I should mention here that my relationship with the CIA station was essentially social. I had very few, if any, business contacts with agency personnel. I made friends with a few of them; I knew Cline slightly – I got to know him better later in my career when I introduced him to Elliot Richardson to be considered for the INR directorship.

After Drumright left the ambassadorship, we had two chargés for a long time – first Joe Yager and then Ralph Clough. It was good to work for both of them. They carried out policy, but were open-minded enough to listen to the staff and discuss the issues. The most contentious probably being the Embassy’s relations with the Taiwanese community.

I mentioned the bitter disputes in Washington about our China policy. I was not much aware of

the battles in Washington between various agencies except with the CIA in 1962. In Taiwan, although various agencies and people had different positions and perspectives, no one, as far as I can tell, “free-lanced” or took any intra-mission debates public. At least, that is what I observed from my vantage point which was that of a junior officer in a large U.S. establishment.

*Q: Did developments in Vietnam have any impact on our China policy?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Our involvement in that war had not begun while I was in Taiwan. We were concerned by developments there – but Vietnam did not rank high on our working agenda; that changed by the time I got to Hong Kong. Then it became a big deal indeed.

*Q: Did the issue of the UN seat come up during your tour?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Indeed it did. The embassy strongly supported Taiwan’s desire to keep the “China” seat at the UN. The issue arose annually and the embassy took the same position year after year. There wasn’t any opposition within the embassy to our position. Had we taken a different view, and had it been approved by Washington, that would have had a corrosive impact on our relations with Taiwan.

In 1958 Bob Scalapino wrote what became known as the “Scanlon Report.” Scanlon was a private consulting firm. He essentially concluded that a future foreign policy course should be to support a “one Taiwan” policy with its claim to the mainland. Not surprisingly that report was created considerable furor on the island. Today, Taiwan would warmly support that conclusion in a minute. I mention this because the future status of Taiwan was, and will continue to be a major foreign policy issue for the U.S.

Given that context, the question of Taiwan giving up its UN seat was just not an issue ripe for serious discussion in Taipei. The politics of the situation also barred any serious discussion in either Taiwan or in the United States of any changes in the current practice or any alternatives to the *status quo*. As far as I was concerned, the UN seat issue at that time was not an issue meriting much consideration. That would change with President Nixon.

*Q: Did you have many contacts with Washington during your Taiwan tour?*

ABRAMOWITZ: A few. I did return to Washington to take the A-100 course during my home leave in 1961. That was a rather unique experience, because by this time, I had been in the government overseas for a couple of years, unlike most my colleagues who were brand new to the Foreign Service.

It was during this time that I became more closely acquainted with some of the Washington heavy weights on China – people like Lew Marks and Joe Yager, who had been the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) and the chargé in Taiwan and then assigned to Washington to run the Taiwan desk. In Taiwan, most of my contacts with Washington were via correspondence on specific issues.

*Q: How would you summarize your tour in Taiwan?*

ABRAMOWITZ: I refer you to a lecture I recently gave at Harvard which covers this point. I said: “For me it was an exciting period, not only because Taiwan was my first time living in Asia, but also because there was still a deep exhilaration in public service – the sense, at least in East Asia, you were contributing to building something and you could see results. I was also the first generation of FSOs after the bloodletting of the State Department’s China experts – John Paton Davies, John Stewart Service, Oliver Edmund Clubb among others – and the focus on security during the Dulles years. There were enhanced security tests in general and a cautious atmosphere on anything to do with China. The atmosphere had eased somewhat when I joined the Department in 1960. In Taiwan you could pretty much speak your mind in private, but one had to be careful: we called Taiwan “China” and China “the Mainland”; public criticism of the Nationalist government was to be avoided, and consorting too much with the nascent and harassed Taiwan nationalist movement was “verboden.” It is remarkable to remember now Bob Scalapino then writing the famous “Scanlon report” – which advocated for “one China” and “One Taiwan.” Because it denied KMT sovereignty over China, it was pillories in Taiwan. Taiwan would love that situation today.”

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ABRAMOWITZ: I stayed in Taipei until the middle of 1962, when I went to Taichung to our language school there. I got out the following year, having passed the course, although, as I said, I am not a great student. I don’t have a “good ear” which is particularly challenging when you are trying to learn a tonal language. I could read well; I never mastered writing. In any case, for the work that we were being trained for in Hong Kong, reading was the essential skill. In Hong Kong, I read Chinese newspapers all the time for my work.

Of course, there were people like Stapleton Roy. He and his brother David had been brought up in China and were almost bi-lingual. David taught at Harvard and later at Chicago. Stape, of course, became one of the Department’s top experts on China and a superb FSO. The Gleysteen brothers were of the same background; sons of missionaries who were mostly bilingual. In fact, before the McCarthy era, it was the sons of American missionaries in China who were the backbone of the Department’s China expertise. After McCarthy, the Department still had some of this talent, but less and with a much lower profile.

The school tried to immerse you in Chinese. We were supposed to speak only Mandarin, but lapses were inevitable given the composition of the student body. I must say that the course was infinitely better than anything that I had taken at Harvard or Stanford, but it was not total immersion.

We studied Mandarin Chinese, the language used for official purposes. Mandarin has been so widely taught over the last 40 years, that one can get along in China using Mandarin exclusively. People still speak Cantonese or other Chinese languages, but most everyone except perhaps senior citizens, now communicate in Mandarin. At the time I took language training, that was not the case.

Mandarin then was not spoken widely on Taiwan. There Taiwanese, was mostly spoken; we

could not use Mandarin and be understood by many.

**JAMES F. LEONARD**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung (1958-1959)**

**Political Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1960-1963)**

**Bureau of Intelligence and Research**  
**Washington, DC (1963-1965)**

*James F. Leonard was born in Pennsylvania in 1920. He received a bachelor's degree from Princeton University and served in the U.S. Army from 1942-1946. Mr. Leonard entered the Foreign Service in 1948. His career included positions in China (Taiwan), France, Russia, and Syria. This interview was conducted by Warren Unna on March 10, 1993.*

*Q: You went on to Chinese language school and then Taipei after this, is that right?*

LEONARD: Yes.

*Q: Now, I'm curious on the Taipei part. I went out with Eisenhower on his last trip abroad, when he couldn't get to Japan because of the riots against the ...?*

LEONARD: I was there then.

*Q: You were in Taipei then? There everything was sweetness and light between Chiang Kai-shek and Eisenhower, and there was no Quemoy and Matsu ...?*

LEONARD: Well, yes. Let's check. This would have been 1960?

*Q: Yes, his last trip before he stepped out of office.*

LEONARD: Yes. Things were fine at that point. They deteriorated very sharply a year or so later between us and Chiang Kai-shek. That is a more interesting story, but at the time that Eisenhower came, there were no problems, we were very friendly and supportive toward Chiang and the government there on Taiwan. We were fiercely determined to defend the offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. There had been a crisis that had got under way the summer of '58 and I was sent out there in the fall of '58 to the language school. It was going on. We, as students, were completely insulated from it. We didn't understand the gravity or lack of gravity of the whole situation. We knew we had made a massive deployment of the Seventh Fleet to the area. In fact the airbase near us in Taichung had had a lot of big airplanes deployed to it. I don't know if they were stationed there, but they were coming in and out a great deal, really as a measure of

intimidation to make it clear to the Chinese on the mainland that we were not going to allow them to take the offshore islands. The way it was described to me by a friend who was in the Embassy was that we put these carriers on the east side of Taiwan and we put the aircraft from them flying up and down the straight very intensively and in a way which made it pretty clear to the government in Peking that they were going to be in real trouble with the United States if they pressed any attempt to take the islands. This was enough to cool them off and avert the crisis.

*Q: I have some recollection of people here suspecting that Chiang Kai-shek was fomenting Quemoy/Matsu, provoking, trying to get the US more involved. This is not ...?*

LEONARD: Well, that may relate more to the '61, '62 period, because what happened after 1960. The Great Leap Forward took place in 1958, and the Quemoy/Matsu was at the same time as that. But the Great Leap Forward had disastrous economic consequences on the mainland. The first year or so, it wasn't so apparent, and then by 1960, it had produced a massive famine. We knew that things were terrible on the mainland, there were a lot of ways that information came out through Hong Kong, etc. At that time I was in the Embassy and was following mainland affairs.

*Q: You were in the ....*

LEONARD: In the Political Section. Although we knew things were bad, we had no idea how bad it was. Millions of people literally starved to death in that artificially created famine which followed the Great Leap Forward. That inspired Chiang to think that maybe, maybe he had a chance to overthrow the regime and return to the mainland. He began talking to us about that, and he also began doing things on his own, sort of behind our back that made us very nervous. So what happened was that ... Averell Harriman had become the Assistant Secretary for the Far East ...

*Q: In the Kennedy administration?*

LEONARD: Kennedy by now, yes. This was early 1961. They replaced Eisenhower's Ambassador on Taiwan with Admiral Kirk, a personal friend of Averell Harriman. I don't know if you ever knew him, but Kirk had commanded the naval landings in Italy and in Normandy, and then was Ambassador to Brussels and Ambassador to Moscow, and then had retired. He was in his early 70s I think at that time. His son is my contemporary, Ambassador Roger Kirk. Harriman asked him if he wouldn't go there in order to ensure that the thing didn't get out of hand, because there was a lack of confidence. There was a feeling that Chiang Kai-shek had been pampered by the China lobby and might misunderstand what would be the American attitude toward an attempt on his part to recover the mainland, to launch any sort of armed action against the mainland. Therefore, Ambassador Kirk was sent out to talk very frankly to the "Gimo" (Chiang) and make sure that this was understood. I didn't go along on the conversations ...

*Q: You were the Political Councilor ...?*

LEONARD: No, I was not the Counselor, I was the number two or three in the section. I became the Counselor a little later. At this time I was not, so I didn't go along on those talks, in fact I

don't know that anybody else was in the room when Ambassador Kirk would talk with the Gimo.

*Q: Was Mrs. Chiang in the room?*

LEONARD: I don't know that at all. Very clear messages were conveyed. In fact, Harriman himself at one point came out. The first time I ever had the pleasure of meeting him, I was sent out to the airport to capture him as he got off the plane, bring him into town. The State Department, and Kennedy personally I think, were all concerned that there might be some sort of dangerous action on the part of the Nationalists, but it didn't happen.

*Q: Well, how did you people in the political section, who were not the Ambassador, not the Assistant Secretary back in Washington, react to this policy, when the end of the Eisenhower period and the beginning of Kennedy, did you feel the US had been naive, or was doing right with a difficult customer? How did you personally react to all this?*

LEONARD: I think most of us were probably critical of the China lobby. We didn't like our Ambassador. He was a very difficult personality and that may have played a part in our attitude.

*Q: This was before Kirk?*

LEONARD: Yes. His name was Drumright. He was a very difficult and very conservative personality and most of us felt that there were a lot of things wrong with the way Taiwan was being run, economic as well as political. It changed very substantially over the subsequent years. Eventually, emerged into the sort of success story that it is today. And that all began more or less in that period. But at the beginning of the Kennedy period, we were all almost without exception in the Embassy exhilarated by the victory of Kennedy, and very pleased that there was somebody there who was not in any way a captive of this right wing Republican ideology on the China question.

*Q: Now, and your language training was a good training in Taipei?*

LEONARD: It was good. Chinese is a very difficult language, but I was very fortunate in going from the school where you got a smattering, a barely able to make out kind of level, to three years in the Embassy, with a good deal of chance to talk Chinese with the political people there, many of whom, outside of the Foreign Ministry of course, did not speak English, it was a good chance to get your language to a useful level.

*Q: So by now, you'd had Russian and Chinese, Mandarin I guess?*

LEONARD: Yes. The Russian was of course deteriorating rapidly.

*Q: So now, you came back then and got into the INR was it?*

LEONARD: That's right. I went right in to the INR in the Far Eastern Bureau.

*Q: So you'd be watching China from Washington?*

LEONARD: Yes. My first assignment was on the China desk, or whatever it was of INR. Then I moved more during the time I was in INR, I guess three years, '64 to '66, almost three years, two and a half anyway. I moved from that, the focus was pretty much on Vietnam because during that period we were engaging in the escalation in Vietnam and we had a whole series of intelligence estimates on what would be the consequences of various US actions, and I was often, not always but often, the US representative in those meetings over in CIA where these intelligence estimates would be turned out saying: "Suppose we bomb, suppose we do this, suppose we do that? What will be the consequences?"

**ROBERT W. DREXLER**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1958-1959)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taipei (1959-1960)**

**Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Chinese Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1963-1966)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1968-1972)**

*Robert Drexler was born and raised in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. He received his Bachelor's degree from Harvard University before entering the Foreign Service in 1957. In 1975 he served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Bogota, Colombia. In addition to Colombia, he was posted to Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Geneva. Mr. Drexler was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1996.*

*Q: Great foreign policy issues: can you give us a view of that time, how we looked at the Soviet Union?*

DREXLER: My view of the Soviet Union was colored by my Army service, because I was assigned to a regiment just across from the Czech border, at one of the gaps through which the Red Army was supposed to pass when it unleashed the Third World War. The US Army had a rather crude political training program for us. I forget what it was called. It involved young officers coming before the troops and impressing upon us the near and present danger of a Soviet attack, lest we spend too much time in the beer gardens and the museums, and not remember that the Soviets were just down the road, literally. And after a while this had a rather counterproductive effect, particularly on those of us who were college graduates and felt that the presentation was not really very effective. So, I think that colored my attitude toward the Soviet threat. My own parents were strongly opposed to Senator McCarthy, and all he stood for, the red scare and whatnot in Wisconsin, as were many. Because Milwaukee, where I came from, has always been a Democratic stronghold. It had a Socialist mayor for 25 years, though of course he

didn't nationalize anything. I think I was probably on guard against the most extreme portrayals of the Soviet threat, for the reasons I've just described. But my interest really was more in Asia, and things Chinese. It had started at college, almost by accident. When Professor John Fairbanks was denied permission to go to Japan to teach a course or something by the Army, which felt that he was of dubious political allegiance, he stayed behind at Harvard, and with Professor Reischauer gave one of the pioneering courses in Asian history, which was very popular and celebrated, and which I took. And then I started Chinese language studies there. And of course at that time it was felt that the Korean War was Chinese in inspiration, and of course, it became Chinese in participation very quickly. And Asia and the Chinese were really my chief interest. And so while I was a little disappointed to go off in the other direction, I soon got back on the right track.

*Q: I'm just curious, because I can't help but compare my own feeling. How did you feel, what were you getting from these courses you were taking, about Communist China. China fell in 1948, and we had non-relations until 1974. But when you came in, how did you feel about relations with China?*

DREXLER: I had a very dark and dim view of China as a Communist state, and I was favorably inclined to the Nationalists at that time. I don't recall this ever really coming up in my college studies of China, because of course Fairbanks and Reischauer had to steer away from that sort of topic, but more important, their course was a backward-looking one, it was historical and cultural. I soon became caught up in this problem, though. I went to Barranquilla, stayed there about 18 months, and then came right back to Chinese language school. So I was back in FSI rather soon. And there we found people like John Stewart Service, people who had been purged from the China corps. Service, I remember, was studying German at that time. And there were others around like Service, such as John Paton Davies, Jr, and it was made clear to us that these were people with whom we should not associate. Perhaps I'm going too far ahead now, but I recall when we were in our Chinese language training, we had asked if we could meet with John Stewart Service, and hear about some of his experiences in China. And we were told this would require a special decision by the Dean of the school, who at that time was Harold Hoskins. The permission was denied. We were told we could not meet with John Stewart Service. He was still an officer, you know. So we were appalled by that, and were beginning to have fresh thoughts about the China problem.

We met with him secretly, in his flat, his apartment in Arlington, where we sat around and listened to him, enthralled by his account of his experiences. And I remember when we left, he said, "Good luck boys, but be careful." And we were careful, subsequently. For example, there was a meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, at a downtown hotel, around that time and Davies was there, with some of the other purged old-timers. And press photographers came around while we were talking to Davies. He said, "Boys, you don't want to have your photograph taken with me." And I'm ashamed to say we stepped aside. So, the atmosphere was really very bad. At that time Joe Bennett was the head of the Office of Chinese Affairs. He was a strong Nationalist Chinese sympathizer. His wife was the granddaughter of Liang Qi Qiao, an outstanding Chinese intellectual from the end of the dynastic period. And I remember that when we had meetings with Bennett as part of our training, and when we began to show some interest in Communist China, and some doubts about keeping them out of the UN, he lost his temper, and

we were astonished by his reaction. I think then we, at least I, began to feel that excluding Peking from the United Nations was a bad idea, founded on emotional and other reasons that really didn't stand the scrutiny that I was able to bring to them, and such knowledge that I was able to acquire about China. Most of the people in my class felt the same way, but we learned that it was imperative that we keep our mouths shut about this. And indeed, I found myself later in my career having to give speeches arguing against Peking being seated in the UN, as year after year we fought the battle to keep them out until we gave up.

*Q: So you came back for your Chinese language training. Could you explain how the Chinese study course was set up? We're talking about 1957?*

DREXLER: This was 1958-59. Actually, I was at it for almost two years. Most of it was in Taichung where FSI language school was operated in a small town where no one spoke English, including the teachers, and that was the best part of it. It was preceded by about six months in Washington, where we began basic language training and an area studies course, which at that time was supervised by Harold Hinton, who later became a professor at G.W. -- a well respected authority in Asian studies and the China field. Nicholas Bodman, a very gifted linguist, was in charge of the language part. We had excellent teachers, who were all refugees from Nationalist China, and distinguished men, highly cultured Chinese from the old school. The course was very good, and we learned Chinese quite well by the time we got to the language school. And once there, of course, we really took off. The teachers were expert, the atmosphere, the climate was just perfect for that. The school had a very good reputation as far as the language abilities of its graduates was concerned. I make that point because, not to praise my own cohort, but to point out that in later years, particularly in the '70s, the graduates of the language school, which was then in Taipei, and then later in China itself, were not being turned out with a high enough language skill, according to the superiors for whom they worked, in their first assignments. But we had a very good operations. Howard Levy was the head of the school in Taichung at that time, and we had to fight off becoming too Chinese. We wore Chinese padded gowns in the winter, as it was quite cold in Taichung in the winter, and because that was the only clothing that you could get, and it was very warm. The student's wives got caught up in Chinese cooking, and we got caught up in Chinese art and calligraphy, and the poetry and so on. And we were in this very Chinese community. There was a very small American airbase near Taichung, and we were resented by the Americans there, as we were thought to be putting on airs. These were Americans who imported frozen Chinese Chungking Chicken from the States, and who used to talk about going into "Chinatown" to shop. And of course we were exposed to the Nationalist Chinese mindset. There we lived in special compounds, that were formally occupied by the Japanese overlords, beautiful old Japanese style houses. And we were taken to Taipei. We heard the Generalissimo speak. We couldn't understand him because of his thick dialect, but we saw old China there. And I like it. It's a beautiful island, and we associated with some very fine Chinese people, refugees, intellectuals, painters, and hundreds of generals and admirals who had come over and had nothing to do. Some of them were forced to take on menial tasks. I know a noodle seller who came by at night who was a colonel at one time, and we would frequently be invited to the homes of these people and see packing crates in the next room, which we learned not to ask about, because we realized they couldn't unpack politically, because they were just there temporarily and they were going to go back, even though by then seven or eight years passed. The island was still in a state of siege. We had to keep emergency rations for evacuation.

There was curfew, a differential for serving in a war zone; the shelling of Quemoy Island and that sort of thing. But I'm getting ahead of it, perhaps.

*Q: When you got there, could you describe the group of your cohorts who were taking Chinese at the time, and also, how did you all view a career -- here you were with the huge country of China sitting there, in which we had no representation. How did you all view China, and taking Chinese as a career?*

DREXLER: We were captivated by things Chinese. The culture is a powerful one, once you are exposed to it.

*Q: By the way, were you married at this point?*

DREXLER: No I wasn't. It is a powerful culture, universal in its scope, and it exerted a very strong attraction. As far as I know, none of the people who were with me then have ever stopped feeling this effect. When I started here in FSI, which at that time was in the basement, the converted garage, of what was then called Arlington Towers, there were just three of us in the class. And we became fast friends. You either did that, or you became fast enemies, because we were in this windowless room, hour after hour, month after month. When I got to Taichung, there were various levels of students there. There were about 30 students, some from State, some from CIA, some military, some CIA under military cover. There were about four classes, I guess, there, and we progressed through. The group that I was in, there were about eight or nine of us, and the senior officer was James Leonard, who went on to become an Ambassador and was head of the UN Association, and is still very active in Foreign Service affairs, and I worked with him later in the Arms Control Agency. He was our senior officer, and the only one who had a telephone. But we were not able to find out much information about Communist China, because all this was censored by the Nationalists. Our teachers, of course, were refugees, and some of them had left their family behind. But we had a Kuomintang, the National Chinese Party intelligence agent among our teachers, who was known to keep watch, not only on the other teachers, to be sure that they were politically correct, but I suppose to file reports on us, and any transgressions we might have. But for example, when Time Magazine put Mao's picture on the cover, they couldn't tear off the cover, but they have a Chinese character, meaning bandit, that was stamped right over his face. The Encyclopedia Britannica was pirated then, I bought a copy, and all sections on China referring to Communist China were whited out, otherwise it was a perfect, 24-volume edition. And the maps were changed to show the capital as Beiping, instead of Peking, or Beijing, as it became. So you couldn't learn anything about Communist China. We went to Hong Kong from time to time and were briefed at the Consulate General. And there, of course, is where the China watching took place. We could bring back books and things, but we had to keep them to ourselves, because our servants would be embarrassed, if they were Chinese texts, to be exposed to this. It would be like having a pornographic novel out when a Catholic priest comes to visit. You put these things away. So there was a strong pull, and we began to feel all the more strongly, as I think I was saying before, that the policy of isolating China was wrong. We became much more sympathetic to what was going on in China. On the one hand, the Taiwan scene was very good, but the Chinese there were building on the Japanese infrastructure. The railroad system, all the farmhouses were brick, electricity, sewage -- everything they built on that. But there had been a time, when the Nationalists first came, of great oppression. But by the

time I arrived the island was prospering, so there was no suffering or wretchedness, and then there was also this dose of the old China, and the graciousness of the Chinese to us. But still we knew that what we thought was the real China was across the way, and our aspiration was to become involved in that. None of us especially wanted to be assigned to the embassy in Taipei. And the Ambassador was rather cold toward us. He was Everett Drumright. He paid very little attention to the school or to our studies. He never visited, and the only time we really heard from him was when we made a rather daring visit by plane to Quemoy Island, off the coast, on one of the days when the Communists were not shelling it. They did it on alternate days, it was a strange system.

*Q: Also, if I recall, Drumright was what one could call an old China hand, but did not speak Chinese, is that right?*

DREXLER: Yes, I don't believe he spoke Chinese.

*Q: You had that dual core, of China hands that never spoke Chinese, who were not sympathetic at all to those who did.*

DREXLER: That's right. We all aspired to Hong Kong as an assignment, but there were only so many places at the time when we graduated, so we were instead sent to what were called peripheral posts, around China, where there were overseas Chinese communities, and once you got such an assignment, you were able to study at FSI the dialect spoken there, and I was assigned to Singapore, so I had three or four months learning the Hokkien dialect, which was terribly difficult, but then at the last minute, the assignment was changed to Kuala Lumpur, where they speak Cantonese mostly, and I didn't have time to learn that. I became the first Chinese Affairs officer at the embassy there. And I was very frostily received, because Kuala Lumpur in those days was the Indonesian language officers' bailiwick. They had a tough language to learn, and few places to speak it. There was Jakarta, Surabaya, Medan, and then there was Kuala Lumpur. I was received at the airport by an Indonesian language political officer with whom I had to work. He said, "Welcome Bob, but frankly, we don't know why they sent you here." But actually Kuala Lumpur is mostly a Chinese city, and I developed contacts in the Chinese community to such an extent that the Police Special Branch complained to the Ambassador about it because they didn't want the US to start sympathizing with the Malaysian Chinese.

*Q: You were there from when to when?*

DREXLER: I got there in 1960 and left at the end of 1963.

*Q: That was the Emergency?*

DREXLER: The Emergency was officially over. The guerrillas, largely Chinese, were still up in the northern jungles. They were no longer killing people in the city, but you were not allowed to go up into the northern territories adjoining Thailand. This Communist insurgency had been mostly put down, and that was a remarkable success in those days. You know, when Americans were still trying to fathom how to deal with such guerrillas, the British showed how it could be

done. They were successful. But there were circumstances in Malaysia that couldn't quite be duplicated elsewhere. At first I found myself at loose ends in our Embassy there, because as I said, people didn't welcome me, and they put me to work as visa officer again, which I objected to, because I hadn't learned Chinese to give visas there, and I asked to be reassigned to another post. And then they gave in, and made me the junior political officer in the Political Section, and that's when I began to work with the Chinese community.

*Q: Who was the Ambassador?*

DREXLER: When I first arrived, it was Homer Byington, who had largely a European professional background.

*Q: Let's talk a bit about what you did. You had to sort of make a place for yourself as the Chinese language officer. How did you do that?*

DREXLER: First of all, I established contacts with the local Chinese, which hadn't been done before. The country was governed by a coalition party, which was responsible for its independence, and still is in charge up to today, called the United Malay's National Organization. And it formed an alliance with parties representing the other two major communal groups, the Chinese and the Tamil Indians. The Tamil Indians were a small community descended from persons brought in to work in the tin mines, as were some of the Chinese. There was a Malayan Chinese association and a Malayan Indian association, part of the alliance. No one much bothered with the Indian association, which was a tiny party, but no one in the embassy had established a relationship either with the more important Malayan Chinese Association. So I did that for the first time. Actually, I called on the Indians too, but mainly got to know the Chinese leaders of that political party, which was part of the government coalition. There were also Chinese who were in opposition to the alliance. And particularly in the city of Penang, a coastal city on the Straits of Malacca, which is largely Chinese, an island. One of the local Chinese politicians there, Lin Chong Eu, had formed an opposition party, and I was the first embassy person to go up and talk to him. The government frowned on this sort of thing, but both of the Ambassadors encouraged me to do it, and they never tried to curb my activities. Of course, we just had chats with these people. It was the sort of contacts that are normal in posts around the world.

There were one or two occasions when I was asked to help the Central Intelligence Agency in Kuala Lumpur, because they didn't have any Chinese language officers either. They occasionally ran operations which required some knowledge of Chinese, and asked me to work with them on this, pledging not to tell my State Department superiors about it. So I did this, and helped them with a couple of operations, which they found useful. And I also had a Chinese lady as my assistant, who formerly worked with the Special Branch during the Emergency, doing press translations. There was a very large number of Chinese newspapers, locally as well as in Kuala Lumpur. And she had been working for some time before I got there, but nobody was paying attention to what she did, and her work production fell off, and she nearly left as well. My arrival, of course, delighted her, because she had at least one more reader, but also someone who was willing to work with her and see that her work focused on things of interest. So we revved up what I think was a very good Chinese press translation service, of documents that we

circulated to the other political officers, and to the Ambassador, who were not getting it from anybody else. So this was important. I became pretty well established in the embassy, when they could see I could be of use to the CIA and to the other political officers. I could help out in the Consulate. USIA would sometimes ask for my help too; I would occasionally serve as an interpreter for the PAO. And of course friends always wanted you to take them to local Chinese restaurants and order the meal in Chinese, which was something I never learned to do, but tried to finesse. So I came to enjoy the post quite a lot.

*Q: I assume you were looking for influence from Mainland China at that time. Did you find any?*

DREXLER: No, not really. I found Nationalist influence. The government, of course, was very anticommunist, just having put down a communist rebellion. And the penalty for being found with a weapon was hanging. The Emergency was a terribly bloody affair, and the Communist Party was banned, and so on. There were no relations with Peking, of course, and there must have been a Nationalist Chinese Embassy, but I don't really remember it, or I certainly didn't have anything to do with it. My interest in the Chinese was as Malaysian Chinese, and how they were faring in their own country. The big question was Chinese education, the future of the language, the Malay's national language policy, these were the hot political issues; that the Malays were imposing their own language officially on the Chinese, forcing them to learn, Malay, English, which they did, and their own Chinese dialects at home, and sometimes Mandarin at school. Many of these young people were learning four languages. And the future of their schools, which were largely privately funded by the local communities, was jeopardized. And I was in touch with the Chinese School Teachers Federation, and I was following that. What we wanted to know was, was the country going to blow up. There have been cases where there were severe racial riots.

*Q: One thinks of Indonesia. Amok is a Malay term.*

DREXLER: In fact, it did not happen while I was there. Shortly thereafter, they had a terrible riot, with great loss of life. So my job was to keep my finger on that pulse. The Mainland - Nationalist thing did really not figure.

*Q: How about the counter thing that was happening in Singapore and Lee Kuan Yew. Here was a real Chinese city and leader, who is around today?*

DREXLER: He was regarded as a dangerous leftist, and 110% Chinese. Not in a Communist or Nationalist sense, but just too Chinese. He represented a great threat to the Malays in Kuala Lumpur. They had great qualms about bringing Singapore into the Federation, and they did so only in connection with North Borneo and Sarawak, which had a non-Chinese indigenous population, which they thought would help balance the Chinese. When they saw these Dayaks and former headhunters come into the Parliament for the first time on the day I was there, the Malays, I think, had their doubts whether this was really going to be the counterbalance that they had anticipated. But it didn't work with Singapore and Lee wanted it to. He was in tears when they broke up. But Singapore and Lee were just too Chinese, and at that time, Lee was regarded as a leftist. And of course some even thought he was a Communist. The DCM in Kuala Lumpur at that time thought that he was almost in the pay of the Chinese Communists. This was James

O'Sullivan. But it was very easy to tar Chinese who resisted Malay dominance, to tar them with a Communist brush. I thought that was unfounded, that the connections did not exist.

*Q: You were there when Kennedy, particularly Robert Kennedy came. And this tremendous emphasis on youth, a real arrogance. Can you talk about Robert Kennedy coming there?*

DREXLER: He made a bad impression on me personally, though we awaited his arrival with a great deal of enthusiasm. I was there when his brother was assassinated, and scurrying around to find a condolence book and hanging the black streamer on our flag, and having our stationery edged in black, and attending an unforgettable requiem mass in the cathedral. We were all devastated. So Robert still had heroic proportions to us. But when he got there, his behavior -- well, you used a word I would find very apt -- his arrogance and his self absorption were so strong, that as he waltzed through the office and greeted us, not perfunctorily but, well, arrogantly, I can't improve on that -- the charm wore off very soon. He also was involved in mediating a quarrel between Indonesia and Malaysia, the "Confrontasi," the confrontation by Sukarno of the federation. Robert Kennedy thought that he could bring this mediation off quickly and prove his skills, his diplomatic abilities. And he made, I remember, demands on the communication system which we simply were not up to, and he was totally unrealistic and short tempered, and unforgiving when neither our embassy, nor Jakarta, nor Manila, where he went off to, was able to provide him with the backup which he felt he needed, and which I suppose he got in Washington with his entourage. So I think he left thinking badly of us, as we did of him. The one virtue of that experience was that shortly after his trip, a much more modern, sophisticated communications system was installed, which we all benefitted from, and which was probably overdue. He, of course, did not succeed in mediating this dispute, but made a lot of waves.

*Q: Just to sort of wrap this up, as this Confrontasi was going on with Indonesia, were people in the embassy taking sides on this?*

DREXLER: We were hostile to the Indonesians. We didn't like Sukarno at that time, and we, among the younger officers there was dislike of the American Ambassador in Jakarta, Howard Jones, who was sometimes called Sukarno's court jester; that's how we viewed him. And of course it was Jones and his country against Baldwin and our country. And in true foreign service fashion, we identified with our host country on this. And of course Sukarno and the Indonesians were easy to identify against. There was poor little Malaysia, a democratic country. And we admired the Tunku, the leader, the prime minister, very much. So we were all for them. I remember when the crowds charged right past my apartment to go to burn the Indonesian embassy, which was just three blocks away, I didn't mind at all. No one was hurt, but we thought they were getting what they deserved. The Indonesian Ambassador and his entourage were all military men and made it clear that they looked down on the Malays. They also felt that the Malays were handed their independence by the British, unlike the Indonesians, who had to fight a bloody war against the Dutch.

*Q: What was your impression of Tunku Abdul Rahman?*

DREXLER: He was a prince, literally, and also in character. He played an indispensable role at that time. He was the royal line of the House of Kedah. At that time, as now, the Federation of

Malay States, which had been formed by the British, of course, had I think nine, or at least seven sultanates. The Sultan of Johore, for example, was well known and even had his own army. These were people who had the almost slavish allegiance of their Malay citizens, who were loyal to their Sultans before anything else. And Malaya, when it became independent, had a king, who served for four years, who was elected by these Sultans, and the role of king passed from one to the other. So the Sultans were very important. They were the cultural, and religious leaders of their sultanates, their states, as we called them then. Kedah was one of these. So the Tunku came from an aristocracy that played an important role. He was English educated, he was trained as a lawyer, he spoke English fluently. And he was a democrat, basically, despite his aristocratic background. By the time I got there he was already on top of the political situation, so I can't really account for his rise. But I certainly witnessed the hold he had. And most important, the Chinese trusted him, and that was vital. They did not trust his deputy, Razak, who succeeded him, who was regarded like most Malays, as basically anti-Chinese. But the Tunku, by his previous political career, by his friendships and his demeanor and conduct, won the confidence of the Chinese, and of course the Indians too. So this was vital. There was no one else like him, no one else near him. So the great fear was that he might die, he might have a heart attack or something, and then what would happen? Of course, he was lucky that he was working with a very enlightened colonial government, the British, at a time when they realized they had to let go. So the transition and the relationship during the transition with the former colonial masters was ideal, very smooth, to the extent that many Brits were kept on after Independence -- the Chief of the Supreme Court, the top military commander -- to ease the transition until the Malays could work their way up. That showed how relaxed both sides were. It's impossible to think of the Dutch staying on as head of the Indonesian Supreme Court under Sukarno. But this is what happened in Malaysia. And then of course they both had put down the Communist insurgents during the Emergency. This of course was a terrible experience for the Chinese community. But by the time of independence, it had been put down. The Chinese Communist guerrillas had clearly lost, order had been restored, and the Chinese community in the cities wanted to get on with their lives, educate their children, make money, be secure, and so on. They realized that the pro-Peking communists had no future. They were beaten and they didn't really have to worry about them. So they got over the Emergency experience fairly quickly. I think the one mistake, perhaps, and Ambassador Baldwin cautioned the Tunku against this, was adopting Malay as the national language, rather than English. We said, why not English? After all, it's not the language of either of the three major communities, yet the leaders of all three know it. It's an international language, and so on. But the Malays couldn't have it.

*Q: Why don't we stop at this point. I want to put down here -- where did you go after this? You left in 1963...*

DREXLER: I came back to the State Department, to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and I was the analyst following China's activities in Africa.

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*Q: Today is March 11, 1996. Please continue.*

DREXLER: From 1963 to the end of 1966, I was in INR, working for Alan Whiting. By that time, I would say that the China corps had been reconstituted. The purged victims from the McCarthy era were gone. There were a few old China hands left, but not many. And by that time, by the mid-'60s there were a number of officers, China specialists, approaching senior rank, and the mid-career group, that I was in. The Chinese language school in Taichung had been quite successful in turning out a new corps. And these people were becoming more confident, I guess, and attention was being paid to them. And of course our loyalty was not in question, because most of us had been school boys at the time China was lost.

It was also at this time that the techniques of China watching were perfected. This is largely the accomplishment of Alan Whiting, for whom I went to work. He had a university background, and was celebrated as the author of a book, "China Crosses the Yalu," which was a study of how the Chinese had signaled us that they were likely to intervene if we moved closer to their borders, how we misread, or ignored, or misunderstood these signals. And this technique of careful scrutiny of Chinese public statements, editorials, and handling of the news, and so on, was really the essence of China watching. And it was the only means we had to find out what was going on in a closed society. And the China watchers that Alan Whiting trained got so good that after a few years, those who worked in Hong Kong would be visited by diplomats -- the British, the Dutch, the Norwegians -- who were in Peking, who would come down to talk to the American China watchers in Hong Kong to find out what we thought was going on. We often knew better than they, I think. So Whiting trained us all, and he had a great influence through his writings and techniques, even on those who didn't work for him directly. At that time the INR office was called the Office of Sino-Soviet Affairs, which even by that time was an anomaly, because the split between China and the Soviet Union was so profound, there was no reason anymore for lumping the analysts together. But it went on that way for some time. And even as much as five or six years later I would still run into people -- political figures, congressmen -- who would question if there really was a split between Peking and Moscow. If there wasn't instead really a devious plot to make us lower our guard. And so there in INR I sat in a cubicle right next to a Soviet specialist, who was also working on Africa. As time went on, it was clear that our focuses were quite different, and far apart.

*Q: Before we move on, can you explain a bit about what the techniques were; how Whiting was training you?*

DREXLER: What we focused on, actually, the only source material we had from China, were the public statements that the Chinese made to their own people, and for foreign consumption. Foreign Ministry statements in the latter case, and daily editorials in the former, although People's Daily editorials could touch on foreign affairs. So you kept careful record of these pronouncements, and you assumed, and I think Whiting is correct in having concluded some years before, that these statements were drafted painstakingly, with great care, down to the choice of adjective and adverb, that there was no carelessness. And very often, the more important the statement was, the more likely it was that it represented the outcome of a high party meeting, and that what you saw in the papers might have been the result of extensive debate, the consideration and rejection of many drafts, and you were able, by keeping careful record, to compare statements in People's Daily on a certain topic, or on a certain occasion -- anniversaries, of course, were vigorously observed year after year -- with its predecessors on the

previous years, or on a previous subject, and note differences if certain formulas were missing. Formulas, for example, which might have identified political campaigns. You could conclude that this omission was not by accident. The writer didn't forget it; that this reflected a decision to put less emphasis on that particular campaign. You also paid careful attention to the order in which officials were named, because the hierarchy, which was quite complex in the party, the standing of individuals and any trends in the leadership, could often be detected from the turnout on occasions, and from who was standing next to Mao this year, and we would check to see where an official was placed on this occasion last year, and a great deal of information could be obtained this way. We were also occasionally successful in getting documents from China that were not meant for foreign consumption, or public consumption. And later, when I was in Hong Kong, I had charge of a unit that was responsible for getting these materials, and paying for them, actually. There was a brisk trade in them. Some of them were real, some of them were not real, as you might expect. The Japanese were among our chief competitors, and had at least as much money as we did.

To take a crude example of our China-watching technique, if People's Daily editorial warned the United States that if Washington took a certain step, it would be viewed with "concern" by the people of China and then a subsequent statement on this subject injected the word "grave" concern, this was not a slip, or just the result of a writer's use of a thesaurus. This meant a shift in emphasis, a growing concern. Using Whiting's book, and the warning statements that the Chinese put out before intervening in Korea, and we also had the statements they put out before attacking India in the '60s, we compiled almost a glossary of such warning statements. And I remember that one of the most extreme warnings, almost signaling military action on China's part, was the phrase, "Rein in your horses on the brink of the precipice." When you saw that phrase, it was a sign that something serious was probably going to happen; that military action was imminent, and on occasion in the '60s, we did see such a phrase, aimed again at the Indians, and we were, if not alarmed, quite concerned about it. So that was the basic technique of analysis.

*Q: Was this Chinese Chinese, or Chinese Communist? It sounds a bit like criminology. What was the genesis in China of this? Was it Communist or a Chinese manifestation?*

DREXLER: No, it was Communist. It did not exist under the Nationalists, or before that time. It was a symptom of the regime's determination to indoctrinate the public thoroughly. The Chinese, on the whole, even today, even in the villages, are much more interested in politics and political questions, than say, farmers in Wisconsin or Idaho would be nowadays, because this was required by their local units, which went down to the neighborhood or farmhouse level. The regime had an intent and a felt need to inculcate the whole population with its line, and it had to use the press and to some extent, the radio, for this. There was nothing else. The regime, of course, was also bent on the most radical social, political, and economic reform programs, and they were controversial. They involved the regimentation of the life of the people to a great degree. So there was a need for information to go out in great detail. And sometimes we were able to see provincial newspapers, or how a provincial government handled a pronouncement from Peking. That could also be revealing, of course. So this system of indoctrination was, I think, more highly developed in Communist China than in the Soviet Union.

*Q: A little bit sounds like it might have reflected the Mandarin establishment in a way. A much stronger hierarchy in China, as opposed to the Russian one.*

DREXLER: Yes, that's true. When the system worked it did work that way. But of course the Mandarin system had broken down by the start of this century. There was a great deal of chaos and disorder, and of course the warlord period as well. But it's true that the Chinese, and in the Confucian system, were amenable to this sort of highly structured hierarchical approach to their lives.

*Q: Was it clear in 1963, when you arrived there, that China and the Soviet Union were really apart?*

DREXLER: There was no doubt in our minds about that in INR. And then of course it became more pronounced in 1964, 65, and later. This was part of a basic change in the attitude of the China specialist toward their problem. It was a sort of revisionism. First of all, we saw that there was not a Sino-Soviet bloc. China was different and separate. Then we also began to conclude that China was basically weak, vulnerable, defensive, and reactive in its foreign relations. When I was first given the chance of the assignment of following China in Africa, there was great alarm that the Chinese were going to move in take it over. This was the time of the African decolonization, there were new, vulnerable, naive countries there, and Zhou En-lai had made a visit during which he famously said Africa is ripe for revolution. And there was one other occasion, almost as famous: I think he was in Mali, and was quoted as looking at the wide open spaces there, and said something about how you have so much room here, and we're so crowded. Which of course led to the feeling that maybe there were 10 million Chinese on their way to Africa, which was ridiculous because at that time the regime couldn't get people to move from the eastern part of China to the west, to say nothing of going to Mali. So I found that this was exaggerated. But then the Vietnam War escalated, and I was put on the Vietnam problem, and my job in INR was to monitor the Chinese aid and assistance to Vietnam, and of course to try to give the signal if it appeared that China was going to intervene in the conflict, as it had done in Korea.

There again, we came to the conclusion that China was not behind the Vietnam War. North Vietnam was not China's proxy, as Dean Rusk was convinced. And we said this in our reports. The office I was in was also responsible for monitoring North Vietnam, with Dorothy Avery, our first-class Vietnam analyst. And we sent in reports showing that the bombing of North Vietnam was not breaking morale, contrary to what the Administration thought or expected. We also had an officer with us, Frank Corey, who analyzed the Tonkin Gulf incident, based on communications and signals intelligence, and wrote the memo a few weeks after the incident, which concluded that it had not taken place as the Administration claimed, or reported. It is now widely accepted that it did not in fact, but it was Frank Corey, arriving at this conclusion from communications intelligence just weeks after it took place. He put this in a memo and it went forward, but of course God knows what the effect was. Well, we know what the effect was, namely nothing. It was ignored. For me then to read McNamara's latest book *In Retrospect*, particularly the passage in which he says that part of the reason that they made so many errors was that the government, and I suppose he meant the State Department, did not have the expertise in China or in North Vietnam that it should have -- this is rubbish. Those experts were

there. I was working among them to a certain extent. I was among them. And we published memos regularly, but they were disregarded.

I remember particularly occasions when Alan Whiting would run into the office and tell us that George Ball, who was our hero in those days, had a meeting at the White House in the afternoon at 3 o'clock. We should immediately crank out a memo with the latest intelligence. We fed to George Ball throughout this period intelligence which supported, and confirmed in his own mind his ideas about the Vietnam War, its current course, and how it should go. But there again, all to no avail. So, as I said, McNamara is quite wrong in that judgment.

But also at this time, ideas arose which I think have damaged the China specialist corps, especially the idea that the threat from China has been exaggerated, that the Chinese are basically defensive, reactive, and that they are weak. From that you go on to the thought that the Communist revolution in China was probably not so bad for China after all. That it was probably basically a good thing. And here we see the influence of John Fairbank, under whom I first studied, and who influenced most of the China specialists at that time. He was a professor at Harvard, and the pioneer, the dean of American China specialists in the academic world. And he had the most profound influence on us. He shaped our view that while Mao was a despot and an extremist, and his half-baked schemes had caused suffering, there was another side: the good that had done for China. The great famines, the floods, the horrors of the pre-Communist period were no longer being visited upon China. There were the barefoot doctors bringing at least some medical care to places that had never had it for a century or more. Roads and railroads were being built. The country was being held together again. Education again was being advanced. And there I see the genesis of a rather soft, almost apologetic line toward China, which has continued, and which I think characterizes the majority of China specialists even today. This was very pronounced during the Bush Administration, and still is now under the Clinton Administration. I am one of the few, I suppose, who finally broke with that view, and as I can describe later, it cost me an assignment in Peking, because of this policy difference. But there was the beginning of this idea.

Now, it was also during this period when I was in INR that the Chinese became a nuclear weapons state. They exploded their first nuclear device in Lop Nor. And that caused a good deal of alarm and consternation. We were wondering if they were going to proliferate weapons to Pakistan and Africa, and who knows where. I became interested in arms control, and I went over to the Arms Control Agency, which was still brand new. It had its original director, William Foster, and original cast of characters. I offered my services, so to speak. They had no Asia specialist, to say nothing of China specialists, on the staff. At that time, and for many years after, the arms control field in the US government, and certainly in State and ACDA, was dominated by European specialists and experts, and properly and understandably so. But this continued for much too long. In fact, it's only been in the past 8-10 years, where even on the academic side, you have attention to Asian arms control problems. This is quite recent, and long overdue, and I think we've paid a price for it. But anyway, they took me on.

*Q: So when did you leave INR?*

DREXLER: I left at the end of 1966. I was in ACDA for 1967-68.

*Q: I want to stick to INR for a little while. Did you find a divergence of view about the relationship, with the Soviet people as to how they looked at things, the relationship, and where things were going?*

DREXLER: Although we were quartered in the same room, and I had a Soviet specialist as a neighbor in the next cubicle, there was no operational or substantive sharing. Hal Sonnenfeldt was the head of the Soviet part of the INR Sino-Soviet unit. There was another officer there, whose name I can't remember. But Sonnenfeldt was the star, the hard-driving Soviet specialist. We had very little to do with them. Indeed, it was not until the incidents in the late 1960s, early 1970s, the Sino-Soviet border clashes, that we really got together closely and were matching notes. So we were looking in opposite directions.

*Q: But here you had a Vietnam War, which was considered all during the war, that the Soviets and the Chinese were as close together as lips and teeth in so far as they were supporting the war. And yet, the Chinese specialists, of which you were one, were reporting out that the Chinese really aren't too supportive of this war.*

DREXLER: The Chinese were not behind it. They supported the Vietnamese, but if I understand correctly, Dean Rusk's idea was that the North Vietnamese were a Chinese proxy for Peking's own imperialist designs over Southeast Asia; this was a proxy war on behalf of Peking, which we in INR were convinced was not true.

*Q: With this attitude, did you find you were in divergence -- obviously you found you were in divergence with the Secretary of State, but how about with the CIA, or the ISA of the Pentagon?*

DREXLER: We had a close working relationship with the CIA then, as I did later in Hong Kong, and later in the East Asian bureau. The problem was that the CIA faced the same limitations we did. It had no good sources of information. There were no defectors, there were no moles that were planted there in China. There was, during the first time I was in INR, the first Chinese defector to the US, and the only one that I know of in this period, who came out of Africa. And I remember interviewing him in a CIA safehouse in Arlington somewhere. We, INR and CIA, were playing the same game, working with the same material. This was not a situation in which the CIA people would come up with some hot information, or hot scoops. So the differences were perhaps over interpretation of the same People's Daily editorial. You had their China specialists and our's and we would put out these reports, and National Intelligence Estimates, chewing over the same stuff. This has been the case for a very long time. This was in the age before satellites. Later, the satellite program was quite helpful, although not greatly. As for the military, we had a rather low opinion of the analytical abilities of the Defense Intelligence Agency. They seemed to emphasize quantity over quality. They, like us, were poring over the same sort of stuff. So for a People's Daily editorial, you had the INR interpretation, the CIA, and the DIA. The DIA one was one that we, I'm afraid, looked down on. And the level of writing, the level of analysis, was so obviously inferior, that the DIA product was usually discounted. We occasionally ran into problems with DIA representatives in making estimates about whether the Chinese were likely to take some military action. We had, at that time, a Watch Committee which put out a weekly statement for the President and the top Cabinet members in the foreign

policy area, of the likelihood of hostilities anywhere in the world, and this was a joint product. You had to have an agreement, or if you didn't, you had to have a footnote showing dissents. The DIA consistently put in footnotes to cover themselves. They always highlighted the worst possible scenario and then signed off. So they lost credibility.

*Q: It was a CIA, cover your ass: Everything is fine, except, however, there's always a possibility that the Soviets may strike immediately, or something to that nature.*

DREXLER: That's right. That's a very good point you make -- the stringing together of qualifying words, "may...probably" was a favorite technique for DIA. So that you got so many conditional phrases that by the time you got to the verb, it could mean anything. The CIA and of course INR language was much more tightly controlled and defined. And we had a superb wordsmith, Allen Evans, a remarkable man, for whom I had great respect, who was in the Front Office in INR in those days and subjected all of our written product to the most careful scrutiny. I think he was English in background and education, and he read our reports as if they were legal documents, so that every word was counted, and we had to choose our words that way because he would just kick the stuff back if it wasn't of that caliber. But there was no one in DIA who seemed even interested in doing this. And later I can describe some instances during the crisis when President Park in Korea was assassinated when we got into real trouble because of DIA.

*Q: Were you and the CIA in divergence on where things were going?*

DREXLER: No, not at that time. Indeed, I can think of only one period, and that was in the late 1970s, where we had a basic difference over the status of Deng Xiaoping. Otherwise, the agreement was pretty close. We knew the fellows there; they knew us. They had an advantage in that they stayed in their jobs. You could have a man following Africa, China in Africa, 5-8 years at a time, whereas none of the Foreign Services officers were in an INR slot for more than 2-3 years. So they had an advantage of continuity. We did have still in INR, at that time, a few old timers, Civil Service employees like Rhea Blue, who had not been RIFed. INR had been drastically cut back in the early 1960s, and had lost a lot of people like the ones I described in the CIA, who had long exposure, long continuity, and institutional memories. But there were a few left. Rhea Blue was one of these. She was a specialist on the Himalayan border area. But we thought what we lacked in continuity we could match with brain power. CIA wouldn't agree, of course, but we thought we didn't do such a bad job.

*Q: What was your impression -- if you were coming up with rather a different analysis than the Secretary of State one, what was your relationship with the Vietnam working groups, who were dealing with this, and also the role in INR in State policy at that time?*

DREXLER: Well, we had in INR at that time a terrific esprit de corps. And part of it was a reflection of the head of INR, who was Tom Hughes, who went on of course, to head the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a well-known think tank in this area. He had a half hour every morning with the Secretary, which was very important. Typically, an analyst would have a week-long duty, you would get up about 3:45 a.m., get to the Department at 4:30 a.m., and be confronted with the evening's take -- enormous stacks of material. And if you, like in my case for example, were the briefer that day for East Asia, you had to cover everything from

Tasmania to North Korea. It was all there, dumped on your desk. You had to go through it, select things that were worthy of being brought to Hughes's attention, you typed them up on old manual machines that often needed a ribbon or which broke down, with your comment on the event. And then, it was a very stressful thing, because as you were doing this, more and more stuff came in up to the deadline, which I think was about 7:30 a.m., and we all went in then, and sat around with Tom Hughes, who would come in, cool and collected, and look over what we had written. He'd ask us questions about this, and you would have to have the answers, which was, as I say, quite demanding, because you might be a China specialist, but you were trying to analyze something that happened in Indonesia, let's say, or North Korea. So we did fairly well. There was no opportunity, by the way, to call anybody at that hour. You were there on your own, this was understood. So Tom would gather all this stuff together, underline this for the Secretary, that not, and then would dash off -- literally run down the hall. So we knew we were getting through to the Secretary. I was, as a junior officer. Of course, naturally we were disappointed that some of our views were not accepted, but I have to say at that time -- now we're talking about the mid-'60s -- the prospect of collapse in Vietnam was not there. We did not see this. The concerns about the military situation, which later became so grave, were not so then. We did not have a sense at that time of a tremendous struggle within the Administration. We knew that Ball had his own ideas, and as I said, we fed him things. But we were not privy to what was actually going on in the NSC or in the White House. And so we were doing our job, we were feeding in material, we knew it was getting to the Secretary, we knew it was getting to Ball. But we didn't have a high degree of frustration that it wasn't changing policy, because I don't think we felt at that time that there was a need to get out of Vietnam, for example. We were not at that point yet.

*Q: Although you were focused on Vietnam at that time, what was happening in China? Was this the time of the Great Leap Forward?*

DREXLER: It was the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, just the beginning. The Great Leap Forward and its damage were past. The Cultural Revolution was taking shape, and we were trying to understand it and to come to terms with it. We had a basic shortage of information on the state of the economy, which was very hard to come by. These were state secrets. We followed, in a fascinated way, the beginning of Mao's purge of Liu Shao-chi, and the people around him, the so-called Capitalist Roaders. And we gave day-by-day reports of the state of play as we could see it. But that was about it. It was almost an academic exercise. There was no sense, I think then, that what was happening within China had any important implications for US policy because we could not detect any debate within China over Vietnam. We knew the Chinese were supporting it; I was monitoring the surface-to-air missiles that China sent in, and where they were being placed in North Vietnam, and so on. But that was about it.

*Q: The Great Leap Forward was over, but the damage to that -- was that apparent?*

DREXLER: No, we didn't really know at that time how severe the economic consequences were because we didn't have the data, the information. We didn't have travelers' reports either. We tried everything. We had a program of -- I can't say even now where this took place exactly -- but in which we examined correspondence coming from China, between private people. That was opened, looked at, translated, and circulated for the benefit of our China watchers. The radio stations were monitored by FBIS. All of the Chinese language stuff was translated and published

in Hong Kong. We were buying documents, we were using the stuff we got from Tibet, leaving no stone unturned. Of course, we were also talking to diplomats from friendly countries who were in Peking. But they were really very much in the dark. It was a very tough business. Of course, we were constantly in touch with academic specialists who faced the same problem. In those years, all of the good books available on modern China would only fill one shelf. Now of course, they would fill a room. We knew what was being put out. The China Quarterly was the leading publication for China specialists at that time. We were in touch with the leading academicians, and they with us. But still there was a great unknown there.

*Q: You mentioned that later you felt that John Fairbank's view was somewhat pernicious. Did you feel that at the time, or was this a growing unease?*

DREXLER: No, I had great respect for him. He was my professor, after all, and his prestige was unchallenged in the field. Indeed, it was only in one of his last books, shortly before he died, that he recognized and acknowledged this himself. But you see, it was a case of the pendulum swinging too far. We were revising a view of China held by ignorant, right-wing extremists in this country, totally at variance with the facts, and which was linked up with the old Yellow Peril ideas, and God knows what all. People were still smarting from our defeat in Korea, at the hands of Chinese forces, and all of that. So, Fairbanks was certainly correct in trying to argue and disabuse people of those ideas which were really pernicious at that time. And I think now no one contests that, and that he was right at that time. I should say that the view I just expressed to you now about Fairbanks and what I think is the excessively soft line, is a minority view, and you will get most China specialists taking issue with me on that.

*Q: One thing before we move to ACDA: Watching China in Africa during this time. There was a lot of attention in Africa at this time. These were new countries coming up, and we knew the names of Sekou Toure and Kwame Nkrumah, etc., etc. Today Africa doesn't raise much of a blip on our radar. And China was certainly a very new player in there, as was the Soviet Union. Did you find that you were up against people who were concerned that China was going to do a lot more in Africa at that time?*

DREXLER: As you say, Africa loomed very important at that time, it was a cockpit of the Cold War. Also, there was a feeling that there were places in Africa that had mineral wealth, uranium, oil, that was important to us strategically or could be very important if it fell into Communist hands. So there was a great deal of concern about that, especially after Zhou En-lai's trip. But the Chinese also became, or tried to be, champions of the non-aligned and the Bandung movement, to which the Africans were very receptive. And it involved, of course, the exclusion of the Soviets, as well as the Americans. So it was kind of a third force, and it had great resonance in Africa at that time. And the Chinese were very good at cultivating these people. So while American officials had an exaggerated view of the potential there for China to sow trouble for us, there was certainly grounds for some concern at that time. It was not wholly exaggerated. The Chinese had a small aid program, but it was sharply focused. They had excellent language training programs. It was taken for granted that when the Chinese Ambassador stepped off the plane no matter where in Africa, he spoke the local African language. I'm not talking about French, say, but the local language very well. And also the Chinese example of Maoism appealed to the Africans in a way that Soviet Communism did not. Like the new African nations, China

was a poor country, victim of colonialism, in a way, pulling itself up by its own bootstraps, fighting off imperialism, so there was real resonance.

*Q: There's a racial thing there too, because the Soviets were white and the Chinese were not white.*

DREXLER: When I finally got a defector -- the only one I told you I can remember, from the Chinese embassy in Africa -- and I went to talk to him, I asked him, "What did you feel about the Africans?" He said "We looked down on them, we despised them racially." But he said, "Naturally, of course, this was never made apparent to the Africans, but we had the strong Chinese racial prejudice against blacks." But what you said before is true. They were colored, and the Chinese tried to capitalize on this.

*Q: Did you find that as INR was so downplaying the long-range influence of the Chinese, where there were others in the government saying you don't understand?*

DREXLER: I think not. There was very little expertise on this subject, and it was not so difficult for us to get our more moderate views accepted by officials in Washington. And the interest in the Chinese in Africa flagged rather quickly, and of course in part it was because we had other things to worry about, especially Vietnam.

*Q: Also, in interviewing people who served in Africa at various times, one of the remarks would be, "Well, the Chinese had a large mission there. God knows what they were doing." Very seldom was there any real concern about what the Chinese were up to. They seemed to be kind of there, but really an alien...*

DREXLER: There is one thing I should mention, and that's the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. We were, the Administration was determined, of course, to block Peking's admission, and to retain the Nationalist seat in the Security Council and elsewhere. Of course, the African countries were numerous, and they all had votes in the United Nations when they entered. For the Chinese, just to get an embassy there, to get recognition, was important, if not so much as to what happened in Niger or Mali, but at the U.N., because that was one more vote. And of course we know how the momentum built up and what the trend was. We could see that time was not on our side. And the Nationalists at that time did not have the money that they since used in some small countries to buy back recognition, and they had to rely on us. So we fought the Chinese U.N. representation battle in the African theater also. The Chinese communists made some gains there.

*Q: Again, I want to keep tapping this one thing. In the China INR side; the Sino side of this, in your hearts of hearts, what was the feeling toward recognition of Communist China by the United States at that time?*

DREXLER: As I recall, I personally had no trouble with the idea that Communist China should be kept out of the United Nations. And as I recall, none of my colleagues, senior or my peers, did either. We accepted that policy. Not frequently, but I often had to talk and brief groups and make speeches on this subject, and to defend the Administration's policy. And at that time I didn't have

any trouble with it. I won't say that it came later, because throughout my career and to this very day I've taken a rather hard-line attitude toward Communist China. I'm not saying that I believe they should now be out of the U.N., certainly not, but I didn't have any difficulty with that in the 1960s. Maybe the fact that I feel that others didn't either is more a reflection of my own views than anything else.

*Q: Why would the Italians or the Germans -- was it just that they wanted to sell equipment off around? What would be their interest in resisting the Treaty?*

DREXLER: The Germans, and to some extent the Italians, saw the Nonproliferation Treaty as a means by which the Soviet Union was denying them the right to acquire nuclear weapons. And whether or not they actually had an interest in acquiring such weaponry, they felt that for giving this up, and thus meeting the Soviet foreign policy objective, they required compensation, either in the form of more liberal restrictions on their use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, or in the form of limits on the Soviets. Our ambassadors sympathized with these views, to the extent that we in ACDA felt that the Administration's policy and positions were not being faithfully portrayed and put forth to the host country governments. I recall one occasion where we had to use the Norwegians, either in Bonn or in Rome, I forget, to make sure that the substance of what we were after was conveyed. This came as a great shock to me. We ran into the same opposition in the EUR Bureau, under George Springsteen. And I witnessed fierce battles between ACDA and the EUR Bureau over the treaty. Most of the ACDA personnel at the negotiations were ACDA career employees. I was one of the few State Department Foreign Service people detailed there. So I felt more than embarrassed; I was dismayed and disturbed by the way my colleagues in the State Department handled this very important foreign policy project. But we prevailed with great difficulty, with our allies, and with even greater difficulty with the Soviets, and finally tabled a joint treaty. It was signed and ratified. We were all invited to the signing ceremony at the White House, which is one of the high points in my diplomatic career.

There was an Asian China twist to it, which I want to tell you about, because it's not very well known, and recorded nowhere, but is of some interest. The basic treaty languages were Russian and English, and once the treaty was approved by the UN, endorsed by resolution and in final form, there was a mechanical task making its text conform in the other languages of the UN, namely Spanish, French, and Chinese. I worked on the Spanish translation, first of all, to be sure that it conformed. Then something happened to the head of the Department's Chinese language unit in Language Services, so he was not available to work on the Chinese text, and they sent me to the UN in New York instead to do this. We did not work from scratch, of course, but rather, as in the cases of the other languages, like the Spanish, from a basic text done by the UN interpreters. But the treaty text was highly technical, and the translators at the UN in Chinese, as well as Spanish, did not have this background or expertise. And so, we had to do a lot of work on the basic draft that they gave us. My opposite number from the Soviet Embassy, was Igor Rogochov, whom I encountered later in Moscow, and who is now Russia's Ambassador to China. We worked together on this Chinese text. Now, of course, for me the sensible thing would have been to have someone from the Chinese UN mission with me, but this was the Nationalists; the Soviets would not allow them into the room, or even into the same general area where we were working. So when we came to a point in the treaty text where there had to be a change, I would have to leave the room, call the Chinese Mission on the phone, and tell them what the new

phrase was. And the first question to me always was, "Did you suggest this, or did the Russians suggest this?" Because they were convinced that if the Russians suggested it, there was something devious there, and that the Russians were bent on putting something in the Chinese version, which would be more binding or tougher on China than, say, for the other parties. And so we labored at this for several days. We were helped by the fact that the technical terminology was already available to us in the Charter and Annexes that set up the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Chinese definition of fissionable materiel and safeguards was already there in the IAEA context, accepted in usage, and so we used that. We were also able to draw on language from the Chinese version of the United Nations Charter, and there we discovered a problem in the text where the Nonproliferation Treaty has a preamble which refers to some of the objectives in the UN Charter. One of them pertains to the use of force, or the non-use of force, rather. We discovered that the Chinese translation of the UN Charter, which had been on the books for 15-20 years, was wrong, and had been incorrectly translated. Nonetheless, we were supposed to quote this passage in the preamble to the treaty. So we were faced with the question of do you quote the Charter language verbatim, even though it's wrong, or do you correct the Charter language when you quote it in the treaty? Well, we made the correction, and we put it in right, and never said anything about it one way or the other. And to my knowledge, the Chinese translation of the UN Charter still has this defect. The Chinese Mission, the Nationalists, later told me that -- well, they signed it, they ratified the treaty, so our translation wasn't all that bad. There were some passages that they felt didn't flow quite right, but by and large it was not such a bad job under the circumstances. The State Department gave me as my reward, a copy of the Chinese treaty text, one of very few, of the version that was used for signing, beautifully printed, on heavy paper, which I still have, as my memento of all that work.

*Q: You were still not a senior officer at this time, a mid-career officer. Did you make any attempts to do something about the non-support within the State Department, particularly the EUR Bureau, of getting our Ambassadors to support this, or not?*

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those countries who wanted to be sure they would get the benefits. Then of course there were a few countries like India and Brazil, who never intended to sign the treaty in the first place, and who probably aspired to become nuclear weapons states, but who used the peaceful nuclear explosive issue as a means of staying out without high political costs internationally. So they used that against us. So that was one thing. But we finessed it, and got a treaty provision providing peaceful nuclear explosion services, but in the end, of course as I said, there was no need for this. The technology was not called upon nor developed, and no one wants peaceful nuclear explosions being set off in their neighborhood anywhere. So that was a problem with the Atomic Energy Commission but it was resolved. The other problem was with the Pentagon on a nuclear weapon test ban. We were required and under great pressure from the countries giving up nuclear weapons to commit ourselves to stop testing ourselves. The Pentagon then, as probably now too, was completely opposed to this, and had allies in the Atomic Energy Commission. There were strong differences in the delegation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who always had a Colonel on the delegation, and the rest of us. There again, we made a treaty commitment that was artfully worded to resolve the problem. Many of these treaty clauses were very artfully worded. I learned quite a lot about treaty writing from that experience, from our very able lawyers there. And one of the phrases that sticks in my mind which served us so well was "effective measures." You would commit your government to take "effective measures" and then you would fill in the space: general and complete disarmament, world peace, to end testing, to end the arms race, whatever you wanted. The operative words were "effective measures," and that was subject to interpretation. You could label almost anything you didn't like, any specific proposal as not being really "effective," and not serving that purpose, as being misleading or misguided, and so on. So the treaty has many such clauses, and I ran into them, not only in the original, but then in the Spanish and the Chinese as well. So there were those problems. But the basic idea of the treaty, that it was in the United States' interest to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, had strong, widespread support, and among public opinion as well, in industry, and bipartisan support. Of course President Johnson was committed to it, and so there was momentum there behind this.

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then I became the chief of the section for two years, and I had 12 officers working for me, and a large staff of 40-50 translators. It was wonderful to be there at that time. We had all the top Asian correspondents of the western American press there, some covering Vietnam, people like Robert Shaplen, who were based out of Hong Kong, Bruce Neelare, Stan Kumpa, all of these people. Plus, all of the leading academic specialists on China came through. We talked to them, got to meet them, exchanged views. The diplomats from Peking came down and talked to us and we to them, and it was a fascinating experience, and for me of course, it was the pinnacle of the China watching overseas operation. I couldn't get beyond that, because we did not have representation in Peking. We briefed an unending stream of Congressmen, military officials, and government officials going through Hong Kong, on China. That was standard, to say nothing of the women's groups and the others who came through and were entitled to this. I gave three or four long briefings a week besides doing writing and reporting. And we were also engaged in the acquisition of documents, which was largely funded by the CIA, and we were able to get some pretty important stuff on the Chinese atomic energy program, among other things.

*Q: Why would the Italians or the Germans -- was it just that they wanted to sell equipment off around? What would be their interest in resisting the Treaty?*

DREXLER: The Germans, and to some extent the Italians, saw the Nonproliferation Treaty as a means by which the Soviet Union was denying them the right to acquire nuclear weapons. And whether or not they actually had an interest in acquiring such weaponry, they felt that for giving this up, and thus meeting the Soviet foreign policy objective, they required compensation, either in the form of more liberal restrictions on their use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, or in the form of limits on the Soviets. Our ambassadors sympathized with these views, to the extent that we in ACDA felt that the Administration's policy and positions were not being faithfully portrayed and put forth to the host country governments. I recall one occasion where we had to use the Norwegians, either in Bonn or in Rome, I forget, to make sure that the substance of what we were after was conveyed. This came as a great shock to me. We ran into the same opposition in the EUR Bureau, under George Springsteen. And I witnessed fierce battles between ACDA and the EUR Bureau over the treaty. Most of the ACDA personnel at the negotiations were ACDA career employees. I was one of the few State Department Foreign Service people detailed there. So I felt more than embarrassed; I was dismayed and disturbed by the way my colleagues in the State Department handled this very important foreign policy project. But we prevailed with great difficulty, with our allies, and with even greater difficulty with the Soviets, and finally tabled a joint treaty. It was signed and ratified. We were all invited to the signing ceremony at the White House, which is one of the high points in my diplomatic career.

There was an Asian China twist to it, which I want to tell you about, because it's not very well known, and recorded nowhere, but is of some interest. The basic treaty languages were Russian and English, and once the treaty was approved by the UN, endorsed by resolution and in final form, there was a mechanical task making its text conform in the other languages of the UN, namely Spanish, French, and Chinese. I worked on the Spanish translation, first of all, to be sure that it conformed. Then something happened to the head of the Department's Chinese language unit in Language Services, so he was not available to work on the Chinese text, and they sent me to the UN in New York instead to do this. We did not work from scratch, of course, but rather, as in the cases of the other languages, like the Spanish, from a basic text done by the UN

interpreters. But the treaty text was highly technical, and the translators at the UN in Chinese, as well as Spanish, did not have this background or expertise. And so, we had to do a lot of work on the basic draft that they gave us. My opposite number from the Soviet Embassy, was Igor Rogochov, whom I encountered later in Moscow, and who is now Russia's Ambassador to China. We worked together on this Chinese text. Now, of course, for me the sensible thing would have been to have someone from the Chinese UN mission with me, but this was the Nationalists; the Soviets would not allow them into the room, or even into the same general area where we were working. So when we came to a point in the treaty text where there had to be a change, I would have to leave the room, call the Chinese Mission on the phone, and tell them what the new phrase was. And the first question to me always was, "Did you suggest this, or did the Russians suggest this?" Because they were convinced that if the Russians suggested it, there was something devious there, and that the Russians were bent on putting something in the Chinese version, which would be more binding or tougher on China than, say, for the other parties. And so we labored at this for several days. We were helped by the fact that the technical terminology was already available to us in the Charter and Annexes that set up the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Chinese definition of fissionable materiel and safeguards was already there in the IAEA context, accepted in usage, and so we used that. We were also able to draw on language from the Chinese version of the United Nations Charter, and there we discovered a problem in the text where the Nonproliferation Treaty has a preamble which refers to some of the objectives in the UN Charter. One of them pertains to the use of force, or the non-use of force, rather. We discovered that the Chinese translation of the UN Charter, which had been on the books for 15-20 years, was wrong, and had been incorrectly translated. Nonetheless, we were supposed to quote this passage in the preamble to the treaty. So we were faced with the question of do you quote the Charter language verbatim, even though it's wrong, or do you correct the Charter language when you quote it in the treaty? Well, we made the correction, and we put it in right, and never said anything about it one way or the other. And to my knowledge, the Chinese translation of the UN Charter still has this defect. The Chinese Mission, the Nationalists, later told me that -- well, they signed it, they ratified the treaty, so our translation wasn't all that bad. There were some passages that they felt didn't flow quite right, but by and large it was not such a bad job under the circumstances. The State Department gave me as my reward, a copy of the Chinese treaty text, one of very few, of the version that was used for signing, beautifully printed, on heavy paper, which I still have, as my memento of all that work.

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*Q: How did one get documents?*

DREXLER: Well, we didn't have to advertise, because by the time I got there it was known that the US Consulate General would pay for good documents. The Japanese Consulate General would also pay, as would some others. We obviously attracted fraudulent documents, so anything that was offered for sale had to be carefully scrutinized. We thought we were pretty good at doing this, and we watched our money. Sometimes you had to take a chance. For the atomic energy documents, I remember the meeting in which I had to decide whether to recommend this or not. We did recommend, and as I remember we paid something in the order of \$50,000.00. I believe that subsequently the documents were found useful. There was no question that they were authentic, but that was rare. To spend so much money.

*Q: You say that the Japanese were paying money. Did you see each other's documents?*

DREXLER: No, the Japanese had their own China watchers there in Hong Kong at this time, and they did not have relations with Peking then either. They were driving up the price. So, I met with my opposite number at the Japanese Consulate, and I said, look here, we're interested in the same material. People are playing one of us off against the other to get a lot of money. Why don't we work cooperatively, and share the documents, at least match notes, consult so that we're not being ripped off and so reduce our expenses. In other words, exercise a monopoly or duopoly. He turned me down. The Japanese refused. We met frequently though, to exchange views as all

the China watchers did. I had a weekly lunch with the chief German Embassy China watcher, and the Chief British intelligence officer. Once a week we met at a restaurant and talked things over. And sometimes we exchanged documents. I also had a weekly lunch with foreign correspondents. There were endless dinners. You never had to buy your own meal in Hong Kong if you were a China watcher at the American Consulate General. We had a superb relationship with the press. These were very distinguished men, Stan Karnow was there, and others, and we trusted them and they depended upon us. There was, in my experience, only one not too important breach of confidentiality by the press, otherwise the working relationship was superb. So while I couldn't bring off the cooperative documents purchasing plan, there was never any obstacle to exchanging views and comments.

*Q: I'm not really sure why the Japanese would be so aggressively separate at this point.*

DREXLER: I can't account for it. I suppose that my opposite number saw the virtue in cooperation, but was turned down by his superiors. We had at the Tokyo level very slight exchanges with them. I went up to Tokyo once or twice, mostly to brief our embassy there on what was going on in China, and I had a couple of meetings with the China specialists in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. But I found their people very stiff and inhibited, and not really very forthcoming or interested in sharing information with us. I think that they felt that there were real limits on the commonality of interest between American officials and the Japanese officials when it came to China. Probably they had their own agents and operatives on the Mainland, their own access, I don't know. They certainly had their own experiences in China. So I had the sense that they looked at China rather differently from us. They calculated their interest as not being entirely congruent with our's. This was not the case, say, with the Germans, the French, the English, the Canadians, the Norwegians, and so on. We were all in the same game together. But the Japanese had their own game going.

*Q: What did we see in China during this 1968-72 period?*

DREXLER: The Cultural Revolution had led to chaos. It was at that time that Mao called in the Army to restore order, and formed local units of government, revolutionary committees, in which the armed forces component was dominant. He also turned to his close comrade in arms and designated successor, Lin Biao, also. The downfall of Liu Shao-chi, and the other targets of the purge which Mao had in mind when he unleashed the revolution, the crushing of the spirit of bureaucratism and so on, all those goals had by then been achieved. But at a cost which Mao felt, and people around him felt should not be sustained. So they were beginning then to draw in the reins and bring the revolution to an end, and reestablish the purified successor generation to Mao, as embodied in Lin Biao. So we watched this take place. The one thing I modestly credit myself with was being the first to detect that Lin Biao himself had been purged. We saw that something strange was going on. There were, as we used to call them, anomalies in the press, in appearances, and there was great disorder involving Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and the Shanghai radicals around her. We were all puzzled about this, until finally, it seemed to me that there was only one explanation, which was unthinkable almost, that Lin Biao, Mao's designated successor, his closest comrade in arms, was finally going to be purged, and that the whole succession scheme was off. I took my telegram about this up to David Dean, who was my superior at that time as Deputy Principal Officer. He questioned me about it, and we sent it off. We were the

first. We were ahead of CIA, all of the other agencies in reaching this conclusion that Lin had fallen. And it wasn't until weeks after that the Chinese themselves confirmed it. So that was a big satisfaction for me personally. But then of course there came the great breakthrough, the Nixon and Kissinger visit, when I became very alienated from Washington's policy toward China. From the Nixon-Kissinger approach, that's when I started to back off.

*Q: While you were there, were these various groups that you would brief, they would essentially be public groups. What were we saying about China at that time?*

DREXLER: We gave them an accurate picture, of course, of the internal turmoil. China at this time was very much introspective. The action was all on the domestic scene, the Cultural Revolution. While they were feuding with the Soviets, and also with us and helping Vietnam, it was remarkable that they were able to maintain this revolutionary campaign at the same time. It was a China dominated by domestic political turmoil. And that's what people focused on and what we briefed visitors about, to help them puzzle out what was going on inside China. Because as far as the Sino-Soviet split was concerned, and Vietnam, our visiting groups more or less knew what that was all about already. But what was going on inside China and what the Cultural Revolution was all about that was a mystery that we could try to unravel for them. Then of course, after the Nixon and Kissinger visit...

*Q: When did that visit take place?*

DREXLER: This would be 1971, I guess, 1971-72, around then. Then we had a stream of people. Erhlichman came through, and I briefed him. George Shultz too. At that time I think he was OMB Chief, or maybe Secretary of Labor. Frank Shakespeare, the head of USIS, Admiral McCain was frequently in from CINCPAC, Secretary of Treasury Kennedy, the Chicago banker, came through. It was endless. Especially after the breakthrough and ping-pong diplomacy led to more contacts. Some of the people who went up were woefully uninformed. Secretary of the Treasury Kennedy's questions and background knowledge were so poor that his own staff was visibly embarrassed as we sat around the table and he threw these dumb questions at me, but off he went. Erhlichman and Shultz didn't say very much. They were good listeners.

*Q: John Erhlichman was on the White House staff.*

DREXLER: That's right, with Haldeman, he was one of the two chief aides of the President. It was also at this time that the Chinese released some long-held American prisoners from the 1950s. The first one I received, unfortunately, after he died. His ashes, I can still see them. I was told that he had committed suicide. This was Hugh Redman. He had committed suicide and the Chinese were going to send us his ashes, and I expected a small urn. Instead I got an enormous package, about two feet long and one foot square, with a muslim covering and the large letters of his name on the side. And this was set on my desk, perfectly horrible. The Chinese told us he committed suicide, after being held for 20 years, with a razor blade in a Red Cross package. The Red Cross told us they never put razor blades in their packages. Then we got word that they would release a live prisoner, Fecteau. These were men who had parachuted while conducting CIA clandestine operations at the time that the Mainland fell to the Communists and who were captured and held for over 20 years.

There was Downey, Redman, and Fecteau. Redman was dead and they told us they were going to put Fecteau across the Hong Kong border at Lo Wu. So I was designated to receive him. The RAF provided the helicopter and took us to the closed border area, which was strictly off limits. We were escorted by a detail of Gurkhas to the bridge, where Fecteau was going to be put across. We knew that there was one train down from Canton, and we waited for it and he didn't show. At the border, in addition to the Gurkhas at the bridge, there was an enormous machine, looking something like those around here that are used to vacuum up leaves in the fall. But this was to spray a banana paste across the bridge in case the Chinese tried to rush across, this gooey stuff would be sprayed from this enormous machine with the great pipe, to coat the whole bridge with banana paste, so that the Chinese would then slip and fall while the Gurkhas went out to attack them. Of course that never happened. But we sat and waited, but there was no Fecteau. I had with me a US Army Colonel, who was one of our attachés and a British military doctor. The doctor was there in case Fecteau was in bad health, but I think also that we had in mind that if Fecteau was going to become difficult, we might have to require the doctor to tranquilize him, because the CIA wanted him taken quietly and quickly by helicopter directly to the RAF part of the Hong Kong airport where there was a C-130 waiting to take him to Manila, Clarke Air Force Base. But there was no Fecteau. So we went to have lunch, and when we came back from our lunch there he was. The Chinese had insisted on giving him lunch at their little canteen at the border before putting him across, after holding him for over 20 years. And there he was, a big strapping fellow in very good health, but totally docile. And far from providing us with any trouble or needing any tranquilizers, he needed stimulus. That is, I took him over to the helicopter, and I said, "Mr. Fecteau, this is the helicopter we've laid on to take you to the air base, and then on to Manila." And he wouldn't move, until I told him to get onto the helicopter and then sit down. The poor man, after all this imprisonment, had been conditioned to such an extent, that he would not make an obvious physical move until told, even by an American friendly officer. With him was a young girl, a mystery girl, who had been put across with him. She told me that she had set off with a boyfriend from Hong Kong a year before and had sailed to Manila. They had been washed ashore, held in a Chinese village. Her boyfriend starved to death, because digestive problems made it impossible for him to eat what the Chinese provided, and she had his passport and a few things with her.

So I asked who she was, and she told me her name and the story I just related to you. She and her boyfriend had of course dropped off the face of the earth, and had been presumed dead for over a year. And I offered to call her father...

*Q: She was Occidental, I take it.*

DREXLER: She was an American citizen, and so was the boyfriend. She had his passport. The Chinese had never told us about holding her, nor alerted us that she was going to come across with Fecteau. I offered to phone her father in the US, but she said no, he had heart trouble, and he'd probably have a heart attack if he learned suddenly that she was alive after all. So I got her on the plane that was there for Fecteau, and sent her off to Clarke Air Force Base, and that was the last I ever saw or heard of them again. Fecteau, of course, said nothing to us, nor did we put anything to him, since obviously he was physically fit. I often thought that he might write a book about his experiences, but as far as I know, he didn't.

One further point, the previous Kissinger visit came as a total surprise to us at the Consulate General.

*Q: Were you all seeing things in the tea leaves on the Chinese side that they were doing something to make the situation ....*

DREXLER: We did not see this, but back in Washington, in INR, an officer and old friend of mine, Lynn Pascoe, strictly on content analysis and looking at editorials and so on, judged that some important positive shift in relations with the United States was in the offing. He deserves great credit for this and is the only one who spotted anything like that. Of course, it was not clear from that what this would exactly entail, namely a Nixon and Kissinger visit. It came not only as a surprise to me, but also as a shock. I thought it was very badly handled, that the terms in the Shanghai communique would come to haunt us, as the Shanghai communique has come to haunt us now these days. But this egocentric Nixon visit to China was done under terms which I think the Chinese regarded as the same way the emperors used to regard tribute bearers. It was self effacing, almost self-humiliating, almost groveling on our part. That's how it looked to me then, and I was very disturbed by what had happened. I count this as a further progression in my disenchantment with the prevailing line among China specialists and among government specialists on what we should do about China. My colleagues were by and large elated by this development (the Nixon visit and the diplomatic breakthrough), and of course in terms of our careers we saw the prospect then of serving in China, and of having our China watching made immeasurably easier and more fascinating by service there. But in terms of American interests and how to deal with the Chinese, and how they perceived us, I thought we were the losers.

*Q: Was this at the time that this developed?*

DREXLER: That was my immediate reaction. I was appalled at what they did.

*Q: Looking at Mao, at that time--here you had this Cultural Revolution and you were beginning to see the consequences of many of these actions. What was your analysis of Mao? Was this like Stalin trying to stay in power, making sure he was in power, or was it for the greater good of the Chinese? What did you see motivating him?*

DREXLER: We thought of him as the greatest Chinese of the 20th century. An outstanding historical figure of unmatched importance in modern Chinese history. Sun Yat-sen, Chang Kai-shek, of course also made their mark, but they were failures. What Mao achieved, bringing a country of over 1 billion people under control, not only of his party, but almost under his personal control, was an astonishing achievement. To watch the man at work, to hear the crowds and see their adulation of him, to be bombarded as we were constantly in Hong Kong by Mao's thought and the little red book, and so on, we noted that we were in the presence of an historic phenomenon. We were also, of course, aware of his shortcomings, that he was authoritarian, and an oriental despot. We were aware of those faults. But we felt that by and large the Chinese people were behind him, that he had that sort of legitimacy; he had not lost, as the Chinese say, "the mandate of heaven." And so I think this was the same idea that Kissinger had when he was ushered into the Mao presence. This was not your ordinary Chinese restaurateur or laundry

man. You were in the presence of a great man, flaws and all. And so that's what we thought about him. I must say that the inside story of his personal life has become known only last year, when his physician wrote his memoirs. It's an astonishing account of Mao's sexual depravity and loathsome personal habits and so on. This was a side to him that you have to add to his other despotic behavior and he now of course looks quite different. But that's what we thought then. He was an historic phenomenon, a great man.

*Q: One has the picture of the China watchers jumping up and down, gee, things are going to happen, and you sitting there scowling. How did your unhappiness or unease with the development take?*

DREXLER: It cost me an assignment that would have been the pinnacle of my Foreign Service career as a China specialist. But that was a little later. The Nixon visit came toward the end of my tour, and I was then going back to the Arms Control Agency to a good job in Geneva. But, if I can go ahead just a little bit, I was out of the China field for three years in Geneva, and then out of it for three years in Bogota, when I was DCM. And at the end of my service in Bogota, Carter had become President, and had named Leonard Woodcock as ambassador and head of the liaison office in Peking. I don't know who was the DCM when Woodcock got there, but the man's assignment was up, and they were searching for a replacement. At that time, I was a front runner, because I was the only China specialist who had experience as a DCM running a large embassy with constituent posts. In Colombia we had three Consulates, and in China we were going to get more. I was a China specialist, I had the right rank, and so on, and finally they whittled down the list and I was asked to fly from Bogota to Washington for just a two-hour final interview with Ambassador Woodcock. He was an American labor union leader, and a very fine man. I liked him. I think he did well. However, before I went up, he had made a speech, a public speech, being back in Washington on consultations, and to pick his DCM, and in this speech he advocated a very soft, accommodating line toward China that went so far that the State Department felt obliged to disavow it, and say that it was his personal view. We did not know at the time that Carter was actually preparing to break relations with the Nationalists, to break the security treaty with Taiwan and have full diplomatic relations with Peking at the ambassadorial level. Undoubtedly Woodcock knew this but he got out ahead on his own. In my interview, everything went very well for the most part. And then we got to matters of policy, and I said to Ambassador Woodcock that I had to in all frankness tell him that I disagreed with the position that he had taken about a more liberal line toward China, and that I felt that he and I should really discuss this openly before I was assigned and got there, because this was going to be a continuing issue and as his DCM I would feel obliged after all these years to raise my own views and challenge his. He thanked me for my frankness and we ended the interview in a friendly way. I went back to Bogota. And when I got back in Bogota a few days later, I was called by Harry Thayer, the China Office Director, who told me that I had lost the assignment. So that was it for me, I lost it. And I was told that this was because of the policy difference. But curiously, years later when the Reagan administration came into office, this affair got me a job back in the EAP bureau, with Paul Wolfowitz, who at that time was the Assistant Secretary. I won't go into that in any detail. But when Paul, who was a very conservative person, as was the President, of course, interviewed me for an office directorship in his Bureau, I could tell the effect that I had on him when I told him the story I just related now, about how my harder line on China had affected my career. And so he gave me the job right off. And he and I were of one mind during

that part of the Reagan administration, of the need to take a tougher line toward China. But there again he, to say nothing of me, failed to halt the pressures toward accommodation.

*Q: We'll probably touch on both of those later, but you went back to ACDA, and when were you there?*

DREXLER: I was given ACDA's only permanent overseas post, the one that they funded. I was Counselor for Arms Control, a kind of political counselor to the US Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, for three years, from 1972-1975. Idar Rimestad was the Perm Rep, and then Francis Dale, a political appointee. So I was ACDA's man there, I had the rank of Counselor, and I was also named the Deputy US Representative to the UN sponsored Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), which was in session about 8 months of the year, two sessions a year. I was also detailed to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the CSCE, as the US Representative in the military basket, the military subcommittee. The Pentagon initially opposed my being named representative there, because they didn't want an ACDA man, but when they found out that I was not really an ACDA man, but a Foreign Service officer, that made me slightly more acceptable, so finally they agreed. So I worked on the CSCE, as well as the Disarmament Conference for three years. Unfortunately, while we made great progress at the CSCE, which was an important negotiation, which results that are still working very well for us, we made no progress on the disarmament side, the arms control side. We were in a defensive, in a holding posture, because the Nixon administration was not inclined to enter into any more arms control agreements there, apart from SALT talks. These bilateral, US-Soviet SALT negotiations were separate from us at the Disarmament Conference and were closely controlled by private back channel by Kissinger. The Nixon Administration was not interested in the work of the CCD, so we had to constantly explain to the other CCD delegations why we couldn't have a test ban, why we couldn't have a chemical weapons treaty, why we couldn't do this or that. It was not a very good time to be there, but we did make some progress on the chemical weapons treaty, and that has finally come into effect, though modified considerably from what we had in mind originally. But the work on the CSCE I found very satisfying, and the one point that I would want to make about it is that we were constantly knocked off balance by Mr. Kissinger's behind-the-scenes negotiations with the Soviets, negotiations that he conducted without keeping our CSCE delegation in Geneva informed. So that frequently the delegation would follow instructions and take positions -- sometime forceful positions -- only to be told by an infuriated Soviet delegate that Mr. Kissinger had already privately disavowed to them the positions we had just expressed. So the Soviets, I think, took delight, as well as tactical advantage, in this, and I felt this particularly in the military committee when we were negotiating confidence building measures. Because of this behind-the-scenes maneuvering with the Soviets by Kissinger we were suspected by our NATO allies, with whom we were supposed to be working together. I often had to go to NATO in Brussels when we would have consultations on the joint alliance posture to be taken in Geneva, and I would be given impossible instructions from Washington, which we knew were the result of deals Kissinger had made behind the scenes with the Russians, and which we somehow had to force down on our allies, who suspected us--rightly--of colluding with the Soviets behind their backs. So that negotiation left a bitter taste in my mouth, as far as Mr. Kissinger is concerned. But nonetheless, it was brought off, and I think the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was successful from the long-range Western point of view.

*Q: You know, I had an interview with George Vest some time ago. And he was in Helsinki working on this, and said that he would sometimes hear from the Norwegian who had heard from the East German, who had heard from the Soviet, that Kissinger was undercutting him. His impression was that Kissinger really was not the prime mover in the CSCE, but Kissinger really was somewhat dismissive of the CSCE, whereas he was more concerned about SALT and all. Did you get that feeling?*

DREXLER: The Helsinki meeting was one of the early phases of the CSCE, and then they moved to Geneva, and, I forget, the CSCE may have been concluded later in New York. But George Vest came to Geneva, and I worked for him, and I have great respect for him. He was close to Kissinger, of course, he had been his press spokesman for a while. I agree that no doubt the SALT negotiations were more important to Kissinger than the CSCE, and more important in every respect, to us too. Also going on were the MBFR talks, the Mutual Balance of Force Reductions, in Vienna, with Ambassador Jonathan Dean there heading our delegation. We tried to liaise with them occasionally, but not with much success. The CSCE was not looked upon as very important. As an arms control measure, it wasn't. But what was important about the CSCE was the human rights basket, and it can be argued that our success, the delegation's success in getting the Russians to subscribe to this, led to the human rights exchanges and openings which helped bring down the Soviet regime. That was very important. But that was not one of Kissinger's interests. My criticism, my quarrel with Mr. Kissinger is not on his priorities, but his style, and his allowing a situation to come about where his delegation seemed to be betraying the Western allies there, and where we were kept in the dark. This was not in our national interest. As for his purposes of downplaying the CSCE to make sure that it didn't interfere with the more important SALT game going -- this could have been achieved in a more statesman-like and creditable way. I thought myself that this was further proof that Mr. Kissinger for his brilliance, his knowledge of history, and his other qualities, had many weaknesses of character. That is still my view.

*Q: By the time you left in 1975, where did things stand?*

DREXLER: The CSCE agreement was nearing completion. The CCD arms control talks were bogged down, and Nixon had resigned, of course. The disarmament conference there in Geneva was largely preoccupied with protecting the nonproliferation treaty, because the treaty had a clause which required a periodic review conference. All the parties get together and look at it every five years to see if its purposes are being met. So, we had a conclave in Geneva in which the non-aligned could hold our feet to the fire. They could charge that we didn't give peaceful nuclear explosive devices, we didn't stop nuclear testing, we kept building up our arsenals. We're still engaged in the mad arms race, and we were doing this sort of thing. So we had, as we did every review conference afterward, until the one a couple of years ago, to preserve the treaty from attack and we succeeded. I was the Secretary General of the US delegation for the first review conference, and we brought it off. But those were three bleak years in which we were on the defensive in Geneva, as far as the U.N. and multilateral arms control negotiations were concerned.

*Q: So you left in 1984, and whither?*

DREXLER: Then I went back to the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. As I mentioned earlier, I was hired by Paul Wolfowitz, who was the Assistant Secretary, in an interview, when I seemed to say a magic word when I was describing how I had lost my assignment to Peking as DCM, because I favored a hard line toward China. He favored a hard line toward China too, and I guess I was such a rare bird among China specialists, that this convinced him to take me on. And I was made Director of the Office of Regional Affairs. In that office we handled at that time the Asian refugee problem, which was a very serious one, all of the million or more refugees from Vietnam, the boat people suffering horribly in the camps throughout Southeast Asia, the refugees from Laos and Cambodia, and so on. I also was responsible for military assistance programs to all of East Asia, and for economic assistance programs. And I handled arms control, which was just beginning to -- I mentioned that the arms control field, when I entered it in the '60s was European in its focus, and its experts and staffs were all European in their background studies -- arms control was now beginning to shift in focus to Asia, and there were proposals for nuclear free zones and other measures. And also I watched China and other affairs, which had a regional interest.

I was the only office director that participated in Paul Wolfowitz's senior staff meetings, which was with Deputy Assistant Secretaries, and his press advisor. I had and have great respect for Wolfowitz, a brilliant, hardworking man, whom I'm sure has a long, great future ahead. We were not always in agreement on domestic politics, certainly, but I had great respect for him. He was a sort of one-man band. I was used to having papers pile up on Middendorf's desk, because he never paid attention and wasn't interested. The papers piled up on Paul Wolfowitz's desk because he was interested, and wanted to read all this, and he would lug home a briefcase that I would have found hard to carry. He was extremely conscientious and hardworking. I should say about politics that when I went to work for Middendorf I was an Independent. After two years with him I became a registered Democrat, and having seen his friends Pat Robertson, Ollie North, and James Watt, and that whole crew. But Paul and I took a conservative view about China, and I think he liked that. The EAP bureau was compartmentalized very much. The office of Indonesian Affairs focused on that country, and they did their own thing. The Philippine affairs officers did their thing, and the Japan people were doing their thing, and the China people had their shop. The problem was that while what happened in Indonesia and the Philippines, and the Australia/New Zealand desk, didn't much affect the rest of the region, but certainly what happened in China did. And I found that the other office directors, covering Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Japan even, always had their eye on what the China specialists were doing, but they never butted in, and were rather inhibited and reticent, because they hadn't studied Chinese, so they didn't know the secret handshake and the secret password, and the China crew let them know this, and kept them out. This crew insisted that their work was only for specialists and those of us who understood China. But of course with my background I could not be kept out in that way, and I constantly sent in memos to Paul, criticizing this or that that I saw developing in our China policy. Primary among this was the growing military relationship between the United States and China, which horrified me. We began moves to update the electronics on their fighter planes, to improve the technology on their ships, to exchange visits with the Chinese military, and so on, all of which I thought was not in our interest, and was selling rope to the hangman. I sent memos to Paul criticizing this, and I remember on one occasion when we were at the FBI Academy together, and I drove him back, and I told him my views, why I thought we were ill-advised to develop military ties with China. He said, "Well, Bob, I think you're right and I agree

with you, but unfortunately this thing has gone too far, and the White House and the Pentagon, and so on, and Shultz, and it just can't be stopped, and we just have to go along with it."

At this time, the Soviet Union was turning into a Pacific power. It didn't last long. They were building up their fleet, they were using Cam Ranh Bay, our former Vietnam facilities, and they were making agreements with a lot of these newly independent island states, buying their fish, or crabs, octopuses, or whatnot, in return for refueling rights and potential base facilities. So they were presenting a new threat in the Pacific to us. And this was the thing that drove the Pentagon to a closer military relationship with China. The Pentagon thought that we could complicate things for the Soviets in the Pacific by cooperating more with China, and some of the Pentagon people even envisioned China and the United States fighting together against the Russians. I actually saw a Pentagon paper that Paul sent me with such a scenario, and he asked me to comment on it, do what I could to fix it up, and so on. And I took it to him and said, "This can't be fixed up. The analysis, the concepts are so erroneous that nothing can be done with this." One of the specifics was that the Chinese would help take out Cam Ranh Bay, that in this war with the Soviet Union we could depend upon the Chinese navy and air force to attack Cam Ranh Bay and neutralize the Soviets there while we were fighting in other areas. I said that this was fantasy, not even science fiction. If the Chinese see a war shaping up between the Soviets and the United States, they'll order a cup of coffee and sit back and watch the tigers fight. There is even a nice Chinese saying to go with this. It's completely unrealistic to expect what the Navy was expecting, but nonetheless it went forward.

And one of the things that troubled me was that EUR and the Soviet specialists didn't seem interested in this. Typically a paper on the subject of Sino-American military cooperation would make clear that this particular move was going to present strategic problems for the Soviets in Asia, and complicate the decision making for Soviet military planners, and contain other advantages for us and disadvantages for Moscow. But, as I would say to Paul, there's always a missing paragraph, and that was, how were the Soviets going to react? What are they going to do when we do this with China against them? What are their countermoves; what might they do? This was always missing. I would take these papers often to the Soviet desk, and find that they were not much interested in it. There was no input for them, no real desire to comment. They themselves just couldn't focus, apparently, on the Pacific. I don't know what other reason there might be. So I found this very troubling, so I formed a committee, an inter-bureau committee, called the Soviets in Asia Committee, which I chaired and which brought together once a month Soviet specialists, and our Asian specialists from the State Department. And we sat down and matched notes on what the Soviets were doing in Asia, what we were doing in Asia and the Pacific with the Chinese, and I tried to close that gap between the Bureaus. And then we would take minutes of our meetings, and reach some conclusions, and record observations, note this or that with alarm, and so on, and then these minutes would be circulated to Paul and to others, which I thought was a good idea, and might help put some brakes on what we were doing with the Chinese in an anti-Soviet thrust. I think that this committee was not continued after I left that job in 1987, and of course, although we couldn't see it at the time, the Soviet Union collapsed, the Soviet Pacific navy is now rusting in Vladivostok.

*Q: I'm an old navy buff, and seeing these really beautiful ships all lined up and sort of listing off to one side on the mud flats...*

DREXLER: We couldn't have foreseen that, but it came out all right, although the military aid and cooperation to China is still there and will haunt us.

*Q: It already is.*

DREXLER: Yes. Now, at that time there was a change in the Administration's policy toward the Soviet Union, at least nominally. Before the change, if I understood it correctly, it was the thought that we would have to regularize our bilateral relationship with the Soviets, sort of at the summit levels, and then once that was done, if it could be done, our problems in various parts of the world -- Central America, Latin America, the Middle East, Africa, the Pacific -- would sort of fall into place. They would be corollaries of this basic agreement. But then this idea was changed. I don't know whether it originated in the White House, or with Shultz, or both. It was decided instead to attack the regional problems. To overcome misunderstanding and conflicts in the various regions with the hope that this would build a basis for a better bilateral relationship and maybe for a far-reaching summit agreement. That was a good theory and in practice we had meetings with the Soviets. Their Latin American specialists and our Latin American specialists first got together and what was important for us was that it was then proposed that the State Department's Asian specialists get together with Moscow's Asian specialists. I thought this was a great idea. Paul Wolfowitz was not so anxious to do it. He is strongly anti-Soviet, anti-communist, highly suspicious of Moscow.

*Q: You were mentioning Paul Wolfowitz?*

DREXLER: Yes, he had a very well reasoned idea of the Soviets as our antagonists and rivals, based on academic study, work in the arms control field, in other words, well founded, well reasoned, not visceral...

*Q: What was his background?*

DREXLER: He had a Ph.D., and I think he taught at university. I believe he did a Ph.D. thesis in arms control on the International Atomic Energy Agency's safeguards of nuclear installations. I think he had served perhaps in the Nixon-Ford Administration in the arms control field, but I can't say for sure. But his background is what we would call a political-military background, with specialization in Soviet Affairs. So he was a careful student and a real expert on the subject. He had never been to Moscow, and that's where we were supposed to go for our first experts meeting. Before we left for there, he arranged a sort of a bull session with a lot of other hard line American Soviet specialists, whom I briefed as to what we were going to do when we got to Moscow. Paul wanted his colleagues to know that we weren't going to sell out our country or be patsies or pushovers, or agree to give up our weapons, or let the Soviets seduce or entrap us. They could depend upon us, and they didn't seem to be worried, but I think that Paul felt he had to secure his right flank if he was going to go to Moscow. And so I drafted for him a memo to Shultz as to what we were going to achieve. We were going to sock it to them in Moscow, we were going to take a hard line, hit them on human rights, and go in there and fight. And I think the Secretary looked this over and sent it back with a marginal comment saying, "This is fine Paul. But also be alert to any signs of flexibility on the Soviets' part."

So we went off to Moscow in 1985. We had two days of talks with the Soviets. They didn't go very well. Ambassador Hartman was away, and the embassy officer in charge of our arrangements got everything balled up. We went to the wrong place for the meetings, we missed our plane, everything was fouled up. And the Soviets said that they didn't have such a thing as an Assistant Secretary, and so their top Asia man, who was called a Deputy Minister, named Kapitsa, a terrible man, would not deign to meet with Paul, because Paul was of lower rank. So Paul said "Well, if he's not going to meet with me, I'm not going to go. You go and meet with him Bob. You go to meet with his underling." I said, "We've come here to Moscow, we can't do this. We have to go through with the talks." And I'm sure if Hartman had been there he would have advised us to. But the Charge, a DCM, was in sort of awe of Assistant Secretary Wolfowitz, and he wasn't much help. But it got very tense there as we prepared for this session, so I said to Paul, "Well, why don't you have a private meeting with Mr. Kapitsa, before the conference, and tell him that things like this sort of protocol problem of rank shouldn't stand in the way of a good frank discussion." So he agreed to this, and when we finally got to the right place, he had a private session with Kapitsa, and sort of worked things out, so that we had our meetings, and the protocol problems were resolved. It turned out that the number two at the talks was Igor Rogochov, the man with whom I'd met 20 years before in New York, when he and I both had the task of making sure that the Chinese language version of the Nonproliferation Treaty conformed, in my case to the English, and in his, the Russian language version. So he remembered me from that time, and I remembered him. The meeting was useful, but Paul took a very tough line on human rights, and Kapitsa got angry, or he feigned anger, and said he wasn't going to be lectured on human rights. And Paul, who is Jewish, had a very strong empathy with the so-called Refuseniks, the Jewish community that was being held almost in bondage in Moscow, and not allowed to immigrate. He felt this very strongly and understandably. So there were emotional issues in the meetings, too. We did have a fairly frank exchange on a number of issues. One of the things that I was supposed to ask the Soviets, and did, was what was going to happen in North Korea after Kim Il Sung died. We hear that he's got this crazy son. Is he going to inherit the way the Bourbons and the Hapsburgs did? You know him better than we do; what is he like? It turns out that they didn't know him much better than we did, and they didn't have anything to offer, and it was clear that they were rather worried too as to what Kim Jong Pil was going to be. Well, we're still in that boat. So after the meeting, we flew all the way across I don't know how many time zones to Tokyo to begin briefing our Asian friends about the talks.

*Q: Talking about the meeting, what was the impression you got of the Soviet feeling toward China at the time?*

DREXLER: We had common views as far as analyzing what was going on, what the state of play was there with Deng Xiaoping. As I recall, we both had the feeling that these Chinese could really be a pain in the ass. That they really were quite a handful to deal with. I think we shared information and matched notes, almost the way I used to do when I would go to the NATO meeting of Asian experts in Brussels, which I did twice a year. It was rather the same atmosphere. Once we got off the human rights thing, there was more or less what was intended, an exchange of views among specialists. There was no posturing on that, and the questions and the answers were very serious, and so this was the case at the luncheon too. The Soviets were hospitable to us in that sense, and I think wanted to deal with us in a professional way. So it was

useful. And then we all flew to Tokyo, and Paul went on to Tokyo to brief the Japanese on this meeting, and I must say the Japanese were very interested in what we had to say, and what this was all about. The Americans getting together with the Soviets and talking about Japan, among other things. The Japanese Charge in Moscow was an old friend of Paul's and invited us out to an elaborate Japanese dinner and did all he could to pump us. Because our Embassy's administrative arrangements were so poor, it was this Japanese Charge who drove us all to the airport when we left. And he drove so slowly, so as to have the maximum time to pump us, that we nearly missed our plane. In fact, we had lost our reservations, and only with great trouble did we finally get on the flight to Tokyo.

*Q: Before we leave this, so the mutual feeling about China -- did the Soviets show much attention to other parts of Asia? Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam, in particular.*

DREXLER: Well, I can't remember anything notable about our discussions of those other countries, except that they were rather sarcastic about the Philippines and Marcos.

*Q: You retired when?*

DREXLER: In September of 1987.

*Q: Well, this has been fascinating.*

DREXLER: I'd like to add one point. When I was in the East Asian Bureau, I attended two Chiefs of Mission conferences. These are annual affairs, where they bring together our ambassadors to all of the Asian posts, and the first one took place in Honolulu, at CINCPAC, the military command center of the Commander in Chief of the Pacific. And it was a very interesting session in the command center. All the ambassadors were there, but there was no one there from our mission in Taiwan, which at that time was headed by Harry Thayer, an old friend of mine. Instead, there was Harry's deputy. And I talked to him, and asked, "Is Harry ill or something, he couldn't make it?" He said, "No, he was not permitted to come." The EAP Bureau at the State Department would not let Harry Thayer come to the Chiefs of Mission conference because the Chinese Communists would object. We had this fiction, of course, that we don't have an embassy in Taipei, but instead an Interests Section, as the Nationalists do here in Washington. And Foreign Service officers staff it, but they nominally retire from the service, are hired by this group, and then when they finish their duty, they come back into the Service. It's a fiction understood by both sides, and it works neatly. Peking accommodates itself to it. But I never thought that we should have to go so far as to not let the head of our office there come to a top secret classified meeting at CINCPAC in Honolulu, a private meeting of our own. This particularly is, I think, wrongheaded because the head of our office in Taiwan wasn't just another chief of mission, like, if our ambassador to Burma was not there, it wouldn't be a terrible loss, because we didn't have that much interest in Burma then anyway, but Taiwan is a major trading partner, important politically in the region, and it was more important that our man in Taipei be there, than our man from Burma or New Zealand. But he wasn't. Not only did he have to be represented by a deputy, but the deputy was not even allowed to sit at the table in CINCPAC, which was reserved for ambassadors only. So he sat in the audience with the rest of us, which I thought was preposterous. So the next year, when they discussed arrangements for another chiefs

of mission meeting, one that was going to be held in Washington, at the senior staff meeting, I said, "I have to be the only one, since Paul has left, who is in the Bureau now who was at last year's chiefs of mission meeting. And I want to tell you what happened regarding our man in Taiwan." I said that, "I think that this is really wrong, and to kowtow this way to Peking is quite unnecessary. If they protest, we just reject it, and they probably won't protest anyway, they may not even know. We are really only harming ourselves, and our discussions by keeping such a man away." Jim Lilley at that time was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for China, and an old friend from Hong Kong days, and he said, "I agree. We will let the representative from Taiwan sit at the table this time." But I believe they didn't let the number one man come even then. So this is an example of the eccentricities and the anomalies that one encounters where China is concerned. I think that is worthy of note.

**DONALD M. ANDERSON**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC and Taichung, Taiwan (1958-1961)**

**Consular Officer/Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1962-1965)**

**Interpreter Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1965-1966)**

**China Desk Talks**  
**Washington, DC (1966-1970)**

**China Expert, Political Section**  
**New Delhi, India (1970-1972)**

**Talks with Chinese**  
**Paris, France (1972-1973)**

**Political Officer, American Liaison Office**  
**Beijing (1973-1975)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1975-1977)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1977-1980)**

**Consul General**  
**Shanghai (1980-1983)**

**Office of Chinese Affairs, Bureau of East Asian Affairs**

**Washington, DC (1983-1985)**

**Consul General  
Hong Kong (1986-1990)**

*Donald M. Anderson was born in Iowa in 1932. He entered the Foreign Service in 1958. His career included positions in China (Hong Kong and Taiwan), India, and France. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 8 and September 2, 1992.*

*Q: How did the Chinese connection which, of course, ran through your entire career but how did this start? Coming from Sioux City...*

ANDERSON: I've been asked that many, many times. About the only answer I can think of is that when I was in the third grade, I believe, my third grade school teacher was a former Chinese missionary. She used to read us stories about China, and take us over to her house and show us all of the things that she had brought back from China. Then when I was at LSU obviously there wasn't much of a China program, but they did have a course in Chinese political history, and I took that. And in my graduate year at LSU I started working on a master's thesis on the 1945-47 period of U.S.-China relations, the Marshall Mission, etc. So I had an interest in China, and the April Fool's sheet that you fill out...

*Q: This was the post preference report that came around and due on the first of April, hence the name April Fools Sheet.*

ANDERSON: From the very beginning I requested Chinese language training. I remember quite clearly that I got a phone call from Personnel...actually I had been assigned to Munich and was quite pleased with the assignment. I was going to the Consular Section in the Consulate General in Munich. And I got a phone call from Personnel saying that they had noted my application for Chinese language training and that the Chinese program was very overcrowded but they could get me into Cambodian right away. I told them, thank you, but no thank you, and sort of made up my mind that I was going to go on to Munich. It wasn't more than two or three days later that they called back and said that I had indeed been accepted for Chinese language training, which meant another year in Washington which just about broke my wife's heart because at that time we had one daughter two years old, and one daughter six months old, and she was very much looking forward to sailing to Munich. But we did the year in Washington and then went off to Taiwan for the second year of Chinese language training.

*Q: The school was not in Taipei was it?*

ANDERSON: No, it was down in Taichung.

*Q: How was the course conducted there?*

ANDERSON: Well, it was a very informal place. Taichung at that time was, I guess, a city of 500,000 people, but by Chinese standards it was a very small town. It reminded me in terms of

size of something akin to Sioux City, Iowa. The school was in a large what had been I imagine a single home. There were about 20- 25 students from USIA, CIA, State. That was pretty much it at that time. The classes were basically tutorials. One would have some classes with two or three students in it, but as you progressed into more advanced Chinese it was usually a one on one situation. The latter part of the course was really basically devoted to newspaper reading because reading Chinese is the time consuming part. We gave speeches, and we had lectures, and area studies lectures in Chinese. It was quite a well run program, I think.

*Q: Did you feel that you were absorbing the Nationalist Chinese point of view? Or was it relatively apolitical?*

ANDERSON: Well, inevitably...being in Taiwan, you were exposed much more to the Nationalist point of view. And most of the teachers had come from Beijing, or from the northeast.

*Q: You were being taught Mandarin?*

ANDERSON: We were taught Mandarin. The dialects vary so much in China that they sought teachers from the Beijing area which was the most standard Chinese. Our teachers were entirely Mainlanders who had fled the Mainland when the communists took over so you did have a rather staunchly anti-communist viewpoint. We did get the People's Daily, and Chinese communist publications because it was necessary to not only learn the standard Chinese characters, that is, the old-fashioned more complex characters which we used in Taiwan, but also you had to learn the simplified characters which the Chinese communists had introduced if you were going to read the Chinese communist press.

*Q: Did you find that a lot of ideographs had been made up? Sort of communist type words, or not?*

ANDERSON: Not the characters themselves, no. That was a pretty straightforward process of simplification based on the logic of the characters. In fact, I think had the Nationalists not lost the war and evacuated to Taiwan, they would have probably introduced a similar expanded simplification system. The language itself, the jargon obviously was influenced by the communists ideology. Like any language it evolves and I did find that when I once became involved with Mainland Chinese, that the language that was spoken on Taiwan -- the Mandarin that was spoken on Taiwan -- was progressively getting more out of date with what they were using on the Mainland. It was, generally speaking, more formal, not classical. A much more old-fashioned kind of Chinese.

*Q: What were you picking up from your fellow students, and any connections you might have with the embassy about the political situation? We're talking about 1961-'62. The Kennedy administration had come in. Was there a feeling that the Nationalists might actually make a try for the Mainland? Or did we think this was a pipe dream? How did we feel?*

ANDERSON: Well, the period I was in Taichung the first time was really sort of the depths of the results of the Great Leap Forward, there was widespread famine on the Mainland, and the

Mainland was really in terrible shape economically. It was probably the one time following Chaing Kai-shek's withdrawal to Taiwan that there was some serious consideration given to the possibility of launching some kind of an attack against the Mainland. I don't think it ever came to anything. I went back for further training in 1965 and one of my teachers at that time was a sort of semi-retired Nationalist general, and he and I used to talk about it. He said that he had been designated in 1962 as the Commander of the Nationalist forces on the Mainland should the invasion take place. Obviously it never did.

*Q: Again, among your group, the recognition of Communist China was a bone of contention that went on from 1948 until really 1977, or something like that.*

ANDERSON: '79.

*Q: What was the feeling there? I was a Foreign Service officer but never dealt with it but the feeling, it's just a political thing, why don't we just get on with it, and recognize them.*

ANDERSON: I think among the group that I was with and certainly my own feeling was that we ought to be moving in that direction. It was not a simple matter of simply switching recognition at that point. It probably would have produced chaos on Taiwan, but a lot of the fiction that we maintained for many, many years really gradually became rather silly. I remember when I went back to the Department -- it would have been the mid-'60s -- you still really couldn't talk about it. If you used the word "China" without "communist" in front of it, there were people who would question what you were talking about. There was a long time, for example, that you couldn't use the word "Peking", you had to use the word "Peiping" which was the Nationalist name for the former capital of China. It was a very emotional issue, and the China lobby was still at that time fairly strong. People still remembered what had happened during the McCarthy period, and the whole issue that we lost China, etc.

*Q: The China hands, John Stewart Service, and others really suffered from that.*

ANDERSON: I had friends who said, "Why do you want to study Chinese?"

*Q: Again, I'm trying to get back to the time...what was the feeling about a career in Chinese? After all, you had this one not overly significant island where we had posts, and then you had this huge Mainland with many millions of people on it where we had no recognition, and you're starting on a career of this. What was the feeling?*

ANDERSON: I guess I took the long view. I figured that I had probably another 20 or 25 years in the Foreign Service and that things would inevitably change. And then in addition to the view that at sometime we would get to the Mainland, it really wasn't quite as restricted as it might sound, because the embassy in Taipei was quite large. And then we had the Consulate General in Hong Kong which was the premier China watching post for the U.S. Government and was larger than most embassies. At that time there was also a practice of assigning Chinese language officers to a number of our southeast Asian posts because places like Bangkok, for example, had very large overseas Chinese communities, and it was felt that it was desirable to have a Chinese speaking officer to follow that sector of the community. So in terms of career possibilities it was

not a bad deal.

*Q: Indonesia, Burma...well then you did go to Hong Kong where you served from '62 to '65. What were you doing there?*

ANDERSON: Well, the conventional wisdom when we were finishing up language school was that the career-wise thing to do was to go to Taipei because that would help you solidify and consolidate your language. I decided not to do that, and I tried to get assigned to Hong Kong because I did want to work on the Mainland. I did not want to get locked into being a Taiwan specialist. So I went to Hong Kong first as a consular officer, which is the way everybody went from language school to Hong Kong...in the consular section. I did a year in the American citizen services...actually the passport section, which was a very educational experience because passport fraud in Hong Kong was a major enterprise.

*Q: How did you deal with it?*

ANDERSON: It was a fascinating thing.

*Q: Could you describe how the fraud developed, and how you dealt with it?*

ANDERSON: Basically, the origins of the passport fraud was in the late 19th century, early 20th century. There was a tremendous amount of, not immigration, but travel by people from Guangdong Province just across the border from Hong Kong, to the United States, largely working on the railroads as laborers. This group of people actually came almost entirely from two or three counties, just across the border. And when the San Francisco earthquake occurred, for example, all the birth records were lost, and all one had to do to be certified as a citizen living in San Francisco was to have two people come in and swear that you were born in San Francisco. A lot of Chinese became American citizens that way. Someone did a study once of the population of San Francisco at that time and determined that if every Chinese male in San Francisco had actually been born in San Francisco, knowing the number of Chinese females in San Francisco, that each woman would have had to give birth to 600 children. Their practice was generally to leave the wife back in the village, and go earn enough money that they were prosperous by Chinese standards; then they would come home and maybe spend a year, and then go back and work some more. During that time would sire children. And, of course, the desirable thing to have was boys, because they would then grow up and as soon as they were eligible they would go to the United States and work to continue this process of sending money back to the village. Daughters were an inconvenience, and so what would happen would be that if your brother who had stayed back in China had a son, and you came back and your wife produced a daughter, your brother's son would become your son for immigration purposes.

They developed an intricate network of fraud and in response the Consulate General in Hong Kong set up a fraud unit which was really quite an elaborate organization. The Chinese traditionally have what is called three generation papers. These are papers on usually red tissue paper, and they have the names of all of the relatives for three generations written on them. These are exchanged at wedding ceremonies. The fraud unit started studying these things, and developed an extensive file and collection of familial relations for these three counties,

particularly Toishan county which was the biggest. It reached the point where people would come in...nobody had a birth certificate or any document so you relied on secondary evidence such as photographs taken with a person, work permits, or whatever it was. They would come in and claim to be so-and-so, and the son of so-and-so. We could send the application to the fraud unit, and they would research the names and come back and say, "He is not so-and-so's son. He is his nephew, and this is his father." We would present this to the applicant and they were usually so stunned that we knew that much, that they would immediately throw up their hands. And then there was blood testing also. Blood testing became quite sophisticated, it wasn't a positive identification, but it was a negative identification. So it was a real job of sleuthing. There was very little legal work or traditional consular passport work. It was trying to figure out the family heritage of somebody.

*Q: I'm sure it gave you a much greater appreciation of the social intricacies of Chinese life too.*

ANDERSON: Indeed. Not perhaps for Chinese life in the big picture, but certainly for southern Guangdong. Cantonese life is frequently quite different than say north or other parts of China. It's very traditional, sort of old-fashioned.

*Q: How about with the language? I've always understood that there's Mandarin and Cantonese, and then a multitude of other dialects. How about Cantonese? Could you get along with it, or were you learning?*

ANDERSON: No. I must confess that for spoken work in the consular section, my Mandarin was virtually useless. They all spoke Cantonese, and in fact, many of them spoke Toishan which is a dialect of Cantonese. I could read the documents because Chinese is standard all over China.

About the language. No, I did not interview people in the language, I used an interpreter. In fact my principal interpreter and assistant knew more about U.S. citizenship law than I ever would.

*Q: This is so often the case. Then you moved to the political section?*

ANDERSON: In those days the political and economic functions were divided differently in the Consulate General because of the peculiar nature of the Consulate. We had a Hong Kong-Macau section, and a Mainland China section, and within each of those two sections we had an economic and political unit. So I was assigned for a time in the commercial section of the Hong Kong-Macau section where one of my major functions was what they called Economic Defense Officer, which was enforcing our embargo on the Mainland. It sort of meant chasing Hong Kong companies around that did business with China, and trying to prevent them from buying American products.

*Q: This was a major effort on our part.*

ANDERSON: Oh, it was one of the silliest I've ever seen. The Consul General himself got in trouble because he had a love for Chinese export porcelain, and thought that was perfectly acceptable to buy. And we had a Treasury agent in the Consulate who warned him that he was breaking the law. That job only lasted for about six or eight months, and then the State

Department contacted me and asked me if I wanted to be the next interpreter for our meetings at the ambassadorial level with the Chinese in Warsaw, Poland. It's something that I had given some thought to because I did fairly well in the basic Chinese language course. I came out of it with an S-4, R-4.

*Q: I might for the record say S-4, R-4, is speaking-4, reading- 4, is extremely high in our business. You really have to be born to get the 5-5, which is the highest.*

ANDERSON: The job rather appealed to me because at the time the officer who was doing it was posted in London in the political section, and used to fly over from London to Warsaw to do the talks. So I readily agreed that I would like to do it...it involved going back to Taiwan for an additional year of interpreter training, and then on to, I thought, London. And as a result I should add they pulled me out of the commercial section, and put me into the Mainland China political section, reporting on Mainland China's foreign relations. So I did move over to the political section for about the last year and a half that I was in Hong Kong. My stint in the political section in Hong Kong ended up really being devoted in very large part to reporting on the probability of China's entering the Vietnam war. While we were in Hong Kong the Tonkin Gulf incident happened, which produced mass rallies in Beijing and a number of very threatening editorials and speeches about the U.S. aggression against Vietnam. There were a lot of people, particularly back in Washington, who still had very fresh memories of the Chinese entry into the Korean war, and there was serious concern as to what the Chinese were going to do, and, I think basically, how far we could pursue the war in Vietnam without provoking Chinese intervention. I was sitting out in Hong Kong reading everything we could get, and trying to provide an analysis of the probability of a Chinese intervention.

*Q: I've heard people say this obvious centuries-long antipathy between the Vietnamese and the Chinese and saying you never could really expect these two to get together.*

ANDERSON: It was pretty well obscured during the war, though. They were talking about being as close as lips and teeth and all of that stuff.

*Q: Just to get a feel for this. Here you are sitting in Hong Kong reading newspapers, and listening to broadcasts, and this type of thing. How could you get any feel for what's going on? It's a controlled press...*

ANDERSON: It very definitely was an inexact science. It was almost entirely from content analysis. Looking at the terminology they were using, talking to Chinese about, "What are the implications of this type of language coming from a Chinese source?" Really just gauging whether they were drawing a line and saying, "At this point we will react," or leaving things fuzzy. It appeared to me quite clear that they were trying to leave things fairly fuzzy. And I pretty well concluded that the United States could bomb, could conduct an aerial warfare against North Vietnam, but if the United States were to cross the 17th parallel, and start driving...

*Q: This is just above Hue.*

ANDERSON: Yes, and start driving toward the Chinese border, then I think we probably would

have gone too far.

*Q: As you went into these analyses, were you using as sort of a test the words that the Chinese were using during 1950 essentially in Korea, and saying, "Ok, they were saying this, and we did this..." and using this as the model to look at?*

ANDERSON: To the degree we could, but we didn't have that much. Alan Whiting wrote the book on China's entry into the Korean war, but that was later. We really didn't have the ability to do that careful an analysis. We probably should have.

*Q: You say you talked to Chinese to find out the nuances. Who were the Chinese you'd get the nuances from?*

ANDERSON: Well, I talked to the Chinese language teachers that we had. We had a Chinese local staff who assisted us with the content analysis, a very bright bunch of people that had an institutional memory of events and pronouncements by the Chinese going back sometimes 15-20 years. In fact, some of the locals that we had at the Consulate back in those days had actually come out of China with us when we left China. So they were a tremendous help. I remember one phrase, *xiu xiu pang guan*; quite literally it means "stand aside and watch," and I was trying to figure out whether this was a serious threat or what, and one of the Chinese said, "Well, literally, I think it probably amounts to your saying, 'If you get in a fight, I'll hold your coat.'"

*Q: Who was the Consul General at that time?*

ANDERSON: Marshall Green was Consul General when I arrived. By the time I was in the political section, it was Ed Rice.

*Q: You were coming out with a sort of a conclusion. This is a very important thing, and there was a lot resting on what the Chinese were going to do, and obviously you were down the line so it wasn't all on you. But still did you feel any pressure as far as how you should call things, or not? What was the atmosphere?*

ANDERSON: No, not really. Obviously I was pretty far down the line, and my analyses weren't going out under my signature. It was being vetted by at least two more layers, and sometimes three, and this was only one input into the decision-making in Washington. INR had an input, and CIA had an input to the decision-makers in Washington. But we were looking at it from the Hong Kong perspective, and as I say, largely based on content analysis. I don't know how much impact that had, but obviously the decisions were made to go ahead.

*Q: Did you get any feel about, from where you were, about the CIA operations? Were you getting information, and how did that meld in with your activities?*

ANDERSON: The CIA operation was very important. At that point less so for Vietnam, and for the Vietnam conflict, at least as far as inputs to me. It was important in terms of conditions inside Mainland China. There was a very extensive interview program, and the agency worked very closely with the British who obviously had a much bigger presence and were screening people

coming across the border, etc. So it was a very important operation. I remember there were one or two guys that showed up who had just come out of North Vietnam, and we chased them around Hong Kong like they were gold miners, and usually they wouldn't talk to us anyway.

*Q: What was your impression of events in China at the time? The Great Leap Forward had...*

ANDERSON: It really collapsed, and economic conditions were in terrible shape. This was a period when Hong Kong was just being swamped by refugees coming across the border. I can remember our apartment looked out over the harbor, and then on to the hills of Kowloon. There was a terrible drought during this period, and we got down to water for four hours every fourth day. The brush fires on the hills you could see at night, burning up the hills. The refugees were streaming across the river that separates China from Hong Kong, and the Hong Kong government was having to cope with these thousands of refugees and began a massive housing program. We were very much involved in that as well because some of them did have claims to go to the United States. So it was a very difficult time, and we were focusing largely on the issues of the day. We were also trying to do China watching in the sense of what was happening in Beijing.

By the time I left to go back to language training in late '65, we were beginning to see some signs that something wasn't right in China, and that there were some new figures beginning to appear. But up until that time the Chinese had been able to maintain a facade of unity. I think people realized rather late that there was a tremendous power struggle going on.

*Q: You went back to Taichung from '65 to '66? What was that all about?*

ANDERSON: That was interpreter training. They had no formal interpreter training program, since they only trained one every four years so I had to sort of make it up myself. I worked with two or three of the senior teachers to design an interpreters' course. We built up a glossary of terms. I would read newspapers and interpret orally what I was reading, and if I saw words that sounded like they might be words that would be useful in the context of the ambassadorial talks in Warsaw I'd pull them out and we worked on a glossary of interpreting terms. Then my wife and I worked on going the other direction from English to Chinese -- sort of standard government jargon that one might be confronted with. Then I had my instructors put that into what they would consider proper Chinese.

*Q: Was your wife learning Chinese?*

ANDERSON: Yes. At one point about that time she was 2+.

*Q: What happened? I notice you didn't go to London for the Warsaw talks after all this.*

ANDERSON: What happened was, the European Bureau in a burst of economy said, "We're sick and tired of funding this position in London for a guy who doesn't do anything for us, and is working for the East Asia Bureau. So unless we can make him more productive, we're canceling the position." And the first reaction was to transfer the interpreter to Warsaw itself, where he became chief of the consular section. When they told me that that was what they were going to

do, I decided I didn't want to be chief of the consular section in Warsaw. I basically said, "You can take my name out of the running," and got back a very quick reply saying, "We have been re-thinking the whole thing, and beginning with you we're going to move the position to Washington to the China desk, and that way you can be part of the drafting of the instructions, and the preparations for the talks..."

*Q: I don't know what instigated it, but I remember there was a Congressional hearing where all of a sudden someone said...somebody on the Congressional side just to poke at the State Department, made a big fuss about, "What are you keeping a Chinese specialist doing in London?" "Ho-ho-ho," you know. I don't think the Department of State at that point, whoever was doing it, had a good answer for it.*

ANDERSON: That's absolutely right. It was one of the poorer showings. I think what he said was, "Well, he uses his Chinese occasionally when he goes to Chinese restaurants." He was our interpreter. So anyway, I ended up going to Washington, and working on the China desk.

*Q: You were there for four years from '66 to '70. What were you doing? Was this pretty much with the Warsaw talks?*

ANDERSON: Oh, no. Maybe I should begin at the beginning. I ended up actually doing three jobs in the four years. I started off as the junior officer, the number two officer, in the China Mainland section. The office at that time was called the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, and theoretically covered Communist China, North Vietnam, and North Korea, all the communist countries in Asia. We spent about 98% of our time on China, and 2% on North Vietnam and North Korea. But I was the number two guy for China, in addition to doing the Warsaw talks, which were becoming at that point less and less frequent because China was going into the Cultural Revolution, and they were in total chaos.

*Q: I think you might explain what the Warsaw talks were.*

ANDERSON: The Warsaw talks were the ambassadorial level talks between United States and China. It was our point of contact with Communist China that went back to 1955. In the Geneva Conference in 1955 John Foster Dulles and Zhou En-lai agreed to begin these talks in Geneva. They started in Geneva. There were only two agenda items. One was the return of citizens detained by the other side. And the second item was other matters of mutual concern. They resolved the first item, reached an agreement in principal, I would say in about six weeks to two months of discussions in Geneva. And then they began a sort of general dialogue that went on literally from 1955 up through early 1970. The talks went through various periods. There were long periods when they were really pretty sterile, pro forma kind of things, and other periods when there were some real contributions made.

In 1958 they moved the talks from Geneva to Warsaw. While they were in Geneva the Chinese ambassador representative was Wang Ping-nan, who used to have to come down from Warsaw. Our representative was U. Alexis Johnson, who used to come over from Prague. So they moved the talks to Warsaw, and Wang continued for the Chinese, and Jake Beam did the talks for the U.S. side.

In addition to that I did Chinese Mainland analysis, and then after a year or so our Hong Kong-Macau officer left, so I became officer in charge of Hong Kong and Macau Affairs for about a year. Then the officer in charge of Mainland China Affairs, the senior position, got promoted to Deputy Director of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, so he moved me up to his job. I ended up as the officer in charge of Mainland China Affairs.

*Q: On the Warsaw thing, did you go to any of these talks?*

ANDERSON: Oh, yes.

*Q: What was your impression in the context of the period you were doing it? From '66 to '70.*

ANDERSON: As I said, in many ways they were quite sterile. At that point China was in no mood, nor in any position, to entertain very many initiatives, or to take any initiatives. The talks were held in an old Polish palace, a hunting lodge actually of a Polish prince, called Myslewicki Palace, which was set in a park in a very picturesque setting. The building was thoroughly bugged so we all were conscious of the fact that we were not just talking to each other, but we were also talking to the Poles, and through the Poles to the Soviets. The arrangements for the talks were that each side had four members. There was the ambassador on each side, a political adviser, an interpreter, and a scribe, as he was called -- the note taker. We would meet in this meeting room in the palace and we alternated on who spoke first, and each side would deliver a prepared statement running about 15 or 20 minutes. In fact, I used to participate in drafting it, and once it was drafted and approved back in Washington I could sit down with my dictionary and translate it into Chinese. I interpreted from English to Chinese, and their guy interpreted from Chinese to English which is the reverse of normal interpreting situations. And then after the two prepared statements there was sort of a give and take back and forth, oftentimes working from prepared position papers because we pretty well knew what the Chinese were going to say.

At the conclusion of the meeting -- the press almost always came to Warsaw for the meetings, American press, the wire services, etc. -- we'd meet briefly with the press, and usually say nothing more than, "We had a useful and productive exchange of views. No further comment."

Then the following day, we had an informal arrangement where the political adviser and the interpreter would meet with their counterparts, usually at the Chinese embassy, and we would give them an English text of our opening statement, they would give us a Chinese text of theirs, and if there was any confusion about terminology, or what we meant by something, we would try and straighten it out during this informal meeting.

I don't know how the Chinese felt about it, but the American side felt it was a useful sort of informal contact where we could talk without the constraints of a formal negotiating session.

It also turned out to be useful in other ways. At the first meeting I attended in '66, we went over to the Chinese embassy -- my predecessor actually did the interpreting, I was there...

*Q: Who was the predecessor?*

ANDERSON: Al Harding. The Chinese gave him a little farewell -- they had soft drinks and beer, which Al said normally they didn't do. They normally had tea. But it was rather interesting because we noted that in the meeting room where they received us on the wall over the sofa there had obviously been two portraits, there were two light spots on the wall. When we got there there was one portrait of Mao Zedong in the middle, and it was one of the really first conclusive bits of evidence that Liu Shao-chi, the former head of state, had indeed been purged, and was no longer a person. Then as we left the building, on the walls in the halls of the embassy, there were pieces of paper with hand-written slogans which was the beginning of the big character posters of the Cultural Revolution.

*Q: You say a prepared statement, was this just two people talking past each other?*

ANDERSON: In large part. In the early days we had a number of concerns that we had to address. One thing we talked about was pilots who were flying against North Vietnam but who strayed and went over into Chinese territory and were lost. We were trying to get an accounting for them. Vietnam was a major factor for meeting all the way up toward the end. But at that first meeting in '66, we did use a phrase which was intended, and I think interpreted by the Chinese, as an assurance that we did not intend to invade North Vietnam and told the Chinese in that meeting that, "we seek no wider war in Vietnam."

*Q: This often was a bone of contention saying we should just go in. Was it your feeling, and those with you, that this could really tip things if we landed at Haiphong or something like this. This could bring the Chinese in?*

ANDERSON: Yes. And that's what we were trying to prevent. On the U.S. side we were trying to promote some sort of informal non-official contact. We were trying to get journalists into China for business, and a variety of what we saw as concrete practical steps that one could take to improve the atmosphere in relations and perhaps lower the tension levels between the two countries. The Chinese were not having any of that. It was a very sterile period. They were primarily berating us on Vietnam. For example, we picked up a Chinese boat that had gotten in trouble in the Tonkin Gulf. It had been in distress and one of our ships picked it up, towed it into port. We gave them food and fixed their ship up, and sent them back. And we mentioned this as something we had done as a humanitarian gesture, and they, of course, denounced us for it.

During the Cultural Revolution period, most of their people got pulled back to Beijing. This was a period when all of their diplomats were being called back to China to take part in the Cultural Revolution, so that the senior official on the Chinese side was usually a chargé d'affaires, not the ambassador, and their interpreter would come back and forth. As I say, the talks were really pretty dull at that point. The Chinese obviously had instructions that they had to have the last word, so our ambassador would respond to a charge by the Chinese, and the Chinese then felt obliged to answer again. Therefore, the talks sometimes would drag on for three hours or more. I can remember one time the political adviser on the Chinese side, who was really not a political adviser, their interpreter was far and away the more influential and the brightest of any of the group. The chargé turned to the interpreter after the talk had gone on for about two and a half hours, and said, "Can I stop now?" The interpreter said, "No." So he made another charge about

something. So we would usually decide this had gone on long enough, we'd let them have the last word, and then decide on the next meeting.

But the rather humorous thing about it was, the reporters didn't get anything substantive because we would come out and give them a bland statement. In 1970, toward the end of the talks, we really did make some significant progress. In fact, the two opening statements were sufficiently substantive and significant, and meshed in such a way that neither side felt that they could go beyond that particular point without getting further instructions. So the meeting lasted for about a half an hour, maybe 40 minutes, and the press, of course, interpreted it as indicating that our relations had reached the lowest point ever. But it was finally, a significant and substantive meeting.

*Q: ...looked at each other and said, "What do we do now?"*

ANDERSON: That's exactly right. So anyway, the talks proceeded through the Cultural Revolution through a very, very difficult period, and then there was a gap of a full year between talks. Basically after Nixon came into office -- he had already written an article indicating that he thought the United States should move toward improving relations with China, and there began to be some movement to see what could be done. The Chinese at the same time, I think, were becoming interested in improving relations with us. This was the period of the Brezhnev doctrine and a real concern on the part of the Chinese about what the Soviet intentions were.

*Q: Did you have any feeling that the Chinese...I mean obviously the Polish intelligence service was passing everything on to the Soviets at that time, that the Chinese were using these meetings to stick it to the Russians, or anything like that from time to time, or not?*

ANDERSON: Not so much to stick it to the Russians, I don't think, but it was obviously an inhibiting factor. One thing I didn't mention was, well, we haven't gotten to it yet, but when we decided to try and resume the talks in 1970, we decided we would have to discuss the issue of Taiwan, and some of the fundamentals of the relationship, and that we couldn't do that in the Myslevitzky Palace with the Poles and the Russians listening, so we proposed to the Chinese that we change the venue of the talks. We considered several possibilities, one being a third country less under the thumb of the Russians. And the other one that the Chinese finally agreed on was to move the talks to our two embassies. So the meeting that resumed the talks after about a year's hiatus in January of 1970 was held in the Chinese embassy.

*Q: Was it sort of the feeling that we were ready and willing to do a lot of things, but was really waiting until the Chinese were ready to make some moves? Was this more or less how things were going? Or were we as disinterested observers say, we were also stalling and not wanting to get anything going?*

ANDERSON: We were stalling to a degree, and particularly we were not prepared to do much in terms of recognizing the legitimacy of the Chinese government of the People's Republic of China. What we wanted to do was more, as I said, the concrete practical level of exchanges, and solving problems. They wanted to talk about fundamentals, and that's why we decided toward the end of '69 that if we were to resume the talks we ought to try and address some of these

questions. At that point I think Nixon and Kissinger were in favor of that, and we were able to do things for the first time in terms of formulations on political relationships that we couldn't have done under Johnson, and particularly under Dean Rusk.

*Q: Was the feeling this was Dean Rusk who was calling the shots on China policy? Or was this basically the Democrats having been burned on China once weren't going to get themselves caught again?*

ANDERSON: Dean Rusk played a major role. He had been Assistant Secretary for Asia, he had been in China, he considered himself a China expert. He was very conservative on China issues. It was very difficult to get any flexibility as far as the seventh floor...

*Q: The seventh floor being where the Secretary of State dwells.*

ANDERSON: And then when the Nixon administration came in and Walter Stoessel, who was then the ambassador in Poland, was instructed to contact the Chinese, and indicate that we would like to resume the talks. Paul Kreisberg was the Office Director. By that time it had become the Office of Chinese Affairs, it was no longer Asian Communist Affairs. We shed North Vietnam and North Korea. Paul Kreisberg was also the political adviser to the talks so he and I worked very closely together on this. We were told to start drafting a new set of instructions for Stoessel for a meeting with the Chinese. As I said, that's where we basically agreed, the two of us who had been working on it, that we should talk about Taiwan and some of the more fundamental issues between the two countries.

I remember some of the earlier drafts of the instructions that we did. I was quite surprised to find that the feeling was that we hadn't gone far enough.

*Q: Was it a surprise, or not, when the Nixon administration came in...obviously Nixon had earned his name as being one of the most vehement anti-communist early on. Was there a feeling there, "Oh my God, here we're moving farther to the right on this." How did you feel about this?*

ANDERSON: No, there wasn't because while Nixon had made his political reputation, as you say, as a vehement anti-communist, he was also recognized as a very savvy and pragmatic international thinker. He had already announced the so-called Nixon Doctrine of limited U.S. involvement. And he had written in one of the journals saying we had to find a way to improve our relationship with China. So we knew he was inclined in that direction. So there wasn't any worry about the ideological aspect of that particular Nixon anti- communist position.

*Q: Again, the '66 to '70 period, what was our view of the Cultural Revolution? Because I suppose in many ways this was your main preoccupation, wasn't it?*

ANDERSON: It was. Well, it was very clearly an unmitigated disaster for China. By that time we were getting a lot of intelligence, mostly through Hong Kong, of what was happening in the provinces. There were a number of places in China where it was nothing short of civil war. They were using artillery, and the two factions were engaged in pitched battles. Bodies would come floating into Hong Kong harbor that had been executed. Sometimes multiple bodies all tied

together would float into Hong Kong from these factional fights that took place just up in Guangdong province. And, of course, it was a tremendous guessing game as to who was doing what to whom in the upper reaches of the government in Beijing. It was sort of an analyst dream...play the game because so much of the indications of where things were going was done in the press, largely through historical allegories and this kind of stuff. It was great fun to play the game, but it was very, very hard to read.

We did have very good intelligence on the degree of chaos that was going on in China. I remember Bill Bundy during the '60s -- during the height of the Cultural Revolution -- set up sort of a Wise Men's Group of some academic scholars. They were the best in the United States...

*Q: Fairbanks and...*

ANDERSON: Fairbanks, Bob Scalapino, Doak Barnett. They would come to Washington periodically to discuss "whither China." One of them finally told me, he said, "You know, we're getting more out of this than you are." Because we were assiduously collecting everything we could get by way of intelligence from the provinces, and probably knew about as much as anybody, which wasn't certainly enough, but we did have a very good...

*Q: How did we feel? I mean was this Mao Zedong going off in a rampage? Or was this a breakdown in authority? What was causing this as far as we saw it?*

ANDERSON: The Cultural Revolution?

*Q: Yes.*

ANDERSON: I think it was the combination of things. It was a power struggle first and foremost. Mao felt that after the Great Leap Forward had failed certain elements of the leadership -- Liu Xiaochi was then head of state, Deng Xiaoping, and a number of others were leading China in a direction of revisionism, or capitalism if you want to put it that way, which they were. They were trying to put the country back together economically from a very dangerous point. And Mao felt he was being shunted aside. He had his own vision of what revolutionary China should be and he decided to mobilize the masses, essentially destroy the system, and then put it back together again. And then obviously there were many people who, for their own purely selfish personal reasons, joined into this struggle for their own personal aggrandizements, or power position, etc., notably his wife, and the people around her.

*Q: Later the Gang of Four. What was our estimate of Mao Zedong? Was he a canny political thing? Or was he sort of a bull elephant in a china shop?*

ANDERSON: Oh, no. I think Mao was a major political thinker, an ideologue, and a truly great leader. Even despite everything he'd done he's still revered by the people of China. He's probably a leader that should have died about 1951.

*Q: Which happens so often. Again, and again you run on these people who outlast, outlive their time.*

ANDERSON: But he brought the revolution to a successful conclusion for the communists, introduced a system which brought a certain amount of hope. There were a lot of excesses, but there was also some hope and a feeling that China was making progress in the early '50s.

*Q: It was beginning to feed itself, and clothe itself, which it had not been able to do under previous regimes.*

ANDERSON: But really from '57-'58 on, it was just one series of disasters. There was the Hundred Flowers campaign, and then the anti-rightist campaign, and then the Great Leap Forward, then the Cultural Revolution. Basically the Cultural Revolution wasn't really over until Mao died in 1976.

*Q: How did we view Zhou En-lai? He always seemed to be a very practical person, but yet he survived under Mao. How were we viewing him at this time?*

ANDERSON: I think he's a remarkable individual in that...I really can almost literally say, I've yet to find anyone who doesn't admire the guy. He obviously had to be a magnificent opportunist in the sense of knowing where to land, and when to give and when to attack. But he was universally revered. I was in Hong Kong when he died, and in Hong Kong the lines stretched down the street to pay their respects at the memorial service. It was just tremendous, and genuine. I know Chinese today that have fled China, have been persecuted by the Chinese, and who hate the communist system, but one person they can't say anything bad about is Zhou En-lai. It's amazing.

*Q: Did we see him...I'm talking about, of course, at that time, as somebody we should keep an eye on because he represented hope? Or did we see him as another one of the boys?*

ANDERSON: I think he was always recognized as a pragmatist, and someone who, if there was anybody we could do business with, it was probably assumed it would be Zhou En-lai.

*Q: Did you get any feel for Kissinger? Was he involved? Did you have any contact? Or were you feeling the hand of the National Security Council at this time up until 1970? Nixon came in '69, so it really wasn't much time, but did you have any feel for Kissinger?*

ANDERSON: Oh, yes. Well, as I say, we had two meetings in Warsaw that were very significant. One was in January of 1970, and the second was in February of 1970. In fact, it was during those two meetings that some of the formulations we put together in terms of describing our views of the relationship between the People's Republic of China, our relationship with Taiwan, and our acceptance of the idea of the unity of China were drafted. Eventually very similar formulations found their way into the Shanghai Communiqué. So in many ways I feel that Paul Kreisberg, who was the principal drafter in most cases, and myself, made a real contribution to the Shanghai Communiqué that emerged in February of 1972. In fact, at that point after the February meeting, we were planning to send a delegation to China which would have been headed by a Presidential emissary. I was working on costing it, how we would do it, and what kind of communications we would require. We were planning for a meeting with the

Chinese in Warsaw in April, but the President in the interim had decided to go into Cambodia with American forces and...

*Q: This is the spring of 1970. I was in Saigon when they went in so I remember it vividly.*

ANDERSON: And the Chinese canceled the talks.

*Q: Was our planning kept very hush-hush? Or was this just sort of a normal diplomatic progression that you were working on? I mean the idea of costing-out a Presidential delegation.*

ANDERSON: This was usually done in secret, NODIS. Its all been declassified now.

*Q: I was just trying to get the feel of how we were...*

ANDERSON: No, it was very, very limited. The Chinese canceled the talks. Paul Kreisberg and I returned to the United States, both of us terribly disillusioned because we thought we were really on the edge of a breakthrough. I decided there wasn't any future in messing around with China for the time being and asked for, and got, an assignment to New Delhi. Paul Kreisberg went off as DCM to Tanzania. Henry Kissinger immediately recommenced the talks with the Chinese in an even more clandestine operation in Paris.

*Q: Then you went to New Delhi where you were for two years, '70 to '72. What were you doing?*

ANDERSON: I was in the external section of the political section. Back in those days...in the bad old days...I think it was Galbraith back in the early '60s decided he needed a China specialist and a Soviet specialist in his political section. So there was a Chinese language officer position in the embassy in Delhi, and I went out as the China specialist, which would have kept me busy about 5% of my time. Actually, my bailiwick, as it turned out, was India's relations with Asia, and the communist world -- Soviet-India relations, Indian-Chinese, Vietnam, and Eastern Europe.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the Indian view of China? Were they still wary? How did they feel, because the Cultural Revolution was in full swing.*

ANDERSON: The worst part of the violence had pretty well stopped. The Gang of Four was still very much in the saddle.

*Q: Yes, little red books waving.*

ANDERSON: The Indians, I think, view China with a mixture of awe, envy, and contempt. There are some very good China scholars in India, and obviously it's a country that's very poor. So they feel a sense of competition. These are the two huge land masses in Asia, the two great population bases. And I think I mentioned, there's a feeling that China gets treated better than India. That the West, and in particular the United States, doesn't recognize the importance of India and accept India's logical hegemonic position in South Asia, which doesn't make India very popular with its neighbors. The '62 war at that time in '72, still was a very sore point. For

example, Taiwan used to launch propaganda balloons from Quemoy and Matsu off the China coast, and the propaganda balloons would sometimes get picked up in the upper air currents and would sail clear across China, and across the Himalayas, and drop in India. Some guy would find one of these propaganda balloons and every time some Indian parliamentarian would get up and give a speech about, "these terrible Chinese are delivering these propaganda balloons to us, and what is the government going to do to stop this?" So it's just a very minor thing.

In the '62 war all the Chinese restaurants in New Delhi changed their names to Japanese. The first page of the menu would have about five Japanese dishes and the rest of the menu was all Chinese.

*Q: Just one last thing, and then we can call it for today. You mentioned this fascination, or the Indians felt we gave more attention to China, I talk as a Foreign Service officer serving around, and no particular speciality, but I've always been intrigued by this fascination we have with China, which goes back to really one of our first consuls where we weren't sending consuls to anywhere else, we sent them to China. There has been this fascination about, and great things are going to happen, which have never happened as far as great trade, etc., etc. Did you feel this? That there's a special China interest in the United States which isn't justified by practicality?*

ANDERSON: I obviously think China is an important place. More important, I think, is an almost unique problem we have with China, and it sort of goes both ways with a similar problem in China. There is this love-hate relationship. When things are going well with China, and China is being good, Americans think China is wonderful. It's all panda bears, and rosy-cheeked kindergarten children, and people going to banquets, and delivering stupid speeches. And then when China does something bad, like Tiananmen, then China can do no right. There is this overwhelming desire on the part of the United States people to somehow punish and correct China, which we're going through right now.

*Q: This must have been an overlying theme all the time, this reversal back and forth all the time in the United States where we don't really have that much of a problem in relations with other countries.*

ANDERSON: That's true.

*Q: As a China hand were you aware of this, and thinking, "Oh God, here we go again," or something like this?*

ANDERSON: Harold Isaacs wrote a book quite a long time ago called "Scratches on the Mind", where he makes this very clear. We have this problem, partially on the part of Americans because there is this affinity to sort of change China, to make it over into what we think should be the image of China.

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ANDERSON: I don't know where we finished, but I was in Delhi and got a cable from

Washington saying that they wanted me in Paris in two weeks. This was right after the Nixon trip. Actually, the lead-up to the Nixon trip, and the continuing contacts had been conducted in Paris through General Walters...

*Q: Vernon Walters.*

ANDERSON: ...who was the Military Attaché', and the Chinese ambassador, and after the Nixon trip the contact in Paris sort of went public and the President announced that this would be the point of contact between the Chinese and ourselves, and that Ambassador Arthur K. Watson would represent the U.S. side. It became rather urgent at the time because Ambassador Watson was flying back to the United States on one of his fairly frequent trips and according to the story that appeared in the press, he got rather intoxicated and by way of apologizing to the stewardesses attempted to stuff \$10.00 bills in their blouses which one of the stewardesses duly reported to the press. Of course, the press was all over...the State Department and the White House asking, "Is this the guy that's going to be handling our contacts?" "Yes, he's going to do it, but we'll have somebody there with him who is a China specialist." That is why I was suddenly transferred to Paris.

*Q: I assume under strict instructions to keep your hands off the stewardesses.*

ANDERSON: We got there in May of '72, and as usual in the State Department after turning my family upside down and disrupting their lives, making everybody miserable, we got to Paris and they basically said, "What are you doing here? And we don't really know what to do with you." Pat Byrne was the Asia officer in the political section and she sort of took me under her wing and took me down to meet the ambassador. I remember that quite vividly because we were walking down the hall and Jack Kubisch, who was the DCM, appeared in the hall on our way down to the ambassador's office, and said in an absolute remarkable way, "Whatever he says, agree." It was sort of a panicky advice that I should be terribly cautious. I went down and met with the ambassador and he was an absolutely charming man. We had a session, just the two of us, and he said he considered the China contacts one of the most important jobs that he had in Paris, that I was his man for those contacts, and I had access to him anytime I wanted to. If anybody in the front office gave me a bad time just to come right into his office, etc. So I left thinking this was going to be great.

And then Allen Holmes, who was the Political Counselor, and was very close to the Ambassador -- the Ambassador trusted him implicitly, and the Ambassador did not trust most Foreign Service people -- spoke to me and said there was a question as to whether I would be Special Assistant to the Ambassador and work directly for him, or whether I would be in the Political Section. And Allen advised me, and I think in many ways saved my hide, that it would be much safer if I were in the Political Section because I would have this buffer between myself and the Ambassador.

*Q: Because at certain points efficiency reports are written, and if you're Special Assistant it depends on the Ambassador. Whereas Holmes being in the Foreign Service among other things...*

ANDERSON: It was even more serious than that in this case. Anyway, that's the way we worked it out. The job really didn't amount to a great deal. The Ambassador didn't take part in many of

the routine things that we did, but I saw the Chinese maybe a couple of times a week, and basically didn't have that much to do otherwise.

*Q: What sort of things were you dealing with?*

ANDERSON: Largely very routine stuff. At this point there were delegations going back and forth between China and the United States. The Chinese delegations almost all came through Paris. They would usually neglect to get their visas arranged and would come into Paris and would have to have a visa by 8:00 the following morning in order to get to whatever appointment they had in the United States. The first Boeing sale was made, and the Boeing people came through to meet the Chinese who were en route to Seattle and didn't know how to do it, so I took care of that. A lot of that kind of routine stuff.

The big thing that we were waiting for was two packages, one educational exchanges and the overall umbrella arrangement that we were trying to set up to begin educational and cultural exchanges; and a business package to set up a similar kind of relationship and a structure for beginning business relationships, remembering that at that point we had no representatives in Beijing. We had no diplomatic relations so this was the only way we could do these things in a non-official type relationship. This was the point at which the organization I'm now with, as matter of fact, the U.S.-China Business Council which was then called the National Council for U.S.-China Trade, was designated as the umbrella organization for trade. The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the People's Republic of China were designated as the educational and cultural umbrella organizations. We were expecting to get these two packages to present to the Chinese, that was probably into around early August and the Ambassador was going home on vacation so I was pushing Washington to get these things. They finally got them out to us, two lengthy cables, and when I came into the embassy that morning the two cables were waiting, and it just happened that the Ambassador was calling on the Chinese Ambassador because he was going on vacation the following day. It was a rather extraordinary meeting because the Ambassador had been out the night before, and was nowhere to be found in the embassy. I spoke to his staff assistant, who was very wise in the ways of the Ambassador, and said, "We've got to wake this guy up, and get him ready. We've got these two things." He said, "Leave it to me, Don. Don't call the residence."

*Q: I take it this was a very ticklish situation.*

ANDERSON: He was a very volatile individual, he could be absolutely charming at times, but he could fire you on the spot as well. So he went over to the residence, and I got the car and met him over there. He brought the Ambassador down and I handed him the two papers. Each were about, I would say, maybe ten pages long -- one on educational exchanges, and one on the commercial relationship. He glanced at them, and tossed them back in my lap and I believe his words were, "This is crap. I'm not going to talk about this penny-ante stuff." He said, "I'll leave that to you to take care of with your counterparts." And while we were riding over to the Chinese embassy he said, "What I really want to do today is just talk about global issues, sort of a tour d'horizon," for which we had no instructions whatsoever. In fact I had been specifically told by the NSC that I was not to do that kind of thing, that this was basically a mail delivery program and I was not to engage in other types of conversation.

But we did sit down with Ambassador Huang Chen, who was an interesting individual, and Ambassador Watson did indeed proceed to indulge in a tour d'horizon. The most memorable moment of which I remember -- this was 1972 -- he said, "Mr. Ambassador, the one thing that I think both of our countries have to worry about the most is Germany and Japan." Ambassador Huang, I thought, looked rather surprised at this statement, but we carried it all off, and went back. I wrote a reporting cable which reported mainly what Ambassador Huang said. Ambassador Watson later told me it was the best cable he had seen written in the embassy since he had been there.

He left very shortly after that and went home, and I am told...I don't know this from my personal experience, that he was met in the United States, and informed that it was time for him to resign. So that was really the last I saw of Ambassador Watson.

*Q: Could you explain a bit about who was Ambassador Watson? What was his background?*

ANDERSON: He was one of the sons of Arthur Watson, the founder of IBM. He had been president of IBM International, and as you know, his brother became Ambassador to the Soviet Union and the story was at the time that there was a question of who was going to become chairman of the board, and the senior leadership at IBM did not want Arthur K., so they arranged for him to become ambassador. I was told later that he had told someone in the embassy that he had always considered me to be the State Department spy in this China business, and he considered that I was responsible for his demise as ambassador, which was not true at all because I was very careful about that.

*Q: Just to get a little feel for somebody looking at this in future times. Maybe you were sort of a mailbox operation there while these other things were happening, but at the same time there still was an official source of communication. Kissinger was head of the NSC at that time. Were you getting instructions, or whatever you want to call them from people in the NSC, "Watch this guy. We don't want him to screw things up," or anything like that? Were people telling you this?*

ANDERSON: Not really. I was hearing in the embassy, and I think it was generally understood, that this guy was rather volatile, and sort of an unguided missile. But, as I say, the instructions were really that we were a mailbox, and I can remember one instance when Marshall Green came through, he was the Assistant Secretary at the time, and I told him that I was going to try and use these contacts to broaden the discussion. And he said, "That's fine Don." And the first time I wrote a cable back based on a discussion with my counterpart on his views on Sino-soviet relations, I got a very fast phone call from Washington saying, "Dr. Kissinger does not want you doing that. Deliver the mail, and that's all." So I did very little of that.

My only other job in Paris during that whole period was to fill in for the Vietnam Liaison; actually I did get involved in the Vietnam peace talks which took place at that time, and which involved the Chinese, of course. In fact, we had a meeting with Secretary Rogers who was with the U.S. delegation, and the Chinese representatives at the Paris Peace Conference during that time. There was a period when Jack Kubisch was involved with the talks, then Jack Irwin who was the next ambassador to come out. By that time Henry Kissinger had gone...this would be

November of '72, Henry Kissinger had gone to Beijing again, and they had announced that they were going to open a Liaison Office in Beijing, which I think was a very neat diplomatic stroke. They basically had an embassy, without calling it an embassy, and managed to finesse many of the issues.

*Q: Particularly the two Chinas problem which was Formosa and...*

ANDERSON: I'm convinced that the Chinese, and I think probably Henry Kissinger, reached agreement on the establishment of the Liaison Office with the understanding that this was the first step toward diplomatic relations and the establishment of a full- fledged embassy. I think probably the Chinese expected it to happen, and they expected it to happen much more quickly. In fact, it took from '73 all the way to December '79 when Carter finally announced establishment of diplomatic relations. I think that was a much longer period, but it was due in large part to, on the one hand the Chinese side which was going through a succession struggle with Mao and the Gang of Four; and on our side we had Watergate.

*Q: This was forcing Nixon out of office.*

ANDERSON: So what happened was, basically I knew from November of '72 that my job in Paris was going to come to an end because we would be setting up the Liaison Office. Then I was informed by Washington that I would be going from Paris to Beijing. I went on a direct transfer from Paris to Beijing in May of '73, so I was in Paris literally one year.

*Q: Back to the peace talks. What were your perspective of those peace talks at that particular place and time?*

ANDERSON: I was not involved at the high policy level. My job was basically liaison with the Chinese. We kept the Chinese very well informed on positions that we were taking. Again, I was something of a mail man. I was the guy that Bill Sullivan would send out to the Chinese embassy at night to deliver papers and messages, and talk to the Chinese about what our positions were going to be. I think basically the Paris peace talks were a means for the United States to exit Vietnam. I mean it's a very controversial agreement, but at the time I think, viewed with a great deal of relief by most of the people that were involved.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the Chinese role? Were they sort of passive by-standers?*

ANDERSON: They were cooperative in the sense that they did not make obstacles. In fact, the atmosphere between our two sides was very good. The Chinese ambassador gave a dinner for...it was a Vice Foreign Minister on the Chinese side. We all went out and I can remember that the atmosphere at the dinner, and at a separate meeting that we had at the American ambassador's residence, basically talking about bilateral U.S.- China issues, was very good. I think at that point they felt the U.S.-China relationship was moving rather rapidly in the right direction.

*Q: How about the lips and teeth relationship between China and Vietnam? Did you have any feel that this was almost now a secondary problem for them?*

ANDERSON: Yes. I think there was very little of that kind of...well, practically none of that kind of rhetoric in our discussion. And, as we found out later of course, the lips and teeth relationship was a rather tenuous one at best. My view of the whole Sino-Vietnamese relationship was one of sort of mutual necessity bringing together two natural adversaries and as soon as the necessity ended in 1975 when the Vietnam war ended, the natural antagonisms came right back.

*Q: You were right in there on the opening up of our Liaison Office?*

ANDERSON: Yes. I got there, I believe it was in June of '73. The initial people, Ambassador David Bruce, who was the head of the Liaison Office, and much of the Liaison Office staff had already arrived when I got there. I had to shut down things in Paris, and I went back home for a few weeks. Then went on to Beijing. It was a real honeymoon period. The Chinese were doing their absolute dead-level best to be as cooperative as they could under the circumstances. Believe me, the circumstances were not that good at that time. I mean, the Gang of Four, Jiang Qing and her group were still very much a force to be reckoned with.

*Q: I suppose in political terms you'd call it the radical left. Mao was still alive, but failing.*

ANDERSON: Mao was still alive, but failing, and Zhou En-lai was very much managing the U.S.-China relationship. But he was failing too. Basically we didn't know that when we got there, at least I didn't. When we set up the Liaison Office, Kissinger came out again in November, and Zhou En-lai appeared in pretty good shape and was at the banquet for Kissinger in the Great Hall of the People. That 1973 visit went very well. My job on that one was as press liaison. I managed the press corps, and the liaison with the information office of the Chinese Foreign Ministry. I thought the visit went smoothly, and Kissinger went away quite pleased with that visit.

For example, on the Liaison Office itself, the Chinese really went out of their way to do everything that we could possibly ask for. The building that they had picked out for us...the system in those days was that they basically built chancelleries and took you out and said, "Which one would you like?" The one they had for us was too small, and we asked them to put an "l" extension onto the end of it. They literally assigned a work crew that went 24 hours a day, and in something like three weeks, had built the extension onto the Liaison Office. It was that kind of atmosphere of "anything we can do to make you happy." At the same time, of course, that they were bugging us, and restricting our travel, and other things.

*Q: Was the Gang of Four the radical left were they able to intrude on the process, or were they kept away?*

ANDERSON: At that time, they seemed to be cooperating with the whole process. It was a very strange time. I mean, Jiang Qing, for example...

*Q: That was Mao's wife.*

ANDERSON: ...Mao's wife hosted the Boston Symphony which was one of the big cultural

events of the initial period of exchanges. She was very charming, of course, when Nixon was there. She was pushing her revolutionary operas and ballets. That group was a very strange group of people. Jiang Qing, for all of her anti-western attitudes, had a fascination with Western movies. We very quietly worked out an arrangement with Jack Valenti, for example, he would send us movies...

*Q: He was president of the American Picture Association.*

ANDERSON: He would send us out films that she wanted to see, and we would deliver them to Jiang Qing and her friends, and they would return them. We would return them back because the American Picture Association was very, very sensitive about copyrights, and piracy, and this kind of thing. Some of the choices of her movies I found rather interesting. The first movie she asked for was Day of the Jackal, which deals with assassination.

*Q: ...of Charles de Gaulle.*

ANDERSON: She also asked for Z, another movie dealing with assassination.

*Q: A leftist movie about Greece.*

ANDERSON: We didn't really sense any attempts to obstruct the relationship, although there was a power struggle going on at that time between basically the followers of Zhou En-lai, a more pragmatic group, and the leftists. As long as Zhou was alive, it seemed, the U.S.-China relationship was contained. Kissinger came back to Beijing in, I think it was again November of 1974, and by that time I was head of the political section so I was the sort of overall control officer for that visit. Kissinger saw Zhou En-lai in the hospital. He'd already been diagnosed as having cancer. I don't think anybody knew exactly what the diagnosis was, but he was ill. By that time a discussion with Mao had to go through two interpreters; one who spoke his native Hunan dialect, and then someone who could speak Mandarin. It was therefore screened through two female interpreters, one of whom was his niece, and the other was a lady by the name of Nancy Tang who was one of finest interpreters I have ever met, but who got involved with the Gang of Four and eventually got into trouble with them. So the visit in '74 did not go nearly as well as the earlier visits, and I think it was partially a reflection of the power struggle that was going on in Beijing. Of course, we had our own problems back in Washington with the Nixon resignation.

We did accomplish a number of things, largely in terms of cultural exchanges -- some very significant cultural exchanges; getting the business relationship started, some high level visits, and basically getting the mission up and running and finding a way to function. We started out in the late spring of '73, operating out of a couple of hotel rooms, using one-time pads...

*Q: This is a coding device, very primitive, very...*

ANDERSON: ...slow. The Liaison Office moved to another apartment, and we set up a very primitive communication system in the bathroom of one of the apartments. Then finally we got a whole communication system, and the building, and we were able to move into it. One rather humorous aside, the Chinese in their efforts to please us when they built the new wing...that was

part of the reason we needed the new wing was to put the communication section in. They did a lovely paneling job of the room where we were going to put the communication system, which involved strips and then wood paneling over it. Of course, the security people said that absolutely positively there could be no wood paneling on the walls of the communication section, so the Seabees had to go in and tear out all the work that the Chinese did. And one of our senior officers, who was very sensitive to Chinese sensibilities, was trying to figure out how we could tear all this paneling out and dispose of it without offending the Chinese. The Seabees built an absolutely beautiful parquet bar which they put in the Seabee apartment as the result of this.

*Q: How did the restrictions and the bugging affect your work? More broadly, here you are, the first time in China, we're starting up after 30 years or so, how did you go about doing political work?*

ANDERSON: It was difficult. We had the normal relationship with the Foreign Ministry. When I say normal, it was a pretty sterile relationship. They were always willing to see us, and they were always pleasant when we went to see them, but in terms of a dialogue, we had very little. One major fact that I neglected to mention was that of course, after about the first year, David Bruce left as head of the Liaison Office to become ambassador to NATO, and George Bush arrived as the second head of the Liaison Office. So I was in Beijing for the second year with...

*Q: I'd like to talk about both of those gentlemen afterwards.*

ANDERSON: As I say, there was very little dialogue. I think, in fact, that was one of the reasons why David Bruce lost interest very early on. I think he, given his background in London, Paris, and Bonn, that he visualized an on-going dialogue with Zhou En-lai. If my memory is correct, he may have seen Zhou En-lai twice after his arrival, but after that he was relegated not even down to the Foreign Minister, but often times being called in by the head of the American and Oceanian Department, who is about the equivalent of an assistant secretary, and at that time not a very pleasant fellow. I think basically, Mr. Bruce decided this was beneath him.

We did a lot of China watching which consisted of reading the newspapers, periodicals, and trying to figure out what the historical references were, the implications of rather arcane philosophical discussions that appeared in the newspaper from time to time, getting out on the streets and walking around. It was very difficult to talk to people but occasionally someone would talk. There was a period during that time when big character posters were put up, a form of expression that the Chinese permitted from time to time. We would go out and literally spend hours just standing in front of a wall reading the big character posters. Then exchanging notes with western journalists who were out doing the same thing, and collecting as much information as we could that way.

*Q: I have visions of these big character posters and all these westerners, "Hey, have you seen this one?" "Come over here and look at this one."*

ANDERSON: The journalists were much more open about photographing and this sort of thing. So we worked out a deal to acquire those. And then visiting with people who came through, western businessmen, and Chinese-American scholars who would come through oftentimes had

better access than we. One of the things we did is attach ourselves to any major delegation, or any delegation at all that we could, that was traveling around China and go with them as escorts. I escorted the first delegation of White House Fellows, for example, on a very interesting trip through China. My wife and I escorted six U.S. governors on a long trip through China. That sort of thing, Congressional delegations, we would go with. It was strange. It was during probably the most restricted period in our bilateral relations in terms of contacts. I traveled more in China in the period '73 to '75 than I've ever traveled in China since. A lot of it was show and tell. We were shown what they wanted us to see and given the standard propaganda line. Then there was a great deal of gullibility in that.

*Q: There has always been this strain in American view of China since the earliest days. For some reason Americans have a rosy view, or keep thinking that things will work out in China.*

ANDERSON: Actually, the problem is not exactly that way. It's a two-sided problem. We tend to swing to both extremes. China is either, as you say, this wonderful place with its 4,000 years of culture, and panda bears, and rosy cheeked little kindergarten children that we all love. Or it's the other extreme, the Chinese and the Korean War, and brain-washing, and torture. Right now we're much more on the negative end. We do have a difficult time getting ourselves positioned in the middle where we recognize this is a marvelous country with incredible history, but they're also a bunch of bad guys and they can do very nasty things.

*Q: How did you find the Chinese bureaucrats? I'm told that they're one of the most difficult to deal with.*

ANDERSON: In the Liaison Office period, they were difficult to deal with, particularly if you got into substantive issues where they would have to go out on a limb and make a statement about a political issue. They were very, very cautious. On the other hand, I find their diplomatic service very, very able, and they were a very bright bunch of people. If they're not telling you something, they're not telling you because they're stupid. They're not telling you because they're protecting themselves. And at times they could be very skillful in finding ways to accomplish what you wanted to do.

I don't want to use up too much time but I remember one case when Henry Kissinger was coming and I was handling the press, it would have been '73. Henry had a friend with the New York Times, I can't remember his name now. But anyway, he was traveling in China, and we got this cable from Kissinger saying, "Please arrange to have this guy included as part of the press corps people" the U.S. press corps, the traveling group that came with Kissinger. So I went over to see Mr. Ma, who was head of the International Liaison, and asked if they could do that. And he said, "Mr. Anderson, you must understand that our rules are that only the people traveling with the Secretary on his plane are considered part of the press corps, and that those are the only ones that can be included." He said, "That is our position in principle." He said, "You understand now our principled position." I said, "Yes." And he said, "Now as a practical matter, since this fellow is a friend of Henry Kissinger's he won't be part of the press corps, but we will include him in all of the banquets, all of the briefings." And I discovered that the Chinese often times follow this approach. They have a position in principle which if you understand that, and agree with it, then in terms of practical implementation of that principle, they can do the exact

opposite.

*Q: Back to a couple of the people that you dealt with. David Bruce is one of our preeminent diplomats. How did you find his approach? You've talked a little about him, but how did he operate?*

ANDERSON: David Bruce obviously was one of our premier diplomats. He was a very, very decent fellow, and his wife Evangeline was a very nice person. Even though Evangeline still remains very interested in China, I don't really think that they were probably well suited to the job. He was well suited in that he was who he was.

*Q: It was a gesture that we're putting a top level person there.*

ANDERSON: Yes, exactly. The Chinese did the same thing. They sent Huang Chen, the ambassador to France. It was a gesture to show how important this relationship was and how important the Liaison Office was. But as I say, I think David Bruce really expected that he would be communing with Zhou En-lai, and when it didn't work out, Mr. Bruce really, I think, lost a good bit of interest. He spent a lot of time working on his memoirs and other things. But he came through when it was important. Nick Platt was the first chief of the Political Section, who had a fatal accident in China -- hit a girl on a bicycle through no fault of his and when he was asked to leave David Bruce was absolutely marvelous in making sure that Nick was taken care of, and it not reflect on him. He looked after his people, had very little patience with children however, which was sometimes a sore point. We had our kids out there...

*Q: ...and compound living.*

ANDERSON: ...and it was very tough living. The compound for much of the time was hotel living, but I don't think David had much sympathy for little kids. In contrast, George Bush was much more conscious of this type of thing.

*Q: Well, tell about George Bush. Now George Bush came to this really...we're speaking at a time when George Bush is President of the United States, but at this time he wasn't a major figure particularly. He had bounced around in a bunch of jobs.*

ANDERSON: Some fairly big ones.

*Q: Had he been head of the CIA by that time?*

ANDERSON: No. He went from the Liaison Office to become head of CIA. He had been a Congressman from Texas, and then ran unsuccessfully for the Senate. I get a little mixed up myself...he was chairman of the Republican Party, and he was Ambassador to the UN. I think he was Ambassador to the UN and then became chairman of the Republican Party, and then came out as head of the Liaison Office.

*Q: But still, from Bruce to Bush at that time, he wasn't carrying quite the weight, was he? Or maybe I'm misreading this.*

ANDERSON: He didn't really have the same cachet as having been ambassador to London, Paris and Bonn. On the other hand, in many ways politically, he was better plugged in, and probably had more clout in Washington with the Nixon administration and ultimately later the Ford administration, than Bruce. He was not without clout.

*Q: Could you describe how he operated during the time you were there?*

ANDERSON: He's a very energetic guy, and sort of a go-go-go type of approach. I think the first message we got was a message to be conveyed to, I think, the Ghanaian ambassador -- it was one of the African ambassadors who he had known at the United Nations. The message was to inform the Ghanaian ambassador he had just become the second best tennis player in the diplomatic corps. They had been tennis rivals in New York. He arrived running; I think he gave a reception for the entire Liaison Office staff the day he got off the plane. One of the first things he did was go out and buy a ping-pong table and move it into the formal dining room of the residence so that the kids could go over and play ping-pong, and he would go over at lunch time and play with them.

But again, I think he was frustrated by the lack of communication and dialogue with the Chinese. I remember at that time we were dealing very frequently with a lady by the name of Wang Hainong, who was Mao's niece and at that point was an Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs. She was really noteworthy for her clamlike approach to dialogue, and I think it used to drive George Bush up the wall because he would go over and we would have a message to deliver from Washington on whatever issue. Quite literally most of the time the message would take five minutes, and then Wang would sort of sit there, and George Bush would be damned if he was going to arrive at the Foreign Ministry and leave ten minutes later. So he would sometimes tend to launch into discussions of issues, political issues that I wondered about occasionally at the time, because we got no response. Wang, or whoever was her interlocutor would sit and listen but we got very little in response.

*Q: Do you have any feel for how the policy apparatus worked at that time? In other words, we'd go in and deliver a message which we felt there should be some response, or something like that, you'd get the clam treatment more or less, but did you have any feel what happened to policy things, and how they came back and answered them.*

ANDERSON: Oh, we would get a response eventually but basically the way it worked Washington would send us a message, we would go over to the Foreign Ministry, deliver the message, and they would say, "Thank you, we will inform the appropriate offices." And then maybe a week later we would get a phone call saying, "Would you come in?" We would go in, and they would read from their prepared position paper. So we got answers, but it was a process that had to go through particularly the party machinery to get the right answer, or to get an approved answer. What I meant was, in a normal diplomatic situation you could go in and do that, and there is conversation and some back and forth in dialogue on the issue. But there was very little of that. Basically, I think everyone was scared to death. It was a time when the power struggle in Beijing was very intense, so no one was going to stick their neck out.

*Q: Was that the situation the whole time you were there?*

ANDERSON: Yes. I left Beijing in the summer of '75, and went to Hong Kong. The Consul General in Hong Kong asked me to come down and we amalgamated the political and economic section into a China reporting section. We were dealing with both economic and political reporting, and he asked me to come down and run that, which I did. We had relatively little operational kinds of functions, but it was a terribly interesting time from a reporting standpoint. Zhou En-lai died...I got there in early fall of '75, and Zhou En-lai died I believe it was February of '76. I can no longer remember the exact sequence, but Chu De, who was number two to Mao for many years, died. Then Mao himself died. And before that they had the Tangshan earthquake which was the enormous earthquake in the Northeast. Three weeks after Mao died we had the arrest of the Gang of Four. So 1976 was a tremendously eventful year in China, and we were observing from Hong Kong through the Chinese press, through intelligence.

*Q: The question always comes, Hong Kong was the preeminent China watching place for years, all of a sudden we open an office in Beijing, so what's Hong Kong doing? And why is it still doing its thing?*

ANDERSON: It's because the two bring two different kinds of attributes. In Beijing you have on-the-scenes, you have the ability to talk to people, you can get out on the streets, you're interacting with the Foreign Ministry and other ministries in the government. There is a large political relationship to be managed, which requires an on-the-spot presence of an embassy. Hong Kong, on the other hand, is outside looking in. It has a number of advantages as well. One is resources. There is a Foreign Service national staff there, a local Chinese staff many of whom have worked for the Consulate for 20 or more years, who have followed these developments and have a historical memory that is invaluable. And being Chinese they can get through Chinese materials twice as fast as any American regardless of how good his language is. And then there is the international press, and a whole China watching community there. And a very substantial intelligence operation. There are intelligence resources there that you don't have anywhere else. And it's been very interesting that over a long period of time you get a different perspective from Beijing and Hong Kong. Usually Hong Kong, when developments are happening, when events are breaking, Hong Kong tends to be more on the pessimistic side that things are going wrong, or that there is a power struggle going on. And in Beijing, living right in the community, the inclination I think is to see things as being more normal than they look from the outside.

*Q: Before we leave the Nixon-Ford administration, what was Kissinger's role once he established this relationship? Did he sort of move on to other things? Did you feel that Kissinger was really on top of the China relations all the time?*

ANDERSON: Pretty much, yes. He retained a very direct interest in China, and at a minimum Kissinger, I think, sort of set a tone that really shaped the way we dealt with China for a very long time. Essentially Kissinger saw the opening to China as part of a global strategic move, and was very much interested in the triangular relationship. At the same time I think he was very affected by China in his book, and speeches I've heard him give. He was obviously very impressed with Mao and Zhou En-lai, and with their intellectual capabilities, their strategic thinking, and this kind of thing. I think they were people he felt he could commune with. Then

there was very definitely an atmosphere in the U.S. government as long as Kissinger was running the show that basically in dealing with China you looked at the big picture and the strategic relationship, don't bother with details which led to, I think, a lot of people...not necessarily myself, but a lot of people feeling that we were giving away things that we didn't need to give to China. In other words, if the Chinese said, "We want this," in terms of a negotiation, the inclination was to say, "Okay," rather than have a show-down, and quibble over details, which may or may not have been wise.

*Q: What about in Hong Kong the view there of events and Vietnam and Chinese- Vietnamese relations?*

ANDERSON: At that period really Vietnam did not figure terribly large.

*Q: It was our major preoccupation, and then it just dropped over the horizon?*

ANDERSON: The Hong Kong Consulate General did not contribute to the Vietnam picture at that particular time. There were the beginnings of Vietnamese refugees, and as a matter of fact, I had one guy working for me who did nothing but Indochina matters. It was not a major focus.

*Q: You left there and came back to Washington?*

ANDERSON: Yes.

*Q: First you were in Micronesian negotiations for a while from '77 to '78. What were you doing on that?*

ANDERSON: I was the Deputy U.S. representative. The Micronesian operation is a very strange thing. It was called the Office of Micronesian Status Negotiations, and the head of the office had the rank of ambassador. At the time I was there it was Peter Rosenblatt. I was a very small part of a process that had been going on, at that point, for about ten years, and went on again for another five or six after I left. The objective was to negotiate a relationship with the Micronesian states which was called Free Association. The United States objective, in crude terms, was to grant limited sovereignty to these states so they could basically manage most of their internal affairs while we retained control of their foreign affairs, their foreign economic relations, and their foreign military relations because a major player in this whole thing was the Department of Defense, which was looking at Micronesia...I always felt in terms of World War II Pacific.

*Q: We'd gone to a great deal of effort and blood to seize these islands from the Japanese. And I guess the Soviets were sniffing around in the Pacific.*

ANDERSON: Then you have to realize Truk, the Marshall Islands, and Eniwetok, these were places where we shed a lot of blood. And there was also in the Marshall Islands another factor which made it very important to us, the Kwajalein Missile Range which was an almost perfect site for testing intercontinental ballistic missiles. We would fire them from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California and drop the warheads into the lagoon at Kwajalein. It was exactly the right depth. So we had some interest, but it was an almost tragic negotiation in many ways. It

was a clash of a huge wealthy western culture coming into an essentially native island culture. Right after World War II the Navy ran the Micronesian Trust, and basically took the approach of sort of anthropologically not disturbing the native life. The UN, under which we had the mandate, went in and looked around and said, "These people are living in poverty. You've got to do something to improve their livelihood." The responsibility got moved to Interior, who then took the approach, "We're going to modernize and bring you into the 20th century, and get all these good things for you."

I don't know what the right answer is quite frankly. The result was you had one of the highest rates of government employment I think anywhere in the world. People forgot how to fish, people forgot how to do the things that they had done for generations. Alcoholism became a problem, and economic development was practically zero.

*Q: I have an interview I've done with Peter Rosenblatt which would bring this up. Then you went to the China desk where you were from '78 to '80. This was the Carter administration. Was this different? This was a new world, wasn't it?*

ANDERSON: It was a new world, but in terms of the U.S. approach to China policy, it was very little changed. The China policy remained very consistent, and as a matter of fact of course, Carter was the one who was finally able to start moving toward normalization of relations, and did so in '79. I'll be absolutely honest with you, I ended up as deputy on the China desk largely because I really wanted to get out of the Micronesian negotiations. They were fascinating in many respects, but I felt like I was kind of out in left field. Our offices were over in the Department of Interior, and I didn't feel that I was in the main stream of what was going on at State. So when I was offered the job of deputy, I came over. And I was glad I did because I ended up being there at the time of establishment of diplomatic relations and the visit to the United States of Deng Xiaoping and some very historic moments in U.S.-China relations.

*Q: When you arrived there, how did you see this relationship? We had a strong relationship with Taiwan, and we were working this other one, the two China policy. How did this work out? What was the bureau suggesting that we do?*

ANDERSON: One big problem at this particular time was that the normalization negotiations, and some of the moves that were being made, were so highly restricted, so highly classified, that a lot of the other kinds of lower level measures that needed to be taken to prepare for it were not being taken because you couldn't tell the people that had to do it. For example, the Legal Adviser was called upon to perform heroic service when we were starting to move toward normalization and had to have some form of legislation to take care of Taiwan. Because of the relationship we had with Taiwan, we couldn't just simply say, "Good bye," and walk away. The Japanese had led the way with their arrangement that they had developed with Taipei after they normalized with Beijing, and we more or less followed some aspects of the Japanese model where we created in effect an embassy, but declared it a private, non-profit, entity. That was all done through the Taiwan Relations Act, and of course, this all had to be done in the context of the normalization negotiations. And as I say, much of it was very difficult to accomplish because the people you needed to do it couldn't be told why they were doing it. Or if they were asked to do it, they would know what was up. I was kept briefed and involved on the normalization negotiations up to the

very end. I guess that would have been into November, but then in early December, I believe it was...

*Q: This would be '79.*

ANDERSON: ...'79, Ambassador Woodcock, who had been meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, had two meetings, or maybe three, with Deng Xiaoping. That was where the last pieces fell into place. I'm sure it took Deng Xiaoping himself to say, "All right, we will do these things." Then it was decided that they were going to do it. I was not included in that, and as a matter of fact I remember vividly that on December 15th when Jimmy Carter went on television to announce that we were establishing diplomatic relations with China, it was the day of the East Asian Christmas party. I got a phone call from Bernard Kalb...

*Q: A correspondent.*

ANDERSON: I had known Bernie for a long time, and he said, "Don, what's going on?" I said, "I don't know," and I added, "I really mean it, I don't know." "Well," he said, "the White House had just announced the President is going to make a major foreign policy statement at 9:00 tonight. He said, "There is nothing going on that he would be making an announcement about, nothing in the Soviet Union, and there's nothing in the Middle East." He said, "Its got to be China." He said, "Is he going to normalize relations?" And I said, "Bernie, I have no idea, and don't you say that anybody on the China desk had any kind of a clue, because it's true." He said, "We're going to go with it anyway." And they did, and they were right. At 9:00 that night Jimmy Carter...

*Q: Did someone then brief you on what was happening?*

ANDERSON: By the Christmas party things did sort of begin to fall apart, and it was generally understood that that was what was going to happen.

*Q: Was the reason for these negotiations of this type, or concern, within the American political environment that this might intrude?*

ANDERSON: Yes, I think it was. There were several problems. One, there was concern about Taiwan. Taiwan actually got treated rather shabbily in terms of notification. I think that they did not want Taiwan to know that we were about to make this move because Taiwan at that time had quite a strong lobby on the Hill. I don't think they wanted the Hill to know too far in advance. They did brief, but a very, very short time before it actually became known. And there was a good deal of resentment about that in the Congress as well. But I think that they did not want a big political "brouhaha" blowing up with Congress passing emergency resolutions, and the top people on Taiwan going to their constituencies and so forth, so it was very closely held.

*Q: Taiwan was part of the China desk, wasn't it until that point?*

ANDERSON: No. It had been separated. At the time of normalization, there was a Republic of China desk. And quite some time earlier, actually in the '60s, we had split the Mainland off from

Taiwan, there was the Republic of China desk, and originally there was the Office of Asian Communist Affairs which included China. And then we dropped North Vietnam and North Korea and it became just the China desk. So the two desks were separate.

*Q: And as a practical measure they both had been going in such different directions that they could be treated as a practical measure as different countries, couldn't they?*

ANDERSON: In practical terms there was a lot of that, yes. The ROC desk and the China desk worked obviously very closely, and now there is a Taiwan Liaison Staff in the Office of Regional Affairs, again, which works quite closely with the China desk, because almost every major policy impinges on both sides. I don't know if you read the Washington Post today, but there's a sale of F-16 fighters to Taiwan which looks like it might be going through which would have some major implications for both sides.

*Q: It seems to be more a political move to get the Texas vote for your former ambassador, George Bush.*

ANDERSON: There may be an element of that, I'm sure.

*Q: During this China desk period '78 to '80. Any other major events that you were dealing with? One would be the visit of Deng Xiaoping, and how he was viewed by us at that time.*

ANDERSON: I think his visit was a tremendous success, and he was very popular everywhere he went. I accompanied the Deng party on that trip around the United States. Everywhere he went there was a degree of tension because there were the Chinese Nationalists and some people were out with the Chinese Nationalist flag, etc. But by and large his reception was very warm, and I think personally he handled himself very well.

*Q: Did he understand the Chinese Nationalists element in the United States? Was he surprised at it, or did you get any feel for that? Was he briefed?*

ANDERSON: I don't think he was surprised. I mean, they're pretty sophisticated on that subject, and they follow it extremely closely themselves. It was obviously one of their concerns, and one of the things they talked to us at the working level about. "We understand there's been a few demonstrations here, and what are you going to do about? Will you make sure that they are kept at a certain distance, etc." So they were expecting it, and it was managed I think in a way that satisfied them.

*Q: How did you feel about, you might say, the High Command dealing with Far Eastern affairs under the Carter administration? I mean, you had Richard Holbrooke who had been sort of a young Turk in the Foreign Service coming in and he was more interested I suppose in Vietnamese affairs at that time. How was he and his immediate subordinates?*

ANDERSON: Basically, I think, pretty good. I always found Dick a difficult person to deal with. But I think he had the right instincts, and we got where we wanted to go. And he had some very good people in the Bureau, and up the line, dealing with people that I dealt with who dealt with

China. I found generally they were quite good.

*Q: As an East Asian China hand, what was your personal feeling about how our China policy came out, which more or less existed to this day. This was considered quite a bold move on the part of Carter to cut this knot that had been around. How did you feel about how it developed?*

ANDERSON: Given the emotional involvement in this whole relationship, I think it came out about as well as could be expected. The immediate Congressional reaction was very strong, and in many cases very negative. And the Taiwan Relations Act reflected Congressional feeling that we were abandoning a friend. But we argued at the time, and I think it has been proven historically accurate, that we were not abandoning Taiwan. In fact, Taiwan has prospered mightily since. From a strictly diplomatic standpoint they have become isolated. But from an economic standpoint, cultural standpoint, they have been successful. And I think the relationship we have with them now is a very sound one.

*Q: Was there anything else we should cover in that period?*

ANDERSON: I can't think of anything. I'm sure that others have covered some other aspects of it in more detail, some of whom like Harry Thayer, for example, were more directly involved in the beginning of normalization negotiations.

*Q: ...Shanghai as Consul General from '80 to '83. You must have felt this was the culmination of your career, didn't you? To have a major post in China, having been out in the place where one would never would return to China? How did you feel about that?*

ANDERSON: I wouldn't call it a culmination but it was certainly something that I sought and wanted to do. I considered it a real challenge. Even when I was living in Beijing with the Liaison Office we traveled down to Shanghai quite often. I had found Shanghai a fascinating city, its history.

*Q: Its really a very recent history. It goes back to about the 1830s, or something like that.*

ANDERSON: Even later than that.

*Q: It was a made treaty port, like Hong Kong.*

ANDERSON: Yes, but an absolutely fascinating place. I was delighted when I got the job as Consul General, and particularly because we were setting up the post. We were creating something new, and in a way setting precedents, and establishing a new consular mission, which I found particularly interesting.

*Q: Were you able to pick up any of the residue of the old consulate which we abandoned and were forced out of in '48? I've interviewed some people who left on ships there. I mean, we went out rather reluctantly, dragging our heels. Was anything of that left at all?*

ANDERSON: It is all there, but one of the fall-outs from -- I guess you could call it a fall-out --

from the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress in its desire to protect Taiwan's interests introduced into the Taiwan Relations Act a provision that all properties in the United States held by the former Republic of China would remain the property of Taiwan. So the former Republic of China embassy, and the residence in particular, a place called Twin Oaks which sits on about 12 acres of beautiful land between Connecticut and Wisconsin Avenues, and a number of other buildings continue to belong to Taiwan. So we have never settled our official claims between the PRC and the United States. We haven't gotten back any of our official buildings, really haven't made much of an attempt. So we were not expecting to go back to any of our former official buildings. And, in fact, the then Deputy Chief of Mission, Stapleton Roy, who is now currently our ambassador, was asked down to Shanghai and shown the building that they were going to lease to us, and came back and...I don't know whether you know Stape, but he is not a terribly effusive kind of person, and he was waxing absolutely ecstatic about this building. It was the home of one of the Yung family, who were probably the wealthiest Chinese in Shanghai. It was three acres of gardens, and an absolutely magnificent old mansion that they offered us, which we grabbed, and we're still there. Part of the fun of opening the post was taking this place and converting it into a Consulate General without destroying the beauty.

*Q: Did you find a contrast in dealing with the Shanghai authorities? One gets the feeling from reading from the periphery about this that they really are a different breed than the people up in Beijing, much more aware of the world, and looser, and easier to deal with? I don't know.*

ANDERSON: There is a certain amount of that. As a matter of fact up in Beijing in the Foreign Ministry you'll find an awful lot of Shanghainese. I used to kid them about the Shanghai mafia that used to run the American and Oceanian Department because there are a lot of people who are originally from Shanghai. For example, the current Chinese ambassador. They are a bit different but you have to realize, of course, I went to Shanghai in 1980, and I was in Beijing in '73. In the interim the Gang of Four had fallen, Deng Xiaoping had come back, so it was a whole new atmosphere. So it was a much easier place to live and deal with. But there were still plenty of problems, and Shanghai in many respects at that time, I think, was kept on a tighter leash by Beijing than many other parts of China. Because really the Gang of Four and this whole Maoist clique that attempted to usurp power, their power base was Shanghai.

*Q: The mayor of Shanghai, was he part of that?*

ANDERSON: Yes, Zhang Chunqiao was one of the Four, and Wang Hongwen, and all three were from Shanghai, and Jiang Qing herself had...

*Q: ...had been an actress in Shanghai.*

ANDERSON: So I think Shanghai for a long, long time was viewed with a certain distrust, and there were a lot of hangovers and holdovers from the earlier period that were still in jobs; frequently not doing much but they had not been dislodged. So that it was a different atmosphere, but Shanghai people are generally much more friendly, and effusive, and sophisticated, than in Beijing.

*Q: Okay, one, you're setting up this thing, but what else did you do? How did you go about it?*

ANDERSON: We basically set up the whole gambit of things. One important thing was getting the consular operation going. We held off the formal opening of the Consulate until we felt we had all of the necessary infrastructure. The consular section was built, and we had the visa machines and everything that we needed. At the opening ceremony I said, "We will be open for business tomorrow morning and ready to provide a full range of services." At 5:00 the next morning we had a line of about 60 people waiting to apply for visas. We did a very big consular business. We did a fair amount of trade promotion. Shanghai was one of the more popular places for American businesses to come, and there were a number of things really just getting started that we could...

*Q: Had they established those economic zones?*

ANDERSON: No, they hadn't come yet. That was later. They were on their way, they were planning them but they hadn't come yet. But Foxboro, for example, which produces electric monitoring equipment for industrial processes, was setting up a joint venture. Nike Shoes came in and tried to set up a joint venture. McDonald Douglas was just beginning what became a major co-production operation building commercial jets. So we had the beginning of a business community, and we had regular meetings of this community to brief them and get their reactions. Finally that grew into the Shanghai- American Chamber of Commerce which now has well over 65 or 70 members.

There were a lot of things not directly related to the consular operations, things like setting up the school. We had to create the Shanghai-American school. We had a cultural section and a very active cultural and educational program. We got the exchange visitor program going, and I think were very successful there. Often times Beijing couldn't use all their international visitor grants and we were always ready to grab them. And Shanghai has an Institute for International Studies, which is one of their most sophisticated sort of Rand type operation. We sent a lot of those people to the United States on short-term grants, and those people have been friends of the Consulate and friends of the United States for a long time.

*Q: The great onrush of Chinese students to the United States was probably, I suspect, will be the most significant thing that was done.*

ANDERSON: I agree with you.

*Q: I mean this back and forth, China will never be the same.*

ANDERSON: I totally agree with that. I take a certain amount of pride that either on the China desk, or in my jobs overseas, I have always pushed that aspect because I totally agree that the 140,000 Chinese that have come to the United States now, and it's growing every year, will be a tremendously important factor in our bilateral relations and in China's modernization. I was struck by that when I was Consul General in Shanghai because at that time, after the Gang of Four period was wound up, many of the older people who had been in prison or had been under house arrest, or whatever, were coming back and getting responsible positions. And many of these people had been trained either in the United States, or at places like St. John's University in

Shanghai which was an American run missionary university.

*Q: And Yale had some...*

ANDERSON: Yale was not so big in Shanghai but there were a lot of people who had had extensive contacts with them, and who were American educated. And dealing with them was just marvelous because they understood even after an absence of 35 years what we were talking about.

*Q: Did you have any problems on the consular side with protection of welfare, Americans getting into trouble? Or wasn't that a factor particularly?*

ANDERSON: We had probably less than many places. People tended to be a little more on their good behavior in China than they are in Tijuana or Naples, or some place like that. We had a few people go around the bend, a few people died. We had several cases of absolutely fascinating individuals who had stayed on in China, American ladies, who had lived in China for the past 30-40 years -- in one case for 50 years. She was a Quaker lady from Pennsylvania, had married a Chinese who was studying in the United States and when he got his Ph.D. she married him, and went back to China. This was in the '20s when an American woman, if she married a foreign national, lost her nationality. She had lived as a Chinese all her adult life. We got to know Muriel, and she was a great gal, tougher than nails, and finally decided she wanted to get her American passport and be an American citizen. So we had quite a range, some rather bizarre consular matters.

Tragically, one of our officers married a young girl from Taiwan where he had met her studying Chinese, and she came over after they were married, of course, a little bit nervous about moving to Communist China from Taiwan. And they were out on a trip, one of the consular corps sponsored trips, died suddenly of a heart attack, age 27. Suddenly we had a dead wife, the family wanted a Buddhist ceremony funeral which we managed to do, and got the body shipped back to Taiwan via Japan. It was a terribly sad thing, but in many ways it was kind of touching because one of the Foreign Affairs Office people, who was helping us with this, and he had on other occasions not been very helpful, came over on a weekend and brought me...they had to do a death certificate, and he said, "I have recopied the entire death certificate because it was printed in our simplified Chinese characters (the modern Chinese characters they use on the Mainland)." He said, "I know they don't use those on Taiwan and I was afraid that they would not accept our simplified characters, so I have redone it in the old characters."

A large part of it was getting set up, getting the building fixed, getting the school started, getting the consular program going, getting the commercial program going, and getting the cultural program going. We did a fair amount of political and economic reporting, and it was a good time to be doing that because nobody had ever done it.

*Q: It's a Foreign Service officer's dream.*

ANDERSON: And then we traveled. The consular district encompassed Jiangsu Province, Anhui Province, and Zhejiang which is really the whole Yangtze basin and includes some of the nicest

cities in China, Hangzhou, and Suzhou, and some of the more scenic spots. I used to tell visitors that if my consular district was a country, it would be the fifth largest country in the world.

*Q: On the cultural side, here is the ancient Chinese culture, and the very aggressive American cultures, were there problems?*

ANDERSON: The problems weren't between an ancient Chinese culture and a modern American culture. The problems, where we had them, were in the degree to which the Communist government wanted to maintain control. And the degree of openness that they were prepared to permit. We were always pushing for more and more open exchanges, more frank discussions. "Let us bring in more films, and show them to more people," and the Chinese were always just a little bit nervous. Shanghai is a very western city in many respects, and as you said, Shanghai's history, while they have the 4000 years of Chinese culture certainly, they look back on a 100 years. They really do look on themselves as sort of the New Yorkers of China.

*Q: I take it you did not follow in the footsteps of one of your predecessors, George Seward, who hung an American in the courtyard of the American Consulate back in around 1863 or so.*

ANDERSON: No, I did take part...he didn't get hung, but we had the first American government ship, it was the NOAA oceanographic ship, I think it was called the Oceanographer, a beautiful white ship that came in along with the director or NOAA. It was an exchange between our two oceanographic societies. The ship, as I say, was a beautiful ship, and it had a co-educational crew...

*Q: It's a fancy term for men and women working on it, which was unusual at that time.*

ANDERSON: The captain took out one of the crew, and they both arrived at the banquet with the Chinese...she having not been invited, a bit tipsy, and the Chinese had a bunch of Chinese admirals who did their Chinese number on them, toasting with MaoTai, the Chinese high potency stuff, and they both got absolutely swacked. The director of NOAA fired them both, so we didn't hang them, but we did send them home.

*Q: How about the relations with the embassy? Any problems.*

ANDERSON: No, we had quite good relations actually. We had a good Admin officer, and we set up a courier system -- it was illegal, but we used to send a diplomatic pouch up with our classified stuff. We'd send up an officer, so we got back and forth as frequently as possible. I didn't have any real problems that way.

*Q: Then you came back for the last two years on the China desk again?*

ANDERSON: I came back in '83 for two years on the China desk, '83 to '85.

*Q: Did you find any difference with the Reagan administration, and China? Reagan came sort of an old line Republican, a very pro-Taiwanese.*

ANDERSON: Reagan, I think, scared us all to death before the election, and really immediately after the election. The transition team that he sent over to State was pretty shocking. I will give Al Haig really high marks.

*Q: He was Secretary of State.*

ANDERSON: He was appointed Secretary of State. He went in and said, "Okay, I'm in charge now. All of you transition people get out of here." I think he kept the China thing on the trolley and prevented it from taking a real lurch. And once he had stabilized it, and the bureaucracy that was built up around the President, after that there were relatively few problems. We had a tougher bunch than we did in the early days. Paul Wolfowitz was the Assistant Secretary, and there was less empathy with the Chinese. I think he was more interested in other issues, and he didn't see why we were pandering to the Chinese. This F-16 deal that we've talked about today...

*Q: ...this is a fighter plane.*

ANDERSON: ...brings up the issue of the 1982 August 17 joint communiqué that was negotiated, which Paul Wolfowitz has always thought was a terrible mistake. This is the one limiting our ability to sell arms to Taiwan. On things like that, the Reagan administration was tougher. I think that they took, if you will, a more pragmatic attitude, and were willing to risk offending the Chinese more so than, say, during the Carter period.

*Q: I suppose looking at these things from a certain perspective and saying, "Well, maybe rightly so."*

ANDERSON: Yes, and history changes too. The relationship isn't the same at different points. I guess the big event of my time as Country Director for China was the Reagan trip to China. I quite literally spent much of my time in the two years I was Country Director, either managing trips or managing visits of Chinese dignitaries to the United States. We had the Reagan trip to China, the visit to the United States by Zhao Ziyang, who was then the Premier, an earlier visit by the Foreign Minister which was the first official formal visit to Washington by a Chinese Foreign Minister. Then a number of other high level visits.

*Q: On the Reagan trip from the press, I mean it's hard to say that one had the feeling that Reagan was not very knowledgeable or engaged on foreign affairs. He tended to see things in rather simplistic terms. From your perspective, how did you prepare him, and what was your impression of how he worked on this. Really, it was a major trip on his part.*

ANDERSON: It was a major trip, but there was not major substance. In fact, I don't think there were too many people that wanted any new breakthroughs or any major substantive changes. So it was, it was a big photo operation. It was a chance for the great communicator to go to China, and communicate to the Chinese, but there was a very strong element, I can remember, of a desire to communicate really over the heads of the Chinese to the American people as well. And there was incredible television and press coverage of that trip, and he did it extremely well. It was one of the few times when I have watched him turn it on in person, and he is remarkable. I went to the White House briefings and we did our number, we spoke our piece, the President

listened, but I didn't have the feeling that there was any great substance. As a matter of fact, after we finished one of the briefings -- I think it was the Cabinet Room, he listened very intently, but at the end his only comment was, he told a story about losing his contact lenses in Hong Kong when he was doing a movie, and so he walked around Hong Kong holding his eyes like this...because that's the way you can see better if you've lost your contacts. He said he didn't understand why everybody was so angry with him. That was his sole comment on the substantive issue.

*Q: In talking about drawing your eyes back to make you look oriental. Then just briefly, you were in the Senior Seminar from '85 to '86, and then you went back to Hong Kong as Consul General for our years from '86 to '90. Was there any change in being in Hong Kong at that time? Had the operation matured?*

ANDERSON: There were lots of changes, but not as many as many people might have expected. The assumption was at the time of normalization of relations that Hong Kong would gradually shrink, would diminish, and in some respects it did. I mean the political section and economic section was considerably smaller. But strangely enough the Consulate was at least as big, and maybe a little bigger, than I had ever known it to be. One of my roles in Hong Kong was to fend off other agencies that wanted to either set up offices, or add staff to their existing offices. It is a great regional center, I think we had 12 or 13 different government agencies represented there, and there was constant pressure to increase. The big thing, of course, that had changed substantively was the 1984 Sino-British Joint Statement a time certain had been set for Hong Kong's reversion to Beijing, which affected a whole range of things in Hong Kong, and the attitude of the Hong Kong people.

Then, of course, the other major development and major tragedy was Tiananmen which occurred in June of 1989.

*Q: This is the quelling of a major student demonstration in front of world television in the main square of Beijing. Let's talk first about the reversion. Did we have a fixed policy when the Hong Kong people would come to you and say, "What's the American assurances?" How did we play this? Because this was only two years after the statement, and people hadn't learned to live with it yet.*

ANDERSON: What happened with the statement was that there was great fear, and uncertainty, prior to the statement -- in the period '82, '83 and into early '84. Property values were affected, people were beginning to make arrangements to get out, and there was a high degree of uncertainty. My predecessor, I will say, played a significant role in presenting an image of confidence.

*Q: Who was that?*

ANDERSON: Burt Levin. Then came the Joint Declaration in 1984, and the document, I still think, was a very good document. It was well negotiated, and if the Chinese abide by the provisions of that Joint Declaration, I think Hong Kong's future is going to be okay. There was a great collective sigh of relief when that Joint Declaration came out. So I came in '86, following a

period of not euphoria, but relief, and a renewed sense of confidence that things were going to be all right. But the next phase in the process, as agreed, was to begin the preparation of the basic law for Hong Kong, in effect a mini-constitution. That process was just beginning. My feeling was that over the period that I was there, there was again something of a deterioration of confidence, in part because of the negotiations over the basic law and a growing sense that the Chinese really aren't going to leave Hong Kong alone to the degree that we hoped. And, of course, Tiananmen occurred which was a terrible shock. The democracy movement in China had a tremendous impact in Hong Kong. I can remember one Sunday there were at least 800,000 people marching peacefully down the main street of Hong Kong. There were enormous demonstrations. There was an interesting change that took place during that period because they were demonstrating for our compatriots in China, our brothers in China. This was a whole new attitude because generally Hong Kong Chinese have looked upon people across the border, in the Mainland, as sort of country bumpkins. "We're the smart guys, we're the wealthy, we're the ones who know how to do it, and all those people up in the Mainland are kind of dummies." And when the democracy movement started, there was all of a sudden in Hong Kong a feeling of being Chinese, of being part of the thing that they were seeing in Beijing. In fact, there was a lot of support, monetary and material support that went from Hong Kong into China during that period. Practically all of those tents that you saw on television in Tiananmen came from Hong Kong.

*Q: Were people looking to the United States to do something? How did they feel about how we reacted?*

ANDERSON: To what? To the 1997 issue?

*Q: To the Tiananmen Square.*

ANDERSON: Everybody watched in horror. I personally felt like I was watching a tragedy. They recognized there wasn't anything we could do in the short term in the sense of changing things. In the short term we did take actions which probably still can't really be discussed, to provide shelter, and help for people who were escaping who had been involved in it. We cooperated with a group of about five other countries to help some of these young people, and some not so young, to get through Hong Kong and get on safely to the United States or to Europe, or wherever they were going. And, of course, the President immediately announced economic sanctions, and certain steps in terms of cutting off high level visits, etc. Actually, the United States probably took as strong measures as anybody, and kept them in place, or is still keeping some of them in place longer than anybody else.

One of the very interesting things about the post-Tiananmen reaction was that probably the people who were back in doing business more or less as usual, were the Chinese from Taiwan and from Hong Kong.

*Q: You probably left there shortly after Tiananmen...*

ANDERSON: A full year later.

*Q: Were the Chinese, who were able to leave, beginning to hedge their bets more by getting out of Hong Kong?*

ANDERSON: No, the brain drain had already become a serious problem. There is a constant outward migration from Hong Kong, and a steady inward migration from the Mainland into Hong Kong so that the population has remained relatively stable. There are about 22,000 people leave every year, in the '60s, '70s, '80s. It went up to 35,000, then up to 45,000 and the last figures I saw it was running between 55,000 and 60,000, and many of these people are the best and brightest, they are people with needed skills. It's a bit of a dilemma because they want to get out, and Hong Kong is certainly not going to try and prevent them from leaving. We do not want to be seen to be contributing to the brain drain. On the other hand, Canada and Australia, and a number of other countries, were actively welcoming those people because a country like Canada, has an under population problem, and needed certain types of skills -- secretarial skills, skills in the financial field, a variety of things which are more or less mobile. It was an issue that I wrestled with much of the time.

*Q: How would you deal with it? Obviously you don't want to shout fire, but at the same time American business people, other people would come and say, whither Hong Kong? Do we have a policy, and how did you handle this?*

ANDERSON: I basically took an upbeat, optimistic approach. I think I must have answered that question several hundred times. Every business executive and business leader that came through from the States, the first question was, "What's going to happen in 1997?" My response was that basically Hong Kong is going to change. There will probably be less personal freedom, more controls, because the Chinese I don't think are capable of accepting the degree of free wheeling operations that Hong Kong has permitted. On the other hand, I don't think the Chinese are so stupid that they're going to upset the business atmosphere to the point where Hong Kong will no longer be a good place to do business, and it has so many natural advantages in terms of communications, the port, the skilled labor force, that it is almost irreplaceable, at least in the short term for China. China depends on it to a tremendous amount. So I told them, "I think we'll still be doing business after 1997."

*Q: Maybe we might cut it off here, do you think?*

ANDERSON: I certainly do.

*Q: Just one last question. Looking at it today, and maybe they have, if a young Foreign Service officer comes to you and says, "What about a career as a China specialist?" What would you tell them today?*

ANDERSON: I would tell them that if that's their interest, and they enjoy it, I would certainly do it. I have probably specialized in China more than anybody in the Service. Out of 32 years I spent about 25 in China, or China related jobs, and never regretted it.

*Q: I thank you very much.*

**MARK S. PRATT**  
**Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1959-1960)**

*Mr. Pratt was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard, Brown, Sorbonne and Georgetown Universities. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he studied Chinese and was posted to Hong Kong. Throughout his career Mr. Pratt dealt with Far East and Southeast Asian affairs, serving in Taichung, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Paris, Taipei and Guangzhou (Canto), where he was Consul General. His Washington assignments also concerned Southeast Asian matters. Mr. Pratt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Were there signs at the time that the Kuomintang group was going to be sort of aged out or moved out, or how were we seeing this? Were the Embassy and all pretty well read into the KMT at that time?*

PRATT: The Embassy was not. The Foreign Service people were not. It of course was the political leadership which, of course, found it convenient for the United States to let the so-called China lobby and it's views of the situation be spread around. I think it was also another good indicator of just how difficult it is when you have a democracy and the persons who are your leaders come in knowing very little if anything about foreign affairs and knowing, however, that they do have another election coming up and therefore it's far more important to pay attention to what domestic concerns are than what the foreign realities are. It didn't bother me particularly because we took that for granted. We realized that we were expected by the Foreign Service to keep track of what was going on in elections, even though, of course, the persons who did so would be called in by the ambassador and the ministers would have fingers wagged at them telling them how we should not be permitted to talk to any of these Taiwanese, we shouldn't go anywhere near polling booths, we shouldn't try to compile biographic information about the Taiwanese and so on. So we knew that we were in an adversarial situation to a certain extent.

*Q: Was Walter Robertson's hand apparent?*

PRATT: Oh, yes.

*Q: He was the head of the Asian Bureau at the time and very much the creature - a strong term to use - but very much part of what you called the China lobby in Congress.*

PRATT: Well, I had had for a short time Pat Paul Weinbarger, who, of course, had been earlier tied in with Sun Yat-sen and very early tied in with also Chiang Kai-shek. So I was not unaware of these people. I heard, for example, when I was a student here, a debate between Fulbright and Walter Robertson. So of course the China question was one which was a big problem in the United States and something we were well aware of. But we did see that one of the realities was that the Taiwanese were not that happy to be under the Kuomintang, and I had to remark also that most of my KMT friends in Taipei had nothing but the greatest of contempt for Chiang Kai-

shek, and what the military leadership was going. They blamed them for the loss of the Mainland. They said, "I wouldn't be here if they hadn't been such a miserable bunch of corrupt officials back in Nanjing." So I found that the Mainlanders at that time - and that was 1959-60 - were far more willing to criticize the leadership of the Kuomintang than they were when I went back in 1979.

*Q: Well, now, later in the years, around October of 1960, the Islands of Quemoy and Matsu all of a sudden became the center of the American political discourse, when Nixon and Kennedy debated on these two islands, which I don't think either of them ever paid the slightest bit of attention to afterwards. But were Quemoy and Matsu the subject of discussion while you were on Taiwan?*

PRATT: Somewhat, although I think they're really, to a certain extent, a matter now of discussion than they were then because, although the 1958 crisis had come, it had also gone, and therefore the only reaction of the Taiwanese, I found, was that they were very annoyed with the Kuomintang because they, of course, considered neither Quemoy nor Matsu to be Taiwanese at all. And they said what the KMT is doing is taking all of our young men over there and putting them on those islands as hostages because they are trying to involve us in a war with Peking over their own interests, which have nothing whatsoever to do with Taiwan. Now, of course, because KMT has had Quemoy and Matsu sufficiently tied in for all this time, they are really saying that Quemoy and Matsu have to be considered part of Taiwan. Now this is not what was the case when I was there early in 1959-60, when these were extraneous islands which should be turned over to the Mainland, and all the Taiwanese troops should not be sent over there to die for the pretensions of Chiang Kai-shek, when they could be kept back for the defense of Taiwan if it were ever needed. This is a very different attitude. Now they have been tied in long enough so that between 1960 and 1990, those 30 years mean that these people consider that that's just a place to go for viewing the Mainland and tourism and so forth, but now it's part of the *Taiwanese* concept of Taiwan.

*Q: Who was the ambassador when you were on Taiwan?*

PRATT: Let me see. Our DCM was Ralph Clough and then Art Hummel.

*Q: I think both have been interviewed by our program.*

PRATT: Everett F. Drumright. He was an interesting character. Of course, as you know, one of the incidents which had occurred a little bit earlier - and I'm sure you've talked to other people about that - was when they had the sacking of the embassy and -

*Q: Talk a little about what you were hearing about it.*

PRATT: Well, what I was hearing about when I got there is that how badly this was really handled by the American side. Now, as I say, I've never gone back to reread the history on the subject, but I was told that Drumright had gone down to Hong Kong for a little R & R and Joey Yaeger was then the - have you interviewed him?

*Q: No. Where is he now?*

PRATT: I think he's here in Washington. He was DCM, and therefore chargé d'affaires. And Chou Chi was foreign minister. I run into Chou Chi the rest of my career, too. And when this occurred, Joe Yaeger went to see Chou Chi, and they could not locate either the chairman, who was down-island, or Chiang Ching-kuo.

*Q: The son.*

PRATT: The son, who of course was a key figure in most security matters and certainly in any security matters which touched the United States connection. So my friends whom I talked to there said one of the real problems was that the Americans didn't seem to understand this: this was all set up by Chiang Ching-kuo [CCK] with the permission of his father to take the place really of elections. In other words, they believed in the good-old Communist type of . . . both of them strongly influenced by Moscow and the Moscow representatives, and therefore you had to have "participatory democracy" without any power coming from democracy.

*Q: The 99.9 percent vote.*

PRATT: But allowed them to let-off steam; let them think that they are participating. And therefore, these demonstrations and the sacking of the embassy were set up primarily to show that, unlike the May 4<sup>th</sup> movement, they were not going to be soft on the foreigners, even though they depended on the foreigners. And therefore, they were going to let out a burst of righteous outrage, and of course, at the same time, however, going along with the looters of the embassy, were a few of Chiang Ching-kuo's agents. And along with the top-secret communications from CINCPAC [Commander in Chief, Pacific] all over the front lawn and so forth, the files which were most thoroughly viewed and then taken were all the biographic files that we had on the Taiwanese population. And so this is what I was told was how the Americans just didn't understand that this was done on purpose at a relatively high level and it was only when the people who attacked the embassy then got close to and appeared to be headed for a police station that, of course, the waiting troops came rushing in and cleaned up the area - that they just did not realize that this was being done *by* the top leadership for their own purposes. So this is part of the environment, this attitude towards the Kuomintang, which was prevalent not only in the Taiwanese, where you would expect it, but also in the more educated and more enlightened Mainlanders. Of course, the Mainlanders also say, you know, "Taiwan, this is the place for my father's generation. We are merely here because we had to go somewhere, but we're all headed out." And at that time, of course, almost all of the scholarships and even permission to leave Taiwan to study went to Mainlander children, not to the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese exodus took place in the 1970s, not at that time, in the late '50s and early '60s.

*Q: Well, given the sacking of the Embassy and all, would you say that the attitude of the Embassy - and we're talking about the officers, particularly who we're dealing with - our "gallant allies" - was there certain amount of almost either dislike or contempt towards the KMT?*

PRATT: Yes. Well, although it was a bit bifurcated in that the top political leadership, which

was also highly military. If you look at the central standing committee of the KMT during the period of the '50s and '60s, it was heavily laced with military and security people. And of course they considered themselves to be occupying an unfriendly territory. When they first arrived in 1945, they treated it more harshly than we treated Japan because from their point of view, these people had been on the other side in that war and therefore they were traitors to China. So of course they were not really very nice colonists for Taiwan. But we also found that there was a whole new breed of intelligent civilians who had either been in the United States when the collapse of the Mainland occurred and then when they left the United States they didn't go back to the Mainland but they went to Taiwan instead. And they were emerging in most economic areas, and they included people who worked in the JCRR [Joint Commission of Rural Reconstruction], which was one of the most interesting organizations which the U.S. set up, the organization which served to really be a way of getting to the top levels of the Chinese Government the intelligent opinions on what ought to be done about agriculture and land reform. All of the Chinese technocrats who had come back from study at Cornell, like current president Lee Teng-hui, and these persons found great difficulties in getting their ideas up to the upper level of their own society because that's not the way Chinese bureaucracy works. And so JCRR was a way of getting around the usual blockage which exists within a Chinese bureaucratic system, which of course we're seeing on the Mainland now, less so in Taiwan.

We found also, paralleling this, the U.S. MAAG organization, the Military Assistance Advisory Group. They served a similar role within the military because down there in Taichung, one of the groups that we knew, of course, the military was headed by Chiang Wei-kuo, the ostensible brother of the vice-president at that time, son of Chiang Kai-shek - ostensibly. And we would hear from them that the MAAG was their only way of getting what really was sensible military advice from the lower level to the top level because, again, you had this blockage in the Chinese bureaucratic system, where you'd never dare tell your boss anything except that which he's already told you before. So this was part of the very creative role which, I think unbeknownst to many of the people doing it, was set up by the very intelligent Chinese who were trying to find ways of handling the difficulties within their own political structure. And so this is one of the things which one could observe there. But I think even more important, though, was the fact that this, in the eyes of most of the Mainlanders, was a hopeless stopgap situation for them, where they would fill out their time till retirement or till their death doing as best they could there, but the thing to do was to try to get it so that their children could leave and get out to the rest of the world and not be in this terrible backwater of Taiwan, because from their point of view they had come from Shanghai, they had seen the glories of Shanghai in the 1930s, they really even considered Peking a little as a backwater. Intellectually speaking it was still a very important part of China in the 1930s and '40s, and Taiwan just didn't rank.

*Q: It's like going to Alabama or something like that.*

PRATT: More like the hills of Arkansas. This was something - because of course, you know, the Chinese I think are very, very sensitive about quality, a kind of snobbish, perhaps, aspect, because it's not always real quality - because that they don't know - but they really do have a sense of hierarchy in quality. And of course now it has become almost something which has to have a numerical price tag on it. But nonetheless they are looking for what is of value, and having known Shanghai, which is, after all, the greatest city in the Orient in the '30s - it was

called, you know, the New York and Paris and the London of -

*Q: Much more than Tokyo.*

PRATT: Much more than Tokyo. So in any case they had to look at this as exile, and I think you may have heard of the great laments written by the poets (who were also officials) who were sent out to Xinjiang under the Ch'ing Dynasty and their laments for the beauties of either Peking or Yangzhou or other places in civilized coastal areas. So this is something which has a whole tradition in China of exile. But the thing is, they considered New York to be far more pertinent to them than Taipei.

*Q: Well, then, were you able to tap much into this sort of intellectual program that was going on?*

PRATT: A bit, because as I said I knew the son of this minister of the interior, and he was a student at the Normal University in Taipei, and he had students. So I would hear a great deal about the views of the younger Mainlander kids who were students of the elite. I met some of the elite. I was taken off to see a General Chiang, who was a cousin of Chiang Ching-kuo, and I would see, say, the brother of Madame P'eng, who was in the Ministry of Finance, and would occasionally have dinner with people of that sort. They were very outspoken because what happened between then and the time when I went back, in 1978, was the great expansion in the capacity of listening devices and enough money used to purchase them, so that the whole society became far more aware of the special secret services and how they could be listened in on and how what they said could be used against them. That's something which did not exist there in 1959, and the Mainlanders could feel free to grouse, the way Chinese love to do anyway. I mean, it's a marvelously complaining society, unlike the Japanese.

*Q: What impressions were you getting of the role of Madame Chiang Kai-shek?*

PRATT: Well, we would see her, say, out at the airport and so on. Sometimes we were sort of air marshals there to see when people were arriving and departing and so on. She, of course, was not greatly liked by either mainlanders or Taiwanese, and they told nasty stories about her silk sheets and how she plundered any place she happened to be in. I mean she was sort of a Hermann Göring of the KMT.

*Q: You hear stories about her during the war in the White House, demanding her silk sheets.*

PRATT: Yes. Well, afterwards she learned to travel with them always. The point was that she expected that there be silk sheets. But she did - she does - because she's still *alive*, one should keep in mind - so she was not at all a Grand Old Lady. She was obviously considered a very handsome woman by the Mainlanders, and they somewhat admired her ability to become so popular in the United States, to speak English well enough, and to head such a role in the American political system; but she was not their kind, any more than Jiang Qing was the kind of person whom the old Communists liked. I mean Jiang Qing was a cheap actress; well, Madame Chiang was, after all, one of the worst of the Shanghai types.

**WILLIAM ANDREAS BROWN**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1959-961)**

*Ambassador William Andreas Brown was born in Winchester, Massachusetts in 1930. He joined the "Holloway Program" which was part of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Program and went to Harvard University, graduating with a Magna cum Laude degree. In 1950 he went to Marine Corps basic training in Virginia and later served in Korea. His Foreign Service career took him to a multitude of places including Honk Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, USSR, India, the UK, and Israel. His career includes an ambassadorship to Israel as well as several positions in the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1998.*

*Q: While you were in Hong Kong, did you or any of your colleagues think about what you were going to do next?*

BROWN: Yes, I was dedicated to the study of China. Remember that I had come into the Foreign Service and decided, in consultation with my wife Helen, that we would put in a year or two and then decide whether it would work out for us. Well, it was working out for us fairly well. There was also the down side of working in a bureaucracy with its restrictions, its hierarchy, and all of that. However, as a first post it was great. As a place to work on my thesis, Hong Kong was also exciting. So our attitude was: "Let's give this career another year or so, especially if I can get an assignment to another Chinese post." I particularly wanted to get advanced training in the Chinese language on Taiwan.

So I applied for advanced training in Chinese, was accepted, and was transferred to Taiwan in August, 1959. We took a good, long home leave, traveling to the U.S. via Europe. We stretched our dollars as much as possible by traveling "economy class." This made it possible for us to introduce our children to the great cultures of Lebanon, Greece, Italy, Germany, France, and so forth. I arrived in Taiwan for advanced language training in late November, 1959.

*Q: So you were away from Hong Kong...*

BROWN: From then until Chinese New Year's of 1961, or about 14 months in all.

*Q: Where did you study advanced Chinese?*

BROWN: The State Department's Chinese language school had been deliberately located at Taichung, then about four hours' drive south of Taipei. We were in an area of Taichung which had been the Japanese administrative center before World War II. In fact, most of us were able to negotiate moving into Japanese-built houses of the old style. They had sliding panels for partitions and beautiful little gardens, with tatami covers on the floors. They were drafty and cold, but living there was a great experience.

It was also a great experience for me, because I'd already had academic Chinese. However, it had become somewhat fractured. I'd gone into the U.S. Marine Corps. My spoken Chinese, in terms of the Mandarin dialect, was somewhat weak. I had acquired a lot of mixed pronunciations and problems with tones and so forth. However, my reading ability in Chinese was better than the average student coming from Washington. The standard Chinese language class started in Washington at the FSI and went on for about 18 months. Then the Foreign Service Officer student trainee went to Taiwan for 12 months.

I was coming into this program in Taiwan laterally, as it were. They couldn't quite fit me in, which was wonderful, because I got, not entirely, but very largely individual instruction. Because of my Marine Corps experience and my exposure to intensive, accelerated artillery training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, I had a view that you could make a lot more progress in a given language than, perhaps, the standard, routine approach would indicate. Remember, I had also had three months of intensive French language training at the FSI. I was tremendously driven in those days by ambition, both academically in terms of my thesis, as well as in Foreign Service terms.

The net result of this was that I took six hours of Mandarin Chinese a day. We had a sympathetic Director of the Language School, Howard Levy, who was a T'ang Dynasty specialist. I approached Howard because I had found a member of the teaching staff who had a classical education and whose father was a professor of literature at a university. I asked Howard if he would let me take an extra hour a day of classical Chinese, which was very unusual. The average student at Taichung didn't go into this. Essentially, this related to the 13th century, A.D., so that I could work on my thesis more effectively on my own time. He agreed. A lady teacher worked with me on classical Chinese texts. If she had a problem, she could go to her father.

I discovered, out in the countryside, in bombproof shelters, the Imperial Library, which had been whisked from Beijing by various means to Taiwan. Then it was moved, out of fear of a Chinese communist invasion, into special shelters. I found ancient texts there, protected by a librarian sitting outside. There were no xerox machines, no copying devices. When I buttered him up through introductions and so forth, I found that the way to order a text, if I could figure out what it was, was to throw myself at his mercy. This would happen on a Saturday or a Sunday. He would order coolies to go into the vaults and get great, wooden chests containing documents which he reckoned would be useful to me and bring them out. I would then hand copy these documents, bring the copied texts back to my teacher, and try to interpret them.

Then word came through that I was being reassigned to Hong Kong. It came as a terrible shock to me to be assigned back there, probably back into the Consular Section. However, I said to myself that if that is what is going to be, then I have to study the Cantonese dialect. There would be only one way of going back to Hong Kong and trying to work in Mandarin, and that would be to be assigned to the Political Section. There was no hope of that, as yet.

So I added an extra hour of study of Cantonese. I was then taking eight hours of Chinese a day, mostly of intensive individual study. I was working nights on my doctoral thesis. I led a very regimented life. I would get up early, go to class at noon, dash back home for a quick, light Chinese meal, (We had Chinese cooks in those days.), have a half hour nap, and then go back to

the classroom. In the evenings, I would have a light dinner and then work on until 11:00 or 12:00 at night on my thesis. This was a very demanding routine.

As time went along, I learned that I was not going to be assigned back to Hong Kong after all, but rather to the embassy in Kuala Lumpur. There was a personnel opening there, and it was thought that my Cantonese, as well as my Mandarin, would be useful. That led me to intensify my work in Cantonese. Then, at the very end, came the switch. The American embassy in Kuala Lumpur decided that to take on a Foreign Service Officer, his wife, and four kids would be a heavy burden on available housing. So the word came that I wasn't going to Kuala Lumpur. Instead, I was going to the Consulate General in Singapore! Bob Drexler, who was a bachelor then assigned to Singapore, was studying Hokkien as a second dialect of Chinese. He and I were both infuriated to learn that we had been switched. He would go to Kuala Lumpur, and I would go to Singapore.

This was the greatest thing that ever happened to either of us. I went to Singapore, which was boiling politically. Drexler went to Kuala Lumpur and got married! [Laughter]

*Q: I've interviewed Bob.*

BROWN: You have?

*Q: What was the situation in Singapore? Singapore has been in and out of Malaysia. Where was it at this time?*

BROWN: First, let me give you a few more sidelights on Taiwan. Remember, I was working intensively, and I decided that I wanted to learn the modern, communistic type Chinese, with the hope that some day I would be posted back to Hong Kong as a Political or Economic Officer. So I took special work in Chinese simplified characters with instructors who were cleared. A few instructors had been cleared to deal with these prohibited materials. I also got into Chinese cursive writing and so forth.

I took a flight with a few others to Quemoy and Matsui Islands. We flew by special plane and visited these besieged, Chinese Nationalist bastions. There were also some individuals among this group, although I won't go into details, who had, shall we say, a rather nitty gritty view or experience with American involvement with the efforts of Chiang Kai-shek on the offshore islands and so forth. So it was quite an education in many, many ways. I traveled a lot in Taiwan. The new cross-island highway had been built. It was then a very perilous, dirt road through some magnificent scenery. During my tour in Taiwan, I was also activated very briefly in the U.S. Marines when Operation Blue Star landed. The Marines needed interpreters, so I put in a couple of weeks as a Marine Corps interpreter, down in Hung Nam in the south. This was an earthquake desolate area where 60,000 U.S. and Chinese Nationalist Marines and Navy landed. Some 5,000 Chinese prostitutes migrated to service them. I got into all sorts of things in Taiwan. It was a very exciting time.

*Q: Let's talk just a bit more about this.*

BROWN: I got to see Chiang Kai-shek, who flew down there for this exercise. On Operation

Blue Star, the good guys were always the Marines who were landing. They had to have opposition, so a battalion of Marines who had been at sea for six weeks were emplaced inland as the defenders. That's why so many of these ladies of the night migrated from all parts of Taiwan down there.

*Q: I'd just like to say this for the record here. On one occasion a U.S. Navy carrier group was apparently coming into Pusan. The Red Cross was getting a bunch of buses to go down from Seoul to Pusan and take the servicemen on a tour. A group of the "Madams" came up to the Red Cross and said, "Look, we're going to go down there anyway. Can we ride the buses down to Pusan and back? We'll pay you." The Red Cross would have liked to have saved money but decided that this arrangement probably would not look too good. It's a different world now.*

*What was the impact of the Chiang Kai-shek regime as far as the State Department students at the school in Taichung were concerned?*

BROWN: Remember that this was a wartime atmosphere. Those magnificent beaches of Taiwan had been mined, and barbed wire had been strung across them. So there was no prospect of getting out and frolicking in the waves. I had to wait 20 years later to do that. There was heavy censorship and total propaganda. The use of Japanese, of course, was banned. The vast majority of the Taiwanese spoke Japanese, having been under Japanese occupation for a very long time [1895-1945]. Also banned were Japanese films, magazines, journals, and so forth.

The line in official Chinese Nationalist publications was very, very tough. The Chinese communists were referred to as "Gung Fei," which means "Communist bandits," with the symbol for a dog as the classifier added in front of this name.

Chiang Kai-shek's position had improved significantly, but the Chinese Nationalist regime was still a very authoritarian and very military oriented society. However, the material side of daily life was improving. A railroad and highway infrastructure was in place in Taiwan. It had basically been constructed by the Japanese and was now being improved. The American presence was very significant in terms of military personnel and bases. In Taichung we studied next to a Chinese Nationalist Air Force Base, which had an American component, and which was later to be very significant during the Vietnam War, as far as ferrying goods and people to and from Vietnam was concerned. At the same time, the Chinese Nationalist line was that they were dedicated to recapturing and reuniting with the mainland of China on Chiang Kai-shek's terms.

While I was there, it turned out that this figure that I was studying, Wen T'ien-hsiang, of the 13th century, was a great, political symbol. Political courses in the Chinese Nationalist system had his portrait on the wall of the classrooms. Newspapers carried articles on him and his undying loyalty to the Sung Dynasty. A town on the East-West Highway in the Toroko Gorge was named after him. A statue of him had been erected, and the base for it was dedicated by none other than Chiang Ching-kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek. All of this was totally unexpected for me and a great advantage as well.

However, to come back to the situation in Taiwan. We had a very strong, security relationship

with the Chinese Nationalists. We took this very seriously and we had a large, military presence in Taiwan.

*Q: What about language studies? I suppose that your teachers were native speakers of Chinese. Were they kept under a certain amount of control by the Taiwan authorities? They were getting ready to fight against an invasion of Taiwan by mainland Chinese forces.*

BROWN: Yes, but our teachers were selected for their accents and cultural backgrounds, so they were largely from Beijing. You couldn't say Beijing in those days. You had to say Beiping, the Chiang Kai-shek term for "Northern Pacification." It was forbidden in Nationalist China to say Beijing, and this was also frowned on in the Foreign Service. One had to say and write, Beiping. One was discouraged from referring to the "People's Republic of China." It was "Communist China," "Red China," or "Mainland China." In Taiwan one could say the "Gung Fei," the "Communist Bandits."

Our teachers were thoroughly screened by Chiang's security police. The teachers had to be very careful about what they said. One or two of the teachers were bold enough to make little jokes, on the side, but they had to be very careful.

I mentioned that in terms of studying about communist China there were several teachers who had been cleared to handle Chinese communist materials. These materials had to be kept in a secure place, watched, and so forth, out of fear of contaminating other people. We didn't know definitely but we suspected that our teachers had to be very careful in handling us and each other. They learned to watch themselves.

*Q: Who were some of the students in your class?*

BROWN: Among those with whom I overlapped one way or another were Mark Pratt, Harry Thayer, Roger Sullivan, Herb Levin, Burt Levin, Bill Payeef, Norman Barnes, and Marshall Brement. My family and I lived in the house left by Jim Leonard, who was later an Ambassador in Arms Control in the State Department. After completing language study in Taichung, he went up to be a Political Officer in Taipei. Some fine people who were going on to greater things were associated with that school. I might also mention David Dean, Richard Nethercut, Bill Thomas and Paul Kreisberg. These people were top-notch in our China service. They had gone through the school at Taichung.

*Q: I'm not sure, given your schedule, that you had much spare time. However, were there ever discussions among the Foreign Service Officers studying Chinese at Taichung about where China was going? I'd like to capture what you were talking about when you were on your own.*

BROWN: Naturally, career-wise, most of us were looking forward to the day when U.S. relations with communist China would improve and, at long last, we would be able to go to mainland China as professional diplomats. At the time I was at Taichung, the atmosphere was pretty grim. We had fought communist China during the Korean War. We lost about 58,000 men killed or wounded. We killed about 300,000 to 500,000 communist troops, both North Korean and communist Chinese. There was terrible hostility displayed in the propaganda from Beijing.

There was the Quemoy-Matsui crisis [of 1958]. We all wondered: “When is this going to end? Isn't it time, or is it time to open up or loosen up a little bit?”

The election of John F. Kennedy as President [in 1960] gave us some hope of change, but this hope was falsely based. I'll come back to that later on. Regarding the future of U.S.-Chinese communist relations, we tended to split. There were those among us who were more critical of Chiang Kai-shek's regime than others were. Some of us said that Chiang's regime was militaristic and authoritarian. There was a certain amount of corruption in it. Nationalist China was still receiving a significant amount of U.S. aid, although the corner was turned while we were in Taiwan. Through our help and their own efforts, the Nationalist Chinese had so improved the situation economically and agriculturally that they were establishing the basis for light industrial development. They were visibly beginning to take off.

My old professor, John K. Fairbank, visited Taiwan when we were there. For him this was a dramatic visit, for he had been very critical of Chiang Kai-shek. By the time he came to Taiwan, he had to admit that significant things were happening on Taiwan. This tattered, battered bunch of Chinese Nationalists who had evacuated mainland China [in 1949] somehow, with our aid and their own efforts, had put things together.

*Q: The Nixon-Kennedy debate [during the 1960 presidential election campaign] seemed to center on the future of Quemoy and Matsui, of all things. Did that debate have any reverberations in Taiwan?*

BROWN: I can't speak for all of us in the Taichung language school, but I think that we were pretty solidly for Kennedy, in the hope that a more liberal administration would somehow move things forward in terms of U.S.-Chinese communist relations. We weren't naive, but I would say that that was our predisposition. Remember, we were a mix of State Department and USIA [United States Information Agency] officers. There were also people from some other U.S. Government agencies. However, our group was essentially composed of State and USIS people.

**ROBERT L. NICHOLS**  
**Chinese Language Training, USIS**  
**Washington, DC and Taiwan (1959-1961)**

**Information Officer, USIS**  
**Hong Kong (1962-1965)**

**Chinese Programs, Voice of America, USIS**  
**Washington, DC (1966-1968)**

**Deputy Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1969-1971)**

*Robert L. Nichols was born in Wisconsin on August 4, 1924. He served in the U.S.*

*Navy during World War II in China and Asia. He received a bachelor's degree from Tufts University and a master's degree from The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. His Foreign Service career included positions in The Philippines, The Netherlands, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore. This interview was conducted by Robert Amerson on August 30, 1988.*

*Q: When did the Chinese language assignment come through?*

NICHOLS: One year after I got back to Washington. My office finally released me. I went into Chinese language training in the fall of 1959.

*Q: This was right after mainland China had been taken over by Mao Zedong and company, right?*

NICHOLS: Ten years after.

*Q: But we were still without relationships with mainland China.*

NICHOLS: Yes. There was no relationship. The only posts where Chinese language officers were being used were in Taiwan, then called the Republic of China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, where Chinese is spoken. They would also assign Chinese language officers to places like Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Saigon, where there was a Chinese population and some possibility to utilize your training.

*Q: So there were not very many of you in Chinese language training?*

NICHOLS: I was in the second class, I think, of Agency officers. We started out in FSI in Washington, and did six, seven, eight months there. Then provided you were doing well enough, you were sent on to Taichung out in Taiwan to complete your training. At the time, I had three classmates from USIA, Howard Stingle, Norman Barnes, and Mervin Hayworth. The others were from the State Department and CIA.

*Q: What were your expectations at the time, if you can recall, about how you were going to use this language ability? Did you ever envision getting into "Red China?"*

NICHOLS: Oh, I had hoped so, of course. There wasn't a one of us that was in Chinese language training that didn't have that goal in mind. I think it motivated most everyone, this desire to go and serve in China. We felt sure that eventually we would be there. That was very true.

*Q: In fact, how did this develop in your case? You went to a Chinese-speaking post next?*

NICHOLS: I followed my two-plus years of Chinese language training with an assignment in Hong Kong as cultural affairs officer, which, unfortunately, is not the best place to use Mandarin Chinese, because most of the Chinese in Hong Kong speak Cantonese. However, I did get to use it, and of course, it was definitely a Chinese environment and Chinese post in many respects. I was dealing with a Chinese audience there, by and large.

It was a very interesting assignment for other reasons. It was interesting because it taught me a lot about exchange programs, being a cultural affairs officer, and I was working with the type of programs I believed in -- exchanges, libraries, book translation, speakers, etc.

*Q: Hong Kong is the kind of place where a lot of Americans come to visit. You must have had a lot of American officialdom.*

NICHOLS: Every American wants to stop in Hong Kong. The entertainers were there in droves. "Satchmo" was there, Sinatra was there. He was moving or trying hard to move in Kennedy circles, so he came there to do good things for them, charity balls and the like. We made good use of people like Sinatra and Gary Moore, but more especially of Rod Serling and Kirk Douglas who came out under our auspices. Serling -- that was an interesting experience.

I was in charge of the book translation program while we were in Hong Kong. One of the plays that had been translated into Chinese was Thornton Wilder's "Our Town." I was reminded of this recently, when I read recently about Arthur Miller's "Death of a Salesman" being done in China. Also I think that Charlton Heston was over there directing some American play in Chinese.

Well, we were offered Rod Serling as an American specialist to come to Hong Kong. What are we going to do with a Rod Serling, a "Twilight Zone" man? A very interesting person, but what are we going to do with him? Well, we had this play that had just been translated, "Our Town," and we had a college in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Baptist College, that wanted to put on this play. There was a young Chinese who had been on a Fulbright to the United States and had gone to the Yale School of Drama. He was back teaching at Baptist College. So I talked with him about it. I said, "Rod Serling's coming out. Is there any way you could use him in the development of the production of this play?"

He said, "Oh, my God, that would be marvelous." He could help explain the meaning of the play and the significance of it. He could help direct.

So when Serling came, the city got very excited about this, and Serling spent his time in Hong Kong helping direct "Our Town" in Chinese. Of course, he had to work through the Chinese Yale graduate, but what he did was get across Wilder's meanings and intentions. The thing that came across so beautifully and to which the Chinese related was the use of mime in the play. There's so much of that in "Our Town." Of course, the Chinese use mime a great deal, too. This worked out very well, and it played to huge audiences in Hong Kong, and it was a very great success.

*Q: This was in the early Sixties?*

NICHOLS: That would be 1964, somewhere around then.

*Q: After your Hong Kong assignment, what?*

NICHOLS: It was time for a tour in Washington, because I had never done a full tour in

Washington. I was assigned to the East Asia area as a desk officer for Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. My duties also included liaison with CU in State.

If I can for a minute, I'd like to go back to Hong Kong to a couple of things that happened in Hong Kong. One was that a Chinese university was established during my stay there, and as I said, I enjoyed the stay in Hong Kong because I learned a lot about exchange programs. We were able to establish a program with the University of California and the Chinese University, an exchange program of professors and students, undergraduate, graduate students, and professors going both ways each year. The Chinese University was a brand-new university in Hong Kong. It came from the consolidation of three private colleges, all of which were actually the successor colleges to those types that had existed pre-1949 in China. A Christian college, a private college and the national university (government funded).

These colleges had been established in Hong Kong after 1949, but were recognized by the British only as "post-secondary schools." However, in 1963 they were amalgamated as one Chinese University, with Chinese the language of instruction. The first vice chancellor came from Berkeley, a man named Li Choh-ming, a very well-known Chinese-American educator.

*Q: Which Chinese language?*

NICHOLS: They used both Cantonese and Mandarin at the university. Mandarin, of course, is the national language of China, and it was also the national language of the then-Republic of China (Taiwan), and remains still the language that is taught in the schools in both places. Cantonese is not really taught, but it is the first language of the majority of Hong Kong people.

Another thing that happened when I was in Hong Kong which had some significance was my first experience with "handling" somebody of historic importance. Mr. Nixon came to Hong Kong in the fall of 1965. He was attached to a law firm, but everybody believed he was probably working to run again for President.

*Q: He had lost the governorship of California and was a few years ahead of his election as President.*

NICHOLS: He was the lawyer for Pepsi-Cola, I believe. Cables announcing his visit came into the consulate general in Hong Kong. When he was vice president, he had been in Hong Kong, and somebody had persuaded him to endow a library with some books and perhaps some money. It had become known as the Nixon Library. On this trip to Hong Kong, the consulate general wasn't too anxious to handle Mr. Nixon. He was not in public office. They didn't know what to do with him, but they knew they couldn't ignore him.

So the consul general said, "We've got an out. The Nixon Library and the cultural officer, they make a pair." Well, Bob Nichols was made the control officer for Richard Nixon when he was in Hong Kong. Of course, Nixon got a lot of attention, press attention and so forth. I was sent down to brief him on the local situation.

I remember the consul general called me in early in the morning and said, "For God's sake, Bob,

make sure he understands what's going on, the problems in Hong Kong we have on Vietnam and with Peking." He was referring to the fact that Peking was accusing the United States of using Hong Kong as a base for its Vietnam operations. Of course, it was an R & R place for the U.S. Navy, and also the Army. The fleet was visiting all the time, and soldiers were flying in from Saigon daily.

Just prior to Nixon's arrival, one of the R & R planes had crashed at the end of the runway at Kaitak Airport in Hong Kong. Everybody on board was killed. It was a headline story and also drew attention to the fact that Hong Kong was being used by the U.S. military to send its troops from Vietnam. I was to make sure that Mr. Nixon understood the sensitivities on this score, and that when he met the press, to be aware of the problem. Of course, I had heard all these things about how Nixon didn't like the press, and I knew I was going to have to run a press conference for him.

I spent a day and a half with him, and the second day we went out to the Nixon Library. He asked a lot of questions. It was just Nixon and myself in the car, along with a congressman from California named Pat Hillings.

*Q: What were your impressions of Nixon the man at that time?*

NICHOLS: My impressions of Nixon prior to his arrival were very negative. My impressions of Nixon the man, based on this experience, were quite positive. He had a tremendous intellectual curiosity. He wasn't telling me anything but rather was picking my brain for everything and anything I could tell him about China and about the attitude of the people in Hong Kong towards China, and the attitude of the Chinese towards Hong Kong. He never stopped asking questions, one after another, which was quite impressive, I thought, as an insignificant cultural affairs officer in Hong Kong, what an experience to have a man who had been vice president of the United States and had run for President and was to run again, asking me these questions and paying attention to what I had to say.

Then I warned him about the press. I told him that the American correspondents would try to take over and dominate the press conference, that the Chinese were very passive, and that it would be a good idea if he paid attention to the Chinese questions. And by gosh, he did. He took extra time. In fact, he delayed his departure from Hong Kong on an Air France plane. They had to hold the plane -- he was going to Saigon -- because he held a press conference longer, mainly because he was letting the Chinese get their questions in. That was a real teaching experience to me.

*Q: You mentioned Vietnam in this context. At that point it was quiescent. The French had left several years earlier, and we were not really involved.*

NICHOLS: We were getting quite involved by '65, yes. It was after the Tonkin Gulf.

*Q: This is after the death of President Kennedy and during the Johnson Administration.*

NICHOLS: This is during the Johnson Administration. The Tonkin Gulf resolution had already

been passed.

*Q: So it was on the front burner.*

NICHOLS: It was on the front burner, yes.

*Q: Did you have any other intimations during that posting of what was to come in Vietnam?*

NICHOLS: You had a pretty strong feeling about what was going on, because it was the R & R people, not only the military servicemen, but also our people posted there. The USIS people and State Department people would come into Hong Kong, and many of the wives were living in Hong Kong while husbands were in Vietnam. So we were getting a good dose of information about what was going on in the country, and it was obviously a much bigger thing than we ever expected. It was a very worrisome thing. It was really front burner in our minds out there, day in and day out. You could not forget that Vietnam was right around the corner from Hong Kong.

*Q: You went, the next year or so, to the Voice of America, and then concentrated on Chinese relationships at that time. That's all part of the same fabric, I suppose.*

NICHOLS: I was only the area officer for Australia and New Zealand, etc., for about six months when I was asked to succeed Jerry Strieker at the Voice of America as chief of the Chinese branch. That was quite an experience. A very interesting experience, and an intimidating experience, too, for me, in the beginning, because succeeding Jerry Strieker, who was probably the best Chinese language officer the U.S. Information Agency has ever had, was intimidating. Jerry recommended me, and I don't think it was based on my Chinese; it was just because Jerry had worked with me and felt that I could do the job. But to go in there and be in charge, and know that you're in charge of Chinese language broadcasts, boy, it worried me.

*Q: VOA had a pretty heavy schedule of Chinese language broadcasts at the time?*

NICHOLS: Oh, yes, very heavy. It was eight hours a day. Some of those were repeats. I think we had three and a half, four hours of original broadcasts, but that's a lot of air time.

*Q: What was on those programs?*

NICHOLS: News and features. We did a lot with news and features, and we had a big staff. I've forgotten how large the staff was. It's still large. But it was 25, 30, 40 people, up to 40 people at a time, including contract people. Some of them were strictly announcer types, news readers, and then there was the writing staff who wrote features, some of which were original features, some of which were based on translated material that was used for the back half of the programs. The front half of the program was always news and commentary. Then there was music, also, but most was news and commentary.

*Q: Since the United States had no formal relations with mainland China, to what extent was the VOA used as a channel for messages one way or another?*

NICHOLS: A very interesting thing happened while I was there in 1968. I had absolutely no idea that anything was going on at that time regarding a change in our relationship with China, but I was very disturbed because we, as a communications agency, and the Voice of America was a tool of communications, a major medium for our message, and that our main -- to use the word -- target audience was the people in China, not the people in Taiwan. I was disturbed that we were using language in Chinese that was offensive to the people in China.

*Q: Why?*

NICHOLS: Because it was our policy to do that. Our policy at the time required that we call them Communist China, not the People's Republic of China. We had to call them Zhonggong, and that means Chinese Communists. We didn't call it Beijing; we called it Peping, which was the nationalist name for Peking, which means "northern peace." Beijing means "northern capital." You see, the Nationalists never had their capital in Peking; they had it in Nanking and Chungking. So we couldn't call it that. And there was other terminology that we could not use. We had to use the language that Taiwan used in describing the government in China.

Well, I wrote a memo to the State Department about this, and I made my feelings known. I said, "Look, we're trying to communicate with people. If we're not going to have them turn off right at the beginning of our broadcast, then we better start using language that they accept." This went over to the PRC desk in State. It wasn't called the PRC desk, the People's Republic desk, in those days; it was called the Communist China desk, the deputy director of which was an old colleague of mine, Dick Donald, who has now passed away. Dick had worked with me in Hong Kong. He said, "I like your memo. This is good. I'm going to pass it on up."

Well, it went up to Bill Bundy, who was then the assistant secretary. By gosh, in a week, I got approval to use the proper terms on our broadcast, except when I was directly quoting Secretary Rusk, who always said "Communist China" and always said "Peping." But otherwise, unless I was directly quoting an American official, I could use the proper terminology.

*Q: A kind of turning point, then. To what extent did the State Department pay attention to the Chinese broadcasts, use them, control them, be concerned about them?*

NICHOLS: They were concerned about them. They didn't control them. They would look over some of the commentaries we were putting out. I worked with them quite closely, because I had a lot of colleagues in State with whom I had gone through Chinese language training.

There was a panel at that time, an advisory panel on China for the State Department, which drew on academics from all over the country, people like John Fairbanks, Bob Scalapino, and Doak Barnett, people who would come for a session once every two or three months. I'd sit in on these as the director of Voice broadcasts to China. The talk was about all aspects of U.S. policy towards China and what should be changed.

There was little doubt that the feeling in the Department of State then at the levels below the very top was that we should be moving in the direction of rapprochement with Peking.

To finish up this story about the Voice of America -- I've always wondered, as I read later, and later when I served in Taiwan and when I read about the signals that were given to China that we were moving away from our hard stance, whether or not we didn't use that change in language as one of our signals. I've never talked with anyone at State about this, really, because Dick Donald died, and I never had a chance to talk to Bill Bundy about it, and I've never seen it mentioned in the memoirs that I've read. But I have talked about it to Chinese in China who listened to the Voice of America.

*Q: You make your annual trips even these days to China, so you are well in touch there.*

NICHOLS: Yes. I ran into two people that told me they were listening to VOA then. They heard this difference in language and to the Chinese it was very significant, and people talked about it. In other words, the Chinese caught this change in language. To me it made everything seem worthwhile. Whether or not they were telling me the truth, it sounded sincere, anyhow, so I think it probably was used as one of the early signals.

The signals to China began to flow in the next two years, when I was in Taiwan.

*Q: This is an interesting focus on the total apparatus of the U.S. Government utilizing all the tools it has at its command for foreign affairs purposes. One wonders whether the top echelon policy makers -- Bundy, Rusk, and higher -- were aware of this signal and what it might have meant to the Chinese at the time.*

NICHOLS: I have to think that certainly Bundy knew. I mean, Bundy had to approve it. He had approved the change in language. I wasn't allowed to do it without his approval, so I'm sure he did. Now, whether this went up to Secretary Rusk, whether it went that far . . . See, this was prior to Kissinger. Most of the signals came in the next administration. The other signals have all been written up in memoirs. This development came prior to that.

*Q: You might have been, you're saying, softening up your Chinese audience with this idea by this change in language.*

NICHOLS: I think the whole idea in communications -- you just can't communicate with people unless you use language that they will accept. I mean, it's such a basic principle, that maybe it was accepted on that basis. Somebody saw the logic of this and accepted it for that reason.

*Q: We're now at 1965 or thereabouts, '66, then '68. After Voice of America, what came next?*

NICHOLS: I went to the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, for a year.

*Q: A year off?*

NICHOLS: Yes, it was a year off. In effect, it was a year off. It was a very interesting year. I guess what it taught me more about than anything was that we have some very fine minds amongst our military. It was a good sort of cross-fertilization. It helped me work with the military later on. I did some interesting research on China while I was there, for my paper, and it

was a good year.

*Q: Then back to active duty as what?*

NICHOLS: Then I went out to Taiwan as deputy PAO in '69.

*Q: Had you been in Taiwan before?*

NICHOLS: In language school. I'd spent two years there in language school, so I was going back to a place I knew. I went out as deputy PAO. When I arrived, the PAO was Ken Boyle, but soon thereafter he was replaced by Bob Clarke, who passed away a few years ago.

*Q: So the changing nature of the Chinese-American relationship must have been one of your top focuses.*

NICHOLS: When I went out there, it wasn't apparent that it was going to be. You see, I went out there just after the change in administration. The Nixon Administration had just come in. I was aware of the Nixon Foreign Affairs article on China, written prior to his being elected, in which he said the U.S. can't afford not to have relation with the most populous country in the world, a quarter of the world's population. So it was obvious Mr. Nixon felt that something should change, and Mr. Kissinger made it known, too. But very soon we began to see subtle changes taking place. Kissinger would have off-the-record briefings for the press that used to come to us as "limited official use." They'd be given out by the press quoting a highly placed official of the administration. Well, from the things that were being said by Kissinger, you could see where we were going.

Bob Clarke and I decided that what we needed to do was prepare our audience in Taiwan for what apparently was coming. Of course, we didn't know exactly what was coming. We had as much difficulty persuading the embassy, I think, to go along with our ideas, as we had in persuading the Taiwanese, the people on Taiwan, of what we were saying was happening. We gave monthly press briefings to the Chinese press, and when we had the right visitor, we'd draw on that person. I gave one on the Nixon doctrine. All these were beginnings, an attempt to show that U.S. foreign policy was moving away from its hard position, and that a detente was in the works.

*Q: That must have generated tremendous pressures by the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan against the American official establishment.*

NICHOLS: There was certainly a great deal, and some of it was manifested in rather unpleasant ways. In Taiwan, we had branch offices down-island in Taichung, in Tainan, and in Kaohsiung. In 1970 I was visiting our office in Kaohsiung when we got a telephone call from Tainan, 30 miles from Kaohsiung. We were sitting down to dinner at the branch PAO's house, when a call came in that a bomb had just blown up the USIS Tainan office. So we went to Tainan. The office had been almost completely destroyed, and several people had been seriously hurt. This happened the day after Double Tenth, the Republic of China's National Day (Double Ten, October 10.) It also happened at a time when the United States had just given asylum or had

helped, supposedly, in the escape from Taiwan of a Taiwan Nationalist, a man named Peng Ming-min.

The Chinese government was not happy with us, and those strong supporters of this Nationalist regime were not happy with us. Who placed the bomb was never officially acknowledged, but there were very strong suspicions about the source.

This was a time on Taiwan when, again, things like language in our press releases became important. The same thing I'd had with the Voice. I remember going to the embassy once to get approval for some language for the press from the deputy chief of mission. I said, "This is what we want to use."

He said, "You can't say that."

I said, "That's a direct quote from Kissinger's press briefing."

And he said, "Kissinger doesn't make U.S. foreign policy." [Well, at that time, of course, Kissinger headed the National Security Council; he wasn't Secretary then.]

I looked at him. I didn't say anything, but I looked at him and thought, "Boy, there's a lack of realism here in the embassy, as well." There really was. There was a tremendous amount of resistance. They couldn't believe what was happening.

Another thing that happened, just before I left Taiwan to go to Singapore -- well, a lot of things happened while we were in Taiwan, actually. I should mention this was a time when we withdrew the Seventh Fleet from the Taiwan Straits. It was announced by Vice President Agnew when he was out there on one of the two trips he made while I was there. Agnew brought the news to Chiang Kai-shek that we were taking the Seventh Fleet out of the Taiwan Straits.

*Q: Chiang, the old Chinese Nationalist leader, was still in power then?*

NICHOLS: Oh, yes, he didn't die until 1975. He was there and his presence was known. A lot of the work of the administration had been taken over by his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, but Chiang Kai-shek was still in power. He dealt with Vice President Agnew.

*Q: Maybe we can jump ahead a little bit. We're talking about relations between U.S.A. and China. Where were you when the renewal of relationship was announced and became public knowledge?*

NICHOLS: The renewal, first of all, the Kissinger trip. He arrived in Beijing the day I left Taiwan on transfer to Singapore. I didn't know it. This is a little story that's interesting, because just a week prior to this, my successor had arrived in Taiwan, and I took him down-island over the Fourth of July. This was '69. We visited the branch posts and missed the Fourth of July party in Taipei. When we returned, there was sort of a flap because the ambassador was concerned about the lack of any news in the papers about the Fourth of July party. Well, there had been some in the Chinese papers, but he only read the English language press, the China News.

The day that I was making my farewell call and introducing my successor in the ambassador's office, he said, "Bob, can't we do something about getting something favorable in the press?" He'd just returned from a trip to Washington. He said, "Do the Chinese know I saw the President?"

I said, "Mr. Ambassador, we didn't know that you'd seen the President."

He said, "Just a minute.~" He went over to his briefcase and pulled out a photo, a large photo, and he handed it to me. He said, "Can we do something with this?" It was a photo of President Nixon and himself (Ambassador Walter McConaughy) sitting in the Oval Office, opposite each other, staring with a blank look on each face.

I looked at that picture and said, "But sir, what would be the caption?" He said, "Okay, okay," and put it away. He felt I didn't like the idea. It wasn't the kind of picture that would have given the people on Taiwan any particular feeling of reassurance. I don't think that he was even told what was going on at that time. The President didn't know what to say to him, and he didn't know what to say to the President.

*Q: And it showed on their faces.*

NICHOLS: A week later, Kissinger was in Beijing. So no question, the President knew that Kissinger was going to make this trip to China when he saw the Ambassador. I saw the news when I stopped in Penang with my wife en route to Singapore.

*Q: So you did not have to face the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan.*

NICHOLS: No, I left and several newspapermen saw us off at the airport. I wasn't there when it happened. I was on vacation.

*Q: They must have been horrified and angered.*

NICHOLS: Oh, I'm sure they were. I know they were, yes, definitely. But we had prepared them for something like this coming.

*Q: We were talking about the moment when you were in Taiwan, when the Kissinger trip became known, and some of your other recollections of that post.*

NICHOLS: I have one strong recollection of the post. I was talking a minute ago about Kissinger's influence and the direction we were taking in China, and how poorly people in the administration understood exactly what his position was. Near the end of my tour, just before I left Taiwan in June 1971, Frank Shakespeare, director of the Agency at the time, and the area director, John Reinhardt, arrived in Taipei.

I've mentioned that we'd had these monthly briefings for the press on U.S. policy. Well, Bob Clarke, the PAO, said, "We got Frank Shakespeare here, let's use Frank Shakespeare and let him

talk to the Chinese press, and maybe he can give them something special, and maybe he can reassure them a little bit." The Ambassador thought this was a good idea. No American officials had been visiting Taiwan and you could sense Taiwan was becoming a pariah of some sort. Frank Shakespeare was the first American official of any significance to come to Taiwan for some time, so we thought we'd use him.

On the day he arrived with John Reinhardt, Bob Clarke and I presented him with this idea, and he liked the idea, but he said, "I've got to get approval." Bob Clarke held a reception at his house that night for Shakespeare to meet the Chinese staff. While we were there, Shakespeare drafted a cable to Washington to present what we wanted to do, and to see if there were any objections to his doing this. We were at Bob's house. He said, "How can I get this cable off?"

I said, "We can get it down to the embassy and the duty officer will get it out." We were at Bob's house. The USIS secretary was Dotty Fry. Dotty and I went into Bob's bedroom, where there was a typewriter. I read it over, and Dotty typed it up. I looked at the addressees and neither State nor USIA were included. So I added them. I thought it was just an oversight. I took the typed version to John Reinhardt. John looked at it, and took it over to Frank Shakespeare.

The next thing I knew, Frank Shakespeare came over to me and led me down a corridor. He put his arm around my shoulder and said, "Bob, I know you're a good bureaucrat." (Laughs) "You've made those changes in the cable addressees, but I have to tell you, I don't want this to go to the State and Agency. I only want it to go to the White House, to Kissinger." I got the message, and learned a valuable lesson. I mean, here was the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, but he was operating only with Kissinger and the White House, ignoring the Department of State and his own Agency.

Of course, the reply came back and he was told not to meet with the press. So we never had the Shakespeare briefing. He was not granted permission. I have always felt that to be a revealing anecdote.

*Q: That was the nature of Frank. He was more interested in...*

NICHOLS: It was also the nature of Kissinger on China policy. That's where all the decisions were made, strictly in the White House with Kissinger.

*Q: Yes. From Taiwan, then, you mentioned you had gone to Singapore and had your own post at PAO.*

**FRED CHARLES THOMAS, JR**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung (1960-1962)**

Fred Charles Thomas Jr. was born in Arizona in 1927. He served overseas with

the Army for two years before graduating from Bucknell University in 1951. He has served at overseas posts in Korea, Pakistan, Germany, Vietnam, and India, as well as the Office of Strategic Research in Washington DC. This interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1995.

*Q: Obviously, you were seeing this from an enlisted man's viewpoint, but I want to catch your viewpoint at various times. What was Korea like in 1947?*

THOMAS: It was so backward; it reminded me of China in the 1930s, when my father and I visited China. Beggars everywhere, filth. You'd come to work and go through that gate, and here'd be people dead in the gateway, in the wintertime, corpses. The smell of feces everywhere. The dust. It was just backward Orient at that time. It was the worst of the worst.

*Q: Was there any contact with the Korean Army?*

THOMAS: Oh, yes, later. Then I was moved to another job because Weckerling went on to something else. I became the Boy Friday to a man named Dr. Ernst Frankel(Ph.D.). Ernst Frankel was later among those who founded the Free Berlin University. He was a noted scholar on constitutional law, and he helped write the Korean Constitution. He was a GS-18 or equivalent in those days. But he was a typical nice Jewish man who didn't know how to handle the military. He didn't know how to use his rank. He and his wife had no children. They treated me as a son, in a way. I was invited for Sunday dinners. I worked for him for a couple of months, and then he was off to something.

There was a group there that was doing the legwork for the POLAD. It was called Political Advisory Group. It was made up of ex-State and -Foreign Service types who had been in the military when they joined the group. Some of them had been with OSS, left State during the Second World War. The head of group had been a State officer, had his doctorate in Chinese studies and was the son of missionaries to China, named Clyde Sergeant. He got to know me there on the Joint Commission because we were all working in one area. He asked me to join his group as the biographic officer. I was to set up the biographic files for Korea (they didn't have anything like that), with the idea that these would end up being the embassy's biographic files.

*Q: What were you doing?*

THOMAS: I was the biographic officer, because that's why they'd hired me. I set up the biographic files, plus I did domestic political work. We had a chief of political section named Rolland Bushner. Did you know Rolland at all?

*Q: No.*

THOMAS: Well, Rolland was a first-class officer, but he resigned later and went with FOREIGN AFFAIRS magazine. We didn't have any American women in Pusan when I first got there; it was terrible. There were no women clerks; you couldn't find anything in the file room. It was a mess. The embassy was in an old bank building. Lightner, who was the DCM, was a breath of fresh air compared to Muccio. Muccio was dour, in a way. I tried to make a joke the first day I arrived, and he said, "Well, if you don't like it here, get on an airplane." It was just a joke. But he wasn't there that long until he was called back for a consultation.

I got there about May 20th. We were in the middle, or soon thereafter, of one of the biggest political crises that had ever occurred, in terms of President Rhee wanting to make sure he got reelected president of Korea. Soon thereafter, we put Chang Myon on a hospital ship, to hide him from Rhee's goons. We were manipulating a great many things. I was involved in this, with the rest of the political section.

First of all, let me tell you, the political section was made up of, I think, four or five officers. I'd been hired because I knew something about politics there and people in the Department talking about my moving around with Bertsch and the Coalition Committee. So I knew some people there, and I knew my way around. This place didn't floor me. They had a fellow named Walter Drew, who would read newspapers all the day long, translations of newspapers, and then write up political stuff. It was pretty dull stuff, but he wrote well. Although, Drew had spent many years in Korea from MG days, he was very introverted and didn't get to know people. Another officer was Phil Manhard, who was a first-class collector and people person. He and I hit it off.

*Q: He had just, not too long before, been in Shandong.*

THOMAS: That's right, and he was a Chinese-language officer. He'd been down on Koji-do, or one of those islands, with a general, looking after the Chinese prisoners of war. But he and I became sort of buddies in the political section.

*Q: What was your impression of the Rhee government sitting down in Pusan? By this time, in the summer of '52, essentially South Korea was as South Korea is today, although the country was devastated, the embassy was in Pusan, and all.*

THOMAS: The embassy was very anti-Rhee, the whole group of us were; Muccio hadn't been. Muccio had gone with Rhee out of Seoul, he and MacDonald and a few other officers.

*Q: Donald MacDonald.*

THOMAS: Yes, we were friends. (He was one of the best Korean specialists in the service, and a very fine man. He should have been made ambassador there.) They'd gotten out of Seoul and stuck together. So they'd been through the hard times together, with this fellow Shin Song-mo, the then defense minister, whom I was talking about, and many in the cabinet, they all went south. They suffered together, so there was a certain amount of camaraderie there. But Muccio was pulled out of Korea and sent back to the States. He'd been trying to protect Rhee and had done everything he could, but Rhee misread what was going on. Rhee felt that Muccio had done him in, and went after him, using money, because Rhee understood the system of using money

with politicians in the U.S. Congress. He had his connections with the extreme right wing of the American government, including Stiles Bridges and others. Many of these names I don't remember anymore, because we're talking a long time ago. But at the time, I knew pretty much. There were people I knew of at that time within the government whose names I don't remember now.

Let me preface this, in terms of my approach to a country like Korea. If you paid for much information, you really didn't get what you really wanted. You had a lot of intelligence agencies there, of all numbers and stripes, collecting information, most of them buying it. I could go into war stories about various ones and stupid things. I'll give you one as an example a little later.

Anyway, because of this, I came to the conclusion that most of what they were furnishing was either concocted or was manipulated, because these people were much more used to manipulating others, in terms of the type things they'd been involved in, especially Rhee. Rhee was manipulating our government back here. I was trying to find out all I could about that, for my own protection and our embassy's protection, because I knew that we weren't going to be popular due to the fact that we were not siding with him in this fight with the National Assembly. That was very obvious.

Rhee suddenly turned to a person named Lee Bum Suk. Lee Bum Suk was a Korean general in Sian China who had been commander of Kwangbok Army under the OSS, Eagle Project, I think it was called, in China, which had a youth corps connected to it. (Later known as the Northwest Youth Corps. He had been the first minister of defense in the Rhee government.) The Kwangbok Army had worked with our OSS against the Japanese. Clyde Sergeant, my boss in the Political Advisory Group, had been the American OSS officer in charge in Sian. I had gotten to know Lee Bum Suk through Clyde Sergeant back when I'd been there in '48, and I knew his background. He was another Chiang Kai-shek, sort of what I call a Christian fascist. You know that type? He was very straight and reminded you of Chiang Kai-shek, very military in his bearing and very black and white. Well, he was brought in to be the hatchet man for Rhee.

The National Assembly, in the past, had elected the president. The president, by this time, had come to the conclusion that there was not going to be any presidency for him if he had to depend upon that damn National Assembly. So he'd better get the constitution changed to make it a popular election for president. The whole issue was to change the constitution. This took a good many votes, a lot of arm twisting and bully-boy tactics. We were trying to protect the majority of the members of the National Assembly, including Chang Myon and others that we considered democrats, against this pressure.

*Q: Well, last time, we had you sort of leaving Korea, and then where did you go?*

THOMAS: No, no, I wasn't leaving Korea. We'd just gotten the ambassador there. We'd gotten up to about 1953. By 1954, we had the whole thing going on with the Geneva Conference, if you remember.

*Q: Ah, yes, this was really over Vietnam.*

THOMAS: But for some reason, and it slips my memory now, they wanted people from Korea who had some experience in that situation to participate in Geneva.

*Q: That's where we were talking to the Chinese, for the first time.*

THOMAS: Oh, yes, and another funny thing in terms of Manhard at the time. Suddenly, because Manhard was a Marine Reserve officer and they wanted to use him for these talks with the Chinese at P'anmunjom, they called him back to active duty and put his uniform back on. I lived next door to the British MI6 for a while there, and the MI6 guy looked at me and said, "Well, this Manhard, he's more than meets the eye."

I said, "Well, may be, I don't know. But I like him; he's a lot of fun."

*Q: Take me to your 166th millimeter regiment, that type thing.*

THOMAS: You couldn't say toilet yet, and here you were... The craziest damn method... A year of this was very frustrating.

I rented a small cottage in Carmel, which was very nice. I became the darling of what I call the divorcee set. As a single man, I was invited to a lot of parties. It was an interesting year. I got to know some of the arty types around Carmel, and went to the club. Every year the club had a function where each language department was to put up a booth to make money for charity. A major in the Asian Department there was a part-time student, part-time administrator, an official interpreter, and an excellent linguist. He also ran the club. The next morning after this function was over, I said to him, "I didn't see a Korean booth here last night".

He said, "Oh, that's a funny story. It tells the difference between the Koreans, the Chinese, and the Japanese. Yesterday morning, the Chinese arrived early in the morning and started hammering and sawing and putting everything together to build their booth to sell Chinese food. And by six in the evening, when the benefit opened, they were finished. About three in the afternoon, the Japanese arrived; everything pre-cut, bang, bang, bang, it's up, and they're done. About six in the evening, the Korean Department head came in and said, 'Where's our booth?' He expected somebody to build it for them."

Anyway, it was an interesting year to be there, with so much going on in Asia at the time, with our first getting involved with Southeast Asia. I felt that there were better ways to learn a language. The teachers were good, but they should have been left alone to teach language rather than the time spent teaching military vocabulary. Korean is such a complex language, but the vocabulary will come if you've got command of the structure and command of the fundamental verbs of the language. That became obvious later, especially when I was learning Chinese. I realized that if you can really handle Chinese fluently, the needed vocabulary is easy to add. The problem is getting the structure down and handling it fluently with ease. Korean is a much harder language to learn to speak than Chinese.

*Q: After a year at the language school, where did you go?*

THOMAS: I went back to the Department, and there were some arguments over whether I was going to go back to the political or economic section, because some people said, It might be better if he did some economic work for broadening, or some consular work." I didn't want to do consular work. Because I was young, there also was some worry among some of the senior guys that my experience in Korea, combined with my language training might upstage them; I had already made some enemies for these reasons.

*Q: I'm sure you had.*

THOMAS: Thank God I had an ambassador who appreciated me, but some of the people in between didn't. By the time it was straightened out and the arguments settled, nearly a year had passed. I was glad to have that time to see my family because my parents were getting older. I left in the late summer of '56.

*Q: By that time, peace was...*

THOMAS: They were then in the middle of an aid program, big aid programs, and a lot of money being wasted. There were a lot of questions in people's minds about the corruption, tremendous corruption, in Korea. Sort of like you have in China today. An awful lot of stealing. Because Rhee was always balancing forces underneath him, it didn't matter whether you were corrupt. The issue was, if your group got too powerful, he'd put another group in. When you're playing that balancing act, you've got to put up with a lot of bad apples. And he had lots of them.

There's one other story that I think should be told because it has to do with that corruption problem. Just after Briggs arrived, this was the late summer of '52, Strong was the economic chief, the fellow who used to get drunk and tell everything to his mistress; shortly thereafter a man named Sydney Mellen, who was a very nice man, arrived to head the economic section. His wife was Italian, and he was a European diplomat, very sophisticated, very charming, but he really wasn't used to dealing with Asian subterfuge (although I felt, after Italy, he should have had some knack).

Anyway, he was at a staff meeting, where he told the brand new ambassador that the Koreans had managed a recent currency exchange, that is currency reform, beautifully, and it was a massive success.

What it amounted to was that on one day they suddenly announced that you had 24 hours to turn in all your currency and get new currency. You'd get one-for-one up to a certain level, then you'd get...

*Q: That came later, but at that time, it was still considered the White House.*

THOMAS: The Kyungmudae was just the name of the area in the Seoul where the President's residence is located.

Anyway, the ambassador started to realize that maybe what I was saying was true, but you couldn't tell Bill Jones anything. I just went my own way, reporting what I'd learned. At this

point, it was a frustrating situation. I had been told when I was in the Department that Rhee was an old man and that I should busy myself trying to find out what the plans were if he kicked off in office because there would be a scramble for power, and how would that be handled. The intelligence people had been given this function, but the embassy had to have somebody looking at it, too. The intelligence people were rotated frequently and usually didn't speak Korean. They had agents who spoke the language, but agents are different from having American officials handling a problem.

I remember asking one influential Korean the question, "If Rhee dies, have you guys got any plans?"

He said, "I don't know, but I'll go find out." He came back and he told me, "They don't have any plans."

I pointed out, "The American Embassy feels you should, because if anything happened, what would..."

As this all went around and came around, he kept reporting back what he was learning, and I would put it into cables back to the Department. So that kept me pretty busy, doing all this and trying to keep track of Rhee.

In the meantime, I got involved in giving lectures at some of the universities on anything they asked me. I didn't know what I was talking about, but I'd go look it up and ... lecture on something to someone's kids. I got to know some of these college kids; I could feel, from talking to them, because I was speaking Korean at the time, that they wanted to learn some English; I had a group of people coming to my house to learn English...

And my girlfriend at the time was helping me.

*Q: Was she Korean?*

THOMAS: No, she was American, Catherine M. Frank, a vice consul. We ended up being married in San Francisco in October 1958 as she was en-route from Seoul to the Department. She was a woman Foreign Service officer and had entered in the class of '56. She'd been one of two women officers in a class of 60 appointed to the Foreign Service. She was to be my assistant in the political section, when an older woman, named Maggie Barrett, who'd done this type work, arrived on the scene and became my assistant. I got to read Kay's personnel file; she had a doctorate in political science. Maggie was a lawyer and a CPA and had been a biographic officer in Mexico City for years; she ended up being my assistant in Korea. By that time, I'd come to the conclusion, the only way to go at politics in an Asian country was the biographic approach. Looking at a political party was crazy. You look at people and the interconnections between people. Maggie turned out to be a gemstone.

Anyway, Kay Frank started teaching these students and talking to them. I felt that Rhee was unpopular. I concluded that sooner or later there was going to be a problem with the students. I kept bringing this up, but nobody would listen to me. You didn't dare put anything on paper, for

fear you'd get yourself... Robertson, at that point, had already gotten rid of some young officers in Taiwan who were talking about what was wrong with Chiang Kai-shek. It was not the thing to do.

*Q: The U.N. Cemetery...*

THOMAS: Across the river from Seoul.

*Q: Across the Han.*

THOMAS: I remember going and standing around there, waiting for this man to approach me because it was to be a blind thing. He never showed. He'd given me his name, and so it was all in the files that I'd gone to meet him. It turned out, that this guy was the guy that later ran the coup that put Park Chung Hee in power. It came up at that time, because they looked up his name and here was this memo I'd written.

Anyway, just before I left Korea in '58... and by then I was convinced we were going to have a shake-up in the Korean government and that Rhee was going to go, one way or the other. Whether it would be the military or the students, I couldn't say, but it was just a matter of time.

I went to see Mr. Huh and told him this. I told him that if anything went wrong, I felt that he was probably the best person to handle the interim situation. Furthermore I was going back to the United States and was going to try to get him invited to do a tour of the United States, on which I would try to accompany him. This would be a way of getting him known and also sending a signal to President Rhee. He said, "All right, if you can do that."

I came back to the States and I talked to my Dad about the fact that it was very sad about the killing of this Korean boy; that it had created terrible feelings in Korea. He knew Mayor Dilworth, and it would be sort of appropriate, on the anniversary, whatever it was, maybe the first anniversary, or the second, I forget, of this kid's being killed, that he invite the mayor of Seoul to be the guest of the mayor of Philadelphia, to commemorate the boy's death and to make an apology on the part of Philadelphia for this. It would be helpful to American-Korean relations. This idea was presented to Dilworth who thought it was a good idea. All it cost Philadelphia was the price of three airplane tickets because he could get free hotel space from the hotel owners. I then suggested that maybe if he could broker this to the cities of New York, Washington, Chicago and San Francisco because the costs to these cities would be small because Mr. Huh and his party could stop on their way back. He'd get a chance to visit these cities and each mayor would welcome him, it would be worthwhile. Fortunately, everybody agreed.

In the meantime, I came back to the Department; I'm preaching at the working level, and I'm waiting to go into Chinese-language school. It was all set up for me to study Chinese because I couldn't stay in Korea all the rest of my life. I wanted to take leave; language school was going to start two months or a month later.

Anyway, I'm preaching this stuff about Korea. I remember David Bane. Do you know David Bane?

*Q: It doesn't ring a bell.*

THOMAS: I remember David Bane was director of NEA. He had been in and out of the Department, I think with some of the oil companies, and he was a rather sophisticated guy. He ended up later in Pakistan as consul general in Lahore. But at that time David was head of NEA. I remember telling David that Rhee was in trouble; his response was you better keep your mouth shut or you'll get yourself fired if it gets to Mr. Robertson that the Rhee government's not long for this world. I said, "You watch, you watch."

In the meantime, Mr. Huh was invited to Philadelphia; I took leave, and traveled around with him. We went to Philadelphia, New York, Washington, Chicago and San Francisco; it took about ten days or a bit more for this tour. In New York we called on General MacArthur at his apartment. The newspaper reported the story about this call on MacArthur and how this visit by Mayor Huh of Seoul was in commemoration of the student's being killed in Philadelphia. It was also reported that Mr. Thomas from the State Department was accompanying the mayor, etc.

When the word reached President Rhee, you can guess what happened to Mr. Huh when he returned to Seoul. He was fired, right there on the spot. He was out of a job. In the interim, Rhee started to make trouble for Ambassador Dowling back here. He was called back for consultation.

*Q: You took Chinese for how long?*

THOMAS: Nearly three years. The first year, off and on, because of being involved with Korean affairs. Then two full years at Taichung, where I ended up being acting director of the language school.

I found much that was wrong with how the system allowed linguistic scientists to select which candidates would study Oriental languages. In earlier times, officers who had proven themselves as competent in relating to the peoples of East Asia, and who would be more effective with the language as a tool, were seen as eligible for this major investment in time and money. To select inexperienced officers on the basis of language aptitude alone can create competent interpreters, but excellent interpreters can be hired at much lower salaries. Many of these people learned easily, but found East Asia not to their liking, and spent their free time at the local American military officers clubs. The investment was a waste of money. (This changed approach to the selection of language officers fitted in well with the demise of "men of substance" and the substitution of "the organization man".)

*Q: Oh, absolutely.*

THOMAS: But if you want effective political and economic officers, they'd better know the language.

To keep that from happening, you must not let them decide who is given language training only based on language aptitude tests. We've got to say to them, "Here we've got an officer we know is damn good at developing productive relationships with the Chinese people (Gwanshi); he's

done such a good job, we want you to teach him Chinese. Now it might take him six months longer than it takes somebody else to learn the same amount of language. We don't care. You train him." But that's what's needed in terms of developing effective diplomats.

I saw this phenomenon during my period at Taichung. In the end, however, I ended up getting a 4 in reading, and a 3+ in spoken, which is pretty good.

*Q: Oh, it's very good. Just for the record, 5 is a native speaker. It's a two thing: 1 through 5 (5 being the highest) for reading; and 1 through 5 for speaking.*

THOMAS: You've got to be a college graduate in that country, native speaker, to get a 5.

*Q: And the normal person going to this is lucky to get a 3.3.*

THOMAS: That's right. I remember, because I was running this school for six months at the same time as I was a student. The teachers all liked me. Because I was the acting headmaster or whatever you want to call it, principal or director, FSI here worried that there might be favoritism. They brought in Don Sergle to replace me, who'd by then graduated from there and was head of USIS in Taichung. He took over the school from me just at the time I was to graduate. He was then acting director the week of my graduation. He had to sit in, actually sit in, while I took my oral, and sit in while I took my written which had been sent to him from FSI in Washington. He sealed both the written and the tape of my oral and sent them to Washington to be graded. This was done because I'd been acting director of the school, and there was a possible conflict of interest.

But a scandal occurred due to me, after I left there, that I felt very badly about. I want to get it on record now because I want this issue to be addressed.

I had always taken the attitude that when you're dealing with people who have less than you do, you try to be helpful to them. When I left there, I sold things that I didn't want or need any longer (like I'd had some carpets made for my house locally, inexpensive stuff), to some of the teachers at a discount price. They were low-paid people. I sold them my bicycle at a discount price. I tried to be decent to these people who'd busted their ass teaching me. I'd come to know, and encouraged the other students to get to know them in a very social and personal way.

They got a new guy in, a few weeks after I left there, who was to be the new director, who spoke Chinese, but he was from a missionary background.

In the meantime, the head teacher of the school had saved up a fair amount of money in dollars and given it to me. He liked hi-fi's; he asked me to buy him a hi-fi when I got back and send it through APO. Well, this was against the rules. There's no doubt about that. But every one of us broke rules that way. You couldn't be in the Foreign Service and not. We're constantly giving whiskey away to people.

There was a fellow, with the initials L.N. who was with the USIS, there in language school LN and his wife had befriended us and thrown a big party for us as we were leaving.

*Q: Were you married by this time?*

THOMAS: Oh, yes, my wife was there. We had to pay money to get her trained in Chinese, because the government wouldn't do it at that time. We spent a fair amount of money giving her language lessons; she learned Chinese along with me. She's a better linguist, but, of course, she didn't cover the amount that I had.

Anyway, as I remember it now, I asked LN, "Would you mind being the recipient of this hi-fi gear for Mr. Lin? He's given me the money, and I'm going to pick it up at the PX up in Tokyo and put it in the APO for you, and when it gets here, just give it to him." Which is what happened.

However, it turned out LN was not a good linguist, and he didn't bust his ass like I did. He was a social animal. He and his wife liked to party. That's why we had good times with them; they were always having parties. He was flunking out of the school. He thought he'd pull a blackmail on Lin, the head instructor -- "I've got this stuff, etc. etc."

Then this whole thing came out, that I'd sent this stuff; therefore, Thomas got these high grades. There was no way I got a high grade... it all originated and was graded back here. So nobody in Washington or at the school, who knew the facts, believed that.

This new missionary type said, "Well, from now on, there'll be no fraternization between the students and the teachers." Couldn't even go to a party.

*Q: The kiss of death.*

THOMAS: Kiss of death. The whole place was terrible. I heard all about it via the letters people were writing me. They fired the senior instructor. He got booted because of all this. LN, in the end, because he'd played this hardnose thing, graduated, but I don't think he was ever very good at Chinese. But they never dared show their faces to me again, those two. Yet we'd been close friends there. They're here in Washington. A very sad ending!

*Q: You graduated what year?*

THOMAS: I graduated in '62. First of all, I was due to go to Hong Kong, in the economic section. There was somebody in Hong Kong that had been in Korea that didn't like me. I don't know who, but I made my enemies.

First of all, there was the commissary issue in Korea. The married couples all wanted a limit so that no servants were to be allowed in the commissary to buy for the single people. The fresh vegetables and other items in short supply came in at ten o'clock in the morning and were put on the shelves, and they were gone in a matter of a couple of hours. Our servants were over there to get them for us, along with the wives. The wives didn't like standing in line with our servants. They should get VIP treatment. If that happened, single people wouldn't get any of the fresh vegetables. Since single people were the majority in the embassy, they could outvote everybody.

That's why I was president of the Embassy Club. The ambassador put out an order that the servants couldn't shop at the commissary any longer. I said, "All right, I can't buck the ambassador." But I quietly went to this Korean manager, since I was his boss as president of the club, and I said, "Look, I want the stuff split. I want two-thirds of it not put on the shelves until six in the evening, the fresh stuff. One-third at ten in the morning because about one-third of the embassy is married. Two-thirds are single. That's the way it's to be split everything that comes in. If it runs out in the morning, you haven't got any more." That's what he did. Of course, that made me unpopular as hell over there with some of the married couples. But that's the way it worked.

Then the married people got together and tried to run somebody against me to become president. It didn't work. They got something through that I couldn't succeed myself; we got another single person in there as president. This type thing went on.

I was back in the Department, and informal word comes back to me that somebody didn't want me in Hong Kong. You know how that works in the damn system. It can cause all types of problems. Then there was talk of sending me to Taipei. A similar thing happened in Taipei; somebody didn't want me there. (I didn't fit as an "Organization Man" and substance types can be a problem for the system.)

Then they decided to open up a new China affairs post for a Chinese-affairs officer in Karachi, Pakistan. Pakistan Internal Airlines had gone into China. They had a Chinese-affairs officer in Delhi. The guy who had been chief of the political section in Hong Kong, Jake, had that job. He'd been transferred to Delhi. That was a pretty senior job in the Chinese-affairs reporting business, because of India. I was given the Chinese-affairs post for two countries: Pakistan and Afghanistan. I was assigned to the political section in Pakistan.

*Q: You were in Pakistan from when to when?*

THOMAS: Sixty-three to '65. That was a very interesting period; I had real problems there. That was a period when China and Pakistan became very close. My biggest fights were with the chief of the political section and with the ambassador.

*Q: Who was the ambassador and chief of the political section?*

THOMAS: McConaughy.

*Q: McConaughy again.*

THOMAS: Yes.

*Q: Again somebody who was...*

THOMAS: Anti-Communist.

*Q: Really a very, very strong anti-Communist, to the point where it probably had some effect on his...*

THOMAS: His judgement. A fellow that did his writing for him, Dick Sneider, who was later ambassador to Korea... Did you know Dick Sneider?

*Q: Yes, he was my ambassador in Korea.*

THOMAS: Is that right? Well, Sneider was my political chief. I didn't get along very well with Sneider because Sneider was doing just exactly what he was told by McConaughy. I was an effective political officer; I got to know a lot of people in Pakistan, fast. Sneider was not very good socially at handling himself. He was sort of abrupt, and people didn't take to this.

*Q: Yes, he was a tough cookie.*

THOMAS: He was chief of the political section; yet he hadn't made many friends in the diplomatic corps there. He was sort of negative; he tended to lord it over people. You know how you make calls when you first get to a post? He put out a memo that none of us were to call on anybody, in any of the other embassies, senior in rank to us. I was a senior second secretary, but most foreign embassies in Pakistan didn't even have second secretaries.

*Q: No, they had just one person, and that was...*

THOMAS: A first secretary, or maybe a chargé, or maybe a minister.

*Q: Maybe quite a junior officer.*

THOMAS: That's right. The word was out in the diplomatic community that there was a China linguist assigned to do the Chinese-affairs reporting job in the American Embassy. Yet I was told I couldn't call on anybody. Well, I soon said, "I'll cure that." I just started telling any junior officer I could, from any other embassy, that this was a problem for me because I was hamstrung by my own political chief, who wouldn't let me meet anybody; that I'd like to get to know anybody else who knew anything about China or Chinese. It turned out the Canadian minister there, who was the deputy chief of the Canadian mission, was a China linguist; I think married to a Chinese. The French Embassy had the same situation as did the Australian Embassy. All these guys, who were number two in their embassies, came around and called on me. You can imagine Sneider's reaction.

We formed a China club, with me as the president. They asked if they could bring their dispatches and talk to me when they were writing about China, and we'd trade information. Out of this, I got to know as many... Karachi became a small Hong Kong. I talked to anybody coming though on PIA going to China. At the same time, I got to know the Pakistani people.

*Q: No, I don't.*

THOMAS: He was a bright young man, had a hell of a good sense of humor, and a nice wife, who was from a Turkish Jewish community in Turkey. I never could understand the Department's assigning Jews to political sections in Muslim countries, especially ones like

Pakistan. Here you had the chief of the political section was a Jew, and you had Gelber. I'm being given hell most of the time by my boss, but Gelber spent all his time working on a Master's Degree thesis. He hardly turned in anything because, first of all, he had no contacts in the community, his being Jewish. He was bright; he could write musicals. He was a very talented guy and funny, and he'd write very funny stuff. But he didn't know how to get along with the local people. He wasn't around them; he just went home to his wife.

After this first trip with Pir Pagaro, I wrote up everything I learned, in a memcon about politics there, and the fact that the Pir wanted me to go with him. I got an agreement out of the political chief that I'd go hunting with the Pir whenever I wanted to, with no leave taken. I didn't have to take leave, because local politics wasn't my job.

I told the Pir I was interested in Chinese matters, and if he could obtain some information concerning China for me, I'd appreciate it. I'd be willing to give him advice on current politics in Pakistan, if I could be of help.

Every Sunday morning, if we weren't out hunting, he'd either be at my house or I'd be at his house, having coffee and talking local politics.

Then another thing happened. It turned out that he's like a lot of South Asians; they believe in soothsayers or fortune tellers. There was an Indian who was his fortune teller. Early in the game, the Pir asked me my date of birth, the exact day and the year. It turned out I was born on the same day of the year he was, only a year earlier. This soothsayer told him that a diplomat was going to come to Pakistan, who was born on the same day of the year, who was going to make all the difference in his career, politically, and that he should use this man for advice. This put me in a rather special situation with Pir Pagaro.

I'm expected to understand local politics. First of all, I don't know anything about local politics. Before I can advise the Pir, he and some of his people have to tutor me on the local situation. They've got to tell me all the background. I'm learning all this background and dictating it in memcons, but it's not my job to get it to Washington.

This resulted in a funny story because many months later, a cable from Washington about Gelber's reporting, stating, "This reporting is excellent, but there are no backup memcons. Where are the memcons for all these cables?" All this stuff is going in by cable. We want to see... Well, they'd gotten word, through the grapevine, and I don't know who, because I didn't care, but somebody'd let them know. I think it was another guy who had gone home early and told them that all this stuff was coming from me. Then Sneider (Sneider was part of the problem) was forced, along with Gelber, to package up all my memcons and send them back to the Department, because it became very obvious that I was the guy furnishing all this information. The Pir had his spies everywhere.

In the meantime, I got to know a man named Jimmy Fancy who was an Ismaili. He was one of the leaders of the Fancy Clan all of whom were Ismailis. The Ismailis were headed by that fellow they weigh in gold, the Aga Khan. He was one of the Aga Khan's followers.

I can still remember telling Fancy, one night during dinner, about one of my hunting trips with Pir Pagaro, when, out in the middle of the desert, my boiled drinking water had been lost. The reason it had been lost was the people who were transporting it thought it was my liquor, and they didn't want me to have liquor. But the Pir had told me, "You bring your liquor. I can't drink it, because it's against the Muslim code. But most of these people will, on the hunt, and you have it..." The person who had left my water behind thought that it was liquor; it was really water. The liquor got there, but the water didn't. I complained to the Pir. He sent around a case of Evian water, how civilized! out there in the middle of the damned desert. I thought this was pretty plush.

I told this story to Jimmy Fancy. Later, when the Aga Khan arrived for one of his visits, I got a call from Jimmy Fancy, "Hey, would you get in touch with the Pir and obtain some Evian water for the Aga Khan?" The Pir responded by sending me several cases which I sent on to Jimmy Fancy.

It turned out that Jimmy Fancy, who ran this big industrial complex, one of the biggest in Pakistan, said to me, "Look, I can't afford, in a country like this, to go without having spies everywhere. I have my own intelligence system. I'm sure that I know more about what goes on here than most of your embassy. Fred, I'm willing to keep you informed, if you'd like." He came to like me. I received all this domestic political information from either Jimmy Fancy, or Pir Pagaro, while, at the same time, giving Pir Pagaro advice.

In the meantime, there was somebody who was working in the foreign ministry, who was close to the Pir, and who was telling the Pir stuff out of school. The Pir was willing to tell me who the man was, but I really didn't want to know because I knew that this information would go over like a lead balloon in our embassy. They might try to hurt this guy. If I didn't know, I could protect the source and still get away with what I was trying to accomplish. It became very obvious to me that Bhutto was in bed with the Chinese Communists. Kennedy was the president when we first arrived in Pakistan; I felt he was a breath of fresh air - after years of knee jerk anti-communism under the Republicans. Maybe, I could sell the idea to the Kennedy administration of using Pakistan as a bridge to China. It was my analysis that Pakistan based on the realities of geography and the size of India, had to have a close relationship with China. There is no way around it. Since India was Pakistan's biggest enemy, there was no way Pakistan was not going to make friends with China. We ought to use this situation rather than trying to fight it, in spite of the fact that Pakistan was in CENTO and SEATO. At that time there was a big argument going on among China specialists over whether the Sino Soviet split was for real. I believed it was for real and that we should look to using Pakistan as a bridge to establishing relations with China. But here you've got McConaughy, whose views reflected those of the extreme right in Congress... And Bowles is down in...Delhi pushing the India card.

*Q: Chester Bowles.*

THOMAS: Chester Bowles is down in...

*Q: New Delhi, as our ambassador.*

THOMAS: I had to go to Delhi fairly regularly, because I was ordered there by the Department, to confer with Jake, who was the Chinese-affairs officer for India. I have to give you this flashback because it tied in with my relationship with the embassy in Delhi. Prior to leaving Washington for Pakistan, I went to the Department's travel office to make arrangements. I told the woman there that we had just had a new baby girl (Veronica), our second child. The baby was about six months old, and we wanted to go by ship. Because of this situation, I was not interested in going first class in a third-class stateroom in the hole. I'd rather fly.

*Q: They would call something first class, but it would be down in the bowels of the ship.*

THOMAS: That's right. So I said, "If you can't give me true first-class accommodations, I want to fly. If you can give me first-class accommodations going to Naples," (then I'd fly out of Rome on to Pakistan.)

She said, "You're going to have to wait, because it's lowest first-class available."

A week or so before we were to go, she called me in and said, "I've got you a cabin on the sun deck, with a big picture window." And she showed me pictures.

I said, "That's fine."

We boarded The Constitution with some of my friends in New York. We went to our first dinner, in the first-class dining room. It was just for couples; they had baby sitters for the young babies. We were seated at a table with another couple. It turned out he was going out to be counselor for administration in Delhi. His name was Bob Francis. He was a big, heavy fellow, but had a good sense of humor. It turned out he was a hunter, and we got along fine. But, of course, he was down in the hole. He introduced me to some ambassador who was going to eastern Europe, who was down in the hole also. We got to be friends on that trip, for the two weeks we were on it. He said, "You get down to Delhi, you've got to come and see us and stay with us."

Every time I went to Delhi, I'd stay with him and his wife at their place. Counselors for Administration live pretty well. He and his wife had become the Bowles's closest personal friends in the embassy. Mrs. Bowles was always dropping over for coffee. Jake, the Chinese Affairs Officer there, was due to leave; Jake's tour was up.

Do you know Paul Kreisberg?

*Q: Yes.*

THOMAS: Paul Kreisberg, I heard later, had wanted that job, and Bowles didn't want him. I don't know what the reason was, but Bowles said no. Here we had another China specialist, because Kreisberg was a Chinese linguist, being sent to Pakistan as deputy chief of the political section, to replace the guy who was caught in Iran, who was chargé.

*Q: Bruce Laingen?*

THOMAS: Bruce had been deputy chief, and the buffer between me and Sneider. Bruce understood I was trying to get the truth out. He was a sensitive and honest person and was so different from Sneider. Sneider was always raising hell with me about something. In my opinion, it was an aggressive posture taken in order to discourage my trying to get something out concerning China that they didn't want to approve.

*Q: McConaughy was a China hand, too, wasn't he?*

THOMAS: Yes, he was a China hand, but he didn't speak Chinese. But he was a China hand. He'd been in China a good deal of the time. He spoke a little Chinese, but not enough to count.

Anyway, while in Delhi, Bowles's wife, whom I came to know through the Francis's, suggested to me that maybe I'd like to come to Delhi as China-affairs officer, to take Jake's place. I quietly told Bob Francis, "I don't want to create problems for you or for myself, but put the scotch on the idea. Bowles likes people who do just what they're told, and I'm having enough trouble with McConaughy. Bowles is bigger than McConaughy, in a way. I don't want to come here. I'll just stay where I am."

Anyway, while in Delhi, I'd talk about what was wrong in Pakistan, and the fact that Bhutto and the Chinese were getting closer. Delhi was getting intelligence about the situation in Pakistan. Aside from the intelligence, I was picking this up on my own. The intelligence reports coming in from the intelligence agencies were full of it. But it was all being pooh-poohed by Sneider and the ambassador. This stuff, that was in raw intelligence form, would come in but you couldn't write about it because they didn't want to give it any significance. At times, it appeared that the Department was playing the same game. This was crap.

In the meantime, I started taking pictures or having pictures taken for me of Chinese tanks coming in the back door in Karachi. Tanks and arms. I tried to get this out, but the ambassador wouldn't let me do anything with it. My cables, were changed and I'd just say, "Take my name off. I don't want my name on this stuff. A war is coming here, and it's being whipped up by the Chinese. Bhutto is involved with it." When you're in that situation and nobody wants to send anything to Washington, you've got to be very careful about how you handle anything you learn, because they're liable to just try to screw it up.

It was at this point, after Bhutto had been to Africa and made a lot of statements that had created real problems for the United States, that the stuff hit the fan. Bhutto claimed that we were creating problems in Africa; he was helping the Chinese in their efforts at subversion there.

The Sindh Club was across the street from the embassy in Karachi. It was the club for the local gentry. Kreisberg, myself and a fellow named Dick Nyrop... (Nyrop was a gusty guy; I'll tell you a story about Nyrop and his courage.) The three of us were at the club when, in front of a bunch of Pakistani foreign ministry types, we called Bhutto some names. I forget what they were, but they weren't very pleasant names, and he's the foreign minister. Because of his lies and crap about the United States, none of us were very happy, and we were saying so.

Suddenly, a memo arrives at the embassy from the foreign ministry, declaring all three of us persona non grata and wanting us out of there in two weeks.

I remember McConaughy calling us all in; all three of us in a row like a bunch of lieutenants, as if saluting him, standing at attention in front of his desk. He read this letter to us and said, "Gentlemen, is there any truth to this?"

And we all piped up, "No, sir!", in unison. But we knew damn well it was true.

Within less than a week... By then, it was well known that I was Pir Pagaro's American hunting buddy. It was going on Christmas time. There was to be a new National Assembly election. It was a parliamentary system there. Bhutto had been going around bad-mouthing the United States, and yet Pakistan was very dependent on the United States for a lot of aid, its military aid, etc.

Suddenly, despite the fact we'd received a memo from the foreign ministry declaring me persona non grata, I received a telephone call from a friend of mine who was at Bhutto's estate inviting me, in the name of Mr. Bhutto, to come as soon as I can get there, for a prolonged hunt with the foreign minister on his estate at Larkana.

I went to see Sneider to tell him that I've received this invitation from Bhutto. I said, "You know, it's very interesting, Dick; I'm being invited to go hunting with the foreign minister at his estate, while at the same time, they've declared me persona non grata."

He looked at me and he said, "You telling me the truth? You're always coming up with these goddamn lies."

He'd cussed me out, called me a son of a bitch one time. I told him, "You do that again, and I'll break your jaw." I could get physical with enough provocation. Sneider just turned me off. Here all this stuff was going in, all this work I was doing, and I wasn't getting any credit with the Department. (In retrospect, I question whether the Department was interested in the truth. I remember, when I reported in after returning from Karachi, how curt Carol Laise was to me when I called on her. It's my opinion now, that the powers that be there had their own agenda and the truth created problems for them.)

Sneider sent me in to the ambassador, and the ambassador said, "He's never invited me to go hunting. You're damn right, you go. Get there anyway you can, but you get there. I want to know what's going on."

Bhutto is the enemy of my good friend Pir Pagaro, so I wanted to check in with the Pir before I did anything. I call the Pir and ask to see him.

We got together and the Pir said, "I know about that invitation. I've got spies there. Don't worry, you'll not be seeing Bhutto right away. Bhutto's not there; he's off doing something. When you first get there, your host is going to be a man named Hukro. And Hukro is a dangerous person. He looks like a benign old man -- white hair, white beard -- but he has killed half a dozen men

with his own hands. He's a dangerous guy. But his job is to entertain you until the foreign minister gets back. There'll be people in the room that belong to me, that are my people. So don't worry. Just go and have a good time. You'll learn something about what that place is like."

I called the airport (it's the Christmas season maybe mid-December) to charter a private plane. Everybody there at the airport was drunk. You could tell they were having a party. I couldn't get a private plane; the train was always booked, but, with enough bribe money, I bought my way onto the sleeper. I arrived at Larkana. The man who'd called me was there, a lieutenant in the Pak Air Force. The first day we went out hunting, I was worried. Frankly, I was scared. I was scared because here was this guy Bhutto (all the stories I'd heard about him) and then this guy Hukro. Bhutto wasn't there, but his wife was there. I was staying in the residence, in Bhutto's own home, in a guest bedroom. Pictures of Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong were on the grand piano and thick Chinese carpets on the floor. Mrs. was very nice, as was their daughter who's now the prime minister.

*Q: Benazir.*

THOMAS: Benazir was then a little girl.

I'd hunted all over the Sindh, south of there. But this was up closer to Lahore, northern Sindh. We were hunting partridge that day, along with pigeons. I never shot pigeons, because I would never shoot anything I wouldn't eat. I didn't like squab, so I didn't shoot pigeons. But, I was shooting more cobras than I was shooting anything else. Blowing their heads off. They'd come up here, and they'd come up there, and boom, boom. Well, this was worrisome; how did so many cobras end up out here? It had never happened before. We shot some partridge that day, and I think I shot a few ring-necked pheasants. It was to be the first day of the hunt. We went back and rested that evening; the next day was a better day.

The evening of the second day there was to be a party in our honor, which Hukro was to throw at one of the local restaurants. We were back from the hunt about four in the afternoon; my young host, who was about my age, was there, this lieutenant in the Pakistani air corps, a pilot. He said, "Look, these bastards are out to get you drunk tonight. You've got to watch. I've got a pound of butter here, and you and I are going to split the pound, and we're going to eat it with this loaf of bread. You grease everything." So that's what we did.

We went to the party; it was a girlie party with Sindhi dancing girls. There was a game they played while the girls danced. Your host or another guest standing behind you would hold money on your cheeks, and the girls would come by and dance in front of you, in low-cut dresses, and lean over you, and take the money away. It was belly-dancing, pretty sensuous. I called them the barefoot, dirty finger-nailed, pretty healthy looking "Sindhi Sexpots". They were prostitutes. ... and we'd all been drinking pretty heavily, with toasts and all this stuff. Going on the end of the evening, I looked down on my cheeks, and here's a lot of money on both cheeks. Somebody standing behind me with a nice chunk of money, Pak money. The most beautiful, gorgeous, voluptuous of these dancing girls was there in front of me, dancing. Instead of just taking the money, she had these two long ruby painted fingernails on each forefinger; as she took the money, she stabbed me in both cheeks with those fingernails. I had a big gash in both of my

cheeks, like saber cuts; I bled like a stuck pig. My host made the comment, "I don't know about your country, Mr. Thomas, but when a woman does that in our country, there is only one cure." In other words, take her home to bed. I wasn't about to take that girl home to bed. I could see myself coming down with God knows what... So that didn't work, but...

Christmas was coming on, and I wanted to be with my family. I could see Bhutto wanted me there for two weeks, which would have been right through Christmas. Hunting wasn't that important to me, and I'd done what the ambassador told me, which was to go up there and find out what they were up to.

Talking to enough people up there, and listening to the drunken talk that was going on around me that night (although I wasn't sober, I was not as drunk as some of the other people I was listening to), I came to the conclusion that the foreign minister wanted to take me around personally, hunting, throughout the whole election district he was campaigning in, to show me off as his American connection, so that he had no worry about people thinking that the Americans were so anti-him because he'd made all these anti-American statements to get himself in with the Chinese. That was what he was using me for; that was the reason.

I suddenly announced that I had to leave because I had to get back to my family for the Christmas holidays. I thanked them for their... They got me a reservation back to Karachi.

On arrival at Karachi, it must have been six in the morning, the ambassador's car was waiting for me at the train station, with orders to take me directly to the residence. The ambassador was shaving when I arrived. The ambassador turned around and looked at me with these scars on my face; he said, "What the hell happened to you?" I told him the story of the dancing girl.

Then he asked, "What did your wife say?"

I said, "I haven't seen her yet."

He said, "I want to know what she says."

Anyway, I told him what I thought this was all about with Bhutto. That evening on arriving at a reception with my wife the ambassador spotted me coming in the door and signaled for me to join him. His first question was "What did your wife say?" "She said 'Are your Tetanus shots up to date?'" He roared, and noted that my wife was a pretty cool lady.

In the meantime, Pir Pagaro had someone in the foreign ministry who knew what was going on, and the Pir was passing that information to me. The Pir even offered to let me talk to this source, but I said I didn't want to. This person had seen a memo that discussed a letter of agreement between Pakistan and China, a secret letter of agreement that had to do with preparations for this war against India, in which China agreed to do certain things, and the Paks were working with the Chinese in terms of this.

I put this in a memo to the ambassador, that I'd heard this through one of my sources, but I couldn't tell him exactly where it came from except out of the foreign ministry.

I sent this, of course, through Sneider; Sneider was livid. That was the morning I threatened to knock his block off when he called me a son of a bitch because of this information. "You haven't got any proof. All you've got there are words in a memo , You sob!" Etc., etc.

"I've shown you pictures of tanks coming in here. I've shown you this; I've shown you that."

In the meantime, Jimmy Fancy came to me with the same facts, that there was a war coming; that China and Pakistan were planning to provoke it with India.

My tour was about over, coming close to an end. Fancy said to me, "Your leaving just at this time, it's terrible. You're the Chinese-affairs officer."

What happened concerned my daughter. The Department wanted me to stay longer. My daughter had been bitten by something; she started having convulsions.

The administrative officer there was of Filipino background, an ex-chief petty officer out of the Navy. He was typical of those who kiss ass above but would screw the secretaries and everybody that was junior. For example, he'd pay the officers' per diem to go up Islamabad on TDY. The embassy was getting ready to move, we were building a new embassy up north. Because of this, the staff had to go up there at times. The secretaries had to go there, but they weren't given per diem, yet the officers were. The secretaries needed it more than the officers.

The embassy doctor recommended that my daughter be taken to Frankfurt to be checked out in the hospital there because the local hospital was terrible...

But the son of a bitch refused to sign the orders.

When I heard this, I went in on a Saturday afternoon. He was in his office. He didn't know how to use the staff; he was always at his own typewriter, doing things. I said, "If you don't sign those orders, I'll spend the rest of my career getting your career." It was my daughter whose health was at stake in this situation.

He was livid. People usually didn't speak to him that way, because the administrative officer could create problems for you.

Well, he signed the orders, and my wife and daughter went off to Germany. But they still didn't cure her, and these convulsions would come and go. They had her on sedatives, some purple-colored stuff that would dope her out.

I wanted to get the hell out of there. My two years were up. The situation was dangerous, the embassy was blind, deaf and dumb, the family was too important to risk under such conditions . Even though the Department wanted me to stay on, I wasn't about to. There's a war coming, and nobody wanted to believe me.

Now here's the damndest thing about this, in terms of the realities of what was happening in that embassy. Jimmy Fancy said, "Look, you're leaving within days on a ship." I was taking the Lloyd Trestino Lines out of Karachi. He said, "I want to throw a luncheon in your honor, I want you to bring several officers from your embassy to that luncheon, so I can get to know some of them. In order to keep your ambassador informed, somebody's got to take your place as my contact with the embassy. If we have a war with India, this could be terrible for everybody here, and ruin my business." He had a big industrial complex.

I said, "All right. Sure."

There were some CIA people in the building; there were the other political officers. I invited several from each group to go to that luncheon. Not one of those people wanted to go. I ended up at that luncheon alone. Not one of them would leave the embassy. They all used the excuse that they didn't want to be out of there. They wanted to be there because the ambassador might need them. Christ, they weren't learning anything sitting in that embassy. The whole issue was: they knew where their bread was buttered. Being involved with the truth could be dangerous for one's career.

Now, a flashback, this one concerns a rather gusty guy named Nyrop... After I first arrived in Karachi, everyone was complaining about the commissary. The prices in the commissary were horrendous. Everybody in USAID (we had a big USAID mission there), clerks in the embassy, officers and wives complained about the terrible prices in the commissary.

Motor pool cars took us to the office in the morning and home at night. You never knew who was going to be in your car. It would be the head of the USIA one minute and a clerk the next time. I had a personal car, but most of the time, I left it home with my wife and rode in an embassy car, because she needed transportation for the kids to go to school.

I was in the car with the head of USIS, the deputy chief of the political section, and someone else, I think somebody from the CIA, and they were all complaining about prices in the commissary. I was brand new and listened but I decided to find out why the prices were so high.

I started making contacts within the American official community and asking questions. I soon located somebody in USAID who knew something. He said "If I give you a memo that I've gotten my hands on, that I'm not supposed to have, will you not let anybody know where you got it?"

I said, "You're damn right. Nobody'll know. I'll just say I got this memo."

This memo had been written for the ambassador by the administrative counselor concerning the commissary problem, the reason why prices had to be so high, and the fact that this was causing economic hardship for the whole staff. This had to be kept quiet because it was necessary to cover up the mistake made by the previous ambassador.

This memo pointed out that the previous ambassador to McConaughy, [William Manning Rountree]... a career type, who was, I gather, somewhat arrogant, had given away to the Pak

Government the big warehouse and building which housed the commissary. The money to build these buildings on land owned by the United States government was the capital of the embassy community and not U.S. Government money. Without it the community had no real property against which it could borrow at reasonable rates for ordinary operating expenses. This capital represented the three or four or five hundred dollars each family put up on arrival, and you got it back when you left. It turned out that this ambassador had given away that building to the Pak government. So the capital for the embassy club was no longer there to borrow against. Therefore, we had to borrow at high interest rates. At the same time, the manager was buying all his stuff from one outfit in Texas, single source. There was some corruption, obviously, over that. But nobody wanted to talk about that aspect, because that's part of the... It appears the administrative officers were tied in with that some way, but I couldn't prove that. But I did have a copy of this memo, with all the details.

I thermofaxed copies of this memo, enough for every officer attending the weekly staff meeting. All embassy officers were present. Before the meeting, I put one a copy at every place around the table and on every chair in the room.

The administrative counselor arrived saw the document; jumped up and said, " Who put this out?"

I raised my hand. He was livid. By then, a lot of people had read it. I said, "Obviously, something's got to be done about this commissary. It appears to be the fault of the administration."

The only person in that room who stuck with me in that fight (and a fight went on that morning) was this one junior political officer named Dick Nyrop. He stuck with me. Everybody else, including the senior officers and heads of other agencies all backed down.

From then on, they, at least, knew what had happened. I said, "From now on, gentlemen, I will manage to get my stuff my own way."

The commissary was trying to make most of profits on the liquor sales. We were paying a horrible price for liquor, compared to other embassies. I asked a British colleague to put in an order for me. I bought all of my liquor from the British from then on, just to get around that problem. By the case. You had to buy it that way rather than by the bottle.

This problem involving commissaries is endemic to the system. By the end of my career I had seen enough to come to that conclusion, but this occasion was the first lesson to me. As I remember it, the man running the commissary in Karachi had been in Afghanistan where he had been fired from that commissary. It was always these single source operations in which prices were too high. I felt there was some kickback going on in the system. I think it was bigger than one person. That's my feeling. Back in the Department, there was something wrong with that whole structure. But, without a full scale investigation by the I.G., who could say for sure?

Anyway, out of this, I was not popular with the administrative counselor, especially after I raised all this hell about sending my daughter out of country for treatment.

In the end, nobody came to the Fancy party, they knew what the ambassador didn't want to hear.

My last night there was a Friday night. We were boarding the ship on Saturday morning.

*Q: This was what year?*

THOMAS: In the fall, early September? of 1965. The war is imminent. The embassy is pretending it's not happening. I had pictures, and had shown them to the political chief, of tanks being brought in. The intelligence people are talking about it, but you couldn't get the embassy...

McConaughy felt (according to feedback within the embassy) that if he admitted that Pakistan our ally, a member of both CENTO and SEATO, was in bed with Communist China, he could not compete with Bowles in Delhi. He didn't want this. He was keeping Pakistan in our court. Pakistan was in our court, and that was that. They weren't in with the Chinese Communists. That was the gospel. He was in a state of denial and self delusion.

It was very obvious that it wasn't going off that way.

The night before we were to leave, there were a lot of parties in our honor around the community. I'd gotten to know the Brits and the French and everybody. We had this China Club the members of which were for the most part the ambassadors or DCM's who had become personal friends.

Before we went to the parties, I got a call from Pir Pagaro. He said, "Look, you plan to come here last thing, after all your parties are over. Plan to stay all night, because I've got something I want to give you as a going-away present. I'd like to help your career."

I said, "Okay."

Well, it turned out the Pir had been called in two days earlier by the general staff of the Pak army and asked to sit in on the general staff meetings of the planning for the war. The Pir didn't approve of this war. But they wanted to use his bandit people, the Hurs, who also lived part of the time in India...nomadic.

*Q: This was going to be the Sindh War, wasn't it?*

THOMAS: The Sindh War, yes. It went off up in Karachi and in Kashmir and in the Sindh and across in to the Punjab.

*Q: It was sort of called the Sindh War.*

THOMAS: The Sindh War, '65. Anyway, it was close to Lahore, where the... and then in the Sindh. Well, the whole thing was planned, and they wanted the Pir to use his people as guerilla fighters. He was given the whole battle plan, when things were to start, the order of battle i.e. where the troops were, etc. for him to study and have for his use, so that he understood.

He said, "Here, now you copy this down. I can't let you have this, but you copy all this you want to."

I copied. I spent all night copying this damn thing, making drawings, quick drawings, putting troops where they were, and the whole damned battle plan.

I hadn't had any sleep. At six in the morning, I put the plan into my safe in the political section. It's a Saturday morning. I wrote a big sign telling the reader to get the security officer and have him open it and read the document inside. It was very important. Right on the safe, big sign.

After I got back to the Department, I learned that stuff never was sent to Washington. The whole battle plan we had ahead of time never got out of that embassy.

Along with this information that I had learned from the Pir and some of his connections, I also learned that this was not just to be a war in Pakistan, this was to be the start of a move to force America out of the Far East.

In other words, if this effort had been successful, it was only the first part of a total plan whereby there was to be a coup in Indonesia, which was to overthrow the right wing. You had a right wing and a left wing in Indonesia. But the left wing, the Communists, were to overthrow the right wing and move on Malaysia and move also on Vietnam, because we were having problems in Vietnam. This was '65. At the same time, they were going to get the North Koreans to move into South Korea. This was to be the first move in a broad scale effort all over Asia to force the Americans out of Asia. You know, the domino thing. All of this was being planned in Beijing.

This was not something that my ambassador wanted to hear anything about.

We boarded the ship. As it turned out, due to our socializing there, we'd gotten to know, but not realized it, the agent for Lloyd Tristino. He'd been to our home many times, and I never even thought of him. So when we decided to go by ship, I asked the travel section in the embassy to get me my reservations. Suddenly, I received a call from this guy, and he said, "You know, I'm their agent here."

I said, "Oh, I'd forgotten that."

He said, "You know your government's rules. You're going on that ship, but you're not going to have confirmation until the last minute, because you're going to have the best cabin on the ship."

It ended up, we did. It was right at the center of the ship, so the rest of the ship rolls around that position.

The voyage began in Yokohama and went all the way through to Venice; Karachi was the halfway point. The Captain's Ball was the night after we left Karachi. For my wife and me, this was our first social event aboard, all dressed up in tuxedo and fancy gown.

At the Captain's Ball, they gave away the captain's prize of a jeroboam of champagne to the winner of the elimination dance. The elimination dance was done using a bingo machine, if the number pasted to your lapel came up, you sat down. We were out there dancing, with a number on my lapel, suddenly one of the stewards came up and changed my number. I didn't even think anything about it. We're dancing along, and the numbers keep falling, and we keep dancing and we keep dancing and we keep dancing. At the end, we're the only ones left standing. So they deliver the jeroboam of champagne.

Most of the dance music being played all evening long was typical rock and roll music of the '60s. Well, I had been dancing with this Italian crowd in Karachi, including this guy (he was an Italian) who was representing Lloyd Tristino at the local hotels. I would dance with the wives, and they all liked Viennese waltzing. I can waltz and many men don't. I learned this as a young man at military school. Many people there knew I could waltz, and my wife and I waltzed often in the ball rooms of the local hotels. They then announced, "Would the winner of the jeroboam of champagne lead off the next dance?" And guess what they played the minute we got up? A waltz, the first that evening. Of course, that tipped us that this was all set up. It was a setup.

*Q: Well, why don't we stop at this point. You left in '65, and you were coming back to the Department.*

*Today is the 17th of April, 1995. This is also income tax day, because it's a Monday. Fred, we've got you leaving Pakistan in 1965. Then whiter?*

[THOMAS: In retrospect, to this point in my career, I had served in two posts as a political officer, Korea and Pakistan. In both, one faced the same problem, a lack of integrity by those in positions of power to attempt to report honestly because it either would not be welcome in Washington or it would, in the eyes of our ambassador, reflect badly on his tenure. It appears that the development of a rational effective foreign policy, based on the realities of a situation, has become the hostage of dogmatically conceived views which have been concocted to serve the narrow economic interests of the "Establishment".]

THOMAS: I returned to the department, and was told that I would be given a posting someplace in the Far East where, after all that work in language school, I could use my Chinese. Every time they went to send me someplace, there was somebody willing to quietly shoot it down. But, as you can imagine, from what I have said so far, I was not the most political guy in the world when it came to bucking the bureaucracy. I realized that, but I had a philosophy that I had to live with, that I was brought up with, and it made it impossible for me to play the smart bureaucratic game. Therefore you do step on some toes when you call a spade a spade. And every time they kept turning... And so I sat in limbo for about a year here, in sort of never-never land, just going into the office. It was like after all of us who left Vietnam, later. But in this case, it wasn't because there weren't enough jobs, it was that the jobs they had in mind kept falling through.

At last, I said, "Look, if this is going to continue, I've got kids and a wife, and I can't stay in limbo any longer. Let's give me a job."

There was an outfit known as the Office of Strategic Research, in the Department, and it had a function. There was a man whom I'd known. I'm trying to think of his name now. You know, names, after this many years... James, Jim.

As a flashback, he had been chief of the political section while I had been a student in Taiwan. And I had been told that I was going to be pulled out of language school there and sent to him to do what they call the political/military job, because they had to rewrite the Status of Forces Agreement there. I put up a hell of a fight, saying I hadn't come to this language school to have it interrupted, and I didn't want to do that, and if they insisted I come there right away, I'd just resign from the whole shebang. And so, when I said that, I remember the ambassador, Drumright, called me in. He had heard what I'd had to say, and he said, "All right, I'll give you three more months down there. In three months, you're to be up here," from the language school into that job. Well, by the time the three months were up, thank God they'd found somebody else to fill it, and I didn't have to go.

Anyway, he was back here and he was chief of the political section there, and we got to know each other, and I liked him; he liked me.

*Q: Chief of the political section in this Office of Strategic Research?*

THOMAS: No, he was in the Office of Strategic Research, one of the senior people in it by then. He said, "Fred, you've got an engineering degree, and we need somebody with an electrical engineering degree." At this time, they were spending gobs of money on the McNamara Line.

My paper, caused questioning by the economics people. I guess this wasn't the thing to be saying, because suddenly my job was switched from Switzerland; I was to go to the political section in Bonn as what they called the Asian guy, working for Jock Dean.

*Q: That's John Gunther Dean.*

THOMAS: Yes. He had a brother, David, who was a Chinese linguist.

*Q: Jagdschein being a hunting license.*

THOMAS: And very hard to come by.

*Q: Oh, yes.*

THOMAS: I enlisted Colonel DeSanto to become the co-chairman. He got some of his junior officers to become the administrative workhorses for this effort. In the end, we made a lot of money. We gave away a car, and we gave away a lot of other things at this banquet. Ford gave us an automobile to give away in a raffle; it was a big moneymaker.

Out of this, I'd become somewhat popular with the school administration. Chuck Wootton wanted me to re-up and stay on. But I wanted to get back to East Asia and Chinese, because here China had just opened up.

*Q: Nixon had made his visit there in, what was it?*

THOMAS: In 1971. China had opened up. I'd learned Chinese, and I wanted to get back to East Asia and China. In response to every inquiry, came the answer that all the slots were already filled. You've been away from the China crowd for a while. You'll have to come back and do your stint in Vietnam. Because that's where everybody was going. So I thought, well, that's fine.

I gave up this pleasant job, drinking wine on the Rhine and going around Germany and having a good time. Relatively, it was the most pleasant post I've ever had. It wasn't high excitement, but it was fun.

*Q: I have a long interview that I did with Terry McNamara, who was the consul general in Can-tho, and essentially he was left alone. The CIA took care of their own and left, and he more or less had to line up things. So he got out on his own.*

THOMAS: I'll tell you why. I was at the embassy at the time; I pulled the ICCS out of Can-tho long before... The only reason they didn't want to pull anybody out was because it would look like the place was falling. This was Martin's own doing, so he insisted everybody stay in place. You couldn't even ship your wife out unless you did it with your own money. The place was seething with anger because people wanted their wives and children out of there. Mine were the first to come in, but then they allowed others in. It was a terrible situation.

*Q: You left when, and when did it fall?*

THOMAS: I left on April 4th, and it fell on the 28th.

*Q: Where did you go?*

THOMAS: I flew to Hong Kong and stayed in Hong Kong a while. I was so worried about friends there and people there, you know, Americans and other people, that I just didn't want to leave. But I'd been ordered to go. I even volunteered to stay, but wasn't allowed to. Hong Kong was a little too expensive, so we then went on to Taiwan, and stayed there for a while. Nobody was pushing to get me back to the States.

*Q: They had too many people.*

THOMAS: Laos had already fallen, and there were all these people out of Laos. I stayed in Taiwan for a while. I think we spent three weeks in Asia, until the fall. I saw some friends, I think, in Tokyo, who had gotten out as it fell. Then we came on back to the States and stayed for a while on the West Coast with my brother-in-law and sister. I talked to people who got out right at the end, but it didn't get any better. The realism.

Thank God for a few people there like Snepp, Moorefield, Hays and Lacy Wright. I think they received some medals out of it. They deserved them because they were the ones who really organized to get things moving.

Our effort was the first, the attachés and my meeting with General Smith started the airlift that moved non-official Americans. Without that early start many Americans would have been endangered. But, there were still a lot of people left behind, who paid the price for our inept policies.

*Q: Then what did you do?*

THOMAS: The Department, nobody wanted me back here. Nobody wanted any of us back here. When I got back, I went into the Department, and I was told to stay on leave, administrative leave, which meant you didn't pay for it. We couldn't keep staying with relatives. We decided get back into our own house. There were no jobs at the Department. The oil crisis was still brewing. It was the mid-'70s, late '70s, and they had all these research projects going, on petroleum and the shortage of oil. I was sent out to do that. It was just make-work. I ended up doing research on oil, going out to the Department of Energy. I had these clearances, and these clearances let me go to a lot of places and see a lot of documents. But it was no job, really.

I kicked around with nothing really to do. They talked about giving me some more Chinese to bring my Chinese back, there was no job in Beijing at the time.

I was a year in limbo with no real job. It was more than that. They ended up giving me a research INR type job, which was dullsville, sort of intelligence analysis, which I found not my thing.

Desai had taken over in India, and they thought there was a big break in India, with Desai in.

*Q: Desai was the new president who replaced Indira Gandhi.*

*Q: You were in Delhi from when to when?*

THOMAS: I arrived there in, let's say, October of '77, and departed in June of '78. I had the school year with my kids there.

Goheen had left on home leave; I went in to make my final call on Arch Blood; I apologized for not having accomplished anything, in terms of my job there. He said, "Oh, you've accomplished a lot. What you did for this commissary and the morale here has been worth, you know..."

I took off for Washington. There was no real job back here, really. They kept kicking me from pillar to post. Suddenly, at a Christmas party here, I met someone from a large corporation; he heard I was a China linguist and that I was looking around; I was sort of fed up with bureaucracy. He said he thought he could line up a job with his corporation, and a new big contract they had in China. This was the winter of '78, Christmas time, and I listened to him.

In the spring of '79, I just decided I'd had it. I retired in June, with no written commitment, but an oral commitment, that I would be hired by this company to go to China for them.

Just as I retired, the Chinese pulled the rug out from under this company and a lot of others. They got scared they were spending too much money, and they cancelled all these contracts. I'd retired, suddenly, into what I thought was going to be a job. It wasn't a job, because it disappeared.

I tried to start a consulting business on China. I was just getting started, when I was hit from the rear in a terrible automobile accident. It was two to three years before I came out of the shock from that, the trauma.

I said, "Well, what the hell. I'm going to enjoy my retirement." I became involved in local political affairs.

That was pretty much my State Department career.

*Q: Well, I want to thank you very much. Fred. This has been very illuminating.*

**JOHN J. TAYLOR**  
**Chinese Language Training/Political Officer**  
**Taichung (1960-1965)**

*John J. Taylor was born in Arkansas and attended Vanderbilt University before joining the US Marine Corps and eventually the Foreign Service. Overseas Taylor served in Ghana, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, South Africa and Cuba. He also served in INR, the NSC, as the deputy assistant secretary for intelligence coordination and as the chief of mission in Cuba. Taylor was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.*

*Q: Were you at all concerned that you might end up in a Spanish speaking area?*

TAYLOR: I think an assignment to Latin America or Spain never entered my head. When I passed the Spanish language test, I had already been assigned to Chinese language training. I went out one door at FSI and in another.

*Q: Had you ever tried to learn Chinese on your own?*

TAYLOR: I was a complete neophyte when I entered Chinese language training.

*Q: You went to FSI first?*

TAYLOR: Right - for nine or ten months.

*Q: What was that like?*

TAYLOR: We covered the waterfront pretty much – both reading and speaking. In the first

month, we concentrated on spoken Chinese. Then we began the infernal memorization of characters. Three of us made up the class. It was a good experience in every way. The teachers were excellent. It's pretty hard to be enthusiastic day after day teaching your language to neophytes, but our Chinese teachers did it with great spirit.

*Q: At the time, we had not recognized the PRC. Did you expect that we would do so or did you think you would be tied to Honk Kong or Taipei?*

TAYLOR: I went into Chinese affairs because I was convinced that US relations with the PRC would eventually become one of the most critical elements in our foreign policy. I had no doubt that the role of China in the world would grow geometrically. I also knew that some day we would recognize the PRC and all the old Consulates would open up. I knew the day would come when I would be working on the mainland of China.

*Q: Do you remember who your fellow students were?*

TAYLOR: One was Marty Gale, a Foreign Service officer who had been vice-consul in Monaco. He had become well acquainted with Grace Kelly, lucky dog. Through that fortunate connection he was, while in Chinese training, offered a job managing some investments of the Prince and Grace in Bermuda. He resigned from the Service. I think he ended up as an advisor to the Bermuda government and Monaco as well. I never heard of him again. I suppose he's retired now and playing lawn bowls somewhere on the islands and having kippers for breakfast.

The other student was a young CIA officer. After completing the time at FSI, the two of us went to Taichung, Taiwan to continue the two-year course. The CIA chap also soon resigned and left government service. So, I was the only one of the three who stayed in the Foreign Service.

After the completion of language training, I was assigned to our embassy in Taipei as a political officer. Consequently, I spent the last few months learning Taiwanese, which, of course, is also a Chinese dialect.

*Q: You were in Taichung essentially for eighteen months. You were there when Kennedy became president. Did that raise expectations?*

TAYLOR: Yes, especially for those planning to work in Chinese affairs. We had high hopes that there would soon be recognition of the PRC - or at least some serious rapprochement between the U.S. and China.

*Q: Did you learn something from your teachers about the situation on Taiwan and in the PRC?*

TAYLOR: The faculty represented a wide variety of experiences and viewpoints. Of course, no one was pro-communist. But we did hear a lot about the mainland; most of the faculty had come from there with the Peoples Liberation Army hot on their tail. We had only one teacher who was Taiwan born.

*Q: During the election campaign, a vigorous debate arose about Quemoy and Matsu. Was that*

*an issue while you were in language training?*

TAYLOR: Naturally, it was a major issue. This was soon after the Quemoy crisis of 1958. At that time, tensions ran high across the Strait and it appeared that war could break out. The language school students made a trip to Quemoy. In those days, the two sides were shelling each other every other day. Wisely, they picked the same day. An old Nationalist Air Force plane flew us onto the island on one of the off days. We explored the extensive fortifications that had been cut into the granite mountain that formed the core of the island. It was striking. It was evident, however, that militarily, Quemoy was not important to Taiwan. It might have provided some early warning if an invasion of the big island was in the planned stage, but it was real estate that primarily had political importance. For Chiang Kai-shek, Quemoy and Matsu were part of the mainland and thus their occupation rationalized his claim to be the leader still of all China. Despite the crisis of 1958, the islands were also important to Mao. Although Mao saw the islands occupied by his enemies with US support as an affront, they also provided a valuable link for him to Taiwan. Thus he probably was content with Chiang's occupation.

*Q: While in school, did you get much information about what was going on the mainland?*

TAYLOR: While attending FSI, we had very good lecturers - academics like Harold Hinton. They would speak to us - Hinton in a machine-gun delivery - on the economic and political situation in the PRC. Even more important, perhaps, was the reading, both assigned and self-selected... I started to read everything I could lay my hands on about China, but especially about contemporary China. I started a pretty good library on Chinese affairs; it now contains hundreds of books.

*Q: Did your wife also take language training?*

TAYLOR: We had two young children, so it was not possible when we were in Washington. When we arrived in Taichung she began to take classes. We paid for these private lessons. Today, they are provided to spouses free. We had Chinese servants - a maid/nanny, a cook, and his wife. None of them spoke any English at all; so Betsy's Chinese became very good. She is fluent still today, but does not read Chinese.

*Q: Who was our ambassador in Taipei at the time?*

TAYLOR: At first, it was Everett Drumright. During the 1940s, he was a relatively junior China specialist who survived the McCarthy era unscathed because he was so young and because he had not been critical of Chiang Kai-shek or the Nationalists in his reporting. Most senior China specialists, like John Service, were of course highly critical of Chiang and naïve about the intentions of the communists. Drumright became ambassador in 1958. He held the view that our support of Chiang Kai-shek was critical to U.S. security interests in the Far East. That, he believed, was the overriding consideration. The regime's internal policies, which included suppression of any political opposition, constituted a domestic question in which, he believed, we should not get involved. In our confrontation with the PRC, we needed the support of the Nationalists in such things as intelligence, but more importantly in the event of war with China, Taiwan would be a key strategic asset and a valuable political ally. Whether or not we liked the KMT's domestic policies was beside the point, he thought. Admiral Alan Kirk succeeded

Drumright in July 1962. Kirk was a good old salt who had been in command of the allied naval forces on D-day, but he lasted only seven months due to bad health. Another former admiral, Jerauld Wright, replaced him.

*Q: You said that in the last six months you concentrated on learning Taiwanese. How different is that from Mandarin or other Chinese dialects?*

TAYLOR: It is something like the difference between Portuguese and Spanish. There is a commonality that allows people to have a limited understanding of each other's speech. They are different languages; although once you know one, it is of course much easier to learn the other.

I did have some difficulty switching after 18 months of Mandarin to Taiwanese. But I was looking forward to the assignment in the political section, my main mission being to cover Taiwanese politics and local affairs. The Taiwan provincial assembly met not too far from Taichung, so while still at the school I made a point of meeting a good number of assembly members. I invited a few to our house for dinners and once a good number for a large reception. I don't remember asking the embassy's permission to proceed with these social occasions, the purpose of which was to make contacts for my forthcoming job. I just went ahead.

*Q: Did you get the impression during your tour in Taichung that the Taiwanese were "second class" citizens with the mainlanders who had fled to Taiwan calling all the shots?*

TAYLOR: The history of the Taiwanese under Kuomintang (KMT) rule had been up to that point quite tragic. In 1947, the Nationalists brutally suppressed a Taiwanese uprising, killing about 28,000 Taiwanese. In the 1949-50 period, as the Nationalists fled to Taiwan, KMT security services executed several thousand other native Taiwanese suspected to be opponents of KMT rule. These were traumatic experiences, which have not been forgotten almost 65 years later. When I arrived on Taiwan in 1960, no open political dissent was allowed. The mainlanders, who had come with Chiang in 1949, dominated the government, the military, the police, and the strong public economic sector, which controlled all infrastructure but also a number of major industries. In the Nationalist military in 1960, no native Taiwanese had obtained the rank above captain.

The Taiwanese were an oppressed majority. It was just a fact of life. No one thought anything could be done about it for the foreseeable future. I reported on the views of the Taiwanese political leaders and other Taiwanese elite in business, church, etc. The KMT allowed independent candidates to run for local elections but not to form opposition parties. A couple of nominal parties from the mainland days still existed in the Legislative Yuan (the central parliament), but under martial law only the KMT could operate on Taiwan. In effect, the independents formed an opposition to the ruling party. I got to know a good number of these independent politicians even before I left Taichung.

*Q: Was the junior member of the political staff usually assigned to cover domestic politics in Taiwan?*

TAYLOR: It was either the embassy or more likely the China desk back in Washington that

suggested that I study Taiwanese as well as Mandarin. This followed a decision to assign a junior officer in the political section to follow native Taiwanese affairs.

The new mayor of Kaohsiung, Henry Kao, was typical of the local opposition politician who operated within the rules and ran for office as an independent. That the KMT allowed him to win was considered at the time quite extraordinary. Chiang Ching-kuo, who was Chiang Kai-shek's son and then responsible for internal security as well as covert operations against the mainland, had been convinced by Kao to allow him to assign monitors to every polling station to insure a fair outcome. Kao thus became the first non-KMT mayor on Taiwan. I got to know him quite well. In private, he would condemn the KMT for its dictatorial and authoritarian ways as well as for its policies that kept native Taiwanese out of government, the public sector, and the military. Still, he was careful not to condemn President Chiang Kai-shek or the grand policy of returning to or "counterattacking" the mainland. Of course, he did not mention the subject of Taiwanese independence. That was far beyond the "pale."

Nevertheless, even in the early 1960s, one could detect the emergence of a group of island-born politicians who saw a path for themselves to position and influence in local and provincial affairs, and down the road possibly something more - provided of course they did not step over the boundaries set by the two Chiangs and the KMT.

*Q: During this 1962-65 period, what was the embassy's attitude towards this emerging native political movement? Did we see it essentially as a Taiwan internal issue or were we concerned that the Taiwanese might try to establish some kind of relationships with the PRC?*

TAYLOR: In the 1960s the chemistry of US-Taiwan relations began to change. President Kennedy was elected in 1960 and ran into difficulties almost immediately in our relations with the Soviet Union. The debacle of the invasion of Cuba was a bad start to say the least. Looking around to recoup and perhaps interested in the subject, the Administration began to consider the state of democracy around the world and what today we refer to as "human rights." This involved taking a hard look at civil liberties even in dictatorial countries that were our allies, like Taiwan. The new "look" in America's world posture had an impact on the embassy's priorities, even when we still had an ambassador (Drumwright) who was completely sold on Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT. Still, the Kennedy people began to make it known to the KMT that it had a strong interest in civil rights and democracy.

For many years, the embassy kept its distance from the budding Taiwanese opposition, not even showing moral support whenever they ran afoul of the government and were locked up. But with Kennedy's election, the embassy started to pay greater attention to these people and to the attitudes of the Taiwanese people in general. As I said, my assignment was a new one for the embassy, and reflected this new interest, and very likely an instruction from Washington.

*Q: Was there any concern that the Taiwanese, if they ever were to take power, might take a different position on foreign policy issues?*

TAYLOR: Ambassador Drumright worried that if the Taiwanese ever took control, the staunch anti-communist line of the KMT would be watered down and Taiwan could even try to adopt a

somewhat neutral position. Drumright believed that if a free and fair election was held on the island, the KMT would lose and the Taiwanese opposition would take charge. He was wary of the opposition's stand on the Cold War and China; at best he thought its position was unpredictable, at worst, it would be opportunist. He saw the Republic of China as a very important U.S. partner - and an unsinkable aircraft carrier - in the Far East. This contribution, he thought, was vital in the Cold War and in the containment of the PRC.

In 1961, a Taiwan magazine called *The Free China Review* became increasingly liberal in its editorial content. It was supported by the Republic of China's most famous intellectual, Hu Shih, who had been ambassador to the U.S. during the early part of the war with Japan. After 1949, Hu remained in New York. His magazine began to call for democratic reform on Taiwan. About this time, an informal collection of intellectuals and non-party politicians that shared these views soon formed an informal study group. It included a mainlander named Lei Chen, editor of *Free China Review*, and the Taiwanese Mayor of Taipei, Henry Kao. They and others discussed the possibility of forming a political opposition party. Lei and one of his associates were arrested one night and charged with sedition. The associate was also accused of being a communist agent. The whole affair was handled with a heavy hand by the authorities. The charges were clearly trumped up and the court had already made up its mind before the trial began. That was not surprising in light of the KMT's track record on opposition parties. The "plotters" were sentenced to long jail time.

The Department sent a cable to Drumright instructing him to make representations on behalf of Lei Chen. He was told to make it clear to Chiang Kai-shek in no uncertain terms that we did not take kindly to his high-handed methods in suppressing democratic opposition. This was the first such lecture the Department had thought of sending to the Gimo since 1950. The ambassador was told to point out to the Gimo that the draconian police measures then commonly practiced in Taiwan might well lead to events like those in Korea that had recently ended with the ouster of Syngman Rhee. Drumright did not follow his instructions; rather, he sent a reply to Washington that pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek would pay no attention to our jawboning in this fashion because he knew that if free and fair elections were to be upheld, the KMT would be defeated. Therefore, neither he nor his son would neither allow such elections nor a formal opposition. That was certainly true, but Drumright went on to paint a dire future for U.S.-Taiwan relations if the KMT was ousted from power, a regime that he considered to be the lynch pin of our East Asia policy.

The Department did not answer Drumright, but soon thereafter Admiral Alan Kirk replaced him. Kirk had been in charge of naval operations on D-Day under Eisenhower. He was selected for the Taiwan job by the Kennedy administration because, in its view, the main challenge in the Far East at this point was not the internal situation in Taiwan and the future of democracy there, but rather events on the mainland after the debacle of the "Great Leap Forward." We know now of course that that this utopian effort by Mao was a miserable failure resulting in millions of deaths by starvation. At this time, thousands upon thousands of Chinese were fleeing the PRC for Hong Kong. For many KMT old timers on Taiwan there suddenly seemed the real possibility of a successful "counterattack" that would take them back to the mainland. In any case, Chiang Kai-shek at the least had to appear to be girding up for the vaunted attack in order to appease his military and other mainlander supporters. He felt had to make it appear that he was seriously

preparing for an invasion of the mainland. The ROC military did begin to make plans and discuss the various possibilities - e.g. a direct attack by sea or one through Burma. Military exercises were held and the CIA station chief at the time, Ray Cline, lobbied back in Washington for US support of a KMT move on the PRC. But it was fairly clear to most of us in the political section that despite all of the KMT military activity, Chiang did not intend actually to lead an attack without all-out US involvement.

Cline had an unusual relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son. The two men seemed to agree completely on political and strategic matters; in fact, they probably agreed on most things. The two used to go on bashes together at night. Some said that they even looked alike. So, Ray became a stout defender of the regime usually urging Washington to go along with whatever Chiang Kai-shek wanted – at the least to supply him more military equipment and supplies in order to mollify his demands for action.

Kirk was appointed ambassador because he was a distinguished elder and senior military officer and therefore in theory should have been compatible with Chiang. Furthermore, his naval expertise included leadership of the momentous Normandy landing. Soon after his arrival, he called on Chiang and forcefully stated the U.S. position on the prospect of invading the mainland. He said he had been involved in a major invasion by sea and he knew that to be successful, the invader had to have enormous and overwhelming resources, particularly manpower on the order of the numerical advantage the Allies had when they invaded Normandy. He laid out what in his view would be required for a successful attack on the mainland. It was obvious the KMT did not have these kinds of resources. Kirk bluntly added that the United States would in no way become involved in either the invasion of the mainland or in repulsing a follow-up PRC “counter-attack.” After that conversation, Chiang refused to see Kirk ever again. Kirk had to leave six or seven months after his arrival for health reasons.

*Q: Did people at your level take the Chiang threats seriously?*

TAYLOR: Most of us at the junior level were more skeptical than the senior officers. Ray Cline, as I said, took it very seriously and even supported the idea of an invasion. The Ambassador and the Department had to take the Gimo's threats seriously and had to prepare counter-arguments. In the summer of 1962, President Kennedy made an important statement about the situation in the Taiwan Strait; he said publicly that the U.S. would not support any kind of military action across the Strait.

But Chiang continued to raise the issue and in 1965, the rhetoric again reached a high point. Cline by that time was back in Washington as the DDI (deputy director for intelligence) at the CIA. Ray had a very close relationship with McCone, then the CIA Director. Again, he used his influence to try to get the U.S. government to support Chiang's aspirations at least at some level. Washington did cooperate in very limited military actions in an effort to placate Chiang - and the CIA. For example, we supported the dropping of several 100-man parachute commando units. It was Chiang's purported idea that these groups would provide intelligence on whether the population might rise up against the communist government, especially given the poor economic circumstances on the mainland. Several teams were dropped, but the PLA quickly wiped them out.

But the issue of a ROC invasion of the mainland kept coming up, even in 1965 and 1966 when Johnson was president. In 1965, as the Vietnam war heated up, the Gimo's proposal was to invade southwest China. The argument was that that this would secure our position in Vietnam by blocking further assistance from the PRC to the Viet Cong. This proposal again had the strong support of Cline and the CIA. At one stage, Chiang proposed sending Nationalist troops to Vietnam. The Department and the Joint Chiefs rejected that proposal over the objections of Cline and the CIA.

*Q: While you were there, was Ray Cline considered to be extreme?*

TAYLOR: You have to remember that in the 1950s, our relations with the Nationalists were conducted primarily by the CIA. Our ambassador knew little of what either the CIA or the military were doing. Sometimes he learned about these matter from the Nationalists. So, Ray's position was not unusual.

The CIA station and Chiang Ching-kuo's organizations dreamed up a number of operations that turned out to be debacles. Most ideas of course were scuttled. The Nationalists usually ended up with some new military equipment to keep them happy. These activities, those actually carried out and those aborted, kept the ROC special operation troops busy and well fed. Sometimes, however, these schemes had serious consequences. For example, a CIA covert operation from Taiwan to stir up insurgency in Tibet took place in 1958-59 - that is it predated the Tibetan uprising of late 1959. The only result was the death of a lot of Tibetans. Another joint ROC/CIA covert operation sought to stir up an uprising on one of Indonesia's main islands. This adventure also was a fiasco. The Indonesians shot down and captured an American pilot named Pope. Washington suddenly reversed course and began wooing the Indonesian military by sending them modern military equipment and weapons.

*Q: Was there the usual division in the political section between junior and senior officers, with the younger staff looking at the KMT as a relic of history?*

TAYLOR: I reported on native Taiwanese affairs and therefore had to explain their point of view. Thus, I came to understand their complaints against the regime more than others in the Embassy. I reported extensively on the absence of democratic practices on Taiwan and how the KMT manipulated political life on the island, suppressing all important public dissent. Private dissent, however, was quite common. This was the fundamental difference between Nationalist rule and that of the Communists. The mainlander population made up 15% of the island population and yet they completely dominated the police and the military establishment as well as the state economic sectors. I wrote reports on this situation, which the embassy forwarded to Washington. I was in the embassy only a short period before Kirk replaced Drumright. The DCM was Ralph Clough - an very open and supportive Chinese-language officer. The Taipei government lodged protests on several occasions about my activities. It was particularly suspicious of my meetings with the Taiwanese opposition or "non-party" politicians. The ambassador or the DCM would tell me about the protests, but I was never instructed to cease and desist. I always assumed that in these meetings the conversation was being taped. Often that was true.

I believe by 1962 the Department accepted that KMT-mainlander dominance could not last forever. We had to pay more attention to future Taiwanese leaders. I think it was in 1961 that the ambassador was first instructed to remonstrate with the KMT about its suppression of Taiwanese aspirations, but the Gimo told him to forget it. By the time I arrived, we would delicately raise this delicate issue only when some serious act of police suppression took place - which by then was very seldom.

*Q: Were you able to give leader grants to Taiwanese?*

TAYLOR: We did. Unlike in the 1950s, Washington possessed some collective level of understanding of the Taiwanese position and how this might affect the prospects for long term stability. And, as I said, in terms of cold-war policy, the new Administration believed it was in American interests to begin to pay more attention to human rights. Thus, we selected people like Mayor Henry Kau for U.S. study grants. When Kau came up for re-election in 1965 or 1966, the government refused to provide poll watchers; that discouraged him enough so that he didn't run for re-election. He did run again later at the end of the 1960s. We made informal demarches to the Nationalist government at various levels to encourage the government to allow more open and transparent elections. During my tour, the policy of encouraging greater political say for the Taiwanese began. It was still limited, but at least the initial steps were taken.

A local politician named K'ang Ning-hsiang, who at one time worked in a gas station, was the first independent politician to be elected to the national assembly, called the Legislative Yuan. K'ang was also the type of oppositionist we tried to encourage. Twenty years later, after opposition parties were allowed, K'ang would be one the moderate leaders of the Democratic Progressive Party. Originally, the Nationalists had refused to have new elections to the Legislative Yuan. As mentioned before, a provincial assembly existed that was made up mostly of native Taiwanese. But the Legislative Yuan (LY) left little real power to the assembly, the two bodies in effect legislated for the same territory and population. But the Yuan passed the principal laws of the land and controlled the bulk of government spending. In the mid 1960s, the KMT decided to allow some supplementary elections to the L.Y, and this allowed a handful of Taiwanese to become members. K'ang Ning-hsiang was one of those.

By the mid-1960s, Chiang Ching-kuo was not only his father's right hand and his eyes and ears, but he was also as well the brains of the party. Chiang Kai-shek's health was failing, and this left more and more of the burden of government to the son. It was during this period that Chiang Ching-kuo and some of the more progressive elements that had long been associated with him decided that the KMT had to take a longer-range view of its future. It had to look beyond the slogan of returning to the mainland. It was Ching-kuo's view and that of some of his inner coterie that the KMT was likely to be stuck on Taiwan for the indefinite future, and thus it had to move away gradually from its authoritarian rule. The goal was eventually to become a more open and democratic institution, and eventually even be able to win a free and open election.

Ching-kuo's new approach had Washington's support. As events moved along, we increased the jawboning about the need for the KMT to ease its authoritarian ways. The reformers under Ching-kuo felt that the KMT could for many years keep political control on the island while

allowing greater Taiwanese participation in political life and a more open society overall. They wanted this reform process to take a long while, during which time the mainlanders would keep control, but they also recognized that eventually, the Taiwanese would control the KMT and the government. This was, at the time, all theoretical but it was a profoundly important change in thinking - the leaders-to be of the dictatorial KMT regime were informally but decidedly embracing the principle of real reform and the eventual target: popular democracy. As Alex De Tocqueville said, despotism is in its greatest danger when it is reforming itself.

*Q: Were we seeing Chiang Ching-kuo as a new broom or just the old broom in a different disguise?*

TAYLOR: Our views of Ching-kuo began to change around 1965 when he made another trip to the U.S. He was then defense minister. Until then, he was viewed as principally the enforcer of his father's dictates, including the brutal suppression of dissent. But during this visit to the U.S., he talked about a new position on Taiwan's relationship with the PRC that was a clear departure from the standard catechism. It was a position which was much more acceptable to us. He said that in the long run it was still the KMT's fervent hope to return to the mainland, but he realized that this might not happen in his life time. Of course, the goal could not be abandoned, he said, but for the foreseeable future his government's focus would be on Taiwan and its economic and political growth.

Ching-kuo's idea was to make Taiwan such a model of economic and political success that its example would put enormous pressure on the mainland to follow suit. After 1965, that is in fact what the Taipei government focused on: first, economic development, and then in a much slower manner political liberalization. The reformers envisioned many careful steps forward, some to the side, and some backward, but in the final analysis, popular democracy was the direction the Nationalists followed thereafter. Chiang Ching-kuo and his friends thought they could complete the process in twenty years. Quite amazingly, they had that amount of time and, helped by events on and outside the island, they did it.

*Q: How good was our intelligence about events on the mainland?*

TAYLOR: The CIA of course had close ties to the Nationalist intelligence apparatus, run by Chiang Ching-kuo. But neither the Department nor the CIA paid much attention to the human intelligence that the Nationalists were collecting. It was not considered reliable. Sometimes it was fabricated. What was most valuable for us was the open monitoring of China's media by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). The National Security Agency also had facilities on Taiwan for other signals intercepts. Information from this source - the NSA - was highly useful to the military but seldom provided political insights.

By this time, we were running U-2 flights over the mainland. This was a program Ray Cline had successfully pushed. The U-2s first spotted China's secret nuclear weapons facilities in the far northwest. Nationalist pilots flew these spy planes, but the CIA controlled the operations. The latter was something of a sore point with the Nationalist Air Force. Two or three planes and their pilots were lost. All of these intelligence operations were as far as the Nationalists were concerned under the command of Chiang Ching-kuo.

We had wide range of exchanges with Nationalist intelligence on what seemed to be going on the mainland. By the mid-1960s, they were much more objective about events within the PRC and on the mainland. That change reflected Chiang Ching-kuo's influence. In the early 1960s, for example, the Nationalists viewed the Sino-Soviet split as a great farce - a deliberate effort to mislead the West. This was CKS' idea. In the mid-1960s, Ching-kuo developed his own think tank staffed by American-trained political scientists, and they produced a much more sophisticated analysis. When I went back to the Department assigned to INR, I covered Taiwanese matters as well as Chinese external affairs. I was involved in these exchanges with the Nationalists and I thought they were useful.

*Q: By the time you left Taiwan in 1965, what were your thoughts about the island's future?*

TAYLOR: I believed that eventually - sooner rather than later - the political opposition would come to the fore and native Taiwanese would take over the government. I did not know how this change would take place - peacefully or not - but I was sure it was coming, probably within ten or twelve years. I felt that the U.S. should take a longer-range view of events on Taiwan and do more than it was doing to foster a political situation on the island that would allow the transition to take place peacefully and democratically. Well, I was off a decade, but US actions did eventually push the KMT toward political reform. This push, however, came not so much from jawboning and threats of sanctions as from our steps toward détente with the mainland beginning in 1971.

**FRANCIS J. TATU**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1961-1962)**

*Francis J. Tatu was born in New York in 1929. He served in the US Navy from 1946-1952. Afterwards, he received his bachelor's degree from University of California in 1955. His career includes positions in Hong Kong, Laos, Taiwan, Philippines, Thailand, Washington D.C., Nepal, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, and Australia. Mr. Tatu was interviewed by Susan Klingaman in October 2000.*

*Q: So to Chinese language training in Taiwan. Tell me about that.*

TATU: This was a wonderful situation from my point of view. We lived in this relatively little town, Tajj Chung. We lived in Chinese-style houses. Actually there were a little more Japanese style because the Japanese administrators had lived in them: *Shoji* screens and *tatami*, you know. Everybody took off their shoes on entering because the floors were covered with *tatami* and we sat on popillows on the floors. They had little contained gardens. It was very nice, a nice situation. Our school, which was an old rundown mess of a building, had a lot of character. We had as our director - "ShauoChang" was the title - a scholar named Howard Levy, who is famed in Far Eastern ranks.

He was a very dedicated scholar, and he had a number of books out, one on “Yang Gway Fay, court favorites of an illustrious celestial” the most famous courtesan in Chinese history, and he was also somewhat of a libertine. He had a book out on Chinese ribald jokes and a book on Taoist sex practices, which is very pertinent stuff. We had, therefore, the school itself, a tradition of very heavy drinking and partying. As a senior you would frown on that, but at the time it was a good way to get to know the people. For example, we had field trips once a month. Soon after I arrived there was a field trip, and we went first to a Chinese cigarette factory. There was great hilarity as everybody feigned trying to find the Chinese *Carmen*. To amuse us and they were making yard-long cigarettes. Howard had the ability. He was wonderful at the language, and really good with people. Then we went to a Chinese wine factory for lunch. That was total disaster because in the Chinese tradition, you know, you are required to toast each other and then each dish in the repast. And the drinking is very heavy. My gosh by the time we were out of there everybody seemed to be roaring drunk. Then we went for a briefing by the MAAG, by the U.S. military, and the briefing officer said, “Just your breathing in here, as a result of you guys, is enough to knock me out.”

That’s an example, but I’m thinking of this demonstration and parade in town also. Once Howard instructed us and we all had to line up on a certain street corner in Tai Chung on a Saturday morning. It turned out we were going to march in a Buddhist parade. There were a lot of American missionaries in the area, and here we were marching along with our Buddhist flags, and suddenly there’s a whole group of missionaries and they looked very startled at this.

*Q: Did they realize that you were American diplomats?*

TATU: Oh, yes, they knew who we were. The school was very well- known.

*Q: How many students were there in the school?*

TATU: I think at that time we had about 15, from all different agencies. We also had a compulsory sports program, “A sound Mind in a sound body;” we had to play baseball. Howard’s favorite Chinese saint was called Madzu, who is famous in the Chinese litany. On one occasion we were playing an Air Force team and they seemed to be badly beating us. Howard had given each of us Madzu medals. He took his medal out on the pitcher’s mound, got down on his knees, and began praying to Madzu. Whereupon suddenly a heavy rain broke out and the game was called.

*Q: That’s what he was praying for.*

TATU: One of the Air Force guys said, “We thought we were playing diplomats, not a bunch of witch doctors.” The next time that we played them, in the make-up game, we beat them anyway. There was always something going on. Howard also wrote a book on footbinding (reviewed by *Time* magazine, thank you). Once we all broke out of class and he had people bringing in little old ladies with the bound feet, putting them up on the table in our recreation room to inspect their feet. On another occasion he had one of our guys all pinned down with acupuncture. That’s the kind of emersion that’s really, really good.

*Q: You got right into the culture, steeped in it, literally steeped in the alcohol of it. How did you do in learning Chinese?*

TATU: Oh, very well. I graduated with 3-4. That was over 30 years ago, but I can still initiate and maintain a conversation in Chinese.

*Q: From just one year? Well, you had started in Hong Kong.*

TATU: Two years. Actually, they held me over because they wanted me to learn what is called “grass”- that’s scriptive Chinese. In the meantime I had the opportunity to go to Saigon and I was enthusiastic about that prospect, but Howard wouldn’t let me go. By the time this was resolved we had a new director, actually a missionary by the name of Jerry Cox. He decreed that there would be no more drinking in the school and restricted all these practices. He wanted everybody to calm down. (When Howard left Tai Chung we hired a funeral band to see him off.) In the meantime Howard had gone off to Korea to open a language school there. The message came back; “I think it would be cheaper, rather than teaching the Americans Korean, to teach all the Koreans English.” Anyway, the short of this matter was the *grass* training didn’t work out, but because of being held over, I missed a number of fairly attractive assignments, and that’s when I went to the Philippines.

**LOUIS P. GOELZ**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1961-1966)**

*Louis P. Goelz was born in Philadelphia on February 25, 1927. After military service he graduated from La Salle College and Georgetown University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1955. He served in Lima, Hong Kong, Sao Paulo Belen Para, Mexico City, Nuevo Laredo, Tehran, and Seoul. He also served at INR, and the Visa Office and was assigned to the NATO Defense College for a year. He retired in 1992 and was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in July 1992 and February, 1993.*

GOELZ: '61. I went out to Hong Kong. I was assigned to Hong Kong to a consular position and I stayed in Hong Kong until 1966, about that time.

*Q: Hong Kong is sort of unique in the visa business. Could you explain what the situation was during this particular period?*

GOELZ: This particular period in the beginning was very unique because we were running a refugee program, as well, and actually it was the consular section that was issuing the papers, and running the program. We didn't have RP in those days, or anything remotely resembling it.

*Q: RP is the Bureau of Refugee Affairs.*

GOELZ: So we were tasked to handle it. It was a program that had been inaugurated by President Kennedy, and had a lot of urgency attached to it -- I believe for political reasons but the idea was to issue as many Chinese visas as was possible. The workload was heavy. We used to have to work sometimes 10 hours a day, 6 or 7 days a week to keep up with the workload that was dumped on us.

*Q: Where would the pressure be coming from to issue Chinese visas? Because there never had been a humongous voting Chinese lobby the way there was, for example, for Italy.*

GOELZ: I agree, but there was some pressure being brought, mostly from California. There was political pressure being brought to bear against the White House, and the White House was responding to it. They wanted that program started, and they wanted it done as soon as possible.

*Q: Who were the refugees?*

GOELZ: Most people in Hong Kong were refugees at that particular period of time, and anybody who left the Mainland at any time who could qualify at certain dates and circumstances involved. Anybody could qualify; the fortunate or unfortunate part of...the problem was that most of our local employees qualified, and went to the States.

*Q: Fraud was not a major problem?*

GOELZ: Oh, it was a very big problem in Hong Kong, and in all Chinese cases. A lot of fraud, of course, concerning citizenship and the issuance of passports, and passport applications. During the time that I was in Hong Kong I spent the first six months to a year in the immigrant visa section working on these refugee cases. After that I headed the passport unit because we were falling behind in our evaluation of citizenship cases. A lot of that concerned fraud, of course, and we had investigative services. We also had there an investigative unit, the only one in the world dealing directly with immigration fraud at that time. We had about 10-12 Chinese investigators who worked for us. We also had what we called "outside men" who were sort of informers and undercover investigators for us. I headed that unit myself for about two years supervising the investigations into fraudulent citizenship, and visa entitlements. It was a very interesting sideline.

*Q: Well on this, I've heard stories about raids on peoples' places in order to catch their briefing book, or whatever.*

GOELZ: Right. This happened earlier on. By the time I got there and got appointed as chief...one of the reasons I was placed as head of the section was because they wanted to put a new aspect to the whole situation. The local Hong Kong government had been unhappy with what was going on because it violated the rights of those under British authority and even the British nationals who were resident there. They were not real happy. It got to the point, when I took over the unit that we were not allowed to go and visit anybody's place of residence. This was done either by our investigators who got permission from the people they were checking on, or by our "outside men" who would investigate sub rosa to see what the situation was. It was a very interesting

time, and the work was extremely interesting because it was very different.

There is one aspect of it that might be especially notable. That was that this particular unit over a period of years had a list of all the villages in Toishan especially, but also in several of the other counties around Hong Kong where most of the Chinese going to the United States came from. In these villages one of the peculiarities was that each village, as small as it was, had a particular family name. So if you lived in that village your name should be so-and-so. We had a book that we actually published with the cooperation of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, they provided the money. We provided a list of all of these villages with the family name or names that would name more names that were found in that particular village. It was a most successful tool in breaking fraudulent cases. Because what would happen, somebody would set up a paper trail of one of the persons in a particular village, but try to use their own name. They were caught every time. INS used it, and may still use it as far as I know. It was a very useful tool for them as well.

*Q: Were there attempts to pay off, I mean, corruption within the investigating unit?*

GOELZ: Was there ever! I had to fire the chief investigator during the two years I was there, and also about five to six investigators who we found out were taking bribes on the side. It's to be expected, though, in something like that unit.

*Q: What was the impact of this on you, Lou? Here you're working, you know these people want to get out, and would use any means possible and as you say, we both served in some of the same places. It's very understandable why somebody would do anything in order to get out, and paying officials is a way of life. How did this affect you at that time?*

GOELZ: Do you mean did it sour me on visas, and visa applicants? Not really. It was as much a challenge as anything else, me against them to see who is going to win. They won more often than I did, of course. But it was still an interesting challenge. It was something useful. Developing tools to help with the work I thought was especially useful. Just turning down cases because somebody may not be giving you full information, is not really the answer. The answer was to go after the fraud, the deep rooted corruption, and the...well, what do you want to call it, just the various ways they used to get themselves to the United States. The Chinese are very nice people once you get to know them. Although I never learned the language, I knew a little Cantonese but not much. But the Chinese we were exposed to in Hong Kong, and elsewhere, turned out to be very nice people. I enjoyed my five years in Hong Kong.

*Q: What was your impression...I think a consular officer, particularly over a period of time, gets one of the best feels for how a group of people settle in the United States. Because you're looking at their affidavits and support. What was your impression of how the Chinese were doing during the '60s?*

GOELZ: The Chinese were doing quite well, quite well indeed, and were getting to the United States, and especially as you say from the affidavits and support of those who were in the States for those who were coming to join their immediate families or relatives. They started out with nothing, and wound up with everything. We had one local employee who I knew fairly well, in

fact I hired him in Hong Kong, who went under this refugee program to the States. He got married just before he left, and he went to the United States on board a ship with his wife and \$100. He landed in the San Francisco area where he had relatives whom he was working with. They raised flowers down south of San Francisco. Today that same local employee is a multimillionaire. He got involved in real estate in San Francisco, and made a fortune. They did well, very well indeed.

*Q: It's always encouraging to work with a group like that. You feel that you're putting people in who are going to be marginal. You left about '66?*

**ROGER ERNST**  
**Deputy Director, USAID**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1962-1964)**

*Roger Ernst was born in New York in 1924. He graduated from Williams College in 1948 and the National War College in 1956. He served as an overseas Captain from 1943 to 1947. His career with USAID included assignments in India, Taiwan, Korea, Ethiopia and Thailand. Mr. Ernst was interviewed in 1997 by Arthur Lowrie.*

ERNST: I came back to Washington, and was fishing around for a new assignment. I had the summer as home leave. I had said that I really didn't think I ever wanted to go to Taiwan because it was a dictatorship. This is the summer of '62. And I got a call, please to come to New York from Nantucket, where I was vacationing, and meet Howard L. Parsons, who had been in the Foreign Service, who was going to Taiwan as the AID mission director. He'd been the Counselor of Embassy in Bangkok for Political Affairs, he later was Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs in Bangkok on another tour. Howard and I met in New York at a hotel near Penn Station, and we liked each other immediately. I said "Alright, I'll come to Taipei with you as your Deputy Director." So that was my next assignment. We finished our home leave, we came to Washington, we went to the FSI, Jeannie and I, for one of those 21-day quick courses on China. Excellent, well done. Arthur Hummel's father was one of the mentors, instructors, who happened to be in Washington, I suppose, because I think he lived in China, most of his life, been a missionary. And he taught us something. He took out a bowl one day, and in the bowl he put marbles. And he swished them around. And they all ran around among each other, yes there was friction, but everything got resolved. He took out the marbles, and he put in sugar lumps. And he swished the bowl, and of course the lumps were all corners and angles, and they banged up against each other. He said, "I want to tell you, don't ever forget..." And I haven't. "The first is Chinese culture and way of dealing with issues. The second is Western confrontationism. We, in our juridical system, in a traffic accident, right and wrong. In our courts, right and wrong. Win and lose in our sports. The other is Chinese. Yes, there's friction, yes, there are problems, but they get worked out, the corners are rounded." And I saw that so many times, both in Taiwan and in other cultures where Confucianism and Chinese culture are important. I learned that from Ambassador Hummel's father. I've told Art about it. One of those little nuggets that you learn, if I didn't get anything else out of the FSI, that was worth the price of 21 days. Gave me a clue.

Went to Taiwan, here were an exciting people, living in a shadow of defeat. It's as if we'd had a civil war here in the North American continent, and the government had been run off the continent and had to evacuate, say, to Puerto Rico. Two million of us, government, businessmen, educators and chefs. If San Juan was Taipei...

*Q: What was the emphasis in AID?*

ERNST: Our emphasis - this is related - was to build the confidence in the Chinese on Taiwan that they could run their own economy, or, as our Ambassador, Admiral Alan Kirk said, who was a great man, he said "They can paddle their own canoe. They have to." So we said to the Chinese - the dialog with the Chinese - was: "You're so good you don't need an aid program, and we're not going to continue an aid program, so you'd better be that good." We played the coin both ways, with the ambassador's approval and agreement and support. It gave the Political Section problems. They were afraid of the "China Lobby" of Senator Knowland.

*Q: Madam Chiang Kai-shek.*

ERNST: Madame Chiang and others. And we were lucky in that Senator Knowland came to Taiwan. And Howard Parsons, with me in the background, had an opportunity to spend about an hour and a half with him. He told him how capable the Chinese were, and how debilitating our aid would be over time. (Do we see some parallels in Israel, with American aid creating debilitating overdependency? Or the welfare syndrome at home?) Knowland said "You're right. I agree we should terminate the AID program." And he said so publicly. So the specter of John Service, the China Lobby, China First group, was dissipated.

David Bell, who was the AID Administrator, came to Taiwan, maybe twice. Anyway, one time he came, and I can remember a conversation with Administrator David Bell, and the assistant administrator for AID, who was a man named Seymour Janow, and Howard Parsons, and me. In the men's room, at the Grand Hotel. And we were talking about terminating the AID program. And David Bell had been through this with us, but Janow hadn't, and Janow said "Is that right?" Howard said "Yes, I think so" And David Bell said, "Yes, we're going to talk to the Chinese about a gradual phasedown, transfer from grants to low-cost loans and from low-cost loans to commercial terms. A transition. Several years, not abrupt. They can do it." And that was the official decision, in the men's room at the Grand Hotel, as far as I can tell, it was then documented in papers pushed through the machinery.

The Chinese had a terrible time, because they'd gotten used to aid; there was a whole bureaucracy that was living off administering the AID program. This was 1963. When I went back to Taiwan in '75, as a private, as an unofficial visitor, I had dinner with P. Y. Shu, who was Head of the Central Bank; with C.K. Yen, who later was Prime Minister, who had been Minister of Finance; with Li Kwo Ting, who ran the AID Administration group, and others. Jeannie was there. Official dinner for me, for us. And they went out of their way to toast us, for giving them their wholeness again by terminating the AID flow.

*Q: When did we actually get out?*

ERNST: In '66 or '67.

*Q: That's amazing, that that philosophy was prevalent then.*

ERNST: They took the challenge.

*Q: But it doesn't seem to have caught on with AID generally speaking, in the world, at all.*

ERNST: No, no, bureaucracy wants to project their jobs.

*Q: In both the donor and recipient investing.*

ERNST: Exactly. And true with the UN too. There was a very exciting time in Taiwan. Averell Harriman came once, and we had big discussions with him. He was then peddling the position that the Chinese in Taiwan should work on assistance to Africa, in order to get African votes in the UN to protect the seat in New York. So we provided some help to the Chinese in Taiwan to beef up their ability to provide assistance to the newly independent African states who had come into being in the '58-'62 period when they got their nationhood. A lot of sidelights; it was very interesting. The Japanese were increasing their role; private business, we brought the first three American banks into Taiwan, held their hand, lubricated the way. National City, Morgan's and Hanover. I don't think Hanover exists anymore, Manufacturer's Hanover. Private businessmen. The first nuclear power plant. It involved a lot of very interesting things.

You asked about policy. Ambassador Kirk was a tremendous person. If he had worked half-time, he'd be better than most Ambassadors. He was so prescient. Economical. He knew what was wanted. And his wife, Lydia, was wonderful, too. They were lucky, we were lucky, they were in Moscow, and he'd had that UNSCOB job, UN in the Balkans. Commander of the fleet that crossed the channel, under Eisenhower to liberate the continent. Little guy, and his son, Roger, Ambassador in Somalia, and in, maybe in Eastern Europe [Romania]. Retired recently. Anyway, Ambassador Alan Kirk said that his instructions from President Kennedy, leaving out the bureaucratic language, were "Not to permit the government in Taiwan to mount an attack against the mainland, nor to liberate the mainland, because that will get us into the soup." So he turned to the head of the Military Assistance group, and he said "Make sure that they never have enough aviation gas and diesel for their ships. I don't want them to be able to get to the mainland. We control their oil supply." We, the U.S. military.

**NICHOLAS PLATT**  
**Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute**  
**Washington, DC and Taichung, Taiwan (1962-1964)**

*Ambassador Nicholas Platt was born in New York, New York in 1936. He attended Harvard University and Johns Hopkins University, and entered the Foreign Service in 1959. His career included positions in Hong Kong, Japan, China, Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Zambia, the Philippines, and*

*Pakistan. Ambassador Platt was interviewed by Paul McCusker in 1994.*

*Q: Now what got you onto the language training, were you particularly interested in China at that time?*

PLATT: I went into the Foreign Service as a European specialist trained in German and French and well grounded in European history. I had done my thesis on the passage of the Marshall Plan through Congress, so I had a smattering of American government as well. As soon as I got into the Foreign Service I found that Europe was full up, it was full up in a lot of ways. Everybody wanted to go there. All the posts were full. You practically had to wait for someone to die before you could get a job. The jobs which you could get weren't very good. The policies had already been lined out. At that time what passed as policy formulation was really just manipulation of nuances. I was steered in the direction of China by a number of coincidences. One, running into a friend in FSI who was taking Chinese language and who seemed to me to be an incongruous choice for such a specialty. But he convinced me that it was a ground floor from where there was nowhere to go but up. The whole region was important to us but had not really been paid much attention to. There were lots of good jobs out there and lots of responsibility. And then, of course, I looked at Bohlen's record and he had made a very good career out of picking very early on in his career a specialty that no one else had an eye on. He had decided, rightfully so, that the United States was one day going to have to have a very important relationship with Russia. He learned the language, did his homework and labored in the vineyards, and he was right and rode that elevator right up to the top. I thought that if he could do it maybe I could do it too as far as China was concerned. It was with a certain amount of romanticism that I went into it but, actually I found that the learning of the language was interesting and the ability to ultimately communicate in Chinese to the Chinese people was very satisfying to me and exciting, and I felt that the Department was giving me something that they couldn't take away. It cost \$50,000 in those days to train a China specialist. I suppose it is six or eight times that now.

*Q: Of course, in those days too there were a lot of younger officers who had the same realization that you had that maybe the answer to their career prospects was to learn a hard language such as Russian, Chinese or Indonesian.*

PLATT: Well, I felt a hard language represented a kind of rudder in the Service. We were all supposed to be capable of serving anywhere but I felt the Windsor assignment really kind of tore the scales from my eyes. I mean, it wasn't what you knew it was what you could persuade the government to spend money on so that they would have to justify that assignment to Congress that would move you in the direction you wanted to go. So if you were a real cynic you would say, "Find me a hard language specialty that is expensive and interesting and work at that, make it happen and you will have a rudder in the Foreign Service." And I think it did work.

**WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN**  
**Economic Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1962-1965)**

*Ambassador Gleysteen was born in China of Missionary parents. Educated at Yale and Harvard Universities, he entered the Foreign Service in 1951. After service in the State Department's Executive Secretariat, Mr. Gleysteen studied Chinese and was subsequently posted to Taipei, Hong Kong, and to Seoul, Korea, where he served as Ambassador from 1978 to 1981. He also served in Washington with the National Security Council and in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. The Ambassador was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1997.*

*Q: In 1962, you were assigned to Hong Kong as an economic officer. How did you manage to get such an assignment that made sense in career terms?*

GLEYSTEEEN: During my whole career, I think I was rather lucky in being assigned to positions that made sense for me and for the Foreign Service. I knew from my friends that Hong Kong was about to have a major turn-over in staff. There was talk of my replacing David Dean - a schoolmate and a language school fellow graduate. I also knew the consul general, Marshall Green, and some of the right people in the Department. So everything worked well from my point of view.

In Hong Kong I was one of two deputies in the China Section headed by John Holdridge. I supervised reporting on the PRC's economy; the much smaller Hong Kong Section handled reporting on Hong Kong. In our section of "China watchers" I recall only one officer who had special economic training. All I had was basic economics at the undergraduate level plus my Taiwan experience. Although we were amateurs in economic theory, our lack of expertise was not a major drawback. We had a commonsense grasp of our subject which had a heavy political content. The distinction between political and economic was blurred in our work.

We had a local staff of about 15 people, who were highly competent. Some were professional economists -university trained. We paid them well by Foreign Service, not commercial, standards. Their services were an indispensable part of our operations. We included the local staff in our discussions to a degree that would not have been permitted in other posts. They did things that the American staff could not do - e.g. reading far more voraciously and extensively in Chinese than we were able to. What made this unique collaboration possible was that in the main we used unclassified material open to all.

I first met Marshall Green in Washington about ten years earlier while serving in S/S - after his return from London to work in the EA Bureau. Then I had quite a bit of contact with him while he was DCM in Seoul and I was in Tokyo. My early impressions of Marshall were consistent with the image he had in the Department: a lively, amusing, upwardly mobile, very ambitious officer. Looking from the outside, I think Marshall did a good job as DCM in Seoul, except perhaps during the first stage of Park Chung Hee's coup. In Hong Kong, I only had a very brief exposure because he left soon after my arrival. During this brief period, I felt Marshall was sound in his assessment of the China issues.

Our paths crossed again in the late 1960s and early 1970s. He was the assistant secretary for EA; I was the East Asia director in INR. I saw him daily, briefing him on the latest developments in

the area. I spent at least half an hour with him and often more. I developed a great deal of respect for him. Throughout every phase of his life, he was cheerful and a master of puns - even at funerals.

My second consul general was Ed Rice, a friendly hands-on officer. Ed was one of the early "China hands." He had a number of out-of-area assignments, but had returned to EA to be a deputy assistant secretary before coming to Hong Kong. He had known Chinese well, although by the time he reached Hong Kong, his language skills had deteriorated.

John Holdridge was in charge of what in Beijing would have been called the political and economic sections. Heyward Isham, a Soviet expert, supervised the political side and I the economic. There were 5 or 6 officers in each unit. After about a year, Holdridge left for home leave and a period of duty on a personnel panel-probably a promotion board-which about half a year. At Rice's request, I filled in for Holdridge. It was somewhat awkward, because Isham and I were the same rank, born in the same month, went to same university and graduated in the same year - although we didn't know each other. I was chosen over him simply because I was a China officer and he was not.

When Holdridge returned, I went back to my economic assignment for a short period before leaving Hong Kong. Substituting for Holdridge was very useful for me; Ed Rice seemed satisfied and I worked with him on a major despatch, analyzing our interests in China and recommending a shift in our recognition policy. Both of us were proud of our hard work, which was the intellectual high point of my assignment. My inquiries later in Washington suggest that Dean Rusk and Co. hadn't seen it or brushed it aside.

In addition to our China reporting, the consulate general had a normal operation dealing with Hong Kong itself, including political, economic, and consular functions. There was a little overlap between the two operations, but we got along very well. Essentially the Hong Kong consulate general consisted of two institutions, both supervised by the consul general. It was a large operation.

We lived in enviable circumstances. Hong Kong was the most comfortable of my posts. The CG building was fairly new and well maintained. It was quite spacious; every officer had a small private office. The building was located downtown in a choice area near good restaurants. We had individual houses for the most part, but also occupied small apartments in various lovely places. I lived in a double apartment complex on Deepwater Bay, which was not too hard to take. Other people lived in Stanley, Repulse Bay, and downtown. The DCM lived on a hill side overlooking Deepwater Bay. The CG lived part way up the Peak. Living may not have been luxurious, but it was far better than adequate. No one should have complained.

Hong Kong, in the 1962-65 period, was beginning to shine - a new development. I remember visiting Hong Kong in 1953 when people were dismissing it as place that "wouldn't make it" much past the end of the Korean War. It was having severe economic problems caused by the enormous refugee influx; it couldn't pull itself together. But we should not forget that in the early 1950s Korea was ridiculed as a "basket case", Taiwan was a dictatorship with severe problems, and even Japan had not yet taken off economically. People tend to forget those rugged days.

Starting with the mid-1950s, Hong Kong began to blossom - becoming the trade gateway into the PRC, providing a savvy base for foreign companies that wished to work in East Asia and China, and serving as one of the first locations for modern labor intensive export industries. Hong Kong lived under the rule of law, with an independent judiciary based on English law. By the time I was later stationed in Hong Kong, it was a thriving, vital city. The business community was very vigorous. There was already considerable affluence in the Chinese community, indicated by the ever increasing number of privately owned boats in various harbors and new cars on the street. It was already clear that the Chinese were becoming the predominant element.

The American business community was heavily focused on banking. There were considerable business opportunities for US banks in Hong Kong, but they were also interested in being ready if and when China would open up for them. Many major American companies located their Asian headquarters in Hong Kong. In the same way as banks, these companies did business in Hong Kong, but they were also readying themselves to invest in the PRC when the time was right.

In many respects the rules for US contact with the mainland were silly. We were all barred from doing any business with the PRC, leaving that growing field to others. For example, we could not buy goods made in the PRC, even if sold in Hong Kong. Food consumed in Hong Kong was more or less exempted. American firms, such as banking, had to be careful that none of their transactions involved the PRC or its citizens. That was not easy, but I think the American firms did their best to keep within US rules. All American transactions were monitored by the consulate general; we had a treasury attache with a staff that was strict on the issue of trade with the PRC. I thought it was a very foolish policy. But it was implemented with great vigor - except, of course, on senators and congressmen.

I might say a word about the problems and challenges of remote reporting on China from Hong Kong. In those days virtually no Americans were allowed to go to the PRC. No officials were permitted to do so, and the rare exceptions were doctors or other professionals who had a good reason and political connections in Washington. The Japanese and the Europeans, even if they did not have diplomatic relations, freely allowed their citizens to visit and do business in the PRC. Our rules were an enormous barrier to travel and a self-inflicted handicap to our understanding of China. Nevertheless, once you overcame feeling foolish, there were plenty of opportunities for useful work. We had to be vacuum cleaners, pulling in any information about the PRC we could. We would talk to every interesting traveler. We would meet endlessly in hotel rooms or invite them to the consulate general or our homes. We would cover every minute of their stay in the PRC. Our big net covered many Japanese, European, Australian, New Zealand and some Americans - like journalists - who got in, one way another.

With practice we became pretty good in the choice of interlocutors, so we were able to focus on those who had something to say. Some were gold mines. They were perceptive; they might had high level contacts up to the highest, including Mao. They knew what to look for. Some of them traveled periodically to the PRC, giving them and us, a sense of perspective. There were only a few of these, but they were the gems.

For the most part, people were willing to share information and views with us. We had a good

reputation, unlike the Cold War headquarters mentality and ideology prevalent in Washington. The consulate general had built up an almost academic reputation over the years; its staff was considered sensible and their judgments had proven pretty good. Many consuls general contributed to this aura. In my time, I felt lucky to inherit it and worked hard to sustain it. Our sources were usually cooperative; quite a few liked coming in to the consulate general, although we always offered to meet them elsewhere. As far as I know, none of our contacts were barred from travel to the PRC because of us, although it was always a concern. We tried to protect people whose comments could be easily traced back to them - a remark by Mao Zedong could be easily traced back because only a few would have had the opportunity to hear it. Generally, however, our activities were very transparent.

The second aspect of the job was to be an intelligent reader, mostly in translation but selectively in Chinese as well. We were allowed legally to buy Chinese communist publications - a great privilege! We read for hours on end. We had a very, very large translating operation that was only closed recently. Every day, there would be reams and reams of material coming out of that section and by wireless from a parallel operation in Okinawa. Much of the stuff was quite good and useful. I did my own reading whenever I could, thereby maintaining some fluency in the language in which I was trained. This was the only time in my career that I did that - reading original political and economic materials coming from the PRC. I concentrated on certain key publications; I wasn't good enough to skim huge volumes of material.

We drew from academic sources everywhere in the world for help with our analysis. If it was not in English, we would have it translated. We had intelligence operations paralleling our work; the intelligence community was less fettered by restrictions than we were, and I found their product useful. It was not the answer to a prayer, but it did add to our knowledge. The information collected was freely shared with us; I had good relations with the station chief.

We exchanged information with other countries, primarily Western European ones and Japan. We worked closely with the British whose operations were quite similar to ours, although they had the advantage of having intelligence representation in the PRC. In terms of quality, I generally found the Japanese most insightful - perhaps a subjective hangover from my previous assignment. I maintained contact with the Japanese consul generals and their deputies. If I had to rank various countries in terms of their usefulness for us I would mention Great Britain first, followed by Japan, and then Western European countries. They were all very cooperative and very useful.

We generally did not interview refugees directly, because the British had a skilled refugee screening program that produced large quantities of material. Information collected from refugees included a great deal of junk and often lacked perspective. Refugees were not necessarily representative of the mainland Chinese population or balanced observers of the China scene. Many academics-e.g. Ezra Vogel, Doak Barnett, Jerry Cohen-interviewed refugees at length. I was happy to glean their results rather than go through the drudgery of their interviews. Occasionally, I myself talked to a particularly interesting refugee.

Perhaps colored by my own interests, my sense of priorities in Hong Kong was: first, interpreting events within China; second, trying to influence our China policy by conveying the Asian pieces

of the context; third, providing insight on the Chinese approach to the Soviet Union, Indochina, Taiwan, Hong Kong itself, and East Asia generally.

Although I know of no institution that did it better, I must admit we did only a passable job of interpreting what was happening within China. Despite the lurches of Mao Zedong's leadership and the mind-boggling nature of some of his policies, we usually were able - with a time lapse - to use refugees and traveler reports, publications, and occasional snippets of good intelligence to give Washington a fair sense of what was actually happening in the country. But there were always big gaps; and we had few clues to help decipher what was going within the inner councils of the leadership. Our self-imposed absence from China and ban on contacts with Chinese didn't help. Our biggest failures were in the area of prediction. There were titanic shifts and events, such as the "Great Leap Forward and "Cultural Revolution," that we did not anticipate. Yet no one really did; it would have been a miracle if we had.

When I arrived in Hong Kong, the PRC was suffering from the collapse of the "Great Leap Forward." That zany policy, begun in 1958, was an act of hubris on Mao's part that rapidly backfired into a major disaster for China. The intensity of forced agricultural production, the formation of massive communes, and the resort to crazy shortcuts - such as the melting down of every bit of cast iron to make useless backyard steel, deep plowing that quickly ruined the soil, etc - took a very heavy toll and thoroughly discredited the regime. Analysts say that as many as 20 million people may have starved to death. At least several millions died from man-made and natural disaster. I don't think anyone really knows, but it was really a cruel period for the Chinese people. North Korean policies some times remind me of Mao's.

A surprising number of people in the West were slow to recognize the insanity of the "Great Leap." During the initial fanfare a number of romantics, journalists, and even some in our intelligence community speculated that some elements of the "Great Leap Forward" might actually work; I thought they were nuts. After the collapse, a different crew of Westerners, following Taiwan's lead, postulated the possible demise the of the PRC. This was less ridiculous but still dangerously misleading. I believe the consulate general's solid reporting contributed significantly to the commonsense views reflected within the government and much of the media.

Similarly I think we did a pretty good job in picking up bits and pieces of information in the aftermath of the "Great Leap," including various reforms with which the PRC was experimenting. Of course, we had far more difficulty trying to figure out what was going at the top. There appeared to be a serious struggle for leadership of the party and the government. Along with several others, I was quite sensitive to this most important issue; our best source for analysis was Chinese publications. I wish I had done my research more boldly because the "Great Leap Forward" was the precursor to the "Cultural Revolution" -another program devised by Mao over opposition from more pragmatic leaders. The first signs of the new upheaval appeared just as I was leaving Hong Kong. They looked peculiar to us and we reported them, never being able to relate one odd development to another with enough coherence, thereby failing to see the shape of the horrendous "Cultural Revolution." I kick myself for having failed to do that. Analyzing what was going on in Beijing's Forbidden City was very difficult for everybody in the outside world - and for most Chinese. But over the years, I think the consulate general deserves good marks for its analysis of the general situation in China.

Our track record on foreign policy matters was okay - probably a cut better than okay. We had a sound appreciation of Sino-Soviet relations - considerably more accurate than some in Washington. We had a fair understanding of the PRC's approach to Indochina as well as its military capacities.

Most important to me and in contrast to Embassy Taipei, the consulate general was open minded and relaxed in its approach to US policy toward China. Consul General Holmes, a distinguished newcomer to Asia who preceded Marshall Green, broke the taboos in talking about our policy toward the PRC, and from then on the consulate general openly pushed for a more pragmatic policy. Marshall Green did so in a variety of ways, and, as I have already mentioned, Ed Rice and I sent Washington a message similar to Holmes's, less elegant perhaps but written with considerable wisdom about Asia. Those messages would look pedestrian today; at the time they were quite bold.

I came into the Department in 1951, during the Korean war. I was deeply troubled by communist aggression on the peninsula and wrestled with what we might do. I was not happy about the course of events, but it seemed inevitable to me that in due time, we would have to establish relations with the PRC - in some form immediately to be followed by "normal" in due time. We were out of step with the vast majority of other countries. From the beginning of my foreign service career, I was uncomfortable with our PRC policy. It was a cloud over me at my early posts. Dutifully, I carried out US policy as best I could, but I was quite out of sympathy until 1971. This didn't mean I "liked" the PRC regime or that I condoned its crude pressure on the Nationalist off-shore islands or Taiwan. But since the PRC seemed well ensconced, I felt it was short-sighted not have some kind of relationship with it.

When I was interrogated in early 1955 by Scott McLeod's investigators about my alleged sympathy toward the Chinese Communists (see remarks regarding my experience in S/S), I made the following comment:

*...Concerning my own views on Communist China, I stated that communism and communism in China were an anathema and disappointment to me. Since the Chinese Nationalist Government was the one I grew up with and because of my family views, it was naturally the one I "supported." From 1945 to 1949 I was mad and sad about its ineffectiveness. After 1949-50 I began to think we probably would have to recognize Communist China diplomatically, as unpleasant and hostile as it was and would be. The Korean War removed this consideration. I went to on to explain that at present it would be disastrous to recognize Communist China because of the tension surrounding Quemoy, Matsu, and Formosa, but I said I thought we should think through the problem for a future date...*

These remarks are quoted from an angry memorandum I wrote to myself on February 3, 1955 to record of a most unpleasant experience. During the next 8 years in Taiwan and Japan I became thoroughly convinced the time had arrived to change an outmoded policy. I saw normalization with the PRC as a process that would develop over years, reflecting the new reality in East Asia, devoid of any adverse moral connotation, and following the practice of most of the world. The choice was simply this: should we have a perpetual wall between two important countries or did

we have to deal with the reality of a communist regime in China. If the latter, then wouldn't it better to have official relations with it? Our existing policy closed its eyes to the facts on the ground. In addition, I thought that we were paying a penalty in having much of our dialogue with the PRC often conducted through third parties - the process of using an intermediary lost us opportunities and made for miscommunications because some of the third parties had their own agendas. I thought about and talked a lot about the consequences for the balance of power. In those days I did not foresee China shifting quickly from its hostility toward us, and I doubted a policy change would have a major beneficial effect on our dealings with the USSR. Yet I thought it would be a move in the in the right direction, and I was sure it would ease our relations with allies such as Japan.

It took Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to put all the pieces in play - for their own reasons and in a strategic framework that exaggerated the benefits. When the breakthrough came with Kissinger's trip to Beijing in 1971, our obsession with "the menace of China" was replaced by an overly simple view of the PRC as part of a united anti-Soviet front. Like others, I understood the new policy in terms of our Cold War interests; I was happy that the US was finally going to normalize relations with the PRC. At the same time, I sensed that the anti-Soviet rationale for the opening to the PRC might be interpreted excessively and lead us to mishandle our relations with Beijing. It is a complicated subject, but I believe that I was right in these concerns, which came to the fore in both the Ford and Carter administrations; I participated in some of the discussions that I will get to later.

The change in US policy toward China should have made long before 1971-72, and we would have been better off if it had been done openly rather than in secret. Despite being pushed to the sidelines while Kissinger and Nixon did it, I am really grateful to them for their bold action. As for Consulate General Hong Kong during the 1960s, I would say we contributed significantly to preparations for the change - both through our analysis of the China context and our policy recommendations. A lot of energy went into the effort.

Friction in Sino-Soviet relations, which burst into public debate while I was in Hong Kong, fascinated everybody, even those in Washington who could hardly believe what was happening. It is hard to remember now the role of the Americans who fought so hard to interpret the Sino-Soviet "bloc" as two communist regimes both marching in the same direction mostly under Soviet leadership. From every scrap of information that we collected, it looked like these people were way off-base. CG Hong Kong deserves kudos for its quite objective picture of reality - portraying the tremendous strains between the PRC and the Soviet Union, which were heading toward a climax of some sort, with actual fighting to take place along their borders in 1969. In addition to the public diatribe conducted in the names of Khrushchev and Mao, there was all sorts of intelligence about troubles dating back to 1954 and earlier. For all its conviction about a Sino-Soviet monolith, I must say in fairness, that we were never instructed by Washington to hew any party line - unlike the editorial work by MacArthur in Embassy Tokyo or the censorship exercised in Embassy Taipei.

My own views on Sino-Soviet relations were importantly influenced during graduate school at Yale. When I was an undergraduate, I had an orthodox Cold War view of the problem. I assumed that Stalin and his cohorts played a major role in setting Asia's fires - which in fact they did. And

I assumed China was cooperatively involved, as a kind of junior partner. But in graduate school I had a chance to do considerable reading on the earlier communist period that highlighted the independence of the Chinese communist movement. I became convinced, as some scholars had, that independence, rivalry, and friction were the reality between the two nations. Essentially, I thought that each would go in its own way, following its national interest more than ideology. That meant that on some issues, there would be a partnership, but often the two would find themselves on the opposite sides. By the time I reached Hong Kong, my views were pretty close to what historically seems to have been the pattern.

After a checkered record of support in the early years, the Soviets finally assisted Mao come to power in the late 1940s. But rarely did the Soviets do all they could have done. In the post-war period, the Soviets pillaged Manchuria for its industrial equipment and later demanded certain territorial concessions from the Chinese - including some of the same things the Russian Empire demanded of Imperial China in 19<sup>th</sup> Century. I was impressed by the replay of this clash of nationalisms. When the more obvious signs of strain began to appear - in the mid-1950s, and even more pronouncedly in the late-1950s with Khrushchev's public refusal to back Mao in the Taiwan Straits - I thought we faced two major powers that would go their own ways, guided, as I said, mostly by their national interests. Despite my analysis, I was still amazed in the late 1960s when they carried this behavior close to the point of a major war and sought to enlist our weight into the contest.

While I was in Hong Kong the consulate general also spent much time speculating how the Chinese would deal with various events in Vietnam and the Taiwan Straits. The Taiwan off-shore islands had again become a subject of US-PRC tension. The PRC was in bad shape economically. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) was suffering as a consequence of the "Great Leap Forward" and its aftermath; so it was hitting bottom as a consequential military force. At the same time, Vietnam was becoming an increasing problem for the PRC because of our military build up. The PRC sent substantial assistance to the North Vietnamese, a very complicated process. Given these conditions, there was discussion in Taiwan of taking advantage of the PRC's preoccupations and weaknesses through a variety of provocative actions. The U.S., as I remember it, made a statement, probably in the Warsaw or Prague Talks in 1963 or 1964, that we would not support any Taiwan action raising the level of tensions. That was well received by the PRC. These and other events gave us in Hong Kong an opportunity to assess the PRC's mind set and possible moves, which we did very conscientiously.

One of our most consuming and tricky challenges was to assess likely Chinese behavior in Vietnam. Washington was obviously concerned about what the PRC might do militarily if we intervened more directly in Vietnam. Stimulated by my Geneva Conference days, I tried to keep up with Indochina even though it was not part of my normal portfolio. While in Tokyo I had managed a rather long visit to Vietnam. I went twice while in Hong Kong and several times more after returning to Washington. I traveled to many regions of the country as well as Saigon, talked to all levels of the military, met at length with our embassy staff, etc.

In general, the consulate general, specifically including Rice and me, felt that the PRC was being very cautious and demonstrating little evidence of intention to intervene militarily. This was a crucial judgment on our part, because Washington was trying to assess how much risk we were

running as we escalated our military presence in Vietnam from an advisory role to combat with US forces. Of course, we put in caveats - one being the obvious need to be prepared if our judgment proved wrong. Although I was fairly confident of our prediction, it bothered me personally. Effectively, we were assisting those in our government who favored deeper involvement in Vietnam. With a brief lapse in 1965, I was opposed to such entanglement.

Incidentally, our assessment of the PRC-Vietnam relationship got me into a running argument with those in INR and the intelligence community who worried about Chinese intervention as in the Korean War. Alan Whiting, who was INR's director for East Asia, disagreed strongly with us. He had written a famous book on the PRC's intervention in the Korean war; he tried to apply the same lessons to the Vietnam situation and came to an entirely different conclusion than I and most of my colleagues. Our debate conducted by cable got into the press from sources "who did not wish to be identified." I deduced and later confirmed that Whiting was briefing reliable journalists "on background." I did the same, giving the *New York Times* some good stories. In retrospect, I think we were both a bit foolish.

As for your question about our access to information and the degree of our influence in Washington, I would say that the consulate general was well served with information, while the effect of our recommendations was less than desired. Our analyses of the general situation in the PRC got broad circulation and were widely respected but they didn't reach the highest levels of the Department; they were fodder for the analysts in EA, INR and other parts of the intelligence community. We had some disputes with Washington over the national intelligence estimates which did not always match ours. CIA would tell us that we were wrong and they were right, if only because they had many more resources to devote to the PRC - and anyway, headquarters is always right! These disagreements were not a big problem for us; they were arguments among peers and we really didn't give that much of a damn about what the bureaucracy in Washington believed.

On issues affecting bilateral relations - on which we wrote some wonderful reports - the consul general often helped in their drafting and signed them out in his name. That plus restrictive circulation helped get attention - at least at the assistant secretary level. I don't know how they were viewed at higher levels; at least there was no attempt to stop us from our analysis or to tell us to hew the line.

On issues such as possible military engagement between the PRC and Taiwan or China and Vietnam, our reports were thoroughly read in Washington. We would get specific questions, some of which indicated certain biases, which was alright because we were not hemmed in our responses. In the case of US-Vietnam relations, I believe our important messages reached high levels in the government.

I also remember being impressed by how much traffic we received on Vietnam, including intelligence material. We were near Vietnam, but we had a detachment that our people in Saigon did not. So we some times submitted interesting comments, even though our immediate responsibility was the PRC. For example, after the Tonkin Gulf incident, Ed Rice inspired and supervised some careful analysis by our section plus the military attaches and CIA Station. As I recall them, our comments would look good today in light of what we have since learned about

the incident. We were never convinced that there were in fact military clashes in the Gulf; we suspected that the US was seizing on isolated indicators to escalate our military intervention. We relied heavily on intercepts of Vietnamese communications, technical intelligence gathering, and Beijing's attitude. This intelligence was rapidly available to us in Hong Kong because we were part of the collection system.

I admired Rice for team efforts such as this one. In other instances he also signed off on messages, even the more strident ones and those he knew would draw opposition. I don't want to leave the impression that we were heroes in Hong Kong. Most often we were only one voice in the cacophony of noises emanating from groups of China watchers.

Let me address the question of how much influence the United States had on China during this time. In the 1962-65 period, our influence was significant. On the fundamental aspects of our policy - the embargo and containment of the PRC - although we could not control other countries, we severely complicated the PRC's efforts to broaden its relationship with the outside world. All of our military and economic goods, all of our technology as well as most of the developed world's military and technical exports, were deflected away from the PRC, thus impeding its economic and military development. As the leader of the "Free World," we did exercise a negative influence on the PRC, even if it meant an increasing tension with some of our allies who did not see the PRC as the enemy, as we did. Some aspects of this policy of denial - for example, the complete trade embargo - were inconsistent with my views on recognition of the PRC.

In the international sphere, our policy of not recognizing the PRC-keeping it out of the UN, handicapping it in all fora - was a joke - on us. We were kidding ourselves if we thought we could keep the PRC isolated for any length of time. Our policy was the dominant one in the developed world, but most countries found easy ways around it - as did many Americans. It was a doomed policy - just encouraging people to cheat. When the policy change finally came in 1971, everyone was ready for it.

As for the PRC's domestic policies, we had no visible impact. We probably provided the hard liners in the PRC with a justification for their policy. We may have had a negative impact on PRC domestic policies, helping hard liners take their crude approach to domestic issues as part of an anti-US campaign.

Three times - the Korean war, the off-shore islands crises, and Vietnam - we engaged in or threatened combat against the PRC. That certainly influenced Chinese views of the world around it. Although our ignorance helped to bring the Chinese into the Korean war, I have always felt - and still do today in light of historical documents now available - that we were right to assist South Korea defend itself in 1950. Over the longer term, our actions in Korea had a definite impact on PRC policies, influencing Chinese behavior on the off-shore island crises and in Vietnam. Our firm stance in Korea gave us some credibility in Beijing. In short our influence on the PRC was certainly heightened by our forceful military posture in East Asia; it compelled PRC policy makers to take our military presence into account.

I should make a summary statement on my tour in Hong Kong. Of all of the posts in which I

served, except perhaps Korea which had some unique problems, I found that the intellectual quality of the consulate general work was outstanding. The consuls general insisted that the staff maintain an objective view and that contributed to enlightened reporting. My colleagues knew their stuff. Reporting from Hong Kong was very special; I don't think I saw that same level of insight again. The staff had a sense of participation on substantive issues that was great for everybody. The staff in Hong Kong was carefully chosen. It was a good team and worked well together. The intelligence community in Hong Kong was well integrated with the rest of the American staff. It was a good show. Even the military attaches, of which there were many, were part of the team, although they sometimes could be difficult with their own agenda. They had too much money and quite often ran clumsy covert operations without experience, thereby getting the U.S. government in trouble.

When I arrived in Hong Kong, Oscar Armstrong was the deputy consul general. He was followed by John Lacey. Both of them played a very useful role. They were excellent officers. As I mentioned earlier, Hong Kong had two separate entities: the "China watchers" - an embassy in exile - and those responsible for normal CG duties with the territory of Hong Kong. In that second category, we had a very active commercial operation. Then we had a large, sprawling intelligence community, which presented technical and legal challenges. The deputy CG was the keystone of keeping all in sync. I had a high regard for the officers under whom I served and for those whom I supervised.

**WILLIAM WATTS**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1963)**

*William Watts was born in 1930 and raised in New York, New York. He received a bachelor's degree from Syracuse University and a master's degree from Harvard University's Russian Regional Studies Program. He served in the U.S. Air Force from 1951-1954. Mr. Watts' Foreign Service career included positions in Korea, the Soviet Union, and Washington, DC. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on August 7, 1995.*

*Q: In the summer of 1963 you came back and what did you do?*

WATTS: I was assigned to Chinese language training, which was what I wanted. It is interesting that if I had not been taken out of Chinese language training, my guess is that I would still be in the Foreign Service. I really wanted to be as bilingual as possible in both Chinese and Russian. I went into the Chinese language program in August/September 1963. Marshall Green was then the deputy assistant secretary for state for East Asian affairs and I had worked for him in Korea. Marshall, who was a very foresighted guy, had wanted to develop within the Department a desk as opposed to something in INR that could deal with mainland China. But you could not have a PRC desk because Congress wouldn't have permitted it at that point.

What Marshall did was to create, obviously with the approval of Roger Hilsman and then

William Bundy, the assistant secretaries, something called the Office of Asian Communist Affairs. The Office had technical responsibility as an operational desk for North Korea, North Vietnam, Mongolia, Hong Kong, because of the trade, and PRC. The China desk remained Taiwan. This Office of Asian Communist Affairs was to be looking at these other places. The rest of it was essentially a phony, it was a cover for having a China desk. We had a desk that had five people. There were: Burt Levin who was a language officer and later was consul general to Hong Kong and then ambassador to Burma; David Dean, who became the head of the US Interests Section in Taipei; Lindsey Grant, who went on to other things; Arthur Dornheim, resident expert on Mongolia and Hong Kong, especially the textiles issue; and myself. I was brought in by Marshall to be the Soviet eyes and ears in this unit. What happened was that because of a lot of bureaucratic nonsense, I was essentially shut out of all the traffic, the really sensitive stuff that I needed to see and have in order to do my job to be reporting on the Soviet issues of the Sino-Soviet relationship. I vented my frustration, but was still kept in the dark.

At this time, the guy I worked for in Moscow, Rocky Staples, who had been public affairs counselor in Moscow, had left the USIA and had gone to work for the Ford Foundation. He came to me and said, "Why don't you come work for the Ford Foundation?" So eventually, after a lot of soul searching, because I went into the Foreign Service forever, I did wind up resigning and going to work for the Ford Foundation. So that was the end of my Foreign Service career.

**MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ**  
**Consular/Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1963-1966)**

*Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.*

*Q: Your next assignment, after language training, was to the American Consulate General (CG) in Hong Kong. I think you were first assigned to the passport section.*

ABRAMOWITZ: That is right. I was not very happy to be assigned to consular work again, but it was the only position open in the Consulate at the time I was available. I was told that as soon as vacancies occurred in the economic or political sections, I would be considered. That assuaged my unhappiness to some degree.

My consular job was primarily devoted to Chinese fraud cases. I did spend a little time on issuing passports to American children born overseas or other straightforward requests, but my principal focus was on fraud cases. These were generated by Chinese who would make an

application swearing that they had been born in the U.S., who had been brought back to China by his or her parents; however all records to verify these stories had been usually lost or destroyed, mostly in the great San Francisco fire. Applicants would show some documentary evidence which usually had little relationship to their application.

*Q: Did you have the opportunity, as you did in Taiwan, to discuss substantive issues with your “clients”?*

ABRAMOWITZ: I would try to engage some applicants, particularly those that had recently come from mainland China and explore their views on conditions in the PRC. This was not a systematic process; it was a matter of opportunity primarily and I did not file regular reports, unless there was something unusual. Most of the applicants came from four small districts in Kwangtung Province. Most of the Cantonese-born Chinese now in the U.S. came from these districts. I would guess that at least half – if not much more – of the applications were fraudulent.

Since these applicants spoke Cantonese, I did not have much opportunity to use my Mandarin; I had an interpreter for interviews. I did however pursue my Mandarin studies with a tutor provided by the Consulate General. I read mainland China newspapers. In the evenings, we often tried to mingle with Chinese and then the Mandarin was somewhat helpful since Cantonese was mostly spoken. You have to remember that we were in Hong Kong only 18 years after the end of the Japanese occupation and only 14 years after Chiang Kai-shek’s retreat from the mainland.

I can’t say that the time in the Consular Section was very useful; it did little for career development or learning. After six months, I moved to the Political Section.

This Political Section of the CG was devoted entirely to mainland China matters. It covered both economic and political affairs in the PRC. I worked on economic issues. I liked the job. I found the economic situation in the mainland fascinating and often the subject of great debate. I was given wide discretion and allowed to pick and choose issues to focus on. I spent much time on the PRC’s foreign trade especially as it impacted on Hong Kong’s foreign trade and was the biggest source of Beijing’s foreign exchange earnings at that time. I spent a lot of time tracking down visitors from the PRC to talk to them about economic conditions in their country. That was the most interesting part of the job.

The Political Section included both economic and political officers and was headed by John Holdridge. The chief of the economic section was Bill Gleysteen. I worked primarily for Bill which was a delight and an excellent experience. I developed a high regard for Bill’s intellectual ability, his honesty and his dispassionate approach to the issues that we were analyzing. Bill was a serious, dedicated man.

John had worked on China for a long time. He was an easy man to get along with and left me pretty much to my own devices, even though he was always interested in my reports and activities. I respected his competence. The first Consul General I worked for was Marshall Green who was in Hong Kong for only a brief period after my arrival. He was replaced by Ed Rice, who was an old “China hand.” I got acquainted with both of these senior officers and liked and respected both. I came to know Marshall much better during later assignments. I did not see Rich

much after I left Hong Kong. He was quiet, very knowledgeable, very accessible, and very serious. I learned a lot about China from him.

We had an agricultural attaché and we spent a lot of time together studying the effects of the “Great Leap Forward” on China. Famine was a hot topic of the PRC – we made estimates of the numbers who probably died. The famine raised the question of the durability of the Chinese Communist regime.

Hong Kong was a great post, and an interesting place to live, in part because we were in effect the U.S. embassy to the PRC. I was in HK during the escalation of the Vietnam war. That raised the fundamental issue of PRC support for North Vietnam which became a major issue for our analysis. In addition, in 1964, the Chinese set off their first nuclear test which was of a course a major issue. The PRC kept us all very busy.

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*Q: What were your basic sources for analysis?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Our key source was the Chinese mainland press. That was enhanced by the efforts of one of our officers to purchase all written mainland material that might be available in HK. Much of that material was smuggled out from the mainland – i.e., secret newspapers not publicly available to the Consulate. I would have to say that in the overall analysis scheme these materials were not a major contributor to our analysis. Some of my colleagues might disagree.

We also kept in close contact with representatives of other countries that had establishments in Hong Kong. That provided us periodically some interesting information. CIA also contributed to our knowledge, although it too was a limited source. There was also a considerable number of Chinese visitors – businessmen, diplomats, etc. from Beijing or Shanghai. We were voracious in our efforts to contact these people and to talk to them about what was going on in the PRC.

I was in my early thirties during my time in HK. It was a very satisfying tour because the issues I was involved in were of great interest to me and to our government. The work was intellectually challenging because we were working on a closed society which required a lot of “tea leaves” reading. China was potentially very important, an enemy of the U.S., and ranked high on the U.S. interest list.

We were putting together a mosaic – taking little bits of information gleaned from many sources and trying to fit into the larger picture, such as portrayed by the Chinese press. You also had to read between the lines and be able to understand the code words that the Chinese used. The press

was particularly important as the Chinese moved from the “Great Leap Forward” to Mao’s increasing efforts to start a new “socialist education” program. You could follow the supposed changes in the government’s programs step by step by reading the Chinese press from 1963 onward.

In general, we believe that we did figure out the broad mosaic, although there were a lot of surprises. For example, all of a sudden, a famous leader is set aside. The day I left in August, 1966 the mayor of Beijing, a very prominent party leader, was fired. We knew that something major was going on, but I think we were all continually surprised by the extraordinary actions taken by the government. It was the early days of the Cultural Revolution. We understood that whatever machinations were being undertaken were at Mao’s behest – or approval, at least. This was a long process which lasted ten calamitous years.

The focus of our intelligence collection and analysis was usually some big issue, for example, the stability of the regime. We were deeply interested in Sino-Soviet relations and focused on the developments of the split. We were eager to fathom’s the PRC’s attitude towards Vietnam and the war and what a role it might play. Finally, we spent a lot of time working on the Taiwan issue – e.g., the PRC’s views of the situation in the Straits.

Minutia was interesting but we had our eyes on the bigger issues. The CG in Hong Kong was one of the principal contributors to this government-wide effort of determining the PRC’s views on major issues. We were the principal source of public information and “tea leaves” reading. We also had loads of visitors from the States who came for up-to-date briefings on the PRC. We spent perhaps an hour each day – it obviously varied from day to day – briefing the American official and unofficial visitors, including an endless procession of the media. This role I think heightened even higher the intellectual excitement that our work brought to us. People were clearly interested in what we were up to. We were the main contact for the large American press in Hong Kong. We had numerous CODELs (Congressional Delegations) interested in the PRC. That role was a major contributor to Consulate morale because people had many interlocutors deeply interested in our work.

*Q: Did you feel that the CG made an impact on your visitors – the press, the CODELs, etc?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Absolutely. The press came to us all the time. This included some of America’s best journalists on East Asia. I have no doubt that we had an impact, on many others to whom they talked. They have often told me so because so many have been life-long friends. The journalists were professional; they did not just accept our analysis and assertions, but often – not always – came to the similar conclusions after doing their own further work. It was a fruitful endeavor for us as well. They spent lots of time with us and I am convinced that the Consulate General helped shape the American public’s perception of the PRC. It was time consuming – on everyone’s part – but it was well spent.

Of course, the process was assisted by the lively social life in Hong Kong. We would meet loads of people on that circuit and were able to make our views known to those we met there, some of whom were VIPs (very important people).

Adding to the intellectual ferment was the fact that many reporters would go from Hong Kong to Vietnam to report on the situation there. On returning to Hong Kong they would pass along their more unvarnished observations. That added considerably to our knowledge and kept our intellectual juices fermenting.

As I said in my Harvard “Neuhauser” lecture: “We were an intimate part of the media, particularly in Hong Kong, where all of us searched for every scrap of information about China and waylaid anyone who came down from China or who had escaped. In fact, the Hong Kong consulate, the de facto American Embassy in China, to a great extent shaped public reporting on China in the fifties and sixties. I don’t mean top reporters like Stan Karnow, Joe Lelyveld, Seymour Topping, Bernie Kalb, Jerry Schecter and others just wrote what we told them. They certainly did not. But the Consulate because of its resources and the quality of its people was an indispensable stop for reporters. It was nice to get our views of China into the newspapers. Such efforts occupy much of my time today, but they are no longer as much fun.”

*Q: How was the Consulate General’s relationship with the Department?*

ABRAMOWITZ: We had vigorous exchanges. We often disagreed particularly about Chinese intentions in Vietnam. There were occasionally public spats between the staff in Hong Kong and Washington. Alan Whiting, for example, who was the head of the INR (Bureau of Intelligence and Research) section dealing with East Asia. The exchanges were vigorous but mostly unpolitical.

I describe some of these exchanges again in the spiel I delivered at Harvard. In it, I said: “Interesting battles raged in Washington over a China we perceived dimly. One, similar to our problem today with Iran and with many of the same considerations, focused on what to do about China becoming a nuclear weapon power as we watched it proceed to its first test in 1964. Significant internal pressures to attack China’s nuclear facilities were rebuffed by President Johnson. A second was a real debate in 1964-65 over how China would respond to the vast buildup of American forces in Vietnam and the bombing of the North. Washington feared that the Chinese might come in a la Korea in 1950 and 1951 if we seriously escalated. The opposing views on the Hong Kong Consulate and Allan Whiting in INR became very public. Whiting, who helped George Ball argue against increased deployments and of course wrote the Book China Crosses the Yalu would spell out to Max Frankel in Washington why China was likely to come in in a big way. In Hong Kong we would talk with the New York Times bureau chief, Seymour Topping, and give our perspective on why the Chinese would not do so. The CG won that argument.

It was, of course, hard to evaluate in our policy deliberations the extent of China’s domestic turmoil and its impact on Chinese policy of those extraordinary two decades in China. The Cultural Revolution mostly produced shakings of the head in Washington and elsewhere. Despite what government specialists were long telling their masters about the depth of Sino-Soviet differences, there was also a skepticism on more pertinent domestic political concerns that hindered trying to take advantage of the dispute. The Democrats had become gun shy on anything Chinese from the damaging “who lost China” debate. The depth of Sino-Soviet animosity became clear even to Washington in 1969 with the incidents along the Sino-Soviet

border. In the end the change in administrations from the Democrats to Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, the American difficulties in Vietnam, and China's troubles with the Soviets all continued to lead to what most China watchers had long and devoutly hoped for, even if we were surprised and captivated by Kissinger's secret diplomacy."

*Q: In your area of responsibility – the economic scene – what were you observing?*

ABRAMOWITZ: The big question was whether and to what extent the PRC was recovering from the "Great Leap Forward." What were the indicators of farm production and what did they suggest? Was China expanding its foreign trade? Were Chinese goods finding a market outside its borders? What was happening to their military forces?

The CG funded a trip that I took to look at the question of Chinese exports in Southeast Asia. I visited six countries meeting with host government officials, local leaders, and visiting Chinese department stores to analyze the size and vigor of a Chinese export drive. The assumption was that if the export sector was recovering, then it was likely that the Chinese domestic economy was also getting back on its feet. That was an issue of great interest to Washington. Hong Kong itself was of course an excellent market for cheap Chinese goods.

The agricultural economy in China was, of course, most important because it was the key to political and economic stability. China had gone through exceedingly difficult times (1959-62) with the "Great Leap Forward." It had wreaked havoc on Chinese agriculture with the resulting death of something close to 30 million Chinese – that was the experts' best guess, but no one has ever known for sure. Regardless of the number, it was a devastating blow to China which made it important to make some educated guesses about the state of Chinese agriculture because that would have a major impact on political stability. I think that by 1963, we had reached the conclusion that China had essentially recovered from its "experiment" and that the economy had hit bottom and was slowly beginning to recover. There were still problems of agricultural production – e.g., lack of sufficient fertilizer (we watched fertilizer imports very closely). But I think by 1963, the sense of crisis was beginning to fade; by 1966, the "Great Leap Forward" was history, replaced by another extraordinary Communist event, the Cultural Revolution.

The Chinese government had embarked on a "socialist education" campaign from 1963 which led us to focus on the stability of the Communist party and its potential impact on agricultural production. Starting in 1965, we began to notice certain trends in the press which suggested to us that a shake-up in the party was in the making. By the time I left in 1966, we were certain that something real big was going on in the party, but we didn't know exactly what. Even though these intra-party upheavals and power-plays were not part of my portfolio, we all had to be up-to-date on this process because of its very likely spill over effect into political and economic areas of the PRC.

Finally, we were interested in the state of the Communist party. Was it still peddling old ideology? For that analysis, we depended primarily on printed material – newspapers, books, etc.

*Q: Did you have any idea what organizational level of the Department was reading the CG's reports?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Our reports went to the country director and the deputy assistant secretary for the region. A few went directly – or were sent by the East Asia bureau – to the Seventh Floor. Most of my own reports would not have gone to the Seventh Floor; my views might have been included in some summary reports on such general matters as Chinese agricultural output and conditions. But I don't think that as a routine matter, the CG's reports were read on the Seventh Floor, except for some staffers. But, as I noted before, our exchanges with Washington were mostly high level in substantive content with the office director being our main interlocutor and the Assistant Secretary that of the Consul General.

*Q: Did you note any changes in PRC attitudes or policies as our involvement in Vietnam grew?*

ABRAMOWITZ: By 1965, we had a considerable presence in Vietnam. The Chinese were supplying arms and other materiel to North Vietnam and thus to the Viet-Cong. In the CG we wrestled with the issue of Chinese intentions toward the war. On this issue we and Washington did not see eye-to-eye generating some major debates. As I previously indicated the CG thought that China would provide significant assistance including perhaps even some man-power, but we never expected the Chinese to enter the fray full bore – as they did in Korea. This is a very broad brush description of our general view; it had some more nuanced aspects. But Washington, particularly George Ball and Whiting, took a much more grave view about Chinese intentions. Although I can not prove it, I think Ball and Whiting in part took this dire view of likely Chinese intervention because they were basically opposed to the Vietnam War, they wanted to limit our exposure, and expressed deep concern as the U.S. increased its involvement. My speculation may be unfair; I wasn't in Washington and privy to their deliberations, but it was what I was hearing. There was certainly no question the CG and parts of the Washington bureaucracy did not see eye-to-eye on the question of Chinese support for North Vietnam. That was a vigorous debate which became public, as I previously mentioned.

We did not have a "Vietnam Hand" on the staff. I did a small amount of reporting on Vietnam as did some of my colleagues. The CIA station spent a lot of time on that issue. We also got plenty of visitors who had great interest in Vietnam – e.g., Dan Ellsberg, Henry Kissinger. All were trying to find new approaches to a difficult situation. Most of these "thinkers" visits were officially sponsored.

We had, of course, a large number of visits from Vietnam-stationed personnel in Hong Kong for R&R. I talked to some of them, particularly the ones with whom I had a personal connection – classmates, colleagues from previous assignments, etc. We got a fairly wide range of information both from these personal contacts and from reading the correspondence between Saigon and Washington, copies of which were sent to the CG.

*Q: Talk a little about Sino-Soviet relations during this period you were in Hong Kong?*

ABRAMOWITZ: That of course was very high on our priority list of topics to follow. We already had indications – secret speeches, newspaper articles, talks with diplomats, etc. – that bilateral relations were deteriorating. These policy differences were strictly downplayed but the public exchange of letters between the two sides was increasingly tough. Moreover Soviet

technicians had already been withdrawn from China. We had to consider whether the Sino-Soviet Axis was irreparably broken and we were witnessing a change in the geo-strategic picture.

Our analysis focused on the severity of the tensions – an issue that was not easily answered from our vantage point. We were also faced with the question of what the U.S. might do to help move the “splitting” process along. Much of Washington was still quite skeptical about the nature and depth of this “split.” I also don’t remember much thought being given in Washington to how the U.S. might take advantage of this potential divide. Adequate attention was not paid to this huge foreign policy development until military incidents along the Sino-Soviet border in Siberia took place in 1969. At that point the U.S. government finally acknowledged that the Sino-Soviet split was real and would impact on many important issues. A consensus began to build in the U.S.G. that this development cried for U.S. activism and eventually resulted in President Nixon’s efforts to normalize relations with the PRC. This continuing development was one of those defining moment in history.

When I left Hong King in 1966 Washington was still in a cautious and skeptical mood, not certain that the Sino-Soviet Axis was dead and required new U.S. foreign policy initiatives.

*Q: What do you remember about your living conditions in Hong Kong?*

ABRAMOWITZ: We were fortunate. We had the house on the very top of Hong Kong. It looked over a great swath of the island. The house had been occupied by Mark Pratt, another Foreign Service officer, who was unexpectedly reassigned from Hong Kong to Laos because he had violated local regulations concerning use of water on private lawns. Hong Kong was in the middle of one of its periodic droughts. So the house became available. In addition to the vista, it had beautiful large rooms with 40 feet ceilings. We had numerous parties – primarily official ones – impossible without our excellent Chinese cook. This was the life of one of the junior members of the staff and it was bracing.

Our guests for the most part, were associated with our work. Hong Kong was a great assignment for a young FSO; it combined very interesting substantive work with a high standard of living that few junior officers had the opportunity to live. Our contacts, whether American, Chinese, British or other Europeans, were on the whole interesting, stimulating, and forthcoming. We worked hard, but there were off-setting benefits. Hong Kong was no hardship post, but an intellectually stimulating hard-working one. Now, However, I have little desire to go back to the island.

**NATALE H. BELLOCCHI**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1963-1964)**

**Assistant Commercial Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1964-1968)**

*Ambassador Natale H. Bellocchi was born in Little Falls, New York in 1926. He*

*received a degree in industrial management from Georgia Tech in 1944 and was soon drafted into the U.S. Army to serve in a rifle platoon during the Korean War. His Foreign Service career included positions in Hong Kong, Laos, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, India, and an ambassadorship to Botswana. Ambassador Bellocchi was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 21, 1995*

BELLOCCHI: We got inspected while I was in Laos and only two of them dared to come up from Bangkok. They inspected us at a time when it very fortuitously rained very heavily so flood waters were all over the place. Our secretaries were sitting at their desks typing away with water and lizards floating around the water, and right within the building. I'm not talking about outside, and they were very impressed with the way we kept everything going even in such a bad time. So I at that time had just become an officer--I'd passed my Foreign Service exam, I actually got sworn in in Laos by the DCM at that time, and they said, "Well, you don't have any language on your paper. What are you going to do about that?" So I said I would like to go to Chinese language; I'd been studying it privately on my own even there in Laos. He asked me, "With a name like yours, why not Italian? That would be the easiest way for you to get off the language problem." I said, "Yes, but if I studied Italian, I would only be able to be assigned to one place and I'm interested in Asia." So he said, "That's reasonable." And he recommended that I go to Taichung, and I did eventually get the orders to go to Taichung.

*Q: Taichung being the...*

BELLOCCHI: ...the language school on Taiwan.

*Q: I've got you there from about '63 to '65?*

BELLOCCHI: That's right.

*Q: I think it's important to understand the type of people who went to language school at that time. Could you talk about your class, and how the training was, and its outlook?*

BELLOCCHI: It was still at that time a carry-over of the old type of language school where it was very important that you mix. You'd get located in a place where there aren't many tourists and foreigners, so that you had to use your language as much as possible. They had a small school, at one point there were only six students and six teachers. It was always one-on-one, changing every hour, no English spoken in the school. Every weekend was off with one of the teachers to some village, or someplace else on the island where the teacher would never never speak English. You had to order food, and get to the hotel, and all this kind of business. So it was very intensive. We had six hours of class a day, plus we were expected to put in at least two to three hours of listening to tapes after that. They threw you into it no matter what. I had not had a bit of the romanization they were using at that time, the Yale romanization system. I'd studied my Chinese from characters because of the job I had, and it was kind of tough adjusting to the new system. I never have really learned much on romanization. I found it very difficult, but that didn't matter. They just threw you in there and you had to do it. I think being that intensive, and being isolated from foreigners, really was very very good. That's where I think government was getting their money's worth because after all of that, and going up to Taipei to the embassy, it

was really only then that I began to think in Chinese, and really felt comfortable speaking Chinese, even after that intensive thing. So if it's less intensive I don't see how people can really get as much out of it.

*Q: What about the officers who were getting trained with you? What was their outlook towards China, and your outlook too? You had Communist China, and you had Taiwan.*

BELLOCCHI: First of all there was a mix of people there. There were some military, some USIA people, there could have been any number of other agencies that had some people learning languages, and USIA people were focused more on culture and that area because the vocabulary is quite different. But as far as the attitude, that was still a time when Communist China was Red China, and the concern mainly was, well, there weren't really very many places to go if you were going to use the language except Southeast Asia, and that was only with the overseas Chinese group. In fact most of those people didn't speak Mandarin, so it was kind of limited. I think that everyone thought, well one day this is going to be useful because one day maybe there would be something opening up out there. But as far as attitude, China was Taiwan. That was the China that everyone knew, and not always with great admiration. There was a lot of criticism of the government of that day.

*Q: From your observation at that time, can you characterize the Kuomintang government on Taiwan.*

BELLOCCHI: Very good in terms of efficiency, the use of our AID money, very impressive. Of course, very disarming always because they're always quick to acknowledge, "Oh, we really appreciate all the help you're giving..." this type of thing. They're very very good at this, and I think it's not a put-on, I think maybe they are sincere. But there was also very much an awareness at that time that it was a small group that was governing, a majority of people that weren't really participating at all in the whole process. In fact, that was my major emphasis when I went up to Taipei because I was assigned up there as the assistant commercial attaché, and it was at a time when AID was just phasing out. In fact they closed their doors in '65, and we had to look for export opportunities. Before that we were dealing with government. So AID always dealt with government only, and government always dealt with their state enterprises, and companies that were more or less Mainlander run companies. And when I got up there, they were saying we really had to start developing a market. Most of the private sector is really Taiwanese, not Mainlander, and we didn't know anybody. So I started a major effort, in fact I wrote a very large report ...I visited almost every factory on that island, went all through that island visiting factories, getting to know a lot of people, and then developing a huge list of Taiwanese business men. Some of them very substantial, and we really started to work on getting to know them better and developing export opportunities for them. Again, you can make every job a fascinating job, and it was fascinating for me.

*Q: You were commercial officer in Taipei from '63 to '68.*

BELLOCCHI: '65 to '68.

*Q: In the first place, was the attitude of the ruling people who'd come over from the Mainland, sort of looking down on the Taiwanese?*

BELLOCCHI: Oh, yes, very much.

*Q: Sometimes these attitudes get picked up by the embassy officers?*

BELLOCCHI: Well, to a certain extent because in those days, just say as an example a political section...I can't remember how many officers were there, say four or five anyway, they would always have one that had had three months extra study in Taiwanese which, of course, meant he could say hello and goodbye maybe at the most. But at least he focused on the Taiwanese community from the political reporting standpoint. It wasn't given that much attention because all the power was in the hands of mainlanders. So I think there was certainly sufficient element of our people who were China oriented, to think that Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang and the rest of them were here temporarily and one day they would return in some fashion back there to the mainland. But there was also a lot of criticism of our dealings with the authorities. To be fair, that's something that doesn't come easily for us, and we were well aware of the inequities there. As time went on that grew, that is, the awareness that the Taiwanese were really second class citizens in their own place.

*Q: Who was our ambassador at that time?*

BELLOCCHI: Admiral Wright, Jerauld Wright. I'll never forget Jerauld Wright. He was only there for a short time. On my first assignment after arriving in the embassy, a lawyer from Los Angeles had a trade complaint on some scrap iron. Somehow or other \$100,000 had changed hands, and the Los Angeles client was claiming they hadn't received the scrap iron, while the local scrap iron dealer claimed they had. The American lawyer came to the embassy for help and they sort of hooked me, and said, "You go and help him." So I was the translator, an interpreter for a full week of this guy bargaining, and by the end of the week, as usual, the fellow's foot was practically on the airplane going back to Los Angeles before the final deal was struck for \$40,000. And they agreed, and he got a check for \$40,000 there at the airport, and to this day I don't have any idea who came out on that one. It seemed to me that maybe both of them came out, I'm not sure. But unbeknownst to me, that lawyer, when he got back to Los Angeles wrote a letter to Ambassador Wright to say how much he appreciated the help this fellow Bellocchi gave, he was a superb interpreter. I didn't know anything about this, but my boss from the Department of Commerce, a very fine...he's still alive and lives out in Minnesota, wrote my OER, efficiency report, and he showed it to me as they were supposed to do. Then he said, "While you're reading this, I want to show you something that I didn't have the heart to show you before." This was months after...he pulled out of the center drawer, this letter from this fellow in Los Angeles and all these fine things he said. Scratched across the top of that letter, "I don't believe in complimenting an officer for just doing his job." Signed Jerauld Wright.

So Wright was there at first, but then there was a hiatus...

*Q: Today is April 10th, 1995. Nat, before we move on, I think we're just about finished with your first time in Taipei after you became commercial officer.*

BELLOCCHI: Assistant Commercial Attaché, that's right.

*Q: I'm not sure if I brought it up but I'd like to bring it up in case we didn't mention it last time. As you got into Chinese, and you were on Taiwan, did the shadow of John Stuart Service and the old China hands who were badly burned by McCarthy and the people on the right, did you new China hands kind of look over your shoulder and think about that much or not?*

BELLOCCHI: I don't think we thought about it at my level at that time. But you certainly sensed that up in the higher levels where policy decisions were actually being made, it was an element in the kind of decisions one was going to be making to be sure one stayed out of trouble.

*Q: Were you saying, this isn't going to happen to me. Or at a certain point you better watch...I mean looking towards the future because by taking the language you had made a commitment. Did your cohorts sit around and talk about this, or not?*

BELLOCCHI: I think in Taipei there was always...I guess among the liberal element of our China types who thought we ought to make more contacts with the native Taiwanese, that this was where all the people were and one day there would be a democracy, and we ought to..., etc. And there were the other cautious ones saying, our policy is with Chiang Kai-shek, and retake the Mainland, and all that kind of business. And even though we knew it was patently ridiculous, that Taiwan was not going to retake the Mainland in that sense, nobody really would stand up and say, let's drop this fiction.

It got to the point where...I remember a little incident when I was leaving Taiwan, Fred Chien and Paul Chou, and one other from the North American section of the Foreign Office in Taipei, had a little lunch together with a couple of us from the embassy. At the time I think Fred was about the number three in the North American section, he's now the Foreign Minister. We were kidding and the inevitable question always came up, what's going to happen when the Gimo goes? The Gimo was pretty old at that time. And Fred who wears glasses, sort of put his glasses down toward the end of his nose, and said, "You mean if he goes." We all got a big kick out of that, but it was the sort of thing that demonstrated that he was considered supreme by everyone, and everyone thought they had to pay public obeisance to it, including us Americans. When I was down in Taichung Ambassador Kirk was just leaving, he was Kennedy's ambassador to the ROC. He was followed then by Jerauld Wright who just died recently.

*Q: Yes, about a week ago.*

BELLOCCHI: Jerauld Wright was conservative, nothing could be better than Chiang Kai-shek and his people, so one had to be a little careful on how one were criticized the Taiwanese Chinese, to protect your own career I guess.

**THOMAS L. HUGHES**  
**Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research**

## Washington, DC (1963-1969)

*Mr. Hughes was born and raised in Minnesota and was educated at Carleton College, Oxford University and Yale University. After service with the US Air Force he worked on Capitol Hill and became active in Democratic Party politics. He later joined the Department of State, first as Assistant to Under Secretary Chester Bowles and subsequently as Deputy Director, then as Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, where he served during the event filled period 1961 to 1969. His assignments brought him in close contact with the major political figures of that era. His final government assignment was to Embassy London as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Hughes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: While you were going through this, what was the attitude of Kennedy's headhunters towards the foreign service?*

HUGHES: Oh, the headhunters, and Bowles was one of them, were very skeptical about the foreign service, especially its oldest ranking officers. Chet thought that State needed big injections of younger, fresher blood. Shriver and Kennedy himself agreed with Bowles on this. They thought that in many cases the foreign service was part of the problem. Rusk, by contrast, admired the foreign service. If you looked at his favorite bureau, East Asia (FE), he surely regarded the U. Alexis Johnsons and Walter McConaughys of this world as eminent public servants. Elsewhere in the department, there was a certain sympathy for that part of the service which had suffered cleansings and expulsions as a result of McCarthy and Dulles, or had been left to wither on the vine, or sent to Latin America instead of to Asia because they were politically unacceptable. The fallout from the who-lost-China struggle left the East Asia Bureau in the hands of the Taiwan crowd, people who basically were going nowhere on China policy. On the other hand Chet wanted to appoint outsiders with positive reputations, which would make it easier for American policy to adjust to new opportunities.

*Q: I heard from somebody that Eisenhower had told Kennedy that he was going to support him in foreign policy but he shouldn't try to change our confrontation with communist China.*

HUGHES: My impression of Eisenhower throughout the Kennedy administration was that he was unremittingly unhelpful on Asia policy. Kennedy in part appointed John McCone as CIA director because he was a Republican with good ties to Ike. He was often sent up to Gettysburg, and invariably came back from the general with hawkish responses on Vietnam and China. Eisenhower always proposed reinvesting in our military effort up to, and including, the use of nuclear weapons. Later Johnson dispatched General Goodpaster to Gettysburg, and the response was the same. I thought Eisenhower's advice to Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960's was deplorable. It contrasted sharply with his own non-intervention in Indochina in the 50's after the French debacle there.

*Q: During the Kennedy administration, including your former boss Roger Hilsman, there was this infatuation with special forces and green berets-- somehow you have bi-lingual people parachuted into the jungle, and this would turn things around. I probably am overstating. But*

*did you find a diminution of that view as the Johnson people became more involved in the war?*

HUGHES: Well, yes, in fact there was a diminution after Roger left the government in early 1964. But it is also fair to say that he wasn't alone in that enthusiasm. Bob Komer picked it up pretty quickly. Bobby Kennedy continued to treasure the concept as one of Jack's legacies. In addition Roger is probably still a better defender of strategic hamlets than I am. He should be interviewed on that subject to see what he thinks in retrospect. . Of course he left INR in March '63 and that was relatively early in the Vietnam saga. As assistant secretary for far eastern affairs, he was able to continue that interest for another year as the operational head of the geographical bureau into the first months of the Johnson administration.

So I don't think there was an abrupt change. Certainly the whole goal of strategic hamlets and pacifying the countryside remained a central objective for those who thought the war had to be won in the south. All that persisted. And then, perversely, the more troops that were dispatched, the more wedded we became to winning the war in the south. As Rolling Thunder and other air force operations failed to produce any dramatically positive results in the North, the policymakers again turned their attention to saving the South. There was a kind of trade-off--attacking the North for a while and when that proved to be unproductive, concentrating again on the South. That was the kind of mental process affecting the policymakers by 1966. There was no question that these contrasting arguments were on the table. The analysis that showed why you were unlikely to succeed here and also why you were unlikely to succeed there confronted the policymakers with a continuing dilemma. Almost all of them, of course, were also proud veterans of World War II. Kennedy supporters were still wearing his PT boat tie clasps left over from the 1960 Kennedy campaign. They weren't about to give up when it came to professional patriotism.

Johnson inherited all of that. He was proud of his own war record, such as it was. There was even a residual secessionist mentality from our own Civil War that identified with South Vietnam. Rusk and Johnson, for example, shared this historical memory in many ways. Both were poor boys with deep Southern backgrounds in rural Georgia and Texas. Both had grandfathers who fought for the Confederacy. In a way the South's revenge for Gettysburg ever since their defeat in 1865, was their subsequent takeover of the US army. Already in the Spanish-American War and the First World War, many US generals were coming out of Dixie. This was in a way the last bugle call for the Confederacy.

I remember Harriman coming out of a meeting on Vietnam saying that he felt like the only Northerner in the room.

After World War II the Pentagon had also had a personal impact on the State Department. General Marshall moved in as Secretary of State. Colonel Dean Rusk who served in the Pentagon after the war, came over to State under Marshall. So there was not only a military-industrial complex but a diplomatic-military-industrial complex. Rusk's protégé U. Alexis Johnson at State had a direct pipeline to the Pentagon. A bureau of political-military affairs was established at State to assure constant contact. Folk memories from World War II were still present in many Washington corridors of power in the 1960's.

Dean Rusk idolized General Marshall. The latter's bitter experience with China also had a lasting

influence on Rusk. He himself had been traumatized by the Chinese intervention in Korea. You couldn't have found a more sensitized audience than the Secretary of State over the possibility of Chinese intervention. Speaking of China, there was another curious development in our public diplomacy as the Vietnam war continued into 1967 and 1968. The student protests at home were accelerating and the country was obviously getting more and more deeply divided. The public rationale for the war needed upgrading because saving South Vietnam from communism was no longer quite adequate. There had to be a bigger rationale than that, not only from the public relations point of view, but also to buttress the internal confidence of the policy makers themselves. They had to convince themselves that the stakes were larger than they previously seemed. Suddenly the Chinese threat was magnified. Rusk spoke of a future haunted by a billion Chinese armed with nuclear weapons. McNamara announced that the reason we needed a missile defense was protection against China. Paradoxically, however, the more China became their rationale for the war, the more fixated Rusk, Johnson and others became on the possibility of Chinese intervention.

Rusk had come into office still believing in the Sino-Soviet bloc, and he was one of the last in the administration to accept the fact that there had been a real falling out between the two communist rivals. When INR changed the spelling of Peiping to Peking, from "Peip" to "Pek", we were pioneers in the State Department, well in advance of the Far East bureau and of the Secretary.

*Q: Was it an acceptance of the communists?*

HUGHES: Yes, it was a denial of the mythology of Taiwan and an acceptance of the undeniable fact of Communist rule in Peking. But the most significant point was a tactical one. In the mid-'60's, Rusk finally accepted the Sino-Soviet split when he realized that it would help let the Russians off the hook on Vietnam. This would enable him to conduct arms control negotiations with the Russians. The more the Johnson administration became embroiled in Vietnam, the more the policymakers became willing to recognize the Soviet-Chinese split. Gradually it became obvious that we were going to conduct a war policy with a China rationale in the morning and a peace policy with a Soviet rationale in the afternoon. By 1966 we have Kosygin and Johnson at their summit meeting at Glassboro. Our debacle in Vietnam had gradually let the Russians off the hook, leaving the Chinese as the main rationale for the war. The US policymakers' chagrin over the unexpected Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was therefore all the greater.

*Q: I want to return to the role of INR and your role. Were you in the State Department responding to this in subtle ways? Were you suggesting how we should look at this split?*

HUGHES: As I said, we were convinced of the split long before the secretary of state was willing to admit it. He was briefed about it when he came into office, and details of the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relationship were a staple in his normal daily briefings. INR and the intelligence community in general also produced more substantial estimates on the split from time to time. Rusk resisted accepting the seriousness of the split, let alone its implications, for quite some time. I came to think that he had a special problem if China was going to become the major rationale for the Vietnam war. It was the Chinese intervention in Korea that had burned him once before, and it was the possibility of a repeat performance in Vietnam that underlay his

incrementalism when it came to escalation.

Setting up China as the major culprit also enhanced Whiting's role in INR as the watcher and warner about every move that the Chinese might be making. So Rusk became ever more attentive to the Chinese threat. His first question at my morning briefings always used to be "Any sign of Chinese movement? Any sign of Chinese reaction?" If Rusk had not been so sensitive about possible Chinese intervention, the rapidity and breadth of our air attack on the north would probably have increased. .

*Q: Whiting was your man, but was there any disquiet on your part or on the part of other China watchers? Did they feel he belonged to the old school and there was a new school looking at the cultural revolution?*

HUGHES: We were quite happy with Whiting in the 1964-6 time frame when he was still with us. After he departed for Hong Kong, and John Holdridge joined INR, there was some shift in attitude. Arguably the cultural revolution did put a brake on Chinese interventionist impulses, in turn enabling US policy to be more venturesome. How assertive Rusk actually was with Johnson on the China issue remains unclear. Johnson himself was deeply worried about China. Rusk continued with his mysterious posture: "I don't speak out at the cabinet meetings. I reserve my advice for the president." We never knew exactly what that was. He clearly saw nuclear non - proliferation as a place where the U.S. and the Soviet Union had a common interest. He was very enthusiastic about pursuing this and undoubtedly thought it could take some of the curse off the Johnson administration's Vietnam predicament. The worse that predicament became, the more Rusk redoubled his efforts with Moscow. That certainly was true right up to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 which of course necessitated another policy U-turn. Thereafter we were back stopping both Chinese and Russian communism again.

*Q: Again, going back a bit but moving off Vietnam onto China. Were you able to get a pretty good fix on China and what was happening? You mentioned there were more China experts than Vietnam experts.*

HUGHES: Yes, but they all labored under the cloud of McCarthyism and were scarred by the "who lost China" controversy. There were academic experts within easy reach in Washington, like the distinguished Doak Barnett at Brookings. There were people in the State Department who were more or less exiled from Chinese affairs like Doak's brother Bob Barnett, who worked in State in another capacity on the economics side. Many ranking foreign service officers with China careers had been burned by the McCarthy experience and had left the government or transferred to other geographic areas. But there was a cadre of younger foreign service officers like Charles Cross, incidentally a classmate of mine from Carleton College, who has just written some stimulating new memoirs. They were serving in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or elsewhere on the periphery of China.

Some of the veterans from the 1950s were still around like U. Alexis Johnson. But they had learned to be gun-shy on China. They knew which way the wind was blowing. There wasn't anything very exciting about the China analysis coming from the senior foreign service officers who had escaped controversy for one reason or another. So we are really talking about younger

foreign service officers or academics. The brilliant young James C. Thompson, another political appointee, was a conspicuous exception. He too had emerged from the Chester Bowles stable. He eventually worked either in the State Department or White House for everyone across the spectrum from Bowles to the Bundy brothers to Walt Rostow. Jim never ceased to speak truth to power. He even accompanied Humphrey on his famous trip to Southeast Asia, and along the way he memorably tangled with the Vice President on China (see the Humphrey memoirs).

Thinking back on it, I'm not sure that at the time we appreciated the real depth of the Chinese cultural revolution. The careful incrementalism of the US air strikes on North Vietnam were designed to avoid provoking China. But the Chinese Cultural Revolution may have dampened any Chinese interventionist temptations then as well. This combination of factors may explain the external caution displayed by the Chinese. You could argue that the regime was so concerned about its internal convulsion that it wasn't going to be venturesome outside. But our official and public view was more ominous.

The earlier Sino-Indian war also illustrated the manipulative way Washington utilized its anti-Chinese point of departure both for policy thinking and policy explanation. The war gave the Indian lobby, such as it was, a positive way to exploit the prevailing anti-Chinese atmosphere in Washington. Here was one more proof of Chinese aggression, never mind the facts. (Allen Whiting, for example, argued that China hadn't really triggered the war with India.) Once more you had an overriding political reaction. This time it separated the supporters of India from the specialists on China. Those few who had worked for better relations with India were not going to miss this sudden and welcome opportunity. India could now get serious attention from the U.S. government since it was engaged in a struggle with China. This was enough to produce yet another Harriman mission. And since we were always good at pressing weapons on people, there were rush proposals for US military assistance to India. Naturally pressure for US intelligence collaboration with Delhi quickly followed, especially since Washington was eager for information about Chinese preparations for their nuclear tests at Lop Nor. The Chinese "attack" was of course a calamity for Nehru and non-alignment, and Nehru's carefully cultivated relationship with Chou en Lai lay in tatters. Washington was eager to exploit that development.

Conversely the Sino-Indian war also confronted the American champions of Pakistan with an awkward readjustment. Our U-2 base for the famous over-flights of the USSR was not the only stake we had in Pakistan. For a long time our covert intelligence operators had also used Peshawar as a listening post aimed at Russia. We liked to kid ourselves that the Pakistanis shared our interest in collecting electronic intelligence from the USSR. But as soon as American inspectors would leave for the day, the Paks would switch the antennae from north to east, in order to train them on their favorite Indian targets. We were interested in the USSR, while they were interested in India, and not surprisingly both interests were accommodated.

I spent some time in early 1964 in India and Pakistan, and again debriefed at some length on my return. A contemporary transcript of that debriefing about South Asia is available in the Bowles collection at Yale.

*Q: How about looking at the Soviet Union? I would have thought we would have had a very sophisticated INR cadre dealing with that by the '60s.*

HUGHES: We did. Throughout the decade, INR had several Kremlinologists with strong credentials, both foreign service officers and civil servants. Our Soviet analysts probably had mixed views about how much could be accomplished with the Russians at that point in the Cold War. Hal Sonnenfeldt, then one of our INR office directors, was a hard liner, if that is the right word. He was a realist, as befits a man who later became known as “Kissinger’s Kissinger”. There were plenty of warnings about the dangers and limits in US-Soviet collaboration. In 1966-7. however, despite the view of the Soviet Union as a continuing danger, there seemed to be new possible policy opportunities with Moscow. They recurred a few years later with the Nixon-Kissinger decision to turn our anti-China policy upside down and to drive a bigger wedge between the two Communist powers.

**DAVID G. BROWN**  
**Rotation Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1964-1966)**

*David G. Brown was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1940. He graduated from Princeton University in 1964 entered the Foreign Service. His assignments include Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Before retirement in 1996, he served as Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 28, 2003.*

*Q: What do you recall about the Philippines?*

BROWN: Not a great deal. I do remember reading about the Korean War. The mental picture I have of myself is of a kid lying on the floor with newspapers and circling words that I didn't know in the newspaper stories about the Korean War and going to the dictionary and looking them up. We lived in a compound with walls around it, and I went to the Manila American School. Honestly speaking, my life revolved around the school and the country club. There is not much other than this memory of reading about the Korean War. Did I remember later that the Chinese got into the fight at that time? No, I have no recollection of that. I was not seriously interested in international affairs. I was not reading, as I do now, avidly about Americans who were involved in foreign policy. That came later.

*Q: At Princeton, what areas did you sort of concentrate on?*

BROWN: There's an interesting story there, which I do remember. In the spring of 1959 when I was accepted to Princeton, I was sent forms asking me to sign up for fall semester classes. At that time, I had just finished reading the book, *The Ugly American*. That book sparked my interest in international affairs and a diplomatic career. Going through the catalog, I noticed that Princeton taught Chinese. So I wrote down Chinese, sent the class registration form to Princeton, and then went off for the summer. That summer I was working at a camp for handicapped children north of Toronto in the lake area, and I didn't give a thought to Princeton for almost the whole summer. In September, I arrived at Princeton and was handed the registration card on

which there was, in handwriting that looked remarkably like my own, the word "Chinese." Did I really want to do this, I asked myself?

I then went and talked to Fritz Mote who was a professor of what Princeton called Oriental Studies. He said, well, you took Spanish when you were in high school. You got pretty far along with it. Here's what I recommend. Take the one class in Spanish you need to meet the language requirement. But also try Chinese out for the first semester. If you like it, you can continue. That's exactly what I did. It wasn't so much that I loved Chinese. It was that the professors in the program were really attentive to their students and cared. So, I stuck with Chinese, and Fritz Mote arranged for me to get a scholarship at the end of my junior year to go to Taiwan for a year abroad. I went. Not only was I married at that point, but also I had a young son who was three months old. The \$3,000 scholarship allowed us to fly to San Francisco and get on a boat and sail to Taiwan, spend a year there learning Chinese on my own and doing research on the thesis I had to write.

*Q: Now, on the Taiwan side, what did they do? Was there a structured course or did they dump you in Taiwan and it was up to you or what?*

BROWN: That was the first year that Princeton had sent students to Taiwan. Two of us went. For my colleague and I, the only requirements was that we be in Taiwan, that we devote ourselves in some fashion to studying Chinese and Chinese society and, when we came back, that we would make recommendations on what future students should do. The latter was really very easy because the year that I was there, which was 1962-3, was the year that Stanford University organized the Stanford Center which was an inter-university program operated on National Taiwan University campus. My colleague and I did not have a structured program. We got introductions to some people who would help us. I tried to audit courses at National Taiwan University but found out that my language was not adequate. Therefore, I fell back on a pattern of doing tutoring with a professor and pursuing my thesis research.

*Q: What was that?*

BROWN: The thesis was about a man, Hu Shih, who you've probably heard of. He was a liberal intellectual in China who participated in the May 4th movement. Hu also served under Chiang Kai-shek as a government official including as ambassador to the United States. When the nationalists retreated to Taiwan, Hu was involved in setting up an intellectual journal of contemporary affairs. One of Hu's colleagues in this was a man named Lei Chen. Lei decided to go a step further and organize a political party in opposition to the nationalists. When he did that the government cracked down and threw him in jail on trumped up charges. This had happened two years before I went to Taiwan. What I tried to do was to write a thesis to understand why Hu Shih had chosen not to come to his colleague's defense. So, I spent a lot of time reading Hu's writings.

*Q: Had he died by this time?*

BROWN: Yes, Hu had passed away. I did interview some people who knew him. I was really green, and I did not have anyone in Taiwan who was helping me. Censorship was heavy, and the

subject was one that was very difficult to discuss with Chinese. I could have gotten myself thrown out of the country.

*Q: A naive kid wandering around asking about somebody who was associated with dissidents.*

BROWN: So, it's probably fortunate that I spent more of my time in the library at Academia Sinica. This was only possible because of connections that the university had set up for me. I was able to go out to Academia Sinica, use their files and read everything that was in the press at the time and research the laws that were in place. It is fascinating now because Chen Shui-bian, the current President of Taiwan, has just released a study about Lei Chen's arrest. It sheds light on things that were hidden at that time.

*Q: But looking at this figure, did this give you, I mean, granted you're really green on this whole thing, but did it sort of open up a slight window on to Chinese political life and all that?*

BROWN: Oh, yes.

*Q: How things worked and all that?*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: Did you have any old mentor or something you could go to and say, "What's this all about?"*

BROWN: I didn't have anyone like that when I was in Taiwan. On my return, Prof. Mote was my mentor. He worked with me on that thesis. I have a recollection that also maybe the other person who was helping was Marius Jansen, who was a Japan specialist. He has a very keen analytical mind and he helped quite a bit.

*Q: How did you find living there? I mean, was this a society, what sort of society did you find this living in Taiwan at that time?*

BROWN: One strong impression was the extent to which the society was still wrapped up in Chiang's goal of returning to the mainland. The visuals were something that you associate now with a communist country. Billboards and placards and statues extolling Chiang. Yet, I never had any sense that I was being followed or harassed.

Another one of the visuals was that there still were pillboxes at main intersections, creating an image that if there was ever any unrest; soldiers were going to be ready to gun down the populace. In one sense it was rather comical because the pillboxes were often painted with slogans. Everyday life was pretty good; life seemed to be improving. This was the beginning of Taiwan's economic miracle. We lived in a Japanese style house with almost no heating. Bought almost everything off the local market. I survived economically because my dad had worked out with the local representative of the American President Line for me to exchange my dollars and get local currency, the New Taiwan Dollar, at about two and a half times the official exchange rate. That's what allowed me to stretch my modest fellowship and support my family for ten months.

*Q: Was there a feeling because this was not that long after the Taiwan Strait crisis and all. Was there a concern of Mainland China jumping on Taiwan or Taiwan jumping on Mainland China? Was this sort of an issue that was around?*

BROWN: I will have to say that I don't recall thinking or worrying about that.

*Q: Well, I mean it probably shows something. What about were you getting, was what was happening in Mainland China at all a topic?*

BROWN: We would talk about it occasionally amongst American friends, but it wasn't something I spent time talking to people in Taiwan about.

*Q: But this was, now do you recall any questions that came during the oral exam?*

BROWN: Well I remember one. Should we recognize "Red China?" I made what I thought was a terribly persuasive case for recognizing the PRC. The examiners had two comments about the exam. Sonny, you don't know very much about the United States. You've got to study it more. It wasn't quite that brusque, but almost. The other was that I had guts trying to get into the Foreign Service by making an argument for recognizing Beijing. Yet, apparently, I'd made the case persuasively and respectfully.

*Q: Well, that's interesting. You know, I think there is a whole very solid body of opinion who calls it practically we should recognized the PRC. I remember I came in the Foreign Service in '55, but I always had that, it just seemed like a lot of people over there were talking to the Soviets, why not these, they had some other problems, but just how to deal with this government.*

BROWN: Under Kennedy, there were people, Roger Hilsman and others, who were advocating improving relations with Beijing. We would have gone farther at that time if the Cultural Revolution hadn't intervened, but that's a different story.

*Q: I heard somebody tell the story that when Eisenhower talked to Kennedy just before the inauguration he said, "I'll give you support on a lot of things, but don't try to recognize China" I don't know if this makes sense. Kennedy was very cautious. He had won by a very small margin. So, you came in really right out of college.*

BROWN: Though I was a bit older because in the Toronto education system, they have 13 years of high school and I'd done that and then I'd done the extra year in Taiwan. So, I was almost 24 when I joined the Foreign Service.

*Q: Did you have any feeling that the oral exam may have pointed out that you missed something about being an American? You know, I mean American history or?*

BROWN: Well, this was pointed out to me, but no, I didn't have any sense I was missing something. I was really focused on trying to understand foreign countries, particularly China and Taiwan.

*Q: How did you find your language was by the time you graduated?*

BROWN: When I came in I was tested I think at the 2/2+ and my first assignment was to Taipei. The Department said I didn't need language training. I was told to study on my own.

*Q: Then your first assignment was to Taiwan?*

BROWN: Right.

*Q: As what?*

BROWN: If you remember the Service in those days, there were rotational junior officer positions

*Q: Yes.*

BROWN: My first six months was in the economic section. I was the assistant commercial officer working for a wonderful avuncular man named Ollie Bongard, the Commercial Counselor. I guess my greatest accomplishment at that time was to launch a Chinese language commercial newsletter working with the Chinese on the stuff at the embassy. So, I was really digging into that subject matter. It was a great deal of fun finding out how one prints with a Chinese typewriter, interviewing people about how they liked the newsletter. It was mimeographed, a very simple production. Then I did a stint, which was supposed to be six months, but ended up being nine or ten, in the consular section wrestling with the question of student visas. Dick Hart, the section chief, was another mentor who took me under his wing.

*Q: What was sort of the attitude of dealing with at that particular point, anybody who got a degree and came to the United States as a student would probably dig in. Now, it's quite a different matter. There's much more backwards and forwards.*

BROWN: We were having maybe 5% or 10% of students come back when their education was finished. It was not a very satisfactory situation.

*Q: What about, first of all, who was the ambassador?*

BROWN: At the beginning, it was Adm. Wright. I recall he left soon after my arrival.

*Q: I'm just looking in the, Wright, Gerald Wright, yes. He was an admiral.*

BROWN: What were his years?

*Q: Gerald Wright was there from '63 to '65.*

BROWN: Okay. I arrived in '65 and then there was a gap and I think the next man was Kirk.

*Q: No, Walter McConaughy.*

BROWN: Walter McConaughy. Anyway, there was a long gap. My current colleague, Ralph Clough, was the DCM and charge then.

*Q: What was sort of the attitude, I mean, you're the junior officer there and it always ends up I gather because of my experience, a clique of junior officers, you know, who sit around and talk over tea or beer or whatever it is. What was the attitude towards Chiang in Taiwan in those days?*

BROWN: Disrespectful I would say. He wasn't in senility at this point, but he was in declining health and the whole idea that he was going to lead them back to the mainland was obviously a charade. The focus of people's attention then was Chiang Ching-kuo. Given his mixed background, what was he likely to be? It was clear that he was going to take over from his father. I'm trying to remember, in 1965 or '66, Ching-kuo was, I think, Vice Minister of Defense.

*Q: He had also come out of the sort of the enforcement side.*

BROWN: Absolutely. He had a very dark image at that point.

*Q: Did you get any feel for being a China hand at this point? Were there China hands around and were you sort of?*

BROWN: Well, I certainly thought I was part of a group of people who had made a commitment to studying and knowing about China, yes.

*Q: How about studying on the side?*

BROWN: I worked at it pretty hard. I guess one of the highlights of my time there was joining the Junior Chamber of Commerce. I spent a lot of time with them and used them as a network to get to know people around the island. The Jaycees was a very well developed organization, and it was entirely in the hands of Chinese. There were a few foreigners in an organization of several hundred members on the island. There were three or four foreigners and one of my colleagues and I from the embassy were amongst those.

*Q: Who was the colleague?*

BROWN: Bob Littell. The Jaycees was a tremendous eye into Taiwan society. It allowed me to use my Chinese, as everything was done in Chinese. It was a tremendous help to my language, but it also was a window into what was taking place amongst younger upcoming people on the island. I had an opportunity to see an organization that had a lot of both mainlanders and Taiwanese in it. They were running for elections within this organization to get chosen for the leadership positions and how did they go about doing it. How did the networks that they developed work? To what extent were people reaching across the ethnic lines? This was still a period when Taiwan was very much split, not in terms of political organization because there weren't any opposition parties, but in terms of ethnic background. There was still a great deal of

hostility towards the mainlanders.

*Q: As you, well, even back to the time when you were a student there, this split, did you find that one tended to sort of get absorbed into the mainland thing at first or was there, could you bridge this gap?*

BROWN: While a student, I did not get to know many young Chinese. My friends were other Americans and my contacts were older people at Academia Sinica and Taiwan University. I met some students, but not many. It shows the things I missed. I should have been actively involved with students, but I wasn't. I was young and much more bookish. Back in Taiwan a second time, I was older more mature and operating in an environment where people were engrossed in local politics. As I said, the Jaycees were a tremendous window for a young person like myself to take advantage of. I was 25, 26 and these people tended to be in their late '30s and '40s, but nevertheless I made a lot of friendships, some of which are still alive today.

*Q: Well, did you find a curiosity on the part of the people in Taiwan from the professional class about who you were, where you were coming from and all that?*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: What about at the embassy was the embassy absorbed by the mainlanders or was sort of the handwriting on the wall for everyone that you know, eventually the Taiwanese are going to take over and we better get ourselves positioned correctly?*

BROWN: The mainlanders dominated government and many of ones contacts were with the bureaucracy. There was at that time an officer in the political section whose job it was to follow the opposition and that was Jay Taylor. He was one of four or five people in the political section. Everybody else was focused on working with either the Nationalist party or the government apparatus or the military, all of which at that time were dominated by mainlanders. There was just one person really in the whole embassy whose job it was to get to know the opposition, and he had to operate carefully. There were prominent opposition figures at that time. One that was talked about a great deal was Henry Kao, who had been elected mayor of Taipei City.

*Q: Was the KMT or the nationalist government coming down heavily or were there any opposition?*

BROWN: I won't say there was nothing, but there was not a great deal of opposition activity in this period. It was too dangerous. I don't know this so much from my recollections from that time, as from the study I have kept up since. I teach a course now on Taiwan. You had the Lei Chen case in 1960 as I said and then there was the arrest of Peng Ming-min and two students who were with him in late 1964. He was a professor at the National Taiwan University who was arrested just before my time at the Embassy. His case played out during my time. I can't remember any other serious arrests taking place during my tenure. It wasn't until the '70s that you began to have a resurgence of active opposition activity. What you had in my time there as I've said were some Taiwanese who would run in local elections against the KMT and occasionally win.

*Q: Were the Taiwanese moving into the coming from the chamber of commerce, were they moving into the commercial side?*

BROWN: Oh, absolutely. You could see this. Particularly outside Taipei, it was almost, the Jaycee organization was almost entirely Taiwanese outside of Taipei.

*Q: Looking sort of back on this, but at the time is there such a thing as a Taiwanese, people from the island of Taiwan a way of operating that may be different from the mainlanders?*

BROWN: Culturally there was little difference. I was quite impressed how strongly Chinese Taiwanese society was. If you go there today, there is a resurgence of interest in Taiwan culture, which hadn't really started at that time. It really began in the '70s. Now Taiwanese nationalists have a very clear concept of how their society is different from other Chinese societies. This is what social science calls an "imagined community." They draw on their past to suit political needs, but in terms of why are Taiwan businessmen so successful on the mainland in their investments, it is in part because they know how to operate in a Chinese environment. They know the language, they know the culture, they know how people act.

*Q: When did the Cultural Revolution start?*

BROWN: 1966. It was just starting as I left to go on to Vietnam.

*Q: Was there any view that the Peoples' Republic was going to be something with whom we could do business or did you find with you and your colleagues did you feel that oh, when is that shoe going to drop?*

BROWN: Yes, my recollection is that we talked about this a lot and that many of us thought something ought to be done to open contacts with Beijing. But we were just junior officers in the embassy, and in those days junior officers weren't let in on issues such as these that were handled by the Ambassador.

*Q: What about, with the chamber of commerce or even as a consular officer and all, did you have much dealing with the bureaucracy at all?*

BROWN: Yes, some. After my consular time was up I was transferred to the administrative section. There I got an unusual task to catalogue all the Chinese employees, foreign nationals contractors, residence staffs etc. This wasn't a counter intelligence issue, just a simple question of who was working for us, doing what in what capacity. The study turned up a surprising number of people employed officially to handle private work for senior officers. I endeared myself to my colleagues asking why taxpayer money was being used to hire gardeners to cut the lawns of all the officers in the political and administrative sections and why is it that the administrative counselor had more of these services? I was getting in trouble. So, I was moved out of that section pretty quickly.

*Q: When did you finish up?*

BROWN: I had hoped that my last rotation would be to the USIS office in southern Taiwan. I had traveled around the island and visited the south several times. There was a staffing gap in the USIS office in Tainan, the cultural center in the southern part of Taiwan. So, I made a pitch for not going to the political section, but spending my last six months as the branch public affairs officer in Tainan. I was told no; you should go to the political section. I think the Embassy was afraid that I was too green and too prone to do things on my own. So, it was safer to have me in the political section. I did that for about two months and then there was an appeal for people to go to Vietnam. I volunteered.

*Q: Had Vietnam been a subject of conversation or discussion the island?*

BROWN: Yes, but how? Here my memory fails me.

*Q: What sort of was the motivation?*

BROWN: Vietnam was becoming controversial. I thought it would be good to go where the action was. Was I for the war, was I against the war, was I going down there to find out what the truth was, you know.

*Q: Well, as I look upon it my motivation for volunteering there in '68 or '69 was kind of this is where the action was and I wanted to see it. A sense of a little adventure and this was sort of the focus of all; I wanted to take a look at it.*

BROWN: Was there an element that it would look better to volunteer rather than just being ordered to go there? There may have been something in that because just everybody was going one way or another.

*Q: When you arrived there in '66, what was the situation in South Vietnam?*

BROWN: The war was not going well, and the Americans were getting more and more heavily involved in it, not just in a military sense, but in every aspect of Vietnamese life. I got assigned to the provincial reporting unit. I came with Chinese and there was a Chinese affairs officer position in the embassy, but that slot was filled. As I did not know Vietnamese, I was assigned to cover the II Corps highlands area where you could do more with French than elsewhere. As I had studied French in Canada years earlier, the Embassy arranged brush-up classes to bring my language up to the 2+ level. The II Corps highlands was where the Montagnards lived.

*Q: Let's talk about. Who were the Montagnards and what was the situation there?*

BROWN: The Montagnards are aboriginal people. The name Montagnards was given to them by the French because they lived in the highlands along the western border with Laos and Cambodia. No one knew exactly how many there were, perhaps one million, divided into any number of tribes. The Vietnamese traditionally despised them. The French had had a policy of keeping the ethnic Vietnamese out of the highlands. This was not a magnanimous policy but one designed to reserve the area for coffee and tea plantations run by French planters. Since the

French government was gone by then, there was a Vietnamese administrative structure in the towns and some Vietnamese and ethnic Chinese merchants. But the bulk of the population in this highland area was Montagnards. In the war, they were caught between the Republic of Vietnam with the U.S. on one side and the Viet Cong on the other side. Both sides were trying to recruit Montagnards because they were tough fighters who knew the terrain. The Montagnard economy and way of life were of course being disrupted by the war. Their economy was slash and burn agriculture.

While we're on Montagnards, let me mention one highlight of my work with them. In 1967 National Geographic did an article on the Montagnards. I helped the reporter and was surprised to find myself quoted in the lead paragraph of the piece. Nothing profound, just a quote about the Montagnards being caught between the government and the Viet Cong with their way of life in jeopardy.

The U.S. government goal was to persuade the Vietnamese government to abandon their cultural prejudices and adopt an enlightened policy that would attract the Montagnards to support the South Vietnamese government. That was a large part of what the embassy was trying to do in the highlands. There was a political movement among the Montagnards called by the French acronym, FULRO, for the United Front for the Liberation of the Oppressed Races. These were Montagnards who were trying to preserve their own culture and achieve autonomy from both the Viet Cong and the government. So, much of what we tried to do in that period was to convince the Vietnamese to be sensible enough that you could then encourage this FULRO movement to cooperate with the government against the North Vietnamese. It was a lot of fun for a young guy.

*Q: How about the regular army units? Did you find this a different breed of cat or something?*

BROWN: Well, I didn't have much to do with the GIs. My contacts tended to be with the Intel people and occasionally with the senior officers. We had different jobs. The intel people were focused on the Viet Cong units. My attention was on what's going on amongst the populations in these areas and what were their attitudes. What were their attitudes about the prospects for the war? What were their attitudes about the South Vietnamese government? Despite the general I mentioned before, generally, I found what I thought were very intelligent men leading our military. There was a General Lee, I can't remember what position he was in, but I remember him wanting to talk to me about the Cultural Revolution in China and what this would mean for the prosecution of the war. In fact at one point, he sent word he wanted me to come and brief him. I was flattered.

*Q: Today is the 11th of February 2003. 1968, what caused you to go after Japanese training?*

BROWN: I was a China hand.

*Q: Yes?*

BROWN: In those days we didn't have relations with China. Having been in Taiwan in a junior officer slot and in Vietnam, which was a very unique experience, I wanted to do something in normal diplomacy. You couldn't do that in Hong Kong. That was where you would go if you

wanted to report on Mainland China from the outside. I'd been in Taipei so I decided do something different by going to Japan where the U.S. had diplomatic relations and where I could be in an embassy and gain experience in normal diplomatic work.

*Q: Well, this raises a question. I've thought about this. We've had our China hands, but it became a very sort of a distant type of diplomacy. I mean essentially they were observing another country not having real diplomatic relations. I mean you had it with Taiwan, but other than that it was sort of like calling themselves political officers, but essentially everybody was an INR officer.*

BROWN: That's exactly it. If you went to Hong Kong you were reading the press, reading interview reports of refugees, trying to pick up local newspapers from around China and read them and read between the lines so to speak to figure out what was going on in China. It was more of an intelligence analyst's job and I wanted to practice diplomacy.

*Q: Did you have any problem you know with your China background and all getting yourself into the Japanese orbit?*

BROWN: No, at that time when you'd done your service in Vietnam, the personnel system was trying their best to satisfy your interests. So, when I said I wanted to take Japanese language training, the request seemed to have been granted quite easily.

*Q: Well, from '70 to when did you?*

BROWN: I spent three more years in Japan from the summer of '70 to the summer of '73 in Tokyo. All the time in what was called the external unit of the Political Section and my principal beat was to follow Japanese policy in Asia. The biggest part of that was Japan's relationship with China.

*Q: Yes, of course an interesting time, too. Before we get to that, how would you describe Japanese American relations in 1970?*

BROWN: They were reasonably good. We had been through the period of demonstrations against the U.S. Japan security treaty. That was in the past. We were in the process of, I wasn't involved in this, but we were in the process of negotiating what we called the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty and of course when that was accomplished in 1972 that was a hugely symbolic event representing America's respect for Japan and the fact that we were, you know, returning the territory to them. Relations were reasonably good. One bad aspect, that again I was not personally involved in, was the controversy over textile exports from Japan to the United States. Later, there were more serious problems caused by the so-called Nixon shocks. The first of those being over Kissinger's secret trip to China and the second one being the U.S. decision to go off the gold standard. Both of these steps were taken without prior consultation with a country that was deeply affected by the decision and a close ally to the United States.

*Q: Was it you know, somebody trying to deal with the Japanese government. Was there kind of a I don't want to sound fictitious, a Japanese person you could talk to or if you wanted to deal with*

*the Japanese government you found yourself sharing with a whole bunch of people. In other words you couldn't go up to the prime minister and say, look we're going to be recognizing China, but don't tell anyone?*

BROWN: Well, first dealing with the Japanese government was quite favorable. Although I was a junior officer, my counterparts were officials with considerable influence on policy. The Foreign Ministry did control Japanese foreign policy. Within the Foreign Ministry, responsibility was delegated downward on most issues rather remarkably. An office director was tasked to come up with policy ideas and to lead a process of consultation within the Japanese government. His boss, the assistant secretary level person was then responsible for selling these policy ideas to the upper levels of the bureaucracy. The ministry's leadership worked hand in glove with the governing Liberal Democratic Party and would get the LDP's blessing, which was normally pro forma. The LDP controlled the Diet, so there wasn't any problem at that level. If we were able to work things out with the ministry at the level at which I was dealing, things went very smoothly. Now, needless to say when you run into a crisis in the relationship as we did when Kissinger's secret trip was revealed things got escalated way up the line and it was the ambassador who was dealing directly with the minister and political leadership.

*Q: What about with China? You know, prior to the Kissinger thing because Kissinger visit was when?*

BROWN: It was in August of 1971.

*Q: Yes. So, what was the state that we were observing of Japanese Chinese relations?*

BROWN: Our policies were quite consistent with each other in the sense that neither of us had relations with Beijing and both governments were in the process of thinking about how to change that and modifying their policies in modest ways. Both governments were in sync in terms of supporting the Republic of China in the UN. The big difference was that the Japanese had a substantial economic relationship with China and the U.S. did not. We still had an embargo on trade with China, though U.S. had already been going through a process of small steps with China to signal that we were open to improving relations. Then the big break came when China invited the U.S. ping pong team.

*Q: That was the famous ping pong diplomacy.*

BROWN: Right. I didn't get involved in it personally because my boss here was also a China hand, Bill Cunningham and he jumped on that as soon as he heard that the news of the invitation. The ping pong team actually transited through Tokyo on the way to China. Bill helped facilitate that and went out to the airport and saw them.

*Q: What was the Japanese economic relationship with China?*

BROWN: It was not an aid relationship, but a purely commercial one, and it was done under the rubric of a trade agreement between a Japanese trading association rather than the government and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade, a government front group

handling Beijing's trade with the West. It was a pretty substantial relationship. For Japan, which was promoting itself as a trading nation, being able to sell everywhere was important. The U.S. didn't really have a problem with this Japanese trade because we too were moving away from a strict embargo on trade with China.

*Q: Were you in a way being a China hand?*

BROWN: Yes, we followed Japanese ties with China closely. I was not an intelligence officer but I read all open source information about China in Japan and reported it. I was supposed to maintain contact with the Japanese China watchers who met Chinese coming through Japan. There were academics whose knowledge and opinions about China we reported. But the main work was maintaining very close coordination with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. We exchanged information on what they were doing on what our policy was, the steps we were taking. There were annual consultations between the Office of Asian Communist Affairs, the China desk at the State Department and the Ministry and between their policy planning staff and our policy planning staff. We were in bed with each other. That's what made the absence of prior consultation about Kissinger's visit to China in 1971 such a shock.

The Japanese government was under a certain amount of pressure to build upon the economic relationship and to begin to improve relations with China. Some European countries were moving ahead to recognize China in the early 1970s. Out of deference to the U.S., the Japanese government was resisting the domestic pressures on it in order to stay in sync with the U.S. The State Department too was trying to keep our two countries on the same wave length. Then suddenly without a word of forewarning the U.S. takes a huge step to open up its relationship with Beijing. The government and the foreign ministry in particular felt that their confidence and support for the U.S. had been betrayed. There was a lot of bitterness in certain parts of the Japanese Foreign Ministry.

BROWN: Well, you read about it in the news. I can't remember whether we saw Nixon's announcement on TV or not. We saw it replayed. Now, as it turned out this had been very closely held and even Secretary of State Rogers hadn't been told that Kissinger was making this trip to China. We in the embassy were taken by surprise, but when we learned the extent to which other people were equally in the dark, we didn't feel quite so bad ourselves. However, we still had to deal with the Japanese. I can remember going over there and having an extremely prickly conversation with Hiroshi Hashimoto who was then the head of the Office of Chinese Affairs. He was an older man and had spent a good part of his post war life involved in China. As a young man had been a soldier in the Japanese army at the very end of the Second World War if my recollection is right, he was in the air force. His reaction was very nationalistic. Over drinks he said this was the end of Japan's trusting the U.S. The relationship with the United States was going to change and Japan would have to start making its own policy thinking about its national interest. That was not the typical reaction. The typical reaction was not nearly so nationalistic and pained as he was. Yet it had been his job to make sure that his government knew exactly what the United States was doing on the China policy and he felt he had been betrayed.

*Q: How did you respond?*

BROWN: There is no response. There isn't a good response, but we said that we've got to move on from this. The next order of business between us was the annual fight over Chinese representation in the United Nations. This was something on which the Japanese and American governments had collaborated to an extraordinary degree on a daily basis exchanging intelligence about what was going on every capital in the world, about the demarches that were being made, divvying up responsibility on who could do a better job in persuading various capitals to support our common cause.

*Q: I know the Americans had sort of assumed the Japanese had expended tremendous what you might call political capital in these fights over who was going to represent China in the United Nations because this was, every little capital, like you say, Togo or something like that and all of a sudden I can't remember what we did, what did we do, fudge it or something for the next time around?*

BROWN: Well, there was a general presumption that this traumatic change in U.S. dealings with China was going to radically undermine the efforts to sustain Taiwan's place in the U.N. Nevertheless, the instructions that came out were to fight the good fight. The U.S. went to Taiwan and said the only way that there's going to be a hope of winning would be to go for dual representation, that is an approach which would create the possibility for both Taipei and Beijing to have a seat, even if Beijing. Washington tried to persuade Taipei that if we could sell this it was certain that the Chinese would reject it and that Taipei in the end would remain in the U.N. However, Chiang Kai-shek but was very deeply committed to the idea that the Republic of China was the sole legal government of all China and he was not going to give on that. So, what resulted was that Taipei said it opposed dual recognition but would not object to the U.S. pursuing the idea at the U.N. So on that understanding, the Japanese and American governments again together tried to sell this. However, after Nixon's announcement, many governments were rethinking their China policies because of what the United States had done. In the end we lost the vote in the United Nations and the Republic of China walked out. Our representative to the UN at the time was George Bush and he got up and he said that it is a reasonable thing for China to be in the United Nations, but it's unfair the way this came about because the principal of universality is important. A founding member has now been thrown out which sets a horrible precedent. I'm sure Kissinger probably didn't care at all that that had happened.

*Q: Prior to this in talking around with both your colleagues in the embassy, but also, and then it carried over to talking to the Japanese in informal conversations. You know, when I came into the Foreign Service it seemed to me to be perfectly reasonable that eventually we're going to have to recognize China. I mean this was not, to say the least.*

BROWN: You've got to live with the reality.

*Q: Yes and I think most of my colleagues did and in talking around this was not one of these things that it wasn't staying gee, communism is a good idea or anything like that, it was just you know, we've got other big countries and they're just going to have to come around. Were the Japanese talking this way, too or did you avoid the conversation?*

BROWN: No, before Nixon's announcement, I often talked with Japanese colleagues informally about how both our countries should be moving together to open relations with China. After Kissinger trip had been announced and knowing that Nixon himself was going to China in the following year, a process of political change was unleashed in Japan and within a year and a half Tokyo had worked out its deals and recognized China and devised a formula for maintaining an unofficial relationship with Taiwan which has worked for the Japanese pretty well and which in fact the United States more or less copied when we took the step in 1978.

*Q: Well, what was the Japanese view of what was happening in China? In the first place, what was happening in China internally '71 or so?*

BROWN: China was coming out of the Cultural Revolution period, the worst of it was over, central control had been reestablished throughout the country and things were beginning to look up. That was part of the backdrop in which the Chinese representation fight was taking place. It wasn't a China that was obviously in chaos and psychologically at war with the world that we were dealing with at the UN. It was a China that was beginning to come out of those policies and get back into more normal relations with the rest of the world.

*Q: Did the Japanese in the press and all, did the Japanese press play much of a role in determining policy?*

BROWN: First of all you had a variety of opinion in the Japanese press, from the liberal leaning socialists to the conservative Liberal Democrats (LDP) on the right. You had some who were strongly committed to maintaining the substance of the relationship with Taiwan and others including Tanaka who favored moving ahead and normalizing relations with China. You had a group within in the LDP that had traditionally had close contacts with people in China and were promoting normalization and you had people in the LDP who were very close to Taipei. So, there was a debate going on. When the U.S. made its move it significantly shifted its debate so that it was quite clear that Tanaka was going to normalize relations with China.

*Q: Was there any understanding on the part of your contacts particularly at the foreign ministry and all about understanding why in a way that you were going to have this shock because this was a shock in the United States, too and it was mainly because had you announced this or done something you would have allowed the right wing in the United States to get cranked. You know, it's a political reality in every country that you've got when you have to do things, sometimes you have to do things suddenly and make them a sort of fait accompli otherwise you allow the forces that are opposed to it to build up enough pressure so that you can't do the thing. It sounds like Japan had the same forces I guess every country's got these forces?*

BROWN: I think that was part of Nixon's calculation that, if he was going to make this kind of radical change, he needed to do it dramatically in order to outmaneuver the conservatives who would try and block such a policy change. You didn't have the same process in Japan. Japan's decision making is different. They engage seemingly endless debates to build a consensus. So, it was very clear a year before they recognized that this was where it was going to end. You could see these debates going on in the press, Japanese politicians positioning themselves in the media and partly through contacts with the foreign ministry. It was just a question of what the terms

would be and the nature of the deal that would be made concerning their relations with Taiwan. Tanaka had to come up with a deal that was satisfactory to the wing of the Liberal Democratic Party, which had close ties with Taiwan.

*Q: Yes, there's a time to just keep your mouth shut and let that take care of it. Did you see any effect as far of the very strong nationalist Chinese supporters in the United States? You know, it used to be the China lobby or whatever you want to call it, you know, the, like it used to be so strong in the right wing of the United States trying to affect Japanese dealing with Taiwan for example?*

BROWN: No, I didn't see any of that.

*Q: I guess by that time that element in American political life wasn't very strong.*

BROWN: Well, I think Nixon had judged correctly that he could sell the opening to China to conservatives as an effective anti-Soviet maneuver. In fact, he was correct. The country did come around without much anguish to support the steps he took at the time. When you get to 1978 with Carter normalizing, that's a different period than in 1971-72. I should go back to how we eventually got over the shock with the Japanese. I would say we got over it because many Japanese, despite their initial reactions, came to appreciate that Kissinger and Nixon were right that the only way to make such a change was through a dramatic move and understood that their initiative was moving in what the Japanese considered the right direction. Therefore they came to live with it and see it as something that wasn't contrary to Japanese interests even though it had been done in a way that was very abrasive and regrettable.

*Q: This of course is not unknown in other places, including Capitol Hill. I've interviewed Marshall Green who was the Assistant Secretary for the Far East and he described how he'd made some sort of thing saying where Kissinger supposedly had an upset stomach or something like that. He said, oh, hell, he's probably out talking to the Chinese or something like that. As soon as he started thinking about he made everybody sit and swear not to even mention that remark because that's exactly what could happen.*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: In a way you think it has to probably have to be done that way. Always there was a predilection on the part of Kissinger and of Nixon to do it their own way and to get credit.*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: How did you find sort of let's say before because that would have been when things were normal, before the opening to China, dealing with the foreign ministry?*

BROWN: It was a very good relationship; personally we got a lot of information. We shared a lot of information. It was a close relationship and it still is.

*Q: Did the Japanese have good information on China? I would imagine they would.*

BROWN: They had all sorts of sources because of the economic relationship and people traveling back and forth and conversations that would take place with Chinese leaders when one or another delegation went to Beijing. Did anyone have real access to the countryside and what was going on in China? No, but we were all trying to share the information that we had. They did their intelligence reports and gave copies to us. We got material from INR, not so much from the CIA because the station had its own relationship with the Cabinet Research Office. So, many analytical reports were being sent back and forth.

*Q: Did you all have a feel for the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution at that time?*

BROWN: I don't know. You certainly were aware of how it had disrupted China, but you didn't really understand then its full impact, as I recall.

*Q: Did you know, one of the things I'm struck about people who got involved in that first opening to China. I was just talking yesterday with Winston Lord. I did a very long interview with him and the sort of the thrill of seeing Mao Zedong and all that, but I mean in a way it's almost although, nobody was really making note that this guy at least in my estimation was a real monster. The things he did to his country are just beyond belief. Was this at all coming out at this particular time you were dealing with it?*

BROWN: We had the impression of him as a megalomaniac who was very far long in his years and was just losing it a little bit.

*Q: Was the feeling that by the Japanese that China was a danger as far as an expansive country or not?*

BROWN: No. That was their view at that time. There wasn't a feeling of hostility. In general, Japanese saw China as a neighboring country with which they ought to have a normal relationship. It was out of deference to the United States that Japan did not normalize sooner. In that period, China was not in the era of reform and growth. There was not a sense that China was what we'd call today a rising power that might be a threat.

*Q: What about looking at China I mean you had the French and British embassies and the Yugoslav embassy all of which had relations with China. Were you getting anything from them?*

BROWN: We didn't get it in Tokyo, but I'm sure the U.S. government was getting it elsewhere.

*Q: This wasn't part of your beat?*

BROWN: No. We met with other embassies and talked about things from time to time and I particularly would spend a lot of time talking to people in the British Embassy and the Australian Embassy who were following developments in the evolution of Japan's China policy the same way I was to try to trade notes and exchange analysis. I didn't have much to do with the Taiwan Embassy, though my recollection on this is not clear.

*Q: After the Nixon visit, well, I mean the Kissinger visit first, as far as dealing I mean your job was it mainly assuaging hurt feelings. I mean were there developments or were the Japanese in a way turned loose as far as China was concerned?*

BROWN: Yes. They felt they freed to do what was in their best interests. They would keep us informed. My recollection is that I had to work harder to find things out and double check sources. It wasn't quite as open as it had been in the past. It was more a job of piecing information together to understand what was going on in the political process in Tokyo.

*Q: Well, I imagine the Japanese press must have gone wild, not just against us, but the whole idea of okay, now we can really report on China and you know, I mean, in that particular relationship. Things must have been sort of fast and loose.*

BROWN: My memory is failing me. I can't remember whether there was a big rush of Japanese reporters to go into China at the time. I can't remember which papers had those kinds of relationships whether that was changing or not. My recollection is that the Chinese were quite skillful at cultivating favorites amongst the Japanese press and freezing out those whose opinions they didn't like.

*Q: Dick Snyder was my ambassador in Korea when I was there. Did you, for you did you feel that you had finally entered the world of real diplomacy and all?*

BROWN: I certainly did. Except for the China issue, not a great deal was happening, but Japan was slowly moving towards what was a very important decision which was to ratify the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Another major issue that I had to follow was attitudes within Japan on nuclear weapons issues. What was the Japanese government doing in terms of eventually ratifying the NPT? What were political and public views on ratification?

*Q: But it's interesting, you know, observing close hand Japanese diplomacy. One doesn't see the Japanese hand in a lot of those things. I mean when you think about you know, as we have today, you think about France for example, its fingerprints were all over everything, but what about Japan? Was there a style of diplomacy that you saw?*

BROWN: At that point in time, Japan had not begun to think about having an independent diplomacy. They were still very much in the mode of being with the U.S. I think the shock on China was one of the things that began to prod them in the direction of saying well, you know, the war has been over for almost 30 years now. It's time for Japan to start having its own policies. The amazing thing is that we're now into the 21st Century and this sort of debate about whether Japan is going to have an independent policy from the United States still goes on. It's advanced and things have affected it over time, but it's been a very slow process in coming.

*Q: Did you find the LDP had any particular cast as far as foreign affairs as opposed to I guess it would be the left wing?*

BROWN: Yes. There was the Japanese Socialist Party, which was still opposed to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. They were in favor of moving rapidly ahead to recognize China, dumping

Taiwan. They wanted to normalize relations with North Korea rapidly. That was part of the political scene, but the JSP was always a minority, and the real action was what was going on in the bureaucracy and within the LDP. Where's opinion within the LDP shifted at any given time? That's what you had to take into account.

*Q: Well, say in the foreign ministry was the foreign ministry responsive to the mood of the LDP or did the foreign ministry kind of do its thing?*

BROWN: The Foreign Ministry had a very strong sense, the ethic of the Japanese bureaucracy, that they were the guardians of the national interest. The ministry knew what was happening internationally. It understood the sophistication and the complexities of international relations. Therefore, it was their job to make sure that Japan stays on the right course. That meant that the Foreign Ministry had to guide the LDP to do what's right for Japan. As I said, they didn't have to worry about the other parties because the LDP commanded a majority in the Diet. It was just a matter of infiltrating sensible ideas into the LDP. That was done a lot at these evening entertainment parties that went on endlessly and at various levels. The office directors, who were the people I was dealing with, would go off in the evening for dinners and drinking with junior LDP politicians and people in the business community who had interests in China policy. Policy was worked out behind the scene. If a Japanese bureaucrat was doing his job well he was able to come up with the ideas, to percolate them up through his own system. Then the system at the senior levels would do this quiet liaison with people in the LDP and the LDP itself was a very hierarchical and structured organization. It was a bottom up type of decision-making. It wasn't the LDP driving policy; it was the mid levels of the bureaucracy driving it.

*Q: MITI. Yes. I've always heard that was a very powerful thing, but at this particular time of '70 to '73, how did MITI fit into the foreign relations side?*

BROWN: I wasn't the principal officer dealing with MITI then. It was the people on the economic side that had those relationships. The way I saw it was in the sense that MITI was very much involved in promoting Japanese exports and that meant in addition to selling to the U.S. and Europe, selling to China and Southeast Asia. They were very much involved in the economic aspects of relations with China. They were pushing to open things up so that Japan could export more. But that was not what was driving Japanese policy. The Foreign ministry was more important.

*Q: But that was administrative, but of course that's sort of the guts.*

BROWN: Well, yes, if you're running an aid program, which Japan was not doing at that time in China but was doing everywhere in Southeast Asia, then what the Ministry of Finance thought the aid levels ought to be and how they fit into the budget and all that was high policy.

*Q: Did you with the opening to China; were you conflicted about being a China hand, Japanese hand and all? I mean all of a sudden this is a new ball game.*

BROWN: I thought it was a great advantage to know something about Japan. I was able to go back and work in Chinese affairs, but I wasn't a person who was only a China hand as some

others were. I would say the quintessential archetype of the China hand was Dick Williams who was my last CG in Hong Kong. He had had five overseas assignments during his 30 plus years in the Foreign Service. Four of them to Hong Kong and one to Guangzhou. Those are the only places that he had served overseas. I mean he worked on other things back in Washington, but that wasn't the career track I was on. I was very happy being able to go from China to something else and then back to China and then do something else and so forth.

**ROBERT LYLE BROWN**  
**Economic Counselor**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1965-1968)**

*Robert Lyle Brown entered the Foreign Service in 1944. His career included positions in Morocco, Japan, Taiwan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles S. Kennedy in 1990.*

Q: *What was the situation in Taipei when you got there in 1965?*

BROWN: The Section was in a viable but marginal situation. It was obvious that the AID program should come to an end. Nearly everyone was fighting it, hook line, and sinker. When I arrived, I went back to what I learned about science and technology and its development. Based on the papers I had written, I developed a concept of whole series of bridges which involved, inter alia, science, technology, commerce, sister city-to-city and industry-to-industry programs. I wanted Americans to come out to see Taipei. I wanted the Taiwanese to pass laws which would encourage investments, which would entice Americans to the island. Little by little--it didn't take that long--they changed. I became the acting AID director because we finished the program for all intense and purposes. Some of my colleagues approached me in subsequent years to apologize because many were convinced that I was off my rocker when I made some of my projections. They said that I saw matters much more clearly than they had. I am not saying that to complement myself, but it was an insight that I had based on my education and experiences in Belgium, Japan and other places.

Q: *Let me ask about the fight with AID. Did you have a lot of opposition and how did you manage the program's demise?*

BROWN: There was a set of fortuitous circumstances. First of all, it was self-evident that Taiwan's economy was improving, that it was becoming viable. It was also self-evident that the excessive dependency was no longer necessary. It was also becoming obvious that Chiang Kai-shek was no longer a viable threat to the mainland. Congress was no longer as self-possessive about Chiang, although Walter Judd and company were still around. New Congressmen were on the scene who were not as obsessive about China as some of their elders and predecessors. The American AID officials there knew the circumstances; it was pretty self-evident. Since they had been successful, good assignments could be anticipated for them. But it took a political decision by the Ambassador. We convinced the Chinese that the cessation of assistance would be to their advantage. They didn't protest as vehemently as they might have five or ten years earlier. I think

therefore it was easier to terminate the Taiwan aid program than it had been in Belgium years earlier. The Taiwan program went out nicely.

Q: *Who was the Ambassador?*

BROWN: Walter McConaughy. He eventually supported me because I had to deal with AID which unto itself was difficult. I also had to watch how the Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) was operating. They were providing training and material to the Chinese military. As this was a resource coming into the country, the Ambassador decided that I was the Embassy's officer for MAAG issues. The Political section didn't like the job because it was sticky wicket, argumentative, full of details, dealing with pushy generals, etc. I had of course dealt with similar issues before and I didn't find it all that challenging. In short I did not come with any significant biases. So I took on the MAAG responsibility. One day, the Ambassador was called to see Chiang Kai-shek who wanted to thank him for the assistance that a member of the Embassy staff by the name of Robert Brown had rendered. Chiang said that he had heard the name from all of his colleagues and friends; he had been told that Brown was working very hard for the Ambassador and the US and Taiwan. Chiang said that he would like it very much if the Ambassador would tell Brown that the President greatly appreciated Brown's efforts. The Ambassador subsequently called a country team meeting that same day and related the story. He was smiling like a cat that had just eaten three mice. He was pleased. Because we had terminated the assistance program it was all the more important. We were under fair weather both politically and economically.

I should also mention that we got the President's Science Advisor to come to Taiwan. The AID representative was still there. He and the Ambassador and the DCM went to the meeting with Chiang Kai-shek. I was the note taker as the lowest ranking man in the room. Chiang went around the room asking people what they thought. He turned to me before many others had spoken and he asked for my opinion. I told him that was very difficult. Taiwan had the sun, the water and the earth--that was a given. The sun and the water had been very gracious; the earth was limited and there are many people. Taiwan had made a great and meaningful step when it distributed land to the farmers; that intensive farming on Taiwan was an example for the world. It appeared that with the development of industry, there would be new options for his economy which could compete with the Japanese. But I thought more could be done for the people. That was interpreted as a political commentary. I mentioned that the majority of his people were under twenty-one and I suggested that they needed more education--they were only going through the sixth grade. I said that these young people were a resource that must be taken advantage of because they were good, hard working people; now was the time to give them more compulsory education. Within one year, compulsory education was established through eighth grade. It was one of the rare occasions when I had tears in my eyes for a positive contribution. Hundreds of thousands of students went to school; schools were built; teachers found and it worked.

**ARTHUR W. HUMMEL, JR.**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1965-1968)**

*Ambassador Arthur W. Hummel, Jr. was born to American parents in China in 1920. He received his master's degree from the University of Chicago. His career with USIS included assignments in Hong Kong, Japan, Burma, and Taiwan. He served as the ambassador to Burma, Ethiopia, and Pakistan. Ambassador Hummel was interviewed by Dorothy Robins-Mowry on July 13, 1989.*

*Q: You were then in the States until 1965. Did you go back overseas?*

HUMMEL: In '65, I went overseas. It was another State Department job. I was Deputy Chief of Mission, DCM, in Taiwan. That was a great time because one Ambassador, Admiral Wright, had already left. I took over from the previous DCM, Ralph Clough. Walter McConaughy was supposed to come immediately. We had already had an agreement from the Chinese government for him.

Then the Indo-Pak War broke out and Walter McConaughy was Ambassador to Pakistan and he was stuck in Pakistan for a solid year. This is the DCM's dream, to have the Ambassador go away so the DCM can take over and do what he wants for a year; that was great fun. I enjoyed it immensely.

*Q: That's a long time.*

HUMMEL: It's an area that I knew a lot about. I met with Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-Kuo dozens of times on my own as the principal interlocutor. I enjoyed it extremely and learned a lot from it.

*Q: What was going on then in Taiwan? The Economic Assistance Program?*

HUMMEL: Just finished in '65.

*Q: Just finished?*

HUMMEL: It terminated in '65, but we still had extremely good relations and Taiwan was already becoming a success story. I had the nice experience of being temporarily a member of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction, JCRR, which managed land reform in Taiwan. The basis for all of their economic progress was that land reform.

Politically, there were some strains. We had to continually restrain the Chinese from doing silly things in relation to the mainland. It would be counter-productive and wouldn't get anywhere.

*Q: Was this with vindictiveness, a sense of "we'll be back there on the mainland"?*

HUMMEL: It was an article of faith at that time: "We are going back." So, we had to be sure that Americans, sometimes American organizations would not get involved, particularly military. CIA was very good about all of this, but some of our military outfits would insist on training the Chinese in small river boat activities that could only be engaged then against the mainland.

**ROBERT KNOPEs**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1965-1966)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taiwan (1966-1967)**

**Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1967-1971)**

**Publications Officer, USIS**  
**Hong Kong (1971-1974)**

*Robert Knopes was born in Janesville, Wisconsin, raised on the family farm, and served in the U.S. Navy during the Korean War. He received his BA and MA from the University of Wisconsin before entering the Foreign Service in 1961. He served with USIA in Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Italy. He was Chief of the East Asia/Pacific Division of Voice of America. Mr. Knopes was interviewed by David Reuther in 2014.*

KNOPEs: And then Chinese. I finally got orders to go to Washington for Chinese language. The program at FSI was a year or less. It was not easy to get a lease for an apartment for less than a year. But we did get settled. And, to back up just a little bit. In September of '64 our second son was born in Bangkok. We thought about having the delivery at the Seventh Day Adventist Hospital in Hat Yai. But there was a blood-related issue that raised some concerns. We decided to go instead to the Seventh Day Hospital in Bangkok. USIS Bangkok arranged for the air force to send a special plane down for us -- with a nurse! It was very reassuring. USIS took good care of us. They took good care of the branch PAOs. We all went to Bangkok. Karen and Chris stayed with USIS friends. I stayed until the baby was born on September 20, then returned to Songkhla with Chris. Karen flew down on Thai Airways a week later with newborn Peter. When we headed back to Chinese language training, we managed two small kids in tourist class.

*Q: So when did you leave the assignment in Songkhla then?*

KNOPEs: June or July.

*Q: Of '65?*

KNOPEs: Of '65, uh-huh.

*Q: And so you came back to Washington?*

KNOPEs: Yeah, to FSI.

*Q: For FSI Washington and Chinese.*

KNOPES: Yeah. The class started in September.

*Q: Do you recall who were your fellow students?*

KNOPES: There were only two students, Ivan Klecka and me. Did you ever meet Ivan?

*Q: Yes.*

KNOPES: Ivan came out of Laos and I came out of Thailand. We were both keen to begin Chinese language. There were two teachers and two students. Ouyang. Did you have Ouyang Chao?

*Q: Mm-hmm.*

KNOPES: She was still there. And Li Tsung-mi?

*Q: Yeah.*

KNOPES: That was it, we were the class.

*Q: Because they must have been running a special class for you because --*

KNOPES: I don't know. I think they were shunting everybody else off to Vietnamese. I was surprised there weren't any State officers studying Chinese.

*Q: But Ivan was also USIA officer?*

KNOPES: Yeah, uh-huh.

*Q: Oh, OK, so -- because I've got a list of FSOs (Foreign Service Officer) that took Chinese at that time. And that doesn't include your name.*

KNOPES: Is that right?

*Q: So obviously USIA was using FSI but running its own course.*

KNOPES: Well, I don't know. That's strange.

*Q: Yeah, because you just named the two main --*

KNOPES: We had the two teachers. When we got to Taichung there were several State officers who had been there for a while. They were finishing the course.

*Q: OK, so you started --*

KNOPES: About September of --

*Q: In '65 in Washington.*

KNOPES: Yeah, mm-hmm.

*Q: And then you in '66 a year later you --*

KNOPES: Went to Taichung.

*Q: Do you recall -- and you would have graduated --*

KNOPES: 1967.

*Q: '67, yeah.*

*Q: We're returning to our conversation with Bob Knopes. So your dream comes true. You're in Washington studying Chinese. What's that FSI introduction like, say compared to your academic --*

KNOPES: Oh, it was so concentrated. When I was studying Chinese at Wisconsin Miss Chou was an easy teacher. She let me get away with too much. So Chinese always came at the bottom of my study list. She was very nice and gave me a good foundation to the language. But at FSI we went past what I learned at Wisconsin in less than a month.

*Q: And how did FSI approach the training?*

KNOPES: We began by concentrating on the spoken word. We started out with tones, added some vocabulary, then began to make sentences. We were halfway through the course before we got to learning characters. In Washington we gained some control of Chinese as a spoken language. In Taichung we would concentrate on characters and reading

*Q: Now, is this so many hours in class and so many on tape, or?*

KNOPES: We must have had about six hours in the classroom each day. I think one of those might have been listening to tapes. We took tapes home to listen to at night. We'd found an apartment not far from FSI, two-bedrooms, and we had two small kids. Then it turned out there was another one on the way. Listening to Chinese tapes with two little guys running around was not easy. At the same time my wife was trying to cope with temporary living while hugely pregnant. Ivan was a bachelor living in the apartment complex above FSI, with plenty of time and no interruptions. I was worried that he would just leave me behind. But the study of Chinese presents its own limits on time and dedication. I held on and Ivan and I went out to Taichung on equal footing.

*Q: Now, where was your apartment?*

KNOPES: Oh, we were on Beauregard Street --

*Q: In Northern Virginia.*

KNOPES: Yeah, Northern Virginia,.

*Q: The year ends in the summer of '66.*

KNOPES: Yeah, mm-hmm. You're assigned then to the second year of Chinese.

*Q: Mm-hmm. How does one travel to Taiwan in those days with two young kids?*

KNOPES: Three by then. Now we had another six-month-old. Andrew was born in March. I don't recall much about that trip. We spent time with our parents, then left from Chicago O'Hare. On this trip we flew in a jet plane, but still had to refuel in Anchorage, Alaska. I think we stayed there overnight, then to Tokyo and on down to Taipei.

*Q: What was it like arriving in Taipei in '66?*

KNOPES: Well, I didn't get much of a feel for the town as we were stuck in our hotel for the entire day. There was a typhoon off the coast that almost delayed our arrival. We were supposed to catch a plane to Taichung the next morning. In the hotel room we watched the weather report on the TV, but didn't know anything about typhoons at that point. The wind outside was whipping the trees and the rain was horizontal. We thought, "This is serious."

But our USIS contact said, "We think it'll be all right. We'll send a car in the morning to take you to the airport."

It was still overcast and windy the next morning when left for Chiang Kai-shek airport. Was it Chiang Kai-shek? This airport was in town.

*Q: Right, this is the one in town.*

KNOPES: Yeah, I think it was called Chiang Kai-shek. Anyway, we went to the airport, only 10, 15 minutes away. We boarded and took off. In minutes we were above the clouds, in full sunshine. When we landed in Taichung it was a beautiful day. That was our first typhoon experience. We learned that if it's not hitting where you are or heading toward you, it's not going to be too serious. This one was just skirting the northern fringe of Taiwan. We were met at the airport by the "xiaojiang," the school principal, Jerry Koch. He had been a missionary, spent time in China, and spoke Chinese. In Taichung instruction was tutorial, just a teacher and a student. Except for an occasional lecture on some aspect of China, there were no group classes that I recall. We began the course by reading lessons prepared at the school, "20 Lectures on Chinese Culture" and "Newspaper Chinese," then launched into reading articles and editorials from the daily newspapers.

*Q: Where were the lessons given and what were your housing arrangements?*

KNOPES: When we arrived there was no house available for us. We spent a couple of weeks in the Railway Hotel not far from the school. It was a basic hotel, not a good situation for Karen and three young boys. We learned that the CIA had a couple of leased houses that were empty. No students were coming to use them, but the Agency didn't want to release them to us. USIS Taipei worked a deal enabling us to camp out in one of those houses until something else came open. We didn't have to wait long. Don Anderson, who I later worked both in Shanghai and in Hong Kong, was leaving to be interpreter for United States-PRC talks in Warsaw. We moved into his western style house, which had plenty of room for us. The only drawback was the hard tile floors and marble railings. We were concerned that a wandering two-year-old might fall and break his head, but that didn't happen. The school was a western-style building with many, many rooms. The administrative offices and a small conference room were on the ground floor. Upstairs were the classrooms. Each teacher had his or her own room. It was a good group of instructors, all from Beijing, all with a heavy Beijing accent. One was a retired general, another a noted calligrapher who gave each of us a scroll of calligraphy when we graduated.

*Q: Mm.*

KNOPES: It was an interesting group. One of my first classes was with a gentleman named Chang Da Mu. I was in the classroom when the bell rang but there was no teacher. Then there was a rattling of the paper covering the bookcase, and Teacher Chang appeared. There were no books in that bookcase. That was where he took his afternoon nap. The atmosphere in the school was relaxed, but personally, the pace was intense -- reading, breaking down newspaper editorials, learning new characters, forgetting those I had learned the day before.

*Q: Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.*

KNOPES: To give the students a break from the routine we had a week or two off every few months. On our first break, Da Chen, the senior teacher, suggested that Karen and I and our son join her and her husband, who was a colonel in the Chinese Air Force, on a drive around Taiwan. We decided to drive from Taichung, east over the mountains, through Taroko Gorge to the port of Hualien. From Hualien we went down the east coast to the tip of the island, then through the towns of Kaohsiung and Tainan, back to Taichung. Spending more than a week with the chief teacher was great experience. The scenery was wonderful but the roads were terrible. Da Chen's husband and I spent much time pushing the car out of mud holes.

*Q: In addition to this trip, were there any other field trips?*

KNOPES: Yeah, we went to Hong Kong on one. I think all the students went along on that one, the whole group. We had briefings at the consulate but had a lot of time to ourselves. We were given an allowance for books and I spent a lot of time in bookstores which were well-stocked with books on China.

*Q: I mean Taichung is quite a distance from the embassy in Taipei. So did you have an opportunity from time to time to interact with the embassy?*

KNOPES: Yes, I was in frequent contact with the USIS office up there. I knew if I went to Hong Kong, Singapore, or Saigon I wouldn't be speaking much Mandarin. I wanted to be assigned to Taipei so I lobbied the PAO for an assignment every time I went up.

*Q: It was Ken Boyle at the time?*

KNOPES: Ken Boyle was PAO and Ned Conlon was his deputy. Every time I went to Taipei I let them know I was available. It worked out. When the field program officer retired, I was first in line. It turned out that my job would be assistant cultural affairs officer, not field programming. I was not disappointed. Taiwan didn't need a field program officer anymore. Our audience was not in the rural areas but in the cities. There were USIS branch posts in Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung. Kaohsiung and Tainan are only about 20 miles apart, so were overseen by a single BPAO (branch public affairs officer). With US assistance Taiwan had become a very successful agricultural economy. Now it was on the verge of change to an urban-industrial economy. As ACAO, I would handle the American Visitors Program, bringing speakers on a wide range of subjects to Taiwan.

*Q: Actually, I think looking at this list, Ivan Klecka ended up in Taichung.*

KNOPES: No, he went to Hong Kong.

*Q: Hong Kong.*

KNOPES: Yeah. He was the USIS Information Officer in the consulate. I went over to visit him a couple of times. He didn't use much Mandarin there.

*Q: So let's see. We're at the summer of '67 and you get assigned into USIS Taipei.*

KNOPES: Taipei, mm-hmm.

*Q: So what does the assistant cultural officer do in this environment?*

KNOPES: We had an active speaker program. USIA in Washington recruited speakers for posts around the world. Posts could request topics, specific speakers, or both. We could also ask for speakers requested by nearby posts, and who fit our needs, to stop in Taipei. A speaker usually came for 3 or 4 days. I think I programmed at least three every month. I remember speakers on the environment, the space program, the United Nations, education, and economics. American politics and government were touchy subjects because the Republic of China was a one-party system and the island was under martial law. I helped programmed the astronauts who made the second landing on the moon and later arranged a display of one of the moon rocks. I prepared and gave lectures on American culture and customs at USIS branch posts and in schools. Most visiting speakers were programmed in Kaohsiung, Tainan, and Taichung, as well as in Taipei. It

was a labor intensive job. But I had a good staff. I believe that every successful USIS program overseas came about because of the work of dedicated FSNs.

I also worked on a donated book program. American publishers got tax credits for sending remaindered books overseas. When I got to Taipei there was a room, about as big as this room, piled floor to ceiling with donated books. My predecessor had been too busy with the educational exchange program to do anything about books. Ken Boyle said, "Well, you're here, you're new, how about taking over the book program?"

And I thought, "Great, I love to look through books."

The book room was in the back of the building. Few people knew where it was and there was no telephone. I spent many happy hours there, sorting books and making lists of where to donate them. I soon knew the librarians and many professors in every major university, as well as some senior government officials and their staffs. I could make individual presentations and I could pick out special books for the PAO to present to his contacts. It was a good opening for me. I finally cleared out that roomful of books, though more kept coming all the time.

*Q: Let's get a handle on how USIS is organized at a major embassy such as Taipei. The senior officer would be the PAO --*

KNOPES: That was Ken Boyle when I got there.

*Q: And then he would have a deputy.*

KNOPES: Ned Conlon, right. Then there was a Cultural and an Information Officer. Larger posts, not Taipei, had an administrative officer, too. The Cultural Officer in Taipei was Merv Haworth, a graduate of the FSI Chinese program in Taichung. He had served in Taipei as ACAO after Taichung. He had just come back from Washington where he had worked on the Fulbright and other Exchange Programs. Exchanges were an important part of the USIS Taipei operation. Merv and another ACAO handled all of the exchanges, leaving me free to do American Visitors and anything else that came along. There were three Americans in the Information Section. Tom Graves was the information officer. Wally Gibson was the assistant IO and Wally Bishop was motion picture and radio officer. The information office sent out the daily wireless file to newspapers, radio stations, and government offices. And then there was a book translation program, World Today books, done mostly in Hong Kong. The information office put out Student Review, a monthly bilingual magazine with English and the Chinese translation side by side. It was a learning tool for English, very popular with students.

*Q: Let's talk about the wireless file for a minute.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: You were saying that comes out of Washington.*

KNOPES: Yeah, every day.

*Q: It's a compilation of what?*

KNOPES: Of current news. Much of it culled from the daily American newspapers. The press office in Washington also had a staff of writers who covered the White House, Congress, anything in Washington that would be interest to posts around the world. One or two USIA journalists would cover events especially for Asia posts.

*Q: Would it be primarily U.S. news and --*

KNOPES: Yeah, primarily U.S. news.

*Q: -- or cover Europe and --*

KNOPES: Yes, they covered Europe, but there was a separate news desk for each area. There was an East Asia desk that gathered and sent out news of interest in Asia. You asked before about Vietnam. There was a lot of coverage on President Johnson and our Vietnam policy. USIS Taipei carried all of that. Of course, the government in Taiwan was strongly anti-communist and fully supported our efforts in Vietnam.

*Q: Now, the local environment is one of censorship or sensitivity to the news.*

KNOPES: Yeah, right.

*Q: Did the wireless file run into --*

KNOPES: No. I don't think there was ever a problem with the wireless file. That was current news. And not distributed to the public. USIS sent it to media and government offices and selected officials and academics. We tried to push a bit in introducing discussion of American political processes. I got the head of the political science department at Taida (National Taiwan University) to translate a book on American politics for World Today books. It was distributed without a problem.

You asked about censorship. We programmed American speakers on American politics in our USIS centers but rarely in universities. To test the limits, Leo Moser, who was in the Political Section of the embassy, agreed to give a lecture on the America democratic system at Taida. Leo had a PhD in political science and had taught before coming into the Foreign Service. We had been classmates at the language school. I reserved a lecture room and put up posters on the campus. At the appointed time we waited and waited, but no one showed up. I am sure students were interested but it was too risky. When talking one-on-one away from campus, students were always full of questions. On campus they knew they were being observed. Being curious about democracy might indicate a sympathy for Taiwan independence. The goal of students was to finish university and go to the United States for an advanced degree. Learning about democracy would come later.

Censors read everything printed in Taiwan, with special attention to things political, and anything concerning the PRC. Small local magazines often pushed the limits on political commentary and were closed down. But they usually reopened a month later under a new name, and maybe a new editor. Any mention of the PRC was forbidden. Textbooks and encyclopedia printed elsewhere but sold in Taiwan were missing pages where items on the China mainland had been.

*Q: In fact, the Taiwanese political movement was starting up at that time.*

KNOPES: Oh, it was, yes.

*Q: And you have the Diaoyu of 1970/'71.*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: Over the Senkakus.*

KNOPES: Sure.

*Q: Those were one of the first major student demonstrations in Taipei.*

KNOPES: That's right. But that was a protest against Japan. It was nationalistic and sanctioned by the government. Those were good demonstrations and under control (*laughs*). Demonstrations about domestic questions were another matter.

*Q: Well, at this time, for example, Peng Ming-min —.*

KNOPES: He went off to the United States.

*Q: Yeah, he went off. How did that happen?*

KNOPES: Well, there was a lot of talk about it after he was gone. It was upsetting to the government. They feared he would promote Taiwan independence from abroad. I just read something the other day about who helped him get out of Taiwan. I don't think anybody in the embassy actively helped him. Though one of the political officers I was in language school with had contacts with many Taiwanese, not promoting anything but keeping tabs on the attitudes of the Taiwanese community. He spoke Taiwanese and had many student contacts. Not long after he was transferred from Taipei most of his contacts were picked up, except for one guy (*laughs*).

*Q: Picked up by the authorities.*

KNOPES: Yeah, right. Not sent away or anything, but questioned. Warned, actually. But the Peng Ming-min departure was an event that created a bit of a stir when I was there. We talked about it, but didn't know much about it at the time.

*Q: But it must have made quite a stir in the embassy, I mean everybody's talking about it.*

KNOPES: Sure. And certainly the story was big in official circles in Taipei. They were very upset by the whole thing because they figured something bad was going to come from it. But Peng went into academia in the US, did not involve himself in politics, and the story died away. Then there's one event that I've never understood. And I don't know if you've heard of this before, but a bomb exploded in the USIS library in Tainan.

*Q: Mm.*

KNOPES: I mention it, but I don't have anything more on it. Neal Donnelly, who was the branch PAO there at the time, has probably talked about it in his oral history. I don't think it was ever ascertained who did it or why they did it.

*Q: Well, Nancy Tucker covers it in her book.*

KNOPES: Did she?

*Q: And she suggests it's the local authorities sending the message.*

KNOPES: That was the only thing we could think of. It was not a dissident. It had to be somebody else. We never got the message as far as I could figure out. A couple of students were injured, so it seemed a senseless act.

*Q: Let's see. Ken Boyle leaves in the middle of your tour, and Bob Clark comes --*

KNOPES: Bob Clark comes.

*Q: And change in bosses, change in atmosphere?*

KNOPES: Oh, much, much. Ken was preparing to retire when I got there. He had a long career, a distinguished career. He had worked in France during and after WWII. He had been a PAO in Hong Kong. Now he was planning to go back to university to study linguistics. His mind was on his future, not USIS Taipei. He was very good at languages, fluent in French and Chinese. He had a new wife and a new baby. Ken continued to manage USIS Taipei but it was not a dynamic operation. Then Bob Clark arrived, with Bob Nichols as his deputy, and things opened up.

*Q: What did they do different, programming?*

KNOPES: Bob Clark developed a good relationship with everybody. He and Bob Nichols were outgoing personalities, experienced, they knew China. They welcomed new ideas. I advocated trying new things in programming, doing more with Student Review magazine, reaching out to students. Bob Clark listened, removed me from the cultural section, made me editor of the magazine, and set me up as the program officer. In one of the first issues after I took over Student Review carried an article on anti-Vietnam war protests in American universities. We were not advocating student protests, but we wanted to present a more realistic picture about what was happening in America. The same articles were being used by USIS posts around the

world. The ambassador was quite conservative, cautious about anything that might upset the US-ROC relationship. When we were trying a new approach, the PAO always explained to him what we planned and got his approval. Musical groups were part of our cultural programming, guitarists, choral groups and small orchestras. When we were offered Junior Wells and his Rhythm and Blues Band, I said to Bob Clark, "This sounds interesting. This is something we ought do."

Bob agreed, and convinced the ambassador that Junior would introduce another side of American music. So Junior Wells brought rhythm and blues to Taipei under the auspices of USIS and the American embassy. Everyone loved it. People got up and danced in the aisles. Several officials attended, even one of Chiang Kai-shek's old generals, who came with his grandchildren. We put them in the front row and offered them ear plugs, but the general said, "Don't worry, I'm an old artillery man."

*Q: (laughs)*

KNOPES: Whether that meant he was already deaf or that he wanted to hear every thump of the high-decibel goings-on wasn't clear. It would have helped if we all had been a bit deaf. Junior's band featured two guitars, a pounding drum, and Junior's exuberant singing, all amplified by a giant sound system in an aged auditorium with minimal acoustics. Everybody had a great time. We got no negative comments at all. The band went on to play in Taichung and Kaohsiung, with the same reaction. We opened things up a bit with out-of-the-ordinary programs like that.

*Q: The Kuomintang Party that's running Taiwan at this time in fact has a propaganda unit that's supposed to watch these things.*

KNOPES: Sure, yeah.

*Q: And the embassy was aware of who that officer was and --*

KNOPES: Well, sure, right.

*Q: And how to interact and --*

KNOPES: We laid the groundwork for it. We promoted Junior and his band as a popular form of American music. They stirred up dancing feet, but they had no interest in politics. I don't think they even cared where they were. On the bus they sat and listened to music on their earphones, oblivious to the passing scenery.

*Q: What else did Clark open up for you?*

KNOPES: I lobbied to do more with students, so I was made editor of Student Review magazine. It was popular because it promoted English learning with its bilingual format - English and Chinese in adjoining columns. I added more local articles, lightened up the format, and put in more about what was happening on American university campuses. We never had a problem or even a comment from the authorities.

*Q: Now, when we talk about the work of the embassy we're talking about the econ officers getting out, and the political officers getting out. What would have been your local contacts like?*

KNOPES: Mine were mostly in the universities and libraries.

*Q: Universities.*

KNOPES: Yeah. We kept close contact with university presidents and department heads, keeping them informed of what was available, asking what we could do for them. I worked with the heads of the departments, mainly social sciences, history, languages, and literature. Programs on the environment, ecology and space were popular. Space flight, moon landings, and space technology especially had broad interest. I made all the arrangements to bring a moon rock for display in Taiwan. That was a major success. The local history museum, which was right across the street from USIS, set up two rooms for the exhibit. On opening day the line to get in extended for blocks. I personally carried the rock on the plane to Kaohsiung for a showing. Crowds in the south were just as numerous and enthusiastic. About the same time we programmed the astronauts from the second moon mission. The entire embassy was involved in organizing events for the astronauts. USIS set up four big screens in the sports stadium to show a film of the actual flight, with commentary by the astronauts, to several thousand secondary school students. The astronauts did similar, though smaller, programs in other major cities, always to capacity crowds.

*Q: Now, David Dean was the political counselor at the time you were there.*

KNOPES: Right.

*Q: And probably was running a pretty good section. Did USIA or yourself chat them up as to, you know, what some good ideas might be, or?*

KNOPES: Oh yeah.

*Q: The interaction between Political and USIA --*

KNOPES: I had been classmates in Taichung with most of the political section -- Leo Moser, Jerry Fowler, Charlie Sylvester, and Ted Price. We came up to Taipei together, partied together, worked together, and exchanged ideas on what was happening in Taiwan. I had a great relationship with the Political Section. David Dan was supportive and helpful. I didn't get to know him very well until we both went to Hong Kong where he was the deputy principle officer in the consulate.

*Q: Now, you're first getting to Taipei in '66. You're leaving in '71.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: What would you say are some of the changes you saw in the, in the mission and in Taipei in the local political --*

KNOPES: Society was changing, the economy was expanding, and the political climate was opening a bit. Taipei was changing, growing outward, becoming urban. But it was not a modern city. The skyline was flat, only two new buildings were over four stories. When we arrived in Taiwan in 1966, we had to watch for oxcarts on the streets of Taipei. A couple of years later they were gone, new thoroughfares and overpasses were constructed and there were more cars and motorcycles on the streets. Kaohsiung was a flourishing industrial city. American aid had helped create a thriving agricultural economy. Now it was moving to industry and technology. The educational system was quite good but there was concern about a brain drain -- students going to the US and staying. This began to change as jobs in education and industry began to open up. Taiwan was still under martial law but it was not rigidly enforced. The ROC was concerned about international pressure for the PRC to replace it in the UN.

*Q: And some have offered that this is because Chiang Ching-kuo was coming up.*

KNOPES: That was clear, even at that time. The embassy, the political section, had regular contact with him. I think everyone saw that Ching-kuo was more open-minded and forward-thinking than his father.

*Q: There was an assassination attempt in New York.*

KNOPES: Yeah, that's right. It was big news in Taiwan when it happened, but it passed quickly. I can't remember much about it. It was a major story in the papers but I got the impression that Ching-kuo didn't want it to be an issue. There was some concern because it happened in the US. But the story didn't last.

*Q: Now, so this whole time you're on the Cultural Affairs Section.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: Oh, and you got rid of that room full of books.*

KNOPES: I did, yes. There were always more coming in, but I could handle them after I got the backlog out of there.

*Q: But that's, that's a good presentation.*

KNOPES: Oh, fantastic. After I presented hundreds of books to a library, USIS was their friend forever. As I said, it was a great entrée for --

*Q: And a personal gift too, you said to the Supreme Court Justices and --*

KNOPES: Sure, right. A book presentation was a good entree to senior officials. It was a way to get to know a lot of people. .

*Q: I remember when I was there later, presentation gifts were big and I have this whole collection of ties from the various municipalities in the --*

KNOPES: Right. Oh, I wanted to mention my experience when I went from language school up to Taipei. As I said, all the teachers had this great Beijing accent, the standard accepted by all Chinese. When I make contacts with older officials in Taipei. My Chinese was very clear, understandable to everyone. The problem came when they replied and I couldn't understand what they said (*laughs*). They were from Zhejiang, Guangzhou, or Shanghai, each with a heavy local accent. Boy, that was a distressing situation (*laughs*). It took a couple of months to get my confidence back. I was really disappointed for a while.

*Q: Some of the Taichung students said studying a language was fabulous. Then you walked out the door to the street and everybody spoke Taiwanese.*

KNOPES: Taiwanese, right.

*Q: Just to sort of illustrate how things are moving, this whole ping-pong thing comes up.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: In April of '71. That must have come to people's attentions.*

KNOPES: Maybe. But as I said, reporting on anything to do with the PRC was strictly controlled. And that story concerned both the PRC and the USA. I don't think there was much in the Taiwan press about it, even though it was a portent of major changes to come. On the other hand, there was heavy coverage when a mainland tennis player defected to Taiwan.

*Q: Now, in '71 you're working on your next assignment or trying to figure out what you're going to do next.*

KNOPES: Yeah. That's right, '71. We were getting ready to go back to an assignment in Washington. Except for the short stay in Virginia for Chinese at FSI, we had been overseas since 1962, so we're coming on more than 10 years. My wife's father had died. Her mother was alone in Mount Kisco, NY. We were making moving plans when I got a call from the area office in USIA asking if I would like to go to Hong Kong to be editor of the Chinese-language regional magazine World Today. The plan was to revamp World Today, sell advertising, and make it self-sufficient. "We think you are the one for the job. Will you do it?" I thought it was a great opportunity but I had to convince my wife. That was a tough job. I never did convince her. But she finally agreed and we went to Hong Kong. It was a job that just popped up. I was a Chinese language officer, had some experience editing Student Review Magazine, and I was available.

*Q: But in those days USIA had a rule, you could only be out of the country so many years?*

KNOPES: That was an informal policy, I think. They didn't want you to lose touch with the US, which we were probably beginning to do. Our boys had grown up in Asia. They knew little about their homeland.

*Q: Want to take a break?*

KNOPES: Yeah, I think so.

*Q: We're returning to our conversation with Bob Knopes. We're talking about the end of your assignment to Taipei and this new assignment to Hong Kong. And I would suspect in one sense this illustrates American soft power, because you're, you're going from organization speakers and influencing audiences that way to now influencing audiences through a written publication. Did USIA have a number of these written publications --*

KNOPES: Oh yeah.

*Q: -- languages around the world?*

KNOPES: Yeah. I recall, Al Majal, which was in Arabic. It was the same size and format as World Today and we used that as our model. Of course there was the magazine done forte USSR. I think it was called Amerika. There was Problems of Communism, in English, with articles indicated in its title. I know there were others but I don't recall the names. Al Majal and most of the others were done in Washington. World Today was done in Hong Kong and distributed in Asia, sold on newsstands. World Today was started in the 1950s to support the Republic of China on Taiwan and to counter material about the People's Republic, which had just taken over the Chinese mainland. At that time the US was still thinking, hoping, the Nationalists might return some day. World Today carried articles about the United States, its policies, and its commitment to freedom in Asia. It's biggest market was Taiwan and Hong Kong, but it had a readership in the Chinese communities in Saigon, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore. Since World Today was sold on newsstands, one of the first editors put a Hong Kong movie actress on the cover of every issue, hoping that would catch the eye of a reader and lead to more sales. It might have worked, but it didn't fit the editorial policy that I had in mind when I took over in 1971. The magazine was then being edited by the local staff with nominal supervision by the information officer. It had become a little bit slapdash, a jumble of translated articles. The area office wanted a more substantial, a more focused publication. Since we were heavily involved in Vietnam at the time, we always had an article or two on United States policy and goals there. There was also the goal of making the magazine self-sufficient through advertising.

Up t that time, World Today had been funded from the USIA budget. Though money came in from sales, US law required that those funds go directly to the US Treasury. They couldn't be used to cover the cost of printing or shipping. Now, USIA lawyers had come up with a new interpretation of the law, allowing us to use advertising income to pay some of the costs of publication.

*Q: As opposed to subscriptions?*

KNOPES: No, we couldn't handle subscriptions. That would require additional staff and a huge amount of paperwork. Mailing individual copies was not possible. We mailed in bulk to

distributors in the countries I mentioned before. Circulation was all news stand sales. I had edited Student Review but didn't know much about the magazine business. I started by talking with magazine publishers in Hong Kong, like Readers Digest and Far Eastern Economic Review. "How do you sell advertising?" "How do you market in various countries?" They were all helpful but not encouraging. It will be tough for a magazine put out by the US government to attract advertisers, they said. And they were right. It wasn't practical. But it was my job and I forged ahead. They said we would first need information on readership for potential advertisers, so I found a small company that would do some surveys for us and an ad agency that started looking for advertisers.

After I got the assignment, I took a trip from Taipei to Hong Kong to talk to the PAO and look over the situation. While I was there President Nixon announced that he planned to visit the PRC in 1972. Nobody saw that coming. I was standing in the corridor of the USIS office listening to a radio broadcast when David Dean came dashing in, asking "What'd he say?" There was no radio outlet in the Consul General's office. That announcement pretty much determined how I was going to do World Today, for the first year, at least. I took over the magazine in July of 1971. Nixon was going to Beijing in the spring of '72. I forget when it was, May or something?

*Q: February.*

KNOPES: Oh, February? OK. I hadn't planned any big changes in the magazine for a few months, anyway. Now we would concentrate on preparing a special edition on Nixon's trip to China. While we were doing that I gathered information on advertising, polling, and distribution.

In the run-up to the visit we made arrangements to get news reports and color photos from AP (Associated Press) and UPI (United Press International). We got materials put out by the State Department and the USIA press office that covered the trip extensively. We had a lot more material than we could use. We had camera-ready copy set for the printer before Nixon was back in the States. Copies of the special edition were on their way to distributors in Southeast Asia within a week. We must have printed almost 100,000 copies. The issue was sold out in a short time. No copies went to Taiwan, of course. The authorities there did not see this event as newsworthy for the island. Around Southeast Asia it was a best seller. This gave us a good start in launching the revised magazine, a monthly, more than double the size of the bi-weekly, with more articles on business, economics, international relations, and US society.

Our ad agency was able to sell some advertising for our first revised issue. I think we had Cross pens and the Hong Kong regional airline Cathay Pacific. Ads for cigarettes would have been a sure thing but we did not accept those. Later, we added some hotels and another airline or two. It was a slow start and never picked up much speed. I was successful in introducing advertising, bringing in some additional revenue. But we were meeting serious headwinds. On a trip to Southeast Asia I found publications carrying more about the PRC. One was even using the simplified Chinese characters developed in the PRC. Once the American president visited China most restrictions on publishing on what was happening there were lifted. In Saigon I got a mixed message. The distributor was enthusiastic, telling me, "We're looking forward to this new publication. We'll definitely increase our distribution." I looked at the barbed wire in the streets, the inflation, and other negatives and thought, "That probably isn't going to happen."

Circulation wasn't going to increase in the Chinese communities of Bangkok or Manila, either. The younger generation was totally assimilated as Thai or Filipino. They were not learning Chinese and would not be buying Chinese language publications. No matter how good we made World Today it would be hard to compete with local publications. We enlivened World Today and gave it more focus, but it was a general magazine put out by a US government agency. A couple of years after I left, USIA cut funding for all its magazines. World Today was ended, but before long a similar magazine was created for circulation in the PRC. It was called Jiao Liu.

*Q: Just on the bureaucratic side of things, what's the tree that you're in? Who do you report to?*

KNOPES: Nobody really. That was the good thing. My first PAO in Hong Kong was a former newspaper man. He was very helpful, suggesting things to try but letting me decide how to proceed. The next PAO was a poor manager. I was well into the job by then and could fend off his wildest suggestions. He was more troublesome to the rest of the staff. The people who were concerned with what I was doing were in Washington, and they were only concerned with the finished product. I was pretty much on my own. I ran each issue by the PAO, but I don't recall any editorial problems arising.

*Q: Being published in Hong Kong, is -- do you own the publishing facilities?*

KNOPES: No.

*Q: Or do you rent --*

KNOPES: World Today was always printed by a local printing company, South China Printing, I think it was called. Their facility was in Aberdeen, on the other side of the island. We were in constant touch with them. When an issue was ready they came by the consulate to pick up the camera ready copy. Once we approved the final layout, the issue was printed and shipped to distributors. After I left Hong Kong, USIS switched the printing of the magazine to USIA's Regional Service Center in Manila, a major publishing operation that printed books, magazines, posters, everything that USIS posts needed. The magazine was then shipped to USIS posts by diplomatic pouch, a significant savings.

*Q: And what was the circulation when you started off?*

KNOPES: I think it was 70,000 to 75,000 copies an issue. Taiwan and Hong Kong took most of that, 70% to 75%.

*Q: After that first issue, you got back into Taiwan, did you?*

KNOPES: After the Nixon issue, yeah. There was just the one special issue. Then we made the switch to a monthly magazine, doubling the pages and changing the format. After Nixon went to China I thought it was time to get away from the pro-ROC bias, or at least make it neutral. In one issue I used a report on agriculture in the PRC that was written by the consulate economic section. It was just one page, a straightforward report, but it indicated that agricultural output was

improving. After the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, there was nowhere to go but up. Our area director at that time was a protégé of Vice President Spiro Agnew, extremely conservative and pro-ROC. He was outraged that I would do such a thing. He threatened to remove me as editor, but settled on forbidding me from using anything positive about the PRC in the future. He left shortly afterward and I got back to carrying more coverage of the PRC. After Spiro Agnew resigned the vice presidency, he was frequently in Taiwan on some form of business. He and his colleague were very close to Taiwan. I could see why they didn't want the magazine saying anything good about the PRC. It might have hampered their future relationships with Taiwan.

*Q: Now, Washington was watching you, or reading from time to time?*

KNOPES: Oh, yeah.

KNOPES: The China desk officer in USIA at that time was native Chinese, so he read each issue. We also appended an English summary of each article in issues we sent back to Washington.

*Q: The magazine wasn't a -- was tied to a larger USIA program of doing these language magazines.*

KNOPES: Well, not exactly, no. It was a local operation. I only used the other magazines as comparison. World Today started in Hong Kong and ended in Hong Kong. It's operating costs were part of the USIS Hong Kong budget. We got a lot of support from USIA press and magazine offices, but we in Hong Kong decided the editorial policy, except for that one instance.

*Q: As the editor then of this publication, you're going around to the parties in Hong Kong saying I'm the editor? I mean you're joining the journalist crowd?*

KNOPES: Yeah, to some extent. I would say, "I'm doing this magazine and we want to sell advertising. Can you give us any hints or suggestions or advice?" They were very helpful. I was a member of the Foreign Correspondents Clubs, a good place to make contacts. That's an interesting point, how did World Today fit into USIA? I believe it was one of the first regional magazines established. From what I heard, the genesis was USIS Hong Kong, not USIA, though I'm sure USIA approved. Its purpose was to present a positive picture of the ROC on Taiwan, but it also carried plenty of material on US presence in Asia and Southeast Asia. My job was to sell advertising, not easy for a general magazine relying totally on news stand sales. We had no idea who was buying the magazine. I put in more features that would appeal to a younger audience, while continuing to carry statements of the secretary of state and other government entities about US Asia policy. We added a section on business and economics. We tried to cover a lot of ground, maybe too much.

*Q: During the time that you're in Hong Kong working this project, other things in the area are happening. The Americans pull out of Vietnam, '72.*

KNOPES: Yeah, uh-huh.

*Q: Or '73 rather.*

KNOPES: Yeah. We always carried articles on Vietnam. When I traveled to Vietnam, I found a stringer correspondent there to write local stories for us. I added stringers for most countries in Southeast Asia. The US was withdrawing, but we were still talking about the future of South Vietnam.

*Q: Middle East pops up. Does any of that get covered?*

KNOPES: Not much. We might have carried a statement of U.S. policy on the Middle East but it was not our area of interest.

*Q: Right. Because the Vietnam Peace Accords were signed in January.*

KNOPES: Yeah, uh-huh.

*Q: '73.*

KNOPES: I think we were fairly optimistic, or at least hopeful, that things would work out. The collapse didn't come for another two years. But the Middle East, no, I don't think we covered much of that. It was a publication about Asia and the U.S./Asia relationship.

*Q: Now, you were there as the editor. Were there any other USIA officers assigned to this project?*

KNOPES: No, I was it. An American officer put together Current Scene. You remember the magazine Current Scene?

*Q: Yeah.*

KNOPES: But that was another office -- again a part of USIS Hong Kong but almost independent. Current Scene was really about what was happening in the PRC, analytical articles in English. The editor acquired articles from academics and unclassified items produced by the consulate. I think it was about 16 pages, published as a quarto, whereas World Today was a regular magazine. The USIS information officer handled press relations for the consulate. But Current Scene and World Today were separate entities within USIS. I had a staff of five or six. The senior editor had been running World Today for many years, although the information officer was nominally in charge.

*Q: Now, was he a USIA officer?*

KNOPES: No, no, Chinese. We had two other editors and two layout artists. I selected the articles and worked with the senior editor on a plan for each issue. The others did the translations and the layout.

*Q: Well, as you were saying earlier, being in the publishing business can be tricky from time to time. Do you ever run into any other complaints on your coverage?*

KNOPES: No, no. We didn't. Everyone seemed to be quite happy with it. I took a couple of trips to visit our distributors. They were always upbeat and offered suggestions on content. When we changed to a monthly, with a completely new format, they were enthusiastic about it. They said they thought we were going in the right direction. I was not optimistic about the long term. The political climate was changing. China was opening and the ROC on Taiwan was losing international clout. The best thing about those trips to Saigon and Bangkok and talking to all those distributors was that I got a fantastic Chinese meal at every stop.

*Q: (laughs) What office in Washington would you have been in contact with on these issues?*

KNOPES: The Area Office for policy guidance and help and the Publications Office for support on materials for the magazine. There was one guy who looked over all trade magazines and company annual reports. Some of these had good articles about future developments in medicine, management, or science that could be useful to us. He sent copies out to us. If we thought we could use them he would get the rights. We always had a pool of good material to choose from. There was a writer and a photographer at RSC Manila who did regional stories that were useful. On my trips around Southeast Asia I hired stringers in each of the countries. They supplied us stories from Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam, Taiwan. We were trying to turn World Today into a regional magazine rather than just clipping and editing from U.S. articles. Of course, we used State Department policy statements. We always carried an article on US policy. The goal was to make the magazine regional. We hoped this would attract more readers and bring in advertising, too.

*Q: Now, this also coincided with the time that Nixon goes to China and we have an unofficial establishment in China. Does this open the door to sending World Today --*

KNOPES: No, no.

*Q: -- into China?*

KNOPES: That didn't happen until about 1979, after our embassy opened in Beijing. World Today was included when USIA killed off the magazines sometime in the mid-1970s. After we opened our embassy in Beijing a magazine called Jiao Liu, similar to World Today, was created. Jiao Liu was distributed free in China. John Thomson was the first PAO in Beijing. He must have had something to do with starting the magazine. The problem was who to send it to. John and his staff grabbed listings from every available telephone book, college faculty directory, government office, any list of names and addresses they could find, and created a mailing list. One of my first jobs when I got to Beijing in 1982 was to refine that distribution list. It was an impressive list but we didn't know if copies were actually reaching the people, or who might read it when it arrived. But no, World Today died somewhere along the line in the late '70s. Jiao Liu wasn't a direct replacement but it was put together in Hong Kong by a similar staff. I believe that staff was all new hire, though.

*Q: Now, when you start in Hong Kong David Osborne was the CG (consul general).*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: And later Chuck Cross.*

KNOPES: Only for about a month, during my last month there.

*Q: Oh, that Chuck came.*

KNOPES: Yeah, it was David Osborne and David Dean all the time I was there.

*Q: What was Osborne like to --*

KNOPES: Oh, he was a very nice guy and an effective CG. As World Today editor, I didn't have much contact with the CG. I played squash with David Dean because we knew each other from Taipei.

*Q: Actually, Hong Kong is one of the larger diplomat establishments.*

KNOPES: Absolutely, right. Right, it was then, too.

*Q: So it'd be easy to get lost.*

KNOPES: Well, you could.

*Q: Or stay in obscurity.*

KNOPES: After Hong Kong David Osborne became ambassador to Burma. When I traveled to Burma as USIA desk officer in 1977, I called on him. He remembered me and was very cordial.

*Q: This is also the Nixon administration, Kissinger becomes secretary of state. Did you notice any particular atmospheric change because of that? At your level anyway?*

KNOPES: No, I don't think so. When was that? '72?

*Q: Kissinger becomes secretary of state in '73.*

KNOPES: In '73, yeah. I don't remember anything at that time or any changes back in Washington. I was pretty much in that little office. We were really struggling with the advertising and I was making trips around the area. I was completely focused on the magazine.

*Q: Well, '74 you make a change by coming back to Washington.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm, yeah.

**THOMAS P. SHOESMITH**  
**Deputy, Taiwan Desk**  
**Washington, DC (1966-1971)**

*Thomas P. Shoemith was born in 1939 and raised in Pennsylvania. His career in the State Department included posts in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korean, and an ambassadorship to Malaysia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.*

SHOESMITH: I was assigned as the deputy on the Taiwan desk, then the Republic of China desk. I was asked to take that job, again by somebody that knew me. That's the way it used to work. It does today to some extent, I suppose. Bob Fearey asked me to come back and handle that job. I had no previous experience with respect to China/Taiwan and very limited with respect to China, except for my time in Hong Kong, which was not the kind of experience which would have been terribly helpful. But I was glad to have the job. After I was there about a year, the Country Director went off to Vietnam, and I succeeded him as Country Director for Republic of China Affairs, I think, in 1967, some time in there. I held that position until I went off to the Senior Seminar in 1971.

*Q: Well, you were there in 1969, when the Nixon Administration came in. Taiwan certainly was a major focus, particularly of the Right wing of the Republican Party, which Nixon somewhat represented. What was the difference between the Johnson Administration and the Nixon Administration regarding Taiwan?*

SHOESMITH: I have no clear recollection of any differences. What I do recall is that there was considerable sentiment within the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, which I shared, for relaxing the grip which the Republic of China had on our policy with respect to Mainland China. There was a feeling that we should try to move in the direction of some opening toward Mainland China. I think that it was in that time frame that the Secretary -- who was it then? Rogers, I guess -- made a speech somewhere to which we contributed. Secretary Rogers said something to the effect that when we are concerned with matters under the control of the people in Beijing, we will have to deal with them. Regarding matters which are under the control of Taiwan, we will have to deal with the Republic of China. And that was the first sort of crack in the door. I suspect that the Secretary had little input into what was going on in the White House in the same direction. Our concern at this time was focused on efforts to try to resolve the question of Communist China's exclusion from the U. N. There were other countries that were beginning to recognize Beijing and to cut their ties with Taiwan. There was increasing pressure in the United Nations to bring China into the United Nations. Initially, we had opposed that. However, that opposition was beginning to waver. Of course, we spent a lot of time talking with the Republic of China Embassy here, in an effort to prepare them for some change in our position on the United Nations and to get them in a more sympathetic frame of mind toward changing their own position. For example, Communist China would be in the Security Council, but we would somehow try to find a way to retain the Republic of China in the General Assembly. All of that effort, of course, just went up in smoke with the Kissinger visit to China, which came as a

complete surprise to me. I don't know whether the Assistant Secretary knew anything about it. For that matter, I don't know whether Secretary of State Rogers knew anything about it. I was on leave in Pennsylvania, and there was a notice that the President was going to make some important announcement on television. I remember my son asking, "What do you suppose that's about?" I didn't have any idea. And when the President said that Henry Kissinger had visited Beijing, I couldn't believe it.

*Q: This was when you were still on the desk?*

SHOESMITH: I was still on the desk. This was in 1971, before I went over to the Senior Seminar.

*Q: The Assistant Secretary was Marshall Green, wasn't he, at the time? He didn't know about it because he mentioned being at a staff meeting and making some remark about Kissinger saying that he had tummy trouble. He said, "It sounds as if you've gone off to China," and then all of a sudden he realized what he had said at the staff meeting and thought, "My God, you know, there might be something to this."*

SHOESMITH: I recall something of this story. So, as of that point, well, everything we'd been doing for a year or more, principally with the Republic of China Embassy here in Washington had gone up in smoke. Our Embassy in Taipei was not much involved in this effort to try and get the Republic of China to save some of its position.

*Q: Well, you really were looking at a two China policy...*

SHOESMITH: We were, in effect, yes, looking at a two China policy.

*Q: Well, how, let's say, before the Nixon shock came about, how receptive was the Republic of China's Embassy to this idea?*

SHOESMITH: Oh, totally unreceptive. I mean, I used to talk mostly with the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. I knew him as a friend, and we had a very good relationship. He could understand what we were trying to do and he may even, himself, have been sympathetic, but he knew that his government would never countenance such a move. It would not be involved in it in any way. We tried, but to absolutely no avail. I remember particularly talking with people from the Canadian Embassy to get them to retain some sort of tie with Taiwan, as they had recognized Beijing. They were unsympathetic. So, it was a futile effort that I was engaged in.

*Q: Did you feel this at the time or did you think that...*

SHOESMITH: I certainly saw that it had very little chance of success, but I myself was not just going through the motions. I must have felt that it was important that Taiwan not be simply cast adrift, that there had to be some place in the international structure for Taiwan. If you could work out something in the United Nations, such as I mentioned, a place for them in the General Assembly, this would have been a good thing to do. However, looking back at the situation at the time, I have to say that I probably realized at the time that there was very little hope that this

could be achieved.

*Q: How did the Republic of China's Embassy work in Washington? Did they still have the "China Lobby," or a vestige of that to try to bypass the Department of State to some extent? Did they have a direct ear or a direct line to Congress?*

SHOESMITH: I don't think they had much support. I mean the "China Lobby" at that time was no longer a significant factor. I think that their ambassador was a very experienced and a very effective person. He probably tried to do what he could. He could see the direction in which things were moving, particularly after Kissinger's visit. I just don't know how much of a sympathetic ear he got up on the Hill. We were sympathetic and were trying to do what we could. It was clear that we were going to be moving toward an opening to China, as we saw it and as I saw it. The task was to try to preserve some position, not only within the UN but internationally for Taiwan, for the Republic of China. For the Republic of China on Taiwan. But the position of both sides at that time -- Beijing and Taipei -- was that you could not have relations with both. And so after 1970-71 more and more countries decided to make that break. Taiwan, it was clear, was going to be increasingly isolated, diplomatically and internationally. There was nothing, I think, that we were in a position to do to halt that.

*Q: Well, as you looked at it, could you see the situation which has more or less developed today? There is really a very vigorous, economic power on Formosa or Taiwan, just sitting out there, without diplomatic clout. However, it really doesn't make a lot of difference.*

SHOESMITH: No, I don't think I foresaw that. I think views about the Republic of China at that time were very much affected by the rather negative impression we had of Chiang Kai-shek and of the KMT [Kuo Min Tang] regime in Taiwan. They had martial law. It was very ineffective, I mean, politically. Of course, we did have important bases there. It was one of the safe havens for the families of people serving in our Mission in Vietnam. And the Republic of China was very cooperative in allowing us to use their bases in support of our activities in Vietnam. We had that, but as to the future, I mean, what would happen to Taiwan, it was not a very bright picture. I don't think anyone anticipated either the economic or the political evolution of Taiwan, which has occurred over the last decade. Particularly politically, within the past five or six years. I certainly wouldn't have anticipated that. The successor to Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, gave no signs that he was a man with the breadth of vision that he subsequently demonstrated.

*Q: He was basically not only the son of Chiang Kai-shek but the head of the police and all, wasn't he?*

SHOESMITH: That's right. He had been, yes.

**NEAL DONNELLY**  
**Taichung Language School**  
**Taiwan (1967-1968)**

**Branch Public Affairs Officer  
Kaohsiung, Taiwan (1968-1971)**

**Cultural Affairs Officer  
Taipei, Taiwan (1971-1972)**

**China Branch Chief, Voice of America  
Washington, DC (1972-1975)**

**Cultural Affairs Officer/Deputy Public Affairs Officer  
Taipei, Taiwan (1975-1981)**

*Mr. Donnelly was born and raised in Buffalo, New York. After graduating from Canisius College he served with the US Army in Korea. He joined the United States Information Service in 1960. His assignments, primarily in the Cultural and Public Affairs field in the Far East, included Saigon, Hong Kong and Taiwan, where he served in a number of different capacities. After entering the State Department Foreign Service Mr. Donnelly had a number of assignments with the Voice of America in Washington. Mr. Donnelly was interviewed by David Reuther in 2001.*

*Q: After Harvard you're actually just beginning on being in a school environment; you went from there to Taichung Language School.*

DONNELLY: Taichung Language School. I was there for not quite a year; I was pulled out early because they needed someone to staff the branch in Kaohsiung. It's a big port city. There was military north of the city and the naval base at Tsoying. There were some U.S. Naval people and a few other military in Kaohsiung, but I was the only Foreign Service officer southern Taiwan. It's a big city with a lot of important people. It was quite interesting.

*Q: Let's go back to Taichung for a minute. How was the language school set up and what was it doing in the middle of the island?*

DONNELLY: It's now in Taipei, as you know. Why was it in the middle of the island? I think it was somebody's idea that it's best to teach language in a local setting where you can go out and hear Chinese spoken all the time. There are too many distractions in Taipei and there's too much English spoken there. I guess that was the idea. I think it worked; I think there were an awful lot of people in Taichung, a few that spoke English, but a lot of people spoke Mandarin. Of course the language of the local people in Taichung is what they call Taiwanese or Fujianese, or whatever they want to call it, but it was very similar.

*Q: Your Mandarin didn't get you far down.*

DONNELLY: Most people could understand it and certainly the young people were all educated in Mandarin.

*Q: Now who was in language school with you? Do you remember? Was it a big class?*

DONNELLY: Yes, Al Romberg, who later became a State Department spokesman, he lived next door to me. Dick Williams, who was later consul general in Hong Kong.

*Q: Was Bill Rolp there at that time?*

DONNELLY: No, Bill Rolp was not there. I guess other people's names will come to me in a minute, but those two names stand out.

*Q: But it was a fair number of people, ten to fifteen people?*

DONNELLY: It was about thirty, I think.

*Q: What were they going to do with them?*

DONNELLY: Some of them were military and there were some, I guess, CIA. I didn't know; I've always been rather dense about the CIA. One of my friends there, I found out later, was in the CIA. I'd had no idea. But there were a fair number of them. Only a few were State Department that I know of; Naran Ivanchukov, and of course Romberg. Naran and Romberg and Dick Williams. In USIA there were Wally Gibson and myself, Dave Huey and there was a guy named Bill Buehler who was in the Army with me in Korea; he was CIA and later left the CIA and now is teaching Chinese at the language school in Monterey. He was at the army language school in Monterey when I was there and then he went to Korea with me. He studied Mandarin right from the get-go; his Mandarin is very good, obviously.

*Q: Now FSI (Foreign Service Institute) Taichung is so many hours of speaking and so many hours of recitation off tapes?*

DONNELLY: Six hours of class work and then you work at home; it's intensive.

*Q: Did you get an opportunity to tour the island as part of the class?*

DONNELLY: Yes, for one week, I think between Christmas and New Year's, they assign a teacher to two or three students to tour the island. We went around it in a car that belonged to one of the students. What we found is that the teacher who was of course a mainlander, not a Taiwanese, was absolutely useless. He didn't know anything about the island and he couldn't speak the local language, so we could've just as well went without him. *(laughs)*

Later on I toured the island myself with one or two friends on bicycles; I've been all over that island on bicycle. Staying in little inns at 75 cents a night or something like that.

*Q: Now this is before the economy in Taiwan really begins to pick up, isn't it?*

DONNELLY: Yes.

*Q: The U.S. terminated aid in '65, I think, and you were there in '67. Were there any inklings of what would become this great economic expansion?*

DONNELLY: When I was in Kaohsiung, they opened up something called the Kaohsiung Export Processing Zone. It was several factories built on what was a sandbar in the Kaohsiung Harbor and they invited foreigners, mainly Americans, British and whatnot, to bring in material or components and hire local people, usually young girls, to process them and then send them out, but not sell them in Taiwan. They started out, the young girls, making transistors and shirts, tennis rackets, golf clubs, all these things, and they would earn probably about \$30 a month. I think that was about the beginning. That was extremely successful; foreign companies made a lot of money and the government made some money on taxes. It didn't hurt the local economy bringing in imported goods because they couldn't be sold there and people were getting money and would buy motorcycles and things.

It worked so well that they set up one north of Kaohsiung and then another north of Taichung. In any event, there were three of them by the time I left. The idea was so good that they just kept expanding in it and forgetting about the export processing; just bringing in. I don't know if they did it in any other country, but it was certainly the beginning of American factories taking advantage of local labor.

*Q: You're in language school and you left early, you said, to go to Kaohsiung. You said there were a couple of other USIA people there; did they have other assignments and you were there unassigned, or you were always going to go to Kaohsiung and you went early?*

DONNELLY: Happenstance.

*Q: (laughs) You did that already!*

DONNELLY: I had no inkling. I didn't ask for it. I don't know why it happened.

*Q: Well now, in those days could you take language without an ongoing assignment?*

DONNELLY: In those days, yes. Right now if you're in the Foreign Service, you bid for assignments. Never; I never bid for an assignment. That procedure was not in effect when I was in Taiwan.

*Q: That would come in, in the 1970s. You're right.*

DONNELLY: They would decide where they want to send you. I think in the case of sending me to Kaohsiung, the PAO in Taipei was Ken Boyle and he had been my PAO in Hong Kong, so he knew me. He didn't ask me if I wanted to go, he just said, "Go." He said, "Go," and he goeth; come and he cometh. *(laughs)*

*Q: So you left the language school a little bit early. If you took language at Harvard and you've got FSI, you must've hit 3/3. Did you test out?*

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*got FSI, you must've hit 3/3. Did you test out?*

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*Q: Now you go to Kaohsiung in July of '68. Would you describe what that mission was; it was a consulate?*

DONNELLY: No, it was just a branch post.

*Q: But was there also a Foreign Service consulate there?*

DONNELLY: No.

*Q: So USIA was it?*

DONNELLY: I was it. If they wanted a speaker at a college assembly, if they wanted an American official, I was it. If anybody had to call in the mayor, I was with them to call the mayor. I'd have the mayor over to my house and...

*Q: I'm interested in this because of course when I was there in the '80s, Kaohsiung was a three or four person post reporting on political events that were going on in Kaohsiung. So here the American presence in Kaohsiung is the telling of America's story; USIA-type presence. Kaohsiung is not politically and economically important enough...*

DONNELLY: Taiwan probably wasn't in the American scope. The TOEFL Exam would be run in my center, some of it. All that sort of stuff.

*Q: How many locals did you have then?*

DONNELLY: I had about eight, I guess. I had a driver, three librarians, an assistant, a janitor, and a motion picture guy.

*Q: So you had an auditorium where you could show films or hold cultural events?*

DONNELLY: If we had speakers come down, just ordinary...

*Q: What kind of academic institutions were there at the time?*

DONNELLY: There was a medical college; the medical college was the biggest college. There was another college; I forget the name of it. It was a normal college. Later on they put a couple more universities down there. A medical college and a normal college, I think were it. I remember, they asked me to give a lecture on American foreign policy at the medical college. Most of the students at the medical college were Taiwanese and after I gave the talk, they had something called "pan chang;" that was the student who was to run roughshod over other students if they got politically away from the Kuomintang; learned too much.

*Q: This was the political officer.*

DONNELLY: They had a political officer, yes. So he got up - of course, most of the students are Taiwanese - and he said, "Why don't you," meaning America, "want us to return to the mainland?" And I said, "I want you to go to the mainland," at which point the students erupted and they whistled and cheered. *(laughs)*

*Q: (laughs) That's an interesting way in which the society was organized at that time. The KMT, the Kuomintang, is a Leninist party.*

DONNELLY: They controlled all the police chiefs, all the university presidents and major staff, all the ministries; they had everything. The Kuomintang really had things screwed down pretty tightly. So much so that almost all the Taiwanese disliked the regime, but they would be afraid to even talk about it because they're not sure... If there are three people together, then someone is an informer. Besides the garrison command and the police and their equivalent of the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), they had several units whose job was to ferret out dangerous types, so Taiwanese wouldn't want to talk openly. If they even mentioned the number 2-2-8, they would be thrown in jail. I know a man who was thrown in jail for having a copy of Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China; he took it from an American school library. They found it and then they threw him in jail.

The husband of one of my employees was ratted on because when he was in China he belonged to a hiking group and they had Communist connections, although he was no Communist. Years later, somebody had an argument and ratted on him that he was a Communist and they threw him in jail and then one day they just called up and said, "Come and collect the body." They executed him.

It was very tight. You had to be very careful what you said. Some people were fearless though; there was a politician named Kuo Kuo-ch'I. They called him Ta P'ao, meaning "big cannon" because he had a big mouth. I went to one of his election rallies and he was talking. The way they ran election rallies, all candidates could get up and talk for twenty minutes or a number of minutes and that's all they had.

This rally was for a legislative Yuan (equivalent of our Congress). There could be KMT candidates and independent candidates, but the independents could not form a political party; they had to run separately. Big Kuo got up and said, "I don't want to talk about Taiwan. I want to talk about a small country in Africa called Rhodesia. In Rhodesia all the important positions, all the police and magistrates and the important government people, they're all from another country. They're all from Britain; none of them are Rhodesian. Of course, the Taiwanese immediately get the point and they all started screaming and laughing and the Kuomintang (KMT) which was running, but they had to shut the machine off, the microphone. But he very cleverly got the point across that they were being controlled by foreigners: the mainland Chinese.

*Q: Why is it, do you think, the KMT even allowed those elections?*

DONNELLY: Oh, I think they had to. You have to have some semblance; even in Communism they have the local meaningless elections for group leaders and things. You have to have something.

*Q: Kaohsiung was in fact a very Taiwanese part of town. The mainlanders were all up in Taipei. If you had some Taiwanese you must have been very popular.*

DONNELLY: Well, I got along well with the Taiwanese; I liked them, also I liked a lot of mainlanders I knew there. But because I spoke some Taiwanese and had a lot of Taiwanese contacts I was rather looked on with suspicion by the government.

I'll never forget in 1975 when I came back to work in Washington at the Voice of America, one of my broadcasters there asked me to go to dinner at a Chinese affair where the Minister of Information, Fred Chen, was going to be the speaker. This was in Washington. I said okay and afterwards she said, "I'd like to introduce you to him." Now, I'd never met him. He was head of the information office in Taipei. I'd been in Taiwan all those years but down island. I'd never met this man, and she introduced me to him. She said, "This is my new boss, Neal Donnelly," and he must not have heard my first name and he said to me, "Are you any relation to Neal Donnelly?" I said, "Yes." Obviously he had my dossier that he had been reading because I'd never met him. I think probably they're very suspicious of me, without any reason at all because I never was instrumental in anything.

Maybe he knew my name because of the bombing in Tainan. About three or four days after China was admitted to the UN (United Nations), I think October twelfth it was - I think it was Columbus Day, I was in the office in Tainan. I had a cultural center in Tainan and the one in Kaohsiung. I went back and forth between the two.

*Q: Oh, you covered both?*

DONNELLY: I covered both, yes.

*Q: So there wasn't a separate third office of USIA? It was Tainan?*

DONNELLY: No, I had both and also a reading room in Pingdong. So it was a big area. I left the office and Bob Nichols, who was the Taipei deputy, was down visiting at that time and that night I had invited the temple committee from the San Feng Kung Temple in Kaohsiung to dinner. I spent a lot of time in and around temples because I became interested and I thought it was very important to understand the religion of the country. If you want to understand a country, you should understand the religion. I think we're learning that now in Afghanistan.

I had the temple committee, only one of whom could speak a little English, and two who could speak Mandarin. The rest were Taiwanese and they were almost country bumpkinish types. Bob and I just got back from Tainan to Kaohsiung and just sitting down to dinner when the phone rang. It was my chief assistant, K.C. Chuang, in Tainan telling me that our building had been blown up. Now this was incredible. Since February 28, 1947 there had been no terrorist explosions and it was just incredible. So I said, "I'll come right away". The temple committee

really didn't understand why I invited them to dinner and left them without eating, but Bob and I rushed back to Tainan and there was very serious damage to the building. A powerful bomb was set outside my office and some students were hurt badly. My janitor was hurt.

*Q: Now the explosion was in the evening?*

DONNELLY: Yes, right after I left the office, so it was about six o'clock, I suppose.

*Q: So that's not too evening; so knowledgeable that there would be people in the building.*

DONNELLY: Oh, yes, they knew that. So we went back and there were two boys that were hurt badly; one lost a leg and the other got a hundred or so pieces of wood and things imbedded in his body. He was in the hospital a long time. They were both poor boys, sixteen years old. You know, trying to learn something at USIS and they were from a little fishing village nearby. Very poor. So I got the ambassador, who was McConaughy, I think at the time, to put some money aside from our liquor fund. They sold liquor, as you know, and then made profit; the profit went for one thing or the other. Anyway, he set aside \$5000 each for the boys which was enough for them to get a college education. I'm still in contact with them.

*Q: Really? What are they doing now?*

DONNELLY: One now has got a Ph.D. and his wife has a Ph.D. He is a chemical engineer and is dean of a university in Taiwan now. So something good came of it.

*Q: You were saying the bomb was brought into the building?*

DONNELLY: Yes, put in between my office and the library.

*Q: So the building is open?*

DONNELLY: Sure, the building is open. The students were there; it was about six o'clock and the library had students in it.

*Q: Now the issue is who claims credit or who gets blamed for this? I mean, as you say, this was just weeks after China gets into the UN. Kissinger has already gone to China and in July of '71 Nixon announces that he is going to go to China in February of '72 and then the vote is taken in the UN on the representation issue and Beijing enters the UN. Shortly after that, there's this explosion.*

DONNELLY: I believe, now we can check this, but I believe China entered the UN before Kissinger went to China.

*Q: No, before Nixon went.*

DONNELLY: Before Kissinger. Because I learned of Kissinger going to China when I was transferred to Taipei, and this happened before.

*Q: Hum.*

DONNELLY: No, China entered the UN before Kissinger went to China. The UN vote, as you recall, the balance of those in favor and against kept slipping and at one point they got in without the help of the United States. I'm pretty sure of that.

*Q: Well, I just checked it so...*

DONNELLY: Oh, you checked it?

*Q: Yes, Kissinger went secretly in early '71 and in July of '71 Nixon announced that he'd been invited as a result of the previous tour. So, by July of '71, Nixon makes public his invitation to go to China in February of '72. So this event of yours is then July/August of '71.*

DONNELLY: No, It's October of probably '70. China was in the UN before Kissinger went to China. I don't know how I can check this, but I will.

*Q: Yes, it'd be interesting.*

DONNELLY: China was in the UN before Kissinger went.

*Q: Coming back to the point though, whose bomb?*

DONNELLY: When we got there, my chief assistant was livid because there were about four or five different KMT security groups, the garrison command, the police, their FBI – they called them ministry or bureau or something, and they're all in there, and my assistant, a Taiwanese said, "They're in here destroying evidence." In any event, they said they were going to question every person on the island to find out. Finally they blamed a young Taiwanese student and they put him in jail. Treated him nicely in jail and then let him out. He came to the United States later and I met him; he did not do it. The question is, who at that time had access to explosives? I was told by a friendly magistrate that it was the son of a general who was mad because China got into the UN, but I can't confirm that. But who would have access to explosives in an island that's so tightly controlled?

*Q: That's a singularly good point.*

DONNELLY: Who would be mad at the United States? Simply not the Taiwanese; we were a beacon for the Taiwanese.

*Q: Why do you say that? A beacon in what sense? Were we very public in our criticism of the Kuomintang's efforts.*

DONNELLY: The United States, as you well know and everybody knows, is a democratic society and we were pushing democracy in all sorts of ways. We were sending a lot of students from Taiwan, both mainlanders and Taiwanese, to the United States and they liked what they

saw. They saw us as a counter balance. If the United States wasn't there, God knows how repressive the regime of Chiang Kai-shek would've been.

*Q: So they were aware that by programs and by profile we were making it a little bit easier for them, even on the island?*

DONNELLY: I think that's really true in every country; in the world probably.

*Q: Without sanctions; don't you have to put sanctions on people first?*

DONNELLY: Well, I wouldn't, but then I'm not running things.

*Q: While you're in Kaohsiung, Vietnam is still around, in fact, there's Tet in '68. Are any of those issues affecting your presentation in your public speeches when you're addressing these issues?*

DONNELLY: In Taiwan you didn't have to apologize for being an anti-communist.

*Q: (laughs) It made your job very easy.*

DONNELLY: It didn't affect it at all, no.

*Q: On the other hand, you had the Tet Spring of August '68 in this timeframe.*

DONNELLY: Yes, again, they were interested in it, but we didn't have to address that specifically.

*Q: Actually, at this time in Taiwan, maybe not down in the south, but certainly up in the north, there was a series of student demonstrations on the Diao Yu T'ai issue, which are these small islands equally claimed by the Japanese and China. The Japanese seemed to be getting the upper hand. This was 1970. Did you see any student demonstrations down in your area?*

DONNELLY: It was the Senkaku island dispute. As a matter of fact, there had been no student demonstrations in Taiwan since 1947. There was Marshal Law; they were not allowed to have student demonstrations. The first student demonstration was at USIS, Tainan. I got a call from the same guy, K.C. Chuang. He said, "Get up here right away. There's a student demonstration." I said, "Impossible; you can't have one." What had happened is fifty students walked from Chung Kung University, an engineering university in Tainan, passed a police station to USIS and demonstrated. How were they allowed to do that? You can't have a demonstration. The way they were able to do it is that the fifty of them were overseas Chinese students; they were from Singapore and places like that, so the police weren't going to touch them. They came and demanded that we force the Senkaku question; we force the Japanese to accept that it is Chinese. I called Taipei for instructions before I went up to Tainan; I called from Kaohsiung to Taipei to the political officer and he said, "Invite a couple of the students in and listen to them and don't promise them anything."

*Q: Who was in Taipei at the time?*

DONNELLY: It might have been Leo Moser. The ambassador was McConaughy, I'm sure. The political officer might have been Leo Moser.

In any event, I went out there and there were the fifty students outside raising their arms and stuff like that and the police looking sheepish because they know these guys shouldn't be doing that, but they don't know what to do about it. I went in and talked to the leaders and they kept talking about the sovereignty and whatnot and I kept saying, "Yes, yes, yes," until they were sick of hearing me say, "Yes, yes, yes," and then they left. That was the first demonstration. Then the next two or three days, because the ice had been broken, the students in Taida, Taiwan National University, thought if these people could get away with it in Tainan then there had to be demonstrations in Taipei. But it was the fifty overseas Chinese students who came to my office who started the whole thing.

*Q: It's a very nationalistic issue for China; this claim to these islands that sit between Taiwan and Japan. I understand from some academic readings that this nationalism just really took over on Taida campus and some people got a little excited and went a little too far.*

DONNELLY: Well, it was pent up emotions for a lot of things, obviously for the nationalistic idea, but also just to demonstrate. Students like to demonstrate; they had a chance now and they had a cause. In Taipei they took it. They bused people in. But they wouldn't have done it if it weren't for those fifty overseas students who took the bull by the horns and marched to my center in Tainan.

*Q: Did you know a Taiwanese nationalist by the name of Peng Ming-min at this time?*

DONNELLY: Not at the time; I've met him later. When he was ferreted out of Taiwan, I think that was probably 1967, he went to a Nordic country first and then finally to the United States; the University of Michigan, I believe. I've met him since. He became the head of FAPA, the Foremost Association for Public Affairs in Washington.

*Q: The United States was implicated in his surreptitious departure. Did you feel anything about that or did anybody talk to you about that because you're down in the very Taiwanese area of the island?*

DONNELLY: Yes, there's a lot of speculation.

*Q: Again, not bad for U.S. image?*

DONNELLY: Not among the Taiwanese. There were two, probably men of course, and then there was a guy by the name of Thornberry who got out of the island surreptitiously. The way Peng Ming-min got out, there's a lot of speculation; the Kuomintang thought that he either flew out from the American airbase south of Taichung, CCK Airbase, or he went out on a U.S. navy ship from Kaohsiung Harbor. As a matter of fact, he went on a Japanese visa; he had a beard and an artificial arm. He lost an arm, you know. He was in Japan studying in Hiroshima or Nagasaki

and he lost an arm in the atomic bomb blast and has an artificial arm now. He was on more or less under loose house arrest because he had been a favorite of the former vice president. But he slipped out with a beard, an artificial arm and a Japanese passport; he left that way. We had nothing to do with it.

*Q: Another event that occurs at this time is CCK (Chiang Ching-kuo) is traveling in America and there is an assassination attempt on the trip in 1970. Was there any repercussions that you noticed in the press or the conversations you were having with people?*

DONNELLY: I was at a party with some Taiwanese right after it and one of the Taiwanese (this isn't very nice to report I guess – it doesn't reflect favorably on him) was talking to me and he said, "Just like a Taiwanese; he can't shoot straight." That's about the only effect. The Chinese government didn't blame America for that and CCK actually was pretty big about it himself. He didn't make a big vendetta over it.

*Q: Is there anything else about Kaohsiung or Tainan that we haven't covered? Basically it's your own little empire in Southern Taiwan; you're the only American official.*

DONNELLY: It was wonderful. I enjoyed it a lot. I spent a lot of time riding around the island on bicycles and stopping in little villages and spending the night. I got to know the people very well and had a very nice time.

*Q: Are you beginning to see the economic expansion? This is now 1970, 1971.*

DONNELLY: Especially with the Kaohsiung Processing Zone, yes. Every year people had a little bit more; this year they'd buy a refrigerator, next year they'd buy a motorcycle. Every year they got a little better. That was why there wasn't a great deal of uprising against the Kuomintang because people's lives were getting better.

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DONNELLY: I think I was called the publication officer at that time. Student Review was the biggest thing we did. We had other books and things. One thing I might mention about Kaohsiung...

After the bombing of the cultural center in Tainan, it took three months or more to put the building together again; there was extensive damage. Actually the Taiwan government paid for most or all of it. We rearranged the building, expanded rooms, and partitioned others. We ended up with an empty room about twelve feet by eighteen feet, something like that, and we decided to use that room and make it available to local young artists to hang pictures.

We got a hold of a well-known local artist and asked him if he would make a committee up and select young artists to hang their pictures there for a couple weeks at a time, but the stipulation was that there could be no sales made. This was only to get them started. We did that and it was a very successful program, so we duplicated it in Kaohsiung and then the USIS branch in Taichung also made a little gallery. Finally Taipei did the same thing. So we had four art

galleries going in the early '70s showing art of young artists of some quality; the quality was judged by local established artists. I think that almost any of the young artists over there in those days got their start in the USIS gallery which we began in Tainan.

*Q: But you mention that there was some resistance on your boss' part.*

DONNELLY: Well, the resistance came later when people in Washington found out that we were doing this and told us it's not the USIS' mission to promote local artists. But I had a different take on it; it seems to me that it established a great deal of goodwill and it was a rather democratic thing to do. Anyway, we did it as long as I was in Taiwan and right up until the '80s when I went back.

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*Q: You were talking earlier about traveling around between Kaohsiung and Tainan on bicycle. What was the road net like in those days? We're talking the late '60s.*

DONNELLY: In those days there was a decent paved road between Taiwan and Kaohsiung, but I would travel secondary roads on bicycle. I didn't want to be on what we called "suicide alley"; everyday you'd see an awful accident when you're driving there. Not only that, but I travel on my bike all over the place. I put my bicycle on a train and then get off at a place and bicycle back. There was a guy by the name of Dave Hughes, who was a Foreign Service Officer for a time; we bicycled from Souao on the east coast, 300 kilometers down to Taitung. Along that mountain road it took us five and a half days. It was quite an adventure.

*Q: Had you been staying at the inns?*

DONNELLY: We stayed at the inns except one night. We were between little towns; we were about twenty kilometers from one town to the other and we came to a little hamlet. The hamlet was called Ho Ping which means peace. There were fourteen thatched roof houses there and it was getting dark and we didn't have any lights on our bikes so we couldn't drive in the dark. We stopped in the middle of this little hamlet and a lady came out and we asked her, "Is there a restaurant here?" She said, "No." "Is there a little inn?" "No." Well, we stood looking at each other and her husband came along and he said, "Well you can spend the night with us." So he brought us in and they gave us a meal; it was rice, regular rice, with a vegetable dish with something like bok choy or cabbage and just maybe a sliver or two of pork and boiled water. That tasted really good then.

They were going to put us up in their one room place. They were going to give us their bed and then the children and they would find someplace to sleep. A policeman came. Now along the border they have border police and this was out on the eastern shore. He talked to them, but didn't talk to us. He wanted to know what we were doing there and I could sense that there was trouble for this family. They were kind to us and we were causing trouble. So he left and pretty soon his superior came; his superior was a sergeant or something. He came and he talked to us. He said, "Who are you?" and we told him. I said, "I'm with the embassy," and he said, "Why did you pick this particular family to come to?" I could see, oh God, these people are in for it. At

about that time the neighbor came. They were Taiwanese but the neighbor was an old soldier from the mainland. He offered for us to spend the night at his house. So we went over and before we got to bed he said, "Well, we've got to have a drink," and of course if a Chinese invites you to drink, you better drink. He had this little thatched house with a mud floor. So we said okay and he went over and got a five gallon can, you know the type you see on the back of jeeps, a gasoline can, and he brought it over. He had made his own moonshine; white lightning. So he started pouring it into little cups, and I thought, oh, my God Almighty. So, we toasted and I drank it. We did this about three or four times. It was awful. Then we went to bed. My friend and I shared the bed. I woke up in the morning and I thought, 'Boy I can see!' I thought I would probably be blind. Dave said, "What do you mean?" "That was awful stuff. What did it do to me?" He said, "You didn't drink it, did you?" and I said, "Of course. I saw you drink it." He said, "No, I poured it on the floor." Anyway, this goes to show the kindness of these people towards us and the trouble they could've gotten into.

*Q: Yes. The Mainlander guy can invite you to his house, but the Taiwanese were compromised by extending the same hospitality. When you were down in Kaohsiung, how much supervision were you getting from your bosses in Taipei?*

DONNELLY: Well, I didn't get much. I was grateful for that. When I applied for USIA, there was a plaque on a building at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue. The plaque read: "Telling America's Story to the World." I guess I did that best by not having a lot of direction. I felt that if the people better understood our policy, which I could explain, then there wouldn't be so many misunderstandings and wars and all sorts of trouble. I modestly think that I might have been successful with less direction than with more direction.

*Q: Did you go up to Taipei from time to time?*

DONNELLY: The first couple of years Ken Boyle was the PAO, I went up about four times a year. Travel wasn't very easy, nor was telephone communication. The Taiwan telephone system was pretty bad. To call there, we would use military field phones and hook up to a U.S. Army net. I would get through that way. But it wasn't easy. You'd be shouting into the phone. To go up by train, it took eight hours in those days.

*Q: So your telephone communication in those days was to hook you into the U.S. military, so the U.S. military was in another place in Taiwan and it had its own net?*

DONNELLY: North of Kaohsiung was a naval base. There was an American contingent there.

*Q: After having all this independence and all this time in Taiwan to yourself, Taipei discovers you and decides that you better come up there with them in August of '71. Can you describe your duties in Taipei?*

DONNELLY: The first year I was there, the main thing I did was the magazine Student Review. It was a bilingual... That was my main duty, and then other cultural duties from time to time.

*Q: Did you get involved with the local television and movie people?*

DONNELLY: No.

*Q: So you were all print.*

DONNELLY: For the most part, yes.

*Q: Did USIA have any contact?*

DONNELLY: Yes, they did. As a matter of fact, one of our local boys was a former movie actor and he had a lot of contact with them, but we really didn't do much with movies. The movie industry was fairly well developed by that time.

*Q: Were the local movies popular?*

DONNELLY: Oh, yes, sure.

*Q: I'm under the impression that the movie The Sand Pebbles, which was one of Steve McQueen's first movies, was actually filmed in Tanshui, on that part of the river.*

DONNELLY: It may have been, some of it, but my understanding was that it was filmed in the Philippines.

*Q: Could be most of the scenes. I was once told though that it was banned in Taiwan, that they weren't allowed to see it.*

DONNELLY: It was not complimentary to the nationalist soldiers. There were American movies, I guess; I didn't go to movies that much. I did go sometimes to the local movies for language comprehension. One of the movie houses I went to, which had Taiwanese movies, was just a very small shed with wooden benches and a dirt floor. It's nothing like that now. This movie house in Kaohsiung was situated between two brothels. I'll never forget taking my eight year old daughter to see a funny Taiwanese movie and thinking, if she only knew where the hell she was. There were two brothel areas. One was behind city hall; another one of those buildings by the railroad station.

*Q: You were saying though there's Taiwanese language movies. How did that fit with the KMT's language requirement. For radio and television, they only allowed a couple of hours in Taiwanese.*

DONNELLY: They would allow the weather report in Taiwanese. That's very important for the fisherman and the firemen and whatnot. The Taiwanese movies were not political in any way. They were slapstick, guys' pants falling down. I think it didn't bother them much.

*Q: But they had that kind of a policy. Did that become a problem for us? I suppose we were putting out reading materials using the characters.*

DONNELLY: It was never a problem for USIA in any way. The government's language policies didn't hinder us in any way.

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*Q: So, you've taken the written, you take the oral, they told you right away that you passed the oral?*

DONNELLY: No, it was about three months. But I didn't know that I had an assignment until much later. Then I went May 1<sup>st</sup>, I think is when I went, and was sworn in. I was sworn in by L.K. Little, who has a China connection. He was, for reasons which I don't know, the last customs commissioner in China before the war. The Chinese accepted a foreigner as the customs commissioner; Robert Hart, I think was the first and there were a series of foreigners who were customs commissioners and L.K. Little was the last. I found out later in Taiwan how the Chinese were also proud to be in the customs office because it was squeaky clean and not corrupt like most of the government. The amazing thing was when I got to Taiwan, the Taiwan local administrative officer, the Chinese who did most of our administration, was a man by the name – I think his name was Duan, but in any event he was the first Chinese commissioner after L.K. Little and then of course fled from China when the communists took over he joined our office and became the USIS Taiwan administrative chief.

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*Q: Well, certainly personnel is sending you messages, "Shouldn't you move on?" or where your boss says, "Hey, I want Neal here."*

DONNELLY: I was actually ordered out of Kaohsiung to Taipei during my second Kaohsiung tour. I was ordered by Bob Nichols. Of course we can get into this when we get to Taiwan, but after I had my first tour in Kaohsiung, I wanted to go back. USIS didn't want to send me, but the ambassador wanted me to go back, so I did; you do what the ambassador wants. Then I had a tour in Washington and the PAO asked me to come back to Taipei as cultural officer and so I did. While I was there in the second tour we had the normalization; they kept me on. It's all happenstance.

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*Q: I'm afraid to ask, but in August '71 you went up to Taipei; was this personnel or serendipity again?*

DONNELLY: I was ordered up by Bob Nichols, who was the deputy. He said, "You've been down there too long."

*Q: (laughs) Oh, they noticed you were down there?*

DONNELLY: Yes. He said, "It's not good for your career." I said, "Well, I don't care. I like it here." This may sound strange to a lot of Foreign Service Officers who come in as young officers

hoping to be ambassador, but I just enjoyed it and I didn't want to go to Taipei, but I was ordered up so I had no choice.

*Q: You were the cultural officer, so USIA had a fairly large program in Taipei? How many officers?*

DONNELLY: Yes. It had about ten officers and it had a book program, a magazine, a lot of lectures, a big library; all sorts of things.

*Q: What's the magazine and how does that work into this?*

DONNELLY: Student Review; Student Review was a magazine put together in Taiwan based on articles written in Washington and send out to countries. It was mostly about America, although we'd have some articles written locally about how modern Taiwan was becoming.

*Q: This was in English language?*

DONNELLY: No, it was bilingual, which made it useful to students. They printed about 70,000 in Manila; there was a USIS printing plant in Manila. Before I became Culture Affairs Officer to Taipei they would send them in bulk to schools for distribution. But I knew from going and visiting schools that the magazines would just sit in the corner. It was a waste of money. I wanted to put a price on the magazine and sell it. I had a hell of a time convincing anybody to do this. Finally they let me do it and they said the circulation would drop. I said, "Half the circulation of people reading it and passing them on is better." It did drop; it dropped about 30,000, but people were buying it and I knew they would buy it because it's bilingual; they could read English and if they don't know what the word means they can glance over at the Chinese on the opposite page. It sold and it was a success.

*Q: Was the translation being done in Manila or just the printing?*

DONNELLY: Oh no, the translation was being done at the office in Taipei.

*Q: So you had full editorial control?*

DONNELLY: Yes.

*Q: And that was under you as the cultural officer?*

DONNELLY: Yes. I think I was called the publication officer at that time. Student Review was the biggest thing we did. We had other books and things. One thing I might mention about Kaohsiung...

After the bombing of the cultural center in Tainan, it took three months or more to put the building together again; there was extensive damage. Actually the Taiwan government paid for most or all of it. We rearranged the building, expanded rooms, and partitioned others. We ended up with an empty room about twelve feet by eighteen feet, something like that, and we decided

to use that room and make it available to local young artists to hang pictures.

We got a hold of a well-known local artist and asked him if he would make a committee up and select young artists to hang their pictures there for a couple weeks at a time, but the stipulation was that there could be no sales made. This was only to get them started. We did that and it was a very successful program, so we duplicated it in Kaohsiung and then the USIS branch in Taichung also made a little gallery. Finally Taipei did the same thing. So we had four art galleries going in the early '70s showing art of young artists of some quality; the quality was judged by local established artists. I think that almost any of the young artists over there in those days got their start in the USIS gallery which we began in Tainan.

*Q: But you mention that there was some resistance on your boss' part.*

DONNELLY: Well, the resistance came later when people in Washington found out that we were doing this and told us it's not the USIS' mission to promote local artists. But I had a different take on it; it seems to me that it established a great deal of goodwill and it was a rather democratic thing to do. Anyway, we did it as long as I was in Taiwan and right up until the '80s when I went back.

As a matter of fact, in the late 1970s when I went back for my second time in Taiwan and was head of the USIS in Taipei, we had probably the most famous and the most successful art exhibit in the whole country in our center. Backing up some years to when we opened in Tainan, there was a fisherman who started painting late in life, sort of a Grandma Moses type, and he came to our center and asked my assistant if he would put up his paintings. My assistant looked at him, and they looked like childish stuff, and said, "No, no, get out of here," so the guy went back crushed. He was a man by the name of Hung Tung; he was a fisherman and his wife sold incense in the local temple in a little coastal town called Pei Men. One day he saw his son drawing Chinese characters and he took up a pen and drew one of the characters and it looked like a man, so he put a head on it and arms and said, "Oh, I can draw," and so he went and got cheap paper and cheap paints and started painting. He told his wife, "Now I'm an artist; I don't work, I draw," and he drew a couple hundred of these really amazing paintings that I'm told are very good.

Some years after he was rejected by our USIS Tainan guy, he went to the artist who we had running the committee, a man by the name of Tseng Pei-yao, and he knocked on his door and said in Taiwanese, "I know you're an artist. I've been to an art exhibit today and I want you to look at some paintings that a friend of mine did," and Tseng looked him and said, "They're marvelous, they're wonderful." He said, "I did them," so Tseng contacted us in Taipei - at this time I had gone to Taipei, and said that he'd like to exhibit this man's work. In the meantime, a very small magazine had printed some of his pictures and they were well received, so we said okay, and we scheduled an exhibit. Before the exhibit we had a press conference; he was a very funny guy who gave sort of off-the-wall answers to whatever question he was asked and he generated a lot of interest, plus the fact that he was Taiwanese and his paintings had no classical Chineseness in them at all. He generated interest and when we opened the exhibit at ten o'clock on, I think it was a Saturday morning, there were 200 people outside waiting to get in. The story got around that this guy's exhibit was fantastic and for two weeks we had people come who had

never been to an exhibit in their life; ladies with babies on their backs. All of them were crowding in so we had to open up a back door of our gallery because we couldn't let people in and out the same door. We had to limit it to 200 in there at a time and at all times there were people lined up. It was a real shocker; it was so much of a shock that the established artists were upset and they had what the communists would call a "struggle session" against him, saying, "Who is this guy? He hasn't done what we've done. I've spent all my life drawing bamboo and this guy is..." They really sort of denounced him.

He became very famous and he wouldn't sell any of his paintings. He was poor; he didn't have any money, and he wouldn't sell any of his paintings. He said all he wanted was the government to repair the roof in his house and he'd give them the paintings. He was a very simple man. The magistrate in Tainan Hsien said he would build him a house and after he said that, the government in Taipei came down like a ton of bricks on the magistrate and he withdrew the offer. I visited the man many times later; he lived in a hovel, really. He died and after he died of course his relatives started to sell his paintings and some of them, I'm told, are selling for U.S. \$20,000.

*Q: It's a great story, but the conflict between Taipei and the Tainan magistrate, is that an expression of artistic conflict or the mainlander Taiwanese?*

DONNELLY: It's political.

*Q: It's political. It's the ethnic division on the island again.*

DONNELLY: The artists who objected to him, not all artists of course, were the established artists. I mentioned before Chung Kung University in Tainan, I can illustrate some of the problems between the Taiwanese and the mainlanders, for a couple years I got permission from the president of the university to audit a history course. I wanted to audit a history course for language comprehension training. It was a lady teacher; a mainland teacher. She taught modern Chinese history. Well, modern Chinese history is just fraught with all sorts of contradictions. But in those two years that I was there, she would get up and speak and no student asked any question of her at all about what she said. That's just the way history classes were conducted in that school and probably in other schools.

At one cocktail party, I met her and we were talking about a friend of mine who is a Dutchman, but a Taoist priest. He was an anthropologist and a sociologist, but he'd become a Taoist priest so he could do his research. This lady was livid at this man who lived in Tainan, a man by the name of Kristofer (Rick) Schipper, because, she said, "We are here in this country trying to teach these people about what they're doing is superstitious and you foreigners come over here and promote it." She was a Christian, of course.

*Q: Actually, I wanted to ask you, Tainan also was the center of the Taiwan Presbyterian Church. Did you come across them?*

DONNELLY: The Presbyterian Church is interesting. In the middle of the nineteenth century, the foreigners carved up China into spheres of influence; the Germans got the Shantung

Peninsula and the Russians got this and the Japanese got that. It looked like such a good idea that the missionary groups informally did the same thing. The Baptists were concentrated in one area. But I say the missionaries; this is all but the Catholics. The Catholics didn't join in on this, they were all over. But the Presbyterians got Fujian and Taiwan. Taiwan was further divided. The northern part of Taiwan was pretty much the preserve of the Canadian Presbyterians and the southern part the British/English Presbyterians. That's why there are two theological seminaries in Taiwan; one in Taipei and one in Tainan. The one in Taipei for a long time had a Canadian cast. You have Mackey Hospital in Taipei; Dr. Mackey was a Canadian missionary. In southern Taiwan you have the British.

When I was there, the number two man in the theological seminary (the number one man was a Taiwanese) was a British minister by the name of Bebe and I knew him quite well. Because of that, almost all of your intellectual, western oriented Taiwanese in the early part of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and in the Japanese time, would be Presbyterian because the Presbyterians were on the ground as missionaries, and what do missionaries do? Missionaries educate. So the educated Taiwanese, for the most part, would be Presbyterians and they would for the most part be the most dangerous to the regime; the rebels. So, the Taiwan Independence Movement had a heavy, heavy Presbyterian cast to it.

*Q: Did USIA have any association with their seminary or did you go lecture on the campus from time to time?*

DONNELLY: No, I did not. I attended a stage performance there and I had lunch over there a couple times, but only as an individual, not as a government function.

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*Q: Now at the time that you were the cultural affairs officer, August '71 to June '72, you had to handle the Nixon trip to China which was February of '72. Did that make much of a blip on your screen?*

DONNELLY: Not on my screen. The political officer had to handle that with the counterparts. It didn't bother us. It was strange how the people... Obviously, the mainland Chinese were very upset. The Taiwanese seemed to think it was not a bad idea, that it might in some ways help them. Our staff was about half mainlander and half Taiwanese. The Taiwanese were not bothered one bit about it. It may break the cycle and weaken the Kuomintang. Kuomintang, the mainlanders, were very upset. Of course they were very quiet. They were always quite assertive in the office because they were on top, but they weren't sure where they were with Nixon. It took a while to get back.

*Q: Were you involved with the Fulbright Program?*

DONNELLY: Yes, I was as the cultural affairs officer, I was on the Fulbright Committee. Then I was chairman of the Fulbright Committee when I became PAO.

*Q: Can you explain how this program works and what its intent was?*

DONNELLY: It's a two way cultural exchange. The Fulbright professors are brought from America to teach in local universities. The other direction for the most part was sending graduate students to the United States for advanced degrees. We had a Fulbright foundation equipped with an executive director, a Chinese man. They would be placed in universities. Then when they would give out grants to Chinese students who wanted to go to the United States for their studies, they would be screened initially by the Fulbright organization that was housed in the USIS building, a large old building dating from the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. It was a Japanese government building and when the mainlanders came after the Second World War, they made it the provincial legislative building. So up until the late 1950's, the provincial legislature met in that building and then when they left and had a permanent home south of Taichung, that building was rented to USIS.

*Q: Were there any other local institutions that you worked closely with? I understand there was a joint council for cooperation in humanities and social sciences.*

DONNELLY: No, but I did work closely with the language center which was attached to the University of Tai Ta (Taiwan National University) and that taught English to college students, mainly those wishing to go to America. I was a member of that board and once a month I'd go over and listen to the meetings and look at their budget. That's about it. Make sure they were doing the right thing.

*Q: Because early on there was a number of joint councils for this and that and now I get the impression that as Taiwan begins to expand they're doing a lot more of their own...*

DONNELLY: In any event, I was not aware of that council that you mentioned.

*Q: Who was the ambassador at that point, '71 to '72?*

DONNELLY: Certainly in '72 it probably was still Walter McConaughy and then later it was Leonard Unger. Walter McConaughy was a very interesting guy. When he was a young Foreign Service Officer, his first post was attached to what was the embassy in Tokyo and he was assigned to the consulate in Taipei because Taiwan was part of Japan. Later he came back to Taiwan as the ambassador and lived in the same house where he had lived as a young consular officer. Very interesting. One of the local administrative officer's father was Ambassador McConaughy's rickshaw driver when he was a young FSO (Foreign Service Officer). Then Unger; Unger was the last ambassador to Taiwan.

*Q: Right. Actually he was in Bangkok before Taipei and I think he left Bangkok in late '73, early '74.*

DONNELLY: Something like that, yes.

*Q: Is there anything else you want to use the Taipei cultural job for to illustrate USIA job definitions, policy, directions?*

DONNELLY: Do you mean the first or second time I was there?

*Q: The second time; around '72.*

DONNELLY: Just that time? Not '75?

*Q: No. Again this is the aftermath of the Tiao Yu T'ai (Senkakus) student demonstrations and whatnot, but that was over by the time you got to Taipei?*

DONNELLY: It was over very quickly because it was a threat not to the United States, but to the government.

*Q: Well this is interesting; in one sense remains contemporary because we're looking at Beijing now and how they're handling their student nationalism, so here you have two Leninist parties struggling with the same problem. That is...*

DONNELLY: The same people, Chinese.

*Q: And the same people.*

DONNELLY: Yes, there's a lot that China can learn from the way Taiwan handled or mishandled.

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*Q: So your next assignment, '72-'75, is VOA. That means somebody found you and brought you back to Washington. (laughs)*

DONNELLY: Yes, they did. I was overseas twelve years without a Washington assignment and people were saying, "How did you do it?" I said, "I didn't. It just happened."

*Q: I remember I came into the Foreign Service in '71 and when we were in Rosslyn for the A-100 class one day, somebody pointed at some gentleman down the hall and whispered, "This is his first time back and he left during the Eisenhower Administration."*

DONNELLY: (laughs) Well, actually I went overseas during the Eisenhower Administration.

*Q: There you go; maybe you were...*

DONNELLY: Maybe it was me.

*Q: Now you come back to Washington; Voice of America. What does the Voice of America do?*

DONNELLY: They broadcast, now I think it's about forty languages, but when I was there I think it was about thirty languages, and we broadcast then in Mandarin only, I think it was about 11 ½ hours a day. We broadcast mainly news, some feature stories and some music, but every

hour on the hour that we were on the air we would have a good fifteen minute news broadcast which was all news; you know, no advertising breaking up the news, just straight news. It was in depth. Then there wasn't any CNN (Cable News Network); it was just short-wave VOA, BBC (British Broadcasting Company), and other national broadcasts.

It was very important to Chinese and other people in those days; now not so much with television, etc. But I read recently in the Afghani business that the Afghans were all at their radios at all times – short wave radios when they had them, listening to the Voice of America to see what was happening. That's true and it was true then. The VOA was very important.

One problem with China was that we never knew if anybody was listening. Not only that, we never knew if anybody could hear it. Of course, and if you are on the air you wanted to know those two things; can it be heard and is anybody listening. So if you're broadcasting even to someplace like Russia, there are a lot of Americans in Russia that can turn on the radio and say, "Yes, it can be heard here," or "It can be heard there." We could send tourists over to a country to listen all over the place, but we had nobody in China. So, I thought of an idea to find out if somebody was listening. I got a lot of flak over this idea and it didn't really do me good in the long run, but having been in Taiwan all those years, I knew a couple of things. I knew that the Chinese were hungry for English and I also knew that they could learn by rote because I'd been in class with them and I'd seen the way they repeat and repeat and repeat, and they could learn. We had a fifteen minute a day program on English which was nothing in depth, so I thought if we put on a half an hour English program and repeat it three times a day and repeat the same half hour seven days a week, that's twenty-one shots that any Chinese worth his salt could memorize that and could learn English.

Now they need a book. How do you get a book in China? I thought, well, I knew that in Taiwan the English 900 Series, which was a Macmillan Series, was very popular. What it is, is 900 basic sentences and if you memorize these sentences you have memorized every grammar rule there is plus a lot of vocabulary. So I went to Macmillan and said, "Could you sell us these books very cheaply?" The 900 sentences were in sixty lessons; fifteen sentences per lesson. They said, "We'll sell you the six volume book, a dollar a book, \$6. So we'll give you some sort of discount." So I went to the program manager at VOA and said, "I want to do this," and they said, "How are you going to get the books to the people?" I said, "What I will do is I will put an advertisement on the air saying we're doing this and any Chinese that wants to have a book could go to their corner bookstore and buy the book. However, if you are in an area where they don't have a corner bookstore, you could write to a P.O. box in Hong Kong and we'll send you the book free.

Well, I got a lot of flak; for one thing they said, "This is a news organization; we're not an educational organization." I kept pushing and pushing and kept getting flak and finally the division director said he'd let me do it. He told me later he'd let me do it only to see me fail. Within the first month, we had two hundred letters from all over China and they were ecstatic and going up to the Hill and saying, "Look, we've got all these listeners!" and the letters kept coming in and coming in and coming in. Then we started learning, when Americans were finally allowed to go to China, they found out that the book was pirated in China.

*Q: (laughs) Of course.*

DONNELLY: Macmillan knew that would happen, but I told Macmillan that the Chinese are product loyal and it would be to their benefit in the long run.

I'll never forget, one time maybe fifteen or twenty years after this, a Chinese was in the States and I was talking to him, I was guiding him around someplace, and I said, "Your English is very good. Where did you learn it?" and he said, "English 900." So, it was successful.

*Q: And that program went on the air when?*

DONNELLY: Let me see if I can get the date. It was January 1<sup>st</sup>, 1973.

*Q: So it takes you one quarter to convince the powers that be to take this experiment. But here you have a news organization; a broadcast organization that has never sought any feedback from an audience? Never checked because they have no way? So how did they justify themselves to the...*

DONNELLY: There was no mail between China and the United States. In those days there was absolutely no contact. They hadn't had a letter in twenty-five years because the Chinese wouldn't forward it and the Chinese wouldn't dare write to the United States. You write to the United States and you've got the thought police down on you.

It may be hard for young people today to understand what a complete wall of silence was between the United States and China. There was just no cultural contact, no academic contact, no mail, no anything. But then they got 200 letters sent to Hong Kong in the first month.

*Q: But see, now, you'd been in Hong Kong so you knew that that's where China leaked, if you will.*

DONNELLY: Yes, that's right.

*Q: And that it would be acceptable to send a letter to Hong Kong where it wouldn't be acceptable to send a letter to the United States.*

DONNELLY: The Chinese knew that letters to Hong Kong would often transfer to Taiwan or to the States or someplace, but they allowed that.

*Q: Right, as long as it's not out front.*

DONNELLY: Yes, face.

*Q: Face; you can get a lot done.*

DONNELLY: As long as your face is preserved.

*Q: When I was there in the '80s, mainlanders would travel to the mainland all the time through Hong Kong and as long as they didn't tout it, both sides allowed it to happen.*

DONNELLY: Sure.

*Q: But you were the first guy to go through Hong Kong and know that that mailbox was there to be used.*

DONNELLY: Well, but there was just so much resistance on the part of the management there. Fortunately the head of VOA at that time, a guy by the name of Ken Giddens, he was a political appointee during the Nixon years and he was a conservative guy, but a very decent guy who I think probably in the end was the reason I was able to get it done; he'd backed it up.

*Q: The VOA had Chinese language broadcast for the mainland only? Can you pick it up in Taiwan?*

DONNELLY: You can pick it up any place. Until English 900 requests for the book, we got no letters from the mainland, but we would get letters from ships at sea because the Chinese sailors could listen, wherever they were. We broadcast towards China, but the atmosphere is such that sometimes it bounces all over the place. Obviously they could hear it in Taiwan clear as a bell. We had listeners in Taiwan, I guess, but they could get most of what they wanted from other ways. But the people in China had no other way of getting independent news.

*Q: As the Chinese branch chief, how many people did you have working for you? How was it organized; was it organized by languages like that?*

DONNELLY: We only had one language then; now I think they've brought Cantonese back. We had sixty-two people, I think, and we had a news service, a features service and a production service. The producers are the technical guys and then the features people would write color pieces and whatnot. The news was the heart of it.

*Q: We're twenty-five years and one CNN later, and now in the press there are issues about independents in VOA. The State Department being critical of stuff they put on. Did those kinds of issues arise at the time that you were...*

DONNELLY: Yes, they did. VOA was jealous of its independents, but we know we all get our paycheck from the U.S. government. The newsmen overseas were particularly jealous. They wanted to be trench coat journalists. They went too far, I think. A VOA journalist overseas would not, for example, go to an embassy and talk to a political officer because he didn't want people to think that he was being fed information where Joe Alsop went to the embassy and the consulate regularly and also Joe Kraff. All of them, any journalist worth his salt, Bob Elegant, checked in with the political officer, but VOA correspondents wouldn't.

*Q: Who was VOA hiring as its correspondents?*

DONNELLY: Well they weren't Foreign Service Officers; most of the VOA staff were what

we'd call domestic staff. The Foreign Service Officers at VOA were there on two or three year assignments.

*Q: I'm looking at the correspondents who were so jealous of their independents? Were they just average Americans or...*

DONNELLY: Yes. They were just guys. A lot of them were former newsmen for other papers. So they were jealous of their independence.

We had a big problem with the boat people during the wind down of the Vietnam War. The State Department did not want us to broadcast anything about the boat people because if we broadcast that the boat people made it to Manila, for example, the State Department was afraid that that would encourage other Vietnamese to leave on boats and maybe to leave to be pirated or raped or drowned. So they wanted us to lay off the stories of boat people and I would get calls from congress to give them transcripts of everything we had said about boat people in the last month or so. One time I had to go to congress and sit there on the witness chair, but luckily I wasn't called upon.

*Q: Saigon falls in April of 1975 toward the end of your tour. There were some big American news stories; the Nixon resignation. How did the VOA cover that? Was there anything unique there?*

DONNELLY: No, just straight.

*Q: At this time, some things are happening in Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek dies in '75. Did that impact on anything?*

DONNELLY: We reported it straight. That's all. It was easy at VOA; you just reported straight and every now and then there'd be a little flak. We had a rule that you had to double source everything which meant that sometimes the VOA was a little slower than other news agencies because they wouldn't immediately go with the report; they'd double source it. So as long as your sources were correct and as far as news was concerned, the news came to us from the news room. I didn't make up the news; it would come to us and we'd select what we want and what we don't want. But as long as we didn't monkey with the news, we double sourced it, kept it straight, we didn't have to worry about anything.

*Q: In these three years did congress pay you any particular attention?*

DONNELLY: No, I can't think of anything in particular. Every now and then you'd get a call from congress saying, "We want to see what you've said about something," but you just take a copy of the file and send it over and that's the end of it.

*Q: What would be the source of that sort of request?*

DONNELLY: It would come through our front office and it obviously came from a congressional staffer. I wouldn't know who it was.

*Q: But that was a fairly standard kind of request to be made?*

DONNELLY: Yes.

*Q: VOA is sort of part of the international, not only news, but was part of the, I want to say competition, but the Cold War with the Soviet bloc. But you're there now at a time in which Nixon has gone to China, there's the liaison office set up in Beijing. Did you get any sense that things were now different; that things were now operating in a slightly different environment in China?*

DONNELLY: Very little. One thing we did, we followed the American news organizations in the State Department in changing the name of some Chinese. You know, Peking became Beijing, for example. With everybody except for those in the China branch mispronouncing it, calling it "Bayjeeng", when it's Beijing, not Peking anymore. Just a few things like that; we started using the proper name for the People's Republic of China and we were very careful about what we reported on Taiwan, but just straight.

*Q: Some of the people working in VOA are immigrants, the Chinese, the change to finally recognizing and using the People's Republic of China, was of significance to them?*

DONNELLY: I would say it varied, but most of them, all of what we in Taiwan would call mainlanders, about half of them were people that had come from the mainland to the United States and about the other half were people who had come to the United States through Taiwan or actually some of them even were born in Taiwan, but of mainland parents. Their Chinese was excellent.

I think you could say they were all more or less anti-communist and some of them even had relatives in the Taiwan, Republic of China Embassy, the Taiwan Embassy it would've been when they had an embassy here. But I think that all of them are proud of China and the fact that China is now China and not Taiwan. They're quite proud of the fact that China now is taking a place on the national scene and flexing its muscles. I think probably every one of them now probably has been back to China and is quite proud of it. I think that they were glad that China was shucking some of the dictatorial trappings of communism and they could see that it was going in the right direction. They didn't cause a problem; nobody quit because we were handling Taiwan with kid gloves.

*Q: Just by way of background, in VOA for the Asian section, was there also a Japanese section and Burmese and Thai etc. or just was the Soviet Bloc, if you will. The Vietnamese, the Chinese...*

DONNELLY: In the East Asia and Pacific Division there was no Japanese. We'd record a feed for the Philippines once a week; not the China branch, but the division had one. The division had a Thai, Indonesian, and the Indonesian language would be for Malay as well; same language. Vietnamese, Korean, Chinese, Burmese. In that division which I later headed, we had 160 people.

I'll back up to the feeling about China. The Chinese, among the people there, they were all anti-communist certainly, but almost none had any sympathy for Taiwanese. That's pretty true with most mainland Chinese. A lot of them, I just had this conversation with a Chinese the other day, they object to Taiwanese because the Taiwanese are interested in independence and they're interested in independence because as Annette Lu, who is now the vice president, told me, in 1897 China divorced Taiwan. She was referring to the Treaty of Shimonoseki (1895) when China ceded Taiwan to Japan after a defeat. "China divorced Taiwan," she said "We want a remarriage." And a lot of Chinese interpret that as denying their Chineseness and the Chinese are very – I'm looking for a nice word, not patriotic, but they're quite proud of their Chineseness, and for somebody to deny that seems a bit much. A lot of them don't like Taiwanese very much.

*Q: Sounds like the distinction you're drawing though isn't only just a political distinction; independence or a part of China. It's a culturally defined identity.*

DONNELLY: The Taiwanese have been tainted in many people's minds by fifty years of Japanese culture and that's the fault of Minister Li Hung-chang at Shimonoseki; it's not the fault of the Taiwanese. The Taiwanese, you'll find out, like Japanese food. What I'm reading and hearing from Taiwanese friends is that the young Taiwanese, especially the young Taiwanese girls, go nuts over anything Japanese. Well that's an insult to a Chinese because the Japanese are responsible for terrible, terrible massacres; the rape of Nanking and, you know, just terrible things in China. Very few Chinese are going to be pro-Japanese. The Taiwanese are, and that's another thing that bothers Mainland Chinese.

*Q: I remember when our Chinese colleagues would take us out to dinner, they'd take us to a Chinese restaurant and when our Taiwanese political friends would take us out, we'd go to a Japanese restaurant.*

DONNELLY: You bet. That's the way they feel.

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*Q: Neal, we had just finished your tour as the VOA Chinese branch chief, in June of '75. So, September '75 you show up back in Taiwan. Is that right?*

DONNELLY: Yes, that's right.

*Q: As the deputy public affairs officer?*

DONNELLY: No, as the cultural affairs officer.

*Q: The cultural affairs officer?*

DONNELLY: I was later made deputy, but first as the cultural affairs officer.

*Q: Can you give us a description of the USIA office at that time, and what your duties were?*

DONNELLY: I think there were about ten officers there. There was a public affairs officer, a deputy, a cultural affairs officer, assistant cultural affairs officer, a press officer, a publication officer, and then there was a branch post in Kaohsiung which had the Tainan branch under it, and a branch in Taichung.

The cultural affairs officer was a very normal USIS type of cultural affairs; one who arranged lectures of visiting Americans. We had a magazine that we put out, The Student Review, and we distributed some things to universities and had the Fulbright program. The exchange both ways were under the cultural affairs officer. The cultural affairs officer was a member of the Fulbright Board, actually chairman of the board, for a large Fulbright operation in Taiwan at that time.

*Q: Now you'd served as a cultural affairs officer in Taiwan at an earlier tour. This is basically coming back to the same job?*

DONNELLY: It was the same office, but this time I was in charge of other offices there. In the previous time, I was a cultural affairs officer, but not in charge of the office.

*Q: So how many people were working for you then?*

DONNELLY: One other officer.

*Q: USIA is also interested in the culture that's going on in that country. You were talking earlier about helping out with art exhibits and whatnot, so are you getting around to the press and the movies?*

DONNELLY: Not the press; the press officer would do that, or the deputy, which I later became and then I was involved with the press. We were in touch with all of the cultural-type people, of course many college professors and many of the artists and musicians.

Did I mention before about the artist program? I did not?

*Q: No.*

DONNELLY: We had one. I think I mentioned before that when I was in Kaohsiung and Tainan I started a program of making a room available for local artists to...

*Q: Right.*

DONNELLY: And they became art galleries. First we did it in Tainan, then we did it in Kaohsiung. Taichung then followed and then in Taipei we did the same thing. We would offer the walls of a room and in Taipei it would be an auditorium, for art exhibits. When I was in Kaohsiung - Tainan, a fisherman came to the office and offered some of his art to put up on the walls and it was Grandma Moses type art. Did I mention this?

*Q: Yes.*

DONNELLY: My chief assistant said, “No, get out of here, it’s no good.” Later, when I was in Taipei, he took his art to a Tainan art critic and showed it to him. The man said it’s super stuff and contacted us in Taipei and then we had an exhibit of his stuff in Taipei. I didn’t mention that before, did I?

*Q: Not that it was in Taipei, but you talked about it.*

DONNELLY: It was in Taipei and the guy was a fisherman from a very poor area in Tainan County called Pei Men. Anyway, his art was very primitive, but the art critics loved it and when we held the exhibit in Taipei, it was the most successful art exhibit that Taipei had ever seen. People were interested because there was a lot of press comment about this very unusual guy. Before we opened the doors on the day of the exhibit, there were a couple hundred people out the front of our building. The exhibit lasted for two weeks and we extended it then for another week. It was extremely successful. I don’t remember what I said before about the paintings.

*Q: It was basically Grandma Moses.*

*One of the things that I wanted to touch on though was here you are, the cultural affairs person in USIA, and you’re working in an environment where the Kuomintang as a Leninist party has pretty good control over movies and the art scene and whatnot. Did you see that control lessening or did you see it at all?*

DONNELLY: Oh, sure. The government would allow almost anything that was not either political or disruptive of public order, public security, so you wouldn’t have any movies or art that was critical of the government. An awful lot of cultural things had a very strong anti-communist message to them. This Grandma Moses-type of artist that I mentioned before was criticized severely by the established artists because his subjects were very much Taiwanese-type subjects: fishermen and puppets. There are puppet shows in Taiwan and opera. He mixed a lot of Japanese-type symbols in his paintings, including a Japanese flag. He was an old man, he’d lived under the Japanese. That infuriated the established artists and they had newspaper articles about what an awful man he was, and how he mistreated his wife and all sorts of things.

The government was pretty much hands off as long as it did not touch on political opposition or affect good public order.

*Q: By 1975, you had the Nixon trip to China and the Americans have established a liaison office in China. Did you see any impact from that in your job as you went through your daily routine?*

DONNELLY: No, there was nervousness on the part of the mainlanders in Taiwan. Initially, a lot of nervousness, but things calmed down. There was always the worry that we were going to go too far with China, but it didn’t affect what we were doing very much. I would say that as far as the cultural scene, it didn’t affect it very much.

*Q: This is also the time where the economy in Taiwan is picking up. In fact, the government begins the ten special projects; the subway, the down-island highway and whatnot. So I would*

*assume there's quite a bit of economic wealth being generated here.*

DONNELLY: I did a great deal of traveling in the countryside and could see every year that the farmers got just a little bit better off and I often thought about a quote from Shakespeare's Julius Caesar; when Caesar was on his way to the senate, he passes by Cassius, one of the conspirators.

Do you know the quote?

*Q: I'm not sure what you're leading up to, but I know the quote, yes.*

DONNELLY: Caesar looks over at Cassius and he says, "Yon Cassius has a mean and hungry look about him. Let me have fat men about me; men that sleep at night." And I thought, the people in Taiwan were fat at that time and they slept at night. So they were no trouble. But the government kept most everything screwed down very, very tightly. But the people were fat.

*Q: What do you mean by "things were screwed down tightly" though?*

DONNELLY: Politically. You obviously couldn't have a movie about the 2-2-8 incident or any movie or article in the press that criticized the government. What you could do is criticize individual government officers. You couldn't criticize Chiang Kai-shek or Chiang Ching-kuo themselves, but you could criticize local mayors and things like that. That was acceptable, but you could not criticize the party as such.

*Q: One of the things that the Kuomintang had been doing for some time was to reintroduce Chinese culture to the island, which you said had been a Japanese colony. Did you see any of that in your work?*

DONNELLY: Well, yes, of course. I may have mentioned that I audited history courses at Cheng Kung University in Tainan. The history was all from the Chinese perspective and in grammar schools, and in middle schools, and in college, all the history was Chinese history. The Taiwanese would complain to me that they would learn about all of the ancient dynasties, but were taught nothing or allowed to learn anything about their own history, which is very interesting history. The fifty years that the Japanese were there, of course was just erased, and the Taiwanese history before that was erased. There was nothing there; it was tacitly banned, I guess. But the Taiwanese were very upset. Now Taiwanese are studying their history. History and culture under the Kuomintang were all mainland Chinese history.

*Q: One of the political changes in Taiwan at this time is Chiang Kai-shek dies in the spring of '75 before you arrive, so his son now takes over the reins. Did you see any of that sort of play out?*

DONNELLY: Yes, sure. Surprisingly, the son made a great, great effort to appeal to the local people. He would put on a jacket and a baseball cap and go out in the countryside and talk to the farmers. He got general acceptance from the people, I believe. He loosened up martial Law a great deal and eventually, of course, dropped martial law. He realized that the country was too tight. He loosened it up in many, many ways.

I think the majority of Taiwanese appreciated the change from his father's rule, but still, of course, you had people like Wang Sheng and others who were hard-line anti-communists and who didn't like Taiwanese very much. You'll find even today, talking to American-Chinese as I did just last week, about their mistrust and dislike, actually, of Taiwanese because they feel the Taiwanese are denying their Chineseness and when you believe your culture is the most superior in the world and you have somebody who denies it, it's a bit like the Americans who become anti-American like the Taliban fighter (John Walker Lindh); everybody wants his head and nobody has a good word for him. So I think as a group, the Taiwanese have a very bad image among most mainland Chinese; not all, but most.

There is a bit of a change in Taiwan itself; an awful lot of mainlanders are beginning to make accommodation for the majority of people who live there which are Taiwanese. Ch'en Fu (Fred Chen), I'm told, is now learning or has learned to speak Taiwanese. That's an amazing thing.

*Q: Now, the administration in Taiwan has changed to Chiang Ching-kuo and it's the Carter Administration in Washington. Is the atmosphere under which USIA is working a little changed budget-wise or in those kinds of ways? Particularly because the Carter Administration is for human rights, too.*

DONNELLY: We did lose some personnel, but I don't remember it being under Carter; it was a little later. Carter established something called "zero based budgeting," which you remember. It seemed every president in every administration had some idea about saving money and there was a lot of hoopla, but it all came to nothing. And zero based budgeting came to nothing. As a Foreign Service Officer, you've been through this so many times, they all run together, zero based budgeting and all this. The Chinese government wasn't very happy with the Carter Administration, but there wasn't anything they could do about it.

*Q: One of the major events that happened at the time that you were there was the Chung Li incident; the riots during the elections of late 1977. Did you see anything out of that or how the press played it?*

DONNELLY: Well, the press played it from the government's standpoint because the press is controlled by the government. There was one independent newspaper called Tzu Li Wan Pao, "Independence Daily," I guess you'd call it. They were a little more reasonable in their treatment, but most of the treatment of the Chung Li incident would be from a government standpoint; that is, a few people were causing trouble and the government took care of it.

*Q: A couple of years after that was the Kaohsiung incident. The U.S. recognized China. Normalization was January 1, 1979 and now by December 1979 there's the Kaohsiung incident. How did that affect the atmospherics in which you were operating?*

DONNELLY: Almost all the people in the Kaohsiung incident had some connection with America. There was a magazine called Formosa Magazine, Mei Li Tao, "Mei Li Tao" meaning beautiful island. Beautiful Island Magazine. But beautiful island is a translation of the Portuguese word Formosa. The people on this magazine were supporting political candidates in

the coming election. The coming election was touted to be a fair and open election. What this magazine did was take a note of candidates and put them all together and when you put all the candidates together, it's a party. Now, the Kuomintang has always allowed independent candidates to run, but they couldn't form a party. Well, this magazine formed sort of a party and it upset the government.

The magazine decided to hold birthday parties where people get up and give speeches and they decided to hold a rally in Kaohsiung before the election in December. I think they held it in early December, I believe, on the UN Human Rights Day; they held it on that day and eight people spoke. The day before the rally, a Mei Li Tao supporter was beaten by the police and so at the rally that night a lot of people showed up with torches and two-by-four pieces of lumber, and the police took this as an excuse to charge the rally and arrest the speakers, and in the process knocked a few heads. There were eight speakers and not all of them were arrested. Some independent politicians who were not even there were arrested. But one of the people who spoke who was not arrested was K'ang Ning-hsiang. Now K'ang was one of the first people to take on the Kuomintang publicly. He was sort of a fearless guy. He grew up in a section of the Wan Hau, where the Lung Shan Temple is. He spoke at the rally, but for some reason he wasn't arrested. But Annette Lu Hsiu-lien and others were arrested and then they, of course, had a trial. Now that was early December; the election was still going on.

*Q: Actually twelve months earlier. Normalization was twelve months earlier.*

*We were about to get into the trials. That would be the spring of 1980. Of course the first thing that happens before the trials is Lin Yi-hsiung's family is murdered.*

DONNELLY: The family lived very close to where the U.S. military annex was, which is now the AIT headquarters. Lin's mother and twin daughters, if I recall correctly, were there at the time and his wife was someplace – I don't know, she was working, I guess. Lin himself was in jail being interrogated for his involvement in the Kaohsiung incident and in the magazine Mei Li Tao and in the opposition movement. I say "interrogated" because that's a pleasant word for what was happening to him. While the wife was away, someone came in and murdered the mother and the twin daughters. There was another daughter that, if memory serves me correctly, was there but was not murdered.

There was, of course, a terrible stink in the press about this, especially when Lin was in jail for a political crime (Kaohsiung Incident), not a criminal action. The government said that they were going to investigate and find the culprit. The reports that we got were that the Lin's house was watched at all times by government police, and the idea that someone could have snuck in there unbeknownst to these policemen just seemed a little strange to most people. But the government came out with a likely criminal, somebody called Big Beard, (Ta Hu Tzu). Big Beard, it turns out, was an American, who on his own sort of befriended the Lin family, although one feels he was more of a pest than anything else. He was an American whose name I can't recall at this time, who was teaching, I believe, maybe a research or graduate student in an Australian university. So they arrested Big Beard, but didn't hold him because he had nothing to do with the murder obviously. It was good smoke to blow in the face of the public. Everybody was talking about Big Beard's nefarious deeds for a few days anyway. Apparently he did go to the house that

day, but was gone long before the murders.

In any event, they had the trial and Chiang Ching-kuo promised that the trial would be fair and open. Before the trial they had an indictment of these eight people. The indictment was for sedition. They had an indictment and they had a trial, and the trial was open and I think probably more or less fair. It was reported in the press, in two papers anyway: Tzu Li Wan Pao and Chung Kuo Shih Pao. The way it was reported was that these two papers and some foreign correspondents, AP being one of them, would send two people to sit in at the trial and they would take turns recording what was said. And their transcriptions would be printed in the newspaper the next day.

*Q: Sort of as a question and answer format?*

DONNELLY: Well, I guess one did the questions, one did the answer, one did five minutes and the other did five minutes. One person couldn't get it all and the two of them would alternate in whatever way was comfortable for them.

*Q: So this amounted to the only public transcript?*

DONNELLY: The only public transcript, and it was in the paper and it was fairly full and fairly accurate. Such things as the intimidation of Annette Lu who is today's vice president and spent six plus years in jail for the Kaohsiung incident. She said that she was intimidated by them. She was interrogated only by men and they would say things to her like, "When you come here, you are as if you are naked," and she thought that was sexual intimidation. That was all printed in the paper. So the trial, I think, was pretty fair.

Lin Yi-hsiung would tell about being tortured with having salt water poured down him until he was bloated and all sorts of things like that. It was out in the paper, so the trial, I think, was fair and open. They had the indictment and then the trial and then the sentencing. The sentencing was based upon the indictment and not upon the trial. So, Chiang Ching-kuo was right, the trial was fair and open, but the indictment and the sentencing weren't fair; they were open, but not fair. So these people all spent time in jail and now, of course, they are all out and in leadership positions in Taiwan.

*Q: Now if the press is publishing this account of the trial, I'm presuming that, it's now AIT, is translating these and sending this back to Washington?*

DONNELLY: What was USIS became the Cultural and Information Section (CIS). We translated them, all of what was in the paper, and sent it back. We did that independent of the political section, which became the General Affairs Section. We sent it in on our own. Really it should've been a General Affairs Section responsibility, but seeing we had liaison with the press and the press has pretty much always been a USIS function, we sent it in on that basis. Everything that was in the paper was translated by us and sent in.

Yu Chi-chung, publisher of Chung Kuo Shih Pao (China Times) had the most complete coverage of it, and he announced that when the trial was all over, he was going to put all of the testimony

that was recorded in his paper into a book and sell it. After he announced that, the government got to him and said, in so many words, “Don’t you dare,” and so he didn’t.

*Q: Well, it’s interesting because Yu, of course, sits on the central committee of the Kuomintang. He is at the center of power; he’s a trusted...*

DONNELLY: Yes.

*Q: Even with that, that’s enough political protection to allow him to publish the trial, but not enough to protect a subsequent book?*

DONNELLY: Apparently. He made the announcement and then he changed his mind. Why he changed his mind, only he knows. *(laughs)*

*Q: Well, actually, we got ahead of our story a little bit because President Carter on December 13, 1979 announced that the United States was going to change diplomatic recognition and recognize the People’s Republic of China and unrecognize the Republic of China on Taiwan. For those sitting in Taiwan at that time, working for the embassy and USIA, what was that announcement like to you?*

DONNELLY: It was a shock, I think for everybody. There had been indications that we were going to do something like this. In September of that year, we were still in the embassy of course, and the country team, that is the heads of the sections, was called together to discuss how we would operate if this happened. Then we put all in of our ideas, I think it’s fair to say that Mark Pratt was the guy who did the writing of the report, but I’m not sure now, anyway all the ideas were put together and sent to Washington as if Washington was at all interested in our opinion, which they weren’t. *(laughs)*

*Q: So this was very much a local initiative or appeared to be a local initiative?*

DONNELLY: It seems to me that it might have been, yes. In any event, nothing happened after September; we were going along quite well. They were in the midst of an election. The election period was about two weeks, and a week before the election was over, Carter made this announcement. A lot of people were very upset about the timing because had he waited a week the election would’ve been over and the democratic forces were making great strides in that election. But when he made the announcement, Chiang Ching-kuo canceled the election.

It was quite a shock to the Chinese and to us. My recollection of that day that the announcement was made, that was, I guess, the 15<sup>th</sup> in Washington; the 16<sup>th</sup> in Taiwan. That morning a cable came in to the ambassador and probably only the ambassador and the political officers were aware of the contents of that message. But that message was something like, “Stand by for an important cable.” It didn’t say what.

That night, Ambassador Leonard Unger went to the American Chamber of Commerce Christmas party at the officer’s club on Chung Shan North Road. He had on his tuxedo and a red bow tie, as I recall. Mark Pratt must’ve been in the office and a cable came in late at night, I’m not sure if it

was 9:30 or 10:00 at night - something like that, saying that Carter was going to announce the Normalization of China and the derecognition of Taiwan. Mark immediately got a hold of Unger at the Christmas party at I think about 11:00 pm and then Unger started the wheels in motion to contact Chiang Ching-kuo who was the president of the country. Now you don't just go to the president of the country's house and ring the bell and talk to him, so it took a while to go through the several people that they had to and then they got Chiang Ching-kuo at, I think, slightly after two o'clock in the morning. Unger told him that we were derecognizing Taiwan. I'm told that he was in shock, shocked into inaction, and really didn't do anything until the following morning.

At six o'clock in the morning I was called by the duty officer and told to get down to the office. I got there, I guess about 8:00, and the country team was in the bubble.

*Q: Now your position at this time was?*

DONNELLY: I was the PAO (Public Affairs Officer). I was in charge of the cultural and information sections of USIS.

*Q: So you were the senior USIA person?*

DONNELLY: I was the senior USIA person and Mark and I had been in Taiwan the longest so we were the most, familiar with Taiwan.

*Q: (laughs) The longest living organizers.*

DONNELLY: We got there and Unger, still in his tuxedo and red bow tie, told us what Carter was going to do and we should call our families and tell them to listen to the radio, the armed forces radio station in Taiwan which would broadcast the message. And to tell our families to keep the kids home from school and things like that. So we did. Then the announcement came and of course people were very upset.

One of the first things that President Chiang Ching-kuo did was to cancel the election. He'd just been shocked into inaction because he wasn't expecting it.

*Q: Talking about peoples reactions, you have employees in your office. Did they begin to react?*

DONNELLY: Yes, sure. Our office had about half mainland Chinese and half Taiwanese Chinese. The majority, of course, felt betrayed and they felt very bad, but there was a minority of Taiwanese, maybe four or five, who thought it was a good idea. They thought it was a good idea because of the dislike of the Kuomintang government and they thought this may, somehow, give Taiwan a chance to become independent. So there were a few who thought it was a pretty good idea.

The election was cancelled and we got a few weeks of just sort of fumbling around. Of course there was a reaction in the United States, as well. The reaction was that not enough people were told; I don't think Barry Goldwater knew. Had Barry Goldwater known, he would've somehow thrown a monkey wrench into it if he could. He and most other conservative republicans were

kept out of it. There was also a feeling that Carter was a little petty about it by announcing it at 9:00 at night Washington time during prime time which meant that as soon as he announced it, people like Goldwater wouldn't have any time to mobilize anything and it wouldn't give the people in Taiwan any time either. In any event, we were sort of fumbling around. It was decided in Washington that it would probably be a decent thing to do to send a delegation to Taiwan to smooth ruffled feathers.

*Q: Give out some face?*

DONNELLY: Yes, face. So, Warren Christopher led a delegation with Roger Sullivan and a lot of other people that, I'm not sure if I've got my dates remembered,

*Q: I think it's the last week or so...*

DONNELLY: It's after Christmas.

*Q: It's after Christmas, but not January 1<sup>st</sup>.*

DONNELLY: They arrived...

*Q: Actually it's 29<sup>th</sup>, 30<sup>th</sup>...*

DONNELLY: Something like that.

They arrived at the airport. I was the head of USIS, but I was also handling all of the press relations. Before they came, someone in the government information office talked to me. I went over and they wanted to know if Christopher would give a press conference. I said, "Yes, I was told he'd give a press conference at the airport," and he asked me who was going to introduce him. I said, "Well, I usually introduce them; that's my job. I'll introduce him." He said, "As a courtesy, would you let Chen Fu," (that's Frederick Chen) "introduce him?" I said, "That's a little unusual. I'll ask Ambassador Unger." At this point, when we were trying to bend over backwards to smooth their feathers, Ambassador Unger agreed.

*Q: Chen Fu is the minister of foreign affairs at this time, isn't he? Or is he head of GIO?*

DONNELLY: At this time, he had already left GIO (Government Information Office). In any event, Ambassador Unger said okay, so I wrote out the statement for Christopher. As I said, they agreed for Fred Chen, who was not the GIO at this time - he was the vice foreign minister, to introduce him. So, Fred Chen introduced him. We got into the airport and as we were going into the airport, we noticed that a lot of students were milling around. Now that airport at that time had a military side and a civilian side, but the same runway of course. The military terminal was, of course, secure. So we went to the gates and outside the gates were all these students milling around. We went in, let me back up just a bit. We were told before, that we probably should use Chinese government cars instead of our own cars in the motorcade. We thought this strange, but who's ever in charge of automobiles said okay. So in the motorcade were, I suppose, thirty cars or so; half the Chinese delegation, half the American, and they lined up outside. Christopher

came with a delegation, Roger Sullivan and other people, and he was led into where the press were. A very small room, but there were about forty or fifty press.

*Q: Now this is on the military side?*

DONNELLY: It was on the military side. There's nobody in there except the press and the delegation.

*Q: But he's arrived in his own aircraft?*

DONNELLY: Oh, yes, the American aircraft. Sure. It was a U.S. Air Force plane, I believe. In any event, he arrives and I would've introduced him if everybody agreed and I would've said, "Ladies and gentlemen, this is Warren Christopher, the deputy secretary of state. He would be happy to take your questions." That's all...

Fred Chen's introduction was not "Ladies and gentlemen of the press, this is the deputy secretary of state. He has a short statement and then he'll take your questions." It was nothing like that at all. It was a condemnation of the act of Normalization, and the Taiwan government negotiating position on Normalization, from which they would not retreat. We were talking about people to people relations and they wanted government to government relations, and they would not budge from that. The introduction was very hard-line, very long. It went on for about five minutes, after which, Warren Christopher read this very bland statement that I read. Should I read it?

*Q: Yes.*

DONNELLY: This is the statement of Warren Christopher after he'd just been blasted by vice foreign minister Fred Chen, and told what they're going to say to us, and that they're not going to retreat from it. He said, "President Carter had asked me to come here to initiate discussions with President Chiang and other senior officials of your government. In these discussions, my purpose will be to seek to develop a general framework for our future relationship. We will be discussing arrangements which can enable our two peoples to maintain our cultural, commercial, and other relationships on an unofficial basis. We are here to begin an important process and I hope we can make a good start. I am grateful to President Chiang and his colleagues for setting aside time for these discussions. I look forward to meetings which will reflect the goodwill and understanding that has existed between us."

*(laughs)* Obviously there wasn't any goodwill or understanding.

*Q: Now let me get this straight. They have created a transportation system in which their drivers control the cars; we're not using our cars and we're not using our drivers?*

DONNELLY: A few of our cars and a few of our drivers.

*Q: But the delegation itself?*

DONNELLY: I was in a Chinese government car.

*Q: But the importance of the press conference is that they've made their negotiating position public so that's it's going to be difficult...I mean, in the world of negotiation, if the other guy makes his a good public hard-line comment, his defense then in the private meetings are, you know, "My public is going to expect this and I can't back down any further." So this is all part of their negotiating tactic.*

DONNELLY: It's part of their negotiating tactics, but it wasn't a good idea, as will be seen.

In any event, we went out then and got in the motorcade and started out. By the time that we got outside the gates, the students, I don't know how many there were, several thousand, surrounded the cars and began to pelt them with eggs and rocks and to jump up on top of the cars and stamp on the roofs. I had with me in the car Mort Smith who was one of our USIA people from Washington. I was sitting in the front seat and Mort and another, Jack Cannon, were in the back. A student came with a flag pole and shoved it through the window and broke the window. I was covered with glass and cut a little bit. Ambassador Unger was driving with one of the admirals, I think. He was mildly cut and his glasses were knocked off. He had the Seventh Fleet commander with him, I think.

*Q: Let's see, Admiral Weisner, was CINC...*

DONNELLY: Yes, that's what he was: CINCPAC, Admiral Maurice Weisner.

*Q: Were they in the ambassador's car with the ambassador's driver, or were they in...*

DONNELLY: I forget; I just don't remember now.

Our car was badly damaged. They kept us for a long, long time in that motorcade; wouldn't let us go through. Just pounded the cars and breaking the windows. No one was hurt badly and I'm told by a young friend of mine who was a military officer - a young Chinese friend - that the soldiers were told to don civilian clothes and make sure that none of the students got too wild. He said, he himself, wrestled down a student who was going after the ambassador's car with a hammer. So they were prepared. The demonstration was supposed to be spontaneous, but when we came to the gate that night I noticed that there was a large truck and on the side of the truck was written in Chinese, "Lu Tung Tzu Shuo" which means "mobile toilet," and you very seldom have mobile toilets at spontaneous demonstrations.

Also, I know from a friend of mine who was a student at National Taiwan University, that there were loud speaker announcements that morning at that university and others, urging students to go and rally at the airport. So it was a put up job.

We finally broke out of the cordon that the students had created, but had to abandon our car because it was so badly damaged. When the cars broke out, they sort of went in all different directions. Some went to the Grand Hotel and our car went up to Yang Ming Shan, up to Kuomintang resort up there. I forget the name of it. There were three or four cars that went off in one direction and Roger Sullivan was in one of them. Then other cars just went to places like

U.S. Military Headquarters.

*Q: What do you mean you abandoned the car?*

DONNELLY: We abandoned our car and found another car that we could take. Our car wouldn't work because it was so badly damaged.

*Q: Now was your car a U.S. government car or one that they provided?*

DONNELLY: It was a Chinese government car. It seems that they thought they didn't want to damage our cars and have to pay for them. *(laughs)* I don't know. In any event, we abandoned it and we got one of our own cars. I forget how we got it, but we got in one of our own cars and I think first we went to the U.S. Army Headquarters and then got on the phone there with Washington; I didn't, but Roger Sullivan did. Some of the people were asking what we should do. I think on the other end was Holbrooke, but I don't remember. I do remember that there were a couple in the U.S. delegation that wanted to turn right around, get back on those planes and fly out of there. The reason they didn't is because there's a U.S. Air Force regulation, I'm told, that a pilot has to have so many hours sleep after so many hours in the air.

*Q: So they didn't have another crew?*

DONNELLY: I don't know. So it was decided that they would stay there and tough this thing out and give face, anyway, and they did. During the three days they were there, there were some mild demonstrations. I'm forgetting, but before they came we did have demonstrations at the embassy. I was there at the embassy. The embassy was sort of surrounded by these yelling and screaming students, and rocks were being thrown at windows. Some windows broke. The embassy was really a good thirty yards from the street and there was a fence there, so somebody with a very good arm got one or two rocks through the window.

*Q: My impression is that the embassy is on a fairly narrow street, too. It's not on a main boulevard; it's sort of off a main boulevard and the streets around it are just two lane roads.*

DONNELLY: No, that's the present AIT.

*Q: Oh.*

DONNELLY: The embassy was, near the old North Gate and the railroad station. It's on the corner of a fairly large street. As a matter of fact, there's an overpass right there. That was one thing that worried our security people, because the overpass is close enough that you could do damage to the embassy from the overpass. In any event, that passed and then...

*Q: Now did you participate in any of these discussions?*

DONNELLY: Not in the discussions, no.

*Q: But you would've had to handle the press, the American press that came with the delegation*

*certainly realized that this was going to be a news event so they got themselves there.*

DONNELLY: There were a couple of dates; the dates of December 15<sup>th</sup> where Carter announced the derecognition, January 1<sup>st</sup> when derecognition took place, and February 28<sup>th</sup> when American official activity in Taiwan would end. In other words, there was a two month period under the Vienna Convention where somebody who is winding down an embassy has a grace period of selling property and acting sort of official for two months.

We derecognized formally on January 1<sup>st</sup>, but December 31<sup>st</sup>, the flag came down for the last time and that was obviously a news event. Ambassador Unger wanted the flag to come down with dignity and had a private, sort of family affair. I argued that that was a mistake. I argued that the U.S. press and the U.S. people would want to see this and it should not be kept from the press. He overruled me, of course. So that day, I went down to the embassy and told the ambassador, "Make sure, if you don't want anybody in here, that that gate is shut."

They were going to take the flag down, I think at sundown, if I recall. What Unger wanted is he was going to stand there at the foot of the flag, have the Marines take down the flag, fold it in military manner and give it to him in a very dignified way. That was going to be alright, but a very enterprising American reporter, I think his name was Collins - his father was a former ambassador or consular general to Vietnam back in the '50s, I believe, he got a hold of a Chinese government car somehow and came to the gate and tooted the horn and the embassy gate guard, a Chinese, opened the gate and let him in. Now we've got, I think he was one of the news networks, CBS (Central Broadcast System) maybe, an American newsman inside the gate. Well, Unger was livid and the security officer was running around screaming, especially at me. I said, "I didn't open the gate." They said, "You've got to get him out of here," and I said, "What do you want me to do, throw him out? He's bigger than I am." They said, "Tell him to leave," and Unger at this point, he's going to call the head of NBC or CBS, whatever it was, and I said, "You're going to get no place. It's the middle of the night, and if you tell him, 'one of your reporters was enterprising enough to get in here', he'll probably get a raise." So Unger finally cooled down, but he was mad as hell. They said, "Get him out of here," and I said, "I'll tell you what, I will go down and ask him to leave." That's ridiculous, but I said I'd do it.

*Q: Where has he parked himself all this time?*

DONNELLY: The car is now inside the gate. There's a wall around the compound...

*Q: And he's just stayed with his car?*

DONNELLY: Yes, he said he's going to cover this event.

So, I said, "I'll go down," and I went down and I knew him. I forget his first name, John or something like that. I said, "What if I asked you to leave?" (*laughs*) He said he'd tell me to go to hell. I said, "Okay, I asked you and that's your answer." So Unger then decided that he would have the flag taken down, folded, and brought into him and presented to him inside the embassy. I said, "Well you know, they're going to get pictures anyway. There's this overpass right by and there are apartment buildings all around and the newsmen and all around. Just let them in," but

of course he wouldn't do it.

I have some pictures...

*Q: The whole incident with the flag taking down, of course is symbolic of the events that have unfolded, so this is a great journalistic coup for this young man. We've just looked at your photos here and I see the overpass you're talking about; it looks like it's only about fifteen feet away.*

DONNELLY: It wasn't that close, but it's close. There were reporters up there and all over the place. Well, the flag is down and now we formally recognize China, but we're still in Taiwan for two months at which point someone from the State Department comes out and a man who later became ambassador to South Africa, his name will come to me in a minute, to tell us what our future is going to be. Now we had all these ideas that if we became non-State and civilians, we'd all get civilian pay and all of this sort of stuff. *(laughs)*

*Q: Sounds like an excuse for a pay raise there.*

DONNELLY: His message was, you're going to be separated from, but then can come back into the U.S. government when you finish your tour here, and your time here will count towards retirement and everything else. There'll be no change in pay. The possibility of you maybe losing a year or so towards any promotion would be great because this will not be a very important post. In addition to that, you lose your diplomatic immunity, so in a traffic accident or anything like that, you won't have the power of the embassy behind you. This is a very discouraging message.

*Q: You'd be quite exposed to local legislation. Now was this someone from the administrative side of State Department personnel or one from the desk; political, policy?*

DONNELLY: No, this was an important person who later, as I told you, was ambassador.

*Q: He's grabbing you out of the personnel system.*

DONNELLY: And his name is personnel administer, because I've seen him since.

*Q: Because now, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which is the law that puts all this in place, has not been passed yet. This is State's version of that law, and so he's explaining to you what State has written into the TRA that they're sending up to congress.*

DONNELLY: I don't know whether exactly he's talking about what State is sending to congress, but he's talking about how State is going to view us and he said, "Anyone that wants to leave, we will reassign them right now. Anybody that wants to stay, this is the deal."

Well, about half the people, I think, decided that they wanted out. I stayed.

*Q: Actually, in addition to those, State had already planned to reduce the size of the mission to*

*some extent.*

DONNELLY: I think they had a cap on it, and I think the cap was something like sixty or sixty-one.

*Q: Yes.*

DONNELLY: And I think the cap has since been lifted, maybe, and now there's a few more. But of course the military is out.

*Q: Right.*

DONNELLY: And a few military who remained, remained in civilian status; no uniforms or anything like that. But the Taiwanese, of course, wanted some military because they wanted to buy weapons from the United States.

*Q: One of the things I wanted to get clear was you were saying about fifty percent of the people didn't take up the offer to stay, but in fact, wasn't that cap smaller than the number of people that were there? So somebody had to leave anyway.*

DONNELLY: Yes, and I don't know what the numbers are.

*Q: Okay.*

DONNELLY: So that was that, and then February 28<sup>th</sup> was the last day when we...

*Q: Could act as an official?*

DONNELLY: Yes, had any official capacity whatsoever. Then what happened was State sent their version of the Taiwan Relations Act to Congress and Congress didn't like it. Congress decided that they were going to write their own. Well, Congress doesn't move very quickly and it took until May. In the meantime, Senator Ernest Hollings decided to punish the State Department for being so naughty and doing things without informing congress: he held up our pay. There could be no money spent on anything in Taiwan while we were there; no visas could be issued, nothing could be done. No official Americans could come and we could not go to our offices. We were all put on administrative leave. Administrative leave means you don't have anything to do, but you get your pay. But the fact is, they couldn't pay us because he held everything up. So there's a whole group of us that are now on administrative leave and the country team met every morning, and Bill Brown's house who was the deputy, we didn't have any ambassador...

*Q: Right, because Ambassador Unger has left.*

DONNELLY: Ambassador Unger has left and Bill Brown is holding in his house every morning, a session where we get together and talk and communicate with Washington by phone (we don't have any cables) about one thing and the other. We did that every morning; the country team did.

The rest of the staff just didn't do anything. They were there, but we're not getting paid. People's checks are bouncing and people's house payments on their houses back in the States aren't being paid. It was a mess. People who wanted to go to the States for good reasons, businessmen and whatnot, couldn't get a visa. The only way they could get a visa, and they worked this out, was for them to give all the information to Hong Kong and the visa would be issued in Hong Kong and sent back. So it was.

*Q: Adding time and delay to the Taiwan businessman's... That would be the individual needing a visa.*

DONNELLY: Yes, so there was a lot of important business that didn't get done for three months, thanks to Hollings' pique at the State Department.

*Q: What's a senator for, but to punish...*

DONNELLY: *(laughs)* Finally, we opened sometime in early May and it was decided that we would call USIS the Cultural and Information Section at that time. It was decided to start our activities on a rather low key. Now one thing we'd always had was lectures for visiting Americans and the first person who wanted to come was Susan Sontag. She had been to China and she wanted to see the other side of China. She wanted to compare them. The State Department was sending her on a lecture tour to Asia, but not Taiwan; she was going to Korea and some other places. But she said, "I want to go to Taiwan," so they said, "Do you want her?" and we said, "Yes."

We decided to start the lecture program not at night when we'd get a lot of people, but in the afternoon, hoping that we'd get started and then we could work into the evening hours. So Susan Sontag came and she was there a couple days. I had her over to dinner, I know, and then the day of the lecture I took her to lunch in Wan Hwa, which is an old section of Taipei. I took her to the Lung Shan Temple, one of Taiwan's biggest temples, and then to a little food stall. Right across from the temple there's a little market area with food stalls in it. I remember we had fried squid and she thoroughly enjoyed herself. And then walked from Wan Hwa back a bit before we got in the car and in Wan Hwa, there is an alley where they sell snake.

*Q: Snake Alley?*

DONNELLY: She was interested in that, and at the next street to Snake Alley, as we passed by, she noticed there were very young girls standing in front of little houses and they seemed to have a lot of makeup on and short skirts and stuff. She asked me about it. I said, "Well, a lot of them are young girls and their father - a lot of them are adopted - and this is a fact, it's not a nice fact, but it's a fact; they'll be sold and rented out to the bordellos for a period of a couple years and then her father would get \$500 or something." So it's not much different than a lot of other societies. It probably doesn't happen anymore, but it did happen.

That was that, and then we got back to the lecture. In the lecture there were about half Chinese, half American. We didn't get many Americans at our lectures, but if you had Susan Sontag, all the American language students would want to come and listen to her. USIA in Washington sent

out a biography of her and we printed it up and I put copies of it on the table in the auditorium. I went in to introduce her and people were sitting in the auditorium, I went up to the stage, I thought she was following me, but she wasn't; she picked up the flier with her biography on it, and as I'm waiting for her, she walks up, she's reading it as she's walking, and then she sits on the stage, reading, and I give the standard bland introduction about her, "Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming Susan Sontag to Taiwan." Clap, clap, clap. Nothing. She's still reading; she's ignoring the audience completely, reading this thing that we had sent out from Washington. I didn't notice that I'd walked to the back of the auditorium by that time, then I look up and she's reading and people are waiting, and she finishes reading and she says, "Neal, who wrote this?" I said, "We got it from Washington." She said, "It's all lies." (*laughs*) And that was the start. Then what she did, she read from one of her books and took questions. The first question was from a dignified older Chinese man who asked the sort of question that they always ask. He said, "Is this your first visit to Taiwan?" (in an elderly voice) She said, "Yes, it is." "What is the thing that impressed you most about Taiwan?" She said, "That you still practice slavery!" (*laughs*) Oh, God, the whole place erupted. She was talking about the little girls in the bordellos, and she went on to explain how I had taken her down there. It was a disaster.

*Q: But actually, by way of background, this is a standard USIA program where they get famous Americans in the arts and they offer these people to the regional bureaus. "We're going to send Susan to Korea and Japan and whatnot. Do you guys want her?" and the post will come in and say, "Ooh, this individual is very attractive to our audience and we would love to put them up."*

DONNELLY: A lot of Americans like to do this, too; people like Daniel Boorstein. He came in – you know, a very prestigious man. And others like Thoreau who wrote The Great Railway Bazaar, and some other things. I know he's got a brother. Is his name Paul Thoreau?

*Q: Yes, that's the travel guide.*

DONNELLY: Paul Thoreau wrote that book after a USIS sponsored tour. He said he wanted to go to all these places and lecture as an author. And he did; he went from one place to the other and then he wrote about them and you had no idea from reading the book, that what he was on a USIS sponsored tour until he got to Vietnam. In Vietnam he stayed with the PAO who was Marshall Bremant. You may know him.

*Q: Yes.*

DONNELLY: Marshall Bremant was the PAO. He was a State officer, but he took a tour as PAO in Vietnam. I don't know if you knew that.

*Q: I had forgotten that he did a tour there.*

DONNELLY: He stayed with Marshall Bremant, then he went to Hue, and in Hue he stayed with the local USIS guy who later was in VOA with me; a very, very nice guy. I forget his name. He's the only one in the whole book that he mentions by name, I think. And identifies as a USIS officer. But anyway, that's a speaker's program, which can be very good.

*Q: My impression is that it's good in a number of ways. I was intrigued that Maya Angelou went on one of these USIA things as a cast member of Porgy and Bess during the 1950s when she was a young woman.*

DONNELLY: We've had a lot of famous musicians. Duke Ellington came and Louis Armstrong.

*Q: To Taiwan?*

DONNELLY: I'm sorry, Louis Armstrong came to Hong Kong while I was there, we had Duke Ellington in Taiwan. Oh just lots and lots of very famous people. Charlie Byrd came to Taiwan too.

*Q: So this is a major program that USIA has to expose American arts to a foreign audience?*

DONNELLY: And expose American artists to the world. So it's a very good program.

*Q: Well, here you are, it's the first days of AIT, you're not getting paid, there's no law that covers you, you literally can't talk to your colleagues officially. I wonder who pays for the telephone calls back to Washington. (laughs)*

DONNELLY: I don't know much about the administrative aspect of it, but it was a crazy time.

*Q: But now things get straightened out by May?*

DONNELLY: May, yes.

*Q: And who comes out to be the head of AIT?*

DONNELLY: Chuck Cross. Chuck Cross was ambassador to Singapore and he's a guy that was born in China of missionary parents and was a China hand-type, and he's the new director. We called him director.

*Q: Of AIT. Actually, Chuck has just published a book of his memoirs, Born a Foreigner. He talks about being of missionary parents in China and a Japanese language officer with Marines during the war.*

*To get this job, has he resigned the Foreign Service or is he actually retired? I've forgotten.*

DONNELLY: Well, all of it. It was all a fiction and I don't know what his fiction was; whether he retired or not. He may have retired, but I'm sure they would've taken him back had he wanted to. But I think that was his last post.

I guess I went on home leave in July or something and I think he came when I was on home leave, but for some reason he left. I came back in September, I think, and he left shortly after I came back and Bill Brown had already left. Bill Brown became ambassador to Israel later, whether he left to do that or not, I don't know. I think he did. So there was no deputy when I got

back from home leave, and I think it must've been September, and Chuck Cross then went on home leave, I believe. I believe he came directly from Singapore to Taiwan and had not been on home leave, so when I got back, he went directly on home leave and I was made acting director of AIT. A friend of mine quipped that the highest rank I got was acting director of an unofficial entity. *(laughs)* In any event, I was acting director and Chuck Cross left me specific instructions, "Make sure that no think piece goes out of this AIT while you're in charge. I don't want any waves while I'm gone." So, sort of make sure nothing happens. And I did that. I had a fight with Mark Pratt once because he wanted to send out something that looked to me like a think piece. We're the best of friends, but we did have a little to-do over that. So anyway, here we get to October 10<sup>th</sup>, which is the Chinese National Day.

*Q: The Republic of China National Day, right.*

DONNELLY: And I'm the acting director, so I cable Washington and say, "What should I do? Should I go to the event?" and word came back that "Yes, you should go to the event." Now at the National Day they have a tea party for diplomatic invitees in the presidential building just before the event, and then from the tea party you go out to the stands in front of the presidential building and watch the parade. So, I'm invited now to the tea party and I go in and they were just having tea and somebody gives me a number, something like eighty-two or eighty-three, and I don't know what it's for, but I've got this number. And then after about a half an hour of tea, we're told that we're going to go and shake Chiang Ching-kuo's hand, and to line up by numbers. Well, I keep looking for what number it is and I find that my wife and I are the very last people in the line. *(laughs)*

The first group in the line are official diplomats. The doyenne of the diplomatic corps was the South African ambassador and then all the Central Americans and the second group in the line were invited guests like businessmen from America and Britain and France and Japan, and then the third group were unofficial diplomats and they'd be the Japanese and the Singaporean. We were the last ones. So I got to shake Chiang Ching-kuo's hand last. It was a real cold fish handshake.

*Q: Well, actually that's interesting because when I was there in the '83, '85 period, they were trying all kinds of gimmicks to create the impression that it was a more official than unofficial relationship. They could have put you in the front of the line and then you would have been sorely tested.*

DONNELLY: Well, dare I tell a joke on this tape?

*Q: Oh, please.*

DONNELLY: This joke was told to me by a Chinese reporter, a lady reporter actually, during the Christopher mission time, because Fred Chen insisted that we have a government to government relationship. Have you heard this?

*Q: Yes.*

DONNELLY: Should I tell that or not?

*Q: Oh, yes, yes. Tell it.*

DONNELLY: A government to government relationship and we wanted a people to people relationship. The joke is, it has to be told in Chinese, that Fred Chen's or somebody's driver was driving an American and a Chinese official around and they kept arguing in English about people to people or government to government, and the Chinese driver didn't speak any English, so at the end of the day he asked his boss (of course this is in Chinese), he said, "I don't understand. You two talked all day long about 'P'i Ku Tu P'i Ku' (people to people) and 'Kan Men Tui Kan Men' (government to government) what's the difference?" Of course, P'i Ku means ass and Kan Men means rectum. It was a joke that made the rounds during derecognition. So it shows that the Chinese have a good sense of humor. We AITers had our own sense of humor. Three of us couples got together and composed the AIT fight songs. I'll give you a copy if you want.

*Q: So you were acting director for how long? A couple of months there?*

DONNELLY: A couple of months, yes. You might say "nonaction acting director".

*Q: On a short leash, by the way. (laughs)*

DONNELLY: Yes, on a short leash.

*Q: How would you characterize the impact of the Normalization procedure on USIA's program in Taiwan?*

DONNELLY: Well, the first test concerned one thing USIS does as a matter of course: it puts out backgrounders to influential people, newsmen, and government officials of U.S. government announcements; for example, a presidential press conference. We'll record it and put it on in mimeographed or other form (mimeographed in the old days) and...

*Q: It's the wireless file.*

DONNELLY: The wireless file. And maybe a presidential speech or even an act of congress or something very official, and send it around. After we opened up shop again and started sending backgrounders, I was called over to the Government Information Office. Carter gave a speech in which he said something about the People's Republic of China. Now, in Taiwan you cannot say People's Republic of China; you either call them Chinese communists or bandit communists. You can call them bandit communists or Chinese communists, but you can't call them the People's Republic of China and I was told that I couldn't send this out; I'd have to correct it. Of course now I'm not official. I said, "I'm not going to correct my president's language. You know, I'm not going to do it. You can do what you want, but I'm not going to do it. You can throw me off the island; whatever you want." They backed down, but they thought they could intimidate the U.S. government. So we felt that. Other than that, the Taiwan government realized pretty soon that their best course was to get along with us rather than to frustrate us.

*Q: So all your programs are intact, you're getting speakers from USIA. How about the magazines and whatnot that you're distributing; is there any problem?*

DONNELLY: There really wasn't any great problem.

*Q: So, change the name on the door and the programs move forward?*

DONNELLY: Right, and I think most of the people in the government wanted to get out of that and there were only a few hard-liners. We were still invited to receptions and it just went on.

*Q: How about your personal contacts? I mean you're the senior USIA person; are some people sort of dropping you off their 'A' list or are the Taiwanese coming forward and making comments?*

DONNELLY: I can't think of any incident where they went one way or the other.

*Q: Is there anything else we need to cover for this period? Actually, we started out that you were the head of the cultural section and we haven't paid much attention to your own jobs during this timeframe. You were head of the cultural section, deputy PAO, then the PAO, the Public Affairs Officers, then you got to run the shop for two months. So at what time did you move from being the cultural officer to the deputy PAO?*

DONNELLY: I was asked back to Taiwan by the PAO; Bob Clarke who had been my PAO when I left in '72. He wanted me to come back and I said okay. I went back in the same shop; the cultural shop. When Bob left, Bill Ayers came. Bob's deputy was a man by the name of Harry Britton and then Bill Ayers who was another China type who had been born in China of missionary parents, he came as the PAO and Britton left shortly after that. Bill made me deputy, so I was Bill's deputy for a couple years and then when Bill left, I was made PAO.

*Q: How formal was your definition of responsibility?*

DONNELLY: In USIA, the standard USIA operation would have a PAO, a Public Affairs Officer, a DPAO (Deputy Public Affairs Officer) or a cultural officer, an information officer. Under the cultural officer you might have a publications officer or assistant cultural officer. Under the information officer you might have a press officer, in some places a radio officer and in some places a motion picture officer. That's the way a normal USIS operation was run. Unfortunately there were very few normal USIS operations. The duties sometimes don't always fit the title.

What a deputy should do is take the direction of the PAO and make things work. He probably might have to write the country plan, he would have to do sort of all administering of the program. In Taiwan it ended up that I did all of that plus I pretty much handled the press because all my life I've been dealing with press. We had a couple of press flaps and the PAO at that time, Bill Ayers, asked me to take over all of the press duties as well as being Deputy PAO.

*Q: Was there a fairly established press presence in Taiwan?*

DONNELLY: There were of course local papers; a lot of local papers. Some more important than others, obviously. In terms of foreign correspondents, you had AP (Associated Press), UPI (United Press International), Reuters, Agence France Press, and a few other foreign news agencies, but not all of these people were represented by Americans. They usually were local Chinese who would do the reporting for you. So we were in touch with all of these people. Then there were several freelance reporters. TIME magazine had a man who was on a retainer, and Newsweek as well. And then there were just other people that wrote for whoever would take their stuff.

*Q: You were saying there were some press flaps?*

DONNELLY: Well, yes, there always are of course. One of the big ones was when Richard Holbrooke came; I forget just when this was. It must've been before normalization. In any event, he came out and when he came into the airport of course the reporters wanted to talk to him. So they crowded around him and pushed tape recorders in his face and knocked his glasses off. Richard Holbrooke is not the kind of guy you want to knock the glasses off of. He said at that time, I quote, "You'll pay for this!" He was really upset with the USIS officer who was doing the press at that time who didn't organize the thing in such a way that that wouldn't happen. He raised hell over that. So that's when I was the deputy and that's when Bill Ayers asked me to take over the press responsibility as well.

The next time Richard Holbrooke came, several months or a year later, I forget when, he landed at the airport and there was a government car to pick him up that speeded to, I think the ambassador's house, through empty streets. It was like the Pope coming; they cleared the way. So there was no problem, but he got deference more than he deserved.

*Q: One of the things; Taiwan is a bit of a focus because of the Kaohsiung incident and the emphasis on human rights, but the Chen Wan-cheng affair happened just before you left. That was the young Mellon University...*

DONNELLY: Yes. Chen Wan-cheng was a professor at Carnegie Mellon. He came to Taiwan to see his parents at Christmas, I think, and he was found dead on the grounds of Taipei University. In college he had been a vocal advocate of Taiwan independence, as most Taiwanese are. The government picked him up for questioning at his apartment in Taipei and he never came back. That's when they found him on the grounds of Taiwan National University. The police said that they brought him home and don't know what happened to him.

Most people think that they interrogated him (this cannot be verified) and beat him pretty badly and he died and they dumped him there. They allowed the body to be viewed by some people from Carnegie Mellon who flew out to look at it. I have seen pictures of his nude body and it was pretty badly beaten. One of the reporters of, I think, the small paper Ta Hwa Wan Pao, a lady reporter, reported that the doctors or whomever they were from Carnegie Mellon came out and did an autopsy. The government got very upset with her use of the word "autopsy." Autopsy is very specific. They said they looked at the body, but they didn't do an autopsy. She was railroaded out of that country; I think she was sent by one of the news agencies to India to get her

out of the country. That may not have been necessary, but that was what happened.

In any event, the government claimed that he must've gone up to the roof of, I think it was the library at Taiwan National University, and jumped; committed suicide. Someone said, if he jumped and committed suicide, why were there no head injuries? Because if you fall, the heaviest part of your body is your head. You're bound to have head injuries. He had no head injuries; his injuries were all on his body. The briefing officer for the garrison command or the police or whoever gave it - and this was recorded in the paper and caused a lot of laughs - said, "The reason he had no head injuries is because he fell on his "peigu," now his "peigu" is his bottom. The idea of committing suicide and somehow arranging to fall on your rear-end is ludicrous. So most people think he was done in by the government. No proof, of course.

*Q: Besides the Mellon people that came, did that draw any extra press attention?*

DONNELLY: Oh, sure, sure, a lot of press attention.

*Q: So here again, suddenly you're handling the press.*

DONNELLY: Well, I'm handling the press, but the story is theirs and I can't get up and give a press conference and say what I believe. I just facilitate whatever; if the reporters come and say they want to talk to a political officer or something, that's one of the things a press officer does. A press officer will set up interviews with embassy people.

Another duty of the press officer, depending upon the embassy and depending upon the ambassador, is to be the press spokesman. In Taiwan they wanted me to be the press spokesman because they didn't want newsmen going to each individual officer and picking their brains and tricking them into saying things. So anybody that wanted to see a political officer or an economic officer, any American newsman or any newsman would come to me and make an appointment and I'd make that appointment and the people would be prepared. If there was any embassy statement to be made, the ambassador would have me make the statement. Now the statement might be written by somebody else, but I would make it. That's the way they control the output to the press and eliminate flaps.

*Q: Now you're the PAO before the break in relations and so after. How would you compare Ambassador Unger with Chuck Cross as managers... or were their jobs so different?*

DONNELLY: I don't think their jobs are so different; Chuck Cross' job may have actually been a little more difficult, but Unger had a difficult job because he sort of knew that things were winding down and he had to almost prevent a flap. I don't believe he did, but if you know that your country is going to derecognize the country where you're accredited to, it must put a great deal of psychological pressure on you and everything you say and everything you do. So Unger had a tough job. Unger was a little stuffy, I think. He'd been an ambassador several times and I think...

*Q: I think he was my ambassador in Bangkok, but he wasn't a China officer if I recall.*

DONNELLY: Oh, no, he didn't speak Chinese. Is that harsh to call him a little stuffy?

*Q: No.*

DONNELLY: I would call Ambassador Unger "Mr. Ambassador" or something like that. Chuck Cross, I called Chuck. I was closer to him. Actually we played golf every Saturday morning and he and I were partners. We played two others, Bob Clark who was the former PAO and had retired in Taiwan, and a guy by the name of Larry something or other who was former CIA – if there's such a thing as "former" CIA, I don't know. Anyway, he was there as a civilian. My relations with Cross were different. Cross is sort of a feisty kind of a guy, but you know, a nice guy.

*Q: Did you have any formal relationships with the other missions in town; the Japanese?*

DONNELLY: No, I didn't with any of them. When I was in Kaohsiung, of course, the only other diplomatic mission in Kaohsiung was the Japanese consul there and we saw each other a lot, but that's because I was the only American in Kaohsiung. In Taipei, no, I didn't.

I had a lot of contact with foreign scholars, mainly because of my interest in Chinese temples and Chinese religion. So I got to know a lot of Germans who did research in that area.

*Q: Why would the Germans be researching?*

DONNELLY: I think I mentioned before about this Dutch scholar in Tainan, Rick Schipper. Did I mention him?

*Q: No, I don't think so.*

DONNELLY: Well, he was a Dutch scholar who came to Taiwan to do research in Chinese religion and then actually became a Taoist priest.

*Q: Oh, yes. Yes, you did mention that.*

DONNELLY: So he's one and then a lot of other Europeans are very interested in some of the culture of any country and some of them are interested in Chinese culture. The best place to do research in those days on Chinese culture was Taiwan, for two reasons; one, you couldn't do it in China, and two, the Chinese had repressed the popular religion, which is what these scholars were interested in. Of course popular religion in China now has come back in a big way, but in those days, no. So sort of a repository of popular religious culture would be Taiwan. There were 8,000 temples. There were Buddhists, Taoists, Confucius – Confucianism is not exactly a religion, but like a religion. And there was what you might call folk religion and a lot of other things. And there was a lot of material there. I was very interested in that and collected a great deal of Chinese religious artifacts. I collected two very old scrolls of hell which were hung by a Taoist priest. Have you seen them?

*Q: Yes, I have; they're very explicit as to what hell looks like.*

DONNELLY: I have a collection of over two hundred wooden temple statues. I collected two of these sets of scrolls. One is according to an academic who studies these, over two hundred years old, which makes it probably one of the oldest in the world because these were not art; they were not considered art. There was no reason to save them; they were visual aids at funerals. On them you have the tortures for hell and then you have the caption alongside the torture telling you what it's for.

*Q: Oh, if you do this, this is your punishment?*

DONNELLY: So it seemed to me that this was a very interesting thing and it told what was naughty and nice at least in one area. The scrolls are fairly similar, one to the other, but as they're copied mistakes are made and then the mistakes are... In any event, I gave mine to the Smithsonian and they had an exhibit here in Washington for six months and then they sent it to several cities in America including Honolulu, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. In addition to that, I took all of the captions, there were five hundred captions in all, and translated them and then wrote a book about them. That accompanied the exhibit.

*Q: It sounds like an assignment in Taiwan then offers a number of intellectually satisfying...*

DONNELLY: I'm not sure what it did for my career, but I certainly enjoyed every minute of it.

*Q: Being the PAO, you would have had an opportunity to interact fairly frequently with two major newspaper guys, Wang T'i-wu...*

DONNELLY: Wang T'i-wu and Yu Chi-chung.

*Q: Yu Chi-chung. What are their careers? How did they become heads of these two newspapers?*

DONNELLY: Well, I'm pretty sure Wang T'i-wu was a military man and Yu Chi-chung was something of a scholar, certainly a political type. The papers started very modestly when the Taiwanese came to Taiwan in the late '40s. I guess probably by dint of their political connections with the government they grew until now or at least when I left, each one claimed a million in circulation and maybe more. I don't know.

Wang T'i-wu was sort of a hardnosed anti-communist and sort of built like a Jesse Ventura with hair. Yu Chi-chung has a gentler look to him; he is more scholarly-looking, and I think a more balanced type. I think he's a decent man.

*Q: And the third paper on the island was Tzu Li Wan Pao?*

DONNELLY: Tzu Li Wan Pao was not the third largest by any means. Tzu Li Wan Pao was more independent in its outlook, but again it had to be very careful; it could only go so far. The rest of the papers were more or less political or non-political. There was a paper for the China youth and there was even a paper for students which would print in Chinese and alongside the Chinese would have the National Phonetic alphabet for the students. If they didn't know the

word, they could pronounce it.

*Q: One of the things that was unique about the Taipei printing situation was these magazines that particularly the political opposition would use to get their message out because they couldn't control a newspaper. If I understand, there were newsprint rules and the Kuomintang control mechanism was such that you couldn't get control of the newspapers, so the political opposition had these magazines.*

DONNELLY: That's true, but in the early days when I was there, there were no opposition magazines. The first one of any stature was Mei Li Tao. That was squashed. Then there were people like Antonio Chang who had started magazines with K'ang Ning-hsiang that tested the waters, pushing the envelope until today it's wide open.

*Q: You know Antonio fairly well. What did his career look like? What did you understand of his experiences?*

DONNELLY: Well he started working with K'ang Ning-hsiang. He's sort of a very balanced guy, I think, but very Taiwanese. His wife is a mainlander, I believe, so he's not wild. His background is totally newspaper and press, and then of course he had his own newspaper and now he has a government job. He now has the equivalent in the Taiwan government of Condoleezza Rice (National Security Adviser). I don't know the Chinese term, but he's the deputy national security adviser.

*Q: Antonio Chang?*

DONNELLY: Antonio Chang, yes.

*Q: Because I knew him...*

DONNELLY: He laughs over all the trouble he had. I asked him if he'd been in China and he said, "Yes," and I guess during Tiananmen he was there and I think he was arrested. He laughed and he said, "Oh, their jails are not nearly as efficient as our jails."

He was here recently.

*Q: Oh, was he?*

DONNELLY: But he is now in government.

*Q: Well, now there's an interesting symbol of the changes that Taiwan has undergone politically, because in the '80s when I knew Chang and K'ang Ning-hsiang, they were on the outside; they were sweating every issue they put out, they were very aware of where the rules were and how close they could get to the envelope.*

DONNELLY: Taiwan is blessed with a lot of very, very intelligent opposition people; they're not wild radicals.

One of the things USIS does really well is libraries. We had within USIA in Washington a bunch of officers who wanted to do away with libraries; make them media centers and just let certain people at it. You know, get rid of a lot of books. But libraries are magnets and they draw the intellectuals. K'ang Ning-hsiang would come to the USIS library often and what he'd do, he would go and read the Congressional Record because we had copies of the congressional record. Anything that was ever said about Taiwan in Congress, he knew. He did his homework well. A lot of people would come to the library and get all this sort of information and so they were really one step ahead of the government on a lot of the issues.

*Q: Just through the simple availability of a USIA library?*

DONNELLY: Now maybe, I guess all of this is on the Internet so maybe it doesn't make any difference anymore. I don't know, but in those days it did.

I attended a cultural conference in Penang one time. John Reinhardt was the head of USIA and cultural officers from the USIS cultural offices from all over Asia came. We had a session on libraries and some people got up and argued that really libraries were expensive and took up room, and we ought to do away with them because we could do things better without them. I got up and challenged that because I think the libraries are the best thing we do and I made the point which I think is valid, that if we had a USIS library in Changsha, China in 1920, Mao Zedong would've been in that library every day. I'm sure of that. I think just the availability, it's a magnet, it's passive, but like a magnet it draws.

*Q: I think you've put your finger on an important point. The Americans are can-do; get out there and whatnot, and the library is passive. It doesn't solve the American psychological need for action.*

DONNELLY: Freedom now.

*Q: Freedom now, right.*

DONNELLY: We had one guy named Carter, Allen Carter, who had some position that he was able to get his feelings known, and his idea was that each USIS officer should know twenty-five people and these twenty-five people we should cultivate and we should decide what books they should read and, whether they ask for it or not, send them the book anyway. This is nonsense stuff, but it's so nonsensical that it was current for a lot of USIS. Maybe that's why there is no longer a USIS, I don't know. *(laughs)* In any embassy, as you well know, the people who knew the situation best, the people who knew the most local people, were political officers and USIS officers.

*Q: Yes, definitely.*

DONNELLY: That was because, I think, the U.S. officers had the freedom to move around and had the mandate to know something about the culture.

*Q: And they also had the language. I mean, we had the language and that simply frees you up and you can move around in whatever environment you're in.*

*Is there anything else we need to touch bases on about Taiwan?*

DONNELLY: I haven't talked this much in ten years. *(laughs)*

**MICHAEL H. NEWLIN**  
**Senior Political Advisor, USUN**  
**New York City (1968-1972)**

*Ambassador Newlin was born in North Carolina and was raised there and in the Panama canal zone. After graduating from Harvard he joined the Foreign Service in 1952 and was posted to Frankfurt, Oslo, Paris, Kinshasa and Jerusalem, where served as Consul General. During his distinguished career, Ambassador Newlin served in several high level positions dealing with the United Nations and its agencies and NATO. He served as Ambassador to Algeria from 1981 to 1985 and as US representative to the United Nations Agencies in Vienna., 1988-1991. Ambassador Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006.*

*Q: How did you view your, what was the UN particularly concerned with at that time, during those years, or were there various issues that you found yourself...*

NEWLIN: We had quite a wide range of political issues that I worked directly with George Bush on.

*Q: Mike, you are going to read an excerpt from your efficiency report explaining what your job was.*

NEWLIN: The counselor for political and security affairs is the principal officer in the UN mission below ambassadorial rank, responsible for the achievement of U.S. political objectives in the United Nations. As this position is presently constituted, the incumbent performs dual functions. Either of which could be a full time assignment. The incumbent's primary role is principal political advisor on both substance and tactics to the chief of mission and his two ambassadorial level deputies. Less visible but of near equal importance are his executive responsibilities as head of the political section consisting of 12 officers and 6 secretaries. In the first role the incumbent must keep abreast of a world wide range of political issues either before or apt to come before the UN. He must prepare or supervise the preparation of briefing papers for meetings between the chief of mission and permanent representatives of 131 other countries, the Secretary General of the UN and other important officials often at the foreign minister level. Normally he participates in such meetings and prepares reporting telegrams, or supervises a member of the political section doing so. The incumbent has overall responsibility for staff work in UN political bodies, the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the two political committees, the Trusteeship Council and the Committee on De Colonization and non self

governing territories.

I wound up being George Bush's chief political officer from the State Department. We worked closely on a daily basis. The issues that we faced were many and numerous. Among them of course, was the second India-Pakistan war. But before that there was the great issue of Chinese representation. When I got there, that was beginning to heat up. We for years and years ever since Chiang Kai-shek was defeated and left for Taiwan, we supported the Nationalist Chinese, even though they were not on the mainland of China. Then just before the issue came to a head in the UN, we adopted what amounted to in effect a sort of a modified two China policy. We wanted to keep our options open to eventually establish relations with the People's Republic of China. We said that we had a one China policy. We said that we recognize that China was one entity, but that there was a special situation with regard to Taiwan, and we thought that even though China should represent the Chinese people in the UN, there ought to be representation for Taiwan as well. The ultimate status of Taiwan should be decided through negotiations. We engaged in a massive worldwide diplomatic campaign for our new policy. The problem was that Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalists didn't support the new policy. They weren't in favor of it. The Soviets at that time did not want to have the PRC in the UN; their relations with Beijing were terrible. Even though that they didn't want to have the PRC in they couldn't very well campaign against them. So George bush was very active in meeting with supporters and getting reassurances that yes when the votes came they were with us. The lineup was complicated. The UK and Canada recognized the PRC. Japan supported us strongly and also mounted a worldwide diplomatic campaign. The nonaligned were aligned against us. We had a wonderful officer in the political section who was a marvelous vote analyzer. On paper, we had a majority of commitments but some of the were soft. Her bottom estimate was that we would lose.

It was about maybe a week before all of this was coming up in the General Assembly and George Bush summoned me to come up, just the two of us. He said, "Mike, I am going to tell you something in the strictest confidence that you are not to tell anyone." He said, "Kissinger is going to Beijing to meet with the Chinese." This was just before the vote. I said, "Well, we are going to lose, but nobody can blame you that we are going to lose." He said, "No I don't believe that at all. We have got firm commitments for a majority, many at the chief of state level. I then went over the opinion of our vote counter whom Bush knew was usually accurate. So then I put together a telegram, a top secret NODIS telegram to the Department that said this is coming up to a vote in a few days. Here are the numbers of states that have said yes they will vote yes. Here are those that are going to abstain. Here are those voting no. We think that when push comes to shove, that we are going to lose and here is our guess as to the final vote. So I took it over to the Waldorf Towers to show George. He said, "I don't like this at all." I said, "Well I think you ought to at least tell the brass in Washington this is our best guess so that it won't come as a shock to them if it turns out to be accurate. Hopefully people will do what they say they are going to do, but we don't know." So he reluctantly agreed to sent it. So then Rogers, the Secretary of State wanted to send his aide, Dick Pedersen who used to have the job that I had, up to reinforce us. George was wonderful about it. He called me in and said, "Washington wants to send Dick Pedersen up here, Mike, for the Chinese vote." I said, "He is welcome. By all means let then send Pedersen and anybody else they want to come up here." So Dick came up. In the midst of this really historic meeting in the General Assembly which dragged on into the night. George was summoned to the telephone to get a call from Kissinger in Beijing. He never told me

what went on but I think it wasn't a very pleasant thing. Kissinger was obviously very nervous about how things were going to turn out. Sure enough we did lose. We went through a period...

*Q: Had the Kissinger visit been announced at that time?*

NEWLIN: Oh yes. It had been announced.

*Q: So everybody was drawing the conclusions that the game is over.*

NEWLIN: Yes. Why should we ruin our future relations with China when Kissinger is meeting Mao? That is how it came out. We had to go down to Washington, went down to Washington with George. We met with Scali and the media and briefed them as to what had actually happened. Long standing allies, the Netherlands, Belgium, Tunisia joined the stampede.

So then the Chinese did arrive. The Chinese ambassador in Ottawa was told to pack up and come to New York and assume his duties there. I don't think the Chinese were really expecting it. I will tell you another very interesting thing that happened. All of this was going on and we were lobbying the quarters. I went over and tried to persuade the Dutch to stand with us and the Tunisians that had promised. They were hell bent to vote for Beijing. The Albanians were the sponsors of the resolution that replaced the Nationalist Chinese with the PRC. So during the meeting it looked like and we were lobbying so much that it looked like that we were going to prevail again in defeating the Albanian resolution. So the Albanian representative got up and started towards the podium. The Pakistani permanent representative Aga Shahi said, "Where are you going?" The Albanian said, "Well I am going up to the podium. I am withdrawing my resolution." Shahi said, "Why are you doing that?" "I am afraid we are going to lose." "You are crazy; the Americans are losing. Don't do that."

*Q: Tell me, Mike, Before you heard about Kissinger going to China which obviously pulled the rug out from everything.*

NEWLIN: It changed everything.

*Q: But before you heard about that, was there sort of the feeling OK we are fighting this battle, and we fought this battle year after year after year to keep the PRC out of the UN. Was there the feeling that OK we are doing this one more year, but this is really a losing battle to go on with?*

NEWLIN: Well, Nixon's overture took everyone by surprise. His entire career had been built on strong anti-communism. We assumed that we would again prevail with the support of anti-communist members. Things got off on the wrong foot that night from the beginning. The roll call is decided by lot. You pick out a country name to begin and then proceed alphabetically and the first member to vote that night was Canada. So the Canadians voted against our position. Of course the UK were against our position as well. So this was a losing proposition.

I think they were probably surprised they won. They came in and we couldn't have any official contact with them, but there was a political officer, Harry Thayer in the political section who spoke Chinese, so he was the one that went with the customs and immigration people to assist

the Chinese delegation when they arrived. Then George Bush wanted very much to meet the Chinese permanent representative. So I said, "OK, we will arrange that." So I found out when Kwong Hua was going to call on the president of the General Assembly. His office was right behind the podium of the General Assembly so I arranged for George Bush to appear to be making a telephone call on the telephone right outside the door. So when Kwong Hua came out, I said, "Mr. Ambassador, I would like you to meet Ambassador Bush of the United States." They shook hands. That was George Bush's first official contact. Of course they were in the Security Council. It was a pretty dicey thing. At one stage there was a debate, I guess this must have been in the context of the second India-Pakistan war. Of course the Soviet...

*Q: It was sort of the Bangladesh war.*

NEWLIN: The Bangladesh war, that's right.. And of course the Soviets were supporting India. The Chinese were strongly supporting Pakistan. George Bush got a call from the Department instructing him to call U Thant, the Secretary General and urge U Thant to call for an immediate cease fire between the two. So he did get U Thant on the line, and U Thant was very dubious that this was something he ought to do. I broke in and said, "People are dying. This is something that the UN should do." He said no, that he really didn't think the situation was one that he could take this initiative. So we reported that back to Washington. Then we got word of a telegram from Islamabad saying that the U.S. could call for a cease fire. The State Department shot back and said, "Do you formally request the United States to call for a cease fire?" Then the answer came back,. "Yes. We formally ask the United States." So then we issued the call for a cease fire. It came into being. Then we had a Security Council meeting the next day to bless the outcome of the war and say that Bangladesh was independent. Bhutto, by that time was president. It was very interesting. I went with George over to the hotel to meet with Bhutto. He was an interesting character because he had been very anti American.

*Q: Oh he was?*

NEWLIN: Yes. But he was very smooth and everything. Then in the Security Council meeting the next day, he denounced the resolution that provided for Bangladeshi independence and for the cease fire and the negotiations. He ripped up the resolution and threw it into the Security Council well. He had had many harsh things to say about India and about a lot of people. Then Bhutto got up and walked out of the Security Council. Then later in the afternoon I saw him walking in the hall outside arm and arm with the foreign minister of India.

**WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN**  
**Director, East Asia and Pacific, INR**  
**Washington, DC (1969-1971)**

*Ambassador Gleysteen was born in China of Missionary parents. Educated at Yale and Harvard Universities, he entered the Foreign Service in 1951. After service in the State Department's Executive Secretariat, Mr. Gleysteen studied Chinese and was subsequently posted to Taipei, Hong Kong, and to Seoul, Korea,*

*where he served as Ambassador from 1978 to 1981. He also served in Washington with the National Security Council and in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. The Ambassador was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1997.*

GLEYSTEEEN: As far as the seventh floor was concerned, we didn't get tasked very much by the secretary or his principals, leaving us room to choose subjects that we thought would be of interest. I focused mostly on China and Vietnam. In the case of China, I hoped our analysis of China's international behavior and domestic developments, particularly shifts in the Chinese leadership, might have some impact on our policy vis-a-vis the PRC. Nick Platt, who had worked with me in Hong Kong, was very good at extracting essential information for our clients. In the case of Vietnam, we tried hard to convey objectivity, often struggling against the tendency of Defense, CIA, Embassy Saigon, and our own Ray Cline to justify our policy in the face of doubtful data.

By the time I got to IO and then INR, I had an opinion on many of the hot issues. It is very hard for an analyst to be completely objective when his or her mind is bent in a certain direction. Although, as I have said, we did our very best to be objective in our written assessments, I felt far freer to be opinionated in oral comments. For example, I was a longstanding proponent of formal relations between the US and the PRC, and in my IO days I sometimes pushed this view to the annoyance of my superiors - who to their credit never censored me.

When Nixon came in, I was concerned that we were about to go backwards; having overlooked his famous 1967 article in *Foreign Affairs*, I viewed him too simply as a strong anti-communist who would never deal with the PRC. Of course, we had no inkling of Nixon's and Kissinger's machinations. NSMs kept coming from the White House; studies were tasked and recommendations options prepared - in part to throw the bureaucracy off the track. Because we feared a conservative backlash from Nixon, we were pretty timid in the recommendations of these papers. But we did manage to get some good ideas into the analysis and we hoped we could at least work on the assistant secretaries - and by influencing them perhaps influencing the policy makers on the seventh floor.

I lobbied quite vigorously with Marshall on the question of PRC recognition. I made clear that normalization with the PRC should take place without undermining Taiwan, because we had a responsibility for its security as part of our long-range strategy in Asia. Marshall heard me out with great sympathy. Both of us thought we were doing our duty, and we were both completely unaware of goings on in the White House. Marshall and the whole Department were cut out of Nixon's and Kissinger's secret maneuvers on China. Nixon and Kissinger took the boldest steps of all options; our timidity must have amused them. I didn't learn about any of this until I after I had left INR and arrived at my next assignment in Taipei in 1971.

Although this central policy issue was always on my mind, most of our China efforts were devoted to such matters as Chinese policy toward Indochina, Sino-Soviet relations that had ratcheted dangerously towards war, and obscure but important leadership developments during the latter phases of the Cultural Revolution. Even if it was hard to document, change was in the air. The Soviets began a massive buildup of forces on the Chinese border, and the Chinese

responded with a considerable buildup of their own forces, including construction of huge fortress-like structures that were fascinating to our intelligence community. In this tense atmosphere the Soviets tried to inveigle us into colluding with a nuclear threat to China. Out of the same fear, the Chinese were being more responsive in their talks with us in Warsaw, through "ping pong diplomacy" - and, completely unbeknownst to us, in their dealings with Nixon and Kissinger.

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I also mentioned Korea as a special interest. I wanted us to examine the changing relationships between the PRC, the Soviet Union, the US, and Japan. We could see the shifts in PRC views towards us - even before the Kissinger visit to Beijing. I wondered whether these shifts in the regional equilibrium might have an influence on the Korean Peninsula, particularly the North. I kept prodding our analysts to be on the lookout. I assumed that the changing relationships in the communist world might have a beneficial impact on the Korean Peninsula, and I hoped that any shifts might allow the North to seek better relations with the South. Some contacts eventually took place with North-South Korean talks in 1972 after Nixon's visit to China. But in the late 1960s and beginning of the 70s I must say that we kept looking in vain. All we heard on both sides of the DMZ was a hard line.

**MORTON I. ABRAMOWITZ**  
**Special Assistant to Undersecretary of State**  
**Washington, DC (1969-1971)**

**Bureau of Intelligence & Research, East Asia Division**  
**Washington, DC (1972)**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Inter-American Affairs**  
**Department of Defense (1974-1978)**

*Ambassador Abramowitz was born in New Jersey and educated at Stanford and Harvard Universities. He entered the Foreign Service in 1960 after service in the US Army. A specialist in East Asian and Political/Military Affairs, the Ambassador held a number of senior positions in the Department of State and Department of Defense. He served as Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research and as US Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981) and Turkey (1989-1991). He also served in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Vienna. Ambassador Abramowitz was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 2007.*

*Q: In your role of special assistant, were you involved in deciding what issues were to be referred to the undersecretary?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Richardson became sort of the super-manager of the Department. Secretary Rogers was quite laid back – some even said “lazy”. That left a vast amount of territory for

Richardson to cover. Most issues ended up on his desk both because of Rogers' management style and his "Henry" problem. Richardson and Henry Kissinger had developed a close relationship, although it turned out that the relationship was not quite as close as Richardson had viewed it. Richardson was very active in generating consideration of issues and got to know a good bit of the working level of the Department.

He became involved in almost every issue. Alexis Johnson, the deputy undersecretary for political affairs, handled most of the day-to-day issues that needed Seventh Floor attention, although Richardson was at least briefed on those as well and was in constant touch with Johnson's assistants. As chairman of the under secretaries committee – part of the NSC system – Richardson was involved in inter-agency matters related to implementation of policy decisions reached by the NSC. In this regard, the one committee action that received most attention were the first steps which eventually led to the establishment of U.S.-Sino relations. I am referring here to the removal of restrictions on American foreign subsidiaries including with China and other actions of that nature. I remember this effort particularly because I drafted the memorandum which eventually went to the president for his approval of these confidence building measures on China. It was just by accident that we were moving in the same direction as the White House in changing China Policy, although, as far as I know, no one in the Department had any idea what Nixon and Kissinger were up to.

Richardson was also responsible for the Department's nominations to the White House for presidential appointments. He interviewed every one of the Department's final recommendations particularly the non-career, many of who were not known to him. A number of candidates who had deep pockets were seeking a presidential appointment after having made sizeable contributions to the Nixon campaign. Richardson examined them very carefully to make sure that they would not at least embarrass the administration in their new positions. He also played an important role in moving some career officers up the ladder.

Richardson got heavily involved in major issues such as Vietnam (of course, everyone was involved in Vietnam). He even hired a special assistant whose sole role was to follow Vietnam developments. That was Charlie Cook, whom Jonathan Moore had found in the Pentagon. That was a full-time job which assured Richardson of being current on fast moving developments.

One of the more effective channels in the government to get things done as well as to smooth ruffled feathers was Richardson's relationship with Kissinger. If there were any problems between the Department and the NSC or if some action needed to be taken quickly by one of those organizations, Richardson would invariably take it up with Kissinger and vice versa. From my vantage point, I never saw Rogers as a very effective Secretary of State – either as a policy developer or a manager. He was, however, a good judge of the American public and its receptivity to American foreign policy initiatives. He was an excellent advisor on how to get public approval, but in the policy development field – either as a creator, implementer, or defender – he was just not in same league as Kissinger. That became a real impediment to a good Kissinger-Rogers relationship, because it put Rogers in a second echelon which created resentment and anger on his part. Rogers was very much concerned about his personal status and his stature in the public's eye. I think you have probably discerned by now that I did not hold him in high regard, although I want to repeat and stress that Rogers had a better feel for the

public's mood and views and how to handle issues publicly than probably anyone else in the government's national security apparatus.

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*Q: So at some stage, Paul Popple called you. Had you known him before?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Only slightly. But he knew my background and had read my writings on China and Korea, and was acquainted with my views and style. I was certainly ready to get out of the IG. Paul was a very fine man; and I liked him a lot. He was a man of great probity, not reluctant to give his opinion even if it didn't fit the "prevailing winds." I also liked that he mostly let me run the division, that is to direct the research efforts of INR's East Asia division. I should note this was my first "managerial" job.

The director of INR was George Denny, who at the time was actually "acting" director. INR at the time had six or seven divisions in it – mostly mirroring the regional bureaus' organization. We had a China office, a Japan office, a south-east Asia office, etc. This was my first opportunity to become better acquainted with south-east Asia; I had focused previously on north-east Asia (China, Korea, Taiwan) although some of my analytical work in Hong Kong on PRC's foreign policy brought me into contact with issues in other Asian countries.

This new job was a learning experience. I briefed Marshall Green, the East Asia assistant secretary, on a daily basis. I got to know him even better and we had a very good substantive relationship. He always asked for my thoughts on major issues – not policy recommendations, but my thoughts on the significance of the intelligence. I also got to know the bureau staff well; and worked closely with them.

The assignment worked out well. I got managerial experience. My understanding of East Asia grew exponentially and lastly, I became well acquainted with both the leadership and the staff of the East Asia bureau as well as those in other agencies working on East Asia. Broadly speaking, our – INR's – responsibility was to provide good analysis of major events and trends in East Asia and to estimate the potential eventual impact of these events and trends on U.S. policy in the region. We were not an intelligence gathering agency; we were the recipient of intelligence gathered by other parts of the U.S. government; our people tried to "connect the dots", as it is described today, based on the information received as well as their own knowledge of the area and its history. The mix of Foreign Service and senior Civil Service officers provided a unique set of skills which was not available to other agencies. My view of that was further reinforced when I became assistant secretary of INR several years later. The mixture of the field experience of a Foreign Service officer combined with the long term attention that a Civil Servant had devoted to a particular subject made for a formidable analytical team. This mixture of skills and knowledge provided a useful support to the policy maker.

We were able to respond in crisis situations with instant analyses – briefings, short papers, longer term analysis, etc. – since we were almost always up-to-date on events and currents in the part of the world for which we were responsible. We provided daily both information analysis which we felt would be useful to policy makers; many of the Foreign Service officers had been in policy

making positions and the Civil Service officers had been close enough to that process for long periods so that they had an understanding of the needs of senior officials. My period in INR-EA was another useful learning experience which came in quite handy when I became the Assistant Secretary.

I am not a dispassionate observer of the policy making process for the East Asia area. I believed then and do so today that INR-EA could usefully contribute to policy making. There is the mantra of the purists who insist that a sharp line should be drawn between intelligence estimates and policy making. This has always been a problem which became much more acute for me when I was INR assistant secretary. In contrast to my INR-EA period, by the time I became assistant secretary, I had long been involved in policy making and that made the maintenance of this “Holy Grail” of separation much more difficult to maintain. While working in EA/INR, I was still in the early stages of my career and although my work in the undersecretary’s office obviously brought me into contact with policy making at the highest level, I had not yet begun that part of my career and therefore trying to maintain some separation between intelligence analysis and policy making – artificial as it might seem – was not a major challenge. I wasn’t shaping our EA policy; I was trying to support those responsible for policy making. I must say that despite some outside skepticism, I always found INR tried to maintain the distinction scrupulously.

That assignment also brought me into Vietnam, an area which had never been at the top of my agenda. No one had ever asked me to get involved either in Washington or in Vietnam itself. I was seen primarily as a “China expert”.

I should mention at this stage the INR relationship with other agencies. I had had some experience with the CIA in Hong Kong and Taiwan. But the INR job required broader exposure to the total intelligence community – CIA, NSA and DIA especially. We had to work together to produce “community products.” (NIEs, for example which at the time were viewed with a reverence that they probably did not deserve.) We spent a lot of time working on those documents. I found this experience “eye opening.” I began to understand the collection capabilities of other agencies. I also began to understand some of the institutional biases which all bureaucracies have. My main focus was on intelligence analysis; I did not for example have a need to know much about covert actions. I can’t remember if I ever had any contacts with the Deputy Director for Operations in the CIA. But in my first real exposure to the totality of the intelligence collection apparatus of the USG, I was fairly impressed by the magnitude of our efforts.

*Q: Let’s talk about some specific issues. What work did INR do on Vietnam?*

ABRAMOWITZ: I began in INR/EA just as the negotiations on a peace agreement in Vietnam were beginning. Our work was mostly concentrated on events on the ground – i.e., the fighting, its political significance, the impact on the government in Saigon, etc. We also focused on what North Vietnamese intentions seemed to be and what they would likely do. We were quite comprehensive in our scope of work. These analyses were also forwarded to our negotiating team. I remember that after one major military engagement, we wrote a paper entitled “Have we turned the corner?” I would describe our efforts as a continual watch of and interpretation of

events unfolding in Vietnam – both north and south. The Paris talks were on-going and we tried to provide our negotiators with information and analysis we thought would be useful in their work.

We knew nothing of Kissinger's dealings with China before the general election. We were surprised by the visit, as was most of the country. But even before and certainly after the trip, we were writing papers for Secretary Rogers and Marshall Green, who were part of Nixon's delegation. We, of course, spent a lot of time on Sino-American relations, the subject of a small book that I mentioned earlier. The subject was of great interest to me which may have also contributed to the amount of time we spent on it.

I was deeply impressed by Kissinger's initiative. It was a real achievement. I would call it "A Great Leap Forward" – to use a familiar Chinese phrase. I had always been on the side of those who wanted to change our China policy. The first step in making a change occurred while working for Elliot Richardson. We allowed American subsidiaries abroad to do business with the PRC. I was surprised by the giant step that the Nixon administration took. I as well as many others saw the potential benefit of our change in China policy as a step toward resolving the Vietnam conflict changing the Soviet orientation. So the initiative was deeply relevant to our country's most vexing foreign policy problems at the time.

At this point it might be useful to quote again from the paper I delivered at Harvard in 2006. It summarizes my views on Sino-American relations over the years including in the Foreign Service and repeats some of the previous discussion. "China was very much part of my various jobs. During my graduate days in Cambridge professors and students including me sneered at Professor Dixie Walker's perverse views of China communism during its early rule. Walker supposedly had gone way overboard in his criticism of communist rule in his book China Under Communism: The First Five Years. Well he was right on what was going on in China, and we at Harvard and most other universities were wrong. That came home in spades, except to the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, in the incredible human catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution."

"Cataclysmic events in China coupled with our extreme limited access and knowledge often prompted fierce interagency debates, almost always between the State Department and the CIA. The Great Leap Forward produced a huge argument over whether China would fall apart because of the severity of the food situation, "the downward spiral" as Joe Alsop called it in the China Quarterly. The outside community provided little insight on China's actual situation with the exception of the famous Father Ladany in Hong Kong. In the end the State Department was proved right in its more optimistic view of China's ability to get by the terrible shortages, although it lowballed the number of deaths. Parenthetically, such fights over ignorance have continued to this day about countries we are isolated from, including North Korea and most vividly, Iraq."

"China's potential for breakdown and our internal debate converged at other times. One interesting episode that I followed closely in Taiwan in 1962 was when the Nationalist government publicly started planning to "counterattack" the mainland and levying all sorts of taxes to support an invasion. A brief effort to rally U.S. support for the KMT was led by Defense

and the CIA, particularly the station chief in Taiwan, a Harvard PhD and former junior fellow – Ray Cline. The Kennedy administration told Chiang Kai-shek to forget about it. It was the last gasp of Chiang’s return to the mainland ideology. The excising of the myth contributed to greater openness on Taiwan.”

“Other interesting battles raged in Washington over a China we perceived dimly. One, similar to our problem today with Iran and with many of the same considerations, focused on what to do about China’s becoming a nuclear power as we watched it proceed to its first test in 1964. Significant pressure to attack China’s nuclear facilities were rebuffed by President Johnson. A second was the debate in 1964-65 over how China would respond to the vast build up of American forces in Vietnam and the bombing of the North” which I discussed previously.

“It was, of course, hard to evaluate in our deliberations the extent of China’s domestic turmoil and its impact on Chinese policy of those extraordinary two decades in China. The Cultural Revolution mostly produced shakings of heads in Washington.”

Back to my employment history. Richardson was appointed Secretary of Defense in mid-1973. I went to work for Defense in the fall. So I was in INR for about one year.

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ABRAMOWITZ: Our concern for the potential of communist encroachment in East Asia, gave me the opportunity in 1975 after Vietnam fell to convene a group to come up with a U.S. strategy for Asia in the post Vietnam era. Our major recommendation actually was to slowly improve our relationships with China including development of a military-to-military relationship. When the study was completed we briefed other agencies in Washington. I think it was well received. It was not a roadmap, but more of a strategy piece intended to begin creation of a framework for inter-agency discussions about what specific steps might be taken to improve our position in Asia. We needed to explore what more could be done to strengthen our relations with China, as part of our effort to contain the Soviet Union in Asia. In any case, our views were heard around town; I don’t know how much influence we had, but I think it gave some help to those pressing for an easing of tensions with the PRC.

It also widely felt that Sino-Soviet tensions might ease if the Chinese came to believe that we were not a reliable player in the region. This view carried over into the Carter administration where it was challenged by some members of that administration. In any case, much of my time in 1975 was devoted to trying to restore East Asian views of the United States as a reliable and dependable ally.

*Q: Let me now turn to the Philippines. What were the major issues you had to deal with as deputy assistant secretary (ISA) in DoD?*

ABRAMOWITZ: Early in the Carter administration, Secretary Vance called me over and said he wanted me to come back to the Department to become Dick Holbrooke’s deputy in EA. I said no. During that meeting he suggested that perhaps the time had come for us to withdraw from the Philippines – or at least to get out of Clark Air Base. At about this time, the national security

process had produced – or was about to produce – a couple of National Security Memoranda (NSIM), which were instructions to the bureaucracy to come with some answers to specific policy questions. One dealt with Korea; the second related to the possible elimination of our military bases at Clark and Subic in the Philippines.

The first one State had the lead, the second DoD. I was appointed as chairman of the inter-agency working group to draft the response to the Philippine NSIM. The principal issue was a strategic one, whether we should withdraw from our bases, long a basic part of our defense structure in the area. Unlike Korea, our posture in the Philippines was a decision the president had not made. We produced a paper which discussed the pros and cons; it was not, to the best of my recollection, a source for serious inter-agency dispute, unlike the Korean paper. It was a unanimous view that we should not withdraw from Subic naval base. Clark was a more debatable proposition with people holding differing views about the importance of that air base. My recollection is that the final draft suggested that the decision on Clark be postponed and then be reviewed again in a year or so. There was general agreement among the agencies that there were already enough action already underway that would reduce our presence in Asia, after our defeat in Vietnam, that this was not the right time to consider major reductions in our presence in the Philippines. I think that all agencies shared the concerns over Asian perceptions if we continued to reduce and reduce our presence in the area.

All of the administration's efforts also have to be viewed within the context of its desire to normalize relations with China. This was a difficult issue in light of all its wide impact. I personally favored the direction the administration was taking toward finally carrying out normalization. But I was also quite cognizant of the number of difficulties that such a policy would create. The administration's considerations culminated in Brzezinski's trip to Beijing in the summer of 1978 during which he told the Chinese that the U.S. had made the decision to normalize by the end of the year.

While China policy was moving ahead the USG was also focused on specific issues such as troop withdrawal and base closings. China policy of course raised the question of our relations with Taiwan which in fact had been under review since the Ford administration. We received a presidential directive to develop a withdrawal plan for our military presence on Taiwan, which ISA did. To further complicate our Asian situation, the State Department was negotiating with Vietnam to re-establish relations and they had gone very far. Given growing China-Vietnam animosity the White House did not want to rock the China boat. Holbrooke's negotiations with Vietnam ran into White House "buzz saw". The two efforts – normalization of our relations with China and the establishment of relations with Vietnam – became conflicting objectives as there was a bureaucratic battle. Vietnam lost out. The normalization of relations had to wait a long time with Vietnam.

This dilemma was not a problem for us in the Pentagon, but I closely followed developments. I supported the draw-down of our troops in Taiwan. I also supported the normalization of relations with Vietnam. DoD as an institution took no position on these policy issues.

I mention these various policy development strands to illustrate the dilemmas Carter – and Ford before him – faced in Asia before and after our withdrawal from Vietnam. I was in the Pentagon

for the first couple of years of the Ford administration and watched the strains close up. There was no question that Asia and our future there was very much on Carter's agenda. In the final analysis, it was our efforts to improve relations with China that was certain and will be most remembered by history.

As I suggested before, there was an informal network in Washington among people dealing with Asia. It consisted of a variety of offices in State, the NSC, and ISA. Holbrooke, Armacost, and I were in frequent contact. We had a high degree of intellectual camaraderie; we didn't necessarily always agree on every issue (e.g. troop withdrawal from Korea), but we had intense and valuable discussions on each issue. We worked together closely and were close personal friends. These colleagues understood my position and even if not agreeing with me, at least respected my views – unlike people like Stillwell who never took the time to try to understand or even be factually correct.

**WINSTON LORD**  
**National Security Council Staff**  
**Washington, DC (1969-1973)**

**Director, Policy Planning Staff**  
**Washington, DC (1973-1977)**

*Ambassador Lord was born and raised in New York City and earned degrees at Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961. After serving in Washington and Geneva, Mr. Lord was assigned to the Department of Defense before joining the National Security Council, where he was involved in China and Indonesia matters. He subsequently served on State's Policy Planning Staff. In 1985 Mr. Lord was named US Ambassador to China, where he served until 1989. From 1993 to 1997 the Ambassador held the position of Assistant Secretary of State dealing with Far Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Lord was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kenned in 1998.*

*Q: But Yale did have that Yale in China thing. I was wondering if there was any spill over there?*

LORD: Well, China was to become a very important part of my life, including my married life. I had no particular interest in Asia at that time. So consistent with the curriculum of most of the schools and colleges at the time, most of the history we took was either American history or European history.

I might add a quick note on my languages. I continued French at Yale, I dropped Latin and Greek. But the problem was that teaching at Hotchkiss, for that matter Buckley before, and at Yale the emphasis in those days was on reading and writing, not on speaking. I got to the point where I could read in French almost as well as English, but to this day I can't speak it very well and I have an incredibly bad accent. Of course, Latin and Greek was all reading and writing in

any event, not speaking. So as a practical help in my career, it was a real lacking here given the kind of approach they took. I could stumble through French, and get along, and I can still read it quite well but I never developed a good speaking habit, and I'm not particularly talented on spoken languages. I'm probably sort of in between. I did extremely well, I was usually first in my class in all these languages, but it was reading and writing, and not speaking.

*Q: What about history?*

LORD: History was, as I've said, essentially American history and European history. I don't recall taking Asian history, for example. And there's no question that there was a bias in our colleges and schools then.

You mentioned Yale in China. Before I forget, we'll get into this but in my senior year I suddenly thought I'd like to participate in Yale in China which was then in Hong Kong. By the time I focused on it I was too late for the application. I might well have gone and if I'd done that I would not have gone to graduate school and maybe would have missed my wife.

*Q: You better explain Yale in China.*

LORD: Yale in China was a program which still exists today in which, in those days, was essentially people going to Hong Kong studying Chinese. I guess it must have been Cantonese at the time, and studying things Chinese. Of course in those days we didn't have relations with China so they couldn't go into the mainland, so it was a little misnomer. Since the opening we've had Yale in China with teachers going into China and working in Chinese schools in various parts of China.

*Q: I think it was initially a missionary impulse, wasn't it?*

LORD: That's correct.

*Q: Then it moved into more academic...*

LORD: A couple more points on my parents. My mother had a very distinguished career but in those days, '30s, '40s, '50s, '60s, this is well before women's lib, she was under constant criticism because of her heavy public involvement and traveling, of being a poor mother, of neglecting her kids. I never felt this way. I'm sure my brother never felt this way. We thought she was a terrific mother, and we were proud of what she was doing. And my father was totally supportive, was not only content but proud to be known as the husband of Mary Lord. I've always joked by the way. I was always known as the son of Mary Lord, and just when I was coming into my own. I had a famous wife who was a best selling author, I became the husband of Bette Bao Lord. So one of these days I might make it on my own.

*Q: I'm afraid it's too late. I mentioned that I was interviewing you today and my daughter and her friend...I went to a party last night with them, and they said, it was all about your wife. Ambassador to China...*

LORD: You might tell them, if they're fans, her latest book, The Middle Heart, a novel which came out a year ago, is going to be a Hallmark Hall of Fame, a television production.

So from early on I had an appreciation of the equality of women, including in careers and how they should have a fairer chance. I also had a good feel for the way my father took this without any ego problems and was very supportive. My father wrote a very amusing book called Exit Backward Bowing which chronicles all the travels he took with my mother. It's by him with the advice and dissent of Mary Lord, and it came out sometime in the '70s I guess. One amusing thing in that is that my mother was always very diplomatic, didn't like confrontations, whereas my father was more straightforward. He didn't like Nehru of India whom he thought was hypocritical and more or less he didn't like the fact he always sort of leaned toward the Russians. But my mother knew his daughter, Mrs. Gandhi very well and didn't want to alienate her in the book. So my father said some nasty things about Nehru in one of the chapters. My mother said, "you've got to take that out." So my father resolved this by saying in the introduction, "I was going to write the following nasty things about Mr. Nehru but Mary said I couldn't do it so therefore I decided to take out the following paragraph", and he left the paragraph in.

*Q: Was there any questioning from whatever passed for the left at Yale at that time?*

LORD: A pretty conservative era. The lines were pretty clearly drawn in the Cold War so one was suspicious, not only of the Russians but of course of the Chinese. I held a rather traditional bipartisan Cold War view, that we were in a global struggle with the Soviet Union. I was a liberal Republican even then, and not an extremist in foreign policy even then. My whole career I've been rather centralist in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy. So I would not classify myself among the raging hawks at the time. But I'm sure looking back I believed in a strong defense and suspicion of the Soviets, and the need to maintain our alliances. The need to contain Communist China, etc.

*Q: You were at Fletcher when?*

LORD: The fall of 1959 to June 1960. If I had to pick out the happiest years of my life, this would be towards the top. First, I met my future wife there and I always joke that I first started becoming her friend because she took very good notes in economic classes, which she did by the way. So we began to get very close starting around December, then we graduated. Since we'd seen each other every day, we thought this is a little artificial so she went off to Hawaii to work - that's the furthest she could get away from me and still be in the United States. She was a Chinese citizen, born in Shanghai, didn't want to leave the country because she wasn't sure she could get back in on her passport so she went off to Hawaii. She actually left for Hawaii with \$50.00, a one-way ticket, no job, and no contacts but she was determined to show that she could work on her own, survive and also to test our relationship and within a week she became executive assistant to the head of the East-West Center which was just starting up. So that was one reason I had a happy year.

*Q: As you were dealing with the world at Fletcher, were there any particular areas where you began to focus? I mean, having a young lady you were very interested in China. Did that move you towards looking at the Far East?*

LORD: It certainly did, although again it's hard to quantify from a distance. Clearly I got more interested in Asia but I think like most of us Europe and the Soviet Union was the major focus, and I of course had been to Russia, and I had been to Asia so I had an interest in Asia as well. So those are the two continents that intrigued me more than Latin America or Africa. Indeed, in my career I became a generalist, and more recently more Asian-focused.

*Q: With your international group at Fletcher, did you find there was sort of a different view of our rather strong anti-view towards the Soviet Union and China?*

LORD: I don't recall specifically. I know we had a lot of debates, both with Americans about domestic politics, and with foreigners about international affairs. But I believe most of the students came from countries that were pretty much on our side during the Cold War. There were several Pakistanis, several Thai students, some Japanese, Latin Americans, only a couple Middle East students as I recall. So I think most of them were from countries that were allies - it doesn't mean they personally would necessarily subscribe to their government's position. I don't recall a great challenge over my anti-Soviet position. There might have been some individuals.

*Q: This is probably a good time, could you give me some background about your wife, because she became an important element later on when you...*

LORD: First on, one further point on the racial marriage. It never seemed to us like it was a big deal, it seemed natural to get married but again in 1963 interracial marriages, even though it was Asian not African-American, was considered unusual. I remember my old nurse who had helped raise me when I was very young, a conservative Scottish woman, was deeply upset that I would have an interracial marriage and tried to talk me out of it, and of course had absolutely no effect. But we never felt at the time or since it was ever a problem. It was always smooth. Of course, my parents were totally relaxed about it, as were the Baos, and the wedding was a happy event. It really was a terrific match. We never really felt any problems, and we never felt since then that we've ever suffered. Indeed we've felt it a source of strength, it enriched us both and, of course, exposed me to Chinese culture and language and food, and dealing with her parents and learning more about China through my wife.

*Q: She was about your age?*

LORD: She is one year younger, she was born November 3, 1938 in Shanghai. Her father was born on November 3rd, her grandfather was born on November 3rd. Her grandmother, her mother, and she were all born in the year of the Tiger, so there was a lot of symbolism. And in fact when she was born her grandfather told her mother that she had all the signs of a rich and happy life. Just the features and the timing, and everything was pointing towards a terrific life. And in fact she certainly would agree with that prognostication.

The Baos were moving around during the war. Bette was the first child of her parents who were married in 1937, and they left Shanghai. They were in various places, including Guilin, Hong Kong, and Chungking. Mr. Sandys Bao was an engineer and he himself was a remarkable person who was the debating champion of all of China. A great athlete, very intelligent and a great

engineer, and he was building or rebuilding factories and power plants in China. And they kept moving around to stay out of the hands of the Japanese, and there were times when they had to go into air-raid shelters, etc. My mother-in-law, Dora Bao, was a gorgeous woman and very strong and intelligent in her own right. So they moved around went into the interior of China. The next daughter named Cathy was born in Guilin, and third third sister, named SanSan, means number three, was born in Chungking.

When Bette was eight in 1946 her father was assigned to the United States as an export representative for the Nationalist government. He assumed the assignment was for six months or a year so he was only going to take his wife and Bette, who by then eight, could learn the language at that time and that would be useful for her, and leave the four year old sister Cathy and one year old sister SanSan behind. Cathy cried so much that they took her as well. He went ahead of his wife and daughters and then she and Bette and Cathy came over in 1946, in the fall. I don't remember the exact month. But they left SanSan behind, only one year old and she would get nothing out of it and they figured they were going back in six months or a year. So they left her with an aunt and uncle to take care of her until they went back.

He kept getting extended in his assignment, Mr. Bao did, and then the Communists gradually took over and they couldn't get SanSan out of China. To make a long story short, she spent the first 17 years of her life in China. Until she was about 16 she thought her aunt and uncle were her real parents. Her grandmother who thought she was dying at the time, she actually died a little bit later, decided to tell SanSan that her real parents were in America. When she heard that she wanted to be reunited, or at least to see her real parents. Her mother wrote a letter pretending that she was sick, and was going to be in Hong Kong for convalescence and could her daughter come out for two weeks to visit her and take care of her. Luckily in terms of timing the Communists for some reason, mostly because there was a terrible famine at that point as the result of this Great Leap Forward, were letting some refugees get out. To this day we don't know whether they believed that the daughter was only going to go out for two weeks and go back in, or whether they realized she was leaving. But she took a train to Hong Kong. My father-in-law was very nervous because many Chinese families had tried this, the kids would come out and they were so disoriented they'd turn around and go back in again and not join their real parents. Mrs. Bao was determined to take a chance, the girl came out, and they were reunited and they went to Taiwan temporarily and came to the United States and she has been ever since.

And that story of her being left behind, growing up in China and how she got out, and her experiences, was my wife's first book to become a best selling author. SanSan arrived just shortly before our wedding and was a bridesmaid at our wedding before she could speak any English. So she was there just in time for the wedding in May '63. I think she got out at the end of '62.

That book was called Eighth Moon. My wife had no intention of being an author. She was a chemistry major at Tufts University where she went. She had gone to a New Jersey high school before that. At Tufts she was a campus leader, and a good student, head cheer leader for four years, a modern dancer, and just one of the most popular people on campus. She started as a chemistry major but as she said she wasn't very good at it, she did this because she felt that all Chinese kids should grow up to be scientists like Madame Curie. So she thought she was going to be an "ist" as a scientist or biologist or chemist. But she kept blowing up the lab. The head of

the chemistry department told her that she could either stay in the chemistry department and flunk, or move on to another curriculum and pass. So she changed to international affairs and felt this was a matter of shame that as a Chinese Asian youngster she wasn't going to be an "ist". Luckily it turned out later in life she was an "ist", a novelist.

Anyway she took international affairs and then went to Fletcher and that's how we met up. So we met and got our master's degree together at Fletcher. We decided for reasons I've mentioned to separate and see how enduring our relationship was, having been in close quarters all this time. She went to Hawaii, as I've said, with \$50.00 and a one way ticket, no job and no contacts and within a few days was the top assistant to the acting director of the East-West Center, just as it was getting launched and helped him launch the whole East-West Center operations for about a year. Then she came back and worked for the Fulbright exchange program in Washington, joined a modern dance group, the Ethel Butler Group which was the outstanding modern dance group in the city.

Early in my career, in addition to writing Eighth Moon, she was basically dancing and teaching dance, being supportive of me but didn't have her own career per se. She did run a major, successful arts conference in the early 1970s while Nixon was President. She had no plans to write anymore, and didn't realize that writing wasn't always that easy. She took on the job of writing her sister's life because her sister didn't speak any English. My wife spoke Chinese. She had forgotten Chinese until she became a teenager and then she relearned it, and felt she was the only one both with a personal connection and the language who could tell her story. So she had her sister dictate her life, and then she turned it into a book. It did extremely well, almost was a best seller, sold probably - which was a lot of books in those times - something like 30 or 40,000 hardbacks, was a Reader's Digest condensed book and was translated in 15-20 languages.

Looking back on her first experience in the United States, however, this is relevant to another book she wrote, when she first came to the States, when her family came over it was to Brooklyn, and she arrived the same year that Jackie Robinson broke into the major baseball leagues. The Dodgers were her passion and Jackie Robinson was her hero.

*Q You might explain who Jackie Robinson was.*

LORD: Jackie Robinson was the first black American athlete to play in the major leagues, and he broke into the major leagues in 1947. My wife was living in Brooklyn, he was playing for the Dodgers. So she was for the Dodgers in general, and for Jackie Robinson in particular. She had a very enriching time adjusting culturally, and always felt that you could be enriched by two different cultures, and that becoming an American doesn't mean leaving your native culture behind. She has always felt that she has had the best of both Chinese and American culture and history, and she had some adjustments like any immigrant would. They arrived on a Sunday, her mother had her in school the next day, a Monday. They went in to see the head mistress and she asked what age she was to figure out what grade she should go into. In China you're one year old when you're born, and you're also another year old when you get to January 1. My wife was eight, but when asked this question she put up ten fingers, and was put in the fifth grade, and she didn't speak a word of English and was put in the fifth grade. But she had to adjust, so she went on and always graduated early, she got out of college by the time she was 20, and went on to

graduate school.

Anyway, her experiences were amusing and enriching, and she wrote a book for children called In the Year of the Boar and Jackie Robinson. It's symbolism in the title, its how you continue to be Chinese, but also become an American, and also how Jackie Robinson stands for the best of America, and how baseball symbolizes America where you're both an individual and a member of the team. This book has won all kinds of awards, it's a staple in classrooms around the country and has been extraordinarily popular.

The other books she has written, just quickly to go through this, It was of course dramatic and we'll get to this later, that I was with Kissinger on the first trip to China by any American official in 22 years. Kissinger kept going back in the succeeding years to advance relationships and on one of these trips, in 1973, my wife went back for the first time to China since she had left and saw many of her relatives, and visited her grandfather's grave, and was very moved by the whole experience, and came back deciding to write another book. The only book she had written at this point was Eighth Moon, which was published back in 1964. This was about nine years later.

She started writing about her relatives, and about China, but realized that if she published it that her relatives might get in trouble with the Communist regime. So she decided to make it a fictional account but realized that she had to go back into Chinese history somewhat, and went back into the end of the 19th century. Then began a novel which then really had no relationship to her actual relatives' experiences, just an inspiration, although many people who read the novel assumed it was a true story of her family history. So she wrote Spring Moon, and this was her first novel. It was an absolute phenomenon when it came out, spread by word-of-mouth. It got fantastic reviews. It was on the New York Times, Publishers Weekly and every other major best selling list for 31 weeks. It got as high as number two in the country in hardback, sold a couple hundred thousand copies, a lot in those days. It was number one in paperback, sold over two million copies. And Alan Pakula, the famous director took an option on it for a movie although he never made it. Again translated into 20 languages, it was a main selection of the Literary Guild, and was just an absolute phenomenon which is still her most famous and beloved book, along with the children book which another generation has equally loved. I mentioned In the Year of the Boar and Jackie Robinson, which was actually published in 1984. Spring Moon was written...well, she took six years writing fiction. She did Eighth Moon in a year, which was non-fiction. Fictions always takes longer, it took about six years.

We went to China from '85 to '89 and based on her experiences and interviews with various Chinese, she came back and wrote a book which was published in 1990 called Legacies: A Chinese Mosaic, which is non-fiction, a combination of stories of Chinese, particularly during the Cultural Revolution up to Tiananmen Square, and her own family histories woven in, so it's both personal and historical, political and cultural. It was chosen by Time Magazine as one of the top ten books of the year. It was a best seller in its own right, I think for nine weeks. It was a Book of the Month Club selection and translated in many languages overseas.

And then her final book was about a year and a half ago (1996), called The Middle Heart, another novel on China, not a sequel but a more recent period in Chinese history, essentially World War II up to Tiananmen Square. Again, terrific reviews. It sold very well but was not a

best seller like her other books. But the compensation is that in addition to many foreign languages, it is going to be on television Hallmark Hall of Fame (with her doing the screenplay - chosen after interview).

*Q: At least you...*

(Lord Speaking about what his next move was in his career)

Lord: And then the other one was when I was offered by the National Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane, and Secretary of State George Shultz to become ambassador to China in 1985. And I said I preferred a job in Washington. My wife said, you're crazy not to be ambassador to China. So in leaving the Service, then becoming Special Assistant to Kissinger, which was the turning point in my career, and then going to China as ambassador, in each case my wife was very influential in helping me.

*Q: As you looked at Asia when you came on board, did you have any ideas thinking back in your mind about different approaches we might take? Leaving Vietnam aside.*

LORD: Well, I thought even then that Asia was of great importance to us. I don't think that even I could foresee how important it would emerge by the 1990s. But I was never guilty of being Eurocentric, I felt that Asia deserved a greater slice of our attention and our engagement. I've already said that I supported our general posture in the war, not only for our global position but for our position in Asia, and to give the countries in the region time to develop. I'd have to say that I was not vigorously in favor of an opening to China at that point, which is important to state given the fact that I was so involved later in my career. I was not Joe McCarthy-like in my dislike or my distrust of China. I must have been aware of Nixon's article which included China in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1967. I don't think anybody realized he was going to carry it to such a dramatic extent but he did indicate that we had to do business with China in that article which coming from him was quite interesting. But it would be dishonest for me to say that in the late '60s I was saying we should open up to China, that will free up our diplomacy in general. I was open to new approaches but I didn't envision the dramatic opportunities of the China opening at that point.

*Q: Taking a little tour of the horizon. Asia, did that include India at that time?*

LORD: No. Again, I didn't work just on Asia. I want to make that clear. But I recall that was mostly what I worked on, and I did some think pieces on Asian strategy in general. But we traditionally in the State Department, as you know, and that is also true in the Pentagon, we don't include the sub-continent in our definition of Asia, or specifically, East Asia and the Pacific. So I don't recall doing much work on India, it was basically east of India.

*Q: Indonesia by this time was sort of considered a safe area. Suharto had been in for about two years.*

LORD: Well, again as I've told you, I want to be very careful not to try to pretend more than I do remember about specifics and where we were on different issues and policies. I recall thinking

that Indonesia was underappreciated given its size and potential importance. I don't recall how much we thought it had stabilized. Obviously, Indonesia together with the rest of Southeast Asia was a major concern for us as we engaged in Vietnam. I would have thought I'm sure that if we lose in Vietnam, if not an automatic domino impact there would nevertheless be an unsettling impact on Indonesia and the other countries in Southeast Asia. It is one of the reasons I generally supported our Vietnam policy. We'll get into this in much more detail as we go along, but in retrospect as one calculates the benefits and the losses of the Vietnam experience, clearly the losses outweigh the benefits. But on the plus side you have to say that we did buy time for Indonesia, for Southeast Asia in general to develop their economies with our having established a buffer against communist influence. And I do believe that the buying of time for Southeast Asia and Asian development generally is one of the pluses of our engagement. If we had never become engaged, and Hanoi had overrun all of Indochina without any opposition in the course of the '60s, I do think without having to subscribe to automatic domino theory, there might well have been other countries falling under communist influence. Our Asian friends agree that we bought them time to develop independently.

*Q: I think it's easy to underestimate the very possible effect, and later of course seeing these other countries strengthening themselves; they no longer had the same momentum later. What about the Philippines, was this a problem? Do you remember anything about Marcos?*

LORD: I remember at that time, probably having a fairly high opinion of Marcos, I forget when he came into office. And indeed, Marcos did some good things early in his tenure. But like so many Asian leaders, or so many leaders in the world, he didn't know when to quit when he was ahead. So whether its the Shah, or whether its Marcos, or whether its other world leaders, sometimes they do good work for a while, and then greed or corruption, or ego, sets in and they begin to pay for it. So I imagine at that time the Philippines were one of our allies in Vietnam, along with Thailand, Australia, Korea, I forget who else was helping, and we had a pretty positive view of them. But again, it's hard for me to reconstruct 30 years later precisely how we felt about each country.

*Q: How about the other two major powers, Japan and Korea? Were there problems at that time?*

LORD: No, I think we felt Korea was a pretty good ally in Vietnam. At that point we were nervous about North Korean strength versus South Korea. Today, in the late '90s it's very clear who has won that race, South Korea has just dramatically outstripped and outperformed the North, its gone ahead and the North has gone backwards. But, we tend to forget, that in the '60s in many respects the North not only posed a major military threat to the South, in some respects it looked like it was proceeding economically, at least on pace with South Korea. Maybe we were misled because it was an opaque society even then. So there was that concern, and this is before the miracle in terms of the South Korean economy taking off. But against that backdrop, they had been a good ally in Vietnam. As for Japan it was supporting our effort in Vietnam in terms of bases, etc. It was somewhat nervous. It wasn't an economic power, yet.

*Q: Moving back, you say you had Asia and you had other things, but were you looking at the Soviet Union and how it was dealing with both China and Japan?*

LORD: I just don't recall. I'm sure in the context of Asia I looked at all those countries. I believe I did some work on NATO and Europe but I don't have a precise recollection. Basically, being a Policy Planning Staff, it was more think pieces, or comment on ongoing policies, than it was operational. So our job was to provide information and possibly policy recommendations. Having said that like myself when I was head of Policy Planning in the State Department later, the heads of our office knew that we had to have policy relevance, that if it was just a white tower academic operation the leaders in the Pentagon weren't going to pay any attention. There was no question, and it wasn't just on Vietnam, but including Vietnam.

*Q: When the election of Nixon came about, I assume that the Pentagon saw this...I mean most of the people who were involved, the military side of it, viewed this with a certain amount of relief.*

LORD: I don't recall there was any opinion across the board. I guess in principle the military thought Nixon being a staunch anti-communist would be firm. But you have to remember that Nixon was promising a secret plan to end the Vietnam war. So on the one hand he had hard and tough anti-communist credentials, but on the other hand he was taking advantage of weariness with the war and suggesting he had ways he was going to end it. He never had a secret plan. To the extent he had a plan, it was basically figuring he could use the Russians and maybe the Chinese to pressure Hanoi, to bring the war to an end by trying to improve relations with them, and cornering Vietnam in that way. But he didn't have any secret plan. Moreover the military wasn't all hard-line because some of them were dovish or at least disillusioned.

*Q: What about the staff that you were meeting there and the people?*

LORD: As for the staff, I can't reconstruct every name, but they included people like the following. Al Haig, the military assistant who would eventually become NSC deputy, who went on to become head of NATO and Vice Chairman of the Army and also chief of staff to Nixon and the one who helped ease him out and make the transition during Watergate, and later Secretary of State, and Presidential candidate. You had Mort Halperin directing the NSC interagency system and policy planner who I have already mentioned, one of the brightest people in government, probably the youngest Deputy Assistant Secretary in the history of the Pentagon. Hal Sonnenfeldt on Soviet, European and arms control issues, who already had a reputation, knew Kissinger at Harvard, had a complicated relationship because they were both Jewish immigrants from Germany and although Sonnenfeldt never had the visibility or stature of Kissinger, he was very bright, very tough in talking back to Kissinger. They had a very complicated, mutually respectful, but also mutually prickly relationship. Bill Hyland, who was also a Soviet and European expert like Sonnenfeldt, who went on to be director of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, and editor of Foreign Affairs among other areas. Dick Sneider on Asian policy who was eventually ambassador to Korea, and a very able Foreign Service officer. Also, John Holdridge, on China and Asia, who became our ambassador and Assistant Secretary. Tony Lake who was special assistant to Kissinger in 1969 when I was sitting across the way in the Executive Building with Halperin, a bright Foreign Service officer who had been in Vietnam, went on to be head of the State Department Policy Planning staff and National Security Advisor. Roger Morris, another special assistant, an extremely bright, young person who went on to be a major historian and writer. William Watts, who also was a bright young officer. Jonathan Howe, only a naval commander then, went on to be a four-star admiral and

actually headed our ill-fated operation in Somalia, and also was head of Political-Military Affairs in the State Department. John Negroponte, who worked with me on Indochina one of our outstanding Foreign Service officers, went on to become ambassador in several places. He wasn't there at the very beginning. Fred Bergsten, who has gone on to be one of the top economists in this country, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury and now head of the International Institute of Economics, Robert Hormats, who went on to become an Under Secretary as well as Vice Chairman of Goldman Sachs. Pete Vaky, another outstanding Foreign Service officers in charge of Latin American affairs. Peter Rodman, a close, personal assistant to Kissinger who went on to be head of State Policy Planning as well as a senior person in NSC staff. Hal Saunders who went on to be a top person on the Middle East, both the NSC and at the State Department. Others who came from Systems Analysis at the Pentagon were outstanding, such as Larry Lynn, Jan Lodal, and Phil O'Deen who worked on arms control and Vietnam.

This was particularly the case for the three priority issues as Nixon came into office from his standpoint, and Kissinger's standpoint - ending the Vietnam War on an honorable basis; opening up to China; and improving relations with Russia. In effect, taking care in his first term of the communist world, as well as the inherited war, clearing the decks so that in his second term he could build a structure of peace, if you will, on the momentum of the first term, and shore up other alliance relationships, although he worked on that in his first term as well, work on the Middle East, and attack some of the new issues including the developing world. That was the master plan. He was poised to do it, of course, after his landslide victory in 1972 and then along came Watergate. So that's the general staff. I could get into the system if you'd like.

*Q: Why don't we talk about the system.*

LORD: I've already given the priorities, obviously Vietnam was a priority, plus China and Russia, and in all three of those there was a heavy dose of secrecy and clearly running it out of the White House. So from the very beginning you had control out of the White House, and that was accomplished in several ways. First, Nixon himself had tremendous strategic conceptual strength, a lot of experience as Vice President and since he was defeated in 1960 he had traveled around the world and met a lot of foreign leaders, gained a lot of capital and brownie points and respect around the world by his travels. He did a lot of reading and thinking and writing including his Foreign Affairs article on Asia which gave the suggestion that he might open up to China. So you had that strength coming from the President himself and his grasp of policy.

*Q: Before we go the next time into the issues that came up, were the meetings for decision-making getting people together, with either Kissinger or his deputy, or somebody sitting there? I've been to so many meetings when people get together and things don't really happen.*

LORD: There were plenty of times, particularly early on, where you were just reviewing things and not necessarily trying to come up with a conclusion. Maybe saying, okay, we've brought the issue this far now let's go back and do some more work on it. There were other times where you'd have disagreement and we need more work, bounce it back and come back again. Other times where you would have enough to go forward to the President. Other times where decisions were made. Sometimes there were crisis meetings to react, e.g. to the downing of an American plane by North Korea, or a quick meeting when there was a border clash between the Chinese

and the Russians in the summer of 1969, a very important event which really brought home to Kissinger and Nixon why the opening to China would make sense. So there were different kinds of meetings; we didn't always have decisions.

The other thing I should point out is the advantage Kissinger had in his control of the system, in addition to brilliance, hard work, staff and the process set up, was proximity. This is always an advantage a National Security Advisor has over a Secretary of State, not that Nixon's door was always open but Kissinger could get in there although Haldeman tried to control him a little bit. He could pick up the phone and go in and see Nixon on a daily basis; he briefed him every morning. This is crucial before NSC meetings. In addition to the papers with the options and maybe tabs with the actual details, with State, Defense, and other agency positions. Kissinger always had the opportunity, and generally took advantage of it - and Halperin or I, or the expert on the staff did it - to put his own views on top. In fairness he would make sure the President knew other peoples' views. He had to, otherwise even he would be in trouble. He owed it to the President and he owed it for his own protection so it didn't look like he was cutting people off. But he would get the last word in, either verbally before a meeting, or in his covering memo saying, well look, Secretary Rogers thinks you ought to do this. Secretary Laird thinks you ought to do that. Here's why I think you ought to go this direction for the following reasons. He would even say on paper or verbally, here's how you ought to play it at the meeting.

Now I want to make clear Nixon in the NSC meetings generally did not make decisions in the meetings. I don't think he ever did. He basically would listen, give people a chance to present their points of views. It was usually led off by a CIA briefing and an overview of issues and options by Kissinger. Nixon would let everyone weigh in, and then go back and weigh his decision. And, again, Kissinger would have a crack at him after the meeting. Whether it's right after or the next couple of days, he could go in there. So he had tremendous access and influence.

Furthermore, another strength Nixon and Kissinger had for foreign policy, and for the system being dominated by the White House, was the fact that they thought in generally similar terms. They both believed in strategic approaches, not just tactical day-to-day approaches. They both had a conceptual framework they were working in, they were both hard headed geopoliticalists who clearly put an emphasis on what countries did in their foreign policies, not their domestic policies, who were clearly attracted to balance of power. And they usually shared views on specific issues. Each independently, for example, saw the imperative of opening up with China. They both deserve credit.

Finally, there was a shared strength because Nixon and Kissinger had a good division of labor. Nixon as President had to make the tough decisions. He had a strategic framework. He was knowledgeable, but he didn't get mired down in details. So he was a general strategist, and he kept informed and on top of things.

He generally left to Kissinger the actual negotiations, the tactics, a lot of the backgrounding of the press, the promotion of public perceptions, the bureaucratic chairing of committees, the infighting, and the traveling.

So I think that President Nixon of all of the presidents that I worked for struck the best balance

between not getting into too much detail and not being sufficiently involved. Nixon was in between, say, the practices of Ford and Carter. President Ford was quite removed from foreign policy, although Ford had great confidence in Kissinger as Secretary of State. In fairness to President Ford he had to heal the nation after the Watergate Affair. The other extreme was President Jimmy Carter, who arguably got into too much detail. I think that President Nixon struck a good balance and had enough confidence in Kissinger, who held views parallel to his, and was sufficiently brilliant as a diplomat and tactician that President Nixon could leave the daily work to him.

*Q: Today is May 14, 1998. Let's talk first about your impressions of President Nixon, particularly early on in his administration.*

LORD: Sure. I had worked for Nixon as a volunteer in the 1960 presidential campaign, as we discussed earlier. I knew his dark side, of course, but also felt that he was very well equipped to be President, particularly as far as foreign policy matters were concerned. Therefore, I went to work for him with considerable enthusiasm, and I was also enthusiastic about Kissinger, his brilliance, and his potential.

I think that the best portrayal of Nixon that I've seen remains Kissinger's portrait in the first volume of his memoirs, in which he captures the complexity of Nixon. First, regarding Nixon's strengths, I should say that in terms of my exposure to him it was considerable but not intimate and certainly not on a daily basis. Kissinger generally liked to meet with Nixon alone, as opposed to having NSC staff people with him. This was both a reflection of Kissinger's ego, on the one hand, and his not wishing to have others there, which reflected Kissinger's insecurity. Kissinger sought to control access to President Nixon in many ways. This was true in the case of briefings, meetings, or, for example, at decision-making sessions after meetings.

However, I sat in on a great many meetings with President Nixon and some strategy sessions with him, as well. As we discussed previously, I was with Nixon on the plane to China. I sat in on all of the meetings Nixon had with Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. I was with him at the Moscow Summit Meeting. I traveled with him as we went beyond Moscow on that trip to Romania, Iran, etc. I once went up to Camp David, Maryland, at a crucial moment, before the May 1972 Summit Meeting in Moscow, when Hanoi launched a new offensive in South Vietnam. So I had intermittent access to President Nixon. At San Clemente, CA, I was out there at New Year's, working on Nixon's annual foreign policy reports. There would be some interaction with the President on these occasions. Then, of course, I also had considerable exposure to Nixon, through Kissinger, in terms of his comments and his relationship with President Nixon. Occasionally, I would be listening on the phone with Kissinger when he'd be talking with Nixon, often in the evening. Sometimes, Nixon would be swearing in his special language, either because he was tired or he had had a few drinks. So that's just to give you a feel for my exposure to him.

Now, regarding the man himself, not only based on the previous evidence but on the observations of others, which reinforced my impressions. The good side of Nixon, in terms of sheer strategy and conceptual strength in foreign policy, was very good, indeed. He had had considerable experience in terms of travel and meetings as Vice President. He had done a lot of

thinking and reading, and indeed writing, including his famous article in 1967 in "Foreign Affairs."

So he had a very clear strategy when he came into office as President. In particular, he had some basic goals. I want to add quickly that his strategy was very close to Kissinger's, but they came at it independently. They hadn't really known each other very well. I think that they had only met once or so before Nixon became President. They hadn't really discussed much, so Nixon had some courage in choosing Kissinger, despite this lack of personal contact and the fact that Kissinger was in direct contrast with Nixon. Kissinger was a Harvard educated intellectual, of Jewish immigrant origin, and an establishment, Rockefeller type person, whereas Nixon was from an anti-communist, California, modest income, American family background.

Clearly, what Nixon and Kissinger had in mind was first, and as the highest priority, to deal with problems involving the communist world. They wanted to have good relations with our allies and to get to issues like the Middle East. However, the three overriding challenges were to: end the war in Vietnam, open up a new relationship with China, and try to improve the relationship with the Soviet Union. These issues were, of course, interrelated. By improving relations with China and Russia they could put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate, since they were Hanoi's two major patrons. So Nixon had a clear feel for geopolitics. He had a sense, and we will get into greater detail on this, that by opening up to China he would loosen up our diplomacy generally and that he wouldn't have to deal with only Moscow in talking with the communist world.

Nixon obviously had a sense by then, and many Americans were slow to come to this appreciation, that the Sino-Soviet split was real. This became very clear after the clashes on the Sino-Soviet border in the summer of 1969. Nixon saw other advantages in establishing contact with China as the world's most populous nation. Above all he wanted to put pressure on the Soviet Union to get them to be more forthcoming toward us, by showing that we had an option by going to China. This was the so-called "China card," a term which was exaggerated. Nixon wanted to have good relations with Russia as well. He wanted to have better relations with each of these large, communist nations than they had with each other.

Nixon also hoped, and here he put more emphasis than Kissinger ever did on this point, that Russia would help him end the war in Vietnam. During the presidential campaign of 1968 Nixon talked about having a secret plan to end the war in Vietnam. He didn't really have a secret plan. I think that his main emphasis was that improving relations with the two communist giants, and particularly the Soviet Union, would help to bring pressure on Hanoi to end the war.

So Nixon's greatest strength was his conceptual approach to foreign policy, his geopolitical feel, and his sense of strategy as he entered office.

*Q: There you were, often the note taker. Were these points articulated by Nixon and Kissinger, or is this something that you are putting together later?*

LORD: It's a combination of both. Certainly, these views were articulated by Kissinger in my presence. They were also articulated in annual, Presidential reports, which hold up very well in retrospect, by the way. Nixon put them out every year, usually by early February. We would

draft them at President Nixon's home in San Clemente, CA, in late December to mid-January. They were highly conceptual statements of U.S. foreign policy. They often gave some sense of the direction in which we were heading, including the opening to China if people read these statements carefully.

So this version of Nixon's views is partly derived from secondary sources but partly from conversations in my presence. Certainly, they reflected the way President Nixon conducted himself in meetings.

I would like to add somewhat to the strengths of President Nixon, and then we'll get to the weaknesses, particularly during the White House years. During the early years of his Presidency, and while I was in the White House, President Nixon did his homework before meetings and conducted himself extremely well at them. Later, it became noticeable, as the Watergate affair began to overtake him, that he was less meticulous about his preparations for meetings and so on.

The strategy papers that we helped to write for him reflected Kissinger's views. However, we knew that they were also consistent with the President's views. I've come to these conclusions, given my exposure to him in meetings and what I had read at the time and since. I think that most observers, including even harsh critics of Nixon, would say that this strategic approach was one of his great strengths.

Also, I think that one of his strengths, compared to other Presidents, before and since, was that he delegated just enough in the foreign policy field. He was a strategist, along with Kissinger, and they reinforced each other. But Nixon made the crucial decisions, whether they involved the opening to China, whether it was bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor at Haiphong, thereby jeopardizing the Moscow summit meeting, or whether it was the Middle East alert a little bit later on, at the beginning of his second term. He made a lot of courageous decisions. He was the conceptual thinker behind these decisions. However, he would not get bogged down in details. He had confidence in Kissinger to do the basic negotiating and moving forward. He clearly was in general charge of the strategy. Therefore, he was on top of it in a way that, say, President Ford never was in terms of detailed, strategic grasp. He didn't get bogged down in minute details, as President Carter tended to do. Nixon's involvement, on the one hand, but his willingness to delegate, on the other hand, were about in balance. He steered between micromanagement, on the one hand, which no President really has time for, and detachment and lack of strategic impact on the other, which a President shouldn't have either.

In this sense Nixon and Kissinger worked well together. Of course, as time went on, this balance changed, particularly as Kissinger began to develop a higher, public profile, achieved more spectacular successes, and made more frequent trips and undertook dramatic initiatives. There was a real, mixed feeling or rivalry between the two men, and I'll get back to that. Nixon became somewhat jealous of Kissinger for getting some of the credit which Nixon thought he, himself, deserved.

So these were his basic strengths. Now, his weaknesses obviously include paranoia. Nixon always felt that the liberal press and the establishment were out to get him and didn't respect him. This is also reflected in the complex relationship similar to that which President L. B. Johnson

had with the Kennedy legacy, and so on. Kennedy was the polar opposite of Nixon's style. This also fed into his suspicions, including all of the manifestations of the Watergate affair, which came to cripple Nixon's presidency.

Nixon had some unattractive elements, for example, of anti-Semitism, which Kissinger has recorded. I heard these a couple of times when I was listening in on the telephone. However, Nixon would often do this in front of Kissinger, so you wonder just how profound it was. I can't judge the degree of Nixon's drinking problem. I don't think that it should be exaggerated. It was clearly exaggerated in the Oliver Stone movie on Nixon. However, there is no question that he had a problem. I was on the phone a couple of times, taking notes for Kissinger, when President Nixon clearly had had a few drinks. But I believe he only indulged at night, not during the day. I do not think that this problem affected his presidency in any significant way. That is my clear understanding of the matter.

Nixon also could be devious. These are some aspects of Nixon's dark side, which have been well documented by others, and I really can't add much to it. He was a shy person, not particularly gifted with small talk. If you were standing around with him, it could be somewhat awkward. This is not necessarily a negative aspect of his personality, in point of fact.

As I said before, Nixon didn't like direct confrontations and so he would have Haldeman in particular to handle them as his hatchet man. If he had bad news for Secretary of State Rogers - cutting him out of something or a decision going against his recommendation - or against Secretary of Defense Laird or another member of the cabinet, the chances are that he wouldn't convey it directly to the cabinet officer concerned. He would have Haldeman do it or, somewhat later, Al Haig, as he became the First Deputy NSC Advisor and eventually Chief of Staff. There are more issues that I could get into, but I'm sort of giving you an overview now.

*Q: Could you mention, particularly early on in his administration, how Nixon treated his Secretary of State, William Rogers? He was an old friend of Nixon's. We'll get to Kissinger later on. Did you have any feel for how Nixon treated Rogers?*

LORD: Again, Nixon would never be directly rude with Rogers or anybody else. I have to stress that I obviously would not have been in very many meetings where there were just Nixon and Rogers. A good many of the meetings I attended with Nixon were just with Kissinger. For example, during the Nixon summit meeting in China, Secretary of State Rogers was off with the Chinese Foreign Minister. As has been discussed earlier, Nixon hired Rogers because he knew that he would be loyal, someone whom he looked to take care of the secondary issues while he and Kissinger focused on the big three issues which I mentioned before of Russia, China, and Vietnam and, to a certain extent, the Middle East. This doesn't mean that Nixon and Kissinger weren't heavily involved in Berlin, Europe, and many other issues. However, whether it involved Latin America, Africa, or perhaps economic issues, Nixon felt that Rogers could handle those while he and Kissinger dealt with the more urgent and cosmic tasks.

Nixon clearly wanted Rogers excluded from the discussions at times. I don't think that he was personally against Rogers, but it was a combination of his wanting to direct major policy areas without a lot of interference and because of his suspicion of the State Department, a flashback to

his resentment of bureaucrats and what he thought of as their liberal bias. So Nixon would often exclude Rogers from a lot of the secret negotiations and trips.

Every now and then Nixon would feel a little concerned about this exclusion of Rogers. For example, and we'll get into this later, when Kissinger went on his secret trip to China, Rogers did not know about the trip when Kissinger took off. Nixon made it clear to Kissinger, even though Kissinger was worried about leaks, that Rogers had to know about this trip as it was taking place. I don't remember the exact sequence, but he conveyed the information about the trip to Rogers, through Haldeman, Haig, or someone else. Rogers was told that this invitation had come from the Chinese, sort of at the last minute, while Kissinger was traveling, and Kissinger was going to go on into China. There was the usual duplicity in the treatment of Rogers.

I would have to assume, from everything that I saw, that Nixon was perfectly polite to Rogers at meetings. He wouldn't humiliate him. That wouldn't be his style. But clearly, the outcome was to cut Rogers out of things.

*Q: In these conversations that you were aware of, did Nixon ask "How will this play in Congress or how will this play with the media?" In other words, Kissinger was supposed to be the foreign affairs expert. Nixon was obviously the politician. You can't get anywhere in the U.S. Government unless you figure out how you're going to make something work with Congress, the press, and all of that.*

LORD: It's fascinating to talk about that, but I don't want to exaggerate the number of times that I heard Nixon and Kissinger on the phone or even in person. These phone conversations I listened in on wouldn't have occurred more than a handful of occasions.

I want to make it clear that I was not privy to the overwhelming majority of Nixon-Kissinger conversations, either bilaterally or with other persons present. But one can assume that they would talk often about how to handle Congress, particularly on issues like Vietnam and what levels we could authorize for troops, foreign aid, support for bombing, and, as the war continued, heading off damaging resolutions restricting our military activity in Vietnam.

I think that, probably in terms of domestic politics more generally, and the press and media, Nixon would talk more to Haldeman, Ziegler, and others. However, he would certainly discuss these kinds of things with Kissinger. No question about that.

I believe that Kissinger himself never gave any press conferences on the record until his famous, peace is at hand press conference in October, 1972, when Hanoi released the details of the agreement we were negotiating with them. This was the first press conference he gave on the record, instead of on a background basis. For an academic like Kissinger who had never previously served in government he showed an amazing understanding, not only of bureaucratic infighting but of handling the press. That was one of his strengths.

In some ways this helped Nixon because it helped explain to the press the conceptual framework for Nixon-Kissinger policies and also helped build support for what we were trying to do on various fronts. However, to the extent that the press began to praise Kissinger and he got more

attention and profile, at times this began to feed Nixon's paranoia and sense of envy.

In terms of substance one of the main disagreements that I can remember between Nixon and Kissinger was that Nixon wanted to extract more from the Russians on Vietnam, as opposed to other issues in the Russian-American relationship. There were times when Kissinger would be moving on SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] or some other, bilateral matters with the Russians. Nixon would want to slow things down unless the Russians did more to pressure Hanoi. Kissinger was clearly in favor of the Russians leaning on Hanoi, and the Chinese also, for that matter, but I think that Kissinger felt that we had very important business to handle with the Russians, whether this involved negotiations on Berlin, arms control, or other matters. Nixon wanted to hold the Soviet-American relationship somewhat more hostage to the Soviets providing help on Vietnam. So that was one area of difference between Nixon and Kissinger.

At times, in the home stretch, the hectic home stretch of the Vietnam talks, there were some differences between Nixon and Kissinger. However, I think that some of this was fed by Al Haig, who was somewhat more hard line on Vietnam than Kissinger was.

There were certainly other, tactical disagreements. However, I think that it's fair to say that Nixon and Kissinger were generally on the same wave length on the broad outlines of policy. This was certainly the case on China. There were never any significant disagreements there. On Vietnam I think that it's fair to say that Nixon was generally more suspicious than Kissinger as to whether the North Vietnamese were negotiating seriously to end the war. Kissinger, without being naive about North Vietnamese intentions, tended to see more hope in that secret negotiating process than, I think, Nixon did. I think that Nixon felt that the North Vietnamese would dig in. In retrospect, I think that Nixon was right, up until the break-through in October, 1972. Every time that Kissinger and I thought that we were making some progress, Nixon tended to be more skeptical. In retrospect, I think that Nixon was entirely right. The North Vietnamese did not come around until they saw that Nixon was going to be re-elected over Senator George McGovern.

The basic point that I am making is that on substance, conceptually, and even in terms of tactical execution, Nixon and Kissinger were pretty close in outlook.

One other thing that I should say is that Kissinger genuinely, and he said this in his memoirs, believed that Nixon deserved lots of credit for the successes that were achieved and his courage in making lonely decisions on major issues. After all, Nixon sent Kissinger into China alone, and really without anybody else knowing about it, risking a tremendous backlash from our allies and, above all, from his conservative base in the Republican Party and elsewhere at home. In retrospect, historical revisionists like to say that the rapprochement and opening with China was inevitable, that it made Nixon popular, and so forth. However, in all fairness when he authorized this opening to China, he couldn't be sure of that in advance.

Nixon took courageous decisions in bombing Hanoi and mining Haiphong, risking the 1972 summit meeting with Moscow, where there were a lot of agreements lined up and ready for signature. I think that Kissinger always felt, despite his mixed feelings toward Nixon, that the President deserved credit for making these tough decisions, which only a President could make.

Kissinger admired Nixon's strategic grasp and the fact that he generally backed up Kissinger. Of course, Kissinger liked the fact that Nixon wanted to run things out of the White House and cut out the bureaucracy. Kissinger had no objection to that.

At the same time Kissinger tended to reciprocate Nixon's views toward him. Kissinger was suspicious as to whether Nixon was bad mouthing him to Haldeman and Ehrlichman, behind his back. In fact, Nixon was doing this. He was constantly doing this, as we know now from the White House tapes. He told Haldeman and Ehrlichman to keep their eye on Kissinger. I don't think that Kissinger thought that Nixon was reflecting any profound anti-Semitism which some of his comments suggest. I think that Kissinger always admired Nixon for having the courage to choose him, Kissinger, even though Nixon hardly knew him and even though he knew that Kissinger was very different from the rest of the White House staff.

Nixon also gave Kissinger wide discretion in choosing his own staff at the NSC, although over time I think that Nixon began to suspect that this staff was a little too liberal for his taste. He suspected that some of the White House leaks were coming from that NSC staff. Kissinger had genuine admiration for Nixon's strengths but, of course, he saw Nixon's dark side as well. There is no sense in my going into great length on this subject because I think that Kissinger has described this very well in his own memoirs.

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*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You talked about some of it. You didn't discuss the transition...*

LORD: Well, I will do this at the risk of some repetition. I know that we talked about my initial interview with Kissinger and his emphasis on loyalty, and so on. I believe that I mentioned that the one thing he never wanted was yes men. He could intimidate people, and we'll get into that in a minute, with his intellectual brilliance and even his temper. However, he genuinely wanted good, counter arguments.

During the first year I was working for Mort Halperin, sitting in the Executive Office Building. We had two, basic roles: one was to help to run the NSC system, that is, the various meetings and how they were run, with the National Security Adviser chairing almost everything and then putting decision memoranda together. I was responsible for helping to prepare the agendas, talking points, and strategy for those meetings, as well as following up on their results. I helped to package the memoranda from the various agencies, plus our memoranda for the President, looking toward NSC meetings and Presidential decisions.

The other role we played was that of a mini Policy Planning Staff, in which Halperin or I would write memos to Kissinger, pointing out issues that would be coming up and which he ought to be thinking about. We would also play devil's advocate on some current policies which we thought might need adjustment.

It was particularly in the latter role of devil's advocate that I caught Kissinger's attention. Of

course, I had been sitting in on many of the meetings in the NSC system. He had seen the work I had done with Mort Halperin in preparing material for Presidential speeches on Vietnam and sending ideas to Kissinger. I think that what particularly caught Kissinger's attention was the fact that I had written some memos which Halperin passed through directly, making clear that they came from me, including some which were critical but well-reasoned enough to earn Kissinger's attention. I remember in particular a memorandum on Laos. I remember another one on Africa, regarding which, I felt, we should be more responsive to the racial dimension there, both because it would help us geopolitically, vis-a-vis the Soviets, in terms of influence in the African continent, and because it would respond to domestic concerns and constituencies toward which, I felt, we weren't sufficiently sensitive.

The point I'm making is that Kissinger welcomed challenges, even if he didn't agree with the thrust of these challenges. I think that these memoranda which I had written caught his attention.

The role of Special Assistant to Kissinger was generally played by Tony Lake and, to a certain extent, by Roger Morris as well, who were sitting over in the West Wing basement of the White House. These people were privy to the most sensitive material, which I was not, such as the beginnings of the opening to China, the secret Vietnam negotiations, the Cambodian bombing, and so on. These were some issues that I wasn't quite cut in on. I can't remember which issues I knew nothing about and which issues I only knew something about. I was exposed to a very great deal, through running the NSC system with Mort Halperin, but I didn't know everything.

However, Tony Lake made clear to Kissinger that, mostly because of exhaustion, and not so much out of substantive disagreement, he was planning to leave the NSC staff in early 1970. It is true that the incursion into Cambodia, which took place in the spring of 1970, was the proximate cause of Lake's resignation, along with those of several others. The fact is, he was going to leave the NSC staff anyway. This event speeded up the process and also gave it a certain cachet. I'm not challenging Lake's sincerity in leaving out of disagreement with this policy. I also disagreed with this policy, but Kissinger liked to point out that Lake was going to leave the NSC staff anyway.

So when Lake was leaving, he needed a replacement. Al Haig came to me on behalf of Kissinger. I don't remember the exact date, but it must have been in January or February, 1970. Haig said: "Would you like to take Lake's place as Special Assistant to Kissinger?"

I still can't believe that I did what I did. For some reason I at least strongly indicated to Haig that I would decline, before checking with my wife. I have a terrific marriage and I consulted her on all major issues, because I genuinely value her opinion. I feel that this should be a matter of principle in a marriage. I just dreaded the office hours I would have to keep if I replaced Tony Lake. I knew what he had gone through. Not that my office hours were all of that relaxed, but I was working from about 8:00 AM to 7:00 PM. I knew that Lake was working from 7:00 AM to 10:00 or 11:00 PM and spent most of his weekends on the job. I am enough of a family man that I knew that I just didn't want to keep those hours.

I went out to have dinner at a restaurant with my wife, which was somewhat of an unusual occurrence, given my work schedule. I told her what I had done. "Exploded" is too strong a

word, but she said that this was absurd. It wasn't so much that she was mad that I hadn't consulted her, although she must have considered that puzzling. She thought that this was a stupid decision. She told me, in her usual, straightforward way, that I had an opportunity to be a close associate of Kissinger, whom she considered the most brilliant man at the time on the Washington scene and someone who was on the verge of accomplishing great things. So just from the point of view of my own, personal exposure, career, and learning curve, she thought that I had made a crazy decision. Beyond that, in terms of public service and trying to help my country, she felt that I had an obligation to take this job, work with Kissinger, and do great things, including ending the Vietnam War. She handed me a quarter - or was it a dime?- to get right back on the phone to Haig and say that I had changed my mind and would accept the job.

By the way, this also reflected the fact that, despite the incredible hours and everything else, she was totally supportive of me. There was a pattern throughout her comments that she thought that this was an historic opportunity for a young person, barely 30 years of age, to be exposed to great issues and great men, as well as her feeling that this was an opportunity to serve my country.

In retrospect, I'm sure that I must have said to Haig that my answer was probably "no" but that I wanted to talk over the offer with my wife. After talking it over with her, I realized that I had made a rather impetuous decision. I called Haig back later that night. I can't remember whether I said that I wanted to think about it further or whether I immediately accepted the offer. In any event, I accepted very quickly. Of course, this was the wisest thing I ever did. I would have missed an historic opportunity to be in the middle of dramatic events and help to advance what I think were positive causes. Even though things didn't always turn out the way I liked, I at least had a chance to make my case. Also, of course, I was stretched incredibly, both intellectually, emotionally, and in every other way. It was a breakthrough for my career, and we did accomplish some major goals, so it was clearly the right decision.

Without jumping forward at any length, I should say that this happened on several, other occasions, where my wife steered me in the right direction. I had been a Foreign Service Officer but left the Foreign Service in 1967, despite my affection for the service. I had been well treated by it, on the whole, but basically my wife considered that I was on a very slow road to real challenges and responsibilities. After five and one-half years in the Foreign Service, she urged me to leave and take a job in the Department of Defense [in 1967]. There was a later time, in 1985, when I was offered the ambassadorship to China. We'll get to that. My initial reaction was: "No, thank you, I'd rather have a job in the State Department, say on the seventh floor," [where the Secretary of State and his principal assistants have their offices]. There really wasn't a good opening then, and she said that she thought that I was wrong. I had turned down the ambassadorship partly for family reasons and so on. She again corrected my course.

So at each of these crucial junctures in my career she was very influential in steering me in the right direction.

Anyhow, I accepted the job of Special Assistant to Kissinger, knowing what I was in for. Of course, it was the best thing that I ever did. So I moved into the West Wing of the White House, in the basement, right near Kissinger's office, in what used to be the men's room.

I don't think that the hours have ever been matched, certainly in my career, and probably in very few careers. I didn't start the day off all that early. I got into the office at 7:30 to 8:00 AM, because I insisted on having breakfast with my young children and at least see them then. I knew that, by the time I got home again, they would be in bed, and I wouldn't see them. I sort of made it a point that I wouldn't arrive at the office at an ungodly hour. It might well have been 8:00 AM or even 8:30 AM when I got in. On the average, I left the office somewhere between 10:00 and 11:00 PM, and sometimes at 1:00 or 2:00 AM. On Saturdays I would say that I arrived in the office roughly at 8:30 or 9:00 AM, getting home in time for dinner, and then usually spending half a day in the office on Sunday. This was in addition to about 13 secret trips to Paris and elsewhere for Vietnam negotiations as well as all the public trips with Nixon and Kissinger. It involved weekends and holidays when I would pretend that I had time off, when I actually had been out of the country. This is not to complain. It is simply to give you a sense of the pace and demands of the job. It was an exhilarating and a fantastic experience.

My job was essentially to be Kissinger's global sidekick in the following sense. He had experts on the NSC staff for every major issue and region. He wanted one person who had the overview to put this all together for him. Therefore, I would pair up on China with John Holdridge. I would pair up on Vietnam with Dick Smyser and later with John Negroponte. I would pair up on Russia with Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland. I would pair up on the Middle East with Hal Saunders. So there would be a regional expert and then a person who had a more general view. I was more of a generalist. I would help Kissinger integrate these issues, so that in devising overall strategies he had someone who could relate these various issues.

For example, one question was how could we use Russia and China to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War? This meant, of course, that it was a fantastic opportunity for me because I sat in on the strategy meetings and helped to write the memoranda, together with the experts, on all of these issues. I went on every one of the trips related to these issues involving Russia, China, and Vietnam. So my job was to work with the experts to make sure that Kissinger was ready for these meetings and/or trips. I would help to write the memos to the President, setting out the strategy for these meetings and/or trips, policy meetings, or NSC decisions related to them. Then I helped to implement the decisions, I would sit in on meetings as a note-taker. I would help write reports to the President after the meetings, whether in Washington or, more usually, when we were traveling. I would also help to prepare the transcripts of the meetings. All of this was completely the case for China and Vietnam, much less so on other issues. On some occasions I was instructed to prepare two versions of reports or transcripts of meetings, leaving out some material for the other agencies.

By the way, Kissinger liked verbatim transcripts, including his jokes. It was easier to do this when a translation was involved, as there was in the case of meetings with the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Russians. There were pauses for translations, and you could keep up a verbatim transcript. I would also sit in when Kissinger was meeting with European leaders, who spoke English. Then keeping up a verbatim transcript was really a frantic job. I was of course more than a note-taker, and others shared this task. I helped to devise strategy and to prepare policy papers and analytical reports to the President afterwards, as well as to suggest where we go from here, especially on China and Vietnam. Of course, I would work closely with the various experts on the NSC staff who knew more about many of these subjects than I did.

The bulk of my time was spent on China and Vietnam, although there was quite a bit of time spent on Russia and on some of these other issues. Then the other main area that I worked on was drafting in general, including memos, reports, transcripts, and recommendations. If the President were giving a speech, whether at the UN, on Vietnam, and so on, Kissinger would turn to me and some others, including the experts, and ask us to give him either the raw material for the speech or some rough drafts.

He would then turn this material over to the speech writers. Our job was to get the substance in there, and their job was to package it, as speech writers do, and give it a lift. Nixon had three, very effective speech writers. Each of them fit a certain, ideological mode. The more liberal of the three was a man named Ray Price. If the President wanted an inspirational speech at the UN, for example, chances are that Ray Price would take it on. The most conservative by far was Pat Buchanan. If the President wanted a hell raising or tough speech for the silent majority or attacking the press, he had Pat Buchanan. Then in the middle was Bill Safire, who is certainly conservative in outlook but in this spectrum of speech writers was sort of in between Price and Buchanan. All three of them were really accomplished wordsmiths, and all of them would greatly improve the rather leaden prose that I would pass up to them.

I helped to get Kissinger ready for press backgrounders. I would help to prepare sample questions and answers, suggest lines of attack or defense, often working with the other NSC staff experts.

We turned out annual Presidential Reports. There were four of these for 1970, 1971, 1972, and 1973. They were generally composed in San Clemente, California, at Nixon's vacation White House, but sometimes also in Washington. These were drafted in the December-January time period, with the final product coming out in February. These were really quite remarkable documents. However, almost invariably, when they came out, the only questions at the press conferences when they were released were about Vietnam. The press would ignore rather important stuff on what we were doing with China or with our allies, in the Middle East, or even with Russia. So it was exasperating that the focus would always be on the immediate problem of Vietnam, as opposed to all of the other elegant, conceptual stuff that was in them.

At some point we'll get into these because, as I went on, I became a speechwriter and then I orchestrated speeches for Kissinger when he was Secretary of State. That, in itself, was an exercise in the agony and ecstasy, but mostly agony.

So these were my basic roles. Most of my time was spent on Vietnam and China. A lot of time was spent on drafting, but some time was spent on Russia and other issues.

*Q: On these memos and notes that you helped draft for Kissinger to go to Nixon on various issues, was there much paper going back and forth on this? Would Nixon come back to Kissinger? Did he have anybody writing for him?*

LORD: We're talking mostly about either strategy memos before meetings or trips, or reporting memos and analysis afterwards. Certainly, on Vietnam or China, I think that it's fair to say that

throughout this period in the White House, I certainly did major reporting on the results of these trips. I want to make clear that I did this, in conjunction with the NSC staff experts. It's fair to say that I had a certain flair for drafting, even though I didn't always have the expertise. I had enough of a sense of the substance, when I got into it, that I could do that. I don't want to exaggerate this, but whether it was on Kissinger's secret trip to China, on which we prepared a 40-page, single space report, or the strategy for upcoming, secret talks on Vietnam, I would certainly do these more or less, in conjunction with others on the staff. In reporting on the results of trips, I would prepare the reports in conjunction with them. It's fair to say that I was a dominant drafter, together and equally with them and increasingly with Peter Rodman, as time went on, on the actual transcripts of these meetings.

Almost single-handedly I did the drafting, in consultation with others, on the 1970 Laos statement, on the 1970 report of the President on Cambodia, and so on.

In most cases the feed back was probably verbal from President Nixon, that is, from Nixon to Kissinger. The one example that was different was on the trip to China. We'll get into this in more detail, but Nixon did an extraordinary amount of homework. I was in charge of putting the briefing books together. I think that we had at least six huge briefing books covering every, conceivable issue. The President underlined and wrote comments on almost every page of the six books. He kept asking for more information, even as we flew out to China, stopping on the way in Hawaii and Guam. Even as he was flying into China, he was asking for more information. He really did his homework and performed very well there.

*Q: Why don't we approach this thematically?*

LORD: I was just wondering if I should give you a portrait of Kissinger. I don't think we've done that yet...

*Q: No, no.*

LORD: And my relationship to him. And then, if you like, we can get into subjects like China...

*Q: Isaacson's book is called...*

LORD: "Kissinger." It shows a very sophisticated grasp of substance in terms of what Kissinger was trying to achieve conceptually, strategically, and tactically. In terms of personality and operating style as well I would have to say that it is the best book on Kissinger that I have seen, even though I fully understand why Kissinger was upset about this book. If someone wrote a book about me that was 90 percent favorable and 10 percent critical, I would be upset about the 10 percent. In Isaacson's case, the critical percentage was higher. There is no question about that. There are some aspects where his comments about Kissinger are unfavorable and/or unfair.

Kissinger had the following strengths. In terms of pure intellect Kissinger was absolutely brilliant. He was a tremendous strategist and conceptual thinker as a geopolitician. He was also a terrific tactician in terms of implementing this strategy. He was a superb negotiator, one who was able to adjust his negotiating style to his interlocutors and their cultural history. He didn't know

much about China before he started his negotiations with the Chinese leaders. He didn't know much about Vietnam. He was more of a European expert.

With the Chinese, and I am oversimplifying this, and their style has changed since then, I might add, their basic approach was first to lay out general principles which they felt strongly about. They would set forth what they really needed from their standpoint and stick quite closely to this to the end. This was in opposition to the Russian negotiating style, which involved inflating their objectives for bargaining purposes. Then they haggled like rug merchants. Or the Israeli style, which reflects their sense of insecurity, understandably because of their history, geography, and so on. The Israelis behave like meticulous lawyers, concentrating on every last detail in negotiating documents. They are almost like Talmudic scholars. Kissinger would go to the Israelis and get 10 requests for agreements that the Israelis wanted him to get out of Anwar Sadat [of Egypt]. Then he would go to Sadat and get agreement on nine of these requests. He would return to the Israelis, and they would complain about the one request that he wasn't able to obtain from Sadat.

*Q: The Japanese called the announcement of the Kissinger agreement with China, the Nixon Shock.*

LORD: And Japan is a key ally of the United States. However, if Kissinger's going secretly to China had been known in advance, a number of things would have happened, and these were some of the arguments used for secrecy.

The Chinese indicated that they wanted some degree of confidentiality as well, but I think that the emphasis on secrecy was certainly as much from our side as theirs. If it had been known in advance that Kissinger was going to China, first, you would have had the Washington bureaucracy weighing in with specific, and, in Kissinger's and Nixon's view, second level concerns, that we had to get this aspect of trade, cultural exchanges, or whatever. Or that we had to be careful about Russian sensitivities. This would have hamstrung the early discussions.

Secondly, we would have had our allies weighing in, in advance, trying to bind us, whether this involved our South Vietnamese allies, the Japanese, or the Europeans making demands and limiting us in our discussions with the Chinese.

Thirdly, there would have been a firestorm among the conservatives and many of the Republicans domestically in the U.S. about the President's even considering making this dramatic move toward China, causing an uproar and hamstringing him in advance. All of this would also have put off the Chinese.

Fourthly, all of this would have been exacerbated by the understandable anguish of our friends on Taiwan.

This can be endlessly debated, and we'll come back to it, but there were at least some plausible arguments for the initial secrecy in connection with the China trip. I might just point that out generally, before I get off track.

There was no question that Kissinger would lose his temper. Isaacson has put out the theory, which may or may not be true, and I think that there may have been some element of truth in it, that Kissinger treated me better than others. I think that this is true, although I got my share of yelling from Kissinger and on many occasions. No question about that.

However, I always felt that Kissinger was less outrageous with me than with some others. I don't particularly buy Isaacson's view for the reasons he cites. I think that this is rather a case of psychobabble. There is the fact that I came from an establishment background, my mother was a member of the Pillsbury family, and I came from Park Avenue. Kissinger was an immigrant, looking for greater social status. I think that is a little bit too complicated for me. Moreover, Nelson Rockefeller surely gave him all these elements. Without wishing to sound pompous or self-righteous, I think that Kissinger felt that I had a certain degree of integrity and principle. He respected that and thought that I was less devious, even though he himself was devious on bureaucratic matters. He felt that I was a little more open. He may have seen some contrast in my approaches versus others and was somewhat more hesitant to scream and yell at me. Frankly, I did good, hard work for him which, I am sure, he appreciated. So, although I had my share of mistreatment, it was not as bad as some others suffered. And he generally would come back more gently after some outburst.

I was put off by the way he would yell and scream at others in front of me or just generally. I was put off by his deviousness, although not so much with me because I knew pretty much everything that was going on. I didn't particularly like the extent of deviousness he displayed with others, which I felt was unnecessary.

Kissinger and I used to joke that when we studied philosophy, as we did in our younger days, he would study logic, and I would study ethics. As was pointed out in one of his books, which he gave me for Christmas, an Andrew Wyeth set of paintings, he inscribed it to my "conscience," or being his conscience.

So Kissinger and I had a complicated relationship. There is no question that, on a personal level, he had high regard for me and my wife, whom he greatly admired, as he liked strong women. My wife is charming and is strong and smart. She talked back to him as well and gave him good advice on China. We were his closest social friends on his staff. He generally didn't socialize too much with people on his staff and never got close to people like Al Haig, for example. Whether at dinner parties, just alone, or at a Chinese restaurant, or whatever the occasion, he saw quite a bit of us. We were one of a small handful invited to his wedding to Nancy. Later on, after Kissinger married Nancy, we saw a good bit of her as well. So it was a good, close relationship.

Of course, there were times when I got mad at him. There were weeks when I would come home, screaming only half in jest that I was ready to quit. My wife would always say: "Knock it off and go back to work." At the time of the Cambodian invasion [in 1970] I was very close to quitting, and we'll get back to that. So I did have some mixed feelings about Kissinger. I would get impatient at the hard work and the constant demands and the deviousness in his treatment of other people. However, at the same time, nobody is perfect, everyone has faults, he was under tremendous pressure, he was working harder than anyone else, he was brilliant, and he was doing, on the whole, things that I thought were very important and constructive. Therefore, you

tend to get into the whole question of means and ends.

So I clearly saw Kissinger's warts. Without being condescending, because I have my own faults, I felt that he was someone who was doing very important things. I felt that you had to forgive people, particularly those under pressure, for certain faults. He was an incredible mix of ego and insecurity. On the one hand, he was extremely self-confident, willing to take on all of these negotiations, juggle a lot of balls at once, go off on trips, and do all of these things with a small staff. He had to have an incredible ego to do all of that. Intellectually, he knew how dominant he was.

However, at the same time he was insecure. He was insecure in terms of President Nixon and the Haldeman crowd, whether they really distrusted him or not. He was insecure in that he did not want people to have direct access to Nixon. We will discuss the phone tapping episode. That clearly was evidence of Kissinger's being in the twilight zone on some of these issues.

He had a tremendous sense of humor, which also was a saving grace. There were constant examples of that. He was self-deprecating. Often Bill Hyland, Peter Rodman, and I would send false memos to him. For example, we once prepared a memo from Kissinger to Nixon suggesting, somewhat irreverently, a meeting with God. We talked about 12 people being present. Supper would be served. A ten-point plan, and so forth. We prepared phony communiques for Guatemala and for Ethiopia in which we would do parodies of meetings just concluded.

I once gave him a picture of a big gorilla, inscribed to me from him, saying: "When I want your opinion, I'll beat it out of you," and that kind of thing. I'm not giving very good examples here, but the point is that this leavened things up and made working for him worthwhile. During meetings, sometimes tense ones, or after them, we would often swap humorous asides.

As he came from Europe, he had a sense of history and tragedy. In looking at the course of events he never had the American sense of optimism. He always had a feeling that things might go wrong. He was greatly concerned with stability and geopolitics. On the one hand, this was an advantage, because he had a sense, as the Europeans did, and as an historian, of the balance of power. This served him well in dealing with China, Russia, Vietnam, and the Middle East. So he had a strong, conceptual and historical background which served him well and worked well with Nixon.

On the other hand, it was a weakness because it meant less concern about human rights and values. This got him into trouble with the right and the left, for example, in connection with the search for detente with the Soviet Union. On human rights generally, he never had a full appreciation of the need for public and Congressional support, which might come more naturally to people born in the United States. In many ways he was more comfortable dealing with authoritarian leaders who could make decisions than in dealing with messy democracies and parliaments. And he did not fully appreciate, in my view that democracies elsewhere helps on national security goals

On the plus side again, I have to say that he got the best out of his staff. I think I have mentioned

that he really stretched me. I learned from him an incredible amount of history, conceptual approaches, and geopolitics, as well as negotiating skills and skill in dealing with the press and the bureaucracy. I will always be grateful to him for that.

I might add, in passing, that any stories about his being a secret swinger and a ladies' man are totally made up, or exaggerated.

I should also point out, on the plus side, that he was a very steady friend. There would be times when he would yell at me and so forth. However, there were times, in the crunch, when he stood by me. A good example, and we'll get to this later, is that my first assignment as a Special Assistant in 1970 was to prepare a long, White Paper on our historical involvement in Laos. Through misleading reports by one agency or another and for other reasons, a mistake, or an alleged mistake, was contained in that White Paper. There was a phrase in that paper that no American had ever been killed in combat in Laos over the previous 20 years or so. There was a lot of controversy about how much we had been involved in Laos secretly. This paper was designed to clear the record. In fact, we didn't have combat soldiers getting killed in Laos. We had people who went into and out of Laos. One group was ambushed and, in self defense, a few had been killed. This was not really combat. So literally the statement we made was true but, of course, it was somewhat misleading. Given the suspicions about our Laos involvement, the statement that in this 20 year period only six or so Americans had been killed, and it wasn't really combat, people could have said: "that's a lot less than we suspected." However, on the day this paper was published, this secret was revealed, so to speak, and made it look as if we were being devious. It was hugely inflated - why would we cover up such a small number? But the agencies misled me in providing information.

Anyway, it was a horrible introduction to being a Special Assistant to Kissinger. The press went crazy, and the White House faced a barrage of questions, day after day. President Nixon was furious at Kissinger and his staff for screwing this up. Throughout that period Kissinger was rock solid personally with me and for me. He said: "It was not your fault. You were just misled by the bureaucracy," which was basically true, by the way. Secondly, while he said this to President Nixon in my defense, it would have been very easy for Kissinger to have laid the responsibility for this statement on me. He basically said: "Look, we should have double checked this around. That's my fault." That is, it was Kissinger's fault, not the fault of his staff. It was a very tough moment for me. I hadn't worked for him for that long. I was new to the West Wing and a brand new Special Assistant, so it wasn't as if he owed me for years of hard work. He stuck by me solidly.

Another good example of his being a good friend, although it was also in his own self-interest, was when Zhou En-lai invited President Nixon to meet with Mao Zedong and said that Kissinger should come along. Kissinger then asked me to come along as well. This was partly so that he wouldn't have to take notes, leaving this task to me. However, in all fairness I had basically done the hardest work on the China visit from the beginning. I had been responsible for overseeing the briefing books. It was obviously an historic moment, and Kissinger included me in on that meeting with Mao, for which I'll always be grateful.

Also, he has been generous to me in his books in referring to my contributions and my character,

as well as in paying tribute to me in public forums.

The down side is that I know that in more recent years there have been times when he has bad mouthed me for some of the policies that I have been involved in. As always, this was not stated publicly, but you always hear about it.

There was the wire tapping episode. We can get into that later on, if you like. However, briefly, his argument was that there were serious leaks in our international security structure, and he was right. As I said earlier, my belief is that if you have a disagreement on policy, you should debate it and generally try to force a policy change. If you lose out on that debate, either you carry the policy out loyally and don't leak, or you quit your job, if it's that fundamental an issue. I was always against leaks. I never leaked, in fact. During that period I was very shy with the press because I knew that I could get into trouble, but also because that was my style. Kissinger, in effect, was saying that these were damaging leaks, and Nixon, Haldeman, and others were suspicious of this liberal staff, anyway. They knew that some of these leaks had to come from a very small circle because the information was so sensitive, and only a few people knew about it.

Therefore, Kissinger said he couldn't say that they could wire tap others but that they couldn't wire tap his staff. He was assured by Attorney General Mitchell and others that the wire tapping was perfectly legal. Kissinger genuinely was concerned about the leaking. A good example of one of these leaks is that just before the secret trip to China, the Pentagon Papers were published, based on selected, secret documents. Daniel Ellsberg, who had been a Pentagon official, put them out without authorization. If anything, these papers were damaging to the Johnson administration, not to the Nixon administration. On purely political grounds you could say that the publication of these papers was all to Nixon's advantage, since they dealt with the Johnson era. However, Nixon and Kissinger went through the roof on the principle that you don't leak these highly classified documents. They were also concerned that the Chinese, who wanted confidentiality in dealings with the U.S. at that point, would feel that the U.S. Government couldn't keep any secrets. So this was Kissinger's reasoning on the wiretapping episode.

Having said that, I would have to add that you cannot square a personal friendship and total trust and intimacy with his authorizing of tapping your phone, as you go along. I am sure that many people felt, and I can understand that, that my sense of outrage was too much under control. I was unhappy with the wiretapping and I said so. I also thought that it was an ineffective way to run down leakers. However, I understood some of the rationale for it. I myself thought that the leaks were unfortunate, even when they involved leaking material to pursue some policy option that I agreed with. I just think that that isn't the way to operate. You can't run a government that way. I understood that I had access to all of the most sensitive information, so that only a few people could be suspected. I would naturally be one of them, because I knew virtually everything. Very few people in that secretive White House knew everything in terms of secret negotiations and policies.

It turned out that I didn't know that my phone was being tapped until just before I was about to leave the White House staff in May, 1973. I wanted to take a break because of total exhaustion and wanting to see more of my family and my kids grow up. The Vietnam War was over, we had opened up to China, we had a degree of détente with the Russians, and it seemed a good time to

leave. I learned about the phone tapping when I had already decided to leave, and I had an exchange about it with Kissinger.

So that is some of the down side of my experience with him.

Kissinger, of course, was very disorganized in many ways. He didn't have a clean management style but, nevertheless, got things done. I don't think that I have anything else to raise at this time, but we may pick up other things as we go along. That is pretty much my recollection of this period.

I want to leave it on a positive note, both in terms of my personal gratitude and my admiration for Kissinger's achievements, his hard work, his brilliance, and his essential patriotism in trying to serve the United States. I'll always be grateful to him and I have affection as well as respect for him. This doesn't mean that there weren't times when I was exasperated or that there were not elements of Kissinger's character that I didn't and don't fully approve of. However, nobody is perfect.

*Q: Before we move to cover the China trip, what about Alexander Haig? I was wondering if you could talk about his role at this time, because he became a major figure later on.*

LORD: Well, Haig rose amazingly fast in the federal bureaucracy. He was recommended by Secretary of Defense McNamara and maybe some other people to Kissinger, who wanted a Military Assistant. He came to the NSC staff as a Colonel with the task of maintaining liaison with the Pentagon and as a Military Assistant to Kissinger. At the time he was no more important than about 15 others on the NSC staff, in terms of either rank or access.

There was fierce competition to see who would be Kissinger's deputy in the early months of the Nixon administration. The major contenders were Mort Halperin, who left partly because of Kissinger's duplicity on various matters and partly because he didn't get to be Deputy National Security Adviser. Another contender was Hal Sonnenfeldt, who had complicated relations with Kissinger. Both were immigrants from Germany. Sonnenfeldt was very smart but was always poking around and making Kissinger nervous. So there was a love-hate relations between the two of them. To a certain extent Larry Lynn was also a contender. He was an assistant to Kissinger from the Defense Department. He did a lot of analytical work, systems analysis work on defense, Vietnam, etc.

Of course, none of these people became Kissinger's deputy. Al Haig became Deputy National Security Adviser, which was quite an extraordinary achievement for someone who didn't even know Kissinger and who had rather obscure beginnings. He worked his way up, finally becoming Kissinger's deputy. He managed this partly because he was a very hard worker, loyal, and tough. He was willing to take on tough issues for Kissinger. It has also been surmised, by Isaacson and others, that Kissinger felt that Haig would not be much of a challenge intellectually, compared to Halperin, Sonnenfeldt, and so on. I think that Kissinger felt that Haig would be a deputy who could do some tough work on his behalf and make the trains run on time. I think that Kissinger felt that he wouldn't always have to be looking over his shoulder at Haig, although that was rather ironic, given their complicated relationship with President Nixon later on.

No matter how you look at it, though, Haig emerged as Kissinger's deputy. He managed to do it, certainly in the early days of the Nixon administration, without alienating the rest of the NSC staff. I mean that he not only reached that position but he did so without leaving a lot of bloody bodies behind him. He sort of did this smoothly. I can't speak for others about their views of Haig at the time. However, I have the impression that, at least in the early going, he was respected and managed to become Deputy National Security Adviser without alienating a lot of people. That was quite an extraordinary achievement.

Now, Al Haig had many strong qualities. No question that he was courageous. He would talk back to Kissinger, which was always important. He was willing to undertake tough assignments, whether this involved giving the bureaucracy bad news or going out to Saigon and trying to persuade President Nguyen van Thieu and the South Vietnamese Government to go along with the Vietnam Agreement of January, 1973. Or going to China in January, 1972, after our secret trip in October, 1971, to help to prepare the final logistics and some of the other details for the subsequent trip by President Nixon. So Haig was someone whom Kissinger could count on to do tough work. He handled some of these assignments very well. He was always outspoken and a very hard worker. He was a genuine patriot, whatever one thinks of all his subsequent views and actions.

As some suspected, Haig would often play good guy with the NSC staff, in distinction from Mad Man Kissinger. He would sometimes be friendly to the NSC staff and say: "I'm on your side. We've got to keep Kissinger under control." I wouldn't put too much emphasis on that, but that was the view of some members of the NSC staff.

On the whole, Haig was more hawkish, if you can put it that way, more suspicious of the North Vietnamese, and more grudging about the Vietnam Peace Accord of January, 1973, although he went along with it. Generally, Haig was on the side of more military pressure in Vietnam, if necessary. He was somewhat more suspicious on how to deal with the Russians. I don't want to suggest any major divergences from established policy. Certainly, he was in full agreement on China. There were no significant differences there. Haig deserves a lot of credit for taking on tough assignments and working very hard. He would cover effectively for Kissinger when he went on secret trips in connection with Vietnam or China. He was very effective in helping to cover up when we were gone from Washington. So he brought many strengths to the job.

He, of course, didn't lack for his own deviousness at times, which played in with Kissinger's style as well. As time went on he more and more gained the confidence of President Nixon for, as we were traveling, he would be the Acting National Security Adviser to the President. He appealed to some of Nixon's more hawkish qualities, his suspicion of the bureaucracy, and so on. He gave Nixon some sense that, perhaps, Kissinger wasn't being tough enough on the Russians or with respect to pressuring Hanoi; or he was being too anxious for a deal with the North Vietnamese. As time went on, Kissinger felt that Haig was playing on some of these issues and trying to gain President Nixon's confidence at Kissinger's expense. I think that there was some evidence for that. The relationship between Kissinger and Haig became very complicated. This is well documented in Isaacson's book and in Kissinger's memoirs.

The most classic example is the effort to try to sell the Vietnam agreement, which we had worked out in October, 1972, to President Thieu of South Vietnam. We went to Saigon after the breakthrough in Paris. Thieu was giving us trouble on that. Kissinger and I kept writing cables back to President Nixon and getting tough cables back in return. Kissinger always felt that Haig was influencing these cables, not always showing all of Kissinger's messages to the President. In the home stretch of the Vietnam negotiations after that, there were some unpleasant articles in conservative columns which took cracks at Kissinger. He always felt that that might have been Haig's influence back in Washington. I'm not saying whether these feelings were correct or not, but they did reflect the rather complicated relationship that Kissinger and Haig had.

There was mutual respect between them. Haig saw all of the strengths of Kissinger that I have enumerated and particularly admired him for those. However, Haig didn't lack for ambition himself. Kissinger saw the value of Haig and leaned on him very heavily, typically in connection with some of the tough work that was needed.

*Q: There are three, major themes now: China, Vietnam, and the Soviet Union. Why don't we take the China theme now?*

LORD: Right.

*Q: Here you have a wife who was born in China, although China was not your particular field. Although you were working...*

LORD: Certainly, the single most dramatic event that I've been involved in had to do with the opening to China in the early 1970s. In my entire career the question of relations with China has been the most important, including not only the work I did in the 1970s but also as Ambassador to China and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. So China has been the single, most important aspect of my career as it has evolved.

It's been given a special dimension by being married to a woman born in Shanghai who, I think, understands China better than anybody that I know. She has always been very prescient on that, although we haven't always agreed on every last policy prescription.

There is some irony about the centrality of China in my career, because I was a Foreign Service Officer in 1962, when my wife and I decided to get married. In those days you had to get permission to marry a foreign citizen. Not just because she was Chinese. She could have been Irish or, say, Congolese. I would still have had to get permission to marry her. The State Department gave this permission, but they said that I would never work on Chinese affairs. This was because many of her relatives were still in China, with the exception of her mother and father and second sister. (Her third sister was still in China at the time.) Her father worked for the Taiwan Sugar Company, which is government-owned, so he was close to being a diplomatic representative of Taiwan in the United States. In fact, he represented Taiwan in the international sugar negotiations. So the State Department said that this combination, and my having a Chinese wife, meant that I would never work on Chinese affairs. I, of course, said that I could find other issues to work on but couldn't find another woman like this, so I would go ahead, with this restriction.

Partly for that reason I never studied Chinese in the State Department. I might never have studied Chinese anyway, given the pressure of time. My wife didn't have the patience to try to teach me Chinese. So I never learned to speak Chinese and never thought that I was going to work on China. Of course, I ended up going with Kissinger on his secret trip to China and was the central support mechanism for Nixon and Kissinger on China throughout that period.

Then, I wound up being American Ambassador to China. So, to my dismay, I didn't speak Chinese when I went to China as Ambassador. I took lessons, but you can't learn Chinese on the basis of an hour a day. There is some irony in all of this, but China has been a special part of my career and my personal life, for the reasons I have mentioned.

One amusing footnote which I might mention, in retrospect, is that my wife was interviewed in the course of my obtaining permission to marry her. In one sense, this interview was outrageous. She was interviewed by someone who was about a mid-level GS civil servant, named Mr. Szluc, I believe. I had accompanied her to the State Department, but Mr. Szluc sent me away and said that the interview was going to take some time. In fact, it lasted for about two hours. He asked her a series of incredible questions which you wouldn't expect native-born Americans to be able to answer, let alone someone born in China. She was not a recent immigrant but had come to the United States at the age of eight. In this interview she was asked to name the starting lineup of the Green Bay Packers football team, who is Vardis Fisher, what's a "Death in the Afternoon" cocktail, what's the difference between a minuet and a pavane, and name the original 13 colonies in the order in which they became part of the United States.

*Q: I couldn't have answered any of those questions!*

LORD: No, and neither could I. I don't know how many she could answer, but I always told her that Mr. Szluc was just having fun. She had a master's degree from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, not to mention an undergraduate degree from Tufts University. In addition to her academic training she is very smart, so obviously the interviewer was just having some fun. He asked the questions very seriously. If she didn't have self-confidence and ego, this process could really have upset her. At the beginning and at the end of the interview he said: "I have the power to deny your application for marriage." He said that with a straight face. On the last question he said: "This is the most important one of all, more important than any other that I have asked so far. What will you do if I tell you that this application for marriage is to be turned down and that your husband cannot remain in the Foreign Service?" She said: "Well, that's very clear. He can get another job but he can't find another person like me to marry." That's what I would have said. So the marriage was approved. It's amusing in retrospect but, in many ways, it was quite outrageous.

*Q: I wanted to say that, as a Foreign Service Officer, I never dealt with China. I entered the Foreign Service in 1955 and always had the feeling: "Damn it. It doesn't make any sense not to have diplomatic relations with China." No doubt there were reasons, but I just wondered if you were carrying any particular intellectual baggage with you in this respect?*

LORD: Well, as I've already discussed, in the early part of my career in the State Department I

worked on Congressional Relations, political-military affairs, and trade matters. When I went over to the Pentagon, I began to work more on Asia and, of course, thought somewhat about China. I have to say that, as I came onto the NSC staff, I certainly was not like Senator Joe McCarthy or Congressman Walter Judd on China. I was not hysterical about this matter. But I also have to say that I wasn't champing at the bit to have a brand new, revolutionary policy toward China.

I was rather open minded. I felt that Mao's Communist China was a pretty unpleasant place and had been pretty unfriendly to the U.S. I was certainly receptive to trying to improve relations, but I was sort of in the middle. I certainly wasn't dug in as a hard right, anti-communist. However, I wasn't one who said that we were absolutely crazy about our policy toward China. I didn't ask why we weren't dealing with the population of 800 million people at the time. So I wasn't a real revolutionary then. It's hard to remember what I felt. I'm sure that I read Nixon's own foreign policy piece in "Foreign Affairs" magazine in 1967, which included the need to deal with China. I think that I was receptive to moving toward China and I saw geopolitical advantages to doing that.

I think that it's fair to say that American analysts, and there might have been some exceptions, on the whole were quite slow to see the Sino-Soviet split. As we look back on it, the Chinese and the Soviets were going through real tensions, certainly by the early 1960s. By the time I joined the NSC staff in the late 1960s to work on Asia, I understood that there were tensions between Moscow and China. I don't think that, even then, we saw how profound they were. We were not under the illusion that the Sino-Soviet bloc was a monolith. Indeed, I am sure that I understood instinctively that what President Nixon and Kissinger intended to do was to attempt some exploitation of the tensions between the two communist states. I would have to say that I didn't appreciate fully the extent of the divisions between Russia and China, even in the late 1960s. The border clashes along the Sino-Soviet border were a dramatic event, of course.

*Q: Along the Ussuri River...*

LORD: Along the Ussuri River, in the summer of 1969. That, obviously, brought home the reality of this split. Once we began dealing with the Chinese and with the Russians, you could see that there was tremendous tension, so it was very clear, of course, by the early 1970s. I would say that I was very slow in coming to realize this, as most people were. I was not naive about a monolithic approach to the two countries, of course, but I didn't realize the full depth of their hostility toward each other.

Nixon and Kissinger each came into office placing a high priority on making an opening to China. They had independently come to this conclusion. Nixon had indicated this in his article in "Foreign Affairs." We know, in retrospect, that he felt that this was a high priority. Kissinger felt the same way, primarily because of the Soviet dimension, but for a variety of other reasons.

Kissinger's rationale, and Nixon's, included the following. First, an opening to China would give us more flexibility on the world scene generally. We wouldn't just be dealing with Moscow. We could deal with Eastern Europe, of course, and we could deal with China, because the former Communist Bloc was no longer a bloc. Kissinger wanted more flexibility, generally. Secondly,

by opening relations with China we would catch Russia's attention and get more leverage on them through playing this obvious, China card. The idea would be to improve relations with Moscow, hoping to stir a little bit of its paranoia by dealing with China. Never getting so engaged with China that we would turn Russia into a hostile enemy but enough to get the attention of the Russians. We'll come back to that. This effort, in fact, worked dramatically after Kissinger's secret trip to China.

Thirdly, Kissinger and Nixon wanted to get help in resolving the Vietnam War. By dealing with Russia and with China we hoped to put pressure on Hanoi to negotiate seriously. At a maximum, we tried to get Russia and China to slow down the provision of aid to North Vietnam somewhat. More realistically and at a minimum, we sought to persuade Russia and China to encourage Hanoi to make a deal with the United States and give Hanoi a sense of isolation because their two, big patrons were dealing with us. Indeed, by their willingness to engage in summit meetings with us, with Nixon going to China in February, 1972, and to Moscow in May, 1972, the Russians and Chinese were beginning to place a higher priority on their bilateral relations with us than on their dealings with their friends in Hanoi. This might begin to make Hanoi nervous.

Much less important for Nixon and Kissinger but a longer range consideration was the potential of economic relations with China. This was less important over the near term, but they saw this in long term dimensions, unlike most American policy makers. They could see a day when China could be an important economic partner of the United States, as well as in terms of cultural exchanges and some other aspects.

*Q: All of this was laid on the table.*

LORD: Yes. This is not just retrospective recollection. This was clearly laid on the table. We also wanted to promote general stability in Asia as well. We had fought a war with China in Korea. There was the problem of North Korea. We thought that generally if we wanted to see a more stable region in East Asia, we would have to deal with China.

These were some of the main reasons for opening up relations with China. Nixon and Kissinger each, and independently, had these reasons on their agenda and, of course, they reinforced each other.

Nixon sent Kissinger a memo on February 1, 1969, approximately one week after his inauguration as President. I can't reconstruct this memo verbatim, but basically he instructed Kissinger to find a way to get in touch with the Chinese. This was one of the earliest instructions that Kissinger got from Nixon. Of course, Kissinger was all in favor of doing this.

We had the following challenge, among a lot of other challenges. You have to remember that we had had 20 years of mutual hostility and just about total isolation from China. We had no way of communicating directly with the Chinese. A lot of Americans were still very suspicious of China, even of an anti-Russian China, including a hard core of Nixon's conservative base. The American public really wasn't attuned to an opening to China as yet, although there were different attitudes on this possibility. We had allies who would be nervous about such an opening to China.

So there were many challenges facing us: how would we get in touch with the Chinese and how would we move, when we knew that they would always put the status of Taiwan up front as the dominant issue? There had been some sporadic talks with the Chinese Communists in Geneva and Warsaw, going back to 1955, but Taiwan, as well as other things, had always been the hang up to an improvement in relations. So the question was: how would we get in touch with the Chinese and how would we move past the Taiwan issue? How would we prepare our allies and the American public for this, particularly the conservatives?

So with all of the obvious advantages that Nixon and Kissinger saw, there were these challenges in the way. Here's the way Nixon and Kissinger went about it. First, in terms of communications, the only way to get in touch with the Chinese was through third parties. I don't have all of the details at hand, although they are available elsewhere. There were various channels that Nixon and Kissinger tried to use to get word to the Chinese. In a general sense, they were looking for a new beginning. One involved using De Gaulle and the French, another was Romania, and we finally, of course, settled on Pakistan.

So we began with indirect negotiations and communications. These warmed up, and we'll come back to that later on. We finally settled, as I say, on the Pakistani channel. Pakistan had the advantage of being a friend to both sides. There was no danger of Russian involvement, as we might have had if we had used Romania. France was a NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] ally of the U.S. and not necessarily the best channel to use to contact China. So, for a variety of reasons we settled on Pakistan. That was one challenge, namely, getting in touch with the Chinese, which we worked out over a couple of years.

*Q: May I interrupt? Why Pakistan? The British had had uninterrupted relations with China.*

LORD: First of all, we would have been willing to use any of these channels. However, it was clear that the Chinese weren't picking up on any of them until we got to Pakistan. The British, of course, because of the Opium War [1839-1842] and their history with China would have been a bad channel for the Chinese. The Chinese didn't pick up on the British. If they had picked up with France, I think that we might have continued with the French. The Chinese also didn't pick up on the feeler through Romania. There might have been a couple of other intermediaries which Nixon and Kissinger tried out, but those were the main ones.

Also, under the general heading of communicating with China, another way that we communicated with China was through taking some unilateral steps at home, by relaxing some economic restrictions. This course did not require reciprocity on their part but was designed to show that we were interested in moving ahead. It was also designed to begin to condition our public and our allies that we were moving ahead in this direction. So several things were done. There was a toast which Nixon gave to President Ceausescu of Romania, in which Nixon used the phrase, the People's Republic of China. This sounds unexceptionable now, but at the time no American official and certainly no President ever used that official designation, which the Chinese Communists wanted. We had always said Red China, Communist China, Mainland China, or something like that.

Even then we knew that the Chinese were very subtle. The Chinese would take aboard our just using that phrase, the People's Republic of China. I remember that at one point Secretary of State Rogers gave a speech in Australia which contained some positive signals to China. We selectively relaxed some Treasury restrictions and some travel restrictions, I believe, for travelers, academics, and perhaps humanitarian representatives. I don't have the details of this but I'm sure that they are in Kissinger's book. We also ended our regular naval patrols in the Taiwan Strait itself, cut them back at least.

The Chinese, in turn, quietly let go free the American yachtsman who had drifted into Chinese waters. Previously they would have made loud noises.

In effect, we signaled the Chinese, in concrete terms, that we were taking certain steps, however modest, and that we wanted to move toward a new beginning with them. These steps were modest enough, and enough in our interest, that we didn't require reciprocity. We didn't want to start to do something which they would have to respond to, tit for tat. We wanted to signal to them, even as we tried to get in touch with them through these indirect channels and messages of a private nature, through these unilateral steps where we wanted to go.

Finally, in the President's annual reports on our foreign relations of 1970 and 1971 we put language on China in them which would suggest to any careful reader that we were moving toward a new kind of relationship with China. By the time the report for 1972 was prepared, this point was quite obvious. So that was designed, not only to send a signal to China and other countries but also to condition our public opinion, which was the other problem, that we were moving toward China. Obviously, all of this, in retrospect, may be clearer than it was at the time. Despite all of these signals nobody was prepared for Kissinger's secret trip to China. A close observer, looking at President Nixon's toasts and statements, statements made by Secretary of State Rogers, as well as the unilateral steps, would surely have seen our tendency, and our goals, but I don't think that anybody could have predicted the dramatic step of Kissinger's secret trip to China and the Nixon trip. However, the fact that we were trying to move toward a better relationship with China was pretty clear.

The clashes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969 underlined the urgency of doing this. We saw the clear evidence of tensions between the two countries. Obviously, China's security concerns on that border, vis-a-vis the Russians, ensured that they would be particularly receptive. I don't have the exact chronology of these various moves but I'm sure that we stepped up our efforts after the border clashes.

*Q: Was there also a feeling that things had reached such a point in China that we might be able to open up relations with that country? This is your field, but there had been this tremendous Cultural Revolution, its offshoot in terms of the Gang of Four, and all of that. China really didn't seem to be ripe for an improvement in our relations.*

LORD: I want to be careful here that I don't retrospectively put perceptions and views in place which are now clear to me and say that we held these views at the time. What was clear, of course, was that China, because of the Soviet threat, might well be interested in improving relations with us. The Soviet Union was clearly their biggest security threat, and the border

clashes had made that clear. We sensed that already before then, and then those border clashes brought it home. So, in that sense, we figured that China would be receptive to these overtures, and for the same reasons that we were. The Soviet factor applied to both countries, in addition to more esoteric things, like dealing with the strongest power in the world, security considerations, and so on.

In addition, the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, after the Soviets put down the Prague Spring, Czech dissent, had a major impact on the Chinese. Naturally they were very concerned about Moscow's asserting the right to intervene in other country's domestic affairs for the sake of socialist solidarity.

You have to remember that, although the most extreme manifestations of the Cultural Revolution were in the late 1960s, it really went on, officially, until the end of 1976. So the Chinese were still sorting this out at the time. In addition to the Soviet factor we also thought that the Chinese might think that, if they could improve relations with us, that might open the door to relations with other countries. Japan was certainly holding back on its opening to China. The French had made some movement toward China, but the British and others, such as the Federal Republic of Germany, were generally holding back in developing relations with China because of the U.S. posture, whether this involved admission of Communist China into the UN or just generally dealing with it. We figured that the Chinese would calculate that if they could open the door with us, that would mean that they could break out of their isolation more generally with all of these other countries. Not to mention getting into the United Nations and beginning to establish at least unofficial, if not official, relationships and breaking out of various kinds of embargoes and isolation with Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. So we figured that that would be another incentive for them which would have a multiplier effect if they opened up with us.

I think that we had some sense that China must have felt somewhat beleaguered at this time. You may remember that the Chinese Government recalled all of its ambassadors during the Cultural Revolution, except for Huang Hua, who was Ambassador to Egypt. So they were isolated. However, frankly, we didn't know much about what was going on in China, as far as the full depth of the Cultural Revolution. We couldn't be sure at the beginning of our effort to establish better relations with China that Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai would have the vision and courage to open up with us. However, the Russian factor and the perceived Chinese need to break out of their isolation more generally by opening up with us were two of the reasons why, we felt, they would be receptive to our efforts.

*Q: These are all oral histories, and we are focusing on the perceptions of the individuals interviewed. You had been doing more general work for Kissinger. How were you clued in on the policy at that point?*

LORD: During my first year on the NSC staff, from February, 1969, until February, 1970, I was not aware of the fact that we were doing private things to establish contact with China. We took some unilateral steps, as I have already mentioned. When I say that I was not aware that we were trying to establish contact with China, let me make it clear that I was not aware that we were trying to pass secret messages to the Chinese. I was aware of some of these unilateral steps because they started in 1969. These involved action taken by the Department of the Treasury and

the Department of Commerce, maybe USTR.

*Q: You mean the travel restrictions. Had the ping pong diplomacy business started?*

LORD: No, that was later, in April, 1971, and we'll get back to that. It happened just before Kissinger's secret trip to China. When I became Special Assistant in February 1970, I was aware of the fact that we were searching for a new relationship with China. We were easing these unilateral restrictions, and I learned that we were starting to send some signals to China. I sat in on some of the discussions about what to do during the Sino-Soviet clashes along the Ussuri River, how much to intervene, what steps to take, and so on. So I was aware of that and the geopolitical desire to improve relations with China. I wasn't aware of that memo from President Nixon to Kissinger of February 1, 1969. I was not aware of the efforts to get in touch secretly with China. I was already aware, of course, that we had talks going on with the Chinese Communists in Warsaw. At the time those talks were being reported through official State Department channels. They were generally just sort of propaganda exchanges. Once I became Special Assistant I was privy to all these moves, of course.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: These were not actually resumed until 1970. There was an effort to try to get them going again.*

LORD: Then they were broken off again after the incursion into Cambodia by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces in the spring of 1970. When I became a Special Assistant to Kissinger, I was immediately told about the secret Vietnam negotiations and the secret China negotiations. I was more generally aware, then, of our dealing with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on the Russian front. I was involved in some of these issues but I didn't become fully involved, particularly with the message passing to China, until I became a Special Assistant to Kissinger in 1970.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You mentioned that you took part in meetings on the clashes along the Ussuri River.*

LORD: That's right.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was there ever a discussion of the United States taking a clearer position on these?*

LORD: As I've said from the beginning of this, I don't want to mislead anyone with a memory precision which I don't have. Again, I think that Kissinger's book would be the most detailed on this. There was certainly a feeling by Kissinger and, I assume, by Nixon, that in the geopolitical picture it would be dangerous for America if the Russians were to humiliate China. Also, these clashes gave us an opening with China; they really brought home their concerns and maybe made them more receptive to our overtures. Therefore, the issues were what signals could we send, either by restraining the Russians or what we might say publicly or on background, and how could we get word to the Chinese that we didn't want them to be humiliated? I don't recall the details of any actual debate about whether we would move military assets around, how much we would threaten the Russians, or how much we would say on background.

Kissinger's main interest was the fact that there was tension on the Sino-Soviet border and that this gave us an opening to China.

So in 1969 and in 1970-1971 there were these public signals and attempts to get through to the Chinese through various channels. Again, the great detail would be in books by Kissinger and others, including Isaacson and so on.

This effort began to be more pronounced in the spring of 1971, of course. There was the ping pong diplomacy business and there was also an interview which Chairman Mao had with Edgar Snow. This interview indicated some receptivity to better relations with the United States. Nixon, of course...

*Q: Edgar Snow was a...*

LORD: Biographer of Mao and a journalist who had spent many years in China.

*Q: He wrote Red Star Over China.*

LORD: Yes. This book spoke admiringly of the Chinese Communists and of the Chinese revolution. We saw this interview as part of a signal back to us. I can't recall the precise chronology. We didn't get much back from some of the channels we opened up through the Romanians and the French. These wouldn't necessarily consist of verbatim messages passed back and forth. There would just be Nixon telling Ceausescu or De Gaulle that the next time they were in touch with the Chinese they might say that the U.S. was interested in better relations with China. It would be at that level.

I don't remember the precise chronology, but it became clear, certainly by 1971, that the Pakistani channel was the one to follow. We began to do it through Hilaly, the Pakistani Ambassador to Washington, who would come to us with hand-written messages from the Chinese, passed through Islamabad to him. He would bring these messages into Kissinger's office, and we would prepare hand-written messages back. Often, I would draft them, or Kissinger would. Then he and I would go over the draft and send it back through Ambassador Hilaly. The issue became how do we move this relationship forward and how do we get beyond the issue of Taiwan dominating the agenda?

There was one exchange in Warsaw, in which the Chinese indicated, more or less on the record and through that channel, that they would be willing to see an American emissary come to China. This was phrased in general terms. Meanwhile, we picked up on that in the private messages through the Pakistanis. Again, I can't give you an exact chronology here. There were gaps in the contacts, sometimes lasting for months. Then through the Pakistani channel the Chinese began to talk about a possible American visitor to China.

There were two issues facing us. One was who would go? Also, what would the ground rules be? These were matters which were dangerous for both sides. So a lot of these messages were designed by us to get Chinese agreement. For us the issue couldn't just be Taiwan. Their initial position was, more or less: "Send someone over here. We can talk to you, but you must resolve

the Taiwan issue before we can do anything else." We wanted to maneuver it so that while we were willing to talk about Taiwan - of course, we would have to do that or we wouldn't get anywhere with them - there would be a broader agenda as well. We finally got to the point in these messages where the Chinese agreed that an American emissary would come and talk about a possible trip to China by President Nixon. The emissary would not only talk about Taiwan but about other matters as well. This was the breakthrough, in the spring of 1971.

Once we had established that this was not just a single issue agenda, that they were willing to consider a Nixon trip, and that they were prepared to receive an American emissary first, then we could begin to get concrete. Right about this time, in the spring of 1971, we had the incident of ping pong diplomacy. This essentially involved an American ping pong team in Japan, which the Chinese invited to visit China. The ping pong team agreed. They went to China and had a warm reception. This was a major development. In fact, we hadn't had a group like that going to China throughout this period. We, of course, understood this event, particularly against the backdrop of our secret channel, that this was a clear signal by them to us that they wanted to move ahead and that they were beginning to prepare their own public for some movement on relations with the U.S. The invitation to the ping pong team was a very carefully calculated move by the Chinese.

So we had the secret channel getting more receptive regarding an American emissary and the fact that the agenda would be broader than Taiwan. We had the public comments by Mao to Edgar Snow, although I forget the date of this interview. Then we had the ping pong diplomacy incident. Meanwhile, we had taken some unilateral steps, so things were beginning to move.

*Q: You were talking about China. You had John Holdridge, who was a China expert in the State Department. Here Nixon and Kissinger were trying to puzzle out China, which they obviously had no intimate knowledge of. Where were you getting the input for the messages you were drafting? Did it come from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], Holdridge, or someone else about what the Chinese were probably thinking?*

LORD: That's a very fair question. First, Holdridge knew quite a bit about China and spoke Chinese. I want to make clear that I am talking about my own role, but Holdridge was clearly crucial here and throughout this period. He brought a lot of knowledge on the China issue to Kissinger and, through him, to President Nixon. In addition, we would ask the bureaucracy for various studies on China, not saying what the real purpose was, in terms of setting up a secret or dramatic breakthrough. However, these were legitimate study memoranda about China and they were very useful. Also we were moving ahead with these unilateral, economic steps. We would ask for analysis of the economic situation and other background material, as required.

Quite a bit of material was submitted by the State Department, CIA, and other government departments, in a legitimate exercise of looking at policy options, generally informing the President and so on. Then, in addition, Kissinger began consulting, on an individual basis, with outside scholars and experts on China. This included Allan Whiting, a Far Eastern specialist, and Andre Malraux, from France, who had written the book, "Man's Fate," and knew something about China. Malraux saw President Nixon as well. I'm sure that these consultations included others but I just can't recall them all.

I assume that President Nixon began to read up on China, as well. I certainly did the same. So there was a combination of Holdridge on the NSC staff; official memoranda from the bureaucracy, requested from the White House; intelligence reports in the normal course of events; and consultations with outside experts. I'll get into the preparations for Nixon's trip later. Does that answer your question?

*Q: Yes.*

LORD: One of the criticisms of the secrecy of this whole operation was that we couldn't fully take advantage of the people in the State Department, on the China desk. We included them finally, as we went along after the 1971 Kissinger trip. However, for a long while people would say that we didn't have the full advantage of their knowledge. Having said that, I would say that we would often get this knowledge by asking for memos. As we went forward on trips, we began to take this material with us. Kissinger went on nine trips from 1971-76. I was on every one. He brought along with him State Department people like Al Jenkins and Marshall Green, of course [Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs], in addition to others who could provide supplementary information and views. You're right. We didn't have the intimate, day to day exchanges that some of these people might have provided, had they been included.

*Q: Did you have any idea who was sending the hand-written notes from the Chinese side?*

LORD: We assumed that they were prepared by Zhou En-lai personally, after checking with Mao. There was no question that something of this magnitude was probably from Zhou En-lai. We didn't know whether Zhou En-lai personally drafted these notes or somebody who was the equivalent of Win Lord on his side. Clearly, these notes had Zhou En-lai's personal touch.

*Q: One other question on the beginning of this opening to China. In a way, Pakistan seemed like an unlikely choice. Was there concern about a possible leakage? Were there any quid pro quos for the Pakistanis?*

LORD: Well, as I said, we sort of tried various channels to see which ones the Chinese were most comfortable with. They chose the Pakistanis. I think that they did it because Pakistan had been friendly to them. China was having its problems with India. They had a war with India in 1962, so China had always leaned toward Pakistan, supporting it on the Kashmir issue, for example. The Chinese generally had a solid relationship with Pakistan. In fact, that has continued all the way through to the present day.

Meanwhile, on our side, we also would lean, on the whole, toward Pakistan. First of all, because we felt that India was lined up with the Soviet Union. Although India was head of the Non-Aligned Movement, it kept doing things that annoyed us. Even under previous American administrations, and more especially under Nixon and Kissinger, we tilted, to use the famous word, toward Pakistan. So Pakistan was a country which was friendly toward both sides, the United States and China. I think that's probably the main reason that the Chinese settled on Pakistan. There was little danger of leaks to India or Russia, which were two of the main concerns in terms of the opening to China at that point.

The other issue, of course, was who was going to go to China? There was some debate, as recounted in Kissinger's book. President Nixon was ambivalent about anybody going because it might take away from the drama of his going to China. Of course, by then he had this complicated relationship with Kissinger in terms of ego and sensitivity. However, he also wanted someone who could handle this trip effectively, and Kissinger was the best person to do that. He also recognized that he just couldn't go to China cold turkey and without preliminary preparations. He realized that it was necessary to prepare the way. We weren't even sure before the Kissinger trip whether the Nixon trip would even be possible. The purpose of the Kissinger trip was to set up the Nixon trip. We had to see whether there was enough to go on, to protect our flanks, and to see whether we could get around the Taiwan issue. So it was a tricky thing.

There was some debate whether we should send Ambassador David Bruce, Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, and I forget the other names that were discussed. I think that at one point Nixon just suggested to Kissinger that maybe Secretary of State Rogers should go. I don't think Nixon ever seriously considered that. Of course, from the beginning, Kissinger wanted to go. He thought that he was the best person to handle it, and I think that he was. Not to mention Kissinger's ego, sense of history, and so on.

Finally, they settled on Kissinger but, even then, there was some debate about where they, Kissinger and the Chinese, would meet. I think that there was some discussion that perhaps they didn't actually have to meet in China and that they could meet somewhere else. I think that there was a feeling that Nixon preferred that rather than have Kissinger go to Beijing, which had a certain drama. Maybe they could just meet over the border in southern China, across the border from Pakistan, or something like that. Again, it wouldn't be the same thing as going to the capital city of the Middle Kingdom [traditional Chinese name for China]. It would reserve more drama for Nixon.

Kissinger, of course, was all in favor of making this trip as dramatic and as central as possible. He also felt that with the Chinese, in terms of psychology and face, a willingness for the American emissary to go to the capital of the Middle Kingdom would be useful. Another consideration was that Kissinger could meet whomever he needed to meet much more directly. This would be no more complicated, in terms of secrecy, than some other place in China. So eventually, and I don't recall the exact chronology or the number of messages that went back and forth, they settled on Kissinger going. They settled on the agenda including issues in addition to Taiwan, and on holding the meeting in Beijing. Then they agreed that, with the cooperation of Pakistan, they would make the trip to China through Pakistan.

Before getting to the secret trip itself, are there any questions that you want to ask, as background at this point?

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I have a question if it qualifies as background. Otherwise, postpone it. You mentioned the Taiwan issue several times. I was wondering if you could say anything about the attitude of Kissinger and Nixon, perhaps, toward Taiwan? What did they think of Taiwan at this time and how significant did they feel that it was as an obstacle?*

LORD: I think that you have to be careful in retrospect. I think that it's fair to summarize their

position as being friendly to Taiwan. Their feeling was that, in terms of American national interests however, you have to take some risks in that relationship, in order to move ahead with China. However, this must be done carefully, both out of loyalty to Taiwan and always conscious that, if you mistreat your friends, other allies and friends are going to get nervous about your steadiness. For example, that was a clear motive for our trying to get out of Vietnam honorably, and not undermining our credibility in terms of how we treat our allies. This point applied to Taiwan. Clearly, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to square the circle. They wanted to open up with China without having to go too far in destroying our relationship with Taiwan and, in the course of doing this, not only hurting our international reputation for steadiness and friendship with our allies, but also stirring up domestic opposition to mistreating an old friend.

So it was a cool-headed, hard-headed, and calculated sense of geopolitics which drove our desire to open up with China for all of the reasons that I've mentioned. We desired to do this with minimum disruption on the Taiwan front, but knowing that we were going to have to do some fancy footwork with the Chinese. From the very beginning, and this is reflected in the Shanghai Communique, the strategy was, in effect, and I think that it was effectively carried out, to postpone resolution of the Taiwan issue, try to appeal to Beijing's sense of geopolitics and fear of the Soviet Union and its desire to break out of its isolation, and to try to override its preoccupation with Taiwan. So we needed to devise an approach, and eventual language, that would preserve Beijing's position and preserve our interests. The idea was to keep working on the Taiwan issue, but we would kick it down the road for later resolution. So that was the basic approach.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: One other factor. You also mentioned relationships with allies and the importance of secrecy prior to this. There have been some suggestions, in some of the books written about this episode, that Kissinger didn't like the Japanese very much and that some of the secrecy involved in this trip was intended to send a message to the Japanese.*

LORD: I wouldn't go nearly that far, because Japan is an important ally, and he wouldn't want to disrupt the alliance. I think that it is fair to say, and this continues to the present day, that Kissinger always had a certain suspicion of Japan, even as he had of Russia, versus a predilection to go easier on the Chinese. I've discussed this with him, and this view still persists. But surely he did not wish to hurt our ties with Tokyo or send any message.

Kissinger was genuinely concerned about leaks out of Japan, feeling that the Japanese were particularly prone to leaks in their media. He was aware of the Japanese-Chinese love-hate relationship, because of World War II and other matters. So it wasn't as if Kissinger wanted to hurt our relations with Japan. He was certainly too calculating in terms of American national interests to go out of his way to annoy Japan. That wasn't the point. However, he was prepared to run some risks to pull off the China trip correctly and not be pressured, whether by Japan or others, to lock ourselves into a position with the Chinese before we even set out.

Now Kissinger would be the first to admit that, as we moved to improve relations with China, we didn't handle the Japan side very well. The dilemma we faced about pre-briefing other nations is that we might be pressured by Japan and others to take positions before we even sat down with the Chinese. Kissinger and Nixon had the feeling that this was totally uncharted territory. It may look relatively easy and inevitable in retrospect, but it was very uncertain at the time. Making

this trip to China was not without its risks, despite our feeling that the Chinese would be receptive because of their fear of the Soviets and of their isolation. Therefore, we wanted as free a hand as we could get when we sat down with the Chinese.

I don't know whether Kissinger would agree with me on this, but, in retrospect, I believe what we should have done to square this circle was to have someone, not very prominent or noteworthy, like myself or Holdridge, go to Japan, perhaps a week before the secret trip to China, or something like that. Such a person could have gone personally to Sato, who, I think, was the Japanese Prime Minister then and informed him in advance. In this way, as a minimum, when this news broke, he could have said that he had been informed in advance by the United States. We could have informed him and sworn him to secrecy. I think that it would have been worth taking that risk of a leak to have done this shortly before the secret Kissinger trip to Beijing.

I don't think any of us proposed this then, and I doubt whether Kissinger would have agreed to this. I think that he would have felt that this wouldn't work because Prime Minister Sato would have to tell his cabinet colleagues or be considered complicitous himself in holding back this information. Then it would leak out, and all the down side of advance publicity I have talked about before would have occurred. We surely gave a shock to Japan, not to mention to some of our NATO allies and others. You could make a case for tipping off Japan more than Europe, since this was an Asian event. We might have informed the Japanese leader so that he could at least say, as a matter of saving face, that he knew in advance, as opposed to admitting that he knew nothing. The fact is that Japan had been holding back in its relations with China, primarily at our insistence. The Japanese were very anxious to move ahead, at least a little bit, in their relations with China. They held back because we kept urging them not to do that. So they felt betrayed when we leap-frogged them.

*Q: Was this a matter of any debate beforehand in Washington, when you were making the preparations for the Kissinger visit to Beijing?*

LORD: It must have been, but I can't recall any vivid debates, believe it or not. We must have talked about whom else to tell about this trip. These arguments about secrecy or not must have been explored. However, I don't recall this as being an ongoing, vivid, and raging debate. I certainly don't recall myself or anyone else, pressuring Kissinger to tell our friends of this trip in advance. I want to be fair about that.

*Q: Particularly because of the impact on Japan, was there anyone in the NSC or in the immediate circle of people dealing with this trip who was really a Japan expert and who would understand the impact on Japan?*

LORD: I think that almost anybody would understand that. You wouldn't have to be a genius or a Japan expert to realize that this visit to China by Kissinger would have a major impact. In retrospect, I don't think that we fully appreciated the depth of the shock and perhaps, a Japan expert would have brought this home. Certainly, John Holdridge knew enough about Japan to understand this. It's not as if we hadn't been dealing with Japan. We had a recently completed agreement on Okinawa, which was quite significant. We had some sporadic textile negotiations.

I want to make clear that Kissinger, whatever his belief that Japan some day may go nuclear or become nationalistic again, certainly, as a friend and ally wouldn't want to go out of his way to cause trouble for Japan. Of course, Kissinger had certain priorities and was worried about leaks.

So I think that Kissinger and Nixon probably didn't fully appreciate the totally devastating blow which the announcement of the Kissinger visit to China would be in Japan. They certainly were aware that this announcement was going to break some crockery. They weighed carefully these considerations. However, I don't recall any raging debates about this, although I could be wrong. I certainly don't recall my pressing any other course than what we did, even though, in retrospect, I would have done it differently.

As we got into May and June, 1971 and with messages transmitted through the Pakistanis we settled on the dates, places, and everything else. I know that we had to bring our Ambassador to Pakistan, Farland, into the preparations, and the CIA, about how we would do this. Farland came to the US, I believe California, for consultations. We got some special briefcases from the CIA with locks on them, and we began to get ready for the Kissinger trip to China. Together with Holdridge, I began feeding Kissinger with lots of briefing material, some of which we would get from the bureaucracy in innocent ways and other materials which we produced ourselves.

Kissinger chose three people to go to China with him. Myself, as a sort of global sidekick, Holdridge as the Asia and China expert, and Dick Smyser, as the Vietnam expert. The Vietnam issue would be a significant factor in the discussions in China. Those were the four, including Kissinger himself, whom he chose to go into China, as well as two Secret Service agents. Kissinger began reading extensively on Chinese history, culture, and so on. I, of course, did the same. I fed him other materials. We began to prepare strategy papers and talking points on various issues or formulations, some of which we would get from past State Department papers. Our famous formulation on Taiwan, that the U.S. acknowledge the view of Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Straits, etc. I believe it drew upon earlier State Department think pieces and so on. Whether it was history, culture, or personal portraits, I'm sure that we requisitioned some of this material from the CIA and the State Department, although carefully, to disguise our real purposes. I can't recall just how much I drew upon my wife at that point, in terms of what she suggested reading.

So Kissinger began to bone up on this material. I think that we met with the CIA and Farland in California at some point to go over some of the secret logistics of how to get in and out of China secretly. At one point we went down to Key Biscayne, Florida and spent a few days game playing the trip, thinking about it, and preparing memos. So we began to get ready for it.

Now, as you recall, there was a publicly announced trip that Kissinger took. It included Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. Then Kissinger was supposed to return to Washington through Paris. That was the public itinerary. However, the game plan was to go off secretly to Beijing from Pakistan and by pleading illness and the need to go to a Pakistani hill station to spend a couple of days allegedly recuperating while, in fact, Kissinger was secretly going into China.

Ironically, Kissinger came down with a real stomach-ache in India, and so he actually was sick in advance of this secret trip. He covered this up as much as possible, because he wanted to save his

real illness until he arrived in Pakistan. I should point out that for the public trip the key U.S. Air Force Special Missions aircraft were taken up for one reason or another. We had a rather poor aircraft. It had no windows and was quite noisy, as I recall. [FYI: This was a KC-135 tanker aircraft with fuel tanks removed and passenger accommodations installed. These aircraft have one fairly small window over each wing. END FYI]

I had the rather incredible job of juggling three types of briefing memos and schedules. There were three groups of people on this flight. In one group were Kissinger, Holdridge, Smyser, and myself, who not only knew that we were going into China but also were privy to the talking points, the strategy, and all of the stuff that we needed to get ready. Not to mention the logistic details on when we would sneak out of Pakistan and how we would do it. This was all on a tightly constricted aircraft, I might add, on which we were going around to these other places. So I would have to keep those briefing memos up to date, including the logistics, the schedule, and the substance. There was the constant harassment by Kissinger of keeping them up to date and in not too gentle a fashion. I had to make sure that only Kissinger, Smyser, and Holdridge would see certain briefing books. I'm talking about people sitting right next to each other on the plane, some of whom knew of the secret trip to China and some of whom did not.

Then there was another group. I know that it included Hal Saunders, NSC Specialist for Near Eastern Affairs, who was along because we were visiting India and Pakistan. People in this group knew that we were going into China, because they had to help cover for us. However, they had no need to know what our strategy and talking points were with the Chinese. So Hal and a couple of others had another series of briefing books. These were sanitized or excerpted copies of the other memos.

There was the third group of people who didn't even know that we were going to China. They had to get a completely different set of logistics and non-substantive memos, as well as substantive papers on matters with which they were concerned.

So there was the usual harassment of Kissinger always looking for excellence and always revising things and asking me repeatedly to update things, complicated by the fact that I had to do three different versions of these revisions. This was one of the more hectic times of my life. Of course, it was so exciting and dramatic that I never begrudged any of this. However, it was a challenge. Kissinger himself has said in his memoirs that it was a rather extraordinary performance on my part. So all of that was quite exciting.

*Q: I was wondering, what was the take that was coming through the system that you were seeing on the leadership in China at that time?*

LORD: Before answering that, there are a couple of things that I want to recall before I forget them. There are a couple of amusing vignettes. Of course, of all the secret things that Kissinger did, along with the Vietnam negotiations, this was the most secret of all. Kissinger swore me to secrecy, as he always did. However, he also understood that I had a very open relationship with my wife and that I was telling her everything. At least Kissinger suspected that. I never quite admitted or denied it. I just trusted her. That's the kind of marriage I have, and I also wanted to get her advice, particularly on China. She was born in Shanghai and is of Chinese ancestry.

Kissinger has said in his memoirs something about the agony of preparing for this trip. He recalls that he told me that I couldn't even tell my wife about it because she was Chinese and would be suspected if there were any leaks. She knew a certain amount about our China policies. However, I was careful. I let her know that we were trying to open up relations with China. I wasn't precise with her about the details of the secret trip but I wanted her to know that we were going to go to China. I also wanted to keep my pledge to Kissinger. So the night before we left Washington on the publicly-announced trip, I called her over to the window of our house and said: "Look out there. I think that I see a 'Peking Tom'" and smiled. Of course, she understood what was going on.

Another thing is that I called her parents, as I always did, to say good-bye before setting off on this trip. I'm very close to my parents-in-law. I'll never know why, but my mother-in-law said: "Hope you enjoy your 'Peking Duck.'" I almost fell off the chair! I don't recall whether there was any public speculation about Kissinger going to China. I don't believe so. In fact, I'm sure that there wasn't. So I don't know how she had this instinct. Certainly my wife had not told her! I was very careful about leakage, of course, and I totally trusted her. Even in this connection I was a little vague, but I know that I wanted her to know where I was going.

The other point I want to make before we get into your question is that, during this period we were trying to improve relations with Russia. We had a mixed bag of results in this connection in 1969 and up to the summer of 1971. We're talking about July, 1971. We had been suggesting for some time that there should be a summit meeting between President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev. The Russians were dragging their feet on this proposal, as well as on the issues of Berlin and arms control. We clearly got the Russians' attention after this secret trip, and things began moving immediately. The point is that we were still prepared to have a summit meeting with Russia and, indeed, before we had a summit meeting with China, if we could arrange one when we went to Beijing.

We wanted to get our sequence straight before we landed in China. So there were instructions for Deputy National Security Adviser Haig to call in Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin while we were traveling and to make one last suggestion of a Summit Meeting with Moscow. Haig was supposed to let us know the outcome of this proposal as we traveled. Anyhow, Haig made the pitch, Ambassador Dobrynin turned it down on instructions, or at least put it off. Haig called me at 3:00 AM local time in Bangkok. He got me out of bed. We used double talk on the phone, but Kissinger said that this wouldn't have fooled a kindergarten kid. Basically, he was saying that the Russians had turned us down.

We then made a clear decision that we would have a summit meeting with China first, assuming that we could arrange it, as opposed to a summit meeting with Russia. Of course, the Russians couldn't know how they were screwing up, because they certainly would have accepted a summit meeting first in Moscow, had they known that we were considering a summit meeting in Beijing. So that is of some significance.

Now, to get to your question. I don't recall all of the information we got on the Chinese leadership at that time. I'm sure that we drew on the resources of all of the U.S. Government

agencies, including the CIA as well as the State Department. I just don't recall what these various sources said about the Chinese leadership. Clearly, I don't think that we could have appreciated the courage and vision that we saw in Mao and Zhou En-lai before we began to interact with them. I would quickly add that we saw these qualities, along with all of the other terrible attributes of both of these people, particularly Mao Zedong. I don't want my views to be taken out of context.

We weren't aware of the full extent of the Cultural Revolution, and certainly the horrors of it. I don't think that anybody was. It was clear that Zhou En-lai was a very skillful leader, but the impact that he made on all of us was much greater than we'd been prepared for. We obviously knew that he was a significant figure and that Mao was a major figure. We had no illusions; we knew that these were ruthless people. There was no question about that. You don't get to the top in that system without being ruthless. We knew about the famine, the Great Leap Forward, and what we knew about the Cultural Revolution, not to mention their intervening careers and so on. They talked about nuclear weapons; at that point they not only were in favor of having them themselves but were also relaxed about nuclear proliferation. They were opposed to us on all fronts and they used hostile rhetoric. I mean, this was not an easy crowd to deal with. However, we also knew their incentives in wishing to improve relations with us, and I have talked about them.

We obviously had detailed CIA and other reports on Mao and Zhou.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was there any sense of factionalism? Did you have any sense that Mao and Zhou were doing anything that was dangerous to them?*

LORD: I want to be careful about this. I am sure that we assumed that approval for broadened contact with us had to come from Mao. Obviously, it came through Zhou, because he was the man who was signing off on the communications. It was obvious that they were working together. I don't know whether we knew who might be hostile to us or the opening. But we knew that broadened contact with us would be very controversial in China, even as improved relations between the two countries were in the U.S. We didn't know how much they were keeping the fact of our contacts on a close hold basis in their bureaucracy, as we were in ours. One of the reasons for secrecy, in addition to the ones I mentioned, was that there was still opposition in China to what they were doing.

I have to say that, as I recall, we didn't have a particularly sophisticated sense of Chinese factionalism. Whether Lin Piao would be opposed to this course, for example, or how Mao and Zhou related to each other, although we probably knew that Zhou had survived by being loyal and always being Number Three in the Chinese Communist hierarchy, if possible, and not Number Two. We had the general sense that Zhou was more pragmatic and moderate than Mao, and things like that. However, I just can't recall how perceptive and how sophisticated our analysis of these Chinese leaders really were.

*Q: We had this program for years of interviewing people coming out of China through Hong Kong, reading papers, and so forth. But still, you say, you did not know that the Cultural Revolution was such a disaster.*

LORD: Well, we knew that this was a terrible system and we knew that the Chinese people had suffered. I knew this personally because my sister-in-law, my wife Bette's sister, had escaped from China in late 1962 through Hong Kong, just in time for our wedding. At the time the Chinese authorities were letting some people out because of the terrible famine. She joined her family and was at our wedding in 1963. My wife wrote a book, before we went to Geneva [in 1965], called "Eighth Moon," based on my sister-in-law's living in China and getting out. So we knew first hand from her of the horrors of the system and the economic problems, as well as the repression. We, of course, knew of the burning of the British Embassy in Beijing and other acts of fanaticism and the isolation of China. So we were aware of these things. I don't think that we had a full sense of just how pervasive and devastating all of these developments were.

Even though we knew that the Great Leap Forward had been a disaster, I don't think that anyone knew of its extent. Even by Chinese Communist admissions, it was 30 million dead, or something like that. Yes, we knew that this was an unpleasant and terrible system. The Chinese leadership was composed of tough people, and the Chinese people had suffered under them. However, I think that the situation was worse than we realized. Of course, this was somewhat balanced by the emphasis of President Nixon and Kissinger, that the opening up to China was in America's national interest, even though the Chinese leadership was composed of an unpleasant group of people.

*Q: Then how did this trip to China proceed?*

LORD: A lot of material has already been published about how this secret trip to China worked out. However, this is how the secret trip worked.

We went publicly to Pakistan. There was a public banquet the first night. We went back to the government guest house. We packed and, at about 3:00 AM we were driven to the Islamabad airport by the Pakistani Foreign Minister I believe - Sultan Khan. It seems that they're all named Khan. I've seen him since. We went to President Yahya Khan's plane. Apparently, there was one reporter from some news service who thought he saw us and reported this to his editor. The editor said that the reporter was crazy and spiked [rejected] the story. I wonder what happened to that guy's career.

The plan was to be gone on this secret trip to China for 48 hours. We got on Yahya Khan's airplane. Let me talk about the cover story. We took off for China and we left about 4:00 AM. On that morning the story was put out that Kissinger was not feeling well and, at the invitation of the Pakistanis, he was going up to a hill station [mountain resort] to recuperate for a day. There was a Secret Service agent in a car, slumped over. It wasn't supposed to be an impersonation but he played Kissinger up to the hill station and, I believe, Hal Saunders was with him. So there was a motorcade going up to the hill station. All of this was done fairly early in the morning so that there were no journalists around.

Arrangements were to be made for a Pakistani doctor to attend to Kissinger at the hill station. This doesn't make much sense to me but the way I heard this story, the Pakistanis asked one doctor: "Do you know what Henry Kissinger looks like?" He said: "Yes." They said: "We're

sorry, but you're the wrong man." So they get another one. In addition, a couple of Pakistani cabinet ministers who were in on this charade went up to the hill station as if they were paying a call on Kissinger.

Meanwhile, of course, we were in China. At the end of that day the Pakistanis put out a communique saying that Kissinger still didn't feel very well and was going to stay another day at the hill station. This meant that our whole, public schedule in Islamabad had to be slipped because we were supposed to leave Pakistan for Paris on the following day. So the rest of the schedule had to be slipped a day. So that was the cover on that front. I don't how many people besides Hal Saunders knew about this, but he and Ambassador Farland were the key men in this respect.

Returning to our travel, Smyser, Holdridge, Kissinger, and I, plus two Secret Service agents, named Reedy and McLeod arrived at the airport in Islamabad. Reedy was the senior Secret Service agent, and he knew where we were going as we went to the airport. The other Secret Service agent had no idea. We boarded the plane and found four Chinese already seated there. I may be exaggerating this in retrospect but I believe that McLeod went to draw his pistol, because he was so surprised to see these Chinese on the airplane.

One of the four Chinese in the plane was Zhang Wen-jin, an Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of American affairs and a key negotiator with us, just below the Foreign Minister level. He helped to draft the Shanghai Communique. He was a very cultured man. He was later Ambassador to the United States. He was the senior Chinese official in this group which was already on the plane. There were also a Chinese Protocol Officer, a grand-niece of Mao named Wang Hai-rung, and Nancy Tang, an interpreter. There were six of us in our party.

During some of the plane trip Kissinger was studying his briefing books. During some of the time he was talking to Zhang, and he switched back and forth between these two occupations. I've always made a lot of jokes about this, but Kissinger was genuinely upset by the fact that he had no extra shirts with him. He had a special, personal assistant named David Halperin, who had packed his suitcase but didn't put any shirts in. So I've always said that, instead of worrying about this historic trip and what he was going to say to Zhou En-lai about geopolitics he was fuming about his missing shirts. He really was upset about his shirts. He borrowed a couple of shirts from John Holdridge, who stands about 6' 3" in height. Kissinger is about 5' 9", so he looked like a penguin walking around in one of John's shirts. He really was upset. Here it was, an historic moment, and he felt that he was would look ridiculous. He was really mad at a time when you would think that this would not be a big deal. However, in human terms you could see that at this most important and dramatic time, when he was meeting Zhou En-lai, he would be upset to look ridiculous in this shirt. And, of course, the shirts he borrowed from John Holdridge had a label that said, "Made in Taiwan."

Anyway, we were sitting on the plane. I forget how long the flight was. Perhaps seven or eight hours or maybe less than that. Here is a well-known story from this trip. I've always tried to make it sound better than it was. I should tell it as it actually happened. Dick Smyser and I were sitting ahead of Kissinger in the back of the plane. The air crew, of course, was composed of Pakistani cabin attendants and Pakistani pilots, navigators, and flight engineers. No American

official had been in China since 1949, so we would be the first American officials to visit China in 22 years. By my good fortune Smyser was called to the back of the plane by Kissinger for consultations just before we got to the border between China and Pakistan. All of the others, in addition to Smyser but not including me, were in the back of the plane with Kissinger. So, as we crossed the border, I was in the front of the plane. So I've said ever since then, in case the question should ever come up, that I was the first American official to visit China since 1949! I've said, on some occasions, that I deliberately raced to the front of the plane to do that, but that's slightly gilding the lilly.

Obviously, there was a great sense of drama. As the sun came up, we were passing K-2, the second highest mountain in the world. It was right outside our window, with the sun on it. Remember, we were in a Pakistani plane with the usual windows. We had left the nearly windowless KC-135 jet back at Islamabad. There was a sense of drama that we were going to the most populous country in the world, after 22 years and there were all of the geopolitical implications of that. There was the anticipation of meeting with Zhou En-lai, this great figure, and there was the excitement and anticipation of those talks. There were James Bond aspects of this trip, since it was totally secret. For me, personally, there was the realization that I was the first American official to visit China in 22 years and that I was married to a woman from Shanghai. I'll never top this experience in terms of drama.

Of course, we spent a good deal of time on the plane, discussing what the strategy would be in talking with Zhou En-lai and the Chinese. I had read very carefully the materials we had prepared over the previous several months. I don't have the precise time with me, but we landed at the military side of the airport outside of Beijing. We were met by Marshall Yeh Jien-ying, a well-known Chinese general from the Long March. I don't know whether he was on the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party, but he was a very important figure. So that was a fairly high level reception. Also there to greet us was Huang Hua, who was later Chinese Foreign Minister. We entered limousines with curtains drawn, so people couldn't see into them. Then we drove into Beijing through Tiananmen Square and past the Great Hall of the People to a place called Dayoutai, which is the guest house compound for very important visitors. We were then secretly ensconced there.

I don't recall how soon it was before Zhou En-lai came over to greet us, but I'm sure that it was right away. We had a banquet that night, sitting around with Zhou En-lai. We had discussions with him which, according to Kissinger's book, lasted for 17 hours. We were in China for a total of 49 hours.

The major challenge, of course, was to work out an agreement that President Nixon would visit China and to develop some rough sense of what the agenda would be. We agreed in principle that there would be just a brief announcement, which both sides would issue simultaneously, after we got back to Washington.

However, the real negotiating, and this went on for hours, was about the following. We wanted to make it look essentially that the Chinese wanted President Nixon to come to China. The Chinese essentially wanted to make it look as if Nixon wanted to come to China and that the Chinese were gracious enough to invite him. So we went through our first, agonizing process of

negotiation on that issue. At one point we broke off the negotiation, not in a huff, but just recognizing that we were at an impasse. We thought that the Chinese were coming back to the negotiations within a couple of hours. Kissinger and I and the others walked around outside, because we knew that we were being bugged, and we couldn't discuss strategy and tactics unless we walked outside. Probably the trees were bugged, too. Who knows? I remember that we waited for hours and hours. The Chinese were probably trying to keep us off balance and were probably working out their own position. Most likely, Zhou En-lai had to check with Mao Zedong.

Finally, the Chinese came back, and we resumed the discussion and worked this issue out. I forget the exact language used in the brief communique which was made public. The formulation used went something like this: "Knowing of President Nixon's interest in visiting China..." And in fact he had expressed an interest in visiting China in general. The formulation went on that the Chinese had invited him. So it wasn't as if the Chinese wanted Nixon to come to China and were going out of their way. They used the formulation that they invited him because they had heard about his interest in visiting China. On the other hand, Nixon wasn't begging to go to China. So it was a fair compromise. This matter was covered in a few sentences, essentially, but it was tough to work out.

In the midst of this negotiation we also did some sightseeing. The Chinese closed off the Forbidden City of Beijing to tourists so that we could visit it privately and on our own. We had the head of the Chinese Archeological Museum and an expert on the area take us around personally as our guide. I'll never forget it. It was a very hot, mid-July day. I was carrying either one or two of these very heavy briefcases. We had to take them everywhere with us. We didn't dare leave them anywhere for security reasons. Of course, it was dramatic to see the Forbidden City all by ourselves. It was also very hot, carrying those damned briefcases around.

After that we had a Peking Duck luncheon-banquet hosted by Zhou in the Great Hall, I think.. The main topic of conversation was, in fact, the Cultural Revolution. Here we saw just how clever Zhou En-lai was. We know that he, himself, was aghast at the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, which had been unleashed by Mao. At one point he himself had been imprisoned in his office by Red Guards. However, he hadn't survived this long by suddenly being disloyal to Mao and on an issue of that importance.

The way Zhou recounted this experience was basically as follows. He went through how he had been locked up in his own office. He talked about some of the exchanges he had had with the Red Guards, in a very clinical way. He then used some phrasing like the following. He said: "Chairman Mao is, of course, much more far-seeing and prescient than I am. He saw the need for the 'Cultural Revolution' and all this upheaval and destruction to 'cleanse' the revolution." I don't recall exactly how he phrased it. Zhou continued: "I wasn't so prescient. I saw the excesses, the problems, and the down side." He said something like that.

If Mao read the transcript of what Zhou said, he couldn't have complained, because Zhou En-lai was saying that Mao had a better vision than Zhou did and saw the need for the Cultural Revolution. At the same time Zhou was signaling to us that the Cultural Revolution had gotten out of hand, had become rather brutal, and there were excesses. So it was a typical example of

cleverness by Zhou En-lai. He was keeping his flank protected with Mao but was also making sure that the people he was talking to knew that he was a much more reasonable and pragmatic person. It was a fascinating performance. I'm sorry that Smyser missed it because he was sick.

When we finished drafting the communique, we got back on the plane and returned to Pakistan. We successfully re-inserted ourselves in the charade which had been worked out in Islamabad. We then went on to Paris the next day. It so happens, and we'll get back to this, that while we were publicly in Paris, we secretly snuck off and met with the Vietnamese Communists. Indeed, this was one of the more forthcoming meetings with them. Afterwards Kissinger and I thought, somewhat naively, that we had pulled off two, historic encounters in one trip: the opening toward China and moving toward settling the Vietnam War. That latter idea was a wildly premature judgment. I remember that we debated which was the more historic and important, getting the war over with or arranging for the opening to China. We said, wasn't it a great achievement to do both in one trip?

*Q: Back to the meeting with Zhou En-lai, how were these negotiations carried out? Was it basically Kissinger and Zhou?*

LORD: It was basically Kissinger and sometimes Zhou En-lai. Sometimes it was Zhang Wen-jin or Huang Hua serving as the negotiators on the Chinese side. Correct me here if your own research comes up with a different view, but Zhang Wen-jin and/or Huang Hua seemed to be serving as surrogates for Zhou En-lai. As I said before, in his book Kissinger says that there were about 17 hours of meetings with Zhou En-lai. I think that there were 17 hours of meetings but I can't believe that Zhou En-lai was there that long. Maybe if Kissinger adds in the luncheon and the other contacts with Zhou, the total time of his discussions with Zhou would add up to that. It was a long negotiation, but a lot of the time was taken up with waiting around for the Chinese leaders. We were not really meeting with them for all of this time.

Now, we didn't just talk about the communique. And each side set forth its positions on many of these key issues. There was considerable geopolitical exchange between Zhou and Kissinger, the beginning of one of the most remarkable multi-year dialogues ever conducted in diplomacy. I was privileged to be present throughout the hundreds of hours of talks between these two giants.

We also clearly, of course, talked about the agenda for the Nixon visit. We made it clear that, although we would talk about the issue which was the most sensitive and important to them, namely, Taiwan, we also wanted to talk about Russia, the Middle East, South Asia, Korea, and the beginning of bilateral contacts. So we began to set forth the agenda that we wanted to talk about. I'm sure that the Chinese kept emphasizing Taiwan but also agreed that there would be a broader, geopolitical discussion. In retrospect, I don't know how much time was spent on this. When Zhou En-lai was there, a lot of time was spent on these kinds of issues. Negotiating the communique would have been carried on with his subordinates.

*Q: What would you do? Go through a certain amount of proposals, and then everybody went back and huddled?*

LORD: Well, regarding the agenda, we weren't negotiating about a specific agenda. We just

wanted to make sure that there were enough common interests and enough to talk about beyond Taiwan that a Nixon trip would be worthwhile. The Chinese, in turn, wanted to make sure that we were sufficiently flexible on Taiwan that they could get around their domestic problems with this issue. It wasn't a matter of negotiating or reducing to specific language these other issues. There was just a philosophic exchange. Indeed, we carefully crafted Kissinger's opening remarks and his talking points both to be sensitive on the Taiwan issue and to put the bigger picture forward and why it was in the interest of both countries to overcome decades of mistrust and hostility. So there were a lot of exchanges. This is where Kissinger was immediately impressed with Zhou En-lai in terms of his sophistication, historical sweep, and eloquence.

Regarding the negotiations on the communique, I don't recall exactly how they went, but I'm sure that we had prepared in advance a draft communique which we presented to the Chinese. The Chinese came back with their draft communique. We were far apart and began to haggle about the details, particularly this issue of who invited whom. I can't recall whether we decided, from the very beginning, to keep the communique very brief or whether both sides reached the point where we agreed that this was the only way to do it, that is, to announce the fact that Kissinger had been in China and that Nixon would be going to China in the spring of 1972. I believe this was the first time that the Chinese used their formulation that they knew of Nixon's interest in China and that they had invited him to come.

I don't recall whether we initially talked about other issues for the communique. I seriously doubt it. We felt that this communique would essentially be an announcement. It was dramatic enough in itself. It would be premature to negotiate on other issues. It would make other people nervous if we said that we had been talking about other matters. I am sure that, from the very beginning, the idea was just to have an announcement that Kissinger had visited China and that there would be a forthcoming Nixon trip. It was agreed that we had to maintain secrecy until we returned to the US. Certainly, President Nixon wanted to make the announcement himself, given the drama surrounding the matter. That was understood, and the Chinese went along with that.

*Q: I take it then that there was considerable discipline on both sides in avoiding political diatribes or simply setting out well known positions and all that sort of thing.*

LORD: I would have to go back and look at the transcripts. Since Zhou En-lai was as sophisticated as he was, he would be firm in their positions on all of these issues, including Taiwan and other, geopolitical matters, but he also indicated his desire to move ahead with the relationship of China and the United States. His rhetoric would have been carefully modulated, so that it wouldn't turn us off. We, in turn, would be firm but clear that, despite our differences, we wanted to move ahead. Kissinger, on behalf of Nixon, was forthcoming on Taiwan even as he sketched the broad agenda. Indeed he began to set forth some important assurances on our Taiwan policy that impressed the Chinese side.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Dick Solomon has suggested, in some of the work he has done on negotiating with the Chinese Communists, that Kissinger so much enjoyed talking to Zhou En-lai that he would tend to go beyond his talking points and range more broadly.*

LORD: Absolutely.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: In this particular instance of the secret trip to China Kissinger may have said some things that, perhaps, would not have been said had they been pre-rehearsed, in the sense that it was good to use the Chinese-American relationship as a joint U.S. and Chinese way to keep Japan under control. Or that Kissinger gave more ground than he might have on...*

LORD: I would have to go back and review the transcripts. There is no question that in the discussions between Kissinger and Zhou En-lai they would range more widely, on this trip and on subsequent occasions when they got to know each other better. There would be a tendency to sit back and get away from the immediate questions at hand. This was in contrast with the practice when we were negotiating with Zhou En-lai's subordinates on specific language. Kissinger would have prepared talking points and positions on all of these issues.

At times Kissinger might push the envelope or use ambiguous formulations which might tempt the Chinese. He was forthcoming on Taiwan. As for other issues, he might have said things on certain issues that he would probably be embarrassed about if they were shown to the country that he was talking about.

On Japan, for example, Kissinger's basic thrust would have been to tell the Chinese that the U.S.-Japan alliance is in our interest and is in China's interest. So he would have said that Japan has an impulse toward nationalism and rearming. However, if the Japanese feel secure under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, or our security alliance, then they won't go in that direction. Therefore, Kissinger would say, it is in China's interest for the U.S. to have good relations with Japan. We worked on them in that connection.

In the initial meetings the Chinese attitude was: "We don't like your alliance with Japan. We don't like alliances in general and we also don't like foreign troops on another country's soil. You are just building up Japan and making it more dangerous." We would counter by saying: "If we didn't have this tie with Japan, they might go nuclear and rearm and be a greater threat to your security. So you ought to be in favor of this alliance."

Frankly, that argument made an impact on the Chinese over the following years. They reached the point where they clearly agreed with us. They have held this position ever since, until the last few years, when they have become more ambivalent about Japan.

Let's just continue with this particular episode, and then we can go back again. Obviously, we were very excited when we got back to Washington. I recall the awkwardness, and I did feel bad about that, when we were flying out from Washington to meet with President Nixon at San Clemente, California, a day or two before the announcement about the Nixon trip, and I was sitting on the plane with U. Alexis Johnson, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. He didn't know anything about the trip which we had made to China. He was an old China hand and had participated, I believe, in the Geneva and Warsaw talks with the Chinese Communists.

*Q: Yes. He was one of the first to negotiate with the Chinese Communists, apart from the talks on the Korean armistice.*

LORD: He was a very decent man. I sat outside his State Department office during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. I had dealt with him in Political-Military Affairs and I always respected him. To be flying out with him, knowing that in the next two days there was going to be an announcement on China, and he didn't even know about it, left me feeling very awkward indeed. I still remember that.

We got out to San Clemente and worked on Nixon's announcement. Nixon's inclination, and I think that he was entirely right, was to keep his remarks very short. It was so dramatic that he didn't need to elaborate. He could get away with a few sentences or a few paragraphs. The eventual announcement was only a few hundred words long.

Nixon announced in advance that he would be making a statement. Most of the press speculated that it was going to be on Vietnam, as they figured that almost anything would be on Vietnam. None of them knew that it was going to be on China. So we had some tense moments during the 24 hours or 48 hours out in San Clemente, putting together this announcement and, also, the game plan for informing, rather belatedly, countries around the world, not to mention our own government. We did this at the last minute. So that was a dramatic time.

Then, of course, Nixon went on TV and made the announcement. Everyone knows what a dramatic impact it had.

Meanwhile, I had brought back with me for my Chinese wife a small sampling of Chinese soil.

*Q: So there wasn't any particular battle about it that I recall. Let's continue on the China theme.*

LORD: Okay.

*Q: So what were you doing at this point? Getting ready for the Nixon trip?*

LORD: Yes. Then we had to work out the exact timing of President Nixon's trip to China and how we got ready for it logistically and substantively.

Let me pause and say that the most immediate and the most important impact was with Russia. We'll get back to Russia later, but let me say very quickly that we obviously got the attention of the Russians. As I said earlier, we had not been making much progress with the Russians. They hadn't agreed to holding a summit meeting, the SALT negotiations [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] were going slowly, the Berlin negotiations were not moving ahead, and we had up's and down's in the two previous years. Basically, we were trying to move, and Soviet-American relations were better than they had been in 1970, when we had several crises at once, but on the whole, we were just treading water.

Then, within weeks, the whole Soviet-American relationship started moving forward. This was very concrete evidence that the opening to China would help us with the Russians, which was one of the purposes of the Kissinger visit to Beijing. Within weeks, or months, the Russians agreed to holding a summit meeting as well, in this case in May, 1972, just a few months after Nixon would go to China. Of course, the Soviets realized that they had miscalculated and that

they should have agreed to a summit meeting before the meeting in China was announced. The Soviets were totally caught by surprise. We then made a breakthrough on the Berlin negotiations. I don't remember the dates, but that began moving very quickly, as we moved toward a very significant agreement. We made progress on arms control, so that we set up the SALT-1 agreement by the time we got to Moscow in May, 1972. We began to talk with the Soviets about economic and other arrangements. Of all the reactions to the announcement of the Kissinger trip to China, I would say that the most important one by far, of a positive or, indeed, any nature, was the reaction in Moscow. The most negative impact, of course, was in Japan, where the announcement caused severe embarrassment to the Japanese Government. However, the progress made in relations with the Soviets was very helpful.

It's hard to judge now how nervous this trip made Hanoi. It certainly didn't make the Vietnamese communist leaders immediately flexible. However, we figured that the combination of the announcement of both of these summit meetings was certainly going to put pressure on Hanoi to be more reasonable. We hoped, of course, that this would give an incentive to both Beijing and Moscow to put such pressure on Hanoi.

For example, in Beijing there was an ideological embarrassment in moving ahead with the U.S., which was fighting with their Vietnamese compatriots. We didn't realize fully at the time the extent of the Sino-Vietnamese hostility, either. We assumed at the time that, if they were not like lips and teeth, as they had once likened their relationship, at least the Chinese and Vietnamese communists were friendly. It was awkward for the Chinese to have American troops fighting against their ideological compatriots in Vietnam. Therefore, it was in the Chinese interest to try to get this war behind us.

Similarly in the case of the Russians, it was awkward, while they were trying to improve relations with the United States, to have their friends and allies engaged in a fight with us. In a little while I can get back to the Chinese view of Vietnam and how we dealt with that.

So the most immediate impact, I'd say, was on Japan, Moscow, and, to a certain extent, Hanoi.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: The Russians had tried, at times, to play the relationship off. In other words, argue to the Americans that they would be better friends of the United States than the Chinese communists would be.*

LORD: That's right.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Were you aware of that?*

LORD: Oh, yes. This was a constant pattern with the Russians. They certainly didn't say: "We white men have to stick together." However, you also got the feeling that there might have been a cultural and racial undertone to this. I can't document when the Russians made their moves and at what time. They often floated proposals, including an arms control deal which, they thought, would unnerve the Chinese, as well as NATO. The Russians made references to their view that the Chinese couldn't be trusted, and so on. Of course, this was always deflected by Nixon and Kissinger.

So we began to think about how to get ready for the Nixon trip to China. I don't remember exactly when we fixed the dates of February 22 to 28, 1972. The announcement only talked about the following spring, I believe. We knew that there would have to be follow-on, advance trips before Nixon went for this visit to this unknown terrain. We had to decide on the specific cities that President Nixon would visit. So we scheduled another trip to China for Kissinger in October, 1971. Al Haig would go to China in January, 1972, and President Nixon would go in February, 1972. When we went to China in October, 1971, I don't believe that we knew that Haig was going to go to China in January, 1972.

The purpose of the Kissinger trip in October, 1971, was two-fold - substantive and logistic. We needed to prepare substantively for the summit meeting. Regarding the agenda, we needed to get a sense of each side's positions and see what might be said in any outcome, whether a statement or a communique. There would also be further, substantive exchanges between Kissinger and Zhou En-lai, in particular, to prepare the ground for Nixon's conversations when he came to China. Secondly, there were the logistical arrangements to be made. That is, what the schedule would be like, where Nixon would go and where he would stay, what his itinerary would be like, and the security and public relations preparations that would be needed. We wanted even to arrange at that point for satellite ground stations to support international coverage of the visit, although this was rather early in the game for satellite coverage.

We took along with us a lot of people from the White House staff to deal with the security and press side of the visit. I know that this was when Dwight Chapin and Ron Ziegler went to China. So we had a dual purpose in visiting China in October, 1971.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Why October?*

LORD: Well, we had been to China on the secret visit in July, 1971. It took us some time to get our act together and get ready to go back in order to prepare for a Nixon trip that was coming in the spring of 1972. There was no magic aspect of a second Kissinger trip to China in October, 1971. It was just the natural rhythm of the calendar.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Some people have suggested, and there is some logic to this, that the secret trip was badly timed in terms of the United Nations and the votes there.*

LORD: In retrospect, and to be honest about it, I don't think that we paid much attention to that. You're absolutely right that the timing of the secret trip was awkward in terms of the UN vote on Chinese representation. Our objective was to prepare for a Nixon visit to China. However, as we got on the airplane and were flying out of Shanghai - we flew from Beijing to Shanghai and then flew out of Shanghai en route back to the United States - we learned that we had lost the vote in the UN on the admission of the People's Republic of China. We had still been holding out, trying to ensure that, at least, Taiwan could stay in the UN as well. Of course, China would only accept one representative for China's seat. That was an embarrassing finale, to say the least, because it drove home the realization that we were causing pain to our friends with this opening to China.

You're absolutely right, and that's a good question. Why a second visit to China in October,

1971? In retrospect, we should have had a better sense of timing, and I just don't recall whether anybody said: "Do we really want to go to China in the middle of this UN debate?" I just can't recall whether we took this matter into our calculations. This was a tactical mistake. On the other hand, once we had made this dramatic breakthrough in July 1971, the UN sentiment was going to shift. We had to go sometime in the fall, during the UN General Assembly session so there was always going to be some awkwardness

*Q: You went on all of the trips in connection with preparations for the Nixon visit?*

LORD: I went on all of the trips during the Nixon and Ford Administrations. There were nine trips to China. There were separate visits to China by President Nixon and by President Ford. Kissinger made seven other trips to China, not including the Nixon and Ford visits. I went on all nine trips. I did not go on the Haig January 1972 trip.

*Q: How about the trip to China by Al Haig?*

LORD: Haig went on his own to China in January, 1972. I don't know whether he ever went to China again, to be honest. However, as he was Kissinger's deputy, he wouldn't travel with Kissinger. He would mind the store at home when Kissinger went abroad.

*Q: During the period between the time you came back from the first trip to China to October, 1971, you obviously had other things that you had to do, in connection with the Vietnam negotiations...*

LORD: And moving ahead with the Russians.

*Q: Yes, so things were really moving. However, you were also fleshing out an agenda that President Nixon would be taking with him.*

LORD: That's right. As we did for Kissinger trips but obviously also for a trip as important as the Nixon visit, we did a lot of homework to get ready for that. First, we arranged by subject matter excerpts from Kissinger's conversations with Zhou En-lai and other Chinese during his first trip. So in terms of Vietnam, to take one example, we had everything that was said on Vietnam during the 17 hours of our meetings. That material would be excerpted from those conversations and put under that heading. These excerpts would be set out in terms of The Chinese Position and The U.S. Position. We set out goals and talking points and also defenses against Chinese attacks in certain areas. In other words, what's their offense and what's our defense? And vice versa. We did that on all of the issues.

We carefully drafted Kissinger's opening statement. We had the transcripts fully recorded both by excerpts and in terms of specific issues. We provided further background material both from CIA as well as from the State Department on Chinese personalities and their positions on various issues, plus the domestic situation in China. We prepared memoranda on Chinese relationships with other countries and what our goals were. Then we drafted a possible communique to be issued at the end of the Nixon visit. So we prepared the talking points and provided background on the various issues that might come up in Kissinger's conversations. We also set out goals for

the summit meeting.

Then there was the whole logistic side, which was managed by Dwight Chapin and others. There would need to be agreements with the Chinese on how many press representatives they wanted to allow. Of course, the Chinese were shocked by the numbers we had in mind. Other matters involved security arrangements and logistics, personnel needs, and issues of this kind. So there was a massive amount of work to be handled.

*Q: I would have assumed that the NSC staff would have been almost overwhelmed by virtually every Embassy in Washington and every Congressional political leader in our own country. They would be asking: "What did you people see in China and what are you doing" to make sure that you make this or that point?*

LORD: I'm sure that this was the case. I don't recall specifically. In my own case I had my hands full with my own in box. My job was basically working with Kissinger and, with him, for President Nixon. Together with John Holdridge and others, I prepared analyses, talking points, and getting ready for the summit meeting. External activity with other countries would have been handled, either by the State Department or by the experts on the NSC staff for the region concerned. So if someone on the NSC staff had to see the Japanese Ambassador, short of Kissinger it would have been John Holdridge, or Sonnenfeldt with a European Ambassador, for example. There was a lot of that contact work going on, but it doesn't stand out vividly in my own mind.

Most of these contacts were handled by the State Department, which was getting up to speed itself, as well as by the White House. Kissinger was very careful about his staff talking to many people, and certainly not to the press or Members of Congress. So we wouldn't have spent much time dealing with external contacts. Certainly, I didn't. Others may have. However, you're right. There were a lot of queries, questions, and suggestions as to what we ought to do.

*Q: The major issue before you, as you prepared for the Nixon trip, was Taiwan, wasn't it? As you prepared to set up the agenda, in a way you had to be coming up with what answer you wanted. Was there a debate raging within the White House over what was to happen with Taiwan?*

LORD: Here, again, my memory is not clear, and I don't want to try to be overly precise. We began, of course, since the situation was now public, to draw in the State Department, including experts like Marshall Green, Al Jenkins, and so on. There were also people working with them who, I assume, had been working on China. I realize that they had been working on China at that point for some years. So we began to get previous formulations about what we had said about Taiwan and other issues in Warsaw and Geneva, also drawing from internal position papers. At least now, since this matter was public, we drew very heavily on these resources. We had drawn on these resources before, but always somewhat under false pretenses, at least about the immediate objective.

Now, of course, the subject was open. President Nixon was going to go to China. Kissinger was going back to China in October, 1971. He took some State Department people with him this

time. So we could draw on these sources. These would include formulations on Taiwan. I can't remember exactly how all of this was thrashed out. I was the one who worked primarily with John Holdridge, getting Kissinger ready for the meeting. We had formulations on Taiwan, on the communique to be drafted, and so on.

Basically, our approach on Taiwan was going to be trying to square the circle. We had no intention at that point, of course, of switching relations or anything that dramatic. The issue was essentially: "How can we kick this issue down the road?" And leave the Chinese enough face so that they could live with it, not solving this issue, certainly not trying to bite any bullets ourselves. We were very sensitive to the impact on our friends on Taiwan, other allies, and our domestic audience. So we came up with words which would be reassuring to the Chinese but which would not get us into too much trouble.

Kissinger had given some important assurances to the Chinese on Taiwan in July 1971, but then and thereafter our formulations were designed not to undercut Taiwan or our ties with it in any fundamental issue.

I don't remember any raging debates on Taiwan in our government. I remember that we put together some massive briefing books on this and the other topics.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Even early on, did you have a scenario on how long our process of normalization with China would take and that it wasn't leading to diplomatic relations...*

LORD: Not really. We did not have any precise time tables. My guess is that the general assumption was that we wouldn't bite that bullet of normalization until after the reelection of President Nixon in 1972. That was sufficiently controversial, not to mention the shock to Taiwan and so on, and also the political fallout. So we didn't want to bite that bullet at that time.

Now, I don't recall whether we ever sat down to the Chinese and said: "We'll do this in President Nixon's second term." I recall that when President Ford was in office, we made it clear that we would move ahead on normalization of relations with China during Ford's second term, if he was reelected. However, I don't believe that we were ever that precise, even among ourselves, beyond a working assumption that we weren't going to try, nor would the Chinese expect, to be able to pull off full normalization during President Nixon's first four years.

However, in February, 1973, after one of Kissinger's visits to China, we set up Liaison Offices in the two capitals. This step amounted to de facto embassies and normalization and was a major step forward. It also showed Chinese flexibility, since they had said firmly they would never have an embassy in Washington while the Republic of China was still there.

That's a good point that you raised. Without being precise about normalization of relations, we did have to figure out how we were going to communicate between China and the United States, since we didn't have Embassies or, at that point, even Liaison Offices. We ended up doing this two ways. One was through General Vernon Walters [the Defense Attache] in our Embassy in Paris. He talked to the ambassador named Huang Chen in the PRC Embassy in Paris, who eventually became Ambassador to the United States. Once the People's Republic of China was

admitted to the UN, we communicated through the first PRC Ambassador to the UN, Huang Hua, who subsequently became their Foreign Minister.

We set up a communications channel through Ambassador Huang Hua in New York. Kissinger and I, or sometimes myself alone or Al Haig, depending on whether we were traveling, would go up to New York and meet Ambassador Huang Hua in a secret apartment, a CIA safe house about two blocks from where my parents lived, and where I had grown up.

We would have exchanges with the PRC in that apartment, and through Paris, whether it involved looking forward to the next trip or talking about the crisis in Bangladesh which concerned India and Pakistan, for example. We had exchanges with the PRC on such subjects. Or we just generally kept in touch. We had to work out communications, and these were the channels that we used until we agreed to set up Liaison Offices in Beijing and Washington in February, 1973.

We didn't have a precise timetable for normalization of relations. I don't recall the formulas we used about saying to the Chinese that some day we looked forward to having diplomatic relations and full normalization. I'm sure that these references were somewhat guarded and certainly were not specific in terms of a timetable. Even as other issues came up, we had to try to be as careful as we could, whether this involved our troop presence on Taiwan, and so on.

So, from the beginning, you are absolutely right, Taiwan was the most sensitive issue, obviously, even as we tried to keep in play all of the more positive issues.

*Q: Regarding the agenda, you arrived in Beijing in October, 1971.*

LORD: That's correct.

*Q: The Chinese knew that you were coming to Beijing. Did you find that there was a different atmosphere? Did you find that you were dealing with apparatchiks? Or was the atmosphere one of, "Let's get down to business." Was there any euphoria?*

LORD: No. Three things happened in connection with this trip. First, there was a continuation and a great enrichment in the conversation over a whole range of substantive issues, between Zhou En-lai and Kissinger. There were really remarkable conversations between them. By the way, Kissinger has said that, of all the people he ever met in the diplomatic field in his life, the two most impressive were Zhou En-lai and De Gaulle. Since Kissinger spent infinitely more time with Zhou En-lai than with De Gaulle, he probably would put Zhou En-lai in first place. Maybe De Gaulle would have rivaled that if Kissinger could have spent as much time with him. However, Kissinger has always said that Zhou En-lai was one of the two most impressive people he has met. Kissinger's conversations with Zhou En-lai were always interesting.

There was a continuing process of feeling out by each side as to where our strategic goals could converge and how we could handle difficult issues. That was one aspect of the Kissinger trip and an end in itself, with Kissinger going back and talking to the Chinese.

Then there were the two goals of setting up President Nixon's trip to China. On the substantive side, and related to the one I just mentioned, we were beginning to see what the leaders would say on these issues when they met, together with mine fields to be avoided and areas of possible convergence to be explored. Specifically, and I'll get back to this, there was the communique, which turned out to be The Shanghai Communique. This would be the concrete result of the Nixon visit and obviously very important. Further, there were the logistic preparations on where the President would go and what he would do. If you like, I could discuss both the communique process and the public process.

*Q: Yes.*

LORD: Let me discuss the public process first. I don't recall how much of this was fixed before we went to China and how much was fixed when we were there. It was agreed that we would arrive in China on February 22, 1972, and remain through February 28, 1972, Chinese time. President Nixon would go first to Beijing, then to Hangzhou for its natural beauty and just to go to another place. Then we would go to Shanghai and leave China from there. There would be roughly a day each in Hangzhou and Shanghai and four or five days in Beijing.

The way the Chinese handled this, and they were very clever in helping to get ready for the Nixon visit, involved getting their own public used to the fact that the American President was coming after 22 or 23 years of total hostility and isolation. During this time the Chinese Communists had demonized America in their own propaganda. So, although we found out that there was underlying respect and affection for the United States by the Chinese people, despite this propaganda, and which was quite remarkable, nevertheless, both in terms of high ranking cadre and even some of the Chinese leaders, and in terms of the general public, the Chinese had their own need to begin to condition the Chinese audience as to what was coming. This renewal of contact was a shock for us, but it certainly was quite a turnaround for the Chinese, as well. So, in effect, we did a dress rehearsal, wherein Kissinger and the rest of us would go to places that President Nixon would be going to, both to check them out, but also gradually to reach wider Chinese audiences.

The most restrictive were the private meetings with Zhou En-lai with a handful on each side. Then there were broader meetings with more people on each side, substantive and logistic. We went to see a cultural performance of some sort, even on that trip, to which high Chinese cadre were invited. So the next circle of people we saw and were seen by consisted of fairly high level party officials who had been specially invited and were exposed to Kissinger and us. Then we went to the Summer Palace and the lake, which is a famous tourist attraction, including for ordinary Chinese citizens. So we were there, not only checking out this site for President Nixon but also exposing the Chinese people to the Americans and the fact that Nixon was coming. We went to these places, both to check out the logistics, the security, the attractiveness, the symbolism, and the photo opportunities, but also to begin to condition widening circles of the Chinese people that Americans were coming and that this was to be accepted, and so on.

*Q: I assume that there was rather intensive, TV coverage of all of this.*

LORD: For the trip in October, 1971, I don't believe so. This is partly because the Chinese

weren't physically set up with satellite TV, as we were later on for President Nixon's trip, and partly because Nixon, with his ego, didn't want his thunder stolen. So I don't believe that there was TV coverage on the October Kissinger trip, or Haig's trip.

*Q: I meant internally, in China.*

LORD: No, I don't believe so even then, either. The Chinese didn't have much television. For example, and I just saw this figure the other day, as late as 1978 or 1979, which is, after all, five or six years after our first trip, something like 10 million Chinese had access to television. I'm not talking about 10 million TV sets, but access to television. Today, the figure for access to TV is over a billion Chinese. So you can see how far they've gone.

I don't know how much press coverage there was of the October Kissinger trip to China. We may not have had any press with us. President Nixon would have been very annoyed, had we had much press with us. Kissinger would have been sensitive to this point. He got enough drama out of his secret trip to China that he wasn't about to upstage Nixon by getting all kinds of photo opportunities. You should remember that it wasn't just us there at this time. There were also Dwight Chapin, the security people, and Ron Ziegler, the press spokesman. They'd make sure that President Nixon wasn't going to be upstaged.

We checked all of those sites out. We did not go to Hangzhou and Shanghai. We stayed in Beijing. We managed pretty much to put together the arrangements for the trip. There was a lot of haggling, I'm sure, as there always is, particularly with the Chinese. But it's also true with the Russians and others. There is the question of security and whose security officers are going to ride in whose car. Nixon had to use Chinese cars, and the Secret Service people resisted that. As far as the press arrangements were concerned, the Chinese probably expected a few score press people, at the most. The Nixon press people asked for credentials for 200 press, or whatever the figure was. The Chinese just gasped.

However, the Chinese were quite forthcoming, certainly on the media coverage. They probably saw that this was to their advantage, despite their nervousness and being totally aghast at the number of journalists who would be coming for the Nixon visit. Regarding the entourage of the American President, the Chinese were relatively forthcoming. Kissinger used to joke that the cultural shock was extraordinary when the Chinese talked to the advance party about publicity.

Among other things which probably was done on this trip, or maybe on Haig's trip, was that Kissinger laid the groundwork for the President and him to meet with Zhou En-lai and others to discuss the political issues, including the particularly sensitive issue of Taiwan, and the communique. Meanwhile, the Foreign Ministers, William Rogers [Secretary of State] and his Chinese counterpart, Ji Peng-fei would deal with things like trade, cultural exchanges, blocked assets, and economic and other bilateral issues. This was arranged so that they would have parallel conversations and keep the State Department out of really important negotiations. This was nothing that anybody was proud of.

*Q: Was Mao Zedong a factor in any of this?*

LORD: No. We didn't expect to see him in October. Again, that would be upstaging President Nixon. Mao really only saw national leaders. He was a factor, and I'll get to the communique in just a minute. He was a factor on that. Zhou En-lai was always deferential to Mao and would always invoke him. So, in the course of conversations Mao's name would come up. We were sure that, for something of this magnitude, anything major would be approved by Mao. However, we didn't see him, and he wasn't directly involved. I am sure that Zhou En-lai was keeping him posted as we went along. So I think that that covers the logistics of the visit, as far as I can recall.

*Q: Was Deng Xiaoping involved?*

LORD: No. At that point, no. He made a couple of comebacks, but at that point we had never heard of him. I know that. At that time he probably would have been in one of his down periods and still hadn't recovered from the Cultural Revolution as yet. You have to remember that the Cultural Revolution went on until 1976. People really started to be rehabilitated in 1977-1978. Deng went up, went back down, and went up again. We didn't meet Deng for the first time until he led a delegation to the UN in New York in 1974.

Are there any other questions on logistics? I can get to the communique and the substance, but I think that's about all I can remember about logistics.

There were quite interesting aspects with regard to the communique. We had in mind a rather typical communique, in which we would try to get in there as many points of convergence, agreement, and parallel policy as possible. Even if we had to stretch it, given the fact that the two countries had been isolated from each other and mutually hostile, and we agreed on almost no issues on the international scene. In the course of our conversations with Zhou En-lai we handed him a draft communique.

*Q: We're still talking about the trip in October, 1971.*

LORD: Yes. The whole idea was to get as much as possible in the communique negotiated on that trip, so we wouldn't leave it until the last minute and under the pressure of the summit meeting in February, 1972, and last minute deadlines. So we wanted to try to get the communique squared away. Ideally, we would have liked to have everything negotiated. As I will describe, we ended up getting the great bulk of it done, except for the Taiwan issue, where we made some progress but still had some outstanding problem areas, which had to be negotiated at the summit meeting.

So, of course, we had this rather well-done, standard, diplomatic communique covering a lot of issues and suggesting that the meeting was very friendly, marked by convergent perspectives, but without being stupid about it, or going overboard.

At the next meeting it was obvious that Zhou En-lai had checked with Mao. He came back and just tore into us with revolutionary fervor, in effect stating that we had given him an amateurish and ill-advised draft communique which was basically useless. I'm not trying to reflect what Zhou En-lai said in a verbatim way, but what he said, in effect, was that we had fought against each other in Korea, the U.S. had intervened on the Taiwan question, and we disagreed on many

world issues. He said that the U.S. had some allies, and China had some allies. We had totally different social systems and views of the world. We had gone through 22 years of mutual hostility and isolation. He said that your people, our people, and our mutual friends around the world are not going to understand this kind of communique, which suggests that we are like two, normal countries getting together for a regular, summit meeting. He said that this is absurd.

Furthermore, and I don't know that he put it this way, but the sub-current of his remarks would be that some of our respective allies are going to be nervous. If we are this friendly, this might mean that we are selling them out. In addition, he said that the description of the world situation in the draft communique wasn't sufficiently revolutionary from his standpoint. He indicated that it was in a bourgeois pattern, and so on. So he said that the whole draft lacked credibility, candor, and, furthermore, couldn't be defended by the Chinese ideologically, in their own party circles, with their own people, and with their friends. By implication he suggested that we might have some of the same problems that certainly the Chinese had. As far as China was concerned, there was turmoil under the heavens, and we shouldn't pretend that there weren't significant differences. He went on for some time, just ripping us apart.

Instead, he suggested, and this was at his initiative, that we have a different kind of communique, which was unprecedented in diplomatic practice, in which each side would state its own position. He said that in those areas where we do have some agreement or some parallel interest we can state those as well. However, he seemed to be saying that, having set out our differences, we would each have protected our domestic flanks, relationships with our friends and allies, and made more credible those areas of agreement when we stated them, because we had been honest enough in the rest of the communique to make the points. We had been separated, we had been hostile to each other, and we had these continuing differences. So when we get to agreements, people will believe us because they have seen our candor beforehand.

Frankly, this was a brilliant idea.

*Q: Oh, yes!*

LORD: It was unprecedented. I don't know of any other communique quite like the Shanghai Communique. The fact is, not only is it invoked routinely and so on, it still is a governing document in some ways. I don't believe that I can think of another such statement, lasting so long in significance. I'm not speaking of something like the Treaty of Versailles ending wars. However, in terms of a summit meeting, I can't recall any summit communique in history which has lasted this long, still having some significance and being invoked by both sides continually and being recognized by the public. This is because of the unprecedented nature of it.

So we had our work cut out for us because, by this time, we only had about two or three more days left in China. Indeed, we may have extended our trip by a day or two in order to negotiate the draft communique. This may have led to this terrible timing at the UN in connection with the Chinese representation issue.

Kissinger and I went back to the guesthouse. I don't recall whether we immediately saw the wisdom in this approach or not, but we had no choice in any event. Certainly, Kissinger soon

saw it, as did I, but at first we were disappointed that we weren't going to have some nice document that would record the major achievements at this forthcoming summit meeting. We were a little bit worried about justifying this visit to our domestic, U.S. audience. But I think that we fairly quickly saw the wisdom of the approach which Zhou En-lai had advocated.

After we went back to the guesthouse, we spent a frantic night, although we spent some more frantic nights during the negotiations on Vietnam. We proceeded to take the draft communique which we had received from the Chinese. I can't remember whether they gave us a full draft of the communique. Certainly, they didn't set forth our positions. However, they set forth their position, on the world in general, ideology, revolution, and whether justice is more important than stability in dealing with the strivings of the poor around the world. Then the Chinese described their friendship with Vietnam, with Pakistan, their backing of the Arabs, and their backing of North Korea, etc, and their related positions on key issues. They mentioned all of these things where we more or less disagreed, certainly in philosophy and ideology. They probably included one or two sentences that the two sides hoped to improve bilateral relations, or something like that.

So we had a challenge of how to accept the Chinese approach. I think that we recognized, to a certain extent, that it was probably a good idea. However, at that point, given the time pressures and the fiery nature of the Chinese rhetoric in their draft, we were pretty concerned. We would never admit to panic, but we were under pressure. We worked in shifts in dealing with this task.

Kissinger went to bed first. I can't give you the exact time. I would say that it was at about 10:00 or 11:00 PM. I spent the next few hours doing a redraft of the Chinese draft communique. In doing this I tried to accomplish three things. Tone down the Chinese rhetoric. This was somewhat presumptuous - trying to tell them what they could say. We said to them that they could very well stand firmly for their positions, but it was not in their interest to excite our own, domestic audience. This would tend to undercut the President's initiative. There needed to be some restraint in the fire eating rhetoric contained in the Chinese draft communique. We needed to tone down their draft because what sounds like natural rhetoric to them sounds pretty polemical and hair-raising in American ears. So one of the parts of our redraft was to take the Chinese positions and try to tone them down, without overdoing it in terms of our chutzpah, because, after all, it's their view of the world, not ours.

Then I set out to state our positions. We decided to do this firmly and honestly, both to balance the Chinese position to a certain extent, to reassure our friends and allies where that was appropriate, to be firm as a matter of general principle, and also to deal with our domestic audience so that it would look as if we were firm as well. We would not, however, employ the kind of rhetoric that the Chinese communists did. So, setting forth our positions would consist of both of us surveying the international scene, ideology, and so on. We also put in principles of international relations on which we felt we could agree, even if we could not agree on the analysis of whether revolution was afoot or whether justice was to prevail over stability. We, the Chinese and the United States, put in several principles, such as non-interference, which they liked, and the view that both sides oppose hegemony, which was a code word for the Russian threat. We liked this, and they liked it as well. It was the single most important agreement in the communique. Neither Moscow nor the world missed it. There were some other principles added

to this. Then there were contrasting statements on specific international issues, such as the ones I mentioned.

Then we had to have language on Taiwan. The Chinese had set forth their position, so we had to set forth our position, maybe finding some areas where we could agree on Taiwan.

Finally, toward the end, we needed to beef up bilateral areas where we already converged and where we could make progress. So we beefed up things like looking forward to an exchange of persons and more economic exchanges. And so we prepared this redraft of the communique. I'm not sure we put all this in during the first draft but we at least headed in these directions.

This is the kind of material I was working on. Then, about 3:00 AM, I woke Kissinger up and gave him my redraft of the communique. I went to bed until 6:00 or 7:00 AM. During this time he redrafted what I had prepared. Then we went back to the Chinese that morning. We gave them our counter-draft, and then both sides kept preparing counter-drafts. We made considerable progress in terms of most of what became known as the Shanghai Communique, except on Taiwan, where we still had significant differences on which we couldn't close the gap, although we would like to have done this.

By the time we left China, in terms of the communique, we had about 80 to 85 percent of the communique done, including pretty much what they were going to say on these issues up front, internationally and on specific issues, and what we were going to say. I think that we had agreement on most of these international principles. There were four or five of them, including the one on hegemony. Although we still wanted to beef up bilateral cooperation in future, positive directions, we had at least some of that in the draft. However, there was still a considerable gap on Taiwan. So that's where we were as we left.

*Q: On the technical side, who was looking at the language on both sides? Were the Chinese looking at the English language and you looking at the Chinese text?*

LORD: That's a very good point. Frankly, we relied on their interpreters in the conversations. As I mentioned, Nancy Tang had been on the plane from Pakistan. She had also done some interpreting for Mao. Ji Zhao-chu was actually Mao's interpreter in the interview with Edgar Snow and had been an interpreter as a young man. He had attended Harvard University. He was also a key interpreter in this context. Tang and Ji did the checking on the Chinese side, obviously translating it for the Chinese leadership, as well as sending it up to the Politburo and Mao, or whoever was reviewing it.

We just worked in the English language. John Holdridge spoke Chinese but not, I believe, well enough to be precise. I'm sure that when we got back to Washington, we checked out the texts with our expert translators and interpreters, in terms of precision in Chinese. You are right. We had to make sure that the Chinese language version matched our English language version.

It was our general experience that, unlike the case with the Russians, the Chinese were fair on translation matters. In their translations they wouldn't try to sneak in a Chinese word that was more to their advantage than what we meant in English. Sometimes, you have two or three

choices. You can take this word or that word. The Russians could always be counted on to take anything that they could find in the dictionary that would serve their cause, even if it was a real stretch of what both sides genuinely meant. In this way they were picking up loose change all the time. This is one reason why Kissinger began to prefer dealing with the Chinese, rather than with the Russians. This was partly because the Chinese were always fair on translation issues.

For example, in the Shanghai Communique, after we issued it, and we more closely examined what they had done after we got back to Washington, we found a few instances where the translation of a given phrase could have gone either way. They actually gave us a word that was more favorable to us than it might have been.

The other reason that Kissinger preferred dealing with the Chinese was that they were more up front about their basic position. When you got a position from them, it was pretty close to their bottom line, even from the beginning, rather than inflated, as was the case with the Russians. As I said earlier, you never knew where the Russians' bottom line was. You always had to slice down to reach it, which means that you, yourself, have to pad your own position. We preferred the Chinese, principled approach.

So, on the issue of language, we were pretty much at their mercy, but this didn't turn out to be a problem. There was no problem in the conversations, because several people on the Chinese side understood English, and John Holdridge knew enough Chinese to double check anything that we needed. The Chinese really had no incentive to distort the translations. Zhou En-lai himself understood some English. He would often laugh at Kissinger's jokes before they were translated.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: What was the reason for not taking your own translators and interpreters with you?*

LORD: By then the trip was public knowledge. In the first place we didn't have too much talent, certainly in the U.S. Government. I guess that Chas Freeman was about as good as you could get at that point, but he certainly wasn't up to the Chinese standard. However, it was mostly a matter of Kissinger not wanting to have extraneous people around for sensitive discussions.

*Q: So when you got back to Washington with the Shanghai Communique...*

LORD: It was an advanced draft of the communique. (End of tape)

*Q: You were saying that you had accomplished a great deal.*

LORD: We had accomplished a great deal in terms of the communique. I think that we began to see more clearly why this was a good, though unconventional approach. I remember that we were also still concerned about the Taiwan issue. Obviously, it was so sensitive to both sides and very sensitive in terms of the President's domestic support for this opening to China. So we knew that we had a lot of work already done on that, but we also did a lot of homework over the next few weeks, trying to figure out how to bridge the gap.

Al Haig went back to China in January, 1972, primarily to pin down the logistics of the Nixon

trip. He worked with the advance security and public relations people. I think he also tried to make further progress on some aspects of the communique, but I don't recall that he made much progress on it. However, he did a good job with the logistics.

*Q: Then you returned to Washington in the fall of 1971.*

LORD: That's right. We had the embarrassment of the UN defeat on the Chinese representation issue as we were flying home. We had gotten on the plane, quite excited on the progress we had made for the Nixon trip. Then we had this immediate downer and shock of the UN vote.

*Q: The UN vote being...*

LORD: The People's Republic of China was admitted to the UN and Taiwan was kicked out. Obviously, we knew in our heart of hearts that was probably coming soon. We fought hard to keep Taiwan in, together with China, without success. To have it come just as we were leaving China was really quite embarrassing to Kissinger and Nixon.

*Q: Why were we making a stand on this, because we had been fighting on this issue for a long time? This had been a sort of major occupation of the Foreign Service for 20 years or more. We tried to get all of these countries to vote for Taiwan and against Communist China. We had expended tremendous, diplomatic capital on it, but as soon as we began to open up to China, we must have known that, in effect, we were trying to hold back the sea.*

LORD: Of course, we knew. What we tried to do was to promote a two China approach, even though we did not recognize the PRC officially, in an effort to allow Taiwan to keep its seat in the UN. I can't remember whether we opposed Beijing getting into the UN at all or whether we were saying that if the PRC gets in, Taiwan should also remain a member.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: This was called "dual representation."*

LORD: Yes, dual representation. However, getting back to the incentives to the Chinese to move with us, one of them was to get into the UN. They knew that this would be part of the fallout of their breaking out of their isolation and establishing relations with other countries. So we honestly lost all of our leverage with the July Kissinger visit, and it was inevitable that the PRC would be admitted to the UN. The Chinese hung tough on the point that Taiwan had to leave the UN. So I think that we knew that the PRC would be admitted, but the real issue was whether some honor and credibility could be preserved for our domestic position for this initiative by keeping Taiwan in the UN as well. This would certainly mitigate the blow. The UN vote was not only on admitting the People's Republic of China but making clear that there couldn't be dual representation of China and that Taiwan had to get out of the UN.

There were some ironic overtones in that outcome for my family. My father-in-law, Sandys Bao, as I said earlier, represented the Taiwan Sugar Company in the United States. Sugar was Taiwan's major export in those days, though it has since diversified its exports. He was also Taiwan's representative on the International Sugar Council which would meet periodically in London. The council included representatives of all of the major sugar exporting and importing

countries and was connected to the UN. So you could argue that I did my father-in-law out of a job. But he hung on in that job, and Taiwan remained a member of the International Sugar Council for what I think was a couple of years after the UN admission of Beijing as a member. This was because of his own capabilities and skills and the fact that he was held in such respect by his fellow delegates. They went out of their way to try to preserve his position. Basically, I cost him one of his jobs.

The other ironic thing was that when my wife and I were married in 1963, our wedding reception was at Twin Oaks, in Washington, DC, which was the residence of the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador at the time and until 1979. The Chinese Nationalist Ambassador gave us a wedding reception. Then, eight years later, I snuck into China with Kissinger and greatly shocked Taiwan.

Let me say that my father-in-law fully understood what we had done. In fact, he told me that the opening to China was in the national interest of the United States.

*Q: When you came back to Washington after the first Kissinger trip in 1971, were you pretty well concentrated on the preparations for the Nixon visit during the period from October, 1971, to February, 1972?*

LORD: A lot of other things were moving, too. Of course, we were concentrating on preparations for President Nixon's trip to China. However, you have to remember that the pace of contacts with Russia also picked up. I spent nowhere near as much time on Russia as I did on either Vietnam or China. However, I was certainly involved in contacts with Russia. That meant negotiations on the status of Berlin, SALT-1 [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - 1], and beginning to move toward the holding of a summit meeting in Moscow, as well. Again, these preparations did not take much of my time. I was fully deployed on China and Vietnam.

The situation in Vietnam was also moving. I don't have the dates in front of me, but we were still making secret trips to Paris during this period as well. And in a major speech in January 1972, the President revealed our secret negotiations and our forthcoming negotiating position. So it was an extremely busy time. Indeed, the following year and a half was one of the most dramatic times in U.S. diplomatic history and certainly in my personal life, because we had the Beijing Summit Meeting, the Moscow Summit Meeting, the ending of the Vietnam War, and assorted other events in the course of that period.

However, to return to the China front, first we had to get ready for Al Haig's trip to China in January, 1972, making sure that he was prepared, and working with the White House domestic staff on the logistics, as well as trying to make further efforts on the draft communique for the Nixon trip. I think that Haig also raised Vietnam a great deal, to try to get the Chinese to continue to pressure Hanoi, and so on. So we were preoccupied with that. I recall being in Florida when we were launching Haig right at the time of the Super Bowl. I am a fanatic Redskins fan, and they were in the game. Kissinger gave me about a six-hour drafting assignment about three hours before the kickoff. I did the job in 2 hours, 55 minutes.

Then, of course, when Haig returned to Washington, we only had a few weeks before President Nixon's trip to China. I was put in charge of the preparations for the President's trip, which meant

that I had to orchestrate the whole thing. I had lots of help, of course, particularly from John Holdridge, who was crucial and much more of a China-expert than I.

This was the most meticulous process of preparation, as Kissinger has said in his memoirs, which has probably ever been undertaken for a summit meeting, both because it was so important and because of its historical significance. So, as I've already mentioned, we put together six black briefing books about so high.

*Q: Looks like about eight inches thick.*

LORD: Yes, six or eight inches thick. These briefing books were filled with everything from Chinese history to Chinese culture and poetry; personal portraits of Mao Zedong, Zhou En-lai, and the other, principal Chinese leaders; all of the transcripts of conversations during our trips in July and October, 1971, and Haig's trip in January, 1972, arranged by subject matter as well as the full transcripts on their own; the Chinese positions and objectives on every issue; our positions and objectives on every issue; our offense and defense; further elaborations of the draft Shanghai Communique, particularly with reference to the Taiwan issue; Chinese popular sayings. We had chronicles and excerpts from articles by outsiders.

We just had an incredible and rich array of material. To this day, and I have worked for several Presidents, I have never seen any President work as hard for a single event or trip as Nixon worked for this trip. As I mentioned earlier, quite literally, there was proof of his having read every page of these briefing books, because there would be his marks and annotations on almost everyone. Often there would be questions and requests for further information. When we finally went to China with Nixon, he kept asking on the airplane, as we flew toward China, for more information. This resulted in a good performance by President Nixon with Zhou En-lai, Mao, and the other Chinese leaders.

*Q: You were talking about the preparations for this Summit Meeting in China. I don't know how it was then, but now one has the feeling that when a Summit Meeting comes up, the major preparation on the White House side is for photo opportunities. The public relations people almost take over. They are concerned about the time of day the television coverage will be available, headlines, backgrounds, and all of that. Were they melded into your preparations?*

LORD: Certainly. There was the major focus on substance - this was after all a truly historic event and exhaustive talks were held during the trip. But the public impact in the US, China, and the world was key and integral to the substance, so the public dimension was clearly a key part of the trip, which was heavily televised. It had a tremendous impact back here in the United States. In fact, this coverage led to the almost instant romance and euphoria that was overstated. After all, horrible things were still going on in China. We swung from one extreme to another, from picturing China as an implacable enemy to a new friend, so to speak. This reflected somewhat a sort of built-in respect and affection for the Chinese people, and also an appreciation for its geopolitical and historical significance.

*Q: This goes back to the beginning of the United States as a republic. I have a history of the United States Consular Service. We couldn't get consuls in places like Germany and such*

*countries. However, back in 1790 or so Congress immediately approved the appointment of a Consul to go to Canton. China and the China trade have always...*

LORD: That's right. There has always been a genuine liking for the Chinese people, a sense of this huge market, as well as the Christian missionary connection. This feeling has been reciprocated on the Chinese people's side, as we found during our first public trip in October, 1971. The Chinese were amazed and stunned at the sight of these Americans walking around. However, they were certainly friendly and not hostile. It was clear, as we went along, that the Chinese people, despite all of the years of propaganda and enmity, genuinely liked Americans. Partly by comparison with all of their other neighbors.

In the case of Japan, even the young Chinese who hadn't experienced World War II had heard stories about the Rape of Nanking, and so on. There was a clear dislike and distrust of Japan. Also a real concern about and dislike of the Russians, as we learned more and more since then. The Chinese have expressed to us their distrust of the Vietnamese. This was also true of their attitude toward the Indians and, to a certain extent, the Koreans. So, as the Chinese looked around their periphery, these feelings were evident. And they didn't like the Europeans, and particularly the British, because of the history of the Opium War [1839-1842], in addition to other depredations by Germany and so on. So, even though the U.S. may not have had a perfect record in our relations with China, we certainly looked more benign and friendly than others.

So, on both Chinese and U.S. sides, there was a generally positive feeling. Of course, Chinese public opinion was under tight control and supervision there. I think that it's fair to say that the Chinese public welcomed this opening of relations. There was undoubtedly debate about the opening to the U.S., maybe among the Gang of Four, and perhaps Madame Mao and Lin Biao didn't like all of this. There may have been some debate at the highest levels of the Chinese leadership.

In the U.S., in turn, there was a tremendous outpouring of affection for China. Part of our problem is that we haven't had a steady gaze toward China. American emotions have run the gamut from the evil Fu Manchu to the noble peasant depicted by Pearl Buck. If we just take American attitudes from the last 50 or 60 years, our perceptions have ranged from regarding the Chinese as staunch allies in World War II to enemies, starting in 1949, when Mao Zedong took over the country, or the Korean War, when we wound up fighting each other. We were appropriately horrified at the Great Leap Forward, the ensuing famine, and the Cultural Revolution. Then, suddenly, now there was this opening to China, the tremendous romance and euphoria, and the feeling that we are going to be friends again. Subsequently, Deng Xiaoping came along with capitalism and the view that the Chinese were going to become market economists just like us.

Then, in the 1970s, we began to hear stories about the Cultural Revolution as we had more journalists more or less permanently stationed in China and began to see the warts as we began to have a more normal relationship with that country. In the later 1980s, the relationship was at its most positive though the bad dimensions of the Chinese system were clear. Then there was the Tiananmen Square massacre [in 1989] and the image of the man in front of the Chinese tank, and we went back to a negative perception of China again. Also, the Soviet threat, key to our

ties, disappeared. Now we are slowly moving back again, with somewhat more mixed feelings. At one point the Chinese were referred to as yellow hordes, Red Guards, and blue ants. Now they are capitalist men and women. So there have been these great swings in American perceptions of China.

Certainly, at the time of the beginning of the opening to China, including the Kissinger and Nixon trips, the reportage out of China was pretty positive and euphoric. People were sort of swept up in this. There were few people who were negative. Certainly, Bill Buckley [conservative columnist and publisher] was one of those who went to China and returned with clear reservations. Marilyn Berger of the "Washington Post" was skeptical. They began looking beneath the surface in China. But almost everyone else was swept up in this euphoria.

That was a very windy response to your question about the preparations for the Nixon visit. Of course, a lot of preparations were made, including arrangements for the press and photo opportunities. However, those preparations were essentially made on the other side of the White House. We were concerned with the substance of the Nixon visit.

At times Nixon, Kissinger, Haldeman, Chapin, and Ron Ziegler might have debates. Kissinger would always be worried about being crude with the Chinese. After all, we were visiting their country, and should we be rearranging their furniture? (This was literally done once in Canada in Prime Minister Trudeau's office.) We needed to have some sensitivity toward China's own culture, as China was the host for the Nixon visit. Of course, the President's advisers on the public relations and political side were much more concerned about the images and popularity at home of the President. So there was always that kind of tension. However, it worked out very well.

We, of course, were focused on the communique and the substantive issues and how we would handle relations with other countries which were watching this trip as it developed.

*Q: Did you have a feeling that Nixon was trapping himself, not so much in a contest, but in a display of his intellectual virtuosity in dealing with Zhou En-lai? He had heard about how great this man was and he may have wanted to show, by God, that dealing with him was part of Nixon's makeup. Do you think that was a factor?*

LORD: I think that that was an element. I mean, any of us, as human beings, when we go up against a heavyweight, want to do our best. So I'm sure that there was that element. However, in all fairness, I think that during those early years of his administration, particularly before the Watergate Affair began to preoccupy Nixon, he prepared very carefully for the major meetings that I also attended, including the Russian summit meeting. In effect, Nixon would commit to memory his basic positions. He liked to talk without notes, whenever possible, to impress people. So this tendency was really carried to a super level on this historic trip. Nixon was very careful in getting ready for these meetings. He really did his homework. Foreign policy issues were his primary passion, even though he became concerned more with the domestic front. People now realize this more clearly than they gave him credit for at the time. He was actually quite progressive on many domestic issues.

So there was that element of ego in Nixon's makeup. He knew, from Kissinger's recounting of his conversations with Zhou En-lai, that this was a formidable interlocutor and that he had to be up to that. However, this was also an historic trip, and it was very important to Nixon in terms of substance, in gaining Chinese confidence, in projecting firmness, inducing them to cooperate, and pointing out the advantages of cooperation.

In addition to substance, Nixon also wanted to have a good sense of Chinese culture and history, what he could say in his toasts, how he could work in little Chinese sayings and poetry in his toasts and in some of his remarks at the various meetings. And Nixon was genuinely interested in China, as most Americans are. He wanted to learn more about China himself.

So Nixon had all of these incentives, in addition to the historical and geopolitical significance of it. Furthermore, he knew that, although the meetings would be off the record, he nevertheless would be watched with tremendous attention on the world stage, including American television.

However, all of this preparation didn't do the President much good when he got to the Great Wall. I can't say that I blame him. There he was at the Great Wall, and the press came up to him and said: "What's your reaction to this?" He answered: "It surely is a Great Wall," and that's about all he could come up with after all of his preparation for this visit. That was the only - and very minor - incident where Nixon did not perform splendidly.

*Q: On the domestic side, what were you getting from your wife and your wife's family? We were going through a sort of euphoric time in terms of relations between the United States and China. Were you getting advice from the pillow, "Don't trust these people?" What were you getting?*

LORD: No, not at all. First, as far as my wife was concerned, it was very exciting that the Nixon visit to China had taken place. She recognized that it was in the U.S. national interest. She felt some pride and excitement that I was personally and directly involved in this. She had a sense of irony that a person like me, who was directly involved, had a Chinese wife. She had, of course, a real feeling of love and respect for the Chinese people and a willingness and desire to overcome a feeling of isolation from the Chinese people, including her relatives in China. So all of these feelings were basically very positive.

The same thing was true of my parents-in-law, even though the Nixon visit had a direct impact on my father-in-law. He was working indirectly for the Taiwan Government. It's hard to exaggerate how responsible he was in his comments to me. There never was any sense of "Why did you do this" or, "How dare you?" In effect, it was just the opposite. He said to me, although he wouldn't want to be quoted in Taipei at the time, "I fully recognize that this trip is in the American national interest." So the opening had no impact in our family except excitement. Even my in-laws were excited that I was involved in this event. There was absolutely no problem in that connection. Of course my wife was very helpful to me - and Kissinger at times - in interpreting Chinese culture, history, and style. And she was aghast about the political system. She also was the only person I remember predicting Deng Xiao-ping's come-back in 1974-75.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: What about the China Lobby?*

LORD: You have to remember that the NSC staff, and particularly myself, in my position as a Special Assistant to Kissinger and being responsible for this particular portfolio, had very little contact with the outside world.

I rarely got out of the damned office. Sometimes I attended dinner parties, for example, in the Georgetown area of Washington, including with Kissinger and, I would see, some of the movers and shakers in social settings. But I would always be late. I had no contact with the Congress, no contact with the press, no contact with foreign diplomats unless I was sitting in on a meeting, for example, with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin or going up to New York with Kissinger for a UN contact. So I wasn't personally exposed to this. I don't recall any tremendous pressures from the right wing, or China lobby. I'm sure that there was some concern expressed to Nixon and Kissinger. Certainly, the overwhelming reaction from the media was positive, as was the overwhelming reaction from everywhere. American public opinion and Congress were an easier sell politically than, we thought would be the case.

I'm sure that Nixon, in particular, was somewhat nervous about public reactions as we went along including his conservative base. This initiative did take some courage. I'm sure that Nixon was pleasantly surprised at how limited the negative reaction was. At least, that's my clear recollection.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: In your position on the NSC staff you were talking about being protected or isolated from the outside world. Do you think that that was a good or a bad thing?*

LORD: Given the office hours I kept, this lack of outside contact probably was inevitable in any event. It also fit in with Kissinger's style. However, it also was a reflection of the fact that I was a Special Assistant to Kissinger. The quick answer is that this situation was probably bad. It would have been better to be exposed to the outside world, including Members of Congress, foreign diplomats, the general public, and even the press, to ensure that I wasn't so insulated. Having said that, I must say that I had so much to do that I wouldn't have had much time for such contacts.

Secondly, I had more sensitive information than anyone else in the NSC staff, except for Al Haig and Kissinger, since I was involved in all of these initiatives. I'm not saying that other NSC staff members didn't have as much information on particular issues, but nobody else had this kind of information on all of the issues. So there was that factor.

However, to deal with outsiders, we had NSC staff people for specific countries or regions. They would have their own clients. So the European expert on the NSC staff would meet with a European diplomat or businessman, etc. I wasn't involved in that because I was a Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger. So for all of these reasons I was insulated from such contacts. I think that it would have been better if I had been more exposed to such contacts.

*Q: Shall we move on to how the visit went and all of that?*

LORD: As I look back on my career, I think that the secret trip was in first place in terms of drama. The Kissinger trip to China in July, 1971, was secret and it was the first such trip, I had a

Chinese wife, and so forth.

The Nixon trip has to be up there, probably tied for second place, if not in second place. Certainly, the trip which brought peace to Vietnam is also up there, and would be in second or third place. Then, next would be the Moscow summit meeting, in fourth place.

The Nixon trip to China was obviously a tremendous event. I run out of adjectives in describing its drama. There was a big buildup to it, and we started it going. It was massively busy getting ready for it, of course, for all of the reasons that I've mentioned.

We got on the President's plane. I can't remember how we moved from my office to the airport. At one point we were on the South Lawn of the White House. President Nixon took off on a helicopter. I remember being with my kids and my wife. I thought that it was on that trip that we were waving goodbye to the helicopter. But how I got to the plane in time is a mystery. Something is screwed up in my recollection of it.

I remember getting on the plane at Andrews Air Force Base. There was a TV on the plane, which we were watching from right outside the President's cabin, in the senior staff quarters. On the TV people were saying goodbye to the President and us taking off from Andrews Air Force Base. As we took off, we still were watching it on television. I was saying: "If this plane explodes, we can see ourselves explode on television!" This was a case of sick humor.

In any event, we made two stops: one in Hawaii and one in Guam. On the trip to China with Kissinger in October, 1971, we had stopped off in Hawaii (the Big Island) as well. We stayed at the most beautiful hotel there on Mauna Kea. That's the good news. The bad news is that, by being closer to Kissinger on this trip I got to stay instead in a guest house up in the mountains. I would much rather have been in the hotel, as we were working very hard on the visit.

As I said, on the way to China we were very busy, revising talking points and getting more information for Nixon. That is all I can remember.

*Q: A technical point. You say that he was going through these huge, briefing books on the plane. You say that Nixon wanted more information.*

LORD: The work continued on the plane. I want to make that point clear.

*Q: I was thinking of your statement that, during the flight, Nixon wanted more information about this or that, in a plane over the Pacific Ocean. How did you get more information from Washington?*

LORD: We would prepare more elaborate talking points, as opposed to our having to do the research on them ourselves. The people in Washington could give us more positions, I think. If it was more information wanted, there were people on the plane, in addition to myself, who probably knew it right away. But if it was information on the Paris negotiations on Vietnam, we had the briefing book. If it was a matter of Chinese history, culture, or something like that, hopefully someone on the plane knew the answer. I can't recall how well our communications

worked with Washington, whether we wired back for more information or not. We certainly did this during our later trips with the President and others.

I don't want to exaggerate this. I'm not saying, for example, that we turned out 500 pages of text on the plane. However, continually and throughout the trip, even on the last leg of it, there were requests coming back from the President for more information. I don't recall - as I did in all of my trips with Secretaries of State and other Presidents - that I ever sat around with Nixon and others, kicking around strategy and tactics. I don't recall precisely. There were probably a couple of conversations that I had with the President in the cabin. It was mostly working on papers.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was this when you sat around with Nixon and talked freely about China?*

LORD: We did that on a few occasions, but not very often. This was partly Nixon's style, perhaps due to his shyness. He probably didn't want a lot of people around him. Certainly, it was part of Kissinger's style. He didn't want to have a lot of the members of his staff with direct access to Nixon.

Once or twice I went up to Camp David [in the Catoclin Mountains of Maryland], when I sat around with Kissinger and Nixon. There were other times when he handled matters differently. Unlike subsequent Presidents and Secretaries of State with whom I have worked, I don't have any recollection of a lot of strategy sessions or directly briefing Nixon, and so on. I want to make clear that Nixon was always friendly and cordial to me. I'm sure that I've already mentioned this, but basically we were isolated from the domestic side of the White House. However, during the October, 1971, trip, and the Presidential trip, we tended to converge a lot more. So too on the Moscow trip.

However, we always sort of felt that we were being treated as second class citizens by the White House staff. As I said previously, we were never admitted to the White House mess and didn't have parking privileges. I don't think that Kissinger made any heroic efforts to get us into the White House mess or have us mingle with the domestic side of the White House. Looking back on it, given Watergate and everything else, it's just as well that we were pretty well isolated. But I would have liked White House mess access on all those late nights in the West Wing basement.

So, anyway, there was a great sense of drama when we went to China with Nixon. I remember that when we landed at Beijing Airport, maybe naively I was somewhat disappointed at what I considered the strained nature of the Chinese reception. We had expected thousands of people in cheering crowds, after 22 years of hostilities. There was a very small crowd, including a Chinese Army honor guard. Looking out the window at the welcoming ceremony, I thought that it was a fairly grey day, too. This didn't look like a monumental event, as it ought to have been.

Of course, everyone was wondering how the first encounter would go between the President and Zhou En-lai, who was at the airport to meet him. They all remembered that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had snubbed Zhou En-lai in Geneva in the 1950s when he refused to shake his hand. That initial handshake this time was clearly going to be important. Nixon left the plane, walked down the steps, and went over and shook Zhou En-lai's hand. This was a famous

photograph. I have a copy in my house of just the hands shaking. This picture is dedicated to the New China Hands. Then there was a restrained reception at the airport, with the band playing, the national anthems, review of the honor guard, and so on. There were not many people there. The reception was very cool. Then there was the motorcade to Tiananmen Square and on to the guest house. There were no crowds in the streets, except the usual ones. No one had been lined up specially. Again, I was somewhat disappointed. The press noted that the reception was rather restrained.

*Q: I think that this point came out in my interviews with others. John Holdridge, for example, mentioned the coolness of the reception. Chas Freeman mentioned the same thing. It was almost humdrum as far as they were concerned.*

LORD: It was, considering the buildup and the drama of the moment. It was sort of anticlimactic. There was the inherent drama, but there wasn't the color and excitement that one expected. I can't say that I was depressed by this, just that we felt that there was not quite the elation we expected to feel at the time.

We got to the guesthouse. I think that Zhou En-lai briefly said goodbye to the President to allow him to freshen up and relax. About one hour later Zhou En-lai came back to the guesthouse and asked to see Kissinger. He said that Chairman Mao wanted to see President Nixon right away. Before the trip we had never pinned down when the President would see Mao Zedong. Obviously, we assumed that he would, of course. This would be a meeting with the highest Chinese leader. The Chinese indicated that Mao would meet with the President, but they never said precisely when this would be. This was a typical example of the Chinese style, where the Emperor used to keep visitors on edge, and the schedule was never fixed until the last minute. This was true of other trips that we had. This was partly intended to keep us off balance, and partly to make us feel grateful when the actual meeting took place and that it did take place.

The immediate reaction was, not being mad, that they just sort of said, "Come on over and see the Emperor." Obviously, there was instead excitement. Also, there was an immediate recognition that, whatever the restraint of the initial reception, the fact that Mao was going to see President Nixon within the first couple of hours of his arrival was very significant. It was going to send a clear signal to the world and to the Chinese people that Mao personally was behind this visit and the historic importance of the event. So this was obviously very good news, even if it was a somewhat unorthodox way to proceed with the leader of the Free World.

Nixon asked Kissinger to go with him. That was his intention, to have just the two of them at the meeting. Nixon didn't want Secretary of State Rogers along. We also thought that there might be more than one meeting with Mao, since this was so early, and Rogers could go to a later meeting. Indeed at one point Zhou had suggested that there might be two meetings with Mao. Kissinger, to my everlasting gratitude, asked me to go as well to this historic meeting. Basically, on the one hand, it was a reward for all of the hard work that I had done, generally for Kissinger and specifically on the China initiative and that, together with Holdridge, I had been in overall charge of the major preparations for the Nixon visit and the drafting of the Shanghai Communiqué. However, it was also in Kissinger's self interest to have a note taker there, so that Kissinger could concentrate on the conversation.

So I got to take notes at the Nixon meeting with Mao. Also, Kissinger knew that I was one of the world's great note takers. I always got meetings down verbatim, even the jibes. There was that element to it.

And so, with great excitement, we went off to see Chairman Mao in the leaders' compound. We walked past a hallway with a ping pong table and into Mao's modest study, which was lined with books. Mao already was somewhat frail, physically, but nowhere near as much as he was during later meetings he had with Kissinger and with President Ford. I tied for first place among Americans with Kissinger in meeting with Mao five times. That is, once with Nixon, once with Ford, and three times with Kissinger alone.

Mao had a couple of nurses around him and clearly needed some help. He was an old man but not a dying man by any means. He was just somewhat frail, physically, but not shockingly so. Indeed, he struck us with his presence. It is hard to sort out how much you expect when you see a great man, given his reputation. I say great, not in a positive sense but, in the sense of impact. Mao was obviously a very bad man in most respects. As for the physical force of the man, how much was I making this up and how much Mao really made this impression? Both Kissinger and I felt that if we walked into a cocktail party and had no idea who this guy Mao was, his very presence would still have had an impact on us.

So it was Nixon, Kissinger, and myself on our side, and Mao, Zhou En-lai, Nancy Tang as interpreter, Wang Hai-rung, and perhaps one or two others on the Chinese side. I'd have to look at the picture to be sure.

The meeting lasted for about an hour. I remember distinctly, coming out of the meeting somewhat disappointed. I was impressed with the physical impact of Mao. It was also clear that this man was tough, ruthless, and came from a peasant background, in contrast to the elegant, Mandarin quality of Zhou En-lai. However, I thought that the conversation was somewhat episodic and not very full. Kissinger had sort of the same reaction as I did. Mao was speaking, as he usually did, in brush strokes, whereas we were used to the elegant and somewhat lengthy presentations of Zhou En-lai. Mao would just throw in a few sentences, a few brush strokes. He went from topic to topic in rather a casual way.

As we left, however, we were obviously happy. We had had this immediate, friendly meeting with Mao. I can't remember which meeting discussed which topic. However, I am sure that we both talked about the danger of the polar bear, the Soviet Union. Mao certainly said, in one of these meetings, and I believe this was the one, that we could wait to settle the Taiwan problem for 100 years. In one of the meetings, and it may have been this one, when told that he had made a major change in China, he said: "No, I've only changed a few things near Beijing." So we had these sometimes rather epigrammatic comments. It seemed at times that he sometimes did not quite know what he was talking about. He was rather casual about what we would be getting at, in what order, and what was his agenda. So his comments seemed somewhat disjointed, not particularly elegant, and a little disappointing.

However, we changed our mind on Mao's deftness as we thought about it, and I don't think that

this is a rationalization, and as the trip went on we realized just how important this meeting was. It was important because, immediately on arrival, and for the reasons I mentioned, he had indicated to the world and to his own public, his backing for this strategic move. It was also important because Mao was setting out the main lines, however thinly and in brush strokes, for Zhou En-lai to elaborate on in the coming days in the various conversations. So maybe there were only two or three sentences on the polar bear, but there was the whole line of anti hegemony and the fact that we had to get together against the Soviets, not as allies, but as a matter of common concern. It was there, authorized, and for Zhou En-lai to fill out. On Taiwan, as I said, Mao said that China could wait. It was there in the communique, in which they could take a tough position, but we could take our own position. We didn't have to resolve this question now. We could move on and kick it down the road.

I'm not saying that these remarks made everything easy. They just authorized the lines of instruction which Mao was setting forth in a strategic way. He had covered these two, key issues, Taiwan and Russia, and he raised some other issues which I cannot now recall. The transcripts of all these meetings, most of which I produced, are publicly available now.

*Q: Vietnam?*

LORD: I don't recall whether Mao mentioned Vietnam. The Vietnam issue probably came up, but I just don't recall. We only spent an hour in this meeting, and there were translations to be made, so there wasn't that much time available. There was some personal banter and also the fact that both Nixon and Mao recognized the other's vision and courage in taking this important step.

However, as we thought about it, and certainly by the end of the trip, we realized in fact that Mao had put in a very skillful performance. In his understated and unorthodox way he had set forth the main lines of Chinese policy, he had made clear the features that he considered very important, and that other things could fall into place. Mao was self-deprecating, even though he had a tremendous ego. He had some humor. He had gotten through his agenda purposefully, even though it seemed casual and episodic. He had managed to cover the main points. I still don't think that it was one of the great conversations of all time. However, I think that Mao was much more purposeful and skillful than we gave him credit for at first. We realized that within a few days.

*Q: I was just thinking about what you said about not having pinned down in advance when President Nixon was going to see Mao. They could have put a really unpleasant twist on it if Nixon had only been allowed to see Mao at the very end of the trip.*

LORD: Well, it would have been much worse if we hadn't seen Mao at all.

*Q: But if you had only seen him at the end of the trip, it would have indicated that Mao was saying: "All right, I'll see Nixon, but..."*

LORD: Not necessarily, and I'll tell you why. During most trips, and our subsequent and more recent trips to China, usually we worked our way up the scale. We started by seeing the Foreign Minister or even the Vice Foreign Minister. Then we saw the Premier. And we ended up seeing

the President or the Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. So it would have been somewhat natural, to see Mao late; certainly the meeting would have to take place in Beijing. However, on the last day in Beijing, we could have had a sort of climax meeting with Chairman Mao, blessing what had happened. It would not have been a put down. On balance, having the meeting right at the outset was the best outcome. By putting the Chairman's immediate stamp of approval on the trip for the world to see, as well as sketching the key Chinese position for Zhou to flesh out. But having the meeting with Mao as a finale would have been fine.

*Q: I see.*

LORD: However, it was rather unorthodox and even more significant to have the meeting with Chairman Mao first.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Did you really get on the plane at Andrews Air Force Base, not knowing whether President Nixon would meet Chairman Mao?*

LORD: Well, we knew in our gut that Mao would meet Nixon. Conceivably, he could do the unthinkable and not meet Nixon, but he didn't. However, when we left Andrews Air Force Base, we did not have an agreed time for the meeting with Mao, and they never explicitly promised a meeting. I don't remember what the Chinese formulation was on this point. They certainly gave favorable indications but I don't know whether they actually said: "We can give you 100 percent assurance that President Nixon will see Mao." I'll bet that they didn't. I know that we made unilateral statements that Nixon would, of course, be seeing Mao. We said that we would like to know when this would be, but we knew that this was going to happen. It would have been unthinkable if it didn't.

So we were sure that Nixon would see Chairman Mao. There was just that one percent uncertainty, perhaps to keep us off balance, in not confirming the schedule for the President, which was mildly annoying. However, it was typical of the Chinese Emperor indicating that he was the head of the Middle Kingdom and that we were showing obeisance. So we honestly did not know the timing of the meeting with Mao and were surprised that it took place that quickly. We expected the more traditional meetings with Zhou En-lai and then a meeting with Chairman Mao toward the end of the visit.

*Q: On several occasions you made reference to the practices of the Chinese Emperors. I've heard this kind of comment from other China experts or people who have dealt with China. You mentioned that China regards itself as the Middle Kingdom. Was it very much in everybody's mind that the People's Republic of China may be a communist regime, but we're still dealing with something like a Chinese court?*

LORD: Well, hopefully not in a subservient or obsequious way, but out of respect, yes. We were dealing with tough, ruthless, Communist Chinese leaders. However, we were also dealing with people who were heading the world's most populous nation which, we were sure, even then, would be a major world power in the next century. And a nation which had the world's richest civilization and culture. And a nation which had been Number One more than any other country in history.

One of the complications in dealing with China is that the Chinese have had so little experience dealing with the outside world as equals. For 4000 to 5000 years they were Number One in the world, at least in their view. Everyone else was either invisible, irrelevant, distant barbarians, or tributaries. Then China had a bad century or two. They were dominated by outside powers from roughly the mid 1800s on. They probably began to lose their technological dominance to the West and Europe by the 1600s or 1700s. Then China was actually humiliated by the British and other Europeans, the Japanese invasion [1937-1945], fighting against us in Korea [1950-1953], and other experiences in the 19th and 20th centuries. So after 4000 to 5000 years as Number One and 100-150 years of being humiliated, this is where we found them when we went there. We are still dealing with the consequences of that, although for the last 15 or 20 years, since the reforms started, the Chinese have sort of stood up as equals. They are getting used to dealing with other countries as equals. This combination of arrogance or self-confidence, derived from being the Middle Kingdom and Number One for so long, plus the more recent humiliations and slights by foreigners and xenophobia, and very little experience in dealing with other countries as equals has made it particularly complicated to deal with China.

So, when we went to China, Nixon and Kissinger in their toasts and their statements were careful to say, and with genuine sincerity, that China was a great civilization and a great country. They said that as China had been in business for 5,000 years, we've only been in business for 200 years. We paid careful attention to Chinese face and were polite. Also, we believe that this is true. Frankly, as a world superpower, much stronger than China, we can afford to be magnanimous. We could be generous and sincere, as I said, because militarily, economically, and in every other way we were totally dominant of China. So for all of these reasons we were aware of this historical, cultural background and we paid due deference to it.

The Chinese are also geniuses at protocol, in making you feel at home, and are very careful with you. Their whole idea is to inculcate in outsiders coming to the Middle Kingdom a sense of obligation for their hospitality and friendship. In effect, they seek to create ties of alleged friendship. They want us to feel that friends do favors for other friends. For example, if the Chinese were taking Nixon or Kissinger to the Great Wall, the Forbidden City, the Temple of Heaven, or the Summer Palace, and they have two hours to cover the Summer Palace, what they would do is to break up two hours in their planning into 20-minute segments. They never want to give a visitor the feeling that he or she is rushed. In going to the Summer Palace, to take that example, if you stop for longer than they expected to look at the Empress's Jade Boat, or something like that, instead of pushing you and saying that we're not going to get through everything, they just agree among themselves, without telling the guests, "All right, we'll cut out the next 20 minute segment and go to the next one." So you end up getting through on time in terms of what the schedule says but you never feel rushed.

The Chinese food was terrific, at least in the early visits. However, it got worse as we visited China in subsequent years. The food during the Nixon visit, particularly the banquet in Hangzhou, was very good, indeed. So the Chinese have tried to create this sense of subtle superiority, Middle Kingdom great host protocol, and so on. All of this is designed to make you somewhat more amenable on substantive matters and deferential in spirit.

*Q: I must say that the one scene that sticks in my mind is of Nixon making a toast. And the band played "America the Beautiful." I never heard this song played so much, which I have always thought should be our national anthem, anyway. It was magnificently done.*

LORD: Before getting into the substance, I would like to mention some of the public events. I don't have these in order, but among the things Nixon did was to attend these banquets, where the Chinese PLA [People's Liberation Army] band played "America the Beautiful," "Turkey in the Straw," and other melodies, all of this on television. I can still recall the vision of the two leaders toasting each other in a huge dining room in the Great Hall of the People. There were about 10,000 at this banquet, or something along those lines. That was one public event. Another event involved going to a dreadful, Cultural Revolution type ballet with Madame Mao. Another one that we went to was a major, gymnastics exhibition in a gymnasium. Nixon also went to see the Great Wall and the Forbidden City. Kissinger and I were busy working on the communique at that point, so we missed that. Of course, we had already been there. That was the point where poor Nixon went to the Great Wall and said: "It surely is a Great Wall." Those were the major, public appearances during the Nixon visit to Beijing. He went on the lake in Hangzhou, and, I believe, visited an industrial exhibition in Shanghai.

To get back to the Nixon meeting with Mao, if I can. One amusing, personal highlight, which you've probably heard, was that, as we concluded the meeting, the Chinese came in with the communique announcing the meeting and photographs of it. The photographs had all of us in them. The communique said that Mr. Nixon, Mr. Kissinger, and Mr. Lord were present. Nixon and Kissinger looked at each other and said to the Chinese: "Please cut out Mr. Lord from all of the photographs and out of the communique and keep secret that he was at this meeting."

The reason that they did this is that even they were embarrassed that Secretary of State Rogers had not been at the meeting. They figured that it was humiliating enough that the National Security Adviser was with the President at this historic meeting, but the Secretary of State was not. To add on top of that the fact that the Special Assistant to the National Security Adviser was there as a third person but the Secretary of State was not was too much, even for them. The Chinese clearly must have been puzzled by this, but they readily went along with this request.

So the official communique just said that Nixon and Kissinger were present on our side. The pictures cropped me out of it. I was on the right side of the picture as you looked at it. I, of course, was disappointed, because I wanted worldwide fame, but I was sworn to secrecy. Very few people knew about this. I don't even believe, in fact I'm quite sure, that the State Department didn't know that I had been present at the meeting, either. I just can't remember now that anybody knew.

I will now confess that when I got back to Washington, I told my wife. I wasn't about to keep this secret from her. However, for a couple of years this secret was kept from the entire world. Then, just to show you the Chinese style, when I went back to Beijing with Kissinger when he visited on his own, in 1973, when he met Mao on his own, we were sitting with Zhou En-lai. Wang Hai Rung, the same grandniece of Mao's, who was close to Mao but also sat in on our meetings, as part of Zhou En-lai's staff, came in with a piece of paper for Zhou En-lai. Zhou En-lai read it out and then said to Kissinger: "Chairman Mao wants to see Dr. Kissinger and

Winston Lord." Now, Chairman Mao wouldn't have known me from Mel Gibson or Woody Allen. I was sitting there with several other US officials, all higher ranking. In protocol terms I would have been the last person going with Kissinger to see Mao, because you can only take one person. The Chinese knew, first, that I was the closest person to Kissinger and, perhaps, the most important in terms of the China initiative. Secondly, I had attended a Kissinger meeting with Mao, but this occasion was secret, and nobody knew about it. Thirdly, the Chinese knew that Kissinger would want to take me for general reasons and because of my note taking and advice. So they thought up the gimmick of Mao wanting me to be there, along with Kissinger. This gave Kissinger the pretext, despite protocol, of taking me with him. I went to this meeting. It was a very nice gesture on their part. On a subsequent trip they gave me a picture of the Nixon meeting with Mao, with me in it, to prove that I had been there. Since then, of course, it has been well publicized, but that was an interesting sidelight.

Now we ought to get to the substance of the trip. We had a series of meetings with Zhou En-lai and also some meetings, particularly to negotiate the language of the communique and other, loose ends, with the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, whose name was Chao Kuan-hua. He was a very able vice minister. He subsequently got into trouble because he bet on the Gang of Four against Deng Xiaoping. He made the wrong bet. His wife, who was a translator, was close to Madame Mao.

So we had two kinds of discussions. There were meetings between President Nixon and Zhou En-lai on substantive issues. On our side were Nixon, Kissinger, Holdridge, and myself. Meanwhile, Secretary of State Rogers, Assistant Secretary of State Marshall Green, and other State Department people were meeting with the Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji Peng-fei. They were dealing with bilateral issues only, such as economic and cultural exchanges, and so forth. They may have touched on some international issues, but their discussion of them would have been superficial. In any case the Chinese Foreign Minister, Ji, was less important than their Vice Foreign Minister, Chao. Of course, Nixon was relying on Kissinger as his adviser.

So the real discussions were between Nixon and Zhou En-lai, and they ranged over all of the issues that one would expect, whether it was on the general, historic nature of the opening to China or Russia, South Asia, the Middle East, Vietnam, Korea, Taiwan, and bilateral relations. There was discussion with Zhou En-lai of general principles and major issues and particularly Taiwan. The specific negotiating session on the language of the communique took place with Vice Foreign Minister Chao, with great assistance from Assistant Minister Zhang Wen-chin. There were some loose ends unresolved on the communique generally, apart from Taiwan, but mostly this was directed at trying to beef up the positive sections toward the end. These sections weren't particularly contentious.

We had really tough negotiations on Taiwan, day after day, right down to the wire. They finally ended up on our last night in Beijing, when we were to take off the next day for Hangzhou. We reached agreement. I still remember this. I don't think that I went with Kissinger to tell Nixon, late at night, that we had reached final agreement on the communique. Of course, you know the formulations agreed on, and I won't go through all of that. Basically, it was a rather historic formulation which has held up to this day. The Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party approved the communique that evening. Of course, we had approved it.

We took off for Hangzhou on the following morning. When we got there, Secretary of State Rogers and Marshall Green saw the communique for the first time. That is no way to do business. Either on the plane to Hangzhou or in Hangzhou, they said basically that this communique was a disaster. They probably did not use that phrasing, but they were disturbed.

*Q: Did they say something close to that?*

LORD: They were very critical, particularly on Taiwan. They said that President Nixon was going to get killed at home and around the world and that we had given in too much to the Chinese. We thought that this view was nonsense, in substantive terms. Each side had declared its positions. In fact, we had negotiated the communique pretty skillfully and we thought that most of their comments on the communique were - frankly understandably - piqued at having been left out of the negotiations. The process was lousy and State should have been included. But the communique turned out to be excellent.

So Nixon had a terrible decision. On the one hand, the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party had already approved the communique. On the other hand, he risked having Secretary of State Rogers and Marshall Green, if not on the record, then leaking out on background that they had not only been excluded from the negotiations but that we had also sold out on Taiwan. So Nixon had the humiliating experience of sending Kissinger back to Hangzhou to reopen the negotiations on the communique.

I still remember an amusing sidelight on this. I happened to be in my underwear when Kissinger somehow came into my room to ask me about something. Just after that President Nixon came into my room and made some stupid joke because he saw Kissinger with me in my underwear. That isn't the point. This was a poor attempt at humor. Then Nixon asked seriously what we were going to do about the views of Secretary of State Rogers on the communique. He said: "I can't afford to have the State Department undercutting what we've accomplished." So he then said: "Henry, you've got to go back to the Chinese and get some of these concessions which Rogers and Green have given us on specific language." Some of these were impossible to get. Obviously, State never could have gotten them either, but you can't blame the State Department for being irate. So clearly they were going to ask for many changes, both because they'd like to get them, but also because they figured that it would be more embarrassing to Kissinger if we didn't get them. Some of their suggestions, however, were minor nuances, or nitpicks.

Kissinger, of course, was very resistant to this. I don't remember exactly what the conversation was. But he dreaded going back to Zhou En-lai and saying in effect: "I've got a small detail here. We know that your Politburo has approved this, as well as Chairman Mao. Here we are in Hangzhou, and the Politburo isn't even around, and Chairman Mao is back there in Beijing. However, by the way, we'd like to reopen some of the sensitive issues on Taiwan that we've both agreed on after months of negotiations." This was going to be embarrassing, to say the least. It was our own fault for having cut out the State Department in the negotiations on the communique.

So we reopened the negotiations on the communique that night. It was very humiliating.

Kissinger explained our bureaucratic and public relations situation. We suggested some changes but didn't try out all of the changes that the State Department wanted, particularly the ones that were really dramatic in their import. Zhou En-lai handled the matter very skillfully. He tried to avoid making this situation any more awkward and embarrassing than it really was.

There was one key point, I believe, that Green made and was adjusted. We had language that reaffirmed all our alliances except Taiwan. It was meant to reassure allies, but the omission of Taiwan would have been glaring. Thus State suggested and we got Chinese approval not to mention the alliances. And Kissinger in his press conference on Chinese soil verbally reaffirmed our commitment to Taiwan. That change was important.

Zhou also gave in on a few secondary points. I don't remember the details, which improved the draft in a couple of places but didn't touch anything fundamental, nor could they, since the Politburo and Chairman Mao had already approved it, and Zhou En-lai was operating on his own. He threw a few crumbs to us, which we then included in the communique.

We went on to Shanghai the next day, and Kissinger presented a press briefing on the communique, including reasserting on Chinese soil that we would continue to have our defense relationship with Taiwan. This was a very sensitive point. It is one thing to say this in the United States, but to say it in Shanghai was quite extraordinary. Kissinger, as it were, was doing a high wire act, and he wanted to protect the President's domestic flank and his international reputation, as well as fears on Taiwan, without overly alienating the Chinese. This was a very skillful performance.

We were not 100 percent sure, particularly after the State Department had spooked us a little bit, what kind of reception the trip and the Shanghai Communique would get, both immediately and when we returned to Washington. Even as we flew back to Washington, with the euphoria of the trip, we were still a little bit concerned about what the reaction would be. Well, once again we underestimated the popular dimension of this initiative. There may have been some carping at the time, but, on the whole, everyone not only welcomed the trip as a tremendous success, with this romance and euphoria. They also said that the Shanghai Communique was very well done.

*Q: As I recall it, and, Nancy, you might remember, Marshall Green's main point, in the Oral History interview I did with him, was that there was some sort of reference or drawing a parallel to Secretary of State Dean Acheson's leaving South Korea out of the U.S. defense perimeter in the Pacific, when he made a speech to the National Press Club in January, 1950, not long before North Korea invaded South Korea in June, 1950. He had outlined U.S. interests in the Far East but didn't include Taiwan as one of them. Does that ring a bell with you?*

LORD: Well, in the first place I want to make clear on the record how much respect I have for Marshall Green. He handled himself, as did Secretary of State Rogers, with tremendous dignity when they were really cut out of things that they really should not have been cut out of. I'm sure that whatever concerns Marshall Green had were genuine, though he felt understandable annoyance at the process. I don't recall that particular comment by Marshall Green, if that's what it is. But his concerns were almost entirely focused on the Taiwan portion of the communique. As I said I believe there was a reference to various allies which suggested an omission of Taiwan

and therefore all references were taken out, so that is probably what Green was referring to.

*Q: His comments were on Taiwan...*

LORD: But we couldn't have possibly stated in the Shanghai Communique that we were going to defend Taiwan. We certainly had the expectation of a peaceful resolution of this matter. Regarding the arms sales question we talked about continuing them, which was dicey. We didn't break our defense treaty with Taiwan at that point. At some point in the communique we used the formulation to the effect that we were willing to reduce our forces on Taiwan as tensions in the area subsided. This was really a reference to Vietnam. We said, in effect, that if the Chinese helped us to end the Vietnam War, they would see us reducing our forces in Taiwan. Since a part of the rationale for our forces in Taiwan was regional stability, including Vietnam, we could justify it on those grounds because it was a subtle way of meeting their concerns on that point. It also could suggest that a peaceful approach by China in the area, and to the Taiwan question, could also help the withdrawal process

Marshall Green may well have made a comment of this kind, but I just don't recall the details of what his concern was. I'm sure that it referred to Taiwan.

*Q: During all of this what was the impression of Nixon, Kissinger, and yourself of Madame Mao? Where did you feel that she stood in the Chinese structure at that time?*

LORD: We didn't see much of her. I think that she was probably at one of the banquets. She was the escort to the President and Mrs. Nixon at the ballet. That was the only exposure that we had to her. I never talked to her in any way. I was standing around when she made some small talk with President Nixon. It was my impression at the time that she didn't seem particularly friendly. I think that, even then, we suspected that she was less enthusiastic about this opening than Chairman Mao. We weren't aware as yet, that I can recall, of the Gang of Four mentality and where she stood on this spectrum. However, either at the time or since then we thought that she was less enthusiastic about this opening. Maybe not resistant, but certainly less enthusiastic.

I should have mentioned the Lin Biao incident during the trip to Beijing in October, 1971. There was tightened security for reasons that we didn't know about at the time. It turned out that two weeks earlier, in September, 1971, Lin Biao, partly, we believe, revolting against the opening to the United States, made a grab for power. He became involved in a struggle with Chairman Mao, tried to escape China in an airplane, and crashed in Mongolia. The world knew nothing of this at that point. This incident was covered up for some time. However, this resulted in a rather tense security situation, and we saw a lot of security precautions in Beijing.

I'm not saying that Madame Mao was linked up with Lin Biao, but she was probably in the more skeptical part of the spectrum with him on the American connection. I can't remember how much we knew of this at the time, but she did strike us as less friendly in the brief encounters we had with her.

*Q: During these discussions in China, what was the view of the Chinese of the Soviets at that time? Were they trying to get any information from us or were they saying that we both know*

*that the Soviets are bad people?*

LORD: Let's get into some of these other issues. Regarding the Soviets, that clearly was a major theme throughout the Nixon visit to China. Kissinger and Nixon would play on this threat to China and us. They were always a little careful so that, if these remarks were transmitted to Brezhnev, they wouldn't be too embarrassed. They were fairly heavy on the dimensions of the Soviet threat. When we would talk to the Soviets, we would never say negative things about China, but we also would try to improve relations with Russia.

The Chinese were the same way on the Soviets. Certainly, Mao was the bluntest about Russia. The higher up you went in the Chinese hierarchy, the blunter they were about Russia. This was true of Deng Xiaoping later, with the talk about the polar bear and the threat. This attitude held true for 20 years. Even during my last meeting with Deng Xiaoping in 1988, or whenever it was, he was talking about the Russian as well as the Japanese threat to China. So that theme was there a lot.

Early on we began briefing the Chinese on our relations with the Soviets. We worked on improving relations with the Russians, but we were also using the Chinese to induce the Russians to improve relations with us. With the Chinese, on the one hand we wanted to reassure them that we weren't being feckless and naive in seeking detente with the Russians. However, on the other hand, we had to spend a certain amount of time letting the Chinese know that we were moving somewhere with the Russians, too, to get them a little excited. So it was a carefully nuanced game here.

Kissinger was always meticulous, and Nixon was on his trip, to brief the Chinese about what our strategy was toward the Soviet Union. Basically, we would say: "Look, we want to improve our relations with Moscow. We don't deny that. They have nuclear weapons, and we don't want to get into a war with them. However, we have no illusions. The Soviets are tough and expansionist. And by the way, they are more of a threat to you than to us, given their geography, history, and capabilities. We don't really trust the Russians, but it's in our national interest to try to improve our relationship with them on a hard-headed, pragmatic basis. We'll use pressures, but we'll also use some incentives. We know what we're doing." The sub-text to this was: "We are making some progress with the Soviets, and you Chinese should be sure that you keep up with us and improve relations with us, so that we don't get ahead of you in relations with the Russians." Indeed, we had a much more concrete agenda with Moscow than we did with China, where we were just launching a relationship. With Russia we had topics like arms control, Berlin, trade, exchanges, etc. With China it was essentially geopolitical dialogue in the early years.

The Chinese would be flat out in talking about Soviet pressures and threats. I don't know that they even went through the motions of saying that they wanted better relations with the Soviets. They might have, but they would talk about past Soviet perfidy and future concerns. I don't know that they complained that the Soviets did not help them with nuclear weapons, but they certainly referred to the border clashes and continuing Soviet pressures on China. At times, and this was truer in subsequent years, particularly in the mid 1970s, the Chinese would say: "You Americans are getting a little naïve with the Soviets. Detente is really an illusion. You're getting too soft and

you're trying to stand on our shoulders to reach the Soviets. You're trying to use us and you're being naive with the Russians." We got some of that flavor, particularly from Deng Xiaoping later on, but not so much from Mao and Zhou En-lai earlier on, as I recall.

So this was a heavy theme in our talks with China. Then there was the anti-hegemony reference in the Shanghai Communique. We were careful to brief the Chinese on what we were doing with Moscow. For example, after President Nixon's trip to China in February, 1972, we went to Moscow in May, 1972. Then, in June, 1972, Kissinger, myself, Holdridge, and so on went back to China for two main reasons. One was to debrief the Chinese on the Moscow Summit Meeting and fill them in, which we continually did. Secondly, we tried to get them to help more on Vietnam. Those were the two main reasons. So that was an example.

Through these trips, and more and more as we went along, we briefed the Chinese generally on policy and the status of negotiations with the Russians, always giving them a hard edge twist that we were not naïve and that we would make sure that the Russians did not take advantage of us. We began to share intelligence reports with the Chinese. Often Jon Howe, who was a military aide on the NSC staff, and I would go off and brief the Chinese on Russian troop deployments. We would also give them information on Soviet capabilities, both to show that we were friendly and that we were trying to share information that might be useful to them. And also, frankly, to make the Chinese a little nervous about Soviet intentions.

So the Russian dimension was very important. It was not the only reason that we opened up with China. That's been proven since the end of the Soviet threat to the US in 1989-90. Over a 20, 30, or 40 year period we will have a large agenda with China, which is going to be a major power. Certainly, our joint concern about the Soviet threat was the glue in the early going, but we've shown, and we will show that we have other reasons for dealing with China, even without the Russian threat. That was the primary reason then, but there are all the other factors which I have mentioned, including the Vietnam issue, the attempt to try to stabilize regional stability in Asia, North Korea, and the Taiwan Straits, to a certain extent. If the Chinese have good relations with us, they'll have less incentive to attack Taiwan and wreck their relations with us.

Eventually trade and cultural exchange and other exchanges have become our other reasons for good relations with China. However, the Soviet theme was the dominant theme in the early 70s and 80s.

*Q: What about North Korea? Did you sense anything approaching distaste among the Chinese for the Kim Il Sung regime in North Korea?*

LORD: No, not at that time. This aspect has become clearer in the last few years and as we speak, here in 1998. However, the Chinese didn't show much daylight on North Korea, and I'll get back to some of the other issues. On North Korea I didn't detect any opening. They had no interest in South Korea at that point. Even then, however, they probably made it clear to us, and in fact, I know that they did, that they had no interest in seeing the North Koreans attacking the South Koreans and perhaps dragging them into another war against us. I'm sure that the Chinese said that they hoped there would be stability on the Korean peninsula. However, they showed no daylight between them and North Korea. Certainly, their references in the Shanghai

Communique and other talking points would be pretty solid in their connection with North Korea.

I would like to make clear that Zhou En-lai was so sophisticated that he wouldn't use terms like lips and teeth and the usual garbage which you get out of the Chinese. It would be much more elegant than that, but substantively he would still be very solid with the North Koreans, I am quite sure. I should say that the conversations between Zhou En-lai, on the one hand, and Kissinger and Nixon, on the other hand, were the most interesting and impressive, diplomatic conversations that I have ever witnessed.

On Vietnam, which is an important subject, we didn't fully realize then how much the Chinese disliked the Vietnamese, and vice versa. In fact, the Chinese invaded Vietnam a few years later (in 1979). We still saw the Chinese essentially as a patron of Hanoi, along with Moscow, somewhat competing with Moscow and somewhat constrained in terms of the degree to which they could help us. This was because they might lose influence in Hanoi to Moscow if they were more forthcoming with us than Moscow was.

The same consideration applied to North Korea. Chinese concern about Russia reflected not only the bilateral pressures between the two countries but their impact around the world in places like North Korea and Vietnam where China was in competition with Russia for influence. So this infused all of their views. Some of this is retrospective and some of this we saw at the time. The Chinese recognized that the Vietnamese could be pretty stubborn. They basically wanted to get on with their relationship with us, and the Vietnam War was a real annoyance, as I said earlier. The Chinese felt that it was a distraction to have fighting going on near their border. The Chinese did have some support troops in Laos, I believe. They never went in force into Vietnam, which adjoined their border, and they still had their ideology and history to deal with. They had to look as if they were close with Vietnam and they did want to compete with the Soviets. So they had all of that working.

However, they clearly wanted to get the Vietnam War settled. They would appeal to us in these conversations and would say: "Look, you're bogged down in Vietnam. Your domestic situation is terrible and there is a lot of uproar. More importantly, you're getting distracted from your other, geopolitical responsibilities. You can't face the polar bear around the world effectively, and even your position in NATO is hurt because you're so preoccupied with Vietnam and you're alienating a lot of countries."

They would use their ideology in this context. Again, Zhou En-lai would be somewhat elegant in referring to a civil war in Vietnam and say that the Vietnamese people demand justice, and all of that stuff. Basically, whatever they put in public communiques, in our private talks they would appeal to our national self-interest, more than ideology and references to lips and teeth. It would be more like: "You guys are bogged down. It's in your interest to get this war in Vietnam over with." Of course it was in Beijing's interest too to end the fighting near its border and also end the irritant in our bilateral relations, which were more important to the Chinese than their ties to Vietnam.

I don't think that the Chinese ever heavily pressured Hanoi. I think that they were helpful to us in

their own self interest. We think that their attitude was: "There should be a military settlement. Hanoi shouldn't be requiring America to humiliate itself by also deciding the political future of Vietnam." We'll get into Vietnam later, but basically the North Vietnamese position for years was that the U.S. not only had to withdraw unilaterally but, as we left, we had to overthrow the government of Nguyen van Thieu and replace it with a coalition government. We made our position clear as early as the fall of 1969, when we suggested a cease-fire in place. And we followed this up concretely in May, 1971, with a specific, seven-point proposal in the secret talks. I'll go into this in greater detail when we talk about Vietnam. We made clear that we could live with a unilateral withdrawal as well as a cease-fire, a return of POWs [Prisoners of War], and international supervision, as long as the political settlement was left for the Vietnamese people to decide.

We made clear to the Chinese that it is one thing to have a military settlement along those lines, but it's another thing to ask us to overthrow an ally and to decide for the Vietnamese people themselves their political future. We said that we're not going to do that. We kept stressing to the Chinese and asked them to relay to Hanoi that we were prepared to reach a reasonable settlement but that the military and political issues should be separated and that Hanoi couldn't ask us to overthrow an ally. We also appealed to the Chinese. We said that if you want us as a balancing force in Asia, the world, and particularly against the Soviet Union, as well as a restraint on Japan, you should support us. If the Japanese felt insecure, they might feel a need to remilitarize and develop nuclear weapons. We said that if the Chinese want us to play this geopolitical role, which was in their interest, they can't have us humiliated in Vietnam, making all of our allies and friends around the world think that we are totally untrustworthy. It is one thing to withdraw. It's another thing actually to overthrow the Thieu Government and put in a coalition government.

We kept pounding that theme with the Chinese, hoping that they would reinforce it with Hanoi. We hoped that we could get a military settlement only, which was what our objective was. We believe that the Chinese, probably somewhat carefully, because of the Russian factor, conveyed this view to Hanoi, although I can't prove it. I think that Zhou En-lai actually went to Vietnam after one of our trips to China. I'm quite sure that he did. There were high level Chinese emissaries who went to Hanoi. We can't prove what they said - I don't think that we had any documentary evidence through intelligence channels. However, we are quite sure basically about what Zhou En-lai said carefully in our discussions and superficially from his trips and so on. There were some signs of Hanoi's annoyance with its Russian and Chinese patrons. The Chinese, in their own self interest, kept this issue out of the way between us. However, we believe that they were leaning on Hanoi and probably saying something like: "Get the U.S. out of South Vietnam and settle for the military side only. You can't expect the Americans to overthrow the South Vietnamese Government. Time is on your side. Once the U.S. gets out of South Vietnam, the country will fall into your lap within a few years. You can afford to wait. In the meantime, get rid of the American presence and let the chips fall where they may in your favor in the coming years."

We think that the Chinese were talking to the North Vietnamese along these lines. In any event, in their conversations with us, the Chinese never pressed us to accept the North Vietnamese political proposals. They put the stress on America's getting out of South Vietnam and getting the war behind us. So by avoiding getting behind the overall North Vietnamese seven-point or

nine-point plan or whatever it was, over the course of the years, it was clear to us that the Chinese were probably sympathetic to a military solution only.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Can I ask you, in connection with North Vietnam, but going back a little bit further back in time, in terms of the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship, how much did you think about it as a limiting factor in pursuing our policies in Vietnam? For example, in a conversation with Allen Whiting which Stu Kennedy had Whiting warned about a possible Chinese intervention in Vietnam. John Holdridge rejected that possibility as being distracting and silly and that the Chinese would never have intervened. Do you have a sense of how seriously that was taken?*

LORD: I would like to make clear also that, as we talk about these issues now, we're not just talking about the Nixon Summit Meeting in China but the tenor of the conversations with the Chinese over a two or three-year period. This is the only way to handle it. I can't be precise.

I think, and this was more relevant during the Johnson Administration, although it may also have been relevant to Nixon, that we had to keep in mind the possibility of Chinese intervention. Short of that, there was also the danger of making it really awkward for the Chinese by escalating near the Chinese border, even if they didn't intervene and therefore affecting our bilateral relationship. In my opinion, the possibility of Chinese intervention in the Vietnam War was not a major factor. Certainly, by the time we got through the early 1970s and the opening to China, I don't believe that we were really concerned about the Chinese directly intervening in the war. There was nothing in our conversations with the Chinese which ever threatened that. The Chinese would often say that hostilities in Vietnam were awkward near their border. They never threatened that they were going to intervene. Again, we'd have to look at the history books. I think that there's some evidence that the Chinese had some forces in Laos and Vietnam in a supporting role, e.g. anti-aircraft or construction.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: There were actually Chinese troops in North Vietnam in the mid-1960s, in a supporting role. I was thinking more in those terms as to what degree, in that earlier period, was this something that all of you had in mind?*

LORD: In terms of Vietnam policy I think that there was some concern but that it was more relevant to the Johnson administration in the 1960s, than it was when we got to China in the 1970s. One of the arguments against going into North Vietnam on the ground, as well as even escalation like heavy bombing, was the Chinese reaction. That clearly was a factor. Reasonable people can disagree on how important it was. Maybe it was fairly important in the 1960s, when I was less directly involved in Vietnam policy. In the early 1970s I never recalled, in dealing with the Vietnamese or the Chinese, that this was a major factor then. I think that the significant considerations were domestic public opinion and the cost-benefit ratio of military pressures. However, others may disagree, and maybe correctly, that this was more of a constraint than I recall it as having been. I think that it was more of a constraint in the 1960s, particularly with respect to sending American troops into North Vietnam and getting closer to the Chinese border.

*Q: After the Korean War you can't help but re-fight your last war.*

LORD: Exactly right. I almost mentioned that the feeling was: "Well, if we go too far in Vietnam, we may make the mistake we made in Korea." I'm sure that that was a factor. People can disagree on the relative weight to attach to it. It was probably significant in the 1960s, but my recollection is that it was not significant in the early 1970s.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: No.*

LORD: Let me raise one other issue. I can't give you a lot of detail on it, but this was the India-Pakistan issue. The Russians were essentially lined up with India during the Cold War, and the Chinese were lined up with Pakistan. On top of that, Pakistan had done a favor to China and the United States by serving as an intermediary and as a launching pad for our opening to China. So when the crisis in Bangladesh broke out, and so on, I recall that this was regarded as a significant issue for some time, although my memory is very bad on this. This included talking to Huang Hua, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN in New York, and coordinating our moves to warn India about not attacking Pakistan. I think that we may have had some U.S. Navy ship movements in this connection.

*Q: USS ENTERPRISE, a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, was sent into the Bay of Bengal, I think it was, at that time. This was regarded as a tilt toward Pakistan. The Indians still remember this.*

LORD: Of course they do. Kissinger finally went to India a few years later (about 1975) and tried to restore our relations with India, to a certain extent. There is no question that, for a variety of reasons, Kissinger and Nixon wanted to tilt toward Pakistan. It's a huge exaggeration to say that we did this solely as a favor to the Chinese. It was a factor that Pakistan had been an intermediary, that the Chinese and we were on the same side, and this would reinforce our new opening to each other. However, in my view, it would have happened anyway, given the general, geopolitical attitude of Nixon and Kissinger that if a stronger power is opposed to a weaker power, you help out the weaker power in terms of balance.

Also, and for some time, frankly, we had been tilting toward Pakistan. There was nothing new about this, in the sense that the Indians were generally closer to the Russians, with the Pakistanis on the other side. So during the Cold War it was natural for us to line up with Pakistan, at least in Kissinger's and Nixon's view, representing geopolitics at the expense of human rights. There were clearly a lot of atrocities in Bangladesh and so on. We didn't pay a great deal of attention to them, which is an understatement.

There was a genuine concern, and some suggestions from intelligence sources, that India might go after Pakistan (West) aggressively, beyond its support of Bangladesh. This, of course, would also affect peace and stability in the world. It is unconscionable that one country should invade another country. So we wanted to deter that. We had a variety of reasons, including the opening to China and the Pakistani channel in support of that. However, that was not the exclusive or predominant reason. During this period we had close discussions with the Chinese, in our mutual interest, but also to underline again our parallel, geopolitical convergence, having the Soviet dimension wrapped up in it as well. We knew about China's concern about India and Chinese friendship for Pakistan. This was an issue that we could cooperate on early in the course of this

opening of our relations, when we were trying to establish mutual trust and confidence, in the sense of shared interests. So that was another issue.

The Middle East was not a significant area. We would keep the Chinese posted on what we were doing. What we got from the Chinese was essentially a pro-Arab position, an anti-Israeli position. This is ironic because, later on, Israel started giving the Chinese military aid, and so on. However, there wasn't fire breathing rhetoric in China against Israel. It wasn't as if you were sitting in Iran or Saudi Arabia. The Chinese view was that justice was on the side of the Palestinians, so they took the side of the Arabs.

*Q: Japan.*

LORD: Let me mention Japan. I think that we touched on that briefly before. I know that we did, but we may benefit from a little repetition here. China and Japan had a love-hate relationship, of course, given their history, culture, and other things. There was the Rape of Nanking, and the Chinese are still resentful of the Japanese invasion and thereby suspicious of the Japanese. They are worried about Japan remilitarizing and/or going nuclear in the future. During the first few visits to Beijing the China chided us about building up Japan, our security alliance, and the presence of U.S. troops there. In their various meetings Nixon and Kissinger made the counter-argument about our security alliance with Japan and our nuclear umbrella. They made clear that the Japanese were secure and that they didn't have to build up their own military forces or nuclear potential, because the Japanese were safe, being allied with the U.S. They said that it was not in China's interest that Japan worry about the loosening of its alliance with the U.S., because they then might remilitarize, go for nuclear weapons, and fulfill China's greatest fear.

This is one, concrete example of the impact of extensive, geopolitical discussions. People may say: "Hey, that's interesting, but what good is it going to do?" In fact, these discussions had an impact. The Chinese began to understand our arguments and dropped their attacks on our alliance with Japan, and therefore created somewhat less mischief between us and Japan. So that was important.

Of course, once we moved to reopen our relations with China, Japan followed us again and even went further with China, as they had every right to do for we had held Tokyo back and then leap-frogged it. They normalized diplomatic relations with China more quickly than we did.

Meanwhile, we were increasing our communications through two major channels - our embassies in Paris and at the United Nations in New York. These were our channels until we established liaison offices in early 1973.

I've mentioned that we went back to China in June, 1972, primarily to brief the Chinese on the Soviet Summit Meeting and to press ahead with Vietnam, which was still a major concern for us. On that trip we also went to Japan, one of many Kissinger trips to Japan over the years. I sat in on a private meeting with Prime Minister Sato, the only other American present. The trip in February, 1973, was the next one after June, 1972. Again we also went to Tokyo. I've talked about the flavor and substance of all of these trips. The subsequent trips were just to Beijing, except for ones where we went to Suzhou and Xian. Also, we occasionally went to see the sights

outside of Beijing.

I want to mention the trip in February, 1973, since it is the last one I made when I worked in the White House. It was a very successful trip, the best during the whole Kissinger period. Until then we had awkward channeled communications with China. We were building more trust with every trip. In fact, the Shanghai Communique said that, from time to time, there should be a Senior Visitor from the United States to China, which shows the mentality of the Middle Kingdom. We were going there. They weren't coming our way. According to them, they couldn't come to the United States, because there was still a Taiwan Embassy in Washington. We were communicating through Huang Hua, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN in New York, and through General Walters, our Defense Attaché in our Embassy in Paris.

By the way, we would always drop in and see the Chinese Ambassador in Paris after we had finished our secret negotiations on Vietnam with the North Vietnamese. We would go over to the Chinese Embassy and give them a read-out on what had happened. This was a courtesy to maintain contact. We would also talk about other issues, but the primary object was to keep them up to speed on our Vietnam negotiations and, hopefully, get their help in leaning on Hanoi.

The trip to China in February, 1973, was the single most successful trip we ever made to China, to develop convergence, at least. First of all, we had begun to build up mutual trust and credibility through extensive discussions over several trips. Kissinger had made three trips by then, in addition to the trip with President Nixon. So there was mutual respect on the personal level and some mutual confidence that we reinforced each other regarding South Asia, and so forth. We had this perennial Russian factor, and all of that stuff. Secondly, Nixon had just been reelected in a landslide, and China knew it would be dealing with him for four more years, and that he planned to move towards normalization.

Thirdly, we had just ended the Vietnam War. So this irritant on the Chinese border, this ideological awkwardness, and the fact that their so-called friends were fighting us in a war were now behind us. They also knew that this would free up our attitudes and resources, whether it involved countering the Soviets or maintaining general, geopolitical balance and assertiveness. So this removed a problem and a complication in our bilateral relationship. Also, public opinion in both China and the U.S. was getting more comfortable with the relationship.

For all of these reasons, this was a very positive context in which to go to China in February, 1973. As a result, it was the first time that Chairman Mao saw Kissinger on his own, and that put the stamp on how important this was.

We agreed in the February 1973 visit on getting over hurdles in terms of communications. We also made an agreement on further economic progress and cultural exchanges. On Taiwan the rhetoric was relatively restrained, I think. However, the most important thing was that we agreed to set up Liaison Offices in the two capitals. This was a clear indication of Chinese pragmatism as well as their feeling more comfortable in terms of this relationship. They had said that there would never be a Chinese Embassy in Washington as long as there was a Taiwan Embassy. This was not acceptable to them, as this amounted to a Two Chinas solution to the problem.

We had tried on previous trips to suggest maybe setting up Trade Offices. We were trying to come up with some formulation under which we would have direct communications with the Chinese, even as we maintained our diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The most forthcoming formulation which we had, and which I think that the Chinese actually suggested, was a Liaison Office. I forget where that phrase, Liaison Office, came from. So the Chinese agreed to the establishment of Liaison Offices, which were Embassies in everything but name. They were big and were going to get bigger. They could do any business that an Embassy could do. So the Chinese could still say that they didn't have an Embassy in Washington while Taiwan had an Embassy. However, in fact, the Chinese did have an office in Washington simultaneously, and that was a major breakthrough.

In addition on this trip we secured the release of two American prisoners, CIA pilots, that the Chinese had been holding since the Korean War.

This trip therefore was extremely successful. The discussions were very rich. It was on this trip that there was another example of Zhou En-lai's style, which was very impressive. There were other reasons for being impressed with his style, including his manner of speaking, elegance, his strategic and tactical skill, his sense of history, his sense of humor, and his charisma. He was an attractive person. The way he expressed himself was always elegant, as opposed to being polemical. He once sent over his personal doctor to look after one of our secretaries, who was sick. He had heard about this in casual conversation. So he had these nice little touches, although obviously he was ruthless in being able to get and stay where he was.

Let me relate one interesting anecdote in this regard. By this time, Zhou En-lai and Kissinger had built up a very warm relationship. Each of them defended his own national interests, but they had great respect for each other. They had tremendous conversations in which they would digress to talk about history, philosophy, or whatever they wanted to discuss. So it was a very warm relationship.

Every time we went to Beijing we stayed at the Diao Yu-tai guesthouse. Kissinger and I, Holdridge, and sometimes others would walk around and talk strategy, just to get a breath of fresh air and some exercise and get away from bugging devices in our guesthouse. On this trip every time we would try to go over a certain bridge, we were stopped by guards. We didn't know why. It turned out later that Norodom Sihanouk or some other sensitive guest was staying there. At the time we were sort of annoyed, because the whole compound, in which the guesthouse stood, was sort of screened out and private. We could cross other bridges, but we just kept getting blocked away from this particular bridge.

Kissinger was puzzled. He either mentioned this matter to one of the Chinese - it wasn't Zhou En-lai himself, but somebody else - or he was overheard in the guesthouse. In any event, to make a long story short, on the final night, when we finished our discussions, Kissinger and Zhou En-lai genuinely didn't want to break up the meeting because they enjoyed each other's company so much. So we went on for another couple of hours, talking about all kinds of things outside the formal agenda.

Then we finished. We were going to leave the next morning. It was a cold night. Zhou En-lai

said: "Well, why don't I walk you back to your guesthouse?" So he took Kissinger and the rest of us back to the guesthouse, which was very friendly in protocol terms. And lo and behold, we walked over that bridge! He didn't say anything about it. But that was, of course, his gesture to Kissinger on the personal level.

Now, do you have any questions?

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Chas Freeman, in his oral history, suggests that Henry Kissinger was resistant to the idea of a Liaison Office in Beijing.*

LORD: For what reason?

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Particularly because Kissinger reportedly felt that, once you had State Department people based in Beijing, that he would lose control of the relationship.*

LORD: Again, memory plays tricks. That sounds like nonsense. We, including Kissinger, wanted direct communications with the Chinese. I only remember that Kissinger wanted to have the most ambitious arrangement that we could get away with, without calling these offices Embassies. I clearly remember that he and I felt that a Liaison Office was a trade off which was better than other possibilities. Any office that you would set up was going to have State Department people in it. Kissinger certainly might be suspicious of other bureaucrats. However, to think that you could have any kind of de facto Embassy without State Department people in it is absurd. Kissinger wanted to have negotiations and direct contact with the Chinese, not to mention the signal this sent around the world, including the Russians and the Vietnamese, that we were advancing in our relationship with China. By that time the Vietnamese probably felt that this issue was irrelevant. It's absurd to say that we didn't want a Liaison Office. I am puzzled by that reference. I don't know how Freeman could come up with it. To be sure, since we set up Liaison Office, Kissinger exercised tight control and was always the key link in our ties with Beijing.

Who else suggested this resistance?

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Roger Sullivan.*

LORD: He may have come up with a formulation; I don't remember where it came from. By then we were involving the State Department and asking for ideas. Someone may have suggested using the name of a Liaison Office. I don't deny that. I just don't recall where this term came from. And I really have trouble believing that Kissinger would have resisted setting up a Liaison Office. It just doesn't make any sense. We were delighted to have a Liaison Office, and we knew that any such office would have State Department people in it.

Now, of course, there was also the matter of heads of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. One of the first two people heading it up was John Holdridge, one of Kissinger's NSC staff members. The other one was Al Jenkins from State. So clearly, Kissinger wasn't going to let these people operate on their own. I don't deny that. It's absurd to say that he wouldn't want a Liaison Office. It just doesn't make any sense.

*Q: We'll stop at this point. The next time we'll cover Vietnam from the NSC perspective. I would like to note that we have covered the Chinese connection and also the Chinese role in Vietnam, India, the Soviet Union, and Japan in this interview.*

LORD: We've gone through the Kissinger secret trip to China and the preparations for it, the rationale for the opening to China, the Nixon and subsequent trips, and some of the discussions and considerations we had on various issues, as well as some personal anecdotes and some on styles.

*Q: So we'll pick this up, starting with the beginning on the Vietnam side. Then, after that, comes the Russian side.*

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*I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. This is June 23, 1998. We will continue to follow the China thread. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is also participating in this interview. Win, you said that there are a couple of things that you wanted to add to the material on your experience on the NSC [National Security Council] staff.*

LORD: Yes, we're still covering China during my days on the NSC staff. I want to go back over a couple of the trips to China, after the trip by President Nixon [in February, 1972]. It may be repetitious, but I want to make sure that it is covered.

In June, 1972, and I don't know whether we covered this in depth. Kissinger went back to China on the first trip after President Nixon's trip in February, 1972. We made further progress on the relationship between the People's Republic of China and the United States, generally. Two main items on the June, 1972, trip were to debrief the Chinese on President Nixon's trip to Moscow and the Summit Meeting with the Soviets, and we also wanted to keep working on the Vietnam issue. We particularly wanted to get Chinese help in the negotiations with Hanoi.

As always, there were broad ranging discussions between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai. There was a whole variety of issues on the agenda, most of which we discussed in our previous session. There were some nice, warm touches here because, obviously, the relationships between Kissinger and Zhou Enlai and the relationship between the two countries, although they were in their infancy, were obviously beginning to become more friendly. There was a very pleasant meeting with Zhou Enlai. I think that Zhou Enlai was there personally on the boat trip, the visit to the Summer Palace, and the trip to the hills surrounding Beijing.

There was also one difficult issue, which was handled with some restraint by the Chinese. Zhou Enlai showed us pictures of some bombs which had accidentally landed on Chinese soil. These must have been connected to the fighting in Vietnam. I don't recall that this ever became public knowledge or that the Chinese made a big deal out of it. It was quite interesting that they didn't make a major issue out of it.

*Q: Were flights over Hainan Island prohibited? This is something that has come up from time to*

*time. People who were with the Office of the Political Adviser to CINCPAC [CINCPAC POLAD] have told us that there were problems with overflights of China during the Vietnam War.*

LORD: I don't recall. I remember that the Chinese on this occasion were concerned about bombs actually falling on Chinese territory. I don't imagine that our aircraft went out of their way to overfly China. I don't know whether we accidentally did so or not. Anyway, the Chinese did not raise this issue as such. It was the reference to bombs falling on Chinese territory that seemed to concern them.

This was also the trip where I was greatly embarrassed because of a table tennis exhibition. Kissinger had rashly told Zhou that I was a good player. A few days later the Chinese sprung a match between me and the Chinese champion on one side and Dick Solomon and the world champion on the other. I played badly. The results remain classified.

Without being specific on the chronology, how did we keep in touch with the Chinese after the Nixon trip [in February, 1972]? We had no direct contact at all with the Chinese before the Kissinger secret trip [in 1971]. We had to go through Pakistan. After the first Kissinger trip, we had two basic channels. One was through the Chinese UN Ambassador in New York, a man named Huang Hua, who subsequently became Foreign Minister of the PRC [People's Republic of China]. Kissinger and myself, sometimes I alone, sometimes Al Haig and I, in various combinations, would go up to New York and meet, usually in a safe house, right near where I had grown up as a child, on Park Avenue and the 70s, to discuss various issues. I remember that we kept in touch in this way during the 1971 South Asian crisis, although my chronology is not precise.

In these meetings in New York we continued to talk about bilateral relations, our respective relations with Russia, and, of course, Vietnam. I remember specifically that I went up to New York on my own in April, 1972, when Hanoi launched its offensive just before President Nixon went to Moscow for the Summit Meeting with the Soviets.

The other channel was through Paris. The Chinese Ambassador there was a man named Huang Zhen, who subsequently became chief of the PRC Liaison Office and Ambassador to the U.S. That was a secret contact. Every time that we met with the Vietnamese in secret negotiations, which we'll get to later, we would go over and debrief Huang Zhen, at least during this period, to keep the Chinese posted on how we were doing with the Vietnamese. Obviously, this was done in the hope that they would try to be helpful in encouraging Hanoi to take reasonable positions.

At these meetings with the Chinese in Paris we would also discuss bilateral matters as well. There was a portrait of Mao Zedong in the PRC Embassy. There was incense burning. We had good, Chinese food when we went there, and so on. So those are some incidental points.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could I ask something? You were briefing the Chinese on what you were discussing with the Russians. Was there a sense of confidence on the part of the Chinese that you were telling them everything, or how did they...*

LORD: Well, it was not in the style of the Chinese to tell us that they didn't think that we were

telling them everything. Nor would they show gratitude at our being forthcoming in briefing them. They listened to us with interest. I don't recall that they probed us with a lot of questions; they would not want to show their eagerness. Mostly, they just listened to what we said.

Indeed, I don't recall whether this began with the trip in June, [1972], but certainly by February, 1973, we began to brief them on Russian deployments [on the Chinese border]. Often I would go off with Jon Howe or some military expert to talk with the Chinese. We would discuss Russian troop levels near the Chinese border and related things. By this means we sought to gain the confidence of the Chinese and to show that we were willing to enter into a new relationship with them.

In their dealings with us they did not reciprocate greatly in terms of their relations with Russia. On the other hand, they did not have much to offer. Relations between Russia and China were pretty frosty at this point.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I was going to ask at what point they began to provide us with information as well.*

LORD: Well, whether it was Russia, the Middle East, or Vietnam, for a long period of time we generally gave them a lot more than they gave us in terms of these intelligence exchanges, although these began to be more mutual as time went on. We didn't consider the intelligence exchanges as a zero sum game. First of all, we thought that we knew more than the Chinese did on most of these issues. Secondly, we hoped to get more out of them, and we encouraged them to do so, but we didn't get a great deal. However, we felt that even the unilateral, intelligence briefings would give them a greater stake in the emerging relationship with the United States which, after all, was still somewhat fragile after some 22 years of hostility between our two countries. We hoped that our efforts would show them that we regarded them as a more friendly, strategic partner.

Specifically, if there were any arguments in the Chinese Politburo about the opening to the U.S., we hoped to help those in favor of such an opening, like Mao and Zhou En-lai. We also hoped generally to indicate to the Chinese that we were not naïve about the Russians but were willing to share information about the Russians with the Chinese. Furthermore, we also made it clear that we wanted to improve relations with Russia as well. We made it clear that we would not do this at Chinese expense but that it was in our national interest as well. We said that we were not about to form a tight, anti-Soviet alliance with China, any more than we would gang up with Russia against China.

We wanted to strike a balance, making it clear that we were as suspicious of the Russians as they were. After all, this was one of the main reasons for the opening to China. We also wanted to keep the Chinese sufficiently on edge so that we might improve relations with Russia, right after improving relations with China. This was to give the Chinese an incentive to improve relations with us. This was the usual triangular game.

*Q: Could you talk about the use of a weapon which we seem to have used quite a bit during that period and subsequently? And maybe before, as well. That is, the use of satellite pictures and*

*photo interpretation. This seems to have become a major tool in our diplomacy, in the sense of telling another country, see what we have to show you from our bag of tricks. Nobody else was in a position to do this.*

LORD: Some of this material is still in a twilight zone of classification. I would not be shocking anyone any more than it would have shocked Rick, to use the line from the movie "Casablanca," when he was told by the French Chief of Police that there was gambling going on in his night club. We began to present verbal and written briefings. As time went on, there were pictures added, and so on. We will also go into this later. However, of course, this began in earnest during the Carter administration, when more strategic cooperation was undertaken with the Chinese with respect to tracking Soviet missile activity, not to mention sharing intelligence and cooperation on Afghanistan and other areas.

Yes, satellite pictures were used as we went on. I don't think that we had reached that point during the period I am talking about.

The only other thing that I have to cover before we go on, unless you have other questions, would be to review what we covered during the trip to China in February, 1973. I really would not want to repeat all of that. I think that we covered most of it, but I ought to mention the meeting with Mao.

As I said briefly, the meeting with Mao in February, 1973, was Kissinger's first meeting with him. I remember that we were sitting late at night with Zhou Enlai at about 11:00 PM. Wang Hairong, I might repeat, was Mao's grandniece. She kept coming in and going out, bearing notes to and from Zhou Enlai. Finally, Zhou said something to the effect that Chairman Mao would like to see Dr. Kissinger and that Mr. Lord was invited as well. Or Zhou said that Dr. Kissinger could be accompanied by Mr. Lord, or words to that effect.

This is typical of Chinese, partially Zhou's, style. The Chinese knew, of course, as we discussed earlier, that I had attended the first Mao meeting with Nixon but that I was cut out of all of the pictures and the communique because of the sensitivities of the State Department. The Chinese also knew that Kissinger relied on me the most on Chinese matters. There were other very, very important people in our delegation, but I had been involved the most on such matters and was Kissinger's closest assistant at that point, both generally and on China. Therefore, the Chinese knew that Kissinger would probably want me in any meeting he would have with Mao.

On the other hand, there was a protocol problem. There were other American officials sitting there, whose names I cannot immediately recall all of whom were higher ranking than I. Therefore, it would be very awkward to include me as one of the more junior people if Kissinger could only take one person with him. So what the Chinese did to avoid any possible controversy was to say that Mao wanted to see Kissinger and that I might accompany him to this meeting. This was absurd in substance because Mao would not have known me from Michael Jordan [star basketball player for the Chicago Bulls professional basketball team]. This meant that Kissinger was relieved from having to choose who would go with him to the meeting with Mao. He got the person that he wanted to go with him. I was rewarded with being included in a public meeting with Mao to make up for the fact that nobody knew that I was in the private meeting with Mao. I

had been in the other meeting between Kissinger and Mao, but my picture had been cut out of the official photograph. That was a nice, grace point by the Chinese.

We went over to meet with Mao. I think that the meeting lasted about an hour and a half. It ended at 1:30 AM, in any event. The conversation was wide-ranging, and I'll get back to that. For the first time Mao used the expression: "I'll soon be receiving an invitation from God." I hadn't realized that Mao used this expression that far back but I double checked it in Kissinger's book. This was Mao's way of saying that he was quite sick and did not expect to live much longer. He said: "God," and not Marx. This phrase was used in the visit between President Ford and Mao a year and a half later.

Also, Mao kept mentioning that women were causing problems in China or at least saying that China could send the U.S. 10 million women. This was not just playing around with the phony story that Kissinger was allegedly popular with females. At the time we couldn't figure out what Mao meant by this statement that he could send us 10 million women. When we got home, I asked my wife, a Chinese woman born in Shanghai. She immediately said that Mao was having problems on policy issues, including perhaps the opening with the U.S., with some of the Chinese radicals, including his wife, Mme. Mao. In effect, he was saying that he was having trouble with the radicals, including his wife. Mao spoke, using allusions, metaphors, and similes. His Socratic dialogue manner of expressing himself was never very explicit on some of these things. My wife's view seemed to make sense to Kissinger and me.

Mao's basic thesis at this meeting was that China and the U.S. had been enemies and that we would probably continue to fire propaganda shots at each other. However, these slogans really didn't mean anything. What really counted were longer range, national interests and far sightedness. Neither side should maneuver for petty advantage. We should put national interests above ideological differences.

Even this early the Chinese began, through Mao, although I don't know whether Zhou En-lai did this as much, to warn us about fake detente. The remarks didn't have sharp edges of the kind we heard later in the mid-1970s, particularly during the 1974-1975 period up to and during the time of the visit to China by President Ford. Mao's point was that we should not be hoodwinked by the Russians. This theme was introduced. There was also emphasis by Mao that there was a need for U.S. leadership in the world and that we should pay attention to our allies, including Europe, Japan, Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey. So that was that.

*Q: We're still talking about the China thread and the period of your service on the NSC staff. There was a lot of euphoria, and this was all very exciting. Was there an undercurrent, discernible to you, about a build-up of the old China Lobby in the United States, including people from the Right Wing who really didn't like China? Was this a factor in Mao's thinking?*

LORD: Actually, no. In fact, just the opposite. In our relations with China and our perceptions of that country, we have a history of swinging from one extreme to another. This goes back to American missionaries and the Boxer Rebellion [in the early 20th century] in reaction to the American missionaries. Even during the last 50 to 60 years the Chinese have tended to be portrayed either as evil, Fu Man Chus [a fictional character] or as noble peasants depicted by

Pearl Buck in her novels. During this same period we were staunch allies of the Chinese during World War II. Then the Communists took over China, and we actually fought against them in Korea. We had images of the Chinese as yellow hordes, red guards, and blue ants working for Mao. The Cultural Revolution greatly enhanced these negative images. Then we had the dramatic opening of our relations with Kissinger and Nixon. The press coverage of China, on the whole, and the general reaction back in the US during the opening in the early 1970s attracted euphoria and tremendous support for the opening to China, much to our relief, despite 22 years of hostility and bad images of China. There still were people concerned about China, but there was great popular, Congressional and media support for the opening.

If anything, in visiting China President Nixon not only did something which was geopolitically correct but exceeded any of our expectations to domestic support. I think that the opening to China was very popular. I think that we all recollect it that way. So we all did not feel very much constrained in terms of the Right Wing or people being overly nervous about this process. There was tremendous support for what Nixon did. And this policy has always been cited as Nixon's most significant achievement as President.

Of course, this swinging back and forth in American opinion has continued ever since then. A few journalists at the time, such as Bill Buckley, Marilyn Berger, and some others, had doubts about the opening or whether China was as relatively benign as some visitors portrayed it. We didn't realize at the time how bad the Cultural Revolution was. As Americans began to work and live in China as journalists and academics and businesspeople, we began to learn about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. Actually, this didn't officially end until 1976 but the late '60s saw the worst excesses. These accounts began to come out. Then we had the Deng Xiaoping take-over in 1978, the reforms, and the normalization of Chinese-American relations. Once again, we had accounts that China was going capitalist, and many became overly sanguine. Then, just as things were developing in a positive direction, we reached the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, which greatly set back Chinese-American relations and still is a major problem in our relationship, not to mention the disappearance of the Soviet threat. Even as we speak, President Clinton is about to go to China again.

But to repeat, we didn't feel any constraints about the domestic impact of our policies toward China. Of course, we were still very careful about the Taiwan issue and the matter of friendship with Taiwan. That was and is still a very important issue in terms of our domestic politics, as well as our reputation as a friend and ally. On that issue we were careful, especially during the Ford years. However, on the whole, we didn't feel much political constraint on our relations with China.

Another out of sequence footnote: during the October, 1971, trip, there was the embarrassing issue of postponing our departure for China from a day. President Nixon was concerned about the timing of the UN debate on the Chinese representation issue. [That is, whether the China seat at the UN would be occupied by representatives of the People's Republic of China or the anti-communist Republic of China on Taiwan.] I forget why President Nixon wanted us to postpone our departure from China. In any event, we learned about Taiwan being kicked out of the UN and the PRC being admitted to the UN even as we were flying out of Shanghai in October, 1971. That UN vote was awkward on the domestic front.

*Q: Was this one of these studies intended to tie the government up while the administration did what it wanted to do?*

LORD: I'm going to give you a mixed response to that question. This was a genuine attempt to get information. Contributions to the response were made by CIA, DIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, our people on the ground, the State Department, and others. In other words, all of the relevant actors in Washington and overseas. Those contributions were assembled to make up the response.

Secondly, this was one of a series of National Security Study Memoranda. They were designed to do what was done on other issues, like the Middle East, Europe, and elsewhere. It is also true that contributing to these memoranda would keep the bureaucracy busy. But there was a real search for data and ideas. Some of the operational responsibilities on key issues would be taken by the secret negotiations through the NSC and Kissinger. However, in all fairness, in the very first months of the Nixon administration when these NSSMS were issued, there were no secret talks with the Chinese Communists and with the Vietnamese Communists.

I am sure that in the case of Vietnam secret negotiation was an issue for very early consideration, although I was not in the front office and was not involved in trying to arrange secret contacts with the Vietnamese Communists. So-called negotiations - in reality propaganda exchanges - were already taking place publicly in Paris, under arrangements made by the previous administration. There was a general feeling that we had to get more information. Also, there was a feeling that we needed more ideas. I do not want to be cynical here. Nixon and Kissinger probably had a rough outline in their minds as to what they wanted to do, but they wanted to get other people's views and additional information. They also wanted to get other people's support for whatever strategy they pursued.

Participating in making this study were not only all of the other agencies I mentioned previously, but also outside consultants, including a man named Daniel Ellsberg, who later leaked the Pentagon Papers. Of course, he was very dovish, even at that point. He had been one of the most extreme hawks. Other people were consulted on this matter. I was involved as a part of the planning staff in the Executive Office Building. And then I collated and summarized the agency responses for Kissinger.

I don't recall the precise sequencing of memoranda, decisions made, and deadlines. I think that it's fair to say that this was a very good, solid, intellectual process. It was genuine and not just a cynical cover exercise. It helped to shape the views and decisions of President Nixon and Kissinger. It helped to construct and gain support for the two-track strategy that I mentioned. Namely, Vietnamization, or turning over additional responsibility to South Vietnam, and serious negotiations with Hanoi at the same time.

Everything was looked at, whether it was pacification efforts, military efforts, or the diplomatic situation. Negotiations were then taking place publicly in Paris. Hanoi's strengths and the positions of allies were looked at very exhaustively. I think that this effort was well done.

In any event, out of this emerged pretty much of a consensus on pursuing Vietnamization and negotiating an end to the conflict. To be sure, the State Department was kept out of the secret negotiations. In retrospect, it is quite astounding that the State Department was also kept out of a lot of the secret exchanges with the Chinese, in addition to a lot of the negotiations conducted by Kissinger with the Russians. But we've been through that already. In addition to secret meetings we used extensively backchannel telegrams through the White House Situation Room.

As I've said, during this period there were two roles that the Planning Staff of Mort Halperin and myself, sitting over in the Executive Office Building, had to perform. One was to help to run the NSC system and to prepare agenda papers for NSC sub-groups and the NSC itself on various subjects. In that respect I helped Halperin put together the various papers, including those on Vietnam, which set out our options and so on.

The other role was to write think pieces for Kissinger on various subjects, in which I sometimes acted as devil's advocate in challenging some aspects of foreign policy. On other occasions it involved just looking ahead, noting that there was a problem coming up which we had to get on top of. During this period I sometimes helped Mort Halperin write these memoranda, although he would often write them on his own as well. Sometimes, I would write memos of my own. I wrote a series of memoranda, sometimes on my own and sometimes helping Halperin, to Kissinger on various subjects. At least a couple of them were on the Indochina situation.

I recall specifically a memorandum from me (through Halperin) on Laos in which I questioned aspects of our involvement in that country. I led off by quoting Kissinger himself, in which he said that sometimes it is more important to ask the right questions than to have all of the right answers. So my memo on Laos did not necessarily say that we ought to change our policy. In effect, it raised a series of questions as to whether this policy was working or whether there were some real problems with it. It was a definitely dovish memorandum, although I don't remember the details.

On Vietnam I believe that any memorandum went forward under Halperin's name, although I often helped him with memos of this kind. Again, without fundamentally challenging the policy on Vietnamization and negotiations, I might well have weighed in on the dovish side or the more skeptical side on what we were doing or how serious we should be about negotiations. What I am pointing out is that, without being uncomfortable with our overall approach, I would question the tactical side, at least in the case of a couple of memoranda to Kissinger. He would either see what I had done or knew what I had done with Halperin.

So I made my views known to Kissinger. This shows that he did not want a yes man and did not react violently to my views, saying, in effect: "How dare you challenge our policies?" He took just the opposite view. Indeed, this was important also, because this is what brought me to his attention. He saw me working with Halperin in NSC meetings, in the NSC system in general, and on specific papers. I think that he was impressed by the arguments that I made in some of these papers. They were not just on Indochina. There were other papers, on African policy and so on. Kissinger welcomed, indeed sought, disagreement so long as it was well argued.

Without my being immodest, I guess that these papers showed that there was a pretty good mind

at work, not to mention some courage. Even if Kissinger was not always persuaded by the arguments, he at least thought that they were well presented. I think that it's fair to say that by participating in drafting these memoranda I derived a more general exposure to Kissinger and the NSC system. These memoranda brought me to his attention, so that when Tony Lake decided to leave the NSC staff, where he had been Special Assistant to Kissinger, I was asked to take Tony's place.

*Q: This is the kind of thing that rankles you and troubles you even today, when you recount this story. However, did this incident have any effect on you and your operations later on? One would think that the bureaucracy would make you much more aggressive to make sure that all aspects of a report are right. Also, what was the attitude of the press about this error?*

LORD: It certainly did not affect my relationship with Kissinger. In many ways, as I said, I appreciated his loyalty. He felt that I had been unfairly treated. He may have felt that I had not checked out this report carefully enough, but Kissinger never said that. In terms of my responsibilities as his Special Assistant, they continued to grow. I became very close to him, certainly personally, as well as in terms of substance. I got more and more involved in matters concerning Vietnam, not to mention Laos, Cambodia, and China.

In terms of my views I thought that the press had been unfair and that they had blown this error out of proportion. Give me a break. If this was all that had happened, it was unfair to blow it up to this extent. In fact, this was a very credible and full report, so I was resentful of the media.

In my job at the NSC, in succeeding years, I didn't do many reports like this. Dick Smyser and John Negroponte, as Vietnam experts, were the essential point of contact with the other agencies. My job was on negotiations on the Indochina countries. It was focused not so much on Vietnamization and the military aspects of the struggle, but on the negotiations to end the fighting. By definition, since the negotiations were secret, other people didn't know much about them anyway. So I didn't have much need to rely on the bureaucracy.

The only major case which I was involved in connection with the fighting concerned a report on the Cambodian incursion which I prepared. I can hardly believe that I did this report fairly soon after the Laos incident. It came out in June 1970. So, once again, I had to rely on the bureaucracy in preparing that report. I can't recall the details now, but I had to be super careful then, having been burned once. There were major reactions to the Cambodian incursion, but there was no major flap about alleged inaccuracies in the long report I prepared. There were of course sharp disagreements on whether the incursion itself was a good idea or not.

So that was a painful beginning to being a Special Assistant to Kissinger. Some time around then there was a leak about the secret bombing of Cambodia. I can't recall the date, but a story on this matter appeared in the New York Times. It was an article by Bill Beecher, who later went on to work for the Boston Globe. I only mention this now, because when I worked over in the Executive Office Building, I didn't know about the secret bombing of Cambodia. I can say with total honesty that I never leaked anything about this or any other subject throughout my tenure at the NSC. I mention this because it was that particular leak, in fact, that got President Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman up in flames about leaks in the sense that they were undermining our

national security policies. Therefore, this led to their instituting the phone tapping. I can talk later about why this happened.

*Q: Then let's not do it now.*

LORD: I don't think that we should do it now. Wait until another time. I mention this now because I think that this was when telephone tapping was really going on. I just can't recall the timing of it. My phone was tapped, and I'll get into that later on in our discussions. I was suspicious of it because there seemed to be a humming sound on my phone.

Before I arrived in the West Wing as special assistant, there had been secret meetings with the Vietnamese, which Tony Lake had attended, in the summer of 1969. The next, secret contacts took place in the spring of 1970. My first secret meeting was in September 1970.

Let me now give you an overview of how the logistics of these trips worked. Along with the first, secret trip to China, which still ranks No. 1 in terms of drama, the secret trips to Paris to negotiate with the Vietnamese communists and try to negotiate an end to the anguish of this war were clearly dramatic highlights in my experience. There were the national interest and the James Bond aspects of these contacts, the secrecy and the high level of the negotiations, as well as the emotional aspects involved of trying to end a long and bloody war with all the domestic trauma as well.

(Since the interview in January 2003, Kissinger has published the definitive account of the Vietnam negotiations, "Ending the Vietnam War." I edited the manuscript, and Kissinger cites me as "my closest associate during the events recounted here." I commend the book to historians and everyone else interested in those issues.

*Q: You remarked how your party went to Paris. Could you talk about the attitude and approach of the North Vietnamese?*

LORD: Could I mention first another couple of aspects regarding logistics? I've given you the example of what happened on many of the 19 trips from Washington to Paris to meet with the North Vietnamese. These trips almost always messed up weekends and holidays, although a couple of times we had secret talks as part of public trips elsewhere. Once we went to London for other reasons, and we flew across the English Channel, secretly, to Paris to negotiate with the Vietnamese. Then we flew back to London. On another occasion, in July, 1971, we were in Paris on our way back from a secret trip to China. Not only did the world not know about our secret trip to China, but, while we were publicly in Paris, we had secret negotiations again with the North Vietnamese.

In some ways it was even more complicated to keep these discussions with the North Vietnamese secret than these weekend excursions from Washington. Everyone knew that Kissinger was in Paris and was probably following him, in a sense. So we had an elaborate operation working with the American Ambassador, who was Richard Watson. We had to find a way for Kissinger to negotiate with the North Vietnamese without people in Paris knowing about it. So the cover story was that Kissinger was holed up in the Embassy, talking to Ambassador

Watson. Dick Smyser and I went off on our own to a big, open plaza looking at the Eiffel Tower.

*Q: What role did Al Haig play at this particular time?*

LORD: Haig was certainly on the hawkish side and supported the Cambodian incursion on all the grounds mentioned above. He can speak for himself and has written that American involvement in Indochina was required on military grounds. He has displayed total contempt for those who would leave the President, both in terms of loyalty or the lack of it, and in terms of their intellectual approach. I'm sure that he was disdainful of those who left the NSC staff on this issue. He may have been polite or semi-polite in terms of his feelings, but I'm sure that this was his basic reaction as a soldier. He was also hawkish in terms of not deserting your commander-in-chief at a time of crisis. So that was another interesting episode.

I think that covers Cambodia, and it's time to go back to Vietnam. On Vietnam I've mentioned the logistics and I've sort of touched on how we prepared for the negotiations with the North Vietnamese before we met with them. Dick Smyser, then John Negroponte, and I would work on a memo from Kissinger to the President, saying that we would be meeting again with the North Vietnamese. Here's what is my strategy. So we got President Nixon to sign off on this basic approach to the meeting. We would also prepare opening statements which we might attach as a Tab to the main memorandum, if Nixon wanted to review in detail what Kissinger would say in his opening statement to the North Vietnamese. Basically, the guts of the strategy and our lines would be covered in the memorandum anyway.

So we prepared a memo for Nixon, which included the general approach, and we also prepared Kissinger's opening statement, as I've said. In addition, we assembled some background materials on the facts, and transcripts of previous meetings. We would set out the likely North Vietnamese positions, what we hoped to accomplish and the formula that we might try out, and how we might try to conduct the meetings. These were very careful preparations which, as I've said, we continued to work on the plane trip over. Then, when we would get back, there would be a memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon, reporting on the meeting and giving his assessment of it. On this, I would get help from Dick Smyser and then John Negroponte.

Now, as a general proposition partly out of hope and partly out of some evidence, we were probably somewhat more optimistic than Nixon about the possibility that the negotiations might produce real progress. Nixon was more skeptical. He, of course, approved of our doing this, but I think that his basic view was that the North Vietnamese were revolutionaries and that there was little prospect that we would achieve much. Over the course of two or three years Kissinger and I were somewhat more hopeful. Probably Dick Smyser agreed with our view, while Negroponte was probably more skeptical. Nixon, and most likely Haig, probably felt that we weren't getting very far. They didn't go so far as to say that the North Vietnamese were simply fooling us, but Nixon suspected that there was no real give in their position. Nevertheless, he approved of our continuing with the negotiations, on the off chance that we could make a breakthrough. In any event, Nixon knew that, for the historical record and when the secret negotiations were made public at some point, he could say: "Look, I was trying to be reasonable." He was trying to protect his domestic flank.

Not to mention, to be uncynical about it, that Nixon genuinely wanted to end the war. He didn't want to have Americans and South Vietnamese killed. He wanted to turn to other issues. He wanted to end our domestic strife. He wanted to end the war with credibility and honor. So if there was some chance that the negotiations might work, fine. However, basically, I think that Nixon was somewhat more skeptical than we were.

There were times when we thought that there was possible progress, if we looked carefully. I remember specifically the July 1971, meeting, after we came back from the secret trip to China and then met secretly with the North Vietnamese in Paris. We thought that Le Duc Tho [chief North Vietnamese negotiator] and his deputy, Xuan Thuy, were somewhat more forthcoming. On this occasion I recall Kissinger and I thought: "Boy, we may have pulled off a double header on this trip." Not only was there a dramatic opening to China, but maybe we had made a significant advance in the Vietnam negotiations.

A couple of general points. When we met with the North Vietnamese, they would have either one or another head of delegation. Either Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy. I once made a pun when we were complaining to each other about Xuan Thuy's performance, which didn't add up to very much. I said: "Xuan Thuy (Wan Twee) doesn't make a forest." So if the North Vietnamese delegation was headed only by Xuan Thuy, we knew that he didn't have the authority to do much and the meeting would be a holding action effort. He was something like a deputy foreign minister. He couldn't negotiate seriously. He would simply repeat their positions.

On the other hand, if the North Vietnamese leader was Le Duc Tho, there was a chance of his being serious. He was Number Five in rank in the Politburo. He was a major political figure and could speak authoritatively for Hanoi. Xuan Thuy was more of a bureaucrat than a representative with his own authority. We never expected very much from Xuan Thuy, although we would still make statements in his presence. We knew that they would go back to Hanoi and be read carefully there. We kept the process going but we hoped that there would be more progress.

*Q: Did you feel that the opening to China might have undercut the North Vietnamese position somewhat?*

LORD: We felt that the openings to both China and Russia would help us. As I said earlier, President Nixon put great weight on the Russian dimension in particular in adding to the psychological isolation of Hanoi. When Hanoi saw that their two patrons were dealing with us, particularly at the time of the summit meetings of 1972, Nixon thought that Hanoi might get concerned and progress might be made. While we were fighting in Vietnam and simultaneously were meeting with the Russians and Chinese at the highest level, this would cause some unease in Hanoi. Secondly, the Russian and Chinese leaders had a stake in the development of our bilateral relationship. The Vietnamese conflict was an ideological and a political brake and irritant in our relationship. Nixon thought that the Russians and Chinese would lean on Hanoi to make a reasonable deal with us as they could move ahead with their bilateral ties with us.

In our contacts with the Russians and Chinese we essentially said: "Look, please tell Hanoi that we are not unreasonable, that we're willing to have an honorable settlement. However, it's got to be a military settlement. You cannot expect us to sell out our allies, overthrow the Saigon

government, as we pull out." Our basic pitch was that we were prepared to leave Vietnam, and let the Vietnamese decide on their political future. As we went on, we got more and more precise about leaving unilaterally, if not on a mutual basis. We wanted a cease-fire and the return of our prisoners of war. However, what we were not prepared to do was to overthrow the Thieu Government in South Vietnam and have a coalition government to replace it. I think that we began to introduce the themes of reconciliation and maybe even economic assistance to Vietnam as additional incentives. We said that this was a reasonable outcome for Hanoi. Moreover, consider that we're trying to develop a bilateral relationship with you. From your standpoint, the Vietnam War is getting in the way and is a distraction in the way of improving relations with you. So it's in your interest to get this Vietnam War out of the way, not to mention showing that we can work together on some of these issues.

We hoped that this line with the Chinese and Russians would help the negotiations. We knew that, by itself, it wouldn't be decisive, but we thought that, combined with military pressure and a reasonable negotiating position, it would help to end the war. Now, we can't be sure how much Russia and China weighed in with Hanoi. We're quite sure, without having actual proof, that Zhou En-lai and others did not think that our position was unreasonable.

There is some circumstantial evidence that the Chinese, in their own interests, conveyed our rationale to Hanoi. In our discussions, Zhou would urge us to get out to Vietnam, but I don't recall his urging us to overthrow the Saigon government. The pitch that we made in terms of their national interest was that Hanoi ought to accept our proposals. They could spin this further by pointing out to Hanoi that the Saigon Government was weak and that it might be taken over eventually, once the Americans were out of Vietnam. Their considerations perhaps appealed to Hanoi, but I think that Hanoi was independent enough that it wouldn't fold under pressure from either Russia or China.

Of course, in retrospect, we now know how much China and North Vietnam opposed each other. They fought their own war along the Sino-Vietnamese border a few years later. I don't think that the China equation had a major impact on Hanoi. However, this was certainly one of the reasons that we opened up to China and tried to improve relations with Russia, although this was not the main reason. I think that, around the edges, it probably helped us with Hanoi, and we finally got a settlement in 1973, which I'll discuss later.

*Q: What about the nomination and campaign of George McGovern [Democratic Party presidential nominee who was notably opposed to our policies on Vietnam]? Or should we postpone discussion of that?*

LORD: I'd rather reserve that, because it was directly relevant to the breakthrough in the negotiations and why there was a breakthrough.

I'd like to make one other point on the North Vietnamese style of negotiations. I've already mentioned that their style was to hang in there, maybe being friendly on some occasions and tough on other occasions. However, essentially, and month after month, and year after year, their basic position was to call for a unilateral, U.S. withdrawal, the establishment of a coalition government in Saigon, and to stick with all these positions, in a revolutionary spirit. They tended

to look to their long investment in what they were doing, feeling that domestic support for the U.S. position was crumbling, for all of the reasons that I've mentioned. So they basically sought to wear us down. They would come, essentially as a part of their negotiating style, to listen to our positions and see whether the United States was going to make more concessions and move closer to what they wanted.

This is in contrast to other, negotiating styles, if I may digress briefly. Kissinger was very good at understanding and negotiating with different interlocutors, depending on their cultural and historical styles. For example, in the case of the Chinese, he preferred their negotiating style the most. Basically, they would take a position on principle. Then each side would establish its basic principles and state what it had to have, at a minimum. Then, within this framework, we would negotiate about reaching an agreement. At the beginning the Chinese would avoid exaggerating or inflating their positions and then bargain them down, like rug merchants, (and like the Russians). I'm talking about the Chinese style in the 1970s, not in the 1990s. They have a much more conventional, haggling approach today.

In negotiations the Russians are more like rug merchants. They inflate their positions, exaggerate what they need, and expect you to do the same. Then you can haggle, haggle, and haggle, and finally reach an agreement. Even then you have to be careful about how they would implement the agreement, whereas we felt the Chinese carried out their obligations.

The Israelis were like Talmudic scholars and lawyers. They have an understandable sense of insecurity, given their history and the fact that they are surrounded by the Arabs. They were very cautious about every semi-colon and every last detail of every negotiation. They would haggle and set out to exhaust you with their suspicions of the Arabs. Kissinger, for example, would go to Golda Meir or Rabin, or whomever we were negotiating with. The Israelis would present 10 demands or requests from the Egyptians. Kissinger would go to President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, get agreement on nine out of 10, go back to Tel Aviv, and present this to the Israelis. Then the Israelis, instead of being grateful for getting nine out of 10 of their demands, would complain that he hadn't gotten the 10th demand for them. Anwar Sadat was more romantic and emotional. He was willing to take a big step as a visionary, as long as Kissinger appealed to Egyptian dignity, self interest, and so on.

So it was very interesting to see the various, negotiating styles, including the North Vietnamese practice of just wearing you down and waiting to hear your concessions. In retrospect, they had no real intention of compromising until they had real incentives to do so, as they did in the fall of 1972.

*Q: How did our records reflect what went on at the meetings? Did they indicate that the discussion was all very nice, but let's get to the substance of the negotiation?*

LORD: Kissinger had a good sense of humor, but sometimes it did not lend itself to those meetings. With all of his interlocutors, including the Russians, the Chinese, the Israelis, the Egyptians, and the Vietnamese he made jokes. He and Lu Duc Tho would often go off and walk around privately and it would seem they were having serious discussions.

Kissinger was very hard-headed, of course. He was not naïve. He was with hard-headed revolutionaries, representing national interests. He knew that they would not suddenly become more flexible because they liked Henry Kissinger. However, Kissinger felt that there was still something to be said, even with this group of North Vietnamese, even more than with other interlocutors, for trying to have some personal relationship. He would break the tension, at times, with humor. He would try to establish his credibility for carrying out commitments and respectability for genuinely seeking agreement. Maybe personal touches would help around the edges. Then, when Le Duc Tho or Xuan Thuy would report back to the Politburo, they would draft their reports somewhat more favorably than might otherwise be the case. Kissinger had no illusions that this effort would make a significant difference in this respect. I think that he was correct in trying to do that. It never hurts to try and be more personable, so long as one has no illusions about the real impact.

By the same token, Kissinger would be very tough and sharp if he thought that Hanoi was getting arrogant. He would come back hard at them, either in the plenary session, or he might well do it, one on one, so that there wouldn't be quite so much face lost. Or he might convey privately, in some discussion, some particularly ominous message from the President. He might say that the President was running out of patience, or whatever it was. So he would try to use different techniques of his own with the North Vietnamese. It was fascinating.

*Q: Do you think that the North Vietnamese were aware of the progress being made in the negotiations with China?*

LORD: I don't think so. Certainly, we didn't tell them. Now, whether the Chinese informed their North Vietnamese allies, I don't know. This was between the time when we had been secretly to China, just a few days earlier, and the time when President Nixon publicly announced the agreement reached with the Chinese in San Clemente, California, a few days later. We were on our way back to San Clemente to report to the President on the trip and the negotiations on the opening to China. I suspect that the North Vietnamese didn't know. It hadn't come out publicly. We certainly wouldn't have told them. We kept this secret until Nixon released this bombshell in San Clemente. I suspect that the North Vietnamese had not been told of this development by the Chinese.

*Q: Was there any interplay between the public meetings and the secret meetings?*

LORD: I think that the best appraisal is that we would hang tougher in the public sessions than in the private sessions. In the interest of public opinion and international propaganda we always tried to make our position look at least reasonable, but in terms of substance we would reserve any real flexibility for the private, secret talks. I don't recall any interplay beyond that. Considerations of timing were not important.

I forget how the public meetings went, whether they were held once a week or once a month. I don't recall this. They were pretty well developed. Both sides, essentially, presented their public positions, appealing to international opinion. We knew that there would never be any real progress in the public talks. We have already talked about secrecy in discussing the opening to China. I agreed with it but there was a certain price that we paid, i.e. with Japan. The rationale

for secrecy in the Vietnam negotiations was entirely justified. That is, if there was ever going to be any progress, each side had to be able to speak freely, without having to worry about their domestic opinion, their allies, or anything else.

In our case we also had the South Vietnamese Government to consider. (Hanoi, of course, totally controlled the Viet Cong.) We kept them generally posted. We would send off a cable on the secret meetings for the information of Ambassador Bunker in Saigon, but being careful to not scare the South Vietnamese. We did not wish to betray them, but, in fact, we went beyond what we were telling them through Bunker. We didn't want to get President Thieu prematurely excited about the sessions and try to lock us in on tough positions. I think that it's fair to say that we were less than totally forthcoming with the South Vietnamese and that we rounded off some of the edges in the reporting on the secret sessions which we sent to Ambassador Bunker to draw on in his discussions with President Thieu. On the other hand, most of the ideas floated in Paris were somewhat tentative and exploratory.

*Q: Had we informed the North Vietnamese in advance that we were going to do this?*

LORD: We did, just in advance. We didn't want to give them too much warning because they might leak the story and pre-empt us. I think that at the last minute before the speech was given, we told the North Vietnamese that they hadn't responded privately to our proposals. In fact, I suspect that we told them at the very last minute. I know that we didn't tell them well in advance, because we thought that they would rush out and leak the story, spinning it their way.

So on the whole I was pleased with the results of the speech. It showed a good faith effort to end the war. On a personal level my friends could see what we had been doing. The down side was that the North Vietnamese, who were so tough and cynical, anyway, would be upset that we had revealed the negotiations and that this might undercut them with their own friends, the Viet Cong, and embarrass the hard liners in the Politburo. They might also conclude that it was showing bad faith to reveal these secret negotiations and would put them in a spot. As a result, they might dig in their heels and, as a result, become even more intransigent. That was the down side. In fact, secret negotiations are kept secret so that each side can speak more frankly, so that you can hope to make progress. We risked that advantage by going public regarding the fact of the secret negotiations. But we weren't making progress in the secret talks after more than two years. Hanoi had not responded to our flexible proposals, and we hadn't met since September.

I know that I felt, and this was a pretty unanimous view, including President Nixon, that it was important to set the record straight and to say that we were not making progress because of Hanoi's intransigence. Maybe this would embarrass Hanoi enough or rally international opinion and certainly shore up American support, so that we'd be in a stronger position to carry on. The speech also made clear how far we'd come on Vietnamization and the progress we were making in this regard. A final reason, I'm sure, in terms of the timing of the speech, now that I think of it, was that the speech was going to be delivered a month before the President's trip to China, followed by a summit meeting in Moscow with the Soviet leaders. So I think that the President also wanted to get his views on the Vietnam negotiations on record, as he headed toward China. The dates of the China trip had already been made public, and Deputy National Security Adviser Al Haig had already been to China. This speech not only had an effect on domestic public

opinion but also, presumably, it helped us in dealing with the Chinese. So there were a lot of reasons for giving this speech, and it was a good thing to do.

So the Nixon speech of January 25, 1972, was an important one. The next important events were the President's trip to China in February 1972, and his trip to Moscow in May 1972. In terms of Hanoi's bilateral relationships with its friends we hoped that this would increase their sense of isolation and make them more reasonable.

The next important period in Vietnam at that time was April 1972. The North Vietnamese launched a major offensive against South Vietnam. (End of tape)

*Q: You were saying that the President had a major decision to make.*

LORD: The President had a major decision to make. He was scheduled to go to Moscow in a couple of weeks. The issue was how to respond to this major attack by North Vietnam on South Vietnam.

First of all, this offensive was having some impact south of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone along the 17th parallel of latitude] and in the northern part of South Vietnam, in terms of the military balance. The North Vietnamese were making some real inroads. So there was a military question as to whether this was really a danger to our overall goals in South Vietnam.

Secondly, the offensive showed that they not only were not responding to our offers, which we had revealed publicly, but the North Vietnamese were instead stepping up their military attacks. This was just the opposite of being reasonable.

Thirdly, and this was very much in President Nixon's mind, they were stepping up the attacks on American and South Vietnamese troops with conventional North Vietnamese forces, which were blatantly crossing the border [on the 17th parallel] and so on. They were doing this at a time when the President was about to go to Moscow, which was providing aid to the North Vietnamese. So, in terms of psychology, domestic public opinion, and credibility, the President was very concerned about being in Moscow in May 1972, at a time when American troops were being killed with Russian weapons provided to the North Vietnamese.

So the military balance with Hanoi and Hanoi's psychology in taking advantage of us by attacking and not responding in the negotiations were serious considerations. But, above all, Nixon envisioned talking to the Russians and clinking champagne glasses while the Russians were providing military materiel to the North Vietnamese who were killing American troops. Thus President Nixon felt that we had to respond vigorously to the North Vietnamese offensive, specifically by bombing targets around Hanoi and mining Haiphong harbor. It would be weak and humiliating not to respond to their attacks. He couldn't go to Moscow in that way.

Counter arguments were advanced by various people, including me, and, to some degree, Kissinger and others. First, all agreed we had to respond to the military threat on the ground. The question was the degree of this response. If we went so far as to bomb around Hanoi and mine Haiphong harbor, Moscow might call off the summit meeting. I remember that there was a

meeting in the White House Situation Room, chaired by Kissinger, probably with representatives from CIA, DIA, and from the State and Defense Departments, the NSC, and others. The purpose of the meeting was to judge what the Russian reaction would be to a major escalation, or counter-escalation by us. I believe that, perhaps with one or two exceptions, everybody at that meeting felt that if we bombed around Hanoi and mined Haiphong harbor, we would lose the forthcoming Summit Meeting with the Russians. The general feeling was that the Russians would cancel the meeting.

We had made major progress with the Soviets, and we can talk about this later. The fact of the opening to China made the Russians more reasonable on the issues of arms control, Berlin, economic relations, and so forth. So we were heading for a Summit Meeting which was set up with a lot of major agreements close to conclusion, including those affecting SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, then in the process of negotiation], arms control, and many other aspects of Soviet-American relations, not to mention the double header of the Summit Meetings in China and in Russia. So we had a lot invested emotionally, intellectually, substantively, and politically looking toward this major advance in relations with the Russians. This had been one of our objectives for several years. Our positions were well established and well prepared. All of this now threatened to go down the tubes at the last minute, because of the proposed bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbor.

To his credit, in my view, President Nixon's position was firm and correct. First of all, as I said, he couldn't afford to look so weak, and he would do less well with the Russians if he went to Moscow and didn't respond vigorously to their North Vietnamese ally attacking us with Russian arms. He might be regarded as a wimp by the Russians as well as Americans and the world, if he was in Moscow while American soldiers were getting killed with Soviet-made weapons and we were not responding. Secondly, and this is what distinguished Nixon from everybody else, and certainly Kissinger, he boldly predicted that the Russians would not cancel the Summit Meeting. He believed the Russians would go ahead anyway and let the President go to Moscow, looking strong and reacting strongly against the North Vietnamese attacks. He would gain the grudging respect of the Russians and wouldn't lose all of the benefits of the Summit Meeting in the fields of arms control and everything else. So he could have his cake and eat it, too, as the popular saying goes. Even if the Russians canceled the meeting, Nixon felt that it was better not to go to Moscow in view of our goals in Vietnam and international credibility. The worst outcome would be to go to Moscow and not do anything vis-a-vis North Vietnam.

Nixon proved to be prescient, just as he proved that those who were concerned about losing the Summit Meeting were wrong. On this issue Kissinger has to speak for himself. I suspect that Kissinger understood the need for the President to appear to be vigorous in his response on this issue. I also know that Kissinger felt that we might lose the Summit Meeting in Moscow, and he and I agonized over this. Therefore, I think, Kissinger was truly ambivalent on how to deal with this matter. I think that, on balance, he didn't want us to go as far as we did militarily but I don't want to speak for him. Surely he credits Nixon in retrospect for his courageous prescience.

I myself was opposed to the escalation of the air war against North Vietnam, partly because of my moderately dovish stance on carrying the war to North Vietnam. I felt that, above all, we shouldn't lose all of the advantages which we had gained in terms of relations with the Russians -

arms control, Berlin, etc. So I was unhappy with this escalation in the air war against North Vietnam. In this respect, I was probably wrong. I was certainly wrong in terms of my estimate of what the Russians would do.

*Q: Was the argument made that, since we had made this breakthrough to China, the Russians, that is to say, the Soviets were concerned with our gaining an advantage with the Chinese if the Soviets got huffy in their relations with the U.S.? Almost inadvertently, we were playing the China card.*

LORD: A very good point. I'm sure that that's one of the arguments that Nixon made, that the Russians had a stake in this Summit Meeting as well and that they couldn't afford to be one-upped by the Chinese. Fortunately, we had already had our Summit Meeting with the Chinese. I don't know what China would have done in the same situation. They might have canceled the Summit Meeting. However, this happened after the Summit Meeting between the U.S. and China. Nixon felt that we wouldn't have any respect from the Russians if he went to Moscow looking like a wimp in the face of this North Vietnamese offensive, using Russian arms.

These were Nixon's arguments, including the China dimension, and they showed his really firm, geopolitical grasp of the situation. I still recall flying up to Camp David on a beautiful spring day [Presidential retreat in northern Maryland, near the Pennsylvania border] with Kissinger in a helicopter to work with one of President Nixon's speechwriters on the speech announcing the bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong harbor. I was very depressed. Both of us were saying: "All of this effort with the Russians is going to go down the drain." It was a dramatic moment.

So we were able to roll back the North Vietnamese offensive, and the Russians went ahead with the Summit Meeting in Moscow. However, we didn't make any progress in negotiations with the North Vietnamese over the next few months. We had several more meetings with them in 1972 in July, August, and mid-September. We then had one in late September where, for the first time, although we knew that we had been overly optimistic before, we felt that the North Vietnamese had indicated that maybe they might become more flexible. I distinctly remember that it wasn't a breakthrough, but clearly their tone was changing. Then we had the breakthrough in October. Let me explain why this happened.

The North Vietnamese had just been hanging in there with their intransigent, revolutionary position, as I've said. They weren't about to be flexible, anyway, but they had an added incentive to be intransigent in the summer of 1972. By then our presidential election was coming up. At some point during that summer Senator McGovern got the Democratic Party nomination and was offering a deal way beyond what the Nixon administration was prepared to offer. That is, he was offering support for a coalition government to be established in Saigon, as well as a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from South Vietnam.

During the summer of 1972, even though Hanoi didn't know how the election would come out, the polls showed Nixon quite far ahead. The North Vietnamese probably did their own wishful thinking and felt that McGovern could still win. This meant first, that Hanoi should avoid giving Nixon any sign of progress in the negotiations with the U.S., which might help get him reelected.

Secondly, in the hope that McGovern would win the North Vietnamese would get free concessions from McGovern in terms of what Hanoi wanted politically, as well as militarily. In short, they could just wait for McGovern to pull the U.S. out of Vietnam and hand over the Saigon government to Hanoi. McGovern was essentially saying, I want the prisoners back and the North Vietnamese can have everything else. So there was no movement in the negotiations with the North Vietnamese during the summer of 1972.

By September 1972, the polls were very clear. Partly due to a spectacular record in foreign policy, Nixon was way ahead. Due to the combination of the fact that President Nixon had gone to China and Russia, plus his January 1972 speech on negotiations with North Vietnam, which had helped us shore up support for the Vietnam War, and other reasons, Nixon was in a strong position. McGovern was a very extreme liberal. This wasn't a centrist Democratic challenge to the President. It was a very liberal challenge to him. Even with all other factors balanced in, there was still a silent majority of people who supported the Vietnam War, plus many others who felt that we should try to end it but felt that McGovern was just totally capitulating to the North Vietnamese. Furthermore, McGovern was attacking American motives, plus everything else. He was preaching isolationism and American guilt, so for a variety of reasons, President Nixon was way ahead in the polls.

By September 1972, even the North Vietnamese, for all of their wishful thinking, began to realize that they were probably going to face Nixon for another four years. Then, by October 1972, this perspective became more concrete in our talks. In September the change in the North Vietnamese attitude had been a kind of mood music. In October 1972, the North Vietnamese presented a specific proposal to us. It was raised on October 8.

So we went over to Paris for this October meeting. By now the North Vietnamese calculation was as follows. First of all, Nixon was likely to be more flexible during the remaining weeks before the election in November. Even though Nixon had an apparent victory in hand, he would want to increase his mandate and make sure he won by looking as if he was negotiating a settlement in Vietnam. So the North Vietnamese figured that Nixon would be at his most conciliatory and would be prepared to make some further concessions on the home stretch in the elections campaign.

*Q: By now these meetings were being announced publicly.*

LORD: They were being announced afterwards, immediately after conclusion, but not in advance. Secondly, the North Vietnamese figured that if Nixon was going to win, he would no longer have to worry about being reelected. He had a new mandate for four years. The North Vietnamese had already concluded that he was a madman at times, e.g. by bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor at Haiphong [in May 1972]. God knows what he would do when he was free of worrying about public opinion and reelection. Of course, we tried to encourage the North Vietnamese to worry about Nixon being a madman. So the North Vietnamese probably felt that they had better lock this up now, since they weren't going to get McGovern. They were going to get a potential madman for another four years.

So this was the reason, and the only reason, why the North Vietnamese suddenly became more

reasonable. They were not being defeated on the battlefield. The overall situation was still very much a stalemate. The Vietnamization program was proceeding. However, the North Vietnamese evidently felt that they could get a good deal, Nixon would be eager for a settlement, and they would avoid having to face Nixon as a mad man in his second term.

We went over to Paris for this meeting in October 1972, and were given a present by Le Duc Tho. We still had a lot of work to do on it, but basically, it was the break that we were looking for. It incorporated the unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces and the release of our prisoners, on the military side. The language of the proposal was fairly specific in this respect. The North Vietnamese proposal also included a cease-fire in place and international supervision of the agreement. The North Vietnamese had moved away from their insistence on a coalition government. There still was some tough negotiating, but they used some new language. They proposed a national reconciliation arrangement, but, in effect, they would leave President Thieu in power in Saigon. So the North Vietnamese dropped the political demands that they had stuck with for years. From my point of view, not to mention Nixon and Kissinger, these demands were something that we shouldn't compromise on.

We received this North Vietnamese proposal at the opening session. Kissinger called for a break in the meeting. I still remember walking with him on a Sunday afternoon in a garden, somewhere in the Paris suburbs. We said to each other: "This is it. We've done it." We knew that we had a lot of tough slogging ahead with the North Vietnamese. Then, of course, we had to get South Vietnamese agreement. However, essentially, the North Vietnamese had dropped their political demands and were willing to have a military settlement only, even though there was a lot of fudgy language about it.

This was a very exciting moment. We continued the negotiations for several more days. We reported home to President Nixon, of course. We didn't want to get Washington's hopes up unnecessarily. So we said that we had made some major progress, though we didn't claim that we were home free. We began to alert the South Vietnamese but again avoided overly exciting them. We said that we had made some progress and were going to continue the negotiations. We had to reply to the North Vietnamese with a counter-proposal the next day. Kissinger had me and John Negroponte take the North Vietnamese draft and then change it, within reason, to meet them part way and keep the negotiations going but also address our remaining concerns.

That night, and I believe that it was the night of October 8, 1972, Negroponte and I took the draft. We worked all night until 3:00 AM. Kissinger had gone out for dinner. He came back, looked at the draft, woke us up at 8:00 AM [on October 9] and said that our draft was too tough. He felt that we had put too many more demands back in and that we hadn't been flexible enough for Hanoi to accept. He gave us some instructions on how to loosen up the draft somewhat. Some of them affected the tone, and some affected the substance of the re-draft but of course Kissinger remained firm on the key points. This was a concrete settlement. It was not just a proposal. It contained the actual points of a settlement. So we were instructed to make it a little more forthcoming, both in substance as well as tone. I don't recall all of the details. By noon on October 9 we had a re-draft, which Kissinger accepted.

We went back to the North Vietnamese. We had several days of further negotiations, until

October 11, trying to improve the draft, generally keeping Washington and Saigon informed. The last day ran for 14 hours straight. As usual we were preparing verbatim transcripts. I couldn't even go to the bathroom when I wanted to, and I had plenty of coffee to keep me going. After Kissinger had made a presentation, I would have taken the notes and, perhaps, be a sentence or two behind him. Then I would catch up when the interpreters started reading the Vietnamese translation. I would have some time while the interpreters were putting Kissinger's statement into Vietnamese and then more time as the North Vietnamese would respond to the Kissinger statement in Vietnamese which I couldn't do anything about, anyway. I had some more time while the North Vietnamese were speaking before it was translated into English for us. So I had a double header of a break in that context. I would wait for a particularly long Kissinger statement, complete the verbatim notes on what he said, and then race out of the room, go to the bathroom, and get back in time, between the translation into Vietnamese and the translation into English of what the North Vietnamese said in reply.

We were really very tired, throughout this period. There were problems, for example, with getting the specific details of when we would get our POWs [Prisoners of War] back and details of proposals on Laos and Cambodia as well as Vietnam. The North Vietnamese would claim that they didn't have control over their friends [North Vietnamese allies in Laos and Cambodia]. It is possible that this posture, in fact, was true, particularly with regard to Cambodia, although less so in the case of Laos. We had to make sure that we got our prisoners back from Laos and Cambodia, and we were trying to get the communist side to withdraw its troops from there and to have a cease-fire extended there. So that was a problem. Another problem was allowing military aid to both sides to continue after a cease-fire. Then there were the details of the international supervisory system and what the status of the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] was. This was the actual dividing line between North and South Vietnam. There were still a lot of details to handle, and a lot of tough questions to be resolved, but the basic breakthrough had been achieved. The North Vietnamese no longer insisted on a coalition government. The language of the draft made it clear that President Thieu would remain in power, while suggesting that there could be a negotiation perhaps leading toward a government of national reconciliation. We tried to make that as vague and as meaningless as possible. In fact, the object was to keep the Saigon Government in power.

We basically put together a draft agreement. Meanwhile, during this period Hanoi was pressing Kissinger to come and visit North Vietnam, as a final, symbolic gesture to make peace and to show, I guess, that we were sort of paying tribute to Hanoi. Not to mention that this made Saigon somewhat nervous. So there was a further question as to whether, after going to Saigon and trying to get President Thieu's agreement to the draft, we would go to North Vietnam as well. Kissinger was willing to dangle this possibility to get the North Vietnamese to be more flexible about the agreement, on the assumption that it was worth doing. There was some disagreement with Washington on whether we ought to go to Hanoi. In addition, we didn't want to be nitpicked by President Nixon and Al Haig [Deputy National Security Adviser] on the details of the agreement. However, we kept Washington generally posted on what we were doing. The same with the Saigon Government, which we also kept posted, to avoid, as I say, getting their paranoia into overdrive.

The final day of these negotiations was October 11, 1972. So there were four days of

negotiations, but one of these days went for 14 hours straight. Kissinger prepared to go back and report to President Nixon. We had a draft agreement initially agreed, but with some outstanding issues of a secondary nature remaining to be resolved. There were also some technical questions of what specific phrases meant, and so on. So this was an exhausting period of several days, including all night sessions of redrafting, checking, sending cables, reporting, and filling in Saigon and Washington, as well as preparing talking points for the next day. We also had to prepare new proposals, in addition to verbatim note taking and so on.

I was left behind in Paris with FSO [Foreign Service Officer] Dave Engle, who by then had been involved in the negotiations as our top Vietnamese speaker in the Foreign Service. He and I were left behind to have technical talks with the North Vietnamese to clear up some of these sub-issues. So we sat down with the North Vietnamese at the next meeting. I don't remember the details except I was both exhilarated and exhausted. Kissinger took off for Washington, and a few hours later we met with the North Vietnamese. It was quite dramatic at my young age to be directly negotiating the document (albeit minor issues) which could end our longest war.

Dave Engle and I then had to negotiate with the North Vietnamese at our level on the agreement and settle some of the details on the language. We tried to push them in some respects on some of these issues and clarify the meaning on other issues. Engle would have to check out the Vietnamese language on some of the questions. That was a rather challenging experience for me, actually to be negotiating with the North Vietnamese myself. Again, this was pretty heady stuff for someone like me in his early 30s, negotiating the text to end the war in Vietnam. Even though the basic negotiation had been handled by Kissinger, and this was more technical, still I felt a sense that, though I was exhausted, I was doing something extremely historic and very important.

We worked for about 10 hours straight, with no sleep. I think that we did a pretty damned good job of getting movement on some of these questions and clarifying other things. So I went to sleep, ready to take off the next morning and come back with this annotated draft and with the changes made in agreement with the North Vietnamese. I got a phone call from Al Haig or somebody back in Washington, speaking on behalf of Kissinger. I don't remember the details, but I had to go back again to the North Vietnamese, having thought that I had finished, and make some more points with them. I think that we tried to get a couple of more changes. This was one last episode. I was truly exhausted by this time. Then I got on the plane, a commercial flight, of course, going back to Washington with Dave Engle.

I remember being very emotionally moved by this moment. I felt that we had reached a final settlement at the end of these long, anguished years that had consumed our society. I felt that I had played a crucial role in it and had acted on behalf of Kissinger and the President. I remember going into the plane's bathroom and crying out of a sense of joy and exhaustion. It was a very emotional moment.

We arrived back in Washington. I went over to see Kissinger and reviewed the changes that we had negotiated with the North Vietnamese. He was quite satisfied with them. We made a report to President Nixon.

Then, of course, our next step was to go to Saigon and present this wonderful agreement we had negotiated. Dave Engel had been certified as qualified by the Foreign Service in the Vietnamese language. We had confidence in his ability to check out the translation into Vietnamese. I don't recall whether we had anybody else check it, because the text was so closely held, until we got to a more public stage. What we had was a text which had been negotiated by Kissinger, with some technical and secondary issues of judgment handled by myself with the North Vietnamese. However, there were still some loose ends. These were significant details. I am sure that these included Laos, Cambodia, the DMZ, and some other issues. We were still not entirely satisfied, but the basic issues had been solved and we thought that we now had a rough agreement, in draft, and ad referendum [subject to subsequent confirmation] by Hanoi's Politburo and our President. Of course, we made it clear to the North Vietnamese that we would have to sell this draft to our ally in South Vietnam.

Before we went to Saigon to review the agreement with President Thieu we sent a cable ahead to foreshadow to some extent that we had something. I forget the term we used, but we said that it represented a breakthrough, a possible agreement, or something like that. We clearly let Thieu know, through Ambassador Bunker, that we were coming to discuss this draft with him. So off we went to Saigon in mid-October 1972. I know that it was mid-October because we were there during my son's birthday celebration, which is October 19. I was always away from home for his birthday. It seemed that there was always something going on in Vietnam, China, or somewhere. I would write him a letter on his birthday (he was five in 1972).

On the way over to Saigon, of course, we continued to refine the draft talking points that we had prepared for the discussions with the South Vietnamese, the texts of the agreements, the rationale for each of the points, the defense against what we knew would be Thieu's likely objections, and so forth. Kissinger and I were relatively optimistic about this meeting with President Thieu, although we knew that he would huff and puff. We thought that he would accept the agreement, because we had eliminated the political elements, the call for his resignation, for a coalition government, etc. John Negroponte was very skeptical on Thieu's reaction, more pessimistic. Among other factors was the fact that North Vietnamese troops would remain in South Vietnam.

*Q: The North Vietnamese troops would be out in the jungle, in the hinterland, while the South Vietnamese troops would be around the cities and would be under much better conditions.*

LORD: That's correct. Absolutely. But it turned out that Negroponte was more prescient than we were in terms of Thieu's reaction to the draft agreement.

We arrived in Saigon. We went to President Thieu's office, and Kissinger made the presentation about why it was in the South Vietnamese interest to accept the agreement and that we would back them up. In case there were any violations, President Nixon would react strongly. Thieu could count on us to enforce the agreement. Kissinger said that this was the best deal that we could get, based on the level of American domestic support. We had done our duty by South Vietnam. We had hung tough in the negotiations and kept Thieu in power. He had gotten a lot of economic and military aid from us. We would rush extra aid into South Vietnam before the agreement was signed, so that he would be in the strongest position possible, before the provisions of the agreement entered into effect. This effort was called Project ENHANCE, or

something like that. We said that we would resume bombing if the North Vietnamese attacked in violation of the agreement. We said that we would give South Vietnam full diplomatic support as well as military and economic aid. We said that we were working on the Chinese and the Russians to isolate Hanoi and try to get them to cut off aid to the North Vietnamese, if possible, and that this was clearly our intention.

There was also the whole aid dimension, where we had agreed with the North Vietnamese that we would help them with the reconstruction of their country. We wouldn't call this assistance reparations, as they wanted to call it. We would also give a lot of aid to our friends in Cambodia, Laos, and South Vietnam. I think that it involved \$2.5 billion for the South Vietnamese. So for all of these reasons, while we didn't think that it would be easy to persuade President Thieu to accept the agreement with the North Vietnamese, we thought that he would buy, despite grumbling. As I said, John Negroponte was suspicious about this.

When President Thieu first heard our presentation, he didn't react. He just listened. We had no reason to be pessimistic after the initial meeting. I don't recall the sequence, but there was some delay in setting up the next meeting, at which we would have Thieu's response. Whenever the next meeting did take place, we were blasted. Thieu was very upset with the agreement, almost across the board. Above all, because of the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops. He picked out all kinds of other language which he thought was weak, in terms of international supervision, supplies, the amount of aid, or whatever. He complained about virtually everything, but above all the continued presence of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam.

Secondly, Thieu said, in effect, that we had misled him. He said that this agreement went way beyond what we had been reporting to him and what he thought was in store for him. Thirdly, in negotiating this agreement, we had been negotiating the fate of South Vietnam. Now, he said, you come to me, a couple of weeks before your elections, and expect me to accept this agreement, which will seal the fate of my country and my countrymen in a couple of days. He said that the agreement was wrong in terms of principle and also wrong in terms of perception, with the Americans ramming this agreement down my throat and not taking into account the fate of the South Vietnamese people.

So, overall, this was a very tough and discouraging session, to say the least. It wasn't a matter of saying that we should go back and fix this up or deal with this or that problem. He essentially rejected the overall agreement. It was not a total formal rejection of the agreement. He said: "We've got to have the following changes." But he required so many changes, and they were so important, that it was just impossible, to see a solution.

To say that we were depressed, would be a colossal understatement. I would compare the flap on Laos (the 'White Paper' I wrote in 1970) as an occasion when I was equally depressed. This was certainly another such occasion, though in this case I didn't feel personally responsible. We ended three or four days of very difficult discussions in Saigon. We were reporting back to President Nixon, through Deputy Security Adviser Al Haig, using back channels, which involved double encrypting of the messages. We reported that Thieu was reacting negatively and what he wanted. President Nixon and Haig were already more skeptical of the agreement than we were. They appreciated the breakthrough that we had achieved but they were not quite as enthusiastic

about it as Kissinger and his team were, not including Negroponte. Above all, Nixon did not want to have a big split with our ally. After all, it was their country.

Contrary to Hanoi's view, Nixon was determined not to look as if he were overly eager for a settlement just before the presidential election. He did not want to be accused before history or public opinion of selling out South Vietnam for the sake of being reelected, or making a deal which did not redeem the sacrifices which had been made over many years. He said that this would look political. Moreover, Nixon didn't need this to be reelected. The polls showed him so far ahead of McGovern that he didn't need a successful negotiation of the Vietnam war. So Nixon was determined not to have an agreement on South Vietnam at any price. He thought that that kind of agreement would look opportunistic and would make him look weak to his hard-headed supporters, and others around the world. As I said, he didn't need the agreement for his reelection.

Nixon was considering that, once he was elected, having beaten McGovern, he would have a mandate, and Hanoi would really be nervous about what this madman Nixon might do. They might be more flexible after the 1972 presidential election. Sure, Nixon would have liked to have an agreement and, if South Vietnam had accepted it, he would have been delighted. However, he certainly didn't want an agreement involving a split with our South Vietnamese allies. He couldn't possibly accept a major split, both in principle, in terms of the agreement standing up, and in terms of public opinion at home concerning selling out our friends, or looking opportunistic before the election.

So we stayed in Saigon a couple of more days after the initial blowup to try to get President Thieu to be more flexible and to collect his requests. By then we realized that we would have to go back to Hanoi and try to accommodate what Thieu's priority concerns were. They appeared to be so extensive that it was pretty discouraging.

Meanwhile, we were sending cables back to Washington, reporting the results of our conversations with Thieu. It was maddening, because there was a time delay in sending the cables, especially using double encryption. What happened was that I would sit down with Kissinger. He would tell me what he wanted in a cable, reporting to Nixon through Al Haig. He would outline the action which he thought should be taken and the key issues involved. For example, should we go to Hanoi? All of these issues had to be resolved. So we sent this message back.

We would get responses back from Al Haig, on behalf of the President. By this time Haig was playing games with the President. He was acting for Kissinger at home and was more skeptical about the agreement, anyway. He knew the President was skeptical. This was an opportunity to gain influence with the President at Kissinger's expense. We didn't know how much in the responses reflected the President's views and how much was Haig. Haig's cables were usually quite tough, criticizing us and being very unhappy about the way things were unfolding. There was always a time lag, so we would be responding to a previous cable. And in response to our cable, they would send another response. So we were one cable behind in each direction. There must have been four or five cables like this. What would happen is that we would draft a cable (Kissinger dictating the substance and tone) and send it to Haig in Washington for the President.

We would then get to sleep, and one hour later the communications people would wake me up and say that a reply from Haig was coming in. It wouldn't be a response to the one that we had just sent to Haig. It would be a response to a message sent earlier.

It was maddening. We were very depressed anyway, because of Thieu's reaction. We were nervous as hell about this agreement blowing up. We had President Nixon and Al Haig beating up on us, and we had this communications glitch because of the time difference and the delays occasioned by communications and the double encryption process. We were always one message behind on these things.

*Q: Something you mentioned struck me. What about this relationship with Al Haig? Did you have a feeling that Haig, in a way, was reflecting Nixon or was reflecting something else?*

LORD: Well, we couldn't be sure. Certainly, Kissinger was particularly suspicious of Haig, and I tended to hold the view that Haig might even have been egging on President Nixon a little bit. I won't try to explain the President's perception. In a way, his was a principled view. He wasn't going to make a lousy deal before the election, both in terms of justice and in terms of self interest and perception. I think that he didn't want to sell out our friends in South Vietnam. Moreover, he always felt that Kissinger was more eager for a deal in South Vietnam than he, Nixon, was. Haig was certainly more hawkish than Kissinger was. Part of this emerging difference would have reflected the President's reaction, anyway. We were quite sure that Haig was saying, in effect: "Well, Henry Kissinger's done it again. Look at Thieu's reaction. He has a point. Why the hell should we do this? Why don't we get the North Vietnamese to do that? Do we really want this argument with our ally three weeks before the election?"

So we had the feeling that some of this rhetoric was either a case of Haig having egged on the President and eliciting instructions from him to this effect. Or Haig was interpreting the President's mood and embellishing it in a fairly tough way. These messages were pretty tough, considering that they came out of Washington. We never could sort that out. Haig, of course, was meticulous about saying that he was only relaying the President's views and that he was trying to represent Henry Kissinger to the President and defend him as best he could. Henry didn't think so, and it was a very tense situation.

We left Saigon with very extensive South Vietnamese demands for changes in the agreement. We had to do a holding action with Hanoi. By this time, of course, it was impossible to go to Hanoi. We could only go there if we could absolutely close the deal. So we had to postpone the trip to Hanoi, and Kissinger said, in effect, to the North Vietnamese: "Well, we told you in Paris that this deal is a good one and we still think that it is. However, we cannot implement this agreement without South Vietnamese acceptance. We will continue to work with our allies and will try to bring them around. However, we're going to have to make some changes. We just can't sell the agreement to the South Vietnamese in this way. We stand by the basic agreement. We think that it's a good agreement. Don't give up. We'll be in touch with you. I can't come to Hanoi now."

So we went back to Washington. I don't know how soon this happened, but within a day or two there was a press release out of Hanoi, lambasting the United States, President Nixon, and

Kissinger. The statement said that the United States had agreed to a deal with Hanoi and now, under the pretense that it couldn't tell their lackeys in Saigon what to do, the U.S. was now renegeing on the arrangements we had made. Hanoi said that we had broken a solemn agreement with Hanoi and also an agreement for Kissinger to visit Hanoi. They then proceeded to publish the entire agreement that we had reached with them. This would have been on about October 25, 1972, give or take a few days. We are talking about perhaps 10 days before the election.

This led immediately to Kissinger's first press conference. He had given plenty of backgrounders and so forth. He dealt with the press skillfully and well. However, I don't recall that he had ever given an on the record press conference, standing there with TV cameras on him. I forget what day of the week it was but I recall going into the office and working with him on what he would say and how he would handle questions and what answers he would give. In short, how to handle the press conference.

This was Kissinger's famous peace is at hand press conference, as you may recall. Basically, he outlined the course of the negotiations. He tried to strike a calm tone with Hanoi. In effect, he was angry with Hanoi because they had leaked the agreement. He tried to keep Hanoi aboard without lowering the whole tone, even though they had blasted us and released the text of the agreement. Essentially, Kissinger confirmed that what Hanoi had released was, in fact, the agreement. However, he pointed out that we had told Hanoi that we could never agree to this deal unless the Saigon Government agreed to it. This was true, but we had been pretty confident that when we got to Saigon, we would obtain the agreement of the South Vietnamese Government. Of course, Hanoi was playing this in the opposite direction, saying that the South Vietnamese Government was just a bunch of U.S. lackeys anyhow and that the U.S. was using this as an excuse.

In this connection, we tried to be firm with Hanoi, on the one hand, by saying that they were absolutely wrong. We had told them that we didn't have a deal until the Saigon Government agreed with it. We also said that we stood by the essential deal, so we advised Hanoi not to jump off the reservation. With the Saigon Government, even though we were mad at them for rejecting what we thought was in our joint interest, we said that we had been very patient and invested a lot in their defense over the years. We tried not to be too tough on the Saigon Government. We said that we were still going to have a deal with the North Vietnamese, whether the Saigon authorities liked it or not. The basic deal remained. This was the best we could do, and it was in our mutual interest. However, we said that we would try to make some changes and make it more acceptable to the Saigon Government and we would not rush the process.

Certainly, shortly before an election in the U.S. we were not going to reach an agreement with the North Vietnamese behind the back of the Saigon Government. We couldn't do this anyway, and we would try to make the agreement more acceptable to it. However, the Saigon Government should not think that we're going to have a revolutionary change in the agreement. The basic structure is there now, including, implicitly, the presence of North Vietnamese troops in their country.

So Kissinger summed up his press statement by saying that it was a good deal. He showed some sympathy for South Vietnam, which was our ally, after all. We could never implement this

arrangement without their agreement. He also said that Hanoi was acting in bad faith. We had made progress and we were standing by the basic agreement.

That was the tone he set, speaking to the two audiences in Vietnam, North and South, as well as to the American audience. In the course of it he wanted to show, first, that we were in fact close to an agreement. This was not some cynical ploy by President Nixon to get votes and that there never had been much of an agreement, and it was all PR [public relations]. Secondly, Kissinger wanted to show Hanoi that we were still within range of a settlement. Thirdly, Kissinger also wanted to show Saigon that, whatever their objections - and we were temporarily, by reason of justice and politics, delaying the conclusion of these negotiations - we continued to stick by the essential agreement.

For all of these reasons Kissinger used the phrase: "Peace is at hand." What he meant by that is that we didn't have it yet, but this is real progress. To Hanoi, we stick by the essential agreement. We weren't going to bow out of the agreement, but we had to renegotiate some of it. To Saigon he said, in effect, that we appreciate your objections up to a point, but you're going to have to live with this deal. Peace is at hand, Saigon and Hanoi.

Generally, that is what Kissinger was trying to do. Now, of course, he was immediately criticized, at least in the following week, for exaggerating how close we were to a settlement, in order to ensure the President's reelection. This is exactly what President Nixon wouldn't want done and exactly what Kissinger was not trying to say. I can say that with all sincerity. President Nixon was going to win reelection anyway. Kissinger was trying not only to hold American domestic opinion but to hold Hanoi and Saigon on the reservation. That was Kissinger's purpose, but he was roundly criticized for exaggerating how close peace was, on the eve of the election.

In fact, the agreement was very close. The deal that we finally did sign a few months later was almost exactly the deal that we had then. So Kissinger was absolutely accurate and was not cynical in his portrayal of the agreement. He was trying to hold the situation together, reassuring Hanoi and warning Saigon.

So that obviously put us in a holding pattern until after the elections. We got in touch with the North Vietnamese and said that we wanted to resume the negotiations after the November, 1972, elections, in Paris. By now, of course, it was public knowledge when we were going, although the discussions themselves were secret. I don't recall whether Al Haig went out to Saigon, but we spent this time collecting South Vietnamese views again, trying to indicate what we would attempt to get and what we wouldn't attempt to get. Of course, we would try to get most of what the South Vietnamese wanted, but in terms of a lot of that, we would simply go through the motions. We had tried once to get some of these changes and would try harder once again. We wanted some of the changes the South Vietnamese wanted - they were, after all, desirable. And if Thieu wasn't fully satisfied, at least he would have enough of a fig leaf to show his people and say to himself that he had gotten some improvement in the agreement.

There were some aspects that we would like to have improved. However, we had gotten about as far as we could, and further than most thought possible.

We went over to Paris in November, 1972, after the elections. The Hanoi representatives were very intransigent. After a couple of days of discussions, when we essentially treaded water but didn't make any progress, the North Vietnamese representatives came in and basically tried to unravel the agreement. They began to make some new demands and to take back some of the concessions that they had already made. We said that we were going to blow the whistle and stop. We weren't getting anywhere. So we stopped.

We had another go-around with the North Vietnamese in Paris in December 1972, with the same lack of results. We were not getting anywhere. In fact, we raised the South Vietnamese points with the North Vietnamese, and there were a few technical points they ceded, but we were not getting anything significant, and Hanoi was making counter-demands.

During the November and December sessions we stayed at the U.S. embassy. I recall vividly having sensational, three star meals, but being very gloomy.

As we headed toward the Christmas holidays in 1972, we were at an impasse. We had tried to make clear that we wanted to go essentially with the October agreement but that we needed a few changes, both on the merits and to bring the Saigon Government aboard. But Hanoi was not having any of this.

To try to prod Hanoi into a more reasonable attitude, as well as for military purposes, President Nixon ordered the so-called "Christmas Bombing," the heavy bombing of North Vietnam in December, 1972. I think that the bombing actually continued during the Christmas holidays. I wasn't particularly in favor of this, although this is an example of my dovish instincts again. It seemed to me that in the past this kind of attack had not particularly worked, but I have to say that I didn't have any particular alternative to suggest. After all, North Vietnam was digging in. We had essentially a good agreement that South Vietnam wasn't buying.

So President Nixon ordered the bombing of North Vietnam for two reasons: first, to show Hanoi that we were not desperate and that if they didn't make some changes in the agreement, we would punish them. President Nixon had been reelected overwhelmingly in November 1972, and Hanoi had to worry about his sanity, now that he had a relatively free hand. Secondly, even as we undertook the bombing, we sent Hanoi a message that we still wanted to negotiate, but they hadn't given us any choice except return to military action.

President Nixon was also sending a message to the Saigon Government. He was determined, as Kissinger was, to stick to the original agreement, essentially, as well as to try to get some changes in it. So Nixon was saying in effect to Saigon: "If you buy this agreement, we'll stand behind you. I'm bombing the hell out of Hanoi right now. We can anticipate some disagreements once we conclude the agreement. I'm showing you that I'm willing to bomb Hanoi and North Vietnam. So if you sign this agreement, you can count on my enforcing it." So the bombing of North Vietnam was not only a signal to North Vietnam to be reasonable but also to South Vietnam to be similarly reasonable and to sign off on the agreement.

As always, I drafted, with Kissinger's supervision and editing, the messages.

Whatever the extent of the bombing of North Vietnam, the objective, of course, was never to cause civilian casualties. In choosing targets, great care was taken to avoid civilian casualties and this was generally done. However, Hanoi, for propaganda reasons, greatly inflated what had been done, and the doves and other people in the United States talked about American atrocities. The fact is that, when we went to Hanoi in February, 1973, the bulk of the bomb craters we saw were in areas which were wholly or relatively unpopulated. I'm sure that there were some civilian casualties, but most of the casualties were military. On the whole, the bombing campaign was carried out as carefully as it could be done.

The fact is that within days of the beginning of the bombing, we received a conciliatory note from Hanoi, suggesting that we resume negotiations. So this worked out well, and it probably encouraged President Thieu of South Vietnam to think that we would be tough in the negotiations with the North Vietnamese, or at least in enforcing a settlement.

Whenever I encounter questions about this bombing of North Vietnam, I always point out that it worked. And that there were minimal civilian casualties. I was reluctant to bomb at the time, although I didn't have an alternative. Nor did anyone else. This was a question of means and ends, and Hanoi was not exactly playing by the Marquis of Queensberry rules.

So, in early January 1973, we resumed negotiations. Things moved quite quickly. The North Vietnamese stopped telling us that certain issues could not be discussed, and stopped introducing new demands, so we weren't going backwards. We reached a few of our objectives of some significance. We made no really major changes in the agreement. The agreement was marginally better in some areas. I believe these included arrangements in the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone around the 17th parallel of North latitude], resupply provisions, matters affecting Laos and Cambodia, and arrangements affecting South Vietnamese prisoners. They were issues of that kind.

We were also negotiating technical protocols. Ambassador Bill Sullivan of the State Department, who had also worked on the negotiation of the Geneva Accord [of 1964] with Governor Harriman, worked on technical arrangements affecting Laos and Cambodia, international supervision, and prisoners of war. These were technical details which we put together. George Aldrich from the Office of the Legal Adviser of the State Department was also involved in these negotiations. By now the State Department was more fully involved in the negotiations. We had a good team to deal with the final details, as well as technical matters.

We concluded the agreement in Paris with the North Vietnamese and initialed it on January 23, 1973. Toasts were exchanged, and there was a feeling of camaraderie all around. There had been too much pain and anguish, but clearly there was a feeling of relief on our part and that of the North Vietnamese.

We had to get the Saigon Government on board with the revised text, in these final days. We sent Al Haig [Deputy National Security Adviser to President Nixon] to Saigon. There were at least a couple of letters from President Nixon to Nguyen van Thieu [President of the Republic of Vietnam]. These letters were very tough and also very reassuring at the same time. I did the basic drafting, as usual, with Kissinger's direction and Nixon's approval. Basically, they said that we

had done all that we could. We told President Thieu that we had gotten whatever we could and that we weren't going to get a better deal. The letters said that President Nixon felt that the revised agreement satisfied the national interests of the United States and of the Republic of Vietnam. The letters said that we would enforce the agreements and would bomb North Vietnam, if necessary, and that the United States would stick by South Vietnam. Furthermore, we would provide economic and military aid to South Vietnam. We pointed out the advantages of the agreement and our willingness to enforce it. President Nixon said, in effect, that we had given the Saigon Government all that we could give it in terms of years of blood and treasure and in terms of the deal. Now was the time for the Saigon Government to come aboard and support the agreement that had been negotiated.

In effect, the letters were a combination of reassurance, persuasion, and threat. These letters later became somewhat controversial, because Congress felt that President Nixon had promised in them to respond with further bombing to a renewal of North Vietnamese aggression, without consulting Congress. In effect, some members of Congress felt that Nixon had made some secret commitments.

Also, as part of the negotiation, we included the aid program, which was somewhat separate. We were very careful not to promise to make reparations payments to North Vietnam. However, we wanted to offer them some economic incentives. We would call them funds for the reconstruction of Indochina and provide large amounts of money for Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam as well. Here too some in Congress later felt that we had not consulted them sufficiently. But we had been careful to point out in the side agreement that Congress would have to approve any assistance, and that North Vietnam would have to honor the overall agreement.

Thus, with Saigon's grudging acceptance, we initiated the agreement and returned to Paris for the final signature on January 27, 1973. Kissinger stayed in Washington, and Secretary of State Rogers went to sign the agreement in Paris with the other foreign ministers. I flew with him. There were last-minute negotiations about who would sit where for the signature ceremony. There were protocol arrangements to be resolved at the last minute.

Secretary of State Rogers signed the text of the agreement for the United States, at the official signature meeting. There were two rows of American officials sitting behind him. I had written most of the agreement, along with John Negroponte, a member of the NSC [National Security Council] staff, and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger. I had spent three years in the negotiations. But thanks to State protocol, I was sitting the farthest back of the American officials, where you could find State Department people who probably didn't even know where Vietnam was! So this probably reflected State resentment over the secret negotiations and turf battles. I was probably a GS-14 [civil service rank] at the time, so I guess that you could make that argument as well. However, I just felt that I deserved a higher position in the seating. That's human nature. I should have been seated farther toward the front. That's a minor point, but I was, of course, delighted to have been involved in negotiating this agreement and to be present at the ceremony. Indeed I was euphoric.

On top of the opening to China, the secret trip to China by Kissinger, and then the trip to China

by President Nixon, the summit meeting in Moscow and the deals with Moscow on many fronts and, I believe, the beginning of some movement in negotiations on the Middle East, I really felt good about the situation in general for our foreign policy. 1972 had been a truly extraordinary year for America and the world - and the most hectic, dramatic, and successful of my entire career.

Perhaps I could explain now why we thought that the agreement on Vietnam would work. The next question is what we honestly thought ourselves of the agreement that we had negotiated. Clearly, when you are in the middle of negotiations and working out a deal, you're going to have a higher view of the agreement than an outsider would have, one who didn't have to slug it out. We were not naïve. We knew that the agreement on Vietnam was not a perfect agreement. Above all, we didn't trust Hanoi. However, we honestly felt a great sense of accomplishment and believed that the deal could work.

I say this particularly because Kissinger has been accused of cynically negotiating a decent interval between the signature of the agreement and its subsequent collapse. When the agreement on Vietnam collapsed a couple of years later, a lot of people on the Left and on the Right said that President Nixon and Kissinger knew that the agreement was going to collapse. These people said that they basically sought some time, perhaps a couple of years, a decent interval, which would make it look like the breakdown of the agreement was South Vietnam's fault and not that of the U.S. Some people, most of them on the political Right in the U.S., felt that the agreement on Vietnam was a phony setup. Those on the Left said that we could have ended the war earlier. If we were going to have a collapse, anyway, why not save lives and reach an agreement with North Vietnam in 1969 or 1970? Both sides were wrong. It was an honest deal. And we could not have achieved it any earlier.

I can tell you that Kissinger, President Nixon, and I felt that the agreement on Vietnam could work, and there was no thought of a decent interval. People like John Negroponte and Al Haig were more skeptical of it but were not violently against the agreement. No one was sure that it would last, but all thought that it might work especially if the U.S. were firm about compliance. So I want to make clear that there was no thinking about a decent interval going on here to work out a cynical deal which Kissinger and his associates didn't think would hold up.

Why were we satisfied with this deal which we knew was not perfect? First of all, there is the general principle that the United States had lost a large number of lives and an incredible amount of money, as well as losing concentration on a large number of important issues around the world. We had torn apart our society, domestically, on behalf of an ally, South Vietnam. After a dozen years of this kind of investment, and you can calculate it from 1961, if you wish, we felt that we had really done our duty for a friend. At some point the South Vietnamese were going to have to stand up and defend themselves on their own. We had given them about 12 years of a very large, American investment in lives and material. Certainly, the Vietnamization process had been going on for several years. We had trained, supplied, and built up the South Vietnamese armed forces so that they could take on this burden of defending themselves. There was sharing of responsibility, and we carried this burden gladly, along the lines I just mentioned. Further, there was the Guam Statement and the Nixon Doctrine which stated that countries should be responsible for their own security.

The problem was that time was not on our side. We preferred to reach a deal before the presidential election of 1972, but not for - indeed, in spite of - political reasons. One reason that we might be able to reach a deal with Hanoi was that we knew that they were calculating that President Nixon, whom they considered a madman, would be able to do whatever he wanted to do after the election. We believed that they thought that they had better make a deal now. But we also suspected that this was not the case. We had a better sense of our domestic scene than Hanoi did. We knew that, even if Nixon were reelected, whatever the mood of the American people, who might be the silent majority, Congress was going to restrict us militarily. Far from having a madman to deal with, who could do whatever he wanted, Hanoi would have a Congress which could constrain Nixon by cutting off the bombing of North Vietnam or by cutting off whatever else he wanted to do. Instead of facing a President Nixon who could do whatever he wanted to do, Hanoi eventually came to realize that Nixon would not have such freedom of action. We understood time was running out on compromise, if not public support, of the war and we would have liked a deal before Hanoi fully grasped this.

We realized that the agreement on Vietnam which we had in sight was the best possible deal that we could get, given the situation on the ground, as well as at home. The deal with Hanoi was very popularly received in the United States. The hawks in the United States didn't like it, and the Saigon Government didn't like it. However, overall, as I've just said, this was a major achievement. Most of the critics in the United States had been saying that we not only had to get out of Vietnam unilaterally but that there had to be some kind of coalition government in place, or some approximation of it. The fact that in this agreement we were able to withdraw from South Vietnam without determining its political future or establishing a coalition government was considered a major achievement, which I think it was. Without a doubt the idea of a mutual withdrawal of forces was out of reach.

So we had gotten the best deal we thought we could get, including getting our prisoners-of-war back, confirmed aid for South Vietnam, and a cease-fire under international supervision. We didn't get as much for Laos and Cambodia as we would have liked to get. There were provisions for the resupply of South Vietnam. We were able to provide as much military aid to South Vietnam as we could before the agreement was signed. Also, the process of Vietnamization had worked to a certain point. We weren't going to get a better deal, and it was on this basis that we decided to go ahead with the agreement in hand.

Finally, and more specifically, we thought that this deal would hold up. We thought that there might be low level, limited violations of the agreement or cease-fire violations by Hanoi, which might nibble around the edges of the arrangements made. However, through the Vietnamization program, the South Vietnamese were sufficiently equipped and trained, they had some good troops, and we felt that they could handle low level violations of the agreement. However, if North Vietnam escalated these violations to all-out or at least very serious, naked aggression, including openly sending troops and tanks across the DMZ, in a major attack, we felt that the American people and Congress, despite their being sick and tired of the war, would approve a substantial bombing offensive, though still short of sending American troops back into South Vietnam.

We could bomb the hell out of Hanoi, making clear that, in a major way, the North Vietnamese were violating the agreement. After all of the investment in American resources and lives, we thought that the American people would want to support enforcing an agreement which North Vietnam was blatantly violating, no matter how they felt about the war as a whole. There would be much lower casualties from an air war. This is not to denigrate these losses, but they would be much lower than would be likely to be incurred in a renewed ground war.

So on the military front the South Vietnamese, with our aid, would be able to handle modest infractions of this agreement. And in response to major violations of the agreement by North Vietnam, the American people and Congress would support action, including a bombing response, even though they were sick of the war.

Furthermore, there was the Russian and the Chinese aspect. With our dramatic opening to China, the major improvement in relations with Russia, both Russia and China had a stake in not seeing the situation in Vietnam unravel. We thought that the Chinese would accept even some bombing near their southern border with Vietnam. There would be some strain in the relations between North Vietnam and Russia and China. Therefore, we thought that Russia and China would help to police the agreement to end the Vietnam War. We would not expect that they would cut off aid to North Vietnam entirely, but we would expect that Russia and China would urge Hanoi to observe the agreement, pointing out that it was a good deal for the North Vietnamese. They could say that South Vietnam would fall into their laps at some point and that Hanoi should avoid giving the Americans a pretext to bomb North Vietnam even if they didn't ask Hanoi not to screw up Russian and Chinese relations with the United States. So we thought that the Russians and Chinese would help to support the implementation of the agreement.

Finally, a further reason why we thought that the agreement to end the Vietnam War would hold together was the economic aid which we indicated that we would consider providing to Hanoi. Not reparations, but aid in the reconstruction of North Vietnam. I think that we estimated this aid might amount to about \$2.5 billion. This would be a fraction of what the Vietnam War had cost us and could help Hanoi to accelerate the reconstruction of North Vietnam. They could call this help reparations if they chose to do so, but whatever they called it, they would get help in rebuilding and developing the North Vietnamese economy. We could provide such aid in an enlightened way, just as we did to Germany and Japan after World War II. Also, we could try to normalize relations between the U.S. and Hanoi. Kissinger agreed to go to Hanoi in February 1973, after the agreement was signed. This would help the discussions on aid to North Vietnam, as well as to assist in resolving the status of American personnel who had been declared to be Missing-in-Action.

We anticipated that in the Communist Politburo in Hanoi there would be a debate on what North Vietnam should do. One alternative would be to work to clearly undermine the agreement, at the risk of a resumption of American bombing of North Vietnam. A counter-consideration would be that there would be some significant, South Vietnamese resistance. Open violation of the agreement by the North Vietnamese would risk annoying their friends in Moscow and Beijing and losing a substantial amount of economic aid from the United States.

The other choice would be for North Vietnam to observe the agreement, not to wait for a decent

interval to pass, but generally observing it. In this way the North Vietnamese would avoid some of the retaliation that might be involved in response to large scale violations of the agreement. Given their self confidence and their staying power, as well as the pervasive corruption in South Vietnam, they might expect to be able to take over South Vietnam after the passage of a number of years. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese could hope to get American economic help and normalize diplomatic relations with the United States. By limiting themselves to carrying out low level violations of the agreement, they could hope to undermine and weaken the Saigon Government politically without eliciting an American response. Over time they could hope to take over South Vietnam anyway, while still getting our help and economic assistance.

So we figured that a combination of threats and sticks, on the one hand, including bombing of North Vietnam, and carrots like economic aid and normalization, plus the influence of their allies in Moscow and Beijing and building up South Vietnam through the Vietnamization program, would influence Hanoi in the debate going on there. We thought that, on balance, they would choose to respect the agreement in their own self interest, biding their time, and postponing action to gain control of South Vietnam, if necessary waiting for many years to achieve this goal. Together with our aid to South Vietnam this would mean that the Saigon Government would have a fair chance to compete with the Hanoi Government and to prevail. If the South Vietnamese didn't succeed in this effort, in effect it would be the fault of the Saigon Government, through corruption and a lack of democracy, whatever you want to call it.

Well, that was our rationale. We knew that we were running some risks, but it was the best we could get. We thought that it was an honorable ending to what we had tried to do in Vietnam. We had rejected a major demand by Hanoi, which we thought would have been dishonorable in the sense of making a political capitulation. We got our prisoners-of-war back. South Vietnam was now in a position where it could determine its political future. We laid this out extensively in press releases and backgrounders which provided a conceptual framework, all of which I worked on with Kissinger and Negroponte.

Within a few months after the signature of the Paris Accord in 1973, Hanoi began to nibble around the edges of the agreement. I left the NSC [National Security Council] staff in May, 1973. As I have done throughout my career, I wanted to take a break. I was exhausted, mentally and physically. I wanted to spend more time with my family and pursue other interests. I didn't know what I was going to do next, but I was personally and emotionally exhausted. By then, the situations regarding China, Russia, and Vietnam were all looking good. We had achieved major breakthroughs. The President had received an overwhelming mandate (this was before any real hint of Watergate). So this was a good time to leave government service. Coincidentally, shortly before I left, I found out that I had been wire tapped. We'll come back to that.

Shortly after I left, and even before I left government service, the North Vietnamese began to nibble around the edges of the cease-fire and began to resupply their forces in South Vietnam in ways which violated the agreement. The North Vietnamese continued to make trouble. While I was out of government service, Kissinger went over to Paris to negotiate with Le Duc Tho (North Vietnamese Politburo member) in an effort to get enforcement of the basic agreement back on track. This effort didn't work out.

Meanwhile, Congress was beginning to put limits on what we could do in Cambodia and stopped the bombing there and in Laos. Finally, a couple of years later Congress virtually put a stop to aid to South Vietnam, a truly dishonorable and reckless act. So, over a period of time, the Saigon Government was being undermined. Whatever its shortcomings - and there were serious ones - the psychological and military impact at limiting and then stopping our aid was devastating. And, of course, it encouraged Hanoi. In 1975 there was an all-out offensive which resulted in the Communists taking over South Vietnam completely. The remaining Americans were taken out of our Embassy by helicopter, and everybody knows about that.

What had happened involved several factors, including the four assumptions that I mentioned. In terms of low-level violations of the agreement, for a while the South Vietnamese were able to hold their own. But generally, the South Vietnamese Army turned out to be weaker than we thought they might be after the Vietnamization process. Toward the end, in 1975, when the South Vietnamese Army was defeated in a hurry, Congress had already, and unconscionably, virtually cut off military and economic aid to South Vietnam. Whatever you feel about the war, we had negotiated this agreement with North Vietnam and had gone through all of this torture and losses. Even though the South Vietnamese Government was not perfect, our cutting off economic and military aid to them, when North Vietnam was continuing to be resupplied by its allies and was breaking the agreement, was absolutely immoral, in my opinion. Whether continued aid on our part would have made all of that much difference is another issue, but has nothing to do with the principle. And imperfect as the Saigon government was, it certainly was preferable to the Hanoi Communists.

In any event the economic and military aid which had been promised to the South Vietnamese was not being delivered, which weakened them further. So our military plans to handle the North Vietnamese threat turned out to be based on a mistaken set of assumptions. This contributed to the South Vietnamese military collapse.

A second consideration was the major offensive by North Vietnam against South Vietnam, to which we had planned to respond by bombing. This plan was undercut by Congressional action in September 1973, prohibiting the further bombing of targets in Southeast Asia. There was also the growing problem of the Watergate Affair, which related to the manner of President Nixon's reelection in November, 1972. As a result, over time, the executive power of the U.S. administration was effectively broken and our ability to take strong action against North Vietnam was further weakened, on top of the general fatigue over the war. In its mood at the time Congress wouldn't even go along with the promise to provide aid to South Vietnam, let alone allowing bombing of North Vietnam. The North Vietnamese figured all of this out, and so the various means of discouraging North Vietnam from attacking South Vietnam were ineffective.

China and Russia may have tried to lean on North Vietnam somewhat, but, particularly in view of their rivalry with each other and competition for influence in Hanoi, they couldn't sustain such a program and make their weight felt under the circumstances.

In terms of U.S. economic aid referred to in the Paris Agreement, Hanoi never got it. We had told them two things. First, we told them that we had to get Congressional approval to provide economic aid to Hanoi. Secondly, North Vietnam would have to observe the Paris Agreement.

There was some controversy as to whether we had made a commitment to provide aid to North Vietnam. We made it clear to Hanoi that we couldn't provide aid to North Vietnam without Congressional approval, and we had already told the Congress that. Many members of Congress didn't like the idea of providing any assistance to Hanoi. They also didn't like the fact that we had made promises to provide such aid secretly, even though we had hedged the promise by stating that we needed Congressional approval to provide it. That created further controversy, which was worsened by the fact that from the very beginning Hanoi began to violate the Paris Accord of 1973. These violations were fairly blatant, and then the North Vietnamese escalated the situation by blatantly breaking the cease-fire agreement.

Under these circumstances, we weren't about to give aid to North Vietnam, which we couldn't get out of Congress anyway. So that incentive for Hanoi was rapidly withering away.

All of the sticks and carrots, in short, were effectively removed, and the Paris Agreement collapsed.

*Q: This is April 7, 1999. Win, we now have you on the NSC staff. When were you there? What did you deal with? What was your role in dealing with the Soviet Union?*

LORD: Right. Going back to the NSC days, I was there from 1969 to 1973. We've already covered two of the most central areas of my responsibility as Kissinger's Special Assistant on the NSC staff. One was China, and the other was Vietnam. We've also covered an area I spent a good deal of time on, namely, drafting annual, Presidential statements at the beginning of each calendar year, reviewing developments in our foreign policy. I've also mentioned preparing early drafts of speeches for President Nixon and getting Kissinger ready for background press interviews. As Special Assistant, I played a general, utility infielder role on ad hoc issues and projects.

The other, substantive issue that I was most involved in was relations with the Soviet Union. Here, however, I was definitely in a supporting role. Hal Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland were the key people working with Kissinger on this issue. I sat in on many of the meetings and went on all of Kissinger's trips to Moscow during the NSC years.

As part of my duties as a Special Assistant to Kissinger, I was supposed to be a global resource person for him. I was the one person working under Kissinger who had an overall view of all of the key issues that we were working on. This included Middle Eastern questions, as we went on further into the Nixon and then the Ford administration. Kissinger wanted someone who could see the entire picture, in addition to himself. I was paired with the experts in each case, whether this involved China, Vietnam, Russia, or the Middle East.

Detente, as it became known, was one of the key Nixon foreign policy priorities, as well as a priority for Kissinger, along with the opening to China, ending the Vietnam War, and movement on the Middle East. The relationship with Russia was obviously crucial because we were in the middle of the Cold War, and the global rivalry with the Soviet Union as a superpower was, for several Administrations, the clear priority. Its expansionism presented both a geopolitical problem and an ideological, value problem. This was a global struggle. However, President

Nixon and Kissinger, on a hard-headed basis, wanted to improve relations with Moscow. They believed that the best way to do that was to have a policy that mixed incentives and pressures, or carrots and sticks, and there would be linkage between them. In this way we could try to move ahead across the board.

In the view of President Nixon, Russia was his best hope for bringing the Vietnam War to a close. He had said during the election campaign of 1968 that he had a secret plan for ending the war. However, he really didn't have one. What he had in mind was to work with the Russians and try to get them to pressure Hanoi to come to a reasonable settlement with the U.S., even as he would attempt to do the same thing with China.

In addition, with respect to the Russian factor, there was the Chinese dimension, which was crucial. Kissinger and Nixon considered an opening to China as an end in itself and a very important one. They also saw it as a way to influence Russian behavior and U.S.-Russian relations. This was intended to keep Russia off-balance by showing that we could deal with the rest of the Communist world, not only in terms of Eastern Europe, which he had already begun to do, but also with China. Kissinger and Nixon wanted to show that Moscow was not the only spokesman for what some people considered a monolithic, communist bloc. They wanted to give Moscow an incentive for improving relations with us because, as long as they were worried about China, they would not want the U.S. and China to gang up on them.

Therefore, this triangular diplomacy was a central feature of the Nixon foreign policy which Nixon and Kissinger crafted. There is no question that in discussions with the Chinese, particularly the private discussions, there was a lot of anti-Soviet flavor on both sides. This was clear from the remarks made by Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai on the Chinese side and Nixon and Kissinger on the U.S. side in talking about the Russian threat to China along its borders with Russia as well as globally. We never hid the fact that we also hoped to improve relations with the Russians on a hard-headed basis.

We didn't take such a decidedly anti-Chinese line in the discussions with the Russians. We made it clear that we wanted to improve relations with China. However, this also drew China's attentions because it knew that we had a lot more negotiations and actual business with the Russians and a generally more mature relationship than we had with China, which was just opening up.

In any event, the idea was to improve relations with both countries, and have better relations with each of them, than they would have with each other. Of course, there were growing tensions in relations between the Chinese and Russians, which most experts were sort of slow to pick up on but which were clear by the late 1960s. This gave us an opportunity. The clashes along the Russian-Chinese border during the summer of 1969 brought home to Nixon and Kissinger as never before that there was a real chance to open up here. I touched on this when I covered relations with China.

*Q: During these times were you called on to look at how the Chinese might feel about the situation as we sort of played with the Soviets? Were you the person who said: "Well, what do you think that the Chinese will feel about this?"*

LORD: I certainly got involved in that. Of course, John Holdridge and later Richard Solomon, both China experts, also had an input here. The Russian experts, such as Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland, would also look at this factor, as well as Kissinger and, to a certain extent, Al Haig, who became Kissinger's deputy as National Security Adviser. You're right that by having me included in the Vietnam, China, and Russian initiatives, Kissinger had someone who could help him and put on paper for President Nixon or for whatever other audience were relevant how these factors interrelated. For example, how the opening to China would have an impact on Russia, and we'll see in a minute how dramatic that impact was. Further, by continuing to do business with Russia, this would also give China an incentive to move ahead with us.

Furthermore, we thought that by our dealing with both giants in the Communist world we would have some psychological impact on Hanoi. This showed Hanoi that Moscow and Beijing cared more about their bilateral relations with the U.S. than they did about their relations with Hanoi. They wouldn't snub Hanoi, but psychologically this would help to isolate Hanoi, e.g. holding summits in Beijing and Moscow while we had some of our meetings with Hanoi in the winter and spring of 1972, in the middle of Hanoi's offensive in South Vietnam. Neither Moscow nor Beijing went so far as to cut off aid to North Vietnam or really lean on Hanoi. However, both Moscow and Beijing had a stake in our trying to get the Vietnam War behind us. We made clear to both Russia and China that we couldn't withdraw from Vietnam dishonorably and were prepared for a military settlement only. We made it clear that we wouldn't overthrow the Thieu government in South Vietnam and install a coalition government. The political future of South Vietnam had to be left to the Vietnamese people. We believed that both Russia and China talked to Hanoi and suggested to North Vietnam that, in its own self interest, they ought to settle for a military solution. The Russians and Chinese could tell Hanoi that South Vietnam would ultimately fall in their lap over time because South Vietnam was weak, and the U.S. would withdraw from Vietnam. We were fairly confident that Moscow and Beijing made this kind of argument to Hanoi, in their own self-interests of moving ahead with us.

So there was this interplay between the three factors, and this made it exciting and fascinating to be in on that. I was the only one, beside Kissinger, who was involved in all three of these relationships.

In the early going with the Russians in 1969-1970 the relationship between the U.S. and Russia didn't make much progress. Indeed, there were some crises. There was a challenge over a potential, Russian submarine base in Cuba [in Cienfuegos]. There was Russian backing for radicals in the Middle East. There were some tensions over Berlin. At the same time, there was the beginning of arms control talks and the emergence of a possibility of holding a summit meeting at some point between Russia and the U.S. This was a mixed bag, but the point is that during the period from 1969 to 1970 we really weren't moving ahead very effectively with the Russians, even though there were talks going on.

Of course, as with respect to most key foreign policy issues, the Russians' key interlocutor was Kissinger, and not the State Department. Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the U.S., Dobrynin, would meet regularly, usually in the Map Room of the White House to conduct private discussions and talks, as part of the conduct of foreign policy out of the Nixon-Kissinger

White House, which we talked about before.

So, from the very beginning, there was an effort to try to improve relations with the Russians. We showed them that we would be tough when necessary, as we were in some of these crises that I've mentioned. Also, we were prepared to try to improve relations with Russia, if we could do so. We gave the Russians an incentive to improve relations but showed them that we could be firm if they pressed us on key areas.

I remember a speech at the UN General Assembly in 1970 which, in this case, was drafted primarily by Ray Price, one of President Nixon's speech writers. He was a political moderate and we knew that when we wanted a more visionary, a more centrist, moderate approach in a speech, whether it involved the Soviet Union or anything else, Ray Price would probably be the speech writer. I worked with him, Sonnenfeldt, Hyland, and others on this particular speech. If the speech involved a tough approach to the Vietnamese, for example, appealing to the silent majority, we could generally count on having Pat Buchanan assigned as the primary drafter. Then, somewhere in between these two approaches would be Bill Safire as the primary drafter of the speech. This was a very strong trio of speech writers, to say the least.

*Q: You were saying that Pat Buchanan went for the red meat.*

LORD: Buchanan would go for the red meat, domestic support, and the silent majority. He would probably help people like Vice President Spiro Agnew with their speeches as well. Bill Safire was more difficult to type, although he was clearly more conservative than Ray Price. So we gained some sense of the emphasis the President was going to give the speech by the speech writer who was assigned to draft the speech. However, there was nothing automatic about this. Since I was generally of a more moderate persuasion, I obviously would be more comfortable if I thought that Ray Price was writing the speech. I had personal respect for all three of the speech writers and their ability. No question about it.

Meanwhile, we were still trying to move ahead with the Soviets, going back and forth. As we moved toward 1971 and the channels of secret communication with the Chinese were beginning to warm up and we were beginning to head toward the Kissinger secret trip to China in July, 1971, we had one, significant break that I worked on, the statement on an interim, arms control agreement. I don't recall all of the details now, but it was<sup>259</sup> drafted some time in 1970 or 1971. Sonnenfeldt and Hyland were of course central. This statement dealt with offensive and defensive arms. I received a note of thanks from President Nixon, one of several generous personal letters to me on my service. That was one significant step with the Russians. But there were other, continuing tensions, and we weren't making much progress. The Russians weren't interested, or certainly were not as interested as President Nixon was, in a possible summit meeting.

So that was the general situation as we went on Kissinger's secret trip to China in July 1971. In all of my career experience I never saw such an immediate impact of one event on relations with another country as the impact of the Kissinger trip on our relations with the Russians and the announcement that President Nixon would be going to China. As I said we were going back and forth with the Russians, at that time, and they were dragging their feet on the proposed summit

meeting.

As we headed toward China on Kissinger's publicly announced trip to Vietnam, Thailand, India and Pakistan, we tried one more time with Al Haig sitting back in Washington to see whether the Russians would agree to a summit meeting, before we went to China. Of course, the Russians didn't know that we were going to China. We were originally prepared to have the first summit meeting with Moscow and the second summit meeting with Beijing.

So as we were traveling, as I mentioned already, I received a phone call on July 5 from Al Haig in the middle of the night, when we were in Bangkok. In this call Haig talked to me over an open line. He used code words for security purposes, but I knew what he was talking about. He made clear that he had seen Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin one more time to suggest a summit meeting. Once again, the Russians put it off with the vague comment that the time wasn't ripe for it. Little did the Russians know that we were about to go to China to arrange a summit meeting with the Chinese. The Russians would therefore be coming after the Chinese, which would be very annoying for them. If the Russians had known that, they would certainly have agreed to a summit meeting earlier.

Literally within weeks, if not days, after the July 15, 1971, announcement by President Nixon at San Clemente of Kissinger's secret trip and that Nixon would be going to China early in 1972, relations with the Russians really began to move. We had clearly gotten their attention. For example, within a few weeks the Russians agreed to a summit meeting, which subsequently took place in May, 1972, a few months after the summit meeting with the Chinese. There was further movement on the Berlin negotiations which had been going on for some time but inconclusively. Kissinger was conducting these negotiations, working - through backchannels - closely through our Ambassador to Bonn, Kenneth Rush, and with the Russians. There was movement on the issue of arms control, which ultimately resulted in the SALT-I [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] Agreement, which was signed at the Moscow Summit Meeting of 1972. There was more systematic discussion of economic and trade links with Russia. So, right across the board, in the wake of the China announcement, we began to make progress with the Russians. This was the clearest example of the positive impact of triangular diplomacy.

*Q: It is a puzzling thing. When you reflect on this, you might recall that Nixon was newly installed in office as President. He was showing a certain interest in foreign affairs. You would think that, since this summit meeting was to take place in Moscow, the Russians would have been eager to show that they were a big player. I think that you're right. It was probably some political affair or might have been a problem within the Politburo.*

LORD: I'm sure that one possibility was that we indicated that we didn't want a summit meeting just for show, unlike the summit with China where the meeting was the message - reopening relations after 23 years of mutual isolation and hostility. We wanted to have some substantive achievements come out of it. We thought that, central to that, there had to be something on arms control. It may well have been that the Soviet military leaders, who were rather conservative, didn't like some of the arms control limitations that were being kicked around. Maybe their hesitation about entering into an arms control agreement, which would logically be the central achievement of a summit meeting, slowed things down. It may be that they were holding out and

trying to make President Nixon make more concessions, thinking maybe that he was eager for a summit meeting. If they dragged their feet, they might get such concessions immediately near the summit meeting.

The Soviets may have hoped to extract additional concessions from the U.S. in order to get a summit meeting, whether they involved arms control or anything else. I think that is the most likely reason, based on tactical, rather than strategic considerations. I'm sure that the Soviets would have welcomed a summit meeting, particularly in Moscow. They probably figured that by dragging out the process, they would be able to get a more reasonable U.S. position on certain issues. They saw the negotiations leading to a summit meeting as a sort of bargaining chip. I think that is the most reasonable explanation, because the Russians were fairly crude in their negotiating tactics. They had the mentality of rug merchants.

The Chinese, although they were just as tough as the Russians, were more apt to put out their basic position at the beginning of negotiations and not haggle over it. They would say that this or that is what they had to have. They would ask: "What does the United States need?" The Russians would deliberately inflate their positions, knowing that we would chip away at their positions. They would expect us to inflate our positions in a similar way. The Vietnamese communists were totally intransigent all the way along. They were basically revolutionaries who didn't like to negotiate and just stonewalled us until conditions were such that they had to make a move, as they did in the negotiations with us in the fall of 1972. When the Israelis negotiate, they are something like Talmudic scholars, legal experts who look at every last semicolon. They are insecure because of their history and geography regarding any agreements made. The Arabs are more romantic in outlook, and you have to appeal to some of those elements in negotiating with them.

One of the fascinating experiences we had during this period was to observe the different negotiating styles of other countries. Even if Kissinger was not experienced in the history and culture of these countries, he was very skillful in figuring out pretty quickly, not only their national interests, but also their cultural, negotiating styles. He would then adjust his own tactics accordingly.

In any event, getting back to the Russians, in the course of the 1970s we made several trips to Moscow. I'll get back to some of them in greater detail. I think that I was on five or six of these trips, before, during, and after the first summit meeting, as we tried to move our relationship further along. There were two, generic experiences which were interesting in this connection.

First, except for the summit meeting itself, when we stayed at the Kremlin, we stayed in the Lenin Hills Guest House outside of Moscow. This was a VIP [Very Important Persons] Visitors' residence or dacha. It overlooked Moscow and was located near Moscow University. Of course, just as was the case in China, we assumed that our quarters there were bugged at all times and so we had to be very careful. Particularly with the Russians - we didn't do this so much with the Chinese - we used a machine called a "babblor." I'm not sure whether I've already mentioned this, but it was a recording machine in which you put in a tape. When it plays, it sounds like a dozen cocktail parties all going on at once. It's supposed to drown out bugging. If you talk softly, against the backdrop of this babbling, it does the job. It basically consists of a recording of the

comments of a lot of different people all talking at the same time at different frequencies or levels. It's designed to shut out any listening devices. I'm sure that it was pretty crude and may have been ineffective, but it at least complicated Russian listening devices when we talked softly. The problem was that it could drive you absolutely crazy. After about 10 minutes of this noise, you were ready to tear your hair out.

There were a lot of jokes about this device. When we were in China, we usually found that it was easier to walk outside the guesthouse where we were staying and talk during walks outside, rather than when we were inside, where our conversations would have been bugged. I suspected, in the case of China, that the trees were probably bugged as well. The babbling was a source of great frustration but also mirth.

There were other aspects. In our dacha the attendants included some fairly attractive women. The Russians were very crude in this respect. It was clear that they weren't above using these women for blackmail purposes, if at all possible. I was never directly approached in this regard, but it was pretty clear that they were trying to tempt Kissinger and, of course, any of us if we were stupid enough, not to mention not being monogamous. I happen to be monogamous and not stupid. Any of us could have gotten into trouble, particularly Kissinger. There were sort of crude jokes made. Of course, he ignored all of this. However, this shows you some Russian crudity, which I don't think that you would find in China.

We also used to joke about how they would drive us nuts. There was a pool table in the dacha. I swear that the pockets you shoot the balls into were smaller than the balls. Actually, they weren't, but they were small enough so that it was particularly difficult to play pool at this table. The pockets seemed smaller than they should be. We figured that this might be psychological warfare.

One final note is that the Russians proved that you could really stagger around because, unlike the Chinese delicacies, the Russians would provide massive displays of food on the table in the guest house. These included caviar, very heavy bread, and all kinds of meat, fish and fowl. I'm sure that the caloric and cholesterol level in this food was extraordinarily high.

I might mention that the motorcades from our dacha to the Kremlin, for example, involved some of the most hair-raising travel that I've ever experienced. The chauffeurs would drive very fast, and each car would be about one foot behind the car ahead of it. If any car stopped suddenly, we would have an incredible, chain reaction car crash. It was always nerve-wracking to be in those motorcades. These are just some colorful aspects of a visit to Moscow.

*Q: The secret meeting was the one where the U.S. Ambassador was not informed about it until afterwards. Were you sort of under strict instructions to stay away from the Embassy?*

LORD: It was part of this crazy system which is now hard to believe. It wasn't just the Ambassador who was not informed. I believe that Brent Scowcroft must have been a military assistant at the time. He wasn't working directly for Kissinger. He was visiting the Embassy in Moscow as well. I believe that the Ambassador found out or was told afterwards that we had been there in Moscow. As I recall it, I think that we went to Moscow at the last minute.

Preparations for the visit were made at the last minute, as it were. As I said earlier, the summit meeting, for which this secret meeting was held to make arrangements for, was held in May 1972.

I think that we were due to go somewhere else. There was some kind of an official dinner party in Washington. We got the word that very evening at the dinner party that we were going to go to Moscow instead. It seems incredible. We traveled in Air Force Two [U.S. Air Force Special Missions Aircraft, a VC-137 Boeing, much like a Boeing 707. Air Force Two was usually reserved for the Vice President or the Secretary of State.] We left Washington so quickly that we gave a ride to Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin on our plane going to Moscow. It was truly a last minute decision.

I have some recollection that there was some place where we were supposed to go, perhaps China. We changed our itinerary. This shows you how reliable my memory of this period is. In any case, the Embassy in Moscow did not know about the Kissinger visit. The Embassy was engaged in logistical planning for the summit meeting, but we were in Moscow for last minute preparations on substantive issues. I don't recall any of the actual details.

What was fascinating was the lead up to the summit meeting itself. During the spring of 1972 Hanoi launched a major offensive in South Vietnam.

*Q: This was the Easter Offensive of 1972.*

LORD: Yes, the Easter Offensive. It involved the use of tanks and heavy weapons. It was clearly an escalation of the war. Therefore, President Nixon was faced with a difficult decision, as he was preparing to go to Moscow a few weeks later. It was his instinct to respond brutally and swiftly to Hanoi in terms of the offensive itself, which contained the danger of really threatening South Vietnam's viability. We also needed to try to get the North Vietnamese back to the negotiating table, because when you were dealing with Hanoi, you had to deal with them firmly, as well as making offers to them. The problem for President Nixon was that, if he responded to this offensive in a brutal way, would this jeopardize the summit meeting in Moscow? The Russians might say that they could not welcome him in Moscow while we were attacking their so-called allies.

So there were debates within Kissinger's staff in which I took part, in the Situation Room and elsewhere in the White House as to what our reaction should be to the Hanoi offensive. We needed to keep in mind our Vietnam objectives but also our interest in arranging for a summit meeting in Moscow. On the one hand there was the fear that the Russians might cancel the summit meeting if we took vigorous action against the North Vietnamese. If this happened, we would lose an awful lot of work expended over a couple of years to improve relations with the Russians. We were on the verge of reaching the SALT-1 Agreement [First phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] and some economic agreements. The Berlin Agreement was also moving forward at that point. Also, of course, the summit trip itself was a dramatic double header, with the China summit trip just a couple of months before that, in terms of our diplomatic achievements generally, isolating Hanoi, and, not incidentally, affecting the prospects of Nixon's reelection in 1972. This would show that Nixon was a man of peace and that he had made major

foreign policy moves. If the summit meeting with the Russians was canceled, not only would this summit meeting be down the drain, but the SALT-1 and all of the other agreements that were being prepared for the summit meeting would be in jeopardy.

There was a general agonizing debate about whether a brutal response to Hanoi for its 1972 offensive was worth losing all of the fruits of work done with the Russians over a period of two or three years. This also included the opening to China, which could be affected if Beijing saw we had real trouble with Moscow.

On the other side of the ledger, and what was uppermost in the mind of President Nixon, was first that he could not let Hanoi get away with undertaking a major offensive in South Vietnam. This was clearly an escalation and a challenge, even as we were conducting secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese to end the war, after all. Also, there would be the embarrassment for President Nixon to go to Moscow while Hanoi was pummeling South Vietnam and American troops fighting there, killing Americans who were defending South Vietnam, as well as South Vietnamese troops. Moscow, of course, was still supplying North Vietnam with weapons and equipment for carrying on this offensive. President Nixon would be in Moscow, trying to negotiate agreements with the Russians while the Russians were backing a tough offensive in South Vietnam, killing American troops. So there was debate along these lines among President Nixon's advisers.

President Nixon decided for two reasons that he was going to bomb around Hanoi and mine the harbor at Haiphong. This would be a major escalation on our part. First there was the factor of the negotiations with Hanoi to end the war, which was a matter of face, incentives, and seeking to achieve a more peaceful settlement in South Vietnam, both to protect American troops and South Vietnam. A tough response would help stabilize the battlefield balance which in turn was key at the bargaining table. To look weak, on the other hand, would cause Hanoi to be even more intransigent.

Secondly, President Nixon decided that he wasn't about to go to Russia looking weak, both to his domestic, American audience, and to Hanoi and the world. He didn't want to go to Hanoi's chief supplier of arms and equipment for carrying out this escalation, striking deals while we didn't defend our troops and our allies.

Thirdly, and most interestingly, I believe that President Nixon was about the only American policy-maker who felt that he could get away with a tough stance, i.e. still preserve the Moscow summit. I could be wrong about this. He was confident that the Russians would not cancel the summit meeting with the U.S. So Nixon felt that he could have his cake and eat it, too. He could be tough and brutal against the Hanoi offensive and still go ahead and reap the benefits of the summit meeting. Nixon would appear to be tough, even as he made deals with the Russians, by showing that he wasn't a wimp on the Hanoi front. I believe that President Nixon felt that Brezhnev and other Russian leaders valued U.S. - Soviet relations and the summit meeting more than they did their ties with Hanoi. He thought that the Russians would stomach the bombing around Hanoi and the mining of the harbor at Haiphong, even while Nixon was in Moscow.

Frankly, I thought that the summit meeting with the Russians might well be canceled. I was

wrong in this respect, both in my predictions and my advice. Kissinger was more ambivalent in this respect. He thought that we had to be tough, but he was very concerned about losing the fruits of all of the hard work we had put in to improve relations with the Russians. He was more fearful that the summit meeting might be canceled if we responded in a tough and even brutal way to the North Vietnamese. I'll leave it to Kissinger to speak for himself as to how he came out on this issue. He has done so in his volume of memoirs on this period.

Some of Nixon's advisers felt that we should be tough, even if we lost the summit meeting with the Russians. Some may have felt that we should be tough and that we might not lose the summit meeting in any case. Basically, this was a decision made by President Nixon, showing his visionary and courageous outlook. He felt that we should be tough for the reasons I have mentioned. He said that, furthermore, we wouldn't lose the summit meeting in Moscow anyway. Most disagreed with him. He proved to be right. We bombed Hanoi and we mined the harbor at Haiphong, which constituted a major escalation. Nevertheless, we went ahead with a very successful summit meeting in Moscow.

*Q: This shows that it wouldn't have happened if there hadn't been the opening to China.*

LORD: I think that's absolutely right. I think that if the China factor hadn't been there, in the first place we might not have had a summit meeting in Moscow. Or, the Russians might have canceled the meeting. But it was more difficult for them to cancel Nixon's trip to Russia now he had been to China.

*Q: In the long run the Soviet Union would have been isolated, rather than the United States.*

LORD: But when we went ahead with the meeting in China...

*Q: We would have had the meeting with China, and the Soviets would have been left out.*

LORD: I think that's absolutely right. I think that the China factor was crucial, not only in terms of the major impetus it gave to our relationship with Russia but also in being able to go ahead with the summit meeting in Moscow and our continued work on other issues. Keep in mind that the Shanghai Communique with the Chinese in February, 1972, specifically had a phrase in it about both China and the United States opposing hegemony in Asia or elsewhere. Now who was going to practice hegemony in the world? Who could that possibly have been but Moscow? So it was pretty clear that we were getting Moscow's attention. We walked right up to the edge of being provocative to do that. We also had to demonstrate to our public and to the Chinese public why we and the Chinese were getting together. You will remember that the Shanghai Communique had all these differences between us listed in it, both on specific issues as well as on ideology.

*Q: With Kissinger keeping Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin abreast of this, we were just not going to lose in this connection. The Soviets were supplying the North Vietnamese. We could say to the Russians to knock this off and we would knock off what we were doing.*

LORD: Absolutely. The constant factor for a couple of years with the Russians was, first of all,

what we said wouldn't be all that explicit. It would depend on how you would phrase it. We would make our points primarily in Washington in discussions with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin but also when we went to Moscow and would see Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as Soviet President Brezhnev. The basic themes we would follow would be that we were trying honorably to end the Vietnam War, but we were not going to do it dishonorably. We would suggest to the Soviets to advise the North Vietnamese to settle for a military settlement only and that we would not attempt to decide the future of the South Vietnamese, which they would decide for themselves. We would say, furthermore, that it was in the interest of the Russians to get this war behind us so that we wouldn't have this major problem in our bilateral relationship. Certainly, Soviet interest with us in arms control, stability in Europe, and economic cooperation with the U.S. were of much greater importance than sticking with these fanatic friends of the Soviet Union, who were just complicating the situation.

We would make clear to the Soviets that we would not expect them to sell out their friends, the North Vietnamese. However, we expected the Russians, in their own self interest, to pressure the North Vietnamese to be reasonable. We would say that, on this particular occasion, when Hanoi launched its Easter Offensive of 1972, this was outrageous. The Russians knew that we were negotiating with the North Vietnamese in an effort to reach a reasonable settlement. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese had undertaken this major offensive. We would also say that furthermore, President Nixon cannot go to Moscow while the Soviet Union is supplying the North Vietnamese with weapons, with which they are killing U.S. troops, without responding vigorously.

Obviously, the line which Kissinger took, at this point, was to tell the Soviets that we were escalating the pressure on the North Vietnamese. He pointed out that it was Russia's friends that had caused this problem, not us. Kissinger said: "You can understand that no President can go to Moscow and not make a tough response to what the North Vietnamese are doing."

Frankly, I believe that the Russians understood all of this. Above all, they understood that their bilateral relations with the U.S. were more important than their relations with Hanoi. And there was the continuing China factor.

*Q: And Soviet control over the North Vietnamese was not that great. In the same sense our control over the South Vietnamese was also not that great.*

LORD: That's correct. We can see this today in the sense that China finds North Korea a pain in the neck. China is not about to sell them out, but it does complicate life for the Chinese. North Korea fires missiles in Asia, and this upsets Japan and gets Japan and Taiwan interested in anti-missile defense.

Let me talk a little bit about the Moscow summit meeting itself. It really was a rather dramatic meeting. As I said, we stayed for several days in the Kremlin, and several agreements were reached. One of these was the initial SALT [Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] agreement. Kissinger was putting the last pieces of this agreement together, even as the negotiating team led by Ambassador Gerald Smith was in Geneva, trying to put other pieces together which related to it. There was always some lingering controversy whether, under the pressure of the summit meeting, Nixon and Kissinger made some last minute concessions to get a deal which

Ambassador Gerald Smith and others felt were unnecessary. I'll leave that to the historians. The eventual, SALT-1 agreement which was negotiated was good for us and the Russians in terms of putting a cap on the nuclear arms race. It was the first major pact of its kind.

Subsequent negotiations by President Reagan and his successors were called START [Strategic Arms Reduction Talks]. That idea was to begin to reduce, not just limit, the number of nuclear weapons. What we were trying to do during this period was to stop the further escalation of nuclear weapons, both offensive and defensive.

I remember Kissinger explaining the agreement in the middle of the summit meeting, on his 49th birthday in a Moscow night club, which was quite interesting. There were also economic agreements for more trade which would take place between our two countries, as well as a variety of other things, such as a space cooperation agreement and an accord on principles of international behavior. Altogether, these made it a very substantive summit meeting, as well as a very dramatic one.

However, the single, most interesting episode for me, personally, had to do with Vietnam. The Russians clearly felt that they had to show that they were not ignoring the Vietnam issue. The Russians had to show Hanoi that they hadn't completely sold them out. So there was one meeting where, it was agreed, we would talk about Vietnam with the Russians. It was going to be held in Brezhnev's country dacha [country residence] about a 45 minute to one hour's drive away from the Kremlin. The plan was to have a small meeting on this subject. It was clear that the Russians wanted to talk tough and then send a transcript of the discussions with us back to Hanoi to show that they had stood by their friends.

One of the more hair-raising experiences of my life, which was humorous in retrospect but which left me close to panic at the time, had to do with missing a Presidential motorcade. We were in the Kremlin for a signature of a scientific and space agreement between Brezhnev and President Nixon. It was one of a series of agreements which were to be signed with the Russians. The plan was, after the signing ceremony and reception, that President Nixon would go to his quarters in the Kremlin and freshen up for half an hour or so before going out to Brezhnev's dacha for the meeting on Vietnam, which was to take place in the late afternoon and evening. Right after the signature of the agreement, while people were still clinking glasses of champagne and so forth, John Negroponte, who was the Vietnam expert on the National Security Council staff at the time, having replaced Dick Smyser, and I, went back to our offices in the Kremlin to gather up the briefing books for this meeting between President Nixon and Brezhnev. To our horror we found out that Nixon and Brezhnev, right after the signing ceremony, had agreed that they didn't need to freshen up and decided to go right out to Brezhnev's dacha.

So they went right to the motorcade, and Kissinger himself had to scramble to join the President. They entered the motorcade and left the Kremlin without John Negroponte and me. There were only four Americans scheduled to be present at the meeting: Nixon, Kissinger, Negroponte, and me. You could argue that our missing the motorcade wasn't our fault, and it certainly wasn't. That's irrelevant. You don't miss a Presidential motorcade. We had visions of Nixon and Kissinger being absolutely infuriated that their staff wasn't with them. We had all of the briefing books. We assumed that Nixon and Kissinger were planning to be looking at the briefing books

in the motorcade on the way out to the meeting at Brezhnev's dacha, so that they would be prepared.

Of course, Kissinger, whom I admired in many respects, is known to have a considerable temper. We had visions of losing our jobs due to a disaster at the meeting, or holding up the meeting while they waited for us. We went out to the street, desperately trying to catch up with the Nixon motorcade. Well, of course, the KGB [Soviet secret police] was not about to allow us to get into any car and head out to Brezhnev's dacha. So they totally stonewalled us, they wouldn't let us get into a car, and they wouldn't let us go anywhere. We finally turned to Bill Hyland, who spoke Russian and interceded with the KGB people. They finally said: "Wait until Brezhnev and Nixon get to the dacha. We'll be in touch with them out there and we'll see whether you people can go out." That wasn't the point. We wanted to catch up with them. We were just frantic for about 45 minutes.

Finally, we received permission to go out to the Brezhnev dacha, and we went out in the usual speedy hair raising drive, figuring that our careers were just about over. To our great relief, when we got there, we found that Brezhnev had taken Nixon out on a boat. That was on purpose, to give Nixon a little fun before the meeting; the delay wasn't intended to fill in the time while they waited for us. We got to the dacha while Brezhnev and Nixon were still in the boat out on the lake, so we got there in time for the meeting, although Nixon and Kissinger still didn't have the briefing books. Well, even the briefing books were largely irrelevant, because Nixon and Kissinger knew that this was not going to be a negotiating session where you need your talking points and positions to refer to. They were just going to listen to some tough lectures from the Russian leaders. So to our great surprise and relief, Nixon and Kissinger took in stride the fact that we hadn't gone out to the dacha with them and were very relaxed about it. So our nightmare was over.

We then went into the meeting, which lasted for three hours, at least. On our side, as I said, were Nixon, Kissinger, Negroponte, and myself. On the Soviet side were secretary-general Brezhnev, prime minister Kosygin, president Podgorny, who was the third-ranking among the Russians, and Alexandrov, the Soviet national security adviser, plus the Soviet interpreter, Viktor Sukodorov. I may not be pronouncing the interpreter's name correctly. It was a very small meeting.

It was ostensibly the most brutal meeting I've ever been at. Brezhnev spoke first, followed by Kosygin and then Podgorny. Each one took about an hour and just ranted and raved about Vietnam, the American bombing of Hanoi, and the mining of the harbor of Haiphong. Somewhat to my surprise, President Nixon hardly said anything. He just sat there and took it. What Nixon and Kissinger realized, even more than we did, although we understood this was going to happen, was that these statements by the Soviet leaders were essentially for the record. The Russians, having welcomed Nixon to Moscow in the middle of our bombing of Hanoi and the mining of Haiphong, had to show that they were tough. They had to have a transcript that they could show to their North Vietnamese friends, and this was all for show.

President Nixon showed admirable self-restraint because the Soviet rhetoric was really rather insulting. It was hot and heavy on this. This went on for about three hours, as I say, and President

Nixon barely responded. The meeting ended. Then we went upstairs in the dacha, and immediately the mood changed completely. It was 100 percent different. Brezhnev couldn't have been more jovial. They got out the vodka and the caviar.

*Q: Did you catch any mood of the President's speech writers, to the effect that: "By God, we're socking it to them?"*

LORD: In this case it was not one of the top three speech writers. I believe that it was a man named Andrews, who was primarily working on this speech for some reason I've forgotten, although maybe one of the other speech writers took it over after that. No, I don't recall any details about this case. Andrews just carried out the instructions of the President in drafting the speech. I saw Nixon briefly at Camp David. He clearly was in a resolute mood. He felt that we had to do this. I can't recall specifically, during the brief encounter that Kissinger and I had with Nixon, whether the President said that we were not going to lose the summit meeting with the Russians anyway. But that was his view.

That was a memorable experience on a beautiful spring day, going from Washington to Camp David, flying up on this helicopter and having this terrible feeling that we were going to lose so many things as a result of the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong.

Now, returning to the summit meeting with the Russians and the personalities. Brezhnev, who sat in at the meeting with Nixon and Kissinger, was, of course, completely different from the Chinese leaders. He was very mercurial in his moods. He could be very tough and also could be very friendly. He could literally give you a bear hug type of approach. He reminded me of a sort of tough, labor leader. He was sort of earthy and didn't have the kind of elegance that Zhou En-lai had, of course. He was much more easy to understand than Mao Zedong who spoke elliptically and allusively..

Brezhnev had a tendency to go on at great length in his statements, which used to drive the interpreters wild, because he would speak very fast and go on for a long time without pausing. It would be very tough for the interpreters to keep up with him. It was also terrible for note taking because when the translation was made, it might last for 20 minutes or half an hour. With Vietnamese, Chinese, or Russian, you're much better off if the conversation involves going back and forth between participants in brief paragraphs. That is easier to keep up with. However, having to jot down notes for 20 or 30 minutes of a monologue by Brezhnev was something else. Brezhnev could be quite friendly and then menacing, as his moods changed. He was not above cracking some jokes. He would sometimes get up from his chair and walk around as he spoke.

I remember a famous exchange with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, in which he admired Sonnenfeldt's watch, which was very expensive. It was probably a Rolex. Brezhnev had a cheap watch. In effect, Brezhnev offered to trade wristwatches with Sonnenfeldt. Of course, Sonnenfeldt couldn't say no to the President of the Soviet Union. So Sonnenfeldt got in exchange some kind of cheap, Timex type watch in exchange for a Rolex.

Also, Brezhnev was trying to cut down on his smoking. He had a little device, kind of like an alarm clock. He couldn't get at his cigarettes except every half hour or hour. A little bell would

go off, and he was then able to get out his cigarettes. But he was always cheating and getting his cigarettes out early.

So Brezhnev was a rough, tough guy in many ways, although he had a certain warmth about him. It was clear that he was ruthless, as were the Chinese leaders. However, he was very human and was not an elegant mandarin, like Zhou En-lai and not like a Delphic emperor, as Mao Zedong was. He was more human in many ways.

*Q: Did you feel that Brezhnev was in command of the situation?*

LORD: Yes. I thought that he was in command, but you could never tell in Russia, as in China, how much debate there was in the Politburo about going ahead. We assumed that there were people, particularly on the military side, who were more conservative and suspicious. So Brezhnev showed some courage in moving ahead with detente. This didn't mean that he wasn't tough or ruthless, but it clearly wasn't entirely easy for him to welcome President Nixon in the middle of our bombing Hanoi and mining the harbor at Haiphong. Brezhnev had his own military people suspicious of the arms control agreement he was negotiating with us. He was dominant but not totally in charge like Mao.

In 1972 and 1973, when I was on the U.S. delegation meetings with him, Brezhnev was still strong and in pretty good form. As time went on, I didn't go to all of the summit meetings, particularly as we entered the period of the Ford administration. For example, I was not at the summit meeting at Vladivostok in 1975. Over time Brezhnev became physically weaker and mentally more sluggish. As I saw Yeltsin's decline mentally and physically, it reminded me of Brezhnev, hanging onto someone's arm, and also staying on longer than he should have.

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was extremely impressive. Of all of the foreign ministers I saw in action, he was one of the top three or four. Yaqub Khan, Foreign Minister of Pakistan, who was Ambassador during part of the time I was in government, was extremely impressive. Chao Quan-hua, the Vice Foreign Minister of China, who ended up siding with the Gang of Four, was also quite impressive. We met some very capable foreign ministers in the Middle East. Later in my career (in the 1990s) Qian Qichen of China and Gareth Evans of Australia were outstanding. Gromyko was very impressive indeed. He lived and served a long time and had tremendous experience and great self confidence. He didn't have to refer to his notes very often. He was on top of the issues, both strategically and tactically. Unlike his general reputation, he had a good sense of humor. Kissinger always tried to leaven his negotiations with Gromyko by telling jokes. For example, I recall that when Kissinger would have a document in front of him, he would joke with Gromyko and say: "I really would like to have another copy of this document. I'll hold it up to your camera, which is in your chandelier," or something like that. They exchanged a lot of jokes like that. Or: "which of these flower pots should I speak into?" Gromyko also had an amazing facility in English. I'm sure that it was limited, but he could speak some phrases very well. He was capable, in English, of using quadruple negatives in a sentence. Not just a double negative. He would deliberately use a quadruple negative just to have fun with it. You always think of Gromyko as being very dour and serious. That was his public persona, and, of course, he could be that way in a negotiation. However, he had a remarkable sense of humor at times. He and Kissinger had a lot of light moments.

Another Lord joke occurred when Peter Rodman and I were in a Kremlin men's room. He said the setting reminded him of Ivan the Terrible. I said it reminded me of Peter the Great.

*Q: Did you feel that the Soviet desk in the Bureau of European Affairs was well plugged into what was happening, or was all of this going on around them?*

LORD: During the NSC period (1969-73), it was pretty much like relations with China and Vietnam. Relations with the Soviet Union were run out of the White House. Now, this doesn't mean that we didn't draw on expertise from the State Department for background purposes. I can't recall, during the summit meetings with the Russians, who would sit in from the State Department, or whether this was handled only by members of the NSC staff, like relations with China. It seems to me that the exclusion of the State Department wasn't quite as complete as was the case with China, where we only had people from the NSC, led by Kissinger, dealing with Zhou En-lai and Mao. In negotiations with the Chinese, Secretary of State Rogers was limited to handling bilateral economic and cultural issues with the Chinese foreign minister. The negotiations with Zhou En-lai and his subordinates on the Shanghai Communique and other issues were strictly handled by the NSC, including me. I don't think that the manner of handling Soviet-American issues in Moscow was quite so closed off from the State Department, but I can't be sure. But surely the principal day-to-day conduct of bilateral relations and the preparation for the summit were strictly Kissinger-Dobrynin/Gromyko affairs.

*Q: Did you see a difference between Kissinger's behavior at the Soviet summit meeting and the way he dealt with the China summit meetings?*

LORD: Well, as I've said already, we had different negotiating styles with the Russians and with the Chinese. You have to remember that in dealing with the Russians we had real, substantive, concrete business to handle, including arms control, trade agreements, the supply of grain, Berlin negotiations, and scientific and space agreements. There were also questions involving our contacts with the Soviet Union around the world. We talked to the Soviet Union about the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and other places.

With the Chinese we were beginning with a sort of *tabula rasa* [clean slate]. We were just starting out on a brand new relationship after 25 years of mutual isolation and enmity. The Chinese didn't threaten us as much as the Soviets did, nor were they adventurists. They didn't have that kind of power. Our conversations were mostly rhetorical and conceptual with the Chinese. At this point, in the early 1970s, there weren't a lot of agreements or specific negotiations. Our discussions mostly involved strategic matters of trying to figure out how China and the U.S. could deal with the Russians. We would also talk about Vietnam, the Middle East, Korea, and other issues. However, we weren't negotiating real agreements.

We had a different kind of agenda with the two countries. With the Chinese, Kissinger was much more philosophical, conceptual, strategic, and reflective, which he was brilliant at, as was Zhou En-lai. In their discussions with Kissinger and American officials, aside from President Nixon, Gromyko and the other Russians, along with Ambassador Dobrynin and President Brezhnev, tended to be much more concrete and specific and were interested in genuine negotiations on

specific issues, as well as discussing positions more broadly.

Finally, I would say, and it was true then and it's true to this day, without being pejorative, Kissinger liked dealing with the Chinese better than he liked dealing with the Russians. Some people would argue that Kissinger and President Nixon, as well as other, subsequent Republican and Democratic Secretaries of State, National Security Advisers, and Presidents, have been somewhat seduced by the Chinese, that they haven't been tough enough with them. I'll leave that for the historians, but the fact is that Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai were extremely impressive, more impressive than the Russians. They were more exciting and pleasing to talk to. Secondly, in Kissinger's view Russia was seen as much more of a threat to us than the Chinese. Thirdly, the cultural and negotiating styles of the Russians and the Chinese were different. In effect, the Chinese would say: "Now, what do you need? Here's what we need. Here are some basic principles, and how do we get there?" They would not change their bottom line very frequently or haggle like rug merchants. The Russians were much more traditional. Initially, they inflated their positions, asking for more than they really needed, expecting us to do the same. Then we would bargain toward the middle position. This was a much more exhausting and tiresome exercise.

Fourth, rightly or wrongly, Kissinger felt that the Chinese were more trustworthy than the Russians, that the Chinese would uphold agreements, while the Russians would push the envelope, try to haggle around the edges, and not live up to the spirit and, perhaps, even the letter of the agreement. For example, in terms of translations, we negotiated the Shanghai Communique in English. We really - and this was irresponsible - did not go over the Chinese version of the communique closely until the summit meeting was already over and we had returned to Washington. When we looked at the Chinese language version of the Shanghai Communique, our experts concluded that, not only were the Chinese faithful to the English language version of the communique, but there were a couple of places where they could have chosen one, two, or three options in terms of what Chinese word to use and they regularly chose the word that was more favorable to us than to them. Kissinger thought that the Chinese had the vision to see that, as he said, rather than picking up loose change and trying to get some tiny, little tactical advantage by a translation change or not fully living up to something, they were more interested in gaining our sense of trust and credibility in implementing the agreements, a longer-term payoff. He felt that in this way they sought to earn a more flexible and understanding U.S. approach by taking the high road. By contrast there were times when the Russians actually screwed up the translation and then tried to work the resulting situation to their advantage. Or they would haggle and press around the edges.

So when you put all of these four or five factors together which I have mentioned, as a result Kissinger felt more friendly toward the Chinese than he did toward the Russians. This didn't mean that he didn't want to improve relations with Russia. However, he basically felt that the Chinese were easier to deal with and more trustworthy than the Russians, not that the Chinese weren't tough and acting in their own self interest.

That situation has continued to this day. In my view, Kissinger continues to give the Chinese the benefit of the doubt and to be suspicious of the Russians. He has always felt that the Russians will come back some day with their expansionist activities, as they did under the Czars and under

the Communists. Therefore, he believes that we have to be careful about a resurgent, Russian nationalism. Similarly, Kissinger has always tended to be suspicious, to some degree, of Japanese militarism, and even of the Indians, to a certain extent, whereas the Chinese get more of a free pass from Kissinger. In answer to your question, these tendencies were seen even back then.

There are two other reasons which come to mind, I think, why Kissinger felt a greater affinity with the Chinese than with the Russians. It is a little ironic, since Kissinger himself is a European and, to a certain extent, a Russian expert, much more than an Asian specialist. He didn't really know anything about the Chinese until we opened up relations with them.

First, of course, the Chinese are much more subtle than the Russians. You can see this symbolically in their food. There is a subtlety and variety in Chinese food, compared to the heavy, somewhat repetitive, Russian food.

You can also see this in their style of protocol. The Chinese are masters at making you feel at home when you're their guest, inducing a sense of obligation in you by treating you well. They are very clever in how they conduct themselves. For example, in terms of sightseeing, we always used to marvel that when we went sightseeing in China to a series of exhibits or museums or trips to various places in the course of a day, we would often linger at various places and take longer than we figured the Chinese had planned for. Yet we would get through the entire tour on time, without feeling rushed. The secret was that on a sightseeing tour the Chinese would divide the planned schedule into, let us say, 15-minute segments. They never rushed the visitor. If the visitor was taking longer than they planned on at, let us say, some exhibit in a museum, they would just cut out the next 15 minute segment and go on to the following portion of the program. We wouldn't know that something had been cut out of the program. They would let us go at our own pace, yet we always got back to our guest quarters right on time and without feeling rushed, feeling that we had seen everything that we were supposed to see. By contrast, the Russians would tend to hurry you along in any tour.

The second reason, and it's related to this, why Kissinger felt more affinity to the Chinese than to the Russians, was the matter of self-confidence. The Chinese knew that they had been the number one power in the world for 4,000 or 5,000 years. They were the Middle Kingdom. Everyone else was either a barbarian or far distant from them. If they were located closer to the Chinese, they were tributary peoples, and China was dominant. China was Number One in the world technologically and in many other ways, up until about the 17th century. Then the Chinese began to lag and they had a bad century or two when they were exploited by the British, invaded by the Japanese, and humiliated by other, outside powers in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. As a result there is a curious mixture of self-confidence and arrogance because the Chinese have this awareness of having been the Middle Kingdom for so long. At the same time, they are also thin skinned and xenophobic because of the rape of Nanking in 1937 by the Japanese or the Opium War of the 19th century by the British, and so forth.

On balance the Chinese, when they look at their history and culture, are very much aware that they were the Number One power for the great bulk of their history. They figure that they will be Number One in the next century or the one after that. As a result, the Chinese have a certain self-

confidence, which means that they can act in a more relaxed and less haggling, nervous, and paranoid way, whereas the Russians have a much greater mix in their history in terms of how they've done. The Russians see themselves as threatened historically and perhaps in the future on the East by the Chinese and the Japanese, and on the West by Europe and the U.S. They have less self confidence in the way they deal with us. This is reflected in everything from haggling over details of a program as to how they handle their translations. I would add these factors to why Kissinger was drawn more to the Chinese than to the Russians.

*Q: Did you find that Bill Hyland and Helmut Sonnenfeldt almost had to gang up on Kissinger to get him to pay more attention to these cultural aspects of dealing with the Soviet Union? How did they deal with Kissinger regarding the Soviet Union?*

LORD: No, I didn't see any problem there. There might be some disagreements on specific tactics, such as what to do on arms control, Berlin, or something like that. However, Kissinger gave extremely high priority to our relationship with Russia. Because we had more specific business with the Russians by far than we did with the Chinese, he spent more hours working on Russia than with China. No question about that. Russia, after all, presented the major challenge to American foreign policy for the past 30, 40, or 50 years. Kissinger treated it as such.

So, when I was on the NSC staff during the period 1969-1973, I noticed that he spent more time on Russia than on any other, single issue. He obviously spent a great deal of time on China, as well, in addition to the Middle East, to a certain extent. However, Russia was the overwhelming problem together with Vietnam. It was never difficult to draw his attention to Russia. This didn't mean that Nixon, Kissinger, and their key advisers would always agree. However, I think that there was a general agreement among us on the basic approach to be adopted toward the Soviet Union.

In his latest book of memoirs, and I've already dipped into it, Kissinger goes over this argument by the neo-conservatives that he was too soft on the Russians. Today it seems a little ironic that some people may think that Kissinger was too soft on the Communists. The concept of *detente* ran into some trouble because it was attacked on the Left and on the Right. I'll get back to that later. To answer your question more directly, no, it was never difficult to draw Kissinger's attention to Russia. The question of Russia always drew the attention of Kissinger and his key advisers.

I was involved in these matters myself but I want to make clear that I was always much more in a supporting role, preparing briefing papers and so on. I was there mostly to give a global perspective, to compare what we were doing with China and Vietnam, as well as to help out on the note-taking. I also did some drafting of documents.

Let me spend just a couple of minutes on the evolution of our policies toward the Soviet Union. As I said, we had this mixed bag of issues in 1969 and 1970. We were not really moving ahead. Then there was a dramatic acceleration of relations with the Soviet Union in the wake of the announcement in July, 1971, that Kissinger had visited China. Having opened relations with China we were able to move ahead with the Russians.

When Nixon was reelected in 1972, we seemed poised to be in excellent shape in foreign policy, for the following reasons. First, we had a President who had won a crushing victory in the elections of 1972 and had an overwhelming mandate from the American people. Of course, this strengthened his position abroad, because he had been reelected by such a large margin. Secondly, since he had been reelected for a second term, President Nixon wouldn't have to be concerned about domestic politics and could do what he wanted to do in terms of foreign policy, essentially because he could not run for reelection. So he could be even more statesmanlike. Thirdly, he had some very significant successes. We had the opening of relations with China and we had detente with the Russians and the specific agreements negotiated with the Russians in the areas that I've mentioned. By January, 1973, shortly after his reelection, we reached a Vietnam peace agreement and were beginning to be active in shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East. As a result, President Nixon and Kissinger both felt very good about where we stood as we headed into Nixon's second term as President.

Much more attention could now be paid to our allies and other issues. There was a turning to the year of Europe and the strengthening of our trans-Atlantic relations. Clearly, there was going to be more focus on the Middle East than there had been. We could begin to pay more attention to the Western Hemisphere, to economic and energy problems, and to the Third World more generally, including Africa. All of these matters were in Nixon's and Kissinger's eyes as issues that we could pay much more attention to in the second Nixon term. During the first term, attention was focused on problems of relations with the Communist countries, as well as the Vietnam War, which Nixon felt that he had to settle on what he considered an honorable basis. He wanted to free himself up, not only to deal with domestic debate and distractions, but also to pay greater attention to how we were spending our resources on diplomacy more generally throughout the world.

Detente with the Russians had obviously been more urgent because of the danger coming from the global relationship with the Soviet Union, which was the single, most important issue on which we had to move forward. That was moving ahead, with the summit meeting with the Russians, and so on. Of course, there was also the opening of relations with China, which helped President Nixon on all fronts. This was a dramatic development in and of itself. We also had the impact, for the American people, of easing the Vietnam trauma. Clearly, any settlement of the Vietnam War was going to be less than perfect. It had some dangers in it, and we later saw it unravel for a variety of reasons which I have discussed elsewhere.

We were extricating ourselves from Vietnam with, at best, an inconclusive outcome; it certainly wasn't a clear-cut victory in either material or moral terms like what we had at the end of World War II. For the American people this outcome could be put in perspective, because simultaneously with that were these other, major moves toward the Russians but, above all, toward the Chinese. We were now dealing with China, the world's most populous nation and a very important one. It was going to be an even bigger country in the 21st century. With this dramatic, new opening, the American people, whether explicitly or implicitly, could see and recognize that this historic move dwarfed in some ways an inconclusive outcome in Vietnam, a small part of Southeast Asia.

So for all of these reasons we were poised to move ahead with our foreign policy, while

continuing our momentum on other fronts. We could deal with our allies more systematically on all of the other issues that I mentioned. We could tackle a much broader diplomatic agenda.

Well, of course, what none of us knew, and even President Nixon didn't know, as of January 27, 1973, when the Vietnam Agreement was signed, was that the Watergate Affair was going to undermine all of this. So, in addition to all of the tragedies about the Watergate Affair, which we could discuss but which wiser men who were more directly involved in it than I could better discuss, certainly the impact on our foreign policy was momentous. As this issue wore on in 1973 and 1974, and as President Nixon became more and more preoccupied with it, he paid less and less attention to foreign policy. His leverage abroad was reduced as people saw him in trouble. So our momentum in the field of foreign policy slowed down with Russia and China. The North Vietnamese, of course, broke the Vietnam Agreement of January, 1973, and that settlement unraveled.

We still managed to move ahead on certain fronts, and you have to give Kissinger credit for great skill in working against this backdrop of deteriorating executive authority, as a result of the Watergate Affair and Vietnam. Arranging two agreements with the Egyptians and one with the Syrians in the Middle East were real achievements. I was involved in the shuttle diplomacy in connection with negotiating the two Egyptian agreements. We moved ahead on issues like energy. In Southern Africa, we pressed negotiations regarding Rhodesia, and this began to move the continent of Africa toward majority rule. There were other efforts made as well, and I'll talk about this when we discuss the State Department Policy Planning Staff, which I headed, in our next session.

The point is that this effort during the late Nixon and Ford Administrations was essentially a holding action. During this period, from 1974 to the beginning of 1977, which covered the Ford administration, one of Kissinger's greatest contributions was to make sure that our overall foreign policy position did not collapse, despite the negative impact on executive authority as a result of Vietnam, the Watergate Affair, the transition from Nixon to Ford, and a host of new restrictive Congressional actions. There is no question that these great hopes that we had in January, 1973, and for the reasons I mentioned, were damaged seriously by the Watergate episode, above all.

It wasn't just a matter of one President being removed from office and under attack before he was removed which complicated our efforts. Also involved was the fact that Congress began passing all kinds of legislation and getting more and more involved in foreign policy, in reaction to the Watergate affair and the perceived excesses of the Nixon administration. Congressional attitudes also changed in reaction to the Vietnam War. The War Powers Act and the Jackson-Vanik Amendment on trade with Russia were passed. There was a series of legislative initiatives which made it much harder for President Nixon and Kissinger to conduct our foreign policy. There was a Congressional backlash and micro-management of foreign policy setting in. These tendencies greatly complicated our efforts.

I think that I'll save until later the consequences for policy planning, unless you think I should cover this now as part of the discussion of our relations with Russia.

*Q: At a certain point, the difference was really not significant.*

LORD: Even a more modest Soviet nuclear capability would have been a great threat to the United States. Obviously, the Soviet nuclear dimension and their ability to push the envelope internationally was a matter of concern to us. Remember that the Soviet Union had proclaimed the Brezhnev Doctrine in 1968, after the Prague Spring. By the way, this was one thing that really concerned the Chinese. In effect, the Brezhnev Doctrine said that the Russians had the right to determine the domestic system of other, socialist countries. That got the attention of the Chinese, along with the border clashes with the Russians along the Sino-Soviet border on the Ussuri River opposite Manchuria.

So, for all of these reasons we all felt that we had to be firm with the Russians, we had to maintain a strong defense, and we needed to exert some pressure in order to get the Russians' attention, given the way they negotiate and their history. Whether they deployed missiles in Cuba during the Kennedy administration, established a submarine base in Cuba [in Cienfuegos], encouraged radical Arabs, or fooled around with the access routes to Berlin, we felt that we had to react strongly to what we regarded as Soviet provocations.

At the same time, I agreed with the Nixon-Kissinger approach that, in addition to firmness, we had to give the Soviets some incentives to develop a better relationship with us. As long as we made clear that the Soviets couldn't push us around, we also had to make clear that we weren't out to dominate Russia or overthrow their regime and that we were prepared to respect them as a major power. We were prepared to have a more normal relationship with Russia, as far as arms control, trade, and other exchanges were concerned. We were also prepared to negotiate with them on subjects of mutual interest to our two countries. I think that this combination of incentives and pressures reflected our view of the Russians. We thought that they wouldn't be irrational if we gave them an option that would be more attractive. However, we had to be firm so that they wouldn't be tempted toward adventurism.

Kissinger and Nixon came under attack for appearing to be soft on the Soviets. Their view was that we had to have a closely linked position, whether this involved trying to maintain a strong defense and intelligence capability, despite attacks from Congress, whether it involved resisting the Soviets in the many crises that I've mentioned, or whether it was just plain, tough negotiations. This above all, we were not soft. But, beyond that, Kissinger and Nixon felt that an all-out confrontation with the Soviets would, of course, be very dangerous in the nuclear age. It could cause strains with our allies, and could cause some problems domestically. We felt that if we were ever going to have a major confrontation with the Russians, we had to have demonstrated to the American people, the Congress, and other countries around the world that we had tried to be more reasonable and had tried to have a more normal relationship with the Russians. We needed to demonstrate that this confrontation was forced upon us by unrelenting Soviet adventurism, as opposed to our prematurely going into dangerous confrontations. Such confrontations would not only be dangerous; we might not have the necessary allied and domestic support because we had not tried to follow a more flexible approach.

I'm sure that Nixon and Kissinger would argue that they recognized that the Soviets were not all that strong. The Soviets were certainly dangerous, but, over the long haul, we sought to buy time

and wear them down by pursuing a policy of containment of Russia and also seeking better relations with them. Over time, Nixon and Kissinger believed, the Soviet system would collapse or erode, as George Kennan himself had suggested in his famous article in "Foreign Affairs" magazine in the late 1940s. He used the pseudonym of "X" for the article.

By far the most exhaustive rationale for detente and review of the record in U.S.-Soviet relations was provided in the summer of 1974. Together with the experts I worked very hard on what was basically a White Paper, and background for congressional hearings. It was a very eloquent document, but received very little attention because Watergate was coming to a climax.

Nixon and Kissinger felt that Senator Jackson, the neo-conservatives, and others, shared the strategic approach of containing the Russians, which they all agreed upon. But Nixon and Kissinger felt that the tactics of Senator Jackson and others were ill-considered, were overly confrontational, and could provoke a crisis and lose domestic support. They felt that it was necessary to play for the long run by being reasonable as well as firm at the same time. Kissinger felt that Jackson and his staff, e.g., Richard Perle, working with allies like Schlesinger and Rumsfeld, kept undermining our Soviet policy. In one example their attacks on arms control agreements being worked out with the Soviets in Vladivostok in November 1974 sunk them. By the time Kissinger got back to Washington, after visiting China, the debate was lost.

Part of the trouble that Kissinger ran into in the field of foreign affairs during the years of the Ford administration was his underestimation of the desire of our people and Congress to reflect values in our foreign policy. Fairly or unfairly, the American people aren't used to the concept of the balance of power or the European approach to diplomacy anyway, which Kissinger thrived on as an historian, and to this day remains his basic view of the world. The American people and Congress felt that there had to be a human component, that other countries' domestic systems were relevant, and that human rights was a subject to which we had to pay attention. Therefore, Kissinger encountered criticism from the Right that we weren't doing enough to bring about change in the Soviet domestic system of government, even as the Left was saying that we were being too tough in trying to affect Soviet external behavior. The Left too was concerned about human rights. So Kissinger was attacked from both ends of the political spectrum, as I mentioned before, diluting this combination of sticks and carrots. That's why detente ran into considerable trouble.

*Q: You noted that the Watergate Affair sort of cut off our ability really to deal with Hanoi from a position of strength. How did you people regard this situation as it developed? This really intrudes into the work of the NSC and policy planning, but how did you see this?*

LORD: First, it was a process of incremental awareness, just as it was for more or less every American. That was true for Kissinger as well as for myself. He didn't know anything about the Watergate Affair. He really didn't know. For all of us it was a process of becoming incrementally aware of what had happened and of the seriousness of it.

It wasn't even a blip on my radar screen while I was at the NSC. I don't believe that Kissinger was aware of its significance before 1973. Of course, this all began during the 1972 Presidential elections campaign. The stupidity of it is well known, not to mention the fact that by the time the

burglary of the office of the National Democratic Committee occurred, it was clear that President Nixon was going to win reelection by a landslide in any case. So it wasn't necessary. Then, of course, there was the stupidity of the coverup. However, none of us knew anything about all of this up to and through the elections of 1972. I think that there was a minor newspaper article in the "Washington Post" about a burglary in the office of the National Democratic Committee on the day following the break in. However, nobody that I knew drew any conclusions from that. So this was not anything that one even considered at the time.

I left the NSC staff in May, 1973. I certainly didn't leave because of the burglary at Watergate. I wasn't aware that that was going to be a serious problem, even then. I left the NSC staff because I was exhausted. Four years of dealing with Henry Kissinger were exhilarating and terrific, but they were also exhausting, because of the long hours, the pressures, his style of work, and so on. I wanted to see more of my children, who were then quite young. I wanted to see them before they grew up. I wanted to get out and re-charge my intellectual batteries.

So I was getting out of the NSC staff for a variety of reasons. Plus, I felt that we had opened up to China, we had ended the Vietnam War, and we had moved ahead on relations with the Soviets. All of the positive elements were in place, and I thought that it was a very good time for me to leave. In particular, the relations with China were on track, the Vietnam War and negotiations had been concluded. So my two major responsibilities were looking good, as well as our general foreign policy stance.

I always thought that I would be coming back into government service and I also suspected that I would be coming back with Kissinger a few months later. However, as I left government service in May 1973, I was not really aware of the Watergate Affair. I came back to government service in September 1973. I can't vouch for Kissinger's views. I suppose by then that he was beginning to see that this incident and its fallout were beginning to become a problem. However, I only became aware of this gradually. As of the fall of 1973 we didn't think that it was going to become all that serious, as Kissinger was appointed Secretary of State.

Shortly afterwards, and certainly in the course of 1974, it began to become obvious that the situation involved in the Watergate Affair was serious, although I don't have the exact time-line here. The point I'm making is that there was no one day when we realized that we were facing a crisis, as events happened, and some of them were more dramatic than others. There was Butterfield revealing the taping system in President Nixon's office. There were revelations about John Dean [then White House chief of staff], and then the episodes when Haldeman and Ehrlichman of the White House staff were fired. The Congressional hearings progressed. The potential seriousness of the matter became increasingly clear. We began to get the feeling that we were inexorably headed for a terrible ending. I can't place this feeling in terms of any one day. It was just a series of events which made the situation more and more serious.

Similarly, the impact on foreign policy did not take place overnight. There was a gradual draining away of momentum. For example, each trip to China after 1973 became less productive, until there was a very chilly summit meeting with President Ford in 1975, as I mentioned. Relations with the Soviet Union were slowing down. There was more restraint on what we were trying to do with the Soviets, both 'sticks' and 'carrots'. Congress was counter-attacking with

legislation, restrictions, and hearings. The North Vietnamese were unraveling the Paris Agreement of 1973, in part seeing the weakness of the President and the mood of Congress. Not all of this was a result of the Watergate Affair but was a combination of the weakness of the Presidency or the fact that President Nixon might actually be leaving office. Then the entry into office of Ford as an interim President meant that things were increasingly slowing down and unraveling.

So Kissinger emerged as the one person sort of holding things together. He was controversial even then, of course. The issue of wiretapping came up, as well as other things which people didn't like about him. However, some people forget that he was generally considered the most admired man in America. He appeared on magazine covers as 'Superman'. He was the one person that people thought that they could trust or who had stature, in addition to the fact that he was untainted by the Watergate Affair itself, except for the peripheral dimension of wiretapping. Kissinger was also the one American official respected abroad. So I think that was one of his more heroic accomplishments, holding our foreign policy together despite the weakness of the executive branch.

*Q: Can you explain the background of this practice?*

LORD: Basically, what happened was the following. There was a series of leaks on sensitive matters, early in the Nixon administration, in 1969 and then in 1970. One particular leak which triggered a strong reaction from President Nixon and his colleagues, including Kissinger, was the revelation in the "New York Times," by a journalist called Bill Beecher of the secret bombing in Cambodia of Vietnamese communist enclaves. These Vietnamese communist troops were coming across the border into South Vietnam, attacking our troops, and then going back to sanctuaries in Cambodia. I didn't know about the bombing until I became Kissinger's special assistant in February 1970.

I felt that the bombing was legitimate, in the sense that these Vietnamese communist troops were violating Cambodian soil and penetrating into South Vietnam. Our bombing was confined to Vietnamese concentrations near the border. They were designed to lessen our casualties. We talked about this and the effect it might have on the level of American casualties. However, the issue was that it was secret from the American people and almost all of Congress, and that we were bombing targets in another country, even if it was justified.

Prince Sihanouk acquiesced in this practice, as long as it was secret. The argument for keeping it secret was that Sihanouk would never agree to it if it was made public. He could not say: "Yes, go ahead and bomb my country". But he didn't want the North Vietnamese threatening his control of Cambodia. He recognized that the Vietnamese communists had invaded his country, that he couldn't do anything about this, and therefore he had no problem with our beating the hell out of the Vietnamese communists along the border, as long as it was secret. So that's why it was secret. It wasn't frivolous to keep it secret.

Nevertheless, Congress, the American people, and the press were very upset when they learned that we had been bombing targets in another country, whether or not it was justified, and without the American people knowing about it. Anyway, that particular leak drew the attention of

President Nixon and his associates. Later on, the Pentagon Papers were leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, and that also fed this paranoia. This contributed to the atmosphere in which the Watergate Affair developed, in addition to the wiretapping.

A key point about the Nixon/Kissinger strong reaction to the leak of the Pentagon Papers. I fully shared their view that this was unpardonable. Whatever one's views, you don't leak a huge amount of classified material. Moreover, all the study and embarrassing revelations were about the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. So Nixon and Kissinger were defending not against personal embarrassments for their Administration but the general principle of conducting government for future presidents. In addition, this was in June 1971, a few weeks after we had made our major, secret proposal to North Vietnam to try and end the war, and a few weeks before Kissinger's secret trip to China. Obviously the domestic uproar over the Pentagon Papers did not give Hanoi an incentive to respond positively, through this was not the decisive factor. Moreover, we were secretly trying to open up with China. The Chinese - and other governments - would have little confidence that the U.S. government could keep secrets.

I believe that some time in the spring of 1970 wiretaps were put on the phones of about a dozen people, including several of us on the NSC staff and a couple of journalists. I don't have a complete list of the people whose phones were being wiretapped. There were about a dozen. Now, why were we picked? Because these were national security leaks, involving Vietnam and Cambodia, and there may have been other aspects. Nixon and Kissinger felt that these leaks could really undermine our foreign policy. We had secret negotiations under way with North Vietnam, we had secret negotiations on the opening to China, and secret dealings to a certain extent with the Soviets. If all of these matters were leaked to the public, it would inhibit our efforts to conduct relations with those countries. It would also tell the Chinese and the others that we couldn't be trusted to keep secrets, and this would complicate everything.

There was also the general principle that if you work for the government, you don't leak secret, sensitive information. If you disagree with a given policy, you can either stay in office and work to try to change the policy from the inside, keep debating, but loyally carry out the policy while you continue to serve. You don't leak information to destroy that policy. Or you can resign as a matter of principle and then try to protest and change the policy from the outside. What you should not do, and I feel strongly about this myself, is to try to undermine a policy with which you disagree by leaking sensitive information, for example, to the press or to Congress. I never leaked sensitive information in my life. I had plenty of criticism of policy and wrote and spoke to Kissinger and others about them. But I believed that if you lost the argument, you either carry out the policy or quit. You don't sabotage it by leaking.

Of course, we all give background press briefings and say things authorized around the edges, but in terms of actually leaking classified material to unauthorized persons, I've never done that.

So there was general concern, some of which I understood, by the way, about what these leaks were doing to our foreign policy as well as to the basic principles under which it operates. As a result, President Nixon ordered the wiretaps, and Kissinger did not resist. The President and Kissinger were also told by Attorney General John Mitchell that these wiretaps were legal, which they were. So Kissinger went along with them.

The reason that some other members of the NSC staff and I were chosen to have their phones tapped was that some of the information which had leaked had been so tightly held that only a few people knew about it. Therefore, the phones of those who might be suspected of having the ability to learn about the information which leaked were tapped. In my case I had access to just about every conceivable secret in the field of foreign policy that we had. I was Kissinger's right hand man and was in the middle of many secret negotiations on various fronts. I was one of the few people who could have been suspected of leaking this material. In addition, Secretary Kissinger's staff was suspected by Nixon and his people of being liberal Democrats from, God forbid, the State Department and academia, and were considered to be rather suspicious. In fact, we were quite moderate and liberal, compared to the people on the domestic side of the Nixon White House.

*Q: I assume that you are talking about Ehrlichman, Haldeman, and people like that.*

LORD: That's right. So there was that general suspicion of us as well. Of course, Kissinger justified the wire taps on the ground that he was truly concerned about leaks. He thought that leaks were outrageous in principle, were also hurting our foreign policy, and were jeopardizing ongoing negotiations with the Chinese, the Vietnamese, and others. Secondly, Kissinger couldn't say to Nixon: "How dare you suspect my staff. Just wiretap other people. Don't tap my people." In fairness, we were the ones who had the information, and he couldn't be selective about the persons whose phones should be tapped. He already felt sensitive because President Nixon felt that Kissinger's staff was overly liberal anyway.

Furthermore, Kissinger would argue that he had been assured that it was legal to engage in wiretapping, which it was, however uncomfortable one might feel about tapping someone with whom you were working every day. So that was his defense.

I didn't know anything about the wiretapping, but I will say this. Even though I didn't know anything about it, I had suspicions, which I didn't really believe, that might be going on. I had a couple of reasons for this. My phone had some funny clicks on it at times.

*Q: Well, did any of your colleagues quit because of this?*

LORD: I don't believe that anybody quit because of wiretapping. Several people, including Tony Lake, Mort Halperin, Roger Morris, and Bill Watts had already left Kissinger's staff long before this story broke. A couple of other people like Joe Kraft, a journalist, were wiretapped. God knows why they wiretapped a journalist. So I don't believe that anyone quit because of the wiretapping. Either they had already left or, like Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who was also wiretapped, they had the same kind of reaction that I did. That is, the practice was stupid and basically wrong. But it was not something to resign over for the reasons I mentioned.

I can see why people would say that this is a ridiculously soft position. They might say that I should have been so outraged that I should have resigned. I was leaving government service anyway, so I didn't face that choice. To be honest with you, I don't think that I would have left my job because of the wiretapping. However, I was leaving government service anyway, so this

issue didn't arise. Of course, I went back to work for Kissinger a few months later, so I obviously wasn't outraged.

One amusing thing that I will say is that there were times when the FBI was listening in on my phone, and my wife was talking. She would often talk to her mother in New Jersey. They would go on at great length in Chinese, which used to drive the wiretappers listening in on this crazy. My wife is not a great one to talk about recipes, but there were times when they were literally talking about Chinese recipes. Here was the U.S. Government, in this case, the FBI, learning about Chinese recipes in Chinese!

*Q: We can get to it, but could you give us the background to how the role of Policy Planning was conceived of when you entered this office, and how it changed?*

LORD: Let me cover quickly how I got from the NSC [National Security Council] staff to the Policy Planning Staff.

Early in 1973 I decided that I wanted to take a break from government service. I had worked hard for many years, and specifically as Kissinger's Special Assistant in the NSC. This involved a lot of traveling and very long hours. I wanted to see more of my children, as they grew up. I wanted to take a break and recharge my batteries, as it were, both intellectually and physically. So early in 1973 I indicated to Kissinger that I would be leaving the NSC staff. However, I also felt that this was a good time in terms of where we stood on the issues I had been working on. As of the beginning of the second Nixon administration, and remember that this was before the Watergate scandal really broke upon us, we had ended the Vietnam War and we'd gone to Hanoi in February of 1973, to try to further the normalization of relations with North Vietnam. We'd opened up relations with China, including arranging for the trip by President Nixon, his trip, and later ones. We were on a path in terms of relations with China that was brand new. We were making significant progress with the Soviets. I had also gone to Moscow for that summit meeting. That situation seemed to be going well. Therefore, on the issues on which I had been working most fully, I felt that we had made important breakthroughs. In the case of Vietnam the future seemed to be uncertain, but I felt that we had done all that we could do for the time being. So this was a logical time to leave government service, both in terms of substance, as well as for personal reasons.

In May 1973, just as I was about to leave government service, I learned for the first time that my phone had been wiretapped. We've covered that. Let us go over it again, knowing there will be repetition.

One day in early May, 1973, shortly before I was to leave, Kissinger called me into his office and told me that on the next day it would be revealed in the "New York Times" that there had been a wiretapping operation under way, involving the home phones of about a dozen members of the NSC staff, the Defense Department, and a couple of journalists. I was one of those whose phone had been tapped.

Kissinger gave the following explanation of this matter on this and other occasions. First, he assured me that it was entirely legal and that the administration had carefully gone over this

process with the Attorney General and others. Secondly, there had been very damaging leaks to the press, for example concerning the secret bombing of Cambodia, as well as other, national security issues. These leaks had been very damaging to our foreign policy and jeopardized our opening to China and other initiatives, in the view of Kissinger and of President Nixon. Thirdly, a lot of these leaks could only have come from people who had access to sensitive information, including members of the NSC staff. Fourthly, Kissinger said that he was absolutely confident in my own loyalty and that I hadn't been involved in the leaking of information. He made it clear that the wiretapping was no reflection on me. Fifthly, he said that, as National Security Adviser, he could not tell the President, the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation], and others that his staff should be exempt from wiretapping. If they were going to pursue the wiretapping, since some of the people around Kissinger had access to this sensitive information and were fairly liberal in political outlook, anyway, it would have to include some of the members of the NSC staff, who had access to the kind of information that was leaked. He said that, therefore, this was a form of protection to some of the members of the NSC staff to show that we were innocent of leaking information.

To be honest about it, my own reaction to this information was not one of total outrage and was quite moderate. However, I can understand why others might feel that I should have been more outraged. My view was the following. First of all, this was a very stupid thing to do. If the President and Kissinger were worried about leaks, they were not going to find out about this over wiretapped phones because people who were going to leak sensitive information to journalists would probably go into some quiet restaurant, sit in a corner, and whisper in their ear. They were not going to leak information over the telephone. So I thought that this was a clumsy, as well as obviously somewhat unattractive way of proceeding. I recognized and felt strongly myself that the ongoing leaks were damaging to national security. One can certainly make the case that the Nixon and Kissinger apparatus was much too secretive. We saw the excesses during the Watergate Affair and elsewhere. However, if you're trying to conduct secret openings to China and secret negotiations with Vietnam and other things, one could argue that security was clearly jeopardized by leaks and by giving people in other countries a sense that we can't maintain discipline and security.

So I understood the problem and the rationale. Also, if you were going to wiretap, you had to include the NSC staff, including me, because I was one of the few people who had access to all of this information. The Russians, the Chinese, and the Vietnamese experts, for example, would know everything going on in their area. But I, along with Kissinger and Haig, was one of the few people who had access to all of the areas. I understood the rationale. I still thought that it was stupid, but I did not feel outraged, either in terms of my personal conduct toward Kissinger or my public comments. As I say, I could understand that people would have different views on such matters. To this day, I think that it was not the way to go about trying to find out about leaks.

*Q: Just a further detail, from an historical point of view. Has it come out, or is the suspicion well founded, involving some person or persons over the years?*

LORD: Over the leaks?

*Q: Yes.*

LORD: No. It has never been determined, any more than we know who was Deep Throat in connection with the Watergate Affair. No, the answer is that this operation, which proved to be very damaging to Kissinger politically and personally, as well as embarrassing to the Nixon administration generally, also didn't turn up anything. Indeed, there were even some absurd and amusing overtones. For example, when they tapped my phone, I don't really know, but I assume that the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] people who listened in must have gotten excited when my wife was talking in Chinese to her mother. However, this turned out to be a conversation about Chinese recipes. Their telephone conversations were not of a sensitive nature.

I had some suspicions, even before I knew I had been wiretapped. I remember occasionally hearing funny sounds on my phone. Obviously, I knew that there had been damaging leaks, and I knew that they involved some issues that very few people knew about. And I was among those who knew about them. So we even used to joke about this, at times, wondering about who was listening in on our conversations, never really thinking that it was really happening.

My strong belief is that if you're working for the government and have a problem with the established policy, you debate it internally within the government. If you lose the debate, you carry the policy out faithfully, and you don't leak the issue in an effort to try to damage the policy. If the policy is of such overwhelming moral and political importance that you think it's of fundamental significance, you resign. We discussed this in the context of the Cambodian incursion of 1970. I don't believe in leaks. Now, there's a thin line between leaking and backgrounding. Backgrounding is at least authorized by higher authority in an effort to build support for a policy or try to explain it in a deniable fashion to influence the national debate. That's different from what a more junior person does when he goes out on his or her own responsibility, leaking information in an effort to damage the established or proposed policy.

So, I want to make clear that I was leaving government service shortly after that anyway, after a couple of months of consideration. I didn't leave because of the wiretapping. In retrospect, I should have stayed absolutely mum publicly, in terms of media inquiries. I remember that I appeared on TV once or twice under great pressure from the media to say something. I made a nuanced response to the questions. Nevertheless, I expressed more tolerance for what had happened than I should have. In retrospect, I wish I had said nothing. It would be hypocritical to criticize the tapping for the reasons which I have just mentioned. However, I should not have expressed myself publicly in any way, although it was only one or two interviews indicating that I wasn't really upset. I should have been absolutely silent in public, rather than expressing partial understanding of what had been done. So I'm not particularly proud of what I did.

I've explained why I was leaving government service. Kissinger was obviously very sorry to see me leave, in view of our personal relationship and our having worked closely together on so many of these issues. He had great respect for my work. However, he understood why I was leaving. The President also greatly valued my work, especially on China and Vietnam. He wrote several nice letters to this effect.

Around June 1973, my wife and I took a trip to Portugal. I took things easy at home and spent

time with my wife and children. I began thinking about what I had been through. I didn't have any master plan as to what I would do next. I went out to the Aspen Institute [in Colorado], where I gave a couple of talks on China. It was August, I believe. I was about to have a week's vacation and also engage in an intellectual seminar on great books, when I got a phone call from Kissinger. He asked me to come to California to talk to him because he was about to become Secretary of State and, in fact, wanted me back on his team. I had my usual, ambivalent reaction because I was looking forward to a little bit longer break from government service. On the other hand, I had been out of government for three months. I was excited about returning to the State Department but also sort of wished that this invitation to return to work hadn't been extended so relatively quickly.

So I went out to California. I remember that Brent Scowcroft was there, as well as Larry Eagleburger. I believe that I met Kissinger at San Clemente, where President Nixon went when he went to California. Kissinger told me that he wanted me to become the Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department. I accepted. We all began talking about the coming challenges.

During this period I was out of the service, I hadn't missed too much in the field of foreign policy. There were no China trips, so I didn't miss any of them. Kissinger had planned to go to China during the summer of 1973, but that trip had been postponed. At the time I returned to working for the government, Kissinger was trying to work out a settlement in Cambodia, with the help of the Chinese. Previous work on a settlement had started to fall apart. In any event I didn't miss a trip to China or Russia with Kissinger. The Year of Europe Initiative was launched by the Nixon administration with a speech by Kissinger. He said that it was high time to pay attention to our European allies, given the changing outline of the world and the challenges facing all of us. We had dealt so much with Russia, China, and Vietnam during the first Nixon term. That European initiative didn't get off to a very good start, but the launching of this program took place while I was out of government.

The Vietnam Peace Agreement was beginning to unravel, as Hanoi began to probe and violate the cease-fire. Kissinger had an unsatisfactory meeting with the North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho in Paris to try and tighten up the implementation of the agreement. Meanwhile, the Watergate issue was picking up steam, though its full dimensions were certainly not yet clear.

It was in September, 1973, when Kissinger went through his confirmation hearings before the Senate. We helped him get ready for those hearings. He was closely questioned on the wiretapping and other controversial issues. He got through that, and then there was a very emotional swearing in of Kissinger as Secretary of State, at the White House. His parents, quite elderly already, were present. His mother held the Bible when he took the oath of office. It was quite a moving experience to have an immigrant become Secretary of State for the first time. A lot of people attending the ceremony were moved to tears. You might think that the person first moved to tears would be Kissinger's mother. She had escaped from the Nazi tyranny in Germany, and her son was becoming Secretary of State. We asked her afterwards: "Everyone else was crying. Why weren't you?" She said: "Well, my son absolutely forbade me to cry. He told me that it was not allowed in any way."

*Q: Well, Sisco had been an FSO, but he never served abroad.*

LORD: That's right. Many people thought of him as an FSO. Roy Atherton worked on Middle Eastern affairs. Tom Enders specialized in economic and Latin American affairs and tragically died a few years ago. There was also Arthur Hartman for Europe. These are some of the best Foreign Service officers. I realize that I'm leaving a lot of very capable people out. I believe that in almost every case, at least as far as I can remember, the Assistant Secretaries were FSOs. Some of the Undersecretaries were also FSOs. As I said, Larry Eagleburger and I had also been FSOs.

So Kissinger would have people on the Seventh Floor who were close to him, but they worked very closely with the FSOs. For example, in my case with regard to China, specifically, I worked very closely with Phil Habib, and then Art Hummel, Habib's successor as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. Regarding Middle Eastern affairs, Hal Saunders worked very closely with Roy Atherton, as well as Joe Sisco. On European and Russian affairs, Sonnenfeldt and Bill Hyland worked very closely with Arthur Hartman. The Assistant Secretaries and the FSOs had very broad access to information and were as much involved as any of us who sat on the Seventh Floor. So there was a very nice mix of FSOs and other people that Kissinger had brought over from the NSC. For these FSOs, of course, this was very exhilarating and exciting.

Probably, when you got to the level of Deputy Assistant Secretary, the morale situation was the same, most of them being closely involved in policies/all of them FSOs. I think that there was still some resentment, say, at the Country Director level and below that they were not so directly involved. Kissinger believed in not having very large meetings. If he was discussing particularly sensitive issues, he often would have only the relevant Assistant Secretary there. So the regional bureaus were clearly involved; it was not just Kissinger's insiders that attended these meetings. But he would also notice if a Country Director or below were sitting in on these meetings. He was always worried about leaks and sensitivities. I remember arguing with him about this to no avail. Others also talked to him about this issue, saying that this was not the way to do business. The Assistant Secretary would have to rely on his or her Country Director who would have more detailed knowledge of a particular nation or issue. The Kissinger arrangement was bad for morale to a certain extent. And it was not particularly efficient. Just to take a specific example. If you're meeting with the Foreign Minister of a given country, and the Assistant Secretary is the only person from the regional bureau attending it, the Assistant Secretary has to take the notes and prepare the memorandum of conversation. So it's a waste of senior people's time. It's good for the Country Director or below to take that burden away and also to be kept fully informed and have 'face' with his foreign counterparts. Attendance at some of these meetings would be on an individual, need to know basis, if there was a particular need.

At my regular staff meetings with about 25 officers assigned to S/P, which I thought were important as a management tool and were good for morale purposes, I would review what happened at the meetings with Secretary Kissinger and what was happening in the Department more generally. I felt that individuals should know more about what was going on with our foreign policy and on the Seventh Floor, and not just in his or her area of responsibility. On sensitive matters I would brief those officers on my staff most directly involved. However, I never let Kissinger know how much I was telling all of my people. I needed their help, I needed

their thinking. This, in turn, helped Kissinger and the national interest. I wanted to promote good morale. I also told them that, because of the sensitivity of some of the subjects, I counted on their discretion.

*Q: How did Secretary Kissinger respond to economic issues?*

LORD: He developed a better understanding of them. There were a lot of jokes about how little attention he paid to economic affairs. At the NSC, you could talk to Bob Hormats and Fred Bergsten, both of whom worked there; they would say that Kissinger didn't spend a great deal of time on economic matters. At State, however, he began to understand the importance of economic issues and began to get more on top of them. He realized this clearly on the energy issue and at the G7 Summit Meetings. He had great respect for Tom Enders, Chuck Robinson, and Bill Rogers, Undersecretaries of State for Economics. Not only was Enders brilliant and creative and gave Kissinger a lot of substantive ideas, but he was a tough person who would argue back with Kissinger and often on turf that Tom was more familiar with than Henry was. Kissinger began to be more familiar with economic issues and realized more and more how important they were. Of course, it's a cliché now in the 1990s to say how important economics is, but even in the 1970s economic issues were important. However, during the Cold War, the balance of power was so important, and the economy was much less globalized than it is now, in terms of our dependence on exports and foreign investment. Now there is also the impact of the Internet on economic affairs. Back in the early 1970s you could make the point that political and security matters were more important than economic problems, while you can make the case now that economics have risen to the top of the agenda.

Actually, I can't think of a weak bureau in the State Department of that time. All of them performed well at least on some issues. For example, in Africa we made major strides on Rhodesia and reached a settlement there. Henry Kissinger's speech at Lusaka reflected a change in our policy. That speech received widespread approval. I think that S/P gave great help there, given the geopolitical dimension. On Asia he had good support on China, for example, from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and myself. In dealing with the Russians he had good support from the Bureau of European Affairs.

I'm not trying to be popular by not criticizing anybody, but I think that, on the whole, since Kissinger picked good people, in general he had pretty good support.

*Q: Jomo Kenyatta.*

LORD: Jomo Kenyatta, of course. All of this was quite dramatic, and I sat in on all of these meetings during Kissinger's trip to Africa. This was coming to a head during the presidential primaries in 1976 when Ronald Reagan was challenging President Ford. I find this hard to believe but, apparently, southern African diplomacy and the push for majority rule in Rhodesia, as well as black rights and majority rule, were considered significant issues in places like Texas and other states in the southern part of the United States. You wouldn't think that the people in those states would be that concerned about such matters. It just shows you how far we've come in our society since then.

President Ford lost a closely contested primary election in Texas in 1976 and, I believe, some other primary elections in other southern states. The outcome was close enough so that Kissinger's diplomacy in southern Africa might have made the difference. To Ford's credit, and Kissinger makes that point in his book, Ford never once mentioned or tried to rein in Kissinger on what he was doing in Africa regarding majority rule and black rights, even though Ford knew that it would hurt him politically vis-à-vis the Right Wing of the Republican Party and Ronald Reagan, especially in the southern primaries.

I remember specifically that we were traveling in Africa during the presidential primary campaign in Texas. I think that we arrived in Ivory Coast at the time, got off the plane, and were greeted by the press. President Ford had just lost the primary election to Reagan in Texas. The press representatives began to sing to Kissinger, "The eyes of Texas are upon you." I want to give President Ford his due. I don't want to be too negative.

To get back to Kissinger's role at this time. It's hard to remember now, but everyone knew that Kissinger, despite the wire tapping and some of the other elements at the time, was completely removed from the Watergate Affair and that he had nothing to do with that. Everyone realized the major contributions Kissinger had made and everyone was looking for someone to trust during this period. Already, of course, particularly on the liberal side, there was some angst [concern] about Kissinger. And some of the conservatives felt that he wasn't tough enough on the ideological and human rights front. However, on the whole, he was the most respected and popular man in America. He was on countless magazine covers. Equally important, of course, was that many people respected him overseas. Those who depended on American credibility and steadiness saw in Kissinger continuity from the Nixon into the Ford era. They saw someone who was able to carry on, despite the fallout from the Watergate Affair and from the Vietnam War, as well as the growing Congressional ascendancy in foreign policy, in addition to all of the other problems that I have mentioned. So Kissinger's holding this country together by virtue of his personality and prestige, making sure that our foreign policy didn't fall apart, was very important, in addition to his other accomplishments.

In addition to some of the Middle Eastern shuttle diplomacy trips and attention to some of these new issues which I have mentioned, as well as a host of other issues where we either prevented damage or even made progress, I think that Kissinger's general role of promoting trust and holding things together cannot be underestimated. Kissinger faced all of the problems that I have mentioned and managed to keep our foreign policy going.

Some people say that Kissinger was one of our greatest Secretaries of State. I think that is the wrong question because you have to look at Kissinger's contributions both in terms of his White House years as National Security Adviser and his years as Secretary of State. By the time Kissinger was Secretary of State, the Watergate Affair and other issues very quickly overtook us. I think that these issues constrained Kissinger, even though he made major contributions in the Middle East and elsewhere. I think that you have to look at his overall contributions during both the White House and State Department years. After all, it was while he was National Security Adviser that we opened to China, advanced 'détente' with the Soviet Union, and ended the Vietnam War. In that sense I think that Kissinger was surely one of our greatest diplomats. However, just as Secretary of State alone, I'm not sure that you can make as convincing a case in

terms of his actual accomplishments. Even as Secretary of State I think that his record was outstanding because of his more general role, which I've mentioned, of holding things together, as well as progress on issues like the Middle East.

There was no question that we slowed down in terms of developing relations with China in 1975 and 1976. President Ford was worried about the challenge from Governor Ronald Reagan and didn't want to take on the Taiwan issue. In turn, China was going through its own transition, with Zhou En-lai and Mao Zedong sick, and then dying in 1976, and the struggle between the pragmatists like Deng Xiaoping, versus the Gang of Four, led by Mao's wife. Détente with the Soviet Union was under assault from the conservatives or neo-conservatives like Senator Henry Jackson [Democrat, Washington state] and others who gave priority to Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union to Israel as one of the conditions for extending MFN [Most Favored Nation] treatment to Soviet products imported into the United States. These conservatives also opposed arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and thus were taking away some of the carrots we had proffered to the Soviets.

At the same time the liberals in Congress and the Left were hurting our Soviet policy by cutting our defense budget and making us less robust and less of a threat to the Soviets. So the sticks and carrots we had intended to use with the Soviets were under attack. There was also the feeling that we had not been tough enough with the Russians in the field of human rights.

So our détente policy with the Soviets was running out of steam. Our China policy was also running out of steam. The Vietnam settlement of 1973 was unraveling. You could argue whether the agreement with Vietnam was realistic and good enough. I've already explained that it seemed to us that it was the best we could get. You could also argue how much of this deterioration was due to the growth of Congressional authority and lack of trust in the Executive Branch. However, the fact that Hanoi didn't have to fear American retaliation because Congress sharply cut and then virtually eliminated both military and economic aid to South Vietnam and opposed any bombing in response to Hanoi's violations of the 1973 agreement were also major factors. Indeed, Kissinger cites Watergate as single-handedly undermining the Paris Agreement, encouraging Hanoi to attack the South without fear of American retaliation because of the weakened Presidency. I agree that Watergate was a major factor but the American people and Congress had lost staying power on Vietnam, with or without Watergate.

This was a very difficult period for Kissinger. I think that you have to recognize that he was a major figure and influence holding us together during this very difficult period. I think that was Kissinger's greatest, single contribution to American foreign policy during his service as Secretary of State.

Of course, there were also individual achievements, particularly in the Middle East and Southern Africa, during that time, for which Kissinger deserves great credit as well.

*Q: There may be nuances here. Did you find that? Mark Palmer was looking at people, rather than power.*

LORD: There would be some elements there which we tried to introduce. Sometimes, Kissinger

would accept them and sometimes not. However, I don't want to pretend that this was a major, philosophical debate, at least on the surface. Nevertheless, the debate took place around specific issues. It would reflect itself and, perhaps, either one of the bureaus or the policy planning staff would pay more attention to values, democracy, and human rights than Kissinger normally would. He might accept some aspects of this and not other aspects. Kissinger did address this issue of values and interests, pragmatism and moralism head-on in his Minneapolis speech. He would always grant a role for values in our policies.

I don't think that it would be right to say that Kissinger was pessimistic, but he was aware of limits. Part of that was accentuated, of course, by the erosion of executive authority because of the Watergate Affair and the fallout from the Vietnam War and the expansion of the role of Congress in the field of foreign policy. There were cuts in our defense budget, and we also found ourselves unable to make concessions, either. So that perhaps also gave him a greater sense of what we might accomplish. You should remember that, as Kissinger came into office, he already felt philosophically, before the impact of the Watergate Affair and the full impact of the Vietnam War, although it had already had some impact, that America could not forever be the sole leader of the Free World, so to speak. Already there was some danger that the American people would become fatigued over this role. A tendency in this direction had already started to become noticeable in the late 1960s, and this role had already gone on for two decades. People had become fatigued at the burdens, financially and in other aspects, e.g. psychologically. We were heavily engaged and trying to do everything, virtually everywhere.

So, as I said in earlier interviews, Kissinger stressed the need for our allies to do more. There was the whole Nixon Doctrine and the tendency to look to other countries to provide combat troops. We would provide the nuclear umbrella, foreign aid, and military assistance to support this effort. There was a general feeling in the United States that Japan and Western Europe were becoming stronger and that they should pick up more of the burden of the Western partnership. So these were constant themes, even before the Watergate Affair and the Vietnam War. I think that Kissinger clearly felt that America had to be the leader. However, domestically and for equity reasons he felt that we should look to our allies to assume more of the burden, in the emerging, multi-polar world.

President Nixon himself gave a speech in Kansas City in the early 1970's, in which he said that five centers of power were emerging, and this was 25 years ago. He said that these centers consisted of Western Europe, Japan, China, Russia, and the United States. He said that we were beginning to move from a bipolar to a multipolar world. I don't think that you could call this pessimism; it was a realistic analysis that the American people and Congress, even before the Vietnam War and the Watergate Affair, but certainly afterwards, were not prepared to do everything in the world. And now that Europe and Japan had become strong, they should shoulder more responsibilities. This in time would encourage the American people and Congress to continue to do our share.

That's also one of the reasons why he felt that it was important to open up to China and try to achieve more diplomatic flexibility, so that we could also meet these challenges in a more sophisticated way.

*Q: You refer to trips. The Policy Planning Staff would not seem to have been a trip-oriented organization.*

LORD: No, and it shouldn't be, in my opinion. That kind of activity leads to one becoming operationally oriented. Now, having said that, I was told that I could go on any trip that I wanted to make. Partly, these trips were fun and exciting. The trips with Secretary Kissinger were also very important. And they gave me policy impact, partly because they provided me with access to Secretary Kissinger himself and to his staff and reinforced my own reputation to others as a close associate.

On the other hand, we had a huge agenda and a lot of work to do in Washington. Basically, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff was not in an operational position, and our role was to look ahead, in my view. So, therefore, I tried to strike a balance. I think that some of my successors went on too many trips, while some went on too few. I think it's useful to go on a few trips, to get a sense of the Secretary of State's thinking and to maintain your personal relationship and access to him, as well as to demonstrate to people in the State Department that you're one of the key players in the building. All of these things are not insignificant. I probably went on about half of Secretary Kissinger's trips.

I of course went on all of his trips to China, in view of the fact that this was my key specific portfolio item. He made several trips to China when he was Secretary of State. I also went on some of the trips to the Soviet Union, because they were important. I went on some trips that were multi-faceted. I remember one trip when we went to Eastern Europe and the Middle East, ending up in Rome at the World Food Conference. I went on both Egyptian shuttle diplomacy trips, but thankfully I missed the trip to Syria, which was by far the longest. Kissinger made three agreements on the Middle East, and I was involved in making two of them. Having said that, I should add that I was clearly in a supporting role. On the China trips I was the leading staff person, together with a representative from the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs and with Dick Solomon from the White House NSC [National Security Council] staff. On these trips to East Asia I worked with Phil Habib or Art Hummel or Bill Gleysteen, from the bureau, as well as Dick Solomon from the NSC staff. Obviously, I remained the key China person.

On a Russian trip I would be in a supporting role with Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Bill Hyland, and Arthur Hartman. On a Middle East trip I played a supporting role with Phil Habib, Joe Sisco, Roy Atherton, and Hal Saunders. However, I could provide some perspective to the other people making these trips. I could remind Secretary Kissinger of what the impact would be on other issues. I could be a good spear carrier and, since I knew enough about the issues, I could help draft memoranda and telegrams on some of these matters, if they needed help, although they usually didn't, in most cases. I would sit in on all of the meetings. Because Kissinger was a traveling Secretary of State, he was in constant touch with Washington, in addition to what he was doing on a given trip. Lengthy cables were going back and forth on other matters. These cables would be from Kissinger's Deputy, from Larry Eagleburger [his Special Assistant], and so on. These people would be taking care of business back in Washington, and some of these matters involved questions that I was concerned with. In this sense Kissinger could use me as a kind of utility infielder.

I went on some of these trips for the reasons I have mentioned but not on all of them. It would have been a mistake if I had done so.

*Q: Regarding the China trips, you say that you were a lead player. What does that mean?*

LORD: Well, I was a lead player on China throughout this period. I don't want to say that I was the only specialist on China. Others from State and the NSC played crucial roles, with deep background, and we always worked very well together. However, I was the person whom Kissinger took to the meeting between President Nixon and Mao Zedong, because I had been in charge of preparing the briefing books for Nixon. Indeed, I went to all - five - meetings with Mao as well as all meetings, hundreds of hours, with and Zhou and Deng Xiaoping. I want to make it absolutely clear that John Holdridge played an absolutely central role. He knew a lot more about China than I did. During Kissinger's State Department years the Bureau of East Asian Affairs did a good part of the hard work and provided the expertise, in addition to the work done by Phil Habib and Art Hummel [Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs], as well as Dick Solomon, who was very helpful in the NSC in the White House. However, the fact is I was involved in the effort to improve relations with China from the beginning. I was very careful always to keep the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs fully informed, e.g. there were times when Kissinger wanted me to meet with the Chinese Ambassador. So basically, the way it worked out, there would be a memorandum for Kissinger's China trip and what he sought to accomplish. This would be a joint memo from me, as Director of the Policy Planning Staff, and the Assistant Secretary of East Asian Affairs, which we would agree on. The memo would also probably make it clear that it also was approved by the NSC [National Security Council] because at this time Kissinger was both National Security Adviser as well as Secretary of State. Indeed, we worked jointly with Solomon of the NSC on these issues. It was interesting to see that the memo would show that Kissinger, or later on his successor as National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft, was in full agreement, as was Dick Solomon, from the NSC staff. So this kind of memo on China was very collaborative between the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, the NSC staff at the White House, and myself as Director of Policy Planning. I think that it would be fair to say that, by virtue of our personal relationships and my role over the years on China, I was still the person, above all, whom Kissinger looked to on China, but this was a collective operation. China was the one area where I remained operational for the reasons I mentioned. I wouldn't try to be operational on other areas.

Even in the case of China, the heavy lifting in the sense of actual drafting of the basic papers was done by officers in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs and the White House, NSC staff. I would help to draft, or actually do the drafting, on some of the strategy and conceptual approach involved. I would also go over all of the documents involved. However, if Kissinger wanted one person at a meeting with Mao Zedong, Zhou En-lai, or Deng Xiaoping, it would be me. Unlike during the NSC days, when the State Department was often cut out of the operation, the Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs was usually included, which was good. The result was that it was a much more comfortable and collaborative effort. It was a more comfortable situation, unlike Kissinger's White House years, when we knew that we were cutting out our State Department colleagues. Kissinger was now Secretary of State, and he believed that the State Department should be at the center of the operation.

The major trips that I recall therefore included the China trips, sometimes paired with other stops. We also went to Japan on many occasions. Kissinger knew that the opening to China was a shock to Japan. During Kissinger's term as Secretary of State he paid a lot of attention to US relations with Japan. He met with successive Japanese Foreign Ministers. We're talking about the situation 25 years ago. Now such meetings are more or less taken for granted. In a bilateral sense Kissinger met with Japanese Foreign Ministers about ten times in just about two years. Now, of course, there is an opportunity to do this, not only at the UN General Assembly, but at regional security or economic meetings, which provide the venue for meeting with the Japanese.

*Q: I would have thought that dealing with Japan was a little bit like dealing with Italy. That is, governments keep changing and there is a collaborative form of government. So it's really hard to go and talk to someone who is going to be able to do anything.*

LORD: That is a very perceptive comment. I may have made this point earlier on in this interview, but one reason we had a secret approach to the Chinese was due to the sensitivity of the issues with China and Russia, and even Vietnam, during Kissinger's White House years. Part of it was that Kissinger wanted to control our policy. Partly it was because President Nixon wanted things to be handled in a secret way. Nixon didn't want public comments or controversy. Part of the reason also was that we were not dealing with democracies, to say the least. Therefore, one or two leaders, or at least a few members of the Communist Party Politburo in these three countries could decide and then implement what was done.

In democracies the process is a little messier. You have to do things openly and involve more players. Japan is a classic example of this, but this situation is even true in the European democracies. This is particularly true in Japan with their collective approach to making decisions and the lack of dynamic prime ministers in general, although there are some exceptions, such as Nakasone. However, basically the Japanese come to decisions slowly and collectively. You're absolutely right, that this process of decision making was something less congenial to Kissinger. His critics would say that Kissinger was relatively uncomfortable with democracies and with parliaments. These critics considered that he would much rather have a dictator to deal with. When he dealt with Japan, Kissinger recognized that these were crucial considerations. In fact, he recognized that he and President Nixon had not treated the Japanese very well during the period of the Nixon shocks, that is, the period prior to the opening to China. He appreciated that some nurturing and tending of the relationship with Japan was important. And he considered the Japanese our key ally in the region, of course.

Other trips, particularly those to the Middle East and especially the two Egyptian shuttle trips I went on, were very dramatic. As I said, during the second one of them we had to prepare a major speech to the United Nations at the same time. That speech and the second Egyptian agreement came together on September 1, 1975. That was truly an exhaustive time.

The first Egyptian shuttle trip was also dramatic. I would like to spend a little bit of time on that. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 broke out when Kissinger was up at the UN. This is a good example of Kissinger taking a crisis and turning it into an opportunity. As the Yom Kippur War unfolded over a period of some time, Kissinger didn't want Israel to be overrun by Egypt. However, after a while, when Israel began counterattacking and pushing the Egyptians back,

Kissinger recognized that if Israel totally defeated the Arabs, that wouldn't necessarily be very good, either. What he did in that connection was to make sure that the war stopped before either side scored a decisive victory. The Israelis had managed to push back the Egyptians. They had surrounded the Egyptian Third Army, and there was a real prospect that the Israelis would virtually wipe out the Egyptians. If this happened, the Arabs and the Egyptians would be humiliated once again, and Israel would have total self-confidence again. The psychological climate would not be propitious for negotiations.

Kissinger worked very hard on this. He quickly went to Moscow in this connection to arrange a cease-fire before the Egyptian Army was wiped out. He did this for the following reasons. He was already looking ahead to try to make progress on negotiations between the Egyptians and the Israelis. Kissinger recognized that here was a chance to achieve a psychological balance between the Israelis and the Egyptians. He felt that the Egyptians could take some pride, and for the first time, in having inflicted some heavy damage on the Israelis. They could honestly say that they had not been defeated. The Arabs could feel some satisfaction over this. At the same time the Arabs would recognize that, once again, if it had not been for intervention by the U.S., they might have been totally defeated by the Israelis. So, in Kissinger's view, the Arabs could feel some pride and satisfaction over the Yom Kippur War and that they were dealing from a position of some strength and not humiliation.

Similarly, psychologically on the Israeli side, the Israelis were in serious trouble, militarily, for the first time. Yes, the Israelis had made their usual comeback from a position of some disadvantage, but in fact they weren't as invincible as they thought they were. They felt that they could be a little more flexible on the peace process, in order to ensure their own security. Kissinger sought to freeze the situation at a point where both sides could claim some victory and some satisfaction. The sense of humiliation was less on the Egyptian side than before, in the sense that they were less vulnerable toward the Israelis than before. Kissinger thought that this situation set up the psychological framework for negotiations between the two sides. This was a classic example of Kissinger understanding the nuances of the situation.

*Q: I think that this person also headed the Dissent channel.*

LORD: You're right. I often spoke at the Open Forum meetings at which people could vent their views and sometimes differences within the Department. At times we had interesting speakers come in, including some who were controversial, like the head of the Green Party in Germany, Petra Kelly. That was another process.

We paid quite a bit of attention to this. I thought that it was important intellectually, but also for the morale of the Foreign Service, that people would think that this kind of thing could go on.

One last thing I would like to mention before I forget it. That is, the fact that Kissinger came close to resigning. I'm not sure that I have the chronology right on this, but it began toward the end of 1975, shortly after a trip which he made to China during the Ford administration. I think that it was in October, 1975. Secretary Kissinger was setting up President Ford's trip to China in December, 1975. There was a mini-massacre, not on the scale of the Saturday night massacre during the Nixon administration, when Attorney General Richardson resigned. This was another

sort of massacre, involving bureaucratic changes.

As I describe elsewhere, by the way, Kissinger's trip to China had not gone well, and the Ford trip to China two months later ended up being very frosty, although we maintained a polite veneer over it. I don't have all of the details at my fingertips, but shortly after we returned to Washington from this trip to China, Kissinger lost his NSC [National Security Council] hat and was replaced as National Security Adviser by Brent Scowcroft. Also, I think that James Schlesinger [then Secretary of Defense] was fired and Donald Rumsfeld (then Chief-of-Staff) went over to replace him as Secretary of Defense. I believe that at about this point George Bush was brought back from China to head the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency].

Essentially because he lost his NSC hat, Kissinger was upset, although this change made sense. It worked out well, and Scowcroft turned out to be a close collaborator with Kissinger, having the same world view as Kissinger. Kissinger gradually began to realize that this new arrangement could work out well.

However, at the time, both in terms of losing some control, but also because there was a perception abroad that Kissinger's role had been weakened, he was concerned about the implications. We went through several weeks when Kissinger was genuinely debating in his own mind whether he should resign as Secretary of State. This seems absurd in retrospect. Given Kissinger's prestige, wearing two hats made no sense and was no way to run the show. It was an unnecessary distraction and bureaucratically awkward. Brent Scowcroft had worked closely with Kissinger, and it would have been absurd for Kissinger to leave the Department of State. For several weeks Kissinger met periodically with me, Larry Eagleburger, and some other, close advisers, as well as friends such as Bill Simon, who was either Secretary of the Treasury or had held that position. Also in the meetings with Kissinger, I believe, was David Bruce and a couple of other people. At these meetings Kissinger was wrestling over the question of whether he should resign. We met both at the Department and in private homes.

It reached the point, by the end of 1975, either in November or December, that Eagleburger and I drafted about ten versions of a public explanation of why Kissinger was resigning as Secretary of State. We did somersaults, trying to figure out how to write this letter. The more we tried to do it, the less it seemed to make sense. It was a very serious matter, and Kissinger genuinely was thinking of resigning. I still remember that it was on a Saturday or a Sunday that I had met with Kissinger again on the latest draft. I waved goodbye to him as he left the Department in a car to go over from the Department of State to the White House, to discuss his possible resignation with the White House. We thought that this actually might happen.

I forget actually whether Kissinger brought this matter up seriously with President Ford or whether President Ford asked him to forget about it. I don't know whether Kissinger said that he would actually resign. Of course, in moments of heat before, he would often threaten resignation for purposes of enhancing his leverage. These episodes were mostly not serious, but this time his resignation seemed to be a serious possibility. There was a lot of debate among his advisers as to whether he should resign, but most people felt that he was exaggerating the blow of losing his NSC hat.

Then, I guess, we got to the point where it was just about Christmas holidays, 1975. Kissinger finally decided to cool off on the matter over the holidays, noting the fact that we were having trouble drafting this letter of resignation. He said that this meant that we were having trouble finding a real rationale why he should leave the Department. He asked us to think about this matter over the Christmas holidays.

So the process of considering his resignation stopped because of the Christmas holidays, and the whole episode just faded away. He never did anything about this. I don't know how much of that is public knowledge. I haven't read Kissinger's most recent volume of memoirs yet. This was a strange episode, where a few of Kissinger's closest advisers were trying to figure out what the impact of his resignation would have on our foreign policy. He finally decided that it was in the national interest not to resign.

*Q: Just to put this in context, we're going to follow the China thread through the period when you were the Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the Department of State, from 1973 to 1977. Then we'll pick it up with your service as Ambassador to China and the period of the Clinton administration. Here, we'll just stick to the China thread. Did the Policy Planning function include a China role?*

LORD: I was Director of Policy Planning, of course, but I handled the China role personally. I worked very closely with the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs [EAP], first with Phil Habib, and then with Art Hummel and Bill Gleysteen as Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries, in addition to people on the China desk like Al Jenkins and in INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research]. Also, I dealt with the White House, the NSC, Dick Solomon, and Peter Rodman. So this was a collective effort. As I say elsewhere, Kissinger melded together a team, drawing on the best Foreign Service Officers he promoted, who took over most of the Assistant Secretary positions, as well as people he brought over from the White House, including myself, Hal Sonnenfeldt, Bill Hyland, and Larry Eagleburger. So, contrary to Kissinger's general reputation of allegedly mistreating the Foreign Service and the State Department while he was in the White House, once Kissinger became Secretary of State, he realized the importance of using the Foreign Service. He always paid tribute to the dedication and intelligence of Foreign Service people. There wasn't just a palace guard around him. He really used the best people. He often did not treat Ambassadors with total openness, to say the least, depending on their competence. I'll cover the whole issue of Kissinger's style elsewhere.

The manner in which he handled the China matter reflects what he did on other issues. For example, he would work with Art Hartman [Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European Affairs] on Europe and Russia, but he would have Helmut Sonnenfeldt [Counselor of the State Department] and Bill Hyland [INR Director] work on these issues as well. On Middle Eastern questions, he would work with Hal Saunders, who had come over from the White House staff, but also worked closely with Roy Atherton [Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs] and Joe Sisco (Undersecretary). It was always a melding of Foreign Service Officers and people close to Kissinger who had worked with him in the White House. Many of these people, like myself, had once been Foreign Service Officers.

That's the way things worked on China policy matters. I was still the key person, but clearly

relied heavily on EAP [Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs] and on the White House staff, because I had these other responsibilities. So that's the way policy matters were managed there.

I made 9 trips to China when I was in the government during this period. We had, of course, the secret Kissinger trip to China in July 1971; the trip in October [1971]; and the Nixon trip [in February 1972], which makes three. Then the trip in June 1972, which makes four. The trip in February 1973, makes five.

I left the government service in May 1973. I was exhausted physically, mentally, and emotionally. Working for Kissinger for four years is enough to drain anybody. It was a tremendous experience but it was also tiring. I wanted to recharge my batteries, see more of my family, and so on.

There was supposed to be a trip to China by Kissinger during that period, partly to resolve the Cambodian question. Partly because of the Cambodian bombing halt and the derailing of those negotiations and for other reasons, that trip was postponed. So I didn't miss any of the Kissinger trips to China, even though I was out of government service between May and September 1973.

The next trip to China, which was the sixth such trip for me and Kissinger was in November 1973. There were two more Kissinger-only trips in 1974 and 1975, and President Ford's visit in December 1975 (as well as to Indonesia and the Philippines).

*Q: I think that we probably should record when you were made Director of the Policy Planning Office in the State Department. Did you wear, in effect, a China hat, as well as a Policy Planning hat?*

LORD: That's right. This has been done on several occasions. My successor as Director of Policy Planning was Tony Lake. He wore an Africa hat, in addition to a Policy Planning hat. I'll treat the policy planning function in another session. Basically, one of the key ways to be effective in this function is to have access to the Secretary of State. One way to do that is to be a key adviser to the Secretary on one or two issues. You then have that natural and constant entree to the Secretary.

*Q: By this time, in late 1973, were all operating systems go? Were things looking good?*

LORD: Do you mean with China?

*Q: With China, yes.*

LORD: Well, conditions were improving. As I said earlier, President Nixon was reelected by a landslide [in November 1972], and this was still before the Watergate Affair really became a central preoccupation of the administration. The Watergate Affair really began to emerge more and more strongly in late 1973 and 1974. I cover this in connection with the trips to China and other places. Obviously, the Watergate Affair began to affect our foreign policy generally and increasingly became a focus of President Nixon's attention.

Still, during the fall of 1973 the ultimate impact of the Watergate Affair was far from apparent, and certainly would have been far from apparent to the Chinese. The Watergate Affair was gathering some steam, but it didn't seem to have done so in any decisive fashion by November 1973, as I recall.

Meanwhile, the Vietnam War irritant between us and the Chinese appeared to be behind us, and President Nixon was presumably in office for four more years. The Soviet problem was still there, although we'd improved relations with the Soviets, which was a good development in terms of our relations with China. We'd improved relations with one country and presumably could improve relations with the other country, because this gave us more leverage.

On the whole, yes, the situation was improving. We had more and more communications with the Chinese through the two channels I mentioned, the Chinese Embassy in Paris and the Chinese Mission to the UN in New York, and now had Liason Offices in the two capitals. We had worked in parallel on issues like the situation in South Asia, and we kept the Chinese informed on other issues, especially our dealings with Moscow. We were overcoming historical mistrust and isolation between ourselves and China. We were beginning to pick up some momentum in the Chinese-American relationship. We were working on the claims and assets question and on the economic front. We were sharing our intelligence with the Chinese. Generally, things were going quite well. That was the background to the Kissinger trip of November 1973. As I have already said, the February 1973 setting up of Liason Offices was the single best visit to China.

The November 1973 trip took place at the end of a long swing through the Middle East. The Yom Kippur War [between Israel, on the one hand, and Egypt and Syria, on the other] had broken out in October 1973, just after I returned to government and Kissinger had been appointed Secretary of State. So we went to Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Iran, Pakistan. We stayed at the same Guest House in Pakistan from which we sneaked out to China on the secret trip in July 1971.

On this occasion, and for the first time, my wife went back to China. I met her there. She had gone to China ahead of me. She saw a number of her relatives. Indeed, this return to China led, many years later, to her best-selling novel, Spring Moon.

Kissinger received a very warm welcome on this trip to China. He again had very good and wide ranging discussions with Zhou Enlai. Of all of the discussions I have been involved in during my entire career, the Zhou Enlai-Kissinger discussions were the most sophisticated, wide ranging, and interesting, bar none. Kissinger himself has said that Zhou was the number one statesman that he ever met. De Gaulle tied for first place in this respect, but Kissinger only saw De Gaulle a few times. I would also put Zhou Enlai in first place.

Having said that, as I commented to Kissinger, and I think that he agreed and so stated in his later memoirs Zhou Enlai seemed somewhat more subdued and restrained than usual. Kissinger was used to Zhou Enlai as a very charismatic and very elegant figure who often commented on various issues somewhat at length, by contrast with Mao. Zhou Enlai had an elegant mandarin style. I don't want to overstate this, but Zhou probably knew by now that he had cancer, which

may have begun to have an impact on his stamina. Maybe Zhou and Mao had begun by now to see the creeping impact of the Watergate Affair, but that's pure speculation, as I've already said. I don't think that it was a major consideration as yet. Zhou Enlai's comments were less lengthy, and he seemed a little bit restrained, although he was still brilliant.

Although this was a good trip to China, and the mood remained friendly on the whole, I would say that you can't expect always to develop momentum during any particular trip. Compared to the trip to China in February 1973, we didn't make as much progress. So it's possible, although we didn't know it at the time, that the struggle that would emerge, certainly during the next couple of years in China, over the succession to Mao, and the Watergate impact on our own domestic scene, meant that we were beginning to see the first signs that domestic constraints on each side were beginning to slow things down. I don't want to stress this too much. I think that this became much clearer in 1974 and 1975. This had not yet happened, and certainly Kissinger had a very warm reception during this trip. Again, Kissinger had an unprecedented, three-hour meeting with Chairman Mao, who normally met only with heads of state. Mao had already done Kissinger the honor of meeting with him in February 1973, probably the first time that Mao met anybody at Kissinger's level, although I could be wrong about that.

As I say, Mao met with Kissinger for three hours and obviously enjoyed the meeting. On several occasions during this meeting Kissinger stood up as if to leave, but Mao extended the conversation. Mao was physically frail, as he had been, but he was still very sharp in his comments. Once again, this meeting hadn't been set up in advance. We assumed that we would meet with him, since we had seen him before. Wang Hairong [Mao's grandniece] would shuffle in and out with notes, and Zhou Enlai would announce that Mao wanted to see Kissinger.

*Q: One question. This will come up again, as things developed. As you describe this meeting, obviously everyone was impressed by the meetings with Chairman Mao, and all of that. However, I've just finished reading your wife's book, "Eighth Moon," about her sister. In this and other books about China, it really comes across that Mao was in a class maybe a little ahead of Hitler and Stalin, as far as what he did. In my opinion, Mao was one of the three monsters of the 20th century. Was this a factor in your contacts with Mao, or were we all caught up in something like adulation of Mao?*

LORD: Well, it's a very fair and good question. Furthermore, I agree that Mao should be put up there with Stalin and Hitler as a monster. Of course, the official Chinese line is that Mao was "70 percent good and 30 percent bad." They say, and I think that you can reasonably make the case, if you try to be detached about it, that when Mao was fighting to unify China and make it stand up, his record was fairly positive, in Chinese terms. None of us liked communism, of course. But then you had the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution, the starvation of the people, the brutality, and so on. Even the Chinese admit that Mao went overboard. In view of the tens of millions of people who died, either through starvation or just in the prison camps and in other ways, and the countless others who suffered, there is no question that Mao was a monster.

Now, to return to your question, we were certainly not naïve. We knew that Mao was no Boy Scout. That was true of Zhou Enlai, as well, who was, of course, more elegant. So we knew for a fact that Mao and Zhou did not get to be where they were without ruthlessness. Having said that,

I admit that the personal impact of Mao and Zhou put some restraint on our judgment in the 1970s. First of all, we didn't know the full enormity of Mao's crimes at that point. Some people probably knew or suspected it, but it was hard to know. I think that it's fair to say that the full disasters of the Cultural Revolution, and even the famine of the Great Leap Forward were not fully known in the 1970s. But Communist China was clearly an unattractive society afflicted with the cult of the personality and with repression. That was obvious to anybody, but the full enormity of it was not known.

Secondly, we were then on a very hard-headed mission. We were not going to give the Chinese high marks for good behavior, but we tried to serve American national interests. At the time we were concerned about the Soviets, the Vietnam War, and all the other things we had to talk about. We also had the longer range desire to engage with China as an emerging, great country. So that was uppermost in our mind, rather than passing judgment on Chinese society.

Thirdly, it was no secret, however, that Secretary Kissinger always had and always will put the emphasis on geopolitics, as against human rights. Therefore, without approving of or being naive about Mao's personality, Kissinger was focused on American national interests and geopolitical considerations. In fairness to Secretary Kissinger, he also believes that, over the long run, this makes for a more stable and peaceful world, with less chance of people blowing each other up. This also serves human rights in that sense.

In addition, you had the general tendency of Americans to swing back and forth. There was this euphoria of opening up relations with China. This made the media and virtually everyone tend to downplay the ugly dimensions of contemporary China. Today, the Chinese government often tends to get a very tough press in the United States. And they deserve it. Yet, compared to the worst of the Mao days, Chinese citizens have a better life. There is still great repression and many abuses of human rights, but less serious compared to what they were going through under Mao. However, for all of these reasons, I am basically granting part of your point. No one thought that Mao was a nice person, but for all of these other reasons, this consideration was not uppermost in our minds at the time.

One other point is that both Zhou Enlai and Mao were personally very impressive in totally different ways. So it was a fact that when you enjoyed your conversations with them, you tend to think in strategic terms as you are dealing with them. The convergence of national interests also tends to affect one's judgment.

*Q: At the time, in late 1973, when you were seeing Mao, did we see China as being a decisive factor in the Vietnam War?*

LORD: Do you mean in retrospect?

*Q: I mean, at that time.*

LORD: Well, the Vietnam War was officially over in January 1973, though the North Vietnamese takeover was still to come.

*Q: I guess I mean in retrospect.*

LORD: We were still urging the Chinese, of course, to contact Hanoi and persuade the North Vietnamese to live up to the Paris Agreements of 1973. The general judgment was, both at the time we were negotiating the Paris Accords and then trying to keep the agreement holding together, despite the North Vietnamese violations, that the Chinese were more helpful than the Russians. This was partly in their own self-interest. They didn't want the embarrassment of a dispute with Hanoi to get in the way of their own national interest, at least on the ideological plane. We also thought that they weren't going to bend over backwards; they weren't going to do anything that would get them in trouble with Hanoi, and that would lose them influence, compared to Russia's influence in Hanoi.

The same problem existed in Korea, because China was jockeying for position, with Russia nearby. They were in a geopolitical competition with Hanoi. If China leaned too hard on Hanoi, the North Vietnamese might turn more toward the Russians. Not to mention, of course, that we now know much more than we did then, believe it or not, about internal competition for leadership within China as they headed the post-Mao period. Future leaders couldn't look too tough on their 'allies'.

*Q: Was anybody telling you at that time that the Vietnamese and the Chinese really weren't blood brothers?*

LORD: We knew earlier on that the Chinese put their relations with us first and this alleged relationship of "lips and teeth" [a Chinese and North Vietnamese propaganda term meaning different functions but close accommodation] with Vietnam second. However, they wanted to have their cake and eat it, too, at least as far as the competition with the Russians was concerned. I don't think that we understood the full hostility in the relations between China and North Vietnam. I don't recall anyone making this point very strongly. In retrospect, this may show that we did not have enough sensitivity to history.

*Q: What about North Korea, because this must have been one of our concerns. It was one of the few, really hostile land borders we had, outside of the border with the Soviet Union. There was the division between North and South Korea and a feeling that Kim Il-sung could launch an attack on South Korea at any time. Was North Korea part of these discussions with China?*

LORD: It was, but as I recall the matter, it was not a very meaningful part. The Chinese expressed a strict line of solidarity with the North Koreans. So we really got nowhere on North Korea, as I recall.

One area where we did make progress over time, and we're talking about a process which covered several trips to China, concerned our alliance with Japan. During the early talks with the Chinese, their basic line was that we were helping Japan to rearm by our alliance with them and that we were making them dangerous. We pointed out that this was an illogical position. Our alliance with Japan and our troops stationed in Japan, plus our nuclear umbrella over Japan, meant that Japan didn't really need to rearm or go nuclear. We said that it was in the interests of China and of the East Asian region that Japan feel that its security was taken care of by close ties

with the U.S. Therefore, in effect, we were restraining Japanese militarism, and the Chinese should favor that. In fact, that argument had an impact on the Chinese over time, and they began to accept that it was in their interest. They never came right out and said so, either publicly or even privately, that they loved to see our troops in Japan or loved our alliance with Japan. However, they clearly got the point and were much more restrained, although that debate continues in Chinese minds, even as we speak today. Japan was an interesting subject of discussion with the Chinese.

We also talked about the Middle East in these discussions. Kissinger kept the Chinese informed in the course of his visits to China. The Chinese were clearly pro-Arab and were not willing to do much with Israel. This situation changed later on when the Chinese began to get military help from Israel. However, at the time the Chinese took pretty much a pro-Arab, pro-Palestinian position. Of course, we encouraged them to be more even handed. Basically, it was a matter of briefing the Chinese on what we were up to, usually working in our prevention of Soviet influence in the region.

On these trips there was often discussion of Europe. China always wanted us to have strong relations with Europe. They wanted to make sure that Russia had to worry about its Western flanks and could not focus all of its energies on China and East Asia. In some of these meetings with Zhou Enlai and Mao there was also discussion regarding the Central Eurasian pivot area from Turkey around to Pakistan. Of course, the Chinese had a particular friendship with Pakistan vis-à-vis India. The Chinese were suspicious of India. Chinese friendship with Pakistan was a frequent subject of dialogue between us. There were discussions about that area, and its geopolitical significance. Occasionally, there were conversations about Cuba and Africa, but these were not areas for major discussions. There was a lot of talk about what the Russians were up to in these areas as well as the Cuban role in Angola.

On Taiwan the Chinese would press us, of course. We indicated that we weren't going to do anything that would create great difficulties for China, but, of course, we also were not prepared to normalize diplomatic relations with China at that point or to back off from any of our commitments to Taiwan. That all came later. These were some of the agenda items that we were dealing with.

*Q: Did the subject of Albania ever come up?*

LORD: I'm sure we made some jokes. At one point, Albania was the one point in Eastern Europe that was close to China. Albania said that, between them and the Chinese, they represented one-quarter of the population of the world!

During those several trips, however, almost everything came up, including history and philosophy, in the course of regular agenda items, digressions, or jokes and conversation. Finally there would be discussion on how to strengthen bilateral ties. The Chinese maintained restraints so as to press us toward normalization. We did establish and expand Liaison Offices. Trade and cultural exchange were limited. We moved on the claims and assets issue.

As the Kissinger visits to China continued, we always took State Department people with us.

That was true even when Kissinger was National Security Council Adviser and before he became Secretary of State. Generally, Kissinger would lean on State Department people for support in discussing things like claims and assets, as well as issues of trade and cultural exchanges. Kissinger saw these matters as less than major in and of themselves, particularly compared with the geopolitical dimensions of our relationship with China. However, he saw these issues as valuable in signaling progress to the world and particularly in terms of building up constituencies in both countries for improved relations. He felt that, if we had business, cultural, and academic institutions in the U.S. which were engaged with China, this would help to broaden domestic support for American policy toward China. Similarly, within China, if more constituencies were involved in developing good relations between the U.S. and China, this would help to strengthen the overall fabric of the relationship, and help to buffer it against strains. So, in this sense, Kissinger encouraged these bilateral exchanges and contacts. However, for him these were relatively boring matters, compared to the big, geopolitical issues. And the Chinese, because of the Taiwan issue and our lack of diplomatic recognition, were not eager to allow great expansion of ties that comes with normalization. And, of course, the trips were all one way, our going to China, except for visits by Chinese officials to the UN, which we would use for bilateral exchanges.

*Q: Could you talk a bit about how these meetings were conducted? Was this strictly a matter of Kissinger sitting on one side of a table and Zhou En-lai sitting on the other side? Did they talk back and forth or were there times when other people would get up, and somebody more junior might say: "Look, we're making a big thing of this, but remember that this is not as important to us as it may seem." Did people on either side try to put matters into perspective, or was it a matter of the principals talking for the record?*

LORD: Well, I won't try to be precise in describing each individual trip. Kissinger went back to China several times as Secretary of State after the Nixon trip to China [in 1972]. He had people from the State Department with him. At the meetings, in addition to me, always there would be John Holdridge (until he became co-leader at the Liaison Office with Al Jenkins) the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs and so on. After the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing was opened, we had the chiefs of that office as part of the U.S. Delegation.

I was in every meeting. The most central part of the visits would be with Zhou Enlai until 1975, when Deng Xiaoping took the ill leader's place. Then, of course, Kissinger met three times with Mao on his own, plus once with Nixon and once with Ford. So he and I met a total of five times with Mao. I cannot be precise in terms of chronology, but we also met several times with the Vice Foreign Minister, Qiao Guanhua. Chao's wife was an interpreter. When Deng made a comeback, Chao made a mistake when he put his chips on the Gang of Four. Qiao Guanhua was a very sophisticated Vice Foreign Minister. He was a very able, number two man in the Foreign Ministry. In a sense, he actually ran the Foreign Ministry. The Foreign Minister was Ji Pengfei. He was replaced by Huang Hua somewhat later on. Qiao Guanhua was the key man to work with, as was Zhang Wenjin, the Assistant Minister who became Ambassador to the United States somewhat later, and who accompanied Kissinger and me on our secret flight from Pakistan to China.

Let me here recall one issue that belongs with a previous discussion of the February 1973 trip to

China. On that trip we did raise again the question of American prisoners being held in China. The Chinese released a couple of prisoners who had been shot down over China as a result of the February 1973 trip. One was a CIA officer named Downey, who had been held since the Korean War. We raised his case. During the February 1973 trip, Zhou in effect invited some humanitarian reason for them to release him, or perhaps we thought of this angle. We looked into the matter. It turned out that Downey's mother had become very sick, cancer I believe. So I believe that we sent a message to Zhou, stating in effect: "Please release Downey so that he can see his mother before she dies." So Downey got out on humanitarian grounds because his mother was sick.

A couple of years later, lo and behold, Downey's mother was still alive and doing well. So Peter Rodman and I drafted a memo from Kissinger to President Ford at the time. The memo said along the following lines: "Mr. President, something has come to our attention which is deeply disturbing. The Chinese may accuse us of bad faith. We got Downey released a couple of years ago on humanitarian grounds because his mother was believed to be about to die. But she is still alive and doing well. The Chinese are obviously going to think that we misled them and that this is an example of bad faith." We then laid out several options as to what we might do. One of these options was to have the CIA wipe out Mrs. Downey so that we could show our good faith! It was, of course, a joke.

Kissinger then sent this memo to President Ford. Ford called Kissinger to the Oval Office and said seriously to him: "Henry, we can't do this."

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Did you have a sense of how much the Chinese believed their own people on what happened at these meetings? Did you find that the officials lower down in the Chinese hierarchy were informed about these meetings?*

LORD: Absolutely. The Chinese are very good at briefing up as well as briefing down. Often we would meet with other, Chinese officials before we saw Zhou, or we would be seeing their people ahead of time. We got the feeling that whatever had been said found its way up the chain, and vice versa. The Chinese were very good at orchestrating and singing from the same sheet of music.

I also said that Mao would use brush strokes in his Socratic dialogue, employing a few sentences and going from subject to subject. He was setting out the basic instructions for Zhou to carry out more elaborately.

*Q: Sounds a little bit like Ronald Reagan, in a way.*

LORD: True, but I wouldn't want to carry it too far.

*Q: Reagan would make a broad brush comment.*

LORD: However, in Mao's case you have to be careful. Mao was very purposeful and laid out his points very carefully, if briefly and seemingly casually. President Reagan would be very economical in presenting his views, but I wouldn't put the same, strategic purpose behind what

he said as I would in the case of what Mao said.

*Q: By this time did Kissinger also make sure that everybody on the U.S. side was well briefed, or was there still an element of secrecy?*

LORD: Kissinger was much more open. By this time Kissinger was Secretary of State and was using the State Department, as well as his colleagues on the NSC [National Security Council], I think that Kissinger was fairly open. There might have been an occasional, sensitive issue on which he talked to Zhou Enlai alone. The fact that we were briefing the Chinese on Russian troop and other deployments was closely held, even within our delegation. Jon Howe and I, and sometimes Kissinger, I believe, handled these briefings. Not everyone would have known about that. However, on the whole, in the various meetings, if there was something that was really sensitive, which was not unusual for the Secretary of State, he might just have me there. Or he might just talk about the matter to Zhou Enlai in the course of a banquet.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: But there would no longer...*

LORD: There would no longer be the kind of secrecy that we had before.

*Q: Was there concern, on our part, about Soviet troop deployments along the Chinese border, or was this just something that we could say to the Chinese, such as: "The Soviets are doing something there..."*

LORD: Yes, we had to strike a balance. We didn't want to look as if we were deliberately trying to stoke their paranoia and fear and lose our credibility, when the threat wasn't all that serious. We didn't want to make it look as if we were trying to scare the Chinese for our own purposes. We weren't so stupid as to exaggerate the Soviet threat to China. On the other hand, we did try to point out that there was quite a formidable Soviet presence along the Chinese border, which, of course, the Chinese knew, although probably not in the kind of detail that we knew. We tried to strike a balance and gain Chinese confidence by sharing this information. We reminded the Chinese that the Soviets were a problem and, therefore, it was in the Chinese interest to continue to work with us on this geopolitical balance. However, we did this without exaggerating the Soviet threat or trying to pretend that it was more than it was. I think that, in general, the feeling was that, although the tensions were lower, the Sino-Russian relationship was still fairly hostile. However, there wasn't the kind of border clashes that the Chinese had with the Russians in 1969.

So I'll go to the details of the November 1973 trip, if that's agreeable. As I said, after a long swing through the Middle East, I met up with my wife in China [in 1973]. I felt that Zhou Enlai was more subdued. During the meeting with Mao, I felt that he was more frail. Mao mentioned the Watergate Affair. He compared it with breaking wind, and so forth. He could be a little crude. He made the point that, in Chinese eyes, this was nothing. I think that that was true of the views of most foreign countries, in Europe and everywhere else. However, it showed that Mao noticed it.

In the final, brief statement at the end of the meeting, I don't know whether you could call it a communique, after some exchanges on Taiwan, Zhou Enlai did insert the potentially meaningful

phrase, the "Principle of One China."

We made it clear during this trip, and I haven't gone over the Kissinger memoirs, that we couldn't accept the Japanese formula for the normalization of diplomatic relations. The Japanese had leapfrogged us after we surprised them in an unfortunate way in 1972. Then they went ahead with their own process of normalization of relations with China. They broke diplomatic ties with Taiwan and normalized ties with the PRC [People's Republic of China]. Kissinger made clear to the Chinese that we couldn't do that. Kissinger may have said that, maybe some day or some day soon, but he said that we clearly weren't prepared to do that at the time. We said, in effect, that perhaps we could normalize relations if we could do it short of the Japanese formula, so long as we recognized the principle of One China. Zhou Enlai picked up on that. He didn't reject this but rather suggested that we try to get some language in the communique. He actually put in the communique the language, the principle of One China.

We thought that this suggested that the Chinese perhaps were willing to settle for something short of the Japan formula. We had essentially agreed to the term, the principle of One China, in the Shanghai Communique, so we were somewhat encouraged by the November 1973 trip.

We agreed to expand the staff and functions of the Liaison Offices. We agreed to more exchanges in various fields and tried to arrange for more trade. There was some progress made on the claims and assets front. However, as I've said, there was a somewhat more tentative mood in the discussions, on the whole.

On the Mao meeting, as I've said, we were summoned, as usual, on short notice to his simple residence in the Forbidden City. We entered the building. Inside there was a ping pong table and then Mao's study with a semi-circle of armchairs, with books all over the place, behind him, on the floor, and on tables. I've already described Mao.

This meeting with Mao lasted for three hours. Part of the reason for the length was that Mao seemed to enjoy talking to Kissinger. We thought that it showed confidence and that it was important. Partly, we thought, it was also because he was providing somewhat more direct guidance than he did at the other meetings. As we've said, he would provide these brush strokes, and then Zhou Enlai would carry on at great length. Now Zhou was somewhat more restrained and subdued, and Mao seemed to give somewhat more explicit guidance. At least in the course of three hours more of their positions was spelled out than in an hour or an hour and a half. Mao made some jokes about problems with the Soviets. The Soviets had complained to Mao, and Mao said that it would take "10,000 years to solve this problem." Kosygin [former Soviet Prime Minister] had come on a visit to China, and Mao made a great concession. Mao said that it would only take "9,000 years to solve this problem." There were jokes like that.

The Chinese expressed some concern about US steadfastness in facing the Soviet threat. Again, these were not as sharp as the attacks which we got from Deng Xiaoping and others on détente a year or two later. There was a lot of discussion with Mao on the Soviet question, Soviet relations with China, and European issues. Mao already was experiencing some trouble in speaking. He had to make a great effort.

On Taiwan, Mao was relaxed. He basically said that China could do without Taiwan for a hundred years. This was all in the course of discussions with Kissinger. They talked about the Near East, including the Near Eastern countries that I mentioned, starting with Turkey. On Japan Mao again talked about being careful.

All in all, this was a very long - unprecedented in length - and warm conversation. Mao had summoned Kissinger during the middle of a reception that was being held in his honor, I believe by George Bush, who was then the Chief of the US Liaison Office in Beijing. The whole Diplomatic Corps in Beijing had been invited to this reception. Kissinger had to miss that reception and we arrived there late.

This trip was the last, serious talks that Kissinger had with Zhou Enlai, because Zhou seemed to be more seriously ill after that. Kissinger visited Zhou in a hospital a year later for half an hour. Basically, we felt that Zhou was increasingly subdued. In retrospect, we can see that now, since Mao was giving more explicit instructions. Zhou was not only beginning to decline physically, but also politically.

We didn't return to China for another year until November 1974. My memory isn't good enough to recall any significant happenings with China in the meantime. We just kept working on the various issues.

*Q: Regarding the initial Chinese-American talks in 1973, one of the great ties between China and the United States was American missionaries, who have had a profound influence on relations between the two countries. Former missionaries, or the children of American missionaries, have had an influence on Chinese-American relations. Did missionaries come into these conversations, either in terms of property or the ability to go back and do their work, or anything else like that?*

LORD: I don't recall. This was a long time ago, and almost every conceivable subject was discussed.

*Q: The issue of missionaries wasn't on the front burner.*

LORD: I don't recall that there were any American missionaries who went back to China. This was not something that Kissinger had very high, if at all, on his list of topics to raise with the Chinese. I don't believe that we were getting any pressure from within the U.S. to raise the issue of missionaries. There may have been some historical references.

The next trip was in November 1974. On this occasion I went separately and met up with Kissinger, who came from the Summit Meeting with the Russians in Vladivostok. In retrospect, we felt later that maybe this wasn't the most clever thing to do, Kissinger going to China directly from Vladivostok, in view of the overtones. I remember going out to China with Bill Gleysteen in particular [then Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs]. We were under instructions from Kissinger to come up with formulas on Taiwan and different things that we might try out and make further progress on.

On this trip Deng Xiaoping was the host. Deng had made a comeback. He went down again later, and then made another comeback later on. The first time that we ever met Deng was when he headed the Chinese Delegation to the UN General Assembly in New York a couple of months before that, in September or October 1974. We met Deng at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel, where our UN Ambassador has an apartment.

I recall that at the time we didn't know much about Deng. Initially, we were not particularly impressed with him. We just felt that, after Zhou Enlai, he was a let down. The initial meeting was at a working lunch or dinner. Deng was the head of the Chinese Delegation to the UN General Assembly. We were struck by the fact that Deng never mentioned Zhou Enlai's name once. We just generally were not impressed with Deng at that first meeting. Of course, the times changed, and given his political ups and downs in the mid-1970s, he was surely cautious at that point.

On the November 1974 visit, we specifically began to probe on the possibility of making further progress on Taiwan. However, Deng stuck to a hard line on Taiwan. We were not overly generous ourselves, either. By then the Watergate Affair was behind us, so this was our first trip to China after Nixon had resigned and Ford had become President. At the time of this trip to China, in November, 1974, Deng himself was in a vulnerable position, trying to deal with the Gang of Four in China. Zhou Enlai was declining in health and politically, and Madame Mao and the other radicals in the Chinese Communist Party were jockeying for position around Mao, trying to get his ear and so forth. Mao was obviously fading as well. So Deng wasn't able to be very flexible on many issues, especially one as sensitive as Taiwan. He couldn't afford to look 'soft'.

*Q: Did you feel any reflection of U.S. developments, when the Watergate Affair heated up and President Nixon had to resign? Were these developments interpreted by the Chinese in the sense that Nixon had opened up U.S. relations with China but Right Wing American elements brought him down?*

LORD: I'm thinking of Mao and Zhou Enlai in particular, who indicated that the Watergate Affair was our business. The general tone expressed by the Chinese about Watergate was that this was a case of breaking wind. They considered it no big deal and clearly wondered why everyone was so excited about it. They were not explicit; they were not inclined to talk about it because they figured that this was a domestic issue for us to deal with. There was no evidence that they thought that this had anything to do with China. It plainly puzzled them because they just didn't understand our system. They wondered why a third-rate burglary could bring President Nixon down, particularly when he had done great things, such as achieving the opening to China. The Chinese were somewhat baffled by it and were somewhat contemptuous of American puritanical attitudes, and so on, or even of democracy as such. I don't believe that the Chinese thought that the Watergate Affair was somehow related to China. If anything, they may have thought, again incorrectly, that détente with the Russians was beginning to create some trouble for President Nixon. However, I don't think that the Chinese thought that the Watergate Affair was foreign policy related. They realized that this was a domestic problem. They just wondered why America made such a big deal out of it.

I don't think that the Chinese ever expressed any particular view of the matter, other than to indicate that they thought this was a domestic affair for us to handle. There was no evidence that this had anything to do with China.

*Q: Since this interview is focused on you and your thought processes, when your wife went to China with you in 1973, did she bring any different insights? After all, she was talking to family members and getting out and around. Hers was quite a different perspective than you would get from a bunch of Occidental officials, sitting around in a reception area and talking to Chinese officials.*

LORD: For listeners to and readers of these memoirs, I would refer them in particular to my wife's book, Legacies - A Chinese Mosaic, which not only talks about more recent events, like the Tiananmen Massacre, but Chinese recollections of the Cultural Revolution, and some of Bette's experiences in going back to China and our serving there.

She returned to China in November 1973 for the first time since leaving in 1946. All of her relatives were there, beside her two sisters, one of whom escaped in the early 1960s (she wrote a book about it, Eighth Moon.) and her parents. Before I arrived, she saw relatives, for example, in Tianjin. They had moved homes just before she arrived back in China. They were living much better than they had been. My wife couldn't understand why her aunt and uncle didn't seem to know their way around their own house. They had to figure out where the silverware was. This was kind of puzzling at the time. Clearly, the government had given the relatives better quarters to impress Bette. Obviously, the sidewalk and everything else had been spruced up as well.

My wife had already begun to hear horror stories about the Cultural Revolution, including how her uncle, her grandmother, and others had suffered during it. She planned to write a book, based on these experiences. Then she realized that this would have been politically too sensitive for them. They might have gotten into trouble. She ended up writing Spring Moon, a best-selling novel, which had nothing to do with her relatives.

My wife always had a more hard-headed, negative impression of the communists and what they had done to China. She was more skeptical about them. She fully believed that the U.S. should open up relations with communist China, in our own, hard-headed self-interest. She was very much in favor of that. However, then and ever since, she has been more skeptical about Chinese actions and perfidy, particularly in terms of the government and the system. Of course, her friends and relatives made her feel that even more strongly.

*Q: Did the fact that you were getting this view from your wife have an impact on your views? There would be conversations in the Office of Policy Planning, and you might have said that the situation in China really isn't that euphoric.*

LORD: First of all, I must make it clear that she was very much in favor of the opening to China and she thought that it was in our own national interest, even if we had to hold our noses a little bit. Indeed, she made major contributions to the relationship over the years, especially when I served as Ambassador. She always placed greater emphasis on the human rights issue. I did as well, certainly by comparison with Secretary Kissinger. However, she would put human rights as

the major item in the Chinese-American relationship or at least thought that it should be among the major items. I've always held the view that human rights are very important but should not control the whole relationship. No single issue should hold our ties. But human rights is crucial in terms of American domestic support and our values. I feel that at times we have to work with some resignation as to how fast we can make progress. We need to do our best and pursue other interests as well. There can never be really positive relations so long as the Chinese government is so repressive and abusive of human rights.

So I can't say that my wife's perspectives greatly affected my own policy judgments. I greatly respect her insights and believe that she instinctively knows more about China than anyone else. For example, she predicted in the late 1960s that Deng Xiaoping would make a comeback before I got involved with China in the early 1970s. She had her eye on Deng. I don't know anyone else who did. She kept talking about the horrors of the Cultural Revolution when it was still fashionable to overlook it or even justify it. So there always was that element, and I thought that it was good to get a reality check through her. However, despite this, she felt that we should go ahead anyway with the opening to China. It didn't really have an impact on my policy judgments.

Going back to the trip to China in November 1974, I have talked about the limits on Deng and, to a certain extent, on ourselves. We proposed a lengthy, communique draft which other people and I had worked on. It noted all of the progress we were making, how we were moving ahead, and so on. We dealt with Qiao Guanhua, the Vice Foreign Minister. He preferred a shorter communique draft. We went on to Suzhou and its lovely gardens. So the trip was not negative, but clearly the momentum was slowing down because of the domestic situation in both countries. This was our first encounter with Deng in China, when he was the host. This was the trip when Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger paid farewell call to Zhou Enlai in the hospital.

I'm just doing an account of the various trips, at this point. I haven't tried to reconstruct specific events in between.

*Q: With regard to policy planning, was there a change when Ford became President? Obviously, Nixon had a very hands on knowledge of foreign affairs. I would imagine that there would have been a real White House input into policy planning during the Nixon years. How was the situation when Ford became President? Ford did not bring that kind of experience or real interest with him. Did you notice a change in that connection?*

LORD: Since we are focusing on China today, we'll reserve a discussion of Kissinger for another time. Just to answer your question in general, President Nixon, as the Watergate Affair began to preoccupy him, became less and less involved in the details of foreign policy. More and more, Kissinger was reporting to him and keeping him informed. Obviously, Kissinger was more and more on his own. So Kissinger, by virtue of being Secretary of State now, was wearing both hats. He was also still National Security Adviser. He totally dominated US foreign policy even during the last year or two, when Nixon was President, since Nixon was so preoccupied with the problems related to the Watergate Affair.

President Ford had less interest and less knowledge and experience in foreign policy. This meant that Secretary Kissinger dominated foreign policy to an even greater extent. Ford's primary

purpose was to heal the country after the Watergate Affair and to focus on our domestic scene. That was consistent with Ford's background, but it was also his top priority at that point. So President Ford basically left it to Kissinger to run our foreign policy. He had total confidence in him. Kissinger in turn respected Ford and of course got his approval on major issues and went to him for major decisions.

We've had other examples like that in our history, although perhaps not quite so extreme. President Eisenhower was heavily involved in our foreign policy, but he left it to Secretary of State Dulles to run the basic operation. For a time, especially early on, President Clinton didn't focus all of that much on foreign policy. President Carter preserved a sort of balance between Zbigniew Brzezinski [then National Security Adviser] and Cyrus Vance [then Secretary of State] in foreign policy. Under Nixon the White House dominated foreign policy, of course. The State Department dominated foreign policy under Ford because even with his two hats Kissinger essentially operated out of the Department. President Reagan delegated a lot of responsibility to Shultz. President Bush (senior), on the other hand was more concerned with foreign policy than domestic policy. So we have had a variety of ways of handling foreign policy, and therefore diverse profiles of National Security Advisors and Secretaries of State. But to return to your question, yes, Ford was less interested in foreign policy.

We didn't feel any great shift because during the final few months of the Nixon administration, Kissinger was running foreign policy. Watergate totally tied up President Nixon. Already there was the feeling that, by virtue of being Secretary of State, Kissinger was running the show anyway. That situation continued under President Ford, so there wasn't any great shift for that reason. Obviously, there was a considerable contrast, say, between 1969 and 1973, but not much contrast, say, between 1973 and 1974. As for State Department policy planning, the staff didn't play much of a role when Nixon and the NSC ran foreign policy, before I took over the policy planning staff. After that, of course, we played a much more important role. I believe, thanks to our various assets and advantages that I have cited elsewhere, the influence of the policy planning staff was the greatest since the Kennan/Nitze years. Some, outside the staff, called our time "the golden years."

The next trip to China took place in October, 1975. The object there was to prepare for a visit to China by President Ford in December, 1975. On this particular trip, both Mrs. Kissinger and my wife were members of the official party. This was the most unpleasant, frosty trip of all of the trips I made to China from 1971 to 1976. The Chinese were very cold on substance, at meetings, and in their public toasts. They were very tough on détente and alleged that we were being naïve about the Russians. I don't know when they first made the allegation that we were, in effect, standing on their shoulders to reach toward Moscow and so forth, but that was their attitude. They really were quite tough, in public as well as in private.

During this trip Kissinger saw Mao again, and it still was quite a friendly talk, despite what I've just said. However, Mao was very sick by this time. He spoke in grunts and wrote things down. I used to joke that Mao would speak in a grunt for, perhaps, 10 seconds, then his interpreter would hold forth for, perhaps, two minutes. I suggested that Mao would attach a number to each policy formulation, and relay it to his interpreter. Number One was Taiwan, Number Two was Russia, Number Three was Japan, etc. Mao would whisper the number, and then the interpreter would

give the standard policy line.

*Q: Wasn't the interpreter the only one who supposedly could understand what Mao was saying?*

LORD: She was Nancy Tang. Mao had a very heavy, Hunan accent, among other things. Also, it wasn't only a matter of understanding his accent. It was a matter of understanding him at all. Mao was writing things down and getting very feeble, but he still seemed quite sharp. We were trying to prepare a communique for the Ford visit, even as we had prepared the Shanghai Communique in 1971 for the Nixon visit. The Chinese resisted and rejected mentioning any real, substantive progress in the communique. We had a draft communique which we gave them. They sat on it for two days and then came back and poured cold water all over it. So we left China, resigning ourselves to making further preparations for the visit through cable traffic.

The reasons for this were essentially domestic politics on both sides. Deng was really fighting for the succession to Mao, who clearly was in his final months. Zhou Enlai was also in his final months of life and no longer an influence. Deng could not afford to look soft, vis-à-vis America, especially on the most sensitive issue, Taiwan. By this time President Ford was beginning to think about his reelection. I can't remember when Reagan began to emerge as a rival to Ford in the campaign for the Republican nomination for the 1976 elections. However, Ford had to watch his conservative flank, particularly on the issue of Taiwan. So the Chinese couldn't do anything on Taiwan, and we couldn't do anything on Taiwan, either. On this trip, as well as on other trips, we said that Ford planned to normalize diplomatic relations with China once he was reelected. However, he couldn't do anything before the 1976 presidential elections.

*Q: Was any thought given to canceling Ford's trip to China?*

LORD: There was no thought of canceling it. However, we were very unhappy when we left China because we saw this as a trip without any results and, perhaps, even without a friendly reception. There we were having to rely on cable traffic now. We had no agreement on the communique and we didn't know what the outcome was going to be. This was in considerable contrast to the meticulous and positive preparations for the Nixon visit at an earlier stage in our relationship.

As we got back to Washington, James Schlesinger was fired as Secretary of Defense. He had just returned from a visit to China. The Chinese really liked him because he followed a particularly hard line on Russia and was friendly toward China. Kissinger lost his job as National Security Adviser. Kissinger was very upset and started talking privately about resigning. At the time there were long discussions between Kissinger, Scowcroft, Eagleburger, and myself. Sometimes, Kissinger brought in outsiders like David Bruce, and Bill Simon about whether or not Kissinger should resign, essentially since he had lost his NSC [National Security Council] hat. He had voiced such threats before, but it got quite serious when contingency planning began and drafts of letters of resignation began to be prepared.

There was even a Sunday, near the Christmas holidays, when I remember Kissinger saying farewell to Larry Eagleburger and me at the State Department. He said that he was on his way to see President Ford, bringing with him a draft letter of resignation.

Kissinger finally stayed in office because of considerations of the substance of issues outstanding. Also, the more we drafted letters of rationale for his resigning, the more we - and he - realized that Kissinger really didn't have a good reason for doing this. Just because Kissinger had lost his NSC hat, this didn't mean that it was the end of the world. We were concerned about the suddenness of the impact on American national interest. Literally, Eagleburger and I prepared about a dozen draft letters of resignation, but we just couldn't find a credible explanation for Kissinger's resignation. As we got close to Christmas, Kissinger agreed, after all of these meetings with people and thinking the matter through, to put the matter aside and think about it again after the holidays. In the course of the Christmas and New Year's holidays, Kissinger decided to remain in office.

*Q: What sparked this change?*

LORD: It was in part Kissinger's concern that President Ford was putting him down somewhat, probably out of concern about his conservative flank. Later, President Ford made Rockefeller resign, and replaced him with Robert Dole as a candidate, a huge mistake which may have cost him the election. Of course, Rockefeller and Kissinger were very close. Ford also appointed Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. Rumsfeld had been chief of staff to President Ford. Kissinger saw these developments as a possible threat to his position. But the primary consideration was Kissinger's losing his NSC hat. He felt that in the eyes of leaders around the world and of his own prestige, this was really a put down. Of course, in that respect, this was an overreaction. He was still someone whom Ford depended the most on in foreign policy. Ford felt that conservative elements in the Republican Party were upset with Kissinger over détente with Russia, and other issues. Ford was worried about his right flank. He didn't want Reagan to get the Republican nomination. Ford was sucking up to the conservatives in the Republican Party. That's why later he dropped Rockefeller, and that's probably why he downgraded Kissinger, from Kissinger's point of view. Kissinger felt that conservative Republicans didn't like the policies he advocated, particularly on détente with the Soviet Union.

So for all of these reasons Kissinger felt that he was losing influence in the Ford administration, and his ego was hurt. This was pretty ridiculous because Kissinger was still dominant and was still the Secretary of State. The more we tried to construct a suitable letter of resignation, the more we had trouble in explaining why Kissinger was quitting. However, that was his mood at the time.

Now let's get back to the December 1975 Ford trip to China. We decided to get tough with the Chinese. We really didn't like the reception we had during the October meetings in Beijing. So in follow up cable traffic we did the following. The original Ford trip was supposed to be only to China and for several days, or maybe as long as a week, to include visits to Beijing and a couple of other cities in addition. In subsequent message traffic we informed the Chinese, politely, in a matter-of-fact way, but unmistakably as a result of our frosty reception in China that President Ford would only be able to go to Beijing. He would just spend a couple of days in Beijing. And we said, by the way, he was not only going to China but also to Indonesia and the Philippines. This made an Asian trip by contrast to the original idea of President Ford's trip to China alone.

We wanted to get the attention of the Chinese. We realized that we had not been very nicely treated, both publicly and in private on the previous trip. There wasn't any meaningful outcome shaping up for this Ford visit to China.

We did get the attention of the Chinese. They immediately began to warm up in the cables exchanged and in their contacts, through the two liaison offices. The Chinese affirmed their desire to have President Ford visit China and promised him a very warm welcome. Sometimes, you have to play things this way with the Chinese.

So President Ford went to China in December, 1975, with visits to the Philippines and Indonesia afterwards. We flew out again to China on Air Force One via Anchorage, Alaska, and visited the petroleum pipeline in Alaska. I remember listening on the plane, even as we went out there, to the incredible football game between the Washington Redskins and the Minnesota Vikings. There was the usual hectic, last minute work on briefing books and toasts. After China, Indonesia, and the Philippines, the President stopped off in Hawaii and gave a major speech on his Pacific Doctrine. We went to Japan.

The Chinese public reception of President Ford was essentially a replay of the Nixon visit. I would have thought that the reception would have warmed up by then. However, we got the same, austere greeting at the Beijing airport. There were the same, welcoming banquets. The Chinese were very careful to do the same things that they had done for President Nixon. Of course, the reception did not seem as exciting and dramatic to the American people and to everyone else, since we had been through this process before. The Diplomatic Corps was at the welcoming banquet in Beijing.

Some members of the Ford party had the chance to shake Mao's hand before we had the meeting with him. I remember that there was the usual scramble as to who was going to attend the meeting on our side. I was included, as were Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] and George Bush [at the time the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office and later President of the U.S.]. Some of the White House staff, including Dick Cheney [chief of staff of the White House] and Ron Nessen, tried to force their way in. However, the Chinese Protocol Officer, Mr. Tang, kept them out.

Mao had about an hour's meeting with President Ford. Mao agreed with Ford on most issues. At the very beginning, and this is a semi-amusing story, Mao repeated his comment that he would soon receive an invitation from God. President Ford looked a little puzzled at this. He didn't seem to understand that this was Mao's elliptical way of referring to his forthcoming death. So, when we left the meeting, Ford went up to Mao and said something to the effect: "I'm going to overrule Kissinger and make sure that you get that invitation from God very soon." Ford obviously did not know what Mao's reference to an invitation from God really meant. Kissinger and I were aghast. However, the interpreter fielded the comment and surely said: "The President wishes you 10,000 years of life," or something like that. The meeting between Mao and President Ford was quite friendly. Mao agreed with the President on most issues. Unlike the trip to China in October 1975, the Chinese went out of their way to be more friendly to Secretary Kissinger personally, and showed greater respect for him. The White House staff was less friendly and gave Secretary Kissinger and me lousy treatment, including room assignments.

There was obviously a little bit of tension between Kissinger and the White House domestic staff. I was kept out of the official party for the visit to Indonesia and didn't go to the dinner with President Suharto, and so on.

Deng Xiaoping made somewhat of a better impression on us during this trip and particularly handled the American press effectively. The fact is that there was really no substantive outcome to this visit, even though the Chinese were correct and certainly didn't insult President Ford. They gave President Ford basically the same reception that they had given to President Nixon. But it was pretty easy to see that there wasn't much in the visit. We didn't even have a communique.

However, after the official meeting and in a seemingly casual encounter Deng and President Ford answered reporters' questions. One of the questions was about the absence of a communique. Deng answered that there was no need for a communique. The discussions that had been held were themselves the key element. Relations between the US and China were good and getting better. In fact, they really weren't. Relations weren't slipping back, but they clearly weren't improving. Deng showed that he was becoming adept at spin control and was trying to help us out in getting through this. I think that he considered this a holding action, aware of the domestic constraints on both sides. As he proved later, Deng was very much in favor of strong relations between the US and China. He also knew that, given our own domestic constraints, as well as Deng's domestic problems, there wasn't much of an opportunity to move relations forward.

*Q: Did Mme. Mao play any role in this meeting?*

LORD: No. We never saw her at all. During the visit to China by President Nixon she took Nixon one evening to one of those horrible ballets which were staged during the Cultural Revolution.

I've already indicated why President Ford and the Chinese were somewhat constrained. Kissinger and I made a sentimental, farewell visit to the Forbidden City. We figured that this might be the last China trip, even though there was another year to go in President Ford's term. We had tea in the same spot where we had tea during the secret trip in July 1971.

Then President Ford went on to Indonesia and the Philippines, with Mrs. Marcos overseeing the Tinikling bamboo stick dances. There was an incredible motorcade in the Philippines. We went to Japan while the President went to Hawaii to give his Pacific Doctrine speech.

Then, in 1976 nothing really happened regarding China. Things slowed down in terms of foreign policy generally. We didn't go back to China. Relations didn't turn sour, but we were basically just treading water. And, of course, both Mao and Zhou Enlai died during 1976. There was also the symbolic and incredible earthquake in Tianjin, a Chinese symbol of dynastic change.

*Q: When the U.S. Liaison Office was first set up in Beijing, can you talk about its role as you saw it? What about the various people who served in it?*

LORD: During the trip to China in February, 1973, we agreed to establish the Liaison Offices, and these were up and running a few months after that.

We had co-leaders of the Liaison Office at first, in the persons of John Holdridge and Al Jenkins of the State Department. They basically handled bilateral issues like trade, cultural exchanges, and claims and assets on a day to day basis. The heavy lifting on important, sensitive, and geopolitical issues was still handled by Secretary Kissinger. We used the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington. I don't believe that we used the Paris channel any further, since we had a Chinese Ambassador available in Washington.

*Q: So much of what we were trying to do was to set up this relationship. Maybe this is just your perspective of this, but it sounds as if the Liaison Offices were really playing a very subordinate role, compared to Embassies in other countries.*

LORD: Well, you have to see how Kissinger dealt with Ambassadors. Basically, when he was Secretary of State, he would use our Ambassadors a lot more than he would use them when he was not Secretary of State. He used some of our Ambassadors, like Herman Eilts in Egypt, and so on, a great deal. He had great respect for Eilts and certain other Ambassadors. Even as he used Foreign Service Officers to a great extent in Washington, I think that it's still fair to say that he didn't fully employ his Ambassadors overseas on key issues. He would not always keep them fully posted.

As to the Liaison Office in Beijing, as I said, the two officers initially in charge of it were John Holdridge and Al Jenkins. They were distinguished and very knowledgeable diplomats. They were very good choices and very competent, and Kissinger respected both of them. They were followed by senior heads (once the office had been set up and running) David Bruce, then Gates from the Defense Department, and George Bush after that. Everything that I've said was also true regarding people after Holdridge and Jenkins. The basic, sensitive matters were handled by Kissinger. You can apply that throughout this period. These were matters handled by Kissinger in Washington. Now, whenever Kissinger traveled to Beijing, the heads of the Liaison Office were fully included in whatever was going on. They were kept well posted. I kept trying to encourage Kissinger to bear in mind that the heads of the Liaison Office had to know what was going on. However, there is no question that whenever there was heavy lifting on really important and sensitive issues, this would be handled by Kissinger himself and not by the head of the Liaison Office in Beijing.

*Q: When Kissinger was in Beijing or Deng was coming here to Washington, how did Kissinger do his heavy lifting?*

LORD: By talking to Huang Zhen or whoever was the head of the Chinese Liaison Office in Washington. China had its own Liaison Office in Washington, after all. So Kissinger would work with him and ask the head of the Chinese Liaison Office to send messages back to Beijing. We generally kept our people in the US Liaison Office in Beijing posted on what was going on. However, there might be things that the chief of our Liaison Office in Beijing might not know. I always encouraged Kissinger to keep our Liaison Office as well posted as possible. If a sensitive matter were involved and Kissinger wanted the chief of our Liaison Office to know about it, he

could send an eyes only message, or a backchannel message for the chief of the Liaison Office and not for other people in the Liaison Office.

*Q: Did you see a parallel to the Kissinger-Dobrynin connection, where often our Embassy in Moscow in effect was bypassed. The Embassy in Moscow might have been informed, but the real contact was Kissinger talking to the Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Was this kind of contact developing between the U.S. and China?*

LORD: Certainly, there was an analogy there, because on really sensitive and important matters Secretary Kissinger would handle them and he wouldn't necessarily tell the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing after the fact. However, this was by no means on the same scale. Now, with the Russians Kissinger had a much more fully developed relationship. In many ways it was less friendly and more dangerous. However, we had more business to transact, and it was a more normal relationship. We had many more regular exchanges with the Russians. We had official Embassies in each other's capital. We had negotiations on arms control, we had trade agreements and other exchanges, we were negotiating on Berlin and other issues. I often went to Moscow with Secretary Kissinger for such purposes in discussions with Brezhnev, Gromyko, and so on. So there were more subjects both for the Ambassadors but also more to keep them in the dark about.

This began to loosen up too. Don't forget that when Kissinger became Secretary of State, and I want to stress this, not only was the Foreign Service more fully brought into the discussions in Washington but our Ambassadors were much better posted than when Kissinger was National Security Adviser in the White House.

*Q: Did you feel that it was part of your job, particularly regarding relations with China, which you are reviewing here, to make sure that everybody was singing from the same hymn book?*

LORD: Oh, sure.

*Q: That was part of your brief?*

LORD: Yes. First, it was important for us to be consistent. Secondly, this was essential for efficiency in the operation of our foreign policy. Thirdly, it was important for our morale. I always tried to ensure that our people were kept posted as much as possible, keeping secrecy to a minimum, in Kissinger's own self interest and in the American national interest. This was also important to maintaining the morale and efficiency of our own people.

So the situation was by no means as it was in the early 1970s under President Nixon. We would brief the chiefs of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing before they went out to China. I was responsible for doing that, in coordination with the East Asian bureau and the White House. I remember spending an entire day with George Bush before he went out to Beijing as Chief of the Liaison Office. That was also true of David Bruce and Gates, as well.

*Q: What about David Bruce? He was, perhaps, our most distinguished diplomat. He had been Ambassador to all of the major, Western European countries. What was his attitude toward this*

*assignment as chief of the U.S. Liaison Office, and how did he operate?*

LORD: First of all, he was chosen by President Nixon and Kissinger. As you say, he was very effective and distinguished. We wanted to get some elevation in this appointment. It was only a Liaison Office. We wanted to make clear to the world and to the Chinese that we had picked someone who was at the very top of our diplomats. He was, in one sense, a political appointee but he was a distinguished and experienced person who enjoyed a very good reputation. I think that Kissinger felt also that David Bruce was very reliable. He was fairly old by this point, in his 70s. Given the limited nature of what you could do with that Liaison Office, in view of the restraints on travel and contacts with Chinese society, this really was a constrained operation in many ways, even without Kissinger's secretiveness. So Ambassador Bruce didn't need a great deal of energy in this position. He was competent and good and was a terrific human being. He was one of my heroes. Kissinger used him as a guru on other occasions, like the energy crisis, and when he considered resigning.

I think that Bruce would be the first to say that, by virtue of the nature of the job, our lack of diplomatic relations, and the limited scope, he wasn't really a diplomat. He couldn't really mingle much with the diplomatic community. He did not have much access to Chinese society outside the official community or much access to top Chinese officials. This was also true of Gates and George Bush, when they were Chiefs of the Liaison Office in Beijing. There was only so much that Bruce could do, so he wasn't exactly working himself to death.

As I recall, Bruce didn't do a great deal of reporting from China, either. However, this is not meant in criticism of him. As I said, he was one of my heroes. He played more of a symbolic role at that point. As I recall, Gates was not in Beijing very long. He seemed to do a competent job. George Bush was clearly the most enthusiastic Chief of the Liaison Office in Beijing. As you may recall, he had been the head of the Republican National Committee. He was called back from Beijing to become Director of the CIA, about the same time as the other personnel shifts in October 1975.

Some people, particularly of Bruce's, or Bush's, distinction and background, might have said: "This is a Liaison Office, and I am not even an Ambassador. Why should I want to do this?" However, Bush was genuinely interested in China, and he threw himself into the job with great enthusiasm. He rode around Beijing on a bicycle. He did as good a job as he could have, given the constraints. As he himself would say, and did say so in his memoirs, he was kept posted by Secretary Kissinger, but in fact there was not much important for him to do. There wasn't much that Bush could do, but he did what he could do, within those constraints. I was responsible, working with EAP, to make sure that he was informed about what was going on.

*Q: Were we looking towards tying China into the Western world as much as possible by student exchanges, opening more Consulates, and getting more traffic back and forth? Or had it reached that point?*

LORD: This was beginning to happen. You have to remember that this was before Deng launched his reforms in 1978. On the one hand China was emerging from the Cultural Revolution and from near total isolation. In the early 1970s, it recalled all its Ambassadors

abroad except one, Huang Hua, in Cairo. By virtue of the opening with us, as they knew they made breakthroughs with others like Japan and parts of Europe that hadn't normalized relations as yet. They got into the United Nations. So they were beginning to open up diplomatically in that sense. However, trade was still very restricted, Chinese society was politically very restrictive, and their own people were very carefully managed. Even on the exchange of persons front, the Chinese were very cautious. They began to agree to some exchanges.

*Q: By exchanges you mean cultural exchanges.*

LORD: Cultural exchanges, including sports teams and academics, as well as trade. So we made progress in relative terms, including on trade, during these years. However, trade was miniscule, compared to the time when I was Ambassador to China, and even more so, compared to today. It was more a matter of building constituencies to support the relationship on both sides and giving it some content. There wasn't any feeling that we could open up China at that point. The Chinese were just too cautious to make that possible.

*Q: Were we seeing much of the tail end of the Cultural Revolution, the Gang of Four, and all that?*

LORD: The official end of the Cultural Revolution was in 1976, though the worse excesses were in the late 1960s. I don't want to get my sequence of events wrong. The Gang of Four was blamed for the Cultural Revolution after this period. As I recall, this was during the period of the Carter administration. Deng returned to office in 1977 and solidified his position once again, pushing out Hua Guofeng, who in turn had ousted the Gang of Four. So the blame for the Cultural Revolution was not attributed when we were in office. Much of the material is already in the history books. In 1976 both Mao and Zhou Enlai died. There was a temporary elevation of Hua Guofeng. Mao said that with Hua Guofeng in charge, he was at ease. Hua Guofeng was gradually pushed aside by Deng over the next year or two. The Gang of Four was arrested and tried. All of this is in the history books. The reforms didn't really take hold until Deng came back to power for the third time in 1977-78.

*Q: When you were the Director of the Office of Policy Planning during this time, for you were in that position for, what, three and one-half years, we already had a well developed group of Kremlinologists who followed developments in the Soviet Union. They figured out who was standing where and the significance of where they stood on public occasions on Lenin's Tomb, and so forth. They had a very sophisticated ability to read Soviet newspapers and figure out what was happening. They really had quite an insight into what was going on. Did you find that you had any of that kind of expertise or apparatus to follow the situation in China?*

LORD: Well, we had some of that. We respected them, whether they were in INR [Bureau of Intelligence Research], the CIA, other parts of the intelligence community, the Department of State, the NSC, or among some outside academics and specialists. We would seek out their views as much as possible. Dick Solomon was in the White House and was a scholar on China. However, in those days a lot of the China watching was still done in Hong Kong, through our Consulate General there. That was our key source of information. We interviewed refugees who came out of China and used other contacts. So even after we had a Liaison Office in Beijing, the

Consulate General in Hong Kong probably produced more material on China. The Liaison Office could give us some material, but the restrictions on their travel and contacts meant that they really couldn't tell us a great deal about what was going on in China.

So we never felt that we knew a great deal about China. Certainly, we learned a lot as we established ourselves there. And, of course, journalists began to take up residence in China after a while. However, it wasn't really until the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1979 that things began to open up, especially in terms of exchanges and access. We began to get a lot of reporting out of China itself to supplement what we were getting from the Consulate General in Hong Kong. I don't think that we really thought that we had as good a feel for what was going on in China as we did for what was going on in the Soviet Union, and even there we had problems, of course.

*Q: Well, it was also as difficult a situation as you could have, since this essentially was an ongoing coup or revolution and all of that.*

LORD: Oh, you're talking about the power struggle within China. I don't want to pretend to precision here, when my memory can play tricks. I think that we realized even then that Hua Guofeng was not a dominant figure. He was a sort of surprising, safe choice. I'm sure that we must have speculated whether this man was going to last. I don't know whether we thought that Deng might come back again. I don't know whether we were that prescient. I'm sure that we had some feel for the struggle between the radicals and the moderates, but I don't think that we had any precise handle on that.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I was wondering to what extent you had contacts with the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan and to what extent you were perhaps preparing studies on what was likely to happen if normalization went on? To what extent was Taiwan a concern in this context?*

LORD: Whenever we had contact with Taiwan, it was done by the Taiwan Desk, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, as I recall. I had a great personal respect and affection for Taiwan. I thought that we should not sell them out, and I don't think that we ever did that. I was always careful to urge that we maintain good relations with Taiwan, both in terms of its reputation and our own historical obligations toward it, as well as in terms of domestic U.S. support for Taiwan. We had to make sure that we didn't stir up the more conservative people in the United States. As I said, my wedding reception was given at the Chinese Nationalist Embassy residence, Twin Oaks, in Washington, DC, and my father-in-law represented the Taiwan government on sugar.

However, I don't recall having that much contact with the Chinese Nationalists. I think that that was left to the Taiwan Desk. With Beijing we basically gave up in 1975 and 1976 any hope of making any progress on the Taiwan issue at least until after the 1976 election. We went through a lot of contingency planning regarding the impact on Taiwan of the normalization of relations with Mainland China. We considered various formulas. We realized that the Chinese communists were not in the mood domestically, and certainly President Ford was not in the mood, to take any chances. So that was essentially a holding action, although we would tell the Chinese that we wanted to keep moving forward on this issue. We said that we would revisit this

issue after the election, when President Ford would have a freer hand and would not have to look over his shoulder at Ronald Reagan.

At one point, I, Dick Solomon (NSC), and either Hummel or Gleysteen of EAP sent a memo to Kissinger urging more progress on the Taiwan issue, but the time was not ripe.

I don't recall that Taiwan was a major area of concern. However, if I had been working in EAP at the time, I would probably have a fuller answer for you.

*Q: You were looking at Ronald Reagan at this point as the point man for conservative Republicans. Is that right? Were you thinking that if he were to take over the Republican Party instead of President Ford at that time, that this could really set back our China policy?*

LORD: I guess so, but the fact was that I personally never thought, perhaps naïvely, that Reagan had any chance to win the Republican nomination for President. I guess that the contest was closer than people realized.

*Q: We're talking about the 1976 presidential elections.*

LORD: I don't remember worrying about that too much because I figured that Reagan was never going to be elected. I personally was very upset with President Ford for dropping Nelson Rockefeller as candidate for Vice President. I was a great Rockefeller fan. This annoyed me, but that's neither here nor there.

You have to remember that President Ford, although he relied heavily on Secretary Kissinger, was beginning to be concerned about the conservative Republicans. I don't think that Kissinger attended the Republican Convention in 1976. There were a lot of attacks on Kissinger at that time, especially on détente. Not so much on China policy, which was still widely supported, because those who thought we were soft on the Soviets saw the advantage of dealing with the Chinese.

Again, I may have been naïve, but I don't think that I ever believed that Reagan was going to be the Republican nominee. I didn't think that this was going to be a problem. If I ever did, then I'm sure I would have thought that it wasn't going to be very positive for our China policy.

*Q: What about China in the UN? Were we holding our breath about what China was going to do? Did we expect that they were going to act like the new boy on the block?*

LORD: China was basically a cipher at the UN in those days. They didn't do anything. They just sort of attended the sessions. I don't think that they used their veto power, as I recall. They generally voted against the U.S., but they weren't active in doing so. They didn't try to do very much. They were very low key at this point.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: To what extent was the Department of Defense active in our China relationship at this time?*

LORD: Very little, as I recall. I'm trying to think about the whole issue of possible military cooperation, but I don't recall any particular details. When I was Ambassador, of course, in the late 1980s the Defense Department was heavily involved.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I'm not exactly sure, either.*

LORD: I believe that the answer to your question is that the Department of Defense was not heavily involved in our China relationship at this time. We thought that it was still rather sensitive to be developing a military relationship with the Chinese at this point. We had not fully normalized our relations with China.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I had nothing specific in mind. I was just curious about it.*

LORD: China policy was run by the State Department and Secretary Kissinger, although, as I say, Dick Solomon of the NSC was involved in most issues.

*Q: Well, in Policy Planning one likes to think that your people are planning policies regarding possible developments 10 years from now. However, the reality is that you tend to deal with matters at hand. Was anybody thinking that, maybe, some time China was going to be an aggressive power and that we should think about some problems in its neighborhood?*

LORD: I don't recall that, but you have to remember that this was a long time ago. Certainly, we didn't have the kind of debate that we have today because China, its economy, and its military establishment were all weak. China was just coming out of diplomatic isolation. So concern with China in those days was more a matter of whether they were fooling around with revolutions abroad, like in Southeast Asia, as opposed to any projection of a military threat.

We saw China as actually weak, although we all felt that, given their history and the inherent greatness of the Chinese people and civilization, they would make a comeback some day. However, this was thought to be some time away. I don't recall any long term projections about what the Chinese would do when they became strong. In Policy Planning I basically handled the China brief myself. However, I want to make clear that I worked with EAP most of the time, and Dick Solomon was very helpful in this regard, helping with some excellent materials and analysis.

*Q: What about China and Africa? This is one area where the Chinese invested quite a bit of money, including in Mozambique, West Africa, and other places. What did we think of this?*

LORD: The Chinese had some interests in Africa at the time. Remember that in Angola, the Russians and the Cubans were backing one faction, the Chinese were backing another faction, and we were backing a third faction. In the general, geopolitical game Kissinger welcomed any Chinese influence that would offset Soviet influence in Africa or anywhere else. He kept the Chinese briefed on his African diplomacy, including working with the South Africans to reach a deal on Rhodesia, which later became Zimbabwe. He did that for geopolitical reasons. In fact, to his credit, and that of President Ford, Kissinger did that even in the midst of presidential primary elections in Texas and other states. This didn't sit well with conservatives in the South.

Africa would come up in conversations with the Chinese, but it wasn't a major issue. The Chinese did have interests in Africa, as you say, and we, of course, welcomed their interest in Africa. We didn't see this as any threat to us, unlike, say, the efforts of the Russians.

*Q: I think that we've talked about this before, but did you sort of keep your policy credentials polished?*

LORD: Yes, I did. First, of course, in terms of my intellectual capabilities, I went to many of these meetings and study groups. I felt that I should keep on top of things as well as showing the flag as president of the organization. At that point in my career in the 1970s and 1980s, I was still a global expert. I had been director of Policy Planning and a Special Assistant on particular issues during my Foreign Service, Department of Defense, and NSC assignments. Even though I had done a lot of work on China and Vietnam, my perspective was still global. The Council on Foreign Relations was global, and this was all very good in terms of continuing the development of my perspective. I had a lot of friends in government during the Carter administration. Then I was also at the Council for the first few years of the Reagan administration. I kept in touch with these friends. In some cases, particularly on China, they would ask my advice or I would consult with them. I wrote a few op ed pieces.

I didn't have any strategic aims in terms of career goals. I never had them in my life. I felt that I wanted to return to government service some day but I didn't organize my whole life around the theme of, How can I pull this off? I spent about seven and one-half years with the Council. After about five to six years there I was ready, as I have been in any job, to move on. I also felt that I had accomplished pretty much what I could at the Council and that it was time for new blood to replace me. I was beginning to do things every year that I had done the year before, and I risked losing my enthusiasm and drive, which I think is only natural. So I was receptive to returning to government service. I had always been a moderate, liberal Republican, so I didn't think that I would get an appointment from the Reagan administration.

I think I've described how I got the assignment as Ambassador to China. Both President and Mrs. Reagan were impressed with the briefing on China which my wife and I gave them at a White House lunch before they visited China in 1984. She also liked Bette's book "Spring Moon." Secretary of State George Shultz had been a director of the Council and NSC Advisor Bud McFarlane knew me from the Ford days. Reagan knew of my having worked with Kissinger on China. I was invited by the Reagans to attend a number of social events.

Naturally, I tried to keep up my intellectual abilities. This was natural with the job, in terms of foreign policy, as well as visibility through occasional articles I wrote and trips I made around the country to visit our committees and speak elsewhere. I would stay in touch with Washington and so on. I was just generally interested in foreign policy and had no specific game plan. I had a desire to go back into government service at that point, unlike now, when I no longer have that desire.

**PARKER W. BORG**  
**Officer, Staff Secretariat – Kissinger China Visit**  
**Washington, DC (1970-1972)**

*Ambassador Borg was born and raised in Minnesota and educated at Dartmouth College and Cornell University. In 1965, after a tour with the Peace Corps in the Philippines, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. During his career he served in Vietnam and Zaire, and in the State Department in senior positions concerning Vietnam, West Africa and Counter Terrorism. He served as US Ambassador to Mali (1981-1984) and to Iceland from 1993 to 1996. Ambassador Borg was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2002.*

*Q: No, we're talking about '71/'72 when Vietnamization was going on and you had an election with McGovern talking essentially about getting out of Vietnam completely and all that.*

BORG: I think the battle fatigue was beginning to show very much in the United States. We'd been in Vietnam longer than we had been able to explain to the American people and the war seemed to be going on forever. What people didn't realize was that there had been a lot of progress on the ground and things were not nearly what they used to be, but as a result the North Vietnamese were becoming much more closely involved than they had been in the past. And there were the Paris Peace Talks that were going on about this time. Kissinger's trip to China took place in '72, didn't it? It was clear that nobody was paying attention, as far as I was concerned, to what was happening in Vietnam. We were looking at the American perspective on it.

*Q: What was the attitude of the Secretariat - obviously you're closely connected to the Secretary of State - about the news that Kissinger had gone to China and all that?*

BORG: People were stunned. Now, did the Executive Secretary know it and not tell anybody? Possibly, but we certainly had no idea. We were all surprised. We had stamped up a paper which identified ping-pong diplomacy as a way to open a dialog with China, and I remember this as being one of the better policy papers that I had ever had a chance to review because it set forth here is an opportunity and, if the Chinese do this, then we might do that, and if they do this, then we might do that, and this might lead to that and then we might do that, and it set it all out in stages that I thought were very perceptive, and they played the way that they did. There were six of us on the line at the time, and we each had responsibility for a separate regional bureau, and we had secondary responsibilities. We backstopped one of our colleagues who was on another regional bureau. For most of the time I worked on Latin America and East Asia, so I had much more knowledge of some of the things there.

*Q: Did the opening of China sort of change things around from your perspective?*

BORG: Well, one of the things that I had studied in graduate school was the China lobby and the ties between the anti-recognized China elements and the various wings of the Republican Party, and I knew that Nixon was sort of at the core of this group that refused to have anything to do

with China, but there was no Democrat who had dared to suggest that we might do anything in China because of the wrath that might have appeared from the Republicans. So when Nixon went to China, I certainly knew that it's a new ball game on China and things were going to change very rapidly, because once Nixon's on board, it's going to happen. I was very interested from the very beginning then in going to China myself.

*Q: Did you feel that as an Asian-type person that this gave a broader field for you?*

BORG: Long, long overdue. I was of the school that felt we had had our head in the sand for much too long and that our recognition of China should have come at least 15 years earlier if not more. You don't recognize countries because you like them; you recognize countries because they're there and there are reasons to deal with them.

**JAMES A. KLEMSTINE**  
**Economic Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1970-1973)**

*James A. Klemstine was born in Pennsylvania in 1930. He received a bachelor's degree from the University of Pennsylvania and a master's degree from Yale University. He served in the U.S. Army from 1952-1954 and entered the Foreign Service in 1956. Mr. Klemstine's career included assignments to Germany, the Soviet Union, China (Taiwan), and Korea. He was interviewed by Jeff Broadwater on April 15, 1993.*

*Q: Then in 1970?*

KLEMSTINE: I went to Taiwan.

*Q: ...and stayed there until '73. What did you do in Taiwan?*

KLEMSTINE: I did the economic work there. I did various reports, but especially the Foreign Economic Trends. That's a quarterly report that you send in to Commerce which is then printed and distributed it to American business. What it did was to summarize the economic developments in the country during the quarter, and also what opportunities were opening up for trade, which fields they're investing in, etc. I did a lot of economic analysis. In fact I was chosen one of the five finalist, for reporting in 1973. Everybody else was political. If you can imagine, political and one economic. But at least I did a lot of good work in proving that Taiwan was going places. This is when I came across the problems with American journals. I guess it was '72 after the Red China recognition. Of course there was a horde of people who descended on Taiwan to determine what's going to happen to this place, whether it was going to cave in, are Americans going to leave, would the economy collapse, etc.

And there was this individual from Newsweek who came in. I gave him an interview. I gave him a real upbeat report because I felt at that time, always did feel, that the Chinese were good

businessmen and this little island was really progressing. We know now it has probably, next to Japan, the world's largest reserves. So I gave him this interview for Newsweek. About a month later Newsweek magazine came out and I read this article, and instead of upbeat, it was downbeat. Taiwan was going to go to the dogs, no future and all that. And, of course, I got a call from the ambassador's office, "What the hell..." And I told him, "Its just the opposite of what I told this guy."

So the reporter came around again in a couple of months, and I said, "What is this?" I had clipped this article. I said, "This is exactly the opposite of what I told you." And he told me, "Yes, I submitted that, but my editor didn't feel that was right, and he revised it in the opposite direction." So that's when I first learned, and learned subsequently, that these reporters for magazines may send in something, but if the editor doesn't like it and feels different, he'll just revise it. So what you read sometimes may be the editor not the reporter. Maybe things have changed since the 1970s, I doubt it, but anyhow then if the editor felt this was what he wanted, he would change it.

*Q: What did you think of the decision to normalize relations with China? That happened while you were there.*

KLEMSTINE: It came as a surprise to everybody.

*Q: It was a surprise to the people in Taiwan?*

KLEMSTINE: Oh, yes. It was a surprise to everybody. The main surprise, I think, was that the Red Chinese at that time were willing to do this. I mean there had always been, within the Department, a feeling that sooner or later relations should be normalized. For public and that, they were always expressing support for Taiwan. There were a lot of papers that had been written on recognition. There was a realization that the Republic of China (Taiwan) was not China. But a lot of us felt that the Red Chinese weren't really interested in it (recognition). I think that was the big surprise, at least for the people in Taiwan that the Red Chinese actually were ready to do it.

*Q: Where did you go after Taiwan?*

KLEMSTINE: I came back to Washington and was on the Thai-Burma desk.

**WILLIAM VEALE**  
**Staff Assistant to Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Agency**  
**Washington, DC (1971-1973)**

*Mr. Veale was born in Washington, D.C. into a US military family and was raised primarily at Army posts in the US and abroad. Entering the military after graduating from Georgetown University, he served with the US Army until joining the Foreign Service in 1971. Throughout his career Mr. Veale dealt primarily*

*with Political/Military and Disarmament affairs, serving both in the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Among his assignments, Mr. Veale was posted to Strasbourg, Berlin and Rangoon. He also taught in the Political Science department at the US Air Force Academy. Mr. Veale was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan in 2000.*

*Q: Speaking of police states, what was the Soviet influence there and the Chinese Communist influence?*

VEALE: The Soviets had a large Embassy there and I suspect that they were using it as a China listening post as much as anything. There was not a lot of interaction with the Soviets there. The Chinese, on the other hand, also had a large Embassy and Ne Win looked at himself more with a Sino affiliation rather than the Sino-Tibetan background that most Burmese identify with. But, Ne Win was critical of the liberalization that China was undergoing at that time. He thought that the Chinese were doing too much too fast and I think he tended to take a kind of senior player role with the Chinese and trying to pontificate that what they were doing was not the way he would do it. I don't have the impression that the Chinese were all that influential in Burma during this period.

I think that the U.S., through its assistance in narcotics programs and communications support that we were giving the Burmese army, was very important. Germany, surprisingly enough, was a major supplier of weapons. Germany, Singapore, and South Korea were major suppliers of weaponry to the Burmese army. The Burmese army was going after drug running private armies and there was a communist insurgency as well. One of the things that I saw while I was there was what a shadow that this insurgency had become, that the Chinese support for it had withered considerably and it really was a bunch of people who were trying to maintain the appearances of a communist organization but the Burmese were very much anti-communist during this period. They were openly anti-communist in their efforts to deal with the Burmese communist party.

**MARK E. MOHR**  
**Non-Immigrant Visa Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1971-1973)**

**Chinese Language Studies**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1973-1974)**

*Mr. Mohr was born in New York and raised in New York and New Jersey. He was educated at the University of Rochester and Harvard University, where he studied the Chinese language. After service in Korea with the Peace Corps, he joined the Foreign Service in 1969, and served abroad in Taipei, Taichung, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing and Brisbane. In his service at the State Department in Washington, Mr. Mohr dealt primarily with Far East Affairs. After his retirement he worked at the Department of Energy on Nuclear energy matters. In 1997 he was recalled to the State Department, where he worked as Korean desk officer.*

*Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.*

*Q: Yes, and they would come and lean over the desk and they would be up against the flak catcher. He was a guy with horn rimmed glasses and some pencils sticking out of his pocket and all. He would listen to these guys screaming and yelling and reply in very dulcet tones about well we will look into that and thank you very much. That was his job, to catch flak. The Polynesians were "mau mauing," which was trying to scare the hell out of him.*

MOHR: So anyway I spent my time basically doing the office correspondence. I also was in charge of clearances throughout the building for policy papers. I would take, for example, a dozen of these long papers in shopping baskets and wheel them around the building, dropping them off in the various offices as required. Then I would follow up on the phone and bug the offices for their clearances. After about a year of this, with about six months to go on my assignment, I got a call from my personnel officer. He said they had a job for me in Taiwan. I was excited. I asked about the job, and he said it was to be the non-immigrant visa officer. I had no idea what the job was really like, but I told him I had two requirements. I wanted to be able to speak Chinese, and meet Chinese people. My personnel officer chuckled, and said those two requirements would surely be met. So I was very happy and thought the foreign service was the best. Of course I had no clue that in my desire to be a China expert, I would be starting at the very bottom, interviewing non-immigrant visa applicants.

It was not all the foreign service's fault that the job turned out to be so bad. Naturally, there was a lot of misrepresentation. People said they just wanted a tourist visa to go to the States, and then on day one after arriving in the U.S. would head over to the immigration and naturalization service (INS) and apply to adjust status to be an immigrant, to stay in the U.S. You knew this because every month copies of the INS application forms of people you had issued tourist visas to would appear on your desk. They were particularly noticeable because the INS adjustment of status forms were printed on blue paper. For the first several months of my job, I interviewed between 30-40 applicants per day. This wasn't too bad. However, in October 1971, Taiwan got kicked out of the United Nations, as the People's Republic of China (PRC) was voted in. There was mild panic in Taiwan. People thought that it would be best, just in case China decided to invade, to have a tourist visa to the U.S. as insurance. So in a very short period of time, visa applications jumped from about 40 per day to over 160 per day. They quadrupled. And I was the only visa officer. We were a three-person office. Besides myself, there was the consul, a very kind-hearted man, and a very nice woman who did American citizen services. Occasionally, the consul, who spoke Chinese, would help out, but essentially I was on my own. After trying to get help, State replied that I would be replaced by two people when my tour ended, but because training took so long, I just had to hold the fort in the interim. It was very stressful, so I was extremely happy to see my tour end. I guess there is some benefit, when you're starting out your career, to have your worst job at the beginning.

*Q: What was the sort of, I mean I realize you were besieged with your non-immigrants. What was the political situation in Taiwan in that period?*

MOHR: Chang Kai-shek was president. It was a dictatorship, but it functioned fairly smoothly.

*Q: Was there still the tremendous tension between the Kuomintang and the Taiwanese?*

MOHR: Oh yes, most definitely. But the Taiwanese were allowed a safety valve in the business sphere. As long as they stuck to making money, they were fine. They were not allowed into politics, or into the military at the officer level; that was the purview of the mainlanders.

*Q: Was there concern about the mainland Chinese invading. I mean real concern?*

MOHR: Yes, there was concern, but for those without means, there was not much they could do. For those with means, it was time to get a U.S. visa.

*Q: What language were you speaking, Mandarin, Cantonese, or Taiwanese?*

MOHR: I spoke Mandarin. I later figured out that trying to communicate in Mandarin to the visa applicants was a bad idea, since they had the upper hand, since their language ability was obviously better than mine. So when I could, I used a translator, and then I could appear as the stony-faced higher official, rather than the hesitating person trying to speak their language.

*Q: Was there much of a pressure group in the United States working on your visas, I mean Senators and so on?*

MOHR: Yes. All the time, and it drove me crazy. For example, Taiwan had a law that if a male was 16 years old he couldn't go overseas until completing his required military service. So many 15 year-olds would apply to visit their grandmothers whom they had never known. I would reject these applicants. Then State would forward a letter from some Senator or Congressman, demanding to know why I had rejected the fine brother of some person who, while housing the grandmother, was probably not even a U.S. citizen. I wondered why the visa office at State, who knew the regulation regarding military service in Taiwan, would not answer the letter, but instead passed the buck to a junior officer.

*Q: What about social life there?*

MOHR: Let's see, I married someone I met in Peace Corps, just before entering the foreign service. My first child, Jennifer, was born on Taiwan, so that kept us busy. There was a large U.S. military presence, so you could use all their facilities, such as movies and the post exchange. My wife also got a job helping edit an English language magazine devoted to Chinese culture. Occasionally, we would take trips around the island.

*Q: So you were on Taiwan until what, 1971?*

MOHR: From 1971 to 1973. Things looked up as my next assignment was advanced language training in Taichung. That would get my ticket punched into the China club.

*Q: This is still in Taiwan.*

MOHR: Right. Taipei is on the northern part of the island, and Taichung is toward the center, on

the western side. The school, which was run by the State Department but was actually the advanced Chinese language school for the entire U.S. government, was in Taichung at the time. After normalization with China, the school moved to Taipei.

*Q: How did you find this year?*

MOHR: I loved it. I had a house with a double yard, and one yard had a volleyball court. Every Saturday, I was host to my schoolmates, who came there to play volleyball and let off some steam. During the week, studying was intense. We had about five hours of class work and five hours of homework per day. The volleyball was a great outlet.

**WARD BARMON**  
**Chinese Language Training, Foreign Service Institute**  
**Washington, DC (1971-1972)**

**Economic Officer/Assistant commercial Attaché**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1972-1974)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1974-1975)**

*Ward Barmon was born in Huntington, Long Island in 1943. He graduated with a double major in American and Chinese history from Yale University and then studied at the University of Madrid for a year before coming into the Foreign Service in 1967. In 1992 he served as Director of the Narcotics Affairs section in Bogota, Colombia. In addition to Colombia, he was posted to Belize, Taiwan, Thailand, El Salvador, and Honduras.*

*Q: Today is the 27<sup>th</sup> of July 1998. This is an interview with Ward Barmon. This is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*To begin with, can you tell me when and where you were born and a bit about your family?*

BARMON: Sure. I was born in Huntington, Long Island in 1943. My father was an airline executive for most of his career. We lived in Lima, Peru, from 1947 to 1951. He worked for Panagra and then worked for Civil Air Transport. We lived in Hong Kong and Taipei, Taiwan from 1954 to 1956. Then, my mother and brother and I moved back to Long Island and Dad retired in 1972. So, that is a little of how I grew up partly overseas.

*Q: Did you pick up Spanish?*

BARMON: Yes, which I subsequently lost and had to relearn.

*Q: That's the name of the game. Then you went to Hong Kong?*

BARMON: Yes, for a year in 1954. Then we went to Taipei and lived there for a year.

*Q: I don't imagine that you got much Chinese as a kid?*

BARMON: Just swear words, basically. Then I studied Chinese at FSI later.

*Q: When you came back where did you go to school?*

*Q: When you left Hotchkiss did you have any idea of why you wanted to go to Yale?*

BARMON: Well, it was a popular school among Hotchkiss students. I really did not want to go to such a large University, but my father pushed me towards it. So, I ended up there and loved it.

*Q: You said your major was Chinese studies?*

BARMON: Well, at Yale, at least in my day, you had to do a double area major in history. So, I majored in American and Asian history. I was pre-med, too, but it did not last that long.

*Q: Was there still a tradition about Yale and China? Were you getting reflections of that?*

BARMON: I believe so. I did not express an interest in the Yale/China Program. I was more interested in studying for my Ph.D. in Chinese history. One of my professor's, Mrs. Wright discouraged me. Well, she did not discourage me, she just said to come back when I have studied Chinese/ Mandarin, French, and German at least so I could speak and read those languages.

*Q: That was pretty daunting.*

BARMON: It was, and it effectively discouraged me from pursuing an academic career in Chinese history.

*Q: Was there any thrust, would you say to the Chinese history? Were you getting much about what was going on in China at the time about the "Great Leap Forward" and the Cultural Revolution?*

BARMON: Most of the courses that I took were prior to that period. Mrs. Wright taught modern Chinese history, but it only went up to the 1911 Revolution.

*Q: Had you picked up any feel for the Foreign Service at this point?*

BARMON: Yes, when we lived in Hong Kong we had some good friends whose father worked in the consulate general. That, I guess was my first taste. I also met some embassy people when I lived in Taipei, so that was perhaps my first exposure, my first interest.

*Q: When you got out of Yale in 1965, what then?*

*Q: At this point, did the NSC, did you pick up any emanations about Kissinger operations and*

*the White House bypassing the State Department?*

BARMON: Sure, what you read in the press. We were so busy, very active with a lot going on. So, I do not think we paid too much attention.

*Q: After the two staff assistant jobs, what then?*

BARMON: Then I studied Chinese.

*Q: And you studied Chinese starting 1971?*

BARMON: Yes, at FSI for a year. Then I went to Taipei in the embassy for two years and did not do my second year of Chinese until that.

*Q: So, you went straight to the embassy?*

BARMON: Yes.

*Q: Well, let us talk about 1971, 1972, the Chinese training. How did the Chinese sit with you?*

BARMON: Well, it is something that I always wanted to learn after living in Hong Kong and Taiwan. So, I got my chance; it was hard to get. I think a lot of the reason for going to the staff assistant job and EA was the hope to get Chinese from there. It is probably easier to get it from EA than from another job outside the Bureau. So, I was able to get Chinese training, but did not want to do two years in a row. It was an unusual way of doing it, but I am glad that it worked out that way.

*Q: How far along were you coming by 1972? Did you feel it was going fairly well?*

BARMON: Yes. I cannot remember exactly what I got, but almost nothing reading. You do not start your reading until your second year. I went to Taipei and got along fairly well with the Chinese on my job.

*Q: You were in Taipei from 1972 to 1974?*

BARMON: Yes.

*Q: How would you describe Taiwan and Taipei at this time?*

BARMON: Well, of course, I had the perspective of living over there in the mid 1950s when Taipei was very poor. There were very few automobiles on the streets. Many people were hungry, disease everywhere, entirely polluted. By the time I arrived in 1972, they outlawed burning of soft coal. People were in much better health. Taiwan started to produce for export, particularly textiles, electronics, and manufacturing components. So, when I was there, it really started to take off economically, but was still very backward and politically repressed. In those 15 years, it had progressed tremendously, and it was quite a different place.

*Q: Who was the ambassador there?*

BARMON: Walter McConaughy, a wonderful southern gentleman, and a Chinese language specialist. This was his last tour.

*Q: You were there during the opening to China? That must have been quite an earthquake!*

BARMON: Well, it was very traumatic for the Taiwanese, particularly the mainlanders. Yes, it was a difficult period. The Taiwanese adjusted fairly quickly, however. Shortly thereafter, we downgraded the embassy to an "Institute."

*Q: What were your interests?*

BARMON: I was the junior economic officer and also the assistant commercial attaché. So, I did a variety of things. The most interesting was the commercial side doing trade work, promoting American investments, and promoting Taiwanese purchasing in the U.S. It was wonderful. It was an ideal job because the Taiwanese had decided to buy from the United States. They wanted to try and keep us as close as possible. So, they would all of a sudden be sending a trade mission of 10 people to purchase, giving them 800 million dollars and saying do not come back until you spend it. So, this made my job quite easy! All I had to do was arrange appointments!

*Q: And take credit...*

BARMON: Oh, of course.

*Q: Did you find sort of an uneasiness towards the end?*

BARMON: Sure, there was a lot of uneasiness. They kept a very close eye on our assistance structure. Of course, we phased out AID in the mid 1960s, but military people were there, and we started to phase them out. Yes, they were very nervous about us abandoning them. And of course, we were among the last to leave. Taiwan was left with very few countries that had diplomatic relations: a few Latin American countries, a few African and Arab countries, and not much else.

*Q: Were getting much from them about what was going on in China itself?*

BARMON: Well, from the cable traffic and news media. Yes, a fair amount, there was a lot of information.

*Q: What about piracy of records, etc.?*

BARMON: There was patent and copyright infringement; there was a lot of that going on. We got involved to a certain extent, but there was not a great deal that we could do because the Taiwanese were very adept closing their operation and opening one three blocks away. The government would go through the motions, but it was pretty hard to catch these people.

*Q: Was that part of your job?*

BARMON: Yes.

*Q: I would think that you would have been sending reams of lists of pirated books, and records.*

BARMON: We did not spend a large amount of time doing that unless we got a specific complaint from a U.S. company. Then we would go in and encourage the U.S. company to hire a local lawyer after the company had already spent a considerable amount of money. As I said before, they would be successful in getting the operation close down, and three months later, it would open up three blocks away. I remember, Aladdin, you know, for Thermos bottles, drinks, those were being pirated like mad. I don't think we ever succeeded in totally closing them down. You could buy a whole set of Encyclopedia Britannica for \$50.00. Of course, the pictures were not very clear, and the print was smudged. I must confess, I bought a few pirated books myself.

*Q: I have one or two tucked away!*

BARMON: I do not think either government was too serious about going after these people.

*Q: In 1974, were there any demonstrations against the United States?*

BARMON: I do not remember. But there was a lot of noise in the media.

*Q: In 1974 did you go back to Chinese studies?*

BARMON: Yes.

*Q: By this time had you made pretty good progress in your speaking?*

BARMON: Well, yes and no. The problem is that those habits that become ingrained after two years of speaking, you have to break. That was the hardest part for me. That was the disadvantage that I had competing against those who had just come from FSI, who did not have those habits ingrained.

*Q: What habits are these?*

BARMON: Well these are ways of expressing yourself at the one plus, two level. Then, to get over that barrier to reach a three level, you have to break a lot of those phrases and patterns that you have memorized in order to learn new ones. It took me months before I was able to get back into the swing of things. The advantage was, I was perhaps fresher. I was more anxious to start than some of the other students who had already had a year of studying Chinese. Also, I had a certain level of confidence after using it for two years. I could express myself easily, but just not on a very educated level. I think the way I did it was good, at least for me. It was a useful way of doing it. I just did not want to study for two years in a row.

*Q: From the teachers there, were you getting much of the politics of Taiwan?*

BARMON: Oh, sure. Of course their biggest hatred was directed against the Japanese. Many if these were mainland teachers and they just hated the Japanese. But, of course the mainlanders hated the communists as well. So, we learned to take on some of their prejudices, especially against the Japanese. They just said awful things against the Japanese. They described them as “dwarf slaves.” Awful! I am not sure that I have ever gotten over that.

*Q: At one point I took Serbian for year with a couple of honest to God Serbs who fit in very nicely in the Serbian government in Belgrade today. We picked up all sorts of things about the Croats. Where did you go after you got out in 1975?*

BARMON: I thought I might be going to Beijing. We had just opened up an interests section in Beijing. George Bush was sent to head the interests section. I thought that I might be going as the economic officer, but one of my colleagues was selected. So, I was looking around for a job. Then, there was some kind of commercial conference going on in Taipei. I met the commercial attaché from Bangkok. We talked and I ended up going to Bangkok.

*Q: From 1975 to?*

BARMON: 1975 to the end of 1977.

*Q: Well, we will stop at this point for today, but when you left in 1985, where did you go?*

BARMON: Back to Washington. I went to the Economic/Commercial Policy Office of the ARA Bureau.

*Q: What about your wife, where did you meet her? How did she get into the business?*

BARMON: We met in Taipei. Her father was the assistant chief of staff of MAAG, the U.S. military assistance group. She finished to high school there. I went out for vacation and we met. We took an instant dislike to each other after having dinner, which was arranged and paid for by my father in good Chinese custom. We met again and dated a couple of times back here during college. We met again at Georgetown University, where we were both doing an MA. We married shortly thereafter. She was a Spanish teacher. She taught in Belize, Taiwan, and Thailand. In the early 1970s, we had two daughters and she was pressuring me to get out. Instead, I said, “Why don’t you try to get in?” So, she took the test and passed. She came in and we went through a tremendous problem trying to get an assignment together. That is why we ended up in El Salvador.

*Q: I guess there was not a lot of competition.*

*Q: When you left in 1994, where did you go? What job did you have?*

BARMON: I came back to Washington. I worked in the Economic Bureau for a few months working on some of the summit of the Americas issues in the Investment Office. There was not

enough work for me to do, so I moved to the International Organization Bureau in their Economic and Social Affairs Office. I was there for about six months and then went to the retirement course.

*Q: What was your impression of working on international organizations?*

BARMON: I think the people in IO were dedicated, worked hard, and felt it was useful. A lot of it was frustrating because working with these large, international, bureaucratic organizations, it was difficult to get anything done. People went about their day to day jobs. I think the feeling was now that the UN was less ideological with the end of the Cold War, that we could get more done. It was difficult because the U.S. was way behind in its dues, so we received a lot of criticism. Despite that, we were able to do a lot because the situation was more normal. Not everything was the U.S. and its allies against the Soviet Union and its allies. Before the end of the Cold War, everything turned into an ideological confrontation in the UN.

*Q: What particular aspect of this did you have?*

BARMON: I worked on some international conferences - for example, the Conference on Social Affairs in Copenhagen. I worked a little bit on the Beijing Women's Conference. I did a lot less on that. They needed some help staffing up the Copenhagen conference and I helped out there. Then, since the position in the Economic and Social Affairs Office covering Asia was vacant, I filled in there and went to the biannual meeting of ESCAP in Bangkok.

*Q: What about the conference in Copenhagen on social affairs? I thought we had moved out of UNESCO. Where were you a member of UNESCO?*

BARMON: We were not, but we were still very involved in this conference. We were one of the prime pushers for the Conference on Social Affairs. Hillary Clinton ended up going over for a couple of days. It was a very high level delegation and we worked very closely with a lot of non-governmental groups here in the States. We were very interested in the issues. We did a lot of work on that conference.

*Q: Your dealing with the women's conference in Beijing, what was the feeling about how that one went?*

BARMON: Well, again, I did not work closely on it. I was more of an observer. I think people were happy in the end. There was a great deal of consternation in the beginning of the conference because of the way the NGOs were treated by the Chinese. I think the conference, in the end was a success.

*Q: When did you leave the Foreign Service?*

BARMON: At the end of September 1995.

**WILLIAM H. GLEYSTEN**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1971-1974)**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary, EAP**  
**Washington, DC (1974-1976)**

**National Security Council**  
**Washington, DC (1976-1977)**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary, EAP**  
**Washington, DC (1977-1978)**

*Ambassador Gleysteen was born in China of Missionary parents. Educated at Yale and Harvard Universities, he entered the Foreign Service in 1951. After service in the State Department's Executive Secretariat, Mr. Gleysteen studied Chinese and was subsequently posted to Taipei, Hong Kong, and to Seoul, Korea, where he served as Ambassador from 1978 to 1981. He also served in Washington with the National Security Council and in the State Department as Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. The Ambassador was interviewed by Thomas Stern in 1997.*

*Q: In 1971, you were assigned as DCM of our Embassy in Taipei. How did that come about?*

GLEYSTEN: When my tour in INR was coming to an end, I asked Marshall Green whether there were any opportunities for me in the Far East. He sent me to Paul Cleveland, who was then his executive assistant. Paul asked whether I would be interested in the DCM position in Taiwan. I jumped at the chance.

There was a possible hitch. I had known Ambassador McConaughy since Tokyo days and got along well with him, but his views and mine were quite disparate on the issue of policy toward the PRC. Marshall doubted that this would be a barrier; I wanted to ask McConaughy personally. So I wrote him a letter. His reply was gracious. Acknowledging our differences, he said that he respected my views and did not believe they should adversely affect our working relations. I found that to be generous to a fault; I don't think I would have accepted a DCM with views so different from mine.

As I reflect back on my second tour in Taiwan, four things come to mind: the striking change within the embassy from the intellectually constipated, conservative administration of Rankin to the humane if still conservative approach of McConaughy; the stunning shift in our China policy that coincided with my arrival; political changes within Taiwan; and the beginnings of real prosperity on the island.

In contrast to the 1950s, my policy views were never an issue during the second round; Ambassador McConaughy treated me as trustworthy. We disagreed openly about normalization of relations with the PRC and later we disagreed on what was going to happen to Taiwan. These

were gentlemanly disagreements. To some extent, I think McConaughy - by now about 62 - understood that a new era in policy was emerging and that he belonged to a generation that was passing from the scene. In any event, he was showing his age. He no longer defended his position with the verve he used to display. He had already decided this Taiwan assignment was to be his last, and he allowed me - even encouraged me - to do things that I, had I been ambassador, would have reserved for myself. For example, I wrote the commentaries on reports of his meetings with Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and his father, President Chiang Kai-shek. I tried hard to avoid any obvious disjuncture with his opinions, but inevitably there was a new flavor of the changing times. I suspect Washington may have been amazed sometimes by the ambassador's commentaries which were much more in tune with its thinking than previously. The same was true for assessments of developments in Taiwan and the region. He let me proceed with my analysis and encouraged me to express my views, for example in a briefing of Congressmen where we were both present. I never dared ask him why he was giving me so much leeway, but I don't think our differences led to any serious problems and they may have well have served a useful purpose.

Our staff knew of our differences. Political section officers more or less shared my opinions, and if they encountered difficulties with the ambassador, they would come to me, assuming I could take care of it. Bill Morell, the economic counselor and a very savvy older officer who had been in Taiwan for quite a long time, understood the economy far better than I and also felt confident of his political grasp. Of the key officers he was the only one who leaned decidedly in the ambassador's direction. There were a few occasions early on when he felt that the ambassador would be more sympathetic than I and got his approval before talking to me. That practice didn't last very long. Morell, who was a good man, became a good friend and we worked cooperatively.

Although we obviously didn't advertise our differences to people on the outside, government officials and political leaders - both the Kuomintang and Taiwanese opposition elements - were certainly aware of them.

The ambassador and I carried on in friendly disagreement for about two years. In 1974 he was replaced by Leonard Unger, following a gap during which I acted as charge'. Unger asked me to stay for the balance of my tour. This was after President Nixon's visit to PRC and the Shanghai Communique, a watershed development in East Asia that fundamentally changed the environment of our China policy.

The overwhelming event for me in Taiwan was this change in our China policy, a change that was sprung on us by stealth and carried out by Nixon and Kissinger with a degree of clumsiness toward Taiwan that contrasted with the exquisite care they devoted to the concerns of the PRC. Our first news in Taipei was an informal phone call from a desk officer in the State Department alerting us to an important announcement about to be made by the White House. A few minutes later we received a flash message with the text or essence of the president's statement about Kissinger's trip and his own plan to visit China before May of 1972. Coming from the conservative, anti-communist leader of the United States of America, this was indeed a big deal, and, along with most others, we had been left entirely out of the loop. If I as a person who supported the change in our policy viewed our behavior in this manner, you can imagine the

effect on Walter McConaughy, a conservative gentleman of the old school thoroughly entwined in our moral crusade against communism.

The historic announcement was made in July 1971 about a week after my arrival in Taipei. Unaware of White House maneuvers, McConaughy had underestimated portents of change. I, although expecting the administration to crack the China door open, thought that it would approach the PRC cautiously and certainly give us notice. We were both jolted by the news. The ambassador was outraged. He felt he had been done in along with his friends in the Republic of China, allies of long standing. Apart from petty feelings of annoyance about being deliberately cut out of such an important process, I was mostly concerned by the speed and abruptness of the change, fearing it could easily result in unintended consequences. In essence, McConaughy was uncomfortable if not entirely opposed to recognition of the PRC; if the PRC was to be recognized, he would insist on maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan. I was sure Beijing would never accept such an arrangement. Yet I had much sympathy for the population of Taiwan and believed we could and should find a way to accommodate their basic needs.

Once we had overcome our astonishment and differing reactions to the news, the ambassador and I turned to practical concerns. We knew the Kuomintang authorities would be astounded that we had taken this action without any kind of notification or consultation with them. Chiang Kai-shek had probably been assuming the status quo would be everlasting; his son, Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and the operational ruler of Taiwan, may have been mentally prepared for some change but surely would be shaken. Almost all people would be worried, and many, including nationalistic party members, would be furious. At a minimum, we would face the excruciating discomfort of trying to explain a policy about which we were uninformed. We expected the leadership would probably keep negative reactions under control, but we were not sure. I naturally remembered the sacking of the embassy fourteen years earlier during my first tour in Taipei, a nationalistic frenzy indulged by the authorities if not actually stimulated by them. It was not a morale-booster to be back in the same building, wondering how crowds might behave this time.

Not having been prepared for a change of policy, either by their own government or by us, ordinary citizens of Taiwan were obviously surprised and confused. Most of them probably found it hard to believe that the U.S. would recognize the PRC or withdraw recognition of Taiwan. They knew their island was the location of important U.S. bases and manufacturing operations for big American companies. No one welcomed the announcement, except a few members of the minority favoring Taiwan independence. The huge majority of Taiwanese, including most independence advocates, were more realistic. While happy to see the end of U.S. support for Chiang's claim to the mainland, they worried that Taiwan would be dangerously isolated. Quite uniformly, people of recent mainland extraction feared that the U.S. change would undermine their status and growing prosperity.

These popular views did not become immediately clear. In the first rash of reactions in the press controlled by the regime there was a tone of "down with the US, we have been betrayed," but there were also comments from some sober observers who analyzed the situation judiciously. The most worrisome noises came from deliberations within the Kuomintang party structure where, for a day or two, some quite senior people talked of violent actions against the US.

We worried about demonstrations. In fact, the government must have shared our concern, because shortly after the announcement they sizeably increased the police presence around the chancery, the ambassador's residence and my house. Lamp posts, walls, and other inviting places were plastered with anti-American slogans - rather like the protest style of the communists in Beijing. Although the situation was tense and worrisome, McConaughy and I felt the regime would not allow matters to get out of hand. We warned our staff to be careful, nevertheless. Fortunately, we were right. The leaders let their Kuomintang colleagues blow off steam and then quelled radical talk; they called us in to make strong remonstrances about our obligations as an ally, etc.; and then the tensions eased. No violence was tolerated for seven years - until the final outburst during Christopher's negotiations for our post-diplomatic relations in 1978.

The process by which we in the embassy - as well as the leaders and people of Taiwan - learned of what our government had in mind was shapeless and confusing, surprisingly clumsy for men who prided themselves on their acute understanding. Little advance thought had been given to the operational issues. Political bromides, such as Nixon's assertion that "our action in seeking a new relationship with the People's Republic of China will not be at the expense of old friends," were viewed with proper cynicism in Asia. Within a fairly short period of time people in Taiwan suspected they were an annoying fragment complicating the implementation of a grand American strategy devised in Washington.

At the beginning stage, I did not feel so critical of our "planning," and I never wavered from my basic support of Nixon's intent. After months of unsuccessful attempts to get meaningful infractions from Washington, however, I was really disturbed and quite angry. The ambassador was less inhibited by lack of instructions; he stuck his neck out in assuring Taiwan's leadership that we would not be withdrawing our support of them. Washington's instructions were minimal - primarily because the State Department and its East Asian Bureau knew little more than we did about what our leaders really had in mind about time tables and specific actions. In this atmosphere of basic ignorance, McConaughy chose to emphasize the happy side, presenting the issue as a long term one, unlikely to harm our ties to an old ally. Although I did my best to keep up people's courage, I suggested with increasing frequency that it was only a matter of time - within the foreseeable future - before we withdrew our military forces from Taiwan and extended diplomatic recognition to the PRC.

McConaughy's optimism was shaken in late 1971 when the U.S. effort to introduce a dual representation formula into the UN failed and resulted in Taiwan's expulsion from the organization, an event that stunned the people of Taiwan. That year, the State Department had finally gotten White House approval to propose an arrangement that would have given China's seat on the Security Council and General Assembly to the PRC but preserved a place for Taiwan in the Assembly. It was a scheme that I had promoted vigorously in earlier years. Kissinger had opposed it in 1970 as unworkable but had relented in the new atmosphere of 1971. Taiwan was bullied into submission. In retrospect, I am sure Kissinger was right about his original prediction of a negative, zero-sum reaction from the PRC. More to the point, he must have known the prospects for success were minimal after his spectacular visit to Beijing in July. This caused a huge shift in voting patterns among countries that had chafed so long under our old policy. The Chinese arranged a humiliating defeat for our position, and Taiwan was out of the UN. This was

lesson number one for them about the implications of our new strategy.

Lesson number two was the Shanghai Communique issued on February 28, 1972 at the conclusion of President Nixon's visit to China. The key section read:

The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

Along with others, we learned in advance from the *New York Times* something of the communique's content and the course of its evolution. We were not given a text until just before its issuance, and our efforts by telegram, helpful visitors, etc. to get some exegesis were unsuccessful. I was rather relieved by the communique, because it clearly identified the issue of peaceful resolution and suggested gradualism in the process of normalization. I took exception, however, to the blatant falsehood of its assertion about "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait" agreeing there was "but one China." Our Kuomintang friends couldn't contradict this clever manipulation of their pretense about sovereignty over the mainland, but our Taiwanese friends - both moderates and extremists - were outraged. Personally, I saw no reason why the U.S. could not have adopted the Japanese or Canadian formula (i.e., "take note of" or "acknowledge" the Chinese position) that was less offensive. Marshall Green tried to get this language modified but didn't succeed. At the time, I thought the American authors were ignorant of conditions in Taiwan, and my later experience working with them convinced me that my deduction was correct.

My criticism did not detract from my basic support of the Shanghai Communique, and I did my best to use this one-and-only guide for the conduct of our extremely delicate operations in Taiwan. Ambassador McConaughy, burned by the July, 1971 announcement and the UN defeat, also took hope from a document that did not announce an explicit timetable for normalization. The phrasing of the communique was a work of art subject to different interpretations. I thought it meant that we would eventually terminate diplomatic relations with Taiwan; McConaughy didn't. Marshall Green, who was despatched along with John Holdridge from the NSC to tell us what it meant, refused to settle our argument but he noted the absence of any flat commitment to normalize. This encouraged McConaughy. He could not conceive that his country would de-recognize an old ally.

Among all groups in Taiwan the communique was a hot topic for discussion. We were subjected to lots of angry criticism, especially for the language I have highlighted. Native Taiwanese were extremely critical of the text. They questioned our right to set policy that would govern their lives. Some did not agree with our basic premise; i.e. that Chinese on Taiwan wished to have one nation. They were interested in independence, not one China, particularly one run by Beijing. Along with almost everybody else on Taiwan, the independence advocates worried about their future and the possibility of a cut-off of military supplies. Mainlanders feared the collapse of their universe. Despite vociferous criticism, I also detected a sense of relief in many quarters that

the United States had not said something even more radical.

The third lesson for Taiwan was that the US military presence really was going to be withdrawn. This was the most operational effect of the new policy. Predominantly, our military base facilities and forces were in Taiwan to support our war effort in Vietnam. The most important facility was CCK Airbase near Taichung used for logistic purposes and refueling of aircraft such as B-52 bombers headed for Vietnam. Further south we had a Cold War strike base for F-4 aircraft along with a small complement of nuclear weapons. There were also other facilities scattered around the island for a variety of purposes, including rehabilitation of aircraft and tanks. Seventh Fleet ships made frequent use of the port facilities in Chilung and Kaohsiung, and the Commander of the US Taiwan Defense Command was a three star admiral. The arrangements struck me as serving a useful purpose so long as the Vietnam war was going on. I should mention that we also had a MAAG for military supplies and training purposes.

Almost immediately after the July 1971 announcement and very actively after the Shanghai Communique, we assumed in the embassy that we should prepare for the phase out of our forces and certainly discourage our military from any thoughts of expanding activities. I wasn't sure what would happen with the MAAG; I hoped we could reach some agreement that would leave a military assistance component on Taiwan. This was an uncomfortable prospect for McConaughy, but I don't recall much resistance from him. Our military commanders, however, were on a quite different wave length, particularly since Washington delayed so long in providing us with so much as a sketch of a withdrawal plan. CINCPAC had little appreciation of what was going on in Washington, and the Seventh Fleet and Taiwan Defense Commanders had even less. They didn't want to think about withdrawals; they even spoke of beefing up forces. The JCS in Washington, who were closer to senior policy makers, had more than an inkling of what might happen, but they were in no hurry to issue guidance until ordered by the president.

Feeling more strongly about this than the ambassador, I struggled to get Washington to rein in our local military and introduce some realism about our new policy. I failed, and we were left dangling in Taiwan. As a result we sometimes had senior military personnel from the Pacific commands, including CINCPAC himself, reassuring their Taiwan counterparts that all would be well.

To make matters worse, we asked a big favor of Taiwan. I am embarrassed not to remember whether it preceded or followed our first notification on force withdrawals, but the impact would have been equally confusing in policy terms. When we reached our first fragile agreement with North Vietnam in 1972, we suddenly realized we were short of aircraft to beef up the South Vietnamese Air Force in the window of time before we would have to cease our own operations. We needed about a hundred or so F-5A,B planes used by the South Vietnamese, and we turned to Taiwan for help. Taiwan had plenty of these aircraft that were being phased out in favor of new F-5Es to be co-produced with Northrop in Taiwan.

After getting instructions from highest authority in Washington, McConaughy, the Taiwan defense commander, and I promptly called on Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo and the chairman of the Taiwan JCS. Not surprisingly, they agreed and were able satisfy our needs quickly. In partial return for this, we guaranteed eventual U.S. Government approval of the F-5E co-

production agreement, an action that might otherwise have been de-railed by the Shanghai Communique.

Chiang obviously saw the longer term benefit of doing us this favor, and we were pleased to have been able to accommodate Washington so rapidly. The net effect, however, was politically confusing - on the Taiwan leadership, on our military commanders, and on Ambassador McConaughy. To varying degrees, they were briefly lulled into hoping our force withdrawals from Taiwan would be postponed indefinitely. In fact, there was a modest build up of American forces in Taiwan for a few months to reinforce our resumed bombing efforts against North Vietnam. I remained sure, however, that we would have to give up our military structure on Taiwan.

In any event, it was not long before we had to tell Taiwan we were about to begin staged withdrawal from the island. The ambassador and I made the initial presentation of our plans to Chiang Ching-kuo who took the news glumly but without great resistance. Over the next year or so we continued the process and after Ambassador McConaughy left for Washington, first for consultations and then retirement, I carried on alone. Our meetings with Chiang were not to seek concurrence; we phrased our remarks in the most diplomatic terms possible, but we had no intention of allowing Taiwan to interfere with our plans. As the embassy's point man, I found this a very difficult task, far more delicate than most. Boiled down to its essence, our message was as follows: to fulfill President Nixon's commitment to your enemy in the Chinese civil war, we are removing our military presence from your country. We know you are a long standing ally of the United States, and we of course support the right of your people to peace and security.

Understandably Taiwan was very unhappy about what we were doing to them. In these circumstances I was most impressed by Chiang's conduct, less so by his stubborn subordinates. At one point, the Taiwan side deliberately leaked information in violation of an explicit understanding not to do so. Partly to signify I was a loyal US team member, I asked Washington to order me to see Chiang. I called on him alone and, speaking in reasonably good Chinese, braced him with our strong objection. Apart from this and a few other problems, Taiwan sensibly did not give us a hard time over the withdrawals - probably less than our own commanders. The process of notification was virtually complete by the time Ambassador Unger took over, although the final withdrawals, the F-4s, intelligence facilities, and headquarters structure, took place after I returned to Washington in 1974.

The most important issue for Taiwan, i.e., the ultimate significance of all that was happening to the country, was not at all clear to anybody during my service in Taipei. In what time frame would the U.S. normalize relations with the PRC? What would be the effect on Taiwan's status? Would a U.S. presence remain on the island? Would the defense commitment remain? Would Taiwan be able to procure arms? etc. For understandable reasons Washington could not provide clear answers to any of these questions, but it could have done much better in helping us cope with Taiwan's trauma. It did not do so, I believe, largely because the White House was playing its cards very close to its chest and did not trust the State Department, which was unable to make a case on our behalf. Thus instead of a consistent U.S. message, people in Taiwan were subjected to confusing voices from Americans with different opinions.

Looking back now, it is interesting that the closest thing to an answer about Taiwan's future status came not from the US but from Japan. When Japan raced ahead of us in 1972 to normalize relations with the PRC, they faced many of the same problems that would complicate our negotiations. Although Japan's arrangements for Taiwan were governed by their discussions with the PRC, they also had to be acceptable to the Taiwan authorities. This led to a drawn out negotiation in Taipei as well as Tokyo - with both help and interference from the governing Liberal Democratic Party. The Japanese ambassador in Taipei, who was a friend of many years, kept me well informed of this process, and I reported it in great detail to Washington.

At the time I got no reaction from Washington, although there was great interest in the Japanese experience. Effectively, Japan cut off all official relations with Taiwan, but preserved a wide range of unofficial relations by means of a facade which was tolerable, if not entirely "acceptable" to the PRC. Granting that the Japanese didn't have to cope with the security issue, their experience was nevertheless very pertinent to what we might eventually do. Japan, the PRC, and Taiwan were quite aware of this as they negotiated the details.

In the absence of guidance on how to deal with these long range issues, our job in Taipei amounted to damage control, and we went about it in different ways. The ambassador never abandoned hope that we would maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, and he was very sincere if somewhat misleading in his repeated expressions of continuity of policy. Convinced this was impossible, I plugged for maintaining as much of a relationship with Taiwan as could be salvaged. Even after losing its UN membership and diplomatic status, I thought Taiwan could survive as a national entity and prosper economically very much as it has. My main concern was that the process of change be orderly and systematic so as not to endanger Taiwan's political stability or security. In these early days I had some embryonic views on how we should maintain non-diplomatic relations and defense cooperation with Taiwan, but these did not crystalize until I returned to Washington.

Although McConaughy and I tried, when talking to the authorities and citizens of Taiwan, to maintain a common line of "reassurance" about U.S. constancy toward friends, our differing visions of the future were fairly apparent, and they were exposed when we had visitors. We had lots of visitors with a wide range of views: admirals who talked to us as though we would have perpetual military access to Taiwan; senators and congressmen who told us they had been assured by Nixon that the policy was just what had been publicly stated - no more, no less. Our visitors spoke in the same vein to Taiwan parsonages. The overall impact of visitor comments was to reduce the sense of alarm on Taiwan.

Of course, we had a few visitors who told us in confidence that they expected sharp departures from current policy, and over time they turned out to be three-quarters right. My sense was that the future might be somewhat between the extremes. In any event, I was desperate to know more about what was going on in Washington. With the ambassador's approval, I wrote and phoned Marshall Green, but I must say that my probing was not very successful. I then asked that I be allowed to return to Washington for consultations, and my request was approved, but not for quite a while, and the result was not very productive. Although Marshall was slowly getting some grasp of the Taiwan issue, he was still being kept at arms length by the White House. John Holdridge, my former boss, friend, and colleague in the NSC, was sympathetic but unable to cut

me in. I returned to Taipei little better informed.

Although the watershed Shanghai Communique provided us a kind of blueprint, it was vague on key points and left most questions unanswered. What I hoped for was an authoritative, two-sided message from Washington. For Taiwan I wanted as much reassurance as Nixon could give about protecting Taiwan's basic needs. For ourselves, and especially our military representatives, I wanted forthright guidance about force withdrawals. I have already explained that we didn't get the latter until late in the game. On the former, however, President Nixon was responsive, perhaps overly so, before his visit to China. I had the impression he really wanted to maintain close relationships with Taiwan as long as he could - unlike Kissinger who shunned the place. He had some respect for Chiang Kai-shek, and he was willing to listen to the Walter McConaughys and Ronald Reagans of the world. In response to McConaughy's request, he selected Ronald Reagan, then Governor of California, as his personal representative to visit Taiwan in the fall of 1971 to assure Chiang Kai-shek and the people that the United States would behave responsibly.

Reagan carried out his mission with zeal. We wrote his speech, blending the kind of sentiments we knew he would want to express within the strictures of the newly emerging policy, and limiting promises as much as we could. It was much more the kind of speech I would have given, than the more positive and hopeful version that McConaughy would have provided. Reagan dutifully delivered the speech as we had written it, but in his answers to questions he spoke for himself, sounding much more like McConaughy than Gleysteen and wandering way out of line in talking about the future. The ambassador and Reagan hit it off very well. Chiang Kai-shek was reassured, Chiang Ching-kuo may have been slightly reassured, and the tame media loved it. Unfortunately, Reagan's answers were misleading; he was speaking for himself, not Nixon and Kissinger. Some elements of the bureaucracy, media, and commercial community understood this. They were more sophisticated and understood the situation better than their bosses. Anyway, we got more reassurance than I thought was wise!

The kind of easy reassurances offered by Reagan were undercut by the Shanghai Communique a few months later. By this time, I had become more pushy in expressing my own views, because I was convinced they were more in line with administration policy. I assumed the U.S. would recognize the PRC relatively soon, that Taiwan would survive and prosper, and that one way or another we would help ensure Taiwan's security. With the ambassador and American colleagues - civilian and military - I talked very frankly this way. After we had begun our military withdrawals, I also became more and more frank with Taiwan citizens - by this time with the full approval of a new ambassador. I tried to conduct these conversations on an off-the-record basis, and I had little trouble doing so, because the regime, with strong powers of censorship, didn't want my remarks to become public. In discussions with high officials I was circumspect, but if asked, I responded frankly. I had no occasion to talk about grand strategy with Chiang Ching-kuo; if I had I would have probably pulled my punches without offering false consolation about the future.

By the time Unger arrived, the situation in Washington had stabilized. Through informal channels and with the passage of time, we managed to get a better understanding of what was going on. We became more active; I stuck my neck out pretty far by end of my tour. I gave a

number of background interviews to editors in which I warned them that a change in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship was bound to happen. I gave these interviews with Unger's blessing, and we reported what I was doing to Washington. This was a painful process for both sides. Although many persons did not want to hear my conclusions, I think I people in Taiwan considered me "an honest man," and I finally gained respect from the regime when my predictions turned out to be right on the money. People probably felt that McConaughy was "morally" right, but that Unger and I were more in step with the times.

The embassy's situation was unprecedented, at least in my experience. First and most extraordinary, we were not consulted by our own leaders about a major change of policy radically affecting our country assignment. Second, we were given virtually no guidance about what to say to our host regime. Third, there was a split in the embassy front office as to where policy was going - or should be going. Obviously, all of this had a impact on the staff who were left with many questions and few answers. Nevertheless, morale was good. As I have mentioned, most of the staff saw East Asia more or less as I did. I think most of them felt that our opening to the PRC was a very significant shift that was bound to occur sooner or later. All, including two ambassadors, felt that it was handled badly on the Taiwan end. There was no way major surgery could have been painless, but with more care we might have been able to soften the hurt for our friends in Taiwan.

Nixon and Kissinger chose to circumvent the normal channels when they moved almost overnight to change the direction of our foreign policy. I think they paid inadequate attention to the effect of the new policy on Taiwan and the nervousness that it created in Korea and other East Asian countries, particularly Japan. I know their justification for being unorthodox, and I would have a hard time arguing they should have relied more heavily on Secretary Rogers. But at least they could have used Marshall Green, who was the Department's stalwart in this process, and they could have assembled an inside team at the NSC with some Taiwan competence. Fortunately, the Department came back to life when Kissinger moved over to become the secretary of state.

In Taiwan we were exposed to decisions one at a time, which made it difficult for us conduct ourselves in ways that would cause the least possible damage in Taiwan. We were very upset by these tactics and continually tried to find out from Washington what might be coming next. For many reasons, this was not possible during the early stages of normalization. Certainly the State Department did not have the blue prints. I am not sure that Kissinger did either. In his talks with the PRC after the Nixon visit he discussed possible formulas for recognition as well as the timetable for force withdrawal from Taiwan, and we now know that Nixon pledged to complete the process after the election in 1976. Although Kissinger apparently assumed fairly rapid progress, the process was, in fact, quite drawn out. Nixon's and Kissinger's hopes that their new policy would induce the PRC to put heavy pressure on the Vietnamese were disappointed. Dealing with Taiwan's future security proved more complicated and more politically sensitive than anticipated. The failure in the UN came as somewhat of a surprise; until things fell apart, we thought we could hold the line in the UN for at least another year. Then came the final demands of the Vietnam War followed by Nixon's resignation. Whatever neat plans may have existed in leaders' minds, these events gave our Taiwan policy an *ad hoc* quality it didn't deserve.

Having been at the receiving end in Taipei, I developed a very active interest in trying to protect Taiwan as much as possible within the constraints of the new policy. Just as in my final months in Taipei, I insisted on calling a spade a spade in my dealings with Taiwan representatives after I returned to Washington to serve under Phil Habib. Moreover, I made a point of telling representatives of the PRC that they didn't understand what was going on in Taiwan, and I tried to explain to them what I saw as the important characteristics of the islands. I was filled with missionary zeal on this subject.

Enough about the effects of our new China policy. We didn't spend all of our time taking things apart in Taiwan. In fact, the negative impact of the Nixon switch coincided with the emergence of very positive trends within Taiwan, political as well as economic. Since I have already touched on this elsewhere I can be relatively brief.

When I returned in 1971 for my second tour in Taipei, Taiwan was undergoing great political change, not dramatically from a police state to a democracy as in later years, but nevertheless significant. Although Chiang Kai-shek was still alive, his almost exclusive focus on return to the mainland no longer governed events. Both he and his preoccupations had virtually disappeared. The new focus was on Taiwan's development. The economy was enjoying rapid growth thanks to well managed export industries and extensive connections with the US and Japan. The old socialist industrial sector was being privatized, and market forces were being allowed to play a major role. Standards of living were rising rapidly.

Most significant for the democratic pattern of today, Taiwan's new leadership under President Chiang's son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was co-opting growing numbers of the native Taiwanese community into the government, the Kuomintang, and the army - even slowly into the senior officer corps. Police state controls were being softened; political power was beginning to be shared; and Taiwan had become a very egalitarian, educated, and socially mobile society.

To be sure, there were more than a few ugly traces of the old regime. Mainlanders still dominated the government and politics. Although oppositionists were elected to the parliament and local governments, they were still barred from organizing any political party outside the Kuomintang. Human rights abuses against Taiwan independence activists and other dissidents were prevalent and often ugly. The mainlander-native divide that I saw during earlier years was still a dominant factor of public life, despite encouraging trends toward accommodation on both sides. The government's implacable hostility toward the PRC - and its periodic resort to paramilitary pinpricks against the communists - remained, even if younger Taiwan citizens sought to learn more about the mainland, some even wanting to travel there. Permission for cross-Strait business and travel was still ten years away.

Citing these traces of the past, some people, including Taiwanese opposition leaders, independence advocates, and some of our missionaries, argued that the regime was as ugly as ever. As in Park Chung Hee's Korea, they stirred up support from sympathizers in the U.S. and Japan in hopes of stimulating foreign intervention. Before I discuss this, I want to emphasize that these people were surprisingly blind to the longer term significance of major changes, particularly the leadership's gradual but real accommodation of the Taiwanese majority throughout the society, the *de facto* military truce with the PRC, and the evolution of a new value

structure in urban areas as a result of market driven growth and foreign exposure.

Unlike the embassy under Rankin and Drumright, the embassy under McConaughy and Unger deserves credit for understanding and being in the forefront of reporting this evolution. Our political counselor, Burt Levin, a shrewd and colorful "China-type," had a firm grasp of it, including the way average people were accommodating to the new vision. So did his successor, Harvey Feldman. I joined Levin on some of his "take the pulse" trips, and I took advantage of my position to cultivate the senior individuals around Chiang Ching-kuo who were implementing this low key but major reform in Taiwan. I praised them and, whenever appropriate, Chiang Ching-kuo himself for what they were doing. Given his old time associations, McConaughy was less fascinated by this process than I, but he let us react positively and convey the message to Washington. From my INR days before going to Taipei I recall there was already some appreciation of this evolution in Taiwan, and after I returned to the EA Bureau in 1974, I think Embassy Taipei's view had become conventional wisdom in the Department.

President Chiang Kai-shek and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, were the symbols straddling this profound change. As I have mentioned several times before, my opinion of the father was less than favorable. I know he played some positive role in China's modernization, but I saw him as a disappointing authoritarian leader; by this time he was a spent force, completely out of touch with the times. His public life was apparently controlled by his wife, who was always with him, or by his secretaries. I was uncomfortable when Americans fawned over him and probably gave him the wrong impression of his status in the U.S.. I accompanied the ambassador on a few calls, once to talk about the impending collapse of Taiwan's position in the UN. Usually, the reason for the visit was taken care of quickly and the rest of time it was "memory lane." McConaughy liked this, and the two men got along very well. Despite my lack of esteem, I did not have hostile feelings about Chiang Kai-shek.

I had a very different view of Chiang Ching-kuo. My opinion of him went through an evolution. I first considered him a junior version of his father. That changed when I got to know him; eventually I had a very positive view. In fact, historically speaking, I would list Chiang Ching-kuo as one of China's more impressive leaders - even compared to the mainland competition. During my second tour he was first deputy premier and then premier before becoming president after his father's death. These were promotions without a distinction; he did the same work in all these capacities. He was effectively in charge of the regime and the country for many years.

Chiang the younger was Taiwan oriented. He visited all parts of the islands to see for himself how people lived. He wanted native Taiwanese to support the regime. He was a smart, moderate man who tried his best to live down his own and his family's checkered past. Although he was very down to earth, Chiang Ching-kuo had a concept and vision about what was needed in Taiwan; i.e. a prosperous, well educated, egalitarian society embracing native born as well as immigrant citizens and depending on strong military forces and international engagement for protection. I often heard him talk this way, but I don't really know how his vision extended to China proper. In his youth he was sent by his father to be educated in the Soviet Union. He denied ever having been a communist, but clearly the experience left him more concerned than his father about the fate of common man. For a leader who had traveled so little to the West, he was quite well informed about the world.

For all the improvements over his father, Chiang Ching-kuo was also authoritarian, very tough, and solidly anti-communist. He maintained firm control over the military establishment and intelligence community - undoubtedly responsible for some of the activity we opposed. He could be quite brutal, as a number of people who crossed him found out. Nevertheless, I admired him for his intellectual growth and for what he did for Taiwan. I don't know if Taiwan could have survived without Chiang Ching-kuo or someone like him.

I had a good relationship with him, although it was not nearly as close as, for example, Ray Cline's, the CIA station chief during my first tour in Taiwan. Ray became known as the "American ambassador" regardless of who actually filled that chair. He was perceived - to some extent correctly - as running the show. None of his successors had the same entree or power even though they all lived in the "Pink House" reserved for station chiefs. Ambassador Drumright allowed Ray to do his "own thing." He traveled with Chiang Ching-kuo and became a kind of foreign confidant. In those days we were still using Taiwan as a base for many anti-communist operations. Cline's role was useful for this purpose, but he should never have been allowed to appropriate such an important role. In any event, my contacts with Chiang Ching-kuo were more innocent. Many of them were in the company of the ambassador. Occasionally, I would escort visitors to see Chiang. I dined with him many times, and I did see him privately on rare occasions.

I remember one such time when Speaker of the House McCormick came with a "small" delegation of 16-20 representatives plus wives. I was charge' at the time, and I invited the huge group to my house. I also invited Premier Chiang Ching-kuo, who got the time wrong and arrived a half hour early. Alerted by our security officer, I rushed home to greet him, and the two of us had a completely private conversation about many things including policy matters until the throng arrived. Chiang's willingness to come to my place, combined with our private conversation, didn't harm my standing in Taiwan officialdom. I must say this was a remarkable experience for me; I found that I could talk with him informally and comfortably about very delicate issues.

Despite Chiang Ching-kuo's relatively enlightened rule and the changes he was nurturing, Taiwan was still enough of a bad boy in the period 1971-74 to be singled out quite often for American punishment. With little public notice, we complained, sometimes very sharply, to the authorities about human rights violations, censorship, harassment of opposition forces, and so on. This was usually done by the political section although occasionally by the ambassador or me. Opposition elements, who knew we did this, appreciated it and often made a show of their relations with us in hopes it would provide a protective screen against the authorities.

During this period we also vigorously discouraged lingering tendencies in Taiwan to conduct para-military and intelligence adventures against the PRC, especially cloak and dagger operations mounted from Hong Kong, which I will touch on later. In the same vein we detected and began strenuous efforts to stop a clandestine nuclear weapons program. We came across intelligence and other evidence that the regime was diverting substantial resources into development of nuclear weapons. We had a difficult time verifying this, initially treating it as probable but not conclusive. Over past years we had cooperated extensively with Taiwan in

peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We had helped with the construction of several nuclear power plants. Our Atomic Energy Commission had good rapport with Taiwan scientists, had provided assistance in improving Taiwan's scientific base, and was familiar with Taiwan's nuclear labs. So we first looked to the AEC for information about what the regime was really doing. They were not very useful.

A senior AEC representative came out to help us. For some time we had been trying to pry our way into the nuclear lab at the Chung Shan Institute where we were fairly certain Taiwan was reprocessing fuel to extract plutonium. Having been given a run around by the authorities, we finally succeeded in getting access. When the Washington visitor, the embassy's Science Attache, and I inspected Chung Shan we were told flatly that the labs there were not used for reprocessing and that Taiwan had never been engaged in the process. Our AEC man saw clear evidence, however, of lab design for that purpose, and we later discovered they had temporarily dismantled part of the facility to hide their operations. These observations at Chung Shan, combined with increasingly convincing intelligence, led us to make a strong demarche, demanding that all nuclear facilities in Taiwan for reprocessing or other military uses be closed down. That was done - more or less, for a while.

An ironic footnote. On a subsequent visit, this same AEC representative told me that he had been approached by his Taiwan counterparts to ask that we "loan" Taiwan a small amount of plutonium for peaceful research purposes in their labs. I was astounded that Taiwan could be so brazen, even more by our man who said he was inclined to oblige them. Washington quickly helped us snuff out this little ploy.

My view on leaving Taipei was that the nuclear genie had been put back in the bottle, or at least had not been allowed to get further out of the bottle. However, a few years after I returned to Washington, the issue again became acute; we found more incontrovertible evidence of Taiwan's experimentation with nuclear weapons production - somewhat akin to our problems with South Korea - and we had to make an extraordinarily strong demarche to stop it. This Taiwan experience sensitized me to the Korean scene. I was a strong supporter of the tough actions we took in both countries.

I would like to conclude with a few more comments about the embassy and the effects of the new China policy on its relations with other U.S. organizations in Taipei. The issue of our force withdrawals from Taiwan created tension between the embassy and the Taiwan defense command. The commanding admiral, a submariner, while being a basically good man, was not skilled in the diplomatic game and lacked sympathy for the direction in which we were moving. Since his guidance from Washington and from CINCPAC was sometimes at cross purposes with Nixon's new policy, we worked out stringent new rules of conduct for all of our military forces to minimize potential misunderstandings. In the early stages, the admiral wasn't very cooperative: we were trying to lower our military profile on Taiwan; he was trying to keep it high. Under McConaughy, who was cozy with admirals, it was hard to keep the commander down.

Under Unger it was easier both because of his views and the fact that he was under pressure from Washington to ensure firm control over all elements of the country team. Our policy had also

become more clear. Shortly after Unger arrived I had a big fight with the admiral who wanted to talk to the ambassador rather than me to try and get around the rules. Since I was the designated contact for the U.S. military, I didn't let him, and we argued back and forth angrily for a long time. He accused the embassy of pandering to the PRC against the interests of our hosts in Taiwan; I warned him that if he kept on giving us a hard time, we would have no trouble getting Washington to order him to behave, or words to that effect. This sobered him down. Unger backed me fully. The admiral's behavior improved markedly.

The admiral was not always present at our high level meetings concerning the military draw-downs. He was, however, very much in the picture when we negotiated the transfer of Taiwanese F-5A and Bs to South Vietnam, and was most helpful. Of course, after each meeting that the admiral didn't attend, we would give him a complete read-out. There was no personal animosity between the embassy and the US command; they were very good to us. But most U.S. military officers understandably thought they were defending a close relationship with an ally and anything that smacked of a departure from this bothered them. It was a real shock for them when we changed directions.

I should say that in general I had very good relations with the U.S. military in Taiwan. I went out of my way to be helpful to them. But sometimes on specific issues, such as the one I just mentioned, I had to be, and was, quite tough. I also had a pretty good relationship with the senior officers of the Taiwan military, including the JCS. I saw a lot of them, mostly in social settings. They knew we had fairly ready access to their boss, Chiang Ching-Kuo; some of them sometimes attended our sessions with him. They always invited us to their parties; we periodically reciprocated.

The station chief during my DCM tour was Daren Flitcroft. The deputy was Bob Grealy. By this time, the station had only residual contacts with the kind of people who had been powerhouses in Cline's days. Because of our cooperation over many years, they knew the intelligence community well, including presumably some of the operatives working against the PRC. But our policy had changed since Cline's days - even before Nixon's opening to the PRC; the change probably started in the Kennedy administration. We stopped talk about their return to the mainland, and we tried to stop them from using violent tactics - poisoned pens, bomb throwing, etc. This new position may have gotten blurred sometimes because of longstanding close personal relationships between our people and the perpetrators of such activities.

McConaughy had a good formal relationship with the Station Chief, but he insisted that his DCM manage the relationship between the Station and the rest of the Embassy. That left me the main job of liaison with the Station, even though the Chief participated in country team meetings. I discussed this aspect of the job with the Ambassador soon after my arrival; I accepted the role willingly because I thought it was important that the front office know what the CIA was doing; I am not sure what my predecessors had done in this regard, but I thought it newly important since there had been a number of embarrassing incidents, particularly in South East Asia, caused by the failure of embassies to exercise firm supervision over stations. Although he obviously agreed that intelligence activities must conform with U.S. policy, McConaughy didn't want to play the supervisory role directly himself, but he pledged he would support me in case of differences with the station.

In fact, that commitment was not really necessary, since both the station chief and his deputy were exceptionally cooperative. As I said, the station had a lot of embarrassing entanglements from the past from which we wanted to distance ourselves. I soon became well versed in intelligence matters, although perhaps not as well as I became later in Korea. With Unger's arrival I remained involved in this process, but the ambassador resumed a more traditional, direct role in supervision of all agencies.

I think I was comfortable with the activities of other agencies-USIA, MAAG, etc. I kept a close eye on USIA; I had troubles with the MAAG chief who, although under a military chain of command, was also subject to the ambassador's guidance for most of his work. I think we had three MAAG chiefs during my tour. The first was a very difficult person a gung ho army major general who was always on the borderline of inappropriate behavior. As I recall, we eased him out before his tour was scheduled to end. His replacement ran afoul of military discipline for financial irregularities. He also had to be removed. Finally, we got a MAAG chief who did a fine job. McConaughy really hated to fire anybody; he was particularly anxious to keep good relationships with all the senior staff and considered the MAAG general "one of his boys." My recommendation caused him some pain, but he approved, nevertheless.

We frequently had airmen who got into trouble with Taiwan's strict rules against drug possession, mostly for marijuana, but sometimes, more dangerous narcotics. Taiwan also hosted many families of both military and CIA personnel assigned to Vietnam. Quite a few of them were involved in drugs, and we had a substantial drug problem in the American schools.

The Taiwan defense commander was responsible for the military schools, and the embassy for the civilian school. We worked together closely. I got the nickname of "Mayor" for my supervision of the schools on behalf of the ambassador. On two occasions, the admiral and I called all the American families together and really laid down the law with the support of the ambassador, who also attended. It was a gathering of thousands. When serious violators came to our attention, we took quick, decisive action - we sent the family home. Those draconian measures helped reduce drug usage among Americans, including our own foreign service families, to manageable levels.

Embassy Taipei was fairly large - not as large as Embassy Seoul - but substantial. If all agencies, except the military commands were included, we had a lot of Americans and Chinese working for the U.S. government in Taiwan.

I mentioned at the beginning that McConaughy was very generous in his treatment of me. Had I been in McConaughy's place as ambassador, I don't believe I would allowed my DCM such a free hand. The relationship is a tricky one. I don't believe a DCM should march in lockstep with his or her boss. A reasonable difference of views is acceptable, and probably a good thing. Some constructive tension in the front office can be helpful; it may on occasion encourage one or the other officer to challenge conventional wisdom, whereas an overly compliant DCM can inhibit healthy argument and even invite danger in some situations. A rebellious DCM is almost sure to be destructive. The difficult question is where to draw the line between useful and destructive.

I think the situation in Embassy Taipei fell somewhere between the two. On the one hand, it was quite apparent to the host country that there was a significant difference of opinion in the embassy's front office. Both McConaughy and I tried to be circumspect about our differences, but acute observers could have detected them. I was never aware of any opportunity or effort by Taiwan to exploit the situation; nor was Washington concerned about it. It might have been different if I, the DCM, had been off base in terms of policy rather than a distinguished ambassador.

In retrospect, I think it was useful that I - or someone with my views - was in Taiwan while our PRC policy was undergoing a major shift. With a DCM who fully agreed with McConaughy, our government would have had a very difficult time getting the ship to steer in the right direction. There might have been serious consequences for Taiwan because the embassy might have delivered the wrong message at critical times. This entire problem melted away under Ambassador Unger. I think he and I had a rather ideal relationship. We had very different backgrounds and some differences, but they posed hardly any problem for our cooperation.

I should not leave this issue without also saying that I really liked McConaughy. After his retirement, I used to visit him. My articulation of my views was always known to him. I didn't go behind his back. It is the ambassador's role to set the views of an embassy, not the DCM's. It is best if the ambassador and a DCM broadly agree on the nature of our national interests in the host country as well as on the basic objectives to be pursued. Although McConaughy and I differed on the merits of recognizing the PRC, he gave me full credit for trying to keep our relations with Taiwan as close as we could. I think my views represented the majority of the embassy staff, even if I was more outspoken.

I want to add a footnote about something that severely embarrassed me while I was in Taiwan. Provoked by the war in Vietnam, some rogue official in our government provided hundreds of classified telegrams to a journalist, Walter Winchells' successor, I believe, who began to print them one by one in his columns. Some of them happened to be from Embassy Taipei, and apart from the shocking degree of irresponsibility involved by both men, I don't think great harm was done. However, one telegram was a message I had sent Marshall Green asking for his help in getting special permission for Taiwan's Foreign Minister Chou Shu-kai to visit Washington at a time we were trying to lower Taiwan's profile in our country. To support Chou's cause I had adopted a rather patronizing tone about his being one of the good guys in Taiwan, and I had been successful in getting him the visa. When the whole damn message was printed in the *Washington Post*, however, I was shocked and acutely embarrassed. Washington was never able or willing to explain how this had occurred, and I was forced to go and apologize in person about our inability to secrets.

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*Q: In 1974, you were appointed as deputy assistant secretary in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP). Who was the assistant secretary and how was the appointment made?*

GLEYSTEEEN: The assistant secretary was Phil Habib, and he wrote to me asking whether I would be interested in the job. It came as a surprise, but I jumped at the chance. Despite being

the most junior deputy to Habib, I inherited Art Hummel's China responsibilities and retained them throughout my Washington tour. My other duties varied from time to time, depending on the strengths and seniority of other incoming deputy assistant secretaries. For example, when Owen Zurhellen joined us for about a year as the senior deputy, he was given the Japan and Korea portfolios. When he left, they were re-assigned to me. At various times, I also had responsibility for the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Southeast Asia (but not Indochina) and the Pacific island areas. For a period I also supervised the Office for Regional Affairs. Throughout this period Bob Miller had normal responsibility for Southeast Asia - overwhelmingly the problems of Vietnam that were so vexing for Habib in those years. Economic issues were the province of our colleague, Les Edmonds.

Vietnam did not prevent Phil from working on other issues. He was thoroughly engaged in China policy, which was so dear to Kissinger's heart. Although he looked to others for expertise, Phil had strong opinions about how to manage discussion in the American camp. I could always see him about China, Japan or any other problems that were arising in my area. He shared my sense of Japan's importance and paid steady attention to Korea. All his deputies, including junior me, were given more than the minimum time we needed with him.

Let me turn to China. Like others I was fascinated by our new China connection, even more so perhaps because of my boyhood and foreign service experience. I wanted to act in Kissinger's China play, and I wanted to make use of my considerable expertise on the PRC and Taiwan. Getting into the play was easy, because my predecessor, Art Hummel, had earned Kissinger's respect, and Habib helped get me into the act as his apprentice. Contributing my expertise was more of a struggle, but fairly successful over time. In one of my first sessions in Kissinger's presence, Habib said he thought I had important things to say about Deng Xiaoping, and I was invited to explain why I thought Deng was not only a worthy successor to Zhou Enlai but probably considerably more important. Kissinger was skeptical; I stuck to my view, and after a year or so he more or less acknowledged I might be right. But whether the process of education was written or oral, it was always frustrating. Kissinger and his inner squad had been in the new China play from the beginning. They had a kind of conceit, and they were not eager to hear from others. Certainly, they did not want help in writing the play. Thanks to Habib's steady cover for me, I sensed that I was eventually accepted by Kissinger as a useful member of the bureaucracy to work with his inner circle. However, I was never part of that circle.

Despite my reservations about the way we had handled Taiwan, I felt our new relationship with the PRC was a radical improvement over the past policy of all-out confrontation. The change was demonstrably helpful to us in the conduct of our foreign policy, both internationally and to some extent domestically. Nevertheless, by the time I began working for Habib, we had reached a point of stalemate in our efforts to complete the process of full normalization of relations with China. The obstacle was Taiwan. In discussions with the Chinese we had not yet come to grips with this nitty gritty problem, largely because of substantial forces of domestic resistance reflected in Congress. This was the situation when I started in 1974 and it remained without substantial change until after the 1976 elections. Even so, great amounts of time and effort were devoted to China. We tried hard to find ways of signifying progress that would benefit our dealings with the rest of the world, especially the Soviets, and sustain the domestic credit earned by Nixon's daring move. High level visits to China were continued with much public fanfare, and

large numbers of other Americans began treks to the land of cultural revolution. Internally, we spent much time and imagination preparing for and conducting this activity. It didn't lead to a breakthrough but it laid the ground work for the next administration.

Although Kissinger rarely shared his inner thoughts with persons such as me, I was quite involved in most aspects of our dealings with the PRC. Habib used me as his additional eyes and ears. He wanted me to keep him abreast of what was going on, and he passed on what he learned from on high. When crunch time would come, he got more directly involved, often saturating himself in the problem. I think it was a good technique. He normally took me along for discussions he had with Kissinger on China, even those that were quite small. Similarly, he made sure I went along on all the trips that Kissinger took to China. I was one of the "China experts" who might be required.

The most important issue consuming us during this period was how to sustain momentum toward normalization. Although I had been quite unhappy in Taiwan about what seemed like careless planning in Washington, I committed myself fully to the cause of normalization after I got back to our capital city. I really thought it could be accomplished without undermining the security of Taiwan, and if it couldn't, I was convinced the effort would still benefit us. I never doubted Kissinger wanted to complete the process of normalization. He had a transparent commitment to the PRC to finish the process, as did President Nixon who had been forced to leave the political scene. Ford, however, did not have the same emotional allegiance to our PRC policy. In contrast to Nixon's almost brazen reordering of the national agenda, Ford was more orthodox, worrying about the potential domestic repercussions of normalization just before going to the voters in 1976. In any event, I, along with others, annoyed Kissinger by pressing him (usually via Habib but sometimes directly) to push all the way to normalization. He didn't appreciate having puppies yap at his heels and told us to keep in mind the complexity of decisions faced by the president. Coping with Taiwan was another of my main responsibilities. In our dealings with the PRC during this two year period we fenced around the Taiwan issue - a fair amount of talking but no major effort to break the stalemate. As he had with Zhou and Mao in 1972 and 1973, Secretary Kissinger raised the issue with Deng Xiaoping during his trips to Beijing in both 1974 and 1975, emphasizing it was a problem within our body politic that had to be resolved. He described the concerns of Taiwan's defenders in Washington and stressed our government's need to take account of their opinion if we were to have the degree of consensus necessary for a successful normalization of relations with the PRC. Although I may be doing him an injustice, I never felt that Kissinger manifested much personal conviction that Taiwan's survival was in our national interest. He talked dispassionately from a Washington vantage point about the political strength of those who identified themselves with Taiwan.

In the first session I attended in 1974 Kissinger probed for Deng's reactions to a variation on the Japan formula; i.e., we would recognize the PRC as the sole government of China and withdraw completely from Taiwan in a military sense, but to ensure domestic support we would need to have a liaison mission in Taiwan and we would also want some assurance about Taiwan's security pending peaceful unification. The implied or stated premises were that all treaty relations with Taiwan would be terminated, people to people relations would continue, while Taiwan would be able to purchase defensive arms until the unification issue was peacefully resolved within the extended period mentioned by Mao Zedong. Kissinger always appealed for

Chinese statesmanship and patience in dealing with this problem of history. No comprehensive model of a proposed solution was ever tabled, which was probably wise in the absence of presidential resolve to reach a solution.

In response, Deng pointed out that the principle of China's sovereignty, enshrined in the Shanghai Communiqué, could not be compromised by any continuing official or unofficial U.S. government relationship with Taiwan. Like Mao and Zhou in earlier meetings he specifically rejected any U.S. continuing role in the defense of Taiwan, even commercial provision of arms. He always added that we "owed China a debt," presumably for our failure to deliver on Nixon's pledge to normalize relations and to compensate China for enhanced risks in its confrontation of the Soviet Union.

While we remained deadlocked with the PRC about the next step of normalization, we proceeded to prepare for it rather systematically within the government. Force withdrawals from bases in Taiwan proceeded on the phased schedule that had been established while I was still in Taiwan. I supervised a careful study, lasting into the Carter Administration, on what Taiwan would need to maintain a "credible" defense effort. We not only surveyed Taiwan's requirements but also identified weapons and equipment that we should and should not supply. With little guidance but clear approval from my superiors, I worked hard to strip away all unessential functions from our civilian and military establishments in Taiwan. Very importantly, I kept the Taiwan authorities informed of our adjusting policy and cautioned them that I was virtually certain we would be switching recognition within the foreseeable future. My main interlocutor was the ROC ambassador, James Shen. I became the senior liaison for the Taiwan Embassy; by this time Kissinger refused all contact with Taiwan officials, and none of my other seniors, including Habib, wanted to hold Taiwan's hand.

Mostly through lunch meetings, I told Shen that official activity would become more and more difficult for Taiwan. I tried to paint as realistic a picture as I could, always asking him to convey my views to Taipei. Once - in 1976, he managed to break through our fence and called on Deputy Secretary Ingersoll for the undeclared purpose of requesting *agrement* for his successor. Taiwan knew that the future of its embassy in Washington was in doubt. Shen was said to be ailing, and they wanted to put a new ambassador in place before it might be too late. We had no forewarning of this move and were caught by surprise. Ingersoll was non-plussed by the request and looked to me for signals. After flash thinking, I blurted out something along the line: "Mr. Ambassador, you can't do that. We can't agree with your request. You will have to plan on staying here for a while." Ingersoll, following my lead, went on to emphasize the need for realism by Taiwan.

Our answer was very painful for Shen and somewhat insulting to his government, but a shift of Taiwan ambassadors at that point would have caused a real rumpus with the PRC. I was certain Kissinger wouldn't accept a new ambassador from Taiwan, so leaving Shen in place was the best tactic. In this zero-sum game, my attentiveness to PRC sensitivities didn't help my relations with the ROC. After the Ingersoll meeting, I talked to Shen and others, apologizing for a response that I knew was painful for them. In fact, however, Taiwan was a bit too clever. They should have tested the water before trying such a bold ploy, conceivably designed by one of their American lobbyists. In any event, Taiwan left Shen in Washington until the bitter end.

I want to touch on a few other aspects of our China activities. A very important feature of our high level contacts with Chinese leaders was to use the warmth of this relationship as a lever in our dealings with the USSR. We engaged the PRC in a broad range of well advertised discussions. We met frequently at Kissinger's level and once at the summit. There were other high profile sessions with the Chinese, for example, at the UN where I believe Kissinger first met Deng. These sessions were long, comprehensive, and remarkably candid in appearance. I sat through hours and hours of conversation, fortunately, not as the note taker. I had an advantage since I was one of two of us who spoke Chinese.

Although I thought the implicit consequences of our China connection were a useful factor *vis a vis* the Russians, I felt the overt manipulation of the triangle was overdone. I didn't like the cloyingly friendly, almost worshipful quality of some of our behavior toward the Chinese leaders, especially Mao, Zhou, and to some extent Deng. I could forgive some of this as an understandable pleasure to discover that Chinese Communists weren't so bad after all, and I could indulge a bit of it to keep the Soviets on edge. But I often reacted badly to the display. I thought it denigrated America's importance, and it ground against my conviction that the Chinese needed us as much as we needed them. It really pained me to hear Kissinger describing our policy of containment/detente with the USSR as a combination necessary to satisfy the softies in our own society and among our NATO allies. I did not like his habit of letting the Chinese keep the high ground of inviolable principles or not being rebutted when they spoke of our owing them a debt. I would have liked to hear a more robust defense of our policy, calling a spade a spade and noting our differences and common interests with both China and Russia. It would have worked just as well if not better, and we Americans would have felt better. Although I made these points to Habib and people in Kissinger's inner circle, I never had the opportunity or guts to tell him myself.

Another area where I sometimes parted company with Kissinger was military cooperation with the PRC. On the basis of long experience, I felt instinctively that as competitors for hegemony in Asia we were destined to have serious differences with China, even while trying to maintain the best relationship possible. I didn't oppose some military and intelligence activities with the PRC, but I was generally wary of measures that would militarily strengthen China. I was thinking of the effect on our East Asian allies, on a newly isolated Taiwan, and ultimately on our own armed forces. This applied not only to weapons but also to dual use technology such as advanced computers. The first time I really choked over this issue was on learning that Kissinger had given the British a green light to sell Spey engines (British built engines used in the F-4) to the Chinese to jazz up one of their fighter/bombers. I argued that this wouldn't sit well with the Koreans, Japanese, and certainly not with the Taiwanese. And it didn't. When the Japanese found out they were furious, particularly military officers. Computers were also controversial. In one long debated case I was the only semi-senior official to have objected, but I did object, and in writing. Subsequent history does not make me look bad. However, my problems under Kissinger were puny in comparison to the ill-considered moves we later made under Brzezinski's influence. A few additional comments about Kissinger's China travels. During my first visit with Kissinger back to the land of my birth in the fall of 1974, Deng was very much in charge. The meetings with him were quite fascinating to me if only because they were my first exposure to the process I have just described. Then in 1975 there were two important visits, one a preparatory trip by Kissinger in the early fall and the other by President Ford toward the end of the year. At the time

the PRC was undergoing leadership struggles; Mao Zedong was in the final stages of his life as Zhou En-lai. Deng had already moved to take a leadership role but unbeknownst to us had run into difficulties with Mao and leftist rivals, requiring him to take more cautious positions. The problem was reflected in the foreign ministry which was in a state of flux and less helpful than in the past. And perhaps it played some part in a sophomoric Chinese effort to tweak Kissinger into a more cooperative stance.

Almost coinciding with our delegation's arrival in Beijing we read foreign press stories, dated Beijing, stating that Chinese officials were unhappy with Kissinger's failure to complete the normalization process and that they were going to invite Defense Secretary Schlesinger to visit China to move things along. Kissinger, who saw himself as having earned a very special, if not unique, place in U.S. dealings with China, was furious over this ploy and set about showing the Chinese who was running China policy in the U.S. government. And he did this quite well. Even if he didn't like the treatment of Kissinger, Deng must have known about this petty gamesmanship.

During this preparatory trip, we were trying to get the PRC to agree on a communique announcing Ford's visit, and we wanted to insert some creative language along the lines of the Shanghai communique to fortify it with a sense of incremental progress. Our PRC counterparts understood what we were trying to do, and they didn't want to help us build a half way house to normalization. They wanted a timetable and public commitment. In wording that I slaved over with Dick Solomon of the NSC and Oscar Armstrong, one of our key China officers, we concocted a statement declaring that normalization was our common goal, vaguely implying progress, but lacking any specifics about substance or timing. The PRC didn't like it and was determined to squeeze more out of us. The Chinese in effect told us no communique and no Ford visit were preferable to ratifying our procrastination.

After our sessions with Deng, we had provided the PRC with a draft communique early in the evening, and we hoped they would accept it so we could wrap it up by the next morning. Instead, the Chinese sent us a counter version about midnight. I no longer remember its contents, but it was quite unacceptable. Kissinger called a small group of us to his room, including Habib, Lord, and myself. I remember the infernal quacking machine that was supposed to muffle words enough so they could not be picked up by monitoring devices. This was one of the few times when I felt Kissinger was listening to me carefully. He asked me a series of questions about what I thought the Chinese were up to. He absorbed my answers and seemed to weigh seriously all the points I was making. He even accepted the thrust of my recommendations. For me, this degree of attention was a singular event. I said I thought that the main issue was a political judgment about the importance of the president's visit. Was it critically important, or were we willing to risk its cancellation? Assuming the latter, I explained that cancellation might be even more of a problem for the PRC than for us, and I therefore advocated a hard line, responding to the PRC in the tough manner that they had used with us. I suspected they would eventually become more reasonable. There was a consensus among us to do this so we sent a firm message back and after some dickering the PRC agreed on a compromise statement of some sort.

I was pleased by the outcome. I might add that, personally, I thought cancellation of Ford's visit would have been most unfortunate. Normally I am not a high stakes gambler.

To spite the Chinese for their behavior over the Kissinger communique, we slightly "downgraded" the Ford visit to China by combining it with a stop in Indonesia, theoretically making the Chinese share the limelight with Southeast Asia. Ford's summit sessions with Deng and Mao were not a great turning point in Sino-US relations. They were harmonious but didn't really resolve any of the major outstanding issues. I remember when discussion at the last session with Deng concluded before its allotted time and Deng was about to let people enjoy a few free minutes, Ford embarrassedly urged him to keep talking so as not to provoke media interest.

It was also during the same contentious preparatory visit in the early fall of 1975 that I had my one and only glimpse of Mao Zedong. Perhaps Kissinger included me as a reward, more likely because Habib told him to do so. I remember the Chinese kept us in the dark as to whether any of us would see Mao and when. Even after there was an agreed list and general time, they had us sight-see the Forbidden City, waiting for word from on high. The session, which took place in Mao's study, was substantively questionable, but the symbolism was important to Kissinger, and I was delighted to have a chance to gawk at a man who in his younger days was certainly one of the main figures of the 20th Century.

As we filed in, Mao greeted Secretary and Mrs. Kissinger effusively, grunting a few words in his Hunanese dialect that were translated first by his niece into mandarin and then by Nancy Tang into English. Despite my language ability, I couldn't follow the dialogue, but it seemed rather contrived. One grunt became many coherent English sentences, etc. Not necessarily phony, but surely padded out by Mao's female assistants. By far the most interesting phenomenon was the interplay between Mao and Deng. All other Chinese were reverential and obsequious toward Mao. Not Deng, who, while showing no disrespect, treated Mao as a peer. I couldn't read much into Mao's reaction except that I sensed a distinct lack of fondness. As a "China watcher" I found this intriguing. (After about fifteen minutes of this, most of us were escorted out leaving Kissinger, Ambassador Bush, and Winston Lord to carry on with Mao.)

The Chinese were very effective in their efforts to fence us off from observing their domestic strife. Although we came across occasional nuggets, such as I have just described, we needed far more information to dope out who was doing what to whom with what consequences for our dealings with China. We had virtually no worthwhile intelligence reports and, like the Chinese people, we were forced to rely on clues from the media, such as the anti-Confucius campaign conducted against Zhou and Deng by the leftists, and occasional bits of luck, a process I described at some length in recounting my Hong Kong tour. We speculated about what was going on, and we had some feel for the emerging post-Mao era, but we had little evidence of the rugged struggles going on.

Not long after this glimpse of Mao and Deng, I was back in Beijing for the Ford visit, and instead of going on with the delegation to Jakarta I stayed a few extra days during which I bought a Chinese Communist periodical to read on the plane to Tokyo. I was struck by a prominent article that had the flavor of pieces written just before and during the height of the Cultural Revolution. The article mentioned Deng in unflattering terms completely out of keeping with previous commentaries. I alerted my colleagues in Washington, but we didn't recognize that we had stumbled across pretty clear evidence that Deng was being ousted from his leadership

role.

I forgot to mention another of these nuggets of intelligence about what was happening within the Chinese leadership in Mao's declining days. In the spring of 1975 I accompanied the Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, and the Minority Leader, John Rhodes, with their wives on an official visit to China. Although I was experienced with Congressional travel, this visit was exceptionally difficult, because of the Speaker's great fondness for drink as well as a self-centered, provincial American style that he maintained regardless of the occasion. His Chinese hosts let me know that they were offended by his interruption and his monopolizing conversations, mostly to offer anecdotes about minutiae or describe the wonders of the U.S. Constitution. Despite the Minority Leader's noble help, I was not able to prevent Albert's starting off in the same manner with Deng Xiaoping who flushed with anger and seemed about to break off the session. Fortunately, Deng calmed down and then delivered a long exposition on China's need for decades of peace so it could attract foreign investment and develop itself economically through a mixed socialist/market system.

Deng's statement was a much longer and more systematic presentation than we had heard from him in 1974, and it was delivered with a tone of real conviction, probably reflecting the challenges he was encountering from the "Gang of Four." The Speaker, who managed to interrupt Deng two or three times, displayed no interest when I later told him the importance of Deng's message. In fact, none of us appreciated its full significance until Deng was temporarily overwhelmed by the leftist radicals about six months later.

I should clarify my comments about the state of Sino-U.S. relations in the mid-1970s. When I spoke of lack of progress or stalemate, I was referring to the normalization process and our inability to move it forward. We, for domestic political reasons, were reluctant to take the leap, while the PRC was eager to conclude the process. In a broader context, however, our relationship with the PRC was greatly improved; in fact, it was quite solid in some respects, particularly in relation to our mutual concern over the Soviet Union. We were becoming more and more engaged with the PRC. The new relationship allowed us to bring intelligence experts to Beijing to share aerial photography of Soviet deployments. We were talking about using PRC territory to add to our intelligence collection capability. There were times when I thought that we treated the PRC better than Japanese or Korean allies. That bothered me, and I expressed my view to Kissinger, to his displeasure.

There were, of course, problems. For one, there were personality conflicts. As I indicated earlier, the PRC had become somewhat annoyed with Kissinger and his style, and this sometimes affected the atmosphere of meetings. The core problem was Taiwan. The PRC was not buying any of Kissinger's formulations. They repeatedly reaffirmed the language of the Shanghai communique - as far as they were concerned, there was only one interpretation, their interpretation. For us, Taiwan's future security was the most troublesome element. In 1974-76 the PRC showed no flexibility on this issue; it was going to be their way - i.e. no American military relationship after normalization - or nothing at all.

Of course there were problems in addition to Taiwan. Kissinger would have liked a more assertive and confrontational PRC policy toward the Soviet Union. He often made elliptical

references to this objective but was never very specific about it. He also tried to involve the PRC in Korea and Vietnam without much success, which was the experience of his predecessors and successors. In fact, the PRC did not help us much, if at all, on Korean matters in those days, and it greatly disappointed Kissinger on Vietnam, playing its own cards in the peace process and substantially aiding North Vietnam's war effort - despite the latter's heavy tilt toward the Soviets.

In turn, the Chinese, who were quite shy of real danger and firmly determined to avoid the risk of serious military conflict with the Soviets, nevertheless wanted the highest possible tension between the Soviets and ourselves short of war. They kept telling Kissinger the Soviets' main target was Europe and ourselves, asking Kissinger why we followed a policy of detente, why we were so interested in arms control agreements when we could have far outmatched the Soviets in military spending, and so on. In the final analysis, neither the PRC nor we managed to alter each other's basic behavior.

I saw Kissinger in action not only on China, but also on Japan and Korea and sometimes Southeast Asia. Clearly, China was the topic of greatest interest to him; I would say that 80 percent of our meetings were on that subject. I mentioned earlier that there were times when I could not get through to the Secretary. For example, it was becoming clear that the Japanese mood was changing from post-war depression to a more normal national pride. This was a most important development for East Asia. While this was going on - and Kissinger was not only aware of it but quite talkative with the Chinese about it - he was fawning over the PRC, talking about the wonders of China's leaders and the greatness of Chinese civilization. Although the Japanese had also made a large mark for themselves and happened to be our allies, they sensed Kissinger was rather dismissive of them. From my own observation, I would agree that neither he nor his staff showed enough responsiveness to Japanese concerns. When the Japanese made reasonable requests for attention, they tended to get short changed in relation to China or West Europeans. Effectively, they were treated as second class citizens, carelessly ridiculed in discussions with the Chinese. If the Japanese ambassador wished to have an appointment with a high level official to discuss a soybean emergency, he would be deflected down to see Habib, whereas we thought nothing of asking the U.S. ambassador in Tokyo to see the foreign minister, or better yet the prime minister, about far less consequential matters. This was upsetting to the Japanese and embarrassing to us. Japan just didn't rank very high on Kissinger's agenda. I thought that Japan was far too important to be treated so cavalierly.

When the PRC normalized relations with Japan in 1972, the two countries side stepped the issue of a treaty of peace, Japan having signed the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty with us and 48 other countries, including the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek. In the mid 70s, the Chinese successfully pressed Japan to negotiate a treaty of peace and friendship, something that was completely unnecessary from the viewpoint of international law but a favorite gimmick of both the communist hegemonies. The Chinese proved very hard-nosed about the language they wanted to include, particularly a gratuitous reference opposing hegemony that was clearly aimed at the USSR. This was at a time when the Japanese were trying to improve their relations with the Soviet Union, so they resisted the Chinese demand in what was a bilateral squabble over a petty matter. Kissinger sided with the Chinese, although not as brazenly as Brzezinski. To jump ahead for a minute, Brzezinski in 1978 took it upon himself to tell Prime Minister Fukuda that the U.S. did not object to the clause and favored conclusion of the treaty. The Japanese felt

cornered and humbled by Brzezinski's simplistic anti-Soviet gamesmanship. In my opinion, it was a needless insult to an ally; the PRC didn't deserve our support for its hypocritical rhetoric denouncing hegemony.

To put it bluntly, I felt our allies in Asia deserved higher priority than they usually got from Kissinger. I feared that treating Japan this way would ultimately provoke a nationalistic reaction, which wouldn't be in our interest - or China's. Although I was outspoken about this, Kissinger and his inner circle seemed indifferent

I have no reason to question that intellectually Kissinger appreciated Japan's importance to us, and I understood his preoccupation with China in relation to the Soviet threat. Even so, I am convinced he could have - and should have - handled the Japanese more skillfully. Apart from time pressures, etc, I suspect he was influenced by Chinese skill in managing (and manipulating) foreigners in contrast to Japanese awkwardness in complex discussion with foreigners.

I remember one important exception to this general tendency; i.e. the Tanaka scandal involving bribery of Prime Minister Tanaka by Lockheed, the American aircraft manufacturer. Kissinger paid close attention to what was happening during the resulting crisis and closed ranks with his fellow conservatives in the LDP. My own reaction, uncharacteristic, since I was usually the voice in the Department defending the Japanese, was that our relations with Japan and Japanese society as a whole might be improved if the Japanese went through a real cleansing, even if that meant that the LDP lost the next election. I favored taking a tough line with the Japanese, but I was overruled by Kissinger who tended to dismiss me as a novice regarding Japan. In this case, Kissinger showed his Metternich tendencies. He did not want to upset the stability of the Japanese political system; he wanted to help the Japanese conservatives - all honorable objectives, and he displayed the proper kind of concern by a secretary of state - even though I disagreed with him. The crunch issue that we wrestled with was the degree of pressure we should apply to the Japanese to get them to reveal the full nature of the scandal. There were prosecutors in both countries who were anxious to nail the perpetrators. Eventually, we went along with the Japanese in a drawn out investigation that nevertheless destroyed the powerful Mr. Tanaka. Not surprisingly, the LDP survived.

In the soybean crisis I mentioned earlier, the Japanese wanted assurances that the supply line would continue. Soybeans were a major US export to Japan. Yet when we had a severe shortage, we embargoed all exports without much consideration being given to Japan and our other steady customers, who were of course furious about our decision. I believe some exceptions were made but no prompt action was taken to help the Japanese. The ultimate effect was a Japanese decision to take control of some of the US business in this country as well as to diversify their procurement to other countries, including China. In this instance and in the second oil crisis in 1974 Kissinger may have sympathized with the Japanese, but he didn't spend any chips on them.

The Japanese ambassador, who was so often given short shrift by Kissinger's staff, was capable and trustworthy. Habib did very well by him and tried to massage his bruised feelings. Less sympathetic persons around the secretary were sometimes not as careful. They explained to the Japanese that Kissinger was a very busy man who had to focus on the Soviet Union and new diplomatic initiatives, such as with the PRC; these were at the heart of U.S. national security and

demanded his undivided attention. On other occasions, the Japanese were told via the media that were being given short shrift because they could not keep secrets. This really offended them, even if it was partially true. The worst insult of all to the Japanese came from those who justified our treatment of Japan by aggressively questioning their standing among other Asians, reminding them, for example, of their colonial exploits and aggression.

Apart from these not very happy memories of Kissinger's involvement with Japan, the East Asian bureau spent a great deal of time dealing with Japan matters, which is what one would expect of such an important country. Much of it was economic in character and related to trade practices that were already a source of serious friction. STR (or its precursor) and Commerce dominated the handling of these issues with Japan, but in those days our bureau and our seventh floor were still able to inject far more foreign policy concern into the battles than they are today. Habib had the *chutzpah* and fighter qualities to make a difference. Moreover, the bureau benefitted from a strong crew of Japan specialists who knew Japan and treated it with sophistication and sympathy. Although I did my bit as well as I could, the key player was Bill Sherman, our Japan Country Director and senior specialist on the Japanese matters. I was impressed both by his bureaucratic effectiveness and by the way he selected and nurtured the careers of his fellow Japan specialists. Tending loving care from Habib, Sherman, and me took the edge off Japanese resentment over Kissinger's shabby treatment.

My third area of concentration under Habib was Korea where we were faced with a variety of problems: human rights and political governance, nuclear weapons development, U.S. military deployments, and the "Koreagate" bribery scandal. Since I have covered these at some length in my book, *Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence, Carter and Korea in Crisis*, Brookings Institution Press, 1999, I will limit my comments here.

Human rights problems and Koreagate were most corrosive in their impact on American attitudes, which shifted in a few years from growing admiration for South Korea's economic leap to dismay over its political repression. In the eyes of many in the church, labor unions, media, and Congress, South Korea had become a political pariah - a favorite target for the bashers. The principal reason was President Park Chung Hee's abrupt, rightward shift in the early 1970s to a regime of political repression. Worried domestically that Kim Dae Jung had almost defeated him in the 1971 election and convinced, almost paranoically, that the U.S. was going to downgrade its commitment to Korea as it had in Vietnam, Park adopted self defense measures. He introduced a harsh new authoritarian constitution and other means to circumscribe political activity, let his cronies kidnap Kim Dae Jung from a Tokyo hotel and almost kill him, authorized an ill-conceived bribery operation among American officials and Congress, began a costly buildup of defense industries, and covertly launched a nuclear weapons program. All but symbolic vestiges of democracy were lost; Park's critics were harassed and jailed; and much of the urban populace was intimidated. The only bright spots were continuing progress in economic and social welfare in rural as well as urban areas. Granting that average citizens were not much affected, the atmosphere was ugly for anyone inclined to criticize Park or protest his regime.

The kidnaping of Kim Dae Jung caught peoples' attention in spectacular fashion. The crudeness and barbarity of Korean intelligence operations in Japan was exposed at great cost to Korea's prestige. Militant foreign missionaries and other human rights activists in Seoul descended on

Ambassador Sneider to denounce our support of Park, and in Washington the church, labor unions, and media activated considerably more than the left liberal fringe in the Congress.

Before giving you some miscellaneous recollections about my time with Habib, I want to make a concluding comment about Secretary Kissinger. Along with many of my Foreign Service colleagues who worked for him I found Kissinger very bright, conceptual, politically skillful, decisive, and terribly energetic. There is no question he had much insight about a complex world and a dazzling didactic ability to convey his views persuasively to others. But there was a distinctly negative side to the man that frequently bothered me. He was too inclined toward self adulation as well as mockery and derision of others, particularly those below him in rank, wealth, or brains. More disturbing to me, he was also too comfortable in manipulating people and facts, apparently justifying it by the nobility of the causes to which he was dedicated. When he displayed these characteristics toward hostile groups or opponents I was not too bothered, but when he dealt this way within his own camp, it really jarred my own moral standards. I found it reprehensible. I don't think my reaction was a case of sour grapes. By Kissinger's rugged standards, he generally treated me pretty well as a competent bureaucrat and useful resource person on China. I was given adequate access to sensitive information; and my views were allowed to trickle up to the great man himself or at least into his inner circle.

I must admit that I was never comfortable in Kissinger's presence, and there were times he really annoyed me by arbitrarily singling me out as the person responsible for something that he didn't like. I will never forget an infuriating instance of this. When the last withdrawals of our Air Force contingents on Taiwan were being implemented - a subject that I knew well from working on it in both Taiwan and Washington - I responded to questions from Bernie Gwertzman of the *New York Times*, carefully hewing to the party line and doing it on a background basis. The same day the *Times* story appeared, the *Christian Science Monitor* also printed a fuller story, the source of which I think must have been Kissinger or someone close to him. The *Monitor* story went beyond the limits we had set on the discussion of this issue, even though it was not a catastrophe, and the thrust - the drive to normalization with the PRC - was correct. In any case, the two newspaper stories got confused in Kissinger's mind or imagination. He accused me of having leaked sensitive information, whereas I hadn't even talked to the *Christian Science Monitor*. When I learned that Kissinger had the FBI investigating me, I went in fury to see Larry Eagleburger - Kissinger's man who was then the Deputy Under Secretary for Management. I raised hell about what was being done to me - the lie that was being circulated - and after a few days the matter was dropped. The next time I saw Kissinger, I protested angrily. He didn't apologize, more or less laughing off my complaints. I never forgave him for subjecting me to calumny to give cover to the real culprit, who might have been Kissinger himself. Fortunately I didn't have many experiences of that kind, but I saw a lot of it happen to others.

Despite my sharp criticism, I still strike a positive balance in assessing Henry Kissinger as secretary of state. Although it is premature to make a definitive statement about his place in history, he will certainly be regarded as one of the greatest to serve in the 20th Century, considerably more impressive than his peers.

Now for the miscellaneous points. Thinking about Koreagate reminds me of Taiwan's extensive lobbying activity in those days with both the Congress and White House. I felt uncomfortable

with those efforts that surely involved money and favors. There was some similarity between Taiwan and Korea on this score, although there was no evidence of direct bribery as in the Korean case. The Taiwan government ran a well oiled operation, less brazen than the notorious "China lobby" of older days but still very generous and often obnoxious in trying to get its way - and complicate our efforts toward normalization of relations with the PRC. Ironically, the Taiwan independence lobby, working separately with different contacts, used similar techniques, resulting in lots of lobbying from the beleaguered island.

Which brings me to intelligence relationships. Habib kept the sensitive part of the process pretty much to himself. He shared information quite liberally, but he was cagey about sources of intelligence and actions he had approved. That was hard on his deputies. Fortunately, we ourselves had pretty good contacts with CIA and knew much of what the head of its East Asia Division was doing. Habib almost always met privately with this man and allowed him to undertake operations that we might not have approved. Most of these concerned Southeast Asia. The result of this compartmentalization was that we deputies had to be careful about where we stepped lest we interfere with an activity already approved by Habib. For example, 1975-76, there was a major drive to reduce the government's overseas presence; it had gotten out of hand during the Vietnam era. The Department was eager to cooperate so long as there was a mechanism to ensure that CIA and the military intelligence agencies took their fair share. We deputies pushed and pushed for the reductions in our various countries of responsibility only to find periodically that Habib was undercutting us.

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*Q: Then in 1976, you were assigned to the National Security Council. How did that come about?*

GLEYSTEN: The assignment came from the top. When Dick Solomon was thinking of leaving his China job at the NSC in 1975, there was some pressure on me to replace him. I resisted because it would have narrowed my responsibilities. Other arrangements were made in the NSC, but in 1976 Brent Scowcroft combined China with all of East Asia in a four person unit and personally offered me the job of heading it. Kissinger let me know he wanted me in the NSC, either as a promotion or to get me out of his hair in the Department. I was attracted by the job but not its timing - just before presidential elections. So I temporized. Finally, Larry Eagleburger gave me a boy scout lecture from his perch as the under secretary supervising assignments. In effect, he told me I was under orders from Kissinger to go to the NSC. If I refused, I might find myself banished to some forsaken place. I capitulated and became the senior staff member for East Asia in the NSC around June, 1976.

I had a good relationship with Scowcroft, which was important because, absent that, I would have been miserable. His door was always open to me - even though I sometimes had to wait until 9 p.m. if I needed more than a few minutes of his time. He would always listen carefully and seemed to appreciate my advice. Of course, he got a lot of advice from many quarters - often quite often conflicting. I found that it always helped if Kissinger was leaning the direction in that I wanted to go.

Bill Hyland was the deputy. Colonel Bud McFarland, as the senior assistant, spent a lot of time

sifting through the volumes and materials received from the departments and agencies to winnow out the nuggets for Hyland and Scowcroft. This was after the NSC regional and functional staffs had already screened the documents to determine which were important enough to send to the front office with a covering memo and recommendations. The decision on whether to send it on in to the president was Scowcroft's. He and only he decided what was to go to the president and in what form. My memory of the three of them in their cramped quarters in the White House is dominated by the mounds of paper on their desks. I admired Brent for his diligence and intelligence and his centrist approach to foreign affairs. I didn't see enough of the NSC's over-all operations or even my own area long enough to judge the efficiency of Scowcroft's operation. I suspect he should have been more selective and had more assistance from one or two more Hylands. He was always overwhelmed by paper, compensating for covering the waterfront by sacrificing his entire private life.

I had three officers working for me: Alan Romberg (China), Jay Taylor (Korea and Japan) and Ken Quinn (Southeast Asia). My main responsibility was to supervise the work of these three analysts and to serve as Scowcroft's East Asia person.

The issues which are most memorable dealt with Korea, including tree cutting event at the DMZ in August 1976, hardline development in China, and Indochinese refugees.

Let me turn briefly to the PRC. During 1976, Mao Zedong died and was succeeded by his designated successor, a little known regional official named Hua Guofeng. Mao's widow, Jiang Qing, and her radical leftist colleagues seemed to be gaining the upper hand. Deng Xiaoping was harassed and retreated for his life to the south under the wing of Marshal Ye Jianying, a powerful and prestigious military peer of Mao. A hard line seemed ascendant in China. Changes introduced by Zhou En-lai and Deng were suffocated by leftist orthodoxy. In this atmosphere, normalization of US-PRC relations went into a deep freeze. There were no interesting meetings of US and Chinese officials. When Senator Hugh Scott traveled to China and initiated a discussion of normalization, Zhang Chunqiao, the tough communist ideologue from Shanghai, talked of forcibly liberating Taiwan. This left-wing distraction didn't last long thanks to a sudden coup-like strike by the PLA organized by Marshal Ye under the authority of Hua Guofeng. The "gang of four" were arrested, tried, and jailed in a decisive shift in the domestic balance of power that soon brought Deng back into the leadership. Nevertheless, combined with President Ford's inhibitions, the turmoil within China extinguished any thoughts of progress toward normalization before our elections. While things were relatively quiet on the policy front, developments in China remained, of course, a subject of intense high level interest.

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During a brief six months in the NSC I was not involved enough with President Ford to develop any feel for his personal views. In fact, I had a better understanding of where his administration wanted to go on China when I was in the Department. However, my tour gave me some appreciation of how the making of foreign policy looked from the perspective of the national security advisor. I had quite a few conversations with Scowcroft during which he shared his views quite candidly. I got a sense of how the State Department "sausage factory" looked to others, and I observed the inter-agency battles with some detachment. My sense of how the NSC

functioned was somewhat skewed, since Secretary of State Kissinger was so dominant in the administration.

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*Q: In January 1977 you moved back to your old office at the State Department. How did this come about and what happened in EA?*

In early January, before inauguration, Dick arranged for us to see Vance, whom I had gotten to know superficially at a variety of long weekend conferences on foreign policy chaired by Harriman. We focused on China, which we discussed at length, and we also talked about Korea, particularly about troop withdrawal. Vance and Holbrooke sought my perspective both as a specialist and person familiar with recent dealings. I felt comfortable with discussion; Vance was very positive about moving promptly to normalize relations with China, and he agreed that Carter's plans on troop withdrawal could not go ahead without careful advance study of the consequences in Korea and East Asia generally.

For the China papers, Thayer in turn assembled some extremely talented staff members, including Alan Romberg from S/P and Stapleton Roy from the desk. Working directly with the drafting officers, I supervised the design and review phases of the paper writing. I was proud of the product in most cases, although we had our share of monstrosities.

By far the most important papers in the first few months of Vance's leadership were on China and Korea. All we had tried to do on China while I was in the NSC was to ride out the political storm in the PRC and await our own presidential election. By the end of the 1976 there were more and more indications that Deng Xiaoping was returning to power presumably with the policies he had espoused before his downfall, and with a new president, we were finally hopeful we could soon move ahead with a major effort toward full normalization of relations. Yet there was still much doubt. For all the rhetoric about wanting progress on China, I was far from sure that Carter was really going to move. The 1976 election was not a referendum on our China policy; China was not even an election issue.

In our first meeting I made clear to Vance and Holbrooke that I had long favored normalization. Acknowledging that China had been very difficult in 1976, I suggested there was again hope for progress if Deng continued his climb back to power. I urged that we test the waters in a systematic way to see whether there was any reciprocal interest in the PRC. The crunch problem was Taiwan, which obviously had to be handled with great care. I remember putting very heavy stress on two points. One was my personal view that Taiwan would definitely survive the strain of de-recognition. Its economic progress and easing political constraints would provide a helpful buffer. The second was my conviction that we would do better with both the Chinese and Soviets if we "played it straight," letting each know that we were dealing with the other because of common interests and acknowledging to both we had important disagreements with both. In effect, I questioned the benefit to us of Kissinger's implicit tilt toward China. Vance seemed positive on all these points, perhaps overly so regarding the second one. In the name of an even hand, I later discovered, he at least subconsciously rated arms control issues with the USSR more important than moving briskly on normalization.

Since Vance, Brzezinski, and many others have discussed how the Carter Administration went about normalization, I will limit my comments mostly to main impressions. Vance had us prepare a memorandum from him to the President arguing the case for moving ahead with the PRC. In an effort to engender State/NSC collaboration we brought Oksenberg fully into the process, even though we assumed he was privately doing something parallel for Brzezinski. As part of the effort we reviewed the quite complete files that Kissinger had left us. They were kept in my office after being turned over to us by Winston Lord. Oksenberg, completely new to this material, was the most eager reader. Of course, the files contained vital information, including the pledges made by Nixon, Kissinger, and Ford, but not the bombshells suspected by some of the new people. The record showed clearly why the PRC had reacted negatively to some of our policies. The Chinese felt that they had been led down a garden path on prompt normalization and resented it.

I thought we did well by Vance, producing a document for the president making the case for normalization in terms that I found more accurate and persuasive than some of the rhetoric from the Nixon period. None of us knew Carter's real intentions. He had spoken publicly in favor of normalization - almost every one had, and he had privately told Vance he was serious about moving ahead. In any event, after reading the paper, the president convened a meeting in the spring of 1977 that was attended by Vance, Habib, Holbrooke and me from the Department, Brzezinski and Oksenberg from the NSC, and, I believe, Harold Brown. Carter gave us a little homily about normalization and his support for it. I was then excused while the others remained to discuss modalities. I still wasn't sure that Carter was determined to push forward, but I was glad that he spoke as he had.

As a result of this session we were charged with producing a paper, PRM 24, on the specifics of normalization. Vance's interest in the China issue was then at its height. Preparation of this blueprint was time consuming. The paper was very thorough and covered all the issues. Like the earlier paper, it reflected the view that our China policy should not be governed simply by anti-Soviet considerations, but by a more comprehensive view of strategic interests, including, of course, our need to counter the Soviet threat. Vance soon became a missionary for this argument, which suited him as he negotiated SALT and other issues with the Soviets. The paper also reflected my concern to minimize the damage to Taiwan that would be the price of normalization. This led to some controversy later. At the outset, every one agreed that we had to be careful about Taiwan, since we had a lot at stake there and would have the world watching to see how we dealt with an ally. I probably had the most intense feeling about this issue, being the only one of us to have served in Taiwan, but I didn't find much quarrel with my position. I was certain Vance would not be a party to any deal undermining Taiwan.

PRM 24 was completed some time in June 1977. Again, I was not included in the deliberations with the President that resulted in the decision to send Secretary Vance to Beijing in August 1977. The accounts in Vance's and Brzezinski's memoirs more or less confirm what I remember being told at the time: Carter's commitment to pursue normalization was clear, but not the priority he would accord it. Vance wanted to get the Panama issue out of the way before facing the Congress with the consequences for Taiwan of normalization with the PRC. He also wanted parallel progress on Soviet issues. Thus, although he was determined to get started, he was in not

in a great hurry to complete the process. At this early stage Brzezinski favored pushing ahead with normalization, but given his concern about the Soviets, he was even more interested in reaffirming and underscoring the tilt toward China symbolized by the Shanghai Communiqué - as was Secretary Brown. Faced with this complex of concerns, President Carter declared himself resolved to carry through with normalization, and he approved a draft communiqué to this effect that Vance could use if he achieved enough progress in Beijing. At the same time, however, Carter opted for a negotiating tactic that flawed the Vance mission to China.

Based in part on the results of extensive consultation with Congress, much of it conducted by Holbrooke, the President decided for domestic political reasons that we should try to get Chinese acceptance of a recognition formula that would improve on the Japanese model, allowing us to retain an unofficial US governmental presence on Taiwan in the form of a consulate or liaison mission. We were to argue with the PRC that a governmental but unofficial presence of some kind in Taiwan was a practical necessity for us because of our extensive involvement in Taiwan, and that this presence would in no way constitute continuing diplomatic recognition of the Taiwan regime. If the Chinese rejected this scheme, it was my clear understanding that we would then fall back to the Japanese formula of no governmental representation. As I recall, I favored authority to retreat quickly to the Japanese formula, since I had personally witnessed Deng Xiaoping slap down Kissinger's effort to do virtually the same thing in 1974. Nevertheless, having accompanied Holbrooke on most of his consultations on the Hill, I more or less accepted the domestic political rationale of trying to improve on the Japanese formula to ease widespread anxiety about switching recognition from the ROC to the PRC. Whatever may have been said later in self justification, none of us at the time - specifically including Brzezinski and Oksenberg — saw the tactic as a deal breaker so long as we handled it carefully. Unfortunately, circumstances during and immediately after the Vance trip made it appear that Vance had naively sought a better deal for Taiwan than we could have realistically expected, causing a major setback in the normalization process.

In his first meeting in Beijing with Foreign Minister Huang Hua, Secretary Vance made a very systematic presentation of our position, including the points about a governmental presence on Taiwan, peaceful resolution of the unification issue, and limited defensive arms transfers to Taiwan. Hua's response the next day was negative, and during a subsequent session Deng characterized Vance's position as a retreat from the Shanghai communiqué. Although Vance stressed that his proposals were a starting point for discussion, he did not offer any immediate sign of flexibility. The Chinese, whose appetites had been whetted by the Carter Administration's rhetoric and reaffirmation of Nixon policy, were clearly disappointed. Yet this was hardly the first time they had faced tough American negotiators, and they displayed no hostility. The Chinese treated us in the same normally friendly fashion they accorded to important U.S. visitors. For our part, we were quite aware that if we wanted to succeed we would have to yield on the representation issue, and we left Beijing feeling that we had begun a dialogue on a very difficult process. This was the tone of the very objective report we sent back to the White House.

As we were leaving our Tokyo stopover on our way back to Washington, you can imagine how stunned we were to learn that a Hearst correspondent (Wallach) claimed that members of the NSC told him they saw "progress" in Vance's discussions in Beijing, quite at odds with what Vance had actually reported. Regardless of who said what to whom in Washington press circles,

this story, which made us look like fools or deceptive manipulators of the press, infuriated the Chinese who issued a prompt denial. Some days later Deng himself publicly characterized the Vance position as a setback to progress.

As one of the drafters of Vance's report to the White House, I shared Vance's anger over this Washington interpretation - so much so that I half convinced myself that Brzezinski must have been the source and deliberately set Vance up for a fall. Although this was probably unfair of me, it was symptomatic of the uncomfortable relationship that had already developed by this time between the NSC and ourselves. In any event, based on my observation of many previous conversations with Chinese leaders, I thought Vance was competent in his presentation of our initial position on normalization. Even though he was not as polished or as free wheeling as Kissinger, he also conveyed clearly that the administration was adopting a sophisticated mixture firmness and flexibility to deal with the Soviet threat. To be sure, the Chinese were not thrilled to learn of a U.S. view that placed the PRC as only one of several special American concerns. Vance made that point quite skillfully, and it was an important message for the PRC to hear. My main criticism of Vance's performance was his failure to signal more clearly that we were prepared to compromise regarding our future presence in Taiwan, but even so, I assumed the Chinese knew we would eventually retreat. In short, I fully expected another round of talks and some progress toward compromise. And this might have occurred sooner if the U.S. Government had been able to keep its big mouth shut.

Our first move on the normalization chess board was clumsy. The bar for the Taiwan jump was set unrealistically high; we underestimated the damage of overloading the administration's first negotiating contact with Deng; and in striking contrast to Kissinger, we screwed up in briefing our own press. Obviously there was no collusion between Deng and Brzezinski, but each for his own reasons decided to categorize the Vance trip as a "failure." This somewhat unfair judgment prevails today.

The unhappy outcome of the Vance visit to China did not smother expectations for progress on the China front, and we continued busying ourselves with our growing contacts with the PRC, holding Taiwan's hand, and conducting studies about various aspects of normalization. Among these I have already mentioned the very careful examination we made of arms transfers to Taiwan, trying to determine the kinds of defensive weapons Taiwan needed to maintain a "credible deterrent" against a PRC attack, which is those days was not a great danger. Although there was some effort on the part of our military to provide Taiwan with unnecessary items, the study for the most part was an objective one and served as a guideline for our behavior even before normalization. Another important study was the legal aspect of abrogating or renouncing the security treaty with the ROC. This was a complicated matter of special interest to Secretary Vance, and it was not completed before I left the scene to go to Korea.

By the spring of 1978, it was apparent that Soviet policy had taken an aggressive turn in many parts of the world - i.e. the Horn of Africa, Angola, Afghanistan, etc.. Our new friends in China and Americans such as Brzezinski were quick to recognize and perhaps exaggerate this, but many others without such a pronounced animus against the Russians also sensed the hard line and saw the need for somewhat tougher policies. Vested interests burst into action - variously favoring a big buildup in defense, a tough line across the board with the Soviets, playing the

China card in new games, etc.. Vance - and even more the President - seemed slow in facing up to this phase of Soviet policy, partly perhaps because they were so committed to a more hopeful prognosis about detente with the USSR. Of course, both men eventually accepted the facts. Carter swung around quite far toward Brzezinski's position. While not sharing Carter's previous naivete about the USSR, Vance also had to toughen his position. Yet he seemed distinctly reluctant and clearly uncomfortable with the tactics of flamboyant confrontation and games playing that were so elemental in Brzezinski's style.

Whatever the reason, Vance appeared a bit soft in confronting the new twist in Soviet behavior, and this worked in Brzezinski's favor. Even though Vance had far more prestige and clout in the Administration and Congress, Brzezinski's posture was more appealing and popular in the Cold War atmosphere of the time. He denounced the Russians and simplified the world into a black and white picture of zero-sum games. He wouldn't, for example, mention Vietnam without adding the prefix "Soviet proxy."

Vance and Brzezinski didn't have major differences over normalization with China, but their differing approaches did affect the debate about many other aspects of our dealings with China. In the struggle I felt Vance did not exert himself when he should have, and I winced as Brzezinski took advantage of this and sought to emulate Kissinger in his NSC days. He began to invite the PRC ambassador to his office for chats - without telling the secretary of State. He maneuvered the president into making important decisions without Vance's participation. It had become obvious to many that the secretary of State and the NSC advisor did not get along. They were very unlike and saw the world through different prisms.

This high level friction accumulated to become a serious impediment to objective treatment of important questions, such as security relations with the PRC, the conduct of Brzezinski's visit to China, and relations with Vietnam. In dealing with these matters I usually found myself in the middle, but nearer to Vance's side. On the security issue, Brzezinski wanted to flaunt our China card in front of the Russians, using various devices to underscore our potential for altering the strategic balance between the Russians and Chinese. Effectively, he favored an explicit tilt toward the PRC, symbolized by a visit of the secretary of Defense to China (fortunately delayed until after normalization), close intelligence cooperation, military contacts, relaxed controls on dual-use technology, tolerance of allied military sales, and possibly even military assistance in limited areas of defense. Brzezinski calculated that the Soviets could be bullied this way into a more cooperative posture, while Vance worried that some of these actions would only antagonize the Russians, stimulating the arms race and damaging prospects for detente in addition to worrying many of our allies. From my less exalted level, I shared Vance's concerns, but I felt we should energetically counter Soviet behavior - mostly by ensuring our own military superiority and trying promptly to normalize our relations with the PRC. Both of these sober actions would convey the right strategic message to the Soviets without the cost the explicit tilt in security.

As I noted earlier I did not object to some forms of military and intelligence cooperation with China, but I was strongly, outspokenly opposed to military assistance to the PRC. My problems began in the previous administration with our approval of British military sales, but in this earlier period the limited measures proposed were conceived as compromises with our allies and China, not pieces of a grand scheme to encircle the Soviet empire. Initially I thought Brzezinski was

going to continue Kissinger's cautious approach, but in early 1978 Mike Oksenberg began trying out ideas on me that I found alarming.

Reflecting his boss, Oksenberg talked not only of our interest in a "stable, prosperous, and friendly" China but also a "strong" China, and he acknowledged that this might mean possible military assistance to China by our allies or even ourselves. Apart from the questionable effect on Soviet policy, I argued that China's Asian neighbors would be appalled by such action, which would also make Taiwan's defense more complicated. But even more important, the concept failed to take account of the prospect that at some future point US and PRC interest might well clash. This consideration seems pedestrian in today's climate, but in those days the intellectual infection of US-PRC military collaboration spread from NSC whizz kids to significant numbers of sensible people in the defense community as well as less sensible persons with various axes to grind.

My recollection is that Vance and I were among the most cautious on security assistance to the PRC, and as a practical matter during Vance's tenure military activities with China were minimized. Later, several foolish decisions were made by the Carter and Reagan administrations, particularly help to the Chinese with the avionics for their F-8 fighter bomber. To put it bluntly: Brzezinski was an ignoramus on East Asia in general; Oksenberg was very savvy about China but not about its neighbors; and neither man paid enough attention to their colleague, Mike Armacost, who was both very expert on East Asia and to our own bureaucracy.

Although I was only briefly and peripherally involved, policy toward Vietnam was another example of how antagonism between State and the NSC complicated an already complicated situation. Like President Ford, President Carter did not feel legally bound by the Kissinger era agreement to aid Vietnam in the post-war period. Vietnamese failure to comply with key provisions of the Paris settlement provided ample grounds to refuse, and Americans generally were lukewarm or opposed to relations with such a recent enemy. However, both the President and Vance as well as a bi-partisan minority in Congress favored normalization of relations with Vietnam and gave the issue considerable priority. I am not sure why. Perhaps it reflected the need for expiation among some who served in the new administration. In any event Leonard Woodcock, former president of the UAW and later Ambassador to China, was promptly dispatched to Vietnam on a fact finding mission, and his favorable report was the trigger for an effort toward normalization that was to last twenty years.

While I had no burning sense of sin about our actions in the war, I too favored a *rapprochement* with Vietnam. Partly this was my standard reaction of wanting to deal with all significant governments that were effectively in power; partly it was a feeling that it would be smart to try to encourage Vietnam away from its steadily increasing dependence on the Soviet Union. Treating Vietnam as a pariah and Soviet proxy in the style of Brzezinski struck me as satisfying Chinese, not US national interests. To be sure, if I had been forced to choose, I would have given priority to moving ahead with China. Although Vance and Holbrooke shared these opinions and pushed negotiations with Vietnam near to success, ultimately they were unable to prevent the issue from being mired down in an ideological debate and questionable reasoning on our part. Brzezinski won the battle over whether we could risk normalizing with Vietnam in the midst of trying to do the same with the PRC. Effectively, we pulled back and halted the process with Vietnam.

Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia obscured the error of our ways. While this crude Vietnamese action took place after I moved on to Seoul, I was still in Washington while the bloody *Khmer Rouge* took over Cambodia and began their aggressive border incursions against Vietnam. If the Vietnamese in response had limited themselves to punishing counterstrikes, history might have taken quite a different turn, but when they went on to occupy most of the country and establish an alternative government under Hun Sen, they blighted prospects for an early opening to the non-communist world. We adopted hostile policies that helped push Vietnam further and further into the Soviet camp. In late 1978, early 1979, I was amazed to learn in Seoul that Brzezinski had given the Chinese a virtual green light to "teach a lesson" to the Vietnamese by a limited military strike and again later when we joined the Chinese and some ASEAN countries in a loose cooperation with the *Khmer Rouge* against the Vietnamese and Hun Sen. Perhaps if I had held some responsibility in Washington, I might have felt differently, but I doubt it. After my retirement I spent many hours over many years arguing with former colleagues for a more sensible policy toward Vietnam.

The third issue I want to mention was the most unpleasant for me and my colleagues in the State Department, namely the NSC's preemption of the core negotiations with the PRC on normalization. As it became increasingly transparent that Vance and Brzezinski were vying with each other for presidential support and control of strategy toward the USSR, PRC officials began to play games with us, as they had done before. Sensing that Brzezinski was eager to put US-PRC cooperation high on the US policy agenda as an anti-Soviet strategy, they welcomed a dialogue with him beginning in the fall of 1977. Through Oksenberg, Holbrooke and I were more or less aware of the NSC advisor's contacts with the Chinese, but we were never consulted. In his memoirs Brzezinski claimed that "Holbrooke and his State Department colleagues looked increasingly to the White House for leadership," because Vance was preoccupied with other matters. This is a shameless distortion of the facts: Brzezinski knew damn well that Holbrooke and I were struggling to prevent him from usurping what we believed to be the State Department's proper function. Anyway, Brzezinski had no trouble soliciting a Chinese invitation to visit Beijing, which was publicized along with Brzezinski's courteous acceptance in November, triggering a fight with Vance, Habib, and Holbrooke, who recognized it as a power play and immediately opposed it. During the next few months Brzezinski used his proximity to his boss to lobby Carter into approval of a visit, while Vance struggled to head him off or instead to have Vice President Mondale be the emissary to China. Brzezinski won the battle in March, reflecting a major set back in Vance's standing with Carter.

Under presidential instructions, we began preparations for a Brzezinski trip to China. This time the process was centered in the NSC with only the minimum necessary help from the State Department - and sometimes not even that. The formal decision making process was relatively proper. Whatever reservations Vance may have had regarding complications in his dealings with the Soviets, the State Department strongly supported a major push by Brzezinski toward normalization, and we were delighted when the president instructed Brzezinski to tell the Chinese that "the United States has made up its mind." Thus Brzezinski was authorized to agree to the Japanese formula of no U.S. governmental presence in Taiwan, although on security matters he was still instructed to stress our insistence on a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan problem and our intention to provide defensive arms to the island. These terms constituted our

best shot to achieve success on an acceptable basis, and we all supported them without qualification. Speaking for myself, I also had little trouble with the way Brzezinski planned to underscore the vigor of our response to expansionist Soviet policies, even though I was openly unenthusiastic about his plan to take along a number of senior advisors to be publicly cozy with Chinese counterparts on matters of strategy, military intelligence, science and technology, and economics.

Despite this substantial consensus about the national security advisor's instructions for Beijing, the NSC had effectively cut State out of the policy development process. Essentially, Brzezinski and Oksenberg developed positions secretly, obtained the President's concurrence, and then presented them to Vance and us as a *fait accompli*. I suspect the NSC had some pang of conscience about deflecting the bureaucracy from giving them the benefit of its judgment, because Oksenberg got permission employ a CIA analyst as a secret advisor. The person he selected was a good friend of mine - feisty and imaginative, but not someone I would rely on for balanced opinions.

To some extent my role also breached the NSC's iron curtain around preparations. Although I was kept well away from the inner deliberative process within the White House, Brzezinski and Oksenberg needed someone such as me to vet key papers and critique their ideas. Very transparently, they also enjoyed using me as a semi-legitimate way of cutting out Holbrooke - and infuriating him. Despite my resentment, I in turn felt it was my duty as a senior career officer to try to insinuate State Department views in ways that would make the visit as successful as possible. On many occasions I was asked by Oksenberg for comments about papers, but I was never allowed to keep a copy, and I was always enjoined "not to tell Holbrooke." While always taking advantage of the opportunity to comment, I made clear that I strongly disapproved of our not being given copies and would keep Holbrooke informed. Each time I immediately reported back to Holbrooke who always hit the ceiling. However, sore as he was over this manipulative abuse, Holbrooke to his credit never tried to stop me from my rather truculent cooperation with the NSC.

As the time approached for Brzezinski's visit in May 1978 our problems became even more excruciating. The State Department had to fight to get Holbrooke and me onto Brzezinski's delegation as the State Department contingent. On the plane Oksenberg conspiratorially pulled me aside to ask me to review Brzezinski's talking points, which I did with Brzezinski himself, and I insisted they be shown to Dick. Initially they were not and other papers were treated the same way - to the point that I refused any further cooperation. Holbrooke was finally shown the papers.

Matters did not improve after we arrived in Beijing. To note the positive first, Brzezinski was able to achieve the beginnings of a breakthrough on normalization - as Vance conceivably might have a year earlier if he had the same instructions. Moreover, with the exception of some childish anti-Soviet pranks in public, Brzezinski conducted himself skillfully. On normalization, he effectively conveyed Carter's readiness to move promptly, resolved the issue of unofficial US representation on Taiwan without much trouble, made very clear to Deng that we did not want to be contradicted in our public insistence that the Taiwan issue be resolved peacefully, and signaled indirectly that we would need to provide limited defensive arms to Taiwan during a

historical transition period. Deng's failure to denounce this latter point as a violation of the Shanghai Communique, etc. struck me as a possible breakthrough, and I immediately said so to Brzezinski when I read the transcript of the session. Although I was less impressed by Brzezinski's customary anti-Soviet rhetoric, I liked his robust defense of our policy toward the USSR and his asking Deng to stop publicly berating us when we had enforced the balance of power so effectively for so many years. I felt this pugnacious point was a considerable improvement over Kissinger's normal response.

In other respects, however, Brzezinski's behavior was outrageous, particularly his delight in humiliating Holbrooke and the State Department both in private and public - behavior that would have been unimaginable for his Chinese hosts, who of course took careful note of this gratuitous advertisement of strains within the American camp. Although I seriously fault Holbrooke for his part in this battle of egos, Brzezinski was the instigator, and to this day I consider his conduct a national disgrace.

Holbrooke and I were included in the lower level meetings in Beijing as well as the brief greeting sessions with Deng Xiaoping and Hua Guofeng, but we were ostentatiously excluded from the key meetings with these leaders, a very clear break in our practice since 1973. Given my blunt, almost violent argument with him about the importance of having State Department representation at these sessions, I was naturally angered to read a few years later in Brzezinski's memoirs that "other members of the delegation accepted this restriction, except for Holbrooke, who made a great issue of personal privilege out of his exclusion." On the plane on the way home, resentments boiled over. Once again I, but not Holbrooke, had been allowed to read the memoranda of conversation, and once again I had demanded they be shown to Holbrooke. They eventually were but not before a disgusting shouting match among all of us and the threat of a school yard physical battle between Holbrooke and Oksenberg. It was awful, probably the nadir of my bureaucratic experience.

Despite the clash of two powerful egos, I never fully understood why two very intelligent people behaved as Brzezinski and Holbrooke did. It may not have done much serious damage to US foreign policy, but it certainly didn't help the cause. To show how personal it was, I might note that I am fairly sure that if the NSC could have invited me to attend those meetings without Holbrooke, they would have done so. It didn't help matters that Ambassador Woodcock was included in all of the meetings with Chinese leaders, because he was playing along with Brzezinski; getting his instructions from the NSC, not the State Department. Fortunately, records of all the meetings became available to us, and I always felt that they accurately reflected what had happened. I am not sure that I would have had the same confidence in Nixon's NSC apparatus.

The net effect of this strain within the administration, when added to the hard line taken by the Soviets and our own tough reaction to it, was to take us back toward the simplistic bipolar world where the line was "let's be good to the PRC as a way of putting pressure on the Soviet Union." This suited the Chinese, because it gave them leverage in their dealings with us. Furthermore, we had a secretary of State in these circumstances who was sensible, judicious, and a real gentleman, but not very adept in the ugly kind of infighting that took place under our Christian leader, Jimmy Carter. After the struggle, the NSC became the real manager of our relations with

the PRC, even though most of the expertise was in the Department of State. I thought it was a risky way to conduct policy.

After the end of the Brzezinski trip, I wrote him a memorandum, giving him my evaluation of the visit and criticizing our treatment. At the time I felt I was being pretty hard on him, but on re-reading the memo a few years ago, I found it too polite. I did compliment him on the outcome of the Taiwan discussion with Deng, stating the visit was more successful than I had anticipated. Of course, I gave Vance and Holbrooke copies of my memorandum.

All this happened in the last few months of my tour in Washington. Just before leaving for Korea, I also wrote a long polite memorandum to Vance that temporarily strained our relationship. As objectively as I could, I discussed where we stood with the PRC - the pluses and the minuses. I praised his role in the development of our policy towards the PRC; pointed out that the Brzezinski visit might well prove to be the breakthrough for us; criticized the way we were being pushed around by the NSC; and urged that Vance insert himself back in firmly with the President. In my memorandum I asked for an appointment, which he granted. We had a very frank private conversation during which I re-emphasized the need for him to take firm hold of the reins of foreign policy. Of course, I was being presumptuous. I was emboldened to do what I did by the power of my feelings, and I am sure Vance got the same advice from many others. He listened to me in obvious pain, made no comment, and changed the subject.

Finally on the PRC, I have two thoughts. First, I thought then and still believe today that our policy toward China was essentially balanced. During the first phase of our rapprochement with China, I felt we could have done better by Taiwan, but by the time of the Carter Administration I was convinced we were doing everything possible for Taiwan short of calling a halt to the entire process with the PRC. I definitely favored going ahead on the terms set out during the Brzezinski visit, and I am convinced the ambiguity of the agreement with the PRC concerning Taiwan security was the best we could do. In other words, I have no apologies.

Second, far less important and somewhat contradictory to what I have just said, I feel we might have done slightly better by Congress and Taiwan in the very final phase. Despite the dangers, it was a mistake not to keep the Congress better informed. The backlash was Congress's revision of the Taiwan Relations Act in ways that significantly reduced our flexibility. Similarly, Taiwan deserved more notice than it was given, and I suspect we could have adopted slightly more favorable arrangements for practical contact with Taiwan, obviating some of our later troubles with visitors from Taiwan. We might have been able to get away with the practices of Singapore and other Southeast Asian countries. Be that as it may, when Christopher went to Taipei to work out the final arrangements for the future, the Taiwanese really took after him - they were very nasty. I understood their ire, and, if I had been a Taiwanese, I would probably have done the same. I am not suggesting that the outcome would necessarily have been better if I had remained in the DAS position in Washington, but I think I would have opposed some of the self-depriving provisions that were finally adopted by persons less sensitive to Taiwan than I.

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I frequently faced Christopher and Derian together, Derian as the prosecutor, Christopher as her

sympathetic judge, and I as the defense attorney for the offending Asian countries. In some of these situations I could have used more help from Vance and Holbrooke. East Asia was by no means the only area of concern to our human rights activists. Most of Africa and the Communist world was off limits for a variety of reasons. The Middle East as well as Central and South America got their share of attention, but East Asia seemed to have a special fascination. In part because of the international church network, Korea's sins, for example, were a steady target. Derian also focused on the Philippines, Taiwan, and Indonesia. The PRC was exempted, largely because of our normalization effort but also because the prospect for human rights progress in China was close to zero.

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I have two final comments focused less directly on the Foreign Service. First, I am grateful that fate exposed me to some important aspects of world history in the making, particularly China. China has undergone huge change in my lifetime, and I had an unusual degree of exposure to this from many vantage points. As I have stated repeatedly in this account, I was critical about how long it took us to face up to realities. Needless to say, I was fascinated to be part of the process that finally broke through the forces of resistance. In the 1970s I hoped that the Nixon experience would open up a sustained new era with China; in fact it did, but US policy toward China remains peculiarly vulnerable to shifts in the political winds - romantic surges of absorption with things Chinese followed by displays of hostility toward China.

I have watched these swings all my life, beginning with my missionary parents in Beijing. I don't know why is it so difficult for us to have a steady relationship with China, reflecting a sensible consensus about what is important and what is less important in dealings between two large nations entangled by history. Driven by domestic forces, we spend too much time on Tibet, human rights, and Chinese domestic practices that are beyond our power to change. In the process we often obscure the importance of security, political, and economic considerations that call for our engagement with China - even when China is being very difficult.

**STAN IFSHIN**

**Chinese Language Training  
Washington, DC (1971-1972)**

**Chinese Language Training  
Tai Chung, Taiwan (1972-1973)**

**Bureau of Intelligence and Research, China Analyst  
Washington, DC (1978-1980)**

**American Institute in Taiwan, Commercial Officer  
Taipei, Taiwan (1980-198?)**

*Mr. Ifshin was born in Brooklyn, New York in 1942 and graduated from John*

*Hopkins University. He entered the Foreign Service in 1967. He has served in numerous posts including Saigon, Taiwan, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta and Philippines. He was interviewed by David Reuther in 2001.*

IFSHIN: When I studied Chinese, that was always a big thing to go out to the Chinese restaurants together and try the various kinds of Chinese cuisine. I don't remember that being an issue in Vietnamese language training. We were more concerned about learning how to say give me that rocket launcher, or I'm a French journalist. There was certain vocabulary we concentrated on.

*Q: While you were in language training there though, Tet appears on the scene, didn't it?*

IFSHIN: Yes, and that was a big shocker. I can't remember if it was Henry Cabot Lodge who met with us. He was of course the U.S. ambassador at the time. He came and spoke to us at the training center, and a number of other people came and spoke to us. Let me mention one thing, this is sort of retreating. In CORDS, we were on loan from the State Department to AID (Agency for International Development), who then in turn loaned us to the military. And when all the other members of my A100 class went off for consular training, those of us who were going through the CORDS program went off to some sort of an AID training program, which was truly one of the most colossal wastes of time I've ever been through, and I've been through a lot of wastes of time, but this was one of the prize ones.

*Q: What did they cover, how to fill out forms?*

IFSHIN: I can't remember now, it's been a long time. But we were really silly. Those of us who were State Department officers assigned to the program made ourselves really obnoxious. I can see why people don't like foreign service officers.

*Q: Well, at this point, what did you understand about CORDS, because CORDS in fact has already undergone a number of changes. It didn't become CORDS until '67 I believe. It wasn't an AID program until Comer made it CORDS in '67.*

IFSHIN: Right. Well, it was something that was undergoing change. Dick Holbrook had actually met with our A100 class, it wasn't our Vietnam training center. He was one of the young officers who had gone through a precursor type program where he had something to do in the provinces. He explained it to us how career enhancing it would all be for us and what a great opportunity it was and how exciting it was.

*Q: He quit two years later. [laughter]*

IFSHIN: Yes, I think we all recognized at the time that this is a bunch of bs, but we listened politely. We were young, and young people tended to be more polite to their elders in those days. In any case, returning to the Vietnam training center, we got area studies and lectures about the overall strategies and what was involved in the war, but basically it was language studies more than anything else.

*Q: That something's coming down the line. So from this office, you are calling people at night, you're calling the desks during the day, you are making sure everybody is linked up.*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: Basically.*

IFSHIN: The last half of that assignment, I was an editor. The job of the editor was to take his selection of the most important cables that had come in during a 12-hour period, both before he came on duty and during the time he was on duty, and do a summary of those cables for the secretary. This was not an unimportant thing because it was your opportunity to draw cables to the secretary's attention. And I don't want to talk invidiously about anyone, but particularly at this time when William Rogers was Secretary of State, I think he did not read a whole lot, so having this opportunity to draw cables to his attention was very important.

My great triumph on this job, that is when I was editor, is that I was on duty when the cable came in that the Chinese, the PRC, had invited the U.S. table tennis team, which was then in Japan, to visit China. I did a item in which I started out saying, Ping, Pong-China Calling, and then went on from there. I worked in the egregious pun about tabling tenets Communism, but people talked about that for a long time after I wrote it. [laughter] I had a lot of fun there.

*Q: So this office is, as it's watching the world, is another platform for bring to the highest levels of the State Department various pieces of information and trends.*

IFSHIN: Well, at this point in my career, I had no idea about the CIA's daily intelligence report, and I didn't know that INR is doing the same sorts of things. But this was the State

*Q: They didn't have CNN in those days.*

IFSHIN: Yes. It was an interesting thing that happened. This was the period of the war of attrition along the Suez Canal, and it was the occasion where the Israeli's shot down a number of Soviet pilots, although they were ostensibly Egyptians, but they were actually Soviets who were flying the planes. And that of course caused a great deal of interest and excitement at the time. I think they subsequently did away with that position.

*Q: The state position over at the Pentagon command center.*

IFSHIN: Yes, it didn't really amount to a whole lot. I remember on one occasion I found a NODIS cable that had gone into general circulation and I had to make an effort to recall that [laughter]

*Q: [laughter]*

IFSHIN: But I don't know if we got it all back or not.

*Q: From that exalted exposure to the seventh floor, you go back into language training.*

IFSHIN: Right. Well, there was a change. After I'd joined the operations center, they made a change to make this a 2-year tour. And instead of a 1-year tour in the operations center, people were supposed to then go out as staff assistants...

*Q: SSS.*

IFSHIN: SSS or Staff. Either. And among the people who served with me at that time, Jerry Bremer who of course went on to exalted things after his service with Dr. Kissinger. I'd already bid for language training and was very anxious to study Chinese. They interviewed me, and I remember Karl Ackerman, who was then the head of the operations center, said we'd like you to take one of these exalted positions. I told him I really didn't think I was cut out for staff and I was up for a line job. I was more of a hands on guy who wanted to get out there and do my thing.

*Q: See, Vietnam did teach you some things.*

IFSHIN: [laughter] These were all terrible mistakes in terms of building a career, but I did what I wanted to do. I started Chinese. I was offered either Japanese or Chinese at the time, I was given an option.

*Q: How did you choose?*

IFSHIN: I'd always wanted to study... I shouldn't say always, but at least since my Peace Corps service, I had been interested in particular in the overseas Chinese and was anxious to study Chinese. In fact, at that time, I thought I wanted to study Cantonese, and they arranged a meeting for with Chas Freeman, who was our great language guru although relatively a junior officer still. Chas said, well, it's fine we need people who speak Cantonese, but you'd be better off starting out learning Mandarin and mastering Mandarin first and then studying Cantonese. So I adopted that as my goal and decided I would study standard Chinese.

*Q: But prior to your Peace Corps experience in the Philippines you hadn't focused on Asia or China?*

IFSHIN: No, it grew strictly out of Peace Corps. In fact, when I entered the foreign service, I'm skipping around a little bit here, I told them I wanted to serve in Asia... any place but Vietnam. [laughter] What I really saw with Chinese in part, and of course at this time we did not have any relations with the Peoples Republic of China, and we had a number of these listening posts, these Chinese language positions around the periphery. While I recognized that Japan was more important to the U.S. than China, and was likely to be so for some time to come, at least from my point of view, it seemed to me that I had a chance to serve in more places and it would be more fun to do Chinese. So I chose to study Chinese. The year at FSI in Rosslyn.

*Q: Who was the linguist in Chinese at that time?*

IFSHIN: Sollenberger, Howard Sollenberger. He was the head of FSI at that time, but he was keeping his hand in as the China linguist because that was his background. He had been a China

linguist and he wanted to do that and he continued to do that. I remember when I was just starting Chinese, he sat in on one of my early classes and he listened to me for a few more minutes and he said to me, you're from New York, aren't you? And I said, yes I am, how did you know? He said I could hear your hard Ps. I said does this mean I'll never be able to speak Chinese, and he said, no, it means you'll speak it with a New York accent which is as good as a Minneapolis accent or a Dallas accent or a Los Angeles accent, it's just another accent in Chinese. Not as good as a Chinese accent, [laughter]

*Q: [laughter] I was always under the impression that the accent one had was also a function of the last language FSI had pumped into you so you probably were speaking...*

IFSHIN: I had an initial problem in learning Chinese in that I had Vietnamese tones. And Vietnamese tones are different from standard Chinese tones. They're more like Cantonese tones actually.

*Q: Right. Aren't there six tones in Cantonese and six in Vietnamese?*

IFSHIN: I think there are five in Vietnamese but I could be wrong. It's been a while since I studied it. In any case, I made a very conscious, deliberate attempt to try to block out my Vietnamese and try to master Chinese.

*Q: Were there many people taking Chinese at that time?*

IFSHIN: When I started, there were four of us as I recall. Myself, and Ward Barmon, a fellow named Phil Myer who subsequently left the foreign service, I think that was his last name, and Tom Penfold who was really going to Singapore and was just doing this to fill in a couple of weeks he had between various other things when he had to leave or report, so they gave him a little Chinese training. Ward and I were the only ones who did this for the full year. Then Ward left for an assignment in Taipei and I went to the language school in Tai Chung.

*Q: He gets one year and goes to Taipei probably in the consular section?*

IFSHIN: No, I think he was in the economics section.

*Q: Yes. And anything about that first year, about how interesting Chinese was? To begin there aren't as many [Chinese] restaurants or whatnot in Washington.*

IFSHIN: [laughter] Well, maybe not as many as there are now, but there were quite a few. Matter of fact, one of the better ones The Shanghai, which still exists out here in Northern Virginia. But it was a lot of fun studying Chinese then. One of our instructors, well, they were both very nice, but one of them was Li Tsungmi, I don't know if you ever studied with Li, but he had been a teacher of Chinese in Beijing for FSI.

*Q: Right, in the late '40s.*

IFSHIN: So there was sort of a link there, you were in the middle of history and that's kind of

fun. I remember some of the anecdotes he would tell. He would tell about being a member of the gentry in China in those days, and some of the things he had done. It was kind of neat and interesting.

*Q: Now actually, the way the foreign service works is that you have to have an onward assignment before you get language training, so you knew what job you were going to...*

IFSHIN: I don't think I did at that point.

*Q: You were the luckiest thing. [laughter]*

IFSHIN: I don't think I was assigned until I was in Tai Chung when I was assigned to Kuala Lumpur. I don't think I had an onward assignment.

*Q: Yes. Interesting.*

IFSHIN: In fact, while I was in Tai Chung, I think it was George Beasley. What was the name of our... he subsequently went into USIS and had a successful career as a USIS officer, a black FSO. But he was the scientific linguist in Tai Chung when I was there. When I was about halfway through, so I guess I hadn't been assigned yet, but he approached me and said I was making good progress and wanted to suggest that I do a third year. I might possibly or would get into translator or interpreter quality if I could do that third year of Chinese. But I said I'm going crazy as is, and two years is about as much as my brain can hold and I don't want to do it. I think that might have been a mistake because I might have imprinted the Chinese in a real way, but instead what happened is I had really decent Chinese when I left Tai Chung and it gradually declined.

*Q: [laughter] Now the foreign service for Chinese, Japanese, Russian, Arabic, these are two-year programs. Generally, you do one year in Washington, one year in a field location. So for Chinese, you did one year in Washington in '71 and '72, and then FSI in Tai Chung in '72 and '73. Now if there's only one guy from the first year program going to Tai Chung, how many people were in language in Tai Chung when you got there?*

IFSHIN: We must have had 20 or 30 people.

*Q: Where did they come from?*

IFSHIN: In addition to...

*Q: If that's the second year...*

IFSHIN: There were people who were coming there not directly from Washington, it's not always done as a 2-year straight.

*Q: Refreshing one's second year...or they've had it one year at a previous time and now they're getting a second year...*

IFSHIN: Or they're coming back, or there are people who learn their Chinese outside the foreign service. Of course FSI Tai Chung, I don't know about these other languages schools that we run around for the other languages, but FSI Tai Chung trains military and CIA and NSA personnel.

*Q: Sort of senior language, senior Chinese for the government.*

IFSHIN: Right, a number of agencies were represented at Tai Chung in those days. Now it's in Taipei. But that was an interesting experience too because getting to know these people... Most of them are really like the foreign service, of course the CIA guys are almost very little distinction between, you'd have trouble picking one out.

*Q: Did they walk with a limp, or? [laughter]*

IFSHIN: Sometimes there's a difference, but the military types tended to be very... the same interests and similar... The NSA were distinctly different, and that was partly their insistence upon protecting their covers. They were all DOD civilians as opposed to NSA employees and they'd all give you these cover stories and expect you to believe them.

*Q: What foreign service officers were with you in Tai Chung?*

IFSHIN: I can't remember.. Peter Smith, he subsequently left the foreign service and went to NASA where he was their Chinese linguist. He was there and he did the 3-year program. I'm remembering more USIS people who were there when I was there.

*Q: Like...*

IFSHIN: Rob Geary was there. John Thomson, John was one of the best Chinese speakers we had in the program and he's really very good. It just popped into my head.. Joe Lake was in Tai Chung the same time I was there. Joe and I became quite close at the time.

*Q: One of the things I've always heard about Tai Chung was here you are studying Mandarin Chinese which is spoken in northern China, and you are sitting with a population that is Taiwanese and there are actually very few Mandarin speakers in the area.*

IFSHIN: A lot of your contact is with the faculty, the instructors, and of course they are all Mandarin speakers by definition and speak with the proper accent. It was interesting being exposed to the accents. I remember very distinctly... we made a field trip to Taipei in which we were briefed by, I think the title was the head of the mainland affairs committee of the KMT who was a native of Hunan Province. He spoke to us for about an hour in Mandarin. We were all fairly advanced in our course and some of us were quite good. I'm not including myself in that. But I sat there and after losing track of what he was saying in about 10 or 15 minutes, I sort of wrote a note to John Thomson, who was one of the best speakers in our class, and I asked do you understand what he's saying. John said, no I don't. So we sat there for the hour and after it was all over we asked our Chinese language instructor what language was he speaking? And she said he was speaking Mandarin. I said, did you understand it? She said, I understood about 75% of it.

Of course that's one of the notoriously difficult Mandarin accents, the Hunan accent.

*Q: Which is Mao's accent.*

IFSHIN: You were a Chinese speaker, so you understand what I'm saying. I don't think spoken Chinese is terribly hard. The great difficulty in Chinese is the number of nonstandard accents and adjusting to those nonstandard accents. To me that's the hard part of Chinese is understanding. So hearing a southerner speak wasn't necessarily a bad thing, especially for someone like me who went off to Kuala Lumpur. In addition to my Chinese, I tested in Hokkien Taiwanese, and came out at a 1+, big deal. But that's what most of the Chinese in Malaysia speak. So knowing a little Minan hua was useful.

*Q: So you found living and working in Tai Chung comfortable?*

IFSHIN: I enjoyed Tai Chung. When they approached me about staying a third year, it would have been a second year in Tai Chung, I turned it down. But I had a very nice time. I had a house. There was a large U.S. air base at the time, CCK, and there was a PX and commissary and everything was available. I had a good time. I don't know if I want to put this in the tape, but they used to tell me I was making great progress in my Chinese, but how come I sounded like a bar girl?

*Q: [laughter]*

IFSHIN: You got to practice where you can practice.

*Q: How did you find the economic situation in Taiwan at that time? Now we see them as so successful.*

IFSHIN: Well, it was already beginning to be successful and there was a great deal happening in Taiwan. It was very comfortable living for someone getting an American salary.

*Q: Now you're there for language study, but actually isn't this the Nixon goes to China timeframe?*

IFSHIN: Right. Just to retreat for a moment, just during the time I was studying Chinese in Washington, this is when Nixon's trip to China occurred. We then, as the language students, were among the throngs who went off to the White House lawn to see him off when he left by helicopter for Andrews Air Force base. Subsequently I think Mike Mansfield accompanied him on that first trip. If not, Mansfield went to China shortly thereafter. I always remember Mansfield came in and spoke to our class about his experience of China, his impression. Which I thought was a very gracious thing for him to do. He was the Senate majority leader.

*Q: Nixon's gone to China, and but in fact you are only 1 or 2 people in the Chinese course. It doesn't necessarily look like anybody's necessarily looking to far ahead that there's going to be tons of consular s and need for Chinese speakers.*

IFSHIN: [laughter]

*Q: Did this get bandied about?*

IFSHIN: Well, Chas Freeman wasn't senior enough at this point. [laughter] Subsequently I had conversations with Chas about how a quarter of the foreign service were going to be Chinese speakers, and we were going to have them all over, but I don't remember when that happened exactly, that conversation. I think that was somewhat later. We opened up the liaison office. But we had so many Chinese speakers who had never served in China and were anxious to get there. But I didn't compete for a job in Beijing. In fact, I went after the Kuala Lumpur job, that was the job I wanted. I had this interest in the overseas Chinese which I'd had for some time and that's what I wanted to do then. Probably another one of my many mistakes. But I had a good time in Kuala Lumpur... we'll get to that later.

*Q: We were talking about the economic situation in Taiwan at the time. What are you seeing?*

IFSHIN: Not so much in Tai Chung which was then a provincial city, and I guess still is. I haven't been to Tai Chung recently.

*Q: It was the capital of the province, too.*

IFSHIN: I first visited Taipei as a Peace Corps volunteer in 1965. When I was in Vietnam I also visited Taipei. So, I'd been to Taipei a number of times already. At this point, Taipei is a rather unattractive, a provincial city with rows and rows of shop houses, the climate which hasn't really changed. In the winter, it's this rather gloomy, gray, unattractive city and climate. But a lot of good restaurants even back then. I think the food was better then, but the Chinese food, back then there was more variety to it.

*Q: Actually, there wasn't much in the way of Western food was there?*

IFSHIN: No. The only place you could have a Western meal was at the various U.S. military officers clubs. And maybe at the Hilton hotel. Basically you ate Chinese food in Taipei, and it was great. Full of great restaurants.

*Q: So you finish your language training, you test out marvelously at three 3s?*

IFSHIN: Yes *three 3+s*, as I recall.

*Q: In the Tai Chung system, were they teaching the abbreviated characters you used on the mainland too?*

IFSHIN: Yes, you had to take both and you had to be able to read the simplified as well as the traditional characters. You started studying with the traditional characters and then they introduced the simplified and you had to do both. At first, it's I just learned this and now you're giving me this - this is a whole different... But after a while you begin to see...

*Q: You begin to see the common thread. Now handling the jentizi, the simplified character material, was not a problem, but something one had to be careful of.*

IFSHIN: I don't remember. We were getting People's Daily, but I don't know if we were allowed to bring it home from the classroom and just protect it. I had a Chinese servant, I was going to comment on that. She was a marvelous cook. She was from Szechwan and was just great. Here I was this single guy, and usually I eat by myself. She'd make these fabulous meals for me, then stand behind me and say it was too hot this time, I made it too spicy didn't I. I'd be wiping the sweat from my brow and say, No, this is just the way I like it. Don't make it any less hot. [laughter]

*Q: [laughter] So you are out of language training and you get home leave and then you go to KL.*

IFSHIN: I don't know if I got home leave at that juncture or not. No, because I had home leave before leaving for Tai Chung. As a matter of fact, when I was supposed to leave for Tai Chung I was on home leave. And my father died in an accident that weekend. I was leaving that Monday and he died on the Friday before. Originally I was going to go to Europe on my way to Taiwan, I was going to go the long way. But of course, I stayed with my mother and her family I think a month or a month and a half, and then flew directly to Taiwan from New York. I was pretty shook up at that point actually, I was in emotional turmoil.

*Q: But your foreign service assignment now is in Kuala Lumpur, were you in the political section?*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: Was it is a joint political/economic section?*

IFSHIN: No. We had three FSOs, and one other officer. And one other officer in the political section. There was the chief of the political section, a Malay speaker, and myself as the Chinese speaker.

*Q: So of the three, were you the lowest ranking, youngest officer then?*

IFSHIN: Yes.

*Q: So you that meant you got to do the biographic reporting, or... what were your duties?*

IFSHIN: It's interesting, actually, because Kuala Lumpur or Malaysia, as you know, the politics are very much ethnic politics. You have these Chinese-based parties, and the Malay-based parties, even a couple of Indian-based parties, and a few mixed parties which tend to be Chinese. So I'm basically responsible for the Chinese parties. So in addition to the usual, being the protocol officer and the biographic reporting officer and the normal cats and dogs, and map procurement and publications procurement and those other good things, I had these very distinct responsibilities for covering the principle opposition parties then, as well as component parties of

the ruling coalition. Which was an interesting way for it to fall out.

*Q: Fairly serious. This was basically your first foreign service overseas tour.*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: And you're talking to the highest level of the opposition party... senior gentlemen in their own...*

IFSHIN: Yes.

*Q: How did you feel? They were obviously older than you were by 30 years... the aura of being from the American embassy can carry a young officer quite a ways?*

IFSHIN: In Malaysia, then at least, the U.S. carried somewhat less weight than it was to subsequently. They tended to be very British-oriented at that point. But I didn't find any problem getting in touch with people. Maybe I dealt with the second level people more than the first level.

*Q: But that's good liaison anyway.*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: You have a very distinct portfolio and it's a crucial one. Malaysia has gone through the insurgency period and they're trying to integrate these groups so the trends and whatnot that you are picking up are telling. Where was Malaysia at that time?*

IFSHIN: The traumatic event that pretty much hung over things was the '69 race riots. Just to trace the history there, if you'll recall Malaysia was formed of Malaya, Singapore, and Borneo provinces, east Malaysia. The Chinese-Malay balance tended to be fairly close at this point. At least from the Malay point of view, the understanding was that the Chinese would dominate economically but they [the Malay] would dominate politically. Of course, Lee Kuan Yu was not going to take a back seat to anybody. I think it's unrealistic to expect that, and he was making a bid for power nationwide, so they expelled Singapore. Subsequently the remnant Chinese still made a bid for political power and came darn close to winning the '69 elections. The Malays came out and rioted and all sorts of rules were instituted to ensure that the Malays would continue to hold political power indefinitely. Plus the various, for want of a better word, affirmative action programs which were meant to promote the *bamiputra*, the sons of the soil, the Malay, as opposed to the other communities. And there was a great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of the Chinese. There were Chinese who of course were interested in working out a different kind of accommodation and there were Chinese who were interested in overthrowing things and radically changing them. There were all sorts of movements and currents and developments among the Chinese. And then quite a few Chinese were leaving, a big Chinese emigration to Australia at that time.

*Q: So in fact from this position, you are talking to all kinds of Chinese groups, not just the established political opposition. You're getting around town and you have a fair arm around the*

*Chinese community. What were their concerns at this time, which is '73-'75?*

IFSHIN: Well, they were, what's our future in Malaysia. We've got it okay now, but what's the future for our children was the major question. Are we going to continue as second-class citizens here?

*Q: You're there through the American withdrawal from Vietnam, which is just up the street, if you will. Is that impacting on the domestic situation in Malaysia?*

IFSHIN: There was tremendous ferment in that part of the world at that time. I remember... a little back-patting here. I was out on a trip when somebody threw in some sort of anti-U.S. remark in the context of Vietnam. I was speaking to some group, I don't remember what it was. But I kind of exploded and said, let's remember the context of American involvement in Vietnam. You as Malaysian should remember Konfrontasi and the Pyong Yang, Hanoi, Jakarta, Beijing axis that was going to sweep Southeast Asia or Asia. America sacrificed to give you time to build your country, etc., in fact all of the southeast Asia countries were allowed to have that time, and now you have a chance to either use it or our sacrifice has been in vain. It cost us a lot but you've gotten a lot out of this. There was a lot of applause, and everybody was rah rah, and I felt very good about it at the time.

The other thing was we were dealing with boat people.

*Q: Your major reporting responsibility was the Chinese political parties. Did you see opportunities to touch bases with colleagues in other embassies who were also looking at the same issues?*

IFSHIN: Yes, basically the Australians of course and the Brits had very good contacts in Malaysia. And the Japanese on occasion.

*Q: This is a regular procedure? In Beijing, we had Tuesday monthly lunch.*

IFSHIN: No. They were a group of youngish diplomats who sort of hung out together and gravitated together, but it was never... It was more social than work related. Although as Al LaPorta, who was number two in the section, used to tell me... I remember once something had happened, I can't remember what, but it had us all puzzled and I would say I'm going to a party tonight and maybe I'll learn something. The next morning I would come in and Al said, what did you learn? I said, it wasn't that kind of party. He looked at me all disgusted and said, Stan, they're ALL that kind of party. [laughter]

*Q: [laughter] What did you think was America's priority in Malaysia at that time?*

IFSHIN: Our priorities were almost strictly economic. Malaysia was a major provider of natural rubber and tin, and we were interested in its continuing in that role and being a trading partner of the U.S. Human rights did not exist at that time as part of foreign policy. We were sort of interested in democracy, out of our own personal predilections we favored those things. But our basic interests were economic.

*Q: Just about the time you arrived...*

IFSHIN: Let me just mention that during the time I was there, our ambassador was succeeded by Frank Underhill who had been political consular in Manila and then deputy chief of mission in Seoul before coming to KL as ambassador. He was really a brilliant political officer in many ways, a brilliant drafter, and a lot of fun. Again, another anecdote just popped into my head. The South Korean ambassador was calling on him. The Korean issue was coming up in the UN and he had been to see the Malaysian foreign minister and had gotten their agreement to support our position, that is the U.S. – South Korean position. Our ambassador, Frank Underhill, reported this conversation, whether the Malaysian said ‘yes, I hear you’, or ‘yes I hear you and agree with you’, or ‘yes I hear you and agree with you and will do what you want’ remains to be seen. [laughter]

*Q: Free will always is one of the great diplomatic problems, isn't it?*

IFSHIN: Bringing it back to my Peace Corps anecdote about getting people to commit. People don't like to say no in that part of the world. They will always say yes if they possibly can, but what they mean by yes is another question. Pinning them down and circumscribing their freedom of operation pretty sufficiently so that you can be pretty certain of what they will do is the trick.

*Q: After you arrived in KL, the Thai government fell. Did that get any notice in Malaysia?*

IFSHIN: When you mention it, I have vague recollections, but I can't say that it did. Part of my responsibility was to cover the area around Penang because it was largely Chinese, so I would at least get that far up the coast. When I left Tai Chung and went to KL I got a boondoggle in which I had stopped off in Bangkok and Songkhla and the Philippines as well to discuss insurgencies and the Muslim problems in the border areas. So I was aware of these problems and of course they were always the Communist remnants in southern Thailand. But I can't say that people were terribly concerned with what was happening in Thailand. Maybe they were in the foreign ministry.

*Q: Malaysia's focused basically in other places, they're looking at Indonesia, that where threat, danger was coming to them.*

IFSHIN: I think so.

*Q: As your first full tour in the foreign service, what did you think of your duties and what you were learning professionally?*

IFSHIN: I found it professionally rewarding and very interesting. One incident occurred when I was there which we have not talked about which might be of interest, and that was the Japanese Red Army seizure of the American consulate and the taking of the consul and other persons as hostages at that time. The American embassy occupied the eleventh, twelfth, and penthouse floors of a downtown office building. The Consulate was on the ninth floor, a suite of offices. The Swedish embassy was also on the ninth floor, in an adjacent suite. I forget what floor, but

the Japanese were in the same office building. The Japanese Red Army seized the consulate, and took our consul and a bunch of other people hostage. I was happened to be outside the building when this all occurred and there was a big mob scene in front of the embassy when I was coming back. I spoke to police and they weren't letting anybody through. I called the embassy and they said, go stay with our consul's wife. I went off, she was Latin American, and I was doing my best to comfort here and various other American wives started showing up.

I went back to my apartment and spent the night in my apartment, a full night's sleep. The next morning I got up and the siege was still going on. I went up to the police and identified myself. They let me through and I actually went up to the embassy this time. They wanted me to go down to the Japanese embassy to act as liaison. I took a walkie-talkie and was in the Japanese embassy for the next 24 hours or so as this drama unfolded. What the terrorists were demanding was the release of prisoners as I recall. Eventually, the Malaysians agreed to their demands and the exchange was to take place at the airport where they were to get a plane and fly off.

I went off with our chargé d'affaires, Bob Dillon, who was the DCM. I don't remember if Ambassador Underhill was out of the country or what, but in any case he was not there. I went off with Bob Dillon to the airport where the home affairs minister was on the phone with various heads of state around the world trying to persuade them to allow this plane to land. Eventually, we got Madame Bandaranaike to agree to let them refuel in Sri Lanka. Colonel Qadhafi agreed to let them land in Libya. Eventually we had our hostages released, and they left with the prisoners. I think the prisoners had been flown in from Japan. They wanted Japanese prisoners. They flew in from Japan and the exchange took place at the airport.

*Q: Your job as liaison at the Japanese embassy, were you talking to the ambassador or their DCM or their political consular ?*

IFSHIN: I think basically their political consular, more often than not.

*Q: He was finding out what was going on in Japan and then you would be able to pass that on to our own people?*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: Who was the consular officer?*

IFSHIN: There was only one consul. It might have been Bob Stebbins. He was released eventually. There was also an embassy employee who was taken hostage. Everyone else was Malaysian, visa applicants of one sort or another.

*Q: Anything else about that full assignment that struck you as an interesting description of either the foreign service life or how an embassy operates? Did you get the feel that we did understand what was going on in Malaysia, that we did have enough contacts?*

IFSHIN: Yes, I think so. As I say, our interests tended to be economic rather than political. But I think we basically understood what was going on and we had a broad range of political contacts.

More than I've seen in other places I've served, in fact.

*Q: You're saying our interests are mainly economic and you're the officer liaisoning with the large Chinese community which is economically oriented, and I see that the next thing you're going to do is go to FSI for economic training. Is there any connection? [laughter]*

IFSHIN: Well, I thought, this is making me a well-rounded foreign service officer. Again, this was lack of understanding of how the foreign service really worked and what the foreign service wanted me to do. But I thought I should know about economics and that would make me a better political officer.

*Q: When did you leave KL then?*

IFSHIN: As I recall it was December of 1975.

*Q: So you did the January '76 FSI economic course?*

IFSHIN: Yes, January to June. Six months.

*Q: Do you remember that I was in that same class with you?*

IFSHIN: No! I do not remember.

*Q: I didn't either until I was looking at your scheduling. That's when I came out of Bangkok, same thing. Political officer, doing political parties stuff and realizing that what they're really arguing about is economic resources.*

IFSHIN: Yes.

*Q: I was thinking, "I better spruce up my economic background." I begged my DCM and he did some heavy shoveling for me and got me into that class. That was a beautiful place. It was the most stressful thing I'd been through in a long time.*

IFSHIN: I did very well in that class...

*Q: [laughter] I knew I didn't like you...*

IFSHIN: I think this had to do with the fact that I had a science background and a math background.

*Q: True.*

IFSHIN: I remember everybody was in a terrible uproar about the math, and the math was all stuff I had done before, so it was all review for me. So I did well.

*Q: But the individual courses came at a fair clip. In one week they would knock off a semester...*

IFSHIN: Sure. It was intellectually challenging and fun in that way. I enjoyed that... and I think I got a lot out of it. I learned things which I think were important to know and have stood me in good stead over the years.

*Q: I'm under the impression that when you talk about professions like the foreign service, that education or continuing courses are important to help the mind focus on things. Assignment after assignment after assignment gains a certain amount of skills, but...*

IFSHIN: What I did not understand was that by doing economic and taking an economic assignment I was guaranteeing I would not be promoted. [laughter]

*Q: [laughter] oops.*

IFSHIN: I was condemning myself to language and grade. But that's just ignorance. I didn't get into the personnel system until toward the end of my career. That's when I learned all this stuff. [laughter]

*Q: Some of us never learned it. Just do a quick description of the economic course. It was six months long.*

IFSHIN: Well, as you said, it included a number of courses and it's supposed to be equivalent to an undergraduate degree in economics of about 20-24 credits of economics. The math was basically at the differential calculus level so you could handle statistics. I found it interesting and challenging enough and quite useful. I think it gave me some intellectual rigor to back up some of my prejudices.

*Q: Did you find that the embassy was receiving a number of visitors, congressional or otherwise, in your area?*

IFSHIN: No. Not particularly, not at that time, not in our area. There wasn't that much of that going on.

*Q: Now, your next assignment, from '78 to '80, is back in Washington. How did you go about getting that assignment, or did it fall out of the air?*

IFSHIN: Well, no, remember, I had been on that job...

*Q: You had open bidding at that time...*

IFSHIN: Yes, as I recall, we had open bidding, and I wanted to go back to Washington. I don't recall where this was on my list of desirable jobs, but it worked out very well for me. I was assigned to INR as a China analyst. Before returning to Washington, I got a familiarization trip to China, this is '78, and I went to Hong Kong and got various types of briefings and meetings there. From Hong Kong, I took the train up to Canton and flew from Canton to Beijing, where I was met by the embassy. Now the embassy had a big delegation, as I recall the White House

Science Advisor was heading a big delegation...

*Q: Yes, Frank Press.*

IFSHIN: Yes, Frank Press.

*Q: I was in that delegation. [laughter]*

IFSHIN: Oh, were you in that delegation? In any case, it worked out. It was interesting for me in the sense that the embassy was all tied up in this delegation and its care and feeding but I got included in their banquets, etc., and so it opened some doors for me and at the same time it left me free to do a lot of things on my own.

*Q: Now, you are talking about your orientation trip between Indonesia and Washington?*

IFSHIN: That's right.

*Q: The one I'm thinking about was right after normalization.*

IFSHIN: No, this was before normalization. This was still an embassy office; the liaison office was rather modestly staffed at that time. They didn't have a lot of personnel, so having a relatively large delegation meant that they were really kind of tied up and didn't have really all that much time for me. So I was on my own a lot of the time in Beijing, as well as elsewhere in China, obviously. This was a fascinating time in China, things were opening up, and I remember I'd go out to a restaurant, for example, and be seated at a table with a bunch of Chinese. These were modest restaurants. So I would be conversing to the extent that I could, I was somewhat out of practice with Chinese, but it was coming back and I was trying to use my Chinese. I would be conversing, nothing all that exciting with people, but people were talking with me. I even had people stop me on the street and want to practice English, but learning I spoke Chinese we'd go back and forth in the two languages and it was all very interesting. I'd rush into the embassy the next morning, and I'd say, do you know what happened? I did dot, dot, x, y, and z and this happened, and the people would say, oh, yes, they just started doing that about a month ago, where they actually stopped isolating us in a room by ourselves and letting us sit with the other people in the restaurant. The liaison office people were not astonished by what to me was all very new, and it was new, and it was among the first times that it happened, but it wasn't the first time. So it was very interesting, China was clearly changing. In any case, after Beijing, I went down to Huangzhou and Nanjing where I visited various factories and schools.

*Q: All on your own.*

IFSHIN: Yes, I was traveling on my own. This was arranged through the Chinese authorities, so I was met in every location with sometimes an official party. I remember visiting a factory with a group of other people, I don't even remember who they were, but they were other foreigners. And then we went to Shanghai and from Shanghai I flew to Tokyo and off to Washington where I assumed my job as a China analyst in intelligence and research. And it was a fascinating time to be working on China because there was so much ferment going on at that time. The Chinese

media in particular were opening up and we were reading things that were in fact news. It wasn't just a list of who had visited what cities and pronounced things good, or bad as the case may be, and it wasn't just a matter of propaganda diatribes. It was an actual discussion of issues and things being written that were fairly astonishing at the time. We were all kind of, what's going on in China?

*Q: It was a question that could in fact be answered.*

IFSHIN: We were convinced at the time, I remember, that there was a secret democrat that somehow-

*Q: [laughter] One of theirs or one of ours?*

IFSHIN: No, no, it was [said] that there was somebody who was interested in opening up the windows and letting some breezes blow through the... And subsequently, from what we know, I would say Hu Yao Bang, who at this point, I forget whether he was general secretary of the party at this point or became general secretary of the party subsequently, but certainly from what we know about Hu Yao Bang, he was a liberal in our terms. I always hate those terms, liberal and left and right, when we're discussing these countries because they're fairly meaningless, because we tend to call people we don't like "conservatives" and people we do "liberals" and those terms mean nothing in terms of actual policies and what they stand for. But it was an exciting time in China. Back in Washington, we were supposed to have four China analysts at that time...

*Q: Do you recall who you replaced?*

IFSHIN: I can't recall if I replaced Doug Spelman or whether Doug Spelman was there. We never had all four, we never filled all four slots during the time I was there, or we never filled them with four State Department officers. During the time I was there, sort of the constant was Carol Hamrin. Carol has been a China analyst for the INR for a long time. I don't know how many years she'd been there. She was certainly a young woman at the time. I don't know how much experience she'd had. She had a Ph.D. in China studies and was very well plugged in and she was there. Doug Spelman, I can't remember whether he was there or subsequently left before I arrived. But I remember seeing Doug and meeting Doug and working with him to a certain extent. At one point, Lilian Harris, and I don't know what's happened to Lilian, but...

*Q: She moved on to Middle East things.*

IFSHIN: Right. But Lillian joined us as a China analyst. That was after I'd already been there for a while. And then we had various people who we'd borrow. I remember somebody from the Congressional Research Service came over and worked with us for a while. Someone from FBIS, one of the FBIS analysts, came over and worked with us for a while. That said, I'd say that we had a very strong analytical team in INR, and while there were many, many people in the community working on China, some of them were outstanding, very knowledgeable, very bright, very good in what they did, I thought INR stood up very well, because we were all kind of doing everything, so we tended to be very well-informed across a broad spectrum of issues. Where, I think for example in CIA, and particularly in DIA, people tend to be more specialized and don't

get the kind of broad guage familiarity with issues in a country like China that you do working in INR. In any case, during that particular period, I thought that INR was doing the best analysis on China of any of the various intelligence agencies.

*Q: One of the stereotypes that I've always heard... the difference between a job at the embassy or a job at the desk in INR, is that the INR analyst can sit back and has a much more leisurely pace...*

IFSHIN: In terms of China, that's absolute nonsense. Again, this is the same thing that I had always heard, that when you were writing something at length, that no one was going to read it beyond the summary, well, maybe the guy in INR would read it because he has time. Well, the guy in INR has no time. He's being inundated with so much, on China at least, he's go so much to read in terms of what is coming in from CIA, from other agencies, from the unclassified traffic. And as I said, what was both FBIS and academic writing about China was being published at that time was extremely interesting in the Chinese press, especially if you were able to read it informed by the classified reporting which we had available to us.

Yesterday, which is leaping ahead, but I was listening to a program about this U.S. plane that had been landed in Hainan island yesterday, and somebody made the comment that 70% of our intelligence about China comes from these kinds of intercepts. That's nonsense. I don't know what the percentages would be and I don't think anyone knows, and it depends on what you mean by intelligence and how you are discussing it, but 70% or even 90% of our intelligence is unclassified. If you know how to read the unclassified stuff and if you have all the classified stuff to give you the background and help shape it, it really helps opens up some new light on what is being published in the papers and what they are saying in unclassified areas. But that's neither here nor there.

*Q: But that's important. Basically, the classified sets up a framework which...*

IFSHIN: Absolutely, I'm not saying the classified stuff is not valuable, and when I say 70%, maybe I'm just talking about volume and not importance, but the numbers get very... Anyway I just heard that and reacted to it last night. Getting back to my tour in INR, it was a fascinating time to be working on China, and a tremendously interesting assignment. One of the things I got involved in, this was the time of the China-Vietnam war. I see you are trying to recall what happened there.

*Q: It was January, 1979.*

IFSHIN: Yes. It wasn't the most important fighting that ever took place, but it was an interesting time for us. In INR, in fact, the State Department never set up a task force and never did anything to follow this as we often do for international crises, but we set up one within our own office. I remember it was basically myself, Rafael Ungerich, who was a Vietnam analyst at the time, who subsequently has passed away, and Tim Hamilton who was the Thai analyst at the time. The three of us set up a 24-hour watch, we were all working 16 hours a day at that time, but we made sure somebody was on duty around the clock for the few weeks that this lasted.

*Q: The stereotype of that action is that the Vietnamese used the national guard, they didn't even bring out the army, and they gave the Chinese a very difficult time.*

IFSHIN: Well, the buildup, there was a long period before the actual fighting occurred, we were doing a lot of fighting at that time, and I think I was among the very first people to say that the Chinese were going to go ahead and do something significant, because I thought it was obvious that governments don't move this amount of money and equipment around without intending to use it, it's very costly to be moving this. It seemed to me that they were going to do something.

*Q: Do you have a recollection of the time line vis-à-vis Deng Xiao Ping's trip to the United States?*

IFSHIN: Oh, yes, well, he had come, and I think exploited his trip. I don't think he told us a darned thing about what their plans were, but he made it look like he had gotten American agreement. I think that's... Well, obviously he had bigger fish to fry in the U.S.-China relationship than making it look like we were supporting his efforts in Vietnam, but I think that was one of the additional benefits he saw. Clearly, a very clever man.

*Q: But that buildup that you are watching, does that predate his trip?*

IFSHIN: I believe it is concurrent. The buildup started and continued during his trip and after his trip. Of course, the actual fighting took place and this was a matter of... I think most people feel that the Vietnamese had the better of the fighting, although it was taking place on Vietnamese territory, of course the Chinese were the invaders. Then and maybe stubbornly, I've taken a somewhat different view of it... at the time the Chinese were saying they were teaching Vietnam a lesson. And my point of view was always that the lesson was not that we could wipe the floor with you, but we're on your border, we're not going to go home, and you've got to live with us. And that means you have to take account of what we want. I think that was the lesson and I think the Chinese delivered the lesson. But other people felt that the Chinese got their eyes blackened and Vietnam had sent them home with their tail between their legs. Again, I never saw it that way.

*Q: It was a costly venture for the Chinese. They had significant losses.*

IFSHIN: Oh, sure, I think in the fighting the Vietnamese enjoyed more success than the Chinese did. The Chinese learned a lot about their inadequacies, and what they didn't have in the way of military strength.

*Q: Can you give us a sense of how projects in INR were tasked at that time? When you arrived in the morning, did you know what you were doing, or you were already working on something, or were there rush projects? The desk calls up and says we want a study on...*

IFSHIN: Well, they were always pressing us to do more in terms of longer studies, analytical studies. When I say they, I mean our superiors. Particularly, now there was a change in personnel which involves events. Shortly after I first joined the office, David Dean became head of the Asian analytical area. David subsequently got very involved during the time of normalization,

with the process of normalization, and emerged as the first head of the American institute in Taiwan's Washington office, when the dust finally settled in that area. Bob Drexler replaced him. I can't remember whether it was David and Bob or mostly Bob who was always anxious for us to do longer pieces analyzing what was happening in China studies. But at the time, we, the China analysts, the shifting cast of characters with Carol and myself being the constants through most of this period, did a lot of short pieces which went into the sort of daily product that was being published for the secretary. We had pieces on a daily basis, sometimes two or three pieces.

*Q: Okay, there was a daily INR report that goes up to the seventh floor..*

IFSHIN: The secretary, right.

*Q: And INR/EAP was getting a fairly constant placement in this...*

IFSHIN: Yes, normally, the size of this report varied, let's say a minimum of five articles or as much as twelve or even larger than that. These are short, one paragraph, type summary items, just highlighting important event. But of that, every day there would be one, two, or three China items. It was just a very interesting and important time in China where every day things were happening, or we were learning of things every day. There was a constant debate within China about policy, and about political parameters, opening up of the system, changing of the system. And then we were always trying to see what was happening on the personnel side of China, although that tended to be fairly opaque and remains fairly opaque. We were always convinced that there was a secret democrat and we were always debating who it was. At times, I think we were way off.

*Q: So in some cases, you are deciding what you are writing on, say you need something for the secretary's morning briefing. Things are coming down from David Dean or from above. Is the desk asking for things out from INR?*

IFSHIN: I don't remember ever being tasked by the desk. We were doing a daily briefing, of course, of SI material for the desk, and had fairly close contact with them. They always got the China items that we prepared for the secretary's briefing. I don't think people get the whole briefing, or that they are routinely circulated to the desk, but the specific items dealing with their country would be given to a country desk. I can't remember precisely what the procedures were then. During the Chinese buildup on the Vietnamese border and the subsequent fighting, I remember we did several oral briefings for a variety of individuals including then David Newsom who was Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and Dick Holbrook who was the EAP assistant secretary. These were at their request.

*Q: You had arrived in INR summer of '78. And December 15, '78, Carter announces that he's going to recognize Beijing. What were you doing on the 16<sup>th</sup> of December? Does this pick up the pace significantly?*

IFSHIN: No, I don't think so. David Dean disappeared at that point, or shortly thereafter, and got very involved in the mechanics of what was going on. I don't remember it really changing things at the working level all that much. We continued doing what we had been doing. Obviously we

were doing a lot of sort of reaction reporting and what is going on and how various people are reacting to this change.

*Q: The change in diplomatic recognition, the derecognition of Taiwan and the recognition of Beijing, would put Taiwan in an area that raised its profile for us. What was going on there? Were you also doing background pieces on Taiwan?*

IFSHIN: Yes, we were.

*Q: And the impact there and how they looked at it...?*

IFSHIN: Yes.

*Q: What were some of the trends you were seeing out of Taiwan?*

IFSHIN: Of course, the initial reaction was one of tremendous dismay, and then there was some violence, with demonstrations in front of the American embassy. But I guess they came to terms with it. The handwriting had been on the wall, and the fact that we were going to establish normal diplomatic ties with China had certainly been in the cards with Nixon's opening in 1972. In fact, I always felt that Carter- Brzezinski handled it in an unnecessarily clandestine type manner. It seems to me that there was a tremendous concern about the Taiwan lobby, or the China lobby as it was still called then. I think that concern was probably misplaced. It faded and there was generally widespread acceptance in the U.S. political circles that it made sense to establish diplomatic ties with China. In fact, controversy did emerge, because I think what the administration had in mind for AIT, the American Institute in Taiwan, and I'm not sure that name existed at the time, but for that institution that there would be a fairly minor operation that only concerned with conducting trade and other minor sort of relations. Congress, in drafting the Taiwan Relations Act, played kind of a useful role in outlining a much more developed and larger relationship. I know, typically we don't like to credit the Congress with any kind of useful role, but in this case I think they did in fact play a useful role, and what emerged with AIT was a much better instrument for U.S. policy.

*Q: Now, INR is reporting on normalization... My impression is that there are a fair amount of congressional trips and cabinet level trips that go over. Are you doing any support of those? Background papers, or there was a standard background paper already, the Chinese economy is...*

IFSHIN: I think that tended to be fairly standard stuff. A lot of, for example, biographical reporting came out of CIA, so that we weren't all that involved. The desk was extremely busy at the time, and sometimes I suppose would levy a requirement on us and ask us for assistance in putting something together. I don't remember being all that involved in preparing for the trips. Though, you are quite right, there was an enormous volume of them.

*Q: One of the things that happens in late '79 in Vietnam is the Kaohsiung incident, which I presume is Taiwan processing its new relationship.*

IFSHIN: In part, but although obviously there were domestic pressures there.

*Q: Right. Did INR get involved in any of that? Summarizing and reporting?*

IFSHIN: I'm sure that we did, but I honestly don't recall a great deal about it. We didn't have a great deal of Taiwan expertise, which is kind of strange when you think that's where we had our embassy all those years and people serving. I think there was a general feeling that we knew Taiwan and we didn't know China. That often seems to be the case... the more open a country is, the less a feeling that we are depending on intelligence to tell us about that country. Although, we are often more ignorant than we think.

*Q: Of course, that's INR's forte, all the intelligence from all the other agencies is coming to one place in the State Department that's INR, so you are looking at all sorts of descriptions of things and summarizing that for the politically active.*

IFSHIN: Precisely. There is an enormous volume of stuff that comes in.

*Q: So this can be more than a 9 to 5 [job].*

IFSHIN: Oh, yes, this was a very involved, very interesting job. And you can always take home unclassified stuff with you and try to do some reading at home and stay abreast in that way. But the image of the relaxed INR officer having time to sit back and read, at least as it applies to China, was a totally false image. Maybe if you were working on, let's see, what would be a good country to be working on? Some obscure country where we don't have to do a whole lot of reporting, and you have time to read all the available material to read on it. But that was not true about China.

*Q: Anything else that would have come out in that timeframe of normalization?*

IFSHIN: I can't recall a whole lot. There were a lot of interesting meetings, intelligence community where we would all sit around and try to figure out what was going on...

*Q: So there were a number of sessions where you would go over to the agency and talk to their guys...*

IFSHIN: The agency, and I remember at least one trip over to NSA as well.

*Q: You guys were busy, but did you get an opportunity to go to academic conferences, or...*

IFSHIN: Yes, the Association of Asian Studies annual convention, in New York, as well as events in Washington. We went around to the various sessions and listened. It was all very useful, very worthwhile. I'm leaping ahead of myself. I did a tour in personnel at one time and I'm going to get into this a little bit more. I always used to advise people to look hard at INR jobs, which are always difficult to fill, and nobody bids on them, at least that was the case then, I assume it's still the case... I think they can be extremely worthwhile and you could learn an awful lot on them. I've seen a lot of fairly senior people, or people, particularly on the political

side, who in my opinion didn't fully understand intelligence and what it really was and wasn't.

I remember when we were briefing, I mentioned during the Vietnam-China clash period we briefed various high level officers. We'd always go through this is what happened, and they moved 70 planes, and they had this capacity, and 700,000 men in these various locations and they had this and they had this kind of support... I remembered that the questions always boiled down to intentions. What are the Chinese intending? I was always willing to give people my opinion, but I always wondered if they understood that that was exactly what I was doing, giving an opinion at that time. This was not based on any special knowledge. Their opinion was just as good as mine. If they wanted my opinion I was willing to advance it, but I had no direct line to the Chinese authorities. They weren't sending me a missive saying, well, we did this because we intend to do that. I was guessing as to what the intentions were, or I was analyzing and trying to figure out what the intentions were. But, having presented the information to them, presumably they were as well placed as I was to figure out the intentions.

*Q: The point is, it's worthwhile to have an understanding of the intelligence that's coming in, its capabilities and what it's able to do for you because at some time in your career as an action officer you're going to have to move on the basis of that intelligence.*

IFSHIN: Precisely. And it's also important to understand the limitations of intelligence and how often we are operating in a murky situation and intelligence doesn't tell us what we need to know. We have to figure that out. I don't know if you have any other questions, but just preceding, the other interesting thing about the INR job is that coming out of that job I had very good contacts in the China area across a broad spectrum of persons and there was a great deal of interest in me for my next job, which is a fairly unique situation at that time. And I remember that originally I had wanted to bid on Mark Pratt's job, that is the job of the general affairs political section chief in Taipei, and Mark extended [his tour], so I thought, well, I'm not going to go after that job.

Then I was approached by Chas Freeman. I guess he was the director of the desk, and he wanted me to bid on a political section chief job on the desk. So I went to personnel to talk to them about bidding on that job, and I said, well, you know, the desk has talked to me about this and they want me to bid on this job and it sounds like it would be a good job. And they said, yes, well, except that it doesn't exist. I said, what? And they said, well, they're trying to create it and they'll probably be successful, but at this time, there is no job so there's nothing for you to bid on. I guess the reason I went to see them is that I'd tried to enter a bid and had not been successful, and that's why because the job was not in the system yet.

*Q: Well, that's funny because I thought Gerry Ogden was sitting at that job. Or Gerry was his deputy at that time.*

IFSHIN: I guess, well, in any case, this was a new job that did not exist, and at this point I got very upset and said, well, here I had this job and I let that go, and then I had that job, and the job I really wanted was Mark Pratt's job and now he's extended, and now you're telling me this job doesn't even exist. And they said, well, wait a second, we can give you Mark Pratt's job, we just have to figure out what we're going to do with you for a year. I said, oh, I can still bid on Mark

Pratt's job? They said, well, it's a language job and it's still listed and you can bid on it. Ok, what are we going to do with you for a year? There were several possibilities, and then they mentioned they had a vacancy for the commercial officer position in Taipei. I said, oh, I have an economic background, I did economic commercial work. So I can go to Taipei and do that job.

So that's what I did, I went off to Taipei for a year as the commercial officer which was again a very interesting job. It was a new experience for me. There was a trade center there and there were two commerce department officers there and I was the State Department officer, and of course we were all AIT at that point, we'd resigned from our various agencies...

*Q: Well, explain that.*

IFSHIN: The procedure at the time, you submitted a letter of resignation and it was understood that you would come back to your agency. It was interesting because we continued to earn seniority, we continued to have money paid into our pension fund, so this resignation was a strange one in many ways, and I'm not sure of what the legalities of it were. But in essence, they withdrew your diplomatic passport and gave you a so-called green passport, a normal tourist, civilian type non-governmental passport.

*Q: My understanding was that the executive branch's version of the Taiwan Relations Act was done by a few lawyers in a back room to basically accomplish this. Take foreign service officers who had presidential commissions. Suddenly wash them, they resign from the foreign service, they happened to be picked up by this contractor, called AIT, perform very similar foreign service like duties, and at the end of their contract with AIT they can be rehired by State Department. That apparently was the original version.*

IFSHIN: Again, this gets into my future reincarnation as a personnel officer as a career development officer. I had some dealings with people who served in the Sinai field mission. The situation that I subsequently discovered there, for example, I had young officer who I was the career development officer for who was promoted during the time he was in the Sinai field mission, but the promotion did not take effect while he's there. It only takes effect when he rejoins the State Department. So that subsequently, he lost pay and he lost various other things, eligibility to compete, all sorts of things.

I remember at the time I went through the system, and spoke to someone, and said I served in AIT and none of this stuff worked that way. We got everything. [If] We got promoted, we got promoted and we started earning our new salary and we started earning seniority in our new positions. Why is Sinai Field mission position being treated so differently? Subsequently, and retroactively, they went back and straightened it out with the Sinai field mission so that they were treated much more fairly, I think, in those terms.

*Q: Actually, that impacts on the whole AIT thing too, because when they created this AIT, nobody knew how it was going to work, nobody knew what the impact was. In fact, at the time didn't they tell people who were at the embassy that if you want to leave and not sit this out, you may do so. Mark extended, but maybe he didn't bid fast enough, did he extend because he was enjoying it or they were afraid there wouldn't be any bidders?*

IFSHIN: I don't know, but maybe he was prevailed upon that this was a very important and delicate time in Taiwan-U.S. relations and it was very important that continuity be maintained. For example, Chuck Cross was brought in as the first head of AIT and again, that was sort of they wanted somebody of ambassadorial rank who had been an ambassador previously. There were all sorts of issues attached to what they were trying to do.

*Q: So, what you've done now is gotten yourself assigned as Mark's successor, but you do the year on the commercial side to position yourself.*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: So you've actually got two assignments.*

IFSHIN: Yes.

*Q: And how was that commercial year?*

IFSHIN: It was an interesting year. First of all, you have an important commercial relationship with Taiwan, as well as just an important relationship in general. The U.S. figures very large in the Taiwan universe, in the Taiwan scheme of things. So being the commercial officer, I was important to a lot of Taiwan businessmen. In addition, I had a really outstanding staff. I had a number of Taiwan locals working for me who were just extremely able and quite familiar with what they were doing, quite capable people. I went over...

*Q: Are you working in the economic center or the trade center?*

IFSHIN: I'm in the trade center, physically located in the trade center, although my boss is in the economic center. I'm working for Sam Lee, who was a U.S. foreign service officer. Sam was State Department, I don't know if the foreign commercial service already existed at this point, I don't know when exactly that arrangement took hold.

*Q: Do you remember who you replaced?*

IFSHIN: When we met Stu Kennedy, I was saying he had served in Taiwan because I would swear that was the name of the person I replaced. I thought the name was Stu Kennedy but I've forgotten now. I don't think he was particularly a China type, the person I replaced.

*Q: Can you describe some of your duties?*

IFSHIN: With this excellent staff that I had, my duties were to brief American businessmen on the ongoing economic relationships and business opportunities and to identify business opportunities for Americans. We maintained a commercial library, largely for Taiwan businessmen looking for agents or to be agents or representatives of American businesses and to import the American products as well as to find representatives for their exports in the United States. We had various trade shows, those were largely the two commerce department persons

who were responsible for the trade shows. I was responsible for the day-to-day facilitating of American and Taiwan businessmen finding each other and doing business with each other.

*Q: Was there a fair string of American businessmen coming to Taiwan?*

IFSHIN: Yes. That was still quite prevalent. Taiwan was then our fifth or sixth largest trading partner. An awful lot of it was Taiwan exports to the U.S., at that point they were running a big surplus. I don't know if they still do, but they were always interested in whittling down that surplus, from their own self-interest point of view of showing what valuable customers they could be as well as sellers of products. There was a significant commercial relationship.

*Q: I sounds like there would be a fairly large American chamber of commerce.*

IFSHIN: Yes, there was.

*Q: Larger than Jakarta?*

IFSHIN: Certainly more heterogeneous. Where Jakarta tended to be dominated by the petroleum sector, this was a broader spectrum of companies and interests.

*Q: You were saying that most of the local businessmen were Taiwanese as opposed to mainland Chinese that were running the government?*

IFSHIN: Yes. Certain sectors had large mainland representation.

*Q: Such as?*

IFSHIN: Banking. China Airlines which largely comes out of the air force and is kind of operated as a fully owned subsidiary of the air force, so that tended to be mainland Chinese. But business, by and large the private sector, was then largely Taiwanese. But there were certain important businesses that were mainlanders' ownerships, just certain companies were traditionally mainlanders.

*Q: Banks are sort of choke points for small businesses... if you can't get your loan..., I wonder if that's one of the reasons the mainlanders were into banking, it also served a political purpose.*

IFSHIN: I don't think it was established in that way. A lot of the banks came out of the government, or were originally government owned, or were then government owned or controlled. And then you had the big Shanghai banking sector which had moved with the nationalist government. Taiwanese were increasingly involved in banking types of things, but I think they tended to have a slightly different legal personality than the traditional banks. They tended to be trusts. Whatever the distinction is, really, is not something I'm terribly familiar with, but like we had savings and loans, they had some other entity.

*Q: Trust cooperatives or something like that.*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: While you are there in the commercial side, you were saying that the government on Taiwan wanted to be a good customer to the U.S. Do you remember any trade disputes or major things like that that came up, or major purchases?*

IFSHIN: I honestly can't at this point. It's all kind of faded. When I was writing my, or making input into my EER, I was responsible for enormous amounts of Taiwan purchases, but I honestly can't remember any of them now.

*Q: Were they starting or had they been doing this trade delegations to the states? The different buying delegations...*

IFSHIN: Well, yes. During that year, this was a big thing where we had a number of states visit Taiwan state delegations and they would also send Taiwan delegations to the U.S.

*Q: My point is, did that start with derecognition, or had they been doing that state buying things at an earlier time?*

IFSHIN: I honestly cannot tell you. It was ongoing during the time that I was there and it's hard for me to believe that they just ginned it up so quickly. But it was an increasingly important instrument of policy for the Taiwan side.

*Q: Explain how they used that.*

IFSHIN: Having lost the formal diplomatic ties with the U.S., they were interested in promoting all kinds of Taiwan sister city relationships, sister university relationships, sister this, sister that. Or they would entertain these trade groups from various states. I remember South Carolina coming out and was headed by then Governor Richard Reilly, the man who was just Clinton's secretary of education. But there were a number of others that came through during the time that I was commercial officer, it was fairly common. Lots of exchanges.

*Q: And then Taiwan would send these buying delegations to the states and announce the purchase of wheat or...*

IFSHIN: I don't know how much of this was actually additional purchases beyond what they would have been making in any case, but they would try and make it look like they were making a big gesture by announcing them together in large amounts, just in the normal course of events we bought so much wheat. Instead, they would give us some publicity and some play and do it.

*Q: Now, as commercial person for that year, did you have much opportunity to drive around the island for business, visiting other businesses, talking to people, or were you mostly in Taipei?*

IFSHIN: As I recall, I was mostly in Taipei. Although, I remember going down to visit some of the significant businesses that were somewhat south of Taipei, in the Taipei suburbs...

*Q: Chin Hsu industrial park?*

IFSHIN: Right, the industrial park, and the China petroleum company which is located outside of Taipei and a number of entities like that, but it was basically confined to the Taipei area. I must have gone down to Kaosiung to the trade center down there, but I don't remember a whole lot of travel. I had been around the island a number of times before I got there. As a language student I traveled extensively in Taiwan. We were encouraged to travel, in fact, we were given a lot of time to travel. As long as we were using the language we were supposed to get out. I'd been all over the island. I mentioned Burt Levin... when I arrived as a language student... I'm going back now... Burt made a comment that he wished he could take me around the island sometime, or that I could go around the island sometime. I don't know how sincere he was in saying that, but when I got down to Tai Chung, I told George Beasley that Burt Levin said he wants me to travel with him around the island. George said, that's great, sure. A month or two, three months after you've been here, that'll be fine. So I contacted Burt and said, remember that trip you wanted take? George Beasley says it's fine. So we took a trip around the island together, starting from Tai Chung and went around to Tai Nan and Kaosiung, and Taidong, and up the coast to Keelung.

*Q: Visiting the government people?*

IFSHIN: Visiting government people, opposition people and calling on all sorts of people.

*Q: So, as a language student, you got an enormous introduction to Taiwan and its politics..*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: Well, given that introduction and the introduction you would have had to Taiwanese businessmen in the year...*

***IFSHIN: I found the introduction to Taiwanese businessmen extremely interesting and I think it was useful in filling in a lot of background for me in my subsequent job as the chief of the general affairs or political section. The businessmen for the most part avoided politics like the plague. This was the time when the Kuomintang was running a pretty tight ship, and it was not necessarily...***

*Q: Well, your arrival was after Kaosiung, which is a signal, they rounded up the entire opposition. They're all in jail now.*

IFSHIN: Right. It was not economically healthy to be involved in politics for businessmen. But nonetheless, I got to talk to a lot of businessmen and establish a certain relationship with them where they felt a little bit more open and willing to talk. While they weren't talking politics per se, a certain amount of the unhappiness that they had with the prevailing political structures came through and they felt comfortable enough to hint at some of these things. It was a good background, that commercial officer tour.

*Q: In that tour, what was your liaison with the local authorities? Were you going over to their department of commerce? (End of tape)*

*You were just coming to the end of your commercial tour.*

IFSHIN: At that time we were pretty religious about not contacting the government, although I think it was somewhat more relaxed on the commercial area than the political area in our dealings with the foreign ministry. Nonetheless, we worked basically with the CCNAA (Coordinating Council for North American Affairs). I had a really outstanding team of locals working for me who conducted a lot of more official relationships, but I didn't know about that and didn't try to know about that.

*Q: Did you come across a circumstance where the authorities on Taiwan wanted you to attend something or do something that was a little more official? Were they making the attempt that the relationship was more official than the Americans wanted it to be?*

IFSHIN: I don't recall that when I was working in the commercial area. Now I would refer businessmen to the Taiwan authorities at times because they needed to deal with them, and I would have one of my locals help facilitate such a meeting. But I don't recall them ever trying to exploit that to get me involved to make that relationship look more official. I don't recall anything like that ever happening.

*Q: Now it's 1981, and Mark is leaving. He had been in place before normalization so he had transitioned.*

IFSHIN: Right.

*Q: You were there after normalization.*

IFSHIN: Yes.

*Q: So you are the first general affairs section chief in this new period, if you will. What kind of a political relationship did Mark turn over to you?*

IFSHIN: Yes, well, I think we operated very much like a normal political section would. We didn't meet with the foreign ministry *per se*, but in a sense, that was, we dealt with CCNAA, and in a sense that was more like a traditional embassy. The embassies of course tend to contact every ministry, and be in contact with all sorts of people. But the more traditional embassy goes through the foreign ministry. We were going through the CCNAA which was acting exactly like a foreign ministry, and whenever we needed to contact anyone, that's the way we did it. In addition of course, we were meeting with the opposition. You mentioned the Kaosiung demonstrations and subsequent arrests and imprisonment of a number the significant leaders of the opposition, nonetheless, the opposition continued to function in despite of the absence of many of these leaders, although, I always feel that there were a whole number of people I don't really know because they were in prison, a whole bunch of significant leaders. Nonetheless, I became familiar with the people who were carrying on at that time. Some of them were very interesting people to get to know. Taiwan is a place that is undergoing very rapid change, political and economic, and it is always interesting to watch that.

*Q: Just to set the scene, who's the head of AIT at the time that you now become the head of the general affairs section?*

IFSHIN: You know, as I mentioned earlier, Chuck Cross was the first head of AIT, and he was the head during the time that I was there as a commercial officer, and I can't remember exactly what the transition was, and he was replaced by...

*Q: Jim Lilly...*

IFSHIN: Jim Lilly, and I can't remember whether Jim Lilly and I assumed our positions more or less concurrently or whether it's just fading in my mind.

*Q: Because actually, Jim Lilly is as the Reagan administration comes in and Jim is basically NSC to start off the administration and then he gets that job. So if they came in at '91...*

IFSHIN: '81...

*Q: '81, yes, and then spent some time in the NSC and then he comes...*

IFSHIN: Yes, I think Chuck Cross must have been in place when I first took over in the general affairs section, but it wasn't very long after I was in general affairs that Jim Lilly took over. I can't remember... Stan Brooks replaced Bill Thomas as the deputy and I can't remember what the exact timing of that, either. Bill Thomas was certainly there when I was commercial officer and I think for a while when I was general affairs. I think Stan Brooks replaced him some time after I had already become general affairs officer. But it was all more or less about the same time, the changing of the guard so to speak takes place.

*Q: So we have a fresh crew after this traumatic event. Do you have any sense of either Chuck Cross or Jim Lilly's connection with CCK at that time?*

IFSHIN: Let me just say that when Jim Lilly came on board, I remember attending some meetings with him and the Taiwans and CCNAA personnel, I believe, where he used what I thought of at the time as kind of retrograde language that sort of set my teeth on edge... he was talking about the Chi Coms and various stuff out of the '50s and I really had to sort of, what's going on here? But I became a big fan of Jim Lilly's and he's a very capable guy, and a lot of that stuff I think was meant to kind of put the Taiwans at ease and kind of establish, 'hey, we speak the same language here and we all know about the Chinese bandits or the communist bandits and you can relax with me'. He was extremely effective with the Taiwans, with Kuomintang, and with the opposition figures as well, just kind of putting them at ease, and making them recognize him as someone they could talk to. I admired him, watching him operate. As I said, my initial reaction had been a little bit of being appalled at some of this, but he was very good.

*Q: There's obviously a number of tensions going on, I mean there's the whole emotional reaction to the derecognition, and then there's the internal political turmoil, which is Kaosiung*

*and the subsequent trials. How did your reporting priorities reflect some of this?*

IFSHIN: Our reporting priorities tended to be focused on Taiwan, China, well, Taiwan-U.S. was always our main priority, and Taiwan-China was a second priority: how is that relationship evolving. And somewhere much farther back was how is Taiwan's internal politics evolving? That was of particular interest to me, and was of a higher priority to me than it was to the U.S. government, but I was very interested in Taiwan's internal politics and how that was evolving.

*Q: How did you follow up on that?*

IFSHIN: I tried to develop relations with both opposition figures and with Kuomintang figures, particularly the Li Teng Hui kind of Taiwan KMT, the bulk of the Kuomintang membership of course at this time was Taiwanese, although the leadership was still largely mainland. One of the things I kind of regret was that I never really got to know James Sung who was then in Tai Chung, where he was the governor, and the...

*Q: At that time he had a KMT party position, head of the GIO.*

IFSHIN: Head of the government information office, but most of the time that I was in Taiwan, he was not in Taipei, so I really didn't get to know him very well. I did get to know, his successor as governor, who was a Taiwanese, Lin Yang Gang. I got to know him a little bit and I got to know some of the other people who I identified as movers and shakers. I had this thesis for a long time that Taiwan mainland relationships would only be worked out at a period when you had an indigenous Taiwanese leadership that would be comfortable and would be seen by the Taiwanese population as representing their interests in a way that the CCK and the mainlanders never could. I always felt that they would be seen by the Taiwanese as trying to work out some sort of deal for themselves, whereas if you were a Taiwan politician, then at some point most of the people would accept that you were trying to work out something on their behalf as well as your own.

*Q: Well, doesn't this come from the fact that it was the KMT position that there was but one China and Taiwan is part of China?*

IFSHIN: I thought there could be a deal at some point, but that it required a leadership that was in some sense democratically selected by the majority of the population by the Taiwanese, or at least seen as representing the Taiwanese. I still feel that, and that is obviously the way that things have evolved to a certain extent, but it's not been as simple as I thought it would be. For one thing, I expected the Chinese to be more pragmatic than they've proven to be. I think they've gotten more ideological, nationalistic, perhaps as Communism lost legitimacy as an idea, then they've had to depend on nationalism as their authority and that's complicated any attempt to work out relations with Taiwan. I thought this evolution of Taiwan's politics was critical to the evolution of Taiwan. Obviously it would be critical to the evolution of Taiwan-China mainland relations.

*Q: Now along these lines, I remember reporting out of Taiwan that would indicate that OCKs put another Taiwanese guy as the head of something... the Taiwanization of the KMT and the*

*legislatures that was something that people were watching. Were you seeing that at the time?*

IFSHIN: Yes, well, it was moving very slowly. The legislature, through the whole period I was there, and I don't know exactly when the change comes, but the legislature was the legislature that represented mainland China.

*Q: Yes, the election of 1947.*

IFSHIN: Yes. When somebody died, they would replace him with someone who ran second if he was living in Taiwan. It was incredible that they were able to maintain this for as long as they were. They had all these ancient politicians who were extremely long-lived who managed to hang on there. It was inevitable, you knew that there were demographic changes that were coming because people do die, but it was hard to see just when it was going to change and how it was going to change. So the legislature tended to be less interesting than what was happening within the party, the KMT...

*Q: The party was the focus of much of your reporting...*

IFSHIN: Right, and then you had the opposition.

*Q: Now in a professional sense, you had been there a year, and Mark had been there three years. When you take over, is there a quick handoff, or he's been including you in the last few months in his meetings and everybody knows you are taking over, or is it as though you just walked in from a different world?*

IFSHIN: A lot of people knew I was taking over. In fact, I guess it had become common knowledge. I had not tried to broadcast it. And once I heard my locals talking about it, and I misunderstood what they were talking about because they used terminology that was not clear to me about a promotion or something, and I didn't know what they meant by I was getting promoted. I was hoping that they had some secret that I didn't know about. But of course, what it was they knew about my move to general affairs, and I hadn't told them, I hadn't told anyone. But it was common knowledge coming out of the personnel section of AIT, and obviously it got from there into the general community, and people knew it was happening and then it did happen. I think the handoff was sort of a mix between what you described as sort of a handoff and gradually working me into things. It was neither, but somewhere in between, there was a certain amount of introduction, but it was done basically at the end.

*Q: What does a general affairs section look like? How many people?*

IFSHIN: At that time, we had four American officers, including myself. One officer from another agency, and two junior officers, they were both second tour officers. Can't remember whether I inherited them or if they arrived after I got the job. I don't remember anybody before them, so I must have inherited them. And as with the luck of the draw, one was very good and one was not so good. There were two secretaries. I had a staff of four or five locals in the political section, one of whom was the social secretary receptionist who didn't really work for me but was nominally under the general affairs section. And then I had three other locals, the

senior one was very knowledgeable about politics, the other two somewhat less so. But they all basically worked as translators, doing translating of Chinese press on a daily basis.

*Q: So the political section put out a press summary. But now there's the USIS office, aren't they also doing a Chinese press summary?*

IFSHIN: I honestly don't recall. But we would identify specific things that we wanted translated, and that's how that worked. I would want to say this about USIS. They were in a different location, in a different building, but nonetheless, I thought we had an excellent relationship and I thought the AIT relationship in general where we were all nominally separated from our various agencies and working for AIT that it worked very well. I thought it was one of the most cooperative organizations that I've ever worked for from all the various aspects and all the people that were involved in various parent agencies that they represented. Now it happened during much of the time that I was there, that the number two man, or the information officer for USIS, and I forget what its designation was called in AIT, it had a different name like general affairs in political section, but the number two guy was a State Department officer Joe Moyle. I don't know whether that improved things or not because we had good relations with his bosses as well, Harry Britton... But it was in general a good relationship. We had a good relationship with the military attachés as well, who were, in fact, retired U.S. military. The military was a little bit more scrupulous about not rehiring.

*Q: One of the things that happens when [one] converts from an embassy to AIT is, there's a whole shuffle of facilities. We leave the old embassy building and now AIT is in a new building. Have all those administrative logistic changes been handled and you no longer have any particular problems... you have enough chairs, there's enough... no more logistics problems?*

IFSHIN: Yes, I think everything was working very smoothly at the time I moved in. They were not the nicest offices I've ever had but they were certainly adequate. From an administrative point of view, we were working smoothly. It was an adequately funded operation, and had a very high degree of operation.

*Q: As head of the general affairs section, what is your relationship with the front office, Jim, Stan Brooks, are you dividing up contacts, how does that fall out?*

IFSHIN: The way Jim Lilly and Stan Brooks operated, was kind of Jim Lilly was sort of Mr. Outside, and Stan Brooks was Mr. Inside. Maybe that's the way an embassy typically operates. Stan did less contact work than either myself or Jim Lilly. But we all had our contacts and tried to pool information. Jim Lilly, coming out of the NSC, had a good sense of how our reporting could have the most impact in Washington and was very interested in timing of reporting, and when we got our reports in and getting them in at the strategic moment when it would have the most impact. Very often, he would instruct us along those lines, that we wanted to do this at such and such a time so that it arrived in Washington when they were contemplating this or contemplating that. And then there was also a good deal of competition with Beijing, where when Beijing did a certain kind of reporting we wanted to come in with the other side or the counter report, or in some cases before they reported, and in some cases after their report, but we were always watching their reporting as well. And again, Jim Lilly was always very alert to that

kind of nuance.

*Q: That must have been very instructive.*

IFSHIN: Yes, it was.

*Q: You are head of the political section, this is a senior position within the mission. Are you accompanying Jim on a lot of his calls, or is he doing a lot of his own reporting?*

IFSHIN: No, I'm accompanying him on a lot of his calls and subsequently writing the report.

*Q: Did you ever get in on a meeting with CCK?*

IFSHIN: I don't recall. This is a historic figure, and I remember seeing CCK, so maybe it was in a meeting. I remember a meeting between Jim Lilly and CCK, as I recall it took place across the street from the presidential palaces or the foreign ministry... I can't remember. But it wasn't held in the building, I don't know if it had an AIT non-recognition aspect to it. But a lot of these meetings would be held elsewhere. I don't think we would meet with CCK very often.

Somewhat more meetings were held with Chien Fu, Fred Chien who was then foreign minister. A lot of it went through CCNAA. Raymond Hu was the head of CCNAA during a large portion of that period, and then John Chang was number two and he was a special figure and had special relations with the Kuomintang leadership, including CCK, so they dealt a lot with him.

*Q: Did you at this time see circumstances in which Taiwan was trying to project an image of a more official relationship than we were comfortable with?*

IFSHIN: Yes, occasionally we would call them out. We'd have a visitor, let's say an official U.S. government visitor and it would get into the press, and we'd kind of call them on it and say if this leaks or gets undue publicity, we won't be able to have these kinds of visits in the future and that would be very unfortunate. And they'd say, oh, well, we don't know how this happened or why this happened. But basically, it wasn't tremendous strains, they were always trying to promote the look of official relations. But I don't think they were obnoxious about it. Obviously, they had their interests and we had our interests and we both understood where we were coming from, and they recognized that a certain degree of cooperation was necessary if they wanted our cooperation. Getting our noses too far out of joint would be against their interests.

*Q: The main political situation is that much of the opposition is in jail now because of the Kaohsiung incident. There's a postponed election that takes place maybe when you were still in the commercial area.*

IFSHIN: I don't remember any elections. [laughter] I mean elections were all that critical at that point. I remember that I was dealing with one wives of the imprisoned Kaosiung figures at that time. And Kang Ning Hsiang who subsequently fades from the scene, I guess, although I remember reading his name in the... The Chinese apparently refused to allow him to accompany whoever was leading the Taiwan delegation to the mainland in a meeting a couple of years ago. But Kung was someone I met pretty frequently with and got pretty close to. I liked him, of

course he was kind of a moderate figure, the kind that Americans tend to like, and I guess wasn't enough of a firebrand for the subsequently evolution of the opposition.

*Q: The Kaosiung incident itself raised a lot of thoughts of human rights and that sort of stuff. Were you getting anybody interested in the human rights situation in Taiwan or a lot of congressional inquiries?*

IFSHIN: Well, yes, there were congressional inquiries and there was always an interest in the human rights situation. I wouldn't say that I was getting people interested in it, because for us it was a problem. But one of the... this is a slightly different aspect of things... in talking to... I remember John Chang in particular, making this point to him... I was always kind of pushing the line that their friends in Washington were the people who would be the most helpful to them in Washington were not the traditional lobby. Jesse Helms or people on the right in the American political spectrum, but it would be people like Steven Solarz, for example, who were interested in democracy and human rights, and that this was the line that they should be pushing and pursuing, that they are an evolving democracy, that they're not some right wing retrograde government and that this would be their natural line of support in the U.S. Congress. Again, I think that's the way that things have evolved to a considerable extent although they've maintained their support on the U.S. right as well. But they've managed to add a number of people who recognized that as they've evolved into a more democratic, I guess now you'd say fully democratic, government that they've added this support of people who are supportive of democracies.

*Q: Does this new platform of the general affairs section give you more opportunity to do some traveling around the island again?*

IFSHIN: Yes, I got out and visited various parts of the island, but again, because of our unofficial relationship, you don't call on the county magistrate and various governmental officials when you travel, but I managed to get out and see people, both official and unofficial.

*Q: There's always the stereotype that foreign service only sees the upper level of people and doesn't get down, and now you're in an unofficial situation where you're not supposed to necessarily see the upper level people. Yet, how would you describe your understanding of the environment in Taiwan at that time?*

IFSHIN: I think it was reasonably good, but not as good as I would have liked it to have been. But we got around and saw people. It was still an authoritarian system where you couldn't necessarily talk freely with a wide range of people, or people would not talk freely with you, to put it more accurately. People were still cautious about contact with foreigners, at least most people were. It was problematic. We had a good sense of what was going on, but not necessarily firsthand. We spoke a lot to the press and to, there were some of these magazines that were coming as part of the liberalization of Taiwan, the number of magazines that were opposition inclined, or at least non-KMT, being an important one. We would talk to those people regularly, publishers, editors, reporters, and that gave us a somewhat broader insight into the society and what was going on.

*Q: There's been some thought that evolved thoroughly and could be anticipated that there would be a shift in recognition, that there was still was hard feelings in some quarters of the Kuomintang officials. Did you get any sense of that... were there people who didn't return your calls or you couldn't... were you trying to keep up with the Kuomintang offices as well as the government offices?*

IFSHIN: Yes, we were trying to work with the Wo Man Dung and get insights from them rather assiduously, in fact since we couldn't contact the government, I think we focused on the Kuomintang somewhat more than we would have otherwise. I don't remember anyone not returning any calls. I'm convinced there were hard feelings on the part of some people, generally a mistrust of the Americans and our goodwill and our faithfulness, but I don't remember anybody stiffing me or being overtly rude. I'm sure there were people who were less cooperative than they might otherwise have been.

*Q: What else is Taiwan doing to then to maintain its relationship with the United States?*

IFSHIN: One of the big efforts they had going on at this point was the congressional staff delegations that they were being invited over, ostensibly under the guise of private missions. It was a non-governmental entity, that is a non-Taiwan entity, that was sponsoring them.

*Q: Sun Jo University...*

IFSHIN: Yes, there were a number of them. There was a series of them, but obviously it was all government money that was in fact behind this. It was a very well-funded, very well organized operation and sometimes they'd run them by us, that is they'd inform us...

*Q: Congressional staffers...*

IFSHIN: Congressional staffers, they inform us that they had a group of four or eight or however many were in the group, who were going to be visiting in Taiwan and they wanted a briefing from the AIT.

*Q: This would be the first time that you would know that these people were coming.*

IFSHIN: Right, that would usually be the case. We'd arrange a briefing, and spend sometimes a couple of hours, sometimes a morning shooting the breeze. Sometimes we wouldn't really have any contact with them at all. We'd know that some people were in town, but we wouldn't be called upon to do anything. I suspect, I believe, that it typically was at the request of the group whether we were involved or not. That is, the Taiwan authorities didn't make any particular point, or it was not routine to set up a meeting with us, but they were willing to do so if the group requested it.

*Q: So a fair number of congressional staff people are coming to Taipei at this time.*

IFSHIN: Perhaps numbering in the hundreds.

*Q: How about congressmen themselves?*

IFSHIN: You know, I just don't really recall. There must have been some, but I don't remember any congressional delegations at this time.

*Q: Hm. Because we're saying, this is a brand new relationship, nobody's done this before... well, the Japanese did it prior...*

IFSHIN: Well, ours was just very different, a much larger relationship.

*Q: Right, so you're feeling your way, they're feeling their way, and I guess the question is as the two of you are feeling your way around and bumping into each other, did it look like it was working?*

IFSHIN: My sense is that it was working very well, surprisingly. Yes, there were bumps in the road, but nothing that we weren't able to work out.

*Q: Now at this time we were also pushing them on some trade issues, if I recall.*

IFSHIN: I don't really recall what you are referring to.

*Q: I think there's some stuff on the copyrights stuff in the books and these were the last days in which Taiwan versions of...*

IFSHIN: You could get those pirated versions cheap. [laughter]

*Q: [laughter]*

IFSHIN: I was not involved in that. There were a number of negotiations going on, on a whole series of issues. My colleague, Clarke Ellis, who was the head of the economics section, was deeply involved in those negotiations at that time, but I never got involved in that.

*Q: So, you're building relationships with party people and dealing with government people through the CCNAA thing. Any other particular incidents or circumstances come to your attention that you...*

IFSHIN: I don't recall anything particularly exciting at that time.

*Q: We were talking about the Kaohsiung earlier, and you'd think that the opposition had been rounded up, but my impression is that those that weren't and the wives of those who were continued to be quite aggressive, and looking for contact with the AIT.*

IFSHIN: Well, the politically active members of the opposition were very open about wanting to be in contact and criticizing the government and yes, that was going on. I always had the idea that there were a lot of people who felt that they were under the Kuomintang's radar who kept a low profile and were not anxious to be... But, I had frequent contact with the opposition and they

were more than willing to meet with the Americans. They wanted to meet with the Americans.

*Q: I would suppose they would have some fairly interesting insights on the local political scene or why a certain set of appointments were materializing.*

IFSHIN: Yes, of course they always had their take on all of the developments, it wasn't always a complete take or the most accurate one.

*Q: And you were saying you were watching the Taiwanization of the Kuomintang, or of the government.*

IFSHIN: Yes.

*Q: Wasn't Soong the vice deputy or premier?*

IFSHIN: As I say, I never got to know James oong.

*Q: No, I'm thinking of another Sung who had a heart attack or stroke and that's why Lee Teng Hui became the deputy. I can't think of the name.*

IFSHIN: Lee Teng Hui became...

*Q: You were saying Lee Teng Hui is within your radar screen, you're seeing him move up?*

IFSHIN: Oh, yes. We did have an occasion to meet with him and I always found him to be a fairly impressive figure. I did not anticipate his becoming president or doing what in fact he did. In fact, I had identified some successive generation which I thought would do some of the things that he perhaps did. I didn't anticipate it happening as quickly as it did.

*Q: But even against the background of Kaosiung, you were seeing reform and movement?*

IFSHIN: Yes, I think we all saw an opening and saw that Kaosiung was a setback, but a temporary setback to what was an ongoing process. Again, it all happened so much faster than we anticipated, but we did see it happen. We did anticipate it. It was the speed that was surprising.

*Q: Well, after Taipei, then you moved to the Philippines where you'd started out twenty years earlier. Did you feel your career was going in circles? [laughter]*

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*Q: Well, it was an interesting intellectual adventure in that you understood what you were involved in and where you were going and a little bit afterwards. As I was saying, when we were in Beijing after Tiananmen Square somebody did the same thing, took some songs, put some new lyrics to them. It was a matter of how you handled the frustration, because we'd evacuated the embassy, there were no dependents, we'd pulled 1,400 Americans, students and businessmen and*

*there was nobody but us for about two or three months. And this process boiled up these songs. "P L A" to "Surfing USA" was interesting.*

*But we were going to pick up a few other things.*

IFSHIN: Oh, yes, I'm sure we were, but I don't remember. It's been quite a break between this, not that it's your fault, I'm the one who became scarce.

IFSHIN: It's after my time and I think it's some years down the road. I can't give you an exact date. It all did happen and it all makes very good sense from my point of view and I believe that it has all worked out fairly well.

*Q: So sitting in PIA, what are your main pressures and what are your main problems that you are working on?*

IFSHIN: The main problem we have is that we are such a small office, and from the State Department's point of view, a not terribly consequential area who is getting attention. In fact, in some ways that was nice. We kind of made policy in a way that if you are a desk officer working on China you don't get to make policy, I don't think, because the amount of interest that is being shown in China by all sorts of people. But in Pacific Island Affairs, for the most part, unless there's a problem, no one's paying a whole lot of attention to what you're doing. We used to feel that basically that it was us and then it was George Schultz because George Schultz had been a marine in the Pacific in World War II and had some interest in the islands, actually. But up until that level, I don't think there were a whole lot of people who were interested in the Pacific Islands. But whenever we needed to get into see him or needed a decision we found that we had a friend in the office of the State Department.

*Q: What were some of the policy areas then that you dealt with?*

IFSHIN: There's a tuna treaty where we provide them, and then it was \$10 million, chump change from the point of view of the State Department or the United States, but we provided the countries of the Pacific with \$10 million for the rights to U.S. tuna boats to fish in their waters. It was always a big deal getting the appropriation out of Congress and keeping it going, but it was done. Nuclear issues were important. The transportation of nuclear waste and nuclear fuels basically between Japan and the United States. Plus of course the French were still testing.

*Q: Yes, isn't this their main testing area?*

IFSHIN: Yes, they tested in...

*Q: In fact is this the main U.S. testing area after the war?*

IFSHIN: Well, yes, but we were no longer doing above ground testing and hadn't been for some years. But the French, well, I don't know that they were doing above ground testing, but they were still doing nuclear testing in the Pacific. The Pacific islanders are sensitive to that. It was just coming on the horizon, but environmental issues were of increasing importance, although

global warming was not yet on anyone's radar screen as far as I can recall...

*Q: Just before you come on board with the desk, the New Zealanders, the Kiwis... New Zealand and the United States have this argument over nuclear issues and, in fact, the Reagan administration writes them out of the SEATO alliance. Was any of that impacting on your policy areas?*

IFSHIN: Yes, it was. Obviously, we did not deal directly with New Zealand, but this was an area of great interest to New Zealand and it was an area where they wanted to show that they could show that they could still operate as an ally and be helpful. So that facilitated our work in many ways. The New Zealanders were very cooperative and helpful to us in the Pacific, as were the Australians for that matter. I think the Australians always had the attitude that they needed to educate us with regard to island issues and bring us along, which quite frankly is true. To them, this is an extremely important area, and to us it was obviously a secondary area. Although, I would maintain that again, in the U.S. government structure, although the State Department might not have put great emphasis on the Pacific islands, the defense department put a whole lot more emphasis on it and CINCPAC for example was vitally concerned.

*Q: So you found yourself liaised a lot with the DOD...*

IFSHIN: Yes, we worked a lot with DOD, probably more than most desks would. They were much more interested in Pacific affairs.

*Q: And they had presence out there...*

*Q: On the analytical side, you've got capabilities and intent. It's the human intelligence that State Department collects that gets you to the intent issues.*

IFSHIN: Well, I suppose. We have so many foreign students studying in this country... Well, we don't have so many Americans studying overseas, I guess [laughter]. This doesn't prevent the enormous misunderstandings. Obviously, relations with ourselves and Iran hasn't been helped by the enormous numbers of Iranians who studied in the United States in the good years or the friendly years. Now we have significant problems with China and of course, we've had enormous numbers of Chinese studying in the United States. I don't know if that has improved things or not. But managing those relations requires people who are familiar with both cultures and can address the American needs thoughtfully and foreign service officers are in a position to do that kind of thing.

**HERBERT E. HOROWITZ**  
**China Desk, Bureau of East Asian Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1972-1973)**

**Economic Counselor, American Liaison Office**  
**Beijing (1973-1975)**

*Ambassador Herbert E. Horowitz was born in New York in 1930. He received his bachelor's degree from Brooklyn College in 1952. He received a master's degree from Columbia University in 1964 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1965. He served in the US Army from 1953-1955. His overseas posts include Taipei, Hong Kong, Peking, and Sydney. He was ambassador to the Gambia from 1986 to 1989. Ambassador Horowitz was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 9, 1992.*

HOROWITZ: A brief stop at the China desk as deputy there, which was really the Taiwan desk; a separate office of Asian Communist Affairs covered communist China. Not long after I arrived it was announced that there would be a U.S. Liaison Office in Peking and a Chinese Liaison Office in Washington, and I was among those chosen for the first group to Peking.

*Q: What were you doing when the news of the Kissinger visit to communist China came so suddenly?*

HOROWITZ: I was at the National War College when some of these things were happening, and then at the Republic of China desk. Most of that was kept very closely and at a high level; not too many people were involved. When that Kissinger visit occurred where they announced that there would be a Liaison Office, I just ruled myself out because I had just started a new job. We went to a farewell party for the advance team that was going to Peking, and I was politely informed there that I would join the first group; within hardly any time at all, my wife and I were packing.

*Q: Before we get to that -- you were at the Taiwan desk: What was the perception of our people dealing with Taiwan just as this whole new world was opening up? Where did they think this was going to go?*

HOROWITZ: I think most of the officers who had studied some Chinese and had had some experience in the China area were very interested in the opening to Peking and were hoping that this would provide an opportunity to visit communist China -- we used to say communist China, now we say mainland China. There was also some concern about the relationship with Taiwan; but at that time I don't think anyone perceived that it would advance to the point of breaking formal relations with Taiwan. After all, for a lot of years we had a close tie to the KMT, the Kuomintang, in Taiwan. After 1949 we had given them a lot of support, a lot of military assistance, a lot of economic assistance; it was hard to imagine that this would change in the way that it subsequently did change.

*Q: You were with the first team to go to China. Could you talk a little about the composition of the team, what you expected you would be doing and your experiences when you got there?*

HOROWITZ: We had little in the way of expectations because the idea of a Liaison Office was a new one. We knew that technically we would not have diplomatic status so the head of the Liaison Office was to be called the Chief of the Liaison Office, the head of the political section would be the Chief of the Political Unit, and I would be the Chief of the Economic Unit. We

didn't know to what extent we would have access, how easy or difficult it would be to collect information. It was a new thing; we really had very little time, it had happened so quickly, to prepare. Part of it was to feel our way. David Bruce wanted the office to be small.

*Q: He was the first Chief?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, the Chief of the Liaison Office. He resisted pressures from other agencies to send their representatives at that time. I know that because in Washington I accompanied him on calls on different economic departments such as Commerce and Agriculture. Those departments were anxious to have people at the Liaison Office. But Bruce put everybody off saying that we don't know what it is going to be like, we have to keep it small and feel our way. So he resisted; he wanted that office to be small. I remember him telling some anecdotes about his past experiences, e.g., being Ambassador to London where there were so many people in the Embassy he didn't know who many of them were or what they were doing.

*Q: Well he had been Ambassador in London, in Paris, all the places where you never get to meet your staff.*

HOROWITZ: So he was anxious that it be small and compact, and that is the way it was. We started off with Bruce, two deputies (if the Liaison Office was unlike any diplomatic mission, it was also different in that it had two deputies; John Holdridge who had been at the NSC and Al Jenkins who had been at the China desk), two officers in the political section, two in the economic section, and communicators and administrative staff. It was really quite a small operation to begin with.

*Q: And you were the Chief of the Economic Unit?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. One of the things that I did which did not endear me to some of my colleagues in the State Department, was to decide that we be called the "Commercial/Economic" section. I did that because at that point there was a lot of interest in the American business community, and we began to cover the Canton trade fair where American businessmen for the first time were allowed in. We got lots and lots of inquiries about trade. Also, I was not sure of how much economic China watching we could do from Peking so I thought it would a good idea to call it a Commercial/Economic section. My successor changed that.

*Q: Why would there be a problem with our colleagues back in Washington by calling it Commercial/Economic?*

HOROWITZ: I was trying to put the emphasis on the commercial. This was the period when Commerce had begun asserting its independence and State was trying to hang on to its turf. I really felt that "commercial" was appropriate. Incidentally, we also had a very good desk officer in Commerce at that time, and with his help managed to disregard burdensome Commerce procedures and forms; we improvised as we went along, the best we could. We had a lot of cooperation and support from State and Commerce.

*Q: When you arrived there how did you set up?*

HOROWITZ: We all lived at the Peking Hotel. Some of us had little children and they were running up and down the halls in the Peking Hotel. We had a couple of rooms at the Peking Hotel that we used for office purposes. My first secretary came on direct transfer from Saigon and she was bright enough to put in her suitcase some paper, some carbon paper, some envelopes and pencils and that is what we had at the beginning. At that point, the Chinese were putting up the building in the diplomatic area that was to become the Liaison Office and behind that the building that was to be the residence of the Chief of the Liaison Office, but it was a few months before we were able to move in. Those buildings are still there; the building that we used for our office is now the USIS building and the residence is still the Ambassador's residence. The Embassy is spread out in some other buildings in the neighborhood. We had no files to begin with, that was the second time in my career that we had to do reporting without any files, and it is amazing what you can do. We all knew something about China so if you were doing a reporting message you drew on your memory, what you had read about, what you knew about, and drew some comparisons.

*Q: Did you find there was a quantum change by being at the center -- you had been on the periphery before -- or not?*

HOROWITZ: Yes there was a change in that what we benefited from was a sort of first hand, visual kind of feel, and having for the first time working level contacts with Chinese counterparts, which in Hong Kong you don't have. However, our lives were very circumscribed; the lives of all diplomats were circumscribed -- though technically we were not diplomats. We couldn't travel very much; Chinese officials were very withdrawn and circumspect about what they talked about. During that period, I was there from 1973 to 1975, I think the reporting we did was a contribution, but in many ways the reporting from Hong Kong was better. They had more people, they had files and they were getting bits and pieces of information from different parts of China -- people who left China, travelers, provincial radio broadcasts. So there were a number of things that they in Hong Kong saw in better perspective than we did sitting in the Liaison Office. I think what we did was a contribution but it didn't supplant the China watchers in Hong Kong.

*Q: China is such a vast place and there are so many provincial aspects that being in the center is not necessarily the best vantage point.*

HOROWITZ: It was a wonderful personal experience.

*Q: Let's talk a little about the commercial side. The Chinese were more responsive on the commercial side -- they have always been a commercial people. What are your comments on this?*

HOROWITZ: You have to remember that at that period China had not yet opened up. In the sixties, there was limited trade with the western world; then the Cultural Revolution. In this period when we were there, in the seventies, there was more foreign trade but the power struggle in leadership was developing between the Gang of Four and the pragmatists.

*Q: Yes, the Gang of Four was on trial.*

HOROWITZ: No, they were making a bid for power and resisting the expansion of contacts with the West. The pragmatists, then led by Zhou En-lai, were trying to bring Deng Xiaoping back; they were trying to make their place in the sun. So it was not a time for great commercial opening. There was a limited commercial opening; they were interested in beginning to sell some things to the west and they were interested in American wheat and some other products, but they were still rather skittish about it. The Chinese officials were not very open; they were afraid to be in many ways. What we learned was mostly what our businessmen would tell us; we would digest it and then give advice, without revealing any secrets, to other businessmen. There were so few business visitors to Peking in those days -- that's where businessmen wanted to go because it was the headquarters of the state trading companies -- that they would come to see us. American businessmen would come to Peking and the first thing they would do is contact the Liaison Office. We would tell them what to expect and how to conduct themselves and very often they would come back later and give us a report. So we were able to build up a body of knowledge on doing business with China, at that time.

We did a similar thing at the Canton trade fair, a twice a year vehicle. That is where the Chinese did most of their selling, but also a lot of their buying too. The Canton fair was an important first step for an American or other foreign businessman in dealing with China. So if they could get a visa to go to the Canton fair they might have some hope of developing a relationship and later on maybe traveling to Peking or other parts of China. What we did was to take a suite at the hotel opposite the Canton fairground to serve as a mini-office. We would man it through the whole month of the fair with one or two people. We would give advice and help, and learn from the experiences of American businessmen. The Chinese still published no data and gave you very little information.

*Q: Did you kind of wonder what you were doing?*

HOROWITZ: No, we were quite busy and I think we did help a lot of American business people as intermediaries, as providers of information. I can think of a number of instances when we were helpful to American businessmen at that time. The commercial side was interesting and active but it was different than a usual commercial operation.

*Q: On the economic side, as there wasn't much published much of that work could have been done better from Hong Kong, could it not?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, but we were able to pick up some information that would be part of the input; some impressions, what the Chinese were buying, what they seemed to be interested in. If they really were in the market for a lot of wheat we knew that something did go wrong with their crop, for example. So we were able to provide certain inputs. But for the broad economic China watching that could be elsewhere.

*Q: Did you feel at all the problems that plagued us serving in the Soviet Union where the KGB was trying to entrap you. Were there any of these games or were there just restrictions on you?*

HOROWITZ: We always felt watched but so did other foreigners, I don't think we felt more

watched than other people. I don't think they ever tried to entrap; they listened, we were positive our apartments were bugged and to the extent that they could bug our offices they probably did that too. I remember that when we finally moved into some apartments, the elevator operator must have been the head party cadre because she seemed to be the font of all information. We were watched quite carefully, what we did and where we went. We had to request permission to travel outside of Peking -- we learned the technique of asking to visit five places and hope they'll approve two. When you went to another place you had to check in with the police when you arrived and you had to check in when you left. That was true for all foreigners. So they kept close touch, but I didn't sense they were trying to entrap us.

Some of the politics did get into the trade things. I remember very vividly that one of the problems we had was the Chinese complaint that in American wheat which they bought there was a type of wheat smut which they didn't have in China and they were afraid that this would contaminate their wheat. We had to bring out experts in from the Department of Agriculture to look into this and explain that there was no danger. The issue was more political than it was economic because at that time the Shanghai papers, and in Shanghai the radicals had a dominant voice, were criticizing Chinese officials who bought poisoned wheat from abroad. There was a political conflict going on and it impinged on our commercial operation. At the Liaison Office we did not have much contact with the radicals of the party, the Gang of Four crowd. Most of the people we saw and had dealings with in the government were the pragmatists, the ones who were trying to get the country back on the road again and working and to get the economy improved. Occasionally we would have some contact but generally speaking we did not.

I remember we had a visit from the Philadelphia symphony, Ormandy was the conductor. It was a great cultural thing. One of the things they did was to play a Beethoven symphony, I think it was the sixth. We later learned that Madam Mao had requested this. They had to scurry all over China to get the music, because the orchestra didn't bring it with them. Not long after that a political campaign was launched, the anti-Beethoven campaign. It was a campaign, initially probably aimed at Madam Mao, but it got twisted and became a leftist vehicle. So we did get marginally involved in some of these things.

*Q: Were we concerned about the transfer of technology? Not just military technology but also that they might get our techniques and copy them.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, but it was not a serious problem then. We visited factories where there would be one piece of Western machinery, very old, and then several more that were copies. At that point we still had very stringent controls on export of technology to China as well as other communist countries, and copying of new technology was not a serious problem. Their economy was not very advanced at that time.

*Q: What about intellectual property problems, basically copyrights and that type of thing?*

HOROWITZ: Not a serious problem then because they had total control over publications. Very, very little material had been published in China in any language since before the Cultural Revolution. There was no free market anywhere so it was a totally controlled situation; it became a problem later on. To illustrate the atmosphere about books: There was an international club, it is still there, which was designed for foreigners: tennis courts and swimming pool and things like

that. It wasn't really a club, it was the Chinese conception of what the foreigners might want. There was a very nice room that was called the Library; it had a lot of windows, easy chairs, a lot of shelves, most of which were empty. The only books on the shelves were Mao's works and three or four communist publications, that's all.

*Q: How were we reporting on political events? How were we getting our knowledge?*

HOROWITZ: Conversations with other people, impressions -- there was always a big exchange among people in the foreign missions -- some little bits and pieces that the Chinese would tell us, what we would see in the newspaper. It was limited. We knew when there was a big meeting in the Great Hall of the People from the number of limousines that would be pulling up and one or the other of us would bicycle by a few times to see what was doing -- that type of thing. I think we did a fair bit of reporting but it was limited to what we would have exposure to. It was frustrating to some extent; Bruce stayed about a year and then George Bush came and I think they were both to some extent frustrated that they could not deal more with Chinese officials. The Chinese were very uptight in those days, very reserved; they would not speak in a relaxed way or off the record. I know that Bush tried very, very hard. He was great to work for; he read our briefing papers and listened to what we had to say. I remember going with him to pay calls on Chinese officials -- the economic minister or the head of their civil aviation or someone like that; we would do a briefing paper, he read it, we talked about it in the car, and he really tried to get some information, to break down the barrier. It was very, very frustrating because the Chinese officials would only reveal or say what they felt authorized to do.

*Q: By the time you left in 1975, what was the political situation?*

HOROWITZ: It hadn't changed much. Actually after we were there and set up the Liaison Office and the radicals had been on the counterattack, things tightened up. Relations were not so good. As a matter of fact, I think the second year we were there there was a drop in the U.S. trade with China; instead of an increase, it fell. Our relationship with the Chinese was in many ways tied to what was happening in China and the political struggle that was going on. But we had made some contacts and knew some of the people and gotten some information.

*Q: How about developments in Vietnam, as things were going from bad to worse; did that affect what you were doing or was it pretty much over the horizon?*

HOROWITZ: It was pretty much over the horizon. The Chinese at that point were primarily concerned with the Soviets. In the 1950's they leaned toward the Soviets, in the 1960's there was the Sino-Soviet split, and in 1969 there was the border clash in Manchuria and the Chinese got socked. It finally dawned on them that the Soviets had really built up considerable military strength all along the Sino-Soviet border. All the Soviet buildups in Europe were balanced by Soviet buildups in Asia. So the Chinese were very concerned about the Soviets. This was one of the reasons for their opening up to the West and the United Nations. They wanted to gradually build some sort of normal relationship with the West. As I recall, that seemed to be their main concern in that period.

*Q: Did you have any contact with the Soviets when you were there?*

HOROWITZ: Oh, yes. The Soviets in Peking felt very isolated; they wanted to be friends with us because they knew it would aggravate the Chinese if we were friendly. The Soviets would invite us, and frankly we wanted to keep the Soviets a little bit away; if we got too close it would harm our relations with the Chinese. The Soviets had magnificent embassy grounds and they would open up their place -- they had a pond -- for ice skating and hockey on the weekends, invite our kids to go there, invite us to films. Bill Rope, who was my colleague on the commercial/economic side, and I, along with our wives, would be invited by our Soviet counterparts; they would give us vodka, drink and food. They wanted to be our pals in the worst way. They were helpful too in that they would explain to us how Sino-Soviet trade was carried out. Also the other East Europeans who were there were friendly; we heard a lot about the trade patterns of China and the rest of the communist world. To the extent that we could, we would compare notes with them. The Soviets were very anxious to be friendly.

*Q: You left there in 1975, and what did you do then?*

HOROWITZ: I went to INR. It was my hope that maybe at that point in my career I could get to another part of the world. That is when Kissinger started a program that got the acronym, "GLOP".

**KATHERINE SCHWERING**  
**Lending Officer**  
**Chase Manhattan Bank (1972-1976)**

*Ms. Schwering was born in Wyoming and raised abroad and various localities in the US. She was educated at Northwestern University and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). She joined Chase Bank, where she was trained as an international economist, and worked with them until joining the State Department in 1978. During her career Ms. Schwering worked primarily on international economic, monetary and terrorist matters in Washington and abroad. Her overseas posts were in Burundi, Yugoslavia and Turkey. Ms. Schwering was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.*

*Q: Where did they put you; what was your first job?*

SCHWERING: Into a staff job, but I lucked out. This was 1973, and China had just contacted David Rockefeller to invite him to China. He was the first American since the revolution in '48 to be invited to China. I forget now, but I think it was that Chase was the only U.S. bank that had maintained relations with China, even though all of China's assets were frozen. Well, then they needed somebody to monitor this account, and I was chosen; but it was a staff position.

While the law prevented us from dealing with China, there were dual claims on bank accounts. That is what it was called as both Taiwan and China claimed accounts dating from 1948. These were frozen until such time as a court might decide to whom they belonged. However, we also

didn't recognize China. The People's Republic of China said they were not about to deal with anyone in the United States until they received recognition. It was also around this time they were finally granted observer status in the UN. It was all very new, and I was monitoring it. Then they created a lending officer position in the Asian banking group for China, and I was moved into it, because I was the only one in the bank then working on China. That was an incredible opportunity.

*Q: When you say China, which do you mean?*

SCHWERING: People's Republic of China. I worked in that position from '74 to the fall of '76.

Having been granted observer status to the UN, the next thing the Chinese did was open a representative office here in Washington. Of course I wasn't really familiar with the State Department at that point, so I don't know how this was arranged. But there were other issues that came up. When a Chinese delegation flew into New York to attend a meeting, for example the general assembly of the UN, there were attempts to seize the airplane, because it was a Chinese asset on U.S. soil. That was when I first met one of the two people in the U.S. who had been trained linguistically, and otherwise, to eventually deal with China. One, I can't remember his name, he became an ambassador. He later was our ambassador to Saudi Arabia.

*Q: Oh yes, Chas Freeman.*

SCHWERING: That's right. I met him when he was up at the UN.

*Q: I've interviewed Chas.*

SCHWERING: He was quite impressive.

*Q: He is one of the most remarkable people you ever could meet. You have to put him in the genius category.*

SCHWERING: Really. Well, I was impressed by him. I remember his approaching me at Chase. I may not have been on the China account any more. He asked me about the assets question and other things.

Now, China, having once made contact with David Rockefeller and having him travel there, decided they wanted to do business with us. It was trade initially; and, of course, because they had to avoid having any assets in the United States, they arranged with Chase (I was the person on the other end) to have banking transactions done through a Japanese bank. They also, somehow, had the trade restrictions lifted, and they began to export very basic things to the United States, like beeswax, batteries, and acupuncture needles, even though I don't think they were used in the U.S. at that time. To make payment for these, American importers would pay the Japanese bank, which would then remit the money to China. So, in effect, I was dealing with the Japanese, not the Chinese.

What was fascinating, though, is that because Chase was the very first institution in the United

States to begin dealing with China, I must have met every CEO of every major company in the United States. They just swarmed in to any meeting with the Chinese. They just swarmed to Chase, because we were the only bank to have a relationship. It was absolutely amazing, you know. These companies included Reynolds tobacco, John Deere, Boeing – you name it. Sooner or later, they would come to me, because I was the desk officer for China.

I also must have met every student in the United States who was graduating in Chinese studies and wanted a job. I also discovered that at the time the CIA (this was before they were not permitted to operate domestically) were sent to me under cover. This was not classified, it was somebody who purported to be from the Department of Commerce. Now, in those days, I could have counted on one hand the number of people who really had anything to do with China. This guy didn't fit; it just didn't ring true. No one from commerce had ever contacted me. I was called into David Rockefeller's assistant's office at one point after this. I was told that this individual had gone back to Washington. He said that I knew too much, and that there was no way he was going to be able to maintain his cover, and they told me who he was and that I was free to share with him whatever information I wanted to. The U.S. government had offered to share with us unclassified financial or economic information. Also, at that time, I was asked by the Department of Commerce to write an article on doing business with China, which I did.

*Q: Just to put this in perspective, Kissinger and Nixon went to China. Where did this come in?*

SCHWERING: They went in '72. I totally forgot about that. That was the opening.

*Q: The opening, but not official recognition, which was coming.*

SCHWERING: That's right. I had forgotten about that. Well it didn't come until what – '78? As I say, we were the first institution to have relations with them. This was before they were permitted to open their observer missions in the U.S.

*Q: Did you get any contact with Chinese?*

SCHWERING: Yes, I was going to go on to that. As a result of Chase's relationship with China, the very first Chinese delegation was invited to visit the U.S. I don't remember what year it was. It might have been '75 or '76. It was a textile delegation. Textiles are labor intensive and, like most third world countries, China could produce these cheaply. They were hoping to export to the U.S., but they ran into our textile quotas. After the Chinese contacted Chase, some businessmen managed to visit China. It was the private sector that hosted the first visit to the U.S. We did invite the State Department and government officials to attend the lunches and meetings.

The Chinese delegation had a schedule. They were going to be in New York for a couple of days, and then they were going to go to a couple of other places. I remember this Chinese delegation was going to visit a textile mill in the South. Well, it didn't take them long after they arrived here to realize this was not a good thing for a textile delegation from China to do. Plus, I think there was a strike on at the mill they were going to visit in North Carolina; so that part got cancelled.

I remember I worked with Manufacturers Hanover Trust Bank (Manny Hanny) in New York City, and a couple of other banks to set up their financial day in New York City. Now the interesting thing about this was translation. We needed translators. This being the time it was in the U.S. there were no translators. There were no Chinese speakers who were familiar with the vocabulary used on the mainland, much less any translators, and even much less any simultaneous translators. So I put on my thinking cap. Mind you, I was just in my early 20's at this point. I contacted the UN and I asked if I could borrow a couple of translators. The answer was "Yes, as long as it is kind of off the record, you pay them. You must understand there is no connection to the UN, because this still wasn't official." So we set up a half-day banking seminar. I forget what the other half day was.

I was the one who organized the banking seminar. I started two or three weeks beforehand to work with these two Chinese simultaneous translators, because things were highly politically sensitive. If you talked about WWII and up to the revolution in China, mainland Chinese referred to it as "the liberation," but Taiwanese referred to it as the revolution or something like that. At this point, if we had used the wrong vocabulary, the Chinese delegation would have gotten up and gone home. Not only that, but you find that in almost any language, banking and commercial translations are almost non-existent. For example, what is a lien, what is a mortgage? These things were very tough. Also, I had studied socialist economies in graduate school, and I understood them and a lot of these concepts didn't exist there. So, I prepared lists of words and concepts for these translators, because they were going to have to translate them during this seminar. They, it turns out, would sneak to the Chinese observer mission in New York City, which would then telex Beijing and work with them on appropriate translations, which would then be sent back. This was all off the books you know.

When the time came for the morning seminar, we had these two translators, who could only do 15 or 20 minutes at a time, so they had to switch off. We had presentations by the big bank. We explained some concepts, and we also explained how financial markets – at least the banking market, not the investment market – in the U.S. worked. I was so pleased when one of the older members of the delegation casually walked over to me during one of the coffee breaks and said, "You know this translation is excellent." He had no idea what had gone into this. Neither did my bosses. I didn't even check with anyone at the bank. There was a lot more autonomy in the private sector.

A couple of things were interesting about this delegation. First of all, I was pressured by Chase and other banks to schedule something for all three evenings the Chinese were going to be in the U.S. Now, I didn't want to do that, because they had just arrived from China and I knew they were suffering jet lag. Also, one of the oldest members of this delegation had participated in the long march. However, despite my trying to convince my colleagues, who weren't internationally oriented, that these guys should have some evening of rest, I had to set things up. It may have been August or something and the only thing I could find for them to do was the New York Planetarium. Well, that turned out to be a real mistake. I don't know if you have been in there, but they have the moving heavens, and you look up and see all the planets and stars and other things. Well, it made at least one member of the delegation very ill. He got so nauseated they had to escort him outside of the planetarium. I was criticized later for subjecting these elderly people to something like this. Which was quite funny.

There was a woman leading this delegation, which was also in the U.S. in business at that time a knockout punch. They were all dressed in Mao suits, with the short hair cut. It was very hard to tell she was a woman. I remember it was at a dinner or lunch. I thought I would have a little bit of fun and asked one of the members of the delegation a slight question about their being able to do something if they wanted to. I can't remember what I asked – something like if they wanted to go off in New York City on their own and look around or something else, could they do it. They all the heads turned to look at this young woman with very sharp features who had been very quiet all along. She was obviously the Communist Party guard dog in this delegation. It was very funny.

Then our job was to get them to Washington DC, which was their next stop. I borrowed David Rockefeller's plane, and Manny Hanny lent their plane. These were small executive jets. This is the only time in my life I have been a stewardess. We put half the delegation on Rockefeller's plane and half on Manny Hanny's plane, as I recall, and we flew them down to Washington, where we handed them over to, perhaps, the Chamber of Commerce or whatever, someone like that. I stayed down there with them for awhile. I remember their very first lunch was held at a hotel. It was hundreds of people, because of course, every business man in the United States wanted to do business with China.

*Q: Oh yes, think of a billion customers.*

SCHWERING: Yes – and sell a billion toothbrushes.

*Q: And oil for the lamps.*

SCHWERING: This was, I believe, the third time this century that you had seen this. I knew this, but these businessmen didn't. I couldn't believe it. Well, first of all I knew about the Chinese because I had a retired Chinese general as my only customer of mainland Chinese origin at this time – an American customer. He was someone who, rather than choose between the communists and the nationalists, had emigrated to the U.S. in '48. His wife was later hired to help design the new Latin-based alphabet that they use to teach children. Apparently they were viewed as politically neutral by the Chinese. In the mid 70's, she was invited back. That is why you see all the X's and Q's in Chinese translation.

We were down in Washington. The delegation was hosted to this huge lunch in some hotel here. You know the Chinese don't like big chunks of meat and they don't eat dairy products – things like that. I couldn't believe it when I looked at the menu and the host of this luncheon decided to serve chicken Kiev. That was three fails in one; but I think it was totally innocent.

*Q: Oh I'm sure. But chicken Kiev is one of the standard rubber chicken dishes on the conference circuit.*

SCHWERING: Yes, you have to consider the politics between the Soviet Union and China at the time; that's what made me laugh. Plus it was full of butter. The Chinese delegation were very good sports. While they went on to other visits, it was really quite an interesting exercise here.

*Q: You think of the Chinese, and I think of two things. One, you have the after effects of the cultural revolution.*

SCHWERING: That was '66.

*Q: Oh, it had already ended, but there were reverberations. I think the gang of four was still at it, and there were still great problems there. On the other hand, the Chinese were probably pre-eminent in the mercantile world. They have an astute business sense. They had that connection all along in Hong Kong. Did you run across the Hong Kong connection? Did that crop up while you were dealing with it?*

SCHWERING: Well, yes. They had a Bank of China. That was their only institution permitted to deal with the outside world and they had an office in Hong Kong. However, I was not permitted to travel as I was a woman. So, Chase wouldn't send me to China or to Hong Kong. But I got around that too. What happened was that in 1975 I took a vacation in Southeast Asia. By that point, the U.S.-China Business Council had been set up in Washington DC. Again, that was private sector. It was an association like the Soviet-American business council. I knew all of those guys very well. One of those young men and a friend of his and I decided to go to Southeast Asia together. It was quite a trip in Laos at the time when the communists in Laos were coming to the top. I took the liberty, when I was in Hong Kong, of calling on the Bank of China. I didn't have the bank's permission to do it, but I did it. I just introduced myself. That was the only connection, because they dealt through the Japanese with us.

*Q: I am trying to go back just to capture the time. Was it that you weren't permitted to travel to places on your own? I mean, you weren't in the company to seduce the male members on a trip. But how about by yourself? Was there concern that you might be vulnerable or was it just that women didn't do business? What was going on?*

SCHWERING: They never said it, of course, but it was A. women didn't do business, and B. no one would take a woman seriously, and our clients wouldn't take a woman seriously. I think it was just so unheard of. They also would not assign any woman overseas. This infuriated me, because people who had been recruited into the training program along with me, who were simply English majors and had no advanced degree, were then sent to run a branch in Africa or Europe or something, and here I was with an international studies masters from Johns Hopkins, and they wouldn't even let me travel. The discrimination was considerable at the time.

At the time that I was working on this account, I secretly joined a group of women who were bringing a class action suit against Chase Manhattan Bank for sex discrimination. We chose a labor lawyer who was very good, as we thought the best kind of lawyer to represent us would be somebody who was used to representing workers against big management. We toyed with hiring a guy who was the famous lawyer who got convicted of using his client's funds and who was known as a liberal lawyer. It wasn't Kunster; I will come up with the names. We toyed with hiring them all, but we chose this woman who was very smart; she kept our names secret until the very last minute.

When we finally held a press conference, we timed it well. I had friends in journalism who told us the best day and time to hold it. I think it was held on a Friday afternoon, because most people don't read the Saturday and Sunday papers. This was going to hit Wall Street like a bombshell, and it did.

It was very interesting to see the reaction at Chase. Management became very careful about handling us women. But, what stunned me was that all of my female colleagues, except for the 13 members of the suit, avoided me and the others like the plague. But I had male colleague after male colleague come up to me and say, "Good for you." It was just the opposite of what you would think. The men of my generation were behind us.

*Q: Looking generationally, I have watched this in the Foreign Service. The women who had made it up through very tough times, and had made a niche for themselves, even though they may have been discriminated against, felt threatened because here are some people who are going to rock the boat. They have made it, but on men's terms. All of a sudden here you are – a bunch of young squirts – saying, "Let's change the rules." These other women would rather play by the old rules.*

SCHWERING: Well, the few blacks that had been admitted into the training program had also done something similar. They hadn't sued, but apparently, they had gathered together and talked. I was unaware of this. It was before we brought our suit. But, apparently, management cautioned them they didn't want to see any groups of blacks getting together and talking; which in that environment was a threat. So it was interesting. I didn't consider myself any better or different from anyone else at the bank. But, it was extraordinarily hard to get what I wanted, and I wanted to go overseas. I was very lucky with this China thing, because I was literally part of history. Like I said, the Commerce Department later asked me to write a China trade article. I may have written the very first article in the United States on how to do business with China. It was called, "Doing Business With China." The Commerce Department published it as a pamphlet for companies all over the United States.

*Q: Were you able, at that point, to pick up on some of the problems in China? As you said, there has been this gold rush three times in the 20<sup>th</sup> century of people running to China thinking, "Oh boy! We've have got these billion customers." They almost all have come a cropper, because of the issues of just dealing with China.*

SCHWERING: The Chinese can outsmart anyone.

*Q: Certainly, there wasn't that much money to be gained at that time as these were mostly poor peasants.*

SCHWERING: China had a huge lack of foreign exchange. I seem to remember that when I did my analysis of China, their entire balance of payments both in and out amounted to 13 billion dollars. That was just nothing for a country that size. So, they didn't have much foreign exchange to buy foreign products, they weren't selling much around the world, and the quality of their products meant they didn't earn much foreign exchange.

*Q: Did you have access anywhere? This is before American businessmen had the experience. You know, over time, they would come back and talk and pretty soon you built up quite a few case histories of what worked and what didn't work.*

SCHWERING: Well they didn't get much trading done. That was one of the stories I was going to tell you. It was absolutely hilarious to talk to these businessmen after they had come back from China, because they would tell me stories about how they would be in negotiations with the Chinese for three days, and the main guy they would be dealing with would be flipping business cards, and he would put them down on the table. Gee the top business card would be the card from the main competitor, the company they had been dealing with. Or they would find out the guy who had been pouring tea for three days was the head negotiator. The Chinese were just so clever. I knew this. I had studied the Chinese, and I had this Chinese general who took me down to Chinatown all the time. From him I learned a lot about how the Chinese view money. They don't trust banks. There wasn't a person in Chinatown who kept their money in a bank.

*Q: They collected together in clans or whatever and would lend it to each other.*

SCHWERING: I don't know if they did that. I know that is Korean. I never heard much about that, but they would keep their money in their mattresses. The money of course, stayed in the family. They don't have the same societal structure as Korea, not in that regard, as far as I was aware of. But of course, they were so smart. They would force these businessmen to buy things they didn't need at all, just for the privilege of getting a visa. I remember one of the first businessmen – I don't remember if it was John Deere or someone else, was forced to buy thousands of gross of acupuncture needles. He didn't know what the heck to do with them, so he had them encased in Lucite and handed them out as company gifts to manufacturing firms. Oh, the Chinese were so funny, and I used to get so amused.

Ah, what was interesting was during this time Chou en-Lai died. That is the story. Chase wanted to send condolences, but nobody really was quite sure what position he held in China. He wasn't a government official. That was the first time I called the State Department, and they did have kind of a China desk. The guy there was really helpful. He said, "The official position Chou holds was chairman of some council or other." So I said, "Okay, we would like to send condolences. How do we get it there?" He didn't know. The State Department didn't know, because they didn't do business with them. So he got back to me. I forget how, but we telexed, or sent a telegram to something. Anyway, I wrote out the condolences, with the address and everything and sent it up to Rockefeller's office. I got the funniest call from his administrative aide at the time, Joseph Reed, who, as you know, later became our ambassador to Morocco. Then, the senior vice president who called me about the telegram for Chou said, "You know, we wanted to send it this way, but you recommended we send it that way, so we are going to do it." So they had a lot of confidence in me in that regard. So we sent it off.

But also another interesting episode during my time in the Asian banking group when I was the desk officer for China, was that there was that assassination attempt on Park Chung-hee. And wasn't his wife or something....

*Q: His wife was killed. An assassin came up and shot at Park Chung-hee but hit his wife.*

SCHWERING: He was wounded I think, right?

*Q: I don't think so. I think his wife took the bullet. I can't remember.*

SCHWERING: Our Korean desk officer was Frank Han, a Korean, who later went to China. He was classmates with all the vice ministers. He later went back to Korea for Chase, after I joined the Foreign Service. Well, anyway, Frank Han was very funny. We had him to handle the Koreans; we had a Japanese person to handle the Japanese accounts. Nobody in the Asian Bank Group liked Park Chung-hee. We knew him for what he was. So again Rockefeller's office wanted to send condolences of some kind, or an acknowledgement. So we had to figure out what we would say. To tell you the truth, most of the individuals at that time felt that it was too bad the assassin had missed. I believe we crafted something very diplomatic to President Park saying we were very sorry to hear about the loss of his wife or something like that. We didn't address his injuries. The bank sent that off. So it was a little like working in the State Department.

*Q: Were you getting anything from the tremendous financial network out of Taiwan? I mean these people were all over the place.*

SCHWERING: Yes, we had a Taiwan desk also. Of course, that was where our business was. But, what was interesting was banks for both Chinas were cooperating very quietly. Because our operations departments didn't really understand the difference between the Democratic People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, on occasion a bank transfer, a trade payment, would get put into a frozen account when it should have been put into a Taiwanese account or we would accidentally put a payment amount for the mainland into a Taiwanese account, which, under U.S. law, the Taiwanese account could then seize because they had claims. We would then get these quiet little calls from the operations department at the Taiwanese bank in town, whose accounts weren't frozen saying, "Pssst, you have accidentally..." or, "Pssst, this payment wasn't meant for us. It should have been put in the Bank of China account with the Japanese bank." They were surprisingly cooperative on the business side.

On the political side of course, they were geared up and lobbying heavily in the United States to prevent the U.S. government from going forward with any plans to re-establish relations with the People's Republic of China. The Taiwanese were furious when the People's Republic was granted an observer mission at the UN and then, later, when they opened their observer mission here in Washington, in the same building where their embassy is.

I used to travel down to Washington, DC periodically and meet with them. I would take bank customers with me. It was very funny. I remember some of the representatives of some of the biggest corporations in this country would go into the embassy for this meeting and all of a sudden talk about what they would do for their workers and how they treated their workers. Everything was workers this and workers that. Of course I knew differently. It was absolutely hilarious. How they would try to cater to the Chinese!

*Q: Show they were very much proletarian...*

SCHWERING: I would sit there and be really amused. I've always had a perspective on things.

**NICHOLAS PLATT**  
**Liaison Officer**  
**Beijing (1973)**

*Ambassador Nicholas Platt was born in New York, New York in 1936. He attended Harvard University and Johns Hopkins University, and entered the Foreign Service in 1959. His career included positions in Hong Kong, Japan, China, Washington, DC, and ambassadorships to Zambia, the Philippines, and Pakistan. Ambassador Platt was interviewed by Paul McCusker in 1994.*

*Q: I think he showed that too with his talks with Marshall in Jakarta before he was President. They had a lot of very serious conversations about China. Now, I don't know who was briefing who because I wasn't there.*

*So you got to the Liaison Office and George Bush was there...*

PLATT: No, George Bush was not there. I went there during the year that George Bush was not there. I went there when we first opened up. I was asked to be in the Liaison Office I guess on the strength of the fact that I had been on this trip. I was scheduled to go to Japan, having asked for Japan because I didn't think China would open up for a long time, to leave the Secretariat when I was supposed to leave in the spring of 1973 and go to Japanese language training for a year and then go to Tokyo and take the number two job in the political section. And I did that.

Well, I was called upon to go to China and be the head of the political section when the Liaison Office blew up. What I mean by that is it became an immediate reality, it suddenly blew up onto the horizon and I was asked to go. I thought it would be an historical opportunity and broke the assignment to Japan. I went and worked for a better part of a year with David Bruce. Bruce was the first of our heads of the Liaison Office.

*Q: I had forgotten that.*

PLATT: Yes. He was a wonderful man and totally inexperienced in China, but he was our senior most diplomat. It was a very strange office, I have to tell you, because this first year there was amazing. The way I pieced it together, Henry Kissinger told both John Holdridge and Al Jenkins that they would be the head of the Liaison Office when it was ultimately opened, and I think that he meant it. I think he perceived it as a small outfit with relatively low level leadership, just, for example, as the liaison office we are setting up in Vietnam now, is going to be. But the Chinese upped the ante by sending their senior most diplomat as head of their Liaison Office. He had been ambassador four or five times and was the one ambassador who had not been purged during the Cultural Revolution and the one ambassador who was a member of the Central Committee. So Kissinger had to respond and his response was to send our senior most diplomat who was David Bruce. But in order to somehow do right by Holdridge and Jenkins he sent them both as

DCMs. We had two DCMs. We had ten officers. One chief, two deputies, three kind of heads of sections and some number twos and that was basically it. Well, it didn't work very well. The two DCMs canceled each other out. And so the counselor level people basically ran the place. But we will let that all come out in the wash.

In any case I worked through that first year. I got involved in a fatal accident which occurred in November. It was a broad daylight affair where I was driving my family to the Great Wall and a young girl, a 15 year old, pedaled in front of me. Just came right across my bow and I hit and killed her. I flagged down a truck and put her on the back of the truck, with the language I could do all of this, and took her to the hospital. It was the hospital that didn't deal with heads, only with broken limbs, so I took her to another hospital and she died there. The Chinese reacted to this in a very traditional way. After a month of investigations, they found me responsible and assessed the insurance for this, damages to the family, etc. Then they called me in and said, "When a diplomat is involved in a fatal accident, he or she invariably leave of their own accord." I said, "Fine, I will be gone in a month." They said, "Fine."

If I had stayed and fought about it I would have ultimately left not of my own accord. This has been a bone of contention amongst those who were working the issues, but I convinced Holdridge and all the others, and they agreed with me that this was the way to do it and that while we felt ill-used and that it was not a fair judgment that it was the right way to manage it. In subsequent years, the Germans had another similar situation in which someone who was trained as an interpreter and had absolutely no other job alternatives got involved in a fatal automobile accident and they fought it tooth and nail and in the end the person was PNGed.

So this is what we did. Kissinger was very kind to me. He was very supportive. People were all wringing their hands and saying, "Here you are our coming China guy and now you have to do something else."

*Q: While you were talking I can't help remember this obituary. He must have been...*

PLATT: I knew him. He was a wonderful man.

*Q: He got a great write up.*

PLATT: He looked as nice as his picture.

*Q: He must have been involved because he was chief of protocol wasn't he?*

PLATT: He ran the trip for Zhou. He was Zhou's right hand man. He was one of their top diplomats.

*Q: How do you pronounce his name again?*

PLATT: Han Xu.

But anyway I left and Kissinger said, "Well, you can have any job that you want provided that

there is a China element in it, because even if you say that this is a traditional thing, I think that the way they have handled it deprives us from your services and China experience and I don't want them to think that the way they have handled that will have that impact. So you can take any job you want but it has to have a China element." I said, "Well, how about this job in Tokyo. It is the senior job in the political section under the counselor, deals with foreign policy, covers China's policy towards Japan and vice versa as well as towards Korea, Southeast Asia, Russia, etc." He said, "Fine." So I went and just did what I was going to do minus about a half year of language training.

**CHAS W. FREEMAN, JR.**  
**Liaison Officer**  
**Beijing (1973)**

**China Working Group**  
**Washington, DC (1978-1979)**

**Country Director for China**  
**Washington, DC (1979-1981)**

**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Beijing (1981-1984)**

*Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. was born in Washington, DC in 1943. He graduated from Yale University in 1963 and joined the Foreign Service in 1965. His overseas posts included India, Taiwan, China, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia. He also held numerous positions in Washington, DC in Washington and also served as Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defense. He was interviewed in 1995 and 1996 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*Q: I thought we might stop at this point, because I think we want to talk about the opening up of the liaison office in some detail. You were put on the team that went to open the liaison office when?*

FREEMAN: That was March of '73. But, actually, I should discuss some of the follow-up to the Nixon trip. There were several National Security studies done, on which I worked, and a number of initiatives taken, which perhaps require a little bit of explanation, which has not been made public.

*Q: And one of the things I'd like to throw in is your impression of the role of the CIA, at this time. Okay?*

FREEMAN: Up to a point.

*Q: Today is the 18th of July, 1995. Chas, you wanted to talk about some studies that were done*

*after the Nixon trip was over.*

FREEMAN: Obviously, part of the process that led up to the Nixon visit was signaling the Chinese by the removal of restrictions on trade and travel and exchanges of one sort or another. But that process was far from complete, and there needed to be major adjustments made in American law and regulation to accommodate the new relationship with the Chinese.

As I recall, within a week or so of the president's return from China, Dr. Kissinger commissioned two National Security studies, one on economic relations and one on cultural relations with China. And he set about a one-week deadline for the conclusion of these, imagining, I suppose, that there was a vast army of bureaucrats below him who could now fill in the details of what he had done.

Well, that vast army of bureaucrats for both studies was basically me. So I spent a week, often a whole night at the office, now out of the Ops Center, drafting two National Security study memoranda, and then circulating these drafts on an interagency basis, and spending much of the following day negotiating with other agency representatives in an effort to get some kind of agreement. The bureaucracy was especially recalcitrant on the issue of relaxing export controls, and the difficulty of coming up with agreed language was quite considerable.

I discovered a number of things about the culture of Washington bureaucracies.

For example, if you called a meeting for five o'clock in the afternoon, by about six-thirty, the Department of Commerce representatives were desperate to go home and have their martinis and dinner, and would begin to make major concessions. So the first lesson was always to call meetings late in the day when there was a controversy with Commerce.

The second lesson was that the Department of Defense, unlike the Department of Commerce, would sit there all night and obstruct. But their bureaucracy was so cumbersome that if you stayed up overnight and produced a redraft and then scheduled a meeting for the early afternoon, they would not have had time to coordinate their position, and you could rule them out of order as not having a position, and push forward.

Treasury was the wiliest and most insistent of all the bureaucracies we were dealing with, partly because the subject matter in which they had real expertise was minimal. They had opinions on many things, but their expertise was quite limited.

*Q: Was it limited because China had just not been in their orbit? Or was it limited because they were limited?*

FREEMAN: Treasury historically has professed some sort of a major role in trade policy. But Treasury doesn't promote trade in any way. It has no direct involvement with the business community, as opposed to bankers. And there is a real question as to whether bankers are an intelligent life form or not. So it was Treasury speaking as the custodian of national interest, as it saw it, even though it had no effective role in the issues that it often addressed.

There were a number of things that I remember with particular satisfaction from that period.

One of them was the proposal to form an organization that became the National Council for U.S.-China Trade. As trade began to become possible with the Chinese, there began to be a proliferation of trade promoters and associations. And it was quite apparent that, left untended, this field would eventually be filled by some sort of Chinese front group, which would be an advocate not for American interests, but for Chinese interests.

So I had the idea, and a young man at Commerce named Driscoll worked with me very hard, to produce a proposal whereby the U.S. government would sponsor, but not fund, the creation of a prestigious business council that would preempt the field.

In the event, this organization was approved, and there was a meeting at the Department of State auditorium to kick it off. I helped recruit the first vice president of it, Gene Theroux, who had been the legislative assistant to Hale Boggs and who is now a prominent attorney here in Washington. Then I helped to recruit the editor of their publication, the *China Business Review*, which has become the premier journal in the field. But its first edition was written almost entirely by the consulate general in Hong Kong and me, on the q.t., trying to ensure that this organization got off to a good start.

Eventually, Chris Phillips, who had served at the U.N. with George Bush and who later served as ambassador to Brunei in the Bush administration, became the president of this organization, later renamed the US-China Business Council.

I spent hours and hours and hours over the succeeding period trying to help this organization get organized, recruit personnel (I interviewed most of them), and trying to produce a commercial library for them and publications and the like.

Of course, following the Nixon trip, as I mentioned, and even before, there had been a great outburst of misguided interest in China trade on the part of people throughout the country. After I switched over pretty much to economic-commercial work on the Desk, suddenly I found myself besieged by people with tape recorders who had come in to receive wisdom from the font.

I had the wonderful experience of having somebody come in, ostensibly just to ask me about how to do China trade and interview me for about fifty minutes, and then he said, "Well, you know, this was so interesting, I'd like to come back. Could I do that?"

I said, "Sure."

He came back and did another fifty minutes.

And then I found the tapes of our conversation on sale for \$1,500 apiece, which was a good deal more than I made in a month at that time. That was a nice lesson.

I also found myself the subject of recruiting efforts by major companies. I've forgotten what I

made at that time, but it was probably something below \$30,000, and I was being offered \$300,000 and so on. And I realized that, in business, if the result is large enough, any price, in terms of salary or commission, however astronomical it may seem to the individual concerned, is worth it, because it's a small percentage of the total.

So it was an interesting time.

The Nixon administration had been essentially unable to send any speakers to campuses, because of Vietnam protests and the like. Suddenly, however, China became an acceptable topic, a politically correct topic, on campuses, and I found myself doing a great deal of public speaking. I think, in the first year after the Nixon trip to China, I did more than a hundred public appearances, including a few that were rather odd. I remember standing in for Nixon at his alma mater, Whittier College, on some occasion, anointed by this great but rather strange man to represent him. There was great curiosity in the United States about China, and it took me all over the country.

*Q: Did you find yourself in the position of trying to throw a little cold water on these flames of enthusiasm as you went around to colleges? China has always excited people, right from the beginning, in the United States.*

FREEMAN: I don't know that I was trying to douse the enthusiasm. Perhaps I was trying to direct it in more realistic directions. There was so much ignorance, it's hard to recapture that moment, but the spectacle of this Red-baiting president going off to China and then to Russia was quite difficult for people to understand. It intrigued them greatly. So I tried to concentrate on putting the events and the various issues, which had been, if not resolved, at least addressed with creative ambiguity in the Shanghai Communique, into some sense of perspective, rather than to talk about the internal workings of Chinese society.

There was a very interesting phenomenon, however, which I found rather appalling, and that was when the American right wing began to go to China, politicians of one sort or another. They discovered a society in which students sat straight upright in their chairs and had short hair and respected their elders and adhered to family values of a sort that were then already nothing but a matter of nostalgia in the United States. They found no theft or significant crime. There was order and what appeared to be a measure of progress, although terrible poverty. And there was this sudden, strange fascination by the American conservatives with this really very conservative society, which Mao had attempted to radicalize, but had failed to radicalize. I found this very, very interesting. Liberals I had expected to be a bit woolly minded on the subject of revolution and the like; I was surprised by the conservative reaction.

*Q: As both a bureaucratic and an American attitude when something new happens, we kind of discard all the experience of other people and we go ahead. This goes from the individual bureaucrat up to the government. Here you're working on economics and trade with China. There's a vast pool of experience on trade with China, by the British and French particularly, but others. They'd been doing this for a long time (much to our annoyance). Did we start from the beginning, or were you able to tap into the British and the French experiences?*

FREEMAN: We basically made our own way. And it was a different way. Even as we were fascinated by the Chinese, the Chinese were greatly fascinated by us. There are many elements in the Chinese character and the American character that are mutually appealing. There are also many elements that are the subject of misunderstanding, so there were mistakes made. But, generally, the process of opening trade relations went rather smoothly.

Of course, we were dealing with a society in which there was essentially no commercial code, no legal system to enforce contracts, and in which trade was done by a sort of law merchant. The law merchant was the customs of trade, initially in the Mediterranean and the wool trade in the Hanseatic League, eventually incorporated into the common law and into the Napoleonic Code, but initially enforced by merchants themselves, in tribunals or arbitration panels on which merchants would interpret contracts in terms of the customs of their trade. And we were thrust back into this sort of medieval environment.

I should say, this law merchant in the Mediterranean was the bridge between Arab and European traders, and it was the Arabs who took the system that later became the Canton Trade Fair to China initially. It was a system in which foreigners were expected to live in hotels, called funduq in Arabic, and to regulate themselves. The national state didn't want to be bothered with the quarrels of pesky foreigners, so it essentially allowed them extraterritoriality. And this medieval system evolved into the Canton trade system in the nineteenth century. Oddly, the Communists, in their own strange way, resurrected it with a semiannual, or annual, depending on the period, trade fair in Guangzhou (Canton). And it was this that was the initial introduction of Americans to the China trade.

*Q: That's when Shaw went out there and all that. Just a historical note, that the idea of this separate compound goes back to Egyptian times. The Pharaoh, in about the year 1000 BC, set up a little island in which Greek merchants had to take care of themselves, but didn't step off the island.*

FREEMAN: I didn't know that. But it's something that really does have Mediterranean roots and which found its way to China.

There were great adjustments to be made. The Chinese essentially had the attitude of Henry Ford: "You can buy a shirt, any shirt, as long as it's white and it's got our label on it." The Americans, obviously, specialized in going in and buying things for the American market, which meant that the shirts had to be specially designed and had to have the Bloomingdale's label. So the process of persuading the Chinese not to insist on their brands and their designs was a very difficult one for the Americans.

And there were wonderful jokes about Chinese brand names that had a different connotation in English than they did in Chinese.

For example, elephants are powerful beasts, and those that are white are pure. So the largest-selling brand of batteries in China was the White Elephant brand.

Shoes in Chinese are pee-shyeh, and in the Chinese Romanization, that comes out as pixie. So

we had Pixie brand shoes for men.

And so forth and so on. It had its moments.

There were also differences of culture and a lack of understanding in financial arrangements.

Boeing told me this story (I don't know whether it's true or not) that, as a direct follow-up to the Nixon visit, they sold ten Boeing 707s to the Chinese.

*Q: Large passenger airplanes.*

FREEMAN: Exactly. These are jet aircraft that were the workhorse of international aviation at the time.

That when they had consummated the deal, which I think was \$40-some million, the Chinese said, "How would you like to be paid?"

They said, "Well, what do you mean?"

The Chinese said, "Would you like cash or a check?"

And they said, "What?"

So the Chinese went into a back room, pulled a curtain, and there was \$40 million in cash sitting there.

There had, of course, been no banking relations.

But generally I think it was a very interesting process of mutual discovery, made all the more exciting for both sides because each side had created vast myths about the other. Everything about China, in the period of our separation, was evil, and China was the Empire of the Blue Ants, and the Chinese were faceless, anonymous, collective-minded persons. Well, of course, the Chinese are consummate individualists, and when Americans finally encountered them, they discovered this. The excitement of discovering that your assumptions had been wrong led to an excess of good feeling, I think, at least on our side, and distorted our image of China much more to the positive than was justified.

In other words, this was a period when, once again, the United States, as it had done before in history, swung the pendulum and oscillated toward an unrealistically positive view of China. There is something about the U.S.-China interaction that is almost unique, because it does seem to swing between unrealistically positive and unrealistically negative views.

*Q: Right now, we're going through quite a negative view.*

FREEMAN: Equally inaccurate.

*Q: You might say, at this point in '95, it's sort of our designated potential enemy.*

FREEMAN: You have to have illusions in order to be disillusioned. And that's what we have become.

*Q: Did Dr. Kissinger look at this swing and see what was happening? I can understand the euphoria of the politicians, because, if you're Nixon, you get a lot of credit for opening up and doing this great thing. But Dr. Kissinger has a reputation of being a much more analytical, cold-blooded looker at things. Was he saying that maybe we better damp this down, let's not go to extremes? Or did that ever come up?*

FREEMAN: I don't think that his forte was the handling of American public opinion. Personally, however, he remained relentlessly realistic, I think, although he was much charmed by the Chinese.

The Chinese have a political culture that puts an emphasis on strategy and the long-term view.

I can remember interpreting once for one of the first visiting Chinese scholars, I'm sure the first one to visit the Senior Seminar at the Foreign Service Institute, who gave a lecture on the objectives of Chinese foreign policy, in the course of which he remarked that the essential purpose of Chinese foreign policy was to redress past wrongs and overcome past humiliations. And he stressed that he was speaking of the recent past.

The first question after the lecture was, of course, "What do you mean by the 'recent past'?"

And he said, "Well, some people would argue that this means everything since the Yuan Dynasty," which was the Mongols in the twelfth century. He said, "I don't agree with that. I think it's everything since the Treaty of Nerchinsk," which was in 1689. So the "recent past" was the last, roughly, three hundred years.

This kind of long view and sense of strategy was greatly appealing to Kissinger. Once, after interpreting for him at a meeting in New York, when he was secretary of state, with his Chinese counterpart, I can remember him commenting afterwards that if these people ever become powerful, they would bury us, because of the adroitness of their strategic thinking. I don't think I agreed with that at the time, and I don't agree with it now, but it is an indication that he was aware of the need occasionally to correct the admiration that one tended to feel in the presence of very able men, on the Chinese side.

*Q: Before moving on to the liaison office establishment, I have two questions. There are two men I've interviewed, actually one I'm still interviewing, and I'd like you to comment on their roles, because they were in the NSC. One was Peter Rodman, and the other was Richard Kennedy.*

FREEMAN: I can't really comment directly on either of them during this period. They were very much staff people in the NSC. My dealings, to the extent I had any, were with Dick Solomon and John Holdridge, who handled East Asia. They did not. Peter Rodman is what I call a securocrat, meaning a Washington national security policy official, not an area expert, and very much at that

time bound up with Vietnam, which was the principal obsession of the country. I know Kennedy quite well, but I don't know what he was doing at that time. I'm sure I didn't encounter him then. I saw him a great deal later, in other incarnations, dealing with nuclear issues.

*Q: Okay, why don't we go on and talk about the establishment of the liaison office. We're talking about something you've written some textbooks on, on diplomatic things. I don't think a liaison office was in the vocabulary until you all invented it.*

FREEMAN: As I discussed before, by the fall of 1972, the infirmities and inadequacies of occasional contact through our embassies in Paris became quite apparent, as we began to try to deal with more technical issues. Consular questions arose on the Mainland. There was a desire for more regular contact directly with decision makers in China. This led, in the view of those of us who were working day to day, to a need for the establishment for some sort of office in China.

We clearly couldn't have an embassy, because we had one in Taipei, which was accredited to the government of China. We could have had a consulate, I suppose, but that would have been complicated because it had a precedent in international law. So we came up with this concept of the liaison office. As I mentioned, the two authors of this were Roger Sullivan and myself.

*Q: Roger Sullivan?*

FREEMAN: Roger Sullivan was then the deputy director of the Asian Communist Affairs Office.

Kissinger was most reluctant to see this happen, because it meant that some measure of influence, control, and transparency to the bureaucracy would be ceded, and that he would no longer have the exclusive management of the China relationship. And so the initial effort to persuade him was quite soundly rebuffed by him.

On the eve of his travel in early 1973 to China, however, I drafted a paper that made the argument for a liaison office really quite compelling, I thought, and that argued that the merit of a liaison office was that no one knew what it was, and therefore we could allow events to define it, rather than worrying about it setting a precedent or raising questions of diplomatic recognition and the like.

The proposal was for the reciprocal exchange of liaison offices. And, leaping ahead a little bit, when we actually reached agreement on liaison offices, in January or February 1973, Kissinger, not being a constitutional lawyer, or indeed any sort of lawyer, and being rather contemptuous of domestic legal process in the United States, frankly, stoutly resisted the idea of legislation to confer privileges and immunities on the Chinese liaison office. And yet it was perfectly apparent that we, in dealing with a society as lawless as China, where arbitrary and capricious decisions were a fact of daily life, required reciprocal privileges and immunities to operate, and that, to do that, we needed legislation. Because we could not confer diplomatic privileges and immunities on the liaison office, since it didn't fit any category of American law, we had to go for legislation. I think Kissinger was correctly concerned that this legislation might be taken hostage by Congress and various elements added to it. But, in the event, we got the legislation we

required.

When Kissinger presented the arguments, the point paper that I had drafted for him on the establishment of liaison offices, it was as though Zhou En-lai and I had read the paper in advance. Before Kissinger could complete all the points, he essentially went down them. And so there was easy agreement that this moment had come.

It was a good thing, because this was just before the spring of 1973, and it was a moment at which the authority of the leadership in both the United States and China began to collapse.

*Q: We're talking about Watergate in the United States.*

FREEMAN: We're talking about Watergate; we're talking about the Gang of Four in China. And the institutionalization of the relationship, which was not terribly appealing to Kissinger, was very appealing to me and to some other people who believe that entangling bureaucracies with each other is a good way to create inertia in a relationship, and therefore preserve it against adverse times.

In any event, in early March, [see page 23] six of us, led by Al Jenkins, who became the first acting chief of the liaison office; myself, as interpreter and factotum; Bob Blackburn, who was an administrative officer, and a very senior communicator, who turned out not to be familiar with the one-time pad, so I ended up as a code clerk. It was below his pay grade, I guess, or above his practical knowledge and technical skills.

*Q: As an old consular officer, I know that if you want to really find out how to do something, you never go to the top person.*

FREEMAN: Absolutely not. He was a splendid fellow, but not well versed in the work of his minions.

At the last minute, a seventh person was added, who was a CIA communicator. The Chinese made quite a point of putting him at the seventh seat at the seventh table and sort of snickering about the CIA turning up. The purpose of this was to give Kissinger a private channel outside the State Department, and it was perfectly obvious. Indeed, he appointed John Holdridge as a second DCM, also with the title of DCM, to serve as the NSC representative in Beijing.

*Q: I must say, you do have the feeling of a person (Dr. Kissinger) not wanting to give up his baby.*

FREEMAN: I think that's right. But I would also say that there really is a period, when you are tacking the ship of state in a new direction, when the captain has to call the shots. He was the captain on this, and it's probably a very good thing that he did hold onto the details, although many of us found him somewhat lacking in an adequate grasp of the details as they became more complex. Still, I think he was right to do this. But it was also right to institutionalize the relationship as we did.

*Q: We had quite a weak State Department, partly because of Kissinger, at the time, under William Rogers, who was not...*

FREEMAN: Was not terribly interested in foreign policy. We had an arrangement that I would say made the NSC the foreign ministry for great-power affairs, and the State Department the ministry for dealings with petty barbarians and the like. [See Freeman.1, page 83.] This was a workable, if somewhat novel, arrangement.

This group set off into terra incognita to open an office. We flew to Hong Kong and then walked across the railroad bridge at Lo Wu into China, where we were greeted by people from the Chinese Foreign Ministry. We went on up to Beijing, staying in the Beijing Hotel, which was then the only hotel worthy of the name in the Chinese capital.

The first days were spent in introductory meetings with senior Chinese officials. We ended up spending a great deal of time with Qiao Guanhua, who was, in effect, the acting foreign minister; Ji Pengfei, who was the nominal foreign minister; Zhang Wenjin, who was the assistant minister in charge of American and Oceanian Affairs, an extraordinarily able diplomat; and Han Xu, who was the acting chief of protocol, since this was during the Cultural Revolution and no one had formal titles.

It was interesting, there was cordiality and cooperation from these people and from the Diplomatic Services Bureau. The Chinese, in the true Soviet style, had established an office to manage and control and staff the offices of foreign barbarians in their capital, and everything -- the buildings, electricity, car registration, and, of course, local staff -- came through this office.

There were many occasions for contact with Chinese officials outside the immediate America-handling and administrative crowd.

Of course, this was the Cultural Revolution, and people had been taught in China not to reveal their identity or their work unit or whatever to foreigners. This was a matter of national security. The papers would routinely identify those who attended meetings as "responsible persons of the department concerned," and you really couldn't get much more identification out of people.

So one of the things I did, which wasn't easy but became a good move in terms of opening up these officials, was to go out to the local printing press, where calling cards could get printed, and after about six days of negotiation with them, I succeeded in getting them to print a card that said, on one side, in English, "Responsible Person of the Department Concerned," and on the other side it said, "Youguan Bumendi Fuzeren," in Chinese. So when they would ask me who I was, I would say, "Allow me to present my card." They would look at this thing for a minute, and some of them would just break down laughing. It was a good introduction.

*Q: I would assume that, because of this, in a way, in military terms, one of your prime jobs must have been to try to develop the equivalent of an order of battle. In other words, to find out who did what to whom. Otherwise, how do you work?*

FREEMAN: Absolutely.

Your mention of the military reminds me that one of the things we did was to put in Marine guards, Marine guards not in uniform, because the Chinese insisted that the Marines had had a history of uneasy relations with the populace.

*Q: Oh, absolutely, in the Boxer Rebellion and then the concessions.*

FREEMAN: Exactly.

I became the sort of custodian of the Marines. There were several things that were quite interesting about that. I ended up measuring for the curtains in their apartment. Nobody could speak Chinese in the Marines, of course. I ended up taking them to get their hair cut. I can remember the barber, a very old man, saying to this Marine, "Are you really a Marine? Oh, I'm so glad to see you!" So there were some in China who remembered the Marines fondly.

But the most embarrassing element of that was that the Chinese had not only great sensitivity to the Marines, but they also had great sensitivity to anything overtly sexual. They had claimed, and probably they had more or less succeeded, that they had eradicated venereal disease in China. And indeed, as I say, maybe they had. One of the Marines turned up with the clap, which his girlfriend had given him.

*Q: I might just say, for the tape, since language changes, "the clap" refers to gonorrhea.*

FREEMAN: In any event, this unfortunate young man had gotten gonorrhea from his girlfriend, and the question was: What do we do with this? You know, this is rather embarrassing. The Marines are remembered ambivalently because of their sexual prowess, and here is the first Marine to set foot in China after a quarter of a century, turning up with the clap. We debated whether to send him out for treatment, and concluded that that was too expensive and that we couldn't do it. So we took him to the Chinese for treatment. The medical people we took him to were delighted; they hadn't seen a case of gonorrhea for years. They called an all-North-China medical conference to examine this, so that everyone could see this strange disease. This poor, poor young man was thoroughly humiliated and I'm sure was much more careful in the future. But he was cured, and life went on.

*Q: While we're on that subject, one of the great problems, which was a terrible problem for us when I was in Yugoslavia a decade earlier, was the Marines and young ladies. What did you do with the Marines and young ladies?*

FREEMAN: There were many alternatives in Beijing. The Polish Embassy rather specialized in providing nubile young creatures to horny bachelors in Beijing. But they were out of bounds, because those young girls were probably KGB controlled.

*Q: That was one of the horrors of the Cold War, I think.*

FREEMAN: The Marines found a warm welcome in the ladies of the diplomatic community support staff.

Establishing the office, we leaned very heavily on advice from our British and Canadian colleagues, and the Canadians were especially helpful. But we had to locate office space. In the end, we were shown a site that was under construction and had been intended as the Embassy of Brazil. But, of course, the Brazilians had not come through on diplomatic relations, so the Chinese offered it to us. It was a small cement residence, with a very small office with a quaint cupola, rather an odd octagonal room at the top, which they explained was for signals. Well, obviously, our communications gear isn't put in such places and requires special handling.

I can remember going over to the Diplomatic Services Bureau one afternoon with Bob Blackburn and explaining that, indeed, we needed more office space on the compound.

And they said, "Well, what do you want?"

So I drew a building and explained that the top floor should have no windows, and that this should all be built to vault specifications and whatnot. They said, "Well, let's take your drawing."

Two hours later, they called us back and showed us a completed architectural drawing. They broke ground about six o'clock that evening, and they built that structure. I've never seen anything like it. They worked around the clock. They basically used workers and threw them away when they were exhausted. They built the whole thing in sixteen days, and most beautifully. The upper story, where the communications were to be, had false windows, so it looked perfectly normal from the outside. And inside, it had beautiful walnut paneling.

Of course, the first act that we committed when we got into it was, for security reasons, to rip out all this beautiful paneling. We were so embarrassed by this desecration of Chinese craftsmanship that we sawed up all the pieces of walnut and sent them out in the diplomatic pouch, rather than bring them out of the building where the Chinese could see what we were doing. We never found any evidence of bugging or anything of that sort in that area.

At any rate, it was quite a performance.

*Q: Just to nail it down, when were you in Beijing for this liaison office?*

FREEMAN: I think it was probably about two months, March through April, maybe early May, '73.

During this period, I was, as I say, a factotum. I was interpreter. I was sort of a GSO (General Services Officer). I was a political officer. I was the code clerk. I was doing trade and economic work, contacting business people on both sides. Of course, I was also, because I was interpreter and because I was doing all these things, having a great deal of contact with senior Chinese officials.

I was asked whether I would stay on at the liaison office, whether as a political officer, economic officer, in the administrative section as interpreter, or, because of my previous USIS experience, as the manager of cultural and information programs.

And I declined, on what proved to be the very well-founded grounds that probably, in this initial period of setting up the liaison office, I had had more contact with Chinese officials than the entire office put together would have in succeeding years, and that to be in China at that time was to be under house arrest. It wasn't that the surveillance was particularly intrusive, although it was there.

I can remember going one day with a British diplomat on a picnic to the Ming Tombs. We were driving along in his car, and there was a motorcycle behind us. He said, "Just wait a minute." He stopped the car, and we sort of looked at the scenery. The motorcycle stopped, and the driver began to pretend to repair the motorcycle. So he walked back to the driver and said, "Is there a problem with your motorcycle?"

And the man said, "Yes, I don't know what's wrong."

He said, "Well, let me see if I can help," and he started taking apart the motor. He pocketed the spark plug, without the other fellow noticing it. Then he said, "I think we better go on ahead, and I'll try to send someone back to help you." And then we took off, leaving the poor fellow stuck there.

But it wasn't intrusive; it was social control, not police control.

I can remember walking near Tiananmen Square, which is not far from the Beijing Hotel, late one night, and being accosted several times by what we called the granny police. These were senior ladies of a neighborhood whose responsibility it was to make sure that no stranger wandered into the neighborhood and that nothing untoward was done. This was a responsibility that was theirs as citizens, not as officials.

When snow fell in Beijing, there was no municipal snow removal. Neighborhoods pitched in together and cleared the snow.

There was a great sense of neighborhood cohesion and defensiveness, all organized by the Party, of course, but really quite spontaneous, and now remembered by the Chinese with some nostalgia, because a lot of this cohesion has broken down as rapid urbanization has taken place and the market economy has come to the cities.

In any event, I was not enthusiastic about house arrest in China, and said to myself that I would return to China for an assignment when one of two conditions was met, or both: either China had changed, to open up a bit, which I thought it might, or I had reached a sufficient level of seniority in the Foreign Service where I didn't really care whether my freedom of movement was restricted.

In the event, both those conditions were met when I went back as charge in the summer of 1981.

*Q: While you were there, where would you describe this as far as the Cultural Revolution? The high Cultural Revolution, the start of it, the end of it?*

FREEMAN: The worst excesses of the Cultural Revolution had occurred in the late mid- '60s. The Lin Biao incident and attempted coup d'etat, which I mentioned, occurred in 1971.

China was in a period of lull. Mao was failing. Jiang Qing, his wife, whom I met and saw many times, was using her nominal position as his wife and her access to him, along with a number of other women who were around him, to build her own political authority. The cultural artifacts of the Cultural Revolution, such as they were -- revolutionary operas and this rather dull, highly polemical repertoire of literature and art that the Cultural Revolution produced -- still had a monopoly. The streets were still renamed in revolutionary style: The street in front of the former American Embassy in the old legation quarter was named Anti-Imperialist Street; the one in front of the Soviet Embassy was named Anti-Revisionist Street, and so on and so forth.

But there was no overt unrest. There were no demonstrations. The Red Guards were a thing of the past. There was lingering political tension and a sense of oppressiveness from ideology. It turned out that this period was indeed the moment at which the Gang of Four began to emerge as the de facto leadership of China. So that, by the fall of 1973, early 1974, U.S.-China relations began to become much more tendentious.

Of course, Watergate was going on in the United States, and Nixon was in the process of falling from power. There was something similar going on, with Zhou En-lai greatly hampered, in China. Both sides, for strategic reasons, in subsequent visits by Kissinger to China, continued to put much the best face on the relationship, but inside, it was rotting, because of the ideological and power struggles in the United States and in China.

*Q: When you were dealing with the Chinese, I was wondering whether you saw a parallel to what I observed slightly later when I had dealings with the South Vietnamese bureaucracy, which I was told was based somewhat on the Chinese one. One of the things I found there was that there really wasn't an awful lot of power down. In other words, the bureaucrats had a lot of power, which was usually to say no; whereas, at the top, maybe they would understand what the problem was and try to get something done, but the mid-level bureaucrats... We can call in the president or the equivalent, and things happen, usually, not always.*

FREEMAN: That was very much the case. This initial period of the liaison office was one of great Chinese cooperation, in part because the senior leadership was directly engaged. We would have lunch with them once in a while, and problems would get solved.

But all bureaucracies tend to behave in the manner you describe. Bureaucracies, like the one in China or those in Eastern Europe or, I suppose, in Vietnam, don't delegate much authority down the line, and, where the consequences of mistakes can be quite severe, tend to be very reluctant to innovate.

And there were some odd things that happened, due to the rigidities of the Chinese.

For example, I helped to negotiate the lease for the liaison office, which, by the way, is now the ambassador's residence. That rather small, quite inelegant place that we accepted in 1973

remains the residence of the American ambassador, and has been quite off-putting to a number of politicians who otherwise would have sought to go to Beijing as ambassador (and therefore maybe a good thing).

In negotiating the lease, the Chinese initially put in a clause that the lease would be renewable after five years, on different terms, and that they reserved the right of price escalation.

I said to them, "You know, this I don't understand, because China's very proud, and correctly so, of not having any inflation. So, if there's no inflation, how could there be a justification for a price increase? So I think that we should put in a clause that says, 'Inasmuch as there is no inflation in China, there will be no price increase.'"

And they agreed.

Subsequently, they had second thoughts, and I think the next lease did not contain that language. But it was possible, occasionally, to hoist them by their own bureaucratic and ideological petard.

*Q: Both when you were dealing in the NSC, looking toward economic matters, trade and all, and when you wore the commercial trade hat a little bit while you were with the liaison office, did the problem of intellectual properties come up? We all knew what had happened in Taiwan, where they stole our intellectual property right and left. They copied everything that you can think of. It was a long problem.*

FREEMAN: It came up primarily in the context of concern by the export-control community about reverse engineering of what would be sold to China. Indeed, there were attempts to do this. The Chinese took the Boeing 707, studied it carefully, and built something that we dubbed the "Boeing 708," which turned out to be a rather awkward flyer and never went anywhere.

They were famous for copying things generally.

There was a story, which I think is correct, that when the Russians shipped some MiG-21s to Vietnam, by rail across China, the rail cars somehow got lost, and some of the MiG-21s didn't turn up for quite a while. And when they did turn up in Vietnam, some of the dials in the cockpit were upside down. Obviously, the whole thing had been disassembled. And, indeed, the Chinese began to produce an aircraft quite similar to the MiG-21 a couple of years later.

But I think the general answer to this was that Chinese technical capabilities were so limited that, by the time a commercial product had been reverse engineered and they were in a position to produce it themselves, one or two further generations of technology would have been introduced in the United States, and it wouldn't be a threat to the market position of companies. So they didn't worry about this very much.

And in the area of music, literature, and the like, China was a society that banned the distribution of any foreign literature, except through controlled channels. They had this marvelous publication, to which I referred the other day, *Reference News*, which distributed, in some twenty-odd million copies, articles from the *New York Times* and whatnot, for internal use only,

which meant only Chinese could see it, although, of course, I did, too.

But that was essentially the extent of it. So there wasn't a terribly great concern about that issue.

That issue, which had been at the center of our relationship with Taiwan for many years, as you indicate, is one that is typical of the relationships between advanced societies and developing ones. In the nineteenth century, the greatest violator of copyright was the United States.

*Q: Oh, yes. Gilbert and Sullivan had long stories about the problems.*

FREEMAN: And Charles Dickens. That is why, in the used-book stores here, there are so many crummy editions of Dickens from the nineteenth century and knockoffs of his books. It wasn't until the United States emerged as an exporter of ideas that we became strict on this subject.

So it's normal for developing societies to regard intellectual products as the common heritage of mankind, rather than as entitled to protection for the benefit of their originators.

But this wasn't an issue with the Chinese at that time.

It became an issue later, largely because we did succeed, as Taiwan became an exporter of technology, in persuading Taiwan to clamp down, at which point they simply relocated all of their factories to the Mainland. The great crisis that we had with China a year ago over intellectual property was caused by Taiwanese investors relocating plants to the Chinese Mainland to produce CDs and the like.

But at that time, it was not a concern.

At any rate, I traveled several times to China with delegations, but remained on the Desk. I continued to interpret, but I made a real effort to get Language Services at the Department of State to recruit a proper professional interpreter, since I had no interest in making a career of interpreting, and did not want, in fact, to be pegged as a China specialist. I thought of myself as a professional diplomat and believed that there were more fields in which to exercise whatever ability I had than just China.

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*Q: Back to your time working on the Deng Xiaoping visit. What were our concerns at the time?*

FREEMAN: Among other things, it was clear that China was about to administer a lesson (actually an entire curriculum) to Vietnam, in response to Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia. Indeed, one of the motives for Deng Xiaoping's compromises with the United States on normalization was to clear the American flank before addressing the issue of Vietnamese imperialism and the occupation of Cambodia.

At one level, I suppose, there was a malicious delight in some quarters about the prospect of the Chinese administering a drubbing to the Vietnamese, which they did, though at a huge cost to

themselves.

On another level, there was apprehension about the implications of this sort of Chinese activism in Southeast Asia. This issue was a very ambivalent one.

There was considerable concern about the prospects for U.S.-China relations, in terms of congressional shenanigans on Taiwan, which centered on the Taiwan Relations Act.

There was a lawsuit, by Barry Goldwater and others, to set aside the president's termination notice for the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China, and to claim that the Senate, having consented to the making of the treaty, had to consent to its unmaking. That ultimately produced a Supreme Court decision that reaffirmed the president's power.

There was the Jackson-Vanik freedom of immigration issue to address. Indeed, Deng Xiaoping, as has been widely reported, did say to Jimmy Carter at one point, when he mentioned freedom of immigration, "I'd like you to speak with Senator Jackson and ask him how many Chinese he would like for the State of Washington. Ten million? I can give him that many tomorrow." And that rather disposed of that issue, which, of course, had been generated by concerns over Soviet Jewry, rather than over Chinese immigration.

There was a mad scramble to get a series of basic framework-setting agreements for cultural exchange and other things in place.

We had to do an enormous amount of administrative work to upgrade the embassy.

There was the issue of who the ambassador was going to be, although it was fairly much a foregone conclusion that Leonard Woodcock, having been the liaison office chief, would be the first ambassador, as indeed happened.

It was an extraordinarily busy and complex time, without even mentioning the corresponding negotiations with Taiwan, to which I referred.

At any rate, this work on the China working group was essentially completed by the middle of February 1979. I was preparing to return to USIA, when I got a call from the under secretary for management, Ben Read, asking me if I would come see him. And I did. He said that there was a terrible management problem in refugee affairs. At that time, we faced a terrible crisis of Vietnamese boat people, and first asylum in the Southeast Asian countries, and African refugee flows, and Afghan refugee flows, already, although the Soviet invasion didn't occur until the end of '79. This matter was under the control of Pat Derian, Hodding Carter's wife, who was the assistant secretary for human rights and humanitarian affairs. She had already, five times, been in violation of the Anti-deficiency Act, which is a provision of law that says you can't write Treasury checks in excess of appropriations. In other words, you can't bounce checks on the U.S. government. Mr. Read said that this all needed to be reformed and straightened out. And he asked would I please head a working group to do this, and to prepare for the establishment of the position of United States coordinator for refugee affairs, who would have broad oversight over the function, and also design a reorganization of the manner in which it was conducted.

And I said, "You've got to be out of your mind. I don't want to have anything to do with that," because I could see that it would be a totally thankless and extremely difficult job, involving alienating the Bureau of Consular Affairs; obviously Human Rights Affairs; probably International Organization Affairs, which had UNRRA, the Palestinian relief organization; the various geographic desks; the Bureau of Administration; the under secretary for management's office, not to mention Health and Human Services, various state governments, and so forth. So I said, "I really don't want to do it."

Well, I went away, and I got another call from him. And he said, "I've talked to the secretary, and he really wants you to do it."

And I said, "Well, he'll have to call me himself and tell me that's he's drafting me for this. I will have to speak with him, because there are some guidelines I need if I'm going to do this."

So Secretary Vance did call me, and I did speak to him. And he said, "I want you to solve this problem, but I don't want Patt Derian on my case."

So I said, "Yes, sir."

And I went back to the Ops Center and started figuring out what had to be done.

*Q: Can we stop here for a minute. I keep going back, but I don't like to leave things unplugged. When we were preparing to have the Chinese vice premier, Deng Xiaoping, how did we view his position within China at that time, from your point of view, and what were we trying to do? Was this a pure bread-and-butter type visit, or did we have things that we wanted? And a little about the interface with the White House, which always wants to get somebody down on the peanut farm, or the LBJ ranch. What were you after?*

FREEMAN: This was Deng Xiaoping's third coming. He had, at the age of 23, been secretary general of the Chinese Communist Party. He had been purged for anti-Soviet sentiment. He was purged a second time, during the Cultural Revolution, for anti-ideological sentiment, for pragmatism. He had arisen again, and he seemed to be in an increasingly unchallenged position. There had been, in 1978, a plenum of the Communist Party that basically embraced his aspirations for reform of the economy and an opening up of China.

I suppose the White House, in looking at this, had several considerations.

In terms of foreign policy, wanting to consolidate the China relationship and give it some momentum, thereby increasing leverage on the Soviet Union and on others, such as Vietnam, to whose activities, both internal and in Indochina, we strongly objected.

There was, as always, some aspiration by the administration for the business opportunities that a normal relationship with China, especially a China that was opening its doors, might bring.

In domestic terms, Deng Xiaoping's visit was seen by the administration as something that could

turn the atmosphere, excitingly, in the direction of a favorable American view of relations with China. Indeed, it did, and it was a remarkably successful visit in those terms.

There was a desire for direct communication between the de facto leader of China and our own president on many issues, ranging from those that I mentioned, the broad global strategic picture, to regional issues in Southeast Asia and South Asia. And there was a very good dialogue.

But it was an opener, an ice breaker, and that was the purpose of it.

*Q: What was the situation, as he was coming and you were doing this preparation, between China and Vietnam? From your observation, had we seen how things were developing? At one time, they were as close as lips and teeth. We always saw Vietnam and China as being part of one big Communist conspiracy. When were we seeing the real split and the war that went on there? How did that develop?*

FREEMAN: It really developed over the course of 1978. The relationship between China and Vietnam was always a great deal more complex and nuanced than what we perceived.

I might say a couple of things about that.

First, it is an article of faith for many American specialists on Vietnam that the Chinese played a minor role in the war. On one level, that's correct; on another, it isn't.

For example, I have spoken with Chinese generals, including one who was present in Da Nang when the Marines landed in 1965, and watched the battle with the Vietnamese, as an advisor. The current Chinese defense attaché in Washington, who is a very fine man indeed, went down the Ho Chi Minh Trail at about the same time. There were Chinese all over the place, intermingled with the North Vietnamese, not with the Viet Cong. There were Chinese in Cambodia. And, of course, there were Chinese defenders of the railway system in North Vietnam, and so forth. So the Chinese were strong backers of Vietnam, in terms of advice and support and providing a sort of secure rear area for the Vietnamese.

On another level, of course, there was no affection between them at all. Vietnam's main partner was the Soviet Union, not China. China and the Soviet Union were in a virtual state of war, so it was an uneasy relationship. Ideologically, the Vietnamese were Soviet-oriented, not Chinese-oriented. China had little appeal to anyone, except the Khmer Rouge, in the middle of the Cultural Revolution. The Khmer Rouge, who had a connection with the Chinese Gang of Four and who fell out of favor with China after the fall of the Gang of Four, were in a terrible relationship with the Vietnamese. I know some Chinese military men who were with the Khmer Rouge, who described firefights with Vietnamese units even back in the '60s and '70s. So this was a difficult relationship.

In the spring of '78, as events in Cambodia took their course, and as Vietnam began to become more and more threatening to Cambodia, and as the Vietnamese lock on Laos got stronger, the Chinese-Vietnamese relationship began to deteriorate substantially. And it was very clear, as I say, that, after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, the Chinese would react. Which indeed

they did, shortly after Deng Xiaoping left Washington.

That Sino-Vietnamese interaction, I think, is poorly understood. The purpose of the use of force is not to avoid casualties on your side, and not to inflict damage. It is to make a political point. The political point the Chinese wanted to make to Vietnam was that they could take Hanoi, if they wished. They demonstrated that. It cost them more, and it revealed more weaknesses in their armed forces, than they anticipated. Indeed, it provoked a thoroughgoing reform of the Chinese military, as those lessons were digested. But the Vietnamese themselves, in talking about these battles, describe a level of ferocity and level of casualties on their side that was vastly greater than anything they experienced at the hands of the Americans. The political point was made.

China also learned some lessons, which were reflected in later reorganizations of the Chinese military.

It is said that was a defeat for China. It was not, any more than China's advance into India in '62 and subsequent withdrawal was a defeat. It was a demonstration of Chinese power. And once they had demonstrated what they wanted to demonstrate, they called it off.

The Chinese, for a long time thereafter, in what we would consider to be a remarkably cynical fashion, used the Vietnamese border as the live-fire training ground for their troops. It was real live fire. They rotated entire divisions through there on a regular basis, to give their military a taste of combat. The Vietnamese obviously are a very skilled infantry, perhaps the best in the world, and they were used by China to good effect.

As I said, the point was somewhat lost, when China said it was administering a lesson to Vietnam. It was not administering one lesson, but a whole curriculum. And the basic point of the curriculum was to demonstrate to Vietnam that it could not afford a hostile relationship with China, and it could not exercise a regional imperialism in disregard of Chinese interests. And that point was made.

*Q: Do you think this was understood by the China watchers, yourself included, at that time?*

FREEMAN: Oh, I believe so. I believe so.

At any rate, this issue was, in public perception, a background issue, but in official perception in Washington, it was very much a central issue during the Deng Xiaoping visit.

*Q: One last question on this. I keep coming back, but while I've got you here, I'm going to milk you for everything I can. What was the impression of the people dealing with China at that time about Leonard Woodcock as ambassador? He came out of the American automobile union, almost an unlikely figure, yet automobile union people are pretty tough, and we were up against some pretty tough people in China. What was the undercurrent of feeling among the China professionals, yourself included, about Leonard Woodcock's time?*

FREEMAN: Leonard Woodcock is a man of strong will and excellent, seasoned judgment, and

personable. He was very much in charge, presiding over the liaison office. I think he had the respect and admiration of his staff, in part because he didn't pretend to expertise on China that he didn't and couldn't develop, not speaking Chinese and not having studied it. What he was an excellent judge of character and a fine negotiator. He deferred on most questions, I think, to Stape Roy, who was the deputy chief of the liaison office and later DCM in the embassy. He had a very fine staff of officers, quite gifted, reporting on China, and he used them well.

I want to just make a point that is probably forgotten, but it was an obvious point at that time. Prior to Deng Xiaoping's visit to Washington, which followed normalization, no Chinese official of any senior rank had come to Washington. And the reason was that there was an embassy purporting to represent China here, and we had a semi-official relationship with Beijing, not a formal one. It was only when the Republic of China Embassy was being converted into an unofficial presence that Deng Xiaoping was able to come.

The normalization of relations set off an avalanche of American official travel to China. And not just official travel, but travel by Cabinet members. For a period, the relationship was trip-driven. That is, it was driven by the requirement of senior officials, on both sides, but especially in the United States, to produce results from visits that they made. And this was something that, when I was country director for China, I used, I hope, skillfully, to...

*Q: But these trips were mainly for people who wanted to go see the other side of the moon, weren't they?*

FREEMAN: They were motivated by many factors. There was serious business to be done. There was a scramble by bureaucracies to establish relations with their Chinese opposite numbers. There were people, like Mike Blumenthal, the secretary of the treasury, who had been born in Shanghai and who wanted to go back. There was a natural curiosity. There was an element of tourism. There was prestige associated with a visit, and publicity and public prominence. And there was the possibility of achieving things -- which is not the case on every trip -- because the United States and China suddenly faced the requirement to establish, in short order, the sort of relationship we might have developed over decades had we had relations.

Indeed, when in 1979 I became country director for Chinese affairs (I'm again leaping ahead), one of the first things I did, with the encouragement, indeed the stimulus, of Dick Holbrooke, was to sit down and write out a five-year plan for where we wanted U.S.-China relations to be. And the basic premise was that we wanted them to be what they would have been if we had not had thirty years of their absence.

So you could go to China, and if you succeeded in producing a program of cooperation or an agreement on some area, you were pioneering and pathbreaking in a way that you couldn't very well do in any other country. Everything was new, everything was innovative and creative, and it was a very exciting period.

But I think I've gotten ahead of myself.

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*Q: You finally got back to where you really wanted to be. Or is China just a tar baby, and once you get into it, you can't get away from it? Or is it a narcotic?*

FREEMAN: It may be, for others. For me, I think I have been driven throughout my career by some relic of my Puritan ancestors' philosophy, which says to me that those who have the capacity to be, have the duty to become, and that the significance of a life in public service is measured by the contributions one can make. Those contributions depend on when and where one is. And so, to be country director for China, with the opportunities that normalization presented, was to have an opportunity to shape a relationship of enormous strategic importance not just to the United States, but globally, and to guide it, because it was a relationship in motion that could be deflected; whereas, relations that are well established and have some inertia to them are hard to move. So, to my mind, this was an enormous opportunity to be creative and innovative, to resolve old problems and to find new opportunities. And that's very much what attracted me to it. Less China, in a way, than this aspect.

*Q: Policy.*

FREEMAN: The professional fulfillment that might come, and which did come.

*Q: We're talking '79 to '81.*

FREEMAN: That's right. In the two years that I was there, we were on a bit of a roller coaster, by 1980, because of the election in the United States and some things that I'll mention. I either personally negotiated or oversaw the negotiation of some 36 treaties and agreements. Really, within two years, using the availability of Cabinet officers whom I recruited to travel to China and the people whom I recruited to come from China, I had overseen and helped to drive the U.S.-China relationship into something very much like what it might have been had we not had the thirty years of nonintercourse and unofficial relationships we had.

But I think that whole chapter probably should be the subject of another discussion, because it'll go on for a bit.

*Q: All right, why don't we stop at this point. So we're going to pick up '79 to '81, your time on the Desk. One of the questions I want to ask, I'll put it on here only to make sure, I'd like you to talk in depth about your dealing with Richard Holbrooke and your impression of how he operated at this time.*

*Today is the 2nd of November, 1995. We're talking about your time in Washington. You were talking about getting deeper into a matter.*

FREEMAN: In the last conversation, which was some time ago, I was beginning to talk about my time as country director for China, and you asked about Dick Holbrooke and his role.

I think I would broaden that to say that we were very fortunate during that time also to have Mike Oxenberg, now an academic, a very imaginative, enthusiastic, positive person, with a great

deal of creativity, at the National Security Council staff. I was able to work very effectively with Mike.

Dick Holbrooke has the most brilliant policy mind that I have ever encountered. He is someone with enormous quickness to see the political realities of Washington and understand how to use those to create results. So he's a very driving personality, with acknowledged brilliance.

He has succeeded then and subsequently because of that brilliance, not because of his charm. He began his tenure, before my time, in the East Asian and Pacific region by throwing out a great number of older people and bringing in people with whom he felt more comfortable. He paid a great deal of attention to personnel. I think he created, in the end, a more dynamic bureau by doing that, but he broke a lot of rice bowls and made a lot of enemies.

And he's infuriatingly distracted always. He would often have a meeting, with two television sets going, on different channels, and while he was reading a newspaper, he would be discussing a policy issue. He has a notoriously short attention span, but somehow the sheer power of his intellect compensates for all of that.

I think he was personally very frustrated, for the first two years of the Carter administration, by his inability to move on Vietnam. In effect, he was told, and the rest of us sensed, that the guidance on Vietnam was that it was not timely to think about Vietnam and that we should refrain from doing so.

*Q: At that stage, we had no relations with Vietnam.*

FREEMAN: Exactly. This was the period in which, in retrospect, drift in the relationship allowed the issue of the missing in action and the suspicion that there were still prisoners of war held by the Vietnamese to achieve the strange salience it later achieved in U.S. views of Vietnam.

It was also, of course, the period in which Vietnam's misbehavior and miscalculations about the United States, its continued insistence on reparations when that was obviously inappropriate, and its actions in Cambodia paralyzed that policy.

I think Dick Holbrooke really looked to China in part as an outlet for his creative energy, and he certainly applied it very, very effectively.

Now I was country director for China from July of 1979 to the beginning of July 1981. So my tenure was three-fourths in the Carter administration and one-fourth in the new Reagan administration.

Of course, normalization had, as I indicated, been accomplished, and it was really my task to lay down a plan, a strategic vision, of how to take advantage of that, which I did. And that was something that Dick Holbrooke encouraged.

I think it was probably best reflected in a speech that I wrote for Dick, which he gave on June 4,

1980. That speech, which he has described as the best speech he gave during his tenure as assistant secretary, I think probably is still the best single statement of a positive vision for U.S.-China relations and the future of China.

The genesis of it was this: Sometime in the spring of 1980, there was a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson Center to discuss China in the year 2000, twenty years thereafter. I joined this meeting, and I was so disgusted by the pedestrian, straight-line projections that were going on, that I went back, literally, on my motorcycle, from the meeting to the office, and I stayed up all night and wrote a paper on China in the year 2000 that laid out a very different vision, a vision that was subsequently, I must say, derided by everyone in the intelligence community. And there was a great meeting at the consulate general in Hong Kong, which at that time was still the center of China-watching, to discuss it and critique it. It was provocative.

I projected that China would grow, economically, at the rate of seven or eight percent a year, and that Chinese agriculture would grow at five percent, and I had various other projections on the economy. And I drew some conclusions from that about the nature of China. I also made some predictions about the political system, military posture, and so forth, all of which were derided, as I say, as wildly over-optimistic.

Well, as it happened, Chinese growth, over at least the first fifteen years of that period, averaged around ten percent, not seven, and agriculture actually grew by fifteen percent. So, if anything, I turned out to be pessimistic.

But it was symptomatic of the view of the time, which was that China was a sort of economic and political backwater that could not hope to achieve very much, that the projections I made were greeted with such disdain.

In any event, Dick Holbrooke was somewhat taken by the paper, and that paper eventually turned into the speech. I guess the occasion for the speech probably was the meeting of the U.S.-China Business Council, then called the National Council for U.S.-China Trade.

In it (in retrospect, with some prescience), he outlined the emergence, for example, of China's contribution to global environmental pollution as a looming issue. He referred obliquely to corruption, by speaking about the Chinese bureaucracy as an issue. And he looked forward in a way that didn't, of course, capture everything that happened in the Deng Xiaoping revolution, which was just beginning then, but that captured a great deal more of it, I think, than anyone else did at the time.

So he was the kind of person who inspired subordinates who were willing to take risks, whether in making predictions or outlining policy objectives, to do so.

*Q: I'd like for people to get a feel for how things work. A speech by an assistant secretary for a regional bureau usually is not just somebody getting up there and making a speech. It's a policy statement.*

FREEMAN: That's correct.

*Q: So you looked at this and you made your projections, saying basically China is going to loom a lot larger than most of us think. This went against the traditional straight-line projections of most other people dealing with the subject. How did Holbrooke come out with this speech as far as within the State Department, within the administration, the White House and all that?*

FREEMAN: I think the speech itself had some resonance with the National Security Council staff -- Oxenberg, in that time, Brzezinski. It was, of course, cleared around there. I don't believe it was cleared at the CIA, which, at that time, in the pre-Bill Casey era, was not regarded as a policy agency.

The basic points that the speech made were an extrapolation from, or consistent with, those that Vice President Mondale made in August of '79 during his visit to China, when he spoke at Beijing University. That speech, largely drafted by Mike Oxenberg, but with some input from me, was a very strong statement of an American willingness to pursue a relationship with China, which went well beyond the strategic triangle of Washington-Moscow-Beijing relations that had dominated the relationship in earlier days.

And so I think the main points that Holbrooke's speech made were that our relationship with China was not simply a function of our relations with the Soviet Union, but should be pursued on its own merits. That we didn't see our relationship with China as coming at the expense of others. That we saw a national interest in a friendly and modernizing China. That we had an interest in China's territorial integrity and security, which was important. And, finally, that we would adhere strictly to the normalization understandings we had reached with regard to Taiwan (and I'll come back to that).

There was actually a last point in addition to those, which was that we saw China as a partner in the resolution of global issues, whether they were environment, food, population, energy, and the like, and that we intended to pursue those relationships with the Chinese. That was a reference to a process that, as of 1995, is still incomplete; that is, integrating China into the world system of states, the international order, and doing so without disrupting arrangements that have been very congenial to the United States, which China, if left outside, could eventually challenge or overthrow.

So the basic themes were these.

Now I think none of us really recognized, on June 4, 1980, that over the course of that summer, George Bush, who was the vice presidential candidate for Ronald Reagan, would be enmeshed by Reagan in a frontal challenge to the normalization understandings, encouraged, I believe, by Jim Lilley, who was at that time principal advisor to Bush.

Ronald Reagan essentially proposed, over the course of 1980, to reverse two elements of the normalization understandings with regard to Taiwan. First, he felt that an official relationship, of some sort, should be reestablished with Taiwan. And, second, he did not agree with the formulation that the Carter administration had carefully preconcerted with the Chinese on arms sales to Taiwan.

That formulation was that the United States would continue to sell carefully selected defensive weapons to Taiwan, on a restrained basis; that is, the weapons would be defensive, they'd be carefully selected, and there would be overall restraint in the level of sales. And he objected to that.

To jump ahead a little bit, when he came into office, both issues immediately arose. The issue of official relations arose in the context of invitations to officials from Taiwan to attend his inauguration.

As country desk officer, in a situation where the Carter administration, of course, had departed and the new administration was not in place, I was the most senior official in the U.S. government dealing with China. And I really had to scramble, with Bud McFarlane's help and Al Haig's help, to persuade the Reagan White House not to, in effect, restore an official relationship with Taiwan at the inauguration.

Subsequently, Reagan thought better of this, when he began to realize the importance of China to our overall international strategy, and specifically the things that the Chinese were doing with us with regard to Afghanistan -- the collection of intelligence on the Soviet Union and the like. And he backed away from that.

But, on the arms sales issue, he persisted in his view. It found expression, over the course of the early part of 1981 and subsequently through the summer and early fall, in the so-called F-X issue, the F-X being a fighter bomber aircraft, but basically an interceptor, that the Carter administration had authorized. This would have been the first such major-weapons system produced by the United States specifically for export, rather than for acquisition by our own armed forces.

This issue was a very political one. There were two companies competing for it: Northrop, which was based in southern California, and General Dynamics, which was based in Texas. The General Dynamics aircraft was a downgraded version of the F-16. The Northrop aircraft was a newly designed aircraft, in effect, major re-engineering, based on the old F-5.

*Q: Which had been our principal export fighter.*

FREEMAN: Exactly. That competition was left open during the campaign, because, of course, Carter wanted to appeal to the voters of both southern California and Texas, and didn't want to alienate one or the other. And he bequeathed this decision to Ronald Reagan.

In the event, Reagan, Solomonically, decided not to tear the baby in half, and to let both of them compete, which meant, in effect, since everyone knew what the F-16 was, that General Dynamics was likely to get the business. And that, of course, is what happened. It also meant that Northrop, which had put a huge amount of money into developing the F-20, as they called it, their version of the F-X, was going to be in deep financial trouble if it couldn't make a sale to Taiwan. Taiwan was the key to Northrop's corporate strategy.

So there were powerful economic interests and political interests involved. The conjunction of Ronald Reagan's sympathy for Taiwan and his gut feeling that it was wrong to deprive a former ally and a friend of access to this very potent weapons system with the economic and political muscle that was behind it from Texas and California meant that he strongly favored selling this aircraft to Taiwan.

This was a clear challenge to the normalization understandings with Beijing, and ultimately, in the fall of 1981, resulted in the Chinese demanding a clarification of U.S. policy, setting off a negotiation from which, frankly, both sides lost, resulting in a joint communiqué on the issue of arms sales, which was issued August 17, 1982.

At any rate, when Holbrooke gave his speech, all this was, in a sense, before us. Ronald Reagan had begun, however, to make his rumbles about Taiwan, and although he wasn't yet the nominee for the Republicans, it looked very likely that he would be. So one of the motivations for Dick giving his speech was to put a cap on and define the Carter administration's policies on China clearly, which the speech did.

*Q: Brzezinski, the national security advisor at that time, was of Polish extraction and renowned for hating the Russians. Did you find that Brzezinski had the same abhorrence for the Chinese, or was this pretty much a Polish-Russian thing? Did you find that he was looking realistically and helpfully at the China relationship?*

FREEMAN: Brzezinski was, as you said, viscerally anti-Russian, and his anti-Russian sentiment led him to be quite pro-Chinese. In other words, his concern about the Soviet Union was a geopolitical concern, not primarily an ideological concern. In fact, on occasion, his anti-Russian sentiment, as in his, I think, ludicrous capering at the Afghan border, firing a rifle over into the Khyber Pass and so on, was sometimes embarrassing. During his visit to China, he remarked to his Chinese hosts, when he went to the Great Wall, "Last one to the top gets to fight the Russians in Ethiopia." He had a sort of schoolboy-like, almost appealing, naive enthusiasm for sticking it to the Russians. And he liked the Chinese for that reason.

I'm sure the Chinese found all this entertaining. They are a very sober-minded people, and I'm not quite sure what their reaction to Mr. Brzezinski was. On the other hand, they clearly knew that Mr. Brzezinski was a very strong supporter of the U.S.-China relationship.

During the period from '79 to '81 in which I was country director for China, there were several different currents. There was a deep current, I would say, in U.S.-China relations in which state governors, congressional delegations, business delegations and the like, and provincial delegations and business delegations and scientific delegations crossed the Pacific between China and the United States and began to really build a deep and cooperative relationship, and to explore the potential for trade and investment, although investment was not yet really possible directly, and for cooperation on science and technology and the like.

Many of the agreements that were negotiated during this period, and subsequently, came under the heading of science and technology cooperation. I'm now talking about a second current, if you will; that is, knitting the two bureaucracies together, the bureaucracies in Beijing and in

Washington. They had two motives. One, the Chinese record and Chinese achievement in some areas provided unique data and insight.

For example, in the area of astronomy, Chinese records are the longest and most complete on astronomical events. And access to these records was very important to astronomers and physicists studying interstellar events.

If you look at the public-health area, there are records in China of very large populations that have been subjected to consistent environmental stress (for example, elements in the drinking supply), which allow you to study the impact of the environment on the human body in a way that can't be done easily elsewhere.

Chinese geology is vastly interesting.

Zoology. The Department of Agriculture had, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, essentially created the U.S. ornamental plant and nursery business with plant stock collected in China. Much of the rhododendron and azalea stock, and many, many other things that we now take for granted, was originally collected by USDA employees in China. They were very eager to get back into such a relationship. The payoff was potentially enormous.

For example, I remember one of the reasons for seeking cooperation in this area was that the Chinese sow, although very fat, which is not desirable, has a litter of a dozen piglets. Whereas the American sow, which tends to be lean, has a litter of six to eight piglets. Well, if you could breed the two and collect the germ plasm from China and introduce it here and produce a larger litter of lean piglets, you could instantly make a hell of a lot of money for American farmers.

Soybeans originated in China, and many strains were of interest. And so on.

So there was real scientific interest.

But I have to say that, politically, the motivation for doing all this was very clear, and that is that those of us charged with promoting U.S.-China relations wished to ensure that the relationship was sufficiently broad and engaged a sufficient number of bureaucracies and special interests on both sides so that it would be insulated, to some extent, from political cross currents. So that was what we were doing.

Finally, as I mentioned earlier, to a great extent, the relationship during this period was trip-driven, meaning that the travel of high-level officials from either side has a tendency to concentrate the mind of the bureaucracy, and to lead to instructions from the top that appropriate achievements be produced for the visit to consummate. So, trip-driven diplomacy accelerated the negotiation of framework agreements and the like.

This process continued until the Taiwan arms sale controversy arose in 1981 and derailed it temporarily. It resumed, at a slower pace, later.

*Q: Were there any trips of particular note, either way, that you can think of? Every time you*

*have one of these trips of a major personage, things go right, things go wrong. As you say, it concentrates minds and also events.*

FREEMAN: There were so many that it's hard to single out any in particular. I suppose I remember most vividly a visit by the first delegation from the Peoples' Liberation Army. Being new to military matters at that time, I was pleasantly surprised, indeed astonished, to discover that, through reminiscence about old battlefields on which people had faced each other, veterans of the Korean War on both sides found they had something in common, and that this common experience quickly established camaraderie, rather than reinforced ancient enmity.

*Q: It happens every time.*

FREEMAN: I gather. But also by the extent to which intelligent discussion focused largely on the Afghan issue, which appeared to both China and the United States to threaten a general Soviet advance.

*Q: We're talking about the December 1979 attempted takeover of Afghanistan by the Soviets.*

FREEMAN: The Christmas coup and occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union. And the threat that this posed to Iran was of particular concern.

In fact, the Holbrooke speech of June 1980 had foreshadowed the fact that the U.S.-China relationship could expand to meet challenges to common interests. It held out an implication that indeed the relationship could move beyond friendship into what Holbrooke called alliance (what I would think you'd more accurately call coalition), namely, that if there were a frontal assault on our common interests, such a relationship could expand rapidly. And that was referring to Afghanistan.

*Q: You're sitting there, you've obviously got your antennae out, how did the Chinese respond initially, and then subsequently, to the Afghan coup and invasion?*

FREEMAN: Their initial reaction, rather similar to ours, was quite panicked, for several reasons, I suppose. China and the United States have long shared a relationship of alliance, or at least patronage, with regard to Pakistan. In the case of the United States, that relationship's been quite erratic and had its good and bad moments. In the case of the Chinese, it's been very steady. And the Afghan invasion was an obvious threat, immediately, to Pakistan, to its territorial integrity, stability, and perhaps to its very existence, especially given the Indian-Soviet collusion on many matters. So I think the initial reaction was one of very great concern.

But the Chinese, rather quickly, I think, within a matter of a month or two, concluded that in fact the Soviets were more likely to become bogged down and regret their Afghan adventure than to use it as a springboard for further advance.

Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation, conducted primarily through intelligence channels, with money from many sources, was absolutely central to creating the Mujahideen resistance to the Soviet invasion. And that program cemented relationships between the United States and China in yet

another dimension.

*Q: The great crisis of the Carter administration was the overthrow of the shah, the Iranian Revolution, particularly the seizing of our embassy and the hostages, who stayed there for 444 days. We were seeking support everywhere, to do something about this. Did we find that there was a China card?*

FREEMAN: No, there was no China card, really, for the simple reason that the Chinese, like the United States, had earlier embraced the shah as the gendarme of the Gulf, and looked to Iran as the principal bulwark for stability to the south of the Soviet Union and to the north of India. Therefore, they had exactly the same sort of relationship with the overthrown regime, although on a lesser scale, that we had.

Second, I suppose, there was no natural affinity between the religious radicalism of Khomeini and Chinese secularism and agnosticism or official atheism, although, I must say, the Chinese noted eerie resemblances between their Cultural Revolution and the chaos that descended upon Iran, which tended to make them quite disdainful of Iran as a society, which, as they had done earlier, was going through a sort of nervous breakdown.

So they were not able to be particularly helpful. I think they would have been, had they been able to be. Of course, one of the things that happened in the Cultural Revolution was that they had their own instances of sacking of embassies and besieging foreign-government establishments, which should have been entitled to protection by the government.

*Q: The Boxer Rebellion.*

FREEMAN: The Boxer Rebellion, at the beginning of the century, but during the Cultural Revolution, the sacking of the British Embassy in particular comes to mind. There were other instances.

I think, in fact, the two matters -- the Chinese experience with their xenophobia and the Iranian lapse into xenophobia -- are related in terms of psychological reactions to colonialism and the humiliation of proud non-western civilizations by the period of western ascendancy. But this is not the time to go into that.

*Q: Going back to the Holbrooke speech. When there's a speech, essentially you write it, Holbrooke plays with it. Did it get passed around?*

FREEMAN: He did something that I didn't at all expect him to do, and never would have done myself, and would have recommended against, and that is, he actually showed the speech in advance to the Chinese Embassy here, which, of course, had to object to the language on Taiwan, which was balanced language, saying, on the one hand, we would adhere to our understandings on normalization, but on the other hand, we would continue to insist on a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan issue. It referred, of course, to the Taiwan Relations Act, which the Chinese had found to go well beyond what they had expected, in terms of authorizing the unofficial relationship with the people of Taiwan.

So that is the only element of clearance difficulty that I recall. I don't think he was trying to clear the speech with the Chinese, but I think he was trying to gauge their reaction to what was a rather more comprehensive and forward-looking statement than any that had previously been made.

*Q: Obviously, the Chinese would be happy with the rosy predictions of their economic future. But on the Taiwan business, after they objected, what happened? Did they come to you and say no, no, no?*

FREEMAN: They just sort of made a stink. Holbrooke's motivation for doing it, I believe, was in part to ingratiate himself with the Chinese. And, of course, it had precisely the opposite effect.

*Q: It doesn't work.*

FREEMAN: That sort of technique does not work, so that was, I think, naive on his part. But I think in part he was proud of the speech and wanted to trumpet it and make sure that it got attention in China. That part of it, I think, might have been handled in a slightly different way.

*Q: Not just in your speech, but before, you sat down and asked yourself whither China. And you were moving away from the straight-line projection of China's like this and it will grow at a certain rate and everything will sort of remain static, which is very easy to do, rather than to see major changes. How did you see China, as you were looking at it back in 1979 to '81, politically?*

FREEMAN: China, in that period, had just emerged from the combined ravages of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four. I believed that what was likely to happen was the continuation of an autocratic system of government over the twenty years forward. I did not believe that there would be a frontal challenge, on the national level, to the control of the Communist Party, but I predicted, as I recall, that there might well be local disturbances, including some in Beijing, which would be brutally repressed.

I thought that, in effect, China was beginning to recapitulate the East Asian model of development, in which autocratic government liberalizes economics, economics booms, and political reform follows, with a significant lag, behind economic reform. I think probably that thesis, which was central to my paper, was what was least acceptable about it, in the context of the time.

And I continue to believe that is exactly what has been happening in China. If you look at, particularly, economics and growth rates, and compound them over a sufficient period of time, you begin to get results that are very startling to people and that they don't want to accept.

*Q: You're talking about a quarter of the population of the globe.*

FREEMAN: Exactly.

In the military area, as it turned out, I was wrong in some respects, because I imagined the

continuation of Sino-Soviet rivalry over this period. Of course, the Soviet Union collapsed halfway through it.

*Q: You're talking about particularly '89ish.*

FREEMAN: Yes. I thought that, by the end of the '90s, the Chinese would have deployed submarine-launch ballistic missiles (SLBM) in the eastern Mediterranean and the northern Indian Ocean. If you have an intermediate-range SLBM, there are two areas from which you can successfully launch on European Russia: one is the Arctic, which I thought was a bit far away from the Chinese, and the other is the Mediterranean. And I had noticed a pattern of Chinese assistance in port development and the like that appeared to be designed to meet the requirements of operations in the Mediterranean. To operate in the Mediterranean, you need one base outside and one inside. And it was clear that the Chinese, in Mauritania and in Malta, and in their relationship with the Egyptians, in the submarine area, were covering their bets for such a venture.

Submarines are vastly expensive, and in the end, as the Soviet Union collapsed, I think the Chinese abandoned this plan, if they ever had it. I don't think we'll ever know whether my speculation was correct and simply overcome by history, or whether it was just wrong from the beginning.

*Q: There are two trends in China: one is centralized government, which you have, the other is a breakdown, when it gets too big, into warlordism and all. As you looked at it, again going back to the time, how did you see this other trend?*

FREEMAN: I did not believe then, and I do not believe now, that China is in danger of breakup, or that the military, which is a strong, centralized, national institution, would develop warlordism. I think we know a lot more now about China than we did in 1980, because it's a vastly more open country. And what we now understand is that China was never anywhere near as centralized as many imagined, and that provincial governments always had a fair amount of latitude within the general guidance of the center. Deng Xiaoping's revolution enhanced that flexibility for provincial governments, and economic growth has buttressed their authority.

But there is still, after the past 150 years of tortured Chinese history, a strong sense among Chinese that the country cannot be allowed to fall apart, that unity is all important, and that the maintenance of social and political order has to take priority over virtually everything else. The Chinese have this conclusion because, literally, over this period, something on the order of one hundred million of them have died in disorders either caused internally or by foreign invasion.

So I believed that these psychological and political factors would outweigh others, and I continue to believe that.

I think Tiananmen is a perfect example...

*Q: We're talking about the shooting of students in Tiananmen Square. This was when?*

FREEMAN: June 4, 1989. I think that is a perfect example of the sort of local disturbance, albeit in the national capital, to which I was referring. The only thing that surprised me about it was that the government did not move quicker to put this down. And I wish, in retrospect, that they had, because the loss of life would have been far less if they had been more resolute early on, rather than allowing the students to, in effect, get out of control and pose a direct challenge to their authority.

*Q: Again going back to this '79 to '81 period, did Tibet raise any political problems? We're talking about the Chinese takeover, as many people feel, of Tibet. And this has become sort of a cause.*

FREEMAN: Not really.

The background on Tibet, as you know, is that, in the 1950s, the CIA spent a vast amount of money to produce a rebellion in Tibet. And that rebellion was the precipitate cause of the Dalai Lama's flight over the border to India. That is, we attempted, as part of our general policy of destabilizing China, to destabilize Tibet and, if possible, detach it from China.

I think we were all very sensitive, in the 1980s, as perhaps people are not now, to the way in which American maneuvers on Tibet might be viewed in Beijing, given this history, which the Chinese are well aware of, even if Americans have forgotten it. So Tibet and the Dalai Lama loomed as an issue in the realm of religious freedom, but it was not a political issue.

Subsequently, the issue of Tibet has been embraced by quite a range of people in the United States: some are simply drawn to exotic cultures and favor primitive peoples out of some sentimental impulse; others, for one reason or another, as the United States has become more anti-scientific, are more drawn to mysticism. There is a significant portion of the American public now that is avowedly dedicated to what is, in my view, superstition and mystical malarkey, and Tibetan Buddhism is about as mystical a malarkey as you can find.

*Q: What are sometimes known as the New Age people.*

FREEMAN: Exactly. So there is a natural affinity between Tibetan Buddhists and this segment of American opinion.

There is, of course, in the post-Soviet-collapse era, a sense that, well, if the Soviet Union broke up and various nationalities that had been incorporated into the Russian Empire flew out of it, why shouldn't Tibet do the same?

I think this is a cause of considerable friction now between the United States and China, because every Chinese, whether he is a dissident who participated in the events in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and is in jail or has been in jail, or whether he is a high official of the government, agrees that Tibet is and always has been and always will be part of China. There is absolutely no sympathy for separatism, or any willingness to tolerate it. Therefore, gestures that, in terms of American politics, seem innocent and noble and perhaps are seen as free shots in the political arena, like congressional resolutions proposing the recognition of Tibet and independence and

the sending of an ambassador there, are seen by the Chinese (and technically they're correct) as justifying a declaration of war in response, since the initiatives proposed to sever a portion of the country from central control, and promote rebellion and secession. Well, of course, Americans don't see that, and therefore are somewhat puzzled by the strength of the Chinese reaction to all this.

Finally, I think Tibet is a very different issue from what is often presented here. It is not so far the case, as is often charged, that China is deliberately populating Tibet with Han Chinese. To the extent there is economic opportunity in Tibet (and that is not a wide extent), Chinese who want to make money will and do move there. But most Chinese with whom I've spoken, who've lived in Tibet or been there, find it an exotic, but very harsh, environment. It's a nice place to visit, but they don't want to live there.

The Tibetan population is quite distinct, quite resentful of Han economic and political dominance, very much devoted to the Dalai Lama, and chafing under Chinese rule. All that is true. But it is also true that Tibetan culture was a primitive and remarkably unsuccessful culture, in terms of producing a decent lifespan or state of public health or economic opportunity or engagement with the outside world by Tibetans. And Tibetan association in the broader Chinese family has brought the Tibetan people all of those benefits. There is some sort of tradeoff, I suppose. Tibet is not viable as an independent country in the modern era. It is viable as an independent country only if it is prepared to live at medieval standards of living, which I don't believe anyone is.

So it's a complex situation. And because Tibet is so far away from the United States, it's a blank screen on which you can project your own mystical fantasies with great ease.

I think we were better served when we dealt, as we did in the '80s, with that issue with some caution and some sense of the inflammatory potential that appearing to sponsor secession by a part of China from China might have.

*Q: We're going through a sort of Republican revolution in Congress now. Tibet is one of those things that is very visceral; anything that's anti-Communist sounds good, and this sometimes comes up.*

FREEMAN: Generally speaking, countries, including the United States, are well advised not to sponsor causes that are hopeless. Tibetan independence can only succeed if there is massive foreign intervention. In other words, a war with China. And I don't see the United States or the American people being willing to make that sort of sacrifice for that cause.

*Q: I was a Balkan hand, and I must say, Bosnia was a hopeless cause. And we're still dealing with it.*

FREEMAN: And we have not yet, to this date, been willing to commit our blood for that cause, much as we may sympathize with it.

*Q: Again going back to this early period, we now have established diplomatic relations with*

*China. Could you talk a bit about your relations with the Chinese officials who came over, because I would imagine that, speaking Chinese and all, you would be somebody whom they could turn to, to say, What is all this about so and so -- the press, the Congress, the presidency, the academic world. I would have thought they would look to someone to give them some ideas of the importance, how people react in the United States. Did you find yourself in that position?*

FREEMAN: In fact, I did. And I think it was assisted by the fact that, as the Deng Xiaoping miracle began in China, many officials who had been incarcerated or rusticated in the earlier regime were brought back, and while they were, of course, extraordinarily cautious in their contacts with foreigners, including Chinese-speaking foreigners, for the first time, they could begin to engage on a truly personal level. And I began to find that friendships were forming between myself and people who later became quite senior in the Chinese establishment. I mean, by friendships, personal relationships that went beyond the official friendship that diplomats always have to espouse.

One of the things that I was trying to do was to strengthen and broaden strategic dialogue between the United States and China on a variety of important regional issues, some of them remote from Asia, on the grounds that it was important for the Chinese not to misunderstand what the United States was doing, as they had tended to do in the past. That, conversely, we needed to be able to influence the Chinese in the direction of policies that were at least not contradictory to, and hopefully, in fact, were tacitly supportive of our policies. So we began quite a range of dialogue. And this brought experts on a variety of areas remote from East Asia to Washington, or it took us to Beijing, to discuss this with them. Certainly, the broadening of contact between us I participated in.

We had some very difficult negotiations during this period, the civil aviation agreement perhaps one of the most difficult, because we insisted, correctly, on maintaining our air links to Taipei. After all, the arrangements that we had agreed to with the PRC for post-normalization relations with Taiwan included economic ties, and aviation is a principal such tie. But the Chinese regarded, at that time, aviation as a state activity, and the state airline (a miserable excuse for an airline), CAAC (Civil Aviation Administration of China), wanted to come to the United States. They saw Pan Am as a sort of functional equivalent of the official U.S. airline. Of course, we were in the process of beginning the deregulation of airlines. We saw the promotion of air links as a legitimate state activity, but we saw their actual management as a private one.

In any event, eventually we were able to reach an agreement with the Chinese. We reached a parallel understanding with Taiwan, through the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), and we were able to inaugurate air service. This was, however, as I say, one of the many rather contentious, difficult negotiations.

There was a series of other issues that began to emerge during this time. For example, the longstanding issue of financial and property claims resulting from Chinese confiscation of property, or the repudiation by earlier regimes, including the Sun Yat-sen 1911 Revolution, of ancient railway bonds and the like. And I later had to deal with these issues in Beijing.

Finally, this was a tumultuous period on another level, because Taipei was obviously highly

dissatisfied with a circumstance in which the only relationship it enjoyed with the United States was unofficial. Earlier, Taipei had enjoyed a privileged, official relationship with Washington. So the unofficial representatives of Taiwan throughout the country, and their many, many offices, were constantly engaging in petty moves to demonstrate the officiality, as they put it, of the relationship. This would include arranging with local officials to fly the flag of the Republic of China over the mayor's office, or, in some cases, to acquire consular license plates from the local officials, since there's no federal regulation of this, or to list themselves, as they did in many telephone books, including in Washington, as the Embassy of the Republic of China. They took out ads in the *Yellow Pages*, portraying themselves as an embassy, and stressing that they were the Republic of China and so on. All of this entirely understandable from their perspective, but enormously irritating to the State Department and to the PRC, as they were endlessly ingenious in the way in which they sought to score these political points.

*Q: I've talked to Nat Bellocchi, who is with the American Institute in Taiwan, who said that the Nationalist Chinese, a Taiwan group, are remarkably adept at networking in the United States. They have developed contacts not just within the Chinese community, but all over, as opposed to the PRC group, who tend to be more dour and more unto themselves.*

FREEMAN: I think that's absolutely correct. I might speak for a minute about that, because it was very striking in 1980 what the consequences of this were. That is, it's now 1995, and Taiwan now has forty, fifty years of experience lobbying in the United States. If you remember, in the 1950s, there was the Committee of One Million, which was a right-wing, Chiang Kai-shek operation. As time went on, Taipei got increasingly sophisticated about lobbying, publicity, public relations, and the courtship of interest groups.

I remember, in 1980, U.S. trade with the Chinese Mainland was booming. In fact, in that year, the Chinese were buying one out of every seven bales of cotton produced in the United States, and had emerged as a major factor in some key American economic sectors.

But no one was aware of this. It was as though the Chinese found this embarrassing and they wished to keep it secret. I knew it, as country director, and presumably the Board of Trade in Chicago knew it, and the cotton traders knew it, but no one else knew it.

But if Taiwan bought a Q-Tip cotton swab, that little bit of cotton would be trotted out by a congressman, who would say, "I have with me my dear friend Mr. Lee, from Taipei, who has just bought this bit of cotton. This was grown in our district, and it will increase employment. And you can see how important this relationship is." Taiwan, of course, very cleverly, understood that allowing a congressman to announce that sort of deal, however small it might be, ingratiated the congressman, who then owed one to Taiwan. This helped the congressman's reelection. It gained publicity for Taiwan, of a favorable nature, in the district. And no official had to be there. So they did this with great skill.

They courted governors. President Clinton, prior to becoming president, when he was governor of Arkansas, was in Taiwan four times. The lure, to a governor, of being able to take a trade delegation over to Taiwan, do some business, and get some publicity back home as a promoter of state exports, was simply irresistible. So they did a great deal of this.

They had a really very subtle and effective publication, which I have always enjoyed looking at, both for what it contains and for the technique that it embraces, called *The Free China Weekly*, which is a sort of tabloid that comes out every week, with a bit of information about Taiwan and cross-Strait relations (Taiwan Strait), Taiwan versus the Mainland, and interaction between all of the above. It very skillfully flogs three to five different themes in each issue, written in colloquial American English. They have a very slick publication on trade that they put out.

They have what I consider to be by far the most professional and skilled congressional-relations staff of any foreign regime represented here. They are much better than the Israelis, who are usually regarded as the best, because, whereas the Israelis gain their way by threatening political retaliation through Jewish or right-wing, Christian, pro-Israel supporters, Taiwan threatens no one. Everything is done by inducement. In the long run, courtship is more effective as a tie that binds than ultimata and threats.

So Taiwan has brought to bear on diplomacy all of the skills of interpersonal relations that Chinese culture embodies, and they've done it supremely well because, as a small place overshadowed by the rest of China, they've had to try harder.

The PRC, by contrast, is much more similar to the pre-modern China of the Emperor Qian Long, who told George III to take his trinkets and buzz off, because China had no need for intercourse with barbarians.

So Taiwan, island China, if you will, has developed an outward-looking philosophy that has caused its influence in the United States to prosper, whereas Mainland China has a continental and inward-looking approach that has left it essentially disarmed in the battle of propaganda, influence, and ideas.

Taiwan has developed what I consider to be a truly admirable society. It has successfully modernized. It is a China that has achieved the dream of Chinese reformers in the nineteenth century; namely, wealth and a measure of power, such that people in Taiwan can stand on the same level with foreigners and look them in the eye, confident that they are, technologically and economically and politically, quite as sophisticated as the foreigners with whom they are dealing.

Ironically, this dream of all Chinese, which is very much the dream on the Mainland as well, has been realized in Taiwan. So as Taiwan's economic prosperity has advanced and its democratization has proceeded, it has had an easier and easier task of selling itself in the United States, since it has, in fact, become increasingly admirable as a society, and its natural affinities with Americans have grown, rather than diminished.

So the contrast that Nat Bellocchi points to is a very real one, and it's rooted in the small size of Taiwan and in its economic and political modernization. I suspect that this path will be followed by the Mainland, although at a far slower pace, because it will remain, as the United States is, primarily obsessed with its own affairs, rather than with affairs abroad. Taiwan, of course, as a small place, pays more attention to foreign events.

*Q: What about, again going back to the Carter period, your connection within the State Department as you dealt with the American Institute in Taiwan? In other words, essentially the Taiwan Desk. Here it was, unofficial, but official as all hell, in practical terms, wasn't it?*

FREEMAN: Smoke and mirrors, perhaps. The contrivance of elaborate forms can make something that might otherwise be official appear very unofficial.

I would say, referring back to those petty moves by Taiwan, that they led to my spending an enormous amount of time doing what I did not want to do; namely, prescribing rules for the U.S. bureaucracy in dealing with Taiwan, shutting doors.

For example, the design of the license plate that would be issued to Taiwan's unofficial representatives. Issued by whom? Well, issued by the American Institute in Taiwan. Well, how was anyone to recognize that was empowered? Also, the design of the identity card. All of these things took on extraordinary sensitivity because of the fact that Taiwan was constantly pushing the envelope. Had it accommodated, we probably would have been able to do far better for Taiwan than we were able to do.

I had learned Taiwanese and always had a fond spot in my heart for Taiwan, yet I found myself in the ironic position of being the ogre on Taiwan policy. I think Taiwan came, during this period, to regard me personally very much as the evil genius behind all their distress, which, to some extent, I suppose I was.

Bureaucratically, the necessity to keep the Taiwan operation somehow related to the China operation, but separate. In bureaucratic terms, what does this translate into? It translates into the usual thing: How can I get the Taiwan coordination staff moved so that they're next to my office, so that they're not up on another floor, doing their own thing, out of sight, out of mind, and making mistakes, since everything they were doing had to be measured against what we had agreed with the PRC. Often, Taiwan would come in and want to do something, and it was eminently doable, but they would insist on doing it in a way that made it impossible. And then, if it was desirable, we had to find a way to do it that preserved the appearance of unofficiality and didn't breach the normalization understandings with Beijing. This took a great amount of time and was an endless irritant.

I can remember, in the fall of 1980, as Ronald Reagan prepared to be inaugurated, speaking with a very senior official from Taiwan's foreign ministry, who was a longstanding friend, and going over all these items with him, and saying, "Look, you now have a much more sympathetic regime coming in, which has not experienced this. If you continue this pattern of behavior, you will very quickly alienate this new group, which will find you irritating. Don't do it. Try to remember what the larger picture is. And don't push too far on arms sales, because if you do, you will pay a price in terms of restrictions. In the end, the United States, if forced to choose between its strategic imperatives of a decent relationship with the Chinese Mainland and its sentimental imperatives with you, will always choose the strategic over the sentimental. Don't force that choice on the new administration, with which you can work and from which you can gain a great deal, if you do so with sensitivity."

Well, of course, they did continue exactly what they had been doing, with precisely the result that I predicted. They soured the new administration on them. And they did, in the August 17, 1982, communiqué, find their access to arms restricted.

You asked about friendships with Chinese officials. Throughout this period, indeed throughout my entire career, I have maintained friendships and relationships with people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. And I've always been accessible to people from Taipei, providing the context was not a violation of my official position. Of course, since I'm no longer in the government, I don't give a damn about that, and I feel free to go to Taiwan, and have done that several times. But I could not, in that earlier era.

By the same token, I've been very open to and accessible, informally, to many, many people from the Chinese Mainland.

I think both of them have respected the fact that I have not concealed these relationships from either. They're each aware that these are going on, and no one has objected.

In fact, ironically, to jump ahead a bit, when I was stationed in Bangkok, all three of my children were studying Chinese in Taipei, and I wished to go visit them, en route back to the United States. I checked both with the Taiwan representative in Bangkok, to make sure that I could visit Taipei with no publicity, and I checked with the PRC Embassy there, to make sure they would have no objection to my doing this. The PRC had no objection, and Taipei assured that there would be no publicity.

My trip was then vetoed by the State Department, on the grounds that it was excessively sensitive, that I knew too many people in Taipei, that Beijing probably would object, etc.

I was then confronted with the irony of arriving in Hong Kong with my wife, to meet with the publishers of a cookbook in Chinese that I had helped to write earlier, who were Communists, who said, "Well, aren't you supposed to be going on to Taipei?", and seemed very surprised when I said no, that I wasn't doing that, and that my wife was going on alone, since the State Department couldn't really control her.

The rules that produced that perverse result were, ironically, formulated by me, in an earlier era, precisely because there were all sorts of abuses and problems, in which Taiwan was complicitous. I have always regarded that period and those antics with a sense of disappointment.

*Q: Just to get very bureaucratic, where was the American Institute in Taiwan located? Who was doing it? Just the day-to-day checking back and forth, how did this work?*

FREEMAN: There was a small Taiwan coordination staff in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which, as I indicated, I eventually succeeded in having moved down adjacent to what was then the Office of Chinese Affairs, now renamed the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs. There is an internal corridor connecting the two (called the Taiwan Strait, of course). That move greatly facilitated cooperation within the Department.

The American Institute in Taiwan has its Washington offices in Rosslyn, Virginia, and it is responsible for day-to-day contact and providing a venue for meetings, of an unofficial character, with officials from Taiwan. It is also the body that is responsible for the post-management and other administrative support functions for the American Institute in Taiwan offices in Taipei and Kaohsiung, in Taiwan. So if a delegation from Taiwan came here, it would be received by AIT, and AIT would arrange appropriate meetings with American government officials, outside of U.S. government offices, in appropriately informal settings.

Well, it turns out, of course, that appropriately informal settings are far more productive than the usual formal settings, and that to insist that all business must be done over a working lunch or over a drink in a hotel lobby produces far better results than making people come to your office. So I don't think Taiwan lost, in any respect, by this, and maybe even gained.

*Q: Ronald Reagan started his run in early 1980, and he was seen by many as being an extreme right-winger, devoted to the cause of Taiwan. It was a major point of concession of his political persona, you might say, at the time, where he was coming from. As he gained more and more power and was coming in, this must have put quite a bit of strain on you to try to explain the American political system and how things worked to the Chinese Embassy and their officials. Could you tell me about how you dealt with this.*

FREEMAN: Indeed, I did spend an enormous amount of time, and I had to take the initiative, and I spent a fair amount of my own money, having Chinese officials, visiting both from Beijing and from the embassy, over to my house for dinner or lunch.

All of this culminated, I recall, in a terrible evening in November 1980, when I invited everybody from the Chinese Embassy, I guess the ambassador was off somewhere else, but everyone else from the Political Section, the ambassador's office, the DCM, the military attaché, the whole bunch, over to my house for an election watch. I remember my son was tossing pizza in the air, making it. My wife had produced copious quantities of hors d'oeuvres and the like. Just as this group was walking in, around eight o'clock, Jimmy Carter was on the television, conceding to Ronald Reagan. It was a highly depressing evening, as it became apparent that Reagan, who'd really campaigned, apparently, for Taiwan, against the PRC, had won a sweeping victory in the election.

So I found, throughout the course of 1980 and certainly after the election, that I was spending an enormous amount of time cautioning the Chinese not to overreact, to recognize that what's said on the campaign trail may get altered, and that they should build bridges of communication, rather than be standoffish or be aloof to the new forces taking charge in Washington.

You're right, this role of sort of counselor, if you will, to an embassy that at that time still had a rather shallow and ideologically constrained vision of American politics was a very important one.

*Q: Coming now to the transition, where you almost have to put your other hat on and try to explain to a new administration coming in the facts of life in the world. It happens with almost every administration, but the Reagan administration came in with more, you might say,*

*international ideological baggage than most others, particularly regarding Latin America and the Soviet Union, but also China. Could you talk a bit about what you were doing?*

FREEMAN: The transition was a somewhat bizarre experience, because it went in two phases. First, there was a group of congressional right-wing types who landed in the State Department.

*Q: These are the staff people.*

FREEMAN: They were ostensibly representing the president, before he had really selected a new secretary of state officially, although Al Haig was rumored. This group arrived, and they were hostile. I was told that Senator Helms had a list of seventeen people who had to be purged, and that I was on that list. And various other statements were made. So there was a very nasty atmosphere. These people went around and interviewed the different Desks, including the China Desk, and tried to get some sense of what the state of play on the relationship was. They were writing papers for the secretary-to-be.

But the instant Al Haig was named as secretary, he thanked all these people for their good work, sent them packing, and brought in his own people, who were a great deal more strategically sensible and less ideological. So there was a sort of sigh of relief.

As we went toward the inauguration, we had, as I've mentioned, problems with various Taiwan officials, who had pretty much managed to insert themselves under the reviewing stand at the inaugural parade. We had difficulty persuading the president-elect that this was not the way to start off, with a crisis with China, and that if he wished to pursue this matter of official relations with Taiwan, he should do it in a more deliberate manner than that.

So it was a difficult transition, although I must say, in retrospect, despite the change in political parties and philosophies from the Carter administration, which in many respects was ideologically quite on the left, to this far-right administration, it was a friendlier takeover than the one between Bush and Reagan in '88-'89, which was a very unfriendly thing indeed, as different wings of the Republican Party succeeded each other.

But China was obviously at the top of the right-wing hit list. I found myself writing a great deal and working with, particularly, Secretary Haig, who was a strong supporter of a good relationship with China, and who had maintained close contact with the Chinese when he was at SHAEF as SACEUR, and who had, of course, been involved with the opening of the relationship with China as Kissinger's deputy back in the early '70s. I found myself working very closely with him in a series of efforts to educate the president, writing short little memoranda for him, providing him with briefing material, making suggestions for points that he should raise with the president, and the like.

He did gradually gain ground with the president on these issues, and convince him that the enemy was the Soviet Union, not China, and that there were merits to maintaining a good relationship with China, and that meant that we had to go through a certain level of contortion in our relationship with Taiwan to demonstrate that it was unofficial.

So that all worked, thanks to the, I think, genuinely heroic willingness of Al Haig to impale himself on this issue.

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At any rate, as 1981 proceeded, I was selected to be DCM in Beijing, and in June of 1981, I went with Secretary Haig for his first visit to Beijing as secretary. Then I came back, packed up, and returned to Beijing July 17, 1981, to become chargé, my predecessor, Stape Roy, having just departed. Subsequently, he was deputy chief of mission in Bangkok, then ambassador to Singapore and, of course, most recently, to China.

*Q: I always like to get the dates. You were there from when to when?*

FREEMAN: I was in China from July 17, 1981, until the beginning of November 1984, just about three and a half years. The new ambassador, Arthur Hummel, did not arrive until September 24, 1981.

I started off with a bang, right in the middle of what was building toward becoming the Taiwan arms-sale crisis with the new Reagan administration.

*Q: What was the situation in China at the time, as you saw it?*

FREEMAN: When I arrived in 1981, we were two and a half years into Deng Xiaoping's revolution. In fact, one of the first things that I did as chargé was to take Warren Burger, chief justice of the United States, and Charlie Wick, who was the head of USIA, over to see Deng Xiaoping. As I recall, Jimmy Carter also arrived during that period. Deng was very clear in stating at that time that he believed, when the history books were written, people would see the real revolution in China, the real march to modernization and restored wealth and power for the country as beginning in 1978 with his third coming. So it was a time of considerable hope inside China.

It was also a period of mounting crisis in U.S.-China relations, as the undertaking of the United States, at the time of normalization, to sell to Taiwan carefully selected defensive weapons on a restrained basis was ignored by the Reagan administration, which was intent on saving the Northrop Corporation's investment in the F-20 fighter, one of the two versions of the F-X.

So, as the summer proceeded, I began to get signals from Chinese contacts of, really, two things. First, a renewed effort by them to engage Taiwan in peaceful reunification.

I was able, in fact, on the basis of those contacts, to predict pretty accurately, well in advance, the statement that Ye Jianying, a Chinese leader, made to what he called "Taiwan compatriots," a very detailed proposal on reunification, with major new elements of flexibility in it.

And I anticipated, but not adequately, I think, in retrospect, that this indication of flexibility by the Chinese on the Taiwan question would be accompanied by a ratchetting up of the pressure on the United States to read here to the commitments that we had made at the time of normalization.

In the event, as I recall, Huang Hua, the foreign minister, went to Cancún and then came to Washington.

*Q: An economic conference of world leaders, held in Cancún, Mexico.*

FREEMAN: He went to that conference and then came to Washington, and essentially threw down the gauntlet on the Taiwan issue. So that, in the fall of '81, it appeared, first, that the sale to Taiwan would go through, and, second, that its consequence would be a break in diplomatic relations with China.

Ambassador Hummel arrived right as this began. I can recall the first series of quiet meetings that we held with Ambassador Zhang Wenjin, who was the vice foreign minister at the time, to explore the Chinese position and lay out ours.

By the end of 1981, I think the two sides had concluded that we had to attempt a clarification and restatement of this issue in the form of some sort of document. Those negotiations had a number of nasty twists, including a visit in January 1982 by John Holdridge, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia and Pacific affairs, and subsequently, visits by many others, including George Bush, as vice president, making efforts to find a basis for compromise.

By the early part of 1982, we were engaged in intense negotiations. The first phase of these was really quite memorable, in that we were thundered at by the then Chinese vice foreign minister, Mr. Pu. In the best Mandarin tradition, he lectured and hectored and put us in our place, seated in a high seat, with us in low seats, in the room. When it was clear that was going nowhere, the Chinese then switched interlocutors, and we got Han Xu, who was assistant minister for American and Oceanian affairs, who had been here in Washington and was very well known, and passed away late last year, 1994.

As the negotiations proceeded, they developed effectively two tracks: first, a series of formal meetings, chaired by the ambassador, and, second, far more productive and detailed, a series of informal lunches at my house, with two of the senior, but subordinate, members of the Chinese delegation, Zhang Zai and Zhang Wenpu, in particular, with some others, and the political counselor from the embassy, Jay Taylor, as well as a couple of other people, talking ostensibly totally on an ad referendum, off-the-record, theoretically not official basis, trying to explore the basis of a compromise, on a sort of what-if basis -- What if we said this, what would you say to that? What about this set of words, would that do it?

Although informal, these discussions were very closely controlled from Washington. The president was personally reviewing every account of these discussions, and they were conducted with meticulous care on both sides. These discussions proceeded and ultimately began to produce the outlines of a communiqué.

*Q: Just to get a flavor for this, when you were doing the negotiating and you got somebody lecturing you, à la Mandarin, trying to put you in your place, what was the American riposte?*

FREEMAN: That initial set of meetings was very much a set of set pieces, with both sides stating, for the record, positions that were obviously very far apart and appeared almost unbridgeable. The American reply to this, through Art Hummel, who is a consummate diplomat, was tough, but not strident, reasoned, and refused to allow us to be put on the defensive, as Mr. Pu was attempting to do.

But, as I said, this exchange of set-piece statements clearly wasn't going to go anywhere. The informal discussions over at my place were conceived, by both sides basically, as a kind of off-conference method of producing something that could then be fed into the conference, which is what happened. There actually were very, very few formal meetings, until the precise end. But, between formal sessions, we worked on communiqué language, as I said, tightly controlled from Washington and from higher levels in Beijing.

I think the Chinese had not been accustomed to this kind off-site, informal session. They, however, quickly grasped the ground rules and played very fair in the course of this rather intense and often quite unpleasant set of exchanges, over lunch, good Chinese meals, at my house, which tended to make things a little more civilized. However, I think people on both sides came to have increasing respect for each other. That helped subsequently in rebuilding the relationship, once we were able to get past this bad moment.

*Q: The Chinese have had their embassy or liaison office for some years now. Did you find that there was a growing expertise or knowledge about the American political process and how things worked? As Americans, we know the possible and impossible in our political world, and where we can and can't go. Did you find that there was some understanding of these?*

FREEMAN: I'm sure there was some understanding. Both sides, frankly, postured. The Chinese would say that they could not ignore the feelings of 1.1 billion Chinese (at that time; now more). By which they meant that they couldn't ignore the feelings of the handful of people who really mattered in China. We would cite congressional sentiment, on our side, as a constraint on what we could do. I'm sure both sets of statements did reflect some sort of reality, but both of us, I think, were aware that we were posturing.

*Q: You say this was tightly controlled. The Reagan administration was quite new in office. Ronald Reagan came as a strong adherent of Chiang Kai-shek and Taiwan and all this. There is always a learning process. Alexander Haig had sort of gotten his political teeth in the Nixon White House; he'd been commander of NATO. I would think that you would not have a very knowledgeable White House, and perhaps not even a knowledgeable secretary of state, at this point, in Chinese affairs.*

FREEMAN: I, of course, was not in Washington, although we kept in extraordinarily close contact with Washington. Much of the most important sort of scuttlebutt that we received came in exchanges of official informal telegrams. This was a device that the Soviet Desk had originated for communication with Moscow, to kind of give the embassy in Moscow a bit of a sense of what was going on bureaucratically or politically back home. It was something that, as country director for China, I had picked up. We actually communicated mainly in Chinese, written in Roman letters, in order to keep prying eyes from being able to read the comments that

we were making about the state of play, and it produced candor.

Bill Rope, who was the country director for China, I think performed valiantly, and in fact was so strong in arguing the case for good U.S.-China relations and for a measure of compromise on the fighter sale to Taiwan issue that it set back his career, I think.

*Q: How do you spell his name?*

FREEMAN: William F. Rope, currently, I think, director of the Johns Hopkins SAIS Nanjing Center in China.

Al Haig was passionately committed to this relationship, and personally undertook to educate President Reagan. Even before I went out to China, he did something extraordinary, early in the Reagan administration. He brought Ji Chaozhu, who was at that time still a mid-ranking Chinese official, but who had gone to Harvard and was actually on the ship of Chinese students who returned to China at the time of the Chinese Revolution and the Korean War, and who had served as Zhou En-lai's interpreter, a very personable, fluent English speaker, in to spend some time with the president, which was rather unusual. Haig's motive was very clear, and it worked, and that was to show the president that the Chinese might be Communist, but they were also decent human beings, and that you could talk with them. I think he did everything he could to try to help President Reagan get a more sophisticated understanding of China.

So there were huge battles going on back in Washington, the precise details of which I didn't, of course, entirely know.

But this resulted, as I say, in very, very specific instructions with regard to wording changes and different approaches that we might take. Now we, in Beijing, made many of the suggestions that resulted in those instructions. We were occasionally overruled on our suggestions, but often they were accepted, although, I gather, not without a battle.

The break point in these negotiations was a personal communication from President Reagan to Mr. Deng, saying, "I just can't go any farther." That was the essence of it. And that came in about July. Mr. Deng, I guess, at that point, and President Reagan, both decided to hold their noses and call off the fight.

We had a series of rapid plenary sessions between the ambassador and Han Xu that wrapped up the communiqué text in mid-August.

In the event, I think both sides ended up losing from these negotiations, which I considered, from the time they began, to be a really tragic and unnecessary exercise. Had we simply adhered to the understanding that we had with the Chinese about arms sales to Taiwan, we could have, in my view, finessed the issue and never would have had to make an explicit statement about it.

The core of the compromise was that the Chinese had to accept that U.S. arms sales would continue to Taiwan, something which stuck in their craw, but explicitly to accept that, thus making the United States the only country that had Chinese permission, if you will, to sell

weapons to what they regarded as a province in rebellion against the central government.

We, for our part, had to agree to cap the quality of the weapons we transferred at existing levels and to reduce the quantity of sales progressively, with a view to ultimately reaching some complete solution of this problem and ending arms sales entirely.

Now, on the Chinese side, I thought at the time that it was very unlikely they would be able to accept U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, politically, indefinitely. I thought that there would inevitably come a moment at which this very controversial, indeed inflammatory, undertaking would collapse under attack in China.

And on our side, our undertaking to cap the quality and reduce the quantity, it seemed to me, strained our ability to manage a policy that had as its very sensible premise the maintenance of a military deterrent in Taiwan sufficient to take a good bite out of an invading force from the Mainland. I say this because obviously the quality of weapons systems marches on. The nature of the threat would change as new weapons systems were introduced in the area, by the PRC in particular, but by others. Old systems would go out of production and have to be replaced, if at all, with newer systems. And quantity was never really defined. Was it dollar volume, or was it numbers of bullets, or what?

The intelligent policy always had been (and this is something I had pushed for, in fact, back in the '70s when I was on the Taiwan Desk, in anticipation of this sort of argument), rather than to make arms sales, to transfer technology, so that Taiwan, admittedly at somewhat greater expense, could produce major-weapons systems in Taiwan. And there would not be the visible export and all of the debates in Congress and publicity that we uniquely generate when we transfer weapons to some foreign purchaser. In fact, that was attempted, and it was the genesis of the so-called IDF (indigenous fighter) program in Taiwan, as a substitute for the F-20 (F-X). It was also attempted with other items, such as patrol boats and the like.

On the day that the communiqué was actually released in Washington and Beijing, I was far from jubilant. I was happy that we had reached a compromise, but I frankly found the compromise very distasteful, and I was quite pessimistic about its longevity.

I turned out to be a bit too pessimistic, because, in fact, the agreement survived until August of 1992, when George Bush, ironically, given his connections with the PRC, in order to appeal to the voters of Texas, authorized the largest arms sale in U.S. history, in this case 150 F-16s, made in Texas, to Taiwan.

That totally destroyed both the cap on quality and any restriction on quantity, and, in effect, shredded the communiqué. It released the Chinese from their undertaking to tolerate arms sales to Taiwan, as well. And it began the process that has produced a reemerging crisis in U.S.-China relations today (today being 1995, in November).

So my pessimism turned out to be somewhat overdone, but ultimately correct.

*Q: Going back to the beginning, you said you took Chief Justice Burger and Charles Wick to*

*meet Deng, rather early on in the Reagan time. Charles Wick was the head of USIA, a close friend of Ronald Reagan, and almost a show-business type person. The Voice of America, which became a rather powerful instrument in China, was under his sway to some extent. This must have been his first look at China and the power structure. How did he react to this?*

FREEMAN: I think, like many Americans with no previous exposure to China, he was startled by what he discovered. I must say that visit, the conjunction of the Chief Justice's visit with that of Charlie Wick, was a rather strange experience.

Charlie Wick began to lecture Deng Xiaoping on the iniquities of the Soviets, when Deng had been purged twice for his own distaste for the Soviets, and hardly needed to be told that they were dangerous people. Charlie's objective was to try to see whether Voice of America could set up relay stations in Xinjiang for central Asia, which he was eager to destabilize. Deng didn't rule this out. In fact, that visit produced the beginnings of some exchanges between the Voice of America and Radio Beijing.

To jump ahead quite a bit, toward the end of my tenure in Beijing, almost three and a half years later, the then head of Voice of America came out and met the head of Radio Beijing, a very tough old lady and very candid, and they had a pretty good discussion about what they were doing. Of course, there were many points that we had in common with the Chinese, on the Soviet issue in particular. At the end of this session, reflecting Charlie Wick's handiwork at USIA, the head of VOA asked the head of Radio Beijing what she thought of VOA's programming. She thought for a minute, and she said, "Well, the news is not bad, but, frankly, your editorials sound like we used to during the Cultural Revolution."

Of course, she was absolutely right. There were editorials that were appallingly ethnocentric and parochial and right wing, which purported to represent U.S. policy, but clearly represented one element of thinking in the administration, rather than the administration's actions. These things caused endless problems, not so much in China, but everywhere around the world, misstatements of policy and so on.

The second thing that made that visit of Wick and Burger rather strange was that Burger wanted to come look at the ambassador's residence. It became apparent, as I was showing him around, that Ronald Reagan had told him that if he wanted, he could displace Arthur Hummel as ambassador, and he was just checking out the facilities. Of course, Art Hummel hadn't even arrived yet, so I thought this was a little unseemly. When Burger looked at the very modest quarters that the ambassador occupies in Beijing, he turned up his nose and said he didn't think he wanted the job after all.

*Q: As the deputy chief of mission, how did Arthur Hummel use you?*

FREEMAN: He was an absolute model manager, in my view. In fact, in my own later years in the government, I tried very much to model myself on him. He's a laconic man, very taciturn, and very quick to decide. Excellent judgment. Delegates easily.

A typical encounter between him and me was brief. I would go in and describe a problem. He'd

ask a question or two. He'd say, "Well, what do you think the choices are?" I'd give him some options. He'd either say, "Well, there's another option," or he'd say, "Of those, I think we ought to do this. Go do it." So the whole procedure took very little time.

He never looked back on a decision. If he had made a mistake, against my advice, or with my advice, he accepted full responsibility for the decision.

As a negotiator, one of his merits indeed was his ability to maintain silence. Unlike many Americans, he's not bothered by a couple of minutes of sitting silently, looking at someone. I think some recent studies have shown that the average American can only tolerate about seventeen seconds of silence. Not Art Hummel. He would sit there, poker-faced, and wait for the other side to say something.

He's very personable, a warm person. His wife, very charming and very much in the old Foreign Service den mother mode, not excessively demanding on the women of the embassy, but very supportive of them.

Stape Roy (J. Stapleton Roy), who's just finished a tour as ambassador in China, had been the chargé in Beijing, following the departure of Leonard Woodcock. Stape has a very controlling style.

One of the first things I did when I got there was to change things around. I don't believe that the job of the DCM or chargé is to edit other people's work. I think they should be capable of editing it or proofreading it themselves. If it was a purely analytical piece, with no real policy implication, I just told people, "Send it out. I'll read it afterwards. If I don't agree with it, you'll hear from me. If I do agree with it or it inspires another thought, I'll let you know. But you have to take responsibility for what you write."

Stape, I think, had been approving even visa cables, and I just cut all that off.

Second, there was a staff meeting that went on for about an hour, and I used a technique there, which I subsequently used elsewhere, just saying, "This staff meeting is going to last twenty minutes, and after twenty minutes, I will get up and leave. So you've got twenty minutes to say what you need to say."

So I tended to delegate a great deal and to try to use my time to direct and inspire, working with the different reporting and analytical offices. I would call them in, and we would chew over an idea for a new look at something or other, and then maybe toss out a few ideas to them for organizing it, and then tell them to go to it. And they either would, or would not, check back with me before it went out.

Anything that had a policy implication, and certainly anything that had a policy recommendation, I did want to see, early on, in draft. I did read everything, and I did write comments on everything, but I believed in having people take responsibility.

Art Hummel very much was the same way. So he looked to me to do the long-range strategic

planning papers for U.S.-China relations.

I also did a five-year master plan for the development of the embassy. We had constant tension at that time between the fact that we had requirements that were very large and we had no housing for people. There was a limit to how many people could be housed in hotels without producing a terrible morale problem. If we didn't have people in hotels, however, the Chinese wouldn't accept our protestations that we were in pain, and wouldn't allocate apartments as they became available, as they were building them. There was, at that time, an explosion in the diplomatic and business presence in Beijing going on. So we had, at any point, between a dozen and a half and thirty households living in hotels. This was a terrible morale problem.

But it also meant that we had to think ahead, to try to project what sort of staffing pattern the embassy might have once it matured. Remember, it was coming out of a liaison office and was in transition.

I paid particular attention to, and I'm very proud of having insisted on, the language designation of virtually every position. And the reason I did that was that if you don't designate positions, the Department of State's personnel planning process will not provide training slots, and no one will be trained. I wanted to have administrative officers who were capable of dealing in Chinese. And that meant that I had to construct career ladders, so that someone could come in as a junior GSO, have a tour in China, then go out and do something else, maybe have some more Chinese-language training, and come in as the administrative officer at a consulate, and then go out, and then maybe come in as administrative counselor. I was very insistent on this, over a lot of opposition. And I'm sorry to say that, subsequently, there was quite a bit of relaxation. But at one point, we had the only embassy in Beijing in which everyone, down to the secretaries, was able to handle some Chinese. Essential, in my view, to really understand the place and work in it.

So Art Hummel let me be CEO of the embassy, and he was chairman of the board. He set the broad policy, he made the major decisions, but he looked to me to not just bring problems to him, but bring solutions. So that's what I tried to do.

In terms of the management of relations with the Chinese, I tried very hard to broaden dialogue with the Chinese. I set up a series of regular luncheon discussions with the leadership of different geographic bureaus, at the Foreign Ministry, for example. I continued a practice, which Stape Roy had very wisely initiated, of meeting with some of the party ideologues and think tanks, editors of *People's Daily* and *Red Flag*, which was the ideological journal, and members of different institutes.

This was quite innovative, in the Chinese context, because China, even though it is not a world power, thinks like a world power and expects to be a world power, and the United States was unique in that we were interested in what the Chinese were thinking about Africa, even though we weren't African. So the African Department over at the Foreign Ministry saw Africans and us, and that was about it. Once in a while, a European would go over and say hello. We were interested in what the Chinese were thinking about Latin America, and we wanted them to know what we were thinking, so we would do that. And the same with the Middle East and Europe. The Europeans hardly ever talked to the people in the American and Oceanian Affairs

Department, which was the one that took care of us.

So we were very active, and I was very personally active in a lot of discussions and contacts with many, many departments of the Chinese government.

*Q: What was your impression of these bureau heads that you were talking to in the Chinese Foreign Ministry, as far as how they were thinking? They had come out of the Cultural Revolution, in which you had to tread a very careful line or you were off to Mongolia. How did you find that breed at that time?*

FREEMAN: There were several exceptions, but by and large, these were really quite sophisticated people; as you say, very cautious because of the experiences they'd had. But, suddenly confronted with an embassy that talked to them in Chinese, rather than demanding that they go through interpreters or speak a foreign language, they opened up quite a bit. We had some very good discussions. We even got a discussion going, for example, with the Korean Desk, even though, at that time, Korea was the great symbol of the Cold War in Asia. That turned out to be very useful, as time went on.

There were a couple of exceptions. We had major legal difficulties with the Chinese over antediluvian, literally antediluvian, railway bonds. Some railway bonds had been issued in 1911, which actually had a role in provoking the 1911 Sun Yat-sen Revolution, to build a railway in south China, between Hunan and Guangdong. These so-called "Hu-Kwang" railway bonds had been bought out by someone in New York at half a penny on the dollar. And they were planning to attach Chinese property to get these things.

*Q: This was the Chinese equivalent to the czarist bonds?*

FREEMAN: Exactly, absolutely, only more like Russian bonds issued during the Napoleonic Era, because the most recent Chinese revolution was in 1949, and this was from 1911.

And we had other issues of that kind, so we had a great deal of dealing with the Chinese equivalent of a legal advisor, Mr. Huang, a very charming, Soviet-educated lawyer, who was absolutely aghast at the American legal system, and refused to believe that it really could operate the way we described it. I spent, I think, more than a hundred hours, in effect, drawing on my legal education at Harvard, trying to help this fellow become educated on the U.S. legal system. Finally, the American legal advisor and others came out, and we managed to resolve this issue.

That was very interesting, because I was in the position, which diplomats often are, of trying to explain the peculiar viewpoint of the Chinese to American lawyers, and trying to explain the peculiar viewpoint of American lawyers to the Chinese, while understanding both perspectives and really agreeing with neither. In the end, we were able to succeed.

Mr. Huang was a product of Soviet education that was extraordinarily rigid and difficult to deal with.

This issue, I might add, went all the way up to Deng Xiaoping, who at one point angrily stated,

"How many governments does the United States have? Let's see, you've got the Executive Branch, which doesn't pay any attention to the Congress, which doesn't pay any attention to the Executive Branch. And then you have this other thing, the courts. I can only deal with one government." He was exasperated by all this. We finally got through to him.

I would say, the other notable exception to sophistication was the Consular Department, with which I spent a lot of time. I thought we needed to liberalize visas on a reciprocal basis. There were some other issues that they dealt with that I was interested in.

For example, although I never succeeded in doing it, I was very interested in getting an agreement on the employment of spouses and dependents, and opening up opportunities for people. Many of them did work illegally.

The Consular Department was headed by a bunch of, you know, not bad people, but they were country bumpkins, who'd come in through the military. They were not terribly well educated, and they were from the interior. They were very closely associated with the public security people, very xenophobic and rigid, doing everything in a sort of nineteenth-century-ledger style, by the book, controlling everything centrally, no delegation of anything to embassies, very rigid about varying the rules. Of course, we were trying to negotiate a consular convention with them, and had done so.

Anyway, I spent a lot of time trying to convince them that not all foreigners were bad, and that there were things they might learn from us. We actually sent them here on an IV, to spend some time in the Consular Affairs Bureau at State, and to talk to INS (the Immigration and Naturalization Service). We sought to cultivate them.

And I think the third sort of frustrating Chinese official, really quite aggravating, was the leadership of the Diplomatic Services Bureau. The Diplomatic Services Bureau at that time controlled virtually every element of our daily lives. It provided (or, rather, didn't provide) apartments to American officers and their families. It was the source of all of the local employees, who were actually employees of the DSB, not ours. And it was the source of all domestic help -- "ayis," as they're called, governesses, nursemaids, cooks, and the like. Frankly, an outrageously exploitative organization. We would pay them hundreds and hundreds of dollars a month for the services of the Chinese; they would then turn over ten dollars a month to him or her. They were part of the Beijing municipality, not really responsive to the Foreign Ministry, and having difficulty in a place where, since the government theoretically owned everything, nobody really knew who had the power to dispose of property. They couldn't find land to build apartments. They didn't have the capital. They weren't terribly interested in learning anything about how westerners wanted apartments designed.

We actually sent some of them here to the Foreign Buildings Office (FBO). I shudder at the thought, since I think FBO is one of the most catastrophic organizations in Washington. But we sent them here to look at apartments in Rosslyn and the like, to give them some of idea of why we liked our kitchens laid out the way we did, and why we wanted closet space and things like that, and why all the electric power that they put in was grossly inadequate for a modern household. This was an unending campaign.

This was in support, obviously, of the administrative counselor, basically, I guess, with the counselors of embassy, including the station chief of CIA and the defense attaché and others. I tried to make myself available and use my notoriety within the Chinese establishment, as the conductor of negotiations with them on a wide range of issues, to give the counselors a higher level of access than they would have otherwise had, and to help develop a sort of court of appeal for them, so that if something broke down at their level, that if whoever was on top had been over to dinner at my house, or seen a movie there, or gone on a picnic, he knew, therefore, who I was, and was predisposed to at least answer my phone call, if not to listen seriously to what I had to say.

So this was a very active managerial and diplomatic role, an exciting one, as a great new embassy emerged from the kernel of the liaison office.

*Q: Can you talk a bit about the reporting officers, both political and economic. How did they operate in this atmosphere at that time?*

FREEMAN: From a managerial point of view, I should have mentioned, we were also in the process of establishing consulates. We had consulates in Guangzhou and Shanghai; and were working on, and indeed opened, a consulate in Shenyang, the former Mukden, in China's northeast, former Manchuria; and in Chengdu, in Sichuan; and we were planning to open a consulate in Wuhan, which to date has not opened.

So one of the issues was how to sort out reporting responsibilities between consulates and the embassy. I took the view that if the consulates were reporting purely on events and trends within their consular district that didn't have any clear national analog, they should just report directly and they didn't have to clear it with us. If they disagreed with us, that was fine, they could say so. But they had to justify why they did.

This led to a bit of friction with the reporting officers, because I also insisted on, and we got a budget for them to do, quite a bit of traveling around the country. We were exploring a piece of virgin territory, since the reporting that had been done on China previously was reporting on national politics from the vantage point of Hong Kong. We were now trying to fill in details, look at what was happening at the provincial level, the local city level, and what was happening in ordinary Chinese lives.

We set up a series, in fact a very active series, called China Essays, in which we looked at issues. We would plan an essay about a month in advance and get input from the consulates, and then we'd send out reporting officers to talk.

Sometimes reporting officers, in dealing with normally very reticent Chinese, would just have an extraordinary experience. I remember somebody going to see the Ministry of Railways about a plan that had been published in the *People's Daily* about railway construction and so on, and the Ministry fellow was trying to explain the *People's Daily* thing. Finally, he just threw up his hands and said, "Oh, for God's sake, that's all a fraud. Here's the real plan." And he pulled it out of his desk drawer and went over it with our officer.

Sometimes people would be surprisingly open about things that, frankly, they would be open about normally in another society, and sometimes they'd be extremely standoffish.

We had the odd incident, over this time, not where we were set up by the Chinese, but there were dissidents, nuts, in some cases, who would do things like jump over the wall and try to get asylum in the embassy. We were always trying to, on the one hand, not give them asylum, because we're not interested or authorized to do that, but on the other hand, smuggle them out, so that they didn't get zapped by the local authorities. We usually succeeded.

Jay Taylor, in particular, who was the political counselor, a very gifted writer and manager, insisted that his reporting officers be out of the office a certain amount of the day. And if he found them in the office, he'd really kick them out. He said, "If you don't have an appointment, go sit in the park and talk to people. What makes you valuable is that you're here, not in Washington." I think we had a group of, by and large, very talented, certainly dedicated, officers, who really dug away at the subjects that they were looking into.

Of course, China, at that time, and it has continued to be the case, was undergoing really kaleidoscopic change. All of the old givens were being undermined and overturned, as the reform process proceeded. Even the economic officers (the practitioners of a dismal, pessimistic science) were astonished, and forced to continually upgrade their projections for the Chinese economy, as the reforms began to liberate labor power and produce more efficient use of capital assets and, therefore, astonishing growth rates in this period. Some provinces, in this early period, were growing at eighty percent a year, economically, as the sloth of Socialism was sloughed off and the natural energy and entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese began to be liberated.

So, from an intellectual point of view, it was an exciting time. And the reporting officers, I think, were, by and large, excited.

There were one or two, I must say, and they were probably useful correctives, and often they tended to be people with a background in the Soviet Union, who just couldn't believe what was going on, and who were always darkly pessimistic about it: It wouldn't work. It was all a fraud. What seemed to be happening couldn't really be happening. After all, this was a Communist country.

But I think, for most officers, there was a sense that, as difficult as life was in China, and as constrained as politics were, and as hampered by Socialism as economics were, the country really was opening up and moving in interesting directions.

*Q: There are two subjects that I would think, for somebody like yourself, managing the reporting, could always cause a problem. You want to foster good relations with a country, yet report accurately, in a totalitarian state, which it still was, human rights and also corruption. Because the problem is, it's my impression, that if you send in really good reports on corruption or human rights, they get zapped right off, immediately, into the hands of unfriendly people in Congress, newspapers, etc., who use this rather than seeing its totality. It's a hard one to deal*

*with. You want to be truthful, yet you don't want to give too much food to, basically, enemies.*

FREEMAN: Yes, you're quite right to point to those dilemmas. On human rights, the principal exercise, of course, was the production of the annual human-rights report, where we did try to be very scrupulously honest and straightforward, but also to put things a bit in perspective. Sometimes Washington didn't want that perspective, that's true. Things always look different from the field than they do from headquarters, and they always look different on the spot than they do from Washington.

At that time, the issue, for example, of birth control was far less controversial than it is now. Chinese coercive birth control practices we reported, but it didn't have the level of controversy in Washington that it now does.

To understand why the Chinese were doing things, you had to back up and look at the context in which they were operating. And we tried to explain that.

For example, China is, geographically, about the size of the United States, including Alaska and Hawaii, actually a little larger. But it only has one-third the arable land. And it's got 1.2 billion people now, whereas we have 260 million. So if you look at the basic problem of feeding and clothing 1.2 billion people, housing them, and so on, I think the correct way to look at this is in terms of the ratio between population and arable land. If the United States, with three times the arable land that China has, had the same population-to-arable-land ratio China has, we would have 3.6 billion people in the United States. And I would contend that if we did have 3.6 billion people, we would take a rather different view of things like Planned Parenthood and the like.

So I think that reporting on human rights from the field always tries to state the context. And the context is sometimes dismissed as ideologically irrelevant in Washington. But I think we struck a good balance. We were not overly kind to the Chinese, but we were also not willing to accept Washington's dictates of how reality ought to be.

I can remember we had quite an interesting exchange of telegrams with Jeane Kirkpatrick, who was, at that time, elaborating her totalitarian-authoritarian dichotomy.

*Q: She was a former George Washington University professor, quite from the right, who was ambassador to the United Nations at the time.*

FREEMAN: Very ideological and very prone to prescribe what reality ought to be, rather than to look at it and then decide what it was. So, even though she didn't really know anything about China, she knew everything about it, and we had, as I say, some interesting exchanges with her.

*Q: What about corruption?*

FREEMAN: Corruption, at that time, was not that serious a problem, in the way that has subsequently become a problem. It is a major problem in China now. There was corruption, and we certainly reported it. The point being that if bureaucrats buy and sell commodities, people buy and sell bureaucrats. That's just a law of nature.

I can remember one case (which I think we did report, and certainly should have if we didn't) that was fairly typical. At that time, all housing and benefits for workers and so on came from this so-called work unit. So the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs would build housing, high-rise apartment buildings, for its workers. And I can't remember which ministry it was, I think it might have been Chemical Industries or someone, built some high-rise apartment buildings for their people. And then they sat vacant for a long time. I was quite puzzled (these were not far from my house), so I started looking into it. What had happened was that the electric company said they wouldn't provide electricity unless twenty apartments were turned over to their people. And the water company said they wouldn't provide water unless a certain number of apartments were turned over to them. And the PTT said no phones unless they got a slice of the housing.

So there was always this bargaining process, rather like the outrageous, under-the-table trades of space and equipment that go on in Washington bureaucracies, where budgets are not fungible, and in order to get things done, you've got to engage in barter. This kind of corruption was pretty bad, but by and large, China was still, at least on the government level, a pretty honest place, and people weren't taking cash and so on. That really began to come along later.

*Q: Were you seeing, at this time, any signs of a breakdown of central authority at the provincial level?*

FREEMAN: I don't think we were. No, I don't think that was the case. And I'm not sure that I'd even describe the situation today in those terms, although I know the press does. But certainly you got a very, very vivid sense of the differences between different regions and provinces and cities throughout the country.

I mentioned that we had quite an elaborate system of coordination for reporting from the consulates and so on, inviting their input on things that we were preparing. It was almost a joke. We would send out, I think every two weeks, a cable in which we would say, "In the next two weeks we're going to be looking at this issue, especially in light of this policy statement that was printed in the *People's Daily* on such and such a date in an editorial that they did, which represents the thinking of the Communist Party on this matter. We would like to have your analysis of what the local reactions to all this are."

Invariably we would get, from Shanghai, "The people are aware of this. They're talking about it. They disagree with it. They're angry. They think this is apostate." Or "They endorse it." Strong opinions and active debate.

And we would get, from Shenyang, something that said, "The people up here are aware of it, but they're not really terribly concerned about it. We can't find anybody who really gives a damn about it."

And we would get, from Guangzhou, "They never heard of this policy down here, and they could care less. Nobody down here reads the *People's Daily* anyway."

And when Chengdu began to come on line, toward the end of my tenure, we got yet another

perspective from there.

So you began to get a sense of the diversity of the country.

In my mind, I'd always had an image of China as centrally directed. But when you looked at it more closely, you realized that it was centrally coordinated, not centrally directed. That each province was essentially self-sufficient economically. In fact, they even had non-tariff trade barriers on the borders. They all had automobile and truck factories, and they tried to be self-sufficient in grain and so on and so forth. That the center was really coordinating it.

Recently, a statistic came to my attention that I think really illustrates this in a startling way. The normal percentage of GNP that a modern western economy cycles through the government varies from around 55 percent in Europe (about 55 percent of GNP shows up as government revenue to be recycled in some way or another) to just less than a third in the U.S. (if you take state, local, and federal levels of government, something just under a third is government revenue). In China, the figure is only 9.8-12.5 percent. It's a very, very undergoverned society, in many ways. Now, obviously, that doesn't include state industry and all the things that the government does as a manager of business enterprises. But, in terms of government services, government bureaucracies that do government things, you've got a very, very low percentage of the country actually engaged in this kind of stuff.

So China has always been more coordinated than directed. This, notwithstanding the fact that directives come out of the center and are dutifully studied and applied (or misapplied, as the case might be) at the local level by officials.

When Deng Xiaoping's revolution began, he took advantage of this. He very, very deliberately fostered experimentation at the provincial and city level, with different ways of doing things. Then he would go out and have a look at the six or seven ways that people had tackled Problem A, to see what lessons might be drawn for a national system. He fostered differentiation. To the extent that there is a serious problem in center-province relations (and I think there is), it's partly the result of that. But it's also just expression, in new form, of something that was always there -- a lot of autonomy for provinces.

*Q: How were the Chinese, during this period, looking at the Soviet Union? We didn't really realize that the Soviet Union only had less than a decade to go.*

FREEMAN: The Chinese thought, I think, that they had repositioned themselves a bit too close to the United States and too far away from the Soviet Union. So during this period, they were trying to move a bit back into the middle. And that meant some minor improvements in their relations with the Soviets. Those, of course, were the subject of great alarm in Washington and great interest.

On a personal level, the Soviet Embassy, which is this enormous sixteen-hectare plot centered on the former Orthodox Church property (granted to the Orthodox Church, I think, at the end of the Ming, or in the early Ch'ing, Dynasty), the Russians were essentially isolated; no one would speak with them. They had extremely limited access to the Chinese government. Some of them

were really quite fine Sinologists, and, I think, genuinely, personally distressed by this situation. I kept some contact with them, with the DCM in particular, who was a very fine Sinologist, just to make sure that I could have their perspective on what was happening in Sino-Soviet relations.

But not much was happening, really. Not much was happening. The tensions between the two over border issues and ideological problems, as well as Soviet foreign-policy activities in Afghanistan and, in an earlier era, in Angola, remembering that Mr. Savimbi was originally a creature of the Chinese, later adopted by us, divided the Chinese very much from the Soviets. While there was some minor movement, there wasn't anything too much going on.

*Q: At one point, we used to talk about the China card. Were we, at least from Washington, trying to manipulate China in any way vis-à-vis the Soviet Union?*

FREEMAN: We were trying to give the Soviets the impression of their being effectively encircled, and the idea that the U.S. and China could, if provoked, respond together to the provocation. This was part of the general policy of keeping the pressure on the Soviet Union and containing it. It, I think, did contribute rather directly to the ultimate collapse of the Soviet Union, so it was a successful policy.

The shift in Chinese emphasis was illustrated in the wrangling we had in the August 17 communiqué negotiations over how the Chinese would state their opposition to hegemonism and whether they would recognize common strategic interests with us. They, frankly, didn't want to be quite so closely associated with us, by 1982, as they had in 1972.

*Q: Did any of your contacts say, "Look, fellows, we don't want to get too close to you"? Or was this the type of thing you had to pick up by osmosis?*

FREEMAN: You had to pick it up by osmosis and by listening to what people didn't say as much as to what they did say. The Chinese didn't want to state flatly that they did not want an intimate strategic connection with the United States, but they clearly didn't.

*Q: Since 1945, Korea has been divided between the Communist north and the non-Communist south. How was Korea, in its totality, seen by the Chinese?*

FREEMAN: That was an interesting subject, because I thought they grossly misperceived Korea, through ideological blinkers. Frankly, I think, in retrospect, that probably we did the same. I was concerned to try to help them develop a more balanced view, and specifically to facilitate some sort of relationship between them and the South Koreans. The South Koreans were fumbling around with the Chinese, through the KCIA in Hong Kong.

*Q: That's the Korean CIA.*

FREEMAN: Yes. Koreans are very direct and tough people, and they were making quite a hash of this. They tended to demand things up front, and to use a very blunt and insulting bargaining technique, and to misunderstand the difference between things that needed to be done with a wink and a shrug and things that could be done explicitly. And so they were getting nowhere.

As China opened up, part of what was happening was a political relaxation. China was letting some dissent blossom, and there was a good deal of discontent, particularly among former adherents of Maoist revolutionary thought, with what was going on. I thought that there would, at some point, be an aircraft hijacking, from China to South Korea. I thought it was just a matter of time. It occurred to me that the Koreans were totally unprepared for this, and that what might be an opportunity for them to begin to establish a relationship with the Chinese would probably be bungled by them and turn into a negative, rather than a positive, event.

So I decided, quite on my own, that I would go to South Korea and talk to the Koreans. And I did. I spent two and a half days in consultations with the embassy, and I saw the KCIA and the National Security Planning Agency, which was an intelligence organization, and I saw the Foreign Ministry and the Ministry of Reunification and the military. I found it really quite fascinating, and I came back, I must say, to China full of ideas, and talked to the Chinese very, very directly and enthusiastically about what I had seen. I think that had an impact.

At any rate, I spent the better part of a day talking to the assistant foreign minister for political affairs, whose name was Kung. He was one of the descendants of Confucius, whose ancestors had gone to Korea as sort of foreign assistance technicians in the Ming Dynasty and stayed on. I talked to him about what to do in the case of a hijacking and how to handle it. I tried to make the point to him that you can't, with the Chinese, be unsubtle. Of course, he argued that there was no word for subtlety in Korean. He'd gone to Harvard and he knew what it meant, but Korean didn't have a way of translating this concept.

Anyway, when, in fact, there was a hijacking, several months later, this connection was invaluable, because I was able to tell him, through a patch through the Ops Center and by cable, who was who in the Chinese delegation, and who was really who they said they were and who was not, and what the characteristics and personal likes and dislikes of the Chinese were. And I was able to tell the Chinese who was who on the Korean side, because this fellow ended up dealing with the Chinese for the Koreans. So I got in the role of orchestrating both sides, and they were both turning to me for advice and counsel and information. And that gave me some credibility on the Korean issue with the Chinese.

*Q: The plane was returned, wasn't it?*

FREEMAN: Yes, it was.

*Q: This was the beginning of an opening.*

FREEMAN: It did turn into an opening, as I had hoped it would, mainly because the Koreans restrained their worst impulses and didn't ask for anything. That was my main point to them: "Don't ask for anything. Do the right thing, and your reward will come," which is what they did.

This gave me some credibility on Korea, and over the spring of 1983, I had quite a number of discussions with the Chinese, arguing with them that they should find a way to have an opening to South Korea, which was something the South Koreans desperately wanted and which we

supported, in general terms.

This culminated (actually, this was very interesting) during Weinberger's visit to China, which I think was in the summer of '83.

*Q: He was secretary of defense.*

FREEMAN: Deng Xiaoping actually proposed to Weinberger a meeting in Beijing between the South and North Koreans, with the U.S. in attendance, all hosted by the Chinese. I was astonished. I thought it was a great idea, and wasn't entirely surprised, because it had been foreshadowed a bit by my own discussions with the Chinese.

That evening, after he left, as we got the reporting cable done and the Weinberger party took it took Hong Kong, we confirmed with the Foreign Ministry that indeed he had said this, that indeed it was very important, and that indeed he was making a major policy initiative. And we sent off a cable saying that, only to discover that Paul Wolfowitz had edited this comment out of the conversation. Washington was mystified by our cable reporting a Chinese initiative in Korea.

*Q: Paul Wolfowitz being...*

FREEMAN: Assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. In any event, he had edited Deng's comments out of the reporting cable, alleging that he hadn't heard any such thing. Then he denied adamantly that it had been said, and accused us of having put words in Deng's mouth. We had two note takers, both of whom had this in their notes. In the event, this whole issue was stillborn, because Washington chose to ignore it. Korea was subsequently a problem as well during the visit of Secretary Shultz. Al Haig did not see the August 17 communiqué through to completion, because George Shultz came in just before it was brought to fruition. I think probably the change on our side helped to convince the Chinese that they needed to reach a compromise, since their great champion, Al Haig, was leaving.

During George Shultz's visit to China with President Reagan in the spring of '84, the Chinese again raised the issue of meetings with South Korea, the U.S., and North Korea. Shultz agreed, talking to Art Hummel. Between Beijing and Shultz's arrival in Seoul, Paul Wolfowitz again reversed this.

And then there was a very nasty leak in the Periscope section of *Newsweek*, accusing Art Hummel of having manipulated George Shultz on the Korean issue somehow. In fact, I later discovered that there was a notation made in my personnel file to the effect that I had put words in the Chinese mouths on Korea and so on. Very nasty stuff.

Korea was a very ideological question for us as well as for the Chinese, and evidently, by the middle of '83, the Chinese were thinking a little more creatively and less rigidly on this than we were. So that's all that went on there.

I mention this because, if people look at the record, they will see a cable that refers to something that we thought was in the reporting cable, but which wasn't in the reporting cable because it had

been struck. It's probably a little hard to understand that record without that.

The point here was that the United States and China share an interest in maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula. And I must say, this issue had a history of which the Reagan administration was blissfully unaware. Dick Holbrooke, in his last days, had begun a discussion with the Chinese on parallel moves by China toward South Korea, and by the U.S. toward North Korea. That, of course, was killed by the defeat of Jimmy Carter in the 1980 election. Probably, therefore, I was one of the few people left in the government who was aware of that. We had made some commitments to the Chinese about moving in parallel. They then began to do things with South Korea, but we did nothing. From their perspective, this was puzzling backtracking by us. But this was a very controversial issue in Washington, very dear to certain elements of the right wing. I think, in fact, we had some openings to produce a relaxation of tension in Korea, in the early '80s.

And I have to say that the Chinese also were absolutely disgusted when, right in the middle of their efforts to broker some contact between the U.S. and North Korea with the South Koreans, Kim Chong Il, Kim Il-sung's son, now the heir apparent but not yet the formal leader in Pyongyang, evidently inspired and directed the bombing in Rangoon of the Korean Cabinet, which resulted in the deaths of many able people, including some that I knew personally, and was an absolute terrorist atrocity.

The interesting thing to me was that, having spent a lot of time talking to the Chinese about Korea, I got a sense of the extent to which they maintained a stiff upper lip about their alleged allies in North Korea, but really regarded them with a mixture of contempt and derision.

At any rate, the North Koreans, by their own actions, ended up obviating any possibility of an opening to either South Korea or the United States. And maybe that was what they tried to do.

Still, we had some opportunities that I think we missed, because of people not hearing what they didn't want to hear.

*Q: Before we leave your time in China, a couple of things I'd like to take up. One, about the flow of Chinese students to the United States, some defections and how these were dealt with. And also generally monitoring how you felt about this process and its influence. And then Vietnam, as an issue or non-issue. Tibet. Also, you had the Reagan visit. A presidential visit is equivalent to one major earthquake. I think it's always interesting to hear about how this went. But also even more about visitors, because it's always struck me that the Chinese are very good at impressing visitors, which sometimes can be a bit annoying to the embassy, because they come away just fascinated with little schoolchildren dancing and all this sort of stuff, when there are real issues to be dealt with. Maybe we could cover some of these.*

FREEMAN: Great.

*Q: Chas, let's start with Chinese visitors to the United States, particularly students, and how, at the time you were there, you saw what this was going to do.*

FREEMAN: Over this entire period, that is, from normalization right through the time that I left and continuing beyond it, there was an extraordinary trend in progress in which the children of the Chinese elite came to the United States to study. I think, at this point, there are very few members of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee or senior officials in ministries who have not had one or more children graduate from American universities. Even Deng Xiaoping's children came here to study, and, in one case, to serve as a wife of a military attaché in the Chinese Embassy. So the Chinese elite is increasingly very...

*Q: I take it, up to this point, there had been a dearth of foreign education. It wasn't as though they were switching from the Soviet Union to the United States.*

FREEMAN: No. In the 1950s, there was significant exposure to the Soviet Union, but in far smaller numbers than later occurred with the United States, for many reasons. The Soviet system was just a lot less accommodating and much more controlled than the American one. That was the early period of restoration of full sovereignty under the Communists, and there was suspicion of foreigners. So that the people who tended to be trained in the Soviet Union were being trained as specialists of one kind or another for specific purposes, either for the Foreign Ministry or, in some cases, as engineers. The current premier, Li Peng, for example, studied in the Soviet Union. He's an electric-power engineer, who has come to specialize a bit in nuclear power.

But the point I was about to make is that this enormous flow of young people, middle-aged people, many of them, whose educations in China had been interrupted by the Cultural Revolution and domestic turmoil, to the United States has given a younger generation of Chinese an extraordinary familiarity with the United States. This has been followed more recently, subsequent to my departure from Beijing, by another flow of, in this case, Chinese business people, many of whom have bought property here, have condominiums in strange places, and who are doing business here. So that the human ties across the Pacific have reknit very quickly. Some who had been in the United States before 1949, what the Communists call, "liberation," came back. Others who had no exposure at all to the outside world suddenly sent their children here and often came to visit them.

The effects of this were rather interesting. I think there was enormous regard for the American economic system, the openness it has to new ideas, the way in which ideas can move from the university laboratories or company laboratories, but often universities, into innovative production technologies. I think probably the Chinese reforms were inspired in no small measure by the discovery of this whole new way, for them, of doing business and managing technology and so forth.

On the political level, I think there was a mixture of admiration and distaste for what the Chinese discovered here. No Chinese that I have met seems to want to emulate either the U.S. federal system or the constitutional democratic presidential system that we have.

In fact, as an aside, the pattern of American democracy was exported to Asia, in the Philippines, and the results have not inspired others to follow this path.

So there was certainly an admiration for the intellectual freedom that the U.S. provides, but at the

same time, a great distaste for what many of the Chinese see as the inevitable results of excessive acquisitive individualism and First Amendment rights. The Chinese tend to tie social disorder in the United States -- high rates of teenage pregnancy, drug use, the extraordinary crime rate in the United States, which is, if not the world's highest, certainly among the world's highest, the lack of personal security on the streets, some of the things that we Americans also find least admirable about our society to our political system. I don't believe, therefore, that most Chinese who came here left the United States feeling that China should abandon the authoritarian pattern it had followed for the previous four thousand years, most recently in an extreme variant under the Communists.

So the English language, admiration for many American ways of doing things, many ideas found fertile ground in China. The Chinese, for example, came here and interned in law offices and discovered the merits and perils of the legal profession. All these things have had an influence, and I think that influence is likely to be a lasting one, which will mount over time. But it didn't produce an impulse to emulate the United States.

*Q: It's interesting, because in a slightly earlier period, '76-'79, I ran the Consular Section in Seoul, Korea, and looking where people were going, it was astounding -- the top schools, many of them technical, at the graduate level. Also, from what I understand, more by hearsay, on Taiwan, the same thing was happening. And both of these groups brought back technocrats. But, along with the baggage of technocracy that they brought back and that they're putting to extremely good use, there were obviously germs of a more democratic society. And both those countries, at least in 1995, are on a democratic course, to some extent because of the American influence on people who came back.*

FREEMAN: I think this may well be the future course of events in China. But the key difference, during this period that we've been talking about, was the absence of the sort of economic prosperity, rising tide of property acquisition, that occurred in both Korea and Taiwan some decades ago. It remains to be proven if, as I believe will happen, a Chinese middle class, which is already emerging, expands and, like middle classes elsewhere, demands a measure of predictability in decisions, and therefore raises increasing demands for the rule of law. I think it is doing this already. Over time, some of these ideas might well be adapted to China.

But, in fact, I believe a more potent example for the Chinese, one that they cite among themselves frequently, is Taiwan, which evolved in an earlier period in which things were perhaps somewhat simpler in the United States. There was a greater sense of optimism and confidence in the United States than there is now, and many of the social problems I cited hadn't emerged in their current virulent form.

So the Chinese look for models, those who espouse democracy or expanding liberty, which is a common sentiment in China, to South Korea, to Taiwan, to Singapore. That is: Let's get on with the business of economic reconstruction, building prosperity first, and then deal with some of the political problems of the system later, in a gradual way.

I think the dominant sentiment for the Chinese, and the reason they react the way they do to some of the untidy aspects of American life -- pornography and crime and addictions and this

sort of thing -- has to do with the searing experience of Chinese history. Disorder in China can have catastrophic consequences, and you don't have to be very old, if you're Chinese, to have actually experienced some of those. So that, while people would like to see human liberty expand, they're very cautious about how authoritarianism is to be relaxed.

As I've said before, China is, in a sense, in my view, recapitulating the experience of Taiwan, with a time lag of a quarter century or more. And it may be that, as time goes on, ideas will be borrowed from the United States. Some of them seem to have a great deal of applicability. For example, federalism, in some form or other, even if greatly diluted, is an obvious point of reference for resolving the difference between center and province in China, which has become more acute in recent years as market economics has raised new demands for government activity.

But the expansion of student exchange was quite something to observe. And the management of this, just from an embassy technical view, was very difficult. First of all, we had visa forms that were deeply offensive to the Chinese, because they asked whether you were a Communist, pusher, prostitute, or whatever, all in the same section, and the Chinese, who were rather proud to be Communists, didn't see why these other affiliations should be associated with their political philosophy.

But even when we got past that form, which we did, with some dickering with the Department of State, most of the Chinese who came here were Communists, and every one of them required a waiver from the attorney general to get in. This added inordinate delay to travel, and complicated things. We began to press hard for a simplification of procedures, because we had to send a telegram on every visa applicant and wait for a name check and so on.

*Q: I used to see them at the other end. I was, at one point, the State Department's liaison officer with INS, and every morning, there was a couple-of-inches-high set of telegrams from China. They all went, so it wasn't a...*

FREEMAN: Eventually, we did, progressively, manage to simplify and streamline this procedure, and, in effect, go to a presumption of issuance that could be rebutted, rather than having to wait for actual approval.

But management of this was difficult.

Then we come to the question you posed earlier about people staying on. I don't think the Chinese pattern really differed, in any material respect, from that of other developing countries -- India, or Taiwan, in an earlier era, or South Korea. Many of those who came decided to stay.

They may not have had that intention when they arrived, but economic opportunity here, salary levels, income levels; opportunities to break out of rigid academic hierarchies, where seniors had a lock on supervision and jobs; fewer bureaucratic restrictions, not political restrictions, but customary restrictions on the ability to launch research on projects and pursue them; better equipment, etc., all tended to drive a lot of the technocrats to try to stay on, for a while.

The pattern elsewhere has been (and this may likely prove to be the case with China) that as prosperity rises, as new ways of doing things, particularly in academic institutions and companies, set in, then people begin to go back in greater numbers.

It's really quite extraordinary in Taiwan, which had notorious levels of non-return (at one point, about eighty percent didn't go back), I think the vast majority now do go back, although they may delay for a few years, to work here.

In China, also, I was more surprised by how many did go back than by how many didn't, because living and working conditions in China, in the early 80's, were really pretty awful, and you had to be fairly dedicated to want to go back.

Our laws and visa restrictions, particularly on exchange visitors, were sufficiently rigid, for people who were bewildered by the complexities of the process and didn't have the habit of going to lawyers, to drive many of them out, anyway. So they went back.

We had a number of notorious defections, not particularly by students. The Chinese seemed to take a very relaxed attitude about whether people came back or not. And during this period, there was a large number of people who were coming here on their own, rather than sponsored by an institution. And they didn't seem to care at all whether these people ever came back. But there was the Hu Na incident, a tennis player.

*Q: A woman tennis player.*

FREEMAN: A woman tennis player from Sichuan, who had been a sometime tennis partner for Wan Li, who was vice premier, and for Deng Xiaoping. Her defection was contrived by the immigration lawyer for the Kuomintang in San Francisco, and I suspect was contrived in part for political effect.

*Q: Often this is the case, they jump in on the...*

FREEMAN: There is some reason to believe that she was put up to it by these KMT operatives. But whether that was the case or not, she did defect, and all holy hell broke loose, and we lost our cultural-exchange agreement.

*Q: Were you there at the time?*

FREEMAN: Yes, I was, and was present for protests by the Chinese and counterprotests by us.

I think one of my finest hours was at the Ministry of Culture, giving them a half- hour lecture on Marx's view that people were not commodities and did not belong to anyone but themselves. I took great pleasure in reading their scripture back to them. USIS doesn't generally do good reporting cables, so it was probably not adequately summarized in the reporting cable they sent. But I truly enjoyed the experience.

Because of Deng's personal involvement in the case, this became really quite a nasty matter. And

Ronald Reagan got personally involved and made various defiant statements about how she could move into the White House and whatnot. So it took a while to defuse the whole issue, but defused it eventually was.

*Q: I would think that, almost before this exchange thing got started, there would be an understanding that, look, we're going to have these things. In the first place, you always have émigré groups (I dealt with this in Yugoslavia, wherever) who want to play up. You know some of these well, and you've got to look at the big picture. And the bigger the noise you make about it, the worse thing it is. Just let it go and say, "Well, you know, we'll see her when she comes back."*

FREEMAN: I think the Chinese did finally learn that, from this incident and a couple of others.

The problem was that, in the case of China, this sort of stuff got so easily bound up with Taipei's then-rivalry with Beijing. Of course, it's a different situation now. I remember arguing strenuously with friends in the Foreign Ministry exactly the point that you made, that these things become causes célèbre only to the extent that you make them such. If you leave them at the personal plane of decision making, where they belong, they don't become a great source of political struggle between the United States and whatever country has lost a citizen for the time being.

In this regard, I think I should say one other thing. At the same time China was opening up, allowing its citizens to go abroad, people in the overseas Chinese community, including many who had fled the Mainland during the Communist takeover, or who had later fled from various periods of turmoil in the People's Republic of China, began to come back in very large numbers. By the end of my tenure, I was repeatedly visited by friends from Taipei who had come, semi-clandestinely, to the Mainland, to look at their old homes, to meet their old schoolmates, to see the Great Wall, to look around and rediscover their native place. People who had been prominent defectors in earlier eras also came back, and came and went with impunity.

This overseas Chinese connection, although at various points it's been attenuated, is one of the great differences between the Chinese Revolution and the Russian Revolution, in an earlier era. The Chinese seem to be very willing to forgive and forget, not make terrible demands on émigrés. They haven't had a history, for example, really, of going out and killing émigrés. In fact, ironically, during this period, agents from Taipei killed a prominent dissident from Taiwan who was resident in the United States. It was so uncharacteristic; the Chinese, whether on Taiwan or the Mainland, just haven't done that kind of thing.

*Q: Certainly, in an earlier period, and it may be true even today, the old KMT group in Taiwan had a very effective apparatus in the United States. Basically, it looked after émigrés, public relations and all. Really a very effective network, including spying for its own interests. What was your impression, during the period you were in China, of that of the Mainland Chinese?*

FREEMAN: I don't think, certainly on the side of the PRC, work with so-called overseas Chinese (meaning Americans of Chinese origin or naturalized Americans) was a great focus. Much less effectively managed, on many levels, than comparable work from Taipei. Also less

overtly demanding. Taipei really demanded positive loyalty from people. Beijing was much more tolerant and willing to have broad contact, perhaps because it was starting from a very low base and needed to appear flexible and accommodating. I don't think this sort of work was done terribly well by Beijing during that period. To some extent, this kind of activity came at the expense of the sort of efforts that Beijing should have made to cultivate Americans with no close connection with China.

For example, they monitored very carefully Taiwan's activities with the overseas Chinese in Chinese. They didn't monitor Taiwan's activities with non-Chinese in English. And that pattern really continued right up to the present day.

So, in terms of Beijing's interactions with Taipei on this overseas Chinese battlefield, it seemed that Beijing was treating this more as an extension of the Chinese civil war than as something really involving the United States. And it was kind of interesting.

Now Beijing does have, as I think you suggested earlier, as Taipei does, the great advantage of Chinese culture as an attractive force. And in Beijing's case, it also has the historic monuments of past dynasties and the mystery and grandeur of this vast state on the Asian continent. The Chinese are exquisite hosts. They are very subtle and effective at putting people at ease and leaving a good impression. They're good stage managers of meetings. Increasingly, as Deng's Revolution unfolded and China opened up more, there was a lot of prestige attached to going to China. That, we were able, as I think I may have indicated earlier, to use to good advantage in reconstructing the U.S.-China relationship.

You asked about Ronald Reagan's visit. That was something fairly extraordinary.

He had entered office with an ideological stereotype of China really untempered by any human contact with the Chinese. Early on in the administration, as I mentioned, we sent sort of the equivalent of a deputy assistant secretary, Ji Chaozhu, now under secretary-general of the U.N. for political affairs, in to see Ronald Reagan, for the simple purpose of showing him that Chinese Communists were also human beings. Ji went to Harvard, and he's a very glib spokesman for Chinese views, in terms that Americans can understand and relate to. This was, I think, not appreciated by the Chinese ambassador, at the time. But, anyway, it began to break down a bit of the stereotype in Ronald Reagan's mind.

Reagan had thought about going to China, I think, even during the campaign, although he ended up sending George Bush, which was just as well, because Bush took a pummeling from the Chinese on the Taiwan issue. But when Reagan actually came to China, he suddenly discovered very warm, reasonable human beings, who spoke in pragmatic, non-ideological terms. And he drew the extraordinary conclusion, which he voiced in a statement that he made during a stop in Alaska en route back to the United States, that the Chinese really weren't Communists at all, which was news to those of us who were dealing with them. What he meant by that was that they were decent human beings, rather than ideological fiends.

His visit was fascinating. First of all, as you suggested, this kind of thing puts an enormous strain on an embassy. In his case, I think the entourage was over a thousand. Given his responsibilities

as commander in chief in a period of the Cold War when every president was mindful that a submarine-launched missile attack on the United States meant that warning was down to seven minutes, when he traveled in China, he had to be within range of earth's satellite stations. We actually installed these at intervals along the route, for example, that he traveled from the city of Xian out to the Qin Dynasty clay warriors at the Qin emperor's tomb.

*Q: A wonderful thing that they excavated, with all these warriors.*

FREEMAN: Exactly.

I was personally very much involved in this, first, of course, as the overall control officer for the visit, although I had the wit to appoint an executive control officer, who did all of the legwork.

There were some bizarre elements of it. The president wanted to have an American meal (I think it was turkey or something), and the newly opened Great Wall Hotel, which was associated with Sheraton, I think, and was one of the first Western-style hotels in Beijing, was selected as the site for this. We went out and ate this damn dinner, in rehearsal, three or four times, my wife in particular, criticizing it and whatnot. In the end, it wasn't bad. California champagne was flown in, and California wines.

There were all sorts of hassles, as usual, about who would use what car and that kind of thing.

*Q: Often, the advent of the advance guard of the Secret Service is as close to a political disaster as one might think. How did the Secret Service handle this one?*

FREEMAN: Actually, by and large, they weren't too bad. Very often, as you say, since they want to treat foreign visits as they would treat a visit to Peoria or some other place in the United States, they tend to try to run roughshod over foreigners. Very quickly, if you try to do that in China, you discover that you cannot run roughshod over the Chinese. They are in charge, and you have to persuade them. But it went, as these things go, less badly, and we were less offensive than we often are.

There was great attention by the Reagan advance people to staging, of course. Ronald Reagan was not called the Great Communicator for nothing, nor did he communicate in a vacuum. So people from the advance team came out to sort of find out where China was and learn the basics of U.S.-China relations and collect material for speeches and the like. And they spent hours sitting in my office, typing on the laptop of the time, GRID computers, as I had sort of said, well, here's a nice theme that you could strike, that would be good politically in the States and good here, and so on and so forth.

Anyway, I started to say that concern about security was pathological on both sides, and the city of Beijing was essentially shut down. I think the ill will that was caused was less due to the Secret Service than to the Chinese acceding easily to American security requirements, which meant that the whole rush hour was stopped for two hours -- people outside, unable to move, bicycles everywhere, and so on and so forth.

In any event, because of the concern for security, the Chinese equivalent of the Secret Service protective detail chief was, along with the head of the U.S. Secret Service presidential detail, in the car with the president, and there was a Chinese driver. The concern was that something might happen, and someone would have to be able to communicate in Chinese. So they wanted someone who could handle that, and, on the odd chance that the president might actually be interested in substance, someone who could also do something substantive on the policy side. So Ambassador Hummel very graciously yielded this place to me. I think his Chinese is solid, but not as good as mine. So I ended up riding around in the car with Ronald Reagan, probably for about six hours.

It was a fascinating experience, because I had not been a political admirer of his, and had been somewhat bemused by him, and I didn't know what my reaction to him would be. By the end of the six hours, I had concluded that he wasn't very smart, and he was awfully lazy, but that if I were ever marooned on a desert island, he'd be the man I'd want to have with me. Just about the most charming individual I have ever met.

On the trip in from the airport, there was dead silence. So I decided I would start acting as tour guide. And I said, you know, this is this.

He said, "Well, what kind of trees are those?"

And I said, "Beats me, I don't know."

Then I said, "This is workers' housing."

That set him off, and he told a Soviet joke. So I told him one back. I guess maybe I told him a Chinese joke. Then he responded with another joke. And I responded with yet another. And so it went. I know, because I exhausted my total repertoire of seventeen jokes. I told these to him, and was amazed to hear him, a couple of days later, retell those jokes he liked, vastly better than I had told them. Just a perfect sense of timing, and a great memory for this kind of thing.

I remember sitting in there at one point, going between the state guesthouse at Diaoyutai to the Great Hall of the People for a meeting. I was sitting in the jump seat with the Secret Service chief, and Jim Baker was sitting next to the president.

*Q: He was secretary of state at that point.*

FREEMAN: No, he wasn't. He was chief of staff of the White House. He had a folder, and he turned to the president and said, "Mr. President, there is a dam project, and the Congress has passed this thing. You have a veto recommendation from the Department of Interior, and you've got to act on this in the next couple of days. I really think you should look at it." And he handed the president the folder. The president looked inside the folder for a second, and then he turned to me and said, "Did I ever tell you the one about..." And so he told some Irish joke, which was pretty funny. Baker was so disgusted; you could just see him, absolutely disgusted. But that was Ronald Reagan.

Nancy Reagan was extraordinarily protective of him, in the car a great deal, most insistent on this, that, and the other. On the departure, she wanted the car to speed up, to get out to the airport. Of course, the motorcade arrival was timed to the arrival of various Chinese dignitaries, and there was no way they were going to speed up. She was very frustrated. But she made sure that he got his rest and whatnot.

George Shultz, who was the secretary of state by then, was along, and had very good talks with the Chinese, which, as I mentioned, included yet another Chinese offer to deal with the issue of Korea, which Shultz, who got a little note passed to him by Art Hummel, our ambassador, readily acceded to. Then, between Beijing and Seoul, to which he flew directly, Paul Wolfowitz and company managed to talk him out of it.

*Q: Again we were talking about opening relations at that point?*

FREEMAN: We were talking, in that case, about a Chinese proposal to host a South Korean-North Korean meeting, with the U.S. in attendance, in Beijing, which would have involved, inevitably, U.S. and Chinese mediation between South and North Korea, and which, frankly, I thought was a pretty creative and useful suggestion. It followed up on Deng Xiaoping's earlier suggestion, which I mentioned. This resulted in a very nasty little Periscope item in *Newsweek*, directed at Art Hummel and at me. Somehow it was presumed I was the evil genius behind this Chinese suggestion. I had, in fact, encouraged them to think creatively, and was rather pleased that they did, and sorry that we weren't politically, apparently, able to take up the idea.

Reagan was the most prominent of our visitors, but Caspar Weinberger, the secretary of defense, also came out, in what was a very important meeting, because, unlike Harold Brown's earlier travel, it was not in a condition of crisis. It was after the Taiwan arms sales issue had been brought back under control. It did open a broader dialogue and some greater cooperation between the U.S. and China. In fact, as I left China, we began to get involved in assistance to the Chinese in building a new interceptor aircraft.

We had other visitors, some of them quite notable. Admiral Rickover, certainly the most unpleasant, arrogant, self-centered man I've ever met.

*Q: He was in charge of the Navy's nuclear force, and he was a power unto himself.*

FREEMAN: Very much so, and very unaccustomed to anybody telling him no, which Art Hummel, to his great credit, did, since Rickover struck me as brilliant, but essentially a nut, in many respects. He had a visit to a Chinese nuclear submarine, which I suppose pleased him, but only barely. I was very proud of Ambassador Hummel for bringing him up short.

We had most members of the Cabinet, and much of the Congress. I spent a fair amount of time, as DCM, and even, on occasion, as chargé, when Ambassador Hummel was not there, accompanying congressional delegations out of Beijing, thinking that actually was a very good investment of my time. And it was.

*Q: This is something that I think sometimes is forgotten. We talk about political junkets, but,*

*particularly to areas where there is a matter of easy misunderstanding, it's very good to be able to have these congresspersons, under your control is the wrong term, but to get to them.*

FREEMAN: To make sure they learned something.

*Q: Did you find that you were having to peel off the layers of euphoria that the Chinese were wrapping around these people? China is very exciting and all that. Did you have to bring them back to reality?*

FREEMAN: Yes, but also, quite honestly, I saw my role in accompanying these delegations as building a bit of enthusiasm for the relationship. There were a lot of things that the congresspersons might not have asked about, which I put them up to asking about, precisely because I wanted them to have their stereotypes shaken and to get a more accurate view of China. But, yes, they were often prone to very misguided positive over interpretation of things that were going on, and they did have to be brought back to earth once in a while.

*Q: What about the American media in China at that time? I read a book recently by a couple from the New York Times. She's of Chinese descent, and he's American. There was the implication that the embassy is often uninformed. The reporters are out in the field all the time, talking to people, whereas the embassy is too busy running the embassy. Could you comment on that?*

FREEMAN: I think there was actually, in this era at least, not very much of that sort of criticism leveled against the embassy, and certainly it would have been unjustified.

I had a practice, as DCM, with the ambassador's encouragement, of meeting regularly with the press, off the record, and sharing interpretations of events. I sometimes learned something from them, but more often than not, I was pointing them in directions they might not have otherwise connected with.

We had also, during this period, the beginnings of a resident business community.

I spent a fair amount of time helping to get the American School (actually the International School, because it was jointly founded by five English-speaking embassies) started. It began on the landing outside the DCM's apartment in San Li Tun, which is a diplomatic residential area in Beijing, moved into what is now the Marine House at the old Pakistani Embassy that we took over, subsequently expanded enormously, and is now out in the direction of the airport.

But at that time, it was very small and not recognized by the Chinese. I spent a lot of time trying to explain to fairly unenlightened Chinese officials in the Diplomatic Services Bureau and the Consular Department and elsewhere that part of opening up China to economic interaction had to be to provide education to the children of business people who would be going to China. I laid the basis for the recognition of the school and for the Chinese acknowledgment that this was a legitimate function. I think that some Chinese, in the beginning, as they had done in the '50 and '60s, wanted to insist that foreign kids go into Chinese schools. There's something to be said for that, but there are also grave demerits, and it's not very attractive to people. So that was an

activity.

I helped form the AMCHAM (American Chamber of Commerce) in Beijing, which also needed to get recognized by the Chinese.

*Q: Back to the school thing. At the beginning, you can create something. Given your proclivities and interests, were you able to get, in this International School, a course on China, to give some knowledge of China? Because, often, these international schools seem to ignore the country, and they sort of recreate a good school in Des Moines or in Oxford in the UK. Were you able to get much Chinese?*

FREEMAN: Yes. The principal at that time, whose name was Ritter, who had served in a similar capacity in Nepal, was very enthusiastic about that. Chinese language was part of the curriculum, and Chinese culture and history were taught.

But at the same time, I have to say, we had to be a little careful about this, because if we overemphasized this, the Chinese might have taken umbrage, since the school was essentially something that we had cobbled together without Chinese permission.

Although this was certainly included in the curriculum, the greater emphasis was on picking the best elements of various national curricula, to ensure that the school was more demanding than the American school system, which is notoriously undemanding of children. We had to do that in order to make the school congenial to Australian, New Zealand and British participants. Canadians, of course, have a system that is not dissimilar to our own.

One of the major issues of the time was that places in the school were severely limited by space. English-speaking embassies, or embassies that, if not English speaking, at least wanted to have their children educated in English, were continually imploring me, as chairman of the board and the manager of the American Embassy, to get their kids in. And it was very difficult.

I started to say, on the American community at that time, there were several elements of it. There was a rising group of business people, many of them housed in hotels, living and working under difficult circumstances.

A growing body of American students there, learning Chinese.

A group of foreign experts, so called, people who'd been hired by Chinese organizations to do things, translate into English, polish English, and the like, some of them old-line leftists, but many of them just Americans with an interest in China, recruited by the Friendship Association or some other group.

One of the great events that we put on, and I introduced McDonald's to Beijing in connection with this, was the Fourth of July picnic. This was sponsored by several of these community organizations, with the Embassy Employees' Association, and was on the grounds of one of the embassy compounds. We had, as I suggested, initially, homemade, and later, McDonald's, hamburgers, and games and prizes and so on, and was an opportunity for the American

community to get together.

We had also an official July Fourth reception, but this was just for Americans, and it was casual. As I left, this was beginning to get out of hand, because the American community was growing beyond our capacity to absorb them. And I'm not sure what the tradition now is.

We charged admission and financed the thing that way, with the proceeds going to what became the American Chamber (it was not then called that, because the Chinese didn't recognize foreign Chambers of Commerce) and to the Embassy Employees' Association.

So there was a lot of emphasis on our part, within reasonable limits, on serving the needs of a growing American community in a very adverse environment.

That included, to go back to your original question, the American press, which were, by and large, very competent, hard-working people, obviously focused in a different way than we were. Our focus was what was in the national interest of the United States. Their focus was what was novel and of interest to their readers. The two weren't always the same. In fact, sometimes they conflicted.

*Q: One foreign-policy aspect that I didn't ask you about was whether Vietnam come up as far as what was happening in Vietnam? Or was this just not an issue, particularly?*

FREEMAN: Vietnam was an issue only in the sense that there was some reason to believe, as '84 marched along, that the Chinese might be planning a further seizure of Vietnamese-held islands in the South China Sea.

*Q: The Spratlys?*

FREEMAN: The Spratlys were part of the problem. Yes, I suppose you could say it was the Spratlys; they were an issue.

*Q: So basically you were talking about oil.*

FREEMAN: From a Chinese perspective, we're talking about, first and foremost, questions of sovereignty and, second, strategic position. If the Chinese, as I believe they will, are able to establish a military base of some kind in the Spratlys, they will be in a position, not now but some decades hence, to exercise dominance and to control that region in the event of a rise of international tensions. It is a major sea lane. So that's the second consideration. I think oil, economic exploitation of the region, is only a tertiary consideration. Perhaps Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and the others who have an interest in this put economics first, but certainly, for China, economics is not the primary consideration.

We had no relationship, to speak of, with the Vietnamese in Beijing. That, I think, was a subject of regret to some of the Vietnamese-speaking officers in our embassy, some married to Vietnamese wives.

The dean of the diplomatic corps at that time was the Cuban, who was an impressively intellectual man who would go on at exceptional length at farewell ceremonies for members of the corps. I can remember when the Egyptian left, that, about the time he'd gotten to Ramses II, which took him half an hour, I had to leave. He would give very erudite presentations on the history, culture, and relationship with China of each country. But we didn't have that much contact with the Cubans.

The major embassies with which we did have interaction were the predictable ones: the Japanese, the Australians, the British, the French, the Germans. I continued a tradition, organized by my predecessor, of having a five-power lunch, so called, with the deputy chiefs of mission, or equivalents, from Britain, France, Germany, and Japan. Once a month, we would meet to talk about the situation in China and international relations as they affected China.

We also had very close relations with the Yugoslav Embassy. They had an advantage over others, because they had a party-to-party relationship with the Chinese, and tapped into the International Liaison Department, which had a whole different set of insights and focuses than the Foreign Ministry. They often were very knowledgeable about goings on within the Chinese Communist Party, or at least more knowledgeable than those of us who were not Communists. So that was a good relationship.

*Q: It's an interesting thing, because I was in Yugoslavia during the '60s, and, of course, then, we had no relations. The Yugoslavs, at that point, were a prime source for information. They're quite willing to share.*

FREEMAN: Yes, and very charming people, whose subsequent tragedy was not yet entirely apparent. This was a period, however, in which Kosovo emerged as a major issue. The Chinese took that to heart, and one of the results of that was a significant loosening up of the Chinese press, because one of the arguments was that the unrest in Kosovo had occurred...

*Q: This was with the Albanian...you can't even call it minority, in Kosovo. It was the majority then.*

FREEMAN: Ninety percent. But the growth of separatist sentiment in Kosovo had been overlooked by Belgrade, because, in the view of the Chinese, the Yugoslav press had not felt able to report. So, facing their own difficulties in Xinjiang and Tibet and the like with possibly restive minorities, they loosened press reporting rather considerably.

There were interesting things happening during that period. Perhaps the most liberal force in Chinese politics, liberal to the point of being anti-Communist, was, ironically, the Institute of Marxism, Leninism, and Mao Zedong Thought. This think tank emerged as a driving force in liberalization of Chinese politics, as well as economics.

It was later savaged, I might say, during the Tiananmen incident, as having been engaged in activities that were subversive of the established order. And I think it was guilty. I used to meet regularly with the people in that institute for lunch. I had a superb chef, and lunch at my house was a treat, so people very willingly came. I would do two or three lunches a week, and

sometimes a dinner or two, in addition to whatever was going on with delegations.

Finally, speaking of chefs and lunch and the like, with my then-wife and then-chef, I collaborated in writing a bilingual book, in Chinese and English, called *Cooking Western in China*, which was about 250 recipes, in menu form, with erudite explanations of the art of eating in the West and similar subjects, how to treat meat.

The inspiration for this was that, although I tried very hard to stay off the diplomatic circuit except to go to national days to meet the relevant Chinese and say hello, for symbolic purposes, to Europeans, Latin Americans and Africans, they tended to have dinner at exceptionally late hours, interminable affairs... They didn't seem to go to work at eight o'clock in the morning the way I did.

*Q: This has been one of the great crosses that the Foreign Service has had to bear.*

FREEMAN: Not only did they have these long, unproductive dinners, with maybe one token Chinese official, or often none, so that the opportunity to do serious work was not great (most of them didn't speak Chinese, and they didn't like Chinese food), but also the food they served, which was prepared by Chinese chefs, was a terrible travesty of Western cuisine. There were only, as I discovered, about four recipes that the Chinese chefs had mastered, so you ate Beef Wellington every time you went out.

So my wife and I decided that we would rectify this. As our gift to the community in Beijing, we would explain Western food to the Chinese, and provide them with detailed instructions on how to prepare it. So I sat down, over Chinese New Year's, which is an extended three- or four-day holiday period, and batted out a series of essays, and sort of forced my wife and the chef into writing down all sorts of recipes. At that time, I didn't know how to cook, myself, I just knew how to eat. Eventually, this was published and, I think, was welcomed by the community. Probably, if it didn't relieve the boredom of these affairs, it improved the cuisine.

*Q: The last thing before we move on, was Tibet much of a problem during this time?*

FREEMAN: No, I don't think we considered it much of a problem, but we followed it closely. There were some fairly promising exchanges going on between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese. At one point, it looked as though the Dalai Lama and the Chinese were about to do a deal, and that he was coming back. I think that was sabotaged by militant members of the Dalai Lama's entourage, rather than the Chinese.

We were in the process, during this period, of establishing additional consulates. Shenyang opened. That's in the northeast, the former Mukden. Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan, which has a district including Tibet, was opening, toward the tail end of this period, in a hotel. And the consul general and others were frequent visitors to Lhasa. So we did monitor the situation, but it was not at a particularly acute stage.

In fact, this was a period, as I recall, of continuing liberalization in Tibet. The Cultural Revolution sacking of monasteries and libraries and the like was being repaired at the expense of

the Chinese government. Large amounts of money were going into Tibet for reconstruction. The Chinese had reversed the Red Guard mentality. Although many of the Red Guards in Tibet were Tibetan, not Chinese, they had made an all-out effort to destroy both the relics and the reality of Tibetan culture. The Chinese had turned 180 degrees and were trying to restore and protect Tibetan culture. Tibet had not yet, at that time, attracted the odd coalition of international supporters that it has since. So, no, it wasn't much of an issue.

I should say that, in terms of opening consulates, we also planned to open in Wuhan. I went to Wuhan to select a site for consulate facilities. Of course, later, a combination of budget and intelligence-agency-generated reciprocity considerations prevented Wuhan from actually opening. I think that is a great mistake. Wuhan's right smack in the center of China, and we should have a post there.

*Q: What was your feeling about the value and use of our consulates during this period?*

FREEMAN: China is a vast country, somewhat larger than the United States, including Alaska, with a huge population and an exceedingly primitive transportation network. At that time, many areas in China were still off limits to foreigners. Americans would turn up there and get themselves into trouble, and all of the usual sort of consular problems would occur. People in the interior needed access to American visa services. So, on the consular level, in terms of trade promotion, in terms of facilitative assistance to Americans and travel services to Chinese, they were invaluable.

But, beyond that, each region of China has a different pulse and different atmosphere. As we began to spread our presence more broadly in China, we were able to take these different pulses and sense these different atmospheres. Before 1949, we had fourteen consulates in China, recognizing all of these factors. The fact that we now have four, with the right to open a fifth in Wuhan, in my view, hardly begins to scratch the potential utility of such postings.

*Q: Where were the consulates when you were there?*

FREEMAN: Guangzhou, which is Canton, Shanghai, Shanying, and Chengdu, with the right to open in Wuhan. We had previously been represented in Xiamen (Amoy), Ürümqi, and various places, most of the major cities in the interior, and additional areas on the coast.

So I think we were probably more foresighted than others. The Japanese have moved in their own directions. But there is no substitute for a presence on the ground. Whether it's in terms of reporting and analysis, or it's in terms of discharging responsibilities to American citizens and promoting bilateral relations, you just can't substitute for this.

**RAY E. JONES**  
**Position not specified**  
**Beijing (1973-1974)**

*Ray E. Jones attended the Lafayette Business College. After a year in Washington, DC working for the Department of Interior, he entered the U.S. Army. He served overseas as a court reporter in 1945. In 1946, Mr. Jones went to Berlin, Germany with the Department of the Army. His Foreign Service career included positions in Korea, Germany, Switzerland, Vietnam, Liberia, the Netherlands, Sudan, and China. He was interviewed by Thomas Dunnigan on August 23, 1994.*

*Q: Did he and you and the others get cooperation from the Chinese in opening up the Embassy there or were they difficult?*

JONES: No. We had very good relations at the time I was there, '73 to '74. We were not an Embassy. We were ... It was called United States Liaison Office, USLO, they called it. I don't think full diplomatic relations were established till about ... After Mr. Bruce left, and the first Ambassador was President George Bush.

*Q: I see. I think it was President Carter who may have established relations but I'm not certain about that. I mean raised it to embassy status.*

JONES: No, all this time it was Nixon.

*Q: Yes, but I was referring mainly to moving USLO to embassy.*

JONES: That I don't remember. That we can look up.

*Q: Did Ambassador Bruce think that he had been effective in his mission there, doing what he wanted to do?*

JONES: I think so. I believe so, but during that time, during our status with USLO, it was kind of unique because the staff accepted no national day receptions or anything else like that.

*Q: And of course they could not perform any of the normal consular functions or anything like that?*

JONES: Not at all.

*Q: It was largely a reporting unit?*

JONES: It was indeed an honor to be accepted because there were about five or six of us. We were the advance party to go into Peking. It was also a unique set up. We had two DCMs.

*Q: Tell us about that.*

JONES: The two DCMs were John Holdridge who went on to be Ambassador to Singapore and I don't know the other posts. And the other DCM was Alfred Jenkins.

*Q: Oh yes. They're both Chinese language men, I believe.*

JONES: They're both Chinese experts. John was on the secret mission when we were establishing relations with China. John was the one who went in with Kissinger.

*Q: I see. But how can two DCMs function when one has to be sort of looking after the running of the Embassy.*

JONES: During this period of time though there really wasn't much work to do because we had no contacts or anything else. The first post I ever had where we called them DCM 1 and DCM 2.

*Q: I see, and I presume that in dealing with a country like communist China, where everything was centralized, that the most effective representation could only be done at the highest level, by Ambassador Bruce.*

JONES: By Ambassador Bruce, yes. During that period of time, you had to get permission from the Foreign Office to travel and that has changed over the years.

*Q: Were you personally able to see anything of China while you were there?*

JONES: Canton on my way. I took a vacation back to Hong Kong and we had to stop overnight in Canton and then proceed the next morning. All of that has changed. It's simplified. Also I got to Tientsin.

*Q: A seaport.*

JONES: A seaport, yes.

*Q: And you saw the great wall?*

JONES: I must say I did go back for three weeks to China in 1985 and traveled all over the country.

*Q: Were you bothered with high level visitors during this period of your service in the Liaison Office in Beijing.*

JONES: We had very, very few.

*Q: Was there a Kissinger visit at that time?*

JONES: Yes, we did have a Kissinger visit and that involved a lot of work. That was very interesting because the whole staff was invited to a banquet at the Great Hall and at that time Zhou En-lai was still alive. Very, very interesting time, and also very good food. During the first six months, housing was very difficult and before we all got apartments, we lived at the Peking Hotel. The food there was just absolutely magnificent.

*Q: So one did not suffer?*

JONES: China has completely changed since the days when I was there. I think they have enormous staff and maybe too big. I don't know

**J. RICHARD BOCK**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1973-1974)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1974-1975)**

**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1975-1976)**

**Political Officer**  
**Beijing (1976-1979)**

**Chief, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1986-1989)**

*Richard Bock was born in Philadelphia and raised in Shelton, Washington. He attended the University of Washington and Princeton University and entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included posts in Germany, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Australia. He was interviewed in 2002 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*Q: By the way, your father being involved with the lumber industry, did you both in high school and in college pick up any of the lumber, particularly the labor problems and also conservation and some of these themes that ran through the lumber industry? They're quite apparent. It's like the fishing industry.*

BOCK: In a couple of ways, I did. First of all, about the time I left to go to college, there was a major dustup over water pollution involving my dad's company. The area around Shelton included a number of oyster farms, including a particular type of oyster which is very small and quite rare. It doesn't grow anywhere else. It's called the Olympia oyster. And the oyster beds, the oysters started dying. The oyster growers and others who were in the budding environmentalist movement claimed it was caused by discharges from the company's plant. And the company, of course, denied it. There was, I think, a lawsuit. I didn't pay much attention to the legal aspects. But eventually the company had agreed to set up a major monitoring effort to try to determine what was going on. This issue dragged on for years. So I was definitely aware of that.

Then while I was at the University of Washington, I had a series of summer jobs. I should mention that shortly after I went to Seattle, my dad was transferred up to Vancouver, Canada.

Rayonier, the company he worked for, had been bought by IT&T, which at that point was developing into this octopus that it became. IT&T in turn bought a Canadian pulp and paper company, which also had a research lab up in Vancouver. I never lived there, but I would visit them on holidays and part of the summer. One summer, I asked whether there was any possibility of getting a summer job with Rayonier. My dad looked into it and he arranged for me to apply for work at a little mill. It was in the north end of Vancouver Island, British Columbia, at a place called Port Alice. It was a pulp mill which was totally isolated. The only way you could get in there was either by seaplane or by barge. There were no roads that connected with anywhere. And it was a very curious workforce. You had a combination of company lifers who were there on transfer for a couple of years or so in management positions, a large community of Chinese from somewhere north of Hong Kong, none of whom spoke English, and a large number of – I don't want to say drifters; it was kind of a mix of people who had either no place else to go or people who were making their stake - "I'm coming to this place for two years. I'm going to save my money and go out and do X." And then a few of us college students. I remember as a condition of my employment, I needed to join the union. My dad wasn't real happy about that, although he... He wasn't a union person. And I got a pretty good view of labor relations in what was very much a company town. This was the company town.

*Q: I assume the Chinese were unto themselves.*

BOCK: Yes. The guy who ran the mess hall, I think his name was Jack Wong, seemed to have a way of bringing in all of his clan over time in there. So there was this huge number of people, all of whom, I think, were related to Jack Wong. I worked on an assembly line and the Chinese would work there, too. But after hours, they pretty much kept to themselves.

*Q: For today we'll finish up just when you go out. But were you picking up any atmosphere from your Foreign Service colleagues about the Vietnam War? And then also beyond that, you were a young man. How were the tides of the Vietnam involvement hitting you?*

BOCK: Well, I was in the Vietnam course throughout the entire election campaign, so obviously that was impinging. A couple of impressions. Among my classmates in the Vietnam training program, there was a large number of people right out of the A100 course, most of them straight from campus. They had signed up to go into the Foreign Service and here they were being sent out as cannon fodder, which was the common view. Most of them were extremely unhappy, some more so than others. One guy was going around passing out essays on how all this was a violation of Geneva conventions and handing them to the military instructors and so on. I probably selfishly, maybe unrealistically, considered myself a little bit removed from all this because, like several of my other colleagues, I had one or two assignments under my belt already. We had volunteers in this group, too. I wasn't a volunteer, but I figured, well, I've had one tour in the Foreign Service; I have had at least the opportunity to get a sense of whether or not this was what I want to do with my life. I can take a couple of years in Vietnam. A lot of these folks were not in that position at all and were really unhappy that they were being dumped into this. Then I can remember some of the area studies where we were being told how all of this was a proxy war against China. At the same time, we were reading some of the background on Vietnamese history and the two just didn't jibe. A lot of the rhetoric about how this was a struggle against worldwide communism just did not make sense. And there was a lot of

discussion within the class about this. Of course, I didn't finish the course until after the election had taken place. The fact that Nixon ran and won on the platform of Vietnamizing the war was something I think made it a little easier for most of us to live with.

*Q: Language training. What type of language?*

BOCK: It was Chinese. After I finished my regular tour in Vietnam, I was not quite sure what I wanted to do with the rest of my career. The French desk was fine, but, you know, where do I go from here? I think, having been in Vietnam triggered an interest in East Asia. If you were going to be in East Asia, China was the top banana.

*Q: By this time, we were just opening up to China.*

BOCK: Yes and no. The Kissinger secret visit had taken place. So, we were in the process of opening up. At the time I applied for Chinese language training, we had no people stationed in China. By the time I started it in 1973, we were just opening a liaison office there. So, the question of what this would mean in terms of concrete assignment was very much in flux, but there was already the big China watching operation in Hong Kong. There was also Taiwan. There were lots of places to go.

*Q: And also as you started there must have been a certain sense of excitement. Generation after generation of language students had gone through with the idea of eventually we're going to go into China and it was actually happening on your watch.*

BOCK: That's right, and that became stronger as I went along. However much of a factor it was when I applied for language training, it certainly was a factor by the time I was in it. There was very much that sense.

*Q: Was it a year here and-*

BOCK: A year here and then a year in Taiwan.

*Q: How did you find Chinese?*

BOCK: Well, probably more difficult than I expected. As I think I had mentioned earlier, I did not have that much difficulty learning Vietnamese. I did pretty well in it. I figured, Chinese is another language, but another language from the same region. There is some relationship to Vietnamese. How difficult can it be? With the whole business of the characters, however, that was an entirely new dimension and that caused me a certain amount of struggle. Plus, and it may just have been the teaching method, but there seemed to be more need to deal with grammar in Chinese than there was in Vietnamese. So it was not easy.

*Q: You were taking Chinese when?*

BOCK: '73-'74 in Washington and '74-'75 in Taiwan.

*Q: On Taiwan, how many were in your class?*

BOCK: There must have been 20-something, maybe about 25, which was a mix of Foreign Service, military, various intelligence agencies, USIA...

*Q: Was there a conscious beefing up of people learning Chinese?*

BOCK: I don't think it had really gotten much beefed up yet. The large classes started later. We had in my Washington class seven people. It was a slightly different mix in Taichung. There were eight or nine State Department people, so this was not a big group. That did come later. I think there was still great uncertainty as to the amount of staffing we were going to be doing on the mainland.

*Q: How did you find Taichung?*

BOCK: I enjoyed Taichung. It was then still kind of a small town, although it wasn't actually that small. There were 100,000 people, I'm sure, but it had a small town atmosphere. It allowed one to experience Chinese society certainly in contrast to Washington, but also in contrast to Taipei.

*Q: Did you get any feel for how the Taiwanese were feeling about the change in relationship now that we had some type of relation with Mainland China?*

BOCK: There was a certain amount of nervousness, but I wouldn't say it was that striking. Our relationship then with Taiwan was still pretty much unchanged. We still had military all over the place. There was an Air Force contingent, an air base, outside Taichung. On the ground, things really hadn't changed and all this was something kind of on the horizon that some people thought and worried about but they didn't have to deal with yet.

*Q: How did your wife feel about China, coming from the Philippines? Was there chemistry one way or another?*

BOCK: No, I don't think so. The one thing that she felt immediately was the inability of the local people in Taiwan to sense that she wasn't Chinese and that was a considerable frustration. We had wonderful three party conversations where we'd go together to some place, a restaurant or a market, and I'd try to say something in Chinese and the answer would come back in Chinese to her, not to me. Of course, she couldn't deal with it because it was only after we got to Taichung that she started to learn the language.

*Q: Yes, this is always a problem. Were your teachers pretty disciplined or were you getting what amounted to political indoctrination by osmosis?*

BOCK: In Washington, there was a very small Chinese staff, three teachers for most of the year I was there. All of them were of Mainland origin. That was necessary for the language aspect. All of them had in some sense fled. They were all native Mandarin speakers, so I think they were all born on the Mainland. So, there was a certain amount of anti-communism which came through.

However, only one of the three was associated with the Taiwan government. Her husband was a retired Taiwan diplomat. The other two, I think, were probably as excited as any of us about the idea that there was going to be a U.S.-China relationship. That was here in Washington.

In Taiwan, you had somewhat different things. There, there was at least one teacher who was pretty strongly Kuomintang. But on the other hand, they realized that most of us were either going to be going to China or to Hong Kong and that we needed to learn everything we could about Mainland China. So, we were learning the Mainland Chinese. To the extent that there are differences of expressions used on the Mainland and Taiwan, we were learning those. So, while we were picking up some of the Taiwan perspective, it was not dominant by any means.

*Q: Were you getting any feel about the schism between the native Taiwanese and the Mainland Chinese who came over in '48?*

BOCK: I think at that time it was something I was vaguely aware of, but our focus was so much on learning about what was happening in China proper that except for those people who knew they were going to the embassy in Taipei, and only one or two were, that wasn't something we were focused on.

*Q: What was the situation in Hong Kong when you got there?*

BOCK: Of course, the famous Nixon trip to China had taken place. Following that, a liaison office had been established in Peking in 1973, just two years prior to my arrival. So we had a very small establishment in China itself. Hong Kong was still at that point the major China watching post, although people were starting to think about how to handle that in the future, how much to transfer up to Peking. But most of the analytical reporting on developments in China was still coming out of Hong Kong and that was the function we had there.

*Q: In Hong Kong at that time, the reversion to China was...*

BOCK: Oh, that was far in the future. The negotiations had not started on that. Reversion itself took place in 1998, but the negotiations started sometime in the '80s.

*Q: When you went there, were you a China watcher?*

BOCK: I was a brand new China watcher. We had a China watching section consisting of about eight people divided into an economic and a political side. On the political side, there were three of us looking at Chinese internal politics largely by analyzing broadcasts which had been picked up by either FBIS or the British and some other materials, including some Mainland Chinese newspapers.

*Q: The local press in China was quite important, wasn't it?*

BOCK: The press was important, but the broadcasts were more accessible. The "People's Daily," of course, was available to everybody. But that was very tightly controlled.

*Q: If you could get hold of it, the City Press would tell what was happening in the provinces.*

BOCK: That was much harder to do because there was relatively little travel to the provinces by any foreigners.

*Q: What was going on in China when you were there in '75-'76?*

BOCK: Well, it was still considered the Cultural Revolution period, although it was kind of in the winddown phase. Mao Zedong was still in charge, but his health was extremely poor. About a year prior to my arrival, Zhou En-lai had died. He had been not always officially number two but was de facto number two for much of the period since 1949 and had been generally considered both by outsiders and Chinese as kind of a moderating influence on Mao. The spring before I arrived, there had been a violent demonstration in Tiananmen Square in honor of Zhou En-lai but, in effect, protesting radical influence in the Chinese government. So, there were definitely signs that this was kind of the end of the regime in some sense with a succession coming up and a lot of uncertainty. So, there was a lot of interest in the western analytical community as to how this was going to play out.

*Q: in effect, was the Gang of Four running things?*

BOCK: The Gang of Four was pretty much running things. Deng Xiao-ping had been rehabilitated out of his exile to a potato farm in 1973 but had again disappeared in 1975 or '74. So, that was seen as a sign that the Gang of Four, as they subsequently became known, their influence was rising.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that the China watchers were sort of invigorated by the fact that we were beginning to open up to China? Prior to that, you had had Hong Kong, Taipei, and maybe the China guy in Burma or Indonesia or something like that.*

BOCK: Yes. It was a little difficult for me to make comparisons because I was very new to the China watching business. But for people who had been doing it longer, there was certainly a sense of excitement that now you could actually get into China after, in some cases, many years of standing outside peering in.

*Q: Did you get into China?*

BOCK: No, not during that year. We had a very limited program of trips up to the liaison office in Peking. I think the idea was to minimize the burden on the small staff there. The expectation was that during any three year tour in Hong Kong, you'd get up at least once, but I was not at the top of the list, of course, so I didn't make it.

*Q: What piece of the action were you looking at?*

BOCK: To the best of my memory, we had divided up the provinces geographically and I was looking at the southern provinces. Then several functional issues, too, but I'm not sure I can remember exactly what the functional issues were. But I think they changed a little bit during the

course of the year.

*Q: Were you seeing at that time a difference between particularly the coastal southern provinces compared to other parts of China? This has become and is now the hotbed of economic movement. Was any of that around?*

BOCK: Well, not in the same sense. You still had virtually no outside influence in China and it's the outside influence subsequently which has caused so much of this disparity between the coast, which gets the outsiders, and the interior, which doesn't. There were individual hotbeds. I can remember the city of Wenzhou, which is in South China, where they were doing all sorts of not necessarily authorized experiments of one sort or another. There were other individual cases, but you couldn't generalize geographically.

*Q: You learned Mandarin?*

BOCK: I had learned Mandarin.

*Q: Were you able to use it in Hong Kong?*

BOCK: To a limited extent. Most of the Hong Kong citizens in those days didn't speak Mandarin. We had some contact with the unofficial PRC representatives there. They had a Xinhua News Agency office which was, in effect, the Chinese Communist Party headquarters for Hong Kong. They were there under semi-official guise and you would interact with them a little bit also with some of the communist press, which were also essentially Mainland based. They all spoke Mandarin. There were other Mandarin speakers here and there that we would have access to, but not very much. I was reading it all the time but not speaking it.

*Q: How was the U.S. being played in the press and in broadcast?*

BOCK: We were still the hegemonists. I would be hardpressed to remember the specific issues involved, but generally speaking, it was a fairly hostile treatment of the United States. Of course, we still had our defense treaty with Taiwan at the time.

*Q: Did the China-Vietnam war take place while you were there?*

BOCK: That was later.

*Q: Were we looking at that?*

BOCK: We had in the consulate a person who was looking at Indochina in particular. There were two Indochina watchers overseas in the Foreign Service at that time, one based in Hong Kong and one based in Bangkok. We still had kind of a rough embassy in Laos, I think, but we were out of Saigon, we were not in Hanoi, we were not in Phnom Penh. His job, however, was more to look at what was happening in Vietnam itself than particular issues involving China-Vietnam relations. I should have mentioned that in the organization of the China watching division in Hong Kong, we also had an external relations section with two people. They would have been

looking at that to the extent anyone was.

*Q: Were we thinking of China being an aggressive power or one that was likely to implode?*

BOCK: I think that was starting to change. We had, of course, looked at China as an aggressive power, particularly during the Cultural Revolution and then with respect to Vietnam. That was part of our motivation for the war. With the Nixon trip and the subsequent developments, we were obviously trying to build a relationship with China which would serve our interests. And we hoped that this could be done on the basis of a non-aggressive China.

*Q: Did we have much contact with what you were doing with the British?*

BOCK: They were doing the same thing we were. Of course, they ran Hong Kong. The governor was pretty much focused on running Hong Kong, but he had a senior political advisor and at least one junior political advisor and that shop tended to do a good deal of China watching. And we had a good deal of contact with them.

*Q: How did you find life there?*

BOCK: Oh, I loved Hong Kong. It's such a scenic city. The whole shopping and restaurant atmosphere was so interesting. I think some people eventually got kind of an island fever from Hong Kong because you couldn't get across the border and if you wanted to go anywhere, you had to take a plane out. But I don't think we were affected by that in our year there. We always had enough to do.

*Q: Was one hearing any complaints about the lack of American troops coming through? This must have generated a lot of business.*

BOCK: There was still a lot of American navy coming through. In fact, during part of the time, part of that year we were there, my wife got a job with the Navy credit union down in Wanchai. So, I was well aware through her every time one of these big aircraft carriers or frigates came through because there was a flood of people coming in to get their money. That happened on a very regular basis.

*Q: Was anybody prognosticating whither China?*

BOCK: Well, a lot of people were trying to. Whether there was any consensus about it, I'm not sure. Everybody was kind of waiting for Mao Zedong to die to see what was going to happen.

*Q: Did Taiwan have any influence at all?*

BOCK: Little. There were pockets of Kuomintang loyalists in Hong Kong, but they were controlled fairly tightly by the British. The British had enough problems with China. They didn't need a Taiwan problem. So, there was this Kuomintang organization. Later there were semi-official Taiwan representatives there. I'm not sure what there was in 1975.

*Q: Had the British started to Chineseify the administration there?*

BOCK: I'm not sure how well I remember that. They certainly had a number of Hong Kong Chinese in their administration. I'm reasonably sure that the chief secretary was still British. In fact, I think he was British up until near the transfer.

*Q: What I recall is that the British were pretty slow about working this out.*

BOCK: Yes, I don't think they were in a real hurry. I suppose from the British point of view, they had to watch both sides of this. If they went toward an indigenization of the structure, that could be interpreted by the Chinese in Peking as saying, "Ah-hah, they're preparing for Hong Kong independence." That would get the British in trouble with the Chinese. So, that, I suspect, was one factor in their thinking of not going too fast.

*Q: You left there within a year. Were there any major developments in China or in Hong Kong while you were there?*

BOCK: I don't remember anything really earth shattering during that year.

*Q: In 1976...*

BOCK: What happened is, when I was in Hong Kong, this was the time that George Bush, Senior, was the liaison chief in Peking. He left then the spring of 1976. He had gone out there with his own private secretary and the State Department had created a slot for her. So, he had her, Jennifer Fitzgerald, as well as a State Department secretary assigned to him. When he left, the bureau cast a covetous look at that slot and said, "We're not going to give another liaison office chief two secretaries. Let's turn that into an officer slot." So they created a new officer slot and cast around for somebody to fill it as a part-time special assistant. My boss in Hong Kong was Don Anderson, who had just a year earlier come out of Peking. I guess he recommended me. So, on very short notice, I was asked would I like to go to Peking and I couldn't say no.

*Q: How long were you there?*

BOCK: Almost three years. Hong Kong was my first real assignment with my wife. My wife was less enthusiastic about going to Peking than I was.

*Q: I was going to say, it would take a hell of a lot of diplomacy to take a new wife from the fleshpot of Hong Kong and go to the more austere Beijing.*

BOCK: It wasn't so much that. She was game. But I mentioned she had had this temporary job at the credit union. She subsequently got a job as office manager for a major architectural firm in Hong Kong and was just starting on that job when this Peking assignment came up. So, her view of it was a little bit colored by that.

*Q: How did Beijing strike you when you got there?*

BOCK: Well, you'd have to imagine somebody who's been a China watcher and never seen China. Again, this image of peeping over the fence and then all of a sudden you're there. There is a good deal of excitement getting there and actually seeing the place. By that time, I knew a good deal what to expect, I guess. So, I'm not sure there were any tremendous surprises. But there was certainly a sense of excitement about being in the middle of it.

*Q: One does have the feeling Henry Kissinger and his crew looked upon this as being their particular place.*

BOCK: There's no question that Kissinger had a lot of personal stake in the whole operation there.

You were asking me my impressions of Peking. They were skewed by the fact that the second night we were there, still in a hotel, the 8.2 Richter Tangshan earthquake took place, which eventually – not right away; I think it took a day – resulted in the evacuation of all or virtually all Peking residents from where they lived. Everybody was out in the street. We were all regrouped at the liaison office building, where the GSO [general services officer] dug out mattresses and spread them out on the ground floor everywhere. After a couple of days, all the dependents were sent abroad. The Chinese government was totally consumed with this. But of course they weren't telling anybody what had happened. In fact, I have a very vivid memory. The earthquake took place at two or probably three o'clock in the morning. We shook a lot in the hotel. We didn't go out in the street. My wife asked me, "Should we leave?" I said, "Well, they'll tell us if we need to" and they didn't, so I said, "Well, let's go back to sleep" and we did. Then I got a phone call from one of my colleagues a couple hours later saying, "Are you still in the hotel?" I said, "Yes. Where are you?" "We're out in the street." I said, "What are you doing out in the street at 5:00 AM?" Anyway, we got out. We were wondering whether the hotel dining room was going to open for breakfast. It did. Once it did, we went in for breakfast. This colleague of mine ran upstairs and got his shortwave radio and brought it down, tuned into BBC or VOA to get information on the earthquake. All the Chinese waiters gathered around because there was zero information in the Chinese media. This entire city had just been shaken apart and there was no news as to what was going on. You can imagine the kind of atmosphere at that time.

*Q: You might describe what the earthquake was as far as distance and what the consequences were.*

BOCK: It was centered near the industrial city of Tangshan maybe about 100 miles from Peking. It would be in the northeast direction. Peking is a little bit inland from the Bohai Gulf. If you go to the Bohai Gulf and then head north, eventually you hit Manchuria. On the way up is Tangshan. It was built on the site of a major coal seam. It was originally a coal mining city and then industry developed around it. It was a city of well over a million people, totally destroyed, totally destroyed. I was through it on the train a year later. You couldn't get off. What you saw was some temporary structures which were... At first, I couldn't understand what I was looking at because they seemed awfully high up off the street level. Then I realized that they had dug down, found the original street level, and anything else was on about six feet of rubble. Then you could still see some twisted metal around where some of the bigger buildings had been. So, Tangshan was destroyed. Tianjin, the port city near Peking, was fairly heavily damaged. Peking

suffered some damage, but not catastrophic. There were a lot of the older mud brick buildings which simply collapsed. Most of those were one story.

*Q: These didn't kill as many people.*

BOCK: They never came up with an official figure for how many were killed. Several years later, some Mexican seismological team was allowed to come in and do some kind of a survey and they came up with an estimate of 250,000 dead, which I think is the generally accepted figure now.

*Q: How did our embassy and all react?*

BOCK: Well, we were first of all trying to find out how bad the damage was and then to assess what the government was doing about it and what effect it was going to have on the government, which was very difficult to do. Sources of information were very limited. But it was almost like the China watching operation in Hong Kong. It was in little bits and pieces. At the same time, the liaison office had to worry about its own people. I mentioned all the dependents were sent out. Everybody was regrouped. And the entire functioning of the liaison office was pretty much changed. The Chinese government was not business as usual by any means, so the normal diplomatic duties were on hold. So, almost everybody in the liaison office was given the assignment of getting out and around, looking at what was happening in the city, whether there was unrest, get some idea of damage, and so on.

*Q: Was the term "mandate of Heaven" being withdrawn, bandied about? My understanding is that when the dynasty is about to go, all Hell breaks loose – earthquakes, floods and all. With Mao on his last legs, I would think this would be some- (end of tape)*

BOCK: The question of the mandate of Heaven was certainly being bandied around in the Western community, in the foreign community. Whether it was being done so among the Chinese was hard to know. I assume it was. But as I said, there was a lack of real access. The local feeling wasn't only anti-American. There was still a real isolationist atmosphere, a distrust of foreigners, permeating China. The ability to find Chinese who would sit down and discuss candidly their views on political subjects was almost zero. There were a few exceptions, but it was very difficult. They wouldn't discuss it among themselves for the most part.

*Q: We're still talking about the time when the Gang of Four were running things. The Cultural Revolution was not over at that point.*

BOCK: It was not over. What I possibly should have mentioned during the Hong Kong time - you asked about what was going on - is that this was the time of one of these periodic mass movements which were sponsored by the central regime which was called Pi Lin Pi Kong, literally "Criticize Lin Biao - Criticize Confucius," but "Confucius" was generally understood to mean "Zhou En-lai." The focus was on criticizing the moderating elements of policy which were associated with Zhou En-lai. That was happening in early 1976 and was still kind of petering out maybe by the time we arrived in China, but that was the kind of atmosphere you were in.

*Q: I take it that at this point you weren't having Chinese sitting down to tell you horrendous things that happened.*

BOCK: No.

*Q: Now there is a whole art form of these memoirs of the Cultural Revolution that are being written. I've read many of them.*

BOCK: This started not too long thereafter. The key two events that triggered it were the death of Mao Zedong and then the purge of the Gang of Four, both of which happened in very rapid succession.

*Q: Is there anything we should cover to set the stage before things started to happen?*

BOCK: Probably not. We arrived in Peking in July. Mao died at the beginning of September. Everybody was still kind of under the influence of this horrific earthquake and then the old man's gone. And that was, of course, very interesting to watch. The Chinese were just in shock. This was a time when you really could tell what people were thinking. They were in shock. A lot of them may not have loved Mao Zedong, as all the propaganda would have it. But he had been in charge of the country for 27 years. It was very difficult to imagine a future without Mao Zedong. So, there were people just sort of wandering around almost dazed. There was an organized campaign of mourning, of course. There was a big gathering of hundreds of thousands of people in Tiananmen Square when they had the memorial service. But there was great uncertainty as to what was going to happen next.

*Q: You were doing what at the embassy?*

BOCK: I was sent up as a part-time special assistant. So, part of what I was doing was the administrative work, helping out the head of the liaison office. But otherwise, I was assigned to the political section. At the outset, I was doing some internal political work. Eventually, I did external, Chinese foreign relations reporting. But during those early months, most of us were focused on internal political matters.

*Q: When Mao died, did we have a reporting plan? "Okay, Rick, you watch the lights in the Ministry of Defense..." Were we anticipating coups, countercoups, disturbances? Were we monitoring or just trying to see what happened?*

BOCK: Well, we were monitoring things as well as we could. I don't remember anything quite as finely laid out as you're describing. But part of what we were doing was going out and looking for the so-called big character posters. Everyone knew this was the traditional way of, kind of a first indication that something was brewing. These things would go up. So, that as much as anything to do with lights on in a building was the focus of what we were doing.

*Q: What happened?*

BOCK: Well, within the course of... First of all, what initially happened was, official posters

went up all over the place showing pictures of Mao Zedong and Hua Guofeng as his designated successor with an appropriate quote from Mao Zedong which said, "With you in charge, I am at ease." This was the regime's announcement to all concerned that the succession had been decided and it was Hua Guofeng. Hua Guofeng was a relatively recent addition to the top political circle and he had been in charge of some security functions in the past. But it was a little bit hard to believe that he had enough clout to really keep everybody in line. He was not completely identified either with the radical wing, the Gang of Four, or the more moderate group around Zhou En-lai and Deng Xiao-ping. So, I think we were pretty skeptical that this was the end of the story. We were proved right about a month later. It was in October when small groups of people started marching down the main street, Chang An Jie, toward Tiananmen Square with their unit designation - everybody in China belonged to a unit, and so you'd get such and such office or such and such factory - denouncing the Gang of Four. And for about a day or two, it wasn't clear whether this was really the end of the Gang of Four or simply some kind of trial balloon or some attempt to provoke a movement. Then it snowballed. Soon, you had masses of people on the street calling for the arrest of the Gang of Four. Then in the period thereafter, you had huge displays of these big character posters, including some dredging up all sorts of horror stories from the Cultural Revolution, including both obscure people and people very high in the hierarchy who had been mistreated, in some cases hounded to death, and it was all being blamed on the Gang of Four, of course. The Gang of Four were Mao Zedong's widow and then three people from the Shanghai region who were allied with her.

*Q: Was there a feeling that these parades... I mean, obviously, somebody was directing them, but was there real passion behind them? Was the Gang of Four that unpopular?*

BOCK: Yes, it seemed quite clear that they were. The initial parades were a little bit tentative. But once it was clear that this really was a mass movement, there was a lot of passion in it. People were very willing to blame these four individuals for all sorts of things. In the Cultural Revolution, which lasted for nine or 10 years, everybody had had something bad happen to them, some more than others, but everybody had a grudge. It was a convenient target to bring all these things up against.

*Q: As this was going through, was there any disquiet on the part of the Americans there that this thing could blow up or could cause other repercussions which might not be to our advantage or not?*

BOCK: Well, I suppose there was a little bit of that in the background, that this could result in a total breakdown of authority, which would not have been welcomed. But I don't remember that being a terribly prominent concern. The whole rapprochement between the U.S. and China had been done under the auspices first of Zhou En-lai and then of Deng Xiao-ping. Mao Zedong, too, but Mao Zedong was kind of the emperor in the background and it was generally attributed to those two individuals. So, the question of who would take over for Mao and whether that would be somebody identified with the relationship with the U.S. was very much in the forefront of our government's thinking. To the extent that these radicals were being taken down from power, that was all to the good.

*Q: I take it that we actually had no cards to play one way or the other. We were watching*

*developments.*

BOCK: Yes. First of all, we had no knowledge of the inner workings. Whatever knowledge we had was always after the fact. We didn't have a current knowledge of what was going on. Whether there were people in Washington that had information which wasn't being made available, I don't know, but I suspect not. No, I never had the sense that we felt we could have much of an impact on this internal power struggle.

*Q: How was our embassy foreign national staff responding to all this?*

BOCK: That's an interesting question. Our foreign nationals were all, in effect, Chinese government employees. They were always at that time considered very - I don't like to use the word "suspect," but we always assumed they had their own reporting requirements. So one had to be very careful of what one said. On the other hand, you could talk to them. The reaction to the extent I can remember it was extreme caution when this stuff started up. But then increasing relief and excitement as it became clear that there was a change in direction going on. After all, given the fact that their loyalties were clearly with the Chinese government and not with us, the fact that they were in this business at all meant that they had some kind of a broader outlook usually.

*Q: Were we getting much from the hinterland?*

BOCK: Not a lot. The liaison office had a program of trying to get its officers out to the provinces on a very regular basis in order to just get a sense of at least that posters were going up and any other signs of political debate. It was very difficult to travel in China at that time. You couldn't drive significantly outside Peking except to a couple of tourist destinations. You had to go either by plane or by train. In order to get a plane or a train ticket, you had to have a special stamp from the foreign ministry. This meant that if you wanted to plan a trip, you would submit a wish list through channels to the foreign ministry and rely on them both to get the travel arrangements and the permission. It usually came a day or two in advance of when you planned to go. Then once you traveled, you were always met at the train station or at the airport by a China Travel Service guide who had made all the arrangements for you. So, it was all very controlled. But given those constraints, every few weeks, if not more often, somebody from the liaison office would be making a trip someplace if they could. Some areas you just couldn't get to. We couldn't get to Tibet in those days. You couldn't get to Xinjiang in the far west. Some other provinces were off-limits. But you never knew for sure what was off-limits and what wasn't. So, you would submit a travel itinerary, including a couple of places you felt pretty sure they would let you go to, and then throw in a couple that were much more iffy and see what you got.

*Q: What was your wife doing? What were your living conditions?*

BOCK: We started out in the hotel, rapidly were evacuated. Once everything settled down and family members came back, which only took a couple of weeks, we were back in the hotel for about a total of three months. Then we moved into one of the diplomatic apartments. The Chinese had built a large number of apartment buildings, mid to high rise, all in several

compounds. The Diplomatic Service Bureau, which ran these things and ran everything else concerning the foreign missions, would parcel these out on the basis of requests from the various embassies. So, it was always a little bit of a delay to get one, but at the time I was there, it wasn't too bad. Two or three years later, you had people going to Beijing to serve in the embassy and they would be in the hotel for a year or more. We were okay. We were in an apartment by October, I guess. It was a small two bedroom apartment in a high rise, not together with other Americans; we were the only Americans in that building. I think we had on our floor an Australian family, a Belgian woman, and a Hungarian couple. It was all mixed together. A few countries, a few embassies, had their own housing, particularly some of the Eastern European embassies, especially including the Russians, who had everything in one compound. Everyone else was on the arrangement that we were. I mentioned about travel. My wife and I did make a weeklong trip in October. It was just in the aftermath of the fall of the Gang of Four. Although we were doing touristy things, which was what we had to do for the China Travel Service, at the same time, I was trying to keep my eye out for demonstrations, for posters, and so on. We saw a lot of posters. These things were going up everywhere.

*Q: Were we seeing much support for the Gang of Four?*

BOCK: No, not much. A little bit. Some of the posters that would go up, for instance, would be very obscure. Upon analysis, it looked like some of them might actually be saying, "It's not really the Gang of Four that's at fault. It's somebody else." But by and large, not much of that.

*Q: Were we able to monitor what the Chinese military was up to?*

BOCK: I don't think we were able to monitor them very well from the liaison office. To what extent long distance monitoring was going on, I don't remember. I don't know if I was aware of any. I'm sure there were efforts to do that. We always kept our eye out for concentrations of troops or something like that, but that wasn't what we were seeing.

*Q: When you were working with Gates, was he making representations to the Chinese? Were you going with him?*

BOCK: Usually not. It would depend on the nature of the representation. Normally, if he went in, he would go either with his DCM or with a section chief, depending on the subject matter.

*Q: Who was the DCM?*

BOCK: The DCM at that time was David Dean, a longtime China hand, or Taiwan hand. He had also served in Hong Kong. For the entire time that Gates was there, Dean was the DCM.

*Q: How was the election of '76 viewed? Were you getting any reflection on that either from our embassy's side or from the Chinese side? This was when Carter beat Ford.*

BOCK: I can't say that I really remember much of an impact. I suspect there was some concern on the part of the Chinese because of the Carter emphasis on human rights. But I'm hard pressed to remember anything specific on that.

*Q: There wasn't speculation on the Chinese that, okay, we're moving away from the Nixon-Kissinger period and we may be going back to the bad old days?*

BOCK: There could have been. I really don't know. What rapidly became clear after Carter took office was that China policy was being pretty much run by Brzezinski, who with what I would characterize as a fairly strong anti-Russian bent, just looked at China through a fairly narrow strategic focus and saw this [strategic rapprochement] as somewhere we really want to go. I don't remember now how rapidly that became apparent, but once it did, the Chinese would have been fairly reassured that there wasn't going to be any big shakeup in the China policy.

*Q: Did the Indochina-Vietnam-Chinese war cause any particular problems?*

BOCK: We paid a lot of attention to it. That's getting a little ahead of the story because that came right on the heels of our own normalization with China. But it took place in early 1979. I was still there. One of my responsibilities was just to find out what I could about it, which wasn't a whole heck of a lot. The information available in Beijing was pretty slim on that. But we were following it the best we could. There was also a spinoff from that... I'm not quite sure of my timing on this. The Chinese incursion into Vietnam, of course, was a reaction to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. I'd have to go back and check to see when exactly that took place. But the result of the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia was that Sihanouk showed up on our doorstep. We went through a period when the liaison office was the main channel of communication to Sihanouk. There was great turmoil in our own Indochina policy at that point.

*Q: Let's go back. Carter came in. Was it expected that he would normalize relations?*

BOCK: I don't know that there was an initial expectation in that regard. Eventually it became clear that he was working very hard to find a way to normalize. The Nixon and Ford administrations had wanted to normalize relations and the stumbling block was always how do you handle Taiwan. That was a very big bullet to bite. It wasn't until Carter that they finally determined they were going to bite the bullet and figured out a way to do it. But the desire for normalization was there throughout, I think.

*Q: Were you seeing a changing attitude towards not only the embassy work but also towards the world with the Gang of Four being edged out?*

BOCK: Yes. What you had along with the fall of the Gang of Four was a considerable criticism of the whole period of the Cultural Revolution, sometimes including criticism of Mao Zedong, although that was very touchy and didn't really get resolved (to the extent that it's been resolved at all) until after I had left. But the Cultural Revolution among other things was a time of extreme isolation on the part of the Chinese. To the extent that you were criticizing that, you were also by and large saying, "We need to interact more with the world." That was certainly taking place. Deng Xiao-ping did come back into power in mid-'77, I think, not too long after the fall of the Gang of Four. That was one of his roles, to bring China in some way more back into the world. This whole period was still characterized by very tense Chinese-Soviet relations. That hadn't really changed. So, bringing China back into the world was in a way looked upon as a

kind of safeguard against any difficulties with the Soviets.

*Q: Was Deng Xiao-ping sort of looked upon as a hero or “our boy?”*

BOCK: By the Americans?

*Q: Yes.*

BOCK: To some extent, yes. I think that’s fair. He was seen as a key to U.S.-China relations.

*Q: Did we know a lot about Deng Xiaoping by that point?*

BOCK: Not too much in personal terms. He had had some role in the establishment of the liaison office. He had [experience] in dealing with Americans to that extent during the ’73-’74 period... His role prior to the Cultural Revolution and what he had gone through was also becoming known through Chinese sources. That was always getting published in one form or another. Of course, if you look back to Deng Xiao-ping in the 1950s, he doesn’t come across as much of a reformer. He was a very hard-line communist, which they all were. But I think more because of the dealings with him in the early ’70s, he was seen as someone that we could usefully work with.

*Q: Did we make any entrée into the universities while you were there?*

BOCK: We began to. At the time I arrived, the only Americans, virtually the only foreigners, who were in the Chinese universities were the old true believers. There were still a handful of them left even after the Cultural Revolution, people who had seen Mao Zedong’s revolution as the wave of the future and had tied themselves to it and stuck it out. They, of course, were very shy of dealing with the U.S. liaison office. That changed to some extent after normalization, after 1979. In addition to that, though, starting maybe ’77, the Chinese began to accept non-ideological people coming in, doing some teaching, began to accept the idea of academic exchanges. There had been no academic exchanges for a period of probably 20, maybe more, years. I do remember escorting a visiting American astronomical group and going around to various observatories in China with this group. It was amazing to watch. You had all these Chinese scientists who had had no contact not only with the United States but no contact with the West. Some of them had a little contact with the Soviet Union back in the ’60s. They were just so pleased and so anxious to catch up with what was going on in the world. Now, that was in a scientific discipline. But it carried over to some extent everywhere in the academic world.

*Q: Were you able to make any friendly contacts with artists or businesspeople?*

BOCK: Very little in that period. That really started to loosen up in 1979, early ’80s is when the big change came. Even though the government policy was clearly moving in the direction of better ties, I think on a private level, people were still very cautious.

*Q: Well, they had gone through the 1,000 Flowers Campaign.*

BOCK: Oh, they had gone through so many political campaigns and they knew that if you stuck your neck out, you were going to get it chopped off. Also until the spring of '79, we had not yet normalized. We were an ally, if not "occupier," of Taiwan. What was also happening, however, was a good deal of ferment. You may remember the period of the Democracy Wall. In the wake of Deng Xiao-ping being rehabilitated for the second time, there was a sense that there was going to be some real political changes in China and some people got out in front and started organizing a movement. We as a liaison office had some contact with those people. I did not. There were a couple of people who were handling that and I was not one of them. But that was going on. But it was still pretty limited. There were relatively few who were willing to stick their necks out to talk candidly about political subjects with Americans.

*Q: Did you get any piece of the action or observation with the opening of official relations?*

BOCK: I had only a very small piece of the action involving the negotiations. That was extremely closely held. I mean, we all knew people were working on it. Woodcock got his instructions from Washington through CIA channels directly from the NSC. They were not shared with anybody except the DCM. He went into a whole series of negotiations in the summer and fall of '78, trying to cut this Taiwan knot basically. That was really the only thing that was left to resolve. I was aware that he was going in to see the foreign ministry and other people but I had no access to his instructions. The only exception was, one time he was given an instruction to go in and the DCM was away on leave. So, I was asked to accompany him. I was a little bit surprised because here I was in effect going around my boss, the political counselor. But I think because I had somewhat more access to certain things than he did that I guess they figured it made more sense for me to go along. I went along as a notetaker. This was not one of the crucial meetings. It wasn't one where a breakthrough was being scored. But that gave me a little bit of a window into the process.

*Q: Woodcock... Were you still acting somewhat as a special assistant?*

BOCK: Yes. My job did not significantly change from Gates to Woodcock. He was asked whether he wanted to keep the same arrangement and he said, yes, that was fine with him.

*Q: How did he use you?*

BOCK: Several ways. One, kind of document culling stuff from the daily take, what comes in to be read. I figured out what was worth his while to read and what wasn't. He wanted to do some traveling around China. Gates had had a bad leg. He had some difficulty getting around. So, he did relatively little traveling during his period in China. Woodcock was quite vigorous and he wanted to get around. So, I would make arrangements, accompany him on trips, including one amusing trip to an automobile factory in Manchuria. Here was the head of the United Auto Workers and he was going to a Chinese automobile factory. Just watching his reaction... He said, "Jesus, this is 1920s technology." So, those were the two major components. And arranging other stuff, just meetings and so on.

*Q: How did he operate? One thinks of a union operator as barking orders and being confrontational.*

BOCK: I think he saw his job pretty much in terms of carrying out the President's instructions on normalizing relations. I think that's why he took the job. He was happy to let the DCM do most of the work in running the mission. So, no, he was not going around barking orders at people. He had a narrower focus.

*Q: Under Gates and under Woodcock, did you find that this new liaison office was a happy ship or a focused one?*

BOCK: I think it was a pretty happy ship. It was a small office. Virtually everybody was there because they wanted to be there. Not all of the positions were Chinese language positions, but most of them were. These were people who had studied Chinese and, having studied Chinese, the chance to actually go into the Middle Kingdom was a great thing. For some support staff, that, of course, was not true. But I think with very few exceptions there were... It was a very isolated place. You couldn't travel. There were certain tourist things you could do in and around Beijing, but you eventually played those out. Very little entertainment. Some health problems. Terrible dust. But given all that, morale was pretty good. That changed to some extent after normalization, but I didn't see it. What happened after normalization was, becoming an embassy, you had a huge expansion in the number of people there. There was difficulty in accommodating them in housing and for certain periods of time in office space; we had to get additional office space. So, I became aware after I had left, talking to friends, that there were considerable morale problems in the early '80s because of that. But it was pretty good when I was there.

*Q: When you were there, did we have anything in Shanghai or Guangzhou?*

BOCK: Absolutely nothing. The Chinese had an annual or semi-annual- (end of tape)

During the annual trade fair in Guangzhou, we would send people from the embassy from the economic section, commercial office, agricultural trade officer, down there. They'd set up shop for the duration, which was maybe a month or so. But we had no permanent representation anywhere else. We got to Shanghai on a regular basis, but it was always on visits.

*Q: Were you feeling that we needed to take the temperature of what was happening and really needed somebody in Shanghai?*

BOCK: I think there was a sense early on that we wanted to have people there. I don't know how this had been discussed, but I think it must have been looked at and decided, well, that's nothing we can deal with until after we have full diplomatic relations; we're just not going to be able to accomplish it. But once diplomatic relations were decided on, then one of the early things on the agenda was a consular agreement which would invoke consular protections but also the opening of consulates around the country.

*Q: Did Japan play any role? Were we making an effort to include the Japanese in our efforts?*

BOCK: Yes and no. The Japanese may have had a larger embassy than we did. We had a lot of contact with them. Again, sharing of information. You were living in this island there where you

had extremely limited ability to talk meaningfully to the Chinese. So, the diplomatic community was kind of forced in upon itself. Of all the places I've ever served, you had much more feeling of community in the diplomatic community there because everybody was in the same isolation. We talked to the Japanese, the Germans, the French, the Egyptians, the Romanians... But the Japanese were high on the list. They, of course, were extremely interested to know what we were doing on normalization. We weren't in a position to tell them. I can remember feeling rather bad myself. I was aware of normalization talks going on, but I was as surprised as anyone else when we were informed one weekend that Ambassador Woodcock wanted the entire staff to assemble in his dining room the next morning. On that morning, we were all there and he made the announcement. He said, "President Carter is going to announce later today a normalization agreement." So I, just like anyone else except Stape Roy and possibly the communicators, was not aware of the timing of that at all. The Japanese at that point were put out. They wanted advance notice and they didn't get it.

*Q: It's always been a problem with the Japanese. The Japanese leak like mad.*

BOCK: Well, we had the whole Taiwan situation to deal with. I wasn't dealing with it, but I sure heard a lot about it, calling Chiang Ching Kuo out of bed at 2:00 AM or whenever it was to inform him at the very last minute. With that story, Taiwan was going to be going ballistic and you certainly didn't want the Japanese blabbing things earlier.

*Q: You were talking about the diplomatic community. So often, the French are the odd man out. Did you find that they had a different cast on things?*

BOCK: Not really. We had pretty good contact with the French. I don't remember them having... They had had diplomatic relations with China before the rest of us.

*Q: De Gaulle in the '60s-*

BOCK: Very ostentatiously. Although the British actually had a consulate or something even earlier. They never let it go. But they didn't officially normalize until later. So, the French had that wealth of experience, having been there through the Cultural Revolution. But I didn't particularly sense either any resentment or anything else. The French probably were like the rest of the Europeans; they thought that U.S. normalization with China would probably make their life easier. I don't think they had a special take on that.

*Q: What happened after...*

BOCK: The announcement was in December and it stated that the embassies would be opened in April. So, we had a kind of a transition period. The reason for that was, you had the whole dismantling of this establishment in Taiwan to take place. I don't remember now what the specifics of the negotiations were, but I'm sure they had something about getting all the military off the island before we had formal diplomatic relations. So, with all that, there was a Deng Xiao-ping trip to the United States. Remember him in Texas with his 10 gallon hat? This took place early in '79. You had the complication of the invasion of Vietnam, where there was some feeling that the Chinese had taken advantage of us, that they had been planning this all along and

they got the normalization out of the way and now they had diplomatic cover for doing this, which didn't make some people happy. And then finally where you had the normalization itself, which was a big show. We had the formal opening of the embassy and Deng Xiao-ping came and several other people. We had security issues and press issues, all of that.

*Q: Did Brzezinski come over?*

BOCK: He was there during the course of the negotiations. I think it was summer of '78. I was only tangentially involved in that visit. We had a number of visitors coming in '78, a number of Cabinet visits as this thing gathered momentum. That kept a lot of us busy, of course, as expected.

*Q: Did they seem to be productive or was this everybody getting used to each other?*

BOCK: It was a little bit of both, a lot of, as is typical in our government, of these Cabinet agencies had things they wanted to do with China and they couldn't really do in the absence of normalization. So, this was all kind of laying the groundwork for agreements of one sort or another.

*Q: You left there when?*

BOCK: I left there in late April or early May of 1979.

*Q: Did you feel a little put out or out of joint that you weren't going to be doing normal relations time or did you really see any great developments at that point?*

BOCK: There were all sorts of things to look forward to, but on the other hand, I had had a pretty full time there starting with the end of the Cultural Revolution and up to normalization. It was as good a time as any to leave.

*Q: How about your wife? Was she able to find work?*

BOCK: She worked at some different jobs in the liaison office, but she had a difficult pregnancy which caused her to stop working. Then our child was born. That was late '77 and she was busy with that.

*Q: Yes. How did you feel, having served in China and Berlin? Did you feel yourself part of the German club or the China club?*

BOCK: I was a bit ambivalent about that. I had kind of one foot in each. On the one hand, I rather of liked the ability to go back and forth, but on the other hand recognized that I risked being looked at askance by one or the other for not being true blue.

*Q: How were relations between the People's Republic of China and the U.S. during this time? Were there issues?*

BOCK: There were always issues, but they were relatively calm. The Reagan administration early on had signed the so-called August 15<sup>th</sup> Communique under which he agreed to limit arms sales to Taiwan. There was a lot of kind of “angels dancing on pinheads” in the implementation of that. Politically, it stabilized the relationship so that in the ’84-’86 period, there wasn’t anything really serious on the plate there.

There were problems in Korea. Kim Dae Jung was in exile in the United States and went back during that period accompanied by several congressmen to make sure there wasn’t another Ninoy Aquino on the tarmac of Seoul airport. So, the administration was trying to deal with that in a way that didn’t totally upset the Korean government.

One of the issues I spent an enormous amount of time on was the compact of free association with the Pacific Isle states. At that point, they were all still UN trust territories but under a specific regime. They were not like the other UN trust territories. There was a general commitment on the part of the State Department certainly and the U.S. government as a whole to find some more permanent setup for them. There were a lot of issues involved. The Pentagon wanted to make sure that its rights, particularly for missile ranges, were preserved. There were issues involving nuclear cleanup in Bikini. There were also bureaucratic political issues. The Interior Department, which ran the trust territories, was somewhat reluctant to let go of them. The Interior committees in the Congress were extremely reluctant to end their oversight.

*Q: What were some of the issues?*

BOCK: Now that you mention it in those terms, you asked earlier about China and I said China wasn’t terribly on the front burner, but there were people in the Senate who were constantly trying to pick fights with China and trying to get resolutions on the floor or riders attached to appropriations or authorization bills or whatever, stating positions on issues involving China. The State Department position was “Let us take care of that.” So, yes.

*Q: What was the situation on Taiwan when you went out there in ’86?*

BOCK: Actually, it was an extremely interesting time to be there. The government of Taiwan was run by Chiang Ching Kuo, the son of Chiang Kai-shek. He was getting very old by that time. He had made the decision, encouraged by the United States, to gradually democratize the political life on Taiwan. He was just starting to implement this in 1986. Up until that time, there was a legislature which was totally dominated by holdovers from the Mainland, people who had fled from Mainland China in 1949 and had been there ever since. They were getting pretty old. Of course, his hand was being forced. Something had to change. There were elections on Taiwan but only for a minority of the seats in the parliament and no opposition party had been allowed to form. There was an active opposition, many of whom had been jailed following an earlier series of demonstrations early on, some of them were just getting out of jail at that point. So, there were these moves. He was starting to open up the political system. He also set in train a rethinking of relationship with the Mainland. Up until that time, all contact by residents of Taiwan with the Mainland was banned. But China, of course, had gone on its new economic path in the early ’80s and was inviting overseas investment and there were a lot of Taiwanese businessmen who were quite interested in doing so and were doing it despite this ban, setting up front companies in

Hong Kong or elsewhere. Again, to some extent, his hand was being forced. He was going to have to regularize this somehow. This was a major issue because the government of the Republic of China considered itself to be the government of all China and had ever since 1949. So, how to square that with any sort of contact with the Mainland was a real problem.

All this was happening, and the Taiwan opposition was to some extent... First of all, they were almost all Taiwanese, very few people who had any real ties to the Mainland, the difference being the Taiwanese are Chinese that came over three or four centuries ago as opposed to the ones who came over 30-40 years ago. Some of them were strong advocates of formal independence for Taiwan. So, from the U.S. government point of view, we were caught in not exactly a dilemma but kind of a tricky issue. On the one hand, we were clearly in favor of democratizing Taiwan. On the other hand, we were not in favor of anything that would look provocative to China, like declaring independence, because then that would call into question what our obligations toward Taiwan were. So, in dealing with this emerging opposition, we had to walk that very fine line, and in dealing with the government, too, but particularly with the opposition because they had people back here who were lobbying Congress and carrying on public relations activities. They were sometimes hearing what they wanted to hear from their contacts in the United States that, "Yes, independence would be a great thing. You guys deserve it." We had to make clear that that was not the U.S. government policy, us coming to their aid if they did anything too drastic. So, that was very interesting. That was the biggest part of my job.

*Q: Let's talk about the opposition. If you're doing what we always profess to want and what we do want, growing democracy and all this, if nothing else, let's say they didn't declare independence but they were going to be sitting there as a bright little island working away with good economics and good democracy and all and then you look over at this huge monster over there which essentially doesn't have that... The more we promoted democracy, the more we were promoting trouble for ourselves.*

BOCK: Well, you have to remember, this was before 1989 and before the Tiananmen incident. The general sense both here and in Taiwan was that China was opening up economically and politically. People were able to talk about things they couldn't have talked about before. They were even in some cases able to write about things they weren't able to write about before. The trends were favorable. Therefore, a demonstration on Taiwan of how democracy could work in a Chinese society could perhaps help that process along in China and that if it ever did, then the choices facing Taiwan would be somewhat different. On the one hand, they might be able to deal with a democratic China and say, "You guys don't really want us. Let's be sensible." Or a democratic China might be attractive enough to the people on Taiwan that they'd say, "Okay, yes, let's work out a deal here and we'll be part of you under certain conditions." All of those roads seemed at least possible in 1986 and '87. It wasn't until after '89 that people had to look at it in a different way.

*Q: What was your impression of the Kuomintang types on Taiwan and then the new breed coming up on the Taiwanese side?*

BOCK: First of all, the nationalists were a very mixed bag. The top rung were still the Mainland establishment. But in the party structure, because the party was there to run elections as a major

part of their job, they had to appeal to the Taiwanese electorate. They had a lot of native Taiwanese in their party structure who were to some extent at odds with the leadership in the legislature, these old Mainland holdovers. So, the Kuomintang was undergoing this transition to become a party to appeal to the population of Taiwan. It wasn't easy but it was still very much a top-down structure so that when Chiang Ching Kuo indicated "This is where we're going," even the old guys at least halfheartedly signed on. On the opposition side, you had these people who were operating as an opposition on Taiwan who actually ran an election that first fall I was there, although they could not run on any party affiliation. They were called the Dang Wai, which literally means "Outside the Party." There was one party [the KMT] and they were outside it. They were the ones by and large who had been the lawyers for the people who had been imprisoned. They had been trying to work within the system to get their people released. However, over time, more and more of the more radical elements who had been either in jail or in exile in the U.S., in some cases Japan, were getting back into the country. So, the people who were running this incipient opposition in 1986 gradually started to lose control toward the more radical, more pro-independence types. So, there was a real shifting of ground there on both sides of the equation.

*Q: How did it work? You were an independent organization. The desk is in Rosslyn and is not part of the State Department. Who was running the show? Who was getting the orders?*

BOCK: From our point of view, that was never a problem. We looked at it as a useful fiction. Our policy instructions came directly from what would have been the Taiwan desk, called the Taiwan Coordination Staff in the East Asia Bureau. We communicated directly with them all the time. Administratively, it was different. But on the policy side, that was clear. The managing director of AIT in Rosslyn would come out for visits, but he was also taking guidance from the State Department on anything he said. So, it all worked quite well. There were occasionally egos involved between the managing director in Rosslyn and the director in Taipei. But on the policy side, we didn't have a problem.

*Q: With the KMT there, were they comfortable with us or was the relationship beginning to fray because they were seeing they were beginning to be outmoded and we were part of the problem?*

BOCK: There was a little bit of that. To the extent they were uncomfortable with us, it tended to be on China policy rather than on domestic policy, particularly because Chiang Ching Kuo had said this is what he was going to do, he was going to open up. We said, "Hey, great. We're with you." Sure, there were issues. I can remember at one point our [CIA] station chief came to me and said, "The security people are upset because you and your section are meeting with all these opposition people." It was his job to pass on that message. He was the liaison with the security people. But we talked about it in a staff meeting and it was absolutely clear and he was told to go back and talk to them and tell them what our policy was. So, there were elements in the government which were not happy about this, but we felt that we were doing things that were quite compatible with what the President wanted.

I should mention that Chiang Ching Kuo died in office, I think in '86. This led to a great deal of uncertainty as to what was going to happen next because it was such a top-down structure. We were scrambling to find out. We didn't have a lot of influence on the internal situation, but we

were scrambling to find out what was going to happen. Eventually, he was replaced by his vice president, a Taiwanese, had been brought into that position specifically as part of this policy of opening up the KMT to the Taiwanese. He was always going to be succeeding as president because that's what the constitution said. The real question was whether he was going to succeed Chiang as head of the party. There was quite an internal struggle over that. It lasted several weeks.

There was another issue which paralleled this. Years earlier, there had been indications that Taiwan had been pursuing a nuclear weapons development policy. Somehow we had gotten a hold of that and we shut it down. I don't know any of the details on it. We then put in place a cooperative mechanism of nuclear exchanges that allowed us to keep track of what they were doing. Despite that, I think in the fall of '86 or early '87, somebody who was working in their nuclear field defected to us and told us they were doing it again. The defection became public just after the new president took office. We had to again try to ensure that the program was being shut down. The question was, was the new president in a position to do that? He had barely made it into office. He was not one of the old boy network. We didn't think he had control of the military. All sorts of questions. It was a military program. So, we had a very dicey few weeks there which I was not directly involved in in terms of talking to people because the people who needed to be talked to weren't my contacts. But eventually it worked out fine. It was not only a question of how is democracy going to go, but this other issue as well.

*Q: Were there issues concerning the Taiwanese government's agents in the Chinese community in the United States? Sometimes they seemed to have a heavy hand.*

BOCK: The big issue had been an earlier one when there was an assassination of a critic of Chiang Ching Kuo. That was well before I was there. There were still some repercussions from that. I don't remember any specific issues coming up during that '86-'89 period. We were well aware that part of the job of the Taiwan representatives over here was to mobilize Chinese Americans in favor of their policy. That's fair game. Everybody tries to do that. During the course of those three years, there was competing policies. The Taiwanese opposition was doing the same thing. They didn't have any official representatives, but they had lots of unofficial ones. No, I don't remember that being a big issue for us.

*Q: What about arms sales?*

BOCK: On arms sales, I mentioned earlier that there had been this negotiated communiqué with China on Taiwan arms sales in 1982. That said that under the assumption that China continued to pursue a policy of peaceful settlement with Taiwan, we would limit our arms sales to Taiwan and gradually decrease them. There were some more specifics involved which we interpreted and gave the interpretation to the Chinese that we would not exceed the level of arms sales as of whatever the base year was. Then there were all sorts of machinations that were a little bit like Enron accounting. You try to make sure that the numbers conform with this. I think by the late '80s most people felt that this was a ticking time bomb. Taiwan's weaponry was getting more and more outmoded. There was also a qualitative restriction on arms sales which was seen as worse than the quantitative one because the longer we said we weren't going to upgrade in quality Taiwan's weapons, that meant eventually they were going to start falling behind. But

nobody wanted to tackle that until they had to. When this all came to a head was during the Bush reelection campaign of '92 when he decided to throw a bone to General Dynamics [and approve the sale of F-16s to Taiwan]. For reasons that were really domestic politics rather than foreign policy, he decided to approve this very massive arms sale, which clearly busted that '82 agreement even though he tried to claim it didn't. But in the '86-'89 period, we hadn't reached that point yet. The program was okay.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that on China policy you had maybe a series of groups but one group which was very influential, those that were on the initial opening to China with Kissinger and really looked on Taiwan as being just a plain nuisance – let's get on with the big game – and these people dominated things for a while? Was there a feeling that there was this group and you were having to deal with this?*

BOCK: The group had been there, but we were in the Reagan administration, so they weren't quite so dominating. Reagan in his campaign had talked about normalizing relations with Taiwan and was finally talked out of that. Sure, there was tension over the policy, but the big tension had been in the early couple of years of the Reagan administration. After that, everybody had kind of come to terms with the general outlines of the policy and you just had these little things that would come up from time to time. But I would say there was no big struggle over China policy within the administration during my three years in Taipei.

*Q: Did you have a feeling that the people in AIT were being monitored very closely by Mainland Chinese agents and if you got what they conceded to be out of line, there would be screams of bloody murder and all this?*

BOCK: Well, monitoring in the sense of following any news about what we were doing, sure. We didn't feel that there were agents in the streets.

*Q: I would think that on any sensitive issue like that, they would be looking at what you all were doing to see if you were getting beyond...*

BOCK: That was only one part of the equation. We had to be very careful for a whole bunch of reasons. You would go and talk to some leading opposition figure. You had to be very worried about what was going to appear in the opposition press the next day. They were quite capable of distorting what you may or may not have said. On the one hand, sure, Mainland watchers would pick that up, but so would our own government and so would people in Taiwan on both sides of the independence issue. So, we had to not only watch what we said but also be careful if something came out which was a distortion to make sure it was corrected quite promptly.

*Q: Did you see a problem or lack of problem in recruiting Foreign Service China types for Taiwan? Was all the action seen as being over on the Mainland or was there a fairly easy flow back and forth?*

BOCK: We didn't have a big problem, no. There was a good flow. It was a relatively small structure as opposed to the embassy in Beijing. Some people found that attractive. You could do your political-economic work there.

*Q: Much better living, too, I suppose.*

BOCK: Yes, particularly in the '80s when housing was extremely shorthanded in Beijing and in Taipei we were nicely set up. Since service in Taipei was by no means a bar or even a disadvantage to later service in Beijing... If it had been-

*Q: It's like we had in Israel at one point where if you had served in Israel you couldn't serve in the Arab world.*

BOCK: There was nothing like that. There were concerns at the outset with AIT as to... For a time, nobody was assigned directly from one to the other. That broke down. A deputy director in Taipei went directly from there to be consul general in Shanghai. I think he was the first to do that kind of direct transfer. So, the Chinese knew what we were doing. As long as we didn't throw it in their face and declare these people to be diplomatic officers [while in Taipei], they basically didn't care.

*Q: Were you seeing developments within Taiwan of a growing strength of the economic community? Were you seeing this turning into one of the tigers?*

BOCK: Yes. This was very much economic miracle time. The Taiwan economy was growing extremely fast. They were starting to get into the semiconductor business but most of the growth was still in consumer electronics. They had the U.S. market for toys sewed up. Shoes. All this kind of stuff. Then toward the end of the '80s, a lot of that lower wage type stuff starting moving to China. By the time I left, there was beginning to be concern as to whether the Taiwan economy would be "hollowed out." I think that is still a concern now, but in fact, they were able to handle it very nicely through the 1990s, so for the longest time, they kept doing very well by pushing overseas across the Straits their low wage stuff and retaining the higher value-added things in Taiwan.

*Q: How about exchanges? Did we have a good student exchange? We had a big one with Mainland China.*

BOCK: There was a student exchange, but it was very much one sided. There were a certain number of American students who were interested in going to Taiwan, particularly people interested in Chinese culture who found better access in Taiwan than in China. Huge numbers of Taiwan students going to the United States. This was self-financed. Some of them even went as high school students in order to avoid the draft. They violated our immigration regulations in doing so and that became an issue at one point. I think around that time, mid-'80s, Taiwan students in the United States may have been the largest group of foreign students. This is from a relatively small place.

*Q: On the academic side, I would imagine that Taiwan would almost fall below the radar of academic interest with a few exceptions in the United States. All of a sudden, Mainland China was opening up and all the goodies were over there.*

BOCK: For Sinologists, people interested in Chinese culture, Taiwan was still attractive. For some people in political science, there was some interest in Taiwan, both because of this relationship with China but also as a very prime example of an authoritarian country which was democratizing. Thirdly, people with academic economic interests also were interested in Taiwan because of its example as an Asian tiger. But that's not to say that that wasn't overshadowed by the very great interest in China, which had been closed off for so long and suddenly in the 1980s was available.

*Q: Was there any problem there?*

BOCK: Congress does what it likes. Congressmen visited all the time, sometimes very briefly, sometimes longer. Solarz came out at the time of an election. That was a lot of fun. People in the KMT government were very distressed. We spent a lot of time calming nerves. The only issue with Congress was their desire sometimes to come out on U.S. government planes. We had more or less of a prohibition of that. Sometimes there were some exceptions where they were dropped off and the plane flew off, but it was very tricky. We had a rule that no U.S. military would come to Taiwan. That was part of having gotten rid of the defense agreement. Of course, the government planes the Congress fly on are military planes. So, that was an issue with Congress. Otherwise not, by and large. With the administration, it was a very different sort of thing. Higher level representatives of the U.S. government were not supposed to come to Taiwan. However, given very serious economic interests of ours in Taiwan, there was a very good case to be made for Cabinet level people on the economic side to come out. That was normally done under the auspices of two counterpart private sector economic committees, one in Taipei and one in Washington. Each year, they would have a joint meeting alternating between the U.S. and Taiwan. So, when it was in Taiwan, we would normally send somebody of Cabinet rank out there. We always elicited a Chinese protest. So, there was sometimes a little reluctance in Washington to do this. It normally took place, though, and the Cabinet member involved was heavily briefed and heavily monitored to make sure he didn't say anything stupid because these people had nothing to do with Taiwan policy and were not really well equipped to dance the fine line that we normally did.

*Q: As you were sitting with your colleagues in the interests section, what were you figuring was going on in China?*

BOCK: It became clear that there was a serious difference of agreement within the Chinese government. If there hadn't been that, the whole series of demonstrations would have been ended with very little chance of the loss of life that happened. There had been efforts at controlled democratization getting back to '86/'87. Hu Yaobang was purged because of them. The question of how these demonstrations in '89 were fitting into all that was looked upon in different ways by different people. We didn't have any great insights as to what was going on. We would read whatever was available, the cable traffic, from our embassy. But certainly by the beginning of June, it looked like it was getting out of hand. Everybody was fearful that something bad would result.

*Q: What did the Australian-American alliance mean?*

BOCK: Well, it's an interesting question. It wasn't an easy one to answer because the original Australian-American alliance was anti-Japanese. Then it became anti-communist and depending on the point of view either anti-Soviet or anti-Chinese. By this time, very few Australians wanted an anti-Chinese alliance and we weren't pushing that either. But then looming over the Australian horizon was Indonesia with some people seeing it as an opportunity and some seeing it as a threat. In population terms, it just totally overwhelms Australia. So, one of the perspectives you could bring up was that our role in the Pacific was a way of integrating these various countries in a way which would be of mutual benefit. That included what was at the time our increasingly closer relations with ASEAN, including Indonesia. That drew a positive response from a lot of Australians.

*Q: What was your impression of the absorption of and the Asiatic influence? It was really quite new.*

BOCK: It was mostly new. There was an old line Chinese population in Melbourne that had come over in the gold rush, but the vast majority of Asians in Melbourne tended to be Chinese and Vietnamese, although you had a sprinkling of Indonesians as well. Clearly, integration was much slower there, but it was happening. I should describe the setup there. Melbourne is a city of three million but the mayor of Melbourne only has control over the downtown business district and then you've got all these separate suburbs that have their own town councils. We were starting to see Vietnamese being elected to these small town councils. So, they were gradually finding their way into the political system, but it was slow.

*Q: What were you doing?*

BOCK: I was assigned to the political science department. The way ICAF worked was that in the first semester, they had a core curriculum which took up most of the students' time. The core curriculum was divided into a bunch of segments, one of which was the political science segment, which really was an in-depth look at American political institutions and policy formulation but also with a foreign policy component to it. What we did was, the eight or nine of us people on the faculty of the political science department all taught the same course in our sections. So, we would get together as a group, work out the curriculum, which was based on last year's curriculum, so you sort of tinkered with it. Then we'd all then do the separate teaching. That was the first semester. The second semester was much more technically oriented where my expertise didn't fit in very well. However, I did lead an area studies course on China and I also helped out with some organization of a computer related course.

*Q: The organization had become rather mature by this point.*

BOCK: Yes.

*Q: How did you see its operation by that time?*

BOCK: The office in Rosslyn was quite a small office. We had a total staff of about ten. It served a couple of functions. One, it served as an administrative backstop for the AIT office in Taipei. That was kind of a can of worms, that I didn't get involved in any more than I had to,

although I did to some extent. Then we were also sort of an interface for Taiwan representatives in Washington, either stationed in Washington or traveling to Washington. This gets back to the nature of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship as it evolved after normalization with China in '79. We had no "government to government" relations. All relations were to be filtered through these private organizations which were set up, AIT on the American side and a counterpart organization on the Taiwan side. Well, the Taiwan government folks were never happy with this arrangement. They agreed to live with it but they were always tinkering at the edges. We had a relationship with Taiwan which covered a very large number of aspects. It wasn't just a political relationship. Virtually every agency of the U.S. government had something, some program or some interest in Taiwan. All of these then had to be filtered through this artificial channel. That was what I spent most of my time on, dealing with all the agencies of the U.S. government to make sure that they understood how they were to deal with Taiwan and to offer our services in helping them to do so. Some of these agencies had longstanding programs with Taiwan and somebody assigned to run them who knew the drill and they were easy. Some did not and they were difficult.

*Q: Who was that?*

BOCK: The exception was David Laux, who had been in the CIA and then been in the White House and been assigned to AIT. However, in '95, the White House decided that it had a new person they wanted to assign into that position who had virtually no China background and whose brief experience in the State Department as a political appointee had apparently been an unhappy one, a fellow named James Wood. There was a lot of resistance within the State Department to his appointment and it was delayed for a long time. It was finally, however, made. AIT has a formal structure - even though it's this artificial creation, it had a formal structure of a board of directors of three individuals, one of whom was the managing director and the other two were just separate directors. They formally elected a chairman of the board. When Wood was named by the State Department at the White House's insistence, the other two directors resigned in protest, publically. Belocchi as the third director was prevailed upon by the State Department to stay on so there wouldn't be a zero board with only this one new person coming in. He was not happy about it, but he was a good soldier and did that. But then there was a struggle to find new directors and there were a lot of things that developed in the wake of that. Wood had an agenda which was not transparent. He wasn't there just to implement U.S. Taiwan policy.

*Q: I interviewed Nat Belocchi while he was still in the job. Was there concern in AIT in your office about there being an awful lot of money in the Chinese community, particularly those that are interested in Taiwan, and various connections? Was this something you knew was out there?*

BOCK: Oh, yes. This had been a well known fact for years that Taiwan was considered next to Israel to be the best managed, best funded foreign lobbying operation in Washington. In fact, at one point, somebody dealing with China who was fending off all these complaints about how the U.S. was always catering to Taiwan's interests, said to this Chinese representative, "You ought to look at the way Taiwan operates. You might learn something." It was a complicated system because, first of all, they are a semi-official representation in Washington. Then there were various consulting contracts with some of the top notch lobbying firms in Washington, some of which were run through the Washington representation of Taiwan and some of which were not.

And then finally there was the whole Taiwan independence movement operation, which was quite separate but which was also increasingly well funded from various Taiwanese-American groups and was in close with a number of congressmen.

*Q: You had been dealing with Chinese affairs and had covered both sides of the Straits. Were you noticing a growing problem after Tiananmen that China per se, Mainland China, was pursuing this quite authoritarian stance, still run by a communist regime, and was pretty hardline with economic changes? And then you have Taiwan, which is increasingly, particularly on your watch, was treating democratic and much more what we all hoped other countries would be. When you get this, it gets harder and harder to not have an American response of saying, "Dammit, this is a democratic society and this other one ain't."*

BOCK: Yes. It was becoming much more confrontational than it had been in my previous tour in Taipei. On the one hand, there had been the clampdown after Tiananmen so that moves toward democratization of China seemed to be pretty much on hold, although there were little things that a person could point to if you were looking. Secondly, the Taiwan government under Lee Teng Hui, who had taken over in the late '80s, was becoming increasingly, although it was a nationalist KMT government, Lee Teng Hui himself took a line increasingly looking toward independence, although he was usually careful not to use that term. He was very aggressive in trying to raise Taiwan's international profile. In fact, it was during my watch there that we had a major incident where he gave a speech at Cornell University which really outraged the Chinese government. It may be worthwhile to give you a little background.

*Q: Yes. This is major.*

BOCK: We had had a policy as of '79 that visits to the United States by a president of Taiwan were out of bounds. We had Cabinet level visits which were all "unofficial," even including the foreign minister, although the foreign minister could never come to Washington, but he would make stopovers. Taiwan had relatively few countries around the world that recognized it officially. One concentration of those countries was, still is, in Central America and to some extent the Caribbean. So, as they tried to increase their international profile, they wanted to send their president to various places like San Salvador and Panama City, but the only way to get there was to go through the United States. So, that raised the question of stopovers. And this was an awkward one from the U.S. point of view. The Chinese, of course, said, "This is totally outrageous for any so-called 'Taiwan president' to come to the United States under any guise." Well, that wasn't the U.S. policy. The U.S. policy was a refueling stop would be okay. But we were very cautious about somebody like Lee Teng Hui in particular using a refueling stop to engage in political activities.

So, this question came up in '94 or '95 of a stopover in Hawaii on the way to some event in Central America. What was proposed was an overnight stopover because of how long a flight it is, after all, from Taipei to Central America. The proposal that went up through channels in the State Department had several options involved on the basis of how long a stopover could be and where it could be and so on. For reasons that I had never understood, at a fairly senior level, another option was added which was "refuse." That was the option which was adopted by the Secretary of State. It was communicated to Taiwan and greeted with outrage. "This has nothing

to do with U.S.-Taiwan relations. You are preventing us actively from dealing with our diplomatic partners.” Well, it was an untenable position and the U.S. had to back down.

*Q: Did you all get involved?*

BOCK: Not really in the policymaking process, no. AIT’s role was, once the policy was set, then it was up to AIT to manage the actual stopover. So, eventually, the State Department backed down and said, “Okay, but only a refueling stop. No overnight.” Nat Belocchi was sent out to Honolulu to handle this. The story is that when Lee Teng Hui got to Hickam Air Force Base, he refused to get off the plane as a sign of his great displeasure with the way this had been handled. The plane was refueled and was sent on. That was not the plan. The plan was, there was a VIP room set up and he was to get out there and have an hour or an hour and a half stopover. He refused to get off the plane. The Taiwan people leaked the story that the U.S. refused to let him off the plane. It was only after a while that that was sorted out. This raised a lot of anger in Congress among friends of Taiwan.

That was the background, then, for the next thing, which was a request by Lee Teng Hui to accept an invitation by his old alma mater, Cornell University, to receive an honorary degree. The State Department’s position was that this would be a big breach of our policy. Stopovers were one thing, but an actual visit, even though it wasn’t the president coming to Washington, was going to be seen as a real change in our policy and also was going to be real troublesome because it would allow all sorts of demonstrations and meetings and so on. But the result was that Congress passed some kind of a non-binding resolution virtually unanimously saying that the State Department should grant a visa to Lee Teng Hui to go to his alma mater. So, eventually the State Department backed down. It’s my view that if we hadn’t had this Honolulu incident in the first place, which had created this whole atmosphere, the original State Department policy on Cornell could have been maintained. But maybe not. You never know. Anyway, Lee Teng Hui came to Cornell. We worked with the university authorities there to try to see that this would not be politicized, but of course he had a huge entourage of press, he had various congressmen waiting for him on a change of planes in Syracuse for private meetings, and when he got to Cornell, he gave a very political speech. Of course, the Department had been giving assurances to the Chinese that this would not be a political speech. So, it was a disaster all around.

*Q: Was anybody that you know of saying, “Let’s not give these assurances. This guy is a loose cannon?”*

BOCK: Not that I know of. I was one step removed from the people making the recommendations as to how we should handle it, but as far as who was talking to the Chinese embassy, that was still another step away.

*Q: Were people in AIT braced for the disaster?*

BOCK: Yes.

*Q: So what was the fallout?*

BOCK: The fallout was not in the U.S. It was a ratcheting up of confrontation across the Taiwan Strait resulting in exercises in which the Chinese fired missiles off the Taiwan coast, in which then the U.S. sent two carrier battle groups down to the Taiwan area, saying, "This is unacceptable," and things were kind of wound down after that. But there has been more of a state of confrontation between China and Taiwan since that Cornell speech than there had been previously.

*Q: Was there any disquiet on the part of the people who were in AIT about the aging military potential of Taiwan to defend itself? Was there a feeling that time was not with Taiwan?*

BOCK: Yes, I think that feeling's been there all along. I had mentioned earlier when talking about my period in Taipei that in the 1982 Communique between the U.S. and China, in which we agreed not to quantitatively or qualitatively increase our military assistance, that the qualitative part was a ticking time bomb... With the decision on the F16s in 1992, that removed the qualitative restriction, although we claimed it didn't. But even so, yes, there were concerns. There was a fellow in the AIT office in Rosslyn whose job was the military portfolio. He was a liaison with the Defense Department and handled all these visits by Taiwan generals coming over. With the decision on the F16s, the next problem was whether Taiwan was really in a position to absorb these properly. That was a constant concern. There were other concerns. Taiwan wanted submarines. That was a big issue. We said, "No, because it looks too much like an offensive weapon." That decision recently has been reversed. But you're right. Regardless of what decision was made on these individual issues, there was still the reality that you had an island of 20 million people facing a continental power of 1.2 or 1.3 billion with growing economic power.

*Q: Did you feel by this time- (end of tape)*

*Did you see a change in our relations with Mainland China? Had we gotten over the Tiananmen shock of '89? Were you seeing steps towards an improvement or was there always a qualification?*

BOCK: Well, I think Tiananmen certainly continued to dampen any expectation of internal democratization in China, expectations that were fairly widely held in the 1980s. But what became the issue was no longer what was going to happen internally in China, although that was always an issue. But the major issue after this missile confrontation was, has China made a new determination that it's going to seek a military solution to its problems with Taiwan? After 1979, there was a general expectation, although Beijing was always a little bit cagey, that they were prepared to be patient and would look for ways to unify Taiwan into China by peaceful means. After 1995, that was increasingly in question and still is.

*Q: Did you find that the approaching absorption of Hong Kong in '97 or '98 was looked at by everybody as saying let's see how this works and this might be something for Taiwan to look at?*

BOCK: There was something to that, yes. People were interested in Hong Kong and the idea that the Chinese were going to want to handle Hong Kong smoothly because they need it as an example of how peaceful integration can work. On the other hand, there was realization that the

circumstances in Hong Kong and Taiwan were very different. One was a colonial outpost which had never been run democratically although in the last years Governor Patton tried to establish democracy. On the other hand was Taiwan, which was running itself increasingly as a democracy. It had been running itself for 40-50 years and had been democratic now for maybe 10 years. So, the issues involved were very, very different.

**WILLARD B. DEVLIN**  
**Chief, Consular Section**  
**Hong Kong (1974-1976)**

*Willard B. Devlin was born in Massachusetts on September 30, 1934. He obtained a B.A. from Tufts University and went to Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy where he received his M.A. and completed his doctoral residence in International Relations. He served in Baghdad, Lima, Hong Kong, and Santo Domingo. He also served in the Visa Office in Washington, D.C. He retired in 1980. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on October 15, 1986.*

*Q: You left Lima in 1974. Then you moved to Hong Kong as chief of the consular section there. Hong Kong has always had the reputation of being sort of a fraud capital of the visa world. Did you find it quite a change regarding the visa function?*

DEVLIN: No, not really, because Hong Kong's reputation as the fraud capital of the world was, to a large degree, based upon the old immigration law, where the only way for a Chinese to get in was via fraud. But with the new law...

*Q: ...this would be the 1967 amendments to the immigration law.*

DEVLIN: That's right. So since most of the people in Hong Kong applying for visas were not born in Hong Kong, and therefore they were not subject to the 100 limitations per year from Hong Kong. Those who were born in China had 20,000 visa numbers available. Therefore, the need for fraud was not as strong as it had been before when whatever the quota was, if there was a quota for China, it reduced the chances of the individual applicant to virtually nothing.

But fraud is a habit and a custom in China, and we had absolutely marvelous, incredible files on the Chinese. We had files which would tell us about a certain village in a province, and it would tell us everything about that village. It would tell us where the well was, and the names of the principal families. And most of these villages really concentrated on one little family group there, another family group here, so that if a Chinese came in and said that he was from such and such a village, and he said that his name was Chung, we could check that file -- and did check the file -- and find that very, very rarely, if ever, did Chung live in this village. Then we could ask him more questions about the village and more than likely, he would be unable to answer those questions.

*Q: You used interpreters?*

DEVLIN: We used interpreters. This was a great, great disadvantage, because Chinese, particularly Cantonese Chinese, it is not a Western language, it is not a language that the average American with a normal ability in foreign languages can pick up off the cuff. It is not a language that if you listen to it, to an interpreter and so on, in this process day in and day out, that you gradually pick up words and so on; in Chinese, you don't. So that the dependence upon interpreters was total, and this is bad.

*Q: Were there any problems with interpreters?*

DEVLIN: Yes, yes, there were problems with the interpreters. Very shortly after I left, one of our interpreters was fired because he -- some of the charges amongst all those against him were that in order to process the papers well, he was getting sexual favors from the women.

The same type of fraud applied not just with the visas, but the same type of fraud applied to passports.

*Q: This would be Chinese who claimed American citizenship.*

DEVLIN: Chinese who claimed American citizenship.

*Q: Were you adequately staffed there on the visa side?*

DEVLIN: The staff was very good and quite adequate. I forget how many we had, but we could very well have had 50 people.

*Q: How about the officers? Would you say they were happy with their assignment there, not happy? How did they feel?*

DEVLIN: Most of them focused their satisfaction or dissatisfaction on Hong Kong, as opposed to the work itself. People either loved Hong Kong or hated Hong Kong, and much of this depended upon, obviously, the individual and on the housing. The housing intrinsically was pretty good; 99% of the people lived in very nice apartments. But it was still a concrete jungle, and not everybody wants to live in an apartment. It restricts one in terms of getting out easily and so on, and the recreational facilities were not as good as lots of people would have liked. So some people found the opportunity to be in a place as culturally exciting as Hong Kong to be one of the greatest gifts in the world. Others found it to be oppressive, because they were cramped up in a little corner.

*Q: Back to the flow of immigrants. What were the pressures? We're talking about the Chinese. What were the pressures on them to go to the United States?*

DEVLIN: It was pressures primarily economic, and it was an incentive, primarily economic. The Chinese, as most of the applicants evidenced, had an excellent ability to work in a western society. But they could do far better in the United States than they could in Hong Kong. They could do far better in Hong Kong than in China. So that it was a matter of just moving up

economically to a better life for themselves.

*Q: In the period you were there, were people beginning to feel concerned, particularly the wealthy Chinese merchant class, about the mainland British claim on Hong Kong, which runs out in 1997?*

DEVLIN: Yes, they were. Every year that that came closer, there was something of a decline in their willingness to reinvest in the economy, more apprehension of what would happen, a greater desire to ensure that their children would be able to get to the United States, get to England or Australia. The United States, Canada, and England were the major objectives. It was difficult to get into Australia. Clearly, a Chinese tradition was to prepare the way for their families and looking at the date of 1997 coming up meant that the time to prepare is now.

*Q: I assume a fairly large number of rather wealthy people using their wealth to gain legal admittance to the United States but then would return, keeping their alien residence status.*

DEVLIN: Oh, yes. Yes, this happened quite often. Quite often. As a matter of fact, some of the local employees in the consulate were in a situation like that.

*Q: You left Hong Kong in 1976. You happened to be, if I recall, in Washington, and they told you instead of returning to Hong Kong, you were sent to Santo Domingo as chief of the counselor section. It's not only a change, but from a work point of view, a change for the worse, wasn't it?*

DEVLIN: Well, Santo Domingo doesn't compare to Hong Kong in any sense. Santo Domingo is the place where, if you win a prize, first prize is two weeks in Santo Domingo. The booby prize is a year in Santo Domingo.

**DEAN RUST**  
**ACDA; Staff Assistant to the Director Fred Ikle**  
**Washington, DC (1974-1976)**

*Mr. Rust was born and raised in Ohio, and was educated at Bowling Green University and Ohio State University. In 1970 he joined the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington, D.C. and worked with that Agency until his retirement in 2005. An expert in nuclear and conventional disarmament issues, Mr. Rust was a major participant in the US government's international treaty negotiations during five Presidential Administrations.*

*Q: What was the state of nuclear non proliferation in '74 when you were there. I mean what did this mean and were there any underpinnings to this?*

RUST: Well, between 1945 when the United States developed nuclear weapons and through 1970, that is 25 years, five countries had become nuclear weapons states. The Soviets followed the U.S. then the British, the French and then the Chinese in '64. The nuclear non proliferation

treaty was negotiated in the mid 60's. It came into force in 1970; that treaty drew a line in the sand. It was based on the assumption that proliferation would contribute to instability and increase the risk of nuclear war. It said "let's stop proliferation where we are." Under the treaty, states that didn't have weapons pledged not to get them, and to accept international inspections. Countries that had nuclear weapons (the Five) pledged not to transfer the possession of nuclear weapons to others and not to assist others in the acquisition of nuclear weapons; they also agreed to try to negotiate an end to the nuclear arms race and to reduce their own nuclear arsenals. So that is where we were when the Indians conducted a nuclear test in 1974. This test was kind of a rude awakening because people thought that by that time, i.e. after the NPT had entered into force. most countries had accepted the notion that it was not a good idea for proliferation not to go beyond the five.

*Q: Was India a signatory to the NPT?*

RUST: No. And the fact is that in 1970, when the treaty entered into force, not everybody embraced it initially. Fifty or sixty states joined. Many countries like the Indians said, "Hey, this is a discriminatory treaty... it allows some states to keep their weapons, but it requires others who join it to forswear their acquisition. We are not going to be party to that." Of course, the truth is many countries did join the treaty despite its discriminatory nature, while others wanted to keep the nuclear option open. The Chinese, a neighbor of India, had nuclear weapons. And of course India always followed a somewhat independent path in its foreign policy.

*Q: How did we view the Chinese at that time?*

RUST: The Chinese were a non-player during the negotiations. The U.S. of course had not recognized "mainland" China at this point and it wasn't even in the UN. The Chinese criticized the treaty as a condominium between the U.S. and the Soviets. The U.S. and Soviets were seen by the Chinese as two countries who were trying to deny other countries the right to get their own nuclear weapons. "The U.S. and Soviets want to rule the world." Chinese propaganda suggested that nuclear proliferation would be a positive development as it would break U.S.-Soviet hegemony. In reality, I suspect the Chinese were more cautious about proliferation after getting their own bomb in 1964. But you would never know that from their stated positions. In the long run, China joined the NPT (1991) and changed its position considerably, although it's generally accepted that Pakistan's nuclear weapons program was aided by China during the 1980's.

**MARK E. MOHR**  
**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1974-1977)**

*Mr. Mohr was born in New York and raised in New York and New Jersey. He was educated at the University of Rochester and Harvard University, where he studied the Chinese language. After service in Korea with the Peace Corps, he joined the Foreign Service in 1969, and served abroad in Taipei, Taichung, Hong Kong,*

*Tokyo, Beijing and Brisbane. In his service at the State Department in Washington, Mr. Mohr dealt primarily with Far East Affairs. After his retirement he worked at the Department of Energy on Nuclear energy matters. In 1997 he was recalled to the State Department, where he worked as Korean desk officer. Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.*

*Q: So you went to Hong Kong when?*

MOHR: In the summer of 1974.

*Q: And you were there until when?*

MOHR: For three years, from 1974-1977. I helped report on the death of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Chairman Mao's death, the end of the cultural revolution, etc. I just loved the job. We read four to six Chinese newspapers a day, from the mainland and Hong Kong, read translated transcripts of provincial Chinese radio broadcasts, and talked to fellow China-watchers at other consulates and from the media. As we had only a small liaison office in Beijing, consulate Hong Kong produced a sort of Time Magazine weekly review of events in China. For some unknown reason, it was called the Weeka, and we went to press every Wednesday. We got it out before lunchtime, and then the political section would usually go to our favorite Italian restaurant in Hong Kong for pizza. At last, I was a real China-watcher, and I loved it. I could talk about Chinese politics all day long.

*Q: Let's take your classic Chinese watcher. What were you watching and how do you do it, or did you do it?*

MOHR: You read. You read the newspapers; you read the transcripts of the radio broadcasts, and you figured out, or you tried to figure out, what was going on with the leadership, who was in and who was out, what were the policies they were trying to pursue in the provinces, what were their economic policies, and of course what were their attitudes toward the U.S. It was all very analytical, and there was a lot of guess work, but for someone who up to that point had never had a "real" political job at an embassy, it was great fun. I was doing internal Chinese politics, so in my last year in Hong Kong, I switched to Chinese foreign policy so I could work on issues a little bit closer to more classic foreign service work, which centered on foreign policy issues and particularly the host country's attitude toward the United States.

*Q: With regard to internal politics, had you had much experience in America following politics?*

MOHR: No, not really.

*Q: In Hong Kong, were you able to tap into the people who were coming out of China?*

MOHR: The refugees?

*Q: Yes.*

MOHR: The British systematically interviewed them, and gave us copies of the interviews. But China was an elite communist political regime, and the refugees for the most part were in the same boat so to speak as we were: they had to guess at what was really going on. So the refugee debriefings were not all that useful, but they were interesting nonetheless. I recall that one woman refugee from Anhwei province, when asked in 1976 about the influence of the Cultural Revolution on her village replied, “What’s the Cultural Revolution?”

*Q: Well in Hong Kong were there people, like those on Taiwan, who were trying to prepare to leave if they had to. Was that going on in Hong Kong too?*

MOHR: No. This was the mid-1970s, and Hong Kong was a British colony. The people of Hong Kong, although they didn’t like the British, felt safe enough.

*Q: Did you get any feel for a change in U.S. policy toward China, with the beginning of the Carter administration?*

MOHR: Carter won the election in 1976. By that time, my tour was winding down, and in any case, I don’t think we were privy to any sensitive negotiations of the time.

*Q: I mean we had opened up with China. Did that play any role or was...*

MOHR: Not much, because even though the U.S. liaison office (USLO) had opened, it was quite small. At the time, there was only a two-person political section, and its time was taken up mostly in the care and escort of visitors, so Hong Kong remained the basic political reporting base for events in China. The Weeka continued. It was a little strange. The post hundreds of miles from the capital of China did the basic political reporting, and the post inside China did not.

*Q: Well was the Gang of Four over doing its bit? What was happening?*

MOHR: Mao died in September, 1976, and the Gang of Four, including Mao’s wife, was arrested within one month of Mao’s death. As a matter of fact, I entered China on the day the Gang of Four was arrested. Each of us in the political section was allowed one trip to visit our colleagues in USLO during our tour, and mine was scheduled for the fall of 1976. It was an interesting time to visit. There were wall-posters in all the cities celebrating the arrest of the Gang of Four. I traveled to Beijing from Hong Kong with my wife on the train. We stopped off for a day or two in Guangzhou (Canton), and then went directly to Beijing.

*Q: Well after your time there, did you have any impression of how China might go after the death of Mao?*

MOHR: Mao was initially replaced by Hua Guofeng, but he didn’t last very long, and then Deng Xiaoping took over. Deng was certainly more pragmatic than Mao, and he knew how to develop and grow an economy. There was a misperception in the West that because we could understand (and approved of) his economic policies, that he was a moderate. This was incorrect. Politically, Deng believed in the dictatorship of the proletariat, led by the communist party. He was not a

cute, cuddly little guy. He was a communist dictator. In the 1960s, there was a down-to-the-countryside movement when millions of college students were sent to the villages to “learn from the peasants.” Their academic lives were destroyed. Deng, not Mao, was behind the movement. Unlike Mao, however, Deng did believe that pragmatic economic development was important, so long as the Communist party maintained control.

*Q: Did you get any feel of the central government and its rule, sort of the cadres running equivalent to the counties or not? Did the writ of Beijing run all the way to everywhere?*

MOHR: No, in Hong Kong we really didn't get a feel for how policies played out at the local level. We were mainly studying the central leadership. It was a bit odd. We were living in this British colony, and we were the supposed experts on what was going on in China, even though there was a small U.S. liaison office in Beijing. We were the experts, but it was an academic kind of expertise.

*Q: Did you feel that everything was in the hands of academics? You know academics have a tendency, a very strong tendency, to have firm ideas and often diverse ideas from each other. Was this sort of academic warfare sort of playing itself out?*

MOHR: We weren't academics. Within the U.S. government (USG) in Washington, there were at times fierce disagreements on what was going on in China. Especially as the Sino-Soviet split built up, many within the USG failed to see this coming. Also, in the years leading up to the Cultural Revolution, only a very few analysts believed Mao was not in full control of China. But in the political section in Hong Kong, while I was there, there were no such disagreements. For example, there was a political campaign in China starting in about 1973 that began as the anti-Lin Biao campaign. Let me explain here that Lin Biao was a very famous Chinese general, hand-picked by Mao to replace him. Lin reportedly betrayed Mao, was discovered, and was fleeing China to the Soviet Union, when his plane crashed and he died. Anyway, this anti-Lin Biao campaign soon morphed into an anti-Lin Biao, anti-Confucius campaign. We in Hong Kong reported that the anti-Lin Biao campaign had been an attempt by the conservatives within the Chinese government and party to attack the radicals, led by the Gang of Four. The Gang of Four tried to turn the tables, and began their own anti-Confucius campaign, with Confucius being the fairly obvious stand-in for then Premier Zhou Enlai. So it was a real battle, played out with a war of words daily in the media, between the Gang of Four's faction and Zhou En-lai's faction.

Ironically, Henry Kissinger, who then I believe was head of the National Security Council (NSC), was concerned that Zhou might be in political trouble, so he actually contacted Zhou and asked him. Of course Zhou replied that he wasn't being attacked, so Kissinger decided that our reporting to the contrary was all wrong. It didn't occur to Kissinger that Zhou was not admitting the truth. By this time, it was 1975. As Zhou Enlai remained in power, Kissinger and his people felt vindicated that our reporting was seriously misguided. As a matter of fact, one of Kissinger's senior aides in the State Department received a “courageous” reporting award for writing memos to him that Hong Kong's reporting was wrong and Zhou Enlai was not in any political trouble. It was only after Zhou died in early 1976, and following the purge of the Gang of Four that fall, that the Chinese media let loose with a torrent of reporting stating the evil Gang of Four and its followers had continuously attacked “beloved” leader Zhou Enlai during the anti-Confucius

campaign. So history proved us right, but it was too late for us to receive any awards. At the time, all we received was criticism. But fortunately, there was no Senator McCarthy around, so no one really suffered. All that happened was that we didn't get promoted.

Another interesting reporting "moment," I believe this was in 1975, occurred when the West German prime minister visited China. In a meeting with Mao Zedong, it was reported in the Chinese media that Mao said, when talking about Deng Xiaoping, that Deng "didn't listen to him anymore." Now I recalled that when Deng Xiaoping had been purged during the Cultural Revolution, Chinese documents had claimed that one of the reasons for Deng's purge had been that he was arrogant, and didn't listen to Mao anymore. I thought that Mao telling a foreigner that Deng wasn't listening to him was very significant. So I wrote up a report stating that this indicated Deng was in political trouble. The problem was that there was no previous indication that Deng was in any political trouble whatsoever. So the political counselor, Don Anderson, who was my boss, said he did not want to send the cable. I rewrote it, and made it much more conditional. I said although this was merely a straw in the wind, it might be important, and we were reporting it so that the Washington China community might factor this one tidbit into its analysis. As I was about to depart for home leave, Don said the cable looked OK and he would send it.

When I returned from home leave, I was surprised to learn that Don did not send the cable. He said upon reflection, it was just too "iffy," and did not merit a report. A few months later, Deng Xiaoping *was* purged, and all the China-watchers in the Washington community came under severe criticism. There was even a study, launched I believe by the CIA, to find out why nobody ever reported that Deng Xiaoping was in trouble. Another possible moment of glory, and it passed me by.

*Q: Well were you getting the feeling of reclusive scholars?*

MOHR: Well, in a way, yes.

*Q: But China really wasn't throwing its weight around the world in those days was it?*

MOHR: No, except for supporting Vietnam.

*Q: They were also doing things in Africa. I am not quite sure what that was all about.*

MOHR: China was trying to use its influence to win support in the Third World, and not having a lot of money, I think they felt a little foreign aid could go a long way in Africa. They funded some major projects, such as the Tan-Zam railroad. They were also trying to compete with the Soviets. But because of the approximately 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1976, where they were almost totally focused on internal problems, their foreign policy and influence abroad was fairly limited.

*Q: Were you a source for say the Japanese or the French or other people coming around and saying what is going on?*

MOHR: Yes, we were. There were only a few serious China watching posts among the consulates in Hong Kong. Of course, the British has great resources, and the Japanese put a lot of effort into China watching. Other than those two countries, other diplomatic posts were not serious China watchers, and drew much of their information from us. I was surprised that the Europeans, particularly the French and the Germans, just did not seem very interested in what was going on in China.

*Q: Was anybody looking at the Chinese influence in other places, such as Indonesia, Malaysia and all that.*

MOHR: In our political section, we had one Vietnamese language officer, to monitor Vietnamese influence in southeast Asia. Also, since we graduated more Chinese languages officers from school than there were postings, there were slots in various political sections in Indonesia and Malaysia for Chinese language officers to follow China's influence there.

*Q: Yes, I think you are right. I have talked to people who were in Burma and Malaysia. Of course we had one who was doing something in Warsaw. But that was as a translator.*

MOHR: Right. But in Hong Kong, in our political section, we had about a dozen people, and one slot designated for a Vietnamese language officer. When I was there, it was a fellow named Charlie Lahiguera. He had a very interesting background. His father had been a Spanish diplomat, who, in 1937, closed the Spanish embassy in Washington when Franco took over, and then asked for, and received, political asylum. So young Charlie then became an American citizen. We liked Charlie a lot, but our work rarely intersected, and he knew very little about China.

*Q: OK, so what did you feel like? You were in the Chrysanthemum club, the club for Japanese specialists, but you were a China hand. Did you feel like a fish out of water?*

MOHR: Well, I wasn't in the Chrysanthemum club, composed of Japanese language officers. I was more like an observer. But I soon grew to be interested in Japan and Japanese society. So I asked my colleagues a lot of questions, and as is normal with human nature, when they realized I was interested in what they were doing, they grew to accept me as a sort of honorary member of the Chrysanthemum club. About halfway through the tour, the deputy chief of mission called me into his office and offered me the opportunity of Japanese language training. It was a great honor, but after thinking it over for several days, I declined. I thought that if I learned Japanese, when I was in China, I would feel guilty and anxious because I wasn't doing enough to keep up my Japanese, and when I was in Japan, I would be worrying about losing my Chinese language skills. So, I declined. Some foreign service officers have been able to do both, but I knew I was not one of them.

*Q: What was your job at the Embassy?*

MOHR: Well, my job was in the external section, to report on Japanese foreign policy in various areas, especially of course China. My other areas of responsibility included the Korean Peninsula, the Soviet Union, and the United Nations. I would go to the Gaimusho (the Japanese

foreign ministry) several times a week, and usually call on the deputy director of the relevant office, because the deputy director was my equal in rank at the time. The members of the Japanese foreign ministry all spoke good English, even those for whom English was their second foreign language.

*Q: What was the Japanese attitude or approach to China during this time?*

MOHR: A very good question. Their basic overall attitude was a bit critical. They felt we were too carried away with China, that we were too emotional. Of course one major concern was that our preoccupation with China would translate into ignoring Japanese interests.

*Q: China does this. People are falling in love with China over and over again.*

MOHR: Yes, the Chinese are very good at manipulation. One example was long-time conservative columnist Joe Alsop. He was a friend of Taiwan, and a critic of China, for many decades. Then, sometime in the 1970s I believe, China invited him for a visit and he went. His column afterwards was incredible. He basically said something like, after going to China, he understood that they were communist, but underneath it all, they were still Chinese! Since they were still Chinese, they were basically good. An incredible flip-flop. The Chinese are good at this, and the Japanese are not. The Japanese spend great sums of money on public relations, invite Congressmen and their staffs to Japan, and still most Americans have a warmer feeling towards China. The Chinese have this amazing ability to beguile foreigners that very few other foreign countries have. The Japanese are particularly bad at this, and so are the Koreans.

**DENNIS G. HARTER**  
**Political Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1974-1978)**

*Mr. Harter was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Georgetown University, Seton Hall and American University. He joined the State Department in 1966 and was assigned to the CORDS program of USAID in Vietnam. He subsequently studied Chinese and served in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Hanoi, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission (1997-2001). In his Washington assignments Mr. Harter dealt primarily with East Asian matters. He also served as Director of the State Department's Press Office in Washington and as State's Representative to the Washington Council on International Trade in Seattle. Mr. Harter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

*Q: You went to Hong Kong and were there from when to when?*

HARTER: I went to Hong Kong in the early summer of 1974. I went there on a four year assignment, two years, home leave and two more years in Hong Kong. So, I ended up leaving Hong Kong for an US assignment in the summer of 1978.

*Q: What Section were you assigned to and what were your assigned duties?*

HARTER: I originally came in as the number two of three in the internal reporting unit in the Political Section – the section basically for the China watchers. The other half of the office, the external affairs unit, followed Chinese foreign policy while we tracked the Party and Government operations at the national and local levels. My boss the first year was Sherrod McCall who has been retired now for some time. I then took his job for the remainder of my tour. His counterpart in charge of the external side was Jay Taylor; he's written several books on China. Jay was replaced by Richard Hart who previously had been working at the Consulate on Refugee issues – the Chinese who were coming into the colony from the mainland, not the Vietnamese who would be the major focus for the incumbent of that position a couple years later. Since I was there for four years, there were also changes in the Political Section Office Director position as well. I started initially under Wever Gim. Wever was a Chinese American, one of the earliest Asian Americans taken into the Foreign Service. Wever's name was one of those INS (Immigration and Naturalization Service) creations. When his family arrived in the U.S. his name was pronounced in Chinese and the INS guy said, "Sounds like Wever to me!" And so his first name became Wever. After that it was Stan Brooks, who had been my office director in INR and finally Donald Anderson.

When I first got there I was working with Sherrod McCall on analysis of internal developments in China. Sherrod did national issues and I did provincial issues. My responsibility was to look at developments in all the various provinces of China. There was a third officer, Mark Mohr, who covered some of the specialized issues. He looked at political-military issues and a couple of other topics. So internal PRC affairs were covered by the three of us. There was also an Economic Section that covered mainland affairs, but it was a smaller unit, and for part of the time was directed by Lin Starbird who was on that China Task Force I referred to earlier when we were trying to determine if we could ensure the Republic of China's seat at the UN.

Sherrod was a great boss who spent a lot of time working with me to sharpen my analysis of events in China. He was also an excellent drafter and editor and he really improved my writing – so much so that when Stan Brooks became the Section Chief he noted the significant change from when I had worked for him in INR. One of Sherrod's most important contributions to my work was to get me to stop writing my reporting messages long-hand on those legal size yellow tablets. Sherrod said I had to think at the typewriter and get my material down more quickly. It took time but I became more proficient under his direction and I was soon turning out my reports much more rapidly. Of course, as you well recall, we were all using manual typewriters – only the secretaries had electric typewriters and then not all of them were so blessed. You also recall those terrible telegram forms, the green ones with the carbon copies and how hard they were to prepare and type and then correct if you made a mistake. Today's officers don't realize how difficult it was to get those messages into useable form for the communicators.

*Q: Mainland China during a lot of this period falls into different things like the Great Leap Forward, etc. etc. Where in 1974 while you were looking internally was China at that point?*

HARTER: The Great Leap Forward was in the mid-1950s, the big events for this period were related to the Cultural Revolution. And, I would say this four year period was probably one of

the most interesting periods of the modern Chinese era. It was a time in which the fundamental changes that you now see dominating the Chinese scene were all in their gestation stage. This was the period when Zhou Enlai convinced Mao Zedong to start winding up the Cultural Revolution. Mao rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping for the first time in the decade following his purge during the Cultural Revolution. When Deng returned, he became sort of an understudy to Zhou Enlai. But, Zhou Enlai died before any such transition could take place. There was still a great deal of opposition to ending the Cultural Revolution and those who had gained their power and influence during that period did not want to relinquish it. This group was led by the so-called “Gang of Four” – Chairman Mao’s wife and three other three key party cadres from Shanghai who tried to push the whole revolution leftward again. They successfully conducted a criticism campaign against Deng Xiaoping and he was purged for the second time for his rightist tendencies. However, before the leftists could consolidate this triumph, Mao Zedong died. Although Mao had selected a personal successor to lead the Communist Party neither he nor the Gang of Four could really take control. Hua Guofeng, Mao’s successor, collaborated with Deng Xiaoping and other senior Party leaders to purge the Gang of Four and restore Deng to prominence. Hua was then slowly eased out of the Party Chairmanship and he was replaced by a Deng ally, Hu Yaobang. Before the Cultural Revolution, Hu had been head of the Party’s Youth League. Deng turned over running the government to a former governor of Guangdong and Sichuan by the name of Zhao Ziyang who as Premier, under Deng’s direction, led the way to transform the economic structure of the nation. During these next few years, there was a steady pressure against the forces that had taken control during the Cultural Revolution and an easing back into power of those who had been purged by the ideological leftists of that period. So a very dramatic period: Deng’s return from the Cultural Revolution purge to a government role under Zhou Enlai; Zhou’s death and the Gang of Four’s successful manipulation of the aging Mao Zedong to force another purge of Deng; Mao’s death and the ousting of the Gang of Four coupled with Deng’s return and the successful “reversal of verdicts” against others purged in the Cultural Revolution and the simultaneous removal of the “leftists” all came about during my tour in Hong Kong as a China watcher. The economic and social experiments which Deng Xiaoping undertook to open up China to the outside world, particularly on the economic side, then led to the creation of the special economic zones and a recognition that it was important to be a part of the world economy.

Because Sherrod McCall left at the end of the summer of 1975, I became the head of the internal unit at a most interesting time. At that point, my job shifted to cover national politics and I re-divided the portfolios for the other two officers in the internal affairs unit, Mark Mohr and Rick Bock, so they shared provincial and topical assignments. As I said before, the US Liaison Office (USLO) officers were stationed in Beijing and they could observe the daily events reported in Beijing, but they didn’t really travel, and they didn’t have a chance to talk to Chinese officials very often. They were there, but they were not very operational in normal reporting and analysis terms.

*Q: Were they able to read the wall posters?*

HARTER: Yes, they could get out and do that, absolutely. And that was very important. They could also talk directly to personnel at other embassies who had access to Chinese officials and who also had better travel opportunities. So, I’m not saying they didn’t do significant reporting,

it's just that the post was still not considered the premier China-watching post. China-watching was still considered to be Hong Kong's responsibility during this time.

*Q: That became quite an art didn't it?*

HARTER: Yes, it certainly was. It was a tremendous art form then – historical allegories, cartoons, satires, and of course the written word. I still have a collection of photographs that were informally taken in Beijing and Shanghai and a few other provincial cities depicting wall posters and people reading them. This included the period when Deng was purged by the Gang of Four and then the posters when they ended up purging Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, and the other members of the Gang of Four. The caricatures of the Gang of Four were particularly lively and imaginative. Some also cover posters from the democracy movement which occurred later. This was a period of tremendous change and upheaval. And you knew what was being written at the universities and on the streets was being read, and read probably by people at very high levels. It was a difficult to do analysis of developments in China but we regularly received commendations for our analytical work from the East Asia Bureau, from the Secretary and other people in Washington. So we had a pretty good audience for our reporting.

*Q: Let's talk about - first just to finish up. Would you explain what the wall poster movement was? What generated that?*

HARTER: The wall posters originally were part of the mass campaigns directed by the Party. They had been used in the past and in the '50s and '60s to purge those already discredited by the Party authorities and to develop mass support for the campaigns. In the early days, these were part of the mass campaigns organized by the Party – sloganeering for the Great Leap Forward, the anti-Soviet campaigns and of course the Cultural Revolution itself. During the Cultural Revolution you had people targeted by personal attacks and posters but they were largely part of a larger Party-run effort more than expressions of public concern or criticism. They were used during the Cultural Revolution to discredit individuals and they were used by all sides. It was only later that the posters became more of a public expression of intensity or even rebellion. That was most evident during the Democracy Wall movement and again later in the 1980s after the death of Hu Yaobang which led to the Tiananmen demonstrations in 1989. But the involvement of students and ordinary people in the poster writing campaigns of the late 1970s were clearly the start of this form of individual or group expression and the start of real criticism of the government and the party. During the seventies, the poster campaigns were designed to generate public support for the downfall of the Gang of Four. They used all sorts of caricatures of the people being criticized. Because Jiang Qing had been a 1930s movie actress and then, as Mao's wife, associated with a series of dramas, operas, ballets to commemorate the revolutionary spirit she was portrayed and written up as “the white boned demon” a traditional opera figure. Posters showed a caricature of her head on top of the body of a snake. Then written below these drawings would be the criticisms of specific actions she had taken, to purge good people, to elevate her cronies, to undermine Mao and the revolution etc. During this period, there was certainly no critique of Chairman Mao, as there would be later on, and many of the posters continued to praise his contributions while pointing out how Madame Mao had distracted him and corrupted his policies.

*Q: As this was going on, we're talking about 1970 what?*

HARTER: Well the whole thing started in 1974 with Deng's re-emergence and the posters and the purges of the "Gang of Four" would have been in 1978 which is when I left, summer of 1978.

*Q: Was there within this a certain amount of democracy? In other words, were local people beginning to put up their own wall posters?*

HARTER: Yes. There were people who did, because they felt that this was a part of a new openness and individuals were putting up posters and student units at the universities were putting up posters. During the period, particularly in the latter phases when the gang of four was purged and Deng Xiaoping came back there were discussions of political change. Deng had proposed major changes and "four modernizations" for China – agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense -- and at the end of 1978, Wei Jinsheng put up a poster on the Fifth Modernization, Democracy. It was posted on a wall outside of Beijing University and that became the center for this sort of expression. The location became known as Democracy Wall and activities there just grew and grew. The Chinese media made much of Deng's early post-Liberation slogans "seek truth from facts" and "it doesn't matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice" and the students took these slogans as the impetus for spelling out all sorts of complaints about the Party and how the people were being treated. Unfortunately, because the party and government leaders were not ready – the government and party personnel were still largely synonymous – the Beijing University location was gradually closed down and the posters were moved to a more obscure location where to enter one had to register and the wall posters there died out by the end of 1979. There was no indication the leadership was ready for any real relaxation of control, and there was certainly no commitment to a western style of democracy. There had been a change of people at the top and a greater flexibility in how these new people wanted to deal with the rest of the world for China's economic benefit, but there was certainly no intention to move for political change. There was no plan to change anything politically. So, Deng and the others said enough is enough and they just closed it all down and arrested people and sentenced them to long terms in jail.

At this time there were a number of very well-known poster-writers, like Wei Jinsheng, who achieved great readership not only in China, but outside, because the journalists who were in China, all began to go out with their interpreters to photograph, to copy down the posters, translate them and publish them abroad. So, you had big articles coming out of the New York Times, the Washington Post, and LA Times all about these wall posters. There were appeals for democracy and freedom as well as named criticisms of some of the leaders for their politics, particularly during the Cultural Revolution. The posters in these instances served the Party well as it made it easier to eliminate leaders who had been "leftists" in the Cultural Revolution but who tried to hold on to their positions afterward.

*Q: Now we move back to you in Hong Kong. How did you get your information? I mean for example, were there duplications of democracy wall in other parts in the provinces and all that?*

HARTER: Yes. There were certainly some big character poster displays in most all of the

provincial capitals. The campaigns for example in the major cities like Tientsin and Guangzhou not surprisingly focused more on local than national issues. In Shanghai, because it was the base for the Gang of Four, there was a lot of criticism of them in particular. As had been the case during the early Cultural Revolution when different groups struggled against one another, there were “old scores” to be settled and a lot of what we heard about in the provinces was one factional group getting back at another that had suppressed them during the Cultural Revolution. In addition, there were still quite a number of people crossing the border from China into Hong Kong. People took advantage of the unsettled political situation to flee to Hong Kong which at that time still had what they use to call the “touch-base system.” If you could cross the border, get through the New Territories on the Kowloon side and reach a certain point, I can’t remember now whether it was on Hong Kong Island or in Kowloon itself, as long as you got there you were “home free” and the British would accept you as a refugee and permit resettlement in Hong Kong.

I mentioned earlier that Dick Hart first had been the head of the Refugee Office at the Consulate General and this subsequently created a problem for him with the authorities in China. All of us knew PRC officials paid attention to us and knew what we did. Once the Liaison Office had been established in Beijing, we periodically tried to send people from the Consulate to visit Beijing and simultaneously do a little traveling in China. My boss, Sherrod McCall had gone in 1974 and the next person in line was Dick Hart. Dick’s application sat, and sat, and sat and Chinese officials never did anything about it. We’d ask the China Travel Service in Hong Kong and they’d say, “Beijing officials are still considering the request.” So, finally the Consul General decided -- its been six or seven months since our first request for his visa and we haven’t had anybody go into China -- Harter, you’re next in line, we’ll put your name in and see what happens. It was instantly approved.

When our liaison staff got the written approval, the word came back from the PRC officials; “your people at the Consulate General don’t have a ‘right’ to visit China. We agree you can visit from time to time, but we’ll decided who visits and when. And,” they said, “we know what Mr. Hart’s job responsibilities were.” The Chinese were letting it be known they were not happy that Dick had been helping mainland refugees and occasionally worked to get someone of interest out to the United States. So, I got a chance to travel to China for the first time in 1975. It was a period where things were still very controlled. It was before the death of Premier Zhou Enlai and Madam Mao’s group was still a very powerful force.

*Q: But, Zhou had died?*

HARTER: No, Zhou didn’t die until early the next year, 1976. So, I went in and how and where I was to travel was very structured. I asked to visit a lot of different places besides Beijing. The answer was no, no, no, no, no, except for Shanghai and Guangzhou. The only travel “concession” was to permit me to travel by train leaving Beijing all the way back to Hong Kong. But, they wouldn’t let me get off the train except in the two approved stops, Shanghai and Guangzhou, and both were approved because one generally switched trains in those locations. I wasn’t permitted to have any meetings in those cities with local officials but I did manage to stay overnight in the Peace Hotel in Shanghai before I caught the train to Guangzhou. When they put me on the train in Beijing, they put me in the soft-seat car, the soft-sleeper car which normally is

for all the foreigners and high ranking officials inside China. They put me in a four-person compartment by myself and nobody else was permitted anywhere near me. On the train, there were scheduled times for meals, but the schedule they arranged for my meals was set up after everybody else had eaten. So, I didn't have any contact on the train with anybody else, with two exceptions. On the ride between Shanghai and Guangzhou, a very high-ranking military officer came in and sat in my compartment. This was a time when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) personnel didn't have identifying insignia or ranks on their uniforms. You judged a military man's rank by the quality of the cloth of his uniform and by how many pockets he had on the uniform. The man who came into my compartment had two breast pockets and two lower waist-level pockets and several pins on good material. He chatted with me for part of the time that it took to travel between Shanghai and Guangzhou. He got off at an intermediate stop and that was it, I was by myself once again.

The other time I had "contact" with Chinese on the train was a less pleasant experience. I was hungry at the time of the mid-day meal and about five or ten minutes before I was scheduled to eat I went to the dining car. Two Chinese passengers were still eating. The staff on the train made them get up and leave, because I came into the dining car. Aside from service performed by railway staff, those were my only contacts with Chinese during this entire on-the-train experience which lasted for more than 3 days.

*Q: It's interesting, because when you look at our officers in the Soviet Union, sometime would get permission to travel and they had a wonderful time, because they'd be out on the train and they'd meet all sorts of people. Normally, things are controlled, but there, I mean, the people would put on pajamas and people would ask all sorts of questions, even in more difficult times.*

HARTER: This was just absolutely out of the question. You just had no access whatsoever. And, as I said, at all the various train stops you could not get off the train. One of the features of the Chinese train station stops was the peddlers who would sell local snacks. About the only thing you could do was to hang out the window and look for what was being sold. Then you'd have to call out and point to somebody and order one of the local snacks just so you could try it. Now I must admit, none of these were prolonged stops so you weren't being prevented from doing a lot of wandering around or talking to people. Each stop along the way was only to let people disembark and board for the next leg of the trip. But, it was made absolutely clear, as a foreigner, you were not allowed to disembark. During this period, a number of the cities were troubled, there was fighting and unrest in the cities. Rural areas were also not excluded and many of them were still suffering from mismanagement so there were food shortages and struggles in the countryside too. As a provincial analyst, that's what I spent a lot of time looking at and describing for Washington readers. So, in a way, you could understand why the Chinese were not eager to let you off the train.

*Q: How did you get your information?*

HARTER: We got our information from refugees, from reporters who were in and out of China, from diplomats who actually had embassies in China and who then would come in and out of Hong Kong and the China watchers at other consulates and commissions. Before I arrived in Hong Kong, a group of China Watchers had set up a weekly luncheon meeting to review

developments in China. It included a lot of the journalists, Jay and Linda Matthews, Joe Lelyveld and Fox Butterfield, Dan Sutherland, David Bonavia, Tiziano Terzani, Sydney Liu, David Chen, David Aikman, Ross Munro of the Toronto Globe as well as the local diplomats and a couple of people from the Hong Kong Government who did China watching. Because there was so much going on and so much interest in trying to learn about it, the group kept getting bigger and bigger. I think there were a dozen regulars when I started and after a year or so we were up over thirty people coming each week. That became a bit much and while I still would go some of the time, I organized a different smaller group made up of representatives of Consulates and Commissions who were most serious about the China watching work. I used similar groups with varying country memberships in later postings as a way to get a broader look at local developments. Anyway, with the smaller group we could really concentrate on important issues without just feeding information to people from consulates who didn't have any other sources or answering questions from a group of journalists. I'd then just meet with the journalists one on one to share opinions and information.

Several of these journalists wrote books about China during this period and they'd often pump us for anecdotes or stories they could use. I remember Jay Matthews, who is now the education writer for the Washington Post, included one story in his book I had related to him which I called "the Umbrella Theory of Courtship in Revolutionary China." While I was visiting Shanghai in 1975, I'd taken a walk in the rain along the Bund, which is part of the old foreign settlement area from pre-war Shanghai. This stretch along the river was filled with young couples standing and talking in the rain. All were carrying umbrellas to ward off the rain but I noticed that some had the umbrellas raised high above their heads while others were lower. Some used only one umbrella to shield the two young people and that seemed to suggest a greater degree of intimacy and affection. But I then concluded that the ones who were the most serious in their mutual affection were the ones who used two umbrellas but who had brought them to shoulder height and formed them into a sort of shell which protected them from the eyes of their neighbors or those passing by. My "umbrella theory of courtship" thus concluded that the degree of intimacy between the young couples was reflected in the heights of their umbrellas until the penultimate stage when they shared one umbrella and the final stage being the two umbrella shell formation.

Another big asset we had the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and its monitoring and translation of provincial radio broadcasts.

*Q: FBIS.*

HARTER: FBIS monitored Mainland broadcasts and we'd review daily translations to try to piece together information about political campaigns. Sometimes there would be local newspapers that had been picked up in the provinces by people from different consulates so we'd share that information as well.

*Q: What about the Chinese staff, the Foreign National staff? I would imagine that these would be a prime source?*

HARTER: Yes. They were also a very important. They would look at the local newspapers, the local PRC newspapers which reflected Beijing policies. We had a couple of analysts who worked

on those issues. But what was most important was their institutional memory of what had been going on in China over the past twenty years.

Many of the local employees, particularly in the Consular and Admin Sections had been there for more than twenty years. The Economic Section analysts were also ones with long tenures. Our chief analyst was a good bit younger but he'd been at the Consulate long enough to know the ropes very well. His family had left the mainland when he was a small child and he'd grown up in Hong Kong but he was always fascinated by the mainland. He was one of the most knowledgeable people I've ever worked with on China affairs. His name was Vincent Lo. Later on, when it got closer to 1997, he emigrated to the U.S. with his family. We had huge subject files, biographic card files on all the various people in the Chinese leadership at all levels. We had files which tracked leadership appearances, who showed up, when and, at what event. This was used to try to determine – particularly when people did not appear where they should be – about possible purges, transfers and power shifts. The local employees would keep track of all of this and Vincent would regularly come up with reports suggesting where changes were about to occur based on this record keeping. I would direct the local employees to look at specific issues and personalities. We'd create a series of watch lists of things that one tried to keep up with. Then, you would periodically review these materials with them and look at who was appearing and what was going on. Then you'd factor in items you've read or heard about from other reporting and try to create patterns of where political activities were taking place. We had a very elaborate system for cross-checking and cataloging information.

*Q: Who was the Consul General back then?*

HARTER: When I arrived, it was Chuck Cross. He was the Consul General and his Deputy was Norman Getsinger. Then when Getsinger left the Deputy was Burton Levin. Tom Shoemith was the Consul General after Chuck Cross. He later end up in the EA Front Office as the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary covering China and then he went to Malaysia as Ambassador. In the early eighties, Burt became the Consul General and he was the one who asked me to go back to Hong Kong in 1982 to reorganize the China Reporting Section. By that time we had normalized relations with China. Hong Kong no longer had the primary responsibility for China reporting. That was Beijing's job. But, there was certainly a feeling Hong Kong had a role to play because of its unique location and resources. Even though we had an Embassy in China and we had Consulates at Guangzhou and Shanghai, those who focused on China affairs felt Hong Kong still could contribute to the reporting and analysis. But that's jumping too far ahead, it was late 1981 or early 1982 when Burt asked me to return and refocus Hong Kong's China reporting.

In the mid-1970s in Hong Kong you had the feeling you had a real audience in Washington for what you were writing. The China situation was dynamic and fluid and China had become a major Washington focus because of the Kissinger-Nixon trips which opened up a relationship with the PRC. Everyone knew it would only be a matter of time before full normalization of relations would take place. It was just a question of when. Of course in Hong Kong, we were cut off from that debate and we had no knowledge of the discussions going on back in Washington about normalization. That was certainly a distraction, particularly for those working on the external or foreign affairs side of the Political Section, because Hong Kong was not included as an addressee on any information about those types of policy discussions. But, for those of us

“reading the tea leaves” and interpreting the leadership and political dynamics of China, there was a feeling your analysis was certainly being widely read and was being used in the decision-making process back in Washington.

I want to stress that our ConGen China Watcher team had a very good idea of where China was going. Vincent Lo, our chief FSN (Foreign Service National) analyst and I worked a lot on trying to project China’s next steps to reform the country. And, shortly before I left, we collaborated on a think piece about the likely direction of China’s political steps and we accurately predicted a couple of years in advance the appointment of Zhao Ziyang as Prime Minister of China. Unfortunately for Zhao, he ended up on the wrong side of Deng Xiaoping during the 1989 demonstrations in Tiananmen. And, when more conservative leaders and the military convinced Deng he should clear the square and end the student demonstration, Zhao was dismissed and put under house arrest until he died more than a decade later.

*Q: When you arrived there what were the changes? What was your view of the direction of events in Mainland China? I mean, were they going to the left, was the situation in doubt? Were things going to become more friendly towards us or what?*

HARTER: Well, during the time that I was there it went back and forth in very sharp swings. As I arrived, Zhou Enlai was still alive and the Chinese leadership was bringing back Deng Xiaoping so it was a swing to the right. Politically, it looked like they were going to open up a bit more, but as soon as Zhou died things went into a swing back across the center and hard to the left with the purge of Deng and the ascendancy of the Gang of Four. That lasted until Mao’s death in the fall of 1976. That immediately resulted in a bumpy shift back toward the center that kept moving further and further right with Deng’s ascendancy and the purge of the Gang of Four. Things were bumpy because nobody wanted a wholesale purge within the leadership and it took several years to remove many of those high ranking officials who had ascended as a result of the Cultural Revolution. Dumping Madame Mao and her immediate cohorts, Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, and Yao Wenyuan, was relatively easy because they were not very popular but the others were scattered around the country in positions of influence which made it hard to get rid of them all at once. I think there was a great deal of optimism in China when Deng Xiaoping returned because he was seen to be less doctrinaire. There was no question the Communist Party was going to be in control, but it was a pragmatic control, the basic focus was results. Deng Xiaoping’s phrase “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white so long as it catches mice” had been used against him in the Cultural Revolution with the leftists arguing he wasn’t willing to follow Mao’s line and would be all over the place with his policies. But that “pragmatism” was what China needed, and perhaps needed most at this particular time in order to get back on its feet.

*Q: Were you picking up stories, there was almost an avalanche of accounts in the 1990s that came out of China of people who were caught up in the --*

HARTER: Caught up in the Cultural Revolution, that period? Yes, there certainly were lots of those first-hand accounts that we heard. In fact, though, some of the stories about the mass campaigns and the purges had come out much earlier. I can remember reading some of those early first-hand stories when I was in graduate schools in the 1960s. But, the ones with a strictly

Cultural Revolution focus were indeed the ones coming out in the mid to late 1970s.

During those years, a considerable number of American and foreign journalists covering China were based in Hong Kong. They could not live very easily or very well in China and if they did live there they tended to have a harder time getting stories than those who worked on the outside and came in from time to time. Although I had good relations with most all of them, one, Eddie Wu, I considered to be a good friend; our families did a lot of things together. Eddie was the number two correspondent for the Baltimore Sun. Eddie was a Burmese Chinese and had gone from working with the U.S. Army during the Second World War and helping us in the Burma-China-India Theater up to Beijing in 1950 after the Communists took control. He bounced around working for various embassies as an interpreter/translator, I remember him saying the Dutch Embassy was one of the places he worked at that time. He got to know the ins and outs of Beijing and Chinese officialdom and then gradually moved out of China to Hong Kong where he joined up with the Baltimore Sun. The chief China Watcher for the Sun was Arnie Isaacs. Eddie and I would talk all the time. He had a lot of contacts with people from the Mainland, including people who had recently managed to get out. He worked to relocate them in Hong Kong, helped them find employment and such and got to know a lot of their personal stories as well as what was happening in a number of places around the country. Our conversations gave me the opportunity to tap into some of those stories and contacts.

*Q: Were we looking towards people sharpening their daggers for when the time came? I mean, an awful lot of people were almost destroyed by their neighbors. I would think there would be an awful lot of concern about revenge.*

HARTER: Well see, that was part of what we were looking at in the provincial areas when I first arrived. A lot of these fights were going on in some of the provinces as a direct carryover from the Cultural Revolution. Factions were still trying to settle scores between factories, within factories, within work units where one group had gained the ascendancy over another during the CR period but now was experiencing what the Chinese were calling a “reversal of verdicts” with those “ins” now becoming the “outs” and vice versa. Groups that had been up or down at one time or another were trying to exact vengeance against the people who had criticized them and who had pilloried them in an earlier period. This was going on quite regularly, particularly in provinces along the coast, like Zhejiang and Fujian.

Some of these places got to be pretty wide open. There were entrepreneurs developing private businesses, smuggling operations involving products going to and from Taiwan and Hong Kong, as well as the rise of groups in these cities who, if they had been in Hong Kong, would have been called gangsters. I remember writing a piece about a little town in Fujian called Shishi. Not such a little town, it probably had a hundred and fifty thousand people or thereabouts at the time. But Shishi was one of those places where they smuggled all kinds of goods from and to Taiwan. There was fighting to control markets and lucrative trade as well as the CR score still to be settled. We’d get reports from travelers who had been through and we’d review the provincial radio broadcasts as they reported on local events. We’d also occasionally see local newspapers and were able from that to piece together the violent activities that were taking place there as well as all the smuggling and profiteering. I remember writing a report about Shishi, saying about the only thing you couldn’t find there was a Nationalist (Taiwan) flag. And, I sarcastically

claimed that was only because they were still trying to reproduce the design at one of the local factories. In fact, you could do just about anything in Shishi that you wanted. The local party and government leadership was corrupt and ineffective and shared in the smuggling profits and got involved in the fighting. Ordinary people were involved in all sorts of illegal trade and gangsters who had smuggled guns in from abroad were robbing banks. It was a wild little town for a couple of years before provincial authorities stepped in and toned things down. But the factional fighting itself continued for more than just a couple of years in places like Fujian and Zhejiang where there was a lot of physical clashes. Some of the very senior Cultural Revolution figures didn't lose power and influence until they died several years later. They were so well entrenched in the system it would have been too disruptive to have tried to force them out before they died.

*Q: I realize this wasn't in your particular area of interest, but you were there when Vietnam fell. How did this hit you and your wife and all and then what was the general prognosis? What did this mean? Did this mean -- we had considered China and Vietnam are closest lips of teeth or something like that. How did this play from your perspective in Hong Kong?*

HARTER: Well, there were several issues involved. First, there was the U.S. Government policy which said USG personnel should not complicate the evacuation process by returning to Vietnam. Second, there was the personal situation where individuals who had served in Vietnam felt they had to help former associates or family members to get out. I was one of the individuals who followed Secretary of State Kissinger's instructions and did not try to go back in as the country was collapsing. Personally, I had been in to Vietnam as a visitor just after the lunar New Year in 1975, and I was able to arrange for my wife's family to depart while I was in Hong Kong.

Not too long before the fall of the country. My wife and I went right after Tet, the 1975 lunar New Year celebration. My wife's brother had died just after the western New Year's. It was a tragic case. He was a bright young man and worked as a translator with the Americans at MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam). But, he got sick during the Christmas holidays. His family took him to the main hospital, a civilian hospital, not one connected to the military. When the hospital discovered he was in the military – he had an ARVN rank – the family was told he had to go the military hospital. Before anybody had even looked to see what his problem was, they had him shipped over to the military hospital. The military hospital was, as usual, inundated with people with war wounds. To the doctors there, he was just another “sick” patient and not somebody who needed a lot of immediate attention. He was shunted off to some room and he died two days later, from meningitis. If properly diagnosed, the disease could have been treated and he could have been back home or at work in a couple of weeks. He was already preparing for a post-war career and had been translating popular U.S. novels of the day into Vietnamese – he'd done a couple of Frederick Forsythe novels and some others. He left behind a wife and three kids; the oldest one a little over three. My wife and I were there in February because we couldn't go when he died a few weeks earlier.

While I was there I went in to visit with a friend of mine who worked in the Political Section at the Embassy, Lacy Wright. Lacy and I talked about the general political situation and the military confrontation. He said, “Our basic assessment is the (Vietnamese) Government is going to come under a lot of pressure in the provinces, particularly in II Corps and it's conceivable

we're going to lose a provincial capitol in the highlands. But, basically the rest of the country is in good shape. The government seems to be in good shape; they've got a good forward strategy in the placement of military personnel and aside from the fact the enemy can pick a target and concentrate its forces on that target and give the government forces a hard fight, most think we'll still do alright, it won't be really bad." So, I'm guessing this was the American Embassy's official position in February. And of course by April 30th it was all over and Hanoi's forces had overrun the country down to the delta and occupied the Presidential Palace in Saigon. When we had this discussion, I nonetheless said, "If things get really bad, can you keep an eye out for my in-laws?" He said, "Sure, no problem, just tell them how to get in touch with me and I'll see they're taken care of."

In one of those unusual coincidences where everyone seems to be related, Lacy was dating someone related to my wife's family. My wife's "aunt" was Lacy Wright's girlfriend. So, where others felt they had to go back to Vietnam to try to rescue family members or to help former associates when Vietnam collapsed I did have that immediate pressure to go back in. When the II Corps highland provinces collapsed, I called Lacy on the phone and he reiterated his commitment to help them out. As the situation deteriorated in April, Lacy moved my then mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law and three kids into his house and told them to stay there until he told them it was time to go to the airport.

When Ambassador Graham Martin decided it was time to evacuate the Embassy dependents, and people associated with the U.S., it was pretty close to the end. Before that he had refused to permit a structured exodus or much planning for one because he said it would demoralize the Vietnamese if they saw us pulling out. Actually, at that point, the Vietnamese had already seen the writing on the wall and they were more than demoralized. They were panicked and were looking for every possible way out of the country before the Hanoi troops reached Saigon and moved down into the delta. Lacy managed to get the family gathered at Tan Son Nhut and they were evacuated on the second Embassy evacuation flight.

I had no idea that anything had even happened until my sister-in-law called me from Clark Airbase in the Philippines and said, "We're out and we're on our way to California." That "we" included my mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law, her three kids, Lacy's girlfriend and her parents. All were evacuated under my name, just one big family sponsored by me. They were sent directly to California via the Clark refueling stop. They didn't go through any of the refugee processing centers or any of the other special arrangements which the U.S. Government was hurriedly trying to set up to deal with the influx. Our group was just dropped in California. The reason they ended up in California was because the family on Lacy's side of the group had a son studying in California. With virtually no forewarning he woke up to discover all of these other people moving in with him. He already had a wife and young baby living in a very small apartment over a garage. Now, he had four infants and another dozen people all staying in there with him. My friend from language school, John Thompson, was a big help because he had a place in California where I could relocate my more immediate family group. She also had a Vietnamese friend who worked as a stewardess for Pan Am who was based in California and she and her boyfriend who worked for the telephone company helped keep an eye on everyone until my wife and I could get back to California.

A couple of days after they arrived in California my wife and I arrived to separate the two parts of the group. I moved my wife's relatives out into the other apartment while the others remained with the son and his family. Then I visited the British Consulate in San Francisco to get visas for all of my wife's immediate family to come back and live with me in Hong Kong. It took a little bit of time because all of them were traveling on international refugee travel documents – they didn't have any real status in the U.S. INS system – and the UK wanted to make sure these people were all going to be appropriately taken care of and not become a burden for the Hong Kong Government. My wife's employment with Pan Am was a big help because we got discounted tickets to get to California and then again to bring everyone back to Hong Kong. Now, however, my family of four had grown to a family of ten in a four-bedroom apartment. It was a good size apartment, but it quickly became crowded. My wife and I and my two kids kept the two bedrooms we had been using and then moved the mother and her three children into one room and my wife's parents into the other. We lived that way for the next year, until it was time for me to return to the U.S. on home leave. My father-in-law got a job with the French Government radio station in Hong Kong, the French Version of VOA, broadcasting news and commentary about Vietnam issues to listeners throughout the region. He also did some volunteer work with some of the refugee groups in Hong Kong. His wife helped out at home and, along with our regular Filipina amah, did the cooking. My sister in law had her hands full with her three kids.

From the policy side, there was obviously a great deal of concern among our contacts of how much further the takeover of the south was going to go. I mean, obviously, not only did Vietnam fall, but the communists also took over in Laos and Cambodia in short order.

*Q: We're talking about the dominos.*

HARTER: All of these countries had been part of an ongoing conflict in the preceding decades both before and after the French had left in 1954. And, it was already quite clear the new regime taking over in Cambodia was in a special category all by themselves. There was no fraternal brotherhood operating here and the Khmer Rouge was already fighting with the Vietnamese Communists as they moved into the areas in the Mekong delta adjacent to Cambodia. There were a number of quite nasty cross border clashes with significant casualties. The Cambodia takeover also produced an unusual personal story. When I had been in Vietnam just after Tet in 1975, I had purchased some lacquer objects, including a lacquer table that had to be shipped to me by sea to Hong Kong. The ship it was loaded on to come to Hong Kong was the Mayaguez and it arrived just before the fall of Vietnam. On May 7, about a week after the fall of Saigon, the Mayaguez left Hong Kong on a routine voyage back toward Southeast Asia. Khmer Rouge military forces seized the ship as it passed into the Gulf of Siam. U.S. Marines were subsequently sent to try and rescue the crew and others and a number of the Marines were killed there on an island where the Mayaguez crew was being held. Later on when I was serving in Hanoi after we had normalized relations, our POW/MIA investigation teams were actually operating on that island trying to recover remains of the Americans who died there trying to liberate the Mayaguez and its crew.

In the aftermath of the Communist victories in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia the non-Communist nations of the region were able to prevent any further southward movement of the Communist

forces. The Thais, in particular, had used the Indo-China war period to strengthen their own capabilities and to build up their economic power. They prepared to defend their borders, shifted defensive forces, assembled aircraft at advance airfields, etc., as the Lao and Khmer Communists took control of the other side of the Thai border. I still believe the United States assistance to the South Vietnamese in their struggle against the North over the previous decade, made the difference for the Thais and those other nations on the Southeast Asian mainland to be strong enough to stand up to the threat of North Vietnamese forces. In the 1960s, these countries didn't have the social, economic or political cohesion, to say nothing of the military wherewithal to defend themselves against Hanoi's forces if they decided to keep moving forward. So, while those of us who had served in Vietnam were greatly disappointed at the outcome of the conflict, there was still some sense of satisfaction there was no further advance into the neighboring countries. I think some, myself included, felt a certain resentment that the political forces in the United States had undercut the southern resistance against Hanoi's invasion. We failed to fulfill the commitments we had made when our troops were removed in 1972. The U.S. political arena was in a shambles, the President was totally discredited, Congress no longer supported any of the President's policies, the American people wanted out of the war and had no desire to continue involvement even if it didn't mean the presence of American troops. Now, I don't know if Nixon's commitments were sincere, maybe they weren't. Maybe his promises were just a part of his planned way to get out of Vietnam and claim credit for ending the war. Maybe he was willing to promise anything just so we could remove our troops. Nixon's reputation for deception and double-dealing had certainly been strengthened by the Watergate revelations, so maybe the commitments to provide supplies and air power to help the Saigon Government were whole cloth from the beginning.

Having said that, I and others felt disappointed the American Government had not been involved in trying to block Hanoi's advance. I'm not sure there was any way the South Vietnamese regime would have been able to build enough public support to stand on its own even given another couple of years of ammunition and armaments. The reputation of the government was poor -- incompetence, corruption, nepotism, no real macro-economic development strategy. On the other hand, none of us had any confidence that whatever Hanoi was going to bring in from outside was going to be anything better for the people in Vietnam. I stress here bringing the regime and policies in from outside. This was no civil war. The southern communist cadre were all tools of the north and when Hanoi's forces took over the southern cadres largely were pushed aside. Historically, Vietnam had not been a unified country, even before the French operated three different zones for the country. Although some southern officials took on important roles in developing the Hanoi economic modernization effort in the late 1990s the people in control were northerners. I felt that way in the '60s and '70s and still feel that way today. I don't think there has been any evidence produced since then to contradict my feeling.

*Q: In your looking, although you were looking at internal matters, were you picking up early on the enmity between Vietnam and China? I mean, I think while you were there the war took place didn't it?*

HARTER: No, the border war actually didn't take place until I was back in Washington. That was in February of 1979.

**DAVID G. BROWN**  
**China Desk Officer**  
**Washington, DC (1974-1976)**

**Office of the Republic of China Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1976-1978)**

*David G. Brown was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1940. He graduated from Princeton University in 1964 entered the Foreign Service. His assignments include Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Before retirement in 1996, he served as Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 28, 2003.*

*Q: Well, then when you in 1973 after this real immersion because there's nothing like being in a place where you really have a challenge which I would imagine that you'd felt that you'd been through the fire as far as having to deal with.*

BROWN: I'd thought that I had learned the trade so to speak.

*Q: So, what did you do in 1973?*

BROWN: I came back to INR to work on China. I wanted a job on China and I couldn't get one on the desk so I accepted one working in INR analyzing China.

*Q: You were doing that from '73 to?*

BROWN: I did it for just less than a year because I found out that I really didn't like being an analyst, writing and rewriting papers and carrying classified papers to the desk. That wasn't terribly satisfying. So as soon as I could work it out I got out of that business and got on to the Japan desk. That was thanks to the help of Bill Sherman who had been my Political Counselor in Tokyo and who was then the Director of Japanese Affairs. He managed to make it possible for me to go work as an economic officer on the Japan desk for two years.

*Q: That would be basically '74 to '76?*

BROWN: Yes 1974 to 1976.

*Q: Quickly on INR, what piece of the action did you have?*

BROWN: Some of China's foreign policy. I remember one thing I did was a study on China's ability to project military power into the South China Sea and the capabilities of other military forces of countries involved in the South China Sea. What would be Vietnam's capabilities, what were the Philippines' capabilities? What else I was doing, I really can't remember. I do remember that I didn't take to it very well, which is funny right now that I'm in academia and enjoy history

and analysis. At the time, writing papers, which were then rewritten by three other levels before they saw the light of day, didn't appeal to me. I just wanted to get back into the action.

*Q: Well, it's really very frustrating. I know I had a short stint in INR and I took a different path where I was a consular officer. I made decisions. I liked running consular sections and you know, getting patted on the head and told yes, your paper is alright, but let me really change it and all that. Some people take to this. You're showing in one way this is why being a China hand at the time when you started was of that nature.*

BROWN: Right.

*Q: Were you suffering from schizophrenia, sort of personnel wise, were you a Japanese or a Chinese hand or was there such a creature as an Asian hand?*

BROWN: There really wasn't. I considered myself all along a China hand. Japan was an interest I developed in addition to my interest in China. My career took me to many parts of Asia, but I always thought of myself as a China hand.

*Q: Did you notice with the Japanese hands, you know, we talk about the China hand going back and forth to a few places, well, the Japanese hand has one place to go and did you find that this your exposure to both the desk and in Tokyo, did this produce somebody who was almost overly localized, too much localities in that?*

BROWN: There is this danger. As I said earlier, I know some China hands who worked on China pretty much their whole career. There were some Japan hands who spent much of their career on Japan. In Japan, you said there's only one place. In fact at that time, there were more places to go as a Japan hand than as a China hand. In China, you could go to Taipei or Hong Kong and that was it, but in Japan you could go to Sapporo, or Osaka or Naha, Fukuoka or Nagoya in addition to Tokyo. A Japan hand could study the language training, go out a consulate, go back to the desk, go out to the embassy, come back to the desk, get a higher job, go back to the embassy a third time as a DCM or political counselor. There are plenty of examples of people who had that kind of very focused Japanese career and would have maybe one or two non-Japanese jobs. I was quite happy with a more diversified set of experiences.

*Q: Be more fun.*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: It gave you also a much broader view.*

BROWN: I think so.

*Q: Well, now in '76 what did you do?*

BROWN: I went to the Office of the Republic of China Affairs which was the desk dealing with Taiwan and I was there for a little over two years until the fall of 1978.

*Q: Well, this also was a very interesting time, wasn't it?*

BROWN: There were, I would say, three interesting aspects of it. One concerned Carter and human rights. Carter created a new U.S. human rights policy, which brought some tensions between desks and the human rights bureau that was being created then. Second, we had the first confrontation with Taiwan over nuclear weapons development when I was there. The third was the lead up to normalization with China. I actually left the desk before normalization, but I was there under Dick Holbrook when my boss Harvey Feldman was very much involved in planning how we would handle the relationship with Taiwan along the lines of the Japanese model when we recognized the PRC. He handled that part of it pretty much on his own. Normalization was being managed out of the White House by Mike Oksenberg and Brezinski. Only a few officials in the Department were involved, including Harvey Feldman.

*Q: Let's go to the human rights. You started in '76 so that you were on the Republic of China's desk during the end of the Ford administration. So, when the Carter administration came onboard, was there concern that they were going to upset things or not?*

BROWN: There was a tension. We were in the process of doing something that hadn't really been done before which was to articulate a human rights policy with respect to Taiwan. We were dealing with a country, Taiwan, where there were very serious human rights issues. Taiwan was still a one party dictatorship. Chiang Kai-shek had just passed away. His son Chiang Ching-kuo, who had run the security services, was Premier. There was no freedom of expression on political issues. So, there were serious human rights concerns. I was fortunate enough to work for a great officer, Burt Levin. He was determined and I shared his view, that the desk were going to stay ahead of the curve and set policy for Taiwan before the human rights bureau -- I think her name was Pat Derian -- tried to cease the issue.

*Q: Yes, Patt Derian.*

BROWN: Burt's approach, and one I shared, was the desk would be active on this acting in a way that made sense and would yield results, rather than being driven by Pat Derian.

*Q: It sounds like this was a very forward policy because so many of the desks sort of resisted the idea of well we can't do this because of such and so. In other words, rather than being proactive, they sat back and tried to be instructive.*

BROWN: We didn't take that attitude. Also, the Congress was getting interested in human rights issues on Taiwan and that kept some pressure on us.

*Q: This is tape three, side one with David Brown. Well, how did we see things? In the first place when you went to that desk, it must have been on everybody's mind that things were changing. I mean Chiang was dead. We recognized China.*

BROWN: Recognition came later.

*Q: I mean hadn't recognized, I mean we'd opened to China, which was a whole new ball game, and Taiwan was not going to be the major player anymore.*

BROWN: That's right.

*Q: Was there a sort of sitting around and regrouping and saying okay, where do we go from here?*

BROWN: It was very clear when Holbrook came into the Department that things were going to change, that the U.S. was going to move ahead and normalize relations with the PRC. How that was going to be handled was an issue, but not whether it was going to be done. I guess there were two aspects of it from our perspective. One was how do you fit Taiwan into this? I can remember the first briefing we had with Holbrook. He had been around to the various desks and I can't remember whether we were the last or not, but we were definitely not at the high end of his list of priorities. I can remember sitting down with Burt.

*Q: Burt?*

BROWN: Burt Levin. Holbrook came to talk with the desk. Of course when one had a briefing with Holbrook, most of the talking was done by Holbrook. He started it off by explaining how proud he was that he had never been to Taiwan. He had never accepted a visit, had no contact, and wasn't being sucked in by the ROC lobby. I recall that the main point we wanted to get across was that if we wanted to normalize relations successfully with Beijing, we would have to take care of the relationship with Taiwan in a manner that would be acceptable to the Congress. Holbrook wasn't interested in that aspect of it.

*Q: I recall around this time I was in Seoul. I was chief of the consular section there and I remember Holbrook making a visit. He came across in those days as a young hotshot who was very full of himself, which he probably still maintains, but he had been on the outside and was not really overly accepted within the establishment.*

BROWN: Well, I don't know if you remember how his time at the Department started or not. Art Hummel had been DAS and was moved up to be Assistant Secretary for a period at the end of the Ford administration. Holbrook just sent a word around that Art and all of the DAS's should be out of their offices by the 20th of January. Hummel offered to brief him, but to the best of my knowledge Holbrook never met Art Hummel to talk about the transition and what the issues were. He knew what he was going to do. He was sure he was well informed. He knew the people he was going to bring in. These were professionals. Roger Sullivan I think came in as the DAS for China, but Holbrook was cleaning house, things were going to be different. I have a lot of respect for Holbrook, but in his personal relations with people, he can be either very charming if you are cooperating with him, but if you're in the way, he just pushes you aside.

*Q: Yes. How did you go about? Let's deal with the first thing: human rights? It would have been an ambassador in Taiwan at that time.*

BROWN: Yes, I believe it was McConaughy who was a four square supporter of the KMT. We

were not out crusading, but Burt's view was that Taiwan was a society which was in the process of gradual change and that we should be trying to nudge them in the right direction. We didn't have many of the tools that we have now. For example, we didn't develop AID programs then to strengthen the Legislative Yuan. I don't recall that we changed the way the embassy operated. The embassy as I said earlier had long had an officer responsible for dealing with the opposition. We just tried to stay out ahead of the curve on the demarches to be made. We were going to write them in our office and clear them rather than let the human rights folks take the lead.

It was just at this time that the first Congressional hearing on human rights in Taiwan was held. It was Burt Levin who was asked to present the administration's testimony. I'd love to go back and find the testimony to see if it sounds today as good as I recall thinking it was at the time. We tried to lay out the history of political change in China, where we thought things were going on Taiwan and how the U.S. could work effectively in Taiwan society to bring about change. How the U.S. ought to encourage change, not just criticize mistakes, without being heavy handed. Not to threaten cutting off aid or reducing military assistance, but by pursuing subtle diplomacy.

*Q: Well, did you feel that Holbrook, did he spend any time on Taiwan?*

BROWN: No. He did bring Harvey Feldman into the planning on what kind of relationship the U.S. would maintain with Taiwan after normalization. Harvey worked on a variety of alternatives for a consular relationship or for establishing a liaison office. But in the end, the decision was to accept an unofficial relationship along the lines of the Japanese. The Japanese arrangements were very informal. No legislation passed by their Diet. In the U.S. system everyone recognized that you would have to have a piece of legislation to establish the future relationship and give it, what's the term I'm looking for? Legal viability in the United States. That led to the legislation that Carter put forward in the spring of 1979. What Harvey was working, with some research help from those of us on the desk, was how do you structure this. What kind of office do you have? What should it be called? How do you maintain the legality of our agreements with Taiwan so that they would stay in effect? How do you set up a procedure where you could have new agreements and keep business going? All this was being studied by Harvey. There were scholars in the United States that were doing research on these subjects and presenting proposals. We collected their materials to ensure that their expertise was available in the Department.

*Q: Was Chas Freeman there or not because I've interviewed the guy.*

BROWN: I don't know where Chas was at the time.

*Q: Moving back to the human rights side, how did Chiang respond? I mean was there, how were things going human rights-wise?*

BROWN: The most positive thing happening in this period was that Chiang Ching-kuo was opening up the KMT to young educated Taiwanese. The KMT was a party dominated by mainlanders. So this new policy was extraordinarily important thing; it had started maybe three years earlier and was just beginning to pick up some steam. So, when I said we tried to encourage things that were happening, we were patting him on the back for doing this and we

were trying to get credit for him in the U.S. for moving in this direction. I can't remember just who was thrown in jail while I was on the desk. We weren't apologizing for such things, but we were trying to get people to see that there were other positive things happening as well.

*Q: Were there any problems with the Taiwanese I hear they have a wonderful network in the United States, almost as powerful as the Israeli network. Did that; was that something you had to consider politically?*

BROWN: Not at that time. The McCarthy era was over. Anti-communist attitudes were still strong.

*Q: We'll pick that up another time. How about the intelligence operations in the United States? Was this an irritant or not?*

BROWN: Not that I recall. However, later when I was working on Taiwan affairs again in the 80s, we did have problems.

*Q: You mentioned there were three things you had to deal with. One was human rights. We've discussed that. What were the other two now?*

BROWN: The other two were the preparation for normalization. Americans on Taiwan were very concerned that we were going to pull the rug out from under them, that we weren't going to provide for Taiwan and that our economic interests there were going to be sacrificed. We dealt with that. I traveled to Taiwan and had to brief different groups about the thinking in Washington. While I wasn't cut in on the details of the negotiation, I knew the general direction of policy. We had to do the same thing in Washington when people would come through the State Department and get briefed.

The third issue was non-proliferation. The problem there was that the Taiwan's had bought from Canada a natural uranium research reactor, and the French were in the process of selling Taiwan reprocessing technology with the idea that they would be reprocessing fuel from their power reactors and using the reprocessed material for fuel rods for the power reactors. The research reactor used natural uranium fuel that was suitable for reprocessing into weapons grade plutonium. That was a very serious concern because this technology could be turned to nuclear weapons use. So, we expended immense effort to persuade the French and the Taiwanese that they should not go through with these reprocessing plans. A lot about this issue remains classified. I did a lot of the leg work on this for Burt and later Harvey.

*Q: That sounds like a nuclear weapons program; what led Chiang down that road?*

BROWN: The Chinese had detonated their first nuclear device in 1964 and were developing their nuclear weapons capability. Countering that capability was probably the prime motivation. Later our withdrawal from Vietnam and the enunciation of the Nixon doctrine, which said states should be primarily responsible for their own security, created doubts about the reliability of U.S. commitments. That may also have been a factor.

*Q: So how did we deal with that?*

BROWN: As I said, we worked to persuade Taiwan and the French to abandon the reprocessing project. We used the fact that Taiwan was a member of the NPT, the Non-proliferation Treaty, and that the safeguards that would have to be applied in Taiwan on any reprocessing facility could only be covered by a safeguards agreement that the United States had with Taiwan. France did not have a safeguards agreement that would cover their sale to Taiwan, and this gave us leverage. By this point in time, Taiwan had been expelled from the IAEA and there was no way the IAEA could negotiate new agreements with Taiwan. We were cooperating closely with the IAEA and one very knowledgeable officer from ACDA helped the IAEA understand some inspection problems at the Canadian reactor. In the end, we persuaded the French to drop the sale, and the Taiwanese to give up their work on reprocessing. Taiwan was in the process of building a second or third nuclear power station at this time, and nuclear energy was a significant part of their electric generation. The nuclear technology and fuel came from the U.S. This was part of our leverage. Although the reactor was a problem, Washington did not object to its operation believing that a combination of IAEA inspections and periodic U.S.-Taiwan nuclear energy consultations would assure effective safeguards.

*Q: Did you get any feel for the attitudes for the personnel of the Taiwanese Embassy? This must have been, they must have thought they weren't quite sure where they were going and all this. It must have been a very difficult time for them.*

BROWN: Yes, they were trying to do everything they could to maintain good relations with the United States. They realized they did not have a sympathetic ear in the Carter administration, so they were using their connections on the Hill.

*Q: Did you find that the Carter administration was sort of turning a cold shoulder to Taiwan?*

BROWN: Yes, they were keeping Taipei at arm's length. We were in the process of scaling down our military relationship with Taiwan. After our military role in Vietnam ended in 1973, we began withdrawing military units from Taiwan that had supported the war effort. The whole relationship had begun to change after Nixon's trip. We had made a commitment to the PRC that we would move in the direction of scaling back our military relations in Taiwan. Once Carter got in office, one part of the effort to avoid a sharp break in relations with Taiwan was to start a steady reduction of the military ties with Taiwan. Units were withdrawn and military assistance was shifted to a loan or sales basis. The MAAG and Taiwan Defense Command were gradually scaled back.

*Q: Well, then when you left there in '78, I mean it was assumed I guess that we're going to have some sort of relationship with Taiwan, but that we were going to have an official relationship with China?*

BROWN: Yes. I didn't know exactly where the negotiations stood. I left in August and it wasn't until December that the negotiations were consummated.

**HERMAN REBHAN**  
**General Secretary, International Metalworkers Federation**  
**Washington, DC (1974-1989)**

*Herman Rebham was born in Poland and raised in Germany. He came with his family to the United States in 1938 and settled in Cleveland, Ohio. After working in auto manufacturing plants in the Midwest, he became Administrative Assistant to United Auto Workers President Walter Reuther, and dealt with domestic and international labor matters throughout his career. In 1972 he became the United Auto Workers Director of International Affairs in Washington, D.C. Mr. Rebham died in 2006. Mr. Rebham was interviewed by James F. Shea and Don R. Kienzle in 1995.*

*Kienzle: One final question. Do you have any comments about the U.S. Government's Labor Attaché Corps and its performance?*

REBHAN: My experience with Labor Attachés was always good. They knew the country [of assignment] and I never ran into one, even during the Reagan period and so on, who spewed the conservative line. The only time someone kind of embarrassed me was in Taiwan, and he was political officer, I think. He wasn't a Labor Attaché. I met with him, and he said, "Well, these are not your real unions. They are government unions. How do you explain that?" I said, "Wait. The time will come." In Taiwan, we had an interesting [situation] in a way. Taiwan was a dictatorship really for many, many years. We had affiliates there. The Japanese worked slowly and quietly there. One time we had an Asian regional conference in Taipei. We checked before hand, because if everybody didn't get visas, we wouldn't hold the conference. We checked with our guys, who told us, "Look, there won't be any problem. The Israelis will get visas." It came time for [the conference], and I got a phone call from the Histadrut. They couldn't get visas. Well, the Taiwanese didn't have representation in many of these countries, so you had to go to Lucerne, Switzerland, to get a visa. That's all right. We didn't care, but they gave us a run around. So two days before the conference I said to our Taiwanese, "You go and tell the Government that we are canceling the conference. Tell them also that when the ICFTU had a congress in Mexico and Mexico didn't want to give visas to the Taiwanese to come to the congress, I voted in the Executive Board to postpone the conference. I fought for you guys to get visas. I think I can [now] expect [visas for the Israelis]." Well, finally the Israelis got visas. They came a day late.

*Shea: Was that Giladi?*

REBHAN: Giladi. He was a nice man. He died.

*Kienzle: He died about three years ago.*

REBHAN: He had stomach cancer of some kind. So we had the opening of the conference and the Minister of Interior, who was in charge of labor like in all those countries, was going to speak to the conference in Taipei. I had a prepared text, which I gave to the Chinese interpreter. I wrote out in longhand in English criticism about the visas. So the Chinese interpreter said to me, "Mr.

Rebhan, you're not going to say this?" I said, "I'm going to say that absolutely. This is what happened." He said, "You can't do this!" I said, "I can do this." Then the Minister of Interior had to tell me, "No, there was a misunderstanding and everything is all right."

**LEONARD UNGER**  
**Ambassador**  
**Taiwan (1974-1979)**

*Ambassador Leonard Unger was born in California in 1917. He received a bachelor's degree from Harvard University in 1939. He joined the Department of State in 1941 and later the Foreign Service. In 1945, he was worked with the post-war boundary issues in Europe. Ambassador Unger worked in the late 1940's and early 1950's on the issue of the Free Territory of Trieste. This work led to his appointment as the Assistant Secretary for South East European Affairs. He served in Italy, Thailand (where he later was ambassador), Laos, and Taiwan. Ambassador Unger was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.*

UNGER: So he was Secretary of State at that point. Kissinger was determined to switch our relationship with China so that we would have diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, Where we already had some kind of less-than-formal representation. We would terminate our Embassy in Taiwan and follow it up with whatever less formal arrangement we could mutually work out with them. So I believe that at the time I was appointed to Taiwan there was pretty much of a conviction, you might say almost a commitment, in many quarters in Washington, to work toward this change, whenever and however it could be most effectively be brought about.

There were many people in Washington, in the Congress, in the State Department, and for that matter, elsewhere in the Executive Branch, people who definitely were not in favor of this move. They were very loyal supporters of Chiang Kai-shek and his government on Taiwan as representing the continuing Republic of China recognized by the U.S. as the government of China.

Anyway, I was appointed and succeeded Walter McConaughy, who had been U.S. Ambassador in Taipei for several years. I was not sure whether or not I was going to be the last ambassador, but recognized that there was a pretty good chance I would be. In some fashion or other, we would be working out a new relationship with Beijing which would oblige us to reduce our representation in Taipei.

I think by that time we had a liaison mission in Beijing. There was George Bush in charge there at that point or soon thereafter. It was the spring of 1974 when I went out; I don't think he was yet in Beijing at that time, but he took over not too long thereafter.

*Q: Yes, Bush. It was David Bruce until September of '74. Bush came in October of '74.*

UNGER: Yes. So less than six months after I took over in Taipei, he took over in Beijing. Now we're in the Nixon Administration. There was still a commitment--whatever people may have had in the back of their mind for the future--there was still a commitment to Taipei.

Was it Leonard Woodcock who was prior to Bush?

*Q: No, it was David Bruce.*

UNGER: Yes, David Bruce. You just said it was. That's funny, I can't see David Bruce in Beijing.

*Q: He was there a relatively short time. He was there from March of '73 until September '74. Then Bush, then Gates, then Woodcock.*

UNGER: In any event, I think my communication with David Bruce was minimal; I was still getting myself installed. I had never, prior to that time, been in China. I don't think I had ever been in Taiwan, except on brief business visits, to say nothing of the mainland.

I don't think anybody knew when I went there just how long I would be there. How long it would be until they felt it was politically acceptable to switch our representation to Beijing--how long before the Administration would want to make that kind of change.

So I became involved with what for many years had been a very special political phenomenon on the American scene, namely, the group that was very loyally devoted to Chiang Kai-shek.

Anyway this was, of course, already a considerable political issue in the United States. By that time, many important people, including people of a generally conservative identification, were feeling that trying to maintain an embassy in Taipei and not give credence to the existence of the PRC was no longer acceptable; they came to believe that the U.S. should appoint some prestigious individual to be present in the PRC and be able to deal with the government in Beijing. It was pretty clear that, barring some international crisis, in which we and the PRC might be at odds with each other, in due course we were going to have an Embassy in Beijing and we would be obliged to close down our Embassy in Taiwan. How we would do it; what kind of continuing representation we would have in Taiwan; what the PRC would insist on in the way of our future relations with Taiwan, if we wished to establish relations in Beijing; all of these were questions that people were working on in Washington.

*Q: You had not particular instructions on this. Everybody knew this was in the cards?*

UNGER: That's right. No, I was instructed that my job was to go and continue the U.S. relations with the Republic of China and Taipei. Of course, inevitably, I had to take into account their attitude about the mainland, but obviously, in no way seeming to agree with it or support it. But nevertheless, I realized that it was a fact of life and that whatever I did, however I managed my mission in Taipei, I had to take account of how they felt about the mainland. Of course, at that time, it was totally negative. It causes me to look with some considerable interest, and some amazement, at the lady who's just gone to Beijing, whom I knew in Taipei.

*Q: She's the head of the Trade Delegation?*

UNGER: Yes, I think that is what it was: trade and/or finance. There was a big international meeting-the A.D.B., I believe-to be held in Beijing. She went in a kind of special category; she took part in some things and didn't in others. Shirley Kuo is the person I'm talking about.

Shirley Kuo I knew as a fairly high-ranking person in the economic, financial field in Taipei. Someone exceptionally attractive and talented. So I have to say that I'm very pleased that she's still in that position, and that she was chosen to carry out this mission.

Her husband was, as I recall, the head of the Elected Parliament; I don't know whether he still is; she was a good deal younger.

*Q: Did you find, within the State Department, and really almost within the Foreign Service, a group of officers dealing with China who felt we should get on with it and in a way, jump completely into relations with the PRC and to hell with Taiwan? And other groups that were saying no? Could you talk a little about this relationship within the professional ranks.*

UNGER: It might be that such a view was increasingly held, as we were moving into the last chapter in what had been a very divisive issue in the United States as a whole and particularly in the Foreign Service. This issue was posed in sharpest fashion once the Communists had taken over on the mainland in 1949 and Chiang Kai-shek had fled to Taiwan.

Of course, for many, many years, the United States Government had no intention whatsoever of any relationship, any official relationship with the government in Beijing, and it very loyally kept up its connection with Taiwan. By the time I was sent to Taiwan, however, I think we already had our liaison mission in Beijing with David Bruce then Leonard Woodcock, and then George Bush. This was seen by many as sort of the beginning of the end of the old pattern and that there was going to have to be a readjustment.

The opposition to that, in the U.S. Congress, and in the Foreign Affairs community was still very strong. I'm not sure I can relate these things precisely, but the mainland had just gone through some pretty unhappy periods of cultural revolution and that kind of thing. So anybody who was taking the earlier line about how Taiwan was a dictatorship, and how the mainland was a model democracy, obviously was being laughed at at that point. [Laughter]

Nevertheless, one had to acknowledge that the real China, was the China with its capital in Beijing. And that important as Taiwan and Taipei was, particularly in a number of special ways, it couldn't any longer represent China as a whole.

So there was certainly an expectation in many quarters that a change in "China policy", change in representation, was going to be coming before too many more years went by. Nobody knew exactly when. Nobody knew what political situation in the United States would permit it. Nobody knew when the discussions with the government in Beijing would reach a point where some of the issues that were very difficult for the United States to face, would begin to be

resolved. And also nobody knew when the opposition in the U.S. Congress and in fairly important political circles in the United States, would reach a point where the switch could take place.

*Q: Where was the greatest opposition? You're saying important political circles. Can you name any people or areas?*

UNGER: Taiwan then, as it has continued to be, was a remarkable locus for American business in numbers of firms and dollars invested and business done and so on. Remarkable particularly when one considers how small an island it is. And yet it's one of the top several--I'm not going to remember precise figures, but I think it was number six--in trade carried on with the United States in recent years. And this was a time, remember, when the mainland presented a very sorry picture of repeated upheavals and cultural revolutions and uncertainties about the future...and certainly of sharp hostility toward the United States.

Also China had had a very close relationship with the Soviet Union; I can't remember exactly when that went on the rocks.

*Q: Right now, I think they're having a summit today in Peking and this is the first one since something like '53 or '54, '57 maybe. I'm not sure. But we are talking about 30 odd years.*

UNGER: Anyway, there was growing sentiment in the United States that whatever we thought of the PRC, it was just too important a factor in the world for us not to have representation there, not to be in some kind of effective communication. And, of course, this had already had its expression in the setting up the liaison mission. Needless to say, Chiang Kai-shek had thought that decision it was shocking and disloyal to our relationship with him. But we were still not on the verge of the switch that did not take place until December 31st, 1978.

*Q: Was Chiang Kai-shek still the leader at that time?*

UNGER: Chiang Kai-shek was the leader in my first year in Taipei but he was in very, very poor health, and in April, 1975, he died. By that time, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo was in charge, with Madame Chiang Kai-shek's efforts at very close supervision; Ching-Kuo had pretty much moved into the position of leadership, not in name, but in fact. When I first went to Taipei, Chiang Kai-shek was still nominally President. And the Parliament, which by now has become a body of real political significance, was still made up very largely of people who had come across from the mainland, with very little Taiwan representation. They were mostly superannuated individuals who had come over in '49 and who held onto their positions, but were certainly out of the picture.

And there was still a very marked hostility to the Communist government on the mainland. There was also marked hostility to any other government that had recognized and chosen to establish relations with the mainland government, as opposed to Taiwan. There were still, I would guess, 30, maybe even 40 governments that still had relations with Taiwan, that had not switched. The number now is something like a dozen (although a few small nations have recently opted for Taipei). And everything that took place on Taiwan, except the most strictly internal matters,

anything in the international field, anything in relations with the United States, was heavily colored by this concern about maintaining the position of the Republic of China as the only government of China recognized by the United States.

*Q: Did you have any feeling that the knowledgeable people in Taiwan were sort of preparing, even within the government, for the time when we would have full representation? Or, were they sort of shutting their eyes to the inevitability of this?*

UNGER: I'm sure that individuals who were reasonably perceptive and honest with themselves and well informed were certainly thinking about this eventuality. I think that even among those who were reasonably realistic, given the position of the United States for so many decades as well as that of some other major countries, there were those who had the feeling that somehow or other they would be able to hang on, that their government would continue to be recognized as the government of China by many countries. And that given all the internal conflicts and instability on the mainland, their day and their opportunity would come when, God knows, maybe they thought they might even be invited back. I don't think very many of them any longer thought in terms of military action to retake the mainland, but they felt there might develop a chaotic situation there, in which it would be possible for them to move back in and reassume charge.

Of course, as time went on, and as the mainland began to pull itself together and overcome some of its internal difficulties, these dreams faded. Prospects grew steadily dimmer as countries that had maintained relations with Taipei, little by little severed them, and were willing to send a consul or somebody to Taiwan but were not willing to have their regular diplomatic relationship with China any longer in Taipei--they were moving over to Beijing. As this went on, of course, it became clear that eventually Taiwan and the Republic of China would be recognized and accepted as China by very few nations.

The disposition of the Government of the United States at that time was such that they were fairly confident that the United States would continue its relationship for some time.

*Q: You had left by this time?*

UNGER: No, I left . . .

*Q: In 1976.*

UNGER: Let's see. I went there in the spring of '74.

*Q: No, excuse me. You had left the post in January 1979. You came in 1974 and left in 1979.*

UNGER: December 31st, 1978 was the last date we recognized Taiwan. And January 1st, '79 was the first day we recognized Beijing. And so, obviously, my official status came to an end on December 31st. I didn't leave for several days thereafter, although I was under very strict orders to leave immediately. All of this had happened very quickly and I was determined, as far as possible, to remain in Taipei long enough to help the government on Taiwan adjust to the new

situation and establish what was going to be the new type of Taiwan-U.S. relationship from that point forward. (We are still there, of course, essentially in that capacity, with our liaison mission).

But the word from Washington became sterner and sterner. I did, in fact, leave something like the 13th of January. I wasn't in Taipei all of the time from the 1st of January to the 13th. I went to a meeting in--I can't remember whether it was Bangkok, but I think it may have been. That was a kind of Chiefs of Mission meeting that I attended. I attended it partly because this whole development had just taken place and everybody wanted to know what had happened, and what was foreseen for the future, and what was going to be the impact of this on Taiwan?

So I went to the meeting with that in mind. Then I returned to Taipei by about the 13th or 14th and left Taiwan for good soon thereafter, leaving in charge Bill Brown, who had been my deputy. He was there in a sort of special capacity and I think he remained until about April or May, by which time the Taiwan Relations Act had been passed by the Congress. This relieved some of the most acute apprehensions of the people on Taiwan as to what would be the future relationship with the United States. And Brown did a splendid job in that interim period when, as you can imagine, feelings ran very high in Taiwan.

The Taiwan Relations Act went a good deal farther toward meeting the concerns of Taiwan than many people in the Carter Administration wished. But it did go through the Congress and was incorporated in law and is now the law. It made it possible for the United States to continue a quasi official relation with Taiwan, and one that Beijing has not worried about unduly.

So this new pattern was developed, essentially in that period, between our very precipitate action in November '78 and the spring.

*Q: Did you feel you had much input into the change of relations or was this something that was being called from Washington? This was, of course, the Carter Administration. You were just off to one side on this?*

UNGER: No, not entirely. Anybody who knew the temper of the U.S. Administration, in regard to China, knew that there definitely was a desire to make the change. It was, of course, also clear to anybody who had a feel for American internal politics. It was equally clear that this was a move that was going to raise a lot of eyebrows and a lot of opposition; it was going to be a politically difficult move in some respects, but nevertheless, one that I think Jimmy Carter and Secretary Vance were determined to carry through.

I was back in Washington in the early fall of 1978; I had a fair amount of discussion with Secretary Vance about what would be the new kind of relationship that could be worked out. He had his staff working on this; Dick Holbrooke was Assistant Secretary at that time and Roger Sullivan was also involved in the problem. They were at work on a whole set of new charters and relationships that would be put into effect at the time.

There was, however, no discussion of when this was going to take place. The impression was that it was still fairly far down the road, since a lot of planning had to be worked out. It was

going to be carried out in a rather gradual way. In this way the impact, to say nothing of the political problems that Cy Vance would have to face in the Congress, would be minimized.

But, in fact, it moved much more rapidly than that. I guess a public statement on the matter was made about the 13th or 16th (or thereabouts) of December, 1978. As soon as that statement was made and I broke the news to President Chiang and opened the discussion of what was to follow, a mission was put together in Washington to come out to Taipei, to work out with the government in Taiwan what would be the new relationship with the United States.

Warren Christopher came out and Dick Holbrooke and a number of other Far Eastern types from the Bureau East Asian came out with him, with a blueprint of a new U.S. relationship to be worked out with Taiwan. There were a lot of questions that were inevitably going to be raised not only by the Chinese government there, but also the U.S. business community and others.

There was a massive demonstration on Christopher's arrival at the Taipei Airport. On leaving the airport he and I found ourselves in our limousine caught right in the middle of a wild protest demonstration. We'll probably never know exactly how and by whom this was engineered. By that time our coming change in relations and all the rest was public property; it was known that it was going to take place although at that time, I don't know that we had a specific date. Washington was the culprit and Christopher came out representing Washington. As we left the airport building, it was clear that we were moving into a demonstrating crowd and obviously not very friendly. I wanted to take a particular route which I knew would get us out of the airport by a back road and then get up to my place up on the hill behind Taipei and thus get away from demonstrations. But the driver was instructed by someone from the local government as to how he was to go. At first I didn't have any reason to be concerned about it; I just felt the other route would be more direct and away from crowds and thus easier to move right along and get to my home.

But what we were directed into was a real mob scene. We were preceded by a truck that had a TV camera on its roof and the TV camera was pointed at our procession. We were the lead car and then, of course, there were several other cars following. As we moved along, and got into the middle of this crowd of demonstrators, the truck stopped so that we couldn't move. There was no way to go back; there was no way to go ahead. It was just a narrow little road and it was lined by a mob of demonstrators on both sides shouting anti-American and other slogans.

We, of course, talked to the driver and asked him whether he couldn't get the TV truck to get on the way and let us move on. But he couldn't and as time went on, he was not even willing to leave the car. Not only was the crowd demonstrating but they began pushing their sticks through the windows of our limousine, and broke our windows if they were closed. Christopher and I didn't really know when this was going to end and what the consequences were going to be.

About at the point when things were beginning to be a little big chancy, and when both of us had been bloodied--not in any serious way, but a little bit--at that point the TV truck began to move. As soon as we got out of that little impasse, I directed the driver, by a back route that I knew, up to our place up in Yang Ming Shan, in the high area behind the City.

We didn't really know that anything serious had happened to us; we didn't feel physically hurt at all. But when my wife saw us, she gasped. Apparently, we were bleeding profusely without knowing it, but only from superficial cuts. That was the end of the demonstration. I will probably never know just exactly how this was engineered. I think I know at least one individual who was ultimately responsible, namely the Foreign Minister, Shen Chang Hwan.

*Q: After seeing Vance in the fall of '78, when you said you anticipated this would probably be a fairly gradual process, had you come back and sort of conveyed this in some way to the Nationalist government and then, of course, you were caught to?*

UNGER: I couldn't convey it to them in any concrete way; any discussion of the subject was immediately a matter of very acute unhappiness. I was not in a position to say just this or that is what the United States government was going to do. I told them my reading of the sentiment in Washington and of the Carter Administration, i.e. that over time, in Washington they would be looking for a way of establishing relations with Beijing.

I couldn't say, because I didn't really know for sure, (although I strongly suspected this was so) that this would mean an end to diplomatic relations with Taiwan. When I had been in Washington early in the fall, and just prior to that, when Vance actually paid a visit out to the region (I think in August) and visited Taipei, he wasn't in any position to be at all specific as to what could or would be worked out.

What did happen, of course, was that once the announcement was made on December 16th (something like that) the group then came out from Washington, headed by Christopher. We Americans sat down with the people from the government in Taiwan to develop a new pattern of U.S.-Republic of China relationships. It was naturally a traumatic situation; the Chinese on Taiwan were deeply distressed and not much disposed to talk about it, yet they knew they had to in order to avoid a chaotic situation once regular diplomatic relations with the U.S. were broken. It was clear the United States was going to take that action, and it had already become public knowledge. So they had no choice but to work something out with us, angry and distressed as they were.

What we worked out was the set of arrangements and mechanisms that are now operating and have been successfully functioning for quite a while. Leaving aside the political distress they felt in Taiwan, from every other point of view it has worked out quite well.

*Q: Earlier on, George Bush, who has now just become our President, was the Liaison Officer in Peking. Did you have any dealings of him and what was your evaluation of him at that time?*

UNGER: I didn't have a lot of dealings. I saw his telegrams and he saw my telegrams. I did have a very specific dealing with him at one time at his initiative, which I welcomed. At one point, after he had been appointed and was in Beijing--I don't remember how long he had been there--I had been in Taipei for sometime. We were both scheduled to go to Honolulu where we were having a U.S. Chiefs of Mission meeting. Honolulu was where those meetings were often held, at the Military Headquarters, CINCPAC. People came out from Washington and all of the

Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission, in the East Asian area attended. We all went to Honolulu, and we had two or three or four days of discussion.

We were both going to attend that meeting, George Bush and I. I got a telegram from him mentioning that we were both going to be going to Honolulu, and given the fact that we were both in China, and obviously had common problems and situations to face, he asked what I would think of our meeting and flying together at least part of the way so that we would have a good chance to have some discussion. I said I thought that was a great idea.

We agreed to meet in Tokyo, which we did, and then flew the rest of the way together and talked, talked, talked, all the way from Tokyo to Honolulu. Then, of course, we both attended the Chiefs of Mission meeting. But all of that gave us a very good chance to talk about our respective situations, all in the context of the pertinent American policies. It meant that we had a very good chance to compare notes and for each of us to learn what was the other's assessment of the situation.

From that point forward, we kept in pretty close touch. I don't think we ever actually talked to each other again directly until I came back from Taipei in '79. Then, when he became Vice President and I was back in the States, he asked me to come around and meet with him and I did so. I had been teaching at the Fletcher School in Boston; he, by that time had been in office at least six months, maybe more. So we had a further talk because he was interested in carrying through on the Taiwan/China situation, up to the time I left. He was also interested in various situations and programs with relation to Southeast Asia, where I had spent a lot of time. So we did have that additional contact.

*Q: Did he seem knowledgeable and knew the right questions?*

UNGER: Yes. All of us in the Foreign Service business, at one time or another, have been thrown together with political appointees. I would say we always talk about whether "somebody has done his homework". I would say George Bush gave evidence of having done his homework a good deal more than many. Certainly, more than Ronald Reagan, "who didn't know from nothing." I mean, he had all kinds of opinions and convictions, but he certainly didn't have much knowledge.

I saw Reagan when he and Nancy came to pay a visit to Taiwan when I was Ambassador there. He was Governor of California at the time. He was 150 percent pro-Taiwan and terribly accusing and negative about those terrible people across the Straits.

Jimmy Carter, on the other hand, seemed to me serious about his responsibilities. I did have an opportunity to talk with him and brief him. I can't remember exactly when; I guess when I came back to Washington once, I found him with a very responsible attitude, even if not terribly well-informed.

Nixon, of course, considered himself a real expert on that part of the world, and very much interested in it. So I had a number of occasions when I talked to him, and he was well-informed. He had a lot of strong opinions, some of which I didn't agree with. But he at least had made it his

business to know what was going on in that part of the world. When I was Ambassador of Thailand he had come out there on a visit.

*Q: I hope we'll talk more about Vietnam and China in a different series of interviews which will be concentrated on those two subjects. So at this point, I'd like to thank you very much. We'll be getting back then.*

UNGER: I think it's perfectly clear that it's a process that I'm very much interested in, too. I regret to have to say what I think becomes evident in this kind of an exercise, i.e., that a memory on which I once prided myself is in rather bad shape! Reconstructing some of these things and relating them properly to other events and so on, doesn't come as easily as it once did.

**EDWARD H. WILKINSON**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1975-1978)**

*Edward Wilkinson was born in Indiana in 1936. Mr. Wilkinson received his bachelor's degree at Purdue University and served in the army from 1957-1959. His career included positions in Philippines, Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina, Taiwan, Ecuador, Korea, Thailand, and Germany. Mr. Wilkinson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 2002.*

*Q: You were in Taiwan from '75 until when?*

WILKINSON: The late summer of 1978. We were there three years, a normal assignment.

*Q: What was the political and economic situation in Taiwan?*

WILKINSON: Well, Taiwan, at that time, was a police state. It probably isn't very politically correct to say it quite like this, but, in fact, the Chiang Kai-shek party, the Kuomintang, just basically ran it in the way they saw fit. They, themselves, would decide who the next president was to be and then this person would become the president. Period. There was a legislative body called the Legislative Yuan. They were not by any means a democratic organization, either.

Things have changed there, in my opinion, very much for the better. But in a certain sense, even at that time, the political situation was okay. I say this because there was order in the streets.

However, at that time we knew perfectly well that the United States Government was soon going to withdraw recognition from the Republic of China and recognize the mainland. And because the people in Taiwan knew that a withdrawal of recognition was possible (even likely), we diplomats were all very well treated by the populace, presumably to try to stave off the de-recognition. So, as I say, we were treated very nicely by virtually everybody in that country.

*Q: You were there when we officially de-recognized the Republic of China?*

WILKINSON: No, we left about three months before that happened.

*Q: But it was assumed that everybody knew it was going to happen?*

WILKINSON: Yes, I think so. But, it was not, in my opinion, well handled. I don't think the ambassador knew precisely when it was going to take place until he was called out of a dinner party – where he happened to be with the president of the country – to be told that the U.S. Government was going to recognize mainland China forthwith. This is according to a story I heard. I cannot confirm it absolutely. As I say, all this took place about three months after we left.

*Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?*

WILKINSON: Leonard Unger, formerly ambassador to Thailand. A man who makes his home, I believe, here in the Washington area, as we speak. He was and is a wonderful gentleman, and I think very highly of him and his wife.

*Q: What was consular work like there?*

WILKINSON: Once again, I would have to say that this was pretty standard operation. When I first got there I was put in charge of American Services. Most of our consular work, though, was in immigrant and non-immigrant visas. Now, in those days the Taiwanese couldn't just get a passport and go somewhere because they wanted to. There were certain restrictions on foreign travel. The same sort of thing was going on in Korea, I believe, at the same time.

*Q: Yes.*

WILKINSON: This, in a certain sense, regulated our non-immigrant visa business. Taiwan officialdom was very understanding and good to us. And as far as American Services was concerned, like in Korea and like, I believe, in Japan, Taiwan had a foreign affairs police, a police force that dealt solely with foreigners. One of the conditions of being a member of this police force, I think, was to speak either English or Japanese, hopefully both, as well as Mandarin and, in many cases, Taiwanese. They were quite easy for us to deal with, so we had no real difficulties in this regard.

Yes, of course, we had people in jail, although don't forget when I was there we had U.S. military still assigned to Taiwan. Americans who broke the law and were incarcerated were almost always jailed side-by-side with the U.S. military detainees. These were all people who had done something not too serious and were serving, perhaps, a two-year sentence. These were not murderers or so on. Let me put it this way, the U.S. military took very good care of their prisoners to the extent even of putting a refrigerator out where their people were. Our people were able to take advantage of these relatively good conditions.

*Q: What about visas? We always think of the Chinese anywhere trying to get to the United States, particularly in Hong Kong there's so much visa fraud. How was it running in Taiwan?*

WILKINSON: It's possible, of course, that we were badly fooled by the people who applied for visas, but don't think there was a great deal of fraud or other similar problems, visa-wise. There was the usual business of the occasional fake birth certificate and there were fake job letters and like, but in general I don't think there were a lot of these sorts of problems. I did not, by the way, ever sit on the visa line there. Non-immigrant visa interviews were handled almost exclusively by our Chinese-speaking officers, so I'm speaking second-hand. But, I don't think we had a lot of problems.

I believe it is fair to say there are many parallels between Taiwan and Korea at the time. For example, there might have been people who would have liked to leave Taiwan, maybe because they were anti-Kuomintang, for example. But these were not people who could get passports, I would have to say our visa work – both immigrant and non-immigrant – was manageable.

*Q: You must have had quite a bit of traffic in students there, didn't you?*

WILKINSON: No, not really. There were certainly student visa applicants, and I always felt that this was very good for the U.S., but once again, the student could not simply go and get a passport to study abroad. I don't recall this being a major problem at all.

*Q: With the American military was there a lot of marriage with the local ladies?*

WILKINSON: Yes I think so, although I don't have a statistic to give you on that. Unfortunately (for me), the word was in the Judge Advocate General office there that a consular officer had to be a witness for the marriage to be valid in the U.S. Of course, that's not true, but the troops would get very excited if there wasn't a consular officer on hand to witness their wedding.

Fortunately, there was only one place in Taiwan where a foreigner could get married, and that was at the Taipei city hall. So, on two particular days a week, we would be there at a designated time. The G.I.'s would bring their documents later to the consulate, and we would do the necessary paperwork to provide them with a "Consular Witness to Marriage." That wasn't necessary for the marriage to be legal, as you very well know, but we did it anyway.

Years later, by the way, probably around 1993 when I was assigned to Bangkok, I visited the home of a newly arrived officer whom I didn't know. After introductions, we were invited to sit down. However, the host looked at me for a few seconds, and then went into his bedroom without comment. He came back a few seconds later with his Consular Witness to Marriage, a certificate I had witnessed it in 1976!

*Q: Did you pick up from your local employees at all any sort of tension between the Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese?*

WILKINSON: Oh, yes. Well, I don't think we did get that sort of information from our local employees, largely, I think, because they didn't think that would be a good thing for them to comment about, at least not to us. Tension certainly existed, however. I don't think we had any Foreign Service National employees at the office in those days who were "Mainlanders," i.e.,

people who had come from Mainland China with Chiang Kai-shek, or their offspring. I think they were mostly Taiwanese, if you will. The Mainlanders wouldn't be likely to have taken a job in the embassy. Those people tended to be generals and senior business people and government people, not "administrative"-type people.

I guess I would have to say that the native Taiwanese people were fairly decently treated by the Mainlanders, although there were some exceptions to that in certain cases. I don't really think this was a horrible existence for them, but there were certain limitations on where they could go and what they could do. I mean that in terms of jobs and so on. Yes, there was tension. There's no question about the fact that there was tension.

We, at least those of us who didn't speak Chinese, had to deal with a population of people where, if they spoke English, they had long since decided it would just simply not be convenient to make too much noise about any tension. So we knew it existed, but I can't give you good examples.

**FRANK N. BURNET**  
**Political Counselor**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1975-1979)**

*Frank N. Burnet was born in New York in 1921. He joined the Foreign Service in 1951 and served in the Philippines, Thailand, Laos, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Washington, DC. Mr. Burnet was interviewed in 1990 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

*Q: Well then you went to Taipei as Political Counselor from '75 to '78.*

BURNET: Before, of course, we changed our recognition to Beijing in '79.

*Q: So you were there really at our last full-scale mission.*

BURNET: That's right, but yet we had already made our opening to China in '72. So it was an interesting twilight period.

*Q: What were your concerns, and how was the embassy functioning at that time?*

BURNET: I think the embassy functioned very well. Leonard Unger was the Ambassador, he was doing a good job I thought. It was really a hand-holding operation to ease the GRC, the Republic of China government into accepting what was inevitable even at that time: U.S. recognition of the communist regime on the mainland. We didn't know when, of course. But I think our main job then was to say: Look, it isn't going to be that bad. You aren't going to fall apart. The sky isn't going to fall when we shift our recognition to the mainland.

*Q: But it was clearly understood that this was going to be happening sooner rather than later.*

BURNET: It was understood by us, and we tried to make it clear to our counterparts. Sometimes I think that the Ambassador didn't talk that directly -- he couldn't, really -- to his counterparts.

*Q: Well you can't come out with a policy statement when the policy hasn't been made.*

BURNET: No, that's right.

*Q: You have to work around it to say: Maybe the tides of history are moving in this direction. But it requires a Presidential decision, and a very difficult Presidential decision at that point.*

BURNET: That's right. But in my own conversations with counterparts and talking to the media and so on, this is the way we would talk, that, you know, really it isn't going to be so bad. Of course they never realized how good it was going to be when the economic situation really took off.

*Q: What was your impression of the Chinese officials on Taiwan that you dealt with? Who were they, and how did you feel they were at this particular period of time?*

BURNET: I, of course, had most to do with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the head of the American desk there. I felt that they were professionals and that they were doing their job. I wished, many times, that they could have let their hair down and leveled with me a little bit more than they did. They kept up a pretty good front of official policy. Of course, their views were pretty orthodox, that China was one, and that eventually they hoped to regain the mainland, although that was quite remote at that point.

But it wasn't bad. It wasn't very busy, either. We didn't have an awful lot to do (after all, Washington's focus was elsewhere), as long as we kept things quiet and made sure that the two Chinas didn't get involved over the Straits of Taiwan. That turned out to be one of my major tasks, to keep an eye on the Chinese Air Force and their activities, and to monitor our military's relations with the Chinese Air Force.

*Q: Tell me, how does one keep an eye on an air force?*

BURNET: Well, you have this island of Taiwan just a hundred miles or so off the mainland which had its own air force. They were flying daily patrols over the Taiwan straits. And the Peoples Republic of China had its air force and they were flying patrols too. Occasionally these patrols met.

We didn't want any flare-up or any exchange of fire, so there were places that we thought these patrols shouldn't be going, and that they should observe a certain restraint and caution.

When there was a contact of some sort, this had to be reported to Washington in great detail: How it happened. Who did what to whom. What was the upshot of it and What steps taken to prevent a repeat performance. Of course the military would make its report, but naturally the Ambassador wanted his own complete report of what happened that day in the air over the China Sea. So it was that kind of a situation. On those days I was quite busy.

Working with the Chinese officials was ok and it was enjoyable. They were dedicated people, professional people. I had a lot to do with certain parts of the Chinese military, but mainly the Foreign Ministry people.

*Q: Were you there at the time that Saigon fell?*

BURNET: That happened in June of '75. Yes, I was there.

*Q: I was wondering whether you were feeling any reflections of this. Were the Chinese saying: Well, here you had an ally and you let them down. Were they throwing this in your face?*

BURNET: Not too badly. I think the Chinese were very careful about that. They don't like to lose face, and therefore they can understand somebody else losing face. That was not thrown up to me. If it was not part of our business, it just didn't come up. If it did, it was minor.

*Q: Were you feeling a sense of confidence in your contacts about: No matter what happened, we're doing a good a job, and it doesn't look like we're going to be taken over, and we're setting up and...?*

BURNET: You mean as far as Taiwan was concerned?

*Q: Yes.*

BURNET: Yes, I think so. I think there was a sense of confidence in the mission, that we were just biding our time and holding the Chinese hands while they went through this trial, this bad period, when we were going to transfer recognition. So there wasn't anything that we were downcast about; it didn't bother us in particular. We were able to go about our job.

Your mentioning the fall of Saigon reminds me that we had a lot of flow out of Vietnam, as it fell, through Taiwan. A lot of people came by to pick up the family that was safe-havened there during the time that the husband was serving in Vietnam. And then, you remember that General Thieu, when he left Saigon, spent his first days and nights in Taipei.

*Q: He was the President of Vietnam when it fell, and left.*

BURNET: That's right. And his first stop on his way to London, where I think he settled eventually, was Taipei. He flew in with a small retinue and lots of gold bars, rumors had it, on the plane.

I was selected, since I had been to Vietnam and so on (actually, I had even met Thieu at some big function or other), to be the go-between, between the Ambassador and Thieu. Whenever we had some message to give him, I went to his quarters. He didn't feel like talking, I could see that. So I could just sort of take a look at the man, give him the message, and get out of there. That was about it. But anyway, he was there for a few weeks, I believe, before he moved on.

*Q: This was just about the time Chiang Kai-shek died, wasn't it?*

BURNET: As a matter of fact, Chiang Kai-shek died in the spring of '75, shortly after I arrived. Reminds me, when he died one member of the political section thought of a short, one-sentence telegram to report this grave event back to Washington.

I don't know whether you remember the period in WW II under Stilwell in the China-Burma theater. Stilwell's word for the Generalissimo was the "Peanut." We wanted to send a two-word telegram: "Peanut planted." But we decided the Ambassador wouldn't appreciate this, even in jest, so we never sent it in for him to sign. But we kicked it around a while for fun.

Anyway, he had a vast, very fancy state funeral which the entire diplomatic corps had to attend. We were taught how to go up by threes to the podium and bow from the hips to his portrait in a gesture of sympathy or respect. The whole diplomatic corps was lined up and had to go through this: click, click, bend at the hips, bend twice and move off. And from then on it was Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, who was running the show.

*Q: What was the impression at that time? You, of course, had not seen Chiang Kai-shek in full bloom, but when his son came on, what was the feeling about the situation?*

BURNET: It was a very good feeling. A feeling that here's a good, pragmatic, business-like Chinese who was going to take over from the doddering old man. And that things would be a lot easier for us and a lot easier for our relationship under him. Everybody felt the same way -- people in the agency, people in the economic section, my section, the Trade Center -- we all felt good about it.

*Q: Speaking of your section, were you all pretty much of one accord as far as our change to the Peoples Republic of China, or did you have some vestiges of: We're selling out?*

BURNET: Fortunately, we did not. Everybody was of more or less the same mind. The reason being, I suppose, that almost all of them were Chinese language trainees and had been through the same program in Taichung that I had been through. And they were looking forward to getting to the mainland someday.

*Q: So in a way it was a career enhancement program.*

BURNET: That's exactly what it was. So, there was none of that feeling. Everybody thought that it was inevitable and that it was just a matter of time.

*Q: How about when President Carter came on board with human rights and all. Did this have any particular impact on you?*

BURNET: It made a big impact, particularly on me. I thought that I had never seen so many instructions coming out of Washington about our military aid program, and I thought that some of the features of that were really excellent.

The idea was to try to keep this thing of acquiring weapons tamped down, thereby minimizing regional competition in arms. The more we sent military aid and built up some country, the chances of their getting involved, either with their own people or with a neighbor, were that much better. So if you could keep the arms transfers down, everybody was going to be better off.

You remember the guidance we used to get out of the Carter Administration about how we were to treat and handle representatives of the various arms manufacturers when they came calling, and how much help, or how little cooperation we were to give them? We were just supposed to give names and addresses, and that's all. We weren't to set up any appointments, provide transportation, none of that stuff we used to do. They were on their own.

*Q: It was a real change.*

BURNET: It's just a shame that all of that by the end of the Carter Administration had pretty much gone by the boards. But in one Administration that was quite a change.

*Q: How about the human rights. How did you see the political situation evolving when you were there?*

BURNET: That was quite a point of interest. Washington let us know that they were not just interested in the annual human rights reports which were just getting going in those days.

Because, as you know, the record of Republic of China was not very good in this area. Arrests of the opposition, throwing people into the pokey for a long period of time and virtually forgetting about them, were going on all the time.

So we had to burrow into the political opposition among the Taiwanese, which wasn't hard to find, and they were always glad to talk to us. They had the scoop. They knew what was going on. They knew who was in jail, and where, and how long they had been there, and what they had done to get there, and what happened at their trial.

All of these things, all of these details Washington wanted to know. We got ourselves in a position to report them and did, I think, a pretty good job of keeping that front covered for the Department.

*Q: Was the Chinese government responding?*

BURNET: Yes they were.

*Q: They saw the winds of change.*

BURNET: I think we were effective and our pressure helped. And all other kinds of outside pressure helped, too. Somebody would lean on Washington about a certain individual, and then we'd go to the Chinese and say: Look, we hear he's not well, he's not getting proper food and medicine. How long is he going to be there? And can you see your way clear to make things easier on him or even release him? We'd do it, and we'd get responses from them. We got results,

I think. Slow, but we got them.

*Q: Adding sort of a personal note: At the time, I was in Korea and we were sort of miffed at all this human rights stuff.*

BURNET: Were you?

*Q: Well, of course we had an enemy 25 miles away, a real honest-to-God enemy, Kim Il Sung. But looking at this thing, I must say I think President Carter made a real earth change in the world by doing this. A short period. I must say I was not impressed at the time, but looking back on it I think this was a really major change in the United States. It brought us back to where we should have been a long time ago.*

BURNET: I forget whose idea it was, it was either the Ambassador's suggestion or Washington's suggestion, but, to make an impression on the staff, they had us set up a seminar on human rights in general. I organized it, and held it at my home, wives were invited. It was really a good exercise. It was mainly for the American staff people, just to get us thinking in that direction.

*Q: It really was an earth change.*

BURNET: You must have done the same thing in Korea.

*Q: Yes. Well, Frank, looking at your career now, I guess you retired then.*

BURNET: Yes, retired in '78 at the end of that tour. I had a heart attack, so that brought that to an end.

**CHARLES LAHIGUERA**  
**Political Officer (Refugee Office)**  
**Hong Kong (1975-1979)**

*Mr. Lahiguera was born and raised in New York. After graduating from Georgetown University and serving in the US Navy, he entered the Foreign Service in 1963. Though he served outside the South East Asia, his primary duties concerned the Vietnam War and its aftermath, particularly refugees. His overseas posts include Germany, Curacao, Vietnam, France, Hong Kong, Thailand and Swaziland, where he served as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Lahiguera was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.*

*Q: Were you there from '75 till?*

LAHIGUERA: To '79. To July of '79.

*Q: What were we getting out of particularly South Vietnam, I mean it had collapsed. We had*

*expected a, what were we expecting?*

LAHIGUERA: Politically it is hard for me to judge. We were concerned about the impact on the rest of Southeast Asia, particularly Thailand and Malaysia. The Chinese at that time were still supporting the Vietnamese, as were the Soviets. We were interested to see how; we were interested in developments in Cambodia as well. The Khmer Rouge had taken over in Phnom Penn. I always said that the Vietnamese were very fortunate in having the Cambodians next to them because compared to the Cambodians they looked like nice people. There was a Vietnamese presence in Hong Kong as well as a Cambodian presence. They had people there to conduct trade and shipping into both Vietnam and Cambodia. There was a flow of refugees from Vietnam. I don't recall any from Cambodia. I guess the Cambodians were principally going to Thailand. So, I was interested in the refugee flows. I had a lot of contact with the Hong Kong authorities on the question of refugees. We were certainly supporting the policy of giving them first asylum and we took the view that people with relatives in the United States or people brought into Hong Kong on American vessels would be taken care of by us essentially. We felt that whatever ship picked them up really should take care of them.

I was interested in debriefing refugees on conditions; I was interested in the fate of our staff in Vietnam. We had a continued interest on the MIA (Missing in Action) question and any sightings of Americans including any Americans who in fact stayed behind. There were those that just elected to stay behind. As I think I mentioned there was in Bien Hoa a young man who was working in a mental hospital. I also recall a priest who stayed behind, an American priest and quite a few others. So, we were interested in those kinds of thing. I followed the Vietnamese efforts to sell goods and to import goods. We had an embargo on American company trade with the Vietnamese. My presence was pretty well known in Hong Kong. I was active in the American Chamber of Commerce there, which is a large organization. They in fact formed a Vietnamese committee of people interested in Vietnam. Some of them had been in business in Vietnam and had left. Others were just looking for new opportunities. We managed to obtain information on what ships were going to Vietnam and what cargo they were bringing, so any time we noticed American goods we let it be known that that was illegal. I recall one ship going into Cambodia and it was carrying a large shipment of Kodak stuff. We had a customs representative in Hong Kong. The U.S. Customs Officer went to Kodak and told them that we were distressed about this. They assured us that they didn't know anything about it and they would look into it. We had a similar thing with Monsanto's shipping chemicals. No great harm would be done by Kodak selling film there, but when we did that the word got around very quickly in the American community that we were watching this kind of thing. I can remember one banker in particular saying, "Well, you know you're not going to stop shipments of stuff into these countries." I said, "Of course not, but it's going to cost the Vietnamese and the Cambodian communist governments an increase of 10% or 20% to buy through a middleman, then we've already achieved our objective. This is not a wartime embargo; it's an economic one." So, I got involved in that kind of thing. I did debrief a lot of refugees. I read the Vietnamese news agency broadcast every morning religiously. It was a chore that I really used to dread, but it was very interesting what you could draw from it. I also developed a range of business contacts who were going into Vietnam and Hong Kong. I used to visit foreign diplomats from Hanoi who would come down and do their R&R in Hong Kong including Australians, Indians, and Swedes. I can remember speaking to the Swedish aid people who were very frustrated. There was an agreement

between the Swedes and the Vietnamese that any equipment that arrived became the property of the Vietnamese government. They'd bring in equipment and the Vietnamese would want to tax it going in. Then after that they'd take the equipment and say it's ours now and we'd rather put it on this other project that the Soviets are helping us with and not have it on your project. This used to just drive the Swedes wild. They had this huge paper mill that they were developing in the north of Vietnam. So, this is the kind of information I gathered in bits and pieces. It was interesting. I can't say that there was any major breakthroughs or that I made any great major discoveries.

I did notice that around '78 the Vietnamese had a party congress. All the people associated with the Chinese were removed as well as people supporting the ethnic minority programs. I didn't understand the link at first until I realized that the ethnic minorities in the north of Vietnam, I kept on thinking in terms of Montagnards, but the ethnic minorities in the north of Vietnam were largely out of China. So, they must have looked at these things as being linked. In any event, this was an early indicator that things were going sour between Vietnam and China. There was a gradual buildup of Soviet relations with Soviet aircraft going into the north and Soviet ships going into the Vietnamese ports. I think that's what really triggered the downward slide. Chinese continued to leave Vietnam including leaving through the north into China. The Chinese made some quite a bit of noise about this, but I think their real concern was the developing Vietnamese relationship with the Soviets and feeling circled by enemies.

*Q: Obviously we must have been looking for the possibility of a conventional bloodbath after the revolution, after the North Vietnamese had taken over South Vietnam. What were we getting from that?*

LAHIGUERA: Yes. We had these terrible reports out of Cambodia. I had very little information about what was going on in Cambodia, but it was obvious from what we had that it was very grim. We were concerned that similar events would occur in Vietnam. I was very pleased to see that it wasn't as bad as I thought it could have been. The first reports I got were about the women who were associated with American efforts, our former female staff. I heard that the women were given very brief reeducation as they called it, usually a month or two, and then released. I attributed this to a certain Asian chauvinist approach that women couldn't have done anything of any real concern so you didn't have to bother much with them. The male staff members had a much more difficult time. I did learn from refugees who did get out that male staff members were in reeducation for at least a year or more. Officers that I knew such as General Ba and General Dao were both in reeducation camps. I recall one particular figure I believe the governor of the central bank of Vietnam who had prevented President Thieu from absconding with the gold. Thieu had, I understand, a Swiss aircraft in Saigon he was going to take the gold on. I forgot how many millions of gold it was, but this gentleman had barred the president's access to the gold. The communists ended up getting the gold and after all that effort they threw this poor guy into reeducation as well. So, I guess that didn't count for a lot.

There were reports in Hong Kong that if you had money you could buy your way out. There were boats that would take people out and drop them off near Thailand or try to get them into Hong Kong. The British also set up flights between Hong Kong and Saigon to take out people who were connected to Hong Kong. I was able to talk to those kind of people. In general things

were severe, difficult, but we didn't have the kind of mass executions that occurred in Phnom Penn.

*Q: The land reform that happened up in North Vietnam in I guess the '50s when the villagers basically were given carte blanche to go after the land.*

LAHIGUERA: In fact the communist government maintained the Republic of Vietnam piaster for quite some time. I had left with a bag full of this money. I didn't think anything of it. I thought it would be worthless the day we left. I had it as a souvenir and I would have gladly have given it away to the Vietnamese staff before I left if I had thought that it was worth anything. I was very sorry about that. I think it took them about two years before they changed to their new communist dong.

*Q: Were you consulting with the China watchers on Chinese Vietnamese relationships? Was there much thought given to this?*

LAHIGUERA: Yes. Well, in fact this report I wrote on the deteriorating relationship between China and Vietnam sparked quite a bit of interest. We had started to normalize relations with China, we had a liaison office in Beijing at this time. The staff sent me up to visit it. I saw Ambassador Woodcock then, but things started going downhill. In '78 when I visited China, the people in our embassy in Beijing thought that I might be able to get near the Vietnamese border, which is what I would have liked to have done to be able to see for myself any military buildup. They decided that when I got to southern China I should apply for a permit to go from there to the border area and that I'd probably be turned down in Beijing. Anyhow, they wouldn't allow me near the border, but they did allow me to go to the refugee camp and I got an opportunity to interview the Chinese who came out of Vietnam. It was an eye opener to me. What the Chinese were complaining about, and I was certainly not one to be a great defender of the Vietnamese communists, was they wanted some sort of privileged minority status. They wanted a different kind of ID card. The Vietnamese wanted everybody to register and if you were going to live in Vietnam you should be a Vietnam citizen. That included being eligible to serve in the military. Well, they didn't want to serve in the military.

*Q: They hadn't in the South Vietnamese system?*

LAHIGUERA: These are Northern Chinese. These people had fled from the north. They didn't want to serve in the Vietnamese army and they didn't want to speak Vietnamese and they wanted to have some sort of special status and have their own schools and be left alone. They just wanted to live in Vietnam. I said to myself, well, I can see why the Vietnamese regarded this as unwelcome. Of course, I didn't say that to the Chinese. It didn't sound to me like they were being abused and the Vietnamese took the attitude of well, if you want to go to China, feel free to leave and they did. Of course the Chinese didn't feel they needed any more people. So, this is a bone of contention between the two countries. When I got back from this trip the Chinese had started moving forces towards the border. I can recall that I estimated there were about 1,000 aircraft moved south in the vicinity of the Vietnamese border. I knew at that point that this is not a bluff, this is not posturing. I filed what was to be my only real dissent cable in my career. At that juncture the consul general didn't see it my way. We didn't put it in the dissent channel,

although it was originally written that way. He decided to send it in as another view from the consul general. The consensus of the China watchers was that the Chinese were very reasonable people and they were just concerned about these refugees and they were just trying to put some pressure on the Vietnamese. I said, no I thought that they were really concerned about a Soviet buildup in Vietnam. They really didn't care much about the refugees and they fully intended to attack. In December of '78, a China watcher, Sarah Ann Smith, and I wrote a joint cable, saying that the Chinese actions had vindicated our position. I felt satisfied with that. By that time I started meeting with the Chinese officials or semi-officials in Hong Kong. One particular gentleman was specializing on Vietnamese affairs. So, I mean he knew who I was and I knew who he was. The day after the Chinese attacked the border in February of '79 he invited me to lunch. I can recall arriving at the lunch and he was sitting at the table already waiting for me and he was beaming. So, I went in and sat down and he didn't know what to say and he finally looked up to me and said, "Well, what do you think?" I paused and I thought it over a while and I finally said to him, "I think it's pretty good that you're just four years too late." He laughed. I hoped that they reported that as such. But, I can still recall from our conversation that we were in discussions of normalizing relations with Vietnam ourselves. He expressed some very strong views of his disapproval of such a move. He noted we were normalizing relations with China and that pressing to be friendly with these abusive Vietnamese probably would not be taken well in Beijing. I think that attitude had a certain influence on our terminating the exercise. I don't say it was that factor alone, but I certainly think it was relevant.

*Q: Hong Kong had developed this China monitoring system, highly sophisticated, getting newspapers and listening to news and interviewing people and all and they had a staff that filtered it out and it's kind of still going on even though we had people up in Beijing at that time and it still for some years remained our major way of finding out what was going on in China. Were you kind of there by yourself though on Vietnam; was there another closed society?*

LAHIGUERA: Yes. I was a sort of a one man band and my contacts were people who really were interested or had business links with Vietnam when the Vietnamese were approaching for credit or barter arrangements or that kind of thing. I also followed the Laotians. I went over to Bangkok from time to time as well and met with Charles Twining and we went up to refugee camps and talked to the refugees.

*Q: You must have been concerned about all the military equipment that ended up in the North Vietnamese hands?*

LAHIGUERA: Yes. One of the disappointments was what happened to the military equipment in Da Nang. We had this mass of fighter aircraft that were all set to be flown off. The Vietnamese pilots instead of flying them off took their families and got on the boats. When the communists arrived they found these aircraft all set up and ready to go. We lost aircraft in Bien Hoa air base as well. I did debrief former military ARV people who got out on the status of the aircraft. The Vietnamese weren't able to maintain and they couldn't get spare parts for much of the aircraft, so it was of limited use. I would think that they have a 100 years supply of artillery however. The aircraft was a more perishable kind of commodity.

*Q: Was there any indication that our equipment was being used against the Chinese?*

LAHIGUERA: Yes. They used '70s aircraft certainly including against the Cambodians when the invaded Cambodia setting up a new government. That was also during the same time.

*Q: How were you seeing the Vietnamese/Cambodian relationship in this '75 to '79 period?*

LAHIGUERA: Well, originally, when Pol Pot first took over, there wasn't any obvious break in relations. Things slowly went downhill along the Vietnamese Cambodian border. Frictions, clashes developed and it just slowly deteriorated. But historically they hated each other, so it wasn't a surprise.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that in a way that you were looking at Vietnam. I mean, here is a place that we had spent lots of lives, lots of our money and all and this was a focal point of our foreign policy for over ten years and all. Then all of a sudden it disappears.*

LAHIGUERA: Yes, it certainly was erratic. In fact, Charlie Twining and I used to say that we two replaced Graham Martin and his cast of thousands. Yes. It went from one extreme to another. Of course, in our realignment, our new relationship with China changed the whole picture and Vietnam became really of marginal interest. I mentioned previously, we made quite a bit of effort with the refugees on the questions of MIAs and also with travelers, people like the Swedes. We were always looking for Americans. I had worked with joint casualty resolution center people in Vietnam and they used to come to Hong Kong as well. So, we were always being urged to see if we could find out anything about Americans. I always thought that they would surface. I was very skeptical about prisoners remaining from the war period, but I expected that deserters would surface. There were reports of an anti-communist insurgency trying to reorganize and I was concerned about Americans going back to support that kind of activity. In fact there were Americans who wanted to go back to get their families out. So, that was another question. I thought there would be a good chance that there would be Americans arrested in the post-war period. We did get some reports from people in the North of seeing Americans. I recall a Swede telling me about a black farmer who apparently spoke English and he was out plowing the fields. That he didn't look like he was a prisoner, he looked like had a farm and a family there. The Swede tried to talk to him and he just ran away. I was very skeptical that there would have been any prisoners because it would have just caused a lot of embarrassment to the Vietnamese government and there was no advantage in their keeping them once the war was over. So, I didn't take the Rambo kinds of things very seriously, but I certainly did take seriously the possibility that Americans were there under other conditions.

*Q: Well, as we both know that during a war they had developed a considerable deserter colony in Saigon hidden away where GI's were selling dope and you know, sort of living under cover with a girlfriend involved.*

LAHIGUERA: Well, when I was in Bien Hoa we had information on somebody whom we believed was a MIA, who was listed as an MIA. I tried to make arrangements to have him photographed just to show that he wasn't a prisoner somewhere, but he was in fact on the loose. We never were successful in getting a picture of him. We had people who described him. There were a lot of these kinds and reports of these kinds of characters running around.

*Q: What sort of apparatus were you reporting to back in Washington? Was there sort of a Vietnamese desk?*

LAHIGUERA: Yes, Jim Rosenthal was our original desk officer and then he was replaced by Steve Lyon, a director from Vietnam and Bob Miller was our deputy assistant secretary over all of these kinds of divisions. So, they would get our reporting and they would send me instructions on any particular thing that they would like me to focus on.

*Q: Well, is there anything else you should talk about during this time?*

LAHIGUERA: I can't say that there was any particular event after the invasion. I was amazed by the press at that time, I'm talking about the invasion of the Chinese into Vietnam. The press made a lot of noise about how it was really a victory for Vietnam because of the high Chinese casualties. That kind of comment was surprising. I couldn't believe Beijing being worried very much about casualties. I thought that the invasion was pretty much a success in sending a message to the Vietnamese that they were very vulnerable to China and better behave. The Vietnamese were fearful of China, China being their traditional colonial boss. They always had this historic fear that they would come back as Ho Chi Minh did. You might like to know that Ho Chi Minh organized the Vietnam communist party in Hong Kong and had the first party congress in Macao. He was arrested by the British and then eventually released. But they had to sneak him out of the colony because they were afraid the French would assassinate him to prevent him from returning to Indo China. I met actually one lady who had met Ho Chi Minh while he was there.

*Q: Well, were Vietnamese politics raging in Hong Kong. I mean were these just people that the Vietnamese had got to Hong Kong just waiting to get the hell out.*

LAHIGUERA: Most of the refugees that made it to Hong Kong were ethnic Chinese and they had no interest in Vietnam once they got out. Most of them were economic refugees and they would largely like to go to the United States. We had some problem and friction with the Hong Kong government because we weren't willing to take everybody that came out. There wasn't any Vietnamese activism in Hong Kong directed against Vietnam. That didn't develop at all or I would have heard about that. I'm sure of that. It was interesting to see how the attitude in the Hong Kong business community changed significantly after the Chinese government became hostile to the Vietnamese. Then suddenly the businessmen and the American Chamber of Commerce were pretty well decided that they weren't interested in Vietnam and in fact weren't sure that they had ever been. It sort of, this whole effort vanished overnight. That was amusing.

*Q: Were you getting any reflection of, I mean there had been a major anti-American movement both in the United States and Europe and all against our involvement in the war and cheers for Ho Chi Minh and all. Did these activists try to head out for Vietnam for the new workers paradise and all that?*

LAHIGUERA: I didn't see much of that kind of thing. It seemed to me, after the war, especially on the American side, there was a great loss of interest on what was happening there. I didn't notice any concerns about human rights in Vietnam after we were out in contrast to all the noise

that had been made before. I do remember there was an Italian journalist at the Far East National Tribune, Tiziano Terzani, I think he's the editor now. He may have just left. He who wrote a book on the fall of Saigon. He also wrote for the Spiegel, which is funny. I remember I had great pleasure in telling him first how I bought his book in Taiwan. He got the point; he didn't get any royalties on my purchase. I then enumerated all the mistakes he had made in the book. He had written something of a sympathetic presentation of the communists. He went back to Vietnam after the election, after the Vietnamese communists finally set up some sort of election machinery. When he came back again he was very disillusioned. I have to give him credit, he did criticize the new regime. I found that the foreign journalists took a far more serious interest in what was going on than the Americans. They were interesting to talk to and they would ask me far more interesting questions. The Americans tended to call me up and ask me what was new. That was the kind of question I would get while the reporters from the Guardian had really very penetrating questions.

*Q: Well, by '79 were you actually getting a little bit fed up with Vietnam?*

LAHIGUERA: Yes, but I was still quite interested in Southeast Asia. I was up for reassignment. The deputy principal officer in Hong Kong, Burt Levin went to Bangkok to become the DCM and I expressed an interest to him in being the principal officer in Northeast Thailand. He supported that and I ended up actually getting that job.

**WILLIAM W. THOMAS, JR.**  
**Economic Counselor**  
**Beijing (1975-1979)**

**Consul General**  
**Chengdu (1984-1986)**

**Science Counselor**  
**Beijing (1986-1990)**

*William W. Thomas, Jr. was born in North Carolina in 1925. He majored in political science and international studies at the University of North Carolina. Mr. Thomas entered the Foreign Service in 1952. He served in Hong Kong, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Taipei, Beijing, Chengdu, and Washington, DC. The interview was conducted by Charles Stuart Kennedy on May 31, 1994.*

*Q: Then you took off again back to your old stamping grounds except on the other side of the Straits, you went to Beijing.*

THOMAS: Right, as economic counselor.

*Q: From 1975-79. At that time did we have an embassy?*

THOMAS: We had an embassy which was called by another name. It was the United States Liaison Office. It was very small. We had about eight non-administrative personnel. No military program, no economic program, no cultural program. Whatever we did we had to call by another name, which I was used to from Taiwan.

*Q: Well, what were you doing?*

THOMAS: We were doing normal embassy work but called something else. It was a pleasure to work in a very small outfit like USLO, as we called it. Bush was a good administrator.

*Q: This is George Bush?*

THOMAS: Yes. He was a very good administrator and I don't think he ever got the credit he deserved for that. It was a very tight knit little organization with a special security arrangement because they wouldn't let us have Marines. The Marines had given a party at what they called The Red Ass Saloon and got kicked out of the country for it. We had to avoid a situation like that coming up again.

*Q: How did you deal with the Chinese government?*

THOMAS: Very distantly. The first time I got instructions to go to the Ministry of Finance, I didn't know where it was. It was an unmarked building because the Chinese at that time were not marking buildings. They thought it was too sensitive for me to know where the Ministry of Finance was.

*Q: How did you get there?*

THOMAS: I asked the driver, of course. If he didn't know, he would ask somebody who did. But the Cultural Revolution was a very peculiar time.

*Q: Was the Cultural Revolution dying at this time?*

THOMAS: It was dying but it wasn't obvious to us that it was. The people were dying, which was obvious. Zhou En-lai died in early 1976. Three big shots died within a year of each other.

*Q: Was the Gang of Four still in power?*

THOMAS: We didn't call it the Gang of Four, but they were very much in power. Just at the end of Bush's tour, Deng Xiaoping came back temporarily and gave a farewell dinner for Bush who was leaving for the CIA job. Then he went down again and it wasn't until October that things more or less stabilized in China. It still was very unstable. We couldn't travel. There was one time that the only city in the country that was open to foreigners was Canton. We were not permitted to go to Shanghai. My daughter-in-law is from Shanghai and we said, "Oh, we will go see your relatives in Shanghai." We got permission and when we got on the train in Shanghai they wouldn't let her off the train so we all had to go on to the next stop because Shanghai was closed unbeknownst to us.

*Q: It was a liberal center in Chinese terms wasn't it?*

THOMAS: In Chinese terms, no. It was the headquarters of the Gang of Four.

*Q: Oh.*

THOMAS: Three of the Gang of Four were Shanghai people.

*Q: Were you and the rest of the embassy going out and reading wall posters and other things like this?*

THOMAS: Yes.

*Q: This was the time of the wall posters?*

THOMAS: When we first arrived in 1975 there weren't many wall posters but we discovered later they were of great significance. We would take a different route going to work every morning riding bicycles mainly so that we could see if there were any new signs up. We found out that Hua Guo-feng was Chairman of the Party by going through our hospital courtyard and looking at all the new signs that were up.

*Q: Who put up these signs?*

THOMAS: We thought it best not to go out at night in those days and so we never saw any signs being put up, but occasionally you could see something. The people putting up the signs would do it late at night and in a place where they were protected by their own people.

*Q: So it was little enclaves of Party people.*

THOMAS: Not necessarily Party towards the end. At first the Party people felt they had enough support where they could do this without too much risk. Later others decided the risk was not too bad and they might get punished anyway, so they were more free about wall posters.

*Q: Were you looking at Beijing as being divided into quarters or something where you would see one type of wall poster in one place and another type in another place?*

THOMAS: No, the areas were chosen because of their conspicuousness. For example, the poster for the big 1976 demonstration for Zhou En-lai was put on a certain monument because it has Zhou En-lai's calligraphy on it and therefore everybody would know that this was support for Zhou En-lai who happened to be dead at the time. The central wall posters were put in Tiananmen Square along the four walls, one of which was a police station, which was burned in the 1976 riot. There was a lot of damage during that riot but there was no press so it got no press coverage. And if there is no television, it didn't happen. The later Tiananmen thing was thoroughly covered by C-Span and was quite extraordinary. I never saw anything like it.

*Q: What were we seeing from the wall posters? Was there a power struggle going on?*

THOMAS: It was very clear, and that is what the wall posters said. "Over throw of Liu Shao-chi," who was the president of the country at that time and who was not only overthrown but was killed...he was sick and not given any treatment. There was frankness in the wall posters that we hadn't seen before or since in China. Throughout 1976, for the entire year, it was very prolific in wall posters and a lot of political information was available this way and through no other way.

*Q: Did we very much feel that we were there as more of a listening post than anything else at that point?*

THOMAS: We had connections with the Chinese but they were very carefully chosen on both sides. It was a very tenuous arrangement. The restrictions on us were no different than restrictions on other foreigners, except for the few Communist Americans, for one thing. It was a relationship we were afraid could be easily ruined. In fact, it didn't happen, but I think it was the right thing to be very careful in our arrangements.

*Q: Part of the time you were there was during the Carter administration. Did you see any change with them?*

THOMAS: No, the problems remained the same and our response to them remained the same. Carter came in with full recognition as the goal and achieved it.

*Q: Did recognition come while you were there?*

THOMAS: Yes.

*Q: Did that make any difference?*

THOMAS: Yes, it did. It made a bigger difference than was immediately apparent at the working level because the Chinese are very cautious about taking things that may be considered not right. But there was a big difference. There were military attachés; the mission changed from a liaison office with a very small group and the agricultural attaché the only non-State Department person... My office was taken and given to the military, fortunately I was gone by then. We became just an ordinary mission.

*Q: While you were there, was human rights at all on the agenda or was it just not a viable thing?*

THOMAS: It wasn't a viable thing then anymore than it is now. But the law then was the same as it is now, the Jackson Vanik Amendment. Both Jackson and Vanik came out. They said the line was basically that things were better than they were, which nobody could question. If you look back to the Cultural Revolution days there has been an enormous change and China is a real democracy. If you look at it from the point of view of Belgium, you could make it a different view.

*Q: Were you getting any particular view of how the Chinese viewed the Soviet Union in those*

days?

THOMAS: Partly through out relations with the Soviets. They were fascinated, of course, by the assignment of Bush to the CIA. But we had relatively close relations with the Soviet embassy at that time.

*Q: When did you leave in 1979?*

THOMAS: Where did I go after that?

*Q: To Hong Kong.*

THOMAS: That was a short assignment.

*Q: But basically you went before things turned sour again with the Soviets by their invasion of Afghanistan which was in December 1979.*

THOMAS: Well, 1975 -79, from our point of view in the embassy, relations with the Soviets and the Chinese were good. We were working on the same wave length. The Soviets were still extremely noseey about what we were doing and obviously from their point of view it was very important.

*Q: Was there the feeling that we were trying to play China against the Soviets?*

THOMAS: Oh, sure.

*Q: Did you have any feel for that at all?*

THOMAS: My job there wasn't focused on the Soviets except for the Soviet trade and they were reasonably open about that. But they were a suspicious bunch. I think they thought we were trying to play one against the other, and I think everybody else thought we were too. Whether it was actually a fact or not is another matter.

*Q: On the trade issues, one of the visions in American life has gone on for two hundred years and that is the tremendous market that China will offer. Here you were as we open up our first embassy. How did you see trade with China and the prospects for it at that particular time?*

THOMAS: My great uncle was the head of the British-American Tobacco Company in China and proved that the stories about sell them a button each and you will sell a zillion buttons does work. The problem right now is very different from the problem we had right then. The main problem of trade with China was the poor organization of the People's Republic of China to handle trade. They first had ideological problems with it. Those were overcome by the power of the dollar and then later on they just had administrative problems in handling a major economy with the tools for central planning. Since then they got a better organized economic administration. Their main problem is trying to keep inflation in check.

*Q: Were you there for the overthrow of the Gang of Four?*

THOMAS: Yes, I was.

*Q: How did that play out from your perspective and our embassy's perspective?*

THOMAS: I was in Moscow when Mao Zedong died and came back on the next plane, not that my presence was required. It was obvious that there was great tension. Mao's funeral was an extraordinary thing. There were girls lying down on the catafalque wailing in the traditional Chinese fashion. Mao was all waxed up. But the political tension was very strong. It was very obvious in the streets. It wasn't until well into the next year that Deng Xiaoping really got things under control.

*Q: Again we were pretty much a passive observer of this?*

THOMAS: Oh, heavens yes, with a billion people in China and an embassy of 20 or 30.

*Q: Well, I had to ask the question.*

THOMAS: Well, it's a fair question. Just because the answer is obvious doesn't mean the question shouldn't be asked.

*Q: Well, you left there and went for a very short tour in Hong Kong. What were you doing there?*

THOMAS: I got an offer of a better job and took it. I don't like Hong Kong, so when I got offered a DCM job elsewhere, I took it.

*Q: Then, off you went to your last tour to China again.*

THOMAS: I went to China as science attaché.

*Q: You were in Chengdu for a while.*

THOMAS: Oh, I had forgotten about the three years in Chengdu.

*Q: From 1984-86 you were consul general there. Where is Chengdu and what were you up to?*

THOMAS: Chengdu is in southwest China. The consulate district had a 170 million people in it. It includes Yunnan, Sichuan, which has a 100 million people, Guizhou and Tibet. Tibet is the largest in area but with only about 2 million people. We had had an office in Chengdu during the Second World War which was in charge of procurement for our air force which was bombing Japan with B-29s. One of the most active parts of the areas politically in China terms was Tibet. The Tibetans always considered themselves very separate and the Chinese considered them separate as far as any actual contact was concerned. But they got to the point where they were shooting at each other and the Chinese took very stern measures with the Tibetans who were defiant and would, therefore, give us some active reporting to do.

*Q: What were you hearing about Tibet from there?*

THOMAS: The surprising thing was that the Chinese and the Tibetans agreed on what was going on and that there was suppression going on and it was not a safe place for foreigners to be. The Chinese wouldn't give visas to foreigners except for large groups which were carefully controlled. This came at a time when Lhasa had opened its first Holiday Inn which always seemed to be very odd, but it could have made money if tourism had not been interrupted by the shooting.

*Q: How did you get reports of what was happening up there?*

THOMAS: We sent people up there as often as we could and talked to people who came out. An occasional Tibetan would come out and talk to us, but that was very unusual. The Chinese would publish a lot more than they had before, and we were a little surprised at this. Once we had recognized Peking, we were able to subscribe to their local newspapers which contained a great deal of information.

*Q: How about the local authorities? How did you find them in Tibet and the rest of your consular district?*

THOMAS: As usual in China, the biggest problem with the local authorities is bureaucratic. They are highly bureaucratic and their bureaucracy doesn't always mesh with ours. Sichuan has a history going back to the second century AD and consider themselves very separate from the other Chinese. But we got a good reception there, and mainly speaking in Sichuan which is by far the most important of the provinces in that group. Tibet wasn't as important until you get to human rights, and then that was and is a very active area in the human rights discussion. The Chinese essentially wished we would leave them alone and let them run their own business. So we had a little difficulty trying to join in.

*Q: Then you moved to Beijing?*

THOMAS: Right.

*Q: From 1986-90. What were you doing then?*

THOMAS: I was the science counselor.

*Q: Which meant what?*

THOMAS: We had quite a large exchange program. Official changes, like earthquake management. This sounds a little silly, but it is a very active program. As far as the science end of it is concerned, an 8.2 Richter scale earthquake gave us a lot to offer.

*Q: What happened?*

THOMAS: Well, at the Tangshan earthquake 375,000 people were killed. We felt it in Peking quite strongly. It came at a time when the political tensions were very high. The peasants said that something awful was going to happen and sure enough Chairman Mao died in three weeks. It was a very active program then.

We had problems with the second Tiananmen Square incident.

*Q: This was the one in 1989?*

THOMAS: Right. Exchanges dropped off quite sharply and later ran into budget problems so they haven't fully recovered. As far as the Chinese are concerned they liked them very much and found they were very valuable.

*Q: Are these mainly students coming to the United States?*

THOMAS: Students, post-docs, mostly graduate students. I have noticed in the scientific literature since I have gotten back, that the number of Chinese names as principal authors of papers are a lot more numerous than they used to be.

*Q: This is a time when the personal computer has started to come on line, were the Chinese able to respond to this?*

THOMAS: They are extremely good at it. Their main problem was having money to invest. Our main problem was piracy of copy righted materials, and that is still a problem. But they reacted very rapidly to it. They are particularly good at software and have software companies. I notice there is one of their companies, Stone, which advertises regularly in the New York Times in their computer pages once a week.

*Q: How did you deal with the problem of piracy?*

THOMAS: We negotiated at a fairly high level on the problem saying that we wouldn't give them Most Favored Nation treatment if you don't stop pirating our computer stuff. This was big business. Book piracy in the old days was fairly small potatoes, but since computers have gotten involved in it, it is much bigger.

*Q: How did they respond?*

THOMAS: They had not given us a satisfactory response by the time I left, which was in the fall of 1990.

*Q: How was Winston Lord as ambassador?*

THOMAS: He is an expert, has a Chinese wife. She was born in Sichuan, so we were delighted to have them come down and pay us a visit. It worked out very well. He wasn't there for the whole time because Jim Lilley took over.

*Q: And how was he as ambassador?*

THOMAS: He was fine. Another China hand. His father was with Standback in east China and spoke good Chinese.

*Q: Could you tell me how the embassy reacted to the Tiananmen Square incident?*

THOMAS: Well, the Tiananmen Square business first began as a reporting matter for the embassy. We took turns on going to Tiananmen to see what was going on and who was there.

*Q: These were basically student demonstrators?*

THOMAS: Mainly students, a few others. Sarah and I went down to have a look on regular tours of these things. It came for the Chinese at a particularly unfortunate time because Gorbachev was visiting.

*Q: Which was the first visit of a Soviet leader in decades.*

THOMAS: Yes, it was a major event for them and it was pretty well spoiled by the demonstrations. We didn't always have to go to the square to get our soldiers. They started bringing soldiers in and put them outside our apartments, just because we lived on one of the main streets. But things didn't work well and they had some trucks stopped and burned by the mob which we could watch out of our windows and they didn't like that. When things got out of control and they were bringing troops in in the middle of the night and started shooting in Tiananmen Square, and many other places all over the city, things got quite dangerous. You have young, green troops with automatic weapons at one point shooting at the apartments we were living in. So, we thought it best to move people and Washington agreed. We got all of the Americans out as quickly as possible. This was not only happening in Peking. In Chengdu there was a riot and they attacked the building the consulate was in. There was much less trouble in Shanghai. It was a little hard to predict which areas were going to be troublesome. I don't think things have fully recovered since in relations with the Chinese.

*Q: One has the feeling things are in a state of suspension almost waiting for the new leadership to come in.*

THOMAS: Well, don't hold your breath. I find it rather difficult myself to figure that Deng Xiaoping can be 90 and still in full charge, but that is all I hear from anybody. I am a little out of touch now

*Q: When you left China in 1990, how did you feel American-Chinese relations were at that time?*

THOMAS: There again you have to separate facts from news stories. I found coverage of China very confusing and one of the problems is that the press and television have to have a story and they overwrite the stories and make an issue of something that need not be an issue, except that it is Thursday and we have to get something on the 6 o'clock news. This is a real problem. One of the advantages of the US Liaison Office in Peking was that the foreign press did not have to be

feed every day because they simply were not there and when they were there, there were no Americans and we could cultivate them in our own way.

When you get to real reporting, the reporting on the Tiananmen massacre, it was quite extraordinary and everybody did a good job on it. But there was plenty to report and people didn't have to make stories up.

*Q: What did you feel about the Chinese students in technology who were coming to the United States? Was there sort of the feeling behind this that we are really in our own way creating a whole new group of people who are in the long run going to have a tremendous affect within China?*

THOMAS: In Taiwan, this was a policy. "We need to send Taiwan students to the United States to get Ph.D.s in whatever subject they happen to choose because we need them to run the place when we recapture the mainland." Well, nobody says that anymore, but that doesn't keep it from being partly true. The exchange programs have been very active, although not as active as the Chinese would like. They are willing to let us bring people into the villages of Sichuan if we let them put people in our physics laboratories. I think it has been a good connection. I notice the relations with the missionary Chinese, with what we used to call Christian Chinese, is still very westernized compared with other Chinese. The old Methodist church in Peking is still full of Chinese. The connection has been a good connection and I think it is cost effective, the exchanges. A lot of the people who come, don't come back, but that is a problem that happens...

*Q: And we certainly come out ahead on this, getting bright people.*

THOMAS: Well, there are people who don't think so. Since my son married one I have the feeling that we get a net gain. But there are a lot of people who are very suspicious of all these A students coming in from China.

*Q: Well, why don't we stop at this point.*

THOMAS: Very good.

*Q: Thank you very much.*

**GILBERT J. DONAHUE**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1976-1977)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taichung, Taiwan (1977-1978)**

**China Reporting Group**  
**Hong Kong (1978-1981)**

**Economic Officer  
Beijing (1986-1987)**

**Economic/Political Officer  
Hong Kong (1989-1992)**

*Gilbert J. Donahue was born in Virginia in 1947. He received his bachelor's degree from American University in 1968. His career included positions in Mexico, Ivory Coast, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Brazil. Mr. Donahue was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 2000.*

*Q: How did you find the 1976-1977 period at FSI?*

DONAHUE: Of course, there is always an adjustment coming back to Washington. However, being in a language training mode means that you almost never get out of your suitcase. We were two weeks late starting our language training because we could not leave post before a certain date and language training must have begun either in late August or very early September. So, we had a lot of catch-up to do. Just getting oriented, buying a car, figuring out where we were going to live, making and then getting ready to make some of the purchases we would have to make down the road. Also, we had wanted to have a family. However, my wife did not want to get pregnant while we were in Africa and while we were taking malarial suppressant pills, not knowing what the impact of that medicine would be. So, after we were off of the tropical regime and after we felt fine medically, we started to be interested in having a family. In fact, that was one of the things that we began to accomplish while we were here in language training. My wife got pregnant. We ended up actually delivering the baby while we were in our second year of training in Taiwan. So, our oldest son was born in Taiwan.

On the one hand, we were adjusting to American life, having lived abroad for over five years since we entered the FS. On the other hand, we had our noses in the books. Chinese language training requires about a 30-hour day. 24 hours are not enough. There is no time out for sleeping. So, the teachers kept at us. There is a tremendous amount of memory work. It's almost like learning two different languages. The spoken language for rudimentary speech, to find your way around and take care of the necessities of daily life, is relatively simple. It's a language where syntax is more prominent than grammar. It's also a language that is highly idiomatic. So, in those respects, it is similar to English. The problem is reading and writing and then integrating reading with speaking. That is the only way to develop higher-level vocabulary. Learning to read takes time. I think your brain is limited to how many characters it can take in at a given period. That part of your memory probably deteriorates with age. So, the people who have the greatest aptitude in learning Chinese would be young people. An aging adult finds it more difficult, which was another reason why that was really probably the window in our career when it was optimal for us to get into Chinese language training.

*Q: Also, 1976 was very early on in our opening of relations with China. Was this seen as a time of great promise for a career in Chinese?*

DONAHUE: It was. Ever since I entered the FS, there had been the expectation that some president would find a way to bring about normalization of relations with China. The wonder is that it took so long. Kissinger had in fact made his historic visit to China under President Nixon. Following that, there was the expectation that we would be opening up in Beijing and we would need to train a lot of speakers. So, in fact, there had been an effort to increase the number of FS officers that would get Chinese language training. However, it didn't happen. There were a number of reasons. The period of the Kissinger visit was during the Cultural Revolution in China, which had never been well understood in the West because very little information about China was made available by the Chinese – purposely. The conditions were simply not right for the U.S. to establish a permanent mission of any type in Beijing during that Cold War period. That was followed by the Gang of Four period. In fact, when we began studying Chinese in 1976, Mao Zedong had just died. There was this brief period of expectation and certainly our Chinese teachers and the woman who was running the East Asian area studies program at the time, Dr. Hattie Colton, believed, “Now that Mao is dead, this can happen.” But we had not expected the Gang of Four to come together and have a hard-line resistance to any reform and for that period to take as long as it did. So, virtually for the entire period that we were studying Chinese, the Gang of Four was in control. It was a kind of return to very hard line rhetoric in Chinese editorials and a fierce face towards the West. There was a U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) in Beijing, but it was a very small one and what they could do was very limited. So, State was training Chinese language officers to have people in the wings, to be held in readiness. However, we could not be placed in an assignment in China at that time.

Nevertheless, at that time – and I think this is still true – the State Department would only accept people for long-term training who already had an ongoing assignment in a country in a language-designated position. So, my wife and I were going to LDPs [language designated position] in Hong Kong. Still, there was the expectation that during the course of our training our assignments might change and we expected we might be assigned to Beijing.

*Q: Why don't we talk a bit about what you were getting in Taichung? First, did your wife have any connection with the Chinese side?*

DONAHUE: My wife's family came from the southern part of Guangdong Province, which is in the south of China. Her father's family came from southwest of Hong Kong. Her mother's family came from northeast of Hong Kong. Linda's mother's family was Hakka, which is a group of people ethnically Chinese but culturally distinct from other southern Chinese. They had maintained more of their northern ways as they had migrated to southern China at a later stage of Chinese history, about one thousand years ago, and after Cantonese was well established in the region. The Hakka are very interesting people in Chinese history. Most Chinese revolutionaries have been Hakka. They are seen as very creative, ambitious, and operating outside of the lines. Deng Xiaoping, for example, was a Hakka.

*Q: Sounds like the perception of the Jews of Russia and Europe.*

DONAHUE: Perhaps. Also because they were culturally distinct and they were frozen out of society in southern China, they maintained some element of secrecy and separate lines of communication with Hakkas in other parts of China. There were pockets in other parts of China,

such as Sichuan Province in the country's interior. They communicated among themselves and had their own intelligence network. Therefore, they were sought after for Chinese intelligence operations because they were very adept at that. One of Linda's relatives, a Hakka, had been an intelligence officer in the Nationalist army. He was active when the Nationalists were being routed from the Mainland and Chiang Kai-shek decided to hold the island of Formosa. That relative ensured that his family was brought over from Guangdong into safety in Taiwan. Linda's family in America had maintained ties with them. So, some of the first people we saw when we arrived in Taipei were that uncle and aunt and their adult children, some of whom were older than we were. They were very welcoming and helped us get into life in Taiwan. Having a family connection there was very useful and allowed us to have the best of all possible worlds.

We would have enjoyed living in Taiwan and working in our embassy in Taipei, but I think my wife breathed a sigh of relief that we were not being assigned there because she did not feel comfortable being subjected to family pressure for granting visas or other consular-type favors. So, we had the best of all possible worlds because we were students, we were at an arm's distance from the embassy, in fact, living in another city. Therefore, the family couldn't really prevail on us to do any favors because we didn't have the ability to do that. It was very apparent that we were there as students, not as officers.

*Q: What was the situation on Taiwan as you saw it? This would be 1977-1978.*

DONAHUE: Right. Taiwan was already undergoing several transitions. It was apparent to me that they were going to fundamentally change how people approached life in Taiwan. It was an interesting period. My first trip to Taiwan was in 1970 when Chiang Kai-shek was still living, although perhaps not functioning very well physically. This was also during the height of the Vietnam War period. The American military presence was very apparent. We had used bases in Taiwan to help support our air and naval efforts towards Vietnam. On the one hand, there were no copyright laws or at least nobody paid any attention to them then, so you could buy English language books very cheaply. Everything was very cheap. You could live well for very little in Taiwan in 1970. But you also had almost the sense of an occupied country. At least that was my impression in Taipei. The American military presence was so great. There were a lot of English-speaking people, shopkeepers and so forth, but their orientation was to sell something to that military person. During 1977-1978, we lived in Taichung, a small city in the center of the island, a 4-hour drive south of Taipei. That was where the American Embassy Chinese Language School was located.

By that time, Chiang Kai-shek had died. His son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was the president. He was a Mainlander, but he had a different orientation than Chiang Kai-shek, partly because his mother was not Chinese, but Russian. He had had to work hard for acceptance by the Chinese at all. Chiang Kai-shek was never truly accepted on Taiwan because the Taiwanese people saw him as having taken away a good thing. Taiwan was one of the very few parts of the Japanese empire that did not chafe under Japanese rule. It had been lost from China in 1895 and taken away from Japan in 1945, so it had been ruled by Japan for 50 years. The Japanese had treated the Taiwanese very well. It was like an agricultural colony for Japan. All of the people who had been through schooling in Taiwan knew Japanese and didn't know Mandarin Chinese. They spoke their own Chinese dialect at home, Southern Fujianese dialect, whose spoken form is quite

different from Mandarin. The written language was based on classical Chinese, not modern Mandarin. So, there was really very poor communication and very little meeting of the minds between Chiang Kai-shek and the Mainlanders he brought with him to Taiwan to administer Taiwan and the Taiwanese, who really preferred the kind of colonial relationship they had had with Japan. Chiang Kai-shek issued a number of very draconian laws forbidding the use of Japanese and prohibiting the importation of Japanese-language printed materials. Everyone must learn Chinese. The language of instruction in high schools must be Mandarin. A number of traditional forms of Chinese government were either reintroduced into Taiwan or were enervated by the state. Chief among them was Confucianism as a state religion to supplant Shintoism, which would have held a similar position as a state-sponsored religion under Japanese rule. Confucian temples were abounding and a lot of money was given to Confucianism. Major museums of Chinese culture were built, including the wonderful National Palace Museum in Taipei. A great deal of effort was made to convince the Taiwanese that, in fact, they were part of the Chinese orbit culturally. The government strove hard to get them to speak modern Mandarin publicly and use that as the language of administration.

Chiang Ching-kuo was much more relaxed about culture. Under his rule – and I think he was seen as quite benevolent and better liked by the Taiwanese – Southern Fujian dialect (Minnanyu) was used more in public. Chiang Ching-kuo understood that people wanted to be able to speak in public the language they speak at home. Under his period, there were television shows and soap operas broadcast in Southern Fujian dialect. They would have been totally forbidden under Chiang Kai-shek. So, the society relaxed a little bit. Also, Taiwan's economy really hit "takeoff" and things started clicking. Big buildings were put up. Chiang Ching-kuo had a series of 10 great projects -- large infrastructure projects for which there was a sound economic need. Some of them were undoubtedly dual-use – airports, highways, seaports. They were part of defending Taiwan. It was a military defense. But they also had a practical commercial value. I think putting those projects in place really allowed Taiwan to have the economic success that it has today.

*Q: I assume you were absorbing things through your teachers.*

DONAHUE: Yes. Cornell-trained Charles "Chick" Sheehan was the linguist in charge of the Taichung School. A real character, he had been sidelined to Vietnamese training for much of the 1970s and was delighted to get back to his love – the Chinese language. He strongly encouraged field trips and other outings with the teachers, as well as social gatherings in which we used our Chinese. Other State Department students in Taichung were Neil Silver, Richard Boucher and Michael Klosson. One service member, Air Force Capt. Lawrence Mitchell, subsequently served in Hong Kong, Beijing and Taipei.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that Taiwan was moving places and that Mainland China was far away and over the horizon? Were you all fixed at all on Mainland China?*

DONAHUE: Well, it was surreal. I go back to learning Chinese at FSI. When you start out with a new language, you feel like you are a kindergartner or a first grader and you move up. In terms of our level of language ability, we were probably at upper years of elementary school when we left FSI and junior high when we got to Taiwan with the hopes that we would emerge from high school by the end of that year. Here in Washington, the teachers who taught us had left the

mainland and severed connections with it in the late 1940s. We were probably the last generation of FS students to have had all of our teachers be those who had worked for the U.S. Army or U.S. government in some way on Mainland China during World War II or immediately following it. The China Mainland they remembered had been swept away by the Communists. What they knew was definitely an old China. However, the orientation of our studies was toward the Mainland, not Taiwan. At that time, the People's Republic prohibited the export of certain items, including banknotes, the money they used. It was simply illegal to take them out. But of course, we have our ways and through our intelligence apparatus, some of these notes had been taken out. Part of our instruction at FSI was to learn language using modules where we would be going to a store and making a purchase and we had to have some money to exchange. So, FSI copied the Mainland Chinese banknotes so that we would have something to do that with. Also, under Mao, a process that began in the 1950s as an effort to improve literacy, China adopted a new series of characters referred to as "simplified" characters. A student of Chinese must know about 3,500 characters to read a high quality newspaper. Not all of those characters had been simplified. But about 2,000 of them have a simplified version. So, we began at FSI learning the so-called traditional or "old style" characters, as well as the corresponding simplified characters. That meant that we really needed to know 4,500-5,000 characters to be considered "literate."

Outside of our language school in Taiwan, you would never see simplified characters or any books from the Mainland. Their use might be treasonous. Our house was considered an extension of our language school because if we were going to do homework, we had to have some of these Mainland language materials. The first time my wife's relatives came to visit us in Taichung, they were shocked when they saw our bookshelves. They were seeing materials that were definitely forbidden in Taiwan. It gave a surreal quality to what we were learning.

Another strange feature about language learning in Taiwan was the challenge of using Mandarin in public. When we were learning Chinese in Washington, our teachers would arrange opportunities for us to speak Mandarin. We would go to a restaurant where the owner was known to be a Mandarin speaker, or go to a museum and have a special tour by a Mandarin-speaking curator. In Taiwan, outside of the school building, the language we heard on the street was Southern Fujian dialect. So, we were in a country learning one language where we could use it on the street if we initiated the conversation, but even so, we could only expect to speak Mandarin with people of a certain age. Generally, only those who graduated from high school after 1955 were really fluent in Mandarin. So, there was an artificial element to this. People working in our embassy in Taipei, when they dealt with government officials, would use Mandarin. That was the language of government. But we were not doing that. Our main interaction with people was shopkeepers, some commercial transaction, a restaurant, a barber, and we felt like fish out of water. Although our language ability in Mandarin improved, it didn't help us figure out how we could live our daily lives more easily.

*Q: That's where the fun is.*

DONAHUE: Right. So, it was a bizarre experience.

The other thing was, the language teachers in Taichung, who also were of the same generation as those at FSI, people who had worked for the American forces on Mainland China before 1949,

whose knowledge of Mainland China had been even more frozen in time. What they knew of contemporary China was heavily colored by the Nationalist propaganda they had been exposed to in Taiwan. However, because of their lifestyles, some of our teachers in Taiwan were more reminiscent of Mainland China in the 1920s and 1930s than we could have encountered anywhere else on earth. They were that Chinese literati class that really no longer exists. From them, we learned much about the traditional Chinese aesthetic, from “polite language” to “grass writing.” The men teachers were truly “Chinese Gentlemen Scholars” from another era.

*Q: Today is May 24, 2000. We're in 1978. You left Taipei and you're off to Hong Kong.*

DONAHUE: That's right. Staying in Taiwan for a minute, I'd like to describe some of the characteristics of Taiwan at that time and contrast them with Hong Kong. Taiwan has subsequently changed a very great deal, as our relationship with it has changed. I was a member of the last class at the American Embassy School of Language Studies in Taichung, Taiwan, to graduate while we still maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan holding the seat of China in the UN. There were many, many changes following my departure from that school. The school itself subsequently was moved to the outskirts of Taipei. Purposely, the State Department had located the language school in Taichung, which was a rather small city, instead of Taipei because they did not want the embassy to look upon us students as a pool of workers who could be pressed into use to fill their needs. We were to be kept quite separate from the embassy staff. On the other hand, we relied on the embassy for administrative-type functions. So, there were two or three times during the year when we had to make the trip to Taipei to visit personnel, to square things away with the embassy in one way or another. We found the embassy very efficient and almost working on a military footing partly because U.S. military bases occupied large parts of downtown Taipei in those days. So, there was an American Air Force base right next to the civilian air facility terminal. On the main road going from downtown Taipei to the famous National Palace Hotel, both sides had U.S. military bases, including an officers club and commissary. All of that subsequently changed entirely in the year following my departure from Taiwan so that we were part of the last of an era. Even while we were there, it was very apparent that Taiwan had grown a lot and the nature of its economy was changing a great deal. There was a sense of great economic dynamism. All of that having been said, however, there was a world of difference between Taiwan and Hong Kong. Although my wife and I felt that we would have benefitted a great deal from having a follow-on assignment in Taipei, certainly it would have cemented our Mandarin being in a situation where we had to use it on a regular basis, nevertheless, we were very much looking forward to our assignment to Hong Kong, which was then and remains now truly an international city. The orientation of our jobs was very much to China, which was a much bigger fish than Taiwan. So, we left Taiwan very much looking forward to working in the realm of China relations, not knowing for sure, but having an expectation that, finally during the course of our tour in Hong Kong, the U.S. government would indeed shift the recognition of China from Taiwan to the People's Republic.

*Q: This was the shoe that everyone was expecting to drop.*

DONAHUE: That's right. As we were leaving Taiwan, all of our social contacts with Taiwanese had that sense of anticipation. Was there anything we could tell them about when this decision would be made? There was a lot of expectation and concern because no one anticipated the

Taiwan Relations Act that would essentially allow us to more or less continue our relations with Taiwan as before.

*Q: The real feeling was that they were expecting to be really cast adrift?*

DONAHUE: That's right. There was a lot involved with the sense of the loss of national recognition. A lot of it had to do with the Chinese sense of face, that they would lose their face internationally. They were very concerned about maintaining their trade relations and their economic well being.

*Q: What about your wife's family relations?*

DONAHUE: There are several different kinds of people living in Taiwan. There are actually Aboriginal people related to the Polynesians and similar to the people of the Philippines. They are island Malays, a distinct minority. The people that most English speakers refer to as native Taiwanese are in fact people of Chinese ancestry whose families migrated to Taiwan since the 1700s. They mostly came from the southern part of Fujian Province on the Mainland of China and speak Southern Fujian dialect. It's written in Chinese characters, but the spoken language is as different from Mandarin as German from French. It almost represents a different language family. So, those are the people who are referred to as native Taiwanese.

My wife did not have any relatives among them. Her relatives were so-called Mainland Chinese who migrated to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek's armies following WWII. It was a harrowing experience for them. My wife's mother was a Hakka from Meih sien County in the northeastern part of Guangdong Province. The Hakka people are probably originally (2,000 years ago) from the Yellow River Valley in northern China and migrated to the south after the culture of Guangdong Province had become established. They were seen as interlopers, refugees from the north. They were never fully accepted into southern Chinese society. For a number of reasons, they maintained their distinction, so their language is different, their customs are different. The women, for example, never bound their feet. They remained apart from the dominant society of the south. Sort of like the Medicis or other people in Renaissance Europe, they maintained family ties with other groups of Hakkas elsewhere in China. Hakka people were very prominent in financial affairs, having run a kind of banking industry throughout China over the last 1,000 years. The Hakka also were mainstays of so-called secret societies and brotherhoods, many of which had a political dimension and were active in the 20<sup>th</sup> century revolutions and civil wars.

*Q: More like the Masons were in Western Europe in the last couple of centuries.*

DONAHUE: That is correct. The Hakka group's secret societies played an important role at the end of the Ming Dynasty and the Ching Dynasty. A foreign group known as the Manchus ruled the Ching Dynasty in China. The Hakkas also played a significant role in the downfall of the Ching Dynasty and the early period of the Republic. Furthermore, the Hakkas played a role in the communist uprising in China, and Chiang Kai-shek used Hakkas on his staff. He probably largely relied on Hakkas in his intelligence network and secret police network. One of my wife's uncles was in fact a general in Chiang Kai-shek's army involved in intelligence.

*Q: At the very end there, did you find that the group, including your wife's family, but others, were looking to meld into the Taiwanese population? Were they looking to get the hell out? How was this group getting ready to deal with the situation?*

DONAHUE: As a group, the Mainlanders who had migrated to Taiwan following WWII never felt fully accepted by the so-called native Taiwanese, the majority of the population. Under Chiang Kai-shek, the Mainlanders held a privileged position, and indeed, they dominated most high level government positions. As time progressed and the native Taiwanese got wealthier and got more political power under Chiang Kai-shek's son, the relative power of the Mainlanders waned. I think a lot of the immigration to the United States and to Australia from Taiwan has been Mainlanders realizing that their prospects on Taiwan were very limited. They felt they would be better off moving on to someplace where they would be given greater scope. At the time we were in Taiwan, Linda's uncle and aunt were still living. They were very elderly. They had a very large family, eight adult children and two still in high school then. All of them aspired to leave Taiwan. Subsequently, almost all of them did. Two family members continue to live and maintain businesses in Taiwan. However, most of the family went abroad for advanced university degrees and then subsequently either went into business or entered a profession while maintaining their lives outside of Taiwan.

*Q: You were in Hong Kong from 1978 to when?*

DONAHUE: 1978-1981. That was a defining period for our relations with China. It also was a major period of decision making for what to do with our consulate general in Hong Kong. Hong Kong had been a rather insignificant part of the British Empire for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century up until WWII. From the 1890s to WWII, the main city in East Asia was Shanghai, and it had the bulk of British and other foreign presence. That was the economically dynamic region. Hong Kong, while it remained very important as a major port, nevertheless really had no industry. So, what gave Hong Kong its industrial base was the flight of refugees from Mainland China into Hong Kong in the early 1950s, as many of those businesspeople were forced to leave China. Most of the refugees in that early period were the so-called capitalists or what the communists termed "bourgeoisie." They took out whatever resources they could, as well as their skills. Many of the refugees from Shanghai established the textiles industry in Hong Kong, its economic mainstay for much of the '50s and '60s. When we arrived in Hong Kong, the early period of the shock of foreign recognition of Mainland China had already subsided. So, Hong Kong business and the Hong Kong population had gotten used to the fact that western countries were rebuilding their relations with China. However, the U.S. had not yet made that decision. So, there was a lot of expectation, not apprehension, but expectation that once the U.S. did indeed recognize Mainland China, it would be ultimately good for Hong Kong because a lot more business would flow through Hong Kong to China. There were many reasons to believe that. Hong Kong had become the main entrepot for China trade. Probably Hong Kong was responsible for as much as 80% of China's foreign exchange earnings. Many foreign countries would not or could not ship to the port of Shanghai. So, a lot of Chinese goods would go by lighters or coastal vessels from Shanghai to Hong Kong to be placed on international ships.

The British government in Hong Kong had evolved during the course of the '50s and '60s, and by the late '70s there was a maturation process. During that period, from 1950-1980, Hong

Kong's population increased about three times. So, during the '50s, which was the greatest period of the influx of refugees, the Hong Kong government had been mainly concerned with how to house these people, how to provide normal city services like schools and water supplies to the new areas that were being built. That was consolidated during the '60s. However, the '60s was a period of great tension in Hong Kong because of the Cultural Revolution taking place on the other side of the border, the flow of another group of refugees, and the concern that Red Guard or similar political activities would cross the border into Hong Kong. There was a feeling of tension. For a period during that time, the Red Guard effectively controlled the Portuguese enclave of Macau on the south side of the mouth of the Pearl River. It was only with great patience and concern and close coordination with the government in Beijing that Red Guard control was ended and the Portuguese were allowed to retain a fig leaf of rule over Macau. It never got that bad in Hong Kong, but nevertheless the Hong Kong government was greatly challenged during that period. There were times when it could not provide a sufficient supply of drinking water to the inhabitants of Hong Kong. They were concerned about power shortages and so forth. That ended by the '70s.

*Q: We really want to talk about 1978-1981. Who was consul general, what were you doing, what was the situation?*

DONAHUE: At the time that we arrived in Hong Kong, the consul general was Thomas Shoesmith, who had been DCM in Tokyo and was a member of the so-called "Chrysanthemum Club" in the State Department. Virtually all of his foreign assignments had involved Japan, and he did not speak Chinese. It was perhaps by happenstance that he was assigned to Hong Kong. I guess the Bureau owed him something. Perhaps there wasn't the expectation that our relations with China would be affected to the extent that they were during the period of his assignment there. Interestingly, he subsequently became ambassador to Malaysia. Shoesmith was highly regarded and extraordinarily knowledgeable on Japan and the U.S. strategic relationship with Japan. However, he really did not have a background in Chinese affairs nor was he particularly knowledgeable about our relations with China as they were to develop. However, that was also a strength. He didn't have preconceived notions. He was willing to ask for guidance and ideas and took them on board very well and cogitated a lot before determining action. So, he was a kind of broker of options that were put forth by various agencies when the questions arose as to what to do with the consulate in Hong Kong. When I arrived in Hong Kong, I was assigned to what was then called the China Reporting Unit. I have to go back a little bit in history to explain the significance of that and then describe what subsequently happened to it.

Hong Kong had truly been insignificant up until the end of WWII and then it became a staging area for American military operations once it had been recaptured back from Japan (it had been occupied by Japan during WWII). Hong Kong became extremely important to both Britain and the U.S. in the 1950s as Mainland China was taken over by the communists and most foreign delegations were forced to leave China, with the exception of the British. Of the main Western European countries, only Britain retained a presence in China continuously. The British Government did this in part because it felt the need to safeguard its presence in Hong Kong. The other western countries increasingly recognized the value of Hong Kong, as well. The U.S. considerably beefed up our operations there. Hong Kong became very important as a source of intelligence and analysis on China for the U.S. and for Britain during the early 1950s for the

Korean War, and in the 1960s for the Vietnam War. It was also an excellent location from which to follow the North Koreans, the Russians, and the Vietnamese. Hong Kong became a significant collection center because it was right there on the coast of China. It was easier to get information than any other place.

The China Reporting Unit was composed of a very unusual group of people, including highly talented FS nationals, some of whom, like David Wong, had actually worked for the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai during WWII. He was one of the last people who closed our consulate in Shanghai and fled the city when the communists were telling foreigners they had only a limited time to remain. So, David and some of the other people at the consulate, like Vincent Li, literally brought papers with them as well as other belongings from our Consulate General in Shanghai. We had a sizeable library of works on and about China written by Chinese and foreign scholars. We had incredible and extensive files of various kinds of happenings in China. David Wong and others of his generation essentially established the filing system that allowed us to track what was going on in China. I know that various places in Washington had some of the same materials, similar materials anyway, but I think that we would have had to visit several such facilities in Washington, whereas they were all together in Hong Kong. So, Hong Kong became a kind of analyst's paradise. Even as late as the 1970s, it was visited frequently by Washington-based analysts to pick the brain of David Wong and Vincent Li. They could find immediately what the analyst was looking for. The reason why this was so very important was, a kind of theology has developed in the world of Marxism and governments claiming to follow Marxist ideology. Certain terms have a particular meaning and they are often associated with people in the leadership. I'm sure in Russia there were terms or ideas that were associated with Lenin as opposed to Trotsky. In the Chinese context, there were similar ideas. There were ones associated with Mao, with Deng Xiaoping. One of the aspects of the analytical function was to very carefully read Mainland press and look for trends or changes in content that would indicate which leader might be coming to the fore or which political line would seem to be most influential at a given period. People like David Wong were past masters at detecting those ideas. David's strength was economic. His political counterpart was Vincent Li. Both of them had reputations that caused people in Washington to really follow what their thinking was. They were that important. So, the China Reporting Unit was one of the places to be assigned, and it was considered quite a feather in one's cap to be part of the staff. It was a learning experience as much as a job for us to accomplish.

*Q: 1978-1981. What was the situation in China as seen by you all?*

DONAHUE: When I began studying Chinese in 1976, Chairman Mao had just died. There was the expectation that China could return to a more liberal or pragmatic approach to politics following his death. We had not really expected the subsequent Gang of Four period that lasted for about two years. About the time I was leaving Taiwan and going to Hong Kong in the summer of 1978, the Gang of Four was arrested. At the very time that I arrived in Hong Kong, there were trials for the members of the Gang of Four. These were show trials and were televised by Chinese TV. We were able to pick up that in Hong Kong and we watched the trials in real time. We also taped them. That way, we could watch the tape as a group, stop it periodically, and discuss the import. So, among the first few weeks that I was working in Hong Kong, it was very exciting because we knew that we were witnessing an historical period. We did not know

precisely what the outcome was going to be. Deng Xiaoping had been reinstated, which was his third resurrection politically. But he was not particularly well known or understood. There were debates on the extent to which he would reintroduce Maoist-type policies, whether he would carry out more pragmatic policies. There was also some apprehension as the trial of the Gang of Four unfolded as to whether they themselves would garner popular support and make it difficult for the mainstream communist authorities to continue to pursue a criminal case against them. But the Chinese government was very astute in staging the TV show trials and arranging testimony from people who had been directly and awfully affected by the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. Many of those witnesses were able to finger specifically one or another member of the Gang of Four. This totally discredited them. This was over a period of some months. So, it got wide coverage in China and a political pulse reading was taken at that time. I would say by November of 1978, we were beginning to realize that indeed a new era was taking shape in China, that Deng Xiaoping was consolidating his power, that the period of excess under Mao and the Gang of Four was over, and that China was getting ready to take a more pragmatic approach. Also, Beijing began really welcoming foreign investment. Already, it had engaged in foreign trade. However, it was a major step politically and ideologically to actually permit foreigners to own property in China. It was even more threatening to the leadership to permit foreign firms to employ workers in China. This was a big step for them, a major concession to capitalism for a country that until then had not recognized individual property rights. The concept of Chinese people working for a capitalist enterprise was just anathema ideologically.

*Q: What were we seeing during this time, the China watchers? Were they concerned about where we might go?*

DONAHUE: I think that this is one of the strengths of the China Reporting Unit that we maintained in Hong Kong at the time. We had files that went back probably to the 1930s, including some files that had been carted out of Shanghai. People like Vincent Li and David Wong went back into that material to research extensively the biographies of Deng Xiaoping and the other people he was bringing back into government. So, we looked very carefully at the period when Deng Xiaoping had lived in Paris, which was in the 1930s. We looked very carefully at what we had known about Deng Xiaoping in the '50s and '60s before he had been imprisoned for a period during the Cultural Revolution. We looked at why he had been placed on Mao's enemies list, what Mao had seen in him that he didn't like. Going back to a point that I made earlier, Deng Xiaoping was a Hakka. He had been on the communist side rather than the Nationalist side during the civil war. Nevertheless, he was part of this Hakka family network and there were Hakkas we knew who could shed a little bit of light on what Deng's thinking or likely operations would be. What we saw was that Deng had maintained contact during the period of his disgrace with a number of people who had been pragmatic thinkers in the 1950s and there had been a period in the 1950s in China when China had done something similar to what Lenin did in Russia in the late teens and early '20s. In Russia, it was called the New Economic Program. Lenin had allowed a level of capitalist enterprise to be maintained. In China, there was a similar period in the early 1950s, when Mao had allowed certain types of capitalist activity. He had divided the capitalist society into two groups. One was called the large bourgeoisie, the other the small bourgeoisie. The large bourgeoisie, with capitalization valued at hundreds of thousands of dollars, were the owners of factories. These were the major enterprises that the state decided to nationalize. It was because of that policy that many of those factory owners from Shanghai

had fled to places like Hong Kong. But the so-called “small bourgeoisie,” the people who owned small storefront shops, restaurants, various services, were permitted to maintain their operations. There was no problem for them as long as they did not employ people from outside their family. However, this was not a problem culturally. Typically, Chinese never felt comfortable employing people outside their family except in very menial positions. They certainly would not invite people from outside their family to keep their books or have deep insight into their financial situation or their business operations because they didn’t want competition. So, this worked in China. It worked until the period of the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, however, even these small businesses were wiped out. In big cities like Guangzhou, that had thousands and thousands of restaurants, they were reduced to only four restaurants for a population of five million people.

So, what we anticipated was that Deng was going to revive this low-level capitalism. Indeed, that’s what happened. Of course, it took years to actually bring back this activity. China’s economy actually shrank during the Cultural Revolution. There was incredible demand, but insufficient production, of certain items, including most consumer goods. During the waning years of the Cultural Revolution and up through the time that I was in Hong Kong, ration coupons were required to buy mainstays in China. That included not just food but also low-level industrial products such as a fan, a radio, and a bicycle. Therefore, there really weren’t products that small shopkeepers could buy that would allow them to maintain their shops. So, Deng Xiaoping faced a number of problems. He had to increase agricultural production, increase industrial production, and make available products that could be marketed through retail operations at the grassroots level. He did accomplish this by bringing back into government and pressing into service people who had been discredited by Mao and considered Mao’s enemies during the ‘50s and ‘60s. But, it took several years for those people to be located and reestablished.

*Q: During this period (You were there up through the second half of the carter administration and the full recognition of China), how did that impact on the consulate general?*

DONAHUE: It impacted in a number of ways. First of all, there were opportunities for us to make official visits to Beijing that would include travel to other cities between Hong Kong and Beijing. The U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing asked us to string out our travels so that they wouldn’t have too many visitors at one time. They were very conscious of the need to not wear out anybody’s welcome and they wanted to manage us well, which is also a Mainland Chinese thing, to manage the foreigners. So, the timing of our travel to China was related to the date of our arrival in Hong Kong. Because my wife and I had arrived late in the summer, we were somewhat later on the list for making our trips to China. Some of the people in the office were making their orientation trips to China during that fall, talking with the liaison office, and getting a sense that the shoe was ready to drop. Even so, it was a considerable surprise to us.

I remember being at a Christmas party at the home of Stan Brooks, the head of the China Reporting Unit, in December 1978. It was a beautiful day and life was continuing on per usual. Then we got the news. I believe somebody called him from Washington or Beijing. “The President has announced that we are normalizing relations with China.” So, the party that had been a holiday party ended up being a kind of celebration of our new relationship with China.

We also spent the rest of that time, and indeed the rest of the month of December, ruminating about how our situation in Hong Kong might be affected. We knew that when the Liaison Office in Beijing was turned into the U.S. Embassy, there would be a great desire to make it a full-fledged embassy and to have it do everything that an embassy could do. We thought our whole unit might be moved to Beijing, lock, stock, and barrel.

Well, for a number of reasons, it didn't happen. But we had lots of meetings in the consulate where all of us had the opportunity to make our views known. This was another thing that perhaps was most unusual about how Hong Kong was run. Tom Shoemith almost viewed us as a combination faculty on China, sounding board on what to do with China relations, and cabinet. All of us members of the China Reporting Unit were given equal standing to voice our opinion. He ran the consulate in a very collegial way. He did not rely exclusively on his section chief to advise him, but really wanted to hear all of our views. One by one, we would go over various themes. I remember contributing to speeches and drafting some speeches he made during that period when he was explaining to various groups in Hong Kong, business groups, groups of Chinese, perhaps even people in the Hong Kong government, what this particular move on the part of the U.S. Government meant for our presence in Hong Kong. He also needed to discuss its effect on our relations with Taiwan because there was considerable dissent about that. As well, our new recognition of the People's Republic had implications for our relations with other countries in East Asia like Japan, and the so-called balance of power in the region. At the time, although we were no longer involved in the Vietnam struggle, we still had a considerable U.S. military presence in South Korea.

*Q: We had pulled out of Vietnam fully in 1975.*

DONAHUE: You're right, but Hong Kong had been affected in several ways by Vietnam. There was a kind of dirty war going on in Vietnam and the rest of Southeast Asia. There were all kinds of things going on in Cambodia. There was a quasi-military tangle between Cambodia and Thailand that involved U.S. military and other parts of the U.S. Government. We had a Vietnam watcher-type position in Bangkok looking at Indochina from that side, but we also had an equivalent position in Hong Kong looking at the operation from Hong Kong's side. The person in that position is still living in the Washington area and is very much involved in foreign affairs: Charles Lahiguera. I believe he served in Bangkok as well. He was a very astute political officer, and his job involved looking at Vietnam. He also looked at what North Korea was doing in this area. There was concern on that score, as well. Because Shoemith had served in Japan, he was looked to by a number of people in the Hong Kong community and the Hong Kong government for a readout on how our new recognition of China might affect our relationship with Japan. There had been a feeling in some quarters that as we renewed our relationship with China, we would diminish somehow our relationship with Japan. There was also a concern about whether China would seek for us to minimize our presence in South Korea, whether China would press forward more vehemently to bring about reunion with Taiwan. So, all of those issues were up in the air at that time. They were a matter of debate within the consulate as well as in Washington.

Typical for being assigned overseas, you are aware of but not always completely knowledgeable about debates taking place in Washington. A lot of times, decisions are made in Washington without necessarily involving the post. So, I would say from December 1978 through about May

of '79, many of us had the expectation that we would just be reassigned to Beijing. None of us frankly expected at that time what subsequently happened.

In Beijing, the U.S. was Johnny Come Lately. I think the fact that we were so late in our recognition of the Beijing government in comparison with other Western governments made it inevitable that we would be further delayed in bringing our embassy in Beijing up to full status. There was a shortage of everything in China, really a great shortage. Because Beijing was a government city, the government provided all municipal services. That means not just a single municipal water and sewer supply, but the provision of heat was based on a city steam plant and things like that. So, even though we could get a plot of land that the Foreign Ministry would allow us to have to build on, it was on the outskirts of town and not part of their plan to be supplied with heat for another 10 years or so. The better plots, the ones that were already connected to that city grid, had already been taken based on order of recognition. So, we truly lost out. Our tiny liaison office building simply was not sufficient to handle the large number of people and multifarious agencies that would want to be in Beijing during a period of normal relations. Everything had to be done. So, in the end, our embassy was able to obtain a series of buildings on two different compounds several blocks away from the liaison office. It was certainly not an ideal situation. But it became sort of adequate. One of the buildings had been the former Pakistani embassy that was moving to newer, better quarters. We had to refit it and it sort of worked but was never adequate. Then the other compound was where we put administrative, consular, and embassy community functions. It was never adequate either, and they are probably still adding a little room here, there, and the other place. But these were all fixes and they are not a true solution. Just refitting the Pakistani embassy required another year or two to make enough room for people. There was a severe housing problem for diplomats; the embassy could not add personnel as rapidly as it wanted to.

So, a kind of division of responsibilities came into being. First of all, even though we maintained the China Reporting Unit at least initially, we changed its nature fundamentally. We split it into an economic section and a political section. The China Reporting Unit officers were split so that Stan Brooks, Ray Burghardt and Neil Silver went to the Political Section, and John Moddero, Kaarn Weaver and I went to the Economic Section. At that time, we were only concerned about political relations with China, not with Hong Kong. The Political Section essentially was a China Political Section. The Economic Section had some people dealing with our relations with Hong Kong with the expectation that China trade would increase. However, it was expected there would be a lot of Hong Kong-related work involved. So, the China economic unit was analytical, and the Hong Kong economic unit was primarily commercial. At that time, the Foreign Commercial Service function was still part of the State Department, so this was not a problem. However, all of this changed during the period I was in Hong Kong. It seemed like every year we had a reorganization and we went through a number of different section chiefs and so forth. By the time I left Hong Kong, the Foreign Commercial Service had been taken over by the Commerce Department and had moved out of our unit physically, operationally and bureaucratically. Therefore, what had been the China Reporting Unit, global in its scope and providing close collaboration between economic and political officers, became much more stratified and separate and our orientation diverged. But we were also in a way backstopping Beijing. We were doing things that our embassy in Beijing could not do, so they were tasking us for research that they knew only we could do.

*Q: I suppose too at this point your Chinese national staff in Hong Kong were highly skilled and were not about to go to Beijing anyway. You had the expertise and all there that could not be duplicated somewhere else.*

DONAHUE: This was true. At that time and even now, we cannot hire FS national employees in China. The Chinese employees of foreign embassies are in fact employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who are seconded for assignment to a particular foreign embassy and the foreign embassy pays their salary by contract. They can be yanked out at any time and they usually are recycled on a fairly regular basis. In fact, it's like employing a spy in your operation so you have to keep them at arm's length. By the time they're trained and are helpful, they're taken out and you have to train somebody else. I think that the people in our embassy in Beijing recognized early on that this was going to be the pattern and that we had a resource in Hong Kong that they could use and they needed to use. We had people in Hong Kong who, in reading a newspaper and especially the editorials in *People's Daily* or *Guangming Daily*, could immediately remember that a given phrase recalled something from the 1950s. These FSNs knew which leader had been involved and they knew what policy could flow out of that. So, we had a capability of forecasting that people in our embassy in Beijing simply did not have and would never have.

However, State Department Security interjected itself and forced some changes on our operations in Hong Kong. Together with the other bureaucratic changes, these fundamentally altered how we worked. In the days of the China Reporting Unit, the entire unit had been on a single floor. The Americans worked right next door to FS national employees. We saw each other all the time. We had meetings throughout the day. We were in each other's offices all the time. I would say we jointly drafted analytical pieces. Yes, only officers had access to classified information. A lot of times – of course, this was an era before computers – a cable or other kind of report drafted by a FS national employee would come to us and we would intersperse paragraphs that were classified that they would never see. Although we would be responsible for the whole piece, the bulk of the report might be mostly their work. Sometime during this period of 1978-1981, State Department Security decided it would not work for us to be located together. They wanted all of the FS national employees to be on other floors in the consulate and for the Americans to operate behind a hard line. So, we had to make a major shift in our operations. Although we remained very friendly and we had to work with each other, it became a bit of a chore. We had to travel between floors. The national employees had to ring a bell or call in advance to get into our office space. It did alter how we were working. As a result, not right away, but over time, some of the longer serving FS nationals who were among the most skilled and had the most institutional memory of the staff ended up retiring. By the end of the time that I was in Hong Kong, 1981, what was left of the China Reporting Unit staff had been weakened. We had a new generation. They were people who had not been born in China and did not have the sense of familiarity with the Chinese countryside as the people who had departed.

I cannot overemphasize the importance to the U.S. Government of Hong Kong as a listening post on China and other parts of the Asian mainland. Hong Kong was a safe, convenient location, with a solid and supportive government, all of which encouraged the activities of a strong resident China-watching group. This included some knowledgeable expatriate businesspeople,

foreign and Hong Kong Chinese academics, non-governmental organizations, and journalists. Although Hong Kong is a big city (4.5 million population), the foreign community, and especially the China watchers, frequently saw each other. There were well-established lines of communication, and many venues for the sharing of knowledge and views. These encounters included meetings of the American Chamber of Commerce's China Commercial Relations Committee, the Foreign Correspondents Club, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, and various receptions and lunches around town, as well as university lectures.

During both of my assignments to Hong Kong (1978-81 and 1989-92), I was privileged to be invited to participate in the Williamsburg Group. This was a handpicked "club" of no more than 20 China watchers who met monthly for dinner. I believe the original meeting had taken place in the Williamsburg room of a club and so the name stuck even though the meeting place changed many times. During my tours in Hong Kong, the group usually met at the Foreign Correspondents Club. During my second tour, I was the only one from the American Consulate General who received the coveted invitation; all the other participants were in the private sector, working for companies or themselves, or else academics or journalists. The meetings were conducted in English and the main rule was that all discussion would be kept confidential. Journalists and others who wrote for the public were not allowed to attribute any views to the participants. These rules became more important in the run-up to 1997, when people became more concerned about how they might be treated by China or the future Hong Kong Government. I found the discussion at these meetings extremely important to my understanding of events in China, helpful to my reporting and analysis, and invaluable as a way to bounce ideas off seasoned professionals.

Unfortunately, my Hong Kong contacts inform me that the China watching community has dwindled significantly since 1997, which caused many of my former colleagues to leave Hong Kong, for retirement or professional relocation. While some of them moved to Beijing or Shanghai, and are doubtless able to maintain their professional activities there, they may not feel so free to voice their views in settings on the Mainland as they were in Hong Kong during the "good old days" of China watching from a short distance.

*Q: What about cooperation with the British and the French in Hong Kong?*

DONAHUE: We have, generally speaking, an outstanding working relationship with the British. Perhaps just one rung below are our relations with other English-speaking countries like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, where we share a very great deal of information. Up until the period when we first established our liaison office in Beijing, we relied almost exclusively on the British to give us a readout of what was taking place in China. The French also had a presence in Beijing, but we have never had the degree of closeness with the French in terms of information sharing that we have with the British. There were times during the Cultural Revolution when even those countries' embassies in China were quite small and there were some weeks when they were advised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs not to leave their premises. So, even they didn't always know and could not always follow the scene of what was taking place in China. Up until the point when we formally recognized China, we had a very close relationship with the British and I would say there was no conflict and no competition. What they could not supply, sometimes we could through signals intelligence and so forth. So, we had a really hand in glove

relationship.

This did begin to change with normalization. The Chinese made a distinction that was very important. We could buy things from China and they would probably buy a few things from the United States, even before normalized relations. But the Chinese had made it very clear from the outset that a full trading relationship would not be possible until we had established a full diplomatic relationship. So, with the establishment of our embassy came an incredible outpouring of interest on the part of American companies in doing business of various types with China. It sort of coincided with the beginning of loosening up in terms of China's overall policy under Deng Xiaoping and a welcoming of foreign investment permission for foreigners to enter into contracts with Chinese enterprises and permission to establish joint venture industrial operations. Of course, American companies were reading about this in the newspaper and they wanted to have part of the action. I think the British and other Europeans chafed at this. There was a feeling that they had been there longer, they had suffered in their relations with China during the period when it was very difficult to live and work in China, and their companies ought to be able to take advantage of these opportunities. They saw Americans as Johnny Come Latelies, wanting to take advantage of an opportunity, and crowding them out. So, there was a sense of competition that we had not had before in our relations with Britain. I saw this competitive sense not only in the period of 1978-1981, but also later when I served in Hong Kong, 1989-1992, in what was getting to be the waning years of British presence there. The British were trying to extract as much commercial benefit as possible from their relationship with China and they really saw U.S. business as wanting to take that away. This was unfortunate, and it did affect our ability to cooperate in some other areas.

Getting back to the French, I never personally found the French very useful or helpful. Perhaps some of the political officers did, but I don't think we had a high regard for French knowledge of China. We had a high regard for Australian knowledge. Australia was gaining a great deal of expertise. Australia and New Zealand had been quite shaken economically and politically when Britain joined the Common Market in the early 1960s because those countries had had a preferential trade relationship with Britain before that. One of the consequences of Britain's joining the Common Market was a trade shift favoring the continent over its former colonies. So, Australia and New Zealand at that point recognized that where they were located geographically had to dictate the countries which were going to be the most important to them politically and economically. Australia was the first Western country to develop agricultural trade with China, a grain deficit nation.

The Australians really made the most of the growing international diplomatic changes with China and they established relations between their academic institutions, their trading institutions, and so forth. There was a constant stream of Australian academics and politicians. On their way to Beijing, they would stop in Hong Kong. In fact, we had a very useful exchange with several of the academics over time, and some members of our staff had indeed studied under some of those academics at Australian National University before American universities could have similar exchanges. So, we got a lot from that relationship.

We also got some benefit from our diplomatic colleagues in the Japanese mission. Japan had also developed a trading and economic relationship with China, and was one of the first countries to

provide foreign assistance to China. Since Japan had linguistic, cultural and historical associations with China, it was somewhat easier for them to understand what was going on there. Also, the Japanese are meticulous in recording details. The Japanese Economic Trade Organization [JETRO] provided many how-to manuals for Japanese business to know what to do in China. These were updated on a regular basis. They were able to do things that the U.S. government was never and probably will never be able to do. The Japanese government does both pre- and post-trip briefings of their businesspeople. So, when a business delegation was going to China, government officials would tell them what to look for. When they returned to Japan, the officials would debrief them and ask whom they saw and what they thought about them. Were the Chinese officials at an appropriate level? Were they decision makers? Questions like these. So, these how-to manuals (mind you, only in Japanese) gave a great deal of information about which Chinese official in which ministry was actually the key decision maker. The manuals advised the best people to deal with at each stage of a business transaction. This is one reason why Japanese business became so successful. They knew how to do this. I was fortunate to obtain such a manual from a JETRO colleague. I do not know Japanese, but I was able to provide it to consulate colleagues who do. They were able to glean some very important political insights. We did not turn around and universally make this information available to our businesspeople, certainly not in the degree of detail that the Japanese did. But in our overall briefings to American business, we were able to say, "We understand that in this ministry, certain people are important and the degree of importance does not necessarily match their title or where they are on the official organization chart" and so forth.

*Q: Was the Commerce Department picking up the ball? So often, Commerce has not had a high reputation within the FS.*

DONAHUE: In the case of China, I think it was somewhat different. This is because the State Department relatively early on, together with a group of politically connected businesspeople, had fostered the formation of the National Council for U.S.-China Trade (subsequently, the U.S.-China Business Council). I could not emphasize too much the importance of that organization in the early days of our relations with China. At that time, the National Council employed a number of people with a serious academic background in China at their offices in Washington and Hong Kong, and subsequently following our establishment of relations, in Beijing. The people they employed were outstanding. One of them, the person who headed their office in Hong Kong, was John Kamm. Despite the fact he appears to have a southern Chinese name, he is a Caucasian American married to a Chinese woman. He became probably the most knowledgeable person anywhere in the U.S. on certain Chinese industries – textiles, chemicals, petrochemicals, and minerals, in particular. There was a lot of strategic interest in what the Chinese were doing in those minerals. So, we tapped into his information. John subsequently became very interested in human rights in China and runs a non-governmental organization on that issue from his base in San Francisco.

The State Department also employed China experts on a contract basis. I'm not sure how they were able to do this. But one of those people, who ended up being assigned for a short period to the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing and then subsequently the embassy, was a man named David Denny. I believe that, after his contract expired, he went to work for the National Council for U.S.-China Trade. But at that time, David Denny did the commercial work for the State

Department in Beijing. He was John Kamm's counterpart in Beijing, the person that U.S. business people would go to for advice. Up until then, very few American businesspeople were able to go officially to Beijing, but some who did developed acquaintances in Chinese ministries and became very knowledgeable. Denny was the one who dealt with them. He was the one who followed the Canton Trade Fair activities from the standpoint of being resident on the Mainland. I should talk a little bit about this.

During the period of the Cultural Revolution, China, like all communist countries, still had to maintain some foreign trade. It could not be economically self-sufficient. However, China wanted to rigidly control foreign trade and, indeed all contact with foreigners. China also wanted to maximize its income from exports and needed to be very judicious about imports. So, it would very carefully predetermine the types of products that it would want to import and often would buy only one item, only one piece of machinery or product, with the idea that the government would turn that over to its engineers to try to reengineer it and be able to produce that kind of product in China. China's exports were mostly agricultural products and raw materials, mineral or other. China was not self-sufficient in raw materials production for its own industry. And, its production was not necessarily efficient on economic grounds. However, for national security needs, China would make available for export enough products to be able to pay for its imports.

That is how it maintained its economy during the Cultural Revolution. It conducted its foreign trade at two trade fairs held in the city of Guangzhou. They used the old name for Guangzhou, Canton. They were spring and fall affairs, one month long in each case. Sometimes they would be themed. One time, they were going to have a textile fair, but usually they would incorporate a number of items. Each four-week session was divided into two parts. Usually, the first two weeks were reserved for China's exports, and the latter two weeks were for China's imports. They would invite people from various foreign countries to attend. The invitee needed to have a personal invitation in hand to obtain a Chinese visa, and to make a reservation at the main hotel – the Dong Fang Hotel near the Trade Fair building. Prior to our establishing full diplomatic relations, very few Americans were invited to the trade fair. To the extent that American companies were able to sell anything to China, it was almost exclusively through a foreign intermediary, either British or Hong Kong Chinese, who would be invited to the fair. In addition to representing a, b, c company, the intermediary could also represent American x, y, z company on the side. Sometimes the intermediary would be chosen because China had a particular need for a given type of technology. For example, something in the computer area. Even so, this type of trade presented a lot of problems.

At that time, the British and American Governments maintained an export control regime for products that had some strategic value. So, when we knew the ultimate purchaser was China, the State Department exercised a degree of control, and we had to decide whether or not to permit that transaction to take place. Before normalization of relations, very few American businesspeople were able to attend the fair. One of the very few was John Kamm in Hong Kong, but even he was given restricted access, so a lot of the information he was able to glean at the Canton Trade Fair prior to recognition of China was from other traders. So, John would follow Japanese practice. He would debrief the traders after they had concluded their contracts and ask what quantity, what price, and so forth. A lot of times, they were willing to give him that information knowing they did not face American competition. John was able to aggregate a lot of

that information and yield much data that was of value to the U.S. Government. So, we were able to make guesstimates of what China's total production of a particular product was, what proportion the country was making available for foreign trade, what it was probably selling it for, and what the total amount of foreign exchange was from that. This became very useful.

With recognition of China, for the first time, we were able to participate fully in the Canton Trade Fair of spring 1979. The timing of that trade fair coincided with the opportunity for my wife and me to make our first visit to China. We started our two-week trip in early April 1979. After the trip, I returned to Hong Kong to get a new visa and then traveled back to Guangzhou for the final two weeks of the fair. My main responsibility was to man the "American Embassy Office" at the Canton Trade Fair. I had to bring up with me from Hong Kong liquor setups and so forth so that we could provide hospitality for the American businesspeople who for the first time would be at the trade fair. David Denny from Beijing joined me at that event. We worked together. When one of us was in the office, which was just a hotel suite, the other would be walking around the trade fair picking up things and we would trade off. So, it was a very exciting period. We saw a lot of evolution in how China was conducting business. During the course of my period in Hong Kong, I continued to visit the fall and spring trade fairs on a regular basis. During that period China also changed how it was conducting trade and invited more and more businesspeople to Beijing to conclude deals or to discuss other kinds of business relationships. So, the focus of trade moved to Beijing, and it took on a different characteristic as it was linked to foreign investment.

*Q: Canton is where all trade with China had to go?*

DONAHUE: That's right. The English word "canton" comes from a Cantonese pronunciation of that province. In Mandarin, the province is pronounced "Guangdong," which means "broad eastern plain."

*Q: You left Hong Kong. Were the Chinese becoming more savvy on the economic side? There would be an awful lot of Americans and others who would come in to trade who really weren't able to deliver. This must have been quite a learning period on both sides.*

DONAHUE: It was indeed. It was a big deal for a Chinese official to be tapped to have the opportunity indeed to go to Guangdong for a trade fair for a number of reasons. The northern part of China where Beijing is located is a very cold, inhospitable plain and has always been a food deficit area and rather poor region of China. The southern coast from just north of Shanghai all the way down to Guangdong has always been viewed by the Chinese as the land of milk and honey. Northern Chinese have always enjoyed southern food and look upon the region as a kind of lush paradise. So, for a typical Beijing bureaucrat to be tapped to go to Guangzhou for a whole month for the trade fair was nice duty. However, at that time, perhaps even to this day, the Chinese have always been suspicious about Chinese who maintained contacts with foreigners. I'm sure there was always a lot of tension. After they spent the day negotiating deals with the foreigner, they would probably have to spend half the night debriefing the security guy and satisfying him that they weren't giving away state secrets. In those days, even phone numbers in China were state secrets. So, it would have been interesting to be a fly on the wall at one of those business deals because there was so much involved with trade that after you had a meeting of the

minds, “I want to buy or sell this for this price,” and became satisfied with the quality and all of that, then you had to figure out shipment details. In which factory is it being produced? Which port will it be shipped out of? On what ship can this be done and which brokering company is going to be responsible for this? Do I need any phone number, any telex number, and all of this? All of that information the Chinese regarded as secret. So, there was a kind of risk involved in giving it to a foreigner in the first place even though it’s a vital part of concluding the trade transaction.

The other thing is, the bureaucrat, the person conducting business at the Canton Trade Fair, was very much removed from anything to do with production, much less business. I’m sure they were given a brief. If you were selling a Chinese product, you must try to sell it for the highest price possible. I have no doubt that one of the primary functions of a Chinese economic officer at a typical Chinese embassy outside China in those days was to gather information about prices for the kinds of products that China would sell. The official would have to examine the world market price and then the government would give a range to these bureaucrats who would try to sell it on the high side and buy on the low side. As you can probably appreciate, there are all kinds of reasons why prices might be different in different parts of the world. A price for a commodity in London may not be the same as the price for that same commodity in East Asia. If China were selling products, buyers had to be very much satisfied regarding the quality. The terms of the shipment themselves – timing, bulk versus container, even entry port – might also affect the price.

Part of the visual appeal of the Canton Trade Fair was the large exhibit halls of Chinese products and machinery. Many of the items that the Chinese were hoping to sell during the trade fair were on display and the Chinese sellers would often provide samples. This was a way to interest other people in their product, and to demonstrate the product’s quality. The Chinese would display some antiquated looking capital equipment and other goods for which the only market would be within the communist world. They certainly would not have met world standards in terms of quality. But they probably would have been sought after in Poland or Albania. Then there were other products, raw materials, for which the Chinese went to great pains to ensure they could match world quality. Such products were feathers, denim, cotton and silk textiles, cashmere, chemicals and minerals. They would show the stages of production from the raw mineral to the first, second, and third stage of processing to the final product to ensure the individual buyer that the Chinese could produce at world standard. Industrial oils and other chemicals were similarly displayed. The same was true for some large equipment. I was told the Chinese produced extremely high quality large industrial valves at a very attractive price. The typical foreign buyer, especially if doing business for the first time, would often ask for and receive a sample that he could take back to his company and have tested. If the company was satisfied, it would then conclude the deal.

There were many interesting anomalies. For example, one of the products that China marketed was something called refractory grade bauxite, which is used to line steel furnaces. In much of the world, this is not produced at a particularly high level of quality. Its use is as a flux in steel making. It is not a commodity per se. No one cares what it looks like as long as it works. In China, it was refined to the nth degree, probably using a lot of hand labor. The bricks were as beautiful looking as gold bricks, except of a different color. The buyers thought it was aluminum

rather than refractory grade bauxite. China for a while was able to get a very good world market for this product because it was both beautiful and cheap, but at what cost to China? China made its mistakes.

There are people with long memories and the country is still living with the consequences of some of these mistakes. In the early 1970s, before the normalization of relations with the United States, China had already become a major world supplier of feathers and down. There was a large and growing market for these materials. This was before some synthetic products had become widespread for use in coverlets, jackets, and other things. Because there are so many ducks and geese and fowl of various types that are commercially raised in China, the country was able to gather all of these feathers, wash them with the use of cheap hand labor and provide high quality products. They marketed them successfully. Once they were known for their quality, they marketed them for a very good price. Chinese bureaucrats knew China had very few competitors in the world. Their production was so enormous and they were going to drive their competitors out of business. So, they kept dropping the price and increasing the quantity that they would market. They drove out of the international market some of the other competitors over a period of years. Then they had to deal with the worst period of the Cultural Revolution when all of their production dropped. Because fowl production declined so precipitously, the Chinese could not fill their international orders and they got a black eye on the world market. I would say that this feathers and down shortage was the impetus for chemical and other companies to develop the substitutes that subsequently changed the nature of that entire market. So, the bureaucrats were not as smart as they thought they were.

I cannot overemphasize the importance to the U.S. Government of Hong Kong as a listening post on China and other parts of the Asian mainland. Hong Kong was a safe, convenient location, with a solid and supportive government, all of which encouraged the activities of a strong resident China-watching group. This included some knowledgeable expatriate businesspeople, foreign and Hong Kong Chinese academics, non-governmental organizations, and journalists. Although Hong Kong is a big city (4.5 million population), the foreign community, and especially the China watchers, frequently saw each other. There were well-established lines of communication, and many venues for the sharing of knowledge and views. These encounters included meetings of the American Chamber of Commerce's China Commercial Relations Committee, the Foreign Correspondents Club, the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, and various receptions and lunches around town, as well as university lectures.

*Q: In 1986, you're off to China.*

DONAHUE: That's right.

*Q: You were there from '86 to when?*

DONAHUE: I ended up being there for only one year, from May '86 to July '87. At the time of my assignment, my wife and I were both assigned to two two-year jobs in Beijing, so we were expecting to be there quite a long time. My initial assignment was as one of the two deputy chiefs of the Economic Section. We had a sizeable Economic Section divided into two units. One was doing internal reporting. The other was external. I was the chief for external, which meant

responsibility for trade and investment. That was one of the peak periods of American business interest in China. Many businesses had already gone in and had contemplated an investment but had not actually made it or were in the process of completing their legal contract work or completing the negotiations with their Chinese partner, whatever it was. They were beginning to run into various kinds of problems. So, we were in a problem-solving mode. On the one hand, we were listening to business and what their concerns were and trying to help them determine who in the Chinese government might be helpful for them. On the other hand, we were also dealing with the Chinese Government at a kind of macro level on trade policy. At that time, we began our negotiations with China on the possibility of its becoming a member of the GATT [the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], the predecessor to the World Trade Organization [WTO].

*Q: Your wife was doing what?*

DONAHUE: My wife is a consular cone officer, but her first assignment in Beijing was as a personnel officer. Her second two-year assignment would have been as the deputy head of the Consular Section. My second assignment would have been as chief of the Science and Technology Section, which was sizeable in Beijing.

*Q: Who was the ambassador and what was the state of our relations with China from 1986-1987.*

DONAHUE: The ambassador was Winston Lord, who had been head of the Policy Planning Staff under Henry Kissinger and had accompanied Kissinger on his famous first trip to China. That having been said, Lord really thought of himself as a specialist on balance of power politics, the broad parameters of power politics, as opposed to China *per se*. But his wife is Chinese. He did not know any Chinese language, but his wife was fluent. A lot of what he understood about China he learned through his wife. Also, he had a wonderful background in our overall policy and where we wanted China to fit into that from his years of experience on the Council of Foreign Relations. So, he brought an urbane New Yorker's world view to Beijing, which we had not had up until then because his immediate predecessor was Art Hummel, one of the real China experts. Before that was Woodcock, the union man.

There has been a longstanding debate among Foreign Service Officers on the relative merits of career vs. political ambassadors. Having served with both kinds, I believe there is no easy answer. The particular personal characteristics that the ambassador brings to the job are the most important factor in the success of the mission. While it is often argued that a career ambassador, ideally, can draw on years of experience with the system, and the region or country of assignment, most career people lack access to the political level of our own government. Therefore, while they may be highly competent and knowledgeable, unless they have access to the top decision makers, their ability to influence policy formation at that level is limited. On the other hand, while the key strength of the political appointee is access to the White House, in most cases that is limited even for them. Certainly, the political ambassador brings another perspective to the job, a perspective of American life outside of government. Because a political appointee has an independent basis for the views he or she voices, that person may be taken as more credible by the host government. Also, the political ambassador may have contacts in

American circles outside of government that could embellish the mission.

Ambassador Lord had many of these assets and used them to great effect. Having served in the State Department under Kissinger, he was well versed on how the system operates and how to get things done bureaucratically. As a result of his tenure at the Council on Foreign Relations in the mid-1980s, he had considerable access with corporate America. Also, he and his wife had many contacts in the American cultural community. They were able to draw on these resources during their period in Beijing to introduce Chinese officialdom to a wider range of movers and shakers in American society than they had heretofore been exposed to. Very few career ambassadors would have been able to accomplish that.

*Q: And before that was David Bruce.*

DONAHUE: That's right. He was our first representative to China after we established the Liaison Office. Each of our early representatives to China brought something in particular to the job. Winston Lord's immediate predecessor, Art Hummel, was really a China specialist. However, a lot of his personal knowledge of China was WWII era. Winston Lord brought the great interest on the part of U.S. business, the Fortune 500 companies, the New York Stock Exchange, and so forth in rekindling relations with China. During the period that he was in Beijing, I think many of those companies brought their boards of directors for meetings in China. I can think of three or four major companies that had their boards meet in China, either in Beijing, Shanghai, or some other city. Many of the organizations had had some important activity in China before 1949 and were trying to determine whether they could revive those operations. Sometimes, the interest was on the part of China. For example, China had sought out the company that was manufacturing Jeeps to bring new technology into its Jeep plant in Beijing. I think that they had also approached Ford and GM to try to bring new technology back to what had been their original operations. General Electric probably was the same. All of those large companies had had major operations in China. For some companies, a change of ownership in the U.S. made it more difficult to stage a direct return to the Mainland. They were interested in China for other commercial reasons. That was true of many of our banks. There had been a lot of evolution in our banking industry since 1949 and some of the biggest American banks that had played a role in China before then no longer existed. Other banks had bought them. So, there was a great deal of interest.

We were negotiating with the Chinese on becoming a member of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT], at least moving in that direction. We were discussing with them changes that would be required in their legal system, the establishment of laws to allow Western business to operate, all kinds of things that we take for granted that they did not guarantee, the sanctity of contracts, the ability to own more than 50% of an enterprise, all of the features of a capitalist system. China was so intensely communist that the concept of private ownership was very bothersome to its leaders – both of the government and the party. As a matter of ideology, they only wanted to accept ownership by the state. So, the concern was how to allow a foreign entity to operate in China without full ownership, or without the amount of ownership that made it comfortable. In fact, a lot of the problems faced by U.S. business involved this issue of ownership. Even if a foreign business owned outright its operations in China, it did not have the ability to manage them entirely without Chinese acquiescence or agreement to certain elements

of its management. That included hiring personnel, renting office space, certainly putting up a building, all of which required many different kinds of permits. We had to help American businesses sort this out and determine how it could work.

*Q: Did you put out a guide to doing business in China?*

DONAHUE: The Commerce Department did. By this time, the commercial function overseas had been totally spun off to the Commerce Department. They had globally absorbed about 30% of the State Department officers who had previously done commercial work. However, their Beijing office included many with private sector experience. I think everyone in that office was new to the Commerce Department but had a lot of experience in China or in countries surrounding China. They did put together a lot of how-to guides.

*Q: What was your impression at that time? Was it worth it to do business with China?*

DONAHUE: Yes, but a lot of times it was a matter of competition with the Europeans or the Japanese. There were several reasons why an American company needed to be in the China market and perhaps could not dare to avoid it. It was considered the largest potential market in the world. There were certain types of products for which the market in the Western world was becoming saturated. A lot of these products were what we call industrial or capital goods – heavy equipment – for which in the entire world there may be a very limited market. An example is diesel locomotives.

For makers of large industrial equipment where the demand was slack in the rest of the world, China was seen as perhaps their most viable potential market. Companies such as Westinghouse and GE, makers of turbine generation equipment, found they had no choice but to try to get into China. In some cases, companies sought to get into the China market to continue producing something which, unless they had a market like China, they would no longer be able to produce. I think GE was in that area with respect to diesel electric locomotives and other large equipment like that. Demand in the U.S. and Europe was slack. The extractive industries were also very interested in China. Again, there was a feeling of intense competition with European and Japanese companies for certain types of minerals, and for oil. U.S. companies believed it was important to make an investment in order to have a claim on the supply stream from that investment. For example, aluminum companies were interested in getting hold of bauxite production. There was a lot of interest in oil exploration in China. Unfortunately, the major oil supply was found far from the coast where it might not have been economically feasible to exploit it.

*Q: How did we find the situation in China per se? Were we able to get around? Was there such a thing as politics there?*

DONAHUE: 1985-1987 was perhaps the period of greatest relaxation of official prohibitions against public expression. That period continued until about 1989, when it culminated with the Tiananmen Square massacre. During 1986-1987, we found a great deal of liberalism expressed in the editorials of the major newspapers. Censorship rules in Beijing for the publication of manuscripts were relaxed, and a lot of Chinese who had written materials and had carefully

hidden them during the Cultural Revolution brought them out and had them published. Also, some papers that had been published in the 1950s were being republished. This was because many intellectuals felt it might be possible to turn the clock back to the period of the early '50s before the ideological wars of the Cultural Revolution. There was the so-called "Hundred Flowers Movement," when Mao invited the intellectuals to criticize what was going on. As soon as they stood up and had their names associated with a criticism, he knocked them off. There was a feeling that the only way for China to really make headway in solving its problems and get ahead with economic development was to allow the intellectuals to debate issues openly, and not characterize their views as anti-regime. So, the late '80s was a period of intellectual ferment throughout China.

There was a square near Beijing University called the Deep Purple Park. It was a place similar to the free speech corner of Hyde Park in London where the students could meet and talk about issues and not feel fear that they would be condemned or face any kind of a problem. It was also a place where foreigners could go to meet students and speak English. Sometimes we would go there, listen to some of the student discussions in English or Chinese, and also speak with some of the students. That was a favorite thing to do on a Sunday afternoon, ride the bicycle over there and appear unobtrusive and sense what was going on.

In terms of traveling around China, when I made my first trip in 1979, we were housed in special facilities. Every effort was made to segregate us foreigners from regular Chinese to the point of having to eat in a special dining room reserved for foreigners, sitting in a rail car exclusively for foreigners. By the time we were assigned in Beijing, the number of foreigners had risen to the point where it was no longer possible for China to maintain those strictures. So, for the most part, if we traveled on vacation, we were pretty much on our own. We were treated as anybody would be. Stand in line to get your ticket. Sit wherever they assigned you. That type of thing. We were pretty free to mingle. If we traveled officially, we still had what we referred to as a "foreign handler," someone from a foreign affairs advisory office in whatever city or province we visited who would generally meet us at the airport and arrange an escort for us. Whatever our needs were, they would take care of it. They were like a travel agency for officials. They would arrange a car and driver, get hotel reservations, and arrange interpreters. They would also set up an itinerary. A lot of times we would make our request in Beijing and before we started our trip be assured that our itinerary was set. Many times, we would arrive in a particular place and find the itinerary had changed for some reason. Sometimes the change might be beneficial, sometimes it was a change that we didn't care for. However, because we were already there, we would not really have many opportunities to change it. Generally speaking, I think we were able to get what we asked for and we were able to see what we thought we ought to be seeing.

The one part of China that remained difficult to access was Tibet. I think that is still true. I think Tibet and the part of Yunnan Province near Burma still have access by foreigners tightly controlled by Chinese authorities. Undoubtedly on some of our travels, we must have gone through some military zones, but I am not aware of any U.S. officials having any problem with that. However, occasionally, journalists did. During the period I was assigned in Beijing, a British subject who happened to be a reporter for "The New York Times" and his Chinese assistant were arrested. They were detained for having traveled through one of these military zones unbeknownst to them. I suppose it's possible because I'm not sure that they're all marked.

You may be going down a road and perhaps see a barbed wire fence and think nothing of it. Then somewhere along the line, you would be stopped, but there would not be a sign saying “foreigners forbidden” or whatever it was. I have a feeling that it was that kind of a case. At the time, this was a particularly interesting situation. The British were in a difficult position. They were in a kind of bind over this incident because they were in a tricky negotiation process on the retrocession of Hong Kong to China in 1997. The British did not want to make a stink of this issue. Ambassador Lord was prevailed upon by *The New York Times* to weigh in despite the fact that the man involved was a British subject. Lord, who realized he had a limited number of “silver bullets” to use with the Chinese Government, nevertheless, did weigh in with the Chinese authorities and was able to obtain the man’s release. I believe the journalist had to leave the country. I don’t know what happened to the Chinese interpreter. He probably remained in detention. But that incident was a little unusual. Another strange event that took place during that year was the sudden death of the Hong Kong governor who was visiting Beijing for negotiations. Governor Youde, who was not known to be ill, died of a heart attack in Beijing quite unexpectedly. A lot of people were very concerned about that. A number of our colleagues at the British embassy were quite beside themselves with that incident. Those were the two incidents involving the British that I remember very well, the trickiness of their negotiation on Hong Kong and the two unfortunate incidents.

*Q: Were you treated with a certain amount of suspicion? Here you were, with a Chinese background wife with connections to the Nationalist regime, as was Betty Bao Lord, too.*

DONAHUE: Actually, in our embassy at the time, in the Political and Economic Sections, maybe half of us had Chinese wives. So, it was not unusual, but in fact, it was unusual for any embassy that I’ve ever been posted to to have so many wives with a connection with that country in one way or the other. I am not aware that anybody had any problem during the period that we were there. I presume you may have heard Betty Bao’s famous story when she first arrived in Beijing. It was perhaps one of her first days at post. Most of the time when she was traveling in the official car going to the residence, the ambassador probably accompanied her. The Chinese guard at the gate, a member of the People’s Armed Police, would have recognized the ambassador. Certainly he would recognize the car. But on at least one occasion early on, Betty Lord was in the car by herself. The man at the gate did not want to open the gate, which is incredible because you would recognize the car, the driver, etc. But for whatever reason, he thought, “This is a Chinese woman in the car. I’m not going to open the gate.” Betty Bao opened the window of the car and called the man to come over in Chinese and said, “You look at this face. Yes, I am Chinese, but I am the wife of the American ambassador. You will open the gate and give me entrance to my house.” She never had any problems after that.

We had some wives who had very unusual backgrounds and I am sure that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs kept dossiers on all of us and probably would have followed them very carefully. I’m not aware of anybody having a problem. There was one woman who was not Han Chinese, but from a minority in western China known as the Uighurs. They are quite a small minority in China. They are also a minority people in some independent Central Asian countries, as well. I believe this woman’s father had actually been politically active. This woman had completed her undergraduate and graduate work in the U.S. and was an American citizen, but of course in China she became interested in the plight of the Uighurs and other minority peoples. Because she

knew the languages, she could move in those areas. I am sure that she spent some time in Beijing with those communities. There was another woman who had family associations with both the communist and Nationalist military. This was not unusual for many Chinese families. But nevertheless, because some of her relatives had been in high-level positions in the military, probably there was some interest in her. During the time that I was in Beijing, there was one American who “befriended” a Chinese woman who was the daughter of a Chinese general. He lost his security clearance and returned to the U.S. I don’t know for sure if they ever did get married, but I know he wanted to do that. But that was the only such incident I was aware of.

My wife has relatives living in China. One member of the family lived in Beijing at the time we were there. That relative and his wife were a wonderful couple, both of whom were medical doctors. The man had done a residency at Harvard University before WWII, so he was already quite old at the time we were assigned in Beijing. He and his wife had both been high-level officials at the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences. We were able to visit them in their apartment compound. We had no problem. There were a couple of things that we noted. If we wanted them to visit us at our apartment in the diplomatic housing compound, we had to send them a written invitation. Otherwise, they would not have entrance into our compound. If we went to their place, we didn’t need a written invitation, but I’m sure we caused consternation. We couldn’t just drop in. We had to call them in advance that we would be going there on a Sunday afternoon or something. I remember one instance when they were very concerned. We had a car that was self-locking. You flipped one button and all the doors locked. We had gotten out of the car inside the residential compound and were heading into the relative’s apartment. He was coming down to meet us. He was very concerned that our car was not locked because he had not seen us put down the locks of the doors. He said, “You know, you really have to lock your car here.” I was a little chagrined because to get to that parking spot, we had had to go through three checkpoints of guards. I thought, “If they have that kind of security, why are they concerned about somebody breaking into my car?” However, I could appreciate that concern later on when we had an incident in our own diplomatic housing compound parking lot. Someone broke into the car of one of our secretaries at the embassy in daytime and set it afire. It was within sight of a guard at the gate. He did nothing. We found out about it because our servant looked out the window and told us about it and we called the fire department. Of course, by the time they arrived, the car was beyond repair. Probably, the car had been broken into by children of Middle Eastern diplomats. The attitude of the Chinese guards was that they were there to provide security from the outside, not to provide security from the inside, that whatever took place inside the compound was our common problem, not theirs.

*Q: During this time, were you noticing the impact of the great flood of Chinese students who had gone to the U.S. mainly for graduate degrees and returned?*

DONAHUE: We were certainly seeing a large number of students going to the U.S. I am not sure that we had seen that many return. There were several phases of these students going to the U.S. Among the first phase were those who had studied abroad or had advanced studies of some type, perhaps in Chinese institutions before the Cultural Revolution, and because they were so bright and capable an effort was made to build their skills up to world standards in the wake of the Cultural Revolution. Then there was another wave of students who were chosen primarily because of their connections with the Party, or there was a political angle that they were being

given a benefit because of their father's status in the government or the Party. Yet there was another wave. I think that during the time that I was in Beijing, this was most prominent. The foreign companies that wanted to benefit their operations in China were finding that one way to do this, and perhaps one of the ways around the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, was to provide scholarships to people who they wanted to favor. In some cases, they would be prospective company employees who needed to bring up their skill levels. In other cases, they would be children of high-level Party cadres whose permission was necessary for the companies to make their investments. A number of visa applicants were students who had valid passports and other documentation, but they might be traveling under an assumed name. I know of at least one instance when the consular officer who was interviewing – because occasionally the consular officers would call us up in the Political or Economic Section and ask us, “Is it proper for us to give a visa to this person?” – was not certain about the bona fides of the particular student and asked, “What does your father do?” The student said, “My father is the president.” The consular officer didn't know what he was the president of. It could be the president of an association, an institute, a company, or whatever. It turned out his father was the person who had the title “President of China.” But because the name on the applicant's passport had nothing to do with his father's name, it couldn't be verified. In this case, we went back channel to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to verify the family relationship. So, there were some instances like that. We didn't want to send anybody out of the consular section without something they should have, but on the other hand we wanted to make sure. We didn't want to be entire patsies. I think probably in the earlier period of the issuance of student visas, it was easier to sort it out than it was during my period there.

*Q: Is there anything else we should talk about?*

DONAHUE: Maybe talk about the stresses and strains of being assigned in China. All of us embassy officials were under constant scrutiny, we were very conscious of the security situation, and this complicated our work style. We had to work in a particular way in the embassy building. We had to go through three doors to get to our offices, all of which required being pestered by the Marine. We had to have clean desks and could not leave any paper on them because there was a Chinese char force after hours. We still have a Chinese char force. I think while we were there, our embassy in Moscow got rid of the local char force and the American officers had that responsibility. We debated whether we would do that or not, but during the period I was there, we didn't. So, if I had to go out of my office for any reason, I would have to carry all of my classified materials with me and eventually lock them up in a safe in the secretary's office. We had IBM electric typewriters in our offices. However, we had to go to another area of the chancery building that had been specially made where all of our computers (at that time, Wang computers) were held. So, if any of us had to type something on the classified computer system, we would be out of our office for some time. Movement within our building was complicated. Our Economic and Political Sections both employed Chinese professional workers that in other embassies would be considered FS national employees. But we could not employ FSNs. So, we obtained our assistance by contract with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Services Bureau. Our employees were themselves Chinese FS officers who just happened to be seconded to our embassy. Therefore, for security reasons we had to keep them in a separate building. But they were absolutely invaluable to us. We used them to peruse the newspapers. They were okay for that. They were okay for compiling statistics. They were absolutely invaluable for putting

together guest lists to help us determine who was married to whom. Many high-ranking Chinese officials were married to other officials, either of the State or the Party. But, the wife did not change her name when she got married. So, we had to know who was really paired with whom and what their relative status was. Our local employees were invaluable for that protocol element. They also greatly assisted in putting together itineraries or making appointments when we were visiting places. Many Chinese ministries had only a few telephones. Their telephone numbers were still considered secret. So, if we needed to see a particular ministry, and perhaps we had never contacted them before, a lot of times our local employees would have to go through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to even find out how to contact them. It was really complicated. Sometimes it would be a lot to do four appointments in one day in Beijing because it's a very large city. You would have to go across town. Drivers sometimes would not even know where the place was. The address would not be clear or there could be all kinds of problems. So, just the process of living and going through normal work experience was difficult.

In our apartment buildings, there were typically six floors of apartments and a seventh floor on top of that, which housed the Chinese "listeners." Our apartments were bugged and we presumed that somebody was listening night and day, probably with a tape recorder, because it would have been really boring in the middle of the night. But we were very conscious of the fact that we were under scrutiny. It was not until after I left China, really, that I realized the amount of pressure we had been under. Being back in the U.S., I was able to relax to a degree that I had not been while in China. As a matter of fact, my wife and I very rarely talk about work outside of the office and we would almost never make any kind of pejorative comment, but nevertheless, it was just the knowledge that we were being listened to.

During the time that we were assigned in Beijing, my wife got pregnant with our third child, which was totally unplanned. We had not expected it, had not planned for it, we were happy with two children, etc. During my wife's pregnancy, we had been injected with a vaccine for Japanese B encephalitis, which uses a live virus. We had to get that in China, not the U.S., because that kind of vaccine is not used in the West. Normally, a live virus vaccine is not given to a woman who is pregnant, but my wife didn't realize she was pregnant at the time. I think the vaccine was given in two or three courses. At least one of them must have been while she was pregnant. So, we had no reason to believe there was going to be any problem with the birth. We were expecting for her to go down to Hong Kong and give birth and then after a short time return to Beijing with the child. What happened was, the child was born in the hospital in Hong Kong. At birth, the doctor realized our child had a major problem, involving a deformed heart and the arterial plumbing that is needed to move the blood to the lungs for oxygenation.

*Q: This is what we used to call a "blue baby," isn't it?*

DONAHUE: Our baby's problems were more complicated than that. He had Tetralogy of Fallot, which involves four problems with the heart. Some of them are not terribly important, but others are critical. So, he needed to be operated on at birth. Fortunately, they could do a palliative surgery in Hong Kong. But he needed to be medevaced to the U.S., and we knew there was no medical care for him in Beijing. So, I had been in Hong Kong for his birth and realized that he was not going to be able to live with us in Beijing. We considered a number of options. One of them was that I would continue in Beijing, my wife would return to Washington or go to

California where her family was, and be on LWOP [leave without pay]. There were all kinds of considerations. So, we didn't really make up our mind what to do until my wife and the baby were medevaced to California when he was six weeks old. He actually turned blue on the plane on arrival in LA, so they whisked him to UCLA Hospital and did another one of these palliative surgeries. At that time we realized we needed to be together as a family. So, my wife and I ended up curtailing two assignments each in Beijing in order to go back to Washington. And that ended our assignment in China.

*Q: How did things work with the child?*

DONAHUE: I think we're fortunate that our son was born in Hong Kong and they could at least do the lifesaving surgery at birth. We were not certain whether it was in time to ensure enough oxygen in the brain. You always are concerned about the loss of oxygen in the brain affecting learning ability and so forth. Then the doctor that we were put in touch with at UCLA Hospital in California turned out to be a surgeon who had been able to do the more complete open heart type of operation on an infant. He was not yet able to do it on a child as young as six weeks. But he was able to do it when our child was 13 months old. So, during the period we were in the U.S., we had sufficient surgery for Ian to develop fairly normally and the Department was satisfied that we could have another overseas assignment.

*Today is June 26, 2000. You're going to Hong Kong in 1989. What were you doing?*

DONAHUE: I was preparing to go to Hong Kong as the chief of the Substantive Reporting Section. Since I had been posted in Hong Kong previously, having left in 1981, there had been several organizational changes. When I had left in 1981, there were separate Economic and Political Sections. In the meantime, they had been combined. So, there was a single combined section. However, it was carried on the books as an economic section, and it was called the Economic/Political Section. It really had four functions. It was responsible for backstopping our embassy in Beijing and constituent posts on both political and economic reporting on China, taking into consideration the continued usefulness of the unique China watching community in Hong Kong and the perspective of Hong Kong-based business in particular. Embassy Beijing recognized the value of the views of Hong Kong's politically astute people on what was going on in China. In addition, the Section emphasized to a greater extent than we had before both political and economic issues in Hong Kong and Macau (we were jointly accredited to Macau). Macau was still administered by Portugal at the time.

*Q: You were there from 1989 to when?*

DONAHUE: Standard three year tour, 1989-1992.

*Q: Who was the consul general?*

DONAHUE: When we arrived, it was Don Anderson. After about a year, Richard Williams, who had been director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the State Department, replaced him.

*Q: What was the view of events in China in 1989?*

DONAHUE: That was a particularly important year. When I had received the assignment in 1988, I had certain expectations. One of them was that the pretty good relationship that the U.S. had developed with China -- that had flowered and reached its full blossom in late 1988 and very early 1989 -- would hold and would be something that we could build on. We were also staring in the face a very important deadline for Hong Kong, which was June 1997, when it would revert to Chinese sovereignty. There was so much work that had to be done, primarily by the British, in their continued negotiations with the government of Beijing. There probably was some expectation that improvement of relations between the U.S. and China might allow the U.S. to play a facilitating role. Typically in preparing for a Chinese language assignment, we had to undergo some brush up. Chinese is a very difficult language to learn, but it's a very easy language to lose. So, I had already arranged to leave the Canada Desk early enough to get some oral practice with the teachers at FSI before going out to post. I was in language class in May 1989, watching with great interest the flowering of the so-called "Democracy Movement" with the students and other people in Beijing taking over Tiananmen Square and seeming to challenge the authority of the Chinese government. Then, I was still at FSI during the Chinese Army's June 4 decision to move on the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, which has been labeled the "Tiananmen Massacre." Because I was a language student and I was freed from other responsibilities, I participated in the task force and then subsequently became part of the emergency crisis group in the Watch Center of the State Department because it was the height of tourist season. There were many American tourists in China and we were concerned whether they would be able to leave the country safely. We didn't know what was going to happen. We thought the whole place could fall apart. At the end of the day, the situation stabilized quite rapidly. Although our embassy in Beijing had been partially evacuated, that evacuation situation lasted only a couple of months. By the time I reached Hong Kong in August, things were sort of back to normal. American personnel had returned to China, and Hong Kong was operating as though nothing had happened. However, there was a great feeling of jitteriness in Hong Kong, certainly in the business community. The British relationship with China was on a very bad footing. It was almost to the point of having no speaking relationship with China for about a year. So, there was no further movement in the negotiations. There were very few opportunities for the British to negotiate with the Chinese on the necessary procedures to bring about a relatively easy, amicable handover in 1997. The U.S.-China relationship was also quite strained. The job, and what we were actually able to do and how we did it, turned out to be quite different than what I had anticipated when I was getting ready to go in spring 1989.

*Q: While you were dealing with Tiananmen Square in the language class and the emergency center, you must have been talking to your colleagues who were dealing with Chinese affairs.*

DONAHUE: Yes, with my colleagues in the Department and also by telephone with our posts in China.

*Q: What was the reading of what this was all about? Why had it turned into such a mess?*

DONAHUE: There were a number of theories at the time and I think that subsequently we perhaps obtained a little bit better information.

*Q: How about at the time?*

DONAHUE: To begin at the beginning, early in 1989, there was a movement on the part of students at universities in Beijing, perhaps in other cities as well, for improvements in how they were treated as students. Initially, it began with just demonstrations, and then maybe some agitation on campus, for essentials like hot water showers, better housing conditions, better quality of food. Then, it increased to something a little bit more substantive where the students were actually asking for the freedom to study what they wanted or to seek jobs that were more in keeping with their real ambitions or aspirations. Up until that time, and perhaps even continuing to the present day, many students in China are selected for university based in part on examination, but also in part for political reasons, perhaps their willingness to be activists for the Party or their family's Party position or connections. They are often chosen arbitrarily to study a particular field and then tracked into a job in a given field or government ministry. Even when I had been posted earlier in Beijing in 1986-1987, several of the students that we encountered said, "Here I am, a hairdresser, and what I really wanted to study was engineering," or "I am studying traditional Chinese medicine. I really wanted to study chemistry." So, there were many mismatches. I think that the generalized aggravation on the part of the students began this.

In many cases, the university authorities, who were caught unawares, had not realized early enough the seriousness of the complaints of the students and had not realized where the movement would go. The university authorities may have, on the one hand, given into some of the early demands rather easily, inviting the students to ask for more, or in other cases, some of the universities around the country recognized what was going on in Beijing because communications in China were improving and there was a more widespread uprising on the part of the students for better conditions. So, similar to what happened during the Cultural Revolution, classes were suspended and students from many universities around China took the train or whatever transportation they could find to Beijing. For several months, there was a continuous student gathering, a kind of sit-in, in Tiananmen Square. It had incredible ramifications for the country. The students took advantage of a state visit to China by then Soviet leader Gorbachev. That was a state visit that had been expected to represent a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union. It had been eagerly anticipated for some months by the Chinese leaders. The visit ended up being hijacked by the students because the major international media were present. The students used their presence to get a soapbox for not only national but also international coverage of their own cause during Gorbachev's visit. Gorbachev spoke about the importance of perestroika and glasnost, which had been important elements of his new policy in the Soviet Union to let people comment publicly and criticize how the Soviet Union was organized. The students just grabbed onto that and called for the same and even more of the same, in China. Subsequent to that visit, the students got a piece of old marble and had a student sculpt the so-called "Statue of Democracy," a Chinese equivalent to the Statue of Liberty. The statue was displayed prominently in Tiananmen Square and the students gave every evidence of occupying the Square indefinitely. What went wrong is not entirely clear, what happened in what sequence. But some of the student leaders, including Wuer Kaixi, as well as others, a group of five or six that seemed to be the main leaders of the movement at that time, arranged several meetings with Chinese leaders. The main leader with whom they met was Zhao Ziyang. He gave the impression of being rather sympathetic for the cause of the Chinese students. Perhaps as a result, he was labeled a liberal by the Chinese leadership, and the

Communist Party got worried, fearful. So, he was ousted ultimately and put under house arrest. He was replaced by much more conservative people. His deputy, Li Peng, who was an adopted son and protégé of Zhou En-lai, immediately replaced him, and Deng Xiaoping brought a harder edged group into office in Beijing. However, the ramifications of the Tiananmen Square disaster continued to be felt.

What we subsequently learned, or at least think we learned, in the months following the Tiananmen Square business was, there were many students either killed or badly wounded. The numbers could be a range of 1,000-5,000. But most of the students who were directly injured in Tiananmen were not from Beijing. In the days and hours before the June 4, 1989 incident, the students who were from the immediate Beijing area, many of whom were children of high-level party cadres, got the word somehow. Their families had heard that there was going to be a move, a major effort, by the government to rearrange the situation in Tiananmen Square, and those students were called off the street, called to go home or go to relatives' houses. Probably many of them did indeed leave Beijing so that if the secret police came knocking at their parents' doors, they would not be there. They got off the square, they dispersed. Many of the students who remained on the square were from other cities and didn't have relatives looking out for them in Beijing who could tip them off. Also, many people – and this includes Chinese officials – felt that things went wrong because of the way the troops moved into Tiananmen Square. Some of them had been ordered to sweep the streets and move into the Square in an orderly fashion from the west with the idea that they would force the students to give up the Square gradually and move eastward towards another smaller square in front of the railway station. The expectation was the students would be bottled up there and could be convinced to leave the city by train. Unfortunately, one of the columns of troops came in from the south and entered the Square on the eastern side and the students got bottled up towards the middle of Tiananmen Square. There was no route by which they could leave the square. So, they got slaughtered. Perhaps as many as 1,000 of them got truly wiped out. The Chinese expression is *fen cui*, literally “smashed to dust.”

*Q: The real question is, why didn't the Chinese leadership put an end to this at an earlier state? This thing festered for a long time. Anyone who knows about the art of Mao's politics, what have you, knows you don't allow something to fester for a long time. You either do something rather drastic right away while it's still small or you say, "Okay, you've got real grievances." It seems like a lot of the grievances early on could have been solved. "We're going to work on it. We'll set up a working committee. You can sit on it. We'll try to get you hot water." Something of that nature. Why this paralysis? How did we feel at the time?*

DONAHUE: I think it was a situation similar to some other grassroots-type revolutions, some of which have been successful, others of which have not been. A little bit of success feeds on itself and something quite significant can grow over very little. It has been said subsequently, and I think that there may be something to it, that one of the events that emboldened the students in Tiananmen Square was the success of the so-called People's Revolution that took place in Manila in 1988. That was an effort by Corazon Aquino to overthrow the previous Philippine government. It was a grassroots effort and it was successful. It also involved people massing peacefully in the streets giving a show of solidarity and nonviolence. I don't believe there was any bloodshed. If there was, it was minor. So, it was seen as a kind of glorious revolution where the voice of the people was heard. I think that there was a great deal of naivete on the part of the

students in Tiananmen Square, but probably also on the part of Zhao Ziyang and other like-minded people in the government. The years immediately prior to this had been a period of liberalizing in China. There was quite a bit of economic progress associated with the liberal trend. Some of this had been generated by Deng Xiaoping. When Deng Xiaoping was revived into the leadership following the Gang of Four period, he realized that a lot needed to be changed in order for China to get economic growth working again and free up means of production to allow China to realize its potential. There had been a great deal of progress in that area. He had brought into government people willing and able politically to criticize the hard-line positions previously taken. So, there was already a sense of acceptance of the criticism on policy.

People in Zhao Ziyang's immediate leadership circle, except for Li Peng and other hardliners like him, generally accepted the ability to criticize current policy. I think without a doubt the students went too far and pushed too hard. If they had accepted the honoring of the original requests that they made, which was an improvement of their living conditions within the context of the university, and if it had gone no further, they would have won a victory. I think the leadership would have felt that they had satisfied that immediate need. If the students and everybody had gone back to work, the Party and the Government could have declared victory. For whatever reason, that wasn't deemed enough.

Wuer Kaixi and others around him became increasingly radical in what they were seeking. There is no doubt that they also felt that they could develop common cause with the workers. During the two or so months that there was a kind of sit-in demonstration in Tiananmen Square, they were seeking to bring workers into this movement. I think that they were generally disappointed that they were not successful in doing that. The workers' world view was quite different from the students'. Many of the workers had faced incredible economic and personal dislocation during the Cultural Revolution period and they didn't want anything to do with a movement that would revive the kind of instability that they remembered during the 1960s. Also, under Deng Xiaoping – and they had already had five to seven years of experience of rule by him – they were much better off. Many workers in the Beijing area worked for companies that had joint ventures with foreign firms. They were getting advanced technology, better management, and had order books that were months or years long. The workers saw so much to be gained under the status quo, and they feared they would lose much if they openly backed the students. There was nothing for them in what the students were seeking. In other words, the workers were satisfied. They were not willing to make common cause with the students.

On the other hand, there were many bureaucrats in government and even Party members who were making common cause with the students. I think part of the reason the rest of the world was able to witness this occupation for the long period that it did, and with the degree of international press that it got, was largely because of the willingness of ministries and even Party members to support the cause. Many of them, too, had suffered a great deal during the Cultural Revolution. This was a way perhaps for some of them to get back at the hardliners. It's quite possible that some of them had a kind of shared dream with the students that this was their way to bring about a liberal democracy and trounce for once and for all the hardliners of the Communist Party. I think that there probably was just before and just after the Gorbachev visit this high hope, but without a doubt the student leaders pressed too hard with Zhao Ziyang. Their inability to arrive at an acceptable compromise settlement must have forced the hand of the old guard and the

hardliners, especially Communist Party members and military. The leaders had no recourse but to say, "We cannot allow this to continue any longer." It would be interesting to know what kind of discussions there might have been between China and Russia during and after the Gorbachev visit, where either the Russians might have expressed real concern about what was going on in China, or the Chinese might have asked the Russians, "What do you think about what's going on?" The flowering of the Chinese democracy movement and the hard-line squelching of it that resulted in bloodshed, and the intense foreign coverage that this received, had an immediate impact on the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Tiananmen helped bring about the collapse of those communist regimes. No one really expected this at the time.

*Q: With this having happened, you arrived when in 1989?*

DONAHUE: In early August 1989. I arrived about six weeks after what we referred to as the Tiananmen incident.

*Q: When you came, was there the feeling that Hong Kong was going to for a while revert to its old ways and it might be handy to have a post like Hong Kong where it could look on what was happening without having to worry about official harassment and that sort of thing?*

That was very much the case. The U.S. and Britain, and probably most other Western countries, had almost no access with Chinese officials for six months after the Tiananmen crisis and really not very easy relations for a full year. We all collectively held our breath at the one-year anniversary of Tiananmen because we didn't know exactly what to expect. So, it wasn't until the summer of 1990 that there was even a return of dialogue that was comfortable at all with the Chinese officials. That was true even in the U.S. Chinese embassy people who previously had had contacts with other governments just wouldn't leave their offices.

*Q: Was this a mutual situation?*

DONAHUE: The Western governments certainly did feel the need for stocktaking, and there was a sense that we could not go back to a status quo. So many of the bilateral assistance programs that had been anticipated had to be cut entirely off. For example, when I was on the task force in the State Department at the time that Tiananmen Square occurred, we had to draw up a list of initiatives, programs and proposals that had been scheduled for the rest of 1989. That included CODEL visits, high-level administration visits, initiatives that involved the private sector, and even bilateral negotiations. One after the other, we killed them all. In fact, USTR was ready to enter what I might call the final stage of negotiations to bring about Chinese participation in the GATT, the forerunner of the World Trade Organization [WTO]. The USTR officials felt that in their preliminary negotiations during the spring of 1989, they had just about tied up all of the loose ends and gotten satisfaction from the Chinese government on some of the areas that were of interest to us or were requirements as far as we were concerned for Chinese entry. They were just ready to send a delegation in late June to wrap this up. I had to call USTR and say, "I'm sorry, but none of this can happen." It was a good three to six months before any high-level delegations visited China. We just were holding our breath, looking for evidence of any willingness by the Chinese government to return to contact. So, in Beijing and in the constituent posts, the only kind of contact was a very formal type. Even the visas, especially student visa

applications, fell off greatly. Everyone was collectively looking for people to show up to request asylum in the U.S. Many asylum seekers came to Hong Kong. For six to eight months after the Tiananmen Square incident, we had three to five asylum seekers come to our consulate in Hong Kong every week. Perhaps there was a similar number going directly to the British or to the Canadians.

*Q: These were student types.*

DONAHUE: That's right. I would say that most of the successful asylum seekers were students who had been directly involved in the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in Beijing and were documented as such. Many of them were those who had given interviews to CNN or well-known foreign journalists and had been named in their articles or had had a lot of exposure and were quite recognizable. We were all astounded at not only how many came out and escaped apprehension by Chinese authorities, but also the long period in which they had been able to remain in China undetected. Obviously, they had been given shelter and assistance in making their way from Beijing all the way down to south China. This is a journey that would have involved more than 2,000 miles of travel over many different kinds of transportation. Their pictures were on wanted posters throughout China and yet they were able to escape detection. So, it was quite phenomenal. There was an impressive network in place to assist these people.

*Q: Was your unit looking at the situation in Hong Kong?*

DONAHUE: We were. From that period, and directly as a result of 1989, there was a great deal of nervousness on the part of Hong Kong people who were interested in politics or were politically active in some way. I would say in that respect that there was quite a difference in the attitude of Hong Kong people beginning in the summer of 1989 in comparison with my previous experience in Hong Kong. Previously, most Hong Kong people would not have thought of themselves as interested in politics. This was a studied avoidance on their part. Many older Hong Kong people or children of older Hong Kong people had been affected in some way by the Chinese civil war that had raged from the 1930s and through the period of Japanese occupation in WWII up until 1949. Many of those families had been on the Nationalist side.

Much of the Hong Kong population, probably 2/3 by the mid-1980s, either themselves or their parents, had been refugees from Mainland China to Hong Kong. Many of them chose to remain in Hong Kong rather than go on to Taiwan because they had been associated in some way or had obtained their personal fortunes during the period of Nationalist rule in China. However, they had also been burned in one way or another by the Chinese civil war. There were some stalwarts who continued to be staunch Nationalists. On October 10, which is the Nationalist national day, they would display the Nationalist flag. This was technically a no-no in Hong Kong, but nevertheless they would do it. Those people often played a role in trying to develop some kind of relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China. But they were a distinct minority. Most Hong Kong Chinese didn't want to play any role in politics at all. On the other hand, in the political spectrum was a small group of left-leaning people. One such group at the grassroots level was communist-oriented. They tended to try to organize transport workers, industrial workers, with some degree of success, but in fact, they were never the majority. They didn't dwell on how wonderful communism would be. Their members were indeed benefitting from capitalism. But

they did dwell on the importance of a kind of emotional solidarity with the Mainland. Another group that also emphasized this emotional element of solidarity with the communist government in China for cultural reasons was a group of Chinese intellectuals who were intellectually socialist or communist inclined. Their movement was nationalism more than communism *per se*. It was a desire to see China, which they felt had been trounced by the West and by Western imperialism, once again take its rightful place among countries of the world and be admired for its heritage and its position in the world of nations. So, this group would have included university professors, lawyers, some quite wealthy people who had connections with Chinese hierarchy in China based on experience on the Mainland, perhaps university education with some prominent Chinese leaders or something like that. Yet it was a small group. A third group that was beginning to grow, but was still quite small, was Hong Kong businesspeople, most of whom had been refugees from China and were either from Guangdong or Shanghai, the industrial heartlands of China. They saw an economic opportunity for themselves in doing business in China. So, they would pay lip service, would carry out protocolary activities with respect to China for their own business advantage. But they were not ideological believers in the sense of the intellectual group. These people even, at that extreme, were quite a small number in the early 1980s. By the late 1980s, there was a group of Hong Kong businessmen who ideologically supported democracy in China. Some of them were indeed financial backers of the democracy movement in Tiananmen Square. As a result of the very heavy-handed putdown of that movement by the hardliners in Beijing -- what seemed by many to be a rise to power of the Chinese military, the PLA [People's Liberation Army] -- many of these Hong Kong businessmen began to quake in their boots because it was quite well known that they had been supporters. In some cases, they had actually donated tents to the demonstrators in Beijing. Some of these people were the Hong Kong owners of the fast food chains in China that had provided free food to the demonstrators over the many months of demonstrations or had in other ways bankrolled their activities. So, they were definitely on Beijing's black list. They were very concerned not only for what might happen to their operations in Beijing following this putdown, but also business and personal repercussions in Hong Kong, too. The PRC apparatus in Hong Kong began to go after them in one way or another. So, grassroots people in Hong Kong were truly disgusted with the putdown of democracy in Beijing. There were bumper stickers everywhere that said in Chinese, "Chinese people do not fight Chinese people." Millions of people in a population of five million total turned out in candlelight vigils on the public streets and parks to protest the heavy-handed putdown of the demonstration in Beijing. The emotions were amazingly open and represented a vast majority of people in Hong Kong. So, you definitely felt a political fervor that just had not existed prior to that.

*Q: During the years that you were observing Mainland China, what were you seeing?*

DONAHUE: In the first six months after the Tiananmen Square incident, we were seeing an effort on the part of the Chinese hierarchy to root out liberals from the government. I think that the military cooperated very closely with the hard line of the Party in trying to bring about a better balance between economic development -- the high level of economic growth that the government needed and the leadership wanted -- and to have it selectively exclude the improved communications and sharing of information that had made the democracy movement so effective. So, there was an effort to once again control all communications, especially the media. Many of the newspapers or magazines that had flourished in the relatively liberal period of 1986

to 1989 were banned or stopped. That included some media from Hong Kong that had been allowed to circulate on the Mainland. There was an effort in Hong Kong to carefully scrutinize reports and editorials about the Mainland. The Mainland government had a number of agencies operating in Hong Kong, many of them actively, sometimes openly, but more often not so openly. They tried to convince Hong Kong journalists to censor themselves in articles that they would write primarily in the Chinese press, but it also affected the English language press. There had up to that point been opportunities for the Hong Kong press to have their media circulate in China at least to some limited degree. So, there was an effort to marshal editorial views and bring about a single official line once again. I suppose that effort culminated on the anniversary of June 4 in 1990. The PRC released a videotaped version of their view of what happened in the democracy movement, why it had gone wrong, and why they had had no choice but to put it down for the benefit of China. It was a totally whitewashed view, although there were some who felt that the Chinese had put their finger on some accurate elements in their presentation. Nevertheless, the editorial nature of it was a Party line. After that one-year period, there was a kind of return to normalcy, but it was recognized by all concerned as not the normal situation that might have taken place if the Tiananmen incident had not occurred. So, we watched very closely, and other governments did as well, how Britain might be able to renegotiate or negotiate anew with China on all of the fine points that needed to be addressed for the return of Hong Kong to China in 1997. That was one of the issues.

Another set of issues, that fall of 1989, was the world witnessing the collapse of virtually all of the communist governments of Europe. As a result, the nature of those countries' relationship with China changed. The Eastern European countries had enjoyed a privileged relationship with China. It was a shock to everybody's system for what looked like democratic governments to be forming in Eastern Europe, even in the former Soviet Union, and for them to establish a different kind of relationship with what one might call a newly hardened communist regime in Beijing. We saw this happen as well in Hong Kong when, for example, the East German Consulate folded and just went out of business. All of the East German diplomats became unemployed. The West German Consulate took down the sign saying "West Germany," and put up another indicating they were representing all of Germany. There were questions about what would happen to citizens of the former communist countries who happened to be in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Government up until then had not given easy access to such people. For the first time, people from the former communist countries really had the run of Hong Kong. They were discovering Hong Kong for the first time. It was quite interesting to see Polish television, Romanian television, and Moscow television coming to Hong Kong, where previously they would have pointed out the evils of capitalism in one of the most capitalist places on Earth, highlighting how wonderful capitalism was and how good a capitalist system was for the benefit of the workers and so forth. Then the journalists would talk about the evils of Communist China next door. It was a kind of "Alice in Wonderland" situation.

Another sea change involved the makeup of the PRC bureaucracy in Hong Kong. Many of the PRC organizations in Hong Kong had previously been headed by fairly liberal oriented people sent there to run businesses or carry on trade. Because of the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square and because it was widely known in China that the students had been supported by people in Hong Kong, almost all PRC representatives in Hong Kong were tarred by the same brush. So, there was a housecleaning at the top and they were replaced by real hardliners in many

cases, or by people with no prior Hong Kong experience.

For many years, the leading PRC organization in Hong Kong was the New China News Agency (NCNA). Although it was there ostensibly as a media organization, it was known to be the shadow diplomatic representation of China in Hong Kong, and it was accorded a special status. It was really given the status of a consulate in many ways. During this period of the early 1990s, it changed into a government in waiting. It was recognized at that point that it would have a very important role to play in the negotiations with the British on the future Hong Kong Government. However, what had not been recognized up until then was, NCNA was also going to be the power in Hong Kong even after 1997. The British had actually believed what they had told the Hong Kong people about the deal they had worked out with China in the early 1980s on the retrocession of Hong Kong to China. The British had understood that Hong Kong was going to be called a “special administrative region,” that Deng Xiaoping had guaranteed that there would be “one country and two systems,” and that the Hong Kong system would be able to continue for a period of (at least, they hoped) 50 years following retrocession. Everybody was hoping that those 50 years would go on forever, that it would be something that would be extended indefinitely, and that they would really be able to have their own democratically organized government.

There are many ironies in this scenario. One of the ironies was that Britain, which had never fostered democracy in Hong Kong prior to that agreement, suddenly got religion and wanted to bring about democracy before 1997. So, the British government in Hong Kong, which was ruled by an appointed governor from Britain, and the higher level officials of which were all British, nevertheless went out of its way to explain to us and to anyone who would listen that indeed once those people left London and arrived in Hong Kong, they were really working for the Hong Kong people. They claimed that the Hong Kong government they ran had as many problems in its relationship with London as it did with Beijing. That was their line. They had really gotten religion and decided that they were going to stage a number of changes during 1984-1997 that would bring about a fair degree of democracy in the Hong Kong government and establish their own democratically organized government. Therefore, they would allow the Hong Kong people self-determination and the only difference would be that it would not be under the flag of Britain but under the flag of China.

Well, Deng Xiaoping, who knew exactly what he had believed in 1984 when the British went down this road, by 1989, was of a very different view. Every time the Hong Kong Government used the word “democracy,” it must have caused incredible heartburn in Beijing. So, the Chinese leaders went out of their way to disassociate themselves with this line coming out of the Hong Kong government and they tried to block in every way any movement towards democracy, what they saw as democracy. They saw that term and the concept as threatening their position and their ultimate sovereignty over Hong Kong.

There had been an effort to formulate a kind of constitution for Hong Kong after '97 that would provide for supreme court judges who would be selected from within Hong Kong in a free process and they would have judicial independence from any other government. Only in the extreme case would a case go on to a higher court. Where prior to 1997 that higher court would have been the Privy Council in London, following 1997, it would be the National People's

Congress in Beijing. Every two or three years in the election of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, a greater proportion of the seats would be open to general election, and some seats that had been appointed or had been elected by special interest constituencies would be diminished. By 1997, the majority of seats would be elected openly. There was also provision for the governor to be elected by all electorates.

As a result of June 4, 1989, every attempt the British government made to have some kind of negotiation with the Chinese government that would have brought about their acquiescence to this process was blocked. At first, the British could not even get an agreement to meet. Then when they finally got an agreement to meet, it had a very limited agenda. Finally when they were able to add onto the agenda some provision to permit free elections, it was blocked. So, the British failed to make any headway under Governor Wilson. Sir David Wilson was a retired British Foreign Service officer who had been British Ambassador to Beijing. He was a China specialist, and quite a scholar on China. He was not a British politician, however. At the time he had been selected to be governor of Hong Kong, if the Tiananmen incident had not taken place, he could have played a very interesting role in being a mediator between the interests of the Chinese people in Hong Kong and interests of the government in Beijing. Instead, circumstances forced him to play a different kind of role. He had neither the backing of the government in Britain nor access to the government in Beijing, although he should have. Because there was a different group in power in Beijing, the people that he would have related to were out. Unfortunately, his efforts were to no avail. As an individual, he really believed in democracy, although democracy from a colonialist point of view, not broad democracy, but a democracy that Beijing might have accepted in other times. However, his efforts to bring about anything were just totally blocked. Governor Wilson was Governor of Hong Kong for virtually all of the time that I was in Hong Kong.

But in the summer of 1992, as I was getting ready to leave to return to Washington, he was replaced by another governor, who was a British politician. His name was Chris Patton. He had been a Member of Parliament and had lost his seat so he wanted a position somewhere and was made the last British colonial governor to Hong Kong. His strength was that he was a politician and he had very close connections with the government in London. His weakness was that he really didn't know anything about China and had no access whatsoever to Chinese officials in Beijing. Ultimately, he became almost *persona non grata* with Chinese bureaucracy in Hong Kong. So, the situation was made even worse for him. What he wanted desperately to do was to give Hong Kong a completely democratic legislature before passing the reins on to China. He was totally blocked to the point that the Chinese government in Beijing made it very clear before 1997, and I think this was in a series of public statements in 1995 and 1996, so it was quite early, that they would not recognize the Legislative Council that was being majority elected by popular vote and they would be the ones to choose the next governor of Hong Kong. The Chinese made clear they would not recognize the newly democratized institutions of the Hong Kong Government and after 1997, they would be calling the shots. So, Chris Patton became quite an ironic figure in his own right. In the end, he was nothing more than a caretaker governor, no more than a British figurehead. This was political process.

There was an economic process as well. There were a number of areas that concerned us as well as the Chinese. It was definitely not Britain's finest hour in any way. First of all, we felt with

respect to democracy, if Britain had been serious about wanting Hong Kong to have democracy, in terms of the preparedness of the Hong Kong people for democracy, they were as prepared in 1980 as they were in 1990. If Britain had really wanted to give Hong Kong a directly elected government, they could have done so well in advance of any negotiation with the Chinese on retrocession. It's easy to say that in retrospect. In the early 1980s, everybody was walking on eggshells, not wanting to do something that would have been seen by the Chinese government as threatening them in any way. Democracy did threaten them. So, I'm not sure that would have been in the hearts of any of them. But people became quite cynical on this issue of democracy. What people really became cynical about and really caused some heartburn in our relations with Britain at this time, was what the Chinese have often argued, and this sentiment had been argued by many former British colonies, that Britain had sought to colonize China primarily for its own economic benefit. There were many in Britain who had made counter-arguments. Certainly this was a strong argument that had been made by the Indian government post-independence, and there was quite an effort on the part of the British government and the British academic institutions to argue otherwise. Nevertheless, we certainly saw that this was the case, at least in the 1990s.

It became widely known in the UK that Hong Kong would cease to be a British colony come 1997. So, this was the last time to make your fortune in the last British colony. Hong Kong essentially opened up its doors to Britons of whatever type, whatever stripe, whatever credibility, etc. Not only were what one might call British-owned Hong Kong commercial enterprises recruiting widely in the UK for managers and other people, but also independent entrepreneurs from Britain arrived in Hong Kong to make their fortune somehow, some way. There was a lot of activity that was seen by the resident foreign community, such as the U.S., but also by Hong Kong business, as rather unseemly. We called the Hong Kong Government on the carpet on several occasions when we called into question some of the practices they seemed to condone. Hong Kong was a member of the GATT in its own right. It got in on the coattails of Britain, which would have been a charter member. But actually Hong Kong for the most part had a freer trade regime than even Britain because it had almost no tariffs. It benefitted a great deal from the GATT. Under the GATT, there were certain elements that every member must abide by. One of those was the generalized tariff system. But then there were other side agreements that they could join or not. The Hong Kong Government, because generally speaking it was of very liberal ideology economically, had signed most of these agreements. One was an agreement on government purchases, which said that for any contract valued at more than \$50 million, they would permit open bidding and there would be a very transparent bidding process. Companies from all GATT member countries would be invited to bid, etc. on government tender. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the British Hong Kong Government unveiled a number of major construction projects that they saw as being their golden handshake to Hong Kong. There were things that they argued needed to be done, but there were also great opportunities for international business. One of these major projects was valued at half a billion dollars or some incredible amount, the building of a brand new international airport on Lantau Island, which did not have any land connection with the rest of Hong Kong. It required incredible engineering: leveling part of a mountain, making a major landfill in the sea because Hong Kong has one of the deepest natural harbors in the world, building a typhoon-proof bridge over to the Mainland, constructing an elevated highway, extending the subway under solid rock, deepening the ship channel, and so forth. So, it involved a lot of work over a period of years to bring about this

project.

We initially took the Hong Kong Government at its word that it would make an open bid tender and it would have a fair bidding process and do this in a transparent way. Then, in 1989 and 1990, large American companies made us aware that they didn't think the Hong Kong Government was managing this in quite the transparent way that it should. It turned out that the Hong Kong Government established a separate authority to oversee the contract letting for the airport. It was headed by a Brit who was very pro-Brit and very anti-American. In all of my life, I've hardly ever met another Brit who was so openly and arrogantly anti-American. His desire was to freeze out any contenders that were not British, even if there was a question about the British firm's ability to actually do the necessary construction. We are talking about complicated construction for which perhaps only a few companies in the world have a positive track record. These are the very large engineering companies, some of which have former American cabinet members on their boards. There is a lot of high-level political interest. Because of the high level of interest that we could not avoid, our Consul General sought a meeting at the highest levels with this airport authority, where we were ushered into an absolutely stunning boardroom with all kinds of high tech features to be given a presentation of what was going to happen. We were given all kinds of information about the various parts of the contract that would be let, and we also were given a rationale as to why only British companies would be permitted to bid on certain parts of the project. Only consulate people attended the briefing. We did not have private sector people. Following this meeting, our Consul General had to report to the American Chamber of Commerce. We were looking over some of the architect's renderings that had been made, and the British head of the organization said to the Consul General, "Well, I don't know why you Americans are complaining so much about not being able to have a part in this project. After all, if you had wanted to have business on the coast of China, you should have had your own colony. Hong Kong has been a British colony for 150 years, not an American colony." Our Consul General was Dick Williams. He had the rank of ambassador because he had been the resident-in-Washington Ambassador to Mongolia, as well as Director of the Office of Canadian and Mongolian Affairs. I'm sure it was the first time he had ever been subjected to such an anti-American statement and also one that was patently false or given by someone who didn't understand the full import of the Anglo-American alliance, which had been particularly strong on the China coast. Ultimately, we were able to obtain contracts for some American companies, including several very important contracts because, as the British finally admitted, they didn't want to throw their money down a rat hole. There were only a few companies that could do some of this construction, and many of them were American. Nevertheless, we had to agree with the PRC that in fact Hong Kong's market was not a level playing field. American interests had not been served as well as they might have been in this final period of British rule.

*Q: Were you seeing an exodus or flight of people, money and all, out of there?*

DONAHUE: There definitely was this, beginning in the late 1980s. It was accelerated in the early 1990s. The Hong Kong people desired to go to other English-speaking countries for a number of reasons. Some of them had a strong preference to go to Commonwealth countries, in particular Australia or Canada. Australia, because if they wanted to continue to do business in China or elsewhere in Asia, it was quite close. I think that the flight from Hong Kong to some place like Sydney is only a few hours shorter than a flight from Hong Kong to San Francisco, but

it is much closer in terms of time zones. So, if they were maintaining their business by telephone from Sydney, it would be far more convenient than from the U.S. Also, if they were professionals, professional certification from Hong Kong would transfer more readily to another Commonwealth country. Their credentials would work in Australia or Canada. So, doctors, dentists, and to some extent lawyers, accountants, and so forth, with UK-type credentials were very much attracted to Australia and Canada.

Canada, in particular, had for a long time a different kind of immigration policy than the U.S. We have tended to give preference to what we call “family reunification,” that is, relatives of people who have already immigrated to the U.S. and become citizens. Canada gave a strong preference for people in certain labor categories that they wanted to encourage immigrating. That was in particular professional categories. So, it would be doctors, nurses, computer programmers, and so forth. Every year, they would come out with a list of occupations they were looking for. Of course, there were many highly educated people in Hong Kong who filled those needs. There was quite a move from Hong Kong to Canada in that period. There were a number of reasons for it. Some Hong Kong people were going with the idea they were leaving for good. They were just looking for a good opportunity for themselves and their children. Other Hong Kong people were looking more strategically. In their heart of hearts, they would prefer to stay in Hong Kong and enjoy the lifestyle and all things Chinese that they were used to. But they wanted the best of all opportunities for their children. They wanted to be in Canada or Australia long enough to obtain citizenship and foreign passports for themselves and their children, and then they felt they could go anywhere and do business anywhere. If the situation in Hong Kong stabilized, they would return to Hong Kong. If they could continue to do business in China and make a lot of money, they were quite well situated to do that.

The situation that affected the U.S. in particular was, many American companies, as well as the U.S. Government, found our Hong Kong employees very jittery about their situation come 1997. This was especially the case for FS nationals and employees of companies on the Chinese black list as having helped in some way with the democracy movement. That included franchises like McDonald’s or Kentucky Fried Chicken, perhaps even some of the large foreign banks in Beijing that had been vehicles for transmitting funds to the democracy demonstrators. The Hong Kong employees felt they were going to be given the third degree by the PRC authorities come 1997. Our own FSNs knew they were going to be an anomaly and no one had an answer for their many questions. In China, and this may be unique in the entire world, we were not able to employ Foreign Service nationals as true employees of the U.S. government. The government of China required that all diplomatic establishments, and up until quite recently all corporations as well, could only employ workers provided from a particular corporation run by the Chinese government. In the case of the embassies, this was the Diplomatic Services Bureau, and the people that we were permitted to employ were usually Chinese Foreign Service or intelligence workers. So, we needed – anybody needs – chauffeurs, typists, and telephone operators, multifarious people that maintain certain types of services in the embassy. We knew that those people that we were bringing under our roof were indeed spies for China. This was true. We had to go that route in our embassy in Beijing and in the four constituent posts that we had in Mainland China. In Hong Kong, we employed Foreign Service national employees and we did not know whether we would be able to continue to employ them after 1997 or not. Under previous law, the Consulate General had the ability to provide facilitated immigration for

workers of long standing to the U.S. Government, but this had usually been accomplished in a particular way. A Foreign Service national who had given 30 years of outstanding service to the U.S. Government at the end of his or her career and getting ready to retire could petition the consulate to provide facilitated immigration to the U.S. under a special category of the law. Usually, that was granted. But it was at the end of a career.

There was no provision to provide facilitated immigration to someone who would be planning to remain on the rolls of the U.S. Government, and there was no provision under immigration law to provide a similar deal for an equivalent worker for an American corporation. In other words, someone who had worked for Citibank or another American corporation abroad perhaps could arrange to immigrate to the U.S., but that person would be handled under the normal provisions of the immigration law. There was no special deal for that person. We in the U.S. Government and the American Chamber of Commerce collectively realized in the wake of the Tiananmen Square incident that we had a problem. We also had a Congress that was sensitized or could be sensitized to this issue. So, we jointly petitioned for a change of law, that was brought about in the 1990-1991 period, for a special provision for Hong Kong. I don't think it was granted to any other place, although there may have been some other place that got in on its coattails. The new law allowed us to provide a facilitated visa for people who were already FSNs in our government and wanted to remain on the rolls working for us as long as they felt they could do that. It provided a similar provision for Hong Kong workers of American firms that would probably continue to work for those American firms but might have to do so in the U.S. for their own well being. There were some other provisions as well. Immigrant visas were made available for Hong Kong investors who agreed to invest something like \$1 million and employ a certain number of people in the U.S., the U.S. created an escape valve for several categories of Hong Kong people. Obviously for a period of time, for a period of some years, the visa work line at the consulate shot up as a result of this visa program. We got a lot of positive publicity from this. The U.S., which had always been the immigration destination of choice, became even more so.

High regard for the U.S. already held by Hong Kong people went through the roof. This was partly because we were measured in the minds of Hong Kong people against Britain. Britain had been petitioned as well by the Hong Kong people to provide facilitated immigration. They came up with a plan that paled greatly in comparison with what we did. In actual numbers, perhaps there were more immigration slots available from Britain than from the U.S. But the way they described their program to the Hong Kong people made it quite obvious it was greatly restricted. There were a lot of people who should have been assisted by the British program who were not, at least not initially. What Britain said was, "We will give immigration slots to 50,000 people." That included individuals and their families so that it was 50,000 "packages." That included a total number of 250,000. But certain provisions had to be met. I believe the individual had to have been born in Hong Kong, and so could not have been from China and then naturalized as a Hong Kong resident. It usually had to be someone who was fluent in English, had a university education. It was better if they were in the UK, had worked for the Hong Kong government at a high level or commanded a certain professional position or something like that. So, it was very obvious that Britain was going to skim off the cream from the top. There was nothing left for people lower down who also might find it inconvenient to remain in Hong Kong after 1997. Some of those groups were important. For example, Britain had a special branch of the police who were very important in Hong Kong, from the standpoint of fighting crime, especially

international organized crime, also from the standpoint of gathering intelligence regarding China and whatever was going on across the border. There were parts of the border that were quite porous where all kinds of things could happen. There were both a sea and a land border where a lot of things went across on a continuous basis. The U.S. had a lot at stake in maintaining this flow of information. We relied as much as Britain on the work of the Special Branch. Many of the members of the Special Branch were Chinese and were not, on the face of it, part of this special immigration process that Britain had talked about. I think that subsequently after some of our discussions with Britain, a way was found for at least some of them to get out of Hong Kong. But it was a lacuna; it was a gap in Britain's initial policy.

There were several other groups that were not provided for at all by the British policy. One of them was the very unusual group of Indians living in Hong Kong. During the heyday of the British colony in the Victorian period, Britain had imported a number of laborers from India, mostly to build roads but for other purposes as well. There was actually a period when most of the police throughout the British Empire were from India. The Chinese didn't do that at the time. For road building in Hong Kong, it was necessary to bring laborers from somewhere else because the Chinese believed in the importance of "feng shui," literally "the wind and the water." What it means is the proper placement of things, mostly buildings, but other civil structures, as well. This is the belief in the proper placement of such structures for the well-being of the families that are going to live there or the people who are going to work there. On Hong Kong Island and in certain other parts of the colony, there are rather high mountains. The British wanted to cut roads through passes or make tunnels. That work was greatly resisted by the Chinese people living there, including the Chinese laborers the British might have intended for that purpose. The Chinese felt that they would be cutting the dragon's tail, or they would spill the dragon's blood under that land formation, and as a result that would diminish the prosperity of the place. So, Britain imported Indian laborers to build those roads and other constructions. What happened was, they remained in Hong Kong. They didn't go back to India. They took various menial positions. Generally speaking, they had poor education. After some generations, the only language they spoke was Cantonese. They didn't speak English or any Indian dialect. Because it was so many years after India's independence, India closed the door on these people. They said they could not return to India to live. Britain said, "You can't go to England to live." The PRC very unhelpfully said after 1997, "We do not want anyone in Hong Kong to be a resident unless they're Chinese." So, China also left these people out. They were not a large number, about 10,000. We thought that these people might become stateless and be put on a ship to nowhere. It was a problem and we felt it was a problem that Britain needed to address. I believe they did at least address it for the majority somehow, but I'm not entirely clear how they finally did. During the period that I was in Hong Kong, this continued to be a hot issue.

Another similar issue was what to do with the 200 or so Gurkha soldiers who had been recruited by Britain years ago in Nepal for the British army and served with distinction in many cases. Many of them had remained in Hong Kong after they had been discharged from the British army. During the period I was in Hong Kong, the British were rapidly disbanding the various military units they had stationed there, and if they were British, they were returning to Britain. For the Gurkhas, it was a question of what could happen. If they were Nepalis and married to Nepalis, they could have returned to Nepal. But many of these Gurkha soldiers had married Chinese women from Hong Kong. Under the British Hong Kong government, they were permitted to

remain there as Hong Kong residents, but they themselves were not able to become legal Hong Kong residents. As long as their wives were there, they were okay. But because they were not Chinese, the Chinese government had said they could not remain there after 1997. It was not entirely clear to me what would happen to them either. So, they were another possible group of stateless people.

Then the other final group that was a real heartburn for all of us was so-called “economic refugees” from Vietnam. During the mid-late 1980s, there were vast waves of migration of boat people from Vietnam northwards towards China. Many of them went on rafts of the type that sometimes people leave Caribbean islands on heading toward the United States. They were leaky vessels and when they arrived on Chinese shores, the Chinese, who didn’t want refugees (certainly not from Vietnam -- there is no love lost between those people), would help them make their boat seaworthy and then wave them along to Hong Kong. They would have to pass by Macau before they got to Hong Kong. The Macau authorities did not want them remaining there, so they would also very unhelpfully wave them on to Hong Kong. There was no place beyond Hong Kong to go. So, a total of more than 50,000 of these people arrived in Hong Kong. There were no other possible destinations for them. The Hong Kong Government didn’t want them mingling with Hong Kong society. So, they built what looked like concentration camps for these people and walled them off and tried to maintain some basic services for them but also keep them separate from the Hong Kong population. This became a political issue, both in Hong Kong and with respect to China. First of all, at that time, the Hong Kong economy was booming. I don’t know exactly what the unemployment rate was, but there were a lot of employment opportunities available at the low level. So, on the one hand, the UN High Commission for Refugees and various NGOs working with them were trying to catalogue all of these people and determine whether among them were any political refugees. On the other hand, the Hong Kong Government was looking to provide them some opportunity to work if they were willing to do so for the period they would remain in Hong Kong. Several things became apparent. Most of these people were refugees from North Vietnam, not South Vietnam. So, very few of them had any connection with the Government of South Vietnam or had participated in any way with the effort of the U.S. Government that would have enabled us to provide a kind of fig leaf of political refugee status. Very, very few. Of 50,000, maybe 2,000 at the most were accorded political refugee status in the U.S. or elsewhere. Most of them were deemed “economic migrants.” They came from impoverished villages in North Vietnam and really there was nothing to be done for them as refugees. So, those who were willing were essentially allowed to work in Hong Kong on a day labor basis if they would agree to return to the refugee camps at night. That gave them some economic wherewithal. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees and various other social organizations tried to provide medical care, education, etc. for the children and families in these camps. Of course, during that period, their numbers were burgeoning. Britain was beside itself because at the time, the U.S. was not really facilitating their return to Vietnam. On the one hand, we were saying, “We would like Britain to continue to house these people. We would like them to return to Vietnam on a voluntary basis. We can’t do more than that.” China was telling the British government, “As of 1997, we will not allow any of these Vietnamese refugees to be in Hong Kong, so you’ve got to find some way to get them back to Vietnam.” We were saying, “But they can only go back on a voluntary basis.” Well, during the time I was there, Britain did force some of the refugees back on what were termed “non-voluntary resettlements.” We got the UN High Commission for Refugees, and perhaps other UN agencies as well, to be on the

receiving end in Vietnam when these people got off the plane to verify that they would not be penalized politically for having departed Vietnam. The people were also provided an economic development package to help them resettle in their village or elsewhere in Vietnam to assuage our own sense of humanity. But even so, it took from a high in 1990 of about 50,000 certainly all of the time until 1997 to whittle that down to a couple of thousand. I believe there are still some Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. By now, perhaps some of them have married Hong Kong women. That was already happening when I was there as one way that they were trying to remain in Hong Kong. In any event, that problem sort of whittled down, but it took a lot of effort to get there.

*Q: We were very much involved in standing on the sidelines.*

DONAHUE: That's right. We couldn't do more than that for domestic political reasons. This is an example of a problem that U.S. foreign policy helped bring about, but was not really able to resolve.

*Q: This is a good place to stop. There is one other thing. I would like on this Hong Kong time, 1989-1992, to talk about the problem of corruption as seen from Hong Kong. There was quite a lot of corruption in the Mainland Chinese system, including connections with the Chinese military and all that. What were we seeing? Where did you go after that?*

DONAHUE: I left Hong Kong to return to Washington for an assignment in the Office of the USTR.

*Q: Today is July 3, 2000. Do you want to talk a bit about our take on corruption within government circles in the Mainland Chinese regime?*

DONAHUE: Sure. In order to talk about corruption, I have to mention a group of organizations referred to as the "triad," which traditionally was something akin to a Chinese mafia.

*Q: We used to call them "tongs."*

DONAHUE: That's right. A tong would be an individual group like a gang. The triad is the organization as a whole. Traditionally, there were secret societies that were involved in some criminal activity in China. Sometimes the activity would be more political; other times, it would be primarily criminal. The triads were tolerated to some extent by most Chinese dynasties. There was a kind of pattern that as a dynasty was waning and losing its power, there was a resurgence of these groups, and many of the disaffected intellectuals moved to these groups for protection. What we saw in the early 1990s in Hong Kong was a rise of activity of the triads. There were several reasons for this. During the period 1950-1985 or so, both the British and the PRC governments had vehemently opposed crime and had sought to at least pressure these groups. They weren't going to be able to put them out of business, but they were backed into a corner. So, in that part of China, one of these safe harbors for the Chinese underworld was Macau. The Portuguese Government didn't have the same power that the British government had to police their activities. What we saw happening in the late 1980s was, under the liberalization influence of Deng Xiaoping, these organizations felt more free to engage in criminal activity. Because

trade in general had been liberalized, some of these organizations went into legitimate trade, usually as brokers rather than producers. Undoubtedly, some of their capital was also recycled in production because that was a way to launder money.

So, what we saw happen was, in the early 1980s, when China first began to decide that international trade was important, not only was the central government going after that trade, but it was also facing competition from provincial governments. There was a profusion of Mainland offices being set up in Hong Kong with names that we had never heard of before, and it was not always clear whether they were official or unofficial, or whether they really had the backing of the province that was claimed. I think that this was a period when a lot of these underworld organizations took advantage of a fluid situation to establish themselves in business or at least make themselves look legitimate. Also, in our previous experience in Hong Kong, there had been very low incidents of street crime, and certainly very little crime affecting foreigners. Places in Hong Kong where foreigners tended to predominate seemed to be off limits for even petty crime, like being held up for your wallet or something. During the 1989-1992 period, however, there was an obvious increase in crime and it was a kind of bold crime often under the nose of the police. A typical crime would take place in some of the tony shopping centers in Central District in Hong Kong where there would be two or three blocks filled with jewelry stores and gold stores. Some of them were broken into quite brazenly even during the day. Some of our friends had their pocketbooks taken even in very nice downtown shopping malls. Another problem that was probably worse was large-scale theft of automobiles from Hong Kong, all of which were taken into China. Some of the heists were so brazen that they were taking very high-priced Mercedes and placing them in a rubber bag, sealing it, and then towing it at the end of a high-speed boat to elude the police. During that period, the Hong Kong police bought high-speed airboats to apprehend the criminals on the water, but they were prohibited from going into Chinese territorial waters. The belief was that this activity could not take place without the connivance of authorities in China and the province closest to Hong Kong, Guangdong.

*Q: I've heard stories where people have gone there and identified some of the cars and they're being driven around by ranking PLA Army officers.*

DONAHUE: Yes, that's right. We know that happened and we know of Hong Kong people who had to pay to ride in their own vehicles while visiting China. Obviously, there were many opportunities for people in China, whether they were with the central government or the provincial government, and they took advantage of those opportunities.

During that time, there was also quite obviously a difference in point of view between the Chinese military in Guangdong and the central government. We were watching closely whether Mainland Chinese would try to sell any of their weapons or weapon products to other countries through Hong Kong. There were times that we got a whiff of questionable material flowing through Hong Kong, probably as samples, but it's not clear exactly where it was going. Nevertheless, there were opportunities and there was probably even more of that type of activity taking place in Macau.

*Q: Was there any talk at this time among you China hands in the early 1990s about the possibility of a rupture in China and a breakup of China? China is essentially an empire. It's the*

*only empire left. Was this talked about?*

DONAHUE: This question has been a matter of discussion and debate for most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. When there was a very weak central government, it certainly looked as though a number of separate countries were going to form in China. That sense of fracture was ended by the strong central government that the communists put together. However, there have been times when that has been under assault, certainly during the Cultural Revolution. We did find that in the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, there was a great deal of dissension throughout China, and some provinces were seeking to move away from the line laid down by the central government. I am sure that it became more difficult and complicated for the central government to maintain adherence to its general policies in some of those provinces. The problem areas generally were southern China (Guangdong had often tried to demonstrate its independence from Beijing), and then west of Guangdong, the province of Yunnan, which borders on Burma and Thailand, and a lot of drug traffic goes across that border. I think that the existence of the drug traffic alone may be evidence that the central government in Beijing does not have as strong control there as it would like to have people believe. Other areas are Tibet and Xinjiang, the northwestern province of China near the new republics formed in former Soviet Central Asia with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Both of those provinces have a large proportion of so-called “minority people.” That is, they are minority nationalities in terms of China. Both of those provinces have been the target of a great effort for maybe 20 years by China to resettle Han Chinese – that is, Chinese-speaking people – into those provinces for both economic and political reasons. Tibet, which I have never visited, now does have a majority Han Chinese population. Xinjiang province may also. At least, the Han Chinese may outnumber the other minorities, because Tibet had essentially one minority, which was Tibetan people. Northwest China had a number of minorities: Uighurs, Uzbeks, Kyrgyz, and many smaller groups. There were people in that province from all of the nationalities in the neighboring Central Asian republics, and probably some Mongolians as well. I think the most vocal politically are the Uighurs, but all of those groups are there and all of them collectively wanted to resist the increased Chinese presence. Because they did not represent a single large group like the Tibetans that could go head to head with the Chinese, they didn’t have that political ability. I’m sure that the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the separate republics on the other side of the border intensified pressure on Beijing to make sure that that northwest province did not go the same way, that it remained within China. It’s actually an economically important province, but it’s difficult for China to take advantage of its potential because it’s located so far inland that the cost of transport to the coast is prohibitive.

*Q: One last question on China. I’m talking about how you all were looking at it at the time. I remember interviewing somebody who was in Poland in the late 1970s. He said there were probably three dedicated communists in Poland at the time. The rest were opportunists. What about in China? What was the feeling about this vast effort to indoctrinate the people running around with the Little Red Book? How was it taking?*

DONAHUE: That is also a complicated question. You can look at it a number of ways. One of the problems with Chinese communism is, it’s not always easy to sort out the nationalism from the communism. I think that most Chinese intellectuals were staunch nationalists and to the extent that what the communists were espousing was what they felt China needed to do to be a

strong country, they supported it. However, there were many aspects of communism that they did not support. It was very clear that after a major effort under Mao to establish communes and get rid of private property, that did not work. When Deng Xiaoping returned to power and allowed what he called “economic reform,” which was the development of a market economy, there was a lot of interest in this. There was a groundswell of support. The inevitable result was, some people got quite rich and flaunted their wealth, which had been a taboo during the many years of Maoist communism, and that got some resistance. The intellectuals, that is, the people who would read the newspaper propaganda on a regular basis and would even be writing some of it, people participating in high-level government positions – they would support the Communist Party as long as it was clearly in their interest to do so. What they were finding, and it became apparent by the mid-1980s and was certainly apparent by 1992, was that people who took advantage of the market economic liberalizing trend under Deng Xiaoping and got into the private sector, those were the ones pulling ahead economically. So, the newspapers were filled with stories about Chinese who became millionaires, especially in southern and coastal China. Many of them enjoyed a far better quality of life than Communist Party cadres, who began to be resentful. So, no longer could they say that kind of lifestyle was limited to the capitalist countries under imperialist control like Hong Kong. It actually was part of China’s current reality. It was harder for them to deny. Also, they could not deny – I think this was true of officials at the highest level – the benefit to the Chinese economy overall of all of this capitalist economic activity. The problem was how to allow that to happen and at the same time for them to maintain control. I think they still have not sorted it out.

In those years when Deng Xiaoping was still living, in the 1988-1992 period itself, at the level of popular culture, some of the communist heroes were being elevated to a kind of divinity status so that in parts of South China temples were being built to Chairman Mao and even to Zhou En-lai. For a while, the authorities in Beijing thought there might be an effort to steal the body of Mao from his mausoleum in Tiananmen Square, so they actually closed it to the public. During Mao’s entire leadership period, the Communist Party had strongly discouraged this kind of popular religion, which they labeled superstition, as being injurious to society. They subscribed to the theory of atheistic communism and believed that all of a person’s efforts should go into some kind of economic production or political activity rather than be wasted in religion. I think the people of Deng Xiaoping’s type were greatly chagrined that there would be a desire on the part of the common people to deify Mao or at least give him a place of honor at the level of popular religion. I think it’s to be expected. This is probably how Chinese religion developed over some thousands of years. The temples were built to him not because of his communist ideology, but because of his nationalism for China. So, the question of whether a person who is a Communist Party cardholder is truly a communist or not, I think that this belief in so-called “international communism” and the inevitability of communism representing the ultimate stage in historical development had been totally shattered. If it hadn’t been before, it certainly was by the collapse of the Soviet Union. I think that all of the efforts of the Communist Party in China have been given over to how they could allow capitalist economic activity to thrive and have themselves remain in power. I think it’s going to be futile, but I think that probably there is still a majority of Party cadres and government officials who believe that without the Communist Party there would be chaos because they haven’t done anything to foster any kind of democratic activity that could carry on after communism collapses.

*Q: Were you seeing an attempt to rationalize production with the normal communist policies on communism, Marxism, etc. both in the schools and the workplace? These take away from education of other things. Communist indoctrination takes considerable time out of the school place and the workplace.*

DONAHUE: During this period that we're talking about, 1989-1992, I do not recall having visited a school in China while the classes were in session. I think where this activity of communist indoctrination was strongest was probably in Beijing and other parts of northern China. The coastal area, and certainly southern China, would have been quick to pick up on the importance of teaching skills that were directly related to production and getting rich. I think that if they could have freedom in that regard, they would have tried to jettison or minimize the rote instruction of ideology except for what may be necessary to pass a test.

During this period, and I think it was in 1991, my family visited the village of my father-in-law, which was southwest of Hong Kong. My father-in-law was an immigrant from part of China known in Mandarin as Taishan. The local people pronounce it as "Toisan." Up until the 1960s or so, the majority of Chinese in the United States were from that part of China. Their dialect is a sub-dialect of Cantonese. Despite the fact that the region had always been an agriculturally wealthy part of China, it was also densely populated. So, there was population pressure for people to go abroad and seek their fortunes. This is what so many did, of course. When we went back with my father-in-law to see his family village, on the way to and from, we saw a lot of evidence of overseas Chinese families having constructed many things there. So, a lot of their money was going back to that part of China. The overseas Chinese families were building major vocational high schools to teach mechanics, low level engineering, and the skills needed for factories. Many of the schools operated in conjunction with a factory. Many of the overseas Chinese were businesspeople and they were taking their capital back to China. They were looking to make investments back in their home communities, but they also recognized the need to train skills. I was somewhat surprised because when I had lived in Beijing in the mid-1980s, we had tried to see whether we could enter into some kind of cooperative arrangement between the Beijing International School, of which I was the chairman of the board of directors, and some Chinese schools. We hoped there could be some kind of interchange, even a sports competition that would allow the students to know or learn something about each other. That effort was strongly resisted at the time and we were certainly given the impression by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that no involvement by foreigners at all in the Chinese educational system would be tolerated. So, when I visited these areas in southern China and saw whole schools being built and textbooks being provided by "foreigners," the difference was, they were overseas Chinese and probably their investment in the school was scrutinized to make sure that it conveyed foreign technology, but not ideology.

*Q: Also, what you're saying is that the split between north and south is becoming more and more profound.*

DONAHUE: I think that is true. The southern and coastal part of China has always been economically stronger. A big difference is that there are cultural changes that come with this economic development now. They will profoundly affect the willingness of the people to continue to even pay lip service to some elements of communism that just don't pass muster in

the modern world.

*Q: One last question on this. Were you seeing any change in the spread of Mandarin and Cantonese?*

DONAHUE: Without a doubt, the communist government has been quite successful in fostering the spread of Mandarin as the national language. It has been very important politically and culturally for educated people from the entire country to have a common spoken language. From the standpoint of nationalism, encouraging the spread of Mandarin was a common goal of all Chinese governments during the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

Mandarin is somewhat lower in quality in areas of China where it has a heavy local dialect or patois, or even different tones. Those areas are Shandong province and Sichuan province, especially. They are within the Mandarin speaking area, but it's a heavily accented Mandarin. In coastal China, Shanghai, Fujian, and Guangdong provinces, the quality of Mandarin is good among Mandarin speakers. Almost anyone under age 40 with a high school education or above would be conversant in Mandarin. It has played a very important role in national unification.

What we saw happen in Hong Kong during this period, 1989-1992, was an intense debate by Hong Kong people over what language they should stress. It was an important debate. Many Hong Kong school educators felt that all Hong Kong public schools at the high school level should teach in English. English is the international language for business and Hong Kong's present and future depended so heavily on international business. They felt that there certainly would not be opportunities for people who were not conversant in English. There is a historical problem, an intrinsic problem, in teaching modern technology in Chinese because Chinese lacks much of the vocabulary. So, at the university level, it is recognized that the teaching of technology has to be in English. Therefore, if Hong Kong is going to move not only into business but also into technology, the city's high school students must be prepared to take that information on board.

At the same time, the University of Hong Kong, which was the premier university, noted that the quality of English for its entering students was declining. Many of us living in Hong Kong also remarked that the English of the average shopkeeper was not quite as good as it had been. There were several reasons for this. One of the principal ones was the great amount of immigration out of Hong Kong by talented people who could immigrate to Australia and Canada and were taking their assets to prepare for their family before Hong Kong would be turned over to China. That exodus provided opportunities in Hong Kong for people who perhaps did not have as much preparation, but it also meant that quality of services was not quite as good as it had been previously. Part of the debate about language recognized the need to maintain good English in schools. Another group felt intensely that 1997 was an opportunity for Hong Kong and Guangdong nationalism. They thought that Hong Kong ought to be fostering education through the high school level in Cantonese, thereby reviving the ancient Cantonese culture. At one time, the area of Guangdong had been a separate kingdom with its own rituals and culture and history, and even its own version of Chinese opera and classical music. Mandarin speakers in the north had quashed those forms of cultural expression. The Cantonese nationalists felt that with their increased economic power, this was an opportunity for an expansion of their cultural presence.

However, many people pointed out that that if they went down that road, they were going to face an historical dead end. They were going to run into political problems with Beijing because they expected that come 1997, there would be strong pressure to have Mandarin taught in the schools, at least as a second language. Some Hong Kong business people thought students should become trilingual in Cantonese, Mandarin and English. So, this debate raged. I believe it still has not been entirely resolved, except that there is much more Mandarin spoken in Hong Kong now even in the government, where previously all Chinese employees were speaking Cantonese with each other in meetings, unless there was an expatriate or unless it was a high-level meeting conducted in English. Now, they would also be speaking a lot of Mandarin because the PRC administration was paying close attention to what they were doing. It's interesting that the rise in affluence in southern China and the easing of communication across the border with neighboring Guangdong gave more prominence in China to Cantonese-speaking cultural idols in Hong Kong. So, Jackie Chan and other actors prominent in movies, and pop stars from Hong Kong had quite a following on the other side of the border. Conversely, some singers and other cultural figures from Guangdong also began to have some following in Hong Kong. There was a rise at the popular level of "Hong Kong speak" in Guangdong province's capital city, Guangzhou. People from a fairly wide area of Guangdong province could pick up Hong Kong TV. So, their speech patterns were also going to be affected. There has been an increase in the importance of Cantonese, at least at the local level. However, to do business with the rest of China or with Taiwan, Mandarin is essential.

**WALTER A. LUNDY**  
**Republic of China, Desk Officer**  
**Washington, DC (1977-1979)**

*Walter A. Lundy, Jr. was born in Georgia in 1933. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Georgia in 1954 and serving in the US Air Force from 1954-1958, he received his master's degree from Georgetown University in 1961. His career has included positions in Colombo, Saigon, Hue, New Delhi, Teheran, and Seoul. Mr. Lundy was interviewed by Raymond Ewing in September 2005.*

*Q: Groups interested in a particular sector or region. Okay, anything else about your good year, better year at the Department of Commerce in '76-'77? Where did you go from there?*

LUNDY: I moved to the economic slot on the old Republic of China desk, and that was a very, very good job. I was quite lucky to get it; I thought there were probably enough Chinese language officers available to fill desk jobs related to China. There were no bid lists in those days, but this was just the kind of job I wanted. I thought I would be more competitive for a job back in the NEA bureau, but nothing worked out there. My career counselor in personnel suggested this job to me. I certainly had no better idea at the time, and the East Asia bureau was quite agreeable to taking me back. It turned out to be a very fortunate career decision. Quite a bit was happening on our evolving relationship with China and Taiwan at that time, and I was in on much of it over the next two years.

*Q: Why don't you describe in a general sort of way what the context of the situation was at the time that you started in '77 and then talk a little about how things changed in the two years you were there.*

LUNDY: The economic desk officer on a busy country desk can exert a considerable amount of influence, particularly when working on an economy which is booming in the way Taiwan's was. There were enormous trade problems, and U.S. and other foreign investment was increasing by leaps and bounds. The country desk receives most of the reporting from all agencies. The economic officer for a particular country probably is the central location for more pertinent information than anyone else in Washington. Just by keeping interested other agency colleagues informed you perform a useful service and earn their gratitude, encouraging them to be more willing to reciprocate by sharing information with you. Everyone gains. You can both promote U.S. interests and help unclog the arteries in the bureaucracy. You can quickly develop a reputation as someone who knows the answers or at least knows where to find them. You also can assist U.S. business interests. There was much demand for a quarterly handout we published covering recent economic developments in Taiwan.

On the political side, it was generally known by then that we were moving toward recognition of Mainland China and the derecognition of Taiwan. This happened about a year and a half after I came to the desk, on January 1, 1979 to be exact. It was in a way a sad time because Taiwan's representatives in Washington, those assigned to the old Republic of China embassy, were first class people. They obviously did not want us to recognize Mainland China. They had bent over backwards to cultivate the desk thinking the bureaucracy might be on their side, but we of course had to be neutral. Recognizing Mainland China in any case was a highly political decision made at the White House. When what came to be termed "normalization" of the U.S. relationship with China took place, the U.S. Government worked out about as sensible an arrangement as could be expected to continue a meaningful relationship with Taiwan. Fleshing out the nuts and bolts was the work of the bureaucracy. As I understand it, U.S.-Taiwan relations continue to this day to adhere to the ground rules put in place in early 1979, which was passed by Congress as the Taiwan Relations Act. We maintain an office in Taipei staffed by Foreign Service officers on temporary leave from the Foreign Service, who are assigned to the Taiwan coordination staff while they are posted to Taipei.

Taiwan in Washington is represented by the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs. There never has been a blip in our working economic relations with Taiwan. American investors did not pull out; trade continued to expand quite rapidly. Taiwan in relation to Mainland China, of course, is a very small country. The United States has made it clear to the governments on both sides of the Formosa Strait that working out the future relationship between China and Taiwan is essentially their responsibility. On the other hand, we have maintained enough of a military presence in East Asia to deter China, which militarily is much stronger than Taiwan, from taking rash actions. We want the dispute to be settled peacefully, not by force of arms. As China and Taiwan have continued to prosper, they both have too much to lose should a war break out. The situation, of course, is far more complicated than we can discuss here. In addition to China and Taiwan, South Korea, North Korea, Japan, indeed all of East Asia, have important regional interests in finding a peaceful solution to the issue.

*Q: As the economic officer on the Republic of China desk, to what extent were you involved in relations with Congress?*

LUNDY: Not very much on the econ side. There were three political officers on the desk, and they tended to handle Congressional relations. I became involved only when some member of Congress became very interested in a trade problem. These were the days of bilateral textile agreements, orderly marketing arrangements, and voluntary restraint arrangements with Taiwan and other prospering developing countries. These mainly covered politically sensitive export items in which American producers were rapidly becoming less and less competitive and losing market share.

*Q: To me it's interesting what you say about Holbrooke's interest in what was happening even on the economic side with the Republic of China; somehow, I guess I would have been a little surprised. There were so many other things going on that you would think that's an area he would let someone else handle...*

LUNDY: Oh he let Earl Heginbotham, the econ deputy assistant secretary, also a former Vietnam colleague, handle most economic issues.

*Q: Or with the . . . , presumably there was another DAS responsible for China?*

LUNDY: Right, that was Roger Sullivan, and before him Bill Gleysteen. They were both China specialists. I didn't work all that closely with either of them but of course my boss, Harvey Feldman, and Dave Brown, who was the deputy director, worked through them. There was a junior political officer as well. I was lucky in having economic issues mostly to myself. Harvey told me early on to keep him informed, but he preferred not being involved in day to day US/Taiwan economic problems. He also was a manager who knew how to delegate.

*Q: Now you mentioned that not much changed in trade and investment relations with Taiwan after normalization with the People's Republic. Of course, there was no longer an Embassy in Taipei, just the American Institute.*

LUNDY: Right, the American Institute in Taiwan.

*Q: In Taiwan.*

LUNDY: Yes.

*Q: Other than the name change in terms of the economic reporting, the work that the people involved did stayed about the same?*

LUNDY: Pretty much the same, yes.

*Q: And there was now this other layer in Washington connected with the American Institute in Taiwan?*

LUNDY: I think the American Institute in Taiwan's Washington office is also called the American Institute in Taiwan, but my memory may be failing me there. The outgoing economic counselor at the Embassy in Taipei, Joe Kyle, became assistant director.

*Q: In the Washington office?*

LUNDY: Yes, the Washington office which actually was located over in Rosslyn. By the time it was functioning and bureaucratic relationships had been established, I had left the desk. My feeling is that Joe did not try to micromanage whatever functions were left in the State Department. The Taiwan coordination staff in the Department eventually became part of the China desk and was reduced to two or three officers. Ross Parr replaced me in the economic officer slot, but I don't think the job changed very much. I assume it was down graded to some extent.

*Q: OK, before we talk about that, is there anything else we ought to say about your time as economic-commercial officer for Republic of China affairs, as the economic officer on the desk?*

LUNDY: No, except that I finally got promoted after eight and a half years as an FSO-4. The job certainly helped me out of a serious career slump.

*Q: OK, in '79 you moved over to the office of economic policy, which I think covers the whole East Asia Pacific region, but I don't know all that much about it. You were deputy director, so there was a director. Why don't you talk a little first about the structure and then about the function of the office and what you did particularly.*

LUNDY: Well, a deputy director may sometimes have trouble justifying his existence in an office that is not too busy. Again I was lucky; problems stemming from rapid East Asian economic growth and rising exports from the area to the U.S. kept us very well occupied. Our huge trade deficit with Japan was drawing more and more attention. South Korea was somewhat poorer on a per capita basis than Taiwan but was growing just as rapidly. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) as it is called, then comprising only five countries, was still in its formative years but also growing very rapidly. The ASEAN governments tended to be conservative and pro-American, in spite of the recent debacle in Vietnam. Southeast Asia was thriving outside of the old Indo-China countries. All of this activity kept the office extremely busy.

*Q: So the office in addition to major issues such as trade relations with Japan was very much involved in regional economic matters. There were economic officers serving on the country desks, as you had for Taiwan, with whom you also worked closely?*

LUNDY: Yes, quite closely. There were some disagreements over turf, but on the whole relations within the bureau were amicable. We probably fought most often with the Japan desk, which always has been noted for its parochialism. To a lesser extent, the China desk had a similar reputation, but things were changing so rapidly in that relationship there was seldom time to argue over turf. In general we were working in tandem with all the country desks. There was

no ASEAN desk; that work tended to gravitate toward our office. Each desk had at least one economic officer, and some had two or three.

Dick Holbrooke's leadership and management style fostered good working relations throughout the bureau. He just would not tolerate people keeping things too close to their chests. We were supposed to keep each other well informed. A regional office fulfills much of its purpose simply by making sure people know what they need to know about policies and procedures which might not otherwise come to their attention. Sometimes regional offices just get in the way of desks, but I hope we kept that kind of obstruction to a minimum.

*Q: To what extent were you involved with South Korea's external economic relations other than with the United States, with China with other parts of the world?*

LUNDY: One of the economic section officers made some excellent contacts on South Korea/Mainland China trade. We did some reporting which was much appreciated in Washington. Two-way trade between Mainland China and South Korea was just beginning, and very little was known about it. Back then there was some political opposition in South Korea to trade with China which stemmed from memories of the Korean War. Now the two countries are huge trading partners.

**WALTER F. MONDALE**  
**Vice President**  
**Washington, DC (1977-1981)**

*Vice President Mondale was born and raised in Minnesota. A graduate of the University of Minnesota and its Law School, Mr. Mondale served as State Attorney General before his appointment and subsequent election as United States Senator from the State of Minnesota. Elected Vice President of the United States in 1976, Mr. Mondale served for the duration of the Carter Administration as active participant and advisor. President Clinton nominated him United States Ambassador to Japan, where he served from 1993 through 1996. Throughout his career Mr. Mondale has contributed substantially to the welfare of the nation in both the public and private sectors.*

*Q: Anyway, we were talking about China.*

MONDALE: Now we're going to China. That was one of my most important trips. We had had the opening to China about a half a year or a year before when we established... in fact, broke the ice and announced that our presence in Taiwan would be some kind of a foundation, a non-governmental relationship, and that our relationship would be with one China whose capital was Beijing. Following that, we had normalization. Then there seemed to be a kind of a dead spot for 4 or 5 months where we had gotten the bare bones in place but then things were starting to drift downward in stasis. So, my trip was designed to try to get some momentum started in our relationship.

As we prepared for this trip, I did something that I did on all my trips that I thought worked very well. That is, we'd sit down and figure out every conceivable thing that could be an issue in this case with China and every conceivable significant interest that we had pursuing with China and their leaders to serve our national interest. We had a big agenda there because we were trying to open up trade, we were trying to establish a cooperative intelligence relationship, we were trying in this case to get some yet secret cooperation that allowed us to better watch the Soviet Union, we were breaking the ice with a country where it had been awfully icy. So, one of the first things you do when you do that is, you realize that a lot of decisions in our own government that are deadlocked or paralyzed or hidden or unresolved, the intradepartmental disputes and so on, and that was one of the things I could do as Vice President. I could shoot those issues out of there. Then when I came to China, we were really ready. (Secretary of State) Cy Vance has said this was one of the most successful trips in our 4 years.

We took a lagging relationship and turned it around and they really felt good about it, the Chinese did. We worked out Ex-Im Bank credits. We worked out new trade relationships. We developed new rules on export controls that were different than that on the Soviet Union, which they really liked. They allowed me to speak to the University of Beijing on national television. We were able to... I think it really worked and it showed how a vice president can push through changes in the American government so you can come ready to do business. They saw that and it made a big difference.

*Q: The other part of that goes back to something we were talking about earlier in terms of public acceptance of policy. Obviously, you'd have to sell normalization with China. Much academic writing has covered the way in which normalization was presented and rationalized. I would suspect that you would agree with the idea that you understood that there was going to be political opposition from the legislature and that in handling that issue you had to be very cognizant of your public support.*

MONDALE: Oh, yes, and I was there on the night that the President made his announcement on his dramatic change of policy toward Taiwan and toward China. I was there with Brzezinski and the others when we told what might be called the "Taiwan lobby" what the new situation was. They were furious. They had said that we had promised to consult with them if there were any changes and here we were telling them 2 minutes before the President went on the air to announce it. It was a sign of what was going to come. It was not well received by those who had these ideas about Taiwan. There was an old part of America that identified with Taiwan, hated China, didn't see any chances of reform there. But I would say, overall, the policy was well received in America at large, that they liked the idea of ending this impasse between our 2 nations, they liked the idea of engaging, trying to improve relationships, exchanges, and all the rest, and doing business. By and large, we had that residual resentment that I've described, but overall, the policy was very well received in America.

*Q: One of the advantages of your trip was to help focus both our organizations and their organizations on the policy change. At this time, I was negotiating the aviation agreement. I was on the China desk at that time. We were also negotiating a maritime agreement with them. They wanted to do something that we thought was very strange. They wanted an annex to the*

*agreement that would list the ports that US ships could go to, but it had to be equivalent. Well, we have 3 coasts: the Atlantic, the Gulf, and the Pacific. They have a single coast. So, we thought, "How are we going to balance this out?" Finally one of the Chinese negotiators took me aside and said, "This is a mechanism for us to communicate to the provinces and the cities that this is real," that they would have to begin to prepare themselves to receive American shipping and in doing that, that would prove to them that the policy change was real, it wasn't temporary. So they were having their own issues with getting local government and the public on board with the policy. So, I've always thought the normalization policy with China was a fair illustration of your domestic audience and your foreign audience and getting those policies in line.*

MONDALE: Right. And that was going on in both countries. We were there, but I think that that trip really changed some perceptions over there. One of the things we did was open up that consulate in Shanghai that you were involved in, once again, trying to put flesh on the bones and show that we were serious about this. I still feel very good about that trip.

*Q: It was really exciting to backstop you on the desk.*

MONDALE: It was really fun. You had that whole generation of top Chinese career officials who had gone through the terrible days of the last days of Mao Zedong.

*Q: The Cultural Revolution.*

MONDALE: Yes, and they were finally passed it, and many of them had been victims but were now in government again. Many of them felt especially close to us and felt really good about the fact that America was coming in there now and changing things. We heard many stories about the Cultural Revolution.

**THOMAS P. SHOESMITH**  
**Consul General**  
**Hong Kong (1977-1981)**

*Thomas P. Shosmith was born in 1939 and raised in Pennsylvania. His career in the State Department included posts in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and an ambassadorship to Malaysia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.*

*Q: Well, you went to the Senior Seminar for, what, a year? You had been the Deputy Chief of Mission for about five years and you had received an assignment to be Consul General in Hong Kong. You served in Hong Kong from 1977 to 1981. How did that assignment come about?*

SHOESMITH: Well, I had been in Tokyo for five years and I guess they were looking for a place for me to go. Hong Kong opened up and the then senior Deputy Assistant Secretary, Ambassador Gleysteen, or subsequently Ambassador Gleysteen, called me one day and asked me

if I would like to go to Hong Kong as Consul General. And that's how it happened.

*Q: Well, what was the situation in Hong Kong. At one point it was our preeminent China listening and watching post.*

SHOESMITH: It still was in 1977.

*Q: Why?*

SHOESMITH: Well, because our Liaison Office -- this was before normalization -- in Beijing was small, and it was the only presence we had in China at the time. There was the Consulate General in Hong Kong. It had a very large complement, both economic, political, and intelligence. Both the CIA and military intelligence. It was a very good collection point for information about the Mainland. There were many people that went back and forth. Publications were available in Hong Kong from the Mainland, and the Consulate General at that time was still doing translations from the Mainland press. So there were many resources available in Hong Kong for China watching. That was true even after normalization for a time. It is probably less true now.

*Q: Did you also serve, in a way, as the consular post for Guangzhou?*

SHOESMITH: No, Guangzhou was not opened until 1979, I believe it was. We had no official contact with the Mainland at all until normalization of diplomatic relations. We assisted the opening of the Consulate in Guangzhou. This was the first.

*Q: Well, did you travel or go into China?*

SHOESMITH: No. Not until after normalization.

*Q: I mean, was it media policy to keep up this quasi-relationship or was it on the part of the Chinese to show that we...*

SHOESMITH: Well, travel to China by official Americans was very limited at that time. There was no particular need for us to go, and we couldn't do political and economic reporting. We could do it better in Hong Kong than by being in China itself because your movements were so restricted.

*Q: Well, here you have a large staff and you were reporting on conditions in China. How did you get your information?*

SHOESMITH: Well, as I say, a lot of it was from open sources -- periodicals, newspapers. A good bit of it was interviewing people who came from the Mainland. Or listening to or monitoring radio broadcasts. In that fashion. That had been going on for years, so it was a very well developed system. I think it was very productive.

*Q: Well, you must have had an extensive file...*

SHOESMITH: Oh, of course, and the people we had on the staff, for the most part they were China experts. They had lots of background on China. Many of them in INR.

*Q: That's Intelligence and Research. How about cooperation with some of the other countries -- particularly the British who were...*

SHOESMITH: Well, there was a certain amount of that, and both the military and the CIA had good contacts with their counterparts in the Hong Kong Government. Those were the primary sources, I believe, within the Hong Kong Government. Apart from that, I mean, there were very few, other organizations. There were private research groups in Hong Kong- -a variety of research groups that we kept in contact with that had their own sources and resources, analytical groups that we would contact. These were mostly private groups that were China watchers as well. There were journalists. Occasionally, journalists were able to go in and out of China.

*Q: Well, the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese control...*

SHOESMITH: That is scheduled for 1997, but that agreement that was reached between the British and the Chinese Governments did not occur until after I had left. So reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese control in those years when I was there was not regarded as a near term matter. It was regarded as a remote possibility. It did not seriously affect Hong Kong itself or the way in which it operated politically or economically. It was only after 1981 that this began to gather steam, culminating in the agreement, whenever that was.

*Q: Was your Consular Section feeling any pressure on people looking ahead to whatever might be...*

SHOESMITH: No. Not at all.

*Q: Trying to get visas...*

SHOESMITH: No. I'm sure there was some of that but it was not an appreciable problem. It was not an appreciable trend at that time. Again, this only began to happen well into the 1980's.

*Q: What about Americans? We had a lot of trouble earlier on. I think you've mentioned Americans who get on the outs, drift into Chinese waters and are picked up. Were relationships such that this was no longer...*

SHOESMITH: There were no incidents in the four years that I was there. I can't recall how much, if any, American travel there was into China at that time from Hong Kong. If there was any, I suspect it was very limited. But there were no incidents like that at the time. Maybe people were more careful, maybe the Chinese were less strict. But there wasn't any problem.

*Q: Were you only watching China or were you also watching Vietnam?*

SHOESMITH: We had a small Southeast Asia-Vietnam brief with one officer that followed

events in Vietnam. For the most part, it was pretty marginal. The information available to us in Hong Kong about developments in Indochina was very limited. A few of the other consulates general had relations with Vietnam, and occasionally we'd see some of their people when they came into Hong Kong. Some of the press occasionally visited there. We had one officer, full-time, in that area. But it was, I think, pretty marginal.

*Q: Well, there must have been the problem of boat people coming out of Vietnam.*

SHOESMITH: Well, that started in 1979. But the boat people were not significant sources of intelligence. I mean, they were all farmers and fishermen and people of that sort and, as a source of intelligence on Vietnam, not very great, although some effort was made to exploit that resource. When the boat people began to arrive in Hong Kong in 1979, as they did in other parts of Southeast Asia, that became a major responsibility of the Consulate because we were involved in the processing of these people to identify those who might be able to come to the United States.

*Q: Were you getting pressure from Washington, then, to try to get the British and the Hong Kong authorities to take more people and not just leave it to us...*

SHOESMITH: No, because the understanding at that time in 1979, I think it followed an international conference on refugees in 1979, was that if the various countries, such as Hong Kong, Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia would accept these refugees and give them what was called "first asylum," the other, major countries made a commitment to resettle the refugees. At that time, at the start of these programs, it was generally considered by our government that anybody that fled Vietnam was a political refugee, under the terms of our legislation at that time. Not everyone agreed with that, either in the United States or elsewhere. With that assurance that they would be resettled, the British Government, or the Hong Kong Government, at very considerable expense, and at some political cost, began to receive the refugees and to house them. They developed, for some of the refugees, a system whereby they could go into the community and work and return to the camps at night. I said, "some political cost," because, at the same time as the Hong Kong Government was receiving these refugees, giving them first asylum, they were returning people who fled the mainland of China into Hong Kong. They would be rounded up from time to time...

*Q: These would be Chinese?*

SHOESMITH: And sent back to the Mainland. Of course, some of those people who came in had relatives in Hong Kong. So the relatives and other persons who were sympathetic to that position took exception to the fact that the Hong Kong Government was giving this asylum and receiving these refugees, while it was turning away the people coming in from China. The difference, of course, was that the Hong Kong Government had a commitment that these refugees would not be permanent residents in Hong Kong. They would be resettled, whereas those who came in from the Mainland were seeking permanent residence.

*Q: Did you have a problem with the way the United States Government was responding? I mean, these boat people would come in. We made commitments to the Hong Kong authorities. We and*

*other refugee-receiving countries would get them out...*

SHOESMITH: No, up until 1981 we in the United States were taking substantial numbers of refugees from Hong Kong and elsewhere. The United States, Australia, and Canada were the main resettlement countries. Although there was some concern in INS [Immigration and Naturalization Service, U. S. Dept of Justice], for example, as to whether these were genuine refugees or whether they were political refugees.

*Q: You mean economic refugees.*

SHOESMITH: I mean economic refugees. That didn't become a serious problem while I was there. It did subsequently.

*Q: Well, tell me. During your tour there, it sounds like a line right through it. The Carter Administration came in and in 1979 China was recognized. We sort of derecognized the Republic of China on Taiwan. How was this received in Hong Kong by the Chinese community in Hong Kong, and did it make any change in your work?*

SHOESMITH: Well, I don't have any recollection of how it was received by the people in Hong Kong. Well, I would imagine that it was received, for the most part, pretty well. We were one of the last countries to recognize China -- among the last major countries. And it was felt that this was coming. It was only a question of time. So I don't think that our recognition of China or the establishment of diplomatic relations with China caused any surprise or any concern in Hong Kong. It didn't in the two years remaining that I was there. It did not, to any significant degree, alter the kind of work or the amount of work that we did, or the size of the Consulate. I think we opened Shanghai in those two years that I was there. I'm pretty sure of that. Yes, we did. So we had only two consular posts -- Guangzhou and Shanghai -- and Beijing. And we attempted to work out, with some success, with [the Embassy in] Beijing, reporting responsibilities -- things that we could still do that they could not handle as well, either in Shanghai or Guangzhou, or in Beijing. Apart from that, the work and the size of the Consulate [in Hong Kong] continued very much the same. Of course, I should say that the Consulate included a number of agencies that were doing regional work. I mean the [U. S.] Customs and Treasury people, and that wasn't affected at all. The focus of the Consulate General as China watchers remained constant for the time I was there. Until I left in 1981 there had been no change.

*Q: To get a feel for how the Foreign Service was operating, did there seem to you to be a healthy program for developing "China hands"?*

SHOESMITH: Oh, yes, there was. It was a very large program. It had been going on for a substantial number of years. My impression was that it was larger than the Japanese language program, partly because Chinese language officers could be assigned elsewhere in Asia, where there was a need for the Chinese language in the Chinese communities in all of Southeast Asia. There were some "China watcher" posts as, for example, in India, where they had a Chinese language officer. There were more opportunities for assigning and moving Chinese language officers around, than there were for assigning Japanese language officers in Japan. Certainly, you couldn't use them outside of Japan as language officers. The Chinese language program was very

well established. There were lots of Chinese language officers. When normalization came, as far as I was aware, there was no problem at all in finding Chinese speaking officers for assignments in China as we began to open up posts and expand the Embassy.

*Q: Had you had any dealings with the Republic of China Consulate and all that? Did this relationship end in Hong Kong?*

SHOESMITH: There was no Republic of China Consulate in Hong Kong. The Republic of China maintained a very low key presence in Hong Kong, an unofficial presence. They did no official business at all. We had no contact with them, or it wasn't of any consequence. They had no official presence in Hong Kong.

*Q: Did you sense, both from your soundings of the staff, of a warming of relations when the Carter Administration came into office and made these gestures? I mean, the Nixon Administration had already made the initial jump, but then the Carter Administration came in and...Did you feel that it had an effect on the whole relationship?*

SHOESMITH: Oh, I would say it was, in essence. When the new [Chinese] leadership came in, and this was in 1979, I think -- 1978 or 1979 -- and the new leadership seemed at that time to be embarking on a course of opening China to the outside and was interested in expanding a relationship with the United States. So the whole atmosphere of the relationship was considerably more positive after 1979, as one would expect, with normalization. But that in particular did not affect our work, except that after normalization we began to have contact in Hong Kong with representatives of the Chinese Government, in NCNA [New China News Agency]. The head of NCNA was China's unofficial, I guess -- actually official representative in Hong Kong, and was so regarded by the Hong Kong Government. And by everyone else. And by 1980 or so, we had contact with them. They would accept invitations, they extended invitations to us to be at certain things. I got to know, slightly -- well, no, more than slightly, the head of NCNA.

*Q: NCNA?*

SHOESMITH: New China News Agency. That's their main wire service. And on one occasion he arranged part of a visit that my wife and I made to China, to one particular place that he was familiar with. That was a very definite change. Prior to normalization, we had no contact at all with the NCNA people or their trade representatives. And so on. Afterwards, those contacts began to open up.

**WILLIAM ANDREAS BROWN**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1978)**

**Trustee, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1978-1979)**

*Ambassador William Andreas Brown was born in Winchester, Massachusetts in 1930. He joined the "Holloway Program" which was part of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Program and went to Harvard University, graduating with a Magna cum Laude degree. In 1950 he went to Marine Corps basic training in Virginia and later served in Korea. His Foreign Service career took him to a multitude of places including Honk Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, USSR, India, the UK, and Israel. His career includes an ambassadorship to Israel as well as several positions in the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1998.*

BROWN: Well, let's get back to the situation affecting my ongoing assignment after Moscow. As I said, I was approached by Roger Sullivan, who was then Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, serving in the new, Carter administration under Assistant Secretary Dick Holbrooke. Roger was an old friend. We had been in the same entering class at the Foreign Service Institute in 1956. He let me know briefly that something was up and that I should prepare myself to go to Taipei as DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. The obvious implication was that if we broke relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan, my job would be to close the embassy, pack the Ambassador off, take charge of the office, and do what was necessary.

Details were not yet available, but I was to move to Taiwan quickly. So my wife Helen and I flew from Moscow to Tokyo and then to Taipei, arriving in July, 1978. I think that we arrived just after July 4.

At this stage I would like to pause and call my audience's attention to a couple of very important, external sources of information which I have recently learned of. We now have, of course, Ambassador John Holdridge's book, Crossing the Divide. Last month, in March, [1999?], under the joint auspices of the American Institute on Taiwan and the Woodrow Wilson Center of Johns Hopkins University, a symposium was held to mark 20 years of contact with Taiwan under the Taiwan Relations Act. The symposium was attended by old timers, including myself; Mike Oksenberg, who worked on the National Security Council as the China specialist; David Dean; Harvey Feldman; and a number of others. This was an important event, marked by some very trenchant questions raised by members of the audience. The audience included a lot of people with considerable background in Taiwan affairs who had come from Taiwan itself to attend the symposium. The thrust of their questions was: "Why can't U.S. policy move on to the obvious, and that is to recognize the new reality of a free, democratically elected regime in Taiwan and give Taiwan more space to develop its policies toward the People's Republic of China?"

At that time David Dean, [a retired Foreign Service Officer and Chinese Affairs specialist], gave an oral presentation of his recollections of the move to normalize fully relations with the People's Republic of China, particularly from his point of view of having served as the first Director of this new American Institute on Taiwan. This institution had been nebulous at the beginning. He highlighted the difficulties he encountered, including a lack of money, policy differences with certain elements in the Department of State, and great sensitivities in various areas. He paid tribute to those of us who had helped to put this new institution into operation. I would

recommend to the readers of this interview to review the papers that will come out of that symposium, including David Dean's presentation. The remarks of Mike Oksenberg at this symposium are also worth reading. They were made from a different perspective and in response to sometimes searching questions on "Why was the decision made to normalize relations fully with the People's Republic of China; why was this done in the way and manner it was accomplished, and why was this done at the time it was done?"

A second source of information on this subject which I have more recently found is a book by James Mann, called, About Face. I don't recall ever meeting Mr. Mann, but he has written a remarkable book, involving considerable research, including documents he obtained from the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and other sources, under the Freedom of Information Act. For instance, he obtained in this way a previously classified, CIA chronology of the moves made to normalize relations with the PRC, all the way back from the Warsaw talks with PRC officials conducted by Ambassador Walter Stoessel and continuing through the trip to the PRC by former Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon, as well as other senior, American officials since then. It's a remarkable book.

*Q: James Mann has used a number of our interviews in this Oral History series.*

BROWN: I sensed that he probably had. I would strongly recommend James Mann's book to readers of this interview. I would like to draw from it, and based on it, make some overall remarks which were applicable then. I would also say that they remain applicable today. It is rather poignant for me that today, April 9, 1999, the PRC Prime Minister is in Washington, negotiating with President Clinton on the whole gamut of U.S. relations with the PRC, including trade and other matters. I saw President Clinton the other day giving an excellent speech on C-Span on the rationale for the policies he has followed on China. That is very valuable. I don't recall such a comprehensive speech or rationalization by an American President in its length and detail as the Clinton speech was.

Coming back to Mann's book, I would like to mention some of his observations and mine, drawn from his work. The first point is that domestic politics played a tremendous role in so many of the important, foreign policy moves of our government, whether they involved the Middle East, the Far East, and certainly China.

At this point in this interview, I am describing my move from the embassy in Moscow to the embassy in Taipei. Although we had a bipartisan policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union over the years, we also had intense, political rivalries within the Executive Branch of our government and between Congress and the Executive Branch. Some of the issues involved were the Jackson-Vanik Amendment [limiting assistance to the Soviet Union unless Soviet Jews were allowed to emigrate to Israel] and other aspects of U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union.

My second observation is that the precedents set by Secretary of State Kissinger and President Nixon and the inheritance they left behind amounted to a secretive, exclusionary and highly personalized form of diplomacy. This itself, in my view, reflected serious domestic, political concerns. Harking back, I can't recall whether I have already told you this but, at the risk of repetition, I will cover this now.

*Q: Okay. It makes no difference.*

BROWN: When I was at the National War College in 1972, one of the speakers was former Secretary of State Dean Rusk. As I had just visited China, accompanying the Democratic and Republican leaders of the House of Representatives and their party, I was full of beeswax and, perhaps, a somewhat exaggerated sense of my own importance. I asked to be recognized and said that I was a Foreign Service Officer who had long advocated a more energetic policy toward the People's Republic of China, leading to a breakthrough in relations. I asked Secretary Rusk why we had to wait until Richard Nixon became President. I asked why President John F. Kennedy could not have moved toward normalizing relations with China on Secretary Rusk's watch.

Rusk answered that there had been pressures to move more quickly on normalizing relations with the PRC. These pressures came from certain sectors in the State Department, including elements of what might be called the China service. However, Rusk recalled that President Kennedy told him in the Oval Office of the White House that he, Kennedy, was aware of these views. However, Kennedy was faced with tremendous, domestic problems, given the Cuban situation and his difficulties with Soviet leader Khrushchev in Vienna [in 1961], and the fact that all foreign aid and other bills that came through Congress in those days would have had bipartisan, legislative riders tacked onto them containing specific language on China (sometimes then called "Red China" or "Communist China"). Rusk recalled that Kennedy had told him: "I don't want any more of this. I don't need it. I've got other problems." So the possibility of a China initiative was turned off. So there you are. That was a very interesting revelation at the time.

In any event the Kissinger and Nixonian legacy was heavily oriented toward domestic political problems. You may recall that the line that emanated was that only Nixon could do this and, of course, that only a brilliant Henry Kissinger could execute it, From Mann's book and my own recollection, as the Carter administration entered office, it had other and more immediate priorities. These included the negotiations on the Panama Canal, which was a major issue domestically, and specific, agenda items on the Soviet Union, including the human rights issue, which I discussed in a previous interview with you, as well as arms control. These were major issues. Initially, the question of relations with China was somewhat further down on the scale of priorities.

*Q: There were questions regarding the Middle East, too.*

BROWN: Yes, the Middle East was a major consideration, and President Carter had made up his mind by this time to move ahead on this matter.

Now, the Carter administration had another characteristic which we've seen in several administrations, and that is the rivalries, not only between the Congress and the Executive Branch, but within the Executive Branch as well. There were rivalries between different departments and agencies, if I can use that expression. There were the competing interests of the State Department on the one hand, the National Security Council on the other, the Pentagon, the Department of Commerce, and so forth. Unfortunately, as I looked at this problem from the point of view of a career Foreign Service Officer, the Foreign Service, certainly during the Nixon

administration, and to a significant degree during the Carter administration, reflected a cleavage between Secretary of State Vance, on the one hand, and Zbigniew Brzezinski [National Security Adviser] on the other.

Brzezinski used to insist that there was a great, strategic advantage in playing the China card vis-a-vis our number one enemy, the Soviet Union. Secretary of State Vance argued for a more balanced approach to this problem. Brzezinski, thwarted in his efforts to travel to Moscow, made a trip to China and acted like former National Security Adviser Kissinger. That is, on this trip to China he brought with him a very small group of advisers, with the State Department largely cut out of his entourage. Richard Holbrooke, as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, was unable to participate in the real talks with the Chinese communists during the Brzezinski visit to China. Great secrecy was observed by Brzezinski, who engaged in wheeling and dealing in China. He made various commitments and promises to the Chinese, many of which have only recently come to light.

This kind of secrecy continued to prevail during the Carter administration, particularly the feeling that Brzezinski's trip to China was going to be a bold stroke which would have to be negotiated very carefully. Brzezinski felt that when the ultimate decisions were made on China policy, they had to be implemented very quickly. This subject was treated in James Mann's book, About Face. It was also discussed at the recent symposium that I previously mentioned on China policy and the status of the American Institute on Taiwan [AIT]. At this symposium it was clear that many of the people in the audience still smarted because of their impression that Chiang Ching-kuo, the President of the Republic of China, was only given a couple of hours' advance notice of the intentions of the Carter administration regarding our breaking relations with the Republic of China and opening relations with the People's Republic of China.

In responding to this comment at this symposium, Mike Oksenberg stated that he had argued for at least 11 or 12 hours' advance notice to the Chinese Nationalists, but events overtook this proposal, and there we were.

Against this background there was an element of considerable concern in the Executive Branch about the reaction of Congress, friends of Taiwan within Congress, and the ability of the Taiwan lobby to counter the action planned by the Carter administration. This is important in considering the background to the circumstances under which I was transferred to Taipei. As a professional observer of Sino-Soviet affairs, I sensed many of these elements, but they weren't explained to me in the relatively stark terms which I am now presenting. So the message to me was: "Go to Taipei. Something is up. Probably a decision will soon be made on relations with China." I was led to believe that probably this decision would involve a break in diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. As a result, Ambassador Unger would have to leave Taipei, the embassy would have to be closed, and I would then take over the remaining facilities. However, no specific details were given to me.

So this was the situation when I arrived in Taipei in 1978. I found Leonard Unger, a wonderful Ambassador, who had been there for about four years at that time. He had been told, when he was appointed Ambassador to the Republic of China [by the Nixon administration], that he would probably be the last American Ambassador there and to prepare himself accordingly.

However, the Ford administration was wrapped around an axle in terms of domestic politics, didn't feel that it could move swiftly on the Shanghai Communique, and did not reach a point of decision. Here we were with a brand new administration under President Carter.

Meantime, it was understandable that Ambassador Unger and his staff had sort of gotten used to the situation. Life went on, as usual, in the embassy in Taipei, as it had done for the previous four years or so, notwithstanding this or that trip to Beijing by some high U.S. official. The U.S. military presence in Taiwan had diminished, in accordance with previous assurances to Beijing, but we still had several thousand U.S. military personnel on Taiwan. We had a Rear Admiral who was the commander of the Joint Taiwan Defense Command, with his own structure and staff. We had a huge PX [Post Exchange] and a huge Commissary. We had U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy people stationed up and down the island. True, the numbers had shrunk dramatically from the level of more than 40,000 people we had had in Taiwan during the Vietnam War.

The embassy in Taipei was a typical American embassy, with good local employees, many of whom had been employed by the embassy for decades. The Chinese Nationalist Government in Taiwan was headed by Chiang Ching-kuo. It was an autocratic, authoritarian government, no question about that. Martial law still existed on paper. There were the first stirrings of opposition to the government, but anything like dissent was rapidly and severely dealt with. One nevertheless sensed that Chiang Ching-kuo was on a track of his own brand of, shall we say, reform and liberalization. His father, Chiang Kai-shek, had died only a few years previously. Mme. Chiang Kai-shek, who was not the mother of Chiang Ching-kuo, had gone off to live in Long Island, New York. Chiang Ching-kuo was undoubtedly in command of the government, which had a very heavy-handed, military element. The Chinese Nationalist military presence was noticeable, the security establishment was very strong, and the intelligence apparatus, with which we had good relations, was very capable. Yet there was no question that life was getting better materially for the people of Taiwan.

Taiwan was already making substantial profits on exports to the United States. A whole system had been set up for bonded production in Taiwan of television and other, higher technological equipment for sale in the United States. Apparel and other goods of Taiwanese manufacture were going to the United States.

When I was transferred to Taipei in 1978, my home leave in the United States had been postponed, so that I could move to Taiwan and take this job as DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission]. Later that year I took home leave and arrived in Washington in December, 1978. My initial impression was that the Department of State was so quiet as to be almost eerie in terms of developments in China policy. I had booked a place down on Marathon Key in the Florida Keys to spend home leave with my wife. One of our daughters joined us there. Shortly before I left Washington for Florida, I had had a conversation over an open phone with Ambassador Unger. He asked how things were in Washington. I said, "Things are quiet as a church." However, just before I left for Florida, Harvey Feldman, the chief of the Taiwan desk, said to me: "Something is afoot. Get ready. Check in with me from time to time." I said, "Okay," and went down to Florida.

I had only been there in Florida for two or three days, when I turned on television, and there was

President Carter's announcement of a breakthrough with Beijing, a severance of relations with Taiwan, the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, and so forth. I picked up the phone and called Harvey Feldman. He said, "Get on the plane. Riots are going on in Taiwan. Get back to Taipei as soon as you can." So I gave our daughter the keys to the rented apartment in Florida. Helen and I jumped on the first plane out of Marathon Key, Florida, changed planes in Miami, and raced back to Taiwan, in time to witness massive demonstrations against the American embassy.

Our Security Officer in the embassy at the time was John McPoland, with whom I am still in touch. John and the Marine Security Guard detachment had coped with crowds of up to thousands of people, who had pelted the embassy with rocks, had broken windows, damaged cars and so forth. As John put it, the Marines had invited the demonstrators to go away using tear gas. The embassy was under siege. The situation was hectic, and Ambassador Unger was understandably under tremendous pressure. During all of this there was a great outcry in the Taiwan press. There were demonstrations against us up and down the island. In all, it was a very, very difficult time.

Then came the word that, in view of the Congressional reaction, which was bipartisan and which heavily criticized the manner in which this change in Chinese representation had been handled, Warren Christopher, Deputy Secretary of State, would fly out to Taiwan and negotiate the terms of our new relationship with the Republic of China. We sent in a cautionary cable, taking into account all of the demonstrations that were going on in Taiwan, but we said that we would do our best to support the Christopher visit. The Christopher party stopped in Honolulu to pick up the Commander in Chief, Pacific, Admiral Mickey Weisner, and continued on to Taiwan.

As I contemplated this situation as the DCM in Taipei and in view of the riots which had already taken place against us, security considerations were paramount in my mind. So, through our Security Officer, I kept constantly in touch with the Chinese Nationalist authorities, seeking reassurances that we would be okay in going to the airport, meeting Deputy Secretary Christopher, getting him into his hotel, and so forth. We were repeatedly assured that this was the case. With great difficulty I finally got through over the telephone to General Kung, retired Commandant of the Chinese Nationalist Marine Corps who was now head of the Chinese National Police. He said that there were hard feelings around Taipei and so forth, but "Don't worry. Precautions have been taken."

When I got out to the airport to join the party welcoming Deputy Secretary Christopher, I arrived somewhat later than many other people. My driver had to move the car very slowly through a crowd of several hundred demonstrators. We had arranged for the arrival of the Christopher party, not at the main, civilian airport near Taipei, but at a nearby, adjacent airport which was under Chinese Nationalist military control. However, a crowd had gathered outside the entrance to this military airport. As I went through this group of several hundred people, with my driver moving the car very slowly, I became aware of a sort of grinding noise. I learned later that this was from people rubbing balls made of a mixture of mud and sand against my car as it moved through the crowd.

I arrived at the terminal and immediately made a beeline for Fred Chien, who was the senior

Chinese Nationalist official present. I believe that Fred was Deputy Foreign Minister at the time. I also sought out the senior Chinese Nationalist police officer on the spot, Brigadier General Peter Chung, who was a close contact of the embassy. I kept pointing to the fact that I had come through this crowd of demonstrators and expressed concern about it. I continued to receive assurances that the necessary security forces had been deployed and that this situation would not be a problem.

So Deputy Secretary of State Christopher's plane landed at the airport. He was received by Fred Chien, who delivered a very acerbic and vitriolic speech, fully covered by the television cameras. We headed out for the cars. Once again I expressed concern and asked if we should not follow an alternative route, cutting across the runway, rather than out the main gate. Once again, the Chinese Nationalist officials assured me that there would be no problem. So off we went.

I think that we went less than a quarter of a mile from the airport exit to the main street outside it. Going down a lane, we found ourselves engulfed by demonstrators, and they really worked us over. I was in the right front passenger seat. We were in Chinese Nationalist Government cars, because it was a large motorcade, and the Nationalist authorities had provided most of the cars. Roger Sullivan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and Herb Hansell, the State Department Legal Adviser, were in the rear seat of my car. I could see what was coming. The crowd was rocking and rolling the cars assigned to us. Iron bars were being used to hit the cars. Finally, I said to the other occupants of the car: "Gentlemen, you'd better turn up your collars because they're going for the windshield." Just then a member of the crowd smashed the windshield in front of me with a crowbar, and we were all showered with shards of glass.

Ahead of me I could see that the windows on the car carrying Deputy Secretary Christopher, Ambassador Unger, and, I think, Admiral Weisner, had been shattered, and members of the crowd were pushing sticks into the broken windows. It was a shambles. They really worked us over. I think that this was the longest quarter of a mile that I've ever gone through. During all of this the Chinese Nationalist police were in evidence, equipped with megaphones. We finally worked our way through and scattered to different destinations. As each car managed to get through the crowd, it would take off in different directions. Some of us went to this place and some of us went to that place. We obviously couldn't go to the designated hotel out of fear that there would be another demonstration waiting for us there.

A few hours later there was finally a general gathering of the Christopher party in a huge, bunker complex at the Joint Taiwan Defense Command where the Rear Admiral commanding the U.S. Joint Taiwan Defense Command had his offices. A group of demonstrators gathered outside. We were furious, of course, at this hostile demonstration. A debate then broke out as to whether the members of the Christopher party should just go back to the plane and return to the U.S. because of the insults expressed by the crowd. Deputy Secretary Christopher spoke over the telephone with President Carter, who asked him for his views. The President reportedly said, "If you feel that it is necessary..." There was a lively debate among members of the Christopher party. In the end, Christopher said, "We'll stay." So they stayed, and the situation quieted down. A tremendous Chinese Nationalist security presence was deployed.

Of course, television viewers in Washington and in the world more broadly were treated to this

spectacle of a real roughing up of the Christopher party, and tempers ran very high. Ambassador Unger had at least one Band-Aid on his neck. People in the Christopher party had been jabbed, poked, and so forth.

We met with President Chiang Ching-kuo, who was very somber, quiet-spoken, but emotional. He presented an historical review, pointing out that during the Vietnam War the U.S. had made tremendous use of Taiwan as a backup and transit point for aircraft and for rotation of personnel. He said that the Chinese Nationalists had given us all that we had asked for, and now we were breaking diplomatic relations with them.

We then began a process of negotiations. Deputy Foreign Minister Fred Chien and senior Chinese Nationalist officials were on one side of the table, and Deputy Secretary Christopher was on the other, flanked by Fred Hansell and his team, including Roger Sullivan. We had been badly shaken up, but there was work to be done. It was fascinating to see how well prepared the Chinese Nationalist officials were. Ever since the issuance of the Shanghai Communique in 1972, at the time of the visit of President Nixon to the People's Republic of China, they had had time to see the handwriting on the wall and had secretly done a lot of homework.

One of the things, among many others, which struck me at the time was the time the Chinese Nationalist officials spent on their concern that the new accommodation, much as they bitterly resented the whole thing, enabled them to be sued in U.S. Courts. When I heard this, I remember scratching my head and saying to myself: "Why in the world are they doing this?" I have used this story many times since then because I learned that to borrow large amounts of money in the United States at reasonable rates, you have to have a court of recourse. In other words, if you're going to go out in the bond market and borrow great chunks of money and do business as a government or a company, there has to be a system under which you can be sued in court. Otherwise, people aren't going to lend you money. I had never thought of that consideration, which had never really occurred to me. So the Taiwan Relations Act has a specific provision to deal with that matter. The negotiating session came to an end, although there were still many issues left unresolved. In any case, Deputy Secretary of State Christopher and his party left.

*Q: Just one question. I would have thought that arrangements to deploy this mob at the airport were planned in advance. I would have thought that, after this incident was over, there would have been a damned good reason for the Christopher party to pick up and go home. In some sense that would have strengthened our negotiating position.*

BROWN: I tell you, Stuart, at some times and in emergencies life works in strange ways. Until that point we, in the United States, were the villain, if you will. However, that mob action against us turned the tables, as it were. Chiang Ching-kuo's administration was now on the defensive. This so limited the ability of these very severe critics of the Carter administration in Congress, who had been in full cry, that it undercut that line as well. It reduced it to a grumble, in many ways. On reflection, I commend Deputy Secretary Christopher for going through this experience. It was only the beginning. The Chinese Nationalists then sent Yang, a Deputy Foreign Minister, to Washington, and the negotiations continued.

The situation had been so hectic that I really didn't have much chance to talk with Roger Sullivan

and others as to how things were going to go over the next few months. One learned the hard way that the execution of the larger scheme had been done in such secrecy that a lot of fundamental planning had not been done. Now, here I was serving under Ambassador Unger, a wonderful man who had gone through this traumatic experience. The word was that he would have to leave Taipei now because we had promised Beijing that the embassy in Taipei would close and that there would be no U.S. officials left on Taiwan.

The word was that we would have to move out of our embassy Chancery in Taipei, and we were going to set up a new institution in its place. I like to think that I coined the word used to describe it, a new instrumentality. We would call it something. It wouldn't be an embassy. It would be unofficial, and we would discuss the matter further.

Meantime, we would close the embassy and get out of the building. The Ambassador would leave Taiwan. We would protect ourselves but get ready for the next phase. Well, it took quite a while for Ambassador Len Unger to go home, shall we say. He had been in Taipei for four years, the conclusion of it had been a very painful experience, time dragged on, and Washington was more and more impatient. So I had to be a real diplomat in that sense.

Finally, there came a moment when we lowered the U.S. flag, as they were raising the flag at the American embassy in Beijing. It was all very emotional and very heart-rending for those of us on the site. This marked the end of an era. We had invested a tremendous amount of treasure, emotion, and money in the whole relationship with the Republic of China. And now we were ending it.

As we went deeper into the situation, it became more and more complicated. Now came the cry in Congress that the whole thing had been done so poorly and the basis for moving on was so weak and flawed that the whole thing had to be re-done. This was the view widely expressed in Congress. Of course, the Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan were playing to the maximum the role of injured party. Remember, we had broken relations with the Republic of China and we had also served one year's notice of termination of the long-standing Defense Treaty with the Republic of China, which had been in effect since 1954. It was a rather peculiar situation. We broke diplomatic relations and pulled the string on the defense treaty. Remember that under the terms of the treaty we were still in a treaty relationship with the Republic of China for another year, even though we no longer had diplomatic relations with the Chinese Nationalists. Really, this was a crazy situation when you think about it.

Congressional Delegations wanted to visit Taiwan. The Department of State didn't want them to go. One of these Delegations was already on the way, led by Representative Lester Wolff, a Democratic Congressman from New York and Chairman of the House Subcommittee on East Asia. He was on the road, and he and I still tell each other this story.

*Q: He lives here in Arlington, Virginia.*

BROWN: Yes. He's a Washington lobbyist. We still chuckle at this story.

As I said, the Department of State didn't want him to go to Taiwan. He wanted very much to go

and, in fact, was on the road. I was told over the telephone that the Department didn't want him to go to Taiwan and I was instructed: "Don't do anything that will enable him to go to Taiwan." He communicated with me, via both backchannel [very secret] and front channel [open cable]. For its part the Department of State made a real blunder. They used a security argument to try to dissuade Wolff from going to Taiwan. They asked me to support the following message to Congressman Wolff: "Look at the tremendous demonstrations against the embassy. Look at the mob action against Deputy Secretary Christopher. You'd be putting yourself at grave risk."

He then took this message and fired it at me. I prepared a cable which said that the embassy in Taipei was, of course, keenly aware of the demonstrations against us, both at the embassy and against the Christopher mission. However, I said that the situation had changed dramatically. The demonstrations were over. Furthermore, I said that I had called on the chief of the Chinese Nationalist Military Garrison. I think that his name was General Wang [Wang Ching-hsu]. He assured me that he would have over 5,000 troops deployed between the airport and the hotel where Congressman Wolff planned to stay in Taipei. He said that these troops would be available wherever the Congressman went, with gas masks, bayonets, and a full flying wedge. I told the Department that General Wang had assured me that everything would be done to protect Congressman Wolff. Congressman Wolff seized upon these assurances and came to Taipei. He came with a small, bipartisan delegation. They relished the spectacle of this tremendous motorcade, with a flying wedge of police, gas masks under the seats, soldiers at attention and armed with bayonets, deployed along the cavalcade route. The Wolff Delegation was wined and dined. Forever after, Representative Lester Wolff could throw this episode in the face of the State Department.

Then came a whole bunch of other Congressional Delegations, some of which were composed entirely of Republicans. We soon realized that among them were some who felt so strongly about this matter that those of us on the ground were part and parcel of the Carter administration which had perpetrated a terrible insult against Chiang Ching-kuo. I had to do my best to cope professionally with these Congressmen.

Then came the financial problem. I was told to close the embassy in Taipei under the provisions of the Vienna or Geneva Convention for closure, no later than February 27, 1979, at which point we were instructed to have left the embassy chancery and those of us remaining in Taiwan would no longer be considered Foreign Service Officers. We were told that all of those who cannot abide by these instructions would be transferred, leaving a small group, no larger than 50 persons, remaining in Taiwan. We were instructed to ensure that all U.S. military personnel would leave the island as soon as possible. We were instructed to get ready to open this new instrumentality, to be designated the American Institute on Taiwan.

So finally, Ambassador Unger left. There were frantic negotiations with very senior U.S. military officers. Whenever the U.S. military has title to something and has to get rid of it, it has to go through a legal process involving negotiation of a sale or the transfer of title at a price of a few pennies on the dollar, or whatever the market will bear.

At this stage, with Ambassador Unger gone, I began to be deluged with all kinds of visitors, including very high-ranking U.S. military officers. They simply could not believe that the U.S.

Air Force, Navy, and Army had to get off Taiwan completely. I had red-faced generals ready to pound my desk, saying that this just could not be. I said, "Tell that to the President of the United States. He's ordered it. You will proceed. We have a deadline. Do it." As I say, frantic negotiations took place in that regard.

Then came a second, classic blunder by the Department of State. Someone in the Department had it in mind that they would take the unexpended funds for Fiscal Year 1979 and already allocated to the embassy in Taipei and, with the approval of the relevant chairmen of the relevant sub-committees of the House of Representatives and Senate, would roll that money over for the AIT [American Institute on Taiwan]. The Department obtained approval from the Congressmen, but when they came up against Senator Ernest F. ("Fritz") Hollings [Democrat, South Carolina], he balked. In their excitement and agitation they threw a security argument at him, which included the unfortunate remark, "Unless we get this done, the security situation in Taiwan may deteriorate to the point where blood runs in the streets." At that point Senator Hollings, a graduate of The Citadel, the South Carolina Military Institute, for whatever combination of reasons, just said, "Show me! No!" As a result, the AIT had no money.

Now, I had very loyal, dedicated people, and I had assurances that somehow all of this would be taken care of. We were instructed to close down by February 27, 1979, after which "you will not do anything of an official nature or smacking of an official nature of any kind whatsoever." This was put to me in very strong terms.

So we ripped out the security equipment or whatever else was valuable in the old Chancery and we abandoned that building. However, I left one teletype circuit, my automatic ticker, still going. In the interim I used the address: "Bill Brown, Taipei." This signified that there was no longer an embassy, nor was there yet an AIT. I left the ticker running, in case anybody wanted to communicate with me. Every so often I would send an UNCLASSIFIED message to the State Department and sign it, "Bill Brown, Taipei." This kind of communications went around the world. That was our situation. I did phone work from home, sending it to Roger Sullivan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and under his direction.

Well, Ron Palmer was then in the Bureau of Administration. He flew out to Taipei and did his best to assure us that, somehow, everything would be taken care of. We would set up the AIT. There were some glitches to be resolved and so forth, but it would be taken care of. However, as time went on, the people with me in Taipei were getting more and more concerned. I remember telling the people in the Department with whom we were dealing, among other things: "Whatever you do, as we move into the new entity or instrumentality, for God's sake don't do anything which would cut off our pay!" No, we were assured, the arrangement is that we would continue to be paid and that eventually a new pay system would be worked out. I said, "Until you've worked it out and tested it, don't cut off our pay." (End of tape)

People began coming to me saying: "You know, my allotments haven't come through, and my bank is saying that my bank account is overdrawn," and so forth. I then had a daughter in Veterinary School at the University of Georgia. I found out that she subsisted on a bag of rice for six weeks because our allotments had been cut off! Despite assurances to the contrary, somebody

in the Department had nevertheless cut the line to Bangkok [State Department Regional Finance Center], and we were without money.

We closed the embassy and moved out of the Chancery. I found myself in a peculiar situation because of the hangup involving the objections raised by Senator Hollings. There was no money available to us. For six weeks we were in limbo. I couldn't go to the old embassy, because that had been closed. I operated out of my house, the DCM's residence up on the hill. I held working coffees, because we were all unofficial now.

We were told that the Department was worried about Deng Xiaoping's reaction [in the PRC] to everything and was eager to convince Beijing that, truly, the American embassy in Taipei had closed. It was stated to the PRC that there were no officials left behind, the entire U.S. military presence was ending and no official business was being done. I remember Roger Sullivan really working me over very hard and insisting that I assure him that absolutely no business whatsoever was being carried on. I told him: "Listen, Roger, are you telling me that if an American citizen dies tomorrow, as they do all over the world, either on the sidewalks of Taipei or down the island, I'm just to leave the body there and not do anything? I shouldn't go down and assist in the removal of the remains and ship them back to the United States?" He said, "Well, you can do that." I said, "Well, come on, let's be realistic."

Incidentally, during this very period, I suddenly received word, although not through Washington, but locally from the Chinese Nationalist officials, that an American C-130 [transport plane] was flying into Taipei. I said, "What? This is impossible." It turned out that a member of the staff of a Congressional Committee had been in Taipei. On the escalator of a department store, he somehow fell and broke his leg. So the Committee Chairman said, "Fly in a C-130 and evacuate him medically!" So out of Okinawa came the old medevac flight, a C-130. I got this guy out to the airport and on the C-130 and off to Okinawa. I didn't talk about it until it was over. You had to be realistic in these circumstances. We had quite a large American community there which did a lot of business, so we did things quietly. For months thereafter I was signing checks dated February 27, 1979, which was our last, official day in Taipei. There were many bills outstanding which had to be paid.

I was informed that an American Ambassador, Charles Cross, an old China hand, would retire from the Foreign Service and become the first Director of the Taipei AIT office. He had visited us in Taipei the previous summer. The Department said that it hoped that I would stay on until his arrival, which I said that I would do. Meanwhile, I said that I would open up the AIT and get it going.

I found myself in this peculiar position with no money. So I met Deputy Foreign Minister, Fred Chien, off-site and I said, "Look, there is space in the old MAAG [Military Assistance and Advisory Group] headquarters across town. It's kind of a tacky building, but it's empty." Near it was the office being used by our friends down the corridor.

*Q: You're talking about the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency].*

BROWN: Yes, they were still operating, but very quietly. Here was empty office space next to

them. So I began quiet informal negotiations with Fred Chien, which were really extraordinary. The Chinese Nationalists were the injured party. I needed something, and I said, "I'm sorry, Fred, but I don't have any money. I need that space, which is modest, unoccupied, and that's where I'd like to set up this American Institute on Taiwan. I know that it's an area with high-priced rents, but, Fred, I want you to rent this to me for a year for \$5,000." He went back to his superiors, consulted with them, and subsequently informed me: "You've got it!" So we opened up the AIT, and that's where it still is.

I went through a tremendously active, consular period. You're an old Consular Officer, Stuart, so you can appreciate this. When the embassy had been in the stage of closing down, we were inundated with a tsunami wave of applicants for consular services in the thousands.

*Q: They wanted visas and passports.*

BROWN: Yes. Some of them also wanted notarial services. The Chinese Nationalist Army was called out to maintain law and order. Some of those applicants for consular services were in line for days and had brought mattresses to sleep on. We put out the word by radio and television that people shouldn't worry and that everything would work out. That, if anything, probably caused them to come in even greater numbers. They came from all over Taiwan. For six weeks nothing much was done to regularize our status. Officially, we were not supposed to do anything. I was still working with the old budget and still signing checks dated February 27, 1979. I arranged to have a nearby building in this compound rehabilitated by local carpenters, plasterers, and so forth. They were working 24 hours a day. I couldn't call it the "Consular Section." We called it the "Travel Section."

As we prepared to open up, another consular tsunami wave hit us, even though we got on the radio, television, and so forth. People came by the thousands. I went to work on the visa line myself. In the process we had to rename all of the sections of the office, calling them anything but an embassy. The "Political Section" became the "General Affairs Section." The DAO [Defense Attaché Office] became something else. As I said, the "Consular Section" became the "Travel Section." The old "Economic" and "Commercial" sections were combined under another name.

Instead of exequaturs [document issued normally by the Department of State, permitting Foreign Service Officers to perform their functions] on the walls, we had brown pieces of paper which said, more or less, that we reposed full trust in this or that person. Although we were non-official, we performed the vital functions which all Embassies perform. Visa applications were nominally checked through the use of the "IVAC" [Lookout System]. The visas stated that they had been issued by the American Consulate General in Hong Kong. In fact, we got the visa stamps from the Consulate General in Hong Kong and issued them in Taipei. However, on the face of it, they were supposedly issued in Hong Kong.

As the U.S. military pulled out of Taiwan in this situation, some very interesting questions arose. One day, shortly before the U.S. military pulled out, a senior U.S. Navy Captain came to my house, carrying with him two large suitcases. He informed me that I was now to become the owner of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of property. The old DAO people had negotiated

as best they could with the local, Taiwanese authorities to get “pennies on the dollar” from our reluctant hosts for certain buildings. The remainder was to be transferred, in the first instance, to me. I said, “What does this mean?” The Navy Captain said, “Well, we sent teams all over the island. We've done an inventory, and here it is. Here are the documents covering it. So, if you will, just sign here.” I said, “Wait a minute. You're talking about millions and millions of dollars worth of property.” For example, this included the Armed Forces Radio Network on Taiwan, with broadcasting and relay stations down the island. There were oil tank farms and large petroleum facilities, pipelines, and so forth. I said, “And you expect me to sign for these?” He said, “Well, you're free, of course, to go yourself and check this list out. That's up to you.” So I took a deep breath and signed for this list of property. In this way I became the owner of hundreds of millions of dollars worth of property!

I also had to dispose of this property. I negotiated then with my Chinese Nationalist counterpart, which was called “The Coordinating Council for North American Affairs,” (CCNA) staffed by professional Chinese Nationalist Foreign Service Officers, including senior diplomats who went through the motions of becoming something else. So we had two organizations which we could portray as non-official for dealing with each other. We, of course, called ourselves “The American Institute on Taiwan.” So I took these two suitcases with documents identifying millions of dollars of property and transferred what had been the Armed Forces Radio Network to the American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan. It still thrives, I think. Psychologically, it was very important to have independent English language, radio and television stations, operating on Taiwan. the other facilities I signed over to the new CCNA.

So it went across the whole spectrum of U.S. owned facilities and establishments in Taiwan. We had to undo all of the official ties, while Congress was pounding on the administration and the Taiwan authorities were doing everything they could to maintain some sort of officiality. In this connection, they were doing everything they could to get the best piece of legislation passed as the Taiwan Relations Act, whereas the Department of State and the Executive Branch of the U.S. Government had originally contemplated a very loose, very vague kind of relationship. The old, legalistic element in the American political system kicked in, and Congress ultimately passed the Taiwan Relations Act which President Jimmy Carter very reluctantly signed. He had no choice.

I might just pause there, once again, to demonstrate that, notwithstanding the texts of so many of these foreign policy decisions and moves, which were intended to be strategic, far reaching, and so forth, there was a very strong, domestic, political undercurrent here. This is still in effect. Much could be, and has been, written about this situation.

I found Mike Oksenberg's remarks at the symposium I mentioned very interesting. Toward the end of a lengthy, “Q and A” [Question and Answer] session, I finally stood up and said to Oksenberg: “In all of the discussion thus far, I have been particularly interested as an old Sino-Soviet watcher. There has not been a word mentioned about the rationale for the use of the China card with the Soviet Union.” I had just come from the embassy in Moscow and was keenly aware of this. Oksenberg differs with me on this matter. He said that there were some people who repeatedly advocated our playing the China card. He very clearly meant Zbigniew Brzezinski by this term. He meant that Brzezinski wanted to develop military contacts with Beijing and get on with this relationship. Oksenberg says that certainly Secretary of State Vance and he, Oksenberg,

were looking on the move to normalize relations with the People's Republic of China on its own merits. That is, to achieve stability in Asia, to prevent U.S.-Chinese confrontation, to build a positive relationship with Beijing, and to do the best that we could under the circumstances with Taiwan.

I differ with Mike Oksenberg. In terms of the rationale for this change in our China representation, and certainly this is the way that I look at it, I would say that, at that time, there was certainly a strong, strategic reason for this change. U.S.-Soviet relations were then pretty poor.

*Q: Were you getting the feeling that in Brzezinski's view, particularly because of his Polish origins, anything that we could do to the Soviet Union that would make the Soviets uncomfortable or put them on the defensive was a good thing? China, in itself, was just an object to be used to stick it to the Soviet Union.*

BROWN: Well, that's putting it pretty baldly, Stuart. I won't go into Brzezinski's Polish origins, but earlier in this interview I spoke of learning through the Informal Channel of a draft policy paper prepared by Brzezinski which advocated really sticking it to the Soviets via the soft underbelly. He advocated playing up the ethnic, nationalistic differences of the Ukraine and the Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union. So Brzezinski was known in Washington circles as being very strongly oriented in that direction.

Like his predecessor as National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, Brzezinski was no China expert. However, like Kissinger, Brzezinski was a quick learner and he certainly used methods like those used by Kissinger, with the approval of President Carter. Beijing exploited both of these opportunities, both during the Nixon, as well as in the Ford and Carter administrations. I would also say that Beijing has exploited these opportunities subsequently. I would say that we paid heavily for this highly secretive, elitist approach to China, allowing the Chinese to extract from us all kind of assurances, but out of the public view. Beijing was then able to use these to play against succeeding U.S. Presidents, and so forth. You certainly saw those chickens coming back to roost in the 1980s and, I would say, even now.

Okay. Back to Taiwan. As the Taiwan Relations Act came to be debated in Congress, our Chinese Nationalist counterparts had really done their homework. The resulting legislation was remarkable in its comprehensive coverage and in the implicit warnings that it gave to Beijing in terms of our view of peaceful resolution of relations between the PRC and Taiwan. We also made clear that a non-peaceful approach, or the use of force by the PRC against Taiwan, would be viewed with grave concern as seriously affecting vital American security interests. There was, of course, the epoch-making determination that we would sell defensive arms to Taiwan.

Now, as you look at James Mann's book and the other literature on this subject, the question of whether we would be able to sell arms to Taiwan in this new relationship was a paramount issue. When Brzezinski went forward with a proposal that, after a one-year pause in arms sales, during which the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty would lapse, we would resume a modest level of arms sales to Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping read Brzezinski the riot act, and Brzezinski came back to the U.S. very much chastened in that respect.

However, assurances had been given to the Chinese Nationalists, in the face of Deng Xiaoping's outburst of rage on this subject, that we would take into account PRC views but still deal modestly with the sale of defensive arms to Taiwan.

Then, of course, came the Taiwan Relations Act, which is the law of the land and not just administration policy. Next came the question of implementing this legislation. How do you initiate a defense relationship with no embassy, Defense Attache, or formal system of communications? This was a highly complex and sophisticated business.

For example, we had supplied the Chinese Nationalists under Chiang Ching-kuo with F-5's, plus various aircraft parts and so forth. Servicing F-5 fighter aircraft and other equipment usually involves setting up special communications channels with the Pentagon, through which a foreign state operates. There were specialists stationed on the ground, at both ends. Normally, joint teams are set up by the host country and the Pentagon in the United States. These are not just ordinary, military offices. They are staffed by real specialists. You're dealing with millions and millions of dollars of spare parts and replacements.

We had to do or to re-do all of this, and it all had to be unofficial. In fact, everything had to be unofficial. All of the previous official relationships had to be entirely undone.

Now, U.S. Government agencies in Washington were still so hung up that, in the early days, no senior U.S. official could even visit Taiwan. Nobody, which was ridiculous. Congressmen and Senators could and would visit Taiwan.

*Q: It sounds as if Mainland China, or whatever you want to call it, was jerking our chain.*

BROWN: Well, whether the PRC was or wasn't doing this, my view is that the fear and apprehension in Washington that things would go wrong with the arrangements regarding Taiwan were very palpable, as I saw and heard it. Washington agencies were very much afraid that the arrangements made regarding Taiwan would come undone. It was also feared that Taiwan would take undue advantage of the situation and that we would bumble things. I don't really think that Beijing really had to jerk our chain. People in the U.S. Government agencies in Washington were very cautious in this regard.

So no U.S. officials could come to Taiwan. We had to be thoroughly sterilized, as it were. I had to reduce the staff of AIT down to 50. Of course, when they heard the figure of 50, others in the U.S. Government, and particularly the Department of Defense and our brethren down the hall [i.e., the CIA], said, "What you mean, Bill, is just you people in the State Department complement." I had to answer: "No, the entire U.S. Government component is going to come down to 50." Then they said, "What you mean is 50 officers." I had to say, "No, 50 total, including secretaries and technicians." At first they couldn't believe it. I had to go through a real squeeze process here. CINCPAC, in the person of Admiral Weisner, said, "What you mean is 50 plus my people from CINCPAC, or 50 plus my communications people." I had to say, "No, the overall number is 50." That squeezed him way down. I had to tell people that if they were unwilling to go through this process of paring down personnel, then the Department of State or their home agency would transfer them elsewhere. Some of them couldn't take these reductions

and were later transferred. I was really learning my trade at a senior level now. I believe that never in the history of the Foreign Service had this been done. It was a remarkable, educational process for me.

You know, at the risk of exaggeration, I would say that every bilateral relationship requires a scapegoat. Each side fixes on some individual, some guy who is the villain in all of this. Unfortunately, the U.S. side fixed on Fred Chien, Chinese Nationalist Deputy Foreign Minister. Some senior people were convinced that Fred Chien bore partial responsibility for the assault on the Christopher motorcade, since Chien was in the last car of the motorcade.

To this day Fred Chien and his wife get very emotional at that charge. They claim that they had no advance knowledge of this. However, Fred Chien had delivered a vitriolic speech when Deputy Secretary Christopher arrived. I was in a very unusual situation. I very much respected Fred as a professional diplomat. He was a key America watcher. He had been educated at Yale, spoke perfect English, and was a very intelligent and dedicated civil servant.

Here I was in this strange situation where Washington wanted no official status for us, whereas Fred Chien, representing his boss and the Taiwan administration, wanted to give us maximum officiality. As far as passports were concerned, we had to turn in our Diplomatic Passports to the State Department. We then had to negotiate the equivalent, in terms of privileges and immunities, without our being diplomats as such. Fred Chien said, "Sure! We'll give you the whole works. You want clearance through the airport? We'll just put the diplomatic clearance in your new, non-diplomatic passports." I had to be very careful and say, "No, what I would like is a courtesy stamp. It mustn't say 'diplomatic.'" And on and on we went through a myriad of details. As I said, Washington remained very apprehensive and turned its eagle-eyes on this whole range of issues.

Taiwan appointed retired General Konsin Shah (formerly Chiang Kai-shek's pilot and *aide de camp*) as head of its office in Washington. They, of course, had disposed of "Twin Oaks," the former residence of the Chinese Nationalist Ambassador in Washington. Fearful that Beijing would try to take this property over, the Chinese Nationalists had laundered it through a private organization. For many years Washington would not let any American official attend any function at Twin Oaks. For years the Taiwan representative in Washington tried to get us to have even a cup of tea or coffee there, but we wouldn't do so. The whole thing was kind of ridiculous. I dwell on this in an effort to give you a sense of how very delicate and sensitive it was at this stage.

Eventually, the first, full Director of the American Institute on Taiwan, Charles T. Cross, arrived in Taipei. Until recently, he had been American Ambassador in Singapore and was a career Foreign Service Officer. He had been persuaded by the Department to retire and take on this very responsible job. AIT itself was incorporated under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, which is the law of the land, as a District of Columbia, public corporation. AIT decided not to place its headquarters in the District of Columbia but just across the Potomac River in Rosslyn, Virginia, where it is still located. Again, this was an extra cautious move so that AIT would not be portrayed as part of the Department of State.

Indeed, I am still one of the three Trustees of the American Institute on Taiwan. (Two of us are unpaid. The third is the Managing Director) As I reflect back on those circumstances, I am impressed to see how far we've come as far as loosening up is concerned from those very tight, initial days.

Chuck Cross arrived in Taipei. Born to a Missionary family in China in 1922, he spoke Chinese and had joined the Foreign Service in 1949. His first position overseas was that of Assistant Public Affairs Officer in Taipei, which he took up in June, 1949. As a young officer, one of his duties was to go up and down Taiwan and keep in touch with members of the small, American community on the island. This community largely consisted of missionaries. He told them to have their bags packed and be ready, because it looked as if Mainland China would take over Taiwan, and, if this happened, we were going to close the American embassy in Taipei. There were still old timers in Taiwan who remembered him from those days.

Chuck Cross came to Taiwan and got right into the swing of things. Members of the AIT staff were not allowed to go and visit any Taiwan Government ministry. I would call Fred Chien and ask to see him. He would say, "Delighted. Come right over." I would say, "No, from now on we have to deal with the 'Coordinating Council for North American Affairs.'" So we would meet outside of Chinese Nationalist Government ministries. There was, if you will, a lot of polite, "winking and nodding" involved in these contacts, because our Chinese counterparts were obviously still under the direction of the Foreign Ministry. We knew that, but we wouldn't go into that ministry or anyplace else of that kind. I wouldn't let my small group of retired U.S. military officers on the AIT staff go into any of the Chinese Nationalist ministries, even when they had to get a given job done. All such contacts were done, shall we say, off-site, as much as possible.

We ordered new stationery and we took up this new identity. There had been a real scare commercially, as President Carter broke diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. The local stock market plummeted, as did real estate values, on a temporary basis. Some Taiwan businessmen approached me during those dark hours and asked for my views. I said, "We'll get over this, and you'll get over it. Things will work out." Those who were smart enough ultimately profited very nicely. Meanwhile, real estate and other markets plummeted, and for a while there things looked bad.

One Taiwan businessman who had just bought the Coca-Cola plant, suffered a disastrous loss because Deng Xiaoping's visit to the U.S. in January, 1979, featured a trip to President Carter's home state, Georgia, including the headquarters of Coca-Cola in Georgia. The reaction in Taiwan was to boycott Coca-Cola. However, things began to come back to an even keel.

I traveled quite a bit in Taiwan. There were times, before Ambassador Cross arrived, when I was busy as all get out, on the one hand, and there were other times when I had time to spare. I got Johnny McPoland, our Security Officer, to make the best of it. He set up special car crash courses. He had many vehicles which had been discarded by the departed American military establishment. They were second hand and couldn't be sold. He arranged access to a special patch of an abandoned airport runway for training purposes. He taught us all how to do the "J turn," the "bootlegger's turn," and so forth. He even trained me to the point of crashing cars. I

crashed many cars, front and rear, to avoid road blocks. He even got me to the point where I could train others. I could take other people out, under his observation, and show them how to do all of this.

We had no Marine Guards left. So John McPoland set up a system for protecting us without any U.S. Marines. That was a challenge, to put it mildly.

As Ambassador Cross settled in, a funny thing happened one day. Out of the blue, my secretary said to me: "There's a call for you from Tel Aviv, Israel." I said, "It must be a mistake. They're undoubtedly trying to reach somebody else. They think that we're a private business concern." She said, "No, there's a fellow named Dick Viets from the American Embassy, Tel Aviv on the phone." Viets and I had served together in India. So I got on the phone, and Viets said, "Bill, I'm DCM here, and I'm going to be Ambassador to Tanzania. Sam Lewis, the Ambassador to Israel, would very much like you to come to Tel Aviv and replace me as DCM." I said, "Dick, I'm committed here. We've gone through hell and are just now getting this place set up. We have a new Director of AIT, but he's just getting his feet on the ground." Dick said, "Well, why don't you think it over? Get back to me."

About a week later came a short cable which said, "Nu?" So I did a cable which said, "Thanks very much, but no. My commitment is here. Given what we've gone through, I should stay here." Then I got a phone call at home from Ambassador Sam Lewis, whom I'd never met and didn't really know. He said, "Look, we got your cable, but you very definitely are the man for this job, on the basis of all of the reports we have on what you've gone through, and so forth." Ambassador Lewis said, "We need your kind of officer here. I'd very much like for you to be my deputy." I said, "Well, Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. However, I've never lived in or studied the Middle East. I don't know any Middle Eastern language. This is my area. We've gone through a very unique period, and I'm sure that the Bureau of East Asian Affairs would be very unhappy if I were to leave here at this time." Later he called back and said, "Your front office is taken care of." I said, "Well, we'd better check this out with the sixth or seventh floor in the Department of State." He called back later and said, "That's taken care of, too. I can tell you that the Secretary and his advisers would very much like for you to come here." He said, "Why don't you get on a plane and come here? I'll be in Washington."

So I discussed this matter with Chuck Cross. He was very nice about it and said that he would certainly miss me. However, he said that these were the needs of the service and a chance for a new vista.

Off I flew to Washington. When I met Ambassador Sam Lewis, he obviously had wanted to see me in person. He said, "It so happens that Special Negotiator Robert Strauss, [a well-known, Texas politician] has been appointed to Israel to conduct the follow-up negotiations on the Camp David agreement. His plane leaves tomorrow for Tel Aviv, so let's jump aboard! You can get a free ride to Israel and see how it actually looks."

So I jumped on the plane with Ambassador Sam Lewis and got to meet Dick Viets and to get the low down on what things really were like there in the embassy in Tel Aviv. I flew back to Washington with Strauss. It was a remarkable journey back to the U.S. Strauss had met Prime

Minister Menachem Begin but had been unable to persuade him with his Jewish, Texas charm. Strauss then briefed the press on the plane in rather characteristic, colorful language. When we landed in Lisbon, the reporters all made a beeline for the nearest phone. I then flew back to Taipei and arranged to move expeditiously to Israel, arriving there in late September or early October, 1979, at the time of Yom Kippur.

I had been blooded, if you will, as a new DCM. I had gone through an unparalleled professional and historical experience in setting up the AIT in Taipei. Let me digress briefly on that. Other countries had done something similar, but we hadn't. There was, if you will, a Japanese model. The Japanese had set up something after they got over the shock of the Nixon visit to China. They quickly moved on recognizing the PRC, but the Japanese model for a replacement for their embassy in Taipei didn't precisely meet our needs as an American model. For example, the Japanese didn't have to contend with Congress. The Japanese have a way of doing things quietly once the fix is in. We find it much more difficult to do things in the way the Japanese do them. I'll give you an example. The Japanese were informed by Beijing at one point that the Japanese national air carrier, JAL [Japan Airlines], could no longer fly into Taiwan out of Narita Airport in Japan. The Japanese accepted this and went right about putting a new logo on the aircraft and scheduling flights out of Haneda Airport in Tokyo to Taiwan. Haneda is fairly near downtown Tokyo and is far more convenient than it would have been to schedule these flights to Taiwan out of Narita Airport. The new arrangement prospered, and life went on.

The Japanese representative in Taiwan behaved in a very low key way and was very quiet. Initially, the Japanese had been very pessimistic about the future of Taiwan and how long it would last. However, when they saw us do what we did, that is, set up the American Institute on Taiwan, they learned their own lessons from the American model. Meanwhile, already during my time in Taiwan, I could see the first glimmerings of Europeans, Australians, and others, looking at what we had done. They had broken diplomatic relations with Taiwan and paid the full price which Beijing demanded for opening Embassies in Beijing.

They now looked at what we and the Japanese had done and began looking for ways in which they could quietly come back into Taiwan, while still preserving their Embassies in Beijing. They started to set up cultural centers, airline offices, and so forth. These offices gradually evolved into something more extensive, but at first they were extremely timid. The PRC had so much more leverage on them, or, more precisely, they allowed the PRC to play them that way. So this was an evolving situation. In some cases these new institutions have evolved remarkably in terms of some countries' representative offices and physical presence in Taiwan.

We are now at a stage, and I'll come back to that at a later point in this interview, where we've had U.S. cabinet officers go to Taiwan if they had business perceived as serving the vital interests of the U.S. This has been done despite protests from Beijing. Remember that when the AIT was set up, not a single U.S. Government official, however lowly, was supposed to be allowed to come to Taiwan. In fact, I had one, almost under the counter [semi-clandestine] case. A representative of the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] stationed in either Bangkok or Hong Kong had a house in Taipei and used to go back and forth. The way I put it to him was: "Listen, you no longer have an official presence here. However, if you want to come to Taiwan unofficially, wearing another hat and so forth, that will be all right." As the press of significant

business came upon us, relatively low level exceptions to the no visit by official Americans were gradually made, on a case by case basis, so that business of vital interest to the U.S. could be carried on. However, during my last few months in Taiwan, getting the U.S. military out of Taiwan was a major problem.

*Q: There is a question I wanted to ask. You mentioned the technical nature of military equipment. You just don't dump equipment from aircraft or ships. Technicians have to go along with a sale of military equipment. How was this handled?*

BROWN: Bearing in mind that everything had to be done quietly, let us say that, maybe, the modular packages were re-labeled, but the basic hardware remained inside them. This included orders of special communications equipment. The whole spare parts question is very complicated. We're talking about automated warehouses which the average civilian or the average Foreign Service Officer has absolutely no comprehension of.

*Q: I was talking to someone who was in Egypt. He was talking about going through the warehouses in Egypt. There are, perhaps, something like a million spare parts for F-16 aircraft or F-5s. I mean...*

BROWN: These days the supply lines for spare parts are all automated. Robot machines go down a line to a given bin, take out a part, and bring it back. Specialists have to evaluate wear and tear on parts constantly and compare notes. The host government constantly wants upgraded [improved] parts and equipment. At first equipment and spare parts that weren't in the pipeline to the Chinese Nationalists just stopped flowing for a year. Then the pipeline was re-opened for new sales, under the Taiwan Relations Act and in view of President Carter's commitment to Beijing not to undertake new sales to Taiwan for one year. Then we got into the question of "What's in the pipeline?" If something has already been ordered, you considered it "in the pipeline," and the transaction moved quietly.

All kinds of side issues came up. For instance, Taiwan was going through the beginning phase of setting up civilian controlled, nuclear power plants. In September, 1978, just around my birthday, my wife had a disc operation on her back at the Clark Air Force Base hospital [in the Philippines]. At about the same time I had an American nuclear delegation visiting Taiwan. Remember, this was before the break in diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. This was an important issue.

First of all, and for years, we had made a major effort to persuade Chinese Nationalist Premier Chiang Ching-kuo to take the Canadian "CANDU" nuclear research reactor and ship its fissionable material out of Taiwan because, although it had been originally been intended for power and research purposes, if mishandled, it could have implications for nuclear proliferation. We went through a long and difficult process of obtaining agreement for that material to be withdrawn from the reactor, shipped out of Taiwan, and replaced with a much lower-powered substitute.

Then there was the question of nuclear power reactors for meeting Taiwan's dramatically escalating electric power needs. Taiwan had no oil. Import of foreign oil was a substantial item

in the Taiwan budget. There is coal in Taiwan, but it is soft coal and terribly smokey. Taiwan invited an American firm to come and build a nuclear power reactor to generate electricity. Local Taiwanese technicians participated in its construction. For the second nuclear reactor they contracted with an American firm but with more Taiwanese participation. By this time Taiwan had acquired more and more know how in building nuclear reactors.

I went out to see the first Taiwan nuclear power reactor with a nuclear team. I'll never forget the introduction. We put on the ritual hard hats. The site for this new plant was called "Gold Mountain ("Chin Shan"). It was located on the Northeast coast of Taiwan. The American nuclear team was given a slide lecture with an American woman's taped voice. The lecture started with: "Welcome to the Chin Shan Nuclear Facility. Why did we choose Chin Shan?" [a click sound, as a new slide was displayed]. "We chose Chin Shan because Taiwan is [click] a very seismic island. Here are the seismographic outlines" [click]. "This area is relatively earthquake free." Just then the whole building began to rock! [Laughter] There was a stunned silence as we all swayed. When the ground stopped moving, and it seemed as if an eternity had gone by, the hosts said, "Would you like to go to the Control Room?" We all went into the Control Room, which was spewing out all kinds of recording tape. Lights were flashing amber red and so forth. Meanwhile, in nearby Taipei, a couple of people had been killed by collapsed buildings. That whole question of nuclear cooperation in the new configuration of relations with Taiwan was yet another example.

Now, before I leave Taiwan, let me cover a couple of other points. We had broken diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. We were now in operation with a new unofficial instrumentality [that is, AIT, the American Institute on Taiwan]. This relationship began to have repercussions in local society in Taiwan. The Republic of China at the time was a very autocratic regime, with the Chinese Nationalist military playing the primary role, and Lord help anybody who was identified as a dissenter. Into prison they went.

Just before the announcement by President Carter of a change in the pattern of U.S. relations with China, the first election was scheduled to be held in Taiwan. At this recent symposium on Chinese affairs, held last month here in Washington, DC, a veteran Taiwan political figure, a lady, got up and spoke with emotion and real dedication. She had been one of the candidates in this first election in Taiwan. In the wake of the momentous announcement by President Carter, one of Chiang Ching-kuo's initial reactions was to cancel the elections. Those who had been candidates in these elections and who protested the cancellation, including this lady, went to prison. She ended up in prison for 12 years!

*Q: My God!*

BROWN: What all of this triggered was great distress over the cancellation of the elections, protests by some of the candidates and their backers, a crackdown against candidates who protested and their backers, and then an increasing cycle of repression. This was such that, after I left Taiwan in December, 1979, demonstrations broke out on the island, and some of them became violent. These demonstrations were brutally and savagely put down, to the point that the Carter administration became very exercised and demanded that the people who had been arrested should be given fair trials, should not be executed, and so forth.

It was a very poignant moment for me, and I think for others in the room, to hear this lady describe her experiences. She is now an elected magistrate of a county in Taiwan.[She later became Vice president.] She said, "I just want you to know that I am a victim of all of this." I think that few of us had ever realized the relative costs of going along with decisions like President Carter's announcement on the change in the pattern of our diplomatic representations in China. She had spent 12 years in prison as a result. I can assure you, well at least I reckon, that they were not pleasant years in prison.

*Q: Well, at this point you were not part of the Department of State. You were sort of a civilian attending that symposium. Were you doing the usual, political reporting?*

BROWN: Oh, yes. Let's face it. Technically, we reported back to David Dean's American Institute in Taiwan headquarters in Rosslyn, Virginia. However, once we re-established our classified communications capability, although everything read, "AIT-Taipei," our reports immediately found their place for appropriate readers in the Department of State. It was all nominally funneled back through AIT, but it was part of the Department of State communications system.

But to return to this question of local repercussions of the Carter announcement, Mark Pratt was the excellent head of the General Affairs Section previously known as the Political Section of the embassy in Taipei. I had previously studied Chinese with him. He is a good friend. We realized that this was a delicate situation, but agreed that we ought to be in contact with certain mildly dissident Taiwanese.

The government of the Republic of China on Taiwan was, after all, an autocratic regime run by mainland Chinese. However, the Taiwanization of Taiwan was inevitable, given the demographic situation that 85-90 percent of the population were Taiwanese. They spoke a dialect or sub-dialect of Chinese, but they considered themselves Taiwanese, and not mainland Chinese. There was a mainland controlled regime sitting on top of them. Almost all of the principal figures in the regime were mainland Chinese but, over time, this was bound to change. At the time I was in Taiwan, already lieutenants and captains in the Chinese Nationalist armed forces were increasingly Taiwanese.

At this time the business community was already and very significantly dominated by Taiwanese. They had made money during the Vietnam War, supplying our needs in Vietnam. They had built up substantial textile and steel industries in Taiwan which were predominantly but not exclusively controlled by Taiwanese businessmen. There was a very significant, Christian community in Taiwan. It was mainly Presbyterian. My wife Helen was invited to meet with Presbyterian ladies, who turned out to be overwhelmingly Taiwanese and who were therefore, I'm sure under the watchful eyes of the security authorities.

Through Mark Pratt it was arranged that I meet with some young Taiwanese businessmen who worked for larger firms. They were moderate people but were already looking ahead. Before Ambassador Charles Cross arrived to take over the AIT [American Institute on Taiwan], I had some stature by virtue of my office, as the acting Director of the new entity, and decided to meet

some of these Taiwanese.

When an evening function was arranged and I appeared in an automobile with Mark Pratt, by golly, there was a big, black Security Service limousine right outside the door. The government authorities were making it unmistakable that we were being watched. In other words, they were not happy that I was meeting with such people. That was the atmosphere of the period. It was to deteriorate sharply in this process that I mentioned, and there were very severe consequences later that same year.

How ironic it is now that we are dealing with Lee Teng-hui, whom I had known as a senior, loyal Taiwanese official of the Kuomintang. He was Taiwanese born and is now the President of the Republic of China on Taiwan. It has become overwhelmingly Taiwanese in every sense of the word. The Chief of Staff of the Chinese Army is now a Taiwanese. The general officers and so forth are Taiwanese. The Legislature is dominated by Taiwanese. It is a free democracy with a free press. All of this has developed in such a short period of time! It's a fascinating development which we can come back to at a later time, once I have completed my recollections of my time in Israel and several other assignments.

**G. EUGENE MARTIN**  
**Deputy Political Counselor**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1978-1979)**

*A Specialist in Chinese Affairs and a speaker of Chinese, Mr. Martin spent the major part of his career dealing with matters relating to China, both in Washington and abroad. His overseas assignments included Hong Kong, Taipei, Huangzhou (formerly Canton), Beijing, Manila and Rangoon. His Washington assignments also concerned China and the Far East. Mr. Martin was born in Indiana of Missionary parents and was raised in the US. and India. He is a graduate of Kalamazoo College and Syracuse University. Mr. Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Well then, in '78 you left.*

MARTIN: Seventy-eight, I was inveigled by Roger Sullivan to go back to Taiwan, part of my cyclical career. He said that he was going back as DCM and wanted to know if I would come join him there. I said I had just been in Taiwan three years previously, but yes, it would fun because Roger was, at that point, the deputy in Hong Kong and would be DCM in Taipei. So I agreed to move there in the summer of '78, about one month after Roger left for Washington. Roger headed back to Washington to be Deputy Assistant Secretary in the EAP (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs), and I moved to Taipei. Len Unger was the ambassador at the embassy, and Bill Brown succeeded Roger as the deputy.

*Q: Was there any concern, sort of career wise, at this point, of saying, "Maybe I better not get too tainted with Taiwan?" I'm just thinking of the analogy of Israel; and if you're an Arabist, at*

*one point, it wasn't a good idea to have served in Israel.*

MARTIN: Yes, but at this point, the embassy was still in Taipei as we still had full, normal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It was considered to be China, as part of greater China, as it is, and we didn't discriminate. No at that point, Beijing was where everybody really wanted to go, as it was new and more exciting than Taiwan where we had had diplomatic relations for a long time.

*Q: You wouldn't feel that too much service in Taiwan would taint you? I mean there wasn't that feeling?*

MARTIN: Not really. There was a sense that you could do both, mainly because Beijing had not officially opened an embassy and Taiwan was still there. But we knew that the trend was toward Beijing. As to being tainted, that was not a major consideration, at least for me.

*Q: Looking at sort of a career type thing, were you noticing, because of the Nixon trip and the beginning of things, a new surge in China careerists? Young people coming up. Was there a new sort of cadre moving up?*

MARTIN: Yes; and this is true all across the country. The number of schools that were offering Chinese language training, China area studies, or Chinese studies was growing very rapidly. At one point, I think they surpassed the Japanese cadre and more schools were offering Chinese. Everybody was taken up by this, certainly after the Nixon visit. The beginning of relations with China came after a long period, from 1950 to the Nixon visit, in which there was almost no contact with China. Now it was acceptable to buy Chinese publications. The FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) didn't come and check on you if you subscribed to People's Daily, or the Beijing Review, the Peking Review in those days. So there was a great deal of interest. It started with ping pong diplomacy. Now people could travel to China. There were more students who were going to China to take tours; very few students were actually studying there, but professors could go, there were return visits by Chinese delegations, and so forth. There was a great deal of interest in China, and those of us in Hong Kong who were able to travel to China really had a sense of this is where things were going to start taking place.

*Q: When you came back to Taiwan - you were in Taiwan from '78 to when?*

MARTIN: I was in Taiwan from 1978 to 1979, just a little over a year.

*Q: Did you sense a different mood there than you had been there before?*

MARTIN: Not really. It was very much the same because nothing much had changed. There was a little bit more easing of marshal law. Chiang Ching-kuo (CCK) had become president after his father had died and had relaxed the more draconian aspects of martial law. Taiwan was also doing quite well economically, so there was a sense of stability and calm. In fact, the confidence was quite high because they were having national elections in December of 1978, in which for the first time they were going to have relatively open elections. This was the first time the KMT had allowed the opposition to run without a great deal of interference.

So most of the summer and the fall after we got there I spent traveling and talking to people and following the upcoming election. I dealt with the opposition. It was not a party, as they were not allowed to organize as one. Rather, the opposition called themselves “wu-dang-wu-pai” which meant “no party,” no affiliation” running as “none of the above.” They were running as “not KMT.” The opposition was composed of quite lively, exciting and intellectually stimulating people.

There were still a few people beyond the pale, a few who pushed the envelope a little bit too much and got thrown in jail. A number of dissidents, as some were called, were in jail; a couple went into exile to avoid jail. One oppositionist was married to an American woman who came to see us quite frequently after her husband was incarcerated. These were the things that were going on that fall. It was really quite exciting, and there was a lot of stimulation.

*Q: Was there a divide as this political thing between the Chinese mainlanders and the Taiwanese?*

MARTIN: There were still communal differences, yes, friction. The mainlanders versus the Taiwanese division was really quite stark. The gap was still quite deep. The mainlanders were very much in charge and dictated most social issues. Linguistically, everything had to be in Mandarin, it could not be Taiwanese. The schools were all taught in Mandarin. Students were required to speak Mandarin in the school rather than Taiwanese. Of course, as soon as they went home or at recess, they all spoke Taiwanese. And more and more, you could see the integration of the two, as it had been almost thirty years since the KMT moved to Taiwan. The second, or almost the third generation was beginning to become more and more integrated. The young people and the young students, even though they may come from mainland families, were able to speak Taiwanese; and they were able to communicate and had friends in the Taiwanese community. So the differences were breaking down.

*Q: What was your impression of the politicians of the KMT? Were they beginning to just get out of it, or were they hanging on?*

MARTIN: They were the establishment, the Old Guard, if you will. They were not very progressive. They wanted to continue to run things as they always had. They had allowed the opposition to run, so this was the first time that they would really have an election. Most new ideas, most interesting comments, and contacts were with the opposition or the Taiwanese. There were Taiwanese in the KMT as well but did not have control over policy. The interesting people we talked to were mostly in the opposition.

*Q: What about the business community?*

MARTIN: Taiwan’s business community was still very much pro-KMT. They didn’t want to rock the boat. They were doing quite well. They thought the opposition might mess things up. The KMT and mainlanders had given Taiwanese entrepreneurs the opportunity to establish major companies, so they were willing to pretty much support the KMT.

*Q: During this time, any problem with Quemoy and Matsu and all that?*

MARTIN: Not that I remember. When I was in Taipei, one change was that embassy people were no longer permitted to go to Quemoy and Matsu. In previous years, we were allowed to take the free trips to the island arranged by the Taiwan armed forces or government people. This had changed when we opened the Liaison Office in Beijing. We no longer did that sort of thing, sticking our finger in the mainland's eye by going there. So that had pretty much dried up.

*Q: Your job was what?*

MARTIN: I was the deputy political counselor in the political section. We had, I think, about six people in the section, a fairly large section. Mark Pratt was the political counselor, Bill Brown was DCM, and Unger was the ambassador. A frustrating thing to me was getting out of the office. When I got there in the summer of '78, I said, "With this many people in the political section, we should have somebody out on the road almost every week. You can take day trips; you can take overnight trips and be back, but we should be out." Unfortunately the system worked against me. There was so much going on in the embassy in terms of reports, and paperwork, and meetings, and so forth, that it was very difficult to get out. I thought this was a real drawback. We should have had people out talking to people, walking around, moving around, visiting places, to see what was really going on. This is, I think, too often the case in so many embassies - you tend to get bogged down in bureaucracy rather than getting out and doing what I think we should be doing.

*Q: What was your big job, other than reporting what was going on? Were we doing quite a bit of handholding of the government; say, you know, we still love you despite the fact that we're opening up to China?*

MARTIN: There was a good bit of that. The Liaison Office was in Beijing; we still had the embassy in Taipei; and yes, that there was not going to be a big abandonment. Of course, that came along very shortly.

*Q: The Carter administration came in in '76. Was that causing concern, do you think?*

MARTIN: No, I don't think so particularly. Taiwan was nervous, obviously, as soon as Nixon went to China and we opened the USLO. That was a big shock, or the "shokku" as the Japanese call it. But they had gotten over that. They were uneasy as to why we were still playing both sides here. I'm convinced that they saw the handwriting on the wall, and that we moving in that direction; but there was no indication that it was going to be sudden, or that it was going to be abrupt. I think that they were expecting that it would be maybe a year, maybe two years, down the road before we would make any major move. I think the decision in late '78 was a big shock.

*Q: Yes. Were you there at the time?*

MARTIN: Oh, I was indeed.

*Q: How did that go?*

MARTIN: The Carter shock, normalization, “zheng chang hua” as they call it in Chinese, was a shock. One criticism I would have, although I don’t disagree with the idea of normalization (which I think was time), was the way it was handled. It was handled totally without any regard to Taiwan. This may have been held in very restricted channels, but as far as I can tell, there was really no consultation with the ambassador or the DCM from Washington. Now Bill Brown or Len Unger may have a different story on this, but at my level as deputy political counselor, which I suppose you’d expect I would have seen a good bit, if not everything, was that there was really no consultation, no consideration of what was happening in Taiwan. I think the timing of the normalization was totally driven by the agreement or the negotiations of Deng Xiaoping. The regrettable result of this was that we torpedoed the elections in Taiwan. If they had been able to go through, or if we had initiated normalization two or three months later, Taiwan would have probably been ahead by three to four or five years in its democratic development because, when the announcement was made, they canceled the elections, and no elections were held for a couple years after that. I think that this was a big setback, yes! A big setback and an obstacle to the development of Taiwan, and I don’t think it was necessary. The China watcher in me asks the question, “Did Deng realize this?” Did Deng say, “Well, let’s push ahead at this point?” Did the Chinese say, “Let’s push ahead and have normalization; we have to have it this year,” because they were aware of what was going on in Taiwan? I can’t but believe that they did not know what was coming up in Taiwan, and that further economic or further democratic development in Taiwan was not in the mainland’s interest! That’s just my supposition or theory. In any case, the sequence of normalization was quite dramatic. Washington had made the decision that they were going to normalize. They decided to inform us that it was coming the next morning. The night they informed us was the night of the American Chamber of Commerce’s Christmas ball.

The ambassador and most of us were at the AmCham ball. The duty officer, one of my colleagues, got a call from the State Department Operations Center, saying that (National Security Advisor) Brzezinski needed to talk to the ambassador immediately!

“Well, he’s at the Am Cham ball. He’s not available.”

“Well, you have to go get him!”

So he went to get him. The ambassador said later he had a sense that something big was coming. So he went to the embassy, to the secure phone line, and called Washington. Brzezinski told him that at ten o’clock that evening Washington time - ten o’clock the next morning our time - the president was going to announce the normalization of relations with China. The ambassador was instructed to get a hold of the president, CCK, and advise him in advance.

Well, this was now about eleven or twelve o’clock at night, and so the ambassador said, “I will have a very difficult time reaching him at this hour of the night!”

Brzezinski said, “Well, you have to do it, because it’s on track, and the engine’s running.”

So the ambassador called the president’s aide and said that he had an important message that he needed to deliver tonight.

The aide said, “Come on!” It’s something like twelve or one o’clock in the morning at this point, and the president had gone to bed, and I don’t want to go in and wake him.

The ambassador insisted, saying he really did need to see him tonight.

So the aide was a bit miffed about this, but finally was persuaded to go and wake the president. The ambassador called on the president at 2 AM, and informed him of the decision. Well, needless to say, the president did not go back to bed thereafter – rather, he began to gather his senior advisors. The fire alarm went off, and everybody rushed to the lifeboat stations. The political counselor, saying that we were going to have a meeting in the embassy of the country team, and everybody needed to be there, called me about six o’clock the next morning. So we all raced downtown. He wouldn’t tell me what it was over the phone, but I had a sense that something big was coming. So we all went down to the embassy where the ambassador informed us what was happening. We decided to man the barricades because we figured that this was going to be a big crisis.

About seven or eight o’clock in the morning, Taiwan TV came on and announced that there was going to be a big development, asked everybody to be calm, and to maintain order et cetera. At nine o’clock, President CCK came on and made the announcement, explained to people what’s going on, and the police were on alert, the military was on alert, et cetera. At ten o’clock, (that was before CNN so we didn’t have live coverage, but we did have a radio link to Washington), we heard the announcement of Carter’s decision.

It wasn’t very long after that that the first crowds appeared at our gates protesting this perfidious act, and betrayal. Thereafter, we were all in the embassy from about seven that morning until at least midnight, at which point we set up duty shifts and sent people home to get some sleep. I went home initially, and then went to the Taiwan Defense Command (TDC).

*Q: How could you go home?*

MARTIN: We were able to get out through the gates. The police had pretty well manned the gates and allowed us out. That was the first time. After that, it was sealed off pretty tightly. The crowds grew larger and larger. They overwhelmed the police, or the police didn’t control them or let them cover the gates, and so it was very difficult to get in and out. So a number of people were in the embassy for quite a lengthy period of time. I went home mid-evening and got some sleep, then went to the Taiwan Defense Command, the military joint command, met and talked to people there, and communicated both with Washington as well as the embassy. And then early in the morning, I can’t remember what time it was, maybe five o’clock, we wanted to relieve people in the embassy. So I was smuggled back into the embassy in the back seat of a police car, sort of crouching down on the floorboards, and got into the embassy that way, and other people were able to get out. But that was about the last time we were able to have a change of shifts.

I think it was the second day after that that things got worse. The marines were ready for action; they had their flack jackets on, and everybody was concerned about not firing anything, not shooting anybody. So the marines were under close orders not to initiate anything. Well,

sometime, later that day, the crowd had become quite surly outside, and they came over the wall! And so a few people came over the wall, and broke into what was then the mailroom, one of the annex buildings of the embassy. At that point the marines fired the riot control powder. That was not a good development because we were crying over our mail for the next several weeks. Every time you opened a letter, you'd have the dust flying around, and we had a lot of tears over the mail. But that flushed the people back over the wall. That was the last time we had an entry because at the point, the Chinese police did step in, and they put up barricades around the chancery so the crowds could not get in close enough.

*Do you think that part of the reason for holding this under the hat was the fear, in Washington, the fear of leaks; that if it had been leaked, what remained of the old China lobby would have weighed in in Congress, and it would have been much more difficult?*

MARTIN: Oh, I think absolutely so. There's no question in my mind that that was the reason. My understanding, subsequently, was that the people in the know were limited to maybe five people. I think about five people in total knew, including the NSC (National Security Council) and the Department. This, I think, caused a lot of problems with DOD (Department of Defense) as well because the military was really quite upset by this. They had an extensive relationship with the Taiwan military personnel and the joint defense command was there. So I think that really it was a matter of sensitivity, of preventing leaks, and they were very successful in that. I must say, it did not leak! I think anybody who has worked in the government knows that the more people you have, the more chance you have of leaks.

I think that if it had leaked, if it had gotten out, the Taiwan lobby and the opponents of China in Congress would have made a big to-do of it. It would have been much more difficult. But it would have been nice if we'd known a little bit about it.

*Q: There must have been a very difficult period thereafter, figuring out what you were going to be doing!*

MARTIN: The next thing was the decision to send Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher to Taiwan to discuss the issue, to explain the rationale, and what we were going to do for Taiwan to preserve their status. So we prepared for him to come. We were busy doing briefing papers, all the usual things. The ambassador and everybody else went off to the airport to welcome him. This was quite the night!

The security officer was concerned, given the riots, the crowds and the demonstrators outside the embassy, about what was going to happen at the airport. He had gone over repeatedly with the various security agencies of the government exactly what the drill was going to be, what security provisions had been laid on, what sort of arrangements there were, et cetera. Everybody had assured him that everything was taken care of, and it was - not quite the way he expected it! They got to the airport, the plane landed, Christopher and his delegation got out and got in the cars. He was welcomed by Fred Chien, the chief of protocol at the time (and subsequently the head of the Taiwan office here); at the bottom of the stairs and escorted to the side of the car. As they were getting into the car, the ambassador and Christopher got in the back of the ambassador's car; and the security officer said to Fred Chien, "Why don't you join them in the

car right behind.”

He said, “No! No! I have my own car.”

And as they got in the motorcade and the motorcade started to leave the side of the plane on the tarmac, the security officer noticed Fred Chien getting into his car and going the other direction.

And he said, “Oooohh, noooo!”

Well, it was “Oh, no!” because it was all a big setup. As soon as they came out of the gate of the airport, they were met by this howling mob outside, lined up on both sides of the streets, which instantly blocked the road. They had lots of flags they were all waving, and started pounding on the car with flag poles, dumping, throwing eggs and rotten vegetables and other things, probably, on the cars, actually jumping on the hood, and bouncing up and down, and so forth. So it was really quite a demonstration! At one point, they were able to break the window with a flagpole, and ram it through, hitting the ambassador’s glasses on the side of the head, and knocked the glasses off. I think maybe it hit him a little bit, but did not injure him. Nevertheless, they were really kind of beaten on. Finally, they were able to open up a way through the crowd, and the limousine shot out.

At this juncture, I was at the embassy, still, wrapping up the last briefing books, and was about to leave for the hotel when I had a call from the Taiwan Defense Command, saying that this had happened at the airport. About two milliseconds, nanoseconds later, the Op Center (Operations Center) in Washington called saying, “What is going on! We understand there’s been a demonstration, and that the car has lost radio contact, and we don’t know where he is!” For a few minutes there we had a rather nervous time because we didn’t know what had happened. We’d had no contact with the car. I think they’d broken off the antenna or something from their limousine, and so we had no idea where the deputy secretary and the ambassador were. Fortunately, they were able to get through the crowd and make their way up the mountain, up Yangmingshan Mountain to the ambassador’s summer residence. From there they were able to use the phone to call in and say that they were okay. But it was about 20 or 30 minutes before anybody knew where they were.

*Q: Well, isn’t this a risky thing? I mean it sounds like a setup.*

MARTIN: Oh, absolutely! It was perfectly orchestrated.

*Q: But you know, once you turn something loose, you can have a dead ambassador and a dead...*

MARTIN: Deputy secretary.

*Q: Deputy Secretary of State.*

MARTIN: You certainly could.

*Q: All right. And that would have just ended it.*

MARTIN: Yes.

*Q: What was the thinking?*

MARTIN: The thinking was to demonstrate their opposition to this policy. The thinking also, I think, was that they could control it. Whether they did or not, I don't know.

*Q: Doesn't sound like they did!*

MARTIN: It sounds like they went a little further than they expected to. I think they were supposed to demonstrate, and maybe throw things on the car, and so forth. But you know, jumping up and down on the hood, and ramming flagpoles through the windows was, I think, a little beyond the scenario. I don't know! Whether or not that was enough to get the police - who were there (but far outnumbered by the crowd) enough room, enough motivation to push the crowd back so the car could get out at the last minute? I don't know! I was not there, and I can't say. Needless to say, I was on the phone with the Op Center for some time, trying to feed them whatever information I had, which wasn't an awful lot.

*Q: Well then, what happened after?*

MARTIN: Well, they went up on the hill and then eventually made their way back down the hill to the hotel, the Grand Hotel in Taipei, with a police escort. The message that we sent immediately to the government was, "We need full guarantees that this is not going to happen again, or Christopher's would turn around and go right back! He is not going to talk to the government!" Well, the next morning the city and the hotel itself was surrounded by troops, so that was fully guarded; and the road all the way from the hotel to the presidential palace was lined about every hundred feet by soldiers. So they turned out the troops, and they made the point that they were not going to have any more demonstrations, and it worked. There were no further untoward incidents. But that certainly did color the entire trip by Christopher, and that did not help.

*Q: Well then, how did things work? From your perspective, did you see this? Did you feel that our people in Washington had done their homework in figuring out how to set up an organization, or were you left in limbo for a while?*

MARTIN: "Limbo" isn't exactly the right word! "Twilight zone" was the word that I used. But that came later. Len Unger had to leave before the end of the year. He packed up very quickly; he just picked up his suitcase, I think, and essentially left. Because this was just before Christmas, Christmas was not celebrated that year, as I recall, not very heartily. He had to leave before the end of the year because 1 January was the official start of relations with China. But the embassy was not going to open in Beijing until the first of March. So we had that two month period in which to come up with the arrangements.

It was quite obvious that nothing really had been worked out as to exactly what the status was going to be in Taiwan. USLO in Beijing was on track to convert itself into an embassy on the

first of March, but nothing really was sure as to what we were going to do in Taipei. We began to fish around to figure out what we were going to do. Congress, of course, at this point, was very much in the act; and they started their hearings right after the first of the year; and they were going to take action, which eventually came out with the Taiwan Relations Act.

Len Unger, the ambassador, left the end of December; Bill Brown became chargé. After the first of January, he wasn't chargé. He was sort of in charge. We weren't quite sure what to call him, but we still were respectful to him, of course. We then kept getting messages from Washington, saying, "We're working on this. It's going to be set up. We will have some sort of unofficial relationship, and so forth. Don't worry about it. We'll take care of it."

Well, we did worry about it; and time went on. We went through the weeks of January. Then we got into February, and things were getting pretty dicey because 1 March was looming as the absolute end of the line. We figured that if we didn't know by mid-February, we had to start pulling people out. We could start evacuating people because we didn't want to be in a situation where we had no diplomatic privileges, we had no guarantee, and we had no immunities.

So about the fourteenth, and I can't remember if it was actually Valentine's Day or a day or two before, we decided we had not heard anything from Washington, so we ought to call. So we called Washington! We called the EAP front office, and phone rang and rang and rang. Nobody answered. So then we called the Taiwan desk, and it rang and rang and rang. Nobody answered. We were getting worried as to what was happening, so we finally - what we should have done initially - called the Op Center, and fortunately somebody answered.

And they said, "There's a 14-inch snowfall in Washington, and nobody's at work, except those of us who got stuck in the Op Center!" And so nothing had been done.

We said, "Well, we're going to have to start evacuating, pulling people out."

At that point, Washington did get back to us and said, "No!"

We had been talking to the Taiwan authorities as well; and they said that they were going to continue our immunities after the first of March, so not to worry about it. They didn't want us to pull out either.

By that time we had packed up most of our stuff in the chancery. We decided that we had to pull out of the chancery; we could not remain in the chancery building because of the symbolism. We then made arrangements to lease, or to continue the lease, on the old MAAG building on the other side of town, and that we would use that as the office building for the unofficial entity, although we didn't know what it was going to be called. It came out with a number of different names, none of which lasted very long. We moved most of our furniture into those buildings. We had designated which offices we were going to use, which rooms we were going to use for what sections, and so forth; but we weren't allowed to set up the offices because this would be premature. So we were able to move the furniture in, my furniture was all moved into "x" room, but we could not arrange the furniture. We just had to pile it in the middle of the room. Why? I don't understand!

*Q: That still says, "Peculiar to me!"*

MARTIN: This was a degree of political correctness or something! You could not set up; you could not set up your desk; you could not set up, I guess...did we have computers? I don't think we had computers in those days. You couldn't do anything. You couldn't put rugs on the floor, hang pictures on the wall, anything; just had to leave things piled up in the room. We didn't know whether we were going to last or not. So the last week at the embassy was really quite farcical because we were sitting on one desk chair and typing on cardboard packing boxes. That was the only furniture left in the embassy. On 28 February, we all walked out of the building; had a ceremony lowering the flag on the flagpole in the front yard, locked the door, and walked out; and we've never been back as far as I can tell. So we walked out - to what? Twilight Zone!

And we didn't know what we were going to do! So we all went home. We had worked out some arrangements for communications and had set up, I think, a communication channel through the Taiwan Defense Command, which at that point I, as the deputy in political division, had been very much involved in helping to close down the Taiwan Defense Command because the military were moving out of there too. They were given a slightly longer period to transition out, so they were able to still have their communication setup there. So we used that.

The telegraphic address was not AmEmbassy Taipei; it was "Bill Brown, Taipei." That was the address.

To keep in touch with each other, Bill kindly said we would have country team meetings in his house every morning. So every morning we would all trundle up to his house. His wife Helen, who was a wonderful cook, would come up with all these wonderful pastries and breakfast delicacies, we would sit there and talk and have snacks all around. That went on for an hour or two each weekday morning. Then the political section would adjourn to Mark Pratt's house for our political section meetings and work. Mark, fortunately, was also a gourmet cook, in both Chinese and French cuisines, as well as having probably the best wine cellar in Taipei. He brought cases and cases of wine from France, and so we had a wonderful time in the political section eating and drinking our way through the afternoon. We would do reporting, and we'd write reports, and we'd talk about what we learned from people we'd talk to, and so forth. That's how we continued work.

*Q: Did you find people were giving you the stiff arm?*

MARTIN: Many of them did, yes. It was very difficult to talk to people; but there were others who still would talk to us, people we'd known before.

*Q: What were you saying? You'd say, "We're going to work this out."*

MARTIN: We did. We said that we felt we would be able to continue to have a relationship with Taiwan even though we had opened diplomatic relations with China; but it was a very hard sell. People just did not believe us! They thought we were basically going to pull out and abandon them. But I said, "Look at the papers. Look at what the news reports are, and Congress obviously

is not going to have all of us pull out and have no representation here at all, and they're working on something.”

So for six weeks, from the first of March until about the middle of April, we were literally in Twilight Zone. We didn't know what to expect. We were very cautious about driving. We were very circumspect about where we drove; how much we drove; tried to make sure that our families did not drive, certainly out of Taipei; didn't get into any difficulty; because we did not know what sort of immunities we might have, if any. There we were, just floating!

*Q: Was the government talking to you?*

MARTIN: They were. They were talking to us. They were, you know, obviously following what was happening in Washington from their representatives in Washington, who were also going through a similar sort of situation. One of the big things, as I recall, was what to do with the embassy property in Washington, particularly Twin Oaks, which is the wonderful residence of the Chinese ambassadors from early in the 20th century behind Mount Saint Albans, on the other side of the cathedral, on beautiful grounds. That was a big to-do on the mainland because PRC said, “That should come to us.” They wanted it too. Taiwan, with some help from its friends here, sold it for a dollar to a private American group, the Friends of Free China Association, an organization which was setup to prevent the PRC from getting it. And so that has remained in their hands and the unofficial Taiwan representatives are able to use it. The Chinese were not happy about that all.

*Q: Was their concern on Taiwan that this might precipitate a military move?*

MARTIN: There was some concern, yes; they thought that maybe. But at the same time, I think they saw that the Chinese had won out on this one, and that with diplomatic relations they were not going to take any actions that would jeopardize that. They thought maybe there might be some action in Quemoy or Matsu, but nothing developed.

*Q: Was there any sort of defections or anything else?*

MARTIN: There were people who took money out. A number of people used their visas to the States to take trips that were open ended. There was a lot of insecurity. The economic situation worsened. A lot of people pulled in investments, sold property. Many were concerned and nervous. So it was a shaky period.

*Q: Were you personally involved in any of the negotiations, or was this strictly a Washington deal?*

MARTIN: It was pretty much a Washington deal because they were working mainly with Congress, and Congress was, basically, rewriting everything the administration had sent them in terms of what sort of follow-on arrangement there would be. It was very clear that Congress was going to write the Taiwan Relations Act and put a lot of teeth into it that the administration had not asked for.

*Q: Was there any sort of off channel, or whatever you'd want to call it, sub-rosa consultation with Congress with what is now whatever your limbo organization was, saying, "What do you need?" or anything like that?*

MARTIN: Not that I know of. There may have been. I don't know. Len Unger, of course, had come back to Washington. My guess is that he probably had some discussions here, but I don't know that.

*Q: How did you send telegrams back, and what did you do?*

MARTIN: From Bill Brown, Taipei! The military, as I recall (I'm forgetting my timing exactly), but I think the military was there until about the first of May. By that time, the Taiwan Relations Act was passed by mid April. We then were able to move in and arrange our offices and set up our communications ourselves, so we, by that time, had our own communication channels, and we were able to handle our own communications.

*Q: What was your mood, and others', towards the Carter administration putting this together?*

MARTIN: We were not very pleased with the way it was handled, but I think most of us agreed that the decision was a correct one. We would've much preferred to have a much more orderly, thoughtful and planned transfer of relations. It would have been all right if they had gone ahead and normalized, but, preferably, with some consultation with us on timing. Again, as I say, my main disappointment was that they caused the scrubbing of the elections, which I think was a big setback. But despite that, I think the idea was right; the decision was correct, but the implementation was poor.

*Q: Well, all of you knew this was a shoe that was going to be dropped at some point.*

MARTIN: Eventually, of course. When Roger Sullivan "enticed" me to come to Taiwan, I use that word, you know, somewhat facetiously; but he did. I liked working with Roger, and it would have been fun, but Bill was good too. But everybody who had been there since the Nixon visit, was saying, "Oh, Taiwan's just the place to be because you're going to be there during normalization, and it'll be a very exciting time." Well, I made it!

It was exciting, but not quite in a way that people wanted. But people did expect it. We just didn't know when it was going to be. People came and went, and nothing had happened in so many years. Nixon went to Beijing in the early 1970s? So it was six, seven years.

*Q: Yes. How about within our military? Because our military usually is not up to the nuances of diplomatic stuff, this must have annoyed, or angered them?*

MARTIN: Angered is a better word! They were livid. I think that is not too strongly put. They were very unhappy. They had established relations, which they'd had for really decades, with the Taiwan military. They thought that this was betrayal; they thought this was just total treason, basically; that we had given up. They pledged, "We will never work with the communist military. We will always be friends with our Taiwan brother," blah, blah, you know, on and on,

this sort of thing. It was not very long after that that they found it was possible to establish contacts with the mainland military.

*Q: How about with the professional diplomats of the foreign ministry? Were you able to have rational talks with them?*

MARTIN: Ah...we did. They understood it. They were obviously not pleased. They were very unhappy, in fact. But I think they, too, had seen it coming; and they were mainly interested in trying to make sure that we worked out an arrangement which was going to be beneficial to both sides. I think we were able to do that.

*Q: Were you getting any feel for the very formidable network that developed and exists today, of the Chinese business community in the United States? It's probably, in a more subtle way, as powerful as maybe the Greek and the Israeli lobbies. Was that in existence already? I mean was that working on the Taiwan Relations Act at all?*

MARTIN: The Taiwan business community?

*Q: Yes, the Taiwan business.*

MARTIN: Well, I'm not sure I would agree that it was the Taiwan business community that was in the forefront of that. It was more the political operatives.

*Q: Kuomintang.*

MARTIN: They had a very strong intelligence organization here, and they had a very strong KMT organization here, in the Chinese community; and they also had a lot of friends - the Committee of One Million, which was far less than one million by that time, but it was still quite influential in Congress. They had a lot of friends who were willing to listen and to do what they asked and make suggestions. So they were quite involved in making suggestions for the Taiwan Relations Act in Congress.

*Q: When you received a text of the Taiwan Relations Act, one, was there an owner's manual that came along with it, or the equivalent thereof? I mean somebody from Washington came out, said, "This is what this means;" because often when you get an act, there's an awful lot of Interpretations. I mean, there's been a lot of debate; and they say, "Well, this how it's going to work and all. So when you get it, you really have to have somebody explain it to you."*

MARTIN: Yes, there was a lot of that! We did not have anybody come out from Washington on that aspect of it. We did have visitors in other aspects, but we had also the legislative history that came out, and all the debates in Congress, and that was quite extensive. So we had a lot of the background that went into the legislation which was very helpful. But obviously, there were parts in the Taiwan Relations Act that the administration did not like; and this caused some problems, and has caused problems over the years. But I think, yes, it took a good deal of reading and interpreting to figure out exactly what was meant and what we were expected to do.

*Q: Was this in a way, sort of a joint effort where you and your interlocutors in the Taiwan government sat down and say, “Well, those #&\*@ over in Washington, to put this together, this is how we’re going to work it out, you know. I mean they leave all of us with a mess.”*

MARTIN: There obviously were some local arrangements made. The most ominous I think was that we could not meet in official government buildings. So we could not go to the foreign ministry to meet with counterparts. Officials could not come to our offices. So we had to find good restaurants. It being Taiwan it was fine as there were lots of them, but it didn’t help the waistline.

But until we set up our counterpart organizations it was awkward. They had more of a difficulty because they were being forced to set up what was then called CCNAA (Coordination Council for North American Affairs), which was a mouthful. The administration said the words “China” or “Taiwan” could not be used in the name. They had to come up with the counterpart of AIT (American Institute in Taiwan). They had to set up an organization because we could not come to their foreign ministry or government offices to meet them, nor could they come to see us; so they had to have this cutout, if you will, the CCNAA, like we had the AIT on our side.

This was an awkward situation. They said, “Why do we have to do this?”

And we’d say, “Well, because it has to be unofficial.” We had to lead them through all this process, and it was very difficult. They were, I won’t say surly, but they were less than fully comprehending as to why we were forcing them to do that. That was a difficult time.

*Q: I imagine that an awful lot of your time after this was in putting together the structure?*

MARTIN: Very much so. One of the fun things, one of the issues was, we don’t have an embassy. We have this, whatever this new, unique creature is called, an unofficial entity, AIT (American Institute in Taiwan). What do we call ourselves? Okay. We have a name now, and Congress came up with the name “American Institute in Taiwan.” I don’t know whose creation that was, but it was okay. It was certainly easier than Coordinating Council for North American Affairs, which Taiwan came up with! Fortunately, now we’ve gotten away from that, and they are called TECRO (Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office), which makes a lot more sense.

But what do we call ourselves internally? We can’t have an ambassador, so we’ll have a Director. We can’t have a DCM, so we’ll call him a Deputy Director. That’s fairly easy. Now! Political section, you can’t have a political counselor; you can’t have a political officer because this is an unofficial entity; so what do we call ourselves? Economics? Well, Taiwan Relations Act said we could have economic and cultural relations with Taiwan people, so that’s okay. So we can have an Economic Chief. We won’t call him section head or counselor; we’ll call him a chief. So we have an Economic Section, and an Economic Chief. All right. We can’t have a Consular Section, because that is a diplomatic term, so what do you call consular functions? So we came up with Travel Services. Okay, not too bad, and you have a Travel Services Chief. Administration? Well, administration, that’s okay. You know, everybody has administration. All right. We can’t have a U.S. Information Service, so what do we call USIS? So we came up with

the Information Section. Okay. That's all right. Okay. The one remaining problem was the Political Section. What do we call the Political Section? I feel some sense of propriety that Mark Pratt and I worked this out together, being the titular head of titles. We came up with the General Affairs Section, which was basically plagiarized from our Japanese colleagues who had set up an unofficial entity a few years earlier after Japan normalized with the mainland. We studied them, and use them as one of the models that we emulated. So we came up with General Affairs Section. Then people said, "Look, everybody's going to think you're the GSO!" Well, no in Chinese we'd worked it out in such a way that it didn't come out to be General Services Officer. So it was General Affairs, which, of course, immediately became the GAS station. And so we had the GAS station, the economic section, and so forth; but it was kind of fun. It's worked out. I mean people still chuckle about General Affairs.

*Q: What did you call yourselves when you went somewhere?*

MARTIN: AIT officers, AIT representatives, or I'm from AIT, or something like that.

*Q: Did you find you had to almost reestablish your contacts?*

MARTIN: No, most of them stayed with us. That was not a problem. A lot of what I did as a deputy political counselor previously, in addition to the election, which was related to the election in many ways, was the political development. I also dealt with the opposition, with the non-party people running for election, and with human rights. I was involved with the human rights community, and one of leaders of the human rights movement there was the Presbyterian Church. So I dealt with that group of people, who were trying to broaden the envelope within the Taiwan political system.

*Q: Of course, this was the Carter administration when it was new. It's now amalgamated into all our policies.*

MARTIN: Right.

*Q: But it was pretty...during part of this time or during all of this time, I was up in South Korea. We subscribed to the idea human rights is a good thing. But with a formidable North Korean army sitting within 30 miles of where we were sitting, human rights went kind of far down the priority list, and we didn't know people messing around too much with it. How did you all feel about this?*

MARTIN: In Taiwan, it was not much of an issue after normalization. But this had been a big issue before normalization because as we were leading up to the December elections, the broadening of political rights, broadening of political opportunities, including human rights. It was a big issue that we were pushing. We had many discussions with officials about political prisoners, opposition activists who had been arrested, sent into exile, etc. These were the key issues in our dialogue. Again, the church was very much in the forefront because the Presbyterian Church was a Taiwanese church. There were few mainlanders who were Presbyterian. I don't know why the denomination sorted out that way. It's just that Presbyterian missionaries went to Taiwan, as they did to Korea, of course.

And it's a very active church, as it is in Korea. I found it an interesting area to work, not only being Presbyterian myself, but also because the people were impressive. So that was a big issue before the election. After normalization, it was still an issue, but not a big one.

*Q: Well, a lot of it had disappeared.*

MARTIN: It didn't.

*Q: It didn't disappear, but why would it diminish?*

MARTIN: Mainly because we had other things we were working out. There was no election coming up. The government clamped down again on opposition activities. We still made representations, but I think it was less. I won't say less fervor, but probably less effect than we had before.

*Q: Was there concern about KMT intelligence organizations in the United States at that time?*

MARTIN: There was because the KMT was known to be quite active in the Chinese communities in the U.S. One opposition writer who wrote an uncomplimentary article on the Chiang family was murdered in California.

*Q: Was that during your watch?*

MARTIN: Yes. We were increasingly concerned about secret societies, or the gangster gangs, mafia if you will, like the Green Bamboo Gang which was implicated in this murder, as being an arm of the intelligence services, or working on contract, if not regularly, for government representatives. This was a big concern, and Steve Solarz was very much involved in watching all this. He was a strong advocate of Taiwan human rights for many years, and I think, quite helpful on the issue

*Q: You say you left Taiwan in 1979?*

MARTIN: In April, about the time the Taiwan Relations Act was passed, a delegation came out from Washington from Personnel to explain the TRA and tell us about AIT. Most of us were quite uncertain what normalization, AIT's unofficial status and our assignments meant in career terms. Ron Palmer and a friend of mine, Pat Wardlaw, who was in Personnel at that time, came out to assuage us and say, "Everything's going to be taken care of. You're all going to be okay.

*Q: That scared the life out of you!*

MARTIN: And then some! It was like the old joke -- We're here to help you. We're from the government. We're from Personnel. We're here to help you.

But many of us were not convinced, because given the record up to that point - the lack of information, the lack of any planning, the lack of any precedents - made it quite apparent that they were running it by the seat of their pants. They didn't have a clue as to who we were, what

we were going to do, because fairly early on, it was decided that we had to resign from the Foreign Service. "Well, now! Just a minute there, Ambassador Palmer! What do you mean, 'resign' from the Foreign Service? What does this mean in terms of differentials, in terms of pay, in terms of retirement, in terms of service credit, etc., etc.? They did not know! So my wife and I made a decision that we would not stay on long. Several of us decided to take the option of transferring. We therefore went back to Washington the summer of '79.

*Q: You given that option?*

MARTIN: Yes, it was a totally voluntary thing because the Department did not believe it could force anyone to resign. The system did work out in time, but it took me almost a year to get my pay records straightened out, even for that short time that I was with AIT. So it was a mess in the beginning.

*Q: But there was no assurance! There was not a very good track record, not just Personnel but the whole apparatus of being very responsive to these things.*

MARTIN: That's true, yes.

**MARK S. PRATT**  
**Political Counselor**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1978-1981)**

*Mr. Pratt was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard, Brown, Sorbonne and Georgetown Universities. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he studied Chinese and was posted to Hong Kong. Throughout his career Mr. Pratt dealt with Far East and Southeast Asian affairs, serving in Taichung, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Paris, Taipei and Guangzhou (Canto), where he was Consul General. His Washington assignments also concerned Southeast Asian matters. Mr. Pratt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Well, then, in 1978 you moved on.*

PRATT: Yes, in 1978 I got a call, and they said that we're going to have to replace our political counselor in Taipei because he's had a heart attack, and therefore we'd like you to go there, and since you're a bachelor and therefore more readily transferable and outside the regular cycle, we'd like you there as soon as possible. Go there. And of course, like most of my previous assignments, as you can see from the fact that there are five years here and five years there and so forth, most of my assignments were not bound to the usual State Department assignment process. So, I went flying out to Taipei. At that moment it was clear that China was again very much on the screen because they had not been able to move ahead and get anything important done with Hanoi, but the normalization of relations with Peking was very high on the agenda of Carter's team as well.

*Q: So you were in Taipei from 1978 to when?*

PRATT: 1978 until 1981.

*Q: Was it an ambassador when you arrived there?*

PRATT: Yes, Ambassador Leonard Unger, who had been my ambassador when I had been in Laos, was ambassador to Taiwan [Ed: Ambassador Unger presented his credentials in Taipei on May 25, 1974 and departed post January 19, 1979.]

*Q: When you arrived there in 1978, the Carter Administration is getting cranked up, and there were sort of a number of things on the Carter agenda. One was the Panama Canal. Another ended up as Camp David. And then there was the normalization. This was the shoe that was going to drop, wasn't it? Was this, when you went out there, were you and Ambassador Unger and the whole place getting ready for this particular shoe to drop?*

PRATT: Yes. Those of us who were adept at reading tea leaves - and I had drunk too much tea in my life, that I could work out those tea leaves very easily . . . In fact, when I was given this assignment, while the Japanese ambassador, whom I had had quite a few dealings with because we had to get him following what we were doing with East Asia and with China and all the rest of it, he invited me for luncheon, and so I told him that, yes, I figured that the reason that I was being picked out was that they did hope - whether they could do it or not is a different matter - but the thing is they did hope to be able to make significant progress in a matter of months, within a year's time anyway, to establish relations with Peking. Therefore, that would be perhaps one of the things that I'd be working on. I had forgotten that the Japanese diplomatic correspondence, which was generally readily readable - I don't think that's true any more, but it was at that time generally readable - by the United States. And so, of course, the Japanese ambassador's account of my conversation in Paris was something which ended up on the desk at INR in a couple of day's time, and of course, they were saying, when I came through Washington, *How could you tell them that?* I said, "Well, I'd been told absolutely nothing. I'm really running on what it is that has been published in the *New York Times* and the regular American press and so on. So I'm just really . . . I have no inside information. I told him that. Didn't his cable say that?" He said, "Well, yes, he said you said that you had no direct information, that this was not something which had been discussed with you, and this is not therefore something that . . .but this is your personal view." I said, "Yes, I've got to be able to have a personal view when I'm asked a question." But I said, "The only problem is, of course, that the Japanese don't have enough sense to use their one channel, which is not readable by the U.S., and they didn't use it." And I said, "Now if I were to see the ambassador again, I'd wave my finger in his face and say, 'Now you're naughty-naughty, don't do that, protect your sources.'" But as I say, it didn't cause any great turmoil because, in the first place, it was not readable to the Soviets or the Chinese - it was only readable to the U.S., because we, apparently, knew how the Japanese -

*Q: Well, this is also, knowing Carter and all, very much on the agenda.*

PRATT: That's right.

*Q: And particularly with Brzezinski. You got the feeling that Brzezinski was always looking over his shoulder and chalking up what he was doing compared to Henry Kissinger. I mean, you always felt that Brzezinski was trying to be more "Kissingerian" than Kissinger, in a way, to show his academic colleague up or something.*

PRATT: Right. And also to show that he, as a former academic - and Kissinger was a former academic - that both of them could also act in the real world. And he did not want at all to have it appear that he was more cut off from handling practical matters than was Henry. But the other aspect was, you had a Secretary of State who was really very impressive in his own rights - Cy Vance - whereas, of course, Kissinger had - I shan't say a nonentity, but in any case - a Secretary of State who was more interested in *appearing* to be Secretary of State than in *being* Secretary of State. (I hope he's not going to be reading this.) But in any case, a very nice man-

*Q: Very nice man, but you get this feeling-*

PRATT: -but he did not want really to go head to head with Henry Kissinger unless Nixon asked him to, which of course was not what was in the cards. But in any case, Vance was a very different matter, and a very serious and well established Secretary of State. And also, as I discussed with the Japanese ambassador, Vance had made his trip to Peking and had come away, of course, with a big, flat no because of two or three matters. And I said, obviously in Washington, they're sitting down and evaluating what it is they can do to get around these three things.

*Q: What were they?*

PRATT: Mostly Taiwan. One was disestablishment of any relations with Taiwan, and that meant at that point we were just told there would be none. We asked about a liaison office; we asked about a sort of consulate general or something of the sort, and the Chinese said no to both. So we hadn't worked out what that could be. The end of the mutual defense treaty: they wanted it to end on the day of our establishment with Peking, in other words the transfer of relations. And the third was withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the area. Now there were a few other things along the way, too, but these were the big sticking points.

*Q: It seems like the Chinese have some stake in establishing formal relations, too? What were we asking?*

PRATT: We wanted to have our embassies, our liaison offices, upgraded to embassies, and we wanted to have access - although we had had pretty good access. Nonetheless, we wanted more access, and I think we wanted also even some military connections.

*Q: Well, it does seem that the charge has been made again and again unto this very day that the Chinese sort of sit back and expect other powers to meet their demands, as opposed to . . . and they seem to cave in. It strikes me, looking as you explained it now, did that appear to you that here is China asking a sort of a barbarian nation to say if you want to deal with us you've got to do this and that, and we want to say, well, then you have to do this and that, too, or something?*

PRATT: No, we had no real demands. We wanted a relation, and of course, what we wanted to do was to maintain as much as we could of the relationship which we had with Taiwan. And as I say, that was therefore the sticking point. We could agree on many other things, including what we would do about discussing policies in Asia and what we would do in the United Nations and so on. So indeed, the only real sticking point was that we wanted to hold on more to Taiwan than Peking wanted to let us do.

*Q: Well, now, when you came back through Washington, beyond being reprimanded for using your own personal judgment on whither Chinese relations, you were going to a place where, obviously, you weren't the only one reading the tea leaves. Just about everybody in the foreign affairs establishment was looking at the same tea leaves. But were you given any guidance from the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, from Dick Holbrooke on down dealing with this?*

PRATT: Well, I dealt primarily with Harvey Feldman, who was the Desk officer.

PRATT: As the Taiwan Desk officer he was very much tied in with Holbrooke and then of course also with Roger Sullivan. And I was told that one of the key things was that they were a bit concerned about Ambassador Unger's being excessively defensive of the Kuomintang and Chiang Ching-kuo. On the other hand, Roger Sullivan, who was the DCM there, was well thought of. When he rotated back to Washington, he went to the NSC at the White House. In any case, he wanted to go to a place where he could sail his boat. In any case, he was considered the one who was supposed to keep Washington's interests constantly pressed in Taipei, so that Unger would not be out of line. Obviously, one of the reasons why he might get out of line is that nobody wanted to tell him anything because they felt if they told him what to do and what not to do, he would go and perhaps tell Ching-kuo what he had been told, and they didn't want that to happen. So this was a rather difficult task to do. You are not often sent off to keep your ambassador in line, and particularly a career ambassador, one who has had three or four ambassadorial assignments and is, of course, fairly confident about his own ability.

*Q: Who was DCM when you arrived?*

PRATT: Well, Roger Sullivan had been DCM, and he was being withdrawn, and therefore I was supposed to handle the interim until they could get a new DCM in. It was going to be Bill Brown. I think you could talk to Bill Brown.

*Q: I've had a long set of interviews with Bill Brown. Now when you arrived out there, how did you see the relations with Taiwan at that time?*

PRATT: Well, let me just get myself there, because after the conversation in Washington, which included being informed about Brzezinski's trip to Peking, I went through Japan and, as usual, tried to see some of my contacts at the Japanese Foreign Ministry and elsewhere. And I happened to coincide with Brzezinski's travels through there. And it was very clear that Brzezinski at least thought he was going with the answers to the three questions from Peking and thought he could perhaps provide proper, suitable answers to move ahead. So that was the framework when I ran into some of the people in Brzezinski's party in Tokyo.

*Q: Who were they?*

PRATT: I'm trying to remember now who they were. They were people in the East Asian Bureau whom I had known. These were the people in the State Department he had brought along, you know, to carry bags -

*Q: What was their mood? Concern about whether we were giving away the store, or were they sort of feeling, Well, you know, I think we've made some real progress, or were they completely out of the information loop?*

PRATT: No, they were in the information loop, and they thought really this time - although they did not know the details of how much Carter had told Brzezinski he could give - nonetheless they felt that they were taking a package which was designed to be acceptable. And therefore, while they couldn't be sure, because of course they hadn't consulted with Peking yet, nonetheless, they felt that the readings of the Vance trip and the requirements set forth at that time and what new they were taking would perhaps work. So this was a positive feeling on what was going to happen on the Peking side. So I arrived in Taipei, also as I say, with some of the things I had with my friends in Japan were that they thought also that we indeed - and I don't know how much we had briefed them on this - that we indeed were trying to get a package which would be acceptable to Peking. Now of course, the Japanese had already gone through their normalization procedure several years earlier [Ed: 1972] , and so they of course had a certain amount of experience and made a certain amount of judgment about what might sell in Peking.

So I arrived in Taipei really considering that this was going to be one of the key things which took place while I was there. And obviously this was not what I was suddenly thrust into, because of course it was business as usual, and to a certain extent a little bit more than usual because, obviously, there was a tendency to try to build up what the Taiwan military forces had in the way of armaments in advance of anything which might restrict us in the future. There was not requirement that Vance had received about the end of any military equipment transfer, but there was indeed a requirement for withdrawal of all U.S. forces. Now that would, of course, presumably include the MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group, which, of course, was involved in so much of what the Taiwan military had as their own capability, from the logistic front and utilization of armaments. And therefore, everybody knew that there was an importance in getting the military side cranked up as much as possible because if there were normalization - and of course in Taipei we had constantly to say *if*, not *when* - then, of course, it would be important to have the capabilities of Taiwan as advanced as possible at that time. So this was one of the key things which we were doing.

We had all kinds of military matters which we were involved in, and of course the ambassador, who would normally be the person who would go over and give either the good news or the bad news, depending upon what it was that was being asked by Taiwan and what the answer was that Washington gave, as I would normally accompany, because as political counselor I was also chief PM (politico-military officer), I had one deputy politico-military officer who unfortunately was not highly esteemed by our military colleagues, so I had to do more than what I might have had to do otherwise. So this was a key aspect also, of course.

The politics of Taiwan were very interesting. It was very much an authoritarian system, but an authoritarian system which was heading towards institutionalization, and that's I think one of the key contributions which Chiang Ching-kuo made, and he was one of the few, I think, in Asia riding the tiger who knew how to get off. When he died, of course, that did result in a totally different political structure.

*Q: In the first place, just to give perspective, how had the Japanese handled their relations with Taiwan when you got there because this would, I think . . . here is a major country which has interests in both places, and so it would serve as a certain model for you to prognosticate how it might come out. How were they dealing with it?*

PRATT: Well, obviously when the turnover actually did take place and we did recognize Peking, one of the few things which we had as a model was what we called the Japanese model or *Nihon-moderu*, anyway the Japanese unofficial presence was called the *Interchange Association, Japan*. So I, of course, immediately got very close to the deputy head of their office. The head of their office was always an Italian ambassador who still had good contacts with Tokyo, but they had a presence seconded from the Foreign Ministry to be his deputy.

The Japanese Interchange Association was proposed as the model which we eventually had. So I indeed did have very frequent contacts with him, and we discussed how they handled all sorts of things. The Japanese system was different from ours. They are much better able to keep things out of their press and not to, shall we say, annoy Peking by having stories about what they are really doing. So they had a very big establishment there. It didn't look that big. Ours always looked much bigger, but they always were able to manage theirs so that the number of people who are obvious are fewer. They had, of course, a big economic connection, and that again was also something which was not nearly so obvious as ours because they often were able to have front men from the Taiwan side, and one of the things they were doing, for example, is using Taiwan as a way of getting preferential tariffs for Japanese manufacturers into the United States. And of course the U.S. has been the great, shall we say, absorber of so much of the economic development outside the United States. But they had this very great network, much of it going way, way back. One of the key persons in the Japanese Diet, whom I saw when I went through Tokyo, was considered the "Mr. Taiwan" for the Japanese Diet. He was in his 80s, and he happened to have been one of the young Japanese who had established the first golf course in Taiwan back in 1914 or something of the sort. So they had all of their old people, and for example retired Prime Minister Kishi would occasionally visit and so on. So they were able to do these things and go back and tell the Chinese that this was all totally unofficial. But of course the Chinese could well understand that in Japan almost all of these people are still official in some way or another and tied in with the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. We wouldn't have that kind of system, so we knew we had to be concerned about how we might do things. But then, of course, the Japanese told me, well, the important thing is just to make a façade and then you tell the Chinese that this is then the unofficial façade. One of the Japanese told me, he said, "When we went to the Chinese, they said just make sure everything is not official. And so we asked them, 'What is our definition of *not official*?' and they said, 'Well, you'll have to come up with that, because in China everything is official, and therefore your society is different and therefore if you say it's non-official, then obviously you know what that means because we don't.'"

*Q: Well, now, when you got with Leonard Unger, you obviously had worked with him before and all that. Were you saying, "Look, this is going to happen," and as a political officer this is your advice, we had better get ready for this? I'm sure he'd been given this from others, too.*

PRATT: Oh, sure, but the thing is, he had already been well aware of this, and the only thing he was doing, he was constantly trying to convince Washington that we should get a minimum of two weeks' advanced notice so Chiang Ching-kuo could make his preparations and let his key people know what was going on and so on. And I, of course, was telling him, I don't think that's what's going to happen because the problem was domestic American politics.

*Q: In other words, you have to present Congress almost with a fait accompli.*

PRATT: Well, enough to ensure that Ching-kuo has a sufficient *fait accompli* so that he can't go and try to go to Congress and to get them to pull his test and sound the fire.

*Q: Which could happen*

PRATT: Which could happen. I mean, it would at least complicate things. And so I said we won't get very much warning, but we're dealing with them all the time. We have bright people like Frederick Chen, the deputy foreign minister, who knows the United States very well. We have the President's illegitimate son [Ed: John Chang] as basically the key American watcher and one that I had constant back and forth with, and therefore we can say that we have no instructions and we have no information other than what we see in the press, but, you know, you can see what's going on. You have your very bright people in Washington, very much plugged in, able to get information which would astound most embassies. So you know, they're not going to be caught unawares.

*Q: Well, how about when you got there, was sort of everybody ready for this particular shoe - I keep using the expression - to drop? This was there. It was almost so obvious.*

PRATT: And it was, of course, a key preoccupation, and so many things which took place would be viewed from that angle: what does this mean? I mean the thing is they had, of course, the Vance trip and the Brzezinski trip. And then there were people waiting to see if there was going to be another trip and who was traveling from Peking to Washington and so forth. It was, indeed, a constant concern. I shan't say obsession, because they had these two other things on their minds, but when it came to the United States, that was the key one. Even when we were dealing with military equipment which we were providing, the question was what should we weed out of this equipment agreement? Is this designed to take care of this problem or that problem? We did not do much in the way of draw-down of our forces in Taiwan, and we did not cut into the role and importance of the Taiwan Defense Command, and we didn't cut back on, for example, on one occasion I accompanied the chief of the general staff on a visit to an aircraft carrier. We didn't cut back on things of that nature because, of course, we weren't anxious to indicate either to Peking or to Taipei that we were caving before we were caving. But nonetheless, as I say, this was the way in which everybody was looking at almost everything that took place between the United States and Taiwan: what does this mean about normalization? So on one occasion, for

example, I was asked to give a briefing to what they called the diplomatic correspondents of all the newspapers. This was periodically arranged by our very active PAO (Public Affairs Officer). And so I went through all the press accounts of what had taken place. I said, "I'm giving you absolutely nothing which is drawn from any telegrams from Washington. We are basically not very much consulted about things of this sort because we're the ones who are going to have to be passing the message, and they don't want to give us any more of a heads-up than they have to, but as I read the same kind of tea leaves that you ought to be reading, mainly what's in the *New York Times*, what has been said by various people after various trips and so on, then it looks, indeed, as though the effort is indeed being made to normalize relations with Peking, and for what they consider to be very good reasons. And of course there will be an impact on Taiwan, and you all know what Peking has required of the French, of the Japanese, and therefore, you know, look around you and see that that indeed will have an impact."

Well, there again, that was misplaced, because one person who had not attended the dinner and heard my briefing and heard all the strictures that it was not based on anything from Washington, DC, and so forth, played it in an AP [Associated Press] report back to the United States saying that the American Embassy had just informed the Foreign Ministry that it was moving ahead on normalization. And you can imagine the blistering call that came in. And so, as I say, this was a person, the AP stringer, or rather the AP person there, was a person of Chinese origin - I don't know whether he had American citizenship or not, but in any case, he was very much under the discipline of the Government Information Office, and he would never have sent that story without the approval of Fred Chen, who had previously been head of GIO [Government Information Office], and obviously this was designed to see whether they could get some information out of the State Department to confirm or deny, et cetera. It really was a pretty nasty, low move, and I let all the reporters know it, that this was not what we . . . Everything was supposed to be off the record, and I had told them I was giving nothing which was in the way of classified information, there was nothing which was official. It was just my view of how things were moving in my own country and in Peking. Well, that was in, I guess, September or October.

*Q: Of 1978.*

PRATT: Of 1978, yes. And so of course, things quieted down a bit, and we thought, well, maybe it won't happen until maybe the Congress reconvenes in February or March. Surely the President would never want to be showing that he is showing due deference to Congress by having it take place, actually, when Congress was back in session. Even though he won't tell them in advance, nonetheless, he wants them to be able to respond.

And we said, "And besides, of course, Taiwan is holding its first probably really significant election under Chiang Ching-kuo's efforts to normalize the political structure and get it closer to, say, what their actual constitution is, which means recognizing the fact that they're only the government of the people who are living on Taiwan, and therefore they have to show decent respect for the opinions of the people on Taiwan and to hold elections which are going to be real elections. Well, they were scheduled for the 20<sup>th</sup> or so of December, and so much of our activity at that time was trying to figure out just how they were going to run these elections, and much of our contact with what had become the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] which was at that time was called the Tangwai - 'outside the party' or 'non-party' group. So that was our focus at

that time, which then shifted to the major internal political development, which were elections. And we sent in quite frequent reports about how the elections were shaping up and how important they were, and how they would not change the KMT's real hold on power, but nonetheless they would show a progression toward something other than a single-party system.

*Q: How were you reading this? Were you seeing that there really were developments within the Taiwan political structure that really were encouraging?*

PRATT: Oh, yes, very much so. See, I had been there in the language school as a student in 1959, and there I was back basically 20 years later, and there had been, of course, considerable changes. And we saw that more were being planned by Chiang Ching-kuo. And one of the key things was the effort to find a way of getting a role for the Taiwanese as Taiwanese, instead of their being just an adjunct of the Mainland-dominated Kuomintang. They had, in 1977, local elections, which had resulted a bad riot in Chung-li, where they had been faced with the dilemma of being unable to control the demonstration without sending in regular troops, and the alternative, as I say . . . well, the demonstration ran wild and burned down a police station, which from their point of view was very bad symbolically. And yet the other alternative of sending in untrained Taiwanese troops was even more horrendous, because would they actually fire upon their own people? So they refrained from doing that, and the police station was burned, and police cars and other cars were burned, and so on. And that left a very bad feeling, and, you know, is this going to be possible to liberalize without having things come apart. And that of course was one of the big debates within the Kuomintang party structure and the security services and the military. So this was obviously a key period, and this, as I say, I got there in 1978, and the thing that still dominated the internal political scene was that riot there in Chung-li during the previous elections.

*Q: Had our embassy prepared for the shock of recognition or something, because the embassy had been the target of a riot years earlier? Was there a good plan of what to do and all? Particularly the thought would be that, yes, there probably would be demonstrations, and considerable ones, once we did this. Were we getting ready for this?*

PRATT: Yes, we were, and we were making sure that we did not . . . the same way with the military establishment, but we always figured the military establishment they would not go after because that would be something where our military friends would say, "We don't want to alienate the admiral. We can alienate the ambassador, but let's not alienate the admiral because we may depend upon him in the future." But we made sure that we did not keep materials that we didn't have to. We had a pretty thoroughgoing review of what we had in the way of holdings and what we could have in the way of protection. We had, of course, a wall around the embassy. We had Marine guards, and they were told what they could use. We eventually had to do some of these things. But, no, that's fine, we knew we had to be ready for it. What we would do about housing, we thought they wouldn't go after any of these people in their housing, and of course a lot of them lived up in Yangminshan, which is very close to the area in which a lot of the bigwigs of the Kuomintang lived, and therefore we felt that they would be very unlikely to do anything in that area. But we did consider that this would be one of the things which might occur. As you are aware, it was the Christopher mission when it did really happen. But in addition to that, we were finding it difficult to use our embassy after the 15<sup>th</sup>, and we did

basically for a time meet in a room in the Tienmu area, piggy-backing on the military. Then when the military were out, we then had no premises, of course, because we had had to turn over our embassy to the Taiwanese Government, and we were meeting in our homes. So we were indeed preparing, but knowing full well that it was hard to be [end of tape].

*Q: We have your elections coming up December 20<sup>th</sup>, and you're getting ready for this, and Congress has been adjourned by this time, I guess.*

PRATT: Yes, and so we were sort of saying, Well, we will have finally the elections for it, and then after that we will probably wait and see what happens back in Washington. And of course one should remember this was also the Christmas season, and so there were a number of Christmas parties being held and some of those big public ones, where the Ambassador would represent the U.S. - the Chamber of Commerce and things of that sort - and others would be private ones where you would be at a friend's home. And so come the night of the 15<sup>th</sup>, I was off at a private dinner at the CIA station chief's house, and the Ambassador was off at a big dinner at the Chamber of Commerce, and a telephone call came through. And finally they tracked me down, and Roger Sullivan said, "Where are you all? We've been trying to get in touch with somebody there." And I said, "Well, the Ambassador is off at an official dinner. If you want me to get a message to him, I can do so." And he said, "Yes, get him over to a secure phone in the Taiwan Defense Command. We want to tell him what he's supposed to be doing."

*Q: By the way, the Taiwan Defense Command was our office.*

PRATT: Yes, it was set up under the Mutual Defense Treaty, and it was located in the northern part of town, and it was a fairly large area because, of course, it was a complex, in that they had several different spots. But the major part was just up near the airport - the then airport which was within the Taipei city limits. So I got in touch with Unger, and the two of us went to the Taiwan Defense Command for the secure phone conversation. And in the secure phone conversation, Roger Sullivan told him the message would be coming through, and it would be a White House channel message but coming through the station. So I had alerted my friend who was the station chief before, and so he knew enough to go to where we would be . . . where the station office was, so we would get the message as quickly as possible. Their office was over near the MAAG, so we were there where the station was, which was much bigger, of course, not just a little part of the embassy, but had its own operation there. So the message came in and told us to... in fact, we were told on the telephone, we spoke to them, and originally they said tomorrow morning, and it was just about 20 minutes advanced warning to Ching-kuo what we were doing. And eventually Unger, if you interviewed him, you'd find out that he was able to persuade Washington to let us do it almost immediately to get the maximum amount of time, not changing the time we were going to do anything in Washington, but making it a little bit more time for Ching-kuo to get his people somewhat organized. So we got the message, and finally we got through to James Soong, who has currently had problems of a political nature in Taiwan, to get through to the president. And as we learned later, they got through to the head of the National Security Bureau, the NSB, who was among the, I guess, only two or three persons who were permitted to wake the president. In other words, the foreign minister was not on this list. The chief of the General Staff was on the list, and formerly the defense minister - I don't know whether \_\_\_\_\_ [inaudible] I guess at that time he still could do it. So just a very

small number of people could put the establishment running so someone could go in and wake the president, because he had insomnia and therefore nobody really wished to face him unless they had to, and the only one who was willing to do so was the head of the NSB. We didn't know that at the time because he was not in evidence when we went over to the president's office. There was Fred Chen there and James Soong as interpreter.

So we delivered the message, and Ching-kuo asked for a written version rather than one which was just read to him, which he would be able to retain, because in it there were reassurances from Carter that the U.S. would continue to be concerned about the security of the people on Taiwan and be opposed to anything which would be, shall we say, a military operation on the part of the mainland against Taiwan, a peaceful solution. I've forgotten just how it was worded, but that would be the gist. And Ching-kuo, in a very sober and very statesmanlike way, said that he thought that we would regret this, that we had made a decision that would not turn out well and we would be sorry. But obviously he had seen it coming. So we went back and reported to Washington through the same channel and finally a few hours later got back a written version of the message which was delivered orally, and we went over and delivered that to his office at his home, which was on a naval base at Tamsui River.

So that was, shall we say, the break, and the turnover was, of course, to take place on January 1, 1979, and the departure of the military three months later and the termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty, in accordance with the required one year's advance notice. So Brzezinski had been able to establish the fact that, yes, we would have no consulate general, no liaison office, nothing resembling an official establishment, and we would do something, as we were learning later, on the order of what the Japanese had done. And then we would break the treaty, but with one year's delay. The Chinese, of course, were not very happy about it. They had agreed to it. And then we would withdraw all American forces, and of course we interpreted that to mean not only Taiwan Defense Command but also MAAG, which then we would have to have under the unofficial office, retired military, and again to manage what the active-duty military had done. So he had been able to get slight modifications to the Peking demands and ones which we felt we could live with. Our basic principle was the maintenance of practical and real relations, and the symbolic things having to go Peking's way. This is one of the things which, of course, was very difficult for Taipei because they were just as Chinese as the people in Peking, and therefore symbols may have meant as much to them as they did to the people in Peking. I don't think that's so true of the Taiwanese population, which is why things are somewhat changing now, although still symbols remain very important in all of Asia, including there. But nonetheless, at that particular time we had a leadership which was composed of elderly mainlanders, for whom the symbolism was again one more humiliation after the symbol of their leaving their home provinces of Chekiang or Chiangsu. So this was indeed very rough for the top leadership, and Chiang Ching-kuo obviously was going to have his hands full trying to manage this. We knew that, and so we, of course... But Unger was deploring that he couldn't get any more time. But I think, really, he made quite a contribution by apparently being able to convince somebody. They couldn't get in touch with the Congress. They couldn't get any bad things done, and if we gave them a few extra hours, so for God's sake, let's give them their early morning hours to do whatever they wanted to do and to tell whatever they wanted to tell so that they could have a statement ready for their own people at the time when the U.S. statement was being broadcast.

*Q: Well, when you were doing this, was it clear that we would have a relationship? I mean, we really weren't pulling out. It was the symbols that were changing, but not the realities.*

PRATT: Well, we knew that there was a certain amount of the reality which would go with the symbols, particularly the Taiwan Defense Command and the MAAG. And therefore this would have to be handled differently. But my personal view was that the people in Taiwan have always been very resilient and capable, and therefore would work out a way to handle this. And also even when it came to the problem of, shall we say, losing the symbol of an embassy and not being able to use the Foreign Ministry openly because we couldn't go there, nonetheless, they'd be able to work that out, too. In other words, the U.S. would have its problems, and probably some of these problems would be much worse here than they were there because we would have the difficulty of the American media and their role, of the Congress and its carping, and therefore it's very hard for us to do something, particularly since this is not an American game. From the very beginning, from the time when Nixon worked out his Shanghai Communiqué, we sort of agreed to play a Chinese game about Taiwan - in other words, forget about reality and be concerned about the symbols and try to manage this unreal world of symbol. And so that had started way back in 1972. And so we knew that this would be very uncomfortable for us because the United States does not really . . . I mean, I had to go through the so-called "secret war" in Laos when there was absolutely nothing secret about it, and yet to the American press and to the critics and all the rest of it, they used this symbolic thing "secret" - you won't admit it, and therefore you're making it a secret. And so in the same way, you're going to have an embassy in everything but name there, you're going to try to manage things exactly as they were in the past, and there's no change over the role of the American military in the area, and we're going to continue to do this, that, and the other thing even though you say you aren't. Well, that's very difficult for the United States to manage, because this is not an American-type game. Face is indeed important in the United States, but it is not the same kind of game as the one we embarked on with Peking.

*Q: It's hard for the press, in a way, to deal with ambiguity. They want to pin this down - what does this really mean? - and all that.*

PRATT: And does that mean, you know, is the treaty in force or not? And so you'll have the Congress coming out and saying, Well, the Taiwan Relations Act is the law of the land. Well, what does that mean, and so forth? So indeed, because when the normalization took place, the intention of Carter was to have a far more modest . . . In fact, he originally had just an executive order which permitted us to operate. We had considerable problems, of course, legally, because where's the money coming from? If we didn't have an embassy in Taipei, what budget was the money coming out of, how much of it was going where, and what kind of things could we do? All of that, you see, had to be -

*Q: And who is going to staff it?*

PRATT: That's right.

*Q: You have a Foreign Service, but they can't be Foreign Service.*

PRATT: That's right. So how that was going to be worked out, they couldn't even address that kind of question until after the major decision was made because they couldn't inform the people who handled budget and fiscal and the legal department. The Department's legal bureau was involved in some of the major aspects of, for example, the lapsing of the defense agreement with Taiwan, but there wouldn't be enough people involved to look at all the other aspects. They looked at quite a few, and they had a few people involved in it, but still much of it had to be done after December 15<sup>th</sup>. And we had a cutoff date, basically, of June 1<sup>st</sup>, when the ambassador was expected to be out, and we had to pull down the flag in our embassy and no place to run it up.

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*Q: Today is the 24<sup>th</sup> of January, 2000. Mark, December 15, 1978: alright, what happened?*

PRATT: Well, we pulled the plug, as we had been making it very clear that we were going to, from the point of view of Taiwan.

*Q: Anyway, let's take you, and what happened?*

PRATT: Well, as we were handling this at that end, we of course had a perspective which was primarily looking at what the Taiwan aspect would be because that is what we were being paid for. I don't think we were given much credit for that because, as you are well aware, many of the Democrats had a very strong anti-KMT bias because, of course, they looked at the KMT as being the favored child of the Republicans, which indeed was the case with Barry Goldwater and all the others. Therefore, they were very surprised to find that after recognizing Peking and of course treating Taiwan somewhat shabbily, they found that the Democrats in the Congress were the ones who spearheaded many of the things which they were opposed to, and appeared to be supporters of the Kuomintang.

Well, of course, our principal point, when we were there in Taiwan, was you cannot just deal with a bunch of strutting mainlanders, corrupt and ideologically driven and all the rest of it, and particularly centered back on their mistakes on the mainland, because this was a gerontocracy for the most part. Even Chiang Ching-kuo, who was next generation, had to deal with the buddies of his father, some of whom are now still alive and in their 100s. Madame Chiang, for example, is going to be 103 shortly. Well, we did not consider that that was the major part of what we were there for handling the Taiwan side of things, because we considered that the majority of the population there, 85 per cent of it, was not Mainlander and not necessarily KMT. And therefore we had to be as concerned about this group of people and how we did things, and therefore we felt that there was a good way for the United States to behave and a relatively impolite way, a way in which we would not like to be viewed by history as having handled this side of the equation. As you I'm sure are quite aware, there was absolutely no concern whatsoever on the Carter team about human rights in China.

*Q: We're talking about Mainland China.*

PRATT: Mainland China. They had gone through and, in fact, barely gotten out of the Cultural Revolution, which was one of the most horrendous periods of any country. It makes the anti-

White campaign that Lenin fought relatively moderate by comparison.

*Q: You're speaking about the anti-White Russian...*

PRATT: Yes, so our view was that there was a way of doing things which was commensurate with U.S. sense of values, and we knew that Tricky Dick had felt that he had to do a relatively tricky thing to get by the bumps in the road about what you'd say about Taiwan, in order to be able to get things through Peking. And he could do that with Mao Zedong in 1972, and he did it by playing a Chinese game, namely, conceding questions of face, symbol, while maintaining the reality. He wanted to go beyond that, of course. He wanted to normalize relations with Peking, and yet every point along the way he had other things, which, of course, intervened. And of course, that particularly was the problem with the Congress over Watergate and so on. But we all saw that the 1972 game was indeed a Chinese game. We, of course, knew why the Chinese wanted it and what the limits were and what basically some of the rules were. But it was key to us to keep in mind the fact that this was not an American game and we had to take care of American values and interests our old way at the same time we see this in questions of face and symbol to the Chinese-type game.

*Q: I want to move you back to you on Taiwan, December 15, 1978, and on. What were you experiencing and observing?*

PRATT: Well, we, of course, had to try to get our own status there and our own arrangements worked out because we were not only going to have the embassy closed within two weeks, or just about two weeks - January 1, but we also had to bring down the flag, we had to leave those premises, we had to find other places which we could operate from. We had to figure out new rules of how we would do this, because of course since the "experts" in the Department of State had been excluded from much of the arrangements with Peking, it was taking a while for them even to find out what it was that Brzezinski and company had actually agreed with Peking, and therefore what it is that we had to do, beyond, of course, the basic parameters, which were very clear, namely the termination of the defense treaty, the withdrawal of all forces within three months and so on, shutting down of our embassy by January 1 - the basic lines were there, but the point is that there are always many practical things that you have to figure out how you do, and you have to be able to work out with the host government side how they're going to permit it to be done, and you also have got to be able to tell them clearly what it is they have to do in the United States.

*Q: Were you also, more immediately, having to prepare for mobs and that sort of thing?*

PRATT: Well, we expected that to happen, and that was - I shan't say the least of our worries, but it was one where we did have to get our security further cranked up. We had to get rid of a lot of things we wouldn't want to have around. Dumping tapes went too far. But we also had to make sure that we told the government that we wouldn't stand for too much of this, that we didn't think that the people on Taiwan would either, and therefore they'd better handle this carefully.

But of course the first step was we had to prepare for the arrival of Warren Christopher and the American delegation, which was going to set forth the policy, explain everything. Something

which, of course, they weren't really able to do because they hadn't been able to work everything out either. And of course, it was labeled as a kind of negotiation, but Warren Christopher made it very clear that there was no negotiations; he was here to tell them what it was we had decided and what it was we were going to do, and what it was they were going to have to do. This was, of course, a relatively highhanded and not very polite way of handling this. Of course, Warren Christopher himself was very polite and very much the gentleman and very cool and I think did as well as anyone could the difficult job of trying to find a little way of stroking the people in Taiwan.

However, on his arrival, the biggest demonstrations of all were set up, and these were, in a very hectoring fashion, announced as being designed to show how the people of Taiwan resented what had been done and how the "just anger" of the people of Taiwan was being given free rein to show Christopher and the other American side how they really felt, and that this should be something he should take back to President Carter and the American people, that this was something which had indeed angered them greatly.

Fred Chen was the deputy foreign minister, and he finally made a speech at the airport when they arrived, wagging his finger a bit, and saying in sufficiently general terms but terms which afterwards were considered to have included the fact that there was going to be a mob scene and there would be actually an attack on the motorcade. Now we considered that this was orchestrated. This was KMT-run Taiwan. You won't get this number of people together without having it organized and having permission being given. And the fact that they moved in portable johns and had other conveniences made available showed that they were indeed making their own organized demonstration, and not something which was the "righteous anger" et cetera et cetera. Some of the few people who really did feel some of this were the veterans from the Mainland. There were still quite a few of them around, and in fact, we knew that we were going to have real trouble when they told the ambassador that he should not use his car but the Foreign Ministry would provide a car for him and for Christopher, and then the other cars would also be provided and no embassy car should be used and no embassy drivers used. In other words, taking it out of our power, and also that meant that if there were damaged cars, there would be no claims by the American Government for damage to American cars, which they then would have to have the indignity of having to pay claims on. So this was all designed, I think, the way they had in previous demonstrations, to show that unlike the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement in 1919, there were not grounds for the people of Taiwan to consider that their own government was acquiescing in something a foreign government did which was against their interests.

*Q: Was there any proposal saying, well, you know, this is moving, maybe Christopher shouldn't come in, which is a perfectly legitimate response to this? To say, "Okay, fellows, if this is the way you want to play it, so be it, but we're not going to be the patsy in this."*

PRATT: Well, there was sufficient indication that something might occur, but every time Unger talked to them about this, they said, Oh, no, these are our precautions being taken to make sure something doesn't get out of hand. And at the same time they were giving him assurances that they would guarantee the safety, et cetera, et cetera. And so what could Unger, who was anxious to have some kind of American gesture to make up for the rather shabby way in which this had been handled, to show that the U.S. Government at least was going to listen to their problems

and this could be registered and taken back to President Carter by a high-level emissary. So he was most anxious to have this tape played, and of course anxious not to be unaccommodating. So we were accepting their reassurances.

Now I'm not saying they did not play it relatively well. There were only a small number of incidents where they'd really get out of hand, where they broke a few windows and so on. I must say that the drivers they assigned were very disciplined, despite the fact that they themselves were retired soldiers or still maybe active-duty soldiers - Mainlanders, all of them - and therefore they had their strict orders, and they were going to follow them. But they personally were not very happy with what had occurred, and one could see that when they saw the people coming up waving anti-American banners and all the rest of it, they shared those sentiments perhaps more than the persons who actually were carrying the banners, which had probably been written for them by other people.

We learned afterwards, for example, that they mobilized the students from several universities and got them all out there, and of course the students were resentful of being mobilized and sent out to do this thing because they didn't particularly agree with it. A lot of them, of course, were ethnic Taiwanese. And so they, of course, were not, shall we say, with the mindset of the old KMT people, but they were forced to do this anyway. They were given eggs, and one told me afterwards, "Well, I asked, 'Are these rotten eggs, and they said, 'No, no, we don't want to do that. These are fresh eggs.'" Well, they stuck them in their pockets and took them home and ate them. But for some of them it was just a lark, but there are a number of old-time Mainlanders who could infiltrate this crowd of people fairly well controlled and get out of line. But they had security people there in plain clothes designed to grab them and pull them away before they had a chance to do too much damage. Now they did knock off Leonard Unger's glasses and they scratched his face, and in our car, I was in the second car with Mike Armacost and a few others from Christopher's party, and we were basically lightly targeted. The car was shaken, and I think a windshield was cracked or something of the sort, but it was basically pretty minor.

*Q: If I recall, Bill Brown was saying in his ADST interview that Fred Chen, after giving his speech, took off and went in a different direction, and Christopher made due note of this and never forgave him.*

PRATT: That's right. Not only that, he figured that what he said . . . Well, obviously, we were going one direction, and Fred wasn't, but it was just even getting out of the airfield area. Fred Chen, when he crossed the tarmac and very clearly with design to avoid the demonstration completely, so it wasn't as though he was going to escort anybody to where they were going.

*Q: That's a very . . . you know, I mean, just plain . . . I would say rude is even the wrong term, it's greater than that. I mean to say, "Okay, Fellows, we're going to go after you. We'll try to keep it under control, but I'm sure not going to be around of this."*

PRATT: "I'm not going to risk it." Yes. Well, we thought, however, that Fred was as much orchestrated as anybody else. So I never held it against Fred because I think that he was really surprised at what happened, and he would have advised against going, not because he wasn't as angry as many of the other Mainlanders, because Fred's been an angry man every since he was

probably in his teens, but nonetheless he was not involved in this part; he was merely told what his role was, to be the person who welcomes them at the airport, and such a welcome! I think he played it badly. I would have found it difficult to go through even the kind of speech which he gave, but he didn't realize that he was making the kind of threat which they intended to follow through on in such a physical fashion.

*Q: Well, now, you have been making a difference between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese. I will say, at the time, both before and after December 15<sup>th</sup>, was there a relatively clear-cut difference between the Mainlanders and the Taiwanese regarding America policy?*

PRATT: Yes, very clearly, because the Mainlanders of course were still fighting the Marshall Mission and what they saw as the cutoff of American aid on the Mainland. They considered that the U.S. was the one responsible for their having lost China and for their having to move out of their palaces in the French Concession in Shanghai and losing all of the prestige of being a minister for all of China. One of my friends from Tokyo put it succinctly "Do I want to go down there and be so-called prime minister of so-called Republic of China, which is merely one province?" So the Mainlanders were all very filled with anger with the United States. They think that we have handled China badly for years. The Taiwanese had none of this. The only thing they blamed us for was supporting the KMT in such a fashion that their ambitions for their own island were being given so little weight in the councils of the top KMT leaders. Remember they only had a few token Taiwanese in the KMT, even as late as when I was there. It was not until basically after 1980 that there began to be a more substantial role for Taiwanese, even within the councils of the top KMT leaders. So they indeed looked at the U.S. very differently. They considered that we should have continued with what it is we intended to do originally, in the early 1940s, which was to free Taiwan from Japan and give Taiwan its independence.

*Q: Well, now, again, before we talk about developments, you were talking about how shabbily the United States treated Taiwan. In realistic terms, I think you'd mentioned last time, we both agreed, that announcing the change in relations almost had to be done as a fait accompli because Congress would be fighting it out to this day. "If 'twere done, 'twere best 'twere done quickly," but what could have been done that would not have sparked a firestorm, particularly in the Senate and all that, do you think?*

PRATT: Well, in the end, as you know, the Congress got its revenge. It passed the Taiwan Relations Act, and we are still today - after all we are 20 years later - and we are still fighting exactly the same battle which we had in 1972, so we've not ended the battle.

*Q: Do you think that we could have come up with a reasonable solution that would have been reasonable both to the Communist régime and to the Taiwanese régime at that time?*

PRATT: Of course, we didn't have a Taiwanese régime. We had a Mainlander, Chekiang/Chiangsu, régime on Taiwan, and we had a Sichuan régime emerging in Peking, but yes, I think we could have done something differently, done better. I think in the first place we would have had to rely a little bit more on people, one, who understood Peking better - and admittedly Peking is not easy to understand (just this last week there were stories of a bomb attack against Zhang Zemin, which turns out to be a kind of hoax, but something happened there

in Shaban), so we still don't know what goes on very well in China. However, there are certain things we can know better than others. Secondly, we did not have to have the view which people like, I don't think Mike Oksenburg was this superficial, but many others were, and that is once we withdraw recognition, Taipei will come and accept Peking's terms very soon, a matter of two or three years, maybe even before the end of Carter's first administration and certainly before the end of Carter's "second" administration.

*Q: Do you think that was the thinking?*

PRATT: That was the thinking of many people. In fact, one scholar, Eric Akenshaw [Ed: ?], says that this is why they felt we could afford to do this, because they felt that the KMT was so cut off from the Taiwanese and Taiwan that they would recognize Peking as a way of making sure that the Taiwanese never got into power on Taiwan. And when they saw the demography working so that gradually the sons of the top Mainlanders went off to the United States and very few remained behind, and as the Taiwanese took over, the Mainlanders would pull a sellout and invite Peking in and have them land at the various airfields, which they would control through the military, and turn the island over to Peking regardless of what the people on Taiwan thought.

Now those of us in the embassy (still an embassy then) considered this was not the way things would work out. We didn't know exactly what the Mainlanders, many of them, might try to do, but we felt that they would not be able to accomplish it. I talked to one of the Taiwanese, really a rather significant leader, and we mentioned the fact, what if, for example, it looked as though Mainlanders were trying to pull a sellout and were trying to get the military set up to be able to invite in Peking's military to turn the island over to Peking? And he said, "Oh, we'd have to kill them all." And of course by that time, the military was sufficiently Taiwanese (although the officer corps and particularly the top officer corps was not) and a lot of Taiwanese had gotten well enough connected with them so that they would be able to make sure that the military could not pull off what some of them might have intended to do. We didn't think that they intended to do it, either. We thought this was a miscalculation on the part of those persons who were so virulently anti-KMT, so virulently against Chiang Kai-shek and all that he stood for-

*Q: We're talking about Americans.*

PRATT: Americans, yes - that they could not see that Taiwan had already changed enormously and that the Taiwanese were very significant players even though they were not among the top people who would be greeting them at the airport or seeing them at the top ministry.

*Q: Well, now, going back to 1978, at the time this theory was sort of floating around, what would have been in it for the Mainlander officer corps or political leaders to invite the Communist régime in? What would have been in it for them? What was the thinking?*

PRATT: Not enough at that time, by that time. And of course, also one thing they failed to understand was that so many of the top leaders of Taiwan were already persons who had made their major career on Taiwan. Sure they had been born on the Mainland, they had been educated on the Mainland, they might have had minor positions on the Mainland, but the positions they had had where they had made the greatest accomplishments were on Taiwan, and therefore

although they were Mainlanders and although they really looked down their noses at the Taiwanese, nonetheless they were persons who considered that their major career had been made on Taiwan and that's what they were proud of, and therefore they had a stake in Taiwan. But you couldn't tell this to the people who were living with the concept of the Kuomintang as it was in the 1950's.

*Q: Well, now, another question about this. Just as a practical thing, we're sitting in an embassy. We had to so-called give up the embassy. Why couldn't somebody wave a wand and say, "This is no longer an embassy; this is a private office building"? Why did we have to go find other quarters?*

PRATT: Because of the symbol, and as I told you, we were playing China's game when it came to symbols. The embassy was U.S. Government property. There was no way. I mean, we sold it.

*Q: What did we do now? I mean, what were you doing during this time after the recognition? Christopher came. What was your reading on Christopher and dealing, once he got through the motorcade and all? What were you doing?*

PRATT: Well, I went with the motorcade to where we were supposed to have our people be staying, which was the Grand Hotel, so my car got there because the ambassador decided that there might be something still happening at the hotel because we were scheduled to go there. So he went to his residence he had up in Yangminshan.

*Q: With Christopher.*

PRATT: With Christopher, yes. We were then in telephonic communication, and we conveyed the message back to the Taiwan side that we would not be attending the foreign ministers' dinner. That was canceled, obviously, in view of the manner in which we had been received.

Now the new foreign minister - because when we recognized on the 15<sup>th</sup> the foreign minister submitted his resignation because, of course, he had failed to hold on the American connection, and the new foreign minister was, I think, a very fine gentleman and not at all as unpleasant and difficult as his predecessor. So we were anxious not to affront him personally because we believed he had nothing to do with this. He would have advised against it, and yet, of course, he was not in the loop for that sort of thing. They were not concerned with what they could do to with the internal security. However, we felt that it was certainly wrong symbolism to be conveyed if we were to be his guest at a dinner, so we moved directly to having the first substantive meeting the following day, and also we arranged for a call on the president, who was not supposed to be involved in the negotiations, but we said that we would not even begin negotiations until we there had been a meeting with the president to express our displeasure at what had occurred and to get assurances that nothing more of this nature would take place. And this is when Bill Brown went on this trip, and I'm sure he gave you a very thorough and good account of how Wang Ching-shi, the head of the Taiwan Garrison General Headquarters, was put in charge of all the security for our stay there and told directly by the president that he had full power to make sure everything was maintained in a good, calm way. And of course, he was a very honorable gentleman. Unfortunately, he was married to the daughter of Admiral Hu Ling-

ching, who had taken the surrender from the Japanese along with MacArthur, and therefore was considered not to be in the Chekiang-Chiangsu clique of President Chiang, and he felt that he had a problem and was forced out of the NSD later on, presumably somewhat connected with the murder of Henry Liu. But at that time he appeared to be one of the persons who was not only a real gentleman and a very honorable man, but somebody who had enough knowledge of who would be doing this sort of thing and could make sure that they couldn't continue to do it. So those were assurances that came from the president and from Wang Ching-shi, which meant that we felt that we had the Security basis and basic political go-ahead to carry on our discussions.

And the person who handled them was the new foreign minister, and he was also named Y.F. Chiang, but he spelled it differently and was not of the same family as President Chiang. But he was from that area of China, well-educated in the United States and a very savvy person who had been involved with the Americans since the 1950s. He had been on the Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction, where he played a key role, which was so often played by these Mainlanders, as being able to get information from below up to where it had to go by using the Americans as the intermediaries. The poor Americans didn't realize. They thought they were there because they were so technically competent. Well, he was probably more technically competent than they, but politically speaking we could serve as a means of communication. So had he played that role very well and was indeed continuing to play a very, very good role. But Fred Chen was also there, and one or two times he started to do his sputtering, and Y. F. just turned and fixed with an icy stare and told him to shut up.

So the talks went smoothly. There wasn't really much to talk about. The Taipei Mission did not find that we learned that much about what Washington intended to do, and certainly the Taiwan side didn't. But at least we got the basic outlines retraced and the time frame for various things to occur, and of course they wanted to be able to have a longer period of time for them to adjust their representation in the United States. They wanted to make sure they had the same number or a larger number of offices here than they had as consulates at the time of the turnover, and we were limiting them. So everything that they wanted we had to say, sorry, no, we had to do it our way. And so it was not that easy, except for the fact that they knew where the power lay. And we were not being very clear about the continuing of arms sales because there was going to be a hiatus of quite some time with no new approvals. And the question was, when would they resume and what sort of arms sales would be resumed? So the security side of things was important, but we didn't have the details for much of that because, of course, the people who handled this in the White House were not terribly good on military matters and therefore they hadn't bothered - the hadn't been able, really, given the way in which they were handling this - to get the Defense Department as thoroughly involved in studying this because it would have meant more people in the Defense Department knowing what was going on than they wanted to have know.

But it was a useful exercise. It gave them a chance not only to present their views, but to be seen by the people on Taiwan as presenting their views. Now, admittedly, they still looked very much like the KMT old-timers' views being presented, and the Taiwanese were still pretty much out of this, but nonetheless it did look as though a view of, shall we say, security and other aspects of Taiwan was being presented to Washington.

*Q: Now Mike Armacost's position was what?*

PRATT: He was still under secretary for political affairs.

*Q: Were you getting from him or from the group that came out with Christopher sort of a feeling of saying, Look, we don't have much control over this, this is a White House thing, and these guys are all screwed up? I mean, was that what you were getting?*

PRATT: No, not that they were all screwed up, but we were finally finding out what it is they have done, and we're trying to work out what it is we can do to implement this. I think nobody questioned the right of the President to make these decisions and basically to arrive at them and to try to implement them any way that he chooses to. This is what I think is the mistake in the way in which Brzezinski and Carter and, of course, Kissinger try to play things always, as the State Department is always trying to thwart them. Well, the State Department basically, at that level, I don't think has ever had a separate agenda where it says, you know, to hell with the President, who does the President think he is, anyway? I think the major thing, and this is one of the things I think which Elliott Richardson understood and used this, and that is that these are people who are assets to be used and not opponents. We had been *pushing* for recognition of Peking since the 1960s or late '50s, and we had been the ones handling the conversations with China at various times. So we weren't people fighting it; merely we were trying to use what little expertise anyone could have over what was going on in Peking to try to make sure we safeguarded our own interests as best we could. But that, of course, was not the way in which it was viewed.

Now Armacost was a good soldier. I mean, we were all team players, and so was Warren Christopher. Warren came to this rather late, too, because he had not been very much involved, and although Tyler, of course, says that this was basically a big feud between Vance and Brzezinski, I think their biggest feud was not really over the China issue (and Vance went along with having most of the people in the Department of State excluded, including political appointees like Mr. Holbrooke, in favor of the little "kitchen cabinet" which Brzezinski had assembled within the White House).

So no, we didn't get anything which was critical of what had been decided. They were interested in knowing our views as to why, for example, we thought if it had been delayed 10 days the Congress still would not be in session and it would have given them a chance to hold their election. I think they were supposed to be on the 18<sup>th</sup>. So the 15<sup>th</sup> took place then. On the 16<sup>th</sup>, the president of Taiwan canceled the election. He said we cannot hold elections with the turmoil surrounding the break-off of relations with the United States. Now we would have advised CCK to go ahead with the elections anyway, and merely take this as a circumstance to be handled in the electoral politics, which they generally are pretty good at. And we were advising Washington, of course, one, that we wanted to get advanced notice so that we could tell them what was going on in Taiwan which might indicate to change it this way or that way if they could. We weren't asking too much - say, a week. A week or 10 days would have made all the difference from the point of view of how things were handled in Taiwan. If the elections had taken place, then the first big step that Chiang Ching-kuo was taking towards having the politics of Taiwan involved, and as it was he had to cancel these, and it was two years later and also one

dreadful incident down in Kaohsiung later that he finally was able to move to elections.

*Q: So how did you all operate? The delegation left, and did you feel that you had instructions? Did you have enough to figure out what you had to do?*

PRATT: No, no. But we knew enough so that we had plenty to do, and we could have known about that, of course, as fast as we did when we started the 15<sup>th</sup> and knew we had to find new premises. We knew we had to do something.

In the meantime, we were told that we could still be getting some money, but there had to be an executive to permit this to happen post-January 1, because, of course, we were in the State Department budget, and that was finished as of January 1. So we had to get word about just how we were going to get the money to pay our local employees and even, for example, our own Foreign Service personnel a sufficient report about what would happen to them - should they stay, should they not stay, if they did stay, what would happen? Ron Palmer came out to give us a bit of a lecture on that and was not very clear because he wasn't told very much about what the shift from status of Foreign Service personnel to not Foreign Service meant. He just told us to hold hands and try to keep the troops from rebelling. But they were really very annoyed because, you know, what was this going to do to their careers. You can argue about being separated from the Foreign Service and what that would mean for the next assignments and all the rest of it.

*Q: You know, I mean, a normal person sitting there and told he had to resign - there was no body of law to really back him up, was there?*

PRATT: That's right. And we were assured that they'd work something out so that after we had resigned and sort of put in our tour in Taiwan, we would then be returned to the Foreign Service and be able to resume our careers and that we'd suffer no disadvantages from being in Taiwan, that any efficiency report written on us would be given as much weight as a report written anywhere else. And so this was supposed to be really very straightforward and no difficulties et cetera. But our staff was given, however, the right to decide whether they would be transferred and reassigned immediately, and I think if you talked to Gene Martin, Gene Martin was one of the ones basically who advised persons who were at difficult points in their careers, not to trust any assurances they got because Ron Palmer was trying to give assurances which he himself did not really believe.

*Q: Well, you know, as a serving Foreign Service officer one of the first things you learn is, don't trust promises given by Personnel. Things change, circumstances change and all, and people look at you and say, "Well, that last group of people may have promised you this, but we can't do it." I mean, there is good, solid reason to mistrust.*

PRATT: Sure, and I said there were those who were having, you know, who felt that they could move ahead more rapidly in their careers if they could get a regular Foreign Service position . . . and several in my own section did leave, some did not. In any case, these were part of the number of internal administrative issues we were struggling with. How were we going to handle things in the process if we lost too many key persons in a particular area? How could we get accomplished all the things that had to be done, because from that moment on we didn't have to

worry about reporting on the elections. We didn't have to worry about the internal politics so much because we had thrown a monkey wrench into that and nobody would know for months what was going to bubble up later on, but it did mean we had to be concerned about where we were going to locate our offices, how we were going to be getting cables in and out, where we were going to have our communications equipment, because of course we were going to have to leave the embassy? What are we going to do about a secure place to have the code equipment and so forth?

So we had a number of problems of a purely housekeeping nature, and we all had to work on that. In other words, this was not something which was left to admin, because many of these things were questions which involved discussions with the Foreign Ministry and with other agencies of the Taiwan Government and were of a political sensitivity as to what Washington was really trying to get at, what it had agreed to with Peking. And every time admin would come out with what was easiest for them, the Department would say, "No, that won't work because Washington has said that they agreed with Peking that we would only do such-and-such and so-and-so."

In addition to our changes, we also had to try to get the Taiwan side to come up with its own organization with which we could deal, because after the first of January we were not supposed to see Foreign Ministry people in the Foreign Ministry. And so we had to work out where it is we would be able to meet unofficially, and they had a guest house, fortunately, right opposite the Foreign Ministry, and we could meet there. We could also - they gradually were setting up their own sort of counterpart organization to our American Institute in Taiwan. We had to work with them on what kind of name they could have for us. They proposed four or five different names, and we kept saying no, no, no, you can't use this, you can't use that, you can't have "China" in it anywhere, and so on. So we had plenty to do. As Bill Brown, I'm sure, told you, we had a sort of morning staff meeting *every* morning up at his residence, which was halfway up the Yangminshan Mountain, which meant people could come down the mountain who lived there and people from downtown could move up there, as I did. And we had to then return to our downtown office, and convey to our own subordinates what it was that had been discussed at that morning meeting.

And I think Bill Brown told you that the cable address we had was BILL BROWN TAIPEI, sounding a bit like an e-mail address, but in any case, not "CONGEN" (Consulate General), not "AMEMB" (American Embassy) and so forth. And so that sort of thing had to be worked out, and we had to know how to handle it so that we could make sure that our traffic got in and we could make sure that our traffic would go out and we could handle various classifications and so on. We also had to work with the Taiwan Garrison general headquarters on our own security. We had to work with the Taiwan Defense Command about what they were doing about drawing down their own troops and getting ready for their departure within three months and making sure that they handled this in a way which was compatible with what it is we'd agreed with Peking that we would do, which was not always easy. I think there were probably a few little lapses there which if Peking could have known about them would have been very, very annoyed.

*Q: What about immunity?*

PRATT: Well, we had to work that out, too?

*Q: Was there a period when you were just sort of nude there?*

PRATT: No, not really, because we had an arrangement. I don't know how formal it was and how it would have stuck with international law, but we had actually in writing the fact that we would retain the same immunity as we had had, and for example, all of our number plates, license plates, had to be changed because, of course, they had the character on them for 'diplomatic.' We had to have that taken off. And we had to have something on them which would indicate that we would be treated in a special, protected way. And we had also, of course, to make sure that their desire for something similar in Washington and elsewhere in the United States would also take place. And that, indeed, there was no real problem about that, because they had received instructions, of course, from the president to make sure that this did take place, and so they had enough connection with representatives, who were trade officers and so forth, and particularly, of course, they had had the Japanese Interchange Association as a model, so they knew how the Japanese had said it had to be handled, and if we ever had any real problems we'd end up saying, "Well, do to us what you did to the Japanese."

*Q: Did you find, though, that maybe the Authorities on Taiwan had already had this experience, but our people in Washington . . . You know, there's nothing like a bureaucracy for not moving.*

PRATT: I know.

*Q: And particularly, this is Taiwan - all of a sudden you're talking about somebody in Protocol, and this is a very small little matter, and it becomes, "We don't do it that way," or something like that. Was there somebody who was cracking the whip in Washington and saying -*

PRATT: Yes, Harvey Feldman was one of the control officers by that point. You've talked to Harvey, have you? Harvey is here at the Heritage Foundation, and he has done a number of articles about this sort of thing.

*Q: I think he's been interviewed, not by me but by someone else [Ed: ADST Feldman Oral History interview started in March 1999 and is on the Library of Congress website].*

PRATT: Well, I think in any case he's the best source. We, of course, got it indirectly because our local interlocutors would complain to us about what it was they were hearing from their various representatives in the States. Because it wasn't quite so bad in Washington as it was in some of the cities where they were trying to protect their consulates . . . because did they have to leave all their premises in, say, Boston and San Francisco and so on? Were they going to have to lose . . . which of the offices were they going to have to close? We didn't tell them what offices they had to open or close; we merely said that they were limited. Instead of 11, they had to go down to eight, or whatever the figures were. I've forgotten now what the numbers were. But they had to reduce the number of offices they have in the United States. And they of course had their offices for several purposes. One, they wanted to be near many of the Chinese communities, because they liked to influence their Chinese compatriots, the Chinese people, but they also were interested in trade, and they were interested in having people who could take care of the students

whom they had here. So they had a real problem when they had to reduce the number of offices they had, because each one that opened only after getting a fight with the budget people about money to handle this and had to justify this new office. So when they were told they had to consolidate and move out, it wasn't nearly so easy as it would be for the State Department, which had been fighting for years but losing every battle to the budgeters. The Foreign Ministry was not accustomed to losing battles over money, because they could go to the president and get the money for something they said they needed. Well, the State Department, of course, as you know, is totally different.

*Q: Were you aware, getting reports back, I'm sure that the Taiwanese, whatever you want to call, representatives-*

PRATT: We called them *Taiwans* to distinguish them from the ethnic group, the *Taiwanese*.

*Q: Alright, the Taiwan representatives were all over Congress at this point, weren't they?*

PRATT: They were, but the thing is, what they had to do was merely try to influence draft legislation, and they could not fight the problem. Some of them wanted to fight the problem and have the Congress just refuse and try to do something totally different, but for the most part the people from Taiwan were pretty practical, and they went not to the people like Goldwater, who would want to turn things over, but went to Kennedy, went to Zablocki, went to a lot of the key Democrats. And they said, you know, let's make sure that we make this thing work well for Taiwan and we protect the interests of Taiwan. So that's why, as I say, I think that a lot of the doctrinaire Democrats who thought that only a retrograde Republican would be supporting anything to do with Taiwan because, really, it was Mainlander KMT we were struggling with, that they were out of date, and people were already talking about the 22 million people on Taiwan, and not the two or three million Mainlander troops.

*Q: This happened in 1978, so we're talking about 1978. How long were you in Taiwan?*

PRATT: I left in 1981.

*Q: So how did things work out? In the first place, just a simple question: did you have trouble getting paid?*

PRATT: No, I think we maybe skipped one pay period or it was three days late for the pay period or something of the sort, but our checks continued to be deposited. We'd get the money put into our accounts. So they did work that out, and they did get an executive order which permitted that.

However, they had to go to the Taiwan Relations Act for a number of other things.

*Q: The Taiwan Relations Act came about when?*

PRATT: That was in May, April or May.

*Q: Of 1979.*

PRATT: I think it was signed into effect in May 1979. And so we were doing a number of things for which we had very shaky justification under any executive order, because there were American laws which required certain things, and the executive order, of course, could not supersede a law. And therefore arms sales, certainly . . . We didn't have any; we had a moratorium on that. But nonetheless, our contacts with them about what it is they were trying to buy and so forth and getting their wish list anyway - these were things we basically felt we could not do until after we had some authorization, which was of some legal, legislative nature. We had nuclear programs, and nuclear, of course, required assurance given by a government. So you needed to have something which could act in place of a government, which was not what the case was merely under the executive order. Our lawyers were pretty good, and at some point you might want to talk to some of them. We became the American Institute in Taiwan as of January.

*Q: Well, did the Institute have much input into the Taiwan Relations Act, or was this something that was being developed?*

PRATT: No, I would say we had some indirect input, because we were talking about what it is we were learning from the Japanese as to how they handled things. We were also learning from the Taiwan side what it is they felt they needed. And we would be sending this information back. But Taiwan's major concerns were being conveyed through their own officers directly to the Congress, because they had, after all, a very high-powered representation here - an ambassador who, of course, had to leave, but he several deputies, including one who reported directly into the president's office, and he had very, very old, long-term contacts with many people in the Congress. So they had their own really good establishment to present their views, but in addition to that you had enough persons who . . . Stephen Solarz [Ed: ADST Oral History interview dated Nov 1996 and located on Library of Congress website] and Lester Wolff. In 1982, Lester Wolff published a really very good book about these issues entitled Legislative History of the Taiwan Relations Act. And people of this sort were really pretty aware of what was going on, and what they did not know they could get out of the Taiwan side without any trouble. In addition to that, of course, the State Department was finally involved, and someone like Harvey Feldman was also very intelligent and very competent, and he knew what the questions were. Maybe he had a limitation because, after all, the draft legislation was set up by Carter and added somewhat by experts at the White House, but it was almost totally turned around and strengthened by the Congress itself.

*Q: You went through all these sort of housekeeping chores and all, so this, I imagine, kept you busy, and the political reporting, as you said, was sort of in abeyance anyway. But how about the Taiwan Relations Act? When it finally appeared, you and the rest of your group, what did you feel? I mean, this really moved things up a notch in favor of Taiwan, or sort of made it easier to work, or what?*

PRATT: Much easier to work because it was indeed very reassuring to the people in Taiwan because it refers specifically to our concerns about the security of Taiwan. And this, of course, was in clearly vague language - as it always has to be - because every time you want to make something stronger than that you run into the problem that you can't even do this in a treaty, that

you still have to say, "subject to the American Constitutional provision." So obviously we had to tell these people that this is as far as it could go under our constitutional legal system. And so it was as good - in fact, some people were trying to say, "Look, it sounds even better than the Mutual Defense Treaty." And we had to say, "Yes, but it's not a treaty, and therefore as legislation and domestic legislation handling the foreign affairs matter, we don't know how it's going to work, because this is very unusual, and we don't know, for example, how the courts may take it." As there was a number of Chinese lawyers who wrote analyses of the Taiwan Relations Act and tried to figure out where the pitfalls would lie, where some person would raise a suit and would get into a court, and some American court might say that this was an unconstitutional way of handling what should be handled by a treaty. And for example, in one of the provisions near the end it refers to "in U.S. legislation wherever the term 'nation,' 'state,' 'country' occurs, Taiwan shall be considered to be covered." Well, this was something which, of course, was required to take care of arms sales and nuclear cooperation and a number of other things, but we can't do it with renegade groups, can't do it with the mafia or something of the sort. We have to be dealing with governments, and yet we had to say that this was not a government. So we knew we had something which could be up for grabs at any point and could be challenged in court and so forth. The fact that none of this had ever gotten into a U.S. court that we know of is, of course, marvelous. We also knew that any sensible judge would say, "This is legislation. It's been signed by the President. And we are a third branch of government getting in there trying to second-guess what it is that the legislature and the President decided was the best way to handle something, and we don't like to get into that kind of political environment because that's not what we as judges are there for." But you know, you can get a judge who won't hold that.

*Q: I know.*

PRATT: So we were saying this could be a big problem. We also, of course, continued to get into difficulties over just plain nomenclature. For example, we wanted to find a way of referring to what had been called the GROC - Government of the Republic of China. We couldn't use Republic of China any more, so we called it for a while "Government on Taiwan - GONT. And this went on for a couple of months, but I think it was by February the Chinese were coming in and complaining and saying, "You can't refer to it as a 'government.'" We tried to explain that "government" was a sort of relatively value-free determination, just a denotation of being a government. And they said, "No, no, no, you must refer to them as 'authority.'" And we said, "Well, you know, *authority* comes from the Latin *auctoritas*, which means 'justified authority.' And therefore, that is something which you say they don't have." They'd say, "Forget about your English language. We use *authority* to refer to a government that we like, and we have a different word in Chinese, which we translate as 'authority' which we use to refer to unlawful exercise of authority." So they came back and protested about that. Then we had to figure out what we could do, and call up Taipei and all the rest of it. We had no real easy term.

But you know, getting things paired between English and Chinese is not always that easy. When, for example, we were first trying to sell our policy of engagement, the Chinese were very, very confused, because they had very different terms for 'engagement.' There are two senses of engagement. One is engagement prior to a marriage, and the other is a military engagement. They have no term to cover our use of the word engagement as something which is what we say is our relationship with China. So you are constantly finding problems of this sort. We were able

to get help from the Japanese, but of course, the Japanese find it much easier to go between Chinese and Japanese because they both use characters, and many of these characters, of course, will have roots in some of the same Chinese literature. But we couldn't quite do that, and so we were constantly having these problems as we went down this rocky road of establishing what is a new, non-relationship. And then, of course, we had to find, for example, we couldn't call my section the Political Section because that would imply that we had a political relationship, which would imply we had a diplomatic relationship perhaps. So I took the Japanese term, which was "General Affairs Section." And the General Affairs Section in Japanese means it's a kind of secretariat that really is a key sensitive group making sure everything works. But when you get into Chinese, it means 'administration.' So there we were taking a Japanese term for the name of my section.

*Q: I have a feeling that for the next two years you were sitting there trying to figure out what the hell to call things. An awful lot of time is spent setting the mold. But other than all this, what were you doing? Up to 1981, you were watching events on Taiwan -*

PRATT: And on the Mainland.

*Q: What were you getting from the Mainland?*

PRATT: We were on distribution for many things from about the Mainland, not the most sensitive ones, because we were still handling much of this in Paris. We were still handling it when I got there in the earlier period, but in the point is that they were moving very quickly from the liaison office to embassy, but nonetheless this was still really relatively new for them, even in Peking. So they were doing a number of things trying to get spin-offs from the Chinese how this was working, and of course the Taiwan problem was one of the things that constantly arose. So we tried to keep track of when they were getting their nose out of joint and over what.

Now those of us who were somewhat old China hands knew well that one of the biggest problems always is one of symbols, and therefore of names. They have a term which goes way back to Confucian times of "rectification of names," and that is that if you get the proper name for something then that's solving half the problem. The reality should follow the name. And of course this is the exact opposite of the Western tradition, where God first created things, then he gave them names; whereas with the Chinese you pick out the name first, and then you create something to fit the name. So we're starting out from different directions, and that's why I said this was a Chinese game we had to play. And when you get a lot of people who are American politicians, they are not really easy, don't really fit in with this Chinese concept of names. We were constantly having that difficulty with the Congress particularly, because the Congress, of course, felt that this was un-American to do it this way. Well, of course it is un-American, but we agreed back in 1972 we weren't going to do an American thing, we were going to do a Chinese thing. To get an idea of the difference in approach, just listen to Senator Helms lecturing the Security Council! The United Nations has got to behave as though it were in Carolina. And this is the attitude of so many of the people, and it made it very difficult to keep relations running smoothly. And as I say, there were a number of congressmen who were savvy enough to be able to understand this, and they therefore, I think, did pretty well with the Taiwan Relations Act, which really was an amazing piece of work, and I've really been surprised there hasn't been more

doctors' dissertations on this in law schools because - I shan't say it's a model for very much else, because you won't find another Chinese situation until you find another China, but nonetheless - it was a key aspect. And we have the same problem in Taipei, because we were dealing with old-time Chinese people just as they were in Peking. They were just as offended every time we got something that make Peking happy. To the degree it made Peking happy, it made the Taiwan side unhappy.

One of the key tasks was, of course, constantly trying to reassure the people who were - shall we say - key figures in Taiwan but not clued in to what the leadership was doing there, because of course they had nothing but, shall we say, total lack of confidence in what their own government was telling them. They never believed what the KMT had been telling about the Mainland, and they didn't believe what the KMT was telling about the U.S. It's one of the problems, I think, of a big propaganda operation, one concludes that you're being gamed rather than being told what's really true and letting you make up your mind as to what it really all adds up to. So the propaganda apparatus of Taiwan was thrown into full speed, and yet this was the very thing which made a lot of the Taiwanese, that is the local majority population, feel very uneasy; and they, as I mentioned the story about one of these politicians who said, "We'd have to kill them all,"; their mistrust of a lot of the old timers was very, very deep.

The Taiwanese, of course, had been badly treated back in 1947, and from their point of view the KMT had never redeemed itself by treating them as adults who could be told the truth and be brought into a kind of cooperative relationship with government. Obviously, the government was at that time really changing under Chiang Ching-kuo, but the fact that the elections were canceled meant that from their point of view they had lost a good chance of trying to convey to the government a greater sense of the role of the Taiwanese majority population. And this is one of the things that we felt was also an unfortunate occurrence. This was when they began to establish their own organizations for human rights and things of that sort, which they were using to present a distinctly Taiwanese view of events on the island. They were not permitted to form a political party. They therefore all had to run ostensibly as independents, even those who got to be relatively organized and, as we use the term, oppositionists, because we couldn't call them an "opposition" because they couldn't be organized to the point where they would be that sort of thing; but they were "in opposition" and they were somewhat connected with each other, but they couldn't be excessively connected or else they would be rounded up for violating the law.

Taiwan had this delightful law that any organization which they wanted to establish legally could be done only if there were no organization which already existed to handle this. They used it, for example, to prevent even an artistic association because they said, "We've already got an association of artists," which was established by the KMT, run by the KMT, and having its cadre drawn from Mainlanders and being very much opposed to any of the currents of art which the Taiwanese and the younger people were interested in. But they couldn't establish their own association for the longest while because already an art association existed. In the same way, they got a human rights organization established first, and then the government had to chase them out and establish their own human rights organization, and they did not apply it to themselves but they applied it to everybody else. The fact that this other human rights organization had already been set up did not mean that they wouldn't establish their own.

But here these people were trying to get their own political movement, in part because they were able to criticize the existing government for handling both the United Nations earlier and the United States connection so badly.

*Q: Looking at this period, the post-recognition period, up to 1981, with your General Affairs Section, were you seeing a real difference? Were you anticipating the Taiwanese eventually moving in to take over, I mean moving in peacefully, or did you see the KMT holding on till the last? How were you foreseeing what was happening on Taiwan?*

PRATT: Well, we saw a constant evolution, and we saw Chiang Ching-kuo as favoring it. Unlike his father, he had seen the kind of Leninist views that his father and Mao Zedong had, at first had when he'd been in Stalin's Soviet Union. And he therefore felt that this was not the way the future was going to be. He had all of his children come under very strong American influence, made sure they all learned English, not Russian, despite his own knowledge of Russian, much better than his knowledge of English - not nonexistent, but it was not that good. And so just as his father had learned Japanese and he had learned Russian, he felt the future was going to be American English, and therefore this was going to be something on the American pattern, which meant rule of law, which he was pushing gradually for and also the importance of the constitution. We nonetheless saw that he was himself running the place in his own fashion as an autocrat.

During this period I did several pieces of analysis of just how the various parts of Taiwan were run by Ching-kuo, how he did not use organization that much; he used his own people in each of the organizations and he had his own separate little connections to security, to the military, to the party, to the economy. And he dealt with them in that fashion. In other words, he did not use his position as chairman of the party to deal with the economic side of things. They only dealt with the premier and the head of the Bank of China and the economic planning organization. And when he dealt with the military he dealt sometimes with and often around the minister of defense. He himself had been deputy minister of defense before he became vice-president and then, of course, became president. So he was well aware of the fact that he himself went to the various aspects of the power establishment through his own sense of organization and knew which people to deal with on what matters. For example, they had previously had a party organization, which was similar to the one in Peking and, I presume, in Moscow, but while they continued to have a finance and economic section in the KMT organization, nonetheless, that was not the way in which finance and the economy were handled. They were handled by the president acting as president, bypassing, not using the party, but going directly to the people who ran the economy.

So this was part of the evolution that took place under him, and the question was, is he going to try to have a succession system which brings forth somebody who will take over and rule things his way or not? For a while there it looked as though he was trying to do that, because they established a separate organization called Yu Shaokan, which brought together a lot of these strengths and put them in the hands of his sort of close collaborator of the beginning of the year, Wang Shen. And this continued until I left Taiwan. It was when I was back in Washington handling Taiwan affairs here that he canned Wang Shen and made it very clear that that was not the direction in which he was going. However, it was still not clear how he intended to have the

real political structure go, but there was no question that he intended to bring the Taiwanese increasingly in and also that he intended to have the constitution determine things, rather than the party. In other words, you are no longer seeing the party, which was like the Communist Party, and the government merely being an instrument of the party. It was preparing to become a party which would be like other political parties, which meant that you could have a second political party.

**VIRGINIA CARSON-YOUNG**  
**Consular Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1978-1982)**

*Virginia Carson-Young was born in the state of Washington. She obtained a B.A. from the University of Washington. She was the spouse of a Foreign Service officer until she became an officer in her own right after the death of her husband in 1972. She served in consular affairs in New Delhi, Hong Kong, Merida, Bucharest, and Lima. She was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 29, 1991.*

*Q: You were there for four years from 1978-1982?*

CARSON-YOUNG: Yes. I was actually American Citizens Officer in Hong Kong and had an extremely interesting time. The Consulate at that time was filled with China Watchers. Their focus was on the Mainland and, of course, there was and is now this huge interesting business community. Because American citizens services are not limited to the destitute, and I had a legitimate reason to know as many as possible, I started going to Chamber of Commerce luncheons. I got to know many of the business people. I became a member of the only overseas branch, at that time, of the League of Women Voters. Working with the League, I was very active in a U.S. program for the 1980 elections, and was on local television promoting the idea of democracy, the responsibility to vote So I had quite an interesting, but essentially non-visa experience.

*Q: What were your main problems and issues that you had to deal with?*

CARSON-YOUNG: It was relatively uncomplicated compared to India. We had certainly the drug-related arrests, but the prisons were well run, the officials were uncorrupted, so jail visits and drug problems were not as complicated. And, of course, the geographical area was much smaller, so it was easier to make these visits. Persons qualifying as citizens became one of the main items of interest for me. We recognized China during the time I was there. The Chinese are experts in using our citizenship laws in order to emigrate. I think that at FSI, probably even now, when they are demonstrating citizenship fraud, they use a photograph of a Chinese family as an example. If you count the heads and the number of feet, they don't match up, because some heads have been pasted in, in order to establish a fraudulent family member's claim to status.

During the Chinese cultural revolution, many documents were destroyed. But one thing the

Chinese are reluctant to do is to destroy photographs. And they take many family pictures. In Hong Kong I had a former Chinese national employee who had actually been the one to close out Shanghai in 1948. He was Fred Tao, a very dapper little gentleman, in his sixties, I think at that time. He was my citizenship expert. Many of the people of Chinese origin born in the United States in the early 1900s went back to China as children. They were now elderly, newly able to come out of China. Most of their documents had been destroyed. Even if they had a birth certificate, how did we know that this was the same person? They were wanting to go to the U.S. in order to qualify their children to go. These elderly people, I think, did not really intend to remain in the United States, but they were eligible to go if they were citizens. So they tried, through photographs, to establish that they were the same person who left California as a baby, and were U.S. citizens by birth.

Fred Tao was my expert on photographs. He said, "If you will notice, the nostrils and the earlobes do not change." And apparently that is the reason for the three-quarter view for immigration photographs. The ear is a very distinctive feature. A baby's ear and an old man's ear will be the same shape. I think there were probably lots of people who assumed we had records and archives and computerized ways of checking, when in fact I would just take a photograph to Fred Tao and he would check out the nostrils and the ears. He would say, "Yeah, it is okay," and we would often issue the passport on this basis.

**DAVID DEAN**  
**American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Washington, DC (1978-1987)**

*David Dean was born in New York City in 1925 and graduated from Harvard. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in numerous posts including Kuala Lumpur, Rotterdam, Taichung, Hong Kong and Taipei. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.*

*Q: Brzezinski was National Security Advisor and was looking at everything with a certain amount of Polish view.*

DEAN: Yes, that's true. He was a bright and engaging person and who knows, perhaps the idea of using the Chinese against the Russian was an attractive one at that time. We are talking about May 1978. By that time the Vietnam War was long lost, but we were still locked with the Soviets in the Cold War, and Brzezinski felt that China would be a really good ally against the Soviets. So, he wanted to move the U.S. forward into formal diplomatic relations with China, and make them a formal ally against Moscow, but at least use them in the game against the Soviet Union. Brzezinski went out to the Great Wall and brandished an AK-47 and said, "This is for the polar bear." He had his discussions with the Chinese and they agreed to start negotiations later on in the summer between Washington and Beijing. These negotiations were kept very secret. They were run by the National Security Council and by the USLO, the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing. They weren't disseminated among other people. At that time, my tour was up, and I left for a job in the Department in INR as head of the East Asia section. My replacement, Stapleton Roy, was

the one who did most of the work with Woodcock on the negotiations with the Chinese. I came back leading a group of Congressmen and Senators in the fall, just before Thanksgiving, and Stapleton Roy and Leonard Woodcock gave us a good briefing. But, at that point there had been no breakthrough on the crucial question of continued U.S. arms sales to Taiwan to bolster their defense against any mainland attack. The Chinese were adamantly opposed to the U.S. continuing arms sales, even of a defensive nature, and the U.S. side would not move ahead unless there was some agreement that we would continue arms sales. After our visit to Beijing, I traveled all over China with this Congressional group. They were interested and interesting people. Senator Muskie was there, as was Senator Stone, Packwood, and several others. Muskie has died, and the others are no longer in Congress. It was a very good trip. The Chinese made a major effort to accommodate their interests. Stapleton Roy gave us an excellent briefing in Beijing. But as I said, there had been no breakthrough.

The breakthrough came shortly afterwards in early December. The Chinese decided they wanted to go ahead with formal relations. They reserved the right to raise the arms sales issue at a later date. They were putting it to one side and letting diplomatic relations proceed, and we did establish diplomatic relations. President Carter, on the fifteenth of December, 1978, said that as of the first of January, 1979, two weeks later, the U.S. was to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, that we were to break all relations with Taipei, that we were to withdraw the remainder of our military forces in Taiwan, which at that time were just a few hundred, and that we were to give one year's notice to terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty that we had with Taiwan. In 1954 the treaty's revision said that it could be terminated with one year's notice. We were to do all of these things, and of course, not too many people in the State Department or in the whole bureaucracy knew anything about this. Very little preparation had been made. The breakthrough came suddenly; the announcement came shortly after that. The negotiations had been kept secret because the administration did not want Taiwan's friends in the Congress to disrupt them or to hinder them, so here was a *fait accompli*, but what were we going to do with Taiwan? Well, "L's" (Bureau of Legal Affairs) Jim Michel drew up a quick version of the Taiwan Enabling Act, or what later became the Taiwan Relations Act. It didn't deal with arms sales. It didn't deal with protection of economic interests on both sides. It didn't deal with a lot of issues which Congress, when they got the draft, felt were important. So, on a bipartisan basis Senator Frank Church and Senator Jacob Javits got together in the Senate and Zablocki and Lester Wolfe and others in the House, and they worked on a bipartisan plan to bring about a Taiwan Relations Act which did include a large section on arms sales, which included language very similar to the Mutual Defense Treaty, that any attack on Taiwan would be viewed with serious concern by the United States. They stopped short of saying what our response would be. They protected economic assets on both sides; they gave Taiwan, in effect, the status of a foreign country to argue its cases in U.S. Courts. They gave all sorts of protections of immunities, not diplomatic immunity but functional immunity, which later was similar to immunity given to foreign consulates or organizations in the United States. They added many provisions like that. For example, they gave Taiwan 20,000 immigrant visas annually, similar to the quotas of other countries. This was something Taiwan hadn't had before. They treated them in many respects like a foreign country, but they said the relationship would be unofficial and would be conducted by the American Institute in Taiwan, a non-governmental private organization. That is where I came in. I had been in INR just for a few months, and I volunteered to Dick Holbrooke to help build up this new American Institute.

*Q: Dick Holbrooke was...*

DEAN: Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. We were concerned that AIT not be politicized, that it become a professional organization subject to the Department's guidance in terms of policy. The American Institute in Taiwan was not established to originate policy; it was to carry it out, and that is what we did. So, the Institute was started in a little basement room where the old FSI used to be. We had a room smaller than this. It was about 12'x12'. We jammed three desks in there and we had one secretary and three officers.

*Q: Well, when you started, was there a concern that somehow this might turn out to be one of these things where they would haul some political figure out as a very strong proponent of Taiwan, and this would sort of muddy the waters and set a precedent. Was this a concern?*

DEAN: Yes, it was a concern, and that person might go directly to the White House, for example, or might be at odds with the State Department over what policy we would pursue. We emphasized in our negotiations with Beijing that we would have only unofficial relations with Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act added on a lot of things that were apparently official, but they gave the President certain leeway. President Carter, when he signed the Act, said the Congress had given him certain leeway, and he would interpret that in light of the negotiations with Beijing on diplomatic recognition. Of course, AIT was just an idea. We had to borrow the \$15.00 to go down to the District of Columbia and register AIT as a nonprofit organization. We didn't have any money. I got into an argument with the Department administrative people because our people out in Taiwan had been put on administrative leave. Later we were going to turn them into AIT employees. The Taiwan Relations Act said that AIT employees may not be U.S. government employees, so we had to separate them from the Department. In the meantime, they were on administrative leave. Some of the administrators in the Department wouldn't let me send air pouches out there with their letters and credit card bills and everything because the Department didn't have any money for the American Institute in Taiwan. I had to go to a higher authority and say, "Can't you just please pay for them anyway and send them out," and they did. It was that type of little problem that was multiplied a hundred fold in every little thing you could think of. Because the Taiwan Relations Act said we were private, nongovernmental, and our employees were not to be U.S. government employees, we had to deal endlessly with personnel and administration, and not just with the Department, but with other departments and agencies to resolve problems. We wanted everybody in Taiwan to be converted to AIT employees regardless of which agency they had come from; USIA, Agriculture, Commerce or elsewhere. We gave them the same allowances, the same types of leave as Foreign Service Officers.

Every single department had different rules for allowances, shipment of household goods, school allowances and home leave and whether they could ship an automobile and the type of housing they could have. We wanted to treat everybody the same way, and we wanted them all to report through the Director of AIT, and not individually, to their departments. Initially, for the first few years, we were able to hold the line, and everything worked out very well in terms of employee morale. Everybody was being treated the same way and got the same benefits in terms of working together and in terms of our relations with their parent agencies and departments back in Washington and everyone enjoyed a harmonious relationship. Things from that point of view

went very smoothly. It was working out the details back here that was really frustrating. Eventually Washington's bureaucracy's insisted on regaining their separate controls. We didn't have any problem with EAP, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Their policy guidelines were very clear, and we understood them. We followed them, and that pleased Department policy makers. They wanted us to be as unofficial as possible. But the administrative side complained they had no experience dealing with an unofficial organization that was carrying out U.S. foreign policy abroad. Our director was just a private citizen; he was not an Ambassador. So we continued to have difficulties of different sorts up until the present day with the administrative side of things, although we tried hard to resolve them.

*Q: How did you, I mean here you are in this organization; did you have a State Department badge and all of that?*

DEAN: Because the State Department lawyers said it would be a conflict of interest if I signed the AIT contract with the State Department, while still being a State Department officer, I retired from the State Department, early in January of '79 in order to take over AIT, to help found AIT, and to manage it and sign the contract with the Department. The contract was important because by means of the contract the State Department was able to funnel funds approved by Congress to us on an annual basis. The contracting officer had never had a contract of this type before. The legal provisions kept defeating him and us. We kept trying to modify and simplify it, but it wasn't easy because nobody had dealt with a situation of this type before, so there was a lot of confusion. Anyway we eventually got things working. Fortunately, we had a terrific administrative officer, Jack Connally. He is still on contract with the Department. He has retired, but the Department calls him back and sends him to different spots to try to solve administrative problems. He was really an experienced, positive thinking officer. We were so lucky to have him because the problems were so enormous and so frustrating. He did a marvelous job. We also had Joe Kyle who had been economic counselor in Taipei and had served in the EA Bureau. He came on board in January as our economic officer. Joe was experienced and a good negotiator with both the U.S. bureaucracy and the Chinese. He negotiated many agreements with Taiwan and kept track of economic developments there. Then we had David Evans from Defense who had been a colonel in the Air Force and later a Pentagon civil servant working with the military unit that supplies foreign military sales. He came over to us and virtually ran our military sales. So, we had the four of us together, but we didn't have any money so we had to work without pay. It was a really good group. They were self confident enough in their own fields to go right ahead and do things and not to worry about getting all sorts of clearances; they just went ahead and did it. Without that type of approach, we never would have set up the Institute.

*Q: You say you couldn't pay anybody. Most people who work for the government, and I speak from experience, don't have a back log. I mean we need our monthly check.*

DEAN: That's right, but we couldn't do anything about that until President Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act in April 1979. Once he signed the Act, we signed a contract with the Department, and the Department started to fund us. Fortunately, because our staff in Taipei had been put on administrative leave and had not converted yet to AIT, the Department was able to pay them. So, they got paid. It was just the four of us in Washington who weren't on anybody's payroll. Jack had already retired from the Department. David Evans was on transfer. We couldn't

pay anybody then but we were able to recompense them later.

*Q: How long did this last?*

DEAN: We started in January; February, March, April, and we started to pay them in May.

*Q: I'd like to get this in here before I forget, how long were you with AIT?*

DEAN: I started with AIT in January 1979. We gave ourselves a title. I was Chairman of the Board and Managing Director, for several years from January 16, 1979, when we registered the Institute, until the very beginning of 1987. I was in Washington for the first eight years. Then I went to Taipei as director of our Taipei office from January 1987 to the end of 1989, and I remained a trustee until 1995.

*Q: This is a minor detail, but did you say you dug into your own pocket to bring up the \$15 to register?*

DEAN: Oh, sure. We borrowed it from Leonard Marks in L. We got by, but we were working very hard then. There were so many issues we had never visualized, and I don't think the Department had thought of them either. Political issues, personnel issues, all sorts of different things, but gradually things came to order. You see, part of the problem was that a lot of U.S. departments and agencies had direct dealings with Taiwan before. They dealt directly with Taiwan's embassy here or sent people to Taipei. We had lots of travel back and forth and lots of business. Now, they had to funnel everything through AIT, through our office in Washington, and they couldn't deal directly with Taiwan officials. They had to have us there and present, even if it was a negotiation of a new airline agreement, negotiated by the Department's aviation division, but with AIT chairing the meetings. Everything had to be funneled through us. Of course that created resentment and a big backlog, but eventually we got things moving very speedily. Of course some didn't want their people in Taipei to be merged into the AIT structure, but we were able, partially thanks to the people I have already mentioned, to do all these things. For instance, we had to sign all the military sales agreements. For the first year, all military sales were suspended by prior agreement with China. In the second year, military sales began again and new contracts had to be signed. We had to sign every single one of them. I must have signed hundreds, if not thousands of contracts, and all in 10 copies or more. I should have had one of those signature writing machines. But military sales were negotiated with David Evans, our military representatives, and the Taiwan military procurement group, and DSAA, the Pentagon unit that controls military sales. David and the others did all the negotiations and I did all the signing. That went quite smoothly although every time we would sign something and send it up to Congress, Beijing would protest. It was more of a proforma protest in those days. We also signed agreements on everything else. During the years I was in Washington we must have signed between thirty and forty different agreements on everything from safety at sea to fisheries to intellectual property rights.

*Q: I am a bit confused. Let's take fisheries. There are fishery people who know fish, and you don't know fish. There are fishery people in Taiwan who know fish.*

DEAN: And we would bring them together.

*Q: You would act in what would be known in Hollywood parlance as the beard. The man who takes somebody else's mistress to a party so somebody else can get together with her. That was known as the beard.*

DEAN: We were the beard plus! What we would do is bring the fishery delegation from Taipei to Washington, not the other way around usually. Then the fisheries experts would meet with each other. If we could spare a person, we would have them there, if not they would meet by themselves in a place that we would arrange at AIT, or a hotel room, or it could be anywhere at that time, but not in the office of our fisheries experts. So they would meet; they would negotiate. When they got to an agreement we would have to sign it. We would sign it, and there was a provision in the Taiwan Relations Act that we had to report all of these agreements to Congress. We were also the repository of all of these agreements. If anyone in the public wanted a copy, they would have to come to us. They were also printed in the federal register. Yes, in a sense we were the beard, but in another sense, we served as the unit that coordinated people and cut through a lot of red tape. You know if there is to be a meeting of people from the State Department, the Defense Department, Treasury, Commerce, they dance around with all sorts of briefing papers and clearances. We would just pick up the telephone and say we are having a meeting here tomorrow, please send a representative. They always did. We didn't have a lot of paperwork, so we cut through a lot of red tape. We facilitated a lot of agreements; we got things done much faster than the normal process worked. The Taiwan representatives were amazed that things like that were happening. Of course Taiwan didn't like the setup; they wanted an official office, not an unofficial one. They wanted to go to the State Department and the National Security Council and talk to everybody in the various departments and they couldn't do that. They wanted to have high level visitors coming from Taipei, and from Washington to Taipei, and they couldn't have that either. There were lots of things they couldn't have that made them unhappy, but in terms of the substantive work, getting agreements done, cutting through red tape, facilitating real work, then AIT did a pretty good job.

*Q: How about the representation of Taiwan in Washington. What was your role in that?*

DEAN: We had to make all their official appointments for them. We were the interface for them in Washington. They would come to us if they needed to see someone, and we would meet either in our office or arrange a luncheon or a dinner or a breakfast. We had lots of breakfast meetings, and we would get someone from the Department, maybe the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and a few others to discuss a particular problem. We would discuss it over breakfast and get a solution usually, I mean if a solution could be reached, or at least they would pass their messages back and forth and hope they would reach the proper recipient. So, they had that type of contact, and when visitors came from Taiwan, legislative groups or others, we would brief them in our office, make their schedule, including calls with the Congress. At that time, the State Department was shy of having these people in the building, but later on legislators could go in, but no Chinese officials, in the State Department or the National Security Council or White House. So things worked out. If I had to do it again, I would have made a memorandum of conversation for every single discussion I had with the Department's administrative people, because we didn't have a good record of what had been agreed upon as the years went by and that was unfortunate.

Other than that, under the circumstances, we did the best we could, and we tried to help Taiwan's Coordination Council. Taiwan's office in the U.S. was called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. Subsequently, in '94, they changed their name to TECRO, which was Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative's Office in the United States because they had to have Taipei or Taiwan in there so people would know where to go to get a visa. In those early days, we did our best. There were lots of embarrassments. In the beginning the State Department was very tentative about dealing with Taiwan at all. They felt that Taipei and their friends in Congress wanted to throw a spanner in the new gears of the relationship with Beijing. Taipei wasn't helping itself at that time because it was always saying that the relationship with the U.S. had some elements of officiality in it, or when we signed the privileges and immunities agreement, Taipei claimed it was diplomatic privileges and immunities. Before you could say Jack Robinson, the PRC Embassy would be in there protesting about a diplomatic agreement, and about the names Taipei used, the Republic of China, and all this type of thing. Washington was really tentative in dealing with Taiwan and worried about Taiwan's attitudes and what they would try to do. They were worried about the new relationship with Beijing. We tried to soothe these feelings both on Taiwan's side and on the Department's side and to build a bridge between the two so they could communicate in a less frenzied, uptight way. I think that helped a little bit. For one thing, I had a very good relationship with President Chiang Ching-kuo. I had served in Taiwan before, so I had met him much earlier. We had become, I would say, good friends. I admired him and respected him, and I think we had a level of confidence in our conversations with each other. I went to Taiwan soon after AIT got started early in '79 and saw him. He had determined he would do everything he could to make the relationship with Washington work. He saw relations with the U.S. as vital to Taiwan's security, although a lot his countrymen and high officials were livid about the break in the relationship and the U.S. diplomatic relations with China. He himself calmed them down and tried to rebuild the relationship. He really did a great service to his country by doing that. Unfortunately, right after the break in relations, on December 27, 1978, Deputy Secretary Christopher and Roger Sullivan, a Deputy Assistant Secretary in EAP and others in EAP had gone to Taipei on a special mission to work out the new relationship. When they got there, the whole cavalcade was met by a mob of students and workers who smashed the windows of the cars, jumped up and down on the roofs, forcing the roofs down on the seat backs with passengers crouching on the floors. Some of the passengers were cut by the flying glass. I think that this riot had a profound impression on the victims. Christopher and the others who came with him became sour about Taiwan and the relationship. It was foolish of us to have sent a mission to Taipei at that particular time because we should have anticipated some public outrage. We should have met in Guam or Hawaii and worked out things in a calmer atmosphere. Partly it was our own fault and partly it was a demonstration that got out of hand, and partly the fault of the foreign minister and others in Taiwan. Things were pretty tense. Eventually President Chiang sent his ablest negotiator, his vice minister of Foreign Affairs, Yang Hsi-kun, to Washington. He was highly respected here. He was an independent thinker, but really brilliant. He worked very hard with the State Department. He got the agreement we now have with the American Institute in Taiwan, its functions in Taipei, its functions in Washington, and the Coordination Council's functions in Washington. The Chinese set up an office in Taipei too. So the agreement was worked out and both sides began to move ahead with the relationship. I think that it has worked reasonably well. At the very beginning, some people thought this would be a short term solution, that things would change in five or 10 years at the most. The unofficial relationship has been going on for 20 years. The 20 year

anniversary will be next April. It looks to me that it will go on for a long time after that, perhaps, another 10 or 20 years. So we have this organization, the American Institute in Taiwan. It has had its ups and downs, but I think it has tried very hard to carry out its responsibility, and it had some very good people. Chuck Cross was our first director in Taipei. We had Jim Lilley and then Harry Thayer, Stan Brooks, and then myself later. I'll get to that.

*Q: How did it work? I mean we had our office in Taipei. Somebody would sit down and write the equivalent to a political telegram reporting this. What would they do, send it?*

DEAN: Send it to me. The telegram would be addressed to AIT Washington, and our telegrams to Taipei, all telegrams that went out to Taipei were from me. I would sign them; I mean my name would be on them. They would be sent by various organizations. The EAP Bureau would send them to other bureaus, after clearance.

*Q: In other words these were basically State Department communications.*

DEAN: Yes. We had a circuit to the State Department. I am only telling you what the form was. The form was put that way in case unclassified cables got into the public realm and it would be seen very clearly that they were being sent between AIT Washington and AIT Taipei. But, in the Department, in the communications sector, when AIT/Taipei telegrams came in, they would be distributed to all the departments and agencies according to subject or there even could be a byline on them, pass to so and so. We had the usual protection of our confidential materials. The Sea Bees came from Manila and built up our communications room and everything else with the normal type of equipment that an Embassy would have. We had full scale cooperation from the State Department in those respects. I mean you couldn't ask for better cooperation, in communications and technical support, things of that type. It worked out very well.

I think there was a lot of concern in Congress about Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act said that AIT had to report to Congress annually for the first three years, which we did. We would give Congress a report which would use the Department's resources as well as our own, a mutually agreed upon statement. Then I would speak at an open hearing about the relationship. I went up to testify several other times for several other reasons, particularly before Congressman Solarz, who was the chairman of the House Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific. He was concerned about several human rights and other cases, some of them just terrible. There was a big riot in Kaohsiung in 1979 at the end of the year. Elections had been postponed the previous year because of the break in relations. It was Human Rights Day so the oppositionists were demonstrating on both of these counts. The demonstration got out of hand. Something like 183 policemen were beaten up. Several rioters suffered some injury too. No one was killed, fortunately but several organizers were arrested. Congress and the Administration were concerned that the Taiwan government was going to give the death penalty to some of these people. Taiwan was still under military rule and martial law, and most of those arrested were going to be tried in a military court. In early January 1980 I was sent to Taipei to speak to President Chiang. This was three weeks after the riot. After we discussed it at length President Chiang assured me that none of the prisoners would get the death penalty, and that most would be tried in civilian court not military courts. In the final analysis, that is what happened. The Taiwan authoritarian government controlled the courts. President Chiang realized the impact on

American public opinion if the prisoners were executed. He was a very unusual and farsighted man. He made it clear to me that he wasn't going to do this, and subsequently that proved to be the case. All of the prisoners who were given jail sentences are now out. Their jail sentences were shortened. President Chiang followed through on his promises to us. Some of those who were released from prison are now among the most prominent leaders of the opposition party in Taiwan, and they have played a major role in Taiwan's march toward democracy.

We worked hard, both in trying to restore confidence in our relationship with Taiwan through our military sales which were very important to them, but also through our conversations, negotiations, and other aspects of the relationship to reassure them that the U.S. was not just washing its hands of Taiwan and walking away as we had in 1949-1950 before the Korean War broke out. They had some experience with that. They were afraid we were going to take Taiwan and hand it to the mainland on a silver platter in pursuit of our own national interests. That suspicion was with them then, and I am afraid it is still with them today.

*Q: In a way, this early period was helped by the fact that Taiwan was not a democracy and the mainland China was not a democracy so we didn't have an emotional stake of withdrawing our support from a "Democratic" country and pushing them into the jaws of a communist one.*

DEAN: You could say that, but on the other hand we had had a long, close, and friendly relationship with the Republic of China, both on the mainland and Taiwan. They had lots of friends in the U.S. and in the Congress, and their economic ties with us were becoming more and more important as well. They had really good links with our military because many had gone to our various military training schools at the highest level. As well as low ones. We had trained their aviators, and had given their navy old destroyers and other ships. It was a very close relationship. We had a joint command, the Taiwan Defense Command, and joint war planning. There was a lot to the relationship which was suddenly brought to an end. This is the first time I can recall that we just broke diplomatic relations with a friend and ally, though we did have a mutual security treaty, in pursuit of our interests elsewhere. I think there was a feeling of guilt on our part for the way we had managed this relationship.

*Q: I have done an interview with Nat Bellocchi who held your position somewhat later. I mentioned that the ROC, the people representing there, had an incredible network of friends. They really knew how to network, I mean they already had it through their mercantile interests and their military interests and all this. We are talking now about the early 1990s, the mid-1990s, the mainland Chinese just didn't have this type of relationship. I was wondering whether you found yourself running into that network.*

DEAN: Oh, yes. Even in a lot of my testimony before Congress. There were those in Congress who resented the fact that the U.S. had broken relations with Taiwan and asked really pointed questions about the new relationship which they resented, I remember Derwinski, who was a Congressman from Illinois, while we were in some grain sales conference (Taiwan had sent us a grain purchasing mission that was in Chicago.) seated on the same platform saying to me in an aside, "If I had my way we would send our battleships to Taiwan, restore diplomatic relations, and put the U.S. flag back up on the embassy there." He was speaking from the heart; that is what he really felt, and lots of others felt that way. It was a delicate time in the State

Department's relationship with Congress, its relationship with Taiwan, and frankly in Taiwan not everybody was going the same way the president wanted to go. There were those who wanted to embellish the relationship and restore officially, but carefully, so as not to offend the U.S. Administration.

*Q: Well now, you must have felt you were the greatest nuancer in the world as far as having to deal with this. I was thinking that the Taiwan representation in the United States, particularly in those early times, were trying every way to almost exacerbate the problem.*

DEAN: What they had done was to compensate for the lack of official relations by sending over all sorts of missions, purchasing missions, sports groups, cultural groups, and inviting to Taiwan, congressmen, senators, staffers, governors, educators, mayors, everyone you could think of. There was a constant stream of visitors, and still is.

*Q: They paid their way.*

DEAN: Yes, of course. This is still going on. They use the alumni association of Tung Hai University to invite people, or Suchow University or other private universities. They did this to compensate for the lack of other types of official contact, and quite successfully. They had very good congressional relations through people in their offices in Washington. They got to know all the staffers, all the congressmen. They were dropping in all the time giving them information about what Taiwan was doing. That has continued, but at the time, it was quite delicate and the new relationship made it even more so. It was very touchy with Beijing, and Congress was intent on following up to make sure things were run as they saw fit. Everybody had a different agenda and a different perspective. We tried to bring them all together.

*Q: What about the mainland Chinese? Were they rattling rockets and doing much during this period?*

DEAN: Well, of course, right after the announcement of diplomatic relations they were still very sensitive. I mentioned they flew off the handle when we signed the privileges and immunities agreement, and Taipei characterized them as diplomatic privileges. They were on the lookout for anything like that. On any showing of the Republic of China flag in the U.S., any sign of officiality, anything, they would protest right away. There were lots of protests to the State Department those first couple of years. Things got even more tense when President Reagan campaigned, when he was the candidate, because he said on several occasions that he would restore diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

*Q: This was in 1980.*

DEAN: Yes, that's right, the 1980 election. President Reagan gave several speeches. He said, "We will have an official government office in Taiwan. The relationship with Taiwan has many elements of officiality in it." He was known as a good friend of Taiwan. He had been there several times as Governor of California, and Richard Allen was writing a lot of his speeches for him. Richard Allen later became the National Security Advisor and worked in the word "officiality". I counted it eleven times in one speech. This drove the Chinese on the mainland up the wall because they were afraid Reagan would restore U.S. official relations with Taiwan. A lot

of Republican visitors to Taiwan at that time, before the election, were promising Taiwan that relations would be upgraded. So here again we had a really tense and difficult situation.

I recall that various invitations for the inauguration had gone to Taiwan. Anna Chennault was the National Republican's Women's Committee leader. She had gotten the senate organizers of the presidential inauguration swearing-in ceremony to invite a delegation from Taiwan led by Y. S. Tsiang, Secretary General of the KMT, and several officials from Taiwan. The Chinese Ambassador heard about this and said that he would boycott the ceremony if Y.S. Tsiang came to it. So, I had to go along with John Holdridge to tell Y.S. he was disinvited. Fortunately he had checked himself into an Alexandria hospital with a "diplomatic illness." Earlier we urged Taipei to tell him not to come. Then Anna Chennault said, "Don't pay any attention to them. Come anyway." We again urged them not to come, but finally they did arrive. Y.S. was here. He knew that he wasn't going to be able to attend the ceremony. He checked himself into the Jefferson Hospital with the flu, and we went to the hospital to give him our commiserations. Anyway, he didn't go; the Chinese Ambassador did come, and the Reagan administration decided they would not upgrade relations with Taiwan.

Even so, the Chinese were really upset and they pressed the Reagan administration. They pressed us hard on arms sales, on the FX fighter plane, on all sorts of issues. Finally the Reagan administration decided that besides not upgrading the office in Taiwan and leaving things as they were, that they wouldn't sell the FX aircraft to Taiwan. We negotiated an arms sales agreement, signed on August 17, 1982, which said that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would gradually decrease and that they would not exceed the quality or quantity of earlier arms sales. This agreement was made under the assumption that there would be a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan situation. The domestic repercussions were so severe that they affected Alexander Haig, who was Secretary of State in the early parts of the negotiation, and his pressing for this agreement was partially responsible for his resignation.

The entire conservative establishment in Washington reacted with cries of outrage and horror. Senator Barry Goldwater and Walter Judd, a former head of the Committee for One Million, went in to see President Reagan. Of course, this was orchestrated over several weeks and months, through the months of May, June, and July, really up to the August signing in '82. When Haig had gone to China in June, he had to use these words, "We will not exceed the quantity or quality of arms sales." This was not in his brief but they represented what he thought. They were written into the August '82 agreement. President Reagan was upset by his friends' reaction. He sent a letter to President Chiang Ching-kuo in July with six points in it concerning arms sales. Two of the points are still important in other areas. One is that we would not be a mediator between Taipei and Beijing, and the other is that we would not press Taipei into talks or negotiations with the mainland. He sent the letter as a way of reassuring them. He said we had not discussed Taiwan arms sales in advance with Beijing and would not discuss them, would not agree to a certain time for ending arms sales, would not change the TRA, and would not change our position on Taiwan's sovereignty. So Reagan sent the letter in July and went ahead and authorized the signing of the Communiqué. I think by that time we had been backed into a corner and had no other option other than to sign it. But it has caused a lot of dissension. I think that whenever you have a document like that which one side is being forced into, you really can't expect it to last forever, and I think we have to say not only the spirit of the Communiqué has

been violated, but several of its terms have been violated by us.

*Q: When you talk about quality, what is quality.*

DEAN: We had a rule of thumb. If something is no longer being produced, like a M-48 tank, then we were willing to sell the next higher production model. But that wasn't an agreement with China. Every time we did something like that, they would object strenuously. So we had a lot of trouble with China in the early Reagan period, during the campaign, during his first year in office, up to August of '82.

*Q: Did you as an Institute have, I mean I would have thought you would have wanted to brief and really sit down and talk to the Reagan people around him. These were people coming in, there always is a learning curve for a new administration but particularly for one coming in as the Reagan one did. These were not old government hands who knew their way around. This was a brand new crew.*

DEAN: That's right. On the other hand, they had some experienced people, John Holdridge, for example became Assistant Secretary for East Asian Pacific. Jim Lilley, whom I had known for a long time, went to the National Security Council. They knew what the score was, but you see they had two motives. They wanted gradually to improve relations with Beijing for our own national interest, and at the same time, they wanted to improve unofficial relations with Taiwan. And, this is exactly what they did. After the '82 Communiqué, the Reagan administration began to do both of these things. Relations with the mainland improved markedly. Relations with Taiwan improved markedly. From the summer of '82 until Tiananmen, we had good relationships with both sides. I won't say terrific; there were lots of problems with both countries. But they were solvable, and the trend was a positive trend. We did a lot with Taipei. Washington had a very good policy team. For once the National Security Council, the State Department and the Pentagon worked together. It was a pleasure to see because at other times they were so often at odds with each other, and I have seen that. In this case, there was Jim Lilley and Gaston Sigur, and Rich Armitage over in Defense. They were all friends. They were representing different organizations but could resolve whatever problems they had and present a unified position very well, and they achieved a great deal, both with Beijing and with Taiwan. That is where I had a hope things would continue to improve, but who could foresee Tiananmen.

*Q: Tiananmen was in 1989, which we will come to. Before we end this, you left Washington in '87.*

DEAN: In early January 1987, I went to Taiwan as Director of AIT's Taipei office. Earlier I was talking about some of the developments which I had taken part in when I set up AIT in '79 until '87.

*Q: We'll stop it right now at '87. At that time in '87 when you moved to Taipei just when you were going or during the mid-'80s, were you seeing a change, or foreseeing a change in Taiwan from being a Kuomintang dictatorship, with a centralized government to one where the native Taiwanese would essentially assume power takeover and that democracy would come in. Did you see this?*

DEAN: Well, yes. In fact, I would go to Taiwan from 1979-87 at least annually, sometimes twice a year, and have talks with President Chiang. He had already announced in '86 to Katherine Graham, the publisher of the Washington Post, that he was going to abolish martial law, that he was going to allow the formation of opposition parties, that he was going to reform the Legislative Yuan, which meant retiring all the elderly legislators and holding elections for new legislators.

*Q: They never had an election did they?*

DEAN: Most of these elderly legislators were elected in 1947 on the mainland. But Taiwan had elections for the lower levels, mayors, and magistrates, city councils, village chiefs, etc. The KMT won most of these because there wasn't an opposition party. There were only individuals who might run as independents. So CCK's announcement was a major departure from the past, and Chiang Ching-kuo told me that he would have done this much earlier but there were serious problems at home and abroad. I am sure he had it in mind to move toward a democratic form of government because he realized that the mainlanders who had come over with his father were only 15% of the population. The other 85% were represented by locally born Taiwanese, and they were beginning to push very hard. There had been serious political problems in Korea and problems with Marcos in the Philippines. He knew that in the future, if he wanted to preserve stability and progress on Taiwan, that he would have to move toward representative government. He was already bringing in Taiwanese to the lower ranks of the party and encouraging them to join the lower ranks of the civil service; then into the mid-ranks, and then into the higher ranks. His vice president was Li Teng-hui, who now is president. He had appointed him Mayor of Taipei, and then Governor of the province of Taiwan. He appointed him Vice President. He was grooming him for the future, and many others too, not just Lee. So when President Chiang told me that he had in mind to move toward these political reforms, the break in relations with the U.S. had set back his timetable. He said he had to postpone the elections for the Legislative Yuan.

There were several other very difficult things, like the '82 Communiqué that we just have been discussing, which were a big blow. Then there were the murders in the Lin Yi-hsiung family in the Kaohsiung incident. Lin Yi-hsiung's mother and his twin daughters were murdered in early 1980 by some unknown assailant, but everybody knew it was political. Cheng Wen-jeng, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, had been thrown off the roof of a library after being interrogated for 13 hours by the garrison command. Henry Liu, a journalist in Daly City, California, had been murdered by a hit squad from Taiwan on the orders of the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Bureau Chief.

These events all caused a big furor in our Congress and in our government. President Chiang was trying to cope with that. He announced shortly after, that no member of his family could succeed him. Although he had succeeded his father, it was quite clear to me that he had not trained any member of his family to succeed him. There was one, the middle son, who wanted to and was trying to manipulate things on the side. It was thought that this son might have been involved in the Henry Liu murder, too.

*Q: Well, looking at these murders, it sounds like kind of a rogue operation.*

DEAN: Yes. I think they were people within the security apparatus who were very right wing and intent on having their own way. But, President Chiang had to deal with all different opinions within his own country. He was quite a remarkable person to try to do this and yet move forward. He didn't just make a decision to move forward into these reforms. He had gone around and gotten everybody's opinion, if not their agreement. At least he had given them the courtesy of long and repeated discussions of the pluses and minuses of moving in that direction. So when he did it, it wasn't a big shock to the establishment. They knew he was going to do it. Gradually things were implemented; martial law was lifted. The plans were underway for the new elections, and then he died. If he hadn't put these things in motion, I don't think his successor would have been able to fight the diehards in the KMT Central Standing Committee, and Taiwan would not be where it is today.

**CHARLES T. CROSS**  
**Director, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1979-1981)**

*Ambassador Charles T. Cross was born in China in 1922. He attended Carleton College and Yale University, and served as a lieutenant overseas in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1942-1946. His assignments abroad included Taipei, Jakarta, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Alexandria, Nicosia, London and Danang, with an ambassadorship to Singapore. Ambassador Cross was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2001.*

CROSS: I stayed in Taipei until late 1981. While in the inspection corps, I was writing a report on our operations in India. One day I was called to come to the auditorium to attend a meeting with other senior officers. It was then that I found out that we had arranged for full normalization of relations with the PRC which automatically called for a termination of diplomatic relations with Taiwan. There would be some unofficial relations with Taipei. After the meeting, I was asked to go to speak to the editorial board of the *Atlanta Constitution* and to a Rotary Club in Tampa. I was to go the very next day.

That I did. While talking to both groups, I was impressed by how comfortable they were with the concept of better relations with the PRC; I was also impressed by how these groups insisted that we maintain good relations with Taiwan. Without that, I could see that our overall China policy would be in great difficulties. When I returned, I found that my two former DCMs from Hong Kong, Roger Sullivan and David Dean, were going to organize the new institution that we were establishing in Taipei and that David would become the "unofficial" president of the American Institute here in Washington. I asked what they intended to do in Taipei and was told that it would be as low key as possible. But they were looking for a senior officer to head up whatever the institution would be and they said they would be glad to put my name on a list if I wanted to do that.

I then was assigned to inspect the NEA Bureau in the Department. When that was finished, I formally retired from the Service and joined the American Institute in Taiwan as its first director. Of course, there was no difference in pay or FS perks and the job had the same or, perhaps more, responsibilities as an ambassador. That was very interesting and all of us in AIT felt we were engaged in the difficult but essential work of keeping things going with Taiwan.

*Q: What kind of vetting did you go through?*

CROSS: Dick Holbrooke was the assistant secretary for EA. Harriman had asked to look at some papers, during which I had a chance to talk to Dick in his home in Georgetown. He asked me what I was doing and I told him that I was interested in the Taipei position. Harriman had been instrumental in getting Holbrooke the Assistant Secretary job in the Department and Holbrooke was living with the Harrimans, so that helped considerably, although I must say that I never did get along with Holbrooke very well. He was worried that I was psychologically too close to Taiwan. We never really clashed, but we did not have a close relationship either. He did give the clearest instructions I have ever received; he told me not to ask for anything because nothing could be done for the institute. Deputy Secretary of State Christopher said roughly the same thing.

*Q: Did any congressmen talk to you?*

CROSS: Absolutely; Congress was after all the parent of the Taiwan Relations Act over the opposition of the Department, which in some details reflected the PRC view. The Department just wanted to sneak me over to Taipei and then we would see what would happen. But in the negotiations with the PRC, we insisted that we be permitted to sell “defensive” arms to Taiwan. That raised - and continues to raise - some contentious issues. Then came the question of what we would do with all the treaties that we had signed with Taiwan, which were numerous. For example, we had the standard treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. All trade between the U.S. and Taiwan as well as U.S. investment on the island was governed by that treaty. What would happen under the new circumstances?

These questions and many more like them forced Congress to step in and it drafted the Taiwan Relations Act [TRA]. I looked at the draft and saw that it would be easy for us to operate under it. As I said, the Department was unhappy with the TRA in general and about a statement at the beginning of the Act which stipulated that the security of Taiwan was very important to the U.S. That was the rationale for the arms sales. It also suggested that an attack on Taiwan could be viewed as an attack on the U.S. It was a very strong statement that raised objections from President Carter and the Department. But it was passed anyway and the president signed it. So I talked to a lot of congressmen, many of whom were unalterably opposed to normalization - for example Ed Derwinski, who later joined the Department. Jesse Helms was also strongly opposed.

I think we should recognize how good Congress was on this issue. There was a fascinating interplay between Congress and the academic community, for example, that fought the Taiwan Relations Act tooth and nail. Most of the questions were not about arms sales, but how the “unofficial” relations would look. That was hard to explain to my colleagues in the Department

and others; it was an unusual arrangement that required considerable pioneering. All of the issues concerning the role of the institute were worked out before I went to Taiwan.

I should mention on the arms sales, with which I was deeply involved, that the Department insisted that we not discuss arms sales in Taiwan. All negotiations on those questions would take place in Washington even though DoD sent a couple of first rate officers - retired - to Taipei. Washington was afraid that we would make recommendations that might be embarrassing. I said that I thought that restriction was unwarranted because it would predictably result in the Taiwan representatives in the U.S. talking to the arms manufacturers, the Congress and DoD, thereby generating lobbies that would really complicate the Department's decision making process. I thought that we in Taipei would be much freer to discuss the Taiwanese requests. We would take a vow of silence; we would just listen and not comment; we would send our recommendations which would not be difficult for Washington to deal with. In the process the Department was establishing, the pressure groups would have been all over the Department before we even had a chance to make our views known. But the restrictions on us were maintained.

The only real dispute we had with Washington was on the question of the follow-on fighter. The Taiwanese had the F-5, which had been the standard export fighter sold to many countries. They were not as capable as some of the more modern fighter planes available by then, such as the F-16 or the F-4. So any follow-on fighter that might be available had far greater capability than the F-5 which had intentionally been built for export and which by then was already many years old. The Taiwanese were partially, if not primarily, interested in a new fighter for symbolic reasons. They knew that their air force could never be adequate to match the PRC's in numbers; so their interest in requesting a new fighter was to see what the U.S. would do after the PRC entered strong objections to the sale as it certainly would. I strongly recommended that the discussions of a follow-up fighter be terminated as soon as possible, before we found ourselves in a major imbroglio with the PRC, the American plane manufacturers, Congress, etc. The decision-making process dragged on and on. President Carter established a new system which required the manufacturers themselves to develop an export model of lower capability than the best U.S. aircraft. These could be sold to countries like Taiwan who couldn't buy the most advanced model. However, Taiwan would still have to have permission from the U.S. government to buy. Both the Carter and the Reagan administrations dithered over their decision, with the PRC fussing all the time.

Our major task in Taiwan was to conduct all of the business of an embassy without being one. We had to do a lot of little things that irritated the hell out of the Chinese. Fortunately, I knew the Chinese well enough that I think we managed to soften the impact of our Taiwan operation; I think, therefore, that our operation became more acceptable than it might have been.

*Q: But weren't your operations difficult to undertake lest they be viewed as part of "formal" relations?*

CROSS: They were. For example, the Taiwanese wanted to address me as "Mr. Ambassador." I told them that was not acceptable; I might have been one once upon a time but was so no more. Then they tried to treat us socially as they would have any diplomatic mission - there were a few still left; so after a while we just didn't attend such things as national days unless other private

Americans were also invited.

Our operations in Taipei had to be conducted with great skill and caution; much of the business was conducted indirectly. I had a couple of contacts which I used periodically for that process. One was Fred Chien, who was a vice foreign minister; he really became the U.S. desk officer. He could be difficult, but I accepted him for what he was, a hard working diplomat. I also worked closely with the advisor to the president, Admiral Ma Chi-chuang. I wasn't allowed to meet President Chiang. I deliberately did not seek any relationship with him. So we never met, even secretly, even though that might have been useful. But sometimes I met Admiral Ma one-on-one to discuss specific issues, such as the Institute's role in Taiwan's human rights - the KMT security services was beating up on the Taiwanese again. I knew that our view would be accurately conveyed to President Chiang. AIT kept plugging away at these issues, all behind the scene. We kept making the point that the regime didn't need to worry about the oppositionists; its reputation around the world was much more important. I think that our quiet approach did have a beneficial impact on the Taiwanese government's action on human rights in the end.

*Q: Were we trying to discourage any movement, if there was one, for Taiwan independence?*

CROSS: The KMT of course was pushing against that. There was nothing subtle about their goals; they were right up front against independence.

*Q: Was there any noticeable difference in Chiang Ching-kuo over time on this issue?*

CROSS: The only hints I saw really came after I left. While I was there, there was no public diminution of the KMT stated desire to return to the mainland or against independence. One person I knew well - a former Foreign Minister and later Secretary General of the KMT - spoke in terms of enough time having passed and that Taiwan should now move towards democracy.

*Q: Did you have any particular problems with Washington's general desire to expand contacts with the PRC?*

CROSS: I had endless problems with the people in charge of U.S.-PRC relations mainly because I think they viewed me as a strong proponent of Taiwan. In fact, I was really downplaying the issue. The main proponents of closer ties with the PRC were on the Desk and in the NSC. I wrote policy papers suggesting that we could not expand relations with the PRC beyond a certain point without giving Taiwan some assurance that their future was safe. One way of doing that was to make the advance fighter available. But Washington was continually concerned that the signing of an agreement for the sale of the advanced fighter - which, by the way, was not yet built - would be viewed by Beijing as a sign that we no longer believed that the two parts of China could be peacefully reunited. I felt that some people in the Department had the view that the PRC thought that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan was the main reason why unification was not happening.

*Q: I guess Taiwan was really an embarrassment to the administration.*

CROSS: Nixon's policy was quite clear. Taiwan was to be tolerated but would not be allowed

interfere with the improvement of relations with the PRC. I think we could have handled the situation much better with both the PRC and the Congress, not to mention Taiwan itself. In fact, the Carter administration would often be viewed as being a hand-maiden of the PRC and doing its bidding. That really frustrated Congress.

*Q: Did you have many congressional visitors?*

CROSS: Indeed, and they all praised Taiwan for its stance. Of course, the Taiwan leadership had no equal in the world on how to milk these congressional visits. I think almost all of the visitors came with open minds. For example, John Glenn wasn't sold on Taiwan. He and Mansfield were leaders in the Senate pushing for improved relations with the PRC all along. When they would come through Hong Kong, I would discuss the situation with them. I also thought that we should have better relations with the PRC; that was one of the reasons why I took the Taiwan assignment. I wanted to help improve the U.S.-PRC relations, but I always ran into suspicions about my sympathies.

*Q: I think you have illustrated one of the problems of our foreign policy. At the second or third level in Washington, you often see people who think they can manipulate the policy and the outcomes and want to show their power. I am sure that the China desk found Taiwan an embarrassment which barred them from doing whatever they wanted with the PRC.*

CROSS: Not only that, but the PRC was constantly telling us that we couldn't have anything that could be interpreted as diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Taiwan had a consulate general in Dallas and the PRC objected to including the names of the staff members in the official consular list. So the PRC was always on our backs trying to undermine our relations with Taiwan.

*Q: Did you get much pressure from that part of the Chinese-American community that supported Taiwan?*

CROSS: The Chinese-American community has supported Taiwan for such a long time that there is bound to be a close affiliation. But I must say that the Chinese-Americans were delighted with the opening to the mainland. They also supported American policy to preserve Taiwan. Most of them didn't speak Mandarin in any case, so communications with the mainland would have been difficult.

I should tell you one story which is very important. During all of the debates about the fighter aircraft, in the spring of 1978, I came back to Washington - at my own request - to talk to Secretary Haig. I wanted to talk to him because it was obvious to me that some people in the Department were willing to proceed with the sale of arms to the PRC on the assumption that then sales to Taiwan would be easier. I thought it was a terrible strategy. I am not sure that Haig was familiar with this ploy, but he did want to reduce the number of fighter aircraft that were to be sold to Taiwan. I thought that the American Institute people in Washington were very good, but I doubted that they had access to the leadership of the Department.

So I came back and had long discussions with John Holdridge, the assistant secretary for EA. We were good friends, having served together in Hong Kong. John told me very clearly that nothing

at that point in time would stand in the way of the Cold War; that is to say, our relations with the PRC had always to be seen in the context of our competition with the Soviet Union. That clear message worried me even more; it did not portend well for U.S.-Taiwan relations. But there was nothing I could do about the facts of life. But one day, I was invited by Fred Chien and James Soong, who was then head of the Information Office and later a candidate for president. This was a family affair to take place at a resort on the coast; so Shirley and I went. We had a very nice time. On the last evening, after we had finished the social events, the two Chinese took me off into a private room where they told me that President Chiang wanted me to give a message to President Reagan. The essence of the message was that Chiang would not make any waves about the putative arms sales.

I asked why. I was told that Chiang had a personal message from Reagan which was the go-ahead for a Taiwan purchase of the advance fighter. I then asked what type plane was being considered. I was told that it would be a model adequate to Taiwan's defense needs, meaning the FX. It seemed to me that this strategy had been a very good one for the U.S.; it was putting the Taiwan issue on the back-burner. I called my deputy, Stan Brooks, and a couple of other staff members and told them that we had succeeded in our mission; Taiwan was going to get an advanced fighter which should give them a sense that the U.S. was supporting them. I thought that then my job was done and I could return to the States.

So I left; a few months later, the Department turned down the request for sale of the advanced fighter for Taiwan. This was Holdridge's recommendation; he thought that the PRC might raise serious objections. In fact, as soon as we turned down the fighter, the PRC called in our representatives and told them that it would object to any arms sales to Taiwan. They threatened to withdraw their ambassador from Washington if the U.S. didn't agree to stop arms sales. That pressure finally resulted in the Taiwan communique of August 1982 which stipulated that we would not increase either quantitatively or qualitatively our arms sales to Taiwan. That was completely cynical because within two years, we upgraded our arms sales and then during the Bush administration, we sold F-16s to Taiwan. I still think that had we sold the advanced aircraft in 1979, when I went to Taiwan, we would have saved ourselves a lot of trouble because it would have closed an open wound between us and the PRC. At the same time, we could have restrained Taiwan from making some of its extreme comments because it knew that this aircraft would be delivered whenever it came off the assembly line. (See Born a Foreigner, pp. 263-270, on arms sales and dealing with the Taiwan issue generally)

**ANNA ROMANSKI**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC and Taiwan (1979-1981)**

**Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer**  
**Beijing (1981-1983)**

*Born in England, Ms. Romanski was raised in England and in New Jersey. She was educated at Stanford and Yale Universities, as well as Middlebury College,*

*where she studies the Russian language. Joining the State Department in 1974, her assignments both in Washington and abroad were primarily with USIA, serving in Public and cultural Affairs capacities. A speaker of Polish, German and Chinese, she served in Germany, Poland and China. Ms. Romanski was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.*

*Q: So, in '79, how did the China assignment come about?*

ROMANSKI: A special notice came out that they needed people to study Chinese for an assignment in China. This would have been after Nixon had visited China: we were on the verge of normalizing relations with China. There was a shortage of Chinese speakers. The notice said that those within certain grades could apply for the opportunity. Both my husband and I needed assignments, applied and were accepted for Chinese language training.

*Q: You took Chinese language training from when to when?*

ROMANSKI: We studied Chinese from 1979 to 81. It was a two-year course.

*Q: Where did you take it?*

ROMANSKI: The first year was at FSI, the Foreign Service Institute in Rosslyn, which is not nearly as nice as NFATC, the National Foreign Affairs Training Center which we have now. The second year was on Taiwan. The State Department had a policy whereby one studied the difficult two-year languages for one year at FSI and one year in the country where the language was spoken so that one could have more exposure to encourage language acquisition. This was perhaps less effective for Chinese because the Chinese language has a great many dialects. We were taught Mandarin because most of us were going to the Mainland, but on Taiwan, they spoke another dialect although most people could understand Mandarin (although not necessarily our Mandarin). In addition, the writing systems are different on Taiwan and in mainland China. Mainland Chinese uses a simplified writing system, while Taiwan retains the original classical writing system, which is much more difficult. Very few of the characters would actually be the same. This meant that we couldn't read Taiwanese newspapers.

So the question arises: how useful was the reinforcement? It was useful mostly because the quality of instruction was much better on Taiwan than it had been back here at FSI. To achieve literacy in Chinese, one would have to know a certain number of characters. In Chinese, as in all foreign languages, we are tested in speaking and in reading. ( Not in writing, thank God.) Chinese is interesting because it contains a great dichotomy. Spoken Chinese is relatively simple, except for the tones, because the grammar is simple and there are no conjugations or declensions. Reading and writing Chinese is very difficult, however, because the Chinese never developed an alphabet. To achieve basic literacy in Chinese, one would have to memorize a minimum of 5,000 characters. The more one could memorize, the better one's reading score would likely be. The first year, we seemed to futz around forever learning the same 500 basic characters over and over again. This meant that we had an incredible workload during the second year in order to get up to speed. All of us complained about it. But, as usual, FSI did not pay any attention to us. I think the feeling was, "We know better than you do. We are the teachers. You are the students." Or

perhaps, the teachers were just lazy. In China, teaching -- this goes back to Confucius -- is a venerated profession, much more so than in the U.S. One goes back to the old "laoshi" (teacher) tradition. I felt that it was counterproductive for FSI to ask us to evaluate the course and then not bother to take any of our recommendations for its improvement, but this is what was usually done with each language.

*Q: When you were going through Chinese language training that year in Taiwan, were you getting the Taiwanese side of things?*

ROMANSKI: Not really because we didn't have much contact with the Taiwanese. The campus was up on a mountain, Yangmingshan. At one point, the school had been in Taichung further south, but it had been moved to a suburb of Taipei, Taiwan's largest city, where the American Institute in Taiwan (the substitute for an Embassy) was located. Taiwan was no longer allowed to have an Embassy since we had recognized Mainland China. As far as living conditions, we were comparatively lucky. We had a separate campus -- not as nice as NFATC, however it included living quarters. The classrooms were located up on the mountain. We all lived in former military housing, which was simple but perfectly adequate. To have contact with the Taiwanese, one would have to descend the mountain to try to locate native speakers. It was an effort. None of us had cars. None of us knew the Taiwanese dialect. We would have to take public transportation. Usually one went into Taipei not to practice one's Chinese but to go to a restaurant or shopping. We also went to the art museum, which had some wonderful items taken from the Mainland, especially massive Shang Dynasty bronzes.

Our teachers were mostly native Taiwanese, but they taught us Mandarin and kept their political views to themselves.

*Q: What were you slated for and what was your husband's assignment?*

ROMANSKI: I was once again destined to be an Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer. My husband had been assigned to the Political Section.

*Q: So then you went to Beijing?*

ROMANSKI: Yes.

*Q: And you were there from 81 to . . . ?*

ROMANSKI: We were there from 1981 to '83. I would have preferred to have stayed longer so that I could have made better use of my investment in Chinese. However, given the nature of the assignment process with its two-year language learning curve, we would have had to extend before we had even set foot in the country. As we were learning Chinese, we would periodically hear terrible stories about Beijing: how unhealthy it was, how anti-American the Chinese were, how everybody hated the assignment, etc. None of our group was willing to take the risk -- the system mitigated against it.

*Q: So what was Beijing like then? How would you describe our relations between 81 and 83?*

ROMANSKI: They were probably pretty frosty. We were in the process of greatly expanding our relations with China, which was why so many of us were being trained in Chinese and had been sent to Beijing or Shanghai, but we didn't have an attractive embassy at all. We were located in the former Pakistan embassy so it was extremely crowded. I had to share a small room with another officer: the other assistant cultural affairs officer. The press attaché never got tired of telling people that his office was a former bathroom. There was very little privacy and it was often hard to work. My fellow ACAO administered the educational exchange program. When she had visitors in our cramped space, I could hardly concentrate on my own work, yet there was no where else to go....I was living in a hotel so I could not have worked at home even if that had been allowed.

I was the ACAO, Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, responsible for cultural affairs. The program was just starting up so everyone felt that there would be enough work for two ACAOs. I handled culture and the other Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer handled education. She was the one with the most visitors.

*Q: What did you do as a cultural officer in China? How did you find the receptivity to what you were doing?*

ROMANSKI: The most curious people about life in America that I have ever encountered were actually the Soviets. They were genuinely interested in American culture and would ask all kinds of questions. They would ask about movie actors they might have heard of, what kind of cars we drove, etc. They were truly curious. The Poles were somewhat curious, although at a more sophisticated level, perhaps asking about the latest trends or universities.

The Chinese were not very curious at all. They tended to be rather isolated. They didn't have a lot of information. At least the Soviets or the Poles had heard of developments, which they could inquire about. The Chinese were starting from a much lower base. Not to mention that the Cultural Revolution had likely discouraged interest in things foreign.

*Q: I was going to say, we are still talking about a very early period in Chinese-American relations.*

ROMANSKI: That's true.

*Q: You might say that that whole Chinese revolution that happened . . .*

ROMANSKI: Right, the cultural revolution.

*Q: No. Not the cultural revolution. I'm talking about the revolution we are seeing now.*

ROMANSKI: Okay. Oh, none of that. In fact, when we were there, one of the things that was so striking was that there were no cars, no privately-owned cars. Everybody rode bicycles. It was much better in terms of pollution. I shudder to think of what the air quality must be like now. The only privately-owned cars belonged to diplomats and official entities such as ministries,

units or factories. No private person would have been allowed to own a car.

*Q: Speaking of the cultural revolution, this was such a horrendous thing. Was this just a non-topic?*

ROMANSKI: I never talked with a Chinese person about the cultural revolution. It was still too close in time, not to mention that one would usually avoid political topics. When we were studying Chinese in Taiwan, one of the more useful teaching techniques was to watch and listen to video tapes of broadcasts from the mainland. I think the trials of the Gang of Four were going on at that time. We would listen to the tapes to try to understand them as best we could. It was even harder to understand the mentality, so unlike our own.

Chinese was one of those very strange languages. It was unlike anything that I had ever studied before. When people on TV would speak Chinese, for quite a while, I would understand absolutely nothing. Then, all of a sudden, I'd finally catch a phrase. Suddenly, almost miraculously, I would start to understand almost everything. It is just a series of sounds, of tones really. Until one grasps a key phrase, comprehension hovers around zero.

*Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?*

ROMANSKI: The ambassador was Arthur Hummel. He was an old China hand. He had been born of missionary parents.

*Q: PAO and CAO?*

ROMANSKI: The Public Affairs Officer when I arrived was John Thompson, but he was soon replaced by Norrie Smith. The Cultural Affairs Officer was Leon Slawecki. Both Leon and Norrie were China hands, which meant that each of them spoke quite good Chinese. Leon was even married to a woman of Chinese descent who had grown up on Taiwan. Norrie was divorced.

*Q: How did you find the cultural side of things? Was it a work in progress? Were there good contacts?*

ROMANSKI: No. It was definitely a work in progress. We were trying to promote relations, trying to educate the Chinese a bit more about the United States. They were trying to send their people over while we were trying to send our people over. I handled the speaker program, visiting American scholars or other specialists who we thought might be of some interest to Chinese audiences. We would often place them at Chinese universities. As in Poland, but even more so, there was an incredible amount of bureaucracy involved, many layers of approval. It often took a lot of paper work for very little happen.

*Q: Were we at the point where there was almost a flood of Chinese students coming to the United States?*

ROMANSKI: No. We weren't quite there yet although there was great interest in studying in the

U.S. You might remember that I mentioned how Poles were unfriendly until I opened my mouth and they realized I was an American. In China, people would approach western-looking foreigners to practice their English, which was often surprisingly good. This would never happen in Poland -- people rarely spoke English and would never want to practice it. In China, it happened all the time. However, whenever they asked the question of where do you work or what do you do, the response "American Embassy" would be a real conversation killer. Ordinary Chinese were very concerned about their own security forces, much more so than Soviet citizens seemed to fear the KGB, in part probably due to the recency of the Cultural Revolution.

Our Embassy had a large number of Chinese spouses although I don't think there were any Chinese-American officers at that time. Had my Chinese been more fluent, I might have been able to conduct a different level of conversation and attain a richer experience.

American students or teachers had much more contact with ordinary Chinese. They didn't have the stigma of being an official American. In many ways, China was my most interesting tour because I felt like I was something of a pioneer. However, we had only the most limited contact with the Chinese. We lived in a hotel our first year but, by the second year, we had moved into a modest apartment. In all that time, the only Chinese person I was able to invite over was my Chinese teacher who was allowed to come.

On my husband's side, however, there would be dinners for official contacts. The Chinese behaved very peculiarly. One tended to entertain early in China, which I personally appreciated so that we could clean up before the next day. If dinner began at the normal hour of six p.m. and five Chinese guests had been invited, all of them would arrive together exactly on the dot of six. All of them would leave together as well -- precisely at eight o'clock. No one would linger. No one would deviate from the pattern. It would be too suspicious. When we had our apartment, we would also entertain foreign diplomats and other members of the large international community. They came and went in a less regimented fashion.

*Q: Did you get out in the country at all?*

ROMANSKI: Not much. It was almost impossible to meet people. It was difficult to get out into the country. As in the USSR, one needed permission to travel outside one's area of assignment. It was actually my most fascinating tour, not because of the contact with the Chinese, but because of the interesting international community. Nobody, except for the Japanese, really had decent contacts with the Chinese. They were just too closed to diplomats. So -- for the only time in my life -- during those two years, we had a very interesting circle of friends that consisted of foreign diplomats, journalists, business people and the occasional academic who happened to be in China at the same time with us.

We would socialize quite a bit within the international community. This was the only post at which my husband and I played a significant amount of bridge. For once, I felt that all the bridge that I had ended up playing in grad school was paying off. It was actually a very enjoyable assignment -- in many ways, my favorite.

*Q: Tell me about some of the cultural things that you were doing?*

ROMANSKI: We brought the New York City ballet over, which was quite a sensation. I remember meeting and working with Jerome Robbins, the famous choreographer, who had worked with Balanchine, an even more legendary figure. Arthur Miller came over to put on a performance of his play Death of a Salesman. It was performed in Chinese so I could just barely understand it, despite having studied the original. The famous Chinese actor who played Willy Loman insisted on wearing a ghastly blond wig, like the hairdo of a rag doll. I guess it was the politically correct depiction of a "foreign devil" since he refused to go on without his wig. In my contacts with Miller, I of course wanted to ask him what it had been like to have been married to Marilyn Monroe, but I didn't dare. After all, I was a diplomat and had to behave "diplomatically."

The actor Kirk Douglas came over with his photographer wife Inge Morath. We had shown his film Lust for Life -- about the painter Vincent van Gogh. I remember having a nice exchange with Kirk. He asked me what travel in China was like as he was to go on to another post. I said that we usually flew, because the train would take too long. I also informed him that the plane had only one class, and it definitely wasn't first. We had to laugh about that.

Another visitor I remember -- although he was not cultural -- was former President Nixon. He was well received by the Chinese since he had opened China, but less well received by the Embassy because we still remembered Watergate. I remember attending some a reception at which Nixon made some kind of sexist remark about being happy to see so many "little women" out here supporting their husbands. Not only was the remark sexist, but it was also off base since all the women he saw were working at the Embassy. It was the kind of post where most of the spouses sought employment, unless they had very young children.

President George Herbert Walker Bush also visited. To demonstrate that sexism was not all on the Chinese side, I got to arrange a tea for the Embassy wives with Mrs. Bush at the Ambassador's residence. I suppose I could have protested, but I honestly didn't mind. In fact, the event was a great success -- contrary to our cookie-pushing image, tea parties don't get one promoted! I think each and every wife came, whether they were working wives or not. This was unusual since a lot of the Chinese-American wives didn't like to mingle much for whatever reason but, for an event of this caliber, they all showed up. It was a lovely event if I do say so myself.

We were working on another big cultural project but just as we were getting to the fruition point, the famous Hu Na incident occurred. Although Hu Na is now buried in the shrouds of memory, she was once a fairly mediocre tennis player who defected to the U.S. towards the end of my tour. Everything was put on hold. Visits were cancelled. Nothing could happen. For my last several months, I basically had nothing to do. Fortunately, I managed to escort a couple of "study groups," which had been allowed under our exchange agreement. I got to serve as a sort of escort -- certainly not an escort interpreter because my Chinese never got good enough so that I could serve as an interpreter. Ironically, I got plenty of compliments on my Chinese, something that rarely happened in Poland. In China, Chinese people would say, "Oh, you speak such wonderful Chinese."

Chinese, as a spoken language, is actually very simple because it has almost no grammar. It is an advanced language in that respect, unlike the highly inflected languages of Polish or Russian. It is difficult because of the tones and because of the writing system. Most of us never really paid that much attention to tones. At first I thought the Chinese were pulling my leg (or perhaps even subtly insulting me) when they complimented me on my Mandarin. However, I realized that since we had been through two years of schooling, we actually sounded pretty good whenever we spoke Chinese with a Chinese for whom Mandarin was a second or maybe third tongue. Everybody spoke dialect. Naturally, we couldn't speak any dialect at all. It was very common, if still disconcerting, for me to get compliments on my rather primitive Chinese. It was just another aspect that made the assignment interesting.

With regard to the study groups, I remember that I got to accompany a group of museum specialists. Another time I got to accompany a National Parks Service delegation to various cities in China. It was fascinating. I welcomed the opportunity to get out of Beijing, which could get pretty grey and depressing in winter. I took that wonderful trip along the Li River near Guilin: this is the magical, misty scenery that one occasionally sees in movies and that regularly appears in many Chinese paintings. It was an unforgettable experience. I enjoyed seeing more of the country, which one couldn't see as an ordinary traveler. One had to apply to travel -- and, it was very expensive to travel as an individual in those days. This was probably another way for the Chinese to encourage group travel. The Chinese were happy to have an Embassy officer accompany official delegations, because even if we couldn't serve as an official interpreter, I could still interpret the culture and explain differences. Delegation members would complain to us and we would try to raise the matter with Chinese officials if circumstances warranted.

I'd like to give an example, not that I could do anything about it, but it is actually one of my more amusing anecdotes. It will also give an indication of how limited my Chinese really was. In China, delegation members were assigned only certain rooms of certain hotels -- rooms that were bugged, basically. One of these rooms had a round mouse hole in it -- it was quite funny actually because it looked exactly like mouse holes do in cartoons. I went to the official escort to ask for another room at the delegation member's request. However, instead of saying that the room had a mouse hole, I said that the room had a tiger hole. The Chinese word for tiger is "laohu," which to me was very similar for the Chinese word for mouse, which is "laoshu." I forgot and said tiger by mistake. However, it didn't make any difference -- not for the guest, who got to stay in his room with the mouse hole, and certainly not for the Chinese, who weren't about to change the room even if it had been a tiger hole! I was amazed at the lack of reaction on the Chinese part. In the U.S., most people would have roared with laughter at someone making such a silly mistake. I never could understand the total lack of reaction. Perhaps the Chinese just expect foreigners to make these kinds of mistakes or maybe they were being polite.

*Q: When you were getting something like the New York City ballet, how was dealing with the cultural bureaucracy?*

ROMANSKI: Just as in Poland or any of these communist countries, everything was laid down in great-to-excruciating detail. Number of performances. Receptions. I think the American side gave a reception and the Chinese side gave one as well. If I'm not mistaken, I think the Chinese side may have returned some tickets to us saying that they could not be sold. That was certainly

not the case because the ballet would have been such a curiosity that people would have been glad to come. Not to mention that the tickets didn't cost anything. This was more likely a reflection on the kind of people who would be allowed to attend such a Western event. We may have gotten permission to distribute leftover tickets to dance students. In any case, it all worked out in the end.

*Q: Did you have children there?*

ROMANSKI: No. We never had children. That would have served as a kind of entrée, however. The Chinese liked young children. Living conditions in China at that time were very difficult. Except for the ambassador and DCM, we all had to live in a diplomatic compound with diplomats from other countries. It was located not far from where we worked. I would often ride my bicycle to work. That was one of the best ways to have contact with ordinary Chinese, who would often wave in a friendly fashion. They saw that you were living like one of them rather than a privileged foreigner.

In the housing compound, all the apartments were quite small. At that time, if you had a large family, you couldn't bring them all. The Chinese had a one-child policy, we had a two-child policy. The post may have had an unusual profile since, at the time, it consisted mainly of people who were single, married people with no children, and those with one or two children or whose children were older and already in boarding school or college. It was not a particularly child-friendly post.

*Q: Did you get any feel for Chinese culture?*

ROMANSKI: Some. There was not a whole lot to do during one's time off so we would go out to the Great Wall. We could visit the Summer Palace, the Ming Tombs or a temple. There was a summer resort called Beihai, which one could book for weekends during the summer. There may have been a museum or art gallery as well. We attended one Chinese opera, but I think that may have been in Taiwan. Although my husband and I are both opera lovers (or perhaps because we are opera fans), we never acquired a taste for Chinese opera, which sounds very screechy to the Western ear. We attended a symphony performance but it was not very good -- the musicians were still suffering the effects of the Cultural Revolution during which Western culture including music, and indeed much Chinese culture, had been outlawed as bourgeois, decadent and unnecessary.

Many of us, particularly the women, spent time frequenting the antique stores. Even if one was not a shopper by nature, it was a way to pass the time until one tired of it. One could still find items that had been confiscated during the Cultural Revolution and were now being sold for hard currency. China was the only post where I found time to do any significant amount of shopping.

*Q: You left when?*

ROMANSKI: In '83.

*Q: Was there a discernable difference in relations from when you arrived?*

ROMANSKI: Our relations had actually worsened because of the Hu Na incident. U.S.-Chinese relations did not seem to be on a very even keel but subject to suspicion and fluctuation. Like the USSR and Poland, China was another country which had a strong interest in obtaining sensitive information. China was not a county where one could hire anyone one liked. Diplomatic services would assign people to various positions. The quality of the foreign national staff varied considerably. Two of our cultural section employees were quite efficient and had a good feel for public affairs work. Mr. Wang was a younger man, whose career potential had likely been damaged by the cultural revolution. He was quite smart but his education had been shortchanged. All of our employees were good communists, but it would have been pointless to discuss the respective merits of our systems.

On one occasion, I had to xerox something and noticed that one of our employees, ostensibly a male secretary who spoke almost no English, was copying something. I noticed that it was written in Russian, a language I know. I couldn't see what it was exactly but, when I came, he quickly folded and put the item away. I had some mixed feelings but decided that it would do no harm to report the incident. I told the RSO (Regional Security Officer) that an employee was copying Russian documents which had nothing to do with his work for us. It caused a bit of a flap, but I'm fairly sure we were not able to get rid of this person as his real employer was most likely not our government. If he was a spy, he didn't cut a particularly glamorous figure. Nor could I imagine that he was very effective since his English seemed to be quite minimal.

*Q: How did the Hu Na thing play out?*

ROMANSKI: I had to leave that summer so I was not around when the Chinese stopped punishing us. In China, we also had a film program featuring American films, many of them quite old. Each section got to invite its contacts. Depending on the film, some Chinese would actually attend. Afterwards, there would be a big reception. After Hu Na, the film program was put on hold. There were also a number of official visits, which were also subjected to the diplomatic climate.

You asked earlier about Chinese culture: a lot of the culture centered around food. We would often go out to eat -- especially with out-of-town visitors, of whom we had a large number since China was recently opened -- but the food in most of the restaurants was really quite awful in those days. It thrilled me that I lost a lot of weight without trying at all. Some of the Westerners we knew who traveled around China ended up getting quite sick. Many family members and even diplomats had to be Medevaced to Hong Kong but I was never so lucky. Everyone had to be tested for parasites stateside when they returned.

You asked about what it was like to be duty officer over weekends. Depending on the country and how large the post was, it could be more or less onerous. In China, so-called death by duck was most common during the tourist season. Fortunately, China was already quite a well-staffed post so I may have served as duty officer only once every six months or so.

Tourist groups were just starting to discover China. Some of the tourists were quite elderly. They would be feted with the usual elaborate twelve-course banquets of rich or oily food, on top of a

lot of sightseeing often during hot weather. Not everyone was up to the challenge. The unlucky duty officer in the consular section would have to deal with the results....

I did, however, handle a death case in Poland. The consular officer praised me because I had actually followed the instructions in the duty officer book and sent out a cable. He was also quite surprised since most officers choose to wait for the consular section to re-open on Monday. I guess I didn't know any better since it was only my second tour.

*Q: You left China, and then what?*

ROMANSKI: Before leaving China, let me tell you a story that is actually my husband's anecdote but I'm borrowing it. Although it was unusual, my husband was actually befriended by one of the houseboys when we lived for a year in the Beijing Hotel. He was invited over to dinner to a typical Chinese apartment a few times. The houseboy was after a U.S. visa, which he eventually got, but he also got into trouble over it. I accompanied my husband only once because the food was very oily and difficult for me to digest. The wife usually cooked the dinner, but one evening, she was not there so the daughter in the family cooked the meal. The "piece de resistance", the highlight of the meal, was the Chinese delicacy known as "haishen," or sea slugs. We knew this delicacy well since it is the most commonplace of all the banquet fare. Sea slugs, even when properly prepared, are almost inedible for most Westerners since they look and taste a bit like tires -- a very rubbery texture. In this case, however, the sister -- possibly new to cooking -- had undercooked the slugs, which rendered them almost inedible. We had been taught in our Chinese culture class that it is very impolite to refuse food. However, a moment arose when all the Chinese tactfully left the room. My husband then distributed his remaining slugs among the host family's plates. They came back, savored the slugs and never said a word.

To avoid situations like this, one of the very few remaining Chinese phrases that I still command is, "Wo siji lai," which means, "I will serve myself." It was a most useful defense against unwanted delicacies piled on small plates by Chinese hosts.

After China, I went back to Washington for a domestic assignment because I was due for one. I had been overseas or studying a language for seven years.

*Q: What was your Washington assignment?*

ROMANSKI: I started out as the policy officer for Europe at Voice of America. I didn't really care for that assignment, so I managed to switch after about a year. I became a program officer for youth exchange at USIA, which was, and still is, located across the street from VOA. I was once again working on educational exchanges, this time on youth exchange.

*Q: How did you find the jobs? The first one was . . . ?*

ROMANSKI: Policy officer. It was actually quite boring. Some high level officials at Voice of America, or perhaps at State, had decided to run editorials stating the views of the U.S. Government on various issues. There were five Foreign Service officers located at VOA to read editorials, which other people had written, to check them for possible errors and for political

content. If we had any questions, we would contact counterparts, most often at USIA, but sometimes at State. It had a nice title but it was a non-job. As soon as I discovered the nature of the job, I tried to find something more challenging.

*Q: So you became a youth exchange officer? What was that about?*

ROMANSKI: Youth exchange started because the director of USIA at that time was a great friend of President Reagan's. He was Charles Z. Wick. One of his big initiatives was launching a youth exchange. He believed that young people were key to the future and that too many of the other exchanges were geared towards old fuddy-duddies. He also wanted to leave his mark by launching something new. He started youth exchange programs with as many countries of the world as was politically feasible.

The largest program under this initiative still exists: it is the Congress-Bundestag Exchange, which involves a large number of German and American students, numbering in the hundreds. The German Government liked this program so much that they supported it very strongly -- I'm referring to financial as well as moral support. The Germans pay a disproportionate share of the costs. The exchange involves high school students spending a year studying abroad and spending some time with the legislature in each country. This didn't happen to be my program, but it was the most important program in the office.

My beat was the rest of Europe, excluding Germany. One of my countries was the U.K. England had two priorities in youth exchanges with us. We were ahead of our time in arranging exchanges with Northern Ireland (where I unfortunately never traveled -- the situation was still quite unsettled). The UK's other concern was anti-elitism, i.e. the priority was to arrange exchanges for working-class rather than academic youth. We had to devise exchanges that would involve young people outside the normal parameters of exchange, since most countries prefer to exchange future leaders, often limited to elites. Britain wanted to get away from that.

Although I never got to travel there, I also handled Middle Eastern countries. Israel was one of my countries. It is the only time in my Foreign Service career that I have ever had anything to do with Israel. I think we may also have had a few exchanges with Jordan and possibly Egypt. They were just getting off the ground since there were political difficulties in launching them, even in those days. With Israel, there was no difficulty at all. Israel was only too happy to take and send as many young people as we could afford.

*Q: This British program intrigues me. It's hard for us, I think, to reach down into what we would call the working class. The British kind of have definitions. People probably declare themselves to be working class. But we don't. How did you manage that?*

ROMANSKI: That's right. We made an effort to recruit some inner-city school kids. We had a wide age range, including down to junior high. Some exchanges involved some less economically-advantaged Americans. This was good for both sides. One of other exchanges with England involved an exchange of deaf youth, although not necessarily economically disadvantaged. We conducted the exchange with Gallaudet. We were broadening the scope of exchanges quite a bit in those days, when there was the money for it.

*Q: Coming out of all this, what was your impression of these programs?*

ROMANSKI: I thought they were very good. Unlike the Fulbright program, which I also have a high regard for, youth exchange would often involve much larger numbers of students on exchanges for much shorter periods of time. The time frame for the Fulbright program at that time would be a minimum of six months, often a year. Extensions were often given. We would often exchange whole classrooms of kids for two weeks. Sometimes home hospitality was involved. The exchanges weren't necessarily all that costly. The exchanges also didn't need to involve a large amount of travel, but they usually featured an academic or cultural component. From the contact I had with the limited number of groups I met, the results seemed to be quite positive. The young participants acquired a larger world view. These were very much people-to-people type exchanges.

*Q: A little bit like the American Field Service.*

ROMANSKI: Yes. We worked with Youth For Understanding, American Field Service and similar organizations. We would give the organization an additional grant for this special initiative.

*Q: This is probably a good place to stop. We'll pick this up the next time, you had finished your job in Washington, I guess. And whither?*

ROMANSKI: After Washington, I would go off to be an Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer, yet again, this time to Bonn. The pattern of my career was the Foreign Service equivalent of "always a bridesmaid, never a bride."

*Q: Did you feel this was partly because you were part of a tandem couple?*

ROMANSKI: Yes, I very much feel that. There have been some very successful tandem couples, but in my particular case, I always felt that it was holding me back a bit. My husband probably felt the same way. I may have started out with ambitions, but I gradually lost those feelings as I saw the way my career was trending....

Today, a career like mine would be inconceivable. A great many junior positions, like ACAO, have been eliminated. What few remain might be reserved for first-tour officers. Nowadays, a second tour officer might be assigned as public affairs officer in Kyrgyzstan or Armenia. Why not?. During my time, when the Foreign Service was considerably larger and probably more bureaucratic, this wouldn't have been possible. It's a different kind of Foreign Service today: leaner, meaner and tighter.

*Q: Well one has to look at this in the long run. I must say that as I do these oral history interviews, did you have fun while you were doing it?*

ROMANSKI: Yes, I did. I mean the assignments that we have talked about so far: Hamburg, Warsaw, Beijing were all interesting each in its own way. Beijing was my favorite assignment

because it was so different from what I had experienced up to that time. I also valued my career for its personal enrichment. I felt I was learning a lot, meeting all kinds of different people, visiting exotic locales -- it seemed to be a great way to earn a living.

**DAVID E. REUTHER**  
**China Affairs, Economic Officer**  
**Washington, DC (1979-1981)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1981-1982)**

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**Taipei, Taiwan (1982-1983)**

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*David E. Reuther was born in Washington in 1942. He received a BA from Occidental College in 1965 and entered the Foreign Service in 1970. His assignments abroad include Udorn, Bangkok, Songkhla, Taipei, Beijing, Khartoum, and Kuwait. Mr. Reuther was interviewed by Raymond C. Ewing in 1996.*

*Q: Today is the August 29, 1996. This is an interview with David E. Reuther which is being done on behalf of the Association of Diplomatic Studies and Raymond Ewing is the interviewer. In talking with you today we want to review your Foreign Service career. You apparently went to high school in Seattle, Washington and then went to Occidental College in Los Angeles and a little later came into the Foreign Service. Dave, why don't you tell me a little bit about your early life and how you got interested in the Foreign Service and what else you did before actually joining the Service, which I think was in 1970?*

REUTHER: I have always considered my interest in international events came from being raised in Seattle. As a premier Pacific Ocean port, Seattle offered exposure to the nations and history of the Pacific Rim. The Pacific was where East and West fatefully met and clashed. In school I read extensively about the battles that took place there during World War II. But if history and proximity didn't catch one's eye, Seattle the melting pot did. The main immigrant groups were Scandinavians, of which a large number came after the World War II. There were large Filipino and Japanese communities, and a small Chinese community. The Seattle Art Museum, for example, had few Van Gogh and Degas paintings, but a stimulating collection of oriental art. The University of Washington always had an excellent Far East Asia studies program. Growing up in such an environment encouraged an awareness of Japan and China. Because Seattle was one of

the few Pacific entry points into the United States, the city was often exposed to Asian artists touring on Cultural Exchange programs. I distinctly remember watching a performance of Japanese Kabuki performed by a visiting group. Seattle's place in the world and the encouragement of my high school history teacher, Grace Meyers made it seem quite natural to pursue studies in college in political science and international affairs.

*Q: So, you finished at Occidental in 1965. What did you do after that?*

REUTHER: By then I was deeply interested in China and had already focused class papers and read extensively on China. I had been accepted at the Sino-Soviet Institute of The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., in China studies. It therefore seemed like a good idea at the time to start on Chinese language studies. The summer intensive Chinese language program at the University of Washington, however, seemed more like Marine Corps boot camp. The faculty was great, but demanding, and moved us through the material in quick step. It was very frustrating. The only thing that made it survivable was that of the twelve people in this class, eight were Chinese Americans from the Seattle area and they were having an equally difficult time. It turned out that these young men were from families that spoke Cantonese at home. But the meetings of the local Chinese businessmen society were conducted in Mandarin. Because their fathers were unable to participate in the business meetings, they were bound and determined that their sons would have the language to succeed. So, here were these poor guys who were Cantonese speakers with six tones and all the consonants that Mandarin doesn't have, just struggling away. That helped the rest of us get through.

*Q: It was an early lesson, perhaps, of the extreme differences among Chinese.*

REUTHER: Oh, absolutely. Like Americans who takes pride in their home state, the Chinese also identify with their regional origins.

*Q: After that intensive summer language program you came to Washington, DC?*

REUTHER: Yes, to the Sino-Soviet Institute that Professor Franz Michael had just established at The George Washington University. He was my academic mentor and key to finding the necessary scholarship funds. Professor Michael had an extensive association with China. He and Professor George Taylor were important contributors to the strong China program at the University of Washington. They authored one of the key textbooks, The Far East in the Modern World, used through the last 1950s, early 1960s in Asian survey courses. Their personal history is fascinating. Michael was German, Taylor was British. During the 1930s they arrived in Asia and obtained a employment teaching at Yenching University. Their China was the China trying to modernize and resist the Japanese. Their personal history constantly reminded we students that modern Chinese history didn't begin in 1949.

*Q: Was this an area studies program?*

REUTHER: Yes.

*Q: Leading to what?*

REUTHER: A Masters Degree in international affairs from The George Washington University and a certificate from the Sino-Soviet Institute, a dual certification.

*Q: And you did mostly China studies. Did you do some Soviet studies?*

REUTHER: Although an area studies program, there was an implicit assumption that China and the Soviet Union were to be studied as communist nation-states. We were to see communist China, not necessarily Chinese communists. Despite my China concentration, I enrolled in a couple of courses on the Soviet Union. I remember writing a paper on the organization of Soviet agriculture.

*Q: Were you interested at that point primarily in political or economic issues or historical and social?*

REUTHER: I'm afraid my interest was encompassing. Ultimately what I found intellectually attractive about studying China was the vast difference between what was happening in China versus how it is perceived in the outside world. The China in American newspapers in the 1960s was a gross characterization of what small reality we knew. So, not only did you have an interesting, unique political culture; but also this American caricatures. It is a great lesson in paradigm construction. Harold Isaacs discussed this very point in his 1958 book Scratches on Our Mind.

*Q: But at that time, in the mid-'60s, you came to The George Washington University to do those studies there was no reality check by field experience. You weren't allowed to go to China.*

REUTHER: And the lack of field experience is what made the subject intellectually challenging. All these things were being said about China in the 1950s and 1960s that seemed more associated with domestic American political partisanship than with Chinese reality. Then there would be intellectual breakthroughs ignored by the political culture because it didn't fit the partisan paradigms. I'm thinking of Donald Zagoria's excellent work on the Sino-Soviet split all drawn from an exegesis of published sources. The implication was that these national leaderships were not communists per se, but *Chinese* and *Russian* communists. During the 1950s and 1960s the American Cold War paradigm of monolithic communism reigned supreme. As a consequence, the role of Chinese nationalism in coloring Chinese choices was ignored. On the contrary, in his introduction to the China White Paper in 1949, Secretary of State Acheson argued that Chinese nationalism was a strong force and that, if the U.S. would just bide its time, Chinese nationalism would eliminate Russian influence on China. Acheson argued for a policy of treating China as a Soviet lackey, pressing Beijing and Moscow together under the assumption that Chinese nationalism would corrode the relationship. By 1962 when Zagoria wrote Sino-Soviet Split Chinese nationalism had begun to erode the relationship with Russia—something Acheson predicted. By that time, however, we were in the midst of pretending there was a vast communist conspiracy.

*Q: Anything special to say about that? Did it give you a chance to use some of your Chinese and your area studies?*

REUTHER: Yes. The National Security Agency (NSA) provides intelligence drawn from the electro-magnetic environment to the analytical community. I joined a program designed to train mid-level managers. This was actually a very interesting experience because the Defense Department has a particular way of training people, that is, from the bottom up. They made you empty wastebaskets, you did the most mundane reports, you were assigned some of the real basic stuff. The idea being that when you become a manager and were directing the work of others, you won't be so silly and arrogant as to demand in an hour some report that you know took you two hours or longer.

But, what interested me at the time was the reaction of my fellow trainees. The 30 people hired for this program were all college graduates, but many were unable to adjust to idea that you had to know what you were talking about before you were given supervisory responsibilities. To them their college degree was a ration card to be exchanged for employment regardless of their interest or capabilities. As you can imagine, those people were weeded out rather quickly.

At NSA I had some absolutely fascinating experiences. I arrived shortly after the North Koreans attacked and seized the *USS Pueblo* and was assigned to an office that was still analytically cleaning up some of the aspects of that incident. I did some China work and then I came back to the Korea section and was working there when the North Koreans shot down a Navy intelligence EC-121. On Monday, April 14, at approximately 5:00 pm EST, a four-engine, propeller-driven, Navy EC-121 aircraft took off from its base at Atsugi, Japan, for a reconnaissance mission in the Sea of Japan. The aircraft had 30 Navy personnel and one Marine enlisted man aboard. Shortly before 1:00 am on Tuesday, April 15, the Department of Defense received a report that this reconnaissance aircraft had been downed over the Sea of Japan by North Korean aircraft. This became my baptism in quick response. At that time a senior Air Force NCO, who had been in electronic intelligence since North Africa in WWII, covered North Korean issues. From our small office we collated and analyzed electronic intelligence on the North Korean attack. Our primary focus was to determine the location of the American aircraft. As I recall, the path of the U.S. EC-130 carried it outside the internationally recognized 12-mile limit and that the North Koreans launched when our aircraft was even further away from North Korean air space. We provided our findings to the U.S. intelligence and diplomatic community. We also produced maps and charts, some of which were used during the UN debate of the incident. We worked straight through for about four days, just the two of us with people looking in from time to time. This was a unique and pressured situation. Nevertheless, the experience stood me in good stead during my years with the State Department when coups, crises, or interagency conflict called for a quick response and a cold head.

*Q: So, somewhere along the line you must have passed the Foreign Service examination.*

REUTHER: I passed the Foreign Service exam in 1967. The State Department entrance exam at that time consisted of an extensive written examination, equivalent to the college entrance SAT or graduate level GRE, and an essay. If you passed the written, then you were invited to take an oral examination. The setting was typical. Three gentlemen behind an uncluttered table, you sat in a chair in front. The interview took place on campus so I interviewed with my colleagues. By some luck of the draw, the most intelligent, academically honored, but rather egotistical, student

went first. Something went terribly wrong. He left the interview distressed and slammed the door when he exited. That panicked us. If the lion couldn't succeed, what chance did we mice have?

With failure assured, I had nothing riding on this exercise and decided I would enjoy myself. There were basic questions about tracing the westward expansion of the U.S., art, and my China studies. The interviewer who participated the least suddenly asked me to tell a joke. That caught me flatfooted because I am not a joke teller. I can hardly repeat good jokes I've enjoyed! After a pregnant pause I leaned forward and offered a play on words, pointing out that some commentators were beginning to think the Chinese leader Mao Zedong was a CIA agent. Wasn't he being called the Great Helm's man? (The background is that Richard Helms was CIA Director at the time). Apparently still in active contention, I responded to a number of other questions and subjects. Among these was a what-would-you-do scenario. The basic story assumed you were stationed at a consulate in France, the local business luncheon group invites you to speak on American culture. The issue is what topic would you pick? My line of thinking was that every Frenchman knows the Americans have no culture -- except jazz and Jerry Lewis. My father, a jazz aficionado, exposed me to the great talents of that very American medium, so I dipped into his teachings. I've always thought this cross-cultural question was the most difficult of the interview and that my father's love for jazz was why I passed and was placed on the roll of prospective hires.

At that time, the strain of the Vietnam War on all federal budgets meant that the State Department was not hiring. As you know, one's eligibility on the hiring rooster is valid for only one year. Consequently to maintain eligibility one would have to repeat the exam process every year. However, during that period, on the anniversary of my passing, I received a letter saying that the Department had not hired from the eligibility list and therefore it decided to extend the eligibility of those listed. I took the exam in 1967, got that letter in 1968, and 1969. I didn't think too much of it, I had already started at NSA, married, and begun planting my feet. Another letter came in late 1969 saying that the Department was hiring but one had to go to Vietnam, into the CORDS [Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support] program. Newly married, working on China at NSA, I passed on the Department's offer. Early in 1970 another letter arrived offering a Foreign Service appointment without prerequisites. The next class started in April. I accepted.

*Q: How much language did you have?*

REUTHER: Well, I was lucky. At the end of our training we were provided a list of posts with junior officer positions and asked our preferences. My recollection is that there were only three Asian posts on the list and a Political Section job at the embassy in Thailand was as close as I could get to China. I checked Thailand and on the last day of the class, assignments were announced. Bangkok it was! Unbeknownst to me, however, State inspectors had recently completed an evaluation of the staffing in Bangkok. Their report recommended abolishing my junior officer position in the political section. So, suddenly I was in language training, but without an onward assignment. In time the embassy suggested waiting until the next Thai language position opened the following summer. That allowed me a full year of Thai study, a luxury considering junior officers were only supposed to receive six months language training.

I think one of the interesting things about Washington, going back to David Brinkley's book on wartime Washington, was its lack of major immigrant communities, such as New York or San Francisco. With the start of language training in the fall of 1970 the teachers were eager that we have an opportunity to experience Thai cuisine. But, Washington at that time had no Thai restaurants. So, the next best thing was to go to a fairly broken down Szechuan-style Chinese restaurant that had spicy food. What is remarkable is that when I returned five years later, Washington was full of Thai restaurants. Large numbers of Asian immigrants finally arrived in the Washington area.

*Q: They were a notable pair, staffers from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, I believe?*

REUTHER: That's right. Richard Moose and James Lowenstein were staff investigators for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and by the early 1970s had a reputation with the Foreign Service. As I recall, when they visited in 1972 I was alone at the consulate. Tom Barnes and the other officer were traveling. A telephone call from the embassy's Political-Military Section alerted me that Moose and Lowenstein were in Thailand and might come to Udorn. I was to be polite, but not accommodate their rumored interest in entering the Thai Air Force base at Udorn. At issue for us was that the bases we were flying from in Thailand remained under the control of Thailand. We had no status of forces agreement. The RTG [Royal Thai Government] was in total charge. It would be a violation of the arrangements between the American and Thai governments for me to assist Moose and Lowenstein to enter a Thai base.

The embassy's warning turned out to be correct. Moose and Lowenstein - I think this was 1972 - showed up in Udorn, came to the consulate and demanded that I gain them access to the Thai base and the American units it contained. They were not interested in being deflected from their task. I remember this conversation because I was threatened and insulted in ways that I had never previously experienced. The one threat that still rings in my ears was their threat to ruin my career, if they did not get their way. I may have been on my first tour in the Foreign Service, but I was a China scholar and I had heard stories in the hallways of congressional blacklists and the reality that Congress can and does destroy Foreign Service careers. What made the threat all the more believable was that you know that the highest levels of the State Department are not about to protect some first tour officer from congressional wrath. After the browbeating I took from Moose and Lowenstein, I was certain that my career was over. Others tried to cheer me up, but I lived with this fear for some weeks until nothing happened and I decided that I was too small a fish for them to waste their time on.

*Q: What sort of job did you have within the political section?*

REUTHER: The political section at that time was divided into two sections, external and internal reporting. The external reporting unit followed Thai attitudes towards Cambodia or ASEAN issues; Thailand's foreign policy stance, that sort of thing. There was even a China watcher. Bill Kushlis, myself, and a couple of other people were assigned to the internal reporting unit. We looked at domestic issues: we sought to identify who were the movers and shakers in the Thai system, the major political factions, and what were the personality and policy issues within the Thai bureaucracies. The Thai ministry of Interior was highly centralized and attractive to a talented Thai civil service. Because I already met a large number of Ministry of Interior officers

up-country, it seemed natural to be in the internal section. My previous experience thus gave the embassy an advantage in working with the important Ministry of Interior.

I think my first few weeks in the Political Section were typical of Foreign Service political work. One of my early jobs was to write extensive political biographies on the main Thai players. I particularly remember writing on Air Vice Marshal Dawee Chunlasap. Biographic writing may not sound fascinating, but it is key to the skills of the Foreign Service. To write a bio, you have to investigate history as seen by those in the country where you are stationed. What was their view of history as they lived it and what did they take away from that experience? In Dawee's case, he was a young officer when World War II broke out. He was a member of the faction that associated itself with the United States. That faction prospered in the post-war world, vice the faction that allied with Japan. So, one quickly learns the basic lesson of diplomacy - if you don't understand the other side's history, you will miss the common elements needed to build friendships and international consensus.

Within weeks of my return from home leave in the States, Thailand was in crisis. October 16, 1973 was a day I will never forget. Since early October, the Thai student union organized anti-government demonstrations in Bangkok protesting the lack of democracy. As was oft the case, the students and their leaders represented elite academic institutions. There was considerable popular support for the students. The public provided food and blankets during the student sit-in at a central park. Suddenly, that October day, it all went sour. Shooting started. Army units associated with the son of Prime Minister Thanom shot on student marchers, so it was a pretty messy business. For the embassy, this crisis raised a number of issues. We still had a major military presence, extensive commercial interests, and a large American community. We needed to know what was going on and we needed to protect American interests without meddling in an internal Thai matter. At the time I supervised the Political Section's internal reporting unit. Our first task was the same as any media journalist, get the story and get it in the hands of our Washington leadership with dispatch so that the Department could make the policy determinations. We had officers from every section of the embassy working in our crisis center or out on the street during the gunfire. I remember one of the military attachés put on this loud Hawaiian shirt and had one for his son, and the two of them got into his radio-equipped car and went to where the shooting was. They would pose as two lost tourists, poke around a little bit, and then return to the car and radio in what they saw. About 150 people were massacred and many more injured. It was just one mess, just incredible. Everything was rumored, and we had to chase down every rumor. We had to keep vacationing GIs and American tourists out of harm's way. The consular section people called hotels to pass the word and be alert to missing tourists. We ran a 24-hour operation for days.

*Q: The military had not tried to come back into power yet?*

REUTHER: That's right, they had not. That would come later. There would be another confrontation between the students and the military in 1976. That confrontation forced some student leaders to join the guerrillas in the bush. Later, the insurgency collapsed. The students were uncomfortable in the jungle, the Chinese withdrew their support, the Vietnamese were occupied elsewhere and the insurgency always lacked a claim to Thai nationalism.

*Q: Well, perhaps it would have been better if Saddam Hussein had gotten the ornamental pistol, instead of some of the other weapons that he came to acquire in the later period.*

*Let's move ahead. After you left the Secretariat Staff, I believe you moved to the Office of Chinese Affairs as an economic officer. Tell me a little bit about that. That was a period from 1979-81, the end of the Carter Administration and the beginning of Reagan Administration.*

REUTHER: While assigned to Secretary Vance's office, the Carter Administration completed the task of normalizing diplomatic relations with China. The Administration closely held this decision. The January 1979 normalization was as much a surprise to many inside the Department as those outside. With normalization came an expansion of officers assigned to the new Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs and I was invited to join the China desk. At that time, the China Desk Office Director was Chas Freeman. The office was divided into two sections: political and economic. I was assigned to the economic half, under Jerry Ogden, and had responsibility for Sino-American economic relations, including export control issues and liaison with Murray Zinoman in OES (Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science) on science and technology issues.

Normalization presented an unprecedented opportunity. Chas Freeman, as you know, was office director at that time and his oral history should be perused for important guidance on this period. He is talented, a gifted linguist, and one of the few officers involved in the initial breakthrough in the early 1970s.

He had thought deeply about what it meant to reestablish relations with Beijing. In addition to easily anticipated foreign policy issues, the State Department itself had to prepare for the new relationship. One of the consequences for the Foreign Service of the previous policy of only recognizing Taipei was that the Taipei embassy provided a limited number of positions for Chinese language speaking officers. The post-normalization Foreign Service, which would have to staff an embassy and numerous consulates, needed language capable officers. Checking with Personnel we determined that Chinese language training for younger officers was one of the things that had lapsed over the years because of budget circumstances, lack of need, and the unintended foreign policy signal training a fair number of officers would have sent. There was a sizable number of older officers with Chinese, but precious few younger officers. Even at that, the Department had Chinese language slots in Manila, Bangkok, and Hong Kong, as a method maintaining a cadre of Chinese speaking officers. With diplomatic recognition, the numbers were totally inadequate, so one of Chas' first objectives was to press Personnel and FSI for more Chinese language training. We had an embassy and consulates to staff. Now, if one were just staffing a country like France -- where there are good newspapers, adequate roads, a modern transportation system -- an embassy and a consulate or two might be adequate to understand national trends. But, China is a vast, continental, developing country with primitive transportation and communication networks. So, if you were to find out what was happening you had to be in those places. For comparison, look at German or British embassy staffing in the continental United States. The U.S. is a modern, sophisticated country and excellent media facilities, yet the Europeans just don't rely on an embassy in Washington, but have the United States covered by numerous consulates.

*Q: How about on the economic trade side. Was there much business community interest? Were you involved in negotiating agreements? Were you analyzing the Chinese economy? What sort of work did you do?*

REUTHER: All of the above. The establishment of diplomatic relations meant replacing the previous tight embargo with trade. To answer the question what sort of market might China be, one of the first things we did was to commission our in-house Intelligence and Research Bureau to conduct some studies for us. I remember one of the questions put to them was, if China were to acquire a telephone network equivalent to Italy or Spain, mid-level European, what would it require? The answer was that it would require the world's production of copper for the next five years to wire China like a mid-level European country. Obviously, if China bought all of the world's copper, prices would skyrocket. So, it was to the U.S. advantage not to have this largest, last, undeveloped country setting traditional modernization goals. Fortunately, satellite technology was at hand, but if the stringent export control laws scared away U.S. business, we would have no commercial relationship, a weak Chinese economy, and potential supply and price problem in the international economy. With this in mind then, we encouraged American companies to consider offering satellite technology.

Of course, such an effort collided with the entrenched export control laws that applied to China. Over the previous 30 years, many a freshman congressman demonstrated his anti-Communist mettle by sponsoring anti-Chinese legislation. The result hardly left any room for any significant trade. There was a need to communicate both to the Congress and the business community that the government was serious about encouraging trade. Our office drafted speeches and sought fora, such as the U.S.-China Business Relations Council, to communicate that the U.S. Government supported trade and encouraged business to sell items for which it earlier could not obtain export licenses.

At the time of normalization our export control laws placed China and the Soviet Union in one category, Yugoslavia, in recognition of Tito's break with Stalin, in another. Written this way, the law assumed that the Chinese would potentially divert any purchase to Moscow, and that any sale to China, became a precedent for a sale to the Soviet Union. One of the most acrimonious aspects of interagency implementation of the new relationship with China was overcoming these presumptions. The whole geopolitical basis of the opening to China was that Washington and Beijing were anti-Soviet! To Chas and others it was obvious that if other bureaucracies dragged their feet implementing existing export control regulations, then trade with China was problematic. In time, because of our interagency delays, we rewrote the export control regulations to remove China from the same category as the Soviet Union. The export control issue took enormous amounts of our time as either we or our principles fought these issues in interagency fora. In time, the Chinese realized little was coming out the pipeline and at high level meetings we began to receive queries from the Chinese as to this project or that computer. Two of the largest issues revolved around the Landsat II Ground station and the Western Geophysical computer for oil exploration. To State, China's economy was so needful that diversion to non-economic purposes was a remote chance were we willing to take. Defense fought us well into the next Administration. We tried to establish export control guidelines for equipment, especially computers: typical graduations were - some low level where U.S. companies threw stuff away (but above current technical limits for sale to China); a low mid-range for which we wanted a

presumption of sale; and a high-mid range for which no presumption of sale was warranted and every case reviewed individually.

Even these attempts didn't streamline our deliberations. I remember one seemingly simple case, I think it was of a  $\gamma$  level medical diagnostic equipment on which DOD kept stalling. Finally, we tried to create a deadline and get a straight answer from them as to the problem. Turned out that some Army lab in New Jersey owned the earlier version of this equipment and wasn't about to approve it for sale to China until they got the budget to buy a replacement for themselves! With the exposure that the problem was not a level of technology issue, but a budget issue for that lab, we obtained consensus for the sale. Export control remained a contentious interagency issue.

*Q. How else did you go about building a relationship with China?*

REUTHER: If the first element of our approach was to encourage U.S. business, the second element was to demonstrate to the Chinese that the U.S. sought a full and productive relationship. The trade embargo was only a symptom of the extent to which the United States worked over the years to totally isolate China. While China was a member of the UN after the early 1970s, it certainly was not a major economic or international actor. It might have trade relations with France or the United Kingdom, but let's face it, the United States is the premier world power and American acceptance meant international acceptance in a manner China had not enjoyed since 1949. So, one of our objectives was to look for areas in which we could engage our two countries in responsible, normal, commercial, and diplomatic endeavors. An analogy we used at the time was that there was great hole in the ground that was a lack of Chinese contact with the U.S., and our job was to fill that hole.

So, we approached this task from a number of angles. China was still a centralized economy dominated by significant bureaucracies. How to engage each bureaucracy and give its personnel insights into the workings of a consumer economy? China's association with European economies was insufficient experience for it to connect with the American economy. The American economy was in the midst of deregulation. Unlike the Europeans, we did not have a national airline, or shipping company. We knew the U.S. economy would 'feel' different to the Chinese.

One of our first steps was to negotiate a maritime treaty, for example. That is a fascinating little case study. The State Department's Economics Bureau has a maritime office. Because of its specialized knowledge of maritime issues, it was the lead negotiator for the American side. Of course, our delegation included other government agencies with equities in this issue. There were representatives from Defense, Transportation, Treasury, and others.

With the negotiating team set, we invited the Chinese to Washington. Setting an American venue was very important to us at that time because we wanted to use this opportunity to increase the pool of Chinese officials who had visited the U.S. The penalty for the years of no contact was that Chinese officials had never seen the United States, had no idea how big it was, no idea of our consumer economy and certainly little understanding of our technological advancement. Nothing like an American hotel room or barbecue invitation to a private home to underscore an important message. The Chinese may have visited Europe, but if they only thought the United

States was a little bit bigger than France, or like Germany, then they weren't getting the whole picture. So, we were quite eager to invite their teams here as an educational experience.

In this vein you will recall that Deng Xiaoping came to the United States in early 1979. I had not yet taken up my Chinese Desk assignment, but my understanding is that our organization of his schedule was designed to educate him about the size and variety of the U.S. I believe his schedule had him stopping in Hawaii first, and then on to Washington. From there he went to Texas and California. The point of the exercise was not for him to come into the West Coast and do serially West Coast, Texas, Washington and maybe out through Europe or something like that. We wanted him to fly across the United States twice assuming that sitting in that plane five hours would give him a physical understanding of the size and majesty of the United States.

So, we began negotiating a maritime agreement. The first problem was our own legislation which forbade port access to Soviet Bloc countries. But then, wasn't that the key political-strategic factor, China was no longer a Soviet satellite? Of course, in reviewing which ports we would offer to open, in close cooperation with our colleagues at Defense, we undertook a considerable effort to balanced commercial ports with those which may have had naval facilities adjacent to them. We wanted a clear appreciation of our national security and economic interests.

The Chinese, for their own requirements, wanted the final list of Chinese and American ports to be of equal length. This was not easy. The U.S. has three coasts, China one. I remember collaborating with Navy representatives and comparing size, water depth, etc. of the Chinese ports with our ports. It made considerable economic sense for Los Angeles to be on our list and Darien to be on theirs. For face purposes, the two lists of ports are equal, but their list included ports of no particular interest to us because they were too small for U.S. merchant vessels. Nevertheless, we also believed the Chinese port list reflected a signal from the central government to the local governments, and the country as a whole, that opening the country to foreign trade was government policy. Considering the Qing Dynasty efforts to thwart western trade 140 years earlier, the openness of the Chinese position and its connection with its own domestic reform was remarkable.

*Q: Were they equally interested in the Gulf coast as well as the West Coast?*

REUTHER: At the time a primary product in Sino-American trade was American grain. Economic reform in China coincided with an extraordinary decision to feed the Chinese coastal cities with imported grain. It was cheaper and unburdened the Chinese rail system. So the mouths of the Mississippi and the Columbia rivers were of interest. In terms of industrial trade, of course, Beijing sought access to the southeast and southwest coasts. Part of our objective was to build bridges with the Chinese and overcome the years of separation. In addition to problem solving, we wanted to create scenarios where they would have to talk to us, have to visit us, exchange with us, begin to understand our requirements, the unique aspects of the U.S. market, etc.

The other economic issue of high priority for us was an aviation agreement. An aviation agreement provided immediate economic and cultural benefits for American business, tourists and academics.

*Q: Deregulation had started?*

REUTHER: Yes, deregulation of the American market had started. Between our deregulation and the Chinese, like all of Europe, with its national flag carrier, we entered these negotiations from two different perspectives. The Chinese already had negotiated a number of civil aviation agreements with Japan and the Europeans by the time their high-ranking team came to Washington. Again, the Department's Economics Bureau, which had an aviation office, headed the American delegation. As with the maritime agreement, the Department of Transportation, Treasury, FAA, and the military were involved.

During these negotiations I heard one of the best advertisements for Boeing airplanes that I have heard in years. During the 1972-79 period, we allowed the Chinese to fly commercial aircraft into the United States on a one-time basis, if they had a U.S. military crewman in the cabin. One of these officers was the Air Force representative to our civil aviation delegation. He told of one flight, which he said was typical of the minimal skills of the Chinese pilots, into Los Angeles. He swore that when the aircraft was five feet off the ground, the Chinese pilot reversed the engines and the plane fell onto the runway. The landing gear absorbed this tremendous impact and nothing untoward happened. After that experience, this air force captain said he loved Boeing quality.

And there were other stories. When the Chinese were going to New York in those days, they had no experience with heavy traffic and the requirement to circle, waiting one's turn to land. Normally, New York air traffic controllers create two stacks of airplanes to safely separate the aircraft and prioritize landings. The Chinese pilots' inexperience with these procedures created a special burden for New York air traffic controllers. Apparently it got to the point that, when the Chinese aircraft arrived, the air traffic controllers pulled all the stacks away from New York, brought him down, and then returned to normal procedures. This story, however, isn't about safety. It's about Chinese inexperience with a commercial economy and the multiple ways in which we could develop a productive relationship with China. We believed it was to our advantage to expose them to how we handled these kinds of problems. China and the United States, as large continental economies and therefore have a great deal in common, particularly the scale of the economic and social issues we both face. Our problems are on a much more vast scale than those facing the Europeans.

Civil aviation was another venue for an interaction in which standards and technical parameters would be exchanged, and ultimately the benefits of American equipment and procedures extolled. At that moment, the Chinese commercial aviation was in its infancy, few planes were in the air, safety relied on the lack of planes in the air. The Chinese piloting experience was to get airborne, be assigned a very small slice of air space (by the military which controlled the sky), get to his destination and be brought down. Every time we exposed them to our system, we were educating, building expectations.

The civil aviation negotiations were interesting because the Chinese brought with them their standard bilateral civil aviation agreement. It was quite inadequate because it assumed both countries had national airlines. During our initial meetings we explained at great length that there

was no U.S. national airline. We had numerous airline companies. We described how we allocated routes through a bidding process. The Chinese were absolutely flabbergasted. How could a country like the United States not have a national airline? In their lobbying effort, the PanAm representatives took advantage of the Chinese presumption, saying, in essence: "Don't listen to what the government guys tell you. We are the U.S. national airline. Remember, we served China in the '30s..." In fact, some of the officials in the Chinese aviation system were mechanics with PanAm in the old days, so the PanAm name resonated. The prime American bidders for the routes to China were PanAm and Northwest. PanAm gained an advantage with its nostalgic presentation. The Chinese support for the PanAm bid, to the extent the Chinese were unfamiliar with aviation trends in the U.S., in part reflected the success of our embargo which kept them on the periphery of world trends.

*Q: PanAm and Northwest actually participated in the discussions?*

REUTHER: As with many of these negotiations, there is an official delegation and industrial representatives. On one hand, the industrial representatives acted as resources for our delegation, but did not participate in the bilateral discussion. On the other, they had full access to the opposite delegation. They hosted some of the meals, privately met with the Chinese delegation and made their own presentations to them. It would be interesting to get the Chinese to tell us what they thought of that whole thing.

Our effort, again, was to try to educate them as to how we operated, why we had so many airlines, why we were so big, how the whole thing worked, because we saw these early meetings with China as methods to educate them as to what we were about.

*Q: During this time did you have an opportunity to visit China, or were you pretty much working on the interagency and negotiating side in Washington?*

REUTHER: Actually I took my first trip to China at that time. Included in my portfolio of responsibilities was what we called science and technology (S&T). International cooperation in S&T evolved from a concern for controlling the technology of mass destruction and the budding environmental movement. The White House had an S & T office. During the Carter Administration, Frank Press headed that office. The relevant State Department organization was the Bureau for Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). Again, we saw scientific cooperation with the Chinese as a method of contacting their educational system, generating immediate benefits for both sides and subtly educating them about ourselves. Science and technology exchanges with the Chinese were in fact a very major part of our bridge building program. There was an umbrella S&T agreement with China and under that there were a large number of individual protocols which again sought to fill the void between the two countries. Our objective was to reverse the many years of suspicion and no contact.

My first trip to Beijing was as the State Department escort officer to the annual S&T conference. The conference created a useful deadline for putting the final touches on various agreements under negotiation and a ceremonial focus for the overall relationship. As this was my first trip to a country I had studied from afar, rather disparate images stand out today. The trip took place in January a particularly cold month for northern China. We were invited to a piano concert. The

weather forced one to wear an overcoat in transit, but what I didn't realize was that this vast, first-rate (to the Chinese) auditorium was not heated. Absolutely everybody there looked like a buffalo wrapped up as best as they could. The poor piano player was probably freezing his fingers off.

*Q: Did we have an ambassador then?*

REUTHER: Yes. Ambassador Woodcock.

*Q: Who came from the labor union.*

REUTHER: Right, the UAW. He had a long time interest in China. In fact, with normalization, things Chinese were all the rage. Major department stores, such as Macy's, had exclusive sales of Chinese products and Chinese influenced designs. It is interesting how Americans flock to fads. One day I took a phone call from a major mid- West manufacturing company. The caller noted that his boss recently finished a golf game during which he heard, at length, about his partner's trip to China. Could we recommend even more exotic Chinese destinations in preparation for the next golf game? One-upmanship in executive travel, if you will, which is absolutely hilarious because China had meager facilities for tourism at that time. It was all quite spartan. These and other travelers had no idea of how desperately inadequate the Chinese facilities were at the time. But, everybody had overly romanticized China.

*Q: Well, there had been a long period, of course, of estrangement between the United States and China and to some extent China and the rest of the world...the Cultural Revolution and all that long period...and certainly there was an excitement at the thought of interacting with China. I can remember being on a panel discussion with you, Dave, in January 1981, I think, and you were stressing how important China was for the 1980s and the need for the Reagan and Bush administrations to deal with some important issues with China. I was talking a lot about Europe in the same panel but I think you were right that China was on the front burner and should have been.*

*Unless there is something else you want to say about that time as the economic officer on the China desk, maybe we should move on to your next assignment, which I believe was to the American Institute in Taiwan in 1981. I think you were there for four years or so. You were chief of the political section. Would you like to say something about the unique arrangement of the Institute not being an embassy?*

REUTHER: Certainly a lot has been written about the way in which we organized ourselves in 1979 to assure a proper relationship with Taipei. It appeared to me that the Japanese precedent was in the minds of the American players. The Japanese in 1972 recognized Beijing and established an unofficial office in Taipei called the Japanese Interchange Office. Taipei had an unofficial office in Tokyo. Taiwan used to be a Japanese colony. Taiwan and Japan had important personal, business, and educational ties that they wanted to preserve. The Japanese unofficial relationship worked. When we came on the same decision-point, we saw an advantage to the precedent the Japanese had set. I think there are minor differences, reflecting unique aspects of our law and customs. We told Beijing in our negotiations that we were going to do this

and whatever their objections they would just have to table them. Beijing may not have liked it, but it found the arrangement acceptable. So, coming out of Washington I was first assigned to Chinese language training, 1981-83.

*Q: Now, you had already had some Chinese before, but you pretty much had to go through the whole program because you didn't have any experience speaking.*

REUTHER: Exactly. My previous language training was in academia, which, because American scholars couldn't go to China, was basically training for research purposes. Diplomatic use of language necessarily assumes face to face conversation.

*Q: The second year was in Taiwan, in Taipei?*

REUTHER: In Taipei. By that time the language school, previously located in Taichung in central Taiwan had moved to Taipei. The pre-normalization American presence in Taiwan was extensive and included a fair military presence. There could be no military presence under an unofficial relationship. The departure of the military left us with this vast housing pool in Taiwan. Instead of having facilities throughout Taiwan, we consolidated basic functions into the housing area on Yangming Shan, a mountain in a northeastern suburb of Taipei.

I finished the second year of language training in 1983 and took up my duties as the Chief of the General Affairs Section of the American Institute on Taiwan.

*Q: Dave, we got you out of language training and into the job at the American Institute in Taiwan. You were there from 1983-85 and chief of the political section. Tell me what sorts of things were going on in Taiwan in those days? They were still, I'm sure reacting a bit to normalization of our relationship with Beijing. Was that your primary focus or was it more internal political developments within Taiwan itself?*

REUTHER: Actually there were a number of aspects to it. On the one hand our primary mission, since we were still close emotionally to normalization, was to make the idea of the unofficial relationship work. For their part, the authorities on Taiwan spent all their time trying to prove to themselves and their public that we had an official relationship. For two years we engaged in a running game of thrust and parry with the local authorities. For example, Taiwan's unofficial counterpart to AIT was the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA). It had an office in Washington (and other American cities) and one in Taipei with which we conducted liaison as if it were the "foreign ministry." Publicly we were seen working with CCNAA which was housed in a separate building a few blocks from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, we worked closely with talented and patriotic officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but in unofficial venues. At one point, for their domestic reasons, the authorities on Taiwan told us that they would move CCNAA into offices on the backside of the building that housed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This would create a situation where, if you will, the address for the ministry is 1500 Third Street, but the address for the opposite side of the same building was 1500 First Street. Despite their arguments of efficiency and obtuseness (the CCNAA and MFA addresses would be different), their intent was to impart the appearance of officiality to the relationship. We begged them not to tinker with the symbols of unofficiality, and they finally dropped this

idea.

This game of imparting officiality into the relationship dominated the two years I was in Taipei. Our objective was not to put Taiwan down. The reality was that we could have as robust a relationship with Taiwan as we desired, as long as we kept it unofficial, meaning out of the public eye. A public event would force Beijing to notice; otherwise Beijing would turn a diplomatic blind eye.

Taipei needed the appearance of officiality for the Kuomintang-dominated government to justify its hold on power. The rationale for KMT rule was that it was the government of all of China. In partial proof, there was a national government on Taiwan and a provincial government. Because Taipei needed the psychological boost of officiality, incidents arose from time to time where Taipei would steal a march on us. After our long years of association, Taipei was familiar with American practices and weaknesses. I recall one day seeing a picture on the front page of the local newspaper of an American military officer, in uniform, at a medical conference. The local authorities had invited an officer from a military medical corps, at their expense, to a conference in Taipei. They knew that in encouraging him to wear a uniform, a symbol of sovereignty and hence sovereign recognition, the officer was violating U.S. policy. My office spent the day calling the major hotels in town, tracking the officer down, and getting him out of town. So, one mark on the wall for them.

Since 1979 the authorities on Taiwan sought to make the relationship as official as possible, and we sought to maintain an unofficial relationship. The ultimate audience for this thrust and parry was not the international community or friends in America. At issue for the authorities on Taiwan was their domestic legitimacy which they had tied to their claim to be the government of all of China. For them these exchanges had an edge, yet I think both sides exhibited professionalism and good humor. That's the point. It is the role of diplomacy to manage disagreements and insure that small conflicts do not snowball into major issues.

In the early 1980s, the issue of the Republic of China's position in the Asian Development Bank [ADB] was an illustration of the tension between the KMT and the Taiwanese. Up to this time, the KMT position was that if its rival, the People's Republic of China, joined an international organization, then the ROC would leave. This made sense within the paradigm of the "One China" issue. Neither the CCP or the KMT wanted to establish a circumstance in which both were represented, no two Chinas, no one China, one Taiwan. Of course, this policy left the KMT isolated internationally. The Taiwanese political opposition, starting with the Presbyterian Church's declaration of 1972, argued that the hardline KMT position was isolating the island. Moderate KMT forces were seeking a way to undercut the Taiwanese criticism. So, domestic and international politics came together over the status of the ROC in the ADB.

*Q: But what was the role of AIT in all this?*

REUTHER: Actually, we played a number of roles which are illustrative of what foreign service work is all about. First, we did extensive reporting on how the various factions in Taiwan thought about the representation issue at the ADB in Manila. We talked to government officials, Taiwanese politicians, and business people. Second, with Director Lilley in the head, AIT Taipei,

we were making a number of suggestions of how the issue of the ROC's representation could be handled. This was important because there were actors on the U.S. side, in Congress and in the Executive Branch, whose support of the KMT position complicated the discussions. Ultimately, I think the KMT moderates won a major victory. The ROC stayed in the ADB as "China, Taipei," a formula that opened up renewed ROC participation in a number of organizations and especially the Olympics. But I don't think the record of the internal KMT debates is well documented yet.

*Q: Handling an issue such as ADB membership, didn't that involve contact with the authorities on Taiwan at the highest level?*

REUTHER: It certainly did and I think part of Director Lilley's contribution, and our efforts in GAS, was to restore a productive association with the KMT. One consequence of the change of relations in 1979, of course, was a much less intimate relationship with the elite, the Kuomintang. I don't remember whether the heads of the American Institute in Taiwan ever did see Chiang Ching-kuo, who was the president at that time. By 1983 he was advanced in age and ill with diabetes and other complications. As a consequence, he was not as readily available to AIT's senior staff.

*Q: Were you in meetings with other senior government officials?*

REUTHER: Yes, all the time.

*Q: Who was the head of the American Institute at that time?*

REUTHER: Jim Lilley was the Director when I arrived but left shortly thereafter. He was very well liked and did an excellent, discrete job. Familiar with the Chinese cultural context, he enjoyed superb contacts at the highest levels and performed an outstanding job on both political and commercial issues. He did much to repair the frayed edges of our altered relationship and projected confidence and sincerity in the strength of the unofficial relationship. After a short hiatus, career Foreign Service officer Harry Thayer arrived as Director.

As we moved away from 1979, our relationship with the government authorities stabilized. Taiwan was also changing and the nature of our political work shifted. In addition to myself, there were three other officers in the General Affairs Section. One of them covered what we called the *tangwai*, or outside the party, that is, the political opposition to the ruling Kuomintang. I covered the Kuomintang. Because of the break in relations, our normal contacts with the Kuomintang had atrophied. AIT had good relations with the economic and the commercial offices of the government and the business community, but not with the ruling party. So, my job for the next two years was to reestablish the relationship with the Kuomintang. When my predecessor introduced me to his contacts, there were no Kuomintang officials at these 'hail and farewell' receptions. Circumstances in Taipei called for a special effort. Normally one arrives at post and your predecessor introduces you to the people he knew and that you are going to be working with. You in turn maintain those relationships and perhaps add a few new people. So, I spent the next two years working on AIT's contacts with the Kuomintang. When I departed post, the third ranking official in the party gave me a heart felt farewell party. Through diligence, perseverance and the fruits of two years of language training, we successfully reestablished a

friendly and professional relationship.

*Q: Of course, the problem for your predecessor at least partly was that that was very soon after the change of relationship.*

REUTHER: Oh, absolutely, in fact, that is quite the point. I was the first officer to arrive who had no relationship with the events of 1979. In 1979, the Department gave people stationed in Taipei the option of staying or departing right away and two officers in the political section, Mark Pratt and Stan Ifshin, decided to stay. They were extremely talented and capable officers of the highest order and chose to stay and do what they could to work through the changed relationship. But to the same extent, they were sort of tainted by the break in 1979. I was the first person to head GAS without any connection to normalization.

*Q: Well, it is hard to transform yourself to really in effect be a transition when you are identified, symbolically at least, with the previously situation. I noticed in your sheet here that you did report on democratization of Taiwan. You just talked about liaison with the government party, a pretty strong party, and I don't know how strong the opposition was.*

REUTHER: In fact, one of the key things that was happening in Taiwan at that time was a consequence of the January 1979 change in diplomatic relations. The political opposition saw derecognition as damaging to the ruling party's claim to power. It argued that even the Americans have walked out on the KMT; that Taiwan was isolated, weak, and in danger of being turned over to Beijing because of KMT claims to be the government of all China. The end result of increased opposition pressure and derecognition was the Kaohsiung demonstrations on Human Rights Day in December 1979. The entire leadership of the opposition was in Kaohsiung on that day. The government trapped the opposition into a street riot and used that circumstance to crush it. One individual, because he was ill and couldn't make the rally, was the only *tangwai* leader not rounded up. Also swept up in the government crackdown and tried in military court was the leadership of the Presbyterian Church of Taiwan. So from 1979 on, the worst aspects of the authoritarian government that had been in place since 1949 exhibited itself. Underlining the significance of these events, on the anniversary of the February 1947 massacre of Taiwanese protesting KMT rule, the family of one of the defendants was slaughtered in its home.

*Q: The trial was before you arrived?*

REUTHER: Right. The trial was during 1980. When I arrived everyone was in jail, the family was murdered, and little incidents denoting pressure on the opposition happened from time to time. For example, a visiting Chinese-American scholar fell off a five-story building while in police custody.

*Q: Was this Henry Liu?*

REUTHER: No, that was Chen Wen-cheng.

*Q: Tell us about that.*

REUTHER: With the 1979 round up of the political opposition, the hard-liners dominated the KMT and it entered a new period of repression. Of course, it is not always clear whether acts were committed on orders or by zealous lieutenants. Henry Liu was a KMT-trained political warfare officer, who worked as a journalist, had fallen out of favor with the KMT, and was in the process of writing a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo. The biography was supposedly very critical.

*Q: And, he was an American citizen.*

REUTHER: Well, at least a green card holder.

*Q: But, living in Taiwan.*

REUTHER: No, he was living in the United States. He knew he couldn't go back to Taiwan. He was researching this book and some of the people that he was talking to were partisan foes of the government. A group came to the United States in 1984 and assassinated him in his garage in a town outside of San Francisco. There is an excellent book by Kaplan, Fires of the Dragon that gives a fairly good description of the circumstances surrounding this murder.

What is interesting about this event is that it appears to have become a turning point in the way the KMT governed Taiwan. It is my impression that the younger, American educated members of the Kuomintang--those who had been pushing for elections and similar procedures to keep the party in power rather the strong-armed tactics--were quite upset that they were a party to this murder. They didn't feel it was part of their self-identification. Mainly Mainlanders, they were not willing to see the Taiwanese opposition come to power, but they thought different tools were available to the KMT; that it could base its legitimacy on its success in economic policy. Oddly enough, there were signs of the system loosening, simultaneously with these murders. The KMT lifted censorship in the movies and a number of Taiwan films won awards at Asian film festivals. One USIA officer, Joe Moyle, was particularly close to the film industry. From time to time we would have special showings of movies that handled sensitive social subjects.

The point to make here is that Henry Liu's murder polarized opinion within the KMT. Just as the conservatives used the Chungli election in 1977 to dominate the moderates and went on to stage the 1979 Kaohsiung incident; the moderates gained from Liu's murder. It appears to have been a decision point that moved Taiwan to democracy. Ed Winkler, an academic, wrote an article in the fall of 1984 arguing that politics on Taiwan were moving from hard authoritarianism to soft authoritarianism. This article was published two months before Henry Liu was murdered. Without the murder, Winkler's conclusions would have been premature, but he may have been drawing on the stirring of these American-educated officials who had little influence at the time he was writing, but whose softer line would predominate in the wake of the Liu murder.

*Q: So, Winkler was right but a little premature.*

REUTHER: A little premature. Chiang Ching-kuo is an absolutely fascinating personality and an excellent biography needs to be done about him because his role in the political transformation of Taiwan is not well understood. He has had so many organizational responsibilities in his

career that observers project his organizational roles as his personal beliefs. He first came to Taiwan as a strict enforcer of the security system. Later he was in charge of the China Youth Corps and may have realized very early that if the KMT was going to survive on Taiwan, it needed a Taiwanese patina. Nevertheless, the Mainlander dominated KMT began its rule by trying to convert the Taiwanese into Mainlanders. The Taiwanese language was banned in the airwaves; quota systems were introduced in the school system; your registration card identified you as either Mainlander or Taiwanese. Chiang, however, may have realized that the army, and then the party, in time would exhaust the pool of Mainlanders. This realization probably led to the Taiwanization of the upper reaches of the KMT and government, which all Taiwan watchers, and we in our turn, observed and reported. When a cabinet shuffle would occur, when the Kuomintang would have a standing committee election, Chiang would add one or more Taiwanese, generally balanced by Mainlander appointments, but slowly resulting in increasing numbers of Taiwanese in positions of influence. After each of these events, GAS submitted a cable explaining the significance of creeping Taiwanization. We would add that our interlocutors characterized the Taiwanese appointees as younger, Western educated, and more talented. Young, American educated Mainlanders suggested they and their Taiwanese counterparts were the group Chiang increasingly relied upon. In any event, we saw the process of Taiwanization of the KMT was preliminary to the democratization of Taiwan.

Our reporting from Taiwan focused on a couple of subjects. We watched the Taiwanization of the party. We watched the impact of the western educated technocrats in the economic arena. We also reported on the *tangwai*, the political opposition, most of which was still in jail serving their Kaohsiung incident sentences. Their wives, however, took up the challenge and rode their husbands' martyrdom to subsequent electoral victories. We extensively spoke to, and reported on, the activities of these opposition leaders.

The Taiwan opposition could be divided between those in exile in Japan and the United States and the *tangwai* on the island. Despite the government line that the political opposition (meaning the exiles) was a hair's breath from sedition and terrorism, on the island, the two sides played a sophisticated fencing match that defined the boundary for *tangwai* activity. This was particularly evident in the media field. The opposition was not allowed to own a newspaper, but it could publish magazines. From time to time, the Garrison Command, the premier security agency at the time, closed down the magazines. So, members of the opposition would register a number of magazine names. When the Garrison Command closed one title, for some article mentioning Chiang Ching-kuo's secret fortune or half brother Chiang Wei-kuo's activities, the opposition would return the next month under a new name. This ballet was interesting to watch. Sometimes Garrison Command would let the *tangwai* distribute an issue and then ban the magazine (collecting copies for sale, but in fact allowing some distribution); sometimes they closed it down at the printing shop. This was a great cat and mouse game in which each side tested the other. In an entrepreneurial spirit, sometimes the opposition would start a rumor that the next issue was going to be banned in order to boost sales.

AIT, and the embassy before it, had long reported on political events on Taiwan. What we were watching was new because the jailing of the opposition leader unified the movement (to the extent squabbling leaders were in jail) and handled it an excellent issue to proselytize the population. I should also note that the U.S. Congress was paying more attention to internal

dynamics on Taiwan during the 1980s. Congressman Solarz from New York visited Taiwan and publicly identify himself with the opposition. His attention assisted their cause and gave them some cover. I recall accompanying him to a speaking engagement at a Taipei hotel. His address was not as remarkable as the opportunity for the opposition to meet without being arrested. It was interesting to note that the *tangwai* provided its own strict security on this occasion. For those who look at the democratization of Taiwan for clues to the possible democratization of Mainland China, note that the consequences of trade (not only in generating wealth, but training entrepreneurial skills) and American education are far more important than human rights posturing by foreigners.

*Q: It was a very interesting period both in terms of U.S. relations, if you will, with Taiwan and in the light of normalization with the Peoples Republic in 1979, but also in terms of what was happening in Taiwan, itself. Of course you were on the political side, but we haven't talked about the economic side but the economy was booming, trade was prospering.*

REUTHER: Trade was booming, substantial numbers of American businesses were in Taiwan, encouraged in the early years by U.S. aid programs, American investment and trade opportunities. Although my immediate responsibilities were political, I made an effort to go to the American Chamber of Commerce breakfasts and meetings to gather a sense from them about what was going on economically and politically. The Chamber was very active and a number of individual American businessmen had been in Taiwan for years. I particularly remember a couple of business issues. Most businesses were tied to their American home offices by increasingly sophisticated telecommunications. Garrison Command regulated communications and had set a maximum baud transmission speed so that it could easily intercept and read any traffic. By the early 1980s, however, contemporary equipment had long exceeded Taiwan's allowable transmission speed. Home offices were complaining to their managers on Taiwan. While the companies improved company-wide speeds, their circuits to Taiwan were comparatively slower and, in some cases, required separate circuits. The issue for the resident business people was do they just upgrade their equipment and not inform the local authorities or seek permission? The justification for 'do and don't tell' was in appreciation of the Chinese cultural context: not directly asking saved face. Asking guaranteed a negative response. I forgot how it turned out.

I was impressed with the economic progress evident on Taiwan. Of course, the island's entrepreneurial spirit had its positive and negative consequences. American Chamber of Commerce (AmCham) members from time to time would express concern about losing good mid-level managers. Because of the open economy, lax intellectual property rights regulations and 'can-do' attitude among the Taiwanese, American companies often faced a situation where a trusted local middle manager would learn some part of the company's manufacturing process and then set himself up in business making a clone of that item, often at a cheaper price.

Another entrepreneurial story. During language training we traveled around the island and practiced conducting interviews. Once, we stopped at a substantial shoe manufacturing facility, I think in Taichung. The Taiwanese owner was making good money, but he knew nothing about design or fashion issues. During our interview, it became clear he had an arrangement with a Japanese trading firm from which he received patterns, dies and tools. He manufactured shoes to

order for the Japanese trading company that sold to the American market. I have seen little academic writing about the role of Japan in post-war economic developments on Taiwan.

*Q: If the economy was booming, the society must have been changing...?*

REUTHER: There were a number of things happening in Taiwan. I think somebody ought to research, for example, Taiwan films at this time. During the 1980s the Kuomintang allowed the Taiwan film industry to move away from a very sterile period to producing innovative and interesting pieces. I recall the Taiwan directors even started to win awards at Hong Kong film festivals. The appearance of creative films was the result, in part, of a process where the senior KMT leadership was looking for opportunities to give the new American-trained party members experience. The KMT was a bureaucracy; members worked their way up and proved their loyalty and competence along the way. At the time I was there, it seemed that the leadership started some of the American educated people in the cultural directorate. What these new people did was to loosen restrictions on the movie people and allowed them to be creative.

On the sociological side, Taiwan was the richest Chinese society in human history. But Chinese cultural history and embedded social signals assumed a traditional marginal economic (primarily agricultural) existence. Some in the KMT were concerned that, to the extent that traditional culture might lead people to dissipate their wealth, the KMT began a newspaper based “Ann Landers” column to inculcate new social signals. The message in part was puritanical, invest wisely and stay out of the bars. I often met young Taiwanese businessmen who owned two or three substantial businesses and were now channeling their wealth into mistresses or dance halls. Was this culture or a lack of alternative investment opportunities?

Apparently, as political and social changes accumulated, the ground was shifting under the KMT. I remember being told in all seriousness by a ranking Kuomintang official, that the Americans underestimated KMT factionalism. He argued that one of the reasons for going slowly on democratization was otherwise the KMT would shatter into small parties and lose the reins of power. He was certain rapid democratization would lead to chaos. Perhaps, while there were limits on our ability to see KMT factionalism, we understood the tensions between the moderates and the hard liners during the mid-1980s, primary over elections.

The KMT, which needed a mechanism to legitimize itself and extend to the grass roots, had held elections on Taiwan since the early 1950s. These elections allowed them to fan rivalries among local Taiwanese factions. The KMT would support one local faction one election and another local faction the next election. But, the older hard liners had always believed that the KMT should always win an election by a landslide. The people returning to the island, the moderates, the modernizers, were saying, you could win an election with 51 percent of the vote, your manhood was intact and you were still in power. That was a revolutionary idea and it took years before the older members of the party agreed that the only thing you had to do was to win the election, not overwhelm it. In fact, one of the senior reformers at one time, Lee Huan, lost his job because during an election in the late 1970s because riots broke out over allegations of KMT ballot stuffing, the old timers didn’t think 80 percent was good enough.

*Q: In this period from 1983-85, to what extent was there interaction between Taiwan and the*

*mainland and was there investment beginning to take place by Taiwanese entrepreneurs in China or did that all come later?*

REUTHER: In the early 1980s there was no investment and little interaction. Getting permission to leave the island was very difficult. The Taiwan Garrison Command watched Mainlander and Taiwanese alike. In those days it was recognized that it was the Mainlanders, brought to Taiwan in the last days of 1949, who longed to visit the Mainland. One *tangwai* stalwart at the time told me that Taiwanese were always worrying about a sell-out; that, as the Mainlanders aged, they might turn to Beijing in their twilight years and turn Taiwan over. After all, the KMT and the CCP were of a single mind that Taiwan was just a Chinese province.

For the Mainlanders, despite Garrison Command, there was a safety value. One could go to Hong Kong and once in Hong Kong one could disappear and visit mainland relatives. There were rumors that, because the people in Fujian Province spoke the same language as people in Taiwan, Taiwanese business people could sneak back to Fujian and do a little business. This seemed inordinately risky for a Taiwanese to me. The security forces easily monitored such travel. But, the KMT couldn't cut it off because that would damage its Mainlander supporters. So, they thought since they couldn't cut it off, they let the security organs monitor and regulate it. As the Mainlanders aged, contact with mainland China opened a little bit more each year. For example, our language teachers in 1982 were able to call their Shanghai relatives via a telephone link through Hong Kong that switched the call into the mainland system. I remember one of our teachers in tears; they had called for the first time that night. It was the first conversation they had had with their relatives since 1949.

While easily monitored and easily controlled, everyone seemed to believe that some contact was going on. The Taiwanese opposition with whom we were in contact believed it, but saw contact as propitiating the Mainlander community and spoke of this contact as evidence of a possible KMT sell-out. When the domestic reforms of 1988-89 came along, the abolition of martial law removed the authority of the Garrison Command to monitor this contact. The sub rosa contacts increased to the point where it was publicly acknowledged and regulated. Looking into the future, it isn't until you get into the 1990- 91 period and the establishment of the Mainland Affairs Council and States Exchange Foundation that cross-straits contacts include Taiwanese business people in any numbers.

Anyway, every now and then there would be a whispered conversation about a Mainlander who had gone to the mainland. The basic rule was you could go to the mainland and see your relatives, if you don't talk about it, which makes a lot of sense in the Chinese context. Saving face means not trumpeting your activities. For example, at normalization we told the Chinese we would sell military equipment to Taiwan and they said, "Well, please don't do that." We said that the subject was not negotiable; we were committed to not abandoning Taiwan. They said, "Okay, but don't embarrass us by doing it publicly." At that time and I think it still is, on all arms sales of \$50 million or more you have to notify Congress, a requirement which guaranteed publicity. So, the Carter Administration chopped up all the arms sales to Taiwan into \$49 million packages. They would manipulate package size to keep it below this threshold. Taipei knew it, Beijing knew it, but as long as we didn't talk about it, we could continue an arm sales relationship.

*Q: During this period when you were in Taiwan from 1981-85, first as a language student and then the political section chief, I assume you did not travel to the mainland at all?*

REUTHER: No Mainland travel, that's right.

*Q: Was that against policy?*

REUTHER: Well, in my case, I had a full plate on Taiwan and the reporting from the embassy and four consulates in China satisfied any lingering curiosity. Those assigned to AIT were discouraged from Mainland travel. They would have had to travel on non- diplomatic passports. Complications could have arisen in those early days after normalization that could have complicated our claims of unofficiality. Of course, diplomatic passport carrying language students might proceed to their next assignment on the mainland--which they would do via home leave.

*Q: Not from Taiwan.*

REUTHER: Right. In the first place there were no direct transportation arrangements. And we wanted to maintain the veil of unofficiality. So Foreign Service travelers would go from Taiwan to their home leave address and then on to their assignment.

*Q: It was a matter of changing status too, because an officer at AIT nominally left government employment.*

REUTHER: Correct, like military officers, Foreign Service officers are appointed under a presidential commission. This bit of personnel arcania was one of the reasons behind the original draft of the Taiwan Relations Act. We needed an administrative device which allowed Foreign Service officers to resign their commissions, take a job with this private company, AIT, and still be eligible for reinstatement as a commissioned officer without the loss of benefits. Let me tell you, it took a lot of legal thinking to turn that light on and in the end we were never able to apply that system to our own military. AIT Taipei had a military section, but there is no way in our legislation, or via the regulations the uniformed serviced followed, for a military officer to resign his commission and then return to duty.

*Q: So they were all retired military?*

REUTHER: They were all retired military who had had full military careers, retired, and then were picked up as private hires. It was not possible for them to go back at all.

*Q: I remember working in Personnel a little later than this and trying to keep track of all these people and arrangements. I think there were times when we weren't perfect and temporarily lost an individual here and there.*

REUTHER: It was one of the more unique circumstances, I think, that Foreign Service Personnel has gotten itself into.

*Q: And, it still continues.*

REUTHER: Yes. It still continues and works well. It is a system that satisfies our need to generate language officers and staff AIT Taipei. There is some debate about moving the language school onto the mainland, but that involves many financial issues and with the present budgetary situation I don't think that it can be done.

*Q: It also involves some other issues in the Peoples Republic in terms of hiring teachers and allowing students to be free and travel.*

REUTHER: I don't think the PRC has a problem with that because we were running language lessons when I was there and traveling freely. But there is a difference between a few language classes and a complete, FSI-administered, language school.

*Q: Not now, but I think in the past they have had issues.*

*Is there anything else you would like to discuss about your time in Taiwan? If not, maybe we should go on to your next assignment, which was Chief of the Regional Anti-Piracy Unit, Refugee Section, American embassy, Bangkok. That got you back to Thailand, but that is an unusual Foreign Service assignment to be involved with pirates.*

REUTHER: More than unusual. Many Foreign Service assignments stress reporting or negotiating skills, rarely do people have program management opportunities. In this case there was a massive outpouring of Vietnamese starting in 1978-79. Actually most of those people were Chinese, although perhaps second generation. In any event, in the eyes of the Vietnamese government, these refugees were Chinese and Hanoi wanted to get rid of its Chinese population. As a consequence, large numbers of people fled into the Gulf of Siam, only to be plundered by the Cambodian/Thai/Malaysian fishermen in the area. Like the refugees at the time of the fall of Saigon in 1975, some in this refugee population had connections to the United States. In any event, the death rate, rape, robbery of the refugees was unacceptable. The U.S. felt a responsibility to act. AID invited Fred Cluny, who was later killed in Chechnya (former USSR territory), to design a program to halt these deprecations. He was a brilliant man and really understood humanitarian relief programs. Congressman Solarz, whom I knew from Taiwan, organized congressional funding for the program.

Cluny's idea was to work on a regional basis with the Thai, Malaysian, Singaporean and Indonesian governments to centralize crime reporting. One of the legal problems was that each country's judicial system was handicapped if the victim ultimately landed in another country. If we were to identify and bring perpetrators to justice, we needed the cooperation of the countries surrounding the Gulf of Siam. My job was to use the prestige and resources of the USG to facilitate that interregional cooperation among the respective governments. I contacted Thai, Malaysian, and Singaporean foreign and interior ministry officials in pursuit of our objectives.

The core of the program was an attempt to professionalize and strengthen Thai police forces to handle this criminal outbreak. My liaison with Thai interior ministry officials, many of whom I

knew from ten years previously, was as the blocker for the quarterback. The key member of the team was a DEA agent who first came to Thailand as a Peace Corps volunteer. An absolutely brilliant man, Tex Learly had both the language skills and the law enforcement professionalism to gain the active cooperation of the Thai police.

*Q: Was there a narcotics element to this?*

REUTHER: Not necessarily, except that Tex was the absolute perfect person for this assignment. He originally came to Thailand as a Peace Corps volunteer, acquired excellent Thai, and enjoyed the country. He later went into police work and DEA. I think while with DEA he had an assignment to Thailand, which he also found attractive. So, when they were looking around for someone who understood police work, had excellent Thai (he could even speak the royal vocabulary), and would understand the needs of the police, his name surfaced. By the time I arrived, Tex was already there. We also had a contractor, Steve Kraus, a young man from Minnesota with extensive understanding of refugee issues and programs, who completed the team. His enthusiasm, knowledge of Thailand, and familiarity with refugee issues was a great addition to the program. My job was liaison with the Thai civil authorities to see that the Thai Ministry of Interior supported this program.

Now you have to understand a little bit of Thai history. Remember we earlier discussed the student demonstrations that sparked the October 1973 coup? One of the consequences of that public uprising was, even though it was the army shooting down the students, the public burned down every police station in Bangkok. Public enmity for the police has a history. The police had lost the coup of 1956. The penalty they paid was that military officers were assigned as heads of the police from that time. The military officers had no interest in suppressing corruption and building a positive public image of the police. So, by 1973 the police had a reputation for venality and corruption. When the public had the opportunity, it burned down the police stations. In protecting the boat people by supporting the police, one is running against the grain of benign neglect into which the police had fallen. So, my job was to liaison with the Ministry of Interior as a symbol of our interest in encouraging a professionalization of the police. There were two police forces actually, the Border Patrol Police and the regular national constabulary.

*Q: And in this program we were working with both?*

REUTHER: Yes. One of the advantages that I brought to the program was that, because of my previous time in Thailand working the northeast and visiting every district chief and every governor, etc., all those officials I had known ten years earlier had moved up in the Thai system. They were now at the assistant secretary level in the Ministry of Interior. So I could walk in and have immediate rapport with a ranking government official. Of course, the program would have to survive on its own merits but at least one got in the door. In fact I have always thought that one of the things that the Foreign Service should aspire to in these major countries is a situation where people come in as young officers, go on to other assignments, come back as middle level officers, and finally return as senior embassy officers. That way you have your friends moving up with you or you move up with them and you have instant rapport. It certainly made a difference in this case.

So, what we were trying to do was to provide training, encouragement, and political cover to our interest in protecting Vietnamese boat people.

*Q: I can remember doing the latter, briefing a congressional group from the middle of a bus, but I never felt that my calling to serve my country required me to parachute out of an airplane, so I think Ambassador Brown was a special kind of person to be able to do that.*

*After you finished your time in Bangkok in 1987, I believe you went to Beijing. Was that the first time you had visited the Peoples Republic of China?*

REUTHER: Actually no. I had that one visit in 1980 when I escorted the S&T delegation to Beijing. But that made going to Beijing on tour in 1987 all the more remarkable because China over those decades of the 70s and 80s is going to be one of those places where people will have such stark comparisons. You will run into people who would say: "Well, you should have been here then," or, "the difference is so demonstrative." I think it is an amazing part of the way China has changed that what we saw in Beijing seven years earlier was quite different from what I saw when I arrived in 1987.

*Q: In 1987 who was the ambassador and what was your specific assignment in the embassy?*

REUTHER: The ambassador was Winston Lord and his deputy was Peter Thomson. The economic counselor was Kent Wiedemann and I was his deputy and concurrently head of the external reporting unit in the economic section. So, the economic section was divided in half, if you will. One half looked at what the internal economy was doing and the other half basically ran our trade relations with China, thus, we focused on China's external economic relations.

*Q: Were you involved then in negotiations between the U.S. and China and what was the MFN, Most Favored Nation, status at that time?*

REUTHER: The Most Favored Nation status at that time was as it was when we first started in 1972, that is, sort of an annual update. This is a draw back from the Jackson- Vanick Act which was designed to punish the Soviets over Jewish emigration. The Jackson-Vanick Bill only illustrates, I think, why lawyers and diplomats are worried about precedent, because if you do something in one area you may get stuck with it in another area. For example, Jackson-Vanick more broadly said that to gain MFN a country had to promise to allow free emigration. Well, when we explained Jackson- Vanick to Deng Xiaoping he said, "How many do you want?"

*Q: Would 100 million be enough?*

REUTHER: Right. Actually he said, "You want 20 million, 30 million? We can do that." And he did it with such a straight face that the Americans really did not know how to respond. Was he pulling their legs, lining people up, threatening, or what? The whole Jackson-Vanick thing is totally inexplicable to China. But, here we are stuck with a policy of making China promise free emigration--which is precisely what we do not want. In fact after getting this promise from him we had to go around and say don't you dare do such a thing. This sort of illustrates that when you are dealing with China on its own, all the stereotypes from the Cold War, all the anti-

Russian stuff, all the anti-Chinese Communist stuff really gets in your way.

*Q: Were you still there when Tiananmen Square took place?*

REUTHER: Oh, yes. That was in 1989. Before we get into that let me address the issue of continuing negotiations. My office was responsible for economic agreements between the United States and China and many of the things that I had worked on while on the desk from 1979-81 period were still important issues. So, we worked on civil aviation a great deal. Not only negotiating further expansion, because the original agreement I think only allowed one U.S. airline initially could serve Beijing and a second airline could come in and serve Shanghai. We had more airlines wanting to get into the China market and were deregulated. So, we have to renegotiate with them that whole bit plus cargo sharing and things like that. So, yes, during that time I had a little rut in the road from our office to CAAC where we did a lot of negotiating.

*Q: Were there also trade negotiations, delegations from the Special Trade Representative's Office that came? STR did not have a person in the embassy did they?*

REUTHER: No, because USTR had a worldwide mandate, they did not have a person in the embassy. But, as issues arose, USTR would lead negotiating delegations to Beijing. I can remember one such circumstance involving tungsten. Chinese tungsten was being sold in Europe in violation of a marketing agreement we had with Beijing. Tungsten, like many minerals, is very specific to origins and trace minerals identified it as of Chinese origin. So, with that evidence in hand, we went to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Relations (MOFERT) and say, "Look, China is dumping tungsten in Europe against the marketing agreement we have. We will impose penalties, if you don't stop this." They said, "Don't look at us, we are not selling it." What really was happening was that Beijing was decentralizing the economy--as Western economics had been encouraging them--which meant that the province of Yunnan, which controlled these mines, had the freedom to market tungsten and were doing so in violation of Beijing's international agreements. USTR arrived and we had about a week of negotiations on tungsten that resulted in them having to recentralize their economy to the extent that Beijing was required to impose an export licensing system on the provinces. I presumed Yunnan was not happy with this reassertion of central authority and probably bargained for a trade-off in another policy area. This whole incident was typical of new problems that arose from China's participation in international trade. By the mid-1980s economic reform meant that there were more actors on the Chinese side, many of whom had short-term, parochial, interests that would lead to trade disputes with other countries until the central government developed new administrative mechanisms.

So, that was one type of negotiation. Another one, and one that would continue for years as it had in Taiwan, was intellectual property rights. We began to address IPR issues in the mid-1980s. As is typical of Foreign Service work, we in the embassy looked around and said, "Okay, we are about to talk to the Chinese about intellectual property rights. What do you suppose their position is going to be?" We took the initiative to plumb the various ministries, determine which ones might be on a Chinese IPR delegation, and gain an understanding of each ministry's approach to IPR issues. It was easy for us to contact the ministries because the Chinese side saw the Economic Section as commercial officers. So I, or my colleagues in the economic section,

had the widest range of contacts around Beijing. We interviewed people at the party schools. We talked to people on the factory floor. We had complete access to the ministries. The whole town was ours. In fact, we had better contacts around Beijing than the Political Section, and often had better insights into the Chinese government and policy debates.

*Q: This was in advance to the negotiation team coming?*

REUTHER: Yes, in advance of the negotiation. This is what the Foreign Service does to prep for these things. What we found out was that the National Science Foundation and the educational establishment in China opposed IPR. They opposed it on the basis that since China had no patent or copyright legislation of its own, and it was un-Marxian to be paid for the results of your own intellectual endeavors, they saw no benefit in it. We also found out that the R&D sections of industrial enterprises practiced what might be called reverse engineering. It seems counterintuitive, but the Chinese intellectual establishment was not pro-IPR in the mid-1980s.

*Q: Reverse engineering? Figure out how something works and is put together.*

REUTHER: Exactly. When you get your *Time-Life* book on how to do your deck in the back, that is what they were doing. On the other hand, when we talked to MOFERT officials they were very eager to obtain some agreement on intellectual property rights because foreign investors had come to them and said, "I am not going to bring my plant here until you can protect my industrial process." So, we reported our findings on the Chinese views on IPR to Washington. This research was in preparation for making the U.S. delegations' presentation as sharp as possible.

A fairly sizable American delegation arrived and we had a fascinating week or so with the Chinese. This preliminary effort was pretty much an educational one. We tried to explain how we looked at patents and copyrights and why we deemed it important; why it was important to our trade; how much of our trade involved IPR issues. We argued how unfortunate it would be for them if they were unable to take advantage of the IPR gateway to technology by paying a few royalties. We pointed out that the industrial world would not be favorably disposed, if China continued to violate these patents. For the Chinese ministries that had intellectual rights offices, and not all of them did, we learned that there was another major input into Chinese thinking on IPR negotiations. These offices were very much aware of the status of our negotiation with the Japanese and Taiwanese on some of the same issues. During my ministry interviews, one of the very sharp comments I received, and reported, was from a senior cabinet secretary who supervised economic ministries, who said, "You cannot expect China to get ahead of what you have gotten out of the other governments."

*Q: We will not give more.*

REUTHER: Exactly, they would not give more. So, what we had obtained from Taiwan or Japan was a cap for them in negotiating with us. Made sense to me that they would not want to be seen as giving more, or acting weaker, than Taipei or Tokyo.

*Q: When you were on the China Desk and here again in Beijing, you were involved in negotiations with the Chinese. Are they tough negotiators?*

REUTHER: While I wasn't in a position to be the negotiator for the American side, in Washington and Beijing I did participate in some typical, primarily economic, negotiations. I stress economic because economic negotiations do not tend to be zero-sum enterprises, but areas where both sides could readily see mutual advantages. Of course, any negotiation session involves a great deal of educating the other side as to why you are taking the position you are. Remember our civil aviation negotiations in Washington? How surprised the Chinese were to find that we did not have a national airline?

I am not impressed with the idea that the Chinese are extraordinary negotiators - that the Americans can manly toss vodka with the Russians, but collapse when the Chinese pull out the egg rolls. Often the issue is not Chinese negotiating expertise, but pressure on our side that may damage our own position. When I was on the China Desk, all Cabinet level officials wanted to travel to China. Each trip had to look successful. Something had to be done or signed. I think the Vice President wanted to travel to China and the main trip even would be the opening of the consulate in Guangzhou. Except we had not finished negotiating the space and facilities for a proper consulate. Now, the Vice President's office doesn't care what the needs of the State Department were. State is to serve and suck it up. So we ended up with a consulate in the Dong Fang Hotel, a miserable facility from a work and security angle. Was this the product of superior Chinese negotiating? Not really.

Remember that in negotiating the Maritime agreement, the Chinese were strongly committed to a reciprocal list of ports? Fact. This illustrates why being in the Foreign Service was so interesting. You were there to tell your side what the trends, fads, and goals of the other side were so that you could factor that into your negotiations. Maybe that would help uncover the Chinese bottom line, maybe that would uncover some important deadline.

The reality is that there are differences in national negotiating behaviors, but they are not often as stark as the op-ed pages suggest. I always enjoyed negotiating with the Thai. Thailand had never been colonized, a fact which made the Thai proud and able negotiators. In contrast, I was told, the Vietnamese were always worried that you had something up your sleeve and that the subject of this round of negotiating was only a pretext. I suspect the Chinese are somewhere in between.

*Q: About this same time the Uruguay round negotiations were going on to create the World Trade Organization.*

REUTHER: In Beijing we were just starting out. Across the straits, we had been seeking IPR agreement from the government on Taiwan for years. When I was in Taiwan, 1983- 85, the Taiwan authorities finally agreed to some basic IPR protection, after almost 15 years of discussion, for American authored books. For years American manuscripts were pirated in Taiwan. The Taiwan publisher would mark the front page "for sale in Taiwan only" or something like that, but then sell throughout Asia. Everybody went through Taiwan to buy their copies of the American classics, academic volumes book of the month volumes - the range of pirated books was significant. Even esoteric tomes such as Ambassador Hummel's father's book, "Biography of the Ch'ing Dynasty," a three volume work, was pirated.

So, Beijing was very much aware of our success in the region on IPR issues and we knew we would have to factor that into our delegation's presentation. Again, it is that kind of background work that the Foreign Service does, not only for Washington as a government negotiating agency, but for American business because, of course, we were sharing our insights with our business colleagues in Beijing and other embassies.

*Q: All with good Chinese.*

REUTHER: Yes, all with good Chinese and a good understanding of how the Chinese system operated. The Commercial and Economic sections would often share insights about commercial issues and the impact of the ongoing reforms. They were the first stop for arriving businessmen. Commerce would often organize industry specific trade delegations, like medical instruments or something like that, and maybe the Foreign Commercial Service would arrange a schedule and interviews. If the delegation was from the aircraft industry, we might do joint briefings because joint ventures might be the focus of such a group rather than trade. Speaking of civil aviation in China, one of the things we realized was that Chinese civil aviation had no independent traffic control capability. The military controlled the air. So, if a delegation came to sell equipment to improve their airports, you don't sell it to CAAC, you sold it to the military. One of the services the embassy tries to perform is to direct the American businessman to the office that has the decision-making authority.

*Q: In addition to that, your two other main responsibilities were reporting on the external economic side and in being involved in actual negotiation - whether assisting a delegation or yourself dealing with a ministry.*

REUTHER: Right. And, of course, what made the job interesting and dynamic were the extensive economic reforms that often impacted on areas of interest to U.S. business. So, we have an extensive reporting responsibility. We tried to send economic officers around China to gain a feel for these reforms and how they were being implemented. We might, for example, be interested in regulations on access to foreign exchange. Such access was one of the key issues we watched, because the Chinese very tightly controlled foreign exchange. In the late 1980s foreign exchange issues might create strange situations. A businessman could come in town and find a Chinese buyer and go back thinking he had set the company up for years only to find out that the buyer doesn't have any foreign exchange. To get around foreign exchange regulations the Chinese buyer might suggest that the foreign company import something that the Chinese counterpart could sell to earn the foreign exchange to fulfill the original contract. The end result was that a foreign export might find itself committed to performing export AND importing roles just because foreign exchange was so tight. So, we did a lot of reporting on foreign exchange...who had it, who controlled it, what the policy was. In doing this and other issues embassy officers traveled to other towns to compare the central regulations with local practice.

*Q: How much connection was there between this economic reform that you have just been talking about and the political environment. We mentioned before Tiananmen Square, the student involvement in the spring and early summer of 1989. How much of that ferment did you see happening? I assumed you worked somewhat with the domestic political side of the embassy as well. I'm wondering, particularly from the economic dimension was there a connection on the*

*political side?*

REUTHER: To me there was a clear connection just because the way economic reforms were implemented under Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang. In the old days if the central government wanted to implement a new policy, the policy came down as an order to all. Reforms in the 1980s derived from a more flexible, experimental policy. Chinese think tanks were encouraged to design different policies mapping how to move from a command economy to a market economy. Implementation was also more experimental. Hunan experimented with one approach, Sichuan another, and Yunnan a third. But the most important aspect of these experiments were the articles in the papers or internal discussion about, say, how Sichuan was doing with housing reform. If Sichuan's experiment looked attractive to the conditions in another locality, then those officials might also pick it up. But it wasn't a matter of the central government saying anymore, "Okay, all you guys do this." So, there was a lot of ferment going on out there and a lot of experimenting at the local level. Both the anticipation of reform and the flexibility in implementation fed into the frustration of Beijing Spring.

We saw Tiananmen as connected with the frustration that reforms had come to an important junction, but were slowing down - in Chinese eyes because, in opening up the economy, corruption and misallocation of resources also emerged. The banking system didn't exist and that was the only command structure the government had to really keep the economy from flying off into hyper inflation which, if you understand Chinese history, is something to be avoided at all cost. The liberals were frustrated and were pushing an idea called neo-authoritarianism. The Western translation would be "Bonaparteism" or "rescue by man on a white horse," because they couldn't figure out how to put limits on the corruption and move ahead. They were looking for some dictator, some one person who would wave a wand or put all the corrupt people in jail, and move reforms forward. The issue was not democracy. The problem was how to move forward, if corruption involved the sons and daughters of the leading elite.

After all of this experimentation, all of these productive changes that had happened in the agricultural economy, or these great reforms, people were making money, dressing better. They had seen the Promised Land. When one young Chinese woman who was assigned to work in the embassy came in a mini skirt one day, I remember a colleague who had experienced China just ten year earlier -- just after the Gang of Four -- remarking that he was astonished by the changes in so short a time.

I don't know if we mentioned it before but one of the things you have to understand is how infectious and debilitating corruption is. When we are talking about the October 1973 rioting in Bangkok, one of the problems that played into that was police corruption. We talked about that and the fact that even though it was the army shooting at students, the public burned down every police station, because the demonstrators saw the police as corrupt and nobody was doing anything about it. Well, here you have the Chinese population in the spring of 1989 with this economic expansion that was being throttled in their eyes by corruption and their answer was to call for a dictator to clean up the corruption. They didn't see any other method of reinvigorating reform. From our point of view, the spring of 1989 was not a democracy movement. We went down to Tiananmen Square and talked to demonstration leaders. They did not have a sophisticated understanding of democracy.

Remember the demonstration leaders at first were students from the premier universities, meaning they were sons and daughters of ranking party members. When government put out an editorial that said the students were being disruptive, student leaders took offense. In addition to their policy complaints was added the issue of face. So, a lot of things came together.

But Tiananmen was fascinating, in part, because it was a reverberation of what was happening in Europe. European Communism was failing in 1989 yet Gorbachev's visit in the spring and the whole thing starts off in a very Chinese way, a demonstration for the funeral for an honored leader was the excuse to get out into the streets. Once the students were out on the streets you couldn't lock the barn door. Gorbachev came, but the demonstrations caused obvious schedule changes. The longer the demonstrations lasted, the more difficult for the student leaders to maintain control, as new groups and students from outside traveled to Beijing. It was not hard to see a parallel with the student demonstrations of the Cultural Revolution. Finally, I think May 27 or 28 the authorities declared martial law. Now that was a significant event. We had established an office in the Beijing Hotel, which is right up from Tiananmen Square. From the hotel the embassy dispatched two officers at a time, from May through June, to chat with demonstrators in the square on a daily basis. Notice the return on investment in Chinese language training. We didn't rely on the papers, embassy officers had first hand information.

*Q: You don't even have to watch CNN.*

REUTHER: Right. We could talk to people, see who they were and see what was going on. The authorities declared martial law late May, responding in large part to labor and business people becoming sympathetic to the students. It was something I had seen during the 1973 student demonstrations in Thailand where the general public demonstrated support by offering food and drink to the students. The Tiananmen students were very disciplined. They could have been civil rights marchers in the 60s. They had their own security, cleaned the square and tried to maximize their presentation of themselves as within the Chinese system by their politeness and conduct...

*Q: Why don't we talk about the role of the embassy. To what extent did incidents occur there related to what was going on at the square?*

REUTHER: As I was saying earlier, the demonstration was very well organized, very disciplined and very big. You have to understand that, at that time and continuing to the present, the Chinese put the foreign diplomatic community in compounds. The main compound is on one of the main streets that exits on to Tiananmen square in a north south direction. From time to time, to keep their morale up and connect with the public, the students marched out of the square and around the internal beltway. That would bring them by the embassy and housing compound. I don't think the Rose Bowl parade or the Macy's Thanksgiving Day parade was ever as exciting as sitting up on the roof watching just miles and miles and blocks and blocks of people -- 10 across -- marching down the road. One of the more beautiful things was the parade of the motorcycle brigades. Economic reforms allowed people to establish private business, the 'getihu.' With their private income, one of these private business people's first personal purchases was a motorcycle. So you had this motorcycle brigade of private business people. Each vehicle had a small Chinese flag on the handlebar and then three very large Chinese flags on poles at about the third rank.

This revving of the engines while going through Beijing was just stirring, I mean it had the emotional impact of a marching band during a sporting event.

Such parades were very stirring and obviously got people quite involved. In fact, the positive public response was the reason the authorities became worried and the hard-liners saw things spinning out of control. What is remarkable about Tiananmen Square is the push and pull between the hard-liners and the moderates right up to the end. We heard rumors that the PLA was divided. The struggle between the two was like the Greek myth about the sun and wind betting which one of them could get a traveler to take his coat off. That is what Beijing was like up to those first days in June. The Conservatives said to the Liberals, "Okay, let's see if you guys can get them to stop demonstrating." So, troops were sent in unarmed without their officers and the Beijing public stopped them from getting to the student center. The moderates in the government failed, the moderates in the student demonstration slipped away with martial law. The streets were left to the people of Beijing and a more inexperienced group of student demonstrators.

Well, if a political process started moderately, it rarely becomes softer, and often reverts to harder. What happened on the night of June 4 was that the hard-liners moved armed troops into Beijing and, like the Paris Commune of 1848, the population of Beijing rose up. The students were a minor focus of what happened that evening. The western press missed a good story by creating a students versus government story. Forgotten in that story—and part of the legacy for the Chinese—was the city of Beijing rose up in revolt. All the destruction, all the death, was caused by the troops fighting their way into Beijing. By the time the PLA arrived at Tiananmen Square, the students surrendered and were marched off very easily, according to a Latin American ambassador who was near the square until early in the morning. According to another account, the only incident between the student demonstrators and the PLA at Tiananmen Square occurred as one group of troops was escorting the students out of the square. In the negotiated surrender, the students were allowed to march out with their flags. However, another unit that had fought its way into town suddenly arrived at the square from the south. Seeing the students with their flags, this second unit apparently opened fire hitting some of the escorting troops as well as students. To the extent that Tiananmen Square was more than putting down a student demonstration, it was an urban uprising. The people of Beijing will remember.

*Q: Was there some sort of shooting incident near or at the American embassy?*

REUTHER: Obviously on the night of June 4 there was shooting all over the place. Beijing was full of tourists and business people. It became obvious that the situation in Beijing was very unstable. So, all the embassies in Beijing evacuated their nationals. We ultimately evacuated about 1500 Americans, tourists, business people, our own embassy staff. The Japanese evacuated 4000 out of all of China. All the embassies slimmed down their missions. There were probably fewer foreigners in Beijing on June 6, 1989, than in the last 500 years. Think about it. The point is that the dream of any nationalistic Chinese for the last 200 years, since the first opium war, is to get the foreigners out of China, because it is the foreign influence that corrupted and weakened China. So, there were conservative elements in the Chinese structure that were very pleased to see these departures. To them the departure of all the embassies was a next logical step.

Someone acted on that impulse. Across from one of the diplomatic compounds that faced Jianguomen Dajie was a Japanese hotel under construction. By virtue of the way housing was allocated, the Chinese knew apartment assignments among the compound buildings. In the morning of June the 6th, or two days after Tiananmen Square, a group of soldiers who were walking along Jianguomen Dajie in front of the diplomatic compound suddenly started shooting up from the street into the building.

*Q: Into which building?*

REUTHER: Into the diplomatic housing compound, building number one. They said they had received sniper fire from the roof of the building. More to the point: the platoon hidden in the building across the street simultaneously poured fire horizontally into building number one. Given a 10 floor building, if you are shooting from the street, bullets will lodge in the ceiling the first six inches or so from the window. In this case, however, you had horizontal fire poured into the apartments of the American, British, Japanese and German military attachés, those same embassies' security officers, one American economic officer and one Brit. They just trashed those apartments with automatic weapons fire. Later the American Defense Attaché told me that he received a phone call from somebody he knew in a central military unit who said don't be home at 10:00, click.

*Q: So, it was planned.*

REUTHER: Something was known in advance. Something whose objective was to scare us away, to make us close all of the embassies.

*Q: Were there casualties?*

REUTHER: No. All the apartments were empty except for one. The American security officer's kids were still there and the maid got them below the windowsill in time.

In retrospect, the objective of this incident was to do what the Boxers had wanted to do in the summer of 1900, make the foreigners go away. This shooting had a great impact on us, being shot at tends to do that to you, but we were quite determined that we would not break off relations with China, they were stuck with us. We would stay engaged and not be scared out. In fact, we presumed the perpetrators were a small cabal of people and that there would be others who were not supportive of this kind of thing. But, if we left, if we did what the shooters wanted, then we would also leave the reformers naked to them.

What is interesting about this is that the Tiananmen Incident reintroduced China into American domestic politics. American politicians expressed the outrage we all felt. But after a while, moralistic statements about China became just another jab at one's American partisan opponent. So, a situation developed where some in Congress were calling for a break in relations with China and the imposition of penalties which meant the same thing. This created an interesting situation where the last remnants of the Boxer Rebellion and congressional China critics were making common cause, saying, "Break off contact." And you have the Bush Administration saying, "No, we have to stay engaged with China because we can't let them break it off and go

their own separate way.” In fact, the advantage at that time of having Bush as President was that, because he had been head of the earlier liaison office, he understood how important the whole issue was. I believe he understood how crucial it was to maintain contact with China so that we didn’t lose contact with the reformers. Dealing with the Chinese has its frustrations, like dealing with the French. But frustration is no excuse to abandon the opportunity to educate.

*Q: What was it like, working in Beijing after the embassy families and all those Americans had departed.*

REUTHER: It was both frustrating and hard on morale. We were as caught up in reacting to the killings as everyone else, although I had been through a similar event in Thailand 16 years earlier. For those of us in the Economic Section, there was little of our standard economic/commercial reporting to do. There weren’t going to be any negotiating delegations coming for some time either. One of the interesting indices of the frustration we felt was that some of our more talented compatriots turned their frustration into song. I had seen this phenomena when I was in Thailand, Foreign Service officers serving in CORDS came to Bangkok singing new lyrics to contemporary songs. The same happened in Beijing. If I can find a couple of examples, I will add them later.

[Songs of Frustration: to the tune of “Yellow Ribbon”

I’ve just been down in Tian an men  
How did we get into this mess we’re in  
I used to follow Zhao Ziyang, I wanted to be free  
Now the PLA is here, and they have outraged me  
They’ve brought those APCs

Chorus:

Just tie some flaming burlap ‘round that APC  
We’ve been here two months in the PRC  
If you don’t get some burlap ‘round that APC  
It’ll run over us, so let’s torch that bus  
Put the blame on Li  
Just tie some flaming burlap ‘round the ol’  
‘round that ol’ APC...]

*Q: Now Tiananmen Square was toward the end of your tour. What other issues were you watching?*

REUTHER: Remember, we were talking earlier about intellectual property rights. Another educational process that we closely watched was the British negotiations with the Chinese over Hong Kong, the bulk of which was covered by a 99-year lease that would expire in the 1990s. From the negotiating record I say much of those negotiations were not negotiations but educational seminars on how the British ran Hong Kong. I remember one report that talked about payroll deductions. A fairly clear concept to you and I, but alien to recent Chinese experience. In China you belong to a *danwei*, or work unit, which provides at little cost to you: your schooling, your housing, your food, your recreational facilities, so the wages you get are minimal and do not represent the cost of labor. Well, in a free market economy, of course, you have to buy all

those things from your wages and save for a pension. Well, the Chinese don't have that, so the British had to describe to the Chinese the connections between payroll deductions, pensions and using stocks and bonds to make pensions grow. No negotiating team looks bad in its own cables, but there is an educational aspect to any negotiation as each side explains its perspective. In the case of the discussions over the future of Hong Kong, the minutia and detail were interesting to watch.

*Q: Real basic.*

REUTHER: Yes, some real basics. But then everything about the Hong Kong negotiations was unique. Even the fact that there were negotiations, China did not follow the Indian example. New Delhi extinguished Portuguese Goa by force of arms. The British-Chinese talks began as a rather legalistic discussion. At one point the Chinese increased the size of their delegation to involve bureaucracies that had implementation, rather than legal, responsibilities. I can't conceive of more complicated talks, certainly given the historical animosity between the two countries.

*Q: It takes time and you have to start building and developing a foundation before you can get into the issues.*

REUTHER: Exactly, and that is where we are with China. People talk about engagement but they are only thinking in national terms seeing China as an undifferentiated whole. But, China, like the United States, is a large continental society. Fortunately we have funding at the moment for five consulates. But if you didn't have those consulates you really would be quite blind to what is going on with the variety of reforms and the variety of circumstances. That would be like saying because there is a French embassy in Washington, Paris will understand Proposition 13 in California. Useful intelligence it not so neatly packaged. While a French Embassy might pass on a definition of Proposition 13, its consulate in California can explain in detail what stimulated the idea, who is behind it, what are the chances for this local movement to become national.

*Q: And in some ways China is even more challenging than the United States is because it is so much larger and really has a lot of diversity. Dave, when you were there in the economic section, were you able to travel some in the rest of the country? Did you rely a lot on the consulates for reporting on what was happening in their areas or did you try to get a flavor yourself of the whole country?*

REUTHER: Well, my experience was a mixture of both. Being in the cockpit of the embassy, if you will, we tasked the consulates for reporting on specific issues, or to determine whether a reform being touted in Beijing was really being implemented. With the consulate reporting in hand, we would combine it with conversations that we had with the Chinese bureaucracies or think tanks and file a report to Washington that we believed provided the best nation-wide picture. I personally didn't get that much of a chance to travel. I found my schedule crowded with visitors and a growing list of negotiating sessions. But, I had some absolutely outstanding young officers in the economic sections and we tried to free them for travel. I assumed that when they returned for a China assignment ten years hence, they would have a useful sense of comparison. So, officers from the economic section traveled to the port city of Tianjin from time to time. Some of the limits on traveling through China were not caused by our demanding

schedules. Even by 1989, China's infrastructure was still rustic. You could not drive from Beijing to Guangzhou on paved roads. Air travel was in its infancy. To cover our district we generally traveled by train.

*Q: Approximately four months after the incident. At the time you left how would you appraise the general situation in terms of the relations with the United States on the economic side? Had things begun to return to the way things were before or would that take quite a while?*

REUTHER: That would take quite a while to describe. Such a destructive event as Tiananmen Square makes people who need security and stability and predictability in their relationship hold back, and nobody wants stability and predictability more than business people do. Even after we started summer transfers, the business people stayed away. Of course, it is business peoples' interest in stability which makes them good advocates for transparent laws, protection of property and other accoutrements essential to underwriting the transition to modernity, if not democracy. Because most countries seek economic advancement they voluntarily put such instruments in place. Human rights advocates rarely have such a system wide impact, and they often meet with resistance.

The first few months after Tiananmen Square were quite telling. We began a series of economic reports discussing the economic price China paid for Tiananmen. I recall one report on the tourist industry in which we compared all international flights coming into China in the pre-Tiananmen Square period versus what was happening after Tiananmen. Literally everyone just stopped coming to China. Tourism collapsed and most airlines simply did not fly their posted schedules. Hotels, two major Hong Kong invested properties had just opened, had enormous vacancy rates. Some airlines still flew. Lufthansa had a joint venture with the Chinese airlines, which were being deregulated at that time, to build a service center for them. So, they could not terminate all flights. They came in once a week instead of four times a week. And they came in empty.

*Q: But they were obliged to continue.*

REUTHER: They were obliged to continue. Cathay Pacific was doing good business because all the businessmen took refuge in Hong Kong and then flew up for a day or two maintain their contacts and fly back. So, Cathay Pacific and Dragon Air, the two companies that flew the Hong Kong to Beijing routes, were doing okay, but everybody else was dead. Hotel occupancy rate scraped along at maybe 5 or 10 percent. We calculated that in tourism alone Tiananmen cost China millions of dollars in lost revenues.

So, I would be prepared to offer the proposition that the Chinese paid dearly for Tiananmen. The government understands the financial, prestige and industrial price it paid in the unintended consequences category, for example, under our export control regulations, guidance systems in the Boeing airplanes that China bought had to be under the control of a Boeing official. Such systems were not stored with the Chinese. This meant that after Tiananmen, the Chinese Boeing airplanes weren't safe to fly. The Boeing personnel had left country and there was no one qualified to adjust the systems or install new equipment. They had all left. By the time I left, most of the Chinese fleet could not be safely flown. So, even their domestic commerce was severely damaged by Tiananmen.

*Q: I think we have covered China as vast as it is. You were there for one of the major events of the last 50 years, a fascinating experience.*

REUTHER: You know it is funny how these things come to you. I was reading a book the other day which pointed out that Herbert Hoover, who would later become the U.S. president, was in Tianjin during the Boxer Rebellion and fired a rifle over the parapet. So, many Americans have had interesting experiences in China.

*Q: It probably wouldn't take you very far.*

REUTHER: Their destinations were rather limited. I think you could fly to Cairo. The Sudanese were singularly isolated. It was all part of the difficulty of that environment. I don't think I have ever been in a more physically inhospitable environment.

I was also on the employees' welfare board and ran our little commissary. Our little commissary was important to morale because literally there was little on the local market to buy. You couldn't send your servant out and say, "Well, buy some broccoli or squash for dinner." We often had colleagues at the embassy in Nairobi cut a deal with a crew member of the Kenya Air flight that arrived once a week to put a box of vegetables on a plane for us.

Fresh food was such a scarce commodity in Khartoum that hunting for it became second nature. For example, at the Khartoum embassy, Matt Ward, who was the embassy economic counselor, and I had most recently been in China. He came from Shanghai and I came from Beijing. The two of us hung out at the Chinese embassy from time to time because the Chinese embassy grew its own food in its walled compound. By the way, the Chinese diplomats were excellent Arabic linguists. Or so my Arab-speaking colleagues remarked. For Matt and I this was a chance to retain our Chinese language skills and eat.

*Q: You mentioned that you worked closely with Australia on New Zealand policy. What were other aspects of our relationship with Australia that you recall?*

REUTHER: As a Foreign Service officer in Asia I always worked closely with the local Australian embassy. In a place like China where the Americans often had more language skills, officers from the English speaking embassies, such as the Australians, would often meet and share notes. The tour in the Pentagon, however, underscored for me the intimacy in Australian-American relations that I consider remarkable. The U.S. military has many exchange programs with foreign militaries, but our exchange with Australia was extensive. To the point where Australian officers were holding billets in the Pentagon in fields such as logistics and procurement. Australia was fully integrated into the inner core of the American security establishment. Cross training and mutual exposure built high levels of confidence when events such as Desert Storm arose.

You could see this remarkable relationship in the work of the Australia Desk. An arrangement had developed over the years where the Director of Asia-Pacific Affairs (that is, the #2 position in our office, usually a one or two star military officer) had a formal quarterly meeting with the

Australian Military Attaché. These meetings were called the HADS-ISA meetings (e.g., Head of Australian Defense Service). Military attaches from other countries had good working relations and easy access to the Desk officers and our bosses, but these formal meetings were particularly symbolic of our close relationship of Australia. Because our relationship was so rich, these meetings provided a centralized venue for raising any security related issue. The agendas that I prepared for these meetings were extensive and covered not only our policy toward some world event, but the status of mutual scientific projects and the constant coordination on New Zealand policy.

Also symbolic of the intimacy of the relationship were the annual Australian Ministerial meetings. I'm not certain when they started, but they certainly were the highlight of my tour. These were annual cabinet-level meetings that alternated between capitals. In 1994 the venue was Canberra, 1995 Washington. These were major administrative events because protocol called for both the secretaries of Defense and State to attend. It is a project of enormous proportions to coordinate the schedules of these two American cabinet officials. Once the AUSMIN was tentatively on their schedule, my State Department colleague, the Australian embassy and I began to work on an agenda. The agenda would cover the waterfront. There wasn't an international subject that wasn't covered. Furthermore, there was an extensive communiqué to negotiate. The communiqué, of course, illustrates the connection between foreign and domestic policy because it was as much for the domestic audiences as mutual allies and neighbors. One of the difficult aspects of the whole proceedings, however, was to arrange the topics so there would be sufficient and substantive topics for each American cabinet official to address in the meetings. This was the job of the working level. There were murmurings from the immediate staffs of the secretaries of State and Defense over the allocation of topics, but such turf questions were to be expected.

The Australians hosted my first AUSMIN (as was our shorthand for these meetings) in Canberra. Ultimately the Secretary of Defense dropped out of the schedule and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Ambassador Frank Wisner, headed the DOD contingent. This was my first time in Canberra. The Australians were gracious hosts and a number of our embassy officers in Canberra were FSOs with whom I had served in other posts. The meetings were held in the unassuming Cabinet room of the new Parliament building. While in town I had my own full schedule of meetings with a spectrum of Australian officials, including representatives of the Prime Minister's office, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. I also took advantage of the opportunity to visit the War Museum in Canberra and the Navy command center in Sydney.

The second AUSMIN was in Washington. Again, the job of the desk officer was to accomplish the preliminary coordination between State and Defense and the Australian embassy. Next task was to commission background papers that provided a snapshot of the subjects to be covered. Working closely with State's Desk we coordinated and cleared the talking point papers from which the principals would speak. Closer to the event one would draft the scope paper that provided an overall view of where this meeting fit into the relationship, what the other side hoped to accomplish, and finally what we hoped to accomplish. After the appropriate clearances, these papers were put together in a briefing book, at least three inches in this case, and passed forward to the principal, with copies to the deputies who would also attend the meetings. Always

a frantic time meeting the deadline for these briefing books. Nevertheless, briefing books are an invaluable photography of a relationship.

One final thought on the relationship with Australia is an observation about how democracies interact. One of my main projects was the preparation of the Annual Facilities Report. For decades Australia's contribution to the alliance was the provision of space for joint facilities that performed a number of defense monitoring functions. The Labour opposition liked to characterize the joint facilities as "U.S. bases" or as performing functions the Australian public would not approve. At one point the slow response to a question in Parliament about some construction at one of these facilities embarrassed the party in power. As a result, at least through the 1980s, the Australia desk officer queried the U.S. uniformed services that had equities in these joint facilities what our plans were. In my turn I gathered these responses and coordinated them into a report which was then forwarded to Canberra via the Australian embassy's defense attaché. The irony is that one of my duties was to assist the Australian government fend off potential domestic political attacks.

*Q: Did I remember you saying that you were also desk officer for another island, Taiwan. How did that come about?*

REUTHER: When I arrived at Asia Pacific Affairs Eden Woon covered all China issues. Post-Tiananmen sanctions restricted military-to-military contacts with Beijing and contacts with Taiwan were predictable. Dr. Woon had come to the position of Head of the China desk while he was still in the Air Force. In late 1994 he left ISA/AP to become director of the Washington State China Relations Council in Seattle. So, I added the Taiwan desk officer duties to my portfolio for about the last 12 months of my assignment to the Pentagon.

*Q: Beijing-Taipei issues are in the news all the time now, wasn't that taking on a heavy load?*

REUTHER: By this time an office reorganization allowed me to turn over my Korean responsibilities to a new officer. So, the portfolio balance remained. But you are right, Australian and New Zealand affairs dominated my attention. In mid to late 1994 we were in the midst of another round of Inter-Agency Working Group meetings on the Australian South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone proposal. Australia and New Zealand had long expressed interest in a nuclear free zone. Some fruitful international discussions had been held, but the Reagan Administration lost interest. This was just one of a number of issues the Clinton Administration was reinvestigating. I was the lead ISA representative to the interagency meetings, most of which an NSC representative hosted. Our position was that nuclear free zones were a function of the Cold War, President Bush had removed nuclear weapons from U.S. naval vessels, and therefore the issue was overtaken by events (OBE). Law of the Sea concerns and U.S. Navy views were a large part of our disinterest. State was also not interested. Peripheral agencies interested in the issue were not strong enough to move the issue forward. As I was saying, though, as to Taiwan we were in the calm before the storm.

*Q: Can you give us a flavor of the Taiwan issues that did come to your attention?*

REUTHER: Our priority issues were maintaining the unofficiality of the relationship with

Taiwan and organizing our best judgement on the issue of arms sales to Taiwan. The Clinton Administration, as it had with New Zealand policy and other issues, conducted an interagency review of policy toward Taiwan. Given the political sensitivity of the relationship, State was the lead agency. That policy review was completed around July of 1994 and announced around September, just before I accepted the Taiwan portfolio. So, I did not participate in the policy review, but kept abreast of the issues during the twice-weekly office staff meetings.

The end result of the Taiwan policy review were a few changes in procedure and nomenclature. CCNAA changed its name to the "Taipei Economic and Commercial Representative Office." Fair enough. CCNAA don't specifically refer to Taiwan or Taipei. On the grounds that trade had grown, economic officials of the two authorities could meet in each other's office. For everyone else, in order to underscore the unofficiality of the relationship, American Institute in Taiwan and TECRO offices were the unofficial meeting places of choice.

For DOD, the policy review meant no changes. Because officers in uniform and government arms sales imply officiality, new rules about Taiwan representatives' access to U.S. Government agencies did not affect DOD as they did Commerce and State departments. DOD equities required strict adherence to the unofficiality of the relationship with Taiwan and DOD continued to work through the AIT office in Rosslyn, Virginia.

Despite all the pro-Taiwan fuss in the media at the time, it is not clear that the interagency group could have changed much. The Republic of China, that is, the authorities on Taiwan, is the successor government to the Qing dynasty, and our normalization with the People's Republic of China meant that the PRC was the successor to the ROC. To illustrate this legitimacy linkage, one of the first requirements the USG made of the PRC was that it resolved the issue of the Kwang Hua Railroad bonds *from the Qing Dynasty*. Any activity then that supports the officiality of the ROC impinges on the legitimacy of the PRC. This was particularly true during the 1970s and 1980s when the ROC unequivocally argued that it was the government of China of which Taiwan was a province. The contemporary PRC claim is a reflection of the earlier ROC claim. Calling on the ROC to change its name so that it is no longer the successor government to the Qing runs into problems on the Taiwan side. The political party that ruled Taiwan from 1945 to the present is the Kuomintang. It legitimized its rule and hence financial and power position in Taiwan on the grounds that it was the government of China. Changing the name of the government on Taiwan has serious consequences for the Kuomintang and its relationship with the people of Taiwan. These are complicated Taiwan legitimacy issues that the USG cannot resolve. That is why our official position since the 1972 communiqué is a neutral one. The issue is for Beijing and Taipei to work out peacefully. The issues are delicate and so interwoven that cutting one innocent thread may lead to powerful unintended consequences.

*Q: You were saying that one of DOD's main responsibilities was arms sales to Taiwan. The 1982 Communiqué talked about a steady decline in the amount of arms sold. How were Taiwan's legitimate defense needs handled?*

REUTHER: Shortly after I assumed the Taiwan portfolio we began the annual arms sales process and a review of Taiwan's defense needs. This starts with a visit to Washington by a Taiwan delegation from the Ministry of Defense that presents Taiwan's list of the equipment it wants and

justifications. We call this the pre-Arms Sales Talks. Taiwan's list is often eclectic. The list often included a wide variety of equipment from submarines to communications equipment to request for technology transfer for co-production purposes. My recollection is that this list comes to us toward the end of the year, November/December, and then we hold the Arms Sales Talks themselves in March or April.

Taiwan's list always reflects the unique political situation from which it arises. RAND recently completed a study on the Taiwan procurement process and that study notes that Taiwan's list is a combination of what Taiwan's military professional think they need to accomplish specific defensive tasks in addition to what the political leaders add to the list. The government wants to communicate to the Taiwan public that it is doing its best to purchase the latest equipment. The problem is that you end up with a list that can be both practical and hype. We have a responsibility not to rubber-stamp it, but give each item due consideration. We break the list into functions and turn it over to our best military and intelligence people to look at the functional components: air defense or anti- submarine warfare, etc.

*Q: Both practical and hype? How do you contribute to the analysis?*

REUTHER: Diplomacy is part of the nation's defense and one should not be unfamiliar with the thinking of the military side of the house. Personally, my avocation is World War II history. My personal career has been intimately bound with that of my colleagues in the uniform services. Thailand dealing with the Air Force; insurgency issues including my exposure to Foreign Service colleagues who saw service in a CORDS assignment in Vietnam. Iraq issues certainly had a military component. Some FSI training involved a class at an Air Force installation in Florida. When we were evacuated from Sudan, I had a temporary assignment in the Political Military Bureau that exposed me to my uniformed colleagues. Finally, at DOD each issue we handled whether Korea, New Zealand or Taiwan, we handled the military side. So, I was able to guide and contribute to the ongoing discussion.

*Q: So, you orchestrated one session of an Arms Sales Talk with Taiwan. Lot of paperwork?*

REUTHER: There was a considerable amount of information to digest between the Pre- Talks and the Talks. Primarily we wanted to make certain we understood where Taiwan was in its execution of some function and what might be the next best step to improve its performance. When you introduce whole new systems, it is important to determine whether the training, tactics and budgeting are in place. Buying the latest fad is a waste of money if one cannot integrate the system into current procedures. Also, by the time I was involved, a number of political changes in Taiwan had significantly impacted on Taiwan's procurement process. Under the unchallenged Kuomintang era Taiwan's defense budget and requests were sometimes more extensive than we could approve. With the impact of a more democratic system, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) opposition was generally anti-defense budget and by 1995 had made significant strides in both cutting the budget and making the Ministry of Defense more accountable. As a result, American defense companies would often contact us and complain that the Defense Department was holding down Taiwan's spending and they were losing contracts! In fact a much more sophisticated game was afoot. Democracy was coming to Taiwan.

The American defense contractors had never experienced democracy in Taiwan and they were unprepared for its consequences. This is not an unusual phenomenon. Twenty years earlier, as the American were winding down in Vietnam and the Congress was cutting the defense budget, we often were involved with the Thai Government to negotiate one politico-military issue or another. One incident I specifically remember was that we wanted to shift reconnaissance aircraft from an upcountry airfield to a southern airport. The distance was a couple hundred kilometers, but the saving on gas and maintenance was noticeable. Thai authorities had never been asked to approve an American proposal on the basis of financial savings. After all the money we had spent in Vietnam, we were asking to save the cost of a couple hundred kilometers! The Thai were dumbfounded and believed for a period that we had some ulterior motive. I suspect that the arrival of a more open system on Taiwan was equally bewildering to the defense contractors used to Taiwan's steady, no-nonsense, military purchases.

*Q: You spoke earlier that you covered Taiwan in the calm before the storm. What are you referring to? What storm?*

REUTHER: 1995 was the high mark of amiable cross-straits relations. Taipei and Beijing were conducting serious and highly educational talks through their mutual unofficial mechanisms labeled the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) on the Taiwan side and the Association for Relations Across The Taiwan Straits (ARATS) on Beijing side. It should be noted that the used of 'unofficial' offices to conduct real exchanges was inaugurated by the Japanese in 1972 when they established an unofficial office in Taiwan and copied by the U.S. in 1979 with the American Institute in Taiwan. Here was Taipei and Beijing copying the Japanese and American precedent! There had been an earlier summit between SEF and ARATS and one was tentatively scheduled for late summer 1995. A second successful summit was predicted to open further the budding economic and social relationship between Taiwan and the Mainland. It was not to be, however. Appointed President of Taiwan Lee Teng-hui was about to seek election as the Kuomintang candidate in the first popular election for President on Taiwan. A marvelous milestone in the democratization of Taiwan. Unfortunately, to demonstrate his talents in foreign policy for the electorate, he decided to he wanted to travel to the United States. Actually there had been informal musings about allowing short visits to set a precedent and move from there. With an election deadline, however, Lee couldn't wait. With a campaign chest of \$4.5 million the Kuomintang hired a lobby firm to exert pressure on the Executive from the Congress to give Lee his trip, the venue was a speech at his alma mater, Cornell University. The Kuomintang move coincided with the swearing in of the highly partisan 104<sup>th</sup> Congress under Speaker Gingrich. Support for Lee's travel to Cornell mushroomed and caught many unawares. In the Executive Branch there were many who were blocked from trying to head-off this train wreck because they could not conceive that Congress could be so irresponsible. In these circles there was no doubt Lee's trip to Cornell, especially under circumstances of obvious Kuomintang lobbying, was a worse case scenario. But, Lee got his trip. The second SEF-ARATS summit was never held. The State Department shunned the TECRO representative. And, consensus withered for moving ahead on the provision of some of the systems the March 1995 Arms Sales Talks had favored.

The lesson here is that we can have pretty much any relationship we want with Taiwan, as long as it is low profile. Little has changed since the Carter Administration when we sold arms to Taiwan in batches less than had to be reported to Congress. In ending Carter's policy and

publicly announcing a major arms sale to Taiwan, the Reagan Administration poked Beijing in the eye, guaranteed a reaction, and ended up with the 1982 Communiqué. The issue is not that we need Beijing's permission or are kowtowing to Beijing in our relationship with Taipei. The issue is that the lower profile a relationship we have with Taipei in certain areas, the more fulsome it can be. Until the two of them work out some mutual agreement. Anyway, Lee's trip to Cornell was a watershed in which we were left with deteriorating relationships on both sides of the Strait.

*Q: Given your long interest in China policy. These were rather anticlimactic circumstances for the end of your career.*

REUTHER: Perhaps so, but one is always learning. It is always interesting to see how some of the events that one has been involved with are represented in the press or the academic community. For example, I have read academic tomes on Sino-American relations that note that we refused to sell Taiwan the manpack Stinger missile and forced them to purchase a jeep mounted version. And there is a half-truth to this story. After Afghanistan and Stingers showing up in unexpected places, the uniformed side of the house disapproved of providing the manpack version of this weapon to anyone. I found this out when New Zealand sought to purchase this equipment for one of its UN peacekeeping forces. We did not sell manpack. The stingers had to be attached to something larger - so they would not show up in unexpected places. That we consummated a Stinger sale for Taiwan is a demonstration of doing our proper job, not abandoning the Taiwanese as critics charged. Anyway you are right. I transferred out of ISA/AP in October 1995. It was an enormous pleasure to work with my uniformed colleagues from Thailand to the Pentagon.

**G. EUGENE MARTIN**

**Staff Secretariat, East Asia – China Policy  
Washington, DC (1979-1980)**

**Special Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State  
Washington, DC (1980-1981)**

**Special Assistant, Bureau of East Asian & Pacific Affairs  
Washington, DC (1984-1985)**

**Deputy Director for Political Affairs, China  
Washington, DC (1985-1987)**

**Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Asia and Africa  
Washington, DC (1990-1992)**

**Consul General  
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*A Specialist in Chinese Affairs and a speaker of Chinese, Mr. Martin spent the major part of his career dealing with matters relating to China, both in Washington and abroad. His overseas assignments included Hong Kong, Taipei, Huangzhou (formerly Canton), Beijing, Manila and Rangoon. His Washington assignments also concerned China and the Far East. Mr. Martin was born in Indiana of Missionary parents and was raised in the US. and India. He is a graduate of Kalamazoo College and Syracuse University. Mr. Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Today is December 15, 2000. There has been a hiatus where Gene was off, called back to serve as DCM in Beijing. But now we're picking this up again, and we're going back to 1979. You went to S/S. What type of work were you doing? Could you describe what S/S or S/S-S was doing at that time because the roles sometimes change around, and then what you were doing?*

MARTIN: At that time, S/S was still in the throes of having been built up during the Kissinger era, when S/S became really the private staffing organization for the Secretary. What I came into was S/S-S, the Secretariat Staff, which essentially was responsible for handling paper from the department to the Seventh Floor Principals, as well as staffing the secretary's overseas trips, of which there were many.

*Q: Well now, the secretary at this point was...*

MARTIN: This was during the Carter Administration. The secretary was Cyrus Vance and Warren Christopher was deputy secretary. I came in during the summer of '79, just before the Iran hostage crisis. Having just come out of Taiwan and the normalization process, I went into the officer position on the team handling East Asia, refugees and politico-military affairs. But East Asia generally kept me fairly well occupied.

*Q: This was about three years after Kissinger had left. Was there a change in the attitude of the department, how it operated, from what you were getting from older hands? Under Cyrus Vance, was it different?*

MARTIN: I think it was lower key, the pressure was less, and there was a less frantic pace than it had been under Kissinger. I had only been in the department under Kissinger when I was on the Burma desk previously but had been quite removed from the seventh floor. Kissinger did not spend a great deal of time on Burmese affairs, as you can imagine.

But I think that the staffing was still there, and the traditions and procedures put in place during the Kissinger era basically continued. I think in subsequent years this has changed. I was responsible for East Asia, primarily; but we also took turns working the secretary's overseas trips. It did not necessarily mean that you would go only to your geographical bureau. You would go on whatever trip was scheduled on a rotational basis.

My first trip was to Panama for Vance's signing of the Panama Canal Treaty, which had been a big political battle on the Hill. In many ways, it was similar to the PNTR (Permanent Normal Trade Relations) battle this year for China.

*Q: Would you explain what that means?*

MARTIN: The granting of permanent normal trading relations, or what previously was called MFN (Most Favored Nation) status to China after we reached an agreement on PRC accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). The battle, or the all court press this year was really reminiscent in my mind of the effort that was put on by the Carter administration to ratify the Panama Canal Treaty, which was very controversial.

*Q: Was the fact that it was signed in Panama, and then Vance went down there, apparently to avoid getting the president too exposed back home, do you think?*

MARTIN: Actually, as it turned out, I was the advance team, as the Secretariat was called. The advance team went first to work out the details of the secretary's schedule with the Embassy, and then a second team came in with the secretary on the airplane. The two Secretariat teams supported the secretary with paper, communications, staffing, such as preparing Memoranda of Conversations, cables, etc. I went down and spent a day or two getting ready for the visit, then got word that he had to cancel his trip because of Afghanistan. So he never came. I had an extra day in Panama to do a little sightseeing, see the canal do some shopping, and then turn around and come home. So that was my first trip with the Secretariat, which turned out to be a dry hole.

*Q: What was the Panamanian reaction. Did they understand that Afghanistan was a big deal?*

MARTIN: I think they understood that, mainly because they already had the agreement on the treaty and they had gotten what they wanted, which was the canal; and so whether or not Vance came or not, it didn't make any difference.

The second trip I took was to Europe when Vance was going to Bonn and to a number of other places for a whole series of meetings, nothing particular in my recollection. Again, I advanced the trip, first to Bonn, and then to Rome, and then to London. And that was the usual frantic pace that the secretary's visits usually cause, which has gotten only worse since then. The "baggage" that goes along with any secretary when he or she travels these days is quite significant. That was an advance trip, which again, was fun in many ways, seeing different parts of the world in which I had not served, having an opportunity to go and spend a couple of days in each place. It generally worked out pretty well.

*Q: Was there an entourage that always went with Vance, for example, or was it sort of a mix?*

MARTIN: It was a mixed gang. The regional bureau representatives would go along, obviously, doing whatever, depending on where he's going; and then Secretariat staffers and a Deputy Executive Secretary would go along on the trip to try to run the administrative side of it. In many ways Vance was quite low-key. He didn't do as much traveling as Henry Kissinger had done.

*Q: Who was the head of the Secretariat?*

MARTIN: The executive secretary at the time was Peter Tarnoff. The Director of the S/S-S was

Art Hughes. I was only there less than a year. I'd come back in the summer of '79 from Taiwan, and in February of 1980, I moved over to be the special assistant to the Deputy Secretary, which was Warren Christopher.

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*Q: Yes. Well now, what was Warren Christopher like to work for?*

MARTIN: Privately, he was a wonderful person. He's a really very warm, engaging, humorous person. Publicly, however, he had a totally different image. He was a lawyer's lawyer. He kept everything extremely close to his chest. While he treated his staff well and was personable, he did not share a great deal of the information. He tended to keep his own counsel. Often we would have to ask him about an issue. If you asked, he would then tell you what he was thinking, all that was going on; but he did not volunteer it. But we had a good group of people working in that office, and it was very enjoyable.

*Q: What was your role in that particular staff?*

MARTIN: My role was to make sure he was aware of what was going on in the building; that he was fully briefed; that when he was having meetings or when he was asked to have meetings, he had all the information he needed to make the decision; and that he had the necessary papers to be able to conduct a meeting. I was also responsible for making sure the bureau for which I was responsible knew what his thinking was, and also to try to be able to run interference when necessary to get things done.

*Q: Did you find at his level that the hostage situation in our embassy in Tehran pretty well tied everything up, or was it business as usual?*

MARTIN: For the first few months it was more business as usual; but as the hostage situation dragged on, he became increasingly wrapped up in it. By the end of my tour there, he was spending almost all of his time on the hostage negotiations because he was the designated negotiator and had the responsibility for the talks. But before his almost total focus on the hostages, he was engaged in pretty much a full range of the Department's activities. Desert One, the hostage rescue attempt that failed so dramatically and tragically in Iran, made him the key person in the crisis.

During the first few months of the hostage negotiation, there was a great deal of pressure for the U.S. to try to do something, to try to rescue the hostages. There were diverse ideas and suggestions floating around. Ross Perot and EDS (Electronic Data Systems) was quite successful in getting some of his employees out of Tehran. There was a great deal of to-ing and fro-ing as to whether it was possible, whether we could do it. The military was anxious to do it, to prove it could be done. So the mission group was cobbled together, a joint command as all the services wanted to participate. There's been a lot written about this, so I don't need to go into a lot of detail. From my perspective, it was an effort to make sure that we notified allies, that we were able to keep everybody aware of what's going on without letting anybody know what we were going to do, which is sometimes difficult.

What happened, as everybody knows, was that we went in one night for the rescue attempt, and something went badly wrong, and one of the helicopters collided with the fuel carrying C-130 causing a big explosion which killed a lot of people and prevented others from getting out on the other aircraft.

Christopher had been involved in a long series of White House meetings at the National Security Council for several weeks. We were aware, I won't say totally, but in general terms, as to what was being planned, but we did not have all the details, which were closely held. The night of the event, we spent the whole night in the office at least until about four in the morning, waiting to hear whether the rescue was successful. When the tragedy occurred, we were there trying to pick up the pieces. It was a long night but a dramatic, memorable time.

*Q: While you were working with Christopher, which was after we had normalized relations with Mainland China, was much coming out of this?*

MARTIN: Oh, I think so. At that time, it was still very much a rapturous time of relations, despite the difficulties with AIT and the Taiwan Relations Act, which had been taken care of in the spring. By the next year, things had pretty well settled down. Taiwan was not collapsing; its economy had recovered somewhat, and it looked as though they were going to be able to regain their feet and maintain their balance. Deng Xiaoping had visited the States, the summer or '79 and there were as series of visitor exchanges.

One particular visit, which remember, was General Yang Shangkun, who was one of the old cadre, one of the old military leaders in China, came for a visit. He was having meetings in Christopher's office, mostly with Christopher, but also with the other people; and these went on for several days. I was involved in orchestrating and helping arrange it. At one point, the talks broke for a rest stop, or a pit stop, and Yang, who was at that time probably in his late 70s (still middle-aged in Chinese terms), had to go to the bathroom. So he got up, but kept talking with some other members of the American delegation as they walked out of the room and down the hall. Vivian Chang, who was our interpreter, was walking right alongside of them to interpret. They walked into the men's room, relieved themselves, and came back out, all still talking, and Vivian still translating.

It was rather humorous. A couple of us tried to flag her down as she went into the men's room, but nobody else seemed to notice. Obviously, they were well focused on the discussion. The exchanges at that time were good as we were beginning to establish some basis for the various agreements that we have with China in science and education, exchange agreements, and things like this. So there was a good deal of back and forth. Christopher was not involved a great deal, except as the protocolary host to senior Chinese leaders.

*Q: Well, while you were in Christopher's office, did you get any feeling about the role of the National Security Advisor, Brzezinski, whether there was a feeling of either competition or being left out as there had been during Kissinger's time as National Security Advisor?*

MARTIN: No, it wasn't the same personalities. Vance was lower key, and seemed not to play

the power games. Brzezinski played the National Security Advisor role to the hilt, but I think Vance was able to hold his own. It was Desert One, the rescue mission, however, that caused Vance to resign. He disagreed with the policy to go in, and he decided that he could not continue as Secretary.

*Q: What was the disagreement over?*

MARTIN: I think the disagreement was whether or not it would be successful; whether the risk of the hostages being killed was greater than a possible success. I haven't read his memoirs, but that was my understanding of it at the time.

*Q: I've talked to some of the hostages and to a person, they thanked God it didn't come off, because they said, "I don't think I'd be here yet."*

MARTIN: A lot of the people that I've talked to subsequently felt that way too. There was a possibility! You sometimes have to take these chances. But I think that Vance felt strongly that this was not going to succeed, and unfortunately, it did not. So, in the end, the administration turned to negotiations; and Christopher spent the next seven or eight months, negotiating with the Iranians in various places. Some sessions were lengthy; some were quick trips out and back.

*Q: Did you get involved in that?*

MARTIN: I did not because another of his special assistants handled the Mid East. They went with him for the negotiation sessions. The legal advisor's office was represented, as well as the NSC and a number of other offices.

*Q: What impression of President Carter and his handling of foreign affairs that you were picking up in the higher reaches of the Department?*

MARTIN: I think the sense was that the hostage crisis was something that nobody would have been able to handle better, that it was a difficult situation. I was not an expert on Iran by any means, nor am I now, and I don't think I could have second-guessed Iranian policy. I recall was a lot of criticism of him, which partly was the reason for trying the rescue attempt. In the end, it just came down to hammering out a negotiated settlement.

Frankly, I think Reagan's stance, when he was elected, that, "I want those people freed, or there will be repercussions" helped move the negotiations to conclusion. The Iranians, of course, waited until the very last minute to release them, just as the inauguration was going on; but I think Reagan's taking office at that point was what really put the final chapter on it.

Christopher had reached the agreement prior to that during several trips to Algeria. I remember one time he expected to be gone for two days, then stayed two weeks. He told us he had only taken a couple changes of clothes, expecting to only be there a couple of days, and the two days dragged on and on and on. He ended up spending a lot of time washing out his clothes in the sink at the hotel, and extra items. But the president in Algeria took good care of the delegations as they were talking. When Christopher came back from one of these long sessions in Algiers, he

brought back a couple of cases of wine that the president had given him; a case from the “La Réserve du Président.” He opened it in the office with the staff. It was probably the worst wine I’ve ever had! It was just awful! I think we could taste the sand of the desert in it still. I can guess why it was the president’s reserve -- he reserved it to give to other people and kept the best to drink himself!

*Q: Algeria, of course, used to be a premier wine growing country.*

MARTIN: Indeed! And many Algerian wines still are quite good, but this was not one of them! So after that I think the cases probably moldered away in the back room until they were poured out or given away. It was not good wine.

*Q: During the time you were with Christopher, did any Asian issues of particular importance come up?*

MARTIN: Human rights was a big issue at that time, of course. Under Carter, human rights became one of the key principles of our foreign policy. That was quite a dramatic change for a lot of the traditionalists, who felt you shouldn’t worry about human rights in foreign policy. You should look at international relations in real politic terms -- power structure, balance of power, force advancement, and so forth. Patricia Derian, who was the assistant secretary for Human Rights Affairs and a dynamic advocate of human rights. One of Warren Christopher’s more difficult jobs, at least in my area of the world, was refereeing (I think is the best word) or, basically, being the body block, between Pat and East Asia Assistant Secretary Dick Holbrooke, who did not like each other, or at least did not act as though they liked each other, and had diametrically opposed views on human rights and policy toward Asia, particularly Korea, the Philippines, China to a degree, Taiwan.

*Q: There were a lot of problems. I had just left Korea, and our feeling was that’s all very nice, but they don’t have a massive army thirty miles away.*

MARTIN: Right. Well, in retrospect, you look back at the famous Kim Dae Jung issue -- the time he was captured by the KCIA in Japan, smuggled back to Korea, and sentenced to death. All those issues were major, major concerns. It is interesting to look back now that Kim is president of the ROK.

*Q: Well, did you find yourself sort of brought in on the China, I mean not just China, but the Asian Affairs thing more, or were you sort of a jack-of-all-trades?*

MARTIN: No, I was brought in on the Asian issues. I was responsible for East Asia, politico-military affairs, and refugees, a similar portfolio that I had in the Secretariat.

*Q: Were you seeing problems with the Philippines at this point? I’m thinking about the Marcos regime. Was this getting kind of a bit smelly?*

MARTIN: It was getting smelly at that time, yes indeed! Imelda was beginning to come into her own at that point. It was not quite the corrupt autocracy that it became in subsequent years. But

about '79–80, by '80, yes, it was really beginning to impact. Filipino exiles overseas were beginning to organize, get a hearing on the Hill, and some attention in the press. This was beginning to get more attention on the seventh floor. I don't remember whether the secretary or the deputy secretary ever visited the Philippines at that point, but I don't remember any such trips during the year I was with Christopher.

*Q: How about China? This has been your area. We now had diplomatic relations with Mainland China versus Taiwan. From your point of view, how were things developing after we'd recognized one and de-recognized the other? You were there at the beginning of things.*

MARTIN: I think it was working. But after the Shanghai communiqué in 1972 during Nixon's visit, and then the normalization agreement, the second communiqué, the Chinese began to push hard about arms sales to Taiwan, because with the Taiwan Relations Act and the severance of relations, Congress insisted and the administration agreed to provide quite a number of arms to Taiwan. There was a lot of pressure from China to reduce our arms sales. This was working its way through the system in 1980–81, finally resulting in the 1982 communiqué. In that agreement, we agreed to limit arms sales, to not increase arms sales qualitatively or quantitatively beyond the level they had been at normalization. Since then, of course, the "basket" has been stretched far beyond all recognition in both measures.

*Q: Were you seeing the Taiwanese lobbying? Its influence, was it pretty obvious?*

MARTIN: It's always been fairly obvious. After Carter surprised everyone with recognition, the real lobbying, began in Congress on the Taiwan Relations Act. After the TRA gave Taiwan a sense of insurance, the lobbying continued; but the fact that Taiwan did not crumble, that the Chinese did not invade, and that our relationship with both China and Taiwan continued to develop took much of the wind out of the sails of the lobby. And the public rapture with China perhaps weakened the lobby's effectiveness and visibility. We didn't have that much of a problem, at least from my perspective, in terms of policy toward China.

*Q: Were we seeing a rapid influx of Mainland Chinese students into the United States at this point?*

MARTIN: Just the beginning. They didn't really begin until about 1982 when the PRC government began to send state sponsored students to the U.S.

*Q: Well, I'm told there are something like 200,000 right now!*

MARTIN: We have about 59,000 here at any one time still in student status. Many never went back after '89. I think that's where you get the 200,000 figure. Many of them are children of leading Communist officials, so the fact they didn't go back because of political persecution doesn't really have much validity. But students from China are the largest student contingent here from any foreign country.

*Q: Were you getting any feedback from people in the East Asian Bureau about developments? Working with both Mainland China and Taiwan, were we able to balance these two?*

MARTIN: I think so. I think everybody felt, despite initial misgivings or concerns, that the normalization seemed to have worked. The Taiwan Relations Act probably went a little bit further than some of us China people would have liked because it really boxed us in more than it would have been useful to have. Generally, however, it was working and things seemed to stabilize. Taiwan was beginning to make its first steps toward political reform domestically. Chiang Ching-kuo was taking some steps, which initially seemed to be quite risky, but he eventually abolished marshal law. He eventually opened up the political system, which has continued to help stabilize Taiwan and get it to where it is now. I think, at that time, it looked destabilizing and uncertain. Everybody was quite a concerned, but I think by '80, or the middle of '80, it looked as though it was coming along okay. Of course, we had the election that year; China was an issue, but it wasn't a big issue. Reagan came in with a very strong position on Taiwan.

*Q: There was disquiet when Reagan became a candidate because he had been the governor of California, and California had been a center of the China lobby. When he was nominated, there must have been a certain amount of holding one's breath on the part of the China hands, just because this could upset an apple cart.*

MARTIN: Right, very much so. I mean they were fairly concerned, and the comments he made during his campaign did cause people wonder what would happen. He talked about giving Taiwan the recognition it really deserved. He felt Taiwan really was a separate entity; and he made other comments, which could have thrown a wrench into the work. But like so many other candidates, once elected, they suddenly realize that they don't have a clear plate on which they can do what they want.

And I think their policies, while perhaps less friendly toward China initially, ended up about pretty much on the right track.

*Q: The election, the new administration, the Reagan administration took over on 20 January 1981, and there you are as the assistant to a political appointee, Warren Christopher. What happened to you?*

MARTIN: Well, let me go back a step. After Vance resigned, Ed Muskie became the Secretary. He was good, I thought, in terms of a bridge secretary at the end of the Carter administration. He had no great ambitions beyond that. I think he was a good man for the job at that juncture. He was able to run the department, run the rest of the world in terms of foreign policy while Christopher was so engaged on the hostage negotiations. I remember one of the things he said. I was sitting one night in my office waiting for a meeting to start when he came in and sat down across the desk from me. We chatted and he asked me how I like being a special assistant to Chris.

I said, "I like it as I feel I can be helpful to Chris on key issues."

His comment was, "In a way, we're all special assistants to the big guy," I thought that was a good perspective on our role in the administration, and, in my mind, summed up his whole attitude: that he was there to serve, to do what he could, but realized his position in the staffing

pattern was to serve the President and his policies. He was an amiable, pleasant fellow without pretensions.

I enjoyed my year with Warren Christopher. Again his “private” personality was warm, and pleasant; but his public image was aloof and even cold. A couple of times I urged him to drop down in his private elevator to the fifth floor or the fourth floor of the department, and walk up and down the hall. I said, “Take 20 minutes; it’s not going take more than that. Walk into offices and meet people, and say, ‘Thanks for what you’re doing.’ You’d make a tremendous difference to the morale in this building.” But he never did it. It was not his style. He wasn’t that kind of an outgoing, kind of guy. He was friendly privately, but not publicly. Perhaps it was shyness.

*Q: Well, I had the same experience. I had George Kennan as ambassador, and it took me about a year to get him to come to the consular section. It was in a rather small embassy, he was on the fourth floor, and I was on the first floor. I always thought it’d be nice to come on in and say howdy. It took almost an act of God to get him down. I mean it was funny. He was a very nice man, and he was obviously a great intellect and of all that, but that inability to do a very simple thing. It’s amazing!*

MARTIN: I tried the same thing with Chris. I said, “Instead of eating in your office,” which he often did, “or going up to the eighth floor, go down to the cafeteria and eat down there once in awhile.” Again, it was something that was not appealing, appetizing to him. It’s a different approach. It’s not a good or bad, but I think in terms of morale, it would have made a big difference to the worker bees down in the rest of the building.

*Q: Well then, what happens? You have a new administration coming in.*

MARTIN: Right. Well, first I wanted to get a Congressional fellowship. I wanted to go up on the Hill and learn something about Congress. So I was lobbying for that, and by the end of the year, of 1980, I had secured a Congressional Fellowship for the following fall. So I needed a six or eight month bridge assignment. Christopher didn’t actually leave office on January 20<sup>th</sup> because he was still in Algeria welcoming the hostages off the plane. So he was given dispensation for two days to be able to come back and then clean out his office, although he’d moved a lot of stuff by that time.

I initially thought I could stay in “D” with the new Deputy Secretary until I started my fellowship in the late summer. General Alexander Haig had been nominated as secretary, and Judge William Clarke, Reagan’s special assistant from the governor’s office in Sacramento, had been appointed as deputy secretary. Clarke came on board as Haig completed his three grueling days of confirmation hearings. The committee had gone through every iota of information that anybody could think of, from the most detailed to Haig’s view of the grand scheme of the world. Haig’s three briefing books were each about six inches thick, and I think they had studied them all. Haig, of course, was confirmed; and those briefing books, copies of them at least, were passed down to Judge Clarke for his use, to prepare himself for his confirmation hearings. He came in as a novice to Foreign Affairs. He had no experience, interest or background in international issues. So there was a bit of a dilemma as to how he was going to prepare for his confirmation hearings.

Meanwhile, all but one of the other staff assistants had left. The other career person and I were still there. One of the other career people had transferred at the beginning of the year, or at end of December, so we were down one; and the three political Schedule C assistants all left with Christopher, so we were down to just the two of us; and he was about to leave in March or in February. So there were just us two FSOs and the secretarial staff in the deputy's office.

When Clarke came in, he initially said, "Well you can stay on, and we can work together on this until we get settled." David Abshire took the lead coaching Clarke for his confirmation hearings. They worked long hard hours, very assiduously, but soon realized they were never going be able to bring him up to full speed by the time of the hearing. They certainly could not equal the Haig performance, Haig, of course, being quite the master of all sorts of details in foreign policy.

So what they decided to do was for Clarke, when he was asked a question, to say, "Well, I really do not have a position on that;" or "I don't really know about that, so I don't have an answer," or "I don't have a position. I don't know." So that is how the hearing went. It was really quite uncomfortable.

*Q: Were you there?*

MARTIN: Oh, yes! I was there. We went up together. I think he did all right, but he just did not have a handle.

*Q: Well, was the questioning hostile, or was it what you'd call sort of the normal probing of somebody who's the number two position in State Department?*

MARTIN: It was probing. It depended on the party of the questioner, of course. The Republicans were generally fairly friendly and calm; but even they, after a while, began to get a little bit concerned about his lack of any knowledge. They asked him what he read.

And he said, "Well, Newsweek and Time occasionally."

"And how often?"

"Well, maybe once a month or so."

"What other magazines did you read?"

"Well, I didn't really read magazines."

You know, and, "What books did you read?"

"I don't read many books."

It was very difficult, it was laborious; and for a while, people probed, but when they got nothing back, they finally gave up.

The hearing was about three hours long, as I recall. It wasn't ominous; it was just difficult. As we were riding back to the Department in the car, he turned to me and said, "Well Gene, how do you think I did?" This put me in a bit of a quandary as to how I could answer, since I was really quite discomforted by the whole event. So I made a comment, which I thought was a safe one when I made it, that, "Well, it'd be like me trying to pass the bar exam after two weeks of cramming." As soon as I said it, I remembered he had failed one portion of the California bar at least twice.

I don't know whether that ruined my relationship with him or not. Nevertheless, I offered to stay on for six months, if he wanted me to, to help him get settled and to staff the office. He decided he really did not need any staff assistants, that he would be able to operate with the secretarial staff, and drop (phone) lines he installed on his phone. If he had a question about Asia, he could push the button and call the Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs; if he had a question about Africa, the AF Assistant Secretary; or the legal advisor about legal matters, and so forth. He said he didn't really need anybody to interfere, or run interference between him and the bureaus. I realized at that point that there wasn't much of a role for me there, and so it was time to move on.

*Q: Did he show any sort of intellectual curiosity or engagement in foreign policy when you were trying to bring him up to speed?*

MARTIN: Not very much. It was totally alien to him and totally, if I may say "foreign."

He had no experience, he had no native interest in it, and his background was as a rancher and as a California staffer. He wasn't a politician. He was a judge; he was a Supreme Court Justice in California. Basically, he was there because he was a close, long time friend of Reagan.

*Q: Did you get any feeling from other people about why he was put there?*

MARTIN: The scuttlebutt around was that he was there to watch Haig. He to keep an eye on Haig and make sure he didn't get out of line in terms of the White House.

*Q: Haig was considered by the Reaganites to be running away with the ball in a way, and it didn't take them too long, about a year, to get him.*

MARTIN: Right after the Hilton shooting. The "I am in charge!" comment was the final straw, and then they got him. By that time, after Haig left, Clarke moved over to White House and became National Security Advisor.

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*Q: You were there from '84 to when?*

MARTIN: I was there from March 1984 until July 1985, about a year and a quarter.

*Q: What were some of the issues in which you were involved?*

MARTIN: China obviously was a big issue. This was right after the '82 Communiqué with China.

*Q: What was the '82 Communiqué?*

MARTIN: This was the one about arms sales to Taiwan. This was also, the first Reagan administration; and we were still trying to sort our way through China policy at that time. The '82 Communiqué had been done during Secretary Alexander Haig's term. When George Shultz came in as secretary, there was some difference of opinion, so we were trying to sort out exactly what our policy was going to be regarding China and Taiwan. Subsequent issues included Japan trade issues and Korean human rights, especially regarding Kim Dae Jung. Southeast Asia was a little less troublesome except for the Philippines. We were coming up on the end of the Marcos era, and that took an awful lot of time as it was increasingly apparent by '84 that Marcos was on the skids and our policy needed attention. Benigno Aquino went back to the Philippines from his U.S. informal exile and was assassinated at the airport. So most of our effort was spent on the Philippines, China, Japan trade, Korean Peninsula, and South East Asia in general. The rest of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was doing okay. In New Zealand, we had the problem with David Lange, who was elected to be Prime Minister and immediately turned off any nuclear cooperation with the U.S. and banned nuclear ships. As a result, our security relationship with ANZUS (Australia-New Zealand-United States) was curtailed, becoming just an Australian-U.S. relationship.

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*Q: An area that was always the center of your interests, I would assume, would be the two-China relationship. How was that being played? Did you have any role in this during this '84 – 85 period?*

MARTIN: Our role was mainly as an observer and a participant in the sense of sort of making sure that things were working as they were decided. I can't say that I was the one who made policy!

I accompanied Paul on his trip to China in the summer of '84 for what was a good visit, and participated in his meetings with Chinese leaders. It gave me a chance to learn about what was going on in China from high-level interlocutors. I hadn't been in China for several years at that point, so it was good to get back and update my information.

*Q: Whither China at that point? Where was it going?*

MARTIN: At that time, Deng had come back in power certainly. The reforms were taking effect. The changes were really quite dramatic! Deng had returned to power in '78 and had launched his economic reforms. The countryside was really becoming quite prosperous. The cities were less advanced, I think, than the countryside, but the country as a whole had a lot more optimism. They were beginning to build; they were beginning to be more open to the outside. That era was probably one of the more optimistic in the last several decades. This, of course, all ended in '89 with Tiananmen.

But in 1984 it was quite positive. Everybody was looking forward to Reagan's visit in his second term and we were already starting to plan for that. Shultz went to China in 1986. So I think that there was a fairly good feeling that bilateral relations were moving the right direction.

*Q: How about Taiwan? What was happening there at that time?*

MARTIN: On Taiwan, they had made considerable progress as well. Of course, in '79 when we normalized with the Mainland, Taiwan went through a crisis. But they had turned around. Their economy was doing much better. They had relaxed some of the marshal law restrictions and soon ended the decades long martial law and moved toward democracy. So Taiwan was beginning to look quite stable. This was only about two, three years after the '82 Communiqué. I think the idea that we were not going to enhance our arms sales to Taiwan arms was the common belief in Beijing, resulting in their willingness to improve relations with us.

*Q: Was there any concern in the bureau that we'd come up with this elaborate arrangement for dealing with Taiwan that prevented senior officials from visiting look around and have face-to-face meetings?*

MARTIN: It did. But I think there were enough ways to meet with Taiwan authorities when they came here, or in other places. We had the AIT Washington office here; and whenever Taiwan people came over here, there were ways in which the State people could go over and meet with them. They didn't come into the State Department building. There was a sort of a fence around the building, but there were no restrictions on the number of people who'd go and talk with them, even at the assistant secretary level. Obviously, Shultz or other principals didn't, but they had worked out the arrangements in such a way in the previous five years that we were able to make it work. I remember Double Ten (anniversary of Republic of China) parties at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown, which were attended by everybody. In those days, Taiwan's unofficial office in the U.S. was called CCNAA (Coordination Council for North American Affairs), a rather awkward name and almost unintelligible acronym. Rather senior officials attended the Double Ten receptions, unofficially of course. The fiction was there, but the work went on.

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*Q: What were the political issues?*

MARTIN: The issues have changed considerably in recent years, but some remain the same – Taiwan, human rights. Trade was less of an issue than it is now, because we didn't have as much trade. We obviously had the annual MFN discussion and debate in Congress, but even at that early stage it pretty much went well. It was before Tiananmen, so the yearly determination and Congressional response under the Jackson-Vanik bill was not nearly as contentious. MFN went through quickly. The major difference, I think, was that at that point, the U.S. had a security relationship with China in a sense. Since the cold war was still "on," we were still playing China off against the Soviet Union. We actually had military-military relations. We had agreed to sell avionic components for the F-5 fighter that was very much in the works. So there were a number

of politico-military relationships to manage.

*Q: What sort of information were you getting from CIA, military, and from our own embassy and all about what's going on in China?*

MARTIN: China is always opaque. It's difficult to get information about China. At that point, it was beginning to change. Hong Kong traditionally was the window on China, and it was easier to get more information on China in Hong Kong than one ever could in the mainland because people would come out of China and feel more comfortable meeting with foreigners. Even Party cadre, government officials would come out to Hong Kong occasionally, and if you could meet with them, they would tell you more than they would tell you back home. But by the mid-1980s things were beginning to open up in China. The good relations with the U.S., I think, helped people feel more confident about talking to us to explain the situation after the change, explain decision making, explain factions within the government, to give us a little bit more of an insight on how decisions are reached, what different interest groups were pushing. A lot of it was economics because the reforms were focused on agricultural and industrial reform. The military was still the fourth modernization. They were the ones at the bottom of the heap, and so the military was not getting a lot of attention or resources from the government. And the Taiwan issue was not a very live one. It was there, there was no question about it, but it was not in the forefront.

There was a general feeling that things were getting better in China, that they were making slow progress to a more open society. There was more of a dialogue with the foreign ministry and diplomats abroad in terms of things that we were doing. The relations with the Chinese embassy here were good. The desk had close relations with them, and we dealt with them on an amicable way. So in a sense, there was a sense that things were improving, things were getting better, and so forth.

*Q: How did you find the Chinese embassy dealing, say, with the Washington political system? In many ways the State Department's not the real player; it's more Congress and the media.*

MARTIN: Oh, it's disastrous. It's always been disastrous. Their idea of congressional relations is to go up and hammer on the table and say, "You can't do that because it would hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." The usual answer, in substance if not words, was, "Yea? Get out of my house!" I also think they did not fully understand how the system works. They thought the State Department and President determined U.S. policy and could bring Congress into line. So Congressional resolutions were seen as evidence the U.S. government (i.e., the executive branch) was not being honest with them and really wanted to double deal, especially on Taiwan. But they've improved recently. They are certainly more active, and more knowledgeable, but I still think that they have difficulty understanding the USG is not a monolithic system. That is what they are used to at home as the National People's Congress (NPC) is still essentially a rubber stamp for what the Party and government want. But even their system is changing and the NPC is somewhat more autonomous of the Party and government than before.

*Q: How did the Chinese embassy compare with the Taiwanese ability to operate in Washington?*

MARTIN: They're masters! The Israelis and the Taiwanese are probably the unsurpassed masters at this. The mainland Chinese have never been able to match Taiwan's representatives. So I think they had a problem. But again, the public attitude on China in those days was still positive, the good feelings from normalization of relations and the growing trade, business dealings and academic exchanges affected policy. So the embassy was able to have a pretty good PR program.

*Q: Were you seeing the massive influx of Chinese students, coming to the United States at graduate level and many of them returning, as making a change? Was this positive? How were we viewing this?*

MARTIN: Oh, it was, very much so. Starting about 1981 – 82, they began to send a lot of scholars, government students, government sponsored students to the U.S. for graduate work. By '85 – 86, they were beginning to allow more and more students come privately, at their own expense, not sponsored by the state. When the state sponsored students here, it had a pretty good tight lease on them, and most of them returned. Not all did, but most went back, because of family, the bond they had put down as a surety, their old job waiting for them, etc. Subsequently, many found their return to their old jobs didn't work out, because once they'd been overseas, many were unwilling or unable to fit back into the old bureaucracy. Once you've been to Boston or San Francisco and studied at the best universities in the world, how do you go home again?

There were many frustrations for these scholars who went back to China, back into their old state sector jobs. They returned with new ideas, which were not welcomed by the people who didn't go to overseas; they came back with expectations and an awareness of how you can do things in the States; and even in those days, had learned to use computers, and many Chinese offices had little electricity, much less computers! And so there was a great deal of dissatisfaction among returned students but generally, the idea of people coming and studying in the States and then going back was a very positive one.

*Q: Did you run across any of these? Early on there were always people who sought asylum - I always think of the tennis star. I would think this would have been a burr under your saddle all the time.*

MARTIN: Oh, we had these hiccups. Hu Na, the tennis star who defected on the West Coast, caused heartburn. But these things were just bumps in the road and generally didn't last long. I think the Chinese realized the risk they were taking sending people out of China but decided the payoff was worth it.

*Q: Was there concern about the Mainland Chinese, their operatives, intelligence operatives working in the United States?*

MARTIN: The one that really got everybody's attention was Larry Wu-tai Chin, a FBIS and CIA translator for many years, who turned out to be a long-term mole. He was arrested but hung himself in jail before trial. That obviously caused a big stir so everybody was immediately looking around for other spies. I remember having met with Larry when he came to the desk. I talked to him a number of times. He was very effective. The Chin case put everybody's teeth on

edge. We spent a great deal of time with the FBI counterintelligence office, talking with them, dealing with them, looking at various Chinese that had come on trips, come on delegations, and so forth. Yes, so there was obviously considerable attention to intelligence issues

*Q: What about Taiwan? In your work, what was happening in Taiwan?*

MARTIN: Taiwan, again, was continuing to loosen up, continuing to democratize its system. Chiang Ching-kuo died about that time and a new generation of leadership moved in. My office was situated in a short hall between the China desk suite of offices and the Taiwan coordination office, part of the bureau's regional affairs office. As these two offices were side by side and my office was in between, I considered myself as being in the Taiwan Strait, the guard between the two sides. We had a lot to do with the Taiwan coordinating staff, making sure that we coordinated with them and with AIT's Washington office across the river in Arlington.

*Q: Was there concern about the growing democratization of Taiwan? As long as you have a nice solid authoritarian regime on Taiwan, it's fairly easy to dismiss them and to say, "Well, you know, we got one here and one there, and now one's bigger than the other, so we'll pick the bigger one as our thing." But when you have one who's all a sudden becoming more like us, it's hard.*

MARTIN: That was a dilemma! It's become more of a dilemma. In those days, it was still at the early stages, so there wasn't quite as much democracy to brag about. But the trend was evident. There was, I think, a lot of discomfort in the mainland about this because they saw this change, but still, the KMT was in power. The KMT had been in power since Chang Kai-shek came to power in the late '20s. So there wasn't a lot of change, but there was a liberalization, a general relaxation of the political system in Taiwan. We saw this as a potential problem for the future, but it was not an issue at that point.

*Q: Yes. Were you feeling pressure from... say Texas and all to sell more planes? I mean congressional pressure on, you know, arm sales, particularly to Taiwan, but also to Mainland China now?*

MARTIN: Well, the Mainland China sale was basically the avionics upgrade of the F-5, which never really got very far, but it did go through. We dealt with the Rolls Royce Spey Engine, which the British were selling. We had lots of discussions about how it would be used, whether or not it could be reverse engineered and then they could start manufacturing it themselves, and what it would do for the fighters that they were going to put it in. The Chinese had a lot of problems with that. That engine had a lot of potential, but the problems were even greater because the engine was of a configuration that they would have to basically modify the entire fuselage to be able to fit the engine into it. Basically, they would have had to rebuild the plane! So, even though on the outside there were occasionally potshots by the Washington Times and conservatives who were worried about this sort of thing, in reality, the more you got into it, the more problems they had. Frankly, looking at the Chinese arms industry, defense industry, in terms of their technology, their machine tools, their metallurgy, and so forth, they were nowhere near a level that could have manufactured that engine. They've improved a lot since those days, but this was early on. You must remember, this was only a decade after the end of the Cultural

Revolution. They had to rebuild their manufacturing base in those ten years. In the last ten, fifteen years, they have certainly progressed much faster.

I think the issue with Taiwan really was an issue on arms sales. It always was an issue even after the '82 Communiqué. The bucket, which we said was not going to expand, didn't expand, but it was very elastic. The bucket tended to grow, even though it may not have expanded. The main issue at the time was the agreement to let Taiwan build an IDF (Indigenous Defense Fighter), which, some people, said was essentially an F-16. General Dynamics gave Taiwan considerable assistance with plans, designs, and so forth, but we insisted the IDF was Taiwan's own fighter. Again, you play the show game.

*Q: What about the relationship between China and the Soviet Union? This is still the Soviet Union at this point.*

MARTIN: The triangular relationship still pertained. China didn't have very good relations with the Soviet Union. Gorbachev had come into power at that point and the Chinese were concerned about what Gorbachev was doing domestically in terms of relaxation of political control, "perestroika" (restructuring) and "glasnost" (openness), and worried about what that was going to mean. But since they didn't have close relations with the Soviet Union, the three way "card game" we were playing with them was not as active. Moscow was mired down in Afghanistan, and it didn't have much of a role outside. There were still concerns in Eastern Europe, of course, but I think generally that was not an issue with which we dealt.

*Q: Did people who were in the Chinese embassy come over and talk about what's happening in the Soviet Union? I mean was it that type of relationship where they could get much information?*

MARTIN: Not really. They've never been very good about talking about a third country. Occasionally they do, particularly more recently. My experience in Beijing was that we held more "tour d'horizon" (general survey) discussions on what was happening in the Middle East; what their views were on South Africa; how they felt about what was happening in Korea; their relations with Vietnam, India, etc. So we did have regional discussions, but that was not really the case when I was on the desk.

*Q: At that time, and speaking of Korea, were we using the Chinese to figure out what was happening?*

MARTIN: We didn't get much from them on that. No, they were careful about not saying very much about North Korea. That was still their special relationship, not quite the old "lips and teeth" but still unique. I think by the mid-1980s they had begun to drift away from the DPRK as China focused on its economic development and growing relationship with the U.S..

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*Q: What was the job you had, and where did it fit?*

MARTIN: The job was as the chief of the Asia-Africa area, which essentially was the entire heroin account in those days. That was before Columbia drug lords began to grow poppies and make heroin. Most of the heroin in the States was coming out of Southeast Asia or South Asia - Afghanistan, Pakistan, and border areas. Burma still was the largest producer of opium and heroin. When I began the assignment, I found that 99 percent of the US government's attention was on cocaine. Resources, programs and personnel were focused on South America. There were narcotics control officers at the embassies, and military personnel from SOUTHCOM (U.S. Southern Command) in Panama were actively engaged in the effort. While there was no question cocaine and crack was a serious problem, and that we needed to spend most of our resources on sources of cocaine, I felt the amount of attention and resources given to the heroin problem was not adequate. I was able to do some traveling. I went to China with the assistant secretary, who was Mel [Melvyn] Levitsky; traveled to the China-Burma border from the Chinese side; worked with the Chinese closely in an effort to increase our counter-narcotics cooperation. I also went on a trip around the world with an interagency team - from DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency), the CIA, and Defense Department - to key capitals to talk about cooperation. My job was to work with host governments on crop substitution programs and counter narcotics prevention and enforcement training. We worked with police, military, and different ministries in the various countries trying to get them to increase cooperation with us and to cut trafficking routes as well as opium poppy growing areas. And I even got a trip to Lagos and to Benin. That was for three days, and that was quite enough!

*Q: Was Africa much of a problem?*

MARTIN: Africa was a problem mainly because of the Nigerian traffickers. Nigerians were just beginning to get involved in the trafficking of heroin around the world. There was a big West African community in Bangkok. A lot of people were being used as mules, or drug carriers. They had a network which persuaded various people - travelers, tourists, students - to transport narcotics internationally for \$200 to \$300. Many were caught and incarcerated, learning the hard way that \$2-300 doesn't do you very much good in jail for 15 or 20 years. The West African traffickers initiated what we called the "swallowers." The dealers would encapsulate heroin in condoms, tie them off and have the carriers swallow them. The carriers then would get on the plane and travel to the United States, and after arriving - how should we put it delicately - deliver the goods. Occasionally, one of the condoms would burst in the stomach, and you would have a massive overdose and death right there on the plane, or at the airport. It was a messy business. When I visited Pakistan, I went to Northwest frontier and stepped across the border into Afghanistan. What a difficult area in which to work. Pakistan's northwest frontier seemed like a different world from the rest of Pakistan. We are seeing that in today's situation. I found INM to be a good job! It was interesting because I was involved with a lot of different agencies I had not dealt with before - the National Drug Control Center, the Drug Czar's Office, the Defense Department, and DEA. CIA was very much involved in counter narcotics efforts - working on intelligence backgrounds, networks of traffickers, kingpins, and ways to block the various trafficking routes and networks. Chinese triads and secret organizations, of course, actively trafficked narcotics around Southeast Asia and across the world. Mostly it was heroin. Ice, D-methamphetamines, which is very popular in Asia, particularly in Chinese communities and Japan, was just beginning to be a problem for the U.S., coming into the States through Hawaii and the West Coast. We were constantly having to find new programs and techniques to turn off

the supply. I was also involved in the demand side of the drug issue -- rehabilitation, education, trying to get people to rehabilitation centers, to find methadone treatment programs.

*Q: What was the attitude at that time? Here was a war. Were you winning, losing, or treading water, or what?*

MARTIN: Treading water at best, I would say. The amount of money involved in drug trafficking, then and now, is so fantastic that some people will take a chance on trafficking in it because the payoff is so great. Innocent, or not so innocent, tourists abroad who would be willing for a couple hundred dollars or a couple thousand dollars to try to smuggle drugs into the U.S. Many of them got caught but we had the sense that we were catching was only a small percentage of what was flowing. The amount of drugs that came in, in containers aboard ships, by air, in the mail, all sorts of different routes - it's a difficult product to lock out, and the demand is such that there will always be a market and profit for those who can bring in the product.

*Q: How did you find the various American agencies worked together?*

MARTIN: Fairly well. There were obviously turf battles. Part of the problem was everybody had their own agendas and their own budgets. Customs and DEA, perhaps, were the two main rival, if that's the right word, agencies. They were always trying to make the seizures so that they could take the credit for "x" amount of tons of drugs. They didn't want to share information, didn't want to share intelligence back and forth, because they didn't want the other guy to get the credit. The FBI wanted to get into the act, so they were trying to set up their own counter narcotics division. They resented their sister agency in Justice, DEA, getting all the action. There was cooperation to a degree but still a lot of rivalry.

*Q: State didn't have a particular stake in this particular area.*

MARTIN: State did not really have a stake in the enforcement side of things. We were mainly involved in policy. We negotiated cooperation and training programs with other governments. The only place we were involved in operations was in Central and Latin America, in Peru and Ecuador where INM had its own little air force, flying planes with State Department employees.

*Q: How about foreign governments? As you saw it, what was the attitude of certain governments towards this? Were some already bought by the drug lords? Were the others trying to do it, but ineffectively; while others were effective?*

MARTIN: I can't talk from personal experience about South America where we have heard about the drug lords controlling vast areas of Columbia, and problems with corrupt Mexican police, and military in other places. In my part of the world I think it was basically a matter of ineffectiveness, the inability to really do very much about it. There was corruption - no question about it - in Thailand and in Pakistan. Burma was a difficult case because the government claimed, with some validity, that they did not control the drug growing areas or drug trafficking areas in the northeast and the northwest. At the same time, they made alliances with the hill tribes that were growing opium poppies. In return for stopping their insurgency against the

Central Government, Rangoon allowed the hill tribes to have autonomy, i.e., to grow whatever they wanted, which was usually drugs since that was the most profitable crop. There were always rumors and stories about the government leaders in Rangoon being involved in corruption, and drug payoffs, but there was never any hard evidence on that. China was a difficult case because China's view basically was, "We will take care of our problem [within China's borders]. You take care of your problem [in your cities]." Many countries felt, "Well, it's America's problem. It's your domain. It's your people that are doing this. If you just get them to stop buying and using the drug, we wouldn't have this problem. We're just the victims too. It's all just passing through us." I would respond by saying that the trouble is when you have a pipeline, it tends to leak. When you have drugs on the back of a truck, some falls off the back of the truck, and you pretty soon have users, addicts all along the trafficking routes. This is exactly what was happening in Burma, Thailand and China. The traffickers started paying the people along the way, the couriers if you will, in drugs, at least in part; and so they became addicted. They then became pushers themselves to pass on the drug, and China now has a tremendous drug problem. Pakistan also has a growing drug abuse problem, as does Burma. All these countries, which previously were just routes through which the drugs passed, now became users. So the problem has come home to them - that it is not only the West's problem, it's also theirs.

*Q: How did you find the State Department hierarchy up above? Did you yourself get good support?*

MARTIN: I think pretty good support. I attribute that mainly to Mel Levitsky, the INM assistant secretary at the time, who was very well regarded by the Seventh Floor, was able to explain his position and go after the resources that he needed. I think he was well respected by the drug czar and by other members of the community. I thought he was quite effective.

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*Q: Were you trained in Mandarin or Cantonese initially?*

MARTIN: I was initially trained in Cantonese. So it was an ideal job for me. I was one of the few in the Foreign Service that actually took Cantonese. Three of us in Hong Kong back in the mid-1960s were sent to the Yale in China program at the Chinese University to learn Cantonese. The other two officers were Sidney Goldsmith and Joe Moyle. So even though my Cantonese was only at the two level, it was still useful. I was able to dust it off enough to use it for social courtesy purposes. All officials, even though they may have been Cantonese and spoke more accented or worse Mandarin than I did, had to use Mandarin in their official dealings. I found it useful to listen to their side comments in Cantonese. Once they realized I could understand Cantonese, they were more cautious. After I spent six months re-learning Mandarin at FSI, I went off to Guangzhou in January of 1993. I was there three and a half years until the middle of 1996 when I went back to Manila.

*Q: What was the situation in Guangzhou? I mean how were our relations, and how was the consulate doing because this was still the period after Tiananmen. Was a cloud hovering over everything?*

MARTIN: Guangdong, South China really is quite different from the rest of the country. Their mindsets are different from the northerners', particularly those in Beijing. They're different in terms of their outlook toward the west, or to the outside world in general. They've had much more contact with the world. Most of the overseas Chinese, at least until recently, have been from that part of China. Most of the Chinese American community came from four districts of Guangdong Province, speaking Toishanese and other local dialects. So in many ways there was a lot more connectivity between Guangdong, and the Cantonese people, and the rest of the world than there was with China at large. I think Tiananmen seemed like it was far away to the Cantonese, and it was not an issue that came up very much in our discussions with the officials down there. The consulate itself was primarily focused on consular work. It was the only immigrant visa issuing post for all of China. So people from all over China had to come to Guangzhou to get their immigrant visas. The reason that was put in place was because initially most of the people going to the States, because of the Cantonese emigration, had family connections with South China. So it made some sense to put all the immigrant visa work there. In future it seems to me there's some question as to whether we need to have two immigrant visa issuing posts a hundred miles apart - Hong Kong and Guangzhou. As Hong Kong becomes more and more linked into China, it makes some sense, in my view, to perhaps centralize immigrant visa issuance, probably in Guangzhou. But we will probably have to wait until after 2047, after Hong Kong's 50 year Special Administrative Region (SAR) status ends and it is (presumably) integrated into China entirely. So we had a large visa operation there. At the same time, we also had a very important economic and political reporting function, because at that point in '93, Guangdong was at the peak of its economic reforms; at the beginning of its economic boom. In 1992, Deng Xiaoping had taken a trip to the south. After the '89 Tiananmen incident, the government was forced by the conservatives in the Party, to back off on economic reforms, to back off on opening to the outside. So when Deng came to Shenzhen in '92, looked around, and said, "Hmm, this is pretty good," everybody said, "Whew!" and off they went, and started a big economic boom. By '93 Guangdong had become the powerhouse of the Chinese export market; and even today, I think, or at least until recently, almost 40 percent of Chinese exports came from Guangdong Province alone. It was really "the" major export oriented market. Businesses were in there. U.S. businesses came in and invested. Hong Kong businesses came across the border. Almost all the manufacturing that had previously been done in Hong Kong had moved across into Guangdong Province. So the Consulate had a big economic role. We had a political role in terms of what was happening politically in South China, which again, had a different perspective both on the world, as well as on how politics should be run, from what Beijing wanted done, or what they felt needed to be done. If Beijing "put politics in command," as Mao used to say, in Guangdong, they much preferred to put "economics" (in reality, money) in command.

*Q: Let's look to the economic side first. Now these companies, American companies, who were investing there, would be investing in order to get cheaper laborers - essentially good cheap labor, I guess.*

MARTIN: That was one factor but not the only factor. In my opinion, the factor that brought them there, was to get a toe into China's potentially huge domestic market. Most were consumer product companies - the Kelloggs, the Proctor and Gambles, soft drink manufacturers, beer companies and so forth. They were initially required to export most if not all their products, but

they were all positioning themselves for a future role in the Chinese domestic market.

*Q: Getting a foot in there, in the Chinese market.*

MARTIN: Right, because they saw the potential for a Chinese market, and it was tremendous! Now, this is the old song, of course, which has been sung by starry-eyed foreign manufacturers for nearly two hundred years -- if only every Chinese man wore his shirt one inch longer, the mills of Manchester would run forever. Given China's present domination of the textile industry, I find this quite ironic. The Manchester mills are long gone. I think many companies felt that this was the way to ride the economic reform wave. As China opened up to foreign investment, initially foreign companies were forced to establish joint ventures with local, state owned enterprises (SOEs). Many of these local joint ventures. While some local partners made sense, others were really quite off the wall. One company, which manufactured household soap and laundry products, was joint ventured with a long-term soap manufacturer in Guangzhou. Colgate linked up with a toothpaste manufacturer. These made sense. On the other hand, a soft drink company came in and tried to partner with the Chinese air force. It didn't make a lot of sense. That endeavor did not last very long. However, military units were in the commercial business. At that stage of economic reforms, Deng Xiaoping had told the military that they were the fourth modernization, the fourth of four. The order of the four modernizations was agriculture, heavy industry, consumer industry, and military. And so the military was told, "You're not going to get a big budget increase. You're not going to get a lot of resources. But to help you out, we will let you find your own means of becoming self-sufficient. We'll let you develop your own sources of income." Well, this was opening the barn door, and off they went! There are many military units in the Guangzhou Military Region (MR), facing Hong Kong, Taiwan and Vietnam. Having been in place since 1949, often having to grow their own food, build barracks, etc., they jumped at the chance to get into all sorts of commercial enterprises. Some, such as using logistics vehicles in the construction business, were beneficial in developing infrastructure -- roads, buildings, factories, etc. Others were less honorable, everything from soft drinks to hotels, brothels, nightclubs, and smuggling. So every local unit had a commercial enterprise in which they were involved to try to increase their budgets. This privilege was subsequently revoked in the late 1990s and the military told to get out of their commercial enterprises. But at that point, the military was much involved in all sorts of economic endeavors. I often thought, from our perspective, it was to our advantage. One, it gave the military a stake in the economic reforms, so the communist party conservatives couldn't try to use the military to oppose Deng's economic reforms and the opening up. And second, the commercial activities diverted personnel, equipment and money from military training. They slacked off on doing exercises, PT, or other activities, which probably didn't help their combat ratings.

*Q: What about Vietnam? While you were there, you would have been covering that border?*

MARTIN: Yes, Guangxi Province was in my consular district. Relations were pretty frozen most of the time I was there. The legacy of the '77 war with Vietnam continued. It was still very icy. One of my favorite trips was going to the border of Guangxi Province and Vietnam, and visiting the Qing Dynasty era Friendship Gate, a very elaborate multistoried tower similar to those along the Great Wall, in the middle of Friendship Pass, a traditional trading route. The gate, particularly from the Vietnamese side, was riddled with bullet holes, absolutely pockmarked.

And I thought this was an appropriate symbol of the state of Sino-Vietnamese friendship at that point. The Vietnamese had fired on it from their vantage points on higher ridges on their side of the border to prevent the PLA from using the pass to enter Vietnam. During my posting in Guangzhou, things did warm up enough for them to re-open the railway line that crossed the border into northern Vietnam. The problem was that Chinese and Vietnamese rail gauges were different. So they added a third rail so the train carriages could go to a border point where they were lifted up and transferred to a different width wheel unit. This is similar to what is done on the Mongolian border for trains entering the trans-Siberian railway system.

*Q: How about the politics? Were you seeing anything in China, between you and the embassy and other posts, looking towards China perhaps breaking up?*

MARTIN: We did have difference of opinions with the embassy in terms of what was happening, because they tended to report from the perspective of the capital, from the perspective of Beijing, and the people they talked to, which was accurate from that perspective. But we had a different view down where we were. We did not see China breaking up. At least I didn't. My view was that the psychological impetus for China to unite, to stay together, and for the Chinese to support the sense of oneness of being Chinese was far stronger than the regionalism, the provincialism, and the difference in economic development that was pulling South China away. A lot of people talked about Greater China, which included Hong Kong, South China, and Taiwan, as perhaps having a sort of economic bond between them which might separate them out into a separate entity from the rest of China. I didn't see that and I still don't. I think that the idea of China uniting, which is why the whole issue of Taiwan was so very important to most Chinese wherever they live, is a factor, I think, that keeps them together more than it pulls them apart.

*Q: I don't understand. I mean why is the desire to bring Taiwan in? Do they feel that it might sort of suck off the wealthier coastal provinces?*

MARTIN: No. I think Taiwan is the only remaining part of what is considered to be a Greater or Great China, or the traditional China if you will, which is traditional only in the Qing Dynasty, of course; and the Qing Dynasty borders are what China generally claims as its borders now. Taiwan is the last remaining piece that is not part, not ruled by a central government in China. I think that this is what is at the bottom of the whole issue - it's very important for Chinese sense of belonging to the world and regaining their rightful place in the world as a united country. That's why Taiwan is such an emotional issue.

*Q: You must have been up against all sorts of Taiwanese entrepreneurs to meet you?*

MARTIN: Taiwanese businessmen all over the place! Particularly in Fujian Province, which is the province facing Taiwan across the strait. The Taiwan Chamber of Commerce in Xiamen, or the old Amoy, was the largest in town by a long shot. We had a few American businesses there, but they couldn't hold a candle to all the Taiwanese businesses that were operating there. Same thing in Guangdong Province - a lot of the Taiwanese had come in. Taiwan government rules, more than anything, set up a dummy front companies in Hong Kong, and then invested in Guangdong. We had hundreds if not thousands of Taiwan companies invested and doing

business in South China and southern Guangdong Province. They even had a Taiwanese school, they had a Taiwanese Chamber of Commerce, and so forth. They were very much a part of the economic boom. But we at the U.S. consulate did not have much to do with the Taiwanese business community. They knew better than we (or U.S. businesses) how to operate in the Chinese environment. And in Fujian Province, the local language was the same. Taiwanese and Fujianese are essentially the same as is the culture. So they did not need our help. Our involvement would have complicated the "arrangements" they had made with local officials and partners.

*Q: How did you see this fitting into keeping together during the '93 – '96 period.*

MARTIN: Again, I would say that the attitude was that the south gave lip service to the idea that Taiwan needed to reunify with the mainland, and that any move to go independent would bring dire results. The missile exercises that were used in '95 – '96, when Lee Teng-hui was running for office, when he visited the United States, was all orchestrated by Beijing. These basically, were disregarded in the south; that was not a big issue there. They supported the national policy publicly, of course, but this was not a major issue that people spent any time worrying about or talking about. In my official contacts with business leaders or with government officials there, if it came up, they would mouth the government line, but then they'd go on to, "Well, we were anxious that the policy would impede more Taiwan investment here." My view is that the economic interrelationship is going to be the critical factor, It eventually is going to link the two sides together. Whether or not it's political, whether or not it's some sort of a federation, confederation, whatever it may be, I think both sides will eventually use the economic mechanism to work out a modus operandi.

*Q: You were there when the Taiwanese president was going to the United States.*

MARTIN: Lee Teng-hui got the visa to come to the States.

*Q: Yes. Was this a real issue down where you were, or was this a Peking issue?*

MARTIN: It was a Peking issue. It was not an issue in our area. Again, as I say, if the subject came up, officials would repeat the official line, but that's all it was. It was evident that this was not an issue that they spent a lot of time worrying about. I had four provinces in my consular district, all very different, including Fujian Province, which is the one that faces Taiwan and is the closest in relationships and linguistically with the Taiwanese. Taiwan came up more often, obviously, in my talks with the officials, but even there it did not seem to be a major issue.

*Q: 1993 – '96, we've talked about the economic boom there. Were any of your provinces deprived in economic role?*

MARTIN: I'd like to talk a little bit about the differences between all four provinces. They were all very different. And I'd like to talk a little bit about some of the visitors I had there, starting with President Nixon, and a little bit about the relationship with Hong Kong.

*Q: First we want to talk about the difference. You had four provinces.*

MARTIN: We had four provinces in the consular district with 135 million people in them, which is probably larger than most of Western Europe. The provinces were Guangdong Province, where Guangzhou was; Fujian Province to the east, facing Taiwan; Guangxi Province to the west, which bordered on Vietnam; and Hainan Island, which hangs down into the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea. They were all quite different. Guangdong, obviously, had the most notoriety, the best reputation, was the most developed. It was the one that all the Hong Kong manufacturers moved into after China opened up in 1978, and so they had a tremendous amount of foreign investment. As I said earlier, Guangdong Province was reputed, at that point at least, to export about 40 percent of all of China's exports, most of which were foreign invested companies, to the United States and to Europe, also some to Japan and Southeast Asia. Guangdong province had a large amount of Taiwan investment. The province itself was really quite varied in the sense that the southern part, close to Hong Kong along the Pearl River Delta, was really developing rapidly. The north and the east were less so, and the western part, outside of the Pearl River Delta, was still fairly traditional and less developed than the delta region. The delta region was the one that you always heard about, between Hong Kong and Guangzhou. While I was there, Gordon Wu, who was a big developer in Hong Kong, built a highway between the border town of Shenzhen, which was becoming a city, and Guangzhou. It took him several years to build it, but he built a superhighway. We called it Darwin Highway, because the first three months it was open, there were about 75 deaths on the highway, mainly because nobody knew what a superhighway was. An old peasant would walk out in the middle of the highway and say, "Oh!" And wham! A Mercedes going by at 120 miles an hour would wipe him out!

Similarly, a lot of people said, "Wow! A new highway! I have to drive my car on it." So these old guys would get out in their old cars. They and the car, neither of them had ever gone over 30 miles an hour, would get on the highway, floor the thing, and the car would fall apart, or the driver would lose control, and one more would be eliminated. So by the end of three months we figured that the fittest survived, as after that there were not as many accidents! But it was sobering for a while because you'd have these black Mercedes, which would usually be the government cars or PLA (People's Liberation Army) cars, going by at 120 to 150 miles an hour, and some guy would be riding his bicycle in the left lane. It was a difficult but interesting experience in modernization. Guangdong Province was uneven. There were lots of pockets of poverty and lack of development in other parts outside the delta. But generally Guangdong was a fairly forward-looking, fairly active province in terms of economic development. Fujian Province was different. Fujian was what was long considered the front line with Taiwan. The military had a great deal of influence and control over large percentages of the province. They had military forces, missile deployments, and airfields throughout the province, to maintain their face off with Taiwan. At the same time, you had a tremendous amount of investment from Taiwan in Fujian, mostly in southern Fujian, where most of the native Taiwanese people's ancestors originally came from *nan-Minan* (southern Minan) people. There was a large Taiwan Chamber of Commerce in the city of Xiamen. Many Taiwan businessmen came in to invest. There were many direct contacts between Taiwan and Fujian, usually at night by small boats. People would come and go. Taiwanese would come over, go to the karaokes, the nightclubs, and then go home, or they'd come for business. There was a lot of back and forth, at night, or underground, and certainly not on a legal basis. The rest of Fujian province, particularly the

north, tended to be somewhat more conservative. Fuzhou City was a traditional Chinese city. It didn't have a very progressive-looking government structure, was pretty much under the thumb of Beijing, didn't have much of an independent prospective or vision of its own. One of the problems that we had with Fujian was that was where most of the illegal migrants to the U.S. originated. Changle county, near Fuzhou City, was the hotbed of illegal immigrants. People in the Golden Venture were mostly from Changle County, and most of the illegal boat people into the United States come from that particular county or the ones around it. I had a chance to visit Changle County. It is a very hard-scrabble place. Agriculture's not very good because of the rocky soil. But the houses and the accouterments you see in the villages there are really quite spectacular, mainly because they've had people emigrating from there for about the last 300 years. People with two, or three, four, five-story houses, marble on the outside, marble bathrooms, Jacuzzis, fountains in the front yard. I didn't notice any swimming pools, but I wouldn't doubt that there probably were swimming pools as well. So obviously the remittances from the people who did succeed overseas were quite useful in terms of building up the standard of living of the relatives left behind. But that was not all over Fujian, and I think that most of the places were still fairly hard-scrabble. A comparison between their lifestyle and the lifestyle of the people further into the interior of China makes it clear Fujian is doing quite well, considering the other parts of the interior. Going to the interior, Guangxi Province was probably the most underdeveloped and backward of the four provinces in my consular district. Guangxi Province really had been left behind. Officially, this is a Zhuang minority autonomous region. The autonomous region meant that you had a token governor, who was from the Zhuang minority, but the party secretary was invariably a Han, and therefore the one with the power. It had not seen a lot of progress. Nanning, the capital, had become somewhat more modernized, but was still 20 or 30 years behind Guangzhou and the delta area. The contrast was really quite striking. One of the best ways to travel into Guangxi was to fly there, and then drive around, or take the train. There were lots of places we could travel, which was useful. *China* was not an easy place to drive since the people had little driving experience. The roads were narrow, and people tended to drive rather quickly. My successor, Philip Lincoln, was killed in Guangxi shortly after his arrival in 1996 when a bus hit his van in a head-on accident.

Beihai, a coastal fishing and increasingly a beach resort destination on the north cost of the Tonkin Gulf. It had an extensive beach - level, nice sand - but the development of tourist facilities on the edge of the beach was what I would call "with Chinese characteristics." Whereas in the west we might like some space and privacy between buildings on the beach, in Beihai, it was a solid row of establishments. Apartment buildings next to restaurants, karaoke parlors, bars, amusement parks, etc. It reminded me of boardwalks in Ocean City or Atlantic City, with little if any zoning or separation of functions. The fourth province in my consular district was Hainan Island, which used to be the penal colony, or the Georgia or Australia of China. The emperors sent their internal exiles and prisoners there, the most southern part of the empire. It is second largest island in China after Taiwan. But during my day they were trying to develop it into the "Hawaii of China." They thought that its beautiful beaches would be worth developing to bring in tourists from Hong Kong, Southeast Asia, and other places. The problem is that their sense of development, certainly to Western eyes, left something to be desired. They figured the way to develop something was to put in casinos, karaoke parlors, and lots of restaurants, and that would attract tourists. They might attract some Chinese tourists, but wouldn't attract many Western tourists. The problem was overbuilding, and internal corruption and connections. Haikou itself,

the capital of Hainan, on the northern end of the island, was undergoing a building boom when I was there. Everybody was building like crazy. Every corner, every street of the city was under construction. It turned out, subsequently, that this was all speculation, that a lot of the money was coming from other parts of China. People, companies, cities, municipalities, even provinces were investing their money in Hainan real estate. When the central government's ax came down, and Premier Zhu Rongji stopped all this, or decided to require some inspection and some accountability, the money dried up. The city in Haikou became a ghost town with skeletons of buildings left half completed. One interesting aspect of Hainan was the naval base in Sanya, in the southern part, which has become much better known in the West since the EP3 incident in 2001. We didn't have much access to the military there or in any of the bases, but we did travel down there and looked around to see what we could see. The other thing of interest was that there was that there was a large overseas Chinese community in Hainan. Many Indonesian Chinese, after 1965 riots against the Chinese and the Communists, came back to China; and many, if not most, of them were sent to Hainan. They were assigned to work in the fields of the state farms there. The problem is, most of the Chinese who came back were urban Chinese, urban overseas Chinese who'd been small shopkeepers, and they knew next to nothing about agriculture. So their adjustment was really rather difficult. But they were making some progress. A lot of them now were second generation, beginning to establish themselves and become more economically prosperous than they were before. So the variety between the four provinces really was quite interesting, and it gave us a chance when we traveled to be able to see different parts of China, different stages of development, different stages of openness to the outside. We had an incident in Beihai, the beach and port city of Guangxi Province, with an American businessman of Vietnamese-Chinese ancestry. His family, originally from Guangxi, had emigrated to Vietnam several generations earlier, as many of the Vietnamese-Chinese had come from that southern part of China. He had been caught there during the French-Indochina War, had moved to Saigon with his family, and finally left in 1975 at the end of the American-Vietnamese war. He went to the States, became an American citizen, and then returned to Guangxi, to Beihai, and opened a shrimp packing business. He was quite successful. Obviously he spoke the language and fit in well with the community. He contracted with fishermen to catch the shrimp. In the plant, they would clean and quick freeze dry the shrimp. He had good sanitary conditions, so was authorized by the Food and Drug Administration to export to the United States. It was too ideal. The problem was that the local municipal officials couldn't keep their fingers out of the cookie jar. They were constantly leaning on him to do this, do that, to pay more taxes, to give them a piece of the action, to hire their nieces, nephews, friends, and what have you. Finally, he walked away. He said he could not take it anymore. He just disappeared and went home. He tried to sell the company, but could not get a decent price to recoup his investment. as the government wouldn't offer him anything. He also was concerned that he might not be able to leave. Officials said, "If you don't pay the taxes we won't let you go! We'll keep you here!" So he went to the States or Hong Kong on a business trip and never returned. Subsequently, when municipal officials asked me to encourage American investment in Guangxi, I would remind them they already had a chance blew it. The level of sophistication regarding foreign investment and working with foreigners, even then, wasn't based on the rule of law. There were few restrictions on what municipal officials could do. This was true in other parts of South China. In Guangdong we had a tremendous IPR (Intellectual Property Rights) problem. I used to call it the pirates' den, as it was the world's largest operation, many little operations, pirating CDs, pirated computer software, books, most everything else. There were probably 15 or 20 major CD manufacturing

companies that were ripping off copyrighted intellectual property, making CDs and movies, movie videos, and computer tapes for a fraction of the price that you would pay legally. We went after them, working closely with the business community. U.S. companies were frustrated because they had to do and provide everything. They had to do the investigations, buy the research as to where these people were. They had to get the goods on these people. Then they had to pay the police to go out and do the raid. They had to participate in the raid so the police would go into the right house instead of the house next door; and they would have to be careful to try to keep confidentiality. Often the raid would go into the plant where the U.S. company knew counterfeit goods were being manufactured, and there would be nothing there. Or there would be one machine and a few boxes of product in the corner, which the police would seize. You knew that the guy had been tipped off, and he'd moved the stuff next door; or in the back room and they wouldn't go look for it. So it was a frustrating event. We had a lot of people who worked with us on IPR. Lee Sands from USTR (Office of the United States Trade Representative) came through many times for negotiations on intellectual property rights agreements and tried to curtail the issue. I think, finally, the government began to clamp down, and they began to really take some serious action. Much of the problem was that municipal governments were invested in township, village enterprises (TVEs) who were doing the counterfeiting. So local leaders weren't about to cut off a company which was providing income to municipal coffers, or individual officials.

*Q: How about the PLA, the People's Liberation Army? What were you observing about their business practices?*

MARTIN: They were very much in business at that point. As we said earlier, the military was the fourth of Deng's four modernizations. Being the last, they were given permission to get into business so as to provide for their own resources, which they couldn't get from the national budget. They got into business in a big way. They were doing everything from hotels to travel companies, construction companies to karaoke parlors, and brothels. Shenzhen was particularly bad in that sense. I would say probably 30 to 40 percent of the business in Shenzhen was military connected, and they were in everything. PLA logistics trucks did much of the construction -- of buildings, highways, apartments, parks --.

*Q: Were we keeping an eye on the military across the straits from Taiwan to see how serious they were about doing something?*

MARTIN: In terms of our access to the military, it was very limited. We had visits, consular officers would travel in Fujian regularly. We had defense attachés come in from either Hong Kong or down from Beijing and travel, but their trips were quite limited. In 1995 we had a real problem with a couple of attachés that came in from Hong Kong without informing us or getting our authorization as was required. They were picked up near a beach in Fujian, where the PLA was conducting exercises. That became a bit of a do. After holding them a few days, and registering a complaint with the Embassy, the government threw them out of the country. After that, those particular Hong Kong attaches were not allowed back in, at least during my assignment. We tightened up our requirements for others from Hong Kong to get clearances before they came in.

*Q: How did you find the discrepancy? You were in provinces that were the beneficiaries of this new prosperity although you had some hard-scrabble places. Were you in consultation with any other consular colleagues? Was there any thought about China splitting up into regional warlords, or economic lords, or power centers?*

MARTIN: There was a lot of speculation as to whether China might split apart or break up. South China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan was often seen as an economic cohesive unit which perhaps could become quite prosperous on its own if it had its own autonomy. It was occasionally referred to as Greater China. There was a big difference, I think, at that time between what was happening in the south, particularly Guangdong Province, and the rest of China. Guangdong really was the laboratory or the experiment that the north allowed to happen and encouraged. I don't think there was ever really any risk of it breaking off, for a number of reasons. One, I think the sense among all Chinese, even in the south, despite their frustrations with the north - their different culture, their different language, and so forth - is the sense that the oneness of China was very important, the psychological importance of that. Secondly, I think that the government really did have good tight controls over what was happening in the south. The Cantonese got away with an awful lot. They would not follow directions very well, they would interpret them in the broadest sense that they could. They would be selective in how they carried out the rules from Beijing. They were not above, like any other place in China, playing games with the accounts. They were required to send a certain percentage of their tax revenue to the central government. But every region in China starved the center, sending only the minimum to Beijing. The amount of taxes that went to the Central Government was somewhere between 13 and 18 percent of the total revenue collected in the country. And so the national government was operating on a shoestring compared to the potential or the actual revenue collections throughout the country. The provinces or regions would find all sorts of ways to finagle the taxes. They wouldn't collect "taxes" per se. They'd collect fees, tolls, service charges, or payments due. They'd call them anything but taxes, so they wouldn't have to remit so much to Beijing. Local people staffed the tax bureau, and so it was natural that the center would not be getting a very big take of the taxes. This was all under process of change when I was there. Zhu Rongji established a new tax system, with a national tax bureau, which was going to establish offices in all the cities and provinces, to ensure that the center gets its fair share. I don't think it's worked out very well at this point. The other thing to remember is that until after the Cultural Revolution and the beginning of the economic reforms, China did not have a taxation system. Everything was government. There was no private property. There was no profit. Any excess revenue, as it was called, went directly to the government, because the state sector, the state owned enterprises, were all part of the government. They were all part of various ministries -- heavy industry, railway industry, telecommunications, etc. There was no taxation because everybody worked for the government. This has changed only since the economic reforms and opening up after 1978, during which the government allowed private enterprise entrepreneurs, non-state sector businesses, to operate.

*Q: We knew China was a Marxist state. They had a huge apparatus of Marxist studies. How was Marxism playing by the time you were there in the '90s?*

MARTIN: In South China, Marxism was rather low key. Party cadres still mouthed the usual slogans and the usual phrases. The government was still organized in terms of the Communist

Party monitoring, controlling and running everything, but there really was no fervor in it. The Cultural Revolution had exhausted everybody; and the Cantonese, particularly in the south, were delighted to be left alone to do their thing. And their thing was to try to improve their standard of living, to improve their economic well being. There was the usual window dressing in terms of what needed to be said; but the sense I had was no one was a committed Marxist.. The difference between Guangdong or Guangzhou and Beijing was that we got very little in terms of harangues or representations about Taiwan, about U.S. policy, about this, that, and the other thing, which, in the embassy you'd get all the time. Down there, there was almost none of that. It was very straightforward in terms of working together on economic investment, to try to improve rough situations, and so forth. However, we did have a very suspicious Foreign Affairs Office (FAO). The Foreign Affairs Office is the local barbarian handlers, responsible for keeping watch, particularly on the consular corps, but also on any foreigners in their area. And they were not helpful. They were actually very much the block, the obstacle to our dealing with the government bureaus at a provincial level. We had to go through them to get appointments, to see officials, visit offices or factories, and to travel in the consular district. Most of the time, they were obstinate. We would talk with them, try to establish good relations with them, which I think we did generally; but they were just hardheaded about it. It was frustrating because our economic officers had developed very good relations with various government bureaus, such as the planning bureau, the industrial bureau and so forth. Officers would call their counterpart whom they'd met, and say, "Well, can I come talk to you about such and such?" And they'd say, "Well, as far as I'm concerned, great! You can come over anytime, but you have to go through the Foreign Affairs Office." My officer would say, "We'll try to get permission. I'll see if I can come see you next week. Are you going to be around?" The contact would say, "Sure, Tuesday would be fine." We'd call the FAO, and they'd say, "We'll check." And we'd wait, and wait, and wait, and finally the FAO would call back saying "Oh! Well, he's out of town!" or "He's not available. He can't see you!" It was total nonsense, but that's how they operated. It was frustrating trying to work with them but we had no choice but to work through the system.

*Q: In some Communist countries a consular officer could take off on his own and go anywhere, whereas a diplomat would have limitations and have to go through the foreign ministry. Were you able to play the consular ploy a bit?*

MARTIN: No, because we still had to go through the Foreign Affairs Office. The provincial or municipal FAO was the foreign ministry representative locally. They often said they had to refer to the foreign ministry for approval, but most of the time, it seems to me, they pretty much had the authority to decide what they would and would not do. It varied by province or locality. The further away from Guangzhou, from the capitals of the provinces, the more relaxed everybody was. In remote areas, officials would welcome you, throw a banquet, and take you around to show you pretty much anything you wanted to see. It was really only in the urban areas that we were restricted. We just had to find ways to work around the FAO to make contacts and get information on developments.

*Q: I assume there were classes in Marxism at every level of school.*

MARTIN: I think there were probably a few true believers at the university levels who still taught Marxism classes. My understanding was that these were required classes - that students

and officials had to take. They were usually large lecture courses on weekends or after hours. Occasionally, we were able to get ourselves invited to the universities to talk to these classes. That was kind of fun, to get into their political theory or Marxist education classes, and have a discussion with the teachers and the students. We didn't get to do so very often, but it was a good opportunity to see what people thought. The students generally didn't say very much. The faculty would carry the conversation. The students seemed to be cautious in front of professors and our FAO escorts.

*Q: Did you find you and your fellow Americans hit all the time on the streets by people wanted to talk English?*

MARTIN: Yes. They would be quite open about that. Everybody seemed to be learning English. At the train station, young people, girls and boys - would come up and say, "Please, sir. May I practice my English?" It was really quite striking, considering that only a few years before, being seen talking to a foreigner would have been suspicious and the people would have been nervous about it, if not restricted. Young people were all eager to learn English.

*Q: Did you get a feel about how your Chinese contacts were dealing with the Cultural Revolution years?*

MARTIN: Most would not talk about it. A few would. It was still a painful episode for most. A few felt talking about it, and bringing it out into the open would help them deal with it. But it was difficult for most people, I think. Most of the people that I tried to talk to would slough it off and not really address the issues. This was particularly true of the cadres. Many of the younger ones had been Red Guards while the older cadres had been under attack by the Red Guards for being the old worms, cheating, lying, capitalist rodents, for taking the Liu Xiaochi capitalist road in the party. They had had a very difficult time, because they all thought themselves as true Marxists supporting the party. Suddenly all these young kids came in, beat on them, and forced them to work on pig farms for 20 years. They came back subsequently to their old positions and jobs in the party and government. Hard to keep one's dedication to the Party I would think. The few people that talked to me about the Cultural Revolution would admit to their being involved in the violent acts. Most of them said, "Well, we were neutral. We were not one faction or another," which in most cases is probably not true because most people did take sides, either with the party cadre or with the Red Guards that were attacking them. Guangzhou, and Guangdong province as a whole, was very violent during the Cultural Revolution. I remember when I was in Hong Kong, reading in the papers about the bodies floating down the Pearl River, and the sharks growing to enormous lengths because they had a wonderful feed that summer. In neighboring Guangxi, subsequent books reported cannibalism, people actually killing opponents and eating their organs. It was an extremely cruel, violent situation.

*Q: How did you find the writ of Beijing?*

MARTIN: Generally, the central government appointed a few senior people to party and government positions. When I was there, the mayor and the party secretary of Guangzhou City were both Cantonese as was the Guangdong party secretary. The provincial governor was from Shanghai. Generally, Beijing assigned senior officials from other provinces or regions so as to

ensure loyalty to the center rather than localities. But the second level and third level were almost all Cantonese. One could compare it to having a political ambassador with career Foreign Service subordinates. The political ambassador can make decisions, certainly, because of his connections in Washington, but the people who run the embassy are career people, That's how it was in Guangzhou and Guangdong Province.

*Q: I've been in various places where I've seen this north-south business, where people in the north look down on the people in the south for somehow being less than hardy, less intellectual. How did that work in China? Was there a difference of how the north and south looked upon each other?*

MARTIN: There is some historical enmity, and some sense of superiority and inferiority. The Cantonese consider themselves the true Chinese, descendants of the Tang Dynasty, one of the high points of Chinese power and culture. They call the Cantonese language *Tanghua* (Tang Dynasty language), and they call themselves *Tangren* (Tang people). Historically, southern China was absorbed into the Chinese civilization about 200 BC when (Emperor) Qin Shi Huangdi of the Qin Dynasty, who first united the country, conquered what was then called the Yue Dynasty in the south. The Cantonese still call themselves the Yue people. That's the traditional name for Guangdong Province. Yue is the same word as that for Vietnam (*Yuenan*). There are many cultural and ethnic relationships. China's increasing circle of civilization essentially integrated, amalgamated, conquered, or replaced local peoples as they expanded out from the centers of north China civilization. The northerners see the Cantonese as mercantilists, commercial, greedy, and business oriented, not very orderly, not very intellectual in their pursuits. The Cantonese see the northerners as cold and aloof, and sort of Prussian, rather rigid in their views. But despite historical and cultural differences, they are all considered to be "Han." There are also many minorities in the south, too. Hainan Island has several minority groups, Guangxi Province is the Zhuang (minority) Autonomous Region, Fujian has many hill tribes related to other minority groups in the area.

*Q: What about the influence of American-Chinese? Canton was the area where practically the entire American-Chinese exodus came from. Did the American-Chinese play any role from your perspective?*

MARTIN: They did some, mainly in the sense of business investment. Most business investment in China is, or until recently has been, overseas Chinese. Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia has been by far the source of the largest percentage of investment in China. I'd say probably two-thirds of all foreign investment in China has been from the overseas Chinese community. American-Chinese did invest there, but not in a major way. Many American-Chinese came to do business in Guangdong with various companies. Some were good; some were not. It depended on how much they identified with China, and how much they could relate to China. One officer in the consulate was, I think, third or fourth generation Chinese-American, who didn't speak any Chinese at all. He had taken some language, but he didn't have any native Chinese, linguistically. His Caucasian wife did, and so it was fun to be with them in the markets. She would speak to the stall keeper, and the stall keeper would answer to him. The wife would speak to the stall keeper again, and you'd see the latter's confusion as she would reply to the one who should be speaking Chinese. It became confusing and humorous. Many American-Chinese could

not related to the political and cultural situation and did not connect well with the local interlocutors. But there was a strong connection with the United States because most Chinese-American families had come from four districts on the Pearl River Delta. We had many visitors who wanted to return to their native villages. Washington State Governor Locke's visit to his family village was a big media event.

*Q: Were we concerned about the Chinese mafia, the triads, or whatever, at that time, because of smuggling illegal aliens, and other things?*

MARTIN: It was a growing concern. Absolutely! The international crime organizations, of which the triads or the secret societies were a part, became increasingly active. As Hong Kong became more integrated into China, the triads and other criminal organizations in Hong Kong, developed contacts and branches across the border. The Communists had suppressed, not eliminated, but essentially suppressed secret societies and criminal organizations after 1949 by ruthlessly wiping them out, and keeping very close tabs on what everyone was doing all the way down to the individual level. But as they opened up, as Deng Xiaoping said, "You open the door, and flies come in," a lot of criminal activity re-surfaced. Some were internal, having never gone away. They had had been operating underground, surviving because of corrupt police officers and party officials. Others came in from outside, with international connections. Drug trafficking became a big issue; prostitution; karaoke parlors; gambling; illegal smuggling. More than criminal organizations were involved. Smuggling along the south coast of China - most of it from Hong Kong, but some from the Philippines or Taiwan - was carried out by the military. The navy was up to its gunwales in smuggling. And it was big business. Most of the cigarettes that came into China on the south coast came in on navy vessels. One of the reasons Jiang Zemin ordered the military out of commercial businesses is because of this smuggling problem. The army was involved to a degree, but they didn't have the resources the navy did of smuggling across the borders. I remember one particular example. During a visit to a town in the Pearl River delta, one of our officers noticed a big parking lot next to the police station was full of Jaguars, Cadillacs, Lincolns, and other cars, many of them with U.S. license plates still on them. He started asking questions, and the police said, "Oh, we found those. We've captured them." My guess is they were being resold to domestic customers rather than being returned to their owners. These were shipped into China by container after being stolen in Los Angeles, San Francisco or New York. Similarly across the border from Vietnam, we saw Mercedes and BMWs being driven across the border into Guangxi Province. So corruption was a problem. We also dealt with the illegal migrants out of Fujian Province that had gone to the States and were, when I was there, starting to be repatriated back to Fujian. Initially, INS flew them to Xiamen, and then trucked them to holding areas, where they were questioned and detained by Chinese authorities for a while, and then let go. I went to see the first flight that came back. I think there were about 40 people off one of the snake boats, as smuggling ships are called. The human rights people, of course, got very excited about this, saying that they were going to be persecuted, and detained, and so forth. Our best information was that they were detained, questioned, fined, and basically let go, because in subsequent years we found the same people showing up a second and even a third time. They'd come back, be let go, take another snake boat, get caught, and be brought back again. So after two or three times, it became sort of a cycle.

One additional point on the illegal immigration of that period. I was bemused as how quickly

migrants intercepted by the U.S. Coast Guard before they reached American soil learned the latest "reason de jour" for requesting political asylum. First, it was their involvement in the Tiananmen protests, requiring the U.S. not to send them back to certain arrest and imprisonment. When U.S. officials quickly determined few if any illegals from Changle County had ever been out of Fujian Province or engaged in any political activity, the rationale changed to family planning. Many were given asylum by arguing that they were being persecuted by family planning officials for wanting to have more than one child. The truth came out after they were given asylum and petitioned for their families to join them under a special visa category. We had families with 3, 4 or 5 kids come into the consulate for visas. As far as we could determine, all the illegal migrants the U.S. repatriated to Fujian suffered no more than a fine and perhaps brief detention.

Drug trafficking was a big problem. We worked with DEA in Hong Kong since, at that point, DEA did not have permission to open an office in the embassy in Beijing. As the U.S tightened up the drug trafficking routes through Thailand, they began to go north from Burma into Yunnan Province, across Guangxi, into Guangdong. The drug would be repackaged in Guangdong, often along the border with Hong Kong, and then shipped out through Hong Kong to the States or wherever. Drug trafficking, drug addiction became much more of a problem domestically for China. In Yunnan Province, AIDS became a problem. I used to tell people the drug tends to either fall off the truck or leak out of the pipelines as it goes through, and people were getting addicted. And they got AIDS from the needles, or drug addiction from smoking. We had problems developing cooperative relationships with the police. They wanted us to help. We were willing to help, but they were not very good at cooperating on a timely basis. In one particular case, we had good intelligence from Bangkok that a junk loaded with heroin was going to drop its cargo offshore in the Pearl River Estuary in Chinese waters, outside of Hong Kong, and that a Hong Kong junk that would come pick it up and take it into Hong Kong. We had the location and coordinates of the drop and the time. We told the police about it, and they said, "Okay. Thank you. We'll take care of it." Well, they may have taken care of it, but not in the right way. We never heard that they ever seized it, never confiscated it, as far as we know; and these were the kind of things that made it frustrating because we could have worked out a good relationship! But they were unwilling to cross the boundaries and cooperate internationally. Everything had to be checked out of Beijing.

*Q: How were relations with Hong Kong at this time?*

MARTIN: I left Guangzhou in 1996. And Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. So they were well on their track to reversion. The implementing aspects of the agreement between the UK and China had been carefully formulated. There was still some nervousness in Hong Kong as to what was going to happen after '97. People were still leaving, going abroad to Australia, Canada, the U.S., punching their ticket to get their insurance policy allowing them to get back if necessary. Once they had that, many came right back to Hong Kong to work and to live. But many people were still nervous. Subsequently, I think it's turned out remarkably well. There were many detail that had to be worked out between the two Hong Kong government and Chinese authorities -- border controls, immigration, customs, cross border trucking between Hong Kong and Shenzhen, and issues of tariffs. But both parties were working through those logically and pragmatically, without political pressure. In the end, I think that the reversion was

calm and peaceful.

*Q: Did you have any human rights issues, Americans caught or American academics of Chinese ancestry arrested?*

MARTIN: At that time, no. We had some Americans who came in and got into trouble. A number of political dissidents from Guangzhou were active. A couple of them had been in jail and had been released a year or so earlier. We had some contact with them. We tried to keep in touch with them, and find out what was happening, and what their position was. Most of them were under quite strict surveillance. One was an artist who had gone back to his artwork without too much interference. The other was not able to find a job so was having a difficult time living off his family and relatives. He subsequently was able to go to the States. A few Americans would drop by the consulate to say that they had special information that they wanted to share. Some was of use; most was pretty scurrilous, wild rumors that had no basis in fact. We had a couple people who tried to walk in and ask for asylum, which is always a problem. We tried to give them advice, but then tell them to go try their luck elsewhere. If they could get to Hong Kong, generally they were in a better position to get some assistance. But we couldn't do much for them in Guangzhou.

*Q: You mentioned Nixon's visit. This, of course, would have been after he'd long since been president.*

MARTIN: He came to China in the spring of 1993, April or May, 3 or 4 months after I arrived. That was his last visit as he died in 1994. I don't think he had ever been to Guangzhou. Certainly not during his famous first visit to China. In any case, he wanted to visit Guangzhou. We learned he planned to visit with a small team. His security "detail" was limited to one New Jersey State Policeman since he had given up his Secret Service protection. One secretary/assistant traveled with him. Also along on that China trip were a couple of his friends - Charles "Bebe" Rebozo, and Robert Abplanalp, and Raymond Price. So there were six altogether. When I heard they were coming, I communicated with his secretary and one of the first things I said was, "When you're here, I'd like very much to have President Nixon come and talk to the American community and the consulate community." The answer I received from his staff was, "Well, it's going to be difficult to do that. You know, he's somewhat elderly. He's not been in the best of health. It's the end of a long trip, etc. etc. So you shouldn't plan to do that." I said, "Okay, but it's too bad" since we didn't get many presidents coming to Guangzhou. He arrived on a chartered (Chinese Air Force owned) "United Airlines" plane. At the airport, he was met by the Governor's representative - not the governor - Foreign Affairs Office leaders, and me. The second thing he said, after he got off the plane and greeted me, was that he wanted to come meet the whole consulate staff, Chinese and American. I said, "Great!" I got on the radio as we were going back into town, and I said, "Try to get everybody together to line up in the driveway of the consulate building, and we'll have a chance to see him this afternoon about five o'clock." That was in a couple of hours. Driving into and through Guangzhou, I noted the Chinese treated him like a visiting emperor. They closed off all the streets, police blocking each intersection, so the motorcade whipped through town in about 15 minutes. He stayed at the White Swan Hotel, which was next door to the consulate. After resting a little in the presidential suite where he was staying, we walked the block to the consulate. The entire Consulate staff and as many from the

American community as we could reach, were lined up in the driveway. After I introduced him, Nixon gave a few remarks. It was probably his Foreign Service post speech number 462 but I thought it was appropriate. The gist of his remarks were: You're a long way from home. People don't appreciate what you do back in the States. But I want to let you know that I know what you're doing, how much I appreciate what you're doing. It's important, etc. etc. It was just right. And then he said, "I would like to have a chance to meet all of you." Everyone lined up and walked through the line, getting a chance to shake his hand, and having a picture taken with the President. The Chinese staff thought they'd died and gone to heaven. This was probably the highlight of their consulate career. Afterwards, everybody had the picture of their shaking hands with Nixon on or over their desk. They talked about it for months. That night the governor of Guangdong Province gave Nixon a dinner at the White Swan. In typical Chinese fashion, before dinner, the guests of honor meet the host for short conversation. The chairs in the meeting room are arranged in a u-shape with the host and VIP in the middle and others arrayed in protocol order on either side. As we walked into the room, the governor greeted Nixon very warmly. I was right behind Nixon so I shook his hand. The governor sort of nodded. I'd been there about three months but the governor had been "too busy" to see me, even though I'd asked for an appointment several times. I mentioned that to Nixon on our way to the dinner. The first thing Nixon did when he was asked for his comments was to turn to me, then looking at the governor, said, "Governor, I wanted to let you know that Gene Martin here, Consul General Martin, is one of our best Foreign Service officers. He was sent here particularly because of the importance we attach to Guangzhou, to Guangdong, and it's very important that he work closely with you." Well, I thought the governor was going to fall down and kiss my feet. Whenever I needed to see him thereafter, I was able to, and he was always friendly. I said to the president afterwards "President Nixon, that was the most helpful thing you could do." And he said, "Well, it's my pleasure - always try to help!"

*Q: From all account he always had problems with the Foreign Service. But essentially, the Foreign Service respected him because he knew his brief, he was very sharp.*

MARTIN: That was the only time I met him personally but I had the sense he was attentive to what he was doing and the circumstance. He seemed aware of what we do, of the importance of the Foreign Service, of the importance of our representation overseas. I remember in the mid-1960s, when he was out of power, he traveled the world and regularly called on embassies and consulates for briefings. I met him casually in Hong Kong. I also heard he never forgot FSOs who were too busy to see him, as well as those who took the time to do so, when ambassadorial assignments were given. Even the last year of his life, he was still cognizant of the Foreign Service. He did the same thing for me in Shenzhen. We saw the party secretary and the mayor who also had been too busy to see me, and Nixon made the same comment, and received the same reaction.

*Q: It's hard to visualize, but for the Chinese, Nixon really is a towering figure!*

MARTIN: Absolutely! He is the one that cut through the Gordian knot and made relations possible. None of us could have.

*Q: And I suppose many ascribe a certain amount of changes in China, because once that opened*

*up all sorts of other things opened up too.*

MARTIN: That's very true! The other thing interesting that evening, after that high point for me, was to watch the toasts at dinner. At the dinner table, sitting around in typical Chinese fashion, there's a plethora of toasts. One has to toast almost every course that comes, every dish. Nixon did not drink at that point. He told us at the table that Zhou En-lai had taught him the importance of how one makes the rounds of a dinner table coming back with still almost exactly the same amount of (fiery) Mao-tai rice wine in your glass as when you leave. They made the rounds of the Great Hall of the People with probably 1,500 or 2,000 people when Nixon visited, and he said, "Zhou En-lai and I came back, and we still had full glasses." Since he didn't drink in Guangzhou, Bebe Rebozo was his designated drinker. I watched incredulously during dinner. Just to begin, he would have a few beers, and then came the toasts. He would drink the toast for Nixon and then drink his own Mao-tai, followed by a couple more beers. The next dish came, two shots of Mao-tai, and a couple more beers. This went on through the full twelve course dinner. I thought to myself, "How long is he going to be able to stay with us at the table." Amazingly, he got up and walked away! How he did it, I don't know, but his face became redder and redder as the meal progressed. Somehow or another he made it through the dinner. It was a memorable evening.

*Q: Did you have any other visitors there that stick out?*

MARTIN: We had almost all the former Secretaries of State come through. Al Haig came through regularly as he was on the board of United Technologies which had Carrier Air Conditioning and Otis Elevator plants, in the province. He also visited on his own behalf as he is well known in China and keep current on developments. It was always useful to see him and keep in touch with him. Larry Eagleburger came through once. One vignette I recall was as we were coming out of the hotel to the car, my driver held the door for him on the right side, and he said, "No, no! You're the Consul General. You sit in the right seat." And he walked around and got in the other side of the car. I thought, "There's a guy with class!" That impressed me. George Shultz came to town and had a very successful visit. Henry Kissinger came to town. We saw him from time to time. I always felt sorry for the interpreter trying to understand his accent. The only one I didn't see during my assignment was Jim Baker, but he didn't have much of a connection with China, as I recall. Those were useful visits. Other than that, we didn't get many official visitors. We had a few Congressional Delegations (CODELS). Dick Gephardt came through with a fairly large delegation looking at why the U.S. should give China Most Favored Nation trading privileges. We were able to arrange a helicopter from one of the oil companies to fly them over the Pearl River Delta. They came back with their jaws dragging on the ground because they said they never realized how much development, and how much industry, and how much export oriented manufacturing there was going on in South China. From Hong Kong border all the way north to Guangzhou was a seamless stretch of one factory after another. It was a good way of demonstrating visually to them what was happening in South China.

*Q: Were you able to observe the absorption of American-trained Chinese, the ones going to our best universities and coming back*

MARTIN: That had not started yet. The first people that had gone overseas were in probably the

early '80s. 1981 or '82 was about the first time scholars were allowed to go overseas to study. Most were government officials, who studied a couple years and then went back. Those who came for study on their own, either privately or with government sponsorship came later. By the time I was there, they'd only had about 10 years in the States. Many had not come back. I would say that of the half dozen I met, half of them were quite happy, half were most unhappy and I think, subsequently, went back to the States. The problem was that when they came, the Chinese didn't really know how to use them. Some were put back into the old bureaucratic system, which frustrated them, and made the people who had not had the opportunities that they'd had for study abroad resentful. And so they tended to suppress their new ideas, their different ideas, or they were left on their own to try to find out their own niche. Some were successful, but it was too early to start private businesses or research endeavors. Subsequently, many more have returned, and I think in the last five or six years it's been quite a flood. One returnee I met was working at the tourist bureau as an adjunct to the Foreign Affairs Office, promoting foreign investment. She seemed to be doing okay, but it was a big adjustment.

*Q: At this time, were the secret police, or whatever, trying to frustrate or set up people? With your staff? Was this a concern?*

MARTIN: The Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS) is the counter intelligence ministry. We had some approaches in that regard. People would sidle up to our staff, or the spouses, on the street and would try to talk to them and befriend them. The staff was pretty attentive to that. There was never any kind of a concerted press as far as we could tell. We didn't have marine security guards in the consulate. We had White Swan hotel security guards who manned our booth at the hard line, rather like the fox watching the chicken coop. But we had a lower level of classification as well as a restricted area that was kept only for American cleared personnel. Generally, we felt fairly comfortable. Diplomatic security people in the department and the embassy were not quite so comfortable, but as far as we could tell, there were no penetrations that were evident or that we were able to determine. This leads into relationships with the embassy. Relationships between embassies and constituent posts vary considerably. I saw both sides as I subsequent was the DCM in the embassy in Beijing. I think when I was in Guangzhou, our relationships were really quite distant. We were believers in the old Cantonese saying - the mountains are high and the emperor is far away. The embassy didn't bother us very much and didn't ask us for much in return. We did our reporting. We did our consular work as was required. We had irregular visits from the embassy's leadership. The Consul General would come down periodically to talk to the consular folks. Commercial and public affairs officers visited periodically. The DCM came down, I would say, one and a half times - one time because he was on his way to Hong Kong, and he just stopped in overnight; and one time he came down for a specific visit to Guangzhou. The ambassador, Stapleton Roy initially, came just once, spent a couple days and made a couple of calls on officials such as the governor and mayor and met with the American business community. Jim Sasser, his successor, came down once. But that was all during my three and a half year tour. DCM Scott Hallford came to Fujian once, where I met him and traveled with him. We had a few department visitors, mostly on drug matters. The Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics Matters (INM in those days) came to Fujian. The Pacific Command Commander, then known as CINCPAC, visit was valuable as it gave me an opportunity to meet the PLA Guangzhou Military Region commander and officers with whom I had little contact. We didn't have a lot of official visitors but they generally were helpful in

giving me access to a wider range of Chinese officials. One issue we had with the embassy was their desire to send their economic and political officers down to southern China to see what was happening. We'd get messages saying, "Joe Blow is coming down to your district to report on such and such a topic. And we'd say, "Well, wait a minute now. We did a report a month ago on the same subject. Is this really necessary? The way to have said it was to ask to do a joint reporting trip with us, so Embassy officers could get a different perspective." The only real contention we had with the embassy was at one point they sent in a generalized report saying, "This is what's happening in China." It was totally from the embassy perspective. So we sent in a report, which we probably should have cleared with them first, saying, "Well, from the south it looks different to us." We got our knuckles rapped for that. But generally, we didn't have much of a problem with the embassy. The relations were cordial, but distant. We'll get back into Embassy-Consulate relations later when I talk about my Beijing experience. At that time, the ambassador and I worked consciously to create much more of a sense of a unified mission. We brought the consulate people more frequently and regularly into discussions in the embassy, had them visit periodically, and held joint conferences and meetings so we all were more or less on the same song sheet.

*Q: Before we leave Guangzhou, let's talk a little about the aftermath of the Vietnam War.*

MARTIN: One of the interesting things that occurred while I was in Guangzhou from '93-'96 were Chinese discoveries of U.S. fighter crashes from the Vietnamese War in my consular district of southern China. Some of these planes had been shot down; others became lost over North Vietnam and crashed. Usually the JPRC (Joint Personnel Recovery Center) in Honolulu would send experts to excavate the crash sites. Others would come down from the embassy, and we usually sent somebody from the consulate. One site was in Guangxi Province, the province bordering Vietnam. Another time it was in Hainan - the island made more famous during the 2001 EP-3 incident. But the crash sites often were in remote, isolated areas that were difficult to reach, usually by hiking over the mountains and into the jungles to find these places. I did not go along on the site visits, but some of my staff did. The reporting that came out of those trips, in addition to finding the crash sites and occasionally some remnants of the crew, was interesting. There was a tremendous contrast with the rest of South China in terms of economic development and reforms and the standard of living. One of my colleagues observed that western Guangxi Province for all appearances could have been right out of the 19th century. Almost no change from traditional China. The only thing that had changed was a small karaoke parlor in one of the villages. No paved roads, no electricity, nothing, but they did have a karaoke machine, and that's what they did at nighttime. I guess that's progress in some respect, but it was illuminating because it helped us realize that what you see on the eastern coast and what you see in the urban parts of China really does not apply all the way across the country. There are many places where it's still very remote and very primitive.

*Q: A question I'd like to ask before we leave this Guangzhou time. Could you characterize how you and your fellow officers perceived what was happening in China? Was this sort of exhilarating to see great changes, or was it one where you were looking at it and saying, "This is all fine, but there are systematic problems and maybe China's not moving a way we'd like to see? How did you all look at it?"*

MARTIN: I think most of us were quite optimistic in the sense that the changes were really quite dramatic. I will say that the social psyche or the people had a hard time keeping up with the economic changes, because in terms of social structure, in terms of their ability to operate in a rapidly changing society, it was difficult. So it was a little uneven in that sense. Driving capabilities, being able to handle urban life, being able to interrelate in a non-structured society was difficult for a lot of people. There were imbalances, there were disconnections within society but generally the progress was positive. People were optimistic about the future. They realized the problems. When asked about corruption, of some people above the law or not having any legal restrictions, one interlocutor cited the United States in the late 1800s when we had robber barons who operated outside the law. They could do what they wanted - the Rockefellers, the Vanderbilts, and others. He said, "We're going through the same stage now. After we get a critical mass of capital, we'll then start limiting and restricting what people can do." That may have been an excuse, but there was some validity to his comment, that you have to go through a certain stage to be able to develop the infrastructure before you can limit it. But I think corruption remains a serious millstone to sustainable development in China.

*Q: There is this perception that people from various areas, the Chinese, people from the Levant, including the Lebanese, Palestinians, and Jews, have a predilection for business. Did you find this?*

MARTIN: Oh, certainly. Of course, we were in Guangzhou, which was the home of the Cantonese who, along with the Shanghaiese, have been known for centuries as being good businessmen. But I think in general, the Chinese are innovative, aggressive and assertive in terms of business acumen. However, in China, as in every other country, you may have five or ten percent of the population who are good at business, and the rest have no particular business capabilities. So development has been quite uneven. Many people from the countryside were country bumpkins fighting to survive in the new society.

*Q: What about the role of women? In rural areas, obviously women and men just worked in the fields. Did you see women moving into the business world?*

MARTIN: Women were moving. Much of the migrant population was young women who worked in the foreign invested factories – making shoes, electronics, clothes. A Nike factory may have 3,000 young women between the ages of 18 and 21 and maybe 50 men. This obviously caused all sorts of social problems, as you can imagine. In addition to the contract workers from rural areas of China's interior who came to the coast to work in the factories, you also had many local women who seemed to be doing much better. Although, despite Mao's statement that women hold up half the sky, they don't get half the cake. They do more than half the work, but they don't get the rewards. Even when women are graduated first in their class academically, men usually get the best jobs first. That's changing, but women still have a tough time. In state-owned enterprises downsizing, the men tend to be kept on while women are the first ones to be laid off. But I think educated women do well. Two thirds of our consulate employees were women who were extremely capable people for the most part. Several of them had good English capability. Some were recruited for jobs in Hong Kong because their English was better than that of native Hong Kong school leavers, whose English was not as good.

**HOWARD H. LANGE**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1979-1980)**

**Economic Officer**  
**Beijing (1980-1982)**

*Mr. Lange was born in 1937 and raised in Nebraska and educated at the Universities of Nebraska and Washington. After service in the US Air Force, he joined the Foreign Service in 1969. After Vietnam training in Washington Mr. Lange was posted to Vietnam. Many of his future assignments, both in Washington and abroad concerned the Far East, China and Taiwan matters in particular. Mr. Lange's overseas posts include Hue, Saigon, Manila, Taipei, Beijing, Warsaw and Malta. Mr. Lange was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.*

LANGE: In 1979, we had the opening in China – the establishment of diplomatic relations. Because I had studied Chinese in the military and done postgraduate work on China, my interest in the China game was reawakened. I made my availability known and in due course was sent to Taiwan to pump up my Chinese for an unspecified assignment to Beijing.

*Q: So you were in Taiwan from when to when?*

LANGE: '79 to '80.

*Q: You'd been there before, hadn't you? How did you find, by this time, of course, we had interest –*

LANGE: I'll get into this more because later I was Director of the Taiwan Coordination Staff (Taiwan desk) in the 1990s. We had established the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in 1979 to manage our unofficial relationship with Taiwan. The language school was part of it, and it moved from Taichung, which was in the middle of Taiwan, to Taipei. We were the first class that was not in Taichung. This was the early part of this unofficial relationship following our recognition of Beijing and withdrawal of recognition from the "Republic of China" (Taiwan), and we still weren't quite sure how this would go down with the people in Taiwan. There had been some consideration of moving the school to the PRC, but practical considerations – costs and relative ease of administration primarily – argued for keeping it on Taiwan.

*Q: People who've gone to the old one when they went there - Taichung - had remarked how good it was to be removed from the embassy and that sort of thing. In other words they were some distance removed, and they really had to use Chinese much more away from the office atmosphere. Did you notice a difference, just internally? Of course we closed our office there but it was still a functioning interest. Did you find that that was a distraction for learning?*

LANGE: That aspect didn't really change very much. The location of the school itself was at Yang Ming Shan in the mountains north of Taipei, which had become a rather well to do suburb of the city. It was a real excursion to go downtown, so we were really separate from day-to-day AIT operations, both as a matter of policy and in a geographic sense. Still, while we were exposed to Chinese language and culture outside the classroom, it was not exactly immersion; we led a rather suburban existence, and passed much of our free time together, speaking English among ourselves.

*Q: This was a time of change on Taiwan. Were you picking up at the school, from your contacts, a sense of growing Taiwanese nationalism itself, concern about China? Things were changing.*

LANGE: That's right. I noticed outside the room here a book by Chuck Cross, the first AIT director in Taipei. I'm sure he covered the transition very well. Taiwan was still under martial law, as it had been since the late '40s. Politics were still very much dominated by the KMT, the Kuomintang. 1980 was the time of the Kaohsiung Incident, when a demonstration by the Democratic Progressive Party - the DPP - in Kaohsiung turned violent. A number of DPP figures were arrested and tossed in jail. At that time - '79-'80 - the people on Taiwan were reeling under our derecognition and still very fearful of what that meant. Very watchful of the effect of the Taiwan Relations Act and to what extent they could still rely on the U.S. umbrella to help them avoid reunification with the mainland. There was a lot of uncertainty, and a certain fatalism as well because virtually everyone else in the world, with the exception of two or three dozen smaller countries, had recognized Beijing. That's what makes present day Taiwan so remarkable, because that's only 20 years ago. Within 10 years after the Kaohsiung Incident, the DPP was legal, martial law had been lifted, and Taiwan was on its way to real democracy.

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*Q: You finished there in 1980. Where then did you go?*

LANGE: We went to Beijing.

*Q: And you were in Beijing from when to when?*

LANGE: '80-'82.

*Q: What was your job?*

LANGE: I was initially in a combined economic and commercial section, which was later divided. The commercial side split off to coincide with the establishment of the foreign commercial service under the Department of Commerce. I was head of the internal reporting unit of the economic section.

*Q: Well of course you were there during a transition time between the Carter administration to the Reagan administration. Who was your first ambassador and then the second one?*

LANGE: The first one was the Labor leader from Michigan, former head of the UAW Leonard

Woodcock. Then he was replaced by career diplomat Art Hummel.

*Q: How did you find being right in the heart of the beast, being able to get economic information at this point? You'd already been used to playing around with reading the local papers down in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and all of a sudden, here you are. So, how did things change and how did it work?*

LANGE: Well, there was quite a lot available in academic journals, and more was appearing all the time. There was more scope for Chinese economists to explore the nature of their economy. There was a growing acceptability of alternate models. As of '78, Deng Xiaoping had embraced opening to the outside world. So this was a major new factor in Chinese economic orthodoxy. Getting a handle on the Chinese economy was of course something else. Statistics were (and still are) extremely suspect, regardless of the new attitudes and acceptability of new ideas. There was still pressure from the leadership to report positively. So all the statistics were quite doubtful. We spent a fair amount of time trying to identify, through looking at the press and journal articles, individuals that we could talk to, who could give us some insight into policymaking, trends, attitudes, and particularly those that had some importance to American businessmen and others. There were just three of us in the unit. One of the others was on loan from the Agency and his Chinese was excellent because he had grown up in Taiwan. He's since joined AID with his wife.

*Q: So was he doing Agency work?*

LANGE: No, it was really an embassy position; it was not an Agency position. The arrangement provided a cross-fertilization benefit to the Agency and the embassy gained a Chinese language resource. The position was short term, but it was reestablished from time to time.

*Q: I would think in a country with such tight controls as China, trying to talk to anyone, particularly a bureaucrat but others, [they'd be] so sensitive about giving out economic information, like how many shoes they sold would be a state secret or something. And this would be an inhibitor on the part of people who'd be willing to talk to you.*

LANGE: Quite right. To have a spontaneous conversation with anybody in China was extremely difficult for a foreigner, and as a representative of the embassy, we were even more on the outside. The Chinese have a foreign affairs bureau for any sizeable institution. The job of these "barbarian handlers" was to deal with foreigners, either businessmen or foreign officials. You had to go through them to set up meetings or visits. To be fair, some of these offices really did do their best to facilitate access to people and information. But they often were barriers and saw their jobs as minimizing contact between the foreigner and real people in the organization. Their function was also to present a picture that was approved by the local party structure. There was an additional constraint. At the time I was there, there was a system of notification of the foreign ministry whenever one traveled outside of a certain perimeter around Beijing. Usually we could go where we wanted, but it meant that everyone along the way knew you were coming. The economists and officials were usually quite careful, limiting themselves to saying what they'd already said in print. So it magnified the problem of trying to understand what was going on.

*Q: In a way, particularly in economics, which is so important - and I'm thinking of countries*

*such as China - it sounds like you were, with all this fancy “restoring relations” and all the hubbub and all, you were almost back, as far as you were concerned, to the bad old days of sitting around in Hong Kong and trying to figure out what the hell was happening by reading newspapers and reading journals and picking up information that way.*

LANGE: Yes and no. Of course, you could read all the journals in Hong Kong and the newspaper articles. But I think the added element was personal experience, the ability to observe things that were going on. You visit a factory, and they couldn't totally pull the wool over your eyes because you could see what was going on. Was stuff coming out the other end of the assembly line or not? Was machinery sitting idle or not? And notwithstanding limitations on contacts and pervasive self-censorship, we could talk to people. During the period I was there, there was a certain amount of rivalry between our missions in Hong Kong and Beijing, but the balance of value-added reporting had clearly shifted toward Beijing. The other consulates we had established already - Shanghai and Guangzhou, had also become significant bases for reporting, even with their constraints.

*Q: I would think the strength, the muscle that made everything work in Hong Kong was its staff of Chinese foreign service nationals who'd been doing this for years who were not particularly, they, just by the fact that they were in Hong Kong, they were not tools of the Chinese mainland government. I know that during this, they were really finely honed, as far as picking up things. Whereas in Beijing, my understanding is that the ministry that handles barbarians was assigning you people. You couldn't go out in the street and hire people. So, in a way, you were deprived of objective, local nationals to read the journals.*

LANGE: That was certainly a weakness of the operation in Beijing. The local employees were assigned by the Diplomatic Services Bureau, an office under the foreign ministry. The embassy could refuse people on interview, for one reason or another, but you couldn't, as you say, go out and recruit people for a position. It was John Thompson, who was running the information section, who first managed to get around that. He identified somebody who made himself available through the Diplomatic Services Bureau. I don't know the details, but he got a very good person as a senior FSN. But usually the people you would get were career diplomats or government people who had an English language capability, who accurately saw this assignment as not contributing to their career. We suspected that some might have been made available by their parent organization to the DSB because they weren't performing. So we got a really mixed bag of Chinese employees, and we relied on them much less than did the operation in Hong Kong. Remember, however, that things were changing fairly fast, and the job of reporting from China posts shifted away from reading tea leaves toward keeping on top of developments. We did have our employees in Beijing scan the press and alert us to interesting developments and do the contact work - setting up appointments and so forth. But we certainly didn't have a cadre of really topnotch local employees to provide analysis.

*Q: Say, you were going down to see “Such and Such Golden Pheasant Electric Company.” How would you find making contact and seeing the various people? Were they responsive, or did you feel they were told to let you come but don't show too much or something like that?*

LANGE: It varied a lot. Once you penetrated this layer of barbarian handlers and got to people

beyond that barrier, often they were enthusiastic. They were thrilled in some cases that somebody was interested in what they were doing, or more importantly, that it might lead to foreign investment and change their lives. In some cases, not; they didn't see any advantage to cooperating or revealing any more than was required. They didn't see any relevance; they were just going through the motions.

Apart from more or less formally-arranged visits, it was possible to deduce quite a lot just from direct observation. To illustrate, I might relate some experiences from a visit to Sichuan Province.

*Q: This was when*

LANGE: This was the winter of 1980-81. I took the train, which was the principal means of travel within the country, and it probably took between a day and 30 hours. In that time, I passed from the harsh winter landscape of northern China, through the even more forbidding mud-brown villages of Henan, then into the mountains separating North China from the protected basin of Sichuan. At about this point in the journey, it was time for dinner. Foreigners could not go to the dining car while Chinese were there, so I was summoned to dine after all others had eaten. I was the only foreigner on the train. It was darn cold in the car, so cold in fact that the grease that is a normal component of Chinese cuisine had congealed on top of the dishes. I picked at it, but couldn't get anything down. About a half hour after I returned to my compartment (which again, I alone occupied), a terrified-looking cook called on me to ask if there were anything wrong with dinner. He seemed petrified that I was going to complain when we arrived. I assured him, and the conductor who was there as a witness, that I suffered from a tender stomach and simply was unable to keep anything down. He was clearly relieved that I was sick.

Deng Xiaoping had only established the "opening to the outside" economic policy in '78, and there was a terrific lag in carrying it out, especially in the hinterlands. It was really only getting underway at that time. Sichuan is an interior province, far from the coast. It is the province to which the Nationalist leader, Chiang Kai-shek, retreated in the face of the Japanese invasion in the late 1930s and established the Nationalist headquarters. It is an incredibly populous province, with over 100 million people even at that time. So it's very important. Because of its isolation, ideas and trends often got to Sichuan much later than to the coastal areas. But it was very lively at that time; the markets were packed. There was a lot of very small-scale market activity - people selling things off the back of their bicycles and so forth. One seller of baskets was an old man who came in from the countryside. They were very attractive, and I still have a couple of them. So I began to engage him in bargaining. Eventually we struck a price, and by this time we had drawn a crowd of maybe 150 people who were watching this process because many of them had never seen a foreigner. So after he had exchanged his baskets for my money, he started talking to the crowd, defending his price as a fair price. He insisted that it was the same he would have charged anybody else; he hadn't exploited the foreigner, there was a lot of work involved in making the basket, etc. This resulted in a lively and serious discussion among all these people about whether this was a fair price or not. Eventually the consensus seemed to be that yes, this was a fair price. It was strange that he felt obligated to defend his price, possibly because he had always operated with fixed prices, selling to his cooperative or whatever. And passersby didn't

think it odd to pass judgment on whether his price was fair or not. You won't find that sort of innocence in any corner of China today.

Generally, prices were low in Sichuan. Seven of us went out for a big dinner – admittedly unrefined food (Sichuan cuisine is considered to be peasant fare among sophisticated Chinese) – and it cost the equivalent of a dollar apiece. Radio and TV retail outlets were doing a very brisk business. Bicycles and sewing machines and watches – all measures of relative prosperity in the interior in those early days – were selling well.

Other vignettes from Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan.

- There was a memorable, 30-foot-high statue of Chairman Mao standing in the middle of the city, with right arm raised in a salute to the masses. When I was there, it was surrounded by scaffolding, and there were wild rumors that it was being torn down. But as it turned out, it was just being scrubbed. They hadn't quite worked out their attitude toward Chairman Mao at that time, though I noted that in the bookstores, the obligatory section devoted to the works of Mao had tarps over the books, dust covers that had apparently not been disturbed for months.
- There was a large family planning billboard at the main downtown intersection in Chengdu. This was at the height of the one-child-per-family campaign, which it later became clear was a failure in the countryside. It worked in the cities where they had some control over housing, ration coupons and so on, where you could really put some pressure on people. But in rural areas, it never really worked very well. The billboard depicted a happy mother, father and child. The text was translated into English because, as a bystander told me, "some foreigners have the impression that there are too many people in China." But the English translation was unfortunate because it said, "You better have just one child," which to us sounds like... "or else...!" I really don't think that was the intent, though the history of family planning in China includes local and regional officials who took drastic measures, including coerced abortions, to insure one-child families.
- In the middle of Chengdu there was an advertising agency, a small, storefront operation. Of course the concept of an advertising agency was new to begin with, and it had the interesting name of "The Hundred Flowers." --- *Q: A hundred flowers bloomed, and then they were all chopped off.* --- Exactly. Chinese were in the mid-1950s invited to offer their honest views on political and social developments – "Let a hundred flowers bloom and a hundred schools of thought contend" – then were attacked and persecuted for doing so. Given campaign and numerous other reversals in Chinese history, the name of the shop showed remarkable faith in the new policies, or perhaps foolish bravado. On the back wall of this agency was a list of services and prices, flanked by portraits of Karl Marx in one corner and Lenin in the other. I couldn't find anyone to ask, but perhaps they were leftover decorations from the era just past. I doubt that the irony was intended.

I returned to Chengdu in 1998, and in most ways it had joined the rest of China in terms of

consumer goods, traffic choking the streets, pollution - all of the trappings of modern China. Pollution is particularly bad in that area. All of Sichuan is a basin, which largely accounts for its fertility and mild climate. But it also traps air pollution close to the ground, which is quite unpleasant and truly bad for health.

*Q: Were there any events during this time? Did you find - I have a feeling that initially there was a cooling off period when the Reagan administration came in?*

LANGE: There was a lot of nervousness among the Chinese about the Reagan administration. Soon after I arrived in 1980, George Bush made a visit. Just about the time Bush touched down, Reagan made a statement that was tantamount to suggesting reestablishment of official relations with Taiwan. Bush seemed as surprised and nonplused as were. The Reagan statement of course sent the Chinese through the roof and cast a pall over Bush's visit. So certainly there were a lot of doubts about the Reagan administration and its meaning for the relationship with China. The statement also highlighted the unfinished business - still unfinished today - of our arms relationship with Taiwan, and this led to the excruciating negotiation of the 1982 communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan. I was not a part of that negotiation, but it was certainly part of the background to life in the embassy. We could see the pressure that Ambassador Hummel was under.

Political concerns however did not dampen Chinese interest in foreign investment, new technology and trade. The promise of the China market allowed them to turn that to political advantage. For example, China was just beginning to open up as an aircraft market while I was there. The Chinese were not shy about hinting that an upcoming major buy of aircraft could well go to the Europeans if the terms offered by the Americans were not right or if political relations turned sour. The Chinese are not alone in playing that card, but the market was really meaningful to Boeing. The political environment is a consistent source of anxiety I think to major players in business in China.

To illustrate the power of Chinese interest in the latest technology, I accompanied a group of American businessmen who were selling port-handling equipment, that is cranes, straddle carriers, that sort of thing. We visited the major ports, about a half dozen. We were provided access that you normally couldn't get and observation of the truly retarded state of modernization in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Qingdao and other ports. This was clearly a product of Chinese eagerness for foreign business competition and world class technology.

This discussion relates to one of the enduring arguments in the China relationship: Is our investment and technology transfer an agent of change in the Chinese system, or is it "selling the rope with which they will hang us" – that is, does it act primarily to strengthen the present system. There is a lot of simplistic thinking on this subject, and the time horizon for some people is clearly very short. I firmly believe, however, that contact with non-Chinese societies will change the Chinese system, and that trade and commerce are powerful agents of such contact. The change may not always be what we expect, or even necessarily for the better, but isolation is not really an option.

*Q: You were there when the commercial service cut loose from the foreign service and moved to*

*the Department of Commerce. How did this seem to work in the field and in an important new market? What was your impression?*

In 1982, I was back in the department. For a year I was in the EAP Regional Economic Affairs office. That was from '82-'83. Then from '83-'85, I was on the China desk.

*Q: In Regional Economic Affairs - '82 to '83 - what were your concerns? What was our economic policy? What were you dealing with?*

LANGE: This was just a one year assignment, and I have to say, it was a year I prefer to forget. Not much happened in my personal career, and not much happened that I can recall in Regional Economic Affairs. This was just sort of a parking place till I got on the desk.

*Q: Okay, this happens.*

LANGE: I didn't enjoy the assignment very much. And the office was somewhat demoralized and disorganized. My portfolio was to coordinate aid, investment and commercial policy in the Asia region.

*Q: So you moved on to the China desk? And you did that from - ?*

LANGE: '83-85.

*Q: What piece of the China pie did you have?*

LANGE: At that time, there were three deputy directors, a principal and one each for economic and political – a fairly egregious example of title inflation. I was chief of the economic affairs side of the desk, which had four officers and two secretaries. It was a busy time. This was still early in the relationship, but we were already catching a number of things on the rebound. During the very early days, we had negotiated a number of economic and trade agreements, and now, four years on, it was time to either extend them or renegotiate to try to fix the things that were wrong. Many of them were concluded in the haste of preparation for this or that high-level visit. You know the way agreements are done. They're not negotiated in a calm environment; the deal isn't cut until there's pressure to do that, and usually the pressure is a high-level visitor. The result is sometimes not pretty, and flaws are soon exposed. I spent a lot of my time with a maritime agreement, which we had concluded in '79, which was up for renewal and which wasn't working. It lurched along through a couple of renewals but eventually was allowed to lapse. There are still notions that a new one can be negotiated.

*Q: What problems?*

LANGE: One of the key issues that went to the heart of the Chinese system was that our carriers wanted the ability to market their services in China. On the Chinese side, you had a monopoly. And the monopoly, COSCO - China Overseas Shipping Company - was not about to easily give up its position. And just as we signed agreements under political pressure, the Chinese did as well. They may have had good intentions in 1979 were never really able to deliver on that

agreement. This was a constant source of grievance for our carriers. Chinese grievances were related to some leftovers from the Cold War in terms of access to certain U.S. ports, the fear being that it was possible to gain technical intelligence in ports that were near U.S. naval bases or where U.S. naval ships transited. There were a number of restrictions on Chinese access to these ports, though we were able to remove most of them. The fundamental problem remained – American carriers could not get direct access to the Chinese economy to provide services complementary to shipping. Without that, they had limited ability to compete with COSCO and its lower operating costs. It was incredibly time consuming and frustrating to try and get those problems fixed. Perhaps WTO membership for China will help in addressing them.

*Q: In a way, problems on both sides.*

LANGE: On both sides. The Chinese for their part want instant acceptance on a basis, to cite their mantra, of “equality and mutual benefit.” Residual limitations on port access rankled. But this couldn’t be quickly fixed. In general terms, in the U.S. one saw almost daily in the press evidence of suspicion of the Chinese from two angles. One was a doubt that they are able or intend to deliver on agreements that they make. My own feeling is that there are some notable failures, but that the Chinese do about as well as most countries in that regard. A second area of suspicion relates to intentions. Is China a long term threat to the U.S.? Do Chinese gather intelligence as a byproduct of commercial activity? It is difficult to assess Chinese intentions, but frankly, I think we are inclined to overrate their intelligence abilities. In any case, one hears a bit less of “China is a threat” discussion these days, perhaps because other, more tangible issues are commanding foreign affairs attention, but it was a significant theme 20 years ago, and it did not facilitate agreement on maritime relations.

*Q: Did you feel, by this point, as the Reagan administration had been in about two years - Ronald Reagan had been obviously the Cold Warrior par excellence, a great supporter of Taiwan coming from California - did you feel that you were dealing rationally with China by this time, as far as administration direction?*

LANGE: Oh, yes. I think there was substantial transformation in the thinking of President Reagan, and this really started soon after he took office. The third agreement with the Chinese, the August ’82 Communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan, I think was a measure of recognition of the young Reagan administration of the importance of China in our overall foreign policy. And I think that’s something that all administrations since ’79 have recognized, or you could trace it back to ’72. At that time, of course, the Cold War was still a reality and a factor in the U.S.-China relationship. Since ’89-’90, that hasn’t been a factor, and that has somewhat complicated the relationship in the sense that a lot of people now question whether we need China, since it no longer functions as a counterbalance, as it once did, to the Soviet Union. The conclusion of the 1982 Communiqué was sort of a watershed event, in that the Administration at least recognized the implications of normalization. The agreement opened the way for three visits at the highest level from 1983 to ’85. Those visits couldn’t really have taken place unless, as you imply, there was a pretty rational and clearheaded approach to the relationship on the part of the Reagan Administration.

It is worth noting here that, just as we question China’s fealty to agreements, the Chinese do not

believe that we are living up to the 1982 Communiqué. The 1982 Communiqué set out limitations on our arms sales to Taiwan, which we have, well, observed in our own way. Our official position is that we abide by the terms of the 1982 Communiqué, even though the language of the communiqué envisions that we will not increase military sales to Taiwan, and will eventually terminate them. That has not happened. We maintain that one of the conditions for concluding the communiqué was our understanding that it was Chinese policy to peacefully resolve the Taiwan question, but that that policy has not been realized, that in fact there continues to be a threat from the Mainland side. The Chinese counterargument is that while Beijing seeks a peaceful resolution and has no *intention* to use force against Taiwan, it cannot forswear the use of force, since that would be tantamount to an invitation to Taiwan to declare independence. I think it is fair to say that in 1982, Beijing thought that we really would gradually phase out arms sales to Taiwan. They regard the facts of the matter – increased arms sales to Taiwan – as a sign of either bad faith or inability of a series of administrations to deliver on the 1982 communiqué.

Another event of the 1983-'85 period was the entry of the PRC into the Asian Development Bank (ADB). This was very difficult, because Taiwan (the “Republic of China”) had a seat in the ADB. Taiwan had to somehow be accommodated at the same time that the PRC was admitted. It was a difficult negotiation that went on for a long time, which the Koreans were active in intermediating. The outcome was not bad – it has worked – but the solution, as is often the case, wasn't wholly satisfactory to either side. Taiwan still has a voice through the Korean executive director, and the PRC has its seat. The PRC could not freeze out Taiwan, but the price for Taiwan was to accept a new name for use in the ADB. This gets deeply into the theology of China nomenclature, but the Taiwan authorities believe that the name under which they now participate – “Taipei, China” – comes uncomfortably close to an acknowledgment that Taipei is a part of China as we know it today, that is, the PRC. They thought that this formulation, with the comma as opposed to without, could compromise their position in nomenclature battles to come. As you see, this is extremely arcane, almost nanopolicy, but these issues are quite important to both sides.

Many Americans feel that such things as a seat in the Asian Development Bank should be a reward for good behavior and essentially for adopting an approach to governance that meets our test. This is one of the reasons there's such emotional support for Taiwan in the Congress and editorially because Taiwan has embraced democracy and our concept of governance, while Beijing explicitly rejects it. So ideologically there's more support for Taiwan today than there was in '79 when Taiwan was authoritarian and under martial law. This is all by way of saying I think our policy toward the PRC gradually normalized to accord with our official relationship. However, the specific problems multiplied because we had a broader and deeper relationship covering many different areas.

*Q: Did you get involved in the equivalent to trade complaints? For example, Xerox wants to set up a factory there, and they're finding that they're being... or some firm wants to get in there and sell goods. Did that hit you?*

LANGE: One of the specific issues during this period was a countervailing duty case that was brought against Chinese textile imports, one of the pressure points in the trade relationship. We

had a textile agreement that provided for a certain growth factor. But it was easily foreseeable by the late '70s and early '80s that this was going to be one of the really difficult trade areas because they can produce so cheaply, and because on our side we had such a vociferous and effective lobby to protect domestic textile manufacturers. This was kind of an imaginative filing on the part of the textile lobby. It was based on a notion that Chinese textiles were being sold in the U.S. for less than "fair market value," and that compensatory, or "countervailing," customs duties should therefore be imposed. It was a complicated and difficult case to make, requiring calculation of imputed costs, for example, and the factual part of it depended to a significant degree on advice to the industry from a retired foreign service officer who'd served in China in the late '70s – early '80s. He became convinced that Chinese textile exports to the U.S. were vulnerable in this area. This was primarily the province of USTR and the commerce department, but all of us concerned with China economic affairs spent an awful lot of time on the case. The Chinese had no understanding of our process, and they refused to get engaged in the case, other than to exhort us diplomatically to direct that the case be dropped. The countervailing duty case had broad implications for imports from China across the board. It would have effectively provided another tool for keeping Chinese imports out of the U.S. market, but it eventually failed.

I mentioned high-level visits. One of those was by the Chinese premier, Zhao Ziyang. That was really our first high-level official visitor from China. Deng Xiao-ping came in 1979, but he had no official government position at the time. Zhao came in January 1984, and the visit was quite successful. Zhao was one of the real architects for the China economic reform, and he was a practitioner as well. He was imaginative; he thought outside the box. He had been very successful as a party secretary in Sichuan, China's most populous province, which now has over 100 million people. As it turned out, he was a little too imaginative and political. His downfall was one product of the Tiananmen Square episode in 1989. He was evidently in favor of hearing the students out, but he was in the minority. The leadership's position was, "We've heard enough from the students; let's stop this now, before they become a threat to stability." Zhao Ziyang, who did not sign on to the decision, has ever since effectively been under house arrest. But his 1984 visit here was quite successful.

It was followed a few months thereafter by a visit to China by Reagan, which, as you can imagine, consumed us for months in preparation. I guess the single most dramatic outcome of the Reagan visit was that the White House insisted and, somewhat to our surprise, prevailed in getting Reagan access to live TV in China. This was a big deal; he wanted to address the Chinese people directly. And that has since been a necessary component of presidential visits to China. During Clinton's visit in '98, a lot of planning revolved around opportunities for communicating directly with the Chinese people.

In 1983-84, tech transfer was a huge issue. High tech exports were controlled through COCOM – a coordinating committee made up of developed exporting countries.

*Q: It was basically there to prevent technical goods of military value from getting into the Communist orbit.*

LANGE: That's right, and this was, since we had customarily been more restrictive than other

countries, an effort by us to get everybody together to agree on what those standards should be, particularly for so-called dual use items, that is things which are imported for non-lethal use but can have military applications. The classic example is a supercomputer, which is used for weather profiling and prediction but can also be applied to nuclear weapons design. There are many others, and this effort to coordinate standards and approach when everybody's out there competing and trying to sell is very difficult. We created a separate category for China, to reflect their difference from the Soviets in terms of both their capability and their apparent threat. So we, along with the Europeans, tried to create different standards to apply to our exports to China. One of my officers – one year it was Richard Boucher, another it was Steve Schlaikjer – spent virtually all his time on this issue of tech transfer.

*Q: Richard Boucher, he's now the spokesman for the Department of State.*

LANGE: That's right, his last assignment was consul general in Hong Kong. Back to 1983: We were negotiating an investment protection agreement with China. That never got done. It's still resurrected fitfully, but we never have signed an agreement with China, because the fundamental approach to something like the protection and treatment of investment, and all of the structures that support an investment climate, is just so different that it has proved impossible so far to bridge the gap. The other factor is that there's plenty of investment that goes into China anyway without an investment agreement. So there's limited pressure on our side or on theirs to get one done.

Another issue was civil aviation. Pan American had service to China at the same time that they wanted to resume service to Taiwan. Northwest wanted to come in as a second carrier, while retaining its service to Taiwan, where the market was strong and growing. That was very difficult to work out, to ensure that there was no discrimination against Northwest in terms of its access to the China market because it had service to Taiwan. Particularly in those early years of our relationship, Beijing was extremely sensitive to anything that had to do with Taiwan. Beijing tried to apply pressure to companies to pull out of Taiwan, but that has largely failed. Boeing sells both to Taiwan and the mainland. Carriers serve both places. I think that's one of the successes of our policy, that we were able to separate to a large degree commercial activity from the political. We framed it as economic relations with the "people of Taiwan". Much as Beijing would have liked our cooperation in raising economic pressure on Taipei, we could not go along with it.

*Q: Well, what were you doing? Were you giving ammunition to the Special Trade Representative or were you dealing with the Chinese through the embassy on these things? How did it work?*

LANGE: In the case of civil aviation, of course, that's one area where the department has retained primary negotiating responsibility. So in that case we on the desk worked very closely with the airlines and with EB (Bureau for Economic and Business Affairs), which negotiates these things, to ensure that we didn't compromise any of our basic principles in negotiating with the Chinese. Sometimes the airlines were almost desperate, and they may have been tempted to make a calculation - should we give up Taiwan because in the long term the PRC is the larger market? I think we helped give airline management the backbone to resist any inclination to give up on rights to Taiwan.

*Q: Well this reflects in a way a battle we'd gone through for a long time on the Arab boycott of any American business dealing with Israel except there the political clout was such that no American company could go along with the Arab boycott because of some domestic repercussions. But you didn't have that particularly in the China thing, did you?*

LANGE: Not exactly, but domestic considerations were definitely a factor. There was always the potential that you'd have this domestic backlash if it were seen that we had pressured or encouraged a company to acquiesce to PRC political pressure and give up commercial activity in Taiwan. I think the danger of that happening is very low.

Another issue at the time of the Zhao visit was a grain trade agreement. China had undertaken to buy six million tons of wheat a year, but they didn't meet their commitment. Other exporters were offering competitive prices, and China's crops improved. They just didn't need to import as much as they had in years previous. Even though we were working against market forces, we had to keep up the pressure on the Chinese, and it was an irritant in the bilateral relationship.

Yet another issue was peaceful nuclear cooperation. China wanted our nuclear power technology, and our companies wanted badly to sell it. But we needed an agreement to deal with the non-proliferation issues. It was a very difficult negotiation, pitting the requirements of our Atomic Energy Act against their pride and notions of national sovereignty, and given our concerns about Chinese relationships with nuclear programs in Pakistan and other countries. An agreement was signed in 1985, but the president did not forward the necessary determinations to Congress, a requirement for implementation, until late in the 1990s. As far as I know, there hasn't been any actual transfer of nuclear technology or materials.

After the Zhao Ziyang to the U.S. and Reagan to China trips, a third big visit that we dealt with during that period was the visit to the U.S. by the Chinese president, Li Xiannian. The part of that visit that I was more closely associated with was one of his vice premiers who came along, Li Peng, who later became premier. Li Peng was well known to us because he was not then, and has never since been, very friendly to the U.S. He's a Soviet-trained engineer. He had a sharp tongue, very acerbic, obviously never liked us very much. He was a key figure in the management of the Chinese economy. We saw this as something of an opportunity - it was his first and until now only visit to the United States - to open his eyes and perhaps give him a different perspective. So we gave him a separate program after Washington. Strangely enough, one of the key movers in this special program was the Corp of Engineers. Why the Corp of Engineers? Well, at that time, planning for the so-called Three Gorges project had reached the point where the Corps felt that there was a possibility for the Corps and U.S. business to get involved.

*Q: It was a huge dam basically.*

LANGE: A huge dam project on the Yangtze, which had been conceived decades previously, but was and is such a massive project, with so many pros and cons to weigh, that it had never gotten off the planning table. It is now in construction, and it's very controversial.

*Q: Its environmental impact--*

LANGE: Environmental impact, population displacement - you're talking about moving one million people, which is mind-boggling and quite inconceivable in any other country. There are endless arguments about the costs and benefits, in terms of hydroelectric power and irrigation -

*Q: And flood control.*

LANGE: That's right. In any case, Judge Clark, who had been Reagan's national security advisor...

*Q: He'd been undersecretary of state, then moved over to security advisor, then moved over to a Cabinet position.*

LANGE: He was out of the Cabinet by this time, but he was still clearly an *eminence gris*, or at least people assumed he was still close to the president, which in Washington is nearly the same as *being* close to the president. He was urging the Corps of Engineers and the Interior Department to mount a really major campaign, directed and coordinated by the Interior Department, to get a piece of the business from this project.

Anyway, the Corps' involvement tended to shape somewhat Li Peng's program, which included a visit to part of the Mississippi lock system in Illinois and Boulder Dam in Nevada. The visit to the lock system was all right; the Chinese were duly impressed with the volume of barge traffic on the Mississippi. Boulder Dam, however, gave Li Peng an opportunity to exhibit his well-known sarcasm. At a meeting after touring the dam, he asked bluntly, "What exactly is the point of showing me this 50-year old technology?" This is not the sort of thing you want to hear from a high-level visitor that you are trying to impress. This was after they pulled out all the stops, with ruffles and flourishes, but he professed not to be impressed, and I guess he wasn't. Similarly, there was a visit to a nuclear power plant under construction near Chicago, which was idle. Construction had been held up by a court case for a couple of years or so. At the conclusion of the visit, he said, "In China, when we decide to do something we do it. We don't wait around for a court case to clear." I don't think he said that for effect. I think he was genuinely puzzled. He really didn't understand why we thought our system was superior to theirs, because theirs got things done. Another visit in his program failed to impress. A Ford plant outside Chicago really was a throwback to an earlier era. It looked to me like something out of the '20s or '30s. It was poorly lighted, and the workers didn't manage to convey any sense of engagement or efficiency. At the end of this tour, one of his accompanying vice ministers said with some apparent irritation, "I've been to Japan where they've shown me modern factories. Why are you showing me this?" Though it is hard to say, the irritation may have been real, not feigned. Remember that the background was our limitations on technology transfers to China. He may have believed we were purposely showing them a second-rate factory. In reality, of course, this old factory simply fit into the schedule, and in truth it probably was representative of a mature industry.

As you know, planning for a visit like this incorporates several objectives. I think for political reasons, the White House had decided early on that Chicago was one of the preferred stops, so that becomes one of the determinants of what you can do. What can you arrange in the vicinity

of Chicago? And given that this vice minister's special responsibility was automobiles and that we had U.S. companies that were interested in getting into the automobile production business in China, this factory visit fell into place; you wanted to show him something. As for the nuclear plant visit, there weren't many - I doubt today there are any that are under construction - in that day there were darn few. So we had to show him what was available.

Another visit was to the Board of Trade, also in Chicago. I don't know if you've ever been there, but it's apparent pandemonium. Buyers and sellers of commodities such as grains, pork bellies, etc., are shouting orders back and forth and are clearly on the emotional edge. I just looked at it as good theater and as an intense expression of the market at work. As we were about to leave, another of the vice ministers who was on the trip characterized the scene as an example of inhuman exploitation. He reacted to the human dimension of what was going on on the floor, where people were yelling in one another's face and building up lots of stress. Incipient ulcers are what he saw, I guess. He may however have been predisposed to be negative, because he was the one who blew up on the way in at some poor Secret Service guy who didn't see his special access lapel pin and tried to search him. He went into high dudgeon, a classic affronted Chinese dignity act, and the Secret Service supervisor had to offer an abject apology. The incident illustrated the difficulty of divining what these Chinese officials were actually seeing and thinking. Was he genuinely upset by his treatment or what he saw on the trading floor, or was he scoring political correctness points in front of his colleagues?

The final episode I wanted to mention out of that trip with Vice Premier Li Peng was a stop in Silicon Valley. We visited two or three companies, and then concluded with a meeting with overseas Chinese students at Stanford. We gathered in an auditorium; there must have been about 100 of them, almost all in post-graduate study. Some were restrained and didn't want to say much. Others made some pointed observations, contrasting conditions in the U.S. and China. At this point, Li said, "Look, we recognize that some of you coming to the U.S. for study will be seduced by materialism and consumerism, and you won't want to go back to China. That's fine; we don't want you back." This was obviously not a politician in our sense of the term, but he was a very successful politician in the Communist Party context. I daresay he must have convinced 10 or 20 in the audience who were wavering, "Okay, I guess we will stay in the U.S." It just seemed very ill advised for him to say something like that to a group of Chinese academic elite, but he is a dedicated communist and Chinese nationalist, and he apparently calculated that China was better off getting back dedicated, uncontaminated nationalists, even at the cost of some brain drain. Today, of course, these academic elites can pursue their materialistic dreams in China.

Li Peng went on to become premier. Given his reputation as a hard-liner and, later, his supposed role in the Tiananmen Square events, he never got an invitation to the U.S. as premier, and that was a little awkward at times. Like others in the Chinese leadership, he must have had a deep ambivalence about China's course. He was picking his way and trying to somehow find a balance between a market system and opening up to the outside on the one hand, and the state dominated system he was accustomed to on the other. This did not apply only to Chinese in the leadership.

*Q: What about some of the larger countries, particularly China and Thailand?*

LANGE: China became the big issue during the time I was in this office. Taiwan was also a problem, and this went back for years, starting with books, moving to sound recordings, then to visual recordings. But part of the story with Taiwan is that as it became more prosperous, it developed a domestic constituency for protecting its own national product, and it turns out that's rather important. The same thing happened with Korea. They became interested domestically in protecting intellectual property rights, and that helps a lot. We're not in the position of saying, "Protect it for us!" We're saying, "Protect it for yourself as well." An element of our mythology, going back to the early days of the Republic, is that protecting intellectual property rights inspires creation of intellectual property. Well, yes sometimes it does, but not always, and in my humble opinion, it is possible to carry protection too far, beyond the point of diminishing returns. (For example, copyright protection 70 years after the death of the original copyright holder.) But to return to the main point, it is certainly true that if you get an interest group made up of artists, authors, inventors and others, it helps to sell protection of IPR.

I had a bit of exposure to the influence of domestic IPR stakeholders in Malta. Talk about a tiny market. The concern started with videos and audio cassettes. You could buy any cassette in the open markets in Malta, and they were always pirated. You couldn't buy or rent a legitimate video there. All the videos we watched at home for three years were pirated. The Maltese approach, not surprisingly, was, "Look, these are available at a fraction of the cost of legitimate products. We don't do the pirating, and our people are poor." Many countries take that approach – that their people can't afford the legitimate product. In Malta's case, they didn't believe, with some reason, that sale of pirated products there had much impact on the world market. We began to make some progress, though, and one thing that helped was a fairly influential guy who wanted to open a multiplex cinema. He wanted to show legitimate movies and make a profit. It was against his interest to have immediately pirated videos in the market, if he was going to be showing the same movies in his multiplex. So that, combined with our threats – and like the proverbial mule, to get their attention you had to hit them with a two by four – gradually persuaded them to take the problem seriously. No government wants to address this politically unpopular issue: they all want to ignore it and hope that it goes away.

*Q: You would rent a room or something?*

LANGE: Taiwan would pay for a meeting room. Everyone understood that a meeting at that level would take place there. Meetings could take place at the AIT offices in Rosslyn as well, and some did take place there, usually at a lower level. But it would be inconvenient for the assistant secretary to cross the river and go up to the AIT offices.

We followed different rules with respect to other departments. From the beginning, we tried to establish the principle with Beijing that certain elements of the relationship, particularly in the economic area, had no policy significance and were necessary to carry out an effective relationship with Taiwan. Our case was that to have good coordination with Taiwan in finance and trade, it is clearly in the interest of the Asian, and indeed the world economy, in everybody's interest to have effective coordination, and so we need to have contact at all levels. Sometimes that might even require a meeting with a cabinet secretary. Of course Beijing never explicitly agreed with this approach. But at the same time that we maintained that we needed to have such

meetings, including occasionally at a cabinet level, we thought that it looked rather official if a Taiwan minister of the economy, for example, comes in and calls on Secretary Rubin in his Treasury Department office. Therefore we determined that those meetings should not be in the cabinet member's office. You can easily imagine how much effort and blood was spilled on the floor trying to enforce this guideline on departments that had little understanding and less sympathy with our Taiwan problem.

That was one of the issues addressed in the so-called Taiwan Policy Review in 1994, which was just approaching implementation at the time I took over the office. Pursuant to the review, cabinet secretaries are now permitted to have meetings in their office. This sort of rulemaking and enforcing, which to most Americans looks petty, unproductive, and even pusillanimous, took up an awful lot of time and effort. But we thought that some of it was necessary to preserve the principle that we were serious about not having an official relationship with Taiwan.

In many ways, and on almost a daily basis, we confronted the tension arising from different policy objectives: Our wish to have unofficial yet dynamic relations with Taiwan; Taiwan's effort to raise its international profile – to gain more international space; and Beijing's adamant opposition to any event that would enable Taiwan to avoid coming to the table to negotiate its future as a part of "one China". For example, Taiwan sought the highest possible U.S. representation at the annual meeting of the U.S.-ROC Economic Council, a group composed of all the important businesses involved in U.S.-Taiwan economic relations. Our job was to identify a cabinet or sub-cabinet level official in the economic area to participate, one who covered an area where Beijing would think twice about retaliating. One year, we sent Secretary of Transportation Pena to the Taiwan meeting, reasoning that Beijing had important transportation interests and would not be inclined to shut down communications with our transportation secretary or retaliate in a more tangible way. Still, Beijing responded by refusing to let Pena travel to China. For Taiwan, this annual U.S.-ROC Economic Council exercise was about equal parts substance and symbol. For Beijing, it was wholly symbolic.

Another area where these differing policy objectives clashed was participation in international organizations by Taiwan. The 1994 Taiwan Policy Review, to which I previously referred, committed us to find organizations where Taiwan's participation might be possible and to help promote entry, or at least allow "its voice to be heard". This particular outcome of the Review probably grew out of the successful effort in the early 1990s to secure Taiwan's participation in the Asia Pacific Economic Coordination forum (APEC). A high-ranking economic official from Taiwan took part thereafter in the annual APEC meeting, and Taiwan participated in subsidiary organizations. The agreement that opened the door to that participation, however, did not extend to a "Leaders' Meeting" associated with the APEC meetings, and which typically drew heads of government. Beijing drew the line there; it was absolutely opposed to letting Taiwan's president take part in the Leaders' Meeting. As we soon learned, there are no other organizations like APEC, which could be viewed as a gathering of economies, not countries. Other international organizations were either affiliated with the UN or otherwise required statehood for participation. The PRC was firmly opposed to Taiwan participation in such organizations, and it could easily mobilize the votes by other country members to keep it out. From Beijing's point of view, permitting this camel's nose under the tent would be yet another encouragement to Taiwan's independence.

Taiwan has done little to make this easy. Since the early 1990s, it has pursued a seat at the UN, using the 28 or 30 countries with which it has official relations. It doesn't have a chance, and the effort has heightened Beijing's sensitivity and its resolve to fight tooth and nail any notion that Taiwan was going to get a seat in an international or UN-affiliated organization. We explored observer status in the WHO, for which there was precedent for non-state participation (e.g., the PLO). Beijing was uncompromising. So we spun our wheels but found nothing, even among obscure and highly specialized organizations. Members of Congress, not surprisingly, thought we were not really trying; that we could work our will if we really wanted to.

*Q: I would imagine, particularly after the 1989 Tiananmen Square episode, that: 1) relations weren't that great with China; and 2) that Beijing's continual carping about these little niceties of who meets who when and where and all that were beginning to run a little sour as far as we were concerned, weren't they?*

LANGE: Yes, and that applies particularly to the Congress and to editorial writers. Going back to 1972, when the Shanghai Communiqué expressed our intention to "normalize" relations with Beijing, and 1979, when we shifted our recognition from Taipei to Beijing – these policy decisions were rooted in a strategic assessment that we needed an official relationship with the "new" China rather than with the China that had lost the civil war in 1949. A relationship with the PRC was useful to us as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union. Also at that time, in terms of the nature of the two regimes, there was a lot less to differentiate Taipei from Beijing than there is today. Until well into the 1980s, the Kuomintang followed policies and principles that would have been very understandable in Moscow and in some cases can be traced back to Comintern agents – most famously Mikhail Borodin – who visited China in the 1920s. The organization of the KMT, and its intolerance for dissent, did not make it exactly a model defender of human rights, to say the least.

Then in 1989, we had Tiananmen and in the same year, the fall of the Berlin wall, and shortly thereafter, the collapse of the Soviet Union. So changes in our strategic calculations and in our emotional attitudes coincided. We didn't need Beijing quite as much as we had before. The other thing that happened was that out of necessity, the government in Taipei, and more importantly the KMT, began a genuine process of democratization. After WWII, the KMT was a party that had dumped itself in Taiwan after losing the civil war on the Mainland, was a minority party, and was seen as an alien imposition on the Taiwan population. But over a period of years it very gradually became "Taiwanized," and democratization of the political process became really a matter of survival for the KMT. I don't think it grows primarily out of an ideological attachment to Jeffersonian principles, though a lot of policymakers had received educations in the United States or in the West and were certainly familiar with Western notions of democracy. It couldn't have happened in the absence of a pragmatic decision that the KMT had to broaden its appeal and had to democratize in order to maintain power and avoid an explosion. So increasingly Taiwan's system began to look attractive to us. On the other side of the strait, the PRC government not only did not embrace our value system, it explicitly rejected it. Since much of our own national identity is bound up in values that we promote around the world, rejection of those values are difficult for us to tolerate, and that can be a heavy burden for a relationship to bear.

So after Tiananmen, there was a clear shift in public, congressional and media sentiment away from Beijing and toward Taiwan. This contributed to pressure to ratchet up the official nature of our relationship with Taiwan as much as possible and to reject pressure from Beijing not to do so. This led to a couple of things. One was the so-called Taiwan Policy Review, to which I have already alluded. This was really a misnomer. It wasn't a review of policy so much as a review of how we implement policy. There really wasn't a serious notion that we would change policy, and it was unfortunate that on the Hill, and to some extent in Taiwan, the impression was that we were considering a change in our policy in some fundamental way. That was never in the cards. The actual review, which took quite a long time, preceded my tenure in the office. What happened after I arrived was the rolling out of the review. The results really affected only a few things on the margin, and to this extent were a disappointment in Taiwan and on the Hill. One example was the change in the name of the Taiwan office here, from the awkward and somewhat mystifying "Coordinating Council for North American Affairs." There was clearly a case for changing the name, and Taiwan would have liked to change it in a way that would make it look as official as possible. Many on the Hill also wanted to make it as official as possible. We wanted to change it in a way that clearly identified the office as representative of Taiwan, but at the same time did not identify it as an official organization. We eventually settled on "Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office." It's still pretty awkward, but at least it provides some clue of what the office is about.

*Q: I'm told that, one hears about the Israeli lobby and the Greek lobby, but the Taiwanese lobby in the United States is no small matter. Did you feel its hand?*

LANGE: We rather thought in our parochial way that Taiwan was second only to Israel in terms of its influence. That may be overstating it, but clearly they are very effective. They've been practicing since the early '40s, when Mme. Chiang Kai-shek was such a hit with the Congress. Many people from Taiwan have been educated in the United States and speak fluent English. They adopt familiar given names – Fred, Jimmy – and that makes it easier for Americans to relate to them. They understand our system. They patiently cultivate the grass roots. For example, using their many branch offices – the equivalent of consulates – they obtain friendly resolutions from city councils and the like. In Georgia, they managed to get the state authorities to issue diplomatic plates to their people in Atlanta. The contrast with Beijing, which by and large has been dismissive of such retail diplomacy, could hardly be starker. One of the ironies of the PRC election influence scare, the notion that Beijing was trying to improperly influence our political process, is that the PRC, unlike Taiwan, would hardly have known where to attempt to exert improper influence.

*Q: We're talking about the 1996 elections.*

LANGE: That's right. I think what the Chinese ambassador was trying to do – to the extent that the press is correct about what we know about meetings in the Chinese embassy – was to exhort his people to try and become at least half as effective as their Taiwan counterparts in knowing what was happening on the Hill and trying to be influential. And of course that's what our system is based on – influence. Although we will probably never know all the facts, I am doubtful that they contemplated directly buying election influence. The Chinese ambassador was

at the time under the gun from Beijing, since this was shortly after the shock we administered by allowing Taiwan's president to address a Cornell graduation.

*Q: What were the major points that he was making?*

LANGE: As I suggested earlier, the content of the speech was in my view secondary to the mere fact that he was making it: The first president of Taiwan, with which we have unofficial relations, visiting the U.S. for a high profile event and using that stage to say anything at all on Taiwan's status was going to alarm Beijing. The speech itself wasn't blatantly political, but to those fluent in the code of cross-Strait relations, it was provocative. On both sides of the Taiwan Strait, they pay absolutely excruciating attention to terminology. For example, when Lee referred to the "Republic of China on Taiwan", that conveyed a certain message to Beijing. The previous formulations had always been "Republic of China," period. The historical background is so important here. When Chiang Kai-shek lost the civil war and retreated to Taiwan, he always said that he would retake the mainland, reinstall the rightful government of China, and restore the Republic of China. We went along with this fantasy for 30 years, some even maintaining that we should "unleash Chiang". After Chiang Kai-shek died, his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, became president. Toward the end of his tenure, Chiang the son explicitly dropped the notion that they would reinvade the mainland at some point and reestablish a Republic of China government. But he did not declare a second China located on Taiwan, or an independent Taiwan. Both sides still subscribed to one China policy; that is, that Taiwan is a part of China. Whether the Taiwan side under Lee Teng-hui still adhered to a one China policy was in doubt, and when Lee alluded to the "Republic of China on Taiwan", it sounded tantamount to a declaration of a second China. But this was not earth-shaking, and what he said was by and large consistent with what he had said on previous occasions, not that Beijing liked hearing them then, either. What was new was that he gained an important political platform. He could have come to Cornell a few years later, when he would no longer be President of Taiwan. But of course he and Cassidy, and for that matter Cornell, weren't interested in that; they wanted to do it while he was president.

*Q: Did you see during this time, shortly before, a year or two before, we had the demise of the Soviet Union. Particularly with the right wing of the Republican Party, I've had sort of the feeling that it's been looking around for an enemy, and China has become sort of the designated enemy and continues today. Did you have any feel about that? They were building up an atmosphere that China was going to be the enemy.*

LANGE: It's a question that's being thrashed out today. Entire conferences are organized around the question of whether or not we are demonizing China. Current press articles deal with disagreements within the Republican Party about the appropriate stance toward China, worrying that we can have no confidence about the direction in which China is going to go. There is this notion that people were looking for the next adversary as the Cold War wound down. As David Sanger of the *New York Times* titled an article: "Looking for an Enemy, and Finding China". It is useful to recall the self-fulfilling prophecy to which Winston Lord often referred: If we want China as an enemy, we can assure that by treating them as such.

The fact is that Beijing explicitly rejects many of our notions about governance, for example, or human rights. As a nation, we have a relatively short history, and we are the product of many

different social and historical traditions. One thing that ties us together is shared values, and we actively promote those values abroad, much more than other countries do. We are comfortable when others accept those values. Taiwan has bought into this vision, but the PRC has not. Another problem is that large countries have large interests, usually think they're right, and don't like to be told what to do. That's true of China – literally, the “Middle Kingdom” – and of the U.S.

Here's an illustration of how our differing perceptions of the PRC and Taiwan can come into play in a concrete way. Taiwan has official relations with some smaller countries in Central America and Africa, often those where Taiwan's aid programs can influence diplomatic recognition. From time to time, Taiwan's political leaders, including the president, want to visit those countries. The only convenient way to get to those in Central America is through the United States, so we've worked out these carefully delimited arrangements for transit. This is strongly opposed by Beijing, which would prefer to keep tightening the noose and completely isolate Taiwan. We've told Beijing that we are nevertheless going to permit transits, for the “comfort and convenience” of the traveler. These transits are not meant to be political events, but not surprisingly, Taiwan usually tries to push the envelope and gain some political mileage of one sort or the other. One of these episodes provided the backdrop for the Cornell visa decision. In 1993, Lee Teng-hui wanted to visit Central America. He wanted to stop in Hawaii and while there touch base with Chinese-American groups. We tried to negotiate an arrangement whereby he could refuel the plane, but rather than contact overseas Chinese, take a rest in the VIP lounge at Hickam AFB. This was consistent with policy but did not meet Lee's expectations. He was so teed off that upon landing, he refused to deplane. It was a master stroke, aided by the press which widely reported that he was not allowed to deplane. Friends of Taiwan were outraged, and were determined that we would never again show such “disrespect” to the president of Taiwan, or “kowtow” to Beijing. The rest, as they say, is history.

The 2000 Taiwan presidential election resulted in the election of Chen Shui-bian. This is remarkable in itself, because Chen heads the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which only 20 years previously was outlawed in Taiwan. The DPP has as an explicit element in its platform calling for independence for Taiwan. To his credit, Chen has soft-pedaled this plank and has tried not to antagonize Beijing. He requested a transit of the U.S. to visit Central America, and my understanding is that his people were quite understanding and did not themselves try to create pressure for political events. Some congressmen were not so cautious – Sam Gejdenson, Dana Rohrabacher, a couple of others – wanted to have a meeting with Chen. He said it wasn't convenient. Rohrabacher apparently showed up at the hotel anyway and sort of invited himself to have a meeting with Chen. Now, our congressmen have a right to see a visitor when comes to the U.S. But is the question rights or is it interests? In this case, the Taiwan leadership saw that it was not in their interest to have these meetings, particularly on the first transit. The congressmen had a different agenda and reached a different conclusion. How long Chen sees it in his interest to exercise restraint remains to be seen. His domestic political considerations may persuade him to be more demanding in the future, particularly if he judges that the risk is limited because of a security guarantee from the U.S.

*Q: This transit took place when?*

LANGE: Just last week. In a sense it goes back to your broader question of how we view China. Is it or could it be an adversary? What are its intentions, to the extent that we can determine them? Is it in our interest to promote the international status of Taiwan in the course of one of these transits, even if it complicates our relations with the PRC? From our standpoint, it could be viewed as the “right thing” to do, consistent with spreading our values beyond our borders. Beijing however is likely to view it as a threatening interference in a Chinese affair.

*Q: What were the issues that you were dealing with?*

LANGE: Well, there’s a standard quartet of big issues that we deal with on China. One we spent some time on already, which was Taiwan. The second is human rights. Third is proliferation of weapons and delivery systems. The fourth is trade and all of its various manifestations. While I was there we had a fifth one as well, which was the reversion of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. So any one of those is a major issue and is time-consuming and - in the classic foreign affairs sense – tends not to be resolvable; the best you can hope is that issues are manageable. One gets from point A to point B but never comes out the end of the tunnel.

It might be helpful to briefly describe the foreign affairs bureaucracy as it relates to China. Because of the importance of the relationship, the White House always has an interest. That is particularly true in advance of high-level visits, and one of those was always on the horizon during my tenure on the Desk. The president’s national security adviser has a direct interest in teeing up these visits. This means that the NSC takes an active part in all significant policy issues, leaving the Desk to manage the day-to-day relationship and, especially when there was a crunch for briefing papers, to act informally to support the small NSC staff. In 1996, shortly before I took over the Desk, the NSC had tried to establish a high-level dialogue, in part to get above the forest of issues and problems and get into the clear air of high strategy. This led to direct insertion of NSA Tony Lake into the dialogue. The nearest counterpart that could be found on the PRC side was Liu Huaqiu, who was director of the State Council foreign affairs office. Lake’s meetings with Liu came at roughly the same time as the Strait missile crisis in 1996, and this had the effect of further reinforcing the NSC’s hold on China policy.

My experience was that the important policy work was done by a small group composed of the NSC deputy for Asia (Sandy Kristoff during most of my tenure), the NSC China person (Bob Suettinger, then Jeff Bader), the EAP DAS for China (Jeff Bader, then Susan Shirk), and Al Romberg, who had the China portfolio in the State Policy Planning Office. They provided the interface to the seventh floor (the policy level) in State, and to the president’s national security adviser at NSC. They also made the trips to China to advance important visits. Significant developments in policy or in public diplomacy came out of that group. State, with its manifold responsibilities and relatively ponderous and multi-layered structure, really played second fiddle to the NSC when it came to China policy. The NSC has a lean bureaucracy, and has the pick of State’s China people to staff its effort. Half way through my tenure on the China Desk, Susan Shirk came in from academia to fill the China DAS position at State. I think that it was extremely difficult for her to learn in a short period of time what she needed to know about the Washington environment and at the same time establish a working relationship with this small group that was formulating and packaging our China policy.

We had an awful lot of high-level visitors in those days in both directions. Chinese president Jiang Zemin visited the U.S. in October 1997, and President Clinton visited China in June 1998. These summits always involve intense preparations, where all aspects of the relationship are examined, with a focus on possible “deliverables” – agreements, for example, that can be pushed to completion and lend the visits some substance. In both cases, after the summits we prepared multi-page “fact sheets” on achievements that were catalogues of the broad sweep of the relationship. They covered areas such as weapons non-proliferation, regional stability, peaceful nuclear cooperation, human rights, political and security dialogue, military-to-military relations, promotion of the rule of law in China, cooperation in law enforcement, economic and commercial relations, energy and the environment, and science and technology.

We had a number of other high level visits as well. The vice president, Secretaries of State Christopher and Albright, and CIA Director Deutch visited China. We had corresponding visits in this direction by China’s foreign minister and its national security advisor. The U.S. president and the Chinese president always meet during the annual APEC meeting. There was also a real spike in congressional visits to Beijing. I think during a six-month period, about 20% of the members of congress visited Beijing, which was much more of a load for the embassy in Beijing than for us, but we had to provide briefings and prepare trip materials and all that. We prepared lots of testimony on the Hill. There were a number of meetings with the Chinese on non-proliferation. The Hong Kong reversion really took a lot of time and effort.

*Q: After all, Hong Kong was between the British and the Chinese. What was our role, other than as an observer?*

LANGE: We asserted ourselves for two related reasons. First is our abiding compulsion to spread our political culture -- liberal democracy -- wherever possible. Secondly, we have assumed a global role as judge of the state of human rights. Remember that every year we publish well over a thousand pages of text on how think other people in the world are behaving with respect to human rights. We took an interest, almost a proprietary interest, in human rights in Hong Kong. Hong Kong had not drawn much human rights attention during over 140 years as a colony of Britain, but it captured our imagination now that it was reverting to the sovereignty of “Red China”. Hong Kong had become a success story, really a poster child of laissez-faire capitalism, a free wheeling environment that capitalism hasn’t enjoyed in this country since the days of the robber barons. It exhibited the sort of freedom of expression that one would expect to see in any place that had been absorbed into the British system. With reversion to Chinese sovereignty in the offing, Britain had recently begun to allow limited exercise of the right to vote. The Chinese and British had reached agreement in 1982 about arrangements for reversion. In 1992, Congress passed the Hong Kong Policy Act, which mandates an annual report by the State Department on how well China carries out this agreement with the British, with particular attention to Hong Kong’s autonomy, specified in the 1982 Sino-British agreement in very broad areas. Hong Kong is to maintain its own customs territory, which means it has its own trade laws. It handles its own immigration and issues its own passport. In any number of lesser ways, it does maintain a separate identity. A process is specified by which Hong Kong people will progressively exercise more direct say through the vote in the selection of a legislative council and a Hong Kong chief executive. The process is deliberate, too slow for some in the U.S. and some in opposition parties in Hong Kong. There were also doubts about the democratic

credentials of the first chief executive, who was a business tycoon. He was Beijing's pick, and this rankled among those who thought Hong Kong should be as independent as possible. My view is that in the real world, it made sense in those early, uncertain days that whoever was chief executive in Hong Kong, where China exercises sovereignty, should have a good relationship with Beijing. Otherwise it wasn't going to work.

Given its iconographic status, there was a great deal of attention in this country to Hong Kong. There was pressure from some quarters on the Hill that the United States should declare that Beijing was in breach of the terms of the '82 agreement with the Brits, even though the party directly involved, Britain, was not going to take that step. We decided not to involve ourselves in that question, I think wisely so. Considering all of the doubts that the PRC organism would be able to tolerate the introduction of Hong Kong into its system, or that Beijing might smother the goose that was laying golden eggs, the reversion went pretty smoothly. The PRC handled it carefully. For the reversion ceremony in June 1997, Madeline Albright went to represent the United States. The Chinese army had sent a token garrison, but they stayed in their barracks at the time, and I believe there continues to be little outward sign of a Chinese military presence there. Hong Kong had considerable economic difficulty growing out of the 1998 Asian financial crisis, but had a period of recovery from that and generally speaking has done pretty well financially and politically, much better than I think critics had anticipated. The long term is another question. As other Chinese coastal cities, notably Shanghai, become economic powerhouses, they could become effective competitors. Hong Kong's boom years may not return.

Politically, there are certain areas where Beijing is extremely sensitive and where the authorities in Hong Kong are going to respect that sensitivity. Advocacy of Taiwan or Tibet independence, for example, will continue to be neuralgic activities in Hong Kong. But Hong Kong these days is much lower on the radar screen than it was during those years leading up to reversion to China.

The reversion of Macao from Portuguese colonial rule to Chinese sovereignty at the end of 1999 occasioned much less attention from us. It has a much smaller population than Hong Kong and is not very significant economically. Also, the Portuguese have made less pretense of democratic process in their colonies than the British have, so it presented a less compelling object of human rights concern.

There is a broader significance to Hong Kong. In the early days of the reversion, Taiwan was at pains to point out that Beijing's policy of "one country, two systems", as applied to Hong Kong, is not a model for Taiwan, and that's quite true. However, Hong Kong is a test for how well Beijing can handle incorporation of a radically different system. Can it manage to keep its hands off? Can it show tolerance of an entity that is much different than anything else on the mainland? In general, can it show that it is able to deal in a flexible way with something that it claims is part of China and in that way begin to develop the sort of trust that is necessary to work out similar, perhaps even more flexible arrangements with Taiwan? On the face of it what Beijing offers Taiwan seems not all that bad. The Beijing leadership has said Taiwan can maintain its own military, keep its own flag – many features of separateness, but without sovereignty. Maybe Beijing would even be willing to work out arrangements for Taiwan participation in international organizations, but that seems a distant hope for now. As I have earlier indicated, both sides look

at international organization as a zero-sum game. There is no sign of an emerging will to compromise.

*Q: What about Tibet during this '96-98 period?*

LANGE: Tibet has captured the imagination of the West, particularly Hollywood. Orville Schell, China scholar and Dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Berkeley, wrote a nice book on the subject: "Virtual Tibet: The Search for Shangri-la from the Himalayas to Hollywood." I'm sure you're familiar with the current situation. China occupied Tibet in 1950. In '58, the Dalai Lama escaped to India and has been in northern India ever since with a large number of his followers and a government in exile. He also has the stature of a Nobel Peace Prize winner and is a legitimate and compelling religious figure. There's widespread sentiment in the West that Tibet deserves to be an independent country and a sense that Tibetan culture is being compromised, not only as a result of explicit Beijing policy but because of settlement in Tibet by large numbers of Han Chinese – not out in the countryside, but especially in Lhasa, the capital. The Dalai Lama has effective representation in the United States and the Tibetans have good relationships on the Hill. In many respects Americans have fallen in love with what Schell terms "virtual Tibet," that is, our projection of a fantasy Tibet.

*Q: Shangri-la refers to a book by James Hilton; it came out in the 1930s.*

LANGE: Yes, Lost Horizon, in 1933. It was, by the way, the first paper-back book ever published. Shangri-la is an other worldly place, a utopia. People are kind to one another, and life is reflective and rewarding. During the time that I was on the desk, there was an initiative on the Hill to pass legislation mandating a special envoy for Tibet. Now the title "special envoy" conveys a certain officiality. It implies in some sense a recognition that Tibet deserves independence. It was something that, in the judgment of the Department, was not wise and would not promote resolution of the Tibet problem. So in due course, the Department in order to preempt such legislation decided to appoint a "special representative" for Tibet. The person selected for this position was Greg Craig, who at that time was director of Policy Planning. This was years before Elian Gonzales episode, when Craig received much wider public exposure. The rationale was that China and the United States had any number of reasons for Greg Craig to interact with his counterparts in China. We had strategic interests in common that we had a mutual interest in discussing, and therefore, the thinking went, the Chinese would be encouraged to deal with Craig and this might promote his acceptability to them as a Special Representative for Tibetan Affairs. It didn't exactly work out that way. The Chinese were very hardheaded about it. To the extent that they dealt with Craig, they attempted to ensure that he would not try to discuss Tibet with them because in their view there was nothing to discuss. It was better than legislation mandating a special envoy, but it didn't really advance our interest in promoting dialogue between Beijing and the Dalai Lama.

*Q: What about weapons proliferation? What were the Chinese doing? We got political and we got quite involved during this period.*

LANGE: There are a couple of different aspects to this. One is that Chinese firms or entities were engaged in shipping bad stuff to bad people without the explicit authorization and perhaps

even without the knowledge of the central government. The other aspect is the extent to which they knowingly assist countries that in our view should not be assisted. That typically applies to Pakistan, both in the nuclear area and in delivery vehicles; i.e., missiles and missile technology. This gets to be very technical, and I personally did not participate in proliferation discussions with the Chinese. The question can turn, for example, on the very specific provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime –our understanding of what they mean and the Chinese understanding of what they mean. Clearly they skated on the edge with respect to Pakistan. On the other hand, they cooperated with respect to Iran, to which they were sending cruise missiles and where they took steps to end that relationship. This was not easy for China, in terms of its relationship to Iran. It also clearly had a more benign view of Iran than we did. The overall picture is a mixed one - some successes, some areas where we still have a lot of work to do, and a very difficult dialogue. Here is where you come up against Chinese pride, and their sense they're being subjected to standards that we don't subject ourselves to. We identify the bad countries in the world and expect others to agree with us, that sort of thing. It's a very, very tough sell. The other complication is Taiwan. The opening Chinese response in any discussion of proliferation is Taiwan. They always try to leverage our interest in other areas into concessions on arms sales to Taiwan. They would not even accept this characterization – “concessions”. In their view, they are calling on us to meet our commitments under the 1982 communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan.

*Q: Now their motivation, irrespective of the Taiwan thing, to Iran, Pakistan and all, would you say that their interest was projection of power or was this commercial?*

LANGE: It was a combination. It's actually quite similar to our own situation: Commercial interests find the arms trade lucrative; they sell arms to make a profit. Many Chinese parastatal organizations with arms to sell are on a commercial basis. Their prosperity depends on the bottom line, much like Boeing or Lockheed Martin. Governments permit arms sales if they are consistent with their efforts to exert geopolitical influence. In the case of Pakistan, there's a long historical relationship dating back to China's confrontation with India in the 1950s. In the case of Iran or other countries in the Middle East, it's interests similar to our own – securing relationships in the region that are going to be longstanding and help them secure sources of petroleum. We've demonstrated that we're prepared to go to war over oil, and we'll almost certainly do so again in the future, so it's not surprising that China is prepared to develop arms sales relationships toward the same end. China also has an interest in relationships with the Muslim World that might help to counterbalance Muslim separatist efforts in China's Far West.

*Q: How did you, in this, you had moved from the Taiwan to the China desk, how did you view the effectiveness of the Beijing embassy as opposed to the Taiwan representation? How did you find the PRC representation here in Washington?*

LANGE: Beijing? It's not good. They are backward, and the investigation into the '96 fundraising probably set them back even further. They still have a feeling that they don't quite understand the rules, and they have a clear sense that a different standard is applied to them. This is particularly the case now that Taiwan has drawn closer to our own political value system. There's a certain maladroitness in the way the PRC reps present their case. Sometimes it's even a failure to present their case. I've heard staffers on the Hill, even sympathetic staffers, tell me -

“We haven’t heard from these guys.” They lack confidence. They lack fluency in the language of the Hill. They feel constrained in a way that people from Taiwan don’t. They always hew very tightly to policy lines, and this often comes off as strident and uncompromising. They’re just not very good at playing the Washington influence game.

*Q: I’ve heard some of the same, not quite those terms, but some of the same of the Indian representation in the United States. While the Pakistanis are ready to go out and be called by their first name. They’ll talk to anyone. The Indians want to talk to somebody of exactly the appropriate rank and all. And once you do this, you’re not going to get very far within the Washington scene. You want to be able to have the ambassador sit down and be able to lunch with a couple of staffers on an important committee or something like that. They can’t respond to this type of thing.*

LANGE: The current Chinese ambassador, Li Zhaoxing, came up through the interpreter ranks, not unusual in the Chinese system, and his English is very good. On a one-to-one basis, he can be quite charming. But in his public appearances, he often sounds as though he’s reading from his instructions and speaking for Beijing ears. One of the reasons the previous ambassador who was here in ’95 took a real hit was failure to understand Washington, and to foresee the Lee Teng-hui visa decision. It was a glaring example of their inability to read us inscrutable Americans. A few weeks prior to our decision that Taiwan’s president could come to Cornell, there was a meeting in New York between Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen and Secretary Christopher. Naturally, Qian asked about all of the media stories about pressure to issue Lee a visa. Christopher’s response was that it’s the Administration’s policy that we will not agree to this visit but, he went on (I paraphrase), “you have to understand that there is terrific pressure on Capitol Hill. The two houses just passed two resolutions virtually unanimously.” As we read the account of the meeting, we thought to a person that Christopher was trying to convey the real situation. To us, the true meaning of his words was that, “This is the policy today, but tomorrow it could change; you’d better alert Beijing that things could change.” It went right over their heads; the Chinese didn’t understand it at all. They undoubtedly reported back to Beijing that they had a fresh, firm assurance from Secretary Christopher that Administration policy is that there won’t be a visit by Lee. They truly didn’t understand. At the working level, we couldn’t give them a clear heads up. Policy is policy, until leadership decides it is no longer policy. The Chinese really felt that they had been badly misled. The Chinese ambassador had to go back to Beijing, and he was still bleeding when he returned to Washington. I think any ambassador here now must feel like he has to be extremely aggressive in pressing Beijing’s agenda.

*Q: And it doesn’t work. I mean that’s just the wrong way to go about it.*

LANGE: It wasn’t long after this that a great brouhaha arose over alleged Chinese attempts to improperly influence our political process, and the ensuing campaign finance investigation. I thought from the time of the first media story, which was based on leaked intercepts, that the information was ambiguous and after storm and fury would still not lead to a clear conclusion on the facts. That was in fact the outcome, but the episode was an invitation to those inclined to “demonize” China in any event to put the worst face on the evidence, such as it was. The irony is inescapable: Lee Teng-hui to Cornell happened in part because the PRC hadn’t a clue how to influence or even interpret American political events. When they tried to beef up their ability to

play the game, even though that effort may have even been legitimate, that also blew up in their face.

Even had the Chinese been knowledgeable and able in the ways of Washington, I'm not sure how much they could have done, given an atmosphere approaching hysteria. Scandal piled on scandal, invariably hyped by partisan politics. There were the campaign finance and political influence investigations on John Huang, Maria Hsia, Johnny Chung and Charlie Trie (Chinagate, Donorgate). I think that all of these people were essentially influence peddlers, not sinister agents. Congressional investigations and hearings, headed by Fred Thompson on the Senate side and Dan Burton on the House side, churned the water furiously but in the end came up with no persuasive evidence, in spite of illegal campaign finance activity, to support wild allegations that the Chinese had affected elections. Then there were national security issues raised over involvement in trade of companies controlled by Chinese military units, allegations of assistance to Chinese missile design by U.S. companies Hughes and Loral, and a story that Wen Ho Lee had obtained nuclear secrets from the Los Alamos labs. There were even notions that acquisition by a Hong Kong company, Hutchison Whampoa, of port facilities at either end of the Panama Canal constituted a potential security threat. A select committee headed by California congressman Chris Cox examined all these issues. The Cox Committee findings were dispiriting, not because of the findings *per se*, which could have been anticipated, but because they were the antithesis of careful and objective inquiry. The report reached dark and categorical conclusions about China's spying activities in the U.S., which rested however on poor analysis and on worst-case assumptions with respect to every ambiguous piece of information. Academics and others discredited the committee's work, but the damage had been done. Well, perhaps this overview serves to give some sense of the noxious climate in which we were trying to conduct relations with China.

*Q: This might be a good place to stop. You then left in '98.*

LANGE: That's when I retired. Before we retire from this, though, I mentioned at the outset four big issues that occupied us from '96 to '98. We haven't devoted much attention to human rights or trade.

Human rights occupied one desk person full time, and it suffused nearly all activities on the desk. At any one time, we were likely to be actively engaged with one or more specific cases, e.g., Harry Wu and prison labor, detention of religious figures in China, suppression of speech, high profile political prisoners, the Falun Gong issue, alleged traffic in human organs. There was always something. It was always a component of high-level meetings. We tried to engage the Chinese, and we tried to exert pressure. Production of the human rights report on China was an annual ordeal. Where did the emphasis belong? Was it on the historical context, in which the experience of the typical Chinese looked quite favorable, or on a universal standard, against which many human rights practices fell short? Typically, those who produced the draft in our embassy were impressed by improvements and the unprecedented enjoyment of human rights in some areas, while the Washington human rights bureaucracy looked through the prism of the human rights professionals, including the non-government organizations. Three-way drafting battles shifted back and forth among the embassy, the desk, and the human rights bureau (DRL). Sometimes, specific issues got to the assistant secretary level. It seemed that no entry could be

dropped in subsequent years. The report got longer and longer and the process more excruciating.

After my retirement, I went to annual meetings in Geneva of the UN Commission on Human Rights to help push for a resolution addressing human rights in China. We had tried for several years to pass such a resolution but had come close only once, in 1995. China assigned a high priority to defeating the resolution and used a combination of enticement and threat on the other delegations, many of which recognized that they themselves could one day be the subject of a country-specific resolution. China argued that a confrontational resolution was not the way to influence human rights behavior and that, regardless of who joined us as cosponsors, the U.S. was trying to impose its human rights standards on others. Every year, a majority of commission members, whatever their views of human rights in China, decided that it was not in their interest to vote for a China resolution. Some human rights advocates argued strongly that the act of presenting such a resolution had a beneficial effect on human rights in China, but after a decade of unsuccessful campaigns, even some non-government organization NGO reps at the Geneva meeting told me that losing efforts were becoming counterproductive.

Our bilateral efforts to deal with human rights met with mixed success. Between 1996 and '98, our bilateral “human rights dialogue” was on hold, in part because of a controversial meeting in earlier years that State’s assistant secretary for democracy and human rights, John Shattuck, had set up with a dissident during a visit to Beijing. We made some headway on separate human rights initiatives – the beginnings of a program to promote rule of law in China, obtaining agreement for a visit by a delegation looking into religious freedom – but progress was fitful. One tempting initiative, particularly in advance of high-level visits, was to secure the release of high-profile political prisoners. Many of us were skeptical about the wisdom of submitting lists of such prisoners to the Chinese, since they could always present any releases as gestures of good faith, with little or no significance to the larger human rights picture. Moreover, the releases were always on “medical” grounds, for treatment outside prison but with the understanding that treatment would be sought abroad; the prisoners were subject to reincarceration if they attempted to return to China. The Chinese thus skirted the potential problem of releasing these dissidents back into Chinese society. We managed to get Wang Dan and Wei Jingsheng out in this way. The case of Wei Jingsheng is instructive. He had captured the imagination of the West, because of his personal courage and implacable challenge to the Chinese authorities. He was the dissident with whom John Shattuck had met earlier. But he was largely a solitary figure, not high educated – which counts for much in the Chinese context – and he did not have strong connections to the expatriate Chinese dissident community. He has not learned English. He has a research position, I think at Harvard, but he has not been able to establish a life for himself outside that of a sort of professional Chinese dissident. By releasing him, China rid itself of an irritant in the U.S.-China relationship at little cost.

What makes human rights such a difficult issue between us? For some Americans, China is a highly visible outlier in an international human rights structure. Other Americans are committed to a particular aspect of human rights; e.g., religious freedom, and China has long been a target of Christian missionary effort. At root, I think, is the sense that Chinese human rights practices represent American failure to promote our values and institutions – an explicit rejection of what George Kennan, for example, has identified as our messianic notion about U.S. responsibilities

in carrying out its foreign relations. In a related way, large numbers of Americans regard promotion of human rights in China as a tool to weaken the hold of an ideology that is corrupt and against which we were pitted during half a century of Cold War.

The Chinese authorities view our emphasis on human rights as an element of a long-term policy to change their system. On the most obvious level, certain manifestations of human rights, such as freedom of speech or assembly, could turn into threats to the control of the Communist Party of China, and self-preservation dictates resistance. But there is a more broadly Chinese factor at work, a Chinese aversion to *luan*, or disorder, and a substantial emphasis on collective rights. For traditional Chinese, Western emphasis on individual rights comes across as self-indulgent and, well, foreign. Resentment of foreign efforts to impose change has a long history, predating the Opium Wars of the 1840s. For all of these reasons, I think that we are well served to be patient, and to allow indirect influences – the Internet, growing prosperity, interaction of trade and foreign investment, and student exchange – to induce change from within. Unfortunately, our system favors results in four-year cycles. When administrations argue that contact and engagement would bring beneficial change to China, and administrations uniformly make such arguments, they are within two or three years called upon to explain why change has not yet manifested itself. Patience is not one of our virtues.

Trade seems likely to cause friction for the indefinite future. China has a nearly inexhaustible supply of cheap labor and a rapidly improving technological base. We have a seemingly unlimited appetite for finished goods and the ability to buy them, at least as long as other countries are willing to finance our consumption by buying our debt. That adds up to a chronic and growing trade deficit for us, and to pain for specific sectors such as textiles. It may be true, as economists believe, that bilateral deficits don't matter; but as long as the overall balance is in chronic deficit, huge bilateral deficits are difficult to defend at the political level. From time to time, there have been efforts, legislative or otherwise, to deal with particular pieces of the trade problem on a bilateral basis. Hopefully, with China's accession to the World Trade Organization, we will be able to manage some of the trade issues on an international basis.

China trade and human rights issues met, until China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, in the annual ritual of most-favored nation (MFN) hearings. The Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the U.S. Trade Act required a certification that communist countries such as China were not hindering emigration. This was a hangover from the period when the Soviet Union was preventing Jews from emigrating to Israel, but notwithstanding the language of the law, it had mutated over the years into a broad examination of human rights practices in communist countries. The congressional and editorial debates on the pros and cons of MFN for China – whether extending it or withholding it was more likely to bring about positive change in China – were repeated year after year. The annual renewal effort engaged all of the economic agencies for months and generated reams of congressional testimony. The outcome was always the same – renewal of MFN for China – but only after exhaustive and extravagant application of bureaucratic and political capital, from the White House on down. The exercise became part of the landscape, and many in the media and on the Hill regarded it as an opportunity to get in their licks on China. As one member of Congress said, it had become a habit. Perhaps one can understand Deng Xiaoping's confusion about the source of this annual uproar and, upon being informed that the U.S. law in question called for freedom of emigration, his bemusement. He

suggested that China would be willing to part with a million or so Chinese emigrants if the U.S. would take them.

U.S.-China relations have been characterized by wide swings of the pendulum. During my first involvement, 1980-85, there was great optimism, even euphoria, about the future of the relationship. During my second involvement, 1994-98 (including my period as Taiwan coordination advisor), we seemed to lurch from crisis to crisis, and to be continually called upon to justify a non-confrontational relationship with China. Even a neutral characterization of the relationship is hard to find. The last-minute product, in connection with preparations for the 1998 Clinton visit to China, was that the U.S. and China were "...working toward a constructive partnership." The media truncated this for public consumption, dropping the "working toward" element, and making it appear that the Administration was overselling the relationship, or naive, or perhaps both.

I would like to be hopeful that we can smooth out the ups and downs of U.S.-China relations, but I am actually not very sanguine. We do have some interests in common. One of these is an interest in stability, which argues for common cause in places like the Korean Peninsula, for economic and trade growth, against regional terrorism, and against proliferation of WMD, even though we may differ on the particular elements of controlling proliferation. On the other hand, China is clearly a rising power, one that will become increasingly important in the region, while we are committed to asserting our interests in the region, including through forward deployment of military forces. On both sides, nationalist sentiments run high. On Taiwan, it is difficult to anticipate resolution of our differences, and there are clearly forces acting to exacerbate those differences. Most fundamentally, China seems unlikely under the current order to embrace our notions of governance and social interaction. Even a new Chinese order, which would probably not come about without a period of disorder or even chaos, might fall short of our ideal of a liberal democracy.

A constructive relationship is clearly in the mutual interest of the U.S. and China. Given the forces continually heating and cooling these two bodies, it falls to the State Department to anticipate and modulate sudden shocks, and to keep the relationship on track.

**ROBERT GOLDBERG**  
**China Analyst, Bureau of Intelligence and Research**  
**Washington, DC (1980-1982)**

*Mr. Goldberg was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland and educated at Gettysburg College and the University of Chicago. He accompanied his Foreign Service wife on her assignment to Tokyo before entering the Foreign Service in 1983 as Foreign Service Officer. A Chinese language specialist, Mr. Goldberg served both in the State Department of State in Washington, DC and abroad dealing primarily with Economic and Chinese affairs. His overseas posts include Tokyo (as spouse), New Delhi, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Beijing, where he served twice, once as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Goldberg was interviewed by*

*David Reuther in 2011.*

*Q: So actually your first job at State was on the Civil Service side.*

GOLDBERG: On the civil service side. I did that for 14 or 15 months and was a foreign policy analyst of Chinese affairs. The senior analyst at that time was Carol Hamrin. She was very good, but we had a few others. Daniel Kiang was in the office. Daniel just recently passed away.

Daniel was in the office, and Lou Sarris who never tired of talking about fighting the good fight on Vietnam, was the deputy director. Galen Fox was the INR/EAP senior Northeast Asia and China person. Towards the end of my time there, Galen left - he subsequently left the Foreign Service and went off to Hawaii where he became a state legislator for a period of time – and was replaced by Bob Randolph, who was a gracious individual who let us pretty much write and research whatever we thought important. I remember doing a piece based on Chinese foreign ministry guidances about the third communiqué in 1982 and making some folks on the China desk unhappy. The desk director at that time was Bill Rope. Scott Hallford was his deputy.

*Q: What was his concern?*

GOLDBERG: We had found some comments that suggested the Chinese were happier with what they got in the third communiqué that we had thought and that they might have settled for us. In retrospect, knowing what we know now about these guidances and how much propaganda was involved, maybe the Chinese just wanted to play this up as part of their public line to their own population. I suppose some of what I wrote did not accord with the China desk agenda for selling the communiqué government wide.

*Q: Now INR as the name suggests is intelligence and research. You are not dealing with daily things. You are supposed to look at information and thinking of trends over a longer time frame.*

GOLDBERG: You know in those days so much of what I did was spot analysis. The longer pieces were few and far between. So we were really doing a lot of spot analysis that was sort of a snapshot of China policy at a given moment. The INR product at that point was divided into two areas – front of the book and back of the book. I don't know how it is divided now. Front of the book was maybe five or six, or maybe even more, one paragraph pieces drawn from intelligence sources that spoke to issues that would be of concern to the seventh floor state department principals. Then the back of the book was two or three pieces, each limited to no more than one page. As analysts, we always felt the editors destroyed our work

*Q: For the researcher who might be interested in the book, would you describe it a little bit? Was it a daily?*

GOLDBERG: This product went to the Secretary and others on the seventh floor. It probably was not more than four pages. A daily brief for the secretary. Was Al Haig interested in this stuff? Yeah, I think on the China side he was. Was George Shultz interested? Yeah. I think he probably was as well. But with everything they had to read, including the Presidential Daily Bulletin, I never had a sense that the INR contribution was all that critical. In subsequent years

INR developed a reputation for critical thinking and did some great work on Afghanistan and Iraq and their analysts at times dissented from the common wisdom that passed as the sense of the intelligence community. This was especially true when other agencies were being pressured to produce intelligence that “confirmed” the views of policymakers rather than challenged those assumptions. INR didn’t face the same constraints when I was there in the early 80s. It was interesting work; don’t get me wrong. I enjoyed it. It was a terrific re-introduction back into China issues, but I never got the sense that much of what we on the China side did was well regarded or closely read.

*Q: This topic is interesting because this is still the initial period of formal relations.*

GOLDBERG: What you have got was a very powerful desk in the Bill Rope years. And an embassy - with Art Hummel out there as ambassador and Chas Freeman as DCM - that was offering a lot of very good analysis and information. There was very close coordination between Freeman and Rope about the line that they felt ought to be taken by State with regard to issues in China. Nineteen eighty-two was a very difficult and significant year in terms of the last of the three communiqués; the stakes were very high in terms of the relationship. We were mainly observers in INR, rather than players and, of course, we didn’t want a sound policy derailed because of some flawed analysis on our part.

*Q: Because of how were you casting the issue?*

GOLDBERG: I wish I could remember exactly, but the conclusion may well have been: can we depend on the Chinese to honor this particular agreement. If you are questioning Chinese intentions with regard to the agreement, you are creating some waves. But it was a tempest in a teapot. It was a little four or five page paper with citations and stuff. It surfaced at a time when people were very nervous about the communiqué and I’m probably suggesting it was more consequential than it really was.

*Q: After this spirited baptism in INR you moved to join the Foreign Service. Did you take the exam or was it a lateral transfer?*

GOLDBERG: No, I took the exam. I recognized early on that the things I wanted to do couldn’t be done from an INR perch unless that’s all I wanted to do – and you know as well as I that the Foreign Service, especially at that time, existed for the Foreign Service Officers. Directors and deputies, even unit chiefs like Galen Fox and Bob Randolph were Foreign Service officers. So as a civil service officer, you were basically limiting yourself in terms of what you might do over the course of 25 or 30 years. I wanted to do something different. I wanted to go off to China at some point and live and work there. So it was sort of thinking that I might not be able to broaden my horizons and meet different challenges without being an FSO.

**WILLIAM PIEZ**  
**Director, East Asia Bureau, Economic Policy Office**  
**Washington, DC (1980-1982)**

**Deputy Assistant Secretary for Economics, East Asia Bureau  
Washington, DC (1985-1989)**

*Mr. Piez was born and raised in Rhode Island and educated at the University of Rhode Island and the Fletcher School. After service in the US Armed Forces, he joined the Foreign Service and was posted to Frankfurt, Kabul and Manila as Economic Officer. During his career Mr. Piez dealt primarily with economic matters of East Asian countries, particularly Japan, where he served first as Economic Counselor and, from 1983 to 1985, as Economic Minister. In the Department in Washington, Mr. Piez was Deputy Assistant Secretary of East African Economic Affairs, and from 1989-1991, Deputy Assistant US Trade Representative. Mr. Piez was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.*

*Q: Well you left there when?*

PIEZ: Well I left there in 1980 to come back to the East Asia Bureau to the Economic Policy Office. I was the office director.

*Q: You were there from when to when?*

PIEZ: I was there for about two years. In 1983 I left that job. Transferred again.

*Q: Well what was this '80 to '83 period. We have been talking about economic difficulties. How stood Asia at this point?*

PIEZ: Well at that time it was the region of the economic miracles. You have got Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia not too far behind. Vietnam was settling down. We were dealing with some of the political issues like the POW/MIAs. We had an extensive structure of regional organizations in Asia. We had ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations). We had the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC). It included Australia and New Zealand. The American Chambers of Commerce in the different countries had their organizations in the region and they met every year dealing with various questions of their business interests in the Asian countries.

*Q: From your perspective when you got there in 1980 what were sort of our economic concerns?*

PIEZ: Well there were still trade issues, and we still had a number of questions relating to encouraging our exports, and the increasing importance of China as an economic power was certainly of interest. A lot was going on there.

*Q: Well how did we feel about China? Did we see China as a potential market? All this oil for the lamps of China idea that this is a great market, at the same time if this thing starts going it will flood us.*

PIEZ: Occasionally you would have someone say if every Chinese lengthened his gown by one inch there would be a market for 80 million square yards of cotton. Well Ok. I was not too

impressed with that sort of thinking. We didn't see China developing as a threat in particular, but certainly Chinese economic development was very much to be desired. China as a poor country was not something that would be to our interests at all.

*Q: Was India included in your bailiwick or not?*

PIEZ: When I was in the bureau, No. That was part of South Asia and still the NEA bureau. We went as far as Burma and after Burma that was it.

*Q: During the time you were there, two years or so, did the investments in Thailand and Indonesia were they beginning to go sour? Were their economies in pretty good shape?*

PIEZ: On the whole they were. Indonesia had some pretty forward thinking industrial and economic leaders. I think it was pretty well known the system was highly corrupt. To get into the category of economic or industrial operations in Indonesia you had to have connections. But on the whole the country seemed politically stable, and economically developing at a reasonable rate. There were continuing problems in the Philippines. Thailand was doing well. The East Asian financial crisis occurred only after I had retired.

*Q: The Marcos regime was beginning to come apart right while you were doing that.*

PIEZ: It was during the Carter Administration that the Marcos regime collapsed. Richard Holbrooke was our Assistant Secretary and he was concerned that Marcos be replaced, but in an orderly fashion and without violence. That was how it worked out, essentially, although economic advancement in the Philippines was still slow and sporadic.

*Q: This was the Reagan administration, at least after you were there Reagan came in. You know, Reagan being a Californian and all, also his people were from California, so they must have been a little more oriented...*

PIEZ: More oriented toward East Asia. The Reagan Administration came in while I was in Washington. I recall that, during the Air Traffic Controllers strike, I was on night duty for a time. Because of the time difference a lot of the traffic on related issues came in at night. Our concern was to keep flights from and to East Asia operating safely as much as we could.

*Q: Did you feel that you were getting your due share of attention in the State Department.*

PIEZ: Oh yes. Ambassador Mansfield, one of his repeated expressions was the U.S.- Japan relationship was the most important bilateral relationship in the world, bar none. He could make that case. One might choose to argue, but he had a pretty strong case. President Reagan kept him on as ambassador, a wise decision.

*Q: But also to the point where you take a look at the situation you have differences. If you look at say Europe. You have a whole bunch of countries, but they are all rather cohesive. But when you look at Asia you have only really got Japan.*

PIEZ: Well Japan was clearly by far the second largest economy in the world.

*Q: China, you didn't know where it was going. Korea was in the middle of a dictatorship. Park Chung Hee had been killed...*

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PIEZ: The harsh realities of dictatorship.

*Q: It had problems and of course you had the other countries, Sukarno and Marcos. So Japan was sort of the keystone of holding things together. How stood during this time were there any particular issues with Japan?*

PIEZ: Well I think that was a period beginning in 1980 when the Treasury Department really started working very hard on the question of the exchange rate. There was a break through early in that period and the Japanese gave up their 360 rate. They ended up negotiating that with Treasury in some detail because the Japanese intention was to upvalue the yen but then fix it again. They settled on 301 and a fraction. There were last minute negotiations over the tenths and how many tenths. It was interesting. I find in many negotiations, after all the big issues are settled, there are many nettlesome little ones.

*Q: They say the devil is in the details. Well basically you are still dealing with sort of the same people in East Asia that you have been dealing with for a long time.*

PIEZ: I had continuity.

*Q: Except China was changing wasn't it.*

PIEZ: Yes.

*Q: How did you feel about China at that time? Where was it going? What were you thinking?*

PIEZ: Well I think at that time the developments in China - Deng Xiao Ping and the economic changes were seen as very much in our interests. So we were more than glad to see all of that progress. Yet there was a recognition that a country that big and with that potential was going to change the landscape of Asia and of the world. Of course Washington was awash in China experts, all of whom had an opinion on what was going to happen next. My own feeling was that China would be making those decisions, and that we would be on the margins.

*Q: Well here you are now, you have moved up so you are dealing with the whole thing. Did you find that the China Hands and the Chrysanthemum Club and others, was there any problem?*

PIEZ: Not really. I didn't find that there were difficult economic or bureaucratic rivalries operating. There were regular meetings held by the East Asia bureau assistant secretary with people from the National Security Council staff, the Pentagon and the Treasury and the East Asia bureau people. I would sometimes attend in place of the DAS who was the regular member. Those events went very smoothly.

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*Q: You were there from '85 to when?*

PIEZ: Until '89. In 1988 George Bush the elder was elected and inaugurated in January 1989. At that time (1989) the new Secretary of State was James Baker who had come over from treasury. He had a treasury officer that had he thought would be very good for my job. I had been in it for four years, after all, so Bob Fauver replaced me coming from treasury.

*Q: Ok, well let's talk about the '85 to '89 period. Were the issues changed much?*

PIEZ: Not very much. Japan was still the number one interlocutor in East Asia for the United States, but of course the job was regional and there were any number of organizations and problems and situations in the region to occupy my time. There was the Asia Pacific Economic Council. There was an Asia Pacific Council of private, mostly business representatives. The American Chambers of Commerce in all of the East Asian countries had their regional organizations. And of course there was ASEAN that I mentioned earlier. So during that four year period there were endless gatherings and meetings. I also participated in many of the bilateral talks. The Undersecretary of State for economic affairs had regular meetings with his counterparts in individual East Asian countries, and I participated in many of those negotiations and conversations. Allen Wallis was the economic Under Secretary at that time. He was an interesting person to work with and for. He had steady nerves and never showed any ill temper. He would not disagree directly with anyone. Instead he would just state very clearly and simply his own conservative economic views. For example, he believed strongly that markets should not be regulated closely, whereas many East Asian economic experts thought that governments should apply extensive controls, or impose taxes designed to direct development of favored industries. They had a rather *dirigiste* approach to economic development. Allan Wallis, however, never came across as doctrinaire. He always favored economic freedom, and it was not

easy to argue with him.

My job those four years involved extensive travel. I also made many domestic trips talking to audiences around the country. On one occasion I was paired with another speaker at a student conference. The other speaker did not show up, so I filled in for him, giving three different speeches on different subjects in one day. And I'd get drafted into other things. If Mike Smith had some talks with the Thais on textiles, I might be brought along as part of his delegation.

*Q: Well how about something we haven't mentioned. I am not quite sure I am leaving out. The term now used is intellectual property. How about copyright. Copying things, movies, songs and books and other things has gotten easier and easier. You were there when things were...*

PIEZ: That was just heating up, and it was a particular problem in Hong Kong and of course China quickly came along as a source of fraudulently marketed or bogus intellectual property. To start off there was the old problem of imitation Rolex watches and that sort of thing. Those would come from Korea or China and they were often sold in Hong Kong. I think not so much manufactured there but brought in from China or Korea, and it was spreading quickly into movies and software of all kinds.

*Q: Was your bureau heavily involved in trying to do something about this?*

PIEZ: It was a growing issue at the time. The number of complaints that were coming in was not anywhere as great as they became later on. The office of the U.S. Trade Representative was a major player in intellectual property because it really is a trade issue. Our economic bureau was very much interested in it.

*Q: Well how about by this time China must have been a loomed heavily on your job didn't it?*

PIEZ: Becoming more and more so, yeah.

*Q: How did you find dealing with the Chinese in economic matters?*

PIEZ: Well we still continued to have textile issues. In other areas Chinese exports to the U.S. were not of major importance. It was still also not a particularly attractive place for U.S. investment. But more and more the Chinese officialdom was at that time particularly anxious to listen and to learn, and also to be recognized as serious players.

*Q: Well there has always been this thing that goes way back in American history, the looming China market. One of the phrases used to be oil for the lamps of China. Which you know the idea I heard at one point in the 20's American coffin makers were saying, 'Gee, just think of how many Chinese die.' We want to get them to buy American coffins. Was it then a period of let's take, it may be difficult and we might not make much of a profit, but once we get our nose inside the tent, eventually we will get something? How did that work?*

PIEZ: I don't think at that time that American business saw the Chinese market as a great opportunity. Of course there were these stories about just think of the market for textiles. Lets

just pick an example of an area which was foreseeable. China was about to become a big producer of textiles. Not a big importer. There were still issues on the political side, questions of freedom. While I was in the East Asia bureau as deputy assistant secretary the Tiananmen Square demonstrations and oppressions took place. That was a hot political issue that pushed any economic issue into the background.

*Q: Everything came to a halt for a considerable amount of time. Were you getting a little tired of taking trips to these various countries?*

PIEZ: I counted up. During the time I had that DAS job in the bureau I traveled to East Asia, usually more than one country, sometimes five or six countries on one trip. During that four year period I made 43 trips, just about one a month. And, as I have said, a number of domestic trips. I might go as far as Hawaii for meetings. We used to have meetings with the Japanese in Hawaii because it was a convenient point between Tokyo and Washington for both of us.

**JAMES T. LANEY**  
**Visitor**  
**China (1981)**

*Ambassador Laney was born in Arkansas and raised in Arkansas and Tennessee. A graduate of Yale University Divinity School, he first went to Korea as Methodist minister and professor at Yonsei University in Seoul. Returning to the United States, he continued his career as minister and educator, teaching at Yale and Vanderbilt Universities and serving as professor and President of Emory University. In 1993 he was named US Ambassador to Korea, where he served until 1996. Ambassador Laney was interviewed by David Reuther in 2004.*

*Q: Speaking of Korea...we haven't mentioned Korea for quite a while...but while you're president of Emory, did you develop a relationship, a formal school relationship, with Yonsei University -*

LANEY: Yes. We also did that with Peking University.

I went to China in 1981, as a guest of Peking University. We were there three weeks, and traveled around, and came back, and we began bringing people here. In fact, the president of Beijing Medical College, which is now folded into Beijing University, was a research professor at Emory for two years, and then every summer since then. He's a cardiologist, and he'd come back and do his research here, and his wife Yuan Ming is a major player in the Center for International Studies [professor of International Relations and director, Institute of International Relations] at Beijing University. I've kept up with her; we were at a conference in Salzburg, at the Salzburg Seminar last December.

*Q: This period coincides with our formal diplomatic recognition of China, the negotiation of various Science and Technology Agreements as the U.S. government tried to create ways to hook up American institutions with Chinese institutions.*

LANEY: Well, I enjoyed that very much. We had a number of exchange students and graduate students and all that sort of thing. It's harder to get our people to go over there.

We used to stay at the Friendship Hotel. Boy! I tell you, they left something to be desired! Let me tell you!

*Q: A very basic, Soviet style hotel, right?*

LANEY: Yes. A couple of times when we...I think we were in Shanghai, we stayed in the guesthouse that Zhou Enlai had stayed in. It was very nice, real rococo, but very nice. But boy! The Friendship Hotel was something else! Oh, Lord, they were bad!

Anyway, in Shanghai we stayed in the guesthouse. As you may recall in 1981 things were still very primitive and the government was very suspicious. I tried to give my little Walkman to - we had two people that went with us all around the country - tried to give it to him, because when he heard it his face was transported to hear a symphony just explode in his ears, you know, this little thing. So I gave it to him. When I got ready to leave they said, "Where's the Walkman?" I said, "Oh, I lost it!" They found it on that guy, and they made him give it back! And I thought, you know, I may have caused that guy real trouble, but they were that tricky then. It was that serious!

*Q: Yes, because both sides, while starting out anew, were encumbered with old stereotypes.*

LANEY: I have to tell you! When we flew from Beijing to Xi'an on the Chinese Air, we got in our seats, the two seats right in the middle of the plane; and before we took off, the woman came and pulled a curtain, like a shower curtain, all around our seats, so we were totally cut off; we were enveloped by this shower curtain! I said, "What is this?" She said, "You first class."  
[Laughter]

*Q: These are great vignettes, but you do set up an agreement with Yonsei University.*

LANEY: Yes, actually we did in 1990 I believe it was. Right, and we'd bring ophthalmology professors over here to do a year's research; there's one a year that comes over from their ophthalmology department and has a whole year of research here. Our ophthalmology is very, very good, and they're pleased to have both the year off and also the research opportunity.

These relations have continued, and now are relationships with lots of other places as well, as most colleges do. Of course, that's the one that's close to my heart!

**DAVID G. BROWN**  
**Chief of Economic Section**

## Beijing (1981-1983)

*David G. Brown was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1940. He graduated from Princeton University in 1964 entered the Foreign Service. His assignments include Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Before retirement in 1996, he served as Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 28, 2003.*

*Q: '81, whither?*

BROWN: I went to Beijing to head the economic section.

*Q: And you were there from '81 to?*

BROWN: Until 1983. I respectfully commented to the people who had asked me to head the economic section that, with the exception of some work on economics at the Japan desk, I didn't have any economic experience or training. I was delighted by the prospect of going to China, but wasn't certain I was the right person for the job. The answer was that there wasn't a lot of economics in this job. It would be much more about understanding the politics of how things get done in China. They said it didn't bother them, please come along, we need you.

*Q: I can't remember had you been in Beijing before?*

BROWN: No. I'd been in Taipei and worked on Mainland China in INR.

*Q: Beijing in '81. What was it like there?*

BROWN: Well, I arrived at a fortuitous time because the process of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening had started two years earlier. Just when I arrived the Chinese government had decided to do what they called opening 40 cities to travel by foreign diplomats. This meant that one no longer had to obtain Foreign Ministry permission each time one wanted to leave Beijing to travel to these 40 cities. So, we were there at a time when you could get out and see the country. It was also the beginning of the Reagan administration and that was the period when U.S.-China relations had worsened because of Reagan's campaign rhetoric about moving back toward an official relationship with Taiwan. So the political aspects of U.S.-China relations were tense for most of the time I was there. The economic relationship was starting from a low base, but was opening up rather remarkably. Trade was growing. We were beginning to get into our deficits with China. But the main thing was the trade was growing, and the economic relationship was seen as a new positive element in what had been just a strategic relationship until then. We in the Economic Section had a lot of opportunities to meet with academics in the Chinese government who were wrestling with the early stages of the reform effort. The Political Section didn't have much luck getting out and meeting these academics. In those days, when you went to see an official you had to call up to get his organization's permission to interview him. It was very structured society, but the structure was opening up on the economic side. We could travel, and the Economic Section set out to write an economic profile of each of the provinces in China, taking advantage of our new opportunity to send officers off for a week of interviewing in the

provinces. We wanted to see how reform policies adopted at the center were actually being implemented in the field. We were also negotiating agreements in the economic area.

*Q: What sort of things were you negotiating?*

BROWN: Textiles, aviation, tourism, ocean shipping. There were a lot of bilateral negotiations going in this period.

*Q: Was there a concern I mean we had done so much to turn Japan into a viable state and an economic power and all, this is our policy. All of a sudden we turn out with these huge deficits with Japan. Were we seeing as we did this we might have created another deficit monster in China?*

BROWN: I don't recall that we saw China becoming a deficit monster, but it was very clear to us that the restrictions that the Chinese had on their markets combined with the openness of the American markets were leading in the direction of deficits. At that time, the numbers were only in the hundreds of millions of dollars. However, we were already in a situation where the Chinese statistics painted a different picture from the American statistics. So we were in the early stages of the debates about why this was so, trying to get the Chinese to focus on the fact that this was going to be a problem and that, if they didn't do something about the deficit, it was going to have an impact on the relationship. This is a story that was only beginning at that point and it's certainly not over yet.

*Q: Say on textiles, were we trying to do limit the textiles?*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: How successful or unsuccessful were we?*

BROWN: We were successful of course because we could simply put on restrictions in those days if we judged that circumstances warranted it. However, we didn't want to act arbitrarily. We wanted to handle it within the context of the agreement and have the Chinese cooperating in managing the issue. Their textile industry was growing rapidly, and there were problems of shipping goods out to Hong Kong where they would be mislabeled and all sorts of shenanigans going on. These were typical trade negotiations. Both sides were being very tough and the embassy's role was to try and help the negotiators from Washington to get the best deal we could.

*Q: Can you characterize the Chinese form of negotiating?*

BROWN: The standard picture you have of Chinese negotiators is that they try and establish basic principles that will shape the negotiation at the beginning. They spend a great deal of time on trying to shape the parameters of the negotiations so that once those have been set, then the specifics would be easier to negotiate. The specifics of course were what Washington's negotiators wanted to focus on. For the Chinese, there were "principles" involved in the sense that the Chinese system was a planned managed economy, which they wanted us to accept as a

given. You saw this on the shipping issue where they were just adamant that they had one major shipping company and it was going to control the ports and it was going to do all of the coastal shipping along the Chinese coast and that the role of foreign shipping was going to be very tightly regulated and controlled.

*Q: Well, did we, there weren't Chinese ships that were going to be plying along our coasts anyway, were there?*

BROWN: No. What we wanted was for U.S. shippers to get into the ports, set up their own loading and unloading facilities rather than using Chinese ones. We were pressing them to permit American shippers to operate intermodal services where we could not only ship things to the port, but also have a role in moving them beyond the ports to the consumers and this was just unacceptable to the Chinese.

*Q: What was looking at the Chinese economy at that time, were you seeing I mean what did it look like? Were there still these huge government things sometimes run by the army or something like this?*

BROWN: Well, the army's role wasn't very apparent at that time. In fact, the army in those days was not involved in the economy per se beyond the particular munitions industries that were linked to the military. In those days, China's international trade was still controlled by a relatively small number of large state trading companies that dealt with textiles or machinery or coal or so forth. If you wanted to export to China you had to deal with those monopoly companies. The process of reforming the Chinese economy had not gone very far at that point. They had started the creation of special economic zones in South China to promote a more open, free market approach to trade. Within these zones, it wasn't the central trading company that you would deal with; you could actually go deal with individual manufacturers or companies in these zones. You could set up joint ventures in the zones, primarily to export from China but do some sales in China too. The economy was just beginning to open up, but it was still very heavily managed and a lot of what we did, in addition to negotiating agreements, was to try and understand the process of reform and how it was being debated internally within China and who was promoting reform and who was against reform.

*Q: What about companies, American companies coming to China? Were we encouraging them?*

BROWN: Yes, we were working very hard to support them. In fact while I was there the Commerce Department set up their first Foreign Commercial Service office in China. We worked very hard to help companies get contracts and to lobby the Chinese government on behalf of American businesses.

*Q: I would have thought that you would have been deluged by people who would take one look, I don't know what the population was, but it was probably approaching a billion at that time.*

BROWN: A little over a billion. China conducted its first census since the '50s when we were there and it came out to about 1.1 billion

*Q: I always think about it, supposedly, I heard somewhere where a casket maker in Ohio took one look and started doing a little calculation and said, hey. In other words, there's always business, but I think it goes back to the oil for the lamps of China and a book on.*

BROWN: Add one inch to the garment of every Chinaman and you'll be rich.

*Q: Yes. I mean and there is validity to this in the long run, but you must have had to deal with an awful lot of people who were pretty naive coming in.*

BROWN: Yes, but most of the people we dealt with were the large American companies. There were also a number of small trading companies that had grown up during the '70s when the relationship was beginning to open up, but before we had full diplomatic relations. These were people who had been in China for a period of time and were establishing personal ties with people in the bureaucracy that dealt with economics. Law firms were also beginning to come in at this time. Some banks were already well established.

*Q: At that point, were companies sort of looking towards, you know, right away making sizeable incomes or were they trying to establish bridgeheads with the potential for something later on?*

BROWN: Well, you had both, but the mantra of everyone who had been involved in China was that you had to adopt a long-term perspective because you're not going to make money right off. You have to establish good business relationships and then the opportunities will start opening up and you can make money. That was the mantra, which was valid.

*Q: Were you watching the rise of an entrepreneurial class within China? I mean it's almost, it's the idea of saying an entrepreneurial class developing. I mean the Chinese I think have it in their chromosomes. Still you have this bureaucracy. Was there something coming out of the bureaucracy?*

BROWN: You'll have to remember this was '81 to '83. Deng had only regained power in December of 1978 and begun the reform process. Reform had started with agricultural sector. There was change in land ownership arrangements and in the way crop planting decisions were made. So, the thing that was very apparent when one traveled around was that in certain parts of China, the Yangtze River Delta and in Southern China, that farmers were able to take advantage of these looser arrangements and that the countryside was really beginning to take off. You could see evidence of prosperity in the form of new homes being built that were dramatically better than what had been there earlier. What you did not see at that point was the development of an urban entrepreneurial middle class. That came later. Another thing you didn't see at that time was an open job market. People could not easily move from one area of the country to another the way they can now. If you were a college graduate, you were still allocated a job by the state. You couldn't go out and obtain employment in a private company the way Chinese can now. If a joint venture wanted to hire people, they would go to a government service bureau that provided personnel to joint venture organizations. The embassy had to do the same thing. It went to the Diplomatic Services Bureau and was allocated Chinese employees to work in the embassy. A lot of the things that eventually loosened up life for ordinary Chinese had not occurred in '81, '82 or '83.

*Q: Were we looking, I mean we have our trade negotiations, but were we looking at China at that time and seeing that the system that you just described and other attributes of the same central thing was going to have to dissolve and what would that leave?*

BROWN: No. I'm trying to think of how to explain this. It's not that we didn't think that there were some possibilities that this might happen over the long term, but the system hadn't started changing enough that you really spent very much time thinking about the implications of it.

*Q: I guess this is what they called the iron rice bowl or what was it?*

BROWN: Yes, perhaps a better way to understand it is what they called the work unit system. Every Chinese was assigned to a work unit. If you were in the rural area you belonged to a cooperative. These cooperatives were breaking down and people were having the right to lease over a long period of time, land that they would then be responsible for developing under a contract between the family and the local cooperative on what they should produce. If you lived in an urban area your work unit was your university, your government organization, your factory, and these organizations were generally involved lifetime employment. If a Chinese wanted a house he would go to his work unit and they would allocate it. If he needed medical care, he went to the clinic that was run by his work unit. If he wanted to get married, he would ask permission of the work unit. When the couple wanted to have children, they would ask the work unit for permission to have a child.

*Q: A child?*

BROWN: It was all a very controlled society and people yes knew that if China was really going to reform itself all of these things would have to change, but in '81, '82, '83 the change was only taking place in the rural areas.

*Q: What were you seeing as you traveled? I mean what was your impression, I assume you did go out and did the usual Foreign Service thing of going to a city and going out and looking at the steel mill and you know, visiting the university and that sort of thing. Were you getting a sense from the people a sense of excitement that things are beginning to change or what?*

BROWN: I did this. I visited Shenzhen, which was the special economic zone across from Hong Kong. I had been up to the border in Hong Kong in the '60s and looked across at what was basically rice fields. I came back in '81 a couple of years after they had established this zone and in the zone you began to see a small city taking shape. There were joint venture companies being established some of which involved American companies. Such visits made it clear that something really important was happening. I also visited Hunan, the province where Mao Tse-tung had been born and spent a week going out into the countryside. One saw an agricultural scene that was becoming more prosperous and a little loosening of the controls on people. By contrast, if one went to North China, which is a less fertile wheat growing area, one didn't see signs that life had changed very much for people. So, it was a very, quite a mixed picture you would get traveling.

*Q: Were Taiwanese able to do any investment at that point?*

BROWN: Taiwanese had permission to travel to the mainland. We knew that a certain amount of investment was taking place. We knew that there was Taiwan money mixed in with the money that was coming in from Hong Kong, but it wasn't a big factor in the equation. Was the SEZ, the Special Economic Zone experiment in China something that had at least some antecedents in the export processing zones, which Taiwan had developed in the late '60s? Yes. People in China had been looking around at what the Asian Tigers, including Taiwan, had been doing to successfully develop their economies. The Chinese approach wasn't the same, but it had some antecedents there. When one talked to Chinese academics or got access to their internal publications, it was clear that they had studied these things.

*Q: Well, now Hong Kong was not part of China at this point.*

BROWN: It was a British crown colony.

*Q: At that point it was in '89 when it was turned over to?*

BROWN: Reversion was in 1997. The agreement that started this process was negotiated between the British and the Chinese in 1984 after I had left.

*Q: So, at that time Hong Kong was seen as an entree point or something like that?*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: Was your experience in dealing with the Chinese bureaucracy different than say the political section, was it a different breed of cat?*

BROWN: Well, as I said, the economic relationship was growing at a time when political relations were strained between the U.S. and China. The economic section had more access. Positive things were happening, things the Chinese were interested in and so we had easier entree into Chinese society than the people in the political section did.

*Q: What about the universities? Did you see these? Were they kicking out pretty good people in the economic field, technical fields?*

BROWN: We did not have a great deal of contact with the universities. However, this was the period when China resumed post-graduate education. That had collapsed during the Cultural Revolution and no masters or doctor degrees had been issued for about a decade. In '81 and '82 they began to graduate their first classes of new Ph.D.'s. Things were happening in this area, but it wasn't an area that the U.S. Embassy had a great deal of contact with at least not in the economic section. We went to the economic research institutes.

*Q: During part of this period, I was seconded as a consular officer to the immigration and naturalization service and I remember every morning I would get a copy of the student applications for or waivers for students to come in. China was really beginning to deluge our*

*institutions with graduate students.*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: We must have seen this as a really major thing.*

BROWN: Yes, it was a sign that they were opening up. I don't remember the numbers.

*Q: I mean obviously we're talking about a billion, you're not talking about, but essentially there were a significant number of people coming in at that time.*

BROWN: Yes and it was significant because in the '50s, '60s, '70s, Chinese had not gone to the West. They had gone, to the extent they had gone anywhere, to the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc. So, something important was happening. Of course, there was uncertainty about how many of the students who went overseas were going to come back. Even though in the early days the Chinese government was financing most of those who went.

*Q: I think wasn't there a tennis player and a few problems like that?*

BROWN: You've got a good memory. Yes, Hu Na, I believe. She defected while we were there and this was one of the frictions in the relationship because she had played tennis with one of the principal reform leaders.

*Q: Well, also were we noticing and was it true that the I don't know what to call them, the cadre, in other words, the top dogs were sending their children to the United States, weren't they?*

BROWN: Well, they certainly are now. I don't recall that that pattern had developed at that time. We did have some issues related to Taiwan that came back on the economic side. One had to do with U.S. airlines. Could they fly both to Taiwan and to the mainland? The answer at the time was yes. However, the political tensions in the relationship threatened that pattern. The Chinese tried to argue that if the airlines are going to expand in China those same airlines couldn't be expanding their operations in Taiwan. There was also an issue related to I think it was First Chicago Bank that was pressured by Beijing to close their banking operations in Taiwan as the price of getting into China. Then subsequently other banks got in without paying that price. So, part of what we were trying to do was to argue with the Chinese that they shouldn't be putting these political conditions on economic relationships. To the extent that issues involved government-to-government agreements, i.e., in the aviation field, we weren't going to tolerate that kind of conditionality.

*Q: Did you get the feeling in this time that the Reagan administration was beginning to change its attitude towards China? I mean a lot of administrations come in with an attitude and then when it brushes up against reality and the sort of economic thing it begins to change.*

BROWN: Yes, that was happening. It was happening next door in the political section in the sense that during that period we were negotiating on arms sales to Taiwan. You could see in the process of that how the Reagan administration was adjusting to reality. Contrary to his campaign

rhetoric, the administration decided early on that it wouldn't try to restore an official relationship with Taiwan and then they made the decision not to sell Taiwan in advance aircraft. Then in order to get over the political problems in the relationship, the Reagan administration agreed to negotiate a long term relationship on arms sales to Taiwan. That resulted in something called the August 1982 communiqué, which set some broad parameters for how arms sales would be handled. What had happened was that the Reagan administration had decided to drop a lot of the things that they had been thinking about doing with Taiwan because they realized that China was an important element in dealing with the Soviet Union.

*Q: How did we look upon other countries opening up and doing economic things, commercial work with China? I mean did we find ourselves, was it a rivalry or was everybody happily going about their business without worrying about the others?*

BROWN: It was much more a cooperative endeavor to understand how China was changing and how you could encourage movement in that direction. Was their rivalry? Yes, there was some because you were still dealing with a country where most decisions were being made by government organizations. Therefore, companies needed their government's support. In parallel with that was a very close cooperation in trying to understand what was going on inside China because it was not a transparent decision-making process. When a German delegation would get access to certain people that no American delegation had been able to meet, you would trade notes with the Germans about what that particular person had said and then compare it to what other people in other parts of the Chinese bureaucracy were saying to Americans. The aim was to piece together this picture of who was promoting what kind of reform and who was trying to delay which kinds of reforms to get a picture of where things were going over the long term.

*Q: Did the academic world in the United States and elsewhere play much of a role as far as its understanding. I mean we'd had academics of looking and reading stuff about China for eons practically, but was there much, any relationship with them?*

BROWN: The place that I would say the embassy got the most insight was from the World Bank. They Bank had been asked by the Chinese to come in and do a study of how reforms could be promoted. One of the first things I read before I went was a World Bank report that was literally a foot high. It had been written by economists who had been given access to information, data, statistics, about the Chinese economy, access to people who were involved in the planning process that went beyond what anyone else had. The Bank was perceived as constructive and it had large amounts of assistance to make available. The Chinese had to let them inside the tent so to speak in order to get that money.

*Q: Was the Soviet Union a player in the game at this point?*

BROWN: They had in this period still very tense relationships with the Chinese. The whole process of "normalizing" after the Sino-Soviet split had not taken place at this point. The Soviets did have their old state trading relationship. One did try to learn from their window of access into China, but they were not a big player. I think, to look back in retrospect, it was the problems at the beginning of the Reagan administration and the uncertainties about what the U.S. was going to do with Taiwan that began to get the Chinese thinking about moving towards a more

independent foreign policy, i.e., one that wasn't so aligned with the U.S. against the Soviets but was more independent. You heard some of that rhetoric when I was there, but it wasn't until the end of the '80s that that all coalesced.

*Q: Did the Taiwan issue come up every time you sat down and talked with Chinese?*

BROWN: On the economic side, rarely. One exception was the civil aviation negotiations, as I said.

*Q: What about while you were there dealing with the problem of corruption, of payoffs and all that?*

BROWN: Not a huge issue at that time, yes some companies felt they had to do some things like this, but it was not a big issue in 1982.

*Q: Did we get involved in the problem of I'm trying to think of the term, but when you're publishing pirated things.*

BROWN: IPR. Intellectual property rights.

*Q: Yes. Was that an issue?*

BROWN: I don't recall it as an issue, it may have been, but I don't recall it at that time.

*Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?*

BROWN: Arthur Hummel was Ambassador and the DCM was Chas Freeman.

*Q: Dealing with, I'm just thinking of going back where we started, before you went to the Atomic Energy Agency, you were dealing with Taiwan, was Chas Freeman, was he there at that time?*

BROWN: I replaced Chas on the Republic of China desk. He had been Burt Levin's deputy and I took his place.

*Q: Well, he's quite a character in a way, isn't he?*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: I interviewed him and it was almost I mean he, from memory or just sort of dictated practically his.*

BROWN: Yes. He has an extraordinary memory. He is sort of a modern version of Teddy Roosevelt. He reads voraciously, remembers everything, intellectually very dynamic, very strong willed, he knows what he wants to do. He and I live across the hall from each other. So every morning I would ride to work with Chas. Every morning he would try to tell me what to do during my day.

*Q: Oh, I can believe that. What about living in Beijing in those days? You had a family, how big was your family?*

BROWN: Erna and I had two small kids.

*Q: How was it?*

BROWN: We loved it. As I said we could travel, not just officially, but privately, Erna and the kids and I went on numerous trips around China. You could go to restaurants. You could go visit temples. You could go and drive your car out 20 miles into the countryside before you ran into the little signs saying that diplomats weren't permitted to drive any farther without a permit. You could get permits to go further a field. We could go to Beidaihe on the coast in the summertime. We traveled down the Yangtze River and went through the three gorges and into Inner Mongolia. It was a delightful time to be there.

*Q: How about apartment living and all that, how was that?*

BROWN: On average, when you arrived at the beginning of a two years assignment, you spent about five to six months in a hotel waiting for an apartment because the Chinese government hadn't built enough to deal with a rapidly expanding diplomatic corps. That was very unpleasant. Once you got into your apartment and got used to the fact that you were living on a diplomatic compound, you could travel around the city very freely. You could get on your bicycle and go anywhere you wanted. We took bike tours out to the Ming tombs. You could drive to the Great Wall. You could go to the Forbidden City. You could go into art galleries and antique stores. It was a fine time. A small school was operated in the back of the embassy compound with about 100 kids. It had gotten to the point where you didn't have to worry about educating your children when you were serving in Beijing because of this.

*Q: Art Hummel of course way back he'd grown up in China. How was he as ambassador?*

BROWN: A wonderful man. Easy to work for. Of course most of my work was with Chas and Chas wasn't so easy to work for, but Art was a delight as was his wife, Betty Lou Hummel who worked very hard to maintain morale amongst the embassy staff.

*Q: How did he, Art Hummel, did he seem frustrated in dealing with the Chinese bureaucracy and all?*

BROWN: Art was a taciturn individual who didn't open himself up a great deal. He was very supportive if you had a problem you could get time with him. He would listen and he would give you his advice, which was usually good advice. He was wrestling the most of the time I was there with this whole arms sale thing and how to work this out. There were only four people in the embassy who were involved in this. They held it very tightly because of its sensitivity. If he got angry and frustrated in that process it didn't wash off on the rest of us.

I might say it's funny how certain things stick in your mind. Dick Nixon came to China while we

were there. It would have been in '82, early '83 and spent two or three days there. I very much recall that four or five of us spent about two hours discussing U.S.-China relations with him. Nixon said what was music to the ears of the economic section. He was convinced that things were changing in U.S.-China relations and that in the future it was going to be, the economic relationship that would become the real underpinning of the relationship, not opposition to the Soviets. I remember that because he was the architect a decade earlier of the opening to China, basing it largely on opposition to the Soviets. Nixon was thinking ahead and recognizing that over the long-term economics would be very much the center of U.S.-China relations. I'm not a great fan of Richard Nixon, but he impressed us that night.

*Q: What about delegations? China has always fascinated Americans and I would think that you would find yourself deluged with political types and other types coming there just to see the elephant kind of.*

BROWN: Well, that's true. There was what we called "death by duck." Every delegation that came Beijing had to go to the Peking Duck Restaurant for a formal dinner either hosted by its Chinese host or, if they didn't take care of it, the embassy was expected to make the arrangements. So, we went to duck dinners about twice a week for the two years I was there. Delegations were a very important part of what we were doing. They were the way deals were sealed and the way you got access to senior leaders in the Chinese government. Art Hummel could get access once in a while to senior leaders, but much of his access came when he accompanied high level delegations that would get calls on Deng Xiaoping, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang or other leaders.

*Q: Then were there any sort of incidents or problems or things that you haven't mentioned here that particularly strike you while you were there?*

BROWN: One thing that was interesting was an issue called the Hu-Kuang railway bonds. These were bonds that had been issued just before the Chinese Revolution in 1911. Some American speculators had bought up these depreciated bonds. After we normalized relations with China, the speculators tried to hold the Chinese government legally responsible for the prior obligations of all former Chinese governments. These bonds were almost 70 years old and nothing had been paid on them for decades. After normalization, the American bondholders went to court to compel the Chinese communist government to accept responsibility for repayment of these loans. A court case was started I think in Georgia. The U.S. government had to persuade the Chinese government that they should go into U.S. court and make the arguments that they were not legally bound to repay these debts of the Qing Dynasty. When this came up you got an almost instinctive political reaction from the Chinese. Hell no, we're not going to subject China to the jurisdiction of American courts on these debts. We tried to explain to them, with the help of a delegation led by the Department's Legal Advisor, why they had to go into U.S. courts. If they didn't go into the U.S. courts, then the court might well grant the bondholders' request. Then when the next Chinese aircraft arrived in the United States the bondholders might put a lien on it for repayment on the bonds. When the U.S. delegation arrived to have the discussions with the Chinese legal experts, who were they? They were people who had studied law in the West in the 1930s. People who had been on the outs for years; many of them were vilified during the Cultural Revolution. But, China didn't have any other legal experts. While I was there we never

persuaded the Chinese to go into court. Fortunately, the Chinese later did go into court and did make the case and the courts decided that the American bondholders didn't have any claims in this particular instance. The issue is not entirely dead however because I have heard that there are still some of the bondholders trying to make another run at the issue now.

*Q: You know, for years we used to hear about the Czarist war bonds and I guess it is the same thing.*

BROWN: Yes, the same kind of thing.

**MARK E. MOHR**  
**Deputy Director, Office of Taiwan Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1981-1983)**

*Mr. Mohr was born in New York and raised in New York and New Jersey. He was educated at the University of Rochester and Harvard University, where he studied the Chinese language. After service in Korea with the Peace Corps, he joined the Foreign Service in 1969, and served abroad in Taipei, Taichung, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing and Brisbane. In his service at the State Department in Washington, Mr. Mohr dealt primarily with Far East Affairs. After his retirement he worked at the Department of Energy on Nuclear energy matters. In 1997 he was recalled to the State Department, where he worked as Korean desk officer. Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.*

MOHR: Correct. After one year back in Washington, where I had been working in the Office of Pacific Island Affairs, I was then transferred in 1981 to the Office of Taiwan Affairs. Mike Armacost, who was then principal deputy assistant secretary in the bureau, told me we were about to enter into sensitive negotiations with the Chinese over U.S. arm sales to Taiwan, and the office director for Taiwan, Don Ferguson, needed a deputy who was politically sensitive and experienced both on Chinese and Taiwanese matters. The front office felt I was the best person for the job.

The background is as follows. In 1979, under the Carter administration, we established full diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC). We broke diplomatic relations with the Republic of China on Taiwan. We cancelled our defense treaty with Taiwan. To continue unofficial relations, the U.S. and Taiwan established liaison offices in Washington and Taipei, respectively, with no diplomatic status, but with a charter to carry out economic, commercial, cultural and other forms of non-governmental relations. Our office was—and still is—called the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). Needless to say, the Taiwanese were a bit nervous about the new relationship, so to reassure them, we agreed to continue to supply them with arms, even though we had no defense treaty. Naturally, the PRC did not like us selling arms to Taiwan, after our having established full diplomatic relations with them, and having recognized that there was only one China and that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait agreed there was only one China. This was the language of the normalization document between

the U.S. and China. With regard to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the PRC view was simple. As one PRC official told me, "Taiwan is part of China. We don't sell arms to Mississippi, so you shouldn't sell arms to Taiwan."

In the fall of 1981, Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua visited Washington and told President Reagan that if we didn't conclude an agreement with them, a bilateral executive agreement to limit arms sales to Taiwan, they were going to downgrade diplomatic relations. Reagan, as I understand it, told Huang that he understood China's position, and suggested that China do what it had to do. He made no commitment. But when then Secretary of State Alexander Haig learned of the Chinese position, he advised the president that the U.S. should enter into such negotiations. To my amazement, the president agreed, and in the first year of the Reagan administration, the State Department led negotiations with the PRC to limit arms sales to Taiwan. It was in this environment that I was transferred to the Taiwan desk, to be the desk's representative, at the working level, for these negotiations.

I was against these negotiations for several reasons. In principle, I did not see the logic in negotiating with China over our actions toward Taiwan. Additionally, I thought having our relations downgraded, that is, China sending our ambassador home from Beijing while it withdrew its ambassador from Washington, was a small price to pay for continuing to sell arms to Taiwan. I also thought it was possible that Haig was misreading Reagan. I couldn't see how Reagan would ever agree to a date certain to end U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, which is what the Chinese asserted was their main goal for these negotiations. So I was against the negotiations, but participated in the talks and argued my views. For the most part, during the negotiations, my arguments went unheeded, and the negotiations advanced.

Another reason I thought the negotiations were a bad idea was the existence of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, once it heard that the Carter Administration was going to normalize with Taiwan, passed the TRA in 1979, both to set up a legal framework for unofficial bilateral relations with Taiwan and also to provide Taiwan with a guarantee that the U.S. would support its defense. Among the TRA's provisions, accordingly, was one asserting that it was the responsibility of the U.S. to provide Taiwan what it needed for its self-defense. The definition of what Taiwan needed was to be left up to the U.S., but nonetheless there was now a law stating the U.S. had certain obligations to provide Taiwan with weapons, with military equipment. However, Alexander Haig wanted to negotiate with the Chinese to limit, and perhaps terminate this obligation. I really thought we were entering into dangerous territory, and felt it would be best not to do so. In my opinion, Haig was a bit panicked over the prospect of having relations with China downgraded on his watch. In any case, he favored the negotiations, and we plunged ahead. The main working level person who moved the negotiations forward was Bill Rope, then director of the office of Chinese affairs at State.

*Q: I am not sure I know him.*

MOHR: I had lots of arguments with Bill, but we got along. He naturally thought my views were misguided. He would lecture me about the strategic picture, and how I was failing to grasp it. He really wanted a security relationship with China, felt Taiwan was an obstacle toward this goal, and believed with the Taiwan issue gone as an irritant in the U.S.-China relationship, China

would grow to be a reliable strategic partner, thereby greatly shifting the strategic balance against the Soviet Union. I argued that China had no interest in being a strategic partner of the United States (it still doesn't), and in any case, neither the president nor the Senate would allow us to do anything that was seriously inimical to Taiwan's defense interests. Bill was supported in Beijing by Chas Freeman, who had been office director for China during normalization, and was now our deputy chief of mission (DCM) in Beijing.

*Q: I have interviewed Chas.*

MOHR: Yes, Bill and Chas were the main forces leading the negotiations from the U.S. side, but it is important to remember that they were at all times carrying out the wishes of the secretary of state. Another unusual thing about these negotiations was that there were no checks and balances within the USG. It was a totally State-run policy and negotiation. Jim Lilly, who was a China expert, had been at the National Security Council (NSC) supervising China and Taiwan policy for the White House when he was appointed head of AIT in Taipei. The White House, in its wisdom, felt there was no need to replace Lilly at the NSC anytime soon, despite the fact that we were entering into negotiations with China over limiting arms sales to Taiwan. So throughout the negotiations, which lasted almost a year, there was no NSC person for China to advise the president. Haig also did a pretty good job of keeping the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) out of the negotiations. So the China desk at State, in the person of its director, Bill Rope, and sometimes the deputy director, Scott Hallford, essentially did all the work in moving the negotiations forward. Bill kept his bosses informed, but John Holdridge, the assistant secretary of state for East Asia, also fully supported the wisdom of the negotiations and trusted Bill to execute the policy.

Since I wasn't key to the negotiations, I knew very little at the time they were going on regarding the details, although I was aware of the general trend. However, by the time the agreement was concluded on August 17, 1982, George Shultz had already replaced Alexander Haig as secretary of state. During that summer, Paul Wolfowitz had replaced John Holdridge as assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs. Wolfowitz was much more conservative than Holdridge, who was a foreign service officer and had been an assistant to Kissinger at the NSC when relations with China had first been established. Wolfowitz was much more skeptical toward China, and much more positive toward Taiwan. In any event, Wolfowitz called me into his office in the spring of 1983, as my tour on the Taiwan desk was winding down, and said he wanted me, and not Bill Rope, to write him a memo detailing the history of the negotiations leading to the agreement concluded in August 1982. This is how I learned a lot of the behind-the-scenes events during the negotiations. I had access to all the secretary to the president (Sec-Pres) memos that Haig had sent detailing our strategy for the negotiations, his suggestions for how to overcome problems raised by the Chinese, etc. If these memos ever become public, they would be a good read. They are fascinating. In my opinion, they indicate that Haig essentially agreed with the Chinese on the need to terminate arms sales to Taiwan, and felt he could win the president over to his views. It is my contention that one of the reasons, perhaps the main reason, for Haig's dismissal in 1983 was that Reagan came to realize that Haig was absolutely serious in his resolve to terminate U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and this was not what Reagan wanted.

Following the signing of the joint communiqué in August 1982, the Taiwanese, understandably

upset, sent a secret arms buying mission to the U.S. to test Reagan's reassurances to President Chiang Ching-kuo of Taiwan that the communiqué would not harm Taiwan's security interests. We at State were told by the NSC, just weeks after the signing of the communiqué with China, that a secret arms buying mission was coming from Taiwan, and that if we wanted to deny the Taiwanese any item from their wish list, the president himself wanted to be informed in detail as to the reasons for the denial. In other words, the White House was telling us, despite the communiqué, to give Taiwan as much in the way of armaments as possible. It seemed to me that not only did we have a two-China policy, but that the policy was determined by which China could complain the loudest.

It took about a year for the arms package to be announced for Taiwan. In the meanwhile, in January 1983, there occurred another remarkable event. A conservative magazine, Human Events, published an interview with President Reagan. The interviewer began by asserting that many of the president's supporters were greatly disturbed by the joint communiqué, believing it had brought great harm to Taiwan. As I recall what was in the magazine, it ran something like this: "Your base is terribly upset. They think you sold out Taiwan. They think you are going to stop arms sales to Taiwan." To this, Reagan replied, (I am essentially paraphrasing here) "No, not at all. If you read the communiqué carefully, all it says is that as tensions are reduced between the two sides, Taiwan's need for arms will accordingly be reduced, so at that time, we will reduce our arms sales to Taiwan. It does not say we will willy-nilly reduce arms sales to Taiwan. The U.S. position remains unchanged with regard to the resolution of the differences between China and Taiwan. They can adopt whatever means they feel necessary, so long as it does not include the use of force."

One of the reasons I was shocked by what Reagan had said in Human Events magazine was that we were in fact meeting in then deputy secretary of state Larry Eagleburger's office every Saturday following the signing of the communiqué to plan out what our yearly reduction of arms sales to Taiwan should be. In other words, we were "willy-nilly" meeting to decide how to reduce arms sales to Taiwan on a yearly basis, to show the Chinese we were carrying out the communiqué. Following the publication of the Human Events article, I raised the issue with deputy secretary Eagleburger. He assured me that the secretary of state (Schultz) and the president were exactly as one on this issue, and our meetings would continue. When I noted this was exactly what he said about the previous secretary (Haig), and that person had been dismissed, Eagleburger snapped that nobody likes a "wise-ass," and if I was not on board with the program, I could easily be terminated from these meetings. At this point, I decided it was best to keep my mouth shut. The meetings went on, and finally there was agreement to slowly limit arms sales to Taiwan on a yearly basis. Arms sales figures are public, so this would indicate to the Chinese that we were carrying out our commitments under the communiqué.

One of the reasons I found these negotiations fascinating is that they revealed a major error in judgment on the part of the Chinese. Traditionally, one of the criticisms of American foreign policy is that American practitioners are not good listeners. We hear only what we want to hear. It is also said that the Chinese are excellent listeners. Well, in the case of the negotiation and aftermath of the communiqué, when the Chinese realized that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan were not decreasing by any significant amount, and would never in anybody's lifetime go down to zero, they felt that they had been outsmarted by the U.S. I heard this several times during my

tour in Beijing from 1988-1990, again from a senior Chinese official when I was in Brisbane in 1993, and again from a senior Chinese friendship association official in 1997. To all of them, I had the same reply: during all the months of the negotiations on the joint communiqué, you could have easily sent your ambassador in to see President Reagan, or you could have sent your foreign minister to see President Reagan. But you didn't. You chose to believe the words of the secretary of state, Alexander Haig, because you liked what Haig was saying. It agreed with what you thought. This despite the well-know fact that the president is senior to the secretary state, and in this case the president was a conservative Republican with a documented fondness for Taiwan. So, I told the Chinese that actually they had outsmarted themselves, and they had only themselves to blame when the results of the communiqué were not as they had wished them.

*Q: Did you get involved with the Chinese PRC people at all?*

MOHR: No. I was on the Taiwan desk, and my job was to listen sympathetically to the representatives from Taiwan in Washington when they asked about the status of the negotiations, and then tell them nothing.

*Q: Well did you find they had pretty good intelligence on what was going on?*

MOHR: The Chinese?

*Q: No, the Taiwanese.*

MOHR: No, not on this, because on this, as I said, even most of the rest of the U.S. government did not know what was going on, so there were no leaks. Jim Lilly, formerly of the NSC and then the head of AIT in Taipei, was also kept out of the loop. He was very frustrated. So the Taiwanese did not know what was going on, and they were very anxious.

*Q: Well was the political consideration that you had with the F-16 being produced in Texas, which was George Bush's...*

MOHR: That was later, in the early 1990s, at the end of President Bush's term. At the time when Reagan became president, in 1981, Taiwan wanted the latest advanced fighter, know as the FX. Perhaps this is what agitated the PRC in the first place to demand a communiqué. In any event, the then head of the NSC, Richard Allen, wanted to sell Taiwan the FX, but Secretary Haig argued against the sale, and won the argument. By then, we had begun negotiations on the communiqué, and Haig convinced Reagan that while the negotiations were going on, it would be a bad idea to give Taiwan a new fighter jet.

So when George Bush became president, and he sold the F-16 to Taiwan, the Chinese said, "Ten years ago we signed a communiqué saying you would limit arms sales to Taiwan, and also limit the quality and quantity of such sales. Now you are selling them your most advanced jet fighter. What is going on?" Some at State somewhat facetiously replied to the Chinese that an election was coming up, the fighter was made in Texas, and Bush needed that state's electoral votes. Thus, this was a purely internal U.S. affair, and as such, the Chinese had no right to complain. The Chinese did not think this "joke" very funny. I actually thought it was, because whenever

you raised certain issues with the Chinese, such as human rights, they would respond that it was an internal affair, and the U.S. had no right to interfere in their internal affairs. But I could see where the Chinese would not appreciate the humor regarding a U.S. jet fighter sale to Taiwan.

*Q: Anybody who knows the Taiwan issue knows it is a hot potato. The foreign service knows because we had our noses smashed in; the China hands especially suffered. Haig was a Europeanist, a NATO hand. Perhaps he saw the issue from a different perspective, and miscalculated.*

MOHR: I agree that he miscalculated, definitely on how far he could bring along the president, but also in his analysis of China's leaders and their motives. In my opinion, Deng Xiaoping was under attack from his left. They were charging that he had engineered the normalization of relations with the United States, but Reagan was now president, and China was not getting anything from the U.S. I believe Deng cooked up this communiqué idea to look tough to his opposition. I also believe—and this is just speculation—that Deng was as surprised as anyone else when the U.S. agreed to negotiate. Remember, China was only threatening to downgrade relations if we refused to negotiate. It was not threatening to break relations. I hope that someday the Chinese government internal documents will be opened to the public, so we can get a better idea of what Deng was actually thinking. I really don't think they would have broken relations with us had we refused to negotiate. After all, at the time, they needed us far more than we needed them. They were very poor. They needed a big country to buy from them and jump-start their economy.

*Q: Well after you finished this communiqué business what were you doing?*

MOHR: The communiqué was finished in the summer of 1982, and it took about a year to decide what kind of big arms package we would sell to Taiwan without causing a major rift with the PRC. Somehow, we accomplished all this, and by the summer of 1983 I was due for another transfer.

**THOMAS P. SHOESMITH**  
**Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1981-1983)**

*Thomas P. Shosmith was born in 1939 and raised in Pennsylvania. His career in the State Department included posts in Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, and an ambassadorship to Malaysia. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1991.*

*Q: Well, when you left Hong Kong in 1981, and you came back to become a Deputy Assistant Secretary in East Asian Affairs, where you served from 1981 to 1983, the Reagan Administration was just getting in, and all administrations -- sometimes the transition can be a little bit difficult. The Reagan Administration came from a different part of the -- from the Right wing of the American political spectrum. Carter was kind of from the Left. Did you find any discontinuity or*

*any problems in East Asian affairs because of the transition?*

SHOESMITH: Well, it's probably something of an oversimplification to say that the Reagan approach to China, the Reagan Administration approach to China, was less unambiguous and somewhat less positive -- certainly more conservative-- than it had been under the Carter Administration. The Reagan Administration had a very sympathetic and somewhat protective attitude toward Taiwan, even though, by that time, we no longer had official, diplomatic relations with Taiwan. But they were much more solicitous of Taiwan's interests or Taiwan's concerns than perhaps the Carter Administration was. Of course, President Reagan was regarded as particularly solicitous of Taiwan. So there was, to some extent, a change. That had some effect on the management of the relationship with Taiwan, or rather with the Mainland, as well as with Taiwan. We still had the unofficial relationship with Taiwan, through the American Institute on Taiwan, and the counterpart, the Taiwan representation in Washington. This, I suppose, came to a head at the time when the Administration began to consider foreign military assistance to Taiwan.

I've forgotten now. There was legislation in Congress at the time of our recognition of China, which, as I believe -- I'm very vague on this -- but there was a Congressional mandate to be concerned with continuing support for Taiwan's security. In late 1981, I guess, and into 1982 we began to try to work with both Taiwan and the Mainland to develop a framework, within which we could continue an arrangement for continuing to support Taiwan's military establishment. And that proved very contentious.

*Q: Did Mainland China have any appreciation of the political need for having something like this, or...*

SHOESMITH: Well, they simply denied the need, and they felt that we were going back on the Shanghai Communiqué, as well as the arrangements that were made at the time of normalization. They felt that we were trying to maintain and prop up Taiwan through the back door. But eventually, we worked out an agreement with the Mainland, with Beijing. It was a very long and sometimes very contentious process. It must have taken the better part of eight or nine months and was concluded, I think, in the latter part of 1982. It had strong support, of course, in the White House. But they remained concerned about the relationship with the People's Republic of China. There was no sense at all of ignoring the interests we had there. But, at the same time, it was felt that we -- and there were strong Congressional voices -- that we had an obligation to ensure that Taiwan was not left completely defenseless. That it had the resources and that we should assist, to the extent that we could, in providing the resources for them to maintain an adequate defense of the island.

*Q: Was there anything resembling the "China Lobby" in Congress and all of that?*

SHOESMITH: No, there were individual senators and congressmen who were very interested, very concerned to see that what they regarded as an appropriate level of support for Taiwan's defense be maintained. But there was no group which you could characterize as a "China Lobby."

*Q: What about Secretary of State Alexander Haig and then Secretary Shultz? You had both of them at the time. Did they focus much on China, or was this left pretty much to the Bureau?*

SHOESMITH: Well, Secretary Haig was very much involved in these negotiations on trying to work out this arrangement for continuing to support Taiwan with military equipment. But there were other things that were occupying Haig's mind, and I wouldn't say that he was himself greatly focused on China. He visited there once, as I recall, during the time when he was Secretary of State. I'm not sure of that. But his focus was much more on Europe, compared with Shultz. Haig's focus was much more on Europe than on Asia, whereas Shultz, I think, had a very large interest in Asia as a whole, including China, of course.

*Q: Well, you were the Deputy Assistant Secretary. John Holdridge was the Assistant Secretary...*

SHOESMITH: For most of the time, until late 1982, I think it was, when Paul Wolfowitz took over.

*Q: Well, what was your particular area?*

SHOESMITH: I was the senior deputy, with responsibility for Japan, China, and Korea. These long, extended, and convoluted negotiations that I have been talking about on China and Taiwan took up so much time that, unfortunately, I think, I was not able to give the attention to Japan, much less Korea, that I probably should have. Although in neither case were there serious problems during those two years when I was... There were problems. There are always problems when dealing with Japan. And, to some lesser extent, in dealing with Korea. But they weren't of a magnitude that took up a great deal of my time. And I really had just so much time. I think I must have spent 60 percent of my time on China and Taiwan.

*Q: Well, you spent time on Taiwan. Technically, Taiwan has this extracurricular, whatever you want to call it, relationship where it has an institute representing it. But essentially, how does that fit into the State Dept?*

SHOESMITH: Well, there was a Taiwan desk. My recollection is a little hazy. I think it was a part of the China Division. But there was a Taiwan desk. The ground rules were that we were not to have, on either side, official contact. What that finally came down to was that our people in Taipei did not meet with officials of the Republic of China in their offices. They met them outside, somewhere. And the situation here was similar. The office in the State Dept, however, worked with the American Institute on Taiwan or in Washington on some aspect of our government relations, such as transfer of certain military equipment, or whatever. We saw their representatives outside of offices, in their homes or whatever. The relationship has worked well, I think. As a matter of fact it's worked so well that other governments have adopted that system for maintaining relationships with Taiwan. But we were the first. The Japanese have it now. The Australians, the Canadians, the French, and many other governments have established similar, unofficial representations in Taiwan.

*Q: It sounds like ancient history now, but during this period what was the view of the Soviet threat or Soviet influence in Vietnam, or elsewhere?*

SHOESMITH: I really can't comment on that in any meaningful way. I was not concerned with that. I would just have to say that it was in the background. Of course, you're aware of it, and I, as senior deputy, had to keep track of what was going on in the whole region. But I can't say anything meaningful about that. Let me put it another way. I have no particular insights into it.

*Q: Well, did you get a feel that there might be a rapprochement between China and the Soviet Union to our detriment? Was this in the cards at all?*

SHOESMITH: Oh, there was speculation about that. The possibility of a warming of China-Soviet relations, but at that time it seemed very remote. I mean, as of 1981-1983, the Cambodian issue was still very hot, as well as Afghanistan. On both of those issues the Chinese and the Soviets were at loggerheads. There were still problems along their own border. The Soviets were building up their military presence in East Asia. None of these things seemed to augur any improvement in Sino-Soviet relations. On the contrary, although it was regarded as a possibility, if not a near term probability, those who thought it was a possibility would always add the caveat that it will never get back to where it was prior to 1960, at the time of the Sino-Soviet split. That both countries -- and particularly China itself -- had moved to a degree that any sort of full rapprochement was unlikely. There would still be suspicions on the Chinese side. There would still be conflicts of interest between the two. I think that what has happened has pretty well matched that caveat. That what has happened since Gorbachev and since the Soviet pullout from Afghanistan. And the apparent modification of its position in support of Vietnam and the Heng Samrin Government in Cambodia.

**CLARKE N. ELLIS**  
**American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1981-1984)**

*Clarke N. Ellis was born in Boston in 1939. He was raised in California and attended the University of Redlands in Redlands, California. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and was assigned as a Junior Officer to Munich. He later served in Italy, Eritrea, Austria, Switzerland, and Taiwan. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.*

*Q: You went to Taiwan from 1981 to 1984. What was your job?*

ELLIS: While I was at the War College, I was trying to find my next assignment. I had submitted my bid list and I got a call from my counselor, and he said, "Come over and we'll talk about your bid list." So I went over, and he said, "Clarke, everything on your bid list is completely out of the question. What is it that you realistically hope to get?" I said, "Well, I'm an economic officer, and I've never been an economic counselor. I think if I have hopes to be promoted into the senior Foreign Service, I really need to get that under my belt."

He said, "Okay, let me see here," and he started flipping through the pages. He said, "Well, I'll

tell you what I've got. I've got a job that's not only" - by then they had split the economic and commercial sections—"the economic counselor but it is still the commercial counselor as well." I said, "Oh, really, that sounds good." And he said, "Of course, there's one little thing; you have to resign from the Foreign Service." I said, "Oh, well, where is this?" He said, "Well, it's the American Institute in Taiwan." As you recall in 1978, we broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan and recognized the Peoples Republic of China. We then set up this private non-profit corporation called the American Institute in Taiwan, which handled American relations there.

*Q: Could you explain about the resigning and all.*

ELLIS: It is basically a pro forma thing. You are then hired by AIT, and your salary and benefits are the same as if you were employed in the Foreign Service. You are still reviewed for a promotion as if you were in the Foreign Service and can be promoted as if you were in the Foreign Service.

*Q: When you went out there in 1981, what was the situation in Taiwan both economically and politically?*

ELLIS: The Taiwan authorities had still really not reconciled themselves to the derecognition, and they hoped that there would be some change. Ronald Reagan had been elected in 1980, and they had hoped that with the Republicans that somehow they would get back some official status. They were always trying, politically, to get an element of officiality back into the relationship, and we were always trying to hold that back and make sure that the relationship stayed unofficial. That was the game that was being played politically.

Economically, the Taiwan boom was really getting underway, and you could see the vibrancy of the economy, the dynamism of the economy as it was really beginning to pick up steam. It was an interesting time to be there. There were always questions of who would be allowed to visit Taiwan, for example, in terms of official visitors. The wording of messages, for example, was important. The first director for a few weeks when I got there was Chuck Cross, whom I'd known from the University of Michigan. Then it was Jim Lilley after that, a marvelous person.

*Q: I'm in the middle of an interview with Chuck Cross right now. He is out in Seattle, and I just started one with Jim Lilley.*

ELLIS: For example, the ground rules were that you could never call Taiwan a country. It didn't have a government; it was always "the authorities on Taiwan." The director could meet with the foreign minister but not in the Foreign Ministry. No one really at that time above a deputy assistant secretary level was allowed to come to visit, and they could only come as consultants to AIT. There was a whole litany or catechism of rules and ways of doing. The Taiwan authorities were always trying to push that envelope. It was an interesting time.

Also, we had a very active military sales program but the people who would normally be MAAG or attachés were all retired military. One complicating fact came because those of us who were at AIT tended to want to get some liberalization of the rules. For example, a fairly senior military officer, a bird colonel, was being groomed to be our defense attaché in Beijing. Well, first, he

was the air attaché and, then, he was going to be the defense attaché in Beijing. He needed to get language training, and it's not possible to separate military officers the way it is Foreign Service officers. So, it was agonized back and forth, back and forth, whether this guy would be allowed to come out to Taiwan for his language training. Finally, Washington relented and allowed him to come out study at the language school. He was the first. Even when you had congressional committees coming over on military aircraft, they were allowed, under our guidelines, to land in Taiwan but they couldn't overnight.

*Q: They had to leave and then come back.*

ELLIS: All of this ideology and some of the rules seemed to be a little petty but many of them were relaxed to a certain extent. Of course, there was always the question of visits of senior Taiwan people to the United States, which has continued to be an issue even in 1996 when Lee Teng-hui was given an honorary degree at Cornell. These were some of the issues, particularly after I'd been there for a while.

I really enjoyed working with Jim Lilley, and Jim gave me a chance to work on a couple of issues that were fairly controversial. One was Beijing's announcement that it intended to join the Asian Development Bank. The initial position of the government of the Peoples' Republic and of our embassy in Beijing was, of course, just like Taiwan got kicked out of the U.N. and the IMF, it would be kicked out of the Asian Development Bank as well. But Jim was determined to resist that, and I agreed with him fully. There was a major difference in Taiwan's ADB membership from its U.N. or IMF memberships, in that Taiwan joined the ADB only claiming jurisdiction over Taiwan, the Pescadores, Quemoy and Matsu. It never pretended to represent all of China in that context. In addition, the Congress, as I recall, passed a resolution, saying that, if Taiwan were kicked out, the U.S. would pick up its marbles and go home and stop contributing to the Asian Development Bank. These two factors caused Beijing to finally relent. Beijing said that Taiwan could remain, and then there was the negotiation over the name that Taiwan would use. Also, the amount of military sales to Taiwan was a big issue during the time that I was in Taipei. There was a third thing, a minor thing, but again it was incremental. There were chief of mission meetings for our ambassadors in East Asia and the Pacific with the Secretary, and the director of AIT Taipei was not allowed to go at that time. I think now the AIT director is allowed. As an incremental step, Jim Lilley proposed to Washington and, after some discussion, got it approved that I would go to the chief of mission meeting and sit there with a "paper bag over my head" and be an observer. At least I would be able to carry a message to the Secretary from Jim and then come back with a report on the meeting.

*Q: I am told that particularly the Taiwanese Chinese, I mean the people who are there, are part of the Chinese overseas community, which is well connected and has, very good business sense and all. It would have been a very difficult group to ignore. They are well connected, particularly in the United States, and quite aggressive. Did you find that true?*

ELLIS: Yes, but in those days it wasn't so much that. It was only in the last year or so that stories appeared about illegal campaign contributions. Certainly, the Nationalist Chinese have had a good lobby in this country for years. But, on the economic side, it was just a lot of business opportunity. We had an extremely active American Chamber of Commerce. We held a number

of trade negotiations with the Taiwan authorities. Intellectual property rights questions were a major issue. While I was there, Taiwan became one of our largest trading partners.

*Q: What about intellectual property rights? Taiwan used to be the place that you served in the Far East where you'd have whoever when there to pick up bootleg books and records.*

ELLIS: Then, they graduated to Rolex watches, computers, and things like that. That was a major problem, and we had a number of negotiations and tough negotiations with them on intellectual property rights. As Taiwan moved up the economic ladder, they began to see the benefit of having intellectual property rights protecting themselves. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I was dealing with Taiwan again from the Washington side, they had a much more cooperative attitude because they were being ripped off by the Mainland Chinese.

*Q: Were there any developments at all between Mainland China and Taiwan?*

ELLIS: There weren't any in that period, or very little. There were people who would surreptitiously visit the Mainland, but, at that time, no. They hadn't started the dialogue. Another thing in the rules of the game for example, we were not allowed to go to Quemoy or Matsu. We would also get invitations to go for the Double Ten Parade in Taipei. October 10 - or Double Ten - is the Nationalists' national holiday. The director could go but no one else could go there, except maybe the deputy director. No one else was allowed to go to the Double Ten Parade. Of course, each year we'd get the invitation, and we'd have to say no.

*Q: Were there any particular threats from Mainland China at that point?*

ELLIS: No, there weren't.

*Q: What was the attitude of the people at the American Institute of Taiwan towards the future of this peculiar national manifestation?*

ELLIS: Well, I think I got the job because no one else wanted it. At the beginning, people were very skittish about serving in AIT from a career standpoint. Not only was it still a new thing - it had only been set up in 1979 - and there were a lot of bugs still in the system. Some people didn't get paid for months. People didn't know whether it would really be considered valid for promotion purposes or not. I think that there was a good deal of feeling that AIT would be some sort of transitional thing, and that Taiwan would, in certainly 10 years, be absorbed by the Peoples Republic of China. That was the general expectation.

*Q: Were there any particular trade problems?*

ELLIS: There was the IPR problem. Other than that, we had basically wanted to reduce Taiwan's trade barriers, and based on limited negotiating authority left over from the Tokyo Round were able to conclude a trade agreement.

*Q: Were we seeing Taiwan reaching out to other countries?*

ELLIS: Oh yes, they were continually trying to get new or keep old diplomatic relations. Where necessary as they became richer, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s, they sought to buy diplomatic recognition.

*Q: Did we have any particular attitude towards this, or is it not our business?*

ELLIS: I don't think we got involved.

**DONALD A. CAMP**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1981-1982)**

**Chinese Language Training**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1982-1983)**

**Political Officer**  
**Beijing (1983-1985)**

*Donald Camp was born in New York in 1948. He received his BA from Carleton College and an ND from University of Chicago. He joined the Foreign Service in 1974. His overseas assignments include Colombo, Bridgetown, Beijing, Chengdu, and Kathmandu. His sister, Beatrice Camp, is also a Foreign Service Officer. Mr. Camp was interviewed by David Reuther in 2012.*

*Q: Now, your next assignment is quite interesting because you're coming into your third bureau. This is unusual.*

CAMP: I'd had my eye on China for a while, particularly after my interest was piqued by Bill Rope in the Operations Center. He recruited me for China. He also recruited my colleague at the time, David Summers, who was in the Op Center with me and had come into the foreign service in the same entering class as I. And at the time I did not realize that he was on the verge of marrying my sister and taking an assignment in China as well. I was also getting married at the same time to Betsy, who'd come down to visit Barbados where we'd gotten engaged. So suddenly we were separately assigned to language training with an onward assignment to Beijing, David and my sister and myself and my new wife. So we were together for four years as a large family.

*Q: Now, for these hard language assignments, personnel assigns you to the Beijing job and then says you have to take language first. And that's why it becomes a four-year commitment. You don't get the language without having an ongoing assignment. Is that correct?*

CAMP: That is correct. We all knew what assignment we were heading to two years hence when we began language training.

*Q: Well, being a fabulous linguist, which you've already proven, in Tamil and whatnot, what was FSI Chinese like?*

CAMP: I'm far from a fantastic linguist, but I found FSI Chinese in general a fascinating intellectual exercise and also a great bonding experience. My Chinese language colleagues and my A100 class are the people with whom I'm still closest. We sat around and talked about our biographies in Chinese and about our interests and got to know everything about ourselves four to six hours a day, and then went to Taiwan and lived together for the second year of language training.

*Q: So your program was one year at FSI in Washington and one year in the language area, in this case Taipei. Yangmingshan? Big class?*

CAMP: The State Department was beginning to ramp up our posts in China and the numbers of officers assigned to language training. A very wise decision was made to train a large number of people in Chinese, assign them to China or Taiwan or Singapore or Malaysia and hope that they would catch the China bug and come back for a future assignment. There was no requirement to take two assignments using Chinese, which is kind of surprising when you're committing the resources to give someone full-time language training for two years.

*Q: How about the teachers? And the linguists and the whole academic part of it.*

CAMP: The teachers were a combination of some older teachers who'd been there for a long time and a few younger ones. One was the wife of a former Taiwanese diplomat in Washington. But FSI was beginning to hire teachers who had come from China since the re-establishment of relations. It was important for us to be familiar with the latest idioms and cultural aspects of a changing mainland China, and it was these younger teachers who could help us there. One of the teachers was a fascinating woman who had been born in New York City to an American father and a Chinese mother. The mother had gone back to join the revolution and she had grown up entirely in the Mainland before coming to the United States after normalization. She was one of our best teachers and ended up marrying Jeff Buczacki, one of my fellow students.

*Q: And the Chinese I assume was done both in the simplified characters that were used in the Mainland and the traditional characters?*

CAMP: One gripe I had with the program was that the entire first year focused on oral Chinese, and only later got into writing. I would have liked to have started writing a little earlier. But each of us knew where we were assigned and therefore knew whether we wanted to concentrate on learning the simplified characters (for the mainland) or the traditional (for Taiwan or Hong Kong).

*Q: Now, that year in Taiwan, having mainland educational materials and simplified characters presented a problem. How did FSI get around that?*

CAMP: I can only assume that our school, as part of the American Institute in Taiwan, had a certain inviolability from the domestic politics of the day. Everyone knew that we were going to

the Mainland and needed to learn the simplified characters, the Chinese communist phraseology of the day, the cultural revolution allusions and the like. The Taiwanese teachers were very well clued in to what we were going to need. I give a lot of credit to the linguist Neil Kubler who did have Mainland experience. I don't recall that ever being a huge issue.

*Q: Could you describe the school and the facilities that you were in up there? Because the previous school had been in Taichung, if I recall.*

CAMP: That's correct. The school had moved up to an area above the city of Taipei with a beautiful view -- Yangmingshan. While technically assigned to the American Institute in Taiwan (and accordingly formally "resigned" from the State Department), we were physically isolated from the offices of AIT and from their day-to-day work dealing with the political issues of the day.

*Q: Now, Taiwan's a very small island. Did you get a chance to move around the island, either on your own or as part of the class?*

CAMP: The school was good at organizing class trips on the assumption that this would help our language ability. When we first arrived in Taiwan from our year at FSI we thought "What have I been learning for a year?" I couldn't understand anything on the street and I couldn't make myself understood. So we really did need to get around and actually speak Chinese in a Chinese environment. And so while exploring Taipei and its surroundings served that purpose as well, it was very helpful that we were able to take some trips down to Gaoxiong and Tainan in the south, and a fascinating air trip to the Pescadores (Penghu). We also went to the East Coast and Sanming Lake, so we did a fair amount of traveling. I didn't really want to travel too much on my own given what I saw of the freeways and the craziness of driving in Taiwan. I'm sure you get used to it if you've been there for a while, but we were tucked away on Yangmingshan. I kind of liked my isolation studying as a scholar in the Chinese tradition.

*Q: Studying. What might a typical day have been like?*

CAMP: We had a good FSI organized program with textbooks of recent reading -- like newspaper articles -- from the Mainland. We watched videos of Mainland newscasts. That would have been even more sensitive than reading in Mainland script. So our teachers really tried to get us to understand newscasts, got us to do some role playing in Chinese. I really wanted to be able to read newspapers and more complicated things. So I focused on that to the extent there was any sort of flexibility. I focused on that more than speaking, -- just a function of my own preference. And it served me well because my reading got to be quite good. My writing never did become very good. Years later my Chinese teacher would say, "You know, you still write like a first grader." But at least that was something. But the reading got to where I was happy with it.

*Q: While you were in class from the '81 to '83 period, you're saying you're fairly isolated, certainly from AIT downtown, but how about other general China related events? For example, the Shanghai Communiqué of August 1982 was a big thing in the China area.*

CAMP: We all knew that it was going to make a big impact on U.S.-China relations, but it was

not something that we were focusing on up in Yangmingshan. We would occasionally have visitors from Washington who would apprise of developments in U.S.-China relations. And of course, Jim Lilley, the AIT Director at the time was a very nice person who tried to bring us into the AIT community. Again, I felt like I was prepping myself for two years in China, but I didn't feel part of the policy process during those two years at all.

*Q: How would you summarize the effectiveness of the FSI China course?*

CAMP: Apart from a few minor issues, I thought they did a pretty good job. The one thing I noted was that we had people of all ages in our Chinese class, from first or second tour officers up to people who I thought at the time were old, probably in their mid-forties. And you could tell the difference in language ability. It was so clear that the youngest people learned it very quickly and frankly, the people 45 and older didn't have a clue. I was right in the middle. But that was my takeaway from language training; learn a language early!

*Q: Now, the assignment that brought you to language training was at the embassy in Beijing. And you arrive in the summer cycle of 1983 and you're a Political Officer following on your Caribbean success. Who's at the embassy and who's your boss and what's the environment there?*

CAMP: We had as our ambassador, Arthur Hummel who was a giant in the field of China scholars. He had an amazing World War II history; he had been interned by the Japanese in Shandong, escaped, and fought with the Nationalist guerillas. When he came as ambassador, he was a link to the 1940's and World War II and an era of U.S.-China cooperation. His DCM was another larger than life figure, Chas Freeman who I hope has done his own oral history, and has stories galore. His Chinese language proficiency was legendary. He said he concentrated in language training on learning to read Chinese characters upside down so that he could be in the office with a Chinese bureaucrat and be able to read what was on the desk in front of his counterpart. And he was that good. The Political Counselor was Dick Hart followed by Daryl Johnson a year later. My immediate boss was Don Johnson, who was the head of the external side of the Political Section. My job was fairly narrowly defined. I was in charge of following China's external relations with South and Southeast Asia, which was my choice, because that was an area of the world I was particularly interested in. I also had the counter-narcotics portfolio, at a time when we were just beginning cooperation in that area with the Chinese. I also took advantage of the embassy's willingness to let everyone do some internal reporting. This was an era when travel around China was still fairly difficult. I remember a reporting trip I took to Henan province – Zhengzhou, Luoyang, and Kaifeng. I also traveled to Tibet and Xinjiang. It was a stage where you could still do what we called Marco Polo reporting, because there was so little known about some of these places that you could write a travel blog and it would be well received in Washington. We did obviously more detailed reporting than that, but it was still a fascinating time to travel around China just as it was opening up in many places.

My interviews outside Beijing had a standardized tone, because everyone knew the Chinese communist party line at any time. For instance, one of the first phrases I learned in the Mainland was, "Since the third plenum of the eleventh central committee we have adopted the policy of reform and opening." So whenever you asked a question of a Chinese official (or even, often, a

man-in-the-street), the opening parlay would be, “Well, since 1978 and the third plenum of the eleventh central committee.....” Also, in those days, everything was preceded by “under the chairmanship of Chairman Mao,....”

It was very telling that this was what everyone knew they were supposed to say. It was only five years after Deng Xiaoping had begun the turnaround of the Chinese economy and society. We were just beginning to see the economic and social momentum that I thought at the time could not be sustained. In fact, that momentum was not only sustained but accelerated over the next couple of decades.

*Q: What kinds of things are you defining as this momentum?*

CAMP: Well, primarily economic. For instance, when we first arrived in Beijing in the summer of '83, there were no cars on the streets. Bicycles and buses were the means of transportation. By the time we left two years later there were taxis and the first private car had been purchased. That first private car was highlighted on the front page of The China Daily. It was considered very newsworthy that a woman who'd made her money in chicken farming had managed to buy a small Japanese car. And that was of course just the beginning. Similarly, when we arrived everyone was still in their blue Mao suits. By the time we left, the dress of choice, particularly in the winter, was a puffy ski parka that was now being made in Chinese garment factories. When we arrived you ate a lot of cabbage when you were out of Beijing. And in the winter particularly you'd see cabbage on every balcony in Beijing because that's what people ate all winter. I remember very clearly on May Day in 1984, suddenly there were bananas on the streets of Beijing being imported from South America. That was the beginning of outside products being brought in. And suddenly things changed. So we saw that kind of change in our two years in China. Suddenly, New Year's was celebrated even more exuberantly than before. Every year you could see it. And I thought this pace of change couldn't be maintained. Of course it was. I went back years later and I kept saying the same thing. I was wrong.

*Q: How about things like restaurants and other consumer areas.*

CAMP: One of our main sources of recreation in China was going out to eat. But in 1983 all restaurants were government enterprises. So whereas you could still find a good hotpot or a good Sichuan restaurant, you had to be careful when you ate because restaurants all closed around 6 or 6:30. And the waiters and waitresses would come around with big buckets of soapy water and start sloshing them to wash off the floors. They were going to go home at 6:30, come what may. There was not a lot of service orientation. By the time we left two years later there was the beginning of private enterprise. People were running very small restaurants out of their home and the food quality improved dramatically.

*Q: Can you give me a description of your own living arrangements?*

CAMP: The embassy did not have nearly enough housing for everyone, as the mission was expanding quite rapidly. So almost all of us lived in hotel rooms for a little while. A little while in our case extended to about nine months, first in the Beijing Hotel, right on the main drag in Beijing, and then at the slightly more upscale Jianguo Hotel. People who had families moved

into apartments much sooner. Once we did move into an apartment, we were in an area called Jianguomenwai, a foreigner complex of high rises. And we lived cheek by jowl with all the other diplomatic missions. It was Chinese government-assigned housing, so people lived next to random diplomats, including for instance to the Iranian Military Attaché. We lived next to the Thai DCM. It was nice to have a mix of people in these buildings. We were on the fourteenth floor of a sixteen-floor building. Our assumption was that we were all very well monitored by the Chinese Security Services. This was verified in our minds by the fact that we saw these Chinese workers in the elevators every morning going up to what was apparently a seventeenth floor. We never got up to the seventeenth floor, but we assumed that we were being overheard. And we worked on that basis all the time in China. But we had comfortable living accommodations. The atmosphere in Beijing was polluted. We had to scrape off the dust from the Gobi Desert every morning. But you had the sense that you were watching the opening up of China and you were lucky to have what you had, and of course we were. We were living in considerable luxury compared to people in the traditional Beijing compounds – the hutongs. We got around by bicycle a lot too. It was a nice town to bicycle around, and to explore on weekends. And of course the history was incredible.

*Q: What was your work environment like? What was the embassy like?*

CAMP: Also expanding rapidly. For my first year, I was tucked into a small office cheek by jowl with another Political Officer. We actually had desks facing each other. It was hardly ideal, but everyone was in the same position. By the second year the embassy had bought the old Pakistan Embassy and expanded rather dramatically into a new office building with all of the security arrangements, and even a swimming pool. So we spread out quite a bit. But we were still in three different buildings, scattered around the diplomatic community. There was the Consular Section and Admin in one building. There was the ambassador's residence next door to the USIS Office in the same compound, and then there was the ambassador and Pol-Econ and Science Sections in the new compound .

*Q: This is four years after normalization, but you'd had an Interest Section there since '72.*

CAMP: Right. But it had only recently I think expanded to the size that it was after normalization.

*Q: In fact, at this time there are two consulates in addition to the embassy, Guangzhou and Shanghai. As a Political Officer, did you get an opportunity to travel to the consulates? Or what was your relationship to the consulates and the consulates' reporting?*

CAMP: My job was to follow China's foreign relations. . So I didn't travel that much on business. The people who did the internal reporting tended to go for consultations to Shanghai and Guangzhou. And of course Shanghai and Guangzhou wanted to do their own reporting. So there was the usual embassy-consulate jockeying about who's doing what. My narcotics work got me down to Guangzhou once. And in fact, the counternarcotics work was interesting because the time was ripe for increasing cooperation. So I worked fairly closely with the Chinese Customs Department. And we started the beginnings of what became a rather extensive counternarcotics effort, focused especially on Yunnan and the areas down south. We sent some

Chinese customs officials to the United States for training while I was there. That was part of my job. The other part was China's foreign relations with South Asia and Southeast Asia. India and Vietnam were the big issues for us in that region. I'd go into the Foreign Ministry for meetings and not get much satisfaction – just what the official newspapers were already reporting. I'd go over to the Indian Embassy and they were much more forthcoming. And here it's worth commenting on our interchange with other diplomats in Beijing. Because the Chinese government said so little to us and because we had so little access to Chinese citizens, the diplomatic community was much more active than I have seen in our countries. We looked for opportunities to exchange the small snippets of information (or sometimes gossip) that each of us had picked up. At every level we had luncheon groups. The ambassadors had their periodic lunches. But so did the political second secretaries. Other embassies had insights that we didn't have and they thought we had insights that we didn't have. In some cases, we did. So I got a lot of my information from the embassies. And there were some unusual elements of the foreign community. For instance, Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia lived much of the year in Beijing. He and his wife, Princess Monique used to throw elegant parties and dances during which Sihanouk would sing. It was one of the more scintillating parts of a very gray sort of Beijing social life. I don't recall I picked up much at those dances, except I always remembered I was to avoid having anything to do with the representatives of the Khmer Rouge and of North Korea who were also there.

The sexiest reporting at most embassies – and Beijing was no exception – tended to be bilateral relations. That was done by the front office – ambassador and DCM – and the political counselor. I was four levels down from the ambassador – through the DCM, Political Counselor, and the Deputy for External Relations. So I very rarely saw that, except when there was a senior visitor from Washington and I was the control officer, accompanying him to meetings.

*Q: Now, I would assume this is still early in the relationship so you'd be the target of a number of high-level visitors.*

CAMP: Indeed. Both the blessing and curse of being in any large embassy is that you are called upon frequently to be a control officer. Sometimes, it's part tour guide, but the positive aspect is that these visits give you access that you would not normally have. The State Department's policy planning chief Peter Rodman was quite well known in Chinese circles; he got senior appointments at the few Chinese think tanks and at the Foreign Ministry. They were trying to develop a policy planning capability at the time themselves and wanted to talk to Peter Rodman. And I went along, thank goodness not as interpreter, but as aide-de-camp and notetaker. This was the era when it was clear in the Chinese mind, as well as ours, that we had much in common because we were cooperating on Afghanistan and the Chinese assumed that we could be a help in their ongoing ideological battle with the Soviet Union. So Peter Rodman was very well received.

And then of course our really big visit was the presidential visit of Ronald Reagan in April 1984. Any presidential visit is a huge operation. I remember the Chinese being befuddled by the number of press and accompanying officials. Our job at the mid levels of the embassy was to serve as what were called site officers as well as note takers at the various meetings. I drew the meeting with the President of China at the time, Li Xiannian. That would have seemed to be an important meeting, but in fact the president was less important than the party secretary or the

premier. So it was more protocol than substance. Nevertheless, I recall walking in and as note taker feeling I could grab a seat fairly close to the two principals, which I did. And then this guy tapped me on the shoulder. He said, "I'm sorry, could I have this seat please?" And in fact, it was the National Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane. So I quickly gave up my seat and moved to a place a little farther away where it was harder to hear the conversation, but more in keeping with my rank.

The other thing I remember about presidential visits is that everyone else, including the National Security Advisor, is only a sideshow. Secretary of State George Schultz was along on the trip. I saw him once walking totally alone without any minders on the steps of the Great Hall of the People. And I realized he's just another hanger-on in this huge visit that is centered around one man: Ronald Reagan.

Of course, presidential visits are always successful by definition, and this one was as well. I don't recall anything substantive that came out of it. There were several large banquets. Reagan gave a return banquet at the Sheraton Hotel, and we were all invited to fill tables there. Again I enjoyed the opportunity to meet senior officials I would normally not see; I was seated with the Defense Minister at the Reagan dinner.

*Q: Now, before a visit like that even takes place, the embassy's energized to do scene setters, reporting, or liaison with the Chinese to determine what are going to be the events, what are going to be the sites. Did you get into any of that?*

CAMP: U.S.-China relations were handled more by the front office and by the Political Counselor. That was true even for the visit planning. A couple of us were site officers and had to go and scout out these places in advance. There was even, you know, pre-testing of our banquet food and speculation about what Chinese would think of our food choices, including something that we unfortunately called "panda salad" -- that kind of non-substantive stuff. And of course a lot of a presidential visit is non-substantive stuff, let's face it.

*Q: Now, one of the big issues this time would have been the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. You would have been doing quite a bit of reporting on that, or at least as perceived by the Chinese.*

CAMP: We were actively cooperating with the Chinese and as I learned years later, importing mules from China and things like that to help the jihadis, through intelligence channels. But I learned a lesson about the fungibility of security classifications. Every day we would get a confidential report on developments in Afghanistan and I was instructed to take off the confidential line, reproduce it, and carry it over to the Chinese Foreign Ministry and brief them on what we were doing in Afghanistan. It was a small part of that whole effort, and it wasn't particularly sensitive. For some part of our bureaucracy it was a confidential document. But we were working closely with the Chinese and I was part of that effort.

*Q: You were mentioning earlier something about Tibet.*

CAMP: Yes. Tibet was not part of my reporting bailiwick, but I wangled a permit for a personal

trip to Tibet in September of '84 at a time when Tibet was just opening up to tourism. And it was one of those periods of opening where they were more relaxed about what was happening there. So Betsy and I wandered around Lhasa for a week with a fair amount of freedom. The authorities cracked down again a year or two later, but during the 80's Lhasa was still very much a Tibetan city, with very little Chinese influence. And the only foreign presence in Lhasa was the Nepal Consulate. The Indian consulate had closed years earlier, perhaps during the India-China war in 1962 but Nepal was allowed to maintain its historical presence. I called on the Nepali Consul General and made a stab at engaging him on political events in Tibet. He was not willing to say much of anything. I'm sure he knew he was being monitored by the authorities and didn't want to endanger his status by sharing anything with the Americans.

I remember being startled -- while wandering around Lhasa -- by the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the monasteries. There are three or four major monasteries in Lhasa. And the police and security forces just did not go in there. They weren't welcome and they didn't barge in. So you'd go into the middle of the largest -- the Jokhang -- the main Buddhist center in Lhasa. And in the sanctum sanctorum there would be pictures of the Dalai Lama all over the place. In the bazaar surrounding the Jokhang, even though that was an area where you would have security forces, you had pictures of the Dalai Lama on sale. So it was by Chinese standards a fairly relaxed time. Buddhism was beginning to flourish again. Post-Cultural Revolution and post-Deng Xiaoping opening and reform, religions, Tibetan Buddhism as well as Christianity were beginning to be allowed to flourish, as long as they presented no threat politically to the regime. And of course that is what has caused Tibetan Buddhism problems over the years in Tibet, because it is perceived to be a threat to the regime. The trip to Tibet was brief but a fascinating glimpse at a time before Sichuan settlers and other immigrants from Han areas came into Lhasa and changed the character of the city.

*Q: Each tour that you've had, there's something unique about it. And in this case, you'd just come across all the paraphernalia that goes on with a presidential visit. What takeaway then would you list for what this tour did for you?*

CAMP: Well, it, it was my first time posted in a world capital. The fact that you were part of a huge diplomatic community, that we were all focused on the leadership of China and China's relations with the outside world and China's dramatic change was a polar opposite to my tour in the Caribbean where what happened was of little moment to world affairs. Whereas here you were suddenly at the center of much of U.S. foreign policy, be it our foreign policy with the Soviet Union, our foreign policy toward Southeast Asia, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the like. So this was where things were happening.

*Q: And how would you rate the usefulness of the language training to the assignment?*

CAMP: In China it was crucial. Not that I was ever completely fluent or confident in my fluency. But you had to have it and make a stab at it to work in China. When I went to the Foreign Ministry if it was an important issue where I had to get the nuances exactly right I didn't trust myself. I'd go with the embassy interpreter or often they spoke English themselves. But you couldn't grasp Chinese society without having an understanding in the language. And you could tell that. People coming from Washington were total newcomers and very naïve in the Chinese

cultural context. They didn't know how to work a banquet, they didn't know how to toast at a banquet, they didn't know how to handle a meeting. Occasionally I would actually find myself doing some interpretation at dinner, for instance, where the honored guest from Washington was attempting a conversation and there was no interpreter present. So I'd say the language was absolutely crucial, and I think the department was very wise then to invest so much in language training and to continue to do so. They've developed a China cadre that's very impressive.

**MARSHALL P. ADAIR**  
**Economic Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1981-1984)**

**Economic Officer**  
**Beijing (1984-1986)**

*Mr. Adair, son of a United States Foreign Service Officer, was born in Maryland and raised at Foreign Service posts in the United States and abroad. He was educated at Middlebury College and joined the Foreign Service in 1972. During his career Mr. Adair held a number of senior positions at the State Department in Washington, DC, dealing with a variety of areas, including relations with the US military Commands, Economic and political issues in Europe and Department personnel matters. A Chinese language specialist, his foreign posts include Paris, Lubumbashi, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Beijing, Rangoon, Chengdu (China), and Tuzla (Bosnia). Mr. Adair was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2011.*

*Q: Were you yourself pointed towards any particular place?*

ADAIR: I had an assignment to Hong Kong. I'd been given a choice before I left Washington of being the head of the economic section at AIT (American Institute in Taiwan) in Taiwan or being the deputy head of the economic section in Hong Kong and the head of the reporting unit that dealt with mainland China. I chose Hong Kong; both because I wanted to experience Hong Kong and because I thought I'd be dealing more with mainland China there than I would in Taiwan.

*Q: So you went to Hong Kong.*

ADAIR: After a year of study in Taiwan I went to Hong Kong in September. I returned to Taiwan in October to get married and then Ginger and I both settled into Hong Kong for three years.

*Q: Well did you find your Chinese studies paid off or did you end up by speaking English mainly?*

ADAIR: The official language in Hong Kong was English, and the language of most of the population was Cantonese. I had learned Mandarin Chinese. I actually used the Mandarin that I had learned quite a lot. There were many people in Hong Kong – people originally from the

mainland that had fled to Hong Kong after the civil war and more recent arrivals who preferred to speak Mandarin rather than English. I also spoke it at home, because my wife didn't speak much English at the time. However, I didn't keep up my reading as much as I should have.

*Q: Who was the consul general when you were there?*

ADAIR: For most of the time that I was there the consul general was Burt Levin, who put in one of the most impressive performances I saw in the Foreign Service. That was a very tough time for Hong Kong. The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) made its push, and increased the pressure on Great Britain to negotiate a turnover of Hong Kong. The UK agreed to negotiate and concluded the agreement to return Hong Kong to China by 1997 while I was there. That caused a crisis of confidence in Hong Kong: anxiety as to what was going to happen, a financial crisis over the Hong Kong dollar and a massive effort to emigrate to the United States, Canada or Europe.

The United States could have just played a quiet, neutral kind of a role. We also could have speculated and been more alarmist. Many people in the United States were as skeptical as the population in Hong Kong about the prospects for freedom and prosperity in a Hong Kong under PRC rule. There was a great deal of doubt that the PRC could or would actually honor any agreement made with the United Kingdom – or that it had any intention whatsoever of allowing Hong Kong a degree of independence. In these circumstances Burt Levin arrived in Hong Kong, and immediately made it very clear to everyone that he believed what the British and the Chinese were doing was right. He told the doubters at the consulate general, “You guys are all wrong. The Chinese are perfectly capable of this. They have no intention whatsoever of spoiling what they've got here in Hong Kong and this is going to work.” He repeated that to the media and to all others that would listen. He was very articulate, and his arguments were powerful.

Then he pulled everybody in the consulate together - it's a big consulate, bigger than most embassies in the world. He said this was what he believed, it was the policy of the U.S. government, and it was what we would say to the public and to the world. He told everyone in the consulate that we could and should question that policy within the consulate, and that we could write analyses and reports that the consulate would send back to Washington. However, no one was to question the policy outside of the consulate. Inside – anything goes – but outside we would exercise strict discipline. And he pulled it off.

He had very solid experience in Chinese affairs, and great political and cultural understanding. His Chinese was really good, and he developed extensive contacts with both Hong Kong and PRC Chinese. I think that he, the consulate and the United States really contributed to stability in that area and helped to make it easier for the UK and the PRC to negotiate an agreement which has worked so far.

*Q: The British had the real responsibility - but we had to worry about our relations.*

ADAIR: Well we had lots of interests. We had strategic interests, because of the harbor and the extent of our reliance on Hong Kong for transportation and communication in Asia. The strategic interests were not quite the same as they'd been during the Vietnam War, but we certainly

wanted to continue to have access to Hong Kong for both military and commercial shipping. We had economic interests. There were many American companies in Hong Kong; and there was substantial trade between the United States and Hong Kong, as well as trade between the United States and China that transited Hong Kong.

*Q: Well you were what, number two in the economic section?*

ADAIR: Well as it turned out I wasn't number two, because the then head of the economic section changed that before I arrived – another lesson for me in the fickleness of bureaucracy. However, I was still the head of the economic section's China reporting unit.

*Q: So what was your responsibility?*

ADAIR: My responsibility was to watch what was going on in China, and to analyze and report on trends in the Chinese economy.

*Q: What was your impression of the Chinese economy at the time?*

ADAIR: In 1981 changes were already taking place in Chinese economic policy and on the ground. However, we were not aware of many of the changes that were happening, and we did not understand how long the reform effort would last or how extensively it would impact China's economy and politics. The PRC leader at the time, Deng Xiaoping - and the PRC official government statements - had begun to articulate changes to China's economic system – allowing supply and demand to operate and giving more freedom to individuals to engage in economic activity. There was a huge amount of skepticism among “China watchers” that they were actually going to do it. I personally was really skeptical.

We had several Chinese working for us in the economic section who had been studying the Chinese economy for some time. One in particular, a man named David Wong, had been watching the Chinese economy for the American consulate since he fled to Hong Kong from Shanghai when the Nationalist government fell. He was probably the best analyst the U.S. government had of what was going on within the PRC economy; and I had the privilege of working with and learning from him. Other analysts and observers of the Chinese economy would come from other U.S. government agencies in Washington or from universities in the United States on a regular basis to talk with him, to get ideas about what was going on, and to bounce their ideas off of him. He demonstrated to me what a “tea leaf reader” actually was. He would read all of the volumes of material coming out of China, pick out obscure references or apparently mundane stuff, and say, “Look at this. This means.....:” and then he would explain things that the rest of us would have completely overlooked. We had constant competition within the consulate from the political section, because economic and political analysis would naturally overlap. What the economic policy was going to be in China was going to depend on the political configuration – and vice versa. So we were all looking at the same general picture. David, however, was just much better at putting the pieces together than anyone else.

For many years the constant job of the China watchers had been to say, “this person's on top, these are the factions around him” and so on. The constant battle for power was usually the

primary focus. David Wong was the first one to say, "Wait a minute. That struggle for power is still going on in principle, but it's been subordinated." He argued that Deng Xiaoping was clearly in control, that he was setting China on a path that had been inconceivable for the last 30 years in China, and that China would stick with it. There was only one other person in the U.S. Government that I was aware of that was willing to go that far.

*Q: Who was that?*

ADAIR: That was Chas Freeman, who at the time was the deputy chief of mission in Beijing, and previously had been the director of the Office of Chinese Affairs. Deng Xiaoping had declared that China would quadruple its gross national product by the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Most in the U.S. government, including myself, thought that was absurd. Both Chas in Beijing and David Wong in Hong Kong said, "No it's not absurd." David was a little more skeptical than Chas about China's eventual success, but he said they were definitely going to try it. They did, and they succeeded.

*Q: Were you there during Tiananmen Square?*

ADAIR: No. I was only in Hong Kong until 1984 and then I went to Beijing. I was actually in Burma when the crackdown in Tiananmen Square happened in 1989.

*Q: What about the other foreign powers who had consulates in Hong Kong; were they all pretty much on the same wave length or were they hedging their bets? What were they doing?*

ADAIR: I think most of them were hedging their bets.

*Q: Were you in your job in close touch with your British counterparts?*

ADAIR: I had lots of contact with people in the government in Hong Kong but I had less official work with them than did some other colleagues in the consulate, because my job was to look at mainland China, rather than work on the bilateral relationship with the government of Hong Kong.

*Q: What was happening to the China watchers now that we had an embassy in Beijing? Before, we'd been sort of looking at the tea leaves from afar in Hong Kong. What happened to that whole apparatus?*

ADAIR: Well most of the American diplomats that had been working on China over the previous thirty years tried to get assigned to the mainland. They had the background. They had studied Chinese history, politics and culture; they had studied the Chinese language; and they had been analyzing developments there for years. However, they had not been able to set foot on Chinese soil and actually look for themselves at what was going on. The openings of the Interests office in 1972, and later the embassy and consulates after 1979 were fantastic opportunities to get in and see, finally, what it was like.

That said, in those early years it was still very difficult for them to produce the kind of analysis

and reporting that would expose trends and accelerate our understanding of China, because their access in China was so limited. The circle of government officials that they could see was small, and most of them wouldn't say very much. They were very restricted in terms of the people that they could meet and talk to on the street and in the society; and their physical travel within and beyond the cities was restricted as well. So they were in these little bubbles – that seemed to grow oh so slowly. Because of that there was still a role for “China Watchers” in Hong Kong. During that particular time, I think those of us in Hong Kong were able to do more than most of the posts in China in terms of analyzing developments and trends.

*Q: The apparatus in Hong Kong, which had been designed to look at developments in China, had not been disassembled?*

ADAIR: There were less resources going into it but it had not been disassembled. No, there was still a huge effort to learn from business people, intellectuals and others who moved back and forth between Hong Kong and the mainland. Most of those people were very relaxed about sharing their experience and their knowledge. There was a growing group of Chinese officials who were in Hong Kong then as well. They were mostly assigned to the PRC press. We tried to get to know them, talk with them and learn from them. In the early 1980s, I would say there were more opportunities in Hong Kong to get that kind of information and give a balanced appraisal of it than there were in the posts in China.

*Q: Could you travel into China?*

ADAIR: Yes, but I didn't travel very much because I didn't have the budget to do it. I made two big trips and several smaller ones. It was pretty easy and inexpensive to visit the areas near Hong Kong like Guangzhou, the capital of Guangdong province, and Shenzhen, the new “special economic zone” (SEZ) that the Chinese were building there.

In addition, I traveled to Shanghai in the fall of 1981: and - I'm not sure whether it was the winter of 1982 or the winter of 1983 - I went to Beijing and made a trip by rail down to Zhengzhou, Xian, Xuzhou and Shanghai.

*Q: When you studied these new economic zones, did they appear to be viable?*

ADAIR: Again, I was skeptical that the Chinese authorities would really allow or promote the kind of freedom necessary to allow those places to grow and prosper; and therefore skeptical that the SEZ's would have much of an impact. What I didn't understand at the time was that the government in China didn't need actually to do much to promote economic activity. The Chinese people seem to have almost unlimited energy and determination, and given even the smallest opportunities will take hold and develop them to – and often beyond – their limits. In China, for thousands of years, the government's job has been more restrict the population of China – to prevent it from reaching that critical mass that might result in an uncontrolled explosion.

So when the government of the PRC announced that it was going to establish these SEZ's that would allow people more freedom to engage in economic activity than elsewhere in China, my reaction was, “I'll believe it when I see it.” The Chinese, however, poured into those zones from

all over the country. The response was beyond what was expected officially or permitted officially. However, the people basically took the reins, pushed the envelope, and what happened was phenomenal. In the case of Shenzhen, they took something that was a little bigger than a fishing village and made a huge city out of it, with industry of all kinds – and in almost no time it was competing with Hong Kong.

*Q: How did you find social life in Hong Kong?*

ADAIR: Hong Kong's a very busy, active place. Nobody is ever going to be still or isolated for long in Hong Kong. Ginger and I spent time with a variety of people in Hong Kong. Some were British - people that I met in the government or through running with the "Hash House Harriers". We met Chinese whose home and ancestors had been in Hong Kong for a very long time, and others who were more recent arrivals from the mainland. Some were through my work, and some were people that Ginger met in the course of her daily activities. Of course, we met quite a few people from Taiwan. We had American, British and "third-country" friends from the business community and other consulates. We didn't do a lot with officials from the PRC because at that time they weren't engaging much in social encounters. We were pretty much restricted to visiting them in their offices or an occasional official lunch. There were, of course, the Americans at the consulate as well; but I've always tried to avoid spending too much time with the official Americans wherever I go.

We had some social connections with the large Chinese entrepreneurs. We got to know some people who were doing business in China and whose families were still in China. There was a huge expatriate community of Europeans and Americans in Hong Kong. If I had been single, I might have spent most of my time with them. However, because Ginger was from Taiwan she had a natural connection to the Chinese world, and I was lucky enough to be able to share that.

*Q: I speak as an ex consular officer, now. What about Chinese coming to you - nervous about the changeover - and wanting your assistance in going to the United States?*

ADAIR: Yes. Well, first of all I was not in a position to give anyone much assistance in going to the States because I wasn't in the consular section. Yes, people did come to us and ask for help. I could give them advice, and I could refer them to officers the consular section, but I couldn't influence what happened next. Some of our Chinese colleagues at the consulate asked for my advice on what they should do when the financial crisis when the Hong Kong dollar seemed to be going down the tubes. I was a little reluctant to give advice, and when I did it turned out to be wrong.

It's insane for anybody that's not really deeply involved with currency fluctuations to give advice. In this case the trend was sharply downward. However, when it looked like there was no where for the currency to go but down, the British government stepped in to support it. At first people said they're crazy, and they're going to lose money too. However, the support was given without reservation and it worked. The Hong Kong dollar, which had been selling on the markets for something like one-third of its value went right back to where it was.

Hong Kong in that time period was a crazy place. The economy was booming and the rapidity of

change was something that I had never seen in the United States. For instance, when I arrived, there was a building being built across the street from the consulate when we arrived. It was a small skyscraper and it went up pretty fast. However, when finished it remained empty for about three weeks and then the owner knocked the whole thing down and rebuilt it bigger - just because that was the way things were going. Hong Kong was also way ahead of the United States in terms of applied technology. There were people using cell phones in Hong Kong in the early 1980s and by the mid and late 1980s everybody had them. The cell phone phenomenon had barely started in the United States. I think Hong Kong is still ahead of the U.S. in applied technology. And, of course, most of those things were far less expensive over there.

*Q: Were you computerized at your office?*

ADAIR: Only in a very limited way. In the 1970s only a few offices in the Department of State had computers. We tried to experiment a little bit with the beginnings of online data collection and stuff like that but it really wasn't going anywhere yet. In Hong Kong we had the systems that the State Department had begun to put in in the 1970s, the Wang word processing system. But at that time the Apple personal computers began to come out. There was a whole section of Hong Kong where the copies came out and they were one-tenth the price of the Apples selling in the fancy stores. Everything was pirated.

*Q: Did you get involved in anti-pirating?*

ADAIR: There were some discussions with the Hong Kong government, but I was not involved. The Hong Kong authorities would occasionally raid these places but that kind of activity had been going on for a long time – like with watches and high end name brands. In the case of computers, most of the merchandise was consumed in the Hong Kong market.

*Q: I go back to the time when I was in Saigon and we used to drop off in Hong Kong. Were American military making port visits and that sort of thing?*

ADAIR: Yes but not on a big scale. The ships would come in, but you really didn't see that many American sailors and military around the streets of Hong Kong. It was very interesting when the fleet came in, because we got to visit the aircraft carrier and talk with the crew.

The British military presence was much more noticeable of course. I got to know them not through work but because I would run with them in the evenings, the Hash House Harrier groups.

*Q: When you leave Hong Kong?*

ADAIR: 1984.

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*Q: Eighty-four. Then you were off to where, Beijing?*

ADAIR: Yes.

*Q: How was that? Was it different?*

ADAIR: It was really different. Hong Kong was a big, bustling international city where you could get anything and everything was available. People were available, information and communication were available. When we moved up to Beijing it was a completely different atmosphere. We didn't even know when – or even if we would get an apartment. For years before we got there some people spent their entire tours in a hotel. As it turned out we were lucky and got a little apartment in the diplomatic area within a few months.

The city, of course, was very different. It was still much more like it had been for the last 30 years than what it is now. There were almost no cars on the streets, mostly bicycles. There were virtually no stores except for the big government centers. We could not go to those. We were limited to the "Friendship Store", which was created specifically to cater to foreigners. But things were changing. Little places began to pop up in little nooks and crannies of the buildings where people lived, teeny little places about the size of this room. They started out selling food, extra produce that the government distribution centers didn't want, then food that enterprising farmers brought in to the city, then articles of clothing and so on. These stores began to mushroom. In the beginning they were very uncomfortable if we went in, because people were not sure how they should behave with foreigners. Many people at that time, even in Beijing, had never seen foreigners; so that made them uncomfortable. Those who were more familiar with the phenomenon understood they had to be careful in dealing with foreigners and it wasn't clear how far they could go.

We had to be very careful in our dealings with other people. Sometimes they would brush us off or try to isolate us – sort of like germs. We understood that it was difficult for them, and that they had to be careful, but it was hard to avoid taking it personally sometimes. There seemed to be a tone of xenophobia or racism sometimes as well. I think that most of it though was that they just didn't know what they were allowed to do.

Then there were the government officials. Some of them were required to deal with us. Some of them were simply allowed to, and many more were not allowed to deal with us. We could request appointments and call on government offices. We could try to have conversations, try to understand what they were doing, and deliver our own points of view. Language, of course, was a limiting factor since my Chinese was still limited – and there were lots of different accents and vocabulary that I had yet to assimilate. We also had a few American interpreters to help us with formal communications, and some of Chinese staff could help as well. Nevertheless, for the most part we didn't get very far. The Chinese officials either didn't have much to tell us, or they didn't want to tell us, or they'd been told not to tell us. Sometimes they knew more than we did about the intricacies of international trade and regulations. It was sort of hard to predict.

In Beijing I was in the economic section, but I was working on bilateral U.S.-PRC relations, rather than the analysis of the Chinese economy. I wanted that change. There were two areas that were particularly active then. One was the textile negotiations. The PRC wanted to export more textiles to the United States, but Chinese exports were limited by the existing system of

American import quotas for textile imports. Those negotiations were very active. Since the Chinese were very interested in them, we had more access to and more contact with those government offices.

The other was the civil aviation relations. American airlines were very interested in gaining more access to Chinese destinations. When I first arrived, there was only one American airline that had official permission under a bilateral agreement to fly to the PRC, and that was Pan American. Pan American wanted greater access – to more cities; and other American airlines – like Northwest - wanted similar access. However, at the time, the PRC had only one national airline. Their attitude was sort of, “We have one airline with access to your market. You get one airline with access to our market.” There was a systemic difference. China had one government airline with access to all parts of China. The United States had many private airlines with access to different parts of the United States. It was really difficult to mesh these things. There were legitimate worries on the part of the Chinese in terms of competition, because the American airlines were more experienced, more developed and – at least at the time – had more money. There was also a security aspect, because in China the air space was controlled by the military and only certain civilian routes were allowed in through that military air space. In the United States it is just the opposite. But in some respects we were negotiating with the military in absentia. The civil aviation authorities probably had to clear everything that they said to us with the military. The military did not seem to have much incentive to compromise, so communication between us and the civil aviation authorities was usually quite sterile. It was very frustrating.

But the city itself was – there. We could walk around. We could even drive around. Ginger and I took a small car up that we had purchased in Hong Kong. It was fascinating to wander around and just look. There were almost no stores, and the buildings were very grey and dingy. However, if you went beyond the diplomatic area and the area of government buildings and looked more closely most of the buildings, streets and alleyways were quite old.

We could also visit the Forbidden City, which was and is a national museum. For centuries that magnificent royal city had been pretty much off limits to ordinary people. There were temples that we could go to. There was a Tibetan temple right next to the Forbidden City. We were able to drive outside the city as well. We could drive to the Great Wall, and out to the Ming Tombs.

At that time there were a few Western hotels that had been built in Beijing, so we could go there for different kinds of food. And the city was constantly changing. Every month there were more changes. You would see it in the people as well - the people that we dealt with.

As I mentioned, it was difficult to associate with Chinese officials when we arrived. About a year into our tour, however, the embassy received some movies that were just coming out in the United States. One of them was “Kramer versus Kramer.” We decided to try inviting some Chinese officials and see if they come. Each section of the embassy got to invite people. Most of the sections did not get much response. However, the economic section got a big surprise. The Deputy Minister who led the PRC textile negotiation team arrived and brought his wife. That just blew us away because we almost never got to meet officials’ families in those days. In addition, when he arrived he wasn’t wearing the standard blue Mao suit. Some government officials had

Mao suits that were made of better quality material than the people on the street, but the design was essentially the same. This man wore designer clothes from Hong Kong, and was friendly and gracious to match. Things really were changing.

That didn't mean that people could pull out all the stops, or even relax. I met an academic from another city in China on a trip, and later he called on Ginger and me when he visited Beijing. We took him out to dinner, and then back to where he was staying. We talked for a fairly long time in the car, because I thought it might be a little safer to talk there than in the restaurant. A week later we got a message, an informal message, from him saying he had been warned not to talk with us and asking us not to contact him again. Things were still being controlled. People were still being watched, and we had to be careful not to get others into trouble.

*Q: During what time period were you there?*

ADAIR: From '84 to '86.

*Q: There are always incidents. Chinese tennis players or dancers would defect or something would happen. There would be collisions. Did anything like that happen while you were there?*

ADAIR: The incident with the tennis player, Hu Na, happened in 1982, before our tour in Beijing. The asylum in the embassy for Fang Lizhi, the Chinese astrophysicist, happened in 1989 after we left Beijing and before we served in Chengdu. We didn't have any major incidents of that sort when I was there.

*Q: What was the city of Beijing like?*

ADAIR: We both actually ended up liking Beijing a lot. In the winter it was cold, and the pollution was pretty bad because they mostly used coal for heating. It was actually very pleasant in the spring and even in the summer. The city itself was fascinating. We had a book called "In Search of Old Peking" that had been published in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. It seemed to be a pretty accurate guidebook to Beijing, though a lot of the buildings and places that it described were no longer there.

*Q: I understand that old quarters would just disappear.*

ADAIR: Yes, well that is what has been going on recently. What we saw was the results of the destruction that Mao Zedong's regime wreaked on the city. In some respects what we could actually see was less significant than what we could no longer see. Beijing used to have magnificent protective walls all around the city. Those walls were almost entirely gone when we got there, torn down in the frenzy of the Cultural Revolution. But it wasn't like the tearing down of the Berlin Wall. The walls around Beijing were 60 feet high and 40 feet wide. It must have been a monumental effort to tear them down. Some pieces were still left along with some of the entry gates to the city. It was pretty amazing stuff, and very sad that it and so many other historical buildings were gone.

*Q: What about visitors? I've talked to people who served in the economic section I think maybe a*

*little before you. They used to talk about death by duck. The Chinese would invite visiting delegations out to have Peking duck, which is awfully rich. You do that a couple of times a week, and perhaps you're not looking forward to doing it again. How did you find it?*

ADAIR: Well it wasn't so much the duck that was dangerous as what they served with the duck – the famous Chinese “baijiu”. It's made from grain and is extremely strong. It's “white lightning” with several thousand years of refinement behind it. When I had been stationed in Paris I really loved drinking the wines and trying all the different kinds of alcohols. I tried it in Taiwan as well. Drinking is a long and honored tradition in China – well, not honored by everyone. It seems a little bit more civilized than what I have heard about in Russia. It is primarily designed to loosen you up and promote friendship. The phrase “gan bei” means “drain your glass” and they do it. There is also an element of competition, and one has to be careful. I wasn't careful and learned the hard way. Within the first month after I arrived we had a delegation of American mountain climbers come through from Seattle. They were led by Lou Whittaker, and were going to make an attempt on Mt. Everest. The Chinese Mountaineering Association hosted a dinner for them at the big Peking Duck Restaurant in the middle of Beijing. It was just an immense restaurant, and foreigners called it the “duck factory” because that's what they specialized in.

I was representing the embassy because the ambassador or the DCM either couldn't go or knew enough not to go. I sat next to the head of the mountaineering association, a very jovial and very tough gentleman who loved to drink. I was determined to keep up with him and I did. I counted. I kept track of how many glasses I was drinking. It was served in shot glasses, and I drank 20 of them.

*Q: Good God!*

ADAIR: At the end of the dinner I wasn't sure if I was even going to be able to stand up. But I managed to stand up, say good night respectfully and walk out to the car. I managed to walk out, get in the car, and go back to the hotel. Ginger met me in the lobby. She says I smiled and said proudly that I drank 20 glasses, then went upstairs and was sick for three days. It was awful. I had poisoned myself. After that I was more careful.

*Q: Well you must have been quite busy with visiting business groups.*

ADAIR: Not so many business groups, and they were primarily hosted by the Commercial Section. The American business community was almost invisible in China. The embassy had really increased the size of the commercial section; bringing people up from the Hong Kong business community who had lots of experience with American business there. They worked really hard. There were some American business people on the government delegations that came to negotiate on things like textiles and civil aviation. There were certainly visitors from banks and big corporations, but compared to the Japanese and the Hong Kong Chinese the Americans were barely players at all.

*Q: Why? Why was this?*

ADAIR: American corporations were risk averse – at least when it came to China. Several years later, when I was the consul general in Chengdu, I traveled to Hong Kong to try and encourage businesses to come up and take a look at Sichuan province. The American Chamber of Commerce organized a meeting for me. Not very many people came to my presentation. I think those that did mostly came because they'd known me when I had been in Hong Kong before. Afterwards, I talked with several of them and they said if I could give them a guarantee of profits in the range of 25-50 percent, then they would think about coming up and looking. Otherwise they were not interested. Because American businesses have this really short timeframe and they have to make a profit within a certain period of time - otherwise their boards and stockholders get unhappy - it's just too risky. And the Japanese and others were going in for the next 20 to 50 years. Americans were way behind – and I think they are still far behind.

*Q: Were there any efforts on the part of business organizations or something to look at the Chinese market over a long period of time or just no effort to change this?*

ADAIR: Well the Chambers of Commerce constantly pressed the U.S. Government to work on Chinese trade barriers and things like that, but in my career I have not seen much evidence of the American business community planning very far ahead – with the possible exception of resource extraction companies. Some companies in the China field were willing to take some risk. They found people that were Chinese language scholars and were willing to - wanted to - go in and spend time in China. Many of them were very good. They got around and learned a lot. But they also had trouble getting their companies to step forward. Admittedly the risks were pretty high. It's difficult now to go into China and deal with the national and local governments and the population. It was even more difficult then.

*Q: Did you have to have a Chinese partner?*

ADAIR: I think the actual requirements for investment varied. Foreign investors did not necessarily have to have a Chinese partner in the same way that the business people in Zaire had to have a Zairian partner – or the way foreigners had to go through Chinese intermediaries in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. But they did have to deal with a myriad of requirements imposed by both the national government and the local governments, and those requirements were changing constantly as the national government experimented with policy and the local governments and local officials sought to enhance their own profits and power. So for a lot of businesses that was difficult.

*Q: Well then you left there in '86? Where did you go?*

ADAIR: After that I went back to Washington for two years.

*Q: Okay, just before we leave, who was your ambassador while you were there?*

ADAIR: Part of the time it was Art Hummel and part of the time it was Winston Lord.

*Q: How were they?*

ADAIR: Well Art Hummel was an extraordinary person. He had good Chinese, and he knew China really well. His own personal experiences, as you know, in China were almost unbelievable.

*Q: He fought as a partisan.*

ADAIR: He was a prisoner of war of the Japanese in China. He escaped and then fought with the Chinese guerillas against the Japanese. He was very good with the Chinese officials, and had tremendous patience. I would go into his office and argue that we should take various measures, including punitive measures – reciprocal measures - to get the Chinese to reduce certain barriers to trade. He would just cut me off and say we're not going to get into that business. And he was probably right at that time.

*Q: Yes.*

ADAIR: It's a hard call.

*Q: How about Winston Lord?*

ADAIR: Winston Lord was very different. He's smart and a very nice person. He had experience on the policy side - obviously, with Kissinger and that first trip to China. And his wife, Betty Bao, is Chinese so she understands the milieu and I'm sure helped him to understand it better. He was a very energetic and dynamic ambassador. But he did not have the kind of Chinese background that gave him a personal understanding of the whole dynamic that Art Hummel had, and that some of the ambassadors after him had, like Jim Lilley and Stape Roy.

*Q: Can you explain how a deeper understanding of the background of a country makes one a better ambassador there?*

ADAIR: That's a little difficult to describe. With China, we are dealing with a whole civilization that is far older than ours, and far more complex than ours. It has a dynamic, an inertia and wisdom that most people who haven't been exposed to it can barely imagine. We tend to deal with everybody in the world in the here and now. We tend to look at the past as perhaps being a nice cultural picture, but primarily an encumbrance, a drag upon progress. We don't see it as being a foundation for something else. We see the negative part of it, the part that weakens our potential adversary or partner, but not the positive side. Consequently, we are less likely to study it carefully. As a result I think that when we have dealt with truly old and established cultures we have been at a disadvantage. Both China and Japan are in that category.

We dealt with them, we thought, from a position of power; Japan because we defeated them militarily, China because it was a basket case. In the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries we thought we were superior because of our greater military and economic power. We also considered ourselves to be very philanthropic with our missionaries and the effort to save Chinese souls. However, in actuality the Chinese have a more solid foundation on which they are standing than do we.

Some of the people who have studied Chinese and Chinese culture and have immersed

themselves in it understand that. Art Hummel understood that. Stape Roy understands that. Their perspective is substantially different. Therefore, the way they deal with individuals, and the decisions that they make are different. They're dealing with both the past and the future; whereas the others tend to be dealing solely with the present. It would be very difficult for someone without a deep knowledge of Chinese history, Chinese government and the Chinese character to do what Burt Levin did in Hong Kong. He arrived and said categorically, "This transfer of power is going to work. You don't understand the Chinese. Chinese communism is a blip on the screen. Hong Kong may be the most profitable city in Asia after Tokyo, but it is just a pimple on the rump of Mother China. They've got a perspective in Beijing that we don't have here." So he was able to say with perfect confidence that, although it looked like total chaos for the next three years, in 10 to 15 years it would be fine. Most Americans don't do that.

**ELIZABETH RASPOLIC**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC and Taiwan (1981-1983)**

**Chief, Consular Section**  
**Guangzhou (1983-1986)**

**Consul General**  
**Beijing (1986-1988)**

*Elizabeth Raspolic worked for the Peace Corps in Pakistan, Thailand, and Tunisia before joining the Foreign Service in 1973. She served mainly as a consular officer in France, Korea, Ethiopia, and China. Ms. Raspolic was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1989.*

*Q: You went to China. What sort of training did you have, and what was your first assignment in China?*

RASPOLIC: I had the standard two years of language training, Mandarin, and it was one year at FSI in Rosslyn, and one year at the Department Language School in Taipei, Taiwan. I went from there directly to Guangzhou, where I was chief of the consular section. That's formerly known as Canton. Believe it or not, the British traders, when they came in the mid-19th century, when they heard Guangzhou, supposedly transliterated it as "Canton." (Laughs) I mean, why not?

*Q: What was your job in Guangzhou?*

RASPOLIC: As chief of the consular section, I was responsible for supervising a section that handled immigrant visas, non-immigrant visas, and American citizen services. Including myself, we had nine American officers, one American secretary, and 27 Chinese employees.

*Q: That's a huge section.*

RASPOLIC: It was a big section.

*Q: Was that the main task, really, of our consulate in Guangzhou, would you say?*

RASPOLIC: It was certainly a major task as a consulate. Our commercial section was equally busy. There were many American businesses who were interested in business possibilities in southern China, which is where, if you're at all familiar with what's going on in China now, the majority of the innovative economic activity is going on in the southern part of China, in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, directly north of Hong Kong. Our political section really was not as active. Our administrative section was very busy, but mostly administering us, rather than providing a service to the public. So it was primarily consular and commercial.

*Q: What were your main functions there in the consular section?*

RASPOLIC: Certainly the biggest chunk of our time was taken up with immigrant visas, because traditionally over the years, Americans of Chinese origin came from the southern part of China. Until we normalized relations in 1979, these American citizens were not able to file immigrant visa petitions for their relatives. So there was a tremendous interest and activity in the filing of immigrant visa petitions from 1979 onward.

I was in Guangzhou from August of 1983 until July of 1986. When I was there, we had over 50,000 names on file in our immigrant visa files, people waiting for their petitions to become current so that we could issue visas. Traditionally, Americans of Chinese origin came from the four-county area, which is four counties within Guangdong province, but basically these counties were between Guangzhou and Hong Kong. Keep in mind that Guangzhou is really only 100 miles north of Hong Kong. So Taishan County and the others were the main sources of immigrants. A tremendous amount of activity.

As the years progressed, we saw more and more immigrants going to the United States as it became easier for them to get their passports and papers in order. We also saw more and more Chinese Americans coming back to visit the homeland to see what relatives were still around. We also began to see more and more retired Chinese Americans coming back to China to retire. Their Social Security checks would certainly go a lot further in China. This was a source of foreign exchange certificates for their family members, and they could live really quite well on their basic Social Security check.

*Q: What years are we talking about?*

RASPOLIC: 1983 to 1986.

*Q: How did you find your staff, both Chinese and American?*

RASPOLIC: The American staff, I thought, was really very good, exceptionally good. We were uneven in that we only had myself and one other position designated as an experienced officer. Then we had seven JO positions. But we had been very fortunate during all three of my years in Guangzhou that one of those JO positions was also filled by a second-tour officer. So we did

have the luxury of having a third experienced officer to help deal with the JOs, because it's very hard to be a sounding board for seven JOs all day long every day. There are certainly going to be many areas where you simply haven't had as much experience. And sometimes there's not conflict, but sometimes some people communicate more easily than others.

*Q: So you need another person.*

RASPOLIC: I think to have the section function well, you need at least one other officer. What we tried ultimately to do was upgrade two of the positions. We won the battle but lost the war, because we upgraded the position, but then we couldn't get any experienced officers worldwide to bid on them. So then we had to fill them with junior officers again! (Laughs)

*Q: These all had to be language officers?*

RASPOLIC: Yes, but under the terms of the new Foreign Service Act, a junior officer is not offered the opportunity to have any more than six months language training before they can be tenured. So what we would do was send people off for either six months of Mandarin, or we also experimented and sent three or four officers for six months in Cantonese. We had them get off language probation on the basis of that, and using those six months, those officers who were interested in it had no problem at all in taking care of their work in Chinese, and many of them really became quite adept at handling interviews in a lot of the other dialects that were used in the area. The JOs are a constant source of amazement to me. I think they're great.

*Q: In Guangzhou, this was your first time, really, in running a section?*

RASPOLIC: Other than the very small section in Addis Ababa, where I had one part-time American employee and two full-time Ethiopian employees, until we fired one.

*Q: How well did you feel you were prepared at this point to run really a very large section?*

RASPOLIC: I felt probably that the State Department had not prepared me to run it, but that I had had sufficient previous experience in the Peace Corps that I could run it. I suppose the largest group I had ever been responsible for was when I was regional director in Thailand and had 120 Peace Corps volunteers in my region that I was responsible for. Granted, I didn't have them all around me every day, but they were all over the countryside. Still, I was reasonably familiar with some of the problems.

*Q: Were you consul general in Guanzhou?*

RASPOLIC: No. Because it was a constituent post, the principal officer was the consul general. I was the chief of the consular section.

*Q: What did you see as your principal job?*

RASPOLIC: My principal job was really a management job, not a consular job. I felt that my principal job was to see that the section opened for business every day and got through the

business day in as smooth and as efficient and as legal a manner as we possibly could. That was the basis of the daily operations, and from then on I would try to work with various officers whom I felt were interested in special projects. We had all sorts of special projects going all the time. Somebody was doing research on how a Chinese cook could qualify for P-6 status; someone else would be doing a special project on how to interview for fraud in a country that wouldn't let you go out and do field interviews for fraud. Things like this. Trying to utilize various officers' special interests and keep them occupied.

*Q: I don't mean this term pejoratively, but would you make up these special projects?*

RASPOLIC: No, no, not at all. Not at all. Usually the special project would come about because we would have requests from perhaps INS in Hong Kong, saying, "We've got a real problem with P-6 cooks. How are we going to deal with it?" So then I'd sit down and we'd have one of our weekly staff meetings. We'd sit around and shoot the breeze about how could we approach it. Somebody would say, "Listen, who's been out talking to the public health officials about how you qualify, how are you licensed in China to be a cook?" Then somebody would say, "Gee, I met somebody the other day who might be able to give me a hand on that. Let me look into it." It would start that way. It would not be any kind of make-work project at all.

*Q: Were the junior officers ready to do this type of work, or did they need quite a bit of guidance?*

RASPOLIC: It varied so much from officer to officer. I found most of them were really quite ready, and they had gone through the ConGen Rosslyn course, which seemed to be relatively successful, I must say, much more so than I felt my training had been. There were always exceptions. (Laughs) There were several officers whom I don't think performed as well as one would have hoped, and I don't think it was necessarily Guangzhou; I basically felt that they perhaps weren't really right for the Foreign Service, and maybe Guangzhou brought it all out a lot sooner than an easier post would have done.

*Q: What were the pressures on you and your staff?*

RASPOLIC: Basically, it was not traditional kinds of pressures. We had pressures to issue visas, yes, but in Guangzhou, people spend a lot more time feeling sorry for themselves, I think, and you had to watch among the JOs not to let them feel sorry for themselves. It is not a pleasant post by any means.

*Q: Feeling sorry for themselves in what manner?*

RASPOLIC: The city is not a comfortable city. It is not all that charming. It's a very commercial city that you can see the main sites of within the first 45 minutes that you're there, but you're there for two years or 18 months or three years, it depends on your tour. So what are you going to do with the rest of the time? It's too easy to say, "I'll go to Hong Kong every weekend." You can catch the train Friday night and come back on Sunday afternoon, and have a very pleasant weekend in Hong Kong, but that's sort of living with one foot in each country, really giving Guangzhou short-shrift.

One of our biggest problems was our facilities in Guangzhou. We were in a hotel, the Dong Fang Hotel. For the first two years that I was there, our office was there and our living quarters. I lived in two hotel rooms in Guangzhou.

Then the third year that I was there, we moved into a marvelous apartment complex. It was really just very lovely. It was a joint venture built by Chinese construction workers with Hong Kong architects, and it was really very nice. But that was the third year.

Our offices continued all that time to be in the Dong Fang Hotel. The consular section was on the ground floor. We had absolutely no security, which bothered us from time to time very much. The first year that I was there, I managed to expand the offices. There was the hotel Sauna that was located next to us, and the hotel was building a new sports complex on another corner of the compound, so this space became available. So we got permission from the embassy to rent it, and we expanded our consular section, which almost doubled our floor space and made a big difference. But we were on the ground floor.

There was a lot of foot traffic outside, a lot of noise. We had no natural light at all, because for security reasons, we had to cover up the glass windows leading out to the courtyard on the interior side. On the exterior side it was just cement brick wall anyway. We had rats in the ceiling, we had cats in the ceiling. In fact, one day a cat fell through the ceiling; it was fighting one of the rats.

We had fleas in the carpeting. In fact, at one point we used to have the exterminators come in, and I really am still, to this day, concerned about what they used to exterminate the fleas with, because we would have to leave. We could not work. Everybody always used to work late in Guangzhou, particularly when we lived in the Dong Fang. There was nothing else to do, so we would work late. We would always have to leave on time the day the exterminators were coming in, because this stuff really was very potent.

We used to also worry about the Dong Fang employees who came in and used their electrical equipment to spread this disinfectant, or whatever it was, because they only had a little gauze mask on. I really was concerned about whether this stuff was eating up their lungs or not.

We had huge roaches, huge water bugs. Not until we expanded the office space did we have a staff toilet, men's room, ladies' room. Before that, we had to leave the office and go out and use either the public facilities that belonged to the hotel or go to your own quarters on another floor, go back to your own apartment and use the john. (Laughs) It really was very unique.

We had a tremendous problem with administration the first year that I was there. I was there for three years, and we had four administrative officers. The first three were the first year that I was there, and then the fourth one came, and he stayed for two years. He was a godsend. He was very, very easy to work with.

*Q: The other ones just said to hell with it and left?*

RASPOLIC: The first one was fired for having his hand in the till, not at that post, but at his previous post. The second two were TDYers, temporary-duty people, sent out to help out until they found some poor soul who was willing to come out. Then the fourth one came on regular assignment.

That's fine and dandy for the rest of the post, but you can't operate a consular section that's issuing 15,000, 16,000 immigrant visas a year unless we know damn well we're going to have forms. We used forms galore. I mean, we had not only just plain immigrant visa issuance forms, but a large variety of application forms. We had all the forms that we sent to people when we scheduled their appointments. We had lots of forms, some of them required by the Department, some of them local forms. But we couldn't operate without these forms.

We also had the problem with our Chinese staff in that we had to train them. They were not accustomed to working in a Western office, and they were not our employees. They were employees of the Diplomatic Service Bureau who were assigned to us. They were actually dragooned from their own work units, sent to the Diplomatic Service Bureau, and then assigned to us. So their allegiance was clearly not to us. We would try and tell them what our expectations were, and we would have training sessions for them, but there were certain American concepts that were very hard to get through to them. One of them was, "Please, when you're using a form, don't come to me when you are down to the last form in the last box. Tell me when you're down to the next to the last box of 1,000 each. Give me a fighting chance to get some more printed or Xeroxed or something or other!" But that continues to this day to be a problem in China. Planning ahead is not rewarded, I guess. I don't know. I don't know what it is, but it made it very difficult.

Ultimately, I had to establish the consular section's administrative subsection. When we expanded our office, we purposely built in a huge storeroom, and we kept all of our forms down there, separating them out from the main consulate storeroom, so that we knew what we had and what was needed to be reordered. We set up our own inventory system. I hired a British woman whose husband was temporarily in Guangzhou with one of the oil companies, and she was one of the best things that ever happened to us, because she was terribly well organized. She set up a very easy-to-deal-with and very comprehensive inventory card system, and worked with the Chinese employees on how to keep it up to date.

*Q: There's no thought of moving into the electronic field in visa issuance, inventory, and all that?*

RASPOLIC: Not in inventory. We have gone to IVACS, the automated visa issuance system in Guangzhou. We made all the arrangements for it while I was still there. I left in July of 1986, and the system actually went into effect in Guangzhou, I believe, late that fall, in September or October, when the training team had come out from the Department.

*Q: With all the problems there, you could still run a system like that?*

RASPOLIC: Yes. With all the problems in Guangzhou, oddly enough, electrical supply was not one of them. The electrical supply was never intermittent at all; it was quite constant, number

one. Number two, with the installation of IVACS, we got an additional position in Guangzhou, and that was a systems person, AIS, automated information system. That person's main role was to keep the IVACS system in the IV section, and also to service all the Wangs that we had in the other sections. We only had WANGS installed in Guangzhou. WANG is a type of word processing. We only had that system made available to us in Guangzhou, I believe, no more than one year before, probably late 1985 or early '86. We reluctantly moved into the 20th century. (Laughs)

*Q: Besides the immigrant visas, were there other problems?*

RASPOLIC: Sure. We had non-immigrant visa that were relatively active, although it was really only the third largest issuing post in China. Most people in Guangzhou will tend to wait for their immigrant visa turn to come up. There certainly are bad NIV cases and applications in Guangzhou, but it could be a lot worse than it is, I must say.

We also had an American Citizen Services section. We had more and more retirees coming to live there, and they would come in and register. We had some American students who had come to study. We had certainly a lot of American tourists coming through, and we would have several very important tourist sites located in our consular district. When we had death cases, invariably they would be up there and not down in Guangzhou. As I say, Guangzhou itself is not very scenic, so tourists would come and make connections on their way to Hong Kong, and they'd stay overnight, if that. We had an anti-fraud officer, and the anti-fraud officer was the only position like that authorized for China. We kept that person busy. We rotated our JOs in Guangzhou, so we tried to give them as much experience as we could, and we also tried to keep them from being bored. They all seemed to like the AFU position. The AFU position gave some of them some very creative leeway. They devised new systems.

*Q: This interview is for people who may be dealing with the consular operation. One of the big things is to try to rotate officers and keep them having fun, or at least to keep them from being bored in some of the more routine things.*

RASPOLIC: Yes. If you're going to be running a section with lots of JOs, you have to be concerned with their careers and training them for what comes next. Then you've got to sort out among the JOs who has already said that he or she is going to be in the consular cone, and who is in another cone. We tried to give consular-cone people as broad experience as we can, because even if it's only a month doing this and you don't do it again for two tours, you will think back and remember and absorb some of this experience, and it will surface again later to the benefit of the Department.

If the person is just paying their dues as a one-time consular officer, then they're going off to make their mark as an econ or admin or political officer, we certainly tried to provide more experience for them, but probably they won't get as much as a consular-cone officer.

What we tried to do was split a JO's tour. First of all, we tried to split the JO's tour, I think, probably too frequently. They had 18 months. We said, "We'll divide it into four sectors. Two of those sectors will be in immigrant visa, since that's the bulk of our work. The other will be either

NIVs or AFU or ACS. We'll just see how it works out. You'll have the luck of the draw." I would work it all out tentatively in pencil and take it around and talk to each one of them, see if they could live with it. If they wanted some changes, we'd see what we could do.

It turned out, frankly, that I thought it seemed to be working reasonably well, but some of the JOs felt that we were rotating too frequently, because they felt they were just getting a handle on the new assignment, and then they'd be moved out into another section. So we said, "Okay." Then we made it three rotations rather than four throughout the tour, and that seemed to work out best for everyone concerned.

*Q: Was the section able to make much contribution to the political or economic reporting?*

RASPOLIC: As the section, yes, I think, because we tried to encourage the JOs to do some reporting for the other sections. One of our officers, who started off as an admin cone officer, now has an econ assignment in the economic bureau here in the Department, and he's switching cones to econ. He used to do some econ reporting for the econ section while he was in the consular section in Guangzhou. Some of his reporting would be based on things that came up during the course of interviews with Chinese citizens over visa matters, and some of them would just be based on his reporting on economic activities that were highlighted in the local press, and some of it would then be tied in with some field work, perhaps, that he had done. He was an excellent reporter.

We had other officers who did non-consular reporting. One fellow did quite a long and very interesting piece on Muslims in Guangzhou. We had another officer who was admin cone, who did quite a bit of food-market research and tried to chart the course of a mild inflation that was going on, watching the price of various things as the prices invariably went up. The prices never seemed to go down.

*Q: No! (Laughs)*

RASPOLIC: I think maybe the world wasn't waiting with anxious breath for some of our reporting, but we did try to give the JOs non-consular experience also.

Also I tried to make sure that the JOs were involved when important people came to town and we had to set up control rooms or whatever. I must say, in three years in Guangzhou, we only had two CODELs [congressional delegations], so you can see. But on the other hand, we did have Vice President Bush come through town. We closed the consular section for a day, other than we had one officer handling emergency ACS cases, and that was it. We felt we could not close that, but we certainly closed everything else. That officer who was handling the ACS cases was actually writing thank-you notes for the Vice President at the same time. (Laughs) Everyone else was down in the control room and working very hard.

We also set up a series of orientation trips for the JOs to travel in China. We used our travel budget that way. This was all on official business. We would send them to the embassy for two days to see how the consular section there functioned, and then to the other consulates for a day each, to see how they functioned there. So it worked out very, very well, I think. We always

knew whose turn it was next to go on the orientation trips.

*Q: It sounds like you had a well-organized program for the care and feeding of the young officers.*

RASPOLIC: We tried. You never succeed with all of them, and you never get through to all of them, but I think we did pretty well, considering what we had to work with.

*Q: How did you get along with the local officials there from the consular group?*

RASPOLIC: Quite well. I think we had a reasonably healthy relationship. We did not see each other all that often. We really only saw each other when there were problems or at social functions, but our relations were really very, very cordial. I knew that I could always call on them when I did have a problem, and I would always receive a very cooperative response.

We had a very bad ACS case toward the end of my time in Guangzhou, and the ministry people could not have been more helpful.

*Q: What was the problem?*

RASPOLIC: There was a lady, an American citizen, who was married to a British citizen, and she lived in London. Apparently the lady had a history of psychiatric problems. Of course, hindsight is wonderful. We found this out after the fact. The first thing we knew about her, she was in a town near Guangzhou, about 40 miles west of Guangzhou, called Foshan. The authorities there were reporting her as perhaps being ill. "Perhaps" -- they had her locked up in a hospital in the director's office. And would we please come and investigate.

We sent off one of the JOs to see her. (Laughs) Fortunately, it was a good choice of JOs, which I didn't know at the time; he just happened to be available. He once had worked in Silver Hill, which is a psychiatric institution in Connecticut, so he at least knows a psycho when he sees one! (Laughs)

The lady had come to China to find the inner meaning and inner truth. Someone in her family had died, and she had inherited something like \$15,000 or \$20,000. She had brought all the money with her to Hong Kong, and had the money transferred into Chinese foreign exchange certificates, of all things, in Hong Kong, transferred directly to the Bank of China in Foshan. For some reason or another, she had read about Foshan before and knew about Foshan, and wanted to go to Foshan. This lady arrived with \$20,000 in the bank in Foshan. She probably had more money than the entire city budget, and it was all in her name. She was staying in a hotel, and she then started acting very strangely. She painted a mustache on her face and was parading around the hotel. She'd get undressed in the hotel room with the hotel door open. I mean, not in China! Not in China! No, no, no!

*Q: Maybe St. Tropez or something. (Laughs)*

RASPOLIC: But not in China, no. I think she stole a table knife. She claimed it was a table

knife; the hotel claimed it was a carving knife. Stole it from the kitchen and slept with it under her pillow. Just a series of rather bizarre things. The affect was completely wrong.

So they had put her in a mental institution. The Chinese wanted us to get her out, and we kept saying, "She's an American citizen. We cannot force her to leave. If you want her out, you're going to have to make arrangements to take her." Under our regulations, we have to protect her rights.

*Q: This is an argument that is going on on a daily basis somewhere in the world.*

RASPOLIC: Absolutely. As an American citizen, we have to protect her rights, even though she is totally unaware that we're trying to protect her rights. So we went around and around and around. This started in early June. At one point, the Chinese said they would sedate her, take her to the Shenzhen border. Shenzhen is a special economic zone right on the border between Guangdong Province and Hong Kong. They would put her in a van. They wanted us to send a vice consul to Foshan to ride in the van with her, sedated, to the border. They would take her out, put her in a wheelchair, and the vice consul would then wheel the wheelchair across the border to Hong Kong. We said, "Yoo hoo! No, no, no, no, no. We're not doing this at all."

Their idea of getting rid of her was to take her to Hong Kong, not send her back to her home in London, because it was so much cheaper for them. The Chinese will not spend money on anything that they don't have to, and certainly not foreign exchange certificates.

Then we contacted Hong Kong, and Hong Kong said if this lady comes down to Hong Kong, according to Hong Kong law, there is nothing they can do for her. They cannot hospitalize her unless she voluntarily commits herself, because she would not have committed any act that would be contrary to Hong Kong law, and she would not be a threat to either herself or society.

So we knew full well that if this lady was on her own in Hong Kong, what she would do is turn around and come back to China. So around and around and around. The family in London was no help at all.

Finally, after enormous, enormous, enormous finagling and dealing with the British Embassy in Beijing and dealing with the family through our embassy in London, we made arrangements. The Chinese were willing to declare her incapable of making decisions on her own. So with that in hand, then we were able legally to step in and make arrangements on her behalf. We had the family's permission. The husband was so touching, he was really wonderful. He permitted us to use her money to pay for her way, for her Medevac. Very thoughtful to the bitter end.

But to get her out, we could not even send her out on a plane that transited Hong Kong, because for one thing, she would have to transfer planes in Hong Kong. It would be a stretcher case, because she would have to be sedated and escorted all the way back to London. If she transferred planes, Hong Kong immigration would consider her to have attempted to enter Hong Kong, and therefore they would not accept the mainland Chinese psychiatric evaluation that she was incompetent. So we had to find a flight that got her out directly, bypassing Hong Kong, back to London. We had to send her up to Beijing on CAC and have her transfer to a British Airways

flight, and then go back to London that way.

First we hired one nurse to come up from Hong Kong to escort her all the way back to London, and British Airways announced that she couldn't fly unless she had two nurses, so we had to hire a second one. That was at the last minute, we got this nurse. This all happened during the very week that I was transferring from Guangzhou to Beijing, so I was making all the arrangements in Guangzhou. Then I flew up and moved to Beijing and was there for her arrival when she came up. I went out to meet the plane.

It turned out that the "wonderful" psychiatric institution in Foshan did not supply sufficient sedatives to the nurses to last them for the entire trip to London. I only found this out 45 minutes before the flight was due to leave Beijing, so we went running around. Fortunately there's an airport clinic in Beijing, and they happened to have, because we were still in China, exactly the same kind of sedative that they'd been using down in Guangzhou. So we bought out their entire supply and sent it along, just in case. (Laughs) It worked out just as well, because apparently the flight was delayed at a couple of points along the line.

When last seen, she was ambulatory when she arrived in London, and British Airways wanted to take her to a hospital for "a check up" at the psychiatric hospital. She refused to go, and walked out of the airport on her own steam, and has never been seen since. (Laughs) I mean, her family has seen her. She went home, but she, fortunately, never came back to China.

*Q: Then you became consul general in Beijing. When was this?*

RASPOLIC: This was July of 1986, and I was there until July of 1988.

*Q: When you were in the consulate, how did you view your consular support from the embassy?*

RASPOLIC: Quite differently. When I was in Guangzhou, I regarded the Guangzhou operation as entirely independent. I would pick and choose which issues I wanted to inform Beijing about or to keep them informed if I thought they might be interested in it, or if I thought it might be precedent-setting, you know, contribute to consular operations in general in China. But I felt that we were the largest post in the country in terms of manpower and IV caseload, and we dealt directly with the Department. Beijing did not visit us and was totally unaware of what the hell we were doing, so therefore I felt no strong allegiance to the consular section in Beijing.

*Q: Now you changed hats.*

RASPOLIC: Now my opinion of Guangzhou is, "What the hell are they doing? Don't they know that they can't do that? Didn't they read our last directive? Haven't they been following the correspondence, for example, from Shanghai, where we've infoed all the consulates? What are they doing? Why are they not acknowledging that this is not new ground?" This kind of thing. "On this particular issue, whatever it is, why are they going directly to the Department? Why aren't they asking us first? Why aren't they giving us the option of speaking for all posts in the country, rather than negotiating with the Department independently?" Your perspective is quite different.

*Q: What was your operation like in Beijing?*

RASPOLIC: It was half the size of Guangzhou in the sense of manpower, and we only had five American officers and one American secretary. We had 14 Chinese employees. It literally was half. But the division of labor was quite different, and the portfolio was different. Granted, in house we had normal visa operations and American Citizen Services.

In terms of visas, when I first got there, we issued both immigrant and non-immigrant visas, but we were in the process of trying to consolidate all immigrant visa issuing in Guangzhou. We felt it was unnecessary to have a duplicate operation in Beijing, in terms of IVs. We didn't have sufficient American personnel, and our Chinese staff was not experienced enough to be able to deal with the variety of cases that we were getting. Whereas Guangzhou had so much experience in this and these cases were just routine in Guangzhou, we figured out that obviously it was going to be physically inconvenient for some of our northern applicants, but since over 85% of the applicants came from the south and of the Beijing applicants, Shanghai used to be in their consular district for IV purposes, almost half the Beijing applicants were from Shanghai and it was equidistant for them to go to Guangzhou as to Beijing. So we felt ultimately we were inconveniencing maybe 200 to 400 people a year, but we were benefitting almost 15,000 to 16,000. So that's what we did. We really received very little flak for it. I think it was much more efficient.

It also gave us time in Beijing to concentrate on our biggest operation, and that was non-immigrant visas. Last year I think we issued in between 35 and 40,000 non-immigrant visas, and those were issuances. We must have refused thousands more. So we were very, very busy in our NIV section.

Before, we had not been utilizing our staff, I think, very efficiently. Our experienced officer was issuing IVs, because it was more complicated, even though it affected a very minimal number of people, whereas NIVs, which were not as complicated but had a much broader impact, were being supervised and issued by junior officers, with very little supervision. I was not at all at ease with that. I think we have a much more efficient, much more reliable operation now.

American Citizen Services is very busy in Beijing because most American tourists who come to China are certainly not going to leave China without having visited Beijing. It's a very popular tourist site. We have the traditional gamut of problems of ACS, and we have a lot of deaths, a lot of people suffering from what a consular officer several years ago referred to as the "Peking duck syndrome." (Laughs) Death by duck. The elderly person, because a tourist in China generally is elderly, because they're the ones who have the money and the time to afford to go to China, they go, they're taken out at 6:00 in the morning, they're off to see the Great Wall, then tromping through the Ming tombs, and they stop off at the Forbidden City. Then they go back to the hotel, shower and change, and go out for a banquet. By the time they get back to the hotel, it's 10:00 or 11:00 at night. You're 75 years old and you had a bypass 15 years before, and bingo! It happens.

*Q: How did you find the Chinese as far as helping you with the death cases?*

RASPOLIC: Very helpful. We had, I think, very good relations with the major hospitals in town. We had two or three hospitals with foreigners' clinics that we dealt with extensively, both for death and illness cases. The civil authorities were very helpful, the people at the crematorium were very helpful to us, Customs, when we had to ship ashes or bodies out, they really went out of their way many times. The Chinese were very, very thoughtful. Tourism is an important business to them, it is their main industry, and they certainly don't like seeing tourists die.

*Q: How did the consular section fit into the embassy?*

RASPOLIC: Quite well. This gets me back to one other point that I wanted to make. Our division of labor at the embassy regarding consular affairs did not necessarily match the division of labor at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Therefore, as the consul general, I was responsible oftentimes for administering parts of our bilateral Consular Convention, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs associated with the consular section because it was a consular convention. However, within the embassy, the issue at hand was probably either an administrative matter or something that would be normally handled by the front office, but which I would be involved in because of the Consular Convention.

To give you some specifics, the whole question of reciprocity. If we let their staff in Chicago travel within a radius of 25 miles of the post, then that means our staff in Shenyang can travel within a radius of 25 miles. Are we going to argue back and forth as to who's not getting their 25 miles? Or if we opened Route 395 for them to exit Washington via the south, does this mean, then, that the people in Shanghai can drive to Hangzhou directly, or do they have to go by train and not take a personal car? This is the kind of negotiation that I would get involved in because of the consular convention, not because of the consular section.

Customs clearance matters were in the Consular Convention and several other points like that. I oftentimes would get involved in things that wouldn't normally be considered to be consular work at other posts.

But as far as how we fit into the other sections, we worked very closely with a lot of the other sections. We worked very closely with P and C, which in China is called the Press and Cultural Section, which in most other posts is the USIS section. But for a variety of reasons, when posts were established in China, they could not be called USIS, so they were called Press and Cultural.

We dealt frequently with the cultural affairs office because there were lots of student exchanges going on, and these people were using the form IAP-66. It used to be DSP-66.

*Q: This is the exchange-student form.*

RASPOLIC: Yes, the exchange-student form, cultural exchange. These would be issued by P and C, and so we worked very closely with them. We worked very closely with them also because they were constantly expediting sending over large groups of Chinese entertainers to the United States, who would have contractual commitments here to perform on X date, but their passports wouldn't be issued until the last minute by the Chinese authorities, so therefore it was up to us to

expedite the visa issuance.

The Chinese have very laborious passport issuance procedures, and they could care less about other countries' visa procedures. If we wanted the person in the United States by a certain date, or if they had to be there by a certain date, then it was certainly not up to them to waive their passport procedures, but it was clearly up to us to waive our visa issuance procedures. So we would go round and round and round about this all the time. We had very complicated China-specific visa procedures that we have to follow.

*Q: Is communism a problem?*

RASPOLIC: Oh, sure.

*Q: As far as clearances.*

RASPOLIC: Very much so. Our law requires it, our procedures require it. We have to presume membership in most cases, because in most cases the membership is not acknowledged by the individual applicant, but we do have to take a look at the applicant and what his or her position is, and whether it is not unusual to assume that that person would be a Party member.

*Q: Did you attend country-team meetings? Were you a part of that?*

RASPOLIC: Yes, very much so.

*Q: Did you find that you were being used as a source of information about how things were going?*

RASPOLIC: Not necessarily a source, but I felt very much that I was an active participating member of the country team. If the ambassador asked for comments on any given situation, there was never any reason for me to feel that my comment was not as well received as anyone else's around the table. The ambassador, I think, was very good about that.

*Q: How about dealing with Washington? In my days, particularly with matters of visa problems, I found that if I wanted to stall or didn't want to do something, I would refer things to Washington. I found it's far better to resolve almost anything you could think of right at the post if you wanted to take action, because you never were sure of what answer you might get, or if you would get an answer. Have you found this to be true?*

RASPOLIC: Not as much as it used to be. I agree with you that before, if you went back to the Department and asked for guidance, that really was putting the whole case in the deep freeze until you got the guidance. But you could pretty much rely on getting the guidance. I don't think that that is used all that much anymore, primarily because the Department, in some offices, has been notorious in not responding. Therefore, it is not efficient to go back and ask for guidance when you're not going to get any guidance. What you're going to have is a very unhappy applicant, his family, supporters, and congressmen, and it puts you in a untenable position because you can't keep saying you're waiting for guidance when this goes on month after month

after month, no matter. For example, if you're talking about the Visa Office, I found that the Visa Office simply has no shame, so therefore you can't try and shame them into replying to you. They simply won't.

So if I had to send something back to the Department, I would tell the applicant that it's not a question of, "Change your plane reservations or whatever. We're going to go back and ask for guidance." What I would have to say is, "I have to refer this case to the Department. I don't know when I will receive a reply. It may be up to six months. Don't call me; I'll call you." It would have to be under those circumstances.

I was very frustrated, particularly during the Beijing tour, with the lack of prompt reply from the Department. I felt that it clearly hindered some of our operations, our visa negotiations, our treaty negotiations that we had going on with the Chinese. I think they could have moved forward much more rapidly had we had some prompt replies. I think that the lack of prompt reply is a direct reflection on who is operating at whatever level in the Visa Office, the people who were in one particular office. When I was in Guangzhou, the Visa Office had established one particular back-up person in Washington, one position to back up the visa negotiations from the Washington side. My predecessor in Beijing had the advantage of that.

When I got there, the visa office, for some unknown reason, abolished the position and gave that responsibility to someone else who already had a full plate. Therefore, I would send in visa negotiation updates asking for guidance, and then I would have to fight to get a reply. Sometimes it would take up to six months! Well, the Chinese, I believe, totally misunderstood this and thought that this reflected a lack of interest on the American side, which simply wasn't the case.

If they're not going to give you authority to conduct the negotiations without the guidance, then they damn well ought to take the responsibility of giving you the guidance! You can't have it both ways. I found that extremely frustrating.

**ROBERT KNOPEs**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1981-1982)**

**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Beijing (1982-1983)**

**Chief, Cultural/Information Office, American Institute**  
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*Robert Knopes was born in Janesville, Wisconsin, raised on the family farm, and served in the U.S. Navy during the Korean War. He received his BA and MA from the University of Wisconsin before entering the Foreign Service in 1961. He served with USIA in Thailand, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Italy. He was Chief of the East Asia/Pacific Division of Voice of America. Mr. Knopes was interviewed by David Reuther in 2014.*

KNOPES: Yeah. I got about six months of refresher Chinese, a lot of reading, mostly Renmin Ribao. I tested out again at S3-R3. Karen and I left for Beijing in July or August of '82.

*Q: And up to this time China had been -- the Reagan administration had finally come to some decision on how it wanted to handle China versus Taiwan. And in fact, Hague is asked to leave in July of '82 because of this maneuvering. And Shultz comes in. So you're assigned to Beijing --*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: And your job is PAO?*

KNOPES: No, not at that time. Once again I went out as the field program officer. I seemed to start out with that title in all my assignments, but never worked in that job.

*Q: No.*

KNOPES: There was no deputy PAO in Beijing at that time. Given the shortage of housing and office space, creating a new position was not possible. The area director said that when the situation changed, I would be named Deputy PAO. In the meantime I should look around and do whatever was being left undone. One of those tasks would be to systematize the distribution list for Jiao Liu, the Chinese language magazine. Another job would be to set up a Distribution Record System (DRS), a centralized list of all the embassy's contacts. DRS was being set up worldwide, not just in China. It was a pretty good idea. Previously, when an officer left post, he carried away his contact lists in his head. His replacement had to start over again. A centralized system would give the new officer a head start. I would also oversee the branch post in Shanghai, open a second in Guangzhou, and plan for a third in Shenyang.

*Q: You arrive in '82.*

KNOPES: I arrived the summer of '82, that's right. In October of '82, I went on a trip through the northeast, to Harbin and Dalian, Jilin, and Shenyang. In Shenyang I looked over the site for our consulate. In the other cities I visited universities and officials to determine what activities USIS, or P&C (Press & Cultural) as we were called in the PRC, could best introduce. I checked on reception of Jiao Liu, added names for the DRS list, and generally surveyed the northeast for program opportunities. I learned a lot about China in that one trip. In Harbin I made my first contact with the foreigner handlers, who were the guys that --

*Q: Oh, diplomatic security?*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: PSB?*

KNOPES: The security, PSB. They were called the waiban, the foreign office. I told them who I wanted to see in the government but they weren't very interested in helping. They didn't know much about me or the American embassy. For some reason, in our conversation I mentioned that I was from Wisconsin. Suddenly, they became very cooperative because the governor had just returned from Wisconsin. He had set up a sister state relationship with Wisconsin.

*Q: Oh!*

KNOPES: Riding in from the airport, I looked around and thought, "this looks like Wisconsin." It was flat, with big fields and heavy equipment to work them. Not at all like the south, where tiny plots were worked by hand. I didn't meet the governor, but the lieutenant governor had a dinner for me. I told him what I could about Wisconsin and I learned a lot about northeast China.

*Q: Love it. Was that off of an IV, or how did he get to Wisconsin?*

KNOPES: That's a good question. I don't think it was an IV. It was too early in the relationship. I think it was arranged between Wisconsin and Heilongjiang.

*Q: Yeah.*

KNOPES: I don't think P&C was geared up for IVs yet. There were more and more sister city connections being made, and I think other provincial governors were visiting the States to promote trade. These were arranged independently, often by Americans, who also wanted trade and cultural exchanges. I met officials in other provincial capitals on that trip but those meetings weren't very useful. The biggest change I saw was the opening up of universities. They were coming out of hibernation after the Cultural Revolution, expanding, looking for ideas and programs. Almost all had foreign experts recruited from the US teaching English. A lot of books, even foreign books, had survived the Cultural Revolution. University libraries could now order books and magazines from overseas. Several libraries I visited had already built a broad collections of publications. Space was the major problem for most libraries. Several university librarians told me that stacks of boxes I asked about were ancient books and manuscripts. There was no room to unpack and display, let alone use them. Another frequently cited problem was building a centralized collection. Every department wanted its own library. When it got hold of a book, it wouldn't share it with anyone else. The student population was growing. Incoming classes were chosen on merit, not political steadfastness. The bad news was student housing. It was just terrible -- crowded, dusty, and cold in winter. The housing of foreign experts. was pretty grim, too. But they were enthusiastic. They accepted their substandard accommodations. Their biggest complaint was the restrictions placed on them. The waiban, university security people, wouldn't let them talk to their students after class, or even mix with the faculty outside of classrooms. They were kept separate, almost in isolation. Many were leaving because of that.

*Q: And what was the source of them? I mean were these just people volunteering, coming out or --*

KNOPES: Yeah, they'd volunteer. I think the Chinese embassy and consulates put ads in papers and flyers in universities. Most of the foreign experts taught English. There were none in political science or government. Probably not much on the history side either. It depended on the university. I talked to one American specialist who said, "I give talks on American institutions once a week. I started out with 10 people and now hundreds are coming." That was the exception, however. On that trip also I visited a music school, a movie studio and the home of Zhang Zuolin, the subject of my Master's thesis.

Other than foreign experts, I didn't see another foreigner on my trip. Not even in my hotels. For breakfast in Jilin, I headed for a large dining room filled with uniformed Chinese, government officials, I think. A waiter stopped me at the door. "Bu xing," he said. Not allowed. I protested a bit but finally turned and went to the foreigners' dining room, where I was served runny eggs, burnt toast, and weak coffee by a young waitress. I was the only customer there.

*Q: Did you get a chance to hit the other consulates, Shanghai, Guangzhou?*

KNOPES: Yeah, I did. In Shanghai Don Anderson was the CG and Dave Hess was the BPAO. I visited Shanghai quite a few times. Dave was a great contact person, but he was a little loose on administrative and reporting duties. He didn't like to put anything on paper. In early 1983 we added a branch PAO in Guangzhou. I went down to see if he was getting settled. The 3 of them, Carl Chan, the BPAO, his wife and baby were doing all right. They had two bedrooms in the Dong Fang Hotel above the consulate and were heating the baby's bottle on a hot plate in the bathtub. I said, "We can make things a bit more comfortable for you. Let me know what you need." He never did, though.

*Q: (laughs)*

KNOPES: He was good officer, very conscientious. I don't know where he is now. But you know, all the JOTs I worked with are now retiring *(laughs)*. I am beginning to feel old.

*Q: Yes.*

KNOPES: It's kind of distressing.

*Q: One of the officers I mentored became an ambassador (laughs).*

KNOPES: Right.

*Q: Conditions in Beijing were pretty basic at this time, certainly on the living side of things, a lot of people went off -- and the desk back in Washington was wanting to be helpful, but the help was basically to block all the other agencies from sending out thousands of people, because everybody wanted to go to Beijing.*

KNOPES: It's all they could do, that's right. Our progression through the housing in Beijing was interesting. We started the Fuxing Hotel. Did you ever see the Fuxing?

*Q: Mm-mm.*

KNOPES: Way out in the west, past the Diaoyutai guest house.

*Q: Mm!*

KNOPES: It was a new hotel, but you wouldn't know it. The plumbing didn't work and the cockroaches were already in residence. It was a terrible hotel. We were there only about 10 days when a room opened up at the Beijing Hotel. So we moved up, uptown and upscale. We were in the Beijing Hotel less than a month when we moved to the Jianguo Hotel, a new hotel over by the embassy. It was a California-style motel built on Chang An Lu, not far from the Friendship store. We had a two-level apartment, with the bedroom upstairs, a little kitchen and a sitting room downstairs

*Q: I think that's the Toronto.*

KNOPES: No. It wasn't, it wasn't Toronto. This was the Jianguo. The staff was well-trained and provided good service. It had a good restaurant, several good restaurants. We moved there in November and stayed until I took over as PAO in February, 1983. I wasn't expecting to become PAO in Beijing. The plan was for me to be DPAO in the fall when a new PAO was to arrive. But the incumbent PAO had not been effective. He was thinking of retiring, planning to be a writer. But he knew China. When needed, he could sit down and write a persuasive memo for the ambassador in a half-hour. But he was not running the office. Complaints about his lack of attention had reached Washington.

The area director came to visit in February. After a private meeting, the PAO called the staff meeting to announce that he had decided to retire. He would be leaving in two weeks. The area director said that I would be acting PAO for the rest of the year. So we moved from the very comfortable Jianguo Hotel to the PAO's apartment, a very big, very nice apartment. It had three bedrooms, a spacious living room, and a big kitchen. But it didn't have daily maid service like the Jianguo, something Karen had appreciated. I took over as PAO but my job did not change much. What I was doing had to be done anyway. The American staff was excellent. Most had been there for a year already and they were doing a fine job. I continued working on the distribution list, supervising the branch posts, and developing contacts. To get a DRS going I met with embassy officers to explain the system and get their input. I began to work on a budget for P&C. The post had grown rapidly, funding was available to expand programs, and things were going well. But we didn't have a clear idea of where the money was going, accountability was a problem. I worked with the administrative assistant and, with help from the admin section of the embassy, produced a reasonable plan for the coming year.

Soon after I took over, Chinese authorities short-circuited one of our projects. A major exhibit of portraits from the National Portrait Gallery was packed and ready to leave Washington for Beijing. Leon Slawecki, the CAO, had worked with various ministries on this show for almost

two years. Everything was settled, all clearances were in hand. Then came a call from, I think the Ministry of Education, saying, "We've looked over the list of paintings in the exhibit and we object to two of them. These must be removed." One was of Douglas MacArthur. There might have some rationale for that one. The other was Golda Meir, who was in the exhibit because she had been born in Milwaukee. Someone apparently wanted her out because of Israel's attitude toward the PRC. We pointed out that all portraits in the exhibit had been approved, that the exhibit was packed and ready to ship, and that it could not be changed at this late date. The matter was non-negotiable, came the reply.

I explained the situation to Ambassador Hummel, who agreed that we could not consider changing the exhibit. If the Chinese insisted, we must cancel.

We informed State, USIA and the Portrait Gallery by cable. My first action as PAO was to cancel the biggest event planned since the embassy opened.

*Q: Where was the exhibit going to be?*

KNOPES: I don't remember. It was a major venue, in Beijing. There weren't many attractive, even suitable, exhibit halls in Beijing at the time. I don't recall where it was going to be. Leon Slawewski, the CAO, had made most of the arrangements. The interesting thing is that five or six years later, when I was PAO in Hong Kong, we brought that same exhibit to Hong Kong, with resounding success. I hoped the Chinese authorities in Beijing read all the glowing reviews about it. In the long run, I did get to hang that exhibit, but not where it was originally intended.

*Q: Actually, you're making an interesting point here. This is really, this is just three years after normalization. So --*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm, right.

*Q: -- the Chinese bureaucracy is feeling it's way probably.*

KNOPES: Sure, yeah.

*Q: Within its own structure. We're feeling our way. And these kinds of things come up in this kind of --*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: -- early stages.*

KNOPES: Yeah, somebody higher up must have taken a look at the list of paintings and exercised his power. Since it was non-negotiable, he must have been very high up.

*Q: Now, you were saying that the post creates an annual program, this is what we'd like to do, kind of speakers. How was that process doing in Beijing?*

KNOPES: Well, I can't say that I wrote one in Beijing. Country Plans were written in the fall, as I recall. So my predecessor would have written the one for 1983. I assume I wrote one 1984. I also assume that expanding and targeting distribution of Jiaoliu magazine was a major goal. Another would have been getting a DRS up to speed. Just getting the post organized was an important function, if not a goal. From 1979, when John Thomson went out as the first PAO, the post had expanded from 1 to 8 officers in Beijing and opened two branch posts. It had just grown, with everyone scrambling to get programs started, to build up useful contacts, and learn how to get things done in China. We were building up a list of official contacts, but it was hard to get beyond the official side. Chinese were reluctant to talk to you in private. Talking to a foreigner could get them into trouble..

Here's an incident about *guanxi* (relationships) and contacts in China. One day I got a call from someone who introduced himself as Mr. Jin and asked if I had studied Chinese in Washington.

I said, "Yes, I did. Mr. Jin was my teacher."

He said, "This is his uncle. I have something I would like to discuss with you?"

And I said, "Fine, where can we meet?"

We arranged to meet on a street near the International Club, not far from the embassy. Mr. Jin was a scientist, maybe a teacher, at the Beijing Union Medical College. He, his wife, their daughter and son-in-law lived in a house on the campus. The son-in-law had been accepted by a college in Texas, but had been refused a visa. Mr. Jin asked if I could do anything to help.

I said I would ask the consulate about the case but could not intervene on his behalf.

P&C was in the same building as the consulate. I explained the situation to the consul general and asked if someone would take a second look. The consulate was inundated with applications from Chinese students who had been admitted to small colleges in the US. The suspicion was that few would return. Mr. Jin's son-in-law was leaving his wife in China, evidence of his good intentions. A consulate officer took a second look and issued a visa. As a result, the Jin family invited Karen and me to dinner at their home. This was one of two invitations to private homes we were offered in Beijing. The other was an official of the Bank of China I had met in Hong Kong. The Jins lived in a western-style, two story house on the PUMC (Peking Union Medical College) campus. They had lived there in comfort for 20 years, with plenty of space, until the Cultural Revolution. Now they had only the upstairs, two unrelated families shared the ground floor. Mother and daughter cooked a delicious dinner on two burners in a curtained off kitchen area. After dinner conversation turned to the Cultural Revolution. The daughter, in middle school at the time, said she had been completely swept up by it. One day after a meeting she came home, broke all her father's classical records and burned some of his books. Her father said, "Yes, that's true. But we have put it behind us." This was the first time anyone in China even mentioned the Cultural Revolution. We didn't see the Jins again. We would have liked to repay their hospitality but didn't want to jeopardize them by trying to maintain contact.

*Q: Now, would this be an environment in which you would propose bringing in the Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra or the Detroit Ballet or those kinds of things, or we weren't there yet?*

KNOPES: We didn't bring in any major shows. The Portrait Gallery exhibit was to be the first. We saw the Royal Ballet in Beijing. They came, they had the --

*Q: The Brits.*

KNOPES: Yeah, the Brits. It was the Royal Ballet, the real thing. The venue was old, the seats were squeaky, and the floor was warped. It must have difficult dancing on that stage. How they handled it, I don't know. Arthur Miller came out to direct "The Death of a Salesman" in Chinese, but that wasn't under our auspices.

*Q: Hm!*

KNOPES: It was a solid hit, with excellent Chinese actors. Even if you didn't know Chinese, they carried the message and drama of the play. I took Arthur Miller and the cast to lunch to show them the embassy was interested and supportive of what they were doing, but we were not involved. Did you see "The Last Emperor?"

*Q: Yes.*

KNOPES: The jailer in the opening scenes was Willy Loman in "Death of a Salesman." A fine actor. I think he was later Minister of Culture.

*Q: Oh!*

KNOPES: It opened up in the fall of 1983.

*Q: Because what's his name brought "Caine Mutiny."*

KNOPES: Oh, Herman Wouk?

*Q: No, the actor. Charlton Heston.*

KNOPES: Oh, did he really?

*Q: Brought "Caine Mutiny" out and had it produced in Beijing.*

KNOPES: Well, there was a lot going on. I know Pat Corcoran talked about escorting Gregory Peck in China. I think the first P&C project in China was an exchange of films. One was "Coal Miner's Daughter," another was "Breaking Away." There were five or six of them, shown in several cities in China. Yehudi Menuhin gave a master class and performed at the Beijing Conservatory. A lot of people wanted to visit China once it opened up. If you had a skill or reputation they were happy to have you. China got international exposure out of those visits, too.

*Q: Were there any \_\_\_\_\_?*

KNOPES: Not when I was there, no. The only real bump was cancellation of the exhibit. That happened early on. Art Hummel was the ambassador and Chas Freeman was the DCM (deputy chief of mission). That's a great team. And easy to work with. You asked about P&C relationship with the embassy. It was easy to get to know everyone because we were so cramped for space. P&C shared a building with Administration, the Consular section, the nurse's office and the commissary. This was Erh Ban (Second Building.) The chancery and all other offices were a quarter mile away in what was called Yi Ban (First building). On a visit to Yi Ban I would meet most of the political and economic officers. Everyone was squeezed into a tiny, tiny space. The office of P&C's information officer's was a converted bathroom. You could still see where the stool and the bath tub had been. The PAO's office was little bigger than a walk-in closet.

*Q: Because Jerry Ogden was there about that time. No, he was down --*

KNOPES: He was in Guangzhou. I think Dick Williams was there when I arrived in China. Jerry came later. You asked about my departure from Beijing. The designated PAO, Lynn Noah, was due to arrive in December of 1983. I would be his deputy. Though I didn't know him well he had been one of my predecessors as BPAO in Songkhla. He had taken Chinese language training a couple of years before me, and he had been CAO in Taipei. When we moved to Taipei from Taichung we took his house. I was looking forward to working with Lynn, but in September I got a midnight phone call from our desk officer in Washington. "Harry Britton is retiring and will leave Taipei in December. Would you be willing to go there as head of the Cultural and Information Section (CIS) of AIT (American Institute in Taiwan)?"

I was dumbstruck and could only say, "I'll have to think about it." Beijing was beginning to open up. It was an exciting place to work. But Karen didn't like it much. Dependents were restricted in what they could do. She had taught English in every previous post, but there was no place where she could teach in Beijing. To keep busy she worked as receptionist at the embassy. We both liked Taipei. I would like to have worked with Lynn Noah but I would have my own post in Taipei. I said yes, I would make the move. Lynn arrived in October. I left for Taipei in mid-December of 1983.

*Q: Here we are, it is the 17th of July, 2014. We're returning to our conversation with Robert Knopes. As we finished up, you were coming to an assignment at AIT in Taiwan from the mainland. You were replacing Harry Britton I think.*

KNOPES: Yeah, right.

*Q: First, can we set the stage by saying how was the AIT-USIS set up, organized, and how might it have been different from Beijing?*

KNOPES: Beijing was a growing operation, whereas USIS Taipei, now called the Cultural and Information Section of AIT (CIS), was a well-established program. Our offices and library were in the same building I had worked in as ACAO in the late-1960s. We would be doing

fundamentally the same USIS programs. Beijing was just getting a Fulbright Program established, there was no library and the prospect of getting one set up in the near term were not good. In Taipei both were firmly established. There were multiple newspapers in Taiwan and we had close contact with all of them. In Beijing our contacts were mostly with Xinhua, the New China News Agency, though we did know a few people at Renmin Ribao (The People's Daily.) It was a developing situation in Beijing but an established set of programs that I was returning to in Taipei. CIS would be a smaller operation than the USIS one I had worked at 15 years before. There were no more publications. Student Review, World Today, translated books, donated books were no longer produced. The important aspect for me was that CIS was part of AIT. I would not have my own budget or the independence of programming I had in Beijing. If I wanted to initiate a new program I had to get the approval of the AIT director and negotiate funding with the admin officer.

My predecessor, Harry Britton, had been deputy PAO in USIS Taipei in the early 1970s. When he returned as chief of the CIS office he expected to continue as before, resulting in a series of conflicts between him and the admin office. These battles may have been a factor in his decision to retire early. Harry's discontent made it easier for me to establish myself as a team player at AIT. I knew what I was going into. I planned to be diplomatic, to work with admin and the director.

Of course, we still had backup from USIA. There could be little programming without USIA support. Exchange programs, books for our library, speakers, everything came through USIA. At that time, AIT was well funded. I had no trouble getting money for conferences and other local programming. Everything CIS did was in the interest of AIT and of the United States. We gave a great deal of support to the US Trade Center -- doing their press releases and helping set up local programs.

*Q: Following up on the organizational side of things, how many officers did you have and what were their specific assignments?*

KNOPES: I had three - information officer, Dave Hess, and cultural affairs officer, Charles Silver, and a BPAO in Kaohsiung. The branch post in Taichung had been closed some years before.

*Q: Was Joe Moyle there when you arrived, or he came later?*

KNOPES: Joe Moyle was still there, in the political section. Harry Britton had pulled Joe over to CIS as information officer for a while. John Lundin was information officer when I arrived, but on his way to another assignment. Shortly after I arrived, Dave Hess finished a year of Chinese and took over as IO.

*Q: But Silver was in --*

KNOPES: Silver was already established as CAO. He had just finished language school. I don't even know who Silver replaced. Were you there at the time?

*Q: Yeah.*

KNOPES: Who was before Silver?

*Q: I'm not sure.*

KNOPES: Silver must have been on the job because I didn't meet any other cultural affairs officer.

*Q: One of the things you'd mentioned was you'd been assigned to Taipei before. Let me ask, what comparisons would you have from that first -- the atmosphere of the first assignment you had to the atmosphere in Taipei right after you arrived there?*

KNOPES: Yeah, this was -- so I got there in '80 --

*Q: Three.*

KNOPES: '83, yeah. It was much more open. I think martial law was -- had been --

*Q: No, that'd come later.*

KNOPES: That was a little bit later. People had always been willing to talk with us. That was not a problem. Martial law was still in effect but now considerably relaxed. People, especially students, were less concerned about being watched. Chiang Ching-kuo was president, and I think he had decided that greater liberalization was the way to go. The clearest sign of the loosening was the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party. A few years later a DPP candidate won election as president. That didn't turn out well but it was the start of a two-party system. I had lunch with some of the founders of the DPP (Democratic Progressive party). They had big plans. The government was not harassing them. They spoke openly about politics, which was not the case when I had been there in the late '60s. That was the biggest change. It was an opening that was allowed, and even encouraged. I renewed contacts and acquaintances from my first tour. As non-official representatives of America we could not visit government offices. The officials I contacted were not standoffish. They were always happy to -- well, I shouldn't say happy -- they were always willing to get together. I had lunches with John Chang, the head of North American Affairs in the Foreign Ministry and with Ma Ying-jeou who is now president of the ROC. During my first tour, the Taiwan Independence Movement was a bogey-man for the KMT, but even then I didn't see a groundswell of Taiwanese backing for that position. What they wanted was greater participation in government. The DPP provided that.

*Q: Right. And as you said, you know, you're, you're there shortly after 1979 when we switched diplomatic --*

KNOPES: Yeah, yeah.

*Q: And in fact, wasn't Fred Chien the ambassador in Washington at that time?*

KNOPES: At that time.

*Q: He was quite miffed at the whole --*

KNOPES: Oh, absolutely, I'm sure he was. But things were finding their level at that point. Government officials were figuring that they were going to have to deal with us. It was the Taiwan Relations Act, an act of Congress, that established AIT and stabilized the relationship. Taiwan officials were coming to terms with their new position in the world.

*Q: Now, in this new environment, did that impact on who you selected as speakers to come in the programs or whatnot?*

KNOPES: Not much. We could offer more speakers on American politics and governance, that sort of thing, than before. Universities were open to a wider range of speakers.

*Q: Now, the Fulbright Program is run by a board that has local embassy, AIT in this case, people. Did that transition well?*

KNOPES: There were no major changes. The Fulbright Program always worked well. It was a prestigious program. It always attracted good people. The change was the expansion of universities in Taiwan. On my first tour we dealt primarily with National Taiwan University and Taiwan Normal University. Now there was a large technical university south of Taipei and a growing university in Kaohsiung. Professors who went to any of these universities were well received and well utilized. The Fulbright program was supervised by a bi-national board of directors, of which I was the chairman. One of the members was the president of National Taiwan University. I don't remember any of the others. The program was administered by an office that had its quarters in part of the CIS building. The CAO worked closely with them in selecting, assigning, and looking after Fulbright scholars in Taiwan.

*Q: One of things you said was they seem better funded. I would think that that was also a part of the comparison between the first time you were there and this assignment in the early 1980s. The economy in Taiwan had improved.*

KNOPES: Oh, tremendously. In the '60s Taiwan was a successful agricultural economy, just beginning its transition to a manufacturing society. In the 1980s Taiwan was moving into technology. In the 1960s, ox carts were a common means of transport, even in Taipei. In the fall, harvested rice was spread out and dried in the street near our house in Taichung. In 1984, I returned to rural villages I had known in the 1960s. Then the villagers had large families, worked the fields with an ox, and had little contact with urban areas. In 1984, the older generation was still there, but the young people had gone to the cities. Rice paddies were still thriving, but were planted and harvested with machines. The kids came back in the spring and fall to plant and harvest the crop.

*Q: Now, you're saying in Beijing there were no papers other than the party Renmin Ribao.*

KNOPES: Right.

*Q: The paper situation in Taipei was --*

KNOPES: Oh, it was wild compared to Beijing.

*Q: -- much different --*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: -- yet party influenced. I mean --*

KNOPES: Well, sure.

*Q: Some were actually KMT spinoffs.*

KNOPES: The Central Daily News was KMT-oriented and subsidized. It had a large circulation. The publisher of the United Daily News, a more independent paper, was Wang Tiwu, a good friend of USIS. I don't remember the others. We had easy access to all of them, and to the TV station. IO Dave Hess was great with people. He knew reporters on every paper and had easy access to all the media.

*Q: There was a thriving periodical market as I recall.*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: In Taipei at that time. And that was the one where the Taiwanese --*

KNOPES: Yeah, right.

*Q: -- were getting in censored form time to time.*

KNOPES: Yeah, they would. We knew some of the editors of those periodicals -- Anthony Chang was one of them. He was advisor to the DPP and his magazine was a factor in its growth. He was a responsible journalist. I don't think he had any problem. Other magazines would push the limits on political commentary, be closed down, then appear the next month with a new name. It would be the same people. They could continue until they stepped over the line again. The government could close them permanently if it really wanted to. They didn't do that. Closing a magazine delivered a message: Don't go too far.

*Q: One of the interesting things that happened at that time was Ninoy Aquino.*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: Returned to the Philippines in a flight from Taipei.*

KNOPES: Mm, mm-hmm.

*Q: And then was murdered at the airport.*

KNOPES: At the -- yeah.

*Q: Did your contacts vibrate from that? Were they concerned about that? Did they talk about that?*

KNOPES: I don't recall. I recall the incident, but I don't remember talking to anybody specifically about it. On the political side it might have been more significant.

*Q: At the same time, Henry Liu was murdered in San Francisco in October of '84. And there was newspaper coverage in Taiwan.*

KNOPES: A lot, yeah. Newspaper coverage over the long term indicated that the ROC government was in some way involved. It made an impact. It was well covered by the Taiwan newspapers, with a lot of conjecture -- how and why did this happen? Why this major move to silence somebody who was not well known? It was an indication that censorship of news was no longer a concern for the press.

*Q: I don't want to ask day in the life of, but you're -- you and your officers obviously had an opportunity in this environment to really get out and know the publishers and academics and whatnot.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: Did you kind of divide up your contacts? Do you do all the university professors? Somebody does -- or --*

KNOPES: Dave Hess was the information officer. He was a great with people. He held open house for journalists almost every night. Journalists would just drop by for a drink, ready to talk. His friendliness inspired openness in others. He picked up a lot of information. He had done the same thing in Shanghai, developed all kinds of contacts in a place where that was not easy. Dave's problem was that he usually didn't tell anyone in the consulate, the embassy, or now in AIT, what he was getting. One of my tasks in Taipei was to get Dave to funnel information back to me and others in AIT. I left daily press contacts up to him while I did more formal representation with senior editors and owners of major papers. I was not an information officer. I tended to work more with the cultural and educational side. I was chairman of the board of directors of the Taipei Language Institute. The Institute had begun to teach English to people AIT was sending to the United States in the 1950s and early '60s. It was still the best English teaching program in Taiwan. It wasn't a *busyiban*, a for-profit, learn-English-quick operation that was common in Taipei. The teachers were all native speakers, mostly Americans who liked living in Taipei. They made their living by teaching at the Taipei Language Institute. My wife taught there. In other programming, CIS, actually CAO Charles Silver, set up a couple of major conferences, just as I had done in Rome. Rather than bring out individual speakers, we requested a panel of speakers and worked with National Taiwan University, the Bank of Taiwan and the

Ministry of Finance on a major economic conference. Harry Thayer, the Director of AIT, attended the opening ceremony and some of the sessions. The two-day conference was well-received and well-reported. We tried to do things that would have a greater impact than individual speakers. It was the academic side that I was interested in.

*Q: One of the things that was interesting in that environment was the local authorities were interested in demonstrating to their public that they had a close connection with the Americans.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: And so I would presume that as a counselor level person in AIT you had, you know, lots of invitations and meetings at a high level.*

KNOPES: Yeah, I'm sure I did. We didn't deal with Ministry of Foreign Affairs a lot, but did have contacts with them. Karen and I were out often in the evening for dinners and other functions. I'm sure a lot of them were with senior officials. I don't recall anybody in particular. I set up a meeting for Harry Thayer with the Minister of Education through my contacts and one of the supreme court judges was a friend from my previous tour.

*Q: Well, I'm thinking too that at that time Harry was there, the director, was making the point from time to time about being concerned at us being at an event where you'd have an American flag and an ROC flag.*

KNOPES: Right.

*Q: And there had been instances where the local authorities had tried to put a much more formal spin on the relationship.*

KNOPES: Right.

*Q: And that tension was in those first early days as, as we tried to not -- we tried to maintain our unofficiality.*

KNOPES: Right, and they tried to get it back.

*Q: They tried to maintain their officiality.*

KNOPES: I recall the issue but I think it pertained more at the director's level. We didn't display flags at any of our functions. I don't recall anybody making an issue of it. In the major conferences that I just mentioned, we had control. With individual speakers it was not a factor. I think that was more at the director's level.

*Q: Now, you're in Taipei from '83 to '86.*

KNOPES: Yeah, right, well, December '83 to about July of '86.

*Q: And your next assignment is USIS Hong Kong.*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: How did that assignment come to you?*

KNOPES: That was part of the deal when they called me in Beijing and said, "Would you like to go to Taipei?" The Taipei tour would be only until the summer of 1986, two and a half years. It couldn't be extended because Harry Britton's successor was already named, Mike Yaki, who was PAO in Hong Kong at the time.

I was concerned that, after those two and a half years, I would be thrown into a bidding process that might send me some place I didn't want to be. I wanted an assignment after Taipei.

They said, "We don't have a replacement for Yaki in Hong Kong yet. How would you like Hong Kong?"

That sounded great to me. Beijing to Taipei to Hong Kong, a pretty good circuit as far as I was concerned. I had served in Hong Kong before, it would be an interesting post. That's how my Hong Kong assignment came about. It was negotiated before I left Beijing.

*Q: Now, you've come out of Beijing, you've gone through Taipei, you're going into Hong Kong. How would you compare the public affairs, USIA environment of those three posts?*

KNOPES: Well, returning to Hong Kong it was going back to a USIS post. I was back in the fold, with my own budget. Many of the staff I had worked with before were still there. USIS offices were in the consulate. Our library was over near Wan Chai. There were four Americans - PAO, IO, CAO, and a publications officer who produced Jiaoliu magazine for Beijing. Part of the USIS Hong Kong operation was support for the Press and Cultural Office in Beijing. World Today had died, but had been resurrected as Jiaoliu magazine about 1980. Including the Jiaoliu editorial staff, we had 30 to 35 FSNs in the Hong Kong operation. When I arrived in Hong Kong, both the CAO and IO were ready to leave. All the American staff but the publications officer would be new. Dan Sreebny arrived from language school to take over the IO position but the designated CAO had to curtail his assignment because of illness in his family. Let's take a step back. As I mentioned, CIS/AIT had a branch post in Kaohsiung when I arrived in Taipei. After AIT opened a quasi-consulate in Kaohsiung, our BPAO was not fully occupied. With the agreement of USIA in Washington and the AIT director, I closed the Kaohsiung post. Anything we wanted to do in Kaohsiung we could handle from Taipei. When the officer slated for the Kaohsiung post finished Chinese language training it was natural for her to be assigned as CAO Hong Kong, to fill the gap caused by the curtailment of the designated CAO.

*Q: And of course the education and public affairs environment in Hong Kong was so much more sophisticated than Beijing.*

KNOPES: Oh yeah.

*Q: So your part of Hong Kong was, more focused on supporting Beijing embassy than some of the earlier programs that had been Hong Kong alone?*

KNOPES: The USIS operation went on much the same as it always had. Support for Beijing was production of Jiaoliu magazine and shipping supplies up through our warehouse unit. What we were doing for Beijing didn't detract from what we were doing in Hong Kong. We still ran a Fulbright Program, maintained contacts with the media - HKTV and RTHK, and all the newspapers. We had regular contacts with the two major PRC-leaning newspapers, Wen Wei Pao and Ta Kung Pao. Ta Kung Pao was the largest and most influential. When the owner died the funeral was a major event. Don Anderson, the consul general, and I attended to pay our respects and show a continuing relationship with the paper. Of course, we had regular contact with the two English newspapers, The Hong Kong Standard and the South China Morning Post. There was a Xinhua (New China News Agency) office in Hong Kong, but we were never able to establish a close relationship with them. The Asian Wall Street Journal was there, too. I took senior editors from the English papers on a cruise on the aircraft carrier Enterprise to show how the Seventh Fleet operated. We met the ship in Subic Bay and sailed back to Hong Kong - two nights and one day. The journalists wrote feature articles about the 7th Fleet and the skill of the American navy. We did the same for Chinese newspapers too, flying them by helicopter out to the battleship New Jersey as it came into port. That sort of event always resulted in positive stories. Either Dan Sreebny or I accompanied them. It was one of the perks of the job.

*Q: (laughs)*

KNOPES: One of our goals was to show that the United States was still maintaining a military presence in the Pacific, that we were there to stay. These trips were one way to do that.

*Q: Now, as you said, the Sino British negotiations were going on about reversion.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

*Q: Hong Kong reverting back to Beijing. How closely did you follow it, or --*

KNOPES: Not very much. I'm sure the consulate was following it, but I didn't. Hong Kong was a British colony. The matter was for Great Britain and China to resolve. It did not impact our programming at all.

*Q: Now, Hong Kong's a pretty open environment. I would suspect that a lot of foreign journalists come through and the consulate and your operation would talk to them.*

KNOPES: Oh yeah, a lot, a lot --

*Q: Help them out.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm. One of the great places in Hong Kong was the Foreign Correspondents' Club. I was a member and so was every journalist in Hong Kong. You met everyone there, including editors and journalists who were passing through.

When we talked about Beijing I mentioned that one of the first problems I had when I became PAO was the cancellation of an art exhibit from the National Portrait Gallery. I talked about that before. One of the first things I did in Hong Kong as PAO was bring that exhibit to Hong Kong.

*Q: (laughs)*

KNOPES: We held the exhibit in the art gallery at the city hall, which is more than a city hall. It's the public library, office building, and a very good gallery for visiting exhibits. The director of the Portrait Gallery came out for the opening. He and Don Anderson, the consul general, did the opening ceremony. Turnout of Hong Kong officials, artists, and media was wonderful. The exhibit got excellent media coverage. I'm sure news of the exhibit's success reached Beijing, letting them know they had missed out on a good thing.

*Q: Now, was this the time when Patten was the governor, or?*

KNOPES: No, Patten didn't come until 1992. The governor when I was there was David Wilson. I met him only once, when I took Charles Wick, director of USIA, on a courtesy call. I knew most of the heads of Hong Kong departments. I had lunch regularly with the chief of the information office, exchanging information on plans and upcoming activities. Day to day operation of information activities I left in the hands of the very capable IO, Dan Sreebny. We had no problem with the press when Dan was taking care of things. The cultural office was another matter. As I noted before, the officer slated to be BPAO in Kaohsiung became the replacement for the officer who could not come. She was a very nice person, well-meaning, but very deliberate in getting things done. Not the ideal CAO in an active post like Hong Kong. I spent more time on the cultural operation and supervising the cultural activities than I might have under other circumstances. During our time in Kong Hong budgets of American government operations were being cut, across the board. USIA was forced to cut a number of branch posts around the world, generally reducing the number of people overseas. In my second year I got a call from the area director. He said. "We're going to have to eliminate the cultural officer position in Hong Kong." He was surprised when I didn't put up a strong argument for the position. But I knew it wouldn't be a great loss. I was already spending a lot of time on cultural activities. I acquiesced and took over the cultural operation. It was not a big problem. The FSNs were excellent, well-connected with cultural contacts. They handled day-to-day activities as well as anybody could. We worked it out.

*Q: And at this point, let me ask. What would be cultural? What would the cultural officer or the cultural program entail?*

KNOPES: There was a library, located in an office building not far away. The library staff was professional, very capable. It required little oversight. We worked closely with an active American Studies organization organized and run by a professor at Hong Kong University. They used the library for meetings and programs. The Fulbright Program was important in Hong Kong. I became good friends with the president of the University of Hong Kong and the school accepted its first Fulbrighter while I was there. Up to that time the school was completely Europe-centered. Chinese University, the Technical University and Baptist University all made

good use of the Fulbright program. All of those schools, plus RTHK (Radio Television Hong Kong) were across the harbor, in Kowloon. There were two tunnels but they were always jammed. Sometimes it took an hour just to get through the tunnel. It was faster take the ferry or the metro across, then take a taxi to wherever you were going. Often I would do that, then have the driver pick me up for the ride back to the consulate. We also had one or two American speakers a month.

*Q: On the other hand, here's Hong Kong, very sophisticated environment. There would be people back in the States saying, "Why do we need a cultural or information program at all?"*

KNOPES: No, I don't think that ever came up. USIS Hong Kong had been an integral part of the consulate since the 1950s. USIS programs in Hong Kong provided information and understanding of US policies to a broad range of residents, including those aligned with the PRC. Now USIS Hong Kong was supporting P&C Beijing with a magazine, books and supplies.

*Q: We're returning to our conversation. We were talking about Jiaoliu, which is the Chinese language magazine to be distributed on the Mainland. But in fact, was put together in Hong Kong. And back in Washington there's an office that provides materials for it?*

KNOPES: No longer an office dedicated to magazines, but there was still a press operation that provided articles and assistance.

*Q: Now, the content of Jiaoliu. Think pieces? Long pieces? Fluffy pieces?*

KNOPES: It's a long time ago. I didn't work directly on the magazine. I worked with McKinney Russell, the Beijing PAO, on selecting suitable articles. I can't recall anything specific. There were statements by the secretary of state and articles on U.S. Asia policy. There were articles on life in America -- business, agriculture, and science. It was a general magazine.

*Q: Of course magazines are put together months in advance, or at least scoped out. I suspect therefore you had a pretty close connection to the PAO in Beijing.*

KNOPES: I attended branch PAO conferences in Beijing to hear about their programming and get suggestions on what Hong Kong might do in support, maybe get ideas for Jiaoliu. McKinney Russell came to Hong Kong at least quarterly to meet with me and the publications office on future issues of Jiaoliu. Then it was up to the publications officer to get the articles and lay out future issues.

*Q: Now, Hong Kong, as you said, is a fairly large post, which means that there's all kinds of other federal agencies in there, immigration, whatnot. Did you have much interaction --*

KNOPES: We did a lot with the Foreign Commercial Service and the agriculture office. I think we put out some press releases regarding the FBI and answered questions on our refugee policy for the press. A new tool we had was EANET, a satellite link with Washington for interviews with well-known academics and senior officials who would not otherwise have been available. This was one of USIA Director Wick's contributions to programming. We used them regularly,

often cooperating with the political and economic sections on topics like US foreign policy, trade policies, and US/PRC relations. Many were held in the 4th floor conference room in the consulate.

*Q: -- or at least explanation to the Hong Kong press?*

KNOPES: I knew everybody in the consulate because the consul general had a regular staff meeting. I don't know if it was every day or a couple times a week. We handled everything for the consulate, all the press releases, press inquiries, and organizing special events, such as a speech by the CG or a visiting American official. We also provided press support for the American Chamber of Commerce, since this fit with our goal of trade promotion.

*Q: Even though it's a fairly large consulate, the State Department component is quite modest I would assume.*

KNOPES: That's right.

*Q: In July of '88, Secretary Shultz goes through Asia and makes a stop in Hong Kong.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: Did your officers get sucked up into that?*

KNOPES: Oh yeah, everybody was pulled in. He came more than once. Maybe three times when I was there. I remember the planning meetings. Everybody was part of those. We handled all the press arrangements for both the local and accompanying press. One of those trips had covered most Asian countries and the press contingent was huge. We arranged a press briefing by Stapleton Roy -- he must have been the Assistant Secretary of State for Asia. Those visits were big events. But not filled with important activities in Hong Kong I'd have to say. The secretary usually had a tennis game, had some shirts made and called on the governor. It was more of a rest stop, though there was plenty of press interest in the visit.

*Q: But it certainly keeps everybody busy.*

KNOPES: Yep.

*Q: And puts great pressure on the staff.*

KNOPES: He came through Beijing when I was there too. That was even more hectic because it was harder to organize. The Chinese didn't have the staff, the facilities, or the experience to deal with the American press.

*Q: You said a couple of times -- yeah, I'm noticing, Shultz stopped in Hong Kong in June of '86.*

KNOPES: Uh-huh.

*Q: You might have just arrived.*

KNOPES: No, I don't think -- July? It might have been. I might have got there in July, but not in on the planning. I do remember a dinner at Burt Levin's residence. Burt was CG, preparing to leave for his next assignment as ambassador to Burma.

*Q: And then again in March of '87.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm. Yeah, I remember that visit.

*Q: So March of '87 --*

KNOPES: Oh, I was definitely there --

*Q: -- March of '88 --*

KNOPES: Oh, March of '88, yeah, those two I remember. Those were the two I was thinking of. Well, as you said -- it did keep the Hong Kong staff busy. As a matter of fact, I think one of the admin officers suggested that perhaps in the future it would save us all trouble if we sent his shirt maker down to Singapore.

*Q: Along those lines, I suppose Hong Kong would certainly be a favorite spot for congressional delegations.*

KNOPES: Well, I don't recall many during my second tour there. At least, I don't remember escorting any of them around. I took a couple of senators around when I was there as a junior officer. There were a lot of visitors though. This reminds me, regarding your question about our relationship with the PRC. When John Burns, The New York Times correspondent in Beijing, was expelled from China -- in 1988? -- CG Don Anderson and I made it a point to go to the airport to welcome him to Hong Kong. We wanted to make clear to the Chinese that the consulate in Hong Kong and the U.S. government supported The New York Times and a free press.

*Q: At that time was that also the height of the Vietnamese refugee thing or that --*

KNOPES: Yeah, it was. Let me see. It seems to me there was still a camp for Vietnamese refugees on one of the outlying islands. I believe USIS put out several press releases on US refugee policy, maybe even did an EANET, a video connection with an American expert. There might have been an article in Jiaoliu as well. USIS worked closely with all elements of the consulate in getting out information on their programs. We were well-integrated with everything that went on there.

*Q: Returning to government administration issues, you were saying in '88 serious budgetary things came up.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm.

*Q: You at least got a call, here's what we're thinking. More than likely, perhaps in this time for other places, Washington just says, "Cut 10%," or some percentage.*

KNOPES: I lost the cultural affairs officer. It is likely that our budget was cut a bit, too. But I think our contribution to budget reduction was the CAO position. Personnel costs are the major part of any operation. At that point there wasn't much left to cut except personnel. We couldn't continue to snip away little pieces of programming. Something major had to be cut. I heard that some complained that USIA was taking most of its cuts overseas, saving jobs and activities in Washington. I don't know if that was true or not. All through my career, every few years we had to make a 10% cut here, later 10% there. We had gotten to the point where we had to start making big cuts.

*Q: Well, when you started out in USIA there were all kinds of programs, you're talking about the magazines.*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: And all these things. Now, here we are in the 1980s, they've either been superseded or dropped off or the environment for their need has changed.*

KNOPES: Mm-hmm, yeah. Well, that was the --

*Q: And so USIA is kind of naturally shrinking.*

KNOPES: Shrinking, yeah.

*Q: Down to personnel issues.*

KNOPES: USIA was beginning to close libraries at USIS posts. Part of it was budget, but a good part was because of access to the internet and growing reference databases. Posts with good international communication connections didn't need a big reference collection anymore. We were moving that way in Hong Kong. Of course, it wouldn't work in Taipei or Beijing because telecommunication connections weren't there yet. In Hong Kong we set up a computer in the library and helped people do research using databases in the United States.

*Q: Now, coming up to 1988, 1989, November '88 the Americans have a presidential election.*

KNOPES: Yeah.

*Q: How did USIS Hong Kong play in that?*

KNOPES: Yes, we set up an election headquarters in the ballroom of one of the big hotels in Central, maybe the Hilton, with TVs and tote boards to show the returns. It was well attended by the press. Businessmen and officials dropped in during the day. The 12-hour time difference with Washington made ideal timing for us. Returns were coming in all during the day. Of course,

RTHK and radio news reports kept people informed, too. Our center provided more color and detail, and provided extra materials for the press. Dan Sreebny and the information staff did an excellent job on it.

*Q: Well, 1988-'89 then would be the transition to a new administration that comes in in January '88. Did you particularly notice any changes in --*

KNOPES: No, no. This would be --

*Q: -- for your operations?*

KNOPES: -- the first George Bush. No, I don't recall any major changes. I suppose we provided a lot of information to the media on the new administration. But no, I don't think it had an impact on our operation.

*Q: But when did you leave Hong Kong?*

KNOPES: Well, that's a story. I left Hong Kong for Washington in July of '89. I knew I was going back to the Voice of America to head the East Asia Pacific Division. In May I took a trip all through Southeast Asia, visiting countries where VOA did language broadcasts -- Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia. I visited the short-wave relay station in the Philippines. I may have gone to Burma, too. My last visit was to Beijing, where students had been occupying Tiananmen Square for several weeks already. The situation seemed to be getting touchy. On June 3, as I got ready to leave for the airport, I called Larry Daks, the deputy PAO in Beijing to check on the atmosphere. I said, "Larry, I'm ready to go to the airport. How do things look on Tiananmen square? Should I put off the trip?"

Larry said, "Well, we don't know what's going to happen. We'll find something for you to do. Come on up."

*Q: (laughs)*

KNOPES: I arrived in Beijing the afternoon of June 3, checked into my hotel. It wasn't the Jianguo Hotel, it was one that was a little farther out on Chang An Lu.

*Q: The Sheraton?*

KNOPES: No, no, it was smaller, only two or three-stories -- I can't remember the name of it. I stopped by the embassy, then walked over to Tiananmen Square to talk to the students. One of them said, "There's a lot of activity around here. You better be careful. We fear something might happen tonight." I took pictures of the goddess of liberty and the tents, then walked back to my hotel. Near my hotel a line of military trucks loaded with soldiers had been stopped by people coming out of the *hutong*, the neighborhoods. The soldiers were not armed. The people were orderly. After a lengthy conversation between citizens and the military leader, the trucks turned around and headed out of town. I thought, "That's a very good sign. Maybe this situation will be worked out peacefully. Maybe the students will disperse on their own." I had dinner and went to

bed about 10:30. About midnight I heard clanking noises, looked out the window and saw tanks going by. Big tanks with big guns, swinging back and forth, at times pointing right at my window. After the tanks came a line of armored personnel carriers, then truckloads of armed soldiers. Looking toward Tiananmen, about a mile away, I could see flames and hear small arms fire. In the morning I went down to Chang An Lu. People had gathered, talking. Around them were remains of buses and feeble barricades that had been crushed by the tanks. It was a grim scene.

*Q: Because the buses had been turned over in the intersections.*

KNOPES: Yeah, right.

*Q: Long before the --*

KNOPES: The people in the street were listening to radios, but they heard nothing but martial music. I tried to strike up a conversation, but they were not about to speak to a foreigner, even in Chinese. I walked over to the embassy, which was, as you know, in chaos. They were trying to figure out what was going on, what might happen next. USIS was trying to get in touch with Fulbrighters and other Americans who were there under our auspices. Concerned calls were coming in from Americans in Shanghai, Chengdu and other cities where there had been student demonstrations. For much of the day I answered calls and did my best to reassure the callers. I didn't find out much about Voice of America broadcasts, the primary reason for my visit, except that jamming had been increased. The CNN Beijing operation was our primary source of information until it was closed down the day after the crackdown. From then on VOA and BBC provided whatever they could get out of China. Then the VOA correspondent, too, was expelled. I had a reservation on Cathay Pacific back to Hong Kong on June 6. On the way to the airport we passed several military encampments. The airport was chaos. Foreigners and many Chinese trying to get out. Back in Hong Kong the next day, I watched tens of thousands march in the streets, protesting the killings in Beijing. They still have a commemorative protest march on June 4 every year in Hong Kong.

*Q: One of the consequences of Tiananmen Square is, as you were saying, the embassy contacted all American citizens and urged them to leave, and in fact brought in charter planes I think --*

KNOPES: I think they might have, mm-hmm.

*Q: -- over a thousand people. I'm not quite sure where all those people went. Did any of them, any of the main journalists come down to Hong Kong?*

KNOPES: Not that I know of. But I was already on the way out. I left for Washington a few days later. Journalists, if they couldn't stay in Beijing, probably went to Japan, which was closer and not as directly involved as Hong Kong.

*Q: Well now we have you at Voice of America. And I don't think we've talked to anybody about what Voice of America is.*

KNOPES: Ah.

*Q: And I think there's a number of issues. Just how is it organized itself and then what's the relationship between it and guidance from the State Department and such. If you'd like to approach that.*

KNOPES: Voice of America started in 1941 or 1942, at the beginning of World War II, to provide news and information to the occupied countries of Europe. I think the expansion to Asia and other countries came later. It was authorized and funded by Congress as an independent news operation. In 1953, when USIA became an independent agency, the Voice of America became a part of this new agency, though it retained a great deal of independence. In 1976, President Ford signed into law the VOA Charter. The Charter has been instrumental in protecting VOA from outside influence and interference on its news gathering and broadcasting, including from the Department of State. There was a fierce independence throughout the organization that I respected, though I had been on the complaining end about some coverage when I was overseas. I went to VOA as chief of the East Asia/Pacific Division, managing the services that broadcast in Burmese, Indonesian, Lao, Vietnamese, Cambodian, Korean, Mandarin Chinese, and Thai. Well, Thai was something separate. The Thai service, only 3 staffers, prepared daily programs that were not broadcast, but sent by satellite to Thai medium-wave stations for airing as they saw fit. I started Tibetan and Cantonese services while I was there. Starting Tibetan brought a lot of criticism from the PRC and a lot of jamming when we began broadcasting. Of course, English programming went on around the clock, reaching all parts of the globe.

*Q: Who was the head of, of USIA and VOA at that time that you were there?*

KNOPES: Dick Carlson was the director of VOA and I think Bruce Gelb was the head of USIA. They did not get along. Dick Carlson was appointed by George Bush, the first George Bush. He had owned some newspapers in California. Bruce Gelb was also a political appointee, but not as well suited to the job. His background was in the cosmetics industry or something of the sort. They were both fundraisers for Bush and the Republican party. They had a disagreement about funding for VOA. Congress appropriated money for the Voice, but it was funneled through USIA. Funds for VOA often didn't come as quickly or as completely as expected. The outcome was that Dick Carlson left VOA, went off to the Seychelles as ambassador. I think Gelb went to Belgium as ambassador. In the long run their public feud didn't help either organization.

*Q: As the chief of the East Asia Division of VOA then, what were your responsibilities and duties?*

KNOPES: I took over right after Tiananmen. The China branch, which had been broadcasting about 10 hours a day to China, increased programming to 12 or 14 hours a day after Tiananmen. Congress appropriated funding for this expansion. Additional new staff was hired to cover the expanded programming. In the aftermath of Tiananmen, the Bush administration extended the visas of all Chinese students who were in the United States. Some were finishing classes and needed a job, many did not plan to go back to China anyway and were looking for work. There was this tremendous pool of talent available when VOA went recruiting for Chinese broadcasters. This worked out well in another way. VOA Chinese broadcasters were all talented

and professional. But almost all had come from Taiwan years before. They were anti-communist and pro-KMT. Some had been there a long time. VOA needed broadcasters who knew the PRC and had current vocabulary. The language had changed both in Taiwan and in the PRC, but not at VOA. Bringing in these young, talented people helped the service tremendously, but it led to a certain amount of conflict between the two groups.

*Q: So under the East Asia Division then there would be language specific --*

KNOPES: Yeah, language services. But the China branch was the biggest.

*Q: Right. Who ran the China branch?*

KNOPES: Dave Hess, who had come --

*Q: Dave Hess! OK.*

KNOPES: Who had come from Taipei. Dave worked for me when I was in Beijing and he was in Shanghai. He went to Taiwan for language school and AIT. I expected to be in Beijing a couple more years at least. When I unexpectedly went to AIT Taipei, there was Dave Hess as information officer. When I went to Hong Kong I didn't expect to work with Dave again. Then VOA came up and we were together again. We couldn't have done much better than Dave for running the China branch during and after Tiananmen. He had experience in radio, having been a broadcaster for Armed Forces Radio. He spoke Chinese, loved China, and was good with people. He did a fine job of getting news of the outside world to a China that was locked down for some time after the massacre. VOA reporting was very irritating to the PRC authorities, much of it the reporting of our correspondent in Beijing, Al Pessin. I knew Al from my time in Beijing. A couple days after the crackdown on Tiananmen he was expelled from China.

The Voice of America was an adjunct member of an organization called the Asian Broadcasters Union (ABU). Any organization that broadcast to Asia was eligible. In addition to VOA, Netherlands Broadcasting, Canadian Broadcasting Company, and Deutsche Welle, were adjunct members. The ABU held an annual meeting in Asia, with the 1989 meeting scheduled to be held in Beijing in November under the sponsorship of Radio Beijing. The leadership of the ABU was concerned about going to China so soon after Tiananmen, but feared cancellation would have create long-term problems. It would have been a major loss of face for Radio Beijing. We in VOA wondered if we should attend, if our attendance would send the right message? I argued for it as a chance to see first-hand what was happening and to find out how other broadcasters were handling the situation. We might even get support from Radio Beijing for replacing Al Pessin. It was decided that Sid Davis, VOA's head of programming, and I would attend. The meeting was held in a new hotel in Beijing, I think it was called the Prince Hotel -- do you remember that at all?

*Q: Yeah, I was --*

KNOPES: It was one of the new hotels. Tiananmen had had an effect. Except for the ABU, there were only a handful of other guests. There didn't appear to be any surveillance or restrictions on

our group. One afternoon I walked to Tiananmen and found it well-guarded. There were PLA and plain clothes guards all over the place but I was permitted to walk around. There were no Chinese, just a few tourists. Beijing was still very quiet. Sid Davis and I attended all the ABU sessions, talked with other broadcasters. We even had a talk with the Radio Beijing people, but with little substance. We requested and got an appointment at the Foreign Ministry. After tea was served, the official, I don't remember anything about him, launched into a tirade about how Al Pessin had broadcast false and misleading news about what happened at Tiananmen. Al had been expelled because he misrepresented the facts. Sid was nonplussed at this overheated diatribe. I took it as theater and rejoined with a description of VOA's news organization, journalistic responsibilities, and our congressional charter. Al Pessin reported what happened, I told him, as did all western journalists. I said it was time to allow VOA to restaff its Beijing office. Of course, nothing came of that meeting, It wasn't an exchange of views, just an exchange of opinions. A few months later a VOA correspondent was accredited and we re-opened our office. Maybe our mild confrontation had a positive effect in the long run. Before I left VOA, we were able to add a Chinese speaker to the Beijing office. The correspondents were not Chinese speakers. A short time later I was able to send a senior staffer from the China Branch to the new VOA office in Hong Kong.

*Q: Did the Chinese jam the broadcast?*

KNOPES: Oh, that was constant. When I traveled to China, I always took a shortwave radio to check our frequencies. There was always jamming, but we broadcast on several frequencies simultaneously. A listener could usually find one that was not jammed. VOA had monitoring offices around the world analyzing frequencies and interference with our signal. There was always jamming in China. Jamming cost money so I think they concentrated their efforts on Chinese broadcasts. They weren't as successful in jamming English broadcasts. They probably weren't as concerned about the English-speaking audience. At the same time, VOA was moving away from short-wave broadcasting, putting more and more on satellite. Shortwave signals went from Washington to a relay station in California. From there it was sent to transmitters in the Philippines, then broadcast around Asia. That's probably a little easier to jam. Sending the signal up to a satellite, then down to the ground gives a stronger signal. probably more difficult to jam.

*Q: Now, just at the time that you're heading the East Asia Division, all sorts of things are happening. What I wanted to ask -- all kinds of things happened in '89/'90. You have a coup in the Philippines. The Americans fly jets over Manila. How does VOA, what role does the East Asia Division have --*

KNOPES: As I said, VOA was a news organization. We had correspondents in Bangkok, Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Beijing, who traveled to cover breaking news like a coup in Manila. The central news room in VOA worked 24-hours a day, gathering correspondents' reports, plus items from wire services, and daily newspapers to prepare articles that were sent to all language services. The services also wrote stories on their own countries based on information they gathered from local media. To ensure accuracy, nothing could be put on the air unless it had three independent, reliable sources.

*Q: So they had correspondents actually stationed all over Asia.*

KNOPES: All over Asia, yeah.

*Q: That could be sent to --*

KNOPES: VOA had correspondents in Beijing, Bangkok and Tokyo. Those in Tokyo and Bangkok were constantly on the move, covering the entire region. VOA had stringers, too, local journalists who would report breaking news and send in feature articles. VOA also had an editorial office, separate from the news operation. Services were required to carry at least one VOA editorial each day. Those editorials were a constant issue between VOA, USIA and the State Department. Editorials were supposed to reflect U.S. policy, but they often reflected a more conservative and rigid point of view. At one point, the State Department wanted to have a chance to look them over, maybe edit them. That didn't happen. They were always a sore point, even within VOA. I think every division would have welcomed a chance to reject some of them, but they were required. No one liked them but we couldn't get rid of them.

*Q: So the editorial shop wasn't under you, it was a separate --*

KNOPES: It was separate, with some outside support that made it secure. I really don't know how it came about, who started it, who supported it.

*Q: So Desaix Anderson who was the DAS --*

KNOPES: He was the -- was he?

*Q: Or Kent Wiedemann didn't call you?*

KNOPES: No. No, they really didn't. We got some complaints through the EA office of USIA, but State did not call me directly. I kept in touch with State desk officers about some issues. But we made our own decisions on what to carry in the services. We set up interviews with senior officials at State to discuss American policy towards Asia. Assistant Secretary Dick Solomon was one. We were a news organization and we interviewed the policymakers and newsmakers. Sometimes news makers we interviewed overseas made comments counter to our policies or against some US position. That caused some problem but was just one voice among many we carried. We always tried to be balanced. There was always that tension. There is another point I should make about the evolution of VOA. When I came into USIA in the early '60s, all VOA division chiefs and almost all the language service chiefs were Foreign Service Officers who had served overseas, usually in the countries they were supervising. There was an awareness of what was going on in those countries and perhaps more awareness of U.S. policy toward those countries. By the 1980s, assignment of Foreign Service Officers to VOA had been phased out. Not because of an issue with their abilities or their point of view, but because language broadcasters, who were very good, very professional, complained about the low ceiling. Why could they not aspire to be service chief? Or even division chief? That was a reasonable position. VOA began promoting broadcasters to head language services, leaving fewer jobs for Foreign Service Officers. Most of those promoted did outstanding jobs as supervisors. But some lost

touch with their home country, especially a country they couldn't visit. And some stayed well beyond their productive years.

*Q: Well, Dave Hess was head of the China Section. Were other sections headed by FSOs?*

KNOPES: No. Personnel matters in the China branch were sensitive, mostly because of the --

*Q: Tiananmen.*

KNOPES: No, from the broadcasters from two sides of the Taiwan strait. You couldn't choose someone who had come from Taiwan, or one who had come from the PRC, to head the Branch. The factions were too entrenched. That was one of the reasons for keeping FSOs in those jobs. I was one of two FSOs as division chief at that time. All the other division chiefs had come up through the language services. When I left, I was replaced by an FSO. But when he retired, my deputy, who had been a Chinese broadcaster from Taiwan, moved up to be division chief. After Dave Hess retired, I brought in a couple of FSOs to run the China branch. One was Bill Palmer, whom I had known in Shanghai. He stayed a couple years. To replace him I got Dan Sreebny, who had been the information officer in Hong Kong with me. Dan was, as I said, a very good information officer, a very good Foreign Service Officer. He was so good that they took him out of the China Branch and made him the head of the Near East division. He knew Arabic as well as Chinese. That was about the time I was leaving. Of course, USIA was folded back into the State Department a couple of years after I retired.

*Q: While you were head of the East Asia Division, did you get to do any traveling?*

KNOPES: Oh yeah.

*Q: You'd done the orientation before you --*

KNOPES: I visited all countries with VOA language services while I was still in Hong Kong. As division chief I made quite a few trips to the area. I attended at least two Asian Broadcasting Union meetings -- the one in Beijing and another in Seoul, Korea. My deputy went to a couple, also. We tried to go every year. It was a chance to meet other broadcasters and to keep up contacts with Radio Beijing. One of my trips was to try to increase audio feeds to medium-wave stations. On that trip I visited the new relay facility VOA was building in northeast Thailand. When it opened a year or so later the signal to all of Asia was much stronger, especially into China. On all of my trips I met with PAOs to talk about VOA and what we might do to make it more effective their country.

**DENNIS G. HARTER**  
**Chief of Political Section**  
**Hong Kong (1982-1984)**

*Mr. Harter was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Georgetown*

*University, Seton Hall and American University. He joined the State Department in 1966 and was assigned to the CORDS program of USAID in Vietnam. He subsequently studied Chinese and served in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Hanoi, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission (1997-2001). In his Washington assignments Mr. Harter dealt primarily with East Asian matters. He also served as Director of the State Department's Press Office in Washington and as State's Representative to the Washington Council on International Trade in Seattle. Mr. Harter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

*Q: Well then, off you go in 1981 was it or 1982?*

HARTER: I went back to Hong Kong in 1982. Burt Levin, who had been the Deputy Consul General just as I was finishing up in Hong Kong in 1978, was now the Consul General there. He returned to the Department on consultations in the spring of 1982 and asked me to join him that summer as head of the Political Section. He was concerned because Hong Kong's role as a China watching post had been seriously eroded as the result of the normalization of relations and the opening of an Embassy in Beijing as well as Consulates in Shanghai and Guangzhou, the latter only a few hundred miles up the Pearl River from Hong Kong. Hong Kong's Political and Economic Sections had already been raided for personnel slots for the new posts and the Embassy and Consulates were already churning out all kinds of reporting. With a new, more open China, diplomats in China could travel and had greater access to Chinese officials and others throughout the country. Burt saw Hong Kong becoming marginalized, but he and other senior officers still believed Hong Kong had a role as a China reporting post. Burt felt I could develop that new role based on my recent four-year experience there. I had enjoyed my year on the desk and my four years in Washington, but I too was anxious to go back overseas. Moreover, the structured layering of the China Desk with its three deputies system had left me out of the biggest of the bilateral issues and that was also a bit frustrating. That arrangement was not likely to change even though there were new people coming in. The EA Front Office people who knew China affairs, Assistant Secretary Holdridge and Deputy Assistant Secretary Tom Shoesmith, both agreed Hong Kong had a role to play in China reporting and both encouraged me to go back to Hong Kong. But no sooner did I get to Hong Kong in 1982 than British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher made statements about the return of Hong Kong to China and she traveled to Beijing to propose the start of negotiations between Britain and China over the return of Hong Kong to PRC sovereignty.

The talks began in 1982, but the actual return date was 1997, 99 years after the lease of the New Territories. This marked the first time the USG was looking at the situation in Hong Kong as something other than a question of textile imports and quotas. Previously, that was the only real issue in our relations with Hong Kong, although we of course did deal with refugee issues, first the refugees from China and then the refugees from Vietnam. But these were largely "international" issues in Hong Kong and while they had an impact on the local population, they weren't really Hong Kong issues. Our Economic and Commercial Sections had wide-ranging contacts in the business community and in the Hong Kong Government with those who dealt with textiles, but we never had much to do with the other parts of the Hong Kong Government or with popular organizations in Hong Kong. We had never been involved with the education system; we'd never been in to talk to people in the local councils or the district administrations.

Politically, we were starting out at ground zero. Over the years, we also had very limited contact with the PRC representatives who were in Hong Kong. Actually, that's an interesting story in itself, going back to my first tour in Hong Kong in 1974-1978.

Because we had diplomatic relations with Taiwan, we did not have any kind of regular access to any of the PRC people who were in town, for the most part under the aegis of the New China News Agency (NCNA). If Britain had a Hong Kong issue to discuss with China, they would meet with the NCNA representatives in Hong Kong and messages would get relayed up to Beijing for resolution. Of course, the British could use their Embassy in Beijing to do this, but the PRC preferred not to deal with Hong Kong issues that way, I guess to keep from making the sovereignty issue so prominent in the pre-1982 periods before they were discussing Hong Kong's return to mainland control.

Separate from the NCNA operations, China ran a "united front" program in Hong Kong to deal with non-communists and to promote PRC policies indirectly. The "united front" organization was largely centered in the labor unions, some of which were dominated by the Communists and their supporters, and the newspaper groups led by the Wen Wei Pao and the Ta Kung Pao. The Ta Kung Pa was run by Fei Yimin. Fei was from an old conservative Shanghai family, but he had been a long-time associate of the Communists and he was used by them to influence non-communist intellectuals and students. Fei moved to Hong Kong after 1949 and took on publishing the newspaper. He had played a role in helping to keep things from getting too out of hand during the Cultural Revolution's spillover into Hong Kong and he had regular dealings with Hong Kong Government officials. While we could not see the NCNA cadres, we could see Fei. He would see us in his offices and talk about PRC policies in Hong Kong and around the globe and we'd discuss U.S. activities as well. Occasionally, he would agree to meet us socially, but usually, if we ended up having a meal together, it was in his offices. Fei was a good source for PRC policy guidelines and gossip on issues in both Hong Kong and the mainland. He would occasionally embellish stories so one had to be careful about subscribing too much credibility to everything he said. But, particularly in the early years when the Liaison Office had limited access anywhere in China, Fei was quite valuable as a source of information. By and large, the New China News Agency officials wouldn't see us, though there were occasional exceptions. I don't think we had any meetings with the NCNA during the time Wever Gim was our Political Section head. A new Consul General or a new head of the Political Section could get to see one of the Deputy Directors at NCNA. If we had one of those meetings, I would usually go along and take notes with either Stan Brooks or Don Anderson when they were leading the Political Section.

After we normalized relations in 1979, the opportunities to deal with NCNA expanded, and we could occasionally get NCNA Deputies to attend Consulate General functions. I had my own regular contact with one of the NCNA correspondents and then later with some of their foreign affairs office people, including one who was the daughter of a high ranking military man in Beijing. When I returned to Hong Kong in 1982, I resumed these contacts, including contact with Fei Yimin and one of his sons who was also working at the paper. Moreover, we could see NCNA officials regularly and at our request. Similarly, our Economic and Commercial people were able to get access into the PRC-run commercial entities, from the Bank of China through the various merchandising operations that China had opened in Hong Kong.

It was a bit ironic, I had been brought back to Hong Kong to try to rebuild the ConGen's China reporting credentials and we now were starting an entirely new focus on local Hong Kong issues and the bilateral negotiations between China and the UK. On the negotiations issue, the basic USG policy was to stay out of the negotiations and to urge both sides to keep the stability and prosperity of the Hong Kong people at the forefront of the negotiations. We did not want to take a position that favored one side or another, but in reality it was very difficult to avoid being seen as supportive of the British negotiating position. And so, while U.S. officials tried to maintain an impartial stance, the PRC regarded our intentions with some suspicion. The British and the Chinese were often at loggerheads and there was a real dearth of contact among the various players in Hong Kong who represented concerned elements in the negotiations. This included the two direct negotiation partners – Britain and China – but it also involved a variety of very diverse groups in Hong Kong. These groups would often vilify one another in the media and they advanced arguments about Hong Kong's future in stove pipes. There was very little cross fertilization of ideas and very little common ground of policy understanding. Because we were out talking to people in all of these groups and getting a variety of opinions about Hong Kong's future, it seemed remarkable how little the various people talked to one another.

After several weeks of the Section producing reports on a variety of these separate views on Hong Kong, I decided to try a little cross-fertilization. After hearing my ideas, Burt Levin and his Deputy, Dick Williams, authorized me to try to put together small dinner parties that would assemble some of these individuals and try to get them to communicate. Burt decided not to participate so as to lessen the image of this being a USG-authorized function and we decided we were likely to get higher level attendees if the Deputy CG was the host rather than the head of the Political Section. I wasn't certain we could get the individuals to come to the same table, even if it was a dinner table, without risking some thoughts that we were "interfering." It was also possible that once the people gathered there would be no real conversation and we'd never have a second opportunity to try this approach. But, we went ahead with the plan and brought representatives from NCNA, the British Foreign Office representatives in Hong Kong, Hong Kong Government executive and legislative branch officials, academics, journalists, local government administration representatives and business leaders to the table. It didn't take us very long to get the conversation started and the guests were quickly speaking out on their views of the Hong Kong situation. The participants soon found areas of common ground even as they articulated confrontational views on a variety of topics related to Hong Kong's future. The first dinner proved to be very successful and both the NCNA and UK Foreign Office people from Hong Kong expressed how useful they thought it was for them to hear differing views in a non-political setting. Other participants were equally enthused and the word got out about the dinners so we never had a problem finding willing invitees, eager to participate in the discussions. We were able to bring different participants together on three or four more occasions over the next few months as a way to encourage more dialogue among those with direct interests and roles in Hong Kong's future. Although I don't know if anything came up in those sessions which made its way into the "Final Settlement", I do know we had discussions of a number of very controversial issues that as they progressed became less combative and more nuanced and blended among the representatives of the two sides. The next day, I would write up these sessions in reporting messages back to the Department.

As I developed my own contacts in the local community, I discovered my Political Section colleagues and I were all operating at a distinct disadvantage. All of us were FSI Washington and FSI Taiwan trained Mandarin speakers. Hong Kong was largely still a Cantonese speaking city so quite often our language officers were taking FSN (Foreign Service National) interpreters with us so we could converse with some of the local Hong Kong officials who were not part of the British educated elites.

*Q: How did you deal with the cadre of Hong Kong nationals who had been translating, I mean you know, you build up this very impressive group of experts, a part of the China watchers. What was happening with them?*

HARTER: When I went back to Hong Kong in 1982, many of the local employee specialists were still working there. The senior Political Section local was Vincent Lo and he had another assistant who had come out of one of the Hong Kong University staffs. The senior people on the Economic Section staff were also there and they too had added some younger assistants. Vincent, like many of the other local employees, eventually emigrated to the U.S. He'd worked for the U.S. government long enough to qualify for the special service visa and so he took his family and came to the United States in the late 1980s. I believe he settled somewhere in this area, but I've never really had any contact with him beyond an occasional Christmas card maybe 15 years ago. Vincent, like many of the other local ConGen employees of his generation, had fled China with his parents as a young child some years after the Communists came to power in 1949. There were quite a large number of such people in the overall Hong Kong population. Because of this background, many felt very insecure about their futures once the PRC took over in 1997. Almost from the start of the Sino-British talks on Hong Kong's future, many people with this background or who were associated with the Hong Kong government were making plans to find alternate residences abroad.

In the two years I was in Hong Kong, there were a lot of times when public confidence was deeply affected by local perceptions or press perceptions of the degree of progress in the talks about Hong Kong's future. The Hong Kong dollar went through a number of troughs, the worst of which virtually cut its value by a third in one afternoon which marked the end of a multi-day session of the bilateral UK-PRC dialogue. For the preceding sessions, the British spokesperson who reported to the press about the state of the talks had used a formula which was bland but at least positive sounding. On this particular Friday, however, he didn't use the same formula and the press and the Hong Kong community interpreted the somewhat different comments as the sign of a great failure. It was probably true that up to that time, this had been a more contentious session between the two sides and there was probably reason to think that the results were therefore a bit of a disappointment to the negotiators. Even though it might not have been as successful a round of talks, however, it would not have hurt for the British to use the same phrases about "frank" and "cordial" talks on that particular occasion. But, nobody perceived that a slight alteration in the formulaic public press comment would trigger such a reaction. The Hong Kong dollar went from something like 6.2 to 1 US dollar to 9.6 to 1 by the end of the day. Prior to this, the Hong Kong Government had been adamant it would not peg the Hong Kong dollar to a fixed exchange rate. But over that weekend, the Governor and his chief financial advisors changed their minds and fixed the Hong Kong dollar at 7.87 Hong Kong dollars to one U.S. dollar and it has pretty much stayed at that rate ever since.

*Q: Were we offering assurances to our people there that we would take care of them?*

HARTER: Yes, in a very informal way we were doing that. We made it clear to the people who had been with the Consulate all those many years that the service visa option would be available in Hong Kong. Admin staff members had discussions with the FSNs through the employee association and individually they had their situations reviewed in their various sections. Procedures were clarified and employees understood their opportunities would not disappear so there was no need for a sudden rush to leave Hong Kong. So, yes I think the ConGen made a conscious effort to reassure folks. The Hong Kong government was of course trying to do the same thing and trying to avoid the hemorrhaging of its experienced personnel. The people who had the biggest concern of course were the people in the police and those who had been in the correctional institutions who felt they would suffer at the hands of the locals once they were no longer part of the official government system.

The British had been very reluctant from the beginning of the talks to share anything with us. That included sharing at our Embassies in London and Beijing and their Embassy in Washington. But, a couple of the Hong Kong British officials, the Political Advisor and his Deputy, both of whom were British Foreign Service officers assigned to the Hong Kong government were accessible. And, within certain guidelines, they did let us have a pretty good idea of where things stood. They were not allowed to go too deeply into details, but in Hong Kong we were able to learn much more about what was going on in the talks than anywhere else. The Consul General, his Deputy and I maintained that particular dialogue with the Political Advisor's Office.

*Q: When you arrived there, how would you describe the British role in Hong Kong? I've heard it said that they were caught a little bit by surprise. They'd been running it more as a sort of old style colonial place.*

HARTER: Yes, that's true. There was very little "interference" from the local population or from people on the outside. If the UK Government wanted to take a particular action in Hong Kong, they simply did it. I was chatting yesterday with a friend of mine who recounted a story about how he had been invited by the Hong Kong Political Advisor to go out and visit the so-called "Walled City." The Walled City was a small piece of territory inside the Kowloon/New Territories portion of Hong Kong that somehow got omitted from the maps that were drawn up when the British leased these territories from the Qing Dynasty in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. So, this was a little section of Hong Kong that was a lawless no-man's land. It had no government, it had no police, it had no authority outside the local gangs who controlled illicit activities in the area. It was a place of squalor and slums where drug dealers and pimps operated freely. Some entrepreneur had built an apartment building in the area. If you remember anything about Hong Kong before the late 1990s when they moved their airport to another island away from the major populations centers, Hong Kong used to have its airport in Kowloon in a very heavily populated part of the city and right along the edge of the inner Hong Kong harbor and you would fly in along the overland flight path and you'd be down the last leg of the route and you'd look in apartment windows as you descended onto the runway.

*Q: Yes, scary.*

HARTER: Well, anyway the Hong Kong Government had regulations about how high buildings could be so they wouldn't interfere with the flights. This entrepreneur had gone in and built something that would have been a couple of stories into the flight path. And, I guess he either didn't know about the regulation or he figured the Hong Kong Government couldn't touch him. So, the purpose of this particular trip, the one my friend was recounting, was to have the Political Advisor enter "no-man's land" and tell the entrepreneur he had to remove the top few floors of this building. He was given a deadline to complete the project or else the Political Advisor promised he faced having the entire building razed to the ground. So, even here, where it was the "Walled City" and the British actually had no legitimate jurisdiction, they felt they still had the right to operate there if the situation required it. My friend recounted the story also to demonstrate that it was indeed a special circumstance, however, that permitted the British to go in to take action. Occasionally, in hot pursuit of a criminal, Hong Kong authorities would cross the boundary into the Walled City, but that was not a common occurrence and it required a pretty serious offense for the British to consider "crossing the line" there either in hot pursuit or as part of a raid to locate someone reputedly hiding in these few blocks of tenements.

*Q: Was there much of a local Chinese, Hong Kong representation?*

HARTER: Well, they certainly had advisory groups, and some institutions that represented the well-to-do Chinese in the business community of Hong Kong. The Executive Council and the Legislative Council created a facade of "Chineseness" to the overall administration. British civil servants were scattered throughout the government administration and only a handful of Chinese had anything approaching "executive" authority, and often only several layers down in the administration. The court system was exclusively British. The administration of all of the government services was British. There were some Brits scattered in the lower levels of the colonial administration, but overwhelmingly the majority of the personnel in the offices were local Hong Kong Chinese. It's just they never got beyond a certain cap and couldn't become real administrators of Departments. During the '80s, and particularly once the negotiations began with the PRC, the British introduced transitional changes that retired more of the colonial officials and more of the local Chinese came in to take increasingly more senior positions. There was also a greater enfranchisement of the local population and a broader range of offices that could be elected at the local levels.

*Q: Did we play any role in - had we been talking to the Brits about this? I mean, wasn't it a way of our business, but --*

HARTER: We had, I think, been as surprised as anybody else by Margaret Thatcher's proposals to start negotiations with Beijing on Hong Kong's return to the mainland. I don't think anybody was focused on it as a significant issue because the lease expiration was still 15 years out. While I'm sure she'd discussed this with the Foreign Office, one had the impression the initiative was her own. And, unlike a lot of other issues where our special relationship with the UK meant we had very intimate exchanges of information, I don't think she or the UK Government ever told us beforehand that she would open the dialogue in 1982. Once that issue was out in the public eye, I am certain we had any number of dialogues with the British urging that they try to negotiate

some quasi-separation for Hong Kong from the mainland. But that wasn't anything special because the UK had as its own chief objective the maintenance of some kind of continued British administrative presence in Hong Kong after 1997.

Quite apart from what the British were doing, the USG was also involved in looking at our own status in Hong Kong after 1997. Would we merge the Hong Kong Consulate with the Consulate in Guangzhou and cover all of south China from there? Would the Chinese permit Consulates to operate in Hong Kong at all? If the Consulate remained, would we be able to maintain defense attaché officers and ship visitation rights once the PRC assumed sovereignty? We had to determine what to do with the FBIS (Foreign Broadcast Information Service) operation in Hong Kong and all of its sundry monitoring of broadcast and news information inside China. We did develop certain contingencies including reducing the size of our staff in Hong Kong and scaling back on our operations. So, there were a lot of those kinds of issues that had to be thought about as it related to the future positioning of a Consulate General in Hong Kong.

That was certainly part of our internal focus back in 1982, 1983, 1984, the time period that I was there. None of these issues was fully resolved before I left in 1984, but later that year the Basic Agreement was in fact concluded and it became clear we would be able to maintain our facilities in Hong Kong after 1997. And much of what we were able to do before 1997 continued to be possible afterwards. In addition to making clear that there would be no residual British role in Hong Kong after 1997, the key to Hong Kong's future began to evolve as part of a five-year transition immediately before the 1997 turnover.

*Q: How was this worked out? Was this something that we - up in Beijing, we're talking at that time and saying, hey fellows, while you're doing this. talking to the Chinese, how about us?*

HARTER: There may have been some informal talks of that nature in Beijing I don't believe, however, there were any decisions made by the Chinese about what else would happen in Hong Kong as it applied to other institutions until it was quite a bit clearer what the final agreement would look like. So, I would say much of that discussion took place in the intervening years up to 1997, working out the overall relationship for the consulate and the staffing and ship visits, etc. There were lots of those sorts of issues involving the practical operation of Hong Kong that were taken care of later. Part of the problem in this particular time period is, we had very little idea what, if anything the U.S. government was doing with the reporting we were sending back. We knew a little bit of what the Brits and the Chinese were doing in the talks and how they might play off some things we had discussed in Hong Kong. But whether there was anybody in Washington who was really paying a significant amount of attention to this, we really didn't know. We virtually never got feedback. I mean, people might say about our bringing the various groups in Hong Kong together around the dinner table, "Oh, great idea, good that you're doing this sort of thing." But, Washington never shared any of its thinking on the formulation of U.S. policy on this issue. I found it frustrating. Knowing the materials we were providing and the way in which we were putting different ideas into the collective mix for those involved in the negotiations, but we had no idea what anybody in Washington thought or whether they really cared about where the negotiations were going. All we got were a few "attaboys."

*Q: What was the -- you were there first place from when to when?*

HARTER: I arrived in the summer of 1982 and stayed there until the summer of 1984. I left very, very quickly to go to Indonesia, because that particular assignment was up in the air until the last moment because of some personnel assignment issues in Washington.

*Q: By 1984 had the preliminary final agreement been reached?*

HARTER: Yes, it was finalized in 1984, but not until after I left.

*Q: What was your prognosis, yours and your colleagues about what was going to happen?*

HARTER: Well, because we had seen the uneasiness among the local population and the large numbers of people already trying to get out in the 1982-84 period, we projected a much larger outflow of people over those coming years than in fact actually happened. Something none of us foresaw, many of the people who went abroad in the 1982-84 period in fact, returned to Hong Kong in subsequent years.

The people who left Hong Kong in this time period got themselves documented in Canada, in Australia, the U.S., Europe, etc and then they came back to Hong Kong to live and work. With their futures secured by foreign citizenship or residency rights, they much preferred living in Hong Kong than they did in Vancouver or New York, or Houston, or Los Angeles or any of the other places they obtained residency. This was a time too when a variety of places sprung up as instant citizenship meccas where you could for fifty thousand dollars contribution to the government of the Maldives or a seventy-five thousand dollar contribution to the government of Tonga, become a citizen of those wonderful places. Actually, in most cases it was a lot more than fifty thousand dollars, but the idea was to attract financial investment to some of these mini-states in return for citizenship. In some cases you had to wait a period of time after depositing your money, but in other places you could get a new passport virtually immediately after making that basic financial commitment. A lot of the more wealthy people had done this years earlier and at this time it was the middle class people who went out and established rights of abode in other countries. My impression is that most of those who came back have in fact remained in Hong Kong after 1997 because the financial opportunities outweighed the PRC political "control" imposed after the British left. I don't know whether this current problem that exists -- the British democratization process was moving incrementally along in Hong Kong in the 1990s but it's been more or less stood on its head by Beijing. Whether that's going to create a new exodus or not, I just don't know.

*Q: It's in the evolving process as we speak in 2004. What were you getting from your contacts with the New China News Agency and all? Being the de facto representatives of Beijing. I mean, were they taking a pretty hard line or --*

HARTER: In general, yes, especially at the beginning of the talks. Margaret Thatcher and Li Peng did not get along in their initial meetings in Beijing, because she thought there ought to be a residual British role and Beijing made it quite clear there would not be any role for the British after 1997. They were taking quite a hard line. The situation, in fact became very difficult, particularly in Hong Kong, because the British had been used to having their own way on

political and economic matters and they were not used to having to consult with other authorities. Moreover, NCNA was still staffed by individuals who were really quite minor-level bureaucrats. There was no one of stature to deal with the Hong Kong Governor.

But, quite unexpectedly, Beijing sent a cadre with stature, Xu Jiatao, to head NCNA. He was a former Party First Secretary in Jiangsu Province, the province surrounding Shanghai, a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Xu was an effective representative for Beijing, who had clear prominence, was an established party official, and yet he was quickly able to move in the various political circles of Hong Kong. When he arrived in Hong Kong circumstances came together in an unusual way and I was the first person from the U.S. Consulate General to meet him.

Back in the Nixon era, ping pong had been the big sport that put the US and China together but, in this case it was volleyball, woman's volleyball. China and Japan had two of the top teams in the world and the United States was an up and comer, featuring a couple of stars who actually played in competitive leagues in Japan. As it happened, one of the leftist run sports associations hosted a three team woman's volleyball match in the colony which included these three nations. So, as usual in those sorts of public occasions the organizers send out complimentary invitations, and quite logically one was sent to the U.S. Consul General. Burt Levin said, "I don't want to go to this," and his Deputy, Dick Williams said, "I don't want to go to this. Harter you go." So, for the three nation competition, I was in the box of honor representing the United States, and I was seated between the Japanese Consul General and the Chinese representative, the new head of the New China News Agency, Xu Jiatao. So, we chatted back and forth in Chinese for a little bit before and during the matches. I went back to the office the next day and said, "You'll never guess who I met" and Burt and Dick were a bit surprised because nobody had known Xu would show up for this event. And, they were a bit concerned they might have created the wrong impression by not having made the effort to attend the competition. But, as I said, nobody had any idea Xu would show up at this event.

But, what was interesting is that Xu had a different mission in Hong Kong than any of his predecessors. His role was to project Beijing's "smiling diplomacy" toward Hong Kong. He went everywhere and talked with everyone, all with the purpose of reassuring the people of Hong Kong that Beijing had the people's interests at heart. Xu was out in the local village communities in the rural areas; he was in the schools and universities; he visited factories, business enterprises and town meetings talking to the people in the government administrations. It was a totally different focus for China's top representative in Hong Kong. He was very effective and very highly thought of in most circles. Xu remained as head of NCNA until 1990 when he fled Hong Kong for the United States, some say largely because of his apparent sympathy for the student democracy movement, many of whose leaders were able to safely avoid Chinese patrols along the Guangzhou-Hong Kong border and reach Hong Kong. Others say, however, that he had become a U.S. asset and he was spirited out of Hong Kong by the CIA because he was under investigation that would likely have led to his recall to Beijing. Whatever his motivation, Xu ended up in the United States.

*Q: Were you finding that - were they sort of saying what they were up to? I mean, in general terms?*

HARTER: Well, after Xu arrived, the articulation of PRC policies softened a bit and Chinese pronouncements on Hong Kong's future featured more assurances to the people of Hong Kong. The presentations were all more sugar-coated. It was all much smoother than in the earlier period where Beijing seemed satisfied just to say "we will be in charge." I'm not sure there was any overall change in Beijing's intentions. Beijing now willingly acknowledged there would be a local administration, some sort of operation which reflected the special nature of Hong Kong and protected the economic system which had sparked China's most recent economic growth. But, ultimately, there was no way Hong Kong was going to be allowed to be "independent" and the Hong Kong administration would be a facade that masked Beijing's ultimate decision-making authority across the political and economic spectrum. The PRC had to be very careful about how it played all of these public pronouncements and maneuvers, because Hong Kong was only part of China's territory that needed to be rejoined to the mainland. Taiwan was the principle prize and everything that was being played out for Hong Kong was being watched in Taiwan to evaluate how the Chinese would handle this transition.

And, of course there was a little issue to be dealt with in Macau, the Portuguese colony which had a 1999 lease expiration date, but which everyone knew would follow just behind Hong Kong once that arrangement was completed. Many years earlier after a big change in politics in Lisbon, Portuguese officials had gone to the Chinese and offered to return Macau. This would have been in the '60s and '70s. But the Chinese said the timing was not appropriate and Beijing would let Lisbon know when the time was ripe. So, while a lot of the new Beijing diplomacy was articulated in terms of Hong Kong's future, it was really being pitched for the audience in Taiwan. I think that's one of the reasons why they sent Xu to Hong Kong. He was a much more polished person than the bureaucrats who had staffed NCNA before this and who would have no flexibility to react to local circumstances. Xu had a flare and a public persona that was approachable. He was relaxed, didn't stand on ceremony, and the most negative thing the press could say about him after several weeks on the job was his penchant for wearing dark glasses all the time. Nonetheless, based on his background, he was certainly more than just a concerned observer and I'm sure if he was required to be a negotiator, he would be hard as nails.

*Q: What were you picking up during this period? What was happening in China? Was there any - were we picking up things in Hong Kong?*

HARTER: Yes, we were able to find a China reporting role for Hong Kong despite all of our focus on Hong Kong. It was certainly secondary to what we had to do on Hong Kong during this particular period, but, there definitely was a role. There were government officials, journalists and business people who, after traveling through China, would have their first contact with any US official in Hong Kong. Hong Kong was a convenient exit point for China and a comfortable place for people to decompress for a couple of days before heading back to their home bases. So, we had opportunities to meet with those people and talk to them and get a better perspective of China developments well before anybody in the Embassy or Consulates who tended to see people more as they started their China activities. The ConGen also had long-standing connections and contacts with the press. After 1979 and normalization of relations, the New York Times, the Washington Post and a many others left their Hong Kong offices and based their reporters in Beijing. But, Hong Kong was still the place to come to get away from Beijing

or to do additional research on China stories. Even though China was a lot more developed than it had been a decade earlier as we were starting the Liaison Office operations, Hong Kong provided a real break from the mainland routine and we were able to take advantage of our reputation on China issues to talk to many of these journalists who also wanted to pick our brains on China or for that matter on the new big story about Hong Kong's future. Those reporters, mostly with periodicals – Time, Newsweek, the Economist, etc. -- who were still assigned to Hong Kong tended to have a regional responsibility and Hong Kong served as their base to cover the rest of Southeast Asia. These would be people who had to periodically drop everything and run off to the Philippines or Malaysia or Singapore or somewhere else in the region because of local stories there. We still had the periodic luncheon meetings of China watchers but over time that too shifted to focus on Hong Kong's future.

*Q: How were your relationships with the Consulate in Guangzhou?*

HARTER: They were OK. We didn't have any jurisdictional problems or anything related to border control issues. ConGen officers still had limited opportunities to go in and out of China. I mean we didn't go in and out as frequently as we would have liked to, but we did try to work out arrangements where we would send officers to Guangzhou to help cover gaps. This was largely something that benefited the Consular side of the house. When we had our planning sessions for consular operations in China, it was decided that all immigrant visa (IV) operations for China would be centered in Hong Kong. That was primarily because the Consular district was the primary homeland for those Chinese who had settled in the United States. More than 95 percent of all the Chinese in the US came from Southern China – primarily Guangdong and secondarily Fujian. So, it just didn't make sense to replicate all of the normal IV processing in Shanghai and Beijing. People who lived outside the Guangzhou Consular District and could not readily get to the Consulate could do all their initial IV paperwork by mail and then come in for the final interview. If the familial linkage in the case was clear and all of the documents had been properly presented, the applicant traveled but once to Guangzhou and got the visa issued on the same trip. Obviously, they still could return home to settle their affairs and they didn't just go from the ConGen directly to the airport to depart. So, while Consular Sections in Beijing and Shanghai had three to five people who focused on non-immigrant visas, the Consulate General in Guangzhou had ten or twelve consular officers focused primarily on immigration cases. Some Hong Kong ConGen specialized agencies had worked out access for personnel who were based in Hong Kong to cover mainland China issues. INS Hong Kong was always sending people in to deal with emigration issues and the DEA (Drug Enforcement Agency) representative was also welcomed by the Chinese from time to time for visits. Customs personnel usually went in to investigate illegal textile shipments so I 'm not sure there visits were all that welcome.

*Q: I think it's probably a good place to stop here. I've got a question I'd like to ask before we move you on and you can cover it next time - relations with the British. Were the old colonial types having problems coming to grips with their diminished role?*

HARTER: You'd hear about some stories like that or read about families who'd been in Hong Kong for generations and were now leaving. I guess this was mostly among the middle-level bureaucrats and smaller business operators. The top UK businessmen either moved out like Jardine Matheson, which re-headquartered in Bermuda but kept its Hong Kong investments, or

planned to stay on as independents. The top Hong Kong Chinese businessmen had all been investing in China over the previous decade and their links to the mainland were already well-established. When I had dealings with the top Hong Kong businessmen like Li Ka-shing and Gordon Wu, it was largely to get their views on the evolution of Hong Kong's political scene or their understanding of PRC plans for the colony's future. They also gave me their insights into the economic development opportunities in China and they, for the most part, were optimistic about Hong Kong's survivability under the PRC. But, when it came to dealing with the British, aside from some journalists, the people we dealt with were the people involved in the negotiations, fellow foreign affairs professionals. I think from a political perspective, Consul General Burt Levin and the Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Edward Youde, probably had more of those kinds of discussions about the impact the turnover would have on local British expats. But, even Youde was a foreign affairs professional, a diplomat and a China specialist. He probably had more conversations with Burt about those kinds of issues, reflecting expat concerns and reflecting colonial attitudes within the overall government administration. Press stories, as I said, often reflected a colonial mentality and depicted concerns about Hong Kong's administrative integrity. But, I can't say I ever really had a one-on-one conversation that reflected this bias.

**JAMES R. LILLEY**  
**Director, American Institute of Taiwan**  
**Taiwan (1982-1984)**

*Ambassador James R. Lilley was born in China in 1928. After serving in the US Army from 1946-1947 he received his bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1951. From 1951-1958 he worked as an analyst for the US Army. His career includes positions in China, Japan, Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Laos, and ambassadorships to South Korea and China. Ambassador Lilley was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in May 1998.*

*Q: We're still talking about the 1968-1970 period. The changes in Taiwan weren't really in the forecast.*

LILLEY: Taiwan was really beginning to "take off" at that time. American economic aid to Taiwan stopped in 1965. However, after all of the mistakes that we had made on mainland China, we finally "got it right." We had some really "crackerjack" people in Taiwan, including men like Wolf Ladjinsky. He promoted real land reform, the move into agriculture and light industry, export promotion, import substitution. Taiwan made a lot of progress economically.

Politically, Taiwan had to fight against authoritarian and single political party KMT control of the system. This is basically similar to what has been done in Singapore. So there has been economic dynamism and political feudalism. Taiwan had gone through this process in the 1960s. By the time I visited Taiwan in 1970, we could really see this process "taking off." However, in the late 1960s and early 1970s mainland China had gone through the awful consequences of the Cultural Revolution. All of this had happened in mainland China, when Taiwan was beginning to move forward economically, although politically and militarily, the progress made was not so

good.

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*Q: Did you see indicators that everybody else was missing, including the view: "Don't fool around with China. Don't upset relations with China."*

LILLEY: Yes. I think that we were beginning to see that the mood was shifting in the United States regarding relations with China. We read information on China which was being sent back by the Consulate General in Hong Kong. The State Department was getting its own reports, too. I felt that, at that time, that we should move ahead in terms of relations with China. However, we had to protect our interests in Taiwan.

...

Some people said that we were already on the scene in strength in Taiwan, but others questioned and said: "Why are you dealing with these relics of history?" The question was how long it would take us to get out of this relationship with Taiwan. They asked whether there were any plans to do this. They admitted that China was in bad shape, but there were better elements in China that would come to power, and so forth.

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*Q: In the first place, did the China desk also cover Taiwan?*

LILLEY: At that time there was an ROC [Republic of China] desk in the State Department. Then there was also the PRC(M) desk [People's Republic of China (Mainland)]. That was the division of responsibility in the State Department.

*Q: I was talking about the arrangement in the CIA.*

LILLEY: In CIA there was a Directorate of Operations which included both Mainland China and Taiwan.

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However, right from the beginning Zhou En-lai said that even though we might work together, Taiwan was necessarily first on their list of priorities. That's when he laid down the importance he attached to Taiwan, no Japanese takeover, and so forth. And they were clear in this from the beginning. They said right from the beginning that we can't really move unless there were understandings on this. We said, okay, basically, and of course it became much more subtly stated in the Shanghai Communique when people like Marshall Green [then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs] and others really felt that it was very important to have agreed language on Taiwan that didn't get us sucked into the Chinese position.

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LILLEY: That language on Taiwan is important today in working on China. The Chinese

communists say that we recognized Taiwan as a part of China. In fact, what the communique says is that we acknowledge the Chinese position. This is an important distinction, which came out in the statement on the normalization of relations between the U.S. and China. However, that distinction did not appear in the Shanghai Communique. Although we didn't really and fully factor in the Taiwan issue in the Shanghai Communique, we did say both sides of the Taiwan Strait regard Taiwan as part of China and we did not challenge the Chinese position. Right now we have challenged it because we don't fully accept the Chinese communist position.

At the same time the Chinese communists are opposed to a Taiwanese declaration of independence. I think that the people who drafted those important communiqués were too much involved in a rush to normalize relations with China, leaving aside the future disposition of Taiwan.

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LILLEY: No, he was in CIA. He worked for Stansfield Turner. We drafted this paper and we had really "put the finishing touches" on our study of the situation there. The Carter administration at that point was really "veering over" in the direction of normalization of relations with China. We sort of grabbed them and said: "Hold it. We've got real 'equities' in Taiwan. The Chinese Nationalists have been our friends. They stood by us during the Vietnam War. We can't really do this to them. This will have a bad effect in Asia. It will hurt the administration's China policy. It is essential to 'get this right.'"

I think that this approach had some effect because, as you know, by 1979 there had been a reaction to this normalization. The secret way it had been done got nowhere near the positive public reaction which had been seen in the case of the Nixon and Kissinger visits to China. The same techniques were used, but the results were different. There was a growing group in Congress, all the way from Kennedy on the Left to Jesse Helms on the Right, and including Frank Church, Jake Javits, John Glenn, and Clem Zablocki. All of these people, with different political views, got together and said that the administration had to do better by our friends on Taiwan. They said that the deal which the Carter administration had gotten was not a good deal, because it did not have the necessary security guarantees for Taiwan. It didn't keep our relationship going legally with Taiwan, through an extension of the existing treaties. They said that they were going to change this situation and were going to give the administration the basis under which it could set up a non-diplomatic, "mission" in Taiwan. I think that that piece of legislation, [the Taiwan Relations Act], was one of the most brilliant pieces of legislation Congress ever passed. It really had many capable members of Congress in support of it.

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Well, all of these things changed. First, provision for a U.S. office in Taiwan was covered in a line item in the State Department budget. Secondly, Foreign Service Officers [FSOs] continued to serve in Taiwan but went through the legal process of "resigning" from the Foreign Service, while still retaining their seniority retirement and health insurance and promotion arrangements. Thirdly, we had a person in charge of the office in Taiwan with Ambassadorial experience, Charles [Chuck] Cross, who had previously been Ambassador to Singapore. He was a retired

FSO, born in China and an experienced, China hand.

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He is really quite a guy. I think that what set this office back was when Secretary Warren Christopher went out to Taiwan and there were riots in Taipei. Demonstrators rocked his car and kicked it. This was in Taiwan in December, 1978.

I think that Roger Sullivan accompanied Secretary Christopher on this occasion. I think that they thought that this riot was "contrived" and arranged for by the Taiwan authorities. They were angry about their treatment. However, it didn't get the average American angry.

There still are some signs of resentment from people like Senator Ted Kennedy [Democrat, Massachusetts] who said: "I told you guys to keep us informed in Congress about what you were doing with China. But you didn't tell us." Well, the administration said that there had been "secret negotiations." That ploy didn't work the second time around.

I think that generally what happened was that people who were "pro-Taiwan," like Ray Cline and others like that, got into this act very vigorously. However, those who had long been "pro-Taiwan," like former Congressman Walter Judd became re-engaged. The American Chamber of Commerce in Taiwan got very interested. The people who then testified before the Congressional committees were very articulate, more so than the people who defended the China policy of the Carter administration. The Chamber appeared to be defending the "small guy" against the "big guy." They included those who feared China. They expressed Taiwan's fear of China. We had large, commercial interests in Taiwan. We had American missionaries in Taiwan. We had all of these ties to Taiwan. These arguments were made.

*Q: By the time you retired from the CIA in 1978, what did you think of the future of Taiwan, from your office's point of view?*

LILLEY: The CIA should not make policy. CIA's responsibility was to call the situation the way it saw it. I think that at the time when our relations with China were normalized, there was a moratorium on arms sales to Taiwan for one year. We terminated the defense treaty between the U.S. and the Republic of China. We pulled our troops out of Taiwan and broke diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. All of these things were done. But by this time I was out of the Agency. However, I would assume that CIA officers were writing about the effects of these actions on Taiwan during this transition period. Of course, Taiwan was turning to us and saying that these actions would have a terrible effect on Taiwan. They said that they were "going to hell in a hand basket."

I think that in September, 1979, communist China began to alter its policies toward Taiwan. They came out with the "nine points leading to peaceful reunification." They switched from the idea of liberating Taiwan to reunification peacefully. Chinese policy began to shift and to become more "flexible."

*Q: During the time when you were still with the CIA, did we see a change in Taiwan that would*

*make it a more democratic country?*

LILLEY: That was beginning to emerge, but then it was "crushed" by Human Rights Day in 1979. There were riots in Kaohsiung [port in southern Taiwan], and the Chinese Nationalists threw all of the advocates of independence for Taiwan into jail. There was the famous "Chen" case, in which a Taiwanese from the U.S. died mysteriously. He "fell" from the fifth floor of a building and was killed.

*Q: Was this in the United States?*

LILLEY: No, in Taiwan. I was just going out to Taiwan. The Taiwan authorities were dealing out fairly rough treatment to people who advocated Taiwanese independence. I think this was largely because the authorities felt "insecure." But they were tough. There was a feeling that the Taiwan president was not a very good guy. Beijing was acting in a conciliatory fashion at this time. They had stopped bombarding Quemoy [Kinmen], and were conducting a sort of "peace offensive." Then the Taiwan authorities made a series of mistakes.

I went to China in the summer of 1980 with George Bush as a member of his "team of advisers." We visited both Japan and China. President Reagan was elected as a sort of friend of Taiwan. A couple of things happened. George Bush was Reagan's vice presidential running mate. At about this time Reagan announced that he thought that we should restore official relations with Taiwan. Oh, boy, the Chinese communists just went right through the roof! Here was Bush, on his way to China. It was a rough trip. Bush was not at all happy. The Chinese asked Bush, in effect: "What the hell is going on? Are you going to set the clock back?" We kept saying: "Look, you've taken us out of context," and so forth. Then, when we returned to Los Angeles, we were going to have a joint press conference with Reagan and Bush and we were going to discuss Bush's trip to China.

This press conference did not turn out as badly as we thought it would. I think that we got Ronald Reagan to "back off" on some of this emphasis on Taiwan. He emphasized our hope for peaceful relations and prosperity for all Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. He said that this is our policy and he didn't get into the question of "official relations" with Taiwan at all. I think that this attitude tended to "smooth over" a potential controversy.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that Reagan at that point was sort of speaking "from his heart," which he would do from time to time? He would occasionally sort of "louse up" the situation for people who were trying to create an organized world.*

LILLEY: I think that part of this was Reagan's own instincts, and part of it was that some of his people really thought this way. They had very close ties with Reagan. I saw Reagan before I went to Taiwan as the second Director of AIT [American Institute on Taiwan], replacing Chuck Cross. I attended a White House meeting for outgoing chiefs of mission. The State Department initially took the view that I could not be included in this group, but a way was found to include me. Reagan had 3x5 cards on each of the diplomats attending the ceremony. For example, the cards would say: "This is Harry Barnes. He's going to India." When the time came for President Reagan to say goodbye to the attendees, Reagan would say: "Have a nice tour of duty."

Goodbye." I was 14th on the list of American diplomats meeting Reagan. I came in last. President Reagan said: "You're going to Taiwan?" I said, "Yes." He said: "Please sit down." His wife came in. Vice President George Bush came in. We were there for 15 or 20 minutes. Reagan was telling stories. He's a very charming guy. My family who were with me have never forgotten this.

Finally, when I left, President Reagan said to me: "You must understand this. I like those people in Taiwan." I'll not forget those words. I think that those were probably as good directions as I needed and where he wanted me to go. At the same time, however, the F-16s and F-5Gs [fighter planes] had been turned down for sale to Taiwan.

*Q: We're talking about types of fighter planes.*

LILLEY: The proposal had come in that we should do this. Everybody was saying that President Reagan was strong for this. I was the guy from the NSC [National Security Council] staff. So I said that we were studying that. The idea was to get the Defense Department to do a study of this matter. I didn't think that the CIA would do it. The proposal to sell aircraft to Taiwan was based on Taiwan's defense needs, in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act. So the Defense Department did a study and concluded that Taiwan didn't need these aircraft. The "Washington Post" picked up this story and published it. Eventually, President Reagan and Vice President Bush decided that they wouldn't sell the aircraft to Taiwan.

So when I arrived in Taiwan, and on the same day, I think, I had to confirm to the Taiwanese that we weren't going to sell them the F-16s or the F-5Gs. It was a "rocky way" to start a trip. However, the Taiwanese believed that I hadn't been involved in the turn down.

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When I had been on the NSC staff for about six months, administration people came to me and said: "Listen, we want to get the 'right man' in Taiwan. Things are not going well. You are a man who is trusted by the Reagan administration. You have a good reputation in Taiwan. Why don't you go there as Director of the AIT [American Institute on Taiwan]?" I said: "Fine."

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There was a very strong movement at that time to move forward the relationship with the PRC [People's Republic of China]. This movement came from Secretary of State Al Haig, John Holdridge [Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs], and Bill Rope, who was then on the China desk. They were pushing this course of action hard. This is what led to the communique of August, 1982, which got us into some trouble with arms sales to Taiwan. At that time the PRC were pushing very hard with the line that the Carter administration had allegedly made a commitment to terminate arms sales to Taiwan. We made a very thorough search of the files and we couldn't find any record of such a commitment. We talked to Zbigniew Brzezinski [former National Security Adviser to President Carter] and we talked to anybody else who might have knowledge of this matter. Finally, President Carter himself was contacted, and he said: "I never made such a commitment. I can tell you that I wouldn't have made it."

Then the PRC started to apply tremendous pressure on Ambassador Art Hummel in Beijing, Secretary of State Al Haig, and other people to terminate arms sales to Taiwan. So there was evidently going to be a big problem with China on this issue. At about this time a memorandum was submitted to President Reagan by Secretary of State Al Haig, following his talks with Huang Hua, the Chinese Foreign Minister, which referred to quality and quantity limitations on arms sales to Taiwan.

A good friend of mine, an FSO [Foreign Service Officer] at the State Department, called me up and said: "This memorandum is coming to the President. It's bad news. See what you can do." I tried to go to the State Department and get a copy of this memorandum. However, this memorandum arrived at the White House at 6:00 PM that same evening. I went to Dick Allen the following morning and said: "I've been told that this memorandum on arms sales to Taiwan is not a good thing and that we should do something about it." It had gone right through Dick Allen's office to President Reagan. It was described as a commitment made to the Chinese communists.

*Q: I'm surprised that any President, and particularly Ronald Reagan, would allow something to come to him overnight, bypassing his National Security Adviser.*

LILLEY: This happened during a period of 16 hours. You can't imagine the confusion in the Reagan administration in its early period in office. The administration had been in office for about six months, but things still hadn't been straightened out, and things were "slipping through."

*Q: Do you think that Secretary of State Al Haig was "playing a game" and slipping matters through?*

LILLEY: I would hesitate to put that "monkey on his back," but that certainly is what happened.

Then the PRC tried to ram something through by the tenth anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972. This was in February, 1982. But they couldn't do it. This sinocentric group in the State Department went to the Chinese and said: "Look, Jaruzelski in Poland is a pro-Russian communist, and the Polish democratic force is coming up, under Lech Walesa. These are the forces we support, and this is good." The Chinese, in fact, didn't want Lech Walesa to win.

*Q: Why anybody would advance an argument like that...*

LILLEY: They had some weird ideas. They thought that, somehow, this would "soften up" the Chinese communists to get something done by the tenth anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué. Well, the Chinese communists got tougher and tougher. Zhao Ziyang was premier at the time. He hit President Reagan very hard on this matter a meeting in Cancun, Mexico.

*Q: This was a meeting of the leaders of the principal economic powers.*

LILLEY: I forget which one it was. It was a conference of leaders, and Huang Hua and the Chinese Ambassador to the U.S. pushed this whole concept of a limitation on arms sales to Taiwan in terms of quantity and quality. That had already gotten through us. Then, the next issue involved what was called the "F-X," a new fighter aircraft for Taiwan. It was similar to an F-16 A or B or an F-5G. The F-16 was made by General Dynamics, and the F-5G was or would be made by Northrop Aircraft. The assembly line at Northrop was running out of parts for F-5Es. Communist China had about 5,000 obsolete, MiG fighters, but it was time to improve Taiwan's inventory of fighter aircraft.

When this recommendation to President Reagan came through to the White House, the whole issue "leaked out," and there was an outcry from people who were very concerned about U.S. relations with the PRC and the way that Reagan was allegedly "messing them up." Articles on this issue hit the press and appeared in the "New York Times." The people who wrote these articles said that we shouldn't sell these aircraft to Taiwan, as such a sale would lead to a break in relations with the PRC.

I decided to take the whole issue and give it to the Defense Department "to do a study" as to whether the proposed sale of these aircraft would meet the defense needs of Taiwan. This procedure was in line with the Taiwan Relations Act. The question was: "Does Taiwan need a new fighter aircraft?" Charley DeSaulnier in the Defense Department prepared this study. I didn't trust CIA to do this study. I knew the CIA very well and didn't think that it would come up with an "objective" report. I had worked there and knew those people very well. In a word, they weren't "dispassionate" on this issue.

So Charley in the Defense Department did this study. He contacted me and said: "Jim, I'm not sure that you'll like this, but we really come out against the sale of this aircraft to Taiwan." I said: "Charley, this has nothing to do with whether I like it or not. I want to know what the objective situation is." In the report Charley made the case that Taiwan had a sufficient number of F-5E fighters to defend Taiwan. The assembly line at Northrop could be extended and continue to produce them. This aircraft was better than anything the Chinese communists had. The F-5E was a short-range, high performance aircraft. The study concluded that Taiwan didn't need a new type of aircraft, which would be unduly provocative. So this report went to the President, and the State Department immediately "leaked it" to "The Washington Post," under the headline that the Chinese Nationalists did not need a new fighter aircraft. The team at the State Department agreed with this view, and the "Washington Post" carried this story.

At this time I was getting ready to leave the United States for Taiwan to serve as Director of the AIT. A very high official of the Reagan administration came to me and said: "Well, do you accept the findings of the DIA report?" I said: "I really can't refute them." This man said: "Do you think that Taiwan needs a new fighter aircraft?" I deferred to the Defense Department on that question. Maybe I shouldn't have done this, but I did. Then the Defense Department arranged to announce that President Reagan had turned down the sale of the F-5G and the F-16A or B to Taiwan on the day I left for Taipei.

So I arrived in Taiwan against this background. However, my friends in Taiwan immediately concluded that this was deliberately done to screw me up. Maybe it was just a coincidence that it

happened that way. (End of tape)

*Q: You were saying that there was a strong, pro-PRC lobby within the White House or the administration.*

LILLEY: There were people holding those views. I don't want to name them, but they were there, and you can pretty well guess who they are. I can't say that this was done deliberately, but it happened just when I was landing in Taiwan. The Taiwan people knew that I hadn't done this. I received very good treatment during the 2 ½ years I was in Taiwan, from January, 1982, to May, 1984. I stayed through the inauguration of Chiang Ching-kuo for his second term as President of the Republic of China. Li Teng Hui was Vice-President of the Republic of China. I knew them both. Actually, an unofficial, U.S. delegation headed by retired Ambassador Walter Stoessel was sent out for the inauguration. Before he retired, Stoessel had been Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. A great guy. He had also been Ambassador to the Soviet Union and to Poland.

Very quickly, the Taiwanese authorities turned on the charm offensive. They figured that I was a new, political appointee, a supporter of President Reagan and Vice President Bush. They thought that I would understand Taiwan's needs better.

I arrived in Taiwan just as the "August Communique" [of 1982] was being negotiated between the U.S. and the PRC. That was a rough experience. Some of it was negotiated in Washington, and some of it in Beijing. The Chinese communists pushed very hard for the termination of arms sales to Taiwan.

*Q: When did the "August Communique" come out? What was reason for it?*

LILLEY: When the Reagan administration entered office, the Chinese communists told us that the Carter administration had made a commitment to terminate arms sales to Taiwan. We couldn't find any record that such a commitment had been made. Then the Chinese communists hit both Secretary of State Al Haig and President Reagan, saying: "You've got to do something about these arms sales to Taiwan. They are intolerable to China as well as deeply offensive to us."

In the fall of 1981 the Reagan administration started negotiating with the PRC for some kind of joint communique to cover arms sales to Taiwan. With the agreement of President Reagan the two sides agreed to include this term of reducing the "quantity and quality" of arms sales to Taiwan in the agreed language. Then the Chinese communists started pressing for a "date certain" for the termination of all arms sales to Taiwan. There were people in the State Department who were arguing that we should agree to this. The Chinese communists indicated that the alternative to this was a "downgrading" of relations between the U.S. and the PRC. They had just "killed the chicken to scare the monkey." They had "downgraded" relationships with the Netherlands for selling two submarines to Taiwan. This was clearly a message for the U.S. In other words, "If you don't agree to a date certain for termination of arms sales to Taiwan, we will downgrade our relations with the U.S."

Memoranda on foreign affairs that came to President Reagan from the State Department passed through the NSC. By this time Judge Clark, who had formerly been in the State Department, had moved over to the NSC. We were then able to watch much more carefully the recommendations going through to the President through the NSC. As I understood it, the memoranda from the State Department took the position that either we would set a "date certain" for the termination of arms sales to Taiwan or we would face the downgrading of relations with the PRC. By this time, as I was now in Taiwan, I didn't have access to these memoranda but I heard about them.

*Q: The "downgrading" of relations between the PRC and the U.S. would have meant what?*

LILLEY: Probably recalling Ambassadors and leaving the respective Embassies under Charges d'Affaires. This would affect us across the board in terms of trade and other matter. The Chinese communists always greatly emphasized trade. At that time, I think that we had a trade surplus with the PRC.

Anyway, termination of arms sales to Taiwan was being pushed very hard. In my position as Director of the AIT, I was being pushed very hard to see whether Taiwan would agree to this, if we could "sell" this proposal to Taiwan. I was brought back to Washington for consultations. The State Department pushed me hard on this issue. I returned to Taiwan and then wrote a message back to the State Department, saying: "This is the wrong thing to do, both in terms of the security of Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act." I said that we couldn't do this.

Meanwhile, President Reagan had already decided that he wasn't going to press ahead with the termination of arms sales to Taiwan. He said: "We'll risk a 'downgrading' of relations with the PRC." He got this message through to the PRC leaders at an authoritative level: "If you insist on our terminating arms sales to Taiwan, we're not going to do it." Then the administration worked out language on a decrease in the "quantity and quality" of arms sales to Taiwan, indicating that it would lead to some kind of final solution of the issue. They dropped all references to the termination of such arms sales to Taiwan and also insisted on peaceful means.

Then they worked on what they called the "six assurances" to Taiwan. I participated in the negotiation of these assurances in Taiwan, and there were also negotiations on this issue in Washington. These basically boiled down to the point that the United States would not pressure Taiwan to negotiate, the United States would not serve in an intermediary role, and the United States would not terminate arms sales to Taiwan. There were six such assurances. These points were all worked into a statement which John Holdridge made, subsequent to the communique of August, 1982. President Reagan's interpretation, as relayed through Gaston Sigur was: "Listen. This issue hit me at the last minute. I don't like it. I want you to understand that my intention is that in the implementation of this communique we will maintain a balance. If China becomes belligerent or builds up a power projection capability which brings insecurity or instability into the area, we will increase our arms sales to Taiwan, regardless of what the communique says about quantity and quality. That is my interpretation of the communique," he said. There is also a phrase in there that all of this is contingent on peaceful resolution of the status of Taiwan.

So, if China made belligerent statements and started to obtain a power projection capability, China would be breaking the spirit of the communique. That was our argument, you see, and this

was the Reagan interpretation.

Then there was a "housecleaning" at the Department of State. Alexander Haig resigned in June 1982, as Secretary of State. John Holdridge was assigned to Indonesia as Ambassador, and Bill Rope was replaced on the China desk. I was in Taipeh when the new team came in. Paul Wolfowitz came in as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. I forget who was on the China desk in State. Maybe it was Don Anderson. George Shultz became Secretary of State. In short, we had a new team. A reason for this was that Paul Wolfowitz, when he was Director of Policy Planning, wrote a critical memorandum on the way that China and Taiwan policy were being handled. It was a brilliant piece of work. Sean Randolph, in the Office of Policy Planning, helped Wolfowitz write this.

Then Paul Wolfowitz was selected to be Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. This made a big difference. Paul came from, let's say, a more conservative, hard line tradition but was brilliant, both in his personal relationships and in his handling of issues. He brought in Bill Brown as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. Bill was "first class." He had a Ph.D. from Harvard in Chinese affairs. He had been a Captain in the Marine Corps. He had all of these credentials and had a very good record. Gaston Sigur moved into the NSC staff. He was a very good politician and a very smart guy, wired right into President Reagan. And Rich Armitage took over as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

*Q: When you were in Taipeh, did you have a feeling that this was a more "compatible" team with which you would be working?*

LILLEY: No question. All of a sudden, things started to "pick up." This was not a "pro- Taiwan" group. These guys were going to open up to China. Rich Armitage had military ties being built up with the PRC. A lot of things were going on. We were beginning to arrange for the Reagan trip to China. Art Hummel, a professional diplomat, was Ambassador to the PRC in Beijing. We were beginning to push the relationship with the PRC forward. The comment was made: "Bring Reagan to China. Show him! He's never been to China. He's never met a Chinese communist leader." He once had a conversation with a Chinese communist leader at a meeting in the White House in March, [1982]. This appointment was intended to give him an opportunity to meet a Chinese communist for the first time.

So we got this Chinese official, Ji Chaoghu, who was Harvard-educated and had been Zhou En-lai's interpreter. He was "smooth as silk." We wanted to bring him to the White House and show him to Reagan. "Look, Mr. President, this Chinese gentleman speaks English" and so forth. However, the Chinese Ambassador, Chai Zemin, said that he would have to go along also at this meeting with President Reagan. Chai Zemin was an old, gruff revolutionary from western China, hard as nails, and with little subtlety. He came in and did all of the talking. Ji just sat there. I remember that after this meeting President Reagan turned to Ed Meese and said: "I told you so. I told you what kind of people they were." So this effort to introduce Reagan to a real Chinese communist didn't work out very well. That was in the spring of 1982. However, Paul Wolfowitz, Gaston Sigur, and Rich Armitage worked with Ambassador Art Hummel in Beijing to develop this new program to "open up" to China.

Well, they tried to do this on the issue of terminating arms sales to Taiwan. It didn't work. Their people never the less tried to push this proposal through. Then the Chinese communists had the idea of "courting" the Reagan administration. George Shultz, who replaced Haig as Secretary of State, was a very stolid person. He had had big business dealings with Taiwan when he was Chairman of the Board of the Bechtel Corporation. Also, Bechtel had been very much interested in making an opening to China. Shultz had a very balanced approach to this issue of normalization of diplomatic relations with China. He wasn't an "ideologue." He had firm convictions, but he was an American exponent of the business of getting things done.

Schultz had great confidence in Paul Wolfowitz and Gaston Sigur. He knew that they were probably a little more in favor of Taiwan than he was, but he could live with that. Schultz wanted President Reagan to go to China and look at it, because Shultz himself had gone to China. He said to Reagan: "Look, there's a lot that can be done there. They do a lot of things wrong but they're trying to do the right things." He said that the Chinese communists were thinking of moving toward "loosening up" their economy, moving toward bringing in free market forces, focusing on agriculture and then industry, and allowing "joint ventures" with foreign countries. He said that this made sense. The Chinese communists had stopped doing "stupid things." He said that it was time for the U.S. to become more engaged with China. He said that we would handle the issue of Taiwan "judiciously and wisely" and would fulfill our commitments to Taiwan. However, he said that we have to make our relationship with China more stable.

Shultz said that he was not going to listen to a bunch of businessmen crying about limitations on American technology transfers to China and saying that American business opportunities were being ruined. He said: "I don't buy that stuff. I know what's strategic and what isn't. However, I'm going to 'open up' to China. I'm going to help American business. I'm going to have talks with the Chinese communists about the Soviet Union. We have to move that whole process forward."

In the early days of the Reagan administration he had all of these hard-line, anti-Soviet types in various government departments who said: "Look, we'll talk to the Chinese, we'll work against the Soviet Union, and the Taiwan issue doesn't mean a damned thing." They would go over to the Chinese Embassy in Washington, soak up a bunch of "Mao Tai" drinks, and then come back to their offices and write memos saying that the Chinese communists were in our camp. They would say: "Don't worry about Taiwan."

Well, that was not true. Taiwan was a "point" issue on which the Chinese communists had focused. However, many of these hard-line, anti-Soviet types had come into office with the change in administrations in 1981. The very balanced, pragmatic team of Armitage, Sigur, and Wolfowitz also came in. They also had David Greis over in the CIA. He was quite a good guy and was part of their team. They dominated the scene. Gaston Sigur had the confidence of President Reagan, Judge Clark [National Security Adviser], Wolfowitz, and Secretary of State George Shultz. Rich Armitage had the confidence of Secretary of Defense Weinberger.

So there was a whole series of things going on. We started moving ahead on the sale of more sophisticated weapons and making technology transfers to Taiwan, which the Department of State fought hard against. However, we overruled them. At the same time we got the first deals

going with communist China. We had negotiations going forward on the "Peace Pearl" program; the F-8 avionics program under discussion, which was a program worth \$550 million; we had the ANTPQ artillery radar program; and we had the "large bore" artillery shell and the torpedo program going. All of these issues were under negotiation with communist China to help them against the Soviet Union. We started actively working with China against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. We developed a real, strategic partnership.

At the same time Taiwan got the indigenous defense fighter with this new APG-67 radar on it. We got frigates, the civilian version of the "BLACKHAWK" helicopter, and the civilian version of the C-130 transport aircraft for Taiwan. These measures took care of several of Taiwan's defense needs, but not in a provocative way. So we really moved ahead on both tracks with Taiwan and China. The issues between them became less noisy because, at that time, we had Paul Wolfowitz, Bill Brown, and myself working with Mike Armacost, who was Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. We arranged for Taiwan to remain in the Asian Development Bank [ADB] and remain active in it. Communist China was also admitted to the ADB. Here they were, China and Taiwan, sitting side by side in one organization, with ambassadorial level representatives. It was a "breakthrough"! This had taken us two and one-half years to arrange.

I must say that the first cables that came from the Embassy in Beijing said: "The World Bank formula applies. If Beijing comes in, Taiwan is out. There is only one China." We said: "Oh, no. Taiwan stays in, and Beijing comes in." There was a fight, but we won the fight. Then we had to convince Taiwan and Beijing. Fujioka, the Japanese representative in the ADB [Asian Development Bank], helped us on this. He developed a formula which both Taiwan and Beijing would join together to implement. That is, Taiwan would stay in the ADB, and Beijing would come in. The formula was very obvious: China and Taipei. Taiwan would change its name from "the Republic of China" to "Chinese Taipei." Taiwan stayed in the ADB, and then Beijing joined the organization.

This formula led to the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Conference] breakthrough and the GATT, which then was in existence. Things were really moving along at that time.

The big development came in 1987, when Taiwan opened its doors to China. The Taiwan authorities revoked martial law, they allowed travel by Taiwan citizens to China, and there was a marked improvement in relations.

*Q: Let's talk a bit about Taiwan when you got there in 1982. What was the situation in Taiwan at that time, in terms of political and economic conditions?*

LILLEY: Taiwan was on an "upswing," economically. They were developing technologically advanced industries. They had been involved in food processing, textiles, shoes, and that sort of thing. Then they started moving into the production of semi-conductors, transistors, electronic consumer goods, computers, and so forth. Taiwan was in a transition period, moving from labor intensive goods, for example, up to technology intensive industries. The Taiwanese economy was tremendously vibrant.

Politically, Taiwan was still fairly "stiff." The Taiwan government did not allow an opposition

party. They called the opposition groups the "dangwat," which means groups outside the party. The government allowed the opposition groups to publish magazines and newspapers, and then closed them down if, in the government's judgment, they went "too far." The government gradually allowed them to express their views and began to allow them to take part in the political process.

A couple of developments occurred at that time which began to change things. The first development affected President Chiang Ching-kuo, a brilliant and visionary man. Early on in this process he had told me, indirectly but authentically, that first he was going to democratize Taiwan. Secondly, democratization was going to become a Taiwanese process. Thirdly, he was going to maintain prosperity, because this was the [gateway to] political reforms. Fourthly, he was going to open up to China. This information was passed to me in 1982. And he did this, making his moves very carefully.

He took his old, hard line mentor, Wang Sheng, who ran the Political Department in the military establishment, and sent him to Paraguay as Ambassador. [Laughter] He brought in an unelected, Taiwanese Governor, Li Teng-hui, as Vice President of the Republic of China in 1984. He made sure that I got to meet Li Teng-hui and to spend some time with him. We got to know each other. No one else was present at our big meeting. Chiang Ching-kuo began to allow more and more Taiwanese to begin to appear at public events, to have meetings, and so forth. He impressed people like Congressman Steve Solarz [Democrat, New York] that he was beginning to release the bonds on his people.

As I arrived in Taiwan in 1982, a Taiwanese independence advocate had been thrown out of a fifth story window and was killed. This was officially described as a "very mysterious death." Three years before this, the wife and two daughters of one of the leaders of the Taiwanese Independence Movement [name indistinct] were murdered. This former leader of the Taiwanese Independence Movement is now the Chairman of the DPP [Democratic Progressive Party] in Taiwan. This was "hard ball" stuff.

However, in 1982 the process of democratization had started. You could see the changes. It was a slow process, but Chiang Ching-kuo allowed Taiwan opposition politicians to begin to appear in public. He had to be sure that American support was firm. I think that by 1986, when David Dean came as the Director of the AIT [American Institute on Taiwan], Chiang Ching-kuo believed that the United States was fairly solidly behind him.

*Q: When you arrived in Taiwan in 1982, there must have been considerable apprehension as to what the U.S. was going to do, on arms sales to Taiwan, for example. Arms sales were critical. If we cut off all arms sales, this could have led to a gradual weakening of Taiwan.*

LILLEY: The Taiwanese became convinced that that wasn't going to happen. With U.S. support for the development of the IDF [independent, defense fighter] and the sale to Taiwan of U.S. made frigates, helicopters, C-130 transport aircraft, and M-48A5 tanks, there was steady action taken by the United States to provide for Taiwan's defense needs.

Secondly, Taiwan wanted access to U.S. Government officials. They had been largely "frozen

out" since the visit to China by President Nixon. The Taiwan leaders thought that when President Reagan came into office, they would immediately be able to walk right into the Department of State and the White House. That didn't happen. However, what we did was discreetly to begin to meet with high level Taiwanese officials. We worked with them. They had appointed a Foreign Minister, Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Chief of the General Staff, and Minister of Defense. Officials at the highest levels of the U.S. Government met with them.

*Q: Was there any trouble about these trips with the Chinese communists. Did they object?*

LILLEY: Yes, they would get wind of one of these visits and would throw a fit. However, we could tell that this was rhetoric, and not the real thing. The Chinese communists knew that we were dealing with the Taiwanese at an authoritative level and that they were getting military equipment that they needed. We also said to the Taiwanese: "Look, we've got an agenda with you. You've got security and 'face' problems. We're being "ripped off" by you on our trade deficit and problems which have emerged in the field of intellectual property rights. You're 'killing us.' You're faking our pharmaceuticals, you've run up a huge trade surplus with us, and you are following protectionist practices against us. Let's focus on this."

When I arrived in Taiwan in 1982, we were spending about 90 percent of our time on security issues. By the time I left, in 1984, we were spending about 40 or 50 percent of the time on "our" issues, which chiefly involved trade matters.

*Q: I was thinking of the intellectual property rights issue. As I recall it, people were buying "ripped off..."*

LILLEY: Taiwan was the capital of the world for that. Fake patented items were cheap. It was all there. We established a committee of distinguished citizens to look into this problem. And what happened? Then Lilly Drugs would find out that the Taiwanese were "ripping them off." When they explained next, there would be guys with clubs who would come in and beat up their managers in their factory in Taiwan. This was really rough stuff. We brought in various people. I think that Kristoff and Peter Allgeier were involved. Clark Ellis was our economics officer in the AIT [American Institute on Taiwan]. They really pushed hard on trade issues.

We began to see progress. We began to get into the Taiwanese consumer markets and more effectively into their wheat markets. We began to see Taiwanese rice exports reduced. These had been "killing" our exports of rice to the Middle East. We were really beginning to get after these Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) offenses and curtailing them. We threatened to retaliate against some of the unfair trade practices in use in Taiwan and we had the instruments to use on these matters. We began to "drive home" on this issue.

The Prime Minister, was our primary contact. He was an extremely competent guy. He understood the problems and worked with us, while still defending Taiwan's interest. However, he knew that we were being "rooked" by these unfair marketing practices. We faced a huge Taiwanese trade surplus. They were "ripping us off" on IPR and so forth. They said: "Well, if you sold us those F-16 fighters, that ought to take care of the problem." We said: "No, that doesn't get into the question of commercial practices in Taiwan. That is a separate issue." Then

they said: "How about selling us all of that Alaska oil?" Well, we have laws which prohibit us from doing that. They said: "Well, you guys aren't really 'serious.'" We said: "We can't take care of trade, if you act that way."

*Q: What was the matter with the exports of oil from Alaska?*

LILLEY: There was a law on the statute books at that time which provided that Alaska oil had to be sold in the United States. So we could not be flexible on this. They said: "Well, all you have to do is change your stupid law, and you can sell the oil to us. We'll buy your oil. We're buying oil from Indonesia and other places now. We'll buy it from you." We also thought that was just an excuse. What they had to do was to give us access to their markets, which were fairly tightly closed. Once we got into the Taiwanese markets and they gave us access to the "big ticket" items, like the nuclear power plants and the new meter system, we could make up for the trade deficit by their giving us these larger contracts for enterprises such as Taiwan Steel.

*Q: By the time you arrived in Taiwan in 1982 and until you left in 1984, the American Institute on Taiwan had gone through its "teething period." Basically, it was an American Embassy.*

LILLEY: It was very much of a "teething period" under Chuck Cross, its first, full- fledged Director. I think that Paul Popple was there earlier but as a diplomat. I forget who his deputy was. Chuck Cross had a rough experience. We appreciated what he had done. By the time I arrived in Taiwan, we were through the "shake down cruise." We were getting started. However, the difference between the AIT and a regular American Embassy was that we didn't have a Political Section, as such. Instead, we had a "General Affairs Section." We didn't have an Ambassador. We had a Director. We didn't have a Consular Section. We had a "Travel Services Section." We had no "National Day." We didn't fly the a flag. We had no Marine Security Guards.

*Q: In fact, it sounds like an ideal arrangement! [Laughter]*

LILLEY: We had the usual people assigned from the Foreign Commercial Service, from the Foreign Agricultural Service, and, of course, from the Foreign Service of the Department of State. All of the latter were FSOs [Foreign Service Officers]. They formally resigned from the Foreign Service and signed a contract with the American Institute on Taiwan for two or three years. Then, at the end of their tour with the AIT, they returned to the Foreign Service and were re-hired. The whole promotion cycle was kept the same. They were not "punished" for this service. So I think that, in many ways, it was an ingenious arrangement. It was legal. Yet we had diplomatic immunity, under an understanding signed with the Republic of China on Taiwan. One of our AIT wives unfortunately killed a Chinese on a road there in Taiwan, and she was protected from lawsuit. This happened while I was there.

*Q: How did you find the Taiwanese as far as an observer of the Asian scene was concerned? Did you go to the Taiwanese Foreign Ministry and did their employees visit you in your offices? What did they think about events in Thailand, Indonesia, and so forth? Or did you pretty well concentrate on the American-Taiwanese relationship?*

LILLEY: We really didn't have much to do with the situation in other Southeast Asian countries. We were primarily concerned with the American-Taiwanese relationship. I didn't meet Taiwanese officials at the Foreign Ministry. I generally met them at a guest house, although I went to the Foreign Ministry once or twice. I went to the Presidential Office, also, but "sub rosa" and without attracting attention. The Taiwanese officials had a sense that we were inhibited by these rules but that we knew how to "get around them." The Taiwanese officials had a saying that the "more senior people have a policy. The people lower down know how to get around it." They understood that we appreciated that we were going to be like President Li Teng-hui in 1995. We actually "changed gear" in Taiwan when he was Vice President of the Republic of China. I think that when I was DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State], I went up to meet him in New York. State escorted him up to West Point for a VIP visit to the U.S. Military Academy. Then he went on to other places in South and Central America.

Li Teng-hui came to the U.S. in 1995, and the PRC pulled out their Ambassador and started firing missiles in the vicinity of Taiwan. I think that now Taiwanese senior people have to make a prior detailed request to visit the U.S. and it's harder to do. When I was there in 1982-1984, the Taiwanese knew that we were trying to do the "right thing" for them, although there were certain limits on us. It's a question of confidence and displaying that confidence through concrete moves. I don't think that they had that feeling of uncertainty in 1982-1984 that they had during the Carter administration. When they met Paul Wolfowitz, Rich Armitage, or Gaston Sigur, they knew these men, and they understood where they were from. It wasn't a matter of "fraternizing" or "condescending." I met high level Taiwan officials several times in a period of 12 months. There was just a natural flow of conversation between us. There was some very tough bargaining. However, at the same time they knew, for lack of a better term, that "our hearts were in the right place."

*Q: I assume that Taiwan was sending a lot of students to the United States and that China was doing the same thing. Did this have any reverberations, with the students comparing their respective situations? Did Chinese and Taiwanese students get together in the U.S.?*

LILLEY: Yes. I think that we saw that the whole air of hostility between the two sides was beginning to break down. Taiwanese students were mixing with students from mainland China, especially after 1987, when things began to open up. They saw more of each other, they got along better, they often lived together, and they went to parties together. I think that, to this day, there are, however, separate organizations on the various campuses. However, the former air of bitter hostility was ameliorating. At that time, 1982-1984, there was little direct contact between the two sides of the Strait. However, even when I was in Taiwan, I knew that Jiang Yen-shih had at one time been Secretary general of the KMT and had been President Li Teng-hui's "mentor" in the old JCRR (Joint Committee on Rural Reconstruction) under the Chinese Nationalists. The JCRR, with American aid, in fact rebuilt Taiwan. Y.S. Jiang was in there, running it, and Li Teng-hui was a "bright young man" in the JCRR. When Li Teng-hui became Vice President and later President in Taiwan, Y.S. Jiang came back in and, always interested in agriculture, was handling early exchanges with China on agriculture.

Even at that time we saw the beginning of trade links between China and Taiwan through Hong Kong. We knew that Chinese businessmen from the provinces were in Taiwan, exchanging

goods and information. The head of one of the universities at Taichung, in Taiwan, went to mainland China frequently. However, they all had to be very careful until things opened up in 1987. Then contacts just "exploded."

*Q: Is there anything else that we should cover in this 1982-1984 period?*

LILLEY: I think that this was the period when things turned around in Taiwan. It led directly to the opening of closer relations between Taiwan and mainland China in 1987. Confidence was built on Taiwan, and President Reagan was able to go to mainland China without serious misgivings. Even before Reagan went to China in 1984, I was called back to Washington for consultations. I saw President Reagan, Secretary of State Jim Baker, and Vice President Bush. In short, everybody who was involved in decision-making. In effect, I was the U.S. representative in Taiwan and was important in this regard. I was asked to make the case to President Reagan about expanding our relationship with China. I think that the White House and the Department of State, under Secretary of State George Shultz as well, had a very good appreciation of this. Yes, President Reagan was going to go to China, but we were told not to worry about his attitude towards Taiwan. He knew what he was doing, and he was right. Of course, we wished that Taiwan would "take care" of our trade surplus, as we had taken care of Taiwan's defense needs. I think that, after that point, Taiwan really began to move on some of these issues.

*Q: Was there any concern about the future? Yes, Taiwan was moving toward democracy, but at the same time you were trying to keep the "lid" on the whole "two China" system. As Taiwan moved toward democracy, this meant, on the face of it, that eventually people in Taiwan might say: "To hell with this. We're our own nation, and let Taiwan be our nation. This is one of the fruits of democracy." Was this view widespread?*

LILLEY: We sensed that we were taking risks. When they actually organized opposition political parties in Taiwan and drafted the platform of the Democratic Progressive Party [DPP], the aim was independence for Taiwan. Those people who had pushed this, like Hsu Hsin-liang and other people, all returned to Taiwan from exile overseas and assumed leading positions in the DPP and other parties. I think that at that point some people became concerned about the direction of events. However, the KMT [Kuomintang, the official government party] was still winning elections by a large margin. Then, gradually, the DPP, the party of the Taiwanese, began to improve its position. They began to win more and more local positions.

At this time also, Chiang Ching-kuo opened up the whole political system. Up to this point a majority of the members of the Legislative Yuan or Parliament were appointed by Chiang. Most of them were holdovers from the mainland of China. Chiang opened up the whole structure to direct elections, in stages. As Chiang opened up the system, more and more of the people in the opposition were getting elected, but they were still a minority of the total membership, although a substantial minority.

President Li Teng-hui began to refer openly to the issues supported by the opposition and to speak out for a separate identity for Taiwan. He would lead the Taiwanese to their promised land, as Moses did to the Jews in Egypt. He said, "I feel strongly toward Japan," and "Taiwan deserves to be independent. We should be in the UN." All of this disturbed the mainland Chinese

leaders. However, as they matured, particularly after the crisis in the Taiwan Strait of March, 1996, we were beginning to see a greater understanding by the more civil-minded, mature politicians. They began to appreciate that there were things that they had to be very wary about doing. In their hearts they thought that they deserved independence for Taiwan, they wanted it, and they were prepared to fight for it. However, they knew that this objective was not necessarily good for Taiwan. They knew that they couldn't handle that. They knew that there would be real costs involved in such a course of action.

I'm not saying that we were out of the woods yet, but there seemed to be a much greater degree of political maturity. The issues being fought out in that year's elections were not about independence. They involved corruption, social security, and greater economic development.

**MARK S. PRATT**  
**Chief, Taiwan Coordination Office**  
**Washington, DC (1982-1986)**

*Mr. Pratt was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard, Brown, Sorbonne and Georgetown Universities. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he studied Chinese and was posted to Hong Kong. Throughout his career Mr. Pratt dealt with Far East and Southeast Asian affairs, serving in Taichung, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Paris, Taipei and Guangzhou (Canto), where he was Consul General. His Washington assignments also concerned Southeast Asian matters. Mr. Pratt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Today is February 9<sup>th</sup>, 2000. Mark, let's talk about the defense aspects, our concerns and issues with the Taiwanese.*

PRATT: Fine, but as I said, I would like to revisit just one quick instance later, so let me do the defense side, and then I'll go back and pick up the last bit, because what we were really concerned about was where Taiwan might go. Would it's governmental system collapse? What were the tensions that would cause perhaps even more problems for the U.S.?

*Q: Good.*

PRATT: But in any case, the immediate one we felt we had to address in 1979 was what we could do to give to the people on Taiwan the feeling that they were not being abandoned, that their security would not be totally impaired, and that they would be facing Peking, a very hostile Peking at that time particularly (although Deng Xiaoping had recently moved in, he still had not been able to put in some of the sensible things that he subsequently did); however the major concern was that we had had to do several things as of January 1 and also within a few months. The first, of course, was to remove our ambassador, and the ambassador, of course, was a bit of a joke because ambassadors in Taiwan had been considered one of the major political ties because often they were chosen because of their influence in Washington and a voice they thought they would use to get through to the top levels, particularly the President of the United States. Then,

of course, they had the ending of the Mutual Defense Treaty, and that was to be terminated in accordance with its provisions, which meant one year from notification. But of course just the notification of it was enough, a major problem. Then also, of course, the withdrawal of the Taiwan Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group, the MAAG. All of these, of course, represented, particularly for the military, but for others as well -

*Q: Which military are you talking about?*

PRATT: The Taiwan military. The last umbilical ties which they felt tied them in with people who really understood them and what their problems were. The military on Taiwan, of course, were very important politically as well as militarily, and in fact, they of course were one of the key political factors. If you looked at the composition of the standing committee of the KMT when I first arrived, you would see that it's still highly composed of security figures and old military, many of whom, of course, were military who had been given other jobs. In the National Assembly, the legislative then ex-military figures were very important, and of course they also were very closely tied in with the security forces, which were run separately by CCK (Chiang Ching-kuo), but nonetheless the Taiwan Garrison general headquarters was interwoven with other aspects, and military officers were . . . For example, the head of the police was a former marine general when I was there. The investigative bureau of the Ministry of Justice was headed by a military man. So you're dealing with a people who had been accustomed to having very close tie-ins with CINCPAC (Commander in Chief, Pacific), and they had an American admiral there they could deal with, and they had as the head of their military forces an admiral at that time because they thought that would deal better with the admiral in CINCPAC and the admiral at the Taiwan Defense Command.

So one had to provide a certain amount of reassurance. As I think we discussed before, there were security aspects which were very reassuring coming out of the Taiwan Relations Act, and in particular people like Senator Kennedy and Senator Pell and so forth were very anxious to make sure that there was a kind of military guarantee which would not totally replace the Mutual Defense Treaty but nonetheless would be as reassuring. That was the whole purpose of the Taiwan Relations Act in the minds of these people, to be reassuring to Taiwan. That, of course, was not in the mind of Carter. Carter was obviously trying to do things which would placate Peking and fulfill the Peking aspect of the negotiation and then also provide a sort of basis in law for having some kind of moderate office functioning in Taipei. But that was not what we read out of the Taiwan Relations Act, and that's certainly not what the people in Taiwan read out of it, and they were somewhat reassured.

Well, there was a moratorium on approval of new weapons approvals, but that did not mean that one could not continue to provide that which had already been approved. Also it did not mean that one had to stop studying what should be asked for and what should be approved once that moratorium was over. We did establish an office, which I initially somewhat supervised until such a time as people arrived on the ground (I made sure they got into their offices and their houses and all the rest of it), an organization of retired U.S. military, who would have background in the military supply field and in general, so a greater savvy about how you deal with military and how you address military problems, because it was going to be the only office we had staffed by military - ex-military, of course, just as we were temporarily ex-FSOs (Foreign

Service Officers). In any case, we had a very gifted and competent person who was the first figure there. He was especially chosen by people in the Defense Department, somebody who had just retired, and that was Larry Ruggut, who did a very, very good job. And one had to sort of hold their hands, the hands of the Taiwan military, and keep them somewhat satisfied. And of course, following on with the arms sales was important, and we had people who could do that, but the thing is that the best aspect was that we had very competent Taiwan military officers who had worked at the MAAG for years, and they knew how to run all this, and they did a very good job as well.

But then, of course, we had to move on to the more conceptual level. We had to begin to consider what would be the kind of scenarios for which they would wish to have new approvals. In other words, you get military equipment to take care of problems. What were the problems which they envisaged? The traditional, old scenario had been one of Peking doing a combined forces landing on the southern plains, narrow plain of Taiwan, and therefore was an invasion force. This of course meant that there was still a very considerable role for the ground army, which, of course, was the major political aspect of the Chinese military, there as well as on the Mainland.

*Q: It employs more people, too.*

PRATT: It employs more people, it is a major way of having their universal military service, because they believed that it was important to have every person on Taiwan go through their military service because it was the only way to tell them that they should be working to defend the Republic of China. This was the government of their country, and so on. They still were bedeviled by what they considered to be their failure on the Mainland where it was more political propaganda, keeping the troops politically correct, than it was actually having military competence. So they had a political department, which of course is something which the Communists had, both Chinese Communists and the Russians, from whom they all were learning that lesson. And until basically near the end of Chiang Ching-kuo's life, that remained one of the key focal points of the military. The military, of course, had, as I mentioned, a role within the KMT structure at other different levels, and therefore it was important that you had some kind of organization which would be politically functioning in the military, and since they did not have a military commission within the party, it was the party commission within the military which had as its secretariat and operating structure the GPWD, the General Political Warfare Department. So these were elements we had to take care of at the same time that we addressed what they considered to be the new approach to danger, and given the fact that the chief of the General Staff was an admiral, not surprisingly, one of the major threats would be blockade and moving against Taiwan with something short of a full-fledged invasion force. So we then had to address the control over the air as being in the way of trying to prevent even a blockade and the use of navy ships against Taiwan, and therefore the key thing that we had to face up to was how do we continue to produce aircraft which would be up to a proper level? And there again, the proper levels had been circumscribed by what they considered to be the assurances given to Peking, namely that there would be only "defensive" weaponry. And you know that's one of the hardest things to do because, as you know, the National Rifle Association says all guns are merely defensive weapons, it's only offensive people who are the problem.

*Q: By this time, though, the whole idea of a "Return to the Mainland" and all that was pretty well dead, wasn't it?*

PRATT: Yes. Basically the KMT had to maintain a bit of this so long as Chiang Kai-shek was living. A lot of the people below that never believed it. But by this time already Chiang Ching-kuo had said that return to the Mainland would be 70 percent political and only 30 percent military, and that would mean that there would have to be a major uprising on the Mainland which they would come to support and exploit. "Return to the Mainland" was still something that they had to be concerned about, but how they did it was a difficult matter. By the time I left there, however, there was really no reference to "Return to the Mainland" at all.

*Q: Did we have - I'm not sure if the term is "offshore procurement" or something - I know I was in Korea round about this time, and they were beginning to move into this "let the Koreans build parts for F-16s" and that sort of thing. Had we done anything like that in Taiwan before this?*

PRATT: Yes, in the first place, we had found that Taiwan had a very, very good work force, and therefore whenever we moved in to arrange something, we found that we could always find a very good pool of people to be used for this purpose, which is why we had them as one of the major support areas for our efforts in Vietnam. We had a facility down-island where we would maintain and do high-level maintenance, which means that replacement and all the rest of that for the F-4s and other aircraft which was being used in Vietnam. And these things were being phased out and turned over pretty much to the Taiwan side. We tried to get them to do more. We had a joint production facility which we were establishing for the Northrop F-5E aircraft. I think this was the reconnaissance model, but I think we just referred to it as the 5E. The next one along, however, was going to be F-5G. So we tried to get them to crank up that, at the same time that they were keeping their old F-104s and F-100s even, which were then pretty long in the tooth. They were able to keep these flying long after any American would be interested in getting behind the wheel. So this was something we knew - they could keep up this maintenance, and we could move rather gradually on the F-5, trying to expand the production both in quantity and in improvement in avionics and radar and so forth and the flier controls. So we were building on that.

We also had to address the question of what we did about submarines. We approved the anti-submarine warfare equipment that had previously been offered, and we felt we could move ahead after the moratorium with an expanded program on that score because we felt that this would be clearly defensive. We had problems, however, with submarine-fighting submarines, and later on, when I was back in Washington, they went to the Dutch for this equipment, and so the Dutch had their troubles with Peking and so on. But all of this was being done in the way of trying to be reassuring, because the whole basic position in the State Department side of things, and to a certain extent a lot of the people who were more savvy about Taiwan and Asia in general did believe that this was primarily a political problem and therefore we had to take care of the political aspects of it, and they had to be equally as important as any kind of, shall we say, purely military examination of the question. So we had to be reassuring to Taiwan, and we had to make Peking believe that this was something they could put up with.

*Q: Well, one aspect of a military relationship in a very politically sensitive area is that it implies*

*a certain amount of influence, if not control. If you loosen these defense ties, was there any concern on our part that it might allow the Taiwanese military to maybe go on their own and cause a situation that we wouldn't like?*

PRATT: We were not really terribly afraid of that because we felt that in the first place most of the military were pretty savvy, and they looked across there and saw just how big China was. And most of the top leaders were, of course, Mainlanders. And these Mainlanders, in their 50s and 60s, had all been raised on the Mainland, and they had in many cases brothers and sisters even who would keep them well abreast of what was happening on the Mainland. So despite the fact that there was a bit of a blackout by the government, which wanted to propagandize the masses of the people on Taiwan, the elite at the top would have no illusions about what was really going on there, and they knew that to recover the Mainland was for the most part a slogan, a political slogan to use to explain to the people on Taiwan why it was that you had a government primarily devoted to maintaining itself for a return to the Mainland rather than being primarily concerned about the welfare of the people on Taiwan.

Now, Chiang Ching-kuo was the one who made that shift, and he was able, I think, very successfully (and he had a lot of problems along the way) to be able to say, "Yes, fine, the return to the Mainland may take place, it may not, and One China is still our basic policy, but my primary responsibility is to the people whom I govern, and it's the people on Taiwan whom I have to provide for what they need," in other words for a democracy based upon the island only, rather than a system like that of his father, which was, "We are only temporarily here, and I'm exploiting this situation to be able to get back to the Mainland." Well, we knew that this was no longer in the minds of Chiang Ching-kuo himself, nor of most of the top political and military leaders. They were much too savvy for that. We also saw one of the major reasons they wanted to keep the umbilical cord to the United States and the fact that if we said no to something they'd jolly well better accept it, because they felt that this umbilical cord worked two ways. It kept the United States involved in Taiwan as the only guarantor.

*Q: Well, now, looking at the other side of the hill, how were we seeing the PRC, its military equipment situation and all, because this was not a time when the Soviets were particularly forthcoming, and I was wondering about their equipment. One does not think of Mainland China as having a very technologically advanced military apparatus at that time.*

PRATT: That's right. And in addition to that, as you said, the Soviets had not been giving them the upper levels of their own technology, because after all the clashes along the border were fresh in the mind, and some of them occurred even later. So one should note that, indeed, one's looking at a situation in which we would look at the Peking side and say, "Listen, their aircraft are 1950s type. They're not even up to the level of the F-100s and the F-104s. In addition to that, we've been upgrading avionics and radar in ways which the Soviets have not been doing and the Chinese have not been able to do on their own." So we would say this is what's maintaining a certain balance. And that's why we don't need to go make a big quantum jump. This, of course, was what began to give the concept of balance. Now balance between a nation of 1.3 billion people and 22 or 23 million people is obviously a very difficult one to be talking about, and I never liked that concept, but nonetheless it was one which was used which meant that you had to look at numbers and you had to look at capabilities. So if the Taiwan had smaller numbers but

had much better capability, then that could create a kind a balance.

*Q: Well, we really had been dealing and continued to deal with this situation in our other major problem area, and that is with Israel and the Arab world. We had a small nation with, at least at the time, a tremendous spirit, at any rate a considerable superiority in both effectiveness of the military and of technology, and was this sort of . . . I mean, you being an Asian type, did you even talk to the Near Eastern types?*

PRATT: Oh, yes. There was quite a bit of this, and of course, the Israelis had their own little office in Taipei, and there were indeed . . . there was more, basically, of a feeling between Israel and Taiwan of similarities than later on, when Israel began to see the possibility of a bigger market with China, and China being able to play a different role vis-à-vis the Arab opponents of Israel. As you may be aware, one of the current problems now is how technology goes, they were saying, from the U.S. via Israel to Peking. The Israelis keep saying, no it's only their own technology, not stuff coming from the U.S. which goes there. But the point is that was for a later period, more than 10 years after that.

*Q: Were you feeling that the Israelis, in light of the joint cooperation between the American military and Israeli military, were feeding special advanced avionics and all that type of thing, missilery and all, to the Taiwanese?*

PRATT: No. Not so much technical exchanges, but the thing is they did talk to the Israelis about the special need of a small force against a big force and the small force having to have a qualitative technological edge, and so that was the only thing which we could see that Israel would do directly. The two sides went back and forth because they both were interested in various things going on in the Arab world as well, because Taiwan, for example, was running air control to Libya. So Taiwan was involved in Israel's back yard, providing technological assistance to the Libyan air force.

*Q: Were we concerned about that?*

PRATT: No, we weren't. We felt that it might, if anything, be a great advantage because there would be people there who would be able to tell us perhaps what was really going on. And of course all of this is a question of timing, and Libya claimed afterwards that the Taiwans were thrown out, but the basic thing was that Taiwan was trying very hard to get the U.S. as involved as possible and to get as high-quality weaponry as possible and to get what they thought would take care of the real dangers from the Mainland. And they still had not quite gotten up to the level where they'd be today with their concern about missiles and possibly something merging on nuclear warfare.

*Q: Well, now, let's move on from the defense side to whither Taiwan and our concerns at the time. You left there when?*

PRATT: I left there in September of 1981.

*Q: You wanted to talk about that.*

PRATT: Yes, I've already mentioned the fact that there was such a thing as the Kaohsiung incident back in December 1979 and is one of the key things which we had to spend a lot of our resources on. I had to mobilize to get people out of the Consular Section to go attend the subsequent trials and so on. But we saw this as an important incident for several reasons, not the least of which is what the impact was on Chiang Ching-kuo's concept of his government. There is a new biography that Jay Taylor . . . I don't know whether you've interviewed him or not, but Jay Taylor is doing a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo, and I think he's gotten a lot of things . . . It's John J. Taylor, and he's half the time in Arlington and half the time down in Florida. [Ed: Jay Taylor, The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Chingkuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan, Harvard University Press, 2000]

*Q: He was what, a Foreign Service officer?*

PRATT: Yes, he served in the NSC [Ed: National Security Council] as well as in regular State positions. But Chiang Ching-kuo was a very key figure in the changes, and I think I've made it clear that when he started out he had to deal not only the Madam, who is still alive, but also a lot of his father's old buddies, some of whom are also still alive. They're now 101 and 102 and so forth. And he was therefore somebody who had had real problems when he came back from Moscow, and people tried to undermine his position with his father, but in the end he was able to prevail, and one of the key things was that Ch'en Ch'eng, one of his fathers oldest buddies who had been vice-president also, premier and so forth, died just in a timely fashion so that Chiang Kai-shek was faced with having nobody he really could bring in if he didn't bring in his son. So he brought in his son. Maybe he intended to do so anyway. We don't know, but that's always been a very strange relationship and something which I hope Jay Taylor's book is going to clarify. But in any case, he always felt he had to move very slowly, and just as he decided that moving more slowly would be postponing the elections, which were scheduled for December of 1978, he would therefore feel that he had to move the liberalization, delaying it by a year from his original schedule - because I think he intended to have relatively straightforward and honest elections, despite the fact that the KMT controlled much of the apparatus of local government and also of the media and all the rest of it - but nonetheless to let a larger number of people emerge who were independents, which would eventually lead towards a two-party system or a system which was not just purely dominant KMT party.

So this was not, however, moving rapidly enough for the Taiwanese, and so the Taiwanese established a human rights group, and then they had a magazine, and then from that they moved to organizing human rights demonstrations around the island. They were carried away by the fact that they were not greeted with heavy-handed reproach in their first demonstrations. But by the time they got to the Kaohsiung incident, well, in the first place, it was taking place at a time when the KMT was holding its party convention up in Yangminshan, just north of Taipei, and that was just the moment when the old timers could have made the most trouble for Chiang Ching-kuo if he had not dealt with a very heavy hand. So they did deal with it with a very heavy hand, and the Garrison Command forces moved in, and some say they even instigated riots against the troops in order to justify the troops moving in and beating up the demonstrators.

In any case, the KMT government had a trial of the main opposition figures, including the

leadership of the Presbyterian Church, which went on for weeks. As I say, it was one of the key things that we had to be following. After all, the trial was a major event on the island, and this was the time of the Carter Administration with its emphasis on human rights. And we made it very clear to the government there that this was really not a very good way to handle this question, especially if it resulted in mobilizing a lot of people in the United States, such as the Congress, the American people, the media, and the scholarly community in a way that feelings about Taiwan were anything but positive. So this is a very negative event for Taiwan, and we, I think, were able to convey that. Ramsey Clark came out, and while they sort of dismissed this as the wild fringe of the Democratic Party, nonetheless, they got enough of a critique from their friends in the Congress and elsewhere that they realized that this had not been a good way to handle the opposition and it was not, therefore, the great victory which some of the old timers thought it was. Coincidental with the trial was the murder of the mother and two of the three daughters of one of the defendants arrested as being the instigator of this when he had not even attended. And this, I think, was a key thing in illustrating to Chiang Ching-kuo that his security services could be very, very damaging to the interests of Taiwan and also that they were not under sufficient control.

One of the things that Jay Taylor I think will be working on is the timing of the medical difficulties that Chiang Ching-kuo had. As a person with fairly severe diabetes, which was not kept under good control when he was younger, he had periods when he had considerable problems, and he would occasionally be in the hospital, but even if not in the hospital would not be functioning at his best. And, I believe, he may have had one of these spells, at about the time that they were murdering, for example, Lin Yi-hsiung's family members. [Ed: Wikipedia article notation "Lin was arrested in December 1979 for his involvement in the Kaohsiung Incident. In February 28, 1980 Lin Yi-hsiung was in detention and beaten severely by the police. His mother saw him in prison and contacted the Amnesty International Osaka office. The next day Lin's mother and twin 7 year old daughters were stabbed to death. Lin's older daughter was badly wounded in his home. The authorities claimed to know nothing about it, even though his house was under 24 hour police surveillance."]

*Q: Did the fact that this was an unnecessary, unprovoked murder - was that known at the time?*

PRATT: The KMT tried to give the impression that this was probably done by an American, Bruce Jacobs, who was a young American scholar then teaching in Australia and on the island conducting research. The authorities apparently selected him and inferred he might have been the one who went there and killed the mother and the two daughters. Of course, it was ludicrous. Nobody really believed that, but the thing is, it was their only way of trying at least to get plenty of newspaper coverage to distract attention to Jacobs and all the rest of it. But it was at the beginning a pretty shoddy thing, but it made us realize that this event closely implicated the security services, and in the end I finally came to the conclusion that this was probably something which had been encouraged by Chiang Ching-kuo's second son, Alex, who had always been a bit of an unguided missile. In any case, he had many friends within the security services, and he thought of this as a glamorous type of life. The story was that he was drunk at a bar and said, you know, "Really, somebody ought to take care Lin Yi-hsiung's mother and family to teach them a lesson," because the mother was even on the telephone to Taiwanese elements in Japan telling them how her son was being mistreated. Well, Lin Yi-hsiung is now the head of the

DPP, the Democratic Progressive Party, and for many years after, however, being imprisoned and with, of course, the great shock of the murder of his mother and two of his three daughters (the third was stabbed but did not die), he somewhat retired from politics, but he's back in again. But in any case, this was something which most of the Taiwanese considered to be part of the nefarious activities of the security services.

And I think that this is something which Chiang Ching-kuo, ever the practical man, felt was, again, a bad thing. It made his job much, much more difficult. There he was; he had come out of these security services, and therefore he had to consider that this was one of the most powerful weapons, because after all they permitted him to get into power, and what if it were used by somebody else? This is where he decided he would cut back on this and try to tame these organizations to prevent the kind of freewheeling which they had felt they could do. Chiang Ching-kuo himself, I'm sure, felt that how could these people do things when I haven't told them to? And he had to realize that the political system was such that that could happen. Now this finally came to a head with the murder of Ch'en Wen-chen from Carnegie Mellon who was thrown off the fire escape of the Taiwan University, and then there was the late 1984 murder of Henry Liu in Daly City, California, which I think finally got him to clamp down and decide that he had to send his son off to Singapore. But that happened later.

*Q: But up to this time, up to 1981, were we concerned about the Taiwan security people doing things in the United States?*

PRATT: Yes, we knew they were doing them, and we knew that some of them, of course, were here on a declared basis. That was the National Security Bureau. When we got to the Henry Liu case a few years later, I'll mention something about the IDMND [Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of National Defense], which was a different type organization, but we obviously knew that this security organization was something which could create problems, and we always had difficulty in seeing that someone as bright and politically sensitive as Chiang Ching-kuo would permit these things to happen, and therefore how did they happen. Well, we had to figure that his health was one of the things. Secondly, we had to consider that he had decided that he needed to keep a strong hand and to provide a strong hand even if he were suddenly ill and in the hospital and if he were suddenly to die. And this is when he established this special organization which basically depended from his old-time right-hand man, Wang Shen. And this was something which could trump the government and the party, and this looked as though it was the organization that he was going to be putting into place and using to control things, in other words, how he will have an authoritarian system without an authority. In other words, he knew that he was the authority, but how could that system work if he weren't there? He had destroyed, basically, the old Leninist concept of having the party run various things. Because he ran the party, he could do certain things over here. He ran the military directly to do things over there. He ran the security services here, he ran the special committees on the premier and the vice-premier level to run the economy. So he was doing everything himself, but in an *ad hoc* system which was not limitless and therefore did not provide for an easy way for any person to take over. And this organization, which he set up and was basically set up in late 1980 or early 1981, was able to give instructions to various parties, bypassing the normal pattern. And this I think was basically designed to take effect either when he was incapacitated or if he were suddenly to die.

*Q: Who was the designated heir or heir apparent?*

PRATT: Well, that's the point. Wang Shen was the head of this organization, but he was considered merely to be the *ad interim* secretary general, and nobody was quite sure whether he would be the actual heir. And the question was, did his son, Alex Chiang (Chiang Hsiao-wu), did he believe that he could do this? What about would other people try to get him, either Chiang Ching-kuo's brother, Chiang Wei-kuo, or another member of the Chiang dynasty, would they go to meet Wang, who had been his former chief deputy in the non-military side of things? Of course, Wang Shen had been in politico-military and security side, and Lee Huan had been a party man, and would then he be the one who would emerge? And so this was how we were viewing things in 1981. As usual, Chiang Ching-kuo moved more rapidly than one anticipated, and therefore, the basic system that we saw emerging was rather disquieting because it was certainly not democratic. Two, it was not compatible with the electoral approach that Ching-kuo was doing. Third, it did not give adequate role to most of the technocrats, who were so helpful in running the economy and could have done a much better job in running the political system. And it seemed to have also no real structure about either the party or elections or the administration and so forth which would be stable because it was sort of designed to be an *ad hoc* thing, and could that move in and create a new structure? And if so, was the only reason the structure worked was that CCK was there, to use the other elements of the structure to keep things going?

Given the fact that his health had permitted such a decay of his ability to make sure the security services didn't do the right thing, we were very much afraid that this organization would be another one of those uncontrollable organizations. That was the way in which politics stood when I left in 1981, so we had concern because succession was indeed one of the key things. As you may be aware, there is a little office in the CIA which followed the health of many of the old figures in Asia, starting with Syngman Rhee and Sukarno and Chiang Kai-shek and then Chiang Ching-kuo and so forth, something which was the "'Thanatopsis' school of politics," as Marshall Green called it. We looked at this as something which was a problem, and back in 1985 even, and that's a few years later, the CIA was still saying that Peking was totally stable because Deng Xiaoping had a smooth succession to his two chosen successors, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, whereas there would be chaos on Taiwan because Chiang Ching-kuo had not chosen a clear successor. And I took issue with that later, but that was a question, however, back in 1981 because succession was very much in the minds of everyone.

*Q: Was there at all the idea that it might be a Mainland-supported Chinese group that might try to seize power, or was this out of the questions by this time?*

PRATT: Well, this was not the way in which we viewed it. The old-timers would seize power for their own purposes. Now some of them might indeed be willing to work something out with the Mainland, but those KMT people who were on the Mainland, they did maintain a kind of shadow, what they called the "democratic Kuomintang," on the Mainland, but those figures had had no connection with Taiwan for so long that they were really out of it. The Mainland did not really understand Taiwan very well, any of its politics.

*Q: Was there a merchant-industrial, rich-person class that was at all important there. In Iran I*

*would talk about the bazaris. Was there the equivalent to that?*

PRATT: In a way, yes. They were mostly Taiwanese because the land reform in Taiwan had resulted in stocks in the Japanese companies being given to landowners in exchange for giving up their lands. In other words, they did give them something, and of course, the bright people were able to parlay this into a developing capitalist economy. These were, therefore, mostly Taiwanese. When I was there, among the top 11 business, I think only two were headed by Mainland groups. The Mainlanders, of course, dominated the government corporations as well as, of course, the government itself. And so they indeed played a very important role because the banks, the power company, and all of these had government corporations in which there was private stockholding as well, and the Mainlanders would dominate this. But the Taiwanese businessmen were almost all kept in line by the KMT. They had to, for example, hire retired officers, colonels often, from the Taiwan Garrison general headquarters, nominally to take care of their security side of things, but really to keep track of the personnel. So whenever some people got to be a little bit too big for their britches, the government would find ways of getting at them. That happened, for example, when I was there with the Cathay Group, a very interesting family which fielded people for the KMT elections and also ran money and so on, and yet they felt that they were getting too big for their britches and not always listening when somebody in the KMT hierarchy told them what they ought to be doing.

But this was emerging, and most of these people, as I say, had to make their peace with the KMT, for example, the head of the Koo family, which is one of the wealthiest. They got their money down in the southern part of Taiwan through the cement corporation of which they were given the stock, the Japanese cement corporation, and they parlayed this into a much, much bigger cement operation, providing cement, for example, for the construction of Hong Kong. So Koo Chen-fu is now the head of the Taiwan office dealing with Wang Daohan, the former mayor of Shanghai on the Mainland. And so he, of course, is somebody, now in his 80s, I'm sure, who has made a great deal of money, was co-opted by the KMT (the KMT made sure he did make money), and then he in turn provides support, including support from the area down in the south where he comes from. So there were indeed businessmen merging, but they were still not a separate power factor the way they are now. Now they are a separate power factor, and many of them are supporting the oppositionists as well as the KMT. They have to be careful still, because a government which controls so much in the way of banking and insurance and approvals for construction and approvals for exports and imports and so on - when you've got a government like that, you have to make sure that you cover your bets. So there are some people who believe they can be very much independent from the KMT, but they don't necessarily try to skewer it.

*Q: Well, looking at Mainland China, more today, but it was prevalent before, one of its serious problems is the rot of corruption throughout the military, throughout the political thing, nepotism, payoffs, local power, almost warlord governors and all this - had the KMT, being a smaller group, more under scrutiny, sort of cleaned up the act better than -*

PRATT: Somewhat, somewhat. Of course they brought with them the old corruption from Nanjing and from Shanghai. But so much of this was gathered into the hands of the top leadership that they didn't, of course, need any corruption because they could get whatever money they needed. The slush fund for the president, for example, was enormous. And so if, for

example, somebody whom he liked, he wanted to please them for one reason or another, he would give them the money so their son could go study abroad. However, one should keep in mind also that there is the corruption of power as well as the corruption of money, and this is when I was in Guangzhou, for example, people resented much more the corruption of power than they did the corruption of money. They didn't mind a bit of money being spent here and there and so forth, but when they found that their kids would be disadvantaged in going to a university because of politics - as those in power created set asides which advantaged high party members' children.

And of course from the Party's point of view, favoritism should go for advantaged party figures. So that system is run just the opposite of our system. And the public resented that. Well, that is true in Taiwan as well. When you look at the early people who came to the United States to study from Taiwan, in the '50s and even up to, well, basically, to the '50s, the Mainlanders were far more numerous than the Taiwanese, despite the fact that the Taiwanese are 85 percent of the population and the Mainlanders 15 percent. That, of course, evens out during the latter part of the '50s, and then of course there was not that much of a variation, even though the perception remained. But, as to money corruption, indeed, people supported themselves through that because they all had this relatively Leninist concept, which is you don't trust people by giving them a decent salary so they can get what they want. You keep control of them by: you are in charge of their housing; you are in charge of the education; you give them a small allowance, the way you would give to a teenager, to buy what a teenager gets; you have the car given to this (when you want them to have a car); you have servants provided; and so forth. So everything is part of the perks. It's not something where they have the money to do this. So anybody who wanted money, because they wanted to buy their own brand of cigarettes instead of taking the cigarette ration, would have to find a way of doing that. And that was true, of course, of customs.

When I first was going back to Taiwan in 1959, I traveled on the plane with somebody whom I had known in Tokyo for American Cyanamid. At that point they were engaging in the first big venture in Taiwan. And American Cyanamid said it had taken so long to get something going, because they were going to be producing, I believe, insecticides and fertilizers for Taiwan - things which everybody at the top political level, of course, wanted done - but you had to go through all these other offices, each one expecting something for him to make the approval. That's the system, which is not terribly different from what it was and is still on the Mainland: power translates into money, and you need a bit of money, but at the top level, whence you have the power, then of course you can have your access to all the things that money buys. Deng Xiaoping didn't have to take a penny. If he wanted a private train to go south, he'd get a private train to go south. He didn't have to figure out how many first-class tickets he had to get for his wife and entourage.

*Q: Alright, well, why don't we move on now? In 1981 you went back to Washington, and you were in Washington from 1981 to '86? When you first went there, what was your job?*

PRATT: I was deputy in the Regional Affairs Office of the East Asian Bureau.

*Q: You did that how long?*

PRATT: A little over a year.

*Q: Well, let's talk about that first.*

PRATT: There's not much to talk about that, because this is one of the stranger offices in the Bureau. We did have a politico-military officer in it, who was, I think, useful and handled relations with PM (Political-Military Affairs) and handled things of that sort, and yet many of the other things I found very strange and often better handled by individual desks, but they did want to have something, I guess, some people to coordinate and to attend meetings and so forth. One of the few things I did was try to defend the budget of the Asia Foundation, and that was under attack within the State Department. The State Department had odd people who did not wish to go to the Hill to defend the budget. We were, however, able to get around that because we did have Under Secretary Whitehead, who was gotten to by the Asia Foundation people, and they made, I think, a very good case. I've always been rather impressed by the role of the Asia Foundation in the countries I've visited in Asia, certainly in Laos and also in Taiwan, and felt that they did make a considerable contribution.

*Q: At that time, what did the Asia Foundation do? What was the Asia Foundation?*

PRATT: Well, the Asia Foundation was established with money coming in from various private donors but getting also support from the U.S. Government to manage many programs which were more easily done in countries where there was great suspicion of the U.S. Government and USIA (United States Information Agency) for example. And the Asia Foundation could handle these things and make grants, get people to the United States for study of agricultural economics or something of the sort, and do this in ways which were less offensive to people like Sihanouk. They had a very active and very good program in Cambodia at the time when Sihanouk was very much trying to reduce at least the visibility of the American role, in part because, of course, he wanted to do what his French friends wanted done, but also, of course, to diffuse criticism from leftists in Thailand. They did a very good job in Laos when I was there, and they were just sort of an additional wheel for the Americans and its approach and were more adaptable to the circumstances of a particularly occasionally than USIA could be, because USIA, of course, had much more direct Congressional supervision and all kinds of regulations and so on, whereas the Asia Foundation, once it got its money from Congress and, of course, it got most of its money from private donors, it was able to decide things as they saw fit. We found them basically to be a very good use of U.S. Government money.

*Q: What was their tie to the academic community?*

PRATT: Very close because they often drew on academics, and some of the professors would go off then to be head of the Asia Foundation in the country in which they had their specialty and then would go back to academia after having lived in this country and after having deepened their understanding of what went on there through actual working with the people in those governments. So we really felt that that was a really good one.

Another thing which was coming up at that time was what they called a Foundation for Democracy, the new organization.

*Q: Yes, I can't think of the name. The United States Institute of Peace. No.*

PRATT: No, this was a new organization which was being established with U.S. Government funding to support democracy abroad. Now this is what Bill Bradley says, you know, "If we can spend 800 million bucks on this program promoting democracy abroad, then why can't we use a similar amount of money out of the American coffers to pay for democracy back here in the United States?" - in other words, to have all campaigns handled through direct government funds. So as I say, this was in its early stages, and it was being run out of the, I guess, the office of the under secretary for political affairs. And I gather it's functioning pretty actively now, but it's U.S. Government funds plus private funds. The CIO [Ed: Congress of Industrial Organization] was very interested in this, and they were one of the major contributors, both of funds and of personnel and so on. So it's again one of those things which may be effective, but we certainly had plenty of time to see that the Asia Foundation was very effective in the very early years. I mean, it's like several other things. There had been a connection with CIA, and CIA had put up some of the seed money for this many years before, but CIA had been out of that business for so long, it had been direct government funds coming from the Congress.

*Q: I can see that things of this nature that concerned you, knowing the activism of the Department of State, the Bureau of Asian and Pacific Affairs and all, everywhere else, I mean, you know, it's what's in the paper today. This is not the sort of thing that seizes the movers and shakers within the Department of State.*

PRATT: That's right. This is something which they know they've got to do but it's one of those things which is done after they take care of the latest crisis in Indonesia.

*Q: Was there any other issue, or should we move on to your next job?*

PRATT: Well, there were a number of other issues, but I don't think they were ones which were of really great moment, and I think we competently handled these serious questions and made a good input, but it was not even like, shall we say, the Youth Committee that Bobby Kennedy had established in the State Department, which poor Chip Bohlen had to handle. That was several years earlier, and I tried very hard to get a program going which I thought would have been very important, but the Defense Department was against it, so of course nobody was going to stand up to Defense. But we didn't have any programs like that, which I think were important, and then the democracy thing, with so much being run, as one would expect, by political appointees for their political reasons - they thought they had to do it because of the Congress and because people had, you know, Reaganomics, you have to have Reagan politics as well - so these things were ones we had to pay attention to, but they certainly, to my mind, were not nearly so interesting as what was going on next door, because my office was right next to the Taiwan office, and this was the time when they were still going through the early stages of Reagan's China-Taiwan policy.

*Q: Okay, so in a way there would be a fall back because obviously you were keeping in touch. When did you move to the Taiwan office?*

PRATT: That was in 1982, after the August, 1982, communiqué was arrived at, so it would have been September.

*Q: And you did that until 1986.*

PRATT: That's right.

*Q: Okay, let's talk about how you were seeing, at that time and even maybe lapse over into the time when you were doing the regional affairs - the Reagan Administration took office in 1981, so you sort of arrived there in the Reagan Administration.*

PRATT: That's right.

*Q: There must have been a lot of apprehension about this new crew, because Reagan came out of the right wing of the Republican Party, you think of Senator Knowland and all that, and having been governor of California. He'd made his obligatory trip to Taiwan and all that. There must have been concerns about "Oh, my God, we're going to go back to square one or something like that."*

PRATT: Well, as you can see, during the campaign, in 1980, already we were well aware of the various difficulties that could arise, how Reagan, who had a certain tendency to say what he really thought - and sometimes that was good, sometimes it wasn't - one of the visitors we had during the 1980s campaign time was George Shultz, and he of course was then at Bechtel, and we certainly got a very favorable impression of him, and of course we asked him whether he expected to be Secretary of State, and he said, "Oh, no, I don't think so because, after all, there are others who are standing in line ahead of me, and in order to balance things they are going to have to do something else, because Reagan is going to really have to take care of other aspect in the Republican Party. So we saw Allen, and we thought Allen did a very good job pulling Reagan back from-

*Q: Allen being?*

PRATT: Richard Allen, the Asian advisor who redrafted what Reagan had to say about Peking and Taiwan after Reagan had said that he was going to reestablish relations with Taiwan and send an embassy there; and Allen was able to pull that back, and then he took over as the principal Asian advisor in the White House. And this was at a time when Jim Lilley, for example, went there. And it looked as though they were going to be able to keep things on a good even keel, you know, taking care of Peking over here and Taiwan over there and the Congress behind them and the American military on the side. So it looked as though this might move fairly smoothly, but of course in the State Department we had Al Haig and we had John Holdridge, and we had a number of others who were drawn from a very different wing of the State Department, so to speak. And so we saw very quickly that Allen was not finding it easy to keep control. And then of course he got caught in the watches and money in his safe.

*Q: He was the national security advisor.*

PRATT: That's right. So he had to resign.

*Q: It was a minor scandal which really had very little substance.*

PRATT: I think it had very little substance and, knowing him, not well, but knowing him, I knew that this was the last thing that he would have been interested in. He probably just hadn't yet figured out what he was supposed to do with this stuff, and he probably didn't have anybody who came to him and said, "Well, listen." - a secretary who would say, "I'll call security and we'll call in the legal advisor and we'll find out how we handle all this." So this is when, for example, Jim Lilley decided he ought to bail out, because he was the Asian man under Richard Allen, and he bailed out and went to Taiwan because he knew that there was going to be a rough time in the White House at that point.

So Al Haig... Al Haig had been - how should I say it - if we think Brzezinski had been influenced by Kissinger, Al Haig certainly had, so he had great dreams of a big geopolitical thinker. One of my friends, a young chap who worked with me in Taiwan, worked on his staff and basically he sort of said, "Make sure that you don't get Peking screaming about anything. Give them whatever they need to stop them from screaming" - because he wanted to placate Peking. He felt that that was the great geopolitical thing he had to do in order to be able to keep the Soviets in line and all the rest of it.

*Q: This has been sort of the major instrument of Mainland China, of protesting and screaming about everything and with considerable effectiveness.*

PRATT: Quite true. Now I never was able to get the precise information as to why we'd even started negotiations with them about limitations of arms supplies into Taiwan because we had handled this in the recognition communiqué - in other words, that there would be a gradual... that we would address the arms question. But there was nothing about when and why we should pick this up, and frankly, I believe that it was basically persons who *wanted* to negotiate with Peking because they felt that this was one way to get them to stop complaining about something. In other words, this is what I feel to be one of the biggest problems we face in dealing with China: we do not analyze what it is they are really trying to get and whether we are going to be prepared to give it to them, and so we go off and talk to them. As we well know, Clinton loves to talk to everybody, but that's not necessarily the best option in dealing with China. If you're not prepared to give them what they want, you know, you face what they call - one we come up with, a verbal formula - "much thunder but no rain." And this was not necessarily helpful. But they were balled in this negotiation, which resulted in the August 1982 communiqué on limitation of arms sales to Taiwan, on which they had persons who did not understand how we gave arms because they weren't permitted to discuss this with the people who did the work. They therefore had to do it on the basis of good, high, lofty principles, and do it with little verbal tricks like "in quantity and quality" et cetera. And it resulted in an agreement with Peking which was basically inoperable.

*Q: Did you have the feeling when you were in East Asian and Pacific Affairs - I mean you came hot out of Taiwan, and obviously you were very sensitive to this even when you were in the regional thing - did you feel that Taiwan had been sort of thrust in the background and that you had sort of a team that was thinking only of Mainland China, that was both caught up, you might*

*say, in the glamour of dealing with this and was from your perspective and maybe that of some of the other colleagues more willing to make concessions than you felt was justified regarding Taiwan?*

PRATT: The short word is yes. Let me say a bit more, though, because in addition to people being sort of interested in the big question, namely Big China rather than Small China, these were persons for the most part who had been associated with the Kissinger approach to China under the Nixon Administration. And while I think that Kissinger is a little more realistic certainly than Al Haig - Al Haig is more of an ideologue than he is a real realist as I think Kissinger can be. This was a crew which was given a great deal of leeway because of the fact that Richard Allen was out and we did not have a strong group in the White House yet. And they also had, I believe, inattention on the part of Reagan, with nobody to go to Reagan and say, "Do you realize what Al Haig is doing?" Now that finally happened, and that was when Al Haig, of course, was out. But that was a little later, when Judge Clark, who had been deputy secretary, supposedly the one designed to keep an eye on Al Haig for Reagan's purposes, went over to the White House, and then he was able to get the word through that Al Haig was not following through on what Reagan wanted done, particularly in meetings with China.

But I was not involved in the negotiations of the August communiqué. I was not even able to follow them closely because, of course, this was handled very, very tightly, and they wanted to keep any of the persons who knew anything about Taiwan or really were concerned about Taiwan out of it, because they saw this as a somewhat adversarial situation because as on the occasion of the recognition communiqué they felt that if any of this leaked to the Congress the Congress would be very annoyed. We have seen afterwards, as you know, the Congress had said that the Taiwan Relations Act should take precedence over the communiqué. This, of course, is just the sense of the Congress, but the thing is it shows at least that there is a problem they have with these executive agreements, which of course also have the force of law. Obviously the Congress considers that the Taiwan Relations Act, as an act of Congress, wherever the communiqués are in disagreement with the Taiwan Relations Act, it is the Taiwan Relations Act which takes precedence. And I think that that is a defensible position. Then again, you can say that because this agreement took place after the Taiwan Relations Act, and the President was well aware of the existence of the Taiwan Relations Act, this is merely a refinement of the Taiwan Relations Act. But you're going to get all kinds of political struggles, but it is a political problem. And we saw that from the very beginning in the way in which they were doing this communiqué. But even more important that that, when I assumed my position handling the Taiwan Coordination Office, was how we implemented something which was drafted by amateurs.

*Q: Who were the drafters? I've interviewed John Holdridge and Chas Freeman, but who were you seeing as the principal drafters?*

PRATT: Well, Bill Rope was the head of the China Desk at that time, and he was one of the key persons doing the actual work. I believe he's now in Nanking. But he was however taking guidance of an intellectual basis from Chas Freeman, so Chas, I'm sure, can tell you exactly why they felt they had to do it this way. Chas was out of the loop. I've forgotten whether he was still in Bangkok, but he was very much the . . . Rope was his protégé. He'd gotten Rope into this job

by arguing in favor of Rope for getting it, and therefore this was part of that particular combine. And another figure, of course, was Holdridge because Holdridge had to approve all of this, but I don't think he would have been doing most of the drafting. Obviously he would take care of certain little points, just as he felt that he had taken care of certain points for the Shanghai communiqué, but of course good old Marshall Green felt that he's the one who did that. Well, in any case, the major concern was to provide something which would take care of Peking's squawking; however, one of the big problems is that you cannot take care of Peking if what you do is not going to be in line with what they think an agreement means. In the end, of course, we've been doing things which aren't even in accordance with the agreement according to what we think it means - because, of course, it can't be done. But as I said, my principal task there, and it was a very important one, and I had one officer who spent basically all of his time working on this, and he was a very competent chap who subsequently left and went back to the University of Virginia Law School and, I guess, is probably enjoying his life as a lawyer instead, but nonetheless, he was a very shrewd chap. However, we missed out on certain things because, of course, the Department of Defense people were the ones who had to handle this primarily.

*Q: It was essentially an arms agreement, wasn't it?*

PRATT: It was a very vague statement that the arms would be limited to the quality of what was already in Taiwan's inventory. There would not be an increase in quality. Secondly, there would be no increase in quantity, and in fact there would be a gradual reduction leading to an eventual end of arms sales to Taiwan.

*Q: It sounds like a sellout.*

PRATT: Of course it sounds like a sellout, and of course double sellout when you say "limit quality" it has nothing to do with the qualities on the other side. And if you take quantity, then of course, given inflation (and arms inflation prices generally go up even more rapidly than regular prices - a loaf of bread), so that just even by keeping it even you are going to be ending up by reducing. So this, of course, went even beyond that. But the big problem was that arms sales to Taiwan are of two sorts. One is FMS (Foreign Military Sales), in which you have agreements to sell something, and that sale is considered to have taken place at the time of the signing of this agreement, not at the time when the goods are actually delivered. Secondly, you have what you call commercial sales. These sales do not take place in accordance with any agreement, and therefore their accounting system was on delivery. Well, something which was sold this year may not be delivered until next year or the year after that, and how are you going to keep track and keep in trade those things which are accounted the minute you approve them right now and those other things which may have delivery from previous years, which you cannot figure out and control when they are going to be. So it meant that the Department of Defense was engaging in various kinds of shenanigans.

We started out also by taking the highest previous years of arms delivery, which were not just the immediately preceding years because there had been a moratorium on arms in 1979 and going through 1980. So we had to then adjust that for inflation, which gave us our base figure. Well, of course, Peking immediately objected to our picking the average of the two highest previous years or the highest previous year, whatever it was, and then adjusting it for inflation and then using

that as our base figure. They objected to that, of course, as we expected they would. Then, of course, they wanted to see very rapid reduction. Well, instead of that, because of the previous moratorium, we, if anything, were having even higher figures. But then in addition to that, the commercial sales would occasionally bunch up and come at a time when we had figured that we had plenty of space for these commercial sales, only it turned out that with a given FMS approval, which had to be counted because they were reported to the Congress - and we had also the figures coming in from U.S. Customs about the actual delivery - and you'd go over rather than being under.

So we had some very incensed people at one point. Mike Armacost was furious because he thought that we had let the Department of Defense get away with having commercial sales which we should have stopped. Come on, they had taken place long before we even focused on them, and they weren't trying to make this trouble; it's just that they did come through that way.

*Q: Well, coming back to the basic thing, as you describe the communiqué to me, it sounded like the idea was to let Taiwan wither on the vine, which was absolutely opposed to how certainly Congress viewed its relation with Taiwan. And I would have thought that you would look at this, particularly from the Taiwan point of view, and say, Okay, we'll play this game, but this isn't essentially going to work because of the Congress and the American public.*

PRATT: That is true after Paul Wolfowitz, or even before Paul, when Gaston Sigur came in to replace Holdridge as the Assistant Secretary in the Asia Pacific Bureau. By that time, Haig was out, and Shultz was in and we were able to get back to a much more stable approach to China and Taiwan and to China as viewed by Congress as well as by the President. I gather that it was Judge Clark who considered that he was responsible for blowing the whistle and telling Reagan just what the communiqué meant and how it was going to be in conflict with the Taiwan Relations Act, and it certainly resulted in a kind of selling out of Taiwan - something which Clark knew that Reagan had not intended to do.

So Reagan himself had been following these various communiqués, and when the final one came through with the notation, drafted by Bill Rope and okayed by Holdridge and so on, to the effect that they thought that Peking was still demanding that there be a time certain for an end to the arms sales (and also they wanted to have something more concrete about gradual reductions), Reagan scribbled on that, apparently, if they won't take this version, then go back to the drawing board because he would not accept these options, because, of course, always these things go through with high option, low option, and so on. And he took the medium option, but the thing is . . . No, I'm sorry, I guess it wasn't the medium option; it was the high option, saying that it had to be what it was and no budge on the dates. And he said if they don't like this, to hell with them. And so what Peking did, preemptively, was accept the version which had been negotiated, and of course many people considered that these American negotiators were basically just trying to present Peking's view to find a way of sneaking it through, believing that the importance of the U.S. relationship with China was so much greater than any of this crap about Taiwan, that the best thing to do was to find out from Peking what they thought would fly. They still thought that it would not fly without a date certain, and so they were a bit surprised when Peking . . . Well, they were surprised when Reagan said no, there's no question of a date certain. And then they were surprised when Peking accepted it. But I think that Peking got the word that they had gotten

as much as they were going to get, and they were therefore anxious to take what it is they could get. Deng Xiaoping was a very practical man.

So as I say, we knew this was not done the right way, and it was not really in accord with what Reagan thought, and you'll hear Jim Lilley, for example, saying, "Well, the real meaning of that communiqué is what Reagan said it was, which was, 'This is not just something which is posited on Peking's having a peaceful policy towards resolution of the Taiwan question, but in addition to that it depends upon balance.'" In other words, we must still maintain a balance in the Taiwan Straits, and that this is the message which Reagan basically gave to congressional people who called on him and objected. And it also can be found in what it was that Holdridge said to the Congress when he went up to defend the thing. But we had to take these various threads and try to figure out how we could *in action* make the communiqué mean something which was acceptable to Taiwan, which would work with the facts in Taiwan - which was, of course, not easy because it did provide for an accounting system which was impossible to use, and we were bound to alienate basically probably everybody by trying to band together apples and oranges. And this was therefore again a big problem: what do we mean by "no increase in quality"?

When Gaston was there and even more when Wolfowitz was there, we were able to get through the concept that "no increase in quality" means that if something which they have in their inventory is no longer available and it's no longer produced, then you can move to the next higher level of quality because that's all there is. It does not mean that you have to artificially create something which is as limited as what it is they already have. This is why we are able to get to the whole question of how they get the new aircraft such as the F-5G.

*Q: F-16 - that wasn't -*

PRATT: That was disapproved. We had F - 16, we had F-4, and even some F-18. One of the reasons why F-5G was considered a good bet to begin with was that it was made in southern California, and the head of Northrop was a good friend of President Reagan. And he was able to say, "Listen, I've got a great aircraft. We'll call it F-20 for others so it will look like a really advanced one, and we'll call it F-5G for Taiwan so it's only one grade up from what they've already got, the F-5E."

In any case, this was one of the key problems. We were able to move to increase the level of avionics, the fire control, and air-to-air weaponry, and so forth, which therefore would maintain a qualitative edge for Taiwan to give them the continuing increase in numbers.

*Q: You're figuring all the time, okay, these agreements are going on by people who maybe don't understand what it is, but - we're talking about this 1982-86 period - you were looking at this with the bench line of saying we want to make sure that the Taiwanese don't lose their technological edge.*

PRATT: That's right. Also, of course, we still considered it within the political framework and therefore, one, we had to try to make sure that we could at least provide an explanation to Peking why we were doing this. So we had to work that out. Secondly, we had to try to be reassuring by showing that there was still a pipeline and the pipeline would not be something which was

useless. It would give them things which would take care of their needs. Now obviously Taiwan always wanted a good deal more than we considered were their actual needs. They of course want something up here; we suggested something down there. When this came to quality, as I say, we had to crank it up, make a meaningful increase, but something which could be presented still to China as not being a breaking of the technological provisions of the 1982 communiqué.

Then when it came to ships, we were going to provide design; they were going to send experts here to study what it is that we produced, and then they were going to build the ships themselves. And this, in the end, I guess they really didn't do. They have since bought some frigates from elsewhere. But some of the persons hewing to the Peking line would say we violated the agreement by providing technological information and other things in order to get around the fact that we weren't going to make the actual sales. Well, we don't agree with that, and we didn't defend it that way to Peking. We defended these approvals to Peking as being ones which were, indeed, just one cut above what it was the Taiwan already had, and about as low as you actually could produce given the state of the art of the day. So we didn't try that particular way to get around the 1982 agreement.

We then went, of course, to defense, radar, and radar control and so forth, and we got that basically sort state-of-the-art, because it's so purely defensive that we felt that a defensive thing would trump the fact that you don't give somebody an old vacuum tube radio when you've got microchips and all the rest of it. And then for the tank, we did a rather bad hybrid because they already had the M-48 tank, and we combined the M-48 turret with the M-61 (whatever it was) chassis, and that would keep the tank production in the United States going, because remember, we had also considerable contacts with the American arms producers for whom Taiwan was a very good market. They paid hard cash. This was not something where you would wait 10 years maybe to get the money back, and so everybody was of course anxious to sell to Taiwan, and they would come and talk to us and talk to the Department of Defense and try to convince people that the Taiwan should get whatever American companies were producing.

So this was the major point how you give through actions a definition to what is a very vague and, shall we say, political communiqué and have it mean something in economic and military matters.

*Q: Well, you were helped to some extent during this particular period in that the Mainland Chinese were not still moving up the ladder technologically, particular in military things.*

PRATT: That's right; however, it was a time when also the U.S. military were trying to get their camel's nose under the tent, and they indeed were beginning to move on some of these matters, and the same office in DOD which was handling the Peking side of things was handling the Taiwan side of things. So you indeed did have a dynamism there which... Fortunately, we had there at that time a very good team with Gaston Sigur and then Paul Wolfowitz, both of whom I think are very bright and very, very balanced. And over in the Defense Department - what's his name - he's emerging now as one of the special advisors to George W. Bush - it will come to us. In any case, he was the ISA chap, very helpful.

*Q: Today is the 23<sup>rd</sup> of February, 2000. Mark, first let's talk a bit about during this 1982-86*

*period just plain straight relations with Taiwan. Any great problems, or was it all tied up with our relations with China?*

PRATT: Well, obviously the relations with China were what influenced what the major problems we had dealing with Taiwan, mainly military equipment. So much of the time was spent on handling what the Taiwan side was requesting in the way of arms and what it is we would be prepared to do and how we could get it through the various aspects of the government, including ones which were, of course, very, very much, shall we say, feeling that they had a vested stake in the 1982 communiqué, more so than in finding ways of living with it. So this leads into your question about adversarial relations.

For the most part, the people in the Defense Department had officers who were dealing with both China Mainland and Taiwan, in ISA [Ed: International Security Affairs] and other key policy making areas. And of course they were anxious to keep a good balance, but they were not, shall we say, very anxious to push the most restrictive interpretations of the 1982 communiqué because they had been so little involved in negotiating it. That was a political document which they considered had been worked on around them even though they in the end were expected to pick up the pieces of it. Therefore, from their point of view, they had a bit of an adversarial relationship with some of those in the Department of State who were leaning over backwards to do whatever Peking wanted. However, the major focus, the major, shall we say, strength of the pro-Peking side in the Department of State was basically reduced when Al Haig left, because Al Haig had been very much himself personally in favor of doing whatever he thought would be best received in Peking. He of course held what he considered to be the view of Henry Kissinger of great politics, which meant China was important, Taiwan was only an irritant. And there were a number of people who also believed that China was in the future the most important relationship we would have, eclipsing Japan; and they themselves felt personally involved in arriving at the text of that 1982 communiqué, and they therefore wished it to be as much a reflection in implementation of Peking's view of that document as possible, whereas of course once Haig was out and Shultz came in and we had a group in both the National Security Council and in the State Department which was anxious to do what they considered to be what Reagan wanted (and this group, of course, was basically in the ascendancy), therefore while starting out when I first moved over to Taiwan from Regional Affairs, the basic flavor, with Holdridge and Haig and so forth, was one of trying to just say that a small amount of the prestige of Taiwan and concern about Taiwan that we had earlier, afterwards we really then had to make sure that we did not go overboard with Taiwan, either. And from a relatively hostile head of the China Desk, we acquired someone who was basically very, very well balanced - that was Don Anderson - and very much aware of the fact that we had our own U.S. interest in this.

*Q: Who was the first head of the China Desk?*

PRATT: This was Bill Rope, who was very much in the Chas Freeman group. And as I mentioned earlier, Mike Armacost and Mort Abramowitz, who was up in INR-[ED; Bureau of Intelligence and Research] there were persons who were also considered to be part of this group which felt that they had to defend China. We have always felt that China was pretty good at defending itself. But in any case, there were, and someone like Jim Lilley was even more sharply critical of this group and very frequently identified them as being either a Peking lobby or else

occasionally sort of suggesting that some of them were indeed trying to get their instructions from Peking before they tried to find out what the State Department wanted. I know that Jim knew that this was carrying it a little bit to extremes, but nonetheless, it was something which went back some 20 years and therefore was not unusual.

*Q: There was very much this feeling of division there between the - I won't say - pro-PRC, but the basic feeling that this is what counts, and Taiwan frankly doesn't count. These are sort of the great picture people as opposed to one who are taking a different course.*

PRATT: That's true, and as I mentioned, even earlier part of this came about because some of the persons who were leaning so much towards China's position were persons who really disliked the KMT and disliked it so much they had read in their history books in the '40s and '50s, and from what they experienced when they either studied in Taiwan or served in Taiwan, and they were very much opposed, therefore, to the KMT rule on Taiwan and they were also of the opinion that once the U.S. indicated that it was headed out, as indeed recognition from their point of view was meant to signal, that the KMT would invoke its "One China" policy and turn the place over to Peking and therefore that would solve our problem for us. The other people, of course, did not feel that Taiwan was going to go down the drain nearly so easily as these others both though it would and hoped it would. You can find a number of documents which report the view that Taiwan would not be with us very long. But we, of course, who had been involved with Taiwan for a while, knew full well they were far more resilient. We also knew that it was far more complex than just a small group of old men from the Shanghai area who controlled the Kuomintang. So indeed, there was a very different appraisal of what Taiwan was.

There was also a very different appraisal of what Peking was. I'm sure you have read about the enthusiasm which Kissinger had for Mao and for Zhou Enlai, and then of course I gather Kissinger really had a rather low opinion of Deng Xiaoping, whereas of course most of us who had worked very hard on China over many years, as Kissinger never did, were well aware of the fact that Mao was, indeed, *sui generis* and being gradually exposed for the rather monstrous figure that he was. And Zhou Enlai was not always so perfect and effective under the shadow of Mao as he might well have been had he outlived Mao. Therefore, our view was more, shall we say, concerned about doing what really had to be done to take care of China but giving China time to move ahead from what continued to be, and was certainly even in the early '80's, certainly a highly authoritarian society, where Deng Xiaoping's reforms were just beginning. And there were no assurances that if Deng had died in 1981 or '82 that anybody that could have maintained his programs, because others who were still there - like Chung Yin and P'eng Chen and Bo Yibo and so forth - that they might well have turned it back into something far more retrograde from the U.S. point of view, including retrograde from the point of view of being open to the United States. So we felt that we had to spend a good deal of our time trying to defend U.S. interests rather than just trying to find out what China wanted done.

*Q: Were you able at that time to make the argument, that look at Taiwan and if you draw a line about where it's going, it looks pretty good, I mean as far as American values go, and China, it doesn't look good? Was this in this 1982-86 period a valid argument or used or was this a little premature?*

PRATT: No, I'd say at that time it was already fairly clear. In the first place, one had the whole concept of the economic liberalization and what that would inevitably do for politics and, of course, what it actually did do in Taiwan and has done elsewhere: that is, when you get an authoritarian government relinquishing many of the areas in which it exercises authority directly and turns it over to capitalism and government-regulated and then regulating less and less, you're getting a society which is going to be far more free. And whether all the elections are going to be as free and whether it's going to have, shall we say, an election which results in throwing the scoundrels out . . . which of course is one of the principal things which elections can serve as. Whether it's turning them out for the right reason or not, it doesn't matter; at least it provides for a succession including a hostile succession, which keeps people on their toes - and Taiwan was certainly headed in that direction. And we also knew that while the people who were in the Communist movement had gotten involved in what was a forward-looking movement in the nineteen-teens, namely Leninism, they also went through the period of Stalinism, and that's not necessarily the best education - whereas the Kuomintang, which had also had considerable Leninist tendencies. Chiang Kai-shek came out of a basically Leninist and militarist era.

Nonetheless, everything else had been handled very differently. Most of the top figures had studied economics and studied in the United States. They were basically persons who were liberalizers, first of the economy and then eventually of such things as even elections. But greater freedom of the press and so forth happened before that. Admittedly there were pockets which were very retrograde such as the security services in Taiwan, as I mentioned the last time in my appraisal of where Chiang Ching-kuo was going. We weren't quite sure just how he was going to end up doing it. This was a time, however, when things were becoming clearer - that is, after I had left Taiwan they became clearer. But nonetheless, the basic tendencies and the basic aspects were far more favorable. In the first place, during a time when China had one of its most unpleasant and not terribly well-organized periods, 1895-1945 - this was a time when Taiwan had been ruled by Japan, which despite its war in the Pacific had nonetheless been far more advanced in its appraisal of science and technology and economics from the West. So Taiwan had benefited from not having gone through the historical troubles of the war between the Communists and the Nationalists on the Mainland from the 1920s and '30s and '40s. It also, of course, having been occupied by Japan much earlier, had a friendly period from 1931, when Japan started its attack on China, starting in Manchuria and then moving down to Peking and so forth, so 1931-1945 were times of deep trouble in China from the Japanese, and Taiwan did not have that. Now admittedly, it was run as a colony and therefore somewhat of a backwater, but nonetheless, a lot of the top leaders, like the current president [Ed: Lee Teng-hui] and like the person handling foreign relations, were studying in Japan at a time when the Japanese universities were among the best in the world. Japanese education, from the Meiji period on, had been very a remarkable institution. But in any case, we know that the basic background for Taiwan provided many, many factors which were more favorable than those which the Communists had on the Mainland. So our position was that, yes, indeed, they're moving very rapidly, and the only question is when an authoritarian figure with a great deal of power, like, President Chiang, when he decides that something is going to happen, he has a means of making sure it does happen because he can calculate all of the opposition and override it, something which couldn't be done in Peking.

*Q: Well, there was real difference in the type of government. I mean, the Taiwan had a*

*government where if the leader decided things had to be done, he could sort of say it could be done, whereas the Politburo in China, I mean, this was not a monolithic organization. I mean, it was basically a committee of geriatrics, wasn't it?*

PRATT: Quite true, and in addition to that, their party system, while giving full central control to the party in almost all the areas, nonetheless, their concept of collective leadership meant that any one of the top leaders could have a very powerful role, particularly in some of the areas of their special concern, so that some of them such as Deng Xiaoping had a lot more power than, say, Hua Guofang, his immediate predecessor, had had. But nonetheless, he had to share this with a number of others because he was there because he was the one most accessible to these various top leaders. This was not the case by the time Chiang really made himself. He of course had full power after the death of his own father, when he was really only vice-president. But he could tell the president what to do, and the president knew that he ought to do it. So he was somebody who had had really power such as nobody had had on the Mainland. Even Mao had greater problems. And therefore, he was able to get through many things over the objections of others. However, as a person who did not like to jam things through, because CCK felt that the repercussions would often be worse than trying to produce the same effect more slowly and to get it done after you can get more people on board. This meant that he was making sure that there would not be a reversal of anything which he was able to get done. And he therefore moved very slowly. He was indeed, I think, too confident of his ability to pull it all off, and therefore could do it at his convenience, when he thought it would be most easily done. What he did not initially take adequately into account was his own health, because his own health, which had several periods of failure, was what reminded him that he had to move more rapidly because he might not be there. And he therefore did create the major changes there which were needed for Taiwan to become politically speaking what it is today.

*Q: Did you see almost a difference in background, experience, or approach between the people who were dealing with Taiwan in the State Department and those dealing with the Mainland?*

PRATT: Well, within the Foreign Service, we of course knew all of these persons, and we had been to school with many of them and often had studied before they had and therefore could follow what they were doing in their studies and then follow what they were doing when they got their first assignments following language training. However, some of these, indeed, got an initial push-up because they were among the first group to go to Peking and develop the new relationship. I believe that group contained some who turned out to be sort of prepared to do everything according to Peking, and others like Don Anderson, to whom at times we had to say, listen, what they wanted is not necessarily what we should want. So we had a group of each, and it was very hard to figure out what would be the qualities of mind or temperament which would have them go more in one direction or the other. And the only thread which appeared to be there was those who felt that they got their initial real push forward from being involved in the early stages of Normalization and of being able to push policies through which they then would be associated with. And of course in the early time, there was more of a problem to overcome some of the reluctance, true of course even during the Kissinger period, when they of course were so concerned about Kissinger's own relationship with the Secretary of State and then later with the Congress and so on, and then of course with the Carter and the Carter effort, and then the Taiwan Relations Act, which indeed was a bit of a rebuke to the President, including a rebuke coming

from some of his staunchest supporters in the Congress. So these persons, however, continued, and that includes as much Brzezinski as it does Kissinger, persons who felt that they were the ones who were responsible for getting things done, and therefore they had to defend their own work. I think this is a very common thing, of people trying to defend ...

*Q: Well, now, who on the Taiwan side in Congress . . . whom did you look upon to be your strongest supporters?*

PRATT: Well, we found them in both parties, and we found there again, they were persons who also made themselves good, effective figures in getting the Taiwan Relations Act through. They were also persons who began to know more about Asia, and so of course, we certainly felt that the old team with Zablocki and Lester Wolf - they were great figures, of course, and then they vanish from the scene. And obviously in the Senate, from the early period on, there were two figures - Pell and Kennedy - both of whom had very strong staff, and the staff of both of them were very interested in what was going on in Taiwan, and they were very interested in human rights, and they were very much able to see that, although there were little snafus occasionally, the basic tendency in Taiwan was far more compatible to U.S. concerns about human rights, and then of course political rights and democracy, than anything in Peking was. So I'm trying to think also of the - name will come to me later - but he's the chap who was the head of the subcommittee in the House on foreign relations.

*Q: It was Solarz.*

PRATT: Yes, Steve Solarz. Steve Solarz was a very powerful and important figure because he was interested in both Peking and Taipei and he had a very, very good staunch figure, Richard Bush, now head of the American Institute in Taiwan, who was one of Solarz' key figures in making sure that people kept track of, shall we say, the important things which were happening in Taiwan and how they should be put into perspective. So we had persons who were often incensed by some of the stupidity and the horrible things which occasionally could be done in Taiwan, but they were as well aware of the fact that this was something which was not even necessarily supported by the president, and in any case something which would not be going on for long.

*Q: I would have thought that you would also have a problem, although times have changed, with the equivalent of the old China Lobby, the very strongly anti-Communist, almost know-nothing types in Congress - no subtlety or real knowledge except "It's them Communists over there and these guys are not Communists, therefore they're our people." And this is not a very helpful group in foreign policy.*

PRATT: No, because some of them - and there are still a few around, and every now and then I had to share a platform with one - but they are really so supportive of the KMT on Taiwan that they will find that even the Taiwan Government does not become as shrill in tooting its own horn as they think it ought to, and they consider the U.S. Government to be basically hostile, that the executive branch basically is much too inclined to listen to Peking and not pay attention to what really ought to be done for Taiwan and does not tell Peking to go to hell. Now occasionally we would get that even from, shall we say, Senator Helms's side, where occasionally, when we'd go

up and try to tell them how much we were providing for Taiwan in the way of military equipment and how this would take care of so many of their needs, and obviously we knew we were going to have some problems with Peking, but this was how we intended to handle it, they would then go to Helms and they'd get messages back saying, you know, to "tell Peking to go to hell," and they ought to do more, et cetera et cetera. Now we were getting so we sought what was going to be feasible, but this group of people, of course, had never been concerned with what was feasible.

*Q: Did events in the Soviet Union, as Gorbachev began to start his reforms and all - this is before the Soviet Union split up and all - were we looking at that and saying, I wonder if this is going to happen to China, and were we thinking along those terms?*

PRATT: Well, we certainly considered that Gorbachev, while many were initially saying, how different can he be from his two predecessors, who of course weren't there very long - you're looking at almost like a succession in the Papacy in that by the time they got to power you couldn't be sure how long they'd be there and whether everything would be overturned and so forth - and since he was the protégé of persons who were very old and very much in the party apparatus, there was a considerable suspicion that we had, and that of course Peking had, over what this really could mean. Is he going to be able to stick around? Is he really going to be able to make that much of a change? Then, of course, when Maggie Thatcher was able to tell Reagan we can do business with this man, then, of course, people began to revise their views that maybe he would be around long enough at least to do business for a time.

We saw this as being one of the things which we hoped would reduce the earlier concern that Kissinger had, which was that we must make up with Peking as a weapon against Moscow, because we felt that was very misguided. I mean, those of us in the Foreign Service who worked on Asia, said that the Chinese, for their own reasons, are against the Russians, and the Russians have always been afraid of the Chinese anyway, because there are very vulnerable parts of their own territory so close to a much, much larger China, so we really don't have to take the Soviet Union as a justification for doing what we ought to do about China, and we certainly hope that if it can show that there was no longer a strategic triangle between Washington, Peking, and Moscow, but rather something where we had to have good bilateral relations with both Peking and Moscow, that we could begin to address all of the China questions on their own merits, because many of the persons who were arguing for us to dump Taiwan were saying we need China so much because it ties down all these divisions of the Soviets in Central Asia and therefore we need China so much for our real concerns about the Soviet Union. Well, it turned out, of course, that we shouldn't have had nearly so much of an anxiety about the Soviet Union, that economically, and therefore eventually militarily, they weren't the great power which they had been portrayed as being. None of that, of course, was able to trickle through to us in the East Asian side, but since very clearly it emerged that they did not have the strength which we had used to justify doing so many things with Peking. We should be able, therefore, to approach everything we're doing with Peking on the basis of what was important from the point of view of U.S. interests and U.S. concerns about East Asia. And that, of course, should make it far easier to see that we don't have to sacrifice Taiwan - or Japan or Korea or any other place - just to be able to have China be anti-Soviet. So we considered that this, insofar as we were given much information about it - we'd gotten a little more than what we'd get out of the American press,

which is, I think, very, very negligent in handling this, just as I think the CIA was.

*Q: Well, now, back to sort of the nitty-gritty. I can't remember if we covered it before, but what about the Taiwanese security services and their activities in the United States during this 1982-86 period? Did they cause you any headaches?*

PRATT: Very much so because, although I had very good relations with the formal head of the organization which was sort of openly declared here in the United States - the National Security Bureau - and used to have periodic meetings with him, nonetheless, we were aware that things were still going on back in Taiwan which were made for novels. The security services back there were not all as intelligent and as open as the office was here in Washington. They were, of course, required to be because they knew they had to get along both with the CIA and with the State Department and so on. So these people were by far the most, shall we say, enlightened. But the previous head, one whom I overlapped with only slightly, when he went back was taken out of the National Security Bureau system, which was foreign intelligence, and put in to the intelligence bureau of the Ministry of National Defense, which has a foreign section basically aimed at Mainland China but also had certain undeclared offices in the United States. This is where, eventually, the trouble came from.

We had had enough trouble with Americans being harassed and killed, permanent residents from the United States having their troubles back in Taiwan, but for the first time we had the Henry Liu case, which was an assassination of a person of Mainland origin but raised and educated in Taiwan, and he was killed by elements of what was called the "Bamboo Gang," which is apparently still functioning in Taiwan, one of the big problems Taiwan still has, and the reason why it is such a problem is that these gangs were often intermixed with the security services. They were not, therefore, a target of the security systems. They were adjuncts. They were elements which they felt they could use and whose mentality they had confidence in and so on. And this is something that still is a problem in Taiwan, because they have not been rooted out. And as I'm sure you have heard also, that the old Triads from Hong Kong and branches of them in Guangdong Province, means that the Triads and therefore gang elements in south China and in Hong Kong remain a big problem for Peking. They have not been able to root it out. In many cases, of course, the governments have felt that these are good adjuncts for their own power, and that goes back to the time when the Green Gang was one of the big supporters of Chiang Kai-shek in Shanghai, in the '30s and so forth. So this was something where we eventually had very considerable problems.

*Q: On your watch did you have it then?*

PRATT: Yes, that was on my watch.

*Q: Can you talk about what happened and what we did?*

PRATT: There is a whole book written by a chap in San Francisco on the subject. Henry Liu was assassinated in Daly City, and it was therefore an event of some importance. [Ed: see David Kaplan, *Fires of the Dragon: Politics, Murder and the Kuomintang*]

*Q: Daly City is in -*

PRATT: Just south of San Francisco. And I have not read the book because I felt that I had my own ideas and I would hate to sit there and get annoyed by what he maybe said wrong. He called me many times, and so we had long chats, and I know I mentioned before the book, and I hope that he got me down correctly, but that's one of the big problems in dealing with many authors, that you will find that they have their own thesis which goes beyond what I think to be justifiable. But in any case, this was a case which caused problems between the State Department and the Justice Department and particularly the FBI in the beginning because apparently there was far more of a role in the FBI in this event than they were ever willing to tell us, because you know they have a sense of "need to know" which is very different from that even of the CIA's. And from their point of view, if they could bamboozle us to get us to do what they want us to do, then that's much, much better than trying to tell us exactly what went wrong and what they would like to have us do to help them out. In the end, we did get to, I think, a very highly principled figure in the Department of Justice who was able to make sure that we got all the . . . he was limited in what he could tell us about what the FBI role had actually been, but nonetheless he was very frank with us about what he was doing, because we had to facilitate several trips for these teams from the Justice Department to go to Taiwan and interview persons who were involved in the events surrounding the murder.

This apparently, this Bamboo Gang group was, as usual, trying to have better relations with the security services in Taiwan because that meant that their own activities would therefore not be looked askance at by the security services, the only ones they were really afraid of. So they thought that they were being given encouragement to get rid of this Henry Liu, to kill him, and there were two factors. One, Henry Liu was considered to be disloyal to the KMT, even though he was a Mainlander, he had been raised in Taiwan and gone to school there, because of alleged dealings with Peking. That perhaps was one of the more important things in the minds of the Bamboo Gang. But secondly, they thought that they could curry personal favor with President Chiang because Henry Liu was coming out with a biography of President Chiang which would be rather unfavorable with, quote, a lot of the worst and most scurrilous gossip, unquote, which they and a broad range of Mainlanders on Taiwan knew. So they would gain favor not only with the anti-Communist security services but then also personally with the family of President Chiang, and what they were not so much aware of (which I think was still one of the principal reasons why the security services facilitated their assassination attempt and its success) was that Henry Liu had himself been involved with Taiwan intelligence from the very beginning of his career. He was trained at one of the universities where the role of the security services in curriculum and teaching and so on was very prominent, and he therefore was expected to be an agent for them whenever they called upon him, even though he functioned as a journalist, first in Washington and then out in San Francisco. Nonetheless, the key thing was that they figured that he should still be under their discipline as an agent. And if they felt that an agent had been turned by Peking, and there was indication that this might have been somewhat what Henry Liu was doing - mainly he was telling Peking more about what he learned about Taiwan than he was telling Taiwan about what he learned about Peking, and at the same time he also apparently was an agent for the FBI and I guess they wondered which one he was telling most to, Peking, Taipei, or Washington. In any case, a rather dangerous game for anyone to play. Double agent is bad enough, but triple agent is often even more dangerous.

In any case, this Bamboo Gang team came to the United States, and apparently they were involved with some of the people whom the FBI was involved with. Now whether these were people who reported also to FBI or whether these were people whom they had identified as problem people and they were listening in to their phones and all the rest, I don't know. In any case, the FBI was on to what happened far too rapidly. It appeared that they had indeed been able to intercept a telephone call that the Bamboo people made right after the killing to the people whom they were reporting to in Taipei. So what actually the FBI role is we were never told, but it looked as though they had been involved with him, despite the fact that he had volunteered his service primarily to the CIA and the CIA had declined to have any contact with him. So then he went to the FBI and volunteered to be of assistance to them. Apparently he just liked, he had grown up, I guess, with the idea of being involved with security services, and more is better than less. So if you can get three services you're working with, then you're better off. In any case, he was not, I guess, a terribly pleasant chap. I knew a lot of the journalists here who had known him earlier, and they told me a great deal about him. He could be cantankerous and difficult, but nonetheless he was an American citizen, and obviously we were not very happy to have Taiwan feel they could use a criminal gang to assassinate people in our country with the connivance of and encouragement from the security services in Taiwan.

*Q: Well, how did it play out?*

PRATT: Well, in the end, the Bamboo Gang, which was also a group which had branches in Hong Kong and in Bangkok and was involved in drug trafficking, had one person who was involved in their team who went from San Francisco to New York and then went down to Latin America, and this was when we, of course, were able to get the name, able to try to get him extradited from I think it was Brazil. And of course, then we ran into Rudy Giuliani. He was then the attorney for the southern district of New York, and of course, he wanted him first for a drug trial in New York, which meant we had to postpone things for the murder trial in San Francisco.

So we of course were involved with all of these things, but particularly the effort of the Justice Department to get evidence through testimony in Taipei. They did talk to most of the key figures; however, they did want to talk to the president because they felt that his role in both condoning it or giving the green light or the role of his son in giving such a green light would probably explain why it is the security services, were supporting them to make sure that they could get the proper kind of passport so they could then get visas to come to the United States. So I thought that they did a really very good job. We didn't get a complete report, but we got pretty full reports of what they were doing, and they did a pretty good job of trying to get as much information as they could. It was indeed I think sort of the last straw for President Chiang because he afterwards sent his son off to Singapore and asked Lee Kuan Yew to try to keep him in line. He also dropped from his entourage Y. F. Chiang, who had been one of his closest friends for years, but he had asked Y. F. Chiang to try to take his son in hand, and Y. F. Chiang in the end said, "I'm sorry, I don't think there's anything I can do. He's not that interested in what I have to tell him. He won't listen to my advice." He was just too taken with the concept of being involved with the security services and other things, which were much sexier to him than, say, Y. F. Chiang, who was very good in education and foreign affairs and the good stable administration and so on. So we could see that President Chiang had been very much shaken by

this and realized that some of his people had gone too far, although he had to admit that indirectly he had some responsibility for this because it was probably his son who led people to believe that this would be looked upon favorably by the old man himself, and yet of course, this was the last thing he would want.

*Q: Well, then, was there anything else we should talk about during this period, up to 1986, or did we get the -*

PRATT: I think I'll say a few words about the divided establishment we had between the State Department and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). As you are I'm sure aware, David Dean was brought into this at the very beginning, in fact asked to retire early in order to take over the leadership of the AIT itself. And he worked as head of that first when I was in Taiwan, and then he was still at it when I came and worked on the Desk here - in fact, almost to the end of my stay here in the Taiwan Coordination Office. And he provided therefore both continuity and I think very strong leadership in trying to make sure that this unusual relationship, of having a State Department office which had to be considered merely a coordination advisor attached to the regional affairs office and an AIT office, which is across the water in Rosslyn, could function together and have a cohesive operation with the various tasks sort of portioned out, so that I would be the one who would deal with the Defense Department on much of the military stuff. They would have a military man over at AIT as well, retired military, and they would host military meetings over there, and yet within the State Department I would have to make sure that everything was coordinated and all the people in PM and elsewhere in the building and also the Defense Department, to make sure on the policy level that we were handling things properly. Then, of course, we both had to deal with the Taiwan office here. We had the good luck to have a person who was rather cantankerous and difficult in some ways but very intelligent and very knowledgeable about the United States, who was Fred Chien, who later became foreign minister, but he was the head of the office here, and a very competent person although occasionally very abrasive. But he also was very, very good in wooing the Congress, and therefore, if we could sort of get to him and say, now, don't try to push the Congress to do something which they shouldn't do because we won't be able to back it up and it will look therefore more of a humiliation if something comes over and we then we have to say, Sorry, but we will pay no attention to it.

So I think during those early years we established very well several basic principles, and that is you can conduct these affairs through at least what is a nominally independent, non-official office. Admittedly, it's incorporated in the State of Delaware, but the sole stockholder is the Secretary of State, and therefore, sure, it's independent, but it's not that independent if it's wholly owned. Secondly, of course, you can figure out which side does what, and you don't have to have the one person being the one who handles all of these matters for Taiwan if you can farm it out so that David Dean would do his job and I would do mine, and we would coordinate and make sure that things worked smoothly. We later on had a different head of that office who wanted to have the State Department abandoned. He wanted to privatize the -

*Q: This was a political appointee, wasn't it?*

PRATT: Well, David Dean, of course, was a retired Foreign Service officer, but the one who was making for the problems later on was a real political appointee. He was just a lawyer from Little

Rock. And so it made it very clear, however, that if you have people both of whom come from the same background and know what you're doing, you don't feel quarrels of face or prestige, but instead are mainly concerned with getting the job done - that this sort of thing can work. Secondly, we had tried to convince Taiwan that this informal mechanism could work adequately, that if Chinese are very much concerned with face, and of course we found the American politicians were very much concerned with their own face. And therefore if a political appointee wanted very much to deal with the top political figure from Taiwan, you're not very happy to see this be done by AIT, which is an unofficial representative et cetera, and so we had as much problem in trying to curtail visits to Taiwan and grandstanding by a cabinet member as we did from the Taiwan side, which was constantly trying to augment the official nature of their contacts by having top political figures in Taiwan meet with top American political figures. We did, of course, arrange for this to happen on certain occasions, and often we tried to get it done on neutral grounds, as in Singapore or in the context of meetings at APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) or something of the sort.

But the constant pressure was there for people who felt that once they had gotten into an exalted position then they alone were capable of really doing anything that handles Taiwan. So that's why you have pressure up on the Hill and a certain amount of pressure from political appointees who want to be able to do these things because they have their concept that once they get to a high position then they alone have the real authority and clout to get anything accomplished. And all of these "hired hands," of course, should get out of the way. We have this, of course, particularly with the American military. The American military finds it very difficult to feel that even their own subordinates can do things when, of course, if you're going to have a high-ranking general then you have to have a high-ranking general on our side to deal with him. So this is what we have also with some of the military contacts with Peking, and they don't realize, really, that regardless of whom they come in contact with from Peking, they're dealing with the same organization. They seem to think they can make personal friends and that alters the whole way in which Peking is going to react. And the ego trips of a lot of the political figures - and of course when military generals get pretty high up they begin to consider themselves to have quite an ego as well: MacArthur wasn't the first or the last. So one did have always that problem, by saying, Listen, we can do this, and we'll load two bases, but you had people on the American side as well as people on the Taiwan side not wanting to load two bases - Taiwan, because of course their own culture is very much a question of face, and therefore they wanted to have all of their figures deal with people who looked as though they were as prominent as they were. You could say, well, listen, you're only the smallest province of China. And that, of course, would get them really set off because Taiwan had to be considered a good deal differently than just the smallest province of China when you're dealing with the United States.

But then, of course, as I say, the system, which was an unofficial one, worked really very well. One did not need to have high-level political contacts, high-level political visits, all the rest of that accoutrement, provided you got people who knew what they were doing and got clear instructions as to what one desired to have from the top leadership. I mean the biggest failure, I think, was the renegotiation of the August 1982 communiqué, and that was not something which was done on the Taiwan side. It was done on the American side, and they were dealing with fairly low level, and yet they did not get something which served U.S. interests well and they did not do something which was sufficiently coordinated so that the document and the agreements

which they concluded would reflect what could be accomplished.

So I think one of the key things is that, indeed, it's a bit anomalous to have Taiwan, which satisfies so many of the criteria for the United Nations membership, be a place where we cannot have formal diplomatic relations, when we have formal diplomatic relations with a lot of countries we get along with a lot less well and who have far less of the attributes of a full state. I mean, when you consider the population of some of the mini-states, the island states and so on, it really is rather silly, because after all Taiwan with 22 million is a fairly large country by the standards of the United Nations. In addition to that, as a sort of 10<sup>th</sup> largest trading nation, just in economic terms it's a pretty large spot. So nonetheless, although it's anomalous, other arrangements can be made to make sure that all of this works, and I think the key thing was that President Chiang directed his people, who were very competent, to make it work. And although he was very much annoyed, as I discussed earlier when we did change recognition, and felt we were making a big mistake that we would live to regret, and on and on, nonetheless, he did direct that once we got something going, there was a make-it-work and not to throw in a monkey wrench every time, even though they could always find ways of doing it. He told them, Don't try to get the Congress to block what it is the American administration is going to be doing because while the Congress can help, and particularly in the broad framework of the law and the Taiwan Relations Act, it's the American executive branch which is going to give us the approvals for military equipment and get to us the things we need for both symbolic and real purposes.

So I think that that was another very, very good and important example. The fact also I mentioned earlier that the Taiwan Relations Act, as a domestic law designed to handle foreign relations, was something which was also unprecedented, and that has worked very well despite the views of many lawyers that various consulates would be called into question, really perhaps even as being unconstitutional. Nonetheless, that's not happened. So I think that the Taiwan handling has to be considered as a relative success and really one of the more interesting successes which is deserving, I think, of a full book to look at this from legal and other aspects.

And yet at the same time, we have this continuing conflict with Peking over how Taiwan is handled. But at least we have avoided, from the Shanghai communiqué on, any real battle. The closest we came was in 1996 with the two aircraft battle groups sailing in the vicinity of Taiwan, but that, I don't think, really at any point came close to being a real conflict. So I think that despite the fact that we had that - yesterday or the day before - 11 thousandth white paper on Taiwan, we have to consider that if all we get are white papers, then we're doing something right.

*Q: This is from Mainland China?*

PRATT: From Mainland China, yes. So, as I say, Taiwan has remained a key problem, despite the fact that many persons thought that it would just plain go away. Those of us who knew Taiwan knew it wouldn't go away. The only question was how do you keep it from coming to a real flashpoint? As you know, we in the Foreign Service often have considered that what we are trying to do is not to solve problems but to manage situations, and I think if there is anything which was a real situation to be managed, it was Taiwan and Taiwan vis-à-vis Peking. And therefore, so long as your constant instructions are to manage it - and that's what the people in Taiwan gave their emissaries, and for most part what we got here in Washington - you can keep

it from being a disaster. And again, most of us in the Foreign Service know the major thing is make sure you avoid the worst; don't expect to accomplish the best. I think by both these measures Taiwan has been really a success; however, it's one that requires constant attention, and this is what the problem [is] with, shall we say, and American problem-solving President who wants to go barging in, solve this problem, and then move on to the next one.

**WILLIAM ANDREAS BROWN**  
**Assistant Secretary, East Asia and Pacific Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1983-1985)**

*Ambassador William Andreas Brown was born in Winchester, Massachusetts in 1930. He joined the "Holloway Program" which was part of the Naval Reserve Officers Training Program and went to Harvard University, graduating with a Magna cum Laude degree. In 1950 he went to Marine Corps basic training in Virginia and later served in Korea. His Foreign Service career took him to a multitude of places including Honk Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, USSR, India, the UK, and Israel. His career includes an ambassadorship to Israel as well as several positions in the State Department, Environmental Protection Agency. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in November of 1998.*

BROWN: You go back to the terms and understandings, written and oral, of the Taiwan Relations Act. You get into our mood, at the time the Taiwan Relations Act was passed in 1979, and the mood under President Reagan, above all. We were determined to develop good relations with China on a strategic basis, involving the great game with the Soviet Union. We wanted increased trade with China and cultural and educational exchange, on the one hand. At the same time, within the context of Reagan's philosophy and the spirit as well as the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act, we were determined to maintain and enhance our unofficial relationship with Taiwan. We sought to ensure that confidence would be maintained on Taiwan, trade and commerce with us and with other countries would expand, and the people of Taiwan would feel secure.

This was opposed to Beijing's determination that, sooner or later, Taiwan was to be liberated by one means or another and rejoined to the embrace of the great motherland of China. Throughout this whole period you have a clash between U.S. and Beijing interests. One of the focal points of many of the Chinese complaints was that the U.S. was violating the spirit of the Shanghai Communique and the whole relationship with China by selling arms to Taiwan of significant, technical quality, in large amounts. Meanwhile, the Chinese failed to see adequate progress being made in bringing the Taiwanese to heel.

This situation escalated into a crisis in 1981, the outcome of which was United States-China Joint Communique (on Arms Sales), August 17, 1982. [For the text see John Holdridge, Crossing the Divide, Appendix C, pp. 277-279.] This was the period when John Holdridge was Assistant Secretary of EAP and Al Haig was Secretary of State, until his departure in June, 1982. This communique was a very important development. We stated in the communique that "arms sales

to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level or those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China.” The Chinese took this as immediately capping our arms sales to Taiwan quantitatively and qualitatively. There was no limit expressed in dollars and cents, but it was expressed in terms of a U.S. intention “to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over a period of time to a final resolution.”

Beijing then pocketed this communique and pressed for the most rigorous implementation of it. As I arrived in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs [EAP], we were faced with this problem. Taiwan in its view needed a great deal in terms of arms, both in quantity and in quality. For, during this period, we were seeing the beginnings of the significant modernization of the People's Liberation Army [PLA] of China, including the Chinese Air Force and Navy as well. We saw China, which had gone through the primitive stages of nuclear weaponry and so forth, pushing to develop these weapons further. It had a long way to go, but it was determined to go that way. So this was a policy dilemma. As I arrived in EAP, it was apparent that the trio of Wolfowitz, Armitage and Sigur was basically very unhappy with the deal set out in the communique of August, 1982. They were determined that it be managed properly. The Chinese were constantly pressing us for statements, facts, and figures, and complaining about the implementation of the communique.

Meanwhile, our team in EAP canvassed the needs of Taiwan, stripping away the rhetoric of Taiwan and Beijing. In our national interest we determined that Taiwan still needed a very significant amount of arms, both in quantity as well as in quality. Of course, Taiwan had the means to pay for all of this and would have been delighted to pay for more.

At the working bureaucratic level we had inherited strict guidelines on these arms sales to Taiwan. For instance, “Thou shalt not sell an upgraded aircraft to Taiwan.” It was during the period when John Holdridge was Assistant Secretary of EAP that we decided that we would not sell to Taiwan the F-X or the F-20, upgraded versions of the Northrop F-5-E fighter planes which they already had. The F-5E was a lighter aircraft which had now been significantly superseded by F-15s and F-16s. However, various aircraft manufacturers were marketing something called the F-X or the F-20, and Taiwan was keenly interested in them. As I arrived in EAP, Taiwan had been told: “Sorry, you're not going to get it.” So this posed a big problem, because Beijing was clearly working to upgrade the capabilities of its Air Force, Navy, and Army. The indications were that these improvements were intended to make it possible to strike Taiwan.

So we considered this matter further, and tremendous debates raged within the Washington agencies on this subject. At these Monday afternoon sessions, of which I have already spoken, we knew that we were right. However, other elements of the State Department thought that we were wrong and were strongly opposed to our views. They had the right to present their positions to the Secretary of State and they did. The same debate was taking place elsewhere in Washington, including in Congress and in the academic communities.

However, on a few occasions while the debate was particularly hot, Gaston Sigur would within the Monday Informal meeting context refer to a piece of paper. I saw but never read this piece of paper. He never passed it over to me to read the text of it. Gaston would read from this piece of

paper, which was supposedly President Reagan's interpretation of the guidelines on the meaning of the August, 1982, Communique. This piece of paper contained a statement President Reagan had decided that a balance between Beijing and Taiwan would be maintained. If Beijing's forces, in terms of quantity and quality, pulled ahead of Taiwan's forces, the U.S. would do what was necessary to maintain a suitable balance in terms of Taiwan's ability to defend itself.

As I say, Gaston never passed out the text of this piece of paper. I can't remember whether it was typed or hand-written. I rather suspect that he had sat down, one on one, with President Reagan, or in a very small group with the President, and had taken down, after debate in White House circles, what the President had decided. So while the debate raged elsewhere on the benefits, pros and cons of this issue, we knew, in this core group, what the President had decided. We knew that we were doing the right thing. Now, this terminology had to be dressed up, massaged, and looked at very carefully, because there were other views to be considered here, including the overall relationship with Beijing. [Addendum: See James Mann, About Face, pp. 127-128 wherein the author, based on interviews with Armitage, Lilley and Carl Ford, states that shortly after the August 17 Communique, Reagan dictated a one-page memo stating that the U.S. would restrict arms sales to Taiwan so long as the balance of military power between China and Taiwan was preserved. If China upgraded its military capabilities, the United States would help Taiwan to match those improvements.]

In that same connection, there were other issues which were very secret at the time, but which are now out in print. If you'll refer to public remarks on the record by Jim Lilley, Jim was then the Director of AIT [American Institute on Taiwan]. He had a CIA background. He later succeeded me in EAP. He was a close friend of George Bush, the elder. I think that he retired from CIA did some work in the private sector and then became the Director of AIT, Taipei. As of 1981 he was the man who had to deliver the message to Taiwan: "Sorry, you're not going to get the F-X or the F-20." In recent years Jim has written his memoirs and has spoken and written in public on numerous occasions. He has spoken of the fact that we had special monitoring stations covering Soviet missile launches in China. These were very secret at the time. They were jointly manned by our specialists and Chinese specialists.

You should remember that in the background to all of this the Chinese still had a phobia about the "Great Bear" [that is, the Soviet Union]. We are talking now about the early 1980s. The Soviet Union still looked mighty powerful and threatening from a Chinese perspective. Therefore, playing on this circuit, we were dangling before the Chinese the possibility of limited arms arrangements with them. For instance, the Chinese had a fighter-bomber deployed up in Manchuria which was largely grounded and needed a very significant upgrade. In discussions with the Chinese we conveyed that we would be willing, on a limited basis, to look into the upgrading of these Chinese aircraft within limits. Naturally, the Chinese were plugging for the highest limits, but we were looking at the matter very carefully.

Another issue was this or that artillery shell, or this or that type of Navy equipment, such as a torpedo, or naval armaments of one kind or another. So we were engaged in discussions with the Chinese, in light of the fact that we were discussing equipment for Taiwan. Eventually, out of this came the first visits of senior Chinese military officers to the U.S. This included, later on, the visit of Jiang Aiping, the Chinese Minister of Defense. He was an older man who had a limp.

Another visitor was the commander of the Chinese Navy. These were startling visits, after the Korean War. They were startling in view of the fact that these gentlemen visited the U.S. at all. They carried a tremendous amount of baggage with them as they came to the United States.

I can remember being in a very small group with Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and Chinese Defense Minister Jiang Aiping as Weinberger was laying out our missile programs and tests and the fact that the Soviets were monitoring our missile launchings near Kwajalein and elsewhere in the Pacific Ocean area. Weinberger was letting the Chinese in on very significant developments and prospects for mutual cooperation. And Jiang Aiping and his associates were lapping this up.

So the whole China question was a major issue, and this was part of my portfolio. Academically, I already had not only a Chinese background, but a Japanese background as well. For a while I carried China and Japan but shunted responsibility for Japan as Paul Wolfowitz got a new deputy assistant secretary for Japan. So I shed responsibility for Japan and had another one added, which was to cover Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands.

*Q: I'd like to ask you something. I think that I've alluded to it before on China. Here you were, sort of at the heart of the machine. It's come up today, when we're having trouble with China. It seems to me that on the American political scene, both in Congress, the media, and all of that, somehow we end up by allowing the Chinese still to appear to be the Middle Kingdom. We always seem to go to them. This grates on me, frankly, and I'd like to get your impression of this.*

BROWN: Well, we'll finish this section shortly because of time considerations. However, let me address that issue head on because, I can assure you, that this team, this trio [Wolfowitz, Armitage, and Sigur] was determined that we weren't going to play that game with China. We were going to play with China but we weren't going to play the kow tow, on your knees, Middle Kingdom, Lord Macartney visit to Beijing of 1690 or something like that. We were going to go into this matter of relations with China clear eyed and with a very clear, conceptual approach to this. You have to remember that other people within the Reagan administration were “ga ga” about China.

*Q: It's like being tossed into Hollywood. They were awash with...*

BROWN: You have to remember that, in this regard, as part of the background, when I made the first or second visit to East Asia with Michael Deaver, he had in his mind an extension of the Reagan itinerary that I've laid out. Under this program, President Reagan would go to China, in addition to the other destinations I have mentioned.

Now, Judge Clark, after the first visit to East Asia with Michael Deaver, heard about this possibility from me. Somehow, in the White House, I was intercepted as I was moving from one place to another. I think that it was Dick Childress who hauled me into Judge Clark's office. Dick was a Colonel on the White House staff. This was at the height of the Clark-Deaver controversy.

Clark asked me: “Where are you going” on this visit with President Reagan. I said this and that place, “and maybe to China.” Clark went through the roof, picked up the phone and shouted on it

to Deaver: “You're not going to China! This hasn't been cleared with me!”] I was in the middle of fierce, White House rivalries. I tell you, it's unbelievable how hot these can get at times.

So very clearly in Deaver's mind was the very real idea that he was going to propose that President Reagan make a great, “earth shaking, melodramatic visit to China.” Whether this was going to come as an add on to the itinerary that I've already mentioned or separate from it was another question. In the end, other matters intervened.

However, it is true that there were elements in Washington who were going “ga ga,” feeling the “Middle Kingdom syndrome,” and so forth. However, this team of Wolfowitz, Armitage and Sigur was determined to keep this whole relationship with China on a more nearly normal, balanced basis, bearing in mind that China needed us more than we needed China in the great game with the Soviet Union. It was a very tricky operation to do this, at times.

**BEATRICE CAMP**  
**Junior Officer Trainee, USIA**  
**Beijing (1984-1985)**

*Beatrice Camp was born in Montgomery, Alabama in 1950. She has a BA from Oberlin College and joined USIA in 1983. Her overseas assignments included Beijing, Bangkok, Stockholm, Budapest, Chiang Mai, And Shanghai. Her brother, Donald Camp, and husband, David Summers, are also Foreign Service Officers. Mrs. Camp was interviewed by Mark Tauber in 2016.*

*Q: So '84 begins your Foreign Service career in Beijing. And you are what USIA called a junior officer trainee at that point, a JOT, which meant rotating through a lot of sections. What was the embassy like?*

CAMP: The embassy had a major real estate problem. When the communists took over they allotted embassy location based on who recognized China. The Russians still had a huge piece of land, even though their presence had shrunk when relations deteriorated. The Czechoslovakian embassy was a whole city block, as was the Polish embassy.

As for us, the Ambassador's residence, along with the political and econ sections, were in *Yiban*, Building #1. Before we arrived the embassy had acquired a second building, known as *Erban*, where I worked. Just before we left post, the embassy opened a third building, *Sanban*. Everyone doubled up; for a while I shared an office with the Deputy Public Affairs Officer. One colleague was working out of a former bathroom.

All the Chinese local employees worked in one room, which also housed the Xerox machine and the long distance phone line. To make phone calls we would crouch under the table to shield from the noise, just to talk to someone in Shanghai.

After so many years of the country being closed off, lots of Americans were eager to visit or

work in China. American Citizen Services had their hands full dealing with elderly tourists who fell to the strains of China travel – we morbidly called it “death by duck” – and the young people who jumped at opportunities to come as teachers. Many signed on to deals in which Chinese institutions would promise air fare, lodging, and other benefits that sometimes didn’t materialize. When the eager American teachers got to China and found themselves stuck with the flight bill, or in housing with no heat, they would come to the Embassy for help.

They also came to the Embassy looking for teaching materials. I’d be in the office on Saturday morning trying to deal with unfinished work when an American teacher would show up asking for a map, which I would have to fetch from a dust-ridden crawl space under the stairs.

*Q: So the housing and working conditions were rough, but there was still so much excitement to be able to go.*

CAMP: It was exciting even though we lived under a lot of restrictions. Diplomats weren’t allowed to drive more than 25 kilometers from the center of Beijing and we needed permission to travel outside the city.

A year in Taiwan had immersed us in slogans about retaking the Mainland and exhibits demonstrating poor living conditions in the PRC. We were particularly struck by one exhibit caption noting that “people living in the Mainland are very happy to have even a black and white TV”, as we had yet to own a color TV ourselves.

With no direct flights between Taiwan and the Mainland, we spent several days in Hong Kong, where we were reunited with our diplomatic passports. From there we flew to Beijing, feeling as though we were going to an alien world. Reinforcing our initial nervousness was the dark road from the airport. China had a law against using your headlights at night, apparently on the theory that the lights would blind the oncoming bicyclers. We had our first demonstration of this driving into the city.

The two-lane road from the airport on that hot August night was impeded by people, mostly elderly men, crouched on the street playing cards under the streetlights. They’d move for our car to pass, then return to the weak street lights and the relative coolness of an outside breeze.

Bicycles were still the main mode of transportation in Beijing. David and I brought from Taipei two pale blue 10 speeds made by a new Taiwan company called Giant. These drew great attention in Beijing, where all the bikes were black, one speed, and heavy.

*Q: Like the old Model T you can have any color you want as long as it’s black.*

CAMP: My brother’s decision to wait until Beijing to buy a bike became a standing family joke when we learned that purchasing a bike in China required a letter of authorization from the buyer’s work unit. In Donald’s case, he had to get the U.S. embassy to authorize his purchase. Meanwhile, we were commuting from the Huadu Hotel to the embassy on our blue 10 speeds, fielding questions about our eye-catching bikes from curious Beijingers. Although we were initially reluctant to reveal our bikes were from Taiwan, our questioners reacted positively. They

were excited that these super-modern machines were made in China.

*Q: Was the air already as polluted as everyone now knows?*

CAMP: When the wind blew we could see the western hills. But in the winter everyone burned soft coal; whenever I encounter that distinctive soft coal smell I think of Beijing. We were warned not to take anything white to China. I had a pair of white ice skates that I hung on a peg in the apartment; when we left the skates were black; the soot seeped in everywhere.

While the embassy was well heated, Chinese offices were not. On a day you planned to go to a Chinese office you had to dress warmly. We would be taken to a meeting room and served tea, which we would drink for the warmth. When your bladder couldn't take any more, it was time to leave. The Chinese were still wearing blue Mao suits but underneath many had pink silk long underwear, visible at the cuffs. We all bought silk long underwear in Beijing.

*Q: And this was the '80s when China had begun down the road of changing the economy.*

CAMP: Yes, socialism with capitalist characteristics. Change was becoming visible, often just in small ways. One day bananas appeared for the first time; word spread like wildfire and we all rushed out to buy this previously unseen commodity. Three months later another banana boat arrived, sparking the same rush. By the time we left Beijing, bananas had become regularly available.

In 1985 we attended the first Western pop concert in China, featuring WHAM! with George Michael. The Great Wall Sheraton opened in 1984 as the first international hotel in China and hosted the first Western banquet for President Reagan's visit. The Open Door Policy announced by Deng Xiaoping in 1978 was beginning to take effect.

My JOT rotation took me not only to the commercial, econ, and consular sections, but provided a stint in Shanghai. True to its reputation, Shanghai was several years ahead of Beijing, with some women even wearing dresses.

*Q: So you're a junior officer with USIA officer; what was the make up of the embassy and what were your main responsibilities?*

CAMP: We were lucky to have two strong China hands at the top. Ambassador Arthur Hummel was born in China, Shanxi province, son of a missionary who later went on to head the Oriental Division at the Library of Congress. Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) Chas Freeman was already legendary in our circle because our teachers held him up as a paragon among language learners; he interpreted for Richard Nixon during his 1972 visit to China.

In those days one of USIA's core products was the daily Wireless File, produced in Washington to deliver U.S. government official texts as well as news stories of direct regional or local interest to USIS posts. For decades it was the most accessible source overseas embassies had for current guidance on U.S. policy.

Sent by shortwave around close of business in Washington, the File reached Beijing in the morning, spewed out on a teletype printer. One of my jobs was to skim through the 30-40 pages to make sure there was no mention of the “Republic of China”, a political no-no that the Washington writers couldn’t seem to shake. Once or twice this formulation slipped past my eyes as well, only to be caught by the ever-vigilant Chas Freeman.

I also helped edit articles for our one-country magazine *Jiaoliu*. Published in Chinese, the magazine supplemented the Wireless File and VOA as USIA efforts to promote information about the United States on the Mainland in the pre-digital age.

*Q: Were there any high level visits while you were in Beijing?*

CAMP: President Reagan visited China in 1984, traveling to Beijing, Xian, and Shanghai. It was a huge deal with an enormous entourage – Bill Brown’s ADST account describes the incredulous reaction of Ambassador Hummel on hearing that the president’s party numbered over 800. For a politician like Reagan who had blasted China in his presidential campaign, it was a bold move. For the Chinese, it was a very welcome symbol of acceptance.

I helped prepare briefing materials – including details such as the correct length of a Chinese cubit as used to describe the height of the terra cotta warriors in Xian – and worked in the press center in Shanghai. In Beijing, one of my responsibilities was making sure that *The Wall Street Journal* got delivered to each of the rooms at the Diaoyutai State Guest House every morning, a task I had no control over as it was totally dependent on whether the plane arrived from Hong Kong with the newspapers.

As with all presidential visits to China, but especially for the first since the normalization of relations, every detail was a negotiation. One of these involved the return banquet. The Chinese system for state visits dictated that the hosts gave a welcome banquet at the Great Hall of the People on the first night; the second night the guest hosted a return banquet, also at the Great Hall of the People. Well the White House, which is to say Nancy Reagan, wanted to feature Western food. With a new hotel, the Great Wall Sheraton, about to open, the White House decided to use it for the Reagan return banquet.

Word arrived that Nancy Reagan wanted to serve turkey. Now we had been taught by our Chinese teachers at FSI that Chinese don’t like turkey – the meat is unappetizingly dry; having knives at the table is barbaric – so we sensed trouble even before the press got wind of the plans. At that time Beijing hosted just over a dozen American journalists, who were pretty much always in a cantankerous mood from their struggles with Chinese stonewalling. When they picked up the hot news story that Nancy Reagan, who already had a reputation for extravagance, was flying in turkeys from California, this small press corps turned on the embassy. We became the ones doing the stone walling, under strict orders from the front office: “don’t say anything about the turkeys”.

The embassy held a practice banquet with some Chinese diplomats to test the menu that had been developed by James Rosebush, Nancy Reagan’s chief of staff. The first dish was the cutely named Panda Salad, which featured raw bean sprouts to provide an Asian touch to the Western

menu. When a senior Chinese diplomat observed in polite, British-accented English, that “when we Chinese eat raw bean sprouts we vomit”, the menu was quickly reworked to replace bean sprouts with hearts of palm.

The banquet went more or less as planned, served Western style with the turkey and the potatoes and vegetables all on one plate. The Chinese guests at my table didn’t know what to do with the plated food; they were used to sharing central dishes.

They were probably also disappointed at not getting to enjoy a second state banquet at the Great Hall of the People, with sea slugs and all the exotic foods reserved for festivities. They’d been deprived of that and were picking at the strange food on their plates. When the Panda Salad course arrived, featuring soft brown hearts of palm, the guest at my right confessed it was the first time he’d eaten panda meat.

I would love to see an account from a Chinese official at that dinner; we got a small taste of the reaction a month later when David and I stood in for the Ambassador at a banquet that the mayor of Beijing was giving for middle school students from Greenwich, Connecticut on an art exchange program. As we worked our way through the many course all-duck meal, a very polite girl asked us to “please tell the mayor it’s not that I don’t like duck tongue it’s just that I’m not very hungry.” We took the opportunity to chat with the Chinese officials about the Reagan banquet, and as they loosened up the mayor allowed as how he had never had food like that before. “You know,” he said, “the problem with Western food is that an hour after you eat it you’re hungry again.”

That was my first presidential visit and it was a memorable one.

*Q: Wonderful. That is sort of the quintessential junior officer experience.*

CAMP: Yes. And the JOT rotation, which entry level officers don’t get anymore, was great. In addition to working in the commercial, econ, and consular sections in Beijing, I spent time in Shanghai. The Branch Public Affairs Officer there was Lloyd Neighbors, a long-time China expert. During my two weeks we had the opportunity to meet a distinguished group of American writers who visited as guests of the Chinese Writers Association.

The American group included Toni Morrison, Francine du Plessix Gray, Leslie Marmon Silko, William Least Heat Moon, Maxine Hong Kingston, Gary Snyder, Allen Ginsberg, William Gass, Robert Rees, and Harrison Salisbury. Watching these famous writers holding a conversation with Chinese writers was an extraordinary experience. I’ll never forget hearing Gary Snyder proclaim – to a group of people who had suffered through the Cultural Revolution not many years earlier – that “the true oppressed of the earth are the grass and the trees”.

Another memorable USIS-sponsored visitor was historian John Toland, whose program at the Chinese Institute of History might have been the first exchange between Chinese and U.S. historians about the Korean War. The Chinese call it the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea; we had very different views on this subject.

*Q: Where else did you travel?*

CAMP: On work assignments I went to the consulates in Shanghai, Guangzhou and Shenyang. Tourism was never easy, but we managed to visit Qufu, the home of Confucius; to climb Huangshan; to see the terra cotta warriors in Xian; and to take a train to the beach at Beidaihe. Road travel to Tianjin for foreigners was opened during our time in Beijing, so we jumped in the car to drive there mainly for the fun of hitting the road.

As a former Oberlin Shansi fellow in Thailand, I very much wanted to visit the original Oberlin-funded school in Taigu, Shanxi, now the Shanxi Agricultural University. In 1980 the Oberlin connection had been reestablished there and every year we invited the four Oberlin fellows to Beijing for Thanksgiving dinner.

Despite a denial from the relevant authorities for travel to Taigu, we were able to get on a train to the provincial capital of Taiyuan. One-year-old William, who drew crowds wherever we took him, was a big hit on the train. In Taiyuan, we were met by a car sent by the university in Taigu, and taken to campus an hour's drive away. Our official hosts deposited us with the resident Oberlin fellows, who were living in one of the little brick cottages built with Oberlin funds after 1908.

Although we could have been in trouble from both the Chinese authorities and the embassy for traveling without official permission, the whole weekend played out like a *commedia dell'arte* plot. It was only after we went to bed that the foreign affairs office showed up to register us. Our American hosts explained that we had turned in for the night; the foreign affairs office said they didn't want to disturb us and left. I figured they waited until they saw the lights go out in the bedroom to knock on the door. The whole thing was choreographed by the university -- our Oberlin connection earned us protection. So we got away with our unauthorized trip. We weren't busted by the Chinese, we weren't busted by the embassy, and I got to visit the old Ming Hsien campus.

*Q: Very interesting. Now you're reaching the end of your time in Beijing. Anything unusual about the end of tour?*

CAMP: The market economy was developing under Deng Xiaoping's policy of reform and opening. We had personal experience with this when a the mother-in-law of one of our FSI Chinese teachers asked us to sell our car to her son so he could profit from the new law permitting private ownership of cars. Mrs. Tien, a doctor, had suffered greatly in the Cultural Revolution because she had lived in the U.S. before 1949 while her husband attended university. After the establishment of diplomatic relations, her American-born daughter was able to immigrate to the U.S., but her two sons left behind didn't get an education and were washing dishes in restaurants.

Mrs. Tien proposed we sell her our car, to be reimbursed by her son-in-law, our teacher in the United States, so her son could start a taxi service and make money. We agreed to give it a try, which led to my husband having several meetings on dark street corners. In the end we were denied permission, on the grounds that the gap between our rank and Mrs. Tien's son was too

great for the transaction.

We felt obligated to our teacher and we liked Mrs. Tien, who had one of those heart-rending Cultural Revolution stories, but the transaction just wasn't possible. When the denial came we had barely a week left in country and still had a car to get rid of. Fortunately, an Egyptian navy officer wanted it, although he refused to pay the full asking price. When David pointed out that \$4,000 was a bargain, the navy officer remonstrated: "I am Egyptian; I can't pay the asking price." So we went down a few dollars and he handed over a wad of cash just before we got on the plane.

**RUSSELL SVEDA**  
**China Desk Officer**  
**Washington, DC (1984-1986)**

*Mr. Sveda was born in New Jersey in 1945. After serving with the Peace Corps in Korea he joined the Foreign Service in 1975. His overseas posts with the State Department include Korea, where he served as Staff Aide to the Ambassador and in Moscow, as Science Officer. In Washington, Mr. Sveda was assigned as China Desk Officer and subsequently as Watch Officer in the Department's Operations Center. He also served as volunteer in the Sinai Field Mission. Mr. Sveda was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in June, 2000.*

SVEDA: But my career counselor, who was a friend of mine, suggested that I might be well to come back to Washington at this point in my career. He suggested the China desk. Well, the China Desk was a wonderful place to be assigned, I recognized that. But it was not the European Bureau. I was really quite crestfallen that I would never get to serve in Europe because it would take me a long time to crawl there from East Asia again. But I went to the China Desk and I enjoyed the two years there very much.

*Q: So, 1984-1986, you were on the China Desk.*

SVEDA: Yes. I was monitoring China's external relations with the focus on China's relationship with the Soviet Union. So, I was forever going back and forth with the Soviet Desk.

*Q: Who was the head of the China Desk and who was the head of East Asian Affairs during this 1984-'86 period?*

SVEDA: East Asian Affairs' assistant secretary was Paul Wolfowitz. He had been in the Department of Defense and had been one of the protégés of Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson. Richard Perle was another protégé of Senator Jackson. Wolfowitz was an amiable man, very conservative, unfortunately sometimes he presented problems that we had to get around, but was altogether a nice person.

There were two heads of the China Desk that I worked with. One was a man named Anderson. Oddly enough, I can't remember his first name right now. A very nice man. Then the second year was a very good friend of mine, Ambassador Dick Williams. He is currently our non-resident ambassador to Mongolia.

I greatly enjoyed working on the China Desk. We had important visits that had to be managed. Ronald Reagan thought that China was potentially the most important relationship that the United States had or could have. He was extremely interested in anything that we did on the China Desk or with China. One of the trips that I managed was a visit of the president of China, President Li Xiannian. Li Xiannian was about to visit when we learned that the President was going to have an operation on his colon for cancer. We simply did not know whether the visit would come off or not. These visits are planned meticulously. The rule that we had for China was Washington plus four cities. We did that for the biggies like him. Li Xiannian first touched down in Canada and the question was whether he would get to meet with Reagan because while he was in Canada, Reagan was literally being operated on. So, the Saturday before Li Xiannian was to arrive and the Saturday that President Reagan was being operated on, I was in the Protocol Office at State with a woman who was deputy chief of Protocol, Bonnie Murdock, a very lovely person and we were making our final arrangements with the Chinese embassy. There were two Chinese embassy people there. It was early Saturday morning. It must have been 8:00 am. I arrived at the State Department. Bonnie has a portable TV at her feet and it's on. The two Chinese arrive and she explains to the Chinese that normally she does not work with a portable TV at her feet but her president was having surgery and she was very concerned not only on a personal level because she wanted the surgery to go well, as we all did, but because we had the visit of President Li Xiannian coming and we didn't know honestly whether it would be possible to do this or not. So, we would go on and make the final preparations as though the visit was coming off. While we're doing this, at around 10:00 that morning, Bonnie gets a call and she is saying to the phone, "Yes, yes. Oh, yes, yes. Absolutely. Yes." She puts down the phone and turns to the Chinese and says, "That was the White House. The White House called to tell us that the operation was a success and that as soon as the President came out of the anesthetic, he wanted us to tell the Chinese embassy that the trip was on, although the White House requested that we reduce the amount of standing at ceremonies and maybe have a lot more sitting because the President would be recovering. If you will watch the TV, the doctors are about to come on and announce this publicly, announce the results publicly." So, the Chinese who were looking at her rather surprised looked down at her feet and "We interrupt this program to bring you a special announcement." There were these doctors and they're saying that the operation was a success and so forth. The Chinese, their jaws had just dropped down to their knees. When the announcement was over, Bonnie turned off the TV and said, "Now, I'm sure you would like to call your embassy and you would like to call Canada and if you wish to call Beijing, this is how you can do it. The phones are over there." They happily went up.

The visit was a great success. President Li Xiannian, who was a few years Reagan's senior, was so touched that the President would be so solicitous about this visit – first of all, not to cancel it, but second, the moment he came out of the anesthetic, at least according to our story, he had asked that the Chinese be assured that the visit was on – he just was so bowled over by this that the visit went extremely well.

One of the things about the President which people don't appreciate is that, contrary to popular belief, he really did make key decisions. So, after the welcoming ceremony at 10:30 am, the President and the president of China went to the Oval Office at 11:00 for an hour's discussion, after which there would be the formal lunch at the State Department. Here I was, in charge of the visit, not knowing whether we would have a treaty to sign with the Chinese later that afternoon. We were talking about a treaty on energy cooperation and everything was ready except for the final approval, but we had no idea. This was one of the topics that the President wanted to raise with the Chinese at that meeting at 11:00. At about 11:50, we find out that the meeting had ended and that President Reagan had decided to sign the treaty. We honestly did not know which way he would decide. He did decide to sign that. Then it was left up to me to scrounge around for a room at the State Department where we could have a treaty signing. We managed to convince the Vice President, Bush, to show up. I say "managed to convince him" because I found the only room that we could use was on the 8<sup>th</sup> floor and it was one of the rooms attached to the big dining room there. The big dining room we couldn't use because there would be a swearing in of our new ambassador to France, a big cocktail party, which the Vice President would attend at 4:00 pm. So, I had the treaty signing for 3:00 or 3:30 so I could get the Vice President to be there. We used one of the side rooms, the Franklin Room or something, with a lot of furniture, the desk that the Declaration of Independence was signed on. So, Secretary Shultz agreed to show up, thank goodness, and the Vice President was there, and the president of China. We decided to use one of those desks. I forget which desk we were using, but it wasn't the Declaration of Independence desk because at one point, Secretary Shultz was explaining to the Chinese president that there were many important artifacts in this room and one of them is the desk on which Thomas Jefferson composed the Declaration of Independence. He indicated where it was in the room and then Shultz, who had a very sharp temper, suddenly yelled out an expletive because the media people who were there were sitting on the desk, the photographers, and he just suddenly lost it for a second. But we managed to get to the treaty signing and everything went well. I had nothing better to do, so I decided to crash the reception for the new ambassador to France. What fascinated me was that he was some sort of major contributor from Tennessee. I think he owned some kind of chicken farm. I think his name was Brown and he owned Kentucky Fried Chicken. The minister at the beginning of the ceremony asked everybody to bow our heads. People from the China Desk were there. We did as well. The minister prayed and he asked God to bring peace to the people of America and the Republic of France. Of course, the State Department people sort of darted eyes at each other, wondering if we had missed something, that perhaps we were at war with France and didn't know it.

I also had a visit of a vice premier of China, Yao Yilin. I took him to San Francisco, Dallas, New York, and Washington. We were able to get the Vice President's plane and on that trip to Dallas – and this was really an amazing thing – we set up a visit with H. Ross Perot at H. Ross Perot's request. I only had the vaguest idea of who H. Ross Perot was. One of the White House people said, no, no, we absolutely had to do this because he was a major figure in EDS, which was a major company doing computer software and he sprung his people out of prison in Iran when the Shah fell and had I not read the book and seen the movie? Well, no, I had not read the book and I had not seen the movie. I vaguely knew who this person was. We go there and H. Ross Perot has this little ceremony where he presents this box about the size of a very large cigar box to the Chinese vice premier and he says, "This is a token of appreciation from the American people for the help that the Chinese gave us in the past at a time when we desperately needed it and in the

hopes that China might help America again.” That was the gist of the speech. The China crowd from the State Department were looking at each other wondering what was this help that China had given us in the past. Then Ross Perot opens up the box replica of the golden spike that joined the Union Pacific and the other railroad together in Utah in 1869. It was in Provo, Utah, where the golden spike was driven. Basically, he was referring to the Chinese coolie labor that had come over and built the first transcontinental railroad. Luckily, the Chinese vice premier didn’t have the faintest idea of what this man was talking about and accepted this with gratitude. Then Ross Perot wanted to go and talk to the man separately. We insisted that there had to be a State Department official present because it was an official visit. Ross perot objected, but he agreed to this condition. He asked the Chinese vice premier for China’s help on finding POWs and MIAs in Vietnam. The Chinese vice premier listened politely and basically was non-committal. When we heard about this later, we were upset because if anybody had been reading the newspapers, China at that time was fighting Vietnam in a border dispute. China was not at all likely to help anybody with Vietnam simply because they were at war with it. So, it was one of those examples of interference in American foreign policy with the best of motives by somebody who really would have done better to have asked somebody what the situation was, but he just went off on his own.

*Q: You say your prime concern was relations with the Soviet Union.*

SVEDA: Yes.

*Q: This was the beginning of Gorbachev’s coming on the scene.*

SVEDA: Yes.

*Q: When you got there in ’84 and through ’86, how would you characterize the relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of China?*

SVEDA: Not good. They were not good but they were not particularly bad. The Chinese were trying to develop a better relationship with Russia because they didn’t want to be on the short end of the triangular relationship with the U.S., China, and the Soviet Union. There really wasn’t that much we could say about the relationship because the Chinese themselves were watching the changes within the Soviet Union with some interest and maybe even a little bit of consternation. They weren’t quite sure what was going on at the time.

*Q: There are mixed feelings. They were a strong communist state and the Soviet Union was a strong communist state. Watching one communist state – i.e., the Soviet Union – beginning to start on a course of relaxation would not have sat well with the Chinese, but at the same time, the Chinese would have seen this menacing power from the north maybe getting pretty self-absorbed.*

SVEDA: I think that’s more or less what was going on there. The Chinese at the time were under the leadership of Deng Xiao-ping. He was intent on changing China economically, loosening things up economically, though not politically. The Russians took exactly the opposite path, which was to loosen things up politically in the hopes that this would improve things

economically. In retrospect, probably the Chinese were right, but at the time, it seemed as though Gorbachev in unleashing the political liberty and creativity would perhaps turn things around economically. It was seen by some to be a possibility, but not by us.

*Q: Were you able to talk to people at the Chinese embassy and say, "Hey, what do you think is going on in the Soviet Union?"*

SVEDA: No. In fact, there were very few worthwhile contacts at my level with the Chinese embassy. They were all relatively formal contacts. I guess the head of the desk had more to say with the ambassador, but not at my level.

*Q: As you were working with China, did you feel that there was a cooler relationship with China at the bureaucratic State Department/embassy level than there was with the Soviets at this point?*

SVEDA: Our relationship with China was very good. It was really excellent. In fact, we took our cue from the Reagan administration. The President personally wanted good relations with China and so we were very intent on having good relations with China. The problems that we had were more from people within his administration who were wary of the Chinese than from any other forces because the American people were very enthusiastic about better relations with China as far as we could see. One example of this is on the day that the President was reelected, our political counselor in Beijing was approached at an election night party at the Great Wall Hotel by a Chinese official who said that the Chinese government would be interested in receiving Peace Corps volunteers. Well, this was really rather revolutionary, the idea of a communist country having Peace Corps volunteers. I saw the cable that morning come in. Having been a former Peace Corps volunteer, I grabbed the cable from the cable traffic and went to the head of the desk, Dick Williams. I said, "Dick, if we ever have Peace Corps in China, could I be in charge of that?" He said with a smile, "Yes, of course. Why not?" Then I handed him the cable. He said, "Okay, good. You're in charge of that." What I also got later in the day was something that was a very valuable piece of paper. Secretary of State Shultz had been a professor at Stanford and he had a professorial habit of making marks on papers that were given to him. He would make little marginal comments, question marks, exclamation points, underlinings, sometimes he would write a word. Whenever he did and it seemed to be at all meaningful, then his staff was under instructions to Xerox this and give it to the office in question. So, Secretary Shultz saw the same cable that I grabbed. On his copy, he had underlined certain things and written in the margin "Good" or "Great" or "Wonderful" or something like that. He was very happy about this. It was extremely valuable to know what the Secretary's thinking was on something like this, especially because Paul Wolfowitz, the assistant secretary, was deadset against the idea. But when I went to Paul Wolfowitz and I showed him the Xerox of the cable with the Secretary's comments, all of his objections to Peace Corps in China evaporated. So, we worked on a project. I worked with a friend of mine, John Keeton. He had been a Peace Corps official in Thailand and Korea, which is where I first knew him when I was at the embassy there, and then he became a deputy director of the Peace Corps, a regional director of the Peace Corps, and he worked with me on getting Peace Corps into China. We worked on a lot of other things as well. A very good person. But we worked very closely with Sergeant Shriver, who was very interested in this. Paulette Ruppe, who has since died, was the head of Peace Corps at that time and was very excited by this. We decided that the Peace Corps volunteers who would go to

China would be the best trained and the most carefully selected in the history of Peace Corps because they would be in such a sensitive position, being the first Peace Corps volunteers in a communist country. Since then, we've had Peace Corps in all the former countries of the Soviet Union and I think we may even have them in China now.

*Q: Did the Peace Corps go into China?*

SVEDA: What happened was that just as the first group was finishing their training, the Tiananmen Square incident occurred. This was June of '89. No Peace Corps group ever actually went there at that time. I don't know if they went later.

*Q: How did our relations with Taiwan affect what you were doing?*

SVEDA: We had an office that dealt with Taiwan affairs but not in Washington. It was in Rosslyn, Virginia, just across the river. The American Institute on Taiwan had an office that was very pointedly not in the capital. The people, the government on Taiwan, had an office actually in Washington, although they really shouldn't have. So, we didn't have very much to do with them. The one thing that I found a bit annoying was that Taiwan newspaper people would try to ingratiate themselves with me and talk with me, mostly about staffing patterns within the State Department. To them, it was extremely important who was going to be the head of this desk and who was going to this position and where people were going after serving on the China Desk and so forth. I found it annoying because I didn't think it was very important. The level of detail that they were interested in was not the level of detail that I either was in command of or cared about.

*Q: At one time when Kissinger and Nixon opened up relations with China, there was a so-called "China card" as a counter to the Soviet Union. Did you have a feeling that by this time things had developed so our relations with China no longer really were as a counter... This was a relation that stood on its own merits as opposed to being just a counter to the Soviets.*

SVEDA: Oh, absolutely, the relationship stood on its own merits. It was not seen by us as a counter to the Soviet Union. It was really quite important to us in a number of other respects. It was important to us in part because China is a very big country with 1.1 billion people and it had at that point already a large amount of trade with the U.S. and since then the trade has become far larger. So, the interest of the United States in the good relations with China was very strong. The arguments that we advanced for the importance of China are equally applicable to India, but we don't advance those arguments. India has as many people as China almost. India is a regional power of some importance and we have a lot of trade with India, but for some reason, we do as a people have a greater interest in our relationship with China than we do with India. That's just the way things are.

*Q: I've done some historical research and written a book about our consular relations. It's interesting. Right from the beginning of the Republic, after the actual confederation, we made special arrangements to open up relations with China. China has always had almost a mystique in American foreign relations.*

SVEDA: Yes, very much so. President Reagan was very much affected by this mystique that China had. He really thought that China was an extremely important country to the United States. Of course, having been the governor of California, he had a certain Pacific perspective on things.

*Q: How were we seeing the mass arrival of Chinese graduate students to the U.S.?*

SVEDA: At the time on the China Desk, we were encouraging all kinds of contacts with China. Our belief was that the more contact with China, the better. I think that that really summed that up. Later on when the Tiananmen incident occurred and I was on detail to the National Science Foundation, it was my job to figure out for the U.S. government how many students there were in the U.S. because we wanted to give them some kind of special visa status which would allow them to stay in the U.S. and not have to go back to China. We didn't know how many there were in the U.S. because the U.S. visa system can tell you how many people have entered the U.S. but it cannot tell you how many have stayed or have left. We have no idea. I think we came up with the number of 4,000, but that seems rather low. I will have to think about that. It was a time of great change, a time when being Chinese was something of a novelty and you sort of expected them to be somewhat and to dress in a Maoist way. When I went to Beijing in 1985, I saw people swishing down the main avenues on their bicycles by the thousands. There were very few cars. People were not wearing Mao jackets. The older people were but some of the younger people were, but not very many. You could see changes occurring in China rather rapidly. To look back on that world of 15 years ago from the perspective of China today, it's an entirely different country. I had a houseguest for about a week, a young Chinese student who I had met on the Internet, who would be starting at GW getting a master's. His family is very highly placed in the government, I believe in the communication ministry. He has been extremely free on the Internet with contacting myself and other people in America and having very free and open discussions about everything to the extent that he's interested. It just is an entirely different window into China than I would have expected five years ago. China is changing very rapidly.

**RUTH KURZBAUER**  
**Assistant Press Officer, USIS**  
**Beijing (1984-1986)**

**Branch Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Shenyang (1990)**

*Ruth Kurzbauer was a Foreign Service Officer, serving with USIA from 1979 to 1991. She was interviewed by Chen Xiaohong on January 16, 1994.*

*Q: When were you in China?*

KURZBAUER: I first came in August 1984 to work at the US embassy as the assistant press officer. That is a USIA function, as your know, under the larger embassy mission. And I have to tell you that prior to that time I served in Yugoslavia, my first post, first as a JOT and then as

what they call the ACAO, assistant cultural affairs officer. My own background had somewhat prepared me for a European assignment. I had studied European art and literature and come from a European born mother and father. I was a music major at university, stressing European classical music. So I wasn't necessarily Eurocentric, but I was comfortable in a European setting, and ended up being very comfortable in Yugoslavia, and we can talk about that later.

But I have to confess that I knew almost nothing about China. I will tell you what I knew before my training, and I will talk about that too. I was born and raised in Cleveland, Ohio and we have a wonderful museum there, which is famous for its Oriental art collection. So as a young girl or student I used to wander through and just looked the way you look at great art and paintings anywhere. Then, when I was an undergraduate at Yale University, I worked as the secretary to two very famous American scholars of China, but that was a chance assignment. I worked for Arthur Wright, who is the great scholar of classical and ancient Chinese history, and an expert on the Sui dynasty. Then I worked for Jonathan Spence, the famous scholar of modern China who was Arthur Wright's student. Then the academic dynasty passed to Spence when Arthur Wright unfortunately died.

So I had some exposure to China by typing papers and doing library index research and meeting the Ph.D. students in the Chinese History program. But that was the extent of my professional exposure. The rest I knew about China was what anybody who is interested in the world around them learns from reading newspaper headlines and occasional books and stories. But I had no other preparation than that.

*Q: I understand that you speak Chinese to an extent and the Chinese you speak from my point of view is very fluent and very understandable. How did you acquire that?*

KURZBAUER: This is thanks to the Foreign Service Institute, which is the training school for American diplomats. I got my assignment through the bidding process that goes on in the Foreign Service. My first choices after Yugoslavia were either in the Balkans, Eastern Europe or somewhere around the Mediterranean, which at that time was my area of interest. But I had put Beijing down somewhere at the bottom of the list because I thought it would be exotic and we were required to distribute our bids among posts that are considered to be hardship posts. So I had to put one hardship post down and at that point Beijing was a greater hardship designated post. I am not sure that it is today -- it probably shouldn't be because of the comfort and diversity of life now possible there. But in those days, 1982-83, China was not the China of today.

So I put Beijing down, and lo and behold I got a cable back saying this is going to be your next assignment. Then USIA officers and State officers, but I think USIA officer even more so, despite junior or middle rank, and I was not a high ranking officer, were allotted a full course in Mandarin Chinese through the Foreign Service Institute. It consisted of one year in Washington, language training and area studies, and almost a year at the extension school in Taipei, Taiwan. So in 1983, I spent about ten months in Washington going to language class every day, four or five hours a day. Also attending the East Asia lecture series given by academics from the Washington area and elsewhere at the Department of State once a week. And then, following that and passing the exam for that year, I was sent with my colleagues to Taiwan for follow up training.

As you know, in the Foreign Service not everyone gets full course language training. It depends on your home agency, on the function you will be doing. For example, the assumption is that as a press officer, a public affairs officer, the network of persons that you will encounter and will have to reach is somewhat broader in number than those working in the administrative function. Your mandate is to go out and make contacts and discuss and learn, etc. with a broad sector of local society, so that the ability to communicate in a foreign language is perceived as being an absolute requirement. So, even though I was of a more junior rank, as a USIA officer, because of our agency's policy, I usually received full language training. I am not sure I can speak for State, but I think junior officers in consular work, although the encounter with the local population is intense and daily, is not necessarily always given a full course, so I was lucky that USIA's policy supported the full course. By the time I got to the People's Republic I had more than a year and a half of Chinese language study.

*Q: And I guess that was very helpful.*

KURZBAUER: It worked well. I had gone through the Foreign Service Institute once before and that was before my tour to the former Yugoslavia. It pains me to say "the former Yugoslavia," but we are speaking now in 1993. Anyway that was my very first tour of duty, my junior officer tour and following on in Belgrade with cultural officer duties. I was given eleven months of Serbo-Croatian at the same Institute. Then I and two other colleagues, both from the State Department, were sent out on kind of an experimental language intensification program to live on the land, as it were, with Yugoslav families for three months. We were the first ever selected, I believe, and I am not sure if the program ever continued. After our formal training in Washington, FSI picked three of us to go out and find a Yugoslav family and just live with them and interact for several weeks in the hope that that would intensify our language use before we actually got into the embassy and began our diplomatic work.

*Q: You didn't do that in Taiwan, did you?*

KURZBAUER: No, not in Taiwan.

*Q: How did you get your training in Taiwan?*

KURZBAUER: There is the AIT, American Institute in Taiwan, a language school extension, if you will, of the Foreign Service Institute. It is a formal school attached to the diplomatic training process. It used to be in T'aichung and then moved to Taipei.

*Q: So you were again going to classes over there further learning the language.*

KURZBAUER: Right. Of course, the purpose of sending us abroad was the hope that after 6 hours at language school every working day and lots of homework, that living in Taipei we would get out and do things in the community and use Chinese in the process. And I think to a certain degree that happened. We were a group of between 20 and 40 students from various US government departments doing the advanced Chinese program. We developed strong group rapport and friendships, so we had a nucleus of friends and used to do a lot of things together in

Taipei city. But we also took off on our own.

For example, I was trained as a musician before I went into my adult work, so I hung out with the Taiwanese classical musicians. I went to art galleries and met artistic types. In many cases the common language was Chinese, although the younger Taiwanese speak English very well, so it was sometimes a hard pull to speak in my limited Chinese and not have my Taiwanese friends break out into perfect English. But it worked. You just lived a normal life. I had no car there so I took buses. My living quarters were up in the suburb of Taipei, which is up on a hill above the city, so in order to get down into Taipei City I had to take local buses and find my way around. It worked very well.

*Q: There is always a prejudice in society against women when we talk about a certain kind of work. I think at your time when you made your decision to get into diplomatic service, was that a challenge, or how did you make your decision that you were going to get into the Foreign Service?*

KURZBAUER: Well, it is interesting, because I have to confess that for me the decision was on one hand, I think, deep, but in a way unconscious and on the other hand serendipitous. I have always been interested in international things. Most everything I did as a student or as a person on my own had some international link. I was playing European music when I was a student, or assisting foreign students in adjusting to university life. I was just always interested in the world in a broad dilettantish way.

*Q: Since I come from China I am most interested in your years in China. After your training in Taiwan, you got an assignment to work in Beijing.*

KURZBAUER: Right. The assignment predated the training.

*Q: You knew the assignment and took the training in order to fulfill the assignment.*

KURZBAUER: Exactly. And it was training not in the PRC but training outside the PRC. Most of the diplomats being trained in that group were destined for Mainland assignments at that point, although others were going to Hong Kong and Taiwan. The thinking was, and I think it was true for all three agencies that feed into the Foreign Service, by and large that if you have training in a language you do some of your tours of duty in one region of the world and other assignments would be in another region entirely, unlike foreign services of some other countries where they have deep specialists. I remember the former Soviet Union diplomatic service. I met quite a number of USSR diplomats when I was in Yugoslavia and they were actually area specialists. They were in a way like you, Ph.D. level or intensely trained geographical specialists and they would stay much of their diplomatic career in the area of their geographic specialty. Many of us in the U.S. service are more general and taken from here and put there and taken from there and put here. But the chances of going back to an area, especially like the Chinese speaking area, once you have received hard language training, are high. In fact many of my colleagues have gone from Beijing to posts outside China and then back to another China post or related post. So there is some long term continuity.

*Q: Yes, because when one acquires the language ability, it is easier to use that person in a way.*

KURZBAUER: But I, myself, had never been to Mainland China and as I mentioned before and except for the training that I received at the Foreign Service Institute I had no academic or professional background in China.

*Q: Yes, so my next question is besides the language you learned about the history and culture of China...*

KURZBAUER: Yes, we had an area studies series that Dr. Howard Spendelow from Georgetown University was the coordinator of, a professional US academic Chinese specialist. These were weekly lectures, two or three hours a week on various aspects of Asian history, economics, politics and then more intensely focused on China during the second half. So it was almost like a graduate survey course. The participants were diplomats, including high ranking ones and junior officers and other agency personnel, but it was basically a survey. I learned a great deal, but it wasn't an intensive Ph.D. seminar with specialists all together investigating deeply a certain topic; it was to give a broad background introduction to the area.

*Q: What you learned from the training program in that regard did you find out that was exactly what China was when you arrived?*

KURZBAUER: I will tell you about stepping into China, I remember this vividly. One of the things I remember vividly is reading...you have to realize at that time, we were in training in 1982-83...I left Yugoslavia in August of 1982 and then went into the first half of the language program in Washington, 1982-83, and then the second half in 1983 in Taiwan. I imagine you were in China at that time, but looking back relations had barely been established and barely at a cordial level. There was not much interaction, travel, movement back and forth. You can't compare it to the situation today at all. There were very few general books on contemporary China that had any roots in contemporary reality. There were views of China by experts who had been outside the country for many years, but there were very few people who had actually been there. Some Canadian specialists, some folks from countries who had had longer diplomatic relations with the PRC than we had, but not very much. Nothing to equal the wealth of articles and periodicals and books and popular magazines that you have today, even articles in the general press. So one book that had just come out was Fox Butterfield's book on China, which I think is called, "Alive In The Bitter Sea."

*Q: That was very controversial in China.*

KURZBAUER: I will be interested to hear your reactions to it because I read it knowing only general things about China. I read Fox Butterfield's book about his own experiences as a journalist in early reformist China, if you will. I am sure that he wrote them exactly as he experienced China. Some of the incidents that have to do with surveillance and caution and the difficulty of interaction between foreigners and the Chinese I am sure happened. But the image from that...if he published it in 1982 then the material was gathered in 1980-81...I think back to China 1981 just in a very anecdotal and not very deep image, but in China then the Beijing Hotel was the landmark and the most comfortable and most luxurious hotel in Beijing and that is where

foreigners would hang out when, you know, you needed to kind of group together and get a perspective on your new experiences in China. And it was from what I read, and from what I remember even going to the Beijing Hotel, it was very Chinese in many ways.

Now, today, you go back and there is some symbolic contrast here; think of the China World, the Sheraton, the Jonglun, which is no longer even a major hotel. One luxury hotel after the other! Obviously that is not all of China and not a symbol of a nation, but it is a symbol of changes, evolution and prosperity of society. In my time, in luxury hotels Chinese nationals could not easily enter unless they were accompanied by a foreigner or had an official reason to be there.

*Q: We had to show our ID.*

KURZBAUER: Now that has disappeared. If you have the bucks you go! That was not Fox Butterfield's China. I think he had a great affection for the Chinese, but his time was both challenging, exciting and stressful, which I think is probably a very realistic way of describing experiences in China as it was unfolding from cultural revolution to the period we are in now. So my image of China from his book and others was darker. I had just read about the cultural revolution and the great dislocations and the terrible traumas. You look back twenty years before then, the Great Leap Forward, and then you look back again to war-time to Japanese invasion and then you look back again beyond that and there is civil war. So the imagery to me was one of turmoil and darkness. If somebody asked me how I imagined China, I would have said regimented, everybody in lock-step, everybody wearing the same clothes, everybody reading the same book -- or turmoil or anarchy! These two kinds of extremes.

I know that is an emotional image, not a scholarly or professional image, but that was my view. So at first when I was assigned to Beijing, I didn't know what to expect and I didn't think it was going to be an easy assignment. I thought it would be isolated, difficult materially, but more importantly emotionally isolated. There would be foreigners, officials, China and a kind of gap in between, only bridged occasionally by formal interactions. So my view, I think, was cautious, nervous and uncertain. It was very interesting, when I got there...again this was maybe an extreme, but for me it sort of sums up how unexpected things really turned out for me, at least personally. I got to the Beijing airport in August 1984, got off the plane and the embassy always sends an officer or staff member already residing in the country to meet the new arrival regardless of the rank or function the new arrival holds. I think it is an important custom. Well, there waiting for me was a member of our USIA section and the embassy driver. We got through customs without a problem, through the diplomatic entrance. I tried out my Chinese for the first time in the PRC when I said, "Hello" to the custom official who was looking at my passport. I got in the car and the first thing I noticed, and that was when my imagine began to turn a little bit...in Fox Butterfield's book he talks a little bit about how the trees had been cut down in Beijing under Mao because of the anti-sparrow and anti-pest campaigns. But as you know along the road from the airport into town, which takes about 40 minutes, are willow trees and it was all green. I found that interesting.

Okay, then we get to the Jianguo Hotel, as you know, which was at that time the only international joint venture hotel. I had expected, gee, I knew I was going to be living in a hotel because there was not enough space in the diplomatic compound. Relations were expanding and

the embassy was growing and, as you know, diplomatic personnel in Beijing lived in Chinese built diplomatic compounds either in Jianguomenwai or Sanlitun, so you have nations' diplomatic corps plus most of the journalists living there. It is kind of a canton system, sort of like keep the barbarians all together! Anyway there was not enough space because relations were improving and officers and staff were being added, more programs and interaction. So many of us newcomers, especially those of us who were single, were housed in hotels for a couple of months. So I was housed in this new joint venture hotel, the Jianguo, which was my beloved home for eight months.

Another image of China that started to turn my mind even more was as we pulled up to the Jianguo, there outside were staff members, probably from the hotel, getting on bicycles and bicycling off home. But there inside, as I walked in, was this beautiful Chinese musician in the lobby of the hotel in a white satin gown! I will never forget that. My image of China was Fox Butterfield, Mao revolutionary oppression, regulation wear of green, green, green, blue, blue, blue, everybody in high necked tunics. But I walked into the hotel and there is this beautiful young musician wearing this silk gown with sequins, sitting at a grand piano playing Brahms. And I thought, "Well, this is not quite the way I imagined it." Again I realize this was not all of China, but it was a small piece of another part of China.

*Q: At least you are in China.*

KURZBAUER: I think then this was "foreigner's China," if you will, but it has expanded now. Just a few weeks ago I got a New Year's card from the Shenyang Conservatory of Music, which is the major Chinese music academy of Northeast China -- Manchuria. We had many cordial and successful cultural exchange type programs between our U.S. Consulate in Manchuria -- my section -- and the Shenyang Conservatory. On the New Year's card I just got from the Conservatory director is a picture of the brand new Shenyang concert hall. As you know, Shenyang is not the culture capital of China, but the people have invested in a cultural center which is aimed at presenting classical, Western and well as other kinds of music, and it has become a popular place to be! You wouldn't have seen that in 1976 or imagined that the mayor of Shenyang would be opening the Shenyang Conservatory of Music's new concert hall with a Beethoven symphony. It would have been unthinkable under Mao.

*Q: That is what we say is the opening up of China.*

KURZBAUER: Or that "Farewell My Concubine" is a best selling film in the United States. These interactions are growing and the world is being enriched. I think I was there at a wonderful time because 1984-85, as you know, was a time of expanding relations. New excitement.

*Q: Right.*

KURZBAUER: So the Jianguo and Great Wall were the two major international business type hotels in Beijing in 1984. The USIA section and the embassy rented the ball room and had an election party where beamed in by satellite were the election returns from the US. And for the first time since 1949 we were able to invite whole classes from China's number-one university, Beijing University, political science classes and international studies classes of Chinese students

who came with their instructors to an American embassy function at the time of election. This was new. It had not been possible before. So there was a lot of excitement in these kinds of first encounters. So I came at a very auspicious time.

Of course there were restrictions and there were difficulties and there also was the "spiritual pollution" campaign. Relations would go up and down. But the overall contact possibilities were expanding at that point. So it was really exciting for me to be there then.

*Q: Yes, I think you were actually in that country at the right time if you wanted to see the development of relations between two countries. China and the United States had had a relationship before, but there was a long time cut off, and it was really picking up speed at the time you were there.*

KURZBAUER: One of the interesting things for me was to meet some of the older Chinese academics, some in government institutions, probably some in your own institution, who had gotten their early training at US universities before the Second World War and then had either been caught up in the war in China or here in the United States and had not been able to get back to China during the Japanese occupation, and then came back to China in the late forties to help build the new China. Of those I met there was a great deal of joy in the ability to be able to communicate again with Americans scholars or bridge the gap that had existed for the last 40-50 years. So someone who had spent his or her youth training in Oberlin College or Harvard and then had gone through all the series of events in China that we know about and had been cut off from broader world ties, now able to reach back out...it was a very moving thing. People like me, American officials, not because of our own personal worth, but because of the function that we held and what we represented, were recipients of that joy. And there was a special emotional quality to some of the encounters and some of the programming that we were able to initiate or promote or extend. Because of that it was like friends finding each other after a long, long separation.

Now, obviously that group of Chinese scholars had not known me, but I represented, or my colleagues represented, that other world for which they had affection also. It was a very moving thing.

*Q: Yes, and moving also not only because they were separated from a country where they spent their youth, but also because of the time period they had just gone through. Remember, if they had training or education in the United States, most of them suffered one way or another during the Great Leap Forward or the cultural revolution, which lasted more than ten years.*

KURZBAUER: Some would tell me their experiences and some would gloss over them by saying "that that was then and now I am still alive and am here." But you are absolutely right.

*Q: So in a lot of ways, their joy reflected not only their personal feelings, but really on behalf of the whole country. The country was changing from an entirely isolated radical phase into a phase which was hopeful at least.*

KURZBAUER: Towards great normalcy and stability. It is interesting because if I compare

interactions in China to interactions in another Communist country...actually I served all my tours in countries that were Communist politically. People used to tease me that Personnel must have thought I was a Communist because every assignment I got had something to do with Communism.

But in Yugoslavia it is interesting, the personal interactions...of course, as you know, Yugoslavian Communism had a different face.

*Q: Tito Communism.*

KURZBAUER: Although there was certainly surveillance of certain personnel, no question about it, we couldn't feel it but it was understood. We just couldn't run around and not be observed by some aspect of security or some aspect of the Party. But there was no overt restraint in personal relationships in Yugoslavia then. So, for example, I sang in a Yugoslav choir. I had Yugoslav friends as I have friends here in Salt Lake City, perhaps more! I went to their homes; I went to their weddings; stayed up all night and drank tea and brandy in the kind of Latin Quarter, the Bohemia cabaret district of Belgrade called Skadarlija. In those days (unfortunately I am sure there have been massive change after all that has happened there now), but it was a kind of live and let live city with a lot of drinking and sitting around with friends in cafes. Kind of an old style European cafe life in a way. A lot of hanging out and window-shopping and socializing. Group social activities were very strong in those days. And there was no constraint for me as an American official to do all that with Yugoslav friends.

Now in China in 1984-86 it was still different. No matter the curiosity, the interest, and in fact, indeed in many cases, the friendship and the affection, I think that our Chinese official colleagues and unofficial friends, let's say students or musicians, had to be cautious and were. So going to someone's home was extremely rare. At the end of my tour of duty, I was invited to private homes, but then I was "safe" because I was leaving.

*Q: When was this?*

KURZBAUER: I left in August 1986.

I went to the homes of several mid-ranking government cadres, but...part of it may be that people live in small quarters and it is very hard to invite somebody to such cramped spaces. I think there was a perception that we can't invite a Westerner who comes from a pretty luxurious style of life into our one-room apartments! Maybe there is some "saving face" involved. But I think there was also political caution. That you know probably better than I. Certain interactions were authorized by a work unit because they were professionally necessary. But in this new period when the rules were changing within Chinese society, but were not clear, people most often, I think, needed to be cautious so that they wouldn't over-step some kind of unwritten rule that they might not know about! Are my perceptions accurate?

*Q: Exactly. Especially when you are talking about a certain section of people. I am afraid that even if they wanted personally to invite you or felt there was no constraint on them in terms of inviting an American friend, they still have to tell their boss or authority that that is what they*

*were going to do and is that all right. Sometimes they will get an easy okay, sometimes they would say that it has to be reported somewhere and will get an okay afterwards.*

KURZBAUER: I think it affected some of our Chinese colleagues in terms of professional programs, they had to receive professional approval in order to participate in the various USIA programs. Now when I was in Shenyang, five years later...of course you know that Liaoning is a pretty conservative province, it is a military district headquarters, etc....I found a great deal of possibility in official programs that we did which were somewhat new or fairly new. We were able to expand in a number of cultural and educational and press exchange areas which surprised me. A lot of it, I think, was due to our staff. I would like to say a word about them if I can. And there were, I think, real professional and personal likings which developed. Not only with me but with my consulate colleagues as well. But still that caution prevailed. When I left I had a whole slew of invitations. Not only banquets from institutions and work units which are par for the course, but from individuals with whom I had worked and who then told me that they sort of needed to wait until I left in order to go that extra step. If they had been too friendly on a personal level with me or American colleagues during the course of our stay, it would have been a little too much, maybe too risky. They were welcome to participate in official doings, but not to extend that too much into a more personal interaction.

For example, a professor at a university. We had a number of programs for professors of English or American literature which we had established in the consulate. We invited both American teachers of English who lived in China at the time and Chinese professors of English and American literature from various universities in Northeast China. And we had a number attend our regular monthly "Literary Salon" that I and my staff established. But those same professors who were able to come to the consulate for those events, which was quite unusual actually, would not feel comfortable enough to say, "Well, come over to my apartment on campus."

Now in 1994 I understand that as far as the American business and academic communities it is pretty much an open door. Whether or not there is still caution towards an American official, it probably exists among some, but if you are a non-official foreigner there is very little that you can't do and very few places you can't go in China.

*Q: Talking about the fact that you were in Shenyang and there at that period of time which was six months after Tiananmen Square...*

KURZBAUER: Actually it was almost nine to ten months after Tiananmen. I arrived at a time when our political relations were still not all that cordial.

*Q: So as a representative of the United States government, did you feel anything that had something to do with the Tiananmen Square incident?*

KURZBAUER: Well, that is an interesting question because as an officer in the public affairs, public diplomacy section of an embassy, namely the USIS mission...we have a twofold mission: one is to present the vast spectrum of American society, culture, politics, intellectual life, etc. to the foreign public, whichever country that may be, and two, to help bridge the knowledge gap between our own American public and a foreign culture and society. That is the overall mandate.

We do it through a variety of programmatic means. One way might be assisting a school like the University of Utah that wants to expand an academic program with China, in making contacts with local Chinese universities that might be appropriate partners. Others are formal programs which are mandated by Congress like the supervision of the Fulbright Scholar Exchange program or the international visitor program that brings leading younger professionals from a foreign country to the United States for a month to meet American counterparts in the hope that they will establish an ongoing intellectual and professional dialogue. This has nothing to do with the government, but we are the facilitators of that introduction.

Other things are social science and cultural and educational types of programs that basically bring both sides, protagonists and professionals, together. The media function, of course, is presenting the American foreign policy point of view, distributing material on issues that might be difficult between the US and China, for example, trade imbalance, MFN. Part of my job was to talk to the local journalists and people who could spread information in the Northeast about why does America have this particular position, what are the trade issues, and explain to government officials of those provinces and also to media people, our positions and viewpoints, etc. So, a variety of activities and tasks.

But the bottom line is presenting America. Now presenting America, obviously, was not the most popular thing to do from the point of view of an official Chinese government ministry at that particular time.

*Q: That is exactly so. Your feeling about what the government was supposed to do...*

KURZBAUER: Of course we also had an understanding that we were supposed to go out there...that all diplomats are learners as well as doers. We are there to learn and understand as best as we can in a limited way. What is the thinking in that local society? What are the problems and goals? What are the issues from the point of view of that country, its population, its society? So it is a two way mission.

*Q: So you have to feedback to the government so that they would make appropriate...*

KURZBAUER: Yes, diplomats in many ways send reports back to Washington that are then reviewed by the policy makers and hopefully are factored into the next policy stage. So we promote and listen. But the promotion function, you are right, how do you do it when officially your host country is not all that encouraging of your method and mission? And I think what happened in my section was that I was lucky because I dealt in some aspects with less controversial issues. I had in some ways in some programs "goodies" to hand out. Some of the things we were interested in doing dovetailed with China's own stated political goals of education development... development in science, development in economics, development in industry...so that as a representative of the cultural and educational side of the USG, I think that some of our programs or contacts were encouraging of Chinese development and that made it a little bit easier to get in the door.

For example, the Northeast universities want to train more of their faculty in English. So I think they were more likely to respond to the kind of programming that we were able to initiate and to

continue, both what we designed on the spot in our consulate and what we got from Washington and then presented, because it agreed with Chinese orientation and development.

But, not all. Sometimes there was the problem of how do you work it. A lot of times you had to go through the "back door" and then through the front door. Every provincial government, as you know, has a "waiban," a foreign affairs office that is suppose to facilitate and assist foreign activity in that area, but also keep an eye on it and make sure that what is being done is not contrary to the perceived interests of China or the provincial government. I believe that most of the cultural and educational and scientific and media institutions in Northeast China with whom our consulate had either existing relationships or expanded relationships had to report to their provincial government or at least their institutional foreign affairs office the contacts they might have with us, or the plans that they might have to do some program with the American consulate.

So I decided with the help of my staff, who were fantastic..as you know the American embassy and consulates are directed by the American officer and American professional staffs that come through the American diplomatic service, but the work really rests on the foundation of local national employees. This is the case in all of the countries in which we have diplomatic missions, not just China. You will have, for example, cultural advisors, economic advisors, media assistants who are nationals of the host country, as well as the janitors, the drivers and administrative staff. So really you have a small layer of American diplomatic personnel supervising and working with a larger group of host country nationals. There have been arguments and I have read in our newspapers and in Congress about the wisdom of that. Shouldn't a diplomatic mission be run by Americans?. Isn't that safer, more secure? It keeps our policies done and executed by Americans. Frankly I think it would be impossible to do the most effective work without the assistance and cooperation of Foreign Service Nationals. They provide a window of understanding into the culture and even are vital in pragmatic things. In some countries you just can't go to the counter and buy a train ticket, you need to know how to maneuver and where to go to get the most efficient service and whom to butter up! No American flying in for two years is going to know that.

In the case of China, I think the foreign national employees were in a difficult position, but they gave outstanding service to the development of bilateral relations and I will tell you why if I can be frank. They were assigned to the American consulates and embassy by the Chinese government's Diplomatic Service Bureau. In France, for example, if the US embassy needs a cultural advisor or an education assistant, you advertise in the French newspaper and look at the resumes. It is just like you would hire in the U.S. If your desiderata is somebody with a Ph.D. in American Studies who has worked in academic exchange programs, then you look at the resumes that come in and hire, just as you would if you were running an American business or big US institution.

*Q: Without any institutional censorship.*

KURZBAUER: Exactly. But in China the government selects people to fill the function on a two, three, four, five year contract as necessary, not only in our diplomatic mission, but all foreign missions that rely on foreign nationals. Now, for example, the Soviet mission did not hire any Chinese local staff. They were staffed completely by Soviet employees from drivers all the

way up to the senior adviser. But most western missions have a mixed diplomatic supervision and local staff, which I think all in all works quite well.

So the staff we received was staff from the Chinese government. Now, obviously at a time of political tension or political disagreement or differences, foreign national employees are caught between two masters. On the one hand the job is to help bridge the gap and help. If I the officer am doing a program to promote American music or to promote understanding in new developments in American environmental science, my staff member is trying to get an audience or get the appropriate format or create the right atmosphere to promote these ideas and this information. At the same time there is probably a certain amount of pressure on that person from his other supervisor, meaning the Chinese Diplomatic Service Bureau, not to go too far to push a positive American program. I'm speculating, obviously none of my Chinese staff sat down and told me that, but I think it is pretty obvious.

*Q: I think we are talking about the right period of time, because if we both think about the primary reason for the Tiananmen Square incident from the point of view of the Beijing government, the explanation or interpretation was the students had had too much Western ideas or had too much Western influence and that is why they were demanding democracy and brought the country into chaos in 1989. So there was some kind of a measure after that to try to reduce it. From your point of view the program is to promote understanding, from the Chinese point of view it is to expand contact.*

KURZBAUER: So it is a difficult task for the American officer, but I think even more of a difficult task for the Chinese employee of an American or other foreign mission who has to really look at two missions, one is the mission of his own political society and the other is the mission of the foreign consulate which, to simplify greatly, is to expand contact and understanding.

Maybe because I had exceptionable people on my staff, or they were genuinely dedicated to...I think they genuinely believed that China and America are two great countries and there is a lot that can be shared. That may have inspired some of their really outstanding efforts.

*Q: So you didn't personally encounter any difficulties?*

KURZBAUER: Oh, there were difficulties but my staff always advised me how to get around them.

*Q: So you were able to get around them.*

KURZBAUER: But had I not had the staff...that is probably my point and I want to emphasize the value of the Foreign Service National to diplomatic work. At least the diplomatic work we do in many countries. Because without these employees I could be the same person with the same mission with the same diplomatic training from Washington and with the same intermediate Chinese language fluency, but I would not have known whom to go to for "permission," or to invite so-and-so because that will help promote the program among the provincial government officials, etc. So it was a very extensive personal network that the staff was able to advise me on.

And in China, as you know, that helps to get things done. Now, maybe it would make no difference if I was in New Zealand. If my staff member says to me...let's say I want to do work with the New Zealand Institute of Animal Technology (I am making that up). So as a diplomatic representative I have my staff call up the director of the university or the vice president for external relations and say, "We have this really interesting program between American animal technologists and we have some scholarships or we have some dialogue possible, would you like to look into cooperation or would you like to be introduced," I don't think there would be any... For them it would be a matter of do they have the interest in the topic, the time or resource to invest in it, is it productive for them intellectually. But in China at the time it was more than is it productive intellectually. Is it political correct, is it useful in local terms, is it politically suspect? There were many, many other levels. Many people in the Northeast had not had extensive contact with the outside world, unlike institutions in Beijing or institutions in Shanghai or institutions in Canton, the great centers. Northeast China, except for Russia and Japan, was not the center of great external relations with the rest of the world. Manchuria was off there, cold and remote. There were many institutions who had little or no external contacts, not only with Americans but with other countries. And we were just beginning to build. So there was caution, hesitation and uncertainty: was it okay to proceed this way, was it useful. The advice that I got from the staff on personal connections, who is important, what key institutions might be interested and which might not be, what did it mean if somebody said, "no." Were they offended or were they just politically unable to respond? Or did I just phrase my program in a way that was incomprehensible? What were all the meanings and results of actions. That was invaluable.

*Q: The staff you are talking about is the Chinese?*

KURZBAUER: That's right. My cultural assistant, my press assistant, my administrative secretary, they were all involved as a team in our programs and I think without them those programs would not have been done.

*Q: I have another question. As a representative of the United States government and as a diplomatic official who is supposed to carry out the American policy of that period towards that country and in this case the PRC, in both period when you were in Beijing and in Shenyang, did you personally experience any kind of conflict? In order to implement your official policy this is what you need to do, but in reality you really found that is not a very smart idea to do it in China.*

KURZBAUER: That is a third element that I did not experience personally, but that is an experience in the Foreign Service, and that is what happens if the individual officer fundamentally disagrees with his own country's policy on a particular issue, and I am thinking about having recently read about the resignation of a couple of our Yugoslav policy officers who resigned on principle because they disagreed with current American position in Yugoslavia. And, of course, having served there I have an emotional attachment to the issues and very much respect the decisions of the four promising young men, who made their own decision to leave government service (even though it is a wonderful career and maybe a unique career), because they could not agree with their own government's policies. That may be rare, but that is a third element. At the time I was in US government service I was not faced with a moral conflict between what I personally believed and what the policy was of my government towards a

particular situation in the country I was serving in. So I was spared that.

Your question also points to a pragmatic issue of here's your mission but can you really do it. I have to say again I was pretty fortunate: in Shenyang I think given the overall political differences at the time between China and the US, the programmatic expectation was that not much would be able to be accomplished in that period. So I was not burdened with over expectation on the part of superiors or our program people back in Washington. In fact, it was the reverse.

But, from what I have seen in my service experience, there is a fair amount of latitude given to individual officers in the execution of their duties. I found that especially in a small post like Shenyang...we had five Americans and everybody else was family or Chinese nationals. And in the compound next door to us were five Japanese diplomats. So it is a very entrepreneurial and very collegial setting. Now in a large embassy obviously the division of labor is much stricter and the hierarchy may be a little more severe. We in Shenyang were almost like a new joint venture; we were out there at a frontier post! We were given a lot of latitude. And that is helpful, because if you can do something constructive you are one step ahead.

*Q: And also I think it has something to do with the United States government's understanding of the post-Tiananmen Square situation in China so they were not expecting the embassy people to do a lot.*

KURZBAUER: I understand the people in Beijing, especially after Tiananmen happened had a very difficult time starting the more programmatic aspects of our work up again. I came after Tiananmen and it may be that it was harder to operate in the capital than out in the provinces.

*Q: Especially the Tiananmen incident had a strong effect on Beijing and even in Shanghai you felt the difference.*

KURZBAUER: I was Branch Public Affairs Officer in Shenyang, so, head of section. That sounds very grandiose, but I was the only American USIA officer in my section. So I was head of myself and my Chinese staff. I reported to the Public Affairs Officer who was the Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs in Beijing. He was the senior USIA officer for all of us stationed in China and there were quite a few of us since every consulate had USIA officers. I also reported to the Consul General of my own consulate in Shenyang, who was kind of a mini ambassador of that. Over all was the ambassador who was the supervisor of the entire U.S. diplomatic mission in China, regardless of the agency you represented. Then you also had your own agency bosses back in Washington. It sounds like a lot of reporting and hierarchy, but there was also a considerable amount of latitude.

I think I found that, interestingly enough, as I went further north, the looser things were politically. Heilongjiang province, at the time, I found probably the easiest in terms of initiating some new contact with some new program activity. Jiein, as it is geographically, was kind of in the middle, and of course we were based in Liaoning. I think the provincial government's foreign affairs office looked more closely at us there than they would obviously when we went off to Heilongjiang. But even in Liaoning, with the right relationships, in programs that were not

perceived to be too threatening to China, there was a lot that was possible to initiate. But I noticed going up to Heilongjiang, which is the Russian/Chinese border, that there was a kind of frontier independence. As you know a hundred years ago it was the frontier. There was gold mining, there were wild native tribes. The railroads helped open up that area just like it did in the West. I think there are a lot of similarities between parts of Manchuria and the American West. Underpopulated until recently, depending on mining extraction, fur industry, developed by outside powers...in the States it was easterners coming west and developing western mining industries, etc. and in Manchuria it was Russians and Japanese coming in. But there is a frontier mentality there of "we are our own bosses." I found of all the provincial interactions that the Heilongjiangers were kind of like the American Westerners here in the U.S. Southwest. Beijing was important, but it was far away somewhere else and the Heilongjiangers didn't have to look over their shoulder for every permission. Whereas the Shenyang authorities were much more cautious and not terribly open, very careful, very considering of every proposal and taking a long time to coming around to certain decisions. Of course the provincial government of Heilongjiang had to do the same thing but I think they were more ready to say, "Our goal is making Heilongjiang a wealthy province and if that means bringing in American business, fine; if that means sending our folks to America for training and bringing some Americans in, fine; whatever it takes to get us moving, that is what we want."

*Q: You know, China is a large country and we have a saying that is carried down from centuries ago which says...The sky is high and far away and the king is remote from me...and means that I can do whatever I want. That in a way explains the rapid development in Canton, Guangzhou. I have heard Cantonese people say that if we want to do something we still do it whether it is after the Tiananmen incident or before that. See, it did not have such an impact on them as it did especially on the intellectuals in Beijing or on the general public of Beijing. So I think being stationed in Shenyang would make a difference then if you had been stationed in Beijing.*

KURZBAUER: Oh, I am sure. If you draw a spectrum and talk about north China, and this is really speculation on my part, really not deep knowledge, you would have Beijing on one end of the spectrum and Harbin or Heilongjiang on the other. Liaoning, Shenyang would be closer in terms of caution and political supervision to Beijing. One incident, for example, was that the president of the major university in Liaoning, who was apparently a well known reformist economist...again this is a secondhand story I heard in China...kept his students out of trouble during Tiananmen Square, but he didn't prevent them from going off, down to Beijing if that is what they chose to do. He is still president, he maintained his presidency, but he was kind of under wraps for foreigners. It took a year for him to be able to attend a US consulate function after Tiananmen. Whereas, his staff like the vice president and department heads, could under certain circumstances and did participate and respond to our invitations to various academic and professional programming. But although the president was invited each time (he normally would be the one to receive the new Consul General and section chief, like me). was kind of under wraps for foreigners. I remember the first time he was "out" was in the spring of 1991. That was when he felt able to accept an invitation from the consulate to attend a consulate function. So that was 1989-91, two years during which he had to maintain a cautious position.

Now, others did not. Usually the economic officials had the most latitude.

*Q: Because he was president of the university and we understand the Tiananmen incident had most to do with universities, and if he was in that capacity, whatever position he took would have a great impact on him afterwards for a while. It was good to hear that finally he did appear.*

KURZBAUER: He appeared at a dinner that we hosted for the visit of the head of USIA's East Asia Bureau. But there are many interesting vignettes.

*Q: One last question. In China we use the term "peaceful evolution," that is the strategy of the United States.*

KURZBAUER: Well, that is what Chinese political commentators say is the strategy of the United States.

*Q: That was the official Chinese line and they said to watch out for the "peaceful occupation"...*

KURZBAUER: In a sense it implies that our real hidden agenda is intellectual occupation by peaceful means.

*Q: Right, or intellectual invasion of China. Now, as a USIS official, as you were laying out the objectives and everything, that if something of that kind is behind all those, then you are the one who is doing something which would contribute to that so-called strategy of the United States diplomacy in China. Now what I am trying to get from you is, how would you interpret the so-called "peaceful evolution" as a strategy in China?*

KURZBAUER: Are you using the term, "peaceful evolution" in the way that the Chinese political commentators would use it?

*Q: Yes, I am using it within quotations. I am saying you worked for that section and generally you worked as a diplomatic official...*

KURZBAUER: Is somebody going to be thinking that my real purpose is undermining the Chinese present system by the introduction of or the exposure to a variety of American alternatives.

*Q: How could you persuade Chinese officials in Beijing that that is not what you are doing?*

KURZBAUER: This reminds me of a question when I was in Beijing in 1984-86 as assistant press officer and I was asked to give a series of talks about American culture and policy to the New China News Agency's English language group of journalists. It was among the early times that foreign diplomats were allowed to go to Xinhua headquarters. Probably now it happens all the time, but this was in 1985. I had a fabulous time. These were young journalists being trained under the Thompson Foundation program. The British press magnate, Lord Thompson, had given money to Xinhua to develop professional journalism standards and training. So this was a special group of Xinhua journalists who were English speaking and would be working in foreign posts. You know how it is in China, audience people did not easily ask questions openly. A lecturer finished lecturing and that's that. (I know in Europe in the old days my father told me he

never would ask questions in a German-Austrian high school or college.) The professor lectured and the students took notes, you didn't raise your hand and challenge, etc. So I think part of that in China comes from another sort of academic tradition and part of it is also social and political caution. So I went to lecture and didn't expect really very many questions. Instead, I got a whole wealth of questions. One of the young journalists said, "Well, isn't it true that all diplomats are spies?"!! So, they asked me about being a spy, so I had to answer them, but no one ever asked me about "peace evolution" so I never had to answer it. But it was obviously in the back of the minds of the people who were looking at the programs we were doing.

My answer would be that I am a representative of my country and my culture. This is how my country and culture operate. We have had successes, we have had failures. We have challenges, we have many problems that we have not overcome and we are struggling with. And we have had things that we think work. I am here to present the reality as best as any one small program can or any one section can of the vast diversity that is the United States. Openness is a hallmark, so we are open or try to be. Disagreement and critique is part of our cultural way so we have to be this way. The adjustment in a China-aimed program has to be in approach, but the fundamental values cannot be adjusted or otherwise we betray who we are. At the same time we are here to look at China as best as we can and understand it from a Chinese perspective. I am not here to tell you what to do. I may believe that a certain way of doing something is the best, but I am not presumptuous enough to tell you that you must do it that way. I can only present that aspect to you and have you see if this is appropriate. There are some areas where there are obvious benefits of working together in a collegial way. There are environmental problems, narcotic transfer problems, AIDs problems, medical problems that both of our countries face. We can bring together our best experts and our best methods to solve these problems. And I think one can agree that there obviously are political and social differences because you have 5,000 years of history and we have 200 plus. China is not really an ethnocentric state, but I think in many ways you can say there still is a dominant Han culture and at the same time a lot of diversity within that Han culture. But if you want to over simplify, there is a core that over thousands of years Han Chinese have seen themselves as related and united at least culturally if not politically or geographically. We are very different. Our whole history is serendipitous, diverse, and so naturally that history affects our values. So I am here to be as best as I can be an honest representative of what I perceive or what our programs help us to try to perceive about who we are. I am here also to honestly listen to you and all of what you are. We have to be honest representatives of who we are. And that is how I would answer it.

If I am an American diplomat serving in Jordan where there is a constitutional monarchy, I would be lying and betraying who I am and what I represent to say to you to make you feel comfortable that monarchy is obviously the best political system. Maybe it is appropriate for Jordan. But this is not what I represent, I am presenting you with the alternatives that the American experience has generated. No political official in China has ever asked me that directly. I mean, they asked me the spy question and that was a journalist. I remember that answer because I was so shocked for a moment I didn't know what to say. Obviously I don't know much about spying but from what I read the purpose is basically to gather information. I would say, "Well, you know an embassy gathers information. How do we gather information? We gather it by talking to you. We gather it by reading your newspapers. We gather it by reading your literature. And your diplomats and your journalists are doing the same thing in the United

States. Now is that bad? I don't think it is bad because if we don't read your literature and your newspapers our perceptions of you are stereotypical, just as mine were of China...everybody running around China dressed in green and blue. Even as an educated woman and as an American official, before I went to China I knew I had a stereotype, but it was there unconsciously inside of me. 'China is grim, the Chinese are regimented, the Chinese don't think for themselves.' All kinds of things. If I hadn't been to China, if I hadn't seen, if I hadn't gathered information that stereotype would prevail. So I think the information aspect comes through reading, talking, programs and interactions and I think it is very important for both countries." And that is the answer I would give.

*Q: That is wonderful. I purposely asked this question in order to provide some material for a future researcher because I think there ought to be somebody who gets into that to do research to explain what "peaceful evolution" is in terms of relations between countries, what ought to be and why this is perceived as "peaceful evolution." I mean, I just felt like it needs to be answered because it is very one sided and the Chinese government says it and tells people that way what do you mean by that..*

KURZBAUER: That's interesting too because I think there is a perception among...I am not really a deep expert in broad policy formulation, as an officer I have been much more the implementer than the policy designer. That is both my background and functional assignments and probably what I do better. I think I am probably a better facilitator than I would be a staffer at the National Security Council creating the right policy we hope for the right moment. But still the general thinking is, I would think, that obviously relationships with nations, states or countries, that have similar perceptions and values are easier. Obviously we relate to Great Britain in an easy way although we have our differences and problems as well. We have them with France, as you just saw in the GATT negotiations and agricultural subsidies. Every nation is going to look out for its own self-interest, and that is the way it should be, even if they are closely related by history or political system. But overall the relationships tend to be easier with those whose systems are similar. So there is a presumption that in the best of all possible worlds, most nation's political and social systems will be organized somewhat akin to ours. But you know, the US society is changing and evolving. Our social criteria change. Our social problems are changing. Our issues are changing. So no society is ever in this ideal state. And there is no such thing as the ideal republic or the ideal democracy. We kind of strive towards it but it is going to take a different form. Even the British democracy's working out of social practice or political relationships are not like ours entirely. I think there are some basic assumptions that are similar and we might want to consider as universal. But the working out of those universals and those values differs even among politically akin nations. And in the end, I am sure scholars are going to say, it will have to be China that decides somehow for itself, and it is a very difficult process. America has been evolving for 200 years. We were not born as we are now.

*Q: Personally as a student of diplomacy and diplomatic relations, my deep belief is that we ought to do everything as a person to promote understanding between and among countries. The more we understand each other the less we will fight against each other.*

KURZBAUER: I would want to believe that also. Some people say that it is like personal relations, if you know too much about somebody, you wind up hating them. But I am still an

optimistic and have that same personal belief as you do.

*Q: I think it is based on the recent history. If you look at the kind of things that the United States foreign policy was based on or the Chinese foreign policy, or the Soviet foreign policy, was based on during the Cold War years. Now in retrospect we have a great number of books that we can read which tell us that there were a lot of misconceptions, especially between China and the United States. There were literally no contacts at all and so each of them were trying to understand the other by their own bias or prejudice and that created a lot of problems. So from the recent history I feel that the more we understand each other...*

KURZBAUER: I am taking a course over in the political science department now in administrative theory. We have been assigned to read a book called "Group Think," which you may have heard of. It is by a social psychiatrist at Yale. He analyzes foreign policy decision making in certain key episodes. One of them was the decision to cross the 38th parallel during the Korean War. He goes into the long discussion bringing in the historical and diplomatic and scholarly literature on U.S. misperceptions not only of the Chinese resolve, but of China itself. We did not see China as a proud new revolutionary state with its own perception of its own self-interests. It sounds like from just reading secondary sources in this "Group Think" book that our policy makers saw China through a very stereotypical lens and that was as a tool of the Soviet Union. That is just a small anecdotal example, but it points right to your point.

*Q: And to add to it quickly, what happened in Vietnam. It turned out that the perception was that Vietnam was operated from Beijing and Moscow, but we now know it is not all that true.*

KURZBAUER: All you Commies are the same!

*Q: That's right and that is how the United States jumped right into it. That is the period that I concentrate on in my studies and that is how I come to this sort of conclusion that the more we understand the less we will fight against each other. I think to promote understanding between countries is everybody's task.*

KURZBAUER: You know it is strange because you look at that and you see how our two nations have had a history of close alliance, the World War II history, and positive mutual perceptions. And then a great divide of mutual hostility and mutual misperceptions and so forth. But we can approach that and can find congruence at least on many levels.

And then there is Yugoslavia and I am still trying to figure it out, even having worked and lived there for two years and probably having gotten more deeply into ordinary society than I did in China, to be honest. Trying to understand how the same people are fighting each other stem from the same nation, if you will, the Slavic nation. They speak basically the same languages: Croatian and Serbian linguistic differences are minute. It is analogous to British and American English. The people are Slavic by original ancestry but history for a variety of reasons has divided them into the Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Muslim segments. Empires from the outside came in and changed histories. People found themselves on different sides of imperial lines, the Ottoman and Austrian. It is like saying the Shandong and the Hebei people who both stem, at least according to legend, from the Great Yellow Emperor, are now fighting each other

to the death. And yet not only are the Slavs originally from the same stock way back, they have had the experience of living, working and intermarrying with each other in many cases for at least the last fifty years. And yet that nationhood was not able to sustain itself.

So you have the optimist and pessimist. On one hand you have two nations like the US and China who are so diverse and have both a bitter and a sweet history, who are somehow making more and more approaches towards each other. And you have peoples who are interrelated but are separating. I will leave it to the historians and the academics to answer that questions. But we belong on the hopeful side, I guess.

*Q: Let's hope so.*

**JON M. HUNTSMAN, JR.**  
**Advance Work, White House Staff**  
**Beijing (1984)**

*Ambassador Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. was born in 1960. He is a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania. He served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce in International Trade Administration and in East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1989 to 1991. He was ambassador to Singapore from 1992 to 1993. Ambassador Huntsman was interviewed by: Dr. Chung and Ruth Kurzbauer on February 25, 1994.*

*Q: Good afternoon, it is February 25, 1994, and this is an oral history interview for the Department of State's diplomatic history archives with Ambassador Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. We are delighted that the Ambassador could take the time to meet with us today. The interviewers will be Dr. Chung, a specialist in US diplomatic history at the University of Utah and Ruth Kurzbauer, a former FSO with USIA.*

*Mr. Ambassador if you would just outline briefly for us and for any future listener or participant, what led you into interest in Asia, into government service and maybe just the broad biographical outlines of your own background up until now.*

HUNTSMAN: My interest in international politics, international affairs, really was a result of living abroad. In high school I was sent over to Germany and spent a little time living and working in Germany right after high school, working as a shipping manager. I developed kind of a view that was a little larger than what one would develop simply living in a fairly isolated city in a sometimes isolated country. That really is what opened up my mind, first to the people of Germany and the culture of Germany and the language. I became enamored with all of them. Shortly thereafter, when I was 19 years old, I was sent as a missionary to Taiwan for a couple of years. Had I not been forced to go over there I don't think I would have had the opportunity or developed at a very young impressionable age a view of people in the Pacific rim, specially the Chinese, those who lived in Taiwan.

*Q: Recalling back to that period, did you have some prior stereotypes of Asians or Chinese or Chinese culture, and if so, were any of those changed by your two year residence?*

HUNTSMAN: I hadn't been exposed to much that was Asian. My parents had been to Mainland China in the late 1970s. They had been some of the first people to the Mainland from the United States as part of a delegation. They came back with some very interesting stories. I, at that point in life, started to develop a very keen interest in Asia, specially China. I didn't know much about it. I knew it was a very mysterious part of the world, but I knew I wanted to learn more about it. So when I received an assignment to live over there for a couple of years, selfishly I wanted to go back to Germany because I was able to speak a little bit of German, I was familiar with the culture and the territory, but I was sent to just the opposite side of the world. I went to Taiwan with little knowledge of the language. We had an intensive language program, two months, so I was able to exchange pleasantries beforehand, but I found as soon as I got there even the pleasantries that I tried to articulate weren't necessarily understood by the local people. Many of them spoke Taiwanese.

I spent two years there teaching English and doing a lot of humanitarian things and in short learning the language, learning the culture and getting to understand the people. It was very much a function of how willing one was to get in and make it an exercise in self-education, more than anything else. I had to teach myself the language. I had to learn about the culture. There were no organized classes that helped us to understand what we were living within, the context of the Chinese experience. Taiwan is a very unique chapter within the whole book of China. I wish now that there would have been some sort of organized academic experience there where we would have been able to make better sense out of what we were doing on a day-to-day basis. We were really thrown into this difficult milieu and we all hoped to make some sense out of it. So the first objective was learning the language so we could get by. And that I worked extremely diligently on.

Through all of the things one does as a missionary, mostly humanitarian work, you can't help develop a fondness for the people and an appreciation for the culture and the history. I became so taken by the history of Taiwan, particularly as it went back to the Mainland and the revolution that took place in 1949. How did the people in Taiwan get to where they are? Why do they have the kind of government they do today? Why was Chiang Kai-shek such a revered person, at least in Taiwan? All of these things were questions I spent a lot of time investigating.

So during that two year period I learned a great deal about the Taiwan experience and the whole ethos of the Chinese world view. Following my return from that experience, during which I continued the study of the language, continued learning as much as I possibly could about not only Taiwan, but I tried to broaden it to Mainland China, and shortly thereafter the entire Pacific rim. I couldn't get enough of it. I took classes at the university.

*Q: When you returned, where did you go?*

HUNTSMAN: I started here at the University of Utah and ended at the University of Pennsylvania where they have a very good Chinese language program. They also have a very good Asians Studies program. I took advantage of both.

During those years I also took some time out to work in the White House for President Reagan. I was the one who would organize his trips, his travels with him. For example, if he went outside of Washington to visit someone in California or New York, it always took a team of people to organize it...the security, the communications, the political aspects, the policy aspects. I was what you call an advance man who basically went out ahead of the President to help organize all these different facets of a Presidential trip. I was able to travel internationally with the President and to almost all 50 states with him. It was a great experience and a great education for a young man. I left the White House in late 1983 and was called back out of retirement in 1984 when the President went to China. I had many friends there, including the deputy chief of staff, Mike Deavers, who hired me. They knew of my fondness and affection for China. When they found out that the President was going to go against everything that he had said during his two or three years in office and actually visit Beijing, I guess it dawned on them that they could call their old friend, the advance man, who had some experience in that part of the world, who spoke the language. So I was called out of retirement to travel over to China. This was what we call a pre-advance...

*Q: This was in 1984?*

HUNTSMAN: This was February, 1984. He actually made the trip in April and May of 1984.

Han Xu, who was later Chinese Ambassador here in the United States, then was the Vice Minister in the Foreign Ministry over North American Affairs, was our counterpart. We worked with him along with Ambassador Art Hummel, who had been over there I think for a year or two by then. He had previously been the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was a terrific, terrific diplomat.

There wasn't much in the way of a bilateral relationship back then since President Reagan had been such a hard liner on US/China policy. So this was a real chance to build a relationship from scratch between the two countries. So I went over there on the pre-advance, got to know a lot of new friends in China, helped to arrange all the aspects of what the President would do in China...take him out to the Great Wall, take him to the Forbidden City, meetings with Deng Xiaoping, meetings with Zhao Ziyang and meetings with Hu Yaobang. It was a terrific experience for me, at 23 or 24 years old, or whatever it was at the time. I got to meet all of these people too: dinner with Liu Shao Chi and Hu Yaobang and a lot of our favorites.

I am trying to think of when Zhao Ziyang came here to the United States, because that was also an important part of my education. I was put in charge of his trip here to the United States. I think it was right before the President went to China, late 1983.

*Q: I am trying to think. I came here in May, 1984 and he had been here already.*

HUNTSMAN: Yes, then it was late 1983, because he extended the invitation to President Reagan to make a reciprocal visit.

I was also taken out of retirement to help organize his trip, Zhao Ziyang's trip to California. So I

spent some time with people in the State Department, the Protocol Officer, people in Zhao Ziyang's entourage and spent a couple of weeks in the Bay area organizing his visit there. And then I was with Zhao Ziyang when he went through his trip, from step to step, event to event. So when I went back to Beijing and got to see Zhao Ziyang for the second or third time, it was like a reunion.

*Q: Did you play golf?*

HUNTSMAN: No, he wasn't much into golf then, he was too busy with other things.

*Q: At the time you were working with the White House, you came to Beijing with an advance team and interacted with an embassy. At that time you probably didn't know that one day you would be an ambassador yourself. Do you have any recollection of your impressions of the embassy's external operation, or how federal agencies work with each other?*

HUNTSMAN: The first thing that I was tasked to do when we got to Beijing...we went right to Art Hummel's home, the Residence of the ambassador...and we had in tow the head of the Secret Service detail, who were the people protecting the President; military people, who would be responsible for putting phones in all the rooms and out to the Great Wall where the President would travel...they had to put telephones out to the Great Wall not only for the President for national security reasons, but for the media who would have to phone in and file their stories right after the President went out there. I remember sitting in Art Hummel's living room with some of the other advance people and being put on the spot, having to stand up in front of all these people, including Art Hummel; his DCM, Chas Freeman; and Dick Hart, who was number three, the political counselor, and describing to these people...I was just a young man and having to describe for them what we hoped to accomplish over our week or two pre-advance. What we hoped to accomplish in terms of arranging the schedule for the President and then melding into that all the political implications of each visit. You should go here because there is a good political reason, or you should not go there because the political implications are ominous. Everything had to be weighed and evaluated very carefully.

But I remember sitting in Art Hummel's living room thinking, "That is what I want to do some day." From that point on my goal was to some day be able to serve in a capacity like that where you could make a real contribution to a relationship, important relationship, bilateral relationships. And Art Hummel was such a dynamic figure and such a pro in the field in China relations. He was born in China, the son of missionaries. He even fought with the revolutionaries during the late forties. He had a very rich history in recent history of China. He so impressed me during that visit that he really became a role model of sorts, almost idol, if you will. You have to set goals for yourself and I thought it was something completely out of reach, would never happen. But nonetheless, I thought that that would be something to which I should aspire. In a good way, not that it is going to bring you any more, but because it might put you in a position to effect change, to help people. To help people on the US side better understand China, and to help the people in China better understand those from the United States. To help ameliorate problems when they arise. I thought he was very good at it.

So that really was a baptism by fire, shall we say. Sitting in Art Hummel's living room, watching

him in action, and having to stand before all these very dignified people from the embassy...all of whom were of great help and assistance in putting this whole trip together. They gave us anything we needed. I was so impressed by the level of professionalism, the quality people that this organization attracted, this embassy behind cameras, guards and gates. In this building sat some extremely talented people. I was absolutely struck by that. I had spent some time in the White House in a very rarified atmosphere for a young man and was impressed by the people coming and going, but it wasn't until I got out into the field where I was extremely taken by the level of professionalism, the level of talent that existed in these embassy buildings. And I traveled with the President to South America, to Mexico and to Asia, and in each case I had the chance to interact with the ambassador and with the senior staff people and I was never let down. I always saw a consistent level of professionalism and it always struck me as being quite unusual that the United States could organize the State Department and within the State Department there was the Foreign Service organization which consistently put out a very, as they say in the business world, high quality product. A constant high quality product.

*Q: Did you notice or hear of any changes in the President's perception of China or his own thinking about the relationship as a result of the week in the country? Or did he still hold to a vision of China as a hard line country to be watched?*

HUNTSMAN: The President had never been to China before that. He had been to Taipei and when you visit the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial it is a museum. There is a picture of Chiang Kai-shek with Governor Reagan. It hangs very prominently there. So he was always very much allied with the Taipei world view. He had always been very harsh. If you remember doing the campaign in 1980 when it came to how were we going to handle the relationship of Beijing, he would say, "Well, essentially I am not going to give them any credibility. I am going to help the people in Taipei because they came out of what we deeply believe in, democracy, civil rights." Even though the democracy and civil rights were far from the truth in the Taipei experience, he used to point out those difference in the 1980 campaign.

But during his two or three years in office before going to Beijing he became educated. He began to understand the importance of that bilateral relationship that President Nixon and Henry Kissinger were instrumental in establishing. I think when he started taking a look at the world as President of the United States opposed to being governor of a state, he probably came to the conclusion that the United States couldn't go on without having a healthy relationship with Beijing from a commercial standpoint, economic and trade standpoint, political standpoint. And I think Reagan being an ideologue during the 1980 campaign became more pragmatist and I think developed a very healthy world view where it wasn't simply based on ideological lines but rather real politics.

He enjoyed his trip to Beijing a great deal. I think I was with him for each stop along the way in Beijing, Shenyang and Shanghai. It was a terrific education for him and throughout it all I think he developed a greater appreciation for the importance of that bilateral relationship.

**HERBERT E. HOROWITZ**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Beijing (1984-1986)**

*Ambassador Herbert E. Horowitz was born in New York in 1930. He received his bachelor's degree from Brooklyn College in 1952. He received a master's degree from Columbia University in 1964 and from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy in 1965. He served in the US Army from 1953-1955. His overseas posts include Taipei, Hong Kong, Peking, and Sydney. He was ambassador to the Gambia from 1986 to 1989. Ambassador Horowitz was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on December 9, 1992.*

*Q: Then you went back to China?*

HOROWITZ: Then I went back. I was asked by Art Hummel to go back to Peking...

*Q: He was Ambassador.*

HOROWITZ: He was Ambassador...and be his deputy. His deputy at that time, finishing his tour, was Chas Freeman. For me, with a long interest in China, I was thrilled at the opportunity. I was in Peking for a year and a half or two years. Hummel's tour came to an end and there was a gap before Winston Lord came because he had trouble getting Congressional approval, so I was Chargé for several months in between. And then I stayed with Winston for several months until he got his feet on the ground.

*Q: What was the political situation like when you were there in Peking this time?*

HOROWITZ: Totally different.

*Q: This was basically 1984 to 1986?*

HOROWITZ: Yes. Totally different from '73 to '75. In 1977 to 1978 the radicals lost out and were purged, tried and put in jail; the pragmatists really came back in; Deng Xiaoping rose to be the principal character; the Chinese were fully involved in the program of economic reform. There was more openness; it was easier to travel. Chinese officials had titles and they had calling cards; in 1973 to 1975 an official might be identified as "a responsible person"; they had no phone books, no rosters. Now, they would speak more openly; we just had a lot more contact all up and down the line. We had a full slate of officers; it was a full-fledged embassy with even a Science and Technology Counselor, a very big S&T exchange program -- lots of students were in the U.S. and Americans were coming to China to teach and study there.

*Q: Was there a full consular network?*

HOROWITZ: We had consulates in various cities; it was a very, very different kind of picture. And China seemed to be doing okay. There was no question that the economy was improving, compared to the seventies there was much more food in the market, more clothing and things to

buy. They were making good strides, but there was still a certain amount of political reaction from time to time. The Tiananmen affair of 1989 was not the first effort on the part of some Chinese to pull back and reassert controls. But the main point was that they were making a lot of progress.

*Q: Were there any great problems that you had to deal with at that time?*

HOROWITZ: No, nothing that was out of the general range of issues. On the management side there was sometimes a problem in trying to keep things under control. Some of our people had become very enthusiastic on the military exchange program, "we want more exchanges," or "the S&T is terrific, let's go all out." People become committed to those issues and I felt one of our problems was to try keep things measured, under control, to know what we were doing and why we were doing it.

*Q: It has always seemed to me, from a historical point of view, that this inordinate enthusiasm about China has permeated our history. In 1790 we had a hell of a time getting consuls anywhere -- it took years to get a consul established in, say, Madrid, or other cities -- yet Congress voted within two weeks to send two to Canton. It has gone on ever since.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, but also periods of disenchantment. For the most part since 1989 we have been in a period of disenchantment and suspicion. There is a tendency to go overboard. Over these years, from the seventies, even while I was in INR and the Treasury, I participated in delegations that visited China as an escort officer and I was just amazed at how people would fall all over themselves when they were now in China. "This is the greatest thing that ever happened." "This is the most fantastic place I have ever gone to."

*Q: These great bursts of enthusiasm. Even during the worst of times, one would see these pictures of small Chinese children and everyone would fall in love with little Chinese children whereas we didn't do the same for children in other countries.*

HOROWITZ: That is true; there is still a certain infatuation with China and things Chinese.

*Q: Did you find the Chinese the same as to American things or were they more reserved?*

HOROWITZ: Yes, I think there is a lot of interest in the United States, in part because we are a big power, a great power, a strong country, also because they know about its economic opportunity. That is why you still read about boat loads of Chinese trying to get into the country one way or the other. They are all aware of America. There was a lot of interest in VOA, listening to Voice of American broadcasts, even back in the seventies when we were there. Sometimes you would meet a Chinese who spoke some English and you would ask him how he learned it, "Oh, I listen to Voice of America."

*Q: I was talking to the head of the Voice of America and am still conducting an interview with him, Richard Carlson, and he was saying that even at the height of the cold war there was still an implicit sort of cooperation between the Voice of America and the Chinese. The Chinese were reproducing our English broadcasts and publishing papers, instructional sheets for this. This*

*was going on even at this very peculiar time.*

HOROWITZ: Yes, I think there is a lot of interest in the United States. Probably in South China even a greater awareness because so many of the early Chinese in this country came from there.

*Q: At this time there was a very large group of Chinese students in the United States studying. At the embassy were you looking at this and saying "when all these people come back this will be not just an exchange program but a real revolutionary thing"? Was this of concern?*

HOROWITZ: To me it has not been a concern because I think in the long run it is going to have a beneficial impact. I can't see how it will not in a country like China with the amount of trade, the amount of travel to and from abroad, the students studying abroad coming back sooner or later, have some political impact. You can't do all that and maintain a totalitarian regime forever and ever. It is not something that worries me, I think it is good.

*Q: Were we concerned though at the time that maybe we were introducing a revolutionary element? Did we know what we were doing by encouraging this?*

HOROWITZ: No, I don't think we were worried about it.

That was not a concern; that we would be creating the basis for change was not something that we were worried about.

*Q: You were there during the Reagan administration. How did you feel that administration handled China policy? After all Reagan came up when China was the great enemy.*

HOROWITZ: I felt all through that period that we were, as a government, determined to continue the process of normal relations, of wanting to bring China into the world political and economic community. I don't think there was any reluctance about that. I think when Reagan first came into office and talked about Taiwan he created some ripples of concern, but I think there was a commitment on the part of the administration to continue the process.

*Q: How about the Soviets at this time -- were they trying to find out what we were up to, still feeling frozen out, or were things beginning to relax for them?*

HOROWITZ: By the mid-eighties the Chinese had moved to a situation where they had a more independent foreign policy -- not lining up again with the Soviets but trying to have more normal relations with the Soviets and a more normal range of contacts with them. They were interested in the changes that were beginning to take place there; they were watching it closely. They were not anymore so much worried about imminent Soviet attack as they had been in the seventies when they imagined the Soviets might attack them at any moment. That had all disappeared -- back in the seventies they would show you the air raid shelters they had been digging in the villages.

*Q: Are there any more areas that we might cover on this particular period?*

HOROWITZ: No, for the most part U.S. relations with China were on course, only little problems here and there. There was interest in U.S. investment coming in, a lot of exchange students going to the United States, people coming back and forth, a much more open kind of situation than we had experienced there before. One thing worth mentioning, I think, is that that was a period, the mid-eighties, of considerable growth in Chinese agriculture, the rural sector, and in the small towns and medium size cities -- they just really took off. As part of the reform efforts one of the first things that the Chinese did was to try to remove some of the stringent controls in the rural areas. The communes in effect had been taken apart; it became possible for people, not to own land, but at least have land that was theirs. Incentives were built in and agricultural production went up, and along with that a tremendous growth in small-scale local industry. I think this is important because it is one of the things that is different about China from Russia and East Europe; when there is food in the market and clothing to be bought and there is not a serious inflation situation in the economy, then you can begin to experiment with other reforms.

*Q: As an economist looking at this, it seems that the Soviets destroyed all the infrastructure that would support the individual farmer -- maybe it was because the countries and climate are different -- so that when you removed the restrictions Soviet agriculture didn't blossom. If you had cows you couldn't feed the cows or get fertilizer or anything else, whereas in China when they let go...*

HOROWITZ: The villages were intact. When the Great Leap Forward failed in the late fifties and they had to retreat from the advanced idea of communes with communal kitchens, they made what in the commune they called the production team as the basic accounting unit and the production team was basically the old village -- or there might be two production teams in one village. Also, during the communist period agricultural production was not stagnant, it did continue to improve. They introduced more and more chemical fertilizer and other ideas; they improved the infrastructure, communication and roads to rural areas. There was a better situation in China for the reforms. Now of course in China they still say they have socialism, socialism with Chinese characteristics. They won't call it anything else but in fact it is a very vibrant, semi-free market economy.

*Q: Just a last question: Could you comment on Art Hummel as Ambassador and Winston Lord as Ambassador; what you saw of their effectiveness, how they worked in China? Both of these men had roots in China, Winston Lord was married to a woman from China and Art Hummel had served with the partisans as a young kid who grew up in China.*

HOROWITZ: Art Hummel knew, and knows, a lot more about China than Winston Lord did at that time. Winston was interested in China and as an aide to Kissinger had played some role in those early days but was not a China expert; he has become knowledgeable about China because of his work experience over the years, whereas Hummel has a better feel for the country and the culture and society. I know Hummel a lot better than I know Winston Lord because I was only with Winston Lord a few months to help him get settled. Hummel down deep had a great love for China but I also think he was a very tough diplomat. He was very rigorous in defining the issues and understanding what the issues were and could be a tough negotiator with the Chinese. Winston Lord was more cerebral; he certainly was extremely intelligent with a very good

analytical mind. He was always analyzing, trying to see what was happening in China, to understand, to get a feel for it. Very different personalities. I really can't comment on Winston's period as Ambassador because I was not there long enough.

*Q: You left in 1986 and then what?*

HOROWITZ: I went to West Africa and became Ambassador to The Gambia.

**HARRY E.T. THAYER**  
**Director, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1984-1986)**

**Dean, Language Studies, Foreign Service Institute**  
**Washington, DC (1986-1989)**

*Ambassador Harry E. T. Thayer was born in Massachusetts in 1927. He received his bachelor's degree from Yale University in 1951. He served in the US Navy from 1945-1946. His overseas posts include Hong Kong, Taipei, and Beijing. He was ambassador to Singapore from 1980 to 1984. Ambassador Thayer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1990.*

THAYER: My job immediately after Singapore was director of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT). The American Institute in Taiwan is and was the quasi-embassy, non- governmental, non-official entity that we established as of January 1, 1979 when we normalized relations with the PRC and broke government-to-government diplomatic relations with the former Republic of China, which is Taiwan. The American Institute in Taiwan is a contract organization headquartered in Rosslyn, Virginia, across the river, on contract to the State Department to carry out the people-to-people relationships -- that is, commercial, cultural, and other relations -- between the people of Taiwan and the people of the United States.

None of the AIT staff is legally an official employee of the American government. All of us who were Foreign Service officers were legally separated from the State Department for the duration of our employment by the American Institute in Taiwan. Under the Taiwan Relations Act we were separated without losing the various emoluments we would have accumulated if we had remained Foreign Service officers during that period and gone on to serve in some country with which we had formal diplomatic relations.

But the American Institute in Taiwan, which is modeled after the Japanese equivalent entity that they established when they broke relations with the PRC, is set up to conduct relations with Taiwan in very much the same way as an embassy conducts relations. We were broken down into the same kind of sections -- political, economic, and so forth. But we called them by different names. The political section was called the General Affairs Section (GAS), for example. The consular section -- what we usually know as the "Consular Section" -- was called the Travel Service Section (TSS), etc.

The point being that we wanted to remove all the symbols of government-to-government relations and all the symbols of an embassy, while still being able to carry out the substantive work. We had no American flag flying in Taiwan. I was not known as Ambassador; I was known as Director. I did not call on officials of Taiwan in their -- I never went to the foreign ministry, did not go into the offices of ministers. Generally speaking, I went to no government offices. There were some exceptions, but we kept the visibility and the symbols of the government-to-government relationship down. If I wanted to complain to the Minister of Economic Affairs, as I did more than once, to get some trade problem straightened out, I would have to ask him to meet me either in a hotel room or a restaurant room which we would hire for the occasion, or in one of our buildings or in one of the Taiwan guest houses. In other words, an unofficial locus for an unofficial meeting between the representatives of two peoples rather than an official place where the representatives of two governments met.

This was an awkward way to do business. Having been on part of the team that helped establish the relationship with Beijing and dis-established the relationship with the government of the Republic of China (when I was head of the PRC desk 1976-79), I entirely approved of this anomaly that we created. But working on it day-to-day, which is one of the things that attracted me to the job, turned out to be a lot more complicated than I had anticipated. There wasn't a day that went by without having some decision about modalities, which would have come quickly and easily if AIT were an embassy, made in a way to maintain the unofficial aspect of the relationship. For example, making a demarche on a given subject required a decision about where -- not automatically the traditional host government building -- to use it.

*Q: Would you explain what a demarche is?*

THAYER: A demarche, at least as I use the term, is if we have a message to give another government asking them to do something or complaining about their not doing something, we would speak to a representative of the other government trying to get the government to take or not take certain actions.

I will say that the Taiwan authorities have their counterpart organization established at the same time as we established AIT. They had their counterpart organization in Washington, which is called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA), and they operate here in the same way as we operate there. In Taiwan, I technically didn't deal with the Foreign Ministry. I dealt with the head office of the Coordination Council for North American Affairs, which was my counterpart. Things that we did were always under the rubric of that relationship between the AIT and CCNAA. We did have some direct contact with government officials, but they were in an unofficial setting or at a lower level.

*Q: I would think that just this sort of diplomatic dance would get a little bit annoying for both of you, because it was a time-waster, wasn't it, to get to places? The only comparable place I can think of at all is the trip our people have to make to go from Tel Aviv up to Jerusalem to do any business at the foreign ministry because we won't put our embassy in Jerusalem.*

THAYER: It did take time. It was also awkward. And it is a difficult arrangement for the Taiwan

authorities. For a government -- that using in lower case, as I must -- the "Republic of China" had a great pride in itself. The government servants, particularly in the Foreign Ministry but also throughout the Government, had a pride in serving the "Republic of China". The formal diplomatic relationship with the United States was very important to them for reasons we're all familiar with. To suddenly be told, "We're going to pretend that you're not a real government, and you're going to need to deal with us on this basis," was hard for them to take. It was a matter of bitter contention, as we have talked about, in the United States Congress at the time and between the Taiwan authorities and ourselves at the time of normalization. And it continued to rankle not just the authorities in Taiwan, but also people around the government, senior businessmen and others, to be treated like a second-class country. In fact, we treated them as not a country but as a political entity which was part of China and an entity with which we did not have official relations.

So there was the awkwardness. It's a time-waster. Whatever the realities of the situation required, one cannot help but empathize with the members of the Taiwan organizations responsible for dealing with the Americans, empathize with their feeling of insult when we did not treat them as a sovereign entity. I agree entirely with the policy, which I worked hard on myself, but from a human point of view, it's easy to understand why it would be difficult for a senior official, somebody who is an official in the "Government of the Republic of China" for twenty-five years, to suddenly be treated as if he were not an official of a government in good standing.

*Q: This was about five years after the AIT had been set up, wasn't it? Were you the third director?*

THAYER: I was the third director.

*Q: Had a real modus vivendi been worked out so that you could pick up the phone and settle a lot of things this way, or did you just say, "Oh, just meet me out in front of the building and let's get this over with," or were they still being very prickly?*

THAYER: We didn't quite get to the point of, "Meet me out in front of the building." But you're quite right in raising this question, because when the relationship was first established, there was little confidence, or certainly not full confidence, on the part of our friends in Taiwan that we could have an unofficial relationship that really worked. By the time I got there, thanks in part to not only those who preceded me in the job, Chuck Cross and Jim Lilley, but also because of the conduct of the whole of the American government in working out the relationship, by the time I got there, there was general acceptance that this relationship was a workable one, that the non-official relationship could adequately handle the substantive affairs that needed to be handled in the interests of both, as we say, the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan.

So we'd gotten past that period of serious doubts that it was workable. We were into a period where, nevertheless, some of the detailed activities rankled, and that continues to this day. While I was there, I was often bearded by counterparts or friends among the Taiwan authorities who would say, "Why can't you guys put up a flag? Why can't you at least give us the dignity of having an American flag in here?" And other questions of that sort. And we always discussed very frankly what we felt our interests were; that is to say that if we were going to recognize the

PRC as the legal government of China, certain things were corollary to that, and our interest was in making the most of the substantive relationship with Taiwan and making sure that worked, and that's what we should concentrate our efforts toward. By and large, I think our friends in Taiwan also saw substance as the important thing. The relationship today is, I think, a very friendly one. But we've been very careful from the very beginning to adhere to the undertakings made to Beijing in the normalization agreement by the statements of President Carter about conducting our relations with the people of Taiwan on an unofficial basis.

*Q: Harry, to get to the substance of this thing, in a way we're watching this peculiar relationship and we have made the statement that, "Oh, yes, there's one China, and eventually this will be settled." From somebody who's an outsider, I mean, it seems so apparent that Taiwan and mainland China have gone separate ways, separate systems, and eventually they're going to be two countries. I find it very difficult to see a melding, but this is from the outsider. Is the Chineseness of both sides such that they will coalesce? What was the feeling when you were there at that time? Where was this going to go?*

THAYER: Well, there's no unanimity of feeling. As you know, there have been for decades people advocating an independent Taiwan. But the current arrangement and relationship to each other could continue, more or less, this way indefinitely for decades and decades without any substantive formal change in the relationship but simply a more relaxed intercourse between them. It's easy to see this current situation continuing indefinitely.

I think our interest is not in having it settled in any particular way, but in a peaceful solution, and that's been our interest since the 1950s, and that continues to be our interest today. We're not tied to a particular solution of the differences. We're just tied to a peaceful solution. We're not in the business of expediting that, and that wasn't my business when I was director of AIT, certainly. Our desire is to conduct a healthy relationship with both sides of the China equation and let them figure out how to sort out their own relationships.

*Q: Speaking of when you were in Singapore, did you have any problem with congressional visits and other visits like that -- of having particularly congressmen or congresswomen coming in, sounding off on their own, particularly those who didn't like the relationship and getting headlines and all, and there you were, having to deal with that?*

THAYER: We did have some. There are a lot of congressmen who were very friendly for a long time with the former Republic of China, now Taiwan, and who made their views clear, particularly when they were in Taiwan on visits. There were lots of "friends of the ROC" -- people formerly from the Hill -- who visited Taiwan when I was there, for a notable example, Senator [Barry] Goldwater, whose views haven't changed much on the issue. And these people are lionized. They are given plenty of attention in the press, and they say their thing and we say, or more likely don't say, our thing, since we keep a fairly low profile out there. That simply is understood to be part of the game. I never made any attempt to tell a senator or a representative what he should or shouldn't say. Sometimes we'd be asked for our view, and I would give it frankly. But for the most part, whatever was said, it didn't embarrass us because we, as contractors for the administration, were doing our people-to-people job and not attempting to tell the Congress what to do.

*Q: You could do a certain amount of ducking, too, couldn't you? Because if you were an embassy, you'd have a USIS office that would be having to respond to everything that concerned America. But being where you were, you could kind of duck things that normally a full-blown embassy would have to respond to.*

THAYER: I guess that's true. We did, however, consider it part of our job, being conscientious contractors to the United States Government, to have the government's viewpoint well known, and, therefore, our Cultural Information Service, which would be called USIS at another post, did issue reports about events in America, purveying the American government's viewpoint on given issues. There were certain things we didn't do in that respect. I can't remember what they were offhand, but we were very careful to continue to wear our non-governmental colors.

*Q: Were there any major issues that you had to deal with in this time between the United States and Taiwan?*

THAYER: The major issues we had that I can discuss here were in the trade area. Taiwan was targeted by the USTR, United States Trade Representative's office, for a number of negotiations -- and Section 301 actions were threatened more than once. We had some very heated times with the authorities in Taiwan over trade matters, and some of them got to be quite unpleasant. The most unpleasant was, for me, the American effort to get Taiwan to open its market to American cigarettes. Taiwan wasn't the only place where we've done that. This was an issue in Korea, too, and also elsewhere, Thailand and so forth. Because of a combination of circumstances, the tone of this debate on cigarettes got to be quite nasty and made me extremely uncomfortable. The press was very hard on us. We brought a lot of pressure. This pressure on Taiwan provoked statements by the Taiwan tobacco people and others that were unhelpful. The trade issue thus became a big political issue, with overtones of pushing opium on the Chinese -- this kind of thing.

*Q: This goes back to the 1840s.*

THAYER: That's right.

*Q: The opium wars in China.*

THAYER: So it was really quite nasty. It was bad enough so that I took the initiative to have meetings with the major publishers and/or editorial boards of some of the newspapers in Taiwan, the key ones, in which I and the economic counselors and others involved in these tobacco negotiations sought to make sure they understood where we were coming from and so that we would reduce the acrimonious press treatment of this tobacco issue, which was souring the atmosphere on other issues.

Let me say that the fact is that Taiwan has a tobacco monopoly bureau and Taiwan makes its own cigarettes, and a good deal of revenue was earned by this. Their market was closed, relatively speaking, to American cigarettes, closed to American cigarette advertising, but open to Taiwan advertising. There's no question about where the equities were. Taiwan being an

otherwise very mature player in international trade -- and a very effective player -- was, for various reasons we're familiar with (a lot of them domestic reasons) -- not opening up its cigarette market, and we wanted it open. Of course, the American tobacco companies wanted it open.

We handled it in a way that was not the best. USTR had the responsibility but we at AIT failed to anticipate what should have been obvious: if we didn't orchestrate carefully, the "P.R." could be harmful. We -- I -- failed to caution USTR adequately, and that was our job. One set of negotiations I remember in particular was held in Taiwan for a week or so. The way we allowed our presence to be characterized was faulty. We had a whole bunch of American negotiators in a downtown hotel. The press -- the local press, which can be very aggressive on such things -- had very easy access to the Americans. And so we had the papers just flooded with reports about what the Americans were doing and how many there were and all of them bringing this huge pressure on poor innocent Taiwan, Americans pushing poison, cancer-inducing substances, on the people of Taiwan. It was a very, very unpleasant business.

I, myself, continue to have deep misgivings about this aspect of our trade policy, that is, the tobacco aspect. It's not a new idea, but it made me damn uncomfortable to see us bringing such government resources to bear to ensure that we were able to sell to other countries what is in fact our cancer- inducing product.

If AIT simply had warned of the potential problems, we could have avoided much of them, perhaps, by insisting the negotiations not be conducted in Taiwan, but rather in the U.S. or even elsewhere.

*Q: To put this into context, in today's Washington Post, February the first, the Center for Disease Control announced that approximately a half a million Americans died last year because of tobacco-related diseases. This has been well known for at least the last decade or so.*

THAYER: Yes. And one can do one's professional thing by treating the trade as a matter of principle. This trade issue, like intellectual property rights, or anything else, is a matter of principle. But there is this human side, and as a Foreign Service professional, I did my professional thing. But I continue to have real doubts about where my moral obligations lie in such a situation.

*Q: In all the communications and the people you talked to, was there an unease in both the communications from Washington and the people about this? Nobody today can pretend that this is not an extremely addictive, extremely dangerous form of indulgence.*

THAYER: No, I think that the people involved in these kinds of negotiations (it's natural) it's natural, have long since gone past the dilemmas that some people have the time for. These people -- and we -- had their job to do. It was to open up the world trading system. Tobacco was one obvious place where it wasn't opened, and it should be treated like everything else. I never detected much misgivings on the part of the people involved in these negotiations, including those in my own staff, because the Taiwan restrictions did not give, as we say, a level playing field. And for the high moral postures of the Taiwan press on this matter, the fact is that the

Taiwan monopoly was pushing their cigarettes as hard as they could. So a lot of this was, of course, hypocritical posturing on the part of our Taiwan interlocutors.

Nevertheless, as a personal matter, I felt -- and I still feel -- deep regret that I was involved in this. This is not to exaggerate my role. These trade things go on. Chiefs of missions do their modest thing, but they're not very important to it. Although I did make a number of representations on this subject and tried very hard to explain the American position. I did this publicly and privately, as I did on many economic matters. But still, tobacco was special, and I didn't like it.

*Q: Did anything come out of this while you were there?*

THAYER: I'm not quite sure where we stand now. There has been a lot of progress, I believe, on the tobacco front and on a lot of fronts for that matter. I think we now have reached a higher level of understanding with Taiwan on a range of issues that are in USTR's purview. I think the relationship is going quite well.

*Q: Any other major issues that you had to deal with when you were there?*

THAYER: Another very unpleasant issue was the murder of Henry Liu, who was a Chinese-American resident in California. The responsibility for this murder lay with one of the intelligence branches of the Taiwan government.

*Q: Where was he murdered?*

THAYER: He was murdered in California. There were a lot of discussions between us and our friends in Taiwan, a lot of American outrage about the murders. It eventually surfaced that these were connected to officially connected people, and three of them were, in fact, convicted in Taiwan court and jailed. They have, I believe, recently been released, having served a number of years. But that was a very unpleasant episode in relations between us and Taiwan. In many ways it cast a pall over a lot of the other things that were going on during my time.

*Q: What was your reading of something like this? Nothing could hurt relations more than to do this type of thing, and here you have the Taiwan government, which is a very knowledgeable government and understands the United States. Was this sort of a rogue elephant operation or what?*

THAYER: The responsibility was at a fairly high level in the intelligence branch, and the key guy, as far as we know, was convicted; and justice, as far as we know, was done. So in the end, it was an issue that was taken care of, but it went on for a while, and it was a difficult one, because it was murder on American soil and obviously something that the Americans had to take very seriously. But, ultimately, the Chinese courts handled the thing appropriately, and, as I say, justice seemed to have been done. But we had to express our outrage -- forcefully and at high levels -- before action was taken.

*Q: So you feel it was caught at the appropriate level. This was not a scapegoat thrown to protect*

*a major government policy?*

THAYER: I don't think there's anything more that I can say about it. As far as I know, justice was done. We wanted to see it done as fast as possible and have our concerns respected.

*Q: You left Taiwan in '86?*

THAYER: I left Taiwan in '86.

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*Q: Then you were the dean of the language school at the Foreign Service Institute.*

THAYER: Right. I had decided that after Taiwan I wanted to come back home, and I was very much interested in the whole training operation. We still have a Chinese language training school in Taiwan, very important to the State Department and other agencies concerned with a China specialty. But I have an interest in the training in general, the development of the professional cadre. So I sought this job, if it came open. I asked to have it after Taiwan, and it came open at just the right time. So I served as dean of the language school, and I saw that as kind of a transition to my retirement which I saw coming up in the next few years.

*Q: Looking at the language training, what would you say were the strengths and weaknesses of the Foreign Service Institute's approach to it?*

THAYER: There are many strengths, and one of them is we pioneered in training adults how to speak foreign languages. Some of it was done during the Second World War at Yale and other places, Cornell, I guess. But we began to do it in the State Department in a fairly well-budgeted way and developed our own texts and our own teaching methods and our own testing methods. We did so very effectively, although we still have our critics...

In the language school we have a score or more of M.A. and Ph.D.-level scientific linguists who are the core of our training effort, who I found to be intellectually very high class. These are the people who run the language programs. These were a very creative and devoted and professional group in whose presence I found myself enormously stimulated. I had a lot of fun with these people, learning what they were doing, helping get the money to help them do it better. My job, in part, also was to be sure that what these professional language trainers were doing was conforming with the very special needs of the Foreign Service. Under these linguists, we have all native speakers actually teaching our students, as you know.

The weakness of the Foreign Service language program, I believe, as do many others, is that we focus on training a mass of people, but we don't have enough money to train many of them deeply. That is to say we train people to a 3-2 level, but don't train enough to a 4-4 level.

*Q: 3-3 being speaking and reading on a rating of 5 as highest.*

THAYER: Right. A level of so-called professional fluency, reading and speaking. But, in fact, it

would be better if we had the money to train more people to a higher level. In fact, we are putting a little bit more money in training to a higher level, and we are doing other things. We were, before I got there and we still are after I left, doing things to train certain people to a higher level than the standard 3-3. But the effort to train a mass of people well involves also constantly developing new materials, up-to-date materials. Languages evolve like anything else, and unless you have money to do that, you can't do it. Unless you have money to be able to pay for the man hours involved, you can't train your teaching cadre adequately or develop adequate new materials.

The language training operation, when I was there, was vastly underfunded. It still is underfunded, and it's a great shame that more money cannot be put into the language training operation. I think we do very well with what we've got, but it could be a lot better.

*Q: Did you find that universities more or less fed off of the Foreign Service operation and language training?*

THAYER: Well, there are not many universities that train in the spoken language the way we do. Georgetown, Middlebury, Monterey Institute -- not the Army, but the private institute -- Cornell, there are institutions which do train in the spoken. But we train for particular purposes and for very directly practical purposes and are unique in the mass of training that we do, as well as the number of languages that we do. We do forty-plus languages. So we're able to attract to the Ph.D. linguist level, very high-class people from the universities. And the Ph.D.s who came to us are interested in the challenge and the rewards of training people -- adults -- to go right to work in a language. The process of developing textual material and teaching methods in an atmosphere that encourages creativity, to develop systems to produce people who can go into a foreign country and use the language, that is a very rewarding thing for many people who are professional linguists, and that was very important to us.

Middlebury, for example, has an extremely good program, and they have a total immersion program that I visited, their summer program. It is very good. In some respects, universities have questions about what the Foreign Service Institute does, and in some respects they are all praise for what we do. So it's a mixed bag, but my impression is generally that the prestige of the Foreign Service Institute language operation is really very high.

*Q: You retired in 1989?*

THAYER: I retired in 1989.

*Q: Looking back on it, what do you feel about your career in the Foreign Service?*

THAYER: I'm very happy with my career. I left the newspaper work, came into the Foreign Service, in part, because I wanted to have a piece of history, play a part in history, as I conceived it at the time, with a particular interest in Chinese affairs; and I have been able to do that. Obviously, one plays a very modest role in history, but one is at least a part of things that are worth being a part of, and for that reason, it was very satisfactory.

**JOAN M. PLAISTED**  
**China Desk, Economic Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1985-1987)**

*Ambassador Joan M. Plaisted was born in 1958 in Minnesota. She attended America University and received both her Bachelor's and Master's Degree. Her postings abroad include Paris, Hong Kong, Geneva, Rabat and Marshall Island as Ambassador. Ambassador Plaisted was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on July 30, 2001.*

*Q: You graduated in '63 from high school. Did you have any idea about where you wanted to go or what you wanted to do?*

PLAISTED: Yes, I did. It was at age 16 that I decided what I wanted to do. This was rather strange for growing up in this small community. When I was 16, I decided I wanted to be a foreign service officer.

*Q: Good heavens, how did you hear about it?*

PLAISTED: Part of it was when I was seven, we took a family vacation to New York and visited the UN. My parents were showing me the General Assembly. I was just so impressed by the whole scene at the UN. You know, in Minnesota in those days everyone sort of looked alike, ruddy red slightly chubby faces. Here I was a seven year old hauled to the UN seeing the Chinese, the Sikhs with their turbans, the Africans with their colorful robes. I thought this place is fascinating. My parents pointed up to the interpreters' booths at the General Assembly and said, "Now maybe someday when you grow up, you could be an interpreter here." I still remember my reaction, I was thrilled to think that I could do that. Little did my parents know I was linguistically challenged. It was such an epiphany. I could do something here. I could work for my country here at the UN. So that gave me the idea as a seven year old, this is something I could really do. I became interested in foreign affairs, I wanted to join the foreign service. I read in a Methodist church bulletin about a university that would train you to be a foreign service officer. The university was the School of International Service at American University, in Washington. I went off my senior year to take a look at the university and to interview with them, and ended up as a freshman at the School of International Service. The first day of school Dean Griffith addressed the 90 of us in the freshman class and said, "Now most of you are here because you want to be foreign service officers when you graduate, but I should tell you that out of the 90, on the law of average, two of you will become foreign service officers. I never felt so shocked and disappointed. But I was determined to be one of those two. It was a long roundabout route until I eventually joined the foreign service. But that is exactly what happened. Today two of us from our class ended up in the foreign service.

*Q: And your job in Hong Kong...*

PLAISTED: I was in Hong Kong from '80 to '83. I had the job that was described as the best

FSO-2 job for an econ officer in the Foreign Service because it had so much policy content. I was the Hong Kong watcher in the economic section - a 14 person econ section. I was the only Hong Kong watcher among all the China watchers. In those days we did a lot of China watching from Hong Kong. This eventually gave me some credentials in the China group. It was also considered such a good job because it was the only non Mandarin language designated job in the economic section. I was the Hong Kong watcher. I had a very interesting time in Hong Kong. This was when the crisis in confidence in Hong Kong's future first came up. What was going to happen in 1997 when the lease on the new territories in Hong Kong ran out? It became an issue that early because many of the land leases in Hong Kong were for 25 years, it was a question how are you going to renew these land leases. I was there at the time of the Hong Kong crisis in confidence which happened in '82-'83. Also I was in charge of all of the economic policy issues with Hong Kong. The main one, of course, was textiles. I helped to renegotiate the bilateral textile agreement with Hong Kong in 1981.

*Q: Let's talk about the crisis in confidence. I mean it had been agreed that Hong Kong would be turned back to China. The lease was up; the British had accepted the fact that it would go back.*

PLAISTED: Well, it wasn't that simple. There was a 99 year lease on the new territories, but Hong Kong island itself was leased in perpetuity. But you can't really separate one from the other. What do you do? Do you recognize Chinese sovereignty over the whole area and turn the whole area back to China? Most people agreed that you couldn't keep Hong Kong as an island by itself, as Hong Kong island, and not have it adjoined to the new territories which is where all the food came in from and where some food was grown. In '82-'83, there was a world recession, economic problems made it more difficult for the Hong Kong businessmen. I remember writing a cable on Hong Kong's future, how actions speak louder than words, because what we were seeing were government officials, and particularly the top businessmen, making very optimistic speeches about the future of Hong Kong - how everything was going to be fine; there was no need to worry. Then if you looked at what they were doing themselves, with their own private investments, they were diversifying overseas as fast as they possibly could, investing more, many of them, in the United States. It was a bit of a mini boom for Hong Kong investment in the U.S. Later a number of the middle class in Hong Kong started resettling in Canada.

*Q: Vancouver.*

PLAISTED: In Vancouver, yes. My former secretary to this day lives in Vancouver. It was the middle level in Hong Kong who decided to get out. Your top businessmen, many of them had green cards or had other options, so they could remain in Hong Kong. If worst came to worst, they would leave. But they were very busy pulling money out of Hong Kong while making these optimistic speeches. The property prices, which have always been something of a yo-yo in Hong Kong, they go up, they go down, the property prices were falling precipitously at that time. There was real uncertainty about the future. It did take several years before it was finally resolved with Maggie Thatcher and the negotiations over Hong Kong's future which occurred after I had departed Hong Kong.

*Q: How did you get information? I mean information is fairly easy to get wasn't it in Hong Kong?*

PLAISTED: People were usually fairly willing to talk to you, but they were also terribly busy. You couldn't call on these top businessmen in their offices for any length of time. I got most of my information over the dinner table. I was quite popular on the social circuit. The good news, being a woman, you can always sit next to the principals who were the men. I could sit next to the men whereas my boss, the Consul General, couldn't. He would be sitting next to their jewel-laden wives. So I really was collecting most of my information on the dinner circuit, or socially when you could get involved in more relaxed conversations. I did have close relations with the political advisors and the assistant political advisors in the Governor's office. On trade issues, I had very close contacts with my Hong Kong counterparts. In fact, it wasn't a situation that pleased me very much, but they would hear what Washington was doing on trade issues long before I would. The Brit who was my counterpart, who was in charge of the U.S. office the way I was in charge of the Hong Kong office for the consulate, would take great glee in calling me up and saying "Joan, did you know..." And of course I didn't. When I later became the economic director on the China desk in Washington, one of the first things I did was to make certain we kept our embassies in China and in Hong Kong informed to the extent we possibly could on what was happening in Washington on the issues.

*Q: I have heard the Brits have been faulted for getting religion quite late as far as really turning over power to the Chinese residents of Hong Kong. It was British run until very late in the '80s. I am talking about real democracy. What was your impression at that time?*

PLAISTED: Some were saying that they acted too precipitously in calling attention to 1997 and agreeing to sit down and negotiate with the Chinese. But on the issue of democracy, in those days Hong Kong really wasn't that actively prepared to run its own affairs, no one was calling for democratic elections. The common wisdom in Hong Kong was as long as everyone is making money, everything is fine. Democracy isn't really an issue. No one was really demonstrating for democracy in those days and the British certainly were not preparing the people of Hong Kong to rule themselves. Most of the business people were really more concerned about the world recession. What did it mean for their exports to Europe, to the U.S. So there wasn't any great progress in those days toward democratization. That all came later, and then in a rushed atmosphere. I would give the British very high marks for establishing the rule of law in Hong Kong. That was something that was always very much respected. It was from my observations a very just legal system, and that is a terribly valuable legacy to leave for Hong Kong, something that Hong Kong is trying to guard today, and one can only wish them well.

*Q: I would imagine many of your Chinese contacts there would be continually looking over their shoulder, saying what do you think I should do and all this, preparing a way to get out. Was this something that people were trying to engage you on?*

PLAISTED: The mass exodus came a little later after I had departed in '83, but people were starting to look at their options at this time. Hong Kong in the early '80s was largely a Cantonese speaking area, I was studying Cantonese. Well, suddenly a few years later, you could see the signs on the wall, everyone was studying Mandarin to prepare for the future. Now if I were there today, I would be studying Mandarin.

*Q: Did the mainland Chinese play a role in Hong Kong at that time, having offices and all that sort of thing?*

PLAISTED: There was a Mainland Chinese office in Hong Kong called CITIC, but it was a much smaller office at that point. The Bank of China, which in later years built the tallest skyscraper with bad feng shui, supposedly because of the spiked towers at the top, that all came later when mainland Chinese businesses began moving into Hong Kong. The most visible links with China in those days were economic. Hong Kong was the principal port and still is to some extent for the whole southern China area. My theory was we were looking at the wrong issue, the mainlanders taking over Hong Kong. What was actually happening economically was Hong Kong was taking over China. Hong Kong businessmen were moving their higher priced textile, footwear, and toy factories, things that had become too expensive to produce in Hong Kong, to China. There was a shortage of labor in Hong Kong, so businesses started moving into the area in Guangdong Province right across the border from Hong Kong. I have seen this development from my early days of traveling to the special economic zone of Shenzhen. When I first went over there, Shenzhen was just brown barren land with a few bulldozers. Today it looks like Hong Kong. You see all these Hong Kong investors slowly taking over the southern part of China. Then I watched them over the years move up the river, getting closer and closer to Guangdong and Canton itself. That whole Pearl River delta area developed with Hong Kong money. Now it continues developing up towards Shanghai. Economically you could argue that these overseas Chinese businessmen in both Hong Kong and Taiwan were actually taking over the mainland of China economically, particularly in the area closest to Hong Kong and in Fujian province right across from Taiwan.

*Q: From your contacts, what were you hearing from people running textile factories and the like in mainland China? How did they find communist Chinese rule? I mean regulations, getting along, did they find it relatively easy?*

PLAISTED: We might get into that more when I am on the China desk and really helped the American business community with all their problems of investing in China. You may want to go into textiles or...

*Q: How do you characterize the Hong Kong Chinese, were they British we were talking to mainly or Chinese?*

PLAISTED: It was always something of a mixed delegation. The top negotiator for the Hong Kong delegation in those days was Chinese, Peter Chou. My counterpart at my level was a Brit, Mike Cartland, someone I stayed in contact with over the years. I always had the highest respect for the Hong Kong negotiators. The Hong Kong administrators would always look for the best person for the job. I think there was a conscious effort later to see that more local Hong Kong Chinese were in these positions in the trade ministry.

*Q: Could you characterize the negotiating techniques of the Hong Kong side?*

PLAISTED: Hong Kong was always exceedingly well prepared. In almost all the negotiations I have ever been in with dozens of countries, Hong Kong negotiators were among the best. They

knew their dossiers very well, had all the facts, had all the figures. I think they were sort of arguing from a perspective of righteousness: We are a poor developing country. This is our lifeblood, which it was certainly to some extent. We are a righteous little free market economy here. Please help us. You don't want to see us all go broke do you big bad west. You in the U.S. have a dying industry. Market forces would declare that you should move into something else, and let our workers work. You don't want to be responsible for the economic downfall of Hong Kong. They had their facts and figures to make this argument. On our side with Mike Smith, I would always try to start catching up on my sleep days before the negotiations began. There were times when we would negotiate for 48 hours straight. I always thought Mike's tactic because he had so much stamina was simply to wear down the other side. When they weren't looking he would slip in a good argument. We would just wear down the other side by being very persuasive and very persistent in the arguments on our U.S. side. This is what the U.S. needs. Our big, bad U.S. textile industry won't settle for anything less.

*Q: Well much has been made recently in the training of foreign service officers to bring them up to professional standards to train them in negotiations. Where did you get your negotiating training?*

PLAISTED: The same way I got most of my other training in the Foreign Service. I think it is rather hard to train negotiators, but we should certainly try. I got it by doing it for better or for worse. Over the years I got more negotiating experience than almost any other foreign service officer. I just learned it from sitting behind the microphone and from watching. At the OECD I used to watch the people I thought were the really good negotiators. I had a lot of respect for Chuck Meissner. He would lead our delegations on the financial side. I thought he was one of the finer U.S. negotiators I ever saw, so I would observe him and learn and ask him, how do you do it. He would go and take cat naps sometimes in the corner of the negotiating room. If it was 10:00 PM he would go and take a little nap for ten minutes and get his stamina back to keep on negotiating for the U.S. So watching others was key.

Also, I always had a lot of problems with public speaking. When I was first in the Foreign Service I remember making a speech on computer equipment at a Paris Trade Center show. Not only would my voice shake, but my whole body was shaking. I was wearing a little mini skirt, and my colleagues sitting behind me were just laughing, laughing. I was scared to death. So I knew I had to do something about my speaking skills and took the Dale Carnegie course on public speaking in French in Paris. I still had problems with my public speaking skills. I still was afraid to speak in public when I arrived in Hong Kong. What I did to help my speaking and negotiating skills was I went back and retook the Dale Carnegie course in Hong Kong. Thank goodness the course wasn't in Chinese. I was one of two westerners in the class. It was great. I took the entire course again and ended up helping to teach it for awhile, so I could really get over my fear of public speaking to be able to be behind the microphone to represent the U.S. It took a real conscientious effort.

*Q: Well now with textiles, all these things eventually keep moving and textiles have moved certainly out there. Were you sensing the beginning of the electronics movement coming into Hong Kong?*

PLAISTED: Yes, this was all happening because the labor costs were going up in Hong Kong. So many of the textile plants, the lower end of textile manufacturing, were moving offshore, mainly to China or other developing countries. Footwear was also moving out of Hong Kong. They had to get into the marketing niche where they were competitive and moved up market into electronics, the higher end of the market. At the same time, one of Hong Kong's major themes in our negotiations was Hong Kong is a poor developing country, you should treat us as a developing area. This was particularly important to Hong Kong because the U.S. was cutting trade preferences for the generalized scheme of preferences in those days. When Hong Kong got to be too successful in exporting a certain product to the U.S. like rattan, we would cut it from our GSP list. Of course it was in Hong Kong's interest to argue that they were a developing country. We had one of the top officials from USTR, an assistant USTR by the name of Doral Cooper, come out to take an overview of the trade issues between the U.S. and Hong Kong. My counterpart in the Hong Kong government, Mike Cartland, took great pride in lining up this tour for us. He lined up what I called the less developed country, the LDC tour, of Hong Kong. He found, and I gave him full credit, he found the only unairconditioned car in the entire Hong Kong government fleet. I didn't even know they had them. He had the driver take us out to some of the worst public housing projects. I had toured many Hong Kong public housing projects. I have never seen public housing so bad. The bathrooms shared by many families were as stinky as can be. He found unpaved roads, which is hard to do in Hong Kong. Most of Hong Kong is paved three times over, a highway on top of a highway on top of a highway. We were driving around out in the new territories on the back roads, unpaved roads, where the driver takes us to a rattan factory. Mike had arranged for the owner of this small shop to tell us of his trials and tribulations because the U.S. had just pulled the GSP, his preferences, for his rattan exports which he was no longer able to export to the U.S., and he and his family were going to starve. So it was an absolutely brilliant tour. This was on Saturday. Monday morning Mike Cartland calls me up at the office and says with a bit of a smirk, "Did you enjoy your tour on Saturday?" I said, "It was quite informative, and certainly Doral Cooper was quite impressed." He said, "Well what did you do with her on Sunday?" I said, "I was invited out on the yacht of Fung King Hey," a hundred some foot yacht. Fung King Hey was one of the richest men in Hong Kong. There were headlines in the Wall Street Journal at one point when he was going to buy 10% of Merrill Lynch that read, "Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Fung?" He had sizable wealth. I said, "I took her out on Fung King Hey's yacht, he served us caviar, lobsters, and champagne as we sailed around Hong Kong's skyscraper lined harbor, we had this fabulous time so that she could see the other side to your less developed country - to see how the very top lives." Mike was just furious that I had undercut his arguments for Hong Kong as a less developed country. I think this points up what a very complex place Hong Kong really is even to this day. When I first arrived one of the top businessmen that I was seated beside at dinner said to me, "Joan, throw out your economic textbooks. You just have to look at Hong Kong as it is." He was right. Hong Kong is not a free market economy at all. It is very complex. You have a large percentage of the people living in public housing in what was supposed to be the freest of the Milton Friedman free market economies. So it was unique. You have to just look at Hong Kong on its own.

*Q: What about relations with our embassy in Beijing? This is always a tricky thing. At one time Hong Kong was the hub of our China watching expertise and everything else. You know time had gone on, at least eight or nine years by the time you got out there. What was your experience with what you were getting out of Beijing?*

PLAISTED: I was the sole Hong Kong watcher. Everyone else in the section, all my colleagues, were all China watchers. In those days, there was a very complementary relationship between what we were doing out of Hong Kong, and what reporting was being done out of Beijing. Of course, over the years, more reporting was moving to Beijing. What we had in Hong Kong, the real strength of China reporting, and the reason we had so many China watchers in Hong Kong in the early '80s, was the mainland Chinese would talk to us when they were in Hong Kong. You just couldn't get that access in China. Nobody would talk to you in those days in Beijing. They were afraid to, so it was very hard to do your duty as a reporting officer if you didn't have anyone you could engage with in Beijing. The reporting targets all seemed to be in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Chinese of course would talk to you. They were going over to the mainland to set up businesses and to visit their relatives, and they were very perceptive in terms of what was happening. They were always willing to talk with the embassy reporting officers. It was a lot easier to get news of what was happening on the mainland in press reports in Hong Kong. There was a real argument that here is where you get access to information. By '85, when I was working on the China desk, the consulate in Guangdong really wasn't doing much reporting. It was either coming out of Beijing or coming out of Hong Kong.

*Q: Did you get any feel about the, I don't know what you call it, but the military complex and party complex owning factories and being very much engaged in the commercial world in mainland China? I have heard reports the red army - the People's Liberation Army - owned a lot of factories. Was that a factor in those days?*

PLAISTED: No, it wasn't something I was hearing about in '80-'83.

*Q: Did you find, you wanted to be an Asian hand, did you find that you were up against in foreign service terms the Chinese Mafia, people who learned the language and all and that you were an outsider or was it more welcoming?*

PLAISTED: Something of a combination of the two. Here's how I always saw my role, and they always joked about it. My role was to keep the China hands honest, because I was the one non Mandarin speaker, not having devoted my entire career to China. There were times when I thought my colleagues were getting a little too close to the subject or were getting too down in the weeds about who is going to get this or that low position at the next party congress. I was always asking what does it mean for U.S. interests? That is what I wanted to know. That is what the Washington policy makers needed to know. Most didn't really care who got the 20th position in the ranking politburo picture, which is what China watchers get hung up on. The number two position in the economic section came open during my time. The argument came up in the office, who should be the deputy. Should it be Joan? She is only slightly more senior, but she is not a full fledged China watcher. We are all China watchers, shouldn't it be a China watcher? The decision had to go up the ladder to the Consul General. I became deputy of the econ section. So that was something of an issue for awhile.

*Q: While you were there, was Taiwan a factor in things you were thinking about, working on?*

PLAISTED: No, not really. I think the feeling was everyone was focusing on Hong Kong, on

Hong Kong's future. What is going to happen in Hong Kong. There were times I thought we were too narrowly focused. I did a lot of traveling on my own around Asia because I just love Asia. I would go to all these other countries and explore what was happening in Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, Taiwan, Indonesia, Singapore, and Burma. The first thing I noticed when I would get off the plane is hey they are not all totally obsessed by what is going to happen to Hong Kong in 1997. I don't think most people outside Hong Kong were even very aware of this issue when it was so all encompassing for those of us in Hong Kong. It was good to get off island every once in awhile just to realize there were other issues out there in the world. The rest of the world was not worrying about this and had its own concerns.

*Q: Kicking that island complex is always a problem. From the economic side, were you all looking at the growth of these little tigers, or was that even an expression at the time? I am thinking of particularly Korea, Singapore, Malaysia to a certain extent, Thailand, which now could turn into real economic powers.*

PLAISTED: We were looking at them more from the perspective of Hong Kong. How much competition would say Singapore be to Hong Kong - the world's third largest financial center. I remember doing reports comparing the competitive positions of Hong Kong and Singapore. Your U.S. businessman is able to invest anywhere in the area. Does Singapore have more to offer than Hong Kong from a competitive position?

*Q: Did you find yourself caught up in promoting Hong Kong as a place to invest vis-a-vis say South Korea or Singapore or something like that?*

PLAISTED: It wasn't really my job to say this is better than that. I wasn't really promoting Hong Kong by saying come here and invest. In Hong Kong it was pretty easy to explain the regulations for U.S. businesses interested in coming to Hong Kong. It was very easy to brief Americans to tell them here is what you are going to face. Hong Kong certainly wasn't that bureaucratic. The tax regulations were very clear. Corruption wasn't as much of an issue as it was in other Asian countries. It was very clear cut. You want to set up here, well your property prices are going to be very high, but your work force is going to be very well educated. You are probably going to pay relatively high labor costs. So it was easy for U.S. business to get a sense of potential costs.

*Q: You are not going to have hidden payments.*

PLAISTED: You are not going to experience to the extent you are in other countries these hidden costs. You didn't need 20 chops from 20 different bureaucracies.

*Q: A chop being equivalent to a seal for approval.*

PLAISTED: A seal. No, I wasn't trying to get the government to set up one-stop investment shops as I did in other places. It wasn't an issue in Hong Kong. It was so straightforward. It was an easy place to know the regulations and to grasp the cost figures to set up an office. Of course, many companies in those days were setting up in Hong Kong to serve the China region because it was so much easier to do so out of Hong Kong.

*Q: Was it the Hong Kong Financial Times or what was the major economic paper that was published in Hong Kong, or was it Singapore? I can't remember.*

PLAISTED: The South China Morning Post was the major newspaper. The major economic paper out of Hong Kong was The Asian Wall Street Journal. The editorial staff of the journal was based in Hong Kong. This was another reason for doing so much reporting on China in those days out of Hong Kong. We could talk to all the journalists who were covering China. They were all based in Hong Kong in those days. Of course they aren't today, but they were then. You could share ideas with journalists running around the mainland.

*Q: Did you take Chinese cooking and all that while you were there?*

PLAISTED: Goodness, no. I am never going to make it as a chef in life. I did enjoy some of the finest restaurants in the world in Paris and in Hong Kong. Your finest Chinese cuisine is in Hong Kong and Taipei. At least it was in those days. I would go out and sample all these little restaurants. With a good friend of mine, we would take turns each Tuesday night selecting a restaurant. We would go and try some little unknown restaurant. The other person didn't know where we were taking them. It would have to be one that neither one of us had been to before, so we were always looking for new little restaurants. They were all holes in the wall, quite inexpensive, and absolutely delicious. So that was a great way to explore the culinary life in Hong Kong. To give you a little bit of the atmospherics: when I lived in Paris for Christmas eve, I managed to get tickets for midnight mass at Notre Dame. Normally only the ambassador and his wife get tickets. I managed to negotiate 10 tickets as a junior diplomat. Well, I did that for six Christmases with my friends in Paris. So when I got to Hong Kong, the big question was, what am I going to do for a Christmas tradition here? What we did, we had access to a junk - an old Chinese wooden boat - through a friend of mine who worked for one of the major banks. We would sail out to a little restaurant area in an older, more traditional part of Hong Kong where they had live fish swimming around in fish tanks. We would pick out our live fish for dinner, and, with the fish flopping in its plastic bag, walk down a narrow path to pick out a restaurant to cook our fish on Christmas Eve. This became something of a Christmas tradition for me in Hong Kong.

*Q: Why don't we stop here, and we'll pick this up in '85? Where did you go?*

PLAISTED: All right. I go to China. I was on the China desk in Washington from '85-'87. Then I attended the National War College. You are really doing all this in great detail.

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*Q: Today is August 1, 2001. Joan, China desk, you were there from '85-'87. When you say China desk, did you have the economic slice of the pie?*

PLAISTED: Yes. There was the director of the China desk. I was the deputy for economic affairs on the China desk.

*Q: Who was the director?*

PLAISTED: The director was Dick Williams. There was a deputy director, too, Chris Szymansky. I was the head of the economic side and a colleague of mine, Gene Martin, was the head of the political side.

*Q: Now, how did we view China when you arrived on the desk? Whither China at that point; how did we look at it?*

PLAISTED: China was just really beginning to open up. Economic reforms were underway. The Chinese were at least giving lip service to wanting to attract more U.S. investment. We were starting to formalize more of our economic relationship, trying to conclude a tax treaty with the PRC. We had negotiated a civil aviation agreement, but it wasn't being carried out correctly from the U.S. perspective. At issue were landing rights. The U.S. wanted to carry forward some of the agreements that we had begun to negotiate with the Chinese. It was also the time when China wanted to join the Asian Development Bank. Taiwan was already a member, so we needed to figure out how China could become a member of the ADB without ejecting Taiwan. It was the beginning of China's application to join the World Trade Organization which only today is being finalized some 16 years later.

*Q: At the desk level was it an optimistic time as far as the China was concerned with China entering the world and all that?*

PLAISTED: I always saw my role as not being 100% optimistic. My role was more to inject a healthy realism into the relationship with China. I did see in a number of American VIPs and congressmen going to China and almost kowtowing to the central kingdom, whereas to me tribute, the concept of bringing tribute to the Chinese emperor, was supposed to have ended with the Ching dynasty. I don't know if it was because the Americans drank too many maotais, a terribly strong liqueur served at the banquets, or if it was the tradition of being very polite with the Chinese, but we seemed to let the Chinese really beat up on us. The Chinese would complain loudly about U.S. protectionism, about China wanting to export more to the U.S. No one on the U.S. side really defended U.S. interests with the Chinese. I considered it as my role on the desk to see that our top officials visiting China not only listened to the Chinese perspective with great respect and replied to what we could to meet any just complaints, but also emphasized the need for China to open up its markets to point out that there were problems on both sides. We needed to defend more firmly U.S. interests at that time.

*Q: Well, Americans, including official Americans, tend to go overboard on this. There is something about China, and this goes back throughout history. We tend to get entranced with China, not always to our advantage. Did you find yourself being somewhat at odds when the people on the desk beat that around and were you always the person who said yes, but?*

PLAISTED: No, I think my boss at the time, Dick Williams, was certainly very receptive to this and to my making certain that our top people visiting China were armed to defend U.S. interests. Vice President Bush visited China in October '95 when I was on the desk. Secretary of State Shultz visited. I accompanied the Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige when he visited China for the Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. Secretary James Baker who was then

Secretary of the Treasury went to China where I joined him in '86 for the Joint Economic Committee, to be certain he was fully briefed for these meetings. I often briefed the principals. They had all the information so when China started accusing the U.S. of not having balanced trade or not allowing China to export more textiles to the U.S., the U.S. side could bring up the fact that China's market was anything but open. The U.S. has one of the freest markets in the world. Just try and get foreign exchange to export textiles to China. There was a need for China to really open up its market, too.

*Q: How did the Chinese reply to this?*

PLAISTED: I have negotiated with the Hong Kong Chinese, mainland Chinese, and people on Taiwan. The mainland PRC Chinese always had a script, and in those days they were very afraid to deviate from their script. They would have opening statements that would sometimes go on for an hour, and would say almost nothing. Occasionally my Chinese counterparts would engage in fairly hard headed attacks on our economic policy. But it was very difficult to get a real good give and take with the mainland Chinese. You couldn't have a spontaneous exchange at the negotiating table the way you always could with the people from Hong Kong or from Taiwan. The PRC representatives were speaking on instructions and were very afraid to deviate from their text.

*Q: Well if something came up would they say excuse us and let's meet tomorrow, and then go back and send off to ask for instructions? Was it that sort of thing?*

PLAISTED: Things usually didn't happen that quickly. It was a very slow painful process. When someone would call for a break to get new instructions they would want to meet much later at some future date. One way to deal with them that I discovered was to try not to surprise the Chinese, to let them know ahead of time what issues we were going to raise to the extent possible.

*Q: How would you do that?*

PLAISTED: Let's say we were preparing for the annual Joint Economic Committee meeting to be headed by Secretary of the Treasury Jim Baker. I would go into detail with the economic officials at the Chinese embassy. I would outline for them what the U.S. was going to raise. Here is what we are going to ask you to do on this item or that, so you can prepare. They could do all their interagency paper clearing processes before the U.S. delegation arrived in Beijing.

*Q: I am told that one of the problems, one of the weaknesses of American delegations, was a certain amount of impatience. They want to get something done. Did that play to our disadvantage?*

PLAISTED: I think it always does with the Chinese because they had been around for many millennia, they know they are always going to be there, and they take a very long term view of the world. I remember going to Beijing on the initial GATT negotiations. We were trying to make some progress. I don't think any of us would have guessed at that point it was going to take 16 years, and negotiations today are still not completely concluded. It is in the American nature

to say let's move forward and try to resolve this issue which certainly wasn't the Chinese mindset.

*Q: When you were dealing with them, what were some of the basic issues that were foremost on your plate when you got there in '85?*

PLAISTED: One of the really main issues was trying to improve the investment climate for American firms in China and for new firms that would be coming to China. The Chinese were always making general pleas, please give us more American investment, when what they really wanted was please bring the money to China and don't insist on repatriating any profits if anyone is lucky enough to make a profit. Something I always emphasized with them was that the first thing an American businessperson is going to do, someone who is interested in the China market, is to talk to the investors who are already there, so you had better treat the investors who are already in China well because they are going to determine whether or not new firms come into the China market. I was on a presidential aircraft with the Secretary of Commerce, Malcolm Baldrige, flying to Beijing for the Commerce Ministers Meeting. Baldrige was great, he mixed with all of us, he knew his experts were in the back of the plane. He would sit down with each one of us to pick our brains. The idea I had with him was for the United States to present to the Chinese a comparison of the investment climate in all of Asia. What was the tax treatment for foreign firms? How many steps did a foreign firm have to make to get an investment approved? How difficult was it? What were the land and labor costs? The Secretary of Commerce quickly grasped this concept and thought this was a good idea. We did make a presentation together. Actually China turned out on paper a little better than I thought they might. But we did manage to make the point to the Chinese, I think they got it to some extent, that you are not the only country in the world where foreign investors can invest, they can invest any place in the world, so you have to make the climate very attractive in China to attract them. One of the problems that our firms were having in China that we were working on at the time was price gouging that was going on. The cost of office space was going up precipitously. In those days many of our business people had to live in hotels. The hotels were trying to get as much as they could out of the foreigners. The cost of laborers would go up say 20% in no time. Businessmen always want to know what the regulations are going to be. They want certainty. Instead, there was a lot of uncertainty, there were a lot of changes in the regulations. At one point China put new taxes on representative offices. How much control you had over hiring workers for your plant varied by company. Some companies were able to go out and hire workers directly. Others had to work through the labor bureau, and they would be sent workers from the labor bureau to interview and to hire. The question was do you have the right to fire workers once you have hired them. It was very difficult to fire workers at times in China. In those days there weren't many U.S. firms that were making a profit, but if you were so lucky as to make a profit, the whole question of being able to repatriate your profits was an issue. So I spent a lot of my time trying to improve the investment climate for the firms that were already on the ground in Beijing and in Shanghai.

*Q: Did you find that with these problems the Chinese authorities finally came around to realize that they were screwing up the works by price gouging or putting on too many regulations and that sort of thing?*

PLAISTED: They are never going to come out and say, hey, we are not doing it right here, but I

think they had to realize they had a problem. You could see a big chart that shows you Singapore, Hong Kong, Korea, what the comparative investment climate is presented to them by the Secretary of Commerce. China had to realize there were other options for U.S. firms to locate elsewhere in Asia. But the Chinese were not going to make changes overnight.

*Q: Say a middle sized firm came to you and said what do you think about putting up a factory or selling our product here, what would you, how would you respond?*

PLAISTED: I would outline the pros and cons of investing in China, and then tell them, of course most of the firms were savvy enough to know it, to get in touch, too, with the American Chamber of Commerce in Beijing that was very active. The AmCham members were willing to talk to businesspeople who were considering the China market. I would also tell them to talk to some of the major firms in similar industries and would suggest certain people to talk with to see what their experiences had been, and to warn them about pitfalls. Most American firms at that time were going into the market for the long term. They knew they were going to have great difficulties in the short term, but they were looking at the long term potential.

*Q: This is really mainly the name of the game.*

PLAISTED: Yes, see we are talking about '85 - '87, just when China was really opening up economically.

*Q: How about the American Chamber of Commerce? I would think that they would have almost a stake in presenting a slightly rosy picture of investment because they are there, and it would make the Chinese authorities mad if they gave too pessimistic a view and all that, but maybe it didn't work that way.*

PLAISTED: The problem with U.S. chambers of commerce the world over is they usually don't want to be openly critical of the foreign government at least not in public conversations. Many of these businessmen who have been living in these countries for some time start adopting themselves the country's view. However, speaking privately, they go off and have tea with the newly arrived businessperson, then they can be much more open in their assessment of the market in China. The chamber itself can be more conservative. When there were issues that were really important for the business community, they could take a unified stance.

*Q: Were you seeing a problem with the cadres of local provinces? I understand that one of the big problems, maybe it is more now than it was then, was the cadres of communist officials in the county had to generate their own money so they were coming out with all sorts of self-generated taxes. They have a light bulb tax or something like that just to get money to support the cadres. Was this a problem?*

PLAISTED: It always has been a problem in China. If you could convince the central authorities to liberalize a regulation and they issued the decree, it is often not carried out at the local level. It never infiltrates down to the local level, and, even if it does, you have all the vested interests. As you say, local cadres are interested in raising their own foreign exchange by their own methods, so yes, that is a problem in China.

*Q: How about intellectual property?*

PLAISTED: Intellectual property rights were very much an issue at that point. The Motion Picture Association of America, Jack Valenti, was very active. There was a lot of computer software pirating, a lot of pirating of music and videos. We were working very closely with the Chinese at that point to conclude an intellectual property rights agreement. But then again, once we concluded an agreement, the real problem with the Chinese was enforcement. Okay, you have an agreement on paper but now you actually have to enforce what has been signed to crack down on some of these pirates who were particularly active in the area around Guangdong province because of the ability to export pirated goods to Hong Kong. So it was also a question of being able to enforce the agreements that we had.

*Q: One has the feeling that in China today, and maybe then, the old plague of China was warlords. Now it is market lords. But I mean the writ of Peking doesn't weigh very heavily out in the hinterland.*

PLAISTED: Then there is also the issue, I think, of the U.S. being a very legalistic society. If we sign an agreement, we usually take that agreement very seriously. American businessmen would say, ah, it is concluded now. The American thinks it is over because the negotiations are over. For the Chinese, now it is time to really begin the negotiations now that you have signed the agreement. Another trade issue I got deeply involved in was our civil aviation agreement with China. Northwest Airlines wanted to fly cargo flights to Beijing, and they needed a permit from Beijing to do that. This was allowed under our civil air agreement. We spent many months trying to and eventually getting the cargo flights approved for Northwest to fly into Beijing, but it wasn't easy. Also U.S. airlines wanted to fly passengers directly to Beijing, not to have to stop in Shanghai. That was a major issue that dragged on for some time. But after many demarches the Chinese finally overturned their refusal to allow U.S. cargo and passenger flights to fly into Beijing. We really were opening up the market at that time.

*Q: Were members of Congress weighing in, you know people from the state of Washington saying Boeing isn't getting enough market or what have you?*

PLAISTED: I was dealing with the airline representatives directly. I don't remember letters coming in to the Secretary of State urging us to do more, that would usually be if Northwest wasn't satisfied. Northwest knew we were absolutely fully engaged, as they were, trying to open up the China market. The thing that was interesting in those days was that Congress was not at all involved in the issue of most favored nation treatment for China - an issue that later became a major one. It was not so much a political issue then. MFN had to be renewed every year, and it was not something that went to Congress in those days. It was such a routine. I actually drafted the renewal document on the China desk and sent it up to the Secretary of State to approve most favored nation treatment for China. It was so routine that I had to write myself a reminder to do it again in May or June the next year. When I met with my successor, I had to brief him to remember to renew this - to get the documents up to the Secretary of State. I assure you in later years, when this issue became entangled with human rights, no one had to draft reminders on the issue of should we renew most favored nation treatment for China.

*Q: Well, 1989, of course, was Tiananmen Square. That changed the whole landscape, didn't it?*

PLAISTED: Yes.

*Q: Prior to that, correct me if I am wrong, we were looking upon China as developing into a healthier relationship and things were maybe moving slowly, but things were moving along. Were we concerned about human rights or did this intrude into economics?*

PLAISTED: At that point, it was the Bush administration, but human rights were always part of the agenda to one degree or another. When you talk about views on China, well China is such a complex area that it gets very difficult to sort out. You get as many views on China as you have China watchers in the U.S. government, of which there were many. I think there were always people all over the spectrum on China. Maybe after Tiananmen everyone saw China with eyes slightly more wide open than before. There were certainly pre-Tiananmen many people in the U.S. government who knew the pros and cons of China and understood its history quite well. China's history consists of a whole series of swings from opening up to cracking down, from power flowing from the central government in Beijing or wherever it is located to the provinces in the south of China.

*Q: Were there other issues you were working on at the time with China?*

PLAISTED: Yes. The U.S. Senate was blocking a tax treaty the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the business community really wanted concluded with China. We on the U.S. side drafted an amended protocol to the tax treaty, an amendment addressing expropriation that Jessie Helms was insisting upon. Then we had to convince the Chinese that for U.S. domestic political reasons, if we were ever going to get a tax treaty concluded between our two countries, China had to sign on to this protocol on expropriation. It was a pretty technical issue. Jim Baker was then Secretary of the Treasury. I accompanied him to the Joint Economic Committee meeting in Beijing. Baker did a masterful job of explaining to the Chinese the U.S. political realities and where Jesse Helms was coming from, and that for our larger interests would the Chinese kindly sign this protocol, which they did. So we were able finally to get the tax treaty implemented. The Senate ceased blocking it. The treaty passed the U.S. Senate and was ratified. Another issue that came up in my time was China's membership in the Asian Development Bank. How do you identify Taiwan so Taiwan doesn't have to be kicked out of the ADB when China was anxious to come in as a member? I was working out language very closely at that point with Treasury and with the economic policy side of the State Department, with EB. We were able to come up with language that allowed China to come into the Asian Development Bank and for Taiwan to retain its membership.

*Q: What was the problem?*

PLAISTED: It was a question of what you list as the main name and what you put in parentheses, or with a comma afterward. It was all a question of how closely you tie Taiwan to China. Is it China Taipei? The name finally agreed upon was Taipei, China. This involved quite a bit of technical negotiating. Another issue that came up was technology transfers to China.

Various controls existed on sophisticated equipment being exported to China. U.S. exporters were rightly irked because there was a heck of a long backlog particularly in the Commerce Department that needed to review their requests to export technology to Beijing. At the same time China was arguing they shouldn't be subject to any controls at all. Of course we thought they should be subject to some controls. At that point we were working very closely with our partners in COCOM, the coordinating committee on export controls in Paris, and came up with a list of items subject to control and were able to speed the approval of non-strategic technology transfer cases to China.

*Q: Were there any people who were dealing with policy when you were going through, saying we had to be careful about China because, while everything is fine now, China may be a major adversary of ours at some point or other. Were people thinking that way?*

PLAISTED: There were some forecasts that China would surpass us - if you take their growth rate and multiply it by so many years, China is going to surpass the U.S. in such and such a year. They are going to become a major economic competitor. That was always something that came up in very optimistic articles on China's economic potential. Most economists, however, realize one has quite a challenge in developing all of China to the point where it truly becomes a highly competitive economic power.

*Q: Moving away from just trade relations, we were also looking or was somebody looking at China as an economic creature itself and how it was coming along? I mean whither China economically?*

PLAISTED: Yes. We were looking at China's economic reforms, and looking at the whole state of China's economy. This is something that both the U.S. and China started to do, especially looking at China's application to join the world's main trade body, the GATT. You had to do an overview of the Chinese economy. It was so hard in those days. It still can be difficult today to get anything like reliable trade statistics or economic statistics. We always had a running argument with the Chinese. They would argue they were running a huge trade deficit with the U.S. which was very interesting because our figures always showed no such thing. Our figures showed China was running quite a healthy surplus, healthy from their perspective, with the U.S. They weren't counting trade that was going through the port in Hong Kong. One of the things I did in those days was to get the Chinese to agree to have their statisticians sit down with our statisticians and at least figure out what each side was counting. So, yes, we were focusing on the overall economy, but even for the Chinese I think it was difficult for them to get a grasp on what was happening. But you could see it visually. Driving through China, waiting a year or two, going back through the same area again, visually you see enormous progress, the number of new little factories that were being set up, more cars as opposed to bicycles on the streets of Beijing, a real increase in pollution. Whether that is a sign of advancement or not, you could visually see dramatic change.

*Q: Were you seeing an increase and increasing Chinese influence of Chinese who let's say were involved in economic business management coming to the United States and getting degrees and then going back? Was there an American educated economic cadre developing?*

PLAISTED: There was. It was very much the thing to do if you could possibly afford it - for the Chinese to come to the U.S. at that point. But many of them were staying, and the Chinese government would complain. Of course, the U.S. government had very little control. We were hardly going to be able to track down all these Chinese students and send them back to China. But what you would find is many of the Chinese students came to the U.S. to study medicine, and said I really don't think I want to go back and be a barefoot doctor in the provinces. That was the problem. They were coming to the U.S. to be educated but many of them were staying here in the U.S. for the professional opportunities afterwards.

*Q: While you were dealing with this, did you find yourself in the whole China operation in the State Department? You mentioned before in Hong Kong that the China watchers got into who is number 14 in the picture showing the politburo and how things are going. Did you find that the China watchers were sort of up in the air looking at who is doing what in the political sphere whereas you had the feeling that this is all very cute, but what does that mean for major relations which were economic?*

PLAISTED: Yes, very much so. I think in Washington we were all more focused on the policy process whereas, out in the field, you are not quite as focused on doing things that are going to get results. But, yes, there was always someone who was saying what does this really mean and what can we do with it? Also I remember discussing, arguing to some extent with my Chinese colleagues. I had been in China and had met Li Peng who was then Energy Minister. This was the U.S. Secretary of Energy's trip to Beijing where he met with his counterpart. Li Peng had made a point of saying he really wanted to visit the U.S. He had been in the U.S. only once before. When we looked into it, he had been very critical of the U.S. when he first visited. So I was arguing with my bosses that we should arrange a USIA-type sponsored trip for Li Peng because I really think he has a great future, or he may have. It is a worthwhile investment just to bring him here, give him a three week trip, show him whatever cities he wants to see so he would understand the U.S. a little better. If he wants to criticize us, fine, but he should do so from an educated basis. Let's pay some more attention to Li Peng. I remember really arguing with the China hands. They said no to any trip, they were not thinking at that point he had much of a future. He truly did.

*Q: Where is Li Peng now?*

PLAISTED: He rose to become premier in China and Chairman of the National People's Congress.

*Q: Did you get the trip for him?*

PLAISTED: No, I never did. The real China experts thought someone with a brighter future should get the trip.

*Q: While you were again with the China watchers, was there concern or consideration to the fact that you are getting a lot of students and other people who really...? Was there concern you have a very elderly central committee in China at that time and growing aspirations of many of the people? Revolutions usually don't start when everybody is poor; they start when aspirations*

*go up, and there might be another revolution and the aging central government might not be able to cope with it. Was this part of the discussion while you were there?*

PLAISTED: Yes, it was an issue that was raised particularly at China conferences where we had some time to reflect on what's happening and also on what are the political views of the new generation in China. How educated are they? How free are they to express their views, and how would that new generation seize power? I don't think anyone had any real answers on how the transition is going to take place, and also how quickly is China going to be able to democratize or open up - whatever you want to call it. That was something that was very interesting during the time of Tiananmen. There was an embargo at the top in China that no information was to get out to the news media, but they didn't turn off the fax machines. There were any number of fax machines in large businesses, and news reports on what was happening at Tiananmen, the deaths, the brutality, were being faxed out of China at that point. You get to a point of westernization or modernization with the Internet, with mobile phones, where it is very hard for the top cadre to cut off all communications.

*Q: Was it an article of faith, maybe I am overstating it, but among the people in the State Department who were dealing with China that as economic policy liberalized this would eventually bring democratization in government? Would economic opening work down to political liberalization?*

PLAISTED: No, I don't think that was an absolute. There was always an expectation once their economic policy liberalized it would open up the country more. There were also many discussions in policy circles that what is really predominant in China is political. You know when push comes to shove what you see is political control. Once Tiananmen started getting out of hand, from the perspective of the aging Chinese leadership, they really had to crack down to maintain political control. They weren't concerned about all these western contracts. They were not asking, "What impact is this going to have on China's economy? Will there suddenly be export controls that are going to be placed on us? Is the U.S. going to block our ADB loans?" No, it comes down in the final analysis to we are losing control of the country. It is time to crack down.

*Q: What about the People's Liberation Army, the PLA, as far as its control over sources of economic machinery? Was that anything we were looking at at that time?*

PLAISTED: It wasn't that much of a political/economic issue then. I know subsequently it became an issue of what the PLA was selling, what goods are being manufactured in jails, what's being manufactured by free or forced labor. The labor unions in the U.S. later became active. I don't remember that as being a really major issue in the mid-1980s.

*Q: How about trade complaints? Did there seem to be a disparity about how trade complaints were settled in the United States? I am talking about say a Chinese who was having trouble with Sears Roebuck or something like that. We have our courts and it is fairly routine, but what about if Sears had a complaint about its supplier in China and wanted to do something about it. Was that a problem?*

PLAISTED: It was always an issue of how you deal with problems. For example, McDonald's had a great location near Tiananmen Square; the Chinese wanted to take the land. McDonald's had the legal right, I believe, but that can mean little. In the final analysis what we did and what I tried to do was to have the next secretary or cabinet level official going to China raise it at the highest level. Ultimately the best way to deal with the Chinese we always found was to raise issues at the highest level. You really need to bring it up to the highest level to get attention. You might take something to the Chinese court system, but that is a losing battle. It wasn't the way to go. If it is a major issue that happens, a big trade complaint, you have to go in and make a demarche at the very highest level.

*Q: That must have meant that our cabinet officials when they went to China were handed a huge pile of situations. They must have said oh my God.*

PLAISTED: It's true. We just had the Secretary of State's visit to China. He raised human rights issues at the very highest level. My point is you have to make a demarche at the very highest level to get China's attention. I'll give you another example of how we handled big problems. The China desk was about a 14 person desk. There was a major conference taking place in another agency. Someone had to stay behind on the desk to be in charge if anything came up. So all my colleagues, all the true China hands who spoke Mandarin, went off to the conference, and I volunteered to stay behind, to be the one to handle anything that came up. The New York Times journalist, John Burns, was arrested in Beijing on my watch. I got a call from the editor of The New York Times, A.M. Rosenthal, to call this to our urgent attention. Of course we immediately got on it. I called in the middle of the night to our political counselor in Beijing who confirmed that yes indeed this had happened. I called the Chinese embassy in Washington to alert them to what had happened. I alerted the op center and called my bosses at the conference. But by the time they came back, I had already drafted a demarche, knowing this should be raised at the highest levels. I drafted a demarche so that we could start the process to protest and to free the journalist.

*Q: What happened?*

PLAISTED: It was a time consuming process. This went on for many days after we were notified of the arrest. But John Burns eventually was released.

*Q: What was the problem? What did he do?*

PLAISTED: It was a general charge that the journalist was spying. He may have been a little too close to what was a military facility. From our perspective there was never any thought that this New York Times journalist was out there spying on the Chinese.

*Q: As you were observing the Chinese, the mainland Chinese, how were they treating the Taiwanese, because China, I believe, had opened up by that time to investment from Taiwan?*

PLAISTED: Yes, Taiwan investment at this point was really beginning to flow into southern China and into Fujian province. It was a time when you couldn't trade directly, you still can't, between Taiwan and China, but there was a lot of trade flowing indirectly through Hong Kong.

Taiwan investors were going into China because this was the time where from Taiwan's perspective their dollar had appreciated so much it really made economic sense for them to relocate their factories just right across the Taiwan Strait to China. So it was a time of a real boom in southern China with investment flowing in from Taiwan.

*Q: You know we have this peculiar relationship, American interests, with the Taiwan people - I mean our own Americans dealing with Taiwan. Would you compare and contrast and all that? They were located where? What was it called then?*

PLAISTED: The American Institute in Taiwan, in Rosslyn, Virginia, and in Taipei. We would see reporting on the China desk from the American Institute in Taiwan in Taipei, and, of course, the American Institute in Taipei would always see reporting coming out of Beijing and Hong Kong. There's always in the State Department someone who follows Taiwan from the policy perspective. There was a Taiwan section in State to follow the policy issues. The relationship with AIT in Rosslyn depended on who the director was - whether it was more than an administrative function on staffing issues with AIT in Taipei. There was a hall connecting the China desk and the Taiwan section in the State Department. We always referred to that little narrow corridor as the Taiwan Strait. They were there. They were there to consult with if there was some issue with Taiwan.

*Q: I think our people in Taipei, for example, I am talking about your particular bailiwick, the economic side, would be getting some very good information because here were people who were much more open. I am talking about the Taiwanese going in and investing and coming back and telling our people, so in many ways it would be a very solid source of information about how economics were working from this particular source.*

PLAISTED: That is very true, and, as I was mentioning earlier, too, we were getting the same type of information in Hong Kong. This is why we have China watchers in Hong Kong because it is a much more open place to get information. People are willing to talk to you, and you can pick up a lot of atmospherics.

*Q: Did you find that our economic people in Beijing were somewhat inhibited about getting out and around and being able to have good talks?*

PLAISTED: It was very difficult for them to get information. I think the Chinese at times were hesitant to talk with them on anything other than a real formal basis and to engage in a give and take with U.S. government officials. Once the Chinese got beyond their instructions they were a little lost for words. So it was difficult to get that same type of exchange. Of course language was always an issue. The Americans had to speak good Mandarin because once you get down to the middle level of the Chinese government not everyone is speaking English in Beijing or has an interpreter.

*Q: What about the academic world? People in the academic world are looking at China, and at other countries in the world but particularly China, and writing things, whither China? The political scientists and economists are looking at China. Were you able to sample much of this?*

PLAISTED: The academics would come in sometimes and talk to us on the China desk and we would sometimes go out to lunch. But frankly we were so busy pursuing all the day-to-day policy issues on what was happening. We didn't have much time to reflect. It was always a great luxury to be able to sit down with China scholars and enjoy an intellectual discussion on whither China, which of course we are still debating today. There were often China conferences at Brookings and other institutions taking place in the area. It was great if you could break away and attend them which we were always quite welcome to do if we had the time to do it.

*Q: This is one of the things, with this oral history project. We are supplying some ammunition for the academics of the future. But I have always been struck by the fact, and this goes back to when I was in the Foreign Service, too, of how little time there is. Academics are writing about this or that, but the people who are actually dealing with policy, usually there is not much of a connect because they don't have time, and after awhile, they haven't found what the academic is writing that useful. I mean it would be nice, but it is almost a luxury.*

PLAISTED: It depends on your academic. There are always some I have a lot of respect for. If they would write something, they would send it to me and I would read it on my own time depending on the academic. But there wasn't always the luxury of taking off to go to a China conference. I was always quite professionally free to do so and my staff was, too, but we had to get our briefing papers up to the seventh floor for the next cabinet meeting or to go brief someone who was going off to China. Alas there was always something more urgent to do.

*Q: Did you get any feel for Secretary Shultz and his interest in economics of China?*

PLAISTED: It was our office director who accompanied Shultz on his trip, so he had more of a feeling for the Secretary of State. I accompanied the Secretary of Commerce, Matt Baldrige, and the then Secretary of the Treasury, James Baker. We also backstopped Vice President Bush's trip to China in October 1985 and briefed him before his trip. I was impressed by a question Bush asked about what the U.S. would do if Taiwan sought independence from China - a very foresighted question.

*Q: How did that trip go?*

PLAISTED: It went quite well. Of course the Chinese treated Bush royally as they always do. It was his return to China after having opened up the mission in Beijing, so it was quite a historic return.

*Q: Is there anything else you think we should cover here? In '87 you went to the War College. Which war college?*

PLAISTED: The National War College at Fort McNair, the top military academy.

*Q: So that would be '87 to '88. How did you find your experience there?*

PLAISTED: Well it was very interesting on a couple of fronts. When I was first assigned to the War College, my reaction was Great! I am going to have a year off, and I can pursue my own

interests. There are no grades at the War College. No one really checks on you. You do have to attend classes, but this is going to give me time to do what I want to do. I really was very interested at that point in reading a lot of history and trying to integrate what was happening in western civilization with what was happening in the eastern world. I don't think anyone had ever written a book really integrating eastern and western civilization. How could Kenneth Clarke entitle his book Civilization and not say a thing about China? That was going to be my personal project during this year of freedom. Well, once I started attending the War College, sitting in the auditorium, I was absolutely enthralled by the quality of the speakers we were hearing. We would have a session on the Presidency and every chief of staff going back to Ed Meese, in Nixon's days, and even the Eisenhower administration would come and speak to us. Every 45 minutes here comes another chief of staff for the former President of the United States to talk to us. We just had such top exposure. We would go to the Supreme Court and talk to some of the justices. I started getting really involved in the academic program at the War College. You could take elective courses in the afternoon. Everyone took three electives. I asked why can't you take four? They said well you could. No one has ever done that. Well the price was right. I wasn't paying for this and the courses were fascinating, so I was adding an extra course each semester because it was just such a fascinating place to study. Some of the professors were superb, including Mel Goodman on the Soviet Union. The professor who handled the Middle East taught me a lot about what I knew about the Arab world before my tour in Morocco. Academically I took full advantage of the War College. I went on almost all of the voluntary trips. I crawled around the back of a B-52 bomber when we visited the SAC, the Strategic Air Command, in Omaha. I went to Colorado Springs where we visited NORAD and Spacecom. I visited the scenic Coast Guard facilities in San Francisco. I descended down into the missile silos in Minot, North Dakota, at the Minot air force base. So academically it was a fascinating place. As a woman, all of a sudden at the War College, my antenna was sort of raised, because of the things that were happening all the time. Little things. I was always getting Mr. placed on my name tags. There were 14 women at the War College at that time, but they just didn't seem to be prepared to deal with women. It would come up in very small ways. At one point, I probably could have made a name for myself at the War College, I was going to write to the commandant who is in charge of the War College and tell him how delighted I was with his policy of topless bathing at the swimming pool, that I felt right at home just as if I were on the French Riviera again. I wanted to congratulate him on his liberalism that I would not have expected to find at the National War College. The student handbook read, "upper garments must be worn at all times except at the swimming pool." I would have made quite a name for myself at the National War College testing the commandant's policy. But those are the type of things that I was running into all the time at the War College.

*Q: Well, it is a very important project I think.*

PLAISTED: Oh, yes, it was just a fabulous experience, a very useful year. I feel very fortunate to have had that year at the National War College. There were field trips. Everyone was bidding on China. You know, you bid on trips. Everyone's first choice was China. Well I don't know how many times I had been to China in the last year. I had ranked it as number 13. The last place in the world I wanted to go to was China. I had never been to Central America or Latin America. I ended up going to Central America.

*Q: Okay. Then you went to Taiwan in 1988 and you were there from '88 to when?*

PLAISTED: To '91.

*Q: What was your job?*

PLAISTED: I was the head of what was one of the very few combined economic commercial sections that were still left, because most of the Foreign Commercial Service had been set up, most commercial sections had been split off at that point. So I headed about a 40 person economic commercial section. We had a trade center in Taipei putting on exhibitions, with a large commercial staff. Taiwan was our second largest trade deficit after Japan in those days. It was very clear Taiwan's market had to be opened up. Even Taiwan was starting to realize it. I headed all the trade negotiations, and there were endless trade negotiations, to really open up Taiwan's market. I was very pleased that by the time I left Taiwan had fallen from number two place to number five. It wasn't completely due to our hard work at the American Institute in Taiwan, but Taiwan had fallen to fifth place in terms of our trade deficit, behind Japan, China, and others.

*Q: Before we go into that, could you explain because I think it needs explaining what you and everyone who serves there had to go through and your official status when you went to Taiwan?*

PLAISTED: This is the American Institute in Taiwan. To serve there, you have to resign from the Foreign Service. We only have economic, commercial, cultural and other relations with Taiwan. After we recognized mainland China, we ruptured relations quite precipitously and quite rudely with Taiwan. So I had to resign from the Foreign Service, to turn in my resignation. I think it actually appeared in the State Department magazine that I had resigned because I was getting letters from friends saying, Joan, what happened? They knew I really loved my career. I think they thought I had a terminal illness to resign. But then about three years later I miraculously reappear on the rolls of the State Department. You continue your retirement benefits although those got a little messed up. You continue the same benefits, the same health benefits, but you do formally resign from the Foreign Service to serve in Taiwan.

*Q: Well then who was the head of the institute?*

PLAISTED: David Dean was the director of the American Institute in Taiwan in my day, and Scott Hallford was the deputy director. Since we do not have official relations, we do not have an ambassador.

*Q: So basically you were a regular embassy with an economic commercial counselor.*

PLAISTED: Yes, but because of the importance of our economic work there, I was the number three, the third ranking person in AIT.

*Q: Who was the top economic person?*

PLAISTED: I was.

*Q: Oh, you were. Now you were number three...*

PLAISTED: After Scott Hallford, the deputy, or the DCM.

*Q: Well now, you go out there. I am sure in your portfolio you are saying look at this deficit, do something. How do you go about doing this?*

PLAISTED: Look there are so many different areas where you can start opening up the Taiwan market. I think one of the first messages we had to get across to Taiwan was to really make them realize it was in their own interest. The time had come. They always wanted to be a more active member of the world community. My message was, it is in your own interest to open up, to liberalize. Then you start attacking the deficit in every way possible from negotiating with them on reducing very high tariffs to endorsing intellectual property rights. We signed a copyright agreement, renegotiated a textile agreement, concluded agreements on strategic trade controls, steel, machine tools, opened up the banking, insurance, and securities markets, negotiated a drift net fishing agreement, several agreements on nuclear cooperation, and a beer, wine, and cigarettes accord. These are all negotiations that I was heading. We would often have delegations coming from Washington. I think one of the most important things that happened during that time is Taiwan's action in response to U.S. pressure because the omnibus trade act was coming up. Taiwan's president announced, and put his personal imprimatur on it, the President's trade action plan, a Taiwan initiative to liberalize trade, which is something that we really supported. He left out intellectual property rights, a most important area. I very quickly called up my then counterpart, who was Vincent Siew who later went on to be the premier of Taiwan, and said, "Vincent, this is really great. This is a good Taiwan initiative. Obviously you are targeting this at the U.S. Don't you think you want to include intellectual property rights?" He knew the atmosphere and very quickly realized this was quite an omission.

*Q: This has been sort of a hallmark. Everybody who thinks of Taiwan in the old days thinks of it as being the source of cheap books and all that. That is what they focus on.*

PLAISTED: So Vincent very quickly grasped the problem and said, "Well, let me discuss this and see if it could be part of the President's trade action plan." Of course it was added. So my main thrust is trying to get Taiwan to realize it is in its own interest to open up and then to say let's work together.

*Q: Well, had they sort of picked up old habits from their mainland days, or was this a revenue issue? Were they thinking in terms of infant industries and trying to develop them and maintaining all these various barriers?*

PLAISTED: Well they did in those days have the world's second largest foreign exchange holdings. So they were a very wealthy area. I think a lot of these barriers were just left over, too, and they had gone through very hard times right after the war. I think now they realize it is very much in their interest to export more globally, and they were going to have to open up their markets, too.

*Q: Did you find that in China, I mean in Taiwan, that when something came out of the ministry it was more likely to be enforced than when you were dealing with mainland China?*

PLAISTED: Oh yes, very much so. And Taiwan had the means to enforce it, too. So if an agreement was concluded with Taiwan, we never had to really worry that it would not be enforced. We could quickly go over and make a demarche. Taiwan would know if there was some political reason an agreement was not being enforced, would figure out why, and identify the problem. There was always a real exchange of views.

*Q: Did you find for example that as you sat down and were negotiating, you were close enough to the seat of power that you didn't have to wait forever in order to notify them, to get instructions and all. Were they more flexible?*

PLAISTED: Very much so. They were always exceedingly well prepared. Something I initiated that helped us, I think, to make progress in all these negotiations with Taiwan was something I had done with textiles in Hong Kong. Before the talks, if it was at all possible, we would exchange papers with them or at least give them a one or two page paper saying this is the U.S. position, this is what we are asking you to do, here is why we think it is important. So Taiwan would know in advance what we were going to say at the negotiating table and where we wanted to come out. So that gave them before the talks the ability to go and do their interagency clearance processes. Also I'd always send a cable to Washington before the talks. My staff who handled each of these areas would draft a cable explaining what we thought we should try to get out of the talks and what we thought Taiwan's position was going to be. So that really speeded things along. And again Taiwan didn't like surprises, so it helped them prepare. And they had some brilliant people on their side. I remember there was one lawyer who was so good who took part in almost all of their trade talks. We always wanted him to come and join our side of the table.

*Q: Did you find a lot of Taiwanese students went to the United States? At that point were they beginning to come back?*

PLAISTED: Yes. The Taiwan students did go back in general. Of course I am speaking in generalities, but the Taiwan students seemed to go back. It was also very important to the people on Taiwan to go to top name U.S. universities. Their calling cards would often note the school they had attended if it was prestigious. When someone would present me with his calling card, it would often give the name of the person and then underneath his name, not his job title so much as where he graduated from - which university. They always liked it to be a recognizable name. So if you received a calling card, you could see where the person went to school, thus emphasizing the importance of education which I have always highly respected. I think it accounts for some of the success of Taiwan and Hong Kong, the importance of education.

*Q: Korea, too, and obviously Japan. Did we ever use that sort of not as a policy instrument but to have the University of Chicago alumni group, I mean university and college alumni groups, getting together in Taiwan and the embassy sponsoring them?*

PLAISTED: I remember getting together with my best Taiwan girlfriend who graduated from

Wellesley, getting together with the Wellesley University group and meeting with the president of Wellesley. But it was done informally, more informally than through the American Institute in Taiwan.

*Q: Did you find once you settled in there that being an institute rather than an embassy, did that really change things at all? Was it a delicate relationship with Taiwan?*

PLAISTED: Yes, you had to be really careful about the terminology. We were never to refer to Taiwan as a country since we recognized Taiwan as a part of China. We did not meet in government officials' offices. This led to frequent lunches and dinners. We had to be certain that someone wasn't going to go running off to call on the president of Taiwan in his office. There were things that just weren't allowed that visiting U.S. government officials just were not meant to do. I remember we would have top level congressional visitors and Taiwan would always try to get more recognition. We would always want congressional members and USG officials to start with a briefing at the American Institute in Taiwan. Part of it was I would brief them on the substance of where we stood in terms of trade liberalization, always telling them the glass was half full or half empty. It depends on how you look at it. But at the same time we wanted to brief them very early on in their visit to Taiwan on the do's and don'ts, on just how one goes about business in this very strange set up we have on Taiwan where we don't have government-to-government relations.

*Q: How about the service industries? I am thinking of insurance, banking, advertising, you name it, legal firms. Was there much of an opening for these in Taiwan at that time?*

PLAISTED: It was a section that did have to be opened up. Taiwan's service section wasn't that open to U.S. firms. So it was an area where we were negotiating to really open up the banking market, the securities market, and the insurance market. This was all very much in the vanguard in those days.

*Q: Did they see that by opening up that would open things up for them, too?*

PLAISTED: Yes, and they were always looking for ways to ally themselves closer, to establish a closer relationship with the United States. I think Taiwan realized that if they could get more U.S. firms to locate in Taipei that could lead to a lobby promoting closer ties.

*Q: Were we seeing their surplus as a target to get them to invest in the United States?*

PLAISTED: We weren't asking them to invest in the U.S. We were seeing their surplus as a need to appreciate their currency, the NT, the new Taiwan dollar. We were often writing reports on exchange rates for Treasury, and Treasury was pressuring them to appreciate the new Taiwan dollar. I talk about this great success in getting Taiwan to drop from number two in terms of the U.S. trade deficit after Japan to number five. If you want to know the real secret of our great success, it really wasn't all these great trade negotiations I headed across the board. You get Taiwan to reduce their tariffs, open up services, crack down on copyright violations - that takes a long time before it shows up in trade statistics.

So the real secret of how we dropped, how Taiwan dropped to fifth place, was not my great, brilliant negotiating. It was that the new Taiwan dollar through various means appreciated so much it became uncompetitive for Taiwan firms to continue manufacturing and exporting from Taiwan, so they all moved over to China, Fujian province, and started setting up textile plants, footwear plants, light electronics goods factories, and exporting to the U.S. from China. We no longer had a Taiwan problem, we now had a China problem with our trade deficit, but it was no longer my problem.

*Q: As a consular officer, if there is an accident, and you ask very carefully just where did it happen, and if it is somebody else's district, well I will tell my colleague to take care of it. You really have been in the field of negotiating for a long time, and the United States in the beginning was sort of benevolent in negotiations and not very insistent. You came early on the scene when all of a sudden we discovered this is costing us money. Did you find that by the time you got to Taiwan they kind of had book on you and knew who you were and were familiar with your negotiating technique. "Oh, my God, here comes the iron lady..."*

PLAISTED: No, I don't think I came to Taiwan with a pre-established reputation as a really tough negotiator. I had not worked with Taiwan in the GATT, UNCTAD, or the OECD. They weren't members. The Americans in the American Institute of Taiwan had heard of me by reputation, but the Taiwan negotiators, I don't think they had gone out there and actually studied my tactics and battle plan.

*Q: Well, you were there in '88-'91, and of course there was the whole Asian thing particularly in '89 in June with the Tiananmen Square incident. How did that hit you all? When you all were watching it, particularly China watchers, what were they saying as they saw this, because this went on for some time. The demonstrations weren't a short term thing. It took quite a while to develop. Was there concern or what was the feeling?*

PLAISTED: I remember watching this slowly build up and the demonstrations became larger and larger. I just remember myself about two weeks before the Tiananmen crackdown thinking and mentioning to some of my China colleagues that China was going to crack down. Others weren't too certain if Beijing was going to crack down or not. I sensed they would. It is just not in the Chinese nature in Beijing to let things get so much out of control. Unfortunately, they did as I had predicted and cracked down hard. I remember I had gone outside of Taipei for the weekend. We had a little guest house up in the mountains. The worst part about living in Taipei is the horrible pollution downtown, so I would flee on weekends to get a bit of fresh air on the top of the little mountain up in our director's guest house. He would kindly open it up to the embassy staff when he wasn't using it. Coming back into Taipei, there were suddenly armed guards at almost every intersection. We hadn't heard what happened over the radio. We had been rather isolated. I don't know if anyone had yet heard over the news what had happened, but it was obvious something was going on with the stepped up security. It only lasted for a day or two. I think at that point Taiwan was a little concerned about a possible spillover to Taiwan when the mainlanders cracked down in Beijing.

*Q: You had this peculiar thing when the mainland Chinese were looking very carefully at who visited the United States and vice versa, Taiwan. Were there any difficulties? You want to get the*

*economic ministers together. How did that work out on your side, particularly with the Secretary of Treasury or the Secretary of Commerce? Could they come there and talk?*

PLAISTED: No, they couldn't, not in my day. We really did not have cabinet level exchanges. You are not going to have U.S.-Taiwan commerce ministers meetings. We didn't have that high level of exchange. If we were going to meet with them we would meet more informally in Washington. We would always meet outside of the State Department on some neutral ground such as in a restaurant.

*Q: You have American departmental secretaries who have over time been able to call on their colleagues as they met them in these international meetings. This whole line of communication, was it dead or was there sort of an informal way of doing this?*

PLAISTED: In my days, the top levels in the State Department were not getting engaged with their Taiwan counterparts. The American Institute in Taiwan in Washington, the director of the American Institute, would come through Taipei a couple times a year. Of course he was a non-State Department person, and he could go and call on various people, the Taiwan authorities. But you certainly were not going to have a Taiwan official meeting even informally with the Secretary of State or the Under Secretary.

*Q: I would think that in the long run you might say the mainland policy of monitoring this very closely would have a certain effect because it was cutting down on the contacts between high officials. You know they get together a lot more than they used to, and they talk to each other, and that is the way a lot of business gets done. Did you notice this?*

PLAISTED: Certainly on the political level it is an inhibiting factor which China has meant it to be.

*Q: How about on the economic level?*

PLAISTED: Economically it was inhibiting to some degree. We can have economic relations but we were very careful to some extent about not letting it spill over to the political realm.

*Q: You know when you are doing this, you are negotiating, you are really looking at State, Treasury and Commerce these are sort of your...*

PLAISTED: And USTR.

*Q: USTR yes because I was thinking of the White House. Was there a filter or basically were you talking to them? How did you work this for your instructions?*

PLAISTED: We have economic relations, we have commercial relations with Taiwan. My instructions were coming from the Washington interagency clearance process. Everyone had signed on and, you know, I would often have a say. I would cable Washington and say this is what I think the instructions should be. They were very much cleared interagency U.S. government instructions.

*Q: So in a way...*

PLAISTED: That was the normal economic relationship, commercial relationship that we did have with Taiwan. I would head all the trade negotiations as the AIT representative.

*Q: Who could you deal with on the Taiwanese side?*

PLAISTED: With our counterparts across the table. Their chief trade negotiator was Vincent Siew who became their economic minister and later the premier. We dealt with the people from their Ministry of Trade and their Economic Planning Commission. We dealt with all of their economic people.

*Q: One always sees lists of the ten most wealthy people in the world, and there are usually a couple of Taiwanese on it. Were there big, would you call them shoguns or the equivalent?*

PLAISTED: Yes absolutely. One is the Chairman of Far Eastern Textiles, Douglas Hsu. I think he still shows up on the Fortune 500 list. Another is Formosa Plastics, the Wang family, who are very wealthy and very well established in Taiwan, Asia, and the United States. I developed close friendships with some of these people.

*Q: I assume they were closely tied to the government at least I mean on economic matters.*

PLAISTED: Most of your top people in Taiwan are very politically savvy, economically savvy, but they weren't always very political. Some were apolitical at times.

*Q: On to politics, we didn't have a political section, was there a cultural section? How did we cover the politics of Taiwan?*

PLAISTED: There was a political section, a relatively small section that would report on what was going on politically. In those days, our deputy director (the equivalent of the DCM) was Scott Hallford. He was a great golfer, still is to this day, and it was a fabulous talent to have. There was a long period of time when we didn't have a director. I was acting deputy director in Scott's job, and he was acting as director. If he wanted to find out what was happening politically, he would take the afternoon off and go off to the golf course, and the next day he would come back and write a great cable about what he picked up on the golf course. He didn't report where he picked up his information, but that was the best place to find Taiwan's movers and shakers.

*Q: Did you feel under any particular threat or anything like that when you were there, or was it pretty tight control?*

PLAISTED: I didn't. I did feel relatively safe in Taiwan. It was the time of the Gulf War. I had a house in downtown Taipei with some red gates. I remember walking out of my red gates one morning, and some guy in the neighborhood points his fingers at me like guns and goes, "Pow, pow, Gulf War," shooting me. I sort of looked at him, but I knew I wasn't under any great threat.

*Q: I understand from people who were in African countries during the Gulf War, they practically shut down. Everyone was watching the war on TV.*

PLAISTED: Oh, absolutely. It was what I was doing to the extent I possibly could. We had the TV on in the cafeteria which was around the corner from my office at the AIT. I announced at a staff meeting that the place to find me if I am not in my office is the cafeteria. I will sign cables or if you need me I will break away from the Gulf War. And please feel free to watch the war yourselves. This is a pretty exciting moment in history. We all need to get our work done, but you can do it whenever you want to. You know what you are responsible for. You are professionals, and if you want to sit there and watch the Gulf War, go ahead. It was a fascinating time. If we weren't watching for awhile, we would ask our colleagues in the hall or the cafeteria for an update. So we were absolutely glued to the TV as much as possible. I was absolutely stunned when President Bush suddenly called off operations.

*Q: I think most of us were. I feel it was a day too soon.*

PLAISTED: I was trying to understand what happened here.

*Q: What about the Gulf War? I mean we were running around trying to get money, get support and all. Did you get involved in that? Did Taiwan get melded into that at all?*

PLAISTED: I certainly didn't get involved in it.

*Q: Because we were sort of passing the hat among a lot of countries, but Taiwan was maybe somewhat off limits. Did the Bush administration which came in while you were there, did that change anything, or did you have any feel for a difference in thrust from Reagan to Bush?*

PLAISTED: No, it was very much the Bush administration. I don't think the change in administration made any real difference. '88-'91, it would have mainly been the Bush administration.

*Q: Is there anything else we should cover on Taiwan? I thought I would wrap it up at this point.*

PLAISTED: I think that's done.

*Q: Did you get the feeling that the Burmese government gave a damn about what we did?*

PLAISTED: They did to some extent because they really did want more support on the counternarcotics side from the U.S. Also I think they were very concerned economically with the power that we had to prohibit new foreign investment or even to have some impact on the U.S. investment that was already there. They were actively putting in a gas pipeline between Burma and Thailand. So I think to some extent, yes, they were concerned about how they were viewed by the United States. At the same time the Burmese government and others would argue that how they viewed the democratic process or how they treated Aung San Suu Kyi and her followers was an internal affair of their government, and we shouldn't interfere. It is the classic

Chinese argument, we shouldn't interfere in their internal affairs and sovereignty.

*Q: How about China?*

PLAISTED: China, it depended on the issue. Sometimes we had like-minded views. I had very good conversations with the Chinese ambassador on our mutual interests at the UN, and, on other issues such as human rights, China had a very different perspective. China, it depended on the issue. Singapore could sometimes see things quite differently. They were very active trying to be contentious at times. So sometimes Singapore would be quite outspoken on issues. We didn't always see eye-to-eye with their permanent representative.

*Q: Was there a problem of Japanese and maybe American, Russian, and other boats basically poaching? Were there Marshallese boats?*

PLAISTED: Marshallese, no. The Marshalls doesn't do any deep water tuna fishing. There was a rather disastrous time when they did buy some tuna boats and proved they really couldn't operate them and then tried to sell the boats back to the country they had bought them from. Now their emphasis has been more on letting mainly the Chinese and some other nationalities do the fishing. Their hope is to get more revenue from the spin-offs.

*Q: At one point in all these Pacific islands, one of our prime objectives was strategic denial, that is to keep the Soviets from putting ships and bases on these islands. Has that completely gone by the board? During your time there, were we looking over our shoulders to see if the Chinese might want to play games on this?*

PLAISTED: When the U.S. was in the Marshall Islands at the height of the Cold War, the concept of strategic denial was very important to counter the Russians. It is debatable how valid strategic denial is today. I think the Marshalls is still of strategic significance to the United States. It is a vast ocean space. These are important shipping lanes between Hawaii and spots further west in Australia and Southeast Asia. We do not want to have an adversary control these shipping lanes. Now there is no one today, not the Chinese, not the Russians, who is threatening these open shipping lanes, but it is very important to keep the lanes open. We don't know what the future threats are going to be. I think this area still is of significance strategically, although the Cold War has long ended and relations have certainly changed with the Marshall Islands since the days of the Cold War.

*Q: Now on the personal and personnel side, how did you keep from going Island happy? I mean also not just you but...*

PLAISTED: The whole embassy team. When I first went out to the Marshall Islands I was so afraid of not having enough to do. I am a very active person and had been posted in Paris, Geneva, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Rabat, not a series of hardship posts. I shipped out 800 pounds of books. I was buying every classic to either read or re-read. I had two copies of War and Peace in case I wanted to read it in two different translations. The embassy had a tennis court. I bought an automatic tennis ball launching machine, quite an expensive piece of equipment, so I could take up tennis. I bought oil paints and canvasses, just about everything I could think of. I shipped

my chessboard out to the Marshall Islands. Coming back 4 ½ years later I shipped back 800 pounds of books, and the canvasses are still white, unpainted. I did use the tennis ball launching machine, and learned how to play tennis to some extent.

What I found personally, and I think it is true for other members of the embassy staff, too, was we were such a small embassy. We were awfully busy. It would have been very difficult to live there without working so intensely. Of course as ambassador I was on call 24 hours a day. I would get calls in the middle of the night that someone in Kiribati had just been bitten by a barracuda and was bleeding profusely and could I please send in the Coast Guard immediately. I think our Embassy staff did save a few lives. The substantive issues really kept me quite busy.

What I did for recreation, what I really enjoyed, was I took up scuba diving. To this day I can't swim very well, and I don't like to get my head under water. But I became quite an avid diver. The Marshalls has some of the loveliest coral in the world, and great fish of almost every tropical variety. What you are almost always guaranteed to see when you are diving are sharks. I can remember quite vividly the first time I ever saw a shark. I was just snorkeling in the Marshall Islands when a shark came swimming by to check out my dive buddy. I quickly learned the different species. The white tipped shark is the shark that is considered less dangerous. The black tipped sharks and your grey reef sharks are very territorial. If they start circling you, you had better swim as fast as you can to get out of their territory. They are telling you that you are in the shark's living room, you had better get out as quickly as you can. Very often, particularly when I was first there, I would spend my weekends under water to get away from the land sharks. I was up on Bikini professionally and was pleased to be able to dive there. I wanted to see the experiments that the Department of Energy is conducting to show how you can grow indigenous plants on Bikini that aren't dangerous to eat.

*Q: What about Kiribati where you were also our Ambassador?*

PLAISTED: Kiribati was a British protectorate until they became independent in 1979. The president today is President Tito, who was reelected during my time, too. I got to know him quite well. When I went over to present my credentials, I discovered that his father had been employed by the U.S. army right after W.W.II where he learned all these American folk songs which he had passed on to his son who subsequently became the president of the country. One of my foremost memories of the president is of the reception he hosted after I presented my credentials. The Peace Corps volunteers and American missionaries were there. He suggested he and I sing "Home on the Range" together. I gave quite a good representation of the United States until he turned to me and said, "Joan, you know the second verse don't you?" Of course I didn't. The president knew the second verse. I didn't even know "Home on the Range" had a second verse. Actually it has five verses I learned subsequently.

The major U.S. presence in Kiribati is the Peace Corps. I have the highest respect for the volunteers who are often on these very isolated outer atolls doing very good work that is highly appreciated by the local people. When I was first named Ambassador, we had 20 Peace Corps volunteers in Kiribati, and they were all in the educational field. The President met his wife through the Peace Corps. She was helping to train some of the Peace Corps volunteers when he was asked to give a lecture and they fell in love. Of course they both have fond memories of the

Peace Corps. He was always asking me for more Peace Corps volunteers, saying this is the way the U.S. can really help. We did manage to more than double the number of volunteers to 40 some in my time. Now about half of them are working on health projects. The Chinese have a mission in Kiribati. The Australians and New Zealanders have high commissioners, since Kiribati is a commonwealth member. The Chinese have built a satellite tracking station.

The president has done a lot to try and protect the local culture – to preserve the dancing traditions. After I presented my credentials, one of their schools put on a dance ceremony. I was absolutely fascinated for about the first 10-15 minutes. It was the next two hours and 45 minutes that were hard to sit through as the VIP. But the dancers are really superb.

*Q: Well, are there any other issues we should cover at this time? Other embassies to mention?*

PLAISTED: During my time, the Marshall Islands shifted their relations from China to Taiwan. Now they are receiving substantial economic assistance from Taiwan.

*Q: I would imagine it makes good sense. They have nothing else to bargain with.*

PLAISTED: Taiwan is very active in courting a number of the Pacific islands, and most successful in getting some of them to change their recognition from China to Taiwan.

*Q: What were you doing there in 2000?*

PLAISTED: I again served as the Asia advisor, the senior advisor for Asia. I remember being in Secretary of State Albright's meeting with President Wahid of Indonesia who was less than dynamic and in meetings with the Korean and the Chinese foreign ministers. There were a number of high level meetings because the heads of state and the ministers of foreign affairs were all there for the millennium summit. The major UN issue that session was UN reform. We needed to work out something so the U.S. would be able to pay our back assessments we owed to the United Nations. That agreement fell into place at the final hours at the end of the General Assembly's main session thanks to the efforts of Dick Holbrook and the administrative counselor at the U.S. Mission to the UN and many other people. There were various votes where I lobbied the Asian Ambassadors particularly on the issue of which countries to elect for two year rotating Security Council seats. The vote probably went the right way because of the support of the Pacific islands and some of the smaller Asian countries, including Mongolia. I or one of my colleagues would sit down with the Mongolian ambassador for awhile and present the U.S. perspective in such a way that he realized this is really the position Mongolia should be taking, too. We often could find an ally in Mongolia which was quite a pleasant surprise.

**MARIE THERESE HUHTALA**  
**Political Officer (China Watcher)**  
**Hong Kong (1985-1987)**

*Ambassador Huhtala was born and raised in California and Graduated from*

*Santa Clara University. Joining the Foreign Service in 1972, she studied Thai and Chinese languages and became a specialist in East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Her overseas postings include Paris, Quebec, Hong Kong and Chiang Mai (Thailand). In Washington, she dealt primarily with East Asia and Pacific Affairs. From 2001 to 2004 she served as US ambassador to Malaysia and, from 2004 to 2005, as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. Ambassador Huhtala is a graduate of the National War College and the State Department's Senior Seminar. Ambassador Huhtala was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.*

*Q: How did you find Chinese?*

HUHTALA: In some respects it's very similar to Thai. It's got the same kind of tones and a monosyllabic word structure, and word order rules rather than declinations and conjugations as far as grammar goes. Yet I found it a lot harder than Thai. For one thing the characters just killed me. Thai has an alphabet. It has 42 consonants but you can learn 42 consonants. And if you can learn those, you can read Thai. To get your 3-3 in Chinese, on the other hand, you have to memorize 3,000 characters. That's hard. And a truly educated Chinese speaker knows 10,000 characters. When you got through the FSI program, you have to learn both the traditional characters and the simplified ones that are used on the mainland. And, whereas conversational Thai will get you through almost anywhere, for Chinese we had to learn several levels of the language, including very elevated Chinese, with quotes from old proverbs going back to Confucius' time. Learning Chinese represented two solid years of serious application.

*Q: How did you find Taiwan?*

HUHTALA: Interesting and a little strange. Taiwan had a parliament that was made up of people who were representing various constituencies in old China, places like Shanghai and Hunan and Fujian. They retained this fiction of representing all of China even though a lot of the seats were empty because the last time they had an election was in 1949 and the legislators were dropping one by one. There we learned an awful lot about Chinese culture, about the mainland as our teachers understood it. There hadn't been a lot of contact between the two up to that time so their understanding of it was a little bit outdated. They did have a lot of written material to teach from that had been sent in by our Embassy in Beijing. This material was written in the simplified characters and it used all of the communist formulations for political discussions. It was very interesting.

*Q: Where you able to get a hold of mainland newspapers and things like that?*

HUHTALA: Yes, we did, as we had them in Hong Kong when I got there. We read articles from Peoples Daily, both at FSI in Washington and in Taiwan. They were brought in to us by diplomatic pouch and they were carefully controlled. For example, we were warned not to leave them in our cars, visible through the windows, as that might get us in trouble.

*Q: How did you come out of that course?*

HUHTALA: I got a 3/3+ in Mandarin Chinese, and I also took a couple months of Cantonese because I was going to Hong Kong. This was an interesting experiment because Cantonese is about as different from Mandarin as French is from Spanish. They clearly have the same origin but they're different languages. So I did all right on the language study. We also had some interesting experiences traveling around the island.

*Q: Who else was in the class with you?*

HUHTALA: Joe Donovan was in my class. He is now our DCM in Tokyo. Keith Powell, a consular officer, and his wife Janet; plus a lot of people who were not from State and who are no longer around.

*Q: You went to Hong Kong, how long were you in Hong Kong?*

HUHTALA: Only two years, unfortunately.

*Q: This is from when to when?*

HUHTALA: From 1985 to 1987.

*Q: What were you doing?*

HUHTALA: I was in the political section, doing China mainland reporting. At that time we still had a very active China reporting unit in Hong Kong to supplement the work of the Embassy in Beijing and the Consulates in other parts of China.

*Q: In many ways you could get around more?*

HUHTALA: We had access to different contacts. There was a large refugee class because everybody in Hong Kong seemed to have fled the mainland at some point or other. They had a real refugee mentality too -- very insecure, very much trying to enrich themselves and make the most of the time they had. There were also political dissidents there. We met with professional China watchers, including some of the academics in the universities. There were members of the clergy who were in touch with the underground church in China. And there were China-inspired newspapers that got all of their direction from Beijing but published in Chinese for the Hong Kong population. There was often a lot of really interesting information leaked in those papers and in some of the political magazines that were being published in Hong Kong; things that one wouldn't dare publish in China but could in Hong Kong, with the full understanding that people in China would eventually get to see them.

*Q: Who was the Consul General at that time?*

HUHTALA: First it was Bert Levin and then it was Don Anderson.

*Q: By that time we had full diplomatic relations.*

HUHTALA: Oh we had had for a while, since the late 70s.

*Q: Under Carter we opened up.*

HUHTALA: In fact, when I went to Taiwan we did not have diplomatic relations there. We operated through the American Institute in Taiwan.

*Q: Did you have much contact; was there much contact between Beijing and Hong Kong?*

HUHTALA: Yes, there was. We visited back and forth. Sometimes we'd coordinate a reporting project. In the past there had been some tension between the two because Hong Kong was or was seen as a rival source of information for Beijing. The ambassador there rightly objected to that, I mean who wouldn't? By the time I got there it was a more collegial kind of relationship. We were coordinating and helping each other out. Particularly we were collaborating with the Consulate in Guangzhou because at that time the whole Pearl River delta was beginning to emerge as a powerhouse of its own. So there was a lot of really interesting economic reporting that we could do.

*Q: Did you end up looking at any particular aspect of China?*

HUHTALA: Yes, I was pretty much slated to look at social aspects, like religion and youth. It was a very sort of vague portfolio, I'm afraid. I did do some work on the leadership dynamics. In fact, I was very proud of the fact that I wrote a cable predicting that Li Peng, one of five or six vice premiers, would make it to the top. When I came back on consultations to Washington the folks in INR were quite intrigued, asking how did I know that, why did I say that? I kind of took them through my reasoning, which was based on some of the Chinese political journals that were circulating in Hong Kong (I think I was the only person in the Consulate who was reading them), and also my discussions with contacts. I was right, by the way; Li did become prime minister eventually. I got to travel around the mainland a lot, sometimes on my own, other times with people from the China posts. Once there was an interesting diplomatic tour arranged by the China news agency in Hong Kong which at that time was China's de-facto diplomatic representation there. They arranged an interesting 10-day tour of Fujian province for Hong Kong-based diplomats. That was really interesting.

*Q: What were you seeing?*

HUHTALA: Well we saw the things they wanted us to see, of course, like factories and tea plantations, but they didn't keep an iron hand on us. An awful lot of migrants to Southeast Asia and to the United States have come from Fujian, so the local culture there fascinated me.

*Q: That's a major, a couple of villages practically, populated California.*

HUHTALA: Oh yes. They had this special economic zone on the coast called Xiamen, right near a place that use to be called Amoy in the imperial era. From the coast there you can see the islands of Quemoy and Matsu that were an important political issue in the 1950's. So we saw this sparkling economic zone with all its new factories, and then we toured the beautiful old brick

town behind it. In the middle of that town was an old former U.S. consulate. Before 1949 the U.S. must have had 15 consulates in China. I was told that the caretaker there had stayed on after '49 because the last consular officer told him, "Here's the keys, you watch this place." He did, he watched it for 30 years. After our diplomats returned to China in the 1970s we finally discovered him and gave him some back pay.

*Q: Were you seeing, if you're looking at the social things, the division between, was it becoming apparent between sort of the back country and the coast?*

HUHTALA: Yeah, this was starting to emerge. This was during the first decade of Deng Xiaoping's rule, when he was saying to get rich is glorious; it was okay again to make money. It was the beginning of the proto-capitalism we see in China today. On my trips to the interior, for instance, I saw an awful lot of collectives and farm areas banding together to make factories to produce orange soda or something like that and start getting cash for it. They proudly showed me the refrigerators in their homes that they were able to buy now, and the TV set in the village that everybody would watch. It was really the beginning of China's startling economic boom which we now have to deal with. Twenty years ago it started at that very local level.

*Q: Were you looking at the old women in China? How was this going at that time?*

HUHTALA: Well, you know officially women in China have always been equal. "Women hold up half the sky," said Mao. What I saw was that there were a lot more women doctors than in the West, and more women professionals, though they still had child care responsibilities just like they do everywhere else. In some ways their lot was significantly better than in the past, but a lot of this was rhetoric, not action.

*Q: Were you seeing any results of the one child policy?*

HUHTALA: Yes, we were beginning to see that, in the presence of a lot of little boys. We were worried at the time that the numbers were not looking so good for the little girls.

*Q: They were still able at this point, were they using the ultra sound to determine if it was a boy or a girl or were they just getting rid of the girls?*

HUHTALA: No, they were killing the girl babies. A lot of times that was what was happening. People were having clandestine babies. There was forced sterilization going on. At that time, I believe, they were a little bit more lenient on rural dwellers than they were on city folks. City folks were absolutely held to the One Child policy. In the countryside if your first child was a girl you could try for a boy. You could have one more but then that was it. Of course the tradition in China was to have as many kids as you could possibly squeeze out, so this was causing a lot of bitterness, a lot of unhappiness.

*Q: I was talking to a friend of mine who served in China, he was saying China was producing any awful lot of spoiled kids. In a way I suppose they are well in their teens and twenties even early thirties now.*

HUHTALA: Even then you saw a lot of chubby kids. They were being given as many sweets as they wanted. They were just totally spoiled. We visited kindergartens and they would be just gorgeously decked out; obviously very doted upon, these single kids.

*Q: How were we feeling about China at this point? Was this a future giant and a menace or was this moving in the right direction?*

HUHTALA: Remember this was before Tiananmen.

*Q: Tiananmen was in '89.*

HUHTALA: Yes, and this was a few years before that. This was when Hu Yaobang was in power. We were seeing a big upswing in student visa applications to the United States and we were taking them happily but we were also hoping that they were going to go back. We figured this would be a liberalizing influence on China. We thought that the trend towards capitalism was a good thing and something to be encouraged. Our companies were beginning to invest, though still not too many. I remember General Motors was in Shanghai. A few far-sighted companies were looking long term and seeing great opportunities. It was made very clear, you had to be an “old friend” – a company had to be established as a friend of China to get anywhere. One can't come in today and expect to have a big concession tomorrow; maybe 10 years from now if you've been a good corporate citizen then you'll get that chance. The smart companies were investing for the long term.

There was a phenomenon that we noted in Hong Kong and we called it the cadre kids; a lot of the twenty-something children of the leadership, like children of Politburo members or military leaders were emerging with special privileges and lots of money to invest. The parents were called cadres, so we called these young entrepreneurs cadre kids. This was a generation removed from the old communist leadership, many of whom were on the Long March still and were supposedly ideological purists. Their kids, on the other hand, were heavily into business. They had huge company's flashy cars and all the accouterments, and were involved in a lot of corruption as well. This phenomenon, we thought, I believe accurately, was presaging a significant change in direction for the whole country.

*Q: Corruption is endemic there.*

HUHTALA: Especially a country like China that had endured so many tragedies, like the Great Leap Forward which just impoverished the whole country, leading to terrible famine in the late '50s. Then of course the Cultural Revolution of the 1960s, which was an absolute disaster. All that was in living memory. I remember once I was riding on an overnight train in the middle of China, from Jiangsu to Guangzhou, or something like that. I struck up a conversation with a woman conductor who was really surprised that I could speak Chinese. (She gestured to everybody around and said, “Look at that, she talks.” I felt like I was a talking dog or something.) But we did speak for awhile. I was in my 30s then and I thought she was probably in her 50s, from the look of her face, all the lines and everything. She was telling me about the Cultural Revolution and what had happened to her. Then I found out that her age: she was 38. It was just so sad, the things those people had to endure. So naturally when economic prosperity

begins to occur in the '80s they went for it with gusto. It's understandable that there would be huge imbalances, that there would be corruption, that there would be people streaming in from the countryside, and indeed all of this has been the story for the last 20 years.

*Q: Were we seeing a change in people who were coming out of China and Hong Kong at this point, were there fewer economic refugees, were they political refugees?*

HUHTALA: There was still a fair amount of repression. We still had political refugees coming out. And there were very tight controls on migration. Hong Kong had very tight controls, and wouldn't let mainlanders just come in at will. What was more interesting to me, I think, was what was going on with the people who were in China. Especially Guangzhou (Canton), it's so close, just 50 miles or so from Hong Kong and they're the same people ethnically, all speaking Cantonese. Throughout that region there was a real stirring, a real dynamism and a real interest in making money. There was the new town of Shenzhen, which was built right on the border of the New Territories of Hong Kong and set up as a special economic zone. I visited it in 1985. It was just a skeleton then, just a few buildings going up. Now it's a major metropolis and they're minting money -- big hotels, big businesses.

*Q: One of your portfolios was religion. What was happening religion wise in China?*

HUHTALA: I was interested in both Protestant Christians and Catholics.

*Q: How about, what's this other so called cult or something?*

HUHTALA: Falun Gong. That did not exist yet. This was before Falun Gong arose and came to be viewed as such a threat by Beijing. Just parenthetically, I've seen this in other parts of the world too. If you try and have a society based on a total absence of religion it doesn't work. People need something. People will make it up if you don't give them something. You have to have something to organize your life around, at least most people do. In Hong Kong, we were very interested in the Catholic Church and the Protestants inside China. There was an official Catholic Church and an official Protestant Church run by the state. In the case of the Catholic Church it was divorced from Rome. They were not in communion with Rome; they weren't taking any advice on appointing bishops or anything else. But there was also a thriving culture of underground churches meeting in people's homes and trying to carry on their true religion as they saw it. There were some very senior priests and bishops who had been in prison for 20, 30 years. I was very interested in that and did some work through the church in Hong Kong. I got to talk to some of the people there and got in communication with Bishop Aloysius Jin of Shanghai who had just been released from prison after 25 years of hard labor on condition that he would not speak out against the Chinese authorities. Like several of them, he would eventually speak out and then get put back in prison, let out again and all of that. A very brave man, and a very holy man, probably.

*Q: Is there anything else we should probably talk about your Hong Kong experience?*

HUHTALA: You know I came away from that with a very strong conviction that China is going to be the big story for the next 50 years. At that time Deng Xiaoping was promising to quadruple

the economy by the year 2000. In fact he did it by 1992. He just set off this chain of events that is just increasing geometrically. I still think what has been happening in China is the story of our lifetime, fascinating and very, very important. It is having profound effects on all the rest of Asia, which I dealt with in my last couple of years in the Service, and towards the United States as well. Even then there was a tendency in the United States to view China as an emerging opponent. That worried me then and it worries me even now.

**G. EUGENE MARTIN**  
**Deputy Director for Political Affairs, China**  
**Washington, DC (1985-1987)**

*A Specialist in Chinese Affairs and a speaker of Chinese, Mr. Martin spent the major part of his career dealing with matters relating to China, both in Washington and abroad. His overseas assignments included Hong Kong, Taipei, Huangzhou (formerly Canton), Beijing, Manila and Rangoon. His Washington assignments also concerned China and the Far East. Mr. Martin was born in Indiana of Missionary parents and was raised in the US. and India. He is a graduate of Kalamazoo College and Syracuse University.*

*Q: What were the political issues?*

MARTIN: The issues have changed considerably in recent years, but some remain the same – Taiwan, human rights. Trade was less of an issue than it is now, because we didn't have as much trade. We obviously had the annual MFN discussion and debate in Congress, but even at that early stage it pretty much went well. It was before Tiananmen, so the yearly determination and Congressional response under the Jackson-Vanik bill was not nearly as contentious. MFN went through quickly. The major difference, I think, was that at that point, the U.S. had a security relationship with China in a sense. Since the cold war was still "on," we were still playing China off against the Soviet Union. We actually had military-military relations. We had agreed to sell avionic components for the F-5 fighter that was very much in the works. So there were a number of politico-military relationships to manage.

*Q: What sort of information were you getting from CIA, military, and from our own embassy and all about what's going on in China?*

MARTIN: China is always opaque. It's difficult to get information about China. At that point, it was beginning to change. Hong Kong traditionally was the window on China, and it was easier to get more information on China in Hong Kong than one ever could in the mainland because people would come out of China and feel more comfortable meeting with foreigners. Even Party cadre, government officials would come out to Hong Kong occasionally, and if you could meet with them, they would tell you more than they would tell you back home. But by the mid-1980s things were beginning to open up in China. The good relations with the U.S., I think, helped people feel more confident about talking to us to explain the situation after the change, explain decision making, explain factions within the government, to give us a little bit more of an insight

on how decisions are reached, what different interest groups were pushing. A lot of it was economics because the reforms were focused on agricultural and industrial reform. The military was still the fourth modernization. They were the ones at the bottom of the heap, and so the military was not getting a lot of attention or resources from the government. And the Taiwan issue was not a very live one. It was there, there was no question about it, but it was not in the forefront.

There was a general feeling that things were getting better in China, that they were making slow progress to a more open society. There was more of a dialogue with the foreign ministry and diplomats abroad in terms of things that we were doing. The relations with the Chinese embassy here were good. The desk had close relations with them, and we dealt with them on an amicable way. So in a sense, there was a sense that things were improving, things were getting better, and so forth.

*Q: How did you find the Chinese embassy dealing, say, with the Washington political system? In many ways the State Department's not the real player; it's more Congress and the media.*

MARTIN: Oh, it's disastrous. It's always been disastrous. Their idea of congressional relations is to go up and hammer on the table and say, "You can't do that because it would hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." The usual answer, in substance if not words, was, "Yea? Get out of my house!" I also think they did not fully understand how the system works. They thought the State Department and President determined U.S. policy and could bring Congress into line. So Congressional resolutions were seen as evidence the U.S. government (i.e., the executive branch) was not being honest with them and really wanted to double deal, especially on Taiwan. But they've improved recently. They are certainly more active, and more knowledgeable, but I still think that they have difficulty understanding the USG is not a monolithic system. That is what they are used to at home as the National People's Congress (NPC) is still essentially a rubber stamp for what the Party and government want. But even their system is changing and the NPC is somewhat more autonomous of the Party and government than before.

*Q: How did the Chinese embassy compare with the Taiwanese ability to operate in Washington?*

MARTIN: They're masters! The Israelis and the Taiwanese are probably the unsurpassed masters at this. The mainland Chinese have never been able to match Taiwan's representatives. So I think they had a problem. But again, the public attitude on China in those days was still positive, the good feelings from normalization of relations and the growing trade, business dealings and academic exchanges affected policy. So the embassy was able to have a pretty good PR program.

*Q: Were you seeing the massive influx of Chinese students, coming to the United States at graduate level and many of them returning, as making a change? Was this positive? How were we viewing this?*

MARTIN: Oh, it was, very much so. Starting about 1981 – 82, they began to send a lot of scholars, government students, government sponsored students to the U.S. for graduate work. By '85 – 86, they were beginning to allow more and more students come privately, at their own

expense, not sponsored by the state. When the state sponsored students here, it had a pretty good tight lease on them, and most of them returned. Not all did, but most went back, because of family, the bond they had put down as a surety, their old job waiting for them, etc. Subsequently, many found their return to their old jobs didn't work out, because once they'd been overseas, many were unwilling or unable to fit back into the old bureaucracy. Once you've been to Boston or San Francisco and studied at the best universities in the world, how do you go home again?

There were many frustrations for these scholars who went back to China, back into their old state sector jobs. They returned with new ideas, which were not welcomed by the people who didn't go to overseas; they came back with expectations and an awareness of how you can do things in the States; and even in those days, had learned to use computers, and many Chinese offices had little electricity, much less computers! And so there was a great deal of dissatisfaction among returned students but generally, the idea of people coming and studying in the States and then going back was a very positive one.

*Q: Did you run across any of these? Early on there were always people who sought asylum - I always think of the tennis star. I would think this would have been a burr under your saddle all the time.*

MARTIN: Oh, we had these hiccups. Hu Na, the tennis star who defected on the West Coast, caused heartburn. But these things were just bumps in the road and generally didn't last long. I think the Chinese realized the risk they were taking sending people out of China but decided the payoff was worth it.

*Q: Was there concern about the Mainland Chinese, their operatives, intelligence operatives working in the United States?*

MARTIN: The one that really got everybody's attention was Larry Wu-tai Chin, a FBIS and CIA translator for many years, who turned out to be a long-term mole. He was arrested but hung himself in jail before trial. That obviously caused a big stir so everybody was immediately looking around for other spies. I remember having met with Larry when he came to the desk. I talked to him a number of times. He was very effective. The Chin case put everybody's teeth on edge. We spent a great deal of time with the FBI counterintelligence office, talking with them, dealing with them, looking at various Chinese that had come on trips, come on delegations, and so forth. Yes, so there was obviously considerable attention to intelligence issues

*Q: What about Taiwan? In your work, what was happening in Taiwan?*

MARTIN: Taiwan, again, was continuing to loosen up, continuing to democratize its system. Chiang Ching-kuo died about that time and a new generation of leadership moved in. My office was situated in a short hall between the China desk suite of offices and the Taiwan coordination office, part of the bureau's regional affairs office. As these two offices were side by side and my office was in between, I considered myself as being in the Taiwan Strait, the guard between the two sides. We had a lot to do with the Taiwan coordinating staff, making sure that we coordinated with them and with AIT's Washington office across the river in Arlington.

*Q: Was there concern about the growing democratization of Taiwan? As long as you have a nice solid authoritarian regime on Taiwan, it's fairly easy to dismiss them and to say, "Well, you know, we got one here and one there, and now one's bigger than the other, so we'll pick the bigger one as our thing." But when you have one who's all a sudden becoming more like us, it's hard.*

MARTIN: That was a dilemma! It's become more of a dilemma. In those days, it was still at the early stages, so there wasn't quite as much democracy to brag about. But the trend was evident. There was, I think, a lot of discomfort in the mainland about this because they saw this change, but still, the KMT was in power. The KMT had been in power since Chang Kai-shek came to power in the late '20s. So there wasn't a lot of change, but there was a liberalization, a general relaxation of the political system in Taiwan. We saw this as a potential problem for the future, but it was not an issue at that point.

*Q: Yes. Were you feeling pressure from... say Texas and all to sell more planes? I mean congressional pressure on, you know, arm sales, particularly to Taiwan, but also to Mainland China now?*

MARTIN: Well, the Mainland China sale was basically the avionic upgrade of the F-5, which never really got very far, but it did go through. We dealt with the Rolls Royce Spey Engine, which the British were selling. We had lots of discussions about how it would be used, whether or not it could be reverse engineered and then they could start manufacturing it themselves, and what it would do for the fighters that they were going to put it in. The Chinese had a lot of problems with that. That engine had a lot of potential, but the problems were even greater because the engine was of a configuration that they would have to basically modify the entire fuselage to be able to fit the engine into it. Basically, they would have had to rebuild the plane! So, even though on the outside there were occasionally potshots by the Washington Times and conservatives who were worried about this sort of thing, in reality, the more you got into it, the more problems they had. Frankly, looking at the Chinese arms industry, defense industry, in terms of their technology, their machine tools, their metallurgy, and so forth, they were no where near a level that could have manufactured that engine. They've improved a lot since those days, but this was early on. You must remember, this was only a decade after the end of the Cultural Revolution. They had to rebuild their manufacturing base in those ten years. In the last ten, fifteen years, they have certainly progressed much faster.

I think the issue with Taiwan really was an issue on arms sales. It always was an issue even after the '82 Communiqué. The bucket, which we said was not going to expand, didn't expand, but it was very elastic. The bucket tended to grow, even though it may not have expanded. The main issue at the time was the agreement to let Taiwan build an IDF (Indigenous Defense Fighter), which, some people, said was essentially an F-16. General Dynamics gave Taiwan considerable assistance with plans, designs, and so forth, but we insisted the IDF was Taiwan's own fighter. Again, you play the show game.

**WINSTON LORD**

## **Ambassador China (1985-1989)**

*Ambassador Lord was born and raised in New York City and earned degrees at Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961. After serving in Washington and Geneva, Mr. Lord was assigned to the Department of Defense before joining the National Security Council, where he was involved in China and Indonesia matters. He subsequently served on State's Policy Planning Staff. In 1985 Mr. Lord was named US Ambassador to China, where he served until 1989. From 1993 to 1997 the Ambassador held the position of Assistant Secretary of State dealing with Far Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Lord was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kenned in 1998.*

*Q: We are still carrying on the China theme and we're going back a little bit. This session will be devoted to your time as Ambassador to China. You were Ambassador to China from when to when?*

LORD: From November, 1985, to April, 1989. That April is an important date. Bette and I were very fortunate to be in China during the most positive period in Sino-U.S. relations since 1949.

*Q: That's right. We touched on it before, but let's go back again. Where were you when this job came out?*

LORD: I can give you a little background; I've taken some notes. First let me just let me give you a brief paragraph on an amusing incident that took place back in June, 1972. We can insert that in the proper place if that is all right. It's amusing, but it depressed me at the time. I'll double check the date; I think it was June, 1972. The Kissinger trip to China was as National Security Advisor. At the welcoming tea at the guest house, Zhou En-lai was sitting with Kissinger, and Kissinger in the course of their small talk, mentioned that I was a very good ping pong player. I was aghast to have him say this because actually while I was fairly decent, to say that you are a good ping pong player in China is a bit like saying you are a good chess player in Russia. This came back to haunt me.

A few days later at the end of our visit, we were visiting a sports complex outside of Beijing, and we saw volleyball players, and we saw swimmers, and we saw gymnasts. I thought we were about to leave, and the escort said no we have one more stop. We went into a gymnasium packed with a couple of thousand Chinese students, and they brought out a ping pong table and announced to the crowd that Winston Lord, expert ping pong player, accompanied by Dick Solomon who was with me on that trip, would now play ping pong with Chang Tse Tung, who was three times champion of the world, not just China but of the world, plus the current Chinese champion. In any event we got out there and even though it was friendship first and competition second, I wanted to show I was a decent player. I was absolutely horrible, a combination of nerves plus big light balls that we are not used to and funny racquets. I just absolutely disgraced myself and was very depressed by this whole affair. When I got home from the trip, my wife couldn't understand why I was so downcast because things had gone well substantively and it

was because of this event.

*Q: Just out of curiosity, do the Chinese use a different type ball?*

LORD: Apparently they do. I'd always played with American balls, maybe this was international standards. The ball kept sailing off my racquet because it was so light. It also turns out that the player, the three time world champion, was a lover of Madame Mao as I found out later.

I left the State Department in 1977 when President Carter came in, to take a break, to recharge my batteries. After eight months in the Colorado mountains, I went to New York to become president of the Council on Foreign Relations in September 1977. Since we were on China, I will just say how I kept up with China during those intervening years until I was appointed. I generally kept reading about China because of my interest and my background. I kept up my contacts with the Chinese in Washington and New York. When the Carter administration first came in I worked closely with Mike Oksenberg who was the China expert for Zbig Brzezinski (National Security Advisor) going over our China policy and the various records and transcripts. Throughout this period, I kept in touch with him and Dick Holbrooke at State and others involved with China policy.

In 1979 I took a trip to China with Kissinger; in addition to Beijing where we had talks with Deng Xiaoping and others, we went to Xian and Xinjiang in the northwest. This is in a period where Deng had just made his final comeback and was beginning to launch his final reforms. A lot of our talks centered on his plans for China's economy, as well as Soviet relations and the usual international topics.

In 1983 I went back on my own and got a warm reception from various Chinese officials, and by then Deng's reforms and opening were beginning to pick up steam. There was one other contact during this period, to go back to early 1979 when Deng Xiaoping visited the United States just after the announcement of the normalization of relations on December 15; the normalization itself took place on January 1. This, of course, was just before China invaded Vietnam. I participated in a very small breakfast with Kissinger, just the two of us plus Deng and probably the Chinese Liaison Chief. I don't recall. We could see then that Deng Xiaoping was growing in self confidence which we also saw in our later trip that year back to China. I also testified early that year on normalization, supporting what the Carter Administration had done.

*Q: This is 1979.*

LORD: 1979. Why I favored moving ahead and thought that we could still maintain security and friendship ties with Taiwan at the same time. In 1982 I testified backing the Reagan administration on the third communiqué that was negotiated with respect to arms sales to Taiwan. Here I made the basic point that although it was difficult because it envisaged a lowering over time of our arms sales to Taiwan, I felt this was sufficiently linked to a peaceful resolution of the crisis, that it would provide for Taiwan's security, and the Chinese made a very forthcoming statement in the Communiqué that their fundamental policy was to seek a peaceful resolution. We couldn't actually get them to renounce force, but we felt that was a strong enough indication along with our commitment and arms sales in the same communiqué to give us

sufficient linkage and therefore we could always provide for Taiwan's defense as long as they had a security problem. We would only reduce arms sales as the situation got more peaceful.

Now with respect to how I got the nomination in 1985, I think this was based on first a general reputation on foreign affairs and of course, what I did on China with Kissinger and Nixon and Ford. With respect to the Reagan administration, I think we first met the Reagans in the fall of 1981 when Bette and I went to a small White House dinner in honor of Isaac Stern, and his new movie called Mao to Mozart. I had known George Shultz, the Secretary of State from the Council on Foreign Relations where he was one of my directors. He asked me to lead a Saturday all day seminar in January of 1983, fairly soon after he became Secretary of State, on China with a lot of government officials there and outside experts including Kissinger and others. That went well and increased Shultz's confidence in me. I also knew Bud McFarland, the National Security Advisor, from the Kissinger-Nixon-Ford days at the NSC. We were also invited to the White House in January, 1984 for a dinner for the visiting Prime Minister Zhao Ziyang. My wife, Bette, sat at the head table with the Prime Minister.

Then Reagan, just before his trip to China in the spring of 1984 had a small lunch of five outside advisors which included Scowcroft, Scalapino, Solomon, and Bette, my wife, and myself. The five of us with the President and Mrs. Reagan, and several cabinet level officials. This, I think, went very well again with the President. Mrs. Reagan loved my wife's book *Spring Moon*, and we are told that in August, 1984, Mrs. Reagan in a conversation with her husband, actually made the suggestion that he appoint me as Ambassador and get two for the price of one in effect. Not only would I be going to China but my wife, Bette, with her unique background would be going along as well.

So, in the fall of 1984, I believe it was October, McFarland was at a Council on Foreign Relations dinner in New York. He sat next to me; I was President then. He mentioned that the Administration wanted me to serve. Would I be interested? Both he and subsequently someone from State suggested Ambassador to China. Almost inexplicably and in retrospect somewhat foolishly, I said no I'd rather serve in Washington for a variety of reasons. My father was quite sick. I wanted to be near my son who was in his final year of high school and other personal reasons. But the more I thought about it and talked about it with Bette, we decided this was not as exciting as being Ambassador to China. By then Shultz had already tried to get me an Undersecretary job at State but was running into some delays at the White House. Anyway, I went back and said no, the other option the ambassadorship, in fact, was our preferred one.

*Q: Excuse me. During the time you were in the Council of Foreign Relations and dealing with these China. What sort of impressions were you getting, first of the late Carter period of the people you were talking to, because you know, there is this back and forth conversation? Then with the Reaganites about China. Was it a realistic one?*

LORD:: Basically, I kept in close touch with the Carter Administration. I met with Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor, a couple of times privately, including just before he went to China in the summer of 1978 on one of his trips which turned out to be very important. I felt they got off to a fairly rocky start as I recall. They seemed to be emphasizing the Soviet Union, which I have no problem with, but not moving on China. My impression was there was some tension

between Vance who was more interested in emphasizing Russia and Brzezinski who was more interested in pursuing China. So, early on they were having some difficulties, but by 1978 they moved toward normalization. Vance's initial trip went badly, and meanwhile they were moving ahead with the Russians, so the first year or so of the Carter Administration, things were not going very well. I kept in touch with both State and the White House after the Brzezinski trip, but, by the end of '78 they moved to normalization; they announced it in mid-December while Congress was out of session, during the holiday season, knowing it would be controversial. They announced that normalization would actually take place on January 1. I felt that the normalization agreement was about the best they could do vis a vis Taiwan, given the realities, and I along with Kissinger and people who worked on this issue supported it, plus the Taiwan Relations Act was passed which strengthened the Taiwan side of the equation. I supported that as well and I actually testified on it.

Then the China connection was pretty well maintained until Reagan came in, and there was a great deal of apprehension by the Chinese and others about what would happen to our China policy as President Reagan took office. He had after all been very pro-Taiwan and very tough on the Chinese political system. It generally looked like he might change the bipartisan policies that had been pursued. I remember distinctly on various occasions with the Chinese in New York and Washington, reassuring them saying that any President when he gets into the oval office tends to have a different view of geo-politics. I thought this President would be no exception; he would see the geo-political and other benefits of moving ahead with China, but he wouldn't sell out his friends in Taiwan and he would be respected for that as a reliable ally. I thought he would essentially pursue the policy of his predecessors, particularly because among other reasons, he had chosen Al Haig as Secretary of State who had been heavily involved in the China opening and was very pro engagement with China. Haig would be working on him as well as other advisors. So I told the Chinese to hold their fire, with respect to Reagan, and give him some time to be worked on by his associates and to gain a greater perception and appreciation from the oval office. I recall that Bush went there - I guess it was between the election and the inauguration in the fall - and he had a fairly tough trip over the Taiwan issue.

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. Because Reagan said some things during the campaign while Bush was in Beijing that the Chinese didn't like.*

LORD: During the campaign he was there?

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. Yes, during the campaign.*

LORD: Okay. There were some rocky things at the beginning of the Reagan Administration. The tension persisted as the Chinese ratcheted up the pressure over the Taiwanese arms sales to the point where the Administration made the choice, and Al Haig was very influential in this, to do a third communiqué, the first having been the Shanghai communiqué during Nixon's trip in '72, the second one on normalization in '79. This was a very difficult negotiation. Leonard Woodcock was at the other end doing good work, and one of the people helping him became my deputy in China, Peter Tomsen. They were working hard on it back at home in the White House and the State Department. For reasons I have already mentioned I believe the 1982 communiqué was justifiable because of the implicit linkage to a peaceful resolution, and this eased the tension

between Beijing and Washington.

*Q: By the way, I just want to insert that this is not only Stuart Kennedy here but also Nancy Bernkopf Tucker who is the other interrogator.*

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. In response to the answer you just gave to Stu's question, one of the things that you mentioned was the normalization agreement that established relations and you basically supported that. You thought it was the best they could have gotten. I think that's probably true, but it was less than the Nixon people thought they could get. Nixon and Kissinger had anticipated for at least a long time that they could maintain some sort of official relationship, a liaison office or something like that with Taipei. The historians at least have looked at what the Carter administration did and said he took less. Do you think that is a fair judgment? Was the Nixon period estimate wrong?*

LORD: I'm not so sure it was the estimate. I would like to go back and talk to Henry and others on that. Clearly we would have preferred, I'm sure the Carter administration would have preferred, a somewhat more elevated tie remaining with Taiwan. I don't think we were under any illusions that we could have maintained an embassy certainly, and whether we thought we could get a liaison office, we hadn't reached that level of concreteness during the Ford Administration. As I said in an earlier transcript, President Ford, because of his domestic travails and worrying about Reagan and renomination and the Chinese, because of the Chinese domestic scene, the ascendancy of the Gang of Four, struggling with Deng Xiao Ping, and then the succumbing of Mao and Zhou, didn't move on Taiwan during the last year of his administration. So, we never got to that point although we played with formulas.

I don't recall now that we felt even privately that Carter had settled for too little. We certainly publicly supported the deal, meaning Nixon, Kissinger, and others. I don't recall that being a collective wisdom that we should have driven a harder bargain. It is not my recollection. Even if I thought that, I might have been bipartisan at the time, but that isn't my recollection of my own view either. The fact that they were going to continue arms sales I felt was an important and significant achievement, arms sales to Taiwan as well as the unofficial ties to Taiwan. I also felt that it was not realistic to maintain a treaty alliance or an embassy, so it seemed to me that it was in the ballpark. Maybe I thought at the time we could have gotten a little bit better here and there, but I, in good conscience, supported the basic deal that was struck. I also was pleased at what the Congress did to strengthen our commitments to Taiwan in the wake of normalization.

*Q: I was just wondering, during this period, did the Taiwan government, its representatives in the United States carry much weight. I mean I assume they were trying to disturb this whole situation with normalization.*

LORD: Because I was in New York, not in the government, I do not recall having too many contacts with Taiwan during this period although I was always friendly to Taiwan, so I'm not a good judge of that. Obviously, there was some criticism in Congress and elsewhere. This was shown by the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act, and there was some criticism that the Administration announced this during the holiday season while Congress was out of town. It was actually quite wise. It is better to do it during that quiet period despite the flak you take for the

timing. In practice it worked out better that way. But, my recollection is there was general support, and that the reaction although quite tough in some quarters was manageable, and that was eased by the Taiwan Relations Act.

*Q: I'm ready to go back now.*

LORD: Okay. I'll try not to go into too much detail about my nomination. It's pretty bloody. I knew from about February-March, 1985, I don't know exactly when, that they were working on the nomination, so I began to work on the various papers that you had to fill out. It didn't leak for awhile until I finally got a call on March 30 from Rollie Evans, the journalist who had picked up rumors. After that it began to leak. This is while my nomination was still being formalized. You know how these things get out in the papers before they are actually formal, so I had to be careful in my public comments. I told the Council on Foreign Relations and the Chairman, David Rockefeller, that I would leave on June 30. I thought I would be nominated and through the Senate during the course of the summer.

It was one of the happiest times of my life because I thought this was a perfect fit, not only for me and my background, but for Bette and her background. There were many overtones including the fact that our wedding reception was at Twin Oaks, the Chinese Nationalist Embassy, that I had first gone into China in '71 with Kissinger, and all that had happened since that we talked about. I had some concern about leaving my ill father, but you don't get into personal stuff in an interview like this. And I was very sorry that my mother, who had passed away in July 1978, never knew that I became Ambassador to China.

In any event, on July 12, I was told that I would be getting a call from the President officially asking me to serve, but right then he had this operation for a cancerous polyp which delayed things. Finally instead of getting a call, I got a very nice letter which was really personalized. It had shaky handwriting with references to Bette and a word from Nancy. It was clear that it wasn't just a pro forma letter. I spent this time, of course, getting briefings in Washington, getting in touch with academics and business and human rights groups, reading as much as I could whether it was long books or memos, etc., touching base with various constituencies. Li Xiannian, the President of China came during this period, but I still wasn't official yet, so I couldn't sit in on any of the meetings, but I got to the social occasions and Bette sat next to him at lunch that Shultz gave and sat next to President Reagan at the White House along with Liz Taylor and some others for this dinner. I had my hearing on July 30 introduced by my New York Senator. Moynihan, was voted out by the Foreign Relations Committee 16 to 1, but the day before that Helms had sent a message to Lugar saying he couldn't show up for the hearing and he wanted it delayed. What was the rush about such a controversial appointment?

*Q: This is Jesse Helms, the conservative Senator of North Carolina.*

LORD: Correct. Meanwhile the Chinese had given very fast agrément. Within 48 hours. After three months of my working on paperwork and security and everything else, it came through right about the time of President Li's visit. The reason for Helms' opposition ostensibly turned out to be on the abortion population issue, but he had other reasons not to welcome my appointment. First I was a moderate or liberal Republican which I guess is an oxymoron, but he

was suspicious of the Rockefeller New York wing. I had been Henry Kissinger's closest associate, and he at that point (they have gotten friendlier since) thought Kissinger had sold out to the Soviet Union and China and was generally leftist which is quite ironic if you know Henry Kissinger. So, being close to Kissinger was a strike against me. I was a member of the Trilateral Commission which was one of his *bête noires*. I was President of the Council on Foreign Relations. He and his staff discovered all that. I had written an article in Newsweek a couple years before that argue for a centrist foreign policy, avoiding extremes. I had one sentence in there that I thought was pretty clever. I was taking a crack at McGovern on one side and Jesse Helms on the other. I said, "We should neither McGovern our foreign policy nor have Jesse at the helm." I told myself if I should run into this with Senator Helms at the hearings I would say I'm talking about Jesse Jackson, not you.

In any event there were a lot of reasons why he obviously wouldn't like me plus my whole involvement in the China opening; he didn't like the China opening and so on. I and the Administration were focusing on the need to get this nomination, now being delayed by Helms having been voted on by the committee, through by September so I could be in place for an October visit by Vice President Bush to China which would be a wonderful way for me to begin my tour. It was important to the Vice President as well.

Without going into excruciating details, the next few months while getting ready for my posting, I just pulled out all the stops to try to get the nomination through, to get around Helms, to get through this situation. There are a lot of details I won't go into. I have to say in all candor the Congressional Relations Office of the State Department was totally incompetent. They were somewhat shy about taking on Helms; they were browbeaten. Not only did they not push it very much, they didn't even keep me informed. I had to keep asking where we stood before they would let me know. I got really annoyed at the White House and the Congressional Relations Office. The White House weighed in as we went on and without going in to it blow by blow, at one point the President called Helms in the middle of the Achille Lauro crisis, he called Helms from Air Force One. Another time he wrote him a letter.

I kept telling the Administration as much as I wanted my nomination completed in time for the Vice President, I didn't want them to sell out substance. After all I had overwhelming support in the Committee and in the Senate and I was well qualified and a conservative American president, Reagan, appointed me which ought to reassure Helms. It was not correct on principle to bend on population policy or any other substantive issue just to get my nomination through. As anxious as I was to get this going, I didn't want it to be at the expense of Administration policy. There finally was a letter from the head of AID, Peter McPherson to Helms in the Senate, wishy-washy in language that we would bend our policy somewhat even a little beyond what I would have liked.

Anyway, we finally got it through, but only after Bush had gone to China and come back. I was very upset about that. Then when I saw I was going to miss that in any event, I sort of backed off and just let nature take its course. I was sufficiently exercised to get this through, I thought for the national interest, also my personal interest in getting there on time for Bush, and just generally that I pushed this very hard, even to the point where I thought some of my colleagues in the State Department thought I was overdoing it. So, I sort of laid back. By now the media had

paid a lot of attention to this, and there were editorials across the country including lead editorials in the New York Times and the Washington Post and many other areas calling me a hostage and putting pressure on Helms.

There was one particularly painful incident where there was a last gasp try to get me through and out there in time for Bush, and I even made a reservation for a swearing in ceremony for October 8, 1985. My father was very sick in Florida, but he made a major effort to come up for it. We had people invited, thinking the Senate just might do it in time. It didn't work out, and so my father missed my swearing in. He had to go back to Florida. It was another further delay for another month, by which time he couldn't travel. Finally as a result of the media pressure and the McPherson letter generally and as I say the President calling Helms and these other efforts, they finally voted on the evening of November 5. I was voted through 87-7. Helms took a crack at me for having orchestrated a media campaign against him. It wasn't true actually, but I didn't mind the compliment. I remember going down to Florida before we went to China, a few days later and I saw my father and played him a tape of the swearing in ceremony. I had a wonderful swearing in ceremony. Shultz swore me in personally, and there was a tremendous turnout. I made some carefully thought out remarks about U.S.-China relations and other personal dimensions.

*Q: Did you have the feeling at the time that these were deep felt feelings of Senator Helms or was this sort of political ego.*

LORD: At the time I thought, although I know he felt sincerely about the abortion issue, that if there wasn't the abortion issue, he would have found something else in order to delay me personally because of my background. Put together the Kissinger connection, the Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations. You could even throw in Skull and Bones at Yale; he probably wouldn't like that if he knew about it. The whole China involvement, being a liberal Republican, I was anathema to him. He was always courteous as he always is, and he was very courtly toward my wife and very polite toward me, but both he and his staff assistant, a guy named Triplett, who has been around for many years, stonewalled me. In pulling out the stops, I talked to Triplett as well. He kept portraying himself as someone who was trying to help me. He was a new staffer then. In retrospect he was also delaying, so I felt it was personal. But, also it coincided with Helms' tactical approach, which he used on many nominations, of trying to extract substantive concessions on policy in exchange for letting names go forward, which is, I think a terrible distortion of the process. We are living with that even as we speak today. It is a terrible morale blow and a national interest blow to hold up important nominations in this hostage way. So I'm convinced if it wasn't the population issue, he would have held me up on some other reason.

#### ***XVIII. AMBASSADOR TO CHINA - VARIOUS ISSUES (1985-1989)***

*Q: Okay. We might as well just keep going. Then you were able to take off.*

LORD: Yes. Now let me make some general points about the years in China, and then there are a few areas where I can get a bit more chronological. I do not have the notes to say this happened this month or that month.

*Q: One thing too while we are talking about that. Did you carry in your mental attaché case any things, you had been dealing with China a lot, that you really, did you have your own agenda?*

LORD: That is exactly right. I thought I would give you some of my general goals and things in general, and then we can go back into some specifics. I don't have the kind of memory to go into great detail.

A couple of comments about the period I served in China, from November, 1985, to April, 1989. My timing really was quite fortunate. I got there when things were really starting to move forward again. There was some tension in the early Reagan years as I mentioned earlier, particularly over the Taiwan arms sales question. The 1982 communiqué broke that logjam, and therefore China and the United States were beginning to have a more positive relationship. Obviously it wasn't easy, but it was beginning to move forward again after having been tense early in the administration.

*Q: Who was the Ambassador?*

LORD: Arthur Hummel. I left, we'll look at this later, but I left just before Tiananmen Square erupted. In fact I left just after the first week of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. Hu Yaobang had died on April 15. His funeral was April 22, and his funeral was the occasion for the first major outpouring of Chinese citizens, roughly 100,000 that day, and of course, our relations took a tailspin after the events of that spring.

So, I was in a period which was probably the most positive period in U.S.-Chinese relations since the opening. Obviously I thought I did a decent job, but I mean it also was very fortunate timing, because if relations go well it is not really thanks to the Ambassador. It is thanks to the overall climate and the leaders in the capitals. I was there during a period where it really did move forward. We had some real tensions as I'll get into, but not the incredible crises, and the general movement was onward and upward. There was a tremendous increase in exchanges and high level visits in both directions and agreements in trade and other areas, and therefore, I felt very fortunate in that sense.

I do want to mention without being overly awkward or self serving the role my wife played there, her background and knowing the language, being Chinese of course, and knowing the culture. Bette was a tremendous advisor to me informally on how to deal with the Chinese culturally, psychologically and even how to interpret their positions that I would talk to her about. She had an instinct no barbarian could have. She had a tremendous circle of contacts for both me and the Embassy as well as herself. There was a whole area of Chinese society that would not have been possible to reach in such width and depth without her, her language and the fact that she was a well-known authoress - academic circles, cultural circles, intellectual circles, artistic circles which I would have in any event tried to cultivate. We had tremendous entree thanks to her, and she was a tremendous hostess both in terms of briefing visitors on Chinese culture and history and on contacts but also in terms of entertainment. She always tried to make our evenings different and interesting and fun, whether it was foreign visitors, American visitors, diplomats or Chinese themselves. We either had an interesting evening and or an entertaining

evening. We never just had the typical evening. We either had roundtable discussions of substance, or we'd have Chinese opera singers or Chinese plays in our garden or musicians or other entertaining, both to show off culture, but also to make an interesting evening. This extended to very imaginative July Fourth parties, the anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué, the anniversary of normalization. Also Bette worked with Charlton Heston to put on a Chinese production of the Caine Mutiny which was an extraordinary success.

Bette would go with me and travel around the country and make a tremendous impact. She was extremely well-known and popular in China. Some of the Chinese leaders probably had some concerns probably because she knew too much. They always liked to think they could fool the barbarians, but they knew they couldn't fool her. She spent the bulk of her time, as she should, with her official and professional contacts, helping me with the government officials, the party officials and so on, as well as with Americans, the American business community, academics and visitors. She spent a great deal of time to promote U.S. interests, and out of her own personal interest too, in dealing with Chinese intellectuals, artists and academics. Many of these were, of course, pushing the envelope in terms of political freedoms in China, and many fell into the grey area of semi or outright dissidents. Many later, of course, got swept up by the events of June fourth (Tiananmen Square). So, among the more conservative leaders, there were probably some suspicions of her, and even me as we'll talk about later, on these contacts. The Chinese officials were tremendously appreciative of her on the one hand, but probably some of the conservatives were suspicious on the other hand.

Bette worked very hard. She got a lot of publicity at the time even back here, media articles, a Barbara Walters Special on 20-20 television, a big Washington Post profile and so on, including on her interaction with Chinese students, intellectuals, scholars, artists, writers and so on. I want to repeat that she spent the bulk of her time promoting official ties. She wasn't shunning the officials and the government, just the opposite in fact. The Foreign Ministry and others were extremely enthusiastic about her, so she kept up her official side very strongly. In the American community I suspect there were some who felt that she spent too much time with the Chinese and not enough time with the American community. She felt that was the proper priority because of American interests in helping to interpret China as well as to expand our contacts and our interests. There were times where the diplomatic community felt that both she and I didn't pay as much attention as we might. I had a clear list of our priorities, and I'll get to that in just a minute. Dealing with my fellow Ambassadors was not high on my list. I would stay in touch if they were particularly good ones who could help me understand what was going on in China. Diplomatic dinners were generally late and boring and not very useful. I certainly was friendly and not rude, but I had to choose my priorities. Spending a lot of time with my fellow Ambassadors was not one of them, and that was true of Bette as well.

Some of the events that Bette produced, either at our residence or elsewhere, were truly imaginative, even spectacular. To take just one example - the party she staged at the Great Wall hotel to celebrate the tenth anniversary of our diplomatic relations. This was in December 1988. It was the biggest Western party for the Chinese since 1949. 1800-2000 guests. 36,000 (five kinds) dumplings. The Chinese Olympic table tennis team. 3000 slides and special movies on ten screens that Bette painstakingly put together after wheedling them from American sources. During this period Bette and I did a major media and speaking blitz.

One last point on Bette. She and I felt strongly that at our July 4th party, we should have Chinese visitors to help celebrate July 4th with us as well as the Chinese employees of the Embassy taking part as a joint celebration. We had a huge block party that we instituted. She lined up McDonalds and other companies to provide free food. We had bands and music and games and booths and parades. Just tremendous what she orchestrated. But the first July 4th party in 1986, we ran into trouble with the some of American community and business who felt that Chinese shouldn't be included.

Bette, justifiably, got extremely high marks for her role. A glowing personal profile in "The Washington Post." A "20/20" special on ABC TV with Barbara Walters. The highest USIA award from Mr. Wick, head of USIA.

*Q: You were saying in the American community there were certain racist...*

LORD: I don't want to say the whole community, but among some of the business people and some of the Embassy there was a feeling of why are we involving the Chinese in our celebration which I felt was both wrong and stupid. It was a tremendous opportunity to engage the Chinese. But there was a certain amount of racism there, you could tell. In any event, we always included the Chinese, and this proved extremely popular. That was just an example where there was some critical attention by some of the American community, although the great bulk of them and all the visitors were extremely high on Bette, her briefings, and her entertainment for them.

One other amusing incident involving her novel, *Spring Moon*. As usual in China, they were pirating it and as they did with all authors, putting out unauthorized translations. There was one being done by committee that was incredibly bad. We counted up in just the first chapter alone 101 mistakes, many big mistakes, not just the natural mistranslations. Not only was it inaccurate, but there was no sense of style or elegance. Now, Bette was not concerned about making money or royalties and was not naive about the ability to enforce intellectual property rights, but was concerned that all her Chinese friends and colleagues would understand she could write well, and she didn't want it mangled. So, she went to the Minister and Vice Minister of Culture when this unauthorized edition was about to come out and said that if this was actually published, we would personally, and we were prepared to do this, buy up all the copies, bring them to the Embassy, invite all the foreign journalists, have a bonfire and burn the books in our Embassy courtyard. It sounds like a joke and overly dramatic, but literally we were going to do that. Fortunately, there wasn't total freedom in China at least in this area, and it so happens that this edition was killed. Then Bette worked with the wife of the Vice Minister of Culture, a famous Chinese actor named Ying Ruochen. She did a tremendous translation of *Spring Moon*. Bette worked with her until the last chapter and then tragically she died of a blood disease. On her death bed, she said she regretted not finishing the last chapter Then Ying himself did the final chapter and it was a very well done translation.

*Q: I think you'd better for the record here give the substance of or theme of Spring Moon because it is mentioned.*

LORD: I don't know how relevant this is. She's written several books, but this was her first

novel, and it turned out to be a huge best seller for eight months in hardback and number one in paperback. Translated all over the world, main selection Literary Guild. It is basically a novel of China; it takes place in the late 19th century up through essentially the 1930s, but it jumps with an epilogue to the opening to China in the early 1970s. It is the story of Spring Moon, this woman and how she grows up and goes through various travails. It is full of the history and culture of China but also Spring Moon's personal story.

On Bette, I just want to make the point that she was a tremendous help to me personally, not only a good marriage but also in terms of advice and all she did in expanding our contacts, projecting America at its best, great imagination and entertainment, and working hard to promote official ties. Therefore it gave an extra dimension to our stewardship together.

Now, with respect to me, I thought very hard during this longer-than-I-wished period of getting ready to go to China while I was waiting for confirmation, reading up and briefings on how I wanted to advance the relationship, how I wanted to conduct the Embassy and my own priorities. I knew that this relationship was going to continue to be mixed sweet and sour if you will. We had too many differences for it to be smooth whether it was human rights or historical and geographic separation. But, I also was firmly convinced there would be great national interests in moving forward with China. Obviously geopolitical interest which existed then, of course, with respect to balancing off Russia, potential trade, cultural, technological and other interests that were beginning to pick up steam. Regional and global security and other matters that we should be working on. So I made, of course, this determination to move this relationship forward.

As for my priorities, and some of these are overlapping. I can't list them in order, but obviously, my first priority was to advance American interests not only with a general engagement with China, but to promote U.S. positions, get Chinese cooperation wherever we could on international and regional issues, as well as to expand our bilateral links both as an end in itself and to develop more constituencies on both sides of the Pacific for a stronger relationship. The more you have various fields interacting, the more you have people both in China and the U.S. arguing for a positive relationship for their own self interest and increasing mutual understanding and linkage between us. So my top priority was advancing our interests, expanding the relationship, relaying U.S. positions, and pushing the Chinese on areas where we wanted their help or restraint. The problems included importantly in the years I was there, their dealings on missiles with Iran and Saudi Arabia for example, as well as on human rights generally and in Tibet in particular. That was clearly my overall priority.

Secondly to report on China, to increase understanding in the U.S. about China. I felt very strongly that Ambassadors in general and I in particular should do this clear-eyed, make sure that people in Washington and other readers would understand what was going on in China. This would include the Chinese point of view, but, emphatically avoid clientitis and localitis. I thought it was very important in order to maintain credibility with your readers, to be firm enough with the Chinese, and to give a clear picture of them, that you could not succumb to being snowed by your hosts. A lot of Ambassadors face this danger. The Chinese are particularly seductive, and so I was determined not to fall into that trap and always to be worried about American interests and tough with the Chinese when it was necessary. I would recommend we be tough when necessary, but also remind Washington and others of the larger stakes in the

relationship, not letting one issue upset the whole relationship. Reporting on China was, therefore, a very important priority as well.

Thus, number one was advancing U.S. interests and presenting U.S. positions and negotiating for the U.S., and second was reporting on China. I think the third one was building up all these links that I mentioned earlier. Specifically, we had some clandestine cooperation with the Chinese in the intelligence area that even now I can't go into great detail on. It has become public since so I can mention that this included, on the positive side, working with them on monitoring Soviet missile tests and deployments, working with them to provide arms to the Afghan resistance against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and sharing intelligence on other parts of the world. At the same time, of course, it still was a Communist country. There was mutual suspicion on each side, spying like mad on each other, so it was a complex intelligence relationship. This positive side, much of it directed vis a vis Russia, even as we tried to improve relations with Russia, was sort of an anchor in Sino-U.S. relations. We had begun during the Kissinger-Nixon days sharing intelligence with the Chinese, but it really began in earnest under Brzezinski and Carter when we began to monitor Soviet activities and provide joint aid to the Afghan resistance. We maintained that strongly while I was there. Even when there was tension in the relationship on other issues or across the board, this aspect of the relationship was never really affected. We could go forward in good times and bad and build on a solid foundation, not known by the public and only by a few in the Congress. It was important for both sides in times of tension that we had this overall strategic interest to work together as well as we could.

Concretely our CIA people spent a great deal of time working with the Chinese on providing arms through Pakistan to Afghanistan resistance against the Soviets, and monitoring Soviet missile and other activities. Sino-American cooperation on Afghanistan was crucial.

*Q: I would think on the intelligence side, you say each side was spying on each other in a normal way, but did you find the Chinese effort was the way it has been my experience with the North Koreans and South Koreans, the Yugoslavs when there was a Yugoslavia, spending a hell of a lot of their time really spying or checking the dissident movements in the United States. In other words were they looking as to what is the United States up to or what were the overseas Chinese up to?*

LORD: I was involved really more with their surveillance of us in China. I wasn't all that familiar in detail with what they were doing in the U.S. They didn't have that many students as yet in college in the United States. That began to expand as we went along, and those are people they'd be watching. Clearly they were eavesdropping and doing things on us in the U.S. even as we were doing that in China. I can't get into detail. We had the constant reality that we figured everything was bugged including our entire household, so we were always careful whenever we spoke in the house unless we wanted to make a point like I hope we aren't having sea slugs at the next Great Hall banquet. You felt, obviously, that you and your people were being followed. In my case, they did it out of security reasons among others. They wanted to make sure nothing would happen to me. Of course, you feel more secure ironically, in a Communist controlled society. You won't get hurt by criminals or other elements because the Chinese are always around and they have got things under control. It wasn't pleasant, but I had the feeling that I could walk around or ride around on my bike without any trouble at a time when worldwide at

many of our posts we had increasing concerns about security. It was a major concern at that point if you look back, with the whole project of fortifying our Embassies and so on. We beefed up our security. I always felt personally it was one of the pleasures of China that I could ride my bike, walk anywhere without any security concerns. The downside was that you always had to watch what you say except in the bubble in the Embassy. You had to be careful in other parts of the Embassy, even in your office as well as at home. Even in our car which we assumed was bugged. I did feel our security was quite lax. We had been briefed, before going out, in the Ambassadors course about the need for security. Within a day or two of my arrival, I walked around and checked out the security of our Embassy building and other buildings there. We tightened things up. On security, the main point I want to make is one we spent quite a bit of time in this area to strengthen the relationship even as we tried to learn more about what was going on in China. It was a very mixed relationship. While I was there, we had three secret visits from three Directors of CIA.

I also was interested over this period and had some success in expanding our military to military contacts. I felt this was important. We shouldn't rush it because of the differences we had, and we shouldn't do anything to jeopardize national security. The military always had and always would play an important political role in China, so we wanted to reach that constituency. It would give us a chance over time to get a better sense of Chinese strategic and military intentions and capabilities. It would send useful signals to the Soviet Union and other potential adversaries about this relationship with China. Moreover, the military was important with respect to the export of dangerous weapons which we didn't like. If you want to get at non-proliferation, you really have to talk to the military. At this point in the relationship we were getting into a more positive footing after two decades of mutual isolation and hostility, so I thought military contact was useful symbolism.

So, for all these reasons we worked on this. We had some modest arms sales. We had increasing exchanges of visitors. I think while I was there, every Chief of Staff of the services came over and most Chinese went the other direction. There were Secretary of Defense visits and theirs going the other direction. We had the first ship visit, very dramatic, one of the highlights of my stay there in October 1986 in Qingdao. Three American ships came in for the very first time. We worked very hard on this, and this military part of the relationship expanded during this period, but was cut off by Tiananmen Square just after I left in 1989. Similarly on the cultural side...

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. Before you go on to culture, on the issue of arms sales, that had long been a very controversial one. It arose initially during the Carter years, and there was that very controversial article by Mike Pillsbury on Foreign Policy recommending this part as a way to get the relationship back on track and move it along. By the time you were Ambassador, was it still controversial?*

LORD: It was still controversial but less so as we had moved ahead with China, as we normalized with China. There were some things in the works I believe, certainly by the time I got there, I think by the time Reagan took over from the previous administration. I don't recall precisely how far back some of these had gone. It included working with them on their rather dated but important F-8 fighters, the avionics with that. It included radar for their artillery which was relevant to Vietnam. Some upgrading of some of their ships. These are some of the

significant areas. We didn't want to go so fast as to excite controversy in the U.S., but felt obviously that for the Chinese military getting a hold of some of our technology - even if it lagged behind our best - was important in terms of getting their cooperation. We certainly weren't going to do anything that was going to be a threat to Taiwan in our view or to military balances in general. Most of the technology or help we are talking about was 20 years old, give or take a few years. We felt this limited attempt was useful politically and psychologically without causing any undue controversy or upsetting any military balances. I don't recall it being overly controversial at the time. The negotiations with the Chinese always took time. In addition we had these functional exchanges at the National Defense University level for more junior officers. And higher ranking generals and admirals going in both directions, Chiefs of Staff and Secretaries of Defense, and the whole thing was beginning to move forward.

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]. How satisfied were you with transparency? More recently there have been complaints that we show the Chinese everything; they don't show us much until a recent breakthrough with Secretary Cohen. But as a general rule there hasn't been a very good balance.*

LORD: There hasn't been a particularly good balance. We always tried to get more access to what they were doing and we would have some staged visits to some of their units and facilities. When the Secretary or the Chiefs of Staff would come, they were probably embarrassed by how far behind they were us. So there is no question we consciously knew that in terms of technology, of course, even in terms of transparency and access, that they were getting more than we gave them. You couldn't see this as something you could balance off exactly. For example, if they see more of our bases and capabilities we figured that would impress them about how strong we were militarily and how far behind they were. They had an interest generally in dealing with us as a geopolitical superpower and specifically in terms of our technology, so we thought it was to our advantage to show our capabilities. We thought over time it would be more mutual. We kept pressing them on transparency, but I would grant that we didn't get the kind of reciprocity that one would normally expect or hope for, but we knew what we were doing.

We had the same thing on the intelligence side, as I mentioned in the last session, in sharing intelligence with them. Generally we would tell them more about what was going on than we would get from them. We did so to advance our interests, to make them a little nervous about the Russians or concerned about some of their partners in the Middle East who we thought were not helpful elements to regional stability. We did so partly to try to get more information out of them. Here again, we gave more than we got, as one would expect from a more advanced country, but also we felt it would pay off for us even though it wasn't strict reciprocity. It was sort of the same principle as the military exchanges.

*Q: While we are on the military subject. What was the evaluation you were getting from the visits and all? I mean what were our military people saying to you about the capabilities and perhaps the positioning? What were the Chinese using their military for during that period?*

LORD: Well, they were way behind us. When you visit their ships or see their aircraft or even their elite ground units, you could see just how far behind they were. They had a major big army but it was not that strong because of all its weaknesses. They were just then beginning to cut

down the size of the army. I don't remember the chronology of this. They were trying to begin to modernize, and that is, of course, where they had an interest with us in getting technology. Of course, they asked for a lot more than we were willing to give them. I want to make that clear. We were measured in our approach. They also had an unfortunate experience with Vietnam; when they invaded in 1979, they really got a bloody nose from the Vietnamese. If they couldn't handle the Vietnamese, who could they handle? I just have to go back and read the literature about their strategy at that point. They were beginning to move away from, I think, Mao's mass mobilization where you swallow people up if they invade you; they began to try to have a somewhat leaner and meaner force and more technologically advanced, but they had an awful long way to go.

On nuclear weapons they have evolved a great deal since those days in terms of their attitude. We were concerned about non-proliferation, although most of the issues we had with the Chinese in that period were on missiles, Silkworms to Iran and some other missiles to Saudi Arabia. They did that to earn money for the PLA as well as to gain friendship and influence in other countries. On the nuclear side, they had a fledgling capability then for deterrence purposes, only regional in nature; they certainly couldn't reach us at that point. At the time they were obviously relaxed about proliferation; they were helping Pakistan with its program.

*Q: I mean were we seeing during this period, mobilizing toward an invasion of Taiwan? Militarily I assume you were watching this closely.*

LORD: No. I want to make sure my memory doesn't play tricks on me. We would always watch their deployments. While I was there, there was no Taiwan military crisis such as we had in the spring of 1996 or we had earlier when we didn't have relations. Their concern was less with Taiwan and more vis a vis the Soviet Union, to a certain extent Vietnam, and they had tensions with India going back to the 1962 war. They had residual historical concerns about Japan and Korea. The Chinese had opened up to us in large measure due to their concern about the Russians. There was a general calculation on their part that the far barbarian, the United States, was less threatening to them in history and geography than the near barbarians. They might not have trusted us or liked us particularly but they felt that since we were not on their borders and since on balance compared to some of their neighbors we had been relatively benign in our history, that they had less to fear from us. We had not invaded them like Japan. We had not taken large parts of their territory - at least as they saw it - like Russia. We had not fought them like Korea or India except in the Korean War. On the whole we were a strong and distant barbarian, and by being in the area and dealing with them, this helped provide geopolitical and security balance as they looked around their borders not only to the Russian threat to the north but these others that I have mentioned. In terms of their deployments and other concerns, it was clearly at that point to the north with the Russians and to a certain extent the south, the Vietnamese, and the Indians. There were not large threatening deployments vis a vis Taiwan.

A more general point. While I was Ambassador, the Taiwan issue was remarkably quiet - probably the calmest phase we've ever had with the PRC. This was partly due to the easing of tensions through the 1982 Communiqué. Partly the general advance of our time. Partly our cooperation against the Soviets, including heavy duty work together on shipping arms through Pakistan to the Afghan resistance.

*Q: To put in context, '89 was not only Tiananmen Square but also the beginning of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. We are talking about a time where the Soviets were still involved in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union was the Soviet Union, not Russia.*

LORD: That's correct and it was still their primary concern when I was Ambassador. Now they were already easing relations with the Russians during this period. Gorbachev gave a speech in Vladivostok on Asia that I considered very significant at the time. I have to check the date, it must have been about 1987. Clearly that was a pitch for better relations with China. I think the Chinese felt it would help them deal with us, along with their own security concerns, if they could ease relations with Russia, and it would help them in terms of their military deployments and expenditures. They were beginning to move with the Russians - not at an alarming rate - but I thought it was significant, more so than some of my colleagues. In our reporting cables, I emphasized the importance of the Vladivostok speech and their concern about the Russians. They of course - this is jumping forward - were improving relations, and Gorbachev was to come there in May, 1989. They didn't like the political reforms he was instituting. They thought this was dangerous in terms of maintaining party control and maintaining the empire. In a way they were right, given what happened in Russia, but they drew the wrong conclusions about the need for political as well as economic reform. In any event, their main concern was still north and to a certain extent south, not really pressure on Taiwan during this period.

*Q: We are talking about this Soviet situation. How in your discussions of your Embassy, did you use the Soviet card or did you let the Chinese figure out what the Soviets were up to themselves?*

LORD: We like to think we did it in a somewhat sophisticated fashion. After all this had been going on now since the early 1970s and here we are in the late 1980s. We were trying to improve relations with the Russians at the same time. We made no secret of that with the Chinese. We also kept telling the Chinese we hope you can improve relations. In fact, our view was, and it was sincere, we wanted a Sino-Soviet relationship that was not tense or hostile but certainly wasn't an alliance. The situation that had existed in 1969 for example, the border clashes, we genuinely thought were too dangerous and too tense. It could lead not only to a conflict between them but a wider conflict in the region with others and even perhaps the nuclear dimension. Even if you could crudely say it is nice to have these two guys fighting each other, we didn't want that kind of hostile, tense relationship between these two major powers.

So, to the extent they were improving relations and easing tensions we would favor that. Now, we obviously didn't want them to go all the way back to the 1950s and be solid allies again. We wanted to have better relations with each one than they had with each other. We felt there was a limit on how far the Sino-Soviet rapprochement could go, and therefore we were genuinely relaxed about the progress they were making with Moscow, and conveyed that to the Chinese both out of sincerity and out of tactics. You don't want to make them feel that they are getting you nervous with their relations with the Russians. We felt that the Russians and the Chinese each needed us more than they could possibly use each other. Of course, in economic terms for the Chinese this is a constant theme from the early 1970s to even as we speak today. The Chinese needed us for the number one priority of developing their country, modernizing their economy, lifting the standard of living of their people, and maintaining Communist party control

by giving their people a better life, calculating that man or woman lives by rice alone. That is their number one priority, and they need our technology, our marketing skills, our capital investment, our know-how, our trade. In order to do that, they don't want to be dependent on Japan or anyone else. As we speak now, we take a third of their exports and we are still the key investment and technological provider. They needed us for that. The Russians needed many of the same things from us. They couldn't get that from each other given their economies. They both needed us, and we figured that was a constraint on their getting so close that they would engender hostility or nervousness on our part and therefore lose out on the economic connection with us. Similarly on the geopolitical front, yes we had tensions with Russia, the cold war and the nuclear dimension, but we weren't bordering them, unless you count Alaska and Vladivostok, as China was. We didn't have troops facing off against each other, and we didn't have this long history of Sino-Soviet tension. We felt there would always be that constraint between Moscow and Beijing, that no matter how much they patched up their relations, there would be this mutual suspicion.

To make a long story short, we tried better relations with both. Usually we went ahead simultaneously or we fell backward simultaneously. It was not a zero sum gain from our standpoint. We did try to remind the Chinese that even as we hoped they would have better relations, they shouldn't feel secure for all eternity vis a vis Russia, but we tried this in a subtle way. We would keep briefing them on Russian deployments and so on so that they would be reminded of Soviet strength and the need to maintain a relationship with us. We would keep them fully posted on our relations with Russia, again striking a balance to show that we were trying to move ahead with Moscow and we were having some success to make them a little uneasy, but also making it clear that we were tough and not being snowed by the Russians, or overlooking the dangers of falling in love with détente. I'm talking about the '70s as well as when I was there, so we were always trying to strike this kind of balance. I think on balance, and this is true of administrations I didn't serve in, that on the whole we have done this quite well and quite effectively.

*Q: What about you in Beijing and our Ambassador in Moscow as well as the European bureau and East Asian bureau? Was this just you sort of working on instinct or was there sort of a controlling hand as to how we were dealing with two superpowers?*

LORD: Of course this always has to be integrated from Washington, the White House and the State Department and other agencies. They'd have to balance off our Russian and China policies. I think I had the advantage in my job of not only having the China background, but a general background in policy where I was head of State Department Policy Planning, special assistant to Kissinger, and head of the Council on Foreign Relations. I had a global view which was useful in my talks with the Chinese in terms of my credentials, including having done a lot with the Russians during my NSC period. By the way, I kept up with the Russian Ambassador in Beijing. I forget the first guy's name, but then he was followed by Troyanovsky. We kept in constant touch, working lunches together, even a basketball game which we won, thanks to our Marines.

But, to get to your question, there was not a lot of tension between our Moscow Embassy and our Embassy in Beijing. It was not as if our Ambassadors to India and Pakistan were facing off against each other, which happens a lot. We didn't have that kind of problem at all as I recall.

We'd each of course, send a copy of any cable we'd send to Washington to each other. We'd do this always with Embassies Moscow or Japan or Korea or other key people in Europe on our cables, and they would do the same, so there was coordination that way. I don't recall any incidents or events where there was real bloody battles between us and Embassy Moscow or real disputes about the triangular dimensions. We also were meticulous in debriefing the Chinese if there had been a summit meeting with the Russians, like Reagan at Iceland for example, or arms control agreements or negotiations. Ambassador Rowny, who did a lot of the negotiations, came several times, as did other negotiators to fill them in. I like to think we played this in a relatively sophisticated way.

*Q: Because sometimes we had. How about a China hand in Moscow?*

LORD: Well, I think there were people in Moscow who had served in China, but I don't recall specifically. We didn't have a slot just assigned for that purpose.

*Q: While we are still on the Soviet side, did you sense any concern about the was it the Gorbo mania. Gorbachev was a new type Soviet leader, and he became rather the darling of Europe, the British, and the United States in this period and seemed to have a rapport with Ronald Reagan which was happening during your time. I was wondering whether they were feeling miffed or concerned that we were getting too close to the Soviets?*

LORD: Well, first if the Chinese were miffed or concerned, they would not show it. I mean just for tactical reasons, they wouldn't want to show they were concerned. We got a lot of lectures as you recall from earlier sessions from Deng Xiaoping and others in the '70s about being naive about the Soviets, not being tough enough. We didn't hear that in the '80s, probably because they were improving their own relations. With respect to Gorbachev, however, I don't recall that they were all that frank in their discussions with us. Clearly we knew that they were suspicious of what he was doing and had real ambivalence. They liked the fact that he wanted to improve relations with China, and they worked with him on that, but they were very concerned about what Gorbachev was doing on the domestic political front in terms of freeing up that society both because it might have a contagion effect in China and unleash similar currents there and because they felt, and they were correct in a way, that this would lead to lack of control by the Communist Party in Russia and even loss of their empire. So, they were suspicious of Gorbachev, and generally on balance, didn't like him. On the other hand, they were pragmatically dealing with him to improve their bilateral relationship.

We can pick up some of these things again later, to get back to bilateral relations, we spent a lot of time trying to expand educational and cultural affairs with the Chinese. We made some progress here, but there is always some, and it continues to this day, restrictive paranoid quality about Western ideas. Basically the Chinese strategy was to get Western technology and Western money without being subverted by western ideals, culture and ideas. We made some progress in terms of agreements signed and exchanges back and forth. Bette worked extremely hard on this and did a lot to promote groups going back and forth, but we would have reminders of their repression.

I remember one example where we were going to send to China an exhibit from the National

Portrait Gallery. Just before it was about to come over, the Chinese said there are two portraits that cannot be included in this. One is Golda Meir from Israel, the other is General MacArthur, I guess because of the Korean War connection. We were very tough. There were some in my USIA section who wanted to bend on this. I thought this was absolutely wrong. I'm not saying everyone in the section, but some elements who sort of wanted to work it out with the Chinese. I said we had to be very tough on this out of principle. Furthermore there was some absurdity here. It is not as if we were putting Hitler there. It was pretty absurd to pick on Golda Meir and even MacArthur. We were prepared to make sure that the texts underneath the pictures wouldn't go out of their way to be insulting to China. We weren't about to remove the pictures. I thought it would be bad both generally as a principle and setting a precedent for future cultural exchanges, and also I thought it would set off an uproar in the United States where there is still understandably great suspicion of China not only on its human rights but its cultural repression. So we hung very tough on this, but the Chinese wouldn't give in and the portrait exhibit didn't take place. This was an example of their idiocy. This took place about 1987, about that time. So, we have continued examples like that. We did manage nevertheless, to have considerable expansion of student and cultural exchange, and science and technology. We worked very hard on all that. Along with other aspects of our growing relationship there was a great increase of exchanges both ways in all these fields, not to mention business activity and tourists in China.

*Q: What about with student exchange, I know that it was very evident with any exchange program we had with the Soviet Union. The Soviets were sending people to learn hard science, and we were sending people to learn about icons. It was of this nature and the Soviets were milking us for everything they could scientifically and not allowing people who were might be get infected by studying American poets or something like that. Did you find that balance?*

LORD: There was an element of that, although we thought it was to our advantage to let Chinese students come to the U.S. and be exposed to American society no matter what they were studying. We just thought it was a good idea and obviously still feel that way. They heavily loaded up, somewhat understandably, on their practical science, technological and economic needs, steering their student exchanges toward science, engineering, and so on. So, the great bulk in that period were in that area. It doesn't mean they couldn't be exposed to American ideas and views and be another link in strengthening U.S.-Chinese relations. It would have a beneficial impact when they got back to China. From the Chinese standpoint they were taking a certain risk either that they wouldn't return or that they would be semi-subversive when they did return or at least expect things they had gotten used to in the United States for their professional and economic abilities. This was a great transfer of technology from their standpoint, learning a great deal about science and technology, so it was a tradeoff that was in both sides' interests. We tried to get more students to come from the U.S. to China, which was a very small number. We had Fulbright exchange programs which I promoted very heavily. We also worked very hard on the international visitor program of USIA which is very important where you select middle level people of middle age, still with a big future but of rising importance to come and spend a few weeks in the U.S., get exposed to American society, go all over the United States and go back again. It was a constant struggle to get people that were not just politically correct from the Chinese standpoint and were not just cadre or hacks. We had mixed success on that, but it was an important program, so we worked very hard in this whole area.

Another objective I had, of course, was economic, and one of my highest priorities was to promote American trade and investment interests. The culture of the Foreign Service was just beginning to change at this point. You know we have a tradition further back in our history where the average Ambassador in his Embassy was saying this isn't really traditional diplomacy. I think it is fair to say 20-30 years ago American businesses saw American Embassies generally as not being particularly helpful. Trade and investment, of course, were less crucial then in international relations. There was less globalization and less of our economy depended on exports and our presence abroad than it does today. But for all those reasons, the change in the importance of this element, the culture has been changing clearly in the State Department. Today people are rated very heavily on how well they perform economically as Ambassadors and elsewhere and it is high on any Ambassador's list pretty much now.

We were just making that shift generally in the culture then, and I was very much in favor of that shift. I felt that Ambassadors and country teams had a distinct obligation to American businesses. It would help American jobs and exports back home and that was important. It would also help to strengthen the overall relationship with China, so it had that benefit as well. And over time it might loosen up the Chinese system. I think if you divide up my labors and it were possible to quantify it, I think I spent as much time if not more on our economic relationship than any other aspect during my 3 ½ years there. This was in terms of seeing Chinese officials on investment or trade matters, opening exhibits, promoting deals, lobbying for American companies, reporting on economics back home, devising strategies to improve the investment and trade climate. I worked extremely hard on that and spent a lot of time on it. As a result, I had very good relations with the American business community. Some have been critical about me in recent years because of my strong human rights stand, but business interests were a major part of our effort. We had a lot of economic agencies come out there. We had cabinet-level commission meetings with Commerce and Treasury and Science and Technology, and a lot of cabinet and sub-cabinet officials and others went back and forth. We spent a great amount of time on that for the reasons I mentioned, to further our concrete interests but to also strengthen the overall relationship.

*Q: I can understand why from strengthening the overall relationship, the more American investment we had in China the better, but what is in it for the United States economically, the United States per se to have a lot of McDonalds?*

LORD: Well, it means increased earnings for American companies, increased jobs in America, increased exports from America as well as the effect of loosening up broadly Chinese society, and, over time, including reforms through American business practices and interactions. Over time, it could loosen up the political and cultural restraints in China, but there were these very concrete American economic interests involved.

*Q: Were you watching the situation that American jobs were essentially being lost because American firms were using Chinese labor rather than American labor?*

LORD: It wasn't that big at that point. In fact, even today it isn't that large compared to say Mexico or some other places where this happens. This was really not an issue at the time. Prison labor hadn't really reared its ugly head at the time although even today it doesn't involve American businesses very much, at least hopefully not. Most of them are very sensitive to that.

Also at that point we even had modest surpluses with the Chinese. The trade was growing strongly while I was there, but it is modest compared to today of course. But, it was growing and we didn't have this tremendous trade imbalance at the time. So this was not at my time there as sensitive issue as it is now. Now it is sensitive because of the tremendous surplus the Chinese have. It has been sensitive, not so much recently, because of prison labor. As for investment, it was a constant battle to get the Chinese to relax their investment climate so that we could get in there. So, that was a large part of our time trying to make it easy for Americans to invest there as well as promoting trade and deals. We had great competition from the Japanese and European businesses. As I said, we launched the joint commissions back and forth, and many high level visits. I spent a lot of time with businessmen briefing them at a weekly happy hour at our commercial section which I would join talking with these people. I went around the country and promoted American business in various places, so this was a large part of my time. Whenever I went, to Shanghai or Guangzhou, even the interior, these other Chinese cities, this would be high on my list with the local authorities.

*Q: Well, did you, were you looking over your shoulder at Japan, because in Japan already we were having a tremendous trade deficit with Japan. I think it was already certainly at that time, the latter half of the '80s, and the Japanese had this system where it was almost impossible to penetrate; while the Japanese are selling their goods to the United States, it was very difficult to sell American goods to Japan. Were you looking at that and having problems of that nature because of their system or were you seeing this on the horizon as we moved ahead with the developing trade?*

LORD: Well, we kept in mind the Japanese example. We didn't want to end up in China like where the Japanese market was closed and we had this large trade deficit, so that general concern was in our mind. But, as I said, trade was modest compared to today, and we really didn't have a trade imbalance. These concerns were not acute at the time. A good part of our struggle was to get the Chinese to make it easier to do business with less and less red tape and more transparency and so on. Also a major concern was access to the Chinese domestic market. Their emphasis particularly in those days was too narrow; they wanted American technology and investment in China and exports, but they were severely restricting American access to that large Chinese market. It was a constant battle to get more access to China's market for U.S. companies.

*Q: In the '30s there was a book called Oil for the Lamps of China and there were millions of customers. Now over a billion customers, and this has always been a theme throughout the history of the United States, if we can only get into that market. It has usually turned out to be not as profitable or as easy as was thought. Can you talk about the attitude of business, the professionalism, the capabilities of American business and any problems or maybe examples of what you had to deal with?*

LORD: Well, for American businesspeople, I think, this was still relatively early. The Deng Xiaoping opening and reforms started in '79, so outside investment started after that including American investment. It was only a few years later. Already there were frustrations for American business because some had been there for a few years and weren't getting anywhere, so some were quite frustrated, but on the whole I think there was a feeling, a recognition that they had to have some patience. They were anxious to be in there for the long run; if they got in early and

earned some credit with the Chinese they might have the inside track vis a vis their competitors when things got a little looser. So, without being able to generalize, there was a feeling that this was a little frustrating, but we have got to play for the long run. A few got sufficiently frustrated that they actually pulled out while I was there, but most of them stayed or started coming in.

A lot depended also on local leadership. For example, I worked very hard with the mayor and vice mayor of Beijing to get more projects into Beijing. At one point we set a quota for the next year of 15; we got up to 23. I was reminded of this at a banquet, again modest by today's standards, but they were anxious to move ahead. In Tianjian in particular there was very dynamic leadership and a new economic zone promoting foreign investment. Li Ruihan was the dynamic mayor then, and he remains one of the top leaders today. We could make progress there. In Shanghai, there was a tremendous contrast between the two mayors I dealt with. The first was Jiang Zemin, now the leader of China, and he was not very helpful. The climate was not very good for investment in Shanghai when I first went down there in late '85-'86.

*Q: He is now the President of China.*

LORD: And the American business community was very frustrated about the business climate in Shanghai when I first arrived. Then Zhu Rongji, who is now the Prime Minister of China, took Jiang Zemin's place as mayor and there was an immediate change. For example, rather than have to go to a dozen different places to get permission to start a joint venture or transaction, Zhu started one stop shopping where they were all consolidated in one place. In other ways he encouraged investment, and was very impressive. When I went back to Shanghai in '87-'88 there was a tremendous change. The American businessmen were very pleased at the progress that was being made.

I think American businessmen on the whole, I'm now generalizing, were not naive. Yes there was a huge potential Chinese market, and that is why they wanted to get a foothold there for the future. But they also recognized this would take time; there wouldn't be immediate dividends. Also it depended on what areas you were dealing in. Not only geographic, but in areas where the Chinese needed investment, they would make it easier for you to invest than in other areas. The biggest problems were transparency, red tape, delays, ability to have access to the Chinese market as opposed to being pressured just to export or to provide technology. Also the hiring of the Chinese staff, the ability to get the best Chinese workers and keep them. Often American business would get them, train them well, and then the government would take them back and send them elsewhere. So, there was control by the government over personnel working in American joint ventures and businesses, and there was a constant struggle to allow American business to have access to the best people and to keep them once they had them. So these are some of the problems that American businesses faced, but on the whole, things were moving ahead and there were some success stories.

*Q: Was there any instead of sort of a Harvard Business School, a Beijing Business School or someplace that was training to managers, or were they relying on the genetic instinct of the Chinese to be good businessmen?*

LORD: The Chinese do have a genetic instinct for great entrepreneurship, but they also had a

terrible Communist economic system and state enterprises and all the other elements that were holding back their economy even in those days. We had one specific program in Dalian, an institute where we trained Chinese managers. We brought them over to the United States, That was a very positive force; we worked hard on that. It was run by the Commerce Department. Secretary Shultz on one of his two trips when I was there, went to visit that institute. Obviously, individual American joint ventures and businessmen were helping train Chinese as they worked together with them. The Chinese had an International University of Economics and Business. Which Bette and I both addressed. This was going on as well. But, this was still pretty early compared to where we are now in the 1990s in terms of Chinese learning management skills, developing entrepreneurship, and even loosening up their system and moving it toward a capitalist operation.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Did you have any trouble at that time with dual use technologies? Was that an issue yet?*

LORD: These are technologies that we would export that could be used for either military or civilian purposes, and the issue is that if you export it, you have got to make sure that it is used for the reasons it is supposed to be used for. I do recall that we were constantly trying to expand the list of exports we thought we could safely export to make more money for Americans and more jobs without endangering national security, including a looser definition of computers because computers have advanced so far that we felt that some could now be safely sent to China. I don't recall any of this being a huge issue. We did point out to the Chinese that our exports of dual use technology were related to their performance, and this echoes today, of how they were dealing with Iran and Saudi Arabia on missiles. There was an implicit tradeoff that we managed on one of Shultz's trips or Secretary of Defense Carlucci's trips.

*Q: Carlucci was Secretary of Defense.*

LORD: To loosen up on certain areas of exports, not on national security items under export control, but rather dual use items in exchange for better Chinese performance in sending missiles to the Middle East. It did not have the kind of controversy that we have now in the 1990s.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You mentioned several times and I didn't bring it up earlier, but the co-question of missile proliferation in the Middle East. How did you go about dealing with the Chinese on that very difficult issue?*

LORD: As I recall, there were two major issues here, again we won't be precise on chronology. One was they sent Silkworms to Iran. That was a significant problem, and we worked very hard on it. We finally got them to agree not to send any more. They claimed they never had sent any, but we got them to agree that while they never sent any, they wouldn't do so again! Shultz worked hard on this, and we worked very hard on this over time, but I don't have any precise dates. That was one area. Then there was another area when their Foreign Minister, Wu, was visiting Washington in the late '80s, and even as he was there, we got reports of their sending missiles to Saudi Arabia, and we got them to clamp down on that. There was also still ambiguous activity with Pakistan with respect to the nuclear program. That was why a nuclear agreement we negotiated with China was never sent forth to Congress until last October (1998) when Jiang

Zemin visited the United States. The other issue that has some resonance now was Chinese rockets launching American satellites. While I was there the Challenger blew up, an American tragedy.

*Q: It was an orbital shuttle.*

LORD: That was a tragedy obviously in personal terms, but also a setback for our whole launching capabilities. Our satellite industry wasn't able then, even as it is not today, to have enough launches of American capability so they could get their satellites up. Plus we felt in general orbiting satellites for communications purposes would feed into the whole communications information revolution and it would have a positive impact on China. Above all, we wanted to help our satellite makers, but we also had to work out certain limits so we wouldn't unfairly hurt our own satellite launchers. They could still do some. We had certain quotas we were shooting for with the Chinese. This was a major agreement we worked out when Secretary Carlucci visited China, I'm quite sure in 1988. We are hearing about it today (1998) for Chinese rockets to launch American satellites. We had several conditions we worked on even after the Carlucci visit. One was the number of launches so we wouldn't hurt American industry. Another was tight controls and inspections so there wouldn't be any security breach. I think there were one or two other conditions.

On missile proliferation, generally we had serious problems on Iran and Saudi Arabia as I mentioned. Along with Tibet which heated up while I was there - we will get back into that - those were probably the most serious issues we had while I was there, as well as the general Chinese restraints on political and cultural freedom.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): What kind of arguments did you make to the Chinese to try to persuade them not to do this?*

LORD: It is not unlike what we have been doing in recent years on proliferation issues. You use a combination of sticks and carrots. We didn't have in place as many sanctions then as we do now, so we didn't have any sanctions we could impose as I recall. The Chinese were interested in getting more technology, including dual use technology. For commercial reasons we were interested in this as well, so we would use that, saying in effect if you behave yourself on missile proliferation, we can do more on exporting dual use technology. So there was that trade off. We also tried to appeal to their geopolitical interests, saying instability in the Near East and the Persian Gulf was not in their interest either. Now that argument has much greater weight today when they have to import oil themselves. They want stability. We also made the point that arming Iran with Silkworm missiles that could hit American ships was a serious problem for U.S.-Chinese relations in terms of American domestic and congressional opinion. Resentment over this could seriously set back the U.S.-China relationship.

So the incentives were more economic and technological cooperation, avoiding the dangers of hurting American domestic support for the relationship, and geopolitical arguments. Now, that had to be balanced off with their need to make money, the PLA in particular, and their desire to have an influence in the region. It was not easy going. There was a lot of tough work over many months by us at the Embassy and in Washington, but we did make progress on both Iran and

Saudi Arabia.

*Q: The PLA is the People's Liberation Army.*

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Was it more difficult to argue the case about Saudi Arabia since that is an American ally? Did you have to approach it differently than Iran?*

LORD: I guess it was somewhat more difficult. I remember we hit them when foreign Minister Wu was in Washington in '87 or '88, around that period. Shultz had a barbecue at his house in Washington. We took this up with Wu. It was the first time this had come up, just before Wu had arrived. He got hit also by the National Security Advisor, Colin Powell as well, not only that evening I believe, but in his office the next day. I think Reagan also referred to it but not as precisely as Powell. I don't recall. We had to appeal to different interests. On the one hand the Saudis were an ally. But we thought it was destabilizing to have missile proliferation in the Middle East generally. And of course, we had the Israeli connection which we were concerned about. Even then the Chinese had some contacts with Israel including military supplies and this grew all the time. So, even though they had a position in the Middle East, interests with the Palestinians and the Arabs, they had some fish to fry with the Israelis as well. We appealed on instability in the region and the impact on American opinion.

I'll move on to some other elements in our relations. One specific thing that I was very happy with, and that I worked very hard on, was the Peace Corps. Before I went out to China in 1985, I remember agreeing with the director of the Peace Corps, Loret Ruppe, that this would be a goal. I just felt it was a great program generally and it would be very helpful to get it into China. I worked hard on that for my entire tenure. The Chinese still had residual suspicions that the Peace Corps might be a front for spying. It had, they thought, some historical baggage, and they didn't even want the name Peace Corps name to be used. It had to be, from the Chinese translation, "American Volunteers" or something like that. I worked very hard on this for several years. One of the last things we accomplished was to sign an agreement letting American teachers go into Sichuan Province just before I left as part of a 3-3 ½ year effort.

By the way, I took Chinese lessons my first few months in China and picked up some phrases for evidence of my efforts. But it was impossible, part-time, to make real progress.

Another major objective of mine was to build up support in the United States for the relationship, in a hard-hearted way and not coming across as being infected with clientitis or being naive about the Chinese. I was stressing concerns about human rights and missile proliferation and Tibet, whatever the issue was. I worked hard to get not only government officials who were already generally committed to this, but also members of Congress. I was anxious to get as many of them to China as possible, particularly conservatives and skeptics of the relationship. They could reinforce our positions to the Chinese with their own points. And they could learn more about the benefits of our relations. Indeed the very first high level delegation to China after I arrived as Ambassador included two or three Senators who had voted against my confirmation (the vote was 87-7). They subsequently became strong supporters of mine, e.g., Senator Hatch of Utah.

I would go back to the U.S. every few months. I think Ambassadors as a matter of policy should do this for a variety of reasons. One of course, is to push issues along in the bureaucracy that are hung up and you can only get it done by lobbying directly at high levels in Washington and moving things along. Second getting the mood back there, getting a sense both in the government and generally the political mood of how things are going so you can relay that to the Chinese and also keep them in mind as you operate back in China. I would see as many congressmen and Senators as I could when I got back. They are always tough to get appointments with. I would get with the academic experts and compare notes with them, talk with a lot of business people and get their perspectives on doing business in China and how we could help them. What their frustrations and goals were. I would also relay my impressions of China to various audiences. Give speeches to various groups outlining our goals with China and building up support for the relationship as well as backgrounders with the press and on the air interviews. I remember on one trip, I did a real blitz because it was the anniversary of normalization of the Shanghai Communiqué or one of those dates. I remember interviews with the New York Times and the Washington Post. I was on the McNeil-Lehrer Show, and NBC Today when I went back.

Another objective was to keep in touch with the American scene, move the bureaucracy along on issues, also plan upcoming trips. I'd be back before Shultz coming over, or the Secretary of Defense, and try to strategize the trip, and to keep in touch with America and what was going on. Also I went back several times to accompany high level Chinese visitors. I already had lots of cabinet and other people coming to China and eventually President Bush toward the end of my stay. In turn, we had high level Chinese visitors going to the U.S. I accompanied them to not only Washington and New York but to other places around the country. Several high level Chinese included a couple of Vice Premiers, Foreign Minister Wu (February 1988), and soon to be president Yang Shangkung (May 1987). We went to various places like Minneapolis, New Orleans, North Carolina, Texas, and California, not to mention New York and Washington. This was very useful. It was fun to see America through other eyes, traveling with the Chinese. What they saw had to impress them with our strengths. It gave me a chance to have access continually with these high level leaders and establish relations with them and try to influence them, to try to make some points and get American perspectives and interests advanced in our discussions with them. It was useful to go back there and advance the relationship in these ways. On one of these trips, sadly, in May 1986, my father passed away in Florida. I had skipped a meeting with Secretary Shultz, with his blessing, to see him a last time a few days earlier.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Can I interrupt for just a second because it follows from what you were saying. Were you able during this period to form personal relationships with the Chinese leadership. How approachable were they? Did you only see them in these formal occasions?*

LORD: I will go over some of the Chinese leaders and my impressions. First a couple of other points.

I have said that my three and a half years were the best ever since the 1971-2 opening in terms of bilateral relations, and that's true. But, of course, we had problems all the time in this mixed relationship. Probably the rockiest time was the last three months or so of 1987. We hit the Chinese hard on their giving Silkworm missiles to the Saudis and on Tibet. They hit us on Tibet

and a Congressional Record resolution and canceled some exchanges. In my usual year end personal review cable I set forth a strategy, including visits and exchanges, for improving the situation. I also planned to step up my own travels around China. In early 1988 the situation improved.

One thing I put great stress on was personal cables, not overdoing it, but setting out in writing every few months my own impressions of what was going on in China as well as key issues and how to advance them. So I would do this and make sure it got to the Secretary and National Security Advisor and others. I took great interest in doing this personally as well as working carefully on the usual Embassy scene setters. I did this personally to prepare visitors on key trips as well, either editing drafts of my staff or doing them personally. So I spent a lot of work on some of these personal notes. You did it selectively so you wouldn't wear out your welcome. I got some very good feedback on that.

We took very seriously visitors from Washington whether executive branch or congressional or actors like Gregory Peck and Charlton Heston or Billy Graham or top level business people. It didn't matter who it was, we went out of our way to give them as good briefings as we could. Particularly when American government leaders came we would give them specific scene-setters. This was standard in our Embassy. I put great stress on it both to help them do a better job when they got to China but also frankly to burnish the reputation of the Embassy. I think, without being self serving, we got a very good reputation with our briefings once they got there as well as our scene setters in advance. We took very seriously briefing these visitors in advance as they set out to do their business and frankly both in writing and verbally we did very thoughtful briefings.

Finally as Ambassador I was concerned about staff morale. I did believe in working people hard and pursuing excellence as the main goal, but we had a variety of ways to engage the staff and help morale. We had monthly staff meetings at the house where spouses would be invited. Very small lunches with junior or mid level officers that you don't see in the normal course of events. Tremendous engagement with Marines even to the point of playing basketball every Saturday and softball every Sunday. We had our Marines picked as the best unit in Asia a couple of times running out of all detachments out there. I would make an effort to write personal notes to the staff on cables to show I was keeping on top of what they were doing. I made sure that my secretary or staff would keep me posted on any personal developments so that I could weigh in whether it was a birth or death in the family or whatever. We took that quite seriously as well. Now, these are some of the objectives I had as Ambassador.

Related to this was my attention to our four consulates - Shanghai, Guangdong, Shenyang, and Chengdu. I visited all of them several times. I, of course, would meet with the American and Chinese staffs and have personnel accompany me in meetings and travels. I sought their views and paid attention to morale, just as I did of the embassy. I worked hard, together with my deputy and others, to improve the poor working conditions, housing, the security, the schooling, etc - both at the consulates and in Beijing. We pressed the Chinese hard on this and travel restrictions and I/we spent much time on these and property issues and made some progress. I also met frequently and Bette and I socialized with our Chinese employees in Beijing and elsewhere. Their morale was important to us.

Another thing I should mention is human rights. Human rights has been a thorn in our side ever since we opened up with China. It has become more acute, most people agree, since Tiananmen Square and the images we had of that massacre. Even in those days though, it was one of the big problems in our relationship. I felt then, as I do now, that this is an important issue in and of itself and in terms of building American and Congressional support for the relationship. But I also felt there were many other interests in China and no one issue can hold the whole relationship hostage. That has always been my view. I raised human rights lots of times. We took it seriously, we raised it, and we pressed it, whether it was freedom of expression or Tibet. But, it was not as high profile an issue as it has been in the 1990s. It did get quite high profile in Tibet where there was tough repression of demonstrations. It was a problem, but it was not the dominant issue. I will get back to this later because I want to give a real vignette about the experience Bette and I had on democracy at Beijing University. While we were there human rights was a continuing problem, but it didn't dominate the relationship. It wasn't as high profile as it is today since Tiananmen Square.

One problem, it's not strictly human rights, but having to do with journalists an issue that came up on several occasions. For example, I was at Chengdu with my wife and son. We were about to launch on a brief summer vacation traveling through Kunming and Guilin. My first day there I got word that John Burns who was a New York Times correspondent although he was a Canadian citizen actually, had been detained by the Chinese because he had traveled in areas that he didn't have permission to travel in. My instinct told me this was a possible bombshell since he was a New York Times reporter although he was not an American citizen. I immediately dropped my vacation and raced back to Beijing and worked very hard with the Chinese. We were visited by Abe Rosenthal and another man from the New York Times editorial board on this issue. It was very tense because there was some concern they might actually charge Burns with trespassing or violating security. In the Chinese so called justice system, once you are charged, you are guilty. So, if he would have been charged, he probably would have been jailed. He was being detained. We worked extremely hard, much harder than the Canadians did.

*Q: I was going to ask about the Canadians.*

LORD: Well, we tried cooperating on this but they were nowhere near as concerned about their own citizen as we were. We got a lot of credit with Rosenthal and others for the efforts we made. I pulled out all the stops and we finally got Burns expelled and not detained. In the process, of course, we lost a tremendous observer of the Chinese scene. Ironically he was writing an article for the Times that was positive about Deng's reforms in the countryside. But, in so doing, he was deliberately going to off limit areas without getting permission. He was on a motorcycle accompanied by a young man named Ed McNally, a very bright lawyer from Yale who helped me with some July 4 speeches.

*Q: What arguments were you using with the Chinese authorities?*

LORD: The main argument was of course the impact on our relations. You take the premier American newspaper, you jail that reporter, it is going to have a devastating impact. Secondly, he clearly wasn't spying. I don't recall how we fuzzed up how much he knew about restrictions, but

he could not have been not spying. His motive was journalism. I made the point that he was telling, he was in fact about to write a positive story about what was going on, and he just wanted to see as much of China as he could, the innocence of what he was doing. He limited his self confession; he violated certain restrictions, but this was for journalistic reasons, not spying reasons. So, we worked very hard and successfully on that.

There was another American with the AP who was kicked out a few months later from Guandong. The journalists generally were always frustrated by the surveillance they had in China. The longer they stay there, the more cynical they get about the Chinese and human rights in general. In fact, they were nervous about making contact with students or dissidents or intellectuals because they might get them in trouble. Their phones and probably apartments were bugged, and they always had to get permission to travel places. There were a lot of frustrations there. It was a tough place to do business even though it was fascinating in terms of substance. There were several meetings where I met with them both Americans and correspondents in general, and they were pressing for even stronger U.S. actions including retaliating by kicking out Chinese reporters from the U.S. and so on. I think they felt I lobbied as hard as I could with the Chinese on restrictions of the press and specifically on these cases. This was a source of tension. I just mention this in the general area of human rights although it was not exactly the same thing as Tibet or dissidents. I'll do Tibet a little more later.

In addition, I spent a lot of time with resident, as well as American, journalists, mostly on background to explain our policies and impressions of China. Every few weeks my key officers and I would meet with the resident journalists to brief them and answer their questions.

Among the vivid memories Bette and I have of our China tenure. The first American ship visits to China since 1949 - October 1986 in Qingdao. Going to a Chinese Catholic church on Christmas Eve, 1986 I believe - it was totally packed. I introduced the Superbowl on Chinese television on March 9, 1986 - sadly a lopsided, dull victory for the Bears over the Patriots. Honor guards for high level American military visitors. Countless banquets in the Great Hall of the People and the Guest House. Travels all around the country. Parties at the residence with Chinese friends. Bette and I won a diplomatic tennis tournament and my son, Win, and I got to the finals of men's doubles. I also won a men's doubles diplomatic tournament. The prize was a week's vacation in Yugoslavia which I never took.

#### ***XIX. AMBASSADOR TO CHINA - CHINESE LEADERS, POLITICAL ISSUES (1985-1989)***

*Q: You were going to talk about your impression of the Chinese leadership both individuals and its collective ability, how you appraised it at that time, because its collective ability was tested just after you left.*

LORD: I had really very good access to Chinese leaders in the sense that we had so many visits and high level visitors during my period, and they would always see most of the top Chinese leaders. It is the Chinese style when they host people of cabinet level or above that the American visitor should not only see the Foreign Minister and his/her cabinet counterpart, but also Vice Premiers, the Premier himself, the Party Secretary or the President or some combination. I had a lot of impressions from those meetings and I had meetings of my own. We had other high level

visitors like Kissinger coming back, old friends, e.g. Jimmy Carter, who would also have meetings with these people.

As for Deng Xiaoping I don't remember how many times we saw him but of course he was less frequent. Even then he wasn't as accessible as some of the others. I must have met him a dozen times at least, probably more, while I was there. I had seen him on many other occasions before I was ambassador. I saw Zhao Ziyang frequently. He was premier and then Party Secretary while I was there. He took over the latter job from Hu Yaobang, who was kicked out in early '87. I probably saw Li Peng as much as any. He was the Premier from '87 onwards. He would see American corporate executives who were visiting as well as American leaders, so I saw a great deal of him. Jiang Zemin I saw as mayor of Shanghai. He didn't have an important role in Beijing by the time I left so I don't recall seeing that much of him after the Shanghai tenure of the first couple of years that I was there. I saw quite a bit of Yang Shangkun, who became the President of China. Also Zhu Rongji, who was the mayor of Shanghai the last couple of years I was there, so I only saw him in the Shanghai context. I also met Hu Yaobang on a couple of occasions, once with Brzezinski. And, of course, I saw the Foreign Minister and other Cabinet officials countless times, also governors and mayors in the provinces, many of them future leaders in Beijing.

The interesting thing is that we are now talking about 10-15 years that have passed and many of these players remain central. Jiang Zemin is President and Party Secretary of the country. Zhu Rongji is Prime Minister and Li Peng still has an important role as NPC Chairman and just left as Prime Minister. Zhao Ziyang is under house arrest. Yang Shangkun has essentially departed from the scene. Now some impressions. You have got to remember that working since the Kissinger-Nixon years I was used to Mao Zedong and Zhou En-lai and they were tough acts to follow. I said in an earlier transcript Deng Xiaoping was not that impressive in our first encounters in 1974-'76, but was certainly more impressive by the time we had breakfast with him, Kissinger and myself, in 1979 when he visited the United States. We saw him together when we visited China a few months later. By then he clearly was an impressive human being.

There were some constant themes in the meetings with him. He was pretty consistent. First, very self confident and lively. Not as stiff as many Chinese leaders. His general habits are well known. He would smoke a great deal and occasionally use a spittoon. He was very short, you know his feet hardly reached the floor, but he was a commanding presence. He always wanted to talk about big issues, geopolitical as well as the bilateral relationship. He would never get down into details. He felt that was not consistent with his position. He had given up all his titles. Even then he was grooming his successors. He was clearly in charge, number one, but on a day to day basis and on greeting people he wasn't that involved. He was already phasing down some of his active involvement. He was Chairman of the Board, strategist. He would give the general lines of policy and leave the details to his subordinates, the Party Secretary, the Premier, etc. Generally during most of the visits where you had a visiting cabinet official like the Secretary of State or Defense or from economic agencies, he would come toward the end and would usually be the good cop. If there were mixed messages to be sent in the course of a visit, some of the tougher ones would be sent by the Premier or the Foreign Minister, whereas Deng generally would emphasize the positive. He seldom gave us unpleasant news; it was usually a very cordial meeting. His strategic discourses depended on the skill of his interlocutor. With somebody like

Kissinger of course, they would clearly be on a geopolitical plane. People usually felt good about him and his relationship because he was usually playing a positive role in his meetings. I'm sure he orchestrated the meetings so if there were some tough messages to get across, he would have made sure it would have been done by then by subordinates, and it would be done. It wasn't his role.

He was very much dedicated to U.S.-Chinese relations. He had a lot to do with improving them and clearly wanted to keep that moving ahead despite tensions. He wanted to emphasize that in our meetings, and he always did. He wanted to look ahead as well as backwards, and he always used a historical and strategic context. In almost every meeting there were cracks by him against the Russians and usually against the Japanese as well. I remember my final meeting with him was with President Bush in February, 1989. He talked about Russian and Japanese history and what they had done to China. Clearly he was making a point that whatever China's near term improvement in ties with those countries, as he looked ahead, they were still strategic concerns for China, and therefore major reasons for maintaining good relations with the U.S. So, on geopolitics, he was very skillful and interested in that. He always thought in a strategic and long term context, and he was very strong on the U.S.-Chinese bilateral relationship but wouldn't get into detail. He would talk a good deal about Chinese economic reforms and opening up to the outside world. His formulations on human rights would be minimal, but emphasizing as all Chinese leaders did, the need for stability which was a code word for them for political control or even repression, as they opened up generally to the outside world and they moved ahead with economic reforms. It was the traditional Chinese communist excuse that they need more control to maintain stability in this vast country and the challenges they faced.

As for my own record on him, I actually wrote a pretty good piece when he died; I got it done too late to get it published. I think there will be a mixed historical verdict on him. I have a mixed verdict on him. The good news is, of course, and none of this is overly revolutionary, he was the architect of the opening after the Cultural Revolution, opening China to the world and what all that means, including economic reforms and moving them into a freer economic society. Secondly he was crucial in improving U.S.-Chinese relations, from normalization all the way up. Even when there were tensions, he kept emphasizing the positive. He has helped the material lot of many Chinese citizens. For all this he deserves considerable credit. He was a tough customer who rebounded several times from tough experiences and came back from the Cultural Revolution, and other setbacks. These are positive items and he deserves credit there.

There are clear black marks as well. He was always conservative on the political level, even though at times even when we were there, things were loosening up somewhat. His general pattern was one of firm control on politics. After all he sacked Hu Yaobang, the party Secretary General in early 1987, partly because he felt that Hu was too liberal on political reforms, too liberal on issues like Tibet. Maybe also he didn't like Hu's freewheeling, self-confident style. There was also the element of feeding him to the conservatives who were upset about the student demonstrations in Shanghai in December-January of 1986-87. So, Deng fed Hu Yaobang to the wolves as a result of that unrest to maintain a collective balance to his leadership. He also did it out of concern for Hu Yaobang's liberal instincts on politics and his freewheeling style. After all, Deng Xiaoping had been the henchman for Mao in the anti-rightist campaign way back in the late '50s. With all his positive aspects on economic reform and opening to the world and

U.S.-Chinese relations, you get a consistent trend of political conservatism and repression. He not only dumped Hu but also his successor as Party Chairman, Zhao Ziyang, in 1989 because the latter was too friendly toward the demonstrators at Tiananmen Square. Li Peng was the heavy during the 1989 massacre because he declared martial law; he was out in front. The fact is it was clearly a Deng Xiaoping decision to attack, fully unwarranted in my view. We will come back to that. And he sacked Zhao Ziyang in the process, so that is two political reform-type party secretaries that he dropped.

Peng will be remembered for the Tiananmen Square massacre and general political repression as well as for the positive things and will come out with a mixed verdict.

Hu Yaobang and I met only a couple of times, and the portrait of him that is in my wife's book *Legacies*, however brief, is very vivid of him. He was unpredictable. He was somebody who really was spontaneous and he wasn't scripted. A very active and physically small person. I think he was the only one who was smaller than Deng Xiaoping. Clearly, although we probably elevated this in retrospect, he was for a looser political system. I have talked to many Tibetans who felt he was very enlightened on Tibet and indeed he was trying to loosen up the repression in Tibet. There is documentation for that. Clearly he felt the need for political reform as well as economic reform. He was pushing the envelope. The reason he was sacked by Deng on January 16, 1987 was the feeling among the conservatives that he was encouraging these trends.

Zhao Ziyang now looks very good to reformers and those of us who want to see a better political system in China, and he was in the Tiananmen Square episode arguing for restraint, not using the Army, meeting the students halfway. He was sacked for this. He has kept up on occasion from his house arrest his drumbeat for the need for political reform. He has come out dramatically twice in the last six months on the eve of summits with letters to the leadership calling for a reversal on the official verdict on Tiananmen Square. When I was there he was trying to separate the party from the government, trying to loosen up the political system, not dramatically, but pushing the envelope. So, you would have to put him on that side of the spectrum along with Hu Yaobang. Zhao was very intelligent, very smooth, very impressive in his meetings, generally on the friendly side in dealing with Americans, private citizens or official visitors. He gave a sense of great confidence. He was a good example of the new kind of leadership in China where they earn their leadership credentials as technocrats, economic experts, pragmatists. They get things done, particularly in the economic area. He was proven in the provinces because he had been governor of Guangdong and Sichuan. He was impressive in many ways.

Li Peng is everyone's scapegoat. Li Peng deserves a negative verdict from Americans. There has been enough proof in his demeanor, the way he has acted in meetings, from intelligence reports, and from reports from other Chinese, that he is generally more suspicious of the U.S., more conservative on economic reforms, certainly very tight on political issues. He not only declared martial law but believed in putting down the students and others in Tiananmen Square. Generally he has caused us trouble on issues. Therefore, he has not been a positive force in U.S.-China relations. On the other hand, he is enough of a pragmatist to recognize that China needs the U.S., particularly for technology, trade, investment etc. He is an engineer by background and clearly sees the need for the relationship for those reasons. Nevertheless, with his Soviet background and his general suspicion of the U.S., particularly our human rights policy subverting their political

system generally, he has been a restraint on U.S.-Chinese relations. Probably tougher on Taiwan and some other issues and conservative on economic reform, certainly very conservative on political issues.

*Q: What was his position while you were there, and what is his position now?*

LORD: I guess he was Vice Premier when I was first there and became Premier. I don't have the timing on this. He was Vice Premier when Hu Yaobang was sacked in early '87. Zhao Ziyang had been Prime Minister until then. Zhao moved up to be Party Secretary and then Li Peng was appointed Prime Minister. He was Prime Minister about the last year and a half while I was there.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): I think maybe, I'm not sure, but when you first got there, he may have still been with the state education commission.*

LORD: He might have had a cabinet level position on the economic side. He was an engineer, there is nothing wrong with engineers, but he was not one for conceptual discussion, geopolitical discussion. He would sort of take practical stands on issues. He would sometimes lecture us on human rights or Tibet or Taiwan or perhaps our building up of Japan as dangerous. These kinds of negative things would come in. Generally he was the bad cop and Deng and (recently) Jiang Zemin were good cops. It doesn't mean Li was totally hostile and there were some meetings where he was friendlier than others. But generally visiting business people, or high level people from previous U.S. governments or cabinet level officials from the current government, most of them came away not enamored of Li Peng, either his personality or the substance of his thoughts. He could be quite rough. This continued during the Clinton years when we had dealings with him.

One example of his rather limited approach. I was initially impressed that he arranged to have Lee Iacocca (the chairman of Chrysler Corporation), who then was a big hero bringing Chrysler back, to a small dinner at a restaurant. In terms of protocol he didn't have to do this. It was the kind of guy he would see in the Great Hall. But he invited him to have a small dinner, just Lee Iacocca, myself, and a couple of the Chinese. I thought, maybe I have misjudged this man. He knows enough to look at a person like Iacocca who has got all this experience particularly in a market economy, and bringing a failing company back, and to see how it could apply to China. Almost the entire evening, however, was devoted to Li Peng's talking about Chinese advancement and in particular the transportation area, citing the number of kilometers of roads that were being built and the number of automobiles they would have one day and other items like that. He just wasted the evening. He didn't draw Iacocca out on anything of significance. So, this sort of demonstrated Li's limits. Now, having said that, the man obviously had more staying power than I gave him credit for. After his martial law and direct negative involvement in Tiananmen Square in 1989, I didn't think he would last very long. But he served as Prime Minister until the Constitution made him retire just a year or two ago. He clearly is head of the conservative camp and with Jiang Zemin's and Deng's general approach to a more collective leadership and the need for balance plus his own bureaucratic alliances he maintained his position, much to my surprise.

Yang Shangkung became President of China. We first took notice of him when he came to the United States. We had visitors going back and forth. We would have the Secretary of State or Defense or others come, but we also moved to get Chinese to go to the U.S. I mentioned earlier the four trips that I went on, one of which was with Yang. At some point, we wondered who would be the next visitor. We weren't at summit levels at that point, at least visiting the U.S. We were running out of Vice Premiers, and the Chinese suggested Yang who was a military man. In fact, he had been Mao's Chief of Staff, been on the Long March, across the grasslands three times. His wife of almost 60 years had just died a couple of years beforehand. She had been on the Long March with him. I think he was Vice Chairman of the Military Commission at the time; he wasn't President yet. When he was suggested as the next visitor by the Chinese, we didn't oppose it, but we were puzzled. They went out of their way, the Chinese and the Foreign Ministry and their Ambassador back here, to explain how important this guy was and to be sure he had a good trip. We didn't quite know why, but it turned out he was very close to Deng, going back to the Long March. He was to become President. He was a major political figure and remained that for several years.

I got along with Yang extremely well when I accompanied him back in the United States in May 1987. He asked me for advice on the various audiences he would deal with, whether it was meeting with the President or a business group or the press. I would ride around in cars with him as well as be with him between meetings. After meetings, he would ask me afterwards how he did on questions and answers. Very appreciative of my advice, had a good sense of humor, spoke movingly about the Long March. We could never quite figure out where he came out on some of the issues. He clearly backed Deng Xiaoping and the reforms and the opening, but to this day it is not clear what his position is on political reform. It is probably fairly conservative. People aren't quite sure where he came out on Tiananmen Square; certainly he didn't oppose the use of force, but there is some feeling that he wasn't in the forefront on that like say Li Peng.

Jiang Zemin is obviously the most important today as we speak. He was not that important when I was there and as I say as mayor of Shanghai was much less impressive than his successor, Zhu Rongji, who is now Prime Minister. He did not strike us then as a man of tremendous gravitas. He was friendly, he was jolly, and he would like to show off his English and his affinity for some Western culture and classics, but didn't seem entirely serious. I would not have picked him as the future leader of China. But he has lasted, and he has been on a roll for the last couple of years - his visit to the U.S., Clinton's visit to China, the 15th Party Congress solidifying his position, has been in power now for many years, first de facto then de jure, and the return of Hong Kong. He has done quite well and is clever enough to have someone like Zhu Rongji out there doing the hard economic reforms. If they work, Jiang basks in success. If they fail, he has a scapegoat. He has balanced off the conservatives and the moderates. He has been quite impressive, but none of this I would have predicted.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Doesn't he get launched in part because of how well he handled Shanghai during the Tiananmen period in '89? Also maybe you could comment on the importance of Shanghai for producing political leaders.*

LORD: That is a good point. When Zhu took his place as mayor of Shanghai, Jiang moved up to be Party Secretary and was in charge during the Tiananmen Square demonstrations. There was a

bloody outcome in Beijing. There were very large demonstrations in Shanghai, but no blood was shed there and Jiang and his cohorts did handle this skillfully. I don't recall offhand whether Zhu was involved in this skillful handling or not, but Jiang certainly gets the credit for having defused very tense and large demonstrations in Shanghai without the kind of bloody put-down that you had in Beijing. That did capture people's attention. It also protects him somewhat about a reversal of the verdict on Tiananmen Square. Although it may not happen anytime soon, it will happen in my view. I think that did help move him.

Clearly Shanghai has been a source of Chinese dynamism and leadership for good or for ill for many decades. That is where the Cultural Revolution started. You have, of course, Jiang from Shanghai, the number one guy. Now the number two guy Zhu from Shanghai. The Foreign Ministry for decades, not so much now, but certainly when I was there during the '80s was dominated by key people from Shanghai, at least the American handlers. In any event, this has been a source of Chinese leadership. It's got a history, of course, of being China's most dynamic and forward looking city. It also produced some of the Gang of Four and has a history of radical currents.

*Q: I wonder if you could talk about how, again we are talking about the '85-'89 period when you were Ambassador. You and the Embassy were looking at how all these people fit together. In other words a little bit like criminology. How were decisions reached? How effective was the government at that time?*

LORD: Well, on the whole we thought the government was pretty effective in the sense they were moving ahead on economic reform. Most of the time you had the feeling that the envelope was also being pushed somewhat on political and cultural issues, but there was certainly tremendous control still. There was more a sense of the ability to publish more and somewhat freer cultural activity particularly outside of Beijing. Some lively journals like the World Economic Herald in Shanghai which was subsequently shut down. Some of the things Bette was able to do in our cultural exchanges. People pushing the envelope like Liu Binyan, the reformist reporter, in covering corruption. You even had in some of the universities including Beijing University some beginning to speak up for political reform. On the whole we felt that things were moving in a generally positive direction but there were swings back and forth - e.g. the sacking of Hu Yaobang by Deng in 1987. We were still very concerned, particularly about Tibet and the continuing holding of dissidents and repression. With respect to the leadership, of course, we were rooting for those like Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, who thought it was in China's own self interest as well as to improve our relationship to be more moderate on the political front than, say, Li Peng. We knew that Deng was rather ambivalent and would go back and forth, but on the whole, conservative. As we were there, there were attacks on spiritual pollution, on bourgeois liberalization even as the envelope was being pushed.

On the whole we thought the government operated quite effectively. Deng, I have already given my impressions of. He obviously was very able, although we were unhappy with some of his political and cultural instincts. We could see even then that he was trying to groom people to come after him which in a communist society is a useful innovation. He was clearly number one even as we left, but even then, by the late '80s, he was beginning to delegate responsibility in meeting with foreigners and day to day decisions of operating the government, all of which we

thought were useful. Now clearly we saw trouble signs twice while we were there and just after, where his successors, Hu and Zhao, were dumped by him even as Mao dumped his heirs or successors. Deng was falling into a pattern of dumping his. He got rid of two, both of whom were more liberal in a political sense than he was. There was room for some concern as well when these campaigns that would take place like the Four Cardinal Principals, stressing socialist ideals as well as anti-spiritual pollution and anti-bourgeois liberalization. On the economic front we felt they were making progress, and we thought the leadership was generally quite effective. They were beginning to promote people now based on merit and economic performance rather than revolutionary credentials or military exploits, probably because they had gotten to the point where most of the Long Marchers had passed from the scene or were too old anyway.

Also I was impressed with some of the younger leaders coming along. I made a big effort to travel throughout China, usually with my wife. It was fun and interesting and she could give insights that I couldn't do by myself, and she was a great ambassador. I traveled widely, partly to show the flag, sometimes to advance our economic interests, partly because it was fun, partly to report back to Washington about what was happening around the country, and partly to meet upcoming leaders. I could see that the mayors and the governors were going to be the future leaders of China. Whether it was the mayor of Tianjin (Li Ruihan) or vice governors elsewhere. I remember Sichuan in particular and Guangzhou and Zhu Rongji in Shanghai. I was impressed with the pragmatism, the desire for good relations with us, certainly the economic reforms, that I found in these people. You couldn't tell so much on the political side. On the whole I felt there was a pretty competent group. That was true of the Foreign Ministry, e.g. Qian Qichen (the Foreign Minister) and Zhu Qizhen (the Vice Foreign Minister). Now in decision making, it was clear that Deng was calling the shots on the important issues, U.S.-Chinese relations, U.S.-China-Russia relations, relations with Japan, basic economic reform decisions, Taiwan. These were determined by Deng pretty much on his own. Day to day operations, details, and secondary issues including running the economy on a detailed basis, he would delegate.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Did you have any sense, from the outside it may be impossible to say, was some of this independent decision making on Deng's part a result of negotiation with Li Peng or others who might have been more hard-line or liberal, or was he really just making up his own mind?*

LORD: The honest answer is you can't be sure, because to get back to one of your earlier questions, it was still a fairly opaque society and system even then, though much less than it had been in the '70s. We had much more contacts, more travel, and more reporting. Despite all that, an area that we were not strong in despite all our best efforts was decisionmaking. Certainly our impression was that Deng had an absolute veto. There was no important policy that could be promoted if he opposed it. That's a given. The basic lines, clearly, were supported by his subordinates. It wasn't as if he were enforcing it. Most people wanted to have better relations with the U.S. These people were convinced, although some were more cautious like Li Peng and others, of the need for opening and reform on the economic front. There would be debates on the political side on issues like political reform and Tibet. I think Deng was clearly first among equals, much more in charge than Jiang Zemin today, not having to check so much as Jiang would have to check, although he has solidified his position. Deng, however, was much less a one man show than Mao Zedong. He was somewhere in between, but clearly a dominant figure

at that point. He knew enough to know that he wanted to keep both conservatives and moderates happy. He would basically vote by conviction, not just power balance. But he would not veer too much in either direction and was particularly back and forth on political liberalization. Just when we were there, there were two or three periods when politics was getting looser and then it got tighter again. That is clearly where the internal debates were taking place, most vividly demonstrated when Deng had to sack Hu Yaobang to appease the conservatives. So, he didn't want that to get too out of kilter with others, but he clearly was in charge on all the key issues. At heart, throughout his career - and shown again during the June 1989 Tiananmen massacre for which he was responsible - he was very conservative politically.

*Q: While you were making these trips out in the country and all and also in Beijing with our officers also out and about, what was your impression of revolutionary Marxist fervor? The cultural revolution wasn't that far away. It had gone completely sour, but the point being that you had almost a billion people running around as revolutionary as you can get.*

LORD: Well, first, on my previous 11 trips to China before I was Ambassador plus my time in that post, by the time I left, I had been to 24 or 25 provinces out of the 30 or 31 depending on how you count Taiwan or Hainan. I was missing Anhui and Ningxia and Guizhou and Hainan for example. I really got around quite a bit for all the reasons I mentioned. Second to answer your question, there was none of the Marxist fervor. Still a lot of people didn't want to talk about, and there was a lot of bitterness about, the Cultural Revolution. Also people whether officials or non-officials were cautious in their conversations. The same is true today. People can speak somewhat more freely when they are alone with you. They can't get up and make speeches that are unsettling to the Party, and they can't organize opposition or distinct parties. In the late '80s, some students and intellectuals might loosen up a little on political issues. Nobody was trying to spout Marxism or revolutionary fervor, to answer your question. They would talk with some bitterness about past excesses, but nobody was going to be criticizing the government or promoting political freedom. The clear exception, with Bette's help, was the circles we had a lot of contact with, students and others in the cultural, academic, and artistic communities, where there was a call for greater political and cultural reform. Even there they would be somewhat cautious. We had a lot of these people to our house. And embassy officials would talk to reformers. Bette went often to people's houses including Liu Binyang and Fang Lizhi. She worked hard on the official front as well. But she stayed in touch with these people to be on the cutting edge. This probably excited some concerns by members of the Politburo. But overall Marxist ideology was pretty dead. Even then people were focusing pretty much on economics and what worked.

*Q: How about the kids in school or in college. Did they have to take compulsory Marxism, the works of Mao Zedong and that sort of thing?*

LORD: I think we are talking about a trend here. They were pretty much getting away from that; they were getting more pragmatic. But surely there were still ideological parts in their curricula.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): I remember in the summer of 1987 at one of these informal lunches that you talked about earlier that you would have with them and the staff, that I was there and...*

LORD: You served six months as an intern.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): Yes, and we talked about what was happening in China ideologically and the sense that communism was no longer a very useful tool to rally support for the government, but in those days nationalism still had not risen. If you were analyzing what was happening in China and trying to explain to the State Department and the White House where the Chinese people were, where were you putting your emphasis? What were you telling the United States about the Chinese people ideologically?*

LORD: Well, we were somewhat humble and not generalizing, clearly. Obviously we felt that people would be more concerned about these political issues if they were urban dwellers than in the countryside. There was no longer any faith, as you say, in Marxism ideology as an approach and a lot of cynicism given that the wind had shifted so many times in China about what is ideologically correct, leaders going up and down, all of that behind them. Nationalism, although anti-Japanese feeling was clear even then, on the whole didn't rise as naturally as it has today when they have grown so much stronger in power. The authorities increasingly substitute that for the loss of ideology. We reported that the people, certainly in the artistic, intellectual and academic communities, had a real desire for more political reform and a feeling they needed that for economic development as well as to meet the aspirations of the people. So in those circles, we would report considerable ferment and a pushing of the envelope, but without exaggerating their power yet. Frankly, we did not predict Tiananmen Square. I don't think anybody did in terms of the massive demonstrations that did take place not only in Beijing but in over 200 cities. Now those weren't only for democracy, they were against corruption, they were against inflation and for education needs and so on. Basically even then I think we felt the people's basic preoccupation was having a better economic existence, a better life and getting away from the horrors in the past. At least they were close enough to the Cultural Revolution to reach some happiness, some contentment that they at least weren't suffering as badly as they did in the Cultural Revolution. It was early enough in the economic lifting in their lives that they were perhaps not quite as concerned about political issues with the exception of the circles I mentioned. I think we were basically saying there were tensions rising on the political front and some of the elements that were most important and most influential were pushing the envelope. But the broad contacts, encouraged by Bette, made this clear. We didn't realize it was quite as fermenting as Tiananmen Square proved.

*Q: Again, looking at China with a cold eye and trying to look at the future particularly in light of what happened within a few years to the Soviet empire where the nationalities thing split it up, were you looking at nationalities within China? I mean sort of 20 years 50 years down the thing will China hold together or not?*

LORD: Well, my basic view I'm sure then, I know it is now, was on the whole I felt China would hold together. That was our basic view in the embassy. Tibet was the most serious issue, and that flared up a couple of times while we were there, with some riots and killings. I was the first Ambassador to visit Tibet, very concerned about it. It was a hot issue through much of my stay there. Xinjiang didn't seem to have much unrest then. It was hard to get to know, and we tried to get reporters out there. In the southern areas where there were minorities or Inner Mongolia, there also didn't seem to be much unrest. In the long historical sweep, we knew about Chinese

history and warlords against the emperor, going back and forth between tight central control and splitting up the country. We knew there were those dangers. We also knew already and we reported on it, the tensions between the provinces and Beijing about taxes, about foreign exchange, about autonomy, about how much did they need permission from Beijing to approve joint ventures, what levels, so there was already tension on the economic front between central control and the provinces. We felt, however, this was in a safe framework of unity within the country. There was no real evidence or prospect that China was going to split apart.

For a variety of reasons I believed - before we knew about the Soviet Union breaking up - and I believe now in retrospect that China has advantages in holding together that the Soviets and Russians did not have. First of all, 93% of the Chinese are Han, whereas in the Soviet Union they were 50% Russian and 50% non-Russian. Secondly in the Soviet Union, certainly there was an empire; the Baltic States for example, parts of Central Asia, and some other places were clearly only recently or loosely part of the Soviet Union. Whereas, in China - again, Tibet is a more complicated example - on the whole the present territory of China most people would argue has been Chinese for a considerable period of time. So it is not so much an empire like the Soviet Union was in that sense. Thirdly the Chinese have always had a tremendous advantage in overseas investment, including Chinese, in helping their economy, and the Russians never had that. Fourthly, the Chinese are more self-confident based on 5,000 years of being number one, more a feeling they will be number one again than the Russians, who are less secure. Finally, there is a good deal of Chinese nationalism.

So for all these reasons at the time I felt, and I still feel, that chances are China will be able to hold together. Furthermore, those who are taking power at the center are generally coming from the provinces or cities and therefore they have some of the perspectives of the outlying areas they could bring to Beijing and some empathy and sensitivity on how to handle this. Having said that, even as we were there, there were considerable tensions between Beijing and the provinces, economic autonomy and who gets the taxes and who gets the foreign exchange and who accrues investment. A good example was Shanghai where in those days it had to pay very heavy taxes to Beijing. Shanghai felt it was the most dynamic part of China; Beijing was reaping the benefits and they weren't. Indeed in recent years with the help of Shanghaiers like Jiang and Zhu there was a great shift and Shanghai has surged ahead as a result.

*Q: Can we talk about Tibet?*

LORD: First, more on political issues. As I said, on the whole, during the period I was Ambassador, China with fits and starts was moving to become somewhat more open politically and culturally as well as economically. There were obvious tensions and some periods of setbacks both within China and in our own political and cultural relations. For example, we got there in late '85, and up until late '86, on the whole they were moving in a somewhat more liberal direction in terms of artistic and political expression. I do not wish to exaggerate. But, in December, '86, actually while I was back on home leave, there were large scale demonstrations by students in Shanghai and considerable angst within the Politburo that these were not controlled faster and better. Partly as a result of that Hu Yaobang was ousted and indeed a period of some retrenchment on political and cultural freedoms set in. Not only was Hu kicked out as Party Secretary, many of his friends and intellectuals either were repressed or rounded up. There

was a campaign against bourgeois liberalization, an emphasis on the four Cardinal Principles. Don't ask me to repeat what they were. Four of your socialist principles. The conservatives generally in this area were on a roll and the reformers were on the defensive. Now having said that, it wasn't a complete rollback.

Let me give you the reasons Deng dropped Hu. I have already mentioned it, but just to put it here again. He had an unpredictable style that might have annoyed Deng. Deng thought Hu was a little unpredictable and wasn't fulfilling his vision of what a future leader of China should look like and maybe shouldn't be a successor. More fundamentally, Hu's instincts on political reform and issues like Tibet were much more liberal than Deng's were, which were always instinctively cautious. Hu was clearly alienating some of the conservatives on some of these issues and Deng always had to maintain a balance even though he was clearly in charge. Therefore partly out of conviction that Hu was a little bit too liberal, partly because he thought that Hu had helped to cause this unrest in Shanghai, partly to maintain his balance in the Politburo and appease the conservatives, he dropped Hu. As I say, they went after some of his cohorts as well. I said that Zhao Ziyang was also, although not as dramatically, pushing the envelope on political reforms like Hu. Clearly he was also interested in greater political reform, but he was not only maintained as Premier for a while but also made Party Secretary. On the one hand, Deng removed those the conservatives disliked the most. But he didn't do a clean sweep and get rid of Zhao as well or put Li Peng more fully in charge. Zhao wore both hats for a while - he was acting Party Secretary until he became confirmed and then when he became that, at that point Li Peng, who was more conservative, took over as Premier.

Other incidents occurred at this time. As I said earlier, another American newsman from the Associated Press was kicked out. Some overseas Chinese student had come home for the holidays and was arrested. There was a Chinese journalist in Sichuan sentenced to seven years for counter revolutionary activity and so on. I remember sending in, in early February, a think piece to the Secretary on this whole issue. It was quite serious, and there was a considerable rollback taking place. I was more alarmist than my colleagues. They tried to water my cable down. I didn't let that happen. Other sackings at this time included Liu Binyan who was this very outspoken journalist who attacked corruption and has since become a major dissident living here in the United States. Some other Shanghai writers, some officials at the universities and the Chinese Academy of the Social Sciences, and the rather moderate propaganda head were all sacked. This clearly was a period of retrenchment. I remember feeling at the time that this was tarnishing Deng's reputation. He was once again showing that it is tough having an orderly succession when he was dumping his successor, killing all political reform, at least temporarily, maybe even having an impact on economic reform, hurting China's international reputation, creating considerable fear and anger among the intellectuals. It so happened it was about the 30th. anniversary of the anti-rightist campaign. All this at a time when Gorbachev was beginning to gain momentum and an international reputation, for reform including on the political and cultural side in Russia. Of course, this was the classic Chinese dilemma. The leaders wanted to have economic reform without political reform. They were ambivalent about foreign influence, needing outside help but worrying about spiritual pollution. How do they get western technology without western influence?

*Q: Did you get hit with you say spiritual corruption, American movies, American films. I mean*

*the things the French and other people rage about. Did this come up to you at all as far as our youth culture and the whole thing?*

LORD: Never conceptually, but there were incidents - I mentioned this National Portrait exhibit. Somewhat later, more related to Bette personally, near the end of our tour, Bette's book finally got a good translation, *Spring Moon*, but when the Chinese edition came out on the news stands, I guess this was late 1988, you couldn't get it anywhere in the bookstores. She went to a book signing, but the only people who were there were the owners of the store, no readers. As soon as she left, the books were put away. That might have been her personally - her contacts with reformers - because there is nothing really revolutionary about *Spring Moon*. Certainly when you get into spiritual pollution campaigns, that has the overtones of American cultural influence and American political influence. This would ebb and flow during this period I'm talking about. Early 1987 was clearly an ebbing of any political and cultural freedom. We got a lot of feedback from our artistic, intellectual, and academic friends who were concerned. We had people in the Embassy keeping contact. I don't mean it was just Bette by any means, of course not. We had a lot of good people in the Embassy doing this as well. As I say some who were rounded up and released were intimidated. The foreign journalists reflected this as well. I told you the AP guy had been kicked out. The Burns episode before that. Forty-three of them signed a petition to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Twenty of them came over to my residence, and they felt the U.S. Government hadn't been strong enough generally, I held a backgrounder with the press every month. I made a practice of keeping in touch with journalists generally when we got back to the U.S. meeting with editorial boards, etc. I thought that was useful in terms of our own interests and getting the word out on what we were trying to do there. This was generally a period of some malaise. Right after that, Secretary Shultz came in March and moved the U.S. relationship forward. We can get back to that at some other point.

The Tibet issue flared up a couple of times while we were in China. In the fall of 1987, I have already mentioned how in that year, particularly in the spring, there was a clampdown particularly on political and cultural expression. Whether or not related, things began to heat up in Tibet. The Dalai Lama went to the U.S. in the middle of September, 1987. On September 27, and the next few days there were considerable riots and demonstrations in Tibet. I gather from the few notes I have, there were about 20 deaths and hundreds injured. The Congress passed a resolution 98-0. Tom Brokaw had just been there for NBC and did a piece on China, including on my wife. It was basically positive, but he went to Tibet and said some nice things about the Dalai Lama. The Chinese weren't too happy about that. As I said the Congress sent letters to Zhao, several Congressmen or Senators did, and they passed a resolution 98-0. The media generally was saying we were a little bit too soft on this. We tried to monitor the situation and made representations about torture and repression and putting down the demonstrations in Tibet. We had a political officer that happened to have been there from Chengdu and we kept him there. We tried to get our political counselor in there. It was very difficult. They were making it hard for us to have access, but we smuggled out reports. Again journalists during this period generally had problems. You had to give Beijing 10 day notice to travel anywhere. I think it is fair to say this general period was difficult, with the Tibet problems and human rights more generally, our media and Congress getting more upset, and I believe the Iranian missiles, Silkworms, issue at this point. So when you put all this together, it was a difficult period.

*Q (Bernkopf Tucker): On the Tibet stuff, you have the Dalai Lama in the U.S. and then you get demonstrations and riots in Tibet. Some specialists on Tibetan affairs, Americans, have suggested that one of the things that was happening was the Tibetans becoming more sophisticated on how to play to American public opinion. Was this a concern in the Embassy that there was an effort to circumvent the diplomatic corps and get to Congress directly.*

LORD: No, I don't think we had that feeling. I think you are right. I think there was some synergy between the Dalai Lama's visit in the United States and the demonstrations taking place a few days later. Our reaction was not one of how dare the Tibetans express their views. We were really upset about the Chinese reaction. Now obviously, without suffering from clientitis, we didn't want the Tibet issue any more than any other one issue to wreck our whole relationship. I pushed the Chinese on it, but we would also try to keep the overall relationship going.

As I said, I went to Tibet, Bette and I went, the first American Ambassador to ever go there, and it may be the first foreign Ambassador of any country who went there on his own, not in connection with some high level visitor. We went from August 4, to August 10, 1988. By now, as I said, I had visited about 24 provinces out of 30. Obviously Tibet continued to be an issue and concern, and I thought one way to get at it was to show the flag by going to Tibet, both to convey our concerns to the officials running Tibet as well as back in Beijing. Show the American flag for whatever that might do for the morale of Tibetans and to show the Congressional and domestic audiences that we cared. The Ambassador went personally out there. This stirred a couple of Congressional visits. Among the issues I pushed for was access for our consular officers to visit there. It was covered by Chengdu, we don't have a consulate itself in Tibet. And I pushed for more media and journalists to get in there and outside groups in general, Congress and the press, even human rights groups. I had the most comprehensive talks up to then on Tibet that any American official ever had with the Chinese. I can't say I got very far. I pressed the human rights situation there generally, the suppression of Tibetan culture and people. They gave their familiar defense of how Tibet had been a feudal enclave there before and very badly in need, enduring slavery under the Dalai Lama, how much better off the Tibetans were now. On access I did make some progress. I did get more consular visits and some journalists in there. On prisoners all I got were some numbers, official numbers, and general assurances on treatment, but I could see no breakthroughs there. I wasn't able to visit a jail; they made some vague commitments maybe in the future. We did take a trip across the country to Xigatse. It was spectacular. We continued to treat this issue throughout our stay there.

*Q: Did you have the feeling, it's almost I don't want to sound too cynical, but that served as a good rallying flag for particular conservatives who just detested our China policy and this gave them a cause, or did Tibet run deeply in your opinion in the American public?*

LORD: Well, the province of Tibet is so remote it is hard to get coverage of it and know what is going on. There is the inherent problem of really knowing what is going on and conveying that to the American people generally. I do think people in Congress and other human rights groups were absolutely sincere in their concern for Tibet and the extinguishing of Tibetan culture, the treatment of nuns and monks and the roundup of prisoners and the put down of demonstrations. Clearly those who were suspicious of China for human rights generally would also highlight this

issue for that reason, but it was born out of a genuine concern for what was a genuine problem. I would say it probably was a higher level profile in human rights than anything else we had then, even prisoners or anything else while we were there. It doesn't mean there weren't lots of prisoners.

I mentioned how generally while we were in China the political and cultural atmosphere was loosening up somewhat back and forth, and I mentioned how we had a tough period particularly in the early part of 1987 and even the latter part of it. As an Embassy, and personally, we raised human rights issues, not just Tibet, of course, but also all the other human rights issues, the need for political reform. But, it was not as high profile as it has been the last few years. Beyond that we tried to have an impact by having philosophic and relatively candid discussions with Chinese officials on the need for political reform and loosening up, including when they would come to our house for meals and round table discussions with American visitors. In addition, I personally and the Embassy generally, with my wife at the center of much of this, spent a lot of time with intellectuals, artists, academics, reformers etc. We wanted to do this partly to report to Washington what was going on in those areas and partly to push the envelope. We could do that culturally in some ways more than we could politically of course. Partly to establish ties with what we felt would be future Chinese leaders. A lot of these people were very bright - the best and the brightest and the younger, and we felt this was important for U.S. national interests as well as being inherently interesting.

*Q: You know we spent a great deal of time dealing with the Soviet intelligentsia, and they turned out not to be very important I gather in what happened in Russia. They gave the impetus and then sort of faded out. When you think of the Chinese culture as being centered on scholarly work and all, did you feel these people would be an important power source?*

LORD: Not only I thought they would be, they turned out to be in Tiananmen Square, in and around it. The jury is still out and the history is still being written about the future of China on this front. Even then many were important. I'm not just talking about dissidents although we were in touch with people like Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan, my wife in particular. But, also people in think tanks, many of whom reported directly to Zhao or Hu with ideas on reforms, both economic and political. These are the kinds of people we had for discussions at the Embassy and so on. So, people already in positions of power although young, in their '30s and '40s, in terms of ideas and think pieces, and the debates going on in China on the need for more political reform. And the cultural side with enlightened people like the cultural Vice Minister Ying Ruochen, the famous Chinese actor, as well as Bette's dealings with the Chinese cultural community, the promoting of a famous opera singer, now in the United States, working with them on the Caine Mutiny Court Martial, putting on Chinese performances at the Embassy and the residence and so on. We felt these people were already important in the internal debates and would be important to future leaders of China.

Now, as part of this general effort, I would take stock, usually at the end of the year or the Spring Festival in February, of our goals and my goals, personal ones, for the coming year or six months, in addition to sitting down at the Embassy and doing strategy for the year and pursuing our interests and having game plans and so on. We would do this rigorously.

For the last couple of years I decided, and Bette agreed, that we would make a more concerted effort to continue what we were doing as I have said with the intellectuals and artists, but to get out more to Chinese universities and think tanks in Beijing, Shanghai and other cities more systematically. Even as we carried on all of our official contacts and everything else, we sought to have more interaction with the younger generation, the think tanks, to show the flag, to get their mood and to try to modestly encourage reform efforts.

So, over a period of just a few months, we each went individually to the National Defense University. It was very unusual for Bette to do that. In fact, I was the first Ambassador there, I believe, and she certainly was the first spouse of an Ambassador. We went out to Beijing University a couple of times with smaller groups. I'll get back to the key one later. We met with a law class and we went to a graduation party. We also went out there with high level visitors. Bette spoke at the People's University. We both spoke at the Foreign Affairs College. We both spoke at the International Business and Economic University. Some were joint appearances including questions and answers. I visited universities in Xiamen and Chengdu. I had a few others later on that either weather or political complications canceled. I visited many think tanks in Beijing, Shanghai and elsewhere. This was all in the period of a few months, so we made a concerted effort to get out there with these groups.

Now part of that, and this is where the story gets interesting, we were invited to come out to Beijing University, June 1, 1988 is when we actually went, to meet with the students outdoors on the lawn. I don't know if it was known then, but in retrospect, it was known as Democracy Salon. The students, among whose leaders included Wang Dan, the famous dissident that has gotten out of jail with U.S. efforts and was exiled to the United States, invited various people to come and speak to them about China and its future, including political reform and the concerns of young people in informal settings. Not for speeches but to sit on the grass and hold conversations. It turns out we were the fifth in a series. One of our predecessors had been Fang Lizhi. I have a story about him later. Bette and I agreed to go out there. Frankly, at the time, perhaps naively - we would have done it anyway - we didn't realize just how sensitive this was for the leadership, for whom we now know in retrospect this whole operation was very sensitive, the students having people like Fang and now the ambassador and his wife. We made no attempt to hide that we were going out. We couldn't anyway because we were bugged all the time and people were following us anyway. I even told - not for purposes of clearance, just courteously or casually or by chance - one of the Foreign Ministry types that by the way I'm going out to Beijing University. Certainly our driver knew it ahead of time and a lot of the local people. There was no question they knew we were going out there, and of course, no one ever complained, at least before the event.

So we went out there. It was the biggest audience they had ever had. It started at between 300-500 and kept growing while we were there. We arrived at 6:45 and we went on until it got dark at 9:30. A very agitated, excited, enthusiastic crowd. It was no speech, just questions. Many of the questions were personal. What is it like to have an inter-racial marriage in America.? How did you two meet? How does your marriage work? Things that were almost forward. We didn't mind that at all. We were happy to talk about it.

Some questions on foreign policy and U.S.-Chinese relations, but a considerable amount on the

domestic situation. I was very struck, even though we had been tracking this and thought we knew what was going on, at the degree of unhappiness, impatience, frustration of the students. Tough questions about the need for political reform, even that the leadership wasn't doing a good job. I was really struck by the openness and the fervor of this group. I, of course, knew there would be security people in the crowd hearing every word. Partly for that reason, knowing I'd be heard, partly as Ambassador, you shouldn't be overly provocative, partly out of conviction because I thought on the economic and opening front, Deng Xiao-ping was doing positive things, and partly so the students wouldn't get in too much trouble, I was very careful. We were very candid about personal things. At times, I found myself almost defending Deng Xiao-ping against the students saying, "Look, he has done a lot of good things and reform will be coming. It is an inevitable process." I even had a quote that ended up in a Hong Kong newspaper on the front page with my picture, something to the effect that he was one of the more impressive world figures, something very positive. I just mention all this as a matter of fact but also because of what happened next. It was a very exciting, dynamic event. I frankly didn't understand just how sensitive this was for the leadership. I was struck by how excited this crowd was. There weren't just students; there were older people there as well. I assume some teachers, security types, and officials. There was a lot of cynicism among the Chinese students including on corruption, backdoor influence, inflation, future control of their lives. They wanted their leaders to be more accessible and engage in the kind of exchange that they had with us. Anyway, it was a very exhilarating experience.

We wrote a couple of careful and quite good telegrams back to Washington. By very unfortunate coincidence, the very next day a student was murdered by hooligans. As far as we know it was totally unrelated to any of this, but demonstrations broke out at Beijing University. This was the day after we had been there. They were basically demonstrations on the need for greater security so students wouldn't be murdered by hooligans. It spread to meetings and to wall posters and a march on Tiananmen Square that was aborted and so on. This was quickly controlled by the security people with warnings to the students, plus it quickly died out because many of them realized the '86-'87 protest hadn't helped. In fact, it resulted in Hu Yaobang's having been kicked out. I think many of the students felt that though they were in favor of reform, and they wanted to go faster, they realized that if they got too out of control, they would give the conservatives ammunition.

Obviously the leaders were very antsy about this, generally, our going out there and meeting with the students at the Democracy Salon and there were demonstrations the next day, although it was because of this hooligan murder. They knew from the '86 demonstrations and just generally that there was increasing concern about corruption and inflation. Not just the students but the workers as well. The leaders would always be concerned about the students and the workers linking up. It is one thing in a communist society to have students and intellectuals unhappy, but if you have in a Marxist society the workers unhappy - and they have got the same dilemma today - then you really have a problem for social stability. Clearly they had been watching what had been happening in Poland and Hungary and Yugoslavia, lots of unrest even then in the USSR. There had been a heavy Reagan emphasis on human rights in the late May/June Moscow summit. For all these reasons, the Chinese leaders were obviously antsy. I was out there, as was Bette, to maintain ties with the younger generation, get a feel for what was on their minds, and generally show the flag. We were not there to cause any trouble, obviously,

but we did feel this was an important part of our job, also very interesting.

On June 8, Liu Huaqiu, who was then Country Director for American affairs (he later was Vice Minister and National Security Advisor), called me in to talk about the upcoming trip by the Secretary. This would have been Shultz's second trip. This was a little bit out of line on protocol. Ordinarily he would be dealing with my DCM. I don't know if this was purposeful or not. On the way out after talking about the trip, he took me aside and suggested in friendly fashion that in the future I notify the authorities in advance so that they could make proper arrangements for meetings like this. He casually shrugged it off. I lightly explained why we went out there without being defensive, described some of the subjects we talked about. I said usually when we go to a University or think tank we have to work through authorities just practically, but in this case there was no problem. We just got in touch with the students and went out there. We didn't need help.

I was in Tianjin on June 9. A new Vice Mayor, new that week, and I guess the Foreign Affairs Director made a friendly warning about a visit to Nankai University that afternoon. Some people were worried about our appearance, but they knew I was an experienced diplomat who would do nothing to disturb stability. We went to the University. I think it was both of us, Bette and me. We had a long session before our speech with the officials that sort of cut off our time with the students. We started later than scheduled, and then there were long and friendly introductions. They made me use translator which cut down the time allotted, even though the audience all spoke English. The questions were written and screened obviously rather than from the floor. All of this was contrary to the way we had operated before where we had informal talks and simultaneous translation, lots of time for questions and answers. The session actually went very well, especially the questions and answers, and the officials did allow it to run over the allotted time by 20 minutes. A big enthusiastic crowd. But we were somewhat rushed.

I got back to the residence, and then I was about to go to Shanghai for a trip and again I could see a pattern, and we knew this was related to what had happened. We learned the students we were supposed to meet with in Shanghai at Jiatong University, my father-in-law's alma mater actually, were suddenly too busy on their exams to see us. We were also supposed to go to Fudan University, and that didn't work out either, in this case perhaps innocently because the Polish Premier was there on Friday and they couldn't get a big student audience on Saturday. I asked for two substitute appointments to take place, one with the World Economic Herald, this progressive newspaper, and one with the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. Both of them were too busy to meet me. I met with a Herald reporter at the hotel and made my unhappiness known. Then I met with the Shanghai Mayor, Zhu Rongji, and after some friendly talk about American investment and so on, I said I wanted to meet others and promote cultural and academic links. I was disappointed I couldn't meet people. He said I should come back and would then clearly see people. I don't know how much he knew at the time. The investment climate had greatly improved as I said. We went to a performance of an O'Neill play that evening to open a big festival in Shanghai. Before the show we had a half an hour with the Vice Mayor and others. We purposely, literally sat for half an hour silently, and Bette and I absolutely refused to say a single word to the Vice Mayor for the whole time. We were showing that we knew what had happened to us in Shanghai and we didn't like it. I, of course, went up on stage after the show and congratulated the performers; it wasn't their fault.

Then during the following week we got reports of displeasure over the Beijing University appearance. There were reports of displeasure about it at a Politburo meeting. I don't recall how we got these reports. They were secondhand, but I think, reliable, probably Embassy contacts.

The banquet was at Beihai Park in Beijing. As I was walking in, the Ambassador to Washington - Han Xu his name was, he was called back to China for consultation - asked me to step outside. I had known him ever since the first trips to China. By now so many things had happened this past week, I figured what the subject was going to be about. He said something of the following. The Chairman, Deng Xiaoping, respected me greatly and in a friendly and private way he suggested that I be more prudent with students.

I went back very toughly. Han Xu was an old friend I had known since the Kissinger days. I knew he was going to be the messenger, so I wanted to make sure. I was clear and firm. I said I was astonished and upset. I wasn't rude, but I made clear I was mad. I pointed to the South China Morning Post from Hong Kong which said that I had said that Deng Xiaoping was one of the most impressive leaders in the world. I had, out of sincerity, certainly said nothing negative and behaved myself with the students. Someone was misinforming the Chairman; I was deeply saddened about this. In any event I don't understand and I can't accept this. I was very surprised and deeply displeased. How would he feel if we told him he had to coordinate every meeting at an American university in the United States and we restricted his movements. I explained my reasons for going out there. How would he feel if Ronald Reagan sent a message through me to him saying you can't go to Yale University without checking with us and so on. He didn't respond. We sat next to each other at the banquet. I repeated my messages during a very stiff time. I wasn't friendly, but I wasn't discourteous. He was an old friend.

Then I asked him to step outside afterwards and said please convey my message to the Chairman. As I was driving away in the car, he ran up and tapped on the window to catch up with me to be sure he got the message right. I think he was a little taken aback, so he wanted to make sure I would go over it again. He got an envelope and wrote it down. I basically said I have deep respect for the Chairman. I told the Beijing students he was one of the most impressive leaders I have met. I was very sad that someone was misinforming him about the encounter. We should straighten this out. I just don't understand because there is no better friend of U.S.-China relations. I have worked on it for 17 years. I was surprised and sad. Then I added the other themes, I have every right to do this, and what is going on and so on. Han Xu was clearly upset. I reported all of this in close held cables. I had my Deputy go in and basically repeat the same themes to Liu Huaqui the next day. Washington's comment a couple of days later was a bit ambivalent. It is great you guys are getting out and talking to all the students, thanks and we applaud this. But I thought there was a little bit of softness there because Washington also asked, "Do we really need to have such a high profile at this point?"

*Q: That's typical, you know, don't rock the boat.*

LORD: Sometimes it is the other way around, with the Ambassadors saying don't rock the boat, and it is Washington wanting you to be tougher. So this is backwards you know. However, I think my message back to the Chinese did have some impact because without going into great

detail, they began to be quite friendly again. At the banquet the next night, the Vice Premier was extremely friendly, said he wanted to play tennis with me. This also came from the mayor of Tianjin who wanted to play tennis. The Vice Minister of Public Security was friendly. Several high ranking people came to a Nabisco joint venture opening when they had absolutely no reason to do so. Liu Huaqui told the DCM to tell me not to worry at a dinner a few days later. All the contacts were very friendly. It just shows you their paranoia and their collectivity. It shows you how they all act together canceling things and postponing things on the one hand, and then you get tough and they back off and they get all friendly again. I really laid into them, and of course, all of this has much greater resonance now when we think of Democracy Salon, Tiananmen Square, Wang Dan and everything else.

*Q: No, this is very interesting. Now, other times you were saying what was said at the salon of democracy, but how about when you are talking at think tanks or students prior to this? Were you getting good solid questions?*

LORD: That is a good question. It would vary. I mean there were times when you'd go to think tanks, and you could usually have very good discussions on U.S.-Chinese relations, on international issues, you know the Middle East or Russia. Taiwan you'd get the party line. You wouldn't raise that yourself unless they did, and they usually didn't. When it came to the Chinese domestic scene, not much problem, even some debate on economic reforms. But, I never felt there was much loosening up either in these joint sessions or even one on one on political issues. Despite the fact the envelope was being pushed open, people were still very cautious, including my best friends in the government as well as think tankers certainly about talking in front of others with any degree of candor about political issues and even alone. Occasionally we'd have working dinners at our house with a mixture of officials, semi-dissidents, reformers. We were always trying to keep this debate going and hear about it and participate. People would venture modestly into more controversial issues. The only frank discussions would take place when some of our Embassy contacts who could speak Chinese were alone with people at times, and certainly Bette and her conversations in her circles.

The universities always gave very enthusiastic receptions. I think it was genuine, they were pleased to have an Ambassador and his spouse come out and they like America generally. The questions were always clearly either softball easy ones or ones designed to put you a little bit on the defensive. I'm sure they were all screened.

*Q: Be true in the United States, too.*

LORD: No, I don't think so. I don't think in the United States we would do what they did to Clinton in Beijing (in 1998) where they had the questions orchestrated and the students weren't even allowed to stand up when he came in. Even today they control events, let alone back then. I have no illusions that our meetings with the students were anything but carefully scripted (except for Democracy Salon). No student is going to ask a question that would get him in trouble. But often they asked personal questions or interesting questions on other issues. But never much engagement on political issues with the exceptions I talked about, particular circles and particularly courageous individuals like Fang Lizhi and Liu Binyan.

*Q: This is really on the same theme, but I was wondering for somebody reading this a couple of centuries from now, some historian will be ruffling through this. To get a feel for the role of the United States you conceived I mean in the world, Did you feel that what you were doing in a sense in the American Embassy, you were alone or were the French Embassy, the French Ambassador, the British Ambassador, were others out there pushing these same themes, or were we pretty much on our own?*

LORD: Pretty much on our own. That is true even as we speak. Certainly in any official government policies on human rights we were generally on our own. The others gobble up the contracts and hold our coat so to speak, while we take on the tough issues. The Japanese, partly because of the guilt feelings of what they did in Nanjing and elsewhere in World War Two, partly because they worry about making money, the Europeans because of money. There were some exceptions, the Australians, occasionally the Canadians, sometimes the British or the Europeans would weigh in. With respect to Ambassadors, I can't be sure about what every Ambassador or Embassy was doing, but I don't know of any that were getting out to the students or the think tanks like I was. I know there was nobody anywhere close to the kind of contacts that we had thanks to Bette with the reformist, cultural, academic, and artistic communities.

*Q: But as a mission, we in a way, I mean besides due to your wife you had these contacts, but I mean you felt you had as part of the mission of the American Ambassador to push these things.*

LORD: Yes, and I also...

*Q: These other ones were not particularly pushy.*

LORD: That is absolutely right. Whether it is specific issues like Tibet or prisoners or whether it is generally getting engaged in debates on political reform. Now I want to be accurate here and not self-serving. I don't want to pretend that we were vigorously leaping up and down and beating the drums and pushing the envelope in aggressive, obnoxious ways. We were somewhat circumscribed. Human rights was less of an issue in the average cabinet level meeting than it would be today or at least it was when I was serving in the Clinton Administration. You cannot have a cabinet level meeting today or even a working level meeting without these issues coming up. That was not the case in the late '80s. Not because we didn't care, but it wasn't quite as high profile. This was still during the Cold War and before the Tiananmen massacre, so don't want to exaggerate our pressures. Having said that, compared to other countries and other embassies, we certainly worked on these issues, and certainly Bette in particular and also I personally worked on these issues.

We did so for a variety of reasons. First, human aspirations and justice, some of the human rights issues, freedom of expression, that man or woman doesn't live by bread alone. Particularly as you build up a middle class and you have economic advancement, people are going to want this. Improvements on human rights and freedom would greatly build up support in America for an engagement policy and conversely setbacks made it more complicated - in the interest of our bilateral relationship and therefore in China's interest as well. A feeling even then, although it is much clearer now 12-15 years later, that as you open up to the outside world and develop your economy with the help of outside investment and technology, and as you begin - it was not that

clear then - to have computers and Internet and fax machines, that you've got to have a freer flow of information. You can't develop a modern economy without greater dissent, greater debate, greater openness, greater ability to express your views, greater pluralism in the political system. As you move toward a marketplace, you have less control, all of these things are important. And a feeling, again I felt then and I do now, that as the President said on his recent trip, that stability requires freedom. China was - and is - undergoing the pain of transition from one kind of economy to another with unemployment and all the other problems, corruption, inflation, etc. The Chinese people must be able to express views peacefully. If they don't have those avenues of peaceful dissent, the other alternative is to take to the streets. All of this opposed to the argument of the Chinese authorities, that is self-serving, that one needs repression for stability, I felt and still feel that you need more openness for stability. You can't get at the problem of corruption without a free press, and you can't get, attract and maintain investment without the rule of law. You can't debate about top economic decisions without the free flow of expression and information and a free press. You can't have stability unless people can let off steam through peaceful means. By virtue of the American relationship and support for our ties with China, by virtue of justice, by virtue of China's self-interest, I felt that this was part of our mission.

I also want to make it clear that I felt very strongly that we needed to move ahead with China despite its clear imperfections and the problems of human rights. Because of our strategic, economic, and political interests, we spent an awful lot of time promoting these other elements of our relationship, indeed the bulk of our time. Bette, for example as well as I, spent the overwhelming part of her time with officials, in addition to pushing the envelope with some of these other groups.

## ***XX. AMBASSADOR TO CHINA - 1989 EVENTS AND GENERAL COMMENTS (1989)***

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I don't know about where you are on things. Do you want to talk about the Bush visit and Fang Lizhi?*

LORD: Yes, because that is an interesting story, too. This will be about President Bush's trip to China in early 1989 in the home stretch as my tenure as Ambassador. Let me say that I greatly looked forward to this trip as sort of a capstone of my tenure there. I had made clear before the November 1988 election that no matter who was elected, as much as I loved this job and it was the best job I had ever had for enjoyment, that I was ready after three and a half years to move on. Washington ought to think of a successor.

Bush I had known for a long time. I had played tennis with him on occasions. I had seen him almost every time I went back to Washington, talked to him about China when he was Vice President. I briefed him on behalf of Nixon and Kissinger when he went out to head up the Liaison Office early in his career. I had what I thought was a very good relationship. He was a newly elected President. He was going to Japan to see the Emperor, but he was going to come to China on an official visit, but not on a full state visit.

As an old friend of China, one who had worked on the relationship, he was looking forward as was Mrs. Bush to return home and see all their old friends. As we got ready for the visit, it couldn't have been a better lead up. To make a long story short, we went full speed, and we were

good at this frankly, my Deputy Tomsen and my whole team working with the advance team to get ready for this trip. The head of the advance team who had been working on trips for more than a decade said it was the best Embassy he had ever worked with. I was the most involved Ambassador he had ever worked with. This is not to be self-serving but to set up something later on. Indeed we just beat our brains out, for a President, a new President. Everything was going terrifically well, logistics, even though it was going to be a 48 hour short trip. The advance team was ecstatic. We sent in the usual think pieces. I personally wrote some personal ones for the President and made sure they got to him. I got word back that he very much enjoyed them before he came out including two portraits of Deng Xiaoping, one with what he had accomplished generally in Chinese history and the challenges he faced and secondly a personal portrait of Deng, his family, his background, his history and how to deal with him. And we had other scene setters. The Chinese had gone out of their way to make this a friendly visit. The Chinese media play was the warmest for any visit I had seen. Again, our relations were fully on track after Shultz's visits and the Secretary of Defense and many others. We were moving along pretty well, although we had continuing problems. He was a new President and an old friend. Everybody wanted to see him so the problem was sorting out who got on his schedule on a brief 48 hour visit. The Chinese agreed to have him go on live television. The first time I believe any foreign leader, certainly the first time any American President, had addressed the Chinese live, well before this Clinton visit (1998). They also worked with us, very unusual for them, to stage a "spontaneous" photo opportunity in Tiananmen Square. He'd get out of his car and mingle with the crowds. Indeed he got a great picture with Tiananmen Square in the background. It was on the cover of Time International. So everything was going swimmingly. I had visions of a perfect capstone to my tenure there, going out with a successful trip by the new President, and we were very excited about it.

As part of the trip, there was to be on Sunday night, he arrived on Saturday, his return banquet for the Chinese in the Great Wall Hotel. We had instructions from the White House to make it a big banquet, include all walks of life, old Chinese friends but all parts of society, reach a broad audience. They asked us for guest lists. Let me just sum up the experience I had, and then I'll tell you what happened. Mao Zedong once said that a revolution is not a dinner party. Well, this turned out to be a dinner party that turned out to be a revolution. In order to draw up a guest list that we had to have approved by Washington, we asked each section of the Embassy to come up with suggestions as to who should be included. We came up with a full list which we sent into Washington a couple of weeks before the visit, soon after they had asked for it. It included all kinds of people, officials, American businesspeople, Chinese, academics, you name it. It also included a few dissidents, depending on how you define dissidents, at least pro-reformers, several of them, one of whom was Fang Lizhi, who had been at Hefei University. He was outspoken on political reform, going around giving speeches that the Chinese authorities were not happy with. He had lost his job there, but was still an official research worker for the Chinese government in Beijing. So, he was still officially that. Although clearly pushing the envelope on political reform, he was not some wild eyed radical trying to overthrow the government, but obviously was someone of some controversy. At the same time, he was a widely respected scientist, a world class astrophysicist. Three different sections of our embassy individually recommended Fang be on the list.

Our view was the following which we explained in a cable we sent back with the guest lists. We

pointed out the several reformers/dissidents with explanations of all of them on the list. We said the Chinese won't like this but frankly we did not expect an explosion in the reaction. We said we thought it was important that the President demonstrate his overall concern with human rights as part of our engagement with the Chinese, out of principle, to lift the morale of reformers, to try to help the China situation and to protect himself with his domestic audience and Congress back home. If we had a separate meeting with dissidents - after all, Reagan had done this in Russia - if we had a separate meeting with dissidents, generally or with Fang in particular, this we felt would be overly provocative to the Chinese. Particularly in such a very short visit with so many friends, so many Vice Premiers and others were disappointed not to see him. To say he couldn't see Vice Premier so and so, but then he sees dissidents, we just felt this was going too far. But we thought it was important that he show some demonstration of concern for human rights for all the reasons I mentioned. Thus we had him visiting a church on Sunday morning, which he did. We had him refer to human rights although much more gingerly than we do now. There were related elements in his remarks on TV. We had Secretary Baker raise the issue of human rights as well.

*Q: Baker being Secretary of State.*

LORD: We felt the other way to do it was to include a few dissidents in the banquet which after all was huge. Not have a separate meeting. This was a nice balance. We sent the list in to Washington. Given the usual inertia you usually get on those things, we got no response approving the list. We were running out of time because we had to issue the invitations. Actually in putting together the list, we got suggestions from three different sections, the political section, the science and technology section, and the USIA section, press and culture. Each suggested separately several dissidents including Fang. I would have added him if he wasn't included. Three different sections told us we should do this. I mention this partly because there was a New York Times article a few weeks later which said that Bette Bao Lord, this known radical, had inserted Fang on the guest list which caused trouble at the summit. Or, maybe it was said approvingly by the human rights people. Whatever way it was said, it was totally inaccurate. I had her go over the list too, because I welcomed her judgment. The point is even before we got to the list, three different sections independently had suggested him and other dissidents.

So, we sent it to the White House and the State Department, the whole list on February 10. As I say, we had a few dissidents, and we specifically foresaw some problems. To be fair we did not see there would be an explosion. We got no reply, so we sent a moderately changed guest list with some additions and some deletions on February 18, but no changes among the reformers. Again I made sure we flagged Fang in particular for Washington. By now we are running out of time; the President is arriving about a week later. We pressed the advance team to help us.

*Q: You were saying you were consulting...*

LORD: We are talking about the Fang Lizhi banquet incident. Finally, the top White House advance man called the White House and got approval on the phone for the whole list. We had to move fast on the invitations. We had one of our Chinese local employees (who report to the Chinese security service all the time) call the Academy of Sciences to extend the invitations orally to those at the academy including Fang. We did a lot of invitations by phone to alert

people, and then we were going to follow up with a written invitation. We heard the next day on February 22 some confused report about somebody saying Fang wasn't actually on the list. It turns out later that a protocol person from the Foreign Ministry called over to the Academy later and said Fang wasn't invited after we had invited him. We then got the invitations out. In many cases we had to hand carry them to many places; we had such short notice. We had somebody from the Embassy hand carry the invitation to Mrs. Fang for both of them. We did this in many other places because of time constraints.

That evening at an advance team banquet, a protocol guy complains, taking us aside. It wasn't a huge complaint but it was the first warning we got. We said relax, big crowd, diverse. Don't get so upset about this. We're inviting Fang as a world renowned scientist. We immediately alerted Washington to this. This could be trouble. We want you to know they reacted to the Fang invitation.

Then for the next 48 hours, getting closer and closer to the President getting there, we didn't hear anything from the Chinese, so we began to feel pretty good and figured this wasn't going to be a problem. We kept wondering if we were going to be called in and they were going to escalate this. We hadn't heard anything, so we began to feel pretty good. Meanwhile, somehow the French press runs with something in Taiwan about how we invited Fang and some idiot in our Embassy on background said, yes, we did this to make a statement. The Chinese would have reacted anyway, I'm sure. Throughout this, however, a tremendous warm reception was building for Bush and very warm friendly media coverage continued to go forward. We kind of figured we were pretty well home free.

Then at 6:30 on Friday, February 24 (the day before the President's arrival), the Vice Minister, a guy named Zhu Qizhen, said he wanted to see me. I get a little nervous; I wonder what this is about. I think I probably know what it is about although I thought we were home free. So I go out to Daoyutai guest house for a final thank you to the advance team and then to the Foreign Ministry. I don't remember the exact chronology. Zhu said this is a real problem for the Chinese, their leadership. I don't have this exactly right, but it was, I believe, around 9:00 Friday night. We had the roughest meeting I have ever had with the Chinese. With Zhu I went through all the arguments about how they shouldn't blow this out of proportion. It is just one person at a banquet. He is being invited as a renowned scientist, etc. I, of course, when I first heard their complaints, just on my own said to the Chinese, I will report this. I said, I can't speak for Washington but I am sure they won't want change to the guest list. I couldn't imagine, particularly after it had leaked, that we could back off from this. The President would have gotten massive criticism. Because there was so little time, I didn't want the Chinese to have any illusion that we were going to back away. I said, of course I'll report and consult. I immediately sent a message to Korea and Air Force One. It was less than 20 hours before the President's arrival. I kept sending messages in. I mention all of this because it comes up later about whether I kept Washington informed.

Scowcroft in response to my cable calls me in the middle of the night and tells me to go in for another appointment. We both knew the Chinese were listening in so we made points about not causing controversy for their benefit. I go in at 9:30 that Saturday morning to try to turn this around again. Another tough go around.

*Q: Scowcroft is the National Security Advisor.*

LORD: Again I send another wire to the plane. Then at 12:30, the President is landing four hours later. The Vice Minister calls me again. This is a message from President Yang Shangkun to President Bush, basically saying if Fang Lizhi comes to the banquet, Yang is not coming and nobody else is coming from the leadership. By now I know I have a disaster on my hands. With each development I sent a cable either by NIACT [Night Action] or Flash, which is almost like a nuclear war, to make sure the President's party on the plane knew exactly what was happening. The last one they didn't get because it was so shortly before they landed in Beijing. The last Yang message, Bush didn't get that until he was at the guest house. He was well aware of the problem, but he had not realized it had escalated to this point.

I went up on the plane to greet the President which you usually do. He was distinctly unfriendly. You could tell he was mad at me about how this whole thing had come up. I rode in with Baker and I said I still thought there was a chance that either the Chinese would relent or Fang would decide not to cause trouble and not come. Something might happen.

We proceed with the trip. Perhaps it was like Mrs. Lincoln at the play, but the rest of the trip went extremely well. The whole time Bush was nervous, as we all were, about how this was going to come out. It would be a clear debacle to have a return banquet and no Chinese leaders there. It would not have gone unnoticed by the press. Throughout the Chinese are keeping us hanging. Their official position remains the same. We go through the rest of the trip. Bush has a meeting and a working lunch with Deng that goes very well. He gives Deng some boots and Deng gives him a bicycle. He meets with the Embassy staff, and now, he and Mrs. Bush are not all that friendly to us. They figure we had gotten them into this trouble. In his remarks to the Embassy employees, he barely mentions the Ambassador or his wife which a week earlier would have been unthinkable. He has meetings with all these other people and they all go well. I won't go into all the details. He was given a warm welcoming banquet. All is going very well in substance. There is one meeting which is running late that we are nervous about because he is due to go on live television. He races there and goes on at the last minute, and that goes well. It is a very productive, good trip, but this incident is hanging over us, and obviously keeping everyone on edge.

Let me segue for a minute to show the edge. My wife, of course, was in charge of Mrs. Bush's itinerary. She had known her well and favorably in the past. For several weeks she had sent messages back to Mrs. Bush, to her chief of staff, with schedules and plans and never got any response. To this day we don't know if it was total ineptness or unfriendliness or what. Literally no guidance on what to do with the First Lady. We would call and send messages, just a black hole. Bette had prepared and recommended some very interesting and imaginative events for the First Lady, none of them in the least controversial.

*Q: This, of course, is before...*

LORD: Before they ever took off. This is totally unrelated to the Fang issue. We think it was just plain incompetence in Mrs. Bush's office, but who knows? It was impossible for Bette. Anyway

she came up with a spectacular series of events. I don't want to sound self-serving for my wife, but it happens to be true. She got an old place opened up that hadn't been open for years, and arranged a session with top Chinese women of all walks of life, none of whom were radicals. They were artists and academics and working women and wives of leaders. She had special tables and entertainment. It was totally cultural, not political. It was a beautifully thought out event for Mrs. Bush, all of which Bette had to do without guidance because she hadn't gotten any guidance. During the rest of the trip everything went well; the usual things Mrs. Bush wanted to do. The Bushes went to church Sunday morning. We were very moved by the whole affair, the very idea of this church again in China. It went back to when Bush was in the Liaison Office. He sat next to a 90 year old woman who had tears in her eyes and hadn't been in church in decades. All of us were moved by this. I come out and I am with the President.

Mrs. Bush gets in another car with my wife and starts screaming at her literally at the top of her lungs about the next social event Bette had planned. Why did you get me into this affair with these Chinese women? I don't want a lot of political controversy. Why can't I go to the Summer Palace? Bette, of course, said she wouldn't do anything to embarrass her. I think you will enjoy this, she said. She was quiet about the fact that she hadn't had any guidance from Mrs. Bush. This incident made clear to me that Mrs. Bush's public appearance is not quite the same as her private personality. She was unbelievably rude to my wife. It turned out the affair was fantastic. Mrs. Bush enjoyed it and she hugged Bette at the end and so on. It was something we didn't forget. By then that particular episode was reflecting the tension of the Fang problem, obviously. I still don't understand why we didn't get any guidance before then.

Anyway, back to the main drama. Finally at the President's meeting Sunday afternoon with Zhao Ziyang, the banquet being Sunday night, we get a note passed to me from the Chinese that the Chinese leaders have now agreed to come to the banquet. We are throwing our hats in the air and figure everything is fine. They didn't say anything about Fang not coming; they just said they were coming. The Chinese said they don't want any press conference about Fang at the banquet or him at the head table. We said obviously we are not going to do that; we are going to treat him as a regular guest. Then the tension is relieved; it is going to be a great trip. Even though we had been on edge for the last 48 hours, it was going to have a happy ending.

We had this big Texas style barbecue at the Great Wall Hotel. We had all friendly people at Fang's table but made sure his table wasn't in direct line of sight of the leaders. We were trying to be as sensitive as possible. We go through the banquet. I'm feeling great. We are having good discussions and the toasts are great, and everything is terrific. I can't see Fang's table from where I am sitting at the head table. I'm just assuming he is there. I don't see anything. We all assumed that. At one point Bette got a note passed to her during the banquet saying an academic - they got the name wrong but something that rhymes with Perry Link - wants to see you. Bette didn't know what that was about, and said I'll see him later or something. It turns out as the history books now know that it was Perry Link who was with Fang and his wife. They had gone to the hotel and were turned away by the Chinese security and weren't allowed to attend.

None of this we knew until I got into the car after dinner, feeling euphoric at the end of this trip. My economic counselor lets me know that Fang is at the Embassy. He couldn't go to the banquet; he had been prevented by Chinese authorities. My heart stopped. I knew the press was

going to get a hold of this. It turned out to be a disaster beyond my wildest dreams. We get back to the guest house and Fang holds a press conference at a hotel. That's all the press cares about, nothing else about the trip. It is all down the drain.

Meanwhile, I should point out for the history books that Scowcroft had told me beforehand on Saturday that first this was just a fantastic job of getting ready by the Embassy for the President. Secondly he volunteered the Fang problem, which is still up in the air, was certainly not the Embassy's fault. He was mad that it hadn't been brought to his attention or Baker's attention, that lower level people had cleared the guest list. I immediately said, I don't want them to get burned, that it is nobody's fault. None of us could have predicted the Chinese would be so unreasonable.

Back to the unfolding disaster. I had to take a sleeping pill to get to sleep. It was a low point in my career; I can tell you that. You know you don't want to see a presidential trip go down in flames particularly when you are in the middle of it. The U.S. side is having breakfast the next morning in the guest house, the top of the American team. I am purposefully, obviously not invited to the breakfast with the President, Baker, and Scowcroft. It was highly unusual, the Ambassador not being there, having a skull session on what to do. They decided to have the President say he complained to the Chinese before he got on the plane at the airport, and they would issue a stronger statement once they were airborne, not on Chinese soil.

The President does this at the airport and I am sent in to Zhu to complain as well. I spend the next couple of days madly working on the press, sending cables to the party, playing up the positive side of the visit. The Chinese are beginning to relax about it and cooling off about it and playing up the positive themes. I am urging the White House to do the same. It was clear that Bush was so pissed off at what had happened that he wasn't hearing much of this. The whole idea was to put a positive spin on the trip, which had the virtue of being true. It was important for a variety of reasons, and the Chinese were willing to play ball at that point. We were making some progress; this thing was quieting down.

Then there was a backgrounder in the press that was given by Scowcroft. It was clear at the time it was either Scowcroft or Sununu, the Chief of Staff. It appeared in the Washington Post and the New York Times, and was picked up by papers all over the place, Taiwan, Japan, Hong Kong, American papers. The backgrounder was by a senior White House official effectively saying the Embassy had screwed up the President's visit, it hadn't kept the Washington team informed about the Chinese being upset, and it had invited Fang Lizhi on its own. All of which is totally untrue of course. That is why I wanted in this history to go into details in terms of clearing the list. We hadn't predicted the time bomb, but nobody did. We did point out probable Chinese irritations. I still think it was the right thing to do obviously. We kept Washington fully posted. The White House and State had cleared the list, including Fang, etc.

My Embassy colleagues were about ready to lob nuclear bombs on Washington. I immediately called the entire senior staff together and said no one is to talk to the press. We are supposed to support the President and show a united front. This is a stupid backgrounder and it is unfair to the Embassy and not in American interests but I don't want any stories coming out of here. Keep your mouth shut. Nothing came out of the Embassy. So there was total discipline by the outraged Embassy staff.

Over the next two days with the help of Tomsen and my wife, I drafted a secret message to Scowcroft with a copy to Baker. I knew Scowcroft had done this, but I didn't want Baker to think, no matter what the subject, that I was communicating with the National Security Advisor without keeping the Secretary of State informed. Baker was in Vienna; Scowcroft was in Washington. I had it double encrypted and sent by the CIA through the White House Situation Room, hand delivered so no one else would see it except Scowcroft and the same procedure in Vienna with Baker.

I rewrote the message about 10 times. I wanted to keep it professional and cool. I basically said the following. I pointed out the President's trip had gone well and we should otherwise accentuate the positive. I said I'm a professional, I have been around for 30 years. There are times when you need a scapegoat for the national interest or the President, and an Ambassador or someone else should take a fall. I don't have any problem with that principle. I think that's time honored and sometimes useful. But, leaving that aside, first, of course, you will remember the chronology - I did clear the list, I did keep them posted and so on. I did it just clinically. Then leaving that aside, let's just look at it from the U.S. national interest. What has this backgrounder done besides being totally inaccurate? Number one, it revived the whole issue, just when the Chinese and the American sides were letting it die. So, it overtook any positive play. Number two, it looked weak to the Chinese, having the President look defensive and embarrassed about inviting somebody who was not a bomb thrower at a banquet with 900 people. Reagan had gone to Moscow and met separately with dissidents. This backgrounder made it look like we are so sorry we hurt the Chinese feelings. That is not the way I said it in my message, but it is the thrust of my message. We looked wimpish and weak to the Chinese which is not a good idea at any time with any country particularly not the Chinese, and particularly not for a new President of the United States starting out a new relationship with the Chinese. It is just a bad way to begin with these guys. Thirdly, it was wrong. It is the Chinese who should be on the defensive. It is the Chinese who screwed things up, not the U.S. Their reaction was totally out of bounds. It was the Chinese who had misbehaved.

Fourth, even though the trip was said not to have gone well, the President at least was getting credit with Congress and the press and human rights groups for inviting dissidents to his banquet. They were saying at least he has the guts to do this. So the background undercuts all his credit with the human rights and congressional types by making clear that he was sorry this guy came to the banquet and he hurt the Chinese feelings. Finally, and this was the least important because I was leaving anyway, he had destroyed any possible influence I could have in my remaining tenure as Ambassador. In effect he was saying to the world and the Chinese this Ambassador is out of control, did something on his own, didn't tell us about your reaction, and ruined my trip.

Anyway, I sent this message to Scowcroft whom I had known for 15 years, who was a relatively good friend and working colleague, who had praised the trip as being sensational, etc. To this day, I have never had even an acknowledgment of the message or explanation. Not one. I know he got it because I had the CIA confirm to me the exact time they handed him the message in the Situation Room and the exact time they handed it to Baker. Scowcroft didn't even have the courtesy to say he got my cable and let's talk about it, or you're wrong for the following reasons, etc.

Let me just finish by saying I have had a lot of bad moments in my career as well as a hell of a lot of good ones. The Laos statement in 1970. The failure of the Vietnam negotiations in October of 1972 when we went to Saigon and felt we had an agreement, and President Thieu turned us down. I think this Fang affair ranks at the bottom with those events, the combination of angst, disappointment, anger at the Chinese and our President and his National Security Advisor, just generally leaving a sour taste in my mouth.

This issue faded as time passed. The Chinese got extremely friendly toward the end of my stay - I left two months later. I am sure, however, because of Democracy Salon and now this incident and this backgrounder, that Deng and others had ambivalent feelings about me as well as Bette. By the time we left, Bette and I got an incredible sendoff. For example, on the same day, I saw the Secretary General, the Prime Minister, and the President. I had special meals in my honor and special toasting and messages sent to me. The same with Bette. So we got an incredibly warm sendoff by the Chinese. Also, back in the United States, I figured most people knew the White House misbehaved, and were pissed off at them, not me. I was a semi hero, beyond what I deserved, with the human rights and congressional groups. I mellowed out more generally. But having said that, obviously for the sake of the United States and the sake of President Bush, and for my own reputation, I would have much preferred a glorious Presidential trip to end my tenure in China.

*Q: Just to put this in perspective, this is very early in Bush's term.*

LORD: That's right, a few weeks after inauguration.

*Q: You also have George Bush who is probably has as good a résumé in foreign affairs including going to China. It wasn't a Bill Clinton of Arkansas. Then, Scowcroft who had been around the NSC for a long time, but in a way it sounds very much like a brand new administration with new boys on the block who don't really understand the game and so if anything happens you have to blame somebody. It sounds like something out of the first couple of months of the Reagan White House, also the first couple of months out of the Clinton White House.*

LORD: I want to try to be as detached as I can. First, Scowcroft claimed and I believe Baker claimed to me at some point, that nobody in their departments had brought to their attention the list and the possible controversy. By the way, Stape Roy was a hero in this. He was Deputy Assistant Secretary, one of the top diplomats we've ever had. He stuck his neck out and backgrounded to the press, talk about sticking your neck out, that the White House was all wet, but, in fact, the list had been vetted by the White House and the State Department, and he knew that Lord was not to blame. So Stape was a hero on that.

First of all, we all underestimated the Chinese response. To this day I am surprised by it, that with Fang to be at a big banquet at some obscure table, they'd get this excited. Also, if I had to do it all over again, I wouldn't do it any differently. If you have a separate meeting, it is more provocative. If you don't do anything, you are vulnerable back home, and you are not sending the right signals to the Chinese or the Chinese people or the reformers whom you are trying to help

and give support to. Even if it were brought to the attention of Baker and Scowcroft, they would have been told, as we suggested, the Chinese would be unhappy about it, but the payoff is much larger than this, and it will be under control essentially. We made clear that the dissidents in general might be a problem. By the way, there were other dissidents in this controversy, clearly people pushing the envelope that the Chinese never mentioned. Obviously Deng Xiaoping had a particular thing for Fang.

Part of the Bush reaction might have been that he felt he had not been informed. Having said that, you would think, not that I wanted it to be this way, that the President would get mad at his subordinates in Washington rather than his Embassy if he feels he has a right to be mad at all which I don't think he does. Moreover, I'm not even sure Bush, Baker, and Scowcroft didn't know. There was a Camp David session with outside China experts before the trip. To this day I have never gotten it straight. At least one or two of the participants told me that the Fang invitation which as I say, had leaked by then, was a topic of conversation among the outside experts. Who were at Camp David? Baker and Scowcroft, at least I believe they were there, and the President. To this day I don't know whether it came up in front of the President, if he knew, actually did know about this, let alone Baker and Scowcroft. So, there is a little confusion.

Anyway, trying to be detached about it, here is the President. He is a brand new President. He has a particular soft spot for China. Going there he expects a triumphant homecoming which he got in every other way. He expects it to be a wonderful personal experience for him and his wife, going back there, and a big media plus, and getting off to a great start on foreign policy and generally on his image, and instead this happens. You can see why I'm trying to be detached about this. I just have to assume that he felt that we should have predicted this more. What bothers me the most is he didn't get mad at the Chinese for ruining his trip. He got mad at his own team. Now, I don't think it reveals lack of experience in foreign policy which they both had, the two people you mentioned and Baker, but frankly a clear softness on human rights, and a feeling that we shouldn't do anything to ruffle the Chinese. The President, in fact, did not raise human rights directly in his meetings with the Chinese at all. He got Baker to do it the first night, but the President didn't raise it. Marlin Fitzwater, the press spokesman, confirmed to the press that the President didn't even raise human rights. We had to scramble and say he was going to church and speaking about it on his radio and TV, and Baker raised it the first night. Clearly, this softness was shown by the President's tepid response later to Tiananmen Square.

*Q: I think so, too, with Scowcroft...*

LORD: Yes, Scowcroft going over there secretly after the Tiananmen Square massacre. So this is just a preview of their view on this subject.

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Given this terrible experience, it is not very long thereafter when you begin to get the demonstrations in the Square of the students. Did this experience influence in any way the way the Embassy understood what was going on and reported what was going on with the students? Because obviously you couldn't have known what was going to come to begin with on Tiananmen night. Was there a concern that there was an unwillingness in Washington to hear about this? Does it have an impact do you think?*

LORD: We didn't pull our punches on reporting. That didn't affect our reporting. Now, we couldn't predict Tiananmen Square. We clearly were made even more aware by the Fang affair than we had been how sensitive Deng and the leadership were to the human rights question. We clearly kept our eyes and ears open even more for that. We did as we had done all along during my tenure, kept reporting on the pushing of the envelope by the reformers. We kept in as much touch as we could on that. I don't believe there was any direct correlation of any magnitude between the Fang banquet issue and Tiananmen Square. It was just a symptom of the sensitivity of the Chinese leadership and their repressive attitudes. Also Deng's annoyance at Fang personally - I believe Fang had talked about corruption under Deng.

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: You are not getting anything when you are making these early reports on what is happening in the Square, you are not getting any responses from Washington that suggested you guys are doing it again?*

LORD: No, absolutely not. Just to make it clear, I left one week after the Tiananmen demonstrations began. I left during the first big demonstration on April 22, 100,000 people at Hu Yaobang's funeral. He had died on the 15th. In the intervening week there had been posters and wreaths to Hu. The sentiment was growing, and then they used the funeral as the first big occasion. We were reporting this. I certainly did not think it was going to grow to the dimensions it did, I don't know anybody who did. It grew to extraordinary dimensions, of course. When people think of students in Tiananmen Square, what they forget is in the first place there were seven weeks without a single incident of violence, without a single death. If anything, the traffic ran better than ever. It was the most orderly, responsive, disciplined crowd. Not one accident, not one incident in seven weeks with a million people sometimes in the Square, absolutely extraordinary. Furthermore, it was not just students. It was journalists, academics, party members, military, business people, farmers, peasants, workers, all kinds of people demonstrating, not just students. Now it wasn't just about democracy. It was about inflation, corruption, nepotism, poor conditions, physical and mental at the universities. There were a lot of different sources of angst. It was in over 200 cities - not just Beijing - which was extraordinary. None of which the scope of which we predicted.

*Q: But to take Nancy's question... I mean after all, an Embassy essentially just consists of Foreign Service Officers who are looking at foreign governments and trying to sense who are they, where are they going, and what are they doing. It is so hard to turn that ability off when you look at your own government. Here is a brand new government. Here is George Bush who sometimes had the view of not being quite serious, you know, sort of a dilettante. He did this and he did that, and saying you know, this is not that strong a President.*

LORD: Look, the Embassy and I personally were extremely mad at the President and Scowcroft, although I am proud of the discipline we showed. There was never one leak out of that Embassy complaining about Washington. The angst was confined to my back channel messages which never got a response. Yes, we were mad, but first of all he was the President. Number two, he was not a dilettante about foreign policy. He was quite serious about it, knew a lot about it, had extensive experience, and did some good work as the Gulf War showed. None of us thought he'd suddenly become a lightweight. I didn't encourage a lot of griping and whining at staff meetings. I can't tell you what went on around the water cooler. We maintained discipline at staff meetings:

look, we are going to show a united front. I know how some of you feel. I know how I feel. It is unfair, but we've got to serve the national interest and serve this President. That is all I would say in front of others. With my wife and my DCM and one or two others I was more frank one on one. I was hopping mad. No, our job was still, and I really think I am being accurate on this, to not pull any punches either way in our reporting, try to serve the President. I kept trying to stress - I worked hard on this for a matter of weeks despite my other unhappiness - to put as positive a spin on the trip as I could in terms of substance and perception and kept urging Washington to do the same. Of course it was overcome by this event; it never really recovered. So, it didn't really affect our reporting. I and others were very angry and disappointed that the President would get mad both inaccurately and just wrong in substance at the Embassy and have his Security Advisor tell the world, as opposed to being mad at what the Chinese had done to him.

*Q: Was it ever proposed that after this thing happened, I can see somebody else reacting saying well why don't we have tea and cookies with Fang at some point. You know if you are sticking it to me I mean talking to the Chinese, why don't you come over and we'll have a midnight snack or something like that, or did that even come up?*

LORD: Well, later he had to get refuge in the Embassy when my successor Jim Lilley was there. I immediately saw Perry Link who was with him and went over this with him and expressed our concern about Fang's well being. I think he was surrounded and under house arrest by this point, so we could never get at him, but I can't reconstruct what happened to him at that point. Basically he was hemmed in. We didn't make any effort to have a high profile meeting with him. I immediately went and made sure I saw his buddy and sent word to Fang about how concerned I was. I met with Perry Link, the professor who had been with him, but I didn't meet with Fang.

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Do you have a sense in the Bush administration, Bush himself considered himself somewhat of a China expert because of his experience in China. Were there any other people at the very top that had any interest in China, Scowcroft and these other people, or were they mostly Europe oriented?*

LORD: That is a good question. Scowcroft was more arms control and Russia, but he had been a generalist. He had been National Security Advisor under Ford after all, so by definition he was a generalist, including China. He wasn't without background on China certainly. Baker hadn't had much dealings with Asia generally I believe or with China. There were plenty of good people like Stape Roy and others back there working on it. I don't think there is any need to go through the other parts of his trip. We hit some of the positive stuff. We followed up. I was instructed immediately after the President left to go and ask for an explanation and complain about what had happened, in addition to a statement issued from the airplane.

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Were there other key policy issues Bush was trying to resolve during the visit?*

LORD: Resolve may be too strong a word. By the way, there was another positive element in the lead up to the trip. They allowed the President to use his car whenever he was riding without a Chinese official in it. For security reasons, they never had allowed that before. It is just another little example of how they went out of their way to be hospitable. In terms of the agenda, it was

the usual suspects, and the talks went very well. There were discussions on Russia, on Japan. The Chinese raised Taiwan but not very vigorously. A discussion of Chinese reforms and where they were going. Reminiscing about Bush's days in China. Baker raised human rights and Tibet. When I say it went well, partly it was because the reception was so terrific until that last incident, all these other factors I've mentioned. The President also did address the Chinese people which in those days was significant. They did have good discussions at the beginning of the President's term sketching the future of U.S.-Chinese relations and our common interests and talking about issues like Japan where he had just come from, and Russia, and some of the other areas. There may well have been some further movement on exchanges in bilateral agreements, but remember we only had about a three weeks advance notice on this. He was a brand new President, so the purpose was not to make breakthroughs, but to establish a positive tone to the beginning of the relationship as he came into office.

Before this, under Reagan, Secretary Shultz visited China a couple of times during my tenure as did almost every other cabinet official. It was a sign of the times and a fortunate window of opportunity we had during those years. We had three different CIA directors coming in black hats. We had a couple of Secretaries of Defense. Shultz was there twice. Almost every other cabinet level economic type, not to mention directors of USIA and Peace Corps and all kinds of Under Secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Congressional delegations which I encouraged. High level visits from everyone from the Stock Exchange to President Carter to Billy Graham to Kissinger to Gregory Peck, Charlton Heston. A great variety. It made it a lot of fun and also helped to expand our relationship and our bilateral links. Probably the single most positive visit and the most important one was Secretary Shultz's trip from March 1 to March 6, 1987.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I actually didn't get to go on the trip, but I helped advance it from Washington.*

LORD: Anyway, it started out in Guilin on a boat trip, and he came to Beijing where he met the Foreign Minister, Li Peng, the Vice Premier, the Defense Minister, President Yang, Zhao Ziyang, who at that time was Party Secretary. Of course he met with the Embassy staff. Deng Xiaoping. A couple of press conferences and speeches and so on. He went up to Dalian and visited this U.S.-sponsored institute training people in business and management. I pushed hard for that visit, even though some were trying to drop it. Then he went on down to Shandong and visited Mount Tai where you climb to the top and Qufu, the birthplace of Confucius, and then out through Shanghai. It was a pretty long trip for a Secretary of State in those days, about six days, March 1-6, 1987. Indeed after the trip, even though it got extremely positive coverage, there was some inquiry and carping about the expense, the number of people, and how long he had been there. It's peanuts compared with other entourages since then, but at the time it was a very minor flap, and we had to explain how important it was.

I had been back in Washington that January to help script the trip. If I do say so we were pretty good on these high level trips, scene setters and think pieces ahead of time and careful work by advance people, advice. I was with Shultz every step of the way, helping him on this, as my wife was with Mrs. Shultz. It was an important time, because as I pointed out earlier there were the Hu Yaobang sacking and some tightening up and some other developments in our relationship. There was less momentum, a slowing down in our relations before this trip. I think this was an

important one in terms of resuming that momentum. It was the first trip as I say after Hu was sacked. On our domestic scene, we had the Iran-Contra issue flaring up. Each side's domestic scene was a little shaky. The strategic purpose of the trip, against the backdrop of these domestic events, was to make sure that we moved forward again in our relationship and our agenda on the bilateral front and to have in depth discussions on the international issues which included Russia, Afghanistan, Indochina, Korea, the Iran-Iraq War. Then a lot of emphasis on the economic agenda both in the discussions and the meeting at the Dalian Institute and the McDonnell-Douglas plane factory in Shanghai and so on. Also he saw many parts of the country. He gave a couple of important speeches and toasts, including on American values like Reagan had done at Fudan, and I stressed that was important to do. Also a careful formulation on Taiwan which in effect said we would welcome any progress between Taiwan and Beijing. We had some formulations. They were not dramatically new. They didn't upset Taiwan, but they gave some encouragement to the Chinese about our position. I did recommend that he not do this on Taiwan at the beginning of his trip in Beijing. It might get so much attention that it would dominate the rest of his trip, but rather do it in Shanghai toward the end.

Since there was some obvious debate going on in China among the leadership on political reform given what had happened in preceding months, I warned the Secretary not to be snowed by what would inevitably be a show of unity and solidarity by the Chinese leaders. I pointed out the tensions in the wake of the Hu fall. I urged him, and he did do this much more than Bush was to do later, to state carefully both in his public speeches and his private remarks, that the gathering repression or the falling back on the liberalization however modest, was not good for China, and also wasn't good for American opinion. It was important to the relationship, discussion among the media, academics, and Congressmen. Many of the latter, Congressmen and academics, were beginning to send letters on treatments of intellectuals and artists. There was a contrast in China to the developing positive events in Russia under Gorbachev. The Secretary did raise some of these themes.

The Chinese didn't react negatively.

I had a lot of talks with the Secretary privately about the Washington scene. At another time, by the way, the Secretary was in the middle of the Iran-Contra debate. As you may recall, at some point Poindexter had been fired and the Tower Commission had been set up. Also we listened to the President's speech on this issue, on the train between Shandong and Shanghai. But at one point, there were rumors that Shultz was thinking of resigning, and I had sent him a private very personal message, literally personal. It must have been through CIA close hold channel urging him to stay on and why I thought it was important and his contributions and so on. Obviously, I didn't turn him around myself, but I know he appreciated that. It was important to send such a message.

So, I felt this trip did provide new momentum in the relationship. Both sides could say that despite our somewhat uneasy domestic scenes, we can and we will move ahead. We agreed with the Chinese on new contacts with the North Koreans through our respective Embassies in Beijing, trying to encourage north-south dialogues. We began to preview how we might begin to liberalize some exports of technology, again if Beijing behaved itself in other areas. We agreed to a PRC Consulate in Los Angeles. We got some movement in reciprocity issues of interest to

us. Shultz gave a good rundown on U.S.-Russian relations. We relayed to the Chinese Foreign Minister and economic ministers and others our concerns about business, trade, and investment problems. None of this is necessarily dramatic, but it gave substance as well as logistic smoothness to a very complicated trip. One of the Secretary's secretarial staff said it was the most complicated Secretarial trip they had. I was really proud of the performance of our embassy and consulates.

Let me now return to the end of my tenure as Ambassador.

In the wake of the Bush trip and for the remainder of my stay, there was still obviously continuing ferment for political reform and dissent. I don't want to exaggerate this, but clearly the debate was continuing and we were reporting on this. Nobody I'm aware of either inside or outside of China predicted or could have known of the size of the demonstrations that were about to come.

As we were saying our good-byes, we had a tremendous sendoff, lots of parties and the usual speeches and so on. We had one party for Chinese at our house on April 15, a week before we were leaving. We heard at that party that Hu Yaobang had died. This is in Bette's book, *Legacies*, at the beginning. Little did we know that was to be a signal for a major event in Chinese history. Hu had always been known as someone unpredictable and spontaneous, feisty, unlike most stodgy Chinese leaders, and had been liberal on political reform and Tibet and related issues. In retrospect he was built up as even more of a liberal hero than was actually the case. In any event, Chinese intellectuals and students saw him as someone who was hopeful. They were unhappy to say the least about his having been sacked a couple years earlier, as well as the continuing lack of real political reform in China. Thus, starting relatively slowly but building up quickly, people reacted to his death by circulating poems and posters and wreaths to his honor, and people began to demonstrate in Tiananmen Square in relatively modest numbers. A state funeral was ordered for Tiananmen Square on April 22, the day Bette and I were leaving China, by coincidence. On that day there was a huge, very big crowd of roughly 100,000 people with the excuse of paying tribute to Hu but also beginning to demonstrate on behalf of greater freedom and democracy, against corruption, against nepotism, for better conditions in school and universities etc. We were reporting this fully, of course, but I felt as I left, although this was very significant obviously, I had no idea that it would mushroom and get to the point that it did. Let alone the massacre a couple of months later. Indeed Bette and I went on from China, had a stop in Singapore, and were invited to a private dinner around his pool by Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yu, who I had known favorably off and on. He asked me in this private dinner with all his leadership what was going to happen in China. I said that I thought it was significant, but controllable and manageable - showing how prescient I was.

*Q: Well, I think we really are talking about something that even at the time, to me it was fairly obvious as an unknowledgeable person about the thing, that this was something that a moderately apt leadership could deal with. You know, you see some people; you do some things. You could have turned this thing off.*

LORD: Absolutely. One reason I was so outraged by the massacre was that it was unnecessary. Particularly in the early part of this, the first couple of weeks, the actual requests by the students

and others were very modest, essentially to have a dialog with the government. There were some stunted dialogue with Li Peng and others, but basically they were not asking for anything revolutionary. There were occasional signs that were insulting, but basically it was obviously very peaceful. As I said earlier, no violent incidents or death in 49 days. And it was all walks of life so clearly it was important. A leadership that had its act together and was moderately inclined could have defused this thing. I remain convinced of that to this day. Obviously there was debate in the Politburo. They were paralyzed as to how to respond. There were those, probably Li Peng and some of the military from the beginning who felt that any demonstration however peaceful in the center of Tiananmen Square with all its history was either inherently dangerous or symbolically dangerous. They ought to squash it right away. There were others like Zhao Ziyang and some other generals including a former Minister of Defense who wrote to the leadership saying don't use force. They thought they ought to meet the students part way. They were paralyzed, and when Gorbachev came, they felt particularly insulted because they couldn't greet him at Tiananmen Square. They had to greet him at the airport. What was supposed to be a major rapprochement with Russia was overshadowed by the demonstrations. In front of worldwide media attention. That made them mad. They held off until Gorbachev's visit because they didn't want to make a big incident beforehand. They began to tighten the screws after that. The history is familiar to everyone. I don't have to go through it.

Personally, it turns out by coincidence my wife had to double back to China. A few months earlier when we knew we were leaving, Don Hewitt of 60 Minutes visited China and knew then that Gorbachev was coming in May to see the Chinese which was a major event that CBS and the other networks were going to cover. So, they asked my wife, knowing we'd be gone by then, whether she would come back and be a commentator on television on the Gorbachev visit, essentially giving background pieces on Chinese culture and history and so on. We checked this out carefully with the White House and the State Department to make sure there was no problem with the wife of a former Ambassador doing this. It was clear from the beginning that she wouldn't be identified as such. She would just be identified as a Chinese-American author. They said fine. We thought it would be a totally conventional nice puff piece type of thing, and she'd come back to China for that.

Well, by the time we left, this thing had heated up and CBS wanted her back right away. She had made the commitment, but she had no idea she would be covering such an historical event. So, after Singapore, she went back to China and I went back to the U.S. She was a commentator on CBS until late May when she left thinking the crisis was over. The numbers in the Square were dwindling, getting down to a few thousand. The authorities clearly could have declared victory and gotten out, but they wanted to move in a show of force. People know the history. She was there commentating almost every day, and she was there when the Chinese pulled the plug on the feed to CBS. She acted as interpreter for Dan Rather and stalled as much as she could until he got there; they did have to deal with him rather than a producer. She did a fabulous job as commentator, but always identified only as an author.

Meanwhile I went back to Washington and was deluged by the media once I left the State Department. I appeared on all the major TV, radio shows, in which I supported the Administration. In support of the demonstrations, I expressed the hope that the Chinese government would act with restraint and meet the students and other protesters halfway with

their reasonable demands, but of course, was very tough in my statements after the massacre. Having said that, I still felt we ought to stay engaged with China as I said in an earlier interview. Over the summer I wrote, and that fall, I published in Foreign Affairs magazine an article called "The Big Chill" which was very tough on the Chinese on Tiananmen Square and the lack of political reform, but also pointed out why political reform was in their self interest and not just a favor to us. Then I made the case that while pressing human rights we should continue to engage China and move ahead with the relationship.

As I have said elsewhere there were tremendous exchanges of delegations and visitors and negotiations and agreements throughout my period as Ambassador. We were lucky to have this positive window. Without trying to give an exhaustive list of any kind, let me give an example of a couple of months period. In the spring and summer of 1987 the following happened. These are just the major events, not Assistant Secretary and below level or other events. In a two to three month period we had a ministerial level meeting of the Joint Commission on Science and Technology; a visit by CINCPAC; a visit by former President Carter; a visit by the Attorney General, Ed Meese; Henry Grunwald, the editor in chief of Time magazine; Pam Harriman leading a delegation; Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor; Henry Kissinger; Charles Wick, head of USIA; Senator Cranston; several other congressional delegations; the U.S. Air Force Band; Ambassador Walters, our UN Ambassador; Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor; former Ambassador Anne Armstrong for security matters; Tom Brokaw in an NBC special on China; and a few other assorted events. This gives you an example of the kind of pace that we had and the interesting and positive exchanges.

*[Kennedy] Today is August 7, 1998. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is with us and will be asking some questions concerning filling in on China. Could you explain what the student demonstrations were, when they happened, and then how you dealt with them?*

LORD: We actually covered a great deal of that, but not with any great precision, partly because of my memory and partly because, by coincidence, I was actually in the United States at the time. So just to go over it and at the risk of some repetition I should say that at the end of 1986 there were demonstrations in Shanghai by students. As I recall, these dealt with the typical student issues of greater academic freedom, corruption, and inflation, probably political issues as well. These demonstrations were thought to have been partly inspired by Fang Lizhi and other scholars who were debating these issues at the time. As I recall, there was no bloodshed, but there were widespread demonstrations. I only remember their taking place in Shanghai. By coincidence, I was in the United States on vacation at the time. I kept in very close touch with this development in case it developed into something more serious.

However, what was most significant was the fallout in terms of Chinese domestic policy. Hu Yaobang was then Secretary of the Communist Party of China. He was known even then and, of course, has been known, in retrospect, to have been more progressive on political reforms than most Chinese leaders. As a result of these student demonstrations, there was debate in the Politburo of the Party on responsibility for the unrest. As a result, Deng Xiaoping sacked Hu at some point in the succeeding months.

We in the Embassy, of course, covered these demonstrations at the time as matters of great

significance. In retrospect, they were something like a tremor in advance of the earthquake in June, 1989, which none of us, as I've said elsewhere, would have predicted would occur on such a large scale. Again, as I recall, the earlier demonstration in 1986 was fairly peaceful.

Of course, the sacking of Hu Yaobang was very important because he was the heir apparent to Deng, as the Secretary of the Communist Party. Deng had already taken himself out of day to day operations, though he was still the number one person in China by far. There were several reasons for the sacking of Hu. First, Deng had always had a balancing act of including more progressive people like Hu and Zhao Ziyang in the leadership as well as more conservative people like Li Peng. Deng had to watch the balance. Deng himself may have felt somewhat vulnerable from the conservatives, because of the unrest. Therefore, he threw Hu to the wolves. We felt that that was one element in play.

Secondly, Deng was convinced, to some degree, of the dangers of liberalism. This was not just opportunism to protect himself. Deng had never been notably in favor of liberalization of the regime. He was very conservative on this front, even as he had been very receptive to economic reforms and on the opening to the outside world. Thus, Deng probably felt that Hu had gone too far. Deng himself had been concerned about the unrest. After all, he was Mao Zedong's right hand man in the anti-rightist campaign. He was to be, in fact, the author of the Tiananmen massacre.

Thirdly, Deng was probably a little uncomfortable with Hu's style. Hu was spontaneous and feisty and said what he believed. He was much more colorful and unpredictable than most Chinese leaders. This had led to some complaints among the Chinese leadership.

So I think that there was a mix of reasons for sacking Hu Yaobang. Also in the succeeding months, it was not just a question of sacking Hu; there was a general process of tightening up under way. As I said earlier, in this period of the late 1980s there was considerable discussion among academics, scholars, students, and writers, many of whom we met in the Embassy, and particularly through my wife's contacts as well as those of the Embassy, about political reform and about the need to open up on that front. There seemed to be more tolerance on these issues in China. So there was that kind of ferment at the time.

However, in the wake of these Shanghai demonstrations, not only was Hu sacked but they undertook some of these conservative, ideological campaigns. I believe that these campaigns included the "Four Cardinal Principles." Don't ask me to repeat these socialist tenets, but that was one thing that they did. There were also campaigns against spiritual pollution and bourgeois liberalization, guarding against peaceful evolution, which was their code word for Western and foreign ideas undermining Marxist and Communist political principles. There was a tightening up in the cultural field, as well, during this period. That campaign lasted for several months.

*Q: [Bernkopf] Could you say anything about what some American leaders thought about China, but not of other countries? I'm thinking particularly here about former Secretary of State George Shultz. Do you have any sense of what his views were and how important he thought China was, particularly in terms of China versus Japan?*

LORD: Yes. Secretary Shultz was clearly in favor of engagement with China. He recognized the strategic as well as the economic importance of dealing with China. He recognized that in the next century China will be increasingly important. He saw the impact of China on regional and global issues, as well as the very extensive, bilateral interests we had in China, including the economic area, which is of particular concern to Shultz. Like any responsible, American leader, he didn't like the Chinese political system and felt that human rights were a legitimate part of our agenda. However, he also didn't feel that the Chinese-American relationship should be held hostage to this issue. Therefore, he would raise it and we would raise it and press on it, even as we hoped for progress. We thought that this was in China's own self-interest, involving economic reform and opening up China to the outside world, with the U.S. and others encouraging this trend. We realized that we would have to move ahead with an imperfect regime because of our other interests to promote this broader agenda.

So I would say, in terms of the current debate, that now he should speak for himself. However, I believe that Shultz would be closer to the Bush and Kissinger viewpoint, and now the current Clinton viewpoint. He would differ from those in Congress who would attach a higher priority to the human rights dimension. He would not ignore human rights but he would stress the need for engagement with China.

*Q: [Bernkopf] He had trouble with other members of the Reagan administration over Iran-Contra issues. Was China ever such a contentious issue?*

LORD: I don't recall that China was ever an issue for debate during the Reagan administration during my time of service. There were periodic debates on China policy during the early part of this administration, which other persons can document. Reagan came into office as being pro-Taiwan and, obviously, a first-class anti-communist. Al Haig came in as Secretary of State, after having worked with Kissinger on the opening to China. He clearly pressed Reagan in a more positive direction. I am sure that there was a lot of debate in the Reagan administration over the Shanghai Communiqué of 1982, which defused the arms sales question. The Chinese put the heat on this issue during the early part of the first Reagan administration.

You will recall that around the end of 1985 I arrived in China as Ambassador, following my previous position as President of the Council on Foreign Relations. By the time I arrived in China, we had signed the 1982 Communiqué and President Reagan had been to China. He had spoken very firmly on values but also urged the development of the Chinese-American relationship. The atmosphere eased greatly, both in bilateral terms and even, to a certain extent, within China. By then there was unanimity within the Reagan administration on China policy, although there may have been some disagreement on particular, tactical issues or negotiations. However, on the general strategy of engagement, even though we kept in mind our values, I don't recall that there was any real dispute on China policy at any time.

*Q: [Bernkopf] I remember that I worked in the Department of State at that time. The way we described the Chinese-American relationship was that it had matured to a point where we anticipated that nothing could derail it again. So I think that this was a period of great optimism for those of us who were working on Chinese affairs.*

LORD: I think that, as I've said previously, it's not that we didn't have problems with Chinese policy, tough negotiations, or some problems with human rights in China or Tibet. However, on the whole, during this period we were greatly expanding our contacts and our constituencies regarding the relationship on both sides. There were high level visits and negotiations. So it was the most positive period in our relations from the Nixon opening right up to today.

*Q: [Bernkopf] Along those lines, and you may already have answered this question, but just to be specific, what was the attitude of Paul Wolfowitz, who has emerged more recently as a critic of Clinton administration policy toward China? I think that he left the Department of State in 1986 or 1987.*

LORD: He was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs during the first part of my tenure in China as Ambassador. Then Gaston Sigur was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs after that.

*Q: [Bernkopf] Could you talk about both of them in terms of their views on China and maybe then any differences in operating style?*

LORD: First, it's only fair that they speak for themselves, of course.

*Q: [Kennedy] I have interviewed Gaston Sigur but I haven't interviewed Paul Wolfowitz.*

LORD: Let me say right off, and this is not to show happy collegiality, that I don't recall any distinctive, real debates with Paul Wolfowitz or Gaston Sigur. Sometimes, Paul and I would tangle on personnel matters or things like that. However, I had very good relations with both Wolfowitz and Sigur. They are both very bright and both in favor of the opening to China. I think that both of them put a great deal of emphasis on geopolitical, security, and strategic aspects of U.S. relations with China, and not just the economic aspects. At the time the economic aspects were of growing importance but nowhere near as important as they are today. Both Wolfowitz and Sigur were concerned with human rights, but, again, although these were an important part of our agenda, they were not enough to hold up the development of our whole relationship with China. So I don't recall any significant differences with either one of them or with the views of either one of them.

I think that both Wolfowitz and Sigur were concerned at all times that we should not undermine Taiwan. I know that they were both firm on that front, as I was, as well. This is not a very interesting answer, but I believe that it is accurate.

*Q: [Kennedy] I don't recall your mentioning it but, for the record, I recall that both Wolfowitz and Sigur were Assistant Secretaries of State for East Asian Affairs.*

LORD: They were Assistant Secretaries of State during the first and second parts of my tenure as Ambassador to China.

*Q: [Bernkopf] Were there any significant differences between these two men in operating style that are worth noting?*

LORD: Nothing that really jumps out at me. They are obviously different personalities. Paul Wolfowitz is a more dynamic and blunt type. Gaston Sigur is more soft spoken and gentlemanly, but that doesn't mean that he doesn't have strong views. In terms of dealing with the Embassy in Beijing, on a day to day basis, and this is natural and correct, our work with the Department was most often either with the Country Desk or with the Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of Chinese Affairs, who in this case was J. Stapleton Roy, who did an outstanding job. He was a solid supporter, as I was of his in the mid-'90s when he was Ambassador to China and I was Assistant Secretary.

So, on a day to day basis, I would deal most often and directly with Stape Roy. This was only natural, as the Assistant Secretary himself has to cover the whole East Asian region. I dealt with Stape Roy more than with either Gaston Sigur or Paul Wolfowitz. I couldn't have had a better back up than Stape Roy, in terms of intelligence, loyalty, openness, and deep knowledge. In addition, I had very cooperative and solid backup in the Pentagon led by Rich Armitage, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. Jim Kelly, and others were also helpful. I would consult closely with all of them when I was home, and we all worked together very well.

*Q: [Bernkopf] You mentioned Taiwan. I just wanted to say, and perhaps this is the last thing I would want to mention, that this was the beginning of a period of tremendous change in Taiwan. That is, it was the beginning of the process of democratization and of real change. This was a change which, one can even argue, completely altered our perspective on Taiwan. Suddenly, Taiwan became what we always wanted it to be, with an open, democratic process.*

*How skeptical were people in charge in the State Department and you, as Ambassador to China, about these changes in Taiwan? How much of a surprise were they? How much of an impact did they make in terms of your view of the balance between China and Taiwan?*

LORD: I can't speak for others, but my own view was, first, that I was not skeptical of these changes in Taiwan. On the contrary, I was encouraged by the changes in Taiwan. Chiang Ching-kuo was followed as President of China by Lee Teng-hui.

Chiang Ching-kuo had started in the right direction. He was able to do that because he had the mantle of his father, Chiang Kai-shek, so he could hardly be accused of doing anything against him. In a sense, Chiang Ching-kuo opened doors on the political process. It was easier for him to do this because he was part of his family. Therefore, this protected him against opposition and legitimized the great, further steps that his successor, Lee Teng-hui, took. It also made it possible for someone born in Taiwan (Lee) to be the leader of the country. So, Chiang Ching-kuo's contribution was very significant. I forget when he died, but his contribution was very meaningful. Although they weren't close to open elections in Taiwan while I was Ambassador to China, the Taiwanese were clearly moving in the right direction.

I was not skeptical about the changes in Taiwan. I was encouraged. I also felt, even as I do today, that these changes, if not inevitable, were predictable. In my view we have seen economic progress in Asia and the aspirations of the middle class reflect the universal principle that man or

woman does not live by rice alone. This process has been at work in Taiwan as well.

I was consistently in favor of maintaining strong, unofficial ties with Taiwan and not giving in to unreasonable Chinese demands, even as we balanced off our interests with mainland China. So my own views certainly didn't change. I felt that we had a moral and historical connection to Taiwan in any event and that we should stand by our friends. If anything, of course, their movement toward a freer political system reinforced my view that we should strongly support Taiwan even as we moved ahead with China. I believe that six American presidents of both political parties have done very well in carrying out this balancing act.

I don't recall now the impact the changes in Taiwan had on China. These changes didn't affect our policy. We have pursued a consistent policy which had been set out by previous administrations, in which I served. Taiwan has always been a key issue with the mainland Chinese. There is no way that you could have a high level meeting with the mainland Chinese without the Taiwan question coming up.

My recollection of that period when I was Ambassador to China is that the Taiwan issue was not as hot as it is today or was, when we opened diplomatic relations with mainland China or during the early years of the Reagan Administration. The Taiwan issue was always there, but the mainland Chinese were already deploying troops away from the coast facing Taiwan and were concerned about the Polar Bear to the North [i.e., Russia] and the Vietnamese to the South. As I recall it, the rhetoric concerning Taiwan was obviously unpleasant but not at a very high decibel level. Taiwan was not an issue that they kept beating us over the head with at our various meetings. Taiwan has always been and will continue to be a key issue in our relations with China. However, I felt that throughout this period it was quite a manageable matter.

*Q: [Kennedy] I would have thought that you belonged to the Kissinger school of realpolitik. In this context Taiwan, as a rather small area, has really been screwing things up with China by doing exactly what we would want and would aspire to have them do. However, the gap between what Taiwan has been and what it is becoming has been growing. It's going to be harder and harder for the United States and the world to refuse to accord recognition to Taiwan. I would think that, in terms of policy planning and looking at the matter with the cold eye of what's in it for us, this, in a way, would be a disturbing development. Did you find this to be a consideration?*

LORD: No, not at all. I really felt that the changes in Taiwan were - and are - an encouraging development. They are good for the people of Taiwan. Initially, we didn't have as extensive a debate as we have had in recent years on universal versus so-called Asian values. This is a phoney debate and Taiwan's move toward democracy proves that. I think that these changes in Taiwan are not only good for Taiwan itself but are a good example generally in the world, in Asia, and to show that Chinese people want freedom, too - a strong message to the mainland.

I don't recall Congressional sentiment bubbling up about a need to be more pro-Taiwan and anti-mainland China because Taiwan was becoming freer, and mainland China wasn't. I don't think that the Taiwan issue really complicated our policy toward China while I was Ambassador. Above all, speaking personally, I've always set great store about promoting our values. I've been

insistent on that. Clearly, I also have geopolitical instincts since I worked for Kissinger and I think that these are legitimate. However, you have to balance off these considerations. My only reaction to these changes in Taiwan is a feeling of pleasure for the people of Taiwan. If anything, these changes might encourage political liberalization in China, at least in a modest way. Now of course you could argue that Deng Xiaoping and others who are more conservative might see developments in Taiwan as a threat to their position. However, I think that they were looking more particularly at what was happening in mainland China.

It is hard to judge the impact of what has been happening in Taiwan on the people in China. I suspect that Taiwan developments didn't have much of an impact on them in the past. You should recall that when I was Ambassador to China the authorities in Taiwan were loosening up, but they had by no means reached the point of free elections. So the situation in Taiwan had by no means approached the dramatic point which it reached by the early 1990s.

*Q: [Bernkopf] I would like to raise one more issue and that is the situation in Korea. This was also a period when the Chinese were moving toward developing diplomatic relations with South Korea. I was wondering to what, if any, extent the mainland Chinese have tried to bring the American Embassy into this process in terms of how you saw it and what you thought the implications were, as well as whether you worried about what the North Koreans would do in the event of normalization of diplomatic relations between China and South Korea.*

LORD: I would like to make a couple of comments on Korea. First, South Korean diplomacy was very skillful. Events started moving toward improved relations with China toward the latter part of my tenure as Ambassador to China. I think that in this context one of the key events was the Olympic Games in Seoul in 1988. Both mainland China and Russia agreed to attend the Seoul Olympic Games. The Eastern European countries agreed to attend as well.

Basically, by that time the economic performance of South Korea was terrific, and the poor economic performance of North Korea was becoming clear. South Korea was eclipsing North Korea after starting out, perhaps behind it in the 1950s or even in the 1960s. South Korea was being recognized by more and more countries. Sometimes this involved dual recognition and sometimes it involved recognition just of South Korea. In particular this involved communist countries. The Seoul Olympic Games brought a major breakthrough, both in terms of general prestige but also in achieving attendance at the games and furthering diplomacy behind the scenes with the Russians, the Chinese, and the Eastern Europeans. So this was just the beginning of the mainland Chinese exploring better ties with the South Koreans.

Both the mainland Chinese and the Russians were very careful about their North Korean flank at this point, although North Korea was clearly unhappy about mainland Chinese and Russian attendance at the Seoul Olympic Games.

The other side of this situation was that the U.S. was exploring improved contacts with North Korea as well, in close consultation with South Korea. My view is that South Korea ought to take the lead in this process. We had some initial contacts in Beijing through our political section. I believe that Ray Burghardt was the key contact with the North Koreans. These contacts never really got anywhere, but they were the first contacts that I can recall taking place. These

initial contacts probably took place in 1988, although I would have to check that.

On our way to the airport on April 22, our second faithful Chinese driver gave Bette and me a photo album of demonstrations for Zhou En-lai in Tiananmen Square in 1976, with preserved leaves included. He asked us to keep this gift secret. Our first driver (also for Bush) had been retired by the Chinese the year before. He cried on his last day. He died soon after. The Chinese didn't allow me to go to his funeral. For further personal accounts of our stay in China, I recommend "Legacies - A Chinese Mosaic" by my wife.

The day before I left Beijing (April 21), I sent a final cable which I personally drafted summing up the state of U.S.-Chinese relations. I enclose here the full text.

Farewell Cable From Ambassador Lord on April 21, 1989

From Ambassador Winston Lord to Washington and key posts.

Ref: Beijing 3855

1. (Confidential - Entire text.)
2. I depart Beijing tomorrow with both a solid sense of progress and an awareness of fresh challenges in the relationship between the United States and the People's Republic of China. These are the themes sounded in my farewell meetings with China's top leadership, notably an April 19 tripleheader with the President, the Premier, and the General Secretary. Much of the progress is due to world events, Washington policies, USUN efforts, the private sector or just plain serendipity. The Chinese, of course, have made their own great efforts. This embassy and our consulates, I believe, have also played their part. The challenges - and indeed some tension - will be perpetual as befits two such contrasting nations. But some of our new problems flow from past success. And they will be resolved or managed if the Chinese and we act wisely, recognizing that our common interests clearly outweigh our inevitable differences.
3. This message will focus on the concrete and programmatic in our bilateral relations. For my analysis of China's foreign policy and domestic scene, I refer the interested reader to the personal scenerunner I wrote for President Bush's February visit (reftel). In that paper, I stated that China was prospering in the world while floundering at home. There weeks from now Gorbachev and Deng will clasp hands. In a few hours as I head for the airport there will be a memorial service for Hu Yaobang near Tiananmen Square, filled for days with protesting students. Progress.
4. Since November 1985 Sino-American relations have greatly advanced and further matured. The foundations have been broadened and deepened in a wide variety of fields. Highlights and recommendations include the following.
5. Visits.

A steady two-way stream of high-level and working-level visitors, most notably President Bush,

has provided impetus, enriched perspectives, nurtured personal links, and strengthened domestic support for a positive relationship. Such exchanges, including distinguished private citizens, will remain crucial. In particular we should continue to encourage congressional delegations, given the many issues involving Capitol Hill.

#### 6. Political dialogue.

Our discussions with Beijing on international topics have changed the PRC position on Silkworms, generated greater Chinese responsibility on ballistic missiles, and substantially modified their approach to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. The Chinese, in turn, (along with Japan and South Korea) helped to improve our posture on the INF agreement. We have closely compared notes on the Soviet Union and provided mutual reassurance. We have enhanced collaboration or CONFIDENTIAL Section 02 10 Beijing 11017.

Comprehension in other areas such as Afghanistan, the Gulf War, and Korea, where the Chinese have facilitated our dialogue here with the North Koreans. The Chinese have somewhat moderated their Third World rhetoric and become more cooperative at the United Nations. They have relaxed their positions toward some of our friends, such as Israel and South Korea. On Central America Beijing has been more sensitive to our concerns and even tossed a bouquet at our latest initiative. We have successfully managed the Taiwan question.

7. In some areas, of course, it has been hard going or worse. Prominent examples include Tibet, population policy, and human rights generally. On others there are promising beginnings, such as dugs and arms control, or potential for initiating exchanges, such as on terrorism and the environment.

8. Overall, as the President and Chinese leaders recently agreed, we need to make our dialogue on international topics even more systematic at the working level.

#### 9. Economic cooperation.

Nowhere has our growth been more impressive. Annual trade has leapt 100 percent the past three years, exceeding \$14 billion in 1988. Agricultural sales have risen from negligible levels to \$1.2 billion this year. We are China's second largest export market and, with \$3.4 billion committed, the leading investing country. Our export controls on technology have been significantly eased in recent years and yesterday we reached agreement that will include China in our distribution system. We have continued to implement the trade development program, over 25 percent of whose budget has been dedicated to feasibility studies for major Chinese projects. During the past three years we have forged new agreements on civil aviation, taxes, textiles and maritime cooperation.

10. The record is mixed at best on other economic fronts. The investment climate has been substantially improved since 1985, symbolized by opening ceremonies I have attended ranging from one of the world's largest coal mines to the world's largest Kentucky Fried Chicken. But major obstacles and frustrations remain for American business. The current credit and liquidity crunch of domestic retrenchment is having a significant adverse impact. Longer term problems

include Chinese practices, soft loans from our competitors, and residual technology controls. We have gotten nowhere on a bilateral investment treaty. In the past year we have moved intellectual property rights from almost footnote status to the very top of our bilateral economic agenda. We have been intensifying our education campaign. The Chinese remain serious violators; and this issue could be among our most troublesome near-term problems in bilateral relations. We have consulted thoroughly on China's GATT application, but its trade reforms must be advanced in order to avoid a heavily safeguarded admission. We need to reinvigorate the JCCT and JEC. On the former we have now agreed with the Chinese to flesh out our proposal for working groups to effect more concrete progress.

#### 11. Science and technology programs.

Our thirty protocols constitute the largest bilateral program either country conducts. We face the continuing challenges to improve the balance of mutual benefits and the commercial applications. And we have correctly hinged the five-year renewal of the umbrella accord on satisfactory Chinese assurances on protection of intellectual property rights. After intensive negotiations we reached a major agreement on satellite launches with the Chinese which will marry Chinese rockets with American satellites on a case-by-case basis.

12. Our military ties have been substantially enriched over the past three years, notwithstanding a temporary pause induced by the missile issue. Virtually every top military leader on both sides has recently crossed the Pacific and a heavy schedule of further trips will unfold during the remainder of this year. Meanwhile working level delegations expand our professional links. One of the most dramatic events of my tenure was the first visit ever to the People's Republic by American naval ships in the autumn of 1986. A year later the U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds performed over Beijing. Earlier this month I saw off the first PRC warship ever to visit the West. More American vessels will steam into Shanghai while Gorbachev is in China, perhaps in Shanghai itself. We have been implementing \$800 million worth of defensive weapons sales and are exploring possible new items.

13. We will need to continue measuring our tread in our military cooperation. It projects useful symbolism and enlists constituencies in the PLA which could play a key role in Beijing's future orientation. But as China grows stronger, so will apprehensions among its Asian neighbors about its intentions and possibly our involvement.

#### 14. Educational and cultural exchanges.

These have mushroomed since 1985, due to one of the most fertile USIA programs anywhere and the proper, expanding, indispensable role of the private sector. American campuses welcome more than 35,000 Chinese students, over half of all those abroad. Increasing numbers of American students and teachers are coming to China, including 25 Fulbrighters at fifteen universities. The world's largest international visitors program has sent almost 300 present and future Chinese leaders to the U.S. VOA reaches and affects tens of millions of Chinese, from ordinary citizens to the highest leaders. We have recently installed a TVRO and are stepping-up direct trans-Pacific dialogue through WorldNet as well as placing programs on Chinese television. President Bush was the first foreign leader to address the Chinese people live on

television. I was the first American Ambassador to be interviewed on the Chinese screen (or, to introduce the “Barbarian” Superbowl). Our book program has translated and published fifty-nine titles on American life.

15. Especially young Chinese are beginning to appreciate our culture as well as our technology, thanks to a continual flow of American artists, performers, troupes and exhibits. These range from Ailey to Joffrey, Peck to Heston, Disney to the Redskins, “The Music Man” to the “Caine Mutiny Court Martial,” which is having a remarkable impact here.

16. We can never do enough in these areas. For our most profound challenges include promoting mutual understanding and reaching the younger generations of Chinese. Whenever I succumb to temporary pessimism about China’s future, I need only recall the warmth and enthusiasm in overflowing university auditoriums greeting Mrs. Lord and me - or, more accurately, America.

17. With occasional blips, cultural exchange has progressed despite the periodic clampdown on intellectuals and expression in China. A potentially dicey area is official nervousness about our access to campuses. If this translates into significant obstacles I believe we should consider reciprocal actions against Chinese diplomats in the U.S., while recognizing the dilemmas presented by our free society.

18. Three weeks ago I signed an exchange of letters which will pave the way for the first Peace Corps volunteers ever to serve in a communist country. This is the fruit of four years of strenuous effort. No fruit has tasted sweeter; few programs hold more potential for Sino-American friendship over the long term.

19. Working and living conditions.

Major improvements have lifted both morale and efficiency. Comprehensive reciprocity talks yielded good results on housing and travel, though we are now stalled on almost every front. The separation of negotiations on housing and selective retaliation hopefully will enable us to resume a positive course benefiting both sides. During the past three years we have built a snack bar, swimming pool, and tennis court as well as additional office space. We have moved the international school to spacious new quarters, allowing steady expansion. We have vastly improved our security posture but are still highly vulnerable on the technical side; we urgently need Washington funding to shore up our defenses. We have managed the burgeoning bilateral relationship sketched in this message with no net growth in our personnel ranks since 1985. Our future substantive performance would be enhanced, and our budget greatly reduced, if we required three year tours here of all but junior officers.

Challenges.

20. These areas illustratively document the basically sound and growing nature of our bilateral relations. Much more than in the 1970s this relationship now stands on its own, regardless of our changing ties to other nations. We have multiplied the constituencies on both sides of the Pacific which have a stake in positive bonds. When serious issues surfaced - such as missiles, expulsions, or satellites - each side strove to insulate frictions from the core of our relations, to

maintain overall momentum even as specific initiatives might be put on hold.

21. While we can therefore take comfort on broad foundations, we can hardly be complacent. Coming years will bring demanding tests we cannot now foresee: four years ago I would have been amazed if told that Silkworms, Tibetans and dissidents would cause more angst than Taiwan. Our most fundamental challenges, however, are already taking shape. I outlined these in my late 1988 San Francisco and New York speeches and in my farewell remarks these past few weeks. Current headlines symbolize the three broad areas: Gorbachev is coming to town; our traders and investors are being squeezed by retrenchment; and there is palpable Chinese nervousness about domestic dissent.

22. The political challenge.

The international framework for our bilateral relations is changing rapidly. The world of the 1970s has been radically altered; so has the world of the mid-1980s. Washington will have a more comprehensive view of this than those of us here. The underlying trends toward multipolarity and interdependence accelerate. The decline of Marxism and Stalinism, the spread of the market and democracy, are ever more apparent. The age of technology and information has already arrived. Gorbachev seeks to transform the Soviet Union, and Moscow's relations with the United States, China, Eastern and Western Europe dramatically evolve. (Can Japan be far behind?) China grows stronger and more assertive on the world stage.

23. We have coped reasonably well with the impact of these changes on our bilateral relations - whether concerning approaches toward Moscow, regional conflicts, missiles, or satellites. We have every reason to be positive. We can take in stride the coming media blitz over the Deng-Gorbachev summit. The history and geography of Sino-Soviet relations will not change, nor will their long border and overlapping ethnic populations. As the Chairman made amply clear to the President, China will need the United States to balance the Soviet Union - and Japan. China's overwhelming preoccupation with modernization must orient it toward the West for capital, management, technology and trade.

24. Our central task - for our China as for our global interests - is to act responsibly and purposefully around the world. So long as we do, our relations with Beijing should flourish. Early in the next century, when China can project its power and our Asian friends consequently project their concerns, we may have to review the bidding. But a stronger China is much more likely to be responsible - and responsive to us - if we have fully engaged it on international issues and participated in its development.

25. The economic challenge.

As our overall relationship with China matures, so must our economic ties. We have come a very long way from our mutual illusions in the early years after the opening. Our business people - eyeing China's size, population, natural resources, inexpensive labor and needs - held exaggerated visions of the huge China market. Many got burned. The Chinese, in turn, assumed that eager outsiders would pour capital and technology into this country. They were somewhat slow to recognize that they had to offer profits and compete with other markets for foreign

attention.

26. Both sides have learned a great deal, often at the cost of considerable frustration. Americans are more realistic about near-term gains and adept at trading and investing in this opaque and bureaucratic environment. Despite well-publicized setbacks, few have gone home. Most are playing for the long-run. And many success stories unfold unnoticed behind the media glare on problems.

Meanwhile the Chinese have substantially improved the investment climate, though its quality varies greatly from one province or city or sector to another. As a result our trade statistics have shot up dramatically the past few years. So have the number of investment projects, though the value remains modest.

27. We have only begun to tap the potential of our economic cooperation. The next two or three years will bring a substantial slow-down overall, and some backsliding in certain areas. The negative effects of the current retrenchment are already being felt. The Chinese clampdown on foreign exchange, credit, construction, and local autonomy will kill or delay many promising deals. One can only hope this period of tightening will be brief and that momentum toward reforms and the opening can be effectively regenerated. If China settles into long-run stagflation or, worse, reverses field back toward central planning and protectionism, then our commercial ties will be seriously affected. So in turn might the stability of China and its overall relationship with the West. I do not believe this will happen, but prudence suggests that it could.

28. Assuming we move through and beyond the retrenchment phase (as we have before), we will still face the more fundamental challenge of reconciling our two very different systems. The mutual imperative will be to loosen up and open up. The United States should increasingly “normalize” its economic relations with China as we have done on the political front. (See the recent Nicholas Lardy report published by the National Committee on U.S.-China relations). This requires further relaxation of strategic controls on technology, consistent with national security. Our anti-dumping approach toward China calls for revision. Protectionism in general needs to be resisted. And other steps, like unconditional MFN and GSP, should be considered in tandem with China’s willingness to free up its own system.

29. If we are to consider such movement on our part, the Chinese must take reciprocal actions. As China becomes more fully engaged in the world economy, it must assume a more open stance. If it wants to gain admission to the GATT, it must liberalize its trading regime. If it wants more technology, it must protect intellectual property rights. If it wants more investment, it must make it profitable. This imposing agenda will demand much of both sides, officials and entrepreneurs alike, during the coming years. The stakes, for our political ties as well as our commercial benefits, are very high.

30. The cultural challenge.

The newest, and perhaps most prickly, problem in our relationship flows from the intermingling of our societies and values. As with our other challenges, the stage has been set by success. The explosion in educational and cultural exchanges, most of it in the private sector, is a major

positive force. It enriches both our countries and greatly expands personal networks that will buttress our overall relationship in the future. But Chinese officials resist the intrusion of certain ideas. China has always been particularly wary of foreign cultural contamination, whether because of middle kingdom arrogance or its century long humiliation by foreigners.

31. Several factors have now joined to make the issue of human rights especially sensitive:

The serious economic and corruption problems that have surfaced since last summer have created disaffection among the people and malaise among the leaders. The latter currently place their premium on stability (as Deng and Zhao told the President). They see the free expression of ideas as leading to instability rather than helping them find answers to complex questions.

Dissident activity, traditionally restrained in China, is picking up, including the signing of petitions for amnesty for political prisoners.

As Deng fades from the scene, the jockeying for succession has intensified, adding to political tensions.

Thanks to Gorbachev's "Glasnost" political and cultural reforms in the Soviet Union have outpaced those in China. Chinese intellectuals and artists have been unfavorably comparing their lot with that of their Russian and Eastern European colleagues. Political developments in Hungary and Poland also have caught their attention. Meanwhile, Chinese leaders look with apprehension at the unrest in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe caused by political reforms.

We have made human rights a prominent part of our agenda with the Soviet Union and achieved some success. The American domestic audience has increasingly questioned the disparity with China. The question I have been most frequently asked in recent public appearances and backgrounders is why we practice a "double standard."

Tibet has emerged in the past one and a half years as a major human rights issue.

The question of U.S. funding for the UNFPA program will focus attention in coming weeks on China's population program.

The death of Hu Yaobang is fueling fresh demonstrations and protests as the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the May 4 movement looms.

32. Against this backdrop the Chinese are currently defining "stability" in very narrow terms, i.e., the suppression of dissent. So far the smothering of expression has been confined to the political arena and has not appreciably affected cultural life, but it would not be surprising to see it spread there as it has in past campaigns. During the past decade Beijing has generally affirmed that intellectual ferment and creativity was needed to help China find the answers in its perplexing quest for modernization. Political reform was needed alongside economic reform. "Let a hundred flowers bloom." These themes are largely absent today. To be sure, Chinese policies, even when misguided, on the whole show relative improvement. Dissidents are ostracized, or (sometimes) allowed to leave the country, rather than locked up. Continued

employment may be allowed even as Party membership is lost. But steam is building up in intellectual circles. Official nationwide campaigns are increasingly difficult to mount because the people won't support them. The Party's image continues to deteriorate. Cynicism is rampant.

There is a feeling that the CCP has lost its ideological bearings and flounders in uncharted waters.

33. It is arrogant for the outsider to judge how best China can balance progress and stability, how fast it can move toward a freer society. But we can hope that China will soon resume again the generally positive course it has pursued since reforms began; that Chinese authorities will make distinctions, for example, between free expression and instant multi-party democracy; that "stability" will be given a more sophisticated definition. For the long run I am hopeful, as younger generations - exposed to Western ideas - seize the reins.

34. For our part we will need to strike a balance in our human rights policy toward China, as we do elsewhere. We should project our values, maintain contact with activists, and register our disapproval concerning abuses. But we must also weigh our strategic, political, economic and other interests. We must employ approaches - sometimes public, sometimes symbolic, often private - which can have a positive impact on China's future course, not just make us feel good.

35. We should maintain an appreciation of the awesome challenges China faces as it seeks to move from one century to another, from one system to another, in a few short decades. We need to have some sense of what is feasible, either in terms of pace or cultural context. We should use carrots as well as sticks, welcoming positive moves and helping the Chinese to develop a legal framework for human rights. We should keep an eye on overall trends, not merely take snapshots.

36. We can hope, but should not expect, other democracies to make human rights a multilateral issue, not just a Sino-American bilateral one. The recent European posture on Tibet has been helpful, but our allies in Europe and Asia will generally let us take the lead - and take the heat. The Soviet Union will try to exploit this issue to its advantage. Some Chinese leaders will be prone to contrast Soviet restraint with American meddling.

37. The Feng Lizhi banquet incident was an unfortunate but minor blemish which did no damage to the relationship. But it was a harbinger of serious tensions to come in the human rights arena. As time passes from the wisdom of our symbolic gesture will be increasingly clear. The Chinese were entirely to blame for their needless escalation. They are geniuses at making foreigners feel guilty and dividing them. One very important lesson to be learned from this episode is not to let them succeed.

## Conclusion

38. I am delighted with President Bush's appointment of Jim Lilley as my successor. His broad experience, outstanding career, and closeness to the President make him a superb choice to strengthen our relations with China. I will do all that I can to help him.

39. I conclude with expressions of gratitude to the following:

President Regan for having appointed me.

Those in Washington who have supported me and our mission in China.

The members of this embassy and our consulates during my three and one half year tenure for their talents and their tenacity in the pursuit of excellence. Overall they have formed the best overseas team I have seen in decades of service.

40. For Mrs. Lord and me it has been a joint venture and a joint adventure.

Lord.

End of message

*Q: [Kennedy] In the first place, could you explain what you had been doing and how you were tapped for this job of Assistant Secretary of State? It was under a completely different administration and so forth.*

LORD: I put together some notes on this and some dates. I left China as Ambassador on April 22, 1989. It was one week after the Tiananmen demonstrations began. It was the date of the funeral of Hu Yaobang. There was a major turnout for the funeral, which perhaps 100,000 people attended.

On my way back to the United States I stopped off in Singapore and had a small dinner with Lee Kuan Yew. I brilliantly predicted that the demonstrations in China, although very important, were manageable by Beijing, as far as I could tell. Even then I was not aware of the magnitude of what was coming.

I got back to the U.S. and spent a lot of time on television and with the radio and print media. Did we cover this?

*Q: [Kennedy] I'm not sure, but go ahead.*

LORD: I spent a lot of time with the media, commenting on unfolding events in Tiananmen Square, even as my wife had circled back to China as a commentator for CBS Television. This is probably repetitious. I'd better get it straight.

*Q: [Kennedy] You talked about her role.*

LORD: She was recruited for commentary on Gorbachev's visit to China by Don Hewitt of "60 Minutes." I'm pretty sure that we've been through all of that. Then we went out to Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for three months. During this period my wife wrote a book called "Legacies," which was another best seller, I might add, and chosen by Time magazine as one of the 10 outstanding books of the year. It covered true stories of her family and Chinese of all walks of life, set

against the backdrop of Tiananmen Square.

I wrote a long article for "Foreign Affairs" on China policy, looking to the period "Beyond the Big Chill" and the impact of the Tiananmen Square events. In effect, I was very tough on the Chinese regarding the Tiananmen Square incident and on human rights in general. I also made a strong pitch that we had to stay engaged with China and get through this period. That article was published in the fall of 1989.

*Q: [Kennedy] I wonder if you could explain how you perceived the role of articles in "Foreign Affairs" magazine at this particular time, because this is important. How were articles like this used within the foreign affairs establishment?*

LORD: Keep in mind that I had been the President of the Council on Foreign Relations, which publishes "Foreign Affairs," although the magazine itself is independent of the Council. In fact, to demonstrate that, William P. Bundy, who was the editor of "Foreign Affairs" during most of the time that I was President of the Council, once rejected an article by David Rockefeller, who was then Chairman of the Council's Board of Directors. That demonstrated the real independence of the magazine. To Rockefeller's credit, he never took it out on Bill Bundy. In fact, he admired him for his courage, if not his judgment.

So I think that it's fair to say that, although sometimes people leave copies of "Foreign Affairs" on their coffee tables - the magazine was not as sprightly as it is today - nevertheless, it is among the elite publications reviewed by members of the think tanks, Congress, administration, and media. It is purely concerned about foreign policy and probably has about as much influence as any one magazine can have. It published the famous "Mr X" article on containment [in 1947] by George Kennan. It has published many other distinguished articles.

So I felt that my article and its placement were important in terms of the debate on U.S.-China policy in the wake of Tiananmen Square. Given my credentials and long involvement with China and having just been U.S. Ambassador to China, I felt that this was an appropriate time to set forth my views on the current situation in China.

The article had two elements to it. I was much tougher than the Bush administration on Deng Xiaoping and what the Chinese were up to. Then, having established my credibility on that front and saying that human rights are still very important, I then went on to say that we have great stakes in a better relationship with China. I said that we have to get beyond the big chill in our relations with China. I laid out the reasons for the broad agenda we have with China as we look to the future. I needed the space that a long article like that could give me. I had time to think about this subject when we were out in Jackson Hole, Wyoming, so I put a lot of care into the article.

I checked the article out with Dick Solomon, a predecessor as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, and the administration, without giving him or them any veto on its content. I didn't expect him to make any changes but I wanted to make sure that I didn't have anything inaccurate in the article. I welcomed his views, as an old colleague, going back to the Kissinger days and in recognition of his qualifications as a scholar on China. As I recall, Dick Solomon

had some helpful suggestions to make on the article, although they were not really of major significance. He was not uncomfortable about the article. It had not been my purpose as to whether he was uncomfortable with it. I wanted to be sure that I had not left anything out of it or made any inaccuracies. I also believe in the principle of not blindsiding colleagues, especially old friends and coworkers.

I can't judge how much impact the "Foreign Affairs" article had. However, I felt that it was important to express my views.

*Q: [Kennedy] Do you think that this article was picked up by people who eventually were going to form the Clinton administration?*

LORD: No. This article appeared in the fall of 1989, about three and one-half years away from the entry into office of the Clinton administration. The article was very strong on human rights in China. I note that in succeeding years there were increasing charges that President Bush was too soft on China or that China was too nasty in the field of human rights. The article also had a lot of emphasis on maintaining our engagement with China. I have no way of knowing whether the article had any influence on those who read it. Probably, Warren Christopher read the article. He was to be Secretary of State during the first Clinton term as President. He had been a member of the Board of the Council on Foreign Relations. Probably Tony Lake (to be NSC Advisor) and others in the Clinton administration read it, too. We can come back to this matter later.

During this period I wrote some Op Ed pieces [articles which appear on the page opposite the editorials in some newspapers]. I kept in touch with the media as a commentator on China in particular. I testified before Congress on occasion, essentially on China. I was deposed and testified at some length on the POW/MIA [Prisoner of War/Missing in Action] issue in Vietnam. I believe that I testified on this matter in the summer or fall of 1992. I gave lengthy testimony on the Vietnam Peace Agreement [of 1973], with emphasis on the POW/MIA issue, before Senator John Kerry, Senator Smith, and others. As I said, I gave speeches, either for money or pro bono. I joined the Board and became Vice Chairman of the International Rescue Committee [IRC], the largest, non sectarian organization which both helps refugees abroad and resettles them in the U.S. A few years later, I became co-chairman of the IRC. I became a member of the Board and then Chairman of the National Endowment for Democracy, which promotes freedom and democracy around the world. I was an active member of the Council on Foreign Relations and also worked on projects in other think tanks. I was a member of other groups, like the Trilateral Commission, and on the Board of Advisors for the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. I have cited other affiliations elsewhere.

Then, for about a year or a year and a half I worked for and with Ambassador Morton Abramowitz, who was then President of the Carnegie Endowment, on a major, national commission on U.S. foreign policy, in the wake of momentous events, including the move toward freedom in the world, globalization, and all of the other elements that you are familiar with. I was Chairman of this Carnegie Endowment's National Commission on America and the World, which put out a report on foreign policy in 1992, looking to the time when the next administration would enter office. This job took up a great deal of my time. This Commission was a very distinguished group. We can go into more detail on it at some other point, if you like.

So I kept up my interests, my work, and certainly my visibility on foreign policy, including on China.

**ROBERT GOLDBERG**  
**China Affairs, Mongolia Desk Officer**  
**Washington, DC (1986-1988)**

*Mr. Goldberg was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland and educated at Gettysburg College and the University of Chicago. He accompanied his Foreign Service wife on her assignment to Tokyo before entering the Foreign Service in 1983 as Foreign Service Officer. A Chinese language specialist, Mr. Goldberg served both in the State Department of State in Washington, DC and abroad dealing primarily with Economic and Chinese affairs. His overseas posts include Tokyo (as spouse), New Delhi, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Beijing, where he served twice, once as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Goldberg was interviewed by David Reuther in 2011.*

*Q: The next job that you get in the summer transfers of 1986 is the China Desk, EAP/CM [Office of China, Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asia Pacific Affairs]. How did you get that job out of the OpsCenter?*

GOLDBERG: Well, I knew Dick Williams who was then the desk director. I also knew Chris Szymanski who was Dick's deputy. I went down and interviewed with them. I interviewed for a couple of other jobs – including the Japan desk - but I want to get back into China. So I decided on the China desk, but did not get the specific on the desk that I really wanted - the external political job. That went to Ken Jarrett - a good friend whom I met when I was on the desk. We subsequently served together a couple of times in Beijing - in the late 90s – and then Ken was CG [Consul General] in Shanghai when I was CG in Guangzhou. Probably the better person got the job. They ended up offering me one of the econ jobs on the desk, and there were at that time two econ officers and a deputy director for economic affairs whose job, the first year I was there was Joan Plaisted. She later became Ambassador to the Marshall Islands and continues to do some stuff for EAP, including, for a number of years, the EAP coordinator at the UN.

The other person on the desk who was a real economist - also named Robert Goldberg. The two "Bobs." And lots of confusion. When people called up and asked for Robert Goldberg, they would ask either for the trade Robert Goldberg, or the investment and science and technology Robert Goldberg. Even then people were talking about a bilateral investment treaty. I noticed just the other day the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, Dave Camp asked why we hadn't negotiate a bilateral trade and investment treaty with the Chinese. And at that point, in 1986, the Chinese were also starting to make a major commitment to the design and operation of the Three Gorges dam. There were discussions about the role that the Army Corps of Engineers might play.

But it wasn't as interesting or fulfilling a job as I thought it might be, and so I took on a couple

of other things. I was my default choice as control officer on the desk when Winston Lord who was Ambassador in China would come back and for Peter Tomsen who was Win's DCM. Also I assisted in putting together books of briefing papers for seventh floor principals who were heading out to China. Standard grunt work that any junior officer does, and I was of course a relatively junior officer. But you learn a lot. You learn about the Department clearance process, which still remains overly cumbersome as far as I'm concerned. You learn about what seventh floor principals need. Control work of that sort has not changed terribly much over the last 25 years. I liked it because it kept me busy when so few of my own issues were in limbo. It was an opportunity to learn from some more experienced professionals.

*Q: Now the Embassy was reporting at great length at this time on China's economic reforms. Who was following that, and what was the view in Washington of how China was doing?*

GOLDBERG: The three of us, Joan, Robert, and myself would follow those issues. Others on the desk – and elsewhere in the interagency community – were far more interested in the political dynamics of what was happening. Even then, we were trying to engage the Chinese in broader strategic discussions about what was happening in East Asia. You have to recall that this was a key period of political reform in China – many analysts thought party reform was inevitable. Not that China would be democratic, but it would have a different system out of necessity, i.e., giving a voice to those who had none. The DOD had a very wide-ranging series of discussions with the Chinese, which led us to consider selling advanced weapons systems to the Chinese. All that was brought to an end, that sense that China was moving in a direction that would converge with U.S. interests, in Tiananmen in June 1989. And our discussions haven't again approximated the sense of possibility that existed in the relationship in the late 1980s.

Anyway, we did look very carefully at issues of economic reform. The desk is fundamentally operational. We do briefings, which are more descriptive than analytical. We might do analysis if they ask, but for the most part, writing about, thinking about economic reform, those were still being done in places like INR, the [Central Intelligence] Agency, which has a pretty good cadre of analysts; although today they seem to be younger and younger and lasting for a shorter period. I think that is probably just my old age talking.

I think the important take away here is that there was a sense of possibility in the relationship, a sense of not operating on parallel tracks, but in a way that suggested there was an increasing convergence.

*Q: Now the Assistant Secretary for Asia Pacific at that time was Gaston Sigur. How did the front office look to the China desk? Were they particularly interested? Who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary that your desk was reporting to, the atmospherics at that point.*

GOLDBERG: The key person really was Stape Roy. Everybody admires and respects Stape for his analytic skills. Stape was not a mentor to me, but I have always considered him one of those legendary figures in the Foreign Service. He knew how to get things done; he got them done in ways that did not leave ill feelings behind. If you went up against Stape and you had a counter argument, you not only had to have all of your facts straight, you had to have enough allies to carry the day. Very rarely did it happen to Stape.

*Q: What kinds of issues would come up in this way?*

GOLDBERG: At this point in the Reagan administration, the central policy conundrum was how far did you go in terms of working with the Chinese. As I said, for most people who focused on China in my generation, the sense of possibility lasted until Tiananmen or a bit earlier, with the demonstrations that took place in China in February, March, April of 1989, when the first President Bush went out there. We kept asking and Stape kept asking: to what extent are they changing. How much reform is actually going on; what can we do to move China in the right direction – probably not the best question since China was going to move in a direction of its choice. The real difference of opinion at the time was the pace – accelerate or keep it steady - and what we actually thought we might be able to accomplish.

*Q: In the 1980s the administration as a whole, and the Department in part, started to become distracted with Iran/Contra scandal. So I would suspect that decisions on China policies floated down to Stape's level and Gaston's.*

GOLDBERG: But we did have the sense that we had good and experienced who could handle those issues.

*Q: At the time you were on the desk here from 1986 to 1988, did any particular Taiwan issues of note arise?*

GOLDBERG: I mean Taiwan was always an issue in terms of Taiwan lobby. Arms sales were a perennial. Some still thought of Taiwan as an unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Pacific, so if our China relationship did not work out, we could always use Taiwan as a bulwark against a resurgent mainland. During the time I was on the desk, until in the early 80s, Taiwan was not front and center in U.S. relations with China. Of course, the Chinese were disappointed over continuing arms sales, and I can't believe they ever really expected that arms sales would "wither away" so to speak. There were similar threats similar to the ones we see today in the aftermath of arms sales where the mil-mil relationship is downgraded.

*Q: Now you are describing the desk as very operational. During this period, were there any particular Chinese delegations you got involved with or major U.S. delegations going out to China?*

GOLDBERG: Someone looking at papers that are being thrown away on the desk or archived is a better person to answer that question. It's one thing to put together books as a low level junior functionary, another to be asked to do high -level briefings. Delegation handling was at several levels above my pay grade as a relatively junior officer.

*Q: Did you have any frequent contacts with the Chinese Embassy?*

GOLDBERG: It was very different Embassy at that point. They didn't socialize aside from the sort of holiday events they might have – a national day or army day, for example. Chinese diplomats were less outgoing, less confident about their ability to interact. Few officials at my

rank did any outside activities. It really wasn't until the mid to late 90s that the Chinese started coming out of their shell a bit. Some of it is recognition that they had to do things differently so there would be lunches with political counselors, DCMs with the Assistant secretary, Deputy Assistant Secretary and ambassador with his counterparts. At the time, the Chinese really pretty much kept to themselves.

*Q: My impression was that they were pretty thin on English speaking officers too.*

GOLDBERG: That is a very good point. The more experience that they have had over the last decade or so, the better the overall officer corps has become. I think they took a leaf out of what other Asian countries like the Japanese and the Koreans have done, sending their junior officers off for training abroad after doing language training at their Foreign Languages Institute. So they are more professional today and better educated and more confident in their interactions with us. As either deputy or as desk director, I would see my counterparts on a fairly frequent basis, not just when they came in to demarche on an issue that was contentious. Over time, the Chinese became more relaxed with regard to demarches, and they started doing them over the telephone rather than schlepping all the way from the Embassy to the Department. On the most consequential matters, however, they always insisted on coming in.

GOLDBERG: I was preparing to go to Taiwan in the summer of 1989 for a year of language study, but before that June 4 Tiananmen took place and I spent about a month on the Tiananmen task force group, doing talking points, drafting papers, and stuff. Dick Williams, the Chinese desk director, was the director of the Tiananmen task force group and again was my boss when we finally got to Hong Kong.

*Q: What was the job of the task force?*

GOLDBERG: Basically to provide real time information on what was happening in China. The task force started as a small working group and grew, as we sought not only to brief principals but to account for all Americans in China at the time. We kept asking where do we go from here. I recall Jeff Bader who was the deputy director on the China Desk at that time putting together a paper about actions we could take to show the Chinese how serious we were about condemning the massacre – that's what we called it then and some people still do today – in Tiananmen. So we adopted sanctions that we thought would be short-term, but which – in a number of cases like riot control equipment – exist 22 years later and limit some of the things we could do to enhance bilateral cooperation. Tiananmen had a negative impact on a whole generation of China specialists such as myself, but we understood right away that we needed to find a way to talk with one another. For the Chinese, the conversation was often when are the sanctions going to be lifted. For us, it was seeking an accounting for those who had died during this period.

*Q: Who manned the task force when it was going?*

GOLDBERG: Dick and Jeff were the day-to-day leads, with Stape, who was still EAP DAS at that time. As in other task force groups, we had consular affairs officers engaged to respond to American citizens, military coordinators who needed to plan in case something of a more serious and ominous nature occurred. But for the most part it was EAP and the China desk that staffed

the task force. I was really an add-on. I had some time in between the end of the Econ course and the time we departed for Taiwan for language training. It was a good experience in terms of crisis management.

*Q: Your next assignment is to Chinese language training, but my recollection is you only go to language training if you are already assigned to a slot. So you had already been assigned to Con Gen Hong Kong.*

GOLDBERG: Well I had studied Chinese before, but as I liked to say I was such an outstanding performer at the Stanford Center so many years ago, that one and all recognized how helpful it would be to have another year. And it was helpful in terms of doing my job in Hong Kong – that was one of the two slots in the mainland watchers unit. That unit was eliminated when Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997 and we lost a significant amount of contacts that were helpful in rounding out our analysis of what was going on in the mainland. During the year in Taiwan, I had four or five hours of class a day and then three or four hours of study - listening to tapes, reading articles and things like that. It was a very good program. Tom Madden was the director of the language center at that time and is today director of the program in Beijing.

*Q: In the early days of the relationship with China the hope was we would establish a number of consulates and if we are going to man all those consulates we are going to need a large Chinese-speaking cadre so the number of people going through the program by the 80s grew steadily. How big was your class, do you recall?*

GOLDBERG: I don't think it is more than 20-25. We actually had a couple of people from other countries there. One Australian and one Brit, and we had people from other agencies who were not going to serve in China. So the total number who were going to be doing China-related jobs was probably 15 or 16.

*Q: In the early days of FSI in Taipei there was always a concern that when they taught simplified characters used on the mainland this would present a political problem on Taiwan. Had that sensitivity been resolved?*

GOLDBERG: More or less. When I started learning Chinese in Taiwan, I studied traditional characters, so my reading was always better than my spoken ability. For me the trick was matching the simplified and the traditional. On Yangmingshan, which is where the language school is, outside of Taipei, we had access to simplified character articles and books and we were able to take them home and read them. My wife was also a language student for the year. It was a very demanding year as you know from having studied difficult languages.

*Q: Part of the curriculum at FSI was field trips from time to time. Did they still do that?*

GOLDBERG: We didn't really do field trips. We did practicums. Those were practical exercises where for a month, usually December and into January, you would find an activity and you would work in a company or an NGO. I had met someone, a Chinese American, who worked at Metropolitan Life and so I worked at MET Taipei for a month. One of the things they wanted me to do was to help edit English language versions of Chinese language reports. So I was able to

use my reading ability to check and polish translations – all in a Chinese-language speaking environment where you picked up a lot of street talk. My wife worked at an NGO that was involved in historical preservation. She had less of an English language component to her practicum than I did. Her association with that group was deeper and more meaningful and longer lasting than mine was with MET. I found it refreshing to get out of the classroom, take a bus, walk around, meet a lot of different people. A lot of the people I worked with were quite generous because their English was far better than my Chinese but they were willing to help educate me.

*Q: Excellent. Who else was with you in the class?*

GOLDBERG: Steve Young who is currently Hong Kong Consul General, which is chief of mission status. Steve Schlaikjer, who subsequently was econ counselor in Beijing and my boss on the China desk when I was the deputy for econ affairs, one of my many incarnations there. Mort Holbrook a good friend who was consul general in Shenyang for three years and with whom I have stayed in contact for many years.

*Q: While you are in language training changes are taking place in China. You have got Tiananmen Square, the European and American reaction. Scowcroft makes two trips to China to try and coordinate how the two countries are going to work their way out of this. So by the time you are in Hong Kong then as econ officer, Hong Kong reporting is probably pretty important to try and figure out what is happening in China at that time from let's see, you probably arrived in June of 1990.*

GOLDBERG: That sounds about right, June or July 1990. My predecessor was Bob Wang who was my successor in Beijing as DCM and who is there now. That is an interesting story in itself. Scott Bellard was the senior China Watcher. I worked for him; and Gil Donahue was the political/econ chief. We didn't have that many people doing reporting. Starting in the mid-80s, much of what was coming out of Hong Kong was commentary on what was going on in the mainland – we weren't first with the story, but we were pretty good at providing texture to the story.

I had some interesting contacts. The most interesting one was the secretary general of Xinhua, the news agency which was running Hong Kong for Beijing. He was reputed to be China's spymaster in Hong Kong. At my first meeting with him, he came right out and said, "A lot of people think that I am a spymaster. That is not the case." These meetings were always very interesting because he spoke in a very thick Cantonese accent which was very hard for me to understand, so he brought along a very polished person whose mandarin was impeccable and who at times had to translate from accented Cantonese Mandarin into Mandarin and occasionally slip in an English word. A lot of the work I did wasn't really mainland watching per se but was looking at the mainland's penetration of Hong Kong. So I did a series of reports on mainland companies in Hong Kong and what they were actually there to do. We had the ability to actually go in and talk with directors in the companies. Scott and I would go out together and meet with people who traveled to the mainland frequently and wrote prolifically like Willy Wo Lop Lam and Ching Chung. Ching had been red guard cultural revolutionary in Hong Kong, and he was then editor of one of the more interesting magazines being published there. He was subsequently

arrested on the mainland for spying or getting access to information that he shouldn't have. I guess he was imprisoned for three or four years.

*Q: We were talking about contact work. Contact work is the bread and butter of any post overseas. When you arrived did you have a hand off with your successor?*

GOLDBERG: Bob Wang was very generous in terms of introducing me to a lot of his contacts. I understood these people had their own agendas in terms of dealing with us, and one in particular was kind of interesting, given his association with Wang Yungching of Formosa Plastics who was thinking about building a major plastics project in Fujian province. I spent a year or so meeting with this guy every couple of weeks to talk about what was going on. That project never came to fruition.

Another major area of interest was what the Taiwanese in Hong Kong were up to and how they were facilitating economic contacts on the mainland. I was close to people who in Taiwan business associations in Hong Kong and spent a fair amount of time chatting them up. At that point Hong Kong was also moving all of its textile factories to the mainland and the Taiwans were cooperating with Hong Kong companies to access mainland labor, land etc. We couldn't compete with what was being churned out on the mainland, but we had some significant areas where we could make a contribution in terms of understanding south China economic integration.

We talked with a lot of American companies as well. The Amcham or American Chamber in Hong Kong was a very important window for many American businesses seeking access to the China market.

*Q: You were saying that the Chinese companies were coming in to Hong Kong. Was this also the time that Chinese provinces set up offices?*

GOLDBERG: Oh sure. Some of them had been set up before I got there, so I spent a lot of time with Guangdong and Guangzhou company enterprises, Fujian and Fuzhou enterprises; provinces and cities I traveled widely in when I was Consul General in Guangzhou. These companies were pretty successful in Hong Kong. None of them could compete with China Resources or China Merchants that had been in Hong Kong for many years.

*Q: My impression was that one of the reasons for having the provincial offices in Hong Kong was to begin to educate the provinces in what was available and how the trading/capitalist system worked.*

GOLDBERG: You would like to think that was the case. Maybe it was, but when I would have conversations with these companies it was all about the deal and about the money. Twenty years on, there is obviously a lot more sophistication about how you talk about these things. But 20 years ago, we were dealing with a lot of fairly unsophisticated people who clearly didn't understand how markets worked.

*Q: Now were you there when Deng Xiaoping made his southern trip which is always described*

*as the first time that reform had gotten back on track.*

GOLDBERG: Yeah, I was in Hong Kong. Anytime Deng appeared somewhere and made pronouncements, it was noteworthy and you took a close look at it. We talked with our contacts in Hong Kong and their message was: watch this page carefully and see what happens.

*Q: Could you give a broad brush coverage of the depth and breadth of the contacts you were meeting with during your time there?*

GOLDBERG: Well, as I said, Chinese companies based in Hong Kong were a very significant part of the portfolio. The Taiwan companies and Taiwan associations gave us some pretty good insight into what eventually became a major concern of the Taiwanese companies and the Taiwan government's concern about the hollowing out of Taiwan's manufacturing. Before I even started my job at the Hong Kong consulate, after language class was over and before my family was settled, I went back to Taiwan for three weeks and did a paper on Taiwan companies going to the mainland; I met with a lot of the companies that I subsequently dealt with in Hong Kong. Contacts that I first made in Taiwan carried over to the mainland. There were obviously American business companies with which we talked. We always went to the left leaning magazines because they were far better than the right leaning magazines on mainland policy. We would see Wen Wei Bao journalists who were mainland directed. We also talked with Ming Bao reporters who were pretty objective. Apple Daily was pretty good but reported a lot of rumors that were made up out of whole cloth. Then I made several trips to Guangdong Province and Fujian.

*Q: Now when was that? When did you do that trip?*

GOLDBERG: The first one was in 1991 and took several days. The second in 1992 sometime. The 1992 trip was from one side of the Pearl River delta trip to the other, from Zhuhai up to Guangzhou and then to Shenzhen. Nowadays you can drive from Shenzhen to Guangzhou in three hours or take the train to Hong Kong in 2 ½ hours. The highways and the infrastructure are superb today, obviously designed so manufacturers can get their goods to ports or railroad stations.

The 1991 trip actually was more important than the 1992 trip because I met someone at the Taiwan Center at Xiamen University who put me in touch with the Xinhua source that was so important in my reporting.

*Q: And I would think the PAO has another set of contacts with journalists, movie...*

GOLDBERG: Absolutely. Later on as we moved closer to reversion, decisions were made that the real value-added in Hong Kong was the story of emerging Hong Kong democracy and Hong Kong's ability to retain its independence.

*Q: When did the reversion discussion start? I forgot.*

GOLDBERG: The British discussions? In the early 80s. The final decisions were made in the

mid-80s. The Brits had always sent out as Governor of Hong Kong a Mandarin type who had significant China background. When we got there David Wilson was the senior British official, and then the last year I was there Chris Patton arrived and totally changed the conversation with the mainland. You may recall Patton saying he would not go to Beijing before he gave his state of the Colony or State of Hong Kong address and that really angered mainland officials. It took them a long time to get over it. They saw Patton as a latecomer who after a hundred years of British rule in Hong Kong was now insisting that Hong Kong deserved more democracy. The Chinese accused him of being anti-Chinese.

Patton rarely backed away from his efforts at pushing the envelope on democracy. I went as note taker to Dick Williams, our Consul General, on his first interview with Patton. It was fascinating. You were just bowled over by the intellect of Chris Patton, and Patton was happy to talk – and be admired. He was probably as smart as he thought he was, but he could have done a better job of stroking Chinese sensibilities. Regrettably, Patton didn't do that. I saw Chris Patten one other time, again as a note taker for some delegation. They too bought into the Chris Patton line about democracy and how we had to further democracy in the run up to reversion.

*Q: The Chinese thought they were inheriting a colony and Patton turned it into a Trojan horse.*

GOLDBERG: The Chinese thought that the “one country two systems” was the solution to all ills. And I think they understood that they approached reversion, people would recognize the need to accommodate Beijing's needs and requests and they would even start self-censoring so Beijing did not have to do it itself. But the couple of times I had serious discussions with people in Hong Kong after I left, they told me that they were wary of discussing their private worries publicly.

Many Chinese we talked to saw a British betrayal of an implicit contract with Beijing – to be stewards of Hong Kong and turn it over pretty much as it was, not with a fervor for promoting democracy over the last four years before reversion. You have to remember David Wilson and the people who preceded him were well acquainted with China's way of doing things and were just in a waiting pattern for reversion. Patton's mission was different; it was how do you provide some sort of representative government infrastructure that allows the people of Hong Kong to have a voice. It was too late. It really was; it was far too late. Again, I think the Chinese believed Patton did not understand China's broader national interests. Part of that was the desire for one China, two systems to work and be seen in Taiwan as a way of eventual reunification.

*Q: Now you were in Hong Kong and the administration in Washington changes. Did that have any particular impact on staffing or...*

GOLDBERG: No, not really. Staffing wise we have always had a professional as the consul general in Hong Kong. When Dick Williams left, Richard Mueller came in as consul general, but I was there for only a couple of months before heading back to the states. Everyone was thinking about what size staff and what issues we needed to consider with reversion – the creation of the modern Hong Kong Consulate, if you will, came with Richard Boucher who made the key decisions about issues the consulate should report on. Staffing-wise, the eventual drawdown wasn't really as great as you might think. By the time you get to 1997, we had gone from a

defense attaché system to a liaison office staffed by military out of uniform. People in other agencies who watched China out of Hong Kong were starting to move those slots to the mainland. But that was a gradual process that took place over a decade. When I was desk director and making decisions about eliminating jobs in Hong Kong and putting them on the mainland, I experienced how bitter and drawn out these bureaucratic fights could be.

*Q: Now wasn't the senior military person assigned to Hong Kong while you were there a naval officer?*

GOLDBERG: Right because in Hong Kong, the main military function is to handle ship visits. Hong Kong is a major port of call for R&R [rest and recreation]. We used ship visits to attract Chinese officials to vessels for tours. It was a fairly substantial office, but after 1997 it was reduced in size. Our defense people in Hong Kong were also actively traveling to the mainland to look at the south China military regions. They had to notify the Chinese about the places they planned to visit; the Chinese followed them pretty closely. The information they collected didn't strike me as particularly significant – lots of license plate numbers, ships in harbor, but I suppose that information in the aggregate was significant to make certain judgments.

*Q: Now you had an interesting turn in your own career to the extent that you go from an economic officer in Hong Kong back to Washington in the summer of 1993. How did you get that job?*

GOLDBERG: I wanted to spend a year doing something other than State Department work and had heard that the [U.S.] Trade Representatives' office was a pretty good place to learn about negotiations and legislation. At the time, State had a couple of details to USTR and I was fortunate to land one of them. I made contacts that stood me in good stead for the remainder of my career. Some of the civil servants at USTR are still there, others have moved to the private sector. All in all, they were very savvy about how to get things done.

When I got there, Hank Levine, whom I had met ten years before when we both were doing part time work for the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations after I returned from Japan, was still in the ag [agricultural] office but preparing to move over to the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] office. I inherited his portfolio.

*Q: Can you put USTR into a policy framework? Who does it report to?*

GOLDBERG: It is a part of the President's office. The trade representative Mickey Kantor, at the time, was a member of the president's cabinet. As was his successor Charlene Barshefsky, with whom I worked on China's WTO accession. USTR was the lead on trade negotiations writ large and the coordinator of trade policy. Interagency decisions and recommendations were routed to the White House through the chief of staff or his designee. It was a small agency, maybe 20 people then. You had an awful lot of authority in terms of chairing meetings and having the pen to write papers that represented the sense of the interagency community. What I learned was that no matter the economic rationale for doing something, the politics was always going to win out.

*Q: USTR would be a major player then when G-8 summits came up?*

GOLDBERG: Mickey Kantor was very close to Bill Clinton. He subsequently went on to be the Secretary of Commerce after Ron Brown was killed in a plane crash. Kantor was quite influential – and very full of himself given his connections. I had hardly any direct dealings with him; I sat on the back benches in meetings he chaired. I had more to do with Charlene Barshefsky in her role as the Deputy USTR handling Asia Pacific, and to a lesser extent with Rufus Yerxa, the Deputy who handled Europe, Latin American, and other parts of the world. There was also a third US Trade Ambassador in Geneva, and there still is one there today.

I really think USTR was far more influential at that time than it is today - Kantor had pushed through the NAFTA negotiated in the previous administration and was heavily involved in the Uruguay Round end game. He had ceded the China portfolio to Charlene who worked closely with a couple of deputy assistant USTRs – Lee Sands and Deborah Lehr. I had less to do with China at that point, though did work the last ever Section 406 action under the Trade Act of 1974, which assessed countervailing duties on imports of Chinese honey [Ed: published in April 1994]. I also worked on getting Pacific Northwest red apples into Japan and on fair market access for tobacco products. U.S. beef – an issue then as it is now – was also high on our trade agenda as other countries were using non-tariff barriers or NTBs to limit our access to their markets. Of all the issues I worked on, I guess I was least happy about helping write administration policy on leveling the playing field for American tobacco.

*Q: Won't your USTR duties have allowed you to work with Treasury, Agriculture, and Commerce departments?*

GOLDBERG: Treasury is another story, because Treasury is always jealous of its prerogatives. Treasury was less consequential on trade issues except when you are talking about financial services. So most of my contacts were with Agriculture, Commerce, and the State Department, which regrettably many years ago ceded commercial work to Commerce. I see where Secretary Clinton would like to wrench that back. The NEC [National Economic Council] had people sitting in on these trade policy discussions. CIA was an active participant in terms of providing analysis about specific negotiations based on information that they had collected.

*Q: Now was that supposed to be a one-year assignment?*

GOLDBERG: Yes. Some people extended for a second, some even ended up leaving State because the work at USTR was more interesting and you really were more actively involved in directing negotiations and were a more consequential part of the policy making. If you are an economic officer at State and are interested in trade, you really can't do any better than spend a year at USTR to learn how decisions are made.

*Q: Now, there was an APEC meeting in July 1993. Would USTR have gotten involved in APEC issues? Did they send anybody?*

GOLDBERG: Oh sure. I don't remember. I arrived at USTR after the meeting. In subsequent years, USTR has played an important role in APEC in terms of programs and outcomes.

*Q: Now you were if I understood you, you were sort of characterizing the USTR as the NSC [National Security Council] of economic policy. That is a pretty high level.*

GOLDBERG: At that point there was an NEC and Bob Rubin was head of it. Kantor and Rubin worked pretty closely together.

**WILLIAM LENDERKING**  
**East Asia and Pacific Affairs, USIA**  
**Washington, DC (1986-1988)**

*A native of New York, Mr. Lenderking graduated from Dartmouth College and served a tour with the US Navy in the Far East before joining the Foreign Service of the US Information Agency in 1959. As Public Affairs, Press and Information Officer, he served in posts throughout the world and in Washington, D.C., where held senior level positions in USIA and the Department of State dealing with Policy, Plans and Research. Mr. Lenderking was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.*

*Q: Well, you went over to USIA and worked from '86 to '88, was it?*

LENDERKING: It was '86 to '88. We had big programs in all the countries of East Asia and the Pacific except for Vietnam. And the area office is what backstopped those programs, supervised them and got involved in everything; what the programs were, what the personnel issues were; if there was a problem the area office was responsible for supervising and resolving it. We had a couple of personnel issues where guys had to be transferred and that sort of thing, those things come up. But the area office was the overseer for the area, and also represented the area to the director, who was Charlie Wick.

*Q: From your perspective, talk about Charlie Wick.*

LENDERKING: He could be very charming but he was also very demanding. I always hoped to be an area director, but there were many days I was glad I wasn't one because whenever Charlie Wick traveled, and he traveled a good deal, he would always take along the area director with him, who was basically the minder and chief baggage handler and responsible for seeing that Charlie Wick was treated in the manner to which he thought he deserved. And this required an enormous amount of handholding and making arrangements and using up all kinds of goodwill chips to make sure that he got access to the most important people and all the other things that people with huge but fragile egos and elevated senses of entitlement require. In other words, he was extremely high maintenance, in modern parlance. A good friend of mine, who was area director, once said it was "unseemly" for adult human beings to be forced to behave in this way.

Now, the bright side of the coin, and Wick's detractors have to recognize this, he did have rapport with the President Reagan, mainly because his wife May Jane and Nancy Reagan were

close friends. Through this association, Mr. Wick got us more resources than we otherwise would have had, in good measure. Sometimes you could reason with him; he had a lot of good ideas, and Worldnet was one of them. That came out of his brain not fully formed but he just carried it forward and developed it and refined it until it was a success and the naysayers were proved wrong. There were a lot of people who were scoffers, initially, and I was one of them. I came to realize that this was really something pretty good and he was on to something worthwhile. He had a temper; he would get red in the face if he didn't like something or when he was tired. So it was important to keep him happy on a trip, and I am glad I never had to go on one with him.

I also have to say that he could be very charming, full of wise cracks, some of which were so funny you couldn't help but break out laughing. He could play the piano very well, and probably could have done OK as a barroom piano player. I was at one meeting in Sao Paulo where he had all the area directors and a lot of high level Brazilians in, and we'd taken a large meeting room in the hotel for a reception after the day's meetings, and someone had arranged for a piano to be wheeled in and he sits down and starts reeling off cocktail music. He was really good, playing and adding witty commentary – it was genuinely entertaining.

*Q: Were there any either personnel or other issues that you were particularly concerned with?*

LENDERKING: Oh yes. They were constant. Let me touch on two of them that perhaps illustrate the kind of regime that we had under Charlie Wick. A perennial issue for USIA was what guidelines we had for our speakers who went overseas for us, often from academic and policy related fields. Given that the Reagan administration was a strongly ideological one, what people said about the U.S. and the administration while they were overseas on a USIA-sponsored trip mattered a lot. Some of the people we chose, who almost always were respected mainstream leaders in their fields -- we didn't recruit people with extreme views of either right or left -- on a number of occasions criticized current foreign policies. Sometimes they made headlines and the cry would go up, "Why are we sending these folks overseas on taxpayers' money to criticize the administration?" In a couple of cases Charlie Wick would get heated enough to either demand that the speaker stop his criticisms or we would abort his trip. Of course, that would have been counterproductive and some of the senior guys would have to try to calm him down. So this issue often arose, but I also can't remember a single instance when Mr. Wick actually carried out his threat to abort someone's trip, but there were a couple of close ones. Our guidance to PAOs overseas was that if someone really got up on a soapbox and delivered a strong policy attack on the U.S., it was up to the PAO on the spot to work out a corrective, either by getting up and saying something like "Mr. Smith has just expressed his views, which he is entirely welcome to do, but American policy is that..." I had to do that a number of times, overseas, and I think it was the right tone to take.

Now, that example was on the problem side. On the good side, one of the most interesting projects I was involved in -- and it was due to Charlie Wick's contacts, was getting Gregory Peck to go to China-

*Q: The movie star.*

LENDERKING: - yes, and take some of his best films and talk about them. And we showed the

movies and we had him there with all the trappings, with very high level, influential people, and it was an enormous success. We got Ford Motor Company – it was probably Charlie Wick who made the contacts – he knew a lot of people -- and a couple of others to pick up some of the expenses because a person of that level of prestige demanded, and rightfully so, to travel at a certain level of comfort. His wife – Veronique -- went with him; he had to have a really nice car and first class accommodations and comfortable treatment all along the way. So Ford contributed a brand new luxury car – I can't remember the model – and Peck and his wife also believed that separate bathrooms for husband and wife held the key to a happy marriage, so those accommodations had to be guaranteed at every stop, and that added to the cost.

Now, I have to point out; he did this pro bono -- he didn't get a cent for this. It was his time and considerable effort that he was donating because he believed in the project of opening doors to China and he was proud of most of his films. He was also an extremely gracious person to deal with. I talked to him a few times on the telephone, but it was a terribly difficult project to put together because people who were in Hollywood, that he trusted, were always whispering in his ear, you know, you cannot trust USIA because it is the U.S. Government and that sort of thing. Some of them were seeking personal advantages for themselves, in the time-honored way of Hollywood. So we would be moving ahead, thinking things were on track and we had all the players in Hollywood, Washington, and Beijing working together, and someone would get to Peck or something else would happen and we'd be confronted with a potential train wreck. Here's just one small example: Peck himself chose the films he wanted to showcase – I think there were about six of them. But locating them proved very difficult. Obtaining rights to show them was even more difficult. Arranging for their safe transportation and storage, deciding how to present them was another. I think we decided against a simultaneous interpreter, and arranging subtitles would have been very costly and there wasn't enough time, so we just went with the films and relied on Peck and others to explain what was going on to those who couldn't handle English. At least that's my recollection.

Gregory Peck himself I think had liberal leanings and was sympathetic to the goals of USIA, and he didn't have any big distrust of government but he wanted the thing to go right and he didn't want any Washington bureaucrats to be messing up his program. He was very proud of those films and rightly so. Well, with all the headaches we had, the program, which involved about a week of public appearances in China, with Peck introducing his films and answering questions, going to official receptions, and all the rest, the entire project was marvelous – really precedent setting. It was a real breakthrough, sort of symbolic of the highly visible emergence of a major world power from decades of being a tyrannical closed society, and it was very exciting. High level Chinese of all kinds clamored to see the films and meet Peck, and the Embassy feasted on the new contacts and introductions made for years. Something like that could not have happened without Charlie Wick's contacts and input, and the months of hard work we put in to make it work were totally worth it.

*Q: Well, of course too, ,at that time, our relations with China and China's relations with the outside world were not that great, and to get these films, which were major films, into China and somebody of the stature of Gregory Peck, who was well known among the Chinese cultural literati, to talk about them was quite an attraction.*

LENDERKING: It sure was. I was not in China but I had a lot to do with it on the Washington end, and the people that we were able to contact and establish ongoing relations with just opened the doors throughout the Chinese world of intellectuals, ideas, and culture. The payoff was enormous and I'm sure we benefit to this day from what that program started.

*Q: Did you get any feel in your office about our exchange program and visitors program? Let's talk about China first. If I recall correctly, this was a period of tremendous exodus from China for those who had the wherewithal to get their kids to go to American schools and pursue university studies.*

LENDERKING: True. It was a time of ferment in China and some of the barriers were coming down, not without struggle, so it was a stimulating time of opportunity for us. We had a gifted American staff in China, people who could speak Chinese and were willing to commit significant portions of their working lives to getting to know this extraordinary country, and who could take advantage of this sudden blossoming.

One example of that occurred on my first trip to China. I was calling on the president of a major university in Beijing and I was very flattered and pleased when not only did he say he would be pleased to receive me on what I thought was just a courtesy call, but he would like to invite me for lunch. And for him I was just a faceless bureaucrat from an agency he probably didn't know much about and not at all equal to him in the social hierarchy, and he turned out a rather large lunch with a lot of his senior faculty present, and I was the guest of honor. At the appropriate time he gave some remarks in Chinese, which were translated. He started talking about the Cultural Revolution and he said, basically, this must never be allowed to happen in China again, and we are depending on you, America, to help us on this. And wow, I was floored. I mean, this was the president of one of the most powerful universities in China saying this, right out there in front of his faculty. So that was the kind of era that we had and it was pretty exciting, considering all the years when China was a closed and hostile society.

*Q: You know, to my mind probably the strong right arm of our diplomacy has been our exchange and visitor program and the great number of students that we attract here. And any tampering with that process would be an enormous blunder...*

LENDERKING: During this period Johns Hopkins University opened a branch in Nanjing and a lot of good things flowed from that, and continue to do so, although I'm not up on current developments. The State Department was behind it, USIA was behind it and the White House was behind it and a lot of really positive things happened.

*Q: You were doing this until about 1988, right?*

LENDERKING: Yes.

*Q: Well, in '88 whither?*

LENDERKING: By 1988, it was time for me to leave that job and go overseas again. I'd been in Washington for six years and that was longer than usual, at least for USIA officers, even though

this was only my second tour in the U.S. after 30 years in the Foreign Service. So I was named to be Paul Wolfowitz's public affairs officer in Indonesia. He was by now Ambassador there, an apparent concession to his wife who had a PhD in Indonesian studies and was enraptured by the country and its culture. What's interesting here is a little side story: when I was in Thailand, Ambassador Mort Abramowitz was named as ambassador to Indonesia for his next assignment. However, there was some mischief making by the disgruntled CIA station chief in Bangkok and some political allies who apparently disliked Mort's liberal views, even though he was a really tough-minded person. I say apparently, because I do not remember all the aspects of this, and wasn't privy to them at the time. Anyway, a few scurrilous articles appeared, and some senior Indonesians who might have believed that as good Muslims they should oppose Jews on every possible occasion, put a stop to Mort's nomination, that is, they did not issue agrément. But a few years later, when Paul Wolfowitz was nominated, I believe he sailed through without a breath of opposition.

Anyway, I was assigned to be the head of the large and important USIS effort there, and it was a great assignment. But for personal reasons involving probable family separation for about six months – my wife was working in a demanding job in the White House and needed some help with our young children, and she also had some health issues to resolve -- I didn't feel I should leave the family for that long. So I used up whatever goodwill chips I had and broke the assignment although I was disappointed not to go to Indonesia and work for Paul because I had so much respect for him. I wrote him a letter and said I was disappointed, and that was true, but also I felt I'd spent so much of my career in East Asia, which I loved, I also wanted to have some experience in another part of the world because I could see I was getting to the final years of my career. So that was another motivating factor.

Anyway, I broke the Indonesia assignment and there were very few openings available. But I learned of a staffing shortage up in New York at the U.S. mission to the UN, to which they always send extra guys for the General Assembly session that lasts for four months every fall. That's when all the heads of state and other dignitaries come and make speeches, and it's an extremely busy time because all kinds of political business is transacted on the sidelines of all that ostensible speechmaking. So I went up there as the political advisor for East Asia and Afghanistan for the USUN during the 1988 General Assembly. I reported to the minister counselor for political affairs and I was part of the political section.

*Q: You did that from when to when?*

LENDERKING: It was September to December of 1988.

*Q: How did you find that situation, the UN?*

LENDERKING: I thought it was fascinating and it was something totally new for me. I had never worked in a political section, although I'd worked at the State Department before. But during the UNGA session I thought it was the hardest working mission of any embassy I'd been in and I have been in some pretty big and busy ones. People stayed late, worked late, worked hard. The difference I think lies in the difference between multilateral and bilateral diplomacy. It is more like, say, dealing with the House of Representatives or something like that than dealing

with just your bilateral counterparts. So you had a much more layered, complex, and nuanced political situation to deal with, with political alliances being formed and dissolved every day depending on the issue and circumstances. Lots of horse trading, trying to build winning votes, and all that goes with that. There were some guys in the Mission, Civil Service guys who had been there for years who were really godfathers to people like myself who didn't know all that much about the workings of the UN. And my boss was an old comrade from Japan days, Bob Immerman, who was a Japan hand and also had had many years at the US Mission. So he was an expert on the UN, how it worked or didn't work, who was important, and how to get things done. In fact, during his entire career he served only in Japan and at the UN, with the exception of one early tour in Guatemala. How he managed to have a career like that I don't know, but he did it and he was one of the reigning experts on both Japan and the UN. Bob knew what had to be done and how to do it and I was very pleased to have him as a supervisor. I learned a lot from him and it was an intense, albeit short, experience.

*Q: Were there any particular issues that engaged you at that time?*

LENDERKING: There was one that I still smart about to this day. That was the seating of the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate government of Cambodia. And it was U.S. policy that the Khmer Rouge was the legitimate government because they had been overthrown by Vietnam, which we still considered to be an enemy, and they had committed an act of aggression. Every year the Cambodian resolution came up for a vote and we lobbied very hard to make sure the Khmer Rouge continued to be seated regardless of who was ruling in Phnom Penh. And Chuck Schmitz, a Foreign Service colleague also seconded to the political section for UNGA, and I worked very hard on this issue. After several weeks of lobbying other delegations, when the vote was taken, it was the highest it had ever been in our favor. It amounted to an overwhelming vote in favor of the U.S. position of keeping the Khmer Rouge as the legitimate representatives of Cambodia and secretly I thought this was shameful. I had no particular love for the communist government of Vietnam, which was still keeping hundreds of thousands of its own citizens in re-education camps, but as awful as that was, it did not compare to the atrocities of the Khmer Rouge. Further, in geopolitical terms, I believed it was time to start working with the Vietnamese to encourage them to loosen up, time to start trying to wean them away from the brutalities of their system. At this time, I believed they no longer represented a threat to our friends in Southeast Asia, such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, and they were also a potential bulwark against China.

*Q: Yes, I realize this is awful.*

LENDERKING: Yes. So, at the end of the vote we got a congratulatory telegram from Gaston Sigur, Assistant Secretary for EAP at the time, effusively praising us for the superb lobbying job we had done on behalf of a policy I thought was wrongheaded.

*Q: Well, what was the reaction from your Asian colleagues at the UN when you came around?*

LENDERKING: Well, I think they understood that American policy was evolving; it was an election year and the most vocal domestic group on Vietnam were the MIA folks who would have been very unhappy at anything that let the pressure off Vietnam for even a minute.

*Q: Yes. Now, we're moving into 1989 and where did you go next? Oh -- I have a question to ask and I don't know if we're covered it. You mentioned your wife was from Australia. How did you meet her?*

LENDERKING: I met her at EXPO '70. As someone who had been an exchange student with Japan, she was selected as a guide – they were called ‘hostesses’ – at the Australian Pavilion, which was right next door to ours. The Commissioners General of our pavilions became good friends and we helped each other out on many occasions. So our Commissioner General, Howard Chernoff, wanted to throw a party just for the Australian staff by way of thanking them for their cooperation. As chief of protocol I was in the receiving line and I introduced the entire staff to Mr. and Mrs. Chernoff. When Susan came through I said hello, nothing more, but I ran into her from time to time just being there at EXPO. We had coffee a couple of times, gossiped about doings at EXPO, and when the exposition was over in September I returned to Washington and she used her EXPO savings to go on an extended trip to East Asia, Latin America and the U.S. with a friend from the UK pavilion.

By the time she arrived in Washington about six months had passed and I wasn't sure I'd remember what she looked like. My marriage had not survived the problems of two years' separation in Vietnam, and I was now a bachelor again. Susan and I hit it off well, and eventually married, in the fall of 1971.

**ROBIN BERRINGTON**  
**Director, Junior Officer Training**  
**Washington, DC (1986-1989)**

*Mr. Berrington was born and raised in Ohio and educated at Wesleyan University Harvard Universities. After service with the Peace Corps in Thailand, he joined the Foreign Service (USIA) in 1969. During his Foreign Service career Mr. Berrington served at posts abroad in Thailand, Japan, Ireland and England, variously as Public and Cultural Affairs Officer. He also served several tours at USIA Headquarters in Washington, DC. Mr. Berrington was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2000.*

*Q: Were you able to sort of turn the spotlight on to the Soviet Union and to Communist China and point out what was happening there?*

BERRINGTON: Not really. I mean not because we were unable, but it was because we didn't need to. I mean the Japanese were very much aware of what was happening in China. The Russians, I mean to this day most Japanese don't like the Russians. In any poll of public opinion in Japan, whenever they talk about who are the most beloved foreigners and who are the most hated foreigners, when it comes to the hated foreigners, the Koreans and the Russians always come out on top. They sort of vie with each other for the top position. So we didn't really have to say or do anything about the Russians to convince the Japanese that they were the bad guys. The Japanese have always had a mixed attitude toward the Chinese. I mean they see the Chinese as

the sort of mother civilization of that part of the world, so there is some feeling that they should be closer and more understanding with the Chinese, but then we all know about what happened in WWII in China, so there is some lingering ill will there with the Chinese too. You know the excesses of the Mao's cultural revolution and all that were frequently reported so we didn't have to play that up. Besides I think that would have been less useful anyway. Our program in Japan was more of a positive program pointing out the benefits to the Japanese of maintaining the security relationship, of close political and economic ties with the U.S. and stressing those positive things rather than working on the negatives of China or Russia or anyplace else.

*Q: Was it pretty well accepted there that you could have fun twisting the lion's tail while accepting the security protection the U.S. relationship offered? That basically saved their own kids from going into the military and saved budgetary resources. Was this pretty much an accepted good thing?*

BERRINGTON: Oh most Japanese are very happy with that. First of all again a little bit of Kabuki, everything about Japan is. There were what they called the self defense forces. There was a naval self defense force, a land self defense force, the air self defense forces, and they were in effect the Japanese army, navy, and air force. But the self defense forces were quite limited in what they could do This has been one of the ongoing debates internally in Japan, just how far could the self defense forces go in pushing their mandate, in pushing their function. In those earlier years when I was in Japan, the self defense forces were really almost used primarily for disaster relief, that sort of thing. You know, a flood comes along and they were sent down to take care of it. Most of the kids that would go into the self defense forces were not your high fliers. They were the ones that didn't do very well academically or maybe didn't complete school, or farming kids that were very conservative in their outlook, and maybe still thought of the military as being a worthy profession. But for most people it is off to a good school, while for most of the country the self defense forces are really a kind of second rate operation. As a result they were very happy to have the umbrella of protection from the United States rather than having to rely on their own forces which not too many years before had caused the grief and tragedy of WWII. Everything when it comes to Japan still today, you know the two absolutely crucial events were the closing of the country during its Tokugawa period and WWII. Those two events really inform so much of Japanese attitude, behavior and still have formed much of what they say and do.

*Q: This is a time of considerable activity on the part of President Nixon and Henry Kissinger and all. How was this playing down where you were, or did it? I was wondering about the opening of China while you were there. Did you have that Nixon shock too?*

BERRINGTON: Well, yes, there were two major body blows to the U.S.-Japan relationship. One was the oil shock which was basically a problem of oil prices and oil supply from the Middle East. The other was the so called Nixon shock which was the opening of China. In both of these cases, the U.S. did not give the Japanese the kind of advance notice or any kinds of consultative briefing that they expected to receive and that they thought they deserved as our so called leading ally in the whole east Asian area. So particularly the China visit was a very humiliating experience for the Japanese leadership because we had not given them the kind of advance word that they expected they would get. We were constantly trying to explain that and deal with that,

and that unfortunately for the Japanese was a bad thing. You can hardly make a good thing out of a bad thing.

*Q: So we didn't have to hammer away at that. It just was there.*

BERRINGTON: No. Seldom did we have to say or do anything about the Russians. Now, do you remember the shoot down of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 by Soviet interceptors on 1 September 1983 over the Sea of Japan just west of Sakhalin Island? The shoot down initiated a major PR offensive by us. Much of it handled personally by Rick and Jean Kirkpatrick. With all kinds of materials being put out. As in the case of anything we got in Japan we would translate into Japanese before giving them out to the Japanese, video tapes. It was a worldwide offensive on our part to expose the Russian duplicity on that. That was something that was certainly an incident that marked a period of time. Again we didn't really have to do that much. In fact, there were times I felt like we were going at carpet tacks with a sledge hammer. The Russians were just hanging themselves. There wasn't that much we had to do, but still it was a major offensive by us at the time.

The issue which probably, when I think back in terms of long term difficulty, the issue that probably has caused us the most, I mean apart from the trade issues which were a constant thorn on the side. But the issue of China, how to handle China; the Japanese have always looked on China as a kind of mother country. I mean in the same way that England looks on the continent as where so much of their civilization comes from, the Anglo-Saxon background. Japan looks on China in the same way. A mixture of respect and slight condescension because China is the source of the language; that is where Buddhism came from, much of the art and culture, Confucianism, all of that is from China. Nevertheless, by the 20th century, look where Japan is, a major industrial world power. Look where China is, still backwards, still split by competing forces with a population in some part starving. Clearly Japan could look at China and say maybe we got everything from you, but look where we are today compared to you. So it was with very mixed feelings how they regard China. But as China developed some nuclear weapons, and after the death of Mao and some of the struggles that went on there, and as China started to figure out its own world view vis-a-vis the U.S. or Taiwan or Korea or whatever, we could not always count on Japan to be right behind us on everything as much as we might have wanted it. There was no question that part of the Japanese differences with us had a racial element to it. You know, very much like Vietnam, they saw China as another Asian brother, and in fact if anything it was more like an Asian mother or father than brother. So for the western powers to deal with China in the way they did sometimes caused problems within the Japanese, particularly the media. There was the occasional thorny issue for us, and still is today.

*Q: Did Tiananmen affect our relations with the Japanese? I mean did it appear from embassy reporting that the Japanese had the same reaction that we had or were they a little more in a way sophisticated?*

BERRINGTON: I think deep down inside the Japanese were horrified at the loss of life. I mean the Japanese would do anything to avoid confrontation and that kind of supreme confrontation was seen as madness, especially because students were involved. And I think the Japanese were horrified.

Clearly to the Japanese it was a break down of social order. Officially they don't like to offend China. You have got to keep in mind there is a huge Japanese business investment there, a lot of trade with China. They really bend over backwards to accommodate the Chinese in so many things. Tiananmen was a big embarrassment to the Japanese in that respect, so there was backpedaling and some kind of silence in some areas to avoid any further difficulties. Unofficially of course, it was just about the worst thing you could imagine. It didn't poison the well for them as it did for us, but it certainly was a problem in their relations.

**DAVID G. BROWN**  
**Taiwan Coordination Staff**  
**Washington, DC (1986-1989)**

*David G. Brown was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1940. He graduated from Princeton University in 1964 entered the Foreign Service. His assignments include Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Before retirement in 1996, he served as Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 28, 2003.*

BROWN: Right. In January of 1979, we had recognized China and derecognized Taiwan. This was shortly after I had left the Office of Republic of China Affairs in '78. We set up an unofficial organization to represent the American people in Taiwan called the American Institute in Taiwan. AIT had a headquarters office in Washington and an office in Taipei and another one in Kaohsiung in the southern part of Taiwan. We had a small office within the State Department building whose job was to develop policy and provide instructions to AIT.

*Q: Well, now which one did you belong to?*

BROWN: I belonged to the policy office within the State Department. The office of the Taiwan Coordination Staff.

*Q: Now in the State Department did this function in all aspects as a desk?*

BROWN: Yes, except that there was no other desk that had an unofficial organization in Washington to conduct liaison on its behalf. Whenever a prominent visitor from Taiwan arrived, it was the chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan office in Washington, D.C. who was responsible for greeting them and going to dinner with them and chairing unofficial meetings for those visitors with people from the administration.

*Q: It sounds like a term that is used in illicit relationships as a beard.*

BROWN: Or a front group.

*Q: A front group. However, that did not mean we were cutting Taiwan loose. American interests*

*in Taiwan changed little.*

BROWN: Absolutely. If you look back at decade of the 1980s after de-recognition, this was a period of great success and development for Taiwan. Relations with the U.S., though unofficial, were quite stable and strong. In short, Taiwan continued to enjoy the stability that it needed to prosper and develop.

*Q: Okay, in 1986 when you went there, what was the situation on Taiwan economically and politically in 1986?*

BROWN: Well, there were the two big economic issues in U.S.-Taiwan relations then. Taiwan enjoyed huge trade surplus with the United States in the mid-1980s. One issue was should Taiwan continue to benefit from our general system of preferences (GSP) when they were a remarkably powerful export economy. At that time, Taiwan's GDP per capita was around \$10,000. Should Taiwan be graduated out of a program that was designed to benefit developing countries?

The other issue involved the valuation of Taiwan's currency, the new Taiwan dollar. Their currency was very carefully controlled, and Treasury was convinced that Taipei was using their currency control system to maintain an undervalued new Taiwan dollar. The undervaluation was seen as a major reason for their massive trade surplus with the U.S. The Treasury Department and we on the desk cooperated in pressuring the Taiwan government into appreciating the currency. There were some interesting unintended consequences of doing this. What Treasury did was to persuade Taiwan that its economy had matured to the point where Taiwan could afford to remove some of its currency controls and allow people in Taiwan to move currency in and out more freely. The by-product of this was that after these currency reforms were put in place Taiwanese started to invest overseas. They invested in the U.S., in Southeast Asia. However, the big thing that no one had anticipated was Taiwanese started to invest in China. That began to open up relations between the island and the mainland.

*Q: What about the result of this sort of freeing the Taiwanese to invest where they will? Was anybody looking at this in the East Asian bureau saying this is a good thing? In fact, it probably was one of the greatest determiners of the China-Taiwan relationship. If China gets too huffy, it may jeopardize all the nice investment.*

BROWN: We were thinking about it, but I certainly didn't anticipate the extent to which Taiwan's investment in China would take off. We knew that President Chiang Ching-kuo had made a major decision to allow people from Taiwan to travel to the mainland. It happened that he did that some months before with the 15th anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué. We knew that this opening up of travel to China was a very important thing that would have long-term consequences. Secretary Shultz took the occasion of the 15th anniversary to make a statement in which we said that it was U.S. policy not to get involved in cross-strait negotiations, but to encourage an environment in which such cross-strait contacts could develop. We understood there was a process going on that was very important. However, I for one certainly didn't understand that what we were doing with Treasury to open Taiwan's exchange rate system for the purpose of correcting our trade deficit would have the side effect of stimulating massive

foreign direct investment by Taiwan and that a good portion of that foreign direct investment would go to China.

*Q: You didn't have to go through the resignation process or something like that?*

BROWN: Well, I was working in the State Department, so no, I did not. People who worked for AIT, whether they were working in Taipei or in Washington, had to go through a process of resignation from the State Department and employment with the American Institute in Taiwan.

*Q: Could the AIT people come at will to the State Department?*

BROWN: Yes. However, Taiwan's representatives and visiting officials could not come to the State Department. The American employees of AIT came to State like any other government employee. They had their own State Department badges. What was important was that appearances were changed. They were publicly called AIT employees. The appearance or form of our relations with Taiwan changed, but the substance did not change much. As for AIT employees, they continued to get their paychecks in exactly the same fashion they'd gotten them before from the Department. Every one of them had employee evaluations. When I was on the coordination staff, some AIT employees received State Department awards.

*Q: What piece of the action did you have?*

BROWN: Well, it was policy guidance. How was the relationship with Taiwan conducted? This was a big part of our role in the exchange rate issue. Normally Treasury doesn't let State have anything to do with exchange rate negotiations. An ambassador is lucky if he knows that they're even taking place. But because Treasury was aware that they couldn't send their senior officials to Taipei, they had to come to us to work out ways to deal with Taiwan. Treasury did not let us in on the substance of their discussions, but we worked with them on the process, and that proved to be quite important. Who in Taiwan should Treasury deal with? Where can Treasury talk to them? Under what arrangements can we deal with them? What form can an agreement or understanding with Taiwan take? Those were issues on which we got involved. Also, Treasury had important relationships with China at the same time. They were very much involved in U.S. economic ties with the mainland. So, they didn't want to jeopardize those relationships any more than State wanted to. So, one question was: do you want to deal with exchange rates by sending a lower ranking official? If so, State could help make Taiwan understand that this person came with considerable authority if not rank. Did Treasury want to work this issue by inviting more senior officials from Taiwan to meet in San Francisco under some private guise? If so, State could help ensure that it was arranged quietly in a way that would not create problems for either Treasury or State in their dealings with Beijing.

*Q: What about Taiwan? During the time you were dealing with this, were their intelligence efforts a problem, I mean looking at the overseas community? Because they messed around a bit in New York, I mean in Los Angeles I believe. How did we see it at that time you were doing it?*

BROWN: The really egregious thing that happened took place two years before I came back to work on Taiwan. This was the murder of Henry Liu, a Taiwan journalist who had moved to the

United States and had written a critical biography of Chiang Ching-kuo. Someone in the Taiwan intelligence chain of command decided that the way to deal with somebody who had criticized Chiang was to have him eliminated by gangsters of the so-called bamboo gang. Intelligence officers hired the bamboo gang to murder Henry Liu. It took a while for this to come to light. The U.S. had evidence on the involvement of intelligence officers in the murder, and this forced Taipei to address the issue of responsibility. The former head of Taiwan's intelligence service in the U.S. was convicted of involvement. It still is not clear how high up people were involved in the incident. President Chiang was acutely embarrassed. He eventually made very significant changes in his intel services. The murder was a huge black mark for Taiwan.

Now there were other things that they were doing, none of which were as egregious as that. Taiwan continued to surveil Chinese students in the United States. They had intelligence operations going and efforts to acquire restricted arms technology that we were not authorizing for sale. The most serious example of that was a program to get inertial guidance for long range missiles from the U.S., technology that we had denied them. Taiwan arranged to have some of their scientists come to the U.S. and get training and then they picked up the designs. That had to be dealt with while I was on the desk. I recall we also put them on the FBI watch list for hostile foreign intelligence organizations. They got the message and over time changed the pattern of what they were doing.

*Q: Well, let's take getting the long-range guidance system. You said that had to be dealt with, what did you do?*

BROWN: Well, I recall that the most important thing we did was to terminate visas for all the scientists that were involved in the training program, send those people back to Taiwan and force the university that was running the program, which I recall was MIT, to terminate those programs which were inconsistent with U.S. policy.

*Q: Were you allowed to have contact with the Taiwanese staff here in Washington?*

BROWN: Yes, but not in the State Department building, I had frequent breakfasts, lunches and dinners with them. When circumstances required, AIT would arrange for a negotiation or signing of an agreement. We had no problem dealing with Taiwanese political groups that would come to the United States. We'd simply go to see them in a restaurant rather than in the State Department.

*Q: It sounds like one would eat very well on that job.*

BROWN: During much of that time, I was working for Gaston Sigur who was the Assistant secretary. Taiwan's representatives in Washington were Fred Chien and later Ding Mou-shih, both of whom went on to be foreign ministers. Whenever they had a meeting with Gaston, it was usually held over breakfast at the Four Seasons Hotel. We ate well and had a lot of pretty heavy conversations to go along with the fare.

*Q: What was your impression of the nationalist Chinese representation here in Washington?*

BROWN: We were fortunate to be dealing with quite sophisticated individuals. As would be expected, we were under steady pressure from them to make the relationship more official. For example, they would propose changing the kinds of license plates their offices and officials could use. Diplomatic plates were not possible, so they pressed local jurisdictions to create special plates for them. Taipei was always trying to get a pseudo official status for their offices. Could they fly their flag outside their office or just inside the office? What titles could their officers use? This was a period of booming trade between the U.S. and Taiwan. Many U.S. states wanted trade offices in Taiwan. Taiwan would be as generous possible in providing benefits and special privileges for those state representatives in Taipei, and then they would turn around and go to the state's governor and say they would like similar treatment in the U.S. Lacking formal diplomatic recognition, Taiwan had a deep desire for the most formal treatment they could persuade people to give them. Dealing with this, and coordinating with local governments was a constant challenge. It wasn't done in a mean spirited way, but we had to hold the line on the unofficial nature of our relationship.

*Q: What about consular protection? I'm thinking of all the Taiwanese students in the United States and visitors and businessmen and the normal thing is you need I'm in trouble with the police or something, call you consul.*

BROWN: We had the American Institute in Taiwan represent us in Taipei. Taipei had an organization with a convoluted name called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) to represent Taiwan in exactly the same way in the United States. They had an office in Washington and about 11 or 12 branch offices in American cities. In one of the more mean spirited aspects of switching relations, we told Taiwan, a country which had more consulates, formal consulates as opposed to honorary consulates, than just about any other country in the U.S. that several of these consulates had to be closed. This was one of the things that would have to change with the termination of diplomatic relations. So, we squeezed them down from 16 to 12, I recall. Nevertheless they retained a very extensive network of CCNAA offices around the country that operated exactly like consulates except that they didn't have consular status. Their personnel enjoyed privileges and immunities similar to those accorded consular personnel. We had similar needs in Taiwan, so we wanted the arrangements to work effectively for both sides.

*Q: When I interviewed Nat Belocchi and Nat was saying that if you think that the Israelis have a lobby or a network in the United States, wait until you run across the nationalist Chinese. How did you find it sort of business everywhere? Was this a pretty significant group?*

BROWN: They were and are extremely active in cultivating good feelings amongst Americans toward Taiwan. They considered themselves a very vulnerable society and they recognize that the U.S. was their principal supporter. Hence, they did everything they could to cultivate friendship among Americans. I'm excluding from this the intelligence operations, and talking just about legitimate diplomacy. Under our international visitor program, we would bring 15 or 20 people a year from Taiwan for month long visits to expose them to American society, just as we did everywhere else. Similarly Taipei was targeting people who would 20 years later be in leadership positions in the U.S. But, Taiwan had programs, which were much larger than ours. They were bringing hundreds of people to Taiwan every year, through every conceivable kind of

arrangement. At one level they were inviting members of congress. They had an extensive program of congressional staff visits. They did the same thing at the state level working through their local offices. They were inviting state legislators, staff members of state governments, staffs of governors around the country. They had an operation with the democratic and republican parties where political parties in Taiwan, mainly the KMT, would invite delegations from those party organizations at the national levels and at the state levels to Taiwan. They had visits from professional groups; they had visits from academics. Then when the visitors came back, CCNAA would follow up, maintain contact and seek these people's help. Their friends are never forgotten. They are always invited to lunches and dinners and parties when visiting delegations come the connections are kept up so that a massive effort to cultivate good will and support in this country for Taiwan because Taiwan is so dependent on American political and military support. Then when help was needed, Taiwan was not shy in asking for it.

What was and is different is that Israel had a large and active domestic political lobby in the Jewish community. While the Chinese community in the U.S. was growing, it was not politically active and was split between pro-Beijing, Pro-KMT and Taiwan independence groups.

*Q: Did you find a sense of unease in the East Asian bureau? Were the people dealing with China per se because I mean just looking at it from the outside, here is this active office doing this thing making cultivating, also the fact is that Taiwan was turning into a democracy. When you say democracy, this rings all sorts of bells in the United States and it was not a fake one. I mean this is a real thing and yet you know, you had China, which wasn't going in that direction at all. Sort of almost a frustration or something of the Mainland China hands within our State Department kind of wishing you'd go away or something like that?*

BROWN: We'll things were different in the mid-1980s. I think the phenomena you're describing are of the '90s. Why do I say that? First because in the mid-'80s the democratic transformation in Taiwan was only just beginning. There still were political prisoners from the Kaohsiung incident in jail. There were more congressional hearings on human rights in Taiwan. The real process of political reform in Taiwan began actually in 1986 but wasn't completed until much later with the first direct election of the Taiwan president in 1996 and the first transfer of power to the opposition in 2000. In '86, '87, '88 this process was just beginning. On the mainland, it was a period when economic reform was seen in this country as promising. There were student demonstrations in China in 1987 that were significant enough to cost party Secretary General Hu Yaobang his job. So, the contrast between what was going on in the mainland and what was going on in Taiwan wasn't as stark then as it was later.

*Q: So, when you were dealing with it both countries sort of seemed to be on a mild trajectory toward the better?*

BROWN: You could say that before Tiananmen.

*Q: Did you feel, was there still this almost coterie who had participated in the opening to China who identified so much with mainland China that they tended to be dismissive or forget about Taiwan? I mean was that still an attitude or did this work itself out?*

BROWN: At that time, the Republican administration had good relations with Taiwan and quite positive attitudes toward the island. Taiwan felt that it was well connected with the Reagan and subsequently with the Bush establishments in Washington. Holbrooke had been dismissive of Taiwan, but the Republican administrations were not. The first person I worked for was Jim Lilley who had been our representative, the head of AIT in Taipei. He believed that if you wanted to manage the U.S.-China relationship as a whole correctly you had to take very good care of your ties in Taiwan. If one didn't take good care of the ties in Taiwan then the Taiwans were going to use this network that they had cultivated, most importantly in the congress, to put pressure on the administration to do things that would not be in the U.S. interest.

*Q: You were there at least in the beginning of the transition between the Reagan and Bush administration and you know, often within an administration between two different parts of the same party the transition sometimes gets a little bit rocky. How did this one go regarding your area?*

BROWN: From my perspective there were no serious problems.

*Q: How about arms sales? Was this something you were dealing with all the time?*

BROWN: All the time, and we were going through all sorts of shenanigans you might call them to provide Taiwan with the weapons it needed in ways that did not provoke the PRC and also, to the best of our ability, could be seen as consistent with the language of the communiqué that had been negotiated with the Chinese in 1982. The August '82 communiqué on arms sales said that there were limits on the quantity and quality of arms we would sell to Taiwan. So, we had to try and live within that framework, but the framework was being stretched beyond credibility by technological change. Taiwan's weapons systems were becoming obsolescent and had to be replaced and the only way you could replace them was by providing newer more capable systems. Subsequently, after I left, we bumped up against the quantitative ceiling as well as the quantitative one with the sale of F-16s. The F-16s clearly were a more capable system, and they were so expensive that there was no way they could be provided within the quantitative limitations either.

*Q: Was there somebody sitting there or some bodies sitting there in the Pentagon figuring out what the mainland Chinese had in the way of aircraft, navy, etc. and what the Taiwanese had and making sure that the Taiwanese were able to have a credible defense?*

BROWN: Sure. Studies were done of the military balance in the Taiwan straits. State, DOD and NSC had to weigh what could be sold that would meet Taiwan's legitimate defense needs and how to do it in a way that would not create problems in our relations with the PRC. One key was to keep what we were doing out of the public eye. Appearances were important to the PRC. Consequently, what systems were called was important. For instance, Taiwan wanted the M-60 tank. We sold them an equivalent but called it a hybrid M-48, the M-48H. I'm using an army system here as an example, though it was not the most important weapon we were selling Taiwan. I could have used the frigate that we had agreed to sell. In that case, we devised a program whereby Taiwan could manufacture in Taiwan new frigates that were better than the old World War II vintage ones that were being replaced. Clearly this would involve a qualitative

improvement. Rather than selling them these ships outright in a way that would be seen as a violation of the arms sales communiqué, we worked out an arrangement to provide the plans and build the ships in Taiwan. These ships would then be outfitted with modern weapons systems. This met their defense needs with less strain on our relations with China.

*Q: What about other countries on this arms thing? Could you say the French and all, were they and other countries, were the Taiwanese shopping around?*

BROWN: Taiwan was out looking all the time, but very few countries were prepared to sell to them. The Israelis would provide some things. They got some systems from the Italians, and believe it or not from the Swedes. The sellers would try to handle the sales in a way that didn't attract publicity or create problems for their relations with China. The really big third country sale again came after I left. This was the French decision to sell frigates and 60 mirage fighters to Taiwan.

*Q: Things were beginning to happen in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was coming. Did that change the equation or was that felt?*

BROWN: That didn't really have any impact.

*Q: How about the Japanese? Did we see them as a rival or a supporter or how did we see the Japanese?*

BROWN: Well, as an economic competitor in Taiwan. For a variety of reasons, Japan did not have any defense ties with Taiwan. Certainly on the political level, they kept a very low profile and were determined to avoid problems in their relations with the PRC.

*Q: During this '86 to '89 period did you find, had the balance shifted from the mainlanders to the Taiwanese and speaking within the political system?*

BROWN: In that context, the most important thing that happened followed the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. Lee Teng-hui, the vice President, succeeded him and became the first Taiwanese to reach a real position of power in Taiwan. This was a revolutionary change. Most people at that time thought Lee was a lightweight who would not last. It was similar to the way people thought about Jiang Zemin when he was appointed General Secretary in Beijing.

*Q: Or Anwar Sadat.*

BROWN: Yes. Well, Lee transformed Taiwan politics and is still having a major impact now as a former president. However, in the years I was on the desk, he started very cautiously. He had to be careful because even though he inherited the presidency, he did not inherit automatically the chairmanship of the Nationalist Party. That was the really powerful position in the political system at that time. The first thing Lee had to do was to get himself appointed acting chairman of the party and that was in fact opposed by Chiang family loyalists, including Madame Chiang Kai-shek who was then in her late 80s. She had returned to Taiwan, in 1986 I think, out of concern that Chiang Ching-kuo might go too far in liberalizing the political system. She was

there when he passed away. She, her son Chiang Wei-kuo and some others tried to prevent Lee from being given the title of acting chairman of the party. Reform elements in the party blocked that effort and Lee became acting chairman. Lee had to consolidate his position and prove to people that he was going to be around for a while. He moved forward with Ching-kuo's program for initial political reform and subsequently carried that process much further in the 1990s.

*Q: Was this looked upon with favor in the United States?*

BROWN: Oh, definitely. Washington's positive response went back to 1986 when Ching-kuo was beginning to signal his willingness to conduct political reform in Taiwan. His biggest signal was when opposition politicians defied the ban on new political parties and announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). KMT conservatives urged Chiang to arrest them, but he told the conservatives that times were changing and this had to be accepted. So, that was the big signal that political reform was coming. Ching-kuo terminated martial law the following year and Taipei passed a civic organization's law that legalized new political parties. They also ended the ban on new newspapers, which had been used as a control mechanism of the press, opening up a much freer press environment. The process went on to a number of other steps, but led to in 2000, 14 years later, to a peaceful transfer of government from the KMT to a president representing the opposition DPP.

*Q: Were there sort of a Taiwanese, I mean there must have been Taiwanese watchers in the mainland government at the embassy here. I was wondering whether you were picking up from your colleagues who were working with that embassy how they were viewing things in Taiwan.*

BROWN: They were trying to figure out what this political transition meant. Did having a Taiwanese president mean that Beijing was going to face demands for Taiwan independence? How do you interpret the freer expression of opinion and the fact that Taiwanese were now free to advocate independence? What did this mean? Yes, there was a lot of interest. The Chinese Embassy was talking to various people around Washington, including those on the China desk. Occasionally either people from AIT in Washington or we on the Taiwan Coordination Staff would meet with Chinese diplomats. We didn't want to do it too often because our job was to deal with Taiwan, and Taipei was very sensitive about our contacts with the PRC. Nevertheless we did meet to make sure that the channels of communication were open and that the PRC accurately understood the way we saw what was happening.

*Q: Were you seeing at this time a really positive direction towards everything or was this, did you see that probably the KMT would eventually be if not phased out, be having to compete for jobs and things like that?*

BROWN: Yes, we foresaw that. However, it appeared that the KMT position remained strong. There was a debate among analysts about whether the KMT was going to be in effect another version of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, a permanent government party within a democratic system because the opposition could not get itself organized effectively to compete with it. The democratic transition had gone far enough by the time I left in '89 that that kind of debate was taking place.

*Q: While you were dealing with Taiwan, were we ever called upon to steam the fleet or something from the seventh fleet up and down the Formosa Strait and that sort of thing?*

BROWN: This was not the period of military confrontation in the Strait. I mean we had issues that we had to deal with because the Taiwan military and the PRC military were occasionally coming into close proximity of each other in the strait. In the mid 80s, the Taiwan military was still quite confident. They had higher quality systems and they would sometimes try to fly too close to the mainland and provoke the PRC. At times we had to warn Taiwan from doing that sort of thing.

*Q: Quemoy and Matsu which were household names back in the '60s, what was happening with them?*

BROWN: Very little. I mean there was some talk, in the context of Taipei's decision to open up travel to the mainland, about what role the offshore islands might play? Can something take place in terms of travel back and forth there? Intriguing questions, but in 1987 when travel to the mainland had just begun, it was too early for such a major change on the offshore islands.

*Q: Were there ever any problems with mainland students and Taiwanese students at UCLA or where have you, what have you, at one of the universities?*

BROWN: Not that I can recall. That was a period when PRC students were coming to the U.S. in large numbers, and there have long been thousands of Taiwanese on campuses as well, but I don't recall any significant problems.

*Q: Did Taiwan make any noises during the 1988 election between Bush and Dukakis I guess it was about political contributions or anything like that?*

BROWN: I don't recall a problem on that.

*Q: You probably would have if there had been. When did you leave in '89?*

BROWN: In July or August.

*Q: How did you, you left just after the whole Tiananmen thing?*

BROWN: That's right.

*Q: This is tape five, side one with David Brown*

BROWN: Yes, I had observed the drama of Tiananmen while still in Washington. The students in the square, the mass demonstrations of a kind that had never been seen before in Communist China, many ordinary citizens joining in, delegations from different ministries participating in the demonstrations. For a while, I believed this would lead to some very significant change. Then martial law was declared and the military suppressed the demonstrations.

In Taiwan, there was a lot of optimism that spring that real reform might occur in China. Then of course, when the crack down came, this bubble burst and the usual attacks on the communists resumed. What happened to cross-strait travel, trade and investment during this period is very interesting. Businessmen went to the mainland, business continued, investments continued, it was rather remarkable. After Tiananmen, when most of the world was reducing contacts and there was reluctance by many in the West to invest in China, to everyone's surprise Taiwanese investments just kept going pretty much as though nothing had happened. It was motivated by business opportunities and most of the investments were in the southern coastal part of China, which was not heavily affected by what was going on in Beijing.

Was Taiwan intelligence involved in trying to support the democracy movement in China during that April May period? We didn't have very much information on that at that time. Most of the external support from overseas Chinese seemed to be coming out of Hong Kong rather than Taipei. But how much came from Taiwan wasn't clear at the time.

*Q: Were we, how did we feel about Taiwanese investment in China? I mean was this a good thing?*

BROWN: A good thing, yes.

*Q: So, we weren't concerned that they were making another competitor for us?*

BROWN: No. You have to remember that this started slowly. There had been a certain amount of unacknowledged trade going on indirectly before the travel ban was lifted in '87. The volume was still modest and not in the high tech area. It was textiles and shoes and sportswear and products like that. Today if you look at the cross-strait trade it's a very different picture. It's a huge factor both for China and for Taiwan. It is very much tied into global IT trade.

*Q: What about Taiwanese versus mainland diplomacy in Africa and other places? Was this at all sort of a battlefield while you were there?*

BROWN: The diplomatic struggle was a constant phenomenon. I can't remember who lost and who won what in that particular period.

*Q: Well, then, when you left there after Tiananmen, where did you go in '89?*

BROWN: Before we leave, let me just come back to one other issue that was very important in those days and about which there have been reports subsequently in the public record. That is the question of non-proliferation in Taiwan.

*Q: You're talking about non-proliferation?*

BROWN: Well about the Taiwan effort to acquire nuclear weapons, which we talked about earlier when we discussed the period when I was on the desk in the '70s. We went through another bout of this. It was reported at the time that Taiwan formally shut down and disabled its research reactor in 1988. This was the reactor they had purchased from Canada in the 1960s. The

other information in the public media was the defection to the United States in early 1988 of one of the deputy directors of the Taiwan Atomic Energy Commission. The circumstances were never very clear in the media under which this individual ended up in the United States, but the fact that he was here was reported at the time and it is in the public record now. Dealing with this issue was one of the most important things the U.S. did in this period. It was in a way cleaning up after our own mess. I say that because the impetus for getting back to an interest in nuclear weapons by the Taiwan military came after we switched relations and their sense of insecurity became very real. Things developed to the point that we had to discretely tell Taiwan that this reactor had to be shut down and disabled. That reactor was the core of the problem because it could be used in a weapons program. In the '70s we had agreed Taiwan could continue to operate it under IAEA safeguards and it just became apparent that that wasn't the smart policy.

*Q: Well, how did the Taiwanese react?*

BROWN: Well, there were only a very small number of people in Taiwan who were aware that this was an issue. They essentially were persuaded that their relations with the United States, with the Reagan and Bush administrations, were more important to their security than anything they might be thinking of doing in terms of developing a weapons capability of their own. The people who were involved in it saw that the better part of wisdom would be to shut down this reactor. This took place around the time that Chiang Ching-kuo passed away. The only thing known to the public was that the deputy director of the Atomic Energy Commission and his family had disappear from Taiwan and it was rumored gone to the United States. We were fortunate enough not to have congressional hearings on this, thanks to some careful briefings of key members, so there was no sort of public discussion of it in the United States either.

*Q: When this director and family left, what was behind it?*

BROWN: Well, I think I better leave it at that because I don't want to go beyond what is in the public record. I think you could put the pieces together you could assume that something he told us was significant in terms of our understanding of what was going on.

**MARK S. PRATT**  
**Consul General**  
**Guangzhou (Canton) (1986-1989)**

*Mr. Pratt was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Harvard, Brown, Sorbonne and Georgetown Universities. Entering the Foreign Service in 1956, he studied Chinese and was posted to Hong Kong. Throughout his career Mr. Pratt dealt with Far East and Southeast Asian affairs, serving in Taichung, Hong Kong, Vientiane, Paris, Taipei and Guangzhou (Canto), where he was Consul General. His Washington assignments also concerned Southeast Asian matters. Mr. Pratt was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: Well, now, in 1986, you left this containing-the-problem job, and you went where?*

PRATT: I went to Guangzhou as consul general, and Guangzhou is, of course, formerly called Canton. And so this was the principal consulate outside Peking itself, because we handled all the immigrant visas there, and therefore it was the largest American diplomatic mission in China, except the embassy in Peking.

*Q: Well, now, you were there from 1986 to when?*

PRATT: From 1986 to 1989.

*Q: This was your first time in the place that had always been over the horizon.*

PRATT: Well, except for when I was there in 1947, when I was a little boy. So yes, however, it had been so much on the periphery of or, shall we say, involved in what I was doing, so I can't say it was an anticlimax, but nonetheless it wasn't quite going home either, but it was certainly neither strange nor totally familiar.

*Q: Was there at all a sort of problem from the Mainlander China group within the State Department sending you there? I mean, if you were seen as pro-Taiwan, or something like that.*

PRATT: By that time, we had basically very congenial persons who realized that I had been very helpful for them in many areas and always completely consulted with them about anything we were doing which could have an impact on what Peking would think. And so we worked very closely together. Also at that time we had Paul Wolfowitz as the assistant secretary, and he was very staunchly supportive of the Taiwan side and those of us who were working on it. I had also, here in Washington, because of my handling of the Taiwan side, been cultivated by the people in the Peking Embassy, and that maintained, really, even after I came back from Guangzhou. So they have always had me in their sort of card file as somebody whom they may not be too happy with some of the things I was doing, but somebody with whom they'd keep very much in touch. So I had had close contacts with the other DCM (Deputy Chief of Mission) here, and before we went off to Guangzhou, my wife and I were invited there to their house for dinner, and other people I would see periodically - either the DCM or the political counselor - and we really had very good relations because they knew the limits of what they could expect to accomplish.

This is another thing which I think was very much a part of what was doing with Taiwan, and that is how you do things vis-à-vis Peking is often more important than what you do. That again, is a very Asian aspect. So long as you don't hit them in the face, so long as you do things in the right way, they may not be too happy about it, but you're not going to really incense them. And of course you do have to be constantly aware of where their interests lie, overall national interests and also the interests of the particular organization to which they belong, because China is no more totally unitary than is the United States. And while it doesn't break down the same way between Congress and House and Senate and State Department and so forth, nonetheless, there are very important different constituencies, and they are not always getting along that well. You've got to know which ones to deal with and how.

*Q: Well, now, Guangzhou, when you went out there in 1986, what was, as you saw it, the*

*situation there, the government, how things were going in Guangzhou? Talk about the greater area.*

PRATT: Sure. Our consulate covered four provinces. It started out being three provinces and then the island of Hainan was made a province, so in the end there were four provinces. Each one was very different, but they all were part of the greater south and, shall we say, the more economically inclined area of China. Early on in his career Deng Xiaoping had established special economic zones, of which the original ones, there were in Guangdong Province, and one was in Fukien Province, and therefore all four of them were within my consular district.

And these were ways that Deng was using to break from the centralized planning and centralized ownership and control system that was in place when he came in. He sent people to canvass how economies were run in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, and to compare all these notes and then submit a proposal about how they could get some of these methods which appeared to work in these areas and to establish those in special economic zones in the southern part of China, where they could be sort of cordoned off and made sure that if they developed any kind of "bad habits" they wouldn't spread elsewhere in China, but the major thing being that they would be test areas to figure out what could be done on the Mainland, based on what Deng considered the Chinese-type policies, the Confucianist background and all the rest of it, that South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore had found was compatible with the Chinese character.

So this was a very interesting approach, and he pioneered in many of these areas methods which subsequently were found to work and some of which they found didn't work and were abandoned and so forth. But this is very much part of the pragmatic approach of Deng Xiaoping, which of course is not at all a Leninist approach, and therefore this was the beginning of what has turned out to be the way in which China has taken almost a whole coastline and transformed it to what are often called capitalist principles, but aren't really capitalist. They are still much more bureaucratic capitalism or a whole range of things, but nonetheless where the economics is important. And that's where it's different from, say, the Stalinist and even the Leninist principle, which was that you do it regardless of what the cost in mere money is. And from the point of view of these other people, though, money is merely the means of finding out what it does cost you.

*Q: What were our concerns in this area?*

PRATT: Well, our concerns were that this was the area which was advancing most rapidly. I'm sure you know of Ezra Vogel's book, the two of them, on Guangzhou, one in 1964 and one later on which he was editing. He was completing his second book while we were posted there in Guangzhou. [Ed: Vogel, Ezra F., *Canton Under Communism* (1969) and *The Four Little Dragons: The Spread of Industrialization in East Asia* (1991), both Harvard University Press]

And therefore, this was from our point of view economic events in Guangzhou seemed to be pointing to the future. And making work economic rationality and the various aspects of this, but the primary thing was beginning to know what things cost so you know what's worth doing and what isn't.

*Q: Were we concerned as this developed that maybe the Chinese might turn into another Japan - in other words, milk our money and send us stuff? We have a very critical balance of trade problem. We've had it for some time, and during this period we had it. Was this a concern, Mark?*

PRATT: Oh, yes. And of course one of the principal purposes of our commercial attaché was to make sure that we did the most we could to try to expand U.S. sales in China. However, we did consider that the Chinese had a very different economy, after all, from the Japanese. The Japanese could sort of mount an export focused economy without necessarily being aware that they had so many consumers back at home, whereas nobody in Peking can consider that they have no consumers back in China. They've got 1.2 billion of them. Therefore this is not so easily done. Secondly, of course, Japan Incorporated - perhaps a rather accurate term to refer to the way in which a government business and so forth all work together. That was never the case in China, and of course I was there in south China, where things are run very differently from the way in which they are run up in the Shanghai area, which is again different from Xinjiang and Mukden [Ed: in Chinese, Shenyang] in Manchuria. We could see that there were a lot of different things going on. It was nothing like Japan.

Secondly, many of the goods which were being produced for the U.S. market, which were beginning to be produced in Guangdong Province, had previously been produced in Hong Kong or in Taiwan or occasionally in South Korea, and therefore this was merely a transfer. This was not a net increase, and therefore the trade deficit with China, which of course developed basically after I left - I mean, it was important by the time I was leaving, but even more important afterwards - nonetheless, this was based on a decrease in the deficit with Taiwan and with Hong Kong, because goods were nominally being produced in China and being carried on ledger books as coming from China, even though the company that may have been producing the stuff either was an American company which had previously produced the stuff in Taiwan or maybe a Taiwan company which was producing it on the Mainland. So you're merely shifting it from one *étiquette* to another; it's not a net increase.

Thirdly, China was far more open to joint ventures. Admittedly, we had problems with some, and often different problems in different parts of China, and we had the fewest problems perhaps in Guangdong province. In part, that was due to the experience of the Hong Kong people who had started many of these ventures or the Hong Kong partners who were involved with the Americans doing it, so if the Americans were running something they often would make sure that they would get somebody whom they knew in Hong Kong who would know the right people to try to handle in Guangdong Province, and sometimes the Hong Kong people would then pick people from Bangkok who were related to the people in part of Guangdong Province, the northeastern part, who would be able to line up political support.

And so what you get is basically very much a, say, rational economic proposal which would pass muster in the banks of Bangkok and in the money houses and export people and the design people and so forth of Hong Kong and getting the more rationally minded figures, which included some of the party types in Guangdong Province. So this was economic rationality, and down in that area we were able to benefit from it.

*Q: How successful was your consulate general in promoting U.S. trade? Were Chinese entrepreneurs coming to you and saying, "What have you got in the line of toilet covers or air conditioners?" - or what have you?*

PRATT: No, it was handled a little differently. Guangdong had a big exposition hall, and they had their annual trade fair for the promotion of Chinese goods, and Americans had previously come in to look at things at this fair and try to get an idea of what they wanted to buy. For sale of American products, we occasionally had shows which were run by the Commerce Department, generally focused shows of a particular type. We had one wine tasting, for example, which was not going to be doing very much for selling California wines, but in general the Americans would go out there and scout out the market and figure out what it is they could do. And they often would go in through joint ventures. So you had Beatrice, the food corporation. You had Heinz.

*Q: Another food.*

PRATT: Another big food one. And you had Procter and Gamble coming in for shampoos and things of that sort. They of course had to work out what it was they thought might sell in China, and of course, initial estimates were all very, very pessimistic about the level of consumption of people of China because people were really not doing a very good geographic examination of China to determine that the economy was very different in the coastal area from what it was in the interior, and therefore beauty products and things of that sort could be sold very easily in the more prosperous city areas of the coastal part of China. And so that's when they found that Head & Shoulders and other things of that sort could sell at prices comparable to the U.S. Also they had not really looked at the Chinese. I mean they knew what their monthly wages were, but they didn't realize that if they had an apartment the rent of which cost three-quarters of what the electric bill was and they were only allowed to have one 25-watt light bulb per room, then you realize that you're dealing with people getting so much as a monthly income, this is almost what a teenager would get who's living at home. It's available for such things as shampoo and beauty products and things of that sort. So China was developing a market much more rapidly than people had thought at first, and therefore baby food, for example, which Beatrice was doing and Heinz was doing, and a number of other things were being produced which could be sold on the Mainland as well as having things exported to Hong Kong and other areas in the region.

So that was part particularly of what we were doing in Guangdong Province. Continental Grain, for example, came in to produce feed grains for raising shrimp and chicken and pigs and so forth, and they were able to find ways of getting the grain stuffs from the northeast through military connections, and they, for example, got the backing of the agricultural head because they named his brother a member of the board and therefore he was getting money out of this, and they had the okay of the party secretary because his brother was connected with the banker who was brought in from Bangkok. So you know, when you've got these various factors together, you could get something going which could rely on American management and American expertise and gradually permit us to train other people. We did not try to do things as advanced as, for example, the Peugeot factory. The French established a factory for manufacturing automobiles in Guangdong Province, but they were piggy-backing on an old company that used to make buses

and so forth, and they had all the kinds of usual problems with the Communist Party organization within the enterprise and the labor organizations which made difficulties. Most of the Americans coming in were able to establish an organization where they could make sure they got on the right side of some of the right people there, and some of these right people, no doubt, were getting paid off. And of course, as we found in the case of the Soviet Union, a little bit of corruption sort of get wheels moving. When you get a lot of corruption, then you get a falsification of the economic system.

*Q: Speaking of corruption, I would imagine this would be one of the things you'd be monitoring rather closely, to see what it was doing to the system.*

PRATT: Well, obviously, one of the problems we have is the American law which does not permit Americans to engage in the kind of corruption which others do.

*Q: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.*

PRATT: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act is not something which the French or the Japanese and so forth have ever adopted. So we had to look at this and sort of see that, well, probably they were having their partner in Hong Kong do the payoff.

*Q: I was thinking more not so much on the American economic side, but looking at basically the political system in this 1986-89 period. Were you seeing the corruption as being a major factor in sort of the politico-economic life of China?*

PRATT: Well, when I arrived in '86, the primary corruption was still political. In other words, the Communist Party membership gave you many rights and privileges, many of which were not financial, many of which were that your children would be able to get access to the better schools. They could go into the faculty of the school that they wanted to go into. They could get the degree they wanted. They could then go on to graduate school where they wanted to go. They then would not be sent out to the boonies but would get a job in some of the central enterprises and so forth. This was the kind of political corruption which was most offensive to many of the younger people there, particularly since, of course, that corruption often favored political figures who were not from the province. And therefore the carpetbaggers, from their point of view, would be the ones who were favored. They would get the better housing. They would be able to get all the perks. When they retired they would get much better housing and they would have a car and driver assigned to them and so forth. So that's the kind of corruption which I think is most common in Communist systems.

Let me give you an illustration of the sort of things that I suggested. When Vaclav Havel was able to open things up in Czechoslovakia, he spread the news about the special facilities for high party figures, all of the special resort areas, all the special housing, all the special clubs, and all the rest of it - to show that Czechoslovakia was not, shall we say, a workers paradise. It was the party's paradise. Well, this was very true in Guangzhou. The whole area, you may be aware of, is this whole area in which Mao used to go because they liked to go south during the winter, and his wife had her special place which was very palatial. They had special trains which would transport them from the north. So this is the kind of privilege of the party figures which from the

point of view of the people there was the most annoying aspect of corruption. Monetary corruption, of course, was still, shall we say, in early stages because there wasn't much you could do with money. If you got a lot of money, what could you do with it? If you couldn't get it out of the country into a bank account abroad so that when you were abroad you could either gamble at Las Vegas or buy something for your children who were studying in the United States, what was the sense of having the money? You could get everything you needed through power.

*Q: How about your reporting work, your contact with the governments of your four provinces? What was your interest concern, outside of sort of keeping a finger on the pulse?*

PRATT: Well, of course, one of the key things we were always interested in was economic development and then the potential role of the United States, either in investing or in selling things there for a certain project which they were interested in. And for that, we did find that the economic zones were often the areas in which we would have the greatest success because these were where people who were sort of the entrepreneurial types from all over China might gravitate, because they made the first - and particularly Shenchen, near Hong Kong - this was the first sort of real Chinese city composed of people from all over China. In other words, it was not Shanghai and all Shanghainese, and it wasn't Peking with a lot of bureaucrats plus a few people from Peking. This was the children of some of the top leaders all over the country converging on Shenchen and making an overall-type Chinese environment, which again was very open, particularly to Hong Kong, but then also open to the U.S., because Hong Kong is certainly very open to the U.S. So we would go around primarily to be seeing those places where there was some economic venture which they could want our assistance for or we could facilitate. For example, I went down to the opening of an automobile showroom in Hainan, and there weren't going to be many American automobiles, but it was an American-connected venture, through Hong Kong. And so I think in the end, probably from one of the aspects of corruption that was important there, because Hainan Island had had special import arrangements, and this had resulted in one of the biggest scandals just before I got there of their buying automobiles through this special privilege and then shipping them across the water into Guangdong Province. And one of the more gifted economic figures was finally coming back to Guangdong after being disgraced as the party figure in Hainan Island.

*Q: Were you running into the problem that I've heard of - of cars being stolen elsewhere, particularly in Hong Kong at this particular time, being taken into China and then the army higher-ups were picking them up at margin rates?*

PRATT: Yes, well, this happened near the end of my stay, because the smuggling . . . Well, they recently had a very important clamp-down on smuggling in Fujian Province in Xiamen. And prior to that, of course, there was a great deal of smuggling into China from Hong Kong, including, as you mention, very high-quality cars being nabbed down there and then peddled on the Mainland. However, a lot of the cars in Hong Kong, of course they drive on the left-hand side of the road, and therefore they were readily noticeable when they suddenly turned up in, say, Chengdu, because who would get the left-hand drive for Chengdu? So there were certain limits to this. The better way of doing things is when they falsified what the customs declaration said, so that it would come in as one thing when it really was another, and a different duty would apply.

Of course, smuggling out of the country was also a key thing I was interested in, as you can probably gather from looking around here. I bought a lot of Chinese things over my career, and those stacks of boxes there contain porcelain I bought mostly inside China, but that one, for example, is a piece which was smuggled out of China, and I bought it in Hong Kong. So there was a very active market for Chinese antiques, lots of them dug up in western China at a time when they were putting in airfields and roads, including one major road for the rocketry and nuclear testing area, where they farmed out the land just ahead of the road builders, and the various smugglers would come in and dig up what they wanted and get assistance from the military in getting it down to Guangdong Province, from which it was then shipped across to Hong Kong. So indeed, there were aspects of corruption of this sort, but one of the things to keep in mind, as I say, is that when the president, the head of a country, Deng Xiaoping, would boast of having a salary of \$240 a month, you realize that how is he going to get private trains and private planes and all the rest of it based on that. Well, at some point also maybe he's going to want to have actual money, and this is one of the things, for example, which was addressed at one of the conferences we had with the education people. Deans of colleges would have housing provided. They would have servants provided. They'd have a car provided. But with the prosperity which was growing in their part of China, they would get as monetary reward far less than a taxi driver or a waiter at a joint venture hotel. And therefore, they could have all these perks, but how could you transform these perks into the common currency which would permit them to decide if they wanted to buy more cigarettes or if they wanted instead to buy a painting. All of this was -

*Q: Or pass on to their children.*

PRATT: Or pass on to their children, because they couldn't pass the housing, they couldn't pass the car and driver, they couldn't pass the cook in the kitchen. So indeed, the perks, which were fine under a Communist system and of course went way beyond what many other people would get, are not something in the end which even satisfies the people who get the perks - if you permit economic development at the same time, which then permits some people to get money. And this was where we got the animosity against economic development, because the people who were getting the money out of it were not the people who benefited from the political perks. In addition to that, one of the person whom we knew was the vice-chancellor of the University of Xiamen, who was a very gifted economist, had studied in Europe, and he also ran the Taiwan and the Southeast Asian special departments because he was an economist and then he worked on economic matters, too. And he said a lot of his professors in the economic area were also called in as advisors, consultants for the special economic zone there in Xiamen. He said, "What can a professor of Confucianism or a professor even of Marxism-Leninism - what can he go to offer somebody to be able to get monetary reward which is basically three or four times what he gets as his salary as a professor?" So these dislocations in the society which are produced by economic reforms had, indeed, contradictions which were making for political and other problems. They tried to raise salaries and they tried to equalize these things, but one of the most difficult things is their collecting their taxes. One of the very interesting things about Guangdong Province is they negotiated a kind of overall fee from Guangdong Province to pay to the central government, and once they came to that negotiated figure, it would remain the same for five years. While an economy which is growing 20 per cent a year, you could figure out that

whatever figure you worked out of this year, five years later it was awfully low.

*Q: Did you at this point, this 1986-1989 period, was Marxism dead, I mean, as far as a belief in your area, or not?*

PRATT: Well, shall we say, it was like many state religions: you can't be sure how many believe it, but you know that you dare not attack it. And what was more important was that fear of the thought police, the government, the party - well, not the government so much, but the party - had diminished following Deng Xiaoping. Deng Xiaoping had broken the back of the great fear mechanism, where everybody was so constantly paralyzed with fear. They had, shall we say, sensible caution about what might happen if you said the wrong thing or if you did the wrong thing, but you didn't have an all-pervasive fear of, my God, what can happen next? - which had, of course, existed during the anti-rightist movement, the Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution. So people no longer had the same fear. Now they knew that they had to be careful, and they also knew that there were certain people to protect them from others and there were other people who they would need protection from, so it was beginning to be a more complicated society, and Marxism was no so much the question as the state religion and being able to go to your catechism class and to learn how to say it. However, after 1989 and the Tiananmen incident, they tried to go back to the old system of having party hacks go in and lecture students and try to do what they did during the anti-rightist movement, where they had nuclear physics professors who had read Marx in the original German and Lenin in the original Russian be lectured by soldiers about Marxism-Leninism. So you know, this kind of system they could not go back to because the students laughed them out of the room. They only had to go sit there, and for days they had to discuss the terrible, terrible evens of Tiananmen - their version, namely that this was an anti-party and counterrevolutionary movement - and they were required to do this in such simplistic terms that university students just found it ludicrous. And they sort of let, therefore, the teachers know that it was ludicrous, and of course the teachers knew it, too. So there had been a lot of change since the Cultural Revolution, and Marxism, you know, was never quite what people think it was. Mao Zedong - what did he understand of Marxism? Even when he moved to Yenan and was already head of the party, he had read in translation only two documents connected with Marxism-Leninism: *The Communist Manifesto* and *Imperialism: The final Stage of Capitalism*, of Lenin. So he knew very little. He finally ordered them to translate more of these works into Chinese. There's a question whether he read very much of them. So Marxism I think has been always a big problem. If you call them traditional and Confucianist, that doesn't make much sense either, but certainly you would have to be far more complex in the discussion of what they are. The attitudes, indeed, were anti-imperialist, but that's often xenophobia, and what has xenophobia got to do with Marxian internationalism?

*Q: Yes. When you were dealing with this, did you find that Marx's slogans were given to you by party people and all that, or was this kind of a dying thing?*

PRATT: Well, this was dying, and when people came in from the north and addressed formal gatherings and they referred to "comrades" at one point, this was something which the local people would sort of shake their head at because they were losing that term and were using "gentlemen" and "ladies" instead, going back to their previous locution. So a lot of these words which were introduced, for example - they used the word *lover* as the word for *wife*, instead of

the more formal *tai tai*. Well, by the time we were leaving, *tai tai* was back, and *airen* was not being used. Now admittedly there's a certain influence from Hong Kong, but also it's the fact that many of these people there were rather conservative and had never really liked some of the more barbaric terms which the Communists tried to introduce.

*Q: Did you find, as somebody who dealt for so long with Taiwanese affairs, that you were getting genuine questions on our Taiwan policy and all that, or was this a burning issue?*

PRATT: It was not a burning issue because, of course, they couldn't care less. Taiwan was farther north and was connected with Fukien Province, but even in Fukien Province they were interested in Taiwan, they wanted to know what I thought was going on there, what I thought was happening, but it was very objective. They were not sort of trying to convince me that they knew what Taiwan was about and the Americans were mainly causing the problems. And in fact, many of them figured that the big power factor in maintaining Taiwan separate from China was Japan, not the U.S., and they said, "That's the trouble with you Americans. You're very trusting and naïve and you don't realize how devious these Japanese are. They are using *you* to preserve their role in Taiwan. After all, they ruled Taiwan for 50 years, and they have people who really have fond memories of Taiwan as part of Japan and wished it would become part of Japan again, and therefore you Americans are merely serving Japanese interests." So that's the framework in which they would occasionally approach it, but not just lecturing me, you know, "You've got to turn her over or else we'll bomb Los Angeles." I mean, that's something which they will say for people up in Peking who could be that heavy-handed.

*Q: What about visas? This was your principal stock in trade in a way in Guangzhou. Was this something you could turn over to your consular section and let go, or did visas impinge on your work?*

PRATT: Well, not too much, much less so that probably in Hong Kong in the good old days. But it was, after all, it was a relatively small number of people who would try to come in to apply for either student visas or business visas. So these non-immigrant visas were rather limited, and they, of course, would be - you'd have to get all the documents which the government would give, and the government was more concerned about who went off to study in the United States than American universities were. Therefore, most of these were pretty much straightforward. It was not like Taiwan or Hong Kong, where many people wanted to go to the United States to be able to get out, and they could still get passports to get out. In China they couldn't get passports to leave unless they had fulfilled their military requirement and graduated from the proper university and were going for the proper course of study in the U.S. and all the rest of it. So those were not so much of a problem.

Then, of course, the rest, the biggest number of visas were immigrant visas, and those, of course, were done basically pretty much by rote, and therefore with any good consular section you handled that without much trouble. The one exception was when we got a few people - it was a small number - who were trying to get out of China after the Tiananmen incident because they themselves were implicated in the Tiananmen incident.

*Q: You were there after the Tiananmen incident.*

PRATT: Oh, yes, and up until October and so forth, all the fall out from that we were very much exposed to. And we therefore had a number of people who had been on the staff of Zhao Ziyang, for example, who were able through friends and other ways of getting down to Guangzhou. However, if they were going to get into Hong Kong, it would greatly help them if they already had in their passport a visa for the United States, so in a number of cases we facilitated giving visas without excessive concern about what their *bona fides* as a *bona fide* non-immigrant were. We would sort of say, "Non-immigrant? Well, they might qualify for political refugee, political asylum in the U.S." And therefore we could conclude that we were giving them visas on the proper grounds. We got basically an okay from Washington to do that because we were the last position on the underground railroad before they finally got out to Hong Kong or elsewhere, and in order, as I say, to be able to get by in Hong Kong and not be turned back it was much easier if they had a visa for them to go on to the United States. They did not all go on to the United States. In fact, one went directly to Paris, because once they got to Hong Kong, they were able to contact the French consulate general and get a way of getting out there, but they didn't have a French consulate general in Guangzhou at that time.

*Q: Well, then, let's talk about Tiananmen Square. This is what, June or May of 1989?*

PRATT: Well, the whole incident really started in April of 1989. One should keep in mind that 1989 is after all the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the French Revolution, and the French Revolution was very, very important in the thinking of many of the Chinese political movements of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. They went back to the French Revolution as much as to the Russian Revolution of 1917. Also it was the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement of 1919. In addition to that, it was the 40<sup>th</sup> anniversary, 1949-1989, of the establishment of the People's Republic. So there were three very important anniversaries coming up, and in particular there was an interest among many students to do again what students had done for the May 4<sup>th</sup> movement. In other words, they had gone against their elders and were in the forefront of pushing nationalist and other important issues. So even before the deaths on April 14<sup>th</sup> or 15<sup>th</sup> of the former party chairman - it will come to me during the course . . . Even before his death, you had already had students coming in from the United States and elsewhere to make plans for a big demonstration on May 4<sup>th</sup>. And when he died, one of the key things they had was a memorial service for him, and this is when they had the first of the big demonstrations, because he was considered somebody who had pushed for some of the reforms and had been ousted as party secretary because of his interest in reform. There are other reasons, I'm quite sure, and I've heard a number of them, but certainly from the point of view of the students, he was one of the few "good guys" in the top party organization. And so they demonstrated very forcefully in his favor, and this was somewhat along the lines of the demonstrations which Deng Xiaoping had been involved in with the death of Zhou Enlai. So this, again, was harking back to previous political events, and therefore the symbolism was not lost on the Chinese in general. And so these things went on, these demonstrations, regularly, and one of the big problems, of course, for Deng Xiaoping was he had wanted to have the business of Gorbachev go smoothly -

*Q: This was the first visit since Khrushchev.*

PRATT: That's right, the first visit since Khrushchev.

*Q: So it was sort of reopening that tie to what was still the Soviet Union.*

PRATT: That's right, but also obviously a Soviet Union which had greatly changed and one where Gorbachev was certainly prepared to make sure that there was no hectoring from Moscow to Peking. He was going to be open and placating and not necessarily say that China was the older brother, but he wouldn't say that Russia was the older brother either. So this was going to be a very different relationship, and it was very important for Deng Xiaoping because he had been the focal figure in the Sino-Soviet split some 20 years or more before that - 1957, I guess it was.

*Q: 30 years.*

PRATT: So 30 years before that he had been the key figure to say very tough, nasty things to Moscow. And here was going to be an occasion for sort of a love feast. Now one of the key things which Deng made his point to tell President Bush when they met before the Gorbachev visit - and perhaps I'll say a few words about that Bush visit later - but one of the few things he said was that this is, however, not going to be a new alliance; it's not going to be something that is aimed at the United States, and so on. But the only message he was really trying to get across to Bush, which shows the importance he attached to the Gorbachev visit and how annoyed he was to find that he could not even greet him in the Tiananmen. They had to meet elsewhere, near the airport, and not go through the streets of the city and so forth. Now this, for a Chinese autocrat, was a great loss of face.

*Q: I think for all of us who were watching this thing, were wondering. First it seemed interesting, but it kept going on and on, this camping, and it seemed like the Politburo was paralyzed. I mean, here you were, a Chinese hand of long experience, and from your colleagues in Guangzhou, were people wondering what the hell is happening here? I'm talking about Chinese, too. I mean, why aren't they at least making nice to the students or wiping them out or doing something?*

PRATT: See, the perspective, when you mentioned the Politburo, it's a very important point. This, however, is not what was coming out of our embassy, and it was not what people in Washington were talking about. But it was what people in Guangzhou were talking about because they saw this as an example of quarrels within the top. In the first place, Hu Yaobang (the name came to me), the party secretary general who had been removed-

*Q: He's the one who died.*

PRATT: He's the one who had died. But he had been thrown out a little more than a year before that, and so that showed a division because Deng Xiaoping had said he was basing his succession on two figures, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the one taking over the party, the other taking over the government administration. Well, one of them was out, and then, of course, Zhao Ziyang was told to pick up the party position, a position in which he had no real deep roots, and he had to give up the State Council, the premier position, in which at least he had some important roots - colleagues, person whom he'd put in there, people who had served with him in a variety

of positions where they knew each other and had shared interests. Got him over to the party, sorry that's not where he had any of these advantages. So people down in Guangzhou were saying Zhao Ziyang had been the major protector of Guangdong Province and its rather central economic past because he had been down there in Guangdong province in the late 1940s and '50s. He had been a principal assistant to the head of the political movement in Guangdong province, and from their point of view it was someone like Zhao Ziyang who would be defending them. And indeed, one of the key economic figures was the senior governor, and a couple of times I was going to Peking he would be on the same flight because he had to fly up to Peking to find out what it was that his friends and the friend of Guangdong Province wanted them to do, because he didn't trust the bureaucracy in between and he didn't trust the communications. So this was very clearly a demonstration of these problems which existed within the top leadership. And we heard that this indeed was paralysis. Zhao Ziyang was party general secretary, and he had been sent off to Korea just as this was boiling up and just when they were having some of these really hard-liners, the ideologues, draft a big editorial to the effect that the demonstration in Tiananmen were not only anti-party but were counterrevolutionary. And this, of course, was a criminalization of this demonstration. Poor Zhao Ziyang was off in Korea when this was taking place, showing, I think, that they were not at all unhappy to have to governor out of the way because they knew that he would be opposed to this. He sent a *pro forma* statement back okaying the editorial, but the minute he got back he tried to fight against it and to have the demonstrations characterized by far more gentle terms, hoping, of course, to be able to defuse it because there were many of the objections which the students were coming up with which were so similar to the ones which had been used during the May 4<sup>th</sup> Movement, that they struck very strong chords within the minds of many of the Chinese people, and as you probably saw at the time, there were banners outside a number of the ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, supporting the students. And they began to get workers supporting the students. So there was no question that the tenor of the population in Peking was very much favorably disposed towards the students, because in general students in China are, I can't say coddled, but in any case they're respected because everybody hopes that their son will turn out to be bright enough to get into one of those prestigious central universities. And therefore they have this esteem for intellectualism, and of course Mao had a great deal of contempt for it. But the average Chinese continued to believe that the students could be the saving grace of China.

*Q: While this was going on, could you say, as it started, what were you getting from the embassy and were you all wondering was this the beginning of the great revolution or not? I mean, were you looking at it or were you seeing this as another blip?*

PRATT: Well, we were, of course, getting a certain amount of characterization of the events and facts about those people who went and talked to people in the square, but down in Guangzhou, this was viewed as basically the sideshow, that the real fight was going on within the councils of the central leadership. They said, you know, "Don't look at what's going on in the square because, although that is significant and what all the people are seeing, that is merely the outside of what is really going on, which is going on inside the very closely . . ." You know Peking's geography - Zhongnanhai, which is where all the top leaders lived, and that basically had one gate which goes almost directly on to the Tiananmen Square. So it's all very close together. But they said the real struggle is going on in the top leadership. And they are not in agreement, and

they don't view it the same way, they don't know how to handle it, and this is therefore a typical Chinese event with something on the surface that everybody is paying attention to, but it means that they are not looking at what the real drama is, and that, of course, was the effort to get rid of Zhao Ziyang. And one of the things which they told me down there in Guangzhou was that it looked for while as though when Zhao Ziyang was in the square and when he told the students, "I have come perhaps too late," and he apparently even had tears in his eyes, terribly impressing some of them as being very emotional and sympathetic, that this sort of showed the degree to which he knew that he would rise or fall based on what went on in the square because he was under attack.

Subsequently there has been other information out. Xu Dao Zhin [Ed: ?], who had been party secretary in Hong Kong, apparently a good friend of Zhao Ziyang, they tried to see Deng Xiaoping during this difficult period and Deng's office shut him off and let them go. So they went to see Yang Shangkun and asked him to tell Deng that they would like to see him because they would like to explain what they thought was really going on with the student demonstration and what was going on behind the scene with those trying to take a tough line towards the student demonstration. Subsequently, I guess they learned that Yang Shangkun had already gone over to the other side, those opposing Deng, and certainly opposing Zhao Ziyang, and he never passed this message to Deng.

So it's this kind of internal efforts which have been so typical in Chinese dynasties around the emperor, and this was apparently what was a spin-off into what was going on with the student movement because, of course, as you can imagine, if you get that number of students together, and you can get a lot of people of security services right out there as well, because they have always had very strong security services in all the universities anyway, because students are one of the elements that they are most concerned about and have the greatest difficulty in sort of having confidence that they will do the right thing because they are often very bright and they will do what they think rather than what they're told to do. In any case, we heard afterwards that there were many *agents provocateurs* there, who were trying to make sure the students couldn't come to an agreement on anything, so that when they were saying, "Zhao Ziyang says he will listen to us but wants us to get off the square, so let's do that," they could not get people together to get a consensus, and they could not do anything without having a consensus. And so this is when these *agents*, who were trying to make sure they couldn't do anything except what they were told by their own bosses to do, were very successful, and afterwards one of the student organizers whom I knew said, "Well, you know, we have made several big mistakes. One, we accepted a consensus rule rather than a majority of a committee, which would be feasible and could take decisions." Well, in addition to that, almost all these people, of course - or many of them - were children of some of the top leaders, and so they knew that there was a squabble going on in the central office there, and instead of trying to work with those people who would have been closer to their side against the others, they were trying to oppose both of them. And that's when Wuer Kaixi and the others who said to hell with all of them, to hell with Li Peng, to hell with Zhao Ziyang, without considering that if you're in favor of Zhao Ziyang, you've got at least one ally against Li Peng. So this was another big failure which he said they'd made: they did not understand that the enemy of my enemy may be at least in part a friend.

So this was a big failure on the part of the students to be able to figure out what was going on

around them, to be able to manipulate and to be able to adapt to the squabbles which were going on. You know, some of the military were asked to participate and found that they were busy or . . . One of the ones I knew went to the hospital to be able to say, "Sorry, I'm in the hospital and cannot attend this meeting."

*Q: Well, now, were there comparable demonstrations in Guangzhou, or was this not a student area?*

PRATT: Well, there were demonstrations, but they were beautifully controlled there because everybody was agreed as to how to handle them and to make sure that they could go on without a big confrontation. They only permitted a bridge across the river to be blocked for one short period so that people could still get across by boat and by the other bridges. So they did arrest a few people, but they said they had arrested people who were "outside agitators," not students from Guangdong Province. They had a meeting every afternoon in the governor's office, looking down on some of the principal areas where they were demonstrating, and all of the aspects of the government - the party and security services and so forth - were there, and the governor had sufficient clout with the military to make sure they didn't do anything prematurely. Though they were told they should get tanks ready south of town, he made sure they were never brought in and that no real military were ever brought in. In addition to that, they had agents within the students, and of course we had our consulate people out there talking with both the students and the other people around there. And so it was handled in a rather kid gloves way, with due respect for the students and their concerns, and none of the real confrontation which existed in some other places. Shanghai was handled pretty well, and that's one of the reasons why Zhang Zemin is now in power. He was considered to have played at least a skillful role in making sure the demonstrations did not get out of hand in Shanghai. But they went even more smoothly in Guangzhou.

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*Q: Today is the 14<sup>th</sup> of March, 2000. Mark, let's talk about the Presidential visit. This is George Bush, who came there in February of 1989, is that right?*

PRATT: That's correct.

*Q: And you were called up to help?*

PRATT: Yes, all the consuls general were there to assist because there many protocolarities as well as other things to be done, and since we were often the old China hands there in the country, it was useful to have us there because we spoke the language and knew the cast of characters and so on. And there was, of course, quite a bit going on. The Presidential visit was set up rather hastily in that it was originally designed for Bush to attend the services for the death of Emperor Hirohito, and therefore originally this was supposed to be in Japan, the visit, and then when they added on, obviously that could not be done in advance of the emperor's death, so of course the timing of this was relatively short for most presidential visits, and particularly short for the visit to China.

I think I've mentioned earlier the fact that one of the problems was that the President himself, of course, had been head of the liaison office in Peking. He had met many of these persons during that particular period, which of course was still very early. It was, after all, before Deng Xiaoping was really in power. But nonetheless, he felt that he had maintained an awareness of what was going on in China through subsequent postings such as head of CIA and so on. And he certainly had a great deal of interest in this. He had obviously, during the period of Reagan, been one of the persons who was fielded whenever they had an important Chinese matter. So indeed, he considered that he was still very much a China hand, even though it was a very strange career for a China hand. But it did make for certain problems in that it was very difficult to get information through to him and be sure that it was going to go, because everybody was very antsy along the way about what they would try to tell the desk officer for China. Baker at one point apparently told people not to expect him to raise any matter of concern to China with the President because that was the President's area, not his. So we had a bit of a frustration in that, with the visit set up so soon before it took place, we were concerned about getting the President aware of what had evolved in China since he had been able to keep hands on, because after all as President, he didn't really have enough time to be a really good desk officer.

So there had been, of course, starting in 1986, the attack on Hu Yaobang, and this had resulted in his being eliminated from the hierarchy. And then of course, there was the fact that Zhao Ziyang had been made secretary general over his own objections, and his arguments with Deng were that he had no real strength to have any real force in that area. So it was clear that there was a big struggle going on in China trying to limit what Deng could do, particularly how Deng could create his own succession program. But this would be very difficult to get across, and indeed it was. What was sent from Guangzhou would not be easily signed off on to be going to Washington by the embassy because they were not anxious to say something which would not be well received. There were obviously questions of all kinds of programming, and I'm sure you are aware of the big fight over Fang Lizhi and how he was going to be put at the dinner that the President gave, and yet we were told that the Chinese side would not be very happy to have him on the guest list. And for the most part, we were letting the Chinese prepare their own guest list. So this was going to be a problem. There's a big dispute as to whether this proposal was something which was or was not signed off on by Washington.

*Q: Winston Lord took great umbrage. He felt that he had warned them about this dissident being on the list, but the political consequences one way or the other. It wasn't an either/or. But he said after it got blown up even more, the White House, which may or may not be true. . . but what usually happens is the White House staff had to blame somebody.*

PRATT: Sure, and it was Win Lord -

*Q: And it was Win Lord who took it, and he was, to use the diplomatic term, pissed off at how they had done that.*

PRATT: That was, I think, emblematic of the problems of real communication between China and the President, because nobody knows whether they actually raised this with the President and whether Bush and others, when he had gone to the Soviet Union, had insisted on seeing dissidents and therefore this was viewed by Win Lord as something which they would be

expecting to do, either to see him there, or at some point to do deal with somebody as prestigious as Fang Lizhi. And I think if you have a chance to interview Doug Paal -

*Q: Who is this?*

PRATT: Doug Paal. P-a-a-l. He who was in the Bush White House [Ed: NSC], and he has some rather nasty things to say about Win Lord and the way in which they viewed the whole operation of the American Embassy. Doug is a very intelligent and very capable officer, and he now is in private business here. But a very good observer and a very sharp mind, very competent. In any case, this was part of the difficulty we felt, in that we were trying to get word, and you had so many filters, because the embassy was not anxious to present stuff to Washington which *they* thought might upset people there. When it got to the State Department, *they* were upset about how they could present stuff to go all the way up to Baker, and then Baker himself was not anxious to be trying to tell the President what to do on a matter concerning China. And Doug Paal was, I think, a very competent person there, and how this slipped by I don't know. But it was, as I say, very clearly a part of the problem of trying to get the President to be aware of what he would run into when he got there. And as someone commented to me who was involved and attended many of the meetings and knew what had happened, almost all the position papers which had gone to the President distorted or, rather, did not prepare him for what it was he ran into.

We, of course, had never been very fond of Li Peng. Li Peng made a visit to the United States, escorted by Jim Lilley, who I think made sure that other people realized that we were dealing with somebody who was not either a friend of the United States nor somebody who would be easy for us to deal with. So he, of course, was in Zhongnanhai, and they wanted to have merely a protocolary exchange with Li Peng and not to try to do anything of real substance. They wanted to discuss the economy with Zhao Ziyang, the premier, who was basically one of the sharpest economic minds in China, and they wanted then to discuss a number of other things with his old friend Deng Xiaoping. Well, it turned out that Deng would discuss only one thing, and that was the visit of Gorbachev and the fact that this did not mean that there was going to be a resumption of any strong ties between China and Russia - in other words, allaying any presidential fears in this regard. And Zhao Ziyang was not permitted to discuss the economy. The only thing he was trying to present was the need for a greater control over the political side, and therefore this was a kind of neo-authoritarianism which he had been associated with, which was designed, of course, in his mind as a reformer, to be able to say we're not going to have the old, stupid type of the old timers still in power; we intend to have a much more flexible way of dealing with this and moving toward political reform as well, be it that any political reform matters on his agenda. But he was able do discuss only a very small range of that, and almost all the other substantive conversations were ones which Li Peng had been charged with handling. And of course, on the American side that means the last person he wanted to talk to about anything we had which was substantive.

So this made, I think, for a visit which was, I think, very revealing for the President because it was far less of the, shall we say, ability of the old friend of China, George Bush, to be able to do things the way he wanted to with people whom he had previously known and whom he thought he could really be friendly with. I think you're aware of the fact that he was very, very much - I

shan't say an egotist - but he was very much a person who believed in his own persuasiveness and himself, and took up the telephone and talked through interpreters, to people all around the world when he was President and thought that was one of his really important accomplishments. And indeed, in most cases it was. Certainly, the way he was able to muster support for the Gulf War was -

*Q: And the fall of the Soviet Union.*

PRATT: Yes, the fall of the Soviet Union as well, and indeed, obviously, the current President believes in soft-soaping people his own way as well. I mean, it's part of, I guess, the ego satisfaction one gets from being the head of the United States. But in any case, he wasn't able to dictate what happened there, and therefore, as we tried to say subsequently, this should be a good illustration of why it is we ought to be concerned about what might blow up next, because China was obviously going through a period of considerable problems. If Deng Xiaoping himself could not sort of respond openly and have a free-ranging discussion with our President, then obviously he must be having trouble with other people in his country, even though he was supposed to be the paramount leader.

So in this framework we were stirring around, and I was in charge of escorting people to the room where they had the cocktails before the dinner began. I sat at the second table after the high table, which was a nice long one with people arranged in protocol order, and I was going to have at my table Ji Pengfei, who had been foreign minister, and I had seen him in Paris in 1973, at the Paris conference, and had chatted with him there, so I was looking forward to finding out what he was doing. And of course, he was, although out as foreign minister and nominally not a person of high position, still very, very influential as one of the people who still had his own special office and was really a top coordinator of foreign policy matters for Deng Xiaoping. So indeed, he was a considerable figure, and he was whipped away to take one of the seats at the high table after one of the persons who did have high position either was told to move down below because Ji Pengfei really outranked him, or something else occurred - we don't know exactly because the Chinese handled their own side pretty much.

But over in the corner was the corner was the table at which Fang Lizhi was supposed to be, and my commercial consul was going to be the head American representative at that table. She was the granddaughter of Sun Yat-sen, and therefore she knew loads of people.

*Q: What's her name?*

PRATT: Sun . . . Nora Sun, as it would be pronounced. And Sun Fei-feng is her Chinese name. In any case, she is now living back in Shanghai. She's left the Department of Commerce and is in business of her own. But as I say, this was a dinner which we had hoped would move rather smoothly, and but for the Fang Lizhi incident, I guess it did move pretty well, as the rest of the visit did. But the major point was that for those of us who were old China hands, we saw that there were indeed many strains, and it was not as though Deng was the full-scale emperor able to command everything, and therefore it was indicative of the troubles which we saw still coming.

*Q: Did you see this at the time as being - I won't say a paralysis - but maybe a government put*

*on hold as far as relations with the United States? With what happened, did it pertain to the United States - sort of freeze us out - or was it more just the internal workings that they weren't able to deal with, a major foreign country?*

PRATT: Well, obviously there are certain foreign policy matters in which relations with the United States cut into high-level quarrels within the Chinese leadership. One, obviously, is Taiwan. It's up again, and it has always been and will continue to be a major issue where you cannot separate fights within the leadership from the relationship with the U.S. Also aspects of economic development are tied in with that. Zhao Ziyang had been very open to suggestions from the United States about various ways of reforming their economy. Now reform, of course, basically is far more than just a tinkering with little things around the edges, when you're dealing with a command economy on the Stalinist approach, and you're dealing then with the determination to marketize it and also to break down the threads of control which this authoritarian system used primarily through the economic side of things. He was trying, for example, to free up housing. Housing is one of the things which they used to dominate their population. If you had housing of your own, then of course you at least had that much freedom from what you had to look forward to when you go home tonight, because you've got a house to go home to tonight. But then they can at any moment cancel that if they have the system which they previously had. Same way with retirement and, of course, also education and health care. These things were all tied in with their state-owned enterprise economic system with the strong role of the party committee within these state-owned enterprises.

So the whole reform question was one which was getting a lot of attention, and this of course was one of the reasons why many of the people were trying to get rid of Zhao Ziyang, and the attack on Zhao Ziyang had already started, even at this time. It was early in this, but we had already heard that there was a clique - and of course Chungyin [Ed: ?] was considered to be the top figure behind it, and he was using his old buddy Bo Yibo to attack Zhao Ziyang and his policies, and of course he was in a much more vulnerable position as secretary general than he had been when he was in the state councils as premier. So we saw this, and of course the fact that Li Peng was the one who was delegated to speak for everybody and Li Peng being renowned as the person who is most suspicious of the United States - he, for example, was very much opposed to having too many students go to the United States to study, especially graduate courses, despite the fact that this was one of the key points that Deng was in favor of - so he had Li Peng, who was known to have positions which were known to be very much opposed to those of Deng Xiaoping being the person who was supposed to be talking with us. It meant that they felt that they had to keep us at arm's length and keep the people who did understand what we would be saying from talking about these things and just having Li Peng, who could be most relied upon to keep us at arm's distance.

So yes, it did have a connection with U.S. relations. However, even more important than that was, of course, when you had the actual end of this affair, with the Tiananmen incident, the internal political side also had a great deal of impact upon American relations through human rights questions and through the fact that this was on everybody's television screens on a Sunday morning, when there's nothing more interesting to look at than to see what was going on in Tiananmen. And this is one of the things which we were trying to tell both the ambassador, Win Lord, and other people in Washington - that what happens inside China can also have an impact

on U.S.-China relations. These persons felt that we could insulate the two. All we have to pay attention to is just how we stroke the Chinese on our own relations; we don't have to worry about what happens within China. We felt that that had been what had taken place, and even Mao Zedong had been willing to have relations with us. But those were rather extraordinary circumstances. That was a time when he was terribly worried about the Soviet Union, and therefore he would compromise, in the minds of anybody who had been following what it is he had been writing all those years, his own principles by joining with the United States to try to have a joint program against the Soviet Union. So that was not a typical aspect of how China would deal with the United States. We were in a much more typical way when we had Deng fighting to be able to maintain at least some shreds of a good U.S. connection.

*Q: Well, do you think Bush and Baker caught the spirit of what was happening? You know, you have these visits, and they're busy and then they move on to something else. Did Baker and particularly Bush come away feeling disappointed that it hadn't worked very well?*

PRATT: I think he did. However, of course, he then had to move on to something else. But I think that the most important aspect was that he did not know why this had happened, and he didn't ask anybody why the trip had gone this way.

*Q: Do you think that too much emphasis had been put on the - I'm going to get my pronunciation wrong - Fang Lizhi incident, as opposed to something much more basic?*

PRATT: Yes, I think that scholars and op-ed writers felt that that as an incident, [it] was far more important than it really was, and they felt that therefore it was all our fault, too. And the fact that it should be structural problems within China, which is not our fault but their fault - or rather, their system, if not their fault - was far more important. And the whole Fang Lizhi incident was just a facet of that. And this was not just that Deng Xiaoping was annoyed that the U.S. should try to see Fang Lizhi - because I don't think Deng would have minded that much - it was that there were other people in the security services and the good old conservative ideologues who were annoyed, and they were able to use this with Deng against the U.S..

*Q: For the record, Mark could you give a brief summary of who Fang Lizhi was and what was the incidents because it's mentioned in other accounts, but I think we'd better put it on this one, too?*

PRATT: Very well, when Deng came in, he had four modernizations, and the military was the last of them. It was basically agriculture, to start, then industry, science, and national defense. And part of the young students were very interested in the fact that there should be four modernizations - which of course meant reforms of various kinds - but they wanted to add - democracy, political reform, as the fifth modernization. And of course, he was immediately thrown in jail for that. Well, Fang Lizhi was a far more prestigious figure. He, after all, was an astrophysicist who had been vice president of the University of Science and Technology in Anhui Province. He later had been part of the, shall we say, ferment which was used to get rid of Hu Yaobang as party general secretary in 1986-87. And he was then later on in Peking when they thought they could keep a closer eye on him, but he also was involved in saying that there needed to be reform in politics as well and that until you did get political reform you could not

really even expect the economic reforms to work. So he was obviously far in advance of what the top leadership was prepared to accept at that time. And even Zhao Ziyang, with his neo-authoritarianism, had a program to placate the top old-timers, hard-liners, Maoist types, and therefore had to be in opposition to Fang Lizhi. And so Fang Lizhi was clearly, openly seen as somebody who was not only going far beyond what was acceptable to the hard-liners, but even what the softer-liners, who knew they had to try to get an improved program including political reform, were prepared to condone at that time. So he was not *persona grata* to any of the top people because they had a big fight over how they could handle this, and as far as they could move was Zhao's position, and Zhao's position was also anathema to many of the old timers. And Zhao was already under considerable attack.

So to include him in a guest list was indeed something which, as others said, "Well, at least you should go to the Chinese side, tell them you're doing it, and find out if they'll accept it; and if they won't, then drop him - before you contact him." However, that's not what apparently the procedure had been when they had thought this up, and so they had sent an invitation to him through an American scholar who was working with him in Peking at that time, and that scholar had said he would both take the invitation and then accompany him to the door, in any case, of the dinner. So this was how it was arranged, and of course since he was under police surveillance, they were able to intercept the car and make sure it did not get to the banquet hall. If he had gotten through the front door, then he probably would not have gotten by the security people because they had found out about it, and therefore they were waiting for him and, of course, would make sure it didn't occur. There were, however, other dissident leaders who were not so prominent who did get through and sat at the table with my friend Nora. And so, indeed, the point had been made, and certainly the point had been made also about Fang Lizhi that it means that we ought to be able to talk to those persons who were not, shall we say, *personae gratae* to the top leadership. And as you may remember, he took refuge later in the ambassador's residence, and we finally were able to negotiate him out. That was Jim Lilley's accomplishment.

*Q: Well, we've talked about Tiananmen Square in Shanghai, but not the aftermath. We've talked about the immediate what happened, but you had some other points you wanted to talk about, didn't you?*

PRATT: Yes, one point which, of course, emerged from this was the fact that it was very difficult to have Americans believe that there *are* internal politics in other countries which can, indeed, in the end have an impact on our own relations. And this was part of the real struggle there, starting with, of course, the President's visit and the internal fighting that had an impact on who would talk with him about what. But then, of course, this meant also who was up, who was down, who was half under attack, and who was going to be perhaps even forced out. And this is the background for the events of Tiananmen.

This incident was one which I shan't say was totally predictable, but nonetheless it was clear that something was happening, and the question would be just when and how. It had a greater impact on how we did things in China than we think it needed to have, but that was because having it take place on American television on a Sunday morning meant that the reaction that Bush and particularly Baker would feel was the domestic impact here in Washington. They immediately felt that they had to respond by distancing themselves from what had happened in the square.

Students, who used to be a privileged class in China (and this is why this was such a bad incident from the Chinese point of view), but also young people in the United States, students or not, have a great deal of resonance with the general body politic and particularly journalism. So, of course, it was very difficult. They felt that they had to take actions which made no real sense in the China framework but made sense from the point of view of what you felt you had to do in the United States. And this is something which we felt caused some of the less intelligent reactions. I think Jim Lilley has probably told you about the problems when the Department refused to give permission for dependents who wished to leave to leave. They said no, you must make a country-wide decision, and it will apply to everybody, and it's a single bureaucratic, administrative *fiat*. All dependents, not those who wish to leave, but all dependents. Don't give anybody any chance to do what he thinks he ought to do or what seems to make sense under the circumstances. They all have to leave, and they have to leave from every place in China, even though some places had no problems whatsoever - such as Guangzhou. We had no problems of security or anything of that sort. And therefore, this was the administrative *fiat*, which they said they can only do it on a country-wide bases, and if so, people in the department ought to have their heads examined, because if you have a country as large as China and you're removing dependents because of a flood, well, you don't remove them from the desert areas. So I can't imagine that this is really what they really had to do under law. But they were telling us that under the laws and regulations, if you get the money from Congress to be able to get people out for any one place in the country, you had to be able to say you were doing it for everybody throughout the country.

So he lost, for example, in Peking. We had enough problems in Guangzhou, but they lost, of course, their local employees. We didn't really lose ours in Guangzhou. Things were moving pretty much as usual. But it meant that they had nobody to man telephones except some of the Chinese wives of some of the American employees. Well, they were suddenly told they had to be whipped out, and this was a time when we had received instructions also to assist people throughout china to be able to get out in case they felt they should - that is, scholars and businessmen and so forth. And they had nobody to answer the phones to be able to make contact with some of these people and to try to help make some of the arrangement to get people out. It was very, very complicated, very difficult. And this, of course, was part of the bureaucratic approach which was made. Also, of course, this was made, and they were trying to say that this will bring the Chinese Government to their knees.

And my wife, of course, was forced out to go to Hong Kong, and they wanted her to go back to the United States, and then, of course, they were going to say she couldn't go back to post and help me to pack up to move out because it was too close to my actual departure and so on, so she was going to stay in Hong Kong regardless of whether they paid for it or not. So she, of course, being a little bit irreverent, said, "Yes, there's nothing which is going to make Deng Xiaoping come to his knees quicker than to learn that I have been sent from Guangzhou to Hong Kong."

*Q: Yes.*

PRATT: This is part of the silliness, when you look at it from the point of view of what you say you are trying to do. And this is what Baker, of course, was trying to make sure the press, the media, and the Congress got, and that is, "We'll show these Chinese that we can be tough on them: we'll take all of our dependents out." Well this was, I think part of a game of the way in

which combines between the political appointees and the, I think, excessive concern about American media and public which can always be educated. I mean the media may be difficult to educate, but the public, I think, can generally be educated if you tell them why you're doing something, if you're doing something which makes sense.

And of course, the administrative side, which is very much interested in doing things in a hectoring and dictatorial fashion whenever they get a chance, because I think that they are so much smartened by the fact that they didn't get to be ambassadors and therefore they were very much resentful of people saying, "Listen, this is what foreign policy calls for us to do."

*Q: Well, how long were you in . . . or were there some other points?*

PRATT: Yes, one point I wanted to raise was the security side of things, because while I was there, Anne Armstrong, who was the head of the Special Intelligence and Security Group at that time, made a visit to Guangzhou with the Special Committee, and she was looking at the basic security situation in the Chinese posts. And we learned certain things which we had sort of expected that any security officer in the embassy could and should have told us. For example, we had a storeroom to which local employees had access on the floor directly below our communications area, and apparently you're supposed to have 10 feet of secure space around your communications equipment. I've forgotten what they call it, but there's something like this zone. And we could immediately improve that situation, as we did. We moved my office down there and had that as a space which was not open to local employees unescorted. So this sort of pointed out, one, the interest in security, which indeed we all should have and as you know most people who are in the political and economic side are well aware of the importance of security. Certainly American business is often very concerned about its security. But admin, of course, is not always understanding what real security is and what some of the problems are. They only have a rather mechanical concept of a piece of paper which has something stamped on it which is left out. And so we found that Anne Armstrong had some very tough security people with her who had previously worked, I guess, with the Congress, and of course, they were, I think, anxious to point out the inadequacies which most of us were well aware of and talking of standards which, of course, would perhaps never be possible in a place that we would occupy in China. Obviously the problems of Moscow were very much in people's minds. That was after the 1987 problems with the embassy in Moscow.

But it pointed out the problems, the kind of security which we really thought was important was often what people were telling us, because that would be what would cause problems for those people. Many aspects of communication such as a lot of secret cables had information which was fairly secret but information which was given to us by the Chinese Government and therefore it was secret but secret for the Chinese, too, and therefore they weren't going to be annoyed because they had told us.

But it was those things which were told to us which were not done with authorization which we had to be concerned about, and we found it very difficult to have some of the people, including the administrative officer in my consulate general, who was of course acting security officer, and he hadn't the foggiest notion. He would discuss the most sensitive matters in areas which were clearly bugged by the Chinese side. But because it wasn't a piece of paper with something

stamped on it, it didn't really strike his security consciousness.

Well, this again was part of the problem we had when we were trying to get the premises because DS (Diplomatic Security) was becoming increasingly - how should I say - professionalized. These were not persons who served sometimes as a personnel officer, then they served as a security officer, then they became and admin counselor or something of the sort; but it was becoming more of a professional group. And of course it was recruiting increasingly from the FBI, and it was indeed more and more within an FBI framework. They had approved the arrangements at our premises in Guangzhou, and the last thing they wanted to do was to let us move to any other place, because from their point of view it might be better, but the last thing they wanted was something which they would have to sign off on under new and more rigorous requirements, because it was somebody else who had approved where we were at that point. So every time we were thinking of trying to improve anything, we would run into those who said, "Listen, we would have to approve that, and we can't do it because it doesn't meet our standards, and what you have now is even farther from our standards, but we don't care about that because somebody else previously approved that." And this meant the perfect being the enemy of the better. We finally found that this was broken through only by a very, I think, gifted and very determined real estate developer type named Nicholas Salgo, who had been ambassador to Hungary [Ed: a non-career appointee who served as Ambassador in Hungary from November 1983 to August 1986].

*Q: I've interviewed him, yes.*

PRATT: You have? Very interesting and, I think, very helpful for all aspects of China security and premises. He, of course, was able to get through this only because he had the backing of Whitehead, who was Deputy Secretary of State.

*Q: John Whitehead.*

PRATT: John Whitehead - because only through that could you face down the determined opposition of the security people, because they of course could bamboozle any head of M (Bureau of Management) who was merely a career officer or even someone who was not a career officer, like Dick Moose. So I think that we sort of saw at that time that the diplomatic security element . . . Of course, it used to be SY, and then it became DS, and as usual when you change your initials often, you change what you actually feel you can do. And it was becoming far more important and far more, shall we say, difficult to deal with. Another aspect was that the FBI was getting greater inroads in that area, and then, of course, when they established OFM, then, of course -

*Q: What does OFM mean?*

PRATT: Office of Foreign Missions. Then, of course, that became a new bastion of the FBI in the State Department. And it was interesting that this was all taking place just as our major adversary, the Soviet Union, was in at least the beginning stages of its collapse. I think that the security side has become even more oppressive in recent years. I, of course, have been away from it since 1989, but from what I have heard, it is increasingly a problem, and it's enlisted

people in the Congress and enlisted in the press, including David Ignatius (I think it's he), who has been writing a series of articles pointing out how the State Department is totally unconcerned about security and you've got to believe these people from the FBI who have moved in on this problem that the great difficulties are still there. Well, obviously, Kennan had a very sharp response to that, as well as Art Hartman, if you've talked to him, he had a lot of problems when he was ambassador because, of course, the security people would be perfectly happy if everybody were withdrawn from abroad because we could keep better tabs on them here in Washington - so let's pack up our embassies and pull them in.

*Q: Well, anyway, I want to come back to your time in Guangzhou. Did you see a change? You left there in what, in 1989? Was the personal computer having any impact at all at that point, because in away this is a much more freewheeling form of communication - interest groups can get together and all - and I think it was probably in its infancy even in the States at that time; but were you seeing any beginning of change?*

PRATT: Well, the big beginning of change was the use of the cell phone, which of course was less high-tech, and the introduction of the fax machine, because both of these meant that communications could be facilitated, and the fax machines were used to great effect during the Tiananmen incident. Many people in the United States sent fax messages to every known fax address in China, which of course blocked a lot of things which were going on inside China and also got information to people in China, until the security services began cutting off all the fax machines. So this was, I think, a precursor because the computers were then relatively limited because there weren't any real PCs in China at that time.

*Q: A PC being a personal computer.*

PRATT: Personal computers. Except those the Americans themselves brought in. And the Chinese were, of course, just fascinated by them and liked them very much, but their computers . . . I mean, they had enough difficulty getting the airlines to have decent computer service between airports and so forth, and when people traveled there, you could have your reservations, but you got to the next place and you couldn't make a round-trip reservation because their computers weren't set up for it. So when even airlines and travel agencies had computers in such a sad state that you really had to rely on telephones for almost everything, it obviously was not an environment in which the PC was that important. Now when I've gone back to China since that time, in 1995 and 1996, then of course that had changed considerably, and people were getting their computers, and using the Internet. The nodes was difficult, but the thing is it's moving, and my Chinese friends here in the United States, for example, the one problem they have is that some of their friends in China are still very sort of nationalistic, and they want to have all of it go on in Chinese. And of course, English is so much . . . you can type the thing with just 26 letters and so forth. If you've ever seen a Chinese word processor . . . but it's a job to get any . . . They've improved the programs enormously, so if you type in the sounds for something or other, often the computer now can fill in the proper characters just from knowing what this would sound like if you were speaking. And so eventually, when they get the computers which will hear clearly, this will perhaps improve things considerably. But it's a long hike, so English is very much, again, the rich national computer language in China as well.

*Q: Well, did you find that the fact that you represented in Guangzhou an English-speaking country a tremendous asset. I mean, were the younger Chinese focusing on English as being a tool that they really needed to have? I mean, those who were thrusting ahead.*

PRATT: Yes, it was very clearly the international language, and of course many of these persons had contact with Hong Kong, where English was, of course, even more pervasive than inside China. The government had also, in the late 1950s, dropped Russian as the principal foreign language and had not even considered Japanese but had moved to English. So English was indeed considered the most important language, and even those persons who had done their studies in Russia in the '40s and '50s, they realized that if they were going to move ahead they would have to know English rather than just staying with Russian. And of course the top leadership to this day, Li Peng and Zhang Zemin - these are all persons whose Russian is a good deal better even than their English. I don't think Li Peng's English is very good at all, but Zhang Zemin speaks pretty good English, but then his Russian is better.

*Q: How about the overseas Chinese ... Were they playing any role as far as you saw in what was happening?*

PRATT: Yes, because many of them were working for American firms. They often had been, well some of them, of course, had been naturalized American citizens, but some were native-born American citizens but of Chinese origin, and they had learned enough Chinese so that they could be of use to American companies, so a lot of even top managers were ones who were sort of being selected to make these programs work in China, and of course, many of them, if they were from Hong Kong or Guangdong Province and so forth, would know Cantonese often as well as Mandarin, so that they performed as a very good cadre for American companies to work from. And of course, in addition to that, the Taiwanese were beginning to invest in south China, not just in Fukien Province opposite the island but also in Guangdong province. And they, of course, or many of them, were relatives. Shall we say, they were the owners who remained in Taipei, but the cousin who had gone to the United States and studied engineering would be the person whom they would pick to go work in China for a Taiwan firm. So indeed, yes, overseas Chinese were going back in considerable numbers, and the expansion of investment and trade with China had, shall we say, an increase in presence of overseas Chinese which was about keeping pace with the very rapid expansion of trade and investment.

*Q: As a consular officer, I've dealt with Greek-Americans, Korean-Americans, Yugoslav-Americans, et cetera, et cetera, who go back to their country of origin - either of birth or of origin - and often, I mean, they're a special breed. I mean they're often 110 percent American - and German-Americans, too, I've had - and sometimes a bit contemptuous or at least they don't always mix too well with the people of the country because, by God, they're not doing it in the American way and all that. Was this a problem? Did you see this with the Chinese?*

PRATT: Yes, occasionally, and more frequently what we would find is that they would be confused by the Chinese system because they had so learned the American concept of business, it's the bottom line, and if it makes economic sense you do it, and so on. And the fact that these people have a different environment in which bureaucracy is very important and nepotism is very important and corruption is very important - these were all things which occasionally they could

not understand. We had one, for example, American Chinese - I mean he was originally from Hong Kong but American citizen - who took the longest while to see that he had a big problem. He had a joint partnership, and this joint partnership included two elements of the Guangdong provincial government, but the two elements were under two separate vice-governors. One was open, and that was the trade vice-governor, and the other was one of the most backward aspects, namely agriculture, which was closest to the party structure. And the two partners hated each other's guts, and one of them got the American partner to fire the accountant who happened to be the brother of the other partner, and this chap could not understand why they were having so much difficulty and why they could go to one vice-governor and he would say, "Well, this is very difficult." I mean he was the senior vice-governor. Why couldn't he tell the junior vice-governor to go to hell? Well, he couldn't because of the nature of the Communist system. And this was something which was very difficult sometimes, because it wasn't as though they were dealing with real businessmen. They were dealing within a political framework, which, of course, is part of the current difficulty in China. One of my friends there was an American journalist in Peking who had written a book on the Beijing Jeep [Ed: Jim Mann, Beijing Jeep, 1997] problem and the difficulties of dealing with the municipal government and all the other aspects of the bureaucracy.

The biggest sort of factory we had in the Guangdong area was a French joint venture building Peugeot cars, and their stories, of course, were fairly illustrative of the great difficulties of dealing with the established political order there, much worse than most of the American ventures, which were plugged in at different levels and to different types of things without the same kind of deep roots in the labor movement and the Communist Party. So yes, Guangdong province was about the most advanced and economically oriented and able to make the most sensible decisions of any place in China, but even there it was very, very difficult.

*Q: Well, then, you left there in 1989. What happened?*

PRATT: I retired out there in Guangzhou, timed, as it happened, just before the end of September so that I could avoid having to take part in the October 1<sup>st</sup> event.

*Q: The October 1<sup>st</sup> event was the -*

PRATT: The national day of Communist China. So we left and went to Hong Kong and spent some time in Hong Kong and Macao because I wanted to go to Taiwan afterwards, but I wanted to avoid Double Ten in Taiwan.

*Q: That's the -*

PRATT: That's the Taiwan national day. So we sat it out in Hong Kong and Macao, a very pleasant little backwater, until we went to Taiwan, where I compared notes with my friends there, including telling them how I found that the people in south China responded on the Taiwan question. And then Japan as well. And finally from Japan we moved to California.

*Q: Well, what was the reaction in Taiwan that you were getting from your friends and colleagues about the Tiananmen incident? How did that play, from what you were hearing?*

PRATT: Well, I found it still very typical of the reaction I had noticed earlier, shall we say, when I was in Taiwan or working on Taiwan affairs. Almost anything to do with the Mainland was of concern only to the Mainlander side of Taiwan. Now this is changing, but at that time it was still the case. I got there and found that one of the dinners where I had thought people would be discussing the Mainland and what Tiananmen meant or how people on Taiwan viewed the prospects of political, even shall we say, interchange with the Mainland, but they weren't interested, because one of the women, for example, whom I had known well, was campaigning to be magistrate, and she had just come back from her place where they had burned down her house. And so, of course, the internal politics, the internal real fight between the Mainlanders/Kuomintang, and the Taiwanese and the dissidents or the oppositionists was still the major thing of interest. Peking and all problems of Peking were all very far away.

I think that this is changing now. I mean certainly when I talk to some of the people here now, it's a much closer thing, but they still don't understand Peking, and they basically are not that interested in Peking. From their point of view, if they can just manipulate the United States, they can get us to handle Peking for them. In fact, I've been told specifically, even as recently as 1996 when I was there. "China is a big country, and therefore something which we can't really do much about because we're just a small country. It's you Americans who've got to take care of China because you're a big country and China is a big country, and it's your responsibility to take care of China for us." So I think this is, indeed, part of the real problem we have, in that we keep trying to say, well, we've got to make sure that these people in Taiwan don't declare independence because we'll be caught up in the middle of it if they do, when of course we ought to realize that they are really expecting us to take care of this, and no matter what we tell them, they're going to say, "You're a big country. What can we do? We can't do anything which is big." So, you know, this is not our problem, that's your problem.

*Q: Fascinating.*

PRATT: And we keep trying to tell them, no, it's your problem, you have got to learn how to handle Peking.

*Q: But also at this point there is talk . . . the Mainland Chinese have just very recently talked about there have got to be serious talks and all that between the two parties, yet if this is the attitude, why have serious talks, because we're not going to do it, it's you Americans?*

PRATT: Well, that's partially the problem, but I think the other thing is that the reaction to the white paper has been quite overblown-

*Q: This is the very recent white paper.*

PRATT: The recent one of February - because it really doesn't promise anything specific, and it's certainly a good deal better than what they did at the time of the prior elections in 1996, when they had a combined operation and launched missiles near the two harbors, north and south, of Taiwan. So if this is the best they can do in Peking, it's not bad at all, and when they say "We cannot wait indefinitely..." well, good Lord, in the late 1970s, Deng Xiaoping declared that

resolving the Taiwan questions was one of the key tasks of the 1980s. Well, we're 20 years later and it's still-

*Q: In Chinese terms -*

PRATT: And it's still indefinite, and even someone as savvy as David Dean was telling me the other day, "Well, now we really have got to do something and make our position very clear because it looks as though they are going to be pushing for something very, very soon." So he wanted us to change our policy, Hal Sonnenfeld fortunately saying, "Well, why change our policy - it seems to have worked pretty well - provided we just limit ourselves to the basic principle that whatever resolution there is, let it be arrived at peacefully." That means if Peking says it's not going to accept the total independence, well, then that won't be done peacefully. If Taiwan says we don't want to have Peking come over and establish their government here, then it won't be done peacefully. We've got a system which is working now, and let's leave it at that. Hal's an old, most basically Soviet hand, but nonetheless, I was really surprised to find David Dean saying, oh, now we've got to move in and solve the thing for them.

*Q: That's very American.*

PRATT: It is very American, yes, because it's very hard for us to keep our hands off something.

**THOMAS R. HUTSON**  
**Mandarin Language Studies**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1986-1987)**

**Chief Consular Officer, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1987-1990)**

*Thomas R. Hutson was born in Nebraska in 1939. After receiving his bachelor's degree from the University of Nebraska in 1962 he served in the US Army from 1962-1967. His career has included positions in Teheran, Belgrade, Winnipeg, Moscow, Lagos, Taipei, Belgrade, Bishkek, and Mazar-e-Sharif. Mr. Hutson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in April 1999.*

HUTSON: So I took my second year of training on Taiwan. I found the language school there to be very good. Neil Kubler, who ran it, was superb. He was replaced by another dean who was also very good. The only problem of studying Chinese is that the Chinese are convinced that foreigners are "big nosed" people who could never learn their languages. So they humored us students until we hit the 3-3 level when we could get our bonuses for having survived. I always thought that non-Chinese should teach basic Chinese first so that the students could gain enough confidence in their ability to learn it and use it. After that, the students could be put in the hands of native Chinese speakers; by then the students would be assured that they could use this strange foreign language and not be put off by the Chinese attitudes. One of the major aspects of learning new languages, particularly those so different than western ones, is the confidence factor. If you

think you can use the language, then you probably can. If you have teachers who deep down feel that you will never be able to use that language, it makes doubly tough to learn it.

*Q: You were in Taipei from 1987 to 1990 at the American Institute. You were essentially the chief consular officer.*

HUTSON: Correct, although my official title showed absolutely no relationship to consular matters. It was the largest “consular” section I had ever managed. We had eleven consular officers and fifty locals; it was a huge operation.

*Q: How were our relations with Taiwan at the time?*

HUTSON: They were quite good. The director of the Institute was David Dean who was the first director. He was a legend and a wonderful human being. He had a sensitivity to Chinese concerns that gave a tone to the Institute and to our relationships with the government which made matters work quite smoothly.

*Q: What was your job?*

HUTSON: It was essentially a management function. While I was there, an inspection report was written which criticized me heavily for being too strict on internal controls. That meant, in my mind, that I did my job extremely well. When I arrived, there were no controls over the visa issuance process. Some were being sold for \$10,000 each on the streets of Taipei. There was no control to monitor this process. It took me six months to get control of the process. I had to threaten to fire all the local employees; I even threatened to shut down the operations. I didn’t do either; had I done so I probably would have been fired myself. Every Chinese employee in the visa section was either “on the take” or knew someone who was, but were too scared to report the transgressor. They felt that if they had reported on someone, their lives would have been in danger. We were talking about big money and a very profitable criminal enterprise.

That was my first introduction into Chinese corruption, which is a major aspect of that society. It is a sophisticated, cosmopolitan corruption; I could have had anything I wanted—money, women, etc. I found it easier to do my job right. I spent a lot of time instructing my staff on how to do “visa referrals.” We drove the refusal rate from 23% down to 6% during my tour. I much preferred issuing visas to people who walked in the front door and went through the process as they should, rather than buying them in some alley in Taipei. Scott Halpern, who was the deputy director of the institute, said to me after I stated preference for the “front door process”, that some people just wouldn’t take “Yes” for an answer.

I was delighted with the drop in the refusal rate. I wanted to issue visas. We did not issue visas to children because we found that too many of the children were taken to the U.S. and were left there. There had been tens of thousands who were left in California. I assiduously tried to get the Taiwanese authorities to deal with this problem, but got no cooperation; they were interested in having their kids dropped off in the U.S. One could tell very early on in a child’s educational process whether the child would be accepted by a prestigious institution as Taiwan National University—or a good high school before that. If the child did not seem to perform up to those

standards, then the parents felt they had enough money to take him or her to the U.S. where they could finish their education - in a grand style in most cases because they worked harder than American students. Not only would the child then have a better foundation for life than what he or she might receive in Taipei, but they would also serve as a potential “foot in the door” should the parents wish to emigrate to the U.S. It was a very difficult issue, but I finally decided that no child would travel legally to the U.S. - i.e., no visa. We did make some exceptions, but they were rare indeed. This was perhaps an extreme policy, but under the circumstances, it was the only defensible one.

*Q: Did your approach raise any pressures from Congressional sources?*

HUTSON: We told those sources that we had no control over whether these children would return to Taiwan or not. We said if the state of California would help us to deal with the problem, we would take another look at the policy. We never did get any offers to help us. I tried to engage American authorities in a dialogue on this problem, but without success. Our approval rate was so high (99%) that we just stopped interviewing these young people. They just sent in their passports with the necessary documents. They were not happy; they wanted to be interviewed to get their visas. But I found in the case of university students that the process was so pro forma that it was the waste of our time. But when I was asked whether any of them had returned to Taiwan, I had to admit that it was too early to say. That situation has changed dramatically because these students were now getting better job offers in Taiwan than they were getting in the U.S.

My gut feeling was that applying Section 214 (b)—which is the presumption that an applicant is an immigrant rather than a student—was very subjective. One of our great exports is our educational system and we should not resent foreigners taking advantage of that opportunity as long as they abide by provisions of the immigration acts.

*Q: You were in Taipei from 1987 to 1990 at the American Institute. You were essentially the chief consular officer.*

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**RICHARD W. CARLSON**  
**Director, Voice of America, USIS**  
**Washington, DC (1986-1991)**

*Ambassador Richard W. Carlson was born in Boston in 1941. His father died when he was 11 years old. After twice being kicked out of high school, he joined the navy at the age of 17. The last year of his enlistment was spent at the University of Mississippi. He then became a reporter in California. In the fall of 1985, President Reagan appointed him to be head of the Public Liaison Office for USIA, and subsequently as Director of the Voice of America. In 1991 he was appointed ambassador to the Seychelles. Ambassador Carlson was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 2, 1993.*

*Q: You were talking about your Mandarin Service as being one of your premier Services. It appears that the Voice of America got very much into the whole "abortive revolution". Could you explain a little bit of what Tiananmen Square was and developments maybe before that from your perspective of how we were covering these major events in China?*

CARLSON: The student demonstrations began in Shanghai a considerable time before they concluded in Tiananmen Square with the death of students.

*Q: This was in 1989.*

CARLSON: The Voice of America happened to have a correspondent, who was Mandarin speaking and in Shanghai when this happened. He was actually attached to the bureau out of Beijing, but had gone down to Shanghai. He was present when they had this demonstration in the center of Shanghai. They went beyond what would have been anticipated. It was interesting. We had the only on the scene coverage from foreign correspondents in Shanghai. He was pursued by thousands of students that found out that he represented the Voice of America. They weren't pursuing him hostilely they were all kissing and hugging him. The poor guy was almost trampled to death. His reports were the only reliable news out of Shanghai when those demonstrations began. And, of course, they were of interest to the American press and were used as a basis for some coverage. But the real interest was that they were broadcast back into China, of course, in Chinese. No matter what the New York Times does or says, or whatever is broadcast at NBC, it is irrelevant to these hundreds of millions of Chinese. It doesn't come to them in their language and doesn't get to their ears, and the Voice does. So we stepped up our coverage beginning with those demonstrations and, I think in retrospect most people would agree that what we delivered

to the Chinese was very sophisticated and very well done.

We had a Chinese Service that was preparing in essences for this for many years. They were au courant with China as much as one could be with a closed society. They had sources and people who were willing to give them information in China as the Chinese loosened up economically and allowed more telephone calls to be made out of the country and into the country. When they allowed faxed machines to be used for commerce, they couldn't shut it down. It was amazing. Our Chinese Service when the demonstrations really started rolling in different cities would receive phone calls from China by the dozens if not the hundreds daily from people who listened to the Voice of America and who were in cahoots with an operator somewhere who would let them use the telephone that was used by some government office that was closed at the moment to call the Voice of America. Every day we received hundreds of phone calls from throughout China with people volunteering information.

The opportunity for provocation, of course, was pretty good because it was difficult to cross reference information. So we never relied on anonymous voices coming to us from China, but we used those as contacts and background. In fact, in almost every instance it was believed that they were not provocative.

*Q: You were probably ahead of the Chinese Secret Service. Everything was moving too fast for them.*

CARLSON: Yes, they couldn't get control. Even though the Chinese security apparatus is very sophisticated and not noticeable and just pretty good, it is funny that right up until Tiananmen Square you could feel...I was in the Chinese Service every day and as the events unfolded up to Tiananmen Square, you could watch the Chinese government finally get its hands around this leakage. The phone calls began reducing and reducing. The last phone call that came through was from the city of Wuhan. Somebody was calling from a phone overlooking the bridge, in a building of some kind, and the operator said in Chinese that this is so exciting, we have a woman on the line who wants to tell you what is going on and this may be our last call. And it was the last call. We never got any phone calls after that. They had succeeded in squeezing off all the lines.

But the impact in China of these broadcasts was enormous. It did in China what it had done in the Soviet Union for many years what Radio Liberty, the BBC and the Voice had done. It brought news of dissident activity from one person to another, other than through underground information. And it told people that there were others like them and thinks like them who have taken some courageous measure publicly in another town. It clearly kept alive the democratic hopes of these people.

I traveled to China a couple of times. I was told then, and we kept abreast of this through the American Embassy and other sources, at the time that the Chinese students would record the Voice of America broadcast, would use them often for the basis for wall posters. Or would record them on cheap tape recorders and when the electricity went out at night, which it did regularly in the universities, people would sit by candle light and replay the Voice of America broadcast.

There were in fact people who were sentenced to severe prison terms for calling the Voice of America. I forgot to mention that to you. There was a person who received 10 or 12 years in a re-educative effort for making one of those calls. He got caught making one of those phone calls to the Voice. Somebody recognized him on the phone and tracked him down.

*Q: While this was going on...the role of the Voice of America...1956 must have hung heavily. There were accusations that the United States, not necessarily the Voice of America, were calling on the Hungarians in 1956 to basically revolt. Here you are talking about the most populous nation in the world and you are talking about something that could have been the mother of all revolutions going on. It was aborted, but the Voice of America was obviously a key element in this. No matter what you did you were adding fuel by just giving news. Could you talk a little bit about what you were doing and what the pressures were? People must have been saying, "For God's sake." You were in the middle of a fire.*

CARLSON: We took no policy direction from State Department over this, nor was any offered other than that we had a great concern that we not purposely throw fuel on the fire. Clearly, philosophically, any kind of coverage of this kind of tumultuous event in a closed society tends to spur the thought in others that they might emulate the behavior that is being discussed. That is a byproduct, in a neutral sense, of news coverage. The only thing that we did, and we do this normally anyway, we were damn careful to err on the side of conservative description. We didn't omit information because it was per se provocative. It was such a provocative event anyway.

But we felt that we had to be extraordinarily careful anyway so as to not unnecessarily inflame people. The inherent, inflammatory nature of all of this was such that we felt...these were people who live in an environment where punches are pulled all the time. Nobody ever tells them the truth. Everything is sugar coated and sort of spruced up to look different than it really is and that is not what we are there for. We are there to give them a fair and impartial view of what is going on in the world, and in this case their own country. We really played the role of a surrogate broadcaster which we don't normally do. There really are no surrogate broadcasters in China as there were in the Soviet Union through Radio Liberty, for instance. But we ended up being the surrogate broadcaster.

One of the things that I did do that I thought might be useful was to put a television camera in the Mandarin studio. We were broadcasting live on radio as opposed to the Chinese who put everything on tape and had a committee involved which would take a week to get it on the air. We put a TV camera in the studio from which we were broadcasting Mandarin and we scrolled across the screen the Mandarin copy that was being read in live time by the newscaster. So on the screen you would see, if you were looking, a Chinese broadcaster who was static and reading the copy and it would be scrolled across the bottom about where their chest was. We then transferred this by satellite and sent it down to satellite receiving dishes throughout the People's Republic of China.

Those dishes were all controlled by the government, of course, and in the control of the military in great measure. In military bases they invariably had satellite dishes that would receive transmission signals on behalf of their own government. We sent those signals into those dishes.

The idea that we had was that the troops, themselves, would probably not be listening to the Voice of America because it was forbidden to do so, but that it would be useful to these military units and their leadership to be able to get a photographic image with the copy. We found out later that in fact wall posters were made out of photographs that were taken from the dishes.

There are so many of the dishes in control of the military and government, but not all of those people are interested in shutting off information. We probably offered some stability to remote...we like to think we did ...military units. There was considerable talk, as you remember, about the Chinese government bringing in troops from outside.

*Q: The first troops obviously couldn't control it so they had to bring in sort of peasant troops from out in the countryside who had no love for the city folk. At least that was the story.*

CARLSON: We thought it would be in the interests of all of them to have at least an honest representation of what was happening with these student demonstrations as opposed to what they would learn or not learn from government broadcasts.

Actually the Voice had relationship with some Chinese broadcasters. For many years the Voice had published...during the worse times in China, too, during those years of the cultural revolution...the Voice had published in conjunction with the Chinese government tens of millions little pamphlets about how to learn English. They used the Voice of America as a basis. The Voice broadcast in something called Special English. It has about 12-13,000 word vocabulary and if you understand those words you can understand any news story that is read in Special English. It is also read at about a third of the normal reading speed. So we would take those scripts...they were called words and their stories and it was English slang like "talking through your hat," or "carrying a big stick." What do those mean? We would print them in conjunction with a script that was read in conjunction in turn with the Chinese government and they would sell them for about a penny a piece.

Although they disliked the US and the West, they on their other hand had a commercial interest in people learning English. It was amazing, with all their anti-Western views at the time of the cultural revolution, they still continued to print in conjunction with us, probably by the billions, these little pamphlets. Special English was a powerful tool.

Regardless of the discomfort between the governments, the Voice had established relations with Radio Beijing, which kind of dominated people's radio in the PRC. I had gone over a couple of times and met with the woman who was the head of Radio Beijing. Actually she came to the United States, too, and I gave a dinner party for her at the house. We came to know some of the broadcasters there. One of them went on the air during the Tiananmen Square event, when the government crushed the students, with a plea to the West to understand what was really going on in China in English. This was in their overseas service. He was taken off the air and he actually said that he was going to have to leave the air now...it was broadcast to Western Europe...and then he went off the air after this. He basically in about three minutes described what was going on in Tiananmen Square. He went to prison I was told. He had actually been in my house at one time. Anyway, it was all quite dramatic.

*Q: George Bush had been our representative in China and knew the leadership and was considered to be closer to the leadership which was doing the repressing than he should have been. Were you getting any emanations from the White House on this?*

CARLSON: No, actually we were not. Contrary to what people I imagine would expect we actually had none. If there was any contact with the White House it was minimal and it would have been through the National Security Council but there was never any attempt to impose on the Voice, and in turn its Chinese Service, any policy perspective or any spin or stress on certain areas with a lack of attention to other areas. There was none of that.

The Chinese Service was very well run, by the way. It was run by a Foreign Service Officer whose name was Tony Sereeti. He was of Italian descent and one of the finest linguist I have ever known. He spoke Chinese perfectly. He spoke Mandarin so well that Chinese thought he was Chinese on the phone. That is not an easy thing. He also spoke Cantonese. And he speaks Russian. He is an amazing guy.

I traveled with him in China. We were in Shanghai and went into a workingman's hotel one night and talked to the desk clerk about two in the morning. We just wanted to see what the place was like. No Westerner had ever been in side according to the woman. She went around to each room, where there would be 10 or 12 people and wake everybody up. They would all sit up and she would introduce me...we gave her Voice of America pins and she had one on...and she introduced me as the head of the Voice of America and Tony Sereeti as the chief of the Chinese Service. Well, they couldn't believe it. They were jumping all over the place talking to us. Sereeti was a fantastic guy.

*Q: He must have been sitting rather heavily making sure the Service didn't get too excited.*

CARLSON: Of course. This was not an easy thing. You have broadcasters with very strong emotional and intellectual and cultural ties to the area and they are angry at this and the government. And they were angry at each other, they have internecine conflicts which are so complex you could never get to the root of them all. Keeping them under control and insuring that there are safeguards to prevent a person from doing all manner of things that are limited only by your imagination is very hard. We always made it a very clear point that the people who wrote the copy didn't deliver the copy. There was also a producer in between. This was live, of course, and most people sitting around could understand what was being said. But, in fact, we very seldom had a problem.

In turn, the people who were employed by the Voice had a great sense of mission and usually a great sense of decorum. They had been there a long time and recognized the potency of what they were doing and the importance of precision and care. The most potentially difficult areas were the Soviet Services, Chinese, Lao, Cambodian, the Afghanistan languages, places where there were conflicts and people had strong emotional feelings about what was going on in the country that they often came from. Those would be the most problematic situation. And even then we didn't have any systemic problems, really.

*Q: What about the aftermath, after the Chinese authorities had suppressed the students and all?*

*What happened to the Voice of America at that point?*

CARLSON: We had problems with our correspondents. Of course they kept throwing them out of the country. We had a correspondent, Al Poissen, and he was expelled. They were always being accused of intelligence activities. I can tell you they didn't engage in that. It would have been stupid. The Voice of America correspondents weren't spies, they were reporters, but unfortunately in the kind of society with the rigidity of the People's Republic you end up doing your things covertly simply because you can't do them in any other way.

*Q: From a practical point of view if you are from the other side, a Voice of America correspondent is far more dangerous than a spy.*

CARLSON: Oh, yes.

*Q: Who cares what the Chinese military is doing, but if you are reporting the truth to the Chinese people...*

CARLSON: I will give you an example of how they tried to compromise a correspondent. We had a correspondent there, a young man, who went into a club one night, some sort of a Chinese club. He was sitting with some friends when all of a sudden a Chinese girl came and sat in his lap. Suddenly a man took a photograph of this. The girl hopped off his lap. She seemed to be a transvestite. It was not totally clear, but he thought this was the case and since the happening was so strange he reported that this had happened to the Embassy security people.

Ultimately he came back to the United States and was working at the Voice newsroom and was going to be going to another country. He was walking down Independence Avenue when a fellow came up to him and started talking to him. He was a Soviet diplomat. They had a friendly conversation. About a week later he was sitting in a restaurant in Adams Morgan and the same fellow and another man came up to him at the table and laid the photograph from China of the apparently transvestite sitting in his lap.

At this point this fellow had married. He thought it was almost funny, this crude way to get him to cooperate, and then, in turn, he reported it. But there was obviously considerable collusion in Services, I guess.

*Q: It was sort of amazing considering the distance and relations.*

CARLSON: Of course, it could have been set up by the Soviets in the first place.

*Q: Did you have a security problem with your correspondents?*

CARLSON: Yes. Not necessarily with correspondents. They were harassed in China by the security services. Of course we had no correspondents in the Soviet Union at all. We didn't have a bureau in the Soviet Union until 1989 when I opened the bureau in Moscow. No VOA director had ever been in the Soviet Union in the past. They wouldn't let them in. We were jammed by the Soviets off and on for years.

But we did have a problem in some areas at the VOA with penetration attempts by foreign intelligence services. In my experience during the time I was there, they were directed at the Soviet division, at various of the language services and some of the Eastern European Services. Bulgaria was one that was a problem. A problem in a sense that it seemed to be of interest to the Bulgarian Secret Service. The Cuban Services were an ongoing problem. Radio Marti initially and then Television Marti, which we had responsibility for legislatively. The Afghan Services in Burma seemed to be a problem as well. Seemingly they were targets of penetration.

I would say that we had a counterintelligence allegation once a month...12 to 15 a year. These often took the form of...people who come from these closed societies grow up differently. Their life experiences are different and their methods of accounting for behavior and conduct and outcome are different.

*Q: They are often justified.*

CARLSON: Yes they are. They can't all be dismissed as paranoia. But it would be typical for me to get phone calls at home from someone with a pronounced European accent who didn't want to identify himself except that he worked in the Voice and knew that so-and-so worked for the KGB or often a Eastern Europe intelligence outfit. We would get letters to that effect.

Often we would get contacted by the FBI saying that in fact they thought there was something going on with such and such. We had a couple who actually fled a couple of steps ahead of the Bureau and who had been employed by us for some time. One was a man and his wife...the man worked for us the wife didn't...but they fled. They were stopped in the street and taken into the Bureau after having met with some intelligence agent. They were interrogated and denied everything and were due to be reinterrogated the following Monday or something and fled the country. There was never any publicity about that. But we had that kind of problem. These were agents of influence, I assume. There were a lot of things you could do. If you believe that the Dari Pashtu Service had an influence in Afghanistan then it would make some since I suppose, and it would be pretty cheap, to infiltrate a sympathizer with the intelligence service into one of those Services to find out what exactly who is doing what to whom and maybe have some effect on it. I think that was primarily the reason that they did it.

At Marti we had a definite problem with it. We had a Marti employee who also defected...that is redefected. He was actually a DGI agent and showed up and held a news conference in Cuba wherein he made a lot of accusations against Radio Marti, etc. So the intrigue level was rather high, actually.

**DAVID G. BROWN**  
**Taiwan Coordination Staff**  
**Washington, DC (1986-1989)**

**Deputy Consul General**

## Hong Kong (1989-1992)

*David G. Brown was born in Boston, Massachusetts in 1940. He graduated from Princeton University in 1964 entered the Foreign Service. His assignments include Taipei, Saigon, Yokohama, Tokyo, Vienna, Beijing, Oslo, and Hong Kong. Before retirement in 1996, he served as Director of the Office of Korean Affairs. Mr. Brown was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on January 28, 2003.*

*Q: Today is the 8th of April 2003. David, you've gone in 1986 to deal with the Republic of China or what did we call it then?*

BROWN: Well, the government calls itself the Republic of China. We call the office that we set up in the State Department to deal with them after derecognition the Taiwan Coordination Staff.

*Q: You were there from '86 to?*

BROWN: '89.

*Q: '89. All right, well, what I think it behooves you to explain a bit about how we dealt with Taiwan at this time.*

BROWN: Right. In January of 1979, we had recognized China and derecognized Taiwan. This was shortly after I had left the Office of Republic of China Affairs in '78. We set up an unofficial organization to represent the American people in Taiwan called the American Institute in Taiwan. AIT had a headquarters office in Washington and an office in Taipei and another one in Kaohsiung in the southern part of Taiwan. We had a small office within the State Department building whose job was to develop policy and provide instructions to AIT.

*Q: Well, now which one did you belong to?*

BROWN: I belonged to the policy office within the State Department. The office of the Taiwan Coordination Staff.

*Q: A front group. However, that did not mean we were cutting Taiwan loose. American interests in Taiwan changed little.*

BROWN: Absolutely. If you look back at decade of the 1980s after de-recognition, this was a period of great success and development for Taiwan. Relations with the U.S., though unofficial, were quite stable and strong. In short, Taiwan continued to enjoy the stability that it needed to prosper and develop.

*Q: Okay, in 1986 when you went there, what was the situation on Taiwan economically and politically in 1986?*

BROWN: Well, there were the two big economic issues in U.S.-Taiwan relations then. Taiwan enjoyed huge trade surplus with the United States in the mid-1980s. One issue was should

Taiwan continue to benefit from our general system of preferences (GSP) when they were a remarkably powerful export economy. At that time, Taiwan's GDP per capita was around \$10,000. Should Taiwan be graduated out of a program that was designed to benefit developing countries?

The other issue involved the valuation of Taiwan's currency, the new Taiwan dollar. Their currency was very carefully controlled, and Treasury was convinced that Taipei was using their currency control system to maintain an undervalued new Taiwan dollar. The undervaluation was seen as a major reason for their massive trade surplus with the U.S. The Treasury Department and we on the desk cooperated in pressuring the Taiwan government into appreciating the currency. There were some interesting unintended consequences of doing this. What Treasury did was to persuade Taiwan that its economy had matured to the point where Taiwan could afford to remove some of its currency controls and allow people in Taiwan to move currency in and out more freely. The by-product of this was that after these currency reforms were put in place Taiwanese started to invest overseas. They invested in the U.S., in Southeast Asia. However, the big thing that no one had anticipated was Taiwanese started to invest in China. That began to open up relations between the island and the mainland.

*Q: What about the result of this sort of freeing the Taiwanese to invest where they will? Was anybody looking at this in the East Asian bureau saying this is a good thing? In fact, it probably was one of the greatest determiners of the China-Taiwan relationship. If China gets too huffy, it may jeopardize all the nice investment.*

BROWN: We were thinking about it, but I certainly didn't anticipate the extent to which Taiwan's investment in China would take off. We knew that President Chiang Ching-kuo had made a major decision to allow people from Taiwan to travel to the mainland. It happened that he did that some months before with the 15th anniversary of the Shanghai Communiqué. We knew that this opening up of travel to China was a very important thing that would have long-term consequences. Secretary Shultz took the occasion of the 15th anniversary to make a statement in which we said that it was U.S. policy not to get involved in cross-strait negotiations, but to encourage an environment in which such cross-strait contacts could develop. We understood there was a process going on that was very important. However, I for one certainly didn't understand that what we were doing with Treasury to open Taiwan's exchange rate system for the purpose of correcting our trade deficit would have the side effect of stimulating massive foreign direct investment by Taiwan and that a good portion of that foreign direct investment would go to China.

*Q: You didn't have to go through the resignation process or something like that?*

BROWN: Well, I was working in the State Department, so no, I did not. People who worked for AIT, whether they were working in Taipei or in Washington, had to go through a process of resignation from the State Department and employment with the American Institute in Taiwan.

*Q: Could the AIT people come at will to the State Department?*

BROWN: Yes. However, Taiwan's representatives and visiting officials could not come to the

State Department. The American employees of AIT came to State like any other government employee. They had their own State Department badges. What was important was that appearances were changed. They were publicly called AIT employees. The appearance or form of our relations with Taiwan changed, but the substance did not change much. As for AIT employees, they continued to get their paychecks in exactly the same fashion they'd gotten them before from the Department. Every one of them had employee evaluations. When I was on the coordination staff, some AIT employees received State Department awards.

*Q: What piece of the action did you have?*

BROWN: Well, it was policy guidance. How was the relationship with Taiwan conducted? This was a big part of our role in the exchange rate issue. Normally Treasury doesn't let State have anything to do with exchange rate negotiations. An ambassador is lucky if he knows that they're even taking place. But because Treasury was aware that they couldn't send their senior officials to Taipei, they had to come to us to work out ways to deal with Taiwan. Treasury did not let us in on the substance of their discussions, but we worked with them on the process, and that proved to be quite important. Who in Taiwan should Treasury deal with? Where can Treasury talk to them? Under what arrangements can we deal with them? What form can an agreement or understanding with Taiwan take? Those were issues on which we got involved. Also, Treasury had important relationships with China at the same time. They were very much involved in U.S. economic ties with the mainland. So, they didn't want to jeopardize those relationships any more than State wanted to. So, one question was: do you want to deal with exchange rates by sending a lower ranking official? If so, State could help make Taiwan understand that this person came with considerable authority if not rank. Did Treasury want to work this issue by inviting more senior officials from Taiwan to meet in San Francisco under some private guise? If so, State could help ensure that it was arranged quietly in a way that would not create problems for either Treasury or State in their dealings with Beijing.

*Q: What about Taiwan? During the time you were dealing with this, were their intelligence efforts a problem, I mean looking at the overseas community? Because they messed around a bit in New York, I mean in Los Angeles I believe. How did we see it at that time you were doing it?*

BROWN: The really egregious thing that happened took place two years before I came back to work on Taiwan. This was the murder of Henry Liu, a Taiwan journalist who had moved to the United States and had written a critical biography of Chiang Ching-kuo. Someone in the Taiwan intelligence chain of command decided that the way to deal with somebody who had criticized Chiang was to have him eliminated by gangsters of the so-called bamboo gang. Intelligence officers hired the bamboo gang to murder Henry Liu. It took a while for this to come to light. The U.S. had evidence on the involvement of intelligence officers in the murder, and this forced Taipei to address the issue of responsibility. The former head of Taiwan's intelligence service in the U.S. was convicted of involvement. It still is not clear how high up people were involved in the incident. President Chiang was acutely embarrassed. He eventually made very significant changes in his intel services. The murder was a huge black mark for Taiwan.

Now there were other things that they were doing, none of which were as egregious as that. Taiwan continued to surveil Chinese students in the United States. They had intelligence

operations going and efforts to acquire restricted arms technology that we were not authorizing for sale. The most serious example of that was a program to get inertial guidance for long range missiles from the U.S., technology that we had denied them. Taiwan arranged to have some of their scientists come to the U.S. and get training and then they picked up the designs. That had to be dealt with while I was on the desk. I recall we also put them on the FBI watch list for hostile foreign intelligence organizations. They got the message and over time changed the pattern of what they were doing.

*Q: Well, let's take getting the long-range guidance system. You said that had to be dealt with, what did you do?*

BROWN: Well, I recall that the most important thing we did was to terminate visas for all the scientists that were involved in the training program, send those people back to Taiwan and force the university that was running the program, which I recall was MIT, to terminate those programs which were inconsistent with U.S. policy.

*Q: Were you allowed to have contact with the Taiwanese staff here in Washington?*

BROWN: Yes, but not in the State Department building, I had frequent breakfasts, lunches and dinners with them. When circumstances required, AIT would arrange for a negotiation or signing of an agreement. We had no problem dealing with Taiwanese political groups that would come to the United States. We'd simply go to see them in a restaurant rather than in the State Department.

*Q: It sounds like one would eat very well on that job.*

BROWN: During much of that time, I was working for Gaston Sigur who was the Assistant secretary. Taiwan's representatives in Washington were Fred Chien and later Ding Mou-shih, both of whom went on to be foreign ministers. Whenever they had a meeting with Gaston, it was usually held over breakfast at the Four Seasons Hotel. We ate well and had a lot of pretty heavy conversations to go along with the fare.

*Q: What was your impression of the nationalist Chinese representation here in Washington?*

BROWN: We were fortunate to be dealing with quite sophisticated individuals. As would be expected, we were under steady pressure from them to make the relationship more official. For example, they would propose changing the kinds of license plates their offices and officials could use. Diplomatic plates were not possible, so they pressed local jurisdictions to create special plates for them. Taipei was always trying to get a pseudo official status for their offices. Could they fly their flag outside their office or just inside the office? What titles could their officers use? This was a period of booming trade between the U.S. and Taiwan. Many U.S. states wanted trade offices in Taiwan. Taiwan would be as generous possible in providing benefits and special privileges for those state representatives in Taipei, and then they would turn around and go to the state's governor and say they would like similar treatment in the U.S. Lacking formal diplomatic recognition, Taiwan had a deep desire for the most formal treatment they could persuade people to give them. Dealing with this, and coordinating with local governments was a

constant challenge. It wasn't done in a mean spirited way, but we had to hold the line on the unofficial nature of our relationship.

*Q: What about consular protection? I'm thinking of all the Taiwanese students in the United States and visitors and businessmen and the normal thing is you need I'm in trouble with the police or something, call you consul.*

BROWN: We had the American Institute in Taiwan represent us in Taipei. Taipei had an organization with a convoluted name called the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA) to represent Taiwan in exactly the same way in the United States. They had an office in Washington and about 11 or 12 branch offices in American cities. In one of the more mean spirited aspects of switching relations, we told Taiwan, a country which had more consulates, formal consulates as opposed to honorary consulates, than just about any other country in the U.S. that several of these consulates had to be closed. This was one of the things that would have to change with the termination of diplomatic relations. So, we squeezed them down from 16 to 12, I recall. Nevertheless they retained a very extensive network of CCNAA offices around the country that operated exactly like consulates except that they didn't have consular status. Their personnel enjoyed privileges and immunities similar to those accorded consular personnel. We had similar needs in Taiwan, so we wanted the arrangements to work effectively for both sides.

*Q: When I interviewed Nat Belocchi and Nat was saying that if you think that the Israelis have a lobby or a network in the United States, wait until you run across the nationalist Chinese. How did you find it sort of business everywhere? Was this a pretty significant group?*

BROWN: They were and are extremely active in cultivating good feelings amongst Americans toward Taiwan. They considered themselves a very vulnerable society and they recognize that the U.S. was their principal supporter. Hence, they did everything they could to cultivate friendship among Americans. I'm excluding from this the intelligence operations, and talking just about legitimate diplomacy. Under our international visitor program, we would bring 15 or 20 people a year from Taiwan for month long visits to expose them to American society, just as we did everywhere else. Similarly Taipei was targeting people who would 20 years later be in leadership positions in the U.S. But, Taiwan had programs, which were much larger than ours. They were bringing hundreds of people to Taiwan every year, through every conceivable kind of arrangement. At one level they were inviting members of congress. They had an extensive program of congressional staff visits. They did the same thing at the state level working through their local offices. They were inviting state legislators, staff members of state governments, staffs of governors around the country. They had an operation with the democratic and republican parties where political parties in Taiwan, mainly the KMT, would invite delegations from those party organizations at the national levels and at the state levels to Taiwan. They had visits from professional groups; they had visits from academics. Then when the visitors came back, CCNAA would follow up, maintain contact and seek these people's help. Their friends are never forgotten. They are always invited to lunches and dinners and parties when visiting delegations come the connections are kept up so that a massive effort to cultivate good will and support in this country for Taiwan because Taiwan is so dependent on American political and military support. Then when help was needed, Taiwan was not shy in asking for it.

What was and is different is that Israel had a large and active domestic political lobby in the Jewish community. While the Chinese community in the U.S. was growing, it was not politically active and was split between pro-Beijing, Pro-KMT and Taiwan independence groups.

*Q: Did you find a sense of unease in the East Asian bureau? Were the people dealing with China per se because I mean just looking at it from the outside, here is this active office doing this thing making cultivating, also the fact is that Taiwan was turning into a democracy. When you say democracy, this rings all sorts of bells in the United States and it was not a fake one. I mean this is a real thing and yet you know, you had China, which wasn't going in that direction at all. Sort of almost a frustration or something of the Mainland China hands within our State Department kind of wishing you'd go away or something like that?*

BROWN: We'll things were different in the mid-1980s. I think the phenomena you're describing are of the '90s. Why do I say that? First because in the mid-'80s the democratic transformation in Taiwan was only just beginning. There still were political prisoners from the Kaohsiung incident in jail. There were more congressional hearings on human rights in Taiwan. The real process of political reform in Taiwan began actually in 1986 but wasn't completed until much later with the first direct election of the Taiwan president in 1996 and the first transfer of power to the opposition in 2000. In '86, '87, '88 this process was just beginning. On the mainland, it was a period when economic reform was seen in this country as promising. There were student demonstrations in China in 1987 that were significant enough to cost party Secretary General Hu Yaobang his job. So, the contrast between what was going on in the mainland and what was going on in Taiwan wasn't as stark then as it was later.

*Q: So, when you were dealing with it both countries sort of seemed to be on a mild trajectory toward the better?*

BROWN: You could say that before Tiananmen.

*Q: Did you feel, was there still this almost coterie who had participated in the opening to China who identified so much with mainland China that they tended to be dismissive or forget about Taiwan? I mean was that still an attitude or did this work itself out?*

BROWN: At that time, the Republican administration had good relations with Taiwan and quite positive attitudes toward the island. Taiwan felt that it was well connected with the Reagan and subsequently with the Bush establishments in Washington. Holbrooke had been dismissive of Taiwan, but the Republican administrations were not. The first person I worked for was Jim Lilley who had been our representative, the head of AIT in Taipei. He believed that if you wanted to manage the U.S.-China relationship as a whole correctly you had to take very good care of your ties in Taiwan. If one didn't take good care of the ties in Taiwan then the Taiwans were going to use this network that they had cultivated, most importantly in the congress, to put pressure on the administration to do things that would not be in the U.S. interest.

*Q: You were there at least in the beginning of the transition between the Reagan and Bush administration and you know, often within an administration between two different parts of the*

*same party the transition sometimes gets a little bit rocky. How did this one go regarding your area?*

BROWN: From my perspective there were no serious problems.

*Q: How about arms sales? Was this something you were dealing with all the time?*

BROWN: All the time, and we were going through all sorts of shenanigans you might call them to provide Taiwan with the weapons it needed in ways that did not provoke the PRC and also, to the best of our ability, could be seen as consistent with the language of the communiqué that had been negotiated with the Chinese in 1982. The August '82 communiqué on arms sales said that there were limits on the quantity and quality of arms we would sell to Taiwan. So, we had to try and live within that framework, but the framework was being stretched beyond credibility by technological change. Taiwan's weapons systems were becoming obsolescent and had to be replaced and the only way you could replace them was by providing newer more capable systems. Subsequently, after I left, we bumped up against the quantitative ceiling as well as the quantitative one with the sale of F-16s. The F-16s clearly were a more capable system, and they were so expensive that there was no way they could be provided within the quantitative limitations either.

*Q: Was there somebody sitting there or some bodies sitting there in the Pentagon figuring out what the mainland Chinese had in the way of aircraft, navy, etc. and what the Taiwanese had and making sure that the Taiwanese were able to have a credible defense?*

BROWN: Sure. Studies were done of the military balance in the Taiwan straits. State, DOD and NSC had to weigh what could be sold that would meet Taiwan's legitimate defense needs and how to do it in a way that would not create problems in our relations with the PRC. One key was to keep what we were doing out of the public eye. Appearances were important to the PRC. Consequently, what systems were called was important. For instance, Taiwan wanted the M-60 tank. We sold them an equivalent but called it a hybrid M-48, the M-48H. I'm using an army system here as an example, though it was not the most important weapon we were selling Taiwan. I could have used the frigate that we had agreed to sell. In that case, we devised a program whereby Taiwan could manufacture in Taiwan new frigates that were better than the old World War II vintage ones that were being replaced. Clearly this would involve a qualitative improvement. Rather than selling them these ships outright in a way that would be seen as a violation of the arms sales communiqué, we worked out an arrangement to provide the plans and build the ships in Taiwan. These ships would then be outfitted with modern weapons systems. This met their defense needs with less strain on our relations with China.

*Q: What about other countries on this arms thing? Could you say the French and all, were they and other countries, were the Taiwanese shopping around?*

BROWN: Taiwan was out looking all the time, but very few countries were prepared to sell to them. The Israelis would provide some things. They got some systems from the Italians, and believe it or not from the Swedes. The sellers would try to handle the sales in a way that didn't attract publicity or create problems for their relations with China. The really big third country

sale again came after I left. This was the French decision to sell frigates and 60 mirage fighters to Taiwan.

*Q: Things were beginning to happen in the Soviet Union. Gorbachev was coming. Did that change the equation or was that felt?*

BROWN: That didn't really have any impact.

*Q: How about the Japanese? Did we see them as a rival or a supporter or how did we see the Japanese?*

BROWN: Well, as an economic competitor in Taiwan. For a variety of reasons, Japan did not have any defense ties with Taiwan. Certainly on the political level, they kept a very low profile and were determined to avoid problems in their relations with the PRC.

*Q: During this '86 to '89 period did you find, had the balance shifted from the mainlanders to the Taiwanese and speaking within the political system?*

BROWN: In that context, the most important thing that happened followed the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in 1988. Lee Teng-hui, the vice President, succeeded him and became the first Taiwanese to reach a real position of power in Taiwan. This was a revolutionary change. Most people at that time thought Lee was a lightweight who would not last. It was similar to the way people thought about Jiang Zemin when he was appointed General Secretary in Beijing.

*Q: Or Anwar Sadat.*

BROWN: Yes. Well, Lee transformed Taiwan politics and is still having a major impact now as a former president. However, in the years I was on the desk, he started very cautiously. He had to be careful because even though he inherited the presidency, he did not inherit automatically the chairmanship of the Nationalist Party. That was the really powerful position in the political system at that time. The first thing Lee had to do was to get himself appointed acting chairman of the party and that was in fact opposed by Chiang family loyalists, including Madame Chiang Kai-shek who was then in her late 80s. She had returned to Taiwan, in 1986 I think, out of concern that Chiang Ching-kuo might go too far in liberalizing the political system. She was there when he passed away. She, her son Chiang Wei-kuo and some others tried to prevent Lee from being given the title of acting chairman of the party. Reform elements in the party blocked that effort and Lee became acting chairman. Lee had to consolidate his position and prove to people that he was going to be around for a while. He moved forward with Ching-kuo's program for initial political reform and subsequently carried that process much further in the 1990s.

*Q: Was this looked upon with favor in the United States?*

BROWN: Oh, definitely. Washington's positive response went back to 1986 when Ching-kuo was beginning to signal his willingness to conduct political reform in Taiwan. His biggest signal was when opposition politicians defied the ban on new political parties and announced the formation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). KMT conservatives urged Chiang to

arrest them, but he told the conservatives that times were changing and this had to be accepted. So, that was the big signal that political reform was coming. Ching-kuo terminated martial law the following year and Taipei passed a civic organization's law that legalized new political parties. They also ended the ban on new newspapers, which had been used as a control mechanism of the press, opening up a much freer press environment. The process went on to a number of other steps, but led to in 2000, 14 years later, to a peaceful transfer of government from the KMT to a president representing the opposition DPP.

*Q: Were there sort of a Taiwanese, I mean there must have been Taiwanese watchers in the mainland government at the embassy here. I was wondering whether you were picking up from your colleagues who were working with that embassy how they were viewing things in Taiwan.*

BROWN: They were trying to figure out what this political transition meant. Did having a Taiwanese president mean that Beijing was going to face demands for Taiwan independence? How do you interpret the freer expression of opinion and the fact that Taiwanese were now free to advocate independence? What did this mean? Yes, there was a lot of interest. The Chinese Embassy was talking to various people around Washington, including those on the China desk. Occasionally either people from AIT in Washington or we on the Taiwan Coordination Staff would meet with Chinese diplomats. We didn't want to do it too often because our job was to deal with Taiwan, and Taipei was very sensitive about our contacts with the PRC. Nevertheless we did meet to make sure that the channels of communication were open and that the PRC accurately understood the way we saw what was happening.

*Q: While you were dealing with Taiwan, were we ever called upon to steam the fleet or something from the seventh fleet up and down the Formosa Strait and that sort of thing?*

BROWN: This was not the period of military confrontation in the Strait. I mean we had issues that we had to deal with because the Taiwan military and the PRC military were occasionally coming into close proximity of each other in the strait. In the mid 80s, the Taiwan military was still quite confident. They had higher quality systems and they would sometimes try to fly too close to the mainland and provoke the PRC. At times we had to warn Taiwan from doing that sort of thing.

*Q: Quemoy and Matsu which were household names back in the '60s, what was happening with them?*

BROWN: Very little. I mean there was some talk, in the context of Taipei's decision to open up travel to the mainland, about what role the offshore islands might play? Can something take place in terms of travel back and forth there? Intriguing questions, but in 1987 when travel to the mainland had just begun, it was too early for such a major change on the offshore islands.

*Q: Were there ever any problems with mainland students and Taiwanese students at UCLA or where have you, what have you, at one of the universities?*

BROWN: Not that I can recall. That was a period when PRC students were coming to the U.S. in large numbers, and there have long been thousands of Taiwanese on campuses as well, but I

don't recall any significant problems.

*Q: Did Taiwan make any noises during the 1988 election between Bush and Dukakis I guess it was about political contributions or anything like that?*

BROWN: I don't recall a problem on that.

*Q: This is tape five, side one with David Brown*

BROWN: Yes, I had observed the drama of Tiananmen while still in Washington. The students in the square, the mass demonstrations of a kind that had never been seen before in Communist China, many ordinary citizens joining in, delegations from different ministries participating in the demonstrations. For a while, I believed this would lead to some very significant change. Then martial law was declared and the military suppressed the demonstrations.

In Taiwan, there was a lot of optimism that spring that real reform might occur in China. Then of course, when the crack down came, this bubble burst and the usual attacks on the communists resumed. What happened to cross-strait travel, trade and investment during this period is very interesting. Businessmen went to the mainland, business continued, investments continued, it was rather remarkable. After Tiananmen, when most of the world was reducing contacts and there was reluctance by many in the West to invest in China, to everyone's surprise Taiwanese investments just kept going pretty much as though nothing had happened. It was motivated by business opportunities and most of the investments were in the southern coastal part of China, which was not heavily affected by what was going on in Beijing.

Was Taiwan intelligence involved in trying to support the democracy movement in China during that April May period? We didn't have very much information on that at that time. Most of the external support from overseas Chinese seemed to be coming out of Hong Kong rather than Taipei. But how much came from Taiwan wasn't clear at the time.

*Q: Were we, how did we feel about Taiwanese investment in China? I mean was this a good thing?*

BROWN: A good thing, yes.

*Q: So, we weren't concerned that they were making another competitor for us?*

BROWN: No. You have to remember that this started slowly. There had been a certain amount of unacknowledged trade going on indirectly before the travel ban was lifted in '87. The volume was still modest and not in the high tech area. It was textiles and shoes and sportswear and products like that. Today if you look at the cross-strait trade it's a very different picture. It's a huge factor both for China and for Taiwan. It is very much tied into global IT trade.

*Q: What about Taiwanese versus mainland diplomacy in Africa and other places? Was this at all sort of a battlefield while you were there?*

BROWN: The diplomatic struggle was a constant phenomenon. I can't remember who lost and who won what in that particular period.

*Q: Well, then, when you left there after Tienanmen, where did you go in '89?*

BROWN: Before we leave, let me just come back to one other issue that was very important in those days and about which there have been reports subsequently in the public record. That is the question of non-proliferation in Taiwan.

*Q: You're talking about non-proliferation?*

BROWN: Well about the Taiwan effort to acquire nuclear weapons, which we talked about earlier when we discussed the period when I was on the desk in the '70s. We went through another bout of this. It was reported at the time that Taiwan formally shut down and disabled its research reactor in 1988. This was the reactor they had purchased from Canada in the 1960s. The other information in the public media was the defection to the United States in early 1988 of one of the deputy directors of the Taiwan Atomic Energy Commission. The circumstances were never very clear in the media under which this individual ended up in the United States, but the fact that he was here was reported at the time and it is in the public record now. Dealing with this issue was one of the most important things the U.S. did in this period. It was in a way cleaning up after our own mess. I say that because the impetus for getting back to an interest in nuclear weapons by the Taiwan military came after we switched relations and their sense of insecurity became very real. Things developed to the point that we had to discretely tell Taiwan that this reactor had to be shut down and disabled. That reactor was the core of the problem because it could be used in a weapons program. In the '70s we had agreed Taiwan could continue to operate it under IAEA safeguards and it just became apparent that that wasn't the smart policy.

*Q: Well, how did the Taiwanese react?*

BROWN: Well, there were only a very small number of people in Taiwan who were aware that this was an issue. They essentially were persuaded that their relations with the United States, with the Reagan and Bush administrations, were more important to their security than anything they might be thinking of doing in terms of developing a weapons capability of their own. The people who were involved in it saw that the better part of wisdom would be to shut down this reactor. This took place around the time that Chiang Ching-kuo passed away. The only thing known to the public was that the deputy director of the Atomic Energy Commission and his family had disappear from Taiwan and it was rumored gone to the United States. We were fortunate enough not to have congressional hearings on this, thanks to some careful briefings of key members, so there was no sort of public discussion of it in the United States either.

*Q: When this director and family left, what was behind it?*

BROWN: Well, I think I better leave it at that because I don't want to go beyond what is in the public record. I think you could put the pieces together you could assume that something he told us was significant in terms of our understanding of what was going on.

*Q: I got you. Well, then '89, whither?*

BROWN: To Hong Kong.

*Q: You certainly were on an East Asian circuit weren't you?*

BROWN: It's a wonderful part of the world.

*Q: We used to have trouble. I know when I was in Saigon it was something known as China coasters. These were sailors who spent all their time; they wouldn't leave ships anywhere. I mean they just kept going up and down the China coast with literally a wife in every port. You were almost a China coaster then?*

BROWN: Well that's an interesting way to put it. I wonder what my wife would say about that?

*Q: You were in Hong Kong from when to when?*

BROWN: '89 to '92.

*Q: Interesting time.*

BROWN: Very.

*Q: What were you doing?*

BROWN: I was the Deputy Consul General.

*Q: Who was consul general then?*

BROWN: At the beginning, it was Don Anderson and in the second two years it was Richard Williams.

*Q: Richard?*

BROWN: Williams. Dick Williams. You really ought to interview him.

*Q: Well, Hong Kong '89. You know Tiananmen had happened. The takeover was not that far away. What was the operative date?*

BROWN: 1997.

*Q: But it was a date that was well, everybody had it on their mind.*

BROWN: Right. There were a lot of important negotiations going on between the British and the Chinese during this period. The most important being drafting what is called the Basic Law, which was the mini constitution that set the framework of how Hong Kong would run after its

reversion to China.

*Q: When you arrived there the aftermath of Tiananmen must have been... Things had been almost euphoric before. You weren't in Hong Kong, but coming there, this was a dose of communist reality, wasn't it?*

BROWN: Right and the city was very nervous. You saw this in a variety of ways. You saw it in the growth of the Democratic Party in Hong Kong, which was just getting started. It was very much motivated by people who were determined to do as much as they could to protect Western values, civic society and promote democracy in Hong Kong, move it along as far as you can get it before the turnover, to provide some kind of a base of democratic politics in Hong Kong before the handover took place. You saw it in our own staff at the consulate, which was very nervous.

*Q: You're talking about the Chinese staff.*

BROWN: Yes, Chinese at the consulate. After reversion in 1997, if they were still working for the consulate, would they be considered as spies because of what they had done at the consulate? How were they going to be protected? You saw it in many different manifestations.

*Q: Well, in a way well, I don't want to put words in your mouth. I mean what were we, the Hong Kong and the premiere observing spot of China, but now we have an embassy, we have the consulate generals. What was Hong Kong doing at this time?*

BROWN: Well, we still had a mainland reporting unit as part of a combined political economic section. There were four people from the State Department component reporting on China. We had a large defense attaché office, though it didn't have that title. Their focus was on the PLA in China and what could be learned about it both from sources in Hong Kong and by traveling around China in the guise of being tourists. Once in a while they got in a bit of trouble from what they were doing, but nothing egregious. Then there was a CIA station there, which was very heavily focused on what could be learned from Hong Kong about the mainland.

*Q: Obviously were we at the time when we were looking at what the British were up to and you know, and also we're beginning to lay plans for what are we doing about Hong Kong? We might not be a player, but had our staff and everything else. What were we thinking about?*

BROWN: In early '92, which was five years before the transition was to take place, at Washington's request, Beijing and Hong Kong did a joint study of what should the U.S. presence in Hong Kong be after reversion.

*Q: This is our post in Beijing?*

BROWN: Yes, our post, Embassy Beijing. Stape Roy, the ambassador at the time and Dick Williams, the CG, were the ones who oversaw the collective inputs as to what the nature of the relationship should be. Our recommendations were then sent to Washington. No decisions were made at that time, our recommendations were later largely followed when reversion occurred. Interestingly enough, there was no big difference of opinion between the Embassy and

Consulate. It was agreed that the United States would have an interest in supporting the "high degree of autonomy" that Hong Kong was supposed to get and that therefore, the type of organization the U.S. should have in Hong Kong should be consistent with the concept of Hong Kong having a high degree of autonomy, i.e., it shouldn't be just another consulate in China. But a Consulate with more autonomy from the Embassy than is usual. Embassy Beijing agreed even then that the person who was in Hong Kong should be seen within the State Department as a chief of missions.

*Q: In other words certainly we report directly to Washington.*

BROWN: Yes, On all things that had to do with Hong Kong's autonomy, and simultaneously have a close liaison relationship with Beijing, but not be treated by Beijing in the same way that Shanghai, Guangzhou and the other consulates were treated.

*Q: Well, this of course to somebody who isn't familiar with this extremely important because you could have a chief of mission in Beijing who would want to.*

BROWN: Exert control.

*Q: Exert control and all of a sudden a lot of disquieting reports came out of Hong Kong it would be tempting to sit on those or to do this. This way by just this reporting channel meant that you would be getting a certain analysis that did not have to go through the venting of the embassy. I mean this happens. We always have this problem if you have supervision. I mean that close supervision. So, it was really a very important decision.*

BROWN: Yes. Right. When they made the decision at the time of reversion, that's the way it came out.

*Q: Well, now, what were the things you were particularly concerned with?*

BROWN: Well, one was to do everything we could to try and make sure that when the transition took place there was a basis for continuing to treat Hong Kong as an autonomous unit in terms of U.S. policy. There we had the cooperation of the Congress and particularly Congressman Porter who was on the House Human Rights Caucus and Senator McConnell.

McConnell and Porter took the lead in passing the Hong Kong Policy Act which essentially said the United States has a strong interest in Hong Kong's continuing autonomy under the Basic Law arrangements worked out with China. It will be U.S. policy to support that high degree of autonomy at the time. We will continue to deal with Hong Kong separately on things like immigration and customs and IPR.

*Q: IPR?*

BROWN: Intellectual property rights and export controls, textile agreements, all of these kinds of things would remain in place. Rather than reaching a pessimistic assumption about what would happen after reversion, this legislation said the opposite. We're going to treat Hong Kong

separately so long as it has real autonomy. That was very important. In the process of doing that we also dealt with our employees' concerns in the sense of getting special provisions put into legislation. If at the time of transition any employees in the consulate wanted to, we would work out expeditious naturalization for them to get a visa on the basis of their employment at the consulate without waiting for the normal 30 years. It was a special set of provisions so that any member of the consulate who felt threatened could get a visa and go to the United States as an immigrant. In the end, very few people in the end took advantage of that provision, but the option was very important to our employees.

*Q: What about were we getting good information from the British on how things were going?*

BROWN: The British were pretty good. There was a debate in Hong Kong at that time as to whether the British were really looking after the interests of Hong Kong or whether they were simply being narrow minded British and only caring about British commercial interests. I happened to be one of the people who thought the British were doing a reasonably good job of looking after Hong Kong's interests. Of course, that gets you into the whole question about how you view of Chris Patten, the final British Governor.

*Q: He wasn't there at your time?*

BROWN: He came just as I was leaving. David Wilson, a career British Foreign Service officer as the governor when I was there, but just as I was leaving Patten replaced him. He had a very different approach. Anyway, we in the Consulate thought that the British were doing a pretty good job of ensuring that the provisions of the Joint British- Chinese Declaration were accurately translated into the new domestic Chinese legislation, the so-called Basic Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The British were pushing the Chinese to consult to a degree with the people of Hong Kong about what the content of what that law should be. The Chinese organized a basic law drafting committee, which had mainly mainland Chinese on it, but included a number of people from Hong Kong. These Hong Kong representatives were chosen by the Chinese, not by the Hong Kong people or by the British. There was an effort to pressure those Hong Kong representatives to stand up for Hong Kong and to have an open process where the texts of draft law were known not just to the British but also to the Hong Kong people and were debated in public. The British played a role in setting up that process. Some people it as only a sham consultation process because the Chinese appointed the members and others thought that this limited process was better than not having any role at all for Hong Kong. I was in that latter camp.

*Q: Were we looking at that time did we want was Hong Kong as sort of an economic dynamo important to us? In other words, were we interested say beyond the fate of the people in Hong Kong, but just to have that, was that a good thing for us to have that there?*

BROWN: Oh, definitely. It was not a perfect free market economy by any stretch of the imagination

*Q: Under the British?*

BROWN: Yes, under the British. Hong Kong gets a lot better marks for being a free market economy than it deserves. It gets those marks because in terms of the trade in goods it's a very open economy. In the services area, however, it was very carefully controlled by the British. Our problems in the trade sector with Hong Kong were largely in the services area. What could lawyers do? Doctors, people who were involved in various parts of the financial sector, what could they do and what couldn't they do? How do you regulate telephone services? How do you open up the port operations to other country's firms? Who would get the services contracts at the new airport that they're building? The Hong Kong economy was very important to the United States because there was a lot of American investment there, a lot of American companies there, but more importantly it was because of the impact that that economy was having on South China. There was a very symbiotic relationship between Hong Kong and the parts of China that were reforming economically the fastest and so the ability of Hong Kong to promote economic reform in China was seen as a big plus. It was something that you would want to keep going. Reform has gone so far in the 21st Century that Hong Kong's impact on China is less than it was at that time, but roughly 70% of all foreign direct investments into China in the years that I was in Hong Kong came in through Hong Kong. That meant technology, the foreign know-how, the ideas were coming in through Hong Kong, and keeping that going was important. For me seeing democracy develop in Hong Kong as far as it could possibly go was an important thing as well, not just for the sake of the people in Hong Kong, but because of the demonstration effect on the rest of China. Democracy hadn't gone nearly as far as one would like it to have gone. So it's not having as much of a demonstration effect as one would hope, but Hong Kong is still the only city in China where there are any members of a municipal council who are directly elected by the citizens. The democratic process there is flawed in many ways, but it's way ahead of the democratic process for the people of Beijing or Guangzhou or Shenyang.

*Q: Were you aware or anybody else aware of mainland Chinese officials coming in and looking over the property, slamming the car doors, kicking the tires?*

BROWN: Well, China was becoming a bigger part of the Hong Kong economy while we were there. There was a process of adjustment by the old British firms in which they realized that they didn't have to keep their relations with London and the governor greased as much as they had to keep their relations with Beijing and the incoming Chinese economic entities greased. You saw companies bringing in Chinese investors. You saw Cathay Pacific, the British invested airline in Hong Kong, spinning off a joint venture airline with some Chinese counterparts called DragonAir that would handle a large amount of the flights between, not all of them, but a large percentage of the flights between Hong Kong and the mainland. Cathay Pacific was an investor in DragonAir along with the Chinese. So, you saw this kind of positioning going on. Not by American companies because the American companies didn't have the inside track with the British. It was mainly the old-line British firms trying to adjust to the new masters. Some British firms tried to avoid this. Jardines, one of the oldest firms, moved their headquarters offshore so that it wouldn't be subject to control in Hong Kong. Its total business was in Hong Kong, but the headquarters would be in the Cayman Islands, I recall. However, most of the British firms went the other way finding ways to get along with your new masters.

*Q: Were American firms still coming into Hong Kong?*

BROWN: Oh, yes, very much so. The American chamber there was one of the biggest in the world and it was growing in those years despite Tiananmen.

*Q: Was this a matter that it was a comfortable place in a way for a corporation to work into China? I mean English speaking.*

BROWN: Yes and lots of local Hong Kong businessmen were doing the same thing. So American firms could operate on their own or cooperate with local partners.

*Q: How did we relate to our consulate general in Guangzhou?*

BROWN: They were two separate organizations with distinct purposes, but overlapping interests because of Hong Kong's intense economic ties with south China.

*Q: I would think that you would sort of bump into each other?*

BROWN: There was some bumping in not just with Guangzhou, but also with all the China post because of Hong Kong's reporting responsibilities on China. Hong Kong provided unique perspectives on China that didn't always jibe with views from within China. And our defense attaches ere given responsibilities to travel throughout China. I remember a good friend who was the naval attaché took a trip to Tibet and then out from Tibet to Nepal and down to India.

*Q: You have to for fleet connections there. You'd been in and out of there before of course, but was there a beginning of reluctance to talk to Americans within Hong Kong by the Chinese and all?*

BROWN: No, not at all. We had I would say quite a bit of contact both with the representatives of China in Hong Kong and with the Chinese business there. It wasn't intimate, but a fair amount of contact.

*Q: Were you getting any reflections there from Vietnam?*

BROWN: We had a big problem with Vietnamese refugees in Hong Kong. We were caught between Washington then under the first Bush administration, which did not want to force any Vietnamese back to Vietnam and the UNHCR and the Hong Kong government that wanted to carefully distinguish between economic migrants and political refugees and send back to Vietnam those who were economic migrants. For Hong Kong, returning migrants was to be a deterrent against a continuing flood of people into Hong Kong. The numbers were quite large. It was a huge political issue within Hong Kong. All the money that had to go into building camps and providing police and health services and education in the camps and all this cost the Hong Kong taxpayer a lot. So there was pressure on the government to get the Vietnamese out. The Chinese Government frequently reminded Hong Kong that this problem should not exist in 1997. Clean it up; get rid of these people. was Beijing's message. And Washington was saying in effect don't send anyone back to Vietnam. Washington wanted liberal criteria for determining political refugee status. Anybody with the slightest reason for political refugee status should be given every opportunity to prove his or her case in Hong Kong.

*Q: Were we putting our money where our mouth was as far as taking the refugees?*

BROWN: Yes, quite a few people were coming to the States. By the end of the time I was there, we'd interviewed extensively and taken everybody that we wanted to take. There were criminal elements among the remaining Vietnamese. People who either had a criminal record that you could identify back in Vietnam or who had committed crimes in the camps. So how to evaluate the remaining Vietnamese was a very controversial issue.

*Q: Were there any other issues there, a lot of fleet visits and things like that?*

BROWN: Yes. And the fleet visits were one aspect of our efforts to build a foundation for post-reversion relationships. We wanted to make sure that we had all of this working smoothly and in a way which had a chance of surviving because the use of Hong Kong as an R&R destination was very convenient for the navy. We didn't want to do anything that would jeopardize that. The basic law was very specific that defense matters were a central government responsibility. Ship visits by naval vessels were an issue to be decided in Beijing and not in Hong Kong. Most of the period since the handover we've been able to have our ships visit Hong Kong as we did before, but there have been a couple of times for instance after the Belgrade bombing and after the EP3 incident when the Chinese temporarily stopped giving approval. It's worked reasonably well. What we were trying to do was position ourselves. We had an office within the consulate that provided support for ship visits. They had some facilities around town and we were trying to get these relocated in commercial locations so that we could have a very small number of people in Hong Kong handling visits, but the support structure would be there.

We did some other things. We reorganized the USIS library operation that conceivably could be seen as propaganda by a communist China. Partly for those reasons and partly for budgetary reasons we relocated the USIS library to Chinese University and made it a cooperative undertaking between Chinese University and the consulate so it could be embedded in Hong Kong. We renegotiated our air agreement with Hong Kong so it would be an agreement not between Britain and the United States, but between Hong Kong and the United States. The same thing was done in the area of law enforcement. We were negotiating agreements with Hong Kong on legal assistance and extradition. We got it negotiated but didn't actually get approval by the Senate until much later. Our objective was to have a basis for continuing law enforcement cooperation.

*Q: How about congress? Did people, a lot of congress people coming by and all?*

BROWN: We had a lot of them; some seriously interested in Hong Kong and some came just to shop.

*Q: I was going to say, I was wondering whether Mr. Lee was still turning out his suits. When I went to Vietnam you know, we all stopped and got your \_\_\_\_\_, but there was one major tailor. You walked in and you walked out two minutes with your measurements.*

BROWN: Many from Congress came because of the Vietnam refugee issue. There were some

like Senator McConnell and Representative Porter who came because they were really concerned about Hong Kong and what's going to happen to the six million people there.

*Q: When you left there, you left there in '92.*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: How did you feel about the situation? I mean did you think it was going to come out moderately well or not?*

BROWN: I was quite optimistic. Optimistic because we saw a lot of resilience in the Hong Kong community. The British were beginning to allow Hong Kong Chinese to have significant positions in the administration, five or six years in advance so that they would be positioned there to keep the civil administration going. We didn't know how the political arrangements were going to work out, but the arrangements were very explicit on one thing and that was that there weren't going to be people from Beijing running things. It was going to be people in Hong Kong, ultimately chosen by Beijing, but people in Hong Kong. And I thought they would stand up or be pushed by the Hong Kong people to stand up for Hong Kong.

Why would one be optimistic? One reason was the resilience of the Hong Kong community. The second was that the international community would be watching. The international community has I think a number of guises, but one of the most important is what you would call international markets. Hong Kong was important to the Chinese economy because of the investment flow, and the Chinese would have its self interest in making sure that Hong Kong remained a vibrant economy and an entry way for the benefits of international trade which were still heavily coming through there. The third reason that gave one some confidence was the Taiwan factor. Everyone knew that the mainland wanted to move on from dealing with Hong Kong to dealing ultimately with Taiwan and talking it back into the fold. If Taiwan concluded that Beijing had not implemented its deal with Hong Kong, then no one in Taiwan would risk making a deal with Beijing. Therefore, the PRC had an interest from that angle as well of living up to the terms worked out with the British in order to have credibility in trying to deal with Taiwan. So, there were reasons for Beijing to adhere to its agreement to give Hong Kong a high degree of autonomy. It wasn't a lost cause, and the U.S. should do its part in encouraging the deal to work.

*Q: What was the feeling? I must say I was sort of surprised, because I had never followed Hong Kong at all, to see that the British were opening Hong Kong up to more Hong Kongese into the government and all that. I would have thought that that would have been done a long time ago. Was there a feeling that the Brits really should have done this a long time ago?*

BROWN: Definitely. They should have done it years earlier. They should have had a political process going on in Hong Kong in the '70s and '80s, but they made some decisions early after the Second World War and repeated them I think in the '60s at the time of the cultural revolution of China, that by gosh Britain was going to keep control of things. Yes, there was a legislative council for the city as a whole, but until 1984, the year of the Sino-British joint Declaration, every single member of the legislative council was appointed by the governor. It was a selection

process, not an election process. The British began rapidly after '84 moving to put in place representative institutions. What was the Chinese view of this? The Chinese view was that Hong Kong was to be turned over the way I had been in 1984. So introducing representative government after 1984 wasn't something Beijing had agreed to.

*Q: They had a point.*

BROWN: They had a point. Beyond the Legislative Council, there were a large number of Hong Kong people working in the administration, but very few of them made it up to the senior levels. There were large numbers of Brits not just as the head of departments, but as the head of sections of departments and deputy section heads who were still British civil servants running Hong Kong up until the late '80s.

*Q: It seems so almost atypical of what was happening everywhere else, I mean you know, one always hears about the Belgian Congo was the great thing. They had about three educated people and here you're talking about a highly sophisticated city. I mean were you talking to the, was there sort of a colonial attitude among the British?*

BROWN: Yes. There was an end the empire mentality among some of them. The official government view, the British government view was that we've got a pretty good deal and it's going to work and we're going to be proud of what we're doing, we're not ratting out and abandoning these people. But there were a lot of civil servants who sort of said, oh, you guys will never be able to run it. Moral will collapse and corruption will return. That was the end of empire mentality among some of the British civil servants. They were the Brits who left at reversion. Yet today, there are still many Brits working in second rung positions in Hong Kong government, even now six or seven years after Hong Kong's return.

*Q: Well, what did this mean for us? How did you see this? What did this mean we were doing now?*

BROWN: First, we weren't undoing anything that the U.S. had in place. We were preserving our alliance relationships. We were cooperating as I said with other allied governments in the region who thought this was the right thing to do. So, we saw this as adding something else on top of what we already had, our alliances, adding something that was compatible with those alliance relationships. We thought over time dialogue might help reshape the way countries in Asia had dealt with each other. We were conscious that there were long term historical animosities at work, the Chinese and Vietnamese, the Chinese and Japanese, and that there were short-term issues that divided countries. The Vietnamese had at that point in time just gotten out of Cambodia. While this issue was being debated, the North Korean nuclear issue was blowing up in the northern part of Asia. So, there were lots of contemporary issues. We believed that the U.S. had nothing to lose and potentially something to gain over the long term by getting people together and seeing if they couldn't build "habits of cooperation" as we put it then. To talk about security issues, to understand each other's concerns and fears and build habits of cooperation where they had not existed before.

When you had looked at the military organizations of most of the countries in Asia, you saw they

were very closed inward looking organizations. Part of what we were aiming for was to find ways of breaking those barriers down and building linkages and establishing relationships. This was a bit of a trick because, even though the U.S. brought along DOD colleagues, almost no other country that showed up at the initial planning meeting brought anyone from their militaries along. Once the thing had been established, one of the early U.S. goals was to get the military officers, particularly younger military officers, engaged in the work of this organization, working on things that were common problems, that were not controversial, but would begin to establish some personal relationships. Believe it or not even within ASEAN, which had created a huge pattern of cooperation amongst almost every part of their governments, there was little direct contact between military officials.

*Q: I would think one of the things that you'd think up there would be to work on piracy, the naval.*

BROWN: Yes, that was in fact an area that everyone was talking about as something that the ARF might get involved in once it got started. It's gone about it in a very delicate way because the question of piracy is very politically sensitive.

*Q: Why is that?*

BROWN: It is politically sensitive along the China coast because it implies that China is not able to control its own maritime borders and politically sensitive in Southeast Asia particularly in Indonesia for the same reason. So in the Malacca Straits, are you going to allow well-organized Singaporean police to chase pirates into Indonesian and Malaysian waters? So, piracy was too sensitive an issue for a fledgling organization to deal with at the start. In fact, arrangements were worked out on a trilateral basis between the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore on how to improve policing in the Malacca Straits.

*Q: I think all of these countries though of us as the camel that was sticking its head under the tent, into the tent or something. I mean we travel with our military. I mean they're part of our calculation and have them say let's all get together and they'll take one look at the seventh fleet or something like this, you can see an awful lot. I would think it would be very reluctant.*

BROWN: Well, it took a while. Let's put it that way. It took six or seven years before the pattern of everybody bringing defense officials, whether they were civilians or in uniform, along got established. But here I'm looking into the future and not talking about '93.

*Q: Well, at this time in '92 ASEAN was a pretty good regional economic entity was it?*

BROWN: Yes, it was six countries and they were all doing extremely well economically. They had in this same period '91, '92, '93, been working very successfully on the Cambodian peace agreement. The peace agreement wasn't something that ASEAN did on its own. It was a combination of ASEAN and the members of the P5 at the UN, the U.S., France, China, Russia, all playing important roles. They put this altogether and got the UN to come in on a major new peace keeping operation in Cambodia. So, because of its economic success and its diplomatic contribution, ASEAN was quite highly regarded in that period.

*Q: How did you find, I mean, you came in between, you came in under the Bush administration? How did you find the transition from your optic went from your responsibility?*

BROWN: I think it went quite well. Again I'm just speaking of the East Asian Bureau. Bill Clark a real professional passed things over to Winston Lord who had worked in government for democrats and republicans at different times. I think Lord had endeared himself to Clinton because he had taken a hard line on China's human rights policy, advocating the linkage of trade and the human rights. But he had worked in a republican administration before. And so, it was one professional turning things over to another professional. It was a sharp contrast with Dick Holbrook's arrival in the Carter years. Dick didn't want to listen to a single thing, his predecessor Amb. Hummel had to say. Winston was the exact opposite. He was willing to talk to everybody. He consulted endlessly with people. So, there was a much easier transition. There wasn't a wholesale scrapping of people. There were some changes. Winston brought in Peter Thompson who had been his DCM in Beijing to be the principal DAS and made him responsible for China. Peter was not a particular popular choice amongst his professional colleagues, but he was a professional.

*Q: Did in \_\_\_\_\_ and all, how about the China card, how were things changing there or did you see that?*

BROWN: The new administration, including Lord, came into office with the Clinton campaign rhetoric criticizing the Chinese leaders as "the butchers of Beijing."

*Q: We're talking about the aftermath of Tiananmen Square?*

BROWN: That's right. Clinton had criticized the Bush administration for working so hard to keep the U.S. China relationship going after Tiananmen. Because of that, Clinton had advocated, partly I think at Winston Lord's urging, a linkage of trade access to the U.S. markets on favorable terms to progress on human rights. That became the administration policy. Winston was at one time administering the trade-human rights linkage in bilateral relations with China and at the same time, on the multilateral level, he was working to include the Chinese in the ARF.

*Q: Was it a matter of Warren Christopher saying you get East Asia, take it or was the hand of Christopher?*

BROWN: His hand was light, but there were certain issues that the Secretary had to be involved in. Winston's work with him on China was probably the best example of that. The Secretary also had to be involved in endorsing what we were doing with the ARF. Christopher went to the Foreign Ministers meeting in Singapore in 1993. This was a meeting of the foreign ministers of ASEAN and their so-called dialogue partners, the U.S., Japan, Canada, Korea, Australia, New Zealand. It was that group that decided to set up the ARF and to announce that the next meeting in '94 would include the foreign ministers of the other countries as well, Russia, China, Vietnam and so forth.

Christopher was also scheduled to attend the actual first meeting of the ARF that took place in

Bangkok the following summer. However, at the very last minute Christopher decided not to go because of a hastily arranged meeting at the White House between Arafat and Rabin. Christopher decided that it was more important to be at this Middle East peace summit than to go to Bangkok's inaugural meeting of the ARF. To put it in a less attractive light, Christopher's public image wasn't particularly good. He had the image of a cold fish. It didn't appear that he was terribly centrally involved in important issues, and his public affairs handlers said, he's got to be seen as involved in something that's important and that's the Middle East peace process. Even if the president was doing all the real work, he's got to be there in the photographs. So he's not going to Bangkok.

Then there was the issue of who would take Christopher's place in Bangkok. The Secretary's initial inclination was to send Peter Tarnoff who was the Under Secretary for Political Affairs in theory the third ranking person in the State Department. But Tarnoff had not been involved with Asia policy and was not seen as a politically important figure by Asians. Winston had to race around and get the Secretary to change his mind and send Strobe Talbot, the Deputy Secretary. Strobe went. He had more rank and was just the right kind of person for the job, an intellectual who thought strategically and understood the importance of the event. He accepted the job with a certain amount of relish.

*Q: In looking at this during your '93 to '95 period and even earlier when you had been in your other job, how would you, I won't say rank the countries, but were there countries within this that were pains in the asses and other ones that were from our perspective sort of on the right road or prima donnas or anything?*

BROWN: Well, I would say that the basic dynamic of this group was between countries that wanted to see the organization develop and become meaningful and others which were very concerned that the organization not do anything whatsoever that infringed on their national sovereignty. Foremost among the defenders of sovereignty were Indonesia and Malaysia. The Chinese were the other ones acting as a break. The ARF operated by consensus, which pretty much meant that even one county could block agreement. That was the main question. The other subtext was between the ASEAN countries and the non-ASEAM members. The ARF was the ASEAN not Asian regional forum. The ASEAN countries were absolutely determined that they were going to remain the "driving force" behind this organization. They were not going to let the big boys, the Chinese, the Japanese and the Americans, dictate to them what this organization should do. So this was the other underlying dynamic. Our approach was to seek working arrangements which allowed both the ASEAN and non-ASEAN members would have an equal ability to contribute to the work of this organization.

*Q: Speaking of the military, a power that was not mentioned was becoming stronger particularly the Indian navy, but India.*

BROWN: India was not considered in the beginning. However, after I left and I can't remember if this was '96 or '97, the issue of India joining was addressed. While I wasn't directly involved then, basically the U.S. was reluctant to see this happen because we were afraid that if you brought India in you would have to bring Pakistan. If you brought Pakistan and India in, that would mean importing the Indo-Pak controversy into the organization, which already had too

many internal problems to deal with. So, the U.S. resisted that, but once again it was the Singaporeans who were pushing this and in the end the overall consensus in the group was to one invite the Indians in and to reach an internal consensus that there would never be an invitation to Pakistan. The reason many countries wanted India in was to act as another counter weight to rising China. One of the things on which there was a general consensus in the region was to try and constrain China by embedding it in regional organizations. This was never said but it was a subtext in all of this. Southeast Asians saw India as a player in a larger game of trying to build a network that would constrain China.

*Q: Well, India makes a great deal of sense because of their military power in the Indian Ocean and sort of like Japan on the other side, that whole crescent there.*

BROWN: One other thing before we move on that was interesting was the Mischief Reef incident.

*Q: The what?*

BROWN: Mischief Reef is the English name for a reef in the South China Sea, which is within the 200-mile economic zone of the Philippines. It was an uninhabited reef, claimed by the Philippines, by China and I think by Vietnam.

*Q: This wasn't the Spratlys was it?*

BROWN: Yes.

*Q: I mean, yes I can remember.*

BROWN: In the spring of 1995, without any advance notice, the Chinese built what they called a fishermen's assistance facility on Mischief Reef. From pictures, it was a cement buildings built on pilings. The construction was done by the Chinese military as part of China's effort to assert its rights in the South China Sea. This really concerned the Philippines and provoked a general reaction in Southeast Asia. This action led the U.S. Government to develop a new statement of its policy on the South China Sea.

It also became a major issue in the summer of 1995 in the preparations for the ARF ministerial meeting in Brunei, a country with 250,000 people that was in the chair of ASEAN. China with 1.2 billion people had just occupied a reef, maybe 400 miles from Brunei. It was Brunei's responsibility to coordinate the ARF's response to the Chinese action. On one side of the issue you had countries that were concerned saying we've got to put some pressure on the Chinese. On the other side, China was opposed to putting the issue on the ARF agenda and at one point threatened not to attend the meeting if Mischief Reef would be an issue for discussion. The U.S. and Australia took the position that for the ARF to have credibility as a security forum it would have to address the issue. This was a very tricky issue and Brunei eventually having consulted widely went to the Chinese and said, ministers are going to talk about this whether we put it on the agenda or not. As the chairman, Brunei's foreign minister will have to summarize the discussion that actually takes place in the written statement issued at the end of the meeting. We

want you to understand this. In the end, the Chinese came the meeting. There was a discussion, and the Chinese presented a new statement of their policy on the South China Sea in which for the first time Beijing committed to resolving issues in accordance with the Law of the Sea Treaty. Our interpretation was that the Chinese decided they couldn't afford not to be at the ARF and that, if they were going to come to this meeting, it would be advantageous to issue a conciliatory statement. I think this was one of the things that convinced people that having the ASEAN Regional Forum was a useful forum. The ARF couldn't challenge the Chinese, but it could put a certain amount of pressure on the Chinese and force the Chinese to take opinions in the region into account in ways that the Chinese wouldn't have had to do if the organization didn't exist. Winston and Christopher were all really very pleased with the way this worked out. One year after its creation, the ARF was serving as a significant forum for discussion.

*Q: Because that area, I remember it was an area of contention back when I was in South Vietnam in the '70s. But Vietnam and the sort of peace in China always claimed to, the thought being that there might be oil around there.*

BROWN: Yes, that's correct. On the Vietnamese side of the South China Sea there are some exploration blocks in the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone where oil has been found and it's being produced.

*Q: On this issue, the reef issue, were we being very careful to take a back seat or were we?*

BROWN: To my disappointment, the answer to that is yes. That spring I took the lead in drafting a new statement of U.S. policy on the South China Sea. I hoped it would include a clear statement of U.S. opposition to military moves that would threaten peace in the region. Winston Lord's view was that the Chinese would see this as a challenge and that the U.S. already had enough problems in our bilateral relations with China. The U.S. should not be out in front on the Mischief Reef question. Yes, we have interests, but we shouldn't be out there leading the charge to challenge the Chinese in this area. We should leave that to the claimants. So, when we worked out this new statement of U.S. policy, it represented some advance from earlier very general statements, but it did not assert in any way that the U.S. was going to play a role of trying to diffuse tensions.

*Q: You said you were disappointed. Did you feel that we should have played a more aggressive role?*

BROWN: Yes, I thought that we were dealing with a dynamic in the South China Sea in which all of the claimants, the Vietnamese, the Filipinos, the Chinese, the Malaysians were taking actions that provoked the others to respond. The situation could easily get out of hand and require some response by the U.S. This had happened in the Paracels in the 1970, when the Chinese attacked and drove the Vietnamese out of the islands, with considerable casualties. Rather than waiting, it would be better to encourage the claimants to work our some rules of the game. The actual idea our office was advocating was that there ought to be an agreement by all of the parties not to occupy any new territory nor substantially reinforce existing positions. We thought that the U.S. ought to be much more active particularly working with the Indonesians which as the biggest country in Southeast Asia had been active on these issues. Winston said, no.

This would essentially mean organizing people to resist the Chinese and we don't need to do that. Let them do it on their own.

*Q: Of course, out of this whole issue raises the question that has been around for a hell of a long time and that is the expansion of China. I mean everybody has been watching China. Are they really planning to exert their influence? I mean it's an empire that's sort of grown and contracted and grown and contracted. This was one place that, it may be a small reef, but it still was representative of aggression.*

BROWN: If you look around the periphery of China, there are a couple of places where there are minor territorial disputes. However, there is no evidence that the Chinese are seeking territorial aggrandizement. The South China Sea is a sensitive area because there are unresolved competing claims to essentially uninhabitable areas unless one builds artificial structures. This is a very unique area and one shouldn't draw conclusions about general Chinese behavior from what they will do in the South China Sea. After Mischief Reef, the Chinese didn't expand their footprint in the area.

*Q: Which results in having a group of people, a group of nations getting together and looking at this in the cold light of day and making certain actions sort of unacceptable. Which if it was just between one country and another, particularly if one country is China, it's a little harder to face it down.*

BROWN: It didn't happen on my watch, but subsequently the idea of no new outposts has in fact been worked into the code of conduct in the South China Sea, which was adopted in 2002, I think.

*Q: I've had two contacts one with Korea, one was an airman second class in sitting off Chodo Island, sitting on Chodo Island up in North Yellow Sea and then later as consul general in Seoul in '76 to '79, but was there the perception that an attack could come anytime? I mean, you know, we've had, it's been 50 years now of tension on the border, but except for forays from time to time, the blue house raid and a few other things, its nothing major has happened. What was the feeling?*

BROWN: If you went for a briefing at U.S. Forces Korea, they would emphasize the threat posed by the North. They would be able to talk to you about the kind of training the North had been doing and show you the number of new artillery pieces that they believe had been placed in caves along just north of the DMZ. They would talk about our intelligence on chemical weapons and so forth. So, USFK portrayed a picture of the North, which was still consistent with the idea that at some point they might attack the South and try to unify the country in keeping with their propaganda.

At the same time if you looked at the balance between the North and the South, you would recognize that the North's economy had been in decline and for at least five years, that their sources of support in the Soviet Union and China had dried up, that the military looked like a decrepit organization. The North was balanced against South Korea, which was the 11th largest economy in the world. It had just been admitted to the OECD as a member developed world and

had an army of 650,000 people equipped with some of the best equipment that the U.S. could provide them, well-trained on their own and with the American armed forces. My judgment and the judgment of others who weren't directly involved in the U.S. forces Korea was that the South Koreans could probably handle the North Koreans pretty much on their own. If we weren't in a confrontation with the North over the nuclear issue, I believed the U.S. really should be involved in withdrawing a substantial portion of the American military from Korea because it wasn't needed anymore.

*Q: Did you get any feeling at that time for something which seems to be a considerable concern on the part of China and that is anything happening in North Korea would mean an exodus of umpteen million poor, starving Koreans into China and this means that the Chinese don't want any change.*

BROWN: Yes, you saw that. The Chinese didn't talk much about their bilateral ties with North Korea, but it was pretty clear to us through various intelligence channels that in the early '90s the Chinese had substantially scaled back their aid to the North and done away with friendship pricing on goods sold to the north. Then when the famine occurred in North Korea, the Chinese were clearly beginning to reassess what they were doing vis-à-vis the North. Even though they never gave any aid to the world food program, we were convinced that they became the largest donor to the North of food assistance. They are the principal supplier of petroleum, i.e., energy supplies through Northeast China. The Chinese reversed their policy in '95 and '96 and decided that this famine was undermining stability in the North and that they would have to provide substantial aid to avoid instability.

*Q: Well, you talk about it, an awful lot of countries that really despise this regime are doing everything they can to keep it going. The Japanese, the United States, the South Koreans, the Chinese. How about the Russians?*

BROWN: They don't have much capability in terms of resources to make a meaningful contribution, but you're right. In some ways, providing aid is repugnant because this regime is as brutal and as inhumane towards its own people as you can imagine. It was and is a government that is prepared to see its own people starve while putting substantial resources into its own military establishment and threatening the rest of the world with weapons of mass destruction. It is repugnant. My view as the director of Korean Affairs was our policy was not to overthrow the regime but to encourage change. I saw the Agreed Framework as a vehicle for encouraging change because, as I said, if the North Koreans were going to implement it through to the end they were going to have to open up their society.

One key issue was how to tie the new reactors into the power grid. The power grid in North Korea was dilapidated. It couldn't possibly handle the power that would be produced by two nuclear reactors. The North Koreans tried to pressure KEDO into agreeing to build a new electrical grid for them as part of the reactor project. KEDO said, no. The way to get the grid is to go to the World Bank. The north didn't like that answer because they knew that would mean they would have to open up their whole economy to the scrutiny of the World Bank. They still haven't agreed to do that, but what we were trying to do was not just deal with an immediate non-proliferation problem, but to bring about fundamental change in North Korean society

through the vehicle of the agreed framework. We saw the humanitarian food aid as another way for doing this. We were prepared to invite the North Koreans into the ASEAN Regional Forum. It didn't happen on my watch. It happened later. There were other things we were prepared to do, but the North hasn't followed through on many of them.

*Q: National Security Advisor.*

BROWN: National Security Advisor. Lake went to Seoul with a message, which said, if you would agree to an initiative to get North South dialogue started, the president will come and visit South Korea. This initiative put our office in a tricky position. For reasons that never explained explicitly, the president wanted Lake to handle this relationship through his contacts with Kim's national security advisor rather than having my boss, Warren Christopher, be the point man on this issue. Perhaps Lake wanted some credit for an initiative. Anyways, Lake and his deputy asked our office for some help in drafting their telegrams to Seoul but insisted that we not inform Christopher. Nevertheless, I discreetly informed Winston Lord what we were doing, and got his agreement. My deputy Dick Christiansen, who knew a lot more about Korea than I did, was involved in this process, too. We were writing the telegrams for Lake to send to Seoul to work out the presidential visit.

The focus of the presidential visit was going to be the announcement of what we called the four party peace talks proposal. The Americans and the South Koreans on one side, the North Koreans and the Chinese on the other side. We would start a process of dialogue about peace on the peninsula. This was a cover essentially for finding a way to get the North and the South to talk to each other. All this was worked out without in the end any bad blood that I could detect between Christopher and Lake.

*Q: What about the Japanese?*

BROWN: They were not happy with this because they weren't one of the four. They were U.S. allies, which China was not, and they were paying a billion dollars for the KEDO. They were not happy, but they were told about it in advance and chose not to object publicly.

**DAVID DEAN**  
**Director, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Taipei, Taiwan (1987-1989)**

*David Dean was born in New York City in 1925 and graduated from Harvard. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in numerous posts including Kuala Lumpur, Rotterdam, Taichung, Hong Kong and Taipei. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.*

DEAN: In early January 1987, I went to Taiwan as Director of AIT's Taipei office. Earlier I was talking about some of the developments which I had taken part in when I set up AIT in '79 until '87.

*Q: We'll stop it right now at '87. At that time in '87 when you moved to Taipei just when you were going or during the mid-'80s, were you seeing a change, or foreseeing a change in Taiwan from being a Kuomintang dictatorship, with a centralized government to one where the native Taiwanese would essentially assume power takeover and that democracy would come in. Did you see this?*

DEAN: Well, yes. In fact, I would go to Taiwan from 1979-87 at least annually, sometimes twice a year, and have talks with President Chiang. He had already announced in '86 to Katherine Graham, the publisher of the Washington Post, that he was going to abolish martial law, that he was going to allow the formation of opposition parties, that he was going to reform the Legislative Yuan, which meant retiring all the elderly legislators and holding elections for new legislators.

*Q: They never had an election did they?*

DEAN: Most of these elderly legislators were elected in 1947 on the mainland. But Taiwan had elections for the lower levels, mayors, and magistrates, city councils, village chiefs, etc. The KMT won most of these because there wasn't an opposition party. There were only individuals who might run as independents. So CCK's announcement was a major departure from the past, and Chiang Ching-kuo told me that he would have done this much earlier but there were serious problems at home and abroad. I am sure he had it in mind to move toward a democratic form of government because he realized that the mainlanders who had come over with his father were only 15% of the population. The other 85% were represented by locally born Taiwanese, and they were beginning to push very hard. There had been serious political problems in Korea and problems with Marcos in the Philippines. He knew that in the future, if he wanted to preserve stability and progress on Taiwan, that he would have to move toward representative government. He was already bringing in Taiwanese to the lower ranks of the party and encouraging them to join the lower ranks of the civil service; then into the mid-ranks, and then into the higher ranks. His vice president was Li Teng-hui, who now is president. He had appointed him Mayor of Taipei, and then Governor of the province of Taiwan. He appointed him Vice President. He was grooming him for the future, and many others too, not just Lee. So when President Chiang told me that he had in mind to move toward these political reforms, the break in relations with the U.S. had set back his timetable. He said he had to postpone the elections for the Legislative Yuan.

There were several other very difficult things, like the '82 Communiqué that we just have been discussing, which were a big blow. Then there were the murders in the Lin Yi-hsiung family in the Kaohsiung incident. Lin Yi-hsiung's mother and his twin daughters were murdered in early 1980 by some unknown assailant, but everybody knew it was political. Cheng Wen-jeng, a professor at Carnegie Mellon University, had been thrown off the roof of a library after being interrogated for 13 hours by the garrison command. Henry Liu, a journalist in Daly City, California, had been murdered by a hit squad from Taiwan on the orders of the Ministry of Defense Intelligence Bureau Chief.

These events all caused a big furor in our Congress and in our government. President Chiang was

trying to cope with that. He announced shortly after, that no member of his family could succeed him. Although he had succeeded his father, it was quite clear to me that he had not trained any member of his family to succeed him. There was one, the middle son, who wanted to and was trying to manipulate things on the side. It was thought that this son might have been involved in the Henry Liu murder, too.

*Q: Well, looking at these murders, it sounds like kind of a rogue operation.*

DEAN: Yes. I think they were people within the security apparatus who were very right wing and intent on having their own way. But, President Chiang had to deal with all different opinions within his own country. He was quite a remarkable person to try to do this and yet move forward. He didn't just make a decision to move forward into these reforms. He had gone around and gotten everybody's opinion, if not their agreement. At least he had given them the courtesy of long and repeated discussions of the pluses and minuses of moving in that direction. So when he did it, it wasn't a big shock to the establishment. They knew he was going to do it. Gradually things were implemented; martial law was lifted. The plans were underway for the new elections, and then he died. If he hadn't put these things in motion, I don't think his successor would have been able to fight the diehards in the KMT Central Standing Committee, and Taiwan would not be where it is today.

*Q: Well, I thought we might have one more session, okay? So, we quit in 1987 and you were off to Taiwan to be the director of our office there.*

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*Today is August 17, 1998. David, what about going there? This is the equivalent to being an ambassador, but it is not. I was wondering about the Senate and confirmation. There are a lot of political currents going around, so I wouldn't think anybody would say this is a routine assignment.*

DEAN: The Director of AIT was chosen by the Department the same way an Ambassador was, that is the Deputy Secretary's Committee, where the Director General of the Foreign Service and the Under Secretary for Political Affairs and a few others sit in on it, and they would have to get White House clearance as well. So, in the fall of '86, George Vest, who was Director General of the Foreign Service then, came to me and asked if I would be willing to go to Taipei. I hadn't thought of another overseas assignment at that time, so I consulted my wife. My wife has been the mainstay of my entire Foreign Service career. In fact, what little successes I had in the various posts were due in large part to her and the friendships she had made with an astounding variety of people in Hong Kong, Beijing, and Taipei. It seemed to me that I had to ask her first if we were going to go. Sort of reluctantly, we both agreed and things were set in train. Usually the AIT Director had a meeting with the President. Mary and I had a photo opportunity with Ronald Reagan although we weren't official representatives and our appointment did not have to be confirmed by the Senate.

*Q: You were there from '87 to when?*

DEAN: I started out in January of '87 and I wound up in December of '89, so that was a three year tour. When we saw Ronald Reagan, he said that he had been to Taiwan several times when he was Governor and was very interested in what was going on there. I told him that I would keep everyone informed. He said that is fine, and that was it. That was in December. and I arrived in Taipei in early January. The first opportunity I had, I met with President Chiang Ching-kuo. I had known him for many years, and he was pleased at the appointment, primarily because someone you know is better than someone you don't. He was very helpful to me. He made sure that some of his senior advisors who really were not too keen on meeting with the Americans would meet with me. For instance, Shen Chang-huan, who was the Secretary General of the President's office, and who had been foreign minister. I tried to invite him for lunch or just to tea, or possibly just a meeting, but he was always busy. I mentioned to the President that I would really like to see Shen and to see a few others. It was very clear that the President spoke to them because very shortly thereafter, they called me up and said, "Let's get together and see each other." I tried to touch base with almost all of the top party and government officials as well as the oppositionists. Then I spent a-lot of time with the American business community because I felt that this is where we could make our biggest contribution, helping them to the best of our ability. I met with various businessmen. There was a new airline to be set up. I met with the chairman of that airline together with McDonnell-Douglas people and Boeing people to introduce them and get them to focus on American aircraft rather than on the airbus which was their original intent. Eventually they did buy mostly McDonnell-Douglas and Boeing aircraft. They didn't buy any airbuses at that time. That is EVA Airlines. Similarly with China Airlines and the Taiwan power company, which intended to build some more nuclear power plants. General Electric, Westinghouse and other American companies were interested in getting the bid on the rapid transit system rather than the French or the Germans. I spent a lot of time opening various exhibits, going to trade shows, doing all sorts of other things, making innumerable speeches. I must have made five or six speeches of one type or another every week. So, I traveled all over the island to universities, to trade fairs that were opening or to various functions of one type or another, environmental meetings, university meetings. I was quite busy doing all that.

*Q: Did the reluctance of some of the party people, the foreign minister and others, because we had recognized mainland China and reduced relations so they were sort of saying to hell with you, or had they gotten over this?*

DEAN: Some of them had not. Some of them were ultra conservative, traditional in the Chinese sense that they had not gotten over the break in our relations. They also felt that the U.S. was not trustworthy. In the '49-'50 period, we had abandoned them and then the U.S. had broken relations in the beginning of '79, and we had the August 17, 1982 Arms Sales Communiqué with the mainland which gradually reduced the quality and quantity of arms sales to Taipei by the U.S. They didn't trust us. Also we had been trying to work very hard in getting Taiwan to stay in the Asian Development Bank. The Chinese wanted to come in, and the usual scenario was for Taiwan to be voted out. Taiwan was a founding member, and we felt that they should stay. Shen Chang-huan was Foreign Minister then, before he became Secretary General to the President's office. He resisted to the nth degree any change in Taiwan's name, any change in its status in the Bank. He really fought to the very end. President Chiang overruled him, so he was feeling put out by that experience as well. There were lots of things that he could point to that he didn't like.

*Q: While you were there, was this Asian Development Bank issue resolved?*

DEAN: It was resolved before I got there in '84. Shen left the Foreign Minister's job and became Secretary General of the President's office. In that capacity, it wasn't necessary for him to meet with any foreigners that he didn't want to. He was a close and influential advisor to the President. I thought that we should have some dialogue and some opportunity to look into these things and see where the problems were and see if we could try to reach a common understanding. I met with Shen a lot later on, and also with John Kwan, who was a very bright and able Deputy Secretary of the KMT. I met with him, and we became good friends I think.

Later on, of course, I met with many of the opposition people. I had gotten to know them during the time I was in Washington and would come out to Taipei. Many of them were wives and relatives of those prisoners who had been arrested after the Kaohsiung riot, and they were trying hard to get their husbands and relatives out of jail. I was trying hard to do that, too. Congress was interested, the administration was interested. We kept trying to urge President Chiang to commute their sentences or to shorten their sentences. I kept arguing, as I said earlier, to Chiang during the time I was posted in Taiwan, urging more and more moves toward democratic reform. That was the best way to bring the American society and the Taiwan society closer together. I think he saw the value of that.

I think I mentioned earlier that he started his reforms or at least announced them in the fall of '86 to Katherine Graham of the Washington Post. He spent '87 gradually implementing them. In July of '87, he announced the lifting of martial law. That was quite a remarkable fact because martial law had been in existence ever since the Generalissimo had brought over his army and the civil servants and the rest fleeing from the communists. So, it had been in effect from '49 to the summer of '87 when Chiang Ching-kuo lifted it. It meant that a lot of cases that would ordinarily be tried in military courts would be tried in civilian courts. It was a great relief to many people. Military law was not accompanied by armed soldiers on every street corner or by tanks rumbling through the streets. I don't want to give that impression. Yet the courts could summarily sentence people who were brought before them, without what we would consider to be due process, for oppositionist activities, for gathering together in groups of more than twenty, for forming a political party or writing articles in magazines that were derogatory or against government policy. All of these things could be tried in military court, but with the lifting of martial law, that was no longer the case.

I think I established a good rapport with President Chiang. He used to send me messages before various actions would be made public. In the case of martial law, he told me when it was going to be lifted, a few months before. As in the case when he decided to allow old servicemen who hadn't been back to the mainland for something like forty years to go back and see their families. This was a major break in policy. He sent me a message, I think it was in the summer of '87, and he told me through his secretary, Ma Ying-Jeou, that he had decided, for humanitarian reasons, to lift the restriction on people traveling to the mainland so those old soldiers could go and see their families. Of course this was a major breakthrough in the relationship between Taipei and Beijing. He wasn't just telling me out of friendship; he wanted Washington to be informed about this major policy change so they were prepared for it and put it into their own calculations. Well,

needless to say, Washington was very pleased about this development. Anything that would voluntarily reduce tensions between both sides was good. They were quite pleased; I told him the reaction I had gotten. He went ahead with this policy, I think in the fall, October or November. Subsequently, literally hundreds of thousands of people started traveling to the mainland. They forgot the distinction that it was supposed to be old soldiers, and everybody went. I think that as of this date something like thirteen million visits have been made from Taiwan to the mainland since 1987.

*Q: Was there anything the other way?*

DEAN: Very little, because Taiwan is still quite restrictive. They were frightened of a flood of visitors, and their security people are still quite tight. There were just tens of thousands who had come from the other way. I don't have a figure. I would guess it wouldn't be more than 70,000.

*Q: How were the two Chinas communicating with each other?*

DEAN: They communicated in all sorts of ways. There was a major defection for example. A China Airline pilot flying one of China Airlines planes, (I think it was a cargo plane if I am not mistaken), instead of coming back to Taipei from Southeast Asia, flew to White Cloud Airport in Canton, and he landed there. This was quite unusual because Taipei had been the recipient of many Chinese air force planes with pilots defecting. This was a case of a man who had serious debts and marital problems. There was a negotiation to release the plane. That was carried out between China Airline representatives who went to Hong Kong and the Airline Association in China, CAAC. The two negotiated for the release of the plane, and that went very smoothly. Other negotiations, like fisheries disputes, were just settled informally. Later on, through the Red Cross, if one fishing crew had been seized and taken ashore by one side or the other, or if storms had sent ashore fishing boats, they would help repair the boats, give the crew food and cigarettes and send them on their way. Both sides were doing this, so it wasn't a vicious type of confrontation. There were all sorts of unspoken rules. I think when the air patrols from the Taiwan side mistakenly went over some mainland territory, the mainland always kept their patrols the same distance away so they didn't converge and accidentally have combat between the two sides. They kept pretty careful track of what was going on. There were lots of people who came over on fishing boats from the mainland to get jobs in Taiwan. Tens of thousands of people at one time were working in the construction industry illegally because they could make in Taiwan in one month what it would take them a couple of years to make on the mainland, and they would send money home. Taiwan security was always picking these people up at construction sites and trying to deport them. That is where the Red Cross came in and tried to help handle the flow.

So, there was a lot of relationship back and forth, and something else that I didn't find out about until later, but about which I was curious. At one time President Chiang told me, I thought it was in the fall of '87, he had received a very courteous message from Deng Xiaoping. I said, "From Deng Xiaoping?" He said, "Yes, he wished us well on the Reversion day holiday, "which was the date the Japanese turned Taiwan back to China. I didn't think too much more of it, but then reflected on it later. It is likely that Lee Kwan Yew had been acting as a conduit back and forth between Chiang Ching-kuo and Deng Xiaoping, not necessarily negotiating but carrying

messages back and forth hoping to reduce tensions between both sides and to increase understanding between both sides. That was pretty interesting. I think it will come out in Lee Kwan Yew's memoirs which are going to be published soon. Anyway, Chiang Ching-kuo kept a pretty careful eye on what was happening, on the mainland; on the oppositionists, who were now given permission to form opposition parties; on the military; on his own die-hard stalwarts in the upper ranks of the KMT, and the people. He had a very nice way of going around and consulting people and asking for their opinions, and trying to find out what their views were. Even if people disagreed with him and were unchinese enough to let him know, he still had given them the opportunity to express their views, so when a policy decision was taken, it did not come as a surprise. Instead it came as, "I knew he was going to do that," so they accepted it. The political reforms, the opening to the mainland, all of these major things, at least to Taiwan eyes, proceeded very smoothly and quite successfully. During the time I was there, I had opportunities to talk to him about his plans and these developments. I think our overall relationship was very good. He told me one time that he felt relations with the United States were better than they ever had been. This was interesting because he was referring back to quite a long period of time. Although the U.S. didn't have formal diplomatic relations, we really had quite friendly relations.

So, the U.S. relationship with Taiwan has thrived. Trade, for example, quadrupled. The visa activity at our American Institute in Taiwan had gone up from 40,000 in '78 to something like 130,000 in 1989, so all of our relationships had deepened, had become more meaningful, had become more valuable to both sides. The fact that Taiwan was fast becoming a democracy did make a difference. Before, everybody had admired Taiwan's economic progress, but now they were making a great deal of political progress. I think this gave Taiwan much more public support in the U.S. and Congressional support than if it had remained an autocracy. It changed the equation a great deal.

*Q: Had Chiang Ching-kuo understood this?*

DEAN: Yes, I think so. This was part of our discussion over the years from '79 onwards, that if they moved toward more political relaxation and more political participation, and in effect more democracy, that it would be the one thing that would really strengthen ties with the United States. I think he understood that very well. I think it was one of his motivations. Preserving stability, providing for the succession, and allowing the Taiwanese majority gradually to take over was part of his vision of the future. He was a very farsighted and intelligent man, and a very careful man. He wasn't a showy person at all. He wasn't the charismatic figure his father was. His father would come into a room, and everybody would pay attention. Chiang Ching-kuo just had a friendly, homely look. He talked to people in a very equal way. I think he never accumulated any money of his own, unlike Marcos or the Korean leaders or the Indonesians. When he died, the state had to take over paying for his wife's hospitalization and for a place for her to live, because he had left no funds. He wasn't a grasping, accumulating type of person. He was willing to share political power, which was a very interesting thing. Sadly, after I had only been there for a year, I went home for Christmas. It must have been at the end of '87, I went on consultations and took some Christmas leave, and before I got back, President Chiang passed away. He had suffered over some years from very serious diabetes, had a pacemaker, and other things wrong with him. His vision was going because of the diabetic problems. He had trouble standing up, and for the last few months, he had to be in a wheelchair. So he was in quite bad physical shape. He was

working even from his bed until the very end.

*Q: How did your office, I mean one of the games must have been what is going to happen after he leaves. What were you thinking about in terms of what happens?*

DEAN: He had hand-selected Lee Teng-hui, a Taiwanese, as his Vice President. He had brought him up in many different roles: mayor, governor, Vice President. I thought there would be a constitutional succession. And since Chiang Ching-kuo had already gotten the political reforms started, I felt there was no going back on it. Some people in the Department and the INR felt the Taiwan military would not allow Chiang Ching-kuo's successor to have as much power as he had, or give him as much scope, they would circumscribe him. They thought that the stalwart higher ranks in the KMT would also not allow Lee Teng-hui to have as much power. I didn't believe that. I didn't believe that the military would intervene and try to control things. I didn't believe that the elders in the party would be able to do so against the forces of modernization. I was one of those who felt that Lee Teng-hui would inherit the power.

As it turned out, this was correct. I had gone back very hurriedly to Taiwan after President Chiang's death, in early 1988. First I had met with President Reagan and some of his advisors, Colin Powell and others, in the White House. I had a message to give to Chiang Ching-kuo, but Chiang Ching-kuo died, so we changed the message to Lee Teng-hui. I went back quite soon after Chiang Ching-kuo's death, I think in January. I called almost immediately on Lee Teng-hui at his home and gave him President Reagan's message, together with condolences. There was of course, a lot of infighting going on. Lee had been sworn in as president. But, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was in residence at Shih Lin, was trying to intervene in the chairmanship of the KMT party. She wanted the party elders to rotate the chairmanship until the July party congress. However, one of the young party functionaries, James Soong, sort of shamed the standing committee into voting for Lee Teng-hui for chairman because James Soong, who had been one of the private secretaries of CCK, said that the president had explicitly said that he wanted Lee Teng-hui to become chairman of the party as well as President. So, no one dared to intervene, and Lee Teng-hui was appointed chairman of the KMT. This gave him the two reins of power, and it prevented anyone else at that time from trying to usurp part of his authority. This put some of the old guard's noses out of joint, but eventually even they understood. Lee Teng-hui was really effective in promoting CCK's policies of political reform.

*Q: CCK is...*

DEAN: Chiang Ching-kuo. We always called him CCK. Anyway Lee Teng-hui was going along and the military supported him. There was an incident just at that time. The newspapers all had to treat this rather delicately, but the newspapers said that the Deputy Director of the Institute for Nuclear Research had disappeared, had left his post, and later was seen in the streets of the U.S., in Vienna, Virginia. Gradually the story came out that he had informed the U.S. about what Taiwan was trying to do in the nuclear weapons field. After considerable conversation and pressure from the U.S. side, Lee Teng-hui and his new government stated that they had no intention of producing nuclear weapons even though they had the capability of doing so. That chapter was awkward because the press claimed that the CIA had paid this deputy director for years, and he was a plant there, and he kept them informed of what was happening. Now just at

this crucial time when Chiang Ching-kuo had died and Lee Teng-hui became the president, all of this story came out. It was a hot potato for Lee Teng-hui to handle, to say nothing of ourselves. He did very well by it, with dignity. I think he was caught by surprise, just as Truman might have been caught by surprise after Roosevelt's death about how far we had gone in this field. Lee agreed that Taiwan would not embark on this program and made sure that this was the case.

*Q: It is obviously our policy not to have this happen, but here you are this private entity. What were you doing? Were you essentially getting instructions to weigh in heavily on this?*

DEAN: Of course, oh, yes. This was part of the message I was carrying. There was no question about that. Even earlier we had gotten them to agree to send back to the U.S., and this is public information too, the spent fuel from their Canadian heavy water experimental reactor. One of the AIT agreements signed with Taiwan and reported to Congress was the agreement on the shipping of this spent fuel. Subsequently we shipped the other fuel rods and the whole plant back, the part of it that wasn't made inactive. Anyway, there was a great deal more to the story than this. I have given you a rundown of what appeared in the press, but it did cause a lot of ripples beneath the surface in Taiwan. One has to give credit to President Lee Teng-hui for being very firm against his own military and scientists and others in closing down the program.

*Q: What was your responsibility? I mean we have besides the CIA, which we mentioned had rather close ties with Taiwan over the years, but we also had our military. I mean you name it; we have these, and here you are in this peculiar position of being a private corporation. Was your responsibility equivalent to that of being an Ambassador?*

DEAN: We never really argued about the AIT director's authority. Everybody worked together. What we did really was the product of our office back in Washington and our office in Taipei. They were working together; they weren't working at cross purposes with each other. They understood our policy and they did their best to help carry it out. So we didn't have any arguments. I was given a lot of latitude on how I would carry out my duties, and I did it to the best of my ability using primarily the contacts which I already had. Some of them were very good indeed. We would have raised this issue with President Chiang Ching-kuo quite readily had he been alive. As it was, I had to raise it with President Lee. But I had known Lee Teng-hui for some time when he was mayor, when he was governor, and vice president, so I had known him for many years. We knew each other very well. When I was in Taipei, I invited him for Thanksgiving dinner along with his wife and some of his close staff. He'd invite me to his house. I had easy access to him anytime I wanted to see him or any time he wanted to see me, I was there. It wasn't that we were standoffish or at odds with each other. It was a period of time when Washington had built up very good relations, even though they were not diplomatic, with Taipei. At the same time, we had very good relations with the mainland. This was the period between, let's say, '82 and '89, before Tiananmen. So, there wasn't as much contention between Taipei and Beijing at that time. In fact, tensions across the Taiwan Strait were at the lowest they had been since 1949 and cross-Strait trade was rapidly growing.

*Q: Were things pretty quiet on those offshore islands?*

DEAN: Yes, things were quiet on the offshore islands. There was talk of reducing the troops

there. As I mentioned to you, Chiang Ching-kuo was using Lee Kwan Yew as a bridge to the mainland. All sorts of people were traveling there, businessmen, investors, visitors. Factories were beginning to move over to Fujian. Before I get ahead of myself, I want to mention one of the things that Lee Teng-hui did. I was discussing with him Washington's concerns about the trade deficit. We had a trade deficit that year, 1987, with Taiwan, of 19.4 billion dollars. Just with a tiny little island, 250 miles long and 90 miles wide. That was a huge trade deficit. Washington was very exercised about it. The Treasury, Commerce, the State Department, all wanted to do something about it. So, I had several talks with President Lee. I was trying to get them to work out some form of timetable where they could bring down their trade surplus gradually. Finally in 1988, Rostenkowski and several other very prominent Congressmen came to visit. In the middle of the visit, President Lee drew out this plan from his coat pocket and said, "I worked this out myself". It was an outline of a trade action plan to reduce the deficit primarily by seeking new markets or expanding existing markets outside the U.S. and by importing more goods from the U.S. Lee said that he was going to give this plan to the various ministers involved and have them flesh it out and in two months time, they were to report back to Lee, concerning the plan's implementation. Well, it worked to a very large extent. Treasury at that time was pressing very hard to get Taiwan to appreciate its new Taiwan dollar. They pressed and pressed, and finally the pressure was so intense that Taiwan did change the value of its dollar and appreciated it from 40 to one to 28 to one. Treasury itself felt that this would be the best way of reducing our trade deficit. I'm not sure if that in itself did the trick. I personally think that diversifying markets and importing more U.S. goods was equally, if not more important, than forcing up the value of the NT dollar. In any case all of these things did happen and the trade deficit was reduced. In 1995, it was down to about nine billion dollars. However, it has been going up since then. At any rate that is a substantial reduction from the earlier 19.4 billion. So, we were quite active on that front. We were also active on the intellectual property rights front, all the copying of tape cassettes, CDs, and video cassettes, home movies everything.

*Q: Computer program software.*

DEAN: Everything you can think of.

*Q: It exploded in that decade.*

DEAN: It was a major problem for us. We had negotiation after negotiation trying to get Taiwan to draw up laws, pass them, and then enforce them against these abuses. They had all sorts of gimmicks. They had Henry Hsu, a businessman and a good friend of mine, who headed the businessman's campaign to stamp out piracy. He'd get a great big steamroller and run it over pirated video cassettes, things like that. The government was very much like the government on the mainland on these same issues. It was very difficult to get them to make any effective moves. They would agree, but then to enforce these decisions was very difficult. They had a lot of little storefront places where people could go and see rented videos for a very small amount of money. They were a bit like social clubs. You could bring in the whole family or a whole group. They were all showing pirated movies. There were thousands of them in every city. It was hard to close them all down. The police weren't willing to get into confrontations all the time with the people about these things. Every block seemed to have one of them. But, eventually they saw the light because they wanted to preserve copyrights for their own software. They were beginning to

get into that in a big way, and they were getting into their own CDs and so on, so they wanted to protect their own. Stiffer laws were passed and the problem was brought down to manageable proportions, but it kept everybody busy going back and forth to negotiate. USTR would come out to Taiwan or Taiwan would send a group to Washington. Then we had problems about fisheries. We were trying to save certain species and also to outlaw the use of these huge mile and a half long drift nets that would catch everything in the sea. Taiwan had a large fishing fleet. They really didn't want to limit their efforts at catching fish; it was very lucrative. They would send these ships out. There would be a mother ship. They would put their catch on ice. It was very profitable. They were fishing in waters they weren't supposed to be fishing in and all sorts of things. We wanted an agreement where our Coast Guard and other search vessels could board their vessels and see if they had made any illegal catch. They claimed this was an infringement on their sovereignty. There were demonstrations and arguments on the radio and in the universities about this effort to curtail their sovereignty. We had a lot of speeches, debates, conversations about issues like that, too. It was quite an active period with all these things going on. I think we solved them reasonably. We did persuade the Chinese about the fisheries issues, and they did pass laws allowing their ships to be boarded. We did persuade them on the intellectual property rights. We did persuade them on the value of the NT Dollar and other trade issues. Sometimes they would complain that they felt behind the eight ball because of our military sales and other things, they relied on us so much that they had to do what we asked in these other areas. I think they protected their own interests as well as anybody could have regardless of this dependency. Certainly when we brought up an issue, they didn't say right away we will go and do it. It took years of argument, negotiation, and persuasion to get them to agree. They were very similar with negotiations we had with the mainland on similar subjects.

*Q: Was there much contact between your office and the Peking Embassy?*

DEAN: Not a great deal. Most of the things we were dealing with, although they had policy implications, were not explicitly Taipei-Washington-Beijing relations. Things were quite calm during that period on both sides of the Strait. The American Embassy wasn't complaining about what Taiwan was doing, and Beijing wasn't complaining about it either. Things were fairly, I don't like to say harmonious, but without crises such as we had later on. That period which one looks back on with a certain amount of calmness came to an abrupt halt in 1989 on June 4, when the Chinese military used weapons and tanks to drive the protesting students out of Tiananmen.

*Q: Were you in Taiwan?*

DEAN: Yes, I was in Taiwan then.

*Q: We'll come back to that, but before we get to that, what about the military equation? Were military sales, training of troops, some of the issues you would get involved with?*

DEAN: Yes, all of them I had very close relations with General Hau Pei-tsun, who was the equivalent to the chairman of our joint chiefs of staff, and all of his top military commanders. I met with them regularly. I had known them for some years. I had not agreed with Washington that General Hau might try to usurp power after President Chiang died. I thought of him as a loyal and good soldier who would obey commands. He later became premier. At any rate, I felt

that he was loyal to his government and his constitution. It may well be that he had earlier conversations with President Chiang Ching-kuo, and Chiang Ching-kuo let him know how strongly he felt about the necessity of protecting the government and the constitution. I think the military cooperated with us. There were five points, if I can remember them. They said that they would play everything in low key. They would not have publicity about the arms sales. They would have patience, persistence and preserve the confidentiality of these sales. Of course, we had to report them to Congress, so eventually they all got out, but Taiwan's military weren't blowing them up out of proportion in their press, and they weren't writing press articles about the annual talks we had with them in Washington on military arms sales, where decisions were made about what types of weapons and what quantities of weapons would be sold. They seemed to be willing to work within the confines of the relationship. We had a small retired military component in our Taipei office. They kept in touch with the Taiwan military quite well, one for each service. We weren't having trouble with the military. The former political oppositionists or dissidents had now become a growing legal political party. There were other parties too. We had very direct interaction with them, carrying on the ones we had before. Things were not going badly at all in terms of U.S.-Taiwan relations. It is true they were unofficial, but you would never know it, except by the fact we didn't fly a flag outside of our office, and they didn't fly a flag outside of their office here. Their representatives here were seeing virtually anybody they wanted to see. They couldn't go into the State Department or the National Security Council, but they saw some of these people outside of these buildings. They saw others, congressmen, senators, State Department people. They seemed to be forging ahead, and we seemed to be doing the same in Taipei, and Beijing was not objecting. We were playing things in low key. We agreed to play things in low key, particularly the military issues, and the government was playing things in low key with us, too. It was only later, some time after I left, that we had problems. We will get into that later.

*Q: What about whatever passed for the diplomatic corps? Did they cause problems?*

DEAN: The Taiwan government kept on trying to push us in with the diplomatic corps, but I just didn't go to any national days. I didn't go to any diplomatic events. I had a few friends, of course. The Japanese director of their unofficial office established in 1972, the Interchange Association as they called it, had been the former DCM for the Japanese Embassy in Taipei when I was in our Embassy. We were close friends. He had worked with my brother in Prague and we were together in Hong Kong, so we had known each other for a long time. We saw each other frequently. Mostly we would have a private supper or he would come to my office or I would go to his office and we would talk about things. If there was a dinner party, which we had occasionally, too, we couldn't talk as much. The Japanese had very close relations with the Taiwanese businessmen and with the oppositionist businessmen or oppositionist party, but also with the KMT. Mr. Hara was an unusually well informed, well plugged in person, an excellent representative. The others diplomats I didn't cultivate. It was a great relief not going to national days.

*Q: I was just going to say it was a load going to diplomatic receptions. It is not exactly a punishment.*

DEAN: No, it is not a question of not being allowed. They would have been delighted if we had

gone there. The Chinese on Taiwan were trying to encourage the impression that our office was the same as the other embassies. But I didn't go because I didn't have to go and it saved a-lot of time. I didn't have to go to the airport whenever the foreign minister came in or went out. I didn't have to go to all the national day functions. I have been to those in many other places. They are really time consuming. Instead, I could see some American businessmen or invite some Chinese officials whom we really wanted to influence to dinner or to a luncheon. I must have had a luncheon every single day, usually with just one person or possibly two. I would meet at breakfast every single day, normally with groups, and certainly dinner every night, receptions for business leaders and others. There were a fair number of congressional delegations that came through in spite of our break in diplomatic relations. They were always welcomed by the Chinese and called on the President and everybody else. Usually, we would go along if the delegation wanted us to, and we briefed them all beforehand, business delegations, congressional delegations, other types of visiting delegations, scholarly groups like the Stanford Business School, the Whiffinpoofs, everything you can think of. Anyway, I think we had a very good office with excellent hard-working qualified personnel. We tried to bring the language students from the school we had moved from Taichung up closer to Taipei into some of these events also. All in all it was a very busy time. I was busy; my wife Mary was even busier than I was. It is difficult in the Foreign Service today. Yesteryear everybody sort of rallied around and all the wives helped a lot, but now that is sort of old-fashioned.

*Q: How did Tiananmen Square hit you all?*

DEAN: Well, it's very interesting. The Chinese on Taiwan were shocked by it like everybody else and dismayed by it like everybody else and they were disappointed by it, but they weren't really taken by surprise like we were. Because they knew through harsh experience that the communists would use force to preserve their power and to knock down dissent. They expected them to use force to do this, so when they did, it wasn't the same as in the U.S. where we thought that Humpty-Dumpty had fallen off the wall and it was the end of the world. There was only a brief pause in Taiwan before they resumed their increasing number of visits to the mainland. Increasing numbers of factories moved over to the mainland to establish themselves there, and increasing investments. There was an enormous amount of that type of activity going on in spite of Tiananmen; whereas, we froze our relationship with the mainland. It was a very different sort of reaction. I think our reaction was vastly overblown, partially because of our own analysts and academicians earlier were acting as though Deng Xiaoping was a reformer and not a communist, you see. They thought reforms were heading toward a bright blue democracy in the future.

*Q: I would have thought there would have been a lot of speculation just as an outsider knowing nothing about China, I found myself wondering what the hell is happening in China, not because of the crackdown because that seemed inevitable, but the fact they allowed this thing to fester on and on.*

DEAN: Of course. That's because there was serious argument within the high command in China itself, in Beijing. There were arguments on how to cope with it. If they had just dragged the students out of the square and put them on busses and sent them back to the university shortly after the very beginning, that would have ended it. Or if they could have left them in the square to bake in the hot sun of the summer. Believe me, Beijing in the summer is really hot, and if they

had forbidden the townspeople to bring them food and water, they would have baked them out. But to use the troops was a crazy demonstration of power. I think they were worried the protest would spread, and it did, to Shanghai and some of the other cities, and they were afraid they'd lose control. That is the worst thing they could think of, that chaos would spread over the land, so they were really up tight. But in Taiwan, I think the harder heads thought that they would use force.

*Q: Among your Chinese friends on Taiwan, was there much debate about what's going to happen, because this did not happen all of a sudden; it was a rather long drawn out affair.*

DEAN: It was a matter of a few months you see. The thing is the press and TV revealed these developments to every one because just before Tiananmen, just before the students went in to Tiananmen to protest and to stay, Taiwan's Minister of Finance Shirley Kuo led an Asian Development Bank delegation to Beijing where the annual meeting was being held, along with about 100 TV and newspaper men from Taiwan, because this was the first time a minister from Taiwan had ever gone to the mainland since 1949. It was a big event.

These newspeople stayed on to film what was happening in Tiananmen Square. Then came Gorbachev making the Chinese face fall even more. Then the argument built up within the top leadership. When you have arguments like that in the top leadership, they are not always evident at the time to people who are on the fringes of Tiananmen Square watching what was going on. But it was very clear that Zhao Zeyang, the Chinese premier, tried to get some agreement with the students and was prevented from doing so because Li Peng and other hard-liners felt it was giving in. It is also clear in the final analysis that Deng Xiaoping was responsible for ordering the army in. If Zhao Zeyang had been able to get an agreement with the students and had kept his position as premier (at least he wasn't a far right communist, he was more toward the center), then China might have moved much more rapidly and the relationship with the U.S. might have blossomed. They might have avoided Tiananmen and made progress toward a different type of society. Sadly, that didn't happen.

*Q: Was there a certain amount of shock on the part of the Taiwanese seeing the United States being so disappointed in what happened?*

DEAN: They would say something like this, that the U.S. didn't realize the true nature of the communists and now they are seeing it for themselves. We knew it all along. We weren't taken aback by this. We knew they would do something like this whereas the U.S. foolishly thinks they can get a nice chummy relationship, and they don't take the nature of the communist beast into effect. The leopard never changes its spots, that type of argument. The whole point is Taiwan, after a momentary pause, continued to build up its investments, its trade, its visits to the mainland. It went on until 1995 when President Lee made his well-publicized visit to Cornell. Then the Chinese on the mainland went up like a rocket. It wasn't just the visit.

The visit had been preceded by a series of moves by Taiwan. In the early part of the Clinton administration, the administration was paying much more attention to domestic policies. They really weren't paying any attention to Taiwan although they had set in motion the Taiwan policy review, which took a year and a half to come out, and it produced very little. The U.S. also

wasn't paying attention to the mainland. Washington was busy focusing on domestic affairs or Bosnia, but not on China, so President Lee felt himself deserted by the U.S. or ignored. Therefore, instead of maintaining the low key foreign policy which had been so productive, he decided to embark on a new high visibility policy which he called pragmatic diplomacy. He went down to Southeast Asia to play golf with heads of state. He made more visits abroad to countries that did recognize Taiwan, especially in Central America. Taiwan was pressing very hard to be the host of the Asian Games. President Lee was pressing very hard to be invited as a head of state to the APEC meetings, that President Clinton had elevated to head of state meetings. He wasn't able to do any of these things. He didn't get the Olympic nod, didn't get invited to the APEC meetings, so had to send his economic minister. Then he coopted the oppositionist party's program of rejoining the UN, and he tried to get the 29 countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan to raise the issue of Taiwan before the UN rules committee, to get it on the agenda, but he was unsuccessful. Finally, President Lee's 1995 visit to the U.S. was for the same reason, to raise Taiwan's international visibility and persona and to persuade the U.S. and other countries that Taiwan had a right to international representation, as much right as most of the members of the UN. All of this activity just infuriated the mainland and finally the trip to Cornell set them off. We had assured Beijing that Lee Teng-hui would not come to the U.S. Secretary Christopher had told Foreign Minister Chien that, "No, we will not permit Lee Teng-hui to come." Our Embassy in Beijing had told the Foreign Ministry, No, he will not come. We understand your concerns." So at the very last minute Congress voted overwhelmingly to welcome him, I think with only one exception, and President Clinton changed his mind. The Chinese reacted by withdrawing their Ambassador. They embarked on a series of military exercises, surface to surface missile firing and live firing exercises in the Strait. They vilified Lee Teng-hui. They broke off the cross-Strait talks that had been started in 1993 between an unofficial entity from Taiwan and an unofficial entity from the mainland, copying our own model. They broke those talks off, and things were really at a hiatus. They got worse, because they kept on claiming that Lee Teng-hui was a secret sympathizer of Taiwan independence and he really wasn't for unification, even though he said that was the government's policy. Finally in an effort to drive home their opposition to Taiwan independence, the Chinese embarked on another huge scale military exercise in the Taiwan Strait in the early part of March '96, just before Lee Teng-hui's election for president, which he subsequently won, partially because of these exercises. The Chinese fired missiles over Taiwan very close to the port of Keelung and then short of the port, so they were bracketing Taiwan with these missiles fired from the mainland. Then they had huge exercises in the vicinity of the offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy. Things were very tense. We dispatched two carrier groups to the waters near Taiwan. You might think this was a plus for President Lee, but it didn't turn out to be. Because of this crisis, high level attention was finally given to China policy, and the administration made a deliberate effort to improve relations with China. This resulted in Jiang Zemin's visit in October of '97, and it resulted in President Clinton's visit to China in the end of June this year, '98. I think in retrospect you have to think that President Lee's visit to Cornell and the high visibility foreign policy and the activity in the Strait has been a turning point in improving U.S.-China relations rather than putting those to one side and improving relations with Taiwan. We don't know where the future is going to lead us, but at any rate, let me get back to '89 and talking about Taiwan's reaction to Tiananmen. We were certainly talking to the Chinese on Taiwan about that. They acted in a much cooler and rational way than we did. Eventually my tour ended in December of that year. I had been in Taipei from early 1987 until the end of 1989. President Lee asked me four different times to stay,

but I did not relay his request to the Department. The Department doesn't like personal requests like that and I knew it, so I said I couldn't. I was getting old and had to leave. Of course he is a couple of years older than I am, so he kept on asking me to stay.

**MCKINNEY RUSSELL**  
**Public Affairs Officer, USIS**  
**Beijing (1987-1991)**

*McKinney Russell was born in New York, New York in 1929. He graduated from Yale University in 1950 and served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1951-1953. Mr. Russell's career included positions in Germany, the Congo, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Spain, and China. He was interviewed on May 10, 1997 by G. Lewis Schmidt.*

*Q: How did you find Beijing at that time? Was it still pretty closed, or...?*

RUSSELL: It was closed, but it was open in a lot of interesting ways. There was always in existence a Fulbright program under which the Chinese accepted 25 American professors to teach in their universities. Also, there were a lot of academic interchanges between China and the United States. The Chinese had at that time about 20,000 students studying here. Unlike the Soviet Union, the Chinese had always felt that they gained more for letting their young people study here. After the end of the Cultural Revolution in the mid-'60s, there was a big explosion in travel abroad by Chinese students. The Chinese diaspora is very important, you know. If you're Chinese living in San Francisco and your grandnephew is a bright kid of 18 or 19 who wants to come to study in California, you come up with the money and he can get an exit visa, and can go abroad to study. The academic side of things was quite important.

The notion of being able to have real outreach in China was steadily growing. Until the crackdown in June 1989, the Chinese Government had been more and more open to expanding relationships with the United States. It was quite surprising. The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, for example, invited me to give a series of talks about the American elections which were coming in the fall of 1988. It looked as if we were going to be able to open cultural centers, and sure enough, we were able to open the first one in Guangzhou (Canton) in the south, about a year after I arrived. I made several trips down there to find and negotiate for a location, because it seemed to us exceedingly important in China that there be access in the major cities to American books and ideas, films and television, and speakers, and so on. During the time that I was there, we opened up a cultural center in Guangzhou and one in Shanghai for the first time, and we were set for the opening in Beijing about 6 months after I left.

The China years were very sharply marked by the events at Tiananmen Square because many hopeful things fell apart in its wake. The day before the students started marching, the Ambassador had signed the agreement to bring the Peace Corps to China, on April 14, 1989, and the students started marching on April 15. For the next 6 weeks, it got bigger and bigger by the day. I used to go most days, afternoon or evening, down to the Square to talk and to listen and to

find out what was happening.

In the middle of May took place the most interesting political time in my career, because Gorbachev came to make party peace with the Chinese on May 15. He was in meetings with the Chinese at the same time that the demonstrations and the excitement grew bigger and louder and louder and bigger. You had this double story going on at the same time, and Gorbachev had brought with him a tremendous journalist corps. Hundreds of people came with him and once they were there, they didn't leave because of the unfolding story of pro-democracy demonstrations. We were very, very much involved in that, in organizing briefings for journalists when the crackdown came. There was a period of 4 or 5 days when the Ambassador and I were there, practically the whole time, exposed to the press, dealing with the students, getting Americans out of the country, arranging for the families to leave. It was a very intense time.

Once that had passed, in the fall of '89 and in the fall of '90, I had two very interesting experiences because I could spend more time outside China because so many of our programs had stopped short or cut back. There was no Fulbright program, for example, for a whole year. My wife and I made a very interesting foray into Mongolia in the fall of 1989. We went for a week by train from Beijing. 42 hours. It was a marvelous trip. I had set the task of finding out what a future USIS in Mongolia would look like. I did an analysis of the university, the cultural scene, the media. I found it interesting and it was helpful when shortly thereafter democracy did come to Mongolia and so did a U.S. Embassy and a USIS. We have a PAO there now who is very active. Back then, it was a great fun to be the first officer to go and talk to people to find out what opportunities there would be for us when it did open.

*Q: Did you find in Mongolia considerably greater openness than there was in China itself?*

RUSSELL: Oh, yes! It was already changing rapidly and in December of that year, for reasons that I don't recall exactly now, there was a kind of backing away from power on the part of the communist party that had been in charge. Great pressure was brought up for changes and they happened very rapidly. The following fall, 1990, we made a similar trip to Tibet to assess the prospects for USIS activities there. Those two fall trips were extremely interesting for both of us, especially since my wife and I could make them together.

*Q: Did you get any reaction from the Chinese on your Tibet effort?*

RUSSELL: They were very careful but not overtly suspicious. We had to get clearances from fairly high up, I assume, and I had to be careful about who I talked to. As a result of it, the trip we were able to set things up so that we were from time to time able to send speakers and others into Tibet. In China, at the time that I was there, we had 4 branch posts, Chengdu in the far west on the way to Tibet, Guangzhou or Canton in the south, Shanghai on the eastern coast, and Shenyang (which used to be called Mukden when we were kids) up in Manchuria. We had Americans in charge in all four places.

*Q: I went to Mukden when young, in 1938.*

RUSSELL: It's still an interesting place. I am sorry I never got farther north. I made 3 or 4 trips

to Shenyang, but I didn't get up closer to the border. In any case, early in 1991, I had an urgent call from Gene Kopp. My tour was going to end that summer, and he said that he wanted me very much to come back and take over as Counselor of the Agency. Mike Pistor, at that time, had been on the job for 2 years, and was in line for an Ambassadorial post in Africa. He had been offered and he wanted to take on Malawi. So we left China a little early, probably 3 months in advance, in March of 1991, and I came back and took over as...

*Q: Who was the Ambassador in China?*

RUSSELL: Very interesting and contrasting individuals. The first two years it was Winston Lord and the second 2 years it was James Lilley.

**JAMES A. LAROCCO**  
**Economic Minister-Counselor**  
**Beijing (1988-1990)**

*Ambassador James LaRocco was born in Evanston, Illinois in 1948. He graduated from the University of Portland and holds a master's degree from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He joined the Foreign Service in 1973 and has served in Jeddah, Cairo, Kuwait, Beijing, Tel Aviv, and as Ambassador to Kuwait. Ambassador LaRocco was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2011.*

*Q: You were in Beijing from when to when?*

LAROCCO: From July of 1988 to July of 2000. I served there as the Minister-Counselor for Economic Affairs.

*Q: What was the situation when you arrived?*

LAROCCO: At the time of my arrival, Deng Xiao Ping had presided over ten years of reforms and these reforms were starting to bear fruit. The economy was beyond take off and moving at a startling pace. I found myself in charge of an economic section far larger than any in the Middle East. We had 12 of us. What an extraordinary group of people. It was truly an honor to lead such a group, almost every single one of whom had more experience in that region than I did. I approached my job with confidence, determination and high expectations for all of us, but I also had the humility of a newcomer.

I would stand our reporting during those two years against any other post's reporting at any period. From a bold, comprehensive energy report that forecast China's situation and outlook for the first time, to nothing-held-back labor reporting that required the highest standards of diplomatic contact and reporting skills, to reporting on China's financial situation, myriad trade issues, intellectual property rights...the list goes on and on and on.

The report that stands out above all others, however, is the one I am most proud of. We all came together to produce a report that forecast what America's trade deficit would be with China in the ten years ahead. Now...keep in mind that when we wrote this report, our annual trade deficit was only \$2 billion. As you might imagine, this drew scant attention in Washington. In our report, we presented a chart projecting annual deficits over the next ten years, with our trade gap surpassing \$100 billion, a 50-fold increase. The shock in Washington was profound, with many dismissing our report as sheer fantasy. But some were deeply disturbed, recognizing the financial, economic, job-related, investment and technology concerns.

For our record of reporting and analysis, we received a group Superior Honor Award. I cherish that award more than any others I received in my career.

Another "honor" that I cherished almost as much as that award involved our Post Inspection by a team from the Inspector General's office. As part of the inspection, each section of the embassy was asked to rate other sections. The inspectors, conveying their final conclusions, told me that our section received nothing but perfect 10's from every officer in Beijing. They had never encountered anything close to this. They themselves found the work of our team outstanding without any exceptions; all our officers were first rate, we worked closely with all the other sections in the mission as well as the consulates, and our work as one team was seamless.

Our team also was constantly engaged in negotiations on a variety of issues. The most important and high profile were talks related to China's accession to the GATT, now called the World Trade Organization (WTO).

*Q: The Global Trade Organization.*

LAROCCO: Exactly. The 'General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade' it was called then. I'm not sure whether it ever became public knowledge, but we actually reached an agreement with the Chinese. Timing, however, could not have been worse. The talks took place during the period known as the Beijing Spring, and an agreement in principle was initialed in the study of my apartment in the area of Beijing known as San Li Tun. The day after the agreement was initialed, we were scheduled to meet again at the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Trade, not far from Tiananmen Square. We never got there. The demonstrators had come out in force and the roads were blocked. Buses were burning and it was clear that the situation was rapidly deteriorating. We turned our vehicle around, swung by the airport and got the U.S. team out on the first plane available. Because of the impact of Tiananmen on our bilateral relations, those talks did not resume until well after I departed Beijing. That agreement, painstakingly reached, sat on the shelf.

*Q: Let's stick to the trade thing. What were we after, what could we do about this growing trade disadvantage and all?*

LAROCCO: That was all contained in the agreement. It was a very elaborate agreement that required them to obey the rules of the GATT/WTO, that there would be dispute resolution, that they would adopt a clear commercial law, that they would adopt all kinds of transparent,

enforceable and enforced regulations and procedures that are consistent with standard international practice. This was truly far reaching for a nation not governed by the rule of law.

It represented, in my view, a dagger in the heart to Communism as an economic philosophy if carried out. I am sure the Chinese understood this, but saw this as the key to a bright future. Communism as ideology was already something from the past for so many Chinese.

Whether or not they would actually carry out what they promised is another matter, but it laid the framework for what I thought to be an effective transition period. There was also a grace period, recognizing that you can't just turn around a massive aircraft carrier like China overnight, and there was sequencing and a timeline that was a part of this agreement, basically a ten year transition period which I thought was reasonable. All this, nonetheless, would require some very difficult, bold and risky decisions on the part of the Chinese leadership.

*Q: Who was the ambassador while you were there?*

LAROCCO: Winston Lord was my first ambassador. He left as Beijing Spring unfolded, and was replaced by Jim Lilley. These were very, very different people with markedly different backgrounds. They were both an honor to work for.

*Q: I had a very long interview with both Winston and with Jim Lilley.*

LAROCCO: They were two of the best ambassadors I ever served, two of the most different people I ever served, both wonderful bosses, incredibly bright, very, very different styles, totally different experiences. Winston Pillsbury Lord was an heir to a fortune and was classic upper class, intellectual, best and brightest, who chose public service as truly a service. He did not need to work, but he did so with a clear view to serving his country. As you know, earlier in his career, when I was on my first assignment, he made a name for himself as Kissinger's policy planner. He was the youngest person in the inner circle by far, but his intellect was recognized early on and throughout his career.

To be frank, many if not most of the embassy staff found him aloof, hard to relate to and not particularly engaged with embassy and staff. He was, in all honesty, operating on a different plane of existence than the rest of us. And his wife, Bette Bao Lord, was a star in the limelight even more than he was.

He was a sports buff, however, and this provided some common ground with him for a number of us in the embassy.

One story in this regard: it was the time of the Olympics in South Korea, and Lord did not want to miss some key events which were shown on TV. One evening, he hosted at his residence a dinner party with 180 guests, with the guests of honor a visiting American group of young business leaders.

The dinner went on, and at one point, I was called away from my table to see the ambassador. I was escorted upstairs, and there he was in front of the TV. I was incredulous. Mr. Ambassador, I

commented, I can't believe you're up here. I have seen you present downstairs throughout the dinner. Did you just come up here now?

He said no...he had been upstairs watching the Olympics all evening. He said his trick was not to have a head table and not to seat himself anywhere. During breaks in the action, he would come downstairs and circulate throughout the area, greeting guests, doing grip and grins, offering toasts. Everyone, including myself, thought he was sitting somewhere out of our line of vision. It worked. The dinner party was a complete success, everyone was happy, and Lord did not miss the Olympics prime time action.

*Q: My interview with him went beautifully. How did you find his wife, Bette Bao Lord?*

LAROCCO: She wrote Spring Moon. She was brilliant.

I must confess that one of the things I enjoyed the most in my foreign service career was when an embassy put on a major representational event. Betty Bao wrote the book on unforgettable events, and I observed her at work carefully, learning as much as I could.

When she laid the plans for the celebration of the 10<sup>th</sup> anniversary of U.S-Chinese bilateral relations, most of the people in the embassy were aghast. It sounded like Barnum and Bailey meet Kung Fu Panda. Hardly the stuff of professional diplomats. I was enchanted. People dressed in panda outfits danced in procession to kick off the events, there was a ping pong match involving the ambassador and foreign minister, a professional Chinese ping pong player and me. I volunteered, never afraid to embarrass myself. That was the point. The Chinese were meant to win. Again...it was the image. A lot of people thought we were crazy. It was a smashing success.

This event paled in comparison, however, to what I consider the best single public event overseas I was ever involved in. Under the leadership of one of the best USIS officers I ever met, McKinney Russell, the grand ballroom of Beijing's only first class hotel at the time, The Great Wall Sheraton, was furnished with giant screens for the Presidential and general election of 1988. The event ran around the clock, and thousands upon thousands of Chinese, eager to witness democracy in action, arrived to be handed a sample ballot and a folder in which they could follow the election as it was being tallied. I cannot describe the look of wonderment and excitement in their eyes. They were tasting democracy and they loved it. To this day, I am convinced that this one event was an important spark in the Beijing Spring that followed not long afterward.

Another spark was something my wife and I talk about to this day: the staging of "The Caine Mutiny" in Beijing. Think about that plot: mutiny against authority. Chinese flocked to see it, glued to the dialogue and the plot. You could see how troubled and uncomfortable they were by the play as they filed out in silence. But their wheels were clearly spinning. This was exposure to the world of ideas outside their comfort zone. And they liked it.

I was particularly grateful to Winston Lord, because only two weeks after my arrival in Beijing, and despite the fact that I was a newcomer to the region, he appointed me in charge of the annual conference of key officers at China posts: Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang, Chengdu,

with participation by Hong Kong, which was an independent mission at that time. I was stunned and honored. I recall walking into the conference room facing more than 200 years of China experience, me with only two weeks. I sat at the head of the table, welcomed everyone on behalf of the ambassador, and introduced the topics for discussion. It was a baptism of fire, and oh so useful for me for the rest of my tour. I got to know all the key officers, a good share of the best Sinologists in the business at that time, and they all knew that I was blessed by the ambassador. When an ambassador has your back, you have instant credibility. I was in the China Club, thanks to Winston Lord.

*Q: Was there any transference between your Arabic experience, your experience in the Arab world and China?*

LAROCCO: Only on a personal basis, not on a professional basis. In those days China had absolutely no interest in the Middle East. Even their oil relationship was still kind of a budding relationship. Arabs to them were just completely alien so it was personal.

But just like in Kuwait, I decided to do a project. While I was studying Chinese, I had written a monograph on “Muslims in China” (zai Zhongguo de huaijiaotu). I had been surprised how little had been written about the estimated 40 million Muslims in China, and I decided to do some first-hand research during my tour. My interest was handsomely rewarded, as from Guangzhou to Xian to the far western reaches of China, Muslims had been present for over a thousand years. I encountered some beautiful mosques, Qurans and other representations of their religion. But most fascinating to me was the mixture of Arabic and Chinese calligraphy. Two of the greatest calligraphic traditions and arts came together in Xian. I was in awe.

*Q: Was the Chinese leadership as opaque as the Soviet one had been?*

LAROCCO: Yes. I developed an appreciation of why so many of the Sinologists were regarded as tea leaf readers. They had to micro analyze every statement that was made, every movement of one official from here to there. It was extremely opaque.

We had some brilliant analysts in the political section in those days, including the legendary Don Keyser. They were so steeped in the intricacies of Chinese leadership dynamics that I marveled whenever they spoke or wrote. They could take one event or movement of seemingly a minor official and come up with all kinds of implications.

Don was trained in the CIA, and he never gave up his love of his manual typewriter. He rarely spoke, so we all had to wait patiently for his think pieces to emerge. He would sit down at that typewriter and pound out a 40-page piece of analysis at one sitting. I never encountered anything like that in my Foreign Service experience.

The ambassador and DCM left Don alone to do his work. No one would dare bother Don when he was absorbed with his thinking or writing. On the interpersonal side, Don was challenged, and I have always lectured young officers that this skill set is the most important in the Foreign Service. It was Don’s interpersonal deficiencies that eventually stopped any rise in the ranks of one of our finest analysts.

I always chuckle when I recall the annual reporting requirement, which in those days was worldwide, of identifying young, up and coming leaders. It was a mission-wide exercise, and our internal specialist, Lauren Moriarty, made some valuable contributions. I chuckle because in those days, young and up and coming in China meant leaders in their 70s and even in their 80s. I think the youngest on our list was 59. That was China back then.

So yes, it was extremely opaque. There were lots of educated guesses as to what was going on in the hidden chambers of governance. There was no way to become a serious educated guesser without decades of trying to decipher this puzzle. So I kept my mouth shut and read what others wrote. It reminded me of when I was a first tour officer in Jeddah and each weekend, we would go offshore to scuba or skin dive in the Red Sea, anchoring at a reef perhaps 10 miles out.

I recall the first time I went shelling, that is looking for shells. I searched and searched for hours and came back to the boat each time with nothing. Our ambassador, Jim Akins, was an experienced sheller, and would finish each dive with bags of marvelous shells. It took me a full year of shelling before I instinctively knew which rock to turn over to find the beautiful cowries, which coral to look behind to find the spider conches. You simply had to have the experience. This was clearly the case in analyzing Chinese leadership dynamics.

There are so many similar examples throughout the world: experience matters. This is why I believe so strongly in a professional foreign service in which regional experience is melded with the experience of tradecraft. There is no substitute for this experience and skills, no short cuts. We deny this reality at our own peril as a country.

*Q: How did you find relationships with Chinese officials as contrasted say with Arab officials?*

LAROCCO: There is no comparison. Arabs are accustomed to dealing with every type of human being. They dwell at a crossroads of world culture and they themselves have the blood of just about every race flowing through the veins. They have survived these millenniums by their social skills, and moving into the Arab culture is so easy it can be off-putting for more introspective Americans. The first time you meet them they not only ask every possible question about you and your family, but even such things totally off limits in conversations between Americans like how much money do you make. They don't care about our way of measuring a person: education, job experience, etc. They dive deep into your being, your heritage, your family, your beliefs...right to the core of your soul. It can be discomfoting to many Americans, and I would estimate that at least 50 percent of embassy personnel at each of the posts I served at in the Arab world avoided contact with Arabs as much as possible.

Before going to my first overseas post, I received excellent area orientation on Arab culture, including learning appropriate answers to the inevitable question, "Why have you not embraced Islam?" The two acceptable answers are: "My father is Roman Catholic, and I cannot dishonor my father." I found most Muslims seem to consider Roman Catholicism legitimate and orthodox, true People of the Book, although not true believers. At the same time, their respect for fathers is well known. The other acceptable answer is: "when Allah chooses to call me..." They are disarmed by this response, because there simply is no rejoinder. It is not for any human to second

guess God.

It was very different with Chinese in those days. There was a huge wall, not even a glass ceiling, more like cement Great Wall that I could not get past, blocking more than an acquaintance relationship with any Chinese. This was one of the reasons I actually was relieved and happy to leave China and go back to the Middle East, where all races and colors are accepted. If you didn't look Chinese or have their habits, you were a barbarian or a foreign devil (or better put, ghost. You simply aren't real.)

It was hard enough to talk to them, even in Beijing in those days, because they simply could not accept that this big nose, hairy foreigner could speak their language. I recall going into the Beijing Friendship Store, not far from Tiananmen, and noticed that they had Mao Tai on the shelf. That's their high end liqueur. One never knew what would be available in the Friendship Store. I went to the counter and said in slow, clear and I'm sure totally understandable Mandarin, "I would like to buy two bottles of Mao Tai." The lady gaped at me. I repeated my line. She just stared. After a long pause, she found another lady and I could hear her say to the other, "I think that big nosed foreigner said to me, I want to buy Mao Tai. Can you believe that?" They both stared at me, and then walked away. I ran after her and asked again. In exasperation, she replied that they didn't have any. I pointed to the bottles on the shelf; she stared back at me, and responded again that they didn't have any. I left in total frustration, but this wasn't the only time something like this happened.

Beijing was beginning to be accustomed to foreigners in those days, but the hinterland was not. I recall that I made the mistake of wearing shorts when I went biking in south China with a friend. We were cycling through the city to get to the White Mountains. When we stopped at a red light, a young Chinese came up to me and plucked a hair off my leg. Ouch! I cried. He just stood there staring at the hair on my legs. He was incredulous. I never wore shorts ever again in China, regardless of how hot it was. Even in Nanjing, a very large city, I found myself looking at a store front window. When I turned around, I saw a large group of peasants, obviously in from the countryside, gathered and staring at me. I am sure they talked about this strange being as the highlight of their day in the big city. I wonder where they thought I came from. China has leaped forward from their isolation as the Middle Kingdom, although I imagine there are still huge rural areas of China that have not seen many foreigners.

My professional relationships were excellent, and I found the Chinese easy to deal with during negotiations. I once asked a Chinese official, who understood foreign culture well and had a good comprehension of English why this was. He said there is an old Chinese proverb: one Chinese is a dragon, three Chinese are a mosquito. The second part of the proverb is that one Japanese is a mosquito, three Japanese are a dragon. The message here is obvious, he said. Despite what you may think, we Chinese are individualists, like you. Bring us together and we have to settle for the lowest common denominator. The Japanese, in contrast, are impossible to negotiate with except when you get them alone.

Speaking of the Chinese as a people, one of the most memorable events I had during my assignment to China was when Jim Lilley asked me to join him for a special evening with Armand Hammer, arguably the most high profile interlocutor between the West and the

Communist world for half a century. He was in Beijing and was being feted by the Chinese leadership. Only Jim and I were allowed to join. The small banquet and entertainment, a young Chinese dancer, was like nothing I had ever experienced. It was the top of Chinese cuisine and culture, and I never would have enjoyed this without this invitation.

Later in the evening, we went back to the Ambassador's residence for a night cap. During the conversation, Jim asked Hammer how he felt the Soviets and Chinese would fare over the years. Hammer replied that Russian character was such that their ideal was a table, a deck of cards, bottles of vodka and good friends talking philosophy and politics. Their future was limited and we should not fear their ever truly being our competitors. On the other hand, the Chinese ideal was a plot of land to grow crops, a shop to sell wares, a job to put their heart and soul into. The Chinese would shock the world with their industriousness, and they would become the drivers of economic growth and development. That said, he also saw nothing to fear from the Chinese. They have a hard enough time holding their country together. They simply don't have the will or capacity to be overly expansionist. I never forgot those words, and they still serve as a useful guide nearly 25 years after they were spoken.

We had three children which always drew a crowd whenever we ventured out. Three children, and the Chinese considered them little dolls (similar to how many westerners consider young Chinese). Everywhere we went people would crowd around. My little boy, taking after my wife, had blond hair and hazel eyes. He was always the center of attention. He was pawed so much but never complained. Our youngest was only two weeks old when we came to Beijing. Since we all had to take Chinese names, she was named Lu Meihua. The meihua had a double meaning, combining the words for America and China on the one hand, while also meaning beautiful flower. She had almost almond eyes, which do run in our family, so unlike the rest of us, was more readily accepted. Just as in Egypt with our first born, every Chinese was a parent for her.

My wife learned Chinese so quickly, spending a great deal of time in the shop where Beijing opera costumes were sewn, joining the seamstresses. When we left Beijing, we left with a magnificent collection of dresses she was able to procure, including classic costumes.

We attracted so much attention as a family of 5. The Chinese were clearly envious that my wife and I had three children. Of course, they could only have one. At the same time, one thing that eventually drove us up the wall was the constant surveillance on our family. Our phones were permanently monitored, and we couldn't even get a dial tone until whomever was doing the monitoring got himself engaged. We knew this was going on, and one time I got so exasperated waiting for a dial tone, I screamed into the phone that my daughter needed immediate medical attention and I must call a doctor now. Give me a fricken dial tone! For the first time, I heard a voice on the other end. Mary's sick, he said? I said yes. Not only did I get a dial tone, but a bunch of Chinese showed up out of nowhere to assist. I honestly feel they loved our family, and I truly pitied them for living in such a police state.

One time, when they were really angry at me because they suspected I had something to do with a Chinese dissident, they surgically removed the fan belt from my car. It was actually quite well done. When I came downstairs to drive to work, I turned on the engine and the light came on signally trouble. I opened the hood and saw the fan belt was missing. I then noticed that it had

been thrown into the bushes nearby. I could tell you all kinds of stories of Chinese harassment of embassy officers during this period. It was annoying, it was exasperating, and definitely not worthy of a great nation and people. I understand this kind of harassment took place in the Soviet Union as well.

*Q: You didn't find yourself people going after you and wanting to know about the United States?*

LAROCCO: During Beijing Spring, it was constant. My son and I would ride our bikes around town, and we passed group after group of people sitting and talking about what was going on.

*Q: When was Beijing spring?*

LAROCCO: Beijing spring took place essentially between March and June, 1989. It was a period of about two and half months in which Beijing completely opened up to discussion and ferment. It was so refreshing, so unexpected and so quickly crushed.

*Q: How old was your son?*

LAROCCO: My son was 7 years old.

The two of us would go out and ride all around all the neighborhoods and occasionally we would stop. I would see a group of about 30 people sitting around talking and they would be talking about what is democracy. I remember some of the conversations.

The most painful one was when we stopped our bikes and there was a bunch of young people. They said, "You're an American?" and I said, "Yes, I'm an American."

"Please explain your judicial system to us."

I thought oh, my God. I can't do it in English. How can I possibly do this in Chinese? Our judicial system is extremely complex. I would never think of myself as being able to explain it in English. You really need a constitutional lawyer, you need a practitioner. You need a panel of legal people to really explain our judicial system, not even just one person. But certainly for me as a non legal person, it was painful.

What I tried to do was basically not talk so much about our judicial system but to talk about our Bill of Rights. I spent some time trying to develop a presentation about our constitution that I could talk to people on the streets. This was so exhilarating and so amazing to see these people so genuinely interested in democracy and participation and freedom of expression, freedom of being able to do all sorts of activities. They were still very much interested in order, no question about that. Order and stability are very big to Chinese because how else do you hold a country of a billion people together? But they clearly wanted more say about their lives and they wanted more freedoms. They were feeling this was possible and it was very encouraging. We did this every night for months. I must say that the weather that spring was delightful, perfect for outdoor congregation.

I remember the Sunday before the Tiananmen crackdown. Our whole family went to the Square and we spent several hours talking with the students in their makeshift tent community. I filmed it, and I cherish that film, always troubled by what may have happened to those eager kids with such high expectations.

At that time, you could feel the tension nearing boiling point. Something had to happen.

*Q: Prior to the Tiananmen crackdown, what was it like in Beijing?*

LAROCCO: It was increasingly tense. Initially, it was this euphoria of Beijing Spring. It was sort of like the initial euphoria of Arab Spring, so to speak, but as things went on it was very clear that something was going on behind the scenes. There were clearly in the upper levels some major clashes taking place. We weren't sure if Zhao Ziyang, who was the seeming standard bearer of the demonstrators, could succeed or not. But as always, it was opaque.

*Q: Was the political section coming back and saying, how the hell do we know?*

LAROCCO: You know how the Foreign Service is. We never reply how the hell do we know? We do the best that we can and I think our political section and our other sections did the best we could recognizing the lack of access to the inner halls, the lack of a probing media, domestic or international, the lack of anything resembling what we have today in the world.

Our guys did the best they could at documenting the tensions, laying out the possibilities, doing this with literally both hands tied behind our backs.

*Q: That's what they wanted.*

LAROCCO: Of course.

I had certain third country nationals that I worked with who were in the business community who really gave me a lot of insights which particularly the year after Tiananmen I was able to do a tremendous amount of reporting that nobody else could do.

*Q: Why would they have something that we didn't get?*

LAROCCO: Because they had a presence throughout the country. They had a longstanding presence that we didn't have. They had people everywhere. These people from a third country, which I must leave nameless, and with whom I developed a very close relationship were able to feed me tremendous amounts of information which I believe to this day is what helped me to cross the threshold, to join the senior Foreign Service. My reporting was eagerly gobbled up. Keep in mind that in the period after Tiananmen, we were almost totally cut off from contacts with Beijing officials.

At this time, our ambassador was Jim Lilley, one of the best of the best and it was very hard for him. One of the good things he did after Tiananmen was to tell us to get out and about the country because the rest of the country was not like Beijing. They had not felt what Beijing had

felt and while we were shunned in Beijing. Many of the people who just by the very fact of knowing us, coming to our houses and talking to us, were banished to the West, which was very painful to us. Just by knowing us they were punished severely. That's hard to handle, and I will always be troubled by this.

We went out to the provinces, where indeed it was a very different story. We were welcomed with open arms and feted. They had heard little about what happened in Beijing, and if they did, they simply didn't associate with it. They were eager to get to know us better, to do business and to expand relationships. This people-to-people, face-to-face diplomacy made us all ambassadors of our country. It was exhilarating, especially in view of the total cold shoulder we were experiencing in Beijing. It also generated pioneering reporting on key areas of China that were previously only touched on in cursory manner.

*Q: You arrive in China, you get to know people and then Tiananmen and then China spring, and Beijing Spring is beginning to bubble. Was the embassy aware? Were you saying something is going on? Was your radar, the embassy radar focusing? What the hell is this all about?*

LAROCCO: Our radar was totally focused on what was going on. We couldn't avoid it. It was right outside our doors, whether at home, while shopping, in the parks or at the embassy. At the same time, I would say that we were a bit naïve. On the day of the Tiananmen crackdown, we had Boy Scouts camping out at the embassy. They were there as tanks rolled down the street just outside the compound. While I and others faulted the RSO and our intel, I must confess that the notion that a government would run over and deliberately shoot down its own people was very difficult for us to comprehend. I can only speak for myself, of course, but keep in mind all the terrorism I had experienced. While most of expected a crackdown, we did not expect the killing and harsh actions on the scale that took place.

For all the terrorism I had been around in the Middle East and doing everything I could as I told you to protect my children from this, they saw and heard firsthand the crackdown taking place from our balcony and it has affected them the rest of their lives like nothing else they experienced in all their years overseas.

There was nowhere to escape so we saw the tanks going down the streets. We saw people thrown onto the backs of trucks and taken off. We saw people shot at. We heard gunfire all the time.

All of our local employees left because they were actually employees of the PSB, run by Chinese security. So all of our 300+ local employees were gone. With our families evacuated, we Americans were on our own.

*Q: Was that a Chinese order or American?*

LAROCCO: A Chinese order. We were outraged because these were people who we really depended on to keep the embassy operating. All of them were ordered to go home. I can tell you certain stories of certain Chinese who in fact, defied that order, but I don't want to do that because I can't be sure that even to this day they would be safe from recrimination.

*Q: I can understand but I am wondering why? Was this sort of stick it to us?*

LAROCCO: Yes. And it wasn't just this. The PLA – Chinese Army -- shot as many as 600 rounds into an apartment complex where our Americans lived. I don't know how much of that story ever came out. We were truly outraged, but the message was clear: get out. There was a Chinese 'ayi', as she was called, a maid who saved the lives of American children by throwing her body over them as the bullets raked across the room above them. We moved the families out as quickly as we could.

I have never told anyone this before, but I must confess that I simply could not resist going down to Tiananmen and seeing what was going on in the city. The night the Tiananmen crackdown started, I was hosting a dinner at my home. We got the word that the military had moved into the square. I immediately ended the event and drove one of the guests home. I drove as close as I could to Tiananmen, seeing everywhere I drove burning buses, fires, tanks and people running. It almost reminded me of the scene in *Gone with the Wind* driving as Atlanta was burning.

The following morning, I and some other officers were summoned to the embassy for a meeting with the ambassador. I took a roundabout way, skirting Tiananmen, going around it but coming right to the edge of the square. At the first roundabout west of the square, twisted, charred, burning buses were literally piled up, bulldozed into this strange sculptural Tower of Babel. It was scene I will never forget.

Beijing was the turning point in the handling of crises and evacuations by the U.S. government. To begin with, Washington just didn't know what to do. We were playing it by ear. They told us to refer to the Emergency Action Plan, but this was a massive, unwieldy document written in unintelligible bureaucratize. You might as well be reading the phone book. It was useless. Things were happening so quickly, and we simply had to make it up as we went along. Washington did not understand. They said the Swiss got out quickly, as did the Japanese. Of course, the handful of Swiss in the country pulled up in their Mercedes and boarded a plane. The Japanese, so orderly, all came to their embassy with two bags, boarded buses and were hauled out of the country in waiting Japanese charters.

Americans? We don't behave this way. We don't like to be ordered around, especially if danger is not readily apparent. We're tough, right?

All of us at the embassy took our turn at the phones, pleading with Americans to assemble at this place or that so we could get them out of the country. Let's face it: Americans don't want to be told what to do and so many said they felt safe and they didn't want to leave, especially if they had to pay to get out. So often only a handful of Americans would be there at the pickup point. And so often, hours later we would get frantic calls from those who did not show saying that there was gunfire around them. Please get me out. At that point, streets were blocked and we could not get through. But here's the bottom line: No Americans were killed, despite the confusion and what seemed to us (and the Americans we served) a very painful operation.

I am so grateful to this day that Jim Lilley was our ambassador. He was a man who had run unpredictable and risky operations for decades. He knew immediately what to do. He was always

calm, in charge, and always knew exactly what to do. He called in about a dozen of us, said we would be his team during the crisis. We looked at each other, detecting immediately that we weren't the recognized hierarchy of the embassy. But Jim knew each of us well, our strengths, our character, our reliability, and to be frank, we all knew and trusted each other to do our part.

Jim put me in charge when he went back to our apartment for the night to catch sleep. I would be there all night and well into the day before I could go home for a few hours' sleep.

In those days, we had to have the phone off the hook 24 hours a day for Washington to talk to us. They constantly peppered us with the same questions: what's the body count? Is the resistance holding up? How many Americans have you evacuated? How many Americans are still left? This constant quest for information at times proved exasperating as we were working tirelessly to get people out of harm's way.

One evening, late at night, when it was impossible to gather any data, I became truly exasperated at the list of endless questions and the demand for immediate answers. I held the phone up to the window, then pulled it back and barked into the phone: did you hear that? It's tank fire. And it's right outside our compound. You can expect no further answers for the time being. We will let you know when we have any. I then took the phone and shoved it into a desk drawer and closed it.

I give a lot of credit to Robert Kimmitt who was the undersecretary at the time and was running the operation back in Washington. He was a level head and made sure we got the help we needed, especially charter aircraft to get Americans out. After the crisis was over, he ordered a full after action report which resulted in a new, more user friendly manual and procedures. It was the first usable template for crisis management in the modern era and served well in future crises. All of this was under the always helpful leadership and guidance of James Baker. When I reflect back on the crisis, we had the perfect individuals in charge: Baker, Kimmitt and Lilley.

I would like add a footnote to all this because I think it says something important about the Foreign Service. To many, the image of a Foreign Service officer is a man in a pinstripe suit wearing wingtip shoes sipping a martini at a gala reception of elite. That may have been common in days gone by, but it was far from the reality of the Foreign Service I was a part of. From Beijing to Beirut, Cairo to Chongqing, the Foreign Service was demanding, challenging and conducted often under the most difficult working and living conditions. This is not a complaint. I loved this environment. But it was not at all reflective of the image I thought the Foreign Service was before I joined, and not the image my friends and relatives back home had.

Then came Tiananmen. I must admit that I joined the Foreign Service for adventure, excitement, travel, crisis, cross-cultural experiences. When Tiananmen started to happen, my juices went into overdrive. I truly felt alive. I believed that all the training I had received, throughout my life, prepared me for this moment. Perhaps Jim Lilley saw this in me and others he chose as key members of his team. He had himself been in countless situations like this, and he was truly unflappable, ready for anything.

What I learned during the Tiananmen crisis is that our basic instincts come to the fore during a

super high intensity crisis like that one. Some of our finest officers, especially Chinese speakers, froze in place, unable to move. I recall the most fluent Chinese speaker with years of experience in China before joining the service, an Ivy League education, all the right training and background, whimpering in my office. I was stunned. I wanted to say, "Get a grip. We need you. American citizens in distress need you. Our country needs you. This is your time. Snap out of it. Let's go!" But I didn't. So many thoughts flashed through my mind, of Patton in Sicily, of stories of soldiers excelling during training only to freeze and drop their weapons when thrust into battle, of those in sharp contrast with little to commend them stepping forward and performing heroic acts.

While I would never presume to compare Tiananmen with the heat of battle, it prompted basic instincts to show themselves. Some underperformers in the day-to-day work of economic reporting and contact work leapt into action, pulling us all forward with them. On the other hand, some of our embassy stars in the normal working environment went missing, holed up in their apartments, not answering our calls.

The Foreign Service is a profession, but one that needs all types of personalities. We need the tea leaf readers as much as we need the crisis managers. We need the masters of traditional tradecraft as much as we need the intrepid "expeditionary diplomats." The martini-sipping, reception-going smooth as silk diplomat, a master prier of information from the European elite, is a needed FSO as is the civil affairs diplomat in a helmet in Kandahar. We are all FSOs, and we are all needed.

As for the person whimpering in my office, I consoled and had him/her escorted to the airport to be evacuated with the families. I never reported that behavior, and this person returned to post after the crisis and performed admirably as one of our finest reporting officers.

*Q: What was happening in Guangzhou and other major cities?*

LAROCCO: Not much. They were basically quiet. The only other city that had unrest was Shanghai. But Shanghai, in sharp contrast to Beijing, had a very enlightened and charismatic mayor who took a very different attitude. He did not clamp down, but he maintained order. He later became a hero for his handling of the situation there. The rest of China, for the most part, was shielded from the events of Beijing. Hong Kong, of course, was a very different matter, but that was outside our purview.

*Q: Looking at it, say when the shooting had died down and the revolt or whatever you want to call it had been suppressed, what did this tell us about the leadership of China?*

LAROCCO: The leadership of China was determined to preserve the Communist Party at all costs. Full stop. That has always been uppermost in their minds, and it remains so to this day. They were determined to preserve the Communist Party and they saw this as a threat and they were going to put it down at whatever cost. How many people died, I have never seen an accurate figure. How many people were exiled, I have never seen an accurate figure on that either. It was brutal and meant to punish severely and leave a lasting lesson. They replaced a number of leaders in their usual quiet way. Keep in mind that these leaders were also Communist

Party members. So it was done mostly outside the spotlights. This led then to all kinds of dissidents who either fled the country or went to prison, some of whom became symbols of the repression. They have always received our morale support, and have always been a wedge in our relationship with the Chinese leadership. You may recall Hillary's troubles regarding a dissident during her visit to China.

I would like to mention one other key event that took place during the Beijing Spring. Winston Lord was still ambassador. Near the end of his tour, President Bush came to China. We had meetings and I was the note taker for the meeting with Li Peng who was unintelligible in any language. In those days, we were required to write up the meetings as verbatim as possible. After the meeting was over, I went back to the embassy, despondent over my task of trying to make any sense of what Li Peng said. Even though I was invited to the gala banquet for Bush, I had to skip it. I was the only officer at the embassy that evening.

I was deep in thought tapping out my report when I got a call from the Marine at Post 1. "There is some guy here at the gate, some Chinese guy and he needs to talk to somebody." I went down there. I thought, what do I do? I don't want to blow this thing. I invited him in. It turned out to be the well-known dissident Fang Lizhi. He showed me his invitation to the dinner, and I knew he was on the list of invitees. He then told me he had repeatedly been stopped by Chinese security officers and prevented from reaching the dinner. He wanted to lodge a formal protest on the one hand, and requested an embassy escort to the dinner as well.

We didn't have reliable cell phones in those days. I tried to reach people and I couldn't. It was in the middle of the banquet, and I assumed phones were turned off. I sat with him for a period of time, which turned out to be the right thing to do. I listened carefully to his protest, his desire to attend the dinner, but I had no vehicles that could transport him to the dinner and I had no idea even at what point the dinner was at. I said, "I need to get your story. Stay here." He was smoking cigarettes endlessly and very, very nervous. "Just stay calm." I sat there and talked with him until I finally was able to contact a political officer at the dinner who knew Fang. He rushed back to the embassy. By that time, the dinner was over, so Fang was extremely disappointed.

As it turned out, Fang Lizhi ended up staying with us as a guest of the embassy, as both we and he feared for his safety. He was hidden from view, and we did a damn good job confusing the Chinese as to where exactly he was. He was with us for a full year. Bill Stanton was his guardian, and I don't know whether Bill has ever written anything about his year with Dr. Fang.

There were plenty of recriminations after this event and it became a cause celebre of the media back in the U.S. Some in our government blamed us at the embassy for inviting dissidents at all to the formal state banquet. Why did we do this? We let Washington handle the press inquiries, but we made it clear to Washington, quietly of course, that there were no secrets here. Everything was clear. I was at the meetings in which a suggested guest list was prepared. A decision was made by our country team to recommend including some notable dissidents. This was sent to Washington and fully approved. Ambassador Lord took some unfair heat for this incident, but he handled it deftly.

Midway through my second year in Beijing, Jim Lilley called me in and said he had developed a

great trust in my management and judgment, and hoped I would stay in the China field. These were important times and my experience in Beijing would be helpful. I was honest with him: my heart was really in the Middle East. Jim wouldn't take no for an answer and arranged with his good friend, Stan Brooks, then director of AIT in Taipei, for me to return there as Deputy Director. This would be my first real DCM job, and I had just crossed the threshold. It was indeed too tempting to pass up. So I accepted.

I left Beijing after two unforgettable years. Despite the drama, I believe it was also very much on the positive side for my kids. They got to see so much of China, from the Harbin ice festival to the Karst Mountains of Guilin, the far western ancient crossroads of Kashgar to Nanjing and Shanghai. My wife was adored; the Chinese consider Audrey Hepburn, with her angelic face and small features, a goddess. They said my wife looked just like her. My kids were beloved everywhere they went. Cute aliens, I guess. And my children had matured overnight via Tiananmen.

*Q: I want to go back to China now. Let's talk about the commercial relationship. Were we concerned that we were delighted in China opening up and all but my God. These guys may be our great commercial rivals.*

LAROCCO: Not in those days, no. We sent in long reports on this, signaling that this was going to happen and we should seize the reins now to seriously discuss all this with the Chinese or we were going to be swamped with imports in the decades ahead. How can you compete with 20 cents an hour labor? And the quality of their products was rising every day.

But American companies seemed hypnotized by the thought of a billion consumers, even though the purchasing power of those billion was far less than that of the people of one American city. Our government viewed China more as an opportunity than a challenge. And all those American companies who were flocking to China to manufacture products for the American market were raking in millions in profits.

At the same time, we could see Chinese reverse engineering our technology and stealing everything they could get their hands on, from technology to processes to intellectual property. Once they made it their own, they cut out our companies. It was not long before the combination of this, their burgeoning exports and their closed market to our products sent the trade deficit soaring. By the time we really faced up to the challenge, their holdings of dollars was unprecedented. This was long after I left Beijing.

*Q: Were other countries seeing the same thing?*

LAROCCO: The Japanese saw it in spades, but there was little they could do about it except to limit the pain. The Japanese were rushing in to invest and diversify. They saw that their days were numbered as manufacturers so the only way they could continue with their standard of living was to invest. As we now know, the standard of living of Japan hasn't changed in 20 years. They have been okay in terms of standard of living because they were not expanding in their population, but they were not okay for the long-term future because they were not expanding their population. Too many old folks, not enough coming in behind them. China faces

that same prospect, as I will talk about later.

*Q: With the Chinese picking up manufacturing, reverse engineering, was there something within the Chinese society that wasn't producing new products? After all, you think about paper and fireworks and etcetera which they had done centuries before but it doesn't seem to be*

LAROCCO: There was very little innovation in China. They were master copiers of everything. The Communist ideology had really beaten down a lot of individual initiative in terms of innovation and was not encouraging it. There was nothing to get out of it. If you personally came up with an innovation, it was immediately taken away from you so you got no benefit out of it. So why do it when copying was easy and profitable?

Recall that conversation with Armand Hammer. He didn't say they would innovate. He said they would produce. This is exactly what's happened. Since they have been unleashed economically, they are producing on a scale almost unprecedented in history. They have brought more people out of poverty than any country ever. It is amazing, the hundreds of millions they have brought out of poverty. But they are not yet innovators, and I think many of those who are innovators are fortunately coming to America which is good for us.

*Q: Did you see any profit to the United States by the flow of Chinese students and many are staying?*

LAROCCO: It had started already back then. The Chinese saw this as win, win, win for them. They saw it was a win if these people went to America, got a really good education and came back. They thought it was a win for China if they stayed in America, because they consider Chinese overseas their bridge to these nations, their "Huaqiao." That's what they are called in Chinese. These are bridging people so they saw them as Chinese transplants, people who would always be Chinese first in their hearts. They also saw them contributing to the American economy, and that was eventually going to help them too.

There are Chinese students who are absolutely the backbone of so many of our universities. I recently heard the figure of 200,000 Chinese studying here. I have no idea if it's true, but I wouldn't be surprised if it is.

*Q: What about Americans? As economic counselor did you still, were you covering the commercial side of things too?*

LAROCCO: No. My predecessor and the commercial counselor had a very bad relationship, but I developed an excellent one with Lyn Edinger, my commercial counterpart. Keep in mind that I had worked for USDOC as commercial attaché in Saudi Arabia, so I knew his line of work. We agreed on what he would stay out of and what I would stay out of, how we would cooperate in overlapping areas, and it worked seamlessly. Our section advised countless business people, but it was solely on financial, investment, macro and micro economic issues. We steered clear of any advice regarding selling their products. To be clear, we strongly supported American business and our commercial interests, but we did so hand in glove with the commercial section.

A good part of being head of the economic section or having an economic section is in fact business support. There is a difference between supporting business and business promotion. Really what the commercial section is engaged in is business promotion. We were really not that. We were giving business support. We were giving companies a kind of analysis that they needed to make informed judgments, whereas the commercial section was introducing them to partners, promoting their products, doing all that sort of stuff.

*Q: I was wondering if you were getting a sample of the American attitude of business people coming over to China looking for markets or for production and all.*

LAROCCO: We got involved when they ran into problems because if there were problems, it was our job to negotiate those problems. If they had problems with intellectual property, that's when we got involved. If they had problems with various commercial laws and disputes, we got involved in that, all kinds of investment problems and things like that so, yeah. We were acutely aware of the obstacles and the difficulties that they were facing in China. It was a very tough market. China was not a society governed by rule of law, and the very notion of resorting to law for redress in a commercial dispute was an alien concept.

On the other hand, if you just came in and said I want to build a Nike factory and I want to employ 12,000 people, wow. They treat you like a king. It was all jobs growth; it was all producing, bringing in hard currency. They loved direct investors who brought in money to build plants.

What really angered me as an American was, for example, selling them airplanes. They wanted offsets. Well, if we buy your airplane, then you must invest in producing this or that here and, oh, by the way, you must buy eight million pairs of surgical gloves. Say what? This is how the Chinese bargained. It was the price of doing business there. It was maddening for many U.S. firms.

*Q: Were you able to use congressional visits to point out to Congress what was happening to them in their home districts and all?*

LAROCCO: Yes, but we did not get as many congressional visits as I would have liked. That I found very disappointing. I don't know what it is like today, but I would say a good share of the congressional visits in those days were related to just getting to know China or were focused on human rights. Very few, if any that I can recall, were focused solely on economic issues.

*Q: So often it's said that it is a unique experience for government officials to sit alone in a car with a congressman for hours, maybe and have a chance to talk to him and explain the situation.*

LAROCCO: I agree, and that certainly was the case during my assignment to Cairo. But once again, my work with Congressional visitors was limited during my two years in Beijing. We had a handful before Tiananmen and very few the year after.

*Q: How did you find Chinese officials when you raised human rights questions?*

LAROCCO: Extremely defensive. They basically said we didn't understand. We didn't understand how important stability was for them. We didn't understand how this was their mission and their goal and their responsibility to provide what they said were the real human rights. Real human rights were not what we said. The real human rights were the right to a job, the right to eat. They said in your culture you define human rights as letting people starve to death as long as they can speak out freely. We don't see it that way. We feel that real human rights are economic rights, not civil rights.

So there was a fundamental disagreement about how you even define human rights with the Chinese. The Chinese were very, very consistent in saying that. How much they believed it, I am in no position to judge. Having listened to them, I can see why they hold their views, since if they don't feed those billion people, heaven help us all.

I am trying to characterize their point of view. For myself, China will never become what it aspires to until full rights are granted to all, especially in the area of freedoms and political participation. I could foresee the death of Communism Party rule, but what would replace it? We still don't know the exact answer, but I have always believed that political participation would have to open up over time and rights promulgated and enforced.

*Q: One last question; did you see China sort of shaking off Tiananmen, was there any lesson there for the Chinese adjusting or was this just something they put down and went on their merry way?*

LAROCCO: Tiananmen will never be forgotten. They have tried every way they can to bury it, but it is always there. I think it is something they know has always been latent.

I eventually was ostracized by the China club because I concluded that China would never forget Tiananmen, would open up to political participation, but could not do so as one entity. As had happened before in its long history, I predicted that China would break up into several entities by 2050. Political change would be one factor in this break up, the differences between regions, which can be profound, demographics, relationships with the outside world, etc. This notion was completely anathema to Sinologists at that time, and I suspect is still so today. But I stand by my prediction.

Let's be frank: Once you give people sustenance, they want more. Once you educate them, their eyes are opened. Once their eyes are opened, they want more rights, more say. They indeed have something to say. The path China is on makes profound change toward more political participation in governance inevitable, and I feel it fits the Chinese character and identity so much more than Communism did. Communism was an aberration, a denial of the Chinese character as described by Armand Hammer. Their identity has been tampered with for nearly a century. It will not be denied much longer.

Now, let's be clear: what I am saying may also be a forecast for the kind of change that is unstable. I think we need to be prepared for that. I don't think we are.

*Q: Well, too we are looking at technology and the fact you can't suppress things. God knows the*

*Chinese are probably more wired than any other group sadly in the use of this. We are talking about cell phones and the various ways of communicating which can no longer be controlled by a central government.*

LAROCCO: You can't control ideas. The ideas are all there. Try as they as hard as they try, they can't do it. It is inevitable the change is coming.

**WILLIAM PRIMOSCH**  
**Office of Chinese Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1988-1991)**

*Will Primosch was born and raised in Ohio and attended the University of Notre Dame and George Washington University. He served in the US Army and entered the Foreign Service in 1975. His assignments abroad included Belgrade, Bangkok and London. In 2001 Charles Stuart Kennedy interviewed Mr. Primosch.*

*Q: How did you find George Washington as a place to go for a graduate degree?*

PRIMOSCH: Overall, I thought it was a good program. They had several very good professors. One of the things that they stressed in the courses that I took was research and writing. So we did a lot of papers and that was a great opportunity to refine my writing skills. Acquiring good writing skills really helped me later on in the State Department. Several of the courses I took I also found to be very useful later on at the State Department. I took courses in international trade and economics, and some courses in international communism. We did a lot of reading on China, Russia and Eastern Europe. As it turned out, my first assignment at the State Department was in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. I found myself very well prepared academically for that kind of work.

*Q: What was the role that China was playing, particularly in the economic sphere?*

PRIMOSCH: China was trying to project more influence in the whole region at the time. My impression was that they were rather clumsy at it. The Chinese did participate in the UN regional organization. They were rather friendly to other representatives there. The Russians were also there. But I didn't get the impression they were all that effective. The Thais, however, are very astute at judging power relationships and had launched a number of initiatives to try to improve relations with China. They were very wary of offending the Chinese in any way. Even when we pushed them to take some hard stands on issues, you could tell they were reluctant to do that because this was a small neighborhood and the Chinese were the big boys in the neighborhood.

*Q: Did you get a feel for the Thai economy as it contrasted to Singapore or Malaysia? How did you see it adjusting to the changes in the world economy?*

PRIMOSCH: Thailand was generally considered even at that time to be one of our success stories for economic development. After World War II, it was a rice-growing economy. There was no industry there to speak of. The Thais were generally very pro-market in terms of their

approach to economic development. The government didn't get involved in a lot of things. You saw a lot of very interesting dynamic economic developments in Thailand as a result. Thailand had a very well developed agricultural sector. It used to be just rice. But Thai farmers were so flexible and responsive to the market that they began growing many different types of crops. Anything they could grow in a tropical climate, they would grow. All kinds of interesting fruits and vegetables and corn, and other crops that we grew in the West. They were very entrepreneurial. It helped that Thailand had a strong Chinese immigrant presence. Many Chinese immigrants has been there for 100 or 200 years, so it's not as if they were recent émigrés. Most of the business sector, as it is in much of Southeast Asia, is controlled by Chinese immigrants. They're very entrepreneurial. Thailand was considered to be a strong and growing economy at the time, although there were still a lot of poor people. Most of the farm sector consisted of poor farmers, but you could also see very visible growth there. The Thai economy was considered rather successful, although not as successful as Singapore, which was the premiere economy in the region. Malaysia was also considered to be very strong. Then probably Thailand after that.

*Q: Did you have family there?*

PRIMOSCH: Yes, I had my wife, who gave birth to our third child there. I had three children in Thailand with me.

*Q: How old were they?*

PRIMOSCH: I think they were six, four, and then my youngest was born over there.

*Q: You didn't really have to worry then about the pernicious influences of Thailand which hit some of the teenage kids.*

PRIMOSCH: No. That wasn't a problem. I understand that drugs had been a big problem, particularly before I had arrived. Someone told me that a couple of teenagers had died from drug overdoses at the international school. Even after I had left, one family had to be sent back because their teenage children got involved in drugs. The drugs and the sex, massage parlors and bars, was pretty wide open. So, if I had teenage children, I'd be very concerned about the influence of that.

*Q: You left in '88. Where?*

PRIMOSCH: Then I went over to the Asian bureau. I got a surprise call from the China Office asking if I would like to serve as their deputy for economics and trade. I didn't know much about China. I had served in Thailand. They wanted someone who knew something about the economy, international economic policy and trade and debt. So, I was asked to serve there in the China Office of the East Asia Bureau. At the time, Stapleton "Stape" Roy was the Deputy Assistant Secretary for China.

*Q: Let's do it prior to Tiananmen, which was June '89. What was our stance economically towards China?*

PRIMOSCH: It was very similar to what it was toward Eastern and Central Europe a decade earlier. The strategy was to try to encourage China to have more contacts with the West. There was almost a missionary fervor in thinking that if we could just bring the Chinese at all levels into greater contact with the West, if we could expand trade with the West, that this would stimulate internal change that would be more liberalizing and might encourage democratic yearnings and a democratic transformation. This was very much the thinking that we had in Eastern Europe in the '60s and '70s. It was a very similar kind of policy only it was much more comprehensive because we were trying to deal with the Chinese at almost all levels. For example, I was also involved in trying to promote the science and technology cooperation. This was also a major effort. There were a lot of U.S. scientists visiting China, and a lot of Chinese scientists coming to the States under a joint science program. We negotiated a new science agreement when I was on the desk. We also had a big joint economic commission with China where we met at a high level. The Secretary of Treasury was involved and the Secretary of Commerce. It was very similar to what we did with Eastern Europe only on a much bigger scale.

*Q: China has the potential for being such a major economy that it would do to us what the Japanese had done to us, use us as a market and there wasn't much of a return for us...*

PRIMOSCH: No, I don't think it was so evident at that time. Actually, it was looking the other way in which many American corporations are still optimistic about the potential of the Chinese market. "There are 1.2 billion people who need to buy Cokes and hamburgers and tractors and machine tools, and if I can just get into that market, I'll be on easy street."

*Q: There was a book that came out in the '30s called "Oil for the Lamps of China." If we can only do this... I recall someone wanting to sell caskets. He thought, "Wow, what a market for caskets."*

PRIMOSCH: I think that in essence was the mentality of a lot of American businesses at that time and still is. If somehow they could crack that market, they would have enormous sales opportunities. The China market has developed much faster than we had thought it would 11 or 12 years ago. When I visited there, you could see the beginnings of market economy develop, and the Chinese had a great interest in Western technology. A lot of companies were starting to go there. But China was still also a very backward place.

*Q: Did you get involved in either backstopping or dealing at any level in negotiations with the Chinese?*

PRIMOSCH: Yes, we were involved in a couple of different negotiations. One involved China's membership in the WTO, which started back in the late 1980s. We had two or three rounds with the Chinese before Tiananmen Square. It's rather interesting that because of the desire to have better relations with the China, the Chinese at that time could have gotten had a very easy deal that required few concessions. We were making almost minimal demands. The Chinese, though, were smart by a half. They always thought that they could get a better deal with even fewer commitments. Ten years later when the Chinese finally resumed negotiations, they had to make extensive, comprehensive commitments to reform their economy and open up markets. If they cut a deal back in the late 1980s along the lines that USTR was proposing at the time, it would

have had to make very little in the way of commitments. So, their delay was costly in some respects, although their commitments are going to help promote the kind of reforms that they want to do anyway. However, it's going to be very painful.

*Q: Did you get a taste of the Chinese as negotiators?*

PRIMOSCH: Yes, a little bit. I traveled three times to China when I was on the desk. A couple of times we had to cancel out. I was supposed to go there a week before Tiananmen, but it looked like situation was going to worsen, so we decided not to go.

But there are a couple of interesting things about their negotiating style. Their overall approach to dealing with foreigners was to win friends. The Chinese can be very charming to deal with. If you ever go to dinner with the Chinese, you're going to have fun. They're good jokesters. They're friendly. And they like to tell stories. They're a lot of fun to be around. We went many times to the Chinese embassy for dinner. They're very good entertainers. They treated everyone well, from the lowest person on the office staff up to the ambassador. Their approach was to win friends. Their thinking was: "We want to have people all over who are friendly to China." Of course, they're going to try to use that friendship. It's a very clear strategy of trying to win friends, and they can be very charming at that.

The other thing I found very strange in the Chinese mentality is, they have this notion – and I saw this in the newspaper recently with regard to the downing of the U.S. spy plane in China– which they repeatedly referenced and which just sounds so bizarre to Americans. If we did something the Chinese didn't like, their way of trying to put us on the spot was to say, "Well, you have to understand, this hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." I don't know how many times I heard that. I think it was the Chinese ambassador who said almost the exact same thing about the aircraft. "You hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and now we have to make amends."

*Q: Of course, our mantra is, "We'd love to help you, but we have Congress to deal with." After Tiananmen, what did you do, just fold your tents and twiddle your thumbs?*

PRIMOSCH: In some respects, while there was a huge amount of work to do after Tiananmen, mainly just to preserve the relationship because there were those in Congress who wanted to retaliate in various ways against China, most importantly by trying to take away their most favored nation (MFN) trade status. This had to be renewed every year for communist countries under the Jackson-Vanik provisions (of the Trade Act of 1974). The requirement stays in effect until China becomes a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in which case we have to provide it on a permanent basis. We spent a lot of time trying to manage the relationship, prevent further damage and get the Chinese to do something to show that they weren't brutal dictators. We also had an incident at the embassy Beijing. There was a Chinese physicist, Fang Lizhi who was an outspoken human rights advocate and who had secretly sought refuge in the ambassador's residence during the Tiananmen Square protests. A very delicate negotiation went on for months to get Chinese permission to have Fang Lizhi leave the country. There was also some concern during that time that the Chinese might even try to break into the residence and snatch him. So we also had in mind the potential threats to the security of the ambassador that

such an occurrence might involve. The two years after Tiananmen were very busy and very difficult in terms of dealing with the Chinese.

*Q: In '93, you did what?*

PRIMOSCH: In '93, I ended up going back to the Department for a short time in the Asia Bureau. I was working on China's most-favored-nation trade status renewal and spent a short time working with Winston Lord, the Assistant Secretary for Asia and Pacific Affairs, on that issue. We were still dealing with the fallout from the Tiananmen Square massacre, and relations with Congress over China's trade status was very sensitive. There were expectations, which proved to be unrealistic, that China would make some gestures towards human rights and internal relaxation as a condition for MFN approval. The Chinese, however, were very resistant to that. In the end, we had to try to convince the Congress that, "Even though we told you we thought the Chinese were going to do certain things internally on human rights, they're not going to do it, but it's still worth renewing China's trade status."

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*Q: What happened? Were you doing much work for them?*

PRIMOSCH: It was kind of slow. Again, I think it was the sense of the political team wanting to keep control of the important work. I didn't have a heck of a lot to do at that time. One issue that I helped to negotiate that actually turned out to be rather significant had to do with Russia's interest in using their former military rockets to launch U.S. communications satellites. At that time, the U.S. was the only country that made the whole range of communications satellites. Satellites happen to be on the U.S. Munitions List, which means it's a militarily controlled item. So, any country that wanted to launch a U.S. satellite had to get a license from the State Department. The Russians came to us for help. This was at the time of their political transition. The hard-line communists had fallen from power. The new government asked, couldn't we help them by allowing them to use their rockets to launch our satellites, which made perfect economic sense. From a foreign policy sense, it would have helped the Russians. But our rocket launch industry was much opposed to that because it turns out that we had expensive rocket launchers which are geared mainly to military uses. They were the "gold plated version" of what it takes to put a satellite up. We had to negotiate an agreement with the Russians that would enable them to launch only a limited number of satellites a year. We had a similar agreement with China that I also helped to negotiate. So successfully concluding those negotiations and the interagency deliberations involved was one of my concrete accomplishments at the NSC. I was the intermediary for negotiating the position among the agencies as to what the terms of this agreement were going to be. It was eventually signed before I left.

**KENNETH YATES**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1988-1989)**

**Deputy Public Affairs Officer  
Beijing (1989-1992)**

*Kenneth Yates was born in Connecticut in 1940. He served overseas in the U.S. Army from 1969-1962 and received a BA from the University of Pennsylvania in 1967. After entering USIA in 1967, he was posted abroad in Seoul, Kabul, Tokyo, Reykjavik and Beijing. Mr. Yates was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.*

*Q: Today is March 20, 1997. This is an interview with Ken Yates being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and I am Charles Stuart Kennedy. Ken, could you tell me when and where you were born and something about your family?*

YATES: I was born in New London, Connecticut on the 10<sup>th</sup> of November, 1940. I began with the Second World War. My father was a salesman. He had the eastern part of Connecticut for Sunshine Biscuits and sold cookies. At the time I was born, my mother was not working, but when I got a little older, she entered the workforce and we became a two-income family. I grew up in Mystic, Connecticut, which is a small seaport town.

*Q: Whaling town.*

YATES: Yes. The whaling museum was right across the street from where I grew up. I used to go over the railing and wander around the museum. It was almost abandoned and wasn't much then. They had the *Charles Morgan*, an old whaling ship. As a child, my father played on the *Charles Morgan* when it was a derelict wreck in New Bedford harbor, so we had a family tie to that boat. The Mystic Marine Museum consisted of a reconstructed shipyard with supporting buildings, including a rope-walk, a ship's chandlery, a sail loft, church, apothecary, school, and a variety of other period buildings including homes. Each building had been disassembled at its original site, the pieces numbered and recorded, and then reassembled in Mystic. For example, the old original New York Yacht Club Building was brought to Mystic.

Today, the educational facilities have been expanded but the basic museum was there at the time. Now it costs a high price for a ticket, but then nobody cared if the locals went in and out. I wandered around for many hours. I suspect my interest in Asia became firmly rooted at this time. The collection included a lot of Chinese artifacts, because the whaling ships left the east coast and sailed around the Horn and up into the Pacific where they spent years in the whaling grounds there. China was a coaling station and a place for water and fresh vegetables, so I learned a little bit about history and got a little sense of the rest of the world by jumping over the fence. For example, the ships had rocks in the bottom of the hulls for ballast, but when in Canton (Guangzhou) or similar Chinese ports, they took the rocks out and substituted blue and white pottery which was cheap in China but brought a good price back in New England. A lot of the blue and white Chinese ware that shows up in antique shops in the area probably made its trip to America as replacement ballast.

*Q: What were you getting about the role of USIA at that time in 1967? What was the spirit and role and goal of USIA then?*

YATES: I mentioned that as a GI in Japan, I had taught English in Sapporo at the American Cultural Center three times a week. One of the things that I learned from that experience was that the Japanese, at least, didn't have much of an idea of what Americans were like but had an intense desire to know more. Save for the American Center, there was really no place where they could easily come to a clear understanding.

In Hokkaido, there is a famous story of a man named William Clark, which I guess influenced me as well. William Clark was a government employee with the Department of Agriculture back in the 1800s who was assigned to a team to go to Japan to give advice to the Japanese. Characteristically, the Japanese were not interested in such unsolicited advice, so when he got to Tokyo, they had no interest in him and sent him away to Hokkaido, Japan's frontier. He went to Sapporo and essentially had nothing to do. Dissatisfied with wasting his time in a job that went nowhere, Clark set about making a personal contribution.

What he did was to found a university on the basis of what a New England college looked like. Today, the campus of the University of Hokkaido looks like a New England town, because the buildings, the layout, and the concept of the university owe everything to William Clark. He also taught English while he was there. He had a class of 18 students, as I understand it, that he taught for only about a year.

His class was all males, of course, and they were young and ambitious. He was in Japan for only about 18 months, but he taught English, founded the University of Hokkaido and had an influence on the thinking that went into laying out the city. It was, on its own merits, a remarkable record of accomplishment. Thus, Sapporo was one of the few provincial capitals of Japan that was laid out in a regular way except what was destroyed in the war and rebuilt later. His short stay at an end, he left Sapporo and hiked back south to get a boat to the main island of Honshu and then back to Massachusetts. He left his students in a little valley called Hiroshima Dani, where today there is a little statue of him. His parting words to his students was "Boys be ambitious." That has come down in Hokkaido folklore to this time.

A few of them really were ambitious, or at least took his advice to heart. Of the 18 students to whom he taught English, four became very senior officials in the Japanese government, senior advisors called ginro. According to the folk tales, they were among the few who strongly advised against the Japanese adventure in China. They vehemently opposed Japanese actions in the Pacific against the Americans. Had there been one, two, or three more William Clarks in Japan at that time and had there been more ginro that had strongly urged against the Japanese aggressiveness of the time, there might have been no incursions into Korea, Manchuria, or China or at least involvement of a significantly less aggressive nature, and we may not have fought the Second World War in the Pacific.

The story encouraged a conviction that if you had enough people to talk about America, not selling an image but accurately telling people about America, much difficulty might have been avoided. If the Japanese in the 1930s and 1940s had understood about this country, they probably would not have fought against us, probably would not have attacked Pearl Harbor, nor would they have directly drawn us into the war. What that would have done to history I can't say, but it

certainly would have saved a lot of lives. That convinced me, at least, that there was something valuable in maintaining contact with other people, even on a casual basis, because a person who understands another person and his culture probably won't shoot at him at some point later.

*Q: I would like to do each chunk at a time. How did you find studying Korean? You say you have trouble studying languages.*

YATES: I was one of the older people in the class, having been to college for one year, three years in the army and six years getting a four-year degree at Penn and then going into graduate school after that. So I was getting on. I was in my late '20s, but others in my class were younger. Language isn't easy at any age, but it sure does get an awful lot more difficult as you progress down life's path. Japanese was basically easy for me since I had lived in Japan and had studied it at Penn. I got my 2,2 and got out of it. But when I switched to Korean, it was back to zero again. Japanese helped a little bit, but even then, Koreans didn't use Chinese characters very much. I had enjoyed Chinese characters a lot. While I was in Chitose with the Army and not otherwise teaching English in Sapporo, on my other off-duty-hours, I took some classes in "sosho," (grass) writing of Japanese characters in a special style. I learned a lot about Japanese discipline, esthetics, and culture in those classes.

Unfortunately, Korean at the time was taught in Roman character equivalents. I guess the theory was that thick-skulled Americans couldn't understand squiggly little writing or something equally indefensible.

*Q: Actually there are only 28 characters, so it is not that big...*

YATES: It is a syllabary, not an alphabet actually. It is grouped in these clusters of syllables, so you get syllables forming words instead of the single "kana" pronunciation in Japanese. It is more difficult. Phonetic values change, based on their relationship to the following syllable, making it more complicated to learn. At the time, Korean was, and still is I guess, considered the most difficult language for an English-speaking person to learn. The reason for that is, it has Chinese characters and a very complicated grammar. Someone once told me there were 2,000 separate verb forms for each verb. Whether that is true or not I don't know, but the multiplicity of verb forms is one aspect that makes the language more difficult.

For example, newspaper language is different from the spoken language, and within the spoken language, there are different levels. If you are my classmate, I speak to you one way. If you are one class ahead of me in school, I would have a slightly different twist to my verb endings. At home, you speak to your child one way; to your father, another way; your wife, a different way; and your brother, in a fourth way. There are different levels of language. That doesn't mean they are completely dissimilar, but there are enough differences so that you can make errors very quickly. English-speaking missionaries who spent their entire lives in Korea are famous as the butt of Korean jokes, because they would make errors that sounded all right to foreigners but to Koreans gave rise to a great deal of amusement. I don't know anyone who is not a native Korean who really speaks Korean. Perhaps that is true for most difficult languages. You have to limit your expectations when you begin such a study.

*Q: He was in the Japanese army wasn't he?*

YATES: Not quite, he was in the Manchurian army which was run by the Japanese. I know a fair amount about Park, because when I went back for an MA, I did my thesis on him. I fault our intelligence services for not devoting the time and energy to do a better job of looking at foreign leaders. It was always a source of frustration to me that our senior leadership did not have the benefit of careful biographic data on their counterparts. What I had seen was mostly the most cursory impressions, much like what you read in news accounts. More important is a better understanding of the elements of the training and experience that serve as the foundation for attitude and prejudice.

Park Chung Hee was a country boy, basically a teacher who was given a break by the Japanese. His later biographies are not very good. He was recruited into the Manchurian army. At that time, Manchukuo was a Japanese state in Manchuria. The basis of the state, as the Japanese promoted it, was a gathering of the five nations that comprised Manchuria. The problem for the Japanese was that in order to sustain the image of a real nation of five nations, they had to have input from all of the member groups, including Koreans. Park Chung Hee was picked as a Korean who could be trusted. He was very good at martial arts.

Evidently his martial arts teacher was Japanese, and saw something in Park that they wanted. He went up to the military academy operated by the Japanese in Harbin (the present day Changchun), graduated, and spent another two years in Zama at the Japanese academy where he had more classes. He then went back to Manchuria and became a lieutenant, fighting bandits in north China. When the Japanese lost the war, Park Chung Hee somehow got himself to Beijing and was then repatriated to Korea. He then went on the rocks for a while. Opposition folk claim that he turned into a drunk and a wastrel, but I doubt that, given his character. He was always fond of drink, even the otherwise lower class Makkoli, a sort of rice beer. His brother was active in the communist movement and Park Chung Hee was eventually arrested and was sentenced to death by court.

*Q: Would this have been under the Syngman Rhee government?*

YATES: Yes. He was sentenced to death for collusion with the enemy who were the communists of the time. His brother died fighting some place (*actually, he was executed*). Park Chung Hee had been known by a Japanese name during the period when the Japanese had forced all Koreans to adopt Japanese names in an effort to forcibly integrate Korea as a province of Japan. Chung Il Kwon, a general in the new Korean army that emerged after the Second World War, had also been in the Manchurian army. Like Park Chung Hee, he had served in the Manchukuo Army but had studied for four full years at the Japanese Military Academy in Tokyo. He pulled Park Chung Hee out of the fire by arranging an agreement for him to cooperate. He allegedly turned over the names of everybody who was among the conspirators on the communist side to save his neck. Again, that is a little bit out of character, but possible. He became part of the civilian intelligence apparatus of the Korean army and because of his Japanese military background, he later entered the Korean military academy when the academy got underway. He was in the fourth class.

*Q: What were you trying to do?*

YATES: The mission had a variety of aspects to it. The major one was to interpret American policy. For example, towards the end of my tour in Kwangju, Nixon visited China, and the Koreans were absolutely convinced that Nixon had sold them down the river. The Shanghai Communique was the only thing we could point to with clarity to convince them we had not. Videotape was a big part of my program and was key to the solution of this special issue.

We copied off-air from Japanese television a tape of the Nixon-Zhou En-lai toasts, the banquet, and the speeches and translated them doing a voice-over. I had a transportable video unit consisting of videotape recorder, a transformer, and a television set. One of my local employees, a driver, and I would show this video at every possible university, business club, school, civic organization, governmental organization, and anybody else I could find, if I could gather three or four in a room together to see that tape. This was to discredit the Korean government's version of what we were doing in China. That was direct support of policy and was one of those rare instances in USIA where we had a clear and unambiguous problem on policy that we could do something with. After about two weeks of very intensive programming around the country, we essentially discredited the Korean government's persistent claim that the U.S. government had ignored Korea and was making secret agreements with the Chinese about policy on the Korean peninsula.

*Q: One talks in Japanese terms about the Nixon "shokku". How did the opening of China go down when word came out that Henry Kissinger had gone to China?*

YATES: That was what I was talking about. That was a shock. The Koreans weren't involved and didn't know about it. It was as much a surprise to them as it was to everybody else. The shokku that occurred in Tokyo had reverberations in Seoul as well. But what we had to do was, quickly and without any kind of hesitation, put out information on exactly what had happened; that was effective. The repercussions of the disinformation from the Korean government did not last very long. I don't know what happened in Japan.

*Q: Yes, the outlook.*

YATES: Absolutely. Kwangju is traditionally the opposition capital of Korea. Korea historically was divided into three parts. Korguryo in the north, the hunters and gatherers, as it were, and Paekche and Silla which are the two southern principal kingdoms during the highpoint in Korean culture. The region containing the Cholla provinces was called the kingdom of Paekche. Paekche had close ties to Japan and was considered a cultural capital of the larger Korean society. It also had ties to China. If you look at a map, you will see how close the Shantung Peninsula of China is to the Korean coast.

The southern part of Korea was especially affected by China, for some reason. When I traveled in the southern Chinese city of Guangzhou, the language there sounded like Korean, but of course wasn't; it was Cantonese. The Paekche and Silla people did not get along. At the time I was in Kwangju, there was a sign above a tunnel that goes through the Chiri mountain range which divided Honam (Cholla Namdo and Cholla Pukdo), the old Paekche, from the

Kyongsando region (originally the Silla kingdom) that says, “This is where the language changes.”

The language, of course, is all Korean, and the nation is supposed to be the most homogenous country in the world, but there are a lot of differences there. There is the difference in attitude and language among other things. The Honam provinces of the southwest provinces traditionally have felt discriminated against. They spoke a dialect which was not standard. The Kwangju revolt of 1918 was one of the first civil revolts against the Japanese. The Tonghak rebellion found its roots in Kwangju and the Silla area. The most prominent people of the opposition today are from the southern area, including Kim Dae Jung who is from Mokpo, the port city southwest of Kwangju.

While I was there, they built the first four lane limited access highway from Seoul to Pusan. It ran through Taegu, which is in the Kyongsando region. It came down through areas outside of the Honam region. Therefore, much of the intense industrial development of the time occurred on the east coast of Korea because of this new highway. This was much to the chagrin of the people in the Honam region who felt they were being ignored. They finally put through a double lane “limited access” highway down to Kwangju and then over to Pusan. When I first arrived, all roads outside of Kwangju and a couple of the other larger cities of the region were gravel, unimproved gravel. I spent lots of time on the road between Chonju, the capital of Cholla Pukdo, and Kwangju, where I lived.

*Q: I would think so, because I recall one of the young women in my file room came to me and wanted some advice. Her brother was going to go abroad to school, he was an engineer, and she wanted to know which ones he should apply to for scholarships. One school was called MIT and the other was Cal Tech. I said that they were the two top schools in the United States, probably in the world, so either one would be fine. I was impressed, because I had run consular sections in other parts of the world where the students were often going to what I would call rinky-dink colleges which were designed really to take money from foreigners. But these were first rate. But it was in the sciences.*

YATES: The Korean system of education, as with Asian educational systems which use rote memorization in general, is more attuned to the kind of mathematical proofs and memorization that is necessary in order to be successful in the sciences. Many don't know English, but your skills are as good in Korean as in English when mathematics is concerned. You don't need a lot of language. There is a special international argot, anyway, to the discipline that you probably will pick up in your country. But when you get into reading historical treatises, expressing opinion, doing original research on a topic, those methods were not common in Korea. The Korean system was not to take a Korean student and show him or her how to learn. It was to teach the student what he or she should know, and when they became professors, they would take that knowledge and expand it more. They would have to learn the fundamentals from their predecessors first.

Of course, the Asian tradition of instruction also had good points that are too often overlooked in the West. For example, when I was in Kwangju, I had a good friend, Huh Baek Nyun, whose pen name was Yi Jae. He was an artist, a living national treasure of Korea. He produced magnificent

work based on classical Chinese Southern Sung Dynasty principles of art. I would chat with him occasionally in his studio and once in a while, would take a new book on American art. He had long fingernails and would turn the pages very slowly. He would stop and look longer at a particular example, and you could tell he felt that particular picture was good, and usually it was. He had a very fine eye.

He was running an art school and had two sons. The younger son was a doctor and the older was with him to be trained by his father. I asked him how his students were? “Oh,” he said, “they are not very good.” “Why not, no talent?” “They are too impatient,” he offered. “Young people don’t understand. They think that you can take a brush and make art. They are wrong. It takes seven years to learn how to make a straight line with the brush. Seven years how to make a dot. After you have learned those two crafts, then you can learn how to make clouds that flow through the mountains, and that is another seven years. So after you know how to make a straight line, and after you know how to make a dot, and after you know how to make the clouds that run through the mountains, then you can begin to create art.”

*Q: What I got some years later was that Park Chung Hee had made a very wise decision, sort of social engineering, in that he was not going to make the mistake so many dictators do and that is milk the farm of everything in order to make bread or rice cheap in the capital city. He was going to make sure that the farmers were receiving basically fair pay for what they were producing. Was this true?*

YATES: I think that is a fair statement. Park Chung Hee was a product of a rural environment. His father was a middle level bureaucrat, but the former President was a small town boy who probably felt some of the traditional resentment of a villager against those sophisticated from the city. However, he was a great reader and that was one of his principal strengths. He read about other strong, authoritative leaders. Kemal Ataturk of Turkey was one of his idols, a strong leader. Nasser was also someone he had a favorable opinion of. There was also talk about de Gaulle as being among his pantheon, but that was less clear. I think it was unquestionable that he had a great deal of respect for Kemal Ataturk. Those are people who had agrarian reforms in their basic programs.

Park Chung Hee spent a lot of time on farm issues. He saw himself as a farm boy, and I think he understood, as Mao Zedong did in China, that the fundamental part of the country is agrarian. Of course, possibly owing to that prejudice, the industrial worker didn’t do too well. Korean labor was generally underpaid for a long time and essentially was the way Korea made its economic leaps forward. There were vertically organized monopolies in Korea, the Chaebol, that dominated the country for a long time.

The Koreans are basically tough people. They have had a difficult history, having been walked on by the Chinese and Japanese and had to tough it out all along. Americans appeared on the scene after the defeat of the Japanese and became a presence in their society but were not going to be there permanently. Koreans expect the departure of the Americans will come at some point, although they don’t want it right now. President Carter was going to pull us out, but the Koreans got upset about that.

*Q: I was there at the time and it was a difficult time—Yankee, don't go home just now!*

YATES: An unusual message. The Koreans are not only tough but reluctantly understand to varying degrees that a lot of their chestnuts were pulled out of the fire because of the American willingness to fight against the communist North. Younger Koreans forget that, they don't learn much of their own history, particularly history starting with the Japanese occupation. Psychologically they want to forget that period of subjugation. It was an embarrassment and a terrible time that they would like to see go away. Iceland has the same feeling about the Danes and won't even talk about them because they were in control and that was an embarrassing period in their history. So the Koreans are reluctant to think much about the Japanese occupation period.

They don't like the Japanese for the suffering they received at the hands of their overlords for almost half a century and will continue to dislike the Japanese for the foreseeable future. In this, they are somewhat like the Chinese. The Japanese haven't quite got a clear understanding that such a feeling persists to the extent that it does, but none the less, that is the way Koreans feel. So they are missing an important part of their recent history, a basic part of their formative years as a modern nation.

Most Koreans blame the U.S. for the division of the peninsula. We ran into this all the time. Many think that the U.S. has a responsibility to put it back together again. That question is open to argument based on the post-WWII negotiations that began in Yalta, but I feel that is basically a false reading of history. The naked truth would reveal that nobody thought about it. Perhaps, that is an even worse insult: that nobody bothered to give serious consideration to Korea; it was an after-thought.

With the Japanese surrender, the American military was very reluctant to get involved in Korea. General Hodge was in the Philippines at the time and was deeply reluctant to accept the direct order to go to Korea. Americans knew little about Korea, and apart from a few missionaries, we had almost no expertise in the language or culture. In our post-war innocence, we had much to learn about the complexities of the responsibilities we inherited with the victory in the Pacific. Hodge rounded up as many experts, mostly missionaries, as he could find, and flew to Kimpo to receive the surrender from the Japanese who were fearful of having to surrender to their long-time rivals, the Russians. The story of that decision, to get to Seoul in response to pleas from the defeated Japanese, is one of the interesting side lights of the end of the war. Evidently the basic decision was made in the White House, with a few relatively junior policy makers and military (Dean Rusk, Marshall Green...) carrying the day.

I don't know whether that was a hurried and ill-considered decision or not, but had we demurred, it is likely that all of Korea would be communist today. Mistake or fortune, we were ignorant of Korea and its problems and really did not want to get involved. There was an effort in 1948 to unify the country with a UN vote, but the North pulled out of it. I don't think too many tears were shed in the South when the North pulled out. Korea is not a unified country, despite all the propaganda which says it is the most homogenous people in the world. They have very deep, historic antagonisms. The Paekche/Silla thing is only part of it. The Northerners have always been Northerners.

The split is something similar to divisions in the U.S. between the Yankees and the Dixiecrats. There is a split there, and it is going to take a couple hundred years for things to cool off. The Korean War didn't help it any. If we had fought the Civil War four or five years ago, maybe we would be able to understand the emotional scars more clearly today. I do not believe that the Koreans themselves fully understand these emotions, but they have this emotional thing in their stomach—yes, we must be united, we are all one nation, but not today. During most of the divided period, it was forbidden to teach about or study the North. Collections of materials about the North were kept under lock and key, and anyone attempting to learn about the North was subject to severe penalties under the National Security Law.

*Q: What was the impression of who did what to whom?*

YATES: The Afghan politics of the time were complicated. The previous king was living in Italy. A prince of the royal family, Mohammed Daud, was serving as President at the time of the coup and was summarily executed. There were a lot of people who were similarly killed at the time of the coup, including people I knew and had worked with. For example, Daud's son, who was a really quiet and shy man with a beautiful wife and two young children, was a television producer. I had worked with him on programming cultural events, such as "Clark Terry and His Jolly Giants," live on Afghan Television. As a producer, Daud's son had worked with us several times on cultural programs. These programs had even included a live performance of a U.S. Air Force band, the first such appearance of an American military band in Afghanistan. He had no interest in politics. If the subject of politics came up, he always politely and quietly demurred. His only concern was his work at Afghan TV and his family. Later, I heard that he was executed, along with his wife and two kids. They wiped out the family. The Foreign Minister under Daud, Waheed Abdullah, with whom I had many visits to bring in guests or reporters, was executed in his office. A lot of people whom I knew from my work were either killed or driven out during that time. Some went off into the hills and crossed over the border into Pakistan.

The source of the revolution was partly ideological but more factional than anything else. The Parchamists and Halquis were the two big major communist factions involved in fighting the government. They feared that the government was becoming more and more Westernized, and each had a particular vision of the fate of the country and, of course, of the leadership which was to assume control. The revolution was not founded on religious differences, even though the communists, for the most part, were atheist, and the Muslims were essentially on the previous government's side. For a long time, the communists had complained about the privileged elite and the clear influence the royal family still had in the affairs of state.

How much direct influence the Soviets had on the event of the revolution is not clear, although their agents thoroughly permeated every part of the military, academic, and administrative sectors of society. Afghanistan was among the poorest nations in the world, according to UN figures on per capita income, and strong willed members of the communists placed blame for continued poverty on those in charge.

Supposedly, the Parchamists had strong ties with Beijing. In fact, I don't think anyone ever proved conclusively that there was this kind of ideological tie. The Chinese were certainly more

friendly with one faction than with the other. The Halquis, either by conviction or default, were considered more on the Soviet side. But it wasn't very clear, at least to me. To me, both sides were of the same coin.

After the Saur Revolution, questions began to emerge about which faction would take control. An effort toward a coalition government faltered and then fell apart, as the several factions continued to squabble with each other. This constant internal strife continued on during the later Soviet invasion and is evident today, although with different players, even though the *Mujahedeen* ultimately defeated the militarily stronger Soviet forces. Today the Taliban are at odds with their former allies, as the unifying effect of a common front against the hated Soviets was lost with victory. Afghanistan has always been infected with factional fighting. The Afghans do things differently from other nation states. They use the Koran as basis for conducting and resolving their conflicts. That meant they had strict rules to their fighting.

There is a little town that you can visit as you pass through from Kabul to Peshawar in Pakistan. I drove back and forth to Peshawar several times through the Khyber Gorge, a spectacular natural wonder that is unparalleled for rough scenery. In contrast, the touted Khyber Pass is little more than a bunch of rolling hills that had the good fortune to become the outermost limit of the British empire and thereby was romanticized by generations of British writers. In three frustrating wars, the British tried to subdue the Afghans and thereby, prevent Russian influence on the subcontinent. Each time they were soundly defeated. That defeat was perhaps as much from the difficulty of the terrain as from the fighting effectiveness of the Afghans, but the result was the same, the humiliation of the British Army.

You have to go north through the Khyber Pass to reach the narrow roads and multiple switchbacks that add a touch of adventure to the spectacular views. It is as though one could drive up and down the mule trails in the Grand Canyon. Particularly in the early or late hours of daylight, the canyons and rills were particularly beautiful, even if the winding switchbacks were dangerous from erratic busses and overloaded trucks plying back and forth to the border and from falling rocks and an occasional herd of goats.

A short distance outside of the Pakistani city of Peshawar to the south of the Khyber Pass, there was a gate which was closed at dusk. It was a gate with no fence flanking either side of it, and the road ran directly through the gate. The act of locking the gate at sunset was symbolic rather than practical, as the Pakistanis did not control the area next to the border, and it was a no-man's land after dark. A small village at its midpoint was a bandit village called Landi Kotl. It was said you could buy anything there that you wanted. You want a DC10 tire? Next Tuesday they would have it. You want the latest refrigerator? They would bring one in. Everything was smuggled.

Young Ne and I visited the town on one of our trips, escaping Kabul for the cultural change from southwestern Asia in Afghanistan to the subcontinental life of Pakistan. In Landi Kotl, people walked around the streets with bandoleers similar to those you can see in the old western movies. All they needed were sombreros, and they would fit right into the archetypal horse opera. They bristled with guns of all sizes and shapes. Rumor held that if you could find a picture of a gun in a magazine, a gunsmith in Peshawar could fashion a reasonable likeness that performed something like the original. It was quite a place. The Wild West in the middle of Asia.

Everybody was armed in Afghanistan, and when the different factions would do battle, they would always go to the mountains. It was against the rules of Afghan warfare to fight in the villages or involve women or the children or the elderly. The rules went so far as to stipulate that you never even involved cattle. You never killed somebody's cow. You never fought in a person's home. So if you were invited to an Afghan's home and he hated your guts because you had killed his brother, he would be a wonderful host. As soon as you left his gate, watch out, because he probably will put a knife between your ribs. But as long as you were in his home, you were a guest. They have very strict rules.

When the fight that swirled about the Saur Revolution spread outside the capital, there was an incident in a mosque in a village south of Kabul. In the aftermath of the struggle, into the village mosque strode a young, bright-eyed communist cadre who pronounced, "All you old men get out of the mosque. This is going to be a museum. We are doing away with religion." The old men attending the service got themselves up, grabbed him, cut his head off, and threw the body along with its severed head into the river. Those in the revolutionary command in Kabul evidently decided that they had to teach this village a lesson to intimidate others who might have entertained similar measures to inflict on the new leadership.

Although I never had the full story, the commonly accepted version that was passed from person to person was that the new revolutionary government in a fit of anger dispatched jets to strafe the village to teach them a proper lesson. Afghans at the time refused to believe that an Afghan pilot was at the controls and guessed that it probably was a Russian pilot, for only a kaffir (non-believer) could commit such a heinous act. Once the carnage became known, it was as if an electric shock passed through the country. The purposeful killing of villagers, women, children, elderly, and cattle was not done by even the fiercest Afghan warrior. It was completely outside the code. It was not Afghan. It matters little now just who sat at the controls of the offending warplane, for the die had been cast, and the course of the eventual fight against the new leadership and their atheistic supporters irrevocably determined.

I had a young man on the staff who we knew was a communist. He was a very talented graphic artist and a generally pleasant person who appeared to be eager to learn and produce quality work for us. On that basis, I hired him. I didn't care what his politics were as long as he produced the quality of graphics we wanted. He would go to his political meetings and probably reported what he saw and heard at work, but we didn't mind, since the messages we were sending were intended as much for his coterie as they were for those who generally sympathized with the West. On one of the mornings following the revolution, we had managed to get the office back to semblance of order and one of my staff came to me and reported that the young man was in one of the back rooms crying and feared to be close to violence. None of the Afghan staff could get him to quiet down.

The reason was that, as a bright young college graduate and a nationalist to the extent that an Afghan can be a nationalist, he had taken pride in the communist revolution which he saw as taking back control of the country from the royalist elite. That morning, he had been coming to work when he saw on the street what he recognized as a Russian soldier in an Afghan army uniform. He became distraught with the realization that this was not what they had fought for.

Their idealistic struggle had not been to turn it all over to the Russians. This was a revolution upside down. He and others in his group had put their lives on the line for those Russians! It destroyed the very fiber of his convictions and violated his sense of justice as an Afghan. Through his tears he wailed, "This is not what we fought the revolution for!"

Afterward in my office, I asked the Chief of my print shop what he thought was going to happen if the things the young graphic artist saw and the stories of the jet strafing a village turned out to be true. He wordlessly shrugged his shoulders and just stood there with his head cocked to one side, looking pained. I pressed, "What are you going to do if the Russians stay; how are you going to handle the Soviet pressure?" The Print Shop Chief who was also a head-man in a small village in the outskirts of Kabul looked up and quietly drew his finger across his throat in a silent threat to the Soviets who had violated his religion, his tradition, and his people. He turned, and without further explanation quietly left my office. For me, it was an encapsulated prediction of what would take years of fighting and bloodletting on both sides to accomplish. But that is essentially what happened.

The foreshadowing of the tragic Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the slow bleeding of the Soviet forces in an unwinnable war, and the ultimate cutting off of the head of the "Kaffir" Russian troops were summarized in the silently shrugged shoulders and the finger across the throat. To my Print Shop Chief, it was obvious. The Afghans have a creed: if you are wronged, you must redress the injury, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. If you were wronged by any member of another family or clan, the wrong must be avenged by a member of the injured clan or family. The injury might be to someone you had never laid eyes on, a distant cousin, but someone of the same blood had a debt of honor to repay the wrong. When the Russians strafed that village, everybody who had relatives who were killed, maimed, or injured was committed, regardless of their politics, to redress the act. The effort to avenge the sin inflicted on Afghanistan had to continue as long as one Afghan had the breath to continue the fight, and fight they did to the everlasting regret of their Soviet tormentors.

*Q: Were the Russians involved?*

YATES: While the incidents I recounted involving members of the Soviet military were beginning to occur, the Soviet role at the time was on the sidelines, supplying arms and giving moral support to their supporting faction. The Chinese were also in the role of supporting the revolution, but either distance from the action or a general wariness evidently kept them from a more direct role.

*Q: I was just across the pond in Korea about this time, and we were just experimenting with a WANG computer there. It was pretty primitive.*

YATES: That time was very interesting. One of the other things I had to do, because of my computer connection, was oversight responsibility for our mail system, addressing, which in USIA is called "DRS," the Distribution Record System. I had control of that in Tokyo. One of the problems with our DRS was addressing. In Tokyo, we had to use Chinese characters (Kanji) that are commonly used in Japanese addresses, particularly for names. People would use the phonetic syllabary, "kana" in combination with Kanji for everyday Japanese text, but because of

the large number of homonyms in the Japanese language, the kana system is used primarily for inflections on verbs and simple connectives. For such things as names and addresses, you need Kanji, which are based on ideograms, and therefore carries a much more complex meaning than the kana. At that time, Kanji-based language was beyond the relatively simple machinery of the Wang VS-100, at least in addressing programs, and therefore made it necessary to contract our address system out. We had no Kanji printing capability in the embassy itself. I discovered, though, that computers were starting to come into their own, and there were some programs available back in the U.S. that might be able to handle our printing needs from there.

In particular, I found a connection to a GE node in Beltsville, Maryland that was being operated by the Japanese advertising firm, Dentsu, and they had a multiplexed connection to Tokyo working 24 hours a day. What we would have been able to do was to dial up a local number in Tokyo and get access to the GE computer in Maryland. This would have been much like the Internet operates today. In turn, they would connect us with our USIA headquarters here in Washington, and we would be able to exchange data plus use the large variety of programs that were online in Beltsville. They had a Kanji printing program that Dentsu was already using.

The basis of my concept was to do the processing in Beltsville and then, download a print file to us in Tokyo where our address labels would be produced. The advantage of this was economic, since the Japanese contractor was rather expensive and through this process we would have full control in the embassy in Tokyo. International computer connections were a relatively new phenomena, and the Dentsu network was not being used that much. The whole process promised to be a lot cheaper than the contracted services then in use, and we would have the added benefit of all of the software that was otherwise not available to us in Tokyo. As it turned out, we ran into all kinds of problems.

This seems silly now, in light of the vast amount of personal data that is available on the Internet, but at the time, we were worried about transborder flow of information on individuals. We had a name list that, at the time, included what we were sending them, when those materials were sent, plus a record of when a given person attended a program with us. This enabled us to maintain contact with our audience and have a better grasp about our effectiveness. The target audience in Japan, at the time, was broken down into different pieces. At the center, was a small group of about 300 whom we spent a lot of time working with. These were key people in the media, economic institutions, and the government that we wanted to talk with about U.S. policy or simply to mail background material to them.

Beyond that, we had a much larger group of individuals that we would invite to programs and send materials to but would not devote much personalized time to. These included junior professors, younger reporters, people who were coming up but had not yet arrived. They were not members of our "core audience" but were important to us, nonetheless, and certainly were a part of the audience we had to maintain contact with. So we included them on name and address lists. Altogether, we had about 15,000 in the data base for those sorts of individuals throughout Japan.

The operation of the DRS systems always was a controversial topic. Our local staff members helped but were sometimes suspicious, believing that we probably were feeding data collected

about individuals back to Washington where it would be used in intelligence or other conspiratorial needs. Of course, nothing of the sort was done, but the more efficient the system and the more productive it was for guidance, the higher the level of local suspicion and anxiety. Some felt uncomfortable with the possibility that personal data on Japanese was possibly being passed outside the country. For most, it was generally all right to keep such information in Tokyo where our local employees had their hands on most of the processes. Efficiencies, such as those offered by the Dentsu arrangement, were understood, but the discomfort was palpable. Technically, it was feasible, and essentially, we had it all set up. All we had to do was sign the contracts to implement a system which, in a limited fashion, would have looked like the Internet does today. Of course, few show much concern about trans-national flows of information today, but at that time, it was a serious problem.

*Q: I am interviewing Steve Solarz now, mainly on Africa. His way of operating was to go to a place, have people lined up for him, and then he would also talk to other people. He would vacuum up everything. During the period I am interviewing him for now, he was chairman of the subcommittee on Africa; then he went to the subcommittee on the Far East. But he could talk with tremendous knowledge, because he talked to everybody and did the things you are saying. So he was able to draw on real data and real contact. Sometimes he could be a pain in the ass, because he wanted to be everywhere, but I think he was also respected, because he did what you are saying.*

YATES: Although I spent a lot of time in the Foreign Service, I had only the slightest contact with American Congressmen. Solarz, with his evident hunger for straight data, was an exception. Of course, the reason was that I had the data he was interested in. I did have respect for Solarz, although there were a number of CODELs that I had no respect for.

One such instance occurred while I was in Afghanistan. Lester Wolf from New York came to Kabul. An interesting man. My recollection is that he was only there about six hours. He was interested in drugs, illicit narcotics. The embassy had made several discoveries in the area of interdicting narcotics and had come to an arrangement with the Afghan government on the means to handle such investigations. They held announcement of the new arrangements off, to wait for his arrival so that he could attend a show and tell about the progress that was being made. At the news conference, he said, "I came to Afghanistan, and despite all these bureaucrats, I broke the log-jam in the narcotics problems here in Afghanistan." Such a grab for the glory that was based on the hard work of others did not endear him to the hearts of the people who had done so much to make it possible for him to be a part of the final success while he was in town.

That kind of offhand treatment of Foreign Service and other officials working abroad is something that happened very, very often. I saw congressmen and even their staffers coming through, using embassy resources and then spitting on the people who had done so much to help them and made sure their visit was successful. Following an overseas visit where every effort was made to make their visit productive and comfortable, members of the Congress would turn around and criticize imagined standards of living abroad or such things as the "booze budget," the funding needed to provide receptions and food to visitors on such occasions as the Fourth of July. They simply were feeding stereotypes at home to make it appear that they were champions of stringent budgetary guidelines, but the cost of one CODEL far exceeded representational

events where real governmental business was transacted to the benefit of American business or the taxpayer.

Of course, there were people in the government who were not like that. In the Carter administration, there was Jodie Powell, whom I had some association with while he was at the G-7 in Tokyo. Normally, when a presidential visit would occur, we would have to supply materials, and everybody in the embassy would take a different part of responsibility. In USIS, one of our responsibilities was to prepare Wireless File materials, a news service we provided to the mission. Included in the Wireless File were summaries of public opinion in the host country and of world events in other areas. The basic service was to keep the presidential party abreast of what was going on and what the local press was saying about the visit. Naturally, USIS would also handle incoming foreign press and briefings and interviews.

Powell was particularly good, because he was accessible. Each day, I would put together the local media reaction plus wireless file materials and get it over to his office. He worked in the basement of the Okura Hotel, which was a hotel next to the U.S. Embassy, so it was easy for us to access. He had a windowless office in the basement, about 7 feet by 8 feet. A very small office, it had just enough room for a desk and a chair. He was always in this office reading. The rest of his people often were pushy and insufferable. But he was smart, capable, knew what he was talking about, didn't waste time, and was always respectful of people who were trying to help him. That was very important for those of us who were grinding out the information.

On the other hand, some of the advance people, in particular, were not very smart. Political advance teams that come out, even for presidential visits, are not always the best and brightest. They were often campaign workers who were given an overseas trip as a reward for their campaign work. I recall one member of the advance team for the Carter visit to Japan that was supposed to be at the airport at a certain time; embassy officials couldn't find him. They were supposed to go to the airport, bring him in, brief him, and get him set up for his work. He had disappeared in Tokyo. After an exasperated search, they finally discovered him in Tokyo.

The story was he had gotten to Narita, gotten off the airplane with his backpack, and went into the terminal to find transportation into the city. Not knowing that he would be met, and evidently not appearing to be of presidential advance team caliber to those who were tasked with meeting him, he checked the cost of a taxi to Tokyo, which was astronomical, and the fare for the airport bus, which was evidently too much as well. So he hitchhiked along the expressway back into Tokyo. He put out his thumb out and got a ride. The great amount of effort spent to track him down because of his ignorance of how things are done created much frustration, a quick spreading story, and did little to encourage respect for the incoming presidential advance team.

There was another incident with the Carter advance team at the time of that visit. As usual with such trips, the President had one schedule and Rosalyn Carter had another. One of the things she was going to do was visit Kyoto and one of the gardens there; I believe it was Ryoanji. The young lady responsible for that part of the trip traveled to Kyoto to set up the visit. She took one look at the stone garden and said this would not do. She wanted carpeting put on the rocks, so that when Rosalyn came and walked out into the garden, she wouldn't slip on the rocks. It took a lot of tall talking to get the advance team to understand that this would not be something that

would be possible, because of Japanese sensitivity to the aesthetics of the location. The advance team fought long and hard on that principal, but finally relented when it became evident that the Japanese and the embassy, would not budge.

During the visit, Carter was to make a major speech on economics. Somebody in the bowels of the White House wrote the speech. I don't know who it was, but he or she knew nothing about Japan, its culture or its sensitivities. Luckily, we got an advance copy, took one look, and knew it wouldn't fly. In the last hours before the speech was given, we had to literally rip the whole thing apart and rewrite from sentence one, because it was so crudely written. One wonders how the government manages to keep things connected at home. On the road, it is evident that things fall apart quickly.

When we have had important officials abroad, more than a few times the saving grace has been some poor guy sitting out in the brush who knew the situation and could say, "No, no, don't do this. You are going to screw it up." As we downsize and shut facilities, as we remove people, there are fewer and fewer experienced people to do this, and the logic would be that we are going to make more and more mistakes, as, I guess we did, on the recent trip to China.

*Q: You were there from 1982 until when?*

YATES: Until 1985: three years. Iceland is technically in Europe but is positioned about half way across the North Atlantic—a very critical place and why public relations are so important there. During the Cold War, much of the Soviet strength was in the Kola Peninsula which sticks up north of Europe. The only outlets from the peninsula without crossing other national boundaries are either by air or by sea, right past Iceland. That meant if we wanted to keep track of Soviet surface, air, and sub-surface activity in the whole Atlantic region, Iceland was the right place to do it. The U.S. military felt that it probably was the single most important military outpost outside the continental US, except, of course, for Hawaii. It was the base they valued the most outside the United States, because it controlled the whole access to the North Atlantic. The Soviets could come out via the Mediterranean, of course, but it was harder because they had to go past all those countries and get through the Straits of Bosphorus and Gibraltar.

A special problem for them was their very large nuclear fleet. Virtually all the Atlantic Soviet nuclear submarine force was based on the Kola Peninsula. It was from there that they could threaten the entire eastern seaboard of the US. When their air flights would go to Cuba, for example, the bombers flying on missions for armament supply or communications, they had to fly right by Iceland because they couldn't overfly Norway or other parts of northern Europe. They had to fly over international waters which meant past Iceland. When they came around the top of the Kola Peninsula, the Norwegians would pick them up on their radar and scramble interceptors to escort them, and then they would pass them off to the U.S. Navy in Keflavik, a base outside of Reykjavik. Keflavik would watch until they, in turn, passed them off to the Brits who would then carry on the monitoring of the flights until they were well along into the Atlantic. U.S. commands would pick them up again when they got closer to Cuba. By then, they were well identified, and we knew exactly who they were and where they were going.

The submarine activity was the most important part, because they were missile boats which would be stationed off the east coast of the United States and a direct threat to our society. They had to pass by Iceland through a rather narrow channel. They were watched by U.S. technical means.

Another aspect of the security situation was that Iceland was also one of our most important points of contact with the Soviets during the Cold War, because of the large Russian fishing fleet that was out there. They were always getting themselves into trouble. The North Atlantic is treacherous water and difficulties for fishing fleets are not uncommon. If you are bent on finding difficulty, that is probably where you will find it.

The U.S. Navy had based an air and sea rescue unit with the "Jolly Green Giant" helicopters at Keflavik. In 20-30 minutes, they could be over almost any spot in the region. They were always rescuing Icelandic fishermen who fell overboard or were injured on a boat. They would go out and pick them up and bring them back to a hospital. We lived in a house in a valley just south of Reykjavik, and just up the hill was the main hospital where the helicopters would take people. At all hours of the day and night, you could hear the chop, chop, chop of the incoming helicopters. Because it was a service that was used often, for Icelandic fishermen the base at Keflavik was a very important benefit. Others in the society found the Keflavik Search and Rescue Teams a great comfort as well, since many of them were related to fishermen. They had sons, husbands, whatever, out on the water and in constant danger out there because of freak storms. You couldn't survive very long out there in the cold North Atlantic water. You had to get out quickly. You can't do that by boat, you have to do it by air.

We had incidents where Russian submarines ran into trouble under water and had to surface. At those times, people may have been injured, or there was a fire on the boat, or something happened to cause casualties. The U.S. Navy would go out, pick them up, and bring them to the hospital. Usually, the Russian ambassador would then come over and present his appreciation to our ambassador for the act of assistance. It actually made for quite a happy relationship there between the Russians and the Americans in Iceland.

One of the more curious aspects of the security situation in Iceland was the position of the Chinese Embassy accredited to Reykjavik. The Chinese Embassy in Iceland was one of their largest, and the Chinese ambassador never failed to get any American he could find in a corner and lecture him or her on the importance of NATO. It was a strange phenomenon, to have one of the major communist powers in the world lecturing the head of the democratic bloc that they had to maintain strong defenses in the North Atlantic. But our presence in Keflavik and effectiveness in keeping an eye on possible Soviet adventures in the North Atlantic was important to the Chinese, because it bottled up a major portion of the Soviet forces that might otherwise be positioned against the Chinese.

So Iceland was a very important place in terms of security concerns. On the other hand, Icelanders are very independent. They are an island people, and fishing is a tough and often solitary occupation. In this country if you know New England well, you will understand the breed of independent and tough-minded people. If you are a foreigner in Iceland, you are not considered very desirable, you are an interloper who is often left alone unless there is specific

business to be dealt with. Therefore, the presence of about 5,000 Americans just outside of the capital was irksome to many. One said to me once that, in terms of proportions, it was as if a quarter million Germans or others were to be quartered just outside of Washington DC. How would we Americans feel in such a situation?

So they sometimes were uncomfortable with the American base at Keflavik. There was a strong communist movement in the country. Physically, Iceland is quite large. If you look at it on the map and locate the major population centers, it is very much like Afghanistan in some ways. There is a mountainous range in the middle and around the edge along the coast is where everybody lives, whereas in Afghanistan they would be arrayed along their landlocked borders. Reykjavik had a population of about 860,000 people when we were there; not a very big city, but it contained more than half of the country's population.

Of course, there were small towns and villages scattered along the coast line. These generally isolated communities were a hot bed of communist activity, particularly within the trade union movement. It is a little hard to measure Icelandic political involvement; because the country is so small, it has more of the characteristics of a village or small city than it does of a major power.

However, this small country is a member of NATO and the UN. Its voice is important in world affairs. But the Foreign Ministry is very, very small. All of the government staff could probably fit into a not-so-large auditorium. This intimacy can lead to surprising situations. When we first arrived, for example, we were in town for two or three days when one of my staff came to me and asked if I would mind going over and having a session with the president. I said that it was unusual for a Public Affairs Officer to be invited by the president of the country to have a chat, one on one. "Oh, yes," was the reply, "please bring your wife."

Vigdís Finnbogadóttir was president and probably still is. We replied, of course, we would go whenever she wanted us to appear. We went to her modest office and spent about 45 minutes in her office, chatting about where we had been, what we had done, what our plans were in Reykjavik, and about ourselves. She is a very engaging woman who was a French teacher, yet spoke very fluent English, like 99 percent of her countrymen, it seemed. Their intonation is strangely American, which is odd, since they have such a strong influence from the continent. Television, for example, is virtually all BBC.

The president's office shares a house with the prime minister's. You walk into the center corridor of the house, and on one side is the president's office and on the other, the prime minister's. Literally, you could walk along the outside of the building, tap on the window and wave to the president as she worked at her desk. More than likely, she would wave back and return to her duties without another thought. There was absolutely no security. By law, no guns are allowed in Iceland except a few hunting rifles which were very carefully controlled. So there was a very low physical threat, although we did have a bomb threat at my center.

That incident was rather strange and came at a time when we were preparing for the visit of then-Vice President Bush. Although he was stopping only as a courtesy and for a brief rest after an official visit to Moscow, the Icelanders were excited and our small staff were working flat out in support of the incoming mission. One afternoon just after the visit began, we were all working in

the third floor offices of the American Center building when someone discovered a suspicious package on the stair landing. No one had been seen coming in or leaving the building, and no one could account for the package. It was innocuous enough, but had a message scribbled on the top of it saying something like “for Israel.” Well, that was enough for me; we evacuated the building and called embassy security to deal with our problem.

That was not a welcome notice. Our American Center was across town from where the Vice President was housed, and even the press center at the hotel was several blocks away. The Vice President’s security did not want to deal with the situation, since there was evidently no direct threat to the Vice President and his party. Of course, we could not resume work and had to find a way to remove the offending package so that we could get back to work. I could not allow the staff, or anyone for that matter, to re-enter the building. We went back to the phones to insist someone take some action. Finally the Icelandic police were called in and embassy security showed up.

Although Iceland has no military, it does have a police force, and there is a special unit in the police that is formed to deal with emergencies. With their jaunty berets and special equipment, that force would, from time to time, practice emergency storming of our building as a part of their emergency training. They were always fun to watch during their drills, but most usually did so with a sense of humor since no one really believed that they would ever be called upon. Yet there we were standing outside of our Center building when the Icelandic version of a Swat Team arrived. All agreed that it probably was a fake, but no one could be sure. That meant that they could not just go in and pick it up, and there were none of the special devices available to go and fetch bombs that you see on TV. The fire department, which had also arrived to our growing scene of excitement, suggested that they take a hose and use it like a water cannon to blow it down the stairs. With visions in my head of the general destruction of our library from a high pressure water stream destroying much of what we had built in a plain but very attractive American library, we tried a bit of negotiation to find a less violent way.

Ultimately, we decided on a fishing technique. With a large fishhook and some strong line, we snagged the package and with the line running down two floors of stairs and out into the parking lot dragged the hooked package outside. Bouncing down the stairs shredded it fairly well without the feared explosion, and it was discovered to contain only animal feces. A bit of a smelly let down after all the excitement, but still a relief and the limp conclusion allowed us to get back to work in support of the visit.

Iceland is a fascinating place with a complicated set of political and national allegiances. If I remember correctly, three times in recent history, the Althing, their parliament, passed a resolution dis-inviting the U.S. from Keflavik. The American Naval Air Station there was noisy, and the local folk did not appreciate it any more when jets took off at 3 in the morning. So there were some base-community relations problems. The communists each year staged a march over the approximately 30 kilometers from Keflavik to downtown Reykjavik. They would drive or be bussed out to the base and then march back to Reykjavik with banners flying as a show of solidarity that the base should go. That was an annual, nettlesome problem for us. The communist movement, however, didn’t have much else to talk about. That was essentially their

issue around which to rally their supporters and demonstrate to others in Iceland their relevance to an issue that most people harbored some degree of frustration.

At the time, the country had very high inflation. It was so bad that they even despatched a team to Israel to see what could be done. Israel had a very successful program in controlling inflation, and it was thought that they might be able to provide answers for the Icelandic problem. To those of us who lived there, the problem was seemingly less complex than it was being made out. Iceland had a socialized system where there was free medical care, free education including university, and so on. The problem was that all those free items were very expensive. I would have debates over this with my staff. For example, I would come in at the start of business and one of my staff people wouldn't be there. I would ask where she was. "She isn't coming in today, she has gone to the hospital." That worried me. "The hospital, that's terrible," I fretted, "what's wrong?" "She has a headache," was the response. That puzzled me. "Why go to the hospital for a headache?" "Why not just take some aspirin and come to work?" With a wave of the hand my concerns were dismissed, "No, she will get something from the hospital."

Sure enough, a couple of hours later she came in. She had been to the hospital, and they gave her aspirin. I asked why she went to the hospital when all it took was a couple of aspirin to solve the not very complicated problem. Her response was, "because it is free." "But," I protested, "it is not free, it costs money." She took time away from the office, she had taken her own and the doctor's time, time consuming paperwork was done, and there always was the "free" aspirin. My point was that somebody, somewhere has to pay for it.

And pay they did. Taxes were outrageously high, as they are in most socialized countries. It was very difficult to get them to understand that it wasn't free and that they paid for it through their high taxes which they didn't like and went to great lengths to get around. So there was a constant state of tension between the people and the government on paying taxes, but the people liked the idea of free schools, free college, and free medical treatment.

*Q: During this time, did you work with people at the naval station? It seems to me if you have 5,000 troops there, it is quite a difficult mass to deal with in a small country.*

YATES: Yes, it was, and that is what caused most of the friction. Community-base relations was an important part of the bilateral political relationship. There was a U.S. Navy Base Public Affairs Officer who was charged with trying to strengthen ties, but my office held responsibility to monitor the situation for the embassy. One of the major problems for the base was the annual march the anti-base groups in Iceland would mount as a demonstration of their desire to have the base removed. They would march from Keflavik back to Reykjavik, about 30 kilometers.

At times, the political forces in Iceland would make a bold statement and vote to dis-invite the Americans at Keflavik. In each instance, the internationalists would jump into the fray and raise popular sentiment to keep the status quo. It was the effect of public affairs relations that would come to our rescue and protect an important defensive outpost and a multi-billion dollar U.S. taxpayer investment. It was a petition drive, not done by us but by Icelanders who felt strongly that we shouldn't go. We were not only important in the defense of Iceland, which has no army

or other defensive means, but we were also important to the people who live in Iceland for rescue and other things.

There is a famous story that illustrates this special relationship. One of the volcanoes off the southern coast of Iceland erupted, I believe in the '60s. At that time, the lava flow threatened a fishing village on an island in the Westmanjar group off the southern coast of Iceland. At that time, the U.S. Navy brought in tug boats and pumped salt water up on the lava, cooling it enough to slow it down and form a natural dam north of the village. There was some controversy whether this was the initiative of the U.S. Navy or whether an Icelander actually thought of the idea, but it was effective.

Anyway, the Westmanjar people, who were fishermen and exposed to the dangers of the North Atlantic, felt very strongly that the American Navy was a very positive thing to have around and any time the question of dis-invitation was raised, they lobbied strongly for us to stay. Consequently, when the Althing passed the resolution to ask the American Navy to leave, a petition drive would start around the country, and a lot of people would sign, putting pressure on the Althing to reverse itself.

In this environment, public affairs played a critical part in maintaining the base's presence. It wasn't a Marine base, like we have in Okinawa, it was a technical base, Naval Air. You did not have ships pulling in, with crews coming ashore on liberty. These were pretty settled people, with families resident at Keflavik. They were pilots and technical people. The educational level of the average U.S. military person at the base was much higher than would be expected at other military installations. Keflavik also benefitted from its status as a remote tour, an assignment that all careerists had to accept at one time or another. Yet, although it was technically remote, families could be brought along. At most other remote sites, you had to be apart from your family for a long period. That meant, despite the weather, Keflavik was a relatively attractive posting for career Navy people. This also meant that the relative stability of the base was higher than other locations.

It also meant that entertainment was more contained on the base than it was at other places with a lot of unattached young males who had off-duty time on their hands. For example, it meant that there was no street of bars immediately on the periphery of the base. Many of the personnel went home from work, had dinner with the family, and spent the evening at school functions or watching videos. Iceland was a relatively liberal country, with less rigid mores about co-habitation among those who were not married. While this attitude in other locations would lead to an explosion of U.S. military setting up house with local women, there was not much fraternization in Iceland. The Icelanders preferred it that way. The base at Keflavik was very much an island apart from the rest of the society. The capital of Reykjavik was only about 30 miles to the north, but the quirky weather and the stand-offish nature of the Icelanders conspired to keep most of the roving lovers on-base.

Still, there was friction. Unavoidably, there were younger people that had the normally active hormones of youth, and since the Icelander's view of sex was relaxed and Icelandic women tall, blonde, and blue-eyed, the attractions were still strong. Icelanders were famous for enjoying a

drink or two, and alcoholism was a national disease. Reputedly, the largest nightclub in Europe, the Broadway, was located to the southeast of Reykjavik, and partying was constant.

The noise of military jets and the usual activity of a major military installation was the source of other strains. There were fishing villages near the base, and the sudden scrambling of fighter jets in the middle of the night to intercept one or another Soviet appearance from the north got many from their beds. These negatives made base-community relations a bit prickly at times. Of course, there was the usual exercise of base tours and Fourth of July celebrations to which the locals were invited, but the strains persisted.

We had to devise programs that siphoned off as much of the resentment as possible. One of those devices was the NATO tours that we ran from the USIS Post in Reykjavik. Usually reserved for more senior members of the government who were part of the decision making process in the capital, the tours were a staple in our programming. The NATO tours consisted of an occasional program of sending Icelanders to other NATO members in the region to receive briefings on the reasons for NATO and how the base at Keflavik fit into the mix of defenses that protected Europe as well as the US.

We especially liked to send the Icelandic NATO tours to Norway. There, the Norwegians, the linguistic cousins of Icelanders and their closest cultural relatives in Europe, did not do any verbal sparring on the subject of defense and gave the rationale for the U.S. naval base at Keflavik in the bluntest terms. In the northern reaches of their country, the Norwegians had a border with the Soviet Union and had nasty memories of the Second World War to encourage them as strong proponents of NATO. There remained Norwegian animosity toward the Soviet Union, and it was not leavened by the even closer geography that Finland had, despite a similarly bad wartime experience. The Finns have a longer, more southern land border with the Soviet Union and face them directly across open water.

So we could always send a NATO tour to the Norwegians, just drop them off, and let the Norwegians take over and give the Icelanders the straight story with much more credibility than we were able to muster. This was especially good, since it showed them that the base was not “American imperialism at work,” as it was characterized by some of the local opponents, but something that others all over Europe had a common interest in.

One of the key elements at Keflavik, and one of the major noise-making offenders at the base were the P3s, the picket aircraft. They would go out and sit on station for a long time, looking for naval or air activity in the defense sector surrounding Iceland, such as Soviet bombers and the surface and subsurface fleets. These aircraft had to fly all hours. Although they were not too noisy, if they found something, they were the trip-wire alarms that would cause fighter aircraft to scramble for an interception.

This sudden blast in the middle of the night would wake everybody up in the villages surrounding the base. Therefore, there was a lot of animosity toward the base, not only because of the presence of the Americans and the beastly noise that stirred their sleep, but also, the main airport for Iceland was co-located on the base. If an Icelander wished to travel to Europe or the US, he or she would have to pass through U.S. base security posts to get to their own airport. For

the fiercely independent Icelanders, this was particularly galling. A new airport separate from base security was being built while I was serving there, but this expensive work went slowly and every Icelander who used the airport to travel in and out of the country was pointedly reminded of the American presence.

Naturally, the Americans also were uncomfortable with admitting the general population onto one of the most sensitive intelligence-gathering bases in the world. The situation was made even more stressful by the fact that members of the Russian, Chinese, and other eastern bloc nations would also have to use the airport/base to move in and out of their assigned country. There were numerous occasions when traveling to the base I could see Russian, East German, and even Cuban transport aircraft lined up on the tarmac only steps away from one of the most sophisticated U.S. military intelligence outposts in the world. For all, it was a most uncomfortable relationship.

It was therefore incumbent on the USIS operation in Iceland to take on the public relations difficulties at the base and come up with innovative ways to take some of the pressure off. Icelanders have a very traditional social structure. For example, the elders of the village had a lot to say about what people think in the town and how they consider outsiders. Their opinions were more important than most. So using this social characteristic as a stepping off point, we organized a special NATO tour for the elders around the base. This would involve the most significant opinion makers in directly experiencing why their discomfort was for an important cause. Although we could do little to relieve the occasional roar of aircraft, we could bring them to understand why that was necessary in the larger scheme of the defense of Iceland and her neighbors.

Unlike the usual NATO tours, we flew them on P-3s, one of the aircraft that were often flying over their heads. To get permission for civilians to fly in military aircraft, we had to go to great lengths to convince the legal minds at the Pentagon that it was necessary for the success of the program. We had to go all the way up the line as far as Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger for approval to carry civilians. We were in a period in which the civilian use of military aircraft was being severely criticized, so we had to get approval from the highest level. Yet it was considered important enough, because we were having serious troubles around the base.

Selecting a number of the most senior officials from the villages surrounding the base, we put them on the P-3, took off, and let them experience what the P-3 does. They were taken on an unclassified mission, flying low over the water and learning how those planes intercepted surface activity. The detection of sub-surface activity was classified, and they had to settle for tracking Soviet warships on the surface. Then they flew them to England and Scotland and let them talk to people.

It worked magic. It took much of the steam out of the complaints from the communities surrounding the base. These respected elders could go back home and tell their families and neighbors what was happening when those noisy machines took off in the middle of the night. They could re-live for others their first-person experience of what it was like and relate why it was so important to keep track of the military activity that threatened them, as well as the rest of Europe and North America. They were still wakened but now had a more visceral and

intellectual understanding of why. That program was very successful in taking a special problem and taking much of the sting out of it, even though the basic cause of the difficulty could not be removed.

I had other duties to manage in regard to the base, but mostly they involved staying in touch with the base information officers and monitoring their programs to insure that they were fully consistent with overall policy and offered no unintended damage to the delicate balance of the larger Icelandic public opinion. The base information program was perhaps more intensely aimed at troop morale than it was at off-base problems, and I had nothing to do with the base newspaper or the other morale and recreation activities conducted there. The only time I was brought into the picture was when their activities moved outside the base and affected Icelanders.

It was not only the problems of the base that bothered the Icelanders. U.S. policy in other parts of the world often intruded into the Icelandic consciousness, many times with negative results. Iceland was upset, at the time, with American policy in Latin America. This was the time of conflict in Nicaragua and Guatemala, and things were not going very well for us in Central America. We were getting hit domestically on our policy in that region, and many Icelanders were really upset, particularly Iceland's university students who identified with small nations evidently being pushed around by a superpower. There was a special nest of post-sixties radical students on the University of Iceland campus, and they were hitting us hard on Latin America. We were getting much bad press, and a barrage of critical articles appeared. Even the newspaper that was most often supportive of U.S. policy was giving us a hard time. Of course, the American press itself was highly critical, and the Icelandic press was simply picking up much of their copy from their usual sources. The result was an alarmed and antagonistic people, upset with our policy.

At that time, we also invaded Grenada, and that simply added heat to an already hot issue. One of my most difficult times in Iceland was to go on Icelandic state television for a half-hour interview about Grenada and getting hardball questions thrown at me. What was the purpose of our presence there? What does all this mean? Is this an example of continuing American imperialism? Is this "manifest destiny" in operation? Such questions were of the "have you stopped beating your wife" kind. I am not sure I convinced a lot of Icelanders, but I think the program helped to pour a bit of oil on the roiling waters.

More effective was a program we brought in from the US. A woman, a former nun who had married the Nicaraguan minister of labor after leaving her order, had very strong feelings about what was going on in Nicaragua at the time. She came to Iceland under our auspices, to bring a first person account of the Central American problem to Icelanders. She was not a strong fan of American policy and found much to prompt criticism. Yet she wasn't terribly bitter about it and knew from her own direct experience what was going on there. She understood that the fundamental problem was locally generated and did not have a great deal to do with the Americans. We just got caught in this web.

Her husband had been incarcerated, and she had had a very bad time of it. The first person account and her church training in presenting a story in the most human terms made everyone who heard her come to a new, more complex, understanding of the virtually unsolvable problem

of Central America. We brought together many of the people from the university, our strongest critics, younger people, and some of the older radicals in town. Most of the people who came to the meeting were communists or inspired leftists. They were a group who were not among our usual crowd at the USIS Center programs and library. Many were highly suspicious of our motives and came to scoff.

Yet the topic had enormous drawing power. They had such deeply held feelings, they had to be present for the discussion. The program had a stunning effect on them. There were people in tears during the meeting. The empathy that the former nun was able to develop with these people was just incredible. She reduced all the coolly distant press coverage down to the most human terms. Her credibility was high and her presentation effective. Almost overnight, the drumbeat of criticism of our Central American policy stopped in Iceland. Icelanders still did not agree with us on the principles and remained suspicious of our big-power motives, but they began to become more sophisticated in their thinking and more aware of the real situation.

A student leader from the university, the one who was the spearhead of this whole effort on campus, was at the program. After the program was over, he walked into my office alone, sat quietly on the couch, and said, "I want to make sure you understand. I am not a supporter of American policy in Latin America, but I didn't realize how much I didn't know. I am going to have to go back and study more." That was a great victory. What it meant was that, for the first time among the left in Iceland, reason and intelligence was being applied to the problem. It essentially knocked the stuffing out of support for radical opinions on the motives for US' Central American policy. It is rather unusual for a USIS programmer to see the direct results of a specific program so starkly. It also was one of the times that confirmed an emotional commitment to the work and offset all the times that "evidence of effectiveness" hadn't seemed to surface. So much is usually taken on faith when a particular grantee returns from a month's international visitor program in the U.S. or a visiting lecturer comes and goes, seemingly without a ripple, yet the cumulative effect builds unseen and unsung. This experience, however, was different and most satisfying.

*Q: You say there was a communist party in Iceland. Was this a Soviet controlled party?*

YATES: The Soviets didn't control it, although I think they would have liked to. I think they were smart enough not to try. My USIS Center was in a separate building in Reykjavik. The only other thing that was in the building with us was a post office downstairs. Once every month, the Russians would mail out their propaganda. They outproduced us by a wide margin. It was clear that our budget for direct mail materials came no where close to what they were spending. We could always tell when the Russians were mailing, because downstairs the trash cans would get filled to overflowing. The reason for this was that, since Iceland was very small, a lot of the residents of the west end of Reykjavik had post office boxes in the small unit downstairs. People would stop into get their mail and find their box stuffed with the Russian product. Like junk mail everywhere, it was immediately tossed aside, unread. Much of this offal ended up in the trash bins in the Post Office, so they did not have to carry it home.

The Icelanders must have done marvelously well with their recycle of paper. We were delighted to see all this trash, since it represented a failure of the competition and made our relative dearth

of similar materials easier to bear. Nonetheless, the Soviets persisted in their big effort. Part of their lack of success probably came from the fact that Icelanders are very independent. They are feisty people. "Don't tread on me" is something that could be used in Iceland, as well as for our "in your face" forebears. The communism we saw in Iceland was not the communism that we would see in China or the Soviet Union. The Icelandic communists were "social" communists, a wish for a utopian communalism rather than the Moscow tied communism we were combating in Europe.

It was awfully hard to get people to understand this distinction. The awareness of a difference was particularly a product of having to work with those who would probably define themselves as "communists" but who would be hard pressed to explain their beliefs in the manner Americans would find convincing. I served in China, Iceland, Afghanistan, and Japan, and all had communist parties, but they were all distinctly different. While there was a worldwide movement (there was no question about that), and a worldwide threat from the Soviets and from the Chinese to some extent, it never caught fire. Even then, it was clear that their economic system was not working in any one of those societies that professed to be the "wave of the future." Other nations, as they became more sophisticated, began to realize the thing called communism sounded good to some of their people but did not work in practice. It caused severe economic problems.

I think the Icelanders recognized that. During the time I was there, they began to get a handle on the tax problem. They began to make noises about charging people tuition at colleges. They were openly worried about students who would attend school but not study. Why should they? It was "free." There was nothing there of value for them to learn. So as the realization that the "free" aspects of society the communists offered were not really "free," as someone in the society would have to pay the taxes to support those "free" activities, public attitudes drifted away from communist dogma.

Still, the communists in Iceland were able to maintain a semblance of influence through the strong ties they maintained with several labor organizations and other public groups. In particular, the labor movement in Iceland was a strong part of the communist movement. For a USIS program in Iceland to be effective, it had to address the very labor groups that were the backbone of the remaining communist effort.

One of the successes of the USIS program in Iceland was the invitation to the head of the carpenter/plumbers union to go on a special program that was run by the AFL/CIO here in the US. The plan was to talk about what the American labor movement is, what its themes, goals and practices were. This was a man who was at the forefront of the anti-base movement, or at least his organization was one of the major funding supporters. Needless to say, he was highly suspicious of the United States. I remember when I invited him to come into the office and talk about his visitor grant. He initially said that he did not want to go and would not have gone except that the AFL/CIO was a labor movement and he was a strong unionist. He just could not resist getting together with other labor union types and was curious. Yet he was really suspicious. He returned to my office to pick up his tickets and was very uncomfortable. Although he was a highly intelligent person, he simply picked up the tickets and left without saying much.

About a month and a half later, he returned. He had on a necktie and white shirt, had lost the Leninist cap, and appeared full of cheer. I asked how things went on his trip. Now talkative, he responded, "Very interesting." I pressed for more details. He said, "Well, I didn't realize that the AFL/CIO is a real union." He had thought that the AFL-CIO was just a puppet organization. But he was really surprised when he discovered that it was a genuine, and very feisty organization. That recognition turned his concepts upside down and resulted in a re-evaluation of his own priorities. One month of traveling around the U.S. looking at different union activities expanded his horizons greatly. As I noted, he was very intelligent and had clearly been misinformed.

After this experience in the US, he gave a lot of thought to the direction and emphasis of his own organization. Whether it was a direct result or not, is not really clear, but not long after his visit, his union pulled out of the consortia of unions that were the financial underpinning for the communist movement in Iceland, including the anti-base march. His union was the most affluent of the unions, so when it pulled out, they lost a major portion of their financial backing. Subsequently, the communists lost their office that had been located in the Carpenter/Plumbers Union building and were unable to muster enough financial or popular support to sustain the large anti-base marches that had for so long bedeviled bilateral relations. While it would be an over-simplification to credit all of the change to a simple international visitor experience in the US, it would be equally unrealistic to ignore the obvious effect on the union and its leader.

Another aspect of the gradual loss of influence of communism in Iceland can be found in the activities of our ambassador. Marshall Bremant was one of the best US experts on Russia. He spoke Russian and was very familiar with the communist movement and its efforts, having served in Moscow. As U.S. ambassador to Iceland, he began a program of social interaction with the communists that was very controversial among those who considered themselves our traditional friends. Conservative Icelanders felt that the ambassador had gone too far in coddling the communists and their leftist sympathizers. That really rankled them. They expected the U.S. ambassador to take his usual role of strong anti-communism and not have anything to do with the group they despised.

Those who considered themselves generally conservative would attend embassy functions and would be elbow-to-elbow with communists. The political divisions in Iceland at the time were so severe that if two opposites were walking down the same side of the street, one or the other would cross the street rather than pass by his or her opponent on the street. I had people come to my office and say, "What is the ambassador doing? These are communists at his party. Doesn't he know that?"

We even had a case where one of the communists I knew came to a reception at the embassy and during the conversation said, "Will you excuse me a moment please?" Clutching the drink he was socially nursing, he walked down the stairs from the ambassador's residence, went out the front door, crossed the street, and joined the crowd where his band of fellow communists with anti-American signs were. He kept the drink in his hand, while participating in the cheering against the US. When the cheering was over, and the small crowd disbanded, he walked back up the stairs and into the reception with his drink still in his hand and full of his usual good cheer. Evidently he did not see any particular contradiction in his conduct.

What prompted his demonstration of a split personality was the efforts of the ambassador to incorporate these antagonists into a reasonable dialog. That relationship gradually expanded, with leftists and those who might be considered “social” communists, slowly drawn into what would have been condemned by their peers as a compromising situation not many years before. This effort, coupled with more formal programs such as the NATO tours, the international visitor program, and the constant visits of speakers in USIS programs, all added to the gradual weakening of the intellectual commitment of many to leftist opposition to U.S. policy. It contributed greatly to their gradual diminution as a serious force, either against the base at Keflavik or against America as a nation.

The ambassador did a marvelous job of accelerating that process, but I do not think he ever got full credit for that from State or from the conservatives in Iceland who constantly grumbled over his unusual practices. Because of his controversial personnel policies that affected all within the embassy community, he later suffered a loss of confidence that never was repaired. While he almost singlehandedly disemboweled the communist movement in Iceland, he was not to enjoy the fruits of his victory with the accolades of the bureaucracy. Instead, he came to be roundly criticized and eventually hounded out of the service.

The conservative Icelanders harbored very strong opinions about dealing in a civil manner with leftists or communists. In USIS, we sponsored periodic delegations of Icelanders on the NATO tours I already discussed in relation to the problems of the base. There was a particular correspondent on Icelandic state television who the conservatives in Reykjavik thought was a closet communist or at least a strong leftist. They didn't like him and resented his growing prominence on Icelandic state television. One of these tours came up, and I selected him to join it. He was smart, affable, young and probably had a good future ahead of him in the Icelandic electronic media. So I picked him and he readily accepted.

I got a stiff call from some conservative Icelanders, saying I couldn't do this and they would not cooperate with us if he were to go on the trip. They argued that he would not be suitable for a NATO briefing and tour. In fact, the Icelandic ambassador to NATO in Brussels said he would not have this man in his room, never mind allow him to visit NATO headquarters as a guest.

This was quite a dilemma. The NATO tours were specifically aimed at demonstrating the value of NATO in protecting the security of Western Europe and the US. They were very effective, as I knew. But could we afford to antagonize our Icelandic allies in a confrontation over principles, even if we were convinced that we were right? There was nothing to be done except follow through with the trip, but the Icelandic ambassador at the NATO Headquarters in Brussels had refused to consider the possibility. After wrangling a bit, we decided to go forward with the trip, but skip the NATO Headquarters in Brussels. This time we would send the group to Berlin and see first hand what the confrontation was all about.

That change in plans neatly sidestepped the Icelandic ambassador's ability to interfere with the trip, since it was fully U.S. funded and we needed no blessing from Icelandic diplomats on what we could or could not do. We meant no confrontation but felt simply that the value of the NATO tours was that people like this television personality could experience a different point of view.

We had to proceed without allowing anyone else's political agenda from restricting our judgement of what was best and in the U.S. interest.

So the trip went generally as planned, save for the visit to NATO headquarters. Some felt that was not much loss, since the briefing in Brussels was seen as very dry and uninspired. Some advice we received was that skipping Brussels was not much of a loss. The group went on to West Berlin instead. They visited the Wall, which was still in existence. The Wall was always a sobering experience. There was almost religious in actually confronting the police state across the small no-man's-land that divided the two halves of what had been the German capital. Something also happened to our special grantee upon witnessing the reality of the Wall. The watchtowers, the concertina wire, the Wall itself covered with the graffiti of hundreds of Germans who hated its reality and its symbolism.

He returned from the NATO travels a changed person. In no way could he be considered converted from his vague socialist or leftist beliefs, but he now more resembled a liberal American Democrat than a Russian communist. He had a sort of epiphany at the Wall. He just could not conceive of what he saw. The grimness of the Wall was beyond his wildest imagination. It communicated to him the communist style of oppression that so many people around the world had known and lived with for so many years. He had never viscerally felt that before. Iceland is an island, a nation apart. For a short period, the Danes had occupied Iceland, but there was never oppression of the Soviet brand. Icelanders prefer to ignore their colonial status as an aberration of history, something to be forgotten as a bad dream that has no relevance to life as it is lived. The visit to the Wall brought up short any illusions of the benefit of the Soviet system.

To some degree, the visit pulled away some of the dust of illusion from around his eyes. I can't say he turned into a new conservative, uncritical of U.S. policy and accepting all that we offered, but he certainly became a very important contact for me at Icelandic state television. In fact, he was my interviewer at the time of my Grenada interview, which was from my point of view a very positive thing, because it allowed me about half an hour of Icelandic state television air-time to explain the U.S. point of view to everyone in Iceland. No amount of other effort could duplicate that opportunity. I never again had any contact with the Icelandic ambassador to Brussels, but we resumed our NATO tours, including the normal stop at the Brussels headquarters. Perhaps the briefings continued to be dull, but it was important to have people see the headquarters and get a sense of the cooperation which was at the root of the NATO organization. I wished that all could visit the Wall in Berlin, but it was slightly off the main topic of the tours, and I had to satisfy myself that, at least in one instance, it did make a difference.

*Q: What were you doing?*

YATES: Two things. The first year I spent in the Office of Management. I wrote a study of USIA's efforts abroad to keep track of our audiences, understand who they are, where they are, and how well we are in touch with them. For the other three years, I went across the street to the Voice of America where I was a Special Assistant to the Deputy Associate Director for Modernization. He was in charge of all the relay site improvements around the world. It was a major program. There was \$2.8 billion dollars worth of work to be done around the world to

upgrade our Voice of America facilities. We were still using vacuum tubes in our transmitters in many places around the world, including some of the major sites in the U.S., and that meant that our facilities were antiquated. My participation in the modernization program lasted from 1986-89. Then I went into language training for Chinese, continuing on to Beijing at the end of 1989.

*Q: Tell us something about your work at VOA.*

YATES: The Voice of America had a modernization program to upgrade its aging facilities. I was a special assistant which meant I was the right hand man for the person who was heading up the program, Mort Smith. I had known Mort many years before when he was the Deputy Public Affairs Officer in Seoul and I came in as a JOT. Our connections went deeper, for my first post in Kwangju was once his post. He was Area Director for East Asia when I was in Japan. He then had taken over the modernization program of the Voice of America and asked me to join him. The program was involved in making treaties with the various countries abroad where we could build new relay stations and then stations which would eventually be turned over to the broadcasting side of the house to operate. At the time, we were working on a relay station in Israel. It was in the treaty stage. There was one in Morocco which was under construction. One in Sri Lanka, which was in the final stage of planning and construction. And one in Thailand which was also gradually coming together. We were looking at some of the islands in the Pacific as a possible location for future facilities. Tinian was among the most important of them. While I was at the Voice, my job was to coordinate these things, pull them together, and give assistance to Mort in any way I could.

For example, we had about 200 engineers at the Voice of America doing the technical work necessary to support modernization, to design and build the relay stations, and keep the plant running. Before you built a station, you had to have some idea how it could propagate the signal. Shortwave radio doesn't operate like medium wave, it skips between the ionosphere and the surface of the earth. In some places, it comes in loud and clear, but in others, it may not be heard at all. Under certain conditions, the signal can bounce between the ionosphere strongly enough to allow it to be heard from a long distance. You probably can't hear it within 50 miles, but you can hear it 500 miles away and multiples of miles further, depending on the strength of the signal.

The problem is, where does this thing skip to, because the ionosphere rises and falls based on the time of day, the temperature, humidity in the lower levels, and happenings totally out of control on earth such as when there are solar flares. A lot of magnetic and technical changes can affect the height and the transparency of the ionosphere. Radio waves are energy. You broadcast the waves out and hope they bounce at the right spot to hit where you want people to hear you. There is no point in transmitting from the Philippines, where we were also trying to modernize, in the Chinese language and have it land in Korea or in Russia, but not in China. So the idea is to pick the right frequency, inclination of the antenna, and the distance from the broadcast point so that the skip comes down where you want it to and your energy is focused on that area where they speak the language of your broadcast.

That is a pretty complicated set of dynamic variables. You need a big computer to do enough calculations to maximize the possibility that you will broadcast as efficient a signal as possible. The problem was that the Voice of America years before had bought a large VAX computer built

by Digital Equipment Corp. It was a main frame computer with enough power to meet the need, but it was never installed. Instead, it had been placed in storage. The reason was security. The security gurus said we could not use it, because in order to meet the needs of security, VOA would have to build a special room with lead lined walls to keep emanations to an acceptable level. The system would be processing classified information up to the level of secret, so that brought everything to a halt three years before. Since there was no funding to do the expensive work of building a special room complete with lead lined walls, a raised floor, ramps up to the raised floor (in compliance with OSHA handicapped rules), special air conditioning, heavier electrical wiring, and a multitude of other requirements for a mainframe computer, the project was stymied. The Voice had spent about \$500,000 for a computer that it could not use.

Mort Smith asked me to figure this out and get it installed somehow. Security was adamant; it could not be done without the prohibitively expensive building modifications. The key to the problem obviously was security. Searching about for another opinion on the security question, I got in touch with a new operation that had just been activated by the National Security Agency. Because of the large number of civilian agencies with computer security problems, NSA had put together a special staff to consider the problems from the point of view of security. Their responsibility was government wide. The person in charge said he would be willing to bring his people over and take a look and see what he could do with it.

We wanted to put the computer on the third floor of what is now the Cohen Building. That location was close enough to the engineers and the propagation people to be useful. Security's original concern was that if the computer was too close to a public area, even the street outside, an uncontrolled person or organization might be able to infiltrate our security by installing sensors close enough to intercept emanations from a running computer. Some felt that equipment was available that might even be parked in a van outside the building to keep a watch on the classified material we were processing.

Yet our third floor location was in the middle of an old, heavily constructed building several floors above ground level. The concept that a large enough installation of equipment sensitive enough to monitor our equipment could be placed either in other offices of a controlled government area or on a street two floors below and at least 75 feet from the internal room seemed a bit far-fetched. The National Security Agency team came to the reasonable conclusion that it was quite beyond possibility that the Russians, the Chinese, or some other group interested in such arcane information would park a large semi just outside our building to try to listen in on the hours long propagation programs running on the new mainframe.

So as we started to strip the problems away, they couldn't find anything as long as we didn't go to a top secret level of information. No one could conceive of such a possibility, so there was no particular reason why we needed a lead-lined room. I asked for and received a letter from the NSA team for the USIA Office of Security; it confirmed their finding that there was no problem. That was enough to allow the project to get back on track. We simply gutted the room, put some paint on the walls and cleaned up the general mess to ready the room for the new installation.

After three years in storage, however, the VAX was so old that DEC asked if we would accept an equivalent replacement, one that the company was still making replacement parts for and could

ensure that its operation would be reliable in terms of the warranty. The upshot was that the Voice of America got a brand new main frame computer at no additional cost and was able to install it in a simple, flat floored office environment. Finally, we were able to do our projections and plots and even classified work on the needed computer. It took us about three months to get it in. As far as I know, it is still running.

Another of my responsibilities was to handle relations with Congress through congressional staffers. Since the modernization program involved several billions of dollars in very long-term construction projects, the annual budget review in Congress always targeted the VOA program as something to chip away at. The very young people who were tasked with taking a look at the program for Congress did not have much experience on large scale projects such as the modernization program, yet they had the power to screw things up in federal programs. Even then in the mid-'80s, we had very strong restrictions on funding. They would say, "What do you need this money for?" "You have not even spent the money in last year's budget." "Why should we give you more?" Similar questions were leveled at us from OMB (Office of Management and Budget) whose staffers were often young people with fresh degrees in economics but little field experience.

Of course, the reason was that such long term construction projects required the commitment of large blocks of funding in advance, to be paid out as the work proceeded. These were often ten-year contracts with substantial funding committed in one year and not "obligated" until the year the work was completed. You had to commit money to a contractor to start work. You could not "obligate" (i.e., commit) it until you were satisfied with the sufficiency of the work, but no contractor would begin work if there was any doubt that the money was available. The Congressional and OMB folk said that we had 200 million dollars we hadn't used yet, so we should only come back when that was fully used to request more.

It was very difficult for them to understand anything beyond the near term of next year's funding. So we had to agree that we had earmarked funds for two or three years of several hundred million dollars that was sitting there and hadn't been spent yet, but that money was "committed." Trying to convince these young people of that logic was an interesting and sometimes very frustrating experience. We really needed a steady flow of adequate funding to maintain progress and keep ultimate costs as low as possible. For example, if we are going to build in Sri Lanka, we need to have the money up front to be able to build this station right now, although we are not going to spend the money for three years. It was very hard for them to understand why we had to have additional money.

One of the more enjoyable duties I had during my tenure at the Voice was to accompany Dick Carlson, the then Director of the Voice of America and the person who was in charge of VOA News, to Europe to take a look at the facilities of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) and to see what they had and how we might be able to more fully utilize them. I went along as the modernization person and as a bag carrier as well. It was a lot of fun. The trip took our small group to Munich, Bonn, Cologne, and other places, examining equipment and office facilities as well as paying a call on Deutsche Welle, the German radio corresponding to the Voice of America. So the job was not all hard work and sweat at the Voice.

*Q: Okay. We will pick this up next time in 1989 when you were taking Chinese.*

YATES: All right.

*Q: Today is May 14, 1997. Ken, you have some thoughts about working in Washington versus working in the field and also working with Congress.*

YATES: I think the experience at the Voice of America put me in a unique position, because I brought with me a fair amount of field experience. I came back to Washington, first spending a year in the management side of things doing a study of our audience records system. But the Voice of America gave me a different kind of exposure. There, I was working with people who were principally Washington budget people, contract people, engineers, and congressional staffers. What I found in that experience was in some ways disconcerting, because not all the people fully understood the purposes for which they were working. They were working very hard, but many of the staffers had never been overseas and did not completely appreciate the end results. They did not have a sense of what was going on in the field, the “why” of what we were doing.

Budget people, people handling congressional relations, and the people who were interpreting USIA Washington to the funding organization, Congress of course, really did not have a very firm grasp of the principle objectives in the field. Some of these people had worked for USIA for a long time. Many others, however, were political appointees who came in from being campaign workers or had experience in business or some other part of government. Those who were the “talent” in the broadcast studios often came from the societies to which they were broadcasting, but even they had only part of the full picture.

The consequence was that Congress, OMB, and other elements of the U.S. government that were intimately involved in our budget process really didn’t have a clear picture of why the money was being spent. Worse, they felt they did have the needed understanding, and could become quickly resentful if confronted by a Foreign Service Officer who had just come in from the field. That resentment was deeper since Foreign Service people serving in Washington simply were putting in time at the “home office” while looking for another assignment abroad. If the FSOs assigned to the Voice were in responsible positions with supervisory duties, resentment was deeper since they were seen as interlopers who were taking positions that should be available to domestic employees who sought advancement.

As a result of this resentment, FSOs generally avoided an assignment at the Voice, since the hostility you had to survive overwhelmed the possibility of deriving a real sense of satisfaction from taking a very responsible position. Some thrived on the challenge, but more often than not, FSOs avoided assignments at the Voice. I did not suffer as much as some, since I was working in a position not in the usual ladder of promotion for domestic employees (although I was replaced by one), and many of the people I worked with were engineers not threatened by one so far removed from their own pecking order.

At the Voice, with the exception of a smattering of overseas correspondents and technical people at a number of the relay stations abroad, the policy people, the broadcast talent, and the people

doing the writing and program creation were principally domestic employees. And many of them, particularly on the broadcast side, were foreigners who came in under a variety of contracts, stayed, and later became American citizens and broadcasters at the Voice of America. Again, some of these were very fine people, very smart, competitive and had a true mission as they saw it. The missions did not always coincide with the definitions that were laid out by the posts in their individual country plans.

Often the disagreements between the field and the Voice became strained, but since the Voice was administratively apart from the areas and other administrative portions of USIA, they could figuratively thumb their noses at USIA and do essentially what they wanted. USIA lacked the capacity to listen to all of the broadcasts, much less to translate all those in foreign languages or read the texts.

The VOA charter realistically demands that the news section of the Voice operate without influence from the policy concerns of the rest of the government. This is as it should be. There were "VOA editorials" which were identified expressions of U.S. policy that were cleared both through USIA and State, yet, as we all knew in the field, there was much latitude for inserting troublesome copy that gave posts fits of frustration.

In the field, you had defined goals and worked hard to achieve them. At one time or another, the Voice would carry items or features that would confound our program efforts and confuse our audiences. To citizens in another country, often where controlled media were the rule, inconsistency in the point of view between the USIS post and VOA did not signify a vibrant democracy but rather a confusion of goals in a government that could not keep all of its parts in sync.

The consequences of this confusion have been worsened by USIA's merger with the Department of State and the Voice being made totally independent under the supervision of the Broadcasting Board Governors (BBG) in 1998. In my way of thinking, any move to make the Voice more distinct from official channels is a disservice both to those who work there and to the taxpayer who should expect an efficient and purposeful American voice abroad.

I suspect that the people who were involved in the changes and the people who were making budgetary decisions were not very well versed on what we are doing abroad. Not that it was secret, but it was difficult to find anyone who could put subject and verb together on the topic of U.S. information abroad. We were supposedly communicators, but we could not communicate at home. Part of that is Congress, because like other federal agencies, USIA cannot use taxpayer funds to "lobby" Congress as we were enjoined against doing that. Again the law has a good purpose; to ensure that a government in power could not propagandize the citizenry using their own tax dollars. Yet this meant that the people who were paying the bills could not really understand what their taxes were being used for. It was a clearly understood rule that we were not to broadcast to audiences in the US.

Superficially, it sounds fairly simple. You put up an antenna, hook it to a transmitter and a microphone, and you are on your way. But in fact, you are not. Even with years of experience abroad and a fairly good knowledge of the receiving end of VOA broadcasts and their impact, I

was surprised at the complexity of the operation. There were two hundred engineers on the staff, and they all worked hard, because moving a reliable signal from broadcast booth in the U.S. to a listener, often in a denied area abroad, was a very difficult problem. Mistakes in propagation cost the American taxpayer a lot of money. You have to burn fuel to put a signal in the air. If the signal doesn't land where you want it to, the money you spent on fuel is entertaining turtles, a common metaphor of the time.

There were charges, for example, that in Central America where local topography and the politics behind the choice of a location meant our relay station in Costa Rica essentially broadcast into a lake. Other parts of the country could hear the signal, but large amounts of energy was spent pumping a signal into the water. They were the most well-informed turtles in the world. The only way we could tell how well our signal was getting through was from responses back from the field. Our monitoring of programs were not very good, because we lacked sufficient funding to hire people to listen and submit accurate reports. Often we had to rely on roving monitors who would move around the world, sampling the signal in varied locations and conditions. At other times, we were able to convince a bored housewife from the embassy community or a patriotic Fulbright scholar to take on some of those duties. Volunteer work can save a lot of money, but results can be uneven. Bureaucratically, however, economies had to be made somewhere, and monitor payrolls most often came up short.

An example of our reach was in Guangzhou in China. China was then and still is, I am sure, one of the more important customers for the Voice of America. We have a Cantonese service which absorbs a lot of time, money, and energy. The heart of the Cantonese speaking region is Guangzhou, the old Canton. But there was a great controversy over whether or not the people in Guangzhou could actually hear the Cantonese Service. Some people said, "Yes, no problem." Other people said, "No." There was not a large volume of mail from the area.

*Q: During this period did we have a consulate general in Guangzhou?*

YATES: Yes, we did. The Branch Public Affairs Officer there was among the people who were telling us they were not hearing the Voice of America. We would send an engineer out from Hong Kong with a radio, and he would sit in a hotel room or ride and bus and try to listen. The reports that he would bring back were not terribly encouraging, they were confused. Travelers from the embassy and other visitors with other business would volunteer to report on the reception of the Voice while in town. Often, they would say that the English service and the Mandarin Chinese service could be heard, but Cantonese was nowhere to be found. Still, that reporting was admittedly not reliable. The problem was getting Cantonese-speaking volunteer monitors to make the effort.

Reception is not easy when you are abroad with an international radio. It is not the same as turning on the old reliable FM or AM station in your home town. Shortwave radio is subject to variations in clarity, signal strength, natural and man-made obstacles, and interference from both intentional and random sources. You have to tune it in carefully and keep adjusting the tuning as the signal fades or interference blocks out a clear signal. At times, you can hold a weak station for a while, only to lose it as atmospheric or local conditions change. It is difficult to listen to.

Sometimes you can find the desired signal, but it is not comfortable listening. The loss of a signal may have involved antenna orientation, time of day, the frequency that it was broadcast on, or the position of the sun. The only broadcast facility that we had close enough to expect a reliable signal into the Guangzhou region was in the Philippines, a long way from the Chinese coast. The Philippines carried the burden of broadcasting to East Asia and China in particular. We had a transmitter site in Thailand, but mainly medium wave. Beyond that, there was nothing much else. There was Sri Lanka, but that was even more remote. The skip on each hop is 500 miles and every time you get further away, the wave loses energy. As distances increase, the reliability of the signal diminishes proportionally. Some sites in the world are remarkable, and a signal from there gets almost anywhere. Unfortunately, most VOA sites are the result of political and economic compromises, and the engineers have to try to do their best in very difficult conditions.

Earlier I talked about the installation of a computer. That computer used a program that was created by another agency in the government to approximate propagation around the world based on the magnetic field, the conditions of the ionosphere, the time of day, the position of the sun, etc. You dump all of these variables into a computer, and it is supposed to tell you how strong a signal is in a given area at a given time. There are more variables, the type of antenna, the amount of power you are putting behind the antenna, etc. and these things cost an awful lot of money.

There is only one place in the world where it is thought that conditions are almost ideal, and that is in Ecuador. There is a particular mountain in Ecuador from which you could reach almost any point in the world with a shortwave radio. That is why a lot of Christian broadcasters have located there. But for us at the Voice of America, locating a relay station was a political question. What government in its right mind, even our close and strong allies, would allow a foreign government to come in and broadcast from its soil. Very few. And only in those places where we had special situations, like the Philippines, could we get permission. Even then, our flexibility is very closely circumscribed. We could only broadcast in languages that were not native to the country. We had to promise we were not broadcasting to the natives of that country. And of course, we had to pay a lot of money up front for facilities on the ground and training engineers and staff and hiring the local people. So it gets very complicated.

Another example of that problem is the experience of Radio Free Asia. Where do you put it in Asia? You can't get there from California, although we had one of our stations in Dixon, California broadcasting to Asia and to Latin America. Latin America is a better shot, but they tried to get to Asia and it was not very successful. They had the same problem. You put a lot of energy behind a signal, and it bounces and loses some more to the turtles. Every time you bring it back up again, varying conditions in the ionosphere mean a longer or shorter hop, so the computer would plot the hops and try to tell you with a fair amount of accuracy whether or not you are going to hit what you want. Another problem was a signal that was excellent one day would be terrible when a sun spot storm appeared. It is an engineering nightmare.

Try to explain that to someone in Congress. It is hard enough to do that here when I have the time and a patient listener. Imagine what it was for a harried, frenzied, busy, "I want it on one page" kind of staffer from the Hill. Therein was the rub. My boss, Mort Smith, was working very

hard at trying to negotiate some of these deals like Morocco. The king of Morocco was a great help to the Voice of America, and we were building a relay station there. It turned out we were building it in a watershed area which tended to flood every year. So what they were doing was building up a station on what were small islands above the usual flood crest. For most of the year, they were in a dry sea, but this was the only land that was politically expedient. I was told that the Morocco station construction was the largest earthmoving project in the history of man. This was long before the Chinese began the large Yangtze dam, which may replace the Morocco station for “biggest” honors.

At great expense, we put antennas, facilities, and power equipment on tall dunes, which we were building to try to stabilize them. VOA was able to get permission from the king for the site, but the construction costs amid a flood plain made the cost of the station much larger than most. Those were the kind of real problems that faced the Voice of America’s engineers. If you found a country agreeable to a relay station, it was not always the best place in the world from which to broadcast. The best countries were not always accessible to us.

We had great trouble in Israel, for example, putting in a relay station to broadcast to the Arab world. This was a place where you would think it would be fine, politically. The difficulties were military and environmental. The place in Israel that we were negotiating to use was up near the border with Jordan. The Jordanians also had a little problem with this construction. Not only was there a fear that transmissions from the station would cause political embarrassment to the government, the area in which the station was to be located was on a fly-way for migrating birds, and Israeli and Arab environmentalists just ripped the project plans apart. They said the birds would be injured by the wires in the tall towers that would be necessary for the transmission equipment. That alone put the project on hold for a long, long time.

Israel was also afraid that Israel fighter jets and military helicopters might be affected by the high energy levels put out by the transmission facilities. There was a suspicion that the emissions would interfere with the “fly-by-wire” control systems of several models in the Israeli inventory. Engineering tests over similarly powerful short wave transmitters in the U.S. confirmed the manufacturers’ assertions that there would be no problem, but the Israelis were suspicious nonetheless. The area available for Israel to maneuver modern, high-speed aircraft is very limited and every square mile of the country is a part of their exercise area. The upshot was that the project was indefinitely stalled, while things such as the environment and military questions were sorted out. Politically, it got impossible to overcome such difficulties, particularly, I suspect, since it was also strong Israeli sentiment that the station would eventually be an embarrassment, so even as strong and dependent an ally as Israel could not stomach the positioning of a VOA relay station on its territory. The bottom line was the Israeli station could not be built and never will be. So we lost that one. Part of the need for that station was to improve the quality of the signal broadcast into the southern part of the then Soviet Union. But it took so long to put together that the politics of the moment and the dissolution of the Soviet Union took precedence, a very expensive, very long-term, very difficult agreement that Mort Smith had negotiated eventually had to be reversed.

A new relay site in troubled Sri Lanka was under way, and in Thailand we were converting what was a medium wave facility into a larger facility with a powerful shortwave capability. Still, we

were searching for other locations. Korea was looked at, but politically it wasn't good. The Korean government felt they would find it difficult. They were just beginning to open ties with China, and they felt any major location of American propaganda radio on the shores of Korea would interfere with the smooth building of relations in the area themselves. Therefore, another stalwart ally got cold feet about cooperation with the U.S. on international radio. Besides, such a large scale project of construction would have set up a frenzy of land speculation in Korea, which the Korean government felt would be inimical to its plans for the reconstruction of the country's economy. So that one also went down the tubes.

We had been negotiating with the Philippines at the time, reworking the agreement with them. Those were the years of turmoil, the end of the Marcos era and beginning of the Aquino age in the Philippines. The Filipinos were beginning to be much more independent of the U.S. Even the ones who were strong friends of the U.S. would counsel against any major change in what was going on there, because they would be looked at as "American Boys." We couldn't go to Taiwan, because that would interrupt our own connection with China. That would be too blatant an insult to the Beijing we were struggling to keep in a moderate frame of mind, despite the recurrent MFN deliberations in Congress.

*Q: It is a hard one. Did you run into the argument that the BBC is taking care of it anyway?*

YATES: You can't hear the BBC in every place around the world either. China was one exception, because they had a very fine facility in Hong Kong. Don't ask me what is going to happen after reversion. The BBC previously used an island off Hong Kong where they had chosen to place their transmitter. From that point on, they were "5 by 5," as radio technical people say, with a very, very strong shortwave signal into China and, I guess, medium wave in Cantonese into nearby Guangzhou and its surrounding Cantonese-speaking area. In any event, the BBC does not explain the United States of America. It's not in their charter.

While you may get the news, which may be close to the way we might report it, the British radio does not explain us, and that is what is intended to be the principal responsibility of the Voice abroad. We were not out there, single-mindedly fighting communism, although that was certainly the rationale which was paraded on the Hill every time we went there for our budget. When the Soviet Union dissolved into its constituent republics, there was an open question about how much of the change was based on information or ideas derived from the Voice of America. I cannot shed any empirical light on the question, but it is just common sense that almost half a century of broadcasting likely had a special effect.

The basic economic system of the Soviet Union was no good, so it probably would have fallen eventually, no matter what the Voice of America said, but VOA probably had something to do with speeding up the process. A little bit of an investment in information goes a long way in removing a need for the much larger necessary investment in defense if the communist system had continued to spread. So we were hoist on our own petard. We became known as the commie fighters, fending off the red menace, but we had a much larger role in representing the U.S. to millions upon millions who probably never will visit the U.S. themselves.

USIA's essential role, its chief purpose for being, was the promotion of the US; building understanding for its policy, culture, and society; and stimulating an environment for trade. One of the larger part of these responsibilities is our educational exchange programs, such as the Fulbright scholarships and educational counseling. The education programs have been the basis for much of the understanding that we have developed with other countries over the years. Similarly effective is our international visitor program where we provide visits to the U.S. for people that our posts identify as potential leaders over the next decade or so. The multiplicity of program tools that USIA has been able to bring to bear on misunderstanding and ignorance is misunderstood.

The Voice of America, however, is a very different tool from the standard USIS programs that are used abroad. It is a passive tool in comparison with the intensely individual efforts that overseas posts make. You throw things into the wind and hope somebody will tune in. Someone has to turn you on and someone has to listen, sometimes at great danger to himself. In China or the Soviet Union, it was dangerous to do that. But people did and I think VOA provided a special service that was different from the other services provided by the USIS operation at the embassy. The USIS operations in any one country had a more personal approach. That meant leaving the desk and getting out into the university and sitting down in professors' offices, and talking to deans and students or visiting media where placement was always an objective. The question is, how many students can you talk to? These universities have tens of thousands of students. We try to talk to the students who are the best and probably the future leaders of the country, those who will be able to pass along the information we impart to them. So we put a lot of effort into defining our audience.

We have talked about that to some extent before when I discussed Japan. It is something that was an important part of our work. By focusing efforts on a smaller number of communicators, however, our numbers began to decline. The more efficient we got in identifying our audience, the smaller the number of select people we were addressing in a given country. Whereas the Voice of America could claim millions of people listening, we could claim only hundreds on a personal contact level. That doesn't necessarily mean one is better than the other. In fact, personal contact would likely have to be considered much more important. The one-on-one relationships that developed because of exchanges had much greater impact, I believe, partially because of a greater credibility and the selectivity involving one or several individuals that will probably have significant responsibility in the future affairs of their country. VOA serves a different purpose and, therefore, must be judged by a different yardstick.

One of the attributes of the Voice of America that is politically important in Washington is its utility as an emergency network for Americans abroad. Almost every traveler listens to the Voice of America, but originally it was not intended for Americans, but for a foreign audience. Yet until CNN became almost omnipresent in hotels around the globe, when you traveled abroad, about the only way to get American news was the Voice of America. Newspapers were late, if you could get them. Local media often had little or no interest in American affairs—neither did BBC for that matter—but you could rely on the Voice of America. News people and American travelers abroad were well served by the Voice of America. Each time there was an attempt to reduce programming, those folks would rise up in support that became an important part of VOA's justification. But that was not the justification for USIA efforts abroad in the embassies.

So we had parallel tracks but very different constituencies and very different purposes and particularly different tools.

*Q: Were you up against pressure groups, Cuban-Americans, Irish-Americans, etc.?*

YATES: Absolutely. There was no question that was one of the most nettlesome, yet most advantageous support the Voice had. Every time we would come up with a budget cut, small services like Lithuanian would come under fire. You can't imagine the strength of the Lithuanian community in this country until you try to cut the Lithuanian service. They felt it was an important link to their homeland. It was a strong post to lean on in times that the Russians were trying to subsume the Lithuanian culture into the greater Russia. How many Lithuanians live in Cleveland, for example? You would be surprised to find out. They would all get together and write letters to their local congressman. There was a devilish cry of pain on the Hill every time we tried to cut any of those small services. It meant that all of the constituents would come out of the walls onto the congressional backs, and we would get rockets from the Hill saying we could not even think of such a move. They would earmark funds in the appropriation bill to make sure that didn't happen. So this sort of earmarking was an incredible bat with which to beat the Voice of America. You can argue that is a good thing, but at the time, something else had to give. You had to reduce Chinese or get rid of somebody else or some other service that we were doing.

One of the most important services of the Voice of America over the years, was the special English program. This was a program in which only about 1200 English words were used. This was like what the *Reader's Digest* does to ensure that its magazine is readable for all. All text is limited to those 1,200 words except when certain terms must be used to be clear. In such cases, the new term is fully defined in the vocabulary of the approved 1,200. This practice gives somebody who doesn't speak native English a much better grasp of what is being discussed. It allows them to practice their English without struggling to deal with the expanded vocabulary most often used by educated speakers of English. Special English is spoken very slowly, so that every word is pronounced clearly and distinctly, giving a non-native speaker of English a better chance to comprehend. Sometimes, it can become boring for an American native-English speaker to listen to, but it is very effective for English-as-a-second-language people and if there is heavy interference, a weak signal, or fading, the broadcasts in special English can be a relief even for native speakers who have a better chance of following the thought.

One good example of the utility of special English can be found in China. After I got there, it was clear that the Voice of America was being listened to with the blessing of the authorities. It was a practice that was followed even in the middle of the Cultural Revolution. On the face of it, that does not sound reasonable. But on examination, this remarkable permission made complete sense. The Chinese understood that their students would have to learn English to be competitive in world markets, and so they had to have the facilities such as language laboratories and native speakers to make their training effective. But China didn't have the money to spread a lot of English teaching resources all over the country.

However, the Voice of America special English broadcasts were free to them. Schools would assign their students to go listen to the Voice of America in English, not Chinese which was forbidden. Entire classes would listen to VOA at night and come into the class next day to review

the lesson they had heard. It was remarkable. Often the content of special English programming was stories about America, the founding fathers, etc. To this day in China, there are people who know more than a lot of Americans do about Lincoln and Jefferson and Washington. They have learned it from the Voice of America and discussed that foreign history in their own schools as part of their language lessons. That simple program concept is a marvelous tool in getting this country more understood.

The payoff is when the political forces become realigned and there is an opening, a great welling up of interest in America. This is a very positive thing in international relations because of this vast groundwork that was done through Voice of America broadcasts to places like China in special English.

Yet there was a serious problem. When reductions had to be taken and earmarking prevented the reduction of one or several of the smaller services, then budget cuts had to be made on the programming side. News was the heart of the program, so that was sacrosanct. The natural instinct would be to take cuts in the special purpose programming such as special English. You can't cut Lithuanian, and you can't cut Latvian, and Tibetan is a new service that the Congress has mandated. Radio Marti, over the objections of many, was going full force and sucking money away as fast as it could. TV Marti was even worse. Yet the budget was going down. Where do you take the cuts? Very, very important programs like special English had to take a cut and that was tragic. Such cuts meant that we were not using our money most efficiently and effectively. If you were a good Lithuanian from Cleveland, you had very strong feelings about the importance of Lithuania and you were probably right. But when you have limited resources and unlimited demand, where do you put on your brakes? I think many times we put on the brakes in the wrong places.

You mentioned Cuba, and particularly in Florida, the vote down there. Cubans are very strong in Florida. The log-rolling that goes on in Congress, of course, made a careful analysis of the broadcast effort to Cuba almost impossible. The principle of "you vote for my thing and I will vote for yours," meant that the Congressional delegation from Florida could jam an earmark through and force funding of a program that many felt was not cost effective. Radio Marti was a sacred cow and, more foolishly TV Marti, which has never had an audience, quickly followed in that tradition. The whole thing was a Looney Toons arrangement. You perhaps remember the aerostat balloons that they were going to put up to broadcast television into Cuba. Fidel Castro said that if the U.S. insisted on beginning such transmissions, he intended to increase the power of one of Cuba's AM radio stations that would interfere with U.S. radio stations deep in the U.S. heartland.

With sufficient power, particularly in the evening hours, medium wave exhibits some of the same characteristics as shortwave. Once the sun goes down, the ionosphere comes down to a point where medium wave radio signals no longer penetrate that layer of the ionosphere. That is why we have laws that restrict broadcasting on certain frequencies. Some stations could broadcast from dawn to dusk, but at dusk they had to power down or get off the air. The reason was that they could easily interfere with a broadcast station on the same frequency that presented no conflict during the day when distance alone kept them apart. AM signals, usually receivable only within a small radius about a urban area, could be heard 200 miles away after sundown.

Anybody who ever lived in New England can remember tuning in to WWVA in Wheeling, West Virginia almost as soon as the sun went down.

*Q: Okay, let's move on. You took Chinese. Can you tell me a bit about Chinese training? It was from when to when and what was your impression of the course?*

YATES: I am not a great linguist to start with. The irony of my situation is that my three languages are Japanese, Korean, and Chinese. I had studied Japanese in University of Maryland courses while I was in the Army. I spoke enough of that to get along. My Korean was pretty good by the time I left Korea in 1972. Chinese, however, was a different animal. It is a very different language, not related to either Japanese or Korean, which have, in fact, a distant relationship between themselves. The Chinese is tonal and in word order and grammar resembles English more than it does Japanese, except for the characters that the Japanese picked up from the Chinese. The ideographs are one of the big problems for an English speaker, as he has to learn a whole different concept of written language.

There is no phonetic alphabet in Chinese. They have created a Romanized equivalent system called "pinyin," which is supposedly a crutch for foreigners, but in fact, may even get in the way. Some linguists have tried teaching only the Chinese characters, the ideographic approach. That is almost impossible, because if you are a well versed Chinese scholarly person, you would have at least 10,000 of those "drawings" under your belt. The Japanese have a limited set of about 1450 they call Toyo Kanji which allows you to read most sentences in newspapers, without the names of people and places that require a specialized vocabulary of their own. But one important difference between the Japanese and Chinese writing systems is the phonetic system the Japanese use to represent inflections and other mechanical parts of their language not present in the Chinese.

That phonetic system is called "kana." It is broken into two separate subsystems, "hiragana," the style of the usual inflections and language parts, and "katakana" the system that is used to phoneticize foreign names. The problem with the utilization of Chinese ideographs with the Japanese language is the dramatic number of homonyms that were forced into a language with only 50 sounds to represent the tens of thousands of Chinese characters. Since the Chinese ideographs carry the meaning in the visual presentation and were created for a language with different tones that can be applied to each phonetic group, the problem of homonyms is not as great. When the Japanese, who do not have a tonal system, adopted the Chinese characters as part of their writing system, they carried over close equivalences in sound, but without the tonal distinctions. Hence, the great difficulty with homonyms.

The kana, on the other hand, allow you to keep on reading when you hit an unknown Chinese character and still get the gist of the sentence. You may have to substitute a verb or noun, but the basic structure of the sentence is clear. Korean is even more consistent in the use of phonetic representation. Hangul is their name for a phonetic representation, and there was a time when most government documents had no Chinese characters at all. Yet without the certainty of a Chinese character, there is still some possible confusion in written Korean. The Korean government has relented on that and Chinese characters have been re-introduced in government documents and into the educational system. They never were really removed from the names of

people and places, but in normal language their use had been cut dramatically. So you can read Korean after you have a command of Hangul, which is a syllabary more than an alphabet, for it is represented by symbols grouped into representations of sounds.

So Chinese has many problems for the student. You have problems with the tones. If you misuse tones, you are unintelligible in Chinese. The second problem in Chinese is that you have a lot of dialects. If you go to Shanghai speaking Putonghua, which is the standard Mandarin, they could figure out what you were talking about, but the two dialects are not like Spanish and Portuguese, they are much more different. In either Shanghai or Beijing, people can read anything written by the other.

Still, writing with Chinese ideographs is a greater hurdle than reading, because it is an art form as well as a means of communication. You recall Mao Zedong and his little red book. Why a little red book? The reason was because Mao Zedong could not be understood by 90 percent of the people who lived in his country. His Hunan dialect was so strong that even people in Beijing could not understand what the devil he was saying. That is why he never gave speeches. If you have seen the newsreels of the time, you rarely heard Mao Zedong speaking. He might be filmed giving a speech, but it would be voiced over even for the Chinese audience. He gave few public speeches, for when he did, people often laughed at him. His country roots showed. Hunanese is different from other dialects and made him appear a “rube.” Traveling even short distances in China will bring you to a wholly different dialect. Mandarin is now the national standard, and most educated people have no problem with it. Yet if you go into the countryside, it is possible to find those who speak no Mandarin and do not understand its spoken form.

I entered the fray off schedule. I wanted to go to China because my wife, after taking Chinese studies at George Washington University, had just gotten a degree and was interested in going to China. I had bid on the job as PAO in Taipei, but that didn't work out. However, the spot as Deputy PAO suddenly became available in Beijing. I was picked for the job, and it meant I had to go into language training immediately, because the incumbent was leaving. This meant I was off-cycle from the usual startup of classes at the Foreign Service Institute, then in Rosslyn. Because of my Japanese and Korean background, they sent me to ICLS (the International Center for Language Studies) to try to use the extra time to brush up on my earlier study of Chinese characters. ICLS was a private school near the Treasury Building on 15<sup>th</sup> Street in downtown Washington. I think it is gone now.

The way ICLS worked was to hire mostly students studying in the Washington area who would agree to work a certain number of hours a week to support themselves in their studies. They were not really trained language teachers. I went there and started trying to get some of my Japanese Kanji and some of my few Korean Hanmun converted into Chinese characters. While the systems are similar, they use different techniques in writing. The Chinese use a simplified version of characters that the Japanese no longer use. The Japanese have simplified some, but simplified them differently. So you have the three languages. Korean is somewhere in the middle, using some of the older, more complex characters which the Chinese have now simplified. So you have simplified Chinese, you have the traditional Chinese which is used in Hong Kong and Taipei, and then you have the Korean style and the Japanese style. So it is a mishmash of stuff. The pronunciation is sometimes related, but while it is close enough to

readily confuse, it is not always close enough to be understood. So you can't speak Japanese in China. It doesn't work. You can't do it in Korea either.

I was confronted with that and spent a couple of months of struggle. Then I shifted over to FSI and started basic Chinese there. I came into my basic Chinese studies with one foot half in and one foot half out. My spoken Chinese was almost zero, but my written Chinese was getting along pretty well. So it made for much confusion. My instructors decided to emphasize my written abilities, but that didn't work out too well. Finally, in exasperation, I went back to ICLS to try to sort out my unique set of problems where I did not have to march to the beat of other students. Then Tiananmen occurred.

*Q: Will you explain what Tiananmen was?*

YATES: Tiananmen was the student movement in Beijing in 1989. At the time, Gorbachev was visiting Beijing, and there was a large number of American and other international media there. An uprising of students in Tiananmen Square in central Beijing quickly got out of hand. It was broadcast virtually live to the world, because of the foreign media presence. I was in Washington trying to study Chinese with distraught Chinese instructors who had family, friends, and neighbors involved. I would go to school in the morning, and we would sit and watch television coverage in Tiananmen Square. So I didn't learn a lot of Chinese at ICLS at the time.

The incident, however, certainly brought home to me some of the emotional and cultural problems of the younger Chinese generation that were related to the incident. The uprising was broken up militarily and with cruelty that was shocking to the viewers abroad. The decision to do that was obviously a hard one for the Chinese government. I think the Chinese leadership did not really understand how much of this was getting abroad, and when they finally came to a realization of how much was getting out, they tried to pull the plug. There was that famous incident where the Chinese authorities confronted American technicians from CNN in a hotel room and ordered them to pull the plug on the camera. It was quite a dramatic scene in international press history. But that sort of excitement really screwed up my Chinese study. Consequently, I did not gain much proficiency in the language. I studied Chinese for less than a year and then went off to Beijing.

*Q: What was your job?*

YATES: I was Deputy Public Affairs Officer. It was an interesting time to be in that position. I went into China through Guangzhou, also called "Canton." I flew there through Hong Kong, leaving my wife to spend some time with her family in Korea, because the evacuation order had not been lifted by that time.

The Deputy Public Affairs Officer in China had responsibility for all the USIS branches. We had four: in Guangzhou, Shanghai, Shenyang, and Chengdu. At the time, we had no branch in Beijing, but we did have our headquarters there. That was later rectified. However, coming in through Guangzhou was important to me, because I had spent time on a couple of occasions before in Hong Kong. When you went to Hong Kong in those days, you would go up to the border and look across. So that part of my introduction to China was fun. I took the train in and

was first struck by the lack of transition between the modernity and the expected antiquity of Guangzhou. It wasn't as shiny as Hong Kong, but it certainly wasn't so far away in terms of appearance. I looked for the "blue ants" but could not find them.

*Q: Blue ants being?*

YATES: The stereotypical concept of the Chinese people, marching in lines all wearing a blue uniform with a red star on the cap. It wasn't that way at all. Guangzhou was a bustling place in 1989 and was exploding with economic activity. The place was a mess with construction. We had a USIS Center at the Garden Hotel with a residence for the Director at the White Swan Hotel, at one time, the most elegant hotel in Guangzhou. It had been quickly overtaken by the building of magnificent new hotels. The White Swan was right on the river, next to where they were putting a tunnel under the harbor. The hotel had been used by an American oil company for years, so right next door was a petroleum dump which was probably dangerous, and certainly unsightly. It was on an island in the Pearl River, slightly off the mainland. You had to cross several bridges to get to it. That location was probably chosen in earlier days when foreigners were looked on as a threat to the Chinese social order. On an island, the foreigners could be contained.

If you recall the Japanese history of Nagasaki, they put the Dutch on an island called "Dejima," apart from the rest of Japan, so they could essentially stand by the bridge and make sure the nasty Dutch didn't get into the real country. The Chinese probably had something like that in mind for the intruding Americans. Because the White Swan Hotel was on an island, it made the process very difficult for people to get to and, of course, made it very easy for the Chinese to control who got in and who got out. Nonetheless, it was a reasonably comfortable life for the people who lived there.

The most striking thing about Guangzhou when I went in was the accessibility of the people. On my first couple of days, I took a walk with the Branch Public Affairs Officer there. He knew where there was what they call an "English Corner" in the city during the weekend. We visited and I spent two or three hours standing and talking with students about anything that came into their heads. The Voice of America, what America was like, was the Washington Post really a "government" newspaper, and all kinds of interesting and sometimes surprisingly sophisticated questions. These were students who just wanted to practice English, but the substance and tenor of their questions had an edge. There were informers among them. You could see that every once in a while, they would look around to see who was listening and who wasn't. Most of them just didn't care.

There in the park in Guangzhou I found a feisty Chinese spirit which I was a little bit surprised to see. Maybe I should have known better, because I had been in Korea, but the Chinese also are very independent-minded people. They are certainly not the "Blue Ants" and probably never were. That image, one of the "Scratches on Our Minds," came out of our MovieTone version of Chinese history. Peasants and people in the countryside who are not generally affected by these political tides may be willing to go along with the emperors in Beijing. The old Chinese saying, "Heaven is high and the emperor is far away," was probably one of the most characteristic things about the country, at least in Guangzhou. And the people in Guangzhou certainly were open. We

talked freely about a large number of issues in that short period of time on a Sunday afternoon in the park in Guangzhou.

The questions flew. I stood in the middle of a big circle and the Branch PAO stood in the middle of another circle. There were not very many Americans running around China at the time, so we were centers of much attraction.

*Q: When you arrived at Tiananmen, were you under any U.S. government constraints? We were pretty unhappy with the government of China for what they had done there and China was being made a pariah at that point. Were there any instructions on how to deal with the Chinese at this point?*

YATES: Not in that sense, no. I had been in the Foreign Service for a long time and didn't have to be told to be careful when living abroad. You don't get out in front of things, and you are a government official regardless of your personal feelings. But my job and the job of the people I worked with, was not to pull the covers over our heads and sulk in the corner. I was there to find out what was going on and to find out whom we could talk to, to make solid contacts, and find a way to make them continue.

For example, the Chinese had at that time put the squash on the Fulbright program. Most of the Fulbright grantees had left out of concern for their own safety. Many of the American English teachers had left. At the time, the Chinese accused us of plotting this, that the Fulbrighters had been told to leave by the American government and the Chinese really believed that. It was not true and we knew that, but they were not willing to accept our word on that issue as truth. Their view was not a matter of dogma. In their society, if the government doesn't want something to happen, it does not. If the government does want something to happen, it does. Most Chinese officials generally assumed that in the U.S., it works the same way. Since all of the Fulbrighters decamped, as well as many of the private English teachers, the assumption was the U.S. government orchestrated it, particularly since the U.S. had arranged for evacuation flights that were available to the people who wanted to leave Beijing.

The Chinese understanding of this was that we were ordering Americans out of China, but it never was required. We can't morally tell an American where to go. We can advise and make it possible for them to leave. In fact, the jets that were chartered did not always leave full. There were a lot of people who stayed in China and did not want to leave. The Chinese should have looked around a little bit and done a bit more inquiry, but they were very unhappy with the way the American government had carried out the evacuation and were not shy in expressing their displeasure. The Chinese were also very unhappy about the role of the Voice of America in Tiananmen.

*Q: When you say the Chinese in that context, you are talking about the about Chinese government?*

YATES: Yes, certainly the Chinese government. But you also have to understand something that is characteristic of other parts of Asia as well. There are a lot of people in China who are what we would call patriotic, the Radical Right, who are true-blue, flag-waving, nationalistic people

who believe in the dogma that we find so reprehensible. Our image of that dogma is colored by our own understanding of it, and it is not always very clear. Remember back in the John Stewart Service days after the Second World War, when we went through this whole business about China? He and other American diplomats in China had seen in China something that others, particularly the American media, either didn't see or were not willing to admit.

They understood that China was a communist nation and the communists were in control, but the Chinese were still Chinese in feelings, outlook, and prejudices. It must be recalled that the American government in its actions following the Second World War was not very well informed about what was going on in China. When Foreign Service folk like Service tried to shed some light on it, they were soundly and swiftly booted out under charges of all kinds of dark motives and as being closely sympathetic to the "red" cause. That action caused much trouble for the American nation in the years following, for not only was it bad scholarship, it was bad faith in the very American principles the long Second World War had been fought over.

The attitude of the Chinese people had to be divorced from that of the government, but the Chinese shared a perception of the U.S. which is not always what we would understand. We think of the masses in chains as a kind of concept that represents an oppressed people. As soon as you unlock the chains, they are going to run free. That is not the case. In fact, that happened during the Tiananmen incident. One of the fundamental rationales that was used by the Chinese government in suppressing the students was the prevention of anarchy. Any student of Chinese history can look back and see an incredible amount of anarchy in the past which has destroyed the nation, or at least led to darkness many times. Many regimes fell because of disillusion among the people and resulting chaos. That is the basic reason so many of the people in the countryside did not support what the students were doing in the city.

Seventy percent of the Chinese people live in the country. It doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that if much of that seventy percent didn't like what was going on, it would not be long before an effort was made to turn it off. If you have thirty percent of the population, that is most of the urban, educated Chinese, in support, you can make a big dent. And they did. But it wasn't enough to prevail, and it had no chance of being enough. Remember again in Chinese history, Mao Zedong's revolution occurred not in the city but in the countryside. It was his ability to organize the peasants that made the revolution possible. It was Mao Zedong's use of that technique which made it successful. In Shanghai, where the communists really started in the early part of the century, certainly after the 1918 revolution in Russia, the movement there was city-bound. It had no success whatsoever in China. There was a lot of politics, a lot of running around, but there wasn't any real success until Mao Zedong came onto the scene and organized the peasants. When those peasants were brought together, that was the first time that their movement stood a chance. If you don't bother the peasants, the Chinese government will continue. The demonstration in Tiananmen Square was not a mass revolt.

To say China was in chains is a metaphor that comes readily to hand, and there certainly were economic chains, but I am not sure you can say there were political chains. After about three years living and working in the country, I certainly do not have enough information to draw firm conclusions, and most media do not either. The political chains in effect were most evident in the cities. The countryside was still much like the old China, with the old attitudes. The farmers did

not like collective farms, and that was clearly an episode in Chinese history that made the countryside unhappy, but that was the first thing to go under the reforms. The old rural collectives are essentially gone, transformed into private plots or coops where there are not enough resources to support smaller farms.

It was not until Deng Xiaoping freed the farmers to do their own thing, sell their own produce, and invest their own accumulating capital that the countryside began to prosper relative to the cities. That is where capitalism started in China, not in the industrial zones or in the urban areas. The large state-owned industries were dead in many cases and some still hang on in a morbid state of preservation. It was in the countryside where the farmers began to produce their own goods and foster the return of capitalism to Chinese soil. Deng Xiaoping and his policy was in the Mao Zedong tradition of looking at the Chinese peasant as the source of change in China. He was also probably accurate, in his terms, that the rebellion in Beijing had to be put down, because it would have engendered chaos, a loss of confidence by the large rural population in China. In 1989 when Tiananmen occurred, even some of the students were in agreement that the demonstrations had to be shut down. The question was, how far could the government let it go?

When the industrial workers, the media, and some of the government agency people began to march in the square, the glove had been thrown down. Probably from the standpoint of the demonstrators, that was the mistake that destroyed the movement. Lacking the support of others in Beijing who were largely government workers, the movement was dying. Things were fizzling, because it was wet out in the square, it was cold, there were hunger strikers, and things were not good, they were beginning to fall apart. It was not until some of the major elements in Beijing, workers groups, got involved for a variety of their own reasons that the troops were brought heavily to bear. If you remember, when the first advance of troops tried to enter the square, they were turned around by the citizens of Beijing, as it were, simply getting in the way.

A lot of these first troops lived in the city. It wasn't until they brought troops from elsewhere, troops not related to the garrison around Beijing, that they were able to put full military force on the students. And even then, you remember the line of tanks with a single student waving his book bag; he stopped the whole line until the driver popped out of the turret and said "Get out of the way." The tank tried to go around him and could not, so the whole column stopped. A famous picture.

Why did the column stop? This was a fly in front of them compared to the events surrounding the square. What prevented the commander from running over him and continuing to the square, like all tyrants would have done? They stopped. American television made much of the courage of the student. There was no question he had a lot of courage and was a strong individual. But don't forget the soldier who had the controls in the tank and stopped and the tank commander who said, "No, don't run him over." What possessed that tank commander? I believe the reason was that the Chinese have an ethic which runs deeper than the roots of communism and military training and transcends all else, bringing the column to a halt. They do have respect for the individual. There are billions of individuals. That is not seen very much in our media concept of the Chinese.

*Q: I think we should come back to your time. What was your impression of the consulate general in Guangzhou?*

YATES: As I mentioned, it was isolated. At that time, the Chinese had cut off most relations with Americans. We had been shut out. You couldn't get meetings with people, you couldn't move around. There were all kinds of excuses: "I'm busy. It's inconvenient today, maybe some other day," etc. But the bottom line was, you didn't get meetings with people. We were building a Guangzhou USIS Center at another hotel, the Garden Hotel, apart from the consulate. It was largely finished by the time I arrived. The Branch PAO and I looked at the place. The installation had some flaws, but it was well located. It was essentially in a store front inside the hotel on the mezzanine level. The problem was, it was not downtown on a street corner, so it meant rag-a-muffin students would be uncomfortable in that place. Yet it was good for young professionals, intellectuals, and people who had some cachet in the government and who found it an interesting, clean, and different place to go. So it probably was as good as we could have obtained, given the political situation of the time.

In the new USIS Center at the Garden Hotel, we were not confined to the island, where we were apart. Although there was a great effort to "save" some undefined resources and move back onto the isolated island, that move would have been disastrous for a public affairs program. The Garden Hotel was expensive, but given that it was the only chance we had to get to people, that was a good move.

On several occasions in my trips to Guangzhou, I participated in a series of programs in which the Branch PAO was bringing in Americans who lived in the town to meet with Chinese. The reason was ostensibly to study English, but the young professionals, doctors, business people, graduate students, and even a couple of lawyers all had very wide interests. They were not a large group, 15-20, maybe 30, people at a time. Their English was fair, and they wanted to know about America. The Chinese are always interested in your personal life. On a later occasion, I was one of the Americans who went down there and sat with a group of young professionals and talked about life in America, politics, what Americans think about, freedom and liberty and all those good things which we never dreamed the Chinese would be allowed to talk about. Because it was a foreign environment, they felt a little bit more at ease, although there were obviously people among them who were reporting back on who was saying what and what questions were asked. That was deemed to be acceptable to the participants, perhaps because the "watchers" were relatives or friends.

I think those programs went a long way in helping to reach people who we would later call agenda setters. The branch in Guangzhou was important. Guangzhou is different from the rest of the country. People there were not interested in politics. It is a culture with a different language and culture. Guangzhou was the source of a lot of people who came to the US, so many people there had relatives in America in one place or another. That gives Americans, I guess, a special entree. But at that time, it was difficult for us to program speakers in Guangzhou, because they didn't want to talk about politics. They would talk about business. You could bring in an economics speaker and have wall-to-wall people. You would try to bring somebody in concerned with politics, and you wouldn't get anywhere. So we had to confine ourselves pretty much to economic questions in Guangzhou.

From there, I moved up to Shanghai on my initial trip to Beijing. Shanghai is a different city and had a different kind of clientele. As Deputy PAO, I had responsibility for a book-translation program that, interestingly enough, was started by John King Fairbank back in the late '40s.

*Q: He later became a "father" of Chinese studies at Harvard.*

YATES: He is the grand old man of Chinese studies in the US. He wrote one of the best books on Chinese history available to American students. In the '40s, he started a book translation program. There were 18 titles in his original program, and the process was essentially to pick titles, translate them into Chinese, and pass them out. I inherited a variation of that program in Beijing and had a fair amount of dealings with various publishers across China. In Shanghai, there were several large publishing houses that we were doing business with, so I became much more familiar with Shanghai than I did with some of the other cities.

Shanghai is to Beijing about what New York is to Washington in the US. It is the commercial capital of northern China. Guangzhou is the commercial capital of the south. Shanghai has the biggest port and the strongest connections with the West. That city was home to a large number of expatriates prior to the Second World War, and the famous Bund is exemplary of a European colonial seaport street. Most people would remember that Shanghai of the old bank buildings, the customs house, and the old colonial appearance that provided the live set for period movies. It was in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Shanghai that the communist movement found its origins.

The Branch PAO in Shanghai has probably as much responsibility as most small country Public Affair Officers in the world because of the strength of the community and the size of the problem we deal with. It was the place where we had our last U.S. military ship visit, for example, before our relations fell apart. Those visits, by the way, have just started again. There was a burgeoning opening in a Shanghai that was under restraint, but nonetheless possessed the latent possibilities for a very productive program since there was such an enormous interest in international affairs and trade.

That is also where I met a number of Chinese lawyers who thought they had a chance of making a dent in the Chinese legal system, which essentially did not exist. China doesn't have a system like we have. They have no tradition of a rule of law that we would recognize and that is so sacred to our own way of living. In China, society is ruled by fiat or something resembling a Germanic code. If somebody has to make a decision on someone doing something wrong, it is done by judge, not by a jury of peers. Equality before the law is not a concept that is common in China. So lawyers have a problem. There are laws, but they are aimed at regulating process in the society rather than to moderate social actions by individuals. Most people are untouched by laws other than traffic regulations and a few political dicta. Otherwise they are not generally aware of a concept of equality before the law. As law becomes more of a way of operating both business and social discourse, legal people become more important. Shanghai is where that effort is beginning.

We had problems in Shanghai because our USIS office was on the consulate grounds. One of the problems of all consulates in China is that they are surrounded by guards. After Tiananmen, steel helmeted, automatic-weapons-equipped troops were stationed about every 15-20 feet in a ring around the consulate compound. It wasn't something that would encourage people to come in to participate in public affairs programs.

We also had a problem with being part of the consulate, because it attracted enormous numbers of people just wanting visas. Shanghai is the business center of the north, and there were always a lot of people wanting to get visas. Every morning, there was a long line outside. It was like a railroad station every day. It was not very easy for distinguished people to come in and go to a program at the USIS Center. Our facilities at the consulate were in a "shed" at the back of the property, literally above a large storage space. They were totally unsuitable for us. To get to our offices, staff and guests had to walk through the consulate gates, past the main building, and down through the consulate garden. This route, of course, drove the security people wild. Arriving at the USIS offices one had to go through a portal where there were sheets of plywood lying around, a fork lift vehicle, and other items used to maintain the embassy. Then you had to walk up a flight of stairs, above one of the storerooms into a kind of "garret" arrangement where we had our program facilities and a library. Having the library in that sort of situation was not very smart, since nobody ran such gauntlet to visit a library.

So we had to get offices outside. As soon as I arrived, it was abundantly clear and the Consul General at the time agreed that we had to have different facilities. So we started our search for quarters. We did find something pretty close to the consulate, but in an independent building with no overbearing security control, at least not with automatic weapons and tin hats.

*Q: Was the security control designed to discourage Chinese from coming to the post?*

YATES: That and more, for it was also, I believe, designed to keep us in. To keep an eye on us. The Chinese were very suspicious of Americans in China at the time. They weren't protecting us because nothing dire happened in China without official blessing, so if our "protectors" wanted to turn their weapons on us, we had no security at all. If they wanted to come in, they would come in. It was clear that if the Chinese government (à la Iran) decided that the students should give the Americans their comeuppance, we were naked there in the wind. They were not protecting us much. Perhaps because of the very severe penalties for robbing or harming a foreigner in China, we were not bothered much by burglaries or other criminal threats. It was at once secure and not secure.

On the other hand, the Chinese forces surrounding us were there to control Chinese access to us. Every Chinese person who approached the consulate was stopped by the Chinese guards and asked what they wanted. Their names and "danwei" membership was recorded. A "danwei" is a work unit. Their unit identification was looked at, and it was reported back to their superiors what they were up to. So it wasn't easy for a Chinese citizen to walk up to the consulate and go in unless he had an official reason to do so. Usually they required an official letter from us and official approval from their danwei to make a visit. So they had pretty strong locks on their citizenry. It wasn't always successful in keeping people out, and we tried to the extent possible to make it easier for people to enter. Yet being at the consulate really kept us out of the mainstream.

So we had to move out. Once I had looked into the issue of the book publishing program in Shanghai, I was free to begin to look into the access problem.

*Q: How were books selected?*

YATES: That was a program I ran after I got to Beijing. When I arrived, it had close to a 100 titles in process of some sort or either—under consideration, had been published, or were in the process of being worked on. The process was a little complicated. We did the translations in Beijing itself. The basic principle of the program was to put the best of American writing in the hands of Chinese in a manner that most educated people could access. We didn't have a lot of money to use for the project, but what we could offer the Chinese was an ability to find good materials that were worthy of translation and assist them in bringing a translation to print. We would buy the first 2,000 volumes of the resulting Chinese edition, hard bound. This was not a big money-making operation for publishers, but it did provide U.S. dollars, hard currency, which most of them put into Hong Kong accounts.

We had about 32 Chinese publishers who were in the program. Among them was the People's Liberation Army Press, and this caused me a bit of surprise. Particularly in the aftermath of Tiananmen, what was the People's Liberation Army Press doing publishing USIS selected American titles in Chinese and selling them in the market? The Chinese, on the other hand, saw nothing amiss, but did prefer to stay solely on military biographies and military issues.

One of the characteristics of this program was that we would provide the material and buying the translation rights, if needed, through USIA in Washington. Once we had the rights, we would enter into a commercial contractual arrangement with the Chinese publisher, giving them an up-front payment for about 2,000 volumes. This didn't amount to much money, because in China books are pretty cheap, thirty to forty cents a copy. Sometimes we would contribute to the translation costs, but not very often. We tried to make it as much of a commercial operation as possible.

The company would translate the volume with people we approved as translators, give us a manuscript of the translation. We would then send it to Hong Kong where Chinese who were not communists would take a look at it to make sure it was a good translation, the language was appropriate to the text and that it was done in a manner we could put our name to. Not all of them got through. As a matter of fact, about half of them didn't. They were heavily edited in Hong Kong and sent back to the publisher through us for reworking. When a final approval of the manuscript came back from Hong Kong, the publisher would publish the book and we would take our copies. The other copies of the book would then be put on sale in the Chinese market, with all profits going to the Chinese publisher. In the case of the Peoples' Liberation Army Press, we expected most copies would be handled through military channels, but that was fine with us since the military was the most natural audience for the kinds of things put into translation. Commercial publishers put a fair number of the titles out through the Chinese commercial distribution system. One might suspect that the publishers simply pocketed the hard dollars we paid and dumped the rest of the run, but we did random checks of book stores and government outlets to see if our titles were making it out.

And, that happened. I was in Nanning a couple of years later and took some extra time to wander in the local bookstores. That was one of my habits as I traveled about China. Nanning is way down by the Vietnamese border, far off the beaten track. There were not even very many tourists there, certainly not very many Americans. I was down there for a conference. If time allowed, I would would prowl around the bookstores and look for our titles in each city I visited. And, sure enough, I found one of our translated titles on American nuclear policy in a bookshop in Nanning. That to me was very gratifying. It showed the books were getting out and were available to the Chinese to buy if they had the money.

Usually the publisher would put out a hardback edition as the first 2,000 or so copies that we purchased as part of the publication agreement. We used those copies for presentations when we made visits to Chinese offices. In most of Asia, people have a great deal of respect for the printed word. If you can give a person a gift of books, that is a compliment to them, because you are acknowledging that they have the intellectual prowess to have an interest in serious work. They often would place them in a prominent bookcase in their office or take them home to enjoy in private. Always they were appreciated. Books on the shelf of one's home were the mark of an intellectual man. So the 2,000 copies that we received were used by our Beijing Officers and Branch Officers as gifts. The rest of the print run, however, usually was prepared in paperback binding because they were cheaper for the individual to purchase.

We had about 100 titles which were chosen by us. My role was to select titles, approach publishers who might have a special interest in that subject matter, and make an offer to have the title published. In regard to the selection process, we gathered ideas from various sources. For example, we had a Fulbrighter who was working up in Shenyang at a university. She was in Beijing for a visit and said one of the things that surprised her a lot in teaching about America was the enormous interest in the American West and American Indians in particular. The Chinese seemed to take to this idea of a frontier mentality. Possibly it was the romance of the noble Indian that attracted them. So out of that comment grew the idea to put together a series on the American West in translation into Chinese, which we did. Everything from Larry McMurtry right back to some Indian writers, Indian poetry. The Fulbrighter agreed to help compile a short list of titles that would appeal most to her students. Her final list was edited a bit and then shown to a number of publishers who were asked if they would be interested in doing a series. In Asia, as in many other countries, people like to collect things in series. This was to become a series on the American West. A publisher was selected and the series got under way. As far as I know, it was completed. I think there were 12 volumes in all. It encompassed a wide range from the Lewis and Clark diaries, and "The Virginian," through the expansion westward. Part of the appeal of the American Indian to the Chinese was the chance to read about the freedom and spirit, particularly the Indian philosophy of identification with nature. That made a lot of sense to those steeped in the teachings of Taosim which has a similar point of view.

Another series we did later on was on American law. In the U.S., there is a book publishing company which specializes in notes for law students, "The Nutshell" series. It is intended to provide a student in an American law school a quick review of a particular subject like tort law, civil law, commercial law, or human rights. In this series, there also were about a dozen volumes. We were able to get this series published, and they sold out very quickly.

One of the most popular books that we had in the program was a book by Len Bernstein, "The Joy of Music." That one the publisher couldn't keep in print. There was another volume on American dance, which wouldn't sell here at all; it vanished overnight in the bookstalls in China. Some of the stuff didn't move fast, volumes on policy and other deeper subjects didn't move very quickly, but other things they liked.

I mentioned the People's Liberation Army Publishing House. I arranged a meeting with a representative of the press. That was a difficult process, since you could not call to an Army number directly. You had to go around a long route and pass a verbal or written message to the person you wished to speak with and get that person to call you. The telephone exchanges in Beijing are not interconnected. I found out later that it isn't in North Korea either. The military has a separate exchange, its own system. So if you want to talk to the military, you essentially have to send a letter, because they can't call you. They have to go to some place outside the military compound to call you. Anyway, I made an arrangement with the publisher. I could not go to his military compound for the meeting, so we arranged to meet for lunch at a hotel.

At the lunch, there was a Senior Colonel, the equivalent of a brigadier general in our parlance, myself, and a couple of his people. I told him that this was post-Tiananmen, and I could understand his reluctance to continue with this program. I offered that we might postpone it for a while. I would leave it up to him. He said, "Not at all. We want more titles and I have some specific ideas." He wanted to do books on Eisenhower, on Marshall, and biographies of other military leaders, obviously for training reasons. That was okay. The military is an important audience for us in our efforts to communicate with possible future Chinese leaders. They were willing to go along, so we continued. We did books essentially on American military subjects. With the Peoples' Liberation Army Press, we had plans to do several longer books on American naval history, but we hadn't gotten started on that by the time I left.

For most publishers, we tried to select books that appealed to a wide spectrum. "Habits of the Heart," for example, is a book on social issues. The most important series that I worked on was the "Library of America." In the US, I don't see much of it advertised any more, but it is a basic collection of 40 or 50 volumes of American writing, most now in the public domain. It is the collected works of Lincoln, Thoreau, Poe, Hawthorne, the big presences in American culture. It is a very respected series, because they picked the best of those writers and did very careful editing. I got the best publisher we had in Beijing to gradually work through that series. These volumes are about 1,200-1,500 pages each. They are printed on non-acidic, very thin paper so that it can fit on your bookshelf, but they are massive volumes of collected writings. There were the collected works of Mark Twain, Faulkner, etc.

The publisher very much wanted to do the series with the same level of quality and seriousness. So we made an arrangement with the Library of America in New York, a non-profit organization devoted to encouraging an appreciation of the best of American letters. That program worked. It is still in progress. They use the Library of America logo and it is promoted as the Library of America. Financially, it is probably a great loss to the publisher, except that they get some foreign currency from the ones we buy and have their logo on a very prestigious series. Nonetheless, the program, itself, is a deficit operation for the publisher since each copy in the final version costs about \$3, but while that is less than 10% of the U.S. price, it still is too

expensive for the usual Chinese consumer. Yet the publisher wanted to do it because it was a prestige item for them. This was the best of American work in a very scholarly format that would present American thought and ideas, Thoreau, for example. Emerson was in one of the volumes first published.

A little side note on the volumes of the Lincoln papers that we had selected for inclusion in the series. When I selected a list of titles for possible translation, I would send it back to USIA which would then buy them and send them out for a complete review prior to offering them to a publisher. I had received a two volume set on the Lincoln writings which included his speeches and letters, etc. I had them in the office and had already set up a time to consult with a publisher when I received a call from the ambassador's office saying, "We hear you have two volumes of Lincoln." I said, "Yes." "We need them this afternoon." "Why?" It turns out that the ambassador was going to see Jiang Ze Min.

*Q: The head of state?*

YATES: Yes. Jiang Ze Min is a Lincoln fan. He has great respect for his writings, so the ambassador wanted to present him with the most distinguished set that he could quickly lay his hands on. That was the set that I had planned to use with the Chinese publisher that afternoon to begin the process of its translation into Chinese. I had to give it up, and as far as I know, my two volumes of Abraham Lincoln are sitting on Jiang Ze Min's bookshelf today. This underscores again the importance of literature and books. Jiang Ze Min has a favorite habit of quoting to visiting dignitaries small portions of the Gettysburg Address or other utterances of American notables like Lincoln. It floors people who come to see him. Lincoln has an incredible following in China.

*Q: Did you find that the "Federalist Papers" rang any bells? The reason I mention this, is in an interview I was doing yesterday. We talked about how, when Helmut Schmidt was chancellor of Germany, he used to quote the "Federalist Papers" in the Bundestag and most people would respond. They had read it. You didn't have to say this was an American thing. He would just say in the "Federalist Papers" number 3, etc. This was the guts of American government.*

YATES: Of course, Germany has a federalist system and maybe there is more direct connection there. The Chinese don't have a federal system. I can't honestly tell you that the *Federalist Papers* have a strong resonance in China. Certainly not to that degree. But I think it is fair to say that the Chinese have a great respect for the writings of our founding fathers, at least those they know.

Where we have a better shot with the Chinese is from people like Thoreau. The idea of civil disobedience is, of course, a hot one in China, but a more fundamental concept that is popular with the Chinese is Thoreau's thoughts about man's relationship to nature. This is similar to the attraction to the philosophy of the American Indian mentioned earlier. If you look at Chinese art, that same relationship between man and nature has been exhibited for many centuries. So the Chinese find resonance with this kind of thing more than the overtly political thought that is represented by the *Federalist Papers*. Maybe now with the new legal movement in China, there is a possibility that some very important people will find that kind of connection with American

thinking. So an important part of the book program was to have this kind of intellectual spread. Within the book program was art, a dose of literature, letters with a strong smattering of American political philosophy (Lincoln, Jefferson and Hamilton), etc.

*Q: You were saying that Edgar Alan Poe was included.*

YATES: Yes, that was a surprise to me. Certainly he is an important writer in American literary history, but my feeling was there were more important writers to include. It was a case of concession to the publisher. The publisher felt that Poe would be a successful volume. He thought that he could sell Poe even at a high price because of the high Chinese knowledge of that writer. Recall that in Chinese history, our first point of contact was the missionaries who had a penchant for forming schools. There are still a fair number of Chinese intellectuals out there in the woods who were schooled in these American missionary-run schools. What the missionaries taught were things that they knew about, and that included a lot of American authors. So Faulkner, Hemingway, Poe, all are authors that the Chinese have followed over the years. If they haven't read them, at least they know about them.

Mark Twain also has a big following there. The Tom Sawyer adventures, of course, are well known. Other popular titles, things like *Gone With the Wind* are well known to Chinese readers. When I was there, we weren't involved in titles like that, but remember when the sequel to *Gone With the Wind* was published? It was called *Scarlet*, and, I guess, it did not have a very good reputation in the American market. I haven't read it and wouldn't have anything to do with it as part of our translation programs. However, one of the publishers was deep into it and translated the entire volume of *Scarlet* in a very short time. He had an over-night best seller which sold out as soon as it hit the bookstores. The second printing was also immediately sold out. It was a great commercial success.

Although we had no program interest in it, the Chinese reading public was eager to get it even at the great price it commanded in the market. It also gave me the clue that there was a willingness to part with money if the book were really desired. The market, like most things in China, is vast and the publishers stand to gain a lot of money if they have something that even a very small percentage of the Chinese public finds of interest. So our primary publisher in Beijing that handled the Library of America, for example, knew that once he got it, he would still have it when the market matured. He was the man on the spot with an approved translation which was co-sponsored by the American Embassy, as it were, and would then be able to take the premier leadership, like Hollywood. The first one out gets the worm.

*Q: Looking at strategy, when you were at the embassy during this difficult time, 1998-92, when relations vis-a-vis the Chinese mainlanders were in the deep freeze more or less, what was the strategy? Did you sit down and figure out that this was what we should do during this particular time?*

YATES: Yes. The approach following Tiananmen in 1989 was largely keeping body and soul together. The Chinese had systematically cut USIS out of much of the discourse that was going on between the two countries and there was official antagonism. That antagonism wasn't very deep, however, and it was possible to penetrate this kind of official wall they had built around us.

As I mentioned before, they had put guards around all of our installations. They never interfered with an American coming and going, unless he or she were a Chinese-American, but they did interfere with our visitors and Chinese staff. So our main business at that time was to hold the organization together and keep the American morale up. Branch PAOs, who had access to many people before, could no longer see them. Telephone calls were not returned. Attempts to visit schools or make office calls were shunted aside. The Fulbright program was flat. Candidates for the international visitor's program could not get approved.

They have a system in China called the Waiban. He is sort of a gatekeeper for foreign visitors and relationships with foreigners. The Waiban has to approve any kind of contact. Beyond that, each individual work unit, or "danwei" as they call it, has to discuss it with the individual and they have to have their work unit approve it first before the contact is made. Then it has to go through the Waiban and the appropriate ministry. You can imagine in a bureaucracy the size of China's how difficult this was. The upshot was that we were not getting anywhere. We had no Fulbright program, no exchange program, and people generally would not come into our facilities. We had to start from zero again.

We were lucky, because we had a large group of local employees who could get access. We could get out of the office and where the Chinese had a particular interest, like the publishing program, they were happy to continue the relationship. Publishers, for example, gave very firm assurances that nothing important would change. They would continue, but we must be discreet about how we did business. They didn't want trouble, but they didn't want to kill the golden goose either.

*Q: When you tell about being discreet, did you also feel that we should be somewhat discreet because of public and media pressure in the United States that we don't want to be too cozy with these Chinese because of Tiananmen?*

YATES: That may be a factor in the relations between the political, economic, and other sections of the embassy, but our USIS business was not so influenced. Our business is establishing ties. That doesn't mean coziness but enough contact to get the word out. Our business is communication, not locking doors. So while we assumed there would be some in Congress or parts of the U.S. who would be very unhappy with our attempts to try to find ways to communicate with the Chinese, I think most people would agree that this was an important thing to do. We had to maintain ties with those who were our friends in China, those who were most inclined to understand and possibly sympathize with our point of view. We had to sustain that kind of contact discretely, always with the awareness that we could not place any of these contacts in jeopardy with the authorities.

More dangerous than our problem with Congress was their problem with their own ideologues. So someone who was a professor and interested in American studies would have to be very circumspect in his contact with us and we had to be circumspect in our attempts to maintain contact. So that was an important constraint on our ability to act. What we always had to keep in mind was not only how much this would affect our political relationships at home, but, more importantly, how our actions would affect that person's relationships with his or her own leadership in Beijing or other parts of China. It was hard, because for a time right after

Tiananmen, there was virtually no contact. At work, we kept the lights on and tried the best we could but, in fact, were rebuffed on most occasions.

When I first arrived in China, one of the first things I did, like any Foreign Service Officer going abroad, was to make a round of “courtesy” calls. You go in and say “Hi, I am so-and-so and am here to do such-and-such. Glad to meet you” and then go home. With my books under my arms for presentations, I went around to the branch posts and made these calls on as many Chinese officials as I could cram into schedules of several days in each city. My visits also gave the Branch Public Affairs Officers a reason to call their contacts and say that there was a visiting fireman in town from Beijing and he would like to bring him around for a “courtesy” call. This would give the BPAO a chance for a new or repeat contact which he or she otherwise would not have. My presence was a commodity to be marketed.

One particular incident occurred was when I visited Shenyang and our branch office there.

*Q: Shenyang is where?*

YATES: It is in the north eastern part of China, up near North Korea.

*Q: Is that the old Daren?*

YATES: No, Daren is a port down on the coast. It is the old Mukden. It was a Chinese rail head and became an industrial center during the Japanese occupation of Manchuria. It is a dirty, tough town. It is an industrial city and pollution is extremely high. There are Mexico City-levels of pollution there. I understand that it hasn't changed much in the years since I left. I just spoke with someone recently who had just came back and said it is as bad as ever. This was a person who had bronchial troubles while there, the air was so bad. Just breathing was a definite health hazard, particularly to our people who are there for a long term. There is also a morale problem.

I had to go up there relatively often, because the Branch Public Affairs Officer is one of a small number of the official American community and the sole representative of USIS. Shenyang has only a very small consulate and a connected apartment building. Living is not terribly luxurious. One of the difficulties is that food supplies are limited and you have to get a lot of what you need from Beijing. Particularly before we arrived there, China was famous for its limited supplies of food, especially in the winter when most fresh vegetables disappeared. People in Beijing frequently ran out of things, let alone people who lived in Shenyang. So, traditionally, it was a tough place to work.

I made a visit there and saw the local provincial head of the Waiban, the person with responsibility for all international contacts, including, of course, Americans. The visit with him was typical of the visits that I had all around the country. I remember this one because it was so graphic. I drove up with the Branch PAO to the front of the provincial capital and went into his office which was on the second floor. It was a nice office, large with upgraded furniture. He was a fairly high ranking person. After greetings, we sat down and one of his assistants was called in with a notepad and sat in the corner off to our side. He began taking notes of our conversation. The provincial chief really laid me out about the Voice of America which he termed was an

affront to the Chinese people. It had insulted the feelings of the Chinese people by aiding and abetting the Tiananmen protesters. It was an incident that was an embarrassment to everybody, etc. He went on and on and on. It was a very well rehearsed speech that I had heard in other places. He went on with his diatribe on the Voice of America, the inequities of the American government and how it has done such terrible things in history, for six or seven minutes. It was quite a show.

Then the note taker closed his pad and put his pencil down, and then we got down to business. We then spoke about why I was there and he was very personable. He asked me where I was from, what was my experience, how he would like to get to know me, and other pleasantries common to such occasions. At that time, I presented him with the books which he accepted with a big smile. It was quite a stack of books. There were a number of books on the U.S. in Chinese and a boxed set of three books on the US. They were paperbacks but collected in a nicely framed box. We went through the pleasantries and promises of cooperation and help. I noticed that the note taker wasn't taking any more notes. He was just sitting there, listening and smiling and being very pleasant.

After about 15 - 20 minutes of that, he cleared his throat, the note taker opened his book, and I got another blast on the earlier subjects. I sat and listened. It is hard when you are being roasted as if you were in court being charged with heinous crimes. Anyway, the Branch PAO and I sat through another five minutes or so of the diatribe while the note taker recorded every thought. When the Waiban finally ran out of steam, that was the end of the meeting. We shook hands amiably and were escorted out of the office and down the hall, with the BPAO and me in the lead as customary. As we proceeded down the hall, I turned around to say goodbye as we approached the stairs and observed the note taker and my new friend, the Waiban, had the gift books opened and were absorbed in animated conversation with big smiles. Their attention was so intense that I had no opportunity to offer preliminary goodbyes, so just turned and walked down the stairs.

To me, that was an illustration of what you have to be careful about in judging Chinese rhetoric. If you listen too carefully to the argument, you get a distorted view of what is going on. In this visit, the Waiban was really happy that we came. He was overjoyed with the books because they are hard to get. He was pleased with them and saw some value in them, because he carried them under his arm. He followed me down to the car outside, the note taker had long before stopped taking notes and was all smiles. With warm handshakes, we said goodbye beside the car. It was a very personable and valuable visit. However, if we had argued with him or taken offense at what he said, we would have gotten nowhere, and the visit would have been a disaster. I had learned that lesson the hard way in previous conversations with Chinese officials. We now had his cooperation and pledges of help in getting our visiting speakers into the city, placing our Fulbrighters and speakers at the university, and making sure we had the right contacts for the book program with publishers who would be able to take our materials. All of these were things we wanted to get out of the visit.

We met our objectives by simply closing our ears and minds during the time of the note taking. He had to record his speeches in those notes so that they could be reported back to his own hierarchy in the political system. They said, "Look, this is what I told those nefarious Americans." He had the notes to demonstrate his resolve and support for the strident policy and

the note taker to confirm what was said. Everything was fine. On the other hand, he also was able to do his business and get what he really wanted. He wanted a Sister City relationship between an American city and Shenyang. We promised and later made every effort to locate a city willing for the tie up. Ultimately, we were not successful, but the demonstrable effort was there. There is a glut of these formal relationships and American cities are reluctant to step off into new ones. The Waiban's motives were, of course, his desire for commercial connections with the US. For that, he was very affable. Those notes, I am fairly confident, were not part of the official record. If you gave them space to do what they had to do, you could come up with very workable and very positive relationships with the Chinese, even the seemingly intractable ones.

Some of the more affable Chinese, the most warm, the ones who would put their arm around you, were the ones to be most wary of. They often were the strongest ideologues. A sort of reverse radish; white on the outside but very red on the inside. They were often the very ones who had been trained as handlers of foreigners, especially Americans. Naturally, not all enthusiastically friendly Chinese were like that, but one had to choose friends carefully.

Another vignette. On one occasion I visited "Diaoyutai," the official residence of the leadership in Beijing. It is located immediately to the west of the Forbidden City. It is a beautiful compound. My wife and I were seated for most of the dinner next to one of those Western handlers. As is the custom in many Chinese official banquets, we were drinking mao-tai, a strong-flavored Chinese drink that is highly alcoholic. It is not bad if you are eating heavy or greasy Chinese food, but it can get to you pretty fast. The Chinese officials attending, like most Chinese government workers, were not rich, so these banquets for foreign dignitaries were wonderful times to eat a lot and absorb as much as they can of the strong drink. This bureaucrat kept pouring down the mao-tai, and it was fascinating to watch the metamorphosis, the butterfly turned into caterpillar. As the evening wore on, he became stripped of his inhibitions about talking about his beliefs and turned into a real communist very quickly.

This was one of the nicest, warmest, most affable and most understanding and Western type Chinese we had ever had contact with in Beijing. But underneath a lot of that was the other side of the Chinese, a real dyed-in-the-wool ideologue. There was no point in arguing with him, because his opinions were rooted as religious commitment to his interpretation of politics. You had to be careful. Those who looked like ideologues often turned out not to be, and those who didn't look like ideologues very often turned into the worse kind. You had to be selective in what kind of relationships you had with people, because you could set yourself up for things as well.

*Q: Let's stop at this point. I will put a few things here so we will know where we start next time. We have talked about your arrival, your book program, the problems in Shanghai, the fact that you had to deal with a deep freeze situation, but you could get through to some people if you were willing to listen to an ideological prelude before you got down to business. A couple of things I would like to ask in the 1989-92 period. Were you seeing any impact or monitoring what the Voice of America was doing? Was it having any impact in China, good, bad, or indifferent? Also your impression of American, but other correspondents, who were in China during this time of immediate post-Tiananmen. Also about the ambassador and your impression of the embassy. Do you have anything you would like to put in?*

YATES: It will probably emerge. We haven't talked much about Beijing and the conditions while I was there. We haven't talked much about Chengdu, which was another one of our branches or, for that matter, Shenyang. Each of them presented a separate problem that confronted me there. Other things in Beijing that deserve mention would be our attempts to make some breakthroughs in terms of communicating with the Chinese, not face to face, but electronically. And some of the telecommunication problems we had within the country itself. Something about life style in the country, the diplomatic community at that time. The main thing I think we should discuss is the state of the exchange program, one of our major efforts in China, and secondarily the Fulbright program.

*Q: This is May 15, 1997. Ken, maybe we ought to start with Beijing and life there, the diplomatic life style and what you observed there.*

YATES: When I arrived in 1989, Beijing was a city under internal siege. Security forces still held much of the city in strict control. Traffic was difficult mainly because of bicycles. During the commuter hours, the city was a sea of bicycles. There were separate channels on major roads for bicycles only, so there would be an island in the road for the vehicular traffic and a rather wide bicycle paths on both sides. That helped a lot in channeling them, but when the two clashed at intersections, there were a lot of problems, and the bicycles clogged up traffic quite a bit.

It was a pretty quiet city, dusty and very badly polluted. At both ends were large power generating facilities and much of the heavy industry was located to the west. This meant that every time the breeze blew from the west, the prevailing wind, it brought all the soot and pollutants right over the city. To keep a house clean was a major problem, because with the windows open, there was always dust and black soot drifting in. So Beijing at that time was not a very healthy place.

Food in Beijing, despite much ado about Chinese cooking, was not very good. You could go out to restaurants to eat, but sanitary conditions were not the best. The quality of the foodstuffs, themselves, was not very high. If you depended on the local market for edibles, you were in trouble. There were private markets where you could shop, but selection was not always extensive and who knew what made the greens grow. If you knew enough about the city, could get around a little bit, and had some Chinese, you could shop in those markets and do all right. At least in the private markets, you could pick the goods out yourself and take them home to cook. But that took a lot of time and is a lot of work. As in most traditional Asian societies, the wife of a family starts early in the morning to prepare the day's meals and works all day long on them. Unlike dropping down to the Safeway here, you didn't go down the street and pick up a few things on your way home from work for dinner. You had to really work at it and prepare it in advance. You bought live, un-plucked chickens and things like that. But even in the early '90s, things were getting better very quickly for the Chinese, as well as for the expatriate community.

Prior to the late '80s and before Deng Xiaoping instituted the reforms which led to the opening up of the peasant market, just about all of the markets were collectivized. All of the produce was handled by the government, and people in Beijing were reduced to little more than cabbage and tea in the winter. There was rice, but it was not always plentiful; cabbage always was.

So that meant that things were better by the time we arrived. The meat was better, but you had to be careful when you bought it on the open market. Many of the foreign community would shop at what were called “Friendship Stores” which were run by the Chinese government for hard currency. So if you had green dollars, you could go in and buy international brands of things like frozen meat, sodas, booze, and some goods like suitcases which came out of Hong Kong. The standard of living was not terrible, but it certainly was Spartan.

Yet, things were changing awfully fast. Major hotels in town were sprouting up like weeds all over the place. They were international class hotels and they had pretty good restaurants. They were outstanding when compared to the standard (and for the most part very much cheaper) fare you had available downtown. There were a number of famous restaurants in Beijing. For example, the Beijing Duck restaurant, which I did not like. The duck was greasy and greasy duck in one week was enough to last for a couple more weeks. As residents, we did not go there very often. Those were “banquet” restaurants, aiming at formal dinners and the tourist market. There were some Korean restaurants in town, a couple of which we liked. Others were not very good and had to settle for the quality of ingredients similar to that one could get on the open market. So it was kind of a hit or miss situation on food.

Entertainment was limited. Chinese television did not have anywhere near the selection you have these days on American television. For news, you could listen to the Voice of America which most people did in the mornings, or BBC or Radio Australia. Chinese television programs tended to be pretty stale and not very interesting. It was interesting to watch CCTV dramas occasionally to get a glimpse of Chinese life, but as a standard diet, they soon paled.

Travel was fascinating if you had the time and patience. The problem was, China is an enormous country, the size of the U.S. end to end. Near Beijing, there were the Western Hills on the outskirts and the Summer Palace and various reasonably close sights such as the Great Wall and the Ming Tombs. Once you have seen the Great Wall, however, there is no reason to go back there. There are a lot of old wives’ tales from travelers which were always fun to talk about. The Great Wall is not a Great Wall after all. It is a lot of pieces of little walls all over the northern part of China. That image of a single wall was hard to get people to let go of.

We had an incident, for example, of a well known woman runner from the U.S. who came out to China to “run” the Great Wall from one end to the other. She was all equipped with special gear and obviously had made a lot of preparations. We had to gently but persuasively convince her that there was no such thing as “the” Great Wall. She would not be able to start on one end and make it through to the other in one long trot. Since they were scattered all over the area and many were in various stages of disrepair and some were long gone, her mission was truly impossible.

There are common myths about the Great Wall. For example, it was said that the Great Wall was the only man-made object the astronauts could see from the moon. Despite that claim appearing in more than several official tourist brochures, it is completely false. The wall is not very tall in many places. It is impressive, but only about 4 stories tall. You couldn’t see a four story building from the moon, so you didn’t have much of a chance to see the Great Wall either. You can’t see

it from the moon, not even with good equipment. But, nevertheless, the Chinese were very proud of saying that.

Despite the misconceptions, China was a feast for a tourist. Many parts of China were worth visiting. Shanghai, of course, was interesting just because of the importance of the city in antiquity and as the most cosmopolitan of the mainland urban areas. Chengdu, which is in the center of the country in Szechwan province, was the old western capital of China and at the terminus of the silk road; the eastern most point, it is a fascinating place with outstanding food. It takes a very long weekend to get there, do something and get back to Beijing.

As time went on, things got steadily, and in some places rapidly, better. That was true also for the multiplying hotel restaurants in the franchised establishments often invested in by various Chinese official organizations, including the military and the police. There was an Indian restaurant that appeared at a Holiday Inn on the western side of Beijing and was a delightful place to eat. It had pretty good control of the quality of the food which I think was imported through the hotel.

I drive an older BMW. When I took the car to China, I was told I was out of my mind. Firstly, I would not get any parts, and secondly, it wouldn't run on the available gasoline which, of course, was leaded. There were going to be all kinds of problems. In reality, I had no problems. I discovered a semblance of a dealership in Beijing which was in the process of becoming established and was managed by an expatriate Yugoslav. By the same measure, all of these old tales I tell you of life in Beijing are certainly now outmoded by far, because things are changing so rapidly.

As the hotels developed in their sophistication, they also started bringing in foreign amenities like supermarkets. Beijing was growing in commercial importance and therefore attracted a much larger number of international folk, all of whom needed some sort of support like what they were accustomed to at home. They also were willing to pay a premium for it. There was the Watson group out of Hong Kong, which moved in to take advantage of the new and rapidly growing market. You could go into their market in the arcade of one of the major hotels and be surprised at what looked like a real supermarket, with rows and rows of canned goods and frozen Australian beef. The meat was pretty dry, but nonetheless, it was a great leap forward compared to what was available for the expatriate community.

Housing was lousy in Beijing but much better than it had been. Everything depends on the development of the country. Previously, people who worked at the American Embassy had to live in hotels. That was the first stage. Then the Chinese put together an expatriate community not far from the American Embassy where many people lived. But that was run down. The Chinese tended to build buildings that looked and operated as if they were ten years old when they opened. This owed much to the indifferent construction. Cement, I guess, was thin, elevators would not work reliably, and painting was mainly whitewash and not the kind of durable stuff that we are accustomed to. This meant every time someone walked down the hall and bumped into the wall, there was a mark. It didn't take very long, given the situation there, to turn a new building into a slum. It was a difficult place to live in.

We moved into a brand new apartment when we arrived, and we felt very fortunate. When the embassy put the carpet in, it looked fine. The problem was, it had been stored somewhere uncontrolled for a couple of years and was infested with brown moths. Thousands of them. Every night, these things would come out and swarm on the walls. When I took my problem to the General Services Office, they said it couldn't be anything they had done and must be coming from outside. "How were our screens?" Of course, there was nothing wrong with the screens; the problem lay under the carpet. The padding underneath was infested. Ultimately, we had to rip up the entire carpet and replace the padding, which is difficult after you have moved into a wall-to-wall carpeted apartment. Even today, from some of our goods that were packed in Beijing and not opened until we got back to Washington, I swear I can recognize some of those brown moths emerging.

Those were the living conditions we faced in Beijing. Every once in a while, the elevators wouldn't run, and if you lived on the ninth floor as we did, you had a major problem. It was okay if you were home when they stopped, but if you were outside coming in, you were in trouble. Luckily, each building had two elevators and if the one for your side of the building was out, you had to take the one on the other side. When you got to your floor, you had to take a sort of catwalk on the outside of the building across to your side of the building. That was unnerving if you suffered from even mild vertigo and it was a windy day. We would have to walk outside of the ninth floor level to get to our side of the building.

Also, in the part of town where we lived, the new Australian Embassy was being built. In Beijing, with good reason, they kept all trucks off the streets during the day. Trucks could only run at night. That meant that the noise on the streets was highest in the evening when trucks were running back and forth delivering gravel and cement. You had the beep-beep-beep noise that goes on when trucks back up, and this went on all night from about 11:00 to 4:00 in the morning. All this was accompanied by the intermittent crash of gravel being dumped on the ground, so it didn't make for a very pleasant existence.

Another little quirk in the Chinese system usually occurred in June when they would turn off the hot water. The philosophy was that you don't need hot water because it was June. It was warm. This was probably true, but you want to take a shower and cold showers are just about as cold in June as they are in December. That meant no hot water for anything in the apartments. Some embassies rented hotel rooms so people could take a towel, a bar of soap, and go down to the hotel and use the shower at least a couple of times a week. So this was not gracious living in the sense I am sure members of Congress would see life in the Foreign Service. It was not easy in a whole variety of ways. For example, you could not drink the water, which meant you had to drink bottled water. You could either take what the embassy provided or use the tablets they gave you and make your own. In the more remote parts of China where the embassy didn't have a supply of bottled water, they had distillers. Each embassy apartment was provided with one, so you could distill your own water. If you have ever had to drink distilled water, you know it does not taste very good. Once you distill the water, you have to aerate it and in aerating it, of course, you then introduce the possibility of more of introducing those things that you were distilling out. Anyway, it was not easy.

We had a resident doctor in Beijing for the many ills and problems that were likely to occur. A psychiatrist visited from time to time to try to soothe the pressures from the day-to-day existence. Security remained a worry for many people. The wife of the Public Affairs Officer was threatened with a knife in the market one day. There were then, and I am sure there still are today, people in China who don't like foreigners and essentially insist that you leave one way or another. That made life nerve wracking, especially for wives who were not working and who had to make other things interesting for themselves like shopping or moving around the city. That was hard and sometimes dangerous. There were a couple of knifings while we were there. Mostly teenagers who would get into trouble. For children, there was not much to do, and this meant additional pressures on families. We didn't have kids, so it wasn't much of a problem for us, but those who had them found there were a lot of things they did not have for their children that they wished they had.

But life was still interesting, because you could move around China and learn much. You could go to some place that was old and different. Because you could exhaust the major sights in Beijing rather quickly, you probably did not go back very often. How many times would you want to go through the Forbidden City, for example? It is interesting, and every time you go there, you find something different, but it pretty much stays the same. There were museums that would change their exhibits now and then. But in many ways, it certainly was not a world class exhibition city. So you found your interests where you could. People who worked, of course, found it in the work, which was remarkably interesting because of the constant challenges at that time. But for the diplomatic community, it was like a ghetto. You lived with other diplomats from all over the world.

There was not an American ghetto or African ghetto, it was all mixed up. But that meant you probably had people living next to you who had kids who didn't have any money. That was particularly true for the diplomats from the smaller nations in Africa or the third world countries that Beijing had cultivated for so many years who had no salaries to speak of and had to innovate to get along. The Chinese had simply given them space for embassies to maintain those relations. So they were living check-by-jowl with people who were relatively rich and that led to temptations. In one of the compounds, there was something that could loosely be termed as gangs comprised of the youth of some third world countries. I guess you could say that most of the danger from theft or burglary probably was from other foreigners. If something happened, the Chinese police would say it was a foreign problem and had nothing to do with them. We didn't get much help.

In the residential areas, the security was not pervasive. You had privacy, but there was a strong probability that all the apartments were bugged. We were on the ninth floor, the top inhabited floor. Above us was a very large area where the heating pipes and elevator machinery was located in the center of the roof and on the two sides was a flat area of roof. You could get up there, but there were parts of that section that were locked up and there were Chinese employees, rather intelligent looking people, running up and down the stairs there often, so that was probably where the listening devices for the buildings were located, in those locked rooms next to the elevator machinery. In the summer when it got hot, they would open the doors and you could see people going and coming, although some of them had air conditioners, which was very rare in China. I guess if you are one of that kind of person, you tend to get what you want.

I had an incident driving home one warm afternoon. As is my habit in warm weather, I had my arm out the window and was driving beside the construction site of the Australian Embassy. A bicyclist rode up beside me, grabbed a hold of the car and threw something into the car and then rode off. He then stopped his bike and turned around and looked back at me. I stopped, got out of the car and chewed him out for endangering himself and my control of the car. Without a word he turned, got on his bicycle and left. I found out later that what he had tossed into the car was a folded up piece of paper saying, "I want to meet you." It gave a place and a time. He was fairly well dressed. Clearly not a student. He looked to be in his early to middle twenties. He had a white shirt on and looked like a bureaucrat. Of course, you never know what complex things you encounter. Entrapment was a common danger. People are approached by all kinds of things. I threw the paper away in the parking lot and then reported it to the security people for a couple of reasons.

If I kept the paper, I was subject to being picked up for possibly aiding and abetting somebody and, if this was a setup, putting myself in jeopardy by walking around with that piece of paper in my pocket. If they found the piece of paper, there was no incriminating evidence on it for anybody, so I didn't feel I might be putting somebody in danger. I suspected that, given the nature of the person and the place of the incident, it was a setup planned for some reason by the security forces. All took place not far from one of the security huts that surrounded the foreigners compound. The location was in full view of that post. There were plenty of other places around town where somebody could have left the paper without being in view of a security post. So to me he was either very inept, and somebody I wouldn't want to have anything to do with anyway. Just why he had stopped his bicycle after tossing in the note was a mystery. If he had been a dissident, he should have kept going out of fear of being discovered by the security person at the compound. Another question was why, after I had stopped and yelled at the bicyclist, no security guard approach or inquired what the problem was. Of course, if it was a setup by a security group they would have stayed away, not wanting to interfere in that operation. Just why he stopped I will never know. I never heard anything more about it from security. Those are the kinds of things you were subjected to.

In the back of our compound at USIS, we had the residence of the Ambassador and the embassy's Health Unit. That compound once served as the entire liaison office and so had several support buildings that were used to support the much smaller staff of the time. It was in the health unit that Dr. Fang Li Zhi, the very famous astrophysicist dissident was in "hiding." Of course, the Chinese knew exactly where he was and likely had the place zeroed in with all types of detection devices. Every day I had to go to work in my office not more than 20 yards from where Dr. Fang and his wife resided. He had come to the residence during the period of Tiananmen, and since diplomat compounds are legally the territory of the resident embassy, the Chinese were not allowed to enter. If they wished to, they could have walked in at any time, using only a small amount of force; there is no real protection, only diplomatic convention.

So we had super special Chinese surveillance around the compound. Across from the sole gate to the compound sat a Mercedes Benz with four security personnel at all times. They consisted of a driver, one female security agent, one apparent supervisor, a male, and one who was obviously a simple muscle man. We also had a Chinese security motorcyclist who always hung out with

them. They would play cards in the car with all the doors open. They were bored stiff. I actually felt sorry for them. I would often drive my car into the compound on weekends to wash it with the hose on the shady side of the building. Of course, it was close to the building and not within easy sight of the security people monitoring the building. I would drive in, possibly do some work in the office, and then go out and wash the car. On leaving the compound, I would be followed every time by both the Mercedes and the motorcycle because they were suspicious that I might be spiriting away Dr. Fang, his wife, or both. Of course, another Mercedes would take the place of the one following me from the compound.

I was followed no matter where I went, shopping, picking my wife up for lunch at a hotel somewhere, etc. When we would get out of the car, lock it, and walk away, one of the security people would approach it to check out the back seat for anything suspicious. Often, one would stand on the rear bumper and jump up and down to see whether or not something heavy was in the trunk. They were always careful not to damage anything and never tried to break in, but they sure made a mess of my rear bumper.

Sometimes, I was very happy to have them escorting me, because in Beijing traffic, you are always subject to getting into an accident from a bicyclist who rides right in front of you without any chance for me to stop. If you hit the person, possibly causing injury, maiming or death, the consequences can be very difficult. Crowds gather quickly at any accident, and the foreigner is always considered guilty. The courts always seem to find that guilt goes with the ability to pay. People at the embassy had those kinds of incidents too frequently during the time I was in Beijing. If you do, you have real trouble that may lead to your being forced to leave the country or even physical injury from the crowds that can easily be stirred up.

Anyway, having the security car right on my tail meant I probably would have had plenty of witnesses if I had gotten into any kind of problem. Because the security car carried no license tags, it was easily spotted for what it was by the normal Beijing citizen. No one would want to tangle with the security division, so that alone might have dissuaded those curious that would otherwise run to check out an accident. In a way, the following chase car was a strange comfort.

I was talking about the problem of security forces following me in Beijing. This practice led to a variety of interesting circumstances. Traffic was always heavy and crowded. If you pull up to a traffic light just as it was changing yellow, the light would turn red before you could get completely through the intersection. Usually the cross traffic would begin to jump the light as it turned yellow, so a chase car, if it was several lengths behind would possibly get caught by the cross traffic. This would mean the chase car driver would either lose you or be forced to do something dangerous like forcing his way through the light. Most of the time, they did just that. However, in certain circumstances such as a blocking bus, the car would be caught. That would show the function of the motorcycle, which would also be a part of the cavalcade. If the car got caught in traffic, the motorcyclist could then take over and follow the car until the Mercedes could catch up again. He would travel down sidewalks to make sure you were not lost. The possible loss of Fang Li Zhi was that serious an issue to them.

After a while, you began to know these people, because they were the same people all the time. If the light looked as if it was going to change, I made it a habit to slow down to make sure I

didn't get through the intersection in time. After a while, the driver of the chase car began, I think, to understand what I was doing. I never had any problems with chase cars. Knowing I would not cause them trouble, they would not tailgate, and although they had to follow me, they were always polite and never abused their authority. I never had any difficulties.

Some others who got their kicks from losing the chase cars did have trouble. We had one younger officer who had a pickup truck, one with a camper body on the back. It was easily identified. He had good Chinese and traveled all over Beijing. He knew some of the dissidents. Like the rest of us, he was routinely followed by the security forces. Unfortunately, he saw it as a game. He would cut down some hutong, which is an alley in Beijing, and make a quick turn down another one. He knew his way around Beijing and sometimes could lose the security car. He did so on several occasions which he thought was a terrific experience and some kind of minor victory. Yet it was a pyrrhic one, for he found one morning that all four tires were slashed flat. The Chinese security forces came over and looked and said, "Gee, this is terrible. Must be one of these foreign kids, a Chinese kid wouldn't do that." That probably was true, a Chinese kid didn't do it. I think it was a pretty obvious warning that if you are going to fool with the security forces, you are not going to be driving. So take your choice, either no tires or the security people. So I think he learned his lesson at that point. This was their country, and if they wanted to do something, they would. You buck them at your own peril.

That is a little glimpse of life in Beijing. There wasn't much social life, of course, although there were diplomatic parties all the time where people got together for conversation, trading of stories, and something to drink. They were not very elaborate, and Beijing was not a place where there was a very heavy social world. If you wanted to go to parties, you could, because most embassies would have national days. With all the countries represented in the Chinese capital, there was almost always someone's national day you could go to. But it was the same crowd all of the time and not very interesting. You got sore feet, didn't get fed very well, and if you did not drink, it was not much fun. I did not drink much, so I did not find much interesting unless there were contacts you could meet there.

If there were Chinese officials invited, it was worth going to receptions just to make contact, because you couldn't go to their offices very often. One of the problems of working in Beijing, particularly right after Tiananmen, was that all Chinese contacts shut down. You couldn't get through to anybody. The most frustrating thing was, you were supposed to be a Foreign Service Officer contacting people of the country, and you couldn't do that unless you got outside of Beijing. That is why my trips to the USIS branches were always so important.

*Q: Who was the ambassador and how did he operate?*

YATES: When I arrived, Jim Lilley was the ambassador. He had come in from Korea. He was actually born in China and, I think, had a very strong personal identification with the country. He was nice, smart, capable, and well liked in the embassy. He was a little stiff sometimes but nevertheless a warm human person. Yet despite his personality and early ties with China, he had a hard time. More than any other person in the embassy, the ambassador is the one who does the contacting or hobnobbing with officials. He could not get to see anybody. Even the mayor of

Beijing was not available to him for a long, long time. In fact, the first breakthrough with Mayor Chen Chi Tong was something that I became involved in.

As Deputy Public Affairs Officer, I inherited many of the invitations that were passed to the Public Affairs Officer but which he did not want to attend. The embassy sent over an invitation it had received for a reception in connection with the publishing of a book, an event that was not a very exciting opportunity for most. The book was a Chinese encyclopedia commemorating the Olympics of 2000. This was the beginning of the Chinese campaign to be selected for the 2000 Olympics. It was essentially a travel book about China and Chinese things. Of course no one wanted to go, so it was passed along to me, the book guy. I was reluctant but decided to go, since we didn't get many invitations and somebody should represent the United States.

As expected, it was a very dry ceremony in a big room with a lot of people, mostly Chinese. I was seated in the front middle, as befitting a representative of the US, but I was a bit uncomfortable since it was expected to be an unfortunately long ceremony with lots of speeches. On one side, I had a Yugoslav representative who didn't speak any English and I spoke no Serbo-Croatian, so I ignored her. On the other side of me was seated an older lady, whom I took to be the mother of a writer or somebody like that. We struck up a simple conversation in Chinese; she spoke no English. We talked about all the inane things you talk about at a gathering like that. Isn't this nice and what the book was about, etc. Out of the blue, she asked me at one point if I thought the ambassador would like to meet the mayor? I was a bit taken aback. Strange things routinely happened in China, but this was in a league of its own. I knew the ambassador had long wished to pay a call on the mayor but had been rebuffed by the hard-nosed Communist. Mayor Chen Chi Tong was implicated in the middle of events that took place at Tiananmen, but as leader of the capital city was an important, "must meet" for the ambassador.

The ceremony was beginning, and people were making speeches, shouting into the microphones, and walking around the room with flowers, making presentations. I responded, "Why, of course. Why do you ask?" She replied, "Well, if you think the ambassador would be interested in meeting the mayor (who was later removed from office because of corruption), I think I can arrange it. Give me a call when you get back to your office." I said, "Fine, I will do that." Then, for the first time, she gave me her card. She was Beijing's Waiban. As I noted before, the Waiban were responsible for handling foreign affairs within their jurisdiction. Every major governmental area has a Waiban and she was the one for Beijing. Evidently she was a Russian translator years ago, used by Mao Zedong in his contacts with Soviets. Madame Gan was in her early-sixties when I met her, and evidently had been given the post as a reward for her good service to the late chairman.

When I got back to USIS, I called the ambassador's office and asked what they wished me to do. They asked me to follow up. So I called Madame Gan back and asked what she had in mind. I was still a bit dubious since my Chinese never was stellar, and there was small worry that I might have gotten the wrong impression. I inquired about what exactly she had in mind. She simply asked, "When would the ambassador be available?" I said, "Name your day." He had never even shaken the hand of the mayor of Beijing and would find a way to make time at the mayor's convenience. Finally, we worked out to go to one of the older world class hotels in Beijing for lunch. It was to be a small group, just the mayor, the Ambassador, several aides, Madam Gan,

and myself. It turned out to be all very pleasant. We sat and talked about not much, but there was contact, and that was the formal opening of contact with the city of Beijing.

We always had a lot of administrative problems with the city and having direct contact with the mayor would be very helpful. In China, “guanshi” or “connections” made all the difference. Politically, the mayor was a very important man in the party in Beijing, a senior elder in the communist party in China, and somebody who the embassy should be in contact with. If we didn’t like him, we could still be in touch with him because he had power.

The Chinese, themselves, did not have a very good mechanism to talk to us, never mind us with them. It worked both ways. It took that kind of a low level contact to get the ball rolling, but once it did, the Chinese were very forthcoming. This was the kind of thing the ambassador was faced with as head of the American mission. He had very limited contacts with the foreign ministry. When you went into the foreign ministry as an embassy delegation, you always were led to the same room, not someone’s office. It was always the same reception room where you sat in the same old chairs. You were served tea, they came in and presented their position, and you presented your position. The meeting ended with their thanks for your coming. “It was nice seeing you,” they would say as they helped you out the door to your cars. It was a very formalized, not very productive relationship.

After Tiananmen in 1989, that was the way it was for a better part of a year. However, it gradually changed. One of the interesting stories that came up, was on how this change started. We always had steel helmeted, automatic weaponry equipped, tall security guards stationed every 18 - 20 feet around the compound. This was to intimidate us and to intimidate the people of Beijing from coming through our gates to see us. Former President Nixon came to China on a goodwill visit. This was long after his presidency; he was doing something for Pepsi Cola. He came to China to see Deng Xiaoping, because Nixon opened American relations with China and the Chinese never forgot. They see Nixon as something of a demi-god. They didn’t understand the business of Watergate, but they did understand that Nixon was the first to make the breakthrough to China, opening China up to the rest of the world.

So Nixon came back to China. While in Beijing, Nixon was to come to the embassy to meet with employees on the occasion of the July 4<sup>th</sup> celebration. As the conversation with Deng Xiao Ping was later related, Nixon said, “I am going to go to the American Embassy later this afternoon to say hello to all the people who work there. I understand there are security guards all around the embassy with automatic weapons and steel helmets. That looks awful. When I go there, I don’t want to see those guards.” Miraculously, no more than twenty minutes after those words had tumbled out of his mouth, those guards disappeared and never came back. At least not during the time I was there, and as far as I know, never did. They just disappeared. In their place were apple cheeked, young farm boys, obviously out of the far provinces such as Gansu. They obviously did not know much about the big city. They had little side arms, sloppy uniforms and stood around, embarrassed at having nothing to do. When Nixon came to the embassy that afternoon, there were no steel helmeted, automatic-weapon-equipped guns around. Evidently, Deng Xiaoping simply told the security forces to knock it off. That was all it took.

In addition to the motorized security forces at our USIS compound, the Chinese also had every intersection in the diplomatic quarter equipped with television cameras. Ostensibly, they were for traffic control, so that the traffic engineers could keep control over where the traffic was and how things were working, but, in fact, they were observation cameras pointed at us. So they kept up their observations and the chase cars, but the threatening posture of the security forces diminished greatly after the Nixon visit.

*Q: You talked about a number of the posts. Shanghai, Canton and Mukden. There were others weren't there?*

YATES: The former Mukden is now called Shenyang, the capital of the northeastern part of China. Shenyang is a rail head and a major center for heavy industry in China. Because of its role as a center of industrial activity, it is heavily polluted. Also, because many of the heavy industries in China were the last on the list for privatization, they are the ones closest to or actually in bankruptcy. That leaves the economy of Shenyang a bit weak. Weaker still is the remarkable city of Changchun just to the north of Shenyang. It is an agricultural city, a poor city. It is one of the few places in eastern China where you can see beggars on the street and people in rags. But the city is magnificent. The boulevards are wide and all the major buildings that the Japanese built are magnificent. They intended it to be a major capital. It is a beautiful city, but, of course, it is no longer used for that. I had a chance to visit once and shall never forget it.

*Q: Where were our consulates?*

YATES: In Shenyang, Chengdu, which is out in Szechwan province - the capital of the west - Shanghai and Guangzhou.

*Q: Was Chengdu where you were having some problems?*

YATES: We had a problem out there, because the facilities were no good. However, Chengdu was extremely important as a major cultural and political center in China. In terms of population, the Chengdu consular district included as many people as the whole of the U.S. The consulate was on one floor and USIS was on another floor of a major hotel in the center of the city, but visitors to either had to enter through a separate entrance in the rear so that the Chinese could control who was coming and going. Living quarters were on the third floor. That meant you lived above the store, and it was known, at least, in one case that there were Branch Public Affairs Officers there who hadn't been out of the building in more than four months. There was a restaurant below and a shop where you could buy cereal, fruit, and things like that. If you brought in a lot of meat in a big freezer, and people did, and bought rice, you could go in and close the door and stay there for months.

Psychologically, it was a bad situation for people to live in. It was dirty and dark, with electric power that would go out all the time. In these days of computers and other electronic gadgets that are necessary for the modern office, it was very, very difficult to maintain a reasonable operation in such a situation. So, the Federal Buildings Office in Washington some years before had contracted with the Chinese to build a new consulate on the edge of the city. In fact, they did build the building, but FBO came back to look at it and said it wasn't suitable. It was built to

Chinese standards and had no real relevance to our needs. Since they had not followed our requests, there was a big hassle. This went on for years.

At the time of the construction, FBO shipped in things like refrigerators, air conditioners, freezers, furniture, and rugs and stored them all. Over a period of about five years, these things began to rust. They hadn't been installed but the building was still sitting there, so after long and difficult negotiations, they got the Chinese to agree to rehab the brand new building and make it into a building that would first meet our needs and secondly would meet our codes for fire, power, plumbing, and other usual standards. In fact they did, but it took us a long time to get in there. There was a great controversy among the staff, because for USIS, operating downtown in the hotel was better. You could get to places quickly to meet people, go to a coffee shop, etc. The new consulate was way out of town. Although it was closer to one of the universities, it was a lot further from the center of the city. So, there were good and bad things and that was a major problem in Chengdu at the time.

Chengdu also had another role. It was the gateway to Tibet. It doesn't look like it on a map, but if you were to fly to Tibet, you had to stop in Chengdu first, stay over night, and then get the plane to Lhasa, if you approached from inside China. So that meant that people who were on their way to Tibet would have to go through Chengdu and that meant that Chengdu provincial authorities had a good deal to say about who went and who did not. If you didn't have permission to go, you could not get on airplanes, get hotel reservations, or move. These things all required clearances. For example, for citizens in China, you couldn't stray more than five miles from the point where you were assigned without getting permission. You had to apply for permission.

There were certain cities in China that were considered open to diplomats and tourists. The consulate cities were open, and you could travel there without advance permission as long as you took public transport, mainly air. You couldn't drive. They knew when you were going to go, because you told them by buying a ticket. For other cities, you had to apply for separate permission and justify your plans. They could choose to let you go or restrict your travel. It was the same for their diplomats in the US. We had been able to add to the number of open cities, apart from those with consulates, by negotiation. All aspects of open cities and travel was by reciprocity. If we had a trip that was turned down by the Chinese, then through the reciprocal arrangement, we would turn down a trip the Chinese had requested in the US. Say they wanted to go to Atlanta. We would say no, because the Chinese do not have a consulate there and it may not have been on an otherwise open list. The State Department might grant permission to travel as long as the Chinese would permit us a similar right in China. So if you wanted to go to some place in China that was not an open city and the Chinese said no, then we would deny one of their people here in Washington permission to go to some place that was not an open city. An interesting set of circumstances.

I previously mentioned that I had visited Nanning, a city near the Vietnamese border. That is not an open city. We were going to have a Fulbright conference down there, and in order for me to go to Nanning, I had to apply for permission and had to have it granted by the Chinese. Normally, they did grant such requests, as we did for them here. They wanted to go to Huntsville, Alabama to visit the rocket site there. We could let them go, but that meant we had to

go to some place like Nanning. The process was quite complicated. One consular officer made quite a reputation by keeping very, very close tabs on that whole process. Every time any slip occurred at all in China, reciprocal actions were taken in the U.S. with the Chinese. It was a real game, making life a little more difficult for everyone.

Normal travel arrangements were also difficult. If you wanted to travel, you could not simply go to the airline counter and say, "I would like to go to Shenyang" and buy a ticket. All airlines of China were controlled by a single ticket office so as to allow maximum security control. Also, because communications were relatively primitive and because the separate Waiban offices had control over foreigners outside of Beijing, you could not purchase round trip-tickets. If you got a ticket to go to Shenyang, it was confirmed that you had a reservation and a seat. To get back home, however, you had to make arrangements for a ticket after you arrived in Shenyang. If there were no seats for your desired flight, a common occurrence, the answer was "no." You were stuck. And many an American tourist was just that, stuck. Some found their way back on trains which were frequently very long and uncomfortable trips. The airlines were jammed-packed full all the time in China, because of the development that was going on in the country. So it was an interesting experience to travel in a country that presented so many difficulties. Are you interested in more about travel in China?

*Q: No, I don't think so. I assume you were monitoring VOA. What were you getting out of VOA?*

YATES: There were two problems with VOA in China. First off was the skip problem and getting into the locations intended. The second thing was jamming of the Chinese language VOA broadcasts. They were not jamming English because English was a resource to them as I described earlier. You couldn't receive the Chinese language broadcasts in Beijing due to the jamming. If you went to a particular western part of the city just before you got to the area called the Fragrant Hills which was a range of low mountains that ringed the western part of the city, there was a military compound with very large antennas. We were pretty sure those were at least some of the antennas used for jamming. But the problem with jamming is that it is a lot harder than broadcasting, because it doesn't skip, it is a direct line. A well designed directional antenna will render it useless or filter it out to permit an audible signal. The only way to render the incoming signal inaudible is to make it powerful enough to overcome the incoming signal from any direction.

For reliability's sake, effective jamming transmitters must be located near the city. All jamming is simply broadcasting on the same wavelength as the incoming signal with another so strong it will obliterate an incoming signal, even for directional antennas aimed at a signal coming from a relatively high angle of attack as it rebounds from the ionosphere. But that takes a lot of oil and energy. I noted before that shortwave broadcasting is an expensive business. Jamming is more so even at a short range and in a limited area. There were about eight known jammers around Beijing in order to make sure the city was not exposed. Yet it becomes more expensive still. Since each frequency must be jammed by all transmitters to be effective, a broadcaster need only simulcast on several frequencies to penetrate a jammed area or at least significantly raise the cost of the jamming.

A radio wave can often be blocked by buildings, mountains, hills, etc., so an incoming shortwave signal bouncing off the ionosphere would be coming down onto the city from above, but the jammers would be broadcasting horizontally across the city. If a person got behind a building where there was a radio “shadow” and put up a simple antenna, he could hear the VOA Chinese signal that could not be heard in other areas exposed to the jammer. So that meant the jammers had to be arrayed in a ring around Beijing to make sure that signals were not getting through certain sectors and to eliminate any “shadows.” Of course, you could get yourself in a car or get on your donkey and ride out to the remote regions of the city and hear VOA Chinese language broadcasts because the Chinese, themselves, could not afford to jam everywhere all the time.

It was clear that the VOA Chinese language broadcasting was getting through. We knew that, because we would get postcards from people telling us they had heard us on such-and-such and ask a question, enter a contest, or something like that. We were getting mail from China clearly indicating that the Chinese language broadcasts were getting through, but they certainly were a lot more difficult to hear than the English broadcasts. Whenever I would travel, I would take a shortwave radio with me, and in the hotel room or wherever I was staying, I would try during the night to hear both English and Chinese VOA signals. We also paid expatriates to do monitoring for us. That gave feedback to the engineers about what frequencies, what times of day, and what the conditions were when that person was listening. The problem was, many of our monitoring radios were of a higher quality than the radios the Chinese, themselves, were using. So it wasn't always a clear guarantee that we were getting through.

*Q: Because we played a prominent part in the Tiananmen incident and there were a lot of dissidents who were in the United States during this time, students who felt they couldn't get back and there was a lot of news about people being unhappy with China, were we having to pull our punches at all?*

YATES: I don't think so, but there is a fine line between pulling a punch and being careful how you do things not to damage your own interests. The finesse of all that is determining what your own interests are. Obviously a paramount interest we had was to prevent any kind of outbreak of war or conflict in Asia. So you can't poke a stick constantly in somebody's eye and expect him to think well of you. So we had to be a little bit careful about that. In somebody's eyes, that would maybe mean we were pulling punches, because you don't always call foul every time there is a transgression of human rights, for example.

One of the problems we had in China was this question of human rights. It was politically powerful back here in the U.S., and it was politically correct to say the right things about human rights. Few would question the motivation of defending human rights. They should be defended. Obviously, this is a basic tenet in American philosophy, the American way of government, and what we are putting forth abroad. On the other hand, if you want progress on human rights, what is the best way to promote that effort in China? A good argument could be made that the best way to get it would be to work to some degree with the system, itself, to try to improve the conditions. Incrementalism, perhaps, is the best word to use, and it is not always a positive phrase. You get two steps forward, one step back in Chinese policy. I think we made a lot of progress on that score. What it meant, however, was you didn't frontally assault them on the question, because they would freeze up on you.

China still has an authoritarian government. This is not a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. We have to be careful, so that if we want to make sure that human rights are expanding in China, we may have to take a different set of steps rather than to defend every infraction of human rights as we see them. The question is one of balance but always keeping the objective in sight. Whenever there is a loss of human rights, someone is affected in a very personal way. Can we afford to look away when the offense is committed, even when it may mean that other, future transgressions might be avoided? What are the basic limits on the question of human rights? If someone is held without bail, is that a basic transgression of human rights? Not even in this country is that a basic transgression. It is possible to hold someone without charges, when releasing them might jeopardize others. There are strict limitations on that police power, but it is not a simple, black or white situation. There must be legal process.

The Chinese don't necessarily always observe the law as we would see it. But, again, it has never been so in China. China is not a democracy. They do not have the same law. While there is a seed of democracy in their system, it has never been a democracy. The question is how far must they compromise their own system before we feel comfortable in accepting them for specific relations such as trade. So it becomes a very complicated equation, and I don't think we had all the answers while I was there. But I do think that we were careful. If we went into a place where somebody gave you a hard time, you tended to listen and keep your mouth shut until they were finished or wore themselves out talking and then make your points, if you could. You had to use a certain amount of tact and a certain amount of understanding of where the Chinese were coming from, a certain amount of delicacy to avoid embarrassing the people who have the same goals as you do, but not always the same road map to get there.. That's always a difficult thing to measure.

We had special problems with CODELs, because some of the congressional delegations would come into town with one thought, to expose the human rights violations in China. They would make speeches and do things that were not in our larger national interest. I remember a very graphic example of that. Since I was Deputy Public Affairs Officer in Beijing, I would be in charge whenever the Public Affairs Officer was absent. During one of those interregnums, I got a big CODEL in, with four members of Congress and a whole phalanx of others. The delegation was led by Nancy Pelosi, the member of congress who was leading the charge on the question of human rights in China and particularly on granting most-favored-nation status to China. It was a hot potato in Congress then, and to some extent still is. Despite an initial reluctance to grant them visas, the moderates in the government had prevailed over the hard-liners, and the delegation was granted visas. It was clear that some parts of the Chinese bureaucracy did not want that particular delegation to enter, and there was a lot of sensitivity about their presence in Beijing. However, the argument was made that it would be best to allow them to see conditions directly, and they were received with politeness and dignity.

On the last day of their visit, they held a press conference at the USIS center which I arranged for them. They came to the press conference after a surprisingly uneventful visit and said that they had come to China, did not agree with the Chinese, found many areas of disagreement, but at least were talking. They continued that they had completed the trip, and everything was reasonable. They had learned a lot and were returning to Washington. That was all right. We

finished the polite and unremarkable press conference, and I took them out to the bus. We had a fairly large group of American and international press, CNN, CBS, etc. On the way out, I asked Representative Pelosi and several other members of the delegation if there was anything else that we could do for them. The answer was, "No, we are very tired. We have been traveling a lot. We are going to go back to the hotel and rest and maybe take a little bit of a walk. Then we are going to get on the airplane and go home. Thank you very much." Everybody shook hands and boarded the bus. I turned on my heels and went back into the building, satisfied that all had been done as required. The bus drove off.

About 20 minutes later I got a call from Mike Chinoy, the CNN correspondent, saying, "I think you ought to know about something that is going on." I said, "What?" He said, "You know the delegation didn't go back to the hotel." I said, "Really? Where are they?" "Well, they are in Tiananmen Square, and they have unfurled a banner protesting Chinese human rights. They were all wearing the small white flowers which they had on before and in solidarity with the students are making speeches and carrying on. There may be some trouble." He was worried about his own people, who had gotten out of the square, but he wasn't sure what the repercussions might be. Security forces were moving in on the square at that time.

The whole thing, of course, became a blowup. That addresses the same question you have been asking. This is what you call tactless. Here the Chinese had hosted this group, and they were soiling the nest before they left, so to speak. I am sure that looked great in San Francisco or in Georgia, or in Washington state where they were from. One particular congressman in the group was in a hard fight in a gerrymandered district, and evidently needed the newspaper columns which he was getting, but at what cost? In the aftermath of this, it was going to become very difficult to get people in who really needed to know about what was going on in China, because the Chinese would no longer accept them, out of fear of the same sort of stunt. Those people in the Chinese bureaucracy who had argued to let those people in to start with, now were under a cloud. Their advice had turned out wrong. They had been bitten by the very people who they were assisting in learning about China. Was the statement of support for human rights worth the lost credibility of the embassy and that of the rest of the U.S. diplomatic community had in Beijing? I would argue that it was not.

*Q: Yes, it didn't further any particular cause because it only furthered the cause of the United States, you might say.*

YATES: It only furthered the cause of several politicians from the United States. I don't think it furthered the cause of the United States. In this case, the cause of the United States was to see an improvement in human rights in China, not to make speeches. This ran counter to that effort. What it did was to make it more difficult to bring in the kinds of the people from the U.S. who would make the case for human rights to the Chinese and give them a better understanding of how congress was approaching the problem, what the American people felt about the problem and why it was necessary for them to make changes in the way that they treated their own people. Why this was good and why this was healthy and would benefit them in the long run. That message was lost in the political showmanship of the moment, and that is too bad.

*Q: What was your impression of the Western, particularly the American, reporting on China and the correspondent corps at that time?*

YATES: Like every group of people, they varied. We had some very, very good people out there who had spent long years in Asia, who knew China and spoke some Chinese but had enormous difficulties in maneuvering around. Mike Chinoy is a good example of that. He had been in town for a long time and could speak Chinese and get around. However, at every turn they were watched and harassed. We had VOA correspondents in Beijing, of course. The Voice of America was thrown out of China for a long time, because the Chinese specifically blamed the VOA for their turmoil in Tiananmen. If they didn't start it, at least they abetted it as it progressed. So the Voice of America was under particular pressure in China. That meant if they were going to cover any stories at all, they had to press all the time for equal treatment with the rest of their colleagues. They had to make a special effort all the time for contacts with China so that they could develop their stories. One of the problems of the U.S. media, and those from other foreign media as well, is that the people whom they spoke with were subject to harassment, pressure, incarceration, or worse because of their contact with the West. The Chinese did not appreciate their own citizens getting in touch with media people, particularly Americans. Many of the media people in China were not Americans; they were Brits, Australians, and others who came to China and were working for American news organizations.

One of the problems with correspondents in China was their editors back home altering a story. The editors were interested in the sensational or striking, but not as deeply interested in the why of what was going on. Hot facts were always more of a story than careful analysis. That meant a lot of the deeper coverage of China was lost. I think that is a disservice to the American reader, but that perhaps reflects the interests of the reading public as much as it is dependent on editors.

*Q: You mentioned that the Fulbright and exchange programs had been shut down after Tiananmen. Were there any changes in their status during your time there, 1989-92?*

YATES: In the beginning, no. The Chinese were miffed. In their view, we had unilaterally canceled the Fulbright program, and they said we had reneged on an international agreement. Our position was that we had not and could not, since we could not force American citizens to do anything they did not want to do. When the so-called "incident" of Tiananmen occurred, many of them picked up and went home because of personal decisions they had made. They felt the security in China was not good enough for them. Some of the English teachers, those who were so-called "foreign experts," stayed, but all the Fulbrighters left.

The problem was, how could we get things back on track. The Chinese felt that if we could simply call off an international agreement at a whim or just because people get discomfited, the agreement obviously wasn't worth anything. They essentially stopped work on the Fulbright program for a couple of years. We pushed very hard to get that program reestablished. Another part of that difficulty was that Chinese Fulbright grantees who had gone to the U.S. rarely returned. One of our basic interests in China was the teaching of American studies in Chinese universities. We had a fairly good group of people teaching American literature, culture, and economics in Chinese universities. Those were naturally the ones who often would be selected as

Fulbright grantees to come to the U.S., because they spoke some English, were in the academic environment, and had topics that needed direct experience and study in the U.S.

We would go to a university, as I did in Shanghai, and sit with the university dean to discuss the problem. At one point, he said, "Look. We love Fulbrighters. We have always had Fulbrighters here and have a long history of foreign teachers, but our people are not coming back." In the Chinese system, when a grantee left China, his position at the university would be kept open for his return. The grantee may have intended to come back, but because of the turmoil or other things, he didn't. That meant the American studies programs throughout China were decimated. The trained instructors had all left. By their own rules, the Chinese universities couldn't fill the positions until they either returned or notified their universities that they would never come back. They could not make such a notification, for that would mean that they would have to change their visa status from student or visiting scholar to that of immigrant, something that most could not or would not do. That meant there were all these empty spaces, and there were no teachers to teach American studies.

Younger American-studies scholars who were qualified and promising could not accept Fulbright grants, because they could not get permission to travel until their predecessors returned. The Chinese official interest in these programs dried up. American studies programs were faltering badly throughout China because of a lack of people to teach.

We wanted to bring American Fulbrighters into China to do the same thing, to teach American studies. But we couldn't get them in either, because the Chinese said if they could not send Fulbrighters out, they were not going to allow any more Fulbrighters in. They essentially laid their cards on the table, saying, "Until you solve the problem of getting our people back, we are not going to talk to you." That was a pretty difficult situation. Another of my interregnum duties when I was Acting Public Affairs Officer was to sit down with the minister of education and try to work out a negotiated agreement, to get the wheels moving again so we could start grantees moving back and forth. We discussed an endless array of options.

The one I had favored was where we would send Chinese Fulbrighters to the U.S. for six months at a time, instead of a full year. One of the problems was, if you send a Fulbrighter to the U.S. to study for a PhD, that ends up as at least four years, an awful long time to be away from home. Therefore, we would allow them to take their wives. In four years, a man and his wife will produce an American citizen. Once they had a child or two, the equation changed. Besides, American universities are warm hearted places, so that if an intensive, personable, and talented researcher is working hard on a subject and gets a PhD, he immediately wants to start post-doctoral research. In four years, they became quite settled in the American university environment. They may have accumulated lots of American friends, probably an apartment, a car, maybe even a green card, depending on how they worked things out, and very often an American citizen in the family.

Now, they have a problem. He goes to his dean and says, "My child is getting older and we want to give him or her opportunities and education. I like working here, your people seem to like me, and I'm doing good work and would like to stay on." The wise faculty member will say, "Well, of course, we will do what we can." And they did. They would write their Congressman, the

Immigration and Naturalization Service, make all kinds of appeals, and guarantee a supporting income by giving the “temporary” Chinese Fulbright grantee a job. So now it is six years and counting. Now the little American citizen is getting bigger and close to school age. They are really interested in this because now they can get a free American education for their children, but if they go back to China, what is their situation? The child doesn’t fit in. He or she speaks English. What do they do with the kid? The humanitarians among us would say, “Of course, we should make sure that the child can stay and build his future.” Many of them put down deep roots, and it is not very likely they will ever go back.

So where does that leave the Fulbright program in China? No where, essentially. It was a very hard sell. The Chinese felt there was nothing in it for them. We send their best scholars to study in the U.S., and they do not go back. In return, they receive a group of temporary scholars who come in for six or seven months and then immediately go back to the US. That is a brain drain that a developing country can ill afford. In addition, many of the U.S. scholars that enter China are not always the best in their field. Sometimes, they could not adapt readily to the life style on the Chinese campus, and most often could speak no Chinese. Consequently, some of the Fulbrighters became glorified English teachers and thereby became frustrated. Those that were acquainted with the Chinese culture and language usually were China scholars, interested primarily in research, not teaching. Even if they could teach, the Chinese do not need foreigners teaching them their own history and culture.

Of course, if you look at the personal side of things, many of the Chinese Fulbrighters had a tough time making the choice to return. Faculty members in China often do not have their own apartments and have to live at home with their families of six or eight people in a two bedroom apartment. If they are lucky, they have running water at the end of the hall. Their living standard would take a tremendous nose dive by going back. They can live in a run down section of town in Washington and be four times better off than they would be in Beijing. So it becomes very, very hard to say to somebody like that, you must go home. Consequently, what was suggested at the time and almost got adopted, was a program by which university exchanges would occur, not in PhD programs but for six month segments, without spouses or children, after which the grantee would return to the sending school. Following another semester or two teaching in China, the grantee would then have the option to return to the U.S. under the same conditions for another six months to continue the program started earlier. Another facet of the program would be that two schools would participate as sister universities in the exchange. U.S. Fulbrighters would be the “sponsors” of the Chinese Fulbrighter while they were in the US, and perhaps would become return U.S. Fulbrighters to the other school on the Chinese side. These internal linkages would militate against the earlier problems, since on each side, there would be responsible to keep the door revolving.

We eventually did work out something so that a limited number, I think the first year it was 12 Fulbrighters, were exchanged, principally Americans going to China. The reverse flow did not really get underway. One of the problems was in China finding someone who was up to the business of going as a Fulbright grantee to the US, language being among the principal problems. If they were going to be an engineer, then it was easy, because the Chinese are whizzes at math, physics, chemistry, etc. and any American university would kill to get a qualified, highly competent Chinese mathematician, chemist, or physicist. They are great. So that

meant if they got them, they would never let them go. It doesn't take very much research to find Chinese names in almost any of the disciplines such as computers, math, etc. They are all over the U.S. and very widely respected. Our argument was that eventually, they probably would go home, but a return within the original expectation of four years probably would not be met. We could understand that as part of the program and still argue that China would eventually benefit much from the knowledge they acquired in the US. The Chinese needed their skills immediately, as their own industry was growing rapidly and they needed a strengthened base of qualified intellectuals. But despite the problems, the program did get started again and as far as I know is prospering. It is a good program.

That raises one of the problems for Americans operating as diplomats in China. You do not have much opportunity to go where people live or to see somebody at home. While I was in China, only once did I have that opportunity in three years of living in Beijing. That was the director of a publishing house that I was dealing with on contracts. He was a university professor, a publisher, an entrepreneur. He was in business. He invited me to come to his house, which I did. This man was the president of his own company, a noted scholar, an author of a dozen books, and had many business connections. He lived in a third floor walk-up, a small dark apartment in Beijing. He had a television set and a small rug. His wife and mother and kids were all around, and it was crowded. I never found out if they had separate toilet facilities or not. Obviously, they were of very limited means. If he had the same job here in the U.S., he could have been living in McLean or some similar place with a fancy house, a lawn, and probably two dogs.

But in China, he had nothing. He was a smart man, a capable guy with a lot of dreams and ideas about how to reform the publishing business in China, particularly on the sales and marketing side. We had long conversations about marketing techniques and how to move a product and promote it on the Chinese market. He was an education to me. But again, his living standard was very, very low. It is hard for Americans to understand the pressures on people in China and how much commitment to their country it takes to stay at home. He could have jumped ship. Although he wasn't rich, he was rich enough to be able to get himself out of the country if he wished, but he stuck it out. Perhaps there is a form of patriotism that we have lost in the U.S. with our open and free government and comfortable style of living.

You had to have respect people who either had such strong ties to their family or their community or their nation, for that matter, to take the loss of what they knew was better. Many of them have relatives in the U.S. and know what the situation is here. You get mixed feelings after a while, living in a culture like that and a lot of respect for the people who are there. So when human right advocates come by and say, "Shut down trade with China, kill it. If they are not going to do what we like, we are going to stop it," who are they hurting? They are not hurting the government, for it is going to survive, whatever we do. But they are hurting those people who are trying so hard to make a living for themselves and build their own technical competence to make something better of life. I am not sure that heavy speeches on the floor of Congress are going to help those people much. But some real support in terms of slow incremental work probably will have a good effect in the long run.

*Q: One last subject. You mentioned that contacts were very difficult and had been cut way back during the time you were there.*

YATES: Yes, they were very hard. There was one technique that was important and probably the only technique that was useful. Like the people of most nations, the Chinese like to eat. Because food was not terribly good in quality or quantity in Beijing during the time we were there, one of the best ways to get people to come out to something was to invite them to dinner or any sort of meal; lunch, dinner, snack, it did not make much difference. It was not really possible to entertain Chinese at home, for they could not come to your home very easily. It was too uncomfortable for them, because they would have to go through security lines to get there. That would get them on lists to be watched and make their lives and those of their immediate family suspect. Certain Chinese such as many of those in the Foreign Ministry and those in international trade probably had been cleared for such contact, because they had a more sophisticated understanding of foreign living. But normal contacts, particularly among my publisher friends, would not enjoy such easy relations. In any event, hotels were available.

A Chinese guest could be taken to a hotel restaurant fairly easily, since there was almost no security in Chinese hotels and, particularly in the period immediately following Tiananmen, Chinese citizens were allowed to enter the hotels freely, because many of them could not depend on foreign tourists or businessmen to support their existence. In that lean economic period, the up-scale Chinese business kept many hotels afloat solely on their Chinese restaurant patrons. People, therefore, could go and come at will. Sometimes, there were security people around, but they were far, far less intrusive than they would have been in a diplomatic compound. That meant my contacts, in many cases publishers, would be delighted to go to lunch with me, especially if I was going to pick up the tab at an expensive foreign hotel. Relatively speaking, a lunch at a tourist hotel did not amount to a lot of money, but it made an enormous difference to me in my ability to meet with some of these people in a casual, yet businesslike, setting.

Office visits were difficult, because if you went to a Chinese office, that meant that person had to get clearance from his Danwei, his work unit, to allow you to come in. You can't just walk into an office in China. You have to go through a gateway where a person in uniform sits and asks, "Who are you and what do you want?" "Well, I am so-and-so and I am here to see such-and-such." "Have you made arrangements?" If you have not been cleared and approved beforehand, you are not getting in, even if the person wants to see you. So it was very difficult. That gradually began to break down as time went on. As I was more known to some of the publishing companies, I think I could have walked in off the street, although I never did, because that would put them in an awkward situation. The Chinese, of course, don't always live in gracious surroundings and would be embarrassed if you walk in on them in their shirt sleeves or even shirt off and in their underwear in the summer time, sitting in front of a fan, because there was no air conditioning. This doesn't lend itself to gracious living or gracious contacts. So you would go through all the formalities in making arrangements.

But feeding people was almost always good. The problem with feeding people was the activity came under what the U.S. government calls representation, which has very, very strong limitations on it. This is what is called by some members of congress the "booze budget;" in other words, American diplomats are abroad spending American taxpayers' money on booze, which was nowhere near the situation. Nonetheless, Congress didn't like it. This meant we were very, very circumscribed, unless we did it out of our own pocket. Beijing may not have been a

world class city for food, but it was a world class city for price, and that meant that none of us could afford to go out and keep contacts using that technique out of our own pocket. So it put a significant crimp in our ability to operate.

However, we did have some resources, which were carefully and wisely used. Mostly, we took people to lunch, because the prices were cheaper. It was cheaper to take some one to lunch than dinner, because they expect less and the hotels were not as crowded either. This meant you could talk for a couple of hours over lunch and really get into things pretty well. I did most of my work with publishers at lunch. Toward the end, before I left in 1992, many of the publishers were beginning to get enough cash flow to feel able to reciprocate. Then we would go to some other restaurant, Chinese usually, where they had an account or something. They were happy with that. It meant they could use their official funds for food, and they always ate very well at these occasions.

*Q: You left in 1992. Whither?*

YATES: From China I went to Hawaii. A change of pace.

*Q: Why don't we do that next time?*

YATES: Have we done everything on China? I haven't said much about the ambassadors. Stapleton Roy followed Jim Lilley, and while he was a very different kind of Ambassador, he had the same sort of pressures on him. Where Lilley was more intuitional, Stape Roy was more cerebral. I guess that is one way to make a comparison. Lilley had instincts and still does, and most of the time they were very good. I think he used those as his guideline as much as he did intensive analysis. Stape Roy, I think, was more of an analytical person and relied less on instinct. I think Roy was a little more distant from his people than Jim Lilley, although they both were very much ambassadors, apart from the rest of the crew.

Like Lilley, Roy was born in China and spoke Chinese with a Szechwan accent which caused amusement and wonder among the Chinese staff and the Chinese people he would meet. His Chinese was so good that he would just blow them away. I think the Chinese had a lot of respect for Roy, but I think he had the same problems as Lilley in terms of making and maintaining contacts. I think Roy enjoyed a better set of working contacts in the business community, because business by then had prospered to the point where Americans were much more accepted in China, and there was less fear on the Chinese side of somehow being coopted by contact with the Americans. We had not reached full confidence in that regard, and we still have not. I think it still is a long way off.

One aspect of the Chinese which is important in the context of East Asian relations is cultural. By comparison, Japanese and Americans have difficulty getting along at times, because Japan is an island and always has been an island with a distinct culture and cultural variances from Americans that makes contact difficult. The distance they maintain from people in social discourse, for example, is very different from the continental Asians, including Koreans and Chinese.

The Chinese language, because of its patterns and sounds, also makes their accented English more comprehensible to an American. If you had a Japanese speaking English and a Chinese speaking English with equivalent abilities, the Chinese would probably be more easily understood by an English speaking person. On the cultural level, the Chinese have a better sense of “give and take” that is more characteristic of a continental society. China is more cosmopolitan than Japan in terms of multi-nationalities, so you get a different set of vibrations there. The potential for improvement in relations with China is enormous. We have a big hangup, of course, on both sides in terms of politics. However, on the basis of person-to-person relationships, the Chinese have an advantage that leads to an opportunity for improvement that other Asian groups may have greater difficulty with.

*Q: How did you get the job?*

YATES: That position, like many other non-mainstream positions in USIA, had been cut by decision of the Area Director for East Asia, as he felt that he wanted to keep more of the available resources in the field. The advisor’s position in Hawaii was considered a “domestic” position, of course. Such domestic jobs stuck up like sore thumbs when people were pressed by downsizing and wanted to keep as much manpower in the field as possible. Yet there were countervailing arguments. The advisor’s job in Hawaii was essentially to keep the U.S. command in the Pacific tuned to the special needs of its overseas presence.

The military, itself, was going through a downsizing process, and still is. At that time, they were cutting back on everything except what they called “war fighting capacity.” In other words, if you drove a ship or a plane, that was fine. But if you were in uniform and were doing things like thinking about cultural ramifications and popular opinion ramifications of our military presence abroad, you were not considered as essential as those who actually had fingers on triggers. This is probably a reasonable distinction. If you have to give up on one or the other, the “war-fighting” capacity will have to take priority. The military role is to defend the U.S. and its people and the question is relative, I guess. In any event, that meant that the U.S. military in its presence abroad was not being served very well, because the lack of cultural and political sensitivity to the special conditions of operating overseas in the Pacific region cost a lot of efficiency.

If you are a commander from a base in the middle part of the continental U.S. and suddenly are transferred to the Pacific, how do you operate in Guam or Okinawa or some other place in Asia where your presence isn’t welcomed or at least you are not considered an essential part of the local culture. You are a guest. The only office that really existed within CINCPAC to put that in context in a cultural way was the USIA advisor’s office. When I came available and was looking around for my next assignment, I was asked if I would go and fill in for about a year, because they really didn’t have an onward assignment for me at that time. This was an alternative to returning to Washington without an ongoing assignment, so I went to Hawaii.

People would say, “Gee, Hawaii. Aren’t you lucky!” There wasn’t as much luck in that as it might seem. Hawaii is a magnificent place. It is beautiful, the weather is gorgeous, and everything was terrific when certain kinds of conditions all come together. If you are a tourist with a lot of money and can travel around the islands and laze on the beach, it is magnificent and

probably unparalleled in the world. But if you have to live there, you get a different perspective.

For one thing, Hawaii is very isolated. Many in the military had this same problem. It is a “rock” two thousand miles away from the nearest significant land mass. In Hawaii, people had all the advantages of the American system of goods and material things, but they were very, very much more expensive. When we arrived there, a box of Wheaties was seven dollars or something along those lines. It soon became very clear to us that Hawaii was going to be a very expensive place to live.

Rents are astronomical. During the time of the Japanese “bubble economy,” when the Japanese had lots of money to invest everywhere, including Rockefeller Center, they bought up much of Hawaii, especially golf courses and real estate. The stories were legend of Japanese businessmen coming to Hawaii with a pocket full of cash and saying, “How much is that?” “Oh, about a million and a half.” He would reach into his pocket and peel off a million and a half dollars and then ask, “What else do you have to sell?” There were no arguments, no negotiating. They were famous for paying whatever was asked. The immediate effect of that was skyrocketing housing costs.

That is okay, I guess, if the Japanese could afford it, but for Americans living there, Hawaii became a very, very expensive place to move to. Those who had owned houses for a long time and continued to own were not directly affected so much, I guess. If you were going to continue to live in Hawaii and sold your older house at a great profit, you had to turn around and buy something equally expensive. On the other hand, many people cashed in and sold at high prices before running off to the mainland where real estate was cheaper.

The weather was magnificent when it was nice. When the “trade winds” are up and the sun is shining, it is grand. When the trade winds drop, the weather immediately turns hot and sticky and you can recall that it is in the South Pacific. Because of its location, Hawaii is vulnerable to typhoons. Traffic is terrible. Hawaii is one of the most congested places in the world in terms of traffic. And of course, there are an awful lot of tourists adding to the congestion. So that was a problem. Nonetheless, the work at USCINCPAC was fascinating for a Foreign Service Officer. It was somewhat like living at a foreign post. The military had their own language, own social set, own conventions.

When I walked into the job, I was confronted by an older man who was head of the CINCPAC Public Relations Section. He also handled Congressional Relations, and rather well I was told. He had the office across from me on what was called the “Bridge,” which was the center of command for the Pacific area. On that floor, they had the admiral of CINC (Commander in Chief) of CINCPAC; the Deputy Commander of Pacific U.S. forces (DCINC); Jim Wilkinson, the Political Advisor (POLAD), who had ambassadorial rank, (who as far as I know, retired in Hawaii); and the older, rather crusty gentleman who was congressional liaison as well as the public affairs guru. By virtue of my position, I was automatically at loggerheads with him, because while he was very knowledgeable about Congress, he didn’t know very much about foreign affairs. There were no other command parts on the “Bridge;” that was it.

The command structure conformed to the usual military relationships, but both the POLAD and I as USIA advisor were add-ons. Because both the POLAD and I were outside of the other parts of the chain of command, it was possible to include us on the “Bridge” since there was office space there and it would not otherwise show favoritism among the other components, which fell under five basic categories, each represented by a number following the letter “J.” J means “joint” since CINCPAC was a joint headquarters. The numbers stood for the usual categories in the military J-1 for administration, J-2 for intelligence, J-3 for operations, J-4 for legal, and J-5 for policy and plans. For the most part, I worked with the J-5 people who handled all of the command relationships and had the greatest need to understand foreign relationships. The J-5 section included all the area offices. Although the U.S. military had begun heavy cuts in personnel, J-5 still had a lot of area offices: the Japan desk, the Philippines desk, the Russian desk, etc.

The Pacific Command (PACOM) was the largest U.S. military geographic command in the world. It ran from the west coast of California all the way to the island of Madagascar. That includes the Indian Ocean as well. It was a key player in the Middle East, because it provided ships, materiel, and aircraft to other commands during the Gulf War and any other insurgency that came about. Such assignments always involved the Pacific command, because it comprised such a large part of U.S. forces. There were about 100,000 in the Pacific command then on duty in the Pacific, of which about 30,000 were in Japan and another 37,000 in the Republic of Korea. That is an awful lot of Americans overseas. Many of these soldiers and sailors were on ships floating around the Pacific or Indian Oceans or in submarines. All were under the general command of PACOM, although there were some “dual hats” in Korea, where the same forces comprised a large part of the UN Command and both the U.S. Forces/Japan and the U.S. Forces/Korea had much autonomous authority.

Such “dual hatted” arrangements led to difficult relationships at times. Whoever was U.S. commander in Korea felt rather independent of the Pacific Command, and this arrangement could make smooth relationships a problem. For me, this meant some trouble in obtaining cooperation when that was important in program planning or developing a cohesive approach to a given problem.

My function at USCINCPAC was essentially writing advisories for the CINC and participating in meetings to monitor what was going on in terms of public relations with allies and other countries in the “area of responsibility.” Other facets of my work were developing an annual briefing program for Pacific military leaders, consulting on the preparation of the command’s magazine, “Asia-Pacific Defense Forum,” and sometimes participating in war games, a kind of think-tank exercise where members of the command and invited experts sit around a table and think deep thoughts about options in certain situations. The war games, at times, considered questions which were a bit far afield for a Foreign Service Officer who normally confronts only the real and present situation abroad. For example, “If Japan or China or another country becomes the enemy, what does the U.S. do and how does the military act to preserve U.S. interests?” Other times, the questions were more specific, such as a consideration of possible nuclear incidents. It was an interesting thing for someone like me to come out from the environment of the Foreign Service and walk into this very different military system. It took a while to become adjusted.

My advisories sometimes brought me into a bureaucratic struggle with the Public Affairs chief across the Bridge hall. He insisted that all of my memoranda to the Admiral be cleared by him before going to the CINC. While this might seem to be common sense, it proved to be a real roadblock. Certainly, he should be informed of my advisories on foreign public relations, but my feeling was that I was assigned to CINCPAC and not to his public affairs office. So I proceeded to direct my advisories straight to the CINC with info copies to him. That led to a number of occasions when he fired up strong dissents to my recommendations. While our relations were civil, he clearly was uncomfortable with my active role in providing advice to the command.

He finally retired, forcibly it turned out, since I was not the only one with a functional problem in dealing with such a strong personality. Nonetheless, the constant sniping on matters he had little knowledge of was debilitating to the orderly progress of discussion within the command on matters that were important to its function. Jim Wilkenson, the POLAD, was a strong supporter and had had working experience with USIA. He was a great booster in this internal struggle to provide the CINC with as candid and comprehensive advice as possible.

*Q: Were the Chinese included in this?*

YATES: Yes. They were one of my principal objectives when I arrived in Hawaii and began work on the SEAS program, since I had just come from China. It was perfect for the Chinese. We worked very hard on that, and it took a couple of years to get it started, because the Chinese were very suspicious of our motives. However, they were also hungry for the program, because it meant we would be taking senior Chinese military officials into some very classified areas of the U.S. military, giving them the chance to talk directly to military commanders and make contacts not only with the U.S., but also with senior military people we had brought together from all over the Pacific. The Chinese clearly saw that as an advantage to them and could not resist.

The first Chinese to participate was Major General Lee Zhi Yun, one of their finest. He was a marvelous man. A consummate diplomat and a cool headed negotiator. He was the head of the Study of Foreign Armies at the Beijing Military Academy. His job was to teach senior military commanders about foreign militaries. Students had to have stars on their shoulders to attend the classes. He came and was a sensation.

Part of the trip to Hawaii was a visit to ships, both the Aegis class cruisers and submarines. We had a major general of the Chinese army for the first time, I think, in contact with a wide variety of the newest and best of American military tools. Real ground was broken, taking him down into the guts of a Los Angeles class attack-sub where he was in the control room that had big signs on the door "Restricted Area Do Not Enter." He sat in the chair where people would sit when the submarine was underway, and he could observe the mechanisms that would control SOSUS cables and other devices that would track other ships and detect submarines. This just blew his mind away. We also took him on an aircraft carrier in Japan. Yokosuka is the home port for the U.S. Pacific fleet, and there usually was an aircraft carrier there, most often the *Independence*. That was always a remarkable visit for the Chinese. I only had two years of tours with the Chinese on board, but that participation in the SEAS program was a fine example to the

Chinese of the American approach to “transparency” as a basic principle of stable military relations.

With some trouble, we also brought the Russians in. It took years to get them in because of the infighting in Moscow. The Russians were very suspicious of the program and several times accepted initially and then dropped out of participation. However, they had an interest in participating for the same reasons the Chinese did.

The first Chinese participant, Major General Li Zhi Yun, and I had a chat in Singapore before he went back to Beijing. When I went into his room, he had a stack, which must have been an inch or 2 inches thick, of very carefully kept notes in the middle of his coffee table. So he really had an eleven course meal of security relations in the Pacific. The most striking part of the trip for him, as well as for the US, I think, was in Korea when he went up to the DMZ. There was a major general of the Chinese army going up to look at the North Koreans from the other side. He never mentioned it, and so as not to embarrass him in a situation where his understanding was more important than my curiosity, I never asked, but he was certainly of the right age and rank to have fought in the Korean War.

One of the show pieces that the Koreans use on the DMZ is the infiltration tunnel that was discovered a number of years ago and is now open for tourists to clamber down into. You may recall a number of years ago when the South Koreans discovered the infiltration tunnel. An engineer who had designed one of the tunnels defected to the south and told the South Korean military where the North Koreans began to dig, and on a piece of paper drew the direction the tunnel was heading. In that indicated area, the South Koreans drilled a number of holes in the ground. They knew the North Koreans were digging along the line, but trying to find where was pretty difficult. But with the engineer’s plans, they were able to intercept the tunnel with a bored hole. Down the hole, they lowered a camera with lights and looked around. It was all dark, and the North Koreans claimed it was a coal mine. When they finally were able to complete an intercept tunnel and actually climb down, the South Koreans discovered that the North Koreans had coated the walls with lamp black, which would make the walls look like coal.

That was the little story we, like other tourists, were told before we went down into the tunnel. Out of some concern for his relatively advanced years and with some admitted excitement to be on hand when the encounter was to take place, I followed MG Li down along the long staircase through the intercept tunnel. Sure enough, when we got down to the bottom and entered the North Korean infiltration tunnel, the first thing Major General Li did was to press his hand to the wall. It came away black. He walked around for awhile and then we returned up the long flights of stairs to the surface. When we emerged from the tunnel, the Chinese general was still holding his hand stiffly out with all the black stuff on it. I sat next to him on the bus and asked, “What is that?” He responded, “Can you believe this?” I said, “What do you mean?” He said, “Look at this?” I said, “Your hand is dirty.” He said, “Can you believe that anybody would be so naive as to think anybody at all would believe this?” His incredulity was a stinging rebuke to his North Korean allies who had made the original claim.

On each of these SEAS trips, we would take escorts along from the U.S. military. At that time, there was a member of the USCINCPAC J-5 group who was very knowledgeable about Korea.

He was Mark Shoemaker, a U.S. Army Colonel who had been assigned on the DMZ for a long time. He sat with Major General Li in the bus going up to the DMZ and was able to explain the military sights along the way. There was a tank trap. Over there, you can see a camouflaged fortified position, etc. He gave MG Li a full explanation that very much impressed him. When we later arrived in Singapore, MG Li told me, "Look, I am a professional military man with more than three decades of professional service. I found the trip in Korea very interesting." He continued, "It is an article of faith in the Chinese People's Liberation Army that the U.S. and South Koreans are in an offensive posture in the south and are waiting to pounce on the North Koreans. But, I know a defensive position when I see one."

That was a remarkable observation from a senior member of the PLA. There are a number of obvious features that supported that conclusion. When you go across the Imjin river on the southern edge of the DMZ, the bridge is old and about ready to fall down. It was pointed out in the lecture on the tour that the bridge has charges underneath it, so it will drop immediately if there is any indication that the North is beginning to come South. Obviously, the UN command was not building reinforced invasion routes to the north.

MG Li said, "Seeing is believing." Being able actually to see the condition of the South was convincing to him. He cautioned, "However, I am a professional military scholar who observes foreign militaries as part of my responsibilities. If I were a line commander and went back to Beijing, I could never say a word about what I saw. No one would believe me, and all that I would accomplish would be to bring harm to myself and my reputation. But I am an academic. I teach. My business is to tell what I see. I can tell them, even though no one is going to believe me. They will think I have been brainwashed here, that I have been co-opted by the enemy. But the facts are there and gradually over the years - it will take a long time - the Chinese military will come to understand what the situation in Korea actually is."

To me, that was a telling moment of this particular program, because it represented a senior set of eyes from the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army looking at a situation from a new and different point of view. I suggested to Major General Li that after he got back to Beijing, he make a point to go to the North again and look at the same view from the Northern side for comparison.

While we were on the way up to the DMZ near the Imjin River, there is a rest stop just before you cross the bridge to enter the DMZ. It is the last point that casual tourists can get to from the south. In the back of the restrooms and souvenir shop, there is a small park with some of the weapons from the war. In the park, there is also a train with the tracks cut to the north of the northward headed engine. This is the train ready to go north when unification is accomplished, or so the story goes. It is a symbol of reunification. While we were walking around there with Major General Li, there was an older farmer sitting over there smoking a cigarette and just sort of watching tourists.

*Q: He was over sixty years old?*

YATES: I am sure he was easily over sixty years old. He was obviously a local, and probably a resident in the area long enough to have been there during the Korean War. He must have seen a lot happen.

Anyway, we were standing there and, of course, Major General Li was in civilian clothes - like an elderly gentleman of Taiwan - and I was obviously a long-nose American. He smiled. I asked him to come over, so we could get a picture. He obliged us long enough to pose with MG Li in front of the engine and then, with the usual friendly and hospitable Korean gusto, shook hands with MG Li and me. So I now have a picture of a major general of the Peoples Liberation Army of China, standing with a Korean farmer, all smiles. I don't know what the man would have said or done had he known who this particular Asian gentleman was.

We had another incident up in the north which I think revealed some of the value of the trip. Indonesia for many, many years has been a non-aligned country. We had Indonesians on the trip, particularly one very smart, capable, acerbic professor of security affairs. One reason she was there was because she taught in the military academy in Jakarta. Part of the general tour of the DMZ was a visit to the site of negotiations at Panmunjom. When you go into the small quonset hut where negotiations are actually held, the other side must be out. However, the northern military remain outside of the building looking in through the side of the building that resembles a long tube cut in half. When the tour group enters, they close the doors at both ends and you can mill around inside, and actually "cross into North Korean territory" (the other side of the table) while the UN command representative gives a little spiel about the height of the flags and all the cute vignettes they have about negotiations with the North. While we were standing there, the North Korean soldiers were outside the building looking in, taking pictures and scowling. They always do that, perhaps to show a kind of disdain for the imperialist forces or whatever.

The problem for them at this time was that this lady was from Indonesia and considered herself non-aligned and a person of dignity. While I was hanging in the back, she came over to me and said, "Why are they doing that?" I was puzzled. "Doing what?" "That," she said, indicating the windows where the Northern Koreans were glaring and staring at our group. She said, "Why is he looking at me like that?" Finally catching her point of frustration, I responded, "You will have to ask him, I don't know." "But that is rude," she sputtered. She was so upset, she could hardly speak. In an Asian sense, the North Koreans were being disrespectful to her. They perhaps did not understand who she was, but nonetheless, she recognized herself as a person who was offended by the clear rudeness she was being subjected to from a fellow Asian, and worse, a national of a nation her own country had often given international support to. It was a rudeness that Americans would likely just look at as part of the show. But to an Asian from a non-aligned country, this was extreme rudeness, and she couldn't get over it. She carried that image with her at least as far as the last days of the symposium in Singapore.

I recall when we were in the process of de-briefing our participants on the conduct of the symposium in order to get some feedback to be used to strengthen subsequent SEAS programs, she again brought up that incident in Panmunjom. How could it ever be the case that someone who they had supported for so long could be so rude to one of them? It was inconceivable to her. I would guess that she carries that image with her to this day.

The second thing that was evident to Indonesians on the trip was the relationship between the Koreans and the Americans. This was particularly important and was demonstrated at Osan Air Base, outside of Seoul, where Korean pilots fly the same equipment as American pilots, go to the same training, have the same mess halls, obviously know each other and play golf together on weekends. Coming out of an environment where the Dutch had for so long held Indonesia as a colony, this was a remarkable kind of relationship. Filipinos don't think about these things, because they have been for so long in association with American military forces. But to somebody out of Indonesia with the Dutch tradition of colonialism, it was very striking. One did not have to explain everything. They could easily see the state of the relationship, and it was apparent that this was a different environment.

A different kind of thing was seen by a Malaysian general during his first visit in Hawaii. As part of the Honolulu visit just to soften things up a bit, we would go to a luau run by the Hale Koa Hotel. The Hale Koa Hotel is a military rest-and-relaxation facility. On a tranquil evening walking back from the luau to the Ilikai Hotel where the group was staying, the Malaysian brigadier tugged at my sleeve and said, "I have a question." "This place, is it for officers?" "No, it is for anyone in the military," I responded. "You have enlisted people there?" I explained, "Most of the people probably are enlisted." He said, "They are staying together?" It was very difficult for him to understand, having been accustomed to the old British concept that a mixing of the ranks was not appropriate. But to see everybody able to sing together, carry on together, eat together, to have a good time together, without any regard to rank or station, was to him quite a revealing experience. Again, it was an example of a very American kind of thing.

The luau at the Hale Koa was a seminal place for observing Americans and their culture. Because it was a military R&R stop, elements of patriotism were more visible than they might have been at a comparable hotel or night club in the civilian community. I remember the Chinese major general was with us the second year I took the group to the luau and there were 200-250 people out on the lawn enjoying dinner, drinking, and the show. In the show was an MC in a white suit who sings and carries on a constant dialogue with the audience. Of course, there was the standard bit where the audience participates in a hula, and other kinds of "where are you from?" questions to the group which usually came from all over the US. Because we were a relatively large group, mostly foreign, the MC (master of ceremonies) would recognize the several tables where we sat. Usually one or more of our members would be asked to attempt the hula, and almost always one of the more outgoing types would volunteer, with much jeering and hooting from our tables. This helped to bring the group together.

At the end of the program, the MC had a standard routine that was used to close the program. Since the Hale Koa Hotel not only accepted active military but retirees as well, there was always a large contingent of older Americans on vacation in Hawaii. He would ask, "Anybody here from the Spanish American War?" There would be great laughter. "Anybody here from the First World War?" Sometimes there would be an old frail hand rise in the back, possibly from someone seated in a wheelchair. That was kind of remarkable and a sense of wonderment would spread through the audience. Then he would go on listing the conflicts right down through the Second World War, the Korean conflict, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and all the different incidents when the nation was at war, particularly in the Pacific. People would stand up, and everybody

would applaud. The MC would say, "I finally want to give some recognition to the veterans of these different conflicts, because so often it is not given." All would applaud loudly.

Even for an American, watching all of these people stand up gives one a sense of reality to some of the stuff you see in the movies. It gives you an internal buzz when you realize that there is so much history collected together in one place. Our foreign military group was thunderstruck by this, because for them most of the wars and military actions were the stuff of history books or newsreels. Often they had seen those actions as American imperialism with malicious intent. To see the real people who actually had been in those conflicts, some of them obviously injured or disabled as a result, was an incredibly powerful experience.

Following the recognition of the veterans, everybody stands up, links arms and sings *God Bless America* swinging back and forth. Here we had non-Americans from 20 or so different countries all linking hands, including the Chinese major general, and singing at the top of their lungs *God Bless America*. To an American, it is a sight that is as unbelievable as it was profound. Some of those lustily singing with the rest were on the other side of the line in those conflicts. In all the SEAS groups I participated in, there was never a critical word said about the experience. Just the reverse, the luau evening spoke volumes on a subject that would have been difficult if not impossible to explain to our diverse group of foreign military. The emotion of the evening and the human warmth of the event made it one of the most important elements of the SEAS program.

I had a hard time justifying a luau on our official expenses, but we were able to do that by bending a few things such as subsuming the cost under the allowance given to each grantee for board. Without doubt, it was worth the effort. What they were taking out of the experience said a lot about the American spirit and the attitudes of the American military. The social event also cemented relationships within the group that were to be very important in subsequent days as very delicate national issues were discussed and contrasted. It was far more effective than anything we could ever have accomplished in a week of serious lectures. So the SEAS program had a lot of facets.

Another important part of SEAS was the "kick-off" session on the first day. Everybody came in and sat around tables arranged in a square with all seats of equal prominence. Of course, the group was drawn from nations that often have been at odds. The Japanese and Chinese, the Singaporeans and the Malaysians, Japanese and Koreans, etc. For example, every time they would come in for this first session, the Japanese would sit on one side of the room and the Koreans would sit on the other. They wouldn't talk to each other or look at each other. By the time we got to Singapore, they were drinking buddies.

At that first session, we gave time to each national representation, sometimes it was two, sometimes only one, to stand and give a five minute presentation on the security situation in their country. There was not enough time to be very comprehensive, but the occasion required each person to stand and say something to the entire group. It was a fascinating seminar in Asian relations, because you went from a Nepalese brigadier who lambasted all his neighbors for interfering in his country and causing trouble, to a Japanese who would give a very comprehensive overview of the Japanese economic situation in the Pacific, to a Korean who

didn't share the Japanese view of the situation in the region, to someone from China who felt beset by everyone. Gradually as the SEAS symposium progressed and after three weeks of eating together, arguing together, sleeping together, traveling together, the group formed remarkable bonds. It was something like what happens at camp among children who spend several weeks together during the summer. We now have a very strong alumni association from these SEAS seminars. We have a newsletter which comes out every year and indicates where former participants are now, what their titles and addresses are, and what the experience was of the immediately preceding SEAS program.

In most countries in Asia, there is a very strong tradition that sharing an educational experience with someone makes you a life-long friend. That same bonding was very active in the relationships among those participating in the SEAS program. The professional connections established in the program was one of its primary goals. If there comes trouble between two nations that prompts a confrontation of arms, it would be useful to the cause of stability if a senior officer on one side of the line were able to give a call to a similar ranking officer on the other to see if the confrontation might be worked out bloodlessly. The bonding that occurs in the SEAS symposia may be adequate to accomplish the task.

Recognition of the importance of the program was given in the attention paid to SEAS in each of the capitals it visited. Usually the U.S. Public Affairs Officer hosted a reception at the embassy, attracting not only the presence of the U.S. ambassador and many of the senior members of the mission, but also the military attaches of many of the countries represented in the program. It was relatively rare that an essentially military group was assembled for a social event. Spin-off benefits of the reception included more frequent contact between U.S. military attaches and their counterparts in that capital, but also the chance to "rub elbows" for each of the other countries' attaches as well. It is common in Asian cultures to build strong bonds with those with whom you study. If a person has been a student with another, there is a life-long bond. This principle transfers to a variety of military programs. For example, the Army Command and Staff College at Ft. Leavenworth in Kansas trains a lot of foreign military, and they highly value the training as a mark of a "fast burner" in their own military societies. When the SEAS group moved from capital to capital, it was common for those who were Leavenworth graduates to search out fellow graduates of that program and, once found, make great efforts to get together. Remarkable interconnections run throughout many foreign armies. The SEAS program became a very important coalescing point for each of the posts we visited, in terms of bringing their military contact people together in a situation where we could talk about something relevant to post objectives.

By the time we finished in Singapore with each of these groups, the consensus was very clear. The U.S. military posture in the Pacific is one of maintaining stability. We were keeping people apart, maintaining a commonly desired sense of stability even though there were times that national interests among the Pacific Rim nations were in conflict. To some, this smacks of "playing policeman," but for most, this was not the sense that prevailed. They, instead, saw the U.S. as a benign presence, a buffer which separated the conflicted nations, giving them time to sort things out short of outright conflict. There was no "arresting" or "judging" on the part of the US. Just "being there" made all the difference. That, of course, also meant that the U.S. was not a welcome player in the internal conflicts of these nations. As long as we minded our own business

and simply hung around the neighborhood, we were welcome. If we crossed the line and interfered, the mood was entirely different. Singapore was a prime example of this principle.

In Singapore, each of the SEAS groups would visit Paya Lebar, a Singaporean airbase and important strategic military location for the city state. On one of the SEAS trips, we included a Malaysian flag officer, and as far as anyone knows, he was the first Malaysian flag officer ever to visit that airbase. Over the years, Singapore and Malaysia maintained a wary distance from each other. This visit of the Malaysian flag officer, if it did not really break new ground, at least served to strengthen a needed communication and a building of trust. Again, the U.S. played a benign, but central, role in improving that military situation.

Another example of the precedent-setting role of SEAS occurred when we took a Chinese major general to Korea for the first time. I had a devilish time trying to get him a visa from the Korean Ministry of Justice. Korea and China had just opened diplomatic relations, and here was a senior member of the Chinese Peoples Liberation Army wanting to visit. They tried but could not get a visa for him in Beijing, even though there was a Korean Embassy there. I implored the Korean Consulate in Honolulu to process a visa after he arrived in Hawaii but had no success. Each time the embassy or consulate pointed down the road. So we flew off to Tokyo without a visa for him for Korea. In Tokyo, I called the Korean consulate and said I urgently needed a visa. The answer I got was "Well, it may be difficult." "Look," I said, "This officer is coming with a group which is sponsored by the U.S. government. We are bringing him to Korea on a study mission of the military. Your foreign ministry people are involved in this, as are your defense people." Of course, because it was the Justice Ministry in Korea that handles immigration and consular affairs, they evidently had no directives on the visit of ranking military officers of the service that is the "blood ally" of their sworn enemy.

In desperation, I took a car from the American Embassy and went to the Korean consulate with Major General Li Zhi Yun's passport, visa application, and pictures. Finding the visa section, I asked for the consul and sat down in his office, saying that I would not budge until I was got a visa placed in MG Li's passport. We had to leave for Seoul the next morning, and if he did not get a visa, there would be a major embarrassment for both Korea and the US. This presented the benighted consul with a huge problem. After fretting a bit, but unwilling to risk a bit of effrontery with his country's major ally, he got on the phone and passed the hot potato up the chain to Seoul. The poor man really sweated this one out. There were successive consultations with his superiors. Each time he would hang up, glance at me - perhaps hoping I would somehow simply disappear - look desperately downcast and quietly remain behind his desk, sweating. Finally, after one of the wearying calls, he dejectedly reached down and opened a drawer of his desk, took out a stamp, gave MG Li's passport a stamp and a quick signature. Passing it to me with a weak smile, he said that he hoped that would be sufficient. I thanked him well and departed.

Of course, the real test of the forcefully obtained visa was at the entry point at Kimpo airport on arrival. I made sure that MG Li was immediately behind me in the immigration line. To my surprise, there was not even a blink or pause from the official clearing my group. I was certain they must have been fully briefed on his entry and played their roles well. MG Li was, I expect,

the first high-level PRC military official to visit Korea outside of the formal diplomatic mission and was a sensation, but everyone was cool, almost blasé. So that was a good start.

Everywhere we went with MG Li, we broke new ground with that man, because it was so sensational. Yet the most common reaction from both official and non-official Koreans was perfect disbelief. When we arrived at one of the senior think tanks in Seoul for discussions, the printed guest list included MG Li as from the Republic of China. I would have to say, not the Republic of China but the People's Republic of China. I would get a blank look. Respectful, but blank. Obviously the foreign guest, me, was sorely confused. They would look at me deeply, perhaps scanning for other less obvious signs of dementia, turn away and simply ignore my correction. They could not understand where this man was from. Those who did understand the import of the visit were discrete.

As in other aspects of the program, the mad Americans were indulged, but the purpose of the visit was accomplished. MG Li went to the Republic of Korea. He was treated well and was respectfully included in the discussions, along with those who were also allies of the Republic of Korea. I have to believe that it had a refreshing effect on those who met and discussed issues with MG Li. He was articulate, forceful, and obviously well briefed on the PRC position. However, the discussions were not exercises in name calling or polemics. Rather they were polite encounters where the participants did not see eye to eye on important issues but still could treat each other as respected members of the common human race. A small, but important victory.

It was incidents such as these that made the SEAS program so important for us and important for those who participated in the program. Although it was expensive because of the touring that was necessary, the food and transportation costs, it was by far the cheapest thing we could do in terms of impact for the taxpayers' dollar. We were able to consolidate an understanding among all of these nations in the Pacific of what we were about, why we were there, what our intents were and more importantly, why everybody else thought it was important for them to have us there. This message was communicated directly to those in their military organizations who were looked to for the development of strategy or intelligence. They were the intellectuals who were an essential part of the modern army, the thinkers who had much to say about the development and direction of security policy in their own nations.

There were many of these vignettes in each of the SEAS programs. I remember several times when we would go to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, sit around a table, and have a briefing by one of their very articulate people on the policy of self-defense and the role of U.S. forces in Japan. Someone of our group would ask, "Why do you allow the American military on your soil?" They would get the answer, full blast. Essentially, "Because it is important to us and in our national interest to have them here. We are not being nice to or cowed by the Americans. We want them here, because they are important to us and they sustain confidence in the region that we are not going to get involved in something in the rest of Asia again." That was a good and powerful message. They might have gotten a different answer had we gone to Okinawa, but in Tokyo, the official view was important.

I think most understood it in the military sense, because when they got to Singapore, it was also apparent to the SEAS group that Singaporeans had the same feeling. Lee Kwan Yew, for example, offered Singapore as a way-station for American forces in Southeast Asia and was soundly criticized by the Southeast Asians at the time, but I think now in retrospect, they agree with his initiative and he is benefitting by it commercially, because of contracts. These messages were reinforced, because representatives from Japan, Korea, and Singapore were traveling as members of the SEAS group and other members could grill them for confirmation and details as they traveled from stop to stop. Since they were becoming fast and trusted friends, the responses were credible and accepted. This reinforced the message that in other situations would have been very difficult to make convincing.

*Q: You were working out of Beijing then?*

YATES: No, I was working out of Seoul. It was an interesting concept, because the North Koreans are so prickly about anything that deals with the South. Yet they agreed to this arrangement. They knew what was going on. They knew where we came from, as we had made no attempt to hide our southern residence. But the big problem was getting enough Korean speakers to go in. It was not a popular thing for people to do. Some would be intrigued by the opportunity to enter a country that was different, even exotic, and the chance to go where so few outsiders had trod was generally exciting. But their ardor quickly cooled when they discovered the living conditions at the nuclear site and the dangers that were involved, not only from the North Koreans in a security sense, but because the site offered radiation threats that were not under the same safety controls common in the U.S. and elsewhere. The North Korean technology to deal with matters of health and safety at the site were not as sophisticated as they would have been in other regions.

However, the North Koreans are very good engineers, and from my conversations with our engineers, most held very positive impressions of their skills and safety consciousness. They didn't have much in the way of equipment, but they were very sophisticated in their craft. That, I think, gave rise to a certain degree of mutual respect that over a period of time was very positive.

On the other hand, the North Koreans are very difficult to deal with. On my first trip into North Korea, I was surprised to find that the conditions there and the attitude of the people was remarkably similar to what I had found in the deepest part of South Korea on my first tour many years before. I had been in Kwangju in the late '60s, and the South then was more advanced than the North is today. Yet North Korea had problems of a magnitude not seen at the time in the South. When I began to travel to the North, the controversy had already begun about the failed crops and the threatening famine. Flooding had already occurred before my first visit. So when I went in, part of what I had to do was look to see if I could gather some insight into what was happening in the North. I traveled from Pyongyang to Nyongbyon where the reactor site is located. It is about sixty miles north of Pyongyang. At the time I arrived, we had to take back roads to get there, and it took about three and a half hours of driving over very poor roads. North Korea must import all of its oil, so they chiefly use cement on the roads. Cement is a local product. They also have severe winters. Anybody who lives in New England would have recognized the damage done to cement sections of road from frost heaves. The road was all broken up in places, and it really made a hard, difficult ride.

We would spend from two to three weeks in Nyongbyon, drive back to Pyongyang with the rotating engineering crews and then fly back to Seoul via Beijing. You could not get to North Korea directly from Seoul, and there was no other service except from Moscow. I guess that was only once a week. So the two flights a week, on Tuesdays and Saturdays to and from Beijing, were the best way to get in and out. You were very, very isolated. Communications were not very good. Telephones worked sometimes, and if you were in the Koryu Hotel in Pyongyang, things were not too bad, but if you were in Nyongbyon, telephone communication was very difficult.

IAEA had a guest house there which was built for their needs by the North Koreans. There are IAEA members who stay there on rotational duty monitoring the nuclear site. They also revolve in and out on a similar schedule of two to three weeks each time. There is always an IAEA representative present to monitor the nuclear site, including the reactor from which the fuel was removed.

When I first arrived, there was no real connection between the IAEA people and the American engineers, although after a while, that dissolved a bit, because they were living in the same spot; in such a unique and closed environment, after a while you get to know each other. But officially, we were not supposed to talk to each other or associate, because it was thought any warmth shown by Americans toward the IAEA people would indicate to the North Koreans that the IAEA was a handmaiden of American policy. We were bending over backwards to be cool and distant from these IAEA representatives who were usually third world people from Mexico, Nigeria, Egypt, and places like that.

The guest house, itself, wasn't bad. Actually the food there was much better than it was in Pyongyang at the hotel. They had a cook who was able to get fair quality materials from somewhere, possibly China. Everybody was paying hard currency, and probably we were able to get anything we wanted. Nevertheless, the cook at the guest house did a marvelous job of creating what his vision of Western food was. He obviously had a cookbook somewhere, because he would come up with amazing things. Some of his creations tasted a little different, but others were really quite good, almost at a gourmet level. The fixings were not dependable, however. Sometimes there were good mushrooms, a variety of vegetables, and lots of chicken. The trouble was, when he found something fresh, you ate it for a week. We had cucumber salad every time, all the time I was there. If he found some tomatoes, you had tomato things; if he had onions, there were onions in just about everything you ate. Breakfasts were not very good, and of the three daily meals, the American breakfast is not very well understood in the rest of the world. There was no orange juice or special items like that. You could bring in your own fixings or condiments, but you could not bring in perishables, because you never knew when you were going to get in.

The rotating engineers would bring candy, M&Ms, Snickers, and favorite snack foods to keep up the sugar levels that were generally low in Korean cooking. You could bring in material to read, but you couldn't leave it in places where North Koreans would be able to see it. If one or another of the North Korean managers at the rest house came across something offensive, they would confiscate it and argue with you and tear it up in front of your face or demand that you store it

away; otherwise you would be accused of attempting to propagandize the people of the North. By general agreement, however, the engineers were allowed to do almost anything on the second floor of the guest house where most of the rooms were. The situation even improved to the point where they were able to borrow a videotape machine from the IAEA people and bring in some movies, although sometimes those got into trouble if the subject matter was deemed inappropriate. The only available recreation at the guest house was a pool table and a lonely basketball hoop outside. If you wanted to use that, you had to bring your own basketball.

The guest house was on a corner outside the nuclear city. The old city of Nyongbyon is a small walled town, one of North Korea's oldest settlements. The only industry there, is a silk factory which recently had not been selling much silk. The town was poor. Arriving at the site, you had to drive through the town, cross the river, and then approach a whole new city, also called Nyongbyon, on the other side of the Nine Dragons River, after which the guest house is named. The new city is not walled in like the old but is surrounded by barbed wire and several rings of guards. There were a series of security areas, one within another, sort of like those nested Russian dolls. In the center of these zones is the nuclear building and reactor. Around that was a military compound. It resembles a treed college campus. It had been built in the early seventies to be the North Korean nuclear research center.

The North Koreans brought in a lot of their researchers who evidently were trained abroad, probably in Eastern Europe, and who essentially stayed in this compound. They were kept apart from their own society. Their life-style distinguished them from their compatriots in other parts of the country. For example, almost all of their houses and apartments had television antennas sprouting from the roofs. That could not be seen in other areas apart from the special cadre housing in Pyongyang. Inside the secure city, they had their own factories which processed food from their own farms. They even had a Korean rice wine factory. They had begun construction on a new cultural center for films and art. Most of what they needed to exist was provided within the compound. There were schools for the children and playgrounds. Connections with the surrounding communities seemed tenuous. There was a bus that ran through the guard posts, but few people other than soldiers seemed to ride it. Most appeared to be farm people going to fields outside the perimeter. Yet despite its isolation, it appeared to be a fairly sophisticated town compared to the other cities that could be seen while traveling back and forth to Pyongyang.

As a foreigner at this unusual city, there were special disadvantages. As a foreigner, you could not live within the city. That would have created too many problems. So they built a guest house outside the security perimeter, near the Nine Dragons River on a bluff. Behind the guest house was a military installation and in front was the river and the guards. At night time, you could go out of the house, but you couldn't walk very far. You could walk down to a big tree where Kim Il Sung had once stopped to give "guidance" to the people and then return, as long as the round trip was done during daylight. In the winter with long work days and short periods of daylight, that meant that there was little opportunity for exercise. It was like being in prison. When you came back, they closed the gate behind you. It wasn't locked, but there was an armed guard at the gate holding you in. There were rice fields around you. There was not much of anything to do at all.

If you wished to be by yourself for a while, you were permitted to climb to the top of the small bluff behind the guest house and look over the river. It was pretty. There was a bench up there that you could sit on. But that was the extent of the recreational facilities. On the second floor landing was a pool table where the North Korean staff were permitted to go. It was the only point where some sort of social contact was allowed with the North Korean staff at the house. I am not really sure that it really had official blessing, but outside of a television set in the lower lobby, which never seemed to carry much programming, there was not much for our North Korean minders to do either. Several of the North Koreans got very involved in playing pool, and the friendly games got very competitive. If too many Americans got involved, however, the North Korean staff became uncomfortable and usually left.

The process involved with the “minders” is one of the aspects of living in North Korea that is kind of controversial. If you read journalist accounts of North Korea you will see a lot of commentary on the watching and “minding” that goes on with foreigners.

North Koreans have a bad reputation, sometimes it is well deserved, of closing people in. Americans always seem to enjoy a sense of conspiracy. This often leads to dramatic exaggerations of the North Korean suspicions. For example, I was told they will not allow me to walk outside the hotel, and you are controlled and watched every waking moment of the day. There will be cameras in your room and the halls. Indeed, there are large mirrors built into the walls in the halls of the hotel we were in, and it is likely, as it is in Beijing, that halls and public areas are monitored. We always seemed to be placed on the same floors of the Koryu hotel, although this could have easily been explained by the relative lack of other customers and the high cost of fuel to heat in the winter. Indeed, when there was a sudden flush of visitors and we had to take alternate rooms, the rooms were usually cold and not made up as well.

On the first night of my initial entry into Pyongyang, I decided to get some air after the long trip to Pyongyang and take a walk. The minders congregate in the lobby of the hotel near the front door, the only way out. Mine intercepted me and said, “Where are you going?” “Well, I am going to take a walk.” “You can’t do that,” he responded. “Why not?” “You could hurt yourself, it is dark.” I was adamant and a bit stubborn perhaps, because I had been told I would be restricted and wanted to test the theory. “Well, it is not too dark, and I only want a short walk,” I claimed. “I will just go out and walk a couple of blocks.” My minder insisted that I stay in the hotel - “it is not advisable.” Finally, I got them to agree if someone went along with me. I thought that was a reasonable compromise. Off we went, myself and two guides, or minders. It turned out they were right. It was really dark. There are no street lights even in the center of Pyongyang, and the only light you had was an occasional passing car - and they were very occasional. To make things worse, the sidewalks are not in very good repair. There are potholes, cracked concrete, and things to stumble over and break your head on. You could walk into a tree and not even see it. It was really dark. People who are accustomed to cities do not understand how dark it can really be in a city if there are no lights. Perhaps a country boy who grew up under the stars might scoff, but in a polluted city there are no stars to guide one.

It was after 8:00 p.m., but since I was hungry, I invited my stalwart but stumbling minders to go with me to a restaurant where we might get something to eat. I got only a worried response that everything was closed. Naturally, I disbelieved, thinking they just wanted to get me back to the

controlled hotel, but after stumbling around a few corners, I began to become a convert. Maybe they really knew more about Pyongyang after dark than I was ready to allow. Yet I still wanted to try to find something. They thought a restaurant down the street might still be open. We stumbled off in the dark, made it to the restaurant, and indeed, it was closed. We had to stumble back to the hotel, and I ended up with them in the lobby bar, buying them a beer.

The point of that little story is that, in fact, the guides probably had my best interests in sight. It was dangerous for an American to go stumbling around in the dark. First, you probably would get lost and, second, you could really hurt yourself. Should you bring harm to yourself stumbling about in an unfamiliar city in the dark, they would be blamed for your misfortune. So reports of the deviousness of the “minders” are exaggerated and may be misleading. Of course, they want to keep track of you and do not want you fraternizing with people.

In addition, there is the myth of the “Potemkin Village” demonstration for VIP guests. Foreign accounts of travel in Pyongyang are replete with vignettes of stores stocked, but not open, and activities ostensibly only for the benefit of curious foreigners. No doubt, there are some restaurants and other establishments that are off limits. For example in Pyongyang, there are some department stores which will take foreign currency, reputedly for the convenience of tourists and foreign diplomats, and others that will only take the local currency. But there are a number of other stores, ostensibly closed, that will accept foreign currency despite the confusing instructions about restrictions. So the confusion about restrictions does not make much sense. Walk into any one of the several “foreign” department stores that are for foreign currency, and they are packed with North Koreans. Many of them are just looking around, but some people are buying and carrying things out of the store. The bottom line is that a lot more observation is needed before conclusions can be drawn.

I wanted to go to department store #1 and was told it was off limits for foreigners. But it was featured in North Korean tourist brochures, and I wanted to get some souvenirs to take back to the South. That seemed to be the convincing argument, because I went several times to department store #1, sometimes with groups of American engineers in tow. I went through all its floors. They had a whole corner of the store devoted to stuffed animals and birds and oddities like that. You could buy foreign liquor there and shortwave radios, which I thought was interesting. North Koreans don't have much money. It is not a monetized economy. It is apparent that most of the citizenry are not accustomed to a monetized society. They receive chits for rice, free housing, free education, and free medical care, so they don't need money except for cigarettes and beer, both of which are extremely cheap. You can buy a great big bottle of Asahi beer for about two dollars.

*Q: Asahi beer is a good Japanese beer.*

YATES: Yes, and the North Koreans love it. It is very cheap, far cheaper than it would be in Japan. It is obviously subsidized. You can buy cheap cigarettes in North Korea also. They make cigarettes. I don't know where they get the tobacco; perhaps it comes from the U.S. via China or Hong Kong. So a foreigner who likes to smoke and likes to drink is in good shape in North Korea. Almost everything else is by chit provided by the government. This means that as a North

Korean, you don't need money to exist. It is only for nonessentials that you use money. So their low wages are essentially disposable income.

Another commonly accepted theory is that of the "Potemkin Village." As I noted before, it is claimed that they put on a big show for foreigners. The stores are not really stores. They will have goods stacked up neatly, but nobody ever touches it. You go in and look around, and nobody is there, and as soon as you leave, they close it up. You ride down the street, and you see all these stores, and they are all closed. So there are no stores, nothing for the North Koreans to buy.

That is not quite true. While it would be hard to define North Korea as a consumer society, they run things differently in their society than we do. A store here in the U.S. might open at 10 in the morning and stay open until 10 at night. Not in North Korea. They won't open in the morning. They will open at lunch time which sounds to an American like a crazy system. But as was explained to me, the theory in North Korea is that everybody is a worker and after breakfast you go to work. If you opened the stores in the morning, there would be no customers, but at lunch time when there is an hour off, there are many people on the street and, sure enough, when I checked at that time, the stores were all open. These goods are all lined up neatly in the morning, because the workers have nothing to do but make them neat until lunchtime when they sell them and then afterwards straighten them all up again.

Perhaps the stores are not crowded as we would expect in our own society, but you do see people standing in line in front of stores waiting to get in. The stores in North Korea are operated, as we would recognize in the old days, as general stores where you walk up to a counter and say, "I want a sack of flour, some lard, and crackers." They then go and get your flour, lard, and crackers and pass them across a counter in exchange for your money. That is the way stores operate in North Korea. You stand in line to get to the counter. When you get to the counter, you order what you want and you take it home. It is a little different than the walk-around-the-supermarket-with-a-cart experience we have. Foreign observers, glancing at the empty stores on their way from the airport to the hotel and back, are not learning much about the system.

A second myth that turned out to be fiction was that there are no such things as gas stations in North Korea. You can ride around Pyongyang for hours without seeing a gas station. The reason is, North Koreans think gas stations are dirty, which I guess has some point to it, and they put them down back alleys. Sure enough, once you know the code, you ride down a street and see a little blue sign up in the corner with a little arrow on it. That is the petrol sign. You go down that alley, and the station is in the back somewhere. There are very few cars anyway, although the numbers are growing. I was in a traffic jam in Pyongyang only once. They have mostly Russian and East European bloc cars, although a fair number of Volvos, which is interesting, and a lot of Mercedes. The North Koreans or someone in North Korea deemed the Mercedes as the best car in the world and decided to build them. So for a time, there was a North Korean Mercedes that was being built. The products of that effort look like Mercedes, except that there is a five-pointed star on it instead of the usual Mercedes three-pointed star. The five-pointed star, of course, is their red star. The paint tends to be runny, and the wheel covers tend not to be the magnesium type that you are familiar with. So it is a little different, but looks like a shabby Mercedes about ten years old. I don't think they are making them anymore.

I know they never paid for the Volvos. That is one of the problems with the North Koreans; they buy things and never pay for them. When I was there, they had a Swedish delegation trying to arrange for the payment of about \$350,000 worth of Volvos that the Swedish taxpayers had paid for, because their government had guaranteed the export arrangement. Volvo got its money, but the Swedes did not. The Swedish government is trying to recover it. That is one of the problems with the North Korean economy; they do not have any money. Because it is a non-monetized economy, they do not benefit from the multiplier effect in the economy. If the multiplier effect is not working, then money is not being generated as it moves through the economy. Without generating money they can't buy anything. So it is a "catch 22."

Our U.S. engineers would go in, in groups of about eight and usually a head engineer or the vice president of the company. There were several U.S. companies involved under contract with the Department of Energy. In fact, all of my expenses and escort expenses were funded by the Department of Energy. I was a USIA officer, working for the Department of State being funded by the Department of Energy. It was a strange arrangement.

But we would go in, if we could get in. One of the problems of getting into North Korea was that you had to have a visa, but North Korea doesn't give visas like normal governments; they give you a piece of paper with your picture on it, which they stick inside your passport. But even that wasn't good enough to get you into security places. For example in Nyongbyon, we had to get a separate pass to allow us to get through the different parts of the guard structure - the municipal guards (police), the local army guards, and the security apparatus around the nuclear center itself. When I arrived for the first time in the fall of 1995, army troops occupied mounted machine gun nests at the access points around the compound of the nuclear city. By my third visit, about a year later, those emplacements had been removed, and there did not seem to be much of an explanation why. Security in the nuclear compound had appreciably diminished.

Still, every time you went in and came out, you had to stop at every guard point, and there were four of them to go through to get into the reactor site. Every morning, we would have to go through the four posts. If you went back for lunch, you had to go through all four posts to reach the guest house outside the perimeter. Going back to work meant going through the four posts again. You had to come to a full stop and show all your documents at each stop, every time you went in or out. They didn't inspect the drivers or the guides. The drivers had a very unique position. First, they commanded the cars, but they also probably had more authority than drivers would in other parts of the world, because they were part of the intelligence establishment.

*Q: Were you there during the death of Kim Il Sung?*

YATES: No, I was there after that. However, I was there during the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Party. The problem at Nyongbyon was that there was nothing for the engineers to do, so we tried to figure out things that might provide some recreation. They worked on Saturdays, so it meant only Sundays were free. We could take a car and drive to Pyongyang. We could go to the hotel, get a room, and sit in the bar. It was at least a change of scenery, and there were sights to see.

One of the weekends on my first trip on October 10, 1995 was the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the founding of the Korea Workers Party. Some of the guides knew we were interested in doing some touring and asked whether we would like to see the show, if they could get us some tickets. Most of the engineers thought that was a great idea. I told the guides that, if we could be given firm assurances that we were not going to be put into a compromising position, that we wouldn't go to any of the places we otherwise would not go to like the memorial to Kim Il Sung, for instance, we could probably go. However, if anything happened that I thought was wrong, then I would take the engineers out immediately. We would stand up and leave, possibly embarrassing our hosts. If they understood the conditions and understood that we would walk out if compromised, we would accept the offer to see the show.

Off we went. It turned out that the apparatus in North Korea is not very well put together. It is a small country but incredibly bureaucratic. The guides had lots of trouble getting us tickets, but we were finally given admission tickets to the foreigners' stand for the ceremony at the Kim Il Sung Square in the heart of Pyongyang.

We left about 7:30 a.m. and got to the square around 7:50. There were no seats, just wide flat concrete areas, arranged amphitheater style, flanking the platform where the leadership stood to wave at the masses below. On one side was the Party cadre, and on the other side, the military, and below that, the foreigners' stand for ambassadors and people from embassies on the right hand side of the podium. So we got shunted off to the right. I had dark glasses on and a hat. The only way you could tell I was a foreigner was because I was differently dressed than the rest of them. But you couldn't tell who I was. Our instructions to the engineers were not to associate or talk with people, to just watch, no politicking.

There were a lot of diplomats there, Bulgarians, Russians, etc. We were also put together with the Party faithful from abroad: the northern Chinese who are adherents of the communist way and some Japanese from the Japanese communist party who had come for the celebration. We were all together, milling about. Things started to move at 8:00 in the morning and lasted until almost noon. It was hot, and it was long. However, it probably was the most spectacular thing I have ever seen in my life. All the citizens of Pyongyang were spread out before us.

We had one representative of the institute managing the project for the Department of Energy who was not interested in the show. He was a jogger and said that he was going to jog. The guides became very upset. "What do you mean, you are going to jog? You can't jog." The DOE rep was adamant. "I want to jog." "You can't jog," responded the guides. "Why not?" insisted the American. "Because you will be arrested if you do." "I am an American and can go anywhere I want," he persisted. "No, you can't. Nobody in Pyongyang can go anywhere they want. The city is shut. Anybody who lives in this city will be at the square by order. You don't have an option. Anybody not in the square this morning will be arrested, you included." So very reluctantly, he was dragged along with the rest of us. The celebration consisted of about half of the people of Pyongyang in a parade with floats and cheering members of work units. The other half of the citizenry was in the square waving plastic flowers, red and pink and some yellow. They choreographed these flowers into signs and symbols. Whenever they mentioned Kim Il Sung, they showed the sun. Whenever they mentioned Kim Jong Il, Kim Il Sung's son, there would be a star. The parade of silk banners was a marvelous thing to see.

The first thing in the morning was a formation of the military, which filled the square. The military leadership made speeches. They had just appointed four new marshals in the North Korean command, so those marshals were there and reviewed the troops in these very long black Zivs, big Russian cars, and a Lincoln and a couple of other Western cars. They rode in circles, reviewing the troops, and then the troops marched off. There was no brandishing of arms. Few of the assembled troops had arms at all. After the troops had marched out of the square, the mass of citizens who were “hanging in the wings” behind the buildings flooded into the square in this mass of pink. The women were dressed in a modified, shorter, version of the traditional Korean Hanbok and the men wore suits and ties. It was quite an amazing show. This continued until all had arrived at their proper place, and then the parade started.

After the military speeches and the review of the troops, Kim Jong Il came in, no more than 50 feet from where I was standing. He leaned over the edge of the baluster there and waved at all the foreigners. We were told that no pictures were allowed, and all of us respected the request. But it was remarkable to see him so close. He didn't look as sick or disheveled or as monarchical as he does in some of the Western press photos. He went off to receive the accolade of the crowd and stood there for hours, waving. He did evidence considerable boredom, and perhaps it is understandable, given that the parade went on for almost four hours and everyone had all eyes on him.

After Kim Jong Il arrived, the parade started. There were thousands of people with floats, lots of silk flags. After the four hours standing on the cement flats, we were impressed but relieved that the marathon was over. We were told we were going to take a break for lunch and then in the afternoon were the gymnastics. We went back to the hotel for lunch and then went out to the Kim Il Sung Memorial Stadium where just about all of the student population of Pyongyang was assembled. They did marvelous things with card flipping. They would make entire pastoral scenes and then a picture of Kim Il Sung, and then a picture of his son, a lot of slogans and things. Hundreds of these were done by all these school kids about 13, 14, 15 years old under direction from the ground. They had cheerleaders down there. I do not remember seeing more than one or two mistakes made in the several hours of constantly changing pictures. There were thousands of these kids.

After the sloganeering and marvelous pictures of the card flippers, the gymnastics started with an incredible display. I had seen a fair amount of Chinese gymnastics while stationed in Beijing, but the kids in the stadium gave nothing to the Chinese in their display of skills. Much of the display ran with multiple activities in different parts of the stadium simultaneously, a “multiple ring circus” that somehow all fit together into a seamless whole. People tumbling in the air, ground vaulting, and all sorts of juggling, all taking place at the same time. Kim Jong Il was there also. We were seated further away. We certainly weren't given very special consideration up in the stands, off on the side. We could take all the pictures we wanted of the gymnasts, but couldn't turn the cameras on the leadership podium.

Our minders carefully observed the ground rules of our attendance. The extent to which the minders were careful about the instructions I had laid down before we had agreed to go, was illustrated during the morning celebration. The TV cameras were constantly roving over the

crowds and the displays of adulation, but during a lull in the celebration, began to pan across the crowd of foreigners, obviously showing the foreign dignitaries who were attending the celebration. At the time the camera came very close to where I was standing, one of the minders saw it coming and stepped between me and the camera and stood there until the camera left. I wouldn't have cared so much, because with my hat and sunglasses, nobody would be able to tell me from any other European, but nonetheless, the point was, he kept his word which was much more important to me than any possible photography.

I found all the way along that the North Koreans were very careful about the agreements that were made. If the agreements were broken, either they had a very good reason, or they did not feel they themselves had broken them. We had one incident during my first visit when I wanted to visit the East German compound to see the Swedish representative who handled American affairs in Pyongyang at the time. I wanted to meet him, say hello, and set up procedures to be used if we had problems in Nyongbyon. Because the Swedes provided some diplomatic protection, the assistance of this Swedish representative could be invaluable in times of emergency. It was getting dark, but that was not of concern to me. I said that I wanted to take the car and go over and see the Swedish consul. My minder of the moment said, "Does he expect you?" I said, "No, but I would like to knock on his door and say hello." "Well, it may be a problem." "Why?" "Well, we don't know where the German Embassy is." That was one of the largest embassies in Pyongyang and our foreign minders didn't know where it was? That was unbelievable. I said, "I really have to go. I want to do this." "We will see what we can do," was the response.

It was about 4:30 in the afternoon, and it gets dark in Pyongyang in the winter time pretty early. They worked for half an hour and then came back and said, "We can't find it. We have called the foreign ministry, and we just can't locate the German compound." I said, "Well, what are we going to do?" They suggested that we take the car and try find it, so we all piled into the car I had rented and rode off into the mists of Pyongyang. We crossed the river into the diplomatic quarter where we stopped here and there, asking security guards where the East German Embassy was. In Seoul, I had seen a map with the general location of where it was but had nothing else to guide us. We took a few wrong turns but eventually did find the place. By that time, it was dark and there was a guard out in front. I got out of the car, a Westerner, and approached the gate. "Who are you and what do you want?" I was asked. "I want to see the Germans." The guard's response was a simple, "Okay." My minders had to stay in the car, since they were not allowed to go into the embassy, but I could.

I had one of the engineers with me, and the two of us went into the compound which was already completely dark. We felt our way along and saw a light in an apartment building toward the back. Europeans don't keep hall lights on very often to conserve energy. We went up some stairs and banged on a door with light showing under it. I don't know what the occupants thought, I never did find out, but they came to the door; getting a bang on the door in the middle of the night in North Korea from people you don't expect must be quite sensational. It turned out they were newly arrived, a young German diplomat and his wife. Nobody that I wanted to speak with was at home, so it was not a very successful visit. But at least I had gotten into the compound, met somebody, and gotten back out. The important part of the story is that my minders worked very hard to locate the German compound when they could have made their lives a lot easier by

simply denying that we were able to go. They were really embarrassed that they did not know where the compound was, when first asked. The North Korean bureaucracy is very compartmentalized, and as I gradually learned more about that unusual government, I more fully understood why my minders had such a problem.

I have another tale that also speaks to the purposes of the minders. When I was getting close to leaving North Korea after my first trip, I wanted to take some kind of candy back to Seoul as a souvenir for my instructors at FSI and others in the South. I was unable to find anything suitable. I mentioned this problem to my minders, and they scurried off. Two hours later, they came back and said, "We have checked all over town. The only place we can find to buy something resembling what you want is up in the hotel bar." Sure enough, upstairs in the bar tucked behind the counter were some boxes of candy. It tasted terrible. But nonetheless, that was North Korean candy which I could take back to the South. But they had worked the better part of the morning, trying to locate the source of my desired souvenirs. I think their spirit of conscientiously trying to do something right is pretty strong.

I later had a different experience while on a negotiating team in my last visit. I was the State Department representative for a negotiating team that was run by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and headed by Norm Wolfe, an Under Secretary at ACDA, to negotiate some of the final parts of the spent fuel arrangements. The canning operation was ongoing, but there were some problems with the details of the work schedule in the final stages of the canning process. Some of the positions of the North Koreans that we thought did not have any merit turned out to be based on things of which we had no understanding. That happened a number of times in my North Korean experience.

You may remember in the press a couple of years ago, we had accused the North Koreans of siphoning off the fuel oil of the first shipment and diverting it to other purposes. Their tally of how much had been taken in was different from ours. Their's showed less and ours showed more. We said, "Aha!" The press had a field day, saying that they were stealing the fuel.

It turned out that our technology was overly sophisticated and had given us incorrect readings. We used technology utilizing sound waves to measure the flow of the heavy fuel oil, which meant we did not have to put anything into the fuel flow itself. It was an acoustic process by which you could tell the rate of flow by, I suppose, the doppler effects on the reflected sound. The North Koreans were adamant that their figures were correct. They used an old propeller system directly in the flow of the oil. The number of times it went around indicated the amount of fuel flow. What happened, as it turned out, was that the fuel going through the line was at a colder temperature than we expected. Since the acoustic properties of the fuel change under those conditions, we had to re-calculate our own totals. In fact, the North Koreans were right and our figures were wrong, despite all of our high tech equipment. Nonetheless, the American press had made much ado about the possible fraud, but made much less about our foul up of the data.

A second incident of the same kind occurred when the North Koreans wanted to stop work on the canning of the spent fuel. We said, "Ah, dragging their feet." This was a charge that was leveled at them regularly. The crane was broken. They had a holiday. Their men were sick. Or the radiation is too much over the pool. They complained that the American engineers were

coming and going in the replacement shifts, but their people were staying and working in the same conditions month after month. The American engineers were working 12 hour days, from 8 in the morning until 8 at night over the pool and for them it was all right, because we had these very fancy, and expensive, dose meters, which were cumulative in determining the amount of radiation that an individual was receiving. They assigned one to you on arrival, and you wore it all the time. Additionally, all American engineers were examined with a full body count done periodically to make sure they did not exceed the Department of Energy's standards for allowable levels of radiation exposure.

However, it turned out that the North Koreans didn't have any of that fancy equipment or sophisticated exams. All they had were the film badges which only indicate when too much exposure is received over a brief period. They had nothing showing the actual cumulative exposure. The way they measured total possible accumulated exposure was by taking a Geiger counter and placing the sensor out over the pool containing the spent fuel while taking a reading. A "health physics" technician would then multiply that by the number of hours the crew was above the pool. The problem was, if you do that, you are not taking into account the shielding of the platform and other obstructions from things above and surrounding the pool. Our crew with the dangling badges would have an accurate reading, but the North Korean crew's accumulation estimates were an average based on the sensor reading taken directly over the pool. That meant if an engineer was suspended directly over the pool for that amount of time, that was the amount of dosage they would receive.

Of course, nobody would be suspended directly over the pool for that length of time, because they walk back and forth for tools, take breaks, etc. Our argument was that there was plenty of space for that, but they were adamant that, because of their health concerns, the exposure of their crews over the pool was high. Finally, we got the idea that the only way they had to determine dosage was to assume the maximum. By doing so, it meant they were spending too much time over the pool and greatly exceeded Department of Energy standards.

It took a long time to wrangle that down to where we understood what they were talking about. They had a good point, and once it was recognized, we were able to come to an agreement on time to be spent over the pool. Although we were happy to have our engineers in over the pool for longer hours, the Koreans absolutely refused. They said that if we gave them the equipment so they could test in the same manner as we did, then we could talk about it. These things are \$500-\$600 a piece, and we weren't about to start handing them out like cookies to all the Korean workers and people who were in the pool area. But in fact, they were being very careful in a dangerous situation with their people. I think in retrospect it was something very difficult for us to argue with. Their intransigence was not so incomprehensible when you began to understand it from their point of view.

One of our major problems in dealing with the North Koreans was that the Americans did not speak Korean. Even in the negotiations I spoke of, we did not have a translator. The only American who had any Korean language was me. The only place the negotiating team could go to converse was out in the street. We had to call for a recess in negotiations and all trundle downstairs and walk around the block. I would tell Norm Wolfe, the head of the delegation and a lawyer, that they didn't understand what we were talking about. First off, we should not use any

legal jargon that is popular in the US, for their translator did not understand it and could not render an accurate translation. My impression was that the translator was guessing a bit and thereby throwing negotiations off the track when our points did not make any sense to the North Korean side. Secondly, the North Korean-supplied translator in translating from Korean into English was doing things that were extremely annoying to Norm Wolfe.

For example, every time they would refer to Wolfe, instead of saying “him” or “you,” he would say, “Mr. Norman Wolfe,” using his full name. That drove Wolfe crazy, because he thought they were needling him. He was not being needled; it was simply a case of the translator trying to be too fussy. The translator was trying to be polite, but he was doing so in a very irritating fashion.

We also saw in the negotiating team an apparent bureaucratic division, almost antagonism, within the North Korean government. The chief negotiator for the North Korean side was an engineer, Director Lee, the Director of the Atomic Energy Bureau, a very senior position in the North Korean government. The North Korean Foreign Ministry was represented by a slick looking gentleman with a silk suit, and clearly not held in the highest regard by the people from the Atomic Energy Bureau. He was a quintessential bureaucrat, one of those Foreign Ministry wonks who just get in the way. He would make caustic speeches, mentioning all sorts of inappropriate and tangential points that would cause Wolfe to get impatient and upset. Obviously, Lee could see that this interloper was causing all sorts of trouble in his negotiation. Actually, there were two foreign ministry representatives, a lawyer who kept his mouth shut most of the time and this other, political type. The talkative representative of the Foreign Ministry was kind of chubby, which was also unusual for a Korean. Those from the Atomic Energy Bureau on the negotiating team were rail thin.

The comparison probably rankled Director Lee. The man in the silk suit would scribble notes all during the negotiations and suddenly rip off a page and pass it to Director Lee. Director Lee was obviously not interested in his scribbled observations, for he would receive the passed notes, hardly look at them, and place them face down on the table beside him. At some time during a break in translation, he would turn up a corner and take a look at the notes and then lay it back face down again. He was doing the absolute minimum to not be completely disrespectful to this person, but certainly not to listen to what he had to say. The man in the silk suit was really upset by this, because he was continually bobbing back and forth in his seat to see what had happened to his brilliant suggestions. You could see him growing visibly ticked off with Lee for not paying attention to his diatribes. It was always the same stuff.

The failure on our part was that we did not have a competent Korean translator on board who was an American and who would understand what we said, even with the ill-advised legalisms. When Wolfe would use lawyer terms, the translator did not know what he was talking about and would guess. Sometimes Director Lee, whose English was obviously better than he would admit, could straighten things out in his own mind or understood the logical stuff, but many times he could not. This prolonged the negotiations to a considerable extent. Finally, we got to an agreement, although it didn't look like we were going to for a long time. In true North Korean style, they would say “absolutely not, absolutely not,” until three seconds before you break and then they would say, “Well, maybe.”

One last thing. The North Koreans had put together a welcoming banquet which was very elegant at the hotel. The meal was well served, and it was excellent food. To be polite and respectful, we had to reciprocate. A bunch of Americans in the heart of Pyongyang had few options. We could not have it at the hotel, because the dining rooms were all booked. I took my minders on a field excursion to see if we might find a place suitable for a concluding banquet hosted by the Americans. We ended up in the Diplomatic Club, which is a kind of curious, run-down, end-of-the-road operation across the river in the diplomatic area. I went over to look at the place to see whether or not it could be suitable for our gala affair, but it clearly was not. It was a dump. It didn't smell good, and it was dank and dark. I had visions of eventually spending cold winter nights downing suds at the bar and listening to bad stories from drunk foreigners once we were finally here with the Liaison Office.

We were ushered into a reception room with plastic flowers. It was really more suited for a funeral parlor than for a banquet. But clearly, we had no choice and would have to make the best of it. After some long negotiations, we finally decided on a menu for the banquet. I asked them to make some changes in the room, to take out some of the junk that was useless like the TV sets, plastic flowers, etc. With a heavy heart filled with trepidation I returned to the Koryu Hotel to break the news to the delegation.

The upshot was, when we had the meal, although it was a little different than many banquets I had been to, it was fairly good. It was, in fact, quite nice in some ways. They had taken out all of the junk and dressed up their waitresses in the North Korean version of the traditional Hanbok. All appeared dramatically different from the polyester-clad bar hostesses I had seen in the afternoon and even the grim room appeared almost cheery. We were brought in through a side entrance, and did not have to walk through the tawdry bar. The North Korean manager did a nice job. Wolfe was obviously pleased, particularly since the total cost came in under the paltry sum available in the ACDA budget. The party was a success and the American taxpayer did well on that one.

By offering that kind of convivial banquet reception, the U.S. side neatly tied up the negotiations on an upbeat note. It really made a difference, because the North Koreans, like their South Korean brethren, really like a good time. They like to drink, to pass the glass around, and play little parlor games, like singing, making speeches, toasts, etc. They got very convivial. These were the hard nosed, brittle negotiators of the earlier afternoon who suddenly now were drinking buddies in the evening. I have heard the same story from academicians and others who have traveled in the North or have had relationships with North Koreans. They take off the official mask, set it aside, have a good time, and put the mask back on the next morning.

I found also one of the great lessons of all this was, if you begin to work with the North Koreans and put aside politics, they become very helpful, very warm, and in some ways very candid. It also means that you can begin to make progress where there was none before. Suddenly doors open. Things are not as much of a problem as they were once thought to be. If they trust you, the whole relationship develops and changes and they begin to rely on you in many ways for counsel on what they should do. It becomes a whole different equation.

Much of our negotiation so far has been handled by people who have no experience in Korea, do not speak the language, and do not know much about Korean history or culture. They go in there with their American eyes and American ears, and they hear things that they think are right and in their terms are correct, but are not the facts based on the way that Koreans see them. In turn, the Koreans believe they have been wronged, or worse insulted, but the Americans think it is obvious and they are simply being stiff. In the classic sense, both sides do not understand what the other one is talking about, so we cannot get agreement. I think that has been the crux of our problem with North Korea all along. By the same token, they have the same problem with the Chinese and Japanese. It is not just us, it is everybody. I think if we had the presence of mind to be able to put together negotiating teams that have the language and the culture background as well as the technical expertise required of the negotiations, we would have much greater success with North Korea.

There were a lot of other parts of the North Korean experience that I think are interesting. There were a whole host of observations and things, but I'm not sure they are germane to what you are looking for.

*Q: One of the things that you read in the paper about North Korea is the adulation for both Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il. Did that come through to you?*

YATES: Oh, sure. I think over the three times I was there, the whole situation changed. I was there in the beginning when there was still the mourning period of Kim Il Sung's death. In the parade given in celebration of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Party, for example, Kim Il Sung was at the center, the son was not. Kim Jong Il was mentioned occasionally, and each time, you had a star that would be shown. He is called the star of Paektu San, the sacred mountain up on the border with China where Korean civilization traditionally came from. There is some controversy about that. As a matter of fact, it is known that Kim Jong Il was not born on the flanks of Paektu San but near Khabarovsk when his parents were living there. None the less, everywhere you go in Korea, there are portraits and squares commemorating Kim Il Sung and to some extent, too, Kim Jong Il, his son, but his son was clearly a secondary deity. In each government building, they would have portraits of the president, vice president, and council somewhere on the wall. What they would have in the foyer was usually a slogan or something said by Kim Il Sung, or Kim Jong Il, for that matter. When one or the other visited a facility, they would take a quote from the visit and carve it on the wall. This is hallowed ground to them.

Engineers are pragmatic, and it is often bone chillingly cold, so they want to get their work done as quickly as possible. We had a shipment driven in from a port, and they tore it apart getting out tools and equipment. The spent-fuel pool room was getting pretty dense with packing material and equipment, but the space in the foyer was empty. So the Americans put down saw horses and began to disassemble the shipment in the foyer until Chief Engineer Lee, suddenly spotted this and exploded. I was in one of the back rooms and was called out. He demanded, "Do you know what is going on out front?" "No," I responded in surprise and promised to take a look immediately. Of course, they had the whole place covered with trash and equipment was all over the place. He said, "I want you all to understand [meaning us Americans and engineers] that this is an important place to us and the actions of the American engineers is very, very rude.

Furthermore, the canning work will not continue until this is straightened out.” We had offended their sensibilities. This was like running around without a shirt or pants in church.

Taking the lesson to heart, the American engineers got the place even cleaner after they finished than it was before they started. To their credit, the engineers understood the problem and were helpful in cleaning the place up, even giving the North Koreans wide tape to tape down wires and make the place look better than ever. The North Koreans got over their pique, accepted the apology, and allowed work to resume without apparent grudge.

At another time, we had a crisis of a different sort. We brought in equipment, and it was cold, the winter was coming on, and there wasn't any heat in the building. Once the reactor was shut down, there was no hot water, and with no hot water, there was no heat. The reactor even had been used to heat the entire community. So we had to bring in kerosene heaters for the offices where we did the water chemistry and another room that was a sort of commons for the American crews. It was really cold. You haven't really felt cold until you have had to sit in a concrete building in a very cold place for a very long time. Then you feel a depth of cold that reaches into your bones. The engineers had put in an emergency request for space heaters. In good government fashion, the request was put out for the low bid, and after purchase, the new kerosene heaters were air shipped over.

They were fine and serviceable heaters, but they were made in South Korea. Labels on the boxes and on the heaters said “Made in Korea.” As soon as we got them out of the packing crates and put them on the floor in the boxes, all the North Koreans disappeared. I got called in again by Chief Engineer Lee and asked him what was the problem. He said, “The problem is, we will not work with those boxes in our building. Burn them, destroy them, but get rid of them. And the heaters as well.” I was alarmed. “But we need them; it is cold.” We finally arrived at the conclusion that the offence was the “Made in Korea” labels. So we got our jackknives out and went out and cut out of the boxes all of the stamps that said “Made in Korea.” We took the stuff out and scraped off all the little “Made in Korea” decals. We examined everything scrupulously to make sure nothing said “Made in Korea.” I went back to the Chief Engineer and said, “I think we have solved the problem. Won't you come out and look?” He went out to look and found nothing with the offending “Made in Korea” labels, so all was now acceptable and we got our heat. The fact they had been made in South Korea was not the important thing. It was the fact that they said “Made in Korea,” to them taunting our North Korean co-workers.

The same thing happened when the first shipment of rice aid arrived in the northern port. Remember when the North Koreans became exercised over the South Korean flag flying on the back of the ship? That was the same syndrome, only written in a different size. The North Koreans were extremely sensitive to that. Whenever we would drive by car through the center of the nuclear compound of Nyongbyon, like in the city of Pyongyang, there was a Kim Il Sung square with his portrait on a billboard as the centerpiece. All cars were expected to slow down and go at a crawl in front of the portrait. You could then speed up (even when crossing in front of the portrait of Kim Jong Il) to continue along to the next check point. That occurred almost everywhere we traveled. It resembles a religion rather than politics or political control. And if you begin to think of it as a religion, you may not become a believer, but you can at least understand it as a religion and then much of what they do becomes understandable.

Kim Il Sung was seen to be a man but revered as a god. Everybody knew he was not god, but nonetheless, he became the symbol of the state, the central image around which the identity of the nation is built. Wherever you traveled around North Korea, there are plaques, pictures, and commemoration tablets that are standing where Kim Il Sung visited and gave “guidance” to the workers of the time. You can laugh at that, but like a good ward politician, he visited every little hamlet in the country. Everywhere you go, there is a plaque where Kim Il Sung stood and gave advice to the farmers or to the workers or the citizens. Wherever he made a pronouncement, there is a picture. There is a wealth of paintings of Kim Il Sung. It is a religion with its own myths and faiths. The images and portraits are the icons of the religion. There is a book of his writings that the believers can cling to. Now, of course, he is dead, and there is the ethereal part of the religion. The son has not, to date, been able to assume the same level of divinity.

I had the chance to watch a fair amount of North Korean television on my several trips north. Since there was not much else to do at the guest house once you tired of pool, it was possible to watch North Korean television. Based on the number of programs I saw, the North Koreans like to show soap opera type programs. This is done all over the world to much the same rapt attention. At least that was the habit of the guest house staff who watched the stories on the one set on the lower floor in the lobby. The most common plot line was usually stories of some hero defending the faith of the party or following the guidance of Kim Il Sung. In fact, they are interpersonal fights, melodramas. We used to enjoy movies with a girl tied up on the tracks, and a speeding train is on the way while a man in a black hat stands by, twirling a handle bar mustache. It is the same stuff all over again. We went through that in the ‘30s and ‘40s. They have their villains and usually they are rightists, or something like that. There is still the black hat and mustache and the girl tied up on the tracks. It is the same story. The hero has muscles and the chiseled jaw like we used to have. The same stuff. That is what they watch and enjoy. The news shows and documentaries generated only boredom until the next drama.

Like all people, if the North Koreans are given a chance to enjoy something different or exotic, they usually take it. An example of this is taped music played in the cars. Most North Korean music is written in North Korea, of course, with generous nods to themes that coincidentally may have appeared in familiar western music. However, if you are in a car with a driver who got sick of the same stuff all the time, what he plays is tapes which are essentially Western music done by North Korean orchestras. That is acceptable, I guess, because they would have Western music which you couldn’t recognize or thought it sounded vaguely familiar but different. Nonetheless, it sounded a lot like what we would recognize as Western classical music. They have a light band which plays on television all the time. They get singers and sing folk songs and things like that. So there is some variety. I bought some of the music. Some of it is very good; Koreans love to sing.

*Q: Yes, we really are talking about Koreans who can take an awful lot.*

YATES: They have taken a lot. They talk about a famine in the north. It is a famine, but they have had some degree of famine for forty years. It is clear that the communist system they have does not work. There are numerous instances around the world of economic failure in communist systems. This is the last of the breed. They know what failure is. The problem is, will they be

able to accept the consequences of that failure in the face of the obvious luxury and wealth of the south at the same time. If the barriers are dropped, what will they do?

The southerners expect them to enter into a mass migration south for jobs. In fact, the South is importing labor now for some of the menial jobs they no longer wish to fill themselves. This is the same kind of thing the Germans had experienced. The question is, would the northerners take these jobs from the foreigners the South were bringing in. Would the southerners also be able to provide the indicated labor force needed for the kind of industries southerners no longer do, like shoes. The south has already moved a lot of its manufacturing base offshore. The investment that went into Korea in the late sixties and early seventies, textile manufacture, shoe manufacture and things like that, are no longer in Korea. Now they are going high tech and much of the stuff they did before has gone off to China or down to Malaysia or Vietnam.

*Q: Did you find yourself being used by the North Koreans because you would be the only one who knew South Korea in this group? Were you feeding their curiosity about South Korea or were they pretty careful?*

YATES: They were pretty careful. I think they don't want to talk about it, because that would easily corrupt them in the eyes of their own system. Generally speaking, they did not talk about it much. After a while when you got to know people, you began to get a little bit more of that. You had to be very careful, because if you tried to push it, then they would push you out. So you did not bring it up. If they wanted to talk about it, you would be happy to do so. But you had to be careful. If they wanted to talk about it, they were probably baiting you or something akin to the games the Chinese intelligence service played. But if you backed off a little bit and took a quiet road, I think you built more confidence among them.

I had a lot of political discussions with my North Korean handlers. In the beginning, they would all give speeches, particularly if a superior was within earshot. If you ride in a car with one of their superiors next to you, the guide in front would launch into a long tirade against American inequities and the duplicity and colonization of the South, etc. They would get tiresome. More than once, I had this happen to me, but not with the same person more than once. Once they had done it, that seemed to complete a check box in the report they had to file on you. Once you are past that, particularly if you are willing to buy the beer or cigarettes, they are willing to sit down and talk about other things. I had a long conversation once about the American civil war, which North Koreans have virtually no knowledge of.

The guides that we got were not political types; they were technical people. It was a strange thing. Political types never studied English, technical types did, because it was a language that allowed you to learn about something technical like nuclear energy or math. A lot of information on nuclear energy is in English or German. So they had linguistic talents but were chemists, physicists or mathematicians. There was one of the guides who was a mathematician interested in a wider range of things. One day, we got talking about the Korean war. I mentioned the U.S. also had had a civil war at one time between the North and the South. He seemed interested and curious, with a wish to know more about it. I suggested that he read The Red Badge of Courage to get an idea of some of the feelings of Americans on the front lines during the civil war.

Steven Crane's seminal work was the first time that war as a terrible thing got into the literature. To Crane, it was not a noble cause but an intensely personal experience that called into question many things otherwise assumed. War not as a valiant thing, as it was portrayed in the North very often. The war on a personal level and how much it cost people, the wounded, and the suffering that was brought about by the war. It would also give the Northerners an understanding of how the suffering occurred in the South as well and how much people there suffered because of the war. It wasn't any longer a question of which side you were on, it was a question of the effect of the war that was the same on both sides. So I suggested he get the book. He said he could not get it and asked if I could give him a copy. I promised I would and in fact took a copy with me back to North Korea the next time but unfortunately never had an opportune time to give it to him. I could not put him in the position of accepting it.

USIA had put together 5,000 volumes, each in North Korean style Korean. We had it specially translated and printed in the Philippines, ready in Seoul to go north with me. Each time I would go north, I would take some volumes with me to leave around if I could. I could not leave them in Nyongbyon, because it was against the rules and would have caused trouble for everybody. But I did leave them in Pyongyang with the Swedish representative to give to people who he thought would know about them and understand them and would be able to accept them without causing political difficulties.

I had a long discussion once with one of our guides' bosses in Pyongyang about the American Congress. At that time, Congress was really in an anti-North Korean mood. Part of the reason was that the North Koreans had denied a visa to Rep. Jay Kim who was an ethnic Korean in the U.S. Congress from California and who had applied to visit North Korea. He was turned down by the North Koreans as, I guess, a person they did not want to see. My point to them was that not granting a visa was a foolish move, because the very person who they could have counted on to have a better understanding of what went on here was kept out. And that was not a good idea. This very educated, very astute, and relatively speaking, well-read man, had no idea who Jay Kim was. The problem for me as a USIS person was, here was an obvious example where a little knowledge would have helped a very difficult situation.

I think in the U.S. we see the North Koreans as monolithic. That somehow the knowledge that one has, everybody has. In fact, they are very badly divided in terms of being super compartmentalized. I mentioned before the division between the public energy bureau and the foreign ministry. This is true throughout their society. It is true in China. You give something to one man in the Foreign Ministry in Beijing, and the person at the next desk likely will never see it. We ran into this in Beijing, trying to get our Wireless Files into the Foreign Ministry. You would talk to one man, and he would say, "I would like to see those." "Gee, we give them to so-and-so who is in your same section." He says, "That is his copy; I don't see it."

In China, as in most places, information is power. So if you go to a meeting and say, "I know what the Americans said," and the other guy did not, who gets the leg up in the Foreign Ministry? It becomes one of these internal rivalry things. Chinese just do not pass messages around very easily. North Korea is the same way. That means you have to get people who trust you in each of these areas; otherwise you may have the trust of one segment on one side, but two

desks over, the bureaucrat thinks you are dirt, because he does not have any idea who you are or what you do.

That is why it was so important for us to have a liaison office in Pyongyang. We can talk until we are blue in the face about our trust and agreements and the fact that the North Koreans did renege on their agreement to cross the border, that is absolutely true. But the fact is, we would have gained far more in the placement of a Liaison Office in Pyongyang than North Korea would have gained by the placement of a Liaison Office in Washington. There is no comparison, because the systems are so dissimilar. It would have been important for them to learn more than it would have been important for them to instruct more. In terms of Pyongyang, the reverse was true. It would be an important learning point for us, but by far it would have been an opening to the society in creating understanding who Americans are and what their intentions are in the world. Now, it is ignorance that dominates things. Gradually, as the North Koreans move around and learn more, this will change, but it will take a lot of patience and time.

A couple of years back, the first North Korean delegation went to Hawaii to CINCPAC to talk about the recovery of remains. That I think was badly mishandled on our side, because we took it as a negotiation instead of what it should have been, an explanation. A similar event had occurred with the Chinese before. I had taken it on as a personal crusade to push that because the Chinese had come to CINCPAC while I was there. Using civilian clothes, military Chinese took a look at our remains identification laboratory, which is called CILHI (Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii), and is located at Travis Air Force Base where all remains from all deceased veterans who are exhumed around the world are brought for DNA testing and whatever positive identification can be made. The North Koreans had a very simplified view of that, as did the Chinese. We brought the Chinese in quietly, no press, no negotiations, but just come as guests and stay in a hotel and be shown what we are doing. We were not asking for any promises or favors. We wanted them to just come and understand.

When that was done with the Chinese, it had marvelous consequences. We got the first American military teams into China to recovery sites in southern China where pilots from Vietnam had crashed. We wanted to investigate those sites and were able to do so in a way that was scientifically sustainable. We could send teams in, working with the Chinese and look at sites at a fair price and exhume the remains where they could be found. We had controlled the situation, so that we had firm assurances for the families back here that those remains were in fact their son, father, uncle, etc. and they could be assured of this when they had that casket back home and in the ground. In North Korea, we didn't get any of that, because the North Koreans came as negotiators, not as tourists as it were, and the effort failed. They tried to do it again in New York a couple of weeks ago, and we made, I guess, some little progress, but it hasn't gone very far. Had we gotten off our political stump and just stood down and said, "You come, you look, that is all we are asking," then we probably would have been a lot further down the line in North Korea than we are now.

**MARK E. MOHR**  
**Deputy Director, Political Selection**

## Beijing (1988-1990)

*Mr. Mohr was born in New York and raised in New York and New Jersey. He was educated at the University of Rochester and Harvard University, where he studied the Chinese language. After service in Korea with the Peace Corps, he joined the Foreign Service in 1969, and served abroad in Taipei, Taichung, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing and Brisbane. In his service at the State Department in Washington, Mr. Mohr dealt primarily with Far East Affairs. After his retirement he worked at the Department of Energy on Nuclear energy matters. In 1997 he was recalled to the State Department, where he worked as Korean desk officer. Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.*

*Q: So then what did you do?*

MOHR: By the time the INF treaty was ratified, it was the summer of 1988, and I really wanted to go back to doing something involving China. I was fortunate. I secured the job as deputy director of the political section in Embassy Beijing. The only drawback was that, at the time, there was no English language school in Beijing. State would have paid for my children to go to an international school in Japan, but my wife and I decided it would be least complicated if they all remained in the U.S. and I went to Beijing by myself.

*Q: So you went out to Beijing when?*

MOHR: In August of 1988. I remembered that the night before I was to leave, the basement of our house flooded, so we were up most of the night mopping up.

*Q: You were in Beijing from when to when?*

MOHR: From the summer of 1988 to the summer of 1990. In those days, Beijing was a two-year tour, because there were none of the amenities that there are today, such as the world's largest McDonalds.

*Q: So you were there during 1989.*

MOHR: Oh yes, I was an eyewitness to the entire Tiananmen Incident.

*Q: When you got out there who was the ambassador?*

MOHR: During my first year, Winston Lord was the ambassador. His tour, of over five years, ended in the spring of 1989, just as the events were taking place which would lead up to the Tiananmen Incident of June 4, 1989.

*Q: I have interviewed Winston Lord.*

MOHR: That should have been interesting. I think it would be good to stop here, and continue next time. Is that all right?

*Q: Absolutely. So we will pick this up in 1988 when you are off to Beijing.*

MOHR: Excellent.

*Q: Today is December 3, 2009, with Mark Mohr. Mark we were going to pick this up as you were arriving in Beijing.*

MOHR: Yes, without my family, to take up my new job as deputy director of the political section in Embassy Beijing.

*Q: How long were you there?*

MOHR: Two years. I arrived the summer of 1988. I had just arrived when we were hit by a veritable blizzard of senior level visits. As I recall, there were four Secretary-level visits in six weeks. I was responsible for coordinating all the meetings and the reporting.

*Q: Let's talk a bit about in 1988. How were relations with China?*

MOHR: They were getting better. With regard to living in China and being able to do our work, things were improving markedly. For the first time the Chinese were agreeing to accept invitations for lunch or dinner at our homes. So we could actually talk to them in social settings, ask questions, and get some answers. Things were warming up. So under Ambassador Winston Lord, things were getting better. We had the usual trade, non-proliferation, and human rights problems, but they were being managed. There was just less tension. There was a feeling that we were just beginning to get somewhere, that we were on the verge of a real breakthrough in relations. Then President Bush came to China in February 1989, and things took a turn for the worse.

The visit had been going well until the February "return" dinner in Beijing, which is the one given by the U.S. side following the dinner by the Chinese side. One of the guests the President had invited was Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist who had been critical of the regime. The year before, in an interview in Hong Kong, Fang attacked the Chinese leadership for nepotism, singling out the special positions of the children of key leaders. Nevertheless, despite such criticism, Fang had been allowed to keep his job and to talk to foreign journalists. So we invited him to the Bush dinner, as a symbol of a regime critic. But apparently Fang was particularly disliked by Deng Xiaoping, and Deng ordered that Fang physically be prevented from attending the dinner. Fang was blocked by Chinese police about a block from the hotel where the banquet was taking place. It was a strange situation, and the embassy and the White House drew much subsequent criticism for inviting Fang. Yet, as I stated above, he clearly was not one of the most punished regime critics. The only sanction against him was he was not allowed to attend physics conferences overseas. Within China, he was not being punished. If Deng disliked him so much, why weren't there more sanctions against him? And why did the regime wait until the last minute, until Fang was about a block from the banquet hotel, to deny him entrance? These are questions still to be answered.

*Q: In the Soviet Union, in totalitarian regimes, you get this sometimes when relations are getting better, you have essentially the security forces on their own going out to screw things up. I mean this happens again and again. This is power within power. I was just wondering was this a possibility?*

MOHR: That is a very good point. Well certainly it is a possibility. The situation certainly was a mess, because the Chinese deliberately embarrassed the president of the United States. More importantly, it revealed to us in the Embassy that “something was rotten in Denmark.” It indicated a kind of weakness in the leadership, perhaps controversy over the state of the U.S.-China relationship amongst elements in the Chinese government, to which you just alluded. We in the political section, with the support of the ambassador, decided to fan out and press all our contacts in Beijing about the sensitive topic of what was going on within the Chinese leadership. To beef up our analytical efforts, we also recruited a Chinese political expert from within the USG in Washington. Our deputy chief of mission, Peter Thomson, didn’t think the Fang incident was all that big a deal. Embassy political counselor Ray Burghardt, economic counselor Jim Larocco and I disagreed with Peter. We had many lively debates. We gleaned over the next few months from our Chinese contacts that something was indeed wrong, but frustratingly, no one would offer any specifics. Then, on April 15, 1989, former Chinese party chief Hu Yaobang died, the students started protesting, and events were put in train that eventually led to the shooting of the students on June 4.

*Q: Had you learned any details of the problems within the political leadership?*

MOHR: There was a split in the leadership. A few years before, Deng Xiaoping had purged Hu Yaobang as head of the Chinese Communist Party. Zhao Ziyang moved from premier to party chief, and Li Peng took over as premier. Hu had favored an opening up of Chinese society, and was particularly beloved in academic circles and by the students. Deng put a lid on Hu’s attempted reforms, and Li Peng kept the lid on. So Li was not popular. When Hu died in April, the students began expressing their aggravation that a good man had died, while in their opinion a bad man (Li Peng) still lived. They expressed their protest in rallies and in posters in the days following Hu’s death. Of course, this was incendiary stuff. The students all camped out in Tiananmen Square. They took over the running of downtown Beijing. Finally on May 20, the regime declared martial law in the area around Tiananmen Square. Troops were brought in. And sometime after midnight, June 4, they fired on the students, killing many. The shooting, courtesy of international television, whose personnel had been brought in to cover the visit of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Beijing May 15-18, was broadcast around the world. The reason that the situation had gotten to the point of violence, again, was that the party was split on how to deal with the students. Party chief Zhao Ziyang, who was politically a moderate and in favor of many of the positions that Hu Yaobang had taken, wanted a dialogue with the students. Premier Li Peng wanted to deal with the students harshly, taking a typically old-line communist party position. Li had the support of Deng Xiaoping, so eventually Zhao was marginalized and the troops were given the order to use lethal force.

*Q: It really seemed incredible.*

MOHR: Yes, I was an eyewitness to the events of June 4 around Tiananmen Square, although

from the vantage point of a hotel room located on the 15<sup>th</sup> floor of the Beijing Hotel. How did I get to the 15<sup>th</sup> floor of this hotel? Let me explain. Once martial law had been declared in May, it was very difficult to report from the square. Cell phones hadn't been invented yet, so you had to go to the nearest public phone, located in the lobby of the Beijing Hotel, and call in whatever you had to report from there. But there were only a limited number of public phones at the hotel, and all the reporters wanted access to them as well, so you had to wait your turn on line. Then I suggested to the ambassador that we rent out a room in the Beijing Hotel, so embassy officers could go to the room and use the phone there. They could also shower, or take a nap. The ambassador approved. The room, as I noted above, was on the 15<sup>th</sup> floor, and had a view of the main avenue, Chang'an Jie. It did not look onto the square, but from the room, you could see the entrance to the square.

On the day of June 3, I was one of the members from the Embassy assigned to report on events from Tiananmen Square. I arrived during the day, and was still there towards midnight. Sometime after 11 p.m., we could hear gunfire coming from the westerly direction off the square. A few minutes later, a group of students came to us and said that army troops were moving toward the square, and it would be best for our safety if we left. We agreed, and departed the square. As we were crossing Chang An Jie to get to the Beijing Hotel, an amazing thing happened. Now you have to picture the scene. Tanks were moving towards us from our left. Although they were still a few hundred yards away, we were trying to get across the street as soon as we could. Suddenly, a man on a bicycle swerved and cut us off. He stopped his bike, looked at us, and asked, "Change money?" He was actually a black-market money changer, and despite all that was going on around us, wanted to know if we were interested in changing dollars into Chinese currency. In retrospect, it was clearly a sign that the Chinese entrepreneurial spirit was alive and well. At the time, however, we just wanted to get across the street to the safety of the hotel, so we declined his offer and moved on.

Once we got to the room, as I mentioned above, you could not see what was going on in the square itself, but you could see the troops and tanks coming down the street, and then turning into the square. This was nighttime, so visibility was not optimum. But you could clearly hear the tanks moving and the gunshots. One particularly heartbreaking thing was that I could make out a long phalanx of bicycles, the main means of transport for the Chinese people at the time, moving in the opposite direction, that is to say away, fleeing away from the main tank column. This was of course quite logical. However, one thin line of bicycles was moving in the *opposite* direction, directly toward the advancing tank column. I assumed these were people who had simply snapped. They were so angry at army troops firing live ammunition at citizens that they just decided to drive their bikes into the tanks. It was suicidal, and all I could do was watch. Again, visibility was poor, but I could make out the gunshots and the sounds of bikes tumbling over. I was deeply moved and very upset, but there was nothing I could do except mumble silent prayers that the "bike column" turn itself around, and move away from the troops. After a certain amount of time I just couldn't watch anymore. There were other embassy people in the room, and I was exhausted, both emotionally and physically, so I went home.

*Q: Well, you knew something had to happen.*

MOHR: Actually most observers, including myself (but not Ambassador Lilly), predicted that

the Chinese military would never use lethal force against unarmed students. Lilly had grown up in China. His father was an oil executive, so he had a better “gut” feel for Chinese actions. He predicted the June 4 massacre. The rest of us saw the events unfolding, but we rationalized the situation. I had one luncheon conversation with the Polish deputy chief of mission, whose last name was Goralczyk. He was regarded as the most astute observer of the Chinese political regime among the east Europeans. Goralczyk had studied at Beijing University in the 1950s, had married a Chinese woman, spoke Chinese fluently, and had spent about two decades in China.

He began the luncheon by lecturing me (in a friendly manner), explaining the difference in a communist state between the army and the police. The army, he said, fights foreigners. That is to say, the Chinese army is geared to fight the external threat, which at that time was the Soviet Union. It is the job of the police, Goralczyk maintained, to deal with dissidents and protests. Goralczyk concluded that I could inform Washington that the Chinese police would clear the students out of Tiananmen Square. I didn’t have to worry about the Chinese army, he said, because they would never fire on the students.

So I reported this conversation. I thought I had done a brilliant job, and I noted in my report that all the foreign contacts I had spoken to agreed with Goralczyk. I sided with Goralczyk, and predicted to Washington that the Chinese would not use guns against the students. Events were to prove both Goralczyk and I spectacularly wrong. As I said, the ambassador wrote his own cable, and his prediction turned out to be the correct one. I recall the conversation I had with the ambassador after he read my Goralczyk cable. He said, “What is this?” I replied, “It’s what Goralczyk said.” He went on, “Do you believe him?” I said, “I want to believe him.” He said, “That is the trouble with you people. You want to believe. But that’s not good enough. They (the Chinese army) are going to shoot them (the students).”

*Q: So let’s talk about how this was developing. Were you and your officers in the political section of the embassy able to go out and talk to students?*

MOHR: Oh yes. I was in charge of the duty list. We had at least two officers per shift, from throughout the embassy, on duty at Tiananmen Square. There were three eight-hour shifts per day, so we had 24-hour coverage. We instituted the duty roster at the start of martial law, in May. I personally pulled many shifts, and overall must have spoken to hundreds of students. Their spirit was very inspiring. When they found out I was from the Embassy, they often asked me to autograph their shirtsleeve. They all approved that the Embassy had given political asylum to Fang Lizhi.

*Q: Was this sort of Tiananmen business as it was developing as amorphous as it seems, just happening as a conjunction of forces?*

MOHR: Well, the students were fairly organized, but no one knew where events would lead, so those events did have an amorphous quality to them. One of the fundamental mistakes the students made was that they didn’t tap into popular support, especially from the workers. Chinese society has deep class division between educated and uneducated people. The students had a traditionally negative view of the workers, so they did not think it necessary to bring them on board. Had they done so, in my opinion, they might have succeeded in toppling Li Peng.

However these were college students, so it is not surprising that they were not terribly politically astute. Also, the main student leaders on the square began to take on characteristics of the Chinese leadership. They were always at meetings, and if you asked to see one, the reply would be, “The meeting place is secret.” (All students at the time lived and met on Tiananmen Square, so they couldn’t have been too far away.)

*Q: Did you feel the students had a real goal?*

MOHR: Well, they said they wanted more freedom, a more open society, and they wanted to put an end to political corruption. These were all noble goals, and the students were predictably idealistic and naïve. It was a mistake, in my opinion, to declare one of their goals as democracy, and buttress this with the erection of a statue which they named the “Goddess of Democracy.” While the statue was wildly popular with the western media, the statue and the advocacy for democracy only made the leaders more paranoid and certain that the United States was behind the movement. In any case, I believe that if Zhao Ziyang had won the policy debate, he could have diffused the student protest. But he lost the debate—and his position—and was placed under house arrest, where he remained until his death.

*Q: When this movement started, how were you in the political section seeing it before it really gained momentum? Were you seeing it as this is another little episode that would be blown away?*

MOHR: We knew something was wrong at the time of President Bush’s visit in February 1989, because they acted so awkwardly to prevent Fang Lizhi from attending the banquet. The trigger for the student movement was the death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, and you can’t foresee someone’s death. At the beginning of the student movement, there weren’t all that many students on the square. Then the regime, in its ham-handed wisdom, issued an editorial in People’s Daily April 26 denouncing the students for their protests and occupation of the square and questioning their motives, which only angered the students and added momentum to the movement. After the editorial, the movement grew rapidly, to the point that there were hundreds of thousands of students occupying the heart of downtown Beijing. Still the regime did nothing. We knew something was very wrong, but we had no idea what the divisions were within the leadership, or who was arguing with who.

*Q: Was there an equivalent there of a criminal element who might have been taking advantage of the situation? Was there any evidence of that?*

MOHR: No, it was a movement clearly led by college students.

*Q: Well I remember watching it on TV. I also recall that at the time of the Gorbachev visit, seeing Gorbachev sort of being hustled into the back entrance. It was rather remarkable.*

MOHR: Gorbachev’s visit was to be the crowning achievement in Deng Xiaoping’s career in terms of foreign policy, the foreign policy equivalent to his domestic policy achievement of reforming the economy and moving it forward. But the students ruined Gorbachev’s visit. They were out on the square protesting, the international media was broadcasting the images to the

world, and it looked like the Chinese leadership had lost control of the downtown of their capitol city. In Chinese cultural terms, the students made Deng Xiaoping lose face, and he was furious. I believe that the student movement having made a mockery of the Gorbachev visit was one of the reasons that Deng decided to use lethal force “to teach the students a lesson.”

One ironic fallout from the student movement vis-à-vis the Gorbachev visit was that the USG “worry quotient” was greatly ratcheted down. From the time of the announcement of the visit, the U.S. government’s public stance was that no one was worried. In fact, they were extremely worried. We at the embassy were told to devote all reporting resources exclusively to the visit. I was put in charge of coordinating these efforts. I was told that Gorbachev’s visit was to be the biggest event for the embassy that year. Clearly, Washington was concerned that the strategic winds were about to shift and that the rapprochement between the Soviet Union and China would mean some kind of net strategic loss for the United States. In the event, the death of Hu Yaobang and the rise of the student movement totally marginalized Gorbachev’s visit. As one example, I recall that the front page of the People’s Daily on the day of Gorbachev’s visit devoted only a tiny article in the bottom right hand corner of page one to it. All other space on page one of the paper was covered by pictures and stories of the students massing on Tiananmen Square.

The Tiananmen Incident occurred on Saturday-Sunday, June 3-4. On Tuesday, amidst the chaos, I received a call from the Chinese foreign ministry, informing me that if I was still interested, I could be briefed on Gorbachev’s visit the following Saturday. What would have been the most important report of my tour in Beijing now would be only a side show. I called Washington to see if they were interested in my going to receive the read-out. I was told to go and write up the report, but the person on the other end of the line said: “Of course, you realize no one is going to read it.”

*Q: Well I can imagine, you couldn’t not do it.*

MOHR: So true.

*Q: What about during the time Gorbachev was there, could you attend?*

MOHR: No, it was a bilateral visit. We were not invited.

*Q: There was no great meeting with the diplomatic corps in the Great Hall of China, with toasts and all of this?*

MOHR: Not that I recall.

*Q: Probably at the Chinese restaurant around the corner.*

MOHR: Well, the banquet was in the Great Hall of the People, which is right in Tiananmen Square. To get there, you had to go through all the students. It was a mess. Kids were running around, jumping, screaming and protesting. As I said, it was a big loss of face for the leadership, and incredible when you think all of this was taking place under the governance of one of the most tightly controlled communist parties in the world. But as I said, the leadership was deeply

divided as to how to handle the situation, so for many weeks there was paralysis, and the students did their thing.

*Q: Were you, and when I say you I am talking about the political section and all, picking up anything, of course it would be the Soviet embassy at the time about this?*

MOHR: There were all sorts of rumors in April and May that the visit was going to be postponed. We would go to the Soviets and they would say that the visit was going to take place. I mean that was all we would get out of them.

*Q: Returning to the night of June 4, what I have heard is that first they tried to use troops of the Beijing garrison, and that they weren't reliable and they had to basically go out and get peasants or something.*

MOHR: Unreliable is putting it mildly. The military leaders of the Beijing Military Region refused to carry out the orders to fire on the public. It took Deng Xiaoping about six weeks to find troops from other regions who were willing to carry out the order to shoot the students.

*Q: Well let's talk about when you first arrived in Beijing in the summer of 1988. Were you getting any people talking about the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution, basically all these horrible things that happened to just about everybody.*

MOHR: Chinese officials would never talk about such things, but shopkeepers and taxi cab drivers, ordinary people would. You realized almost every Chinese person had a "story," and almost all of them were of sadness and suffering. One thing I learned in the weeks after I arrived was that although Mao had been extremely popular with undergraduates and leftists in the U.S., almost no Chinese had a good word to say about his rule from 1949 to 1976. Actually, the stories people told me were so sad that it got to the point where I just got exhausted hearing about them. And then Tiananmen happened.

*Q: Well at the time after the shooting and all, were you looking to see what was happening in the rest of China, in Shanghai for example?*

MOHR: Of course. We have consulates in Shanghai, Guangzhou, Shenyang and Chengdu, and the reporting from those posts was excellent. There were student movements in all the major cities. Shanghai's was the largest outside of Beijing, but no one was shot. They never used lethal force. They somehow successfully got the students dispersed without any loss of life. Ziang Zemin was the leader in Shanghai. I believe after it was all over, the reason why he was appointed to be head of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was because of the way he successfully handled the student movement in Shanghai. So in the provinces there were a lot of copycat movements to mimic what was going on in Beijing, but they never got totally out of hand. It seemed that the provincial leadership, especially in Shanghai, did a much better job of handling the student protests so they didn't escalate into violence. Nonetheless, my theory is that lethal force was never necessary in Beijing either, but Deng had suffered so much during the Cultural Revolution, which was powered by students, and he was so angry with the students over the fiasco of the Gorbachev visit, that he wanted to use lethal force so that the students, and

anyone else in Chinese society so inclined, would never ever again be tempted to protest against the regime like that.

*Q: We are talking about students they were essentially the Red Guard weren't they?*

MOHR: During the Cultural Revolution they were the Red Guards. During the Tiananmen Incident, they were just students. They organized themselves into a form of government around Tiananmen Square, but they had no special name. They were just college-aged kids.

*Q: The Red Guards were young kids too, but they had proved to be sort of under the tutelage of Mao to be as nasty as you can imagine.*

MOHR: Exactly, and the students of 1989 reminded Deng of all of those unpleasant experiences of the Cultural Revolution. After all, one of his brothers was killed, and his son was thrown off a building and crippled for life. This was all at the hands of the Red Guards, of students. So I believe Deng wanted to use lethal force, even though it was not necessary. The regime of course insisted that it was necessary. However, I was a witness to the events. At the height of the student movement, sometime in May, there were hundreds of thousands of students at Tiananmen. They filled the entire square. But by the beginning of June, enthusiasm had waned, and I estimated the number of students at Tiananmen Square on Saturday morning, June 3, at no more than five thousand.

Then something curious happened. Loudspeakers around the city began telling people not to gather around the square that evening. All day long, the loudspeakers blared: "People, do not come to Tiananmen Square this evening." So naturally, thousands of people came to Tiananmen Square that evening, and once again the square was filled with people. But these were just observers, not student squatters. However, the regime could now claim that once again the square was filled, and that no regime could let the heart of its capital be controlled by an unruly mob. They insisted afterward that because of the great number of people who had taken over the square, they were compelled to use lethal force to regain control. But this claim was bogus. The real number of people by the night of June 3 occupying the square was far closer to just a few thousand. Twice as many police, with clubs, could have cleared the square. But the regime wanted to clear the square with the army, using rifles, and live ammunition.

*Q: OK, the shooting takes place, what happens then? Did everything shut down as far as we were concerned?*

MOHR: Yes it did. For a day or two afterwards, there was not even any place open to buy food. One of the secretaries had a huge jar of peanut butter. That's what we ate for two days, until the owners of the food stores and restaurants came back later in the week. Our apartments also didn't have water, so the embassy rented out a hotel room at the Jianguo Hotel, within walking distance from the Embassy. There was a sign-up sheet at the embassy for the hotel room, in order to go there and shower or bathe.

*Q: What about after Tiananmen? Was the Chinese government almost closed off to the embassy?*

MOHR: It was almost totally closed off. Since the PRC official line was that China didn't do anything wrong, and that all sanctions against China, including those from other foreign governments, were originated and orchestrated by the U.S., we were not very popular with the Chinese government. So every Chinese government agency was closed off to us. This lasted several months. The only contact we had was a once-a-week meeting at the foreign ministry. The ambassador was called in to be lectured to on how bad we were, and why the sanctions needed to end. (U.S. sanctions, imposed by President Bush, included an end to all military cooperation and a ban on high-level Chinese visits to the U.S.) I was the note-taker at the weekly meetings between the ambassador and the senior Chinese foreign ministry official, Liu Huaqiu. Otherwise, there was nothing to do. Many of us worked out in the newly opened health clubs, and the Chinese language officers studied Chinese. It was most strange. We were an embassy, but the host government would not talk to us.

*Q: Could you get out into the countryside or travel?*

MOHR: To go anywhere outside of Beijing, even in normal times, required permission from the Chinese government. In the months after Tiananmen, we couldn't go anywhere.

*Q: The same thing was happening to our consular officers?*

MOHR: Yes, in terms of travel. Another thing that really bothered the Chinese was that we gave political asylum to astrophysicist and dissident Fang Lizhi. He lived on the ambassador's compound. They registered their dislike about that. But with the man-in-the-street, we were extremely popular. People would walk up to me on the street and ask if Fang was at the embassy. When I would reply that he was, they would give me the thumbs up sign.

*Q: How about other embassies?*

MOHR: That is a good question. I think we were the only ones who got the cold shoulder. I remember the Japanese having a parliamentary visit about a month or two later. The visiting delegation had a meeting with Chinese Premier Li Peng, and this is where Li gave a most interesting explanation of the Tiananmen Incident. Li said that China had 40 years of uninterrupted peace since the communists took over in 1949, so they had no water cannon or rubber bullets to deal in a non-lethal way with massive crowd control/unrest. (This was of course a huge lie: millions died during the see Great Leap Forward, and the Cultural Revolution saw over a decade of violence and upheaval.) Li continued his remarks to the Japanese, assuring them that China was acquiring water cannon and rubber bullets, so next time would be different. I interpreted Li's remarks as the closest we would ever get to the Chinese government admitting they had made a mistake, but of course that was not enough for President Bush, who was demanding the Chinese apologize publicly before we would lift sanctions. I think the French may have gotten the cold treatment as well, because the French were particularly upset. Tiananmen occurred while they were celebrating the 200<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the French Revolution, and the French gave political asylum to many of the student leaders.

Another noteworthy point was in those days, China really had little knowledge of how the U.S. worked. Now with all the thousands of returning students from the U.S., they have a lot more

sophisticated view of us. But in those days, many of the leaders, and many within the Chinese government, really believed that somehow the U.S. was behind the student movement. And we could not convince them otherwise.

*Q: All right, but were you trying to analyze things, like what was going on in the politburo? When one looks at 1979 in the Kremlin and saw their actions in invading Afghanistan, was there a feeling that this was something similar, a last stand of the old guard?*

MOHR: Well, it certainly was an overreaction on the part of Deng Xiaoping, and we didn't know whether or not the leadership would be able to maintain its rule, because the people were certainly outraged. But the only thing we could do was observe and see how things would play out. What we didn't know at the time was that the moderates had completely lost out, and the hardliners were in firm control. Deng was an aged leader, but there were many hardliners like Li Peng, who were only in their 50s or 60s.

*Q: Was there certain feelings of being let down among the China hands? I felt this and I was long out of it after five years in Yugoslavia. You know the Serbs are the sons of bitches that let me down by how awful they were, and I will never feel the same. I was wondering how this affected you.*

MOHR: Well, the Chinese people didn't let me down. The Chinese government was less than ideal, and it was the government which had demonstrated the lengths it was willing to go in order to retain power. It was a communist government. Mao had put the people through decades of suffering, so no one should have been too surprised. It's just that we didn't have relations with China during Mao's bouts of political madness in the 1950s and 1960s, so no American was on the scene to witness and record the events at that time. Furthermore, as I said, no one believed China's rulers would actually shoot the students. This was a function of our naiveté, our lack of understanding of Deng and the other leaders. In hindsight it was clear, given the amount of suffering Deng had endured during the Cultural Revolution and the weeks of humiliation the leadership suffered while the students had control of downtown Beijing, especially during the Gorbachev visit, that the leadership might feel it necessary to shoot so that no one in the society would ever take to the streets again to oppose the regime.

*Q: Did you get any feedback from your people in the consular section about Chinese students in the United States? Were they ordered back, or what was happening there?*

MOHR: Yes, in general the Chinese were smart enough to leave students in the U.S. alone, and when they returned, they weren't hassled. At least, we never heard any stories from the students in the U.S. or those returning to China that they were being given a hard time.

*Q: Well when you left there were things in still sort of a stand down?*

MOHR: The Chinese government started reengaging with us in the fall of 1989, and the man responsible was Richard Nixon. He came out for a visit. I believe it was in November. The day before he was to visit the embassy, he told Li Peng that he was going to visit the embassy, which he understood was surrounded by armed militia. He wanted the Chinese to withdraw the militia

immediately. Now these militia were put there after Tiananmen, supposedly for our safety, but they were really there to hassle us. They were young and untrained. Often they would point their rifles at us. Presumably, the rifles weren't loaded, but it was still creepy. Ambassador Lilly asked the White House to protest, but for whatever reason, no one did. However Nixon did, and since Nixon had met with Mao in 1972 and had normalized relations, he had tremendous status. So Li Peng had to grant his request. The militia was removed, and shortly after Nixon returned home, the Chinese started reengaging with us. By the time I left, I think it was May 1990, relations had improved somewhat. But as they say, when things hit rock bottom, they have no place to go but up.

*Q: Well there was quite a controversial visit probably early on, was it Scowcroft?*

MOHR: Ah, yes, the Scowcroft visit. He was head of the NSC, and Bush sent him to China, I think it was around the time of their national day, in October 1989, to try and see if relations could resume. Scowcroft made some routine toast to the health of the leadership, but these were the people who still had the blood of the students on their hands. We in the embassy were livid about Scowcroft, but there was nothing we could do. Speaking of people who made us sick, there was always Alexander Haig. What he did was far worse than what Scowcroft did. He attended Chinese national day celebrations on October 1. The celebrations were at Tiananmen Square, and that year, they celebrated the "victory" of the forces of law and order over the students. And Haig sat there, watched the "celebrations," and saluted the leadership. It made us all at the embassy very hostile to Haig. This of course was the same person who, seven years before, thought it would be an excellent idea to negotiate with the Chinese to end U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. I might add that shortly after Haig left office in 1982, he wanted to broker an arms sale of the most sophisticated U.S. helicopters to *Taiwan*. (It was refused.) So you can see that Haig was never one of my favorite people.

*Q: Oh yes, he is still alive.*

MOHR: Well I am sure his company is successful, and has many financially rewarding ties to China. (Note: Haig passed away on February 20, 2010.)

*Q: Well that is in general what I am talking about; there has always been this fascination almost adoration of China in America and in Europe.*

MOHR: That is why I went into Chinese studies. I was fascinated by China. I really like the Chinese people, although even now, they have a really terrible form of government.

*Q: Did you find this sort of screwed up things sort of from our policy view, I mean the fact that so many cabinet members wanted to come and go to the Great Wall and so on?*

MOHR: Yes, I am glad I went into Chinese studies, but I try to remain objective. These visitors, senior U.S. officials and otherwise, just seemed spellbound by the Chinese. Now, I think there is a lot we can learn from China, especially in the way they organize their society and their social values; for example, how they react and cope with discomfort, suffering, personal setbacks, and their tight family structure. It is true that this traditional kind of society is breaking down as the

Chinese become more industrialized and westernized. But I believe that the way Chinese society is organized is worthy of our respect. On the other hand, their governing system is just ridiculous. It is a communist dictatorship. It lacks popular backing, the people have no interest at all in communist ideology, and if the regime didn't produce great economic gains year after year, they would be in political trouble.

*Q: Well one of the things that interests me is the question, does the writ of Beijing go out into the provinces or are there dukedoms out there or what?*

MOHR: In the early part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there were warlords or dukedoms, so to speak. But not now. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did a decade-long study after Tiananmen as to why the Soviet Union collapsed in 1989. One of their conclusions was that the Soviets let the provincial party structure atrophy, so the CCP has spent a tremendous amount of time, energy and money to bolster provincial and lower levels of the party, including having them study things like management training. There is a wonderful book by Professor David Shambaugh of George Washington University, China's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, which documents all this.

*Q: Well did you find that communist ideology still permeated the system, because I have talked to people who served in Poland who said by the time martial law was declared there may have been three or perhaps four communists in the whole country. Was that going on?*

MOHR: After the Tiananmen Incident, in a country of one billion people, there were perhaps three or four who still believed in communism. Actually, no one believes in communist ideology any more. But party leaders certainly believe in the CCP as the only organization capable of governing a country the size of Europe. From an ideological point of view, all Mao's campaigns turned people off, and the Tiananmen Incident sealed it. People believe in the opportunity to get rich, and the party has been successful to date in delivering an improvement in the people's economic well-being, year after year. So long as the party accomplishes this goal, the people will allow themselves to be governed by the party. Communist ideology plays no role in this. Ideology is gone.

*Q: Well what about while you were there in 1988?*

MOHR: Ideology was pretty much gone by 1988 as well, but as I noted, the Tiananmen Incident really completed the people's dislike of the Chinese Communist Party and its ideology.

*Q: Do Chinese universities still teach courses in Marxist ideology?*

MOHR: I don't really know. The party certainly gives courses in Chinese-style Marxism. Current party chief (and president) Hu Jintao was head of the party school for 10 years, in the 1990s, so courses in Marxist thinking are still being given. But basically, no one really believes in them. I think Hu believes Marxist thinking is useful, but he is one of the few.

*Q: Marxism has always been a favorite academic exercise and it is taught in the States at our universities.*

MOHR: The appeal in China is long gone. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping said it is glorious to be rich. That is now the people's anthem. It is sort of like 19<sup>th</sup> century U.S. frontier capitalism.

*Q: OK, well you left in May 1990. Where did you go?*

MOHR: I went back to be deputy director of the China desk. I felt that in the aftermath of Tiananmen, the China desk just didn't support the people in the field to the degree I felt they should. For example, when people inquired about their personnel assignments, often there was no response from Washington for days or weeks. So, I wanted to be in the Department and support the troops in the field, so to speak. Ambassador Lilly told me to take the job as deputy director of the Korea desk. He said there were sensitive issues going on with North Korea's nuclear program, and if I took the job on the Korea desk, chances were I would be promoted. He said all I could do on the China desk was keep the relationship from collapsing, and unfortunately, promotions are usually geared to something positive happening, not from preventing something from getting worse. Lilly proved to be correct. In the two years following, while I was on the China desk, no one there got promoted, but people on the Korea desk did. However, I was comfortable with my decision. I made sure that any inquiry from the embassy was answered within 24 hours, even if it was only an interim reply stating the reasons why a definite reply could not be made.

*Q: So we will pick this up next time in 1990 when you are on the China Desk.*

MOHR: Yes, the chaos of the China desk.

*Q: Great.*

*Q: All right today is January 4, 2010.*

MOHR: That is right. Tomorrow is my birthday and I will be 65 and eligible for Social Security. I am very happy.

*Q: Well Mark, happy social security. I have been on it. I am 81 now, so I have been hanging on to the government for many years. Well where are we now?*

MOHR: It is 1990, and I am returning home from China.

*Q: Ok, but let's talk a little more about the year after Tiananmen, from 1989-1990. Let me ask something. I know how important the foreign service national staff is in so many countries. Frankly this is where your continuity comes from. I know in Yugoslavia these were people who had been around and could say we have done that before and they have the connections.*

MOHR: I agree. The foreign service nationals (FSNs) provide the continuity.

*Q: How important let's say prior to Tiananmen were they?*

MOHR: Well unfortunately China, being a communist country and somewhat of an adversary, was different. No Chinese FSNs were allowed in the political section. The FSNs in the embassy worked only in the non-classified sections, helping out in consular and administrative work. The only FSN I do remember was in the administrative section, doing travel. We later found out that he was a senior official in the ministry of state security, which wasn't a surprise. Because of his position, he could get tickets on any plane flights, or if the planes were full, he could bump Chinese people and get our people seats. Needless to say, this was invaluable during times of Congressional visits.

*Q: Was there any feeling that an awful lot of our work is not secretive, and what you want to do is say how do you think this will play or something like that? Was there any thought of let's get somebody whether they are high ranking or not so we can use them to play the system?*

MOHR: Not in political or economic work. Our phones were bugged, our phones at home were also bugged. The technology was fairly primitive at the time. Often, when you picked up your phone, you would hear a loud click as their tape recorder went on. China was just too closed a society at that time. The best source of information, outside of our Chinese contacts, when they were talking to us, was U.S. journalists. They often spoke Chinese, and had excellent contacts among the Chinese students at the various universities, including foreign students at the Chinese universities. I remember particularly a group of Hungarian students were particularly helpful, as were a few American students.

*Q: What about your own internal political section?*

MOHR: My job was deputy director of the political section, and also chief of the external section. So I was responsible for reporting on China's foreign policy. Because of the Gorbachev visit, I was very busy devoting all my time to that. China's internal political scene had been quiet for several years, so internal reporting was not a priority, and those doing it really didn't have good contacts, and almost none among the Chinese academic community.

*Q: How about the other embassies, the British?*

MOHR: The British, Japanese, and others were all taken by surprise by Tiananmen. As we said, the ones with the best contacts on the scene were the American journalists, particularly Dan Southerland of the Washington Post, David Schweisberg of UPI, and Mike Chinoy of CNN. It also didn't hurt that David and Mike were personal friends of mine. I am mentioned several times in Mike Chinoy's book, China Live.

*Q: Did you all sort of get together pretty often and see what the hell was going on, or were things going in a way rather calmly and so there wasn't much concern over what was going on?*

MOHR: Before Tiananmen, things usually proceeded rather calmly. But the Fang Lizhi incident during Bush's visit of February 1989 stirred things up, and after Hu Yaobang died in April, all hell broke loose. We began getting together to talk on a daily basis. Then martial law was declared, and Gorbachev came, and it got even more hectic.

*Q: After it was over did it have any lasting effect?*

MOHR: Gorbachev's visit?

*Q: Yes.*

MOHR: No, nobody cared in China at the time. The regime was too busy trying to maintain stability. As I mentioned, it probably added to Deng Xiaoping's motivation to use lethal force against the students. In subsequent years, though, the Chinese and the Russians seem to have put most of their differences behind them, so perhaps Gorbachev's visit was indeed significant.

*Q: You previously mentioned Congressman Steven Solarz, whom I have interviewed, by the way. China has always been a place that seems to attract congressmen; China seems to appeal to Americans. It is a drawing card; the celestial kingdom and all that.*

MOHR: So true.

*Q: How did you find these Congressional trips to China? Were they fairly brief?*

MOHR: In the year before Tiananmen, they were fairly frequent. I believe they had value. Contact between members of Congress and the Chinese government are important.

*Q: And did they seem to come back sort of impressed by the beauty? The Chinese can put on a good show. Did you feel these visits were in a way almost counterproductive?*

MOHR: No, not really. The Chinese know how to put on a good show, and make a favorable impression. One thing about the conservatives used to irritate me. They would speak critically of China to us, for example criticizing the administration for not putting enough pressure on the Chinese to have a more even playing field with regard to bilateral trade (we always had a big trade deficit with China), but then when they were with the Chinese, all they would say is, "Thank you for this delicious tea." In other words, they were reluctant to criticize the Chinese to their faces. Solarz was a bit different in that he was like a knowledge sponge. He was very serious, and was relentless about asking questions. He clearly learned something from his visits.

*Q: He was a unique case.*

MOHR: Almost too much so. I recall one luncheon with a Chinese official on Tibet. Solarz asked so many rapid-fire questions that the official didn't have time to eat. His aides had to feed him.

*Q: Yes, I have talked to people about what Solarz did in Africa. He would go and he would have a huge schedule.*

MOHR: Morning, noon, and evening. He would go until he was exhausted.

*Q: Returning to the aftermath of Tiananmen, were Chinese students still going to the States?*

MOHR: I didn't work in the visa section, but I assume the Chinese government still allowed students to go to the U.S. It made sense; if there were any dissidents, better they should go abroad, where they didn't have any contact with the Chinese people. Also, we had no reports of any returning students being hassled. This is one thing you've got to give the Chinese credit for. In this area, they were being intelligent.

*Q: Did you get anything about the Chinese students maybe going to America and getting infected by Americanisms and coming back and having a difficult time?*

MOHR: No, nothing of the sort. The Chinese students may have been "infected" by a dose of democracy while in the U.S., but they also had seen what happened to their fellow students during Tiananmen. It had the desired chilling effect.

*Q: You had mentioned in the months following Tiananmen the Embassy was surrounded by rifle-bearing militia. How did that affect the morale of embassy wives?*

MOHR: They had a difficult time in the immediate days following Tiananmen, and were evacuated. So in subsequent months, they weren't there. They were evacuated. When things calmed down, the families returned.

*Q: I may have asked this question before, but I will ask it again. Were we looking for control strings within the Chinese apparatus, for autonomous activities in the provinces, or was everything pretty much in Beijing?*

MOHR: I was just totally focused on the central political forces in Beijing. Outside of Beijing, I think the worst protests were in Shanghai, but they were managed without resorting to lethal force. So it didn't seem like there were any serious problems throughout the country. China is almost the size of Europe, so it is a pretty big place. The real problems were in the upper echelons of leadership of the communist party, not in the regional apparatus.

*Q: There is similar public unrest and shootings in Iran right now. One of the things that is always significant is that when a regime has to shoot its own people in a crowd, that often is the indicator that things are going down. In a way Iran looks like the fundamentalist regime might be in its final days. China seems to be one of the few countries that has been able to get away with this.*

MOHR: Again, I would refer you to Shambaugh's work on this subject. It describes how after Tiananmen the CCP studied, for over 10 years, every socialist and other kind of long-standing political party, including the Soviet Union and Singapore, and analyzed all the good points and bad points. Then it took a look at what it felt were the weaknesses within its own system, and drew up a plan to right the wrongs. It seems to have worked. Many regime critics outside of China predicted the demise of the CCP after Tiananmen. But they're still there.

*Q: Well when you talk about that part, are you talking about in a way about something not at all communist?*

MOHR: They are a communist party in terms of their organization and rigid control of the political system, but nobody, including probably most of the leaders, believes in the ideology. However, they all believe that the CCP is the only institution that can govern China. An interesting thing to note is that there are over 70 million people in the Chinese Communist Party. So the CCP is bigger than most countries.

*Q: But were you seeing even before Tiananmen a diminution of sort of the ideological explanation of things.*

MOHR: I think by the time Mao died in 1976 there was great relief, and a diminution of ideological fervor. Mao and his constant political movements gave ideological fervor a bad name. When Deng started to institute his pragmatic economic reforms a few years later, the Chinese people breathed a collective sigh of relief.

*Q: Well then let's pick up this discussion from the time you left China. When exactly did you depart?*

MOHR: In May 1990.

**HORTENSE F. FIEKOWSKY**  
**Representative for the Department of Labor**  
**Tiananmen Square (1989)**

*Hortense F. Fiekowsky worked for the Department of Labor for twenty years, and had the opportunity to represent the Department of Labor on its trade negotiations. Her career in international trade began in 1969, and she was mainly stationed in Washington DC. She was able to travel to Asia on several occasions, and happened to be in China during the Tiananmen Square incident in June of 1989 where hundreds of peaceful protesters were killed. While Ms. Fiekowsky was able to get out of the city before she was in any danger, she remembers the event vividly and describes the events below. Ms. Fiekowsky was interviewed by Daniel F. Whitman in 2010.*

*Q: In terms of the things that happened, the people you knew, your own work, does anything stick out?*

FIEKOWSKY: Tiananmen Square was the most exciting thing because we did not know what was going to happen.

*Q: Why were you there?*

FIEKOWSKY: We were there because we were going to negotiate a free-trade agreement with China, finally, because China was dying to get into it, in 1989.

*Q: So it was a coincidence that you were there in June of 1989, and suddenly this huge event happened?*

FIEKOWSKY: Usually I was in Japan, but it was very exciting that we finally got China to negotiate.

*Q: Now you said that this is the most interesting thing that you observed?*

FIEKOWSKY: So we finally got to negotiate with China, which was exciting because it is a big market to let in U.S. goods instead of just shipping things to us. Trade imbalance was a big problem. So we would start negotiating, and go across the street from our embassy, and we would come back and the ambassador said "We may have to leave. The soldiers are gathering outside of the city."

*Q: So the foreign ministry was at Tiananmen Square? Were you physically by the square?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yes, right by the square. At this time, Beijing was a small city. People mostly only had bicycles, they did not have cars. So that meant that the railroad station was very important; if you didn't have cars, the railroad station was the hub of the city. So I was in a hotel across from the railroad station, and we would go over to their Ministry of Foreign Affairs and we would have a list of issues. Meanwhile, the students were coming into the city on the train. It was a quiet little city, and then all of a sudden, these students were coming in. They would march to the square.

*Q: So this was before Facebook, how would they know to come at that time?*

FIEKOWSKY: It was just a network. You knew somebody that knew what you wanted to know. So somebody had a phone and would relay the information. If you were interested in politics, and you knew this was an issue, like if you knew you were a devout communist or whatever, they would tell you what to do. So because my hotel was right across from the railroad station, I could see all of these students coming in.

*Q: We remember Tiananmen Square as a massacre, but what was it that the students came to do?*

FIEKOWSKY: They came to get more rights for freedom for students.

*Q: Why at that time?*

FIEKOWSKY: I guess they felt that now China was talking to the U.S. So it had to do with our presence. Maybe they felt that now there was a chance they could get more intellectual freedom, instead of being taught the party line in their schools. It was very restricted. But the colleges weren't good, which is why they would send their diplomats abroad to learn the U.S. way.

*Q: So your delegation being there, was a very high-profile thing?*

FIEKOWSKY: It was a very high-profile thing. In fact, most countries had left because they knew there was some trouble coming. They did not want to be in the trouble. So we were the only negotiations. The ambassador told us that mostly all the other countries had left. We are the negotiators.

*Q: What is the time frame here? A few days? A few hours?*

FIEKOWSKY: A few days.

*Q: So the event, was it triggered by your arrival?*

FIEKOWSKY: It had a lot to do with it because then they felt that there was a chance that they would get something. The students did hand-lettered posters in Chinese and put them on the wall, which they were not allowed to do. You are not allowed to put posters up in China because that might cause trouble with the government. But at the time of Tiananmen, there was a certain breakdown of civil order; the police were unable to control it.

*Q: So this is a situation that the Chinese government was not prepared for?*

FIEKOWSKY: No. They were worried when the students started being restless, then they got nervous. They were afraid that there would be a revolt of the students, and there was. They were nervous about it at that time. They wanted to negotiate with us and get this agreement.

*Q: So the government had a lot to deal with that week. They wanted to deal with you, but they wanted to somehow control the students.*

FIEKOWSKY: The students were polite and were not like U.S. students. They were polite and orderly; they were quiet, disciplined and civilized about their revolt. I mean, they couldn't be too disorderly, they did not want to be conspicuous or if it didn't work, they could be taken to jail.

*Q: So somehow, at one point, something tipped and the control was lost. By the way, what happened to your negotiations at that point? Were they halted or did you get to finish them?*

FIEKOWSKY: We never finished them because at that time at Tiananmen, we thought we had an outline for a trade agreement, and we were very happy about it. After Tiananmen the ambassador said "It's all off, we can't agree to this under these conditions." He told the Chinese that we cannot negotiate until this was solved. We also had spies there, and they told us that the soldiers were gathering outside of Beijing, the Chinese soldiers were ready for war. The Chinese are very casual about life in general. I had a Chinese colleague in Commerce and I said "How can you stand it when they kill so many people?" and his reply was "There are so many of us."

*Q: So this was in June of 1989 and everything happened within a few days and it didn't take long. The government must have been nervous.*

FIEKOWSKY: Yes they were nervous, but they wanted to have the negotiation. So they had a team with them to negotiate, though they weren't the same team as the soldiers.

*Q: Did you have a certain camaraderie with the team you were negotiating with?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yeah. But they were all careful. They knew they would all be spied upon. I could get away things in the U.S. but if they did it they were “dead meat.”

*Q: So they were friendly but cautious?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yes. We would talk about our families and where we went to college, but we were not going to discuss politics.

*Q: So at one session or something you got a message that said, “Stop the talks.” Is that right?*

FIEKOWSKY: It was not at the session. We would speak at night to the U.S. and ambassador due to the time difference. I was very careful in talking with Labor because you never know who is listening. We could talk to our own team and local U.S. officials.

*Q: So then this big crisis came. Did you actually see what was happening?*

FIEKOWSKY: We could see it happening because we were there. The soldiers came. The ambassador said “The soldiers are outside the town, you should leave now.” This friend of mine from State and I said, “Well we aren’t leaving.” So then we were on our own.

*Q: Did others in the delegation leave?*

FIEKOWSKY: Most of them left. So it was just the two of us.

*Q: So you stayed because of curiosity?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yes. I wanted to see what was happening.

*Q: What did you see?*

FIEKOWSKY: Well, I saw the gathering in the square. They would put up posters that they could not put up before, even in the department stores, and all of a sudden there were posters. I could not read them, but you could still tell that they were not official. They were student posters defying the regime. They weren’t really posters; they were like hand-written signs. We then went to the square at night to see what was happening, and we saw the students gathering. It was just a few blocks to walk down to Tiananmen Square, and we saw that they had a camp and a little statue of liberty. It was very impressive. There were a lot of students there, and they were very orderly. They weren’t like American students that would be rowdy and drunk and drugs or whatever. They were serious; I think they realized they had a lot on the line: life or death.

*Q: So they knew there was a risk of being hurt or killed?*

FIEKOWSKY: Not only that but they knew their whole family could suffer. If they knew the

name of the student, they could go to the family and say “Your son is a spy” or whatever they want to call him.

*Q: So things got very bad very quickly?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yes, very quickly until they gathered in the square. They would then sing the Internationale which was interesting. I knew that because I was a former socialist/communist. I like that song; it’s a good song. So the students were basically just asking for freedom in general. The Internationale is a song of communists, and they knew that song. It was probably a Chinese international song.

*Q: So they did not think of the more repressive aspects of communism, I guess, when they sang that song.*

FIEKOWSKY: No. In fact we did not even know about it ourselves; it was all coming out more about the repression. More and more was coming out. But to them, Internationale was a song of freedom. I used to feel that way when I was a young socialist. I loved that song. It is a very emotional song. I mean, I believe in freedom and I believe if you are repressed that you should rise.

*Q: The emotions in songs, is emotion .It’s not ideology it is a conveyer of feelings. So you went in the evening and the students were there, and they were orderly, and they were singing the Internationale.*

FIEKOWSKY: Yeah. They also had the statue of liberty and everyone was so happy because everyone thought that China was going to be free. It was so exciting to be there when this was happening. If you didn’t know what was happening, I could go to my hotel room and there would be reporters and I could watch T.V and the reporters would send the stuff back. So I found out a lot on T.V from CNN. It is ironic because I was there but I could not find out a lot of things directly. CNN is very good internationally and it still is.

*Q: So you saw some of the events eye-witness and some of it you saw on T.V?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yes and we saw reporters in the hotel.

*Q: So the reporters must have been in reporter-heaven because there was this big event and a lot of action. So when did things go wrong?*

FIEKOWSKY: So this was going on. The ambassador said we should leave, and he left, so just this woman and I were there. There was finally a point at which we could not do anything. We could just see the students there.

*Q: So there were two of you. You were there by yourselves.*

FIEKOWSKY: Yeah and we had a good time. We could go around the Chinese palace and there were these little houses, these little huts, where people were living and there was no plumbing or

electricity. Nothing has changed for the Chinese at this time. It was just like it always had been. So we could get the feeling of what it was like to live there in these cute little houses, but with no plumbing and electricity.

*Q: So you were in the hotel throughout I guess.*

FIEKOWSKY: I stayed in the hotel, but we were out observing.

*Q: So you were never hassled by one side or the other?*

FIEKOWSKY: No. But then this woman left, but I was still there. Because she was a State Department person.

*Q: So you were the last person?*

FIEKOWSKY: I don't know, one of the last. I did not really check on who was still there. But at that time our negotiation had fallen apart, the Embassy was not open for business. There must have been somebody there; they wouldn't leave it alone with all the materials. So I just got to see how people were, and how happy they were. I then had to leave at some point. I felt that I should go. At this time some of the big important Chinese people were leaving too. They had a lot of their possessions that they were taking with them because they did not know what would happen.

*Q: Were people thinking Tehran 1979? A total change? Was there some echo of students taking over the embassy in Tehran, 1979?*

FIEKOWSKY: It wasn't the students. It was just the feeling that everybody, if they had the whiff of freedom; the Chinese are orderly people. They were brought up to be orderly. If they could get free, they would try to use their freedom. They weren't against the Americans. They liked Americans because we were friendly to everybody and the ones that wanted to get away, wanted to learn English. For instance, I would go to a park, and a student would say "I am studying English, will you speak English with me?" They had ideals of liberty. They associated those ideals with America, because we were the main country that was negotiating. A lot of countries would not negotiate, but we did up to a point.

*Q: When your negotiations broke down, did you have mixed feelings?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yeah, because we thought we had the agreement. You thought you had it in your hand. This was a good agreement, and we thought we would bring it back and get it approved. Then the revolt and the ambassador from the U.S. said it was all off. This isn't the same circumstances that we negotiated for.

*Q: Were you also swept up in the wish for freedom for the Chinese people?*

FIEKOWSKY: I was hopeful that the Chinese would get their freedom.

*Q: Did they get any freedom at all?*

FIEKOWSKY: When they were in the square... the department stores were all still the same. But the students thought they would have freedom, but they were also worried.

*Q: We know that bad things happened. Any idea of how many people were killed? There had been a lot of discussion.*

FIEKOWSKY: No. When I was there nobody was killed. See when I was there, they were just in the square and everybody was excited that this was it; we finally got rid of that government, and we'll have something better. You felt this had to be better, but who knows.

*Q: So they felt that they had done regime change, but it was not so?*

FIEKOWSKY: No. But the actual government wanted to keep their jobs and their status in the government, naturally. They had the soldiers and an army, a chain of command. No matter what the soldiers thought, they were being told what to do. They were outside the town just waiting and watching.

*Q: What was it that helped you decide when to leave?*

FIEKOWSKY: Well, a lot of people were leaving. So I had to get a reservation to go back and the station, you had to take a train to the airport because it was out in the country. So everybody in the station was with suitcases and talking and buzzing of activity, and at one point I put my brief case down to check my ticket, then all of a sudden I could not find my brief case that had all of my papers. I am looking at everybody because I did not see it. So I thought, "Maybe somebody took my bag" and they let me go back down the shoot to baggage center to look at the bags. But I didn't see my bag there. So I came back but I still didn't know where it was. So then I was just waiting in the station and I see a group of people with a bag like mine. So we just got our bags mixed up. They had my bag, so I got the bag. So that was a little minor crisis. Imagine going back with your bag stolen with all of the papers in it. But in fact, it wasn't taken. In all the chaos it was accidentally taken.

*Q: So that was on your way in the train to the airport? You left just before the actual conflict?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yeah, because then I got home and I saw it on T.V, the shooting.

*Q: It sounds as though you decided to leave at just the right time, because bullets don't always go in the right direction.*

FIEKOWSKY: I didn't really think about that. Trouble is I don't really worry about things that way. I mean I am not a cautious person.

*Q: Remarkable. What can we say about China now? Looking back, was that turning point a fail to turn?*

FIEKOWSKY: Well they have more freedom now because of the internet and all kinds of

information that they couldn't get before. But they have T.V so China can't say the rest of the world is evil, and we are the only good people because they could see. It was no longer a totally controlled information environment.

*Q: People had to die for that to happen, or they did.*

FIEKOWSKY: Not many of them died, it was a peaceful revolution because most of the country was not involved, it was just Tiananmen. I mean considering it was an unusually—I don't know the statistics—but I would say it was some kind of Prague revolution in which one person was killed.

*Q: So comparable to the Prague spring? So you remember it as a positive moment in China's history?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yes. I mean it wasn't costly and it gave people hope that things could happen. Up until then, they had no hope. It was just the way it was that it would remain that way. It is not what it used to be though; there are more sources of information now, and the Chinese cannot control the information that comes through—the cell phone, for instance.

*Q: Now the negotiations that you had conducted and which were halted, were they resumed at a later time?*

FIEKOWSKY: Eventually. By that time I was probably out of the government. If I had been in the government, I would have been in it. But by that time-- I retired in 1996.

*Q: How long did it take before trade negotiations were resumed? Do you have any idea?*

FIEKOWSKY: I have no idea. It was more than a few months. It was a big bridge. Then the revolt spread from China to Hong Kong. I had to change planes in Hong Kong, and then saw the revolt there because they had gotten the word. At that time, Hong Kong was sort of half free-half Chinese. But everybody felt like me when it happened. I mean thank goodness it's over, I mean it's not over, but may be freer.

*Q: Oppression is now partially gone for good, is that what you are saying? So you stopped in Hong Kong on your way home, was it more than a plane change? Did you stay for a while?*

FIEKOWSKY: Yeah. I was there a little bit. But I always stop in Hong Kong; I used to like to shop there. By the way that was against the ambassador's orders because we should not have been there officially.

*Q: He suggested that you leave, but he did not say "Don't come."*

FIEKOWSKY: We were there negotiating with China, we thought we had a deal, and we were euphoric. But then that night, the students were coming in at the main train station in Beijing right across from our hotel, and I would watch them get out of the station and march in a very orderly way to Tiananmen Square. There they set up camp. They didn't have tents because it was

summer; it was warm. But they just figured out how they could sleep in sleeping bags or whatever they did. It was June. We were still euphoric. We thought the chains are broken; China is free, and we all thought that. I am sure some people were unhappy people about it too, the government or something. They could have lost their job or been killed, you don't know what is going to happen. So then we were told to leave because it wasn't safe and soldiers were out in the outskirts. The Chinese soldiers, because nowadays they admit that we had spies. Tiananmen is one of those days that people just do not forget.

*Q: So when you say a day that will always be historic, you were saying that there was some ambiguity. It looked like there was euphoria, but then the euphoria came to an end; what was the meaning of it?*

FIEKOWSKY: Well as far as the public and most people, they were concerned. They were very happy that they were free at last, so to speak.

*Q: Did they really believe that this was going to happen? That there would not be a military...?*

FIEKOWSKY: Well, there were a lot of people that went to the square, including the students and people that would walk up like I did. There was sort of like an encampment right on the square and around the sidewalk there would be people with posters.

*Q: When you say, "The way I did" do you mean as an observer? As a curious person?*

FIEKOWSKY: Well they weren't just curious people, they live there. They were going to be effected.

*Q: So you think that anyone who was present was a part of this event?*

FIEKOWSKY: Most of them were. They could have been people, like the embassy, a diplomatic enclave and somebody must have been there; you don't leave the whole place. Just the basic staff.

*Q: So you left hours or a day or two before the intervention?*

FIEKOWSKY: I left about a day before the shooting. It was close.

**G. PHILIP HUGHES**  
**Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, The White House**  
**Washington, DC (1989-1990)**

*Ambassador Hughes was born and raised in Ohio and educated at the University of Dayton, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Harvard University. His career with the US Government included service at the senior level with the Congressional Budget Office, the Departments of State and Commerce, and the*

*White House, where he served two tours with the National Security Council. In 1990 he was named US Ambassador to Barbados, where he served until 1993. Ambassador Hughes was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1997.*

*Q: We've really covered the NSC. Unless there is something that occurs to you at our next meeting we're going to talk about how you left the NSC and how you got an embassy.*

*Besides picking up the Barbados thing, off mike we realized that we had forgotten completely about China and Tiananmen Square and the perceptions there of dealing with China during that year.*

*Today is the 27th of October 1997. We were sort of doing a tour of the horizon and we did not cover Tiananmen Square, China and all of that.*

HUGHES: I was of course then Executive Secretary at the National Security Council and I think it is fair to say that we watched with interest, both through reporting and the vivid news coverage, the growing protest gathering in Tiananmen Square, the students who sat in in 1989, as I recall, who built a Statue of Liberty model in the square and protested for democracy for several days. We watched also in horror as the Chinese authorities moved in the armed forces. We got reports of movements in the Beijing area just before the armed forces basically put down the student demonstrations in that bloody and fiery nighttime raid. We saw the same thing that everybody else saw, the dramatic footage shot from the Beijing Hotel of one lone student standing in front of a tank moving down Chang'an Avenue.

Both the protests and the aftermath of the protests put the Bush Administration on, it seemed to me, the horns of a dilemma about what to do. With the protest I think that there was sort of a silent hope in many breasts that maybe this would lead somehow to a liberalizing reform by the Beijing government. But at the same time I believe that in the minds of the Presidential policy advisors that I was aware of, there was sort of a hope or a belief that the liberalizers wouldn't go too far or that the government itself would never go too far in compromising with them. Far from this being a revolution it would certainly not end up being the end of the communist government but rather maybe some kind of reformist accommodation would be worked out by the Chinese government and the student leaders. That was what I thought I saw people around me imagining as the furthest things could go.

Once the Chinese government cracked down on the protest and put an end to it, then the Bush Administration was, it seemed to me, in a very serious dilemma. There were forces in Congress, Nancy Pelosi, a Democratic Congresswoman being one of the most vocal, who were very vocal. Partly for partisan reasons, partly because of their sincere convictions about democracy in China, and partly because they I think recognized that President Bush's ties to the Chinese government and friendships with people in Beijing would make it difficult for him, in fact it would be quite contrary to both his advisors' advice and to his own principles, to sever relations with China, to sanction China strongly or brutally, to sever trade ties with China, or to take some other drastic action as a result of Tiananmen. They felt that he might be vulnerable on this issue, and therefore to push for trade sanctions or trade embargo or something like that would be advantageous.

In any case it was clear that the Bush Administration realized they had to react somehow to Tiananmen but yet they regarded the China relationship as so important and fundamental that we couldn't overreact. I would say that avoiding overreaction was something of a hallmark of President Bush's approach to crises like this. Fashioning a response then that was a reaction to this stunning worldwide event and yet not an overreaction that would be misread or misunderstood by the Chinese authorities or in turn overreacted to by them in some way that brought a spiraling down of our relations, was the task of the day for our China people.

*Q: Did you have the feeling that George Bush having been our representative in Beijing not too long before, was taking an active role to try to craft something to deal with this?*

HUGHES: Yes, I very much had that feeling. I can't point to specific indicators at this stage. Actually he had been the head of our liaison office in Beijing, in a sense quite a while before because it was at that stage at least 12 years and possibly 14 or 15 years ago. I don't have specific actions or directives that he gave that come to the top of my mind but this was not policy that would be made without his active involvement. I'm sure his judgment certainly help set the limits of what we could do and what we wouldn't do in response to Tiananmen.

**CLARKE N. ELLIS**  
**American Institute for Taiwan**  
**Rosslyn, Virginia (1989-1993)**

*Clarke N. Ellis was born in Boston in 1939. He was raised in California and attended the University of Redlands in Redlands, California. He entered the Foreign Service in 1962 and was assigned as a Junior Officer to Munich. He later served in Italy, Eritrea, Austria, Switzerland, and Taiwan. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.*

*Q: You went to the American Institute for Taiwan in Rosslyn, is that it? You were there from 1989 to 1993?*

ELLIS: Yes, it was for four years.

*Q: Could you explain what that was?*

ELLIS: AIT was set up according to the Taiwan Relations Act to handle relations with Taiwan on a non-governmental basis. Since I served once with AIT in Taiwan, once here in the U.S., and also because I married in the 1960s a non-American, I ended up resigning three times from the Foreign Service during my career. The first time I submitted a resignation with my request to marry a non-American and the resignation was not accepted, and I was able to marry my wife.

*Q: She was what nationality?*

ELLIS: She was Italian. Then, I resigned in 1981. It was just, of course, a formality to go to AIT

in Taipei, and then I had to again in 1989 when I went over to AIT in Rosslyn.

*Q: In this 1989 to 1993 period, what was your job?*

ELLIS: I went over as the number two with the title of deputy managing director. The managing director of AIT Washington at first was David Laux, who was a political appointee who had been on the National Security Council staff during the Reagan administration. Then, for the last part of the time that I was there, it was Nat Bellocchi, a career officer and retired ambassador.

As the number two over there, and apart from being the deputy, I was responsible for the financial and investment side of economic relations plus all scientific relations with Taiwan. I was not so much involved in the trade. Since we didn't have any official relations with Taiwan yet it was a very important and growing economy—I think it was our 13<sup>th</sup> largest trading partner - we were very interested in negotiating various agreements with the Taiwan authorities. They, in turn, were interested in negotiating agreements with various U.S. agencies.

To do this, the agreements had to be laundered through AIT. In other words, there would be an agreement between AIT and its counterpart organization, the Coordination Council for North American Affairs. Whether it was on cooperation of nuclear energy, weather forecasting, or agricultural matters, or you name it, during the time that I was over there, I negotiated the agreements. I think I negotiated some 50 agreements with Taiwan. When I left AIT, Taiwan's National Science Council honored me for my contribution to U.S.-Taiwan scientific and technical cooperation.

Now the basic agreements, of course, were frequently done by the U.S. agency involved but we had to go through them with a fine-tooth comb, change who the agreements were between, strike out references to any officiality, and work out reimbursement arrangements. A lot of these agreements were reimbursable because the Taiwans basically wanted technical assistance.

For example, I negotiated an agreement between the National Weather Service here and the meteorological authorities in Taiwan that provided for the U.S. Weather Service to set up a computerized forecasting center in Taiwan, together with all the hardware and software that came along with it. I went out to the National Weather Center in Boulder, Colorado, with the negotiators from Taiwan to talk about this agreement. Of course, we had to massage these agreements. There were a lot of tricky issues that would come up, particularly with regard to handling money so that money could be passed to the U.S. government agency after being laundered. In effect, I used to engage in money laundering for the U.S. government!

*Q: Congress usually oversees these agreements even though they are not treaties. How did that work?*

ELLIS: We would have to report a lot of these agreements to Congress. Also, whenever there were negotiations of economic or other matters, an AIT officer would have to chair the negotiations on our side, and they would have to have a nominally unofficial person chair their delegation on the other side.

*Q: Did you find it in a way overly complicated by this time, or had everybody gotten used to how to do it?*

ELLIS: Well, there were questions sometimes as to whether we could do an agreement or not. It wasn't always completely straight forward or easy to do. For example, one thing that was decided that we could not do, at least while I was there, and I don't think it's been done, was an extradition agreement. We talked about it, but it was, I think, finally, decided that an extradition agreement is normally done as a treaty. You can't have a treaty, it was decided, with a non-country.

There were problems that came up. I was at AIT during the Uruguay Round Trade negotiations and the issue of Taiwan and our trade gap came up. After thinking about it a long time, it was decided that, yes, it was possible for Taiwan to apply for GATT membership. In fact, the Taiwans didn't submit an application as the Republic of China but rather as the autonomous customs territory of Taiwan, Pescadores Islands, Quemoy, and Matsu. There were precedents for non-sovereign autonomous territories being members of GATT - Hong Kong is an example - so that we couldn't object to Taiwan applying.

*Q: How did you find dealing with the Taiwanese here? Any problems with them?*

ELLIS: They always, of course, were interested in trying to get as much officiality into the relationship as possible. We always had to back off on that and try to encourage them to look to the substance and not to the form in relations. That was a continual battle. That came to a head later with the U.S. visit of Li Teng-hui long after I left.

*Q: I would have thought that you would find the relation with Taiwan representatives, particularly during this time - post-Tiananmen Square - was one where really the veil had been stripped away from this what we felt was a benign, evolving democracy in Mainland China into a hard-nosed regime. This must have given the Taiwans a certain amount of encouragement and a bit of a see-I-told-you-so.*

ELLIS: Yes, I think there was some of that attitude. Certainly, they were pushing for more officiality and more extensive contacts but, at the same time, it wasn't just a one-way situation for them because good relations between the U.S. and China frequently meant there was going to be less pressure on them on the part of the Mainland. If relations between the U.S. and China were bad, then they would be making more of an issue of our relations with Taiwan. Then, there was a feeling that we might sell them out. They weren't necessarily happy that the Mainland regime had been shown to be a pretty tough, undemocratic government.

*Q: Were we concerned at this time about the operations of the overseas intelligence security apparatus of the Taiwans?*

ELLIS: Yes. We were concerned about that and efforts, for example, to get consular license plates in several states where they had representative offices. At the beginning of the period I was here and during the period when I was in Taiwan, the Taiwan security services were very much active in trying to keep tabs on the Taiwan independence groups here in the United States.

That was a source of some concern.

*Q: Was the institute playing the role of policy planning, or of reporting on what was happening in Taiwan? Was it apparent that Taiwan was headed towards becoming a real democracy and becoming more Taiwanese that the Mainlanders were dying out? Was this all sort of out there?*

ELLIS: Yes, you could see even from the time that I was in Taipei that, although they had to move slowly and cautiously for the most part, it was a gradual evolution toward democracy. Probably the most striking event was when Chiang Ching-kuo, Chiang Kai-shek's son, was elected president and chose Li Teng-hui as his vice president. Li was a Taiwanese and became president when Chiang died. I think the fact of a Taiwanese running Taiwan instead of Mainlanders alone marked the clear transition that would take place. That was certainly a clear sign that Chiang recognized that the Taiwanese would take over the government and the ruling party, the Kuomintang. So the Kuomintang didn't disappear, it was just taken by the Taiwanese.

*Q: In your relations with East Asian Bureau and, particularly, the Mainland Chinese hands, did you find that the culture was different or anything?*

ELLIS: Well, the Department made clear that, basically, the policy toward not only Mainland China (The Peoples Republic) but also Taiwan would be determined by the Department. We were an executing agency rather than a policy determination agency. Nevertheless, we tried to have some input into the policy process. There was not always agreement on how far we should go with the Taiwans in granting this or granting that or whether this official of the deputy assistant secretary rank was really necessary to lead a trade delegation to Taiwan or not. So, there would be discussions on things like this that would come up. The Department, I think as a general rule, tended to be more cautious or conservative on things than we would have been at AIT.

*Q: Looking at it from some distance within the Foreign Service culture, were there Taiwanese hands and Mainland Chinese hands within our officer corps?*

ELLIS: Things were pretty well mixed up. The second year of the language school was at Taipei. Officers would be expected to serve in both places. There wasn't a separate category of Taiwan officers. You stand where you sit. The other interesting thing, of course, was since AIT is not a part of the government, we had to get our own funding. The only way to do that was as a contractor to the State Department. We had to justify our budget requests to the Hill as a separate line item, as a contractor in the State Department's budget.

Since we weren't getting enough money, we started something which has now gone world-wide, and that was a visa processing fee. In other words, not being a consular post, we couldn't issue visas. In fact, we did. We had consular officers there who would interview people, adjudicate their cases, and stamp the visas in the passports. But the visas, when I was involved, said "Hong Kong" and, nominally, they were issued by the consulate general in Hong Kong. In fact, they were issued in Taipei. Now, they no longer can say Hong Kong. I think they say the Department of State, Washington. In order to be consistent with the fact that the visa didn't cost anything, we presented the argument that, since we had to process these visas which were really being issued

by Hong Kong, we could charge a fee for that. We had to supplement our income with this visa processing fee.

*Q: Particularly thinking of Taiwanese young people going to American universities, was there any attempt to change the exchange? Was this a pretty steady flow?*

ELLIS: Oh, it was a huge flow. Taiwan was either the second or the third largest, I think, in terms of foreign graduate students in the U.S., and we had a very great interest there. Also, as the deputy managing director, I had to try to find good people to serve out in Taipei. By the time I was the deputy managing director there, I think most people knew what it was. When I went out to Taipei in 1981, I didn't know what I was getting into. Resign from the Foreign Service? I didn't know. There was real concern.

Nevertheless, I was disappointed when I was over at AIT that there were still some loop holes in the Taiwan Relations Act, which caused some problems. For example, like most Foreign Service posts these days, we had some spouses locally engaged in Taipei doing things such as family liaison officer. Most of the staff were either Foreign Service or Civil Service officers who were separated and under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, and they could retain their benefits as if they were employed by the government during the time of their service at AIT. There were some people who were not in that category. The director, for example, was considered a political level position and was not covered, therefore, by the pension system. And, the Taiwan Relations Act said that employment with AIT whether in the United States or in Taiwan is not considered employment for the Social Security Act. So people who are employed directly by AIT, such as the secretary that we employed here, wouldn't even get Social Security for the time they were employed by AIT.

Now, you can say, "Why in the world was that done?" Well, that was done since AIT was set up in 1979. That was before they had the new Foreign Service and Civil Service retirement systems. The provision was put in the act to prevent the Social Security Administration from coming around to these people who were separated and saying, "Hey, now you have to contribute to Social Security." At the time, it was meant as a protection for the people who were separated to serve with AIT but it did create some problems. A pension system was set up, first for the director only and a couple of the officers of the corporation, and then it was extended to all AIT employees who weren't otherwise covered by another pension system. That proved to be costly, and the Department had problems with it. I'm not sure what happened but they weren't interested in the alternatives either.

*Q: What about dealing with the Taiwanese-American community? I interviewed Nat Bellocchi at one time, and Nat was saying that the Chinese Taiwanese group really was well established and had a very solid lobby.*

ELLIS: Oh, yes, it's a very strong lobby.

*Q: How did this play? Were they monitoring what you were doing all the time?*

ELLIS: Not so much us but they knew what was going on in U.S.-Taiwan relations, and they

wouldn't so much come to us as they would go to the Hill. That's where they knew the power was. It was the Congress that really strengthened the Taiwan Relations Act more than it would have been. We broke relations in 1978. It was the power of the Taiwan lobby that the strong Taiwan Relations Act was passed. They have very well-funded lobbyists on the Hill. I think they recommended the non-binding resolution for the Senate to allow Li Teng-hui to come to the States. The vote was something like 90-something to nothing. That's an example of the Taiwan lobby's influence on the Congress.

*Q: I would have thought that, because of the way the AIT was put forth and done reluctantly on the American government, in many ways you would have looked more than any other bureau to Congress as being your supporter or your mentor just in the back of your mind.*

ELLIS: We had to look to Congress for money. We had to go, basically, through the State Department. We couldn't lobby Congress on our own.

*Q: But you know there's lobbying and lobbying. Some of the guys who were with the staff of the House were saying, "We are disgruntled because we are not getting anywhere with certain things."*

ELLIS: I don't know one way or another whether the managing directors at the time did that but I certainly didn't.

*Q: Was the Bush-Baker combination a continuation of how it had been under Reagan? You arrived just about the time they did and were there through their period.*

ELLIS: It was pretty much the same.

*Q: How about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and our desire to get money back in? Did you get involved in that?*

ELLIS: No, we didn't really. It was decided that it was rather difficult to get Taiwan mixed up as an official supporter of that effort because of the political ramifications.

*Q: Were there any major issues that you had to deal with during this 1989 to 1993 period?*

ELLIS: Probably apart from the various trade issues that came along, the major issues were arms sales issues. We had a retired army colonel who handled the military issues. Not just with regard to my duties but, I think, the toughest issues that we were dealing with were those regarding military sales to Taiwan.

*Q: During the election of 1992, didn't Bush announce that he was going to send something like 150 F-16s?*

ELLIS: That was very hotly debated.

*Q: Did AIT play any role, or was this a political thing?*

ELLIS: In the final analysis, it was a political decision but in terms of looking at what was going to be sold and what the Taiwans wanted and all of that, everything had to be done, again, through AIT to the State Department and the Defense Department. In other words, we didn't have a policy vote on it but we did pass on the requests and had to analyze the requests somewhat in terms of what it meant and that sort of thing.

*Q: Did you find that you were hearing screams from the Mainland Chinese types in the East Asia Bureau? I'm talking about the Americans who take our relations with Mainland China seriously.*

ELLIS: They were certainly opposed to selling the F-16s. Apart from the various agreements that I had to conclude, there were, for example, the annual military meetings in the U.S. and in Taiwan. I organized annual meetings dealing with scientific cooperation. There was a meeting with the National Science Council here every year that had to be organized. Organizing these meetings was a very significant part of my work.

**DENNIS G. HARTER**  
**Consul General**  
**Guangzhou (1989-1993)**

*Mr. Harter was born and raised in New Jersey and educated at Georgetown University, Seton Hall and American University. He joined the State Department in 1966 and was assigned to the CORDS program of USAID in Vietnam. He subsequently studied Chinese and served in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Guangzhou, and Hanoi, where he was Deputy Chief of Mission (1997-2001). In his Washington assignments Mr. Harter dealt primarily with East Asian matters. He also served as Director of the State Department's Press Office in Washington and as State's Representative to the Washington Council on International Trade in Seattle. Mr. Harter was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004.*

*Q: So the next assignment was the Consulate General at Guangzhou? From when to when?*

HARTER: I got there in the early fall of 1989 and stayed there until January of 1993.

*Q: What was the situation - well you arrived just after Tiananmen Square didn't you?*

HARTER: Yes. The Tiananmen demonstrations lasted from April to June in 1989.

*Q: What were you getting from your colleagues and all, just before you went out, about Tiananmen?*

HARTER: We had a very confrontational relationship with the Chinese, because of the Tiananmen events. During the weeks of the student protests, we were strong supporters of the students. We were urging the Government to meet some of the protestors' demands. The U.S.

was an outspoken critic of the Chinese crackdown in June, and for the next year our relationship was complicated by the fact a prominent Chinese dissident scientist and his wife were living in the US embassy. Fang Lizhi and his wife were finally permitted to leave in June 1990 and they went to the US under our protection where they were given asylum. At about the same time, the former head of the New China News Agency in Hong Kong, Xu Jiatur, escaped from China and also “defected” to the United States. Xu had been deposed as head of the NCNA in January of 1990 because he was seen as too close to the students and too much an advocate for Hong Kong interests during the early stages of the Sino-British negotiations. So, yes, I would say it was a very negative relationship at that point. We had a new Ambassador, Jim Lilley, who just recently published an autobiography on his China experiences [[China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia](#)], who had replaced Winston Lord.

Winston Lord [Ed: served as Ambassador from November 1985 to April 1989] was very upset, because the Tiananmen demonstrations arose just as he was getting ready to leave and I don't believe he anticipated them becoming so dramatic an issue. He had been working to promote a more open relationship with the Chinese and both the demonstrations and the eventual crackdown surprised him and everyone else at the Embassy. Talking with Winston, I think, in a sense, he saw these events as reflecting on his handling of the China relationship. Jim Lilley [Ed: served from May 1989 to May 1991] came in after the first few weeks of the demonstrations in the midst of public U.S. criticism of the Chinese handling of the demonstrations. The demonstrations intensified and the relationship only got worse with the crackdown in June. The continuing asylum situation with Fang Lizhi at the Embassy added to the negatives. We had limited communication with the government and there were large numbers of Chinese troops outside the Embassy.

The Tiananmen demonstrations were of course, not strictly confined to Beijing. There were student demonstrations and some outbreaks of violence in all of the major cities throughout China. In Guangzhou, the demonstrations were among the least confrontational simply because the southern Chinese didn't let politics get in the way of managing the issues. The provincial government and party leadership had a more collegial interaction with the public (the masses in communist terms) and the students. The party apparatus organized a couple of big demonstrations cooperatively with the students, ensuring roads were kept open for the marches and transportation was provided, etc. And, of course, after the crackdown by the PLA forces in Tiananmen, many medium and high-level officials in southern China helped the leading dissidents from the North escape to Hong Kong or to Macao. From there, they subsequently went to the United States, sometimes to Europe, but mostly to the United States. The southern leaders were a much more receptive audience for the students' issues, particularly as they applied to a lessening of central control and authority. The people in Guangdong Province were quite happy to have Beijing otherwise occupied and not restricting local efforts to expand their economic market activities.

*Q: Was this sort of almost the traditional cultural dividing line at the Yangtze River, I mean the Cantonese-Mandarin, I mean the whole business of China being split.*

HARTER: Yes. The Cantonese were much more progressive politically and economically than those in the north in Beijing. When Deng Xiaoping set up the Special Economic Zones with

public infrastructure money to experiment with market run economic programs built on private investment, the Cantonese took the ball and ran with it. From the ordinary people to the top Party leaders in that region, they pretty much all bought into the program. Party ideology took a backseat to economic prosperity and development. During the time I was in Guangzhou, I liked to argue that the Communists could run open elections in Guangdong where anyone could run for office against the existing government and party leaders and that the Communists would have won the elections, because they basically were all popular figures. Everybody generally liked the people running the government and party there, because they had a much more open attitude toward the economy, self improvement and education and all the rest of these so-called “basics” that were of concern to the ordinary people.

*Q: Well, I imagine you were looking at this. How did this come about? Was there almost the equivalent within the party of almost the elective process or was there just something in the spirit or what?*

HARTER: Well, when Mao took power there was a fair amount of mobility in the political system. High level cadre would quite often be sent to their home areas to work but there were quite a few who were sent from one geographic region of the country to another. Over time, local cadre rose through the system and stayed in the system locally. They weren't moved around. During the political campaigns – the Great Leap Forward, the Cultural Revolution – there was a bit more mobility at the top, particularly when the PLA was sent in to take over party and government positions after the major disruptions of the Cultural Revolution. But, in fact over the years the local administrations tended to remain localized.

In the south, the local party and government leaders thought the same way as the people who wanted to do business like their cousins across the border in Hong Kong and Macau. The whole focus in Southern China was to be as much like Hong Kong as you could be. This feeling was obviously centered in Guangdong Province – home of the Cantonese who populated Hong Kong and Macau. But it was also true in Fujian Province, the home province of most of the émigrés in Taiwan and Singapore, and second only to Guangdong among all overseas Chinese communities. Guangxi Province was a province dominated by minority peoples and so it didn't have the same widespread entrepreneurial drive. Hainan, the island which made up the fourth province of the Guangzhou consular district took capitalism and stretched it to the extreme. Where Guangdong and Fujian had small special economic zones with a few square miles of land in which to experiment, the entire island of Hainan was declared a special economic zone. And, with that incentive, the Hainan leaders opened up the biggest land and commercial speculation China had seen since the Kuomintang ruled in China. The Hainan authorities in their haste to show progress in the modernization of the island managed to get on the wrong side of just about everything. What I'm referring to is largely speculative activity, using government funds, for example, to procure and import luxury goods through tax and tariff free Hainan which were then resold to other parts of China at high mark-ups. Top level provincial party, government and military cadre were all involved. Bribes and payoffs were the foundation for wild business deals and land development schemes. Many properties were bought and flipped for a profit without anything ever being developed or produced because everyone wanted to get in on the prospective riches. Prostitution and gambling were open activities in Hainan's two cities. The Governor was personally involved in a luxury car import scheme that brought duty free luxury cars to Hainan

and then arranged their re-export at a big profit to the local military and political figures in other parts of China. The Hainan fiasco almost scuttled Deng's entire SEZ policy experiment. Only some very careful critique of the Hainan Governor's "excess zeal" to earn profits for the State managed to keep his actions from spilling over into the zones in Guangdong and Fujian.

*Q: Were these stolen cars?*

HARTER: The stolen cars were part of the wide open speculative and corrupt practices that were going on at that time, but the Hainan Governor's activities were a separate activity. What you are referring to is the contract stolen car operations that were conducted between southern China and Hong Kong and Macau. Occasionally the thieves went as far as the United States and Europe to get their merchandise. With the sudden rise of approved wealth accumulation in China there was a lot of pent up demand for the kinds of luxuries one found in the west. But China was not permitting the expenditure of money to open up those sorts of markets in China. So southern Chinese criminal elements opened up their own supply system. Specific cars could be ordered and they would then be stolen in Hong Kong or Macau and brought across the border through a number of different smuggling routes. Hong Kong has probably more luxury cars per capita than any other city in the world. I know for certain they have more Rolls Royce and Bentley automobiles per capita than any other country in the world. But, the thieves were also picking up big Mercedes sedans as well as Ferrari, Jaguar and even Lamborghini sports cars. You would see these autos being driven on the highways and local city streets in southern China with provincial Chinese license plates – including official government plates – and you just knew where they came from. The Customs Office people and the military, particularly those along the border areas were all taking money to allow this to happen. Periodically there would be a crackdown or somebody would get lucky and intercept the smuggling boats before they reached Chinese territorial waters, but these were exceptions to the rule. The smuggling techniques became increasingly sophisticated. A stolen car in Hong Kong would be stowed inside a large rubber bladder and then towed behind a fishing boat to a coastal spot in China where it would be unloaded. Kept under water, and unlikely to sink because of this big rubber bladder, the car was undetectable. Only the slow movement of the towing vessel tended to give away that it was transporting a heavy load. Sometimes the smugglers would just bring them in on an ordinary car carrier vessel, mixed in with other cars that had been legitimately acquired.

I said this was a period of considerable confrontation between the US and China. When I got there the interaction between myself and the Consulate, with Guangdong government and party officials had already started to improve. The nadir of our interaction with the Chinese officials had never reached the depressed levels it had in Beijing and in Shanghai. And we were also the first to restore our level of activity to pre-Tiananmen days. The provincial authorities were also making a lot of money out of the fees they collected to support emigrating Chinese who pretty much all lived in the Guangzhou Consular District. I mentioned earlier, since 90 plus percent of U.S. citizen Chinese traced their origin to the Guangzhou Consular District it was decided to place all immigrant visa processing there. While the Chinese officials in Guangzhou originally objected to this arrangement, the local authorities eventually saw this operation as a way to obtain lucrative earnings. I believe this gave us some additional influence with the local authorities and influenced these officials to keep the relationship with the United States more open in Guangdong and not as restrictive as it was in Beijing. For example, when I first arrived

in Beijing to start this tour the atmosphere outside the embassy was as bad as it was at the time of the incident I described to you in 1975 with all the guards around the U.S. mission buildings. In fact, it was probably a bit more rigorous in 1989. You had to go through three or four check points before you got to the actual gate to get into the US compound. There were guards at each end of the street who would check documents of any Chinese proceeding down the block toward the US mission. There were patrols walking in front of the buildings and then there were stationary guards in front of the buildings. At the Consulate General in Guangzhou, there were no street-side guards and usually only one or two guards near the entrance to our part of the hotel where the Consulate was located. Once we moved to our new location, we went for several months before there was any local guard set up outside our facility even though we had constructed a small guard post for them to occupy.

When I came to Guangzhou in 1989 the U.S. Consulate was still in its original 1979 location, a Chinese government-owned hotel. Its placement there is an interesting story. After the normalization of relations and the opening of Embassies in the two countries, the US and the PRC both wanted to open Consulates. We were looking to open in Shanghai and Guangzhou, two big economic centers along the east coast. (The Chinese wanted Houston and San Francisco.) And, as we've noted before, Guangzhou is the capital of the province where most Chinese-Americans come from. Vice President Mondale was about to travel to China and everyone wanted him to have a "deliverable", something he could do that would have a tangible result. The answer turned out to be "opening the Consulate General in Guangzhou." New hotels were being built and lots of business activity suggested there would be some choices if the USG had decided to wait. But there were no other identifiable "deliverables" and so the US decided to open the Consulate General in a Chinese Government-owned hotel which had been in business in Guangzhou since the 1950s. Although it has been expanded and modernized several times in the intervening years, in 1979 it was still very primitive compared to western style hotels. We took a large space in one wing of the building on the first floor for our consular section and then converted a number of hotel rooms on the upper floors to establish the rest of our offices, including our communications center. It was clearly insecure. We had an open elevator shaft – which we did not control – running right up through the office space and adjacent to the communications shell. The offices were of course, all converted hotel rooms and the living quarters for the Consulate staff were also converted hotel rooms. Because each new "apartment" – a combination of a several hotel rooms – had more bathrooms than anyone could use, wooden planks were installed on top of the tubs to create shelves and storage space. I had stayed in this hotel during my 1975 travel to China and I can't say it had changed significantly by the time I arrived there as the Consul General in 1989. There were certainly more modern parts of the hotel, but we were not in those parts. The hotel did, however, have one big advantage, it was located directly opposite the fairgrounds where the semi-annual Canton Trade Fair was held. So, the hotel still had a great deal of business that kept it going. It was very convenient for us to provide services to all of the Americans who came to China each spring and fall to attend the fair and do business. The consular section was in the worst area because on the first floor they were subject to rat infestations and there were cats in the ceiling who urinated and defecated up there creating odors, health concerns, and occasional leaks through the ceiling and into the consular work areas.

Guangdong province was the heart of China's post-1979 modernization. Excluding the island of

Hainan, which had originally been part of Guangdong province, three of China's four special economic zones were in Guangdong. The economic experimentation, which had originally been confined to the zones, was quickly expanded throughout the Pearl River Delta which extended from Guangzhou southward to Hong Kong and Macau. Farm land was quickly being developed into new factories, new zones, and new transportation links tied these areas to Hong Kong. New hotels controlled by outside foreign interests in partnership with Chinese entities were being created to provide services to the entrepreneurs who were coming in from abroad to do business. At one point Guangzhou had four, five-star hotels while there was only one in Beijing and one in Shanghai. The money and the investment and the visitors were clearly all down in the south. Foreign involvement in business and commerce was all centered in Guangdong. After the central authorities created the special economic zones to open up the economy there had been some additional decrees from Beijing which created broader areas for development in the country along the major river networks. But in Guangdong, the province began to make its own decisions to expand the zones. The special economic zones had the most liberal regulations to promote investment, but the Pearl River Delta towns just gradually sucked those special conditions closer and closer to Canton. In effect, you had swath of land and towns several miles wide that ran northward from Shenzhen to Guangzhou for about 150 miles. It was this area that established China's basic light industrial and textile exports to the rest of the world. Of course, Americans were very interested in getting involved in such business opportunities. After Tiananmen had stalled activities in the north, American businessmen saw the more relaxed attitude in Guangdong as a real opportunity to expand their involvement in China. In fact, Guangdong business activity never really closed down during the Tiananmen disturbances or the crackdowns. Some Americans in Guangzhou diminished their day-to-day activities in the immediate aftermath of the crackdown, but very few Americans actually left Guangdong for an extended period of time after Tiananmen. By contrast, all the business people evacuated Beijing and Shanghai after Tiananmen and they did not return for extended periods.

*Q: I was going to ask, had there been the equivalent to, I mean was this - they left because of the atmosphere or they leave because of pressure in the United States, don't do business with these people.*

HARTER: It was a combination of those two. The crackdown in Beijing made people feel it was unsafe to be there – largely the military action and presence around the capital, plus the hostile attitude that persisted toward Americans after the Tiananmen events. That hostility was due to Chinese Government propaganda targeting the US for interfering in China's internal affairs – human rights criticism, sanctuary for the Chinese scientist in the US Embassy, and asylum for student dissidents able to flee the country. To a certain extent that hostility toward Americans also carried over into Shanghai and some of the other big population centers and Americans and other business people took that occasion to leave the country. Once they were out, they were then more subject to the pressures in their home countries where people saw the Chinese totalitarian regime as oppressing its citizens. Businesses based in the U.S. and in Europe that were active in the China market were under pressure not to do business with these “bad” people.

*Q: When you arrived there, when in 1989? I assume you made your normal calls, was there a Governor of the Province and then the Mayor and this sort of thing?*

HARTER: I arrived about November, more than six months after Tiananmen started and a few months after it ended. Yes, I started my official calls right off. The Governor was the son of one of China's top Generals and a long-time power in the province.

*Q: Were the people you were talking to saying OK, we've had a rough patch let's get on with it down here. Were you able to discuss the situation and all that?*

HARTER: Yes. They were very pleased with the way things had progressed in the south after 1979 and they were very anxious to continue domestic growth and foreign investment. Provincial authorities in Guangdong had reached an accommodation with the students and there were no real social disruptions. The leadership did not agree with the crackdown – I should note that Premier Zhao Ziyang who had supported the students and who had been dumped after he criticized the leadership policies had been the Governor of Guangdong many years before and had close ties to the leadership there. You had a feeling Guangdong Governor Ye Xuanping and the top leaders of the party and the government there knew lower level officials were helping dissident students to escape and the provincial leaders let it continue because they too believed it was the proper thing to do. Guangdong was at the forefront of this effort to support the escape of the students but people in Guangxi and Fujian were also involved.

*Q: Were you getting remarks about those jokers up North?*

HARTER: Yes, you would get a certain amount of that -- certainly from middle level and lower level officials. Some of them would make those negative references toward northern officials in very informal conversations. And, that was again one of the advantages of being in the South, everything was a much more informal and relaxed when it came to interactions between the foreign community and the local government institutions. Sure we had some formalistic encounters and some difficulty from time to time getting meetings or getting cooperation to do things. But, overall, you had a much better opportunity to talk with these people and meet with them than you did in either Beijing or Shanghai. Now, the highest ranking people in the province were certainly less accessible than others at lower levels. In that sense, I would say my access to the Governor was probably the same as the CG in Shanghai had access to the Mayor there. I was not able to see the Governor very often, but I could see one of the three or four Vice Governors several times per year. Guangdong had two Governors during the three plus years I was there and I probably met with them on only three occasions.

*Q: I mean, how did the Shanghai and compares politically? I mean how did they look at each other for and sort of from the Consulate's perspective?*

HARTER: Well, the two cities are real competitors. In the 1930s and 1940s, Shanghai had been the center of China's expatriate business activity and after 1949 under the communists it was one of the major investment centers for the PRC. Shanghai's state-owned enterprises were major tax contributors to Beijing but they were also the primary focus for state investment. Guangzhou was more backward and a lot less developed from that time up to the start of the reform and opening policy in 1979. In the 19th century, the situation had been reversed, because initially the only open ports for trade with the foreigners were in Guangdong. Then, the only foreign factories were on Shamian Island which was also the site of the foreign legations after the 1840 Opium

War. My predecessor, Consul General Mark Pratt, had negotiated a lease with the five-star White Swan Hotel to take over its former staff building on Shamian as the new Consulate General site. Actually the White Swan had never used the building for its staff because Esso had leased it for its headquarters and residence soon after it was constructed. In 1986, Esso had decided to relocate to Zhuhai in order to be closer to its drilling sites in the South China Sea and so the building became available. So it was as though we were coming back to where the first American consuls had operated.

By the 20th century Shanghai had clearly surpassed Guangzhou and the other coastal cities as a commercial center with the pre-World War II era being its golden age. Shanghai was also very important after the Communist takeover in 1949, because many of the top leaders around Chairman Mao, particularly during the Cultural Revolution, came from Shanghai. But, Shanghai got a bloody nose with the death of Chairman Mao and the purge of those people around his wife -- known as the Gang of Four -- all of whom had come out of Shanghai. Under the communists, Shanghai was the most ideological city in all of China, especially during the Cultural Revolution. I always sort of felt that Shanghai's communist intellectuals were the most ideological, because they felt guilty about how bourgeois and capitalist the city was. To compensate for this capitalist excess, these intellectuals articulated an excess of leftist, radical communism ideas.

*Q: Well, Shanghai was actually a fairly new city wasn't it? I thought it was established almost as one of the port cities back in the early 19th century or so.*

HARTER: It was not as developed as the southern ports, but I believe it did have a business center in the latter part of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. You are correct though that the really big expansion was in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, especially in the decades between the First and Second World War. It was probably in that time period that Shanghai became a much bigger and more important commercial center than it ever had been before and the foreign section of Shanghai was virtually autonomous from the rest of the city where the Chinese lived.

I think there was a rivalry relationship between the two regions. Beijing was pleased with the effectiveness of the new reform policies and the growth of Guangdong cities and the revenues they produced for the central government. But conversely, they were also concerned that the significant investments which the central authorities had put into Shanghai were not producing the same positive results. After the reform movement in 1979, Beijing was getting huge tax returns from Guangdong and the southern Chinese. But, they were also losing a lot of control over economic developments and that gradually was also restricting Beijing's ability to dictate policy to the local authorities. Part of the reason was simply because Guangdong would provide extra money through loans to the central authorities. This money was beyond what the province would normally provide in revenue share and taxes. Guangdong would periodically provide an extra couple hundred million dollars worth of loans to the Central government. During these years, Shanghai was still a cash draw. It's economy still was dominated by all of those state-owned enterprises that weren't doing anything.

In this time period, in the early 1990s and particularly through the rest of the decade, the Central government made a conscious decision to re-make Shanghai as its most important commercial city. And, they decided to do it in a way that preserved Beijing's control and oversight. They

didn't directly downgrade Guangdong and the SEZ areas but they made Shanghai the center for re-directing national investment, particularly in infrastructure, as a way to encourage greater foreign investment to the Shanghai area. Shanghai's "privileges" under the state-run investment program rivaled the investment incentives offered in the zones but they came with greater clout in Beijing. It didn't hurt that Shanghai cadres were once again manning top positions in the Central Government and Party structure. With the combination of foreign investment and government infrastructure development funds, Shanghai took off. Shanghai, I just saw in the paper yesterday, now has a train that goes from their new airport to the outskirts of the city at 287 miles an hour. They say it's the fastest train in the world. The Germans built it. So, a lot of the modernization effort put in Shanghai I believe is a direct result of Beijing seeking to undercut a growing economic independence in Southern China that Beijing feared could potentially have political repercussions. Guangdong's link to Hong Kong, that territory's new special region status after 1997, and its preservation of a capitalist economic structure would only strengthen perceptions that Southern China was a separate entity. Moreover, as Beijing sought to entice Taiwan to a closer association with the mainland it was conceding political and economic independence for Taiwan within that association. In combination, Taiwan and Southern China and their powerful economic muscle could pose quite a challenge to Beijing's control over the country's economic system. Ultimately, Beijing could not risk this economic power becoming a destabilizing element, and thus, the leaders created Shanghai as the regime's counterweight to the free enterprise, foreign investment dominated southern areas.

*Q: What was your staff like there? What were you doing?*

Harter: First of all, there was no deputy position in Guangzhou and so traditionally, that function was assumed by the head of the Political/Economic Section, a three person unit. The head of the unit was John Tkacik, a career Consular officer who had been in the Hong Kong Consular Section part of the time I served there and who technically was the head of the Economic Section. When I started in Guangzhou, the head of the Consular Section, our largest unit, was Tony Leggio, and he was later replaced by Bernadette Allen, a consular cone officer whom I pushed for a stretch assignment to the section chief's job. She did an outstanding job overseeing the large staff at a time when our immigrant visa load was expanding rapidly, particularly with the growth of a very busy adoption program. Brent Miller was the head of our Admin operations and that was a major job because of our move from the old Dong Fang Hotel facilities into the new building next to the White Swan Hotel on Shamian Island. He was constantly working with FBO on the plans for the conversion of office space and the refurbishment of apartments in the building as well as with the Seabees who did the installation work for our communications operations. We experienced a less successful stretch assignment with Brent's successor. His short foreign service tenure and limited experience – only GSO work – did not give him enough background to be the ADMIN officer as well as the RSO and Personnel Officer for the Consulate and I had to spend more time on these issues myself than I had when they were under Brent's direction.

We had an outstanding young FAS (Foreign Agricultural Service) officer, Phil Shull, an experienced USIA officer who was very active, Rich Stites, and two FCS (Foreign Commercial Service) section heads, Todd Thurwachter and Denny Barnes, who consecutively ran that two-man shop. Prior to my arrival there, these three agencies had been permitted to operate in their

own independent facilities without any agency commitment to re-assemble the units once we got better facilities. This produced a lot of coordination problems in agencies that traditionally liked to do their own thing anyway. Of the three, however, it was only FCS that proved particularly stubborn in coordinating its activities with the rest of the ConGen staff. USIA also had a couple of interns who came through as fill-ins while the USIS officer was on leave and they turned out to be very creative and dynamic additions to the team.

As I mentioned, because the Consular Section handled all the immigrant visa work in China, we had a very large Consular section -- I would say roughly a dozen officers. Beijing had only five and the other Consulates had one or two officers to handle non-immigrant visas and American Citizens Services. We had a local staff supporting the Consular Section of probably 35 or 40 Chinese. We had one political officer and two economic officers. In addition to the three agencies I mentioned earlier, INS and Customs personnel would come in to Guangzhou to assist us or occasionally to conduct special investigations. They worked with us as much or perhaps even more than they worked with the Embassy in Beijing. This was due to our large immigrant and adoption work as well as South China's production of export goods for the US market. I guess, all totaled up, we had a staff of around the low 30s. We didn't have any Defense Department attachés and no Marine Guards in the Consulates.

*Q: Could you get around easily?*

HARTER: Yes. Access and travel opportunities were pretty good throughout the Consular District. The district covered four southern coastal provinces, the four Provinces had, I don't know, maybe 140, 150 million people.

*Q: What were the Provinces?*

HARTER: Guangdong Province was the biggest and the consulate offices were in its capital in Guangzhou. Guangxi Province is adjacent to Guangdong in the southwest and it was the province home of the Zhuang minority which dominated the administration there. Fujian Province is north of Guangdong along the coast and sits opposite Taiwan. Hainan Province, is a large island, south of Guangdong that had originally been part of Guangdong Province but was made a separate Province and a special economic zone in its own right.

*Q: So your consular district covered the Provinces that bordered Vietnam?*

HARTER: Guangxi Province shared part of the border with Vietnam but the rest of the border on the China side is in Yunnan Province. Yunnan is part of the Chengdu Consular District along with Sichuan Province and Tibet. Sichuan Province, with Chengdu as its capital, is the largest Province in China. A single Province with well over a hundred million people at that time. Chengdu probably is the largest city in the province, or it may be behind Chongqing. Chengdu probably had five million people. So, it was definitely not "the sticks" in that sense.

When we started out in 1979 with our Consulate General, there was no way to have a separate stand-alone building. The only existing buildings that were developed enough to give you facilities and to give you something reasonable to work with was in the hotels. As I said earlier,

we had a hotel-based Consulate and our staff all lived right in the building. My three immediate predecessors spent a lot of their time looking for a piece of property on which to build our own independent facility. The first properties they were offered by the Chinese government were all inside the city but in areas that were a bit out of the way of the ordinary flow of the city. Subsequent options proposed by the Chinese appeared to be too far outside the city – at least at the time they were offered and we also turned them down. While there was a feeling among the ConGen staff that we needed something a lot better than we were working in, there was little likelihood we would be funded for such a project until the Embassy in Beijing had been replaced, because they too were shoe-horned into facilities in the capital. So there wasn't as much pressure to make a decision and find a piece of property as their might otherwise have been if we were the only truly disadvantaged facility in China. Later on in my tour there, I did spend some time looking at property sites and I did find one that was eventually approved by the Department's Property Negotiator, Ambassador Nicholas Salgo. But I don't think anything has yet been done to begin construction, even though we do have lease title to the land we want to build on.

After I had been in Guangzhou for some months, we moved out of the hotel and into a high rise where the lower three floors were reconfigured as office space and the upper nine floors were the residences. The building became available when ESSO, the old Rockefeller oil company, decided to join other oil companies in the Shekou Section of the Shenzhen SEZ which was where all of the oil exploration activities were centered in South China. Mark Pratt, the Consul General at this time, convinced the Department to take over the lease. It was a great decision and has provided us with a facility we use even today. I spent the remainder of my three plus years in Guangzhou dealing with the rebuilding and reconstruction of that particular facility. It was a terrible experience.

Working with FBO (Foreign Buildings Operations) is probably one of the most trying things I've ever had to do in the Foreign Service. When I had been in Hong Kong on my second tour, I was asked by the Consul General to head a group to evaluate a building that had recently been built for occupancy by the Consulate staff. It had been one of the properties in Hong Kong that had been constructed when FBO traded a number of US-owned sites to a local developer in return for some additional buildings being constructed for our use. This new apartment building I went to look at was one of the oddest buildings I'd ever seen. None of the rooms in the apartments had only four corners. Each room had some extra angles which created very difficult space in which to fit furnishings. Moreover, the rooms were all so small and there was so little closet space in the bedrooms that we had to downgrade each apartment by one bedroom so that people would have a place to store things.

In addition, the designer who had been selected by FBO to plan the building had no experience with tropical weather or typhoon type storms which hit Hong Kong most every year. The building had small mosaic tiles placed all along the outside of the building. Unfortunately they leaked when it rained and it took several additional months of reworking the exterior of the building before it could be occupied. That building was bad enough, but FBO also made another big mistake in agreeing to lease a 79-unit apartment building that was supposedly going to be turned over to the USG after twenty years of rental payments. This building, however, had no setback from the street, was totally surrounded by bigger buildings and thus was totally

incapable of being protected from potential terrorist activities. Congressional oversight committees roundly criticized this transaction as well. The Consulate was fortunate to be able to get out of the lease, though we had certainly lost almost all of our USG owned properties.

*Q: I was thinking it was FBO and Chinese bureaucracy?*

HARTER: FBO was absolutely terrible, unable to make decisions, inadequate planning, equipment and materials improperly ordered, no concept of a “schedule.” Then, to make it worse, I had the same experience once again when I was in Hanoi. Twice in my career I ended up working in a construction site. What made Guangzhou worse than Hanoi is that we were living in the same building in which all the construction was taking place. At least in Hanoi Embassy people had a chance to leave the work zone and retreat to a proper residence. Of course, a lot of the heavy reconfiguration of office space in Guangzhou was completed before we moved in and began operations, but there was still a lot to be done and continuing issues with communications and classified equipment that had to be installed after we moved in. To make things more personally disagreeable, we also had to move out of our apartment in the building so FBO and the Department’s interior designers could come in and redo the CG’s (Consul General’s) residence as an “official residence.” Some of the items they came up with and the patterns and fabrics they selected were unbelievable. It was not an enjoyable experience.

*Q: How about your contacts with the government people? What sort of things would you work with them on?*

HARTER: A lot of things we dealt with involved investment. We occasionally had discussions of a political nature, talking about Chinese domestic policies and their implementation, but almost all of the political issues were handled in Beijing along with Sino-US bilateral relations and foreign policy issues. Our political officer and I would try to analyze political dynamics within the Consular District and report on them but we were not “involved” in political activities per se. Sometimes when the Embassy was directed by Washington to make a particular demarche to the Chinese on a bilateral issue, the Embassy in Beijing would direct me and the Consul General in Shanghai to go in and talk about the same issue, but that was pretty rare and I can’t say that I can recall any specific issue I might have had to raise that way. But, because of the business-oriented focus of the region, by and large I probably did more commercial support work than anything else. I certainly got involved in some of the Consular issues, particularly as we tried to sort out policies to handle adoptions and a rapid growth in immigrant visa issuances. I was also involved in trying to cut into the surge of illegal immigrants coming out of the district and into the U.S. But, I tried to stay out of the day-to-day consular issues and avoided making referrals and recommendations for others to get visas. As I mentioned before, the head of the Economic unit was a long time consular officer and on a number of occasions I had to get him out of the Consular Section operations. He was constantly getting involved in trying to adjudicate cases or making sure people he referred were getting their visas. And, of course, my main task was to make sure all of our people got the support they needed to do their jobs effectively.

A lot of what I had to do was also ceremonial -- U.S. businesses opening up an exhibit; U.S. businesses opening a factory, all that required my “presence.” I helped to dedicate or break

ground for all kinds of different buildings and facilities. Pabst Blue Ribbon, which used to be a popular beer in the United States, brought in a U.S. factory and set up their own brewery in China while I was there. I think at one point it was the only actual Pabst Blue Ribbon factory still in independent production with all of the U.S. produced beer under that label being made in other companies' breweries. They were the first American beer to come into China and they were very popular across the Consular District and then across much of China because they had that "American" cachet. Several young entrepreneurs got their start by buying Pabst in Guangdong and taking it off by train or plane to other parts of China to sell at a higher price than they paid in Guangdong. The Pabst people did terrific things within their locale to support their local partners and their community and they were a great help for our representation activities and Fourth of July events and everything else where we needed support from the American business community.

Following a process begun by one of my predecessors as Consul General, we also helped introduce McDonalds to Southern China. When I arrived, McDonalds was just being permitted to open in the Shenzhen SEZ. But, every year on the Fourth of July or occasionally for some other special events, we got local government permission to allow McDonalds to bring food up on the train from Hong Kong. Hong Kong McDonalds sent some of their staff and we set up locations for them to prepare and assemble the food and we'd have a Fourth of July with McDonalds hamburgers, french fries and apple pies. We also got Kentucky Fried Chicken introduced the same way and we were able to rely on support from the Pepsi and Coke factories that had also opened in Guangdong to provide us beverages and snacks – Frito Lay is part of Pepsi -- so all of this made for a big draw for our July 4<sup>th</sup> events. Fortunately, these companies were all anxious for the exposure and so our limited representational budget did not take a hit when we had several hundred people come in for the Independence Day activities.

While I was in Guangzhou, the city hosted the first ever women's World Cup Soccer Championship. The American team was one of the favorites and ended up winning the tournament. In fact, they have remained a top contender in each of the following quadrennial contests.

*Q: The Chinese had a team?*

HARTER: The Chinese had an excellent team, yes. But, interestingly the other perennial top competitors have always included Norway and Sweden. How those two countries with their relatively small population base would be out there competing with the United States and with China and their much larger populations seems incongruous. Moreover, they're probably got to deal with snow and frozen turf for close to half of the year which limits their outdoor play experience. I think it's quite phenomenal. Anyway, the Consulate General did a special McDonalds event for all the members of the team and their parents. Unfortunately, McDonalds hamburgers and fries were not part of the approved diet for the athletes so they couldn't partake of the food. Another locally based US food manufacturer was an official sponsor of the competition and M&Ms chocolate candies from the Mars Company were also part of our celebratory events.

*Q: These are candies?*

HARTER: Yes, the candy manufacturer. So, we had good opportunities to highlight American products and to use them for special events. M&Ms made special promotional items, including hand-held fans and signs with team cheers and the M&Ms logo for the soccer event. I recall taking all of the parents and the coaches out to dinner at one of my favorite street-side Sichuan restaurants near the Consulate and for a group of fifteen people I think I spent all of about \$25 of my representation fund to entertain them with local beer and spicy Sichuan food. Unfortunately that was again something the team members had to miss.

But, we did a number of those kinds of promotion events to give U.S. businesses and artists opportunities to interact with the Chinese community. One of the things I did in Southern China that pleased me the most was to get Agriculture, Commerce and USIA to work together to do joint programs under the auspices of the Consulate General that were directed toward their own target audiences. We actually did a number of promotional events, involving all three of those agencies, which turned out very well. We had a commercial food products show opening in one of the Chinese department stores organized by either our Agriculture or our Commerce unit. I got the other one to participate with representative US products and then convinced USIA to spend some of its funds to bring in a U.S. rock band that was performing in Hong Kong to appear at the grand opening. We set the band up in the parking lot of the department store with all of its sound equipment and we had the parking lot filled to capacity and the construction site next door to the location was filled with workers and others who climbed up onto the building to get a better view. When the concert was over, the crowd piled into the store and many of the US products were sold out very quickly.

On another occasion, the Agriculture Officer was doing a New Orleans style food presentation for our landlord, the White Swan Hotel, with a chef from New Orleans preparing traditional foods for both lunch and dinner menus. One of the Commerce Officers was from New Orleans and I got him to contact some of his friends to see if we could find New Orleans musicians who might be willing to come to China for a couple of weeks. Once he found them, I got the USIA office to get this Zydeco band invited under USIS auspices. I got Commerce to work with United Airlines to get the musicians free transportation to China in return for United publicity material being placed at the White Swan Hotel. United was agreeable because they were trying to get rights to fly to China and in the meantime were still taking a lot of U.S. bound passengers from China through their operations in neighboring Hong Kong. We worked with the White Swan Hotel to give the musicians free rooms and meals in return for their performances at the hotel dining room events. And, during the daytime we were able to get the musicians over to the local university music department to offer classroom instruction on Zydeco and other traditional New Orleans music. It ended up being a multi-dimensional, multi-agency operation that was very, very successful and each of the three agencies contributed to making it work for themselves and for the others as well. And, the Consulate General was the big winner because all of the Chinese entities involved were satisfied with what they got out of it. So often overseas these agencies operate in their own little worlds and never, never try to do anything with one another. In the worst cases, they are each trying to outdo one another as though it was some sort of competition.

*Q: When an American business person would come to talk to you, what would you tell them in setting up? What were the good things and the bad things at that particular time?*

HARTER: Well, of course the pressures for payoffs and under-the-table payments and things of that sort were very heavy in southern China. And, Americans of course had to be very careful of both the US laws and regulations on corrupt practices as well as local laws. Relationships with local partners also took a lot of cultivating and many a company foundered because it didn't do due diligence in selecting its partner. Much of what I talked about with American businesses related to these issues. I also spent a lot of time explaining how the signing of the first MOU was in fact, just the beginning of the negotiation with a Chinese entity.

A Memorandum of Understanding, a cooperation agreement, is an agreement to cooperate between a Chinese entity and a U.S. business firm which set out the basic target of a business. It was difficult to get the businessmen to understand the Chinese hadn't really started to bargain or work on a partnership at all until after that MOU was signed. MOUs really meant nothing. They were just a significant showing of interest and willingness to proceed with a lot of other, often very difficult negotiations.

I can remember one Massachusetts company's multi-month conversations with a local municipality that would have provided modern equipment and technical management expertise for the city's power plants. I had briefed the U.S. businessmen each time they came to China and gave them my thoughts on how to proceed with their discussions. On a trip back to the U.S. on consultations which also included some public speaking engagements, I stopped at their headquarters and again talked about how their deal was progressing. Finally, everything seemed about to be finalized. Even though the U.S. company team had been there for more than a week and had already engaged in a number of different sessions with the local officials, the municipality authorities balked on some last minute arrangements and postponed a couple of "final" discussions that were to take place before the actual agreement was signed. Now I should point out, all of this was taking place toward the end of December. It was either 1990 or 1991 and the Americans were all anxious to get home for the holidays with their families. "Reluctantly" the Chinese agreed to one more meeting, scheduled at 6:00 pm just before a small banquet dinner which was now scheduled for Christmas Eve, ensuring the Americans would all miss out on their holiday at home.

I agreed to sit in with the businessmen to demonstrate USG interest in seeing the two sides reach agreement and to provide any last minute suggestions to help the Americans. The Chinese officials knew what they were doing, they knew exactly what they were doing. They knew the American team wanted to get out of there and wanted to go home for the holidays, but they had strung them down to the wire. The senior US businessman made the last little concession the local officials felt was needed to make the municipal government satisfied and we concluded the agreement somewhere around 8:00 pm and adjourned for dinner and a few well earned maotai toasts. The U.S. businessmen didn't get out of town until Christmas Day and by the time they were back in Massachusetts they only had the New Year's Holiday left to enjoy with family and friends. But, that was the way the Chinese would work and do business to exploit their leverage.

And, it didn't make any difference whether it was Americans or other nationalities coming in. They played the same tricks with Overseas Chinese who would come in to negotiate business deals. Because I had worked in Hong Kong previously, I knew a number of these Hong Kong

entrepreneurs – Li Ka Shing, Gordon Wu, Henry Fok – who came to arrange major investments, primarily in the Guangzhou consular district provinces. The Chinese Merchant Steamship Navigation Company, for example, developed the entire Shekou District of Shenzhen. Gordon Wu had brokered and then built a major power plant to supply the electrical needs of all of the towns and factories in the Pearl River Delta. Then he came to the local authorities to pitch the construction of a super-highway from the Hong Kong border and the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone (SEZ) all the way to Guangzhou. Once that leg was completed, he then planned to build a parallel route that would go down the other side of the delta to the Zhuhai SEZ opposite Macau. When I first heard the idea during my early 1980s tour in Hong Kong I thought this was a ridiculous idea, because there just wasn't enough traffic to justify that kind of expenditure. I used to tease Gordon that he just wanted to get on a big road away from all the traffic in Hong Kong so he could open up the speed on his big Mercedes sedan or on one of his family sports cars. And I suggested the only money he would make would be by ensuring his friends and their high powered Lamborghinis could get out on the road and have a good time. But he was truly prescient. The road concept proved to be a phenomenal success and a big money earner. Gordon negotiated, as part of his concession, the right to collect the tolls for a period of time, as well as the right to develop land at the interchanges and so he then became the new developer for a slew of satellite towns and factories along the edges of this new highway.

*Q: Sounds like the Union Pacific in Southern, going across the continent.*

HARTER: The plan was a fantastic achievement. Gordon was a Princeton educated architect engineer. He was a pioneer in Asia's development of build/operate/transfer power plants. He would sign a contract to build a large power plant and for his investment would receive the right to sell the electricity for a period of time until the contract called for the plant to be turned over to the local authorities. His success on the big plant in Guangdong gave him entree to do similar projects in Thailand and the Philippines. And, his timing for the project coincided with the big burst of growth in the Pearl River Delta with its export-oriented factories and its SEZ investment areas.

*Q: Any more stories, did Hong Kong capture southern China or vice versa?*

HARTER: Li Ka Shing's investments were in land development, industry and hotels. His Hong Kong holding company, Cheung Kong Holdings, was the largest Chinese enterprise in the colony and it dominated land development, warehousing, and hotels. The Hong Kong Hilton down the street from the ConGen was a Li Ka Shing enterprise that the Hong Kong ConGen used all the time to put up visitors. Li rebuilt and modernized the hotel while I was there and then eventually took it down to put up an even larger commercial building because of its prime location adjacent to the Bank of China and the Hong Kong-Shanghai Bank which was the old British standby. Li had come to Hong Kong as a refugee and made his first fortune producing plastic flowers in a small factory in Kowloon. As a refugee from the Communist takeover of China, he might have seemed an odd businessman for the China operations, but Li was above all a businessman and he knew where money could be made.

Henry Fok, on the other hand, had been a long-time supporter of the communists and he had made a good deal of money smuggling items into China during the Korean War. He was on the

U.S. blacklist during the war and for some time afterward. I met him while I was in Hong Kong and had numerous subsequent meetings with his son. All of the top Chinese businessmen ran their enterprises as family businesses with the children expected to follow in the father's footsteps. (At that time, Gordon was the exception because his children were still not even teenagers.) Henry Fok was the investor who built the White Swan Hotel and who did a lot of investment in Fujian Province, his original home in China. Because he also spent time in Guangzhou, he built a whole new wing on the municipal hospital with a cardiac center equipped with all of the latest equipment and foreign-trained Chinese doctors who could take care of all the geriatric Chinese businessmen and investors who were constantly in and out of Guangzhou. The local doctors there were contacts of ours at the Consulate and they were very helpful when we had American tourists with medical problems – the kind you suggested in an early session that became known as “death by duck.” On one occasion I had to take my wife there in the middle of the night because she had developed a terrible case of hives. We wandered around a number of wards in the old section of the hospital before we could find anybody to get us into the more modern cardiac section and it was a real lesson in contrasts. Thereafter, we made sure we had regular contact information for the duty doctors in that part of the hospital.

*Q: American Business comes in and sets up operation there. I'm talking about during your time. And, they finally after a lot of very difficult negotiation set up things. Was that just the beginning of trouble or had the Chinese learned that you don't keep trying to; you know I'm talking about bribes. You don't get labor, you don't, I mean all sorts of things can happen.*

HARTER: Well, for the most part, one of the key elements of my in-briefing for the new businessmen was, be sure of what your partner can do; make sure your partner has some capabilities, not just connections, but capabilities. But, if you decide you're going to have a partner who has no intrinsic-to-the-business capabilities and you only intend to use him for his connections to get things approved, then make sure your agreement restricts his ability to get involved in the management of your enterprise. Finally, make sure the percentages of shared responsibility and profits reflect the work to be done, that you can repatriate profits in hard currency, and that you have an acceptable means of settling disputes. If the partner was a facilitator rather than a participant in the business, it was best to limit his involvement to his collection of a percentage of profits and appropriate fees for his facilitation work. I also warned the businessmen who were taking on partners with existing factories that they had to be firm about hiring workers. The first thing a Chinese partner wanted you to do was to absorb all of its workers. That was a recipe for disaster because most of the workers had very limited skills and didn't do much of anything on the factory floor. Chinese factory workers were way in excess of the needs for any given factory's operational requirements and the amount of redundancy could be as high as 50 or 60 percent. The American businessman had to make sure he had a say in hiring and to emphasize he wanted a new batch of people to train for the new work styles involved in modern manufacturing.

Proctor and Gamble did one of the best investment development programs I've ever seen and I used their experiences as a model and lesson plan for a lot of others. P&G had gotten started before I arrived, though they had not yet started production of the P&G shampoo product that was to start their overall line. They initially partnered with a local soap company and upgraded the local company's facilities so they could begin producing for the local market, getting their

brands more well known, and developing an understanding of how the local market operated. At the same time they were starting to build a factory that would enable them to then produce their own products under better conditions – like a more open plant floor with mechanized conveyor belts moving the product through the production and bottling and packing phases of operations. They had a really good working relationship with this particular partner. The partner got his products upgraded as part of the deal and he helped P&G get permission for local sales of the P&G products. This was a very tricky issue with the Chinese Government because it was always trying to insist on the foreign investors agreeing to export their products in order for China to earn foreign exchange. The Chinese were often also very restrictive on the repatriation of profits. At the beginning this was not a big issue for many of the investors as they were trying to expand their businesses and using up their local currency to do that expansion and pay for factory construction meant corporate money wasn't being spent. But eventually, they all wanted to bring home the bacon and the Chinese made that difficult. I can recall learning of stories of companies buying Chinese products with their excess local currency and then trying to market those products abroad. One big seller during that period was Chinese carpets and I think even P and G at one time or another purchased Chinese carpets as a way of getting profits out of China.

I tried to get other investors as they came in to look at how P and G had set up its investment and to look at how the partnership agreements were worked out. And, Proctor and Gamble was generally pretty good about that. They were willing to let other people know how they had actually gone about doing business. So, they were a big help for people like Avon and Amway when they came in and tried to start their own manufacturing operations. I was there when P and G's first products came off the line in the partner's factory and I was the U.S. official who participated in the new factory dedication with P and G's CEO and other top American officials from the company. I later watched them roll off new product lines including bar soaps and Pampers at the Huangpu factory site. I also spent a lot of time with delegations from GE that were evaluating a variety of investment opportunities for different operating divisions from small appliances and light bulbs to bigger sales promotions for turbines, engines and other such items. When GE finally inked its first deal, Jack Welch came to town with the Italian GE Vice President who succeeded him and we spent some time together discussing business operations in China. I also had the chance to work with a small business investment group that included former Cabinet Secretary Elliott Richardson among its members and I had several sessions and trips to factory sites with him and his partners during this tour.

*Q: Avon is cosmetics?*

HARTER: Right, right. This was another real tremendous breakthrough, because Avon was allowed to do what it has done traditionally in the United States, door-to-door, sales and marketing where individuals basically ran their own operations. Although the original sales operation was to be restricted, initially Guangzhou and a couple of adjacent areas in Guangdong, it spread very quickly through individual initiative. What was most important, it provided a tremendous opportunity for women, and all of a sudden there was a great deal of upward mobility for women in south China.

*Q: As you say this, I can think of a horror of allowing Chinese women who are not known for being passive really when they get going in business things to turn that loose on their fellow*

*ladies.*

HARTER: It was absolutely unreal in terms of how fast they grew. When Avon started out the company brought into Guangzhou what it thought would be a six months supply of products. At the beginning, Avon could only produce a few of the products so they had to bring in supplies from outside to get started. The “six month supply” was gone in a week and a half. The company had to bring in huge quantities of products from other factories outside the country – I think it was mostly from the Philippines – in order just to be able to meet the explosive demand as they tried to get their own production capabilities expanded and producing at a full capacity right from the start. This was very expensive for Avon because it had to pay all the duties on the imported products, exactly what it had hoped to avoid by setting up its own production facilities in Guangdong. But they just couldn’t keep up with demand, particularly after the Chinese ladies decided they could determine the sales zones on their own.

*Q: Well, you’re talking about something that has been a dream of entrepreneurs from outside.*

HARTER: Right. Sell an aspirin or a bottle of coke to every Chinese and you’ve made a million dollars.

*Q: It use to be oil for the lamps of China and all this stuff.*

HARTER: What you had initially for the Avon ladies was a group that was recruited, interviewed and hired by Avon representatives who came out from the states. But, thereafter, the ladies who went out to sell from this first tranche were picking their own sub-dealers and other intermediaries. They had sales staff networks where some ladies at the top of the chain were making as much as three and four thousand U.S. dollars a month from their commissions and sales. These ladies usually did some sales of their own but for the most part they were running a series of other people down below them. I’m not sure this ever would have passed muster with Mao Zedong and Marx and Lenin were surely already rolling in their graves.

Avon, as I said, was originally designed to focus on the Guangzhou area and the Pearl River delta regions down to the Shenzhen and Zhuhai SEZs (special economic zone). So the sales area was originally confined to only a part of Guangdong Province. But, once they were in business, these Chinese ladies went out and bought an airplane ticket and got on a plane with their samples boxes and order forms and all of a sudden they were in all of the big cities of China. Avon products were turning up in Western China among the Muslim tribal areas. Avon products were available in Shanghai almost over night. Avon products were in Beijing, simply because these ladies said, “Why do I have to stay in Guangdong? There’s already a whole bunch of ladies down here selling these products, I’m going up to Beijing where there’s nobody else selling it.” Before long, Avon, was one of the biggest enterprises in all of China. They became so successful that a few years later the Chinese decided this arrangement was getting out of hand as a kind of pyramid program and they forced Avon to sell out, though I believe Avon was able to return and resume operations without the direct sales approach. Basically, I think the pyramid scheme argument was a mask for a Chinese Party decision that there was too much “independence” and lack of control in a direct marketing program.

Others came to China and started this same kind of pyramid door-to-door sales program. The two college classmates who created Amway and the combination of detergent and cleaning products as well as personal care products also came in and set up a factory to produce their product lines and then recruited a sales force to market door-to-door. They had less of an appeal than Avon, because there was a real lack of local competition for the Avon products. For Amway and its detergents and cleaning products, they ran head on into Proctor and Gamble and the big British Unilever group.

*Q: Did you run across problems, I'm not sure where they started, but you know, I think of the triads and the criminal type things wanting to edge in and all that.*

HARTER: Yes, that was a very significant problem but in a different way. You didn't have them trying to get into the business world or trying to extort money for protection. The big item was smuggling luxury goods into China. And then, during the time I was in Guangzhou we had the real start on a large scale of Chinese being smuggled into the United States. There were all sorts of routes and systems involved. Some groups went through Europe or Latin America, with the latter coming up and across the Mexican border. There were groups who came to Canada on transit visas, left the airport and were walked or driven across the Canadian-U.S. border. There were groups brought across the Pacific in cargo containers and then smuggled out of west coast ports. This also meant a big upsurge in false documents, passports, visas, stamps and seals and photos. Government officials connived in the process and for a fee they produced documentation that prospective students would use to submit to U.S. universities in order to gain admission. Faked papers from U.S. universities would also be submitted and the volume of applicants at the windows was such that people got a very short screening. Over time, the consular section interviewers' presumption was that most of the documents they were looking at were fraudulent and the basic interview starting point "prove to me you are not an intending immigrant" had an even more negative take in Guangzhou.

For those who were going to go to the U.S. on a more direct route, this was the way to go. You had to get documents good enough to make it on the plane. Once on board, you simply destroyed the documents or passed them on to a handler who would then recycle them for future use. Then the document-less Chinese would stand in front of the immigration desk and ask for political asylum, just as they had been coached to say when they were preparing to come to America. On the United States end, the enforcement system was, and largely still is, farcical. Someone would be stopped as an undocumented alien, an illegal immigrant. Once they claimed political asylum, they were under the protection of the U.S. courts and they had to be given a hearing. Detention facilities for the illegal aliens were over-crowded and couldn't handle the influx so the illegal alien would be told to return for an interview and hearing in three or four months. At that point, they were gone. They didn't return for the interview and INS didn't have the personnel to go out and look for them.

Since all of this had been arranged for a very healthy fee, most of these individuals became sweat shop slaves, working to pay off their transportation and facilitation debt. Because they were also being charged for their room and board, their debt tended to increase rather than decrease. Young attractive women were recruited or forced into prostitution and drug running. Strong, aggressive males were recruited for drug running and as enforcers to help control the large numbers of

people in the system.

I spent a lot of time talking to people in INS and State and other agencies and for the longest time everybody said, "You can't do anything with this. There's no way we can stop it; we can't turn people around; and we'll just have to do something different." I said, "That's unacceptable. We cannot allow trafficking in human lives. We cannot accept this as a norm. You need to try and take out the criminal element that is making money on this process." And, I actually made enough noise and objections that INS and the Department convened a regional meeting in Hong Kong for the very first time sometime in 1992 to try to determine how to slow if not stop the process. I personally could never understand why the US Government automatically extended the protection of the U.S. Constitution to an intending immigrant who had no documentation just because he or she had managed to reach a US airport. To me, the fact they arrived without documentation indicated they had already committed a crime and therefore should have been immediately subject to deportation. We could have created some system that would have permitted the human rights victim to be screened out of this direct deportation arrangement. But even then that screening system might not have been used very frequently because the human rights activists had usually been successfully interviewed abroad at a US embassy or consulate.

I decided it was simply a question of having to go back to the source of the smuggling efforts and in southern China, the source was generally Fujian Province, the northernmost province in our district. The smugglers were working with relatives from Taiwan, across the Taiwan Straits, because most of the people in Taiwan were of Fujian ancestry. There were Chinese in Indonesia and Malaysia and Singapore who were also originally from Fujian and they were part of the intermediary points that moved the Chinese in stages to the U.S. I took it on myself to start putting pressure on the government authorities in Fujian Province. We started by having the Consular section question the people the Fujian government was sending down to us with recommendations for visa issuance. We scrutinized local Fujian government documents and found many of them were fraudulent. We started putting pressure on them to do a better job of screening the people before they were sent to Guangzhou. The Fujian Government operation was probably the most corrupt of any that I have ever had to deal with. Government officials were getting kickbacks from individuals who wanted to get to the U.S. and they were also working with the people smugglers because many of those being smuggled were Fujian residents. Fujian Province officials invited us to come to the province to work with them and I took the Consular Section chief and sometimes others from that section to Fujian to talk about the issues. Over the course of long meetings, long banquet dinners with myriad liquor toasts, they tried to get us to simplify our scrutiny and to accept their recommendations and referrals but I would not budge and we regularly rejected visa applicants who had been recommended by the provincial authorities.

Actually this reminds me of some local color stories associated with our trips. On one of the early trips I had brought the Consular Section Chief, Bernadette Allen, and the newly arrived Economic Section Chief, Steve Spangler, to Fujian with me to meet with the provincial officials but also to go out into the countryside and see some of the local areas where there were issues of interest to both of those sections. For both Bernadette and Steve, this was their first foray into the Chinese provincial banquet circuit. On this particular occasion, as I noted just a moment ago, the provincial authorities kept us at the toasts and drinking Chinese liquor for some time. When all

the courses had been completed, they took us off to the hotel's karaoke lounge and a private room where we could continue to drink and, of course, sing. Then as the evening wound down, the Chinese officials proposed that I go off with them to write up an agreement on visa issuance procedures. Needless to say we did not reach or even work on such an agreement that evening or at any time during the visit. Aside from the copious amounts of liquor, our hosts had provided us with a rather standard set of dishes for our banquet meal. That was not the case however when we left Fuzhou and went out into the mountainous region to the west of the city. There we were entertained with snake bile liquor, snake soup and a variety of other unmentionable or unrecognizable animal ingredients. Both Steve and Bernadette managed to "hang in there" and upheld the honor of the U.S. side but they remained amazed that this was what I usually encountered on my provincial travels and that I still continued to make the trips.

*Q: In a way there are two different things. One is the fake papers which Hong Kong had been dealing with for, all of a sudden now you are able to get to the villages where these people say they're from. Was the INS able to get in there and your people get in there to the villages. Use to have these books on where was the well of such and such a village and all that.*

HARTER: We actually did get some of our people in there. Sometimes it wasn't quite so easy for the Americans to go and we had to send some of our local employees into more remote areas where the appearance of a foreigner would be a lot more suspicious. We ended up having to do the exact same thing when I was in Vietnam later on, because we found the same smuggling enterprise developing in Vietnam that we'd had a decade earlier in China. The INS people who were in Vietnam in the late '90s and their local employees ended up having to do a lot of those investigations.

One of the issues that we got involved in in Guangzhou, and one that was later to be paralleled in Vietnam, was the start of agency promoted adoptions of Chinese babies. This was another one of those situations where fraud and mismanagement and corruption crept in. There were agencies and individuals in the United States who were unscrupulous. There were government officials and local hospitals and both Chinese and American adoption facilitators who were "buying" and "selling" babies and some were passing on babies that had illnesses to unsuspecting American parents. One of the worst things you can imagine dealing with is someone who has just started to bond with a baby and then is told the baby can't go to the United States because of bad documents or procedures.

*Q: Oh that's terrible!*

HARTER: We had a couple of those cases while I was there. Some of them got nasty and involved lawsuits and Congressional interventions. We also had situations where adopting parents had bonded with the baby, and the baby died in their arms after only a couple of days while they were in the midst of processing the paperwork.

*Q: Where were the babies coming from?*

HARTER: Mostly from the rural parts of Hunan, an inland province, next to Guangdong, but also from Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Sometimes people would get babies from the North,

but most of them were coming out of the South.

*Q: Almost all of them girls weren't they?*

HARTER: They were occasionally some boys, but most all of them were girls, that's right.

*Q: I was in Seoul in the 1970s, Consular General there and we were processing about 5,000 adopted babies a year. However, it worked. I mean, we had anti-fraud procedures in place which seemed to be pretty good checks. The kids were healthy kids for the most part.*

HARTER: Well, you had a different operating environment in Korea. You're able to get around a lot more; you're able to deal a lot more openly in Korea as an American government official than you are in China. So, it was a lot harder to do some of those checks and to verify the paperwork and procedures in the adoption facilities or the hospitals. And, we just simply didn't have the manpower to be able to go out and cover a country as vast as China.

*Q: What about doctors for visas, particularly for the children, but for the others too? Were you able to have a fairly good medical screening system?*

HARTER: Yes, we did. We did pretty good medical screening. We used the provincial facilities in Guangzhou and even did some of our work through the doctors in the special cardiac center I mentioned earlier. They had all the latest equipment and a number of western trained doctors.

*Q: Were you seeing any reflection of all the Chinese who went to the United States to get educated? Were a significant number coming back?*

HARTER: No, not at that time. No, significant numbers were not coming back. The original tranche of students were the so-called "cadre kids," children of the leadership in the government apparatus and the Communist Party. Many of them came back because they were being groomed for Party and Government positions based on their parents' status. After that group of students and as the numbers grew significantly most of the student did not return. I'm not sure that the students intended to stay permanently, but I do believe they intended to spend a significant amount of time in the US after their university studies were completed. At this particular time, there was still not a lot of opportunity for the well-educated Chinese student to succeed in China and so staying abroad meant greater options and the ability to send money back to the family. It was only later, probably around the turn of the century, when the Chinese economy began to generate its own momentum that these Chinese began to return home and the recent graduates of that era didn't stay as long in the US after graduation.

*Q: How about the Taiwan connection in your area?*

HARTER: The Taiwan connection was very big. We had a lot of Taiwan businessmen who came in to work both in Fujian and in Guangdong. They were investors in a variety of seafood enterprises in particular, because they had markets that they had developed in Taiwan to supply Japan. They came in and they set up eel farms, and fish farms, and shrimp farms to raise and process these foodstuffs for Japan. We had a number of Taiwan business people who worked

with Americans to help develop projects. That was also a good cooperation, because the Chinese had certain access on one hand, but then could use the Americans as the intermediary for dealing with the government in a way that, you know, use the influence and the power of the United States. So, it was a good combination between the two. This was particularly evident in the shoe industry, the athletic shoe industry with all the top U.S. brands at one point moving out of Taiwan and South Korea and almost entirely into southern China.

I can recall a particular visit to the Shantou SEZ which is in the northern part of Guangdong just south of the border with Fujian. This was another area that was the home for a significant number of Overseas Chinese and thus a natural area for China to set up as a Special Economic Zone to attract Overseas Chinese investors. On this visit, I was meeting with a Communist Party official who had been in the area for a long time. He was explaining to me that the local farmers outside Shantou were no longer producing rice and they were importing the rice from across the border to meet their needs. I questioned him about this because I knew that farmers liked to produce rice at least for their own consumption because they often thought that the “local variety” of rice was just a bit better than what was produced elsewhere. He agreed, but said it was more important to make money out of the land. He then sketched for me the evolution of the recent year’s investments in different land utilization practices. He said that vegetable production had been the first stage of the farmer’s evolution into entrepreneur status. Those farmers living closest to Shantou or closest to the main highway were the first to make the change. But then when lots of people got into the vegetable business, some of the more prosperous farmers decided to invest in orange trees and other forms of fruit trees. This was good because it brought both a higher return in the local sales market, but it also opened up opportunities for international sales, to Hong Kong and Japan. He didn’t make the obvious mention of Taiwan sales but we both knew that Taiwan was also a buyer of the local fruit. Then, once these farmers were in the international market, they drew the attention of Taiwan and Japan investors who came in and convinced them to convert their fruit tree groves to eel and fish farms, particularly eel farms. This was totally for export and almost exclusively for Japan. While I was there I visited a number of the eel farms and saw how the live eels were shipped in plastic bags of water and air on the flights out of Shantou airport for Japan. There were also a couple of farms which set up their own factory production facilities so that they killed, cleaned, and roasted the eels in a special soy sauce and then shipped them in hermetically sealed pouches direct to the supermarkets of Japan. This was even more profitable than just shipping the live eels to Japan. But I digress, the main story I wanted to tell was how surprising it was to hear this long-time Communist party member talking about ordinary farmers giving up their rice paddy fields for entrepreneurial activity to make more and more money. He never once indicated that this was somehow out of step with communist economic theory. He was just proud of how the people in his district were prospering

*Q: Were relations with Taiwan and Japan, they seem to go up and down. I was wondering whether that was reflected in the business or did that sort of have a life of its own?*

HARTER: During this time period the relationship, I think was pretty stable. There were no big incidents, there were no major defections of pilots and aircraft along the coast, there was no test shelling of a rocket here or there. All of that came much later. Taiwan was only slowly easing out of its Kuomintang domination period into a more pluralistic political system. The

mainlanders were still in control and so Beijing was not so worried about a political system that looked like Taiwanese running Taiwan for the Taiwanese and looking to have an “independent” status for the island. I don’t believe there was any incident or difficulties during that time involving the Japanese. The big disputes about textbooks and the Japanese Prime Minister visiting the shrine to the war dead came at different times.

*Q: What about us on the Consular side, Americans getting into trouble. Was that much of a problem?*

HARTER: We had some, minor issues with Americans in jail or under investigation – usually regarding a business complaint – but nothing significant. Nothing, nothing of major consequence that I can recall, not even anything like the Lisa Wichser case I was working when I was on the China desk.

*Q: What about, say an American gets into conflict with his Chinese partners or something?*

HARTER: That was definitely complicated. There were certain circumstances where Chinese businessmen absconded with certain funds or factory equipment just disappeared. They were also similar cases where the American wasn’t exactly above board. I got complaints from Chinese officials and Chinese business people about a particular American who had promised something and collected the funds for it and never delivered it. We had a few issues like that. But, these were issues where the Consulate and even the US Government had no control and we had to just simply tell the Chinese that it’s a question of caveat emptor, the buyer’s got to be aware of what he’s making an agreement to buy and with whom he is dealing.

*Q: What about, I mean were any Americans in jail?*

HARTER: A couple of times, I can recall where we had an American in jail. I can’t remember anybody being in jail for anything terribly significant. We didn’t have any murders; we didn’t have any rape cases or things of that sort. It was usually drunk and disorderly I guess or bad documents, or expired documents, things of that sort. So, we did have some cases where Americans in jail and our American Citizen Service officer had to visit them periodically.

*Q: Was there much in the way of American men, usually older men arriving to find a bride and that sort of things?*

HARTER: This wasn’t a big industry like it is in some other areas in Asia or Eastern Europe. It was more often elderly Chinese from the U.S. looking for younger Chinese women. But, it was not the same sort of thing you’d have in Thailand or as it would later be in Vietnam. There you had both Overseas Vietnamese from the U.S. seeking a younger, less Westernized woman as well as older Caucasians seeking young brides.

*Q: And some of these were very fake. I mean these were guys that arrived, fall in love at the airport with a young lady and come in the next day to the embassy in order to get married.*

HARTER: Oh yes, to be sure. There were a number of the “love at first sight” occurrences.

There were certain cases of people who showed up in ACS (American Citizens Services) which looked like they were just part of the people smuggling process. Somebody came in and arranged a wedding in order to bring the person to the states, simply for the purpose of immigration. We did certainly have some of that, yes. And, I can recall INS had to look at a couple of those arranged marriages.

*Q: Is there anything else we should cover about this time you were there?*

HARTER: It was again, a very wide open, very entrepreneurial time period for Southern China. They were really getting their teeth into development and growth and very quick to dispense with communist ideology when it came to economics and business. They were averaging during that time period, 18, 20 percent or more growth each year.

I recall Ambassador Jim Lilley coming down to visit a couple of times with the express intent of going out into the provinces to see what the south's economic development was all about. He too was amazed to see what was going on. I recall he was also very proud of his staff in China and he noted how when we went off to meet with provincial and local government officials we all conducted our meetings in Chinese even though the Chinese often had interpreters set up for the meetings. He commented to me that none of his other colleagues in Beijing had similar capabilities among their staffs either in Beijing or in their Consulates.

I guess I should also mention the other Consulates that were in Guangzhou at that time. Once again I organized a monthly luncheon group among the various CG's in town. The group included the Poles, the Japanese, the Australians, the French, and the Thai. The Poles had been there the longest because they had been one of the first to recognize the PRC and because they needed someone in southern China to look out for Polish seamen on the Polish and Eastern European ships that delivered trade goods to and from the PRC.

There was a North Korean office in Guangzhou as well but nobody ever associated with the North Koreans. Even the Chinese officials were a bit stand-offish when it came to the North Koreans. I can recall the head of the Guangdong Provincial Foreign Affairs Office telling me that the North Koreans were into smuggling and all sorts of unsavory activities and that they virtually never came to any official events. I can't recall ever seeing them at any provincial events which involved the consular corps though I did see their dark colored sedan occasionally on the streets of Guangzhou. The Vietnamese also had consulates in Guangzhou and in Guangxi province but these had been closed during the 1979 border war. Toward the end of 1992, the Vietnamese and Chinese resumed the staffing of their respective consular missions and a Vietnamese Consul General appeared. I was the Dean of the Consular Corps at that time and it was my duty to welcome him to Guangzhou and he participated in the last few luncheon gatherings which I attended before leaving China in January of 1993.

The luncheons served as a chance to review general events in the consular district and occasionally to talk about the larger events in China. We also reviewed consular issues and our relations with the Guangdong Government and I recall we made joint demarches to the government on a number of occasions about local policies or to seek better access to government officials. As a result we got an annual group meeting with the Governor of Guangdong and we

successfully resisted the Foreign Affairs Office effort to have us make all of our appointments to see provincial officials through the FAO.

As a result of our “activism”, the Foreign Affairs Office also tried to be more open and provide more opportunities for us to participate in provincial events. One of the most enjoyable was attendance at the annual lychee festival in one or another of the Pearl River Delta municipalities or counties. We’d travel by tour bus to the locale and after the usual ceremonial greetings we’d go out into the orchards where the lychees were being picked. Fresh lychee just picked off the tree is especially sweet and we’d all be covered in sticky juice. After the required farewell banquet, we’d all be presented with big baskets full of lychees to take home.

I guess I should also note that I again assigned the three political and economic officers to cover each of the outlying provinces in our consular district, leaving Guangdong to be covered by everyone. Political and economic officers were to be responsible for all activities in their respective provinces and not just issues in their own cones. This developed a better understanding of the issues and personalities in the provinces. The three officers also were tasked to mentor junior officers who were interested in doing reporting work. Because we had such a large consular section, most of them were first tour officers and not all of them belonged to the consular cone. So, I encouraged them to try to get out of the Consulate and to take some in-country travel. If they traveled in the consular district – and there were some worthwhile things to see and do in the consular district – I told them I would not charge them annual leave if they proposed and I approved an investigative reporting topic that they could complete as a result of their travels. Then, I’d have one of the political or economic officers review and develop their reports for transmission to Washington. Although I guess relations between consulates and the embassy are often a good bit more structured and constrained, we did not have any such limitations while I was in China. We reported directly to Washington without clearing our materials with Beijing. Occasionally, Beijing would ask us to submit some information to assist the Embassy to complete a tasking from Washington, but it was more usual for us to be tasked and to respond directly to Washington.

*Q: Was there concern about, on our part about the environment?*

HARTER: We certainly did have concerns about the environment. We tried to make sure that American manufacturers that went to China paid some attention to that too. We advocated they not just simply export a lot of old systems and old technologies that would create environmental problems. While I was there, there were a number of scandals involving fires in over-crowded dormitories where the companies hadn’t taken the proper safety precautions and hundreds of people died in the fires. Fortunately these did not involve U.S. companies, but people who were working in these factories were often producing directly for the US markets. We tried to encourage American businesses to develop good business operations and practices as though they were in the U.S. and to try to encourage better local conditions for the workers in these factories. It was easier to do with companies that were actually producing products in their own or joint venture factories than it was for those that only involved buying up production or factory output that was owned by another investor. The garment and toy industry largely fell into this latter category. Southern China export industry factories often had sweat shop conditions with poor ventilation, inadequate lighting and safety equipment. These factories often ran all day long

and the successive shift workers shared dormitory beds with those on other shifts.

When I was talking about before about the U.S.-Taiwan partnership, Nike had basically partnered with a lot of Taiwan shoe manufacturers who came in and set up the facilities to manufacture Nike shoes. Some Korean factories also were moved and this occasionally meant there were Korean managers running the factories. Some of these factories were first rate, with good ventilation in the toxic smelling gluing areas and featured well-lit assembly lines with good equipment that protected the workers along the line. Workers wore masks so they weren't inhaling the fumes or the residue of the fabric that floated in the air. But others were 180 degrees opposite and it all depended on the Taiwan or Korean manager/owner. Human rights organizations in the U.S. occasionally would target NIKE or some other manufacturers because of poor conditions for the workers.

A lot of Nike's bad publicity in the late 1990s in Vietnam came about as a result of this sort of situation. The local Nike representative there wasn't paying much attention to the factories in Vietnam and didn't recognize their link to NIKE's image. The Korean and Taiwan-run factories there just got out of hand and I can remember there were charges a Korean manager was involved in beating workers. NIKE didn't have a very good public relations staff at the time and they added to the problem with some inept press releases. NIKE had an overall responsibility to set some basic standards for production and for treating workers but it was certainly difficult to do when they had no control of day-to-day operations on the factory floor. Once again, this was an area where P&G had an excellent reputation and its quality control procedures and its overall worker-owner relationship was outstanding.

*Q: In Summary how would you differentiate the workload at Guangzhou from other China posts?*

HARTER: The obvious difference between Guangzhou and the other China posts was first and foremost our immigrant visa work for all of China and the much higher volume of adoptions we were handling as China adoptions became popular in the U.S. Beyond that, the Consulate General's major operational focus was support for U.S. businesses seeking to get into the China market. As CG, I spent a lot of time advising businessmen and working with them in their dealings with local officials and government-owned factories. Showing the flag, was clearly a commercial endeavor, much like it was when the US first appeared in China in the 18<sup>th</sup> Century and when we established a presence on Shamian Island in the 19<sup>th</sup> Century. It was too bad I didn't have a big sailing vessel since the Consulate building backed directly on the Pearl River.

**DAVID DEAN**  
**Trustee, Board of American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Washington, DC (1989-1995)**

*David Dean was born in New York City in 1925 and graduated from Harvard. He entered the Foreign Service in 1951. He served in numerous posts including Kuala Lumpur, Rotterdam, Taichung, Hong Kong and Taipei. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1998.*

DEAN: Yes. I stayed on the Board of Directors of AIT as a trustee. I had been on the Board since it was founded on the 16th of January, 1979, and I stayed on it at their request when I left Taipei in December of 1989. I was on the Board up until September of '95. The reason I left, as you may know, was because the administration appointed a man named James Wood to the chairmanship of AIT. When I heard about this I spoke and wrote to Winston Lord, who was Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs. I told him I looked at Wood's record and that he had no experience whatsoever in the field of relations with China or Taiwan. This was in '95 mind you, at the time when all of these things were going on that I just mentioned, President Lee's visit to Cornell, the Straits crisis leading up a little bit later to the second military crisis and our dispatch of carriers. It was a critical time. My worry was that the administration, even with President Lee's visit and the repercussions from it, still wasn't paying enough attention to what was happening in our relationship with Taiwan and our relationship with the mainland. I felt that they really were allowing a crisis to come to a head by not paying enough attention to it early on. That was one of the reasons I had spoken to Winston Lord. James Wood was sort of a secondary reason. It was pretty clear to me that they weren't paying any attention to what was going on if they intended to name someone without any background to the job.

*Q: Was he a political appointee?*

DEAN: Yes. They didn't use the normal procedure to get him in. Apparently it was some deal between Moose, who was Under Secretary for Administration and the White House Personnel Office. It later turned out that Wood had gone over to the White House for the last couple of years and was camping out in the White House Personnel Office, trying to get them to appoint him to something.

*Q: Who was he?*

DEAN: I don't know. He was a lawyer from Arkansas or something, but he had worked in the State Department and in FBO and in diplomatic security. His boss in diplomatic security had called me when he heard about this, and said you don't want someone like that because I had to fire him for lying. Furthermore he caused trouble over properties that diplomatic missions might have in Washington DC, more trouble with the DC officials and with the embassies than you could imagine. All of these things had to be swept up after him. I had this call and a couple of others from employers about him. I didn't want to protest on the basis of his own personal record. I figured the Department should know that, but I based my letters on his lack of background in the area and also on the belief which I had spoken earlier to Holbrooke when we started the operation that it was important to have a Foreign Service officer there who was at least amenable to discipline, knew what the rules were, took orders from the Department and tried to carry them out, and didn't try to create an independent foreign policy. I didn't put all of these things in my letters, unfortunately. Maybe I should have. I sent letters to Winston Lord and Tarnoff, who was the Under Secretary of State then, and to Tony Lake, but the die had been cast. They confirmed the appointment of Wood. Subsequently they fired him about a year later. He kept trying to sue the Department because he felt that AIT should be an independent agency not subject to guidance from the State Department. The State Department lawyers said the whole intent of setting up the American Institute in Taiwan was so that the State Department could use it to carry

out policies toward Taiwan. Anyway, I saw the lawyer's letters passing back and forth. It was a very messy thing. Wood also apparently had been trying to steer Chinese businessmen to a consulting firm with which he was associated. According to Nat Bellocchi, he tried to raise funds for the Democratic National Committee in Taiwan and other things. It just proves that for a job of such sensitivity, you have to get someone whom the State Department can rely on to carry out their own requirements. This is what I tried to say, perhaps inexpertly.

*Q: Well, you said it expertly. These things are usually decided at a political level. Moose was Under Secretary for Management at that time. He was also from Arkansas and the President was from Arkansas. These things happen.*

DEAN: That's right, and I understood that too, but it was unfortunate. I can see things like that happening when you know, you have the case of an Ambassador to London whose only qualifications may be that he speaks English. But you can have a good deputy. But, AIT Washington was a very small office. It has a few people with explicit responsibilities. It doesn't have deputies or DCMs. I'm not talking about Taipei; I'm talking about the Washington office.

*Q: Another question back to the time you were in AIT in Taiwan, What was in it for the Taiwanese government to encourage all these investments in Mainland China?*

DEAN: It wasn't what was in it for the government; it was because we had forced the value of the NT dollar to rise. Wages in Taiwan went up very rapidly. Formerly they had been a big manufacturer of low wage goods like shoes and textiles and things of that type. Now wages were too high; they couldn't manufacture these things competitively, so it was very easy for them to move to the mainland. The mainland welcomed them. They just took their whole machinery and their managers mostly and sent them over to Fujian. They spoke the same Minnan dialect in Taiwan as they do in southern Fujian province, so they were welcomed with open arms, and the wages were incredibly low in comparison. This was a made in heaven deal for Taiwan's manufacturers of shoes, golf clubs, textiles and a lot of other things where low wages would help a lot. As a result, Taiwan itself has been propelled into the high tech area. Perhaps not by our design but by the circumstances, propelled into computers, electronics, the high end of manufacturing where their high wages are not that much of a drawback. The wages there for computer professionals are still less than they are in the States. They prospered from their factories on the mainland, and they prospered from their new high tech factories in Taiwan.

*Q: Did you have any concern at that time about this development?*

DEAN: I don't think any of them foretold it. Later on President Lee became concerned about the huge outflow of investment funds as well as factories to the mainland. He is worried that the mainland would have a lever it could use against Taiwan. Already over 20% of Taiwan's exports go to the mainland. They already have a lever. This is to say nothing about the investments that Taiwan has made, over \$30 billion of investments on the mainland in factories. I think Lee Teng-hui's government is worried and has prevented some very large investments. The Formosa Plastics Group wanted to invest something like \$6-\$9 billion on an island just off Xiamen in a big petrochemical plastics complex. He persuaded them not to do it by offering them more land in Taiwan, some place that they could build there. I think that these big companies will eventually invest heavily in the mainland as time goes on. It is hard to say what is going to

happen.

*Q: What have you been doing since you left AIT?*

DEAN: I thought so highly of President Chiang Ching-kuo that I agreed to become an advisor to a foundation that was set up in his memory. It is an academic foundation that gives grants to colleges and universities to encourage Chinese studies, research and books for publication by university presses, for new faculty positions, for senior scholars and for dissertation grants, things of this type. So, I have been doing that two or three days a week, and I write articles. I have written one recently for a book that is to be published, entitled *Twenty Years After the Taiwan Relations Act*, "a review of U.S. relations with Taiwan." Mine is a chapter in the book and Nat Bellocchi will write a chapter, David Lanx, Jim Lilley, and a few others will also contribute. I have raised funds for a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo. It has been completed by a colleague in the Foreign Service, Jay Taylor, who is putting the finishing touches on the last draft and will send it up to the Harvard University Press shortly. It is a very interesting book; I have read all the different drafts. It is well written, informative, and it goes over many of the things I may have touched on. I hope Harvard will accept it and it will be a popular book.

*Q: During this last time you were with AIT what was the role, you mentioned one thing about Madame Chiang Kai-shek, who was a dominant figure for so long. You mentioned the grey ghost.*

DEAN: That was the "ghost from Shihlin." That is what the Taiwanese called her when she tried to intervene in the election of the Chairmanship of the KMT after Chiang Ching-kuo died. I don't think the Taiwanese hold her in the same respect as history does, as we do for example or as the mainlanders who live on Taiwan do. Several of my Chinese friends journeyed to New York City for her one hundred and first birthday, I think in April. She is looked upon as one of the last great figures of this century. Certainly she was very prominent during W.W.II in terms of Sino-American relations and certainly she will have a place in history. Some young newspaper woman just came by and interviewed me because I knew her quite well in the olden days. She is writing a biography of Madame Chiang Kai-shek. It is hard to get people to say anything, even people close to her because there have been some scurrilous biographies, as for example Sterling Seagraves' book on the Soong dynasty. It was a case in point, sort of like yellow journalism. So, people are afraid to say anything or to be quoted or anything because they don't know how the author is going to slant things. I have gotten involved in writing some articles about the future relationship between Taiwan and the mainland. A close friend of mine, the publisher of the *China Times* in Taiwan, Mr. Yu Chi-chung, a remarkable man in his late 80s, wrote an article about the prospects for a confederation or a commonwealth for China and Taiwan. I wrote a similar article at the same time in 1994 for St. Johns University's conference on Taiwan. Mr. Yu gave his opinion in a speech before the Central University in Taiwan. Subsequently even the former chairman of the oppositionist party, the DPP, Democratic Progressive Party, advocated a British Commonwealth solution for Taiwan and the mainland like the British Commonwealth of Nations. Various others have raised this same issue. Even one of the active DPP legislators, who was an academic before he became a legislator, was thinking of a confederation that might even include other Chinese areas. At any rate, it is an idea that probably would be accepted by us and Taiwan and other countries, but not at this time by China. I think in the final analysis this would

give Taiwan their independence in everything but name, and a commonwealth name is not a tie that binds too tightly, the only objections probably would come from China. China has promoted their one country two systems that they have used for Hong Kong. But the one country two systems idea they have for Taiwan is much broader than the Hong Kong model. It is not impossible for me to see in some future period, 10 or 20 years from now, when China's definition of one country two systems could expand and become suspiciously like the definition for a commonwealth or a confederation. It would solve the problem for everybody and in a way that would be peaceful and without stress to everybody involved. China is a huge place; Taiwan is a very tiny place. It is true that China can use Taiwan's expertise in trade and everything like that, but essentially China has its own problems. I think they don't want to be forced into a confrontation over Taiwan, but they will if they have to. It is the territorial imperative all over again. It is still an interesting and critical issue. I closed my chapter for the book I mentioned by advocating the same thing, a commonwealth of nations or a confederation.

**MARK E. MOHR**  
**Deputy Director, China Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1990-1992)**

*Mr. Mohr was born in New York and raised in New York and New Jersey. He was educated at the University of Rochester and Harvard University, where he studied the Chinese language. After service in Korea with the Peace Corps, he joined the Foreign Service in 1969, and served abroad in Taipei, Taichung, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Beijing and Brisbane. In his service at the State Department in Washington, Mr. Mohr dealt primarily with Far East Affairs. After his retirement he worked at the Department of Energy on Nuclear energy matters. In 1997 he was recalled to the State Department, where he worked as Korean desk officer. Mr. Mohr was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2009.*

MOHR: In May 1990.

*Q: Then what did you do?*

MOHR: I took the job as deputy director of the China desk. I wanted to support our people in China in any way I could, and I wanted to be a part of helping to prevent the bilateral relationship from crashing through the floor. If that happened, I felt it might take generations to get it back on track. One of the reasons, as I mentioned previously, for going to the China desk is that I felt the personnel system had not been as responsive as it could have been to the desires of our people in the field.

*Q: Well let's talk about first about the personnel system, the personnel in broad administrative terms, what was the problem?*

MOHR: I don't really know. Perhaps the China desk was just exhausted from the entire Tiananmen business, and the people there just didn't have the energy to put pressure on

personnel to be more responsive to requests from the embassy. In those days, the embassy would send in daily cables called O-Is, which stood for official-informal communications. They involved the nitty-gritty administrative stuff, including personnel issues. We would send in questions or requests in the O-Is, and often many of our queries would go unanswered. I vowed that when I returned to the desk, every issue raised in an O-I would have a response, even if it was an interim response, within 24 hours.

*Q: Talking about the communications, I represent an earlier era where we used quill pens, and clipper ships. How did it work when you were there? The internet, was that up and running by that time?*

MOHR: This was 1989. There were no cell phones, there was no internet. There were just telegrams, like the O-Is.

*Q: How would an O-I work?*

MOHR: It was a daily cable to the Department, and it involved administrative matters. But it also included substantive matters. For example, we would comment on policy or on requests from the Department to engage the Chinese on some issue or other.

*Q: Would these action messages be screened by the DCM or something to make sure you weren't wasting time?*

MOHR: The screening should have been done by the China desk at State, but they didn't do that.

*Q: You were on the China desk for how long?*

MOHR: For two years, from 1990-1992. As I mentioned, after the Tiananmen incident, the U.S. imposed a set of sanctions against China. All military cooperation ceased, and China's leaders were barred from visiting the United States. The Congress, the media, and public opinion were all critical of this policy. They felt we should be doing more to punish China for shooting the students, especially in the economic area.

A consensus therefore built up to abolish most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status with China. If MFN were taken away from China, Chinese goods into the United States would be taxed at least at double the going rate. If that were to happen, China's trade with the U.S. would be destroyed. As trade with the U.S. was the engine of China's economy, the damage to China would be considerable, and this would probably have set back bilateral relations for decades. Thus, the task of the China desk post-Tiananmen was to preserve MFN for China. President Bush actually told the State Department directly that the China desk was to focus on preserving MFN for China. The basic threat came from Congress. There was a majority on the Hill to take MFN away. Our goal was to find 34 opposing votes in the Senate, enough to sustain a Presidential veto when the legislation passed to remove MFN from China. .

Our task was formidable. Both houses passed the legislation, and after much lobbying we succeeded in sustaining the Presidential veto by one vote; I repeat, one vote. It was a turning

point in the history of the relationship, and I don't think either political scientists or historians have appreciated this event. If the vote had gone the other way, we estimated that 10 million jobs would be lost in southern China alone within 3 months of the removal of MFN. China would have suffered severe long-term economic damage. Those within China who never wanted to normalize with the U.S. would have been vindicated. They would have argued that the U.S. never wanted to see China strong and prosperous, that we always wanted to keep China down. In that case, these persons in China would have been put in charge of the bilateral relationship, and China, just like in the 1950s and 1960s, would have taken a posture of regarding the U.S. as an enemy, allying with nations with similar views. Just imagine the problems today if China were supporting Al-Qaeda, or if China were allowing Al-Qaeda bases on its territory to train. It's one thing to invade Iraq, but invading China would have been out of the question. Fortunately, nothing like that ever happened, because we won the battle to preserve MFN for China by one vote. I was the head of the task force that accomplished this.

*Q: OK, how did you bring this about?*

MOHR: Basic lobbying. Unfortunately, U.S. business interests refused to support us, even though we were fighting for their interests in trade with China. We're talking about billions and billions of dollars in trade here. Nevertheless, they were afraid to draw the anger of Congress, and the public. The basic argument against continuing MFN ran something like this: China still has the red blood of the students on its hands, but all the Bush administration cares about is the green of money. So U.S. business was afraid, and would not help us. We were left to our own devices. We drew up our arguments for preserving MFN, and would just call or meet with Congressional staff and the leaders of the relevant committees to press our case.

We coordinated our efforts with the Bureau of Congressional Affairs, and identified about 40 Senators who might vote in favor of MFN. Then we just went to work. Hours and hours of lobbying, that's what did it. Nancy Pelosi was in her first term in Congress, and she ran with this issue. She said she had a moral imperative to take MFN away from China. I spoke to her personally several times. I never could convince her, but it was a given that the House would vote to take away MFN. We concentrated on the Senate, trying to get the 34 votes we needed there to sustain a Presidential veto. I will never forget the day the vote was taken. I got a call from Pelosi's chief staffer who said, "You are probably celebrating right now. (Actually, we were). You shouldn't because we got a late start, so now we have a strategy in place from this very moment. We are starting today. If I were you I wouldn't celebrate too much because next year we are going to bring you down, and we are going to take away this odious Most Favored Nation status." Fortunately, his words proved hollow: in the next year, they lost by 23 votes.

*Q: Yes, but by then things had changed.*

MOHR: Yes, but that was a year later. On the day, the staffer really scared me. I mean you work so hard to accomplish this goal, and after just one phone call, you think you are going to have a tougher fight on your hands over the next year, and this time you might lose. After all, on that day, we only won by one vote. It's like doing some huge research paper for school, then your computer eats it, and you have to start all over again. It really was an awful feeling.

*Q: So essentially this is a three-cornered game or something. The House people were encouraging the Senate to block it. It is the Senate that decides this.*

MOHR: The Senate decides when the president vetoes a bill. The House and Senate first passed a bill to remove MFN from China. Then the President vetoed the bill, and the Senate, which of course had passed the bill, now had the opportunity to override the presidential veto. But they needed a two-thirds majority to do so.

*Q: You said Pelosi led the fight from the House. She is from San Francisco, isn't she?*

MOHR: Yes she is, and that is one of the reasons she said she had to get involved, because so many of her constituents are Chinese. But I think this was an excuse. She was in her first term, and this issue gave her national exposure. It launched her leadership career. I would talk to her, she would call me personally and we would argue. I told her I didn't think she was right. I didn't go so far as to say that I questioned her integrity, but I don't think she really cared about the issue. I think she cared about getting her name in the newspaper on a daily basis.

*Q: What about the Senate?*

MOHR: Well, Jesse Helms was chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC). Lucky us. I mean, here we have a Republican president, with a Republican majority in the Senate. The president is passionately in favor of preserving MFN for China, but there is no way in hell that he can convince a majority of his own party in the Senate from voting to take MFN away from China. Ironic, isn't it? And it wasn't as if we had this isolated or irrational policy. Every other major country in the world, the Europeans, the Japanese, the Australians, etc. had sanctions on China because of Tiananmen, but none, I repeat none, had any trade sanctions. So our policy was in keeping, so to speak, within international norms. Of course Congress didn't care about what anyone else in the world was doing. All it cared about was punishing the Chinese leadership for what it did at Tiananmen. But by taking MFN away, it would be punishing the Chinese people far more than the leadership, and the people had been the victims. Another irony was that this was one of the few instances where the Republican leadership in Congress would be taking an act that would hurt U.S. business interests as well, but emotions were just too high. Members of Congress had been so provoked by those T.V. images during Tiananmen that they didn't care.

There is another point I would like to make. Not only did we not have the support of U.S. business in the MFN fight, we didn't have the support of Secretary of State James Baker either. At the time, Baker had presidential ambitions. I think he felt, assuming that Bush would win again in 1992, that he could be a presidential candidate for the Republicans in 1996. I drafted three separate speeches for Baker to give supporting MFN for China. They always were returned to me with something written on the top to the effect of, "Will not deliver." The third time this happened, I went to one of Baker's staffers and asked why the secretary would not deliver the speech. He replied, "Mark, you are so naïve. The secretary does not do losers." I asked him to explain, and he said MFN would be taken away from China, and the secretary did not want to back a losing cause. I got really mad, and said that so long as Baker took his paycheck from the Treasury, he was secretary of state, and he had a duty to act like one. The staffer just chuckled.

The real reason for Baker's inaction was that he didn't want to anger Congress, and bring the media down on his head, in defending MFN for China. This, he felt, would damage his chances to run for president after Bush's (assumed) second term. I often wondered why the President ordered the China desk to defend MFN, but didn't order his secretary of state to do likewise.

*Q: Of course this happens again and again with such people. There is nothing like presidential ambitions to screw things up.*

MOHR: Right, secretaries of state shouldn't have presidential ambitions, except if you have the abilities of a Thomas Jefferson. So it was one of the things that really disappointed me. Baker wouldn't support us. The U.S. business community wouldn't support us. But we won anyway, and MFN—and the bilateral relationship—was preserved.

*Q: What about the embassy of China? How did it work from your perspective?*

MOHR: The embassy couldn't help. They were considered poison, any Chinese government official was.

*Q: Didn't they have any clout or influence on the Hill?*

MOHR: Then? No, they were just members of a country that was universally reviled. They were treated like lepers. Also, at that time, they didn't have any office in their embassy that dealt specifically with Congress. It was not until 1994 that they established a unit in their embassy to deal with the Hill. Although their first diplomatic office was set up in 1972, and an embassy in 1979, the Chinese were so ignorant of our political system that they thought, just as in China, the legislature in the U.S. was just a rubber stamp, and the executive was all that mattered. Although we constantly tried to persuade them of the importance of Congress, they wouldn't listen, that is, until 1994.

*Q: This has always been a problem with embassies. When people first arrive they think that their main contact point is the State Department. The main contact point should be the media and Congress.*

MOHR: And the NSC.

*Q: Yes, I recall interviews that I have had revealing that the difference between Pakistan and India was that the Indian embassy would only come to somebody of comparable rank, maybe an assistant secretary, whereas the Pakistanis would get right down to the lowliest desk officer and cultivate that person. It showed, because the Indians were very hyped on protocol, and that is not what you want. You have got to reach out all over the place. Who was the assistant secretary for East Asia?*

MOHR: In 1990, it was Richard Solomon. He knew Baker's opinion concerning the issue, so he focused his attention on Cambodia. Ironically, Solomon had a Ph.D. in Chinese studies. Have you talked to Solomon?

*Q: Yes I have.*

MOHR: What did he say? Well, it will be interesting to read what he said.

*Q: You can pick it up on the internet. My interview with him is on the internet.*

MOHR: Where on the internet?

*Q: You Google frontline diplomacy and then go to the S. It will be there. Now as I did those interviews, the earlier ones, they were not obviously as detailed. Perhaps I didn't get into his views on MFN. Maybe I didn't get to this interesting point.*

MOHR: I agree it will be interesting, because I am sure he was aware that the President had given it top priority, but he spent the majority of his time on Cambodian issues. His principal deputy assistant secretary, Desaix Anderson, on the other hand, was very supportive of our efforts to maintain MFN for China.

*Q: Did you have much to do with the White House and the NSC?*

MOHR: Not me personally. Kent Wiedemann, who was my boss, the office director for Chinese affairs, had daily contact with his NSC counterpart, Doug Paal. They spoke every day over the phone, usually from about 5:30 p.m. to 6:30 p.m., so there was daily contact between the desk and the White House.

*Q: Well, could the president do things? Was he on the phone to the Congress, particularly the Senate?*

MOHR: I would have to assume that the President called many senators and lobbied personally. I know for a fact that he was engaged heavily on this issue. Being a former head of the U.S. liaison office in China, President Bush had a good background and a good feel for the bilateral relationship. He really cared. It's funny, because in a way, the President was the real head of the China desk. We on the desk really didn't have much support within the building, but in the end it didn't matter, because we had the support of the President.

*Q: Were the Chinese understanding of the problem and repairing things; were they cooperating on trying to show that?*

MOHR: Well they didn't shoot anybody else. So I guess that was a positive. The way the Chinese saw it, they didn't do anything wrong. There had been a challenge to their regime, and they beat it back. They felt it was no one else's business. They were fairly outraged that we decided they had done something wrong and imposed sanctions on them. The President publicly called for them to apologize. That was never going to happen. So we maintained our sanctions, and they continued to criticize us and refuse to do business with the U. S. embassy.

*Q: Well you must have made a trip or two to China didn't you?*

MOHR: No, there was no point. Not in the years following Tiananmen. It was a stalemate, and I was too busy trying to preserve MFN for China. It was a full time lobbying job.

*Q: So you did that for two years?*

MOHR: Yes, there was agreement within the U.S. government that if we could preserve MFN, the Chinese would see that, despite the sanctions, we meant them no real long-term harm, that we valued the bilateral relationship and wished to maintain it.

*Q: Were the Taiwanese trying to screw up the works?*

MOHR: Not that I recall. I think the Taiwanese were afraid that a rupture in relations between the U.S. and the PRC would only create more tension in the Taiwan Strait and in the long run harm them as well.

*Q: Well if you had horrible relations it could mean that China might use Taiwan as an external enemy or something.*

MOHR: But you need to recall that in 1987, there was a big breakthrough between China and Taiwan. China agreed to allow Taiwanese to visit the mainland for the first time, and the government on Taiwan agreed to let their people go visit. So China and Taiwan had begun a process of opening up, and neither side wanted Tiananmen to affect that. As a matter of fact, while tourism from Western countries dropped over 90 percent in the year following Tiananmen, Taiwanese tourism continued unabated. I talked to some Taiwanese tourists, and they confirmed to me that they were not afraid one bit. In their opinion, Tiananmen had nothing to do with them.

*Q: How about say the British and all that? Did we have much contact, did you have contact with the other embassies?*

MOHR: Well as I said, the British were among the few serious China watchers in the diplomatic community, but we didn't have a lot of contact with them. However, we would occasionally discuss what we thought was going on in China with them, the Japanese, and the Soviets.

*Q: When you were back in Washington did you ever talk to the Russians, I guess they would be the Soviets still, or the British?*

MOHR: No, we were just too busy. We put in over 12 hours a day working on MFN and other issues in the bilateral relationship. Occasionally, foreign embassies would come in to ask about the state of U.S.-China relations, but that was about it.

*Q: Again, at the level of the Secretary, there was little contact.*

MOHR: Yes, as I said, Baker just didn't want to get involved. But fortunately for us, and for the state of the bilateral relationship, the President did.

*Q: Well how about the second year you were there. What was that like?*

MOHR: It got a little easier. As I said, on the first MFN vote, we only won by one vote. By the time of the second MFN vote, we garnered almost a majority, and we only needed one-third plus one.

*Q: OK, after two years, were there any developments other than the MFN?*

MOHR: That was pretty much it. The second year was much easier, much less stress. Then, I needed to focus on my next assignment. Traditionally, the deputy director of the China desk is an FSO-1, a rank equivalent to a full colonel in the military. The pattern usually was that the deputy director, on next assignment, goes to Beijing to be the political counselor. This is a senior foreign service job, and after two to three years in the job, the incumbent always had been promoted into the senior foreign service. The only problem was that I was exhausted. Two years working on the INF treaty, the last year working 16 hour days; two years in China watching things blow up and people getting shot; two years in Washington worrying day and night about MFN. I needed a rest, and being political counselor in Beijing, especially during those times, was a very stressful position. I thought about it for a long time, and instead of making a move to advance my career, I made a move to shore up my mental health. I did not apply for the job of political counselor in Beijing. Instead, I chose the position of U.S. consul in Brisbane, Australia.

**ROBERT GOLDBERG**  
**Economic Officer**  
**Hong Kong (1990-1993)**

*Mr. Goldberg was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland and educated at Gettysburg College and the University of Chicago. He accompanied his Foreign Service wife on her assignment to Tokyo before entering the Foreign Service in 1983 as Foreign Service Officer. A Chinese language specialist, Mr. Goldberg served both in the State Department of State in Washington, DC and abroad dealing primarily with Economic and Chinese affairs. His overseas posts include Tokyo (as spouse), New Delhi, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Beijing, where he served twice, once as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Goldberg was interviewed by David Reuther in 2011.*

*Q: While you are in language training changes are taking place in China. You have got Tiananmen Square, the European and American reaction. Scowcroft makes two trips to China to try and coordinate how the two countries are going to work their way out of this. So by the time you are in Hong Kong then as econ officer, Hong Kong reporting is probably pretty important to try and figure out what is happening in China at that time from let's see, you probably arrived in June of 1990.*

GOLDBERG: That sounds about right, June or July 1990. My predecessor was Bob Wang who was my successor in Beijing as DCM and who is there now. That is an interesting story in itself. Scott Bellard was the senior China Watcher. I worked for him; and Gil Donahue was the

political/econ chief. We didn't have that many people doing reporting. Starting in the mid-80s, much of what was coming out of Hong Kong was commentary on what was going on in the mainland – we weren't first with the story, but we were pretty good at providing texture to the story.

I had some interesting contacts. The most interesting one was the secretary general of Xinhua, the news agency which was running Hong Kong for Beijing. He was reputed to be China's spymaster in Hong Kong. At my first meeting with him, he came right out and said, "A lot of people think that I am a spymaster. That is not the case." These meetings were always very interesting because he spoke in a very thick Cantonese accent which was very hard for me to understand, so he brought along a very polished person whose mandarin was impeccable and who at times had to translate from accented Cantonese Mandarin into Mandarin and occasionally slip in an English word. A lot of the work I did wasn't really mainland watching per se but was looking at the mainland's penetration of Hong Kong. So I did a series of reports on mainland companies in Hong Kong and what they were actually there to do. We had the ability to actually go in and talk with directors in the companies. Scott and I would go out together and meet with people who traveled to the mainland frequently and wrote prolifically like Willy Wo Lop Lam and Ching Chung. Ching had been red guard cultural revolutionary in Hong Kong, and he was then editor of one of the more interesting magazines being published there. He was subsequently arrested on the mainland for spying or getting access to information that he shouldn't have. I guess he was imprisoned for three or four years.

*Q: We were talking about contact work. Contact work is the bread and butter of any post overseas. When you arrived did you have a hand off with your successor?*

GOLDBERG: Bob Wang was very generous in terms of introducing me to a lot of his contacts. I understood these people had their own agendas in terms of dealing with us, and one in particular was kind of interesting, given his association with Wang Yungching of Formosa Plastics who was thinking about building a major plastics project in Fujian province. I spent a year or so meeting with this guy every couple of weeks to talk about what was going on. That project never came to fruition.

Another major area of interest was what the Taiwanese in Hong Kong were up to and how they were facilitating economic contacts on the mainland. I was close to people who in Taiwan business associations in Hong Kong and spent a fair amount of time chatting them up. At that point Hong Kong was also moving all of its textile factories to the mainland and the Taiwans were cooperating with Hong Kong companies to access mainland labor, land etc. We couldn't compete with what was being churned out on the mainland, but we had some significant areas where we could make a contribution in terms of understanding south China economic integration.

We talked with a lot of American companies as well. The Amcham or American Chamber in Hong Kong was a very important window for many American businesses seeking access to the China market.

*Q: You were saying that the Chinese companies were coming in to Hong Kong. Was this also the*

*time that Chinese provinces set up offices?*

GOLDBERG: Oh sure. Some of them had been set up before I got there, so I spent a lot of time with Guangdong and Guangzhou company enterprises, Fujian and Fuzhou enterprises; provinces and cities I traveled widely in when I was Consul General in Guangzhou. These companies were pretty successful in Hong Kong. None of them could compete with China Resources or China Merchants that had been in Hong Kong for many years.

*Q: My impression was that one of the reasons for having the provincial offices in Hong Kong was to begin to educate the provinces in what was available and how the trading/capitalist system worked.*

GOLDBERG: You would like to think that was the case. Maybe it was, but when I would have conversations with these companies it was all about the deal and about the money. Twenty years on, there is obviously a lot more sophistication about how you talk about these things. But 20 years ago, we were dealing with a lot of fairly unsophisticated people who clearly didn't understand how markets worked.

*Q: Now were you there when Deng Xiaoping made his southern trip which is always described as the first time that reform had gotten back on track.*

GOLDBERG: Yeah, I was in Hong Kong. Anytime Deng appeared somewhere and made pronouncements, it was noteworthy and you took a close look at it. We talked with our contacts in Hong Kong and their message was: watch this page carefully and see what happens.

*Q: Could you give a broad brush coverage of the depth and breadth of the contacts you were meeting with during your time there?*

GOLDBERG: Well, as I said, Chinese companies based in Hong Kong were a very significant part of the portfolio. The Taiwan companies and Taiwan associations gave us some pretty good insight into what eventually became a major concern of the Taiwanese companies and the Taiwan government's concern about the hollowing out of Taiwan's manufacturing. Before I even started my job at the Hong Kong consulate, after language class was over and before my family was settled, I went back to Taiwan for three weeks and did a paper on Taiwan companies going to the mainland; I met with a lot of the companies that I subsequently dealt with in Hong Kong. Contacts that I first made in Taiwan carried over to the mainland. There were obviously American business companies with which we talked. We always went to the left leaning magazines because they were far better than the right leaning magazines on mainland policy. We would see Wen Wei Bao journalists who were mainland directed. We also talked with Ming Bao reporters who were pretty objective. Apple Daily was pretty good but reported a lot of rumors that were made up out of whole cloth. Then I made several trips to Guangdong Province and Fujian.

*Q: Now when was that? When did you do that trip?*

GOLDBERG: The first one was in 1991 and took several days. The second in 1992 sometime.

The 1992 trip was from one side of the Pearl River delta trip to the other, from Zhuhai up to Guangzhou and then to Shenzhen. Nowadays you can drive from Shenzhen to Guangzhou in three hours or take the train to Hong Kong in 2 ½ hours. The highways and the infrastructure are superb today, obviously designed so manufacturers can get their goods to ports or railroad stations.

The 1991 trip actually was more important than the 1992 trip because I met someone at the Taiwan Center at Xiamen University who put me in touch with the Xinhua source that was so important in my reporting.

*Q: And I would think the PAO has another set of contacts with journalists, movie...*

GOLDBERG: Absolutely. Later on as we moved closer to reversion, decisions were made that the real value-added in Hong Kong was the story of emerging Hong Kong democracy and Hong Kong's ability to retain its independence.

*Q: When did the reversion discussion start? I forgot.*

GOLDBERG: The British discussions? In the early 80s. The final decisions were made in the mid-80s. The Brits had always sent out as Governor of Hong Kong a Mandarin type who had significant China background. When we got there David Wilson was the senior British official, and then the last year I was there Chris Patton arrived and totally changed the conversation with the mainland. You may recall Patton saying he would not go to Beijing before he gave his state of the Colony or State of Hong Kong address and that really angered mainland officials. It took them a long time to get over it. They saw Patton as a latecomer who after a hundred years of British rule in Hong Kong was now insisting that Hong Kong deserved more democracy. The Chinese accused him of being anti-Chinese.

Patton rarely backed away from his efforts at pushing the envelope on democracy. I went as note taker to Dick Williams, our Consul General, on his first interview with Patton. It was fascinating. You were just bowled over by the intellect of Chris Patton, and Patton was happy to talk – and be admired. He was probably as smart as he thought he was, but he could have done a better job of stroking Chinese sensibilities. Regrettably, Patton didn't do that. I saw Chris Patten one other time, again as a note taker for some delegation. They too bought into the Chris Patton line about democracy and how we had to further democracy in the run up to reversion.

*Q: The Chinese thought they were inheriting a colony and Patton turned it into a Trojan horse.*

GOLDBERG: The Chinese thought that the "one country two systems" was the solution to all ills. And I think they understood that they approached reversion, people would recognize the need to accommodate Beijing's needs and requests and they would even start self-censoring so Beijing did not have to do it itself. But the couple of times I had serious discussions with people in Hong Kong after I left, they told me that they were wary of discussing their private worries publicly.

Many Chinese we talked to saw a British betrayal of an implicit contract with Beijing – to be

stewards of Hong Kong and turn it over pretty much as it was, not with a fervor for promoting democracy over the last four years before reversion. You have to remember David Wilson and the people who preceded him were well acquainted with China's way of doing things and were just in a waiting pattern for reversion. Patton's mission was different; it was how do you provide some sort of representative government infrastructure that allows the people of Hong Kong to have a voice. It was too late. It really was; it was far too late. Again, I think the Chinese believed Patton did not understand China's broader national interests. Part of that was the desire for one China, two systems to work and be seen in Taiwan as a way of eventual reunification.

*Q: Now you were in Hong Kong and the administration in Washington changes. Did that have any particular impact on staffing or...*

GOLDBERG: No, not really. Staffing wise we have always had a professional as the consul general in Hong Kong. When Dick Williams left, Richard Mueller came in as consul general, but I was there for only a couple of months before heading back to the states. Everyone was thinking about what size staff and what issues we needed to consider with reversion – the creation of the modern Hong Kong Consulate, if you will, came with Richard Boucher who made the key decisions about issues the consulate should report on. Staffing-wise, the eventual drawdown wasn't really as great as you might think. By the time you get to 1997, we had gone from a defense attaché system to a liaison office staffed by military out of uniform. People in other agencies who watched China out of Hong Kong were starting to move those slots to the mainland. But that was a gradual process that took place over a decade. When I was desk director and making decisions about eliminating jobs in Hong Kong and putting them on the mainland, I experienced how bitter and drawn out these bureaucratic fights could be.

*Q: Now wasn't the senior military person assigned to Hong Kong while you were there a naval officer?*

GOLDBERG: Right because in Hong Kong, the main military function is to handle ship visits. Hong Kong is a major port of call for R&R [rest and recreation]. We used ship visits to attract Chinese officials to vessels for tours. It was a fairly substantial office, but after 1997 it was reduced in size. Our defense people in Hong Kong were also actively traveling to the mainland to look at the south China military regions. They had to notify the Chinese about the places they planned to visit; the Chinese followed them pretty closely. The information they collected didn't strike me as particularly significant – lots of license plate numbers, ships in harbor, but I suppose that information in the aggregate was significant to make certain judgments.

**GREG THIELMANN**  
**Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Chief, Office of Strategic Forces Analysis**  
**Washington, DC (1990-1993)**

*Mr. Thielmann was born and raised in Iowa and was educated at Grinnell College and Princeton University. A specialist in Political-Military Affairs, he held a number of positions dealing with such matters as Strategic Proliferation,*

*Arms Control and Missile Programs. He also served abroad at several posts in the capacity of Political Officer and Consular Officer. His last position was Chief, Office of Analysis for Strategic Proliferation and Military Affairs in State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Mr. Thielmann was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2004*

*Q: Yes. It really is amazing. Well, what about China? How did we view China at that time, '90 to '93?*

THIELMANN: What I remember about that era is that it was so difficult for the intelligence community to not use our own model of strategic forces development in thinking about the Chinese. So what I remember from that era was how strong the other agencies pushed in their analytical product for the assumption that China would have many more strategic nuclear weapons within some number of years, that they would have multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles on each of those missiles and that they would be telling policymakers the Chinese are basically going to take off. One of the reasons I remember that so strongly was because I was uncomfortable at the time since we had seen a history of the Chinese being very modest in their nuclear weapons programs. I mean they acquired nuclear weapons, and then they increased their capabilities at a very slow rate. It was nothing like either the U.S. or the Soviet development pattern -- kind of exponential increases in warheads. I remember at the time feeling that I didn't really have enough time as an analyst of Chinese strategic forces to really pound the table too hard on this issue. I remember being skeptical, but these memories came back to me several years later when I reentered the picture and found that lo and behold the Chinese hadn't done any of those things that the majority of the intelligence community seemed comfortable in predicting. But they were still at that same low level of strategic missiles that could threaten the United States.

*Q: Well, as you are looking at this, did you find the normal military assumption of a worst case scenario. You can't say the United States will roll over the Iraqi Army in a matter of days practically. You have to say well, maybe such and such, whatever it is. It's always, you have to plan for the worst case. Was this coming through in the what you are getting out of the analysis people?*

THIELMANN: I think that's certainly part of it, and I'm not as hard as some on the worst case analytical predisposition of the Pentagon. I mean I call it responsible prudent worst case analysis.

*Q: I agree.*

THIELMANN: But that's what they need to do. But that didn't mean that we had to do that. The way I would put it, our obligation in advising the senior State Department leadership was to present them with our best estimate of what was likely to happen and not what could in the worst circumstances happen. I mean we can identify that and encourage people not to forget that this most likely course could be wrong and that it could be even worse than that. But that shouldn't be our headline on intelligence products because that's very misleading. If you end up writing products that use screaming headlines and saying this country could do this when that's a ten percent probability, you've fundamentally misled the Congress and the senior leadership

because they don't read that as being something that's very unlikely. So to me that's the real difference. You do need to look at the worst case, but you also need to have perspective properly presented to the policy makers. So I think what was happening here was a reflection of the natural and understandable instincts of the military side of the intelligence community. But then the irresponsible senior intelligence officials who come up with the community products giving it more weight than it deserves and the kind of presentations that are made. I would also say even for those who understandably should look at the worst case, I don't think there was due deference to what the track record was of China even in that 1990 to 1993 interval. They should've drawn some conclusions from how China had behaved in the 1980s instead of just saying well, of course China could technologically develop independently targeted reentry vehicles. In order to provide the sort of U.S. level of protection of their modest force, there is an imperative they increase the number of warheads. I mean that's the way we would think. We would think you assume the worst of the other side so you have to make sure that you can survive an attack that the other side makes against you. The Chinese obviously didn't think that way because their forces in the early 1990s and certainly in later 1990s were getting perilously vulnerable to a first strike U.S. attack. But the Chinese weren't thinking the way we were about that because they were obviously willing to accept that kind of vulnerability.

**MARSHALL P. ADAIR**  
**Consul General**  
**Chengdu, (1990-1992)**

*Mr. Adair, son of a United States Foreign Service Officer, was born in Maryland and raised at Foreign Service posts in the United States and abroad. He was educated at Middlebury College and joined the Foreign Service in 1972. During his career Mr. Adair held a number of senior positions at the State Department in Washington, DC, dealing with a variety of areas, including relations with the US military Commands, Economic and political issues in Europe and Department personnel matters. A Chinese language specialist, his foreign posts include Paris, Lubumbashi, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Beijing, Rangoon, Chengdu (China), and Tuzla (Bosnia). Mr. Adair was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2011.*

*Q: Okay, you're off to Chengdu. Now, describe where this is.*

ADAIR: Chengdu is the capital of Sichuan Province, which is in central western China. It's really right in the geographic middle of China, including Tibet. Sichuan Province is very special in China. It is surrounded by mountains. You have the Himalayas on the west; the Hengduan Mountains on the border with Yunnan where the Yangtze River goes through; the Tianshan, Qinling and Dada mountains on the north; and then lower mountains on the east. Sichuan province is essentially a basin through which several rivers flow. The rivers have made that basin a very fertile area. The mountains protected and isolated it from invading armies. It has a mild climate so it's very easy to have agriculture pretty much year round. The fertility of the basin was enhanced by one of the world's first major irrigation projects more than 2,000 years ago. With irrigation Sichuan became a major food producing area. It seems to me that over the long

course of Chinese history different groups, when they were defeated, sought protection in that basin, creating a concentration of civilization there that's special in China.

The weather is unusual because all those mountains, they trap the clouds. The Sichuan basin has a thin layer of clouds all the time and you very rarely see blue sky. It's not dark, just hazy all the time. That also means that it is more humid and damp. That has affected agriculture and that has also affected Sichuan cuisine. One of the reasons that Sichuan's food is so spicy is it's designed to counteract that humid climate. And it's got a very unusual spice that's used almost nowhere else in the world that I have seen: the Sichuan peppercorns. These are not the little Thai spicy green peppers. These are peppercorns that grow on a tree. They have a very pungent, numbing taste and that is specifically useful for getting rid of excess moisture in the body.

Everything about Sichuan is unique. That concentration of different peoples has created the largest and densest concentration of people in China. When I arrived in Chengdu, Sichuan was the most populous Chinese province with well over 100 million people. Technically now it's no longer the most populous province, because the metropolis of Chongqing (Chungking – the WWII capitol), has been broken off and made an independent municipality.

*Q: That's very interesting.*

ADAIR: So Sichuan itself is special and it has a history throughout China of being special in terms of people and culture. We've seen that during World War II it was important in an even larger sense than it had been in some of the other historical times. This was where the government of China retreated to in the effort to fend off the invasion from Japan. The capital was in Chongqing with armies throughout Sichuan and Yunnan. That was their redoubt, and we helped them out. We put the B-29's and the Flying Tigers in and around Chengdu and down around Kunming in Yunnan Province.

After World War II and after the Chinese civil war, when China was becoming so isolated during the Mao Zedong period, they also moved some of their strategic industry away from the coastline and into the interior. A certain amount of it went into Sichuan. So it continued to be a strategically important and strategically sensitive area.

*Q: What was its relation to Tibet?*

ADAIR: Well, first of all, it borders on Tibet. Secondly, what is now Sichuan Province includes not just the central Chengdu plain that I was describing, but the easternmost part of the Himalayan mountain range. That part used to be part of the Tibetan Kingdom. It was called Kham in our transliteration. Today, it's a part of Sichuan Province. It is not included in what China calls the Autonomous Region of Tibet. So, Sichuan Province borders on Tibet, has a portion of what used to be Tibet included in it, and, when I was there, it was the principle place from which one left to go to Tibet. That was the flight path - from Chengdu into Lhasa. There were land routes that went in from Qinghai and Yunnan, but most short-term visitors to Tibet would go from Chengdu.

In the foreign affairs structure of our embassies and consulates, Tibet was placed in the consular

district of the consulate general in Chengdu. Back in the mid 1980s, when we negotiated the consulates in China, I think the two that were of primary importance to us were Shanghai and Guangzhou. The third was Chengdu. Then we established one in Shenyang, which was up in the northeast. We also negotiated agreement to establish a consulate in Wuhan, which is in the industrial center of China. However, we never opened that one because of budgetary shortfalls.

*Q: Well you were there from when to when?*

ADAIR: I arrived in January, 1990, and left in July, 1992.

*Q: So what was the situation in that part of China at the time? Had things at Tiananmen left an impression or was it sort of business as usual?*

ADAIR: No. Tiananmen definitely left an impression. It was fairly tense. It was tense all over China after Tiananmen. We had a difficult relationship because the United States had so openly disapproved of what the Chinese government did in Tiananmen Square. Things were especially tense in Sichuan and in Chengdu. I was told when I was in Sichuan that the Chinese government was not surprised by the expression of dissent that manifested up there in Beijing. What they were surprised by was that the strongest manifestation of it was in Beijing. They were actually expecting it to be in Sichuan, in Chengdu. I don't know to what degree that's true, but Sichuan traditionally has been a problem for the central government of China. It has always been unruly. It has always maintained a sense of independence, and the people in Sichuan are quite volatile. The central government therefore expected trouble in Sichuan. There were serious demonstrations in Sichuan, the most serious after Beijing.

*Q: Well had the Chinese kept non-Sichuanese troops in Sichuan?*

ADAIR: My understanding is the Army of the Peoples Republic of China is not local. Military personnel are moved around regularly. That lesson was learned that a fairly long time ago – actually that was true during imperial times as well.

*Q: How big was the consulate and what were you up to?*

ADAIR: Let's see, we had five American Foreign Service Officers, and one Foreign Service Secretary; so there were six official Americans with families and about 20 to 30 Chinese staff. We didn't have our own building. Our offices and our residences were the Jinjiang Hotel in Chengdu. We had an entire wing of the hotel. The offices were on the ground floor and then we had rooms to live in on the next two floors. It was a fairly high profile operation. Everybody knew we were there. There was only one other consulate in Chengdu at the time, and that was the consulate of Nepal. They were there part-time. Our job was to represent the United States, to get to know as many people as we could, to understand what was going on out there, to have a dialogue, and to provide services to the officials and the population in terms of visas and information on the United States.

*Q: Well, what were your main activities? I would imagine the visas must have been busy.*

ADAIR: The visa section was very, very busy. There was one consular officer and there were always people waiting. That was really hard. The consular officer had the most stressful job of all - and that was true for China in general. There were just a lot of people that wanted visas, and not a lot of people met the criteria that had to be met in order to give non-immigrant visas. It was just too difficult for many people to prove that they wouldn't stay in the United States.

*Q: Yes. Well I saw something in the paper, I think yesterday, saying that for students, Chinese students coming to the United States, it's very difficult because they seem superb on paper but are not always what they are cut out to be. In other words there's, you know, considerable fraud.*

ADAIR: There may be. Chinese students have to show that they're able to pursue study in the States. They have to show that they're able to pay for it. They have to be accepted, of course, into a college in the United States. Now there are lots of places in the United States that are willing and able to present documentation saying that they will accept Chinese students. There is also lots of money that's available to support them, from overseas Chinese, from organizations in the United States, from the Chinese government, and increasingly now from people in China. Many Chinese students are extremely qualified. Many also have insufficient English language. They have to pass the TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) exams, of course, but even then consular officers have to talk with them to make sure that they actually can speak and understand. It's amazing that young Chinese can learn as much English as they do but some of them still don't have what they need. Some of them are just too scared when they get to the consulate, and appear more inarticulate than they are. They are also not sure what they should say and what they shouldn't say there, because they've dealt with bureaucracies all their lives.

Then there is the crux of the difficulty for our whole system, and that is the determination whether they intend just to go to the United States, study and return – or whether they intend to remain indefinitely in the United States.

*Q: You know, as an old consular officer, my feeling was hell, the students don't know whether they want to stay.*

ADAIR: I agree.

*Q: I mean, that's that period in life when it depends on what cards are dealt to them at the time.*

*Did the Sichuanese who were going either to be students or just to visit have a particular area or areas they were headed for in the States?*

ADAIR: Neither geographic nor substantive as far as I recall. Also, it was not just Sichuan. We had people from Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Tibet in our consular district. All had to apply in Chengdu for their visas.

*Q: How stood things in Tibet? It must be a difficult issue to work on. I was driving behind a car yesterday which had a license plate engraved with "Free Tibet." That was sponsored by one of the states around here. How did you deal with that sort of thing?*

ADAIR: That's a huge issue. First of all, we as a nation have always wanted to support freedom and self-determination for other people around the world. We believe that people should be able to define their own nation, determine their own form of government and express themselves and their culture. We want to be able to support that. Second, Tibet is an intriguing and romantic image for us. It's a colorful and exciting mountain kingdom far away; it's Shangri-La, it's what "Lost Horizons" was written about.

*Q: By James Hilton, yes.*

ADAIR: Yes, and when you see the people, they're striking. They're beautiful, colorful, dynamic, and energetic. There is so much there that we like and admire. On top of that they have a mysterious and intriguing culture. Tibetan Buddhism with all of its bells and whistles (literally) is intriguing for a lot of us. In addition, this mysterious and intriguing culture was invaded and suppressed by a larger neighbor; one that we were once taught to revile and see as the ultimate extremist and inhumane enemy. Not that long ago, the Chinese communists were painted as the most evil, dangerous threat to the world ever. The combination of all those things made it almost impossible, I think, for Americans not to want to support Tibet. We made it a cause; we almost had to make Tibet a cause. It's a part of our psychological makeup. We would have done the same thing to support some of the Indian cultures out in the western United States - if we hadn't been the ones that were actually destroying them.

*Q: Yes.*

ADAIR: So, it's almost a given that Tibet is going to be a subject of interest, intellectually and emotionally, for Americans. We had to deal with that. I have to admit that I was one of those Americans interested in Tibet for all of those reasons. That's one of the reasons I wanted to go to Chengdu. We also had to deal with the fact that Tibet is extremely important to the Chinese government. The United States accepted long ago that that Tibet was a part of China. When we recognized the PRC in 1979 that was no longer an issue for us – in terms of foreign policy. Nevertheless, we had opposed the invasion and the forcible imposition of PRC control. Since we did not recognize the PRC at that time as the lawful government of China, that position was not difficult to take. We went further, and clandestinely tried to help Tibetan freedom fighters oppose that invasion and control. The CIA had provided support to Tibetan resistance fighters in the 1950s and we certainly gave them moral support for decades. But now we are faced with the reality that we recognize the PRC as the lawful government of China and that Tibet is a part of that China. We recognize it, and so does most of the international community. I could go into in much more detail but I don't think we want to here.

It was a real challenge for the consulate and for me personally. Tibet was part of our consular district and we were responsible for all aspects of U.S. foreign policy in that area. We did have human rights concerns. We believe as a nation that concern for the human rights should be part of our foreign policy and part of our relationship with other governments. It is our policy to promote respect for and protection of human rights in all countries. Therefore, it was a part of our dialogue whenever we dealt with Tibet – whenever we visited Tibet. Every time I went to Tibet I had a list of people that we were concerned about. We had reports of people who had either disappeared or been abused or whatever. Sometimes we knew they were being held in

prison, sometimes not. I would give that list to the authorities – to whoever I met with in Tibet - and I would talk with them about it. I would ask them for information, and they would usually give me the standard reply that this was none of our business, that it was the internal affairs of China. I would say of course it's the internal affairs of China, and then I would explain our broader concern with human rights. I would explain the principled part of it, and I would explain the practical part of it. The practical part was that this was the reality of the United States; and that we would continue to make this an issue in our relations. Then I would appeal to them, in the interests of better relations between our two countries, to do the best that they could. They maintained their principled position, and out of humanitarian concern they did come back and give me information on many of those people, which I would send back to the Department.

On one case I actually went and visited the prison in question with the ambassador who was making a visit to our consular district. I arranged for him to visit; we went, we saw the prison, we saw the conditions, we met with individuals, we talked with them and did a full report on it back to Washington. What I saw, though, was that we weren't always helping the cause of the Tibetans, individually or culturally.

When public statements were made in the United States about Tibet, by members of Congress or other notables, these would be heard or read about by people in Tibet. Often this would encourage them to take greater risks. Not too long after something like that happened in the United States, activities would surface on the streets in Lhasa. People would demonstrate and they would get carried away. Then there would be a crackdown and people would get hurt, killed or put in prison. That part was unnecessary. It wasn't helping. It set things back for them. Unintentionally we were often causing problems, I think, for people in Tibet. We were causing them problems rather than helping them.

*Q: Did you have good contacts in Tibet?*

ADAIR: My contacts in Tibet were primarily official. I worked through the foreign affairs office there, which I had to do in all of the areas that I worked. In the case of Tibet, the head of the foreign affairs office was actually a Chinese diplomat who had been assigned to Tibet after his return from Yugoslavia. So he understood the dynamic; he understood the position I was in; and he understood the implications of this for China's relationships with other nations. He did his best to help. He was always available to talk with me. We would have our official meeting, and have fairly extensive discussions. He would try to get me access – to people in the monasteries, to people in the government up there in Lhasa, to economic officials, to prison officials, etc. He got me regular appointments with the governor of the autonomous region of Tibet.

The one person he never got me a meeting with was the party secretary. The party secretary at the time was Hu Jintao, who is now the chairman of the communist party of China and the head of state. But I never got to see him. On the whole the access that I had in Tibet improved. Part of the issue of access was just getting around. Initially when I went up, I was pretty much confined to Lhasa. When I had been at the embassy in Beijing earlier I had managed to make one trip to Lhasa as a tourist and had gone out to the southeastern part of Tibet, but it took me awhile to get to other parts, to get to some of the monasteries.

*Q: Did you find the Tibetans well informed? I mean, were they a savvy bunch or were they provincial?*

ADAIR: That depended on who one was talking with. Some of them were very well informed – like the governor and some of the people in the foreign affairs office. They knew what was going on in China and they were aware of what was going on elsewhere in the world. There were business people and some in the monasteries who recognized the reality of the political situation, but were distressed with certain aspects of it and wanted to find solutions to that. And, then there were monks and other individuals that I met at various times in Lhasa who just wanted the Chinese out at whatever cost. That wasn't an option.

I had one long conversation with a monk in one of the big monasteries who expressed concern that the quality of their religious instruction was declining. He believed the new, younger monks weren't getting the kind of guidance they needed because many of the older monks had fled. That would be a serious problem in any religion but it was particularly serious in Buddhism and in Tibetan Buddhism, because they have to go through not just instruction, they have to go through training. If they don't have people that have gone through this themselves and are wise enough to see where they are in their own spiritual, emotional, psychological make up, it's very easy to get off track. That was a legitimate concern, but they probably weren't going to be able to deal with it effectively.

*Q: This is probably a good place to stop. We'll pick it up the next time'*

*Today is the 8th of November, 2011, with Marshall Adair. Marshall, we were talking about your experiences in your representation in Tibet. Could you set up sort of a permanent office there or was this a no-no or what?*

ADAIR: No, I don't think there was any option to set up a permanent office. I don't think the Chinese would have let us do it, and I don't think that we could have found the money to do it even if they had. It would have been an interesting place to be but I don't know how much it would have helped anyway, really.

*Q: Well to a certain extent the very existence of such an office would mean that you would be constantly petitioned or demonstrated.*

ADAIR: That's right. It probably would have generated more trouble; and that wouldn't necessarily have helped the Tibetans.

*Q: It wouldn't advance any particular cause?*

ADAIR: I don't think so.

*Q: What were your connections, if any, with the Dalai Lama at the time?*

ADAIR: I didn't have any connection with the Dalai Lama; and I didn't have any communication with his people at the time. There was communication off and on, I think,

between some people back in Washington on the China desk but not that much. I had met the Dalai Lama once in Washington on my own, and had pictures of him and Ginger talking together. People in Tibet revered him, and they were ecstatic to receive pictures of him, because they were publicly available in Tibet. We had taken some pictures with us when we visited the first time back in 1985 and the reception was really quite extraordinary. The Chinese officials tried to stop us from passing them out, but they weren't heavy handed about it, at least not at that time.

*Q: Was there a serious liberate Tibet movement in Tibet?*

ADAI: There was serious sentiment for Tibetan independence, but there was no effective organization that I saw. The Chinese government control of it was pretty effective. However, there were plenty of people that were available to demonstrate if the occasion arose.

*Q: How about India? A lot of the monks, of course, ended up there. Was this a significant center of Tibetan activity outside of Tibet?*

ADAI: I don't have any personal experience with the Tibetan community in India so I really can't talk about it effectively. India provided refuge to the Tibetan exiles, and has allowed them to live there as a government in exile for many years now, for decades. It's really quite an extraordinary thing. There's a community there and a government there that has all of its officials and travels all over the world contacting people. It has its own procedures and resources. That is certainly serious. That's who many governments around the world deal with.

*Q: Did you get any good reporting, a feel for the education within Tibet and how it reflected on both Buddhism and on the history of Tibet and all?*

ADAI: As far as I know, the principle education on Buddhism and that kind of history of old Tibet existed within the monasteries. It was education that was given to the young monks, the novices. The people that educated them were the older monks. There were older monks there but many of the more accomplished monks, had chosen to leave Tibet, either when the Dalai Lama left or later.

The Chinese had no reason to provide education on Tibetan Buddhism in the public school system, or perhaps anything that was favorable to the religion itself. The government of China is officially atheist. For decades it actively discouraged religion in any form. They are still suspicious and view organized religion as a politically and socially disruptive force. Nevertheless, even during some of the worst of times they allowed somewhat more autonomy for the study of religion in places like Tibet than they did in other parts of China. However, even after China began to relax those kinds of controls, I don't think it became part of the regular curriculum. Teaching religion and Tibetan culture I think depends more on the Tibetans themselves, and they have limited resources to continue it.

*Q: Now what about visitors from outside, including Americans; were they bringing "the word" back? I mean, spiritual support or not?*

ADAIR: You mean taking it into Tibet or taking it out of Tibet?

*Q: Taking it into Tibet.*

ADAIR: Well first of all visitors from the United States and other countries continued to be restricted. The severity of that restriction would ebb and flow, mostly in relation to the political and security atmosphere. Access to different parts of Tibet has certainly grown in the last two decades; it's grown tremendously. Foreigners, particularly Americans and Europeans, that had an interest in Tibetan Buddhism would visit. They would want to talk with monks and different people in the religious communities. But I wouldn't really describe it as them taking the word in. I think most of them were going in for their own edification, for their own education.

*Q: Were you able to go to Tibet at will or did you have to get permission each time?*

ADAIR: I had to get permission each time. When I was in Chengdu we pretty much had to get permission to go just about anywhere. But I don't think I was ever told no. I went a total of, I think it was seven or eight times while I was there.

*Q: What about traveling around Sichuan province? Was it easy to travel?*

ADAIR: No, it wasn't easy to travel. Again, we had to get permission. From Chengdu, we were allowed to travel, without permission, a certain distance out along several roads and it varied. Beyond that we had to get permission to visit anything other than tourist-type places, and sometimes permission was required for those as well. It was very restricted. We could ask for permission and we would often get it, but we were also turned down a significant number of times. That was particularly true if we wanted to go off into places where foreigners didn't often travel.

The government had a number of concerns. Number one, they were still in the process of opening up. It was still a little bit difficult for foreigners to travel in China in general. It was getting easier every year but they didn't have their political, supervisory system, or whatever you call it, set up to watch and take care of people. The first concern was that we might cause trouble for them.

The second concern was for our safety and well being. That was partially a genuine humanitarian concern, and partially because the local government was responsible for the safety and wellbeing of the diplomats. So in some respects it was just easier for them to say no, you can't go there because we don't have the facilities, than it was to try and set up a system for care and feeding of the foreigners. It was evolving, but only very slowly. One of my objectives was to expand the area to which we were allowed to go without permission. I talked with the local officials quite a lot, and they were not about to do it. They probably didn't have the authority to do it anyway. We didn't get any real response from the authorities in Beijing either. So I went to the embassy and I went back to the State Department and I argued that we should restrict their movements in the same way that they restrict our movements. In other words, their diplomats in the United States should be restricted.

That's something that the State Department has always tried to avoid doing, because that sort of tit for tat is sort of small-hearted; and it can cause more problems than it solves sometimes. It's more difficult for us to set up those kinds of restrictions, and once we do it may be hard for us to remove them. So for those reasons and the danger that they would cause even more problems for us in other countries we tend not to do that. However in this case I argued it forcefully – and incessantly - and people finally agreed. I went back to Chengdu, pulled out a map and looked at the different consulates in the United States. I then recommended that we make an analogy between Chengdu and the Chinese consulate in Houston, Texas. At the time Chinese diplomats at the Chinese consulate general in Houston were free to go anywhere they wanted, and see anybody they wanted. I crafted restrictions on the diplomatic personnel in Houston that were as close to what we experienced in Chengdu as I could; and presented them to the Office of Foreign Missions at the State Department. The Department imposed the restrictions – which was really quite surprising to me. Within two weeks of that action all the restrictions were taken off of us.

*Q: Good God.*

ADAIR: I think that the reason it worked was basically that it was good for both parties. China is a huge country with a huge government which is a huge bureaucracy. There is tremendous inertia. There are many different factions with different interests. Those interests may not be mutually exclusive. They may not be totally in competition, but the competition is what comes first and sometimes it is difficult to get beyond it and find the common interests. The Chinese intended to lift many restrictions on foreigners eventually, but many of these competing interests stood in the way. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in principle would be interested in helping us, but in practice it would have been difficult so they would be inclined to avoid it. However, when we told them that they were going to be similarly restricted that clarified their interest. It also gave them an important argument to use with all those other factions, whoever they might have been. In other words, they could now say that Chinese national interests would suffer in a specific way if they didn't take action.

The other reason that it worked was that it didn't come out of the blue for them. I made sure they knew that this was going on. I included our Chinese employees in the consulate in the whole exercise. So they were reporting constantly about what we were doing. They knew that it was coming. They might have been surprised when it actually happened. They also knew that it wasn't being done as a punitive exercise. It was being done out of necessity on our part, as constructive thing to promote our access, and that was in the interests of both countries as well.

*Q: Well then you basically could go where you wanted?*

ADAIR: Our access was significantly improved. There were still some areas that were restricted. At this point I can't remember exactly what they were, but they would have been areas that were considered to be particularly sensitive.

*Q: Nuclear?*

ADAIR: Well they had a space launch center out there.

*Q: Yes.*

ADAIR: I visited it by invitation for the launch of an American-made satellite. There had been some American personnel from American companies working out there to make it possible, and they made a big deal of the launch – which turned out to be successful. Many people attended. I went from Chengdu. There were people that came up from Hong Kong, including some big Hong Kong investors like Li Ka-Shing.

*Q: Did you have any sort of tribal groups that were restive?*

ADAIR: No, not when I was there that I recall. There are lots of minorities in southwest China. Quite a few are in Sichuan. There are even more in Yunnan and in Guizhou. The Chinese government makes a big deal of the fact that these minority groups are allowed the autonomy to pursue their own customs – and to some degree their own social and quasi-political organization within the larger context of China. When you visit these areas it's very colorful. Their villages may look the same as they have looked for centuries. Their clothes, their language and many of their customs are unique. They are all still part of China. They have their own representatives in the Communist Party and other organizations. In some respects I think they've been able to maintain their own cultures better than similar minorities in the United States.

*Q: How about academics? I would think that his would be a place where aspiring academics from the United States and other countries would love to go and study.*

ADAIR: Yes, I think so. There weren't very many when I was there. There were a few in the university in Chengdu. There was one in Tibet. Some came to the consulate to register with us, but I didn't see very many of them. I think there are more now. Negotiations were underway when I was there for the Peace Corps to send out people to that area. I think the first group went out soon after I left in 1992.

*Q: You were there when they were working on the Three Gorges Dam?*

ADAIR: They were beginning, yes.

*Q: Was that hitting your area?*

ADAIR: It hadn't yet, but would eventually. There were villages in our consulate district that knew they were going to be moved. The whole process was just beginning. I believe there was still a chance to back away from this big project. But they didn't.

*Q: Was there room for dispute? Was the Chinese government allowing contrary opinion to come out at all?*

ADAIR: Well, they weren't encouraging it. Most people that I talked with just assumed that the government in Beijing had decided to do it, and that any discussion of it was not going to change the basic direction. All you could do was perhaps was soften it a little bit. One of the reasons was that it was the brainchild and the pet project of the prime minister of China, Li Peng. He believed

that it should be done for a variety of reasons and he was the power in Beijing.

*Q: In talking with the officials in your area, how did they refer to Beijing and all? Did they kind of roll their eyes and-?*

ADAIR: No, absolutely not. There was almost no expression of any kind of disagreement with Beijing. The officials that I dealt with in Chengdu kept their distance from me. I saw them when I asked to see them and it wasn't always easy. I'm talking about the senior officials. Most of them had very little interest in dealing with the American consulate or American personnel. I think that that was partially because they had other things on their plate, and partially because there was a lot more downside for them than there was upside.

*Q: I would think so.*

ADAIR: Particularly since this was the period after Tiananmen and there was still a fair amount of tension. When I talked with them the conversations were fairly shallow. We didn't get very deep into issues. There was virtually no expression of personal opinions. Of course, it's not only in China that you encounter that.

It's not to say that there were no officials in the area with whom we could talk. There were some who were in positions that were not sensitive or in positions that where they were supposed to deal with us on various matters. That included economic officials who wanted to promote trade with the United States, and support officials, people that dealt with us on an administrative support level.

*Q: Did you get involved in cultural affairs?*

ADAIR: We had a public affairs officer at the consulate and she got involved with bringing American musicians and speakers to the area. They were well received. We ourselves visited sites in the area. We went to the temples, we got to know some of the artists in Chengdu, we went to the markets, we met people that were educated and with whom we could discuss history and different things about Chinese culture.

*Q: Did you find you were besieged by parents and kids who wanted to go to the United States to school?*

ADAIR: Yes. We were besieged by people applying for visas in general. Students were certainly a big element of that. There were parents who wanted to get their kids to school in the United States, because they wanted to get them out of China and give them different opportunities. Things were changing in China but they hadn't gotten to the point where they are now; where the opportunities in some respects are better than they are in the United States. We gave lots of visas to people to go to the States to study and to visit. We also had to turn many down.

We had one incident where a businessman who I had met in Guizhou Province came to the consulate with a relative of his who wanted to go to the United States. He brought 30 bottles of Mao-tai, which is expensive. It's one of the most famous drinks in China and came from

Guizhou Province. I went down and I talked to him. I told him that we could not accept his gifts, because these visa issues had to be decided on the merits. I asked him to take his wine back. He insisted that this had nothing to do with the visa; that he was bringing it as an expression of friendship between nations, etc. etc. I knew that technically I should not accept the gift. However, I had also been raised, basically, to believe that if somebody offers you something it's impolite not to take it. There's an element of that in some cultures that's true. I finally said he could give this wine to the consulate but it will have absolutely no impact on the decision. He said fine. We took the 30 bottles of Mao-tai and then gave them to all of the Chinese employees in the consulate. His relative went in and saw the consular officer who interviewed him and then refused him the visa. I thought, well, at least that's going to spread like wildfire and it would be unlikely to happen again.

Subsequently, I concluded that the decision was half correct. What I really should have done was then go back to that man who had come in and take him out to dinner so that he didn't lose face personally. But I didn't do it, and that was wrong. There are many things in my career that I would like to be able to revisit.

*Q: Yes, well in these interviews of course we play by one set of rules and they play by another.*

ADAIR: And we, for the most part, are not able to play them as intricately as they do. And it was really hard. You were in the consular cone and you know how difficult it is to do that kind of work. But it was really hard for the consular officers all over China. I would not want to be a consular officer in China.

In Chengdu it was especially hard. The volume was high. I think that the individual consular officer in Chengdu had close to the same number of cases as individual consular officers in Beijing or Guangzhou or Shanghai. However, in Chengdu that consular officer was alone. He or she had no one else to share the burden with. They also had no privacy. There was no respite because they couldn't leave the office and go to their home and be private. They left their office, went around the corner and upstairs into the same hotel. Access to the hotel was not restricted. They could be cornered in the hotel or on the hotel grounds or just about anywhere. They were in a fishbowl, and people could go after them at any time. So the stress for those consular officers was just tremendous. I admired them greatly for the poise that they maintained.

*Q: Well did the fact that they were in China compensate those officers for the stress they had to bear? America's fascination with China goes back many, many years. Did this make a difference?*

ADAIR: Of course. Most of us who were in China were there because we were interested in China. It wasn't because we had just been told to go there. Most of us were fascinated with the circumstances that we found ourselves in. Most of us understood that there were many different levels to it and that when we were restricted in one way or another or stressed in one way or another, it wasn't a one dimensional thing. It wasn't just directed at us. We understood that there were all kinds of reasons for this, and that the people with whom we were dealing were going through something infinitely more difficult and complex. Those of us in Chengdu at that time had it better than the American diplomats who first arrived in China in the 1970s, and better even

than when we were in Beijing in the mid-1980s. There was more freedom to walk around; there was more freedom to associate with others. We could talk to people. We still had to be careful because we never knew whether somebody that talked with us would get in trouble or something. But we could communicate with individuals. We could talk with the old woman who was selling something on the street and exchange smiles. We could have a philosophical discussion with somebody at a teahouse or in the park. I think most of us appreciated that we were able to get quite a lot out of it. When I was there there was only one American officer in the consulate who didn't have Chinese language. That was the administrative officer, because the Department had had trouble finding somebody. He was from USAID and he volunteered. He and his wife were probably two of the most enthusiastic people who were there. They got out and they went all over. They took full advantage of the opportunity to see the place and to communicate with people. There were lots of people there that spoke some English and wanted to practice their English too.

*Q: Were there any particular points in the United States that students were headed for? I mean, established connections or not?*

ADAIR: I think there were a few places that were better known than others.

*Q: Yes, I was talking to the headmaster of my prep school, who was saying he couldn't say it in public, but China's become almost a cash cow.*

ADAIR: I've seen that in a number of private schools.

*Q: I mean, he said they were getting superb students. They were not lowering their standards.*

ADAIR: I know some schools that are actually going to China and recruiting.

*Q: Was the question of religion at all taking root from where you were?*

ADAIR: Religion of one form or another was becoming more prominent in many places around China. Chengdu didn't seem to be unusual. I was aware of more resurgence in the Christian religion in Beijing and in Guangzhou than in Chengdu. I don't recall visiting a Christian church in Chengdu. However, the Buddhist and Daoist temples were very crowded and active.

*Q: Were you sort of off the beaten track for visitors to China, government visitors?*

ADAIR: Pretty much so. We certainly didn't get the same number of official visitors as Beijing, Shanghai or Guangzhou. We did get some. Some made a special effort to get out to southwest China because they had a personal interest. Some came out for specific government or business purposes. I only remember one group coming through to Tibet. That included Dick Holbrooke and John Holdridge, who were both private citizens at the time. We also had a number of visits from officials who were focused on Yunnan because of the narcotics issue.

*Q: Were drugs a problem in your area?*

ADAI: Not in Sichuan. In Yunnan there definitely was a problem along the border with Burma. It was a problem that the Chinese government was concerned about. They were taking a variety of measures to deal with it, both law enforcement and rehabilitation. Drugs were being moved from the border with Burma across China and down to Hong Kong, though detailed information was hard to come by. We made some efforts to begin building a relationship between our Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) people and the Chinese public security bureau. It started in Beijing, but when I arrived in Chengdu it was still sort of tentative and nothing had happened in our area. I thought that that was a good time to try, so I went down to Hong Kong and talked with the DEA people there. They were enthusiastic, so I then went to Yunnan and talked with the foreign affairs office there. They were responsive too, and organized a trip to the border with Burma. The Director of the Foreign Affairs Office in Yunnan, and the Director of the Yunnan Public Security Bureau took me and one DEA officer from Hong Kong. It was the first time that any official American had been to the Chinese side of the Burma/China border since before the Chinese communists had taken over in 1949. It was fascinating. It was really fascinating for me, because I had recently lived in Burma, and I had not been allowed to go to the Burmese side of the border. It was completely off limits to foreigners and specifically to Americans.

I had seen the Chinese and Burmese mixing and working together in Mandalay. I had begun to be able to see when someone in Burma had Chinese ancestry. On the Chinese border I had to try to see it in reverse. In some ways it was more difficult, because that area of Yunnan has so many different minorities of its own. That's a big part of Yunnan's identity. On that trip, we only went to one place on the border, a town called Ruili, where most of the trade was crossing. There was clearly an important Burmese influence on the Chinese side, and probably an even bigger Chinese influence on the Burmese side.

The trip was successful in that it initiated direct ties between DEA and the Chinese Public Security Bureau in Yunnan, and nothing untoward happened. There was no downside to it, and everybody was more comfortable working with that relationship afterwards. Not too long after that the assistant secretary of state for narcotics (INS) also visited. We took him to the border as well. Then we did a longer trip, went to more places and visited rehabilitation centers. We were able to wander along the river there where the border was and talk with people.

*Q: Did you have Americans caught in drug smuggling or anything like that?*

ADAI: No. Not when I was there and I'm not aware of any since then either.

*Q: How about Chinese dissidents? Were they of a presence where you were?*

ADAI: We didn't have any issues with high profile political dissidents in Chengdu when I was there. Sichuan is a very volatile area, and traditionally the people of Sichuan have been as upfront as any Chinese about expressing disagreement with the central government. For that reason there was probably more effort made to keep that kind of expression suppressed.

*Q: Were there any American firms dealing there?*

ADAI: Yes, there were a few but not many. There were a few companies dealing with larger

Chinese operations. Hughes sold a communications satellite to the Chinese government and had personnel at the rocket launch center in the west of Sichuan Province. McDonnell Douglas had some personnel working with an aircraft manufacturer near Chengdu. There were virtually no entrepreneurs that I saw in that area when I was there. I tried to encourage people to come and didn't get any takers, except for one, McDonald's.

*Q: Well let's talk about it a little.*

ADAIR: Well, close to the end of my tour in Chengdu another mountaineering group came through. This was the second American mountaineering group that I'd seen come into China to climb Everest. The first was when I was in Beijing, led by Lou Whittaker from Seattle. This one was led by his twin brother, Jim Whittaker. This group was going to climb with the Chinese and with a Russian group. I think it was called the "Climb for Peace." When they came through they stopped in Chengdu on the way, and we met with them. When they left I asked Jim Whittaker what we could do for them when they came back. What would they like? He laughed and said, "How about a Big Mac?" I said okay.

So I called the headquarters of McDonald's in Hong Kong and I explained the situation to them. I didn't know whether the team would succeed in getting to the top of Everest or not. They did. However, I thought McDonald's could get a lot of good publicity from catering a welcome back event. They thought about it and said yes. They filled up an airplane with all the stuff for Big Macs and flew it to Chengdu with their own personnel. We worked with the local government and local businesses and set up the event at a major hotel in Chengdu. We let the climbers know when they got down to Lhasa, put up big welcoming banners and invited about 300 people. The mountaineers loved it, and I thought everybody loved it. Driving to the reception I was sitting with Jim Whittaker and I explained what had been set up. He asked me if I wanted him to speak. I replied that if he wanted to speak, sure, but that this reception was for them to enjoy so the choice was his. He said very well, he would just eat. So that's the way we did it. I introduced them; and he got up and made a big deal of taking a bite out of the Big Mac. Afterwards I got a nasty letter from one of the American professors who were at the university there, saying he couldn't believe that the U.S. Government would do such a crass material thing, promoting American companies and not even give Jim Whittaker a chance to speak. I replied to him, but I guess you can't make everybody happy.

*Q: How about corruption? Did you run into this?*

ADAIR: Chinese corruption?

*Q: Yes.*

ADAIR: When I was there Chinese corruption, in the sense that we usually speak of it, did not appear to have really gotten started yet. There wasn't enough freedom yet. Corruption always existed in China, of course. There are always people who will try to use whatever power they have to do something for themselves that is outside the bounds of what is permitted. During the period of Mao Zedong's rule in China the corruption was still there. It just was not on the business side because there wasn't any business. The currency of corruption wasn't dollars or

yuan. It wasn't money. The corruption came in the form of whether you would get a better apartment, or a car to take you around, or your child would be allowed to leave the country to go study overseas. The economic opening that began in the late 1970s and grew through the '80s began to provide economic incentives for corruption through profit. But it hadn't really had a chance to be that noticeable in Chengdu in the early 1990s, at least as I recall. It was probably growing pretty quickly in construction related areas though.

*Q: Well I got a certain insight into this from a book by this Peace Corps volunteer who then became a New Yorker. I think it was called "Driving Around." It's a book about driving around Beijing and China. He documents corruption related to cigarettes. Apparently there are categories of cigarettes and you tell how much clout you have or you think you have by the cigarette brand that you smoke.*

ADAIR: I think those kinds of things can take many forms. I took a congressional delegation to Yunnan Province and we visited a tobacco company. I can't remember where the congressional delegation was from. When we finished the tour of the plant, the company gave everybody several cartons of cigarettes to take with them. They had one kind of cigarette that was an experimental combination of tobaccos unique to China. And I asked the company if they would give me a couple more cartons of that, because I thought I would take them to a friend in Hong Kong who might be a good advertisement for them. One of the people in the congressional delegation sort of raised his eyebrows and asked if that was appropriate - could it be considered a kind of a bribe? I laughed and said I didn't think so, but I suppose someone might have thought so.

*Q: One of the things that certainly was prevalent at all our embassies and consulates for years may still be going on, and that was the Christmas gifts.*

ADAIR: Yes.

*Q: At one point because other countries were undergoing real privation we used to give out things like bottles of Scotch, but also razor blades and things of this nature. And you know, after a time I think we've probably gotten away from this, but this was giving the customs officials and others with whom we worked the message that we really care for you and we remember you; remember us.*

ADAIR: Right.

*Q: Now, did you do any of that sort of thing?*

ADAIR: Yes, we often try to give gifts to people. In China and elsewhere I tried to give gifts that were about the United States.

*Q: Books.*

ADAIR: Books, particularly picture books of the United States. I tried to get them from USIS (United States Information Service). When we could we would give American whiskey, but that

was difficult to get in China, particularly in Chengdu.

In Chengdu, we mostly took people out to dinner. In China there is a whole culture of eating. You don't go out one-on-one. You get a big group of people; sit at a big table where a seemingly endless array of dishes is served; and it's very loud and boisterous. That was part of Chinese culture and it was permissible for Chinese officials to accept those invitations. It was also less compromising for them, because these were public, multiple person events. They were less vulnerable to potential criticism. So we tried to do that as much as possible for the people that we dealt with – at least as much as we could afford it. It was a way of showing our interest in them or gratitude for services that they had done for us. We would often take the head of an office and a number of his people - anywhere from five to 15 or 20 of them. They liked it because we would take them to good restaurants that many of them wouldn't otherwise have the chance to go to. There weren't any foreign restaurants in Chengdu at the time; it would be Chinese restaurants. It was nice for us because we got the chance to visit with them in a way that was less formal – and because it was something that we could actually do for them.

*Q: I was just thinking of the problem that diplomats have had, certainly in the former Soviet Union, probably Russia now, with drinking. Was trying to drink you under the table part of the Chinese system?*

ADAIR: Oh, very much a part of it. I told you about my experience in Beijing.

*Q: Let's talk about it some more now.*

ADAIR: Okay. There is a part of Chinese culture where drinking is very important. It's done as a social thing, it's done as a competition thing and it's done as a personal thing. People who get drunk together can form a bond. In China it has been also carried into art forms. Some very famous poets have composed poetry when they're drunk. I suppose like Coleridge and his drugs. I don't know to what degree paintings were done that way. Even in martial arts there's a whole style called "the drunken master."

I was first exposed to it in Taiwan when I was studying. The teachers tried to teach us the danger of this. I was less concerned about the danger. I wanted to experience it - try all the different wines and stuff like that. And I did that to some degree in Taiwan and to some degree in Hong Kong. But I didn't get really exposed to it until I went to Beijing. Beijing in the mid 1980s was still pretty closed down, but official drinking was permitted. As I described earlier, I way overdid it. In Chengdu I was more careful.

*Q: Are there any tricks?*

ADAIR: Oh, there are. People have all kinds of tricks. The first one I learned was from Russians at the UN in New York back in 1971. They said if you eat lots of butter before you go and drink, you won't get drunk. I tried that. It didn't work for me – just made me sick. The Chinese actually have a variety of medicines that you can take before and after that help significantly because they protect the liver. The butter or oil prescription may protect the stomach, but it hurts the liver. So the Chinese know how to do it.

The best story I heard, though, was from an uncle of mine who was an American military officer stationed in Kunming during World War II. He had to have dinner with a local general who was a famous drinker – and I guess not a very nice person. He secretly arranged some deal with the people at the restaurant so that only the general was getting liquor – he was getting something else. He won that competition, and somehow the ruse was never discovered. If it had been, I suppose things might not have gone well for the restaurant owners.

At our wedding reception in Taipei, when we made the obligatory toasts to each table of guests, I had tea in my glasses, which was the same color as the wine. At the time I had a stomach ulcer and alcohol was dangerous. However, my ruse was discovered by one of Ginger's uncles who started to broadcast it until he was stopped by his mother who had recommended that course of action to begin with.

*Q: Did you get any reflections on the WWII participation by Americans in Chungking when you were there? What is Chungking called now?*

ADAIR: Chongqing. There were still strong memories of that period, and of the American involvement in both Chongqing and Chengdu. There were American bombers stationed outside of Chengdu. The Flying Tigers were near Kunming in Yunnan province.

Several times during our stay in Chengdu, people came up to me on the street, older people, to say they remembered the Americans who protected them when we most needed it. They would describe seeing the Flying Tiger aircraft over the city. The Flying Tigers were the fighters that protected the cities from the Japanese aircraft. The B-29s were bombers would fly out across the lines to bomb the Japanese positions. When these planes flew overhead, the people knew they were American - that somebody was with them. That meant a lot to them and they had never forgotten it. That was really touching, particularly since for the previous 30 years our two countries had been mortal enemies. Some of these people even made a point of saying that during all that time they never forgot what we did to help them.

When I was there the Chinese government also memorialized Joseph Stilwell, the American general who was in charge of U.S. military forces in China and the liaison to General Chiang Kai-shek. A small museum was set up in the house where he had lived. Some of his family members came out for that and I attended the ceremony. And that was pretty nice, that the American general would be recognized that way; that he would be given an official place in their history.

*Q: You know, every once in awhile, we have an incident with the Chinese. They get very touchy on things that often are either their fault or our fault. I'm thinking of the collision with the reconnaissance plane that forced it down, and also the bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. Did anything major like that that happen while you were there?*

ADAIR: When I was in Chengdu we didn't have anything specifically of that nature. We did after I left. One of my big projects in Chengdu was to get the permanent consulate building completed. When I went out to Chengdu, the consulate was in the hotel. There was a site that had

been selected for the consulate, and a Chinese construction company had actually built the shells of the buildings. The project had stopped because communication between the Department of State's OBO (Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations) and the Chinese had fallen apart. OBO had put the project on hold indefinitely. I spent a lot of time trying to resurrect that project, and succeeded. It was a lot of work, and quite difficult to get through the bureaucracy. But we finally got it restarted. I didn't move into it but my successor did.

One of the issues had been a question about setback. There was a wall around the whole compound, but the consul general's residence was right against the corner of the wall. It didn't meet the standards – a 100 foot setback – that I think had been established after the initial construction started. I argued that was less important in a place like Chengdu where China would always control the security. Well, after we bombed, by mistake, the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, there were demonstrations in Beijing. A mob stood around the embassy in Beijing and threw stones at it breaking all the windows. There was a picture of the ambassador looking out through the broken windows. Well, what they didn't show was what happened in Chengdu, where the mob burnt down the residence of the consul general. Luckily no one was hurt, but that showed me the downside to my aggressive argument that we could apply a different security standard in China.

There's a very strong emotional side to the Chinese population. It may take some time to come into play. They can go through an awful lot before they finally react, but when they do react it's pretty serious. It can happen when there is a perception that their national honor has been damaged beyond what can be justifiably accepted. The Chinese government does not always try to defuse those situations – enough said.

*Q: Perhaps understandably in some cases. As an old Belgrade hand I wondered, how the hell could we have done that?*

ADAIR: When my Chinese friends have talked with me about that, I have said that it would make no sense for the United States to do something like that. It would serve no rational purpose. But I also said, "Never underestimate the ability of any government to make really stupid mistakes like miscalculations using out of date information, improper maps, etc. – and that includes the United States for all its wealth and power. With us, the bombing of an embassy is pretty unacceptable. If that happened to us we would be pretty difficult to please. We always have to be careful. There are lots of ways in which the lines may be crossed inadvertently, and the reactions – of either side - might surprise us.

*Q: Well for example court cases. I mean something dealing with a Chinese plaintiff in a court case determined in, you know, East Bygosh, Pennsylvania, might not get much attention in Pennsylvania, but once it gets played up in China it could be a different story.*

ADAIR: Yes. I think another area where difficulties may grow over time may be visas. We have made it difficult for Chinese to get visas to the United States. It's expensive, and many Chinese have felt insulted in their efforts get visas to visit the United States. We see now that it's becoming very expensive for Americans to get visas to China now. Perhaps at some point it may become difficult for Americans to get visas to China at all. The Chinese may tell us they are just

doing it out of reciprocity. They are telling us that now, and there is some truth in it – some. I think we gave some multiple year visas to Chinese when I was in Chengdu, but I can't get one now to China. These kinds of things stick in peoples' memories and get interpreted differently over time.

*Q: Well as far as relations with China, it strikes me that here is a population that can be encouraged to really be beastly, including go on rampages against other countries. It strikes me that this would be a real factor that we'd almost have to consider in our relations with them...*

ADAIR: Any population can be encouraged to be beastly - any population.

*Q: I know but the Chinese-*

ADAIR: The Chinese have a larger population than anybody else.

*Q: Yes.*

ADAIR: The Chinese stand on a much deeper and older civilization than anybody else in the world. They have an ancient social organization – which has survived in spite of the Cultural Revolution - and many traditions that restrain them. But those restraints can be taken off. And, perhaps because they have such a complex set of restraints, if there's any green light that says "you're relieved of these restraints," then maybe the explosion is larger than it would be in other cases. Maybe that's part of the reason the Japanese behaved as they did during the war. Their society has some of these restraints as well. I don't know.

*Q: Was there any action while you were there, in your area, on encouraging Chinese-American military cooperation of any kind?*

ADAIR: Well yes, we were trying to establish more contacts between our two militaries. It was happening very, very gradually and the embassy was playing a role. American and Chinese military attaches in many places around the world were increasing their contacts. When I was in Chengdu I didn't have any contacts with the military per se. I met some military officials at the satellite launch that I referred to.

However, that part of the relationship was very limited. In the long run it is a really important part of our overall relationship. One way or another, our respective defense establishments have enormous influence on our national and international policies. In China there have been periods when the military was not just heavily influential, but dominant, in government decision making across the board. It may have been less so in the 1980s and early 1990s because that seemed to have been part of the plan - to move them back a notch, get them involved in other things, and give them a stake in opening to the rest of the world. In recent years, the Chinese military seems to be reasserting its role again. China has become wealthier. It can pour more money into the military, and is taking a much larger role on the international stage.

To some degree, this is natural and perhaps necessary. As China grows more powerful it will have to play a role across the board: political, military, economic, cultural - everything. The

question is, what kind of balance will there be? One of our largest concerns from the beginning has been to promote a relationship with China that is not an antagonistic relationship. We had an antagonistic relationship in the '50s, '60s and part of the '70s because both sides chose to make the relationship antagonistic. In more recent decades, both sides have tried to overcome that legacy. However, there are still forces in both countries that would like to return the relationship to an adversarial one. I think that we have to be real careful about what we do all around the world – even in apparently unrelated areas - because what we do can affect the balance between those who would promote a more friendly and constructive relationship and others who would prefer something very different. When I was in Chengdu, the United States undertook the first Gulf War. In the minds of most Americans, it was done for the best of reasons: we intervened to protect Kuwait, a small and friendly state, from Iraq, a more powerful, territorially aggressive and not so friendly state. We intervened, with the approval of the United Nations, to restore internationally recognized boundaries and to maintain the integrity of an international system intended to avoid catastrophic conflict. In addition, we considered our intervention to be quite restrained. We didn't go in and occupy Iraq. The first Bush administration was really impressive in the way that it did that.

On the other hand, our display of massive technological warfare was so extraordinary - and so flamboyant - that I think it had a profound impact on Chinese observers. It surprised most Americans that we had those capabilities. I think it also surprised and worried many Chinese.

*Q: Oh yes.*

ADAIR: The Chinese were impressed and they were also concerned. If I were a Chinese official in Beijing at that time, I would have been asking, why would the United States be willing to take its power halfway around the world to protect this little teeny country with which it had no protection treaties? Oil would not be a sufficient answer since the United States had other sources, and also could have simply restored the apparently friendly relationship that it had had with Iraq not too long before. I would also have been concerned by the demonstration that the United States could apply unbelievable force anywhere on the planet. Then we demonstrated the willingness to do it again with the second Gulf War, and the invasion of Iraq – even more worrying because we were willing to go in and occupy.

I think these factors strengthened the voices within China pressing to view the United States as the enemy, as a threat. Some 3,000 years of history have taught the Chinese that they will suffer when they ignore potential threats from the outside, whether it be from Mongols, Tibetans, Manchurians, British, Japanese.....or Americans? So now we see them pouring more and more resources into the military - traditional forces, navy and even space. They've always been concerned about Taiwan. We have been flying intelligence gathering planes off the coast of China as a matter of course for years. That's got to be a concern for them. If China were to fly spy planes 12 miles off the coast of California we would go apoplectic. Why, I don't know what we'd do because it's almost inconceivable that they would do that. It was a surprise that they made such a show over the Hainan incident; but on the whole both sides were fairly restrained. There will be more of these situations, particularly since that whole area of the South China Sea is very important to China. I don't know how it's going to play out.

*Q: Because it's not as though there are other countries in that region that look with pleasure on the Chinese laying claim to the area.*

ADAIR: No, they don't.

*Q: Okay, when did you leave?*

ADAIR: I left China in the summer of 1992 - July.

*Q: Alright, and for the next time, where did you go?*

ADAIR: I came back to Washington, went into the Senior Seminar for a year and then went into the European Bureau.

*Q: Today is the 15<sup>th</sup> of November, the Ides of November, 2011, with Marshall Adair.*

*And we're going to go back a bit. I made a note to ask you, how did your wife find being a Taiwanese in the Middle Kingdom and all?*

ADAIR: That's a very important question. People from Taiwan had a very special status in the PRC at that time; and for many of them it was not comfortable. The government officially welcomed them, but of course welcomed them as citizens of China. The official policy was intended to be very accommodating: maintaining the political position, recognizing differences. In a sense it was a courtship, one where both sides had interests but not necessarily interests that coincided. It was particularly challenging for women from Taiwan who were married to American diplomats and officially American citizens.

Before we went to China we had heard stories about how difficult it was for ethnic Chinese spouses to get along in China. Public security officials often restricted them from entering the embassy, either by misunderstanding or possibly intentionally. The guards at the embassy, some officials at the hotels and even people on the street sometimes tended to give them a hard time. The assumption was that there was some envy because the people from Taiwan were wealthier and better dressed; or anger because they were considered by some them to be traitors to China. There were all kinds of stories.

Ginger was aware of that, and decided to address it head on. When we arrived in Beijing, while we were still living in the hotel, one of the first things that she did was to tackle the relationship with the embassy guards – the young policemen or soldiers from the Public Security Bureau. She put on this little hat, a somewhat ordinary hat except that it had a cute little duck embroidered on the front. It stood out. Then she went and visited all of the guard stations at the embassy buildings and the around the area – there were probably ten of them. The embassy itself had three embassy buildings: the ambassador's residence, the main chancery and the administrative building. In front of each of them and at each entrance to the diplomatic residential area was a guard-stand. She took her ID card, went up to each of them and she introduced herself. She said I'm Mrs. Adair, the wife of Marshall Adair, who's such and such at the embassy; I come from Taiwan, etc. She was polite, smiling and friendly - and they had never seen anything like this.

They were all just taken aback. She wasn't asking to go in, she was just introducing herself and telling them that she would be going in – and she wasn't going to cause them any trouble. I don't know exactly what she said to them, but after that they all remembered her. She was never stopped, which was very unusual. She was never given any trouble. They would even smile when they saw her coming and wave to her when she came in. Lots of the other people continued to have difficulty.

She figured out pretty early on something that I often forget, that there are two sides to people. There's the side where people are worried or angry or afraid or whatever and there's the other side of people that want to be friendly and helpful and so on.

Related to that were the restrictions placed on all of us as foreigners, and particularly as foreign diplomats. I didn't like the restrictions that were placed on us, didn't like the idea that we were constantly being listened to, constantly being followed; didn't like the idea that we were told we couldn't go here or we couldn't go there. I didn't like the fact that when we went into restaurants we were only supposed to eat in certain areas, and that when we rode the trains we could only ride in first class - and pay more and so on. Most of us saw that as an imposition. We believed that these were restrictions exclusively for political reasons.

Well, restricting us for political reasons was a big part of it, but it wasn't the only part. The other part was that officials at most levels had instructions to make sure that nothing happened to us. If anything did happen to us they were responsible. So they were extra careful. Ginger could see this pretty clearly, and she figured out ways to reassure those people rather than get angry with them. She learned how to appeal to their better side. It took me years to see and accept that. Obviously she could communicate with them better because she had fluent Mandarin. My Mandarin wasn't fluent.

She was also able to connect with people in China that I was not able to connect with. I had some obvious disadvantages: I was a foreigner with a different face and limited Chinese language. I had some less obvious disadvantages: I more often didn't recognize what people had to offer personally. I was focused on officials or things that I had some understanding of. There was an awful lot out there that I didn't understand. I didn't understand the art world, the performing art world, the literature world. Everyone was all dressed the same in these dingy blue overalls, and they seemed to act the same way. Actually, they were all different and had some very different backgrounds. Some were not educated at all. Some were extremely well educated - not just in terms of the ruling party and what you were supposed to believe - but classical educations that went back way before the communist takeover in China. Ginger picked up on stuff like that just by talking with these people briefly, meeting them on the street or whatever. As a result of that she met people that were beyond the normal environment of the embassy and beyond what was normally accessible to embassy personnel. And when she met them, I got to meet them too.

For instance, there was a Buddhist association in China. At the time, in the mid '80s, China had already begun to relax its restrictions on religion. There was a national Buddhist association and there were Christian churches and there were various other things. She got to know some of the monks and lamas and others associated with those communities; and she was actually able to study with them, which was very unusual. I made an official call on the head of the Chinese

Buddhist association before I made that trip to Tibet, and Ginger went with me. When we talked with him, he found out that she had an interest in Buddhism and he said, “Oh, you should go and meet this person.” That was pretty rare at that time as well.

So Ginger exposed me to a much broader segment of Chinese society. She helped me to understand that the restrictions that were being placed on us by the official community had two sides to them. They could restrict us but they could also help us sometimes. Some of these people, who we saw primarily as obstacles, could give us better access to some places than we could get on our own, because some of those people were very, very well connected. And as a result we were able to meet people, go to places and do things that otherwise might not have been possible.

*Q: Did you have the feeling at the time that there was an effort to seal off problem areas in the Chinese community from foreigners or was this more a matter of trying to keep you out of trouble?*

ADAIR: Well it was both. They didn't want us to get into trouble but they didn't want us to foment trouble. There were areas that they were watching that they were concerned about. They didn't want foreigners going in and making things more difficult for them. One of these areas was religion and particularly the local Christian churches. The government had decided to provide them with more freedom to worship and follow their faith, but they didn't want that to spill over into the political arena. They were concerned that if these groups grew too much or too rapidly they would spill into the political arena. And, historically they had some evidence for concern.

*Q: Well I was wondering. I've talked to people who have served in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. As time went on, communism as a belief was losing an awful lot of its appeal. People were going to lectures on the principles of communism and falling asleep. This is compulsory for some, but it had lost its appeal up and down the line. Towards the end you couldn't call upon people to be good communists, because they'd almost laugh in your face. What was happening at the time you were in China to the appeal of communism, the teaching of it?*

ADAIR: In the late '70s Deng Xiaoping made the decision to begin relaxing the controls on the economy, because he recognized that the command economy imposed as part of communist doctrine and philosophy had not worked. But, in other parts of the world the free market economy had been much more successful in using resources, harnessing the energies of the people and stuff like that. So he and others decided to move government back from control of all economic activity and give more freedom to people to participate in it on their own. By necessity that included allowing other freedoms in society like association, movement, education and so on.

However, they also determined that the communist party had to remain in power – partially because some form of legitimate authority was essential and probably also to protect the leadership's own position. The senior leadership had been “communists” for a long time. Most of them had to believe in at least some various principles of communist theory and philosophy. They were not prepared to junk it. The communist party would continue to be the power

governing China and it would not accept any questioning of that. The realm of political organization and governmental management was off limits at the beginning to these reforms. Communist ideology, loyalty to the party and the party's control of all mechanisms of government and security had to be maintained; they were determined to maintain them. Now, what his vision was for the long term, 10, 20, 50, 100 years, I don't know. I'm still speaking of Deng Xiaoping because he was the force behind this.

Clearly there were some contradictions. Ideology was important, because it had been an active tool in holding a very large and diverse population together. It also held the party together. Relaxing the command economy was antithetical to standard communist ideology. So, they had to do an ideological dance to smooth and explain this change. They came up with the phrase, "socialism with Chinese characteristics." They inserted Chinese-ness, or what I call Han nationalism or Han chauvinism into the equation. Cultural nationalism can be a very useful unifying – and disciplinary - tool.

Essentially what I think was happening was the communist party was moving into the position the imperial court and bureaucracy had occupied for more than 2,000 years before the chaos of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The party would retain absolute authority, but allowed the rest of the country to operate more freely as long as it was healthy and not threatening the stability of the nation. It would retain the power to stop any problems that might develop. How that has actually been done in terms of the education of communist party members and stuff like that, I don't know. I don't know how this has really played out in those inner circles, but it's a work in progress. My own view is that eventually they're going to go back to something like the imperial system that they had for some 2-3,000 years.

*Q: Were you picking up from anybody a change in how students viewed communism? I mean, you know, courses and other things that were going on?*

ADAIR: I think in the beginning some, perhaps many, believed communism was flawed. But most of the people that had any connection to the establishment would be careful about how they expressed that. In so far as students were concerned, I think Deng Xiaoping's initiation of reforms encouraged a renaissance in the importance and attraction of formal education. Parents determined to obtain the best possible education for their children, within China or abroad. Students once again focused more on their studies than on political activity. For many people, it has seemed for the last several decades or so that the best educational opportunities were overseas, because the institutes of higher learning in China were limited by outlook or by resources. Access to the best Chinese institutions was more available to the children of those who were already in power. So a lot depended on where you stood in that hierarchy as to how you saw the system.

I was able to meet a few young people that were fairly high up in that hierarchy when I was in Hong Kong and occasionally in Beijing, but not very many. Those that I did meet were very well educated and intelligent. They were not doctrinaire. Their thinking processes were not controlled by the slogans of the previous decades.

*Q: The Little Red Book had disappeared pretty much?*

ADAIR: Pretty much, yes. The leadership of the Communist Party had decided on the direction that China was to take, and that direction was substantially different from China's trajectory of the previous 40 years. However, they also knew that if they were going to maintain authority within China, they had to act within certain parameters and they had to maintain loyalties in their relationships. And they did it.

*Q: I have to say that I spent four years in a religious prep school run by monks, Episcopalian monks, and there was compulsory chapel. Later, when I joined and worked in the Foreign Service, I did so with the profound feeling that this whole God business is nonsense – but within the context of the Foreign Service I didn't say so. Now I'm older and I can say it. But one can live in community with others and abide by their morays.*

*Now, back to your wife. What about the Taiwanese factor? Did she find herself either challenged or just plain questioned? I'm sure that this was a burning issue, but one that normal Chinese necessarily had much exposure to.*

ADAIR: Well, that's right. Basically, at that time the Chinese were very concerned about Taiwan. One of the nation's primary goals was to bring it back into the fold, re-establish connections and reintegrate it into China. So, at that time they were very interested in people from Taiwan. Luckily the government's perspective was more long-term. They weren't trying or hoping to do this in a period of five or 10 or 15 years so there wasn't a lot of pressure behind it and emotions were under control. They were especially interested and curious about people who were actually Taiwanese. There were a lot of people in Taiwan who were not Taiwanese; people that were born on the mainland and had gone to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek. Ginger was Taiwanese. Her father's family had been there for some 300 or 400 years; and her mother's family had been there much longer because much of her mother's family were the aboriginal people – related to the Pacific Islanders.

Issues related to Taiwan actually started when we were in Hong Kong. She was very upfront about this. I remember a conversation with a taxicab driver, who labeled her as Chinese. She replied, "No, I'm not. I'm Taiwanese." "What? Taiwan is a part of China." "No, it's not." That was her personal answer. The taxicab driver went apoplectic. His whole universe was being challenged. Ginger was very straightforward with the people that she met in Beijing. She considered herself Taiwanese, and would show people a picture of her family that she carried around with her. - "See, we look different." She considered herself part of the Chinese tradition, but as far as she was concerned Taiwan should be an independent country. But she was not political. She didn't seek out political arguments. It was only if they pushed her that she would answer. She was happy to talk about her family, she was happy to talk about culture; but she did it in a Chinese context, where you don't spill your guts to just anybody. Americans are much less restrained.

*Q: Was she ever called upon to talk in public, like on a radio talk show or something like that?*

ADAIR: No, and she wouldn't have done it. I don't think that the embassy would have wanted her to go. She made it very clear that she wasn't interested in politics in any form whatsoever.

That was one of the things that made it easier for her to go and study with the Chinese monks and the Tibetans. She didn't want to get involved in those kinds of questions. There were other things that were far more important to her and were more important to them as well, so.

*Q: While we're talking about religion, what about movements in China like the Falun Gong?*

ADAIR: Yes, that's a quasi-religious, quasi-political movement centered on the phenomenon of "Qi" - the basic life energy that exists in and around all of us - and how to tap into it. The concept of "qi" - and how to use it, "qigong" - runs through thousands of years of Chinese history and culture.

*Q: The "Boxers" would have been something like that.*

ADAIR: Yes. Today, Falun Gong is presented as a philosophy and a religion. But historically these movements in China have gone beyond the bounds of personal development into social and political arenas - and they have presented challenges to existing governmental authority - sometimes serious challenges. So the current Chinese government has banned it. Lots of people are up in arms about that on the grounds that it violates human rights. But the Chinese government is very clear about it. Historically, when these movements have started they've gotten out of hand. This one looked like it was getting out of hand. The way it's pursued here and in other places is very political.

*Q: Well now did that impact at all on your service in China?*

ADAIR: No. We have met people that are interested in Falun Gong. We have certainly met many more people that are interested in qi. Daoism is focused on this. Buddhism teaches a lot about it, but goes at the whole process of personal development in a different way. Daoism focuses on the physical manifestations. Qi is a big part of Tibetan Buddhism which focuses on the body and the cultivation of it as a means to enlightenment. The Taiping movement and rebellion in the 19<sup>th</sup> century was a quasi Christian manifestation. At one time or another, all of these have been, or have been used by some as mechanisms to challenge existing authority. This phenomenon is something that successive Chinese governments for thousands of years have realized that they have to keep in check, because they can threaten the foundations of government and order in China.

That concern is what was behind the restrictions on Christian communities in China as well. The government would allow them to exist and to function up to a point, but if they became too evangelical and moved into the sociopolitical realm that was when they were restricted.

*Q: Were you having problems in 1993 or so? I spent three weeks in Kyrgyzstan preaching the culture of how to set up a consular establishment, part of a USIA- sponsored program. There were many Christian faiths sending people out to these areas. They were having a wonderful time, converting and all this. Some of them were, you know, akin to snake handlers practically. Was any of this going on?*

ADAIR: Yes. It was harder to do it in China, because the Chinese government kept pretty tight

controls on it, but there were people constantly trying. This included Americans. They were so proud when they got through customs with Bibles in their suitcases that had not been discovered. They thought that they were doing such a favor to the Chinese people by spreading the word. I grew up in the Christian faith, and the Christian Church has been an important part of my life. I think it has a lot to offer people and I think it's done a lot of good. It's also done a lot of harm; and I've always been very uncomfortable with both the concept and the practice of evangelizing. It's one thing to share something and teach people. It's quite another to demand that they behave in a certain way and follow the faith that you tell them to follow unquestioningly. It's very difficult for Americans, perhaps for anybody, to draw the lines there.

*Q: I was wondering; I would think one of those Christian sects is one that many Americans are uncomfortable with as the election in 2012 approaches - that's Mormonism. The Mormon Church puts a great deal of emphasis on conversion.*

ADAIR: Yes.

*Q: -and in Asia particularly.*

ADAIR: That's right. That's one of the reasons I was uncomfortable with the choice of the last person we sent as Ambassador to China.

*Q: Huntsman.*

ADAIR: Yes. I just don't think it's right to send people who have another agenda. But, you know, this is not new to China. The Jesuits were there, in the courts of the emperors, hundreds of years ago, and the Jesuits had the same goals. Their goal was to convert people to the Christian faith; they just did it in a different way, and perhaps with a longer timeframe. There were Nestorian Christians that came in from the west of China, using the Silk Road, and established places of worship, teaching their faith in a number of places in China. Muslims have gone into China and done the same thing. So have the Tibetans. The Tibetans conquered - occupied the capital of China - back in the late 700s, I think it was. A lot of that was an energy that came from religious belief, religious conviction. It may start with a belief in the divine, but in the long run it becomes all too human. It's more easily corrupted than any other form of power, I think. It does as much harm as it does good.

But before we leave the subject of China, I would like to talk about the family experience there. I talked a little bit about what Ginger did in Beijing earlier. When we got to Chengdu it was the same story, but on another scale. Ginger was able to access parts of the society in Szechuan that I was not able to. In the city of Chengdu she went around to places, met people and met organizations that I would either not have known about or might not have been permitted to contact. I might have been kept at arm's length because of my face and my position. First of all, she took our son, Charles, to schools because she considered enrolling him. He was only 4 1/2 when we got to Chengdu but she thought that it would be good for him to go to a local school - to have kids to play with and to learn the language and stuff like that. She eventually decided against it, because the schools that she visited were conducted a dialect that was unintelligible to most Mandarin speakers. She had some concerns about the safety of the school building and

things like that as well. So we ended up tutoring Charles at home.

But Ginger also went to the service organization that helped the consulate and said she wanted to visit an orphanage. She had always had an interest in orphanages. The government people wanted to take her to a model orphanage, but she said no - what else was there available? She ended up going to a much lower profile orphanage where many children had been left because they were disabled in one way or another. It wasn't a real happy sight, but they did the best that they could. When she visited it, she took Charles, and then they continued their visits. She wanted to make a contribution, but she was uncomfortable making a monetary contribution because she didn't know how it would be used. So she went to the market. At that time China was producing lots of down jackets for export, and there was a substantial surplus domestically - but they still cost money. She bought lots of warm jackets and comforters and took them to the orphanage - enough for all the kids. And they were somewhat taken aback. Nobody had ever done this before. Also, Chengdu has a fairly mild climate so they didn't really know what to do with it. But they accepted it and they were really pleased that someone would show this kind of interest. Then, that winter it snowed for the first time in 30 years or so - so they were really pleased to have that gift. To this day, I have no idea how Ginger anticipated that.

Ginger was able to meet people and have an impact on the way they viewed us as well. Yes, she was Chinese, but they also knew who she was - eventually. In the case of the orphanage, they concluded that her gift was an official gift from the consulate. It wasn't - it was personal.

We lived in the hotel, and most people didn't like living in a hotel for extended periods of time. When we got there we heard all kinds of stories about the people that managed the hotel - that they were uncooperative, and that particular individuals were difficult to deal with, and so on. There was a great deal of frustration. Ginger approached it completely differently, just as she had in Beijing. She would talk with the hotel staff about their families, she would give them little gifts - things that we had at the consulate like books or something that she found on the street - just little gestures. And she developed a really close relationship with them. One result was the people in the hotel helped us more and more.

We had two organizations in Chengdu that were sort of responsible for us. One was the Foreign Affairs Office, which was sort of a mini-foreign affairs ministry. We were to conduct our relations with the government through them. They seemed like they didn't want to deal with us at all. They were very uncomfortable when we would come because there was really no upside to the relationship for them. There was a downside - this was post-Tiananmen. They would do their duty, but tried to keep it to a minimum. There was another organization called the Foreign Affairs Service Bureau, which was the organization that provided us with all our staff, and they were the ones that actually had to support us. In the past, that relationship too had been a bit of a struggle. But Ginger helped to change that. I would talk to them formally; but she would drop by from time to time just to have tea with them and chat. They felt more comfortable. She learned what they could do, what they couldn't do; and how we should ask for this - or how we could help them as opposed to just being a one-way street. It changed the dynamic of the relationship tremendously.

If I had been a bachelor it would have been a very different kind of an atmosphere. If I had been

married to an American woman it probably would have been a different dynamic, even if she had excellent Chinese. All of those things made a difference - and our son Charles too. He was four years old when we arrived and six years old when we left. He learned to ride his bicycle in the rose garden at the hotel; he and his mother would travel by pedi-cab and go to the park every day and stuff like that. But he introduced me to a lot of things that I wouldn't otherwise have noticed.

*Q: How was that?*

ADAIR: Well, for instance, stuff that he saw in the park. He would say, "Oh, you've got to come," and he would show me what he and his mother had done: having tea; watching the waiters come and pour the tea from three feet away into the tea cups; watching the people do their exercises in the park. One day he found something else that I would have missed. I had been trying to think of ways that we could do things with our Chinese staff, to improve the team spirit. We had about 30 Chinese staff and there were only about six of us Americans, so we relied on them. My birthday was coming up, and Ginger and I had thought maybe we should do something for my birthday that would include them. When Charles was in the park with his mother he saw something that he had never seen before and he wanted to show me. I went back with him, and he showed me a bumper cars arena. The park had set up a carnival like arrangement with bumper cars, and I said, "That's it; we're going to invite all the Chinese staff to come over to the park with us and do the bumper cars on my birthday." We did and it was hysterical. I don't think any of them had seen it, and they had certainly not driven them. Charles had found it and made it possible.

*Q: Did you find this focus on children sort of opened up people? Often in societies the way to get to know people is through children, usually with parents of other kids. How did you find this?*

ADAIR: That's very true in China. It always made people more comfortable, even the highest officials. It was nice for them to be able to focus on a child and then ask you about that afterwards. And it always made me feel good. I mean, you always feel good when somebody asks you about your kids. And Charles was a really cute kid.

**NATALE H. BELLOCCHI**  
**Chairman, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Rosslyn, Virginia (1990-1995)**

*Ambassador Natale H. Bellocchi was born in Little Falls, New York in 1926. He received a degree in industrial management from Georgia Tech in 1944 and was soon drafted into the U.S. Army to serve in a rifle platoon during the Korean War. His Foreign Service career included positions in Hong Kong, Laos, Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, India, and an ambassadorship to Botswana. Ambassador Bellocchi was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on March 21, 1995.*

*Q: So in '90 you moved over to what?*

BELLOCCHI: To the chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan.

*Q: Chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan. Because we're doing this for the historical record, could you explain the background to this, and then what it encompasses.*

BELLOCCHI: Technically speaking, as you know, the TRA, Taiwan Relations Act, in fact legalized the establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan to conduct the unofficial relations between the people of the United States and the people of Taiwan. It actually began just before the TRA was actually passed.

*Q: When was that?*

BELLOCCHI: 1979. The treasurer of the corporation told me that he opened the bank account for the American Institute in Taiwan with one penny. He always likes to tell that story. Our account with the Riggs Bank was opened with one penny, but eventually we got money from Congress to get the Institute going. We have this office here which is the headquarters of a private non-profit corporation.

*Q: We're speaking in Rosslyn, just across the Potomac from the Kennedy Center, and the Department of State.*

BELLOCCHI: So, in fact, some people wanted to say we must in appearances be separated from the Department of State, which we were until about two years ago when the Office of the Inspector General moved into this building and this became SA-39 but we don't advertise the fact that we're in the same building as the State Department. It's very unique, and I found it a very innovative way of carrying on a relationship that has everything that any relationship we have with any country has except the name.

*Q: Can you give a thumbnail sketch of the history on how this organization developed up to the time you took it over in 1990? It obviously was a strange creature.*

BELLOCCHI: Yes, it remains that way, strange. It was started relatively small. We had the headquarters here which is supposed to act as sort of a State Department side, and then the branch office out in Taipei is an embassy in everything but name. They were to report to their headquarters here, and in fact it flows through to the Department from us. The system works fine except in policy matters. The U.S. government must maintain complete control over policy, so the State Department lays down the policy. We implement it in effect. And the man out in the branch office in Taipei under normal circumstances would be an ambassador, and his recommendations and reporting and all the same thing that goes on, normally, goes on there. This office here, the headquarters, is more the administrative headquarters with the money coming in via Washington, we redisperse it out to the branch office, and most of the money goes out there. That's where most of our people are. So that is what maintains this office here, this job. It has other elements, not just supporting the branch office in Taipei. We are responsible for the money that we're getting. We have public affairs activity because the State Department doesn't conduct public affairs for our relationship with the people in Taiwan. I go around the country speaking largely to Chinese-American associations all the time.

And then probably more important than anything is liaison with the Taiwan representative here which I do on almost a daily basis. I'm the liaison with State on a daily basis, the liaison with MFC, with Commerce, with Agriculture, Treasury, all the others. They all flow through us here.

*Q: Let's say you have a fast breaking situation--just recently the Mainland Chinese fired some missiles into the Formosa Straits as to sort of say, we can do nasty things. I might just mention for the record right now, August 1st, our Secretary of State is meeting with the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China because we're going through what the British would call a "rough patch" with China. But, you know, when you have something fast breaking, the idea of sending something to you in Rosslyn to get over to the State Department...*

BELLOCCHI: Oh, no, no. In actual fact there are communications. That is, after all, in the air somehow it winds its way straight over to the State Department also.

*Q: They eavesdrop on your communications.*

BELLOCCHI: There's no short-stop on that. We are here mainly in the administrative sense shortstopping on occasion.

*Q: What has the State Department had to deal with Taiwan? They have to have something within the body of the State Department to deal with Taiwan.*

BELLOCCHI: Oh, there's the coordination office over there that would be somewhat the equivalent of a desk, except that because we are here dealing as a liaison with the Taiwan representative office, there doesn't have to be the same number of people. But the relationship is as broad as you would find anywhere.

*Q: For example, can the State Department people, the relations group, can they go out and have lunch with the Chinese, the Taiwanese?*

BELLOCCHI: Yes, I have lunches quite often.

*Q: You're the 'beard', in a way.*

BELLOCCHI: Yes, and I invite people on both sides.

*Q: You're the cutout in a way.*

BELLOCCHI: We're technically, yes. And yes, that's really an important part of the program.

*Q: I would think it would be essential.*

BELLOCCHI: In many ways, let's take the example, the trade negotiations. That's relatively a non-controversial subject to get into. If we're negotiating a trade issue, or whatever it is, GATT, or whatever it is they're negotiating, of course the negotiations have to be done by USTR. We

don't have the expertise to do that kind of business. And the Taiwanese are the same, they don't have that kind of people here in the Washington office, so people come from Taiwan, for example, and we set up a meeting. And we have as our "consultants" people who come from USTR. We sit them down at the table, and say, "Welcome to AIT, let's sit down and talk trade." And they sit down and they talk trade. If they come to some kind of an agreement, they turn it over to the Taiwan representative office, and to the AIT, and we write up an agreement according to the lines that they've been instructed, and we sign them. It's an agreement between AIT and TECRO the Taiwan representative. So that's the way things are done across the board.

*Q: I suppose all we've done, the thing has been in place now for what?*

BELLOCCHI: Sixteen years. Beyond anyone's realization. I think when the TRA was passed, I know that somebody that you know, gave a speech over at the War College, very intimately involved in our China relations at that time...

*Q: I think your talking about Chas Freeman, aren't you?*

BELLOCCHI: Who said that this thing was probably not going to be needed more than about three years. Well, it's been sixteen years later. So actually by accident it has survived, not only survived, but thrived. You know, we pass out, we say we process more non-immigrant visas in Taipei, sometimes more than any other country, but at the very minimum we are the third largest processor of NIV visas in the world. I mean it's across the board. Our trade is enormous. We sell to Taiwan twice as much as we sell to the PRC. I mean it's a very big relationship.

*Q: Let's talk a bit about our representative's office in Taipei.*

BELLOCCHI: In Taipei, it's called the American Institute in Taiwan.

*Q: Who staffs it?*

BELLOCCHI: We have a director, who in other circumstances would be the ambassador. We have a deputy director who under other circumstances would be the DCM. And then what we call the general affairs section, which under normal circumstances would be the political section. We have an economic section, we use the same words for that. We have the travel service section, which would be the consular area.

*Q: You mentioned the travel services section. I'm an old consular officer, and a part of consular problems, one, just visas and all, which is relatively simple, but are there special provisions because the visa law is set up to say, countries?*

BELLOCCHI: The Taiwan Relations Act includes in it, or gives the AIT the authority to process visas, and we are even getting the authority for passports soon, because that's become...so many travelers back and forth. We did not originally have that authority. The visas are still stamped as being issued in Hong Kong. That clearly is not going to last very much longer. What we change it to is still under discussion, but eventually that will be changed.

*Q: One of the things I take it is that you must have an officer in charge of euphemisms almost.*

BELLOCCHI: Well, that's really one of our jobs. My deputy spends a lot of his time scrubbing communications to be sure it doesn't say...oh, yes, we're a laundering agent as well.

*Q: One of the important function of a consular things, and that is protection of Americans. Usually you have a Consular Treaty.*

BELLOCCHI: That's right, American services.

*Q: What do we have with Taiwan?*

BELLOCCHI: We have an American Citizen Services Office.

*Q: But do we have the equivalent to a treaty?*

BELLOCCHI: No, we have an agreement between AIT and our counterpart on privileges and immunities, and they are almost the same, but not quite the same as diplomatic immunity type of thing. So that's really the thing that judges...I mean our professional relationship between us and the Foreign Office there.

*Q: Because this is for the historical record, when you say...I can never get the right term, but our office, your office in Taipei is staffed, who are these people, where do they come from, and how does it work?*

BELLOCCHI: Okay, the Taiwan Relations Act has taken very good care of that. We have a mixture of people, but most of them are Foreign Service people who have been separated, and they are actually separated from the Foreign Service. It's a very bothersome process for our personnel people in the State Department to go through all the paper work that has to be done to separate them from the Service. They're given a regular passport for their tour in the AIT. We in our budget include all of their salaries, rents, benefits. That's why our budget is as large as it is, it's around \$34 million a year, it's because it includes all these things that under normal circumstances are centrally located in the State Department. At an embassy the admin officer does not get the money to pay people out there. Their pension checks are sent direct here at home. The rents are coming out of Washington as well. That's not the case with us. We have to do all of that ourselves. But we contribute to their pension fund with the TSP and all the other business. So their time in service is never broken. It's smoke and mirrors. We've arranged a way so that these people's service remains intact. These are the bulk of the people. We do have some people from Commerce, Foreign Commercial Service, and the Foreign Agriculture Service. The military is not able to separate uniform military personnel, so we pick up recently retired people, of course, with the cooperation of DOD, to come and work for us.

*Q: They probably come out ahead on that in a way, a little more selective.*

BELLOCCHI: And it's not a bad deal. We have some civil service people, including from the State Department, who are separated the same way. And then we have some people who are

direct hire. We can hire directly. So we have a whole combination of people for whom we have to pay everything.

*Q: Looking at this thing institutionally, in many ways the very fact that you've been here for five years now means that you have probably a little better institutional stability here.*

BELLOCCHI: More continuity.

*Q: ...than you do in other places, which is always a...*

BELLOCCHI: Our people here in Washington. But the turnover out there in Taipei now is very much like an overseas post, a three year assignment cycle.

*Q: Is there a problem there as it used to be if you served in Israel you couldn't go to an Arab world?*

BELLOCCHI: No, they've got American tourist passports. They can travel anywhere they want.

*Q: So a service in Taiwan does not preclude their serving in the PRC?*

BELLOCCHI: Oh, no, on the contrary. We teach language students in our school in Taipei, the old Language School. Most of them go to the Mainland for assignment there.

*Q: Often, and I'm sure right now, there are policy discussions going on. I mean the PRC is showing a propensity to export arms, and to arm itself, and there is concern that this may be our next major enemy...*

BELLOCCHI: That's one school.

*Q: But, I mean it is a school so there have to be essentially policy considerations about whither our relationship with these things, which would mean meetings certainly between the Department of Defense and the State Department and the National Security Council. What happens? Where do you fit into this?*

BELLOCCHI: Well, technically speaking, and in most part not only technically but actually, policy discussions go on over at State, and once the policy is decided, that's what we stand up and salute and carry out. Now, that's not to say we are not asked what do you think of this, or what do you think of that. But we do not have a role in the decision making. Formulating, it may be of course, they will try to draw on all the expertise they can get on what they think is going on here and there, especially in Taiwan, what our views are, and what the reactions would be, etc. That, of course, I contribute to. But the decision itself is made in government. It's got to be a USG decision.

*Q: But there has always been the thing, do we from time to time at least have a Taiwan vet, I mean somebody who has been sitting there in the NSC or something like that?*

BELLOCCHI: You mean that kind of continuity in government?

*Q: Sometimes when policy is being considered, it's not bad to have somebody who knows, who has been around the block in a particular country sitting over at the NSC--you're rolling your eyes.*

BELLOCCHI: You know, like any other service, military or anyone else, we don't like to be second guessed anytime, so having someone that says, "Well, we've been through this two times before, and this is the time it worked..." it isn't always very appreciated. So one treads that one rather carefully.

*Q: I wonder if you'd comment a bit about how, you've been in and out of this whole relationship for some time, when the Taiwan Relations Act was set up, and Chas Freeman said he'd give it three years. This was generally considered because, if I recall, and correct me if I'm wrong, Taiwan did not seem like the greatest ally. I mean it was the end of Chiang Kai-shek. Repugnant may be the wrong term, but it seemed to be two regimes, the People's Republic and Taiwan both. It was very easy to have a two China policy because then we got to deal with them, but we didn't like them. They're not like us, but things have really changed, and I wonder if you could talk a bit about your reflection on the change. Because I think this is profound in what's happening.*

BELLOCCHI: It is absolutely fundamental to the problems we're having right now. I have to see it from the perspective of Taiwan, and some of the other people that you're talking to, of course, have to look at it from the perspective of China. And the PRC, there is no one that I know of, no matter how rabid a supporter of Taiwan, or how rabid an anti-China person that individual is, would ever contest that we should have a good relationship with the PRC. That's an important relationship. No one ever contests that. But seeing it from a different perspective really makes a difference. And what has happened is that our policies established in the '70s were based on the kind of two Chinas, if we can use that expression, that you just talked about, and that doesn't exist anymore. China, of course, has changed a great deal, but nothing compared to the way Taiwan has changed. So how you deal with this set of relationships when you have an authoritarian Taiwan, and how you deal with it when you have a democratic Taiwan, is different. You cannot do in a democratic Taiwan, what you could do in an authoritarian Taiwan. And what to do about that has really perplexed everyone and that exists today among the highest thinkers of these set of relationships, Mr. Kissinger included. That they can easily say, "Well Taiwan, just don't make any noise now because we've got to deal with this big fellow who is very important for us, and you know that's it in your interest, that we have a good relationship. So you just stay down, boy, and don't make any trouble." That's not even feasible anymore. If you're a political leader and depend on votes, and the people have opinions over there--they're one of the most widely traveled people in the world, 20% of the people in Taiwan travel abroad every year. I mean they're really very conscious of what goes on in the world, so that makes them extremely sensitive to the fact they have no status. They have difficulty going to different countries. They have to get visas on different pieces of paper. They're getting more and more proud, or nationalist, or whatever you want to call it. And that isn't given enough weight here, and it absolutely is not given enough weight over in the PRC, who I think really don't understand the fact. They don't understand democracy, so they don't understand what's going on over there. But the fact is that there is a very, very strong undercurrent in Taiwan of this kind of feeling. And a

political leader has got to be responsive to it, or he's going to lose power. And the president of Taiwan no longer has that carte blanche power, no matter how popular he is, that the old leaders of Taiwan used to have. So that is a different set of circumstances. When you have say, "Please don't make noise now because we've got this boy to deal with." The leader there can't say, "Well, okay, we'll sit tight." They won't sit around very long because the people aren't going to accept that. So how you deal with it is a very perplexing issue, and that is the problem that we're facing today. It's a democratic Taiwan, and how in the world is that going to fit into this mold that we had before? We are having problems with it already. That's the reason we're in trouble now. Because in trying to deal with this, if one side cannot accept the changes, or doesn't understand the changes like the PRC, not able to understand the things, well, how do you deal with it? So we're in what you said, a bad spot, a rough spot, with the PRC on this because they are not in a position to accept the changes that have to be dealt with now, or they're going to lose out. It's almost a catch 22 because, for example, you mentioned the missile firing. Missile firing was a rather crude way of reminding the Taiwanese to behave, because if they don't behave those missile could be aimed a little bit further on. But what's the other side of that coin? The other side of that coin is that they've just gone through another experience, one that it was "them," against "us." It's a unifying experience for the people on Taiwan, and strengthened the differences between the people on Taiwan, and the people on the Mainland. It doesn't help. It hurts that kind of tendency, saying "Fellows, you've got to get together and make up your mind what kind of relationship you want." And when you do things like, it actually drives them further apart. And that's what's been going on. There are a lot of people, I think, with forlorn hopes. Frankly, I think they're unrealistic. A million plus people from Taiwan travel over on the Mainland. They're tourists, they've got plenty of money, traveling is cheap for them. As far as I know, I don't know what figures, how reliable they can be, but the last time I heard the figures they say a total of 300 out of 7 million have stayed over there. These are people that were old, and wanted to die in their old village back in the Mainland. Nobody will stay over there, and it's become a place where--I'm from up-state New York, when I was growing up a trip to New York City was kind of a rare occurrence, 250 miles away in those days was a long way, and everyone always said, New York is a great place to visit, but I'd never want to live there. Well, that's what the attitude is in Taiwan. The PRC, that's great, it's interesting, its got a big wall, big statues, big buildings, but I wouldn't want to live there.

*Q: As we're speaking today, and God knows, one really can't predict, it's still a very authoritarian government which is kind of falling apart in many places.*

BELLOCCHI: Well, the standard of living also, I don't know what the per capita income over in China is, maybe 400-450, it's 12,000 on the island. Just that alone in practical terms...I think both sides understand that whatever--they say unification, if that's what it is, that's fine, but it is a long, long way down the road. And there's got to be something to take its place in the meantime, and it can't be what was before, because too many changes have taken place. So no one wants to bite that bullet. It's a very difficult thing. It's probably not the time. China is in the process of deciding on its next leader. How long that's going to take, but I think that article the other day in one of the papers, Wall Street Journal, saying we're really going to have to wait until things settle down over there, and probably settle down here because we have a campaign coming up before anything of any substance can be done. But whether or not we will be willing to bite the bullet, will have the political will, or them, the PRC, to bite the bullet, and say, "Let's sit down and think

about the changes and what alterations we should make for this kind of arrangement." We're always going to have problems.

*Q: There doesn't seem to be much push for unification. On the part of Taiwan, I don't see what's in it for them. In fact many of the people don't...I mean it's a new generation, an island people, just in the normal course of events.*

BELLOCCHI: Unification on Taiwan, as it is still in the Mainland is an emotional issue, a carryover from the civil war on the Mainland of China. In Taiwan now, with the Taiwanese government, democracy, all the things that have happened on Taiwan, unification is no longer an emotional issue, it's a practical problem. In China it's still among the top leadership an emotional issue. The old civil war baggage is still on their shoulders. In Taiwan it is no longer an emotional issue, it's a practical problem. That doesn't mean that they'd give up unification. It means, though, if we've got to have it, let's do it in a realistic way. The political leadership on Taiwan has got to put the welfare and security of the people on that island first, or they won't stay in power. And that's the change. Not unification first, the people on Taiwan first.

*Q: You say you go around and address a lot of Chinese American associations. What are you saying, and what are you getting from them?*

BELLOCCHI: Oh, they're in quite a change themselves. They're reflecting the turmoil in thinking out there. The older Chinese American groups...I can no longer go to San Francisco or Los Angeles and just speak with one group. I've got to speak to two or three, or I've got a problem because they won't mix. And the older generation, they really have no emotional attachment to Taiwan per se, their attachment is to a China that doesn't exist anymore. So they're completely befuddled. They don't like what's going on in Taiwan. Taiwan was only supposed to be a temporary footstop before we get back to China. So they're unhappy. And, of course, the PRC is making hay in some of those associations because they're representing themselves as the real China now, "We're not what we used to be." So they're making some inroads. Taiwan is losing the allegiance of a lot of the old Chinatown crowd, places like that.

The new immigrants from Taiwan are the real basis of support for Taiwan these days. And they have plenty of support within the country. The younger generation that is coming here now, immigrating to the United States, gets much more involved in our politics than the older generation. They ran their laundries, and their restaurants, and they sent their kids to medical school, and they didn't care about all this other business. Not now. This younger generation here, they're really savvy and they're very much involved in the politics of their communities. And if these organizations were ever able to unify, which is totally against their character, they probably could be a political force. But they have difficulty unifying, so they're not. But if you're talking about what problems do we have, if you want to have a sense of what I think, we don't here as a country have a sense of the revolution that's taking place in Taiwan. I've just lived through it these five years. When I began to talk to these groups, especially the Taiwanese groups, the overwhelming problem was, why can't we get a visa to go back home? They were blacklisted. There were people that couldn't go because they preached independence and all of this business. That was the overwhelming problem of the groups here in the United States. That's all gone now. It's all gone. They can go back. Some of them are in the legislature. If you go to

meet the leader of the opposition, he has spent 25 years in jail. Nobody has been killed by this revolution that's taking place, so people haven't noticed it as much. But if you could feel it when you go to Taiwan the people that you're dealing with now, it's like a big breath of fresh air. They want to talk independence. They want to oppose the leadership simply because they can do it now, and weren't able to do it before. It's that kind of thing that the leadership has to live with. They have opened the doors, and opened the windows, and everybody wants to shout, and boy their politics are as vigorous as you can find anywhere. Because it's new, it's invigorating. They can really do all the things that they could never do before. And that strengthens them very much. So we worry about that they should really be thinking about their relationship with the Mainland. The only time they think about it is how much money can I make over there, or if they shoot missiles, there they are, at it again. But otherwise they don't think of the Mainland. They think of all their problems on Taiwan.

*Q: We have a sizeable immigration, I assume, I don't have the figures, but coming particularly from that Quan\_\_ area from Mainland China. Do you find yourself talking to these people? Are they a separate group?*

BELLOCCHI: No, although some of them are in the groups. The groups I talk to are usually quite identified with the Taiwan side, and you don't find them there. Where you find the differences in the groups that I talk with, are really in generation because even Mainlander young people who are recent immigrants from Taiwan, are not terribly different than Taiwanese immigrants from Taiwan in thinking. What they have is what today's Taiwan is like, whereas the older generation are thinking of the day's that are now history.

*Q: Here you are in this quasi-official position. Can you talk to them the way you're talking to me now?*

BELLOCCHI: I remember the first group I went to talk to was the Taiwanese American Chamber of Commerce of North America, having their annual meeting up in New York, and I decided to go and I gave them the talk. I had been giving talks before that were much more candid than before. I think previous AIT people had always talked about trade, and how well the relationship was doing, and put them all asleep type of talk. And I decided Taiwan was opening up, and we had to tell people what Taiwan was like. It was more than just trade in this relationship. So they were a little bit shocked in the older groups that I would talk about the changes taking place, and how bad it was. They weren't letting their own citizens back into Taiwan, and the fact that they were developing quite a different identity on Taiwan than those people on the Mainland. This was almost heresy to be saying this. Well, when I went up to the group in New York, this was the first Taiwanese group...

*Q: This was about when?*

BELLOCCHI: Towards the end of 1990, around that time. There was still all the business of visas and all, so I gave them that kind of talk and told them what Taiwan was like. And you can't imagine the feeling of the people. There was about 400-500 people. They always have huge crowds in these things. There were about 400-500 people there and you could tell that they were so, so happy that someone from what they perceived government, was actually paying attention

to them. They had never had anyone pay any attention to them before. So as I travel around the country talking to more of these groups, I sense they really had a very strong feeling that they were sort of cut adrift. I think now that that's changing. They're really getting a lot more confident. I mean Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy is giving us a lot of problems in terms of our policy. But it is very, very well received by the Taiwanese community, even here in America. Certainly back home that's given them a little pride.

*Q: I keep referring because right now I'm doing a couple of interviews with other Chinese more Mainland oriented. One as we mentioned before is Chas Freeman, who was both deputy chief of mission in Beijing, and also ambassador to Saudi Arabia. So I asked him about the difference between the Taiwanese lobby and the Israeli lobby. The Israeli lobby is renowned in the United States. And his thing was really in many ways the Taiwanese lobby, particularly in this day, was getting more effective because the Israelis were more in your face in that they would come, and say you do this, and if you don't do this I'll have a Senator calling you by this afternoon. Whereas he said the Taiwanese have cultivated and really gotten much more into that. I don't know. I just want you to comment on that.*

BELLOCCHI: Okay, I know Chas has just made a speech out there in Hong Kong that said they bought the vote, I think that's absurd, really, I'm sorry, it's absurd.

*Q: We're talking about the vote about...*

BELLOCCHI: ...whether or not we should give them visas to come here to visit. The resolution got a 96 to 0 vote. Lobbying certainly helped. There's a lot of lobbying that goes on. That doesn't hurt, but it's the message, and I think it really misdirects our ideas if we think that they bought it. But, there's no question about their effectiveness, and they're coming close to what you have just described. They have plenty of people up on the Hill, influencing a very broad spectrum of politicians. It used to be that only very conservative Republicans...

*Q: We're talking about Senator Knowland and a few from California.*

BELLOCCHI: But that's changed now, democracy has made quite a difference up on the Hill. I mean, someone like Leiberman in Connecticut, and Paul Simon in Chicago.

*Q: We're talking about quite liberal Senators.*

BELLOCCHI: ...these are people that support them because they are a democracy, and they have turned their human rights thing around so completely, so they have a very broad spectrum of support up on the Hill. And yes, the Taiwan lobby is getting more and more open because it's a democracy and they can't hide the figures anymore. And even PR firms like Cassidy are being used to generate public relations. Well, that's a lot like what the Israelis were doing. It's the same kind of thing. And the fact that the Taiwanese themselves are far more politically active in our politics, all of this has meant that they have greater radar reach on the Hill, and they more clearly understand that the only thing that really keeps them in play is the Congress. They're well aware of that.

*Q: Well, Nat, to sort of end this, from your perspective we're talking about August 1995. How do you see the relationship with Taiwan, the People's Republic, and the United States developing?*

BELLOCCHI: Taiwan would like us to detach that trilateral relationship and make that two separate bilaterals. I don't think it's possible, of course, because you've always got to take the other into consideration. But it's troublesome. I think the relationship with the PRC is a separate issue, and it may even get worse because of our politics. But that hasn't anything to do with Taiwan. Unless we can start accepting that we've got to do something different than we were doing before, I mean really different, we'll have trouble. We won't have the same kind of relationship we've had with Taiwan in the past. They've got money. They've got great economic strength, and they've got political strength because in March 1996, I'm sure Lee will be elected, directly elected, by the 21 million people on that island to be their president. You can't get more legitimate than that. And what do we do about it? When they say, "I'm the president of Taiwan, I want to do this, and I want to do that, or I want to go this way." We can say no, of course, but at some cost.

*Q: What about Taiwan's relationship with other countries? We tend to be U.S. centric. when we put this thing together, but how do they deal with other countries?*

BELLOCCHI: With difficulty because all these other countries as on almost every issue, are hiding under our skirts. They always tell the Taiwanese, "You deal with the Americans, and you want to enter GATT, you deal with the Americans." Only when the Americans stick their neck out, are they willing to stick their neck out afterward. But in many cases it's getting more and more difficult. When we gave Taiwan trouble on military sales, the French moved in and sold them Mirages, for example, and then moved right back out again. They don't have the same interest we have, none of the Europeans do, so they can dance in and out of these problems and leave it up to us.

*Q: I imagine Japan...*

BELLOCCHI: Oh, no, they're more cautious than ever. I mean they've got more at stake, they're much closer to China than we are. They've got problems, and they're growing problems. Some of the problems that they're growing in Japan are the same things that we've had to face. They've got a lot of business with Taiwan; they have more business with the PRC than we do. We have more business with Taiwan than the PRC. They have it the other way around, but they also have a democracy that's increasingly aware of the democracy in Taiwan. So Taiwan's support in Japan is actually growing. It was very high at first because they appreciated that old Chiang Kai-shek didn't demand reparations for World War II. Well, that crowd has sort of died away. They've sort of become history just like Chiang Kai-shek has become history. But now the newer group is coming up. They're doing business with Taiwan. They respect democracy in Taiwan. So I think the Foreign Office, in Tokyo is beginning to feel the same kind of pressures that our State Department feels on the issue of Taiwan. In a much lesser degree now because their inclination to be more wary of the PRC is much greater than ours, based more on geography than anything else.

*Q: How about some of these other relationships, sort of an ASEAN, Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Philippines, again they're in that area very suspicious of the power of Mainland China.*

BELLOCCHI: But there's something else too. Taiwan has become the largest investor in Vietnam, and the second largest in most of the other countries, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines. The Philippines are becoming a major factor in this. So here's little Taiwan which offers no threat to them at all putting money in their country. Whereas their own Chinese population, many of them are putting money in Mainland China, taking them out of the country. Here's Taiwan, putting some money in. So that helps.

*Q: Do you see upon the Taiwan government...is this natural economic expansion, or is this, I mean as you see it, are they making real efforts to make sure they invest in various places?*

BELLOCCHI: No, they can't direct it. It's very much a free market. As a matter of fact if they could direct it they wouldn't have this much going into the Mainland that goes now. It really is very difficult for them to direct. I mean they can try incentives, which is what they're doing with the southern strategy, for example, and being led by some state enterprises, to go down there and invest. But that's all. They can't coerce their private sectors into these areas. Erland Heginbotham, formerly a DAS at State, attended the seminar that I was in, and he said that if you want to know where the next economic opportunities are in the Asia area, follow the Taiwanese businessmen, because they're largely small corporations, or little branches of bigger ones that take risks, and they move. I mean, if the opportunity, especially labor costs are cheaper here than there, then they take their machines out of there, and simply move them over to the other ones. A very simple operation.

*Q: Sounds like a much more flexible operation than say the Japanese.*

BELLOCCHI: Oh, yes. It's part of the character in Taiwan. They can never get together, so they're all little individual companies, but it really gives them enormous flexibility. So you find some of the investment that has been in China gets disgusted, they simply pick up their machines, put them on a boat, and go down to Vietnam.

*Q: I would imagine the Taiwan-Vietnam relationship...Vietnam as we talk now we've just started to open American relations, but I would think the Vietnamese would welcome Taiwan because there's obviously no love lost between Vietnam and China these days.*

BELLOCCHI: Also no danger. So no, of course, they have an investment guarantee agreement with Taiwan. Even the KMT has made investments in Vietnam, a big industrial park down there. And a lot of companies have gone down there. They're welcomed by the Vietnamese. One Taiwanese businessman I talked to in Taichung who had factories in both Fujian and Vietnam, and asked him what he thought of the two. And he compared in very much an absolutely apolitical way, he wasn't thinking of politics at all. But saying labor costs were cheaper in Vietnam, trainability was better in Fuchien, but quality was better in their labor in Vietnam. And then he wrapped up the discussion by saying that one big difference was that Vietnamese officials encourage him to invest, while Chinese officials expect him to do so.

**MICHAEL H. NEWLIN**  
**Retired annuitant, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1991)**

*Ambassador Newlin was born in North Carolina and was raised there and in the Panama Canal Zone. After graduating from Harvard he joined the Foreign Service in 1952 and was posted to Frankfurt, Oslo, Paris, Kinshasa and Jerusalem, where served as Consul General. During his distinguished career, Ambassador Newlin served in several high level positions dealing with the United Nations and its agencies and NATO. He served as Ambassador to Algeria from 1981 to 1985 and as US representative to the United Nations Agencies in Vienna., 1988-1991. Ambassador Newlin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2006 and by Thomas Dunnigan in 1997.*

*Q: This is one place where the United States and the Soviet Union were in agreement.*

NEWLIN: Absolutely. Even during the worst days of the Cold War.

*Q: We have got these nuclear toys but we don't want anybody else to have them.*

NEWLIN: That's right. Well the Russians did make a mistake I believe right after communists took over in China. I think they did help the Chinese, and then of course when their relations soured, that was a big mistake that they figured they had made. When China then became a nuclear power, that was something that they had contributed to. The Chinese would have done that anyway, but it would have taken longer.

*Q: What did you do?*

NEWLIN: After Clarke wound up over at the White House, he persuaded Rand Beers to join him as his deputy. Have you interviewed him?

*Q: I haven't finished, but I started.*

NEWLIN: Okay, well Rand Beers was the deputy assistant secretary for export for munitions licensing and policy which was the largest group in PM which issued licenses for the export of military equipment. This all goes back many years when Congress passed a law saying the State Department would be responsible for licensing military items. Of course it all had to be coordinated with Defense and with the other appropriate agencies. A big thing. So I had to quickly learn all about export controls, first of all the laws and then the regulations. Then I was doing that, when Bob Einhorn who was the person that Gallucci relied on for anything to do with nuclear matters, Bob Einhorn came into my office one day and said, "Mike, would you be willing to lead a delegation to Kazakhstan to explain to them export controls?" I said, "I would be delighted to do that." So we put together a delegation under the Nunn Lugar program which

was one of the most far-sighted pieces of legislation that was done to deal with problems resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Nunn Lugar program was to secure and prevent the proliferation of nuclear materials. The heart was the safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear weapons in Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus but export controls were also a part to short circuit the involved Congressional budget procedures and in view of the urgency of the problems, the Nunn Lugar legislation provided that an initial sum of \$500 million would be reprogrammed from the enormous Pentagon budget. Easier said than done. Belarus was a special case but Ukraine and Kazakhstan had so many other problems that they hesitated to address SSD. So I guess I was the first one to be asked to do something under Nunn Lugar. Now this was quite apart, Stu, from everything that was going on at the very highest levels including the president and secretary of state to deal with what is going to happen with all of these nuclear weapons and nuclear facilities in the newly independent states. That was all being dealt with separately. Things like export controls, and then later on safe and secure dismantlement of nuclear warheads and nuclear materials. That was all under the Nunn Lugar program. So I put together my team. It had people from DOD, customs, energy, CIA. So we were all ready to go. We sent a telegram to Almaty which was the capital then. The person that was responsible in PM for getting the Nunn Lugar funding called up defense and defense said, "Oh, we are still working on this reprogramming thing. There is no money available now, and we don't know where it is coming from." Imagine the bureaucratic scrounging. Nobody wanting their money reprogrammed. Dan Poneman was on the NSC staff. He followed the PM operations. He was having a meeting to discuss a variety of things. The assistant secretary of defense for international affairs, I think it was Ashton Carter. Have you ever heard of Ash Carter? No, I think. He was from the Kennedy school at Harvard. So I went over to the old executive office building and sat in on this meeting. When Ash Carter got up to go back to the Pentagon, I got up and went out and I said, "Look, we have got a real problem here. We are supposed to carry this thing forward and Kazakhstan is willing. We can't get any money from you." He said, "I will take care of it." And he did. So off we went.

It was a very interesting experience. Here the Soviet Union dissolved. The people in charge were the people; many of them had been running things under Moscow including the president. Here the United States comes in and wants to talk to them about creating export controls. Of course that raised suspicions. Why are the Americans doing this? What is in it for them? What is in it for us and so forth and so on. But they did produce a Kazakh delegation with all the appropriate people.

They had just created their own atomic energy agency with their own Kazakh personnel. Of course there were vast quantities of nuclear material. Ust-Kamenogorsk was the largest factory in the world that produced nuclear materials for reactors. So we explained to them our own system and the fact that they needed to move quickly to set up their own export controls. Our system while it is very effective, it is very cumbersome because of the accumulated regulations that we have. I stressed to them that they should set up something that met their requirements and not necessarily try to duplicate what we were doing. They were very receptive. They had their own fledgling experts there. We spent several days in sessions. Airplane connections in those days were not very frequent, so we wound up at the end with a couple of free days. Somebody said we ought to do a field trip. I said, "Sure, where do you think we ought to go?" "Well let's go to Baikonur, their Kennedy Space Center, or we can ask to go to the Chinese border and see what

the export controls are on the Chinese border, or we can ask to go to their nuclear test site at Semipalatinsk.” I laughed. “Do you think they will let us go to Semipalatinsk?” So they said, “Well let’s ask.” The answer came back, “Well no, we are working at Baikonur.” They first said yes to the Chinese border, and then they said no, there was a transportation problem. They finally said toward the end of our stay, “You can go to Semipalatinsk.” There was a catch though. There were no air connections with the old Aeroflot that would get us to Semipalatinsk and back to Almaty in time for us to get one of the flights back to Frankfurt. My colleagues said, “Let’s ask the Department if we can charter a military plane from the Kazakhs to go there.” I laughed and said, “That will take weeks to decide.” They said, “Well we can ask can’t we?” “Yeah, go ahead and send them a telegram.” Next morning the answer came back, “Go to the embassy, get \$1500. Charter plane and take your delegation to Semipalatinsk.” Off we went. We flew in a modified military plane called a Yak. The Kazakhs met us at the airport and we bussed out to the test site. Drove up to their building and here were the Russian generals with their pie plate hats. “We welcome you to Semipalatinsk on behalf of the President of Kazakhstan.” And they were very nice. We drove around through what had been their open air nuclear test area. Our representative from energy was a lady. She said, “This is all a charade. These cows and sheep that are out here eating all this green grass. It is all radioactive. You would never drink any milk or eat any of this flesh.” So we then stopped by a door. We all got out and went in, put on the white smocks. They gave us a dosimeter to measure radioactivity. We went down a corridor looking up at a huge reactor, brand new reactor. One member of our delegation was from the Sandia nuclear laboratory. He had nothing to say during the entire time we had been there. Then he started asking questions. “What is the reactor fueled with?” “Well highly enriched uranium. Weapons grade uranium.” “How much? When was it put in? What is the reactor used for?” “The Reactor is used for research.” So we had a very successful meeting there. We went back and had a nice luncheon. As we were getting ready to leave to be bussed back into town, the Kazakhs came up to us and said, “Mr. Ambassador, would you by any chance have space on your plane for some of our delegation because we can’t get a plane back to Almaty today?” I said, “We would love to have you on board.” So we had the whole new Kazakhstan nuclear ministry of top officials on our plane. We could talk to them and find out who they were and where they came from. So that started our effort on export controls.

I did give a press conference in the end where I said what all of us believed was the case, that they had no export controls. In Soviet times all the decisions in this whole area were made in Moscow. So they had no export controls as we knew them. They had to develop them. I made this point and it was reported on the front page of the Washington Post, that they had none, and that we had better hurry up with the Nunn Lugar program in dealing with all of the other nuclear successor states. This remark was not taken kindly by the new undersecretary for disarmament, a Miss Lynn Davis from the Rand Corporation. She had replaced Frank Wisner, and PM came under her. She wanted to know who authorized my statement and had the U.S. government determined that this was the case, and why was this statement being made in Almaty. That kicked off a long period of her dissatisfaction with what PM was doing across the board.

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*Q: During this time, we began to ease up on the China question, as I recall. The first tangible evidence was the visit of the Chinese ping pong team.*

NEWLIN: Yes, there began to be indications that we were. Of course by that time Charley Yost had departed. In 1970, George Bush arrived. It was his first time in national politics as well as diplomacy. He was closer to the White House, I would say, than he was to the State Department. He was very conscientious about following his instructions and he was diligent in doing his homework.

The first big thing that happened was the Chinese ping pong visit to the U.S. George Bush invited them to play ping pong at the U.S. Mission. The newspapers all carried pictures of him and the team. George may have been the senior U.S. official to meet with them.

*Q: Paddle in hand! What was his relationship, by the way, with Henry Kissinger, who was then in the White House?*

NEWLIN: Well, like anyone else's, I guess. Henry told him in strict confidence on the eve of the vote on Chinese representation, a very critical movement, that he was going to make the trip to Beijing. George told me in strict confidence that he was going to make the trip to China. I guess I was the only one he told; maybe he told others, I just don't know. So I told him, I said, "Well, we will lose the vote, but nobody can blame you." He said, "No, no. We've got the vote." The awkward thing was that Rogers and the State Department did not know about the trip.

*Q: That is to maintain the Taiwan seat?*

NEWLIN: Yes. We changed to what amounted to a two China policy. We supported Beijing as the representative of China but linked this to continued representation for Taiwan. I said, "The waiverers, whenever this gets out, when the pictures come out of Henry meeting with Mao and Zhou En-lai, when push comes to shove, we will lose." But we still maintained our full court press. It was one of the most dramatic things I was ever involved in. Two days before the vote I asked our experts at the Mission to estimate what the final tally would be (they did not know about the trip). Instead of a narrow victory, they projected a seven or eight vote loss. I persuaded George to send it to the Department in a Top Secret message so that they could be prepared. He was reluctant because he did not want to appear defeatist, but he was persuaded.

*Q: So everybody was drawing the conclusions that the game is over.*

NEWLIN: Yes. Why should we ruin our future relations with China when Kissinger is meeting Mao? That is how it came out. We had to go down to Washington, went down to Washington with George. We met with Scali and the media and briefed them as to what had actually happened. Long standing allies, the Netherlands, Belgium, Tunisia joined the stampede.

So then the Chinese did arrive. The Chinese ambassador in Ottawa was told to pack up and come to New York and assume his duties there. I don't think the Chinese were really expecting it. I will tell you another very interesting thing that happened. All of this was going on and we were lobbying the quarters. I went over and tried to persuade the Dutch to stand with us and the

Tunisians that had promised. They were hell bent to vote for Beijing. The Albanians were the sponsors of the resolution that replaced the Nationalist Chinese with the PRC. So during the meeting it looked like and we were lobbying so much that it looked like that we were going to prevail again in defeating the Albanian resolution. So the Albanian representative got up and started towards the podium. The Pakistani permanent representative Aga Shahi said, "Where are you going?" The Albanian said, "Well I am going up to the podium. I am withdrawing my resolution." Shahi said, "Why are you doing that?" "I am afraid we are going to lose." "You are crazy; the Americans are losing. Don't do that."

*Q: Tell me, Mike, Before you heard about Kissinger going to China which obviously pulled the rug out from everything.*

NEWLIN: It changed everything.

*Q: But before you heard about that, was there sort of the feeling OK we are fighting this battle, and we fought this battle year after year after year to keep the PRC out of the UN. Was there the feeling that OK we are doing this one more year, but this is really a losing battle to go on with?*

**DONALD A. CAMP**  
**China Desk Officer**  
**Washington, DC (1991-1992)**

**Consul General**  
**Chengdu (1992-1995)**

*Donald Camp was born in New York in 1948. He received his BA from Carleton College and an ND from University of Chicago. He joined the Foreign Service in 1974. His overseas assignments include Colombo, Bridgetown, Beijing, Chengdu, and Kathmandu. His sister, Beatrice Camp, is also a Foreign Service Officer. Mr. Camp was interviewed by David Reuther in 2012.*

*Q: Coming off the Hill then you took an assignment to the China/Mongolia Desk.*

CAMP: Well, I had been assigned to be Consul General in Chengdu, a job that was open in summer of 1992. So I had a gap of one year and the obvious place to put me was the China Desk, where I could do work that would prep me for my next assignment..

*Q: Can you give me a description of the China Desk, its size and organization?*

CAMP: It was the Office of China and Mongolian Affairs. Office Director was Bob Perito. I worked directly for the Deputy for Political Affairs, Mark Mohr. In the East Asia Bureau front office, we reported to Desaix Anderson, the senior deputy assistant secretary. I was the human rights and Tibet affairs officer. The Tibet portfolio was particularly significant for me since I knew Tibet was going to be a major area of focus when I moved to Chengdu.

*Q: This was your third or fourth desk officer assignment. What were the kinds of things that you were covering and writing on?*

CAMP: I had more congressional activity because Tibet and human rights in China are both very high profile issues. This was only two years after the Tiananmen massacre, and emotions were still very high. There was a lot of involvement with Capitol Hill, NGOs, and the public and press.

My congressional experience came in very handy. I knew most of the Foreign Relations Committee staff at that point. China prison labor was a big issue at the time, especially the controversy over products of Chinese prisons coming to the US. It was dealt with both as a human rights issue and as unfair competition. In the course of dealing with this issue, I learned that we pay our own prisoners a pittance; they also produce products that compete in the marketplace. No one was much interested in hearing about that.

*Q: What's U.S. policy to China as seen from the desk?*

CAMP: Besides the usual business of carrying on a bilateral relationship, we always felt as if we needed to fight back against efforts to completely derail our relationship with China. We were under legislatively-mandated sanctions, but there were also efforts in Congress and elsewhere to rebalance our relationship toward Taiwan and away from the mainland. We tried to take a longer term view in the State Department and say we will continue to need a productive relationship with China, let's not go overboard.

*Q: Is that illustrated by the Radio Asia issue?*

CAMP: That is a good example Congress was looking for ways to bring news into China. In those pre-internet days, it was still very much a closed society. Voice of America was active but did not have a mandate to report actively on China's internal developments. The congressional proposal was to establish a Radio Free China, which would be a surrogate radio network analogous to Radio Free Europe. It would provide the Chinese public an alternative to local media and actually provide perspectives on what was happening inside China. The State Department believed that it would be better to beef up VOA, expand its Mandarin – and Tibetan – services, and increase its coverage of Chinese news. A lot of my time was spent on this effort, which was ultimately unsuccessful. VOA was never a particularly effective advocate because they really didn't want to change their focus, and become a local news purveyor. And so, VOA now coexists with Radio Free Asia. There was concern at the time that two radio services would be competing for a limited pot of funds, and I think it has played out that way, to VOA's detriment.

*Q: Now, on Radio Free China and other issues, again, you're dealing with other actors in Washington, other offices.*

CAMP: There were frequent interagency meetings, which took a lot of our time. But my job was very much an outreach job. I was fortunate because our jobs are so often focused on internal

deliberations that we don't have time to talk to the press, the Hill, the NGOs. My job by necessity was to help convince critics of our policy that there was a way forward on U.S. policy toward China that did not involve cutting the country off from everything. So I dealt with a lot of the interest groups. One of the more interesting and effective, then and now, was the International Campaign for Tibet. Then and still (2012) it was headed by a very effective Tibetan by the name of Lodi Gyari, who cut a wide swath around Washington. He's the personal representative of the Dalai Lama in Washington; he was well-received, sometimes lionized on Capitol Hill and among journalists and think tanks. I got to know Lodi; he was a very effective lobbyist. But part of my job was trying to prevent his efforts from derailing US-China relations. As I recall, there was a bill introduced in Congress around this time that referred to Tibet as an occupied country. This was received in Beijing with dismay. The Chinese Embassy knew that it had no effect on the official relationship and was presumably telling the Foreign Ministry. Our message to China was along the lines of "Look, we have very serious human rights concerns here, you know that. We do not intend, however, to change our official relationship with China. We continue to recognize Tibet as an integral part of China. That has not changed, whatever you may hear from Capitol Hill." But when a senior party official in China reads in his official translation of the American press that the Congress has called Tibet a country, he is not going to understand the nuances of American politics, and the separation of powers. He's going to think this is reflective of US foreign policy. So we did a lot of damage control.

*Q: Did you have an opportunity to interact with any of the embassy officers?*

CAMP: Yes. Some of the same people I had worked with in the Foreign Ministry in Beijing in the mid-'80s were now in fairly senior positions. The DCM was Liu Xiaoming who had been a junior officer at the Foreign Ministry in 1984-85. So it was nice to re-establish that relationship. In general, the Chinese embassy officers in Washington were a pretty sophisticated lot. They knew how to work the halls of State and of Capitol Hill. It was a difficult time for a Chinese diplomat in Washington. They were not greeted with enthusiasm on Capitol Hill, for instance. But it was important to them – and to us – for them to explain to their leadership back in Beijing how Washington worked.

*Q: Now you're preparing to move to Chengdu to become the Consul General.*

CAMP: That's right. I was an avid reader of the reporting from Chengdu while I was on the desk. I was also the desk's backstop/liaison for the consulate. The management backup was performed by the bureau's executive office and a lot of that was focused on preparing the consulate's new office building and the move from the temporary hotel location. I was the beneficiary of that in the first year I was in Chengdu.

*Q: Actually, like most of our consulates, didn't they start out in a hotel or something like that and finally after long negotiations got their own plot of land and then built a building?*

CAMP: That's exactly right. And it was longer than usual in Chengdu. But fortunately, this was mostly accomplished by the time I got to Chengdu. At that point it was mostly opening our new facilities.

*Q: How did you prepare for your new assignment?*

CAMP: Well, in addition to dealing with the human rights and Tibet issues from the Washington perspective, I worked on trade promotion issues. And toward the end of my year on the desk, I went over to the Peace Corps headquarters to talk to the folks working on the new Peace Corps program in China, which was to be headquartered in Sichuan, in Chengdu. Peace Corps almost always sets up in the capital, but with China so huge, they decided to focus at first just on the province of Sichuan. And, in another departure from standard practice, they had agreed with the Chinese after laborious discussions that it was not to be the American Peace Corps, it was to be the U.S.-China Friendship Volunteers.

*Q: So now going out to post you would have stopped in the embassy in Beijing. What did the embassy tell you it wanted you to look at and report on and who was your handler in the embassy?*

CAMP: My supervisor the DCM, Scott Hallford, was very helpful. And the Ambassador at the time was Stapleton Roy, one of our great China hands. He told me that he had a Chengdu history himself. He'd been a boy in Chengdu, as the son of a missionary family. During World War II, he would climb to the top of the city wall and watch the explosions as the Japanese shelled Chengdu. So he had a personal interest in Sichuan and came to visit a number of times while I was there.

*Q: Did he have any particular emphasis on your focus?*

CAMP: Yes. Tibet was something that the embassy was very interested in. It was a very sensitive issue then as it is now, both for human rights concerns and our whole bilateral relationship. So one message was to get out to Tibet often. They also wanted more reporting from the other provinces in the consular district. Chengdu's district was the province of Sichuan, the autonomous region of Tibet, the province of Yunnan and the province of Guizhou. Yunnan bordered on the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia, and therefore was a developing major narcotics area. Sichuan was just beginning to be a major investment focus for foreign companies. The east coast had already seen a lot of development. Now attention was turning more toward the west, so trade promotion was important. And the fourth big issue was management. We had been in a hotel since the consulate opened seven years earlier. And we would finally be moving into a compound, an office building, an apartment building, and a CG's (consul general) residence. And that took a lot of my attention, particularly that first year.

*Q: The new buildings, were they newly built by the State Department's Overseas Buildings Bureau?*

CAMP: It was kind of parallel with the consulate in Shenyang, which had opened earlier. That is to say, the design was OBO's (Overseas Building Operation) -- it was FBO then, OBO now. But the construction was primarily done by the Chinese with some OBO supervision. I don't know how it worked out in Shenyang, but in Chengdu it was not good. It took a lot longer than we expected. And one of the problems -- the biggest problem probably -- was a design problem from the beginning from our side, which is to say it was designated as an unclassified post. And that is

not realistic. That was probably done for cost-saving reasons. But it was clear when I went out there that we needed classified communications. We didn't have it, we didn't have an area that allowed for that. So that took a lot of redesign while I was there and delayed us further. But it was much more comfortable when we finally moved in, compared to working and living in the Jin Jiang Hotel in downtown Chengdu.

*Q: And that's where you were when you first arrived.*

CAMP: Correct.

*Q: And when you first arrived, how large is the consulate?*

CAMP: We had seven American officers and we had about 25 to 28 locally hired staff. So it was small. And it was clearly destined to grow. One of the problems was that the locally employed staff was, unlike almost anyone else in the world, not hired by us and they weren't employees of the U.S. government. They were contract employees and they worked for the Sichuan provincial government and they were assigned by the Sichuan provincial government. So we didn't choose them as we would like. And this problem persisted for another 10 years or so all over China before we finally were allowed to hire employees.

*Q. When was your first trip to Tibet?*

CAMP: I arrived in August 1992. I am pretty sure that I went up within the first few months because that was a priority for the mission. I can't actually remember the first trip with great clarity, but it was wintertime. I had some perspective on the place from my 1984 visit. The government in Beijing allowed limited access. It was relatively open for most of the time I was there; diplomats could go but under strict numerical limits and each trip was on a case-by-case basis.

It was clear you were always under surveillance there. You couldn't set foot in anyone's house without everyone knowing that you were there. And this was brought home to me once when I was sitting with a Tibetan, who might properly be called a dissident. And in walked someone who obviously knew who I was and said, "We need to talk to you. You need to come over and talk to the Foreign Office." So we had to be very careful about who we met. And that limited our reporting greatly. Even foreigners were careful about what they said. As in 1984, I called on the Nepal Consul General, the only foreign diplomat there. He obviously knew more about Tibet than most because he was from neighboring Nepal, spoke the language, and had a consulate staff. But he also knew he was under surveillance and was never very helpful. I always checked in with him, but he never had that much to say.

*Q: Now, when you come to Chengdu in '92, what is the Chinese policy toward Tibet? Or at least what is our perception?*

CAMP: The atmosphere was somewhat more liberal than the past, and dramatically so by comparison with the horrors of the Cultural Revolution. High schools were teaching in Tibetan and -- my own touchstone of openness -- you could still buy pictures of the Dalai Lama in the

bazaar. If you asked for a picture they'd pull one out from underneath the counter and sell it to you. If you went into the most holy of the shrines, the Jokhang Temple, right in the middle of town, in the sanctum sanctorum there was usually at least one picture of the Dalai Lama. Once I remember seeing a "Free Tibet" poster there. So clearly the police did not come into the sanctum sanctorum. That was not always true. Crackdowns seemed to run in cycles.

I tried to get to Tibet at least four times a year. One of my memorable trips was as escort for a congressional delegation arranged at very short notice. Senator Claiborne Pell, then Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Levin were on a CODEL in China. They had had a longstanding request to visit Tibet; during their visit in Beijing, it was suddenly approved.

Senator Pell was quite elderly. The Chinese government sent along a doctor, because they knew of the health problems of going to 13,000 feet suddenly. The Americans sent along our own doctor at Senator Pell's wife's insistence. She was quite concerned.

But the senators were very excited. We had a small delegation. Everyone's advice when you arrive in Tibet, whether you're a 20-year old and fit, or older, is to take the first day off, just relax, acclimatize. You're going from practically sea level to 13,000 feet; it's actually quite dangerous. Senator Pell would have none of that. We came in from the airport, which is a lengthy drive. And he saw a famous monastery. He probably knew about it already, but he said, "Stop. I want to see that monastery."

Well, that was another climb of maybe 800 feet or so. The doctor was taken aback, and tried to encourage him to continue into the city and relax till the following day. But Pell just started climbing the steps. It was as if he was rejuvenated, with a shot of adrenalin.

So we all followed him, in my case with a sense of foreboding. I had had mild altitude sickness on a previous trip. In fact, that night, Senator Levin and I both had horrible headaches and couldn't sleep. We commiserated with each other and the doctors helped us get through the night. Senator Pell slept like a log and was great the next morning. He was on a psychological high. It was a successful trip. The Chinese showed off the relative freedom accorded to Tibetan Buddhism and Senator Pell and Senator Levin had the trip of a lifetime.

*Q: Now, one of the pressures that's building in Tibet is Chinese immigration. Han Chinese are coming into the area. It's similar to when the Qing Dynasty fell. Manchuria had been off limits to the Chinese. And when the dynasty fell, the Chinese piled into Manchuria.*

CAMP: This was beginning to be an issue. It became more dramatic after I left. Han Chinese from the plains mostly had a very negative image of Tibet, not only because of the cultural image of Tibet, but because they didn't think it was a good place to do business and they thought it was too high and too cold. Not many came at the beginning, but you gradually started to see Sichuanese shops popping up in Lhasa. It was still very much a Tibetan city. Soon after that, and even more so now that the train line has come in, you have Sichuanese and other Han Chinese from all over coming up to do business, to settle, to establish themselves. And they found it very lucrative. Lhasa is much less a Tibetan city now, except for the area right around the Jokhang, the traditional bazaar. I saw a little of that. There was just the beginning of the idea that Han

Chinese were destroying Tibetan culture by overwhelming the local populace.

*Q: So as you progressed through this tour, what trends were you perceiving about Tibet?*

CAMP: It was mostly a liberalizing trend in those years. The Chinese were eager to show it off, show off what they were accomplishing. Again, their point of reference was the Cultural Revolution, when things were disastrous and Buddhist monks were tortured. And so now there was an effort to demonstrate Tibetan Buddhists can practice their religion, monasteries are open and prospering. That was true to an extent. But any indication that those monks were involved in politics was a bridge too far for the Chinese authorities, and they would crack down.

Richard Gere was invited to Tibet in 1994, and came through Chengdu. He had a delegation, including some Rinpoches from India, an American Rinpoche and a reporter from Rolling Stone Magazine. It was quite an entourage. Richard Gere, even then, was known to be a devotee of the Dalai Lama. He wasn't quite the public activist on Tibet that he is now. I presume the Chinese authorities thought they could influence him by showing him Buddhist culture in Lhasa. The effort was unsuccessful.

*Q: Could you describe some of your contacts? Who were you calling on on a regular basis?*

CAMP: As I said, I tended to be fairly careful about private contacts in Tibet. I started with a few who had been cultivated by my very good Political-Economic Officer John Brennan who had studied some Tibetan. He really made an effort to travel to Lhasa, but also importantly the Tibetan areas of western Sichuan and of western Yunnan. Neither was part of the autonomous region of Tibet, but both were part of the historical area of Tibet, and politically quite important. John was very good about searching out people with his limited Tibetan, so I followed in his footsteps. In Lhasa, I had a few local Tibetan contacts but also lots of government contacts. Those latter were not practically productive in terms of knowing what was going on but they were important because we needed to work with the government. I can't say I made much of an inroad into the Tibetan dissident community -- in any case, contact with me would have been a real problem for them. But we did talk to monks through interpreters who were native Tibetan speakers. They worked for the government, but they were often sympathetic to the Tibetan cause and would go off script on occasion. That was obviously very useful for reporting purposes.

*Q: Did you get around to the other provinces in your consular district and did you get a chance to get around at the district level?*

CAMP: Yes. In the mid-1990s, the officialdom of Sichuan province was fairly conservative. We were the first foreign consulate in Chengdu and in Sichuan Province. They weren't quite sure how to deal with us and they were taking orders from Beijing and learning how you deal with the foreigners. So the provincial government, while not unwelcoming, was not very helpful. It was hard to get onto university campuses. I had two excellent Public Affairs Officers, both good Chinese speakers, but doing programs on campuses was really, really tough. My son went to kindergarten at Sichuan University, so I had access to that campus regularly. We continually pushed the envelope and tried to improve our access. I went to Chongqing frequently. At that time, it was part of Sichuan Province, although later hived off as an autonomous city. And I went

to some major cities along the Yangtze which were major commercial areas. One of my tasks was commercial promotion and so we were trying to encourage American investment and trade from the United States. We were just beginning to get high tech in there. Intel came in while I was there. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas were trying to sell aircraft. Sichuan Airlines was a new entity, so I called on them and tried to discourage them from buying Airbus and buy Boeing instead. McDonnell Douglas had a manufacturing operation in collaboration with Chengdu Aircraft Corporation, making parts of the fuselage for its commercial aircraft. Proctor and Gamble started a factory as well for shampoo sold on the local market. Sichuan was such a huge and populous province that American corporations were already seeing it as a huge potential market.

Yunnan Province was particularly important because it bordered Burma and Laos, so we covered a lot of narcotics issues down there. They had the beginning of an AIDS problem there. China was still very much in denial about AIDS with Beijing saying that it was a foreigners' disease, unknown in China. Meanwhile, along the Burmese border, the government had established AIDS hospitals and living quarters for those with AIDS. A lot of it was related to narcotics, shared needles, and the spread of AIDS from Southeast Asia. So I did some reporting on that. The Yunnan provincial leadership was actually pretty good, pretty welcoming. As a border province, I guess they saw that a foreign presence like ours could be more an asset than a burden, as I think they saw us in Sichuan.

Guizhou, the fourth province in the consular district, was quite poor; at that point, it was more interesting from a cultural and anthropological point of view, but I didn't have a lot of business there. I think I just made two trips there in three years.

*Q: Are the distances involved there large? Did you drive?*

CAMP: In the mid-'90s we could drive virtually nowhere, partly because of the roads but more because of the government restriction on foreign diplomats. Air and train were the main methods of transportation. To give you a sense of the distance, Chengdu to Kunming in Yunnan was a 24-hour train ride. It was a *beautiful* train ride. It took you through mountains and valleys and fantastic scenery. It was obviously much easier to fly. There was nothing of the network of major roads or bullet trains between cities that there is now. As I was leaving in 1995 they had just opened the Chengdu-Chongqing Expressway, which made a huge difference. But it didn't affect much of my life there. I almost always traveled by train and occasionally -- if we could get permission -- by office car within 50-100 miles of Chengdu.

*Q: If you're basically the only diplomatic mission there, when July 4<sup>th</sup> comes up how do you celebrate it under these conditions?*

CAMP: Well, July 4<sup>th</sup> was a great occasion all three years. The first was the most memorable because we'd just moved into our new consulate, and so we had the 4<sup>th</sup> on the consulate grounds. And of course everyone wanted to see this new American outpost in Chengdu. We had a small but growing American community and we had a large Chinese contact list that was delighted to come to the consulate and particularly for that occasion. So it was quite a raucous party and people were admiring our green lawns, which had to be the only green lawns in Sichuan

Province at the time. We'd put a lot of effort into making it look like a little bit of America with Chinese characteristics. So the party was a great success. And in fact, I think because we also combined it with a consulate opening, we had high level representation both from our embassy -- the DCM -- and the Governor of Sichuan Province who was quite a senior personage. For the second year, we had the Peace Corps, so that was even better in some ways. We had 30 or so young Americans who were delighted to have a bit of Americana for a day after their time in the villages or the towns of Sichuan.

*Q: One of the things that comes up toward the end of your tour is Harry Wu.*

CAMP: That was fascinating. He came through Chengdu on one of his sub rosa trips on which he was gathering data on prison labor. I never expected to see him. I didn't know he was in Sichuan Province, although it's not surprising since Sichuan has some of the more developed prison labor camps or did at the time. Harry Wu walked into the consulate one day -- I don't even know how he got into the consulate -- and was ushered into my office. And I was amazed that he was here, because the Chinese wanted to arrest him. They had no interest in his digging up dirt on the prison camps. So while he was expansively telling me what he was doing, I was pointing to the ceiling and trying to pantomime -- "No, write it down. Don't talk to me." But he was fearless. He wanted to tell me what he was doing, he wanted to explain, he wanted me to report back to Washington. And I suspect it was to some extent self-preservation, that he wanted it to be known by the Americans that he was there. I always thought the consulate was pretty well surveilled, but he did not get arrested on that trip. He got out of Sichuan and finished his research. I was never quite sure why he was not picked up after that meeting, because I can't imagine he escaped the attention of the local authorities.

*Q: Doesn't he have U.S. travel documentation?*

CAMP: I don't think that would have protected him from arrest when you're doing things that the Chinese government considers criminal. And I'm sure they would have found some criminal charges to apply to him.

*Q: You said that there was no Taiwan issue in Chengdu. What does that mean?*

CAMP: Well, I'd served at the embassy in Beijing before and I of course went up there frequently. And whenever there's a crisis in our relations relating to Taiwan -- often over arms sales -- you hear a lot about it from the Foreign Ministry. But not just the Foreign Ministry. If you go to the Commerce Ministry they have an obligatory statement they feel they need to make before they start doing business with you. In Sichuan, they didn't seem to really care much about that. It simply wasn't on their agenda.

I would go for long periods without anyone mentioning Taiwan to me except in passing. In fact, as often as not, it was a positive reference, as in "maybe we can do business with Taiwan." That's what they were interested in. They felt no obligation, they were under no duress from the party or the Foreign Ministry to raise Taiwan with us. In fact, they didn't raise many bilateral issues or bilateral political issues. They wanted to get things done.

*Q: Well, that it didn't get raised in your area is interesting because your last year coincides with President Lee Teng-hui visiting the US, which prompted a major, major spat.*

CAMP: Of course. And you know, maybe my memory is failing me a bit, but I don't remember that even then Taiwan was raised with me. They were far from Beijing -- "the emperor is a thousand miles away," as the Chinese say. And my boss was a thousand miles away, which is a nice thing about consulates like Chengdu..

I suspect the decisions that were made in Beijing that affected our life were affected by bilateral problems like Taiwan. For instance, the Peace Corps occasionally would have problems bringing in supplies or bringing in new volunteers or whatever, which may well have been orchestrated by Beijing. But as far as my official contacts, minimal.

*Q: You're saying the supervision by the embassy was pretty modest?*

CAMP: It was. The embassy had many other priorities and we were fairly low on the list. Once I asked the DCM whether I was doing OK, since I hadn't heard from him in a long time. He said, "Don, I'm just so glad I have a consulate that I don't have to worry about."

I also didn't have a good way to communicate with the embassy either. The only secure communications we had was an antiquated STU-3 (Secure Telecommunications Unit) phone. I had to unlock my safe, get out the key and put it into the telephone to talk to the DCM or whoever was calling me from Beijing. We were considered an unclassified post at the time though we did have a means of sending classified cables.

*Q: Could Chengdu report straight back to the department or did all your reporting go through the embassy?*

CAMP: For most of the time I was there it was a practical problem. We would type our cables in what passed for a classified area in the attic and then send them to Beijing by courier. After a while we did some policy cables that were specifically from Chengdu, addressed to the Department and presumably went there without editing by Beijing. It was more a practical issue than any policy of centralizing reporting at the embassy.

*Q: What outside events affected your life in Chengdu?*

CAMP: I will digress and point out that while I had a peaceful three years, my successor Kees Keur's tour was rudely interrupted by the US accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. That prompted riots in Chengdu and a breach of the consulate's wall by the rioters and the burning of the CG's Residence. I hope Kees will do his oral history; it was a scary time in Chengdu.

*Q: Did you ever get involved in the Chinese commercial space launch facility in Sichuan?*

CAMP: Yes. Very much. The major Chinese commercial satellite launch site was in Panzhihua, south of Chengdu. At that time, we were licensing American components for Chinese satellites.

But we were very careful about tech transfer concerns, and therefore certain components were carefully protected and were under our control until they were launched. At one point, I was invited to Panzhihua to observe a launch, which was a total success. A few months later, there was another launch and I sent my Pol-Econ Officer, John Brennan, to observe. The launch vehicle exploded spectacularly shortly after launch. The debris of the satellite was spread over dozens of square miles. The tech transfer people immediately said, "We've got to recover those pieces." And so John actually led a team to go scouring the countryside for pieces of the satellite that had exploded, and I think turned up a few. I imagine a few escaped as well. But that was quite an adventure for John.

*Q: One of the shadows over Chengdu I would suspect is World War II because that was where the Americans were. Did you get some old GI's coming back?*

CAMP: Yes. We had a couple of things related to World War II. When I first arrived, Chongqing had a famous museum devoted to one of the Kuomintang's spy missions against the communists, which detailed alleged KMT and American atrocities against the Red Army during the war. I never visited that museum. But the Chongqing municipality, to which I give a lot of credit, decided that they wanted to celebrate the American support for the war effort against the Japanese so they built a museum to U.S.-Chinese cooperation in World War II and it was dedicated to General Joe Stilwell. General Stilwell's daughter came out for the inauguration. They had interesting artifacts that they'd found related to General Stilwell, to the 14<sup>th</sup> Air Force, and to Flying Tigers leader Claire Chennault. I donated an army jacket from my father-in-law who'd flown The Hump in those days.

Similarly, there was a monument in Kunming to the aviators who'd flown the Hump. I paid my respects there.

And 1995 marked the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of World War II. The Pentagon decided they wanted to celebrate this by sending around the world their latest cargo plane. I think it was the C-5. Enormous thing. They flew it from Beijing to Yunnan and then over the Hump to India. I got to fly from Beijing to Kunming. With Chinese government help, they'd found surviving Chinese pilots from that era and brought them along on the flight. They took them up to the cockpit and showed them what a modern aircraft was like. And these guys were wonderful. They said, "Yeah, we flew this high, but we didn't have pressurization". And the young American Air Force pilots were just so touched by these old guys and vice versa. It was a really wonderful experience and a very successful Pentagon-organized commemoration of US-China cooperation during the war.

*Q: Did that attract any American tourism?*

CAMP: That was certainly part of the Chinese government's interest in it. I tried my best to publicize the Stilwell Museum. But World War II veterans were fairly long in the tooth by that time and not a lot of them were traveling to China. So I don't think it was a big tourist draw of the kind the Chinese had hoped for.

*Q: What would you say was the most interesting thing about the Chengdu assignment?*

CAMP: It's hard to find just one. From a professional point of view, I'd been in the Foreign Service 18 years and it was my first opportunity to be in complete charge. The Foreign Service trains us as political or economic or consular or admin officers, but then at some point throws us into management positions. I survived and grew and thrived.

But one of the most satisfying things for me personally, even though I was not directly responsible for it, was the arrival of Peace Corps. I'd been in the Peace Corps in India many years before and it had been a formative experience for me. So it was very exciting to be involved in the creation of a big new program and with China One, as the first group of Peace Corps volunteers was called. It was a management challenge. We had to integrate into the consulate staff a Peace Corps Director, Admin Officer, a nurse, and some locally hired staff. In line with standing Peace Corps policy, they were not really part of the consulate. But the Peace Corps Director Bill Speidel ended up living in one of our consulate apartments, and becoming a good friend. The volunteers would come to the consulate for Thanksgiving or other occasions; it was really a wonderful addition to the American community in Chengdu, which was primarily businessmen and missionary teachers. The volunteers brought a new life to the area, and in fact, several of them later became very good writers. One of them, Peter Hessler, who was in Chongqing at the time, is now a New Yorker staff writer who has written extensively about China. I can't take much credit at all for the success of Peace Corps there, but it was certainly one of the more exciting parts of my tour there.

There were missteps too. There always are. When China One was due to be sworn in, we had Senator Pressler in town for a CODEL. So we invited him to make a speech at the Peace Corps inauguration. It would have been fine, except that Senator Pressler, who I don't think knew much about the Peace Corps or its tradition of being non-political and apart from the State Department, said very memorably to the volunteers with the government of Sichuan listening in the audience and on the podium, "We'll look forward to your reports from the villages." And, "Thank you very much for furthering American foreign policy." It was one of the more awkward moments of my Foreign Service career. But Peace Corps thrived and has prospered and has since expanded to other provinces.

**J. RICHARD BOCK**  
**Deputy Managing Director, American Institute in Taiwan**  
**Rosslyn, Virginia (1993-1996)**

*Richard Bock was born in Philadelphia and raised in Shelton, Washington. He attended the University of Washington and Princeton University and entered the Foreign Service in 1955. His career included posts in Germany, Vietnam, Taiwan, Hong Kong, China, and Australia. He was interviewed in 2002 by Charles Stuart Kennedy.*

BOCK: I stayed in Washington and was assigned as deputy managing director of the American Institute in Taiwan, which despite the "In" in its name was headquartered in the U.S. in Rosslyn.

*Q: You were there from '93 to when?*

BOCK: To '96.

*Q: The organization had become rather mature by this point.*

BOCK: Yes.

*Q: How did you see its operation by that time?*

BOCK: The office in Rosslyn was quite a small office. We had a total staff of about ten. It served a couple of functions. One, it served as an administrative backstop for the AIT office in Taipei. That was kind of a can of worms, that I didn't get involved in any more than I had to, although I did to some extent. Then we were also sort of an interface for Taiwan representatives in Washington, either stationed in Washington or traveling to Washington. This gets back to the nature of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship as it evolved after normalization with China in '79. We had no "government to government" relations. All relations were to be filtered through these private organizations which were set up, AIT on the American side and a counterpart organization on the Taiwan side. Well, the Taiwan government folks were never happy with this arrangement. They agreed to live with it but they were always tinkering at the edges. We had a relationship with Taiwan which covered a very large number of aspects. It wasn't just a political relationship. Virtually every agency of the U.S. government had something, some program or some interest in Taiwan. All of these then had to be filtered through this artificial channel. That was what I spent most of my time on, dealing with all the agencies of the U.S. government to make sure that they understood how they were to deal with Taiwan and to offer our services in helping them to do so. Some of these agencies had longstanding programs with Taiwan and somebody assigned to run them who knew the drill and they were easy. Some did not and they were difficult.

*Q: Before we get to that, who was the head of this? This was a time of some difficulty, wasn't it?*

BOCK: It became a time of some difficulty. When I joined AIT in '93, the office was headed by Nat Belocchi, a former Foreign Service officer who had served in Taiwan and had been in that position for a couple of years. The tradition had been to fill that position with someone... With one exception, they were State Department background. Even the one exception had been someone who had been dealing with East Asia on a policy level. That had worked pretty well.

*Q: Who was that?*

BOCK: The exception was David Laux, who had been in the CIA and then been in the White House and been assigned to AIT. However, in '95, the White House decided that it had a new person they wanted to assign into that position who had virtually no China background and whose brief experience in the State Department as a political appointee had apparently been an unhappy one, a fellow named James Wood. There was a lot of resistance within the State Department to his appointment and it was delayed for a long time. It was finally, however, made.

AIT has a formal structure - even though it's this artificial creation, it had a formal structure of a board of directors of three individuals, one of whom was the managing director and the other two were just separate directors. They formally elected a chairman of the board. When Wood was named by the State Department at the White House's insistence, the other two directors resigned in protest, publically. Belocchi as the third director was prevailed upon by the State Department to stay on so there wouldn't be a zero board with only this one new person coming in. He was not happy about it, but he was a good soldier and did that. But then there was a struggle to find new directors and there were a lot of things that developed in the wake of that. Wood had an agenda which was not transparent. He wasn't there just to implement U.S. Taiwan policy.

*Q: First, where was his power coming from? Somebody doesn't just get nominated. You have to have backing and somebody who's pushing.*

BOCK: Yes. I can only answer that question on the basis of rumor. His roots were in Arkansas. He was a lawyer from Arkansas and had been in Washington for a long time. Some people claimed he was a friend of Clinton's. He never really made that claim himself and I'm not convinced that he had any more than a passing acquaintance with Clinton. His nomination was apparently pushed by Dick Moose, who was Under Secretary for Management.

*Q: He was also from Arkansas.*

BOCK: Yes. Why it happened, I never understood. It seemed that this was going to be a troublesome appointment and why anybody would want to do that is beyond me.

*Q: How did Congress fall in on this?*

BOCK: There were some voices raised in Congress as to whether this was a good idea, but I don't remember... It's not a position that requires confirmation. There wasn't any storm involved. There were some questions raised.

*Q: Where had Wood served in the State Department?*

BOCK: I think he served twice. He had served once in Bonn in some kind of a legal office and I know very little about that. Then he had been out and been reappointed and served in the Office of Foreign Missions in Washington as their in-house counsel. When the whole controversy about his impending appointment to AIT came up, the former head of OFM was quoted in the press as saying he would never hire James Wood for anything again but not saying why. So there was bad blood there.

*Q: So what happened? You were his deputy.*

BOCK: Yes.

*Q: This must have been very nervous-making for you.*

BOCK: Well, it was awkward. But we managed to get on all right. He started analyzing what

AIT's legal position was, had a lawyer background, with the evident intent of trying to make AIT more independent from the State Department. It was never clear where this was going to lead. I left before that developed into any serious problem. Then what happened is that he was accused of using some of his trips to Taiwan to get illegal campaign contributions to the Democratic Party. I don't know for a fact whether that was ever true or not. I think it's still unproved. But he was finally forced to resign and that was after I left. The reason for the resignation was on that basis.

*Q: While you were there, did this job normally require policy considerations or was this really to operate sort of as the Taiwan desk?*

BOCK: First of all, there was a Taiwan desk in the State Department. It wasn't called that. It was called the Taiwan Coordination Staff. The head of the Taiwan Coordination Staff was essentially office director. He was the one who did all of the policy recommendations to the East Asia Bureau. AIT was supposed to take all its policy guidance from the State Department. The only time that becomes an issue is when the managing director is making some public statement. On his various visits to Taiwan, he would normally have public statements and sometimes in Washington, although not... It's usually the Taiwan press that's interested in what he has to say. Wood never got himself in real trouble on that basis. Whatever he was trying to do, he wasn't trying from the outset to change U.S. policy toward Taiwan. But he did have this kind of resistance to too much oversight from the State Department.

*Q: I interviewed Nat Belocchi while he was still in the job. Was there concern in AIT in your office about there being an awful lot of money in the Chinese community, particularly those that are interested in Taiwan, and various connections? Was this something you knew was out there?*

BOCK: Oh, yes. This had been a well known fact for years that Taiwan was considered next to Israel to be the best managed, best funded foreign lobbying operation in Washington. In fact, at one point, somebody dealing with China who was fending off all these complaints about how the U.S. was always catering to Taiwan's interests, said to this Chinese representative, "You ought to look at the way Taiwan operates. You might learn something." It was a complicated system because, first of all, they are a semi-official representation in Washington. Then there were various consulting contracts with some of the top notch lobbying firms in Washington, some of which were run through the Washington representation of Taiwan and some of which were not. And then finally there was the whole Taiwan independence movement operation, which was quite separate but which was also increasingly well funded from various Taiwanese-American groups and was in close with a number of congressmen.

*Q: You had been dealing with Chinese affairs and had covered both sides of the Straits. Were you noticing a growing problem after Tiananmen that China per se, Mainland China, was pursuing this quite authoritarian stance, still run by a communist regime, and was pretty hardline with economic changes? And then you have Taiwan, which is increasingly, particularly on your watch, was treating democratic and much more what we all hoped other countries would be. When you get this, it gets harder and harder to not have an American response of saying, "Dammit, this is a democratic society and this other one ain't."*

BOCK: Yes. It was becoming much more confrontational than it had been in my previous tour in Taipei. On the one hand, there had been the clampdown after Tiananmen so that moves toward democratization of China seemed to be pretty much on hold, although there were little things that a person could point to if you were looking. Secondly, the Taiwan government under Lee Teng Hui, who had taken over in the late '80s, was becoming increasingly, although it was a nationalist KMT government, Lee Teng Hui himself took a line increasingly looking toward independence, although he was usually careful not to use that term. He was very aggressive in trying to raise Taiwan's international profile. In fact, it was during my watch there that we had a major incident where he gave a speech at Cornell University which really outraged the Chinese government. It may be worthwhile to give you a little background.

*Q: Yes. This is major.*

BOCK: We had had a policy as of '79 that visits to the United States by a president of Taiwan were out of bounds. We had Cabinet level visits which were all "unofficial," even including the foreign minister, although the foreign minister could never come to Washington, but he would make stopovers. Taiwan had relatively few countries around the world that recognized it officially. One concentration of those countries was, still is, in Central America and to some extent the Caribbean. So, as they tried to increase their international profile, they wanted to send their president to various places like San Salvador and Panama City, but the only way to get there was to go through the United States. So, that raised the question of stopovers. And this was an awkward one from the U.S. point of view. The Chinese, of course, said, "This is totally outrageous for any so-called 'Taiwan president' to come to the United States under any guise." Well, that wasn't the U.S. policy. The U.S. policy was a refueling stop would be okay. But we were very cautious about somebody like Lee Teng Hui in particular using a refueling stop to engage in political activities.

So, this question came up in '94 or '95 of a stopover in Hawaii on the way to some event in Central America. What was proposed was an overnight stopover because of how long a flight it is, after all, from Taipei to Central America. The proposal that went up through channels in the State Department had several options involved on the basis of how long a stopover could be and where it could be and so on. For reasons that I had never understood, at a fairly senior level, another option was added which was "refuse." That was the option which was adopted by the Secretary of State. It was communicated to Taiwan and greeted with outrage. "This has nothing to do with U.S.-Taiwan relations. You are preventing us actively from dealing with our diplomatic partners." Well, it was an untenable position and the U.S. had to back down.

*Q: Did you all get involved?*

BOCK: Not really in the policymaking process, no. AIT's role was, once the policy was set, then it was up to AIT to manage the actual stopover. So, eventually, the State Department backed down and said, "Okay, but only a refueling stop. No overnight." Nat Belocchi was sent out to Honolulu to handle this. The story is that when Lee Teng Hui got to Hickam Air Force Base, he refused to get off the plane as a sign of his great displeasure with the way this had been handled. The plane was refueled and was sent on. That was not the plan. The plan was, there was a VIP room set up and he was to get out there and have an hour or an hour and a half stopover. He

refused to get off the plane. The Taiwan people leaked the story that the U.S. refused to let him off the plane. It was only after a while that that was sorted out. This raised a lot of anger in Congress among friends of Taiwan.

That was the background, then, for the next thing, which was a request by Lee Teng Hui to accept an invitation by his old alma mater, Cornell University, to receive an honorary degree. The State Department's position was that this would be a big breach of our policy. Stopovers were one thing, but an actual visit, even though it wasn't the president coming to Washington, was going to be seen as a real change in our policy and also was going to be real troublesome because it would allow all sorts of demonstrations and meetings and so on. But the result was that Congress passed some kind of a non-binding resolution virtually unanimously saying that the State Department should grant a visa to Lee Teng Hui to go to his alma mater. So, eventually the State Department backed down. It's my view that if we hadn't had this Honolulu incident in the first place, which had created this whole atmosphere, the original State Department policy on Cornell could have been maintained. But maybe not. You never know. Anyway, Lee Teng Hui came to Cornell. We worked with the university authorities there to try to see that this would not be politicized, but of course he had a huge entourage of press, he had various congressmen waiting for him on a change of planes in Syracuse for private meetings, and when he got to Cornell, he gave a very political speech. Of course, the Department had been giving assurances to the Chinese that this would not be a political speech. So, it was a disaster all around.

*Q: Was anybody that you know of saying, "Let's not give these assurances. This guy is a loose cannon?"*

BOCK: Not that I know of. I was one step removed from the people making the recommendations as to how we should handle it, but as far as who was talking to the Chinese embassy, that was still another step away.

*Q: Did anybody from AIT go along?*

BOCK: Oh, yes. Belocchi went up, as well as a couple of other people. I went up on an advance. When they sent their advance team over, I was up for a couple of days trying to work the arrangements and make sure that whatever restraint we could get would be put on the program.

*Q: What was your impression of the advance team?*

BOCK: I don't know exactly what they knew, but you started out with the assumption that anybody representing the Taiwan government would play for what they could get. There were no surprises there.

*Q: Were people in AIT braced for the disaster?*

BOCK: Yes.

*Q: So what was the fallout?*

BOCK: The fallout was not in the U.S. It was a ratcheting up of confrontation across the Taiwan Strait resulting in exercises in which the Chinese fired missiles off the Taiwan coast, in which then the U.S. sent two carrier battle groups down to the Taiwan area, saying, "This is unacceptable," and things were kind of wound down after that. But there has been more of a state of confrontation between China and Taiwan since that Cornell speech than there had been previously.

*Q: Was there any disquiet on the part of the people who were in AIT about the aging military potential of Taiwan to defend itself? Was there a feeling that time was not with Taiwan?*

BOCK: Yes, I think that feeling's been there all along. I had mentioned earlier when talking about my period in Taipei that in the 1982 Communique between the U.S. and China, in which we agreed not to quantitatively or qualitatively increase our military assistance, that the qualitative part was a ticking time bomb... With the decision on the F16s in 1992, that removed the qualitative restriction, although we claimed it didn't. But even so, yes, there were concerns. There was a fellow in the AIT office in Rosslyn whose job was the military portfolio. He was a liaison with the Defense Department and handled all these visits by Taiwan generals coming over. With the decision on the F16s, the next problem was whether Taiwan was really in a position to absorb these properly. That was a constant concern. There were other concerns. Taiwan wanted submarines. That was a big issue. We said, "No, because it looks too much like an offensive weapon." That decision recently has been reversed. But you're right. Regardless of what decision was made on these individual issues, there was still the reality that you had an island of 20 million people facing a continental power of 1.2 or 1.3 billion with growing economic power.

*Q: Did you see a change in our relations with Mainland China? Had we gotten over the Tiananmen shock of '89? Were you seeing steps towards an improvement or was there always a qualification?*

BOCK: Well, I think Tiananmen certainly continued to dampen any expectation of internal democratization in China, expectations that were fairly widely held in the 1980s. But what became the issue was no longer what was going to happen internally in China, although that was always an issue. But the major issue after this missile confrontation was, has China made a new determination that it's going to seek a military solution to its problems with Taiwan? After 1979, there was a general expectation, although Beijing was always a little bit cagey, that they were prepared to be patient and would look for ways to unify Taiwan into China by peaceful means. After 1995, that was increasingly in question and still is.

*Q: Did you find that the approaching absorption of Hong Kong in '97 or '98 was looked at by everybody as saying let's see how this works and this might be something for Taiwan to look at?*

BOCK: There was something to that, yes. People were interested in Hong Kong and the idea that the Chinese were going to want to handle Hong Kong smoothly because they need it as an example of how peaceful integration can work. On the other hand, there was realization that the circumstances in Hong Kong and Taiwan were very different. One was a colonial outpost which had never been run democratically although in the last years Governor Patton tried to establish

democracy. On the other hand was Taiwan, which was running itself increasingly as a democracy. It had been running itself for 40-50 years and had been democratic now for maybe 10 years. So, the issues involved were very, very different.

**WINSTON LORD**  
**Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Pacific Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (1993-1995)**

*Ambassador Lord was born and raised in New York City and earned degrees at Yale University and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He entered the Foreign Service in 1961. After serving in Washington and Geneva, Mr. Lord was assigned to the Department of Defense before joining the National Security Council, where he was involved in China and Indonesia matters. He subsequently served on State's Policy Planning Staff. In 1985 Mr. Lord was named US Ambassador to China, where he served until 1989. From 1993 to 1997 the Ambassador held the position of Assistant Secretary of State dealing with Far Eastern Affairs. Ambassador Lord was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kenned in 1998.*

LORD: Then, when Clinton was elected President, I think that the following considerations led to my appointment as Assistant Secretary of State.

*Q: [Bernkopf] Is that because the position of Assistant Secretary is more independent than what you had as a Special Assistant to Secretary Kissinger?*

LORD: Well, Kissinger was tough in another way. It was tough in physical terms, but, then, I was a lot younger when I was Special Assistant to Kissinger. So I was able to handle that. Being Special Assistant to Kissinger was tough in terms of travel and the hours I had to work. It was also tough because of Kissinger's personality. It was also exhilarating because of the excitement of working for someone like Kissinger, who was so brilliant, as well as the attraction of being involved in dramatic events. I'm not going to say that being Special Assistant to Kissinger wasn't a tough and demanding job. However, my focus was much narrower. I was dealing with China, Vietnam, to a certain extent Russia, and I was writing and drafting material of very great importance - whether communiques, peace agreements, or presidential statements. I was focused on those countries and was essentially reporting to one person. As Assistant Secretary, I was the nexus between the Secretary of State and the Seventh Floor and my Bureau and/or the Embassies in the East Asian area. Not to mention the White House, the Defense Department, the economic agencies of the government, the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], and other institutions, non-governmental organizations, business, the media, etc.

I enjoyed the job of Ambassador to China the most, but working for Secretary Kissinger was more dramatic. The most enjoyable job was being an Ambassador. A more difficult job was being Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. The good thing about being an Ambassador is that you essentially are running your own show. You have to take instructions

from the State Department in Washington, but you're in charge of your own team. It's much less bureaucratic in terms of infighting and jungle warfare than you inevitably have in Washington. That doesn't mean that you don't have your own share of such bureaucratic warfare, and you have personnel problems in an Embassy. However, at least you feel that you are running your own ship, whereas in Washington you are involved in constant, bureaucratic battles. On the other hand, you have much more power in Washington, more influence on policy.

So the Assistant Secretary not only has to run his or her own bureau. You have to deal with and instruct 20 or 25 Ambassadors. You constantly have to deal with Congress and the press. You have to work the inter-agency circuit. You have to deal with other bureaus in the Department, in competition with officials on the Seventh Floor. You have to deal with think tanks and interest groups, all of which makes it fascinating and demanding but which stretched me even further. I'll get into all of that later on. I don't recall what this question involved, but these were all reasons for my mood as I took over the position of Assistant Secretary and my approach to it.

*Q: [Kennedy] What were the salient points of your statement, particularly the ones which would have involved moving ahead, rather than the usual contents.*

LORD: I don't want to go into it at great length, because it's probably more than you want to know. What I did was the following. First, the title of the statement was "A New Pacific Community: Ten Goals for American Policy." When I referred to it over the next few years, I called it, "Lord's Ten Commandments." This may not have been the first use of the term, "Pacific Community," but it was the first use by an official of the Clinton Administration. I don't know whether it had ever been used as a goal of American policy.

My theme was that it was in our interest to work with other countries. We needed to work to build a new, Pacific Community. I started out by listing all of our interests in Asia. I won't go through them, as it's not necessary here. However, they included security, political, historical, cultural, economic, and social interests. The fact is that we have a growing number of immigrants coming from Asia. Our population is moving from the East Coast to the West Coast. These are all reasons why Asia is already crucial and will be even more so in the next century. I included the statement that there is no part of the world more important to United States interests than the Pacific region.

I set out that view, in addition to the usual introduction about my background, the honor I felt at having been chosen for this post, and pledging to work with Congress. Then I went into the importance of our interests in Asia. One of the themes I used, and I'll get more specific in a minute, was that we had to pursue our bilateral interests by all means, as these were crucial to the U.S. I wasn't suddenly saying that there was a community already existing out in Asia. That was more a vision than a reality. So there was a mix of going over the key, bilateral relationships, with heavy emphasis also on trying to build more of a community in the Pacific area, even as we have already done in Europe. However, I made clear that the concept of a Pacific Community was a lot different from a European Community.

I laid out 10 goals. I would like to keep this very brief, but they were basically as follows. I purposely put Japan first, as I thought that it was our most crucial partner. Particularly since I

have a heavy China background, I wanted to make clear to everyone else, including the Japanese, that I thought that Japan was the most important country in terms of U.S. interests. I put South Korea second because it was another key ally and the site of the most urgent security challenge. Then I got to China and the others. I'll just read off the Ten Goals, because that's the easiest way to review them.

I mentioned our need to forge a fresh, global partnership with Japan that reflects a more mature balance of responsibility. Global partnership means not only our bilateral relationship but increasingly working with Japan on many regional and global issues, as well as a more mature balance of responsibilities, meaning that Japan needs to assume, in conjunction with the U.S. but also in terms of its own self interest, more responsibility in the world. I was trying to be very careful in my drafting.

Secondly, I mentioned erasing the nuclear threat and moving toward peaceful reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. This was aimed at disposing of the problem and then trying to build a more stable and long lasting solution.

Thirdly, restoring firm foundations for cooperation with China, where political openness should catch up with economic reform. That is, trying to restore momentum in the Chinese-U.S. relationship, in cooperation with China, but also working in the fact that political openness needed to catch up with economic reform. I tried to go into both the strategic interests and also the concern for freedom.

Fourthly, I referred to the need to deepen our relationship with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], as it broadens its membership and scope. I wanted to make clear that although much emphasis had been placed on the big actors in Northeast Asia, ASEAN was really growing as a major economic and diplomatic power in many ways. I also made clear, consistent with my overall theme, that we not only had to deal with ASEAN as a group of countries, as a part of building a Pacific Community, but also the U.S. had very important, bilateral relationships within ASEAN which we also had to nurture.

Then I referred to obtaining the fullest possible accounting on our Missing in Action, as we normalized our relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Of course, I put the accounting of our MIAs first, as we always did, we had to do, and we should do also. We needed to do this, both in terms of what we needed to do but also in terms of building domestic support for this policy. However, I worked in the phrase, "As we normalize our relations with Vietnam." This involved stretching the envelope a little bit because I was projecting the normalization of relations with Vietnam.

Then I went on to speak of working to secure a peaceful, independent, and democratic Cambodia. Cambodia was scheduled to have elections in May, 1993, so that was an urgent goal. I went on to refer to ASEAN in its collective dimension as being key on this issue as well.

The last four goals were sectoral and essentially oriented more toward a Pacific Community, speaking in collective terms.

I spoke of strengthening APEC as the cornerstone of Asian Pacific economic cooperation. APEC is the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, which is not the world's greatest title. It was not self-evident that, in listing 10 goals in the Pacific Region, we would include APEC. At this point APEC had been going for a few years, beginning with the Bush Administration, but it hadn't achieved much of a profile or attracted much interest. I wanted to talk about our economic interests in Asia in general, which obviously were crucial. However, I also wanted to make clear that APEC would be a major vehicle for promoting our economic interests, and I'll get back to that.

So I put that in. The order of these goals was important. I wouldn't argue that all 10 goals were equally important, but I put strengthening APEC down as one of these goals. Then I got to the security goal, subtly making the point that in our new foreign policy economics was at least as important as security, unlike during the period of the Cold War.

On security, and here I was pushing the envelope again, I spoke of developing multilateral forums for security consultations, while maintaining the solid foundations of our alliances. I'll go into more detail on this, but I would point out that the Bush Administration, with some plausible reason, was very skittish and reluctant to push regional security schemes. They were concerned about the old threat from the Brezhnev Doctrine and the implications of collective responsibility. They didn't want anything that looked as if we were walking away from our bilateral and unilateral security obligations and replacing them with some fuzzy, regional mechanisms. They didn't want to signal to anybody that we were pulling out of East Asia. They were worried that if we put too much emphasis on regional security dialogues, we would look naive. They felt that Asia wasn't Europe, where we have NATO as a long established, defensive alliance.

I believed that these interests and considerations were not mutually exclusive. So I made it very clear that we should maintain the solid foundations of our alliances and our forward, military presence. However, as long as we keep our alliances and our forward, military presence as the foundations of our policies, we could supplement and not supplant them with regional security dialogues. This concept was pretty much embryonic at that point, but I signaled in this statement that we were going to emphasize these dialogues and forums. Again, this concept was not particularly controversial, but it was a new departure, versus the views of the Bush administration in terms of our emphasis. I was signaling that.

Both the APEC and regional security dialogues were picked up by the President in his first few months. He lifted APEC to the summit level, and he suggested overlapping regional security approaches in addition to our alliances and military presence in a major security speech in South Korea.

Then I referred to spurring regional cooperation to deal with global challenges like the environment, refugees, health, narcotics, nuclear non-proliferation, and arms sales. This reflected the new foreign policy agenda and some of the issues involved. Actually, these issues were not all new, but they were growing in importance. Secretary Christopher would have a new Under Secretary for Global Affairs, for example. Nuclear non-proliferation, the environment, and so forth were very important. I knew that President Clinton was interested in some of these issues, so I wanted to make sure that they were highlighted on the agenda. Again, I felt that regional as

well as global cooperation could contribute to our positions in the Pacific and to meeting these problems.

Then, finally, and because the last goal is almost as prominent as the first goal in an agenda, I put down promoting democracy and human rights where freedom has yet to flower. This goal underlay and would contribute to all our other goals. So I ended with it, not to mention the rhetorical value.

So those were the ten goals, and I went into greater depth on each one. As I said, I think that the statement was well received and I'm glad that I went to the trouble I did.

### **A NEW PACIFIC COMMUNITY TEN GOALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY**

Opening Statement at Confirmation Hearings for Ambassador Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State-Designate Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, March 31, 1993

#### **China**

Ever since participating in the opening to China more than two decades ago, I have worked hard to build Sino-American relations. I will continue to do so, conscious of both American interests and values.

China is an influential member of the international order. More than one of every five humans live there. It possesses nuclear weapons and exports nuclear technology. It launches satellites and sells missiles. It represents a huge market and one of the world's richest civilizations. It holds a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. It is central to key regional issues like Indochina, Korea, and disputed islands. It abuts the unsettled Central Asia region. It is salient in new challenges that require global action.

In recent years, China has opened up to the world, moved toward a market economy, and enjoyed the fastest growth rate in the world. Together with the greater Chinese communities of Taiwan and Hong Kong it has become one of the most promising areas for investment and trade.

At the same time, its leaders cling to an outdated authoritarian system. Serious abuses persist. While Beijing releases some prominent activists toward the end of their jail sentences, it arrests others for the peaceful expression of political views. The Chinese leaders are gambling that open economics and closed politics will preserve their system of control. It is a gamble that sooner or later will be lost. Economic reform produces - and requires - political reform. In today's world, nations cannot prosper for long without Opening up their societies. Technology and information, the forces of modernization, and global democratic trends have been eroding communism and totalitarianism across the globe.

All of the Asian models of economic success toward which China looks - many of them Chinese societies - have shown that political relaxation, tolerance of opposition a freer press, the rule of law and other democratic elements are inescapably linked with economic development.

Our policy challenge therefore is to reconcile our need to deal with this important nation with our imperative to promote international values, we will Seek cooperation with China on a range of issues. But Americans cannot forget Tiananmen Square.

The United States therefore should conduct a nuanced policy toward Beijing until a more humane system emerges. Shunning China is not an alternative. We need both to condemn repression and preserve links with progressive forces which are the foundations for our longer term ties.

We will continue to be guided by the three Sino-American joint communiques that have provided a flexible framework for our relations. It is up to China and Taiwan to work out their future relationship; we insist only that the process be peaceful. Consistent with our undertakings not to challenge the principle of "one China," we will continue to build upon our unofficial relations with Taiwan based on the Taiwan Relations Act. In our diplomacy and through the 1992 U.S.-Hong Kong Policy Act we should make clear our large humanitarian and commercial stakes in the future of Hong Kong.

Against this backdrop we face a host of serious issues with China: Widespread human rights violations, including in Tibet. Chinese exports of dangerous weapons and technology to volatile areas. Our fastest-growing trade deficit, which is now more than 18 billion dollars, second only to Japan. Collaboration at the United Nations and on regional conflicts. Emerging challenges like the environment and drugs. We should work together where our interests converge and bargain hard over differences.

We will press forward with this agenda in a sober, constructive fashion. Our approach will reflect that China is a great nation. In response to positive movement by the Chinese, we are prepared to address their concerns and strengthen our ties.

The Chinese people hold the same aspirations as others around the globe. We will support those aspirations - without arrogance - recognizing that the Chinese people will determine their own destiny, but confident that we are aligning ourselves with the future.

## **Economics**

In the aftermath of the Cold War, economics is increasingly supplanting military considerations on our foreign policy agenda. More than ever our national security depends on our economic strength. With domestic renewal now America's highest priority, trade and investment are critical. And no region is more central for American economic interests than the world's most dynamic one - Asia.

When I served as Ambassador to China, I devoted more time to promoting American business and economic interests than any other task. I will do so as well in my forthcoming role. I will consult closely with the American business community on their problems and their goals. I will urge our overseas posts to do the same. For the private sector in Asia, as elsewhere around the world, is an increasingly important actor. Helping American businesses to penetrate overseas

markets will be key to America's prosperity.

The Asia-Pacific region is the world's largest consumer market and our biggest export market. Last year our exports were worth more than 120 billion dollars and 2.3 million American jobs.

We need to confront our Asian economic challenges and opportunities on several levels. Foreign policy begins at home - strengthening our competitiveness is a sine qua non for an effective policy. The successful completion of the Uruguay Round is the most urgent multilateral task - this would dramatically increase trade and investment in Asia as in the world, and it would help preserve an open global system against the dangers of protectionism and regional blocs. We welcome the positive role played by Australia and New Zealand as active Cairns Group members. Here, as on other issues, we will consult closely with Canada. Bilaterally we must continue to pry open Asian markets, Particularly in those nations running large surpluses with us. We will champion expanding trade but we will insist that others open up to our products and services. As the President has said, we will compete, not retreat.

In addition to these domestic, global, and bilateral policies, greater regional cooperation is required.

The most promising vehicle is APEC, established in 1989 through the efforts of Australia and others. Today this trans-Pacific grouping brings together fifteen Pacific economies representing almost half of the world's GNP. It underscores the new imperatives of interdependence. It can dampen the appeal of exclusionary regional blocs. It can advance regional trade liberalization and integration. It can anchor America in the world's most dynamic region.

As the host for this year's annual Ministerial Conference in November, the United States has the opportunity to strengthen this organization. This will be at the top of our agenda this year. Working with others we can create a true Asian-Pacific economic community.

## **Security**

For the first time in this century, there are no adversarial fault lines among the great powers in Northeast Asia: the United States, Japan, Russia and China. The post Cold War period invites dialogue to prevent arms races, the forging of competing alignments, and efforts by one power or group of powers to dominate this strategic region. Our voice will be crucial. In close concert with our Pacific allies, we could engage Russia, China and others inside and outside Northeast Asia.

## **Global Issues**

- Many measures of human impact - from water use to the emissions of trace gases - show greater change since 1950 than in the previous 10,000 years. The Asian region, with its massive increase in energy consumption, faces severe environmental problems. They range from the plundering of Southeast Asian forests to China's burning of coal to the threat of global warming for some Pacific Island states.

- There are almost 20 million refugees in the world today. Even more people are uprooted within

their own lands. While some recent developments in Asia are promising, poverty, repression and uncertain political succession could unleash major migrations in the future.

*Q: [Kennedy] You made these points, and there was this concern by the Bureau of Congressional Relations you have referred to. How did the hearings go? There is always the wild card of Senator Helms, the conservative, Republican Senator from North Carolina. I would have thought that he would not be your friend.*

LORD: As you will recall from our earlier discussions, he hadn't been a friend in holding up my nomination as Ambassador to China for months. However, in this case I had no opposition or any real problems, as far as I recall. I did the usual round of going up to Congress ahead of time and talking to the Senators. They asked questions, but these were easily handled, and I had worked very hard to get ready. I knew the issues. And I had a solid, bipartisan reputation and credentials.

I had some follow-up, written questions to respond to, but it all went very smoothly. I don't recall how long it took, but it was fairly fast. Any controversial questions really went quite smoothly.

Senator Helms didn't cause me any problems this time around. In his case I had been outspoken about Chinese behavior regarding human rights, so that probably made him feel that I wouldn't roll over for the Chinese. This was one of the key issues in that area.

In 1992 I could have run into trouble in my deposition on Vietnam. That is always an emotional issue.

*Q: [Bernhardt] Where did this idea of raising the level of participation in APEC originate? Was it with you?*

LORD: No. I think that it originated with some people outside the U.S. Government. Fred Bergsten was very helpful, working with us on the APEC meeting. He probably floated the idea of raising the level of the meeting, although I don't recall precisely. I certainly had the idea, but many others had it, too. I can't pretend that this was a brilliant idea that only I thought of. The Australians had floated it. It just seemed to me that this was a terrific way to highlight the Asian region, to get President Clinton engaged in it, and to start a process of Pacific leaders meetings, as European and Atlantic leaders had been meeting for decades already. They were in constant touch and were talking about issues that they had in common. I thought that this was a good way to build a Pacific Community which was in our interest, even as we maintained our bilateral foundations. Those meetings would also be a good umbrella for a series of bilateral meetings at the site of the conference - just like the United Nations General Assembly in the fall. Indeed President Clinton was able, for example, to have regular meetings with Chinese President Jiang before he was able to visit China.

*Q: [Kennedy] Talking about minorities, what was your impression of the recruitment to positions in EA/P of Asian-Americans? Would you say that they were sort of coming on stream?*

LORD: I think that by definition we had more Asian-Americans in our Bureau than in any other

Bureau. There was a lot of interest among Asian-Americans in our bureau, and we had a lot of them there. I considered that as part of the minority mix as well. That was a fairly easy objective to achieve. Even when I came into the bureau, I noticed that we had quite a few Asian-Americans. The real problem and challenge was and remains the recruitment of African-Americans. The bureau and the Foreign Service in general have done much better in the recruitment of women. However, we're still lacking in terms of African-Americans. Nevertheless, I attached a high priority to this, and the powers that be in the Department of State recognized and appreciated that.

Could I mention a few other, generic issues which might be helpful to you? I'm talking now over a period of several years. First, and I'll get back to these, I went on all of the Presidential and Secretary of State Asian trips overseas during my tenure as Assistant Secretary. I traveled with the Secretary of Defense to China, Japan, and Korea. I went semi-clandestinely with the Director of CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] to China. I went with the NSC Advisors on a couple of Asian trips. In each of these cases I was the top adviser to the principal representative.

I don't have the numbers, but in my own personal travels I went to Japan the most. I made it clear, particularly early on during my service as Assistant Secretary, especially with my China background, that Japan was our number one partner in East Asia. Japan was the first place that I visited on my own, as I recall, and certainly this was very early on in my term as Assistant Secretary. Almost every time I went to Asia, I would try to go to Japan. I would always seek Japanese officials out at meetings of senior officials on regional security, around the edges of the UN, and so forth. I would try to show that I wanted to consult and concert with them as much as I could on the various issues in Asia under consideration.

On my own trips, and when I traveled with the President and the Secretary of State, I must have visited Japan about 15 or 20 times during this period. I would say that I visited South Korea at least 10 times; China, six times; Hong Kong several times; ASEAN countries probably varied from Brunei, twice, to Thailand, about eight times, with the other countries more or less in between and closer to the level of trips to Thailand. I visited Vietnam roughly six times; Cambodia, roughly four times; Australia, maybe four times; New Zealand, maybe three times; and the South Pacific, maybe three times. I went to Europe several times and to Russia twice for consultations on Asia. I thought that these trips were important in pushing our interests and for all of the other reasons I have mentioned.

I also gave high priority to dealing with the press. To be honest about it, I got to be fairly good at it. Mike McCurry [White House press spokesperson] would have me go out after Presidential meetings, sometimes by myself, and sometimes with White House people. It was fairly unusual for White House people to let a State Department official handle this. Such meetings with the press were often on a background basis but sometimes on the record, especially in terms of Presidential meetings and always in the case of State Department meetings. I would often be brought down by the State Department press spokesperson, first Mike McCurry and then Nick Burns, to give special briefings at the State Department. I did a lot of press contact work on the telephone and gave a lot of backgrounders to the press.

I did a lot of work with the foreign press, not only on the phone, but also at the Foreign Press

Center in the Department of State. I had more appearances by far on USIA's WorldNet than any other Assistant Secretary.

*Q: [Kennedy] Would you like to talk about the two, major meetings? First, there was the trip which President Clinton made to Japan and to South Korea. Then we might move over to the Seattle meeting of APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Conference]. Perhaps we could begin with a brief, overview of the situation and problems during the four years of the first Clinton term. Then we could hit each country and problem separately.*

LORD: Right. We're talking about both reality and perception of how we were doing in Asia and in the Pacific during this time. When we had some of our biggest problems, I think that you could say that our Asian problems were like what Mark Twain said about Wagner's music: "It's not as bad as it sounds."

I think that it's fair to say that we got off to an early and good start. Although there was some friction right away with Japan on trade, we took advantage of the calendar that we discussed, including the President's trip to Asia. Generally, during President Clinton's Asia trip, he set out broad themes in Japan and South Korea on economics, security, and human rights/democracy.

My Senate confirmation statement was of use in my early dealings with other countries. I went on an early trip to several countries in East Asia in May, 1993, before the President went on his trip to the area and began moving on regional dialogues. I negotiated with the Congress, on behalf of the President, MFN [Most Favored Nation] extension for China. At the time, and people tend to forget this, this was greeted as a very positive outcome. Although the President had been very harsh on China during the campaign and many in Congress wanted very tough conditions or to cut off MFN altogether, the human rights conditions we negotiated were modest. They put some pressure on the Chinese, but they weren't so onerous that the Chinese couldn't meet them, and thus we wouldn't lose MFN extension as a result. In any event, I worked well with Congresswoman Pelosi [Democrat, California] and Senator Mitchell [Democrat, Maine] on this issue. There was disappointment from the beginning with the economic people in the administration, who didn't want any conditions. Later they sabotaged the President's policy. But at the time (June 1993), the MFN deal was greeted as a success.

Then, by the end of 1993 we had the very successful meeting in Seattle of APEC. There was the drama of the first meeting ever of the leaders of the various, participating countries and setting forth provisions for greater trade and investment in the Pacific. This was part of a triple play on trade. Just before President Clinton arrived in Seattle, NAFTA was approved by the U.S. Congress. And soon after Seattle there was a breakthrough on global negotiations in the Uruguay Round of GATT.

*Q: [Kennedy] That's the North American Free Trade Agreement with Mexico and Canada.*

LORD: That's right. President Clinton arrived at the APEC meeting, having just won a major victory on NAFTA, with the help of the Republicans, I might add. This was accomplished literally one day before he arrived in Seattle. If he had lost this agreement, it would have hurt everything. So the President came in on the wave of a major success. This gave an impetus to the

whole APEC meeting, of course.

Then the bold vision set forth by the APEC leaders in turn directed the attention of the Europeans to the Uruguay Round of tariff and trade negotiations. The Europeans had been dragging their feet on the Uruguay Round. Then the Europeans began to see in APEC that the U.S. and Asia might get together at Europe's expense, and they began moving on the Uruguay Round. Within a couple of months, therefore, we had major breakthroughs on NAFTA, on APEC, and on the Uruguay Round in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] negotiations.

When you put all of that together - the MFN deal on China, the President's Asia trip, APEC, etc. - things looked as if they were going pretty well in the Asia-Pacific region in 1993. We did have trade problems with Japan. However, on the whole, things looked pretty good at that time.

During the latter months of 1993 therefore I was getting a good press, and people were generally supportive of our initiatives. I might add at this point that Secretary of State Christopher decided that Cliff Wharton wouldn't work out as new Deputy Secretary. So Christopher was looking for a Deputy Secretary. I'm just giving you the general rhythm of the administration, but it reflected the fact that Christopher and the White House were happy about how things were going in Asia at that point.

As I say, at the end of 1993 Secretary Christopher was looking for a Deputy. I know for a fact that the choice came down to Strobe Talbot or myself. Indeed, at one point Elaine Sciolino from the "New York Times" called me and said that the "Times" was going to run an article on the following day, saying that I had been chosen to be Deputy Secretary of State. I said: "Well, you know something that I don't know," and I steered her away from that. This was just as well, as the story was not accurate.

One semi-amusing comment here. I was told by someone very close to Secretary Christopher that the choice was between Talbot and myself and over the following weekend Christopher was reportedly going to choose between Talbot and myself. One thing that he doesn't do, unless it involves a crisis, is that he doesn't bother you on weekends. He's not like Kissinger, who might go out of his way to contact you on weekends, if he possibly could. It was very unusual for Christopher to call you on weekends. He might call you on Saturday morning, if you're in the office or he sees you. Otherwise, you don't generally get a call from Christopher over the weekend. He would say to himself: "This can wait till Monday."

So I went into the weekend, knowing that the choice was probably between Talbot and me and against this background of Christopher's habit of never calling on weekends. At about 6:00 or 7:00 PM on Sunday night a call came through that Secretary of State Christopher was calling me. So I sort of looked at my watch and thought that I might be asked to be Deputy Secretary at about 6:50 PM on such and such a date.

What Christopher discussed with me was some press report on China. It was not all that important or urgent and could have waited until the next morning. We discussed this report for about ten minutes. I kept waiting for the other shoe to drop. Not only did I know that he was

making up his mind on his deputy but I also knew that he knew that I knew! So here we had this ten minute conversation about some relatively modest issue about China. He got to the end of it, said: "Thank you," and hung up. I was totally puzzled. In any event, I found later that Christopher had chosen Strobe Talbot instead of me. He called me finally in Vail, Colorado.

Frankly, and this may sound amazing, I was not that disappointed. First of all, I thought very highly of Strobe Talbot. I'm not just being polite for the record. Secondly, I really liked what I was doing and had my teeth sunk into the job. Obviously, on balance I would have preferred to have been selected as Deputy Secretary of State. However, I've always had some anxiety levels as I've moved up, so I had mixed feelings about the resolution of this issue.

*Q: [Kennedy] Well, I'm trying to get a feel about the inner workings of the bureaucracy and do not want to criticize anybody. However, what was your impression and the word as to why the relationship between Cliff Wharton and Christopher hadn't worked out?*

LORD: Well, I had known Cliff Wharton as a Director of the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a very able man. I think that the conventional wisdom is true, in that Christopher didn't think that Wharton had all of that much experience on foreign policy and that he wanted either Peter Tarnoff, Tom Pickering, or somebody else as his number two man in the State Department. I think that it actually was Tom Pickering's name which was floated around most often at the time. However, the White House, with its laudatory goal of increasing diversity in the administration, put considerable pressure on Christopher to choose Wharton, who is an African-American. You'd have to ask Christopher if this is true, but I got that feeling. So I don't think that Wharton was Christopher's first choice to be Deputy Secretary.

All of us have strengths and weaknesses. I think that Cliff had served in AID [Agency for International Development], but he was not a bureaucratic jungle fighter and wasn't all that decisive. I just think that Christopher needed more support, and Wharton wasn't working out in the job. I think that Wharton wasn't all that happy, either, as Deputy Secretary. It is a little awkward for me to discuss this matter, and I think that you ought to talk to the people most directly involved. I must say that Wharton is an extremely decent guy. I think that Christopher needed more decisive, stronger support and that he, Christopher, found that he couldn't successfully delegate key issues to him.

I don't mean to digress too much on this Deputy Secretary issue. I believe that if you are detached about it, strictly in terms of foreign policy resume, mine was probably more impressive than Talbot's, because he had only worked for the government for a year. He had done extremely well as a special representative on the Soviet Union. However, he didn't have the equivalent of my experience on foreign policy, although he had a very impressive resume in other ways. But he had shown in one year that he was terrific on policy making and on dealing with the bureaucracy, as well as on substance. Above all, he was very close to the President, which I felt was valuable for Christopher. I thought that that would be very helpful for Christopher in dealing with the White House and the President. So I thought that on those grounds, as well as Talbot's other qualities, he was a very sensible choice.

Anyway, Talbot is so decent a person that he would handle his close relationship with the

President and serving Christopher with great skill, and he did so. In short, he was an asset for Christopher in terms of the White House, but he clearly never played Christopher off against the President and never used his White House connection to Christopher's disadvantage. He retained enormous respect from Christopher and from the President. He did an excellent job and has done so ever since. He is just a great human being. I would say that off the record as well as on the record.

This is more or less by way of telling the good news in a general way on the first year foreign policy - and my reputation - in the Clinton Administration. Now I'll get to the bad news. As I said, during the first year of the Clinton administration I think that people felt, and I felt also, that we were off to a good start. Then we ran into some trouble, no question about it, in the first few months of 1994. Several things conspired to produce this result.

First, and I'll go into more detail on Japan, but what dominated the public and media perception of Japan policy was trade disputes with that country. I'll get into that later. Basically, the conventional wisdom or the view of the hard liners in economics was that we ought to confront the Japanese on these matters. But even those who were worried about the balance of payments deficit or market access felt that all of this noise and dispute with Japan was dominating what after all was our most important partnership. One way or another many thought we were hurting relations.

Secondly, at the same time, we had this reversal on MFN [Most Favored Nation] status for China. We had the unfortunate trip by Secretary Christopher to China in March, 1994, and then the President changed his position on MFN conditionality. It is now called "Normal Trade Relations" or "NTR," instead of MFN, which is what it was called at the time. So we were embarrassed on that front and weren't making a great deal of progress with China. Therefore, it looked as if we weren't doing very well with China. People like Kissinger and other Republicans in particular said that we weren't giving enough emphasis to strategic dialogue and that we were too focused on human rights. At the same time, the human rights people, including some in Congress, were unhappy that we had reversed our policy on MFN. So there was considerable criticism of how we were handling the China relationship.

In addition, in the early months of 1994, the Korean issue heated up. The North Koreans were threatening to leave the NPT.

*Q: [Kennedy] NPT is the Non Proliferation Treaty.*

LORD: Yes. There was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing about IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. So we had a buildup of tension on the Korean front. And trouble with our two biggest partners in Asia, Japan and China. You put all of this together, and there was considerable criticism of our Asia policy. This became increasingly personal. With respect to the MFN reversal - I'll discuss in detail later - people were looking for scapegoats. Clearly, I was a likely target. I had been in favor of conditional MFN extension and I had advised President Clinton to that effect. I was Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, including China, and so there was a lot of press backgrounding and even foregrounding, particularly by the representatives of our economic agencies, that I had not consulted enough

with them and had sort of screwed things up. There was an article in "Newsweek" with my picture asking: "Is Lord about to be fired?" So this was not the happiest time of my career.

I obviously thought, at the time, that although we had some problems, they were manageable. There was also the debate at the time about Asian values. There was a conference in Vienna about Asian values versus universal values.

*Q: [Kennedy] Could you explain what that distinction means?*

On China, I think that if we had it all to do over again, we probably shouldn't have had conditional MFN renewal. But we were in a box in 1993 because of the President's campaign positions. I also think that it might have worked. I think that in 1993 we got the best possible outcome, given the President's campaign rhetoric. The compromise that we got from Congresswoman Pelosi, Senator Mitchell, and others, the yardsticks for Chinese improvement were realistic. If we had not been undercut by the economic agencies of the U.S. Government and our business community, we might have worked this out.

Nevertheless, China policy was looking rocky. During the summer of 1993, State drafted a strategy paper which we sent on to the White House. I had a lot to do with drafting it. (End of tape)

We had drafted this paper on the strategy of engagement with China. It essentially presaged our future policy and was approved by the White House in September 1993. We were trying to be more closely engaged with them. I felt that some of the critics who said that we hadn't engaged in enough strategic dialogue with China didn't appear to realize that we weren't exactly talking to Zhou En-lai and others of the older generation of Chinese leaders. However, I understood that we needed to straighten out China policy in some respects. In the case of Korea we had inherited a very difficult problem from the previous administration, and there weren't very many good choices available to us. So I felt that we were doing the best we could on that front, and we were negotiating rather than selling out to North Korea or going to war with it on the nuclear issue.

More importantly, I believe that we were making progress on other issues that had been lost sight of. We will go into all of these issues in more detail. We were already moving ahead toward normalization of diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. We had raised APEC to the leaders' level, with all of the positive implications of that. We were moving ahead with APEC as a major instrument of free trade and investment. We had begun to launch regional security dialogues, which I thought were important.

Nevertheless, having said all of that, both in terms of reality and certainly in terms of perception, the early months of 1994 were certainly the nadir of my tenure as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. But, during the rest of 1994 and later, we really began to pick up again. I'm trying to be as detached as I can in this respect. Perhaps this was less so in the case of China, but we got beyond the initial MFN dispute and began to have more visits and to work on a broader agenda. With Japan we negotiated several trade agreements, the trade deficit began to go down, and we were stepping up our dialogue, working with Joe Nye of the Department of Defense on security issues. We were beginning to make progress on that.

In October, 1994, we negotiated the Korean Nuclear Accord, a framework agreement which was a major step forward. We made much further progress on relations with Vietnam and moved ahead on that. In July, 1994, not only did the regional security dialogue move ahead but we created the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] Forum, which brought five new countries, including China, Russia, and Vietnam into this security dialogue. That was a significant step forward.

*Q: [Kennedy] That happens.*

LORD: It happens, particularly when a memo is critical of what you are doing. So I can understand that accusation, however wrong. That's just a sidebar.

First, the memo did lay out where things were going well. I thought that this was only fair. I didn't want to get everyone too depressed, and so I pointed out where things were going well, along the lines which I have mentioned, even then, in the spring of 1994. But then I spent the bulk of the memo saying that we were having some problems, what they were, and why we had them. Honestly, I haven't looked at this memo for a couple of years.

Some people thought that this memo was written as a part of the China policy debate and before the MFN decision. It was about that time, though I can't remember exactly when it was. It wasn't primarily about China, though it included China. Basically, I talked both fundamental issues as well as stylistic problems. On China I believed we needed more strategic dialogue and to expand our agenda.

However, the memo wasn't written primarily because of China. China was one of our problems. Basically, my view was that we have to broaden our agenda with China. Human rights are still crucial, but we have to talk about a lot of these other issues, like Korea and so on, as part of a broader agenda.

On Japan we were already working with the Department of Defense on the need for stepping up our visible as well as our invisible security dialogue.

But the news focused on broad themes, not specific policies. I went through the various issues before us. There was a general theme of getting more multilateral support. I focused on this and the Asian values issue. I also emphasized that we should act without arrogance. With other nations, I thought we should appeal to self-interest themes.

I talked about style generally with the Asians and how we had to be respectful without rolling over. I don't recall everything that I said but I did talk about our stylistic approach, and the need for greater Congressional and media attention. I covered a lot of issues in this comprehensive memo. I was trying to get us on a more positive track, both in terms of substance and in terms of perception.

I think that the memo was pretty useful. It was designed to encourage a debate on these issues. When the memo leaked, a lot of people felt that I was covering my flank or other parts of my

anatomy by criticizing the Clinton administration on our policy. This was nonsense, because I had helped to fashion it. I didn't always succeed in this regard, because, frankly, we didn't have control of Japan policy in the early period of the Clinton administration. There were some problems. However, I was basically being self critical, too, pointing to areas where we could do better. It would be nonsense to say, at least of policy toward East Asia, that our problems were everyone else's fault, not mine.

So that was one thing that I did in the spring of 1994 when we had problems in Asia.

The other thing that I did was to convene the Chiefs of Mission conference of 1994. These meetings are sometimes pretty routine, but we did a lot of work on this meeting. Everyone was there from all our posts and from various agencies in Washington, bringing up problems and suggestions. Again, this happened in June 1994. That meeting was important in getting ideas on how we should approach things. People then went back to their post, sometimes instituting a new style and approaches.

So I think that those two efforts were fairly important.

*Q: [Kennedy] Well, regarding the memo, you can write one, but the question is: "What came back?"*

LORD: What came back was discussions with Secretary Christopher and others in Washington regarding the memo. I can't remember whether we had a special meeting called to discuss it. However, there was a very enthusiastic response in terms of providing intellectual grist for the mill. I also invited comments from our Embassies and asked them to reply to the points made in the memo. There was very good dialogue with our posts.

I can't quantify the impact the memo had. First of all, I am very careful to avoid claiming that this memo turned around our Asian policy. I don't think that things were that bad, as some people thought. Secondly, our policy would have been turned around to some extent, as you always learn on the job. The whole Clinton administration was learning and adjusting. But I think that the memo had some influence, and in fact that we began to pick up speed. In the subsequent months, there were adjustments in our approach as recommended in my memo and other papers we wrote. By itself, this memo wasn't going to solve the Korean nuclear problem or some of the other issues I mentioned. However, I think that the memo underlined the need for greater emphasis to our China policy in the sense of the need to broaden our agenda. I think that it underlined the need for having other elements in our Japan policy. I think that, stylistically, we adjusted our tone somewhat in the region. I did that by constant iteration and instructions in this regard.

Speaking generally, I think that this memo got people thinking, although I can't quantify to what extent. I got some very good feedback on it from various people. As I said, there was some criticism from people outside the State Department who said that it was designed to have a self serving purpose at a time when I felt defensive about where we were. But people in the government bureaucracy and at our overseas posts tended to think that it was a very useful exercise. In most cases people agreed with its main themes.

Recently, I received a copy of the memo as published in a Japanese newspaper. I enclose it here for the record, as published.

*Washington - The following is a letter Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of State, submitted to Secretary of State Warren Christopher:*

Subject: Emerging Malaise in our Relations with Asia

When this Administration took office, the fundamental challenge in the Asia-Pacific region was to raise the region's profile in our foreign policy. We sought to highlight the stakes for our domestic audience and convince Asians of our staying power.

(1) In the first year, we have succeeded - through the travels of the President, yourself and others; high level bilateral meetings; major speeches setting forth the vision of a Pacific community; maintenance of our military presence; the APEC leaders meeting; promotion of regional security dialogues; forward movement with Vietnam; staunch support for a democratic Cambodia; modest improvement of ties with Indonesia and Malaysia; reinforcement of relations with Australia on arms control, regional security and APEC; and a change in our contacts policy for New Zealand.

(2) Now, we face a fresh, growing, more complex challenge. With our Asia-Pacific partners more persuaded of our long term engagement, they now are beginning to resist the nature of that engagement. A series of American measures threatened or employed, risk corroding our positive image in the region, giving ammunition to those charging we are an international nanny, if not bully. Without proper course, adjustments, we could subvert our influence and our interests.

(3) The malaise

This spring, the positive Pacific community principles articulated by the President in Seattle are being crowded out by a plethora of problems which Asians perceive as caused by hostile unilateral U.S. actions. These are creating a sense of resentment and apprehension in our relations with the region - and also engendering some tension within the Administration.

(4) Central to this malaise are the problems in our two principal Asian relationships.

(5) Japan and China.

We view these as arising from the unwillingness of Japan and China to conform their policies to international norms. Asian, and others, view us as placating domestic interest groups and criticize us for tactics that destabilize relationships which are central to the region's peace and prosperity.

There are a host of other frictions. Our attempt to interject workers rights issues into the world trade organization has been universally opposed by Asians and non-Asians alike (France being the major exception). It threatens (threatened?) to mar the APEC Trade Ministers meeting in Marrakesh. We have sanctioned China on the MTCR, and Thailand for Libya. We just announced sanctions on Taiwan regarding endangered species. We have decertified Laos on narcotics, although granting them a national interest waiver softened the blow. We continue to press Malaysia and Indonesia on workers' rights and Singapore on its flogging sentence against an American teenager. We disagree with almost all Asians about the proper tactics for promoting reform in Burma. In varying degrees our promotion of human rights and democracy complicates our ties with several nations.

This is not to suggest that such policies are basically wrong. We have a right and a duty to pursue our interests and reflect our values. Moreover, one should not judge success by an absence of friction; harmony sometimes is purchased by paper over differences, risking larger problems down the road. Some of the frictions can be viewed as inevitable bumps in the road. The confluence of these individual issues, however, has fostered malaise, eroding the sense of optimism and partnership forged in Seattle.

In brief, the Asia-Pacific region presents in acute form a general challenge for American foreign policy. How do we reconcile our competing goals in a post cold war agenda when security concerns no longer lend us a clear hierarchy?

*Q: [Kennedy] While we're on the subject of a Chiefs of Mission conference, how did you feel about Ambassadorial appointments to your area? A new administration had come in, and they had political payoffs and all of that to consider in making such appointments. How did you feel that you came out?*

LORD: I felt that we won some and we lost some. I made a real effort, both on the merits, to get the best people as Ambassadors, and, in terms of morale in the Bureau, to get as many outstanding senior Foreign Service Officers who had served the Department loyally, preferably in the Asian-Pacific region. I think, on the whole, that I did well in this regard, over the course of two, three, or four years. I can't quantify this. Naturally we didn't always get the Ambassadors that we wanted, but I felt that, with one or two exceptions, I had a full crack at getting our views across.

Sometimes Ambassadorial appointments depended on the White House and sometimes it was up to the Seventh Floor of the Department of State. However, more often than not, we managed to get good people assigned as Ambassadors who deserved appointment. I say this without being critical of my predecessor, there was a feeling that, in recent years, not too much attention has been paid to this. It's one thing to nominate someone as Ambassador. It's another thing to get into a bloody fight to make sure the appointment is made, including lobbying people on the Seventh Floor of the Department and/or the White House.

I spent quite a bit of time on this matter. I believed that, on the whole, we had been successful in making pretty good appointments overseas, and I felt that I won more than I lost. Of course, I welcomed truly qualified political appointees - such as Mondale to Japan - so long as the percentage was not high.

I will just finish up this overview now, and then we'll go into issues in more depth. I felt that in particular, we had some pluses and some minuses in our policies in 1995. Our experience in 1996 was very good on the whole. There were several developments in this connection that made me feel very good. One of the reasons that I left office at the end of the first Clinton term was that I felt that our Asia-Pacific policy was in good shape.

In 1995, by the way, we normalized diplomatic relations with Vietnam and opened up an American Embassy in Hanoi. That was a major step forward.

We will discuss developments with China in 1996. In the spring was the Taiwan missile crisis

and other issues included intellectual property rights, nuclear proliferation problems, and human rights issues. By the end of the year, we had gone from crisis to genuine, major progress. Secretary of State Christopher went back to China in November, 1996. This was a very successful trip, and set up subsequent summits. I had worked on this with Tony Lake [National Security Adviser] in a July 1996 trip. The future summit meetings were announced at the Manila APEC meeting at the end of 1996. So relations with China were on a positive track.

With Japan we had President Clinton's trip in the spring of 1996. I think that this was one of the best prepared and most successful summit meetings which I had ever been involved with regarding any country during my whole experience with foreign affairs. This trip reaffirmed and updated the alliance after the Cold War. It closed with a major joint statement on our partnership, the defusing of the Okinawa rape incident, which we'll get back to, and the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This involved working on new defense guidelines that would update our treaty and clarify how we would work together on various regional, as well as bilateral, security problems. This was a very successful trip which made me feel particularly good, given the importance which I attached to Japan and the problems which we had during the first couple of years of the first Clinton term. This was the fruit of a dialogue for which I give Joe Nye and Kurt Campbell [of the U.S. Defense Department] full credit. Nye and I, as well as our deputies, had worked closely together on security issues, which resulted in some of these results. Full credit also goes to Secretary of Defense Perry, who did an outstanding job, particularly on the Okinawa rape issue, on which he and Ambassador Mondale also worked very hard.

So I thought that relations with China and Japan were both on the right track.

On Korea, the Agreed Framework which we had negotiated in 1994 was still holding up in 1996. By then, and after considerable effort, we had launched Four-Power Talks [involving the U.S., China, North Korea, and South Korea]. So the situation in Korea was looking good. We had some tensions with our South Korean friends, but we were able to ease them.

By 1996 APEC had gone through several meetings with national leaders and had become an institution. We had free trade and investment goals announced in APEC in 1994 and made good progress in succeeding years. These were major objectives which, in turn, inspired the countries of the Americas to move toward free trade, and so on. So APEC was well established. Regional security dialogues, notably the ASEAN regional forum, were moving ahead as well.

Cambodia was still holding up. We had improved our relations with New Zealand, as I said, and strengthened relations with Australia.

In short, I believed that by the end of the first Clinton term we were in good shape in these countries, and in the regional generally. Of course we had made some mistakes, especially early on, but I was pleased with the progress over the four years, both on specific issues and on elevating the region on our foreign policy agenda. The overall record stacked up quite well with the goals and my March 1993 Senate statement.

Now, of course, I was also fortunate in the timing of my departure, since we had a domestic scandal [Monica Lewinsky affair] in the White House, which emerged after I left and

increasingly preoccupied the President and his people and caused problems back home. There was also, of course, the major Asian financial and economic crisis which also broke soon after I left the government.

*Q: [Kennedy] All right. Can we just discuss one question? There was sort of a political earthquake in the United States resulting from the Congressional elections of 1994, when the Republicans gained control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate. The new Congressional leaders brought in very much of a conservative agenda. It seemed as if the Clinton administration was greatly weakened. Was there any sort of conservative focus to this development?*

LORD: That's a very good question. I would say that, for a variety of reasons, it didn't have any major impact on our Asian policies. There is no question that it had a tremendous impact on political alignments in the United States. I haven't thought about this systematically, but it might have had some impact on other foreign policy issues.

Regarding Asia, this change in Congress didn't really hurt us. First, the bad news was that generally we saw people emerge in Congress who were less interested and less informed on foreign policy. This was continuing an established trend. We had people coming into Congress who didn't have a passport. When Congressmen go overseas, which I think they should do, most of them work hard. They get unfairly criticized in the "Washington Post" for going on boondoggle trips. I think that there were two or three Republican Congressmen who boasted that they hadn't been overseas since the late 1980s. This was a ridiculous situation, in terms of ignorance. This resulted in problems caused more by ignorance than ideology.

Having said that, I found that most of the issues that I dealt with involved contact with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee, and particularly the sub-committees dealing with Asia. We found very responsible leadership in these committees, which continued when they were taken over by Republicans. We saw Senator Thomas come in as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Sub-Committee on Asia and Congressman Bereuter as Chairman of the House Sub-Committee on Asia. They were both bipartisan, serious people with whom I was able to work extremely well, as I did with their predecessors, Senator Robb and Congressman Ackerman.

We were fortunate in the people who were chosen to serve on the key sub-committees on Asia. We were also fortunate that there wasn't that much controversy over Asian problems. We had problems throughout with a guerrilla minority on the Hill dealing with Vietnam. The other part of the problem with Vietnam involved the White House. The biggest part of the problem was political skittishness of the NSC and the White House, rather than Congress. That situation didn't change. It was there anyway.

The Korean Framework Agreement was generally approved, but funding problems emerged as we went on, but this wasn't any particular reflection of the 1994 elections. Problems with the Framework Agreement were more the result of North Korea being such an unattractive, opaque, and lousy regime. No one liked to make deals that were less than perfect with the North Koreans.

On China the MFN debate, no matter who controls Congress, given China's policies on other issues such as human rights, trade, Tibet, or nuclear non-proliferation, always presented problems. I don't think that this problem was appreciably worsened by the results of the elections of 1994.

On Japan many Congresspeople continued to think that we should be firmer on economic issues. Then, as we began to have more positive security relationships with Japan, that wasn't much of a problem.

This is a long way of saying that the elections of 1994 were of major significance in terms of domestic policy and maybe some foreign policy issues, but not in terms of Asian issues that could really hurt us. Ironically, I think that most people would say that in general the Clinton administration on foreign policy, and certainly Secretary of State Christopher, with his reputation, did much better during the final two years of the first Clinton term than during the first two years.

This was an interesting phenomenon. At the outset of the Administration, you had the stumbling over Haiti, Somalia, and Bosnia, as well as some of the Asian problems that we had during the first two years of the first Clinton term. Obviously, there could be criticism of many foreign policy issues, but I think generally that most fair-minded people, and even Clinton's fiercest critics, would say that by the end of 1996 our foreign policy situation looked a lot better than it did at the end of 1994. This was despite the fact that Congress was going in the opposite direction during the period 1994-1996. Now, how you put those two trends together is somewhat ironic. So, the fact that we faced a new, less attractive, and less informed Congress did not particularly hurt our foreign policy. The Clinton Administration ultimately got its act together, gained more experience, and changed some policies. We did a better job on Asia, as a whole, during the last two years of the first Clinton term than during the first two years.

*Q: Could you talk about China as you described it to candidate Clinton? Also, did China come up as an issue during the 1992 presidential election campaign?*

LORD: The answer is "Yes, of course." As we get into this more current period on China, let me say that, from the beginning, I was, of course, a strong believer in engaging China. The United States and China are two great nations looking to the next century. From the American national interest and in the global and regional interests, they need to work together.

At the same time I've never had any illusions about the difficulties of doing this. Nor the fact that, throughout these years and as far ahead as I can see, the relationship between the United States and China will be periodically sweet and sour, if I may use this expression.

Two of the more important people in my life on various China issues have been Henry Kissinger and my wife. Of course, in many ways my head is with Kissinger, but my heart is with my wife, in every way, but including China in particular. What I mean by that is the following.

Particularly when I was younger and working with Kissinger, my overwhelming emphasis then was on geopolitics. I don't recall focusing as much on human rights, trade, and other matters. I

continue to share Kissinger's view of the strategic importance of the relationship between China and the United States. However, frankly, and he would admit this, too, we had somewhat of a parting of the ways on China, not so much personally but conceptually, since the Tiananmen Square massacre [of 1989]. Therefore, I agree with Kissinger on the one hand, in the sense that I agree on the importance of engagement with China and that was the basic approach of the Clinton administration. However, I assign a higher priority to human rights than Kissinger does, both generally and in foreign policy terms, and specifically on China. Not only because of the virtues and values of human rights and idealism and the need to maintain Congressional and domestic support, but also because I think that it is in China's self interest to emphasize respect for human rights.

I believe that China cannot develop its economy without a freer society, especially in the age of information. I think that it is in China's interests in terms of maintaining stability for the Chinese people to be able to express themselves peacefully. With unemployment and other pressures, there will be instability in China. If there is no room for peaceful dissent, then people will take to the streets. For all of these reasons I think that the protection and promotion of human rights should be an important part of our policy.

However, I do not go as far in this direction as my wife, who also agrees with the concept of engagement with China. From the beginning, she supported the opening toward China and still does. Nevertheless, she believes that human rights must be a centerpiece of our policies toward China. She wouldn't hold the whole relationship with China hostage to human rights, but she would be much more apt to go slow and be tougher unless there is more progress made in China in the area of human rights.

So, therefore, I don't believe in holding back the development of the Chinese-American relationship because of the human rights situation in China as much as my wife would favor. However, I would certainly put more stress on human rights and be less defensive about the Chinese than Henry Kissinger and, say, the great bulk of the American business community and experts on China. So much for the general background.

Now, I will start after the Tiananmen Square massacre, which I have covered.

Regarding the Tiananmen Square massacre, I was not shocked in the sense that I knew that the Chinese authorities could be brutal. But of course, I was very distressed by what the Chinese authorities did in Tiananmen Square, which was totally unnecessary in my view. The demonstrations were fading away.

*Q: This was in June...*

LORD: June, 1989. Coincidentally, I had left China on April 22, 1989, when the Tiananmen demonstrations were just beginning to take place, a week after the death of Hu Yaobang and the day of his funeral, when the first big crowd of about 100,000 people assembled in Beijing.

I returned to the United States as the news of the Tiananmen Square demonstrations grew and I was therefore immediately invited to appear on television and speak to other news outlets in

May, June, and July, 1989. As I said, I had left China in mid-April, 1989. Obviously, I supported what the Bush Administration was doing at the time. However, I was very tough on the Chinese authorities, even though I believed very strongly in the development of our relations with China, where I had just been Ambassador. Like other observers, I was hopeful about how the situation would turn out. I thought that the demands of the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square were reasonable. I thought that the Chinese Government's solution to this incident was brutal and unnecessarily so, because the crowds were dispersing when the crackdown took place. In my view, this situation could have been solved peacefully. So, in my comments on this incident, I was very critical of the Chinese authorities.

Nevertheless, I still believed that we had to deal with China and had to keep moving ahead in developing the Sino-American relationship. I thought that we should react strongly to this incident in a rhetorical sense and apply sanctions for what the Chinese authorities had done.

The approximate sequence of events was as follows. I had left China as Ambassador in April, 1989. After a short interval my wife was commenting on CBS [Columbia Broadcasting System] television, identified only as an author. During the summer of 1989 I wrote an article for "Foreign Affairs" magazine, entitled "Beyond the 'Big Chill,'" which was published in September, 1989. In that article, as I say, I was very tough on the Chinese authorities. I said that they needed to move toward greater freedom. I said how unnecessary all of this repressive action had been. But I also made a strong case for holding the Chinese-American relationship together and continuing to move ahead.

At this point the Bush Administration had been relatively firm in its response to events in China, although, even then, not enough to my liking. Its public rhetoric was relatively too moderate, but the administration had taken certain steps involving some sanctions. At that point I was unaware of the secret visit by Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] to China only a week after the Tiananmen Square massacre.

I showed my article for "Foreign Affairs" to Dick Solomon on the NSC staff, just for his ideas but not in the sense of any censorship. We had worked together. The fact remained that my article was very tough on the Chinese and maybe tougher than the Bush administration wanted. However, it was also very positive about forward engagement and was supportive of the Bush Administration's general policy line. So there wasn't any real daylight between my position and that of the administration. I thought that administration officials were fairly happy with the article. However, whether they were happy with it or not wasn't the point. I was simply expressing my views.

Over the next couple of years the MFN issue as it related to China began to be debated every spring.

*Q: MFN means...*

LORD: Most Favored Nation. It is renewed every year because of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment. The President is required by this legislation to certify that emigration from China [and other communist countries] is relatively free, which it has been, despite all of the other

things the Chinese have done. We could conscientiously say that this was so. Nevertheless, we could only renew MFN for a year at a time, because China didn't have permanent, MFN status. I won't go into all of the details of MFN.

I don't have the exact chronology before me. I don't remember whether this issue came up in 1989 or whether it was too late by then to consider whether to extend MFN status for China. In 1990 I did not favor placing conditions on the MFN status for China and certainly was not in favor of revoking it. I have never favored revoking MFN status. However, as the years went by, I felt that the Bush Administration was overly soft on China, even though I believed in engagement. I thought that we had allowed the pendulum to swing too far in the other direction. I was getting increasingly restless about what I thought was an overly compliant posture toward China.

Then, it was publicly announced that Brent Scowcroft had been to China in December 1989. Scowcroft was pictured exchanging toasts with a senior Chinese official, whose name I don't recall. Scowcroft also made, in my view, some ill-considered remarks on this occasion. This was sort of the last straw for my growing impatience with the Bush Administration's posture on China. Again, I'm not against engagement with China. I am not one of those right wingers or left wingers who care only about human rights. However, in terms of respect for the Chinese people, the world, our values, and our interests, I thought that we had to take a stronger stand. I began to get more dissatisfied with the posture of the Bush Administration. In fact, the Scowcroft trip pushed me over the edge, as it were. I wrote a very strong op ed [published opposite the editorial page] piece about the Scowcroft trip which was published in the "Washington Post."

I knew of the Scowcroft trip and wrote this article in a few days. I learned just after I published the piece that Scowcroft had not only visited China in December but also in July a week after the massacre. Had I known that, I would have adopted an even stronger posture. Given my past service as Ambassador and association with Scowcroft and others, my article made quite a splash. From then on I began to express a more critical view of the administration but hopefully not nasty or partisan. I kept saying that engagement with China was important and continued to sound that theme. Moreover - I don't remember the exact sequence of events - either when asked for my comments or when testifying before Congress, I said that I was not in favor of revoking MFN status for China or placing conditions on granting MFN status in 1990.

I believe that by 1991, or certainly by 1992, when I was asked to testify before Congress, I modified my position. I felt that, on the one hand, we should not revoke MFN status for China. MFN status is really normal and available to almost all countries, including terrible regimes. More importantly, I thought that there was much substance to the argument that you can encourage a society by engagement and by opening up our relations. If we cut off MFN status, we would be cutting off the reformers and business people who were working in the direction we wished. This would also hurt American business interests and legitimate concerns, both in terms of our exports to China and imports from China of cheaper goods for our blue collar people who buy textiles, shoes, sneakers, toys, and so on. This would also hurt innocent bystanders, particularly Hong Kong and also Taiwan, if we cut off MFN status for China. Cutting off MFN status would be too blunt an instrument to express our displeasure with what China had done. Such action would put us in confrontation with China, when I still believed in engagement. On

the other hand, I was increasingly frustrated with what I thought was the overly soft approach toward China by the Bush Administration and the fact that we didn't seem to have any leverage with China.

*Q: You say: "...with some reluctance?"*

LORD: With some reluctance, I modified my stance. I didn't favor China's losing MFN [Most Favored Nation] status. I came out in favor of what I considered modest conditions for an extension of MFN status for China. The point here was to lay out some objectives, sufficiently concrete to be meaningful, but not so specific and detailed that we would box ourselves in. We needed to have some flexibility on how we would interpret making progress. So my basic position was that we needed some leverage to make progress which would not lose MFN status for China for all of the reasons that I've mentioned. However, by setting some modest conditions, that would give the Chinese some incentive to make progress. They could do enough to meet our conditions but not so much so that they would have grounds for worrying about instability or risking their control of the situation. At least we would have some leverage on the Chinese because of their huge trade surplus with the U.S. and because of the importance of trade to them.

Therefore, I advocated modest, not heavy but realistic conditions concerning progress in human rights, which they could meet in the course of a year. I reluctantly decided that this was the next step in trying to find a way to move the Chinese on this issue.

*Q: You've been a Washington operator. Where did you feel that the thrust for this sort of business as usual attitude or policy on the part of the Bush administration was coming from? Bush had been the Chief of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing.*

LORD: I thought that this attitude came directly from President Bush himself, related to his time in China and elsewhere. This was proven to me in connection with the Fang Lizhi incident, which we covered. Basically, he blamed me and the Embassy, instead of blaming the Chinese for their outrageous behavior. I was careful not to let my personal animus against him and Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] get in the way of my policy prescriptions.

It was clear to me, in view of President Bush's supine reaction to the Fang Lizhi incident, that this kind of attitude toward the Chinese was coming from him.

And I figured that Brent Scowcroft shared Bush's view. Secretary of State Baker was more politically attuned and kept his head down on China, because he knew it was not popular in Congress and among the public more generally, although he got more involved later on. So Baker was a little bit more nuanced in his approach. Certainly, I thought, Bush and Scowcroft were soft on China. That's why I gave you a little bit of philosophy in the beginning of this segment. I believe strongly in engagement with China. I think that it's phony to debate isolation versus engagement. I think that you can have engagement of a hard headed nature. You can be firm with the Chinese and keep your powder dry, but also have a broad agenda of positive things to accomplish. You should hold firmly to human rights but should not let human rights hold the relationship between China and the United States hostage. I just felt that the balance in this relationship had been upset by the Bush approach.

So in careful congressional testimony I laid out this rationale for a modest position on MFN extension. This would be enough to induce progress but not so much as to risk losing MFN extension. I figured that the economic interest for China was enough to make this approach work.

I was equally strong against either extreme: either revoking MFN or placing heavy conditions, on the one hand, or business as usual and not stepping up some of the pressures on China, on the other hand.

My view probably also came to the attention of the prospective Clinton Administration, which was looking for a policy on MFN extension. They were not happy with the position of the Bush administration.

Now, in the course of the Presidential election campaign of 1992 candidate Clinton used very strong language. He was tough on President Bush's position on China saying Bush had allegedly coddled dictators, or whatever the language was that he used. I was not consulted on the language he used in his speeches. I thought that it was excessive. Even though I myself was frustrated by what the Bush administration was doing, I had never gone as far as candidate Clinton went. I thought that Clinton went too far.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Do you know where the language used by Clinton came from?*

LORD: No. I don't want to be disingenuous. I was not unhappy that Clinton was being critical of the Bush approach. I was not happy with it myself. However, I was not consulted and did not help to write the language which Clinton used on China during the campaign. I would not have gone that far myself, because when you become President, you need more room for maneuver.

So after the New Haven meeting around Labor Day [of 1992] I got a few phone calls on behalf of Clinton from Nancy Soderberg, Sandy Berger, Tony Lake, and so on, asking for my views. I wrote a paper or two. I basically set out various options and recommended the line which I had used in my testimony before Congress, involving setting modest conditions, and I stress the word, modest.

Thus, I advocated conditional MFN extension. So that's where I stood when I ultimately agreed to serve in the incoming Clinton administration.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Do you have a sense that Clinton used this attack on President Bush as an important part of his campaign?*

LORD: If you are asking whether this issue came up during the 1992 Presidential election campaign, in fact foreign policy was never as big a deal as other issues. Clinton's basic campaign was that President Bush ignored domestic policy. However, in the foreign policy area, I think that it's fair to say that China was one of the three or four topics that Clinton touched on.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Right. It's interesting to note, insofar as one can tell, that candidate*

*Clinton had been to Taiwan when he was Governor of Arkansas. However, he had no real experience with, or interest in, China as such. So were his remarks on China part of his basic view or were they obtained from someone else?*

LORD: I think that these views were part of his own convictions. In the first place, then Governor Clinton probably was friendly to Taiwan. However, he wasn't being propelled by a pro-Taiwan outlook. I think that he understood, and certainly this was clear in our conversations, when he asked good questions, that China was important. I want to make clear that in my briefing, and I should have made this point more clearly, that, in addition to coming out modestly for conditional MFN, I placed heavy emphasis on the need to engage China and the importance of moving ahead. In fact, I emphasized that the U.S. and China had many interests in common. I also said that I thought that we had been too soft on the human rights issue and that the granting of conditional MFN was the way to go.

There was more discussion with Clinton in my September 1992 meeting with him, not specifically on MFN, but on the relationship with China and where it had been over the years. That is, what the context was and the importance of moving ahead. So a lot of this discussion was based on that. Clinton asked good questions. I had the feeling that even then, before he was President, he considered that the relationship with China was important. He didn't want to swing all the way over to isolation and containment. He genuinely was concerned about China on human rights grounds. Surely, there was a partisan element in this. This sort of thing happens in every campaign. Clinton saw that Bush was vulnerable on this issue, and it might play well before the American people. I'm sure that that was another factor.

*Q: Can you talk about who asked you to be Assistant Secretary of State? Also, can you talk about your confirmation hearings for this position?*

LORD: Sure. Warren Christopher, the incoming Secretary of State, called me on the phone. I don't recall the exact date, but it was sometime in December or perhaps January, 1992. The appointment was not announced, I think, until January 20, 1993. When I was nominated to be Ambassador to China, Senator Jesse Helms [Republican, North Carolina] held me up for several months. I had a long wait for confirmation as Ambassador to China. This time the process was easy. My appointment as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs was announced on January 20, 1993. My hearings took place about two months later, in March, 1993. Then I was approved, more or less right away. I don't want to get too far away from the China scene. We can get back to my confirmation hearings some other time.

I worked very hard on my opening statement for the confirmation hearings. The Congressional relations people at State didn't want me to make a major statement. They preferred bland opening statements, such as that I was happy to be here, that the appointment as Assistant Secretary of State was a great honor, that I looked forward to working with Congress, etc. Then I could say that I would be happy to take questions from the Senators. Instead, I prepared a broad-ranging speech, including my view on how we should deal with China. I had to fight to give it. After all of the work I had put into the original draft...

*Q: Stick with China. Okay.*

LORD: Shortly after I was confirmed as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, in fact, within a few weeks, I had to go to Brunei to attend a regional security dialogue.

This was convenient, because I wanted to get overseas quickly on my first overseas trip in my new position. Of course, I thought that it was also important to go to China, particularly since we had the MFN deadline looming. At that point some people even thought that President Clinton might recommend revoking MFN for China. There was a lot of sentiment for revoking MFN or attaching strong conditions to extending it in the Congress, in addition to Clinton's own statements made during the campaign. There were a lot of questions about what President Clinton was going to recommend. For example, was he going to wait until he was close to the June renewal deadline for MFN status for China? It seemed to me, and, of course, Secretary of State Christopher agreed, that I should get out to China and sort of test the waters.

I can't tell you the exact date I went to China on my way to Brunei and a couple of other places. It was in April or May, 1993. While in China I made the point that President Clinton wanted a good relationship with China. I tried to stress some positive elements. I drew on and pointed to my own personal involvement and the experience I had with Secretary Kissinger and then when I served as Ambassador to China.

The Chinese officials I met knew, of course, that I had been critical since the Tiananmen Square massacre [of 1989]. So by this time they had sort of ambivalent feelings toward me, all the more so since my wife had been even more critical and outspoken, even though they had loved her while she was there with me when I was Ambassador to China. So they probably looked at me with some ambivalence. They knew that they would have to deal with me for four years. They were probably concerned about what President Clinton had said in his own campaign in the fall of 1992. They credited me for my role with Nixon and Kissinger and as Ambassador. But for the Chinese conservatives, at least, my interaction with Chinese students and the Fang Lizhi incident had created some concern.

The Chinese basically listened to my presentation, which included a heavy dose of comment on human rights and the need for progress. However, I was careful to cover a broad agenda, including regional and global issues, as well as bilateral problems. I was honestly concerned about the looming deadline on MFN extension to China for another year. Therefore, I made a pitch for progress on that front.

The Chinese gave me a cordial reception, because of my past contributions to Chinese-American relations. A new, American administration was in office, and they wanted to get along with it. They sought to display general courtesy to me. The reception was not as warm and outgoing as it would have been before the Tiananmen Square massacre. It was a perfectly proper reception in terms of whom I saw and so forth. However, the Chinese officials didn't go overboard. The subsequent discussions I had were workmanlike. I didn't expect immediate progress, particularly in the first meeting. I didn't get any sense that there was going to be any movement on the human rights issue in particular. Therefore, while I can't say that I was surprised, I surely wasn't encouraged by this trip to China. Our immediate preoccupation was with the MFN debate, but I was trying to set the stage for the Chinese-American relationship in general.

When I returned to Washington from this trip, of course, we were getting close to the MFN deadline. In the course of May in particular we had to start figuring out what our decision would be. However, it couldn't just be our decision in the State Department or even the White House. Congress was controlled by the Democratic Party. Basically, I handled the key negotiations with Representative Nancy Pelosi [Democrat, California] in the House of Representatives and Senator George Mitchell [Democrat, Maine] on the Senate side. I was the point person for President Clinton, accompanied usually by Wiedemann of the NSC. Of course, we consulted other agencies of the U.S. Government. We weren't just winging this issue on our own. However, I think that it's fair to say that the economic agencies didn't feel that they had had a fair enough crack at the process at that point. They never liked any conditions on MFN. Sandy Berger [Deputy National Security Adviser] was involved, as were several other officials. However, I was essentially the point man who worked this issue out with Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell. We had a series of meetings with them and their staffs where we crafted a package that was realistic from the Administration's view and sellable to the Congress at large.

What people now forget is that what we worked out at the time was, on the whole, hailed as a very good outcome. To be sure, the economic agencies of the U.S. Government would have preferred no conditions on MFN extension. They don't like sanctions, they don't like any uncertainties in trade, and all of that. Further, they advanced legitimate arguments on what might result from losing the extension of MFN status to China. The business community in general didn't want any conditions on MFN extension. So they were not happy. However, I think that even the people in the business community and former colleagues of mine like Kissinger (I believe he killed the outcome "statesmanlike") and others were somewhat pleased over how moderate the conditions on MFN extension ultimately were, given the President's campaign and the Congressional mood.

There were plenty of people on the other side of the argument who wanted much tougher conditions on MFN extension or even outright revocation of MFN status. Therefore, when we came out with what were really moderate and realistic conditions, this was hailed in most quarters at the time as a significant success. I'm sure that many people, certainly in Congress, thought that the outcome was much too mild. In the academic community I'm sure that there were some people who were opposed to any conditions at all. Certainly, economic observers didn't want any conditions. However, on the whole, MFN extension with moderate conditions was greeted as a significant achievement. As I recall, most people were pleased because we had headed off MFN revocation or heavy conditions.

The outcome on this issue took into consideration President Clinton's rhetoric in the 1992 campaign, which I thought had been quite heated. However, we had avoided loading on conditions which the Chinese could not realistically meet. Specifically, we came up with two mandatory conditions. First, there was the Jackson-Vanik amendment language, which had always been there and which related to free emigration from China. The other was connected with goods produced by prison labor. We had five other conditions which dealt with prisoners, Tibetan culture, and other matters. In dealing with these conditions we stated that there had to be overall progress on them. We had to be specific enough to make it possible to figure out what we were trying to do but flexible enough to give us some leeway on judgements whether this related

to preserving Tibetan culture and history or getting prisoners released. However, we had to avoid being so specific as to put us in a box, by saying something like: You must release 28 prisoners, or something like that.

So we said that there must be significant, overall progress. It wasn't even put in terms that there must be overall progress in each of the five categories. There just had to be overall progress made, whether on each of them, all of them, or some of them. Therefore, there was some judgment calls on what needed to be done, but enough specificity to be credible to our domestic audience and comprehensible to the Chinese.

The feeling was that, with the Chinese stake in this bilateral relationship - and we would stress other parts of the relationship at the same time and work with them on this - there would be enough progress, so that, a year later, we would not have to revoke MFN status for China. We would have made some progress. We could then review the bidding on conditional extension of MFN status and extend, revise, or drop the conditions at that point. However, all of this was contingent on what we hoped and expected would be enough progress as to justify renewing MFN.

*Q: Just to get a feel for the political environment in the United States, the Bush administration, which had been a Republican administration, had been castigated for being too soft on China. Was there any significant number of Republicans or conservative Democrats who were in favor of doing something to China?*

LORD: There was real doubt about the outcome. It was key that we obtained the support of Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell, who were quite outspoken on this issue and carried a majority of their colleagues. There were some people like Senator Helms [Republican, North Carolina] or Congressman Solomon [Republican, New York], and here I'm just picking names out of the air, who either wanted to revoke MFN status for China or attach very heavy conditions on MFN extension. Then there were some Democratic and Republican members of Congress and a lot of Republicans like former Presidents Ford and Bush, who favored MFN extension without conditions. By no means did this category include all Republicans. There were conservative Republicans as well as liberal Democrats who felt strongly about conditioning MFN extension. Some Republicans and a few Democrats, mainly those serving on economic sub-committees and who represented economic interests, didn't want any conditions attached to MFN extension.

The major problem at that point was to avoid having heavy conditions attached to MFN extension, given the sentiment in Congress. The fact that Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell agreed to much less than what they had said that they wanted made the job easier for us. They were very statesmanlike, because they didn't want President Clinton to be in a box. As long as some, modest conditions were attached to MFN extension, they would go along with this outcome. When we set out, it was not a foregone conclusion that we would not have either MFN status revoked or have heavy conditions attached to MFN extension. It appeared more likely that heavy conditions would be attached to MFN extension than to have MFN status revoked.

Moreover, we obtained congressional agreement to have this set forth in an Executive Agreement rather than legislation. This gave the President even more flexibility. These were

significant achievements, given the political climate.

So at the time our outcome was generally hailed, as was I for my role. This was generally forgotten a year later when President Clinton had to reverse his position on this issue. Frankly, one reason that I received personal praise, as did the Clinton administration at the time from most quarters, although I'm not saying that this was unanimous, was that we were able to have Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell deliver the broad, middle ground of people who were critical of China but didn't want to wreck Chinese-American relations. When we got the credentials of Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell behind us, we were able to move ahead. There was some grumbling from economic specialists in Congress and a lot of grumbling from those who thought that we had been too soft on China. However, Pelosi and Mitchell gave us the necessary cover...

*Q: Senator Mitchell was the Democratic majority leader in the Senate. However, Representative Pelosi...*

LORD: She was a member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. She is from San Francisco, represented a lot of Chinese in her district, and always has been very outspoken in favor of Chinese dissidents and scholars. She had regularly urged President Clinton to be firm with the Chinese authorities.

Both Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell were very responsible in their attitudes on this issue. I went up to Capitol Hill and dealt with both of them, personally. There were other people with me, of course. As I say, we were very pleased with the outcome.

Now, the dirty little secret is that, over the next few months, in fact, thanks to the extension of conditional MFN and engaging the Chinese, we made some progress. Now, it was not monumental progress, and that's for sure. I don't want to exaggerate it, and we never did. However, until we got to the trip to China by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in March 1994, we were beginning to make some progress during that period. Secretary Christopher met his Chinese counterpart in July at the regional security dialogue in Brunei. President Clinton met the President of the PRC, Jiang Zemin, in November, 1993. This was his first meeting with Jiang Zemin, and I'll come back to that in a minute, at Seattle, when we lifted the APEC meeting to the summit level...

*Q: APEC means?*

LORD: The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. This is a grouping of major economic powers in the Asian and Pacific region to promote free trade and investment. It now meets annually and is attended by heads of government. We were the host at the first meeting during the Clinton Administration in 1993 in Seattle and we lifted this meeting to a summit level to underline our interest in Asia and the importance of Asian trade, as well as Asia's political significance.

The fact is that these meetings with China produced some general commitments through quiet work. The Chinese, however grudgingly, were making some gestures in the field of human

rights. There were a few releases of prisoners, somewhat better accounting of the number of detainees, and an agreement to talk with the Red Cross about prison conditions. Chinese formulations on Tibet were less bellicose, certainly than they are now. The Chinese agreed at some point, and I don't remember the timing, to a regular and formal dialogue on human rights with John Shattuck, the Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs. We reached a prison labor agreement, and emigration from China continued to be quite free.

While I don't claim major progress, I believe the last half of 1993 represented the most progress we made during the first Clinton term. Surely the MFN conditions were of some help.

MFN extension was agreed to in June, 1993, and we were looking to the renewal of MFN coming up in June, 1994. We were concerned whether we were going to get over the bar of debate on MFN renewal and whether enough, significant progress would be made. We did not by any means think that the situation was hopeless. There was enough progress in the fall of 1993 to make it possible to say that we were beginning to move ahead.

However, we also encountered serious problems in carrying this out. First, there was general, Chinese resistance to pressure. The conditions of course were public pressure, even though we worked to implement these arrangements in private, as much as we could. The Chinese remained preoccupied with repression and political control. Jiang Zemin himself had not yet solidified his position as Chinese political leader. Above all, the Chinese considered human rights to be an internal issue.

On the other hand, China was extremely interested in trade and exports, and sought to have good relations with the U.S. But there was disarray on our own side, which totally undercut our leverage on this issue.

First, there was the U.S. business community, which didn't want to have any conditions placed on MFN renewal and which, at the end of the road, generally doesn't care about human rights at all, although there are some exceptions. The business community doesn't realize why a politically more open society is in their own interest. Anyway, the U.S. business community, instead of lobbying the Chinese to improve human rights practices in China, so that MFN could be renewed on its own merits, was lobbying the Clinton administration to drop any conditions and was very vociferous in that respect. That is, perhaps, understandable and certainly legitimate, although you would like to think that they would lean on the Chinese, as well as President Clinton and Congress.

What was not legitimate was the behavior of our economic agencies, particularly the Treasury, the Department of Commerce, and the USTR [Office of the U.S. Trade Representative]. Sometimes they would put themselves on the record, expressing half-hearted support for the President's policies. However, very purposefully and on background, they were attacking the President's own policy. This came to a crescendo in the winter and spring of 1994, but this pattern of behavior was already evident from the very beginning of the Clinton administration. This totally undercut us with Beijing. Obviously, they could see the disarray within the U.S. Government.

President Clinton, to his detriment, didn't rein in these economic agencies. He refused to knock heads as he should have done in ensuring that his own policies were carried out. Therefore, we had splits in our position, which the Chinese could see and which totally undercut our leverage. The Chinese could say to themselves: "Well, the White House is not policing its own agencies. All of the economic types in the American administration are unhappy. The business community is 'lobbying' the administration. They're unhappy, so why should China make concessions?"

I'm not saying that this is the only reason that we ran into trouble. I am saying that it sure as hell hurt us. If the President disciplined his own administration, we might well have pulled this off. It was a major failure of leadership by Clinton, not backing the State Department in carrying out his own policy, letting his economic officials undercut his own policy.

Throughout 1993-1994 I convened interagency meetings to monitor our overall China policy as well as progress on the human rights question. I also convened such meetings in 1995-96 as we continued to make progress, despite ups and downs, with China.

I'll get to the March 1994 trip to China by Secretary of State Christopher next, but let me circle back to President Clinton's first meeting with PRC President Jiang Zemin and give a little chronology here.

*Q: This was in Seattle?*

LORD: Yes, in November, 1993. By then, as I said, Secretary Christopher had met the Chinese Foreign Minister in Brunei in July, 1993. I want to make this clear. Christopher has been accused of not spending enough time on China. It has been reported that Christopher went to Syria countless times and to China twice. The fact is that he met his Chinese counterpart 12 times in four years. So, on the average, this was about once every three months. Christopher made two trips to China. The second trip was very successful. The first trip to China turned out to be very unfortunate. Throughout the four years, he continued to correspond with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. He met with him at least 12 times, probably in seven or eight different cities. This included every summer around the edges of the regional security dialogues. It also included every fall in New York on the occasion of the UN General Assembly meetings and APEC [Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation] summit meetings. This was in addition to Christopher's trips to China, and so on. We even met once in The Hague. Of course, I was at all of these meetings, as I was at every Presidential meeting. The point here is that Christopher devoted a great deal of time to China and was in constant dialogue with his Chinese counterpart.

*Q: This was before the first Christopher trip to China. Christopher had been Deputy Secretary of State during the Carter administration. What was your impression of any baggage which Christopher carried to China, when you first were getting acquainted with him, and all of that?*

LORD: I would say that he had a pretty balanced approach. There were two elements which certainly made him somewhat more skeptical and hard-headed on China than, say, Secretary Baker during the Bush administration. The main element was that Christopher had always been strong on human rights and had a lot to do with implementing President Carter's human rights policy. The issue of human rights became a part of the U.S. agenda during the Carter

administration.

So Christopher had a human rights background as a lawyer, and he was genuinely concerned about this issue. So he had some distaste for the Chinese political system. He believed that it was legitimate to press for progress in this regard. Having said that, I would add that he was obviously a very experienced, international operator. He understood the importance of China in our foreign policy. Christopher had spent most of his life in California, had a Pacific orientation, and believed in the importance of the Pacific Ocean area. Indeed, I got a lot of support from him in elevating Asia in our foreign policy.

So Christopher wanted to improve relations with China but had no problem with being pretty firm on human rights as part of that. Again, like me, he didn't advocate holding the whole Chinese-American relationship hostage to the human rights issue. He believed that human rights were an important factor. He had no problem with the extension of conditional MFN status to China. He agreed that we should try to make the conditions modest when we negotiated with Representative Pelosi and Senator Mitchell.

So that's where Christopher was coming from. He had also delivered the bad news to Taiwan in early 1979 about full normalization of our diplomatic relations with Beijing. In Taipei his car was rocked back and forth by Taiwan demonstrators. However, he didn't hold that against Taiwan. He understood their emotions, and this incident didn't make him anti-Taiwan or affect his view toward Beijing.

I just want to repeat at the outset that he worked very hard on the relationship with Beijing. When we improved this relationship during the last year of the first Clinton term [1996], I believe that Christopher did as much as anyone, if not more than anyone else, to get us back on track, contrary to what has been said in various media and books. Tony Lake in 1996 helped out in doing this and also deserved a lot of credit for it. I worked side by side with Lake also.

Anyway, President Clinton met Jiang Zemin in November, [1993], and it was frankly a poor meeting. I believe that they spent about an hour or an hour and a half together. At this point Jiang Zemin didn't have full self-confidence. He was still consolidating his position in China. I had been dealing with Zhou En-lai, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping, who were very impressive, and Jiang suffered by comparison. During the course of the meeting with Jiang Zemin, President Clinton asked Jiang a question about economic reforms and Chinese economic policy, as an easy way to get a conversation started with him. President Clinton was then treated to about a 45-minute monologue in which Jiang Zemin cited statistics. It wasn't a hostile meeting by any means. It was just wasting time during this first meeting between the two Presidents. Jiang Zemin went on and on about how China had done economically. Then they touched on other issues briefly and to no great consequence toward the end of the meeting. So very frankly, although of course we went out and said what a wonderful meeting it was, President Clinton was disappointed with it, as were we all.

Again, I want to make clear that the meeting wasn't hostile on human rights or anything else. It was just that this was a wasted opportunity on the essentials. President Clinton put the usual, more positive spin on it, although if you look at the statements made, you can see that we were

careful not to portray it as a great meeting. We didn't go overboard in our characterization of the meeting, as far as I can remember.

I frankly don't remember much about the Christopher-Qian meeting which took place in July 1993. It was pretty workmanlike. There is no question, and I want to be honest here, that during some of these early meetings, we usually had only an hour or an hour and a half on the edge of an international conference. A lot of the agenda focused on problem areas, including human rights, the trade deficit, and nuclear non-proliferation. On the Chinese side, the issues they raised included Taiwan. We tried to talk about other, positive aspects of the agenda. I think, looking back, that we probably should have tried harder. Too much of the meetings consisted of each side covering its complaints. However, I think that people have to understand that, if you want to have a strategic dialogue with the Chinese these days, it isn't all that easy. Not everyone can conduct such a discussion as well as, say, Zhou and Deng used to do. And we had some real bilateral problems which we had to deal with.

I should add that in the summer of 1993, that is, after we had come out with the MFN conditions policy, we worked on a strategy toward China. I believe that this was at my initiative, but at any rate it was agreed in the State Department and the White House that we should be laying out a strategy for the administration, now that we had gotten through the initial MFN extension issue. While I don't recall if we actually used the word engagement, although I think that we did, the basic policy toward China which we are following today was laid out in that memo prepared in the summer of 1993.

Of course, we said that we had to be firm on human rights and we already had a conditional extension of MFN. But we sought in this paper to define elements of constructing a broad agenda, included trying to find positive elements on which to work with the Chinese and the importance of China and the U.S. working together in the next century. Outside observers discern themes at best toward the end of 1996, but these themes were in that paper prepared in 1993. I think that it was a hell of a good paper. It took a long while to get White House approval of it, not because of opposition to it. The delay in obtaining White House approval of it was just due to inertia. It was massaged through a couple of high-level, interagency committees and was then sent to the President. I think that he finally approved it in September, 1993.

I don't think that we implemented this paper well, in terms of strategic discussions. In a typical case, let's say, Secretary Christopher would be having a meeting of an hour and a half, perhaps a working lunch, with his Chinese counterpart. You have to cover human rights and try to make progress, as well as telling the press that you covered human rights. The Chinese foreign minister would take up time on the Taiwan issue. We had some urgent matters for discussion, including possible sanctions on non-proliferation. You had to address economic issues. So by the time you got through all of that, there was very little time left to talk about North Korea, Cambodia, regional security, APEC, global issues, and some of the more positive matters.

So, if we had it to do over again, maybe we should have done things differently. We always had longer meetings with the Chinese than we had with anybody else, but then were still compressed. You could argue that Secretary Christopher should have gone right away to China. I grant that. What I am saying is that the basic approach of engagement with China, of having a mixed bag of

positive and negative issues on the agenda, of trying to construct a strategic relationship, even as we grappled with these problems, and of trying to demonstrate to domestic American and Chinese opinion that we had some converging and parallel interests, all of that was in our basic strategy paper. We had some difficult issues to deal with. But we didn't implement this strategy paper as well as we might have done. And, of course, the Chinese didn't make it easy.

*Q: The Clinton administration came into office in 1993, not really well focused on foreign affairs. I'm not talking about the Clinton team but rather how it was directed. The domestic economy was considered the major issue. As an outsider looking at this, I had the feeling that President Clinton did not have much background on foreign affairs. In fact, he had virtually no background in this area. At least as reported through the media, there seemed to be a certain amount of drift and really no great focus on foreign affairs. However, you were on the inside of this on major issues. Was there any of this?*

LORD: Yes, that is fair. I think that this was the view on the outside of the administration and I think that it was also a fair view from the inside. I think that most fair-minded people, who were not partisan either way, will tell you that the last two years of the first Clinton term were much better in terms of foreign policy than the first two years. If they are really fair, they will say that the last two years of the first Clinton term were pretty good. Most people would say that the first two years of the first Clinton term were pretty bad. I say two years. Maybe it was a year and a half versus two and a half years.

In reply to your point specifically I would say at the outset that the administration had to deal with Bosnia, Somalia, and the Haitian problems, for example. There was backing and filling on the extension of MFN status for China in 1994. So, both in terms of perception and reality, I think that it's fair to say that the Clinton administration didn't do well at the beginning.

This was partly due to the process of shaking down a new administration. It was partly due to the fact of the President's overwhelming focus on domestic issues. Clinton was elected the first time by saying that President Bush had ignored domestic issues. There was the election slogan, "It's the economy, stupid." Clinton genuinely wanted to focus on the economy from the beginning, and I think that this was correctly the case. However, you pay a price for this. You can't run foreign policy without the full involvement of the President and the White House. This is certainly true of China policy.

A good example of this is that for years I pushed strongly, and I persuaded Secretary Christopher to push for a Presidential speech on China. I also worked directly with the NSC [National Security Council] staff on this. I started this effort in the summer of 1993. Certainly, it was one of the recommendations of the strategy paper, which was finally approved in September, 1993, and which contained a recommendation for a Presidential speech. I thought that it was important to have the strategic approach to China laid out to the public in a broader framework, so that these constant problems that we had on human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, trade, and Taiwan wouldn't be the only things that people noticed. These issues could be put in a broader context of the need for engagement on some of the more positive aspects of the agenda.

I literally spent four years trying to get President Clinton to give a speech on China. In fact, I

wasn't able to get the President to give a speech on China during the first Clinton term. China would often be part of a speech but never the main issue. Once Clinton started giving speeches of this kind, they turned out to be pretty good and they helped. Even Secretary of State Christopher didn't speak out solely on China for a couple of years. I was pushing for that as well. Every time we could do so, we would work in a reference to China at some length in a speech on Asia, or in testimony before Congress. But Secretaries of State just don't get much public attention when they speak, anyway. Christopher is a man for whom I have great respect, but he's no Billy Graham [well-known preacher and evangelist] when he gives a speech.

So the point I'm making is the same as yours. That is, President Clinton did not focus that much on foreign policy. He is a very quick fix, very smart, you can brief him up in a hurry, and he will do a great job. However, he just wasn't that much involved. This has changed over the years, but he paid the price on China because he didn't give a speech containing a strategic concept on what we were trying to do, he didn't discipline his own cabinet, he didn't give sustained interest or direction.

*Q: This points out the importance of having insiders who know how significant speeches are. Insiders have that ability to deal with speeches. They know the work that goes into writing a speech. If you don't make the effort, that is an act in itself.*

LORD: It was partly the fact that we were never able to get President Clinton's attention. This was due, very frankly, to some of his political advisers. If the President gives a speech on China, you know that it's going to be controversial. There is no way that you are going to make everybody happy. Part of the problem was the lack of emphasis on foreign policy but a large part of it was the realization among some of the President's advisers that this was a delicate, sensitive matter. First, because it involved campaign positions. Then, as time wore on, and the President changed his position on the extension of MFN, he would make statements around the general subject of MFN, but these would be 10 and 20 minute statements. I don't mean that President Clinton never spoke on China. It was just that he never gave a long speech on China, which we desperately needed and wanted. It was a great disappointment, and it hurt us.

*Q: I think, too, that you are also pointing out the problem facing a new administration just entering office. The people surrounding the President are essentially domestic, political operators. In many ways they have the ear of the President, and there is the impetus of not making waves in the field of foreign affairs. This means that foreign affairs operators like yourself continue to be frustrated.*

LORD: This is true of many administrations.

*Q: It is true of many administrations.*

LORD: In addition, there is the general question of giving a foreign policy address. The specific subject of China is especially sensitive.

Anyway, that was the background of the trip by Secretary Christopher to China in February or March 1994. In effect, he was going to China to promote our China relationship generally and

specifically to make the further progress needed so that we could renew MFN. Keep in mind what I said. We had made some progress, but we hadn't made enough progress as yet.

We were going to China by way of Australia. There was a joint meeting with the Australians and the respective Foreign and Defense Ministers. While we were in Australia and also while we were heading toward China, the Chinese, in advance of Christopher's visit, began rounding up dissidents. This reflected their general nervousness. The Chinese authorities figured that these dissidents would speak out, try to meet Christopher, or something like that.

Then, literally when we were flying to China and to our own surprise, Assistant Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, John Shattuck, met privately with Wei Jingshen, the most famous Chinese dissident. Shattuck had gone to China ahead of Secretary Christopher and his party to try to make more progress on human rights, so that Christopher could push the ball down the field a little farther. In effect, Shattuck would prepare the way. Again, we had this MFN deadline coming up in a few months. So Shattuck was in China as part of our formal dialogue. This was one of the reasons that we were making some progress. At least we had that dialogue.

Shattuck consulted with Ambassador J. Stapleton Roy, our outstanding Ambassador to China, but what they didn't do was to consult with Secretary Christopher, which, in my opinion, they should have done. So we were blindsided by this development. The fact is that Ambassador Roy and Assistant Secretary Shattuck had every reason to meet with Wei. Wei was an heroic figure. He'd been let out of jail, at least on a temporary basis. This was one of the things that we managed to accomplish. For about 24 hours the Chinese authorities failed to react, even though, with their surveillance system, they knew that Ambassador Roy and Assistant Secretary Shattuck had met with Wei. Then Wei made some public remarks, and the Chinese authorities, in effect, felt forced to react. So that's what happened.

In any event, the Chinese authorities blasted the hell out of everybody because of the meeting with Wei in advance of the Christopher visit to China. Again, I believe in meeting with dissidents, but I also believe that something this sensitive should have been checked out in advance with Christopher.

In this atmosphere, as we were heading toward China, there were some calls in the United States to cancel the Christopher visit to China. So we had debates on this issue within the delegation before we got on the airplane to go to China and on the airplane itself. Secretary Christopher got on the phone and touched base with a few Senators and Congressmen. My recommendation was that we should not cancel the Christopher visit. If we canceled the visit, we weren't going to get the MFN conditions met and we would have to make the horrible decision to cut off MFN extension. Then, whatever we did, the whole Chinese-American relationship would come to a standstill. Indeed we might have a crisis.

On the other hand, when people say that Secretary Christopher had a bad trip to China, let's remember that the Chinese were rounding up dissidents before we got to China. I said that we had to go ahead with the trip, despite the firestorm of Congressional and media criticism at home.

So, in effect, I recommended on the plane, and I think that we pretty much all agreed on this, that we should not cancel the Christopher visit. Instead, I said that we should make some public statements and some on background that we were very unhappy with what the Chinese authorities were doing. So we recommended that Secretary Christopher should get on the phone, from the plane, to some key Senators and Congressmen, to deflate any pressures to cancel the trip and assure them that we would press strongly on these issues. We felt that Secretary Christopher should do all of this before he reached China. In this way he would have made the point and protected his domestic flank while he was going ahead with the trip. At the same time, if he didn't do this so vocally on Chinese soil, it would be somewhat less provocative to the Chinese. In this case the Chinese authorities were being provocative by rounding up dissidents. Still, we didn't want the whole trip to fall apart.

This was my recommendation, others on the plane agreed, and Secretary Christopher agreed with it. He used some pretty tough rhetoric before we arrived in China. I say that because he has been criticized. Well, the point is that he could either cancel the trip or just ignore what the Chinese authorities were doing, such as rounding up dissidents, and so on. I felt, and I still feel, that all that Secretary Christopher could do was to be firm in public before he got to China. This was to justify going ahead with the trip and to show the Chinese that he wasn't just a pushover. Then he need not be so critical of the Chinese on Chinese soil and could see whether we could make progress.

When we reached China, we had a frosty reception. I forget how long we were there. I think that it was for two or three days. The first meeting was with Li Peng [Prime Minister], who was extremely rough and tough.

*Q: In what way?*

LORD: He was very dismissive of Christopher, accused him of meddling in China's affairs, and criticized Assistant Secretary John Shattuck's dealing with Wei. We didn't make progress on other issues, either. Li Peng was always tough on human rights issues. So it was just a very nasty atmosphere, and the general atmosphere of the Chinese reception was cool.

I don't whether the next meeting took place on the same day or not. I wouldn't say that President Jiang Zemin played "good cop" to Li Peng's "bad cop." Jiang Zemin wasn't particularly friendly, either, but he was a lot less vitriolic. This was his style, anyway. He's always been more tempered in dealing with our relationship than Li Peng has been. However, Jiang Zemin was also less than cordial. He was less insulting, but he was fairly firm. I had the feeling that he was sort of letting us know that first we were going to be hit over the head. Then he would ease up a bit, and we were supposed to feel grateful.

Actually, on the last day of the visit, when we met with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, we began to make some progress on a few issues. They were not major issues, but compared to where we started with at the beginning of the visit, we moved forward. In the course of this visit there were some volleys fired back and forth with the Chinese press spokesman. I had to brief our press. The Chinese blamed us for hurting the atmosphere of the trip. This was during the trip. I got up and said that this was a great "leap of chutzpah" on the part of the Chinese. In effect, they

accused us of ruining the atmosphere of the trip while they had been rounding up Chinese dissidents. So there were some pretty nasty exchanges, back and forth. I was pretty pleased with some of my one-liner comments. This was clearly not making the trip a smashing success, but I felt that we had to be firm in facing the Chinese.

So we left China obviously unhappy. We had made no progress on human rights. There were a couple of vague promises in a couple of areas, but I can't remember what they were. As I say, the meeting with Foreign Minister Qian Qichen was somewhat better, but mostly in relative terms. We made some headway on a couple of other issues. All in all, the trip wasn't a total disaster, since we had made some progress. But the press was already saying that the visit had been a disaster. People back in the U.S., including the representatives of the economic agencies, were giving background interviews with reporters. They were directing their attacks at Secretary Christopher, and not the Chinese. This was really a disreputable performance by our government.

Of course, it was important to get a White House statement backing up Secretary Christopher. This had to be a Presidential statement, saying that Christopher had represented American interests firmly. We needed a statement which said that we wanted good relations with China, but the Chinese had to behave themselves better, and that kind of thing. We never got such a statement from the President, who remained silent. Christopher tried to get this statement but without success. So the combination of the attitude of the economic agencies in undercutting Christopher and the President's not only not coming to Christopher's aid or disciplining his cabinet but just being silent made this a very tough period. The White House was irresponsible, leaving Christopher (and the rest of us) twisting in the wind.

We didn't have a great deal of conversation on the plane. However, Christopher and I, more or less independently of each other, began to think through where we went from there in our policy toward China. Christopher was detached and cool enough at the time. Rather than just getting mad at the Chinese, Christopher felt that we had to rethink whether we were on the right course on the MFN issue, however modest the conditions were and whether the MFN issue wasn't too blunt an instrument for dealing with the Chinese. He was wondering whether we had to think of some other approach.

So we returned to Washington. It was pretty clear now by March, 1994, that we weren't going to make it over the hump and get enough progress on human rights to get an extension of MFN status for China by May, because of the lack of progress on this trip and the disarray in our own government. The U.S. business community was continuing to lobby us and not the Chinese.

We made one last effort during this period by sending Mike Armacost, former Under Secretary of State, to Beijing on a secret trip to Beijing to try and get last minute development on human rights. We made little progress.

During the spring of 1994 we went through an agonizing reappraisal. We did a lot of computer runs, working with the Department of Commerce, to see whether it was possible to come up with an MFN arrangement hitting only those Chinese exports that were from Chinese military industries or were derived from military sources. In other computer runs we considered to what extent we could hurt China with higher tariffs on some Chinese exports but wouldn't hurt Hong

Kong or Taiwan. So we tried to see, since the Chinese did not make enough progress on human rights, whether there was a way selectively to affect Chinese exports by hitting only military industries or picking products that didn't affect innocent bystanders.

We just couldn't find any way of doing this. There was no way to sort out the Chinese structure of military versus civilian companies and cut-outs and cover and producers versus exporters and holding companies. The only thing that we could identify, which we finally did, was Chinese arms exports of handguns to the U.S., which were coming onto our streets. That was one kind of merchandise which was coming from the Chinese military, and we could single it out. But we just couldn't come up with a nice deus ex machina program to identify anything else to get us out of this box.

We had hoped that we could say, in effect: "We don't want to cut off all of our trade with China, but we are going to hit them selectively because they haven't made enough progress on human rights. We are going to hit military companies, we are going to spare Taiwan, Hong Kong, etc." We figured that this might be enough to satisfy our domestic audience in the U.S. We would admit that China had not made enough progress on human rights and so we were taking these limited steps. We weren't going to cut off all MFN trade. We were trying to get something that might affect, for example, 10 to 20% of their exports to the U.S., as opposed to the majority of their exports. So there would be enough damage limitation so that we could continue with MFN status on most Chinese exports to the U.S. and avoid the major problems I mentioned. We would have selectivity in the application of trade controls, avoiding harming Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also maintaining some momentum in the overall Chinese-American relationship.

Well, as we got down to the wire, we found that we didn't have those options. We just couldn't come up with a program or, rather, the computers couldn't find it.

So then we had three choices. First, we could say that the Chinese hadn't met the conditions, however modest, for the extension of MFN. Therefore, we were revoking MFN status for China. We didn't want to do that for all of the reasons I have mentioned. The negative impact on Chinese-American relations and on our business and exports, as well as the impact on Hong Kong and Taiwan were generally things that we wanted to avoid. We never wanted to harm them.

*Q: Can you explain why, whatever we did with MFN status for China, it would have an effect on Hong Kong and Taiwan?*

LORD: Well, a great deal of Chinese exports to the U.S. go through Hong Kong. Many of them are reprocessed and given a higher value in Hong Kong. This is one reason why we have disputes in our trade. The Chinese think that we exaggerate the deficit in our trade with China, because a large part of this trade with the U.S. really comes through Hong Kong. So, by hitting Chinese exports to the U.S., we were going to hit the economy of Hong Kong very heavily. I don't have the figures in front of me, but a great deal of Chinese trade with the U.S. goes through Hong Kong. And a large number of jobs in Hong Kong would be affected. We would be raising tariffs on goods of Chinese origin, if China lost MFN status, to a level which would be prohibitive, in many cases. Hong Kong would have been severely affected, and Taiwan,

somewhat less so.

*Q: Why would Taiwan have been affected? Was Taiwan also at that point reprocessing mainland Chinese goods destined for the U.S.?*

LORD: Taiwan had some investment in China and so it imported some goods from China, reprocessed them, and then re-exported them to the U.S. from China. Indeed, a large part of our trade deficit with China was caused by Hong Kong and Taiwan production going into China. So our trade deficit went down with Taiwan and Hong Kong but went up with China. But Hong Kong and Taiwan still would have been affected by our limiting our trade with China.

There were mixed feelings in Taiwan because the government there didn't like Beijing. However, they also didn't want to hurt their own economic interests, so they were pretty quiet on this issue. In fact, the Taiwan Government did not lobby Congress to cut off MFN status for China. I think that the Taiwan Government just stayed neutral on this issue. So, one of the choices facing us was cutting off MFN status for China. We didn't want that choice. In the U.S. government, I believe John Shattuck was the only one favoring revocation of MFN, or at least selective revocation.

Another choice was to say: "Well, China already has MFN status. We're not happy with Chinese behavior. However, based on how we define them, the Chinese have met enough of our goals, and we will renew MFN status for China." Maybe we could again renew MFN extension but with conditions. That would be one sub-option. We could renew MFN status, saying that China had made enough progress to justify renewal, but we are still going to keep some conditions on because China has not done as much in the field of human rights as we would like. We rejected that course as well. Rejection of this course was strongly recommended by Secretary Christopher, myself, and others because it would have lacked credibility.

On the two mandatory conditions, emigration was an easy call - dissidents and other people could get out of China without any great difficulty. Prison labor involved somewhat of a stretch, but in good conscience, taking into account the views of the lawyers, we could say that we already had a prison labor agreement and we had some inspections provided for to ensure that they were not exporting the products of prison labor. It wasn't an airtight breakthrough by any means, but we thought that it was enough to justify meeting that condition. However, in terms of overall significant progress in releasing prisoners, there wasn't much to point to. The Chinese authorities had let some people out, but they were also beginning to round up others. On prison conditions nothing had really happened. Nothing had happened in the case of Tibet. On these and other conditions, we just felt that the Chinese authorities hadn't made significant progress on them. If we had tried to stretch what had happened, we would have had a firestorm in Congress. Probably this would have resulted in having the President overridden by Congress, anyway.

In any event, it would have made the President look so eager to stretch the truth that he would have done anything to renew MFN status for China. We would have lost credibility in Beijing because the Chinese Government would have concluded that the American Government was so desperate to renew MFN status for China that they were calling our bluff. The Chinese hadn't made any real progress on most issues. Our lack of credibility would have had an impact around

the world. So we ruled out manufacturing progress because of domestic and Chinese reaction.

I think that the third choice, which we eventually selected, was the least bad alternative. Certainly, it was what I recommended at the time, but it was very embarrassing. It meant a reversal of policy. The President hadn't been willing to discipline the economic agencies or present a united front in any event. The Chinese would continue to do what they had been doing, and placing conditions on renewal of MFN status just wasn't going to go anywhere. We weren't prepared to pretend about progress allegedly made and we weren't prepared to revoke MFN status for China. So we felt that the only choice we had, and the least bad choice was simply to renew MFN, while pressing human rights in other ways. And this is what we did.

This was awkward, but it was the only choice available to us at the time. Some people might say that we should never have placed conditions on the renewal of MFN. Some people said that we should have kept MFN, while others said that we should have revoked MFN status for China. I still feel, to this day, that if we had had a united administration and a strong President on this issue, we might have pulled off our initial policy of MFN renewal with modest conditions.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I was just curious. In initiating this policy to what extent, if at all, did you consider that you were giving leverage to the Chinese? In many ways the renewal of MFN status for China could only work with Chinese good will. That is, if the Chinese were willing to come far enough under these conditions. So the initiative for making the Clinton administration policy work was in Chinese hands. Was that a consideration?*

LORD: Yes. However, put another way, we felt that the Chinese had enough of a stake in the Chinese-American relationship in general, and the export and trading part of it in particular, to have Chinese good will. After all, we were taking one-third of their exports, and they had a huge surplus in their trade with the U.S. Therefore, in this view the Chinese had an incentive to cooperate with us, if not out of good will, at least in their own self-interest. However, that depended on China's concern that there was a real danger of their losing MFN status. And between the business lobbying and what the economic agencies were saying, that clearly was not the case. There is no question that one can criticize conditional MFN, albeit forgetting that we headed off revocation of MFN and the imposition of heavy conditions on MFN extension. You can say that extending conditional MFN status should never have happened in the first place, but in 1993 we faced the realities of Clinton's campaign positions and the congressional mood.

The President said that he wasn't going to pretend about the extent of progress. He said that we considered that conditional MFN renewal had been a useful instrument up to now, but we had used up whatever utility it had, and we couldn't make any further progress on this front.

We stated how we would be vigorous on human rights on other fronts. Specifically, we revoked or cut off MFN status on Chinese small arms and handguns, so there was a tiny sector that we did hit. We stressed that we would continue to consider human rights a very important part of our policy and that we would do it through resolutions passed in Geneva, and through the human rights dialogue. We began to mention legal reforms in China at that time. We mentioned that we would work through Radio Free Asia and other programs involving non-governmental organizations. We also said that we would try to work with the business community on the

adoption of good business principles to promote human rights. There were a couple of other elements which were announced at the time.

So we've renewed MFN without conditions and changed our position. And we set out to improve our relations and press human rights in other ways.

In the fall of 1994 Secretary Christopher met again, in Indonesia, with the Chinese. The APEC meeting that year was in Bogor. He was working hard by cable, by letter, and also at periodic meetings with Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. Various issues came up, but I can't give you the chronology.

We had the famous case of the Chinese ship with the chemicals on it. We received poor intelligence from our people. The ship wasn't transporting dangerous chemicals. We stopped the ship, boarded it, and examined it. We got egg on our face as a result. What happened was that our intelligence people had proof, from the cargo manifest of the ship, that it was scheduled to load certain dangerous chemicals on board. Either the Chinese snookered us in a kind of con game and took these chemicals off at the last minute to embarrass us or, in fact, they had unloaded it in planned fashion. It didn't have any dangerous chemicals on board at the time we inspected it. The Chinese predictably blasted us for this.

We were also concerned about Chinese nuclear proliferation activities with Pakistan. We had to slap sanctions on China a couple of times in this connection. I think that this occurred once in 1993 and again in 1995.

We made very little progress on human rights. The Chinese called off the dialogue with Assistant Secretary John Shattuck after a while. We would go to Geneva and lose on the votes taken there to pass a resolution critical of the Chinese.

On the other hand, the Chinese were somewhat helpful on North Korea and became increasingly helpful in this connection. On Cambodia the Chinese halted their aid to the Khmer Rouge. They were more helpful there and supported the UN operation and the elections. Our exports to China were increasing, even though the overall trade deficit with China was increasing generally. There was some, slogging progress on nuclear non-proliferation, particularly in the wake of the sanctions that were applied to China.

We tried to talk about broader issues with China. We began to talk about developing a new agenda on some of the global issues. So the Chinese-American relationship began to make some progress. It was not dramatic, but clearly it was getting way beyond the level of the Christopher trip, which had gone so badly.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could you say something about the relationships within the American administration? One of the things that has often been talked about is the growing role of Ron Brown, Secretary of Commerce, in defining how the relationships worked, and foreign policy more generally. What did you see as the dynamic in this situation? To what extent was Secretary Christopher as important a player as previous Secretaries of State might have been?*

LORD: I think that Secretary Christopher was important during this period. No question about that. In fact, on China I think that he was the most important player short of President Clinton, despite criticism of him. Now Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser, got into this picture constructively toward the end, and we'll get into this later. But in the first few years, his deputy, Sandy Berger, was the key person at the NSC on China, and Asia generally. Having said that, there was no question that Christopher did not control foreign policy as Kissinger did. So there was in some people's eyes, and probably in the eyes of the Chinese, some varying degrees of emphasis which were different, if nothing else.

Whenever there was an economic cabinet member, like Ron Brown, or the Secretary of the Treasury, or the USTR [United States Trade Representative] going to China, we would work with them. I would often send one of my people with them. We would brief them and encourage them to raise human rights, even as they promoted our economic or commercial interests, and try to show a united front. This was particularly the case after the tough going early in the Clinton administration. I must say that, after that change in MFN policy, we had a much more united and disciplined administration. Most official visitors who went to China, even though they didn't particularly like it, would raise the human rights issue. So we began to get a more cohesive policy, partly because with no conditions standing in the way of MFN renewal, the economic agencies were comfortable with the policy. I think that the President was happy no longer to have this yearly deadline of MFN renewal staring at him. It had been an awkward and embarrassing situation, but we began to make progress overall with the Chinese.

Again, the economic agencies were important, but they didn't dominate foreign policy. We had very good relations between the White House and the NSC [National Security Council]. That was generally true with regard to policy toward East Asia. The NSC Asian officers and I and my colleagues worked extremely well together. The same with the Defense Department.

On China there were a lot of skull sessions, particularly when we got to the renewal of MFN status each year or when the President was going to meet Chinese President Jiang Zemin at an APEC meeting or Secretary Christopher was going to meet Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at some international conference. There would often be an interagency meeting, usually chaired by Sandy Berger [Deputy National Security Adviser]. Tony Lake [National Security Adviser] wasn't too much involved with China in those days. We worked well together, so there was a cohesiveness which had been previously missing. I think that it is fair to say that, although the White House became more involved, the Department of State was still in the daily lead on China policy. However, the economic agencies were important and were bound to be important. At this point we at least had a united policy. It was constructive that the White House became generally more interested and in control of China policy. Christopher and I personally were fully involved throughout. There has been some revisions that after the 1994 MFN change the White House took over and State was cut out. This is total nonsense. We worked very closely together.

Secretary Christopher very much promoted our economic interests. He took a lot of time at meetings in doing this, even the economic agencies would mention human rights when they went to China. So we had a better team at this time than had previously been the case.

*Q: Were we, not only in front but virtually all by ourselves in dealing with human rights in*

*China, compared to the British, the French, and so forth?*

LORD: The answer is "Yes." I have said publicly that our friends would hold our coats when we raised some of these tough issues with the Chinese, whether it concerned human rights, nuclear non-proliferation, or even trade negotiations. They would hold our coats and then take the trade contracts while we took Chinese annoyances.

That's a very good point. It's another reason why the conditional approach on MFN renewal did not work. We were all alone in this respect. No other country tried to put on sanctions or conditions on trade status. Other countries didn't press the Chinese on human rights. There were modest exceptions to this, like Great Britain, because of Hong Kong, and Australia, because they cared about human rights. Other countries just went through the motions. So the Chinese, of course, were very adept at saying: "Well, you people may want to place conditions on MFN renewal or keep bugging us on human rights, which are our internal affair, but our European and Japanese friends don't do this. We'll just give them the contracts."

In fact, the Chinese wouldn't always do that because we might have better technology or better deals. The Chinese didn't want to be dependent on Japan and Europe, so the Chinese bark was sometimes louder than their bite. However, there were times, for example, when we were left with the feeling that maybe Airbus Industries got a contract for aircraft that Boeing might have gotten. Maybe some French or Japanese company got something that an American company might otherwise have gotten.

So this lack of multilateral help hurt us. One of the criticisms was that the U.S. was pressuring the Chinese unilaterally and why didn't we do this in coordination with our friends? The answer to this is that we tried very hard to get our friends to act in coordination with us. I would have policy talks with my counterparts, including the British, the French, the Germans, and the Japanese in particular, and try to persuade them to work with us on human rights issues so that we would have a more effective approach to the Chinese. We never got anywhere with this approach. This really hurt our efforts in the field of human rights in China. No question about it.

One of the reasons that our business community was upset with stressing human rights was that they figured that the Chinese would shift business to their competitors.

*Q: During the period from 1993 to 1997 the issue of birth control and particularly of abortion were hot button issues in American politics. Did you have to deal with that?*

LORD: I had to deal with that, but, strangely enough, even though it was always there and always simmering, these never became overriding issues. There were major issues on human rights in general, but I would say that prisoner release, Tibet, and prison labor policy. Of course, some Chinese officials saw the need to hold down the growth of China's population in any way possible. However, I think that there was less and less proof that forced abortions were going on, although there surely were some. This issue, at least in my recollection, never became one of the major matters.

Every now and then there would be related matters like infanticide, killing girl babies,

mistreatment of orphans, organ transplants, or issues related to these. These might come up. However, these were just among the human rights issues that we were concerned about. They were never at the top of the agenda. We were concerned about them, but I just don't think they caused that much steam in Congress, compared to other matters, like prisoners and Tibet.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: One other question. I'm not sure whether it belongs here or maybe later, but how much access, if at all, did people concerned with the China portfolio have to the President? Did you have opportunities to meet with him and brief him? Did Secretary Christopher go on trips with him?*

LORD: Well, early in the first Clinton term foreign policy was not the President's major preoccupation. However, we would meet with President Clinton before he met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin, perhaps a week or so in advance. Then we would meet with President Clinton again just before he would go into the meeting.

Most of the interagency meetings on China policy were at the level of Sandy Berger [National Security Adviser], Peter Tarnoff [Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs], and myself, at the Department of State level. Joe Nye would sit in, representing the Department of Defense. These meetings did not involve the President. I don't recall a full-scale, NSC [National Security Council] meeting on China alone during the first two or three years of Clinton's first term, if, in fact, such a meeting ever occurred. There were a couple of sessions at which we briefed the President, attended by outside experts in addition to ourselves. However, President Clinton did not pay a great deal of attention to foreign policy at this time. He made up for this later on, to some extent. Often, if he was going to an APEC meeting or on an Asian trip, we would work in China issues as well. I can't recall more than one or two such sessions which were just on China, for example, before President Clinton met with Chinese President Jiang Zemin. However, President Clinton is a quick study, and we had the opportunity to brief him before he would meet with someone, as I say, like Jiang Zemin.

Generally, briefing President Clinton was a little hair raising because he was usually late for them. I'm talking about the briefings just before he would go into a meeting. These are supposed to take place an hour in advance of such a meeting. But the President would show up for his briefing with only about 15 minutes to go before the meeting. Several people would be standing around in the Oval Office in Washington or some hotel, wherever we were, shouting last minute advice at him. He would be looking through his talking points. His press secretary would be going over his public statements. We would be pretty nervous. We didn't know how much homework he had done and whether he could absorb all of this advice. However, he would perform quite well at these meetings.

Now, as time went on, some outsiders thought that our China policy was not really progressing as much as it should have. We did what we could to engage the President. I know that, on occasion, President Clinton met with former Secretary of State Kissinger or Al Haig. Often, businessmen would weigh in on U.S. policy toward China. We know now, of course, that even campaign contributors could do that. However, in terms of your basic question as to whether President Clinton was exposed to a lot of expertise and heavy thinking and debate on China policy, I shouldn't think so.

*Q: There wasn't somebody who was a friend of President Clinton's from Little Rock, Arkansas, who had a Chinese cousin or something like that? Sometimes, it happens that somebody who is personally close to the President may have pronounced ideas on China.*

LORD: It's not surprising that business people, either in a meeting or if they are talking to the President at a reception, or when they are having coffee with him, or on some such occasion, would advocate trade or investment with China, or engagement with China in general. There is nothing wrong with that, and I am convinced that anything which President Clinton did on China was not done as a favor to contributors. Again, we have to look at investigations now going on and make sure that they are fully carried out. However, President Clinton's views on China policy would have been what he thought was in the national interest, not the result of a lot of systematic access by outsiders. That was true, not just on China, but on foreign policy issues in general. At the same time, the consistent economic emphasis by businesspeople seeing him undoubtedly had an effect.

So we were sort of moving ahead on China policy. I can't quantify it. However, as we reached the beginning of 1995, we had had these periods of ups and downs. Then we reached the visit to the U.S. by President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan.

Let me just step back on Taiwan for a minute. In 1993-94, we launched the first, systematic review of our Taiwan policy since the passage of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. This review went on for a good year or so, including debates on how bold we could be. I don't remember the specific timing, but it happened early in the first Clinton term. We in the bureau led this effort, personally headed by me and my deputy, Tomsen.

There was never any feeling that we were going to revolutionize policy toward Taiwan in one way or another. We weren't going to go backward and resume having official relations with Taiwan. That would really have hurt ourselves with Beijing, as it was one of the most sensitive areas from Beijing's point of view. Nor were we going to flip over, do the bidding of the PRC [People's Republic of China] Government, and hurt Taiwan in any significant way. That would be weak, unnerve allies, demoralize a good friend, and caused an upheaval in Congress.

So this review was constrained from the beginning, and I think correctly so. We didn't want strawmen options and we ruled out either extreme. However, within that framework we wanted to see whether we could strengthen ties with Taiwan, without significantly hurting our China relationship.

Many anomalies had grown up since we had passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979. These had turned out to be awkward in terms of how we deal with Taiwan, because this relationship has to be unofficial. So the questions came up, "Where can you meet Taiwan officials and in which U.S. Government buildings?" "What level of American Government officials can go to Taiwan? Who could visit the U.S. from Taiwan? What shall the name be of the Taiwan Government office in Washington? A lot of things were rather hurriedly thrown together in 1979 to compensate for normalization of relations with the PRC [People's Republic of China] and to control keep our ties with Taiwan, both in legal terms and in terms of nomenclature, and in

political terms with regard to Beijing. These arrangements had become cumbersome and awkward in dealing with Taiwan. So not only did we want to strengthen relations with Taiwan but we wanted to simplify relations in a way that wouldn't have major substantive impact but which would just make it easier to work the Taiwan side of the issue.

So we went over this subject for probably a year. It took a long time, partly internal debates, partly White House inertia. Taiwan kept pressing us in terms of what was going to happen. The results were constructive. They were modest, but I think that they were helpful. I can't remember all of them, but we changed the name of the Taiwan office in Washington to "Taiwan Economic and Cultural Relations Office [TECRO]." Now what was it called before?

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: It was called, "The Coordination Council for North American Affairs."*

LORD: The Coordination Council for North American Affairs is a real mouthful, and TECRO was a modest improvement. We did that, but it certainly didn't make this office more official. We wouldn't do that, but it gave more sense of what this office was up to. We did approve, in principle, economic cabinet level official visits to Taiwan, which was quite significant. However, such trips had to be related to specific goals. Such trips wouldn't be frequent, but they would be acceptable when they could help us, particularly in the cultural and economic areas. Until then, I believe, the only U.S. Cabinet level official who had ever gone to Taiwan was Carla Hills, at the end of the Bush administration. She was U.S. Trade Representative. We also said that Taiwan officials who have economic functions could meet in U.S. Government offices, even though we said that they couldn't meet U.S. officials in the State Department in Washington, because this would suggest diplomatic overtones.

We decided that we would vigorously support Taiwan membership in international organizations which didn't require statehood. And in the case of those which required statehood, we would press to make sure that their voice could be heard in some fashion, perhaps as observers. In the case of those organizations which didn't require statehood, such as APEC, WTO [World Trade Organization], and other economic agencies, we would push for some Taiwan presence more strongly.

At the APEC meeting in November, 1993, we also worked out that Taiwan could attend the summit meeting that year. That was also very tough and delicate. Taiwan had already become a member of APEC during the Bush Administration, but it was not a foregone conclusion, when we lifted the level of representation from Foreign Ministers to Heads of State or Heads of Government, that Beijing would settle for Taiwan being present. So we had delicate negotiations conducted by my deputy, Peter Tomsen, in which we arranged for Taiwan to send a representative to the APEC meeting. This representative would not be President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan. This would have been too much for Beijing to accept. The Taiwan representative was, in effect, at the economic cabinet level. This got Taiwan into the APEC summit meeting but at a slightly lower level. It was a rather ingenious compromise which represented a step forward for Taiwan in many ways. They really couldn't have expected to have President Li Teng-hui at that meeting when PRC President Jiang Zemin was there. The PRC didn't like this arrangement, and Taiwan didn't like it either, which shows that it was a good deal. It has lasted ever since.

I want to underline that I worked very hard at maintaining good relations with Taiwan. I met with their representative, as well as visiting officials very frequently, probably more than any Ambassador in my region. Because of unofficial ties, we couldn't meet in the State Department - I would go across the street to meet in a hotel room; sometimes we had meals at the Four Seasons Hotel in Georgetown. I was dedicated to good relations even as we went ahead with China, because we had moral and historical bonds, we were responsible for Taiwan's security through arms sales and rhetoric and deployments, it was a democracy in contrast to China, we had strong economic links and there was great congressional and media support for Taiwan. I kept Taiwan closely briefed on trips and meetings with China - my own, the President's, Secretary Christopher's, etc. I always supported a robust arms package. Except for the Lee visit interlude, my relations were very cordial, especially with Ding Moushi and Jason Hu.

In any event, we did all of these things and others for Taiwan. I forget when we announced the results. Of course, it was less than Taiwan had hoped for, but we felt that we had cleaned up a lot of the anomalies, maintained our basic policy, avoided really annoying Beijing all that much, and modestly pleased Taiwan. I think that we came out quite well. The outcome wasn't dramatic. It correctly avoided the extremes.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Why did it take so long?*

LORD: Essentially because people disagreed. Also, frankly, this was a result of inertia in the White House, particularly when there was sensitivity on this issue. It was hard to get meetings scheduled and decisions made.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Were there people arguing that this was going too far, that we were going to hurt Chinese feelings, and this was a bad move?*

LORD: I don't remember that there was a lot of passion in the discussions, to be honest, because it didn't mark a dramatic departure. I don't recall anybody in the Clinton administration pushing for much bolder moves in support of Taiwan. I don't recall anyone saying very passionately that this was going to hurt our relations with Beijing. Thus, you have raised a fair question, why this process took so long. I think that a lot of it was simply a matter of plain inertia in getting the White House to come to grips with the issue. There might have been some nervousness that, maybe, Beijing would be a little annoyed, but I don't recall that this view was held very passionately.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I ask because, from the outside, I think that the feeling always was that if movement had been faster on this issue, it would have been seen as a really positive, administration move.*

LORD: A very good point.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: However, it took so long that everybody's expectations were raised.*

LORD: That's a very good point, and I am glad to record it here. This package of measures

involving Taiwan was not revolutionary by any means, of course. We did not review or change our policy on arms sales to Taiwan and the basic policy of unofficial and friendly ties with Taiwan. But if we had done all of this, say, in three or four months, people would have said: "Well, they're looking at the situation affecting Taiwan and they're cleaning up some anomalies. And there's some good steps forward. This is not as much as we 'Taiwan' supporters would like, but it's a step forward. They did it without alienating Beijing. It was a pretty good job." And I think that in fact was the case.

However, taking a year for action was damaging. Not only were the economic and academic experts on the outside watching this situation, wondering what the hell was going on. Taiwan, of course, was working with Congress to try to pressure on the administration to undertake some bolder moves forward. They had their expectations raised, although, through careful backgrounding of the press, we tried to keep those expectations down. I also tried to keep them down in my meetings with Taiwan representatives. By the time these changes came out, a lot of people probably thought that we had produced a mouse. I think the outcome was better than that. I think that it was partly the delay which caused this misperception.

Having said that, however, we didn't pay a price of any significance in Beijing, and we got modest kudos from Taiwan. On the whole, Congress thought that we should have done more, but members of Congress grudgingly said that we at least did something.

Then, in the course of 1994, there was the episode of President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan wanting to visit the United States in transit to Central America, where he was making a state visit. I believe that it was in 1994. Up till then we hadn't even allowed transit visits by top officials in Taiwan through the United States, bound for another destination. This was due to opposition by Beijing, which had a tremendous, double standard in this regard. They accepted that President Lee Teng-hui could play golf and have official meetings with the leaders of Southeast Asian countries. Beijing would hardly say anything about it. But the U.S. was a different matter, as was Japan.

In any event, in 1994 President Lee Teng-hui wanted to have a visit, preferably a stopover somewhere in mainland U.S., en route to Central America. He wasn't asking for an official visit to the U.S. at that point. What he wanted was more like a transit visit, but a leisurely transit visit. We split the difference. We decided that we would make the case that, given considerations of geography, it was only natural for him to go through the U.S. en route from Taiwan to Central America. It would have been a little tough and inconvenient not to do so. It was also a matter of airplane distances. You couldn't fly directly from Taiwan to Central America. So on grounds of logistics, convenience, and courtesy, you could make a case for approving this transit visit through the U.S. We knew about Beijing's sensitivities and we decided to have the transit take place in Hawaii. Yes, Hawaii is part of the United States. However, it's in the middle of the Pacific Ocean. A short visit there was not like landing in New York or California. We decided to approve a transit visit which was genuinely a transit visit. It would be a refueling stop. President Lee Teng-hui would come into the VIP lounge while his plane was refueled. I sent out the head of our Taiwan office in the State Department to greet him as a matter of courtesy. The problem is that this solution didn't work in any direction. The Chinese Government in Beijing was mad and beat up on us, but that was manageable. We could live with that. President

Lee Teng-hui, wanting a more high profile visit, said that he wanted to spend a couple of days in Hawaii, play some golf, and meet local people. Instead of Taiwan being grateful that for the first time ever its President had set foot on American soil, it turned out that it was not at all satisfied that the arrangement approved was a step forward compared to what any other American administration had previously permitted. Lee was upset because he just had this refueling stop in Hawaii.

Lee decided that he would play up this incident and magnify it by not getting off the airplane. As I said, I had sent one of my officers from the Taiwan office to meet and greet him and bring him into the VIP lounge. To this day, like the "Energizer Bunny" [advertisement for a brand of flashlight batteries], I've been trying to stamp out this rumor that we wouldn't let Lee get off the airplane in Hawaii. Of course we wanted him off the plane. We wanted him in the VIP lounge in the airport in Honolulu. By the time my officer met him at the plane, Lee decided that he would get more propaganda advantage by staying on the plane. Then Taiwan put out a statement that we wouldn't let Lee off the plane in Hawaii. We never caught up with that allegation. I became blue in the face, telling every newsman and every Congressman and Senator that I could get my hands on that this allegation was not true. The Taiwan Government keeps saying, to this day, that Lee couldn't get off the airplane in Hawaii. This is total baloney.

In any event, that was a little forerunner of what came next. Beijing was upset, but this was all right with us. We knew that they weren't going to be pleased. We thought that this was a fair splitting of the difference, balancing security, comfort, and courtesy. We were not being provocative. President Lee didn't have any press conference while he was in Honolulu.

This incident foreshadowed what happened in 1995. Lee started pressing for an official visit, or at least a working visit. He knew that he couldn't come as a head of state for an official visit. The excuse he used was that he wanted to receive an honorary degree from Cornell University. This was nonsense, because he already had an honorary degree from Cornell. The idea was that he would go up to Cornell University, give a speech, and be feted by his former university.

Taiwan already had strong lobbyists on Capitol Hill, of course. Taiwan was in second place, just behind Israel and just ahead of Greece in its lobbying effort in Congress. Taiwan also hired a PR [Public Relations] firm, Cassidy. My own view is that Taiwan would have been able to mount a lot of pressure for a travel permit, which is shorthand for Lee being able to come and visit the U.S., even without the PR firm.

They had four million dollars available for this campaign. There were some people in the Taiwan Government who argued against this trip, saying that they should not annoy the Americans and pressure the U.S. Government or go around and lobby Congress, but there were various factions in Taiwan behind this project. Who knows all of the details? In any event, the pressure was intense for us to allow Lee to come to the U.S. and give a speech at Cornell University. This particular episode, along with the reversal of our policy on MFN extension, were the two key events for which the Clinton administration has been criticized on specific aspects of our China policy.

So we had to deal with the question of the Lee visit. There was a view in the administration, held

fairly generally, that Lee should not be allowed to come. You never know when the President was consulted, but he was clearly aware of the matter. The fairly generally held view was that, even though the Chinese Government was being somewhat unreasonable by objecting to an unofficial, private visit by President Lee Teng-hui, the turbulence that would be caused in our relations with Beijing wasn't worth granting a travel permit to Lee. We continued to talk about a transit visit, but when it came to a working visit, this would present a fundamental problem. The basic policy for several administrations had been not to allow visits by high level Taiwan officials. We already had moved on transit visits.

I remember going up on Capitol Hill on several occasions and just getting lambasted. I was asked: "What the hell is going on? Can't a guy who is a distinguished person, the head of a democracy, come to the United States and visit his 'alma mater'? We're not talking about a high level, high profile visit. We're just talking about letting this poor guy come here and get an honorary degree. Are you going to let these 'pirates' in Beijing pressure you? This guy Lee is a democrat and a friend of the U.S. What the hell is going on here?"

I remember thinking frankly, during all of the time that I was testifying to the best of my ability, that I privately agreed with the Congressmen. This was an absurd situation. I'm not saying that I argued, within the administration, that Lee should be given a permit. I saw the turbulence building in Beijing and I was not in favor of giving him a trip. However, I felt that, on the merits, it was absurd saying that Lee, as a democratic politician, couldn't get honored by his alma mater. We kept on fighting the Congress and telling the PRC Embassy and Beijing that it was our fundamental policy not to have a visit to the U.S. by such a high level official of the Taiwan Government. This position was also relayed in a meeting in April, 1995, which Secretary Christopher had with PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at which he said that our fundamental policy was still not to allow visits to the U.S. by high level Taiwan officials. However, Christopher also said that we were having a difficult time convincing the U.S. Congress that this was the right course, and the pressure was building up. Understandably, Qian Qichen reported the first part of Christopher's remarks back to PRC President Jiang Zemin and others that the U.S. continued to oppose such visits. Either he didn't report the second part of Christopher's remarks or didn't give appropriate weight to these Congressional pressures. Maybe Qian Qichen thought that, whatever these pressures, we would just ignore them.

I'm not trying to say that Secretary Christopher was trying to tell Qian Qichen that we were going to reverse our policy on visits by high-ranking Taiwan officials. The PRC authorities, I think, were caught by surprise, but there was a lot of foreshadowing by Christopher to Qian Qichen of the ultimate decision, based on the fact that there were great difficulties in the way of continuing this policy. When we did reverse this policy on visits to the U.S. by high-ranking Taiwan officials, Qian Qichen didn't say that he was personally embarrassed. PRC President Jiang Zemin was embarrassed, to the extent that he looked as if he had been outflanked by Taiwan at a time when Jiang was trying to consolidate his position. This was a very sensitive issue, which was embarrassing both for President Jiang and for Foreign Minister Qian. Qian was identified with dealing with the U.S. and for having gotten these assurances that there would be no further visits to the U.S. by high-level Taiwan officials. It was one of the reasons why Foreign Minister Qian was so hard-line during the later Taiwan Straits missile crisis. He needed to show that he could be firm on Taiwan and so protect his flank. The same was true with Jiang.

Anyway, the pressure kept up on this proposed visit to the U.S. by President Lee Teng-hui. Congress voted unanimously, without dissent in the House of Representatives, to allow Lee to come for a short visit. In the Senate, I think, the vote was 97 to 1. These were "sense of the Congress" resolutions without legal effect. However, the votes were overwhelming and were a clear message to the administration. The only holdout in the Senate was Senator Bennett Johnson [Democrat, Louisiana], who voted both out of conviction, to avoid upsetting Beijing, and because of various oil interests and so forth. This took guts, I must say, no matter what his views were. So we got to the point where we felt that Congress would be so outraged if we held out on this issue that it might tamper with the Taiwan Relations Act and might enforce other things with respect to Taiwan which could really hurt our policy toward Beijing. The media was also generally beating up on us. The Cassidy firm had been very effective, but these pressures would have been there anyway.

We also felt that the PRC Government was overreacting, of course, but basically we knew that continuing to decline to issue a traveler's permit to Lee Teng-hui was going to cause huge problems. On the other hand, we knew that we had told the PRC Government that we would hang in there, so it was very awkward for us.

Now, I was traveling overseas in May, 1995, so I didn't get directly involved in the last few days of debate in Washington on the Lee visit. I don't know exactly what I would have done if I had been in Washington at the time. However, I want to make very clear that I knew through back channel messages from my deputy, the acting Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, as I was traveling, what was happening and that we were going to reverse our policy and let Lee Teng-hui visit the United States. I did not oppose that decision.

In retrospect, if I had this to do all over again, I think that we should have agreed to grant Lee a traveler's permit from the beginning. We would then have avoided the flip flop in the eyes of the PRC Government, although they still would have been outraged at the decision. However, on the merits, I think that Lee Teng-hui should have been allowed to make a private, unofficial visit, and then we should have been prepared to tough it out with the PRC. Another thing that we should have done, and I'll get to this, is that we should have been much more air tight on the speech that Lee was going to give at Cornell University.

*Q: By any chance, during the arguments on this issue within the administration, was the case for letting the Shah of Iran into the United States for medical treatment brought up as something that might have been a parallel?*

LORD: No, I don't recall that. By the way, I happen to have been in favor of allowing the Shah of Iran to be brought into the U.S. for medical treatment. But that parallel...

*Q: I was just wondering whether that case was considered. There is a certain symmetry...*

LORD: In terms of our relations with another country, I understand that, but I don't recall that that argument was used. Basically, it was the impact on Beijing and the pressure on Beijing, versus the impact of the pressures from Congress. And, of course, there was the feeling that the

PRC Government was really overreacting on this issue. However, in the end, we were also concerned that Congress might pass legislation which would really tie our hands on Taiwan and China. As I have said, these were incredibly overwhelming votes in both houses of Congress.

There also was the question of timing and the President, and I'll never sort this matter out. When he announced the decision on the travel permit for President Lee Teng-hui, President Clinton expressed the view along the lines of: "I believe in freedom of travel. Why can't the President of Taiwan come to the United States privately?" This seemed to suggest that Clinton didn't know what American positions on proposed visits had been. He finally seemed to conclude that our position had been unreasonable and that we were going to change it. I can't tell you how much President Clinton consulted with Tony Lake [National Security Adviser] and Sandy Berger [Deputy National Security Adviser] as he went along. However, it was such a visible issue that I can't believe that the President wasn't in favor of holding the line. He just changed his mind, and put emphasis on the freedom of travel and other considerations when he announced his decision. Of course, the Congressional pressures were key for him.

Of course, we tried to package this decision for the PRC Government as best we could. What we told them, and what we told Taiwan at the same time that we did this, was that this visit was going to be at the lowest key possible. So we worked out that President Lee would hold no press conferences. He would land in California and go directly to Ithaca, New York, [where Cornell University is located] and not even go through New York City. Of course, not Washington, but not even New York City. He would go directly to Ithaca. He would not be met by any U.S. Government officials, although we would have my Taiwan Country Director accompanying him, partly to keep Lee under control, to work with their people, and make sure that he didn't do something that would be awkward.

There were Congressmen and Senators who wanted to go up to Cornell and meet President Lee. We couldn't do anything about that. However, he would not meet with any administration official, there would be no press conference, and he would not even go through New York City. We were assured by Benjamin Lu, the Taiwan representative in Washington, that Lee's speech would be low key, would be non-political, and would cover economic reforms in Taiwan. So, in retrospect, the other thing that we should have done was to obtain the text of his proposed speech in advance. I know that we attempted very vigorously to get details of the speech from the Taiwan representative in Washington, but without success. This should have made us suspicious.

In retrospect, and I didn't argue this at the time, we should have given him the visa from the beginning, so we wouldn't have had a public flip flop on the issue. We wouldn't have had these pressures from Congress and the awkward reversal of policy. This would have helped modestly with Beijing. In the context of air tightness, on the trip being unofficial and low key, which we managed to pull off on other things, besides the speech, we should have said that we would only approve the issuance of a travel permit for Lee if we could see the text of the speech in advance. If he didn't like this condition, he didn't have to come to the U.S. at all.

I am convinced that the Lee speech created a major problem. The PRC Government was going to scream and shout, even without the speech. However, the fact is that during most of the Lee visit, we kept the press away, we limited his itinerary, and we explained all of this to the PRC Chinese.

They did not react all that strongly during the lead up to the Lee visit and even during the first couple of days of it. The reaction was strong, but not in terms of the decibel count that I was familiar with in terms of the Chinese rhetoric. Then Lee gave his speech. In his speech he had countless references to the "Republic of China on Taiwan, in addition to other provocations." He totally double crossed us. Of course, the PRC Chinese went ballistic. I must say that I went ballistic as well, as did others in the U.S. Government. After all, on this issue President Clinton had stuck his neck out, risking our relationship with the PRC, and then Lee gave a big political speech on Taiwan.

As a result, on my own, I just refused thereafter to receive Benjamin Lu, the Taiwan representative. I was not personally given any instructions to do this and I didn't consult anyone. For a few months he had absolutely no access to me. I was the highest level official in the State Department that he was allowed to see and I had been seeing him regularly. Because of his performance on the visit, however, and to register our displeasure on the speech, I just ignored him. He was finally recalled to Taiwan. I would like to think that I had something to do with it. He is a nice man but ineffectual. However, he personally could have been more helpful. He was either weak or disingenuous. He had been lobbying Congress and going around us, without attempting to discuss the matter with us. He wasn't respected in Taiwan, anyway. Everyone thought that his appointment to Washington was somewhat puzzling to begin with. I was therefore sending a message to Taiwan about our unhappiness over this issue but also our unhappiness with his behavior. As a result, he was withdrawn from Washington, but not just because of me. But the Taiwan Government saw that he had no access to the State Department, and this contributed to its decision to withdraw him from Washington.

Anyway, we were very tough with Taiwan afterwards. Also we went back to Beijing on it, but in any case the damage was done. PRC President Jiang Zemin and Foreign Minister Qian Qichen in particular thought that they had been embarrassed on this matter. I don't remember all of the things that happened, but the PRC Government cut off some trips and exchanges. They withdrew their Ambassador from Washington, and relations got very frosty just when we had been making some progress on our relationship. I think that the PRC began its first military exercise [in the Taiwan Straits] in summer, 1995, not long after the Lee visit.

I also paid close attention to Hong Kong throughout my tenure. The British colony was to return to Chinese sovereignty on July 1, 1997, after I left office. I thought it was important to underscore American support for Hong Kong's future autonomy and freedom under Chinese rule. I enthusiastically supported Governor Chris Patten's efforts - and tangle with Beijing - to introduce some elements of political choice and democracy. This would constitute a glass ceiling which the Chinese would have to break if they wanted to roll back reform. Of course, the British were late at doing this - Patten had the courage and foresight to do this whereas all his predecessors had essentially kow-towed to Beijing. Some of them, and some so-called China experts in the U.S., criticized Patten for this. I strongly supported him, as did our government. I would always see him, usually at a private working breakfast on my several trips there to show the flag.

I would also meet with the Chinese representatives (NCNA) and urge tolerance in China's self-interest. Christopher and I would also raise this in our meetings with Chinese officials elsewhere.

In Hong Kong I would also meet with American businesspeople, Hong Kong business types, and Hong Kong legislators, including democracy activists, like Martin Lee. I would include support for Hong Kong in various speeches and hold press conferences there, as elsewhere in Asia.

At any rate they fired some missiles and had some military exercises. We reacted to this, saying that these exercises were not helpful, but I don't recall any high level protest, since they were not particularly provocative.

In 1995 we got MFN status renewed for China by a fairly significant majority despite the controversy that came up every year. We kept working on other issues. However, as we reached the beginning of 1996, it looked as if we faced a real nightmare. This was even before the Taiwan Missile Crisis heated up again. We had been able to improve relations somewhat with the PRC but we discovered that there was a whole minefield ahead of us. The Chinese were sending ring magnets to Pakistan, which helped Pakistan develop their nuclear capability. Consequently, we slapped on sanctions because of that.

We had very tough negotiations on intellectual property rights. American business interests were losing billions of dollars each year because of pirating [unauthorized copying] by the PRC Chinese of CDs [Compact Discs], VCRs [Video Cassette Recorders], computer software, pharmaceutical products patented in the U.S., and so forth.

In March, 1996, we had coming up the annual tussle in Geneva over a resolution critiquing Chinese human rights. This was always a source of irritation between us and Beijing. The MFN extension would come up after that in May-June, and the human rights issue wasn't going well. There was still the chill left over from the withdrawal of the PRC Ambassador from Washington in the wake of the Lee visit, although he would have returned by then. I don't remember when exactly. However, there was a basic chill on exchanges with the PRC. So the relationship between the U.S. and the PRC Chinese was not in very good shape early in 1996 and difficult issues lay ahead.

With my encouragement Secretary Christopher - of course with the full agreement and encouragement of the White House - said that we have to look at our whole policy toward China and see how the hell we are going to get back on track in terms of our relationship and get through all of these minefields. I don't recall whether it was January, 1996, or it may even have been in the fall of 1995. At any rate, we began a process of intensive, strategic reviews, both in the State Department and at the White House. Either Sandy Berger would chair meetings at the White House or Christopher chaired meetings at the State Department, with Sandy Berger or Tony Lake coming over to the State Department.

The point I am making is that this contradicts stories that this was essentially a Christopher-led operation or a White House one. Meetings were held at the White House and the State Department and there was total cooperation. Everyone felt that we had to see how the hell we were going to get through this minefield of issues. So we not only looked at specifics about what we would do about IPR, what we would do about nuclear non-proliferation, and what we would do about human rights. We also considered our approach to all of these issues, generally. It was agreed, among other things, that we really would try to make a much more aggressive effort to

engage in a strategic dialogue with the PRC, even as we referred to individual issues.

I should add that at this time Liu Haoqui was Tony Lake's equivalent within the Chinese hierarchy as National Security Adviser, although not as powerful, reporting directly to Lee Peng [PRC Prime Minister]. He was also Vice Foreign Minister. He had been an America hand for some time, including when I was in Beijing as Ambassador. Anyway, Liu was coming to visit the PRC Embassy in Washington in March, 1996, to talk to all of the PRC Consuls General and the PRC Ambassador. This was a sort of "Chiefs of Mission meeting," whatever they called it. So, with close coordination between the State Department and the White House, we requested that Liu spend some time, not only with the usual suspects in the State and Defense Departments but also with the National Security Adviser. We arranged a day-long retreat and to have a strategic dialogue with him.

This was done with Christopher's agreement with the understanding that I would sit in on all the Lake-Liu talks. The PRC Government clearly appreciated that there was full coordination within the U.S. Government, with Secretary Christopher keeping up his vigorous efforts with the PRC Foreign Minister, which he did, throughout this period.

Lo and behold, on the day Liu arrived in Washington, Friday, March 7, 1996, the PRC fired missiles that landed on either side of Taiwan. One missile landed off one port in Taiwan and two others, I believe, landed off a second port. This incident greatly escalated the tension in the Taiwan Straits. As I previously mentioned, the PRC had already held military exercises in the area, and tensions were building up. That was the other development which was already making things look pretty grim in early 1996.

So that particular time - March 1996 - was clearly the low point in U.S.-China relations during the first Clinton term. All of these factors came together, with the missile crisis being the latest and the most dramatic.

As we looked toward the Liu visit, we had decided not to change our policy toward the PRC, but to implement it much more aggressively in terms of a strategic dialogue, looking ahead at all of these minefields and the continuing problems we were having. We were engaged in mapping out what we would do on each of these issues. But also we tried to think of ways that we could do things the PRC might find positive, in addition to pressing them on things that they would find difficult. So a lot of discussions on strategy went on, as I say, between the State Department and the White House. Secretary Christopher chaired most of the key sessions, unlike what is stated in this "Washington Post" article, which emphasized the role of the White House.

*Q: You might mention why we are mentioning the "Washington Post."*

LORD: Well, as we speak here in late June, 1998, there has been a two-part series of articles in the "Washington Post" which essentially could have been written by Tony Lake and his new partner, Rothkop, who used to work in the Department of Commerce. These articles essentially said that U.S. China policy during the Clinton administration was screwed up by the State Department until Tony Lake rescued it. That's what I'm referring to.

I will give Lake his due, as we go ahead, you can be certain. It's just that this is a one-sided view. I'm not saying that Lake wrote these articles. I'm just saying that these articles contain a lot of spinning, in the sense that they are a very partial view, if you look at them from the historical perspective. The facts are that both Lake (with me by his side) and Christopher worked on improving our relations with China in 1996. There was total coordination in our government. It was natural, and healthy for the National Security Advisor to get more involved (until then, it was mostly his deputy, Berger), but this was done in close concert with Christopher and me. Together we did a very skillful job on China in 1996 and by the end of the year relations were much more positive.

We had arranged for Liu's visit to begin on a Friday night with an informal dinner at the State Department, hosted by Secretary of State Christopher. This was to make clear, as Liu went off the next day for a full day's meeting with Tony Lake and me, that the State Department was still heavily involved in U.S. foreign policy. So as part of a united front, Lake was going to come over to the Department, and they were going to have a joint dinner with Liu.

When we got word of the PRC missile firings, we decided to add Secretary of Defense Perry to the discussions we were going to have with Liu. I don't believe that we included the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Shalikashvili. So the dinner included Secretary of State Christopher; Secretary of Defense Perry; Tony Lake, National Security Adviser; myself; and Jeff Bader, the PRC Country Director, who was note taker. I can't remember whether Sandy Berger was there. It was a small dinner, with about six or seven of us on the U.S. side. We decided to do a full court press, of course, on the PRC missile firings. This was now required before opening up a strategic dialogue on the next day. This had now been overtaken by the PRC missile firings, which we had to address first. We weren't going to cancel the Liu visit. However, we had to carry out our policy of having a strategic dialogue against the backdrop of firmness in view of this Chinese provocation.

It was agreed that first Secretary of Defense Perry, then Secretary of State Christopher, and then National Security Adviser Lake would speak, although I am not entirely certain of the order in which they spoke. I know that Secretary Perry went first. Each of the three speakers was to deliver a tough message over dinner. We worked closely together on this. In effect, Perry, and this has been covered in the article in the "Washington Post," said that what Beijing had done could result in grave consequences. This was a pretty heavily loaded term. He said that this could lead to a possible conflict with the United States. He likened what the PRC had done, firing missiles North and South of Taiwan, as a kind of bracketing artillery fire, where you fire to one side and then to the other side so that you can zoom in on the actual target. He used that image, which was strong language. And Christopher and Lake also used strong language.

Our clear impression was that Liu was totally surprised by the timing of the missile firings, if not the missile firings themselves. I'm sure he was not pleased that this was the way that he was starting his visit to Washington. Liu, of course, was firm. He is always firm. He can be jovial at times. He was personally very friendly to me and my wife on many occasions when we were in China, so I have personal respect for him. However, he can be very feisty in his discussions in defending Chinese interests and attacking the U.S. So he was tough. However, I felt that, by Chinese standards, he was on the defensive, and his decibel level was under control. He clearly

felt awkward about this situation, although he didn't say that, of course.

So we basically spent the whole dinner on this one subject. We made some references to the view that we hoped to move ahead with our relationship. We noted that Liu would be meeting with Tony Lake throughout all of the following day. However, we indicated that we thought that this was a hell of a way to start important discussions.

On the next day there was a lot of snow on the ground, and it was cold. We drove down to Pamela Harriman's estate in Virginia. It is called "Pelican Estate" and it is secluded. I forget the exact town it is near. There were four of us on our side, including Tony Lake, Bob Suettinger of the NSC staff, Jeff Bader, and myself. We had worked closely with Tony Lake in setting this up. We worked very well together. Tony Lake did an extremely good job and deserves a lot of credit. He helped a lot. He had not played that much of a role on China policy, as Sandy Berger had. Now he was getting more involved on some of these Asian issues, generally and specifically on China. It's true that Lake had been advised by some outsiders that the White House should get more involved, including Tony Lake personally, as Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger had formerly played key roles on China issues. Lake should have been doing the same thing here. In years gone by Kissinger and Haig had urged the importance of our having a strategic dialogue with China, and the importance of having the White House involved in it.

So we carefully scripted how we would approach the meeting with Liu. We sat in a comfortable living room. There were four people on the Chinese side, plus one interpreter. We sat around a fireplace and then went into the dining room for a working luncheon. Following this, we came back to the living room and sat around the fireplace. The discussion lasted roughly from 9:00 AM to 4:00 PM, including lunch. Our strategy was the classical one to follow at a time like this. First, we had to repeat the warnings and the grave concerns expressed at dinner on the night before, regarding the Chinese missile firings at Taiwan. We began with that.

Tony Lake also made references to words that we heard from Charles Freeman about a potential Chinese threat against us (Los Angeles specifically), if we had a nuclear confrontation. We said that we didn't know how authoritative these words were, but we didn't like what we were hearing. So there was some tough talk at the beginning, reiterating the points made the night before.

We then went over to what was supposed to be a more constructive discussion. We decided to do that in three parts. They were carefully scripted but were also projected to the Chinese in advance. The first part of the presentation was more conceptual, philosophical, and strategic, describing two great powers heading into the next century, that is, how we could work together, why that is important, and how we see China. We said that we want to see China as a strong, stable, prosperous, and open society. We weren't out to contain China, divide it, or subvert it. We thought that it was in our interest for China to have these attributes. We would not oppose China in developing such a society and, indeed, would work with it. However, we said that we were also hard-headed and would defend our interests. We would maintain our force levels and our alliances. We would be firm in negotiating. We had interests and would stand up for our values. This was a philosophical discussion of our approach and why it was important to have a strategic dialogue with China. We sketched out some areas where we could work more effectively

together and give some content to this approach.

Some of the areas involved ranged from Korea to Cambodia, regional security dialogues, APEC, economic questions, Chinese admission to the WTO [World Trade Organization], and environmental questions, crime and narcotics. All of these things have become more familiar today. We laid most of those out on this occasion, as I recall.

So we started with this conceptual, philosophical, and strategic framework of a rather positive nature, after the initial pounding about Chinese missile firings in the vicinity of Taiwan.

Then in the second part of the day we took on the tough issues. We didn't want to start with the negative side. We wanted to set out a strategic, positive framework within which to take up these tough issues. We also didn't want to end up with negative issues but rather on a positive note. So we put the tough issues in the middle. We covered human rights, trade, nuclear non-proliferation, Taiwan, and so on.

Then we ended up in part three by indicating where we could go on some of the issues which we had sketched in the agenda earlier in the presentation. We outlined some suggestions on how we could make progress on troublesome issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, human rights, and some other matters, as well as reference back to regional security, economics, and some of the other positive aspects. We also proposed the intensification of exchanges between the two countries at various levels, and, I believe, some foreshadowing, without locking ourselves into it, of a possible summit meeting. We indicated that our Presidents had met on occasion and we suggested that this might be a good idea.

*Q: President Clinton had not yet made a state visit to China.*

LORD: No. He hadn't made a visit to China of any kind. The last visit had been made by President Bush in 1989.

That, basically, was the approach we made to the Chinese. Tony Lake handled himself very well. There was a firm discussion, particularly in the middle part of the agenda. However, it was clearly constructive, and, obviously, the Chinese liked the fact that this was a discussion at the strategic level of two great powers. Lake and Liu livened the discussion with some humor at times, and so on. On the whole, it was the most extensive discussion and the most strategic that we had with the Chinese during the first Clinton term.

It was the best such discussion that we had had because previous meetings, whoever was conducting them for the U.S., lasted for only an hour here or two hours there. We never had more than a two or two and a half hour meeting. For this meeting we purposely got out of our Washington offices and from within range of telephones. We knew that we had seven hours to discuss these matters. It was an important step, particularly since we had reached the nadir of our relationship at that point. I believe that this meeting helped set the stage for an improvement in our relations thereafter. It was a turning point. I'll get into more detail on that.

We still have to comment on what the Chinese were up to at this point. Do you want me to

answer any questions about this meeting, which was held, I believe, near Middleburg, Virginia?

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could you say something about what the Chinese raised with you when you asked them for this meeting? How serious were the discussions which Chas. Freeman had with General Xiong?*

LORD: It depends on whom you were talking to. Chas. Freeman likes to think that these discussions were of fundamental importance. I think that that's baloney. It was vague, at least the way we heard it at the time. It seems to have gotten more precise since then.

But I think that we all felt that there was enough there that we had to respond and take note of it. We didn't want to inflate its importance. Obviously, it wasn't coming...

*Q: What was supposed to be coming out of this?*

LORD: Basically the Chinese were alleged to have said more or less as follows. They said: "Look, we're not worried if we get into some tension and potential conflict with the United States. By the way, we have nuclear weapons, too. In the event of a real confrontation we don't think that the Americans are going to give up Los Angeles in exchange for Taiwan."

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: They basically said that in the 1950s and 1960s it was possible for the United States to eliminate China with nuclear weapons. However, times have changed, and the United States would not be willing to sacrifice Los Angeles for Taiwan.*

LORD: So this was unpleasant, but it wasn't so authoritative that we wanted to give this comment the dignity of an official, Chinese position. We also wanted to let them know that we had noticed the comment. I wonder whether this exchange was quite as important as Freeman suggested. Nevertheless, he felt that he had the obligation to report it, and it was of potential significance. So we addressed that matter head on at the Saturday session as well, but not at great length. Does that answer your question?

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Yes.*

LORD: On the very next day we met in Secretary of Defense Perry's office on the Taiwan missile crisis. This was Saturday, March 8. We were, of course, very concerned about Chinese actions. We felt that, obviously, China was seeking to intimidate Taiwan and influence the Presidential election there. There still was residual fallout not only from the visit of President Lee Teng-hui to the U.S., but from Taiwanese diplomacy, which was trying to get more international profile. Taiwan was trying to get into the UN, in response to growing independence sentiment in Taiwan. Beijing, in its heavy-handed way, was trying to prevent this.

This shows how little the PRC leaders understood about democracy. All they did was to increase Lee's margin of victory in the Taiwan presidential elections and make many people on Taiwan very angry. The Chinese also scared countries in East Asia. On the other hand, in effect the PRC sent a message to Taiwan that, although they can't attack Taiwan in an amphibious way, they could lob in a few missiles. They could affect the Taiwan stock market, investment, and so forth.

So the PRC didn't lose totally on this. I'm sure that the PRC rationalized it in their own mind that their tough muscling around had some positive impact.

In any event, we met in Secretary Perry's office on Saturday morning, March 8. I remember that I went over to the Georgetown section of Washington and joined Secretary Christopher at his home and then rode over with him to the Pentagon for this meeting. The Americans present were Perry, Christopher, and myself - I was the only sub-cabinet official there - John Deutch, the Director of Central Intelligence, was there, as was JCS Chairman General Shalikashvili, and either Tony Lake or Sandy Berger from the National Security Council staff. Probably Lake, but maybe both of them were there. I just can't remember.

Perry's office had charts on display for the meeting. Perry had Gen Shali do the presentation. Basically, there was no debate. The question was what, if anything, we could do to deter Chinese use of force. Neither we nor Taiwan had any intelligence that the PRC was going to use force at that time against Taiwan, beyond firing a few missiles and using intimidation. We had no evidence that the PRC was going to hit an uninhabited island with a missile or harass shipping. Certainly, the PRC was not going to attack Taiwan if they didn't even have the capability to attack one of the offshore islands. As far as we knew, none of this was within the PRC range of capabilities. Our best judgment was that the PRC wanted to engage in psychological and political warfare to intimidate Taiwan and send a signal about the sensitivity of this issue, from the PRC point of view. Taiwan intelligence agreed with that view.

Having said that, it was agreed that there was a five or ten percent chance that we were wrong. The PRC might take aggressive action at the lower level, namely, for example, seize an uninhabited offshore island or lob a missile at some uninhabited territory. The PRC might possibly go after one of the larger, offshore islands, although we believed that they couldn't take even one of the offshore islands without bloody fighting, and they would have to prepare to do that well in advance. We knew that the PRC wouldn't attack Taiwan itself, because they couldn't do so. Furthermore, that would be incredibly provocative.

There was a danger that our intelligence was wrong and that the PRC might just do something of a modest nature which would still be very humiliating and which would make it very difficult for us to decide what to do in response. Or, through miscalculation, the PRC might stumble into action. Either a missile misfire could hit a populated center, or harassment of shipping could result in a collision or some incident in the air. Or something could happen just inadvertently. There was unanimous agreement, and Secretary Perry stressed this point, "an ounce of prevention is worth an awful lot of cure." Our choices after the Chinese had done something would be much more difficult, even after an accident, however modest it was, than if we deterred them from the beginning. So the feeling was that we had to have a demonstration, beyond the rhetoric that we had been applying, both privately, through diplomatic channels, and publicly, when we strongly criticized what the Chinese were up to.

We had to show the Chinese that we were serious. Furthermore, we wanted to show our allies and friends in the East Asian region that we were reliable partners. We wanted to remind Beijing that we were number one in terms of military power. We also, of course, wanted to reassure Taiwan about its security concerns. We wanted to show Beijing that provocation doesn't pay and

is dangerous. And, of course, we were concerned about our domestic front in Congress, whose views we shared completely. Many members of Congress were concerned about Taiwan and were angry about what Beijing was up to. For all of these reasons there was a unanimous view in this group which met in Secretary Perry's office that we needed to do something significant.

We had the usual aircraft carrier deployed in the region. I think that the USS INDEPENDENCE had been undergoing repairs and overhaul in Yokohama. I guess that by the time of this meeting it had already sailed, with its accompanying battle group. We made sure that it moved close to the region of the Taiwan Straits. This key decision, by itself, would get some attention from Beijing, in the sense that this was a carrier deployed in the Pacific. When we moved it closer to Taiwan, this was significant but it was not particularly dramatic. We didn't want to take any half measures. So we purposely decided, again without anybody disagreeing, to deploy another aircraft carrier, along with its accompanying escorts, to the area, which would really make our point. This would marshal the biggest fighting force in the Western Pacific for a long time.

We had to get this second carrier, which I think was the USS ENTERPRISE, from the Indian Ocean or Persian Gulf, so this carrier had to be replaced from somewhere else. Of course, it took some time for it to get to the vicinity of Taiwan. The very fact that we were deploying a second carrier would - did - get everyone's attention. So it was agreed, and Sandy Berger or Tony Lake, whoever was there, and I guess it was Lake, said that he would take this matter back for presidential approval, which he got by that night. We agreed that we wanted the word of this redeployment of the second carrier to get out quickly. We didn't want to be overly high profile, but it was important for the word to get out rather quickly to have an impact on Beijing and U.S. domestic audiences. After all, the information about the PRC missile firings had spread quickly and was causing a great stir.

Secretary Christopher was due to be on the TV program, "Meet the Press," which was one of the Sunday talk shows on March 9. We decided at the State Department to have Secretary Christopher handle the announcement during this program. I don't know whether we checked with anyone else on this, but it had been agreed by everyone who had been at the meeting in Perry's office that we would get the word out. Christopher had taken enough of a beating on China policy and deserved better than the treatment he had received. So, it was appropriate for him to take the public lead on this key move. So he got the word out. I forget the exact phrasing he used on "Meet the Press."

We were working on this matter on both sides of the Straits. With Beijing, of course, the most dramatic signal was the deployment of these aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Straits. Both publicly and privately in our rhetoric, we were telling Beijing not to use force and get into a conflict with grave consequences and so forth. At the same time we were providing them both for real as well as for face reasons, evidence that we were not changing our policy toward Taiwan. Our policy was still a One China policy. We assured Beijing of continuity. We also told Beijing that we were telling Taiwan that they shouldn't be overly provocative in their diplomacy. So we sent a double barreled message to Beijing, that is, aircraft carriers, "tough rhetoric," and "don't use force" coupled with assurance that we were sticking with our China policy. We were disturbed with what Beijing had done but we weren't going to change our policy on One China. We were urging Taiwan to cool it. We were encouraging Beijing and Taiwan to have direct talks across

the Taiwan Straits. We did not put the carriers in the Strait itself but kept them nearby.

With Taiwan, of course, the deployment of the carriers was reassuring and a great boost to morale. It made the point. We also filled this in with appropriate rhetoric. We told them that we found what Beijing was doing was unacceptable. However, we told Taiwan that we didn't like Taiwan's being overly provocative in its diplomacy, because this might drag the U.S. into a conflict. We said that we didn't think that this would serve Taiwan's interest because tensions in the Taiwan Straits don't serve Taiwan's security or the economy of Taiwan. Recalling President Lee's speech at Cornell University and Taiwan's direct dealings with the U.S. Congress, we were not going to let them outflank us. As for Taiwan's international diplomacy, the U.S. would support Taiwan's efforts to get into international organizations which do not require statehood for entry. In fact, I don't recall whether we tried to discourage Taiwan from its campaign to get into the UN but we did say that we didn't want Taiwan to act in a provocative way. We told Taiwan that they could see that we continued to ensure its security, and they could see what we were doing with the deployment of the aircraft carriers to the Western Pacific. In return, Taiwan owed us some restraint.

Specifically, we had Peter Tarnoff, the Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs, and Sandy Berger, Deputy National Security Adviser, meet secretly at a hotel in New York with Ding Moushi, who had been the Taiwan representative in Washington during the early part of the Clinton administration. He was now a direct adviser to the Taiwan Government on national security affairs, although not the national security adviser to President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan. We knew that he had a direct pipeline to President Lee and was also an able guy, unlike Benjamin Lu, then representative at the time in Washington. We didn't even tell Benjamin Lu that this meeting was taking place at a hotel in New York. So they met up in New York. I didn't go. My country director, Bodey, went. Tarnoff represented State. He and Berger delivered both the reassurances to Taiwan and the point that they not be provocative at the same time.

I happen to think that this combination of rhetoric and diplomacy with Beijing and Taipei was one of our finer moments. This deployment of carriers to the Taiwan Straits helped to cool things down. From then on our relationship with Beijing started to improve. As I've already indicated, Beijing probably saw that the missile firings had backfired. They had caused apprehensions in Asia and caused a conflict with us in which Beijing had to stand down and stop firing missiles. So their firing of these missiles hadn't been a ringing success. On the other hand, President Jiang Zemin, of the PRC, had now protected his flank on Taiwan, after looking awkward because of the visit to the U.S. by President Li Teng-hui of Taiwan. Jiang Zemin was still consolidating his position. The PRC showed that it could cause jitters of an economic, if not security, nature, with regard to Taiwan. But on the whole, we figured that the missile firings toward Taiwan was not one of the PRC's wisest decisions.

Meanwhile, we got lots of credit in Asia. Taiwan, of course, warmly welcomed our show of support. The Asian reactions were very supportive but as usual quiet. I think that the Australians came up with a public statement. Many Asian governments patted us on the back and were very happy, although not many said so publicly. This was the usual game that they played with Beijing. We know that we did ourselves an awful lot of good throughout Asia, without exception, because the East Asian countries were concerned about this episode, about China

creating mischief in 1994 in the South China Sea, and China's buildup of its military. Even though nobody wanted a confrontation with China, and rather wanted engagement, the East Asian countries were concerned about Chinese power. That was one of the reasons, along with keeping Japan under control, that these countries welcomed the U.S. military presence in East Asia. So they welcomed our checking China. These actions were also applauded in Congress and in the U.S. press. We got a lot of credit, in contrast to our previously having taken a beating on China policy on some occasions. It was kind of refreshing to have all of these kudos. I think that we deserved them and that we handled this situation quite well. To this day, even critics of the China policy during Clinton's presidency all applaud our handling of the 1996 missile crisis.

We then worked on all of these other elements of the Chinese-American relationship. There were major negotiations on nuclear non-proliferation. We got the Chinese to agree by May, 1996, not to ship any nuclear materials to non-safeguarded facilities in Pakistan. With this and other Chinese steps, we were able to lift the sanctions previously imposed, and so we made progress on nuclear non-proliferation.

On intellectual property rights we threatened China with the largest sanctions in the history of trade negotiations in order to get their compliance. These sanctions would have affected about \$3.0 billion worth of Chinese exports. We got close to publishing the list, but our leverage worked. As a result of tough negotiations, we got a very good agreement, including arrangements for enforcement by the Chinese, which our industry strongly supported. So we got that issue out of the way.

We were stepping up our dialogue on other issues. We had continual meetings at my level in Washington and, of course, in regional security talks in July, 1996. Also, Tony Lake went to Beijing in July, 1996. I went with him once again. We continued the strategic dialogue with the PRC, in this case in Beijing. It was held in the Dai Yutai guest house, which is in a compound away from the office buildings of the PRC Government. It wasn't as distant from the center of the PRC Government as Pamela Harriman's estate in Middleburg, Virginia, had been for the talks with Liu. We had similar meetings with PRC officials on the strategic dialogue regarding where we wanted to go strategically in the future in handling ongoing, tough issues, as well as expanding our positive agenda.

We were now talking about reciprocal summit meetings. We got pretty concrete during that visit. We had come up with this idea earlier as well, but not in as concrete terms. In addition to Tony Lake carrying on this dialogue, I participated in it, and we found it very helpful. Secretary Christopher was also working very hard through messages to the Chinese foreign minister and through his meetings to get the Chinese-American relationship back on track. Christopher made several statements and speeches, although we never got one from President Clinton. We had begun to solve some of the contentious issues. The extension of MFN was resolved without difficulty. We made modest progress on trade, nuclear non-proliferation, and even human rights. None of this was dramatic. The Taiwan issue was defused, and we began to expand our agenda.

In short, by the time Secretary Christopher went to China in November, 1996, we had developed considerable momentum. Already in the air was the possibility of a summit meeting. We went to China just before going to Manila, where the annual summit meeting of APEC was taking place,

and President Clinton would meet PRC President Jiang Zemin. This was a happy note to close off Clinton's first, four-year term, in contrast to Christopher's earlier Beijing visit. There were very warm and friendly discussions with PRC Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. It was agreed that the two Presidents would announce mutual summit meetings when they got to Manila a few days later. We made some progress on other substantive issues.

Christopher gave a major speech on bilateral relations in Shanghai. With my encouragement, he deleted references to "partnership" with China as being overly optimistic. We had a banner with this phrase at the speech site changed. Christopher and I didn't want a misleading label that would make us look naive in our relations with China. But in the second term, after we had both left, the Clinton Administration unwisely used the even worse phrase "strategic partnership."

We went from China to Manila where the two presidents jointly announced the two summit meetings.

So we concluded the first Clinton term in a lot better shape than we had been at any time during those four years [1993-1997]. Specifically, we had come a great distance from March, 1996. Now I'll answer your questions.

I would agree that we could have done some things better before 1996. On the other hand, I think that any fair-minded critic would say that from March, 1996, the nadir of the Chinese-American relationship, we did an excellent job. This continued till the end of the first Clinton term where U.S.-China relations were in their best shape of the four years. I think that we handled ourselves very well with an appropriate mixture of firmness, expanding the dialogue, and highlighting a positive agenda. We finally were getting more public statements about our policy toward the PRC, but still not out of the White House.

So this was one of the reasons that I felt comfortable about leaving at the end of the first Clinton term. I thought that our policy toward Asia was generally in good shape. We had strengthened our alliance with Japan, reduced tensions in Korea, normalized relations with Vietnam and moved ahead with APEC and ARF, and made progress elsewhere. I felt that our China relationship was on track and heading for summit meetings. We had gotten out of this difficult period and were headed on a generally positive but still inevitably mixed course. Given my long relationship with the China issue, I wanted to feel that way before I left government service.

*Q: We're probably reaching our endurance levels here, but, just for a minute, let's talk about when we were in the trough of our relations with China. At that time, did anyone say that we ought to play or threaten to play, the Taiwan card? I mean that if the PRC was going to be beastly on human rights or something like that, we might do something like invite President Li Teng-hui to come to the U.S. for an informal lunch at the White House, or something like that.*

LORD: That's a good question and a fair one. The answer is: "No." I don't recall anyone ever suggesting that. I myself would have been against such a course. I could get impatient with the PRC and would argue about how firm we should be with them. I believe in using leverage and pressure at times. However, you have to take into account the best mix with the Chinese and face and the effects, as opposed to posturing.

On Taiwan I always felt that we shouldn't touch that. It was too sensitive. I didn't think that we should be any less faithful to Taiwan but I also didn't think that we should be provocative to Beijing. I don't recall anyone ever suggesting that we should stick it to the Chinese by fooling around with our Taiwan policy. So this just didn't happen.

In the inevitable debates over individual arms sales to Taiwan some people in the Pentagon and in the Department of Commerce may sometimes have wanted to be somewhat more ambitious, although I'm not even sure about that. The Pentagon would not necessarily always be for arms sales to Taiwan. These were individual decisions, and reasonable people could disagree on Taiwan defense needs, whether offensive or defensive. I was always supportive of a solid arms sales policy to support Taiwan.

As for diplomacy, no, no one ever said that the PRC leaders were being tough and therefore let's give President Lee Teng-hui a state dinner at the White House, and so on. This kind of possible action was never proposed at my level, or any other level.

*Q: Regarding the missile crisis caused by the PRC firing missiles near Taiwan, there had been an even more dangerous crisis during the Cold War. We deployed Patriot missile batteries in Israel. The Patriot missiles were designed to shoot down just the type of missiles that the PRC had. Did we consider doing anything of that nature?*

LORD: We had already provided Patriot missile equipment to Taiwan. It was called MAD. This did not mean "Mutual Assured Destruction" but something else called, "Modified Air Defense." I don't remember that we rushed this equipment to them during the middle of the Taiwan Straits crisis. Maybe we provided it to them afterwards.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: We had promised to provide Patriot missiles to the Chinese Nationalists at some time before the Dole-Clinton election campaign of 1996. I know that Senator Dole spoke about providing Theater Missile Defense to Taiwan, while Clinton said that we were going to speed up the delivery of Patriot missiles to Taiwan.*

*Q: [Charles Stuart Kennedy] This was during the 1996 election campaign.*

*Q: [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker] This was after the Taiwan Straits missile firings began, so I'm not sure what was actually in place in Taiwan. I have a few other questions. What was your assessment of Lee?*

LORD: I'm basically positive about him. I am less positive than I used to be. He jerked us around on the question of his 1995 trip and speech and the way he was playing with Congress directly instead of the Administration. So that behavior has modestly altered my view of him. However, in terms of the big picture, I think that he deserves great credit. He will be recognized as the man who consolidated and really brought democracy to the presidential level in Taiwan, while maintaining its great economic performance. So, on those grounds alone, I think that he deserves a great deal of credit. His state to state formulation of relations with China in the late 1990s was unduly provocative, however.

Let me make this clear. I can understand his frustrations, and Taiwan's frustrations, about not getting any more international space. We have encouraged the PRC, and we should continue to do so, to let Taiwan participate in some of these international organizations, making clear that this doesn't represent recognition of Taiwan's statehood. It's not a threat to Beijing or to the one China policy. The PRC has let Taiwan participate in APEC and in the WTO. Why not some of the other organizations? Taiwan should be a member of the organizations that don't require statehood and an observer in those that do.

I understand Taiwan's frustrations. It has turned in a great economic performance, is one of the world's largest markets, despite its relatively small size, and has gold and foreign exchange reserves which are among the largest in the world. It is a flourishing democracy, has generally acted in a responsible way, and has a population of 23 million people. I understand its concern that it doesn't have more international profile, even if it preserves the one China principle. However, having said that and against that backdrop, Taiwan, in fact, Lee bypassed the American administration and dealt directly with Congress. It would be a correct description to say that Taiwan did this, in addition to Lee's double crossing us in connection with his speech at Cornell University.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Our policy toward Taiwan has basically been one of strategic ambiguity in terms of what we would do in this situation. First of all, how much discussion has there been of changing that policy? Secondly, do you think that President Lee Teng-hui made an assumption that Taiwan would have American support, regardless of what happened?*

LORD: A good question. Of course, we didn't want Taiwan to think that they had a blank check from us. That was why we were telling Taiwan not to be provocative just because we were deploying the two carriers to the Taiwan Straits. After all, it was Beijing which provoked that crisis. Nevertheless, it was not in Taiwan's or our interest to have a conflict or tensions in the Taiwan Straits. Just because the U.S. had a commitment to the security of Taiwan, it should not think it could abuse that commitment by getting us all into a scrape which we all would be well advised to avoid.

During the 1996 missile crisis, there was some discussion of the question of strategic ambiguity within the Administration, but I don't recall that there was any view that we should be more precise. During this time I testified a lot before Congressional committees and gave a lot of interviews to the press. I got a lot of questions about why we were not more precise in our response to the PRC challenges, i.e., why we maintained strategic ambiguity. In answer to these questions I used one or another of the following themes.

First of all, the Taiwan Relations Act itself states that any administration has to consult the Congress before taking any specific actions. So I said to Congressmen opposing ambiguity that it was rather ironic that they seemed to want the administration to get out in front of them, whereas the Taiwan Relations Act states that there should be consultations with Congress before action is taken. Secondly, there is a provision in the Taiwan Relations Act, and I don't have the verbatim language of the act here before me, that the administration is obliged to come to the Congress when the situation has developed to the point that the threat to security is so serious that we

should consult with Congress on what to do. We've never reached that point. Even in the crisis which arose over the PRC missile firings in the general direction of Taiwan, we didn't invoke that part of the Act. Thirdly, it is prudent generally that you don't state in advance what you will do in specific situations. Fourthly, and most fundamentally, if we get away from ambiguity and go in either direction, we're in trouble. If the PRC thinks that we won't come to the defense of Taiwan in a crunch, it's going to be aggressive and will press Taiwan. In that case we're likely to run into a difficult situation and possibly a conflict. On the other hand, if Taiwan thinks that we're going to come to its defense, no matter what happens, it's going to be provocative, knowing that it's going to have a free ride no matter how angry Beijing gets.

Therefore, we can't be precise about what our response would be in a crisis. Having said that, we've got to use the right kind of adjectives and send aircraft carriers at the right moments to make clear that it's dangerous for Beijing to think that it can act aggressively. However, as we did it, we reassured Beijing that we're not changing our policy. Meanwhile, we made it clear to Taiwan that it doesn't have a blank check.

So there wasn't much debate within the administration on this crisis. Most people saw that rationale. I don't recall people arguing that we should be more precise. Frankly, I didn't feel too much pressure from Capitol Hill. I think that the merits of the case were pretty persuasive. A few Congressmen argued that we should be very precise and tell Beijing exactly what we were going to do.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Yes. Subsequently, I think that both Secretary of Defense Perry, and particularly Joe Nye, have said publicly that we ought to be more precise. Would you say that this is a point which may have evolved in their thinking since the missile crisis in the Taiwan Straits and which they didn't express at the time?*

LORD: That's correct. I'm not even sure that Joe Nye was in the administration at the time of the crisis over PRC missile firings at targets near Taiwan. I think that he may have left the administration by then.

Now, to complete the coverage of China during the Clinton Administration, I went on a trip with Secretary of Defense Perry and Senators Nunn and Warner [Democrat, Georgia, and Republican, Virginia, respectively], which modestly advanced the military relationship with the PRC. I don't remember the date. I also went on a trip with John Deutch [then Director of CIA], which was black hat but not totally secret. We were prepared to confirm the trip, which, indeed, was part of a longer Asian trip. It leaked out, when he was in South Korea, that he had already been to China. I was with him on that trip. This was very unusual - for the CIA Director to take an Assistant Secretary of State with him. But Deutch had a high opinion of me and wanted my counsel on China. We got along very well. He was not particularly pleased with the Chinese response to intelligence sharing and other issues. He generally wasn't too enthusiastic about the Chinese. I wanted to cover those two trips which I went on, in addition to meetings I had with the President.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Could you say anything about why Jim Sasser was chosen to be Ambassador to the PRC? How did that happen?*

LORD: First, Ambassador Stape Roy had been terrific, but he was due to leave China and go to Indonesia. We needed a top grade replacement for him in Beijing. Of course, ideally we would want somebody who had had a lot of experience on China and would have the kind of background that Stape Roy and I had. On the other hand, we also needed someone of stature. We were at the point where we were trying to improve our relations with the PRC. We had former Vice President Mondale in Japan, so we wanted somebody who had some stature in Beijing.

We have some terrific people, career people on China in the Foreign Service. But in terms of timing, we've gotten beyond Stape Roy, Art Hummel, Winston Lord, and that generation, and the other ones coming up haven't quite made it to the point where they could yet be Ambassadors to the PRC. Even if these other, capable people could handle the post of Ambassador to the PRC, they don't yet quite have the reputation to do so in terms of their resume. So in the career service we weren't quite at the point where we had a natural choice, though Charles Freeman thought that he was a natural choice to be Ambassador to China. Chas was very disappointed. He had hoped that he would get this assignment. There were some people in the administration who thought that he was overly sympathetic to Beijing. You could have made the case for appointing Freeman as Ambassador to the PRC, since he had been Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, he had the best resume, the most expertise, and was the best Chinese language speaker in the Foreign Service. But there were doubts whether he would be objective enough, whether he would suffer from clientitis.

Briefly, there was no other career candidate. You would have to talk about how well he got along with people in the Pentagon. I don't know anything about that. I would think that they would have checked him with the White House. As I say, some people felt that he wouldn't be tough enough on the Chinese. I never got the impression that Freeman was almost going to be chosen. I believe that in the White House there was a feeling that there was a need for a political Ambassador, one with status and political ties.

Jim Sasser had been senior Democratic Senator from Tennessee. I think that he probably would have been Democratic leader in the Senate if he had been reelected to the Senate in 1996 and if the Democrats hadn't lost their majority in the Senate. In any case, he was one of the leaders of the Democratic Party. He was very close to Vice President Al Gore. He was defeated for reelection to the Senate in 1996 and was looking for a job. So I believe that the initiative for Jim Sasser's appointment as Ambassador to China came from Vice President Gore. President Clinton also thought highly of him. So that's how it came to be.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: I've forgotten exactly when the U.S.-Japan guidelines were finalized, but clearly they were being discussed while you were still in the State Department.*

LORD: Oh, absolutely. We'll get into that in some other session, but I worked very closely with Joe Nye to insulate the U.S.-Japan security relationship and our overall ties from the trade disputes that we had with Japan. Bill Perry [then Secretary of Defense] took the lead on defense guidelines, and Secretary Christopher, my deputy, Tom Hubbard, and I worked with him and his people, especially Kurt Campbell. These guidelines came out around the time of the President's trip to Japan, which was in the spring of 1996.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Yes.*

LORD: It was a very successful trip. It had been postponed from November, 1995, because President Clinton said that he had to stay home because the budget had not yet been passed. He couldn't go to the APEC meeting in Japan. He was scheduled to make a state visit to Japan, as well as attend the APEC meeting.

We were determined to strengthen our relations with Japan, which is, of course, an important partner in Asia. We had had these trade disputes with Japan. I want to get into this in more detail in another session. We also felt that with the end of the Cold War and the passage of 15 or 20 years it was time to update the guidelines on U.S. policy toward Japan. China had started complaining and had become suspicious. This feeling seemed to have been directed at Taiwan. It appears that the initial, Presidential visit and the Defense guidelines document, also reaffirming the Japan-U.S. alliance generally, which would have taken place in November, 1995, would have been strong, in any event. Then the Taiwan missile crisis, which relates to your question, I'm sure, intervened between the original date for the Presidential visit to Japan and when the visit actually took place, in April, 1996.

Some people have said that the Japan guidelines document was strengthened because of the Taiwan missile crisis. The answer to this is, "Yes." Japan again began to become worried about an aggressive China. However, I want to make the point that this Japan guidelines was going to be a very strong statement of principles. I can't remember the exact time when we finalized the revision of the Japan Defense guidelines document, because this was an ongoing process. It was clear that the revision of the Japan Defense guidelines document was given greater impetus by the Taiwan missile crisis. It was kept ambiguous whether the guidelines document applied to Taiwan. Neither we nor the Japanese have either confirmed or denied it. We were not about to deny that it applied, because it might well apply. However, it was provocative to Beijing to say that it does apply because it considers Taiwan part of the territory of China. The phrasing of "situations surrounding Taiwan..."

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: Situations and areas surrounding...*

LORD: "Surrounding Japan," so it doesn't mention Taiwan. So we and Japan effectively stonewalled the Chinese on what the guidelines document really means. We wanted the Chinese to understand that it might well mean Taiwan. However, we didn't say that it did, because that would be provocative.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: In your experience has it been difficult to get Japan to talk about China? Have there been continuing consultations between the Japanese and American Governments on China problems?*

LORD: There have been no difficulties at all. I went out of my way on this subject myself, because of my own, personal experience in the 1970s, the Nixon Shoku, and so forth. I thought that it was crucial to stay in close touch with Japan. I'll talk about Japan in another session. I went to Japan more than to any other country by far. On almost every Asian trip I would drop in

on Japan, either at the beginning or the end. We regularly had regional security dialogues, which I promoted and which we worked on at my level, in getting ready for the ministerial meetings. In May I would usually make a trip around Asia. We would meet with Japan at the beginning and coordinate our strategy. We would maintain a constant dialogue on China policy and make sure that there were no surprises in this regard.

The only rift between us was on human rights. Japan just wouldn't put any pressure on China. Partly this was natural policy because Japanese commercial instincts always overrode everything. It was also partly because of their guilt feelings about World War II and the "Rape of Nanjing." The Japanese didn't want to look as if they were lecturing China, when...

*Q: The Japanese weren't the right people to do that.*

LORD: They weren't the right people. They haven't been exactly forthcoming in confessing their sins in China, or Korea, or World War II generally.

*Q: That's what I mean. They haven't really fessed up.*

LORD: Yes. Also, on the other hand, the Japanese have sort of said that, because of their history, it's awkward for them to discuss human rights abuses, even though they don't acknowledge their history.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: The Japanese always seem to be uncomfortable, both when our relations with China are bad and when our relations with China are good.*

LORD: A very good point. If our relations with China are bad, then the Japanese get nervous about tensions in the Taiwan Straits, because they might have to choose between the U.S. and China. If U.S. relations with China are good, the Japanese wonder if it will be at Japan's expense. So the phrases which they have been using, and which you may be familiar with, is that we may either bash Japan or may bypass Japan. Right now the Japanese are concerned about our possibly bypassing Japan.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: One final question that might be a little sensitive, but, particularly, there has been recent pressure by Congress on the administration. Many questions have been asked in Congress about whether the administration should have sanctioned China and/or Pakistan about transfers of missiles and missile technology from China to Pakistan. The administration has always insisted that these transfers haven't been clearly demonstrated. However, intelligence sources have recently suggested that the administration did know about these transfers of missiles and missile technology and that there were such transfers.*

LORD: Well, as you know, there have been a lot of issues during the last several years regarding transfers of technology from China to Pakistan and elsewhere in the nuclear and chemical areas. These reports have reflected varying degrees of precision and severity, sanctionability, and so forth.

We did invoke sanctions against China on two occasions, in 1993 and 1995, in this general area.

I think that the specific area to which you refer is whether we had evidence to prove that they shipped missiles and technology to Pakistan. The general feeling was that they were right on the edge, but we never had a smoking gun. In effect, without getting into classified material, we saw suspicious crates and heard chatter about unpacking these crates. We were able to see some signs of training by Pakistanis on how to use certain equipment. This would have been a real hammer if we had invoked the sanctions. I admit that people were not anxious to do this. In any event, you need very high legal standards if you're going to do that, and we didn't have a smoking gun.

Furthermore, we were making progress, generally, in the nuclear area with China. But we were now more concerned about missiles. At that time, the Chinese were then, and even more so now, linking their proliferation of missile technology with our providing arms to Taiwan and in specific terms, Theater Missile Defense equipment. So the Chinese are tough on missiles. They say that it is proliferation when we ship something to Taiwan, which we of course totally reject. There are some ambiguities regarding materials useful for chemical weapons. However, in the nuclear area the Chinese were making progress throughout this period. That was another incentive not to find the PRC guilty on missiles. It is fair to say that there were those, certainly in CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and maybe in DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] who felt that the evidence was sufficient and that we should invoke sanctions. But others, including in State, argued we had to have a smoking gun.

We never crossed over that line. I would be the first to admit that we were not anxious to do so. I will also say that if we did have a real smoking gun, of course we would have invoked sanctions. We had every legal and moral obligation to do so. And the Congress would have been very insistent.

There were different sanctions for different reasons. Whatever their laudable purpose, they were generally not well crafted, leaving aside a debate on whether sanctions are effective at all. Most of the effect of sanctions is to cut off our exports. So it hurts our economic interests and has very little impact on Chinese imports. Now, of course, sometimes they want our technology, for whatever reason. But, on the whole, the sanctions were hurting American companies more than China. So the sanctions did not apply particularly effective pressure.

We made progress in the nuclear area. China signed many international agreements. It cut off nuclear assistance to Iran, beyond what it was required to do. It also tightened up on Pakistan. We worked very hard on the missile and other areas as well, through a combination of selective sanctions when we had to apply them and when we felt that they were required. Incentives, either involving lifting the sanctions or possibly by defining more carefully dual technology exports, and the geopolitical dialogue which we carried on were maintained. We have continued to explain why it is in China's self-interest to clamp down on nuclear and missile proliferation. We have said many times that the nuclear arms race in South Asia is going to be of more concern to China than to the U.S., because of geography. We have suggested to the Chinese that they may have helped to create a monster in their own backyard. And with China's growing need for Persian Gulf oil, it has an interest in making sure countries like Iran cannot threaten shipping with missiles. Also nuclear weapons in North Korea would be a real headache for them, and could provoke Japan, South Korea, even Taiwan to develop nuclear weapons.

So the PRC has joined the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty] and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, even though the Chinese had done much less testing than anybody else. They agreed to cut off the export of fissile materials. They made this agreement on non safeguarded facilities after the ring magnet episode with Pakistan. They agreed not to ship any more missiles to Pakistan. China also joined the Zanger Committee on nuclear exports, and has helped us with regard to North Korea. I think that it's fair to say that, on the whole, they've moved forward on the nuclear front. Of course, that was shown by the decision of President Clinton to go forward with a nuclear agreement during the visit of President Jiang Zemin last October, implementing the agreement which we reached in 1985 when I was Ambassador to the PRC. We had never sent this agreement to Congress for ratification because we couldn't say, in good conscience, that the PRC had ended its unhelpful activities with Pakistan and Iran. The fact that the President could now go ahead with the nuclear agreement showed the progress made with China in the nuclear area.

Anyway, we made progress with nuclear arms after heavy slogging over a period of months and years. We encouraged the PRC successfully, when I was Ambassador in Beijing and since then, to cut off all nuclear cooperation with Iran, even though it's legal. Iran is a member of the NPT and is subject to supervision under that treaty. We just said that such nuclear cooperation was unwise, even though it wasn't illegal. Such cooperation, if it had been with Pakistan, would have been illegal. China has also agreed to cut off sending any conventional missiles to Iran, so we have made further progress in this area.

Let me make just a couple of other points. Whatever tactical mistakes we made with China, and I think that we inevitably made some in this complex relationship over the four years I have been talking about, I have tried to explain also where I think that we have done well. I think that the mistakes we made were not so egregious, although I would say that we did much better toward the end of the 1993-1997 period than at the beginning. I would like to make the key point that it takes two to tango, to use that awful cliché. There is a tendency by some of my former government colleagues and academic experts, which I still resent, that when things go wrong in our relations with China, it's always the fault of the U.S. In fact, it may often be China's fault.

I still feel strongly about some of the experts and former officials who jumped on us because of some of these matters, when they really ought to have been tougher on China. That is also true of the business community as a whole. This is not to say that we did everything correctly. My experience with China now goes back to the 1971 secret trip with Kissinger and a year or two before then, preparing for it. During recent years, the mood and the attitude of the Chinese leadership has been the most arrogant and prickly that I've ever encountered. This doesn't mean that I'm not in favor of engagement with China or that we shouldn't work at this relationship. As I've said, "They never promised us a rose garden." However, for a variety of reasons the Chinese have been particularly difficult to deal with. This includes their growing power, invocation of nationalism, apprehension about American encirclement.

Before I go any further in that direction, let me say that in our own backyard we suffered greatly because President Clinton never gave a speech on China during 1993-1997 and that our moves were not always the wisest. However, we faced the lingering effects of the Tienanmen Square massacre, the end of the Soviet threat, and Chinese aggressive actions. It wasn't just that the

Chinese are bad at public relations. They do things in the field of human rights, Tibet, weapons transactions, market access, and Taiwan that are bad period. They deserve a bad press at times. So you put that together with Tienanmen Square images and the end of the Soviet threat, and you have problems in the U.S. with respect to China.

Moreover, there is the Chinese mood. First there is the point that, over 5,000 years of its history, China was number one and the "Middle Kingdom." Everyone else was a barbarian, irrelevant, or was a tributary state of China. The Chinese were leading the world and were superior. Then the Chinese had a bad century or, say, 150 years when they were humiliated by foreigners. The country was carved up by European powers. There was the Opium War and the Japanese invasion of China. Whatever the case, China from the mid-1800s to when Mao Zedong took over the country in the late 1940s, looked as if it was being trampled on by outsiders.

So China is a country which, in effect, has very little experience - only the last couple of decades - in dealing with outside countries as equals. During most of its history China was number one. More recently, it has been humiliated. So there is a combination of arrogance, xenophobia, and nationalism. This is not new. It goes back for some time, but it is part of the general background to the present.

Then, on top of that, there is the always tricky phenomenon of an emerging power like China, which is in the process of becoming a great power, adjusting its status to the world's superpower. That was the case with the Germans early in the 20th century. That is a difficult process to handle. This often happens. Then, on top of that, there is the fact that China is growing very strongly in the economic field and, to a certain extent, in military terms, though this has been exaggerated in some quarters. This gives the Chinese a certain self-confidence, a certain arrogance and a certain desire to flex their muscles and also to be treated as equals, as they should, anyway, as a great, rich, historic and cultural force. On top of that the Chinese have a certain smugness vis-a-vis the Soviet experience. They figure that Gorbachev and other Russian leaders allowed too much political freedom without making economic progress. So the Soviets lost their empire, and the Communist Party lost control of the country. The Chinese feel that they're not going to make the same mistake. And they say, see, it's working. The Chinese leaders say that they have lifted the lives and living standards of the Chinese people, and that they have managed to do that without allowing political freedom. They think that they're not going to make the same mistake which Moscow made.

Then the Chinese military are demanding more of a role. In the South China Sea and the Taiwan missile crisis, they clearly had a significant role to play. They showed that they can be more aggressive. In addition, there is the fact that there isn't a single, dominant leader in China; whether he was good or bad is another issue. The Chinese had previously had Mao, Zhou En-lai, and Deng Xiaoping. Although Jiang Zemin is now clearly the first among equals and is consolidating his position, throughout most of this period he was still engaged in trying to solidify his status. It was only in 1997 that he completed strengthening his position. He had had a successful Congress of the Communist Party of China, Deng had passed away, there was a relatively successful reversion of Hong Kong to China, although the jury is still out on this, and Jiang Zemin had a successful trip to the U.S. However, during most of this time Jiang Zemin was watching his flanks. The Taiwan missile crisis is a good example of that. So this meant he

couldn't afford to look soft on sensitive issues. Thus, China did not have a self-confident, charismatic leader who could steer the China-U.S. relationship as Deng, Mao, and Zhou had done earlier on.

Then there are Chinese suspicions of the United States. Some of these are probably for tactical reasons to put us on the defensive. But some of the Chinese leaders genuinely feel this. The most extreme Chinese view of the United States is that we're keeping them down, and we don't want another super power around. So, in this view, we are trying to restrain, contain, and isolate them. This is allegedly proved by our maintaining our military presence in the Pacific Ocean area and by our strengthening our relations with Japan and so on. Allegedly, the U.S. is trying to control China's exports of military materials and military sales and is allegedly interfering in the Taiwan Straits and in Taiwan generally. Another allegation is that we are trying to keep China out of the WTO [World Trade Organization], and generally trying to keep China down. Then we are trying to divide up China's territory, with pressures on Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan. On top of that we are allegedly trying to subvert China politically by pushing human rights and democracy, so that the PRC Government will lose political control of the country.

If you put all of these allegations together, I would argue that that's a fairly difficult mood to deal with. This is not by any means an excuse for any mistakes we might have made. It just means that, objectively, it's not going to be easy to deal with these people.

We should continue the policy of engagement, which I am in favor of. However, when we run into trouble, because the Chinese fire missiles, lock up dissidents, crush Tibet, or sell dangerous weapons in volatile areas of the world, some of the so-called China experts in the U.S. or some of the former U.S. Government officials should admit that maybe the Chinese are making trouble, and it's not just the U.S. administration.

One other China-related issue - the visit of Mrs. Clinton to China in September 1995 for a UN-sponsored International Conference on Women. I may have covered this elsewhere. I was with her as foreign policy advisor. She also went on to Mongolia with my urging to show support for that struggling democracy, and an inherent contrast to repressive Beijing. There she met with high level Mongolians, of course, and visited a nomadic family in a yurt. Very colorful trip, and the Mongolians were immensely pleased.

I had met Mrs. Clinton before, including sitting next to her at a White House dinner. I was very impressed with her intelligence which is well known. We worked hard with her and her staff to get ready for the trip. On the plane to China, and throughout the trip I was also impressed with other qualities, not so well known by the public - her sense of humor, her willingness to listen to ideas, her approachfulness, without losing the dignity of First Lady. We had a good time, figuratively putting our feet up, with her and her staff. She was pleasantly surprised that I encouraged her to be tough at the conference on women's issues, rather than being a State Department softy worried about upsetting the Chinese who were a clear target on some of these issues. I knew she cared deeply about these issues and that U.S. leadership was important and that her audience would be watching her. So she gave a very firm and well received speech. There was a driving rainstorm and trouble getting around the swampy compound outside Beijing that the Chinese forced the NGO groups to occupy so as to isolate them. I also knew that being

firm on these global issues wouldn't really hurt us with the Chinese.

We didn't even finally decide to go to China for the conference until the Chinese released Harry Wu, a dissident who they caught sneaking back into China.

*Q: Right. The next session will concentrate on your time as American Ambassador to China. Then we'll revert back to your time with the NSC and talk about things other than China. Particularly Vietnam and the Soviet Union.*

LORD: That's right. We'll do China first, and then you're welcome to hear about anything else. I assume that that's up to you. I assume that that's what you want.

*Q [Nancy Bernkopf Tucker]: That's the main thing.*

LORD: We'll certainly finish the discussion of China, I think. I would welcome both of you going over the transcript and thinking of any additional questions that you might have. I'll try to make sure that I haven't left anything out. Maybe in half a day we can get through the rest of it.

*Q: Fine*

LORD: The most contentious part was where did the guidelines apply. The Chinese have been complaining that these guidelines might apply to Taiwan. Both we and the Japanese cleverly agreed not to confirm that. We agreed not to rule out the defense of Taiwan, in case China becomes aggressive and attacks. We agreed not to be provocative toward China or say that the guidelines covered what the Chinese considered their territory. So we neither confirmed nor denied that the defense guidelines covered this. In effect, we said that this relates to situations, not geographic entities. We danced around this matter and we're going to continue to do so. The Chinese continue to press us and the Japanese to exclude Taiwan. Of course, neither we nor the Japanese will do that. We wish to deter Beijing's use of force without being provocative.

*Q: [Kennedy] Did we get involved over - I'm not sure what you call them - or did we just sit back and relax over the Northern Islands [Kuril Islands] problem? I'm not sure that that is what you call them. They are located between Japan and Russia.*

LORD: We supported the Japanese position on those islands. We were clear on that. We supported Japan both privately and publicly on this matter. We called for an improvement in relations between Japan and Russia. Every now and then someone would surface with the stupid idea that we mediate on this issue. How can you mediate something when you have already taken one side's position? I've never understood that. We spent some time on that issue, and I worked with Strobe Talbot [Deputy Secretary of State] on trying to improve relations between Japan and Russia. We tried to introduce this matter in our talks with the Russians to gain some perspective on this issue. I might add that during my four years as Assistant Secretary I engaged in bilateral consultations on Asia with the Russians. I went to Moscow twice, and Russian officials came to the U.S. once or twice to discuss Asian issues across the board. The feeling was that we were moving with China and Japan on regional security issues in general. Russia was a Pacific power which had specific interests in Korea, and it had relations with all of these other

countries. Russia had potential economic interests and a desire for investment. They wanted to get into APEC and into the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]. I felt that Russia was a legitimate, important player, and one way that we could deal with them, particularly when they weren't in the other organizations yet, was to have these bilateral consultations.

I also pressed for Russian entrance into the ASEAN Regional Forum, and I helped to get them into ARF, as well as China and India.

*Q: [Kennedy] Well, I was wondering. I started with the status of the Northern Islands.*

LORD: Oh, yes. Without being belligerent about them and certainly recognizing that these islands involved something that Yeltsin couldn't resolve overnight, we made clear that we supported the Japanese position on that territory.

*Q: [Kennedy] Now, before we leave Japan and U.S. relations with Japan, were there any issues in the Middle East, in the United Nations, or anywhere else on which we were either working with Japan or colluding with Japan. Also, in connection with the United Nations, were we involved in giving Japan one of the permanent Security Council seats?*

LORD: Well, we of course supported them on this issue and still do, by virtue of Japan's weight and financial contributions which are important on the world and regional scene. We've supported Japan and Germany for permanent seats on the UN Security Council for some time. They've always appreciated the fact that we have kept that up.

You're absolutely right. We would meet and talk a lot about bilateral, economic, and security issues. We also spent a lot of time, particularly Secretary Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry, on the security side. We would also discuss other issues as well. On some of them the Japanese were very helpful, while on others they were cautious and not helpful.

On the Middle East the Japanese were helpful economically, in terms of contributions. However, they were always worried about their Arab flank because they obtained a lot of oil from the Middle East. We could never count on them to lean on the Arabs to be reasonable. Similarly, they were more cautious about Iran, Iraq, and the Gulf. Because of their dependence on oil, they wouldn't be as tough. That's sort of their style, anyway.

On Korea the Japanese were very helpful. They engaged in close coordination on this issue with us. They understood the Four Party Talks approach [involving the U.S., China, North Korea, and South Korea],

The Japanese left it to us to do all of the heavy lifting on human rights. Partly, they still had guilt feelings about World War II, the rape of Nanking, and the occupation of China and Korea. The Germans have repeatedly acknowledged their misbehavior in Europe. The Japanese haven't really apologized for the rape of Nanjing and other atrocities but they are, nevertheless, sensitive to it. The Japanese feel awkward about lecturing the Chinese on human rights, when they behaved in such a bestial fashion during the 1930s and 1940s.

*Q: [Kennedy] Did Vietnam enter into your discussions with the Japanese?*

LORD: On Vietnam we kept in close touch with the Japanese. I would say that the Japanese were generally quite helpful. A problem in connection with Vietnam was not to have the Japanese leap too far ahead of us and sort of isolate us on the Vietnam issue in multilateral institutions and bilaterally in other contexts. The Japanese were out in front of us, but I would not say in an unhelpful way. We really can't complain too much about what the Japanese did on Vietnam and some other issues.

*Q: [Kennedy] What about sanctions against Iraq? Did the Japanese play any role or did they try to stay out of it?*

*Q: [Bernkopf] I was going to say, in just going around the circle, what about the Japanese attitude on Taiwan? You referred to the defense guideline issue. To what degree were there consultations on the Taiwan issue with Japan?*

LORD: Well, we kept in close touch with Japan on China generally, including Taiwan. We never had any real disagreements. The mood in Japan in recent years sort of fluctuated on China and Taiwan with public opinion. Over the last several years, and particularly the last couple of years, there was a growing feeling that Japanese interests lay more with the mainland of China and that Japan shouldn't hamper itself by being overly solicitous about Taiwan. The Japanese never wanted to dump Taiwan, but the feeling we got was that they wanted to improve their relations with mainland China. However, the Chinese keep bashing the Japanese on different aspects of World War II. More recently, they have criticized China in connection with disputes over the control of certain islands. They have also beaten up on the Japanese regarding the exchange rate of the yen. These actions by China have tended to make Japan nervous. Whenever there is a U.S.-China summit meeting, the Japanese have been a little concerned as well.

For all of these reasons I think that, consequently, there has been some recent concern among the Japanese about Taiwan. I don't want to exaggerate this and I'm just talking about an amorphous mood. However, I felt that in the course of my four years as Assistant Secretary that the Japanese romance with China began to sour a little bit. The Japanese still knew that they had to and wanted to deal with China, but they began to see that China is going to be a real rival in the region. The Japanese are getting a little annoyed at the Chinese sticking it to them all the time when they meet with the United States. The Chinese seem to want to make the Japanese feel guilty. As I said, there are still some territorial disputes in the Yellow Sea, or other areas. Japanese-Chinese relations have always been a love-hate relationship.

On Taiwan there has always been a suspicion in China about Japanese motives, because of the history of Japanese involvement in Taiwan. Regarding Taiwan the only two countries that the Chinese really care about are the views of the United States and the relations between Taiwan and Japan. The Chinese leaders generally look the other way when Taiwanese leaders visit Southeast Asia, whether for official visits or golf games. However, the Chinese go crazy when President Lee Teng-hui of Taiwan goes to Cornell University, either unofficially or to get an honorary degree. Also, President Lee Teng-hui attended a Japanese university. So the Chinese complain loudly to us and Japan about high-level dealings with Taiwan, but tend to overlook

other countries.

I don't know of any U.S.-Japan disagreements on Taiwan. During the Taiwan missile crisis, the Japanese welcomed our sending aircraft carriers to the region. They would not have admitted this in public, but then they never do.

Prime Minister Hashimoto and other Japanese officials were very good on the defense guidelines. One of their cabinet spokesmen got out of line, in effect, when he said that the defense guidelines applied to Taiwan. I think that he was fired for that remark. Then, somebody else tried to pull back and said that the defense guidelines didn't apply to Taiwan. I think that was Koichi Kato. Prime Minister Hashimoto reaffirmed the U.S.-Japan security treaty during the President's trip to Japan. Just as we reassure Japan when a senior American official goes to China, without being defensive, we also don't want to be provocative with Japan when we're dealing with China, although I would rather lean toward Japan if we have to choose.

So before President Clinton's trip to Japan and during the process of reviewing U.S.-Japanese defense arrangements, we kept the Chinese posted. We briefed the Chinese fully just before the announcements in Japan and on the public statements made during the trip by the Japanese Prime Minister and the President, specifically on the defense guidelines. We made clear that our defense treaty was not directed at China and that we wanted constructive relations with China. We talked to the Chinese privately as well.

We found ways to remind them, however, that firing missiles in the Taiwan Straits and being belligerent might well contribute to a tightening of the relationship between the U.S. and Japan. We said that it wasn't in China's interest to be provocative. However, that was done with some subtlety.

So, in answer to your question I don't remember any serious disagreements between the U.S. and Japan on Taiwan.

*Q: [Bernkopf] Were the Japanese at all reluctant to discuss Taiwan and future problems, in the event of a conflict?*

LORD: The Japanese certainly made no public statement or let any comment on this subject leak out, although they were more relaxed in talking about Korea than they were about Taiwan. I wasn't in on all of the detailed discussions on contingency planning, and I can't say just how precise we were on this. However, the U.S. and Japan continue to maintain that the defense guidelines apply to situations and not places. Nevertheless, it's clear, and this is a strictly hypothetical comment, that if China launched an obvious act of aggression against Taiwan, and Japan wouldn't let us use our bases in Japan or help us out, a lot of Americans would wonder what the U.S.-Japanese alliance was all about. I think that the Japanese understand that. However, everyone hopes that we never get to that point.

*Q: [Kennedy] When we talk about a defensive alliance, we should note that things have changed. You have to be defensive against something. How would we deal with a putative Chinese attack on Taiwan and what have we been thinking about that? Taiwan is obviously something.*

LORD: Obviously, the easiest thing to point to, and the least controversial aspect is Korea. We had no objection to saying, either publicly and privately, that we were going to work out with the Japanese how we can coordinate better in the event of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula. In such a situation Japan would be absolutely crucial as a staging base. We would want to be sure that we could use all of Japan's bases and we would want to be sure that they would back us up with refueling, minesweeping, and so on. So that's an easy contingency to discuss. That's the one that we point to.

Beyond that, what we've been stressing generally is the importance of this treaty for regional stability and reassuring people with our presence, with the added virtue of having troops in the area. Beyond Korea we are not specific in using examples in public. The treaty is there and it's meant to be a deterrent. I don't even know, myself, in the years since I left the Department of State, how much private precision we have on the Taiwan situation, on a contingency basis. We do have quite a bit of precision on South Korea. It's hard to be specific and quantify, but there is no question that our defense relationship with Japan does provide a sense of stability in the region. The U.S.-Japan relationship and our troop presence generally in Asia are going to be under review if not challenge if we ever get a settlement in Korea. Don't hold your breath until this is accomplished. However, if the Korean situation is resolved and the country is unified, or at least peace returns to the Korean Peninsula, then people are going to wonder why we have all of these U.S. forces in Asia.

We'll get to Korea in just a minute. That's the next subject. However, the fact is that the Koreans themselves, and I've heard President Kim Dae Jung say this in so many words, want us to stay on in South Korea even if North and South Korea are reunified. He said that he would say this to his North Korean partner if the country is ever reunified, and we'll get back to that. If we take our troops out of South Korea and they're only in Japan, that will put all the more domestic, political pressures on Japan to ask the U.S. to withdraw our forces from Japan as well. So we have to stress, and we believe this, that the presence of U.S. forces in the area, including Korea, provides regional stability.

In fact, if the threat to our forces and to South Korea all but disappears, then we probably should reduce or redeploy at least our ground forces. But our air and naval forces generally and troops remaining in Japan and to some extent in South Korea would still be relevant. We don't want Japan to be the only place in the Pacific where we have troops, besides Hawaii and Guam. Have I answered your question?

*Q: [Kennedy] Yes.*

*Q: [Kennedy] You served as Ambassador to China, and you saw, I don't know how many, but in any case a lot of Chinese going to the United States to study. I mean, they were studying subjects at important levels. They were coming back to China. Obviously, this present generation of Chinese includes a lot of people who have a real understanding of the United States. They will be moving into important positions in their families and elsewhere.*

*Q: [Kennedy] We're talking now about an opaque system, which allows editors and*

*commentators to have a wonderful time because they can make up anything that they want. Had Kim Il Sung [long time leader of North Korea] died at this point?*

LORD: Well, before answering that question I would like to get back a little bit to the narrative. In the midst of the difficulties that we were having with the North Koreans, and I don't recall the exact dates, as 1993 wore on, and then in 1994, we got to the point where the North Koreans were on the verge of pulling out of the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty]. So we went to the UN and pressed for sanctions against North Korea. The situation was getting quite tense. Of course, we had to bring along the Japanese, who were a little bit nervous but were generally supportive. The South Koreans, of course, were happy to work with us. The Chinese were dragging their feet, as were the Russians. However, we managed to get a UNSC President's statement even though we didn't get a Security Council resolution. We were moving toward sanctions because the North Koreans were flouting the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections.

I don't recall the exact language they used, but the North Koreans threatened that sanctions could or would lead to war. So people have to remember that this was a very dangerous situation. We couldn't ignore the budding nuclear threat, and we didn't wish to risk a bloody war. We negotiated a less than perfect agreement but a very good one, in my view. Also, we were willing to flex our muscles. This was a classic lesson in diplomacy. You have to have sticks and carrots to use. The stick was that we were prepared to go for sanctions, and we worked hard on that at the UN. This was a very tense time, and people tend to forget this.

During this time we also reinforced our forces in South Korea to strengthen our diplomatic hand and to be ready for conflict. We sent Patriot anti-missile weapons. We sent Apache helicopters. And, in the middle of an NSC [National Security Council] meeting, at which I was not present, there was talk of further force deployments. There were options being considered of major reinforcements, moderate reinforcements, and token reinforcements. The President was close to deciding even at that meeting to have another, major buildup of our forces. Then a message came from former President Carter, who was visiting North Korea, of a possible breakthrough with Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader.

So former President Carter made an historic contribution, for all of the concerns and nervousness we had in connection with his travels. One of my officers traveled with him on each of his trips in East Asia. Dick Christianson had actually been the DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] for some time.

*Q: [Bernkopf] I don't know whether we've already covered this. Could you talk about working with China on the nuclear crisis involving North Korea and the agreed framework that was developed?*

LORD: Yes. This issue is certainly relevant here. From the very beginning of my term as Assistant Secretary I thought that it was important, as did the administration, to work as much as we could with China on the problem of North Korea. In the first place it was the most urgent and dangerous problem.

*Q: [Kennedy] Can you explain what the problem was?*

LORD: We'll do this again briefly. When we entered office, the North Koreans were refusing some IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] inspections of some of their nuclear facilities, which they were obligated to have inspected under the NPT [Non Proliferation Treaty], which North Korea had signed.

This issue came to a head after we entered office, when the North Koreans threatened to withdraw from the NPT. We threatened to apply sanctions, built up our forces, and went to the UN. The North Koreans were saying that the imposition of sanctions could lead to war. It was a very tense situation, which I have dealt with in more detail.

This was the most urgent security problem that we faced, certainly in Asia and perhaps during the first year or two of the whole Administration. We thought that it was important to involve China, for several reasons.

First, we thought that China probably had more influence with the North Korean regime than anyone else, although we knew that the North Koreans were prickly and weren't going to take orders from anybody. In terms of influence with North Korea the Chinese certainly eclipsed the Russians, although we also wanted to stay in touch with the Russians also on this issue. So the Chinese were going to be a crucial factor in restraining North Korea, as they already were a crucial factor in propping up North Korea economically.

Secondly, we felt that there were some parallel objectives in this situation. China already had an important economic relationship with South Korea, which was growing. The Chinese had fish to fry with the South Koreans. We were quite sure that for a considerable period of time the Chinese had been restraining North Korea from any military adventures, because they didn't want to be dragged back into a possible conflict on the Korean Peninsula, as they had been during the 1950s. The Chinese didn't want to complicate their relations with the U.S. and Japan, not to mention South Korea. Generally, China didn't want a war, particularly with nuclear implications, right on their border. So China had been a source of restraint on North Korea. The Chinese were becoming much more even handed now that they had interests in South Korea. There was a parallel linkage between Chinese contacts with the two Koreas.

Thirdly and more broadly, we felt that by cooperating on this issue we could also demonstrate that we had regional, global, and strategic interests with China on our agenda. Perhaps we could agree to cooperate in other areas and achieve better exchanges on regional security matters, for example. In this way we could demonstrate to the American and Chinese publics that China and the U.S. could work together on some of these regional and global issues.

So for all of these reasons we put a high priority on dealing with the Chinese, and we worked with them throughout my four years as Assistant Secretary of State.

Generally, in the course of those four years and since I have left that position as well, the Chinese have become more cooperative, without going so far as to be in lock step with us. In the exchange of information during this four year period and since then we did not get much out of the Chinese at all; they would profess not to have a great deal of information on North Korea.

They generally told us that the situation in North Korea was not as bad as people had been saying and that, in particular, the economic situation was not as bad as many people believed. They told us that the situation was stable. They were not particularly candid with us, to say the least. By contrast, over the past couple of years the Chinese have acknowledged that the economic situation in North Korea is very serious, although they have emphasized that the political situation is relatively stable.

I want to make it clear that they have not always been entirely helpful. However, they have been increasingly helpful throughout the past few years. The Chinese have always been careful to guard their flank with North Korea, but we sensed a clear frustration on China's part with North Korea. First, because of the dangers involved and, secondly, because North Korea has such an opaque regime which is very difficult to deal with. This was accentuated by the fact that the Chinese had long, personal associations with Kim Il Sung, but when he died, he was replaced by his somewhat flakey son [Kim Jong Il]. As a result, Chinese personal ties with North Korea were consequently reduced.

The Chinese were also frustrated that they had been urging the North Koreans for some time to reform their economy as the Chinese had done. The North Koreans had resisted that advice because they were worried about losing political control of the country to outside influences. So the Chinese had to bail out North Korea economically.

For all of these reasons over time the Chinese were increasingly concerned about the situation in North Korea. In addition, the Chinese have had greater exchanges of information with us, they have come to have greater trust in us, and have had greater contact with South Korea. They have become somewhat more helpful to us, although they have never moved in lock step with us.

This has meant that the quality and quantity of their exchanges of information with us on North Korea expanded over these years. This meant that, after considerable delay, they finally agreed to join the Four Party Approach [North Korea, South Korea, China, and the United States], which was helpful in the effort to promote peace on the Korean Peninsula. Most of the talks in that context have been at the technical level. There has only been a couple of talks at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level until after I left the State Department. However, as I understand it, the Chinese have moved from a position of not being particularly helpful or being passive or sometimes even taking the North Korean side, to the point of actually facilitating talks and the four party approach. The Chinese never joined KEDO, which is an organization set up to help provide alternative and less dangerous, nuclear reactors.

*Q: [Kennedy] Is that spelled K-E-D-O?*

LORD: Yes, it deals with North Korea. So that has been frustrating. The Chinese have provided a great deal of economic assistance to North Korea, including food and oil, which has kept it from collapsing, more than any other factor. As I say, diplomatically the Chinese have recently been more helpful.

So this is a theme in all of the regional and global issues. This is the first one that we can cite in terms of pointing to the fact that we have some parallel interests with China, in spite of our

ideological and other differences. This is an area where the Chinese have been constructive. They haven't always been perfect. We've had a lot of trouble during this period about military contacts at the DMZ [Demilitarized Zone] at Panmunjom in Korea. The North Koreans have constantly challenged the armistice agreement of 1953 and have demanded a peace agreement. They have tried to force outside countries acting as observers to withdraw from Panmunjom. We've had less than all out help from the Chinese on that. Even on that, their attitude was nuanced. They wouldn't pressure the North Koreans or back us fully on some of these issues. However, they would make the point to the North that the armistice agreement still was in place, until a peace agreement could replace it.

So the Chinese were still somewhat worried about their North Korean flank. However, on the whole the Chinese involvement in Korea was helpful. They obviously helped to put pressure on North Korea and they helped to prop up North Korea so that it didn't collapse. They demonstrated that we had shared interests which supported the Chinese-American bilateral relationship in general.

*Q: Why don't we turn now to bilateral relations between the U.S. and South Korea? I think we had some economic issues outstanding. What was your feeling about the political situation in South Korea? How did you think South Korea was handling its foreign policy? Are there any other issues that you might want to discuss?*

LORD: Yes. I think that we can cover these issues fairly quickly. We've already covered them, to a certain extent. One of my major concerns was to make sure that we had as much solidarity as possible with the South Koreans, even though we sometimes had a prickly and paranoid President of South Korea to deal with. I have already indicated that we worked hard on that matter, as did others. It was not just me. Also included were Secretary of State Christopher and Secretary of Defense Perry.

Throughout the four years I served as Assistant Secretary, our primary preoccupation with South Korea was dealing with North Korea. We had economic issues in dispute with South Korea, but we actually had a trade surplus with them. So, in terms of trade, it wasn't as pronounced a problem as it was with Japan or China. When I initially got the job as Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, one of the first things that I did was to meet with American business people in New York. Hank Greenberg, a major businessman and head of a large insurance company, pulled together a lot of American business people interested in Asia. We went around the table and asked them what was the most difficult place in East Asia to do business in, particularly in terms of American investment. Almost unanimously, they said South Korea, more than Japan, China, or any other place.

So we obviously spent some time on the trade issues. We finally got South Korea into the OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development]. This was all before the financial crisis in Asia, which occurred after I left office. We instituted semi-annual consultations on economic issues, addressing macroeconomic as well as specific trade issues. I would raise these issues when I went to South Korea. Secretary of State Christopher and others would raise them. However, in all candor, although they were significant issues, they took up a very small percentage of our time and attention, compared to the nuclear question, the North-South talks,

and North-South security questions.

South Korea generally could be counted on to help us on UN issues, but they were so preoccupied with their own security questions that we didn't expect much, nor did they do much in other areas. We consulted closely with South Korea on regional issues, such as, for example, the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]. We worked with them in APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum] in terms of economic advancement. However, in relative terms the economic dimension wasn't relatively that significant, compared to the security dimension. I think that that's the correct proportion. This doesn't mean that the American economic agencies didn't spend a lot of time on economic issues. I'm simply saying that I didn't spend too much time on these issues, although when I talked with them I pressed them, as I always did, on general and specific economic, trade, and investment problems.

Finally, at the instigation of President Kim Young Sam, he and President Clinton agreed on a bold new initiative of Four Power talks, to include South Korea, the United States, China, and North Korea. Obviously, strictly North-South talks would have been better, and that's what we wanted. However, failing that, the South Koreans agreed, and we, of course, agreed with them, that we ought to try this other approach. The rationale was as follows. First, the parties included were signatories to the Armistice Agreement [of 1953]. The Chinese had fought in Korea, so they were a party to the Armistice Agreement. Therefore, in addition to geography, history, economics, and ideological ties with North Korea and improving ties with South Korea in their direct interest, they had that rationale. The Japanese had not been a signatory to the Armistice Agreement.

Secondly, you never could tell whether the North Koreans welcomed the Chinese or not. On balance, they probably didn't. They didn't like trilateral discussions involving North and South Korea and the U.S., which made the balance two against one. Then the North Koreans may have thought that, since China was shifting somewhat toward South Korea, this might make the balance three against one. Ostensibly, the Four Power talks were designed to be two communist powers over here and two good guys [the ROK and the U.S.] over there. So there was that cover. We were very careful to make sure that the Japanese, in particular, were comfortable with this arrangement. They were and they never gave us any trouble on this. They understood the rationale of the Armistice and they understood that if they were included, the Russians would have to be included. This would have meant Six Power Talks, which we thought would be too complicated. We of course continued to consult closely with Japan, both bilaterally and together with South Korea.

The Russians were very upset about this. They thought that they had a legitimate interest in Korea and wanted to know why they were not included in these talks. As I said, we never had formal consultations with the Russians on this subject. In informal talks with them we basically said that we saw some value in Six Power talks at some point, whether for guarantees or other purposes. Therefore, we could see that a Six Power arrangement might have some function. However, meantime we told the Russians that we would keep them closely informed, and why didn't they join KEDO? They have not been happy about their not being included in these consultative talks.

The other rationale for the four-party approach on Korea, however, was that if we got four parties together, then, under that cover and around the edges of that conference, we could promote a North-South dialogue. The North Koreans have resisted talking to South Korea for so long that, for reasons of cover, it was easier for them to talk to South Korea directly as long as everyone was in the same city for the Four Power talks. Also, the carrot for North Korea was that that meant that they could talk to us as well. So we made it clear that if North Korea came to the table in the Four Power talks, we wanted to urge that North and South Korea conduct the basic negotiations, with the Chinese and us being in a facilitative role. However, the North Koreans would also have the benefit of talking directly to us, which they wanted. As against that, they would also have to talk directly to South Korea as well, which they may not have wanted.

For all of these reasons this was announced at Cheju Island, when President Clinton met there with South Korean President Kim Young Sam, I believe in the summer of 1995. I was there for this meeting.

We spent the rest of the first Clinton term trying getting the North Koreans to move ahead in the talks. They would inch along in talks at the Country Director level at the UN in New York. We tried to get the Chinese to weigh in. The Chinese were supportive, but they weren't prepared to pull out all the stops. They kept arguing more U.S.-North Korean movement. As always, the North Koreans were a pain in the neck. They would inch up to the starting line and give us the impression that we were going to get the four-party talks started. Basically, we only had talks about the talks. We never had actual talks. Instead, there were talks to see whether we could have talks. We finally reached the point where we could have four-party talks at the level of my deputy, Tom Hubbard [Deputy Assistant Secretary of State]. Since I left the Department of State, my successor has had a couple of rounds of fruitless discussions at the Assistant Secretary level.

Meanwhile, recently elected South Korean President Kim Dae Jung has been more forthcoming toward North Korea. He has encouraged U.S. investment and U.S.-North Korean direct talks, including relaxing our sanctions. He has himself opened his arms to the North Koreans but so far has been rewarded by considerable intransigence, although the rhetoric from North Korea has been more restrained.

There was another complication in U.S.-South Korean relations. I don't have the exact date, but late in the first Clinton term, probably in 1995 or 1996, a North Korean submarine stranded in South Korean territorial waters. There were both North Korean commandos and sailors on it. The commandos killed all of the sailors, and many of the commandos escaped. There was a big manhunt all over South Korea. Some of the North Korean commandos were captured, and some South Koreans were killed. This caused a furor in South Korea and held up any movement toward talks or anything else with North Korea.

Again, during this time I spent a good deal of time holding the hands of the South Koreans, pledging U.S. solidarity with them. I remember that once I arrived on a trip to South Korea, and there was a big cartoon in a South Korean newspaper which showed a South Korean watching television. The video was all screwed up. It was on the blink. It just wasn't working. The heading of the cartoon referring to the video said: "U.S.-South Korean Relations." The cartoon showed me coming in through the window. The caption showed me saying: "I'm here to fix your

television set."

*Q: Did you have the feeling or was it conventional wisdom that the North Korean infiltrations, such as the case of the North Korean submarine, may have been designed by the North Korean military to louse things up?*

LORD: That's a very good question. That is one explanation of this incident. However, it seemed to us to be somewhat inconceivable that the North Korean military could do this without the blessing of Kim Jong Il, the son of Kim Il Sung and the apparent ruler of North Korea, or at least his acquiescence. The North Korean military couldn't have just done it on their own. So to this day, since we don't know anything about North Korea anyway, we don't know what happened. We do feel, without falling into the trap of good guys and bad guys battling within the Politburo of the Communist Party, that there are some people in North Korea, probably within the Foreign Ministry and the economic agencies, who want to implement the Framework Agreement and get outside help. There are others, probably including most of the military, who are hardliners. There are probably even some who would like to sabotage the agreement.

So if I had to hazard an explanation of this incident, I think that this infiltration incident was an ongoing thing which they did all the time. They didn't launch it specifically to screw things up. They didn't want to be caught. If you're not caught, you don't screw things up. So this was ongoing, and probably Kim Jong Il was kept posted. He probably said: "Just because we're negotiating with the Americans, we don't stop our intelligence activity. Just don't get caught." So they went ahead and screwed up.

*Q: Why not stop at this point? We'll note at the end of this section that we've covered relations with China, with North and South Korea, and with Japan. So we're ready to move on to the rest of Asia during this 1993-1997 period.*

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*Today is October 21, 1998. We might now look at some of the other issues. I'm going to leave it to you to pick the matters to raise as we go along. They're almost completely separate issues. So if you will name them, we'll start off.*

LORD: Okay. What I would propose to start off with is ASEAN, both collectively and in terms of its individual members. This would include the newer members, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma. Then we'll pick up Australia, New Zealand, Mongolia, and the other pieces of Asia that we haven't covered already. We can then look at some regional approaches, whether it is APEC, ASEAN and regional security matters, global problems like the environment, and then the whole question of promoting democracy and human rights, as well as the Asian values debate. Then I might cover my more general recollections on the four years of my service in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, after we've gotten through these individual pieces. Okay?

*Q: All right. In the first place you mentioned ASEAN. Can you tell me what ASEAN stands for?*

LORD: Sure. ASEAN stands for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. It's an organization

of several countries of Southeast Asia which was established 25 or 30 years ago. It originally consisted of Thailand, the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore. Then it added Brunei a few years ago. In more recent years it has added Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Burma. Of course, the addition of the countries of the former Indochina and Burma has complicated ASEAN's performance. I won't dwell on this, because most of it happened since I left office as Assistant Secretary. These additions have added poor countries to other countries which were generally regarded as economic tigers. It also added generally authoritarian or semi-authoritarian governments to a grouping which was mixed but had a considerable degree of political freedom. So the addition of some of these newer members has affected the cohesion of ASEAN.

ASEAN started out essentially for economic purposes to promote economic progress among these countries and also to damp down regional and historical tensions between Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. There have been disputes among these countries, one way or another. Even as the European Community was meant, in part, to ease historical antagonisms and prevent future conflicts between France and Germany, for example, so, although on a less grandiose scale, one of the purposes of ASEAN was to try to mute these rivalries and to promote cooperation among these countries.

What started out as an economic grouping also began to take on some political and diplomatic force as well. As the Clinton administration came into office in 1993, obviously the giants of China and Japan, as well as South Korea, given the historical involvement of U.S. troops, captured a great deal of our attention, including continuing public and media attention in the U.S.

However, we have become very much aware of the fact that Southeast Asia, including ASEAN, is also crucially important, both collectively and in terms of its individual members. For example, as ASEAN heads toward the year 2000, and with its new members, the 10 members comprising all of the Southeast Asian region, have a population of some 400 million. If you take the ASEAN countries collectively, this group of states has already become roughly our fourth largest export partner. These countries are located in a very strategic area, which includes the Straits of Malacca and the passage of oil and trade through there, which affects not only the U.S. but also key allies like Japan. Therefore, ASEAN is very strategically located.

Of course, the ASEAN area also has historical resonance because of our involvement in Vietnam. Indeed, the Vietnam War, while a tragedy and a mistake, in my view, had a clear silver lining in the dark clouds - the fact that by our involvement in Vietnam we bought time for the Southeast Asian countries. Whether you believe in the domino theory or not, the Vietnam War did give them some time to develop, with the buffer of U.S. involvement in Vietnam and, in a certain sense, in Laos and Cambodia, to protect them. This allowed these Southeast Asian nations to get on their feet and not only not be taken over by communism but to begin to develop their own, free market approach and their own economies. In fact, they became economic giants.

I would like to enter a little footnote here. We'll get to APEC later, but when President Clinton was about to make a speech at the APEC meeting in Seattle, he was going over his speech drafts. When he was traveling out to Seattle on Air Force One [aircraft on which the President usually travels], he noticed a phrase which he thought was terrific. The phrase said that the Asian countries had grown from dominos to dynamos. He told the speech writer, who was going over

the text with the President, that this phrase was terrific. The speechwriter very generously said: "Oh, that was Win Lord's phrase." So when the President actually gave the speech in Seattle at the APEC meeting, he got applause when he got to that line. The President stopped, looked in the camera, and said: "I have Winston Lord to thank for that line. I'm glad that you liked it." There never has been a more generous speechwriter. You can appreciate that when the President says something, the speechwriter should not take credit for a given phrase; but citing to the President somebody else for the phrase was an act of generosity that I will never forget.

Again, as we speak today, we see some serious economic problems in the Southeast Asian region. However, on the whole, during the last 25 years a lot of the tigers in Asia have been in the Southeast Asian grouping. The movement toward freer trade among the Southeast Asian countries of ASEAN, as well as the political and security stability among them which ASEAN fostered, had a lot to do with their very dramatic economic growth. Also, of course, the U.S. security presence in Asia helped to provide stability for ASEAN as well as for many other countries, including even China. This allowed the people of these countries to focus on improving their economies and not having to worry about conflict.

*Q: When you are talking about regional security, normally you are pointing at a threat, or something like that. It sounds as if there was no longer a threat.*

LORD: Could we come back to the regional security meetings before we go into that? I thought that I would treat that separately in the context of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

*Q: Sure.*

LORD: ASEAN was crucial for the regional forum, but this included many other members, and I would rather do this under the general rubric of regional institutions. That's a good question.

I also made a considerable effort to meet, not only my own counterparts, but also foreign ministers during the general debate at the UN General Assembly each fall, when the Secretary of State was too busy to meet with some of them. (End of tape)

I'll go through the specific countries.

Indonesia was clearly the giant in ASEAN by virtue of its population. We had a mixed relationship with Indonesia. The difficulties lay in the human rights area. Indonesia had an authoritarian regime, a lot of corruption, and a problem with East Timor which Indonesia had taken over from the Portuguese back in the 1970s. There was a movement for the independence of East Timor or at least much greater autonomy. There was also somewhat similar unrest in Aceh.

*Q: That's at the northern end of Sumatra.*

LORD: Right. So Indonesia was a constant concern of human rights groups and others. It put a certain limit on our relationship with Indonesia. Indeed, every time that the President, the Secretary of State, or I met with our Indonesian counterparts, in addition to a very positive agenda, which I'll get to in a minute, we would usually raise East Timor or human rights issues.

So this was a controlling factor preventing us from having a full blown relationship with Indonesia.

Having said that, I should add that we had a very positive agenda as well, and we treated Indonesia as a very important country, even though we disapproved of some of its human rights practices. As I've already mentioned, it's the fourth largest country in the world in terms of population, it's the largest Muslim country in the world, and is generally very moderate in its approach to Islam, as opposed to radical fundamentalism elsewhere in the world. So it's an important example of toleration and general restraint in that area.

Indonesia provided us with some military cooperation. Some of our training activities with the Indonesian military were restricted by Congressional concerns over human rights. Some of the Indonesian leaders whom we trained were enlightened in terms of the rule of civilians over the military, legal justice, and human rights practices by the Indonesian Army. However, there were some graduates of U.S. training programs who turned out to be involved in the suppression of some groups, and this caused controversy. So there was a constant debate about how much we should cooperate with the Indonesian military which, of course, is a very important political force in Indonesia. In fact, it's the dominant political force. We generally felt that through the exchange programs and joint operations we exposed Indonesian military personnel to professionalism and attitudes toward democracy and human rights which would pay off and would be good over the long term, on the whole.

However, given the Indonesian military role in East Timor and in other areas, you can see why Congress had some concern. However, we had some access for U.S. Navy ship visits and training programs with the Indonesian military, so that there was a military dimension to these activities.

Indonesia is an important country economically, as well. It has been a significant and positive force in diplomacy. Often it led ASEAN activity. As I said already, in the South China Sea Indonesia didn't have any territorial claims of its own and therefore could play a less subjective role, holding workshops and trying to promote cooperation among the ASEAN countries and with Vietnam before it became a member of ASEAN. Indonesia was also very important with respect to diplomacy regarding Cambodia and efforts made to try to reach a cease-fire there and organize elections. On that issue, as on so many others, its very dynamic Foreign Minister, Ali Alatas, was a crucial player.

Indonesian troops were involved in UN peacekeeping in various areas. Indonesia was an important player in the regional security dialogues. In November, 1994, Indonesia was the host to the APEC meeting in Bogor [West Java], where it supported the objectives of free trade and investment in the Asia-Pacific region by the year 2020 and for developed countries by the year 2010, which were set forth under the leadership of President Suharto.

Of course, Indonesia was very strategically located, as I already indicated. So for all of these reasons we had many goals of a positive nature to pursue in Indonesia. However, we were somewhat constrained by various human rights problems.

As you will recall, in the wake of the Vietnam War there was the classic problem of the Khmer Rouge taking over and establishing a brutal regime in Cambodia. We'll get back to Cambodia later. Part of the problem was further exacerbated by the participation and influence of other, outside countries. On the one hand there was China, with its historic animosity toward and problems with Vietnam. This was ironic because we saw China as a patron of Vietnam during the Vietnam War. We underestimated the actual tensions between China and Vietnam.

China essentially backed the Khmer Rouge, apparently thinking that a Khmer Rouge - dominated Cambodia would be a kind of buffer between Vietnam and China, or that a Chinese-influenced Cambodia would put more pressure on the Vietnamese. As you recall, Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1979 and installed a government essentially dominated by the Vietnamese. China was always involved in trying to weaken that government. The Chinese don't worry about things like genocide and human rights. Anyway, they didn't have to hold their noses very much when they were working with the Khmer Rouge.

On the other hand the Vietnamese, of course, wanted to see a friendly government in Cambodia. In fact, the Hun Sen Government in Cambodia was disposed in a friendly way toward the Hanoi Government.

Then there were the Thai working with the Khmer Rouge for the reasons I have mentioned. The Thai have some historical tensions with Vietnam as well, of course. The Thai were allied with us against North Vietnam during the Vietnam War.

There were also residual French interests and a residual U.S. role in Thailand.

The Cambodian conflict was complicated by these outside powers, all of which gets me back to Thailand and our leaning on them. Gradually, the Chinese became more even handed. They cut back and then cut off aid to the Khmer Rouge. The Thai began to crack down more effectively along the Thai-Cambodian border. All of this helped to weaken the Khmer Rouge. As we speak now the Khmer Rouge are just about finished as an effective force in Cambodia. In many ways Cambodia is a tragic country. At least they no longer have the threat from the Khmer Rouge.

*Q: During the time that you were Assistant Secretary were we working on China to "withdraw its support" from the Khmer Rouge?*

LORD: Absolutely. They would never acknowledge directly to us that they were doing what we wanted. They didn't do it primarily for our purposes. Again, they did it because they saw that Hun Sen and his forces were in the ascendancy. The Chinese knew that they were paying a price for their blatant support of the Khmer Rouge, in terms of international opinion, which isn't as important to them as geopolitics and the balance of power. Anyway, as the Khmer Rouge began to grow weaker, the Chinese began to see that maybe they could have more influence in Southeast Asia by displaying less support of the Khmer Rouge.

*Q: Cambodia received support from China.*

LORD: Yes, but, given China's historic problems with Vietnam, anything that makes Vietnam

nervous helps China with their Vietnam problem. Again, we would raise this matter with the Chinese, appealing to their own interest and influence in the region. With the Chinese you don't get very far by invoking the human rights dimension and by talking

about the terrible genocide. You have to cite practical reasons, including their desire to have better relations with Southeast Asia and their general interest in having more stability in that region.

In any event, returning to Thailand, we really raised the Cambodian issue in almost every meeting with the Thai, because it was very crucial to us. As I said, the Thai became more and more helpful, to the point that, during the last couple of years of my service as Assistant Secretary, I think that it's fair to say that we were pretty satisfied with what the Thai were doing. We would check out what the Thai were doing through our intelligence reports. We had a pretty good reading as to whether the Thai were reining in their people. It reached the point where, not only did the Khmer Rouge no longer count on Thai aid or even Thai asylum but sometimes they would be turned back from the Thai-Cambodian border. So working with the Thai became another way of weakening the Khmer Rouge.

The other problem with Thailand was illicit drugs. The Thai became more and more cooperative on the drug problem, which had been a major issue for us. So we made progress with that. I cite those two problems as being typical issues we dealt with in Thailand, along with intellectual property rights. We made some progress on that issue, as well.

Thus, we had some difficulties with Thailand, but we had a very good security relationship with them. Thailand was our most important Southeast Asian security partner. We had our second largest military exercise in East Asia with Thailand, after another major exercise in South Korea. There have been numerous exchange programs and exercises, and we have had access to Royal Thai facilities.

We had one disappointment in 1993 or 1994. We tentatively approached the Thai to see if we could preposition some supplies offshore, in Thai waters, for possible future contingency use. This would have consisted of materiel and equipment which we could get to quickly, not only for Southeast Asian contingencies but also those involving the Middle East. We didn't handle this issue very well, diplomatically. We didn't prepare the ground well, news of it leaked, and it got caught up in Thai domestic politics. Thailand never really turned the proposal down, but it put it off indefinitely. This was somewhat irritating, since Thailand is an ally, and we thought that, given their cooperation in so many other areas, we would obtain their approval. Instead, the issue got tangled up in Thai domestic politics, since it looked as if Thailand would become involved in regional conflicts if it agreed to pre-position U.S. military supplies in Thailand. The U.S. JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] finally decided a year or two later that we really didn't need this equipment storage facility. That was one example where, on the military side, we did not have full cooperation from the Thai. This was an exception to the rule of broad cooperation from the Thai.

*Q: Did you meet Mahathir?*

LORD: Yes. I had at least one meeting alone with him when I visited Malaysia in my own right.

I sat in on meetings between Secretary Christopher, President Clinton, and Mahathir. I saw him in the White House.

I should add that Mahathir wasn't totally hostile at all times. He could turn on the charm, but you never forgot that he held these views of suspicion of the West, even as he wanted Western investment. I will also say that he supported the U.S. military presence as being in the interests of Malaysia and Southeast Asia for stability. He still has some residual concerns about China or Japan and so he sees the U.S. as a balancing force. Even then, he was somewhat more ambivalent toward us than, say, Singapore, the Philippines, or Thailand.

I would point to all of the democratic forces in Asia and add that one shouldn't just listen to people like Lee Kuan Yew and Mahathir, let alone Jiang Zemin of China,

*Q: Okay, we're back in business.*

LORD: Let's start with Vietnam, which has recently become a member of ASEAN in its own right. Let's start off by talking about Vietnam primarily in the bilateral context, which most concerns us, on the whole, although better relations between the U.S. and Vietnam made improved relations with ASEAN easier when Vietnam became a member.

I would say that, from a personal standpoint, I had more personal impact individually, while working with others, of course, on this issue than perhaps on any other matter in the region. I would like to think that I was heavily involved, and I was, in all of the major Asian issues and made a contribution on many of them. However, I think that in terms of the normalization of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, if I can be slightly immodest, it would not have happened without constant efforts on my part.

This involved a real balancing act. There were several factors in it. First was Hanoi itself, and our negotiations with the Vietnamese Government. Then we had to consider the interests of the White House, which was very sensitive on this issue. The White House was very concerned about domestic, political criticism, particularly since President Clinton had avoided the draft during the Vietnam War. Also important to consider were domestic pressure groups, veterans' groups, and members of the families of the Missing in Action and POWs [Prisoners of War]. They did not all hold the same view. They often had different views, some of them very strongly held. Then there were the political sensitivities of members of Congress, who were on different sides of this issue. They held varying views, but many of them were very suspicious of Hanoi, as were other domestic groups.

So we constantly had to watch all of these flanks as we tried to move ahead with the Vietnamese-American relationship. I believe that the policy we ultimately followed was one of our most constructive and most successful during these four years. We moved from the point where we inherited this issue to full, diplomatic relations by the time we were finished, less than four years later.

*Q: Could you describe how the Bush administration handled this issue, to understand where you moved?*

On the other hand I also had a sense that Vietnam was an important country. It was important to try to heal the wounds left by the Vietnam War in our society. Moving ahead in relations was our best bet to get more information on our missing in action. Vietnam was also potentially important from the economic point of view. It obviously was also important in geopolitical terms. It has a large and dynamic population. Given the traditional Vietnamese antagonism toward China, it was also useful, in dealing with China, with which we wanted better relations, to improve our relations with some of China's historical enemies. This was just to remind the Chinese of the balance of power considerations applicable in this situation, whether it involved India, Vietnam, Russia, or Japan. Having good relations with those countries is helpful when we deal with China. So, for all of these reasons I felt that it was important to try to move ahead with Vietnam, even though I had this distrust of them.

*Q: Could you explain for the record what we mean when we talk about MIAs, what the situation was, and how it had progressed, because this is a crucial consideration?*

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*Q: Were you getting much support from the Asian countries on normalization of relations between the U.S. and Vietnam?*

LORD: China was ambivalent. On the one hand, they would say that we should move ahead without worrying about issues like MIAs and human rights. They would ask why shouldn't we have normal relations? However, underneath this, I think that they would just as soon we not have good relations with Vietnam because of their own historical antagonism with Vietnam. One of their concerns probably was that normal relations with Vietnam would give us more leverage against China. For historical reasons the French would say that we should move ahead on relations with Vietnam. So most countries thought that we should make progress in this direction.

Now, a little more on the politics of this issue. I've already said that the White House was very sensitive on this question. Making progress on this matter was often like pulling teeth. Secretary Christopher was very helpful on this matter. He spent a lot of time on this. I spent a lot of time with him to get him working on it at his level. He wanted to move ahead, along all of the lines I mentioned, as did many people in the State Department. I had terrific support in my own bureau with outstanding FSOs, like Peter Tomsen, Ken Quinn, Kent Weidemann, Chris LaFleur, with experience in the area.

The U.S. economic agencies were anxious to move ahead because of the economic dimension in particular. The Defense Department, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wanted to move ahead, probably because they thought that we could get more information on the MIAs and partly because they saw the China aspect I mentioned above. Just generally, in terms of our interests in the area, they thought that having a better relationship with Vietnam wouldn't be all bad.

*Q: Because it might have gotten lost, you might explain that, while we didn't have formal diplomatic relations with Vietnam, unlike North Korea, which is really sealed off, we had all*

*sorts of contacts with Vietnam. There were visits by prominent Americans to Vietnam. Even teams went out to Hanoi to talk about MIAs.*

LORD: Yes, we had teams in Hanoi which we greatly beefed up under the Clinton administration. We had people up there, even before the Clinton administration entered office, searching for remains of MIAs. We were working with the Vietnamese to get more information. Our military people doing this were extremely dedicated, and doing hard, sometimes dangerous, work.

There were some official American visitors going to Vietnam. We were not totally isolated from Vietnam, as was the case with North Korea and some other countries. We had an embargo on trade. We also blocked World Bank and IMF loans to Vietnam. Of course, we had no Embassy, Liaison Office, or anything else.

*Q: But we had an immigration program, the so-called orderly departure program.*

LORD: That's right. The orderly departure program helped people get out of Vietnam and travel to the United States if they wished to do so. There was also the problem of Vietnamese boat people who escaped from Vietnam and went to Hong Kong or to one of several countries in Southeast Asia. We tried to work with the Vietnamese authorities on that.

*Q: What was our reading on the Vietnamese Government at that time? That is, in 1993.*

LORD: Well, it was pretty authoritarian. There were some indications even then, in 1993, and the process continued, that there was a desire in Vietnam to reform their economy. Somewhat like what the Chinese had done, to open up to some extent to the outside world. The Vietnamese Government seemed to be interested in trying to get more foreign investment. However, the picture on human rights in Vietnam was still very grim. So that was our general impression. There were some members of the leadership who were considered more pro-reform than others. However, it was going to be a tough row to hoe, certainly in the field of human rights. But there were some indications that the Vietnamese Government was opening up.

As we looked at the situation in Vietnam, I've explained what we saw in it for us, in terms of moving ahead. From the Vietnamese point of view, first they had a major economic incentive to open up with us. That is, getting American trade and investment to help them in their efforts to open up to the outside world generally, in a way similar to what China had done, and to reform their economy. So they clearly had a tremendous, potential economic interest in normalizing relations with us. Not only oil research, for example, but investment generally and all kinds of other things.

Secondly, Hanoi had a general sense of diplomatic isolation because of us. The Vietnamese knew that we were, in effect, holding Japan back somewhat, for example. If they could normalize relations with us, this would open the diplomatic gates more generally. They managed to have pretty good relations with other countries, but normalization with the U.S. would generally help them. Thirdly, more specifically on the diplomatic and geopolitical front was their concern about China. By normalizing relations with us they would have some assurance and/or

leverage vis-a-vis the Chinese.

So for these economic and geopolitical reasons, we figured that they had a lot of incentives to work with us. The trick was to play on those incentives to get the Vietnamese to be more cooperative on the MIA and the POW questions, in their own self interest.

I would like to make one more quick point, before I forget. I have talked about my own role, somewhat immodestly, but I could not have done this without tremendous help from a lot of Foreign Service Officers, and particularly Ken Quinn, who, as we speak, is now our Ambassador to Cambodia. Also, Kent Wiedemann, who is supposed to be our next Ambassador to Cambodia. There were other Foreign Service Officers, including Chris LaFleur, who is now DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission] in Tokyo. He was previously on the Vietnam desk. Desaix Anderson, who became our first Ambassador as we moved ahead. A lot of people worked very hard on this process of normalization. Obviously, this was always a collective effort.

Now, basically what we did in the course of several years was to make some progress on MIAs and then take a step forward in the relationship between Vietnam and the United States. One way we went about this was that we had to have some criteria to define progress on MIAs.

I don't have all of these yardsticks at my fingertips, but we had four or five main areas where we wanted to see progress made. These included, I recall, finding the remains of MIAs. That is, getting as many remains back as possible. Also included in the yardsticks was information on the missing in action, particularly the most promising cases. There were about a couple of hundred of these cases. We sought access to Vietnamese archives to get more information on the histories. Also, we wanted cooperation from the Vietnamese people. It wasn't just getting cooperation from Vietnamese Government officials. We also needed cooperation from villagers, some of whom might have seen things relating to the MIAs. The Vietnamese Government people always said that one way we could get help from the villagers was "to help us with our MIAs," even though they didn't care as much about them as we did about our MIAs. We did try to help them with their MIAs in terms of turning over our own records and archives, so they could go to their own people and say that the Americans are helping us with Vietnamese MIAs. They would then ask the village people to volunteer information to us.

One thing that the Vietnamese Government officials did was that, in their communications with their own people, they made it clear that they should cooperate and that it was in their interest to do so. Some of the Vietnamese people might not want to cooperate because they had bitter memories of the war, the American bombing, and so forth. So it was important to show that we Americans were providing the Vietnamese officials with information on Vietnamese MIAs. I recall that I went on a couple of trips to Vietnam where we brought information on their MIAs, so that they could tell their own people that they ought to cooperate with us.

Another criterion was cooperation with Laos and triangular searches. A lot of MIA cases involved locations in Laos, as well as some in Cambodia. I might add quickly that Cambodia was always the most forthcoming of the three countries of the former Indochina on the MIA question, although it was the least important in terms of information. The situation of MIAs in Laos provided a mixed picture. The Laotian authorities were generally quite helpful. However, they

were generally poor in providing logistic help, so our assistance was needed.

So we had these criteria and probably some others that I've forgotten. Whenever we wanted to take a step forward, and I'll mention these in just a minute, we would also have White House white papers and State Department press releases, explaining how the Vietnamese Government had stepped up their cooperation, before we could take another step in normalizing our relationship.

In addition to dealing with Congress to get support, President Clinton also sent special missions to Vietnam to deal with MIA questions. I was Co-Chairman of these special missions, along with a man named Herschel Goldberg, who played a crucial role in them. Herschel Goldberg was the Deputy Director of the Department of Veterans Affairs. He was from Arkansas and had been working on veterans' affairs in Arkansas. He was on close terms with President Clinton. Then he came into office as the second ranking official in the Veterans Department. He also had served in Vietnam and spoke some Vietnamese. Because he represented veterans' interests and because he, himself, was suspicious of Hanoi, was from Arkansas, and was close to President Clinton, I welcomed his cooperation in this effort, in which he became heavily involved. It turned out that his involvement in these special missions was crucial to their success. So it wasn't just the State Department, the Defense Department, the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff], the economic agencies, and the White House. The Veterans Administration, which obviously had a clear interest in the Vietnam issue, was represented by Herschel Goldberg, its deputy director, who turned out to be very important in this regard.

If somebody goes to the President and says: "The Vietnamese Government is cooperating on MIA issues, and we ought to move ahead to broaden trade, or something like that, with Vietnam," and this person is from the State Department, from the Defense Department, or one of the economic agencies, the impact would be less than if Goldberg did. Not that we wouldn't have credibility, but the President might say: "Well, how do I know that the Vietnamese Government is really helping us?" So when a tough-minded, suspicious guy like Herschel Goldberg would say this to the President, it would carry a lot of weight. Also, Goldberg was very helpful with veterans groups and, to a certain extent, with the MIA families organizations. He would have more credibility with them than State Department or even Defense types. Tony Lake and I in particular worked with family and veteran groups as well. I made several appearances before them as well as consulting them.

From the very beginning and even before I had personally met him, I saw Goldberg as an asset. As I say, he turned out to be very crucial. He and I headed up several Presidential Missions to Vietnam. I was always an equal ranking member of the mission but was mainly concerned with the political side of it. I would make sure that Goldberg was treated as the first among equals, even though we were co-chairmen of the mission. In fact, the NSC [National Security Council] representative on the mission, whether it was Wiedemann or Roth, would be the third-ranking person. Goldberg was the co-chairman and was the "first among equals," as he should have been, both because he was a sub-cabinet level official and also because he was close to the President. I felt that, for credibility purposes, it was very important for our domestic audiences to see that the number one person on the team was a Veterans Department man and not a State Department official.

Goldberg and I worked extremely well together. It was not because we particularly liked or trusted the Vietnamese Government officials we met on the successive trips to Vietnam, though we liked the Vietnamese people. Rather we saw that it was in the self-interest of the Vietnamese Government to help us on MIAs. Because of our efforts to press them on this matter, they were, in fact, cooperating, and we were able to go ahead on the normalization of relations. We regularly made reports to President Clinton after these trips on the cooperation we had received from Vietnamese Government officials. This had credibility because Goldberg was involved in preparing these reports, in addition to myself, the Defense Department people, and so on. We always had an officer dealing with POW/MIA matters from the Defense Department at about my level, as well as other experts from the Pentagon and so on.

We made several of these trips. I made some trips on my own but often went with Herschel Goldberg. On the first couple of trips we also had some representatives of MIA and veterans groups with us, because they could help us prepare for the trip, sit in on the discussions with the Vietnamese, and also report back to the President, as did Goldberg and myself. This was somewhat of a risk. We had to include various members, some of whom were more radical than others and more distrustful of U.S. Government officials. However, we felt that this was a good move in terms of domestic politics, since it gave them a chance to participate on these trips. Secondly, it made it possible to bring more leverage and pressure to bear on the Vietnamese officials because they would be sitting in on these meetings. The Vietnamese officials would hear directly from MIA family representatives and from U.S. veterans groups and could see how important this matter was to us, from the political point of view.

These representatives also gave us some good advice. We constantly had to make sure that we were in charge of the talking points. We often would go over our approaches with them before the trips, though we couldn't give family group and veterans organization representatives a veto over talking points. On these trips we would make our presentation. Then we would turn to the veterans and the MIA family representatives. They would make their own comments, individually.

I would say that in the veterans community there were different groups. Some of them were willing to follow our approach. Others were more suspicious of the U.S. Government. We didn't convert everybody. Some of these representatives were still hostile to the Vietnamese Government and didn't want to go ahead on normalizing relations with Vietnam. Others were already in favor of going ahead. I think that some of those in the middle were somewhat influenced to cooperate with us once they went on these trips.

*Q: When you were talking to the Vietnamese officials, what was your impression of how well informed they were about America?*

LORD: I think that they were pretty well informed, considering the fact that we didn't have a lot of communications with them. Some of them had made occasional visits to the U.S. and so on. I don't know how to quantify this, but I think that Vietnamese officials were relatively well informed about America. I think that they understood the domestic political pressures on our side. They certainly had to understand this, from the aggressive talking points we presented on

the MIAs. We always spent the first couple of hours of a meeting with them on this issue alone. They understood how important this issue was for us, in principle, in terms of our domestic politics, and in our being able to move ahead on normalization of relations with Vietnam.

Really, it was quite extraordinary to go to Hanoi, either alone or a co-leader of the Presidential Commission on MIA questions, and spend three-quarters of our time on the MIA issue. From the standpoint of the Vietnamese Government officials we met, they were thinking about economics and geopolitics and the fact that, after all, we had lost the war. They had many more missing in action than we did. I'm sure that some of the Vietnamese officials were sort of puzzled and others were annoyed that we should spend so much time on the MIA issue.

It really got to be repetitious. We used essentially the same talking points at every meeting with them. However, I think that, by virtue of our presentations and, I'm sure, from their conversations with fellow Asians and fellow diplomats, they gained an improved knowledge about Americans. This added to their general knowledge. I feel that they understood the U.S. pretty well.

*Q: Modern sampling techniques, particularly the use of DNA as an identifier, were really just coming into their own.*

LORD: That's right, and they became more and more helpful. We would dig and dig in these incredibly remote and heavily forested hillsides, and DNA samples were very difficult to find. Sometimes it took heroic efforts by our people, and by the Vietnamese villagers as well, to conduct these searches. In the course of the search they might just come up with a couple of teeth, or something like that. Digging around took an extraordinary effort. The DNA samples helped.

We had laboratories in Hawaii, which I often visited with the Secretary of State and others when we went through Hawaii. These laboratories did the DNA work, which sometimes took considerable time. They would look at the remains very carefully, piecing things together.

In summary, how we moved ahead was roughly as follows. Based on Presidential Commission trips made by Goldberg and myself or in the course of my individual trips, we reported back to the President, and the White House released a summary of the findings. In 1993 we took the first step of no longer blocking or vetoing support from the IMF [International Monetary Fund] and the World Bank in the form of loans for Vietnam. This actually was in many ways more important than the bilateral trade embargo, which we still had at this point. It freed up money from other countries. Up to this point we had blocked IMF and World Bank loans to Vietnam. This was the first step we took in response to some progress in MIA identification, which we reported back to the White House. This was in 1993, I believe.

I don't have the specific date in mind, but some time in 1994 we took the next step and lifted our embargo on trade with Vietnam. This was another step, which was also based on further progress with the MIA cases. Later in 1994 we set up Liaison Offices in Washington and Hanoi, just as we had had previously done years earlier with the Chinese. Up until then we had been dealing with the Vietnamese in the United States, primarily through their Ambassador to the UN in New

York. He was very helpful. He would come down to Washington and talk to me, and I would see him up there in New York. However, now we set up Liaison Offices in each other's capitals. That was a major step forward, as they were de facto embassies.

Then, in 1995 we moved to full diplomatic relations. In one of the most dramatic events in the four years I spent as Assistant Secretary, Secretary Christopher made a trip to Vietnam in August, 1995, during which we raised the U.S. flag at the new American Embassy in Hanoi. I'll get to this trip in just a minute. Given all of the historical baggage behind it, that was quite a moment. So this was the way we proceeded over a period of several years. He also visited Cambodia on this trip and, along with the rest of us, was depressed once again by Khmer Rouge atrocities.

In each case it was like pulling teeth to get the White House or Tony Lake to continue the process. We sent along enough convincing reports to the President by Goldberg, myself, and others - backed up, as I say, by the Pentagon and by the economic agencies in Washington - to give us reasons to move ahead. Very frankly, this was not an easy job. Over the years I and my colleagues had to maneuver and press the White House, as well as working with Congress and the family and veteran groups. It took great effort and Christopher was very supportive.

Secretary Christopher has characterized his trip to Vietnam in 1995 as a very moving experience for him. He deserves a lot of credit for his effort in accomplishing this, working in cooperation with the White House, on this whole saga over a period of several years.

In the course of this two-day visit to Hanoi we spent the first day essentially and symbolically on the past. The second day we spent on the future. As always, on the first day he met with the Joint Task Force people to see how we were doing in cooperation with the Vietnamese in collecting and shipping remains and developing further information on MIAs. This, of course, represented the past. He participated, as I had on an earlier visit to Hanoi, in a repatriation ceremony. This was a very simple ceremony at the airport in Hanoi. The Vietnamese turned over to our people several coffins containing the remains of deceased American military personnel, which were then loaded upon transport planes and flown back to the U.S. It was one of the most moving experiences in my life when I witnessed one of those ceremonies. I had the same experience with Secretary Christopher as well.

As I said, the MIA issue was still a high profile matter, and this took up the first day of the Christopher visit to Hanoi. We then took up other issues, of course, including economics, geopolitics, and so on. There were further meetings with Vietnamese officials and discussions about where we could cooperate and develop our bilateral relations. There were meetings with U.S. businessmen to underline our economic interests in Vietnam. Raising the U.S. flag at our new Embassy symbolized the beginning of a new relationship. Then Secretary Christopher gave a speech at the University of Vietnam before a group of Vietnamese students. He talked about the past and also about the future, looking toward the next century.

This was a nicely symbolic trip which was the final and major step accomplished over a period of several years to normalize relations. It turned out, by this time, to be very well received in the U.S., including the media, with minimal criticism.

During the remainder of those first four years of my service as Assistant Secretary, we continued to try to flesh out that relationship with Vietnam. We had Desaix Anderson, a distinguished Foreign Service Officer initially serving in Hanoi as our first Ambassador. Then Pete Peterson, a former POW, went to Hanoi to replace Anderson. We worked to get more information on repatriation and to move on trade and the MFN [Most Favored Nation] issue, discussed geopolitics, including China. We also talked to the Vietnamese about human rights. We had several dialogues on this issue while I was there. These were like the human rights dialogues which we had with the Chinese. They were conducted by Assistant Secretary of State John Shattuck and people from his Bureau of Human Rights, with other people from our bureau sitting in. These dialogues took place both in Washington and in Hanoi.

*Q: As we were moving on these issues, what was the role of Senator Helms [Republican, North Carolina]?*

LORD: It was interesting. He was among those who, you might imagine, would be opposed to this. However, he never seemed to be as much out in front on this issue as he was on some other issues, like abortion or the United Nations. He was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, obviously, and he was generally very suspicious of Vietnam. He was generally not helpful. Senator Smith [Republican, New Hampshire] and various Congressmen were much more vocal on this issue, and they could count on Senator Helms' supporting them. It was more Senator Smith and others that we were dealing with on a day to day basis. As I have said, we had indispensable help from Senators and Congressmen who were war heroes or POWs.

*Q: Obviously, this whole opening to Vietnam was a very emotional and also a political issue, one that really engaged the attention of Americans. What was your impression of the Vietnamese leadership in Hanoi, when you were talking to them? Did they seem to have the same...*

LORD: We dealt, on a day to day basis, at one level, of course. I'll get to the Vietnamese leadership in a minute. The Vietnamese representative at the UN in New York later came down to Washington to head up their Liaison Office. He is now their Ambassador in Washington. The Ambassador and the Foreign Minister, a man named Cam, were pragmatic and relatively easy to deal with, particularly for Vietnamese, based on my experience during the 1970s. They were clearly interested in moving ahead with the Vietnamese-American relationship, in their own national interest. Therefore, they wanted to be helpful on the MIA question.

They would sometimes play the game that, "We have our own hard liners in Hanoi. We need your help in order to satisfy them" or, "Don't press us too hard on human rights. This is a sensitive issue among our leadership." Or they would say: "There's a debate in our leadership, and there are suspicions of U.S. intentions. So please be careful." They would play that game but, on the whole, at this level people seemed to understand the U.S. fairly well and genuinely wanted to improve our relations. I must say that we had really cordial and friendly relations with some very helpful people in Hanoi, as well as their representatives in Washington and New York.

I would see members of the Vietnamese leadership when I was heading the Presidential

Commission on MIAs with Goldberg, or when I was with the Secretary of State. You got different emphases from them, at one time or another. I saw the Prime Minister, the head of the Communist Party of Vietnam, and the President of Vietnam. The impressions we had of them would vary. If I recall correctly, the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Ministers were generally more pro-reform. You got the sense that they were somewhat easier to deal with and friendly, whereas the head of the Party was sort of in the middle, and the President was more hard line. These were people in their 70s. They clearly had a personal legacy left over from the war, but we sensed no particular bitterness or vitriol coming out of them. They didn't rake over old coals. Generally, they were patient listeners, whether at my level or a higher level, to long presentations on nothing but the MIA question. They always pledged full cooperation with our efforts, sometimes noting their own MIA problems.

I can't say that any of these officials were incredibly impressive, as, say, Zhou En-lai had been impressive or even someone like Fidel Ramos of the Philippines and other officials of a more democratic stripe. So those were my impressions of them.

*Q: My question, beyond that, was whether dealing with United States representatives seemed to stir any emotions on the part of Vietnamese officials?*

LORD: There might have been one or two meetings where emotions of this kind would pop out on occasion. I can't be specific about that, but there might have been a phase of the conversation where the Vietnamese would get slightly testy. However, on the whole, whether we were dealing with the Vietnamese leadership, with people at my level, with the Foreign Minister, or with a few ordinary Vietnamese citizens that we met, there was a remarkable lack of bitterness about the past. There was a general commitment to look to the future in our mutual, national interest. I had seen the same phenomenon in China, where, despite our mutual hostility and isolation for two decades, there was an immediate positive response to us. I got very little evidence of an adverse, emotional reaction to Americans.

The other interesting thing is that in the U.S. I would only occasionally see and meet with Vietnamese-American representatives. While we had a lot of dealings on the domestic front with Congress, with families, and with veterans organizations, moving ahead with Vietnam did not seem to be a major source of controversy. Normalizing relations with Vietnam did not seem to be a serious issue. The Vietnamese I met in the U.S. wanted to normalize relations with their country, because they felt that it was in their own self-interest to do this. Another reason might have been that this might give them a chance to go back and see their families in Vietnam. If they were from South Vietnam, you might have expected that they might be bitter because they had worked with the U.S. and had to leave Vietnam when the war ended in 1975 or 1976. Or, if they were boat people, they might have left Vietnam because they were violently against the communist government and were opposed to improving relations with it. But for some reason the Vietnamese people who had come to the U.S. had very little contact with my office or with me personally, even though obviously I was one of the point men on the whole policy of improving Vietnamese-American relations. They didn't play a major role in our policy. I never had the sense that one of the obstacles to moving ahead, for example, would be the opinions of Vietnamese who had fled their country and come to the U.S. There was much more American than Vietnamese-American opinion opposed to normalization of relations. And even this turned

out to be modest, in part thanks to our skillful handling of the issue.

*Q: Well, then, turning to the other parts of Indo-China, such as Laos and Cambodia, we talked somewhat about Cambodia already.*

LORD: Yes, let me deal with Cambodia, and then we'll discuss Laos, Burma, and some other places.

This is another issue, like Vietnam, that had some personal resonance with me on several issues. First, in dealing with the Vietnamese negotiations in the 1970s. When I worked with Dr. Kissinger, Cambodia and Laos were also on the agenda. As I already mentioned, I came close to resigning from Kissinger's NSC staff over the American incursion into Cambodia in the spring of 1970. Also, like every human being, I was subsequently totally shocked and outraged by the Khmer Rouge atrocities in Cambodia. I think that most people would agree - although, more recently, Africa has had its own horrible stories in Rwanda, Burundi, and the Congo - that after the holocaust of the Jews in Europe, Hitler, Stalin, and Mao, the Khmer Rouge brutalities were among the worst events in the second half of the 20th century. I have great respect and affection for the Cambodian people. I also had Cambodia a little bit in my background because when I was Ambassador to China, Prince Sihanouk spent several months out of each year living in China. I used to go and call on him, just to stay in touch. The Chinese played an important role in the ongoing Cambodian situation, of course, supporting opposition to the Vietnamese, but this also reflected our past association. I had met Sihanouk several times when I was traveling with Dr. Kissinger. For a long time, he suspected that the Nixon Administration had engineered his overthrow in 1970 - this was not true.

I always felt considerable admiration for Sihanouk. He acquired in some quarters a reputation for being a buffoon because he was always changing his mind, going with the wind, and switching sides. Perhaps there was an element of that even in these meetings, but I felt that here was a man who was doing a balancing act but who always had his country's interests at heart. He was genuinely trying to ensure that Cambodia might become more peaceful and prosperous and live a more democratic life. He was personally torn by his own personal angst about his country, and the difficult choices he faced.

On the one hand, of course, he was a fierce, Khmer nationalist who loved his country and always put it first. He was always trying to figure out what was best for Cambodia. Therefore, he always had natural, anti-Vietnamese instincts as a Cambodian. He opposed the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1979. On the other hand, he detested the Khmer Rouge, who had murdered something like 15 or so members of his own family and who kept him essentially as a front for their rule for seven years, during which time he was under house arrest. He was torn between an intense dislike of the Vietnamese and an equally intense dislike of the Khmer Rouge. He steadily searched for the best way through this thicket, which involved a lot of emotional, personal, and political dilemmas for him.

Certainly, Sihanouk was in favor of promoting a third force, an alternative to the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese influence, that still is led by his son, Prince Ranariddh, who has always been rather ineffectual and weak. So I found from our conversations that Prince Sihanouk reflected

this terrible agony of his country and genuine patriotism. I thought he was shrewder than many people gave him credit for, even as he has periodically reversed his positions. He was above all a survivor. To this day, he's a force in the country.

Anyway, I came to Cambodia in 1993 with some considerable historical baggage, just as I had with Vietnam. Early in my tenure as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs, Cambodia was high up on my agenda. I came into office in March, 1993, and the Cambodians were gearing up for elections in May, 1993. The biggest peacekeeping program in the history of the UN was being implemented in Cambodia at that point. The program was called UNTAC. I don't have the details at my fingertips, but literally billions of dollars were being spent on a very large UN presence.

As I was saying, by the early spring of 1993 the huge UN operation in Cambodia had succeeded in doing many things. First, violence had substantially declined in Cambodia, compared to the Khmer Rouge period and even after that, when there was fighting between the Khmer Rouge and other factions.

Secondly, with UN help, 350-400,000 refugees, most of whom had been in Thailand, had returned to Cambodia and were being resettled. Thirdly, outside influence of a nefarious nature was being reduced. The Chinese were backing away from their support of the Khmer Rouge. The Thai were beginning to crack down on the Khmer Rouge along the Cambodian-Thai border. The Vietnamese were being generally helpful. Elections were being organized in Cambodia. All in all, this was one of the most successful UN operations ever.

So my first task, or rather the Clinton administration's first task, on the Cambodian front was to give as much support as possible to the electoral process and to make sure that the elections were as fair as possible.

I went to Cambodia early in my tenure as Assistant Secretary to show support for this electoral process. This was only about ten days before the elections. There were some outbreaks of violence and some question as to whether all of the various political parties were going to participate. Some observers were not sure that the elections were going to work out, even though 95 percent of the people had been registered. This was quite an achievement. So I purposely went there to urge all of the political parties to take part in the elections. I held a press conference to show American support for this process. Even though I wasn't 100 percent sure, by any means, how it was going to come out, I expressed great optimism and U.S. support for this process. I said that I hoped that it would be a fair election and said how meaningful this would be for the Cambodian people, who had had such a tragic history.

The UN operation in support of the elections was headed up by the Japanese, a Mr. Akashi, who then went on to Bosnia afterwards. He did a fabulous job in Cambodia. Working with him was Australian General Sanderson. Of course, I met with them, as well as with others, when I was in Cambodia. In my various trips to that country I met with many people, including government leaders, members of various factions, representatives of non-governmental organizations and human rights groups, American business people, and so forth.

*Q: You mentioned that a decision had to be reached, early on in the process, about what we should do. Would we support Prince Ranariddh fully, or would we go for cohabitation, or however you call it? On an issue like this, I think that it's interesting to follow the process. How was the decision made? Was it made by you, or...*

LORD: First of all, it was essentially a United Nations decision. Or at least it was a decision made by the countries participating in UNTAC [UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia]. As I recall, the decision was unanimous among the countries involved that, even though we didn't like the way Hun Sen was muscling his way in, he had received some 40 percent of the vote in the election of 1993, and we were going to have civil conflict, so we ought to live with this. The UN certainly made that decision. Indeed, it was a UN and not a U.S. decision. Obviously, having said that, I must add that we were crucial to it. But if we had held out, I am not certain that we could have changed it. We would have stood pretty much alone in this respect.

Within our own government, I don't recall the exact process. As the very least, it would have been a decision approved by Secretary of State Christopher and by Tony Lake, the National Security Adviser to President Clinton. I don't know whether it ever reached the President. Certainly, it was the kind of key decision that would be dealt with at that level.

*Q: What about Laos?*

LORD: I don't have too much to say about Laos. It was rather quiet during my watch. You have to have priorities, and of course you have to say about every country that it's important. And Laos does have some importance, but I'm not going to sit here and insult people by saying that Laos, Brunei, and Papua New Guinea were our highest priorities. I visited Laos a couple of times. Since it was part of the former Indochina, it had a certain resonance for me. I've already mentioned that my first assignment as special assistant for Dr. Kissinger was to write a paper on Laos in 1970 and this turned into a crisis because of misleading information fed to me by other agencies. Like Vietnam in the early 1990s, Laos had an authoritarian government and had some human rights problems. However, Laos was very important to us regarding the MIA question, second only to Vietnam. It was not so much the numbers of MIA cases but the fact that many of the most promising ones concerned Laos, because we were getting more information on those in Laos. Laos was also important in terms of the narcotics traffic.

So we paid some attention to Laos. I tried to get the attention of Secretary Christopher and others directed to Laos, though I couldn't justify it very much. I visited Laos a couple of times. I always saw the Lao Foreign Minister when he was in the U.S., either at the UN in New York or in Washington. I would try to get him in at higher levels of the State Department, probably at the Undersecretary of State or Deputy Secretary level.

We worked to improve our relations there and to increase trade and investment. We didn't have the kind of embargo to deal with that we had with Vietnam. We tried to get Lao cooperation on the drug program. We made fair progress with some effort.

On MIAs I always felt that the Lao weren't very helpful. For some reason the American MIA family groups said that Laos was more helpful than Vietnam. I didn't think so. Part of the Lao

problem was just poverty and a lack of resources.

So I spent some time on Laos. I was always very courteous to them. Even before Laos became a member of ASEAN, if Lao representatives were in town for whatever reason, I tried to see them. Whenever Lao representatives went to an ASEAN regional security dialogue, I made a particular effort to see them. However, Laos was not a high priority for me. The single most important issue on the agenda of contacts with Laos was MIA cooperation. We managed to improve that. Often we tried that together with the Vietnamese. We did some work along the Vietnam-Laos border. At one point I went to an excavation camp in that area where we searched for MIA remains, working with the Lao and the Vietnamese.

Laos was a secondary issue for us. We made modest progress with Laos during my four years as Assistant Secretary. It wasn't on a major scale, but there was some improvement on the investment front, on the MIA question, and on drug cooperation.

*Q: Burma?*

For several years China had continued to develop its relations with Burma, because the Chinese leaders, of course, don't care about human rights in another country. Secondly, for geographic reasons, the Chinese have sought to extend their influence in Burma and eventually to gain access to a warm water port in Burma. So there has been a lot of Chinese military aid extended to the Burmese Government.

Our interest in Burma was to see whether we could improve the human rights situation and gain the Burmese government's cooperation on drugs. There was some debate within the U.S. Government and within our Congress about which objective should have priority. Some observers, including some Congressmen from Harlem [in New York] and other places where drugs were a huge problem, consider that drugs are decimating our youth. They feel that, in this case, our overriding priority should be dealing with the narcotics situation. Even if it meant giving some aid to the Burmese Government while holding our nose about the nature of the regime, they felt that we had to do something to stem the flow of opium and other drugs into the United States from Burma, which was a key supplier. I don't have the figures before me now, but a huge percentage of the opium traffic in general and other drugs was coming out of Burma.

*Q: Were there any other political personalities on the scene, apart from the Burmese military and Aung San Suu Kyi, whom we were concerned about?*

LORD: Not really. I don't recall anyone else. There was the usual speculation about who was somewhat more reasonable and who were the hard liners in the regime. There was speculation about who might be somewhat more willing to deal with Aung San Suu Kyi and who wanted to isolate her totally. We had some reason to believe that there were some different factions, but the Burmese were never really forthcoming. The collective decision of the Burmese military continued to reflect a hard line.

Outside the government, Aung San Suu Kyi's supporters who won the 1990 elections by a landslide - many of them were harassed or imprisoned. The only other force in Burma are the

ethnic groups. There were a lot of ethnic insurgencies in Burma, including three or four different major rebellions. The Burmese military junta moved to crush and/or reconcile itself with each of these different groups, to make sure that they could consolidate their power. Through military pressure and some process of negotiations and bribery, they managed to stamp out several of the ethnic insurgencies.

Some of these groups were at least potential allies of Aung San Suu Kyi, at least temporary allies of convenience with a common enemy. They might have been able to weaken the Burmese Government's central control of the country, but the alliance of these ethnic groups with Aung San Suu Kyi was not particularly effective. As a practical matter, there was no real way that we could deal with them. Some of these ethnic groups were engaged in drug trafficking, so they weren't necessarily good guys either.

*Q: Still sticking to this general area, did Hong Kong amount to anything in particular?*

LORD: I can't recall how much we talked about Hong Kong in the China context. This was not a major agenda item with the Chinese or British, although we were concerned about the return of Hong Kong to China in July, 1997. We made clear our interests in China's living up to its obligations to preserve Hong Kong's autonomy. I visited Hong Kong several times and always met with Governor Patten, Anson Chan, the local Chinese representative and Americans and Hong Kong business leaders and Hong Kong legislators including Marin Lee, plus the media. Patten, in my view, was terrific and very courageous in trying to carve out political space and freedom for Hong Kong before the Chinese took over. He incurred Beijing's wrath and insults by pursuing reforms that gave the Hong Kong people somewhat more political clout. He was trying to make it difficult for the Chinese to roll back this process after the 1997 takeover. I - and our government - strongly supported Patten, who was extremely impressive. We established good personal ties as well.

Now let me review Mongolia briefly.

I always had a soft spot in my heart for Mongolia. To the credit of Jim Baker, the former Secretary of State under President Bush, he visited Mongolia twice. Once he was supposed to visit there even longer and do some hunting. Then there was some kind of international crisis that he had to leave Mongolia to deal with.

*Q: It was the Gulf War.*

LORD: The bad news is that I believe Baker went to Mongolia during his tenure as Secretary of State twice as often as he went to Japan. He went to Japan only once, I believe, which, in my view, reflects a somewhat skewed priority.

Although it was obviously not at the top of my list, Mongolia at least deserved attention and sympathy for several reasons.

First, it was the first Asian country to throw off the yoke of the Soviet Union, in 1990 or 1991. You should remember that the Mongolian economy was about 90 percent dependent on the

Soviet Union. So this was a courageous move for Mongolia, even in that early period after the disappearance of Soviet influence and empire.

Secondly, the Mongolians have tried consistently now, and for several years, including my term as Assistant Secretary, to promote both economic and political reform. Mongolia is unlike Vietnam and unlike China, which have only gone in for economic reform, and are still authoritarian in outlook. Mongolia promoted democracy at the same time as they promoted opening up their society to a free market, foreign investment, and trade.

Thirdly, Mongolia is sitting out there between these two giants, Russia and China. There is obviously a lot of romance and nostalgia and admiration for these nomadic people, who have lived between these two giants. Mongolia has no human rights problems. They are trying to promote democracy and the free market. Not only should we have some sympathy for that, but also we believed that they could establish a pattern and influence debate about what course much of Asia is going to take. This concerned the issues of Asian values, authoritarianism, human rights, and more political freedom. Mongolia could be an example, even though a modest one given the fact that while it is a large country, it has a small population of only two or three million people. A successful Mongolia would show that you can have open politics, with free elections and democracy, and make economic progress at the same time. The example of Mongolia could make it possible to counter the Chinese argument - and the phony Asian values argument - that you need stability to make economic progress with "stability" translated into repressive government.

So for all of these reasons, I always worked hard on Mongolia. I labored to get as much aid for Mongolia as possible. Whenever a Mongolian visitor would come to the UN General Assembly or would visit Washington, I would always try to make it possible for him to see as high a level official as possible, like the Secretary of State or the Deputy Secretary. I took two trips to Mongolia. The first trip really demonstrated my commitment. I went in January-February, 1994, when it was ice cold. I went out over the Gobi Desert in a helicopter. I met with all the Mongolian leaders. We had some very interesting geopolitical discussions in the Gobi Desert with their National Security Adviser and their Foreign Minister. I was very moved by the whole experience.

I went back to Mongolia in the fall of 1995 with the First Lady, Mrs. Clinton. We had gone together to China for the International Women's Conference, and we went off from there to Mongolia. She was also very touched by the visit. I've always kept in touch with Mongolia since then. I meet periodically with their Ambassadors in Washington and in New York.

After I left government, I pressed for a time to have President Clinton stop in Mongolia when he went to China, but I gave up on that after a while. I thought that the symbolism of the President's visiting this neighboring democracy in Asia would be impressive. (On his trip to China, President Clinton didn't even go to Japan).

We managed to get quite a bit of aid for Mongolia, which couldn't absorb all that much. The aid was for energy and for other purposes. The total amount was \$10-\$15 million annually. Given the shrinking AID budget and the fact that Mongolia is rather distant from the point of view of an

average American, we did well. We emphasized to Congress that the Mongolians were trying to promote freedom, as well as the capitalist system. They had no human rights abuses. They had free elections. They went from a communist to a non-communist government. I thought that the Mongolians really deserved our support. Several Senators visited Mongolia and came back supporting an aid program for that country. During the last year I was Assistant Secretary, we got more aid for Mongolia from Congress than we asked for, which is almost unheard of, particularly in a time of declining aid budgets.

Sadly, and as we speak, Mongolia has had some real problems. A certain deadlock has developed between the President of Mongolia and the Prime Minister and Government. The jury is still out on what they're going to do. I spent more time on Mongolia than, perhaps, many people would think that it deserved. But I had a soft spot in my heart for that country, and I thought it was an important example of courageous people trying to move in the right direction.

*Q: Should we talk about Australia and New Zealand?*

So the subjects we discussed with Australia were UN peacekeeping, various regional conflicts, and issues like Cambodia, relations with key Asian countries like China and Japan, open trade, progress toward free trade, lifting APEC to the summit level, forceful and regional security dialogues, always being forthcoming and trying to move these dialogues along, while taking on the Chinese and others, environmental and non-proliferation issues. These discussions with Australia really reflected dream relationship.

Interestingly enough, Australia was the one country in Asia with which we had a trade surplus. Indeed, the Australians used to point out that, in terms of the percentage of trade, their deficit with us was bigger than our trading deficit with Japan. I remember the first AUSMIN meeting, because it was in March, 1994. It involved bringing Secretary Christopher to Australia as well as Perry. This was on the way to the terribly difficult Christopher trip to China, when the Chinese had locked up dissidents.

Anyway, I remember this AUSMIN trip for that reason. When we got to Australia, we had terrific meetings of Defense and State Department representatives. We agreed on just about everything. However, at that point, as I've said elsewhere, we were having difficulties both in our Chinese and Japanese relationships. With China, because of human rights and the MFN issues. With Japan, because of trade disputes - Mickey Kantor, the U.S. Trade Representative, took on Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto and others, and so on. Even though Evans and Keating and the Australians in general were very high on human rights and democracy, they didn't think that we ought to link them with trade and MFN with China. They also didn't think that we should be getting into a big battle with Japan, particularly when it looked, as a result of our poor public relations that we were in favor of managed trade, while Japan was in favor of freer trade. This of course turned upside down our two countries' positions.

I mention all of this, because when we came out for a joint press conference with Foreign Minister Evans and Secretary of State Christopher, as often happens, the media focused on the one problem area. 99 percent of our agenda and meetings had been positive. We had a tremendous communique. We had agreed to cooperate on all of these regional and global issues.

However, Evans got one or two questions on Japan and China. He took a whack at U.S. policy, and that just dominated the entire media coverage in Australia and the U.S. coverage of the meeting. So it looked as if we had had poor meeting whereas, in fact, we had had a fabulous meeting. This was really unfair and the media often do that - bad news is more news than good news.

Secretary Christopher was annoyed at that, including Evans' role, although you can't really blame Evans for giving an honest answer and then having the Australian press totally dominated by it. The press likes to fasten on differences between countries. We had such a love match with the Australians on all of these issues that it was almost boring. It was unfortunate that such a successful visit was marred by this media slant. Not to mention the fact that we were all preoccupied by the upcoming Christopher visit to China.

So, although Australia was helpful and would talk about East Timor and human rights, as we did, and was probably more helpful than any other country in Asia in this respect, Australia was certainly not more forceful than we were or out in front of us on that issue. As I said, Australia was helpful on human rights with the Chinese, even though sometimes it cost them. It was helpful on Cambodia, and on all of these other issues. However, I wouldn't say that they were more forceful than we were. Just that they looked better than any other Asian country. They were in the habit of being helpful to us.

Also, another thing that the Australians were doing, which I clearly understood and had no problem with, was that they were trying to become more of an Asian country. Of course, they had started out with an almost undiluted, heavy, British background. So they looked to England and Europe and the Commonwealth in general until recent years. Then they shifted in their trade patterns, their alliances, their interests, and influence. They looked more to the United States, which is now a major influence on Australia. Now Australia, when I was in office, also wanted to be seen more as Asians than Europeans. They were excluded by Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia from his EAEC [East Asian Conference] concept, which made the Australians (and New Zealanders) mad because they thought that they should be accepted as Asians.

Australian trade patterns were beginning to be more with Asia and not just with the U.S. and Europe.

What I have to cover now are a couple of functional matters.

*Q: I was going to ask you about APEC, mutual defense, and Asian values. I think that we can also cover a couple of other matters.*

LORD: Some of this I have touched on tangentially already, but let me go now to APEC and then regional security.

*Q: Could you explain what APEC stands for and how it came to be?*

LORD: APEC stands for the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. It is, perhaps, the most awkward name ever devised. The word "Forum" is usually dropped, so just call it APEC.

It's a trans-Pacific operation which had been started a few years earlier. I believe that the first meeting of the group took place in Australia, and some of the other, early meetings took place in Seoul [South Korea] and elsewhere. It was designed to promote freer trade and investment in the Pacific area. It included the major countries of the Asia-Pacific area, plus the United States and Canada. Under a compromise that had been worked out a few years earlier in Seoul it also included both Taiwan and China. It's one of those organizations which didn't require statehood to be a member, like the UN. Rather, one could become a member of APEC if it were a recognized, economic entity. Given Taiwan's economic importance, the Chinese allowed Taiwan in, although there was constant fighting about how much influence Taiwan could have, at what level, and so on. Hong Kong was also a member.

When the Clinton Administration came into office, there had been a lot of "alphabet soup" going on in the Pacific area, including economic and other organizations. Even I can't remember all of the initials, but there was the Pacific Basin Economic Council and a couple of others. Some of them were strictly to promote trade and investment. Others were think tanks, and there was a whole bunch of organizations. However, this seemed to be easily the most promising to us. It always met at the foreign minister and trade minister level.

We decided, and I highlighted this also in my confirmation statement, that in striving to elevate Asia in our foreign policy agenda and to build incrementally, with others, a Pacific Community we would blend both bilateral and regional approaches to Asia. If it were a matter of defense, this obviously meant maintaining our bilateral relationships and alliances but also promoting a regional security dialogue.

For example, if we were concerned about Korea, we would wind up not only promoting bilateral talks between both North and South Koreans but also four power talks, including China and the U.S. If it was APEC, we wanted to pursue trade and investment bilaterally, but we also wanted to use APEC for trade and investment liberalization. Often, it's easier to encourage countries to open up if there is collective pressure, not to mention incentives, than if it was just a bilateral meeting with another country. We thought that, over time, whether it was Japan, China, or whoever else where we had trade problems, not only would we negotiate with them bilaterally but we also hoped that the collective commitments and pressures toward freer trade in the area would work on these countries as well and help us to open them up. In this way we wouldn't have to do all of the heavy lifting by ourselves, even as we hoped that the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and then the WTO [World Trade Organization] would help on a global basis.

We also saw APEC as being important because it included the U.S. and Canada. Therefore, it was trans-Pacific in character and would tend to head off regional blocs limited to Asia only, including the EAEC [East Asian Economic Caucus]. However, one of the debates about trade policy concerns whether it is dangerous to have a regional organization like APEC, or one like NAFTA [North American Free Trade Area] tending to promote trade within blocs, as opposed to a global approach to trade, under the GATT and now the WTO. The fact is that these two approaches are not mutually inconsistent. We always referred to APEC and the North American Free Trade Association as leading toward or at least promoting global trade liberalization, not as regional trading blocs as such.

Indeed, we used movement on trade and investment in APEC, as I'll mention in a minute, as an inducement to the Europeans to be more reasonable in GATT and in the Uruguay Round. It also helped to spur progress in the Western Hemisphere.

So we had the fortunate calendar timing that I mentioned earlier. There were 15 members of APEC when the Clinton administration entered office. The host country for these meetings rotates every year. It just so happened that in the first year of President Clinton's first term, the U.S. was the host country. Even as the G-7 [meeting of the largest industrial countries] had taken place in Tokyo, when there was a one out of seven chance that the G-7 meeting in its first year would be held in Asia. We used that to promote the Pacific community right off the bat in the Clinton administration. So the U.S. was the host nation for APEC in 1993, and the meeting was held in Seattle. This provided an opportunity to put Asia on the map in our foreign policy, public consciousness, and also in Asia's perception of American priorities.

Later in the game, and with the support of Prime Minister Keating of Australia, President Clinton and the White House agreed, roughly in June or July, 1993, to raise APEC to the Summit Level at the meeting scheduled to be held in Seattle, Washington, in November. This would be the first ever summit meeting of Asia-Pacific powers, in and of itself important. We would give APEC more visibility. We would increase the pressure on the various bureaucracies to come up with meaningful arrangements to make progress for their leaders. It would give political impetus from the top on trade and investment, and not just at the ministerial level. This would help to anchor the U.S. in the Pacific area. It would show Presidential leadership, particularly on an issue like international trade, which was very important to our domestic economy and increasing our exports. And it would mean that every year the President would meet with Asian-Pacific heads of government, usually traveling to the region.

President Clinton had based his campaign on the slogan, "It's the economy, stupid." So it all played into Clinton's domestic priorities. Clinton was very conversant and comfortable with trade and economic matters, unlike with some other, foreign policy issues on which he had very little experience.

For all of these reasons we promoted lifting the APEC meeting to the Summit Level. It's one of the best things we ever did. It meant a huge challenge for our Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, with 15 heads of state or government coming to the U.S. There was an awful lot of agenda items to prepare for, and to coordinate with the White House, with the U.S. Trade Representative, the Department of Commerce, and the Treasury Department. There was the whole scheme, with all of the separate bilateral meetings, plus all of the other paraphernalia of a Summit Meeting.

The meeting was held in Seattle, of course, on the other side of the American continent, involving not only heads of state and governments, but economic and foreign ministers, with all of the schedules, logistics, and preparations required. With the great help of my principal deputy, Peter Tomsen, we put together a major task force in the Department of State and practically coordinated for the whole U.S. Government a large part of the substance of the meeting, working with others, of course. We also were involved in working out the logistics of this large scale

meeting. I think that it's one of the best things that our bureau ever did. This was fairly early in my tenure as Assistant Secretary, and I give full credit to my colleagues for their efforts.

We had one, specific diplomatic challenge, too. That was the representation of Taiwan at this Summit Meeting. As long as it was not at the Summit Level, China had lived with a Taiwanese economic minister coming to the APEC meetings, but did not want to have the Taiwanese foreign minister attend, for symbolic reasons. Taiwan always had a minister there, just as other countries did. But the other countries also had foreign ministers attending in previous years.

When you get to the Summit Level, what do you do? Taiwan, of course, wanted to send President Lee Teng-hui, and the Chinese were sending Jiang Zemin. The Chinese said that they would not agree to having Lee Teng-hui at the meeting. So we had a hell of a challenge. Again, my deputy, Peter Tomsen, took this on, including the preparatory meetings on APEC, which I also went to. Tomsen was the point person for the preliminary arrangements, with the help of Sandy Kristoff. After working with the Taiwanese and the Chinese we worked out a deal in Seattle at the working level, which was then referred back to the respective capitals. The Chinese agreed that Taiwan could attend, although they had not even wanted a Taiwan representative there at the Summit Meeting. The Chinese agreed that the Taiwanese could still participate in the meetings of the foreign or economic ministers prior to the Summit Meeting itself. However, the Chinese didn't want to sit in the same room with, or accept the presence of, someone else representing Taiwan at the chiefs of state level. This would look like two states or two governments representing China.

It wasn't easy, but we got the Chinese to agree that Taiwan could attend. We got Taiwan to agree in turn that the chief Taiwanese representative would not be Lee Tung-Hui, the President of Taiwan. Instead, the chief Taiwanese representative would be a kind of super economic minister. He was at a somewhat higher level than the chief Taiwanese representative had previously been at APEC meetings, but he was still not a head of state or head of government. His functions were purely economic.

We thought that this was a pretty ingenious deal, which has held up every year since then at APEC Summit Meetings. Prior to these meetings Taiwan and China would come to us. Taiwan would want to up the level. We would say: "Go to the host country. It's their problem this year, not ours." They have always stuck to this level, and it's probably going to continue to stay at this level. However, our arrangement was a matter of considerable significance. Taiwan is very important, economically.

I've already told the story perhaps, but I'll tell it again. On the way out to Seattle, President Clinton was going over his speech. He came across a phrase which he told the speechwriter he liked very much. The text said that Asian countries had gone from being dominos to being dynamos. In a very generous and unusual gesture for a speechwriter, he said that this was a phrase from Winston Lord. The President's speech was carried on national television two days later and was interrupted by applause. The President said that Winston Lord came up with that phrase. He said that Lord had a lot of good ideas but he came up with that phrase. I've always been grateful to the speechwriter.

Anyway, Secretary of State Christopher gave a major speech on Asian policy. The President gave another speech. We got a lot of visibility out of this in the press and around Asia. We had a very fortunate chain of events in this connection, which made this even more successful. Just before President Clinton arrived in Seattle, he got a favorable vote out of the Senate approving the NAFTA Treaty, using the APEC meeting as leverage to a certain extent.

*Q: [NAFTA is the North American Free Trade Association.]*

LORD: He got that with Republican Party votes, certainly. It was a good example of how President Clinton, when he really throws himself into something, can get something done. Unfortunately, he doesn't often do that on foreign policy, but he did in this case. He won a very tough vote on the approval of NAFTA. If he had lost that vote, it would have been another day or two before he arrived in Seattle. He would have come into the APEC meeting severely weakened politically. He would have gone to a major conference on trade and investment after having lost to his own Senate. Conversely, having won that vote, President Clinton came in with considerable momentum, having won a major victory on an issue that had looked very tough.

Together with the Asian leaders, he worked out a statement which at the first year of meetings at the Summit Level, was essentially a vision for the future. It wasn't concrete yet, but it was a commitment by all of the leaders attending the APEC meeting to promote freer trade and investment in the region. It stressed the importance of working together. It contained a lot of visionary language. This was very much needed. The very fact that it took place at the Summit Level was a real achievement during the first year of such meetings. No specific agreements were needed. This gave a whole new lift to APEC, which had been meandering along, in the shadows, without making much progress. Now it was a useful meeting each year.

So that APEC meeting really was a huge success. In subsequent years APEC made further progress. The most dramatic step came the next year when APEC took that vision, and the leaders agreed, that there would be free trade and investment throughout the Asia-Pacific area by the year 2020. For the developed countries like the U.S., Japan, and a couple of others, this goal was to be reached by the year 2010. Now, a few years later, this may look relatively cautious, since these are objectives to be achieved in 20-25 years. However, at the time, we were talking about the elimination, in principle, of all tariffs and investment barriers throughout this huge, vast region, which is the fastest growing area in the world. It offers the greatest terrain for U.S. exports.

This was a pretty bold objective. From the standpoint of the United States, it is particularly good, because most of our tariffs and investment restrictions are fairly low, anyway, and we have relatively free trade. Whereas in countries like China and Japan, as well as in Southeast Asia, this objective has major implications. Even though this deadline was some time off in the future, the value of a deadline like that is that investors, governments, and entrepreneurs start making decisions about trade and investment, knowing that this element of much freer trade and investment is coming up. So this was a major political, as well as economic, statement made in 1994 in Bogor, Indonesia.

In the following year, 1995, the APEC meeting was held in Osaka, Japan. The meetings are

always held in November of each year. There are always lots of lesser meetings throughout the year in preparation for this meeting. Foreign and trade ministers meet just before the Summit Meeting itself, doing business of a more nitty, gritty nature than the leaders. The summit leaders would lay out a vision for the next year and would be working at it for the next 12 months. Then the foreign and trade ministers would reach agreement in November and report to their leaders.

Right after that, the Summit Meeting itself would be held, issuing new directives for the next year. It was sort of a rolling process.

*Q: I notice that when you were saying "Asia-Pacific," you were also saying, "the United States and Canada" on some other issue. There were two other countries that I was thinking of: Mexico and Chile.*

LORD: Yes. I'm glad that you mentioned that. Membership is an issue that came up. There is a classic question, first of all, as to whether you deepen a fairly new, international organization, or whether you widen it. The EEC [European Economic Commission] faced that issue in Europe. Nor was there a clear, overriding threat, like the Soviet Union during the Cold War. So there was always a debate about that.

In APEC we were talking about important countries of the Pacific area. In the Western Hemisphere there are countries like Chile, Mexico, and Peru. The primary considerations are that they are important in terms of trade, they border on the Pacific Ocean, and they are generally free traders. Then, of course, there are other claimants for membership in APEC. Russia considers itself a Pacific power. Shouldn't they be included in APEC? Vietnam was a growing power. Shouldn't they be in APEC? So there were a lot of debates and controversy, particularly at the foreign minister level. It occupied us during the first couple of years.

Secretary of State Christopher got around this issue by declaring a moratorium after letting in Mexico and Chile. We then had a three-year moratorium, and this issue of expansion began to come up again after I left the Government. Since then Russia and Vietnam have expressed interest in joining APEC.

*Q: Could we continue for a little more and talk about Asian values, whatever that means, and the issue of regional defense? Then could you talk about Secretary of State Warren Christopher and President Clinton and your views about them? Then about the budget squeeze?*

LORD: Let me discuss those questions, minus Secretary Christopher and President Clinton. We can see whether we have the time and energy to discuss them or whether I ought to think more systematically about them. We could start with them the next time.

*Q: Sure, no problem.*

LORD: And we could look at the other substantive issues. What would that cover?

*Q: Well, here you were, the head of the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, dealing with the appointment of Ambassadors and so forth. I'd also like to ask for your views about the American*

*Institute on Taiwan (AIT), political Ambassadors, and general matters of that kind.*

LORD: We can get back to those and deal with the other issues here.

Regarding the issue of regional security, I talked about that in my confirmation statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in terms of the building of the Pacific Community. As another aspect of our East Asian policy, we wanted to blend both the bilateral and the regional aspects of it, particularly as the Pacific area really wasn't a community at that time. You don't throw away your important bilateral relationships. You maintain and strengthen them and you also try to build some of these regional approaches. I've mentioned various examples of that.

This is where we departed somewhat from the policy of previous administrations. On the whole, Asian policy has been fairly consistent from one administration to another, though with some different nuances and emphases. For example, we raised the APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Conference] meetings to a summit level, and we were more aggressive on normalization with Vietnam.

On regional security we took a different tack. Frankly, I did this without any particular authorization because I was still in the process of being confirmed. I more or less previewed this different tack in my confirmation statement. The Bush Administration approach, which I think was quite understandable was that if you encourage regional security organizations and dialogues, you run some serious risks. Encouraging new regional security organizations might be interpreted by our Asian friends as an effort by us of seeking a way out of our responsibilities, of trying to turn over the burdens of American defense responsibilities in the East Asian region, in both psychological and financial terms, to regional organizations in an effort to try slowly to withdraw from the region. So we might be sending the wrong signals if we indicated that we thought that new regional security arrangements could replace our long standing bilateral alliances. Secretary Baker had specifically laid out a concept that our Asia policy should be composed of spokes in a wheel, with the U.S. in the middle of this wheel, and with various, bilateral spokes going out from it.

Also, the previous, [Bush] administration had plausibly pointed out that Asia is not Europe. Asia is much more culturally diverse and more geographically spread out. There is no real, collective security approach, unlike NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] in Europe. So any possible parallel approaches would not really hold up. Also, as I have pointed out, regional security schemes, which had popped up over the course of many years, often had a subversive quality. The Russians, and Brezhnev in particular, often used to propose collective security in Asia, precisely to try to reduce American influence. This Russian idea appeared to involve turning to peacekeeping and a collective mini-UN type of approach, in order to drive out the U.S.

So for all of these reasons there was little enthusiasm in the previous administration for regional security arrangements.

I took a different view. I don't think that there was unanimous agreement in the new administration but I encouraged this for those who hadn't thought about it. I set this idea forth in my confirmation statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

I said that, first of all, we reaffirmed our bilateral alliances. They came first. We should not lightly dismiss them or in any way call them into question. In fact, we should try to strengthen them. They were still relevant and still important in the world following the end of the Cold War. That should be our foundation.

Secondly, another foundation should be our forward military presence. We had reached the level of roughly 100,000 troops deployed in East Asia, having reduced this level down from about 130,000 during the latter phase of the Cold War. We should make clear that we were going to maintain a level of about 100,000 troops deployed in East Asia, assuming that the host countries, and particularly Japan and South Korea, the major powers concerned, wanted to continue to have us do that. I said that these countries wanted us to maintain this level of troop deployments as a stabilizing presence. So in no way would we question these foundations which were in place and which the previous administration had also been in favor of.

However, to supplement and not to supplant these foundations, we could begin to look to the conduct of a regional security dialogue. Not as a replacement, as I said, but as an additional factor to deal with this vast region of East Asia. I said that we should do this gradually. This should not be seen as an attempt to shed our responsibilities. Rather, we should seek to reduce tensions and promote a better climate in the area, even as we maintained our hard headed alliances and a forward, military presence.

Conceivably, over a long period of time, maybe the climate would change and these regional organizations would be strong enough that we could begin to reduce our presence in the area. However, we didn't assume that this would happen, and this wasn't our purpose. This was to be added insurance for security purposes and stability.

We felt that we should encourage regional dialogue, though not so much on the level of NATO. NATO was one bloc set against another bloc in Europe and a defined threat in the form of the Soviet Union. Rather, we should seek to develop a gradually increasing dialogue with the countries of East Asia to have a better understanding of each other's intentions, reduce miscalculations, build up a somewhat greater climate of trust, and talk about sensitive issues. We would seek to develop confidence-building measures and perhaps to move on to preventive diplomacy, where you seek to head off conflicts, and even get to the point of conflict resolution, where you try to resolve conflicts.

When we came into office, an annual practice had developed under my predecessors. Every year, in the spring, usually in May, there was a meeting with the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries at the Assistant Secretary level to prepare the agenda of security issues for a subsequent meeting in July, when the Foreign Ministers would meet. This Foreign Ministers meeting was called the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. The Ministerial Conference was a summit meeting of ASEAN leaders and their Foreign Ministers. After that, the ASEAN countries would have a dialogue with key outside powers in two forms. First, there would be a series of bilateral dialogues. The ASEAN leaders would sit with their interlocutors from the United States, the EEC [European Economic Community] countries, Japan, China, Australia, and New Zealand. By that time, the Republic of Korea was also included. Second, the

ministers of all of these countries would meet at one time in one place and talk about regional issues.

There was no attempt to do any work between these sessions, such as holding committee meetings. There wasn't much discussion of sensitive issues. The participants made mostly set statements. These really didn't go very far.

So the first thing I did was to make sure that Secretary of State Christopher would be willing to attend this ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. Generally, the Secretary of State attended these meetings, but on a couple of occasions he missed attending these sessions. That sent a very bad signal. I wanted to make sure that as part of our effort to make some fast progress with our Asian associates, our Secretary of State would attend these post-ministerial meetings.

Again, just as was the case with APEC, this was very useful, not only for the dialogue with the Asian countries but also for the various bilateral meetings that we would have. So it was possible to have bilateral meetings with other countries which were there to have a dialogue with ASEAN countries, as well as the dialogues we had there in the collective meeting.

In 1994 we agreed to invite other key countries which had not been attending this post ministerial conference. We wanted them to join that, and we arranged to call this meeting the ASEAN Regional Forum, or the ARF. I was always glad that we didn't call it the "Biannual ASEAN Regional Forum," which might have been contracted to "BARF!" So we included China, Vietnam, Russia, Laos, and Papua New Guinea, which had not previously attended this meeting. We agreed that every year, at the Foreign Ministers' level, these countries would meet with the rest of us collectively, in addition to the ongoing bilateral meetings with ASEAN.

We also maintained the somewhat separate grouping; the ASEAN post ministerial conference had become a little cumbersome. We really talked generally about relations between the countries concerned. The discussions were not limited to security matters. The new ASEAN Regional Forum as such was just concerned with security issues.

Starting in July, 1994, we would start first with the ASEAN Regional Forum [ARF]. It started out as a half day's meeting and then extended into a full day. The emphasis was on very informal meetings with only the Foreign Ministers and one aide present from each country participating. In that case I was the aide present with Secretary of State Christopher. Since then they have managed to expand participation to one more person, so that they could get someone from the Pentagon attending. There would be a note taker in another room, listening in on a public address system, so thank God I didn't have to take notes! There was just the Secretary of State, me, and another official. After that we would have the post ministerial conference, on issues beyond security.

We made modest progress throughout this period. Several interesting things happened. At first the Chinese were quite cautious. They were happy to join these consultations but they didn't want to discuss sensitive issues there. They wanted to keep it a general discussion, partly because they wanted to deal on sensitive issues with countries on an individual basis, particularly with regard to the South China Sea, which was of interest to many ASEAN countries. The Chinese

figured that they could throw their weight around by dealing with this issue bilaterally. They were worried that if the various issues involved in the South China Sea became involved in an ASEAN forum, they would have to take on ASEAN collectively. There were other issues which they didn't want to discuss, such as Taiwan and so forth.

So in the early going we tried to make progress in the sense of discussing sensitive issues at these meetings. In addition, we sought to have meetings throughout the year in between these Foreign Ministers' meetings. We talked about confidence building measures that could be explored at these sessions. However, the Chinese wanted to go slowly. Some of the other countries such as Malaysia, I believe, also wanted to go slowly. Some other countries, such as Australia, Singapore, and the United States, wanted to move more quickly. Japan and Korea were somewhere in between.

As time went on the Chinese became a little more relaxed about becoming engaged, and more sensitive issues, including the South China Sea, came up. We even discussed Burma, which, after all, is a Southeast Asian country. We discussed Burma while the Chinese were sitting there, and they even joined in the discussion. So the dialogue became a little freer and a little more spontaneous, with a little less speech-making. I don't want to exaggerate the speed of the process. It still had some distance to go at this point.

We also got the Foreign Ministers to agree on confidence building measures, and the U.S. did much of the heavy lifting in this respect. Countries agreed to issue white papers on their defense policies. During this period China issued its first two white papers on this subject. There was cooperation on search and rescue issues and on dealing with some natural disasters. There was some discussion of having observers present at military exercises and arranging for exchanges of military officials.

So the first step in the ASEAN Regional Forum agendas was to include these confidence building measures, involving greater transparency and cooperation. We hoped to move over time into more diplomatic areas, such as perhaps preventing crises or at least heading off miscalculations, and maybe some day getting into conflict resolution, although we were a long way from that.

One specific contribution the ASEAN Regional Forum made involved Mischief Reef, a disputed island which China occupied in the Spratley Islands, which the Philippines claimed as its territory. It was close to the Philippines. There was a lot of tension about this island where the Chinese were establishing a presence. We issued a very strong statement. It was not anti-Chinese, but it was clearly meant to warn China against the use of force. We said that we took no stand on the territorial issues involved here, but said that there shouldn't be any unilateral actions. The international law of the sea and freedom of navigation should be observed, and we hoped that the countries involved would work out this matter peacefully. This was a much stronger statement than had ever been made previously. There also was a rather strong ASEAN statement which supported the Philippines.

I believe that the advent in 1994 of the ASEAN Regional Forum added to the pressure on the Chinese to back off, to talk to ASEAN collectively, and to behave themselves on this issue. So

the advent of the ASEAN Regional Forum meeting, together with these other actions, persuaded the Chinese to back down. It helped to defuse that crisis. This showed the potential of the ASEAN Regional Forum.

We added a couple of more members, Cambodia and Mongolia, in the ASEAN Regional Forum which, we felt, were important. Meanwhile, we had to differentiate this meeting from the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference. We were trying to push the latter conference into more global issues, like nuclear non-proliferation and terrorism, and even some issues which overlapped with APEC, such as the environment.

I don't want to exaggerate the significance of the ASEAN Regional Forum, but we thought that we had started something which could be quite useful. Under the umbrella of these meetings we held bilateral discussions with the Chinese, because Secretary of State Christopher would always meet with the Chinese Foreign Minister on such occasions. As I said, even though Christopher only made two trips to China, he met with the Chinese often, in various cities. He also attended high-level, trilateral meetings on Korea (U.S., Japan, South Korea) which took place around the edges of ARF. So this was another part of our effort to build a Pacific Community.

*Q: I gather that with these institutions you have to draw the line somewhere.*

LORD: Yes.

*Q: However, as I look at the map and think of some of the issues involved, I would think that there would be a temptation to bring India into the discussions as an observer, or something like that. In a way, India has some interest in a good number of these matters.*

LORD: I'm glad you made that point. I'm glad you mentioned this. In my last year as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs [1996] Indian participation became a hot issue for exactly the reasons that you mentioned, in view of India's geographical position, to some extent its naval capability, and the tensions in its relationship with China.

So as you can imagine there was a debate, and even within the U.S. Government, on Indian participation. You can imagine the debate that took place between the various bureaus of the State Department on this matter. The issue was a classic one. There were all of the reasons mentioned for including India. However, the problem was how to include India without including Pakistan. When you start opening up the membership...

*Q: Then you have to include Sri Lanka and others.*

LORD: And you turn it into a sort of mini-UN. On balance, I favored including India, drawing the line against including Pakistan, even though this might cause some strain with Pakistan. I think that India has a clear, East Asian dimension, just by virtue of geography and culture. It has a much greater interest and presence in East Asia than Pakistan.

I felt that the way to do this was to make clear that Sub-Continent, South Asian issues like Kashmir and so forth, would not be discussed. We would only discuss East Asian issues with

India's participation. Obviously, there was no happy way to resolve this, and Pakistan was not pleased. We worked hard on this matter. I worked effectively with Singapore behind the scenes. Singapore has a heavy Indian influence and so wanted to include India. One of the Singapore arguments, which I agreed with, was rather subtle. Singapore argued that the inclusion of India in the ASEAN Regional Forum would increase leverage on the Chinese. Any consideration of Chinese-Indian tensions would involve having one more entity to work with in dealing with these tensions, not to mention the legitimate security concerns of China, India, etc.

*Q: Absolutely. When you look at this matter, it really looks incomplete.*

LORD: You are very perceptive. I can't think of anything else.

*Q: While you were Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, how did the Indians respond to the matter of inclusion in the ASEAN Regional Forum? Did you find that they were a positive influence?*

LORD: Yes. India was only included in the forum during the last year I was there [1996]. They were quite responsible, and very grateful to the U.S., and me personally, for getting them in.

*Q: I think you have already referred to it but I wonder if you could explain the issue of Asian values.*

LORD: Yes. There is one other thing I would like to mention first. One of the challenges facing the ASEAN Regional Forum was that it was pretty well driven by the ASEAN countries themselves. They organized it and provided the host country every year. However, there was a feeling that the ASEAN countries perhaps dominated the organization too much. After all, by the time I left the Bureau of East Asian Affairs, while the six ASEAN members were in the process of increasing to 10, there were 19 members of ARF [ASEAN Regional Forum]. With the increase of ASEAN members to 10 the ASEAN countries provided about half of the membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum. So we often met with non-ASEAN members of the ARF to try and get our strategies aligned. Not so much with China but with some of the other countries. We thought that ASEAN had a right to provide a certain driving force in the ASEAN Regional Forum, but we also didn't want the ASEAN countries to dominate everything.

Also, to the extent that the ASEAN Regional Forum was driven by the ASEAN countries, it didn't seem particularly well suited to discuss Northeast Asian situations. We would talk about Korean issues and, to a certain extent, China-Taiwan, and U.S.-Japan defense relations in the ARF as part of our effort to discuss sensitive issues. However, part of the problem with the size and diversity of the ARF, which I supported, was that you couldn't really discuss some of these key issues in any meaningful way.

We had always envisaged our approach to regional security as not only involving alliances and foreign military presences plus the ASEAN regional dialogue. We also thought of other groupings which would address specific issues. On Korea, for example, we ended up with Four Power Talks (the two Koreas, China, and the U.S.). We also started an informal, non-governmental six power dialogue on security. We called it the Northeast Asian Security

Dialogue. This was organized by a professor from the University of San Diego named Susan Shirk, who is now Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs. With her help and leadership we created a grouping of six countries, including the U.S., Japan, South Korea, North Korea, China, and Russia.

There was one exploratory meeting held during my first year in the Bureau, which was at the technical level. This meeting was attended by academic figures and governmental officials from Defense and Foreign Ministries, in their unofficial capacities. There were North Koreans attending that first meeting. We generally had yearly meetings afterwards at the deputy level (Peter Tomsen went for the U.S.), but we never got the North Koreans to join in this unofficial organization. Partly for that reason, we never tried to make this an official organization, but this remained our longer term goal. We felt that it was important to have a smaller grouping concerned with Northeast Asia, which would be more manageable than the ASEAN Regional Forum. Also, this sent a certain signal to the ASEAN Regional Forum that we had other options if the ASEAN countries tried to dominate the proceedings in the ARF.

We felt that at unofficial meetings people would speak more freely than they could if they attended as government officials. This was something like sending scouts out on the terrain, trying to see what the situation was. They would report back to their governments, even though the meetings were unofficial. We were working with some academics and scholars, trying to see whether some progress could be made. That was another area where we tried to make progress, although we never got very far.

A couple of points on "global issues" before I get to the issue of Asian values. In my March, 1993 confirmation hearings, I included matters related to the environment and other "global issues." President Clinton and Secretary of State Christopher put emphasis on these global issues. We can no longer call them new, but they were still fresh issues in addition to the traditional security and economic matters. Other such issues besides the environment were refugees, terrorism, drugs, and international crime. Some people would put down nuclear proliferation under this heading. So I included that as one of the ten challenges I mentioned in my confirmation statement. It seemed to me that, by definition, since most of these were global issues, they would have to be treated globally and not regionally. However, just as we can have regional trading groups that led to global approaches, I thought, we can do some work here in the East Asian region on these matters.

I'm not going to pretend that this was our highest priority, but we made some efforts on these global issues, both bilaterally and regionally, as well as globally.

Bilaterally, with Japan, we established what we called a "Common Agenda." I mentioned that in the Japan section of this interview. This includes the environment, natural disasters, AIDS, science and technology, etc. There is a whole range of such issues on which we work collectively with Japan. It never got much publicity, but we did a lot of useful work.

With China we similarly tried to carve out positions on some of these issues, which I mentioned in the China section of this interview. We sought to increase cooperation with China on the environment on drugs, terrorism, and other issues. We fleshed out our agenda bilaterally and also

addressed these problems globally.

I went with Mrs. Clinton to the United Nations Conference on Women in 1995.

We would talk about the environment in places like APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Conference] and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The environment was a major part of our agenda in the South Pacific Forum, which I mentioned elsewhere in this interview. The Clinton administration was pro environment and worked on global climate issues or, for example, the coral reef initiative. Secretary of State Christopher gave increased emphasis to the environment within the State Department by appointing an additional Under Secretary for Global Affairs, Tim Wirth, a former U.S. Senator who coordinated the work of various bureaus within this area like the environment, narcotics, crime, human rights, refugees, and so on.

Under this heading the drug issue was important, and there were certain, key countries, such as Burma, which I have already mentioned. With Thailand we had increasing cooperation, and the same thing was true with Laos. There were some discussions with Vietnam. We had some cooperation with Cambodia, where there was a growing problem of drug addiction. We had considerable cooperation with China, where there was more and more concern about the drug problem.

Thus, we did pay some attention to global issues. I can't say that we ever really achieved a great deal, although we certainly made some progress, in terms of some of our bilateral relationships, and to a certain extent with APEC and elsewhere where we had more systematic discussions of the issues.

Finally, let's move on to the whole question of democracy and human rights, and the related so-called Asian values. I hate to keep referring to my confirmation statement but I knew that matters of this kind were going to be a part of the intellectual and political debate during my projected four years as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs, or however long my tenure in office was going to be. So I paid considerable attention to issues of that kind. I made promoting democracy and human rights the tenth of my goals, although this did not mean that this issue was the tenth most important. Indeed, in a way, it summarized the intellectual challenge. I couldn't put it first, but putting it in tenth place gave it more visibility than making it fifth or sixth, and it cut across all the other nine issues.

Promoting human rights and democracy amounted to a mixed bag in Asia. There were a lot of established democracies of different types in the region, or what we would call democracies. Among these are Japan, which, of course, is essentially a one-party democracy. In South Korea they have made considerable progress in making more sense of their political system; South Korea had become a democracy, with elections, by the time we entered office. Taiwan is making its democracy take root, making clear that Chinese care about freedom. The Philippines and Thailand are democracies. Mongolia is struggling to become a full-fledged democracy. In Asia and around the world, people have struggled and even risked their lives to vote, whether in Cambodia, where almost 90 percent of the people voted, crossing minefields and facing massive intimidation, or in Mongolia, traveling for miles and miles on horseback in order to vote. All of this, in my mind, proves that democracy is one of the universal aspirations of mankind and that it

isn't just a Western concern. The people time and again showed that it was important in their view.

The field of human rights is not the same thing as democracy but closely related to it. Human rights are most respected and protected in democratic systems. I have discussed at length how we handled these issues with China. With Vietnam, as in the case of China, we had a formal dialogue and raised some specific issues as well as the general matter of human rights, including the release of some prisoners. Burma's repression was a key problem. In Indonesia, there were human rights problems, particularly in East Timor. These were some of the major human rights problems. I have just placed each of them in their own context elsewhere in my interview.

In promoting human rights and democracy, I often took on the so-called "Asian values" question, which I tried to include in some of my speeches. I said that we would promote democratic values without arrogance, but also without apology. By saying "without arrogance" I meant that we had to be careful not to be self-righteous and not to display a kind of missionary zeal. That is, other people didn't have to be like us, because they had national histories and cultures that were different. We had to avoid making this the only issue in our bilateral relations, when with these countries we had many security, economic, political, and other interests to deal with. We had to avoid looking as if we were being overbearing on this issue, hurting other interests by looking arrogant or overly zealous. Sometimes we needed to avoid complicating our efforts by being too public and expressing our views in a way which was too much in other people's faces, as it were. This could make it mighty difficult for them to move, even if they wanted to do so. So we tried to avoid arrogance.

However, on the other hand, we also avoided making apologies, in the sense that we made it clear that we stood for certain things in this country. Americans have always had the view that their foreign policy has some idealistic, as well as some practical realpolitik elements. To maintain support for our foreign policies in Congress and among the American people, we had to express some of these values in our relationships. So this was important in our foreign policy generally, as long as we didn't promote them in an arrogant way. We would do this without apology.

Also, in terms of tone, we tried to promote our democracy and human rights in terms of other nations' self-interests, as opposed to just appealing to human goodness and universal aspirations. For example, in my speeches I continually made the case that, in an age of globalization, of computers, fax machines, cellular phones, satellites, and the Internet, a country cannot develop its economy, certainly over a period of time, without opening up its society. You need to have pluralism, openness, and freedom of information if you want to compete in today's world. This is just a matter of objective reality and of self-interest. Maybe, if a country has a small economy, like Singapore's, which has the rule of law but still isn't a full democracy, you can get away with some undemocratic behavior for a while. Maybe, as in the case of China, you can have a mixed bag with economic reform and political repression and, for a while, make progress. But this cannot last long.

Over time, open societies are clearly necessary for development purposes. For example, you cannot attract investment, which you need to develop, if there is not transparency, the rule of

law, the rule of contracts and honoring contracts, which are elements of democracy. For example, you cannot attack corruption, which is so much of a problem in so many countries, including those countries which have an emerging free market system, unless you have a free press to attack corruption and ventilate these problems. You cannot move forward on difficult reforms where there is going to be disagreement about the proper role of the state, without some free dissent and debate, with different viewpoints freely expressed. You cannot have what can be painful transitions where you have at least temporary unemployment or other problems of adjustment in a global economy, without some political safety valves through which people can express dissent peacefully. If they can't express such dissent peacefully, then the only way that they can do so is to take to the streets. I think that that's going to be a problem in China, which has huge problems of unemployment, exacerbated by widespread corruption. If the Chinese Government doesn't give people the chance to express themselves peacefully, there will be more ominous demonstrations of discontent, especially when it gets into the WTO.

We tried to lay out this self interest line and to say that it was in the interest of the Asian countries to loosen up and be more pluralistic and more open. We said that you don't have to attempt to implement Jeffersonian, American democracy. We said that elections aren't the only yardstick of a free society, although elections are important to hold governments accountable because if they make mistakes, there can be peaceful change and some other government can enter power, as happened in Korea and Thailand. In contrast, the previous government of Indonesia was overthrown because Indonesia didn't have a democracy.

So, as I say, we tried to stress the self-interest aspect as well as specific components like the rule of law, free press, etc.

Furthermore, I believed strongly in another reason to promote freedom which we stressed to American audiences. I often raised this with my old boss, Henry Kissinger and others, who were less enthusiastic about how important democracy should be. The fact is that democracy and open societies serve our hard-headed national security interest. I read this in a book - I don't know how a person can judge this, but it's stated in this book that there have been roughly 350 wars fought since 1819 and none of them has been between two established democracies. Whether or not this is absolutely accurate, the fact is that people cannot come up with examples where two democracies have fought each other.

*Q: You can play a real game with the case of Germany versus France in 1914.*

LORD: Well, I wouldn't call the Kaiser's Germany a real democracy. You can get into some semantic battles, but the fact is that, depending on how you define democracies, wars, and so on, it's very hard to find many, if any, examples of two, open democracies fighting each other. Generally, democracies are not aggressive, even against non-democracies, although they will defend their interests.

Furthermore, open, democratic societies don't persecute minorities and their citizens. Therefore, they don't drive people into opposition of a militant kind, because the people can express their views. Or, put another way, democracies don't generate refugees. You lessen refugee flows with open, democratic societies. Furthermore, democratic governments do not practice government or

state terrorism. They are apt to be better trading partners and they are apt to be better in terms of the environment. The Chernobyl disaster occurred partly because Russia did not have a free press reporting on its problems.

So there are a lot of hard-headed, pragmatic reasons to promote human rights and democracy.

So we also wove that theme in. We said that we were not just dealing with some idealistic mission. We know that we have other interests to balance off with human rights and democracy. But in a pragmatic way and particularly in terms of security and economic development, the spread of freedom is crucial. It is in the self-interest of the country that we are talking to. These are universal aspirations are not just "Western" ideals. We can cite examples of this around the world the past decade which I have mentioned particularly since the fall of the Berlin Wall, including many places in Asia.

Furthermore, we tried to work in, without being overly defensive, the view that the U.S. was not perfect either, and we've had some need to perfect or improve our own society. An important theme is that democracy is not just a matter of elections. You can have elections in a given country which might bring in a government which might then crack down and practice human rights abuses, despite the elections. So you need to build a civil society, the infrastructure of democracy, not just hold elections.

Personally, I would introduce these themes at meetings which we would have and I would include them in speeches. We would also balance these themes with our other interests.

Generally, we tried to get as much multilateral support as we could on these themes. With the exception of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand we wouldn't get much help from other countries in promoting these values. Japan was nervous in terms of its guilt over World War II and didn't want to lecture other people. It also had commercial interests. ASEAN has a couple of democracies but generally didn't believe in interference in the internal affairs of its members or other countries. European countries were more interested in business contracts than in promoting human rights. Thus, even though we tried, at various levels, to get some help, usually it was the U.S. operating by itself in dealing with these matters.

That brings us to the Asian values question, which is closely related. In that debate we would make all of the points that I have already made. That was part of our position in this debate. We would also point out that there aren't any Asian values per se, because there are so many spokesmen for Asia. You have Anwar versus Mahathir [in Malaysia], Aung San Suu Kyi [in Burma], Kim Dae Jung [in South Korea], or the Dalai Lama [for Tibet]. There are a lot of such people speaking for Asia beside the autocrats who use the slogan of stability as an excuse for maintaining authoritarian government.

The Asian values question came into concrete focus during the first year of my service as Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs. A conference was held in Vienna to review the UN Human Rights Covenant. Some of the Asian countries were promoting amendments to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to provide for some escape clauses to take into account local considerations and move away from universality. We beat that effort off. Secretary

Christopher was very strong on that.

I always felt that this was a phony debate, as if Westerners didn't care about discipline, community commitment, and family values, or Asians didn't care about freedom.

I often met with human rights groups in the State Department and with such organizations when I went to other countries, such as Cambodia, Indonesia, and so forth. I met with human rights groups in the U.S., I'd say every three or four months, even as I met with business people and other interest groups to try to help to form our policy. I heard their viewpoints and reported back to them on progress that had been made in Asia.

I think that the whole fervor in the Asian values debate has sort of calmed down somewhat. I think that people are now so concerned with the financial crisis that the Asian values debate is beginning to fade from sight. It will be important to see whether Thailand and South Korea, which are democracies and which are also trying to carry out IMF [International Monetary Fund] recommended reforms, succeed.

Asian values were a hot issue during much of my tenure as Assistant Secretary. In the spring 1994 memo to the Secretary which I wrote, and which we discussed, I pointed out we were having some difficulties with our policies in the region. This was a relatively famous memo which, I think, was called by some the "Malaise Memo." I have joked that it really was called the "Malaysian Memo." I addressed this values question. What I stressed in my memo was that we should be careful about our tone, but promoting our values should be a high priority. I thought that we should try to stress some of the themes that I have suggested, so that stylistically we would be more effective and sensitive in promoting our values.

In my final week as Assistant Secretary I gave a farewell for journalists at the Foreign Press Center. My opening talking points highlighted the challenges and accomplishment of the past four years.

*Q: We might close at this point. There is one specific question which I'd like to ask. One of my recent interviews was with David Dean who, at one point, was Director of the American Institute on Taiwan [AIT]. He said that it should be understood that we would never have a political appointee as the Director of that office. Politically, the AIT is very sensitive. However, during the Clinton administration a political figure was appointed to it. I think that we talked about this issue.*

LORD: Let me give you a run down on that. First, a comment about Ambassadors generally. I think that, like most Foreign Service Officers, I'm a strong believer in having a mix of career and political Ambassadors. All that I ask, and all that most FSO's ask, is that, first, political appointees should be qualified. Secondly, they should be a distinct minority of Ambassadors, so that you don't remove the incentive for Foreign Service Officers to move up to the top level of the service. Thirdly, they shouldn't get all the most important posts.

In my view every administration has been guilty of having too many political appointees. I think that roughly 15% of the Ambassadors should be political appointees. But early in

administrations, the figure of political appointee Ambassadors is often about 40%. Then the figure drops down to about 30% as the term wears on.

*Q: It's in that range.*

LORD: I think that there are too many political appointee Ambassadors. Having said that, I think that there's room, and there should be space for new people coming in who are particularly qualified to take on an assignment as an Ambassador. Someone who is well qualified and also politically connected with the White House can take on assignments where clout is important. You can always have experts qualified in that country, including DCM [Deputy Chief of Mission], supporting the political appointee. However, you have to reserve the great bulk of Ambassadorships, including many of the most important positions, in terms of quality as well as quantity, for the Foreign Service. Otherwise, you're going to destroy morale and you may not have as good Ambassadors. I can look at this question in a detached way because I've been a Foreign Service Officer. However, I've also been a political appointee, including my assignment as Ambassador to China. Clearly, in my case I was qualified to be Ambassador to China, not only because I had spent much of my career working on Chinese affairs, but I had the other qualifications.

Some of our best Ambassadors have been political appointees. To take a couple of examples, we had Ambassador Mondale in Japan and Ambassador Laney as Ambassador to South Korea. They were both terrific and were well qualified. We should make sure that political appointees are well qualified and that the Foreign Service provides most of the Ambassadors. There should always be room for some political appointees in Washington. The Secretary and some of the Undersecretaries and Assistant Secretaries should be political to provide new blood and effect White House perspectives. But they should be experienced and able. And most of their high level positions should be career people, to provide continuity and maintain high morale in the career service. I don't believe there should be more than occasional political appointees below the Assistant Secretary level.

I'm not sure that I would ever make a permanent exception for any post, one way or the other. If there is ever a case where you should only have career appointees, it probably would be the Director of the AIT [American Institute on Taiwan], who is a de facto Ambassador. Actually, we're not talking about the person who is in Taiwan. In this case what David Dean is referring to is not the Director of the AIT, who continues to be a career appointee; other Directors have been Lynn Pascoe and Daryl Johnson. He's talking about the man who was sitting in Washington and had David Dean's job. AIT is a strange, unofficial relationship. It is a mechanism to maintain the appearance of unofficiality while having an intermediary here in Washington, but of an unofficial nature.

We're talking for purposes of this recorded interview about the AIT person sitting here in Washington, not the person in Taiwan, who has continued to be a career officer and, in my view, should be. I'm not saying that this overseas position should always be unofficial. However, as long as it is unofficial, I think that it should be held by a career officer, as much as possible.

The same thing is true of Washington, where we traditionally had distinguished people like

David Dean, who had a China and/or Taiwan background, spoke Chinese, and knew people on Taiwan. These people also usually know quite a bit about China. Above all, they should know the delicacies and sensitivities of the Chinese-American relationship, how to manage this unofficial Rube Goldberg contraption with Taiwan and who are not subject to domestic political pressures from the Taiwan lobby and so on. So I would agree with David Dean's basic premise that the Director of AIT should be a career Foreign Service Officer.

Now, this practice was broken in the Clinton administration. This proved that David Dean was right and that I was right, although I was not strong enough in defending this position. The time came for a replacement for David Dean who, after all, had been in the position for several years. It was only fair to replace him. David Dean said that he didn't mind being replaced, as long as his replacement was a good man. But that wasn't the issue.

We began to get strong pressure from the White House to replace David Dean. The White House pushed hard for James Wood. Wood had previously served in the State Department as a political appointee. There was some controversy about how well he did in that capacity. He left the Department. Some people felt that he left because he was "incompetent" and perhaps this is not totally unfounded- (end of tape)

Wood had no ostensible qualifications to work on Taiwan affairs. He had helped President Clinton in the election campaign of 1992. I forget now, but I think that he was close to some people in the White House and elsewhere. He didn't have a particularly distinguished career, including this murky time when he was previously in the State Department. He claimed to have worked, at least to some extent, on the Taiwan Relations Act. However, it was clear to me and to my colleagues in the Bureau of East Asian Affairs that he did not have strong qualifications. Above all, there was the principle that David Dean mentioned, namely, that Taiwan was too tricky, sensitive, and arcane a relationship to be handled by an inexperienced political appointee and subject to political pressures. Not to mention a need to sense nuances from the substantive point of view in dealing with Taiwan and China.

So frankly I kept getting pressure from Dick Moose, who was Undersecretary of State for Management. Dick, in turn, was getting pressure from the White House to appoint Wood as Director of the AIT for Taiwan. I frankly ignored this pressure, I dragged my feet, I said that he wasn't qualified, I said that they should try somebody else if we couldn't keep David Dean in this position. I said that if this guy needed a job, they should get him a job somewhere else where he may be qualified. I said that maybe he was a good guy. I wasn't saying that he shouldn't get a job, but not THIS job. I kept dragging my feet. I got several phone calls. I dragged this out for about a year.

Finally, the pressure got very heavy, and I made a mistake. I said that I would interview the guy and check him out. He came across not too badly in the interview. The pressure was so intense that I said that I finally didn't agree with this appointment but we would have to go along with it if it was this important to the White House. This was a mistake that I made at this point, frankly. Maybe I could have stopped this appointment if I had really broken a lot of crockery and resisted strongly enough. That's not certain, however.

However, the pressure from the Seventh Floor [of the State Department, where the Secretary of State and other senior officers have their offices] and from the White House was very heavy. I pointed out the problems, but finally decided that I would go along with the following package. The Secretary of State would appoint him, but first we would have a written agreement with Wood on what his job was and how free he was to operate. We would make it clear to him that he was under my guidance and that of the State Department in general. This was the case, and it's always been understood by career officers. That is, if Wood was going to be a political appointee, we would have a charter showing that nevertheless he was under our control. Secondly, we would get very strong (in effect Vice) fellow Directors at AIT. We had had some good people, but they weren't heavyweights; sometimes they were appointed to AIT as a favor to them as retiring FSOs. This made clear we were going to get two people who were knowledgeable on China and Taiwan and strong people to help control Wood if he was going to be a problem.

If I had known that he was going to be a disaster, I would have resisted his appointment even more. I finally decided that the package seemed okay. I thought that we would have a charter on how he was going to operate and would also have two strong Directors in AIT to control and guide him. Indeed I didn't really think that we would need to really control him. I thought that he might be weak, but not nefarious. So we got Chris Phillips, who had been an Ambassador in our Mission to the UN and had been the head of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. We also got Bill Brown, who was an expert on Asia, and had also been Ambassador to Thailand. So these were two heavy hitters.

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*Q: Well, now we're back from lunch. I thought that we might do some profiles of people that you've worked with. I was thinking of the first term, Clinton administration, involving President Clinton, Secretary of State Warren Christopher, and others. So I'll turn you loose and may have some further questions on this subject.*

LORD: As we sit here on April 27, [1999], I note that I've done profiles on Henry Kissinger, President Nixon, and Mao Zedong, as well as, to a lesser extent, on Zhou En-lai, and Brezhnev. I dealt with Al Haig a little bit, Gromyko a little bit, and so on.

Let me begin first with the Presidents I've worked with. I've worked with every President since President John Kennedy, except for President Carter, when I left government service to take a break during that period. I didn't meet Presidents Johnson and Kennedy directly or work with them. I was too junior at that time. So President Nixon was the first President that I had extensive interaction with. The next one, of course, was President Ford.

I went on some trips with President Ford, including his trip to China, Indonesia, and the Philippines. I sat in on some of his meetings but I don't want to exaggerate my exposure to him. I didn't have as much contact with him as I did with Presidents Nixon or Clinton, or even with Reagan. Through Kissinger, through my own observations, and through selective meetings with President Ford, I formed some impressions of him.

Kissinger has a new book out on sale, which was published in the spring of this 1999. It is very laudatory of President Ford. It basically talks about what Ford did to heal the nation after Watergate and to hold the nation together. He talks about Ford's decency in improving the atmosphere, and the political price he paid by pardoning President Nixon for the good of the nation. It may have cost him reelection [in 1976]. Kissinger's book is entitled, "Year of Renewal." He credits the renewal to President Ford.

I would grant all of those things to President Ford, certainly including his decency. He was always polite and straightforward. You didn't have to stop to figure him out, as I did with a complicated man such as President Nixon. President Ford came across, in the sense that, "What you saw is what you get." All of which is to be applauded. I would also, as I say, applaud his "healing function" and his courage in pardoning President Nixon. I would also add, on the positive side, that he showed courage on occasion. For example, in 1976, Kissinger undertook a lot of diplomatic activity in Africa, including trying to bring majority rule to Rhodesia, which came to be known as Zimbabwe. Some of this activity was happening during the Presidential primary campaign, including in Texas and some of the other primaries in the South. Ford was being challenged by Reagan and the conservative wing of the Republican Party. Meanwhile, we were pressing for equal rights for Blacks in Africa, which was not the most popular issue at the time in the U.S. South. To Ford's credit, he explicitly told Kissinger that: "This may hurt me," in terms of a challenge from the Right wing of the Republican Party in these southern primary elections. He added: "However, you go ahead and do what is correct." Kissinger moved ahead along this line.

I remember one day when we landed in Senegal, I believe. On the very day that we landed there, Reagan had beaten Ford in the Texas primary election. So, in our usual black humor, some of us on the staff greeted Kissinger by singing: "The eyes of Texas are upon you," and so on. I make this point to indicate that Ford showed some courage there. I don't want to be negative on Ford. He had these positive dimensions and deserves to get credit for them.

Having said that, I think that President Ford was not a great man by any means. From what I've read of Kissinger's memoirs, and I've read a lot more in other books about Ford, I think that Kissinger was overly generous toward Ford. I think that Ford had his limitations. This is based on superficial contacts I had with him. I must admit that Ford was nothing but nice to me and was always a decent man. So I hesitate to be critical of him, but in the interest of candor I just think that he was limited in terms of intelligence or conceptual strength. To his credit, he knew his limitations and delegated to Kissinger the basic running of foreign policy. He was able to make some difficult decisions, not only in Africa but on some other issues during his tenure as President.

First of all, I didn't think that Ford was particularly smart or handled himself all that well in meetings that I attended. More significantly, with respect to his essential decency and courage, this was limited in some respects. Certainly, he was courageous in pardoning President Nixon, and that dwarfs other things. I want to acknowledge that. However, despite Ford's closeness to Kissinger and respect for him, Ford didn't really defend Kissinger very strongly when the Reagan people attacked Kissinger. At the time Ford was watching his right flank. Kissinger did not even go to the Republican convention where Ford was given the Republican nomination for President.

Ford knew that Kissinger would be a magnet for conservatives who didn't like Secretary Kissinger and didn't like detente. I just don't feel that Ford was very loyal to Kissinger, any more than President Eisenhower was very loyal to General George Marshall when he was attacked by Senator Joseph McCarthy, though I don't want to compare the two - Ike was a great American and great President. So there was that element.

What also dismayed me about President Ford was that, in a stupid attempt to appease the right wing of the Republican Party, Ford dropped Nelson Rockefeller as nominee for Vice President. Rockefeller was one of my heroes. He was a moderate Republican. Ford replaced Rockefeller as nominee for Vice President with Bob Dole, whom I didn't particularly like. I felt that that action was both stupid tactically and showed weakness in exaggerating the right wing problem in the Republican Party, particularly as time went on. In any event, this was no way to treat Rockefeller, who had been a loyal Vice President. Rockefeller, to his credit, never complained, either privately or publicly. He was a good soldier. I found that a major mistake on Ford's part. So my own view of President Ford is mixed, and that's really all I have to say about him.

*Q: Did you get any feel for Nelson Rockefeller during the time you were on the NSC staff? As Vice President, Rockefeller went back to the 1940s as far as being involved in Latin American affairs was concerned.*

LORD: Right. I met Rockefeller on several occasions. I certainly didn't know him well. I had met him superficially on social occasions, as I recall it, when I was younger. I met him through Kissinger and went to his house at least a couple of times but didn't deal with him and sit in on meetings with him while Rockefeller was Vice President, at least as far as I can recall. On the occasions when I did meet him, he struck me as very dynamic, someone who was very gregarious and energetic. Being a moderate Republican, I basically liked his views, although as I look back on it, he advocated perhaps too big a role for government for my taste when I think of his service as Governor of New York.

I knew of Kissinger's great respect for Rockefeller. I also had great respect for him. Rockefeller seemed to run his political campaigns on the basis of ideas, thinking that he would be nominated for President by issuing policy papers. That is not quite the way you do it. Meanwhile, he risked being cut up by the conservatives and could never quite get through a Republican convention. I was very upset when people like Senator Goldwater beat Rockefeller. I was particularly upset when Rockefeller was booed at the party convention in San Francisco by the Goldwater people. I liked Rockefeller because he was forthcoming on the racial issue and was a strong proponent of integration and equal rights. He was very strong on that. Rockefeller seemed to me to have a kind of vision on foreign policy that Kissinger did, in terms of a combination of firmness but also a willingness to negotiate with our adversaries. America had to play a large, international role. So I was a great fan of Rockefeller's, but I didn't know him well.

*Q: I was wondering whether, during the time that Rockefeller was Vice President [under President Ford] and he was the patron of Henry Kissinger, there was any evidence of the hand of Nelson Rockefeller behind Kissinger?*

LORD: I don't recall. Kissinger kept Rockefeller posted, because he was Vice President, because

he was a close friend of Kissinger's, and because Kissinger had worked for Rockefeller. To Nixon's great credit, he chose Kissinger to be his National Security Adviser. Indeed, as Kissinger tells it, when he was approached by Nixon after the election of 1968 to be National Security Adviser, Kissinger had the effrontery to say to Nixon: "Let me think about it. I'll get back to you." He was thinking about whether to take a chance and work for Nixon. After all, he'd been with Rockefeller, he'd been with the Harvard University liberal intellectual crowd, even though he wasn't a liberal himself. He was wondering whether he would be criticized and would feel awkward, working for Nixon after he had opposed him in the primary campaign. Rockefeller, of course, generally came out of the Harvard, etc. milieu, which was suspicious of Nixon.

Kissinger went to Rockefeller, and Rockefeller said: "Look, Nixon is taking a much bigger chance by appointing you than you would be taking by joining him. After all, he has his own perspective. You've worked for me. You're a Harvard intellectual." I don't know exactly whether Rockefeller said that Kissinger was a Jewish immigrant, but he said, more or less, that if Nixon was willing to take a chance on Kissinger, how could Kissinger have the effrontery to tell the next President of the United States that he would think about it and get back to him. Rockefeller said to Kissinger: "Call Nixon right away and say that you accept." And that's exactly what Kissinger did. Kissinger tells this story himself about his reaction to the offer from Nixon and Rockefeller's comments.

That's the approach Rockefeller had. The other approach was that Rockefeller never expressed bitterness, either publicly or privately, about being dropped as Vice Presidential candidate by President Ford. Rockefeller remained loyal to Ford, even though it must have been a bitter blow to someone who wanted to be President. He probably thought that his best bet was to succeed Ford as President, after being Vice President, never envisaging the humiliation of being dropped from the ticket.

The next President I dealt with was Ronald Reagan. As I said, I left government service in 1977 and therefore didn't serve during the Carter Administration.

*Q: Before we leave President Carter completely, were you getting...*

LORD: I can give you something on Carter...

*Q: Could you? There are always waves of Presidents. I was wondering, particularly because of the work you did, the milieu you came from, and all of that...*

LORD: I should talk about Carter. I knew him superficially. I didn't know him very well before he became President, although I believe that I had met him. I was attracted to Carter in the sense that he looked to me like a moderate Democrat from the South. I'm a centrist myself. Throughout my lifetime, I have voted almost exactly 50 - 50 for Republicans and Democrats. I stayed away from Senators Goldwater [Republican, AZ] and McGovern [Democrat, ND] and generally voted for candidates from the center, whether moderate Republicans or moderate Democrats. Even though it's a secret ballot, I'll be very honest and say that I was sufficiently unhappy with President Ford dropping Rockefeller from the Republican ticket in 1976, as well as other dimensions of his record that I didn't approve of, and was sufficiently intrigued by Carter, even

though I didn't know much about him, that I actually voted for Carter in the 1976 Presidential election. I did this, even though it meant that if Carter won and Ford lost, I'd be leaving government service. In fact, I wanted to leave anyway. I was exhausted, and this prospect didn't bother me.

So, superficially, I was attracted by Carter. Since then, I have met him in various milieus. I met him even during the Clinton administration, when he negotiated on the Korean issue. I met him when he came to China, when I was Ambassador. I saw him at the Carter Center in Atlanta once. I've also been at meetings where I hosted him at the Council on Foreign Relations at which he or his wife spoke. I have met him and have some impression of him, even though I didn't work directly for him.

None of these impressions will represent a particularly revolutionary analysis. There is no question that President Carter is very smart in a detailed, tactical way. I think that the conventional wisdom is correct, that he was terrific on details but he paid too much attention to them. Unlike any other President or a busy executive, he would not only read the full memoranda sent to him, but he would read the annexes and attachments, even though they were bulky. He would get to know a subject intimately. However, the problem was that he would know the trees but would no longer know the forest. It is rumored that Carter even scheduled appointments on the White House tennis courts. I find that hard to believe, although as a great tennis fan, that's probably not a bad idea. So there is that aspect. He was a bright, smart engineer.

There is no question that on Korea Carter was very helpful to the Clinton administration, and I've gone into that in a previous interview. Carter is sharp. In retrospect, I give him more credit than I did at the time for giving us a new emphasis on human rights in our foreign policy. In the 1970s, and when Carter became President, I was still more of the realpolitik school of Kissinger. I was more interested in human rights than Henry Kissinger was, but that's not a very high barrier to leap over. I tended to agree that, on the whole, you worry more about the foreign policies of foreign countries than you do about their domestic systems. I have greatly evolved in my thinking. I think that human rights are a legitimate item in our foreign policy agenda and an important item with any country. We need to look at human rights carefully, not only to maintain domestic and Congressional support, but also to reflect our values and to include idealism as well as pragmatism in our foreign policy. Above all, I think that this concern for human rights also advances our security interests because more open, democratic nations are less aggressive and less apt to produce wars. They don't generate refugees, they don't practice terrorism, and they are less involved in the drug traffic. Therefore, there are concrete security and other benefits to be gained from promoting democracy and human rights in foreign countries, in addition to humane considerations.

Also, in the age of the Internet, fax machines, satellites, and computers, I don't think that you can develop an economy effectively without a more democratic, law-based, open, transparent society. If you don't do this, you're going to fall behind at some point in your development. So, for all of these reasons, I am now convinced that human rights and democracy are legitimate aims of our foreign policy. They are not the only aim, and cannot dominate all other considerations, whether it is with China or any other country. However, promoting freedom as such is an important aim of foreign policy. I feel that more strongly than Kissinger did. I feel that

more strongly than I did when I was judging the performance of President Carter. At the time I thought that Carter was probably pushing human rights too much.

Of course, President Carter has been a terrific, ex-President. He deserves the kudos he has gotten for his humanitarian work, his important efforts at the Carter Center in Georgia, as well as some of the selective diplomacy he has engaged in, including Korea. At other times I think that he has been too generous toward real dictators and, as a human rights advocate, has tended to overlook some of their excesses. Sometimes, he has meddled in some issues without cooperating fully with the U.S. Government. So his record has been a mixed bag. However, on the whole, you have to give him credit for his performance as an ex-President.

As for his presidency on foreign policy, clearly by the end with the hostage crisis and oil problems, he was on the defensive and looked weak. But you have to give him credit for at least three major achievements which people tend to forget: the Panama Canal Treaty, which took great courage. The Camp David Middle East Peace Accords. Normalization of relations with China. That's impressive.

Having said that, I think that he falls short, certainly on personality grounds. He has no sense of humor and is very egotistical. (End of tape)

One example of Carter not being overly generous involves his visiting Beijing in the late 1980s, when I was Ambassador there. We had a good visit with him and Mrs. Carter. However, in the course of a series of banquets and luncheons, where the hosts were Chinese, there would be toasts to U.S.-Chinese relations, including Carter's contribution to normalizing relations in 1979, for which he deserves credit. However, there I was sitting there, the current Ambassador to China who had been involved in the opening of relations with China with Kissinger and President Nixon and who would like to think that he made his own contributions to reopening U.S. relations with China. However, not once, throughout this visit, in any of his toasts or public comments, or even private comments, to Chinese, when he was talking about the development of U.S.-Chinese relations, did he talk about anything but his own contributions. He never acknowledged what Nixon and Kissinger, and, to a certain extent, what the serving U.S. Ambassador, who was his host, had done. I don't want to exaggerate this, but this shows a certain lack of grace.

*Q: It essentially shows a character flaw.*

LORD: I think so and I also think that it's dumb in terms of the Chinese. They remember old friends. They give Carter credit for what he did but they also give President Nixon and Henry Kissinger a lot of credit. It would have been more graceful, and the Chinese would have respected him more, if he had mentioned that. I don't want to exaggerate this, but I think that President Carter has a tendency toward self-righteousness, pomposity, and a lack of humor. He has always been very decent to me. He has never been impolite to me. He is bright, and I think that he knows it. But he doesn't spread generosity around.

*Q: Moving up the line of the Presidents, did you have any feel for the role of the Presidents' wives, as we go through this review? Did you have any dealings with them?*

LORD: I really can't comment on the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. I've always felt that Jackie Kennedy [Mrs. John F. Kennedy] was overrated. Why she should have put up with what her husband did, I'll never understand. Mrs. Lyndon Johnson, of course, put up with what her husband did, as well, but I think that she was formidable. She is one of my favorites as First Lady. I think that she has great strength of character. Mrs. Nixon, of course, was an enigma, very shy, and obviously didn't like the public life of a First Lady. She was living with a complex person, but I only met her very superficially and never really got to know her. The same is true of Mrs. Ford. I didn't know her as well. Of course, she was struggling with alcoholism at that time and was not very prominent. As far as the First Ladies that I knew, these were all women who didn't expose themselves very much to outsiders.

Now, I got to know Mrs. Carter during their trip to China. I also hosted her at the Council on Foreign Relations in the late 1970s. I was quite impressed with her. She was just as smart as her husband. She had a warmer edge to her than her husband did. She was a little more friendly and a little more generous. It was clear during their trip to China that there was tension between the Carters at that point. I think that they had a very good marriage, but they had just co-authored a book, and they admitted themselves that during the writing of that book, they disagreed a great deal. I recall that during this trip to China in the late 1980s that she tried to show her annoyance with President Carter in the following way. The Chinese always kept to a very tight time table. When you go to the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, the Guest House, or some other place for a meeting or a dinner, they don't make you start too soon and then expect you to wait around. They leave just in time, so you get there on time.

My wife is convinced that, on at least one occasion, Mrs. Carter went into the ladies room just before we were to leave and stayed there for 10 or 15 minutes. There was nothing wrong with her physically. She just wanted to make her husband concerned about being late for the next event on the schedule. My wife had to go in and sort of get Mrs. Carter out of there. So that was an amusing footnote. Mrs. Carter struck me as a very able person. I respected her.

That brings us up to President Reagan. First, as I think I mentioned earlier, I think that we were chosen partly by Mrs. Reagan, as well as by the President to go to China, because she had read my wife's novel, "Spring Moon." She loved it and pointed out to her husband that if I were to be appointed Ambassador to China, the U.S. Government would have two people for the price of one, as my wife is Chinese and would add a great dimension to my assignment. I always found Mrs. Reagan very approachable. I basically saw only her good qualities. I had no doubt that she would be so fiercely loyal to her husband that, if you ever crossed her, you would be in deep trouble. She could be tough but she struck me as someone who was really quite gracious in our various encounters, and I had many of them. She seemed friendly. I always felt that she was so loyal to her husband and so worried about his place in history that she was a moderating influence on issues like dealing with the Soviet Union. She wanted President Reagan to go down in history as a peacemaker. In that sense I think that she was probably helpful. I have no doubt that you could get into trouble if you weren't fiercely loyal to the President.

Reagan himself presents an interesting phenomenon personally. I have always said that I was a moderate Republican and still am. That's almost an oxymoron as we speak in 1999. However, I

always distrusted the Right wing of the Republican Party. I thought that, to some extent, it had a racist dimension, even if it was unintentional. In some cases right wing Republicans were isolationist and in other cases they were nationalistic and confrontational in a way that was not effective in foreign policy, when we needed a balance of firmness in negotiations and cooperation. I didn't know that much about Reagan when he was Governor of California. However, as he began to aim for the Presidency, first challenging Ford and later when he actually was elected President, I really wasn't a fan of his. I was a Rockefeller or Nixon supporter. I felt that they were people more toward the center of the Republican Party. I didn't expect that I would think highly of Reagan.

However, by the time he ran against President Carter, because of the Iranian hostage crisis and what I thought was a very poor response to that event, as well as some economic problems in the U.S., I actually got to the point where I voted for Reagan. However, I had some concerns about his outlook, including his policy toward Taiwan which, at that point, threatened to cause a problem with China. Nevertheless, I figured that, once he entered office as President, he would see, as his predecessors and successors have, that we had a great interest in working with and trying to deal with the Chinese, even though we had to "hold our noses" at times. I also thought that people like then Secretary of State Al Haig and others would be working on him to follow the example of his predecessors. Indeed, this is an interesting phenomenon. In successive presidential elections we have seen the challenger to the sitting President attack him as being too soft on China. Once the new President gets into power, after a year or so in office, he has adopted the policies of his predecessor toward China.

President Carter attacked Kissinger and Nixon for sucking up to the Chinese and being too soft after reading some of the transcripts of meetings with the Chinese. Carter, of course, normalized relations with China after some initial lean toward the Soviets. He promoted the relationship with China, and this is to his credit.

Some Republicans, although not the great bulk of them, attacked Carter for selling out Taiwan. However, Carter was attacked by Reagan regarding his Taiwan policy which, he charged, was much too soft. Reagan gave great emphasis to this issue. Of course, after he was elected President and had been in office for a couple of years, and the 1982 Communique of Taiwan arms sales was negotiated, Reagan then went to China, and he moved China policy forward, as his predecessors had done. Reagan was followed by President Bush, who endorsed his policy toward China but ran into early trouble because of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre.

Then President Clinton came along, and he bashed President Bush for being too soft on China, particularly in the wake of the Tiananmen Square massacre. He conditioned MFN [Most Favored Nation] trade on Chinese improvement in the field of human rights. Then, after a year or two, President Clinton changed his policy toward China and moved more toward the policies of his predecessors as President.

So this has been a recurring phenomenon and makes for an interesting footnote.

I developed a growing respect for President Reagan, which continues to this day. I'm not one to mythologize or eulogize him and ascribe to him heroic, Churchillian accomplishments, as some

of his worshipers do. Having said that, I think that Reagan proved that there are certain qualities that are more important than being brilliant. Of the Presidents I dealt with, I'd say that Reagan and Ford seemed to me to be the least intelligent in the conventional sense. Nixon, Carter and Clinton, it seemed to me, are the most intelligent, with Bush somewhere in between. There is no question that in meetings I sat in on with Reagan, mostly on China, because I was Ambassador then, he would follow his cue cards. He would follow his script, at times somewhat mechanically. So I didn't feel that there was a great mind at work here, something like Nixon on foreign policy or Carter on details, and so on. However, Reagan proved that if you have a certain few principles and convictions and you stick to them, and don't bend with the wind and consult the public opinion polls, as Clinton has done, you can get some things done. Perhaps the single largest achievement of Reagan was to restore the spirit and confidence of the American people, especially after Carter's period of "malaise," economic problems, oil shocks, and American hostages. Observers were saying that the American presidency was fatally weakened. Reagan disproved all that and showed that a President could do great things. His optimism, faith in America, strength of character, fidelity to his principles all made a huge difference in the American psyche in addition to his specific accomplishments.

In addition of course he was one of the great orators and could lift his audiences, whether at a time of national tragedy like the American Challenger space tragedy or telling the Russians to tear down the Berlin Wall. Of course speechwriters like Peggy Noonan - or Ted Sorensen for Kennedy - deserve great credit.

The economy did well under President Reagan. Of course, he also helped to bring about the end of the Cold War. Now, I give great credit for this to Secretary of State George Shultz, and I'll come back to this later on. I'm not sure that President Reagan could have done it by himself. There's no question that he was tough and firm with the Soviets. He built up our defenses. He went too far with the idea of Star Wars [which he called the "Strategic Defense Initiative," or SDI]. This was a crazy idea which sought to build up a perfect shield to protect the U.S. However, by stretching the economy of the Soviet Union and the ability of the Soviets to keep up with us technologically, it certainly helped to bring down the Soviet Union. Under the influence of Secretary of State George Shultz, Mrs. Reagan, and some others, he used the assets available to him with the buildup of our defenses and technology drive to create further leverage on the Soviets and also negotiate with them. He helped to bring about the demise of the Soviet Union and was helped in this regard by the administration of President George Bush. The rottenness of the Soviet system had an awful lot to do with this, so that not all of the credit for this should go to President Reagan.

The policies of Reagan's predecessors also had a lot to do with this, including those of Nixon and Kissinger and, to a certain extent, those of President Carter. So, no one person deserves credit for our victory in the Cold War, but certainly President Reagan deserves and is getting much credit. I've changed my mind about Reagan. He showed good judgment in choosing people like Secretary of State George Shultz and using them effectively. He showed a willingness to adjust to changing circumstances, as he did in the cases of Taiwan and China, as he did on negotiating with the Soviets, and on maintaining his principles. I think that all of that is a plus. I still can't figure out how culpable he was in the matter of exchanging arms for American Embassy hostages in Iran, which I thought was a disgraceful episode. However, Reagan was always

vague, and he managed to slip through that, because of his vagueness. He has to be held responsible for the Iran-Contra affair, and that is a major mark against him. It was outrageous to be dealing with Iran in that way, not to mention possible violations of law by subordinates and a possible coverup because of Reagan's vagueness.

However, on the whole, I would give Reagan very high marks. I would give him lower marks on what he did on our budgetary deficit. The term "voodoo economics" is true. You cannot raise defense spending, which I think we needed to do, cut taxes, and say that you are going to get a balanced budget. This just can't be done. On the whole, I think that Reagan deserves great credit and I would certainly put him above Ford or Carter as President. Nixon was much more brilliant in the field of foreign policy and had much more dramatic achievements in some respects, although, because of the Watergate Affair, you have to rank him lower in terms of his overall performance.

Next came President Bush (Senior). This is the mirror image of my evolving view of President Reagan. I went from negative to positive on Reagan. I did just the opposite in evaluating President Bush. Again, I'm a moderate Republican and therefore, for that and many other reasons, George Bush appealed to me greatly. I had known him and played tennis with him. I had known some members of his family favorably and well. He was a WASP [White Anglo-Saxon Protestant] like myself. He went to Yale, as I did. He was in the Skull and Bones, a secret society at Yale like myself. He was a moderate Republican and seemed like an eminently decent guy. When he went to China as one of the first chiefs of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing before we had full diplomatic relations with China, I was in charge of getting him ready to go to China on behalf of Kissinger. I briefed him and took him around to call on a number of people. I was very impressed, not only with his enthusiasm but his ability to absorb the various dimensions of China policy. I thought that he did an enthusiastic job in Beijing, even though there wasn't much that he could do in terms of policy. He was kept on a tight leash by President Nixon and Kissinger. The Chinese didn't allow him a great deal of access in Beijing in a still very restricted environment. So, for all of these reasons, I was a fan of George Bush before he became President.

Furthermore, when he was Vice President under Reagan and I was Ambassador to China, almost every time when I came back to Washington for consultations or when I was accompanying a Chinese leader, such as a Vice Premier, on a trip to the United States, I would see Vice President Bush. He was one of the hosts of the Chinese leaders. He would host either a dinner or a lunch in honor of the visitor, in addition to entertainment by the President, if it was appropriate, depending on the level of the visitor. But I would see Vice President Bush on my own, just as an old friend to bring him up to date on China, in which he was very interested. He had had the same driver that I had in China. He wanted to hear about his old friends in Beijing, as well as talk about policy issues. There was always a very full exchange of views, back and forth. He was very friendly, so I was a great fan of George Bush.

I voted for George Bush and thought that he would be a terrific President. I also thought, very naively as it turned out, and I have covered this point elsewhere, that I would get a high level job with George Bush. There were rumors in the press that I might be National Security Adviser to President George Bush. Bill Safire, "Newsweek," and others suggested key jobs were awaiting me. It was reported that I was favored to be appointed CIA Director, which was absurd.

Someone else had me down for appointment as Deputy Secretary of State. There were a lot of rumors going around. I didn't know what I'd be, but I was pretty sure that I would be up for a pretty high level job, given my good relationship with George Bush and the fact that I thought that I had done well on China, as well as during the rest of my career.

I want to emphasize genuinely that the fact that I did not get a high level job is not the reason why I changed my mind on George Bush. I changed my mind on Bush because of his trip to China, which we've covered at great length elsewhere in this interview, so I won't repeat myself. Basically, leading up to this Bush trip to China, I wrote personal memos for him and personal profiles on policy, which I thought were very good. His advance people thought that I and the embassy had done a terrific job. So everything up until that trip to China was positive, as far as my view of George Bush was concerned. By then I had found out that I wasn't going to get a high level job working for Bush, but that didn't affect my view of him. Frankly, I was disappointed and puzzled, but this didn't change my positive view of Bush for all of the reasons that I have mentioned.

I changed my view of Bush as a result of his trip to China in February, 1989. My views regarding Bush on that will be found elsewhere in this interview. It completely soured me on his character.

*Q: The Tiananmen Square incident occurred in...*

LORD: June, 1989. Bush's trip to China took place in February, 1989, right after his inauguration as President. I've covered that and his weakness in the face of the Fang Lizhi incident and his sending Brent Scowcroft [National Security Adviser] to do a press backgrounder which was totally inaccurate and which attacked me and my Embassy.

That annoyed me, both on personal grounds, which is only human, but also, and more importantly, in terms of a general weakness toward the Chinese and a general lack of character.

As time went on, after I left government service, I felt that President Bush had been very weak in response to the Tiananmen Square massacre. So I was increasingly disillusioned with him. I admired what Bush did in terms of Desert Storm [victorious campaign in the Gulf War in 1991], for which he deserved great credit. He marshaled public opinion and had the courage to intervene there. He maintained a complicated alliance with several countries in fighting that war. I think that President Bush was right not to march on Baghdad. We would have been bogged down. But I think he should have continued the fighting for a couple of more days and decimated the Iraqi Republican Guard. And he should have provided air cover for the rebelling Kurds and Shiites. However, on the whole, he deserves the credit he's gotten for that. I think that he managed the transition from the Cold War after President Reagan very well. Certainly, he supported the unification of Germany effectively and dealt with Soviet President Gorbachev at a time when the Soviet empire was crumbling, and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was losing control in that country. He made sure that the Soviets didn't feel "cornered" and that they were able to save some face. So there was a peaceful denouement to this situation. President Bush deserved credit for many developments in foreign policy.

As I said, I thought that Bush was increasingly weak on China. I became steadily more impatient with him on that front, to the point where finally, after hesitating, I began to speak out against Scowcroft's trips to China after the Tiananmen Square massacre, as well as his general softness versus Beijing. I became more and more critical of President Bush and also more disillusioned with him. I also felt more generally, as an American citizen, that Bush largely ignored domestic policy because he was so interested in foreign policy. Essentially, I believe that's why Bush was not reelected. People thought that he was ignoring domestic issues. So in that respect I thought that Bush was delinquent. More generally, I began to see a weakness in Bush's character, in contrast to Reagan. I reached the point where I admired President Reagan a lot more and President Bush a lot less.

I had been a fan of Mrs. Bush as well. However, she has a public reputation beyond what she deserves, in my opinion. She is one tough lady. Never mind about her being tough. I'm in favor of that. But she can be quite nasty and was to my wife, during President Bush's trip to China. So I generally have a less elevated view of her than the general grandmotherly vision that she projects to the American body politic.

That brings us to President Clinton. Of course, President Clinton swung too far in the other direction and did so much in the field of domestic policy early in his first term that he didn't pay enough attention to foreign policy. By the time the election campaign of 1992 rolled around, I was critical in private and in public of Bush on China and was generally disillusioned with his character as I saw it. Clinton appealed to me the way that Carter had many years before. That is, he appeared to be a moderate, centrist Democrat. As I said, I was disillusioned with Bush. I served Democrats and Republicans. It appeared to me that Clinton was not a left wing Democrat by any means. And he clearly was bright.

I knew something of his background as a womanizer and some of his weaknesses, obviously his evasions on the Vietnam War, as well as the Jennifer Flowers affair. It was clear to me that Clinton was not a perfect human being. I'm very old-fashioned on marriage vows, and I didn't approve of his behavior. However, I understand that Clinton's behavior was irrelevant to other people. People disagree on the importance of that, and certainly they say that this is not a crucial matter for a President. A lot of Presidents have been in trouble in this respect. Clinton was not my first choice among the Democrats, but once he became the nominee of the Democratic Party, I preferred him over George Bush.

Indeed, I met with him once on Japan and China policy during the 1992 election campaign around Labor Day, 1992, and this has been documented elsewhere. I was extremely impressed with this first meeting with Clinton, and he has made a good impact on many people. Among his characteristics are his intelligence and his clever answers to questions. He is a good listener. He is also charming, friendly, and open. When I walked into the room to meet him, he said: "Strobe Talbott [now Deputy Secretary of State] speaks very highly of you." I didn't know that Strobe Talbott, who is a good friend of mine, was also a Rhodes Scholar, as Clinton was, and is very close to Clinton. Presumably, Talbott mentioned me to Clinton as someone to keep in mind for a future position.

I had a favorable exchange with President Clinton on China and Japan, voted for him, and came

into the Clinton administration enthusiastically. By now, I am totally disillusioned with Clinton as we speak here in the spring of 1999. I had mixed feelings while I was working for Clinton. On the whole, I had a positive attitude toward him. Clinton did some good things. I liked the fact that, for whatever calculating, poll taking, triangulating reasons, Clinton had moved to the center and committed himself to welfare reform and balancing the budget. I think that the Republicans also deserve a lot of credit for that. I was frustrated about Clinton's lack of systematic attention to foreign policy during the first couple of years of his first term. I felt that he was right, that domestic policy had the highest priority after the Bush administration, and I thought that if the Clinton administration was strong domestically, that would help him in the foreign policy field. So Clinton clearly wanted to make domestic affairs his major priority.

Having said that, I found that Clinton was a little too sporadic in foreign policy for my taste. We encouraged him to host the first APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Conference] summit meeting in Seattle in November, 1993, which was an important element in our Asian policy. We managed to use his calendar for that reason during the first year of his first term. Also, in July, 1993, we were able to arrange for President Clinton to go to Japan and South Korea on his first, overseas trip, because there was a meeting of the G7 [seven most highly industrialized countries in the world] in Tokyo. We managed to get him involved in Asian affairs early by using the calendar. But he was sporadically involved in foreign policy issues generally early in his Administration.

I was most frustrated with President Clinton on his China policy. After I had negotiated a deal with Congress with moderate conditions on MFN renewal, the economic agencies undercut us and showed division in our government to Beijing, undercutting our leverage. The President never disciplined his Cabinet and made them support his own policy. Then when Secretary of State Warren Christopher went to China early in 1994, it was the last chance to get the Chinese to make progress on human rights, so that we could renew MFN [Most Favored Nation] treatment for China. We had a chance to advance enough to say that they had met minimum conditions for MFN treatment for China. This was a very tough trip to China, which I have described elsewhere. The Chinese cracked down hard on dissidents. We tried for a week or two to get President Clinton to issue a statement supporting Christopher and making clear to the Chinese that the turbulence in China was the fault of the Chinese Government and that the President was backing up Secretary of State Christopher. However, we couldn't get a single statement out of the White House by President Clinton or the White House, backing Christopher. This clearly undercut Secretary of State Christopher at the time. It gave the Chinese every incentive to hang tough on human rights.

Also annoying to me was the fact that throughout his first term President Clinton never made a speech on China. I tried mightily to get him to give one. Now, China is one of the most complex relationships that we have, probably THE most complex. You have to explain to an American audience why engagement with China is in our interest and why engagement is not appeasement or rolling over. We need a mixture of firmness in negotiation and cooperation. Our relationship with China will continue to be a mixed relationship, both sweet and sour. That can only be handled by a President, articulating a strategic approach, which President Clinton never did during his first term. We had a policy of engagement with China, which my staff and I had advocated in a memo prepared in September, 1993. It looked very much like what we're doing today, as we speak. However, we never got President Clinton to present this policy. He and his

political advisers always calculated that this topic was too sensitive to treat in a speech.

We convinced Secretary of State Christopher to make long comments on China, but a Secretary of State never gets the attention that a President does. So that just documents the fact that President Clinton was an in and out on foreign policy, and our foreign policy during the first couple of years of the Clinton administration suffered as a result. I'll get back to this when I get to Secretary of State Christopher, but we were much more successful in 1995 and 1996 on several fronts. We stumbled early on policy toward Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia. We had to reverse ourselves on China, and there were some serious problems early in the Clinton administration. Then Christopher got much better afterwards, as did the Administration generally on foreign policy.

Nevertheless, despite this mixed review, I always liked President Clinton in terms of his charm, his warmth, and the feeling that he was engaged with you. I considered President Clinton extremely bright. He is the smartest President that I ever worked with. He is also the dumbest President that I ever worked with, and I'll get back to that. In terms of his smartness, I've never seen a President who could absorb issues so quickly and put this understanding to good use. The most concrete example of this was getting him ready for high level meetings, in my case, with Asian leaders. Whether the meeting was in California or at the White House, at an APEC summit meeting, the UN, or wherever it was, you are supposed to have time before a given meeting to get the President ready. This is not always literally the case. You don't know whether the President has read his briefing book. You don't know sometimes how much he had grasped of the leader he is meeting with or the issues involved.

In some cases we had interagency briefings of Clinton, sometimes with outside experts, a week or two before a trip or meeting. But usually just before the meetings themselves, with all of his advisers waiting around, Clinton usually ran late. He would be available for briefing purposes with only 10 or 15 minutes to go before the meeting instead of the hour scheduled. At this point I would worry greatly that he won't know enough or know what to do. For example, there were times in the Oval Office [of the President] when you would have, say, Secretary of State Christopher there and maybe also the Secretary of the Treasury or the Secretary of Defense and the National Security Adviser, depending on what the issues and who his interlocutor was. His chief of staff and his press adviser, McCurry, or whoever it was, would also be standing around him. All of them would be trying to get in a few words about what he had to do on this issue, that issue, how to handle the press, and the kind of questions he was going to get. There would also be advice on how President Clinton should conduct the meeting. It was especially awkward for me because I had a superior, Secretary of State Christopher, present at such a time. There wasn't much that I could say, particularly when my boss was there, although Christopher is a very decent man and didn't mind it too much.

So we would be sitting around a table or standing near the President's desk in the Oval Office. There were about 10 or 15 minutes to go, with perhaps five people talking at once. President Clinton would be shuffling his cue cards containing his talking points. You didn't know what the hell was going to happen. So what happened? He went into the meeting and performed brilliantly. He not only knows the issues as well as you do. He knows how to conduct the meeting. For example, he would start off with a fairly warm and friendly approach, depending on

the circumstances. I am generalizing, but he would be relatively friendly and cooperative during this early part of the meeting. Then the tough or difficult issues that he would have to grapple with, or the warnings or problems he would want to raise, he would put in the middle. Then he would make sure that he ended up on a positive note again for face or mood reasons. He didn't want to start off or end negatively. This is pretty elementary as an example of an A-100 course in diplomacy or negotiations. However, President Clinton had an instinct for this, and I use it as an example. He not only knew the issues but would also handle them in the right sequence.

That was one of his strong parts, and I use it as an example of President Clinton's brilliance in absorbing the details affecting complex issues and giving them back to the visitor. He had a slight weakness. I think that he wasn't tough enough at some of the meetings. For example, with the Japanese on economic issues or the Chinese on human rights. He had a certain tendency of wanting to be liked by his interlocutor. Particularly in terms of meetings with the Japanese and Chinese, I felt that he wasn't quite firm enough at times on some of the issues.

So when I left the Clinton administration at the end of 1996, it certainly wasn't because of Clinton himself. I had no particular complaints. I felt that our foreign policy was in much better shape than it had been when I entered office [as Assistant Secretary of State in 1993]. I certainly felt that our policy toward Asia was in good shape. The China summit meeting was scheduled, and relations with China were on track. We had come out of a crisis with China related to the Taiwan missile crisis. President Clinton had had a very successful visit to Japan, where he had handled himself very well. I was with him on that trip as well, of course, as I was on all of his Asian trips. I had also sat in with him in Oval Office meetings, as well as meetings on Air Force One. I had had a lot of exposure to Clinton. I liked him personally and thought that he was a good President in many ways.

We had also normalized diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. APEC meetings were moving ahead, and regional security and a lot of other things were going well on the Asian front. We had the Korean Framework Agreement. We had terrific relations with Australia and had greatly improved relations with New Zealand. We were doing well with ASEAN. Also Mongolia.

Since I've been out of office for more than two years now, I've learned, as has the rest of America, including some of his closest advisers, that President Clinton has some fundamental, character flaws. When I worked with him, I went through a period of semi-denial that this was so, as was the case with some of those advisers. Maybe I was naive not to have known this, but if I didn't fully understand this, how about George Stephanopoulos [former key staff for Clinton] and others, who claim not to have fully understood it either? Well, without going into a great deal of detail which is particularly relevant to this record, I have learned of the coverups and lying to the American people and violations of the law by the nation's chief law enforcement officer. This is now confirmed by the judge, who has concluded that Clinton appears to be guilty of contempt of court. Not to mention how he treats his wife, his daughter, his cabinet, and the American people, especially women.

For all of these reasons I was glad that he was impeached by the House of Representatives in early 1999. I also became disillusioned with him because he follows public opinion polls too

closely. He was selfish and reckless and immature and put his stupid, mind-boggling gratification above his Presidency, his character, and his family. He is a person who clearly was already in danger because of his relationship with Jennifer Flowers and Paula Jones and all of the rumors of other matters. He didn't even have the sense to do what he was doing outside of the Oval Office.

I think that people may disagree on whether he should have been removed from office. The biggest argument against his removal is that the American people didn't want it, and therefore there would have been bitterness and polarization on this issue. I can live with impeachment and a finding by a judge that Clinton has been guilty of contempt of court, as well as permanent stains on his record. However, I stand by some of the positive aspects of his record, including some of the things that he accomplished. On balance, I am furious at what he did to the country and how he let down the American people. It was a tremendous waste of talent. And the issue was not "sex" but the breaking of the law and coverups and how he dragged this nation deceitfully for years.

So those are some comments of mine about the Presidents I served under. Regarding Vice President Al Gore, I knew him only superficially before I entered office under the Clinton administration. In 1992, I chaired a Carnegie National Commission on Foreign Policy, to look at our foreign policy and make suggestions to the incoming Administration. One of the people we talked to before we wrote the document was then Senator Gore. We talked to him about foreign policy, and particularly on the environment, where he has been an expert. At that meeting and in the course of other, superficial observations of him, I was impressed with Gore as a moderate Democrat, a dynamic and experienced figure, basically centrist in his instincts. This view of Gore, which is widely held, was reinforced during the occasions I had to deal with him during the first term of President Clinton. This included dealing with visiting Chinese or other Asian leaders, for example, and substituting for President Clinton, as Vice President Gore did in Osaka in 1995.

In debates on Vietnam policy I thought that Gore conducted himself well. For example, on Vietnam policy, as I've said, I thought that President Clinton was very skittish because of his own draft evasion and his worry about domestic backlash. Gore was generally supportive of my efforts and those of Secretary of State Christopher to move ahead in a graduated way with normalization of relations with Vietnam, which I thought was in our interest. Gore was very helpful in that regard. So I generally had, and I still have, a basically positive opinion of Vice President Gore. He was extremely hard-working, well-versed, experienced, and, on the whole, a centrist figure. However, I have become less enamored with him because he got up, on the day that President Clinton was impeached, and said that Clinton was one of our greatest Presidents. That was a bit much for me. I realized that he felt that he had to be loyal to the President, but I thought that went too far.

Gore certainly has been a very impressive Vice President. I don't think that any Vice President has been as intimately involved in policy matters. This has not just involved PR [Public Relations] but counseling the President, sitting in on key decisions, and undertaking important assignments abroad and at home. He has handled these matters quite competently. So I have no animus against Vice President Gore. He has certainly treated me decently. At a couple of

meetings which I attended, Vice President Gore did seem to be following briefing cards and not knowing the issues very well. However, that was the exception, rather than the rule. Gore is a little stiff, as people say, but I thought that he was a decent man. Again, I'm basically positive toward Gore, but I can't live with his statement that President Clinton was one of our greatest Presidents.

I was originally a tremendous fan of Mrs. Clinton. I first got to know her, sitting next to her at dinner at the White House, when I had occasion to talk to her for most of a couple of hours. I also met her superficially at various meetings and social occasions. She was always very gracious, warm, and obviously intelligent. I became a super fan of hers when I accompanied her on a week-long trip to China and Mongolia. That this was in the fall of 1995. She went to a United Nations conference on women's rights in Beijing. We attended this conference for several days. It was primarily an international conference, not a U.S.-China meeting. She had no bilateral meetings with Chinese leaders. We were having trouble with the Chinese at that point, but that wasn't the question. She was there for the UN meeting as a representative of the U.S. Then we went on to Mongolia.

First of all, she confirmed what everyone knows. She is extremely bright and the smartest First Lady that I've ever met. However, beyond that, she took advice I gave her on a speech. I was there essentially as her adviser on China and Mongolia. I was the only person outside her immediate staff. They were very loyal to her and very friendly to me. I encouraged her to be tough with respect on human rights and women's rights, including implied criticism of her hosts.

Some of the State Department people and other advisers were telling her: "Don't embarrass the President" by beating up on the Chinese record on women's rights or human rights. However, I said: "Absolutely not. You're here to speak at a UN women's conference. You're addressing that issue and you can put it in universal terms and not just China. But you shouldn't shy away from it. That's not inconsistent with engagement with China; it is another dimension of it. You should express your own convictions and principles because of the nature of the conference and to show that we have a balanced policy toward China. We're just not going to roll over for them." So, if anything, I toughened up her speech. She probably expected me, as the Department of State adviser, to suggest that she not annoy our Chinese clients or to be nice to them. I may have gained her respect in that sense. In my consideration of the issue, I advised her in terms of what I thought was right for U.S. policy.

She took other advice and was modest in her approach. The speech was strong and good and went over very well. She got a tremendous reception on a day when it was pouring rain. I still remember the unbelievably bad conditions under which it was delivered. She spoke in a tent.

Mrs. Clinton was also very friendly, warm, and approachable. She didn't lose her dignity, and she was still the First Lady of the United States, but you felt that you could talk to her as a human being and a friend. She displayed a good sense of humor. So I just liked her on every level and I retain these positive views of her to this day.

However, because of the scandal involving President Clinton, I've lost some respect for her. She is too smart not to have known what was going on. Therefore, she was an enabler for the

President. She said that this affair involved a “vast right wing conspiracy” and said that right after the Monica Lewinsky scandal broke. She had also protected the President during the campaign on the Jennifer Flowers issue. You can't judge other people's marriage, but, perhaps out of ambition, for a woman who is supposedly a spokesperson for women's rights to put up with this kind of performance by her husband to me is beyond the pale.

*Q: Let's turn to your experience with the various Secretaries of State you knew. You've already talked quite a bit about George Shultz...*

LORD: I've already talked about Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and Warren Christopher, the three Secretaries of State I worked with the most. I've discussed Kissinger at great length, as well as Shultz and Christopher. I've already talked about Shultz and I'll just touch on him briefly.

I think that George Shultz was a truly excellent Secretary of State, one of our three best since World War II, though he is not Dean Acheson or Henry Kissinger in stature. By the way, Kissinger deserves to be ranked as one of our top Secretaries of State and National Security Advisers. I think that it's just a bit misleading to say that Kissinger was a great Secretary of State. You have to include his 5-6 years as National Security Adviser. He was a great Secretary of State, but he was also a great National Security Adviser. You have to put the two positions together because, otherwise, you lose some of his almost incredible achievements during the first four years of the Nixon Administration. I've covered his achievements at the Department of State as well as the NSC. At State in addition to Middle East breakthroughs and independence for Rhodesia (becoming Zimbabwe) and his other specific accomplishments, perhaps Kissinger's greatest contribution was his holding the country and our foreign policy together almost single-handedly in the wake of the Watergate Affair. But you have to add the 1969-1973 achievements, what he did in terms of China, the Soviet Union, Vietnam, and the Middle East, etc. before he became Secretary of State.

Shultz, of course, was brought in after Al Haig's debacle and Haig's quarreling with Jim Baker and the White House staff generally, as well as Haig's general personality. Shultz brought in a steadiness of personality but, much more important than that, on most issues I happen to have agreed with Shultz. I think that he had just the right balance of toughness and a willingness to negotiate with the Soviets and with others. He was out in front on some issues like terrorism and the importance of technology to foreign policy and the world in general. He was way ahead of most people on issues like that. He had patience and toughness of the kind that Warren Christopher had, and I'll get back to Christopher later. Shultz had somewhat greater conceptual strength than Christopher did, though obviously much less than Kissinger.

Shultz didn't have the most effusive kind of personality. He didn't have a great sense of humor. He was very tough to figure out, not just for me, but for others as well. People used to call him "the Big Buddha." If you were briefing him for a meeting, he was a terrific listener, and you knew that he was taking in everything that you said. That's the good news. The bad news is that you had no idea how much he agreed. He would listen and absorb what you said and, perhaps, ask a few questions. However, you never got much feedback. You never knew how much he was taking aboard and how much he agreed with. You knew that you were being listened to, carefully. But Shultz handled himself extremely well in meetings, and you could tell that he took

aboard your briefing. So it all came out all right, but you never got a sense of feedback, nor was he ever particularly generous in extending praise to his subordinates. That's the least important attribute, but, if you're a human being, you have to get some feedback.

A couple of times I got some feedback from George Shultz indirectly. For example, in connection with his lengthy trip to China in 1987, I think that I've mentioned what he said on the airplane on the way back to the U.S. He said that this was the single, best trip he had ever taken as Secretary of State, and maybe as a public official. Our Embassy and I had something to do with that. I know that George Shultz thought highly of me, but I could never have proved it by his exchanges, his memoirs, or anything else. He had a Buddha-like quality, but that's the least important characteristic about someone.

When you talk about President Reagan bringing an end to the Cold War, you have to include George Shultz in there as well. I don't think that Reagan could have done it by himself. Reagan was excellent, in the sense of being principled, firm, and steady. With the help of George Shultz and Mrs. Reagan he also saw the need to negotiate. However, essentially, he built up our assets. An additional factor which helped to bring down the Soviet empire was the basic rottenness of the Soviet system. In addition to that it was U.S. spending on defense, and particularly the Star Wars program, calling the Soviet Union an Evil Empire, his insistence on human rights, as well as negotiating with the Soviets and meeting separately with dissidents in Moscow. In supporting all this, Shultz had the basic instincts to conduct a firm policy and exert some leverage on the Soviets. He continued to exert pressure on the Soviets over their invasion of Afghanistan. When I was in China, we did an awful lot of work against the Russians, with the help of the Chinese. Reagan was very good at putting pressure on the Soviets. Shultz could turn those assets and leverage into negotiated outcomes and use them effectively, in a diplomatic sense. So Reagan deserves credit for picking the right man as Secretary of State, that is, George Shultz, after making a mistake with Al Haig.

I think that you have to give Shultz a lot of the credit for steering President Reagan, in a hard-headed way, toward negotiations with the Soviets and using the leverage that he had built up. I give Shultz a lot of credit for that.

Shultz was clearly opposed to the Iran-Contra idea of trading arms for hostages. He skated close to flatly denying his involvement in that. He clearly was against it, but it seemed to me that it turned out that he knew that something was going on in this respect. However, he didn't dare try to find out just what it was, which is not the most heroic position to take. He certainly was a lot better, as were Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, than Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, Bud McFarland, and the rest of the group on the National Security Council staff. But he could have been more aggressive, and not just passively against the Iran-Contra maneuver. He could have poked around a lot more than he did. So Shultz sort of escaped criticism for that.

I recall that Shultz agonized over this issue. I could tell from the media and what I had heard that he debated whether he should stay on as Secretary of State after the Iran-Contra debacle. Not because he was involved in it, but just generally because of his unease over the whole matter. I wrote him a personal, back channel message, on November 22, encouraging him to stay on as Secretary of State. I told him how important he was, how steady he was, and that he had invested

too much to leave his position. I'm not pretending that this message had much impact on what he decided to do. I just cite it. Obviously, others were telling him the same thing. I don't think that Shultz ever really came close to resigning as Secretary of State, but there were some rumors circulating to that effect. (End of tape)

In 1984, during President Reagan's trip to China, the American business community had a meeting with Secretary of State Shultz. Or maybe it was a separate trip which Secretary of State Shultz made by himself. Anyway, Shultz was in China on this occasion, and the businessmen began criticizing the United States over our maintaining controls on exports and not sharing technology with China. The American business community also complained about other aspects of how the U.S. dealt with China in the economic field. To his credit, Shultz controlled his anger but, in effect, said: "If you don't like the United States, leave it." He said in substance, support your government. I don't recall his exact words, but in effect he made a very tough reply to the American business community.

The American business community also attacked Secretary of State Christopher when he went to China. They were more polite, but they still displayed an obnoxious attitude to him. They undercut our policy in China by lobbying us, together with the U.S. economic agencies, and by splitting the U.S. government and thus encouraging the Chinese to be inflexible on human rights, as I discussed earlier in this interview. They never pressed the Chinese. Zhu Rongji has just been in Washington as we speak in the spring of 1999. The American business community is regularly critical of the Administration and the President but fawns all over Zhu. So on the whole, and with some exceptions, the American business community has behaved outrageously on China trade issues, as it has on human rights issues generally. Thus I always respected Secretary Shultz for responding firmly to them on that issue. So I always gave him very high marks, although I couldn't always figure out what he wanted to do. I thought that he was a solid, steady presence. There were considerable achievements made during this period.

As we sit here in this magnificent Foreign Service Institute [FSI], my understanding is that Shultz was responsible for the rehabilitation of this building for use by the FSI at a time of budget constraints. He realized the need for training our diplomats. He put aside the necessary money for this work and held firmly on this issue. At the time it would have been very easy to say: "Well, we'll do that some other time. I have to worry about nuts and bolts now. That's for next year." He deserves credit for that as well.

In terms of style as Secretary he relied heavily on his Assistant Secretaries and the career service rather than a palace guard of close aides (as Baker did). In this respect he was probably the best in using professionals and was popular for that.

Any more questions on Shultz?

*Q: No. I thought that you might express whatever thoughts you might have on Secretary of State Jim Baker, even though you did not serve under him.*

LORD: Well, under Reagan he was Secretary of the Treasury after he was White House Chief of Staff. At the time I was serving as Ambassador to China. The only really direct experience I had

with him was when he made a trip to China as Secretary of the Treasury. This must have been some time in 1987. I was very impressed with him. I had heard about his political shrewdness. I had admired his performance as White House Chief of Staff. I knew that he was skillful in getting people elected but also did a terrific job as Chief of Staff to President Reagan. It seemed to me that he was doing a good job as Secretary of the Treasury. I had a favorable impression of him before he came to China, and it was even stronger after he left. I thought that he dealt with the Chinese well. He didn't fawn over them. He was polite but businesslike, which you have to be with the Chinese. Too many people fawn over them, as business people often do, and they are seduced by their Chinese experience.

A minor issue came up during Secretary of the Treasury Baker's visit to China. I can't remember now what it was, but he skillfully negotiated a concrete solution to the problem while he was there. I think that it involved financial services of some kind. It may have been related to the dual taxation treaty, or something like that. It was not a matter of cosmic importance, but I saw the skill with which Baker handled it. He was very personable. I liked him and was very impressed with him. I always thought that he was an able person. I think that he did a pretty good job on foreign policy during the Bush administration. Certainly, he performed well during the Gulf War and with respect to the German reunification issue.

But handling relations with China reflected the less laudable side of Secretary Baker. He made sure he stayed away from controversial issues. As a result, he was not obnoxious on China in terms of being soft, as General Brent Scowcroft and Bush had been. He just tried to stay out of current issues on China policy altogether. He just basically let other people deal with the Chinese because he knew that in domestic, political terms, after the Tiananmen Square massacre, China was not a popular issue. So he had a tendency to stay away from something that would hurt him politically. This was not exactly an admirable trait.

Also Baker really relied on a palace guard at State. They were very able. But the Foreign Service felt excluded and resented this.

*Q: From my interviews I have the feeling that Baker, in effect, was somewhat interested in running for President. He kept that option open, which is always very dangerous for a Secretary of State. As was the case with Kissinger, a Secretary of State deals with things that most Americans don't want to have to deal with.*

LORD: That is an issue that I would fault Baker on. The example of China is a good one. There were some others that were controversial that I now forget. He tried to keep a low profile on them. He would be happy to be engaged in the more popular ones. But in terms of dealing with the Russians and German reunification, the Gulf War, and some of the big ticket items, Baker was excellent. The team of Baker, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, National Security Adviser Scowcroft, and President Bush made up a pretty harmonious group, whatever else you may think of them.

Baker was very skillful. At first, when he entered federal government service, he was one of three people working for President Reagan as co-chief of staff in effect. He shoved the other two aside skillfully. I forget their names now, but Baker became first among equals. Later, he became

Secretary of the Treasury for Reagan and then Secretary of State for Bush.

One footnote here. Baker didn't treat George Shultz, his predecessor as Secretary of State, very well. They were both moderate Republicans, working for Republican administrations and they had been cabinet colleagues. I know that Shultz, who was pretty tight-lipped, was pretty annoyed that Baker wasn't particularly graceful during his transition into office as Secretary of State. As I recall, he consulted Shultz only once, and never called him very much afterwards, so Shultz was somewhat annoyed that his successor as Secretary of State wasn't more gracious.

You're right. Baker was someone who was always calculating his political image and would stay away from controversial issues. Maybe he was too clever by half, certainly more of a negotiator and tactician than he was a conceptualizer, like Kissinger or Zbigniew Brzezinski. On the whole, I think that Baker did a pretty good job as Secretary of State.

I naively thought that I had a pretty good reputation with him, too. I obviously can't judge people. Baker didn't invite me to be in the Department of State with him, which sort of surprised me, to be honest. However, I have no particular animus against Baker.

I think that the fact that he stayed away from some controversial issues suggests that after President Bush's term was over, they were not the closest of friends. In contrast, Scowcroft at first wasn't particularly close to President Bush - certainly not as close as Baker - but he became much closer to him and collaborated with him on the book published by Bush. I think that Bush feels that Baker distanced himself from some of these controversial issues.

*Q: Baker kept his distance from Bush, although they were both from the same city.*

LORD: It sounds that way now. They used to be very close friends, and Baker's low profile on some tough issues may be the explanation for this new distance.

*Q: Then we come to Secretary of State Christopher. I would also like you to talk a bit about former Vice President and then Ambassador to Japan, Fritz Mondale.*

LORD: All right. Let me comment on Mondale briefly. I have covered him elsewhere, too. I had known Mondale superficially off and on over the years. He was involved with the Council on Foreign Relations when I was there. I had also met him in some other capacities. My mother was from Minneapolis, so there was always a Minnesota connection to a certain extent, but I didn't know Mondale well. As I say, I knew him superficially as Vice President. I got to know him best when he was Ambassador to Japan, during the Clinton first term as President. I got to like him and, to this day, I'm full of admiration for him. Mondale was always more liberal on domestic politics than I was, as a centrist, but that's not a sin. I always respected him. He is an extremely decent man. He was a perfect example of why a political appointee as Ambassador can be so good. Every Foreign Service officer that I know welcomes good political appointees of good quality, if they deserve it and if they bring new blood into diplomacy. All of this is positive, as long as you don't have too many political appointees, taking all of the best posts.

Mondale's appointment as Ambassador to Japan was important to show Japan that we had

someone of elevated stature for assignment to that post. It was a wise appointment and paid the Japanese tribute. However, more important, Mondale's political instincts turned out to be terrific. I remember when I was briefing him before he went to Tokyo in 1993. I recall his saying that what he intended to do was to be very respectful of the Japanese in public but to be as tough as he had to be in private, particularly on economic and trade issues. Ambassador Armacost had been tough with the Japanese as well. In fact, some of his toughness in private crept into the public dimension, and he was knocked around a little bit by the Japanese because of it. I think that was a bum rap. Armacost was a very close friend and was my deputy at one time. He was terrific and did an excellent job in Tokyo as Ambassador, particularly in the wake of former Senator Mike Mansfield. I yield to no one in my respect and affection for the Senator, but Ambassador Mansfield increasingly suffered from clientitis and was much too soft on the Japanese on economic issues. Ambassador Mansfield was disdained by the American business community. I don't always side with the American business community but I think that they had a point that Mansfield wasn't always tough enough with the Japanese. So Armacost had to correct that impression when he replaced Mansfield.

I think that Ambassador Mondale combined the best of all worlds. He was very respectful and cordial with the Japanese in public, without fawning over the Japanese. However, he could be very tough with them in private, including on economic issues, even as he worked with us and others, including Secretary of Defense Perry, myself, and Joe Nye to insulate our security relationship with the Japanese from our economic frictions. Mondale proved his worth, not only in terms of his style with the Japanese, but in terms of his political instincts also.

There was one incident during his tenure as Ambassador to Japan. I don't have this exactly right, but a Japanese student in this country was shot to death.

*Q: This was during the Halloween period in Louisiana, or some place like that. It was awful.*

LORD: That's right. Ambassador Mondale didn't ask for instructions or even get on the phone and ask whether he could do this or that. Using his political instincts, he immediately went on Japanese television and apologized on behalf of the United States. Not in a guilt-ridden way that would be excessive, but in an appropriate way. He defused the domestic Japanese backlash immediately by his instinct to get out there quickly in the same news cycle as the report on the murder. This showed that his political instincts were very good.

Another example was when there was the terrible incident of the rapes in Okinawa. He was magnificent in dealing with the Japanese public on that, as well as privately with Japanese officials.

So I was very high on Mondale's firmness, his hard work, his balanced view that we had to do something about economic issues, as otherwise they might intrude on security matters; the security relationship is in our own interest, and we have to keep it insulated from economic issues. This takes hard work on the security side. Together with Defense Secretary Perry, Mondale deserves a lot of credit. I think Mondale was an excellent Ambassador and a very decent man. I have great admiration for him.

Let's discuss some of the other people in the Clinton administration, starting with Secretary of State Warren Christopher. I have great respect for Christopher, who is a very decent person. Everyone knows his public service. He served twice in the Department of State as Deputy Secretary and then as Secretary. He also had responsible positions in California and was Deputy Attorney General of the United States. He dealt with riots during the Vietnam War and police problems in Los Angeles. He's really had a distinguished career. Whether it was dealing with the problem of hostages from the American Embassy in Teheran or police problems in Los Angeles, he's had some genuine accomplishments. I consider Christopher a friend, and he's always been very decent to me.

I believe in being loyal and I will be loyal to Christopher. Having said that, I think that he was too old for the job of Secretary of State. He came into the position at age 70 or 71. Some people are very vigorous at that age, and he is in great shape, physically. He jogs all the time, he's thin as a rail, and he's tough. However, I got tired in my late '50s as Assistant Secretary of State. I don't think that you can be in your 70s and be President or Secretary, although Reagan managed to pull it off. Toward the end with Reagan, it was a close call. There were times when I just felt that Christopher's stamina was amazing for someone of his age and in view of the pressures he was under. But that's the point. A Secretary of State shouldn't have to have amazing stamina. I really don't think that people in their 70s should be President or Secretary of State, no matter how vigorous they are. I just don't think that they can handle the job, as a rule. So I think that he paid a certain price for his age, even though, God knows, he was amazing in his resilience, in recovering from jet lag, and in being tough. There were times when you could tell that he was tired and not at the top of his game. I don't blame him for that. He was a great public servant. At his age he could have rested on his laurels but he was willing to serve his government. But I think that the factor of his age intruded on his effectiveness.

Like Shultz, Christopher was very difficult to figure out. He was very much like Shultz in briefings. He would listen, but you had no idea how much he was taking aboard. Having said that, I felt that, like Shultz and perhaps even more so, it was worthwhile to brief him because he was following a lot of your ideas. He would stick very closely to the talking points he was given. He knew his material and worked very hard at it. However, I had the feeling at times that he had a schedule which he had to get through, no matter what, and he didn't have a great deal of spontaneity or time for important detours or follow-up. I wonder whether he could decide whether or not to be discursive or to follow up on something. What you hear about Christopher is true. He was patient, decent, dogged. He had a willingness to take the long view and to hang in there. He was a good negotiator, tactful, and decent. He had all of these qualities. Of course, he had great stamina for his age, but I've already addressed that.

On Asian matters, I have to say that we didn't do badly when he was Secretary of State. We always had to fight the problem of Eurocentrism. My whole strategy for my confirmation statement and later on was to make Asia as important as Europe in our foreign policy. Looking ahead, I thought that this was as it should be, and in fact it actually was. I had good cooperation from Secretary Christopher on that point. Certainly, Clinton too cooperated on the calendar of the first year of the Clinton presidency, when he started off by going to Japan and Korea, then raising the APEC [Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation] talks to the summit level. Christopher supported that. He made several of his own trips to Asia to visit specific countries and/or to

attend economic (APEC and security (ARF) conferences. If I really needed to get his attention on an Asian problem back in Washington, I could do it. I always had direct access to Secretary Christopher and never had any problem with that.

Having said that, I would have to add that problems with Bosnia or the Middle East could distract his attention. That's understandable to a certain extent, but it could be frustrating. There are times when you can only do so much at the Assistant Secretary of State level. I would like to think that I did quite a bit and I surely had access to other leaders, even though the protocol divide was quite extensive. However, at times you have to involve the President or the Secretary of State, and both the President and Christopher at times were distracted by some of these non-Asian matters. We managed to get across to the Asians, and fairly successfully, I think, that we thought that Asia was more important because of the APEC Summit Meetings, because of the regional security dialogues we started, and because of the President's trips to Japan and Korea, his engagement with China and the normalization of relations with Vietnam, etc. For these reasons we managed to elevate the status of Asia within the U.S. Government.

There were times when the situation was frustrating. On one occasion, as I have related elsewhere, Christopher had to turn around from a regional security meeting somewhere in Southeast Asia, cancel a trip to Australia, and return to the U.S. I recall an anecdote in that connection. The Foreign Minister of Australia, Gareth Evans, was the most impressive foreign minister in the region. He could also be very tart and tough. I had a great relationship with him. He had a great sense of humor and is a brilliant and creative man. However, he was understandably outraged that Secretary Christopher, on this occasion, was canceling his visit to Australia. The meetings were scheduled to last for two days. We were going to go to northern Australia and meet there so that we wouldn't have to go all the way down to Canberra. I was on the phone with Evans, trying to negotiate what the communique would say about why Secretary Christopher had to go back to Washington.

Evans was screaming in my ear, in effect saying: "You've got to get Christopher to say in the statement that he will visit Australia in the next six months," or something like that. He must be committed to go to Australia. I ran down the hall to Christopher's office and finally got him to agree to go to Australia. In fact, Evans beat up on me by characteristically using an Australian expression: "You've given me a shit sandwich to deal with my own public opinion and my leaders back home."

I mention all that because a couple of months later I was calling on Evans in New York at the time of the UN General Assembly meeting. It was a one on one meeting, although we also had some advisers present with us. I had access to these foreign ministers. Evans greeted me. There was a little plate of finger sandwiches on the table. So I sat down at the table and moved the sandwiches around, looking at each one of them. Evans noticed this and said: "What the hell are you doing, Lord?" I said: "I'm looking for the shit sandwich!"

In any event, there were some distractions, but on the whole Secretary Christopher helped us on Asia. I say this against his background of great decency and humanity. I like Christopher. However, he is stiff and is basically shy. To me some of the most impressive foreign ministers he dealt with were the ones he liked least, because they were full of themselves and, like Evans,

were very blunt and egotistical. However, I thought that Evans was so creative and so friendly to the U.S. on the whole that he was one of the ministers that I liked. Secretary Christopher did not have good chemistry with some of these ministers.

One issue that Secretary Christopher was very helpful on was Vietnam. I've mentioned elsewhere how we had to fight the White House, because of the skittishness of President Clinton and National Security Adviser Tony Lake on this issue in moving ahead on normalization of diplomatic relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. I went to Christopher and got his support to back up our reports of Vietnamese cooperation on MIAs [Missing in Action] and the interest we had in moving ahead on normalization. He would argue with President Clinton and Tony Lake that we should continue to move ahead. Secretary Christopher was always a very solid factor and deserves a lot of the credit, and I think that I also do, frankly, for our normalization of relations with Vietnam. Secretary Christopher clearly didn't have as much conceptual strength as Secretary Kissinger did. However, who the hell does? Christopher approached negotiations on foreign policy more like a lawyer on discrete issues which you try to solve pragmatically, one at a time, without enunciating great, strategic concepts. You could argue that, in the wake of the Cold War, that was appropriate. However, Christopher didn't have the developed sense of grand strategy that Kissinger had.

I think that Christopher came out looking fairly good as a Secretary of State. He won't be ranked with the great Secretaries. Part of that is due to the opportunities which some of them had, such as Secretary Acheson did. Part of it is how good the Secretary is. If his record had been written after his first two years as Secretary of State, Christopher would have looked worse than he does as a whole. That is true of President Clinton's first two years as well.

One of Christopher's big mistakes, as he freely admits, is that he went to Europe to discuss policy toward Bosnia and backed off from being tough with the Yugoslavs, because of European skittishness, as opposed to showing leadership. There were problems in Somalia, and some of them were due to President Clinton. There were initial problems in Haiti, although that ended up coming out pretty well. There was a tough trip we made to China in March, 1994, which we have talked about. Certainly, President Clinton didn't back up Christopher on China policy. So the first couple of years of the first Clinton administration were pretty tough for Christopher. He had a pretty bad press.

The press is never as kind when things go well as it is vicious when things don't go well. I think that by the time Christopher left office, the press gave him a much better scorecard than he would have gotten for his first two years in office as Secretary of State, but I think that he deserves better than that. His patience and plodding paid off with some progress in the Middle East. We finally got the Dayton Accord on Yugoslavia. Of course, Assistant Secretary Dick Holbrooke had a lot to do with that. One could question now whether we should have dealt with Milosevic. However, the Dayton Accord stopped the killing in Bosnia for three years, if nothing else. Holbrooke himself said that Christopher was very helpful on that front.

I've indicated that Christopher was helpful on Vietnam and policies toward some other Asian countries which we have discussed. I'm not trying to recall everything that Christopher did. I know that he worked very hard with the Chinese, despite the problems, to get us out of the hole

that we were in following the Taiwan missile crises. In 1996 he met several more times with Qian Qichen, his counterpart. Even as Tony Lake was getting more involved, you have to give Christopher a lot of the credit, after some rough times with the Chinese, for helping to restore that relationship. He held strategy meetings on how we could get through this difficult period in the spring of 1996, and he helped to implement this strategy. He stayed in touch by correspondence and by meetings with Qian. He ended up with a successful trip to China in November, 1996, where we fixed the summit meetings with the Chinese, which was announced a few days later in Manila at the APEC summit meeting.

Christopher also worked hard with the Japanese Foreign Ministers, who kept changing to try to make sure that our economic frictions did not spread to the overall relationship, including security ties and a common agenda on global issues and so on. So Christopher worked quite hard on the Japan front. He also was very involved and supportive of our policy on Korea.

I think that, by the time he was through as Secretary of State, the Clinton foreign policy looked better, and Christopher also looked better. I think that he will go down, and rightly, as a solid and competent Secretary of State, though not a great Secretary.

*Q: I was thinking of Tony Lake and Sandy Berger [National Security Advisers to President Clinton during his first and second terms]. Maybe you could comment on Secretary of Defense Bill Perry first.*

LORD: I think that Bill Perry was certainly one of the most impressive people in the first term of the Clinton administration. I think that Mickey Kantor [U.S. Trade Representative and then Secretary of Commerce] was also impressive. He had a down side in terms of hurting us in some of our relationships, but he got an awful lot done in international trade negotiations. In connection with the APEC [Asia Pacific Economic Conference] summit meeting he was helpful, as well as with the Uruguay Round of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement], in addition to some bilateral talks. His deputy, Charlene Barshefsky, was also Kantor's successor as U.S. Trade Representative. She was equally impressive. Obviously, Bob Rubin and Larry Summers [Secretary of the Treasury and Deputy Secretary of the Treasury and eventually Secretary of the Treasury] were impressive on the economic side, given our economic performance and the respect they commanded. However, Bill Perry was up there as one of the most impressive and most decent people in the Clinton administration. He was an excellent Secretary of Defense and a man of great integrity.

Traveling with Perry, as I did on his trip to China, I found, as was the case with Strobe Talbott, that he was a joy to work with. He would sit around informally and prepare for a meeting carefully, discuss objectively strategy as well as tactics and how we should approach the issues involved. He would invite me to speak with his interlocutors while I was sitting there with him. I was with him during his meetings with the Japanese and the South Koreans, as well as with the Chinese. He would handle himself extremely well and do the post mortems afterwards. He and Strobe Talbott were the best people to travel with because they were terrific in this respect. You didn't get that feedback or intellectual exchange from Secretary Christopher, who was more "Buddha-like," or from Secretary George Shultz.

In my view, Perry was right on the issues. He was tough-minded and firm, as a Secretary of Defense should be expected to be. He was also flexible. He saw the value of the Agreed Framework with the North Koreans, even though it wasn't a perfect agreement. He saw the extremes of either acquiescence with the North Korean nuclear program or perhaps going to war. These were less good alternatives than the one he came up with. Secretary of Defense Perry was also helpful on China, helping us develop a military relationship. He not only went to China himself, and I accompanied him, he had his top deputies go with him to develop the exchanges with the Chinese military, generally recognizing the strategic importance of China. However, he could be firm with the Chinese as well. He was a major force, though the decision reflected a unanimous collective opinion, in moving the U.S. Navy aircraft carriers near the Taiwan Straits during the March, 1996, missile crisis affecting Taiwan and China. He felt that this would get the attention of the Chinese leadership, so he proved that he could be very tough, too.

Above all, I think that his greatest accomplishment, at least in the area I was involved in, was Japan. We had a lot of points of friction with Japan on economic issues. He wanted to insulate those problems from our security relationship. I worked hard with Joe Nye, with Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, and with others to do that. There was no question that the Pentagon took the lead on this issue, as it should have done. They handled this matter very well. Perry also handled very well the aftermath of the Okinawa rape incident. He displayed his sensitivity, going ahead with reviewing our defense relationship and guidelines with the Japanese. He helped in his own trip in March 1996 to set up a very successful trip to Japan by President Clinton in April, 1996, during which we reaffirmed our strategic partnership, if that's the word we used, and I think that it was. We did so along broader lines, as well as managing the Okinawa rape crisis and relocating and consolidating our defense facilities in Okinawa to defuse that tension politically and maintain our force presence in Japan. He performed magnificently on all of these fronts. Now, of course, he is heading a review of the role of our Korea policy, and he has the kind of credibility with Congress and domestic public opinion to do that in a very effective way.

Having said that, I would have to say that Lake was very helpful on Asia policy during the last year of the first Clinton term. Specifically on China, Lake became more involved. This was something that Secretary Christopher didn't mind, although he tried for a long time to prevent a trip to China by Lake. Christopher probably didn't want a repeat of Brzezinski's [National Security Adviser during the Carter administration] taking over China policy from Vance. But in 1996 they acted as a tag team, exchanging roles with one another. In 1996, Christopher worked very hard on China policy, and so did Lake.

I joined Lake in strategic discussions with the Chinese in the spring of 1996 at Middleburg, Virginia, at the Harriman estate. He handled himself very well, and we worked closely together. In July, 1996, I went with him to China, where we had important, strategic exchanges and really began to get into substantive discussions with the Chinese, which we should have done a long time previously, on some of the big issues around the world. We were also tough with the Chinese where we had to be. Essentially, we broke the ground for a summit meeting, which Secretary Christopher cemented in November, 1996, during his trip to China.

Lake was also helpful on Korea. He met with the Koreans and helped to come up with the four party peace proposal, which President Clinton and President Kim Dae Jung announced. I forget

the year, but I think that it was during the summer of 1996.

So, when he finally got himself involved on Asia policy, Lake was very good and very helpful. However, he took a while to do that, and he had these personality quirks which none of us ever figured out.

Sandy Berger, who was Lake's deputy as National Security Adviser, was one of the hardest working people I have ever met. I think that he was overloaded with responsibility. He was a very decent man, open to all opinions. He felt, as any Deputy NSC Adviser should do, all agency views must get fair consideration. He ran meetings well and with impeccable fairness to all points of view. With my encouragement, after the change in our MFN [Most Favored Nation] policy toward China, we began to have Berger chair meetings on China, as opposed to me.

We worked very closely together. I would go to all of these meetings, but unlike what Jim Mann suggests in his book, this was not a case of the White House taking something away from the State Department after a failed policy. Rather it was recognition of the fact that we had to have more White House attention devoted to China. We had to balance off competing government interests and get discipline among the economic agencies which undercut us in terms of MFN policy and generally have a more integrated China policy. We wanted to have everyone singing from the same sheet of music, and this is not something I could do out of the State Department. Moreover, more NSC leadership meant more Presidential and White House attention. We had to go to the White House and at Berger's level. We were much more successful once we did that, with my full encouragement. I was fully involved in every meeting. I went on every trip, including trips with Tony Lake. So I had no complaints, and this is a typical case of distortion by Jim Mann. This allowed the strategy for 1996, which had come from Secretary Christopher, to be implemented at White House meetings. I think that Sandy Berger was very fair and very good. I had great admiration for him. I thought that he was overwhelmed at times. I think that we can stop here, unless you have some questions.

*Q: This may be somewhat out of sequence, and we could put it at the end. Here you were, dealing with Asian affairs and particularly Chinese matters. Your wife was born in China. I imagine that your nerve endings would be particularly sensitive to this, but did you find that in the political outlook of many Republicans, and we're talking about 1999, you encountered an almost anti-Chinese, racist bias, as there has been, for example, against the Blacks or Jews or other minority groups?*

LORD: The quick answer to your question is "No." I don't think that there is a racial dimension, certainly in the Republican or Democratic Party as a whole. There may be something of a more general, racist dimension in the American body politic as a whole.

Let me just address this matter briefly. As we speak, there may be a tendency in certain quarters, although I don't know how much evidence there is of this tendency as yet, that, because of indications of official Chinese fund raising and espionage in the U.S. by Asian looking people, there may be some feeling of suspicion toward them. Unfortunately, most Americans can't tell a Chinese from a Japanese or a Korean. I don't think that such a view is very widespread, and I don't even have any proof that it exists. There may be some Chinese-Americans who have a

different view of this. They may feel that some Americans have inherent suspicions of Asians, just as some police officers may have inherent suspicions of Blacks or Puerto Ricans they meet on the streets. I don't believe that this has become a major factor as yet among the American public in general. It certainly is not true of Republicans (or Democrats) as a whole.

First of all, the reaction to indications of official Chinese fund raising and spying isn't just a Republican matter. A lot of it is, for obvious reasons, but there has also been fund raising on behalf of the Democratic Party. It is also true that some recent cases of spying have taken place during Democratic Party administrations. There are a lot of Democrats who are concerned about some Chinese activities. That includes the Cox Committee Report, which is due to be issued soon and parts of which have already leaked out. This report expresses virtually unanimous views on Chinese spying, from both Democrats as well as Republicans. Certainly, the Republican Party is not unified on China or on this particular aspect of China.

The views of China as we speak, in the spring of 1999, are not a matter of controversy between Republicans and Democrats. The debates on China are held within the two parties. On the Democratic side, you have great concerns about China in the views of Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi [Democrat, California], union leaders, and some liberal Democrats, primarily because of human rights issues, but also on nuclear non-proliferation and maybe trade deficit issues, and jobs in the case of trade unions. They want a tough posture toward the Chinese. On the other hand there is the Clinton administration and many Democrats who favor engagement with China.

Similarly, as far as the Republican Party is concerned, there is a debate within the party with respect to policy and attitudes toward China. One of the Republican groups involved in this debate is led by people like Kissinger, Ford, and Scowcroft. These are people who, in the past, have worked for engagement with China and still believe, for geopolitical or other reasons, that we should move more closely to China. Plus businessmen who, on the whole, are Republicans and very much in support of engagement with China. On the other hand there are conservative Republican figures, such as Pat Buchanan or people concerned about the pro-life issue, such as Gary Bauer, or religious people worried about religious discrimination in China, or human rights advocates in general. These people are also worried about our trade deficit with China or about nuclear non-proliferation. And these people, including some in think tanks, see China as a looming military threat. Some consider that China will inevitably be an enemy, and that we should contain that growing power.

So, getting back to your question, I don't think that it's a matter of the Republican Party being racist on China. In the first place, the people most critical of China are within both parties in this debate. And those friendlier to China are within both parties, too. Also, I don't think that those who are against China do so for racist reasons. Sometimes, it's hard to figure out what is implicit racism, but I really think that those who are anti-Chinese, including those in the Republican Party, hold these views for reasons that are understandable and have nothing to do with race. I think that they honestly believe that the Chinese have behaved in a reprehensible way on human rights, on Tibet, and on religious persecution. These people believe that the Chinese have a huge surplus in their trade with the U.S. because they keep their domestic market closed to us. They also believe that the Chinese have been exporting technology, nuclear weapons, and missiles to sensitive areas and rogue regimes, that they are trying to bully Taiwan, and that they are getting

arrogant. And many believe that China is becoming a military threat.

On top of that, the Chinese have been spying against the United States. Some aren't particularly shocked at this, because everyone, including Israel, engages in this kind of activity. But these people consider that this kind of activity is additional evidence of unfriendliness toward the United States. Others feel that the Chinese have tried to influence our political campaigns, although definitive proof is not yet available. Some of these people emphasize some issues more than others. Some of them look at the situation across the board. Plus, there is the matter of China's growing power, and some people believe that China is going to challenge us in the future, not only in Asia but around the world as well. They genuinely want to see a tougher policy pursued toward China, and it's not because the Chinese happen to have yellow skins.

Now there is no question that some of these people get upset at some things the Chinese do but don't get upset if other people do the same thing. I mean, bad as the Chinese are in the field of human rights, Saudi Arabia, for example, does not exactly have a good record in terms of human rights. Just take the treatment of women. There are other bad regimes which we beat up on, like Iran, Iraq, North Korea, or Serbia under Milosevic. We tend to pick on smaller nations. We beat up on other countries in the field of human rights. Obviously, Israel has advantages because it has tremendous, political clout in this country with Congress and public opinion. People have to worry about the Jewish vote, and so on, much more than they have to worry about the Chinese vote. Israel is also a democracy, and it has some genuine, security concerns. So Israel gets a much easier ride than China, which is not a democracy. On the other hand, some nasty regimes get much tougher treatment from us than China, with whom we have a greater range of interests.

That's a long-winded way of saying that I ascribe no feelings of real racism in these anti-China tendencies, because I think that it is made up of all these other elements.

Let me go back briefly to the end of my tenure as Assistant Secretary, after the APEC summit meeting in November 1996.

In addition to ongoing business, I and my bureau worked hard for the transition to a new Secretary, Madeleine Albright, and my successor, Stanley Roth. This included the preparation of many briefing papers and memoranda, as well as verbal briefings and meetings. There was one particularly important, comprehensive session that I had on the region with Ms. Albright and her top aides.

I also sent messages and farewell cables to our overseas posts, summing up our years and thanking my colleagues. I also worked on helping the career moves and next assignments of several in my bureau and abroad.

There were various farewell parties, including a large one with staff, colleagues, and friends (including my wife) at which Secretary Christopher spoke in positive terms.

Incoming Secretary Albright asked, indeed urged, me to stay on as Assistant Secretary. I declined for reasons cited earlier in this history, including my view that we had made major progress in the region and that our relations with key countries and institutions were in good

shape. Also I was tired after four years of the most demanding, along with the Kissinger years, of all my jobs.

Ms. Albright then offered me my pick of any embassy in the EAP region (and I inferred that other regions might be possible, too). Sandy Berger, the National Security Advisor, clearly with her concurrence, called me to offer specifically the Ambassadorship in Seoul, Korea. I again declined with appreciation. Finally the State Department recommended me to the White House as Ambassador to Japan, the one post I would consider. The White House, however, settled on House Speaker Tom Foley.

On January 20, 1997 I left government service for almost certainly the last time. I had served in a series of challenging, often dramatic, assignments at the State Department, in Geneva, at the Pentagon, in the White House, again at State, at the Council on Foreign Relations, in China, again in the private sector, and once more at State.

**MICHAEL A. BOORSTEIN**  
**Administrative Counselor**  
**Beijing (1993-1996)**

**Director, American Embassy in Beijing Project**  
**Washington, DC (1999-2002)**

*Mr. Boorstein was born in Washington, DC and was raised in that area. He was educated at Beloit College, the University of Colorado, Harvard University and the University of Turku in Finland. Entering the Foreign Service in 1970, Mr. Boorstein specialized in administration and personnel, serving in Palermo, Rome, Ottawa, Warsaw Curacao, Moscow and Beijing. In addition, Mr. Boorstein played a major role in the planning and construction of US embassies in Moscow and Beijing and in the renovation of consulates and embassies throughout the globe. He spoke six foreign languages. Mr. Boorstein was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005.*

*Q: Well, while you were setting up all these new sites and all this, when you were working in Moscow, everything seemed to be dominated by security, eavesdropping and all that. How stood things when you were in China?*

BOORSTEIN: Oh, exactly the same. The threat level was viewed at the same level as it was in the Soviet Union. The need, well, basically, we operated under the assumption that our embassy was insecure and at the end of the day the only way to fix that was to build a whole new facility and that's what we're doing now in Beijing. Even though we had secure conference rooms where we would go, the view was it was better than nothing, but not as good as it really needed to be. We were very much disciplined to the need to segregate the Chinese national staff from the areas we worked in. You had your secure spaces that were only for the Americans and the Chinese were not allowed in. Of course in the chancery the Marine guard barred the entrance from having

people go upstairs which was totally an American area. I worked on another compound which had the consular section and I'm trying to think, yes, the consular section and a lot of the administrative operations and we had the Chinese staff back in my little area, my immediate office and that of my deputy and the secretary was an area where the Chinese staff was not allowed to come back. They could come under escort. You could invite a Chinese Embassy person to your office for a meeting, but that person could not go in and out on his or her own.

You know the same kind of regime that operated that if we had a sensitive personal issue at home and we wanted to have a discussion with our spouse we were allowed to come in and use the secure conference room to have that kind of a discussion. We were told not to keep any sensitive personal papers at home, but in our office in the safe. So, there was that great deal of sensitivity. Of course the planning for our new embassy and in the case of Guangzhou just like we did in Moscow, there are only top secret cleared American workers building those parts of the compound that are only going to be used by Americans for the classified work.

My preoccupation as the administrative counselor as I was saying was on the facilities side and being a member of the school board. Let me talk about the school board experience a little bit because that really was a dominant part of my life and again it helps to illustrate some of the roles that Foreign Service diplomatic people play in our more important overseas posts. The International School of Beijing was founded in 1980 as a diplomatic school for the children from five nations, the U.S., the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. In 1980 there were no students whose parents were expatriate business people because there just weren't any there, very, very few. It started off in an embassy apartment and then it gradually grew to the size where they had to get leased quarters. The school was housed in a housing complex that included apartments and a Holiday Inn and like I said the capacity of the school had maxed out at about 600. We did this modular campus to increase the capacity, basically doubled the size, had a new multipurpose building, had a new cafeteria. It had new two story modular classrooms that basically became the middle school and the upper school, the high school. Until I arrived until 1994 it was the only school in Beijing that taught in English for foreigners. Subsequent to that and again as part of the critical mass of people, the number of expatriates as well as the diversification, new English language schools started up afterwards, but only the international school retained, it was the only high school available in Beijing.

I was on the school board for three years. The second year I was the vice chairman and the third year I was the chairman of the board. The efforts got into serious high gear to find a new campus and to find funding to build and design a new school. In order to do that we had to get the permission of the Chinese government to move the school. The Chinese government took advantage of that request to basically eliminate the school's diplomatic status eventually, since the vast majority of students were the children of expatriate business people rather than diplomats. In order to place the modular campus, the school had to use about one-third of a playground that it had leased from the Chinese government. This was the summer of 1994. The previous fall the International Olympic Committee was voting on which country and which city was going to get the Olympics for the year 2000. China was advocating like crazy to have it in Beijing in the year 2000. That was the year that there was a non-binding resolution in congress that said that the U.S. position was not in favor of granting the games to Beijing because of China's poor human rights record. As a result, in China there were a lot of strong anti-American

and anti-British sentiment that led up to the vote. This was in October or November of 1993 and by a very close vote the nod went to Sydney to get the Olympics in the year 2000. The mayor of Beijing at the time a gentleman named Chen Xi Tong was very resentful of the fact that Beijing didn't get the Olympics and blamed the Americans. He was no longer mayor I believe by the spring of 1994, but he was still a senior party official and he retained his title I think of being head of the committee for the Chinese Olympic Committee. We learned from pretty reliable sources that he was behind a unilateral action that the Chinese city government took. We had started the construction of the modular campus. We laid down the foundation on which these modular buildings would lie and one of the buildings was going to be very near the fence line separating the school's property from the highway leading to the airport. Well, this former mayor was able to enforce a decision that expropriated a strip of land no more than 20 or 30 feet wide from the fence inward, which they claimed was needed as a green space. So, therefore the amount of room available to build the modular campus shrunk. We literally had to dig up the footings that were placed and move them 30 feet inward and use up even more of the playground to accomplish this. There were all kinds of protests from the diplomatic missions that were the sponsors of the school, but to no avail. There was no due process here. It was not like it was an action of some sort of land commission that the school could appeal. It was simply a bullying tactic on the part of the Chinese government.

*Q: Well, apparently we keep seeing articles about this all the time that the communist officials use power without redress.*

BOORSTEIN: That's right. That was done and so the school was smarting from that. We got the campus done and whatever, but ultimately a year and a half later when we were looking to get new land and to get the Chinese government to agree through basically the Beijing municipal government that we could move, the foreign ministry got into the act and basically then unilaterally lifted the school's duty free status and then said that the customs authorities were free to bill the school for the duty on the imported classrooms after the fact. Well, the embassies protested and basically the school with the backing of the U.S. Embassy and the others refused to pay the bill and I don't believe the bill was ever paid. It was a very Chinese solution in that the Chinese basically said "we have the right to charge duty," and the American Embassy I believe said, "we acknowledge your right to charge the duty, but we also inform you of our right to refuse to pay it on behalf of the school." So, it reached an impasse. In any event the school did get its land, did get its permission to move. The capital fee levy was imposed. It took a great deal of selling to the parent organizations that were not as supportive of the school or they didn't support their parents to the extent that the American government did. At the end of the day we got through. The school was built and I was invited to the dedication ceremony in April of 2002. I saw this beautiful campus and it was a great feeling of satisfaction that I was very instrumental at its beginning.

*Q: Were you harassed, you know, we've had over the years lots of stories about the KGB harassing American diplomats and all. How heavy was the hand of the Chinese security service?*

BOORSTEIN: Speaking personally they didn't bother me at all. Maybe they felt I didn't know as much as a political officer or whatever, but in terms of the embassy as a whole, we went on fairly high security alert shortly after I arrived because the international Olympic committee was

voting on which city was going to get the Olympics in the year 2000. This was in the fall of 1993 and Beijing was competing for it mightily and that was the year that Sydney was awarded the games. So, there was a lot of anti-China feeling in the congress because of their human rights level, the Chinese human rights record. There was a sense of congress resolution as I recall against China being awarded the Olympics for Beijing in 2000. The Chinese were not happy with that and so on the day that the vote was held I believe it was the evening in Beijing we took some security precautions. We coordinated with the Brits and the Australians and some others. We for example took all of our motor pool vehicles, which we were very comfortable in parking on the street overnight and moved them inside our compound. We advised people to stay home, low profile. China of course did not get the games, Sydney did. There were no riots. There was a lot of anti-American rhetoric in the press and this, that and the other thing, but nothing that was taken out on us. I mean unlike whatever the year was where during the campaign in the former Yugoslavia where there was all this NATO bombing and we inadvertently bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and killed several of their people.

*Q: Were you there when that happened?*

BOORSTEIN: No. That was in '99, 2000, something like that and of course that was very serious. Our poor ambassador was basically held hostage in the embassy for three or four days. There were all kinds of pictures of paint being splattered and rocks being thrown and that was part of the impetus where we felt that it was very important for us to have land with the proper setback to build our new embassy. None of that, I'm trying to think in terms of other people in the embassy. Some of our military attachés that of course it was their job to push the envelope when they went out on their trips and if the Chinese caught them being too close to military installations taking pictures or whatever they would file a protest and in some cases they would kick them out of the country. My sense is that it didn't happen as often as it did when I was in Moscow in the late '70s, early '80s.

*Q: How did you find the Chinese Foreign Service Nationals?*

BOORSTEIN: By and large, they were very good. They were good at what they did. It was a double-edged sword because you knew that they were planted there and in particular, even when you would have counter intelligence briefings before going overseas, the security officials would have some specific information or had come to some conclusions about a certain number of the local staff that you were basically told to trust less than others. At the same token, I'm not going to name any names here you would still find these people to be very helpful, whether it came to, there were times where we had to get visas for people that were transiting Beijing and they were going to North Korea where of course we had no relations. It was during a time where we were considering establishing relations and there were some of our local staff that were very adept at dealing with the North Koreans at their embassy in Beijing to get the visas. When you want stuff done, they were there and they were helpful. But of course, we were very careful in what we gave them access to. We were very careful because of the category of threat that was established for all of our posts in China. We had certain protocols in place that separated even our unclassified information systems from the Chinese. Our computer center for example was staffed entirely by Americans with security clearances whereas in other countries you could have locals in the computer centers. That certainly was not the case in Beijing. We would have certain floors

in the embassy that were totally off limits to the Chinese, except we would let the char force in there in the evenings under escorts by the Marines under escort. As I said we were very careful and it was a regime where the security officer kept. He ran a very tight ship and we had a lot of awareness. We were reminded and if we wanted to have any sensitive conversations at all, we had to use the special rooms that were designed for that purpose. That was just a factor. You just sort of got used to it. You knew you were not in friendly territory.

You also, in dealing with the foreign ministry I recall one instance where I went in there, I forget what the issue was and I, which I typically did, I took one of the DSB employees to be the interpreter. Of course, he was a Chinese national and my Chinese was not fluent by any stretch of the imagination, but I knew enough that I could follow along when he interpreted my comments and there was one case where I stopped him and I said, "No, Mr. Chung, that's not what I said." I repeated it in English. He apologized and he said, "Oh, I heard it differently." Well, you know, I think that's bologna. I think he knew exactly what it is that he wanted to say and he wanted to characterize what I had to say in a different way and I caught him. I was quite gratified that my Chinese was good enough to having picked out that nuance.

*Q: Did you have overall responsibility for the administration of our post?*

BOORSTEIN: That's right.

*Q: How many posts were there and could you characterize what their problems were?*

BOORSTEIN: Sure. We had four consulates in China. Our two largest were Shanghai and Guangzhou and the two smaller ones were Shenyang and Chengdu. Shenyang is in northeastern China.

*Q: Is that all Dalian or is that?*

BOORSTEIN: No. I don't know that it ever went under another name. You're thinking of Port Arthur, not Dalian. Guangzhou was Canton in the old days and that was our largest and it remains our largest consulate. Shanghai a little bit smaller. Chengdu and Shenyang were roughly a quarter of the size each of those other two. They were mainly listening posts. Shenyang being fairly close to the Korean, the North Korean border. Chengdu, which is the capital of Szechwan province where the pandas come from, where the spicy Chinese food comes from, was also the closest post we had to Tibet and that was a major reason why we had our consulate there. At the time and I believe to this day Chengdu remains, we are the only consular presence in Chengdu. No other countries have a presence there. In Shenyang there are other consulates, the Japanese, the North Koreans, I think even the South Koreans have something there. I'm not sure about any other countries.

They each had their own management challenges. Guangzhou was and remains the only post in China that issues immigrant visas. The consular section there is enormous, the biggest we have in China. Southern China being a very economically active area, a booming area, the demand for non-immigrant visas for business purposes for other travel increased enormously. The largest number of immigrant visas that would be issued, would be issued to orphans. American families

would go to adopt Chinese children, mainly girls that were abandoned by their families. It was always heartening to go down to Guangzhou and stay at the White Swan Hotel, which was just down the street from where the consulate was. It was basically the same complex. To see all these parents that were there to adopt children and the children were with them while they underwent the formalities. They were basically seeing these kids for the first time and seeing how they interacted and how joyous it was for the most part, to see them and it was very gratifying to see that.

Even on this last trip that I made in March even though the consular section has relocated to a high-rise office building because of the demand for the space they still use the White Swan because the White Swan is used to catering to their needs and still see the parents and the kids. There was one instance where they were taking a group picture by this lovely Chinese fountain in the lobby of the hotel. That's really a major focus of our consulate there, plus of course the consular district that encompasses, that Guangzhou is responsible for, probably has 90, or 100 million people and so that's more than the population of Germany, more than the population of Italy. There's a lot of interest by our consulate staff to get out and about to talk to the provincial authorities to see what's going on with business. Wal-Mart has invested a lot.

*Q: It's also the area of special business areas.*

BOORSTEIN: Shenzhen, yes, that's the special administrative zone up from Hong Kong. It's a two hour train ride from Hong Kong and it's a very, which I did in March when I was there, the first time I'd done that. It's an easy trip to make.

*Q: You didn't mention Hong Kong. Hong Kong did fall under you?*

BOORSTEIN: No. Hong Kong, there was a debate while I was there because of the return in 1997, that's when it returned to Chinese control. There was a debate whether administratively it should be brought under the jurisdiction of the ambassador in Beijing or remain an independent consulate. It remains an independent consulate. The government of the Peoples Republic of China under the terms of the return of Hong Kong is responsible for foreign affairs and for defense of Hong Kong. Everything else it retains its independence. Economically primarily. When you fly from Beijing to Hong Kong, still to this day it is an international flight. You go through customs. You get your passport stamped that you've entered the territory of Hong Kong and that will be the case I believe for 50 years. So, for a variety of reasons it was decided that Hong Kong, the consul general will not report to the ambassador in Beijing. The four consulates that we have in China are as I mentioned. We have the right under the Shanghai protocol of I think 1979 to open up a fifth consulate in Wuhan. We have never exercised that right. The Chinese on the other hand have five existing consulates in the U.S., in New York, which is separate from their UN Mission, Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles and San Francisco.

*Q: Were there any of these consulates cause problems for you?*

BOORSTEIN: Well, yes, they required a lot of administrative coordination and help. For example, while I was there the consulate general in Guangzhou underwent a major renovation just to deal with the growing demand in the consular section and they were adding staff and they

had to rearrange it to make sure the staff could all be accommodated and we didn't have any ability to at that time to expand as they did now into a separate location, but it ultimately got to that point. We were constantly having teams from Washington and local contractors and other things going on there. Shanghai was the same thing. A lot of pressures for the consular section, which only gave out non-immigrant, visas. They ultimately ended up in a new space in leased quarters for the consular operation. The consulate general in Shanghai was in an older building, which had a lot of maintenance problems. A lot of maintenance challenges. It was a compound in and of itself. There were grounds and you couldn't build onto the grounds. They were protected as historical properties. Shenyang and Chengdu were in compounds that were leased to us under the provisions of an agreement that dated back to 1991 a lot of maintenance problems. When I was there, we were renovating an apartment house for our staff in Chengdu that was then occupied and just a lot. The Chinese just messed up the internal construction and you would have toilet pipes that would not be routed correctly and you would get the products that would come out of a toilet coming out of your bathtub and it required a lot of retrofitting. You would have pipes that would burst in walls and cause all this mildew and mold that would have to be fixed and it was just a constant effort. It was finally dealt with, but one of the things that and we were also supporting the embassy in Ulan Bator. I went and visited there during my tour in November and it was already extremely cold, snow on the ground and they also had space issues. They also had maintenance issues in their chancery. There was constant travel on the part of our general services people. There was constant travel to support their financial systems in making sure that vouchers were properly processed and whatever because their local staff was not very experienced. It was a lot of handholding that went on, plus the administrative Americans in the two smaller posts were largely inexperienced and so you had to keep an eye out on them. I visited Shanghai and Guangzhou probably three or four times while I was there. I visited Chengdu a couple of times and I went to Shenyang only once and to Ulan Bator. You have to keep hands on these kinds of places.

*Q: Did you run across any manifestations of the locals, not really warlordism, but the local parties. I'm told that there are a lot of little almost like dukedoms or communist party cadre in places where they control an awful lot of corruption.*

BOORSTEIN: Nothing that was really surprising. We had an issue in Shenyang over payment of back rent and that issue, we were ready to pay a certain amount and the Chinese took issue for that, I don't recall whether it was based on an exchange rate or based on whatever and that issue went on for years. We would pay what we thought was right into an escrow account just because we didn't want to have one big bill at the end. These were all local government officials I'm sure were influenced by the party whether they saw an opportunity to make some extra money, I don't know.

Each city where we had a consulate had its own branch of the Diplomatic Services Bureau. They had a system of the foreign affairs offices of the provincial governments were the ones that we'd have to deal with. Sometimes they would listen to Beijing, sometimes they wouldn't. Nothing really jumps out at me to think wow, it was any more significant in one place than the other.

*Q: Before we leave here, can you characterize how you felt maybe of some of your fellow officers about China because you know China in some ways is seen as the great power of the 21<sup>st</sup>*

*Century or a menace. It's got so many internal problems that just keeping it together is going to keep it pretty well inward looking. What were you getting?*

BOORSTEIN: Let me comment on that. I wanted to finish a thought that you had asked me a question earlier about living conditions to show what has changed in China that started while I was there. When I got there like I said 100% of us all lived in Chinese government supplied housing. We then, to meet our demand, leased several apartments in commercial high-rise apartment houses. In 1995, we initiated negotiations with the Chinese to hold them accountable to deliver under the 1991 property agreement, which provided our ability to buy land for a future embassy in Beijing and also to buy a site for a future consulate in Shanghai. We also wanted the right to buy commercial real estate. Now in China, being a communist country, you can't own land. The state owns the land. You can rent for up to seventy years by paying a lump sum once at the beginning and that's yours for seventy years. We had been giving the Chinese the right to buy property in the United States for their staff and we basically said we're not going to do that anymore until we get something approaching that in China. We negotiated that in 1995 and we obtained the right to buy commercial property. Well, you go to Beijing today, we do not have anybody living in government provided housing in Beijing. Everybody is either living in apartments or villas in the suburbs that were built to cater to the growing expatriate community that we had bought or that we leased. That has been a huge, huge improvement in post morale. So, I just wanted to make that point and that started on my watch. I am very pleased that I was part of that negotiation. I was on the negotiating team that hammered that one out and it really has had enormous consequences for the morale in the quality of our living conditions.

Anyway to get back to your question, during my tour there was recognition.

*Q: This is Tape 7 Side 1 with Mike Boorstein.*

BOORSTEIN: It was recognized that the nature of our relationship was growing so rapidly that we could no longer from a Washington perspective try to run it on a shoestring. The mission in Beijing, it's hard to say, was significantly smaller than Moscow for example, which grew by leaps and bounds after the fall of the Soviet Union. It was smaller than our embassy in Tokyo, it was smaller than our embassy in Manila, Bangkok, and certainly Seoul, Korea but it wasn't reflective of here's a nation of 1.2 billion people generating the largest trade deficit for the U.S. of any other country in the world as of yet, and an emerging power. So this was the beginning of efforts to look into the future and figure out what was going to be needed to really be adequately staffed and resourced to conduct relations with China.

So my last year there, in particular, was the beginning of the planning for what lead to the China 2000 program. That was spearheaded largely by the person who replaced me in Beijing, Pat Hayes, when he was the deputy director of the executive office of the East Asia Pacific Bureau and with the support of Undersecretary Moose who visited Beijing in the spring of 1996 and walked away shaking his head at our poor housing, the decrepit state of the chancery and recognized that this was a post that was under funded, under staffed and the facilities were in awful shape. You could only do so much to upgrade it. So that gave strong impetus to the discussions that lead to our purchase of a site for our new embassy and ultimately getting, I think it was \$435 million from Congress, the largest single appropriation for an American diplomatic

mission ever to build a new embassy. The number of desks the size of that embassy are roughly I'd say at least three times greater than what it was when I was there.

Where we first had a presence in China we had nothing there from '49 to '72 and then when we had the liaison office, when George Bush, Sr. was there in the mid-70s then we opened up our consulate in Guangzhou, we opened up our consulate in Shanghai and ultimately the other two. It was all done on a shoestring and initially our staff stayed in hotel rooms, we purchased the chancery that we still are in today from the Pakistani's, which we took over from them. Then ultimately, I believe, the second big building in our compound, I think the Romanians had it at some point and, of course, all the Communist countries had palatial buildings in Beijing, which now are largely rattling around with hardly anybody in them. Even across the street, the Bulgarians at one point we were negotiating with the Bulgarians to help them move to another place in Beijing so we could take over that compound and combine it and that would be the site of our future embassy. Well, even we recognized that was inadequate, that plus after the bombings in Africa and the change in the set-back requirements we realized, when I was running the Beijing program office, that we couldn't possibly manage our projected growth by building a new embassy on that property.

So we think we have it right although we know that when the day that embassy opens in 2008 it's going to be bursting at the seams already. So we may have to build an annex, we have enough ground on that property to build another building and we probably will do so two or three years later. In terms of the resources that the U.S. government, number of government agencies, the size of the staff, the dollars pouring in to support the infrastructure, the platform for us to conduct diplomacy have just multiplied enormously since I was there in the early and mid 1990s. Like I said, it was just the beginning of the recognition that we no longer could be the pioneers and there was an attitude among some of the early senior diplomats and I won't name any names of, well, we are just here and we just have to roll up our sleeves and do our job and live with these lousy conditions because that's the way it is. We are American diplomats and we don't need to ask for anything.

Well, fine when you got to a point though and maybe this represents a change in the attitude in the Foreign Service and people going abroad in general, that we have positions that were vacant, largely the lower ranking communications staff, the secretarial staff and so a big push was made to improve overall conditions and afterwards they came up with a nice video saying how wonderful it is to serve in China. Well, they were able to show footage of some of these new commercial apartments that we had bought or leased that were really quite nice and so they don't have those recruitment problems anymore that they had when I was there.

So, that really was a watershed moment that I was there, I helped stimulate it, I helped respond to the people and what...again zeitgeist was there where you had sympathetic people in Washington, you had sympathetic people at senior post management and they all, we worked together. I was not there for the crest of the wave but I was there for the building up of it and the resources all came together probably in 1999, 2000, three or four years after I left.

*Q: Now tell me back to the question of when you left there in what '90...*

BOORSTEIN: '96.

*Q: '96. What was, you know, talking to your colleagues and your own feeling whither China particularly vis-à-vis the United States?*

BOORSTEIN: Well you know, we felt that we were in China for the long haul and that we wanted to promote human rights, we wanted to set an example of much like what we did in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. We felt that in the long run maybe democracy will come to China. It was not an overt every day kind of thing that you hear more by this administration but still with our outreach through our press and culture sections, the USIA (U.S. Information Agency) kind of thing, and trying to promote the rule of law into China there was a sense I mean again I don't know that you would see it in any overt unclassified policy documents or even the classified ones but there was a sense of eventually the Communist structure in China will collapse. It was important for us to help them get there without it being destabilizing. So in effect that continues, the engagement bringing Congressional delegations.

The biggest bilateral issue between the United States and China was and probably still remains, Taiwan. In the Fall, no the Spring of 1995, I had been there a little less than two years the U.S. agreed to issue a visa to the president of Taiwan, who was an alumnus of Cornell University, to come to a reunion and I believe event to be a keynote speaker. Well, the People's Republic of China (PRC) reacted violently to this, I think they conducted war games in the straits; they just basically threw a blanket of ice over our relations. This was a time; our ambassador to China J. Stapleton Roy was a man that I respect enormously, personally and professionally. He was a consummate China hand, he was born in China, his parents were missionaries, he spoke fluent Chinese, he grew up in China and left in 1949 as a teenager. He had served earlier as deputy chief of mission back in the late '70s, early '80s and came back as the ambassador in 1991 and was very well liked by the Chinese, well respected by the Chinese officials in the ministry of foreign affairs but here at the end of his four years he left under this enormous cloud because of this polity decision. Whether he agreed or not, I have no idea, to issue this visa. So he left, the foreign minister did give him a farewell dinner and I attended it and we gave him a send off in the embassy. I had a particular closeness with him because he was there at the founding of the international school of Beijing and I was one of his two representatives on the board and I always had ready access to him on any issues involving the school that I needed his advice in dealing with the Chinese authorities and I had almost this unwritten agreement with the deputy chief of mission that I didn't have to go through him, I would just go right to the ambassador. He was very supportive and he left under this cloud and it just took a long time for that ill will of that act to dissipate. So anything whether it was the sale of more military jets to Taiwan or its allowing even a future president of Taiwan to even get a transit visa to go through Los Angeles to fly to El Salvador because Taiwan was very successful in having diplomatic relations with some countries in Central America in lieu of the PRC it was just a constant irritant. So they are just emotional about that little island being a rogue element and they feel that if they don't eventually take it over it's just going to speak terrible things for their ability to be unified.

*Q: Well it does give the ruling party something on which to rally I mean they don't really have a hell of a lot of other things going for them.*

BOORSTEIN: Right.

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*Q: OK, today is the 31<sup>st</sup> of August 2006 and we're in 1999.*

BOORSTEIN: Correct.

*Q: So what was up?*

BOORSTEIN: OK, well I had just come on board as the first director of the Beijing program office in the office of foreign buildings in the bureau of administration and this was a new office that was created for the purpose of planning for the future new embassy in Beijing. I've already covered the rationale for why a special office was required because of the overriding security requirements in Beijing, similar to what we had done in Moscow, but with the much wiser perspective of having gone through the debacle of the first Moscow project and having figured out how to do it right ten years and a couple hundred million dollars later.

So it was decided to treat the future embassy in Beijing with similar security attention but to have it within the office of foreign buildings rather than a separate office that was done for Moscow. Because of my experience with the embassy in Moscow and having served as the admin counselor in Beijing, Pat Kennedy, the assistant secretary for administration, asked me to head this office, which I was delighted to do.

I started out...the office of foreign buildings at the time was headed by Patsy Thomasson, who was a political appointee from the Clinton administration. Patsy Thomasson was a political operative from Arkansas, close to the president. She had come to the foreign buildings office after having worked in the White House office of personnel as I recall, and during the shake up there when there was a bit of a travel controversy in that office, she was sent to the State Department to be a deputy assistant secretary. She was pretty effective in that job. She took it quite seriously; she had some background having been involved in some construction of highways in Arkansas. She was a bit ambivalent about the idea of having a special office only dealing with one embassy project even though here supervisor, the assistant secretary for administration, decreed that was the way it was going to be. There was some reluctance to be as supportive and as embracing of the concept as I would have hoped would have been the case, but nonetheless the office thrived, developed and we very quickly were given some additional resources.

I had a full time security officer, I had a full time engineer, I had a full time asset from the intelligence community, a gentleman who was a China analyst. He was very, very effective in sort of guiding the effort on how we were going to frame the relationship with the Chinese because we knew also that the Chinese wanted to build a new embassy in Washington. So much like the underpinnings of the Moscow project in the 1960s, where that was also driven by reciprocity we had the same reciprocal dynamics going on, which really gave us a wonderful opportunity to get what it was that we needed.

So building on the Moscow model, and the Moscow project was still under construction, so I took my little team to Moscow in late 1999 and also visited Helsinki to have them see the logistical arrangement through the port of Helsinki. Earlier I had already been to China, accompanied the Undersecretary Bonnie Cohen on her first trip to China, along with the Executive Director of the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Bart Flaherty. We went to Beijing, Guangzhou and Chengdu. Chengdu had their consulate compound walls breached by Chinese rioters, who were protesting the inadvertent bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during the Balkans campaign.

*Q: Kosovo.*

BOORSTEIN: Kosovo intervention. So the Department and the East Asian bureau very much wanted the undersecretary for management to see this small consulate and see the ravages of the effect of the rioting because they had basically come over the wall and they had burned the consul general's residence, which was in the compound. The consul general and his wife basically had to flee for their lives back into the main embassy, excuse me, the main consulate office building. The people in the consulate who lived also in an apartment house that was also on the compound also took refuge in the compound and their lives were saved because of the hard-line and everything else that prevented the Chinese from breaching the walls. Some actually stayed in their apartments as well, but there were no casualties, but a lot of damage, in the consul general's residence essentially a shell remained, but the inside was burned out.

We did some preliminary planning for the new embassy in Beijing and through a series of trips and interactions with the East Asian bureau and with the embassy we developed what's called the Space Program. We figured out how big the embassy needed to be in terms of the staff, taking into account the very rapid growth that had been pent up due to the limitations of the existing facility. This lead, after one round of negotiations, I believe in early the year 2000, we had to inform, no actually it was during the visit of Bonnie Cohen to Beijing, we actually had to inform the Chinese that the earlier arrangement that had been developed through an earlier bilateral agreement would not work. That agreement would have allowed us to purchase the Bulgarian embassy compound, which is right next door to the compound existing at the time, but because of the bombings in Africa in 1998, the standards for set-back for embassies changed and were increased from 50 feet to 100 feet. So by doing that, the footprint that would be left to build the new embassy was not sufficient to utilize the Bulgarian compound. So we told the Chinese we needed a new ten-acre site, 40,00 square meters, within the city limits convenient to our housing and convenient to the foreign ministry. That was a very tall order but we basically offered the Chinese very plum property in Washington in our international center for their embassy.

*Q: Where was that located?*

BOORSTEIN: The international center is near the zoo. It's an area that was set aside in the 1950s when the Bureau of Standards moved out to upper Montgomery county in Maryland with the idea of relocating embassies there to allow embassies to build new buildings designed for that purpose rather than to be scattered around or be in smaller, inadequate quarters along the Massachusetts Avenue corridor.

So a number of embassies had already moved or were already in the process of building. Egypt, Bangladesh, Austria, the United Arab Emirates, I think there are ten or twelve, the Israelis are there, Singapore. As a matter of fact, Singapore was right next to the sites we had...we offered three contiguous sites to the Chinese, the last undeveloped sites on that property. So, of course, we were not going to finalize the deal until we got what we needed. So ultimately the Chinese did offer us the ten-acre site roughly rectangular even though it's called the third diplomatic zone in Beijing and it really was quite a good site in an area where new embassies were also being built in Beijing.

We hammered out a final agreement in November of 2005, which set the stage for further negotiations on conditions of construction that applied to both the embassies in Washington and Beijing. That turned out to be more problematic. Those negotiations took almost three years. The Conditions of Construction Agreement was signed in November 2003; the main issue that divided the two sides at the time was our insistence that we had to have 100 percent visual contact with our shipping containers that were shipping over materials for construction of the embassy. We originally wanted to use the Moscow model where the Russian government allowed us to designate a forty-foot container or a twenty-foot container as a diplomatic pouch. The Chinese for their own reasons refused to do that but at the end of the day did agree to the principal of constant visual contact by U.S. eyes and so that was allowed and that allowed the agreement to be signed.

After that happened and even as those negotiations were occurring, the foreign buildings office conducted a design competition that was sponsored by the General Services Administration (GSA), it was called the design excellence process. Through that process the firm Skidmore, Owens and Merrill or SOM, based in San Francisco, was selected as the designer. I found that personally rather ironic, because SOM was also the original design firm for the failed Moscow project of the mid-'70s. But, of course, their product, in terms of the housing compound, the school and the marine house still remain today.

So the development of the plans went fairly rapidly. We had our staffing plan laid out, we had our government estimate of how much it would cost to build, we set out the standards based on the conditions of construction, which required a great use of top-secret cleared American workers for again the same reasons that we did in Moscow.

In the midst of all of this in January of 2001, after George Bush was elected president and that was dragged out and the Supreme Court decision that gave him the election in December, Patsy Thomasson as the deputy assistant secretary left on January 20<sup>th</sup>.

Pat Kennedy appointed me as the acting-deputy assistant secretary for the entire foreign buildings office. I was the senior ranking Foreign Service officer at the time and even though my portfolio was only Beijing until a little bit more other stuff in China, he would give me that responsibility, which I did for about two months. In that capacity I went to Guatemala for a regional administrative conference for the Western hemisphere posts, was involved in some planning issues and construction issues in the form...

*Q: With the east wing of the National Gallery, etc., etc., etc.*

BOORSTEIN: The Bank of China building in Hong Kong is a very signature piece with cross beams. He wanted to talk to me and would I mind giving him a call and here is his phone number. So I called and got through to him and he picked up the phone. I said, "I am very pleased to talk to you Dr. Pei, what's on your mind?" He said, "Well you know of my love for my adopted land the United States and love of my country of origin China and that the Chinese ambassador in Washington reached out to me as an ideal bridge to help ensure the progress for these embassies in both of our capitals. I am doing this as a friend to both the United States and China. So as a result of that request he asked me to look at the site that the State Department has offered the Chinese." I said, "Well I think that's wonderful." He said, "I have to tell you I don't like the site, it has bad feng shui." Feng shui is the Chinese principle of...feng shui literally means air and water and it is the relationship of the elements, it is the relationship of where do you put the living room, where do you put the bedroom...

*Q: How it faces?*

BOORSTEIN: Whether your main entrance should be on the north side, the south side and all these consequences and we had gone through great lengths to convince the Chinese that this site was in fact good for them not for any feng shui reasons, but because this was on federal land and outside the purview of the government of the District of Columbia. We didn't want to get the Chinese to have to deal with the DC government and have the DC government be difficult and snub their nose at the State Department as a federal government entity because they wouldn't care about or wouldn't understand the sensitivity of the whole bilateral-political relationship and therefore try to play hardball with the Chinese, because we wanted them to play ball with us in Beijing. So by having them on federal land it came under the jurisdiction of a National Capital Planning Commission, which does have a representative from the DC government but they can't sing the tune, they can't force the decisions alone. So this is all going on in my mind as I. M. Pei is telling me that he doesn't like the site. So here I am, Mike Boorstein, senior Foreign Service officer, telling the most renown living architect in the world today, "I wish you hadn't said that Dr. Pei because we are trying to make that site work and we believe that it is in the best interest of the U.S.-China relationship that the Chinese find that site acceptable. That I'm sure that you with your architectural talent can find a way to make that site work." Then his reaction was, "Oh, do you think that I made a mistake?" I sort of repeated myself and I said, "Not one that can't be rectified." You have to pull out all your diplomatic skills and I was telling one of my architectural colleagues and he said, "Well Mike, you were talking to the equivalent of a rock star in the world of architecture." Here I am talking to the Mick Jagger of architects about this.

*Q: This is May 2007. We have been talking about the siting of the new Chinese embassy here in Washington and go ahead.*

BOORSTEIN: OK, I want to talk about the time that I was the director of the Beijing program office from that time forward from my recollection of where we picked up on the tape I think we are roughly in 1999-2000. When I finished my year at Harvard I became the director of the Beijing program office which is a new office within the Foreign Buildings Office of the bureau of administration that was created in order to consolidate within one organizational structure, the

planning for the new embassy in Beijing and to model the kind of resources that were integrated along the same lines that were used to build the embassy in Moscow because of the very heavy focus on security. So we also were taking advantage of the fact that just like the early days of negotiating with the government of the Soviet Union back in the late '60s early '70s we had a very good opportunity because the Chinese and the U.S. both wanted to build new embassies in their respective capitals. So the whole arrangement where in we could build our embassy and build it in accordance with a program that would maximize our security, we had leverage because the Chinese wanted to build a new embassy in Washington that would be really their signature embassy of any place in the world. So that is what was behind our trying to facilitate the Chinese getting their site in Washington and putting it on federal land.

So, there was a series of negotiating type trips that were organized that were held both in Washington and in Beijing. I was the deputy chief negotiator. The negotiating team on the U.S. side was headed by Terry Wilmer who was the director of real estate for the foreign buildings office and had a lot of experience in negotiating property acquisitions for the State Department and he did a superb job. I had worked with him dating back to 1995 when I was the administrative minister-counselor in Beijing when we were negotiating the gain the ability to actually purchase the equivalent of ownership in China under 70 or 90-year leases to allow us to have residential apartments and things of this nature. In exchange, we were able to grant the Chinese an arrangement they wanted for their UN mission in New York, which was a very diplomatically finessed kind of arrangement because it wasn't a bilateral issue, it was a multilateral issue. The State Department itself was kind of internally conflicted because the people in New York, at the time at the U.S. mission to the United Nations, including Madeline Albright who was the U.S. ambassador to the UN at that time, were very much in favor of helping the Chinese whereas the bilateral side of the house, the China desk, the office of foreign missions etc., were interested in finding a linkage as tenuous as it was with what we were looking for in China. It all worked out by sort of smoke and mirrors and winks and nods and letting the Chinese know that we weren't going to help them in New York unless they helped us in China and ultimately we got what we needed. But over several series of negotiations we were able to work out the arrangement where we acquired our ten-acre site in Beijing and the Chinese were able to get the land that they wanted in the international chancery center, which was on federal land. The short version is we ultimately were able to negotiate the acquisition on a 90-year lease renewal for another 90 years on the property in Beijing and we negotiated it in part by giving back another piece of land that they had allowed us to buy under a previous agreement that was signed I believe in 1995, if not earlier.

So we ended up by... I'd say the deal was signed, the last round of negotiations was in November of 2000 and so we got the site and then through a series of agreements and whatever, the site was cleared. We did our geo-technical studies and then in early 2001 at the end of the Clinton administration the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Foreign Buildings, Patsy Thomasson, who was a political appointee, she had to leave because George Bush was elected. She was very, very sad and upset to leave because she really liked the job. I was named as the interim acting deputy assistant secretary for foreign buildings. I was the senior foreign service officer in the organization at the time and Pat Kennedy, who was the assistant secretary for administration put me in the position on an interim basis, on an acting basis, and I did that for about two months.

When Colin Powell came in his first nominee for appointment, as a new deputy assistant secretary was a retired two-star general from the Army Corps of Engineers, Charles E. Williams. He came in having negotiated an arrangement with the new secretary of state that the foreign buildings office would be removed from the bureau of administration and be made a bureau in and of itself. This was not apparent at the time he came in because he was sworn in as the deputy assistant secretary but within a few weeks it was clear that was the direction we were going in. That had all been agreed upon before he came because during the transition period he was brought in to evaluate for the secretary the whole program of how we managed our overseas construction and maintenance and management of our properties for diplomatic facilities and consular facilities and housing.

So by the second or third week in March he was sworn in and I was no longer the acting deputy assistant secretary and I went back to being the director of the Beijing program office. Well within a couple of weeks, no his first week actually the third or fourth day he help an off-site at Fort Meyer where he was going to unveil his reorganization arrangement for this new bureau. So he unveiled it sort of piece by piece, sort of like peeling off a layer of onion or sort of like a very non-titillating striptease where he would take off a glove and take off his shirt and expose this new organization to his senior people. Sure enough there was an organizational chart and I didn't see the Beijing program office on it. So during a break at the end of the first day, I went up to him and I said, "General Williams," and by the way that is what he wanted to be called. He was not Chuck he was not Mr. Williams, he was General Williams because of his Army career, that was what he identified as and that was what he was known and is still known today because he is still doing the same job. So he smiled and said, "Well, don't worry Mike I have something even better in store for you." Well I sort of dragged it out of him and what he wanted me to do and what he appointed me to do was to be the director of the office of planning and development of the new overseas building bureau.

So this was one of the senior jobs, it was the equivalent because he became the equivalent of an assistant secretary so I basically was elevated to be the equivalent of a deputy assistant secretary of this new office that he had created called planning and development because before under the foreign buildings office there was no discrete office of planning. It was sort of part and parcel of the real estate function and it was not as prominent. So I then became the director of planning and development for the entire world. I inherited a staff of about 85 architects, engineers, space planners and cost specialist, cost engineers. So the first thing that we were asked to do by General Williams was to put together a compendium in accordance with a set of criteria of the most critical projects for new embassy or new consulate construction as well as the most critical rehab renovation projects around the world. It was called a long-range overseas building plan. So this was delivered to Congress, it was used by OMB (Office of Management and Budget), a copy was given to the secretary. We turned this thing around in about three months. This thing has been updated ever since 2001 annually, The Long-Range Overseas Buildings Plan is the official title.

I got involved in the roughly 15-months that I was in this job. I took a team to Paris twice to try to improve some of the space issues there. There was the Talleyrand building, which is very historic; it is where the Marshall Plan was administered. It is right on the street by the Place de la Concorde and deemed to be very vulnerable. The idea was to take our people out and put them

elsewhere either within the Chancery or in leased quarters in other parts of the city of Paris that were more secure, to basically move out the consular section and public diplomacy. This was very delicate because there were some representational rooms in there that were being renovated by use of private funds because of their historical nature, there was the idea to build an underground parking garage underneath the backyard, so to speak, I mean the garden of the American ambassador's residence. This was all politically motivated because on Tom Brokaw's NBC Evening News the segment he would have from time to time called the *Fleecing of America* broadcast about a GAO (General Accounting Office) report that said that there was a sliver of land next to the ambassador's backyard that was being used for parking space for senior officers of the American embassy in Paris at no cost and the GAO had recommended it be sold because it was worth several million dollars. So I was going there, General Williams had gone there initially after this story broke at the request of the secretary to look into it and then I did the follow up visits to look into what it would take, how much it would cost to put in an underground garage and whether we would have to tear up the back third of the ambassador's very beautiful garden and then rebuild it. So we even took along a landscape architect. Long story short that garage was never built but I had two wonderful trips to Paris, and did further the planning process for that.

I continued to be involved in the China program preparations when it came to some of the reciprocal discussions even though the Beijing program office was put lower into the new organization chart as part of the larger office of construction and commission. I went to a East Asia-Pacific administrative conference in Hong Kong, I went to Moscow and Oslo after 9/11. The threats to our chancery in Moscow because after we moved into the new embassy we maintained the old one which was right near the street so we were trying to find a way to protect by enhancing the blast resistance of the original building so I led a team over to look at some of those studies and had a lot of interaction with Ambassador Vershbow and his team. Then I went through Oslo on the way home and looked at property options for building a new embassy in Oslo because even though the embassy in Oslo was designed, I believe by Saarinen, it was on a triangular piece of property in Oslo that was very vulnerable from a security standpoint. So I was looking at a site where the former Fornebu Airport was which was just being abandoned. Ultimately there was another site that was going to be a military barracks. That had been abandoned by the Norwegian military and it's my understanding, this was after I left, that's the site that ultimately was chosen and the embassy is either under construction or is already finished. So I was glad that I played a roll in that particular undertaking.

I went to a European conference of administrative officers in Frankfurt. The objective was to convince a lot of these agencies from other embassies around Europe to consolidate their regional functions in Frankfurt where we were building a new consulate in the former Army hospital there, which before the war or during the war had been a German Army hospital.

**ROBIN WHITE**  
**Director, Bilateral Trade, Economic Bureau**  
**Washington, DC (1996-1998)**

*Ms. White was born and raised in Massachusetts and educated at Georgetown University. After graduation she worked briefly on Capitol Hill before joining the Foreign Service in 1973. A Trained Economist, Ms. White served at a number of foreign posts as Economic and Commercial Officer. In the State Department in Washington, she occupied several senior positions in the trade and economic fields. Ms. White was also a Japan specialist. Ms. White was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2005*

*Q: Where did you go after Canada?*

WHITE: In the summer of 1996, I became the Director of the Bilateral Trade Office in the Economic Bureau. That had two divisions for developed and developing countries. We worked various free trade agreements, including NAFTA, the Generalized System of Preferences for developing countries and other bilateral issues. We had to coordinate closely with the regional bureaus.

The China Most Favored Nation (MFN) issue was a major issue during that time. We worked with USTR and the China desk to get the Chinese government to improve their trade practices but also faced a yearly Congressional vote on the continuation of MFN tariff treatment for China.

*Q: What was the problem with China? Was it just because China was communist and had lousy human rights?*

WHITE: The reason for the annual Congressional vote was the Jackson-Vanik Act, which had originally been aimed at the Soviet Union. We didn't have specific trade problems like today where China is the new economic giant with a huge trade surplus and an undervalued currency, but there was still a sense that China was a potential threat to the U.S. in economic and security issues. We in EB worked with USTR, Commerce, Treasury and the China desk at the State Department to prepare one pager summaries. These were used as background with various audiences. For example, we wrote on issues as diverse as slave labor in China and connections the Chinese military had with Chinese factories; these were issues raised by labor groups, human rights groups and Congress. There were probably 30 or 40 of these one pagers that set forth the claims or accusations and then laid out the facts. Of course the reality in some cases was fairly grim, but perhaps not as bad as the opponents were making out. We argued that the U.S. and the west would benefit from drawing China further into the global system, that by exposing the Chinese people to Western influences through trade, they would become more aware of democratic trends and seek more of a say in their own government.

**PAUL P. BLACKBURN**  
**Chinese Language Training**  
**Washington, DC (1996-1997)**

**Public Affairs Officer**  
**Beijing (1997-2000)**

*Paul P. Blackburn was born in Hawaii in 1937. He received his BA from Haverford College in 1960 and an MA from the School for Advanced International Studies in 1962. His postings abroad include Bangkok, Khon Kaen, Udorn, Tokyo and Kuala Lumpur. Mr. Blackburn was interviewed by Charles R. Beecham on November 18, 2002.*

*Q: What was the biggest programming challenge you faced?*

BLACKBURN: There were many difficult ones – relating to the Vietnam War, to our sudden opening to China, to increasing trade frictions, and so on – but the Watergate crisis certainly put us in a strange public affairs situation. The Japanese generally were quite high on Nixon, despite the “Nixon shocks” relating to China and our unpegging the dollar-yen exchange rate. They thought Nixon was a tough, effective Cold War leader. In Tokyo, as elsewhere in Japan and around the world, USIS officers suddenly found themselves in the odd position of explaining why our president’s transgressions were so serious many Americans had determined that he should be thrown out of office. My Japanese contacts, no matter how versed they were in “American studies,” simply could not grasp what was going on. They kept asking me if there wasn’t really some sexual or financial scandal behind it all. I tried to explain the seriousness of Nixon’s alleged participation in the Watergate cover-up, and to use the crisis as a way of informing Japanese about the arcane workings of our political system. Despite our efforts, the Japanese continued to view the cover-up as a very small matter that had been blown way out of proportion by Nixon’s mean-spirited and opportunistic enemies.

*Q: Who was in Hong Kong then?*

BLACKBURN: The PAO was Jack Friedman. He was one of the extremely rare cases when a State Department officer with no USIA experience was assigned as a PAO. Though Jack was very dedicated, his lack of familiarity with the arcane array of Agency products, programs, regulations, and hidden pots of money made it difficult for him to operate as effectively as he might have. Since consolidation, with considerable interchange between officers in all the cones, the Department has done a much better job of basic public diplomacy training for officers such as Jack Friedman.

*Q: Then you went off to China. How did it happen that you were assigned there? I don’t remember that you had any particular background in China.*

BLACKBURN: True, I didn’t have much, except for my graduate study, my Legislative Reference Service work, and my support for the 1979 Mondale visit. Getting that assignment was a total surprise. Here is how it happened. One day in the spring of 1995 I noticed in my email take a message in transliterated Thai, of all things. When I had deciphered it, I realized it was from my old friend Harlan Rosacker, Director of USIA Personnel, asking if I would be interested in going to Beijing as PAO. He said I should not mention the communication to anyone except my wife, but to call him if I wanted to discuss the idea.

After consulting with Pek, I called and asked what in the world was going on. Harlan said, “The

senior assignments inner circle group – including Director Duffey, Counselor Donna Oglesby, and me – think that you are the Agency’s most-qualified person to be running USIS in China at this point. We have two strong candidates among the China hands, but neither has had your large-post management experience. So how about it?” They wanted me to curtail in Tokyo and start language training that summer, arriving at post in the summer of 1997. I said I’d be delighted to have the job, but there was no way I could leave Tokyo before the end of my tour in 1996. Harlan said in that case I would just have a year of language training and do the best I could with that.

*Q: You mean, studying on the side?*

BLACKBURN: No, it was to be a full-time year starting in 1996. But not the usual two years. Harlan said they would give me all possible support, but did not expect me to reach the S-3, R-3 proficiency normally required for assignment to the position.

I was told that secrecy was necessary so that everything could be worked out more smoothly. Well, this was extremely awkward for me, because it meant that my boss, East Asia Area Director George Beasley, was not in the loop. George was not just my boss, but also the officer I was to replace in Beijing in 1997. Besides that, he was the former head of the Chinese Language School in Taijung and a strong believer in sending people to China with the strongest possible language skills.

So USIA directly contacted Stapleton Roy, the Ambassador in Beijing, to seek his concurrence in the assignment. Stape had known me since he was DCM in Bangkok, when I was PAO and Frank Scotton, now the Beijing PAO, was CAO. He of course consulted Frank, who was taken aback by the news and immediately contacted George Beasley. This backwards way of getting the word to George was very unfortunate in many respects. Among them was that it put me in a bad light. It looked like I had at best been complicit in a deception and at worst had perhaps instigated the whole thing.

Stape Roy was willing to concur, provided that I came equipped with a 3-3, or close to it, in Chinese. Frank told him that if anyone could reach that level in just a year, he was confident I would at least make a good stab at it. I gather Stape okayed the assignment on the basis of that rather vague assurance.

I fully respected the strong views of George, Stape, Frank, and the other leading China-hand candidates for the job. No wonder they had reservations about me. Here I was coming along out of the blue, at 57, not knowing a word of Chinese. Such an age is definitely not the recommended time in one’s life to start learning that endlessly complex language!

Anyway, I had the assignment and was determined to make the best of it. From 1995 until I left Tokyo in 1996 a Chinese-speaking wife of an officer on the Embassy compound taught me some basics of the language for a couple of hours a week. Once I got to FSI in Washington and was tested, the linguist determined that those introductory lessons were enough to get me placed in that semester’s only available new class above the beginner level. I joined two other officers, Robin Bordie and Doug Kelly, who had previously lived in China, already spoke quite a bit of

Chinese, and clearly were way ahead of me.

Robin and Doug showed enormous tolerance of my presence in the class, and I owe them an awful lot. I got a tremendous push – and pull – from being in class with them, while struggling to move along at their pace. That year of Chinese was, by a long way, the hardest of my Foreign Service career.

*Q: I can imagine.*

BLACKBURN: For those ten months I was totally consumed with trying to learn Chinese.

*Q: Does your wife, Pek, speak Chinese?*

BLACKBURN: Yes, some. And that helped provide a supportive atmosphere at home. I also got a boost from Pek's aunt, who was with us at the time and speaks pretty fluent Mandarin. She helped me with drills and in other ways.

As a way of keeping sane and not taking myself too seriously – I would say to myself, “Look. When it comes to the Chinese language, you are nothing but a fuzzy-headed, pudgy, and naked old man with a speech impediment. But come on – how bad is that?” My attitude was simply to give the challenge my all-out best effort. And the teachers were terrifically supportive. After a year, thanks to the instructors, to my fellow students, to my own efforts, and to the leg up I got from previous exposure to Thai tones and grammar as well as to Japanese characters, I finished the ten months having reached an S-2+, R-3.

After that I went to Taiwan for ten more weeks of study and further progress at the Taipei Language Institute. Once I got to Beijing and started working in the language, I continued to improve and eventually reached my cherished goal of the S-3, R-3. I thought that was quite an accomplishment, one that paid a kind of debt I owed to George, Frank, and the others who rightly upheld the importance of Chinese language competence for all officers assigned to China.

Once on the ground at the post, I got great satisfaction from using the language whenever I could, with strong encouragement from Chinese I dealt with. I had many chances to speak Chinese in meetings, when making toasts, and in other semi-formal situations. My excellent Chinese language tutor helped me with remarks I made at functions. Some of those presentations were considered so amusing and apt that they were later included in the standard teaching materials used for advanced Chinese language studies by FSOs in Beijing.

Working in China was tremendously stimulating. The energy and excitement of the place were palpable. Though it retains many of the unpleasant characteristics of a totalitarian dictatorship, the country is changing so fast and in so many ways that its future directions are one of the great stories of our age, a fact that accounts for the presence of legions of foreign correspondents there. Every day I would wake up expecting – and unusually finding – some mind-blowing and major change occurring right under my nose.

I had the chance to travel all over China. We had branch posts, known after “consolidation” as

the Public Affairs Sections, or PAS, of the local consulates, in Shanghai, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Guangzhou. I got to all of them several times and to many other parts of the country as well.

*Q: How big a staff did you have?*

BLACKBURN: We had 18 Americans.

*Q: You're kidding! I didn't realize we had that many people in China.*

BLACKBURN: Yes, it was a substantial number. For example, we had an IO and two AIOs, plus three ACAOs reporting to the CAO, and five officers at the branches.

*Q: What did they all do?*

BLACKBURN: Well, for example, you needed an ACAO just to run the International Visitor program. China had, and still has, the largest IV program in the world, sending well over 100 people as either IVs or Voluntary Visitors. It was an enormous undertaking. And the Fulbright program had to be handled by an ACAO in our office, because there is no Fulbright binational commission in China. We needed an ACAO to work exclusively on handling a program that in terms of numbers of exchangees almost equaled Japan's, which is run by the Japan-United States Exchange Commission under an Executive Director and more than 20 Japanese employees. And you needed a third ACAO for the speaker program, which involved an array of lectures and seminars throughout China. Then we had a Regional Library Officer, who was responsible for all the Information Resource Centers in China, as well as strengthening our contacts in the Chinese library world.

On the information side, we needed an AIO for press and an AIO for electronic media as well as the Embassy website. In addition, we had a contract American editor of the post-produced Chinese language magazine called Jiaoliu, which we sent out each quarter to a selected mailing list of about 10,000. And we had an Executive Officer, until consolidation, and a computer specialist, both of whom were sorely needed to keep us afloat in that country.

All the branches were one-officer posts, except Shanghai, which had two.

In our front office, I had a deputy, Don Bishop, and an American secretary, first Maxine Jeffries and then Linda Adams.

*Q: How about the Chinese staff?*

BLACKBURN: There were about 55 Chinese staffers at all our various facilities. They were officially employed by the Diplomatic Services Bureau, or DSB, and could be removed by them at any time. Though this had happened quite frequently in earlier years, by the time I got there we were essentially able to hold on to the ones we wanted to keep. There were pluses and minuses to the fact that they were not Foreign Service Nationals. On the plus side, it was easy to discharge them, an option I had to exercise a couple of times. They were entitled to two week's notice, but in both cases I delivered the news on a Friday afternoon and they chose to depart

immediately. On the minus side, we were constrained by DSB regulations that made it difficult to reward the outstanding performers, as the DSB took a handsome cut of all payments.

I was pleasantly surprised at how good and loyal the Chinese staff was, having over the years heard accounts of their inefficiency and unreliability. That was not my experience at all. And we were getting better employees all the time, thanks mainly to having more control over the hiring process. Even some of the old-timers, like Yang Gengqi, in charge of distribution, were first-rate, while new hires like Gu Hong in the Information Resource Center and Lin Chunmei in the Press Section were fully the equal of FSN counterparts in other countries where I served – in terms of dedication, analytical ability, English fluency, and overall professional skills.

*Q: How did the Americans you programmed fare under the rigid Chinese system?*

BLACKBURN: There were certainly rigidities, but just as with our experience with managing DSB employees, we found more and more flexibility. For example, by the time I arrived we had growing input into what campuses the some 20 American Lecturers brought over each year under the Fulbright program would be assigned to. We even “sanctioned” one leading university by denying it a lecturer because of our unhappiness with the way they had treated an American professor the previous year. The university quickly shaped up, allowing us to resume placements to that institution. Except for rare instances, the American Fulbrighters were extremely enthusiastic about their China experiences – the students they taught, the seminars they arranged or participated in, and their opportunities for travel all over the country. Although it was a constant struggle to recruit Fulbrighters to go to China, once there on the ground, they were amazed and delighted with what they found.

At this time all of us in the Embassy were witnessing, even participating in, major changes in China. To the astonishment of many, for example, my wife was invited to give numerous guest lectures at both the Foreign Affairs College and Peking University, two institutions once very difficult for Embassy officers or their families to visit without special permission. In USIS we pushed the envelope in many ways. For instance, with “rule of law” being a priority of the Chinese leadership, our post, our speakers, and Fulbright Lecturers organized conferences on such topics as American legal education in America and the relationship of law and the media.

*Q: Isn't it unusual that you would even have a one-country magazine after USIA shut down so many of them?*

BLACKBURN: Yes, it was one of the very few left at any of our posts. The key people we sent it to seemed grateful for it and recipients often commented to us on specific articles. I think it was an important public diplomacy asset – even though we fully recognized that our mailing list of only 10,000, however thoughtfully constructed, was at best reaching only a small cohort of China's present and future leadership.

*Q: Was this all a continuation of activities begun before your time as PAO in China?*

BLACKBURN: Yes, very much so. I was fortunate that on my watch the public affairs programming environment in China opened up so quickly and widely, while my predecessors

missed out on seeing the fruits of their earlier labors. I hope my successors will benefit in similar ways from things I did.

*Q: Were you doing this on your own premises – or with cosponsors outside?*

BLACKBURN: Most of the speaker presentations were at Chinese think tanks or on university campuses. We would be there officially as their guests. They would carry the water to get the official approvals needed for the event to go forward.

We also used our own facilities. In the early 1990s USIS opened an information resources center at the Jingguang Center, an “offsite” location away from the three heavily-guarded American Embassy compounds. It was in many respects like the American Centers in Japan, but we also ran the Fulbright and IV programs from there. We used a programming space for some presentations, but we didn’t have Japan’s simultaneous translation capability, and we had to limit its use to fewer than 50 attendees. Though it was obviously a USG facility, that didn’t seem to bother our audiences very much, particularly since many of them were considered reliable “foreigner handlers” by their home offices. The advantage to us was that we could invite individuals from many institutions. Most of our programs there were directed at fluent speakers of English, though on occasion we used consecutive interpretation or had Chinese-speaking lecturers.

Sometimes we held WORLDNETs or other events right at the USIS facility, which was located on the same compound as the Ambassador’s residence. Memorable WORLDNETs included interactive dialogues with American officials talking about upcoming APEC meetings, new approaches to environmental regulation, and possible restrictions on Chinese imports because of Asian Longhorned Beetle infestations.

Some of the branches, particularly Chengdu and Shenyang, used regular on-site speaker programs to reach broader communities in which they were located. The Consulate posts also had WORLDNETs and Digital Videoconferences (DVCs) with American speakers. Shanghai became a leader in using the DVC medium.

*Q: Tell me more about the beetle problem you just mentioned.*

BLACKBURN: A major problem arose suddenly in late 1998 when our Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service – or APHIS – people in the Agriculture Department discovered an infestation of Asian Longhorned Beetles in packing materials used for Chinese exports to the U.S. The Secretary of Agriculture was about to cut off imports from China unless the problem could be solved by some system for certifying that the wood used had been properly treated. Such an action would have affected the bulk of China’s billions of dollars of non-textile exports. The consequences for our bilateral trade as well as for our overall relationship would have been enormous.

I got immediately to work on a public affairs strategy, which we put in place with the help of the APHIS and Agriculture folks. The first task was to get the announcement delayed until some public affairs groundwork could be laid, and to make sure that the official statement both

provided a realistic phasing-in period and presented the policy in non-accusatory tones. Our job on the ground was to explain to the local U.S. correspondents as well as the Chinese why this action had to be taken. We set up a one-country WORLDNET with a senior officer in the Department of Agriculture, who carefully explained how the beetles had already destroyed many trees in New York and Chicago, and showed video news clips that backed up his presentation. The Chinese were shocked, and many doubtless suspected us of introducing a non-tariff barrier to reduce the bilateral trade deficit. Besides using WORLDNET and other presentations, we also provided detailed hand-outs – in Chinese as well as English – to explain the problem and how we intended to work with the Chinese to set up an eradication and certification scheme that would keep the beetles out of the packing cases and allow trade to continue as before.

Although we often think that public affairs activities for foreign correspondents don't have much impact on what we do locally, in this case I believe there was a direct connection. Though the Chinese media gave scant attention to our public affairs output, and even refused to accept full-page descriptions of the problem we offered to pay to have placed in Chinese papers, the leadership doubtless was influenced by the long and factually accurate articles written by U.S. journalists we briefed, especially those appearing in the New York Times and the Chicago Tribune. Thanks to our efforts, and the great work of USDA and APHIS officers who gave endless briefings to Chinese exporters and port officials, the new procedures were put in place with so little fuss we all counted it a minor miracle.

*Q: It sounds like things had really opened up.*

BLACKBURN: That's true. The police state apparatus was still there – as we saw when central authorities told Chinese publications not to accept our Asian Longhorned Beetle placements – but overall bilateral atmospherics were greatly improved by the successful visits of President Jiang Zemin to the U.S. in 1997 and by President Clinton's to China in the summer of 1998.

*Q: What was that "POTUS" visit like?*

BLACKBURN: I was deeply immersed in that one, which took Clinton to Xian, Beijing, Shanghai, and Guilin. With seven nights on the ground in China, it was the longest peacetime visit by a U.S. President to any single country – exceeded only by President Wilson in Paris after World War One and President Truman in Potsdam at the end of World War Two. The President was accompanied not only by Hillary Rodham Clinton and daughter Chelsea, but also by Mrs. Rodman, five or six cabinet officers, numerous other dignitaries, and a raft of business executives.

I stayed on top of the planning from the beginning, working with the White House advance team as well as with Anne Edwards and her press advance people. That meant traveling several times to each of the cities on the itinerary and participating in the usual endless discussions of hotel space, filing arrangements, and transportation. In the end we brought on legions of volunteer American residents who supplemented our assigned American and Chinese staffers and provided guidance and other services to the White House correspondents. Again, I asked the Agency to send me a "dream team" of my choosing, and succeeded in lining up most of the people I thought would be most useful. One assignment that gave me particular pleasure was to bring

George Beasley back, at his request, to help out as the senior USIS officer for the Xian stop.

The trip was notable for the fact that both the opening joint press conference between Jiang Zemin and Clinton at the Great Hall of the People and also the President's speech at Peking University were broadcast live by the Chinese state media. Getting to the point where that could be made to happen involved complex negotiations with the Chinese, who consistently insisted that they would not allow the direct transmission within China, but would permit foreign broadcasters to carry live coverage from those two sites. The White House judged the trip a great success because of those events – even though the President's most critical statements were not repeated in later broadcasts or picked up in any of the Chinese print media. USIS was also directly involved in a live talk radio program that BPAO Tony Sariti suggested for Shanghai and another long interview that was carried nearly in its entirety on CCTV.

The atmosphere surrounding the trip was almost euphoric. The two leaders talked about working toward a “constructive strategic partnership.” It seemed like democracy might flourish in China, and there was even hope for resolving the Tibet issue. The public affairs part of the visit was central to its success, and we all felt somehow that our sleepless nights had been worth it. Of course, in the months that followed, things went south. The democracy movement was squashed, tensions rose in the Taiwan Straits, no progress was made on Tibet, the WTO negotiations ran into serious difficulties, and the government harshly cracked down on Fulan Gong.

Though not normally a fan of Presidential visits, I have to say that the Clinton visit to China in 1998 was certainly one of the highest points of my career. Besides being exciting and fun, it produced a helpful Chinese “party line” that it was okay to be friendly to America, which opened a lot of doors to us. The stress on me had been great, however. For weeks after it was all over, I could not sleep through a full night undisturbed by anxiety dreams.

*Q: What were some of the specific consequences of that visit?*

BLACKBURN: Now the official word was that “relations between the world's most powerful developed country and the world's largest developing country” were headed in a positive direction. One senior PRC official responsible for media guidance told me they had sent guidance to the Chinese media that only positive stories about the United States were to be reported by correspondents overseas! That guidance had a limited shelf life, of course.

The new mood helped propel what I think of as a continuing “golden age of American Studies.” Just about every educated Chinese, however they might feel about our country, has concluded that his or her future is somehow tied up with the United States. Just as Americans are paying increasing attention to China, they are looking at us – and even more seriously. Their motivations of course are many, but certainly include trying to understand how better to sell to us, to compete with our companies, to latch on to our technology, to fend off our efforts to change them, to learn the secrets of our success in maintaining stability with such a large and diverse population, or simply just how to come to America to build a new life here. The result is that vast numbers of students want to learn more about America.

We strongly supported the American Studies Center at Peking University, the premier academic

institution in the country. Just after his speech on that campus, President Clinton presented that Center with a multi-volume special collection on American institutions and ideals. We had worked with the American Studies folks back in USIA to put together the collection, never dreaming that it would be the President making the formal presentation. At one point we had three Fulbright lecturers assigned to Peking University – one teaching American literature, one teaching U.S. constitutional law, and one teaching, among other things, a ground-breaking interdisciplinary survey course in American Studies that attracted more than 200 students. The lectures from the law course, given by Professor Elizabeth Spahn, were put on the university's website in both English and Chinese. We were excited to be doing all this at China's top university – and the likely source of many future leaders.

Another initiative I set in motion was to translate basic American law texts into Chinese. The idea was to create an "American Law Library" that would eventually total 200 volumes. Don Bishop – with help from USIS staffer Yang Gengqi and our Chinese and American legal community advisors – honchoed the program during my time there, our successors Lloyd Neighbors and Rich Stites kept it going, and Don plans to move the project along further when taking over as PAO in the summer of 2003. The opportunity to translate these texts in much demand by the Chinese and get them sold all over the country represented an important breakthrough, one that promotes positive changes at a very fundamental level.

*Q: Can you say a little more about the Fulbright program and what you were trying to do with it?*

BLACKBURN: Sure. Fulbright has a long history in China. In fact, the China program was the first in the world to get off the ground after World War Two. That Fulbright operation of course went off to Taiwan with Chiang Kai-shek. We had essentially no exchanges with the People's Republic of China for the 30 years from 1949 to 1979, the year we set up the current structure for U.S.-China Fulbright exchanges.

During my tenure I promoted the idea of starting a Fulbright commission in China, a proposal that could never have had a glimmer of support just a few years earlier. Unfortunately, the obstacles were simply too great for us to make appreciable progress. Officials at the Chinese Ministry of Education, our counterparts in managing the program, gave me a respectful hearing and several of them bought my arguments about the advantages that would come to both countries. However, China has never allowed such a semi-autonomous binational body to operate outside the tight control of Chinese officialdom, and I had to content myself with the few short steps we made along the steep path toward actually getting one established. Still, I am sure one day a China Fulbright commission will come into being, as it has in nearly all other countries with which we carry out substantial Fulbright exchanges – even many that operate on a much smaller scale.

One specific measure we took in the direction of broadening the oversight of the Fulbright program was to set up an advisory body made up of Chinese and Americans from outside the governmental chains of command. Its first task was to select senior scholars and other individuals from both countries to participate in a "Distinguished Lecturer Program" to commemorate the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Fulbright program in the PRC. Our inaugural meeting

in May 1999 was very productive and encouraging. Unfortunately, it took place the afternoon immediately preceding the U.S. accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, an event that cast a pall over our relations for many months thereafter – and represented the nadir of my Foreign Service career.

Some of our speakers dealt with more provocative topics. For example, Joshua Muravchik spoke all over the country about America's commitment to democracy. He is a conservative intellectual, often published in the Washington Times, and a powerful, though soft-spoken, lecturer. His straight-forward message to audiences was that America will not feel truly secure in this world until all major countries, especially including China, are democracies. It was the kind of message that you would think could not be delivered to audiences in China, but – handled properly – it could be done.

Similarly, we had speakers address the sensitive but important role of religion in American society and politics. We of course had to program them officially under a more anodyne rubric like “U.S. interest group politics.” Still, the speakers were not only able to talk on the campuses, but also to meet with officials in China's Bureau of Religious Affairs about this major factor in American life. Such programs helped us provide needed context for much-resented U.S. expressions of concern about religious freedom in China.

*Q: And the Chinese didn't complain?*

BLACKBURN: No, they didn't really object, provided we did not circumvent procedures egregiously. They were in most cases interested in hearing what our speakers had to say. Sometimes officials in local areas were reluctant to approve a lecture – and everything had to be cleared in advance – but usually a program could be arranged, even at an alternate university venue. On some occasions, a party cadre in the audience would feel it necessary to stand up and give a lengthy rebuttal to points made by our lecturers. That was just part of doing business in China.

Besides the speakers, we devoted a special issue of Jiaoliu magazine to the subject of religion in America.

*Q: Please tell me more about what happened to your operation at that point.*

BLACKBURN: Essentially, all but the most routine activities came to a complete standstill. For example, on the calendar for later in May was a major symposium on regional security that we had been working on for months. It was to include security specialists from all over Asia participating in the USIA and CINCPAC annual program called the Symposium on East Asian Security, or SEAS. SEAS had never before had a China stop on its program itinerary. Our cosponsors were the prominent military intelligence think tank called the Chinese Institute for Contemporary International Relations, or CICIR, with which we were working closely for the first time. All was in readiness – for the participants and for a distinguished panel of speakers that included current Assistant Secretary for East Asia and the Pacific Jim Kelly. The event was canceled by the Chinese immediately after the bombing. A year later, however, we joined CICIR in pulling off a similar event. That one was a symposium for the annual gathering of SEAS

alumni from Japan, Korea, Mongolia, Russia, China, and the U.S. called the Symposium on Northeast Asian Security, or SNEAS, a rotating security “Track II talkfest” I got started while PAO in Tokyo.

Another unprecedented event on our calendar affected by the bombing was a conference set for September on U.S.-China-Russia relations. In that case we were cooperating with the Chinese Institute for International Relations (or CIIS), the major think tank of the Foreign Ministry. They were cautious about working with us, but with terrific help from American scholar Jonathan Adelman, who had strong relations with the CIIS leadership, we had finally reached agreement on a workable concept that promised to meet all their concerns while achieving our goals as well. That conference was also iced – though it, too, was successfully organized the following year.

*Q: What were you doing during the crisis itself?*

BLACKBURN: On the Saturday morning of the bombing, the Embassy held an Emergency Action Committee meeting at the Embassy as soon as the senior officers could be assembled. The Regional Security Officer told us there would be a demonstration in the afternoon. We were instructed to tell our American staffers and their families to stay in their apartments in the diplomatic compounds, exercise proper security precautions, and await further news of developments.

As the demonstration got under way that afternoon I rode my bike to a street corner by the Embassy where I could watch what was going on – all the while trying to look like a harmless senior-citizen foreigner. The demonstrations were orchestrated by the Chinese authorities, who worked through the Communist Party cadres assigned to the universities. Two busloads from each of the major Beijing universities came, each with similar banners and slogans to chant, and each bearing a petition to be delivered to Embassy authorities. At first the demonstrations were peaceful, and the Embassy sent representatives to the gate to accept petitions. But the protests got more and more hostile as the afternoon progressed, and the marchers started throwing items such as glass bottles, stones, bricks, paint, and eventually Molotov cocktails. In that early period, I felt pretty safe, being out there on the street along with a large contingent of foreign correspondents and other onlookers, just observing developments and ignoring attention directed toward me.

My daughter was due to perform in a play that evening at the International School, so I was keeping an eye on my watch all the while. Not knowing for sure how hot things were getting in other parts of the city, I decided to go into the Chancery, report to Ambassador Sasser, and then head out to the play. I slipped by the demonstrators and wheeled my bike through the front gate of the Chancery so I could tell those inside what I had been observing on the street. I briefed the Ambassador, the Acting DCM – who was Jim Moriarty – the RSO, and others on what I could understand of the demonstrations, what the American correspondents were doing, which universities had so far marched past, and the general atmospherics. Seeing that the Ambassador was on the verge of returning to his residence to be with his wife, I grabbed my bike, exited the door by the front gate, and peddled off through the demonstrators to find a taxi to get me to the school. I later learned that my departure from the Embassy was filmed by CNN and frequently carried as part of their coverage of those days. As it turned out, I had left just ten minutes before

the Embassy was completely shut down for the next three days. In that short time, the demonstrations got uglier and the RSO urged the Ambassador to stay in the Chancery, where he could be better protected by the Marine guards, rather than return to his less-protected residence. The Ambassador was understandably unhappy about being separated from his wife, though fortunately the Sasser's adult son and some friends were there with her.

Not surprisingly, when I got to the school I learned that the play had been canceled and all the kids had gone home, which I promptly did myself.

During the first day and a half of the crisis, many of our colleagues, especially those in the Chancery and at some of the Consulates, were in significant danger. Though U.S. Marines protected the Chancery from direct assault, officers on the spot engaged in a full-scale destruction of classified materials that might fall into the hands of demonstrators should the Embassy be overrun. In hindsight, it appears the danger was never that close, but several Chinese did jump the compound wall and had to be confronted by Marines in full battle gear before they were persuaded to jump back over the wall.

Except for Shanghai, with its own Marine guard contingent, the other Consulates were protected only by Chinese security guards. In Chengdu those guards were of virtually no help. Demonstrators climbed the compound wall, set fire to the Consul's residence, and smashed their way through the outer door of the Consulate. They were using a bike rack to try to crash into the interior – while screaming that they were going to exact vengeance – when city security forces finally arrived and routed them. Our colleagues were understandably terrified through this ordeal. They were frantically calling the Embassy and local contacts, and getting increasingly agitated by the slow, almost grudging response of the Chengdu authorities. During this most dangerous period I talked with Min Bookbinder, the wife of the BPAO, who was then standing on the roof of the Consulate staff apartment building. She had an all-too-clear view of the still smoldering Consul's residence and described for me the pervasive fear that the apartments were soon to come under direct attack. Chengdu staffers and their families were traumatized during that period, but fortunately the situation soon stabilized.

I was proud of the performance under such conditions of my USIS colleagues – and their family members. Throughout the Chengdu crisis, BPAO Joe Bookbinder performed courageously, as did those in the other two Consulates most heavily attacked, Salome Hernandez in Guangzhou and Thomas Hodges in Shenyang. Shanghai, where Tony Sariti and Teresa Wilkin served, was never seriously endangered, though the staffers there likewise performed with distinction. Conditions were exceptionally stressful for official Americans wherever they happened to be in China during those first days.

Happily, in the end no Americans anywhere in the country reported suffering any physical harm. One Australian and I think a Canadian – who to no avail protested that they were not Americans! – got roughed up, but only slightly. Canadian lapel buttons were in wide use by U.S. citizens during those days.

Throughout the ordeal we maintained contact with the USIS Chinese employees, especially those with email. Some of the USIS staffers were of great help, for example by translating statements

from the White House and the Secretary of State.

The Fulbright professors were another major concern. I was convinced that, with campuses all over the country erupting with anger at the U.S., many of the Fulbrighters and their families would want to be evacuated as soon as possible. But none of them did request to go home. To their great credit, they all hunkered down for those first tense days in their campus apartments, staying in touch by email with Frank Whitaker, the ACAO in charge of the Fulbright program. After a few days their Chinese handlers and colleagues at the universities knocked on their doors and told them it was safe to return to normal activities. The email system Frank had earlier put in place was a great communications tool. We could stay up to date on the Fulbrighters' situations, give them specific advice and information, and keep them apprized of Embassy thinking.

The volume of press queries from international media was almost overwhelming. Information Officer/Spokesman Bill Palmer and his deputy, Tom Cooney, fielded an unrelenting onslaught of questions and requests for on-the-air descriptions of the scene on the ground. I handled some of them, too. People called at all hours of the day and night, both on our regular phones and on the cell-phones they somehow knew we were using.

Throughout the crisis, we were able to maintain the Embassy website. It was regularly under attack by hackers, but our contractors somehow managed to fend them off, or to quickly get it back up whenever it was taken down.

*Q: You mean electronically, I assume.*

BLACKBURN: Yes, that right. Electronically, not physically. We used the website in many ways besides just communicating with each other. For example, I wrote a statement for the Ambassador, expressing his regret about the mistaken bombing and calling for continued good relations between the two countries. We put that up, with his picture, in both English and Chinese. The Embassy's Gunnery Sergeant, an excellent photographer, took a widely-used picture of the Ambassador looking forlornly out through the broken glass of the front door of the Chancery. The Washington Post and a lot of papers around the country carried it on their front pages. Another he took showed our American flag through an upstairs broken glass window of the Chancery. That one was on the front cover of the Far Eastern Economic Review. We put both these photos, and several others, on our website, and the news organizations picked them up from there. Chinese media handlers I talked with later told me they felt very resentful when they saw what we had done. They said we should have also carried pictures of the devastation and deaths at the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. I explained that that was not our job, but that we had carried numerous statements conveying our regret for the tragic mistake. Our contacts were generally unaware of the damage done to our facilities when the demonstrators got out of control, and were shocked to hear that we had be showered with rocks, paint, Molotov cocktails, and even human feces.

Once the demonstrations had essentially run their course, we brought the USIS Chinese and American staffers back to work. A few of us had gone in earlier to try to clean up some of the dirt and glass shards, but we couldn't fix the broken windows and there were limits to what we could do to make the premises presentable before the main body of the staff returned. It was

pretty bad. Everybody, especially the Chinese, was deeply disturbed by what they saw. Though we were not the primary target of the demonstrators, our compound was directly on the main route the demonstrators walked along. The USIS facility lost about 85 broken windows, while perhaps a ton of rocks and other debris had been thrown into our office space. Besides returning to depressingly messed up offices, the Chinese staffers were still suffering the effects of having had their families and friends urge them to get DSB to transfer them to new embassies and away from the contemptible Americans.

On the first day we were all back, I called the staff together and said, "Look. This is what happened, as best I understand it. Many Chinese think we bombed their Belgrade embassy on purpose. It was not done on purpose. It really was a mistake. We understand that Chinese media and party cadres put that unflattering interpretation on the accident, and that all Chinese feel very angry right now. The mistake was a terrible one, and we are deeply sorry it happened. At the same time, you should realize that Americans are insulted and upset with Chinese who accuse us of doing it on purpose because we feel some kind of hatred toward China and the Chinese people. As you can see, some Chinese felt justified in attacking Americans and causing all this damage to our facilities. We in USIS just have to deal with this tense bilateral atmosphere and get on with our work. After all, we are the Chinese and Americans who every day try to strengthen the basic fabric of relations between our two countries. That is our job, so let's get on with it. But first let's have some meals together and try to relax a bit." And that is what we did.

One incident that sticks out in my memory involved Ambassador Sasser, who behaved with courage and dignity throughout the crisis. During those first days some of the press calls got through directly to him – despite our off-site efforts to help him pick and chose which interviews to accept. At least one, but perhaps more, of the journalists who reached him got a quote to the effect that, being stuck in the Chancery as he was, he felt like a "hostage." His use of that term, plus the wide play given to our website photos, were apparently the motivation for a call from the State Department Spokesman, who – unable to reach me – got through to IO Bill Palmer. The message conveyed was a firm instruction that we were to stop "hyping the drama" of our situation, which was distracting public attention away the priority effort then under way in the former Yugoslavia.

*Q: Did U.S.-China relations suffer permanent damage?*

BLACKBURN: Sure, it was harmed, but in most respects it bounced back pretty quickly. In the days immediately following the bombing, the Chinese showed that they did not want the emotions of the moment to overwhelm the benefits China gains from the bilateral relationship. From the get-go they were anxious to protect economic relations and tourism. In fact, American tourists were going about their usual activities through the whole episode – and came up against no particular hostility, as far as I know. And the American business community was strongly encouraged by the Chinese authorities not to pull out either people or investment.

They also wanted to keep our educational ties going. Following the Tiananmen Square tragedy in June of 1989, we suspended the Fulbright program. People in both of our countries remembered that, and thought it had been a big mistake. When relations are sour, that is not the time to cancel educational exchange activities; you need them all the more. So both at the Ministry of

Education and on the campuses, officials made a special effort to emphasize to the Fulbrighters and other foreign teachers, especially Americans, that their presence was very welcome. Military-to-military contacts stayed on ice for quite a while, but educational ties and media relations soon were much like they had been before the bombing.

After a couple of months, the overall climate of the relationship improved substantially. We sent a delegation to give senior Chinese officials an explanation of how the targeting mistake came to be made. Another delegation worked out what we would pay the Chinese for the loss of life, injuries, and property damage sustained in Belgrade – and the compensation we expected for the damage done to our facilities in Beijing and elsewhere in the country. We finally agreed on a payment of about \$30 million to them. And they agreed to give us about \$3 million.

*Q: Did we have a good explanation of what had happened? I forget the details.*

BLACKBURN: We said that it was a faulty map, and using some charts and maps, explained to the Chinese leadership in some detail how things went wrong. Those charts and maps have never been made available to the American public! I felt, and still feel, that we did a very poor job of providing a satisfactory public explanation. The Chinese kept insisting that we had done it on purpose, and we had no hard documentation to use in rebutting them. Unfortunately, bureaucratic butt-protecting kept us from admitting our mistakes – except through leaked information that appeared in the New York Times. That put new Ambassador Joseph Prueher and the rest of us in the very odd position of referring our Chinese interlocutors to a newspaper article, rather than giving them an official document – or, better yet, a White Paper – that laid it all out.

With nothing to bring the issue to closure, the bombing has entered the long list of humiliations China feels it has suffered at the hands of anti-Chinese foreigners over the last two centuries. I thought it was a great failure of our public diplomacy, but I was unable to do anything about it – either when there or after I got back to Washington.

*Q: Did the consolidation of USIA and State take place while you were there? What was the time frame?*

BLACKBURN: The merger took place on October 1, 1999, nearly five months after the Belgrade bombing, so I was in China for nearly a year of the new organizational arrangement.

*Q: Was the same thing happening in all countries?*

BLACKBURN: Yes, I believe so. It was the new reality, and the arguments we were all hearing from our DCMs had a lot of logic to them. I tried to present an objective and persuasive case outlining the kinds of compromises all parties to the new arrangement should be prepared to make. Citing the legislating mandating that USIA's integration should not entail any diminution in public diplomacy quantity or quality, I stressed that the State Department had not simply acquired new personnel and new resources to manage, it had also taken on unfamiliar responsibilities carrying unique requirements. And to do that job, we would need understanding and full support from the rest of the Embassy, especially the Admin Section.

I argued that PAS should retain a deputy to help run what was still a complex nationwide program. I prepared a lengthy memo for McCahill detailing the ways that my responsibilities differed from those of the heads of other Embassy sections. I showed, for example, that the job of the Political Minister Counselor, while undoubtedly exceedingly demanding, involved relatively few management tasks. Understandably, any effort to persuade a political officer DCM that the PAO's position entailed more responsibility and administrative skill than that of the Political Minister-Counselor was unlikely to carry the day. Though McCahill and his successors as DCM, Gene Martin and Mike Marine, were not persuaded by my arguments regarding either the PAO grade level or the need for a deputy, the Washington management arm instructed all missions not to take precipitate action until a comparative job analysis could be conducted. The analysis looked at persons supervised, budgets managed, and other quantitative factors. This enlightened approach was very helpful to our morale. The survey, completed after I had departed Beijing, found that most PAO jobs, including the one in China, did not need to be down-graded, even if they were higher than other major sections of the Embassy.

*Q: That protected you a little bit. Is that what you are saying?*

BLACKBURN: Basically we agreed, in Beijing and elsewhere, to wait a year or two before instituting major changes. That gave our post breathing room to make the transition to a new team, Lloyd Neighbors and Rich Stites in our case, without everyone going through the trauma of a major shakeup.

The General Services Officer (GSO), the Budget and Fiscal Officer, and other key support personnel tried to be helpful, but they were essentially ignorant, as they admitted, of how we operated, especially in the area of contracts. Gradually they appreciated our special needs – for example, that periodicals for our Information Resource Center needed to be ordered on a different schedule and according to different procedures than staff-use periodicals for other sections of the Embassy.

In the case of the USIS vehicles, initially we were allowed to keep the four we had, but soon they were added to a central pool. At first GSO said we should ask for drivers when we needed them. After a short time, however, they realized that we had frequent need for drivers who understood our requirement to make deliveries all over the city, to ferry our speakers around to unusual destinations, and so forth. So we ended up with a modified system whereby drivers were more or less permanently on duty at our two locations – a kind of satellite motor pool, if you will.

In procurement, too, there was a learning process we had to suffer through. The initial impulse was to treat PAS no better than any other section. However, we had so much trouble getting the flexible and speedy support we needed for our routine work – and kicked up such a fuss – that, before too many months had passed, new procedures gave us quick processing when necessary, plus authority to make our own small to medium purchases.

Making these adjustments was aided by the fact that PAS activities in China and elsewhere were given a separate allotment that was funded from the earmark for public diplomacy Congress put into – and continues to insist on – in the State Department budget at the time of consolidation.

*Q: Just a minute. Before you go any further – isn't there a Congressional mandate for democracy programs to be run out of Washington, for example through the National Endowment for Democracy, or NED, and other institutions connected to the two major parties? What connection is there with them?*

BLACKBURN: There is of course some connection. NED, the Asia Foundation, Ford Foundation, and other institutions have long promoted human rights in China and other countries. There is also money floating around both the State Department, in different offices and intended for the same purpose. Some of the funding in Washington goes to NED and its affiliates, with the expectation that they will find the appropriate U.S. and foreign organizations to administer programs on the ground. But our embassy-based democracy commissions were to hand out small amounts, generally less than \$10,000, to local organizations that could really use such funding.

**ROBERT GOLDBERG**  
**External Economic Officer**  
**Beijing (1996-1999)**

**Deputy Director for Economic Affairs, China/  
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**Washington, DC (1999-2003)**

**Deputy Director, Office of China Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (2003-2005)**

**Director, Office of China Affairs**  
**Washington, DC (2005-2007)**

**Consul General**  
**Guangzhou (2007-2009)**

**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
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*Mr. Goldberg was born and raised in Baltimore, Maryland and educated at Gettysburg College and the University of Chicago. He accompanied his Foreign Service wife on her assignment to Tokyo before entering the Foreign Service in 1983 as Foreign Service Officer. A Chinese language specialist, Mr. Goldberg served both in the State Department of State in Washington, DC and abroad dealing primarily with Economic and Chinese affairs. His overseas posts include Tokyo (as spouse), New Delhi, Hong Kong, Guangzhou and Beijing, where he served twice, once as Deputy Chief of Mission. Mr. Goldberg was interviewed by David Reuther in 2011.*

GOLDBERG: Well I knew I wanted to go back or I wanted to go to China. Seems I say that a lot. I went and lobbied very hard for a job that just opened up out there as the chief of the external economic unit in Beijing. The only other candidate was Bob Tansey. There was a disagreement between Washington and Beijing over who should get the job. Bob was in Beijing already and some people out there thought he should have the job. I received desk support and ended up being paneled into the position. It was an interesting three years to say the least, because almost everything I did was related to China's succession to the World Trade Organization or WTO.

*Q: Can you give us a sense of what that office was like when you got out to the Embassy? Now they are still in Er ban?*

GOLDBERG: San-ban was the chancellery where I worked. The Embassy does not move to new offices until 8-8-2008 [August 8, 2008]. When I arrived, Jack Gosnell was the econ counselor. But he had burned a lot of bridges and was not long for the job. He remained econ counselor in name only for a period of months before he was replaced by Bob Ludan, who was then head of the internal section and for whom I worked for two and a half years. Deputy Chief of Mission was Bill McCahill, an econ officer who had formed a pretty good relationship with Jim Sasser before being designated in that position. Bill became a very good friend. The econ section was relatively small at that time all things considered. I initially had three people reporting to me; by the time I left I had five. The internal section increased by one or two people as well. So let's say by the time I left in 1999 there were ten people. Today there are two dozen. Bob Ludan became the economic counselor and I was the nominal deputy. Bob Tansey headed up the internal section for a while before Steve Wickman – later a CG in Shenyang – replaced him.

*Q: Now, the Ambassador, Jim Sasser, was a non-career ambassador. What were the atmospherics like?*

GOLDBERG: Well he was terrific. Early on, after doing some remarks for him at an airport ceremony during which the remains of American servicemen recovered in Yunnan were being repatriated I became his speechwriter. So my relationship with him was quite different than that of other people in the mission. He was a politician – like Jon Huntsman for whom I also worked – and treated people at the mission like constituents. He wanted them to know he appreciated their work, and he was working hard for them. As a result, he got a lot of buy-in for his objectives and he had a number of officers – like me, I suppose – who were quite loyal to him. Sasser was far more interested in the politics of China than in economic policy. But overall, we were well served, given his contacts at the White House. He was very close to Al Gore. His wife had known Gore's wife for a long time, Sasser had in fact driven Gore's father around on his losing campaign to be returned to the Senate. He got to know Gore even more when they were both Senators from Tennessee. He knew both Clintons as well, so his entrée in Washington was unbeatable in all respects. He could call Washington and people would answer his calls.

He once said the best piece of advice he ever got was from Stape Roy, his immediate predecessor, who told him, "You want to go back to Washington to touch base at least three times a year." Well Sasser went back probably four times a year to touch base. I accompanied him a couple of times on those trips, ostensibly as speechwriter. At that point, my wife was still

working, and she was in the States so on trips back, I was able to spend some time with my family. Of course the trips were a fair amount of work because we were constantly shaping the presentations that he made. I also accompanied him to most of his meetings, though when he went to the White House to see the Vice President, I waited outside by the gate.

All-in-all, we were very busy in this very large mission. I spent most of my time working with USTR, which seemed to come out every other week, meeting them at the airport, taking notes or doing whatever had to be done. Occasionally they let us in as they brainstormed issues; Bill McCahill was particularly well responded. Working on the accession protocol to the WTO carried through the whole three years that I was there.

*Q: What were some of the issues that were involved in that?*

GOLDBERG: You name it. It was across the board - tariffs, the regulatory environment, the lack of transparency, negative lists, when certain things were going to be allowed, what China's developing country status actually meant., the time frame for phasing in obligations. These were the nitty gritty issues under discussion. It was basically working out the "devil is in the details" aspects. It really wasn't until the Bush II administration when Bob Zoellick was USTR and Jeff Bader was the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative handling China issues that they made the political decision that enough was enough. We had gotten 98% of what we needed. The remaining 2% was not going to happen. Some companies and sectors were going to be disadvantaged, but maybe we could remedy that in the next round of serious negotiations - which of course are essentially moribund. You ought to talk with Jeff about all this.

We made a lot of progress in the three years I was in Beijing, but we were never really quite there. A host of Assistant and Deputy Assistant USTRs before Jeff kept trying - Lee Sands, Deborah Lehr, Bob Cassidy, Christina Lund, Don Phillips.

*Q: I can imagine your experienced domestic lobbying.*

GOLDBERG: Absolutely. No trade agreement takes place in the absence of the squeaky of business and industry.

*Q: While you were in Beijing, in July 1997, Hong Kong reverts to China. How was that seen or did it impact on your work.*

GOLDBERG: It didn't impact what I was doing. We were interested, of course, but the Hong Kong and Macao office rarely saw anybody from the embassy. Our ConGen Hong Kong people would come to Beijing once a year to meet with their counterparts; sometimes their counterparts were not prepared to meet with them. American businesses which still had their home offices in Hong Kong would come up and chat with us about reversion and about doing business issues in the mainland. But increasingly, on those matters, the Amchams in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangzhou were able to speak for themselves about their business-related interests. I'd also point out that much of the lobbying on WTO related issues came from business home offices in the U.S. So USTR and the White House were listening to U.S.-based chief executives in terms of what they needed and then calling upon them later to support and sell this agreement to the

Congress.

*Q: One of the events that marked the re-normalization of the relationship after Tiananmen Square when that Jiang Zemin visited the United States in October 1997, and Ambassador Sasser accompanied him on that trip.*

GOLDBERG: Well he accompanied him throughout the visit. I don't know if he flew on a Chinese plane or not. I know Sandy Randt did years later on Chinese leader state visits and Huntsman accompanied Hu Jintao on his plane in January 2011. When we had a Presidential visit, we ceded a seat or two on our planes to the Chinese - not Air Force One, but the follow on plane. On the Jiang visit - Sasser went back, thought it went very well, and he thought he had a good overall relationship with Jiang.

But Sasser like every other ambassador was frustrated by the asymmetric access he had versus what the Chinese ambassadors in the U.S. have. Chinese ambassadors in the U.S. see secretaries and White House officials, and members of Congress, even get presidential drop-bys and meetings when seeing the National Security Council advisor. U.S. ambassadors have long been relegated to dealing with senior vice-ministerial level people or the vice minister in charge of American affairs. John Huntsman, for example would see Vice Minister He Yafei or Vice Minister Cui Tiankai; when I was Chargé, I'd more than likely just see the Director General for the Americas Zheng Zeguang. Sasser used to chafe at that. But he had a pretty good relationship with Jiang, who seemed to like Americans.

*Q: How did he characterize the Jiang visit when he got back?*

GOLDBERG: Oh very successful. But these kinds of visits are always successful – even before they occur – unless something out of the ordinary happens. They are so well scripted. Jiang Zemin staked part of his legacy on building up a strong relationship with the United States. Jiang wanted to be perceived as someone with whom the United States could work. We did think Jiang had a geostrategic approach.

*Q: About this time the Chinese dissident Wei Jiansheng was released. Did that impact on anything?*

GOLDBERG: Well, just in the sense the Chinese were happy to get rid of him and we were happy to check him off as a specific subject of concern. Human rights remained a pretty important issue.

*Q: Now you are saying McCahill was your DCM. What was he like to work with?*

GOLDBERG: Well for me, very supportive. Bill really studied up on WTO issues, and got to know Charlene Barshefsky quite well. She was at that time the Trade Representative, having succeeded Mickey Kantor. He worked well with Bob Cassidy, the Assistant U.S. Trade Representative and was viewed as a team member – more so than those of us who were on point, so to speak. Bill had a back channel to one of Jiang's most senior advisors, Zeng Qinghong, who eventually became vice president during the first five years of Hu Jintao's presidency. So if there

issues that needed some political oversight, Bill had this back channel.

*Q: By this time America's diplomatic footprint in China is fairly extensive. Did you get a chance to visit any of the other consulates?*

GOLDBERG: I traveled a bit, not that much. Talking about America's footprint, one of the most important things that happened while I was in Beijing was the inspection of China posts in 1998 by Dick Hecklinger and his OIG [Office of Inspector General] team. The report that Ambassador Hecklinger did led to the "China 2000 ramp up" in resources – it was a recognition that we needed to think critically about putting more people, more money, better technology in China so that we could significantly enhance our capabilities there. I had an opportunity to spend a couple of hours with Hecklinger. The report was, as I say, key to the growth of the mission. Of course, it was a time when the State Department was growing again, resource-wise. My sense is that the mission today has grown beyond its needs – I know some will dispute that. But it was half or a third the size in the late 90s than it is today and we were never at a loss for work, whether it was preparing for groups coming out, supporting groups that were there, or doing the follow up work after the delegations had left. And then, on top of that, we were doing reporting, trying to provide some sense of next step strategic thinking about the relationship and whither China. That was particularly true on the WTO side. We had a good team, people who understood the issues quite well and who were willing to work hard. I was lucky. I had Chris Beede who was the Mission interface on WTO issues with USTR. Afterward, Robin Bordie was in that role. Robin was outstanding. We also threw in anyone else who seemed to have time on his/her hands to work the issues.

*Q: On the bread and butter issues, who were your contacts? Who were you dealing with on the Chinese side?*

GOLDBERG: My contacts were almost all government because these were national level trade policy issues. I didn't have the kinds of contacts with think tankers that would have been helpful but some of the officers working for me did. I saw a lot of people at what was then still MOFTEC, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, which morphed into the Ministry of Commerce years later. Also I saw a lot of people at the Ministry handling telecommunications – today's Industry and Information Technology Ministry. We also worked with the U.S. Treasury Department to make contacts with the People's Bank of China on tax issues and subsidies for state owned enterprises. Financial services didn't occupy a terribly large component of our WTO work. We coordinated closely within the mission with the Foreign Agriculture Service and outside with the U.S. Department of Agriculture since market access for U.S. agriculture was a significant issue in WTO accession. Not as significant as we would have liked it to be but still significant. One of the criticisms of my work at that time was that I spent more time doing speeches and presentations for Sasser than I did on the issues I had been assigned to go out and do. Probably true.

*Q: Talking about handling visitors; in June 1998, the President visits China.*

GOLDBERG: Yeah, and I had nothing to do with that visit. Absolutely nothing.

*Q: How could you not?*

GOLDBERG: Well Charlene Barshefsky was out there ten days in advance of the President's arrival and I was the control officer for Barshefsky. The Chinese were interested in having a WTO agreement ready to sign when the President got there. The last meeting I attended with Charlene was at MOFTEC about an hour before the President's arrival. She was sitting across the table from Shi Guangsheng, the MOFTEC Minister; sitting next to Shi was Long Yongtu - their senior WTO negotiator who was looking at his feet the entire time because he was embarrassed about Shi's pleading to get Charlene to sign a statement of principles. To his right was Yi Xiaozhun, who became a vice minister at the Ministry of Commerce and is today China's WTO Ambassador in Geneva. So there is Shi trying to get Charlene to sign this two page MOU [Memorandum of Understanding] and Charlene saying, "No. Can't do it. Can't sell it. The President won't buy it." We got up and left and stood outside the Ministry and watched the presidential motorcade go down Jianguo menwai toward the Diaoyutai state guest house where the President was staying. So when I say I had nothing to do with the President in his visit, I literally had nothing to do except attend the President's meet-and-greet at the embassy before he left. Just my luck - by the time the President got to where I was on the rope line, his aides whisked him away.

*Q: Why couldn't we sign off at that time? What were the issues?*

GOLDBERG: A memorandum of understanding? The issue was that we had no agreement that spelled out chapter and verse what China's obligations were.

*Q: So they were looking for an overarching something and we were looking for the details.*

GOLDBERG: Yes that is where the devil is in the details. Again as I say it doesn't come until Zoellick and Bader decide enough's enough and we can conclude a deal.

*Q: Well, actually isn't the next act in the WTO story Premier Zhu Rongji's visit to Washington in April of 1999.*

GOLDBERG: He thought he was going to sign an agreement too and I think at one point the administration was prepared to sign. But then White House advisors kept at Clinton and told him we didn't have enough to justify signing. Nobody wanted to sign a bad agreement just to announce it at a high level meeting, and it would not have been as good an agreement as the one we eventually concluded. A lot of people think that Zhu Rongji was using the WTO as a way of making China's domestic industries and companies, particularly the state owned enterprises, more competitive. He wanted them to operate in a global business environment. I think there is a lot to that. Sasser said that Zhu was pretty disappointed that Clinton had backed off. It probably had a bit of impact on him politically, but I don't think it ever showed in his relations with the U.S. One thing - if an agreement is not signed before a visit of this sort, it's unlikely to be signed during it. But the Chinese really pressed during the visit, and it just didn't happen.

*Q: One of the things the academics pick up at this time is the USTR publishes a list of what are considered Chinese concessions, and that publicity damaged Zhu's standing at home.*

GOLDBERG: Undoubtedly, but I think the biggest damage was the failure to bring this to a close.

*Q: Actually, finally it did come to fruition. When was that?*

GOLDBERG: Well not until the next administration. So we are looking at the Zoellick-Bader collaboration, and it came very quickly. The sense was we had enough to sell the agreement and it was time to cease the bickering. Both sides were moderately satisfied with the agreement, though the Chinese maintain they negotiated under duress and at a disadvantage and the final outcome was not good for them. But ten years on, if you look at the outcomes, I think from China's perspective it has been successful, more so than for us. And the tenth anniversary commemorations on the agreement have reached the same conclusion.

*Q: One of the events that came up during the time you were in Beijing was the May 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. That must have been interesting.*

GOLDBERG: Well it was interesting; interesting is sort of an understatement. There was disbelief in the Mission that this had happened. You know the famous story - we hit what we wanted to hit but it wasn't what we thought it was. The defense attaché received a call in the early hours after the bombing and was asked whether the Chinese had an Embassy in Belgrade and where it was located. The mission hunkered down. The first day, demonstrations around the embassy were reasonably peaceful. We closed up shop and were told to stay at home. You could always get into the embassy by jumping over the wall between the Irish and American embassies and you could exit the same way. We had very good relations with the Irish.

But the demonstrations turned violent the evening of the second day after CCTV coverage of the bodies of the dead Chinese diplomats being flown home and images of bloody clothing. That evening, the Chinese government bussed in some hooligans likely from the Public Security Bureau or the Ministry of State Security, and they threw rocks and plastic liter bottles filled with urine at the mission. They busted almost every window in the mission, but they never broke one of our antiquated Wangs [Ed: and early word processing computer]. It didn't make any sense. Such extraordinary aim. When we finally got back in the mission, clean up didn't take that long and we were up and running pretty quickly.

While the demonstrations were going on, we were supposed to stay inside our apartments near the Embassy, but in fact, they were in such a limited area – with Chinese students who were bussed in to march around for a couple of hours or so – that we didn't feel any inhibition about sneaking out the front of side entrance and going over to Starbucks for a cup of coffee. Some officers met contacts there who provided insights about what was happening elsewhere in the city.

My last meeting in Beijing as note taker was when Ambassador Tom Pickering came out to explain what happened. The story he told was plausible and the narrative held together but it was still totally unbelievable and fantastic from the Chinese perspective. He acknowledged we hit what we wanted to hit. We thought it was something other than it actually was. Yang Jiechi was

then a vice foreign minister and he sat across the table from Pickering. People have asked me if I ever saw Yang very angry and emotional. Well yeah I have. This was a rather magnificent performance. Because it was clear he wasn't paying any attention to what Pickering was saying but was rehearsing his reaction would be. It was truly over the top. I wasn't very good at taking notes that day because I was busy watching his performance. The only other performer I ever saw to top that was Madame Wu Yi who was Shi Guangsheng's predecessor at MOFTEC and who subsequently became a vice premier and China's most senior woman for a decade. She was a consummate actress. But whether Yang was acting or had really lost control was unclear – it was just interesting to watch from a performance point of view. So when I was actually doing the cable of the meeting, and we had at that point the 24-hour rule to get it done and back to DC, I had to ask others at the meeting to help me recreate what had happened.

*Q: I think Pickering was there on June 17, or something like that.*

GOLDBERG: And I left at the end of that month.

*Q: Ambassador Sasser leaves about the same time doesn't he?*

GOLDBERG: Yes he does. I was actually on a trip when Sasser left. We went out to the northwest and did the Silk Route tour at that time. Anyway, as I say I very much enjoyed working for him; he had superb political skills and really knew how to work the Washington system. I think he did a good job out there.

*Q: Is there anything you think you want to add to what your duties were at that time?*

GOLDBERG: No, not really. I was very fortunate to be working for Jim Sasser and having an opportunity to help him out with his speeches and do a bit of travel with him, working on the WTO account. The Embassy was a great place to work and I made a lot of very good friends – though few among the Chinese we met. I learned an awful lot about mentoring people and have been fortunate over the last decade or so to have continuing associations with some extremely talented people.

*Q: Let me ask this. You served in Hong Kong before, but this was your first inside China assignment. Did you have some assumptions about China or about your contact work that didn't turn out? I mean comparing how China looked at the start of your tour with how China looked at the end of your tour, what did you see changed perhaps in your own mind but more certainly on the ground?*

GOLDBERG: Well I arrived there about four or five months after the firing of missiles in the Taiwan Strait – that was the Chinese reaction to our providing a visa to Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui to speak at Cornell in June 1995. And I left in July 1999 after the Belgrade Embassy bombing. So two extremely difficult events bookended three years of a very positive relationship, one that was on an upward trajectory until Belgrade. Belgrade alone didn't sour the ties – there were concerns about China's military modernization program, differences over a wide range of global issues – and this will sound familiar – Iran and North Korea. We had concerns about trade policy. I'd say there a darkening of ties in 1999, but Belgrade put a period

to the positive and gave us pause so we could reevaluate where we were. I don't think we really recovered and started having a productive – or more productive – conversation until after September 11 (2001).

*Q: When you were in Beijing and you are interacting with your official Chinese contacts in your various ministries, did they seem increasingly sophisticated in their approach to some of the issues that came up?*

GOLDBERG: Well the main issue that I dealt with, the WTO, the standard line was that the level of expertise was extremely thin, in other words, a mile wide and less than an inch deep in terms of sophistication about the issues. During the period, the Chinese were taking advantage more of the window on the world they had and they were learning a great deal. I would add that over the years we've seen an increased sophistication and confidence on the part of their diplomats.

*Q: Your next assignment then is back to the China Desk and this is going to be the start of a long policy association with China. Let me start out by asking how did you get that next job?*

GOLDBERG: Well, I was up for reassignment in the summer of 1999. Steve Schlaikjer who was then the China desk director traveled to China for meetings in the fall of 1998 and we talked about my coming on board as the econ deputy. We had been in language class together ten years before, although Steve was studying at a much higher level than I was. This was the best option that was available to me at the time.

*Q: Now what was that job as deputy director for economic affairs? How did it fit in the office? There is an office director...*

GOLDBERG: We were really firing on all cylinders insofar as economic issues were concerned. Although Steve was extremely well versed on the issues, Jim Keith who was the deputy for political affairs and personnel – a job I held later - wasn't. So a lot of interesting issues fell to me. I had a lot of interaction on economic issues that affected China within as well as without the department. One really nice thing as a deputy – and I had to acknowledge this really was kind a second deputy job, not as important as the one Jim had – was that I had an awful lot of autonomy. This was the time when we were working to extend to China PNTR or permanent normal trade relations.

*Q: Let's go back to the organization of the China Desk. You have a director, Schlaikjer. You have a deputy...*

GOLDBERG: Deputy for political and personnel affairs.

*Q: OK, so there is one director and two deputies which are divided between political and econ functions.*

GOLDBERG: The political deputy often does a lot of the administrative and all of the personnel stuff. In decisions with regard to economic officers, of course, the political/personnel deputy

consulted with the economic deputy. But in terms of the efforts at recruitment, most of the responsibilities fell on the political/personnel deputy.

*Q: How many people were working with you on the econ side?*

GOLDBERG: On the econ side I had three total. Just two actually working econ issues, because the third was the desk officer for Mongolia. I had one person working on what was the equivalent of the ESTH, Environment, Science, Technology, and Health portfolio, and one person who was handling a variety of macro, micro, and trade issues.

*Q: Give me understand the organization of the EAP front office. The assistant secretary at this time was Stan Roth?*

GOLDBERG: Yes.

*Q: Who was the deputy assistant secretary that handled China affairs? Was that Darryl Johnson or Ralph Boyce, I have forgotten?*

GOLDBERG: Skip was doing Southeast Asia; we reported through Darryl. He was a classic political officer – I have a great deal of respect for him but he wasn't overly interested in economic issues. Nor was Roth. So I was EAP's voice coordinating China economic issues with E [Office of the Under-Secretary for Economic, Business and Agricultural Affairs] and EB [Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs].

*Q: Who would you have worked with from those offices?*

GOLDBERG: Well internally almost any office EB, the economic bureau, but mostly the trade office. At that time Bill Crane was either the director or deputy director for trade policy. We did stuff with Wes Scholtz on investment-related issues. We didn't do terribly much with the monetary and finance people in large part because financial markets weren't as key an issue as they would become ten years later. We worked closely with the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs office Al Larson. Over the course of two years I got to know Al quite well, and worked pretty closely with him, again mostly on WTO and PNTR but on some IPR [Intellectual Property Rights] and other trade issues.

*Q: Right, let's get to that in a minute. The observation I would like to make is that as an officer on the desk, a senior economic officer at that, what you have just described is the web of contacts certainly in the building that you worked with on a normal basis to get the job done.*

GOLDBERG: And outside the building as well. We spent an awful lot of time at meetings over at USTR. I also sat in on a few White House meetings convened by the NEC to discuss about how we could move forward on our relationship with China.

*Q: Now set the stage for me on the permanent trade relations issues. China had to have an annual renewal.*

GOLDBERG: It was once called Most Favored Nation status. But we changed the name since every nation except China and a few others were favored. In order to accede to the WTO and have the benefits of the multilateral accession protocol, China needed PNTR – and they had to extend that to us as well. Absent this mutual provision, a country would not enjoy the benefits of the accession - this is the problem we face with Russia

*Q: Now one of the complicating problems if I recall on the political side of this issue is Tiananmen Square and congressional and lobby criticism of that to block or forestall the issue of China's accession to WTO.*

GOLDBERG: Jackson-Vanik Amendment [1974] was not just simply anti-Soviet Union-related. It was also applied to all countries deemed human rights violators. It had to be waived or terminated in order to extend the WTO protocol to China. And the key here was the Congress. We spent a lot of time in meetings with Congressional staff. We also were doing papers for as many as two senior level meetings a week at the White House. Many of them were attended by Madeline Albright, the Secretary of State. Eventually they were so frequent, that she decided to delegate attendance to Al Larson in his capacity as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. But Albright retained a whip hand by appointing her counselor Wendy Sherman to be head of a State Department supra working group. But Al was our public persona in the interagency process. There was a lot of give and take in our internal meetings. The president himself was very much involved in lobbying legislators and we were writing points for him as well. It was a very constant drumbeat of activity – good thing we had super copy on our computers' word perfect package. I should note that we also worked very closely with H [Bureau of Congressional Relations] at that time. Congressional relations provided strategies that might appeal to individual legislators.

*Q: Did you yourself get up on the Hill and brief people.*

GOLDBERG: I talked to staffers. At that point I did not talk to congressmen directly.

*Q: Were those discussions political or economic?*

GOLDBERG: I would say that at this point it was largely a political discussion more than economic. We focused on job creation what the benefits for American workers and farmers, American service providers and consumers. We had data on all of that which proved to have been exaggerated. A key feature of our argument was that China's accession to the WTO was going to change China positively so that it would operate in a rules based environment on trade issues. We didn't say that some of our worst trade tensions are with those countries with which we are the closest, like Canada and Europe; countries are perfectly willing to operate in a rules based environment and break the rules. They are prepared to have WTO cases brought against them and if found in violation of the WTO agreement pay a fine which is really less than the cost of doing business.

*Q: Would you be able to characterize by party or leanings those who seem to be easily persuaded by these issues and those who were quite resistant on the hill?*

GOLDBERG: It is easy to sort of say Democrats went this way; Republicans went that way. But it wasn't that simple. My recollection is that we had an easier time with Republican members on the Hill than with Democrats who were wringing their hands over human rights issues and were concerned that granting PNTR meant they would lose leverage by threatening annually to penalize the Chinese for their various sins. One of the ways around that was to use the money saved by sun-setting a commission and putting it in to two other commissions that had a China focus. This was the cost of getting Senator Byrd's vote. One of these was the Congressional Executive Commission on China, which was composed of members of Congress and members from the administration; the other was the Economic and Security Review Commission on China, a group of commissioners appointed by members of Congress. With regard to the latter, there were an equal number of Republicans and Democrats, with the chairmanship of that commission as well as the deputy chairmanship being rotated each year or two between the two parties. The Commissions put out a fair number of reports each year and the Chinese always find something to criticize in them. I've always thought it was a pretty good gig to sit on one of these Commissions and ride whatever hobbyhorse you were on in to the sunset.

*Q: So that was sort of the price for moving the process along.*

GOLDBERG: Yes, and as I say they are still around ten years later.

*Q: Now you were on the desk from 1999 to 2001. A number of things happened in the world at that time, but the first thing I want to look at is you have a new administration come in in 2001. Now normally the desks in Washington do transition work in the November, December period before the inauguration. Here you have some very important issues with China, so I would assume this transition business quite occupies the desk.*

GOLDBERG: It does, but you will recall the administration coming in was very critical of the Clinton administration's policy towards China. It brought in people at the Deputy level like Rich Armitage who said it was time to rebalance America's East Asia policy and refocus on Japan. Our colleagues on the Japan desk were under the gun to come up with creative ways we could use to re-establish that relationship. It didn't take long for China to hit the headline, particularly in February, President Bush "mis-speaking" himself – as his press spokesperson said - with respect to defending our ally on Taiwan. Taiwan was not an ally and that led the Chinese in Beijing to conclude that something different was in the offering in terms of the bilateral relationship. Then of course there was the EP-3.

To get back to your question, the transition team – and I think this is true of all transition teams – wanted to find ways to distinguish the incoming Bush administration from the Clinton era and to come up with a new Asia Pacific policy. It's always back to the future in these situations rather than forward and let's build on what we have already. This transition was complicated, as you recall, by an election that was unprecedented in American history. You didn't have the final tally on who would be the next president until mid-December.

*Q: Oh that is right. So the transition team wouldn't be there ready to go.*

GOLDBERG: Exactly, so you are dealing with multiple transition teams and multiple agendas

writing papers that are trying to satisfy – and take in to account – the biases of the next administration. But I do recall that when the decision went for George Bush, the air got sucked out of the China side and we figured that all of the action would go elsewhere in the Asia Pacific – as I say focusing on our alliance structure, re-establishing the U.S.-Japan relationship, emphasizing the competitive aspects of our relationship with China rather than the cooperative ones.

*Q: Now as you were saying on April 1, 2001,, a Chinese air force plane crashed into an American EP-3 off the coast of China and our plane landed on Hainan Island. This started a very intense period of interaction with the Chinese. That certainly would have dominated work on the desk even on the econ side.*

GOLDBERG: Well actually at that point I really wasn't even functioning as an economic officer. During the ten days standoff between the U.S. and China, David Sedney who was the political deputy at that point, and I were a two-man working group switching off every 12 hours and monitoring developments. We had a small office in the operations center. We did nothing but EP-3, coordinating with our people in Beijing. What I would say is that issue largely got resolved at a level well above my pay grade, well above the assistant secretary's pay grade and the undersecretary's pay grade.

*Q: High-level attention you are saying.*

GOLDBERG: Yes. The discussions were among Rich Armitage and Colin Powell, Paul Wolfowitz, at Defense, Condoleezza Rice at the NSC and Joe Prueher, our Ambassador in Beijing. David or I might listen in on some of these conversations but just as often we were excluded. We were very fortunate to have Admiral Prueher in Beijing at that time. He was a former naval aviator and former CinCPAC or Commander in Chief of the Pacific. Prueher had flown EP-3's and knew what the plane was capable of. In a rather dramatic moment he said to Jiang Zemin that the military was misleading him. There was no way that a slow-moving, lumbering plane like the EP-3 could turn sharply into the fighter jet that was being flown by Wang Wei, the Chinese pilot. It was at that point the crisis was defused. Within a matter of weeks, our people came home; the plane didn't come back until much later and it came back in pieces.

*Q: So actually one of the issues here is the level of sophistication or at least briefing of the other side.*

GOLDBERG: Well we always had the feeling that the military people in China withheld the facts about the capabilities of the two planes. Still, there was genuine anger over what had happened. The loss of the plane and the loss of the life of the Chinese pilot, and genuine anger that about the United States pressing its right to patrol waters off of China's coast in order to keep tabs on China's military buildup.

*Q: I presume the Department response to the EP-3 incident was to stand-up a task force?*

GOLDBERG: Well, it really wasn't a task force. It was really more sort of a limited working

group. With a task force, you end up with 15-20 people working as a team around the clock. Oftentimes the task force are formed to ensure the safety of American citizens in difficult situations and to respond to the inquiries of their family members with regard to their whereabouts. A task force has a very large consular presence and lots of interagency coordination. This never got to that point - it was just Sedney and I and maybe one or two others who kept a log of what was going on.

*Q: Did you in the working group end up writing papers or summaries, chronologies, a logbook if you will.*

GOLDBERG: As I said, we certainly kept a log. We did a chronology. We did notes to brief people, but they weren't really for the senior officials. They were for other officials, out of the loop but with a need to know - like the deputy assistant secretary or the assistant secretary.

*Q: Your next assignment in the summer of 2001 is to the economics bureau with whom you had been liaising all along. How did that tour come up?*

GOLDBERG: Well, I got a note from Tony Wayne's executive assistant inquiring about my interest in an EB job - Tony was then the EB assistant secretary and I had worked closely with him during the PNTR battle. I thought it was kind of special, Tony reaching out to me, but in fact, these notes went out to almost every economic officer, because economics jobs at that time went begging. EB was one of those bureaus that had to do a significant amount of recruiting - aggressive recruiting - in order to get its jobs filled. Anyway, I went and talked to Shaun Donnelly who was Tony's principal deputy assistant secretary and he suggested a few jobs. I wasn't sure whether my career was going to continue much past this Washington sojourn and figured it might be a good idea to get some experience dealing with real business issues. So I took the job as the deputy special representative for economic and commercial affairs. There was no special representative the first year I was in the office, so I was effectively running it.

*Q: Now again could you situate that office within the bureau?*

GOLDBERG: Well to be honest about it, it was kind of a marginal office in many respects. There were bigger issues, trade issues, financial issues, monetary issues, and while all of these had an impact on businesses global operations, we were a backwater operation. In addition, we were not really doing policy but coordination and liaison with business. And advocacy. But the lead on advocacy was not CBA, the Commercial and Business Affairs office, but the Advocacy Center over at the Department of Commerce. My second year in the office, there was a special representative - Frank Mermoud - and he liked to travel. So I was still running the office more or less while Frank was handling the politics of putting us on the map. We had a pretty good group of people and we had a lot of autonomy. The first year was higher profile, of course, as I attended the biweekly EB staff meetings as well as the daily meeting with Tony Wayne and the weekly meeting in E with Al Larson. All of which took up a lot of time and which Frank enjoyed. The special representative was kind of lower than a DAS but higher than an office director level.

*Q: So you had people working for you? You were a supervisor.*

GOLDBERG: Yeah, I had five or six people working for me, and that continued even after the special representative came in. They were divided along geographic lines Asia Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe. I had one person who did a small grants program. And we always had interns. We were one of these offices that needed interns because we had so much operational work to do.

*Q: What is behind the name change. You said it was first the deputy representative for commercial and business then a special representative?*

GOLDBERG: I was paneled as the deputy special representative and in the absence of a political person that first year, I was the acting special representative. Then in the second year after Frank arrived, I was his deputy. It was good to have all that exposure the first year, because it gave me credibility within the bureau, within the building, and with the Commerce Department as being someone who could get things done.

*Q: Would you also have touched bases with businesses?*

GOLDBERG: We were constantly in touch with businesses. Whether it was groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the individual business associations, or regional groups that were set up in support of businesses like those in the Asia Pacific. We spent time at the mid levels of all the major corporations; I sat in on most of the meetings that Tony or Al had with senior businesses leaders when they came calling.

*Q: What was their interest? What could State provide these business people?*

GOLDBERG: You know in a lot of business people are risk averse, surprisingly so, they want guarantees of government support and if not of support, then of the government not looking too closely at their actions. We advocated on their behalf when they were looking for contracts and we provided detailed risk analysis of the political climate in a country. Tony Wayne was a political officer and as economic assistant secretary, he was better at big picture briefings than at analyzing the data. He was very generous in terms of including officers who had area expertise in his meetings.

*Q: Now this 2001-2003 tour coincided with the September 11 twin towers attack. You are in an economic business bureau, but did you see any impact from that?*

GOLDBERG: In my second year, I spent an awful lot of time as a member of the Iraq task force group. You may recall the State Department report that was done about the future of Iraq took a much different approach to reconstruction than the one that was adopted – more measured, with more transitions, more capacity building, not leaving the Iraqis to deal with issues that they had no inkling about. I was also involved in working with USAID on coming up with ideas with regard to contracts – the bidding of contracts, including sole source contracts. I helped write some of the rules for the interagency on how contracts would be bid and monitored.

*Q: This is all the work State did in looking at Iraq.*

GOLDBERG: The State study of post-Iraq war scenarios was two volumes. And all for naught in the aftermath of the war, what with Rumsfeld calling looting the “exuberance of liberation” and Bush declaring “Mission Accomplished” when it was no such thing. Had we followed the State blueprint – and here I’m not trying to lay blame on DOD or others who wanted to get in and out as quickly as possible, but their actions certainly were short-sighted - we probably would not have had the kind of problems we have had over the last ten years.

*Q: Now was the seventh floor interested in this work?*

GOLDBERG: Oh yes, very much.

*Q: Did you brief on the seventh floor?*

GOLDBERG: I didn’t. The work that we did was briefed up on the seventh floor, but I personally didn’t brief on the seventh floor.

*Q: You were saying earlier you weren’t quite sure what this job and the Commercial Business Affairs office would provide to you. Two years later as you are leaving what do you think you got out of this assignment?*

GOLDBERG: What I thought I would get going in was contacts that might stand me in good stead later on as I moved into a different career. But what I ended up getting was some hands-on practical knowledge about how business operates and what government can provide to business

*Q: Now in the summer of 2003 you move again but it is back to the China desk.*

GOLDBERG: Yes and it is back to a very different job. It was the other deputy job, the one handling political and personnel issues.

*Q: Well going back to our template, could you describe the desk when you arrived in the summer of 2003. Who is there?*

GOLDBERG: Well let’s see. Joe Donovan was the director. I was his deputy. Chris Marut was Chris there at that time as the economics officer.

On the political side, we had maybe four people and on the economic side there were three people. We had a public affairs officer seconded to the desk – this was the period when every officer was a public diplomacy officer and to show how serious we were about that, we brought PAS into the desk’s activities. So overall, including office management people, the desk was about twelve.

*Q: Who was the deputy assistant secretary the desk reported to?*

GOLDBERG: Randy Schriver, who was very close to Richard Armacost, the Deputy Security. And the assistant secretary was Jim Kelly.

*Q: Since you are literally coming home after a short absence, how did the desk feel to you? What were the atmospherics? What were the policy priorities?*

GOLDBERG: It hadn't really changed that much from what we had been doing before. Again let me reiterate, this was a very operational job. China policy since the Kissinger days has been made over at the NSC, with State Department input. We were fully engaged writing and briefing but always understood where policy was made.

*Q: What were typical duties at this time? An average day?*

GOLDBERG: The first thing we did when we came in in the morning was a daily note to the Assistant Secretary about overnight events in China and Hong Kong. That was latter shared in the building round the interagency community. Some of the issues did require guidance and we would ask for it. The Assistant Secretary then used the items to brief at the Secretary's daily meeting. So that was the first order of business when we came in.

The second order of business was press guidance. In many respects it was updating previous press guidance. But whenever you had something that was unusual or different, you'd churn out and clear a couple of sentences. After clearance, it went on the EAP press office and to the Assistant Secretary's suite by 10:00am. Once all the boxes were checked, our items would be incorporated in the book for the press secretary's noon press briefing. Then of course there were the daily taskings. At night, or throughout the day, we put together the official-formal, which was a series of "private" communications and information sharing with the embassy or the consulates. In those we would also solicit Mission views and opinions or talk about personnel related issues.

*Q: Now in the old days, as they say, that official informal was sent out as a telegram. But at some point State converted to e-mail. Which was it when you were there in 2003?*

GOLDBERG: We started with cable, but by the time I left as Director three years later, everything was in e-mail.

*Q: Now how would you describe the difference of being the deputy political as opposed to being the deputy economic?*

GOLDBERG: A lot of issues were ones I had not addressed previously, especially on the military, security, and intelligence sides of the house. So obviously I had more contact with the NSC and DOD. I had to get smart of some things I hadn't really been involved in before, like security and intelligence. Not that everything was new but the level of detail that you needed to do your job well was greater than before and different.

*Q: Let me back up a tad. How is it that you came back to the desk in the first place?*

GOLDBERG: Well another one of those situations where a lot of the jobs that I had been interested in - and some of them were DCM jobs overseas - went to other people, and it was

getting pretty late to be looking for a job. I spoke to Don Keyser, who was then the DAS for China before becoming PDAS for Korea and Japan and Don asked if I were interested in going back to the desk? I was and I did.

*Q: Excellent. You arrived at the desk in June 2003 during year three of the Bush administration. In the wake of the earlier EP-3 incident and the 9/11 attack on the twin towers, what is now the major attitude toward China?*

GOLDBERG: Well, I think the Bush people had the sense that China could be helpful in the war against terrorists. If we were successful in working together on this, we could develop a broader strategic relationship, one which made it possible to ease our burdens in Afghanistan and Iraq. Also, we could get China to help us forestall Iran's nuclear ambitions or other efforts that were inimical to American interests. Eventually we even persuaded the Chinese to help us deal with North Korea's nuclear program. When I was on the desk, Jim Kelly had a famous meeting with his NK counterparts where they acknowledged they were in possession of nuclear capability that could lead to a bomb. There was great anger and hostility as the North Koreans, not surprisingly, had taken advantage of the United States, not honored the agreements of the early 1990s about not embarking on a nuclear program that was aimed at weapons development.

*Q: You were talking about liaising with China to tell the Iranians to behave themselves. This must have been difficult when the Iranians were encircled. They had American troops in Iraq and American troops in Afghanistan. How successful do you think the Chinese might have been?*

GOLDBERG: The Chinese were interested throughout this period in keeping America preoccupied in the Middle East/South Asia/the "-stans" so that the focus would not be on China. It didn't cost the Chinese anything to say "sure we will be helpful" and then not deliver or deliver minimally; alternatively, they could and did resort to their policy of non-interference and just state that they were not going to do anything which interfered with another nation's right to self-determination. A lot of our discussions were repetitive; they certainly didn't move us forward in a positive direction, and personally, I think we were unrealistic in our expectations, even slight as they were. But given the situation, the dire situation we found ourselves in and with people thinking that China was a potential ally, the conversation went on. I think we spent far too much time assuming they would help.

*Q: I would presume as head of the political side of the house you had a fairly decent interaction with the Chinese embassy during this assignment. Any particular regular contacts? What level were you interacting with?*

GOLDBERG: As director, I interacted at the political counselor level. As deputy, with an odd assortment of lower level officials. The Chinese mission in Washington – as with missions throughout the world – was really pretty rank conscious. Political counselors preferred dealing with the director, the DCM with the DAS and the ambassador with the Assistant Secretary and above. We had the occasional social get together with the Chinese. Very scripted and formal. There was always a degree of wariness.

*Q: Now were they still in their old embassy?*

GOLDBERG: Yes. They didn't open their new embassy until 2008, the same year we opened ours.

*Q: Now, you have interacted with Chinese over a few years now. What assumptions or observations were you making about the caliber of their diplomatic people that you meet?*

GOLDBERG: Given the importance of the United States, many of their best diplomats were in the North American bureau. They had people who were increasingly better language qualified, better informed about the United States than their predecessors, and certainly far more polished. It doesn't mean that they were any more desirous of having personal relationships. They were cautious – there was, in their view, potential for them to be compromised or be perceived as compromised by their colleagues, being too close to the Americans. But they were certainly getting a better caliber of officer at their Embassy in Washington and their consulates elsewhere in the U.S.

*Q: Do you remember anybody particularly who was outstanding?*

GOLDBERG: Certainly He Yafei, political counselor and DCM who went back to China and became a Vice Minister focusing on North American affairs. He is now Ambassador to Geneva. Their DCM Liu Xiaoming, who was probably more impressed with himself than other people were with him, but he knew his stuff. He became Ambassador to North Korea and is now their Ambassador in London. The Ambassador to the U.S. at the time was Li Zhaoxing and he represented more the old way of doing business than the new; he became Foreign Minister. Xie Feng, who is now their DCM, was here as was my counterpart in Beijing when I was DCM, Zheng Zeguang. They had some up and coming people who were bright, highly motivated, and interested in the relationship.

*Q: Now I would assume since you are on the political side of things, you have some sort of watch on Taiwan issues. Mike Meserve is in regional affairs doing Taiwan at this time. How did things Taiwan come to your attention?*

GOLDBERG: Joe and Mike would meet two or three times a week formally with the Deputy Assistant Secretary and more often informally. I had a good relationship, at the time, with Mike and often went to his office – down the hall – to talk. Mike had two people working with him, but coordination was extremely good. Given the importance of the issue, you had to have a keen sense of the issues on both sides of the strait how developments would play domestically in the U.S. There was also a lot of coordination with Congressional affairs on Taiwan-related issues.

*Q: Such as?*

GOLDBERG: Oh, who to brief up on the hill. How to brief them. When to brief them.

*Q: What would you say were the main issues during this assignment from 2003 to 2006?*

GOLDBERG: We didn't have anything like the Belgrade bombing or the EP-3 incident, that is

events that sort of set the relationship backward in dramatic fashion. Or move it dramatically forward. For the last six years of the Bush administration, we had a relationship that was on a reasonably positive trajectory.

*Q: Speaking of operational things, you were mentioning that in July of 2005 you became the director. How did that come about?*

GOLDBERG: Originally I was going to language training that year before going out as Consul General in Guangzhou. A couple of people who might have been interested in the Director job passed on it. Randy Schriver asked me if I was interested in doing the job and I said yes. I figured whatever language I really needed to brush up on I could do that while I was out in Guangzhou. It turned out that wasn't the case and I could have used a year review, but certainly I don't regret the time I spent as Director. I think it made me a better manager my last five years in the Service.

*Q: So you would have been assigned to Guangzhou already by 2005?*

GOLDBERG: Yes. I was already assigned to language training. So before Guangzhou, I was supposed to have a year of language training.

*Q: So actually the Director job was an extension of your two year tour.*

GOLDBERG: Well you could look at it that way but you have to be formally paneled into the Director job. It was a different number, a different code. I was paneled for a one year tour. Since that was my seventh consecutive year in Washington, I had to get formal approval from the Director General's office to be in stateside that long.

*Q: Oh that is right. State had a regulation you are only supposed to be back in Washington for a set period of time, Five years?*

GOLDBERG: At that time it was six. Now it is five. So I moved up. Randy left and Jim Keith came in as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for China in EAP.

*Q: What was Jim like to work for?*

GOLDBERG: Very substantive and policy savvy. Very good relations on the seventh floor. He was close to Chris Padilla who was Bob Zoellick's executive assistant and spent a lot of time with Zoellick as well. Jim was often called upon to fill in for Chris Hill, the Assistant Secretary, when Hill was otherwise engaged on North Korean issues.

*Q: Now as Director it would have ratcheted up your contacts at the Chinese embassy.*

GOLDBERG: Exactly, so the political counselor at the time was always in the office or on the phone – that was Jia Xiudong. Periodically I would meet with the DCM when I was acting in Jim's capacity and I had more opportunities to meet with Chinese delegations.

*Q: Any particular issues came up during your directorship?*

GOLDBERG: You know the interesting thing is the further up you go the more the personnel issues become important. I dealt with more personnel issues as Director than I did as Deputy Director. So there were efforts to put the right people in the right places, and then there were efforts aimed at getting the wrong people out of where they were. I guess the major event of my time as Director was Hu Jintao's visit to the U.S. and how it was marred in some ways by referring to the PRC as the Republic of China (i.e., Taiwan) and a Falun Gong journalist shouting slogans at Hu during a White House ceremony.

*Q: Now you were saying that through language you were to be assigned as Consul General in Guangzhou. Was that going to be Mandarin or Cantonese?*

GOLDBERG: No, it was going to be Mandarin. Cantonese was a bridge too far for me personally. When I left the desk, I did take six weeks of language training. When I was in Guangzhou, I used speeches as language learning opportunities, forcing myself to practice my delivery and reading the remarks in Chinese characters rather than having them Romanized for me. That enhanced my ability to engage directly in Chinese.

*Q: Now the Consul General in Guangzhou is the largest of the five CGs, isn't that right?*

GOLDBERG: Actually Shanghai was and I think is still larger in terms of personnel numbers. But the thing about Guangzhou that is notable is that it handles all of the immigration work China wide. People who were actually immigrating to the U.S. were processed – lovely word – in Guangzhou. So we had the full range of consular service, immigrant, non-immigrant, American citizen services, fraud prevention and adoptions - what have you. The largest component of the mission was devoted to consular.

*Q: Actually that part of China is the traditional source of overseas Chinese.*

GOLDBERG: Yes. But increasingly Chinese are emigrating from places throughout China, not just Guangzhou and Fujian, so we would see people from central China like Hunan and Hubei, for example, and from the north, Shanghai and Beijing. But the reason for having all immigration services in Guangzhou, as you point out, was that traditionally immigration had come from that area.

*Q: Now what was the consular district?*

GOLDBERG: The consular district was Guangzhou, Fujian, Hainan and Guangxi provinces.

*Q: And did you get a chance to travel to all of those provinces?*

GOLDBERG: Oh yes, actually I tried to get to them three times a year. I didn't go to Hainan that much. But I did spend a fair amount of time in Fujian and in Guangxi. In part, aside from the importance of just getting out and showing the flag, the reason for that travel was to establish virtual presence posts. These are not consulates per se but recognition that a city or an area was a

target of opportunity and we should be visiting frequently. We had three VPPs: Nanning in Guangxi, Xiamen and Fuzhou in Fujian. So I was traveling in those two provinces extensively. In my second year, we established the Nanning VPP on the Fourth of July and in my last year, we did the same – on the Fourth – in Xiamen. It was important for us to reach out beyond Guangzhou, the consular city in which we were based, to other major cities in China, especially to communities that we thought might be receptive to an American presence and an American message.

*Q: How did that work out?*

GOLDBERG: Pretty well. But these things tend to lose focus unless you really tend them. So although countrywide I think there were a dozen VPPs, only a few were really successful – and I think Xiamen and Nanning were among them. We did Fuzhou because the Mayor of that city, the capital of Fujian province, was unhappy that we would focus on Xiamen, a city of two and a half million people rather than Fuzhou which had four-plus million. Also, at an earlier time, we had thought that we might put a consulate in Xiamen.

*Q: Now getting back to the consulate in Guangzhou, what sections do you have there and who is working for you?*

GOLDBERG: Well we had a full complement of State department officers – pol/econ/consular/management/public affairs. We had a commercial officer, soon to be two officers. We had an agricultural officer. We had somebody from the Department of Homeland Security. We had a Patent and Trademarks Office person. Technically, he was under the commercial office but we treated him as a separate office. All were members of my small country team in Guangzhou.

*Q: And who was your political and economic chiefs?*

GOLDBERG: When I first got there the political chief was Jim Turner and after that it was Steve Lang. Steve is now the Deputy Director on the China desk.

*Q: Back up in Beijing the ambassador is Clark Randt, and Dave Sedney is DCM.*

GOLDBERG: Yes. David was there, an old friend who was very supportive of what we were doing.

*Q: Now one of the interesting things about your consular district is Fujian province, from which the people on Taiwan actually emigrated from. So I suppose you were reporting on Fujian in terms of Taiwan investment, tourism.*

GOLDBERG: We would spend time whenever we went to Xiamen city at the Taiwan Research Institute of Xiamen University. We got to know the scholars there really well. We also met with the Taiwan associations anywhere we went in Fujian; also in major cities in Guangdong and Guangxi, which also had a significant Taiwan presence. Our reporting – our ground truth version of what was actually happening in cross-Strait business and trade was very good. We didn't cross

over into policy lines but we could see for ourselves the increasing economic integration and Taiwan's growing economic dependency.

*Q: There was a considerable amount of Taiwan investment in that area?*

GOLDBERG: Everywhere in the south. Guangxi province, for example, was trying to attract Taiwan investment into the hinterlands and part of the long-range Guangxi infrastructure development project related to getting goods to market, accessing ports in Guangzhou and Shenzhen by building roads and railways.

*Q: Now as the senior officer at the mission you must have had fairly extensive contacts both in the provincial administrations and the party organizations?*

GOLDBERG: No, not the party. They weren't terribly interested. I had nothing much to offer in their view. So my contacts were mostly with the provincial government. But even there, the provincial governors weren't interested in seeing me either so I was relegated to a vice governor. Others in the mission were lucky if they saw directors general. The Chinese really low-balled us, even as they – as I've said before – had access to senior officials in the U.S. Their senior people did often roll out the red carpet for major American business and trade groups. That was money, after all.

*Q: What was the nature of the reluctance? Did they have the capability to interact, language?*

GOLDBERG: They just weren't interested. I don't know what Gary Locke's experience is, but I know that Sandy Randt, Jon Huntsman, Jim Sasser, Joe Prueher, they were all frustrated that the only people they saw were "vice" something or other - a vice minister of foreign affairs, a vice minister of commerce – when they had an issue of consequence.

*Q: Now Guangzhou has a fair sized foreign diplomatic community.*

GOLDBERG: Yes. When we were there it went from about 22 missions to 32. A significant increase. I am not sure how many they have there now. It could very well be the same because a couple of missions like Sweden closed up shop and a few have opened. But we did end up with a very significant foreign mission presence.

*Q: Now did all those missions have fairly equal or unequal contact with the Chinese?*

GOLDBERG: Absolutely. Everybody was frustrated. I remember a meeting with Party Secretary Zhang Dejiang when he was in Guangdong. Once a year he would meet with members of the diplomatic community and that was it. So overall there was great frustration on our part in terms of our inability to engage at the most senior levels.

*Q: Let me ask you an operational question. With that size of foreign diplomatic community, was there an international school?*

GOLDBERG: Yes. There was the Guangdong Guangzhou American school, but it was an

international school.

*Q: And did you have some fairly significant responsibilities for the administration of the school?*

GOLDBERG: During the first two years, I sat on the board as the U.S. representative, and then in my third year I delegated that to my administrative counselor.

*Q: What was the international school like?*

GOLDBERG: It was not bad. During this period, we were considering plans for and then building a new school in one of the suburbs of Guangzhou. Most parents you talked to thought their kids got a good education. As you went higher up in the grades in the school the number of Americans as such was significantly reduced. The largest contingent of students at the school was Korean.

*Q: Speaking of new buildings, didn't the consulate at Guangzhou move out of the hotel at one point, had they already moved out?*

GOLDBERG: No, that is the new mission. We were in the old Esso Tower near the White Swan Hotel. The mission is still there. A lot of the work I did was associated with building the new consulate, which is scheduled to open next year.

*Q: How did those negotiations go?*

GOLDBERG: Very difficult. Reciprocity was very important. When you got an agreement at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs level, you would be back at square one dealing with the local regulators. So we had teams out all the time meeting with the Chinese on design, and trying to come to terms with an ever changing set of regulations, which the Chinese told us were unchanging. When I was there we had cleared the grounds in the area that the building will occupy in Zhujiang Xincheng, the new city along the Zhujiang River. But we had not formally broken ground. Ground was broken when I was in Beijing as DCM.

*Q: What is the new facility going to look like?*

GOLDBERG: A state of the art building. It will be a secure facility with the appropriate setbacks that were mandated by the Inman Commission after the Africa bombings in late 1990. It will be a very open facility, with a great hall leading into the consular area. There will be an atrium, similar to the atrium in the Beijing Embassy. The flow-through looks very good particularly on the consular side of the house. It is a facility that allows for an increase in the number of Americans and Chinese who are working in Guangzhou. It can accommodate up to about 325 people total.

*Q: There was an story on the NBC 10:00 news program last night about visas from China and how everybody had to go to the five consulates to even apply and there was terrible delays and what not. Were those kinds of delays and heavy workload the case while you were there?*

GOLDBERG: Heavy workloads yes. But I think the carping about this has gotten significantly greater my last year in Guangzhou and then the year and a half I was in Beijing, when in fact the process has been simplified and efforts are made to be more accommodating. Still, absent more officers – and that has happened – there are long waiting times. In Guangzhou and Beijing, one of the significant reforms was the decision that a person did not have to apply in his or her consular district but in fact could, if the wait time was too long in one place, he or she could go to another consular district where the wait time was shorter.

*Q: Now I assume you have hosted the ambassadors' field trips down to your consular area?*

GOLDBERG: Yeah. We had Sandy Randt down there three times during the period I was there.

*Q: And what would those be like in terms of work for the consulate and what was going on?*

GOLDBERG: Well they would give us a list of people they hoped to see and a list of events they were interested in our setting up for them. Randt was able to see the Party Secretary, Wang Yang, and that was the first and only time I saw Wang in an American scheduled meeting. I saw Wang only one other time after that with a group of other diplomats. Having the Ambassador visit mean putting together a considerable number of briefing papers, updating contacts preparing for Q's and A's [questions and answers] and things like that. But having the ambassador did provide a greater degree of access and opportunities for having dialogues that we would not have otherwise have had.

*Q: I have in the back of my mind that Guangzhou is responsible for almost half of China's GDP.*

GOLDBERG: Probably less. Probably Guangdong and Fujian together account for 1/3. I am not sure that it is still that high.

*Q: You would have done some extensive economic reporting.*

GOLDBERG: Yeah we did. It was really economic reporting on the Pearl River delta area, the area between Guangzhou and Shenzhen area. Then we did reporting on the Xiamen-Fuzhou corridor in Fujian and what was happening there as well.

*Q: Connecting money to investment is important to business. Were you also looking at the banking system and making judgments about it?*

GOLDBERG: The banking, I mean we did that basically through our American contacts. The local Chinese bankers weren't all that interested in meeting with us. I did get to know Frank Newman quite well. Frank was a former American Deputy Secretary of the Treasury who became a senior administrator at the Shenzhen Development Bank. We did have some contacts with the China Development Bank as well and the China Merchants Bank. None of these were major policy banks in China, whose local subsidiaries had nothing to do with us. So whatever we might have learned about the banking community came from our contacts with foreign bankers who were there. And even they were guarded.

*Q: Now Shenzhen was one of the original special economic zones. You are there almost 20 years later. Has it been subsumed, overwhelmed? How are the Chinese planning their economic expansion?*

GOLDBERG: Well, Shenzhen has not been overwhelmed or subsumed in any way shape or form. Shenzhen was never really under the Guangdong provincial government authority. It always reported directly to Beijing. Beijing continued to have a vested interest in Shenzhen's success and cross-border interaction with Hong Kong and whatever else they might be able to do this area. Shenzhen today is a city of seven-to-nine million people, has reasonably sophisticated financial services and telecommunications, with Huawei and ZTE campuses in the city.

*Q: Now you have the consulate in Hong Kong next door. What was your relationship with them?*

GOLDBERG: Starting in early 2009, we were doing more joint reporting, more cross border traveling. As a result, we were doing a better job of telling the story of what was happening in south China. In fact, we also had an MOU with Taiwan with regard to travel of Taiwan officers on the mainland and in Hong Kong.

*Q: What kinds of things were being observed that impacted on the mainland and in Hong Kong businesswise? I have in mind reports that Hong Kong was moving its small manufacturing into Guangdong and as was Taiwan so I assumed you would be reporting back and forth on Hong Kong XYZ Company....*

GOLDBERG: They moved the manufacturing out of Hong Kong well before I got to Guangzhou. When I went to Hong Kong, Joe Donovan would host events for me and the consulate would arrange some meetings. We would see business people who had thrown in their lot with the mainland government; their entire business operation had already been moved across the border. A lot of the Taiwan businesses who were in Hong Kong had made a similar migration, retaining the back end, sales and finance in Hong Kong, but moving the whole manufacturing operation to Guangdong, and to a lesser extent Fujian. Also increasingly large numbers of Taiwanese – many of them former military from pre-revolution days, others businesspeople pure and simple - were settling down in Shanghai.

*Q: Now you had been stationed in Hong Kong many years before. From this perspective in 2006-2007, what differences did you see? Of course you are on the other side of the border now but does Hong Kong look to you?*

GOLDBERG: The biggest difference was that while there was the appearance of freedom of expression and dialogue, it was also clear that many people would not say what they thought about some of the changes for fear of offending the ruling authorities. Papers that used to be critical were self-censoring.

*Q: How useful was the press you were reading in Guangzhou?*

GOLDBERG: Ahh. Good question. If you read the standard national papers, you questioned what they wrote about south China. But you also had papers like the Southern Weekend which

often would report on issues that were critical of the mainland policy. They sometimes crossed the line; editors were fired or journalists who were imprisoned or detained for periods of time. You could do an article that was critical of something going on in another province or another locality outside Guangdong province, as sort of exposé. It was always clear to the casual reader in Guangdong or Guangzhou the real target was either the provincial governor or the mayor or deputy mayor of Guangzhou who were doing the same things. These investigations were chosen at random.

*Q: What was our political reporting on governance or ethics?*

GOLDBERG: We had a couple of delegations in Guangzhou looking at governance and ethical issues. We also had groups looking at rule of law. Beijing University established a law school on its campus in Shenzhen, which taught American jurisprudence rather than the European. That got a lot of play, i.e., training lawyers in a different legal tradition. But for the most part we ended up being unable to verify much of the corruption going on around us and ended up reporting rumors rather than facts or coming up with real case studies. We had a better than average handle on what was going on in Shenzhen where almost every mayor or deputy mayor was called to Beijing and placed under administrative detention. It was easy to be corrupt in Shenzhen

*Q: Let me move on to something else. You should have a fairly major USIA (U.S. Information Agency) program and outreach. What did that look like?*

GOLDBERG: We had two really good people handling our public diplomacy. Darcy Zotter whom I had known in Beijing ten years before worked for me first and was followed by Paladino who had served on the China desk when I was there. I spoke at a lot of events, opened some exhibitions, fronted for some musical groups that came out. We had some seminars etc. All-in-all, it was a very well-run operation at a time when the mantra was every officer a public diplomacy officer.

*Q: Was there a USIA library?*

GOLDBERG: There was one attached to the USIA office that Chinese could use, but it wasn't terribly large. It was mostly periodicals and journals. We had a couple of computer terminals where people could access information.

*Q: How was the funding for that? Was that always a problem for the USIA program?*

GOLDBERG: You could always use more, but I don't think we were ever in a situation where we could not do a program because we didn't have the money during the three years I was there.

*Q: Let me go back to something else. We are talking about an ambassadorial visit. At the time you were there, were those visits just to Guangzhou or to the other provinces?*

GOLDBERG: I never traveled in Fujian or Guangxi with Sandy Randt. He only came to Guangzhou or Shenzhen.

*Q: Actually one major event happens at the time you were there. In 2008 the Chinese hosted the Olympic Games. That must have been very exciting for them.*

GOLDBERG: Well that really was a Beijing-centric event in almost all respects. As far as Guangzhou was concerned, they were looking towards the Asian Olympics, which the city hosted in 2010. People watched these events on television but you didn't get the same sense of excitement you got up in Beijing.

*Q: Anything else about Guangzhou that we haven't touched on?*

GOLDBERG: Well I would say just one other thing and then why don't we bring today's session to a close. There was an awful lot of illegal immigration and people smuggling. We organized a group of six consuls general to address those issues as a group. While I was in Guangzhou, I organized our team of CGs for a trip to Fuzhou to talk to the vice governor, the mayor of Fuzhou and immigration officials about ways we might cooperate in order to meet the challenges of illegal immigration.

*Q: And they were seized with that?*

GOLDBERG: They weren't as seized with it as we were. We were seized with it but they were not. My successor, Brian Goldbeck, continued the program.

*Q: Now one of the programs that you would have controlled down there was the international visitors program I assume.*

GOLDBERG: We contributed to the International Visitors Program by coming up with lists of people from our consular district who we thought might benefit from the travel and work/study experience.

*Q: Were you fairly successful in getting your nominees accepted by the program.*

GOLDBERG: Yes. All of our nominees were accepted by Beijing. We always provided a significant list of alternates and many of them were chosen as well. The only limitation was whether the Chinese would allow the people we chose to go on these programs. Those who didn't go despite being chosen would plead they couldn't go for work reasons. However, it was often the case that they could just not get permission from their unit to participate.

*Q: So we are not only talking about civil society types but government people.*

GOLDBERG: Yes.

*Q: Was there any particularly successful IV grantee who came back and said, "Wow?"*

GOLDBERG: We had some bloggers who went, who blogged about their trip. We had some people who went in and came back less enthusiastic about the relationship as a result of some of the things they saw, a sense that China's time was coming and America was in decline.

*Q: Interesting. Like what?*

GOLDBERG: They were critical of mass consumerism, American values, television programs, sex, clothing, you name it, so much of it was cultural. We had one conversation with a returnee about whether China was ready to have a dramatic rethink of its political system and move toward real representative government. He said it wasn't important to have representative government, what was needed was to make officials more accountable for their actions.

*Q: Bob we have got a big part coming, Embassy Beijing, 2009-20011.*

GOLDBERG: Well the first question to ask is how did I even get this job?

*Q: That is right because DCM jobs are special and important.*

GOLDBERG: I was lucky. The DCM, Dan Piccuta, a good friend, was planning to curtail and retire. I was already paneled into a job working in the office of the Inspector General. Dan asked me and a few others whether we might consider coming to Beijing. Frankly it was one of those jobs you just can't turn down. Having been in Beijing in the 90s, having worked so many years on the China desk, and then having traveled to Beijing many times over the course of three years as Consul General in Guangzhou, I knew there were a lot of challenges and I thought I was more than capable of handling them. I had some support in the EAP front office and good recommendations from Dan and others.

Jon Huntsman had already been chosen as ambassador and was going through the confirmation process. When I contacted him and asked if he wanted to do an interview, he said no. He was comfortable with whatever decision EAP and the State Department personnel office made. I landed in Beijing on July 5, and was Chargé for the first six and a half weeks I was there. The first issue that confronted me on the day that I arrived was the uprising in Xinjiang province and whether or not I would send our officers, two military and two State Department officers in to harm's way in order to monitor the situation.

*Q: Was that the embassy's call?*

GOLDBERG: It was the embassy's call. We informed Washington of our intentions, but did not ask permission. We already had officers on the plane at that point. I guess if there had been any pushback out of Washington we would have reversed course. But none of us thought there would be because the demand for information was very strong. We just went ahead and did it.

*Q: Now were these officers from the embassy in Beijing or from one of the consulates?*

GOLDBERG: Just Beijing. Xinjiang, even though so far to the west, was in the Beijing consular district.

*Q: Now how did you hear about these disturbances in that area?*

GOLDBERG: It was already in the news. CNN always trumps anything we do in terms of getting the story out. But then hopefully we do our job in terms of getting the details and the story behind the story right. We also do pretty well on analysis that might be useful to policy people in Washington. That is why you need people on the ground.

*Q: Now, did Chinese authorities need to approve this?*

GOLDBERG: We didn't even bother with that. Had we asked, we would have tipped our hand and been told the situation was too volatile and no one could vouch for our protection.

*Q: Who headed the team, do you recall?*

GOLDBERG: Well what we did initially was send down a couple of very low-level officers under guise of doing our standard consular services package. In other words, we were making sure that American citizens in the area we were serving were safe. We did get inquiries about their welfare and we needed to account for them. We sent one consular officer and one political officer down. And, as I said, we also dispatched two military officers, who were there to observe military movements. We did that over a period of about six weeks alternating teams every week to ten days. Then they would come back and be debriefed. While there, they would phone in messages or send us e-mails which we turned into sitreps or situation reports on a daily and sometimes twice daily basis. When they returned they would do a more in depth cable. The military officers did the same through their system.

*Q: Now did our team members get to talk to local officials or not?*

GOLDBERG: Not very much. In fact once it was clear what we were doing, they were followed. There were a couple of times they were warned away from certain areas which were problematic in terms of their security.

*Q: And what conclusion did the Embassy come about this event?*

GOLDBERG: In the beginning, foreign reporters called the situation a home grown or domestic reaction by disadvantaged Uighurs to Chinese policies. In some places in Xinjiang, Han majorities of over 70 percent were controlling business; Uighurs were nowhere to be seen and few were benefiting from economic development in the area. Clearly the policy out of Beijing was to Sinicize the area – just as in Tibet or the Tibetan areas of Sichuan. But ultimately our conclusion was there was considerable outsider or outside the country involvement, with financial and arms support for the uprisings.

*Q: Umm mmm. I can remember from my own studies when the Qing dynasty fell, up to then Manchuria had been off limits to Han Chinese. Afterward, Han Chinese farmers looking for open fields and better prospects flooded into Manchuria.*

GOLDBERG: In any case it was quite a challenge, but for me as DCM the decision to send them was not a difficult call and officers wanted to go. We had no dearth of volunteers. For the first two weeks I was in Beijing, I would get calls, maybe three times a week, from the Chinese

foreign ministry, usually at 10:30 at night to come in and receive a demarche at 11:30. They were always doing me a favor they said by providing me with information that was strictly confidential – confidential that is until the stroke of midnight when it would be out in the New China News Agency. Those demarches also ended with the Chinese expressing hope that the U.S. wouldn't be involved in the events that were unfolding in Xinjiang and that the U.S. wouldn't comment unfavorably or characterize Beijing actions as human rights abuses, that we would understand the Chinese were doing everything possible to prevent the violence from escalating

*Q: Now you said that the team out there would sometimes report back by e-mail.*

GOLDBERG: If not by e-mail, then by blackberry or telephone. When it became clear that the U.S. was not condemning the Chinese but urging a cessation of the violence and trying to assist in finding an accommodation between Chinese and Uighur interests, then there was less blocking of communications between the Embassy and those in the field.

*Q: Now let's go back to the Embassy as you arrive there. This is a major American diplomatic establishment and certainly has more agencies than just the State Department present. Could you talk about how large the embassy was and how it was organized?*

GOLDBERG: Well mission-wide, there was an Embassy and five consulates. We consider Wuhan to be a consulate although it had not been planned to set it up as such – we did at that point have the right to open a fifth consulate and had chosen not to do it earlier. Our hand was forced between under the Vienna convention if you have a diplomat permanently stationed somewhere, then you need to have a consulate. We had about 2000 Chinese and Americans countrywide working for us. The Embassy when I got there had about 31 or 32 agencies. Every agency wanted to be there. We had agencies that had no presence elsewhere globally like the Food and Drug Administration, which had a total of eight people in country. So it was very big. You tend to think country team meetings are small and compact, an opportunity to engage in depth on some specific issue. But for our country team meetings, we might have as many as 35 people sitting in a secure area with a very limited amount of time to brief on their activities.

*Q: Well it sort of illustrates the depth and breadth of the issues on which we interact with the Chinese. You said the Food and Drug Administration was there.*

GOLDBERG: Yes, when I was Desk Director, I had participated in conversations with regard to opening the FDA. Guangzhou and Shanghai were the two consulates in which an FDA presence was approved. We spent about a year or so changing the layout of three floors in Guangzhou consulate so that we could accommodate the FDA presence and its need for a lab for testing. As you say, the FDA's presence does illustrate the breadth and depth of the relationship and how many issues we were involved in. On the FDA side alone, we had Heparin adulteration, the Melamine milk scandal, some pharmaceutical issues. All were matters on which we felt it necessary to engage the Chinese in country.

*Q: Now did the Chinese have a counterpart organization to the FDA?*

GOLDBERG: Whenever you set up one of these offices, there is always a memorandum of understanding that provides reciprocity. I'm not sure what the Chinese have done in this regard.

*Q: About the time you arrived there or maybe earlier the Chinese had another Swine flu outbreak. Of course, they responded to it much differently than the earlier SARS outbreak. I think I read articles about tourists being tested right at the airport to see what their temperature was.*

GOLDBERG: Right and if they had a temperature or some evidence of illness then they were confined for a period of anywhere from seven to ten days. This created some problems for us, not just our citizens being quarantined but the need to respond to public inquiries about what was going on. We had to have our consular officers over to the hotels and hospitals where people were confined. The Chinese were operating from a zero tolerance non-science based position. It was as if they were seeking to hermetically seal the country off from any illness. Interestingly, their course of action was popular with the Chinese public.

*Q: And of course you are just saying this would involve the consular officers doing citizen services.*

GOLDBERG: It ate up a lot of time.

*Q: How big a consular section did we have?*

GOLDBERG: China wide we issued hundreds of thousands of visas a year. So it was a substantial operation. We had 40 or 50 Chinese and Americans or more working on visas and American services.

*Q: Now how was that visa situation because from 9/11 there had been new rules and it slowed the process down. Was that impacting on your situation in China?*

GOLDBERG: Post-9/11, many countries thought the United States was closing its borders. Actually we were redefining ways in which the United States could make its borders more secure but we didn't do a very good job of explaining what we were up to. We had a one size fits all because you don't tailor your visa policy to any one country; it is designed to be worldwide. Our visa issuances while I was in Beijing increased dramatically; this was true of all of China. By the time I left in January 2011, we were issuing well in excess of 80% on an adjusted basis. But our rep on the street was that visas were somehow difficult to get. In fact, our bias was towards issuance and not towards denial.

*Q: Speaking of some of the interesting organizations that were at the embassy at the time, I am looking at the list. DHS [Department of Homeland Security] was there. DHSCIS [Citizenship and Immigration Services], DHSICE [Immigrant and Customs Enforcement], what were they doing?*

GOLDBERG: CIS was also in Guangzhou and Shanghai looking at what was called visas 1992, or those given to family following to join people who have refugee status in the States. CIS was evaluating and processing family members. In some instances family members weren't really

real family members, but individuals paying the people in the States to put them on an application. This could cost you anywhere from \$25,000 to \$50,000 if you were successful in getting your name on the list. So we had a lot of people at DHS following this very closely as to whether or not people were in the appropriate legal status. But they also did some other things in terms of liaison with the Chinese on immigration and customs and border issues.

*Q: So in fact they were in liaison with the Chinese on some of these other issues sharing their expertise. At the time I was there, there were an outstanding group of officers in the defense attaché office. I think General (Charles) Hooper was there at the time that you were there. What were their responsibilities?*

GOLDBERG: General Hooper had left before I got there. I saw him I guess in April or May, but he had been replaced by Brad Gehrke, a rear admiral, by the time I arrived.

*Q: What was DAO's contribution to the mission and their liaison with their Chinese counterparts?*

GOLDBERG: Their mission was threefold. First they were trying to build relationships military to military. This was difficult as the Chinese military held them at arm's length first because of our Taiwan policy and then later because of differences over navigation in the South China Sea. Their second function was an intelligence one. Their officers traveled around the country doing direct observation of military installations if possible (and it was not all that possible frankly) and collecting information from people along the way. Then the third function was working within the mission to advise us in general about what is going on. They also coordinated with other elements of the mission that had intel functions.

*Q: Now at this time how were we ranking the Embassy in size? It was one of the larger ones wasn't it?*

GOLDBERG: Yeah, I think it was number two.

*Q: Now you are there; you are chargé. That is kind of a tough way to start an assignment. You don't even get a chance to know where the bodies are before you have to start directing them around. But Ambassador Huntsman comes in. How did he see his role and how did you two work together to run the embassy?*

GOLDBERG: Well it was always clear from day one that the Ambassador was the policy guy, the public face of the mission, and that I was the mission manager. But he was very generous in including me in any meetings that I wanted to be included in. It was always clear mission-wide that anything substantive that went to the ambassador for approval or consideration as part of his overall activities and agenda passed through the DCM's office. That is normally the way that it operates. We had a very good relationship from day one. He came in fully briefed. He had ideas about things he wanted to do from the moment he arrived. A lot of our activities were pointed toward the President's visit at the end of the year. So we convened a series of meetings and hosted any number of delegations really with eyes towards making that visit a success.

*Q: Now actually Ambassador Huntsman has been an ambassador before.*

GOLDBERG: Twice. He had been Ambassador to Singapore when he was 30 during Bush I and he was also Ambassador and Deputy U.S. Trade Representative for Asia during Bush II. So he came fully conversant on all issues. While he was engaged on all fronts, he took a special interest in the economic working group. We formed a working group – replicating the interagency group in Washington – so that we could come up with ideas on how to expand our commercial presence and resolve trade conflicts, which are endemic in any relationship of this size. Our objective was to advise Washington on the best ways to create opportunities for American businesses and jobs for American workers.

*Q: Then in late October 2009, Commerce Secretary Locke, USTR Kirk and a group went to Guangzhou for the U.S. China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade. That is a pretty high level delegation. Is that trade commission particularly active?*

GOLDBERG: Yes. It has been around for a quarter of a century, meeting annually at the top level, once or twice a year at the deputy level and constantly at the assistant level. It was designed to handle the day-to-day operational aspects of the trade and commercial relationship. The annual Strategic and Economic dialogue in contrast is supposed to look at the broader conceptual issues that further bilateral trade interests or bedevil them.

*Q: What were some of the major economic issues that arose during this assignment?*

GOLDBERG: Pretty much the same thing as any other time during the last decade. Access to markets, transparency issues, intellectual property rights, financial services, banking and insurance, capacity building. One of the issues that was hard to get a grip on was “indigenous innovation.” It appeared that the Chinese were only going to allow domestic companies to bid for government programs and that were going to give favorable, if not exclusive, consideration to domestic companies in a whole host of things from telecommunications to infrastructure. These domestic companies, by virtue of dominating the domestic Chinese market, would acquire the know-how and skills to be global in scope and the very bigness of China would dictate that China set new rules for standards and regulations. Indigenous innovation was characterized as one of the “new” developments that we had to address, but in fact, it wasn’t as new as a lot of people made it out to be. It was pretty much how they operated most of the time.

*Q: Actually I notice that the time you were there the Rio Tinto scandal popped up. What was at stake there?*

GOLDBERG: For us, insofar as the arrests of the Rio Tinto employees were concerned, nothing. We weren’t involved in providing iron ore to the Chinese and Rio and the others that were involved are not American firms. Rio’s employees, among them Stern Hu, who was arrested with a couple of Chinese employees, is Australian. Our Australian colleagues were most under the gun wavering between wanting to be supportive if this were an injustice but they were outraged when they found out that the bribery allegations were true. From a broader perspective, the Rio arrests sent a chilling message to all companies about the scrutiny they were being subjected to from Chinese authorities. What saved the U.S. companies was the Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act, which makes it illegal, punishable by a fine and imprisonment, for American companies to bribe or act in a corrupt fashion overseas.

*Q: What were some of the things that Ambassador Huntsman was particularly focused on in addition to economics?*

Q: In addition to economics, he was very much involved in our VPPs, Virtual Presence Post program. He supported the expansion of these activities by either providing money or showing up, just visiting. He traveled a lot. From the moment he arrived he was very positive about public diplomacy in general, talking about who we are in the United States and our deep abiding interest in making the U.S.-China relationship a successful one. He also made the most of his family - one of the things the Chinese were most intrigued about was his adopted Chinese daughter, Gracie Mei. Jon and Mary Kaye visited Gracie's hometown several times, and the Ambassador took Gracie back to the orphanage from where she was adopted. I think he was giving her an appreciation of her identity as a Chinese, but was always aware that she was now an American.

In addition to the VPP travel, the Ambassador visited all the consulates two-three times during his time in China and he went other places where Americans had not have been for a period of time. He was much in demand by business for the support he gave companies seeking to expand their commercial presence in China.

His third priority was being CEO of Mission China. So he did outreach to the mission, walking around, listening the concerns staff brought to his attention. Morale at mission China shot up significantly during the period he was there.

His fourth priority was ensuring that Washington was clued in on everything that was going on. He would be on the phone - mornings and evenings - with key individuals in Washington, providing his views about what was going on as well as listening to theirs. We did limited distribution scene setters for major visits and he had something insightful to add to every one of them. I would edit things and add a fair amount, but he then took that and shaped it in ways that gave it a distinctive voice.

*Q: The Ambassador's travel was remarkable. How about your own travel?*

GOLDBERG: Well my predecessors, interestingly enough, didn't travel. Sandy Randt, the Ambassador, thought it was the Ambassador's job - and indeed the Ambassador's prerogative to be the public face of the mission and he alone traveled for the front office. One of my predecessors traveled once. Dan Picutta traveled a couple of times. But I got to all of the consulates (except Guangzhou) and went to Shanghai and Chengdu three/four times during the 18 or 19 months that I was there. The Ambassador thought that was important to demonstrate that we were hands on and concerned about the welfare of the people who were serving outside of Beijing.

*Q: Now as the chief management officer did you run into any inter agency squabbles that you had to referee or major personnel issues?*

GOLDBERG: Of course. Many times that was reconciling differences on the economic side of the house. Some of the disagreements that existed in Washington were mirrored in Beijing. But Huntsman's view, and I think he was singularly successful in dealing with this problem of interagency dissonance, was that we were all in this together, working with one another in a collegial fashion and we could as a unit could make a unified series of proposals to Washington about how issues should be addressed. You were always going to have interagency squabbles. And personnel problems, some of which I handled better than others, but I give Huntsman full credit for handling them well all the time. What always impresses me about missions in general, and I encountered this in Guangzhou, is how many things end up on the senior manager's desk and they are issues you were never prepared for. You heard a lot about some things people might do and someone would invariably do something that made you want to ask "My God what were they thinking?"

*Q: Now one of the major pressures on an Embassy would be a presidential visit, and President Bush visited Beijing in November 2009. You mentioned that when you arrived in June you knew that a presidential visit was on the schedule. Could you sort of walk us thorough how a mission as large as Beijing begins to shape and organize one of these visits. What is the Embassy role in these processes?*

GOLDBERG: You start by trying to help Washington define the issues. You are very operational, focusing on some things you are actually seeing on a daily basis. There is a lot of control officer work, inspecting, visiting the sites the President is going to visit and making sure that everything is staffed out. Inside the mission, one of your first decisions is to designate a senior officer, not necessarily in terms of rank but in experience, who will be the operational point or contact for the White House. This person also has an assistant who may or may not be a junior officer. As an aside, let me note that an Embassy as large as Beijing can afford to assign multiple officers to do things as a training/mentoring exercise.

Next you set up a working group. We did that in early August. Our working group eventually grew to 20-25 people. Before the President arrived, we had a daily countdown meeting and when the President's team arrived, we sometimes met twice a day. The DCM is nominally the overall control for a presidential visit, but a smart DCM knows he or she needs a couple of the Mission's best officers to make a visit work.

*Q: Who were those primary points of contact?*

GOLDBERG: Well on this presidential visit, I think it was Graham Mayer in the political section who had worked for me on the China desk, and Brooke Spelman, who is the daughter of former Shanghai Consul General Doug Spelman. Wise choices, wonderful officers. That's about all the credit I deserve.

*Q: Now in these kinds of visits there are expected formal sessions and required dinners. But the mission generally is in a position to say if the visiting dignitary went to this campus or this monument, it would be unique and make a particular statement. Did the embassy get a chance to nominate...*

GOLDBERG: You make your views known all the time, you provide lots of options, and the White House chooses. Naturally, the president's time in Beijing was quite limited so all the things we thought might be good from a PR point of view were not possible. The last thing he did while he was in China before getting on Air Force One was to go out to the Great Wall. In fact that photo of him in the leather jacket standing alone on the wall at Badaling, against a backdrop of the Gobi desert, was used by some Chinese firms for commercial purposes. Nice that it was so iconic, but in point of fact, he was freezing out there. As was Jon Huntsman who didn't take an overcoat with him.

The most significant part of the visit was the President's Shanghai town hall meeting. You will recall he went to Shanghai before he came to Beijing. He was very comfortable in these town hall forums and the idea was that he would make a few remarks and then respond to Q&A. Our hope was that the town hall would be broadcast countrywide – an illusion from the very beginning and not sure who was smoking what when we tried to do this – and we spent a lot of time negotiating with the Chinese for extended coverage. Until the last minute it wasn't clear how much coverage there would be. It was not nationwide but it was better than we thought we might get, limited largely to Shanghai and its environs. What gave some limited satisfaction was that when his town hall comments hit the blogosphere, tens of millions more Chinese had the opportunity to read what he had to say. The whole experience was frustrating – difficult negotiations with the Chinese on coverage, the venue, who would be present at the town hall. Looking back, we'd have probably been better not to have done it because the press story was how the Chinese were trying to limit the town hall rather than the efforts to give the President a platform to speak directly to the Chinese people.

*Q: Do you check this off as a good visit?*

GOLDBERG: Personally I think this was a very good visit, a successful visit. As good as it was, it really was the end of a reasonably successful period of diplomatic engagement and the start of a period of considerable difficulty. People looking at the visit in retrospect thought the visit had not gone well, while people who were part of it felt quite the opposite. What happened just a month later in Copenhagen, i.e., the public airing of our differences on environmental issues was just the beginning. In July and February, we were beset with Taiwan arms sales and the Dalai Lama's visit.

The President had made it very clear when he was in China meeting with Hu Jintao and others that he intended to see the Dalai Lama when the Dalai Lama was in the states next and that he was going forward with a package of arms sales that had been approved previously. The Chinese would always get angry when we announced the sales, then even angrier when we followed through with actual sales. We also had some significant trade issues which contributed to the downward spiral a period of two or three months.

*Q: I was noticing on the 18<sup>th</sup> of February 2010, the president did meet the Dalai Lama in Washington and the media picked up a story that the Ambassador was summoned to take a protest at MFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).*

GOLDBERG: Pretty standard reaction. Any time the president meets the Dalai Lama, the Ambassador is summoned to protest this interference. Sometimes he is called the day before and then the day after as well. Nuisance calls, really. The Chinese would always claim we were engaging in a conversation with a “splittist” who is not a really a religious figure.

*Q: About that same time, March 2-4, 2010, Deputy Secretary Steinberg and Jeff Bader came to town, very close after the President’s visit. What was the focus of their trip?*

GOLDBERG: Well two things. First, we wanted to emphasize that it was important to have a normal dialogue even in times of stress. Our second objective was to engage the Chinese in a strategic discussion separate from the Strategic and Economic dialogue (S&ED). We wanted to address matters like cyber security, the weaponization of space, the South China Sea and maritime navigation. We also thought this kind of dialogue could be a way of having a more open and frank dialogue on Taiwan or Iran. It took about a year to get Chinese assent to consider such a conversation under the rubric of the S&ED which Steinberg had shortly before he left office as Deputy Secretary. The fact that the Chinese accepted the Steinberg/Bader visit at that time was a sign that they wanted to find a way to reengage over three tough months.

*Q: I would suspect that on an issue like Taiwan arms sales, the whole mainland-Taiwan relationship has a lot of nuances to it, and you are hearing different things from different Chinese organizations. How would you describe the discussion of Taiwan during this period that you were DCM?*

GOLDBERG: The cross-Straits relationship was improving on its own. Without any push or help or “interference” from the U.S. Ma Ying-jeou had replaced Chen Shui-bian as president. Ma was interested in establishing a broader, more mutually beneficial economic relationship with the government in Beijing. He also wanted to promote cultural and student exchanges. He avoided talk about political associations of any sort. The mainland-Taiwan relationship was operating in a fairly positive fashion and it eased somewhat the anxiety in Beijing about Taiwan independence. It didn’t spell the end of their concerns about U.S. arms sales, of course; now the mantra was “see, things have improved, they are improving further, why would you sell arms to Taiwan when there is no longer any threat from us.” So there was no end to Chinese complaints about our failure to honor the third joint communiqué of 1982 in which we pledged, among other things, to decrease the quantity and quality of arms that America sold to Taiwan for its self-defense. I can’t really recall a good conversation on Taiwan on an official level that concluded with “you have given us something to think about and we will be back to you.”

*Q: I was noticing there were some visits back and forth between China and Taiwan which seemed to be thickening the economic relationship and what not. That was of reportable interest I presume.*

GOLDBERG: That is right, and we encouraged that. We also reinforced our interest with the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office. Of course, we were also happy that we were no longer dealing with all the name calling that had gone on before during the Chen Shui-bian years.

*Q: One of the other major relationships the embassy was probably watching was the Japanese-*

*Chinese relationship. How was that proceeding?*

GOLDBERG: That was a legacy of World War Two and subsequently a tribute to both Japanese obtuseness about the image they presented by periodically making ill-considered statements about the War and the visits to Yasakuni Shrine and to Chinese efforts to play the nationalism card by criticizing Japan for omissions and a failure to apologize adequately. Clearly the Chinese valued the economic and trade relationship with the Japanese, the access to services products and technology. I'd say the two sides have a "Yes, But" relationship. Yes we want to move ahead and we can work together, but apologies to date have not been good and by the way that relationship you have with the United States is directed against us, so why don't you reconsider. This is complicated today by the vast amounts of oil and gas resource interests in the seas claimed by both China and Japan. You have Chinese submarines patrolling in territorial waters, which are off Japan's continental shelf, and creating incidents that require U.S. support for an ally.

*Q: I was noticing that in September 2010, there was this incident of a Chinese fishing boat colliding with a Japanese patrol boat. That occurred in one of those disputed areas. I saw media reports that in the midst of that controversy or circumstance the U.S. told Japan that the area was covered by a security treaty. That is a fairly strong support to the Japanese side.*

GOLDBERG: We made no bones about it. We reaffirmed our commitment to Japan in an area that we believed the Chinese were encroaching upon.

*Q: Another area where the embassy is probably making a fairly substantial contribution is the whole North Korean situation and the Chinese role in getting the Six Party Talks going. How did the embassy see China's role with regard to North Korea?*

GOLDBERG: The six party talks were managed out of Washington, with advice and assistance from the mission. In terms of direct influence on policy, the embassy's role was less significant than people might think was the case. We maintained contact with our colleagues at the South Korean embassy and worked very closely with them but they were as in the dark about what was going on in Seoul as we were sometimes about Washington's actions. I would meet periodically and exchange views with the Korean DCM, who went on to become Korea's senior negotiator for the Six Party Talks. The political counselor and political officers had their own set of contacts – I mean we were meeting with them at all levels and having essentially the same conversation, devoid of much more than speculation. The South Koreans were always interested in seeing whether there was any difference between what Washington was telling them and what the Embassy in Beijing was telling them.

We also tried to have as many meetings as we possible with the International Liaison Department of the Chinese Communist Party. As you might know, the Chinese relationship with North Korea is party-to-party, not government-to-government. The ILD is a tough nut to crack. They would brief us after a high level visit but often they would dissemble about what had happened. For example, I was once told that Kim Jong-il had been remarkably spry on one his visits in Northeast China, jumping up on a train, when we knew he was still suffering from the effects of his stroke. Anything we learned in China as to what was going on in North Korea was

either through contact with NGO's that had some role in North Korea or from Chinese think tankers who were prominent in providing advice to party officials.

*Q: Was there any particular domestic, economic internal issue in which the Embassy quite disagreed with an approach that Washington suggested?*

GOLDBERG: Not really. We never got to that point because the communication was so good. People had a lot of confidence in one another. Jeff Bader was over at the NSC and was very savvy and policy-oriented. We had differences of emphasis but not basic approaches with those doing economic policy at USTR, Commerce, and Treasury. The EAP people at the State Department - Joe Donovan for whom I had worked was PDAS, Dave Shear was Deputy Assistant Secretary for China - I'd known for years. Kurt Campbell and Jim Steinberg were very engaged and for the most part prepared to entertain views that we might have with regard to how to get things done.

*Q: You mentioned extensive contact with your South Korean counterpart. Was there kind of a Friday afternoon lunch group with your counterparts in other embassies?*

GOLDBERG: We had get-togethers with like-minded missions. I was part of two groups like that. The South Koreans were not part of either group. The Ambassador had similar meetings with his counterparts.

*Q: That way you would be able to see what other people are seeing in their reporting and sharing.*

GOLDBERG: We certainly share our views on issues of general interest. And we'd discuss different approaches. It was not surprising that the conversation usually turned on what the Americans were doing.

*Q: Off a slightly different angle. Beijing is a major diplomatic post for everybody, which must have meant tens of national day celebrations. Did you get involved in those requirements?*

GOLDBERG: I did far more of that when I was in Guangzhou where we had 30 plus national day events. I did not go to all that many in Beijing. For the most part you'd go to the really important four or five; the rest you passed out to other mission officers and they'd have an opportunity to meet with their counterparts. We'd often have five or six people at a single national day event - from the political and economic sections, the military, some other agencies.

*Q: In your own work did you have a set of regular contacts on the Chinese side of things?*

GOLDBERG: Mostly in the foreign ministry - the director general for the Americas. I did not meet as many Chinese in my official capacity as you might think because I was spending the vast bulk of my time inside on management and paper flow issues, chairing various working groups, dealing with the daily personnel issue.

*Q: One of the things that is in train and I have lost track of the time line. The U.S. was planning*

*or breaking ground for a new embassy. Was that going on at the time when you were there?*

GOLDBERG: Breaking ground for a new consulate in Guangzhou, yes. Negotiating for land in Shanghai, yes. Looking at building an annex onto the embassy property, yes. The annex will be eight stories and designed to handle the dramatic increase in the number of officers who have been sent to Beijing since the mission itself was built. The original “right sizing” blueprint did not adequately account for how large the mission would eventually become.

*Q: Eight story annex. Well that means you are no longer in Erban and Sanban and those facilities.*

GOLDBERG: We haven’t really been able to get rid of those and we recently decided to reopen Erban to accommodate visa overflow. The problem is that we have a difference of opinion over who should reap the benefits of the land appreciation when the properties are sold. Yiban remains the Ambassador’s residence and we will stay there for the long term because we are never going to get another piece of property like that. What we need to do is tear it down and build something that is more representative of our presence in China. That is not going to happen any time soon in this current economic environment.

*Q: So when did we move to the new Embassy site?*

GOLDBERG: 8-8-08. President Bush was there to inaugurate. The actual move itself came a couple of months later. I was not in Beijing at the time.

*Q: One of the things that you must have been watching, certainly the officers in the external section of the political side were doing so, was China’s outreach to the rest of the world and its greater diplomatic activities. I think you and I just shared a list of President Hu travels here, the Premier travels there. Did you see and report on high level Chinese outreach to other countries?*

GOLDBERG: Yes. The Chinese are on the world scene, even if they are not yet a global power in the classic sense. They have been going out so to speak for at least fifteen years. Jiang Zemin certainly liked to travel and it is a part of any senior leader’s activities. After any visit, we would seek an MFA briefing; we would also talk with the missions where the Chinese leaders had traveled as well as ask U.S. missions in those countries for their take on what had happened. Though it sounds like we did a lot along this line, it really was not a significant part of our work.

*Q: What was the significant part of our work?*

GOLDBERG: I must have drunk the public diplomacy Kool Aid but I think a big part of our work was non-traditional diplomacy – trying to find a way to get the Chinese to understand the United States better, I mean really understand what was going on beneath their surface observations; we also wanted to get away from the Chinese mantra that they understood us better than we understood them. During the whole 4 ½ years I was there, we invested an awful lot of time in public diplomacy and outreach. To his great credit, Jon Huntsman took up that cause and made it his own as well. Also of significance was the economic and commercial work, helping American business and agriculture, finding new opportunities would lead to jobs in America.

On the political side, we worked to get traction in our discussions on issues as varied as North Korea, Iran, and Afghanistan-Pakistan. We wanted our policymakers to understand Chinese views on these issues so that when they presented American policies, they would present them in a way that also responded to Chinese concerns. Overall, just about every bit of our work was significant in my view; but were I evaluating the Huntsman legacy, I'd say it related as much to our interest in showcasing what America has to offer to the Chinese as in the more traditional things we do.

*Q: Now did that include leadership grants, the USIA program?*

GOLDBERG: Sure, in Guangzhou, as I said earlier, we made suggestions that were then vetted in Beijing. In Beijing, I saw and signed off on the final list. I didn't have anything really to do with it as such. The country team that evaluated potential applicants made good decisions and I think we were able to get the right people to the States.

*Q: Now in terms of official Chinese travel, the embassy always wanted to encourage visits to the U.S. I recall in late October, 2009, the vice chairman of the military commission General Xu Caihou visited the U.S. and had some fairly significant meetings with Steinberg, Sec Def Gates, and even President Obama. Would you categorize that as a fairly successful trip?*

GOLDBERG: I think that is a fair assessment. The Chinese were very pleased and thought it was a successful visit as well, especially being received by the President. Unfortunately successful visits don't necessarily lead to outcomes where you are able to work more closely together to find common ground. I don't think the Chinese are ready for that kind of military-to-military relationship. They will take what they can get on the protocol side, but on the substance side, they hold us at arm's length. It is not just Taiwan arms sales that lead to a downturn in mil-mil ties, although Taiwan is important. It is also about Chinese insecurity – they are spending billions to modernize their military and to develop strategic doctrines. They like having asymmetry in the relationship. The more they know about us the better, and the less we know about them, the better.

*Q: Reciprocity is always part of the diplomatic portfolio. January 18-21, President Hu Jintao visited the U.S. That must have involved quite a bit of coordination with the Chinese, devising an itinerary. How does the embassy get involved in that level of Chinese official coming to the States?*

GOLDBERG: Well in the same way as when President Obama visited Beijing. We had a working group in Beijing to coordinate with our Chinese counterparts. We had meetings at all levels, the main ones being the Ambassador's with Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai to go over what the agenda would be. I met with my counterpart Zheng Zeguang and then later with his replacement Xie Feng, who had returned from Washington where he had been DCM. They had their working groups; we had ours. We all wanted to ensure that Hu Jintao found a welcoming environment in Washington and with the American people that he might meet along the way. The Chinese are a lot more reserved about those kinds of interactions than Americans are. So whereas the President was anxious to have a town hall meeting with a real exchange of views,

the Chinese always wanted to limit the interactions their president had with the American people. They were concerned there might be some sort of embarrassment. Always in the back of their minds, they wondered: is there is going to be the playing of Taiwan's national anthem, a reference to the Republic of China rather than the People's Republic of China, a Falun Gong episode like the one that took place in 2005, some kind of human rights demonstration. We always tried to tell them that in a country like the United States the unexpected is going to happen and you need to be prepared for that. Well, they never accepted that which is why I think most of their officials come off looking stiff and formal.

*Q: It must keep their planners on edge. When President Obama came out, it is always fun dealing with the Secret Service, White House Security. Did any particular things come up along those lines?*

GOLDBERG: Yeah there was one incident. Normally we reserved the entire floor that the President is on for security purposes. That means we really don't want any Chinese anywhere near the President; for security purposes. But the Chinese reserved rooms for themselves on the President's floor in November 2000 and not just one or two rooms but a half dozen, crowding out some people who needed to around the President. That was a deal breaker for a visit as it could compromise the security and communications for the President. So you get these pissing contests going back and forth with each side marking its territory.

*Q: You have been involved with China for some time by now. What would you tag as major changes in their outlook or attitude or trends over the years, including did you see whether MFA was one influential domestically and secondly more talented and trained.*

GOLDBERG: Well on the MFA side I think the foreign minister and foreign affairs communities are less influential these days than in the past. Clearly the state counselor, Dai Bingguo, had the most influence by virtue of his relationship with President Hu Jintao. It will be interesting to see what the next state counselor's relationship with Xi Jinping, the heir apparent, will be like. The Chinese certainly do have better language officers, and their people come back constantly to the U.S.; they are more sophisticated about what was happening in the U.S. Regrettably, the conversations we'd have in private were not all that sophisticated or illuminating, but pro forma, a recitation of talking points. They would have no reason, of course, to have any other kind of discussion. If we engaged productively with anyone, it was with China's think tank people, who as I said were incredibly influential by virtue of the fact that they were writing policy papers to the Chinese leaders, and some of those are actually acted upon.

*Q: When I was stationed in Beijing we did pay attention to the think tanks and called on them from time to time. I assume the embassy is keeping up that contact work.*

GOLDBERG: I didn't do very much of that as DCM, but our political counselor and political officers certainly did so. Those who were involved with economic issues similarly met frequently with their contacts in think tanks on trade and investment, financial issues. Our Treasury attaché had very good contacts over at the People's Bank of China and at the Ministry of Finance, less good at the Chinese state owned banks because you required PBOC approval before engaging with them – and that was not forthcoming. Overall, on the sophistication side,

the jury is still out.

*Q: Let me ask you a few questions, you talked about virtual presence posts. Could you define that and say what it means for China?*

GOLDBERG: In places where we do not have consulates, we identify cities or areas that might be of significance to the United States for economic reasons or public diplomacy reasons or because up and coming leaders reside there, or we have a lot of American citizens living there. We identify these and we organize teams in the consulates and at the embassy to go to these places every six to eight weeks, if possible, to do programs. We incorporate ambassadorial travel, travel by political and economic counselors, consular services work, and anything else that might be of interest – opening an American company, doing a health program.

We also have a website for each VPP and upload general information to it as well as slide shows of American life – and if we have a visit, anything specific that happened. As I said earlier, country-wide there were 15-16 places identified for VPPs, 15-16 working groups put together, some more successful than others.

*Q: Now as the economic and tourist relationship with China has expanded, and I suspect it has expanded significantly, did any particularly unique or difficult American Citizen Services consular cases come up?*

GOLDBERG: Yes – especially problems encountered by Chinese-American businesspeople. Often this was in the form of extortion, less commonly there were accusations of spying or obtaining information illegally. There was one case in which the Ambassador took a personal interest - a Chinese-American, the geologist Xue Feng, whom he felt had been unfairly treated and who was convicted of getting information that had been public when he downloaded it (and was still available on the internet) and then subsequently classified secret. When I left, he was still appealing his sentencing. The Ambassador's interest in this particular case was so great that either he or I would go visit this person once a month. It was a statement about the case, but also about the fate of Americans in China who were being unjustly accused. I visited about eight times or so.

*Q: Now American tourism to China is increasing by leaps and bounds, at least in my mail I am always getting offers to take a Yangzi River trip or visit Xian. So the embassy must be aware of large numbers of Americans just coming through the country.*

GOLDBERG: We did, but for the most part we did not have any contact with them unless they lost a passport or there was some problem that they wanted to bring to our attention.

**DONALD M. BISHOP**  
**Deputy Public Affairs Officer**  
**Beijing (1997-2000)**

*Donald Bishop was born in Tennessee in 1945. He received his BA from Trinity College and his MA from Ohio State. He joined the Foreign Service in 1979. His overseas posts include Hong Kong; Seoul and Taegu, Korea; Dhaka, Beijing, Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; and Kabul, Afghanistan. Mr. Bishop was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2010.*

*Q: All right. Today is the 1<sup>st</sup> of March, 2011 with Don Bishop. And Don, you're off to China. When did you go to China?*

BISHOP: We got there in the summer of 1997 – for a normal tour of three years.

I went from being PAO in Bangladesh to being the Deputy Public Affairs Officer in one of our largest programs. Perhaps only ten or a dozen of our programs in the world had a DPAO, so this was a step up.

I replaced Charles Silver. For a short time after I reached post, George Beasley was PAO, but then Paul Blackburn arrived, and I spent the remainder of the three years working as his Deputy.

At the time, all Embassy people were required by the Chinese to live in one of the Beijing's three diplomatic compounds. So were all foreign journalists. We lived for a few months in the Sanlitun compound, but our permanent place was a nice-sized apartment in the Jianguomenwai Compound. The diplomatic compounds were guarded by the People's Armed Police (“PAP guards” in Embassy lingo). On one hand they provided ordinary security. On the other hand, they were assuring that we could not invite ordinary Chinese in for conversations. The RSO told us to assume that all our telephone calls were monitored.

The Jianguomenwai compound was only a few hundred yards from the Embassy's Yiban compound. Yiban (“Compound 1”) included USIS, the Ambassador's residence, and the Health Unit. It was a nice walk every morning from our apartment to the office.

*Q: When you arrived, the Ambassador was a political appointee?*

BISHOP: Yes, James Sasser, former Senator from Tennessee, a terrific ambassador. When I say “terrific,” I of course mean he had a good sense of policy. He had, though, an extra bonus. Perhaps because he'd spent his life in politics, he liked meeting people. He was good at motivating the Embassy. He and his wife always came to Embassy social events, even small hail and farewells, and always with a covered dish! Even junior officers and FSNs could feel his magic, let's say. He showed some real determination when he stayed in the Embassy during the demonstrations at the time of the Belgrade bombing. At his Embassy farewell, he was given a framed copy of a newspaper with his picture on the front page, and the whole Embassy community gave him the most heartfelt long cheer I witnessed in 31 years.

*Q: What was his background?*

BISHOP: He had been a Senator from Tennessee, but he was defeated in 1994 by Bill Frist. He was a prominent leader in the Democratic Party, with strong ties to Vice President Gore, and

President Clinton named him to go to China.

He was succeeded by Ambassador Joseph Prueher. He had been the CINCPAC, Commander in Chief of the Pacific Command. So the Embassy transferred from a former Senator to a former Admiral.

Admiral Prueher was another great ambassador. His style of leadership was a little unusual, in Foreign Service terms, because he'd grown up in the military frame, leading in the Navy style. He was also good at policy and very good with people.

I compare both of them to the Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, who made many visits to Beijing. Whatever the brilliance of her foreign policy insights, she was a zero on leadership. She came to China three or four times without once having gathered the staff to express her gratitude for their work. A Secretarial visit, as you know, is a very big and very taxing deal. Thanks are in order. If you miss a chance to thank people at post because you've got to rush to the next capital, that's one thing. But to have done it three times, four times, let's say it was noticed by Embassy people.

Seeing this disposition of hers, Ambassador Prueher pulled her aside and said "You need to thank the people who worked so hard." So she agreed to schedule a half hour meeting with the Embassy staff in the consular waiting room. I said to myself, OK, she's finally growing in the job. Then, at Country Team we were asked to provide jokes, amusing lines, laugh lines, for her to use at the meeting during her pep talk. I didn't think much of her effort.

*Q: All right. Let's try to set the scene. First, what was the situation in China, per se?*

BISHOP: It's the late 1990s. There had been the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. There had been the opening under Deng Xiaoping in 1979, the same year the Embassy was established. When I arrived, we were well into the second decade of China's gradual opening.

Every single step along the way was stony. The Communists had fiercely implanted a suspicion of foreigners during the civil war, the establishment of the PRC, and the Korean War. The anti-Rightist campaign and the Cultural Revolution had really seared people. The result was that everything that the Embassy might do, and every approach that America would make, had to overcome Chinese misgivings or suspicions. Even in the 1990s, the usual Chinese response to our extended hand was to create bureaucratic obstacles.

The usual Embassy take on China -- and on the Foreign Ministry -- was that the government of world's most populous nation was not yet up to being a great power. They had the aspiration. They talked it. They could say that history had denied this to them. But they realized that they had not built up the institutions, nor had they the confidence, needed by a leading country to play a leading role. So China was still in an odd way a little passive in stepping forward to grasp opportunities that were presented. I'm speaking of course, of China ten to fifteen years ago.

In the 1990s, then -- we now all think of as a rather tranquil decade between the end of the Cold War and 9/11 -- the controlling idea, well expressed by a succession of presidents since President

Nixon, was that the U.S. task for the relationship with China was to pull them little by little into a partnership with United States, and to become a responsible actor in the world stage. There was a trade side to that, a security side, and so on.

My sense was that our American China hands were committed to a very long slog. Step by step, little by little, the U.S. would pull China into fully joining the rest of the world. Then China would undertake the obligations and responsibilities that would bring.

I think the largest specific issue for the Embassy in the 1990s was whether China would accede to the World Trade Organization. This big issue had preoccupied the Embassy for years, and it happened while I was there.

I should mention that there was an inspection of the Embassy just after I arrived. The inspectors reported that the whole Embassy, USIS included, was coming under increasing pressure from more and more and more issues on the U.S.-China agenda, and more and more congressional visitors.

The inspectors understood, too, the reality of work in Beijing. Every time we opened the hand to China to cooperate on this or that, we faced the bureaucratic obstacles that came from China as a party state. It added enormous friction to our work.

The phrase in the inspection report that sticks in my mind ran something like “This was the Indianapolis 500 of diplomacy, and the Embassy car on the track is -- a Ford Pinto.” The report acknowledged that we did not have the resources, the people, or the money to be able to achieve what was needed in China.

*Q: Let's take up a point you just made. In China, there's the government, and then there's the Communist Party. What is the relationship? And how did this effect the work of the Embassy and USIS?*

BISHOP: You're right that any analysis, any take on “China” needs to recognize how the Chinese Communist Party rules. China is a “party state.” The PRC constitution acknowledges the role of the Chinese Communist Party as the vanguard. I knew this in theory before I got to China, and I'd seen some of it from my earlier vantage point in Taiwan, but China was very much a party state.

A short digression on Chinese history. Remember that the CCP and the KMT, which became the cores of the PRC and the ROC, had both been given organizational shape by the Comintern agent in Guangdong province in the 1920s, Mikhail Borodin. In a way, the CCP/PRC and the KMT/ROC mirrored each other in their party state setup. The Party determined its policies, the party line, so to speak, and the members of the Party in the state structure implemented it. Each significant organization like a university, a radio station, a business, or an association had a Party Secretary, and Party members in the organization assured that its work conformed to the Party line.

This system had been decaying in Taiwan, but it was still formally intact at the time of Chiang

Ching-kuo's death in 1987, my first year there, but then it finally unraveled. In China, though, the party state had been institutionalized by the Chinese constitution in 1949, and it continued.

What this meant for us at the working level was that you might visit a town and they would introduce you to the mayor. You were a representative of a government, the Embassy, visiting the town, so your meeting the mayor was an appropriate government-to-government contact. In fact, however, the mayor is not the most powerful person in that town. Rather the Party Secretary is. But you didn't meet the Party Secretary because they were adhering to form, that you should meet someone from the government structure.

People who deal with China come to understand this second, parallel structure there, the Communist Party. If you visit a factory you'll be introduced to the manager, say, but since there's a Party organization in the factory, which assures that the organization hones to the Party line, the guidance given by the Party congresses, the Party Secretary holds the ultimate power.

You could see this party state structure very clearly in the meetings of the National People's Congress. You know the charts we show American school children about "how a bill becomes a law." There's a different chart for China. Passage of a law by the National People's Congress is the third and final step on their chart.

The first step is the meeting of the Party Congress. The Party drafts all the laws. At the meeting the Party announces its work plan and shapes needed legislation.

Once the Party Congress approves a bill, it goes on to the second step at the CPCC, the Chinese People's Consultative Congress. This is a rump organization, and this is a meaningless step, but it's a formal step required by history. The CPCC includes representatives of the rump, the remains, the fictional representatives of the democratic parties that had existed in 1949, now completely under the thumb of the CPC. All the individual representatives of the old parties that sit in the CPCC are personally approved by the CPC as reliable. The CPCC also includes selected and approved representatives of groups, like religious bodies, so that they can give their sanction to the Party's initiatives.

The second step in the process, then, is a formal and publicized consultation with these puppet representatives. In theory the CPC might integrate some of their concerns into the legislation, but this was never evident.

So, the bill has been drafted by the Party Congress and chopped by the Consultative Congress. Then it goes to the National People's Congress, which rubber stamps the bill. The NPC put a government/democratic/legislative cloak over the decisions of the party, a chop, so to speak, a seal, and they formally became laws.

The deep China watchers who lived and breathed Party congresses could see in the 1990s that little by little the meetings of the National People's Congress did include some policy debates. Here and there a few delegates actually voted "no" on a piece of legislation. These might have significance in the future, but at the time they were shallow, almost invisible, ripples on a smooth pond.

So, when you went to China you had to get used to this unusual party state structure. If there were any democratic winds blowing in China, or perhaps we could say participatory winds, they all had to be found within the party. Chinese would tell you that, “Oh well, yes, we don’t quite have your system of democracy, but you see there’s considerable democracy within the Party which represents the people.” This was not convincing, but you would hear it. The notion was that the 60 million members of the CPC somehow knew all the conditions of ordinary people in China, and the Party would address the issues on the inside. Here and there the Embassy’s political officers could wring out a few signs of liberalization and more permissive atmosphere for debate within the Party.

*Q: Well then, what were you and your colleagues in Public Diplomacy up to?*

BISHOP: In 1997 when I arrived, we had the traditional relationship between State and USIA at post.

USIS or PAS in China was called the Press and Culture Section. USIS in Beijing had a PAO, DPAO, IO and two AIOs, CAO and three ACAOs, an IRO, an OMS and some local hire Americans. The main office was in the Yiban compound, but we had several ACAOs, the IRO, the magazine editor, and the IRC in a high rise office building, the Jingguang Center, on the second ring road – the American Center for Education and Exchange (ACEE). We had branch posts at the consulates in Shenyang, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Guangzhou.

After I received word of the assignment to Beijing -- this was while I was in Dhaka -- I realized that the China assignment would test my management because the program was so large. In Dhaka I was running a full-service Public Diplomacy program, but I could be involved in everything. I could write press releases, I could organize programs, I could personally review Fulbright applications, and so on. I could still be “hands on.”

In China, I realized, that would no longer be possible. I would have to delegate. I would have to lay down the general direction for our programs, and think through the times that I would review how things were going. For the International Visitor program, for instance, I needed to focus on the instructions that went out to those nominating Chinese for the program, and I should chair the selection committee, and I would myself release each nomination cable, but in between, and afterwards, I didn't need to be micromanaging.

When I arrived I found that the outgoing PAO, George Beasley, and his outgoing DPAO, Charles Silver, had worked out a novel organization of the post. At most large USIS posts, the heart of the traditional DPAO position, the everyday business, was to supervise the work of the branch posts at the consulates. For the DPAOs in Seoul or New Delhi, for instance, the primary job was to tend the field programs. In those posts, it was the PAO who supervised and rated the Information Officer and the Cultural Affairs Officer and the Executive Officer.

But George Beasley had set up a much better system. The DPAO supervised the IO, the CAO, the EO, and the PAOs at the Consulates. The PAO directly supervised and rated only two people, the DPAO and the Office Management Specialist (once upon a time called the secretary).

This organization gave the DPAO far more authority and scope than merely being the manager of the field programs who also happened to sit at the PAO desk while the PAO was away. It was more like the military system, with the DPAO acting as Chief of Staff. I was quite pleased with this. I supervised everyone in USIS in Beijing and at the Consulates (except for the PAO and the OMS). I had the whole program as a Class One officer. Perhaps you could say I was the Chief Operating Officer.

Of course, I kept the PAO informed of any problems or issues, whether they were on the IO or the CAO side, and there was the ordinary crossfeed and guidance at staff meetings, but the issues were mine to work through as the direct supervisor. The PAO who replaced George, Paul Blackburn, also liked the new organization, and he continued the arrangement. Paul and I were together for three years. It was the best collaboration of my career.

This new organization gave the PAO time to strategize and work the Front Office in ways that other PAOs, tied up with supervising the IO and CAO, could not. The inspection team, for instance, had given the Ambassador informal feedback that the relationship between USIS and other parts of the Embassy was frayed. Paul did good work in ending any tension between parts of the Embassy. The novel organization of PAS gave him the time to do so.

There are a couple of other features of the post to note. One was the local Chinese employees. At other posts, our employees were FSNs, but in China our local employees were not our own direct hires. They were employees of the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Services Bureau (DSB). That deal had been made back when the Embassy was established. Not a week went by without us cursing it. We wondered what the original Liaison Office people or Embassy people who had made that deal had been thinking about.

The DSB arrangement meant that FSOs in China could not really develop the kind of full rapport with local employees seen at other posts. Their salaries came to them from DSB (which, by the way, took its own cut of what we paid for their services). You knew they had their own rank and promotions within the DSB. There was anxiety that they might be reporting to the DSB, not just on programs, but also on you and your quirks – and your contacts. This arrangement impaired the kind of bicultural collaboration that you had at other posts. There was speculation among the FSOs about who among the FSNs was the real leader of the DSB cell, or what was their rank over at the Diplomatic Services Bureau.

*Q: That sounds like Moscow, where the Ambassador's chauffeur was probably a colonel in the KGB and that sort of thing. You know, I mean --*

BISHOP: Yes, there was that kind of talk.

All that said, I'd learned from Bangladesh that being zealous for the FSN cause is an important way to develop rapport. I tried to develop relationships with all the senior local employees, and to prepare them for the day when the DSB system would be terminated and they would become FSNs.

*Q: What kept the Information Officer and his staff busy?*

BISHOP: Fielding the many requests for statements, interviews, and backgrounders that came from the international media filled up most days. So did organizing the press conferences for the many top-level visitors, handling the press at visit sites, or joining a visitor's entourage as "riding press officer." There was the normal requirement for press translations. The IO supervised the local-hire editor of *Jiaoliu* magazine. We arranged for Chinese journalists to visit the U.S. as part of the TV Coop program.

Speaking for a moment about the WTO, PAS was not at the negotiating table or in the meetings that resulted in China's accession, but we were steadily providing every statement of Administration policy to the Foreign Ministry, to China's scholars and policy institute specialists, and to the Chinese and international media. It was IO Bill Palmer -- one of the very best! -- who arranged the countless backgrounders for journalists and set up the press conferences for every Administration principal that came to Beijing for the negotiations.

*Q: And the Cultural Affairs Officer?*

BISHOP: We had all the exchange programs, and the CAO was the major point of contact with the Ministry of Education on the Fulbright program.

One ACAO tended the Fulbright program -- arranging the selection and travel of Chinese academics to the U.S., and supporting the American Fulbrighters who were teaching at Chinese universities. The American profs, most in China for the first time, needed a lot of hand-holding, especially because Chinese universities often wanted to treat a Fulbrighter as one more Foreign Expert or one more body that could be impressed to teach English.

Another ACAO handled the International Visitor program. The IVLP program in China had a different profile than in most other countries. We sent very few of the China IVs on group programs; almost all were solo IVs who traveled on individual schedules with a dedicated escort interpreter. Planning the individualized programs took a lot of time.

Another ACAO was designated as the Director of the American Center for Education Exchange, and that officer tended speakers and seminars along with many other odds and ends. Organizing a program in China for a visiting U.S. speaker was made more difficult by the need to arrange everything through the Foreign Affairs Office (*waiban*) at a Chinese university or think tank. The Chinese had their own ideas about topics.

*Q: You have spoken before about "leaning" public diplomacy programs to support goals. Were you able to do this in China?*

BISHOP: To the degree that I have had sway over our Public Diplomacy programs, what I always wanted to do was push the envelope on policy. I wanted to make sure, for instance, that our U.S. Speakers all addressed, directly or tangentially, the high priority issues in the Mission's strategic plan, and spoke to influential audiences. In China you could do things, but you had to do them in ways that were smart and worked within the Chinese system. As I mentioned, we

always had to work through the Foreign Affairs Offices of Chinese government departments, universities, or organizations, and sometimes it took real creativity to get our speakers in the door.

I wanted to make sure that we had a vigorous conference diplomacy. I told each Branch Public Affairs Officer that we had enough money to fund a \$15-30,000 conference in Shanghai, Shenyang, Guangzhou, and Chengdu each year. I said, “Set up a conference. My only guideline is that it be on a Country Plan or Mission Program Plan theme. You pick it out. If you love the environment, that's fine, environmental issues are in the Mission Program Plan. Go ahead and organize an environmental conference. If you're keen to advance the rule of law in China, that's also an MPP theme, so a rule of law conference would be great.” In Beijing, our part would be to send a keynote speaker from the U.S. and perhaps an Embassy officer to join the deliberations, I told them. One reason I did it this way was because I so valued autonomy. I wanted the Embassy to recognize the expertise and judgment of the officer on the ground. And I wanted the Public Diplomacy officers at the consulates to feel the enthusiasm that comes from being empowered.

USIS Beijing was still publishing *Jiaoliu*, the magazine I had helped launch when I was in Hong Kong. We began to run feature issues that addressed different country plan themes, giving Chinese specialists from the top to the bottom of their system a better view of U.S. policy, in Chinese.

I worked with the ACAO to reshape the International Visitor program nomination process to align it with MPP goals. The TV Coops that we proposed to Washington were on the same set of MPP objectives.

Perhaps the best example of the “leaning” – bringing as many programs in the Public Diplomacy toolkit to bear on our goals -- was broadening and deepening our focus on rule of law. More “rule of law” would support virtually every other U.S. goal in China -- political, economic, commercial, trade, and human rights. We could talk about this for a quite a while.

There's more to the Chinese legal system than meets the eye. We tend to think of China as having a top-down and unitary system of government. We imagined that if Jiang Zemin pounded his fists, then everyone in China, right down to the local village, would snap to. The reality was way more messy. The Party and the government issued guidelines and passed laws in the National People's Congress, but then every province's Party Congress and People's Congress had to develop its own implementing legislation and regulations. Laws were not, then, actually uniform within the whole country, so there was room to influence local authorities. Translations of American law texts could reach down to provinces and provincial law schools. Moot courts demonstrated by visiting American law professors could familiarize Chinese law students with the jury system. And so on.

*Q: Well, one has to think about the Russian legal system as it developed, or didn't develop. It's so corrupt that much of the law is based on how much they can squeeze out of people, or punish people who are opposed to the local cadre and all.*

BISHOP: Well, let's talk about that.

China's party state system is thoroughly corrupted by power, and its most important goal is to protect the Communist Party's monopoly on power. Protecting the Party's monopoly isn't just an abstract notion. It means defending the party secretaries or the deputy party secretaries down at the province or municipality. Those leaders have all found ways to squeeze the system for ill-gotten gains. They want to protect their power, and they want to protect their cash flows. It means the Party and government turn a blind eye to the venality of Party members and local officials, their petty and not-so-petty oppressions, their crony deals that evict ordinary citizens so that companies can amass more money, their infidelities, and the crimes committed by family members.

The legal system is co-opted, and cooperates. Local judges check with the Party Secretary first before they issue a ruling in any sensitive case. This is an integral part of the system of control that defends the status quo, defends the corruption within it, defends the power bases, and quashes any independent social movement.

Party members would never acknowledge this reality, but they understood that it was not law that held sway at the local level, but rather the caprice of local leaders. Party members understood that big league corruption was diminishing the standing of the party among Chinese people. Party members understood they had an interest in making the Party and government more honest. They understood that it was not in China's, and not in the Party's, long term interest that local judges were often retired Army officers and NCOs who didn't know the law and asked superiors for guidance on cases. The Party members understood this, but tomorrow's need for reform and honest government ran up against today's demand for cash and power. The few Party members who retained a spark of idealism were entangled by bosses and co-workers who were focused on power and the money, rewards, perks, cars, banquets, and mistresses that flowed from the power.

Everyone knows that changing the Chinese legal system, and its culture, will be the work not of years or decades but also generations. Still, if Public Diplomacy could get law school professors talking about the law, talking about standards, learning about international best practices, understanding how Chinese law had to keep up as the stock market boomed or property was developed or China developed its own strong entertainment industries, all this could in time be transformative. We found that working on rule of law programs with the law schools gave us an entry point into these conversations, and USIS programs, and our book translations, could have a significant effect.

China is an enormous country, but rule of law programs at the law schools gave us a leverage point in the Chinese legal system to move it in a better direction. The Chinese were interested in "rule by law" while we were speaking of "rule of law." Still, you have to have a law first. While I was there, China was suspended somewhere on a continuum between rule by law and rule of law, closer to the former than the latter, but we found that among China's law professors there was a strong desire to move toward the latter. The intellectuals were talking about rule of law, so were businessmen, and so were citizens, though in the Chinese way all the discussions were discreet and bounded, lest the system get pushed too hard.

I sensed the system was sufficiently open to discussion, and it led me to lean as much of our Public Diplomacy as I could in the direction of rule of law. I decided that spending time and money on rule of law would have a larger ultimate payoff than in some other areas. When I left, a quarter of all the Fulbrighters -- the Americans coming to China, the Chinese going to the U.S. -- were in law. To the Fulbright program, add speakers, add conferences, add articles in *Jiaoliu*, add the translation of law books -- I was trying to take all these diverse, and too often disconnected Public Diplomacy programs and get them increasingly focused on this single high priority issue. I think we made some good headway.

Probably we did more programs with the Beijing University Law School than the others, but we were sponsoring programs at other law schools in the Capital. The BPAOs also began to develop ties at the law schools in the consulate cities.

Of course, we couldn't visit a law school and give a fireball talk on human rights. They'd have cold feet on that, indeed, the Foreign Affairs Office would bar a presentation. But you could talk about all the parts of it. You could talk about evidence, you could talk about court procedures, you could talk about court administration and administrative law. You could address the roles of judges, and prosecutors, and attorneys. You could organize moot court sessions to introduce the jury system. It was using discussion of parts of the law to get to the whole -- rule of law.

Law in China had enough attention in Washington that justices of the Supreme Court visited from time to time. One was Sandra Day O'Connor. While I was in China, the justice I programmed was Anthony Kennedy, once when I was DPAO and once as PAO, as I recall.

When he came, I joined Justice Kennedy for his entire program. When he met students at a law school, of course he could draw on his vast experience as a speaker and a teacher to put together an inspirational talk. At Peking University he was very skillful, leading with the case of *Yick Wo vs. Hopkins*. This case from 1886 involved a California law on laundries that discriminated against Chinese laundrymen. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the law. It was the perfect case for the audience of Chinese students. It addressed state law and Supreme Court review, it addressed how discrimination can be clothed in legal disguises, and it involved disadvantaged Chinese laundrymen getting a hearing in the highest court in the land. It counteracted the narrative that Chinese immigrants to the U.S. in the nineteenth century, the railroad workers and so on, encountered nothing but persecution by white America. It was a great talk.

Justice Kennedy of course understood that while visits and talks played a role, there needed to be long-term relationships between the law schools in Beijing and law schools in the United States. There were some ups and downs in that long-term effort. What the Chinese law departments wanted was bricks and mortar first, facilities. Their view was that facilities could house exchange professors and moot courts and so on. Interested American donors, however, didn't see it that way. They wanted to do the seminars and exchanges and courses first. Justice Kennedy didn't find so many eager donors.

That said, spending two or three days with a Supreme Court justice is a pretty rare thing, and riding across town with him, chatting, you got some inside glimpses of the Court. I didn't know, for instance, that among his colleagues Justice Scalia is called "Nino." You could tell Justice

Kennedy was a great teacher when he gave his talks, and when he talked about the Constitution. One of the great things about the American Constitution, he said, is that it is so short. Since I heard him say that, I've been looking at the length of constitutions -- Nigeria's must be 150 pages long. But ours fits in a little booklet. "Because it's short, it's teachable," he said. A 150-page constitution, how can you teach kids about that?

*Q: And when a country's fundamental law runs 150 pages, it means they're going to be continually changing the damn thing.*

BISHOP: That's true too! The teachableness of the American Constitution -- with a short constitution, you can plant the big ideas in the mind of even a seventh-grade civics student. That's what keeps the constitution alive in ordinary citizen's hearts. For instance, when you watch "Law and Order" or one of the other police or courtroom television programs, you learn that the law of evidence is quite complicated. All the complexities are for the police and the lawyers and the judges. An ordinary viewer can understand, however, that what everyone's arguing is "searches and seizures" in the Fourth Amendment. They know it from reading the Constitution in high school.

For many years the China Book Translation Program had been run by the Deputy Public Affairs Officer. I continued it, but I made a strategic turn to focus on law, where translation and publishing could make a real impact. I thought about a goal of translating in full fifty American law textbooks into Chinese -- contracts, torts, evidence, patents, copyrights, trademarks, securities, banking, financial regulation, and so on. I worried that the goal of fifty titles was too ambitious, but Paul Blackburn said, "Let's go for 100." We set in motion our own hundred flowers blooming. We partnered with the China University of Political Science and Law, partly because they had branch bookstores in law schools all over the country. Fast forwarding some, when I left Beijing in 2006 we had about 60 of those titles in motion. Even now, I think that the \$5000 we spent on each volume was exceedingly good value.

The arrival of a translated law book on torts or evidence or property was a pretty big publishing event in Chinese legal circles because it introduced the whole array of American legal thinking to Chinese scholars and practitioners.

*Q: You were promoting legal education through Fulbrights and exchanges. Did young Chinese have opportunities for jobs in law?*

BISHOP: Another large question! The basic law credential in China is a bachelor's degree in law from a Chinese university. When I was in China, China was producing not so many graduates with that basic credential, but the law departments were expanding and so were the number of graduates with degrees in law.

As in the U.S., there are primo, blue ribbon law schools and not-so-famous schools. Among Chinese law graduates, there was the ordinary stratification. The best students could pass examinations to be judges or prosecutors, the very best finding positions in Beijing and Shanghai and the other leading cities, and others spreading out to smaller places. For the students without the stellar degrees, there were jobs to be found in Chinese government departments and,

increasingly, in Chinese companies that wanted people who had a legal background. Again, a favorable location in a large city was preferable to a job in a smaller or more remote locale. And there was the beginning of a trend seen in other countries -- some of the private sector jobs that drew in law grads could pay more than the traditional prestige jobs as judges and prosecutors.

The presence of American businesses in China and the growth in trade was beginning to create a need for both American lawyers in China who understood China and for Chinese lawyers who understood the American legal system. A number of stateside law firms had offices in Beijing and Shanghai. The credentials of these expat attorneys were American, so they were not formally allowed to practice law in China. The firms also needed, then, Chinese attorneys who had had some legal education in the U.S., spoke English well, and understood the Chinese and American legal systems both. Some of these Chinese attorneys with LL.M. and J.D. degrees from the U.S. had also passed bar exams in the U.S. Many young Chinese law students hoped to get on a track for these jobs. Usually an LL.M. from an American law school was the gateway degree, and the prospect of a good future and good salaries made the investment worthwhile.

The short answer to your question, then, is that there were jobs for China's law school graduates. If we have too many lawyers, China has too few, so there was work for all in an expanding field.

Parenthetically, the first young American graduated from Peking University's law department while I was there. He was a real pathbreaker, deciding in high school to earn his bachelor's degree at Peking University. At the time, an American could easily qualify for admission -- now it's much harder. In any case, when he graduated, he could ask for any salary he wanted, and he went to work for one of the big New York law firms.

*Q: In your experience, how much did leading Chinese know about the U.S.? Were they still looking at the U.S. through the same lens as Chairman Mao?*

BISHOP: It's not possible to discuss this briefly, but let me give it a go.

In Chinese bureaucracies, the less creative, less energetic time servers who didn't really read or speak English -- their views of the United States had often been formed during the Cultural Revolution when they were young, and hadn't really changed. You could hear echoes of Marx and Chairman Mao when they spoke. The leading people in government departments or institutes had broader views. They were more sophisticated, though even in the 1990s they had to be careful in their language lest it appear they had been too influenced by the U.S.

I would also say that all Chinese, from the top to the bottom of their society, were watching American movies -- mostly illegal DVDs with not-so-accurate Chinese subtitles. Set aside the IPR issues for a moment. A steady diet of Hollywood gave them a sensationalized view of America -- drug abuse, car chases, corrupt cops, venal businessmen, abusive fundamentalists, gunfights on the streets.

One of the things that I noticed about the flow of communications, the exchange of knowledge, or the currents of mutual understanding between China and the U.S. was that there was an asymmetry in translation flows. If you sit in the Pentagon or the State Department, various parts

of the U.S. government translate enormous amounts of material from Chinese and English. Much of it came from the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), partnered with the BBC to share translations. I didn't have a good handle on it, but Defense had its own translation activities. At USIS we were a small part of this translation flow, doing our overnight press summaries and media reactions.

No one person, no diplomat, no analyst, no Congressional staffer, could read everything, so great was the daily flow. I won't say it's a Mississippi, but there's a Hudson River of translations that goes from Chinese to English, from China to the States. U.S. policymakers are, therefore, pretty well informed.

If you looked at all the U.S. government material on China -- think of all the studies, the testimonies, the papers -- there's a vast Lake Superior of stuff about China written in the United States. But only a little trickle of that gets put into Chinese. We were investing money and skilled manpower in helping American policymakers learn about China, but we never made a parallel investment in helping Chinese learn about the U.S. That meant that Chinese were not getting a good view of what Americans think about China. This also meant they were not getting a full view of their own society, because they were unable to access the many American papers and studies that might reveal to them what their own government did not.

It's true that Xinhua published two restricted circulation newspapers, for "internal use," *neibu*, for government and Party officials. These were *Cankao Xiaoxi*, "Reference News," and *Cankao Ziliao*, "Reference Materials." People at the Embassy believed that these two newspapers were the means by which senior leaders read about the United States and were exposed to foreign criticism of China. I never saw a copy of *Cankao Ziliao*, but occasionally it was possible to pick up a copy of *Cankao Xiaoxi* at from an inattentive seller at a news stand.

My own scan of a few issues indicated that the Xinhua editors were running a kind of foreign news digest. There were articles sourced to AFP, Tass, the BBC, and American wires, yes. I was surprised to see so many articles from the Central Daily News in Taiwan, the KMT newspaper. But all of these articles were heavily abridged, and editors were pulling their punches when the foreign articles opposed Chinese policies. I have my doubts that Chinese officialdom was seeing foreign reporting and commentary on China in any depth. I'm not sure the two newspapers were presenting the full range of opinions being published on the U.S. I tried to get the Embassy to support a formal study of the papers, but I couldn't interest anyone.

Convinced, then, of the imbalance in translation flows, I went to Beijing with two goals. One was that the Embassy web page must be in Chinese as well as English. That was the easy one.

The other was to have USIA launch a Chinese language version of the Washington File (formerly the Wireless File). When the File was launched in the 1950s, they had the anchor English version, but staff were also dedicated to producing a daily Spanish file, a French file, and an Arabic file, for instance. If the Secretary gave an important speech, it was translated into French in Washington, rather than asking each Francophone post to translate it for the local French-reading public.

When the Wireless Files had been set up in the 1950s we didn't have any relationship with China, so a Wireless File in Chinese had never been organized. That meant, for instance, that each year when the President delivered his State of the Union address, a battery of translators in Washington turned out French, Spanish, and Arabic texts which were immediately sent to posts around the world. In China, Public Affairs Sections had to organize big, crash efforts at post, to have everybody drop everything and to work into the evening. Of course it was done in Taipei and Hong Kong and Beijing because no post could wait for the other to do the work, not to mention that usages in the three places had diverged after 1949.

It was mind-boggling that there was no Chinese version of the Washington File, and every time one had been proposed over the years, Washington pleaded it's too hard, or we don't have the people, or no one has given us funds, all the usual pathetic bureaucratic excuses. I couldn't stand it. With Paul Blackburn's assent, I wrote one of my best cables ever, saying a Chinese Washington File was long overdue and had to be organized NOW! I wrote it bluntly enough that it actually got people's attention in Washington, and the new version of the File was going within a few months.

I didn't have to do the hard work of organizing the new File, finding the money, justifying the new positions, the FTE's, and hiring a team. Bob Holden had to do that in Washington. Still, I think it was my cable that galvanized Washington, and it set in motion a permanent structure in the government to increase the flow of translations out to China.

*Q: I recall President Clinton made a visit to China. What was the public affairs role?*

BISHOP: President Clinton came to visit China while I was there. This was the nine-day visit from June 25 to July 3, 1998.

You experienced enough visits by a President or Secretary of State in your career to know that even a three-day visit about grinds an Embassy into total incoherence.

*Q: One presidential visit is equivalent to an earthquake.*

BISHOP: This visit was *nine* days. The first question is what can a President do in one country for nine days?

The trip was planned for months. First, the President landed in Xi'an to be greeted. He came to meetings in Beijing, followed by a visit to Shanghai. And he went down to Guilin to take the river cruise, and he went out through Hong Kong.

The political and economic officers had their own headaches setting up the appointments with high officials -- Jiang Zemin, Zhu Rongji -- focusing on the U.S.-China agenda. Everyone else dropped everything to handle the lodging and vehicles and security and communications for two Boeing 747s of visitors. This meant tangling with the Secret Service and the scores of young people -- let me be blunt, ignorant and bossy young people -- sent by the White House for the pre-advance, the advance, the lead and so on.

One of the 747s was completely filled with traveling media. There was the sizable Beijing-based press corps, and hundreds of other journalists arranged their own travel to China from all over Asia. The Japanese and Koreans sent many dozen representatives of the pencil press and video crews. This came to about a thousand journalists, all wanting access and good coverage. Just credentialing the American press was a big hassle of its own. Parenthetically, the Chinese refused visas to two reporters from Radio Free Asia, which became the subject of cables and demarches as the trip drew near.

For USIS, in each city we had to set up all the media coverage, and we had to set up filing centers for all the members of the traveling media that accompanied the President. There wasn't wi-fi in those days. Now, journalists can write stories in their hotel rooms and send them to editors via the internet. Back then, however, we had to set up an old fashioned press center at each location -- hundreds of telephones, hundreds of desks, hundreds of internet lines, an industrial copier, and AIOs to tend to the journalists' wishes. This had to be done in Xi'an, in Beijing, and at all the other stops.

Every Chinese-speaking Public Diplomacy officer in the Foreign Service was yanked out of whatever they were doing. Many retirees were "recalled." George Beasley, for instance, came back, and he set up everything for the Xi'an greet, and then he leapfrogged to Guilin.

As I said, the numbers were intimidating. There was a Boeing 747 that carried the President and his staff, and there was a second 747 for the traveling press. Just hauling the baggage from the aircraft to the hotel, and back, at each stop had to be done with military precision with bossy young Washington staff acting like they were Drill Instructors at Parris Island.

*Q: Why Xi'an?*

BISHOP: Xi'an is where the terra cotta warriors are, so in Xi'an you can see the majesty of China's ancient culture, and its history. It's a pretty interesting city. It provided good photo-ops. Had I been setting things up, though, I would not have made Xi'an the first stop because that is where northern chiefs and kings entered China on their way to pay proper obeisance to the Emperor. President Clinton's stopping in Xi'an fit too easily into a Chinese template.

*Q: This is a kowtow or ...*

BISHOP: Yes, there was some of that image. President Clinton of the so-called mighty superpower has come to China, through Xi'an just like the barbarians of ancient times.

Paul Blackburn, the PAO, was in his real element. Paul's experience with high level visits made him understand that the PAO needed to be with the President's spokesman the whole time. With Consulate PAOs reinforced by TDYers handling public affairs on the other stops, I was the anchor in Beijing.

The visit was quite successful. The joint press conference with Jiang Zemin and Bill Clinton was broadcast live. The President gave a speech at Peking University, and he was interviewed on a radio talk show in Shanghai.

Still, the Chinese were happy to jerk us around. We wanted the joint press conference to be broadcast live. They consistently said no, but then consented, but only an hour and a half before an event scheduled for the middle of the day. Because there was no advance announcement, no one was tuned in. As for the radio talk show in Shanghai, the reach of the program was quite limited.

At any rate, we were doing the USIA thing, trying to really allow the Chinese to hear American leaders unfiltered by how Xinhua or People's Daily would rewrite the story.

I came to understand how Xinhua reported visits by foreign leaders. Here's the simple version. Every visit included a policy speech. The speeches characteristically began with a few words like "it's good to be here in this great country." So the next day's Xinhua lead was "Visitor Calls China a Great Country." The speeches usually include boilerplate about our happy concord and greater progress and partnership and blah de dee blah blah, and then, toward the end, "we still have to make progress on this or that," or "we Americans are concerned about this and the other." These sentences are the policy heart of the speech, but of course they were never reported by Xinhua.

For domestic stories, Xinhua never admits that China has any problems until the Party has started to solve them. Xinhua's China is a kind of la la land. This is why a major Public Diplomacy goal for every visit was to allow American words to be broadcast directly, so that our messages would be heard without being subject to the intermediate editorial hand of Xinhua or the newspapers.

It was gratifying that the President and Mrs. Clinton attended the Chongwenmen Church in Beijing, and Mrs. Clinton and Secretary Albright attended a ceremony at the old synagogue in Shanghai. Our top visitors made it a point to attend worship services in China, to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to religious liberty.

*Q: Haven't these visits to places of worship rankled the Chinese?*

BISHOP: By the late 1990s, I'm sure, the Chinese were used to the requests. They were always to places of worship affiliated with the officially recognized Three-Self Protestant church, so that eased their anxieties. Even so, worshippers in China were cheered by the visits by high-level Americans.

While we're discussing religion, though, let me mention something more. During the 1990s, there was a lot of talk in the United States about the religious right, and in our own domestic discourse it was the dangerous religious right, or the theocratic religious right. I fess up. I'm a member of the religious right. So when Chinese began to take their lead from the U.S. critics, getting all concerned about the impact of the religious right on American politics and U.S.-China relations, it particularly got to me.

These Chinese misreadings fit into the PRC's own historical narrative. In the Party's take on the nineteenth century, the missionaries were just imperialists in disguise, talking happy Jesus talk when their real goal was to keep China down. The Chinese concerns over the religious right also

gave testimony to the strict controls on religion in China.

Over the years I've observed that when religion is a topic of discussion, Foreign Service Officers who themselves are not religious have a kind of tin ear. Too often they don't know how to respond because they don't have a basic sympathy for the effect of religion on a man's or woman's heart. They're not very effective in discussing religion in American society. Say you're having a conversation with the scholars at the Chinese policy institutes, a quiet one with no journalists. They might ask, "What about this religious right in the United States? You know, they seem to be demonizing China."

It's not unlikely that there are FSOs who personally regard the "religious right" with disdain or alarm. "Ohh, religious right," and the roll of the eyes indicates they've dismissed the religious right in their own understanding of American society, and they communicate that it's illegitimate to the Chinese. Just as illegitimate as opposing abortion, say, or gun control. The Chinese have their own tin ears, since all members of the Party have to abjure belief in God when they take their oaths as new members of the Party.

I noticed, then, that questions about "the religious right" indicated that the Chinese lack of understanding about religion was an obstacle to mutual understanding. Our human rights policy certainly draws on religious views, or on views of justice grounded on religious values, and we weren't communicating this well to the Chinese.

So what do you do? The Chinese are very sensitive about religion. They consistently refused to allow us to program speakers in this area. I was looking for an article that I could run in our magazine, *Jiaoliu*, explaining religion in the United States -- a straightforward, scholarly, non-religious article, but one which acknowledged the important role of religion in American society. Once it was translated into Chinese, we could reprint it, we could refer to it, we could put it on our web page, we could do things with it. Alas, I could never find one. Many articles that addressed the topic were not good for Chinese readers because they presumed too much cultural knowledge.

I finally decided there was nothing for me to do but to write an article myself. I spent a month, I suppose, writing out a primer on the place of religion in American society in a strictly factual way. At the end it gave some introduction to religion as a factor in American politics and foreign policy.

I was thinking that it would be published in *Jiaoliu*, but quite to my surprise, when I showed the article to scholars at the Institute of American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, they liked it. They published it in their own journal. I think I may have been the first Embassy officer to have been published by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. My friends at the Academy told me that there was enough buzz about the religious right among senior Chinese leaders that my article "went to the top." I suppose they prepared a cover letter and sent it up the chain. I don't know if Jiang Zemin read it, but it circulated among senior leaders.

The article was published in their journal, *Meiguo Yanjiu*, "American Studies," and it also went on their website. Their imprimatur was a chop saying it is OK to read and cite.

We took the same article and published it in *Jiaoliu* as we originally planned. Of the things I've published in my life -- and I still consider myself an active historian, though in the minor leagues, of course -- that is my most cited article. It's been loaded onto dozens of Chinese websites. The Director of the Institute of American Studies told me on my second tour that it is the most cited article in Chinese social science literature on religion in the United States. I really think I did a good turn for Uncle Sam when I wrote it.

*Q: I assume it was written initially in English.*

BISHOP: Yes, and the Institute of American Studies translated it into Chinese, and our own magazine's translator tweaked it some for the *Jiaoliu* version.

*Q: Can you append it to this interview?*

BISHOP: I think I could, yes.

*Q: Well, this brings up the question of religion and how the Chinese have shown themselves to be extremely sensitive to --*

BISHOP: The Falun Gong.

*Q: Yes. Was that an issue when you were there?*

BISHOP: I have a hard time distinguishing between my first and second tours, but let's talk about religion in general.

Religion looks to a higher authority than government, something higher than the ordinary political order. The Chinese Communist Party established itself as the top of the political, economic, and social order in 1949. Religion's appeal to higher principles is something that Party can't endorse, and indeed regards as inherently subversive, so there's a permanent state of tension between the Party and religion.

At different times believers in China have undergone persecutions. The Chinese constitution, when it was written in 1949, did include a sentence about freedom of religion, just as the Soviet Union's constitution had. But like all Communist constitutions, freedom of religion is one of those things subject to law.

When the People's Republic stood up, the Communist Party and the PRC government established organizations to handle religion, or perhaps to contain it. On the government side, there's a State Administration of Religious Affairs. On the Party side, the United Front Work Department tends religious issues. There are five authorized religious bodies -- the Chinese Patriotic Catholic Association, the Three Self Protestant Association, a Daoist Association, a Buddhist association, and a Muslim association. The Party assures that the leaders of these associations do not allow religion to threaten the basic order, the leadership of the Party, and the fundamental atheism of the state.

So there's a small licit place for religion in Chinese society. If you're a member of any of those religious bodies, though, you forfeit your opportunity to become a Party member because of the oath that Party members have to take. So yes, there's freedom of religion to join one of those five religious organizations, but there are what Jefferson would have called temporal burdens and civil incapacitations that follow from that. A believer knows his worldly advancement will be capped.

It's worth noting that the list of five faiths has some striking omissions. There's no Jewish association even though there have been Jews in China for a thousand years. There's no association for Mormons. The Church of Jesus Christ and Latter Day Saints has long hoped to become an open religion in China. Notice, too, that all the Protestants got grouped together.

By the way, the meaning of "Three Self" is that Protestants in China should be, first, self-propagating. That means there should be no foreign teachers or missionaries. Only Chinese can talk to Chinese about religion. Second, Protestants should be self-supporting, meaning that no foreign money can help build churches or buy Bibles. The third is "self-governing." There can't be any foreigners in religious bodies.

The same principles apply to the other official groups. There can't be a Jesuit university in China. There can't be bishops named by the Pope because that would mean the Holy Father is governing the Church in China. For all the faiths, there can't be subordination to any hierarchy that is not Chinese, which means the Pope or the Dalai Lama or the LDS Quorum of the Twelve.

The system, then, does allow a small and circumscribed place for religion in China, but it is a place subject to extreme vigilance by government and Party.

As the years have gone by, that place has become a little more open, and there's more toleration of these five groups, depending on decade and place. The system has had, however, an unintended side effect.

The five religions -- Catholicism, Protestantism, Buddhism, Daoism, and Islam -- are what I call "mature" religions. All are religions with centuries of meditation on the great moral issues, and also meditation on the relationship between church -- what we would call "church" -- and society. All of them have centuries of experience in dealing with different forms of government.

The desire for values and guidance to help a person through life is written in the human heart. Religions are one way that people find meaning, indeed, the way most people find meaning. This desire for meaning is very intense. Any Chinese will tell you that's a major problem for China in the twenty-first century -- the lack of meaning beyond a richer material life, the lack of a code of morality that supports justice. In the 1950s and 1960s, the Party tried to make China's brand of socialism, socialist rectitude, and the teachings of Chairman Mao the new moral reference point. We can be diplomatically understated and say it didn't work out well, and the Party is now entirely discredited in this role.

Where I'm going is that when the mature religions don't have an opportunity to engage a person,

the heart still has the longing. Without religious teaching, or moral teaching at the least, the longing can go off into crazy directions, like money and fame.

The mature religions can provide all of this, but the door to their revelations, their meditation, their reasoning and to the consolations of faith is only open a crack. Chinese yearnings for faith are as powerful as anywhere in the world, but the Party cannot allow Chinese to embrace faith in something higher than itself. When the mature faiths are not allowed to meet the yearning, immature religions may take their place. One sign is the sway of relatively unlettered Protestant pastors in some rural areas, pastors with a few months of seminary and self-taught Bible study, who can gather some followers. In the Catholic mythology of my youth, you'd hear talk of ignorant country preachers, Protestants of course, derided as "snake handlers." Some of these Chinese countryside preachers remind one a little of that old stereotype.

And then you get new religions, like Falun Gong, which meets the desire for meaning, for solace, for all the things that religion provides. It started from breathing exercises, *qigong*, meditation, and getting your heart to calm down and all of that, but it grew and became a new religion. The Chinese Government's response to it has been ugly.

The meaning of all this for U.S. Public Diplomacy is that there's a constant tension between an America dedicated to religious liberty because of our founding principles, and China, where the government is more or less -- sometimes more, sometimes less, some places more, some places less -- trying to keep the lid on religion.

*Q: As the Embassy's Public Diplomacy person, were you feeling pressure from religious communities in the United States to do something?*

BISHOP: No doubt religious leaders in the U.S. from many faiths spoke to the State Department on Chinese persecution and the need for religious liberty in China, but I never got any calls from Catholics or Protestants or the Mormons to do this. They may have been coming in through other channels, perhaps reaching the Political Section each year when the Human Rights Report was prepared, but I wasn't feeling it. I did it because my conscience demanded it.

This demand met the Public Diplomacy need to figure out China and the communication asymmetries between our two nations, to understand where there was no meeting of the minds, and to help China better understand the U.S. Our posture on religious liberty, and the tension with China that derived from it, didn't come out of nowhere. It wasn't suddenly invented by Jimmy Carter or Ronald Reagan or the "religious right" just to give China a hard time. I wanted them to understand what it was our history and our social order that moved us in this area.

*Q: OK, what about the academic side? I remember, growing up, meeting people who had been in the Yale in China program. Tell us about academic connections between China and the United States.*

BISHOP: Certainly the academic ties between China and the U.S. were growing -- during both my Beijing tours. This is a rather large topic, and we only have time to discuss the wave tops.

One current in the stream was individual students going to study in the other country. The Chinese were limited in the early years after 1979 by lack of English, some; for lack of visas, some more; but mostly because education at American universities was so expensive by their standards. Still, each year there were more Chinese students in the U.S., mostly in graduate programs. And there were more American scholars -- faculty and students -- in China, though the numbers were fewer and their stays were shorter.

Both sides wanted to set up something more permanent than the flow of individual scholars -- longer-term relationships and programs. This dovetailed with the belief that long term educational relationships could help avoid conflict between China and the United States in the future.

Before I came, the Hopkins-Nanjing program had been established. The American students go to Nanjing University where they bunk with Chinese roommates. The Americans take classes in Chinese, and the Chinese take classes in English. But there were beginning to be other programs -- law school programs, language programs, even undergraduate programs. The growth, however, was not symmetric. Far more Chinese were studying in the U.S. than Americans in China. The Chinese went to the U.S. for full degree programs; the Americans came for shorter periods, sometimes for only a few weeks. The Americans in China faced obstacles and sensitivities that Chinese in the U.S. did not encounter.

The asymmetry in numbers was partly a function of language. Chinese, when they applied to study in the United States, had been studying English for years. They will all confess that no matter how long they studied English, they were still shocked when they actually got to the United States and realized how poorly they had been prepared. Still, they were far better prepared than American students going to China. Chinese is taught in few American high schools, so American students start later. And they could only study Chinese at large comprehensive universities. So Americans are way behind in Chinese language study.

*Q: Was there a solid cadre of Chinese students majoring in Americana? American history and so on?*

BISHOP: Every year there were, and there are, more Chinese students who are serious about studying English, and the opportunities to learn English in China are now good enough that there are many university students whose English is quite good even though they had never been to the States. There's some understanding of American society and culture that naturally flows out of learning the language. There's also fascination with, or interest in, America's popular culture. Movies, illegal DVDs, and just the buzz about the United States -- our cultural presence all over the world -- drew people more to us than to the British.

I think, though, that most of the interest in English was not in the first case driven by curiosity or good will or a desire to understand America. Rather it was driven by the desire for good jobs. A young Chinese who could land a job with the Price Waterhouse office in Beijing was on his or her way to success. This is especially true for Chinese women, who have opportunities for advancement in foreign companies that they don't have in their own.

This is where I think the economic opening was ramifying. The opening didn't have just economic effects or trade effects. It also had larger cultural effects by creating incentives for people to study English, and as we've always known, when you study the language, understanding the culture follows.

All that said, I think your question was about American Studies. There's no doubt that Chinese scholars -- from the real experts at the policy institutes to undergraduates writing papers -- were trying to understand America's economy, history, law, society, and so on. Individual students and faculty members were doing so without formal majors or programs in American Studies, and there wasn't an American studies movement or an American Studies society.

There was demand for a movement or a society, but it ran up against the controls established by the Party. A proposal to establish an American studies track at a university, or hold an American studies conference, or recognize a local American studies organization would surely go up the chain and need approval by the Party Secretary. The Party defaulted to a general distrust of the United States, so such approvals were rare.

About the only platform for American Studies at the time was the American Studies Center at Fudan University in Shanghai, which had been set up in the 1980s with the approval of the university's President Xie Xide, who had studied at Smith College in the class of 1949. During the Cultural Revolution she had been barred from teaching and was locked inside a lab for ten months. She cleaned lavatories and swept floors in the Physics Department.

As far as a society was concerned, the Institute for American Studies at CASS had an American Studies Society as one of its affiliates, and the rule was that no local American Studies society could be organized except in concert with CASS. The Party had made this arrangement to crowd out any independent organizing. This wasn't just true of American Studies. No independent women's organization could exist outside the purview of the All China Women's Federation, a Party organization, for instance.

All over the world, USIS posts supported American Studies societies and conferences. In China, we couldn't do so directly. It required some indirection, sponsoring conferences and activities that focused on specific issues rather than on America, and the Party working through the Foreign Affairs Offices of universities and policy institutes could turn the spigot on or off as needed.

*Q: Do I recall that the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade happened while you were in Beijing? That caused major demonstrations, as I recall.*

BISHOP: Yes, a NATO aircraft bombed the Chinese Embassy, killing three, and the NATO aircraft was an American B-2 bomber from Missouri. The circumstances of the mission and the intelligence error that caused the bombs to be dropped on the Chinese Embassy are in the public record, so I don't need to go through them here. I can give one man's view of things from the Embassy, though.

I first heard of the deadly mishap from a journalist on Saturday morning of May 8, 1999. I must

not have had enough coffee that morning, because I didn't anticipate the sharpness of the Chinese reaction to the news. I went to the office in mid-morning to work on efficiency reports. I went home for lunch and went back to my office in the Embassy's Yiban compound afterwards. At about 3 p.m. I received a call from the Marines -- they were calling every office -- to tell me I should leave the Embassy. The word was that the demonstrations were coming.

The outrage in China was quite palpable. My office was at Yiban, and as evening approached angry students and citizens began to protest at Erban and Sanban, the two other Embassy buildings separated by a street between. I was following events from my apartment in the Jianguomenwai Compound a few blocks away, watching it live on CNN. If you ever have a chance to see the television footage, it's quite dramatic.

Where there were entrances, gates, to our two compounds, the People's Armed Police had three rows of men with interlocked arms blocking access. The physical pressure on those policemen was high, and from time to time two young policemen in the front row might lose contact with one another, but the lines held. There was screaming and shouting. Students were climbing the trees on the street to see if they could get over the wall. Hundreds of people were throwing rocks over the walls at the buildings -- many were substantial paving stones. Here and there a Korean-style Molotov cocktail would sail over the wall and burn between the wall and the building.

It was very dangerous. Most everyone had been evacuated from the three Embassy buildings, but not everyone. The Ambassador's residence was behind our USIS offices in the Yiban compound, and Ambassador Sasser's family was hunkered down inside. They moved to the safe haven for the compound, which was the old vault next to my office. Our IO, Bill Palmer, was there with the Ambassador's family members.

Bill had gone through the police lines into our Yiban building to fax the Ambassador's condolences to the Chinese media, but then he couldn't leave. You may recall that President Clinton had done also expressed condolences, but he did it rather off-handedly on the tarmac at Andrews AFB. The optics -- too casual, informal -- were not good and angered the Chinese. Bill Palmer told me that the most tense moments followed the end of a soccer game at People's Stadium. Departing fans poured into the neighborhood and bombarded our Yiban building and the Ambassador's residence with paving stones and rocks.

Still inside the two main buildings were the Marines and about five others including the Ambassador. Things were so dangerous that they began to destroy the Embassy's files in accordance with the destruction plan, going from safe to safe and tossing everything into the shredders.

I digress here and say -- it's very interesting what happens in an Embassy when all the documents have been destroyed. Six months later, a pesky request comes in from Washington for information -- Washington is famous for asking Embassies to search files that could as easily be accessed in the Department, but they like to dump the work on posts. After the records had been shredded, Beijing could reply, "gosh, we don't know. We don't have any records from then." It considerably lightens the burden of work.

Anyway, the documents were being destroyed, and the Ambassador was one of the five Foreign Service people in the building while infuriated people are rioting outside. Once in a while, a Chinese would manage to get over the wall, but would be pulled out by other Chinese or by the People's Armed Police before doing any damage or getting hurt.

The Marines were safely inside the building too. There were no breaches of the doors or windows, and if there had been a penetration all would have retreated into the safe haven. If, in the charged atmosphere, the confusion, the rage, anyone would have been killed -- this is a "what if," it didn't happen -- I think the Embassy would have been razed to the ground. It was, in any case, very touch and go.

The demonstrations continued a second night and a third. The fourth night was calmer.

I have photos of the piles of rubble outside the Embassy from all the paving stones. The walls were stained with eggs and burst bottles of ink. It was the same over at our Yiban building. That was the event.

Paul Blackburn and I would go to our compound each morning -- the streets were calm for a few hours after the night's demonstrations. The compound was full of stones and rocks, all the windows were broken, the offices were strewn with broken glass inside, air conditioners were damaged.

*Q: Where could you go? Could you go home?*

BISHOP: Except for the Ambassador and his family in The Residence, everyone in the Embassy lived in one of the diplomatic compounds. Our apartment was only a few blocks away in the Jianguomenwai compound. We were safe there. Nobody was going to go in and bust their way past the PAP guards and the Brazilians and the Nigerians and the Euros in order to get to us. It was our office buildings that were damaged.

I hope you will have a chance to interview our BPAO in Chengdu, Joe Bookbinder. He has quite a tale of the assault on the Consulate compound and the burning of the Consul General's residence there.

When the crisis passed and the Ambassador was able to leave the compound, he held an impromptu press conference in the parking lot of the Jianguomenwai Diplomatic Compound. I was the one to set it up, and my sister emailed me from Connecticut to say that she saw me in the background. Perhaps five seconds of international exposure! I'm still owed fourteen minutes and 55 seconds of fame.

The Ambassador was calm and reassuring, and in the course of his brief comments he mentioned how steady the Marines had been. A while later, this resulted in a telephone call from Jamie Rubin to Bill Palmer -- to pass the word that the White House didn't want to see any comments from the Embassy that might imply that the Embassy had been the Alamo.

After the bombing and the demonstrations, we in USIS were looking at a wreckage of all the

patient work we had been doing -- in rule of law, and trade, and building mutual understanding and trust. I'm sure our colleagues in DAO were facing even greater wreckage to the mil-to-mil relationship. Paul Blackburn and I realized that the bombing was a real setback. Even though it would take years to repair, we had to do something to restore communication and dialog between the Chinese and U.S. scholars who best understood the long-term challenge of bringing our two nations closer together. It had to be done sooner not later.

Paul came up with the idea of immediately organizing videoconferences between scholars at key Chinese foreign policy institutions and their American counterparts. Getting the Chinese to participate in the videoconferences was the first challenge. The next step was to persuade the Chinese to host quiet, face-to-face gatherings of Chinese and Americans to talk through all the issues that the bombing called forth.

We spent some money on this, generously covering the Chinese institutes for costs -- lodging, meals, honoraria, and so on. Chinese hosts always tried to make some money whenever we hosted an event, charging the foreigners high room and meal rates in hotels their Ministry owned, higher than the rack rates, for instance, and we always tried to trim these costs. After the bombing, however, we paid what they asked -- in order to get things going.

I believe we were successful in getting the Chinese university and policy institute scholars -- all of whom were advisors to ministries -- together with Americans faster than they would have on their own. Fortunately, we could do so from post funding, so that we could make things happen without depending on Washington to dither over money. Paul's idea of jumping right into this was a very good one.

*Q: Well, it does, you know, something that struck me about that and then later the plane collision and al. The Chinese seem to be a very touchy people, and these demonstrations can get going. You kind of wonder, can you really have good relations with such a touchy people?*

BISHOP: Here's my short take on what's a very large question. Dealing with the Chinese on anything, even in calm and ordinary times, you run into some unique features of the Chinese personality -- "face," for instance. Every time you negotiate a deal, or work with the Chinese, there's a chance of unknowingly running up against a Chinese sensitivity.

You might say or do something with the French or the Germans that hit them wrong, but there's enough cultural overlap so that they would understand your intentions and overlook the intercultural faux pas. The Chinese are more distant culturally, and they have their own cultural and behavioral characteristics. When you deal with them, you need to be careful not to do anything that pushes them far enough to get a face-driven negative reaction. You must know these general features of the Chinese personality that have been thousands of years, I suppose, in the making.

Then, there's another factor to deal with -- the narrative, the Chinese understanding of their own history. The Party's and the PRC's narrative of Chinese modern history is that in 1500s, 1600s, and 1700s, China was the most advanced, the most humane, the most prosperous society in the world. Then the Europeans came and made China submit. China's centuries of shame began with

the First Opium War in 1842. And, according to the narrative, the whole history of the 19<sup>th</sup> and early 20<sup>th</sup> century was the West keeping China down, denying China its rightful place in the world, taking advantage of China. This narrative was expressed early in the 20th century by those who founded the old Republic, and the Communists sharpened it. It had, and has, the advantage of pointing to others as the cause of China's woes.

The narrative is deeply seared into the Chinese mind, and there are ripple effects. When the Communists took over in 1949, they liked the narrative, gave it Marxist, Communist, and revolutionary characteristics. They built on the narrative that described foreigners as imperialists whose predations were motivated by the aim of keeping China down. In the late 1940s, members of the PLA were taught by their political officers that the U.S. was as great an enemy as Chiang Kai-Shek.

The narrative is taught in the schools. The Party assures that museums, or television dramas, or anniversary celebrations, repeat the narrative. All the versions of the narrative in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were strongly anti-American. The Chinese took to heart many of the Soviet Union's criticisms of the U.S. and capitalism. I noticed this from looking at PRC magazines from that time before the Sino-Soviet split. The PRC magazine *Manhua* drew on all the same visual tropes as the Soviet Union's *Krokodil*.

Even after 1979 when China turned direction with Deng Xiaoping's policy of opening, the features of that narrative never changed. It takes a party decision to allow the narrative to be changed. Individual Chinese scholars might come to understand that the outcome of the Opium Wars were as much China's fault as they were the West's. They might understand that the Dowager Empress did more to diminish China's standing in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century when she crushed China's own self-strengthening movement than did the foreign powers. Scholars might understand that the Boxer Rebellion was not what Party historians said it was. You could talk with individual scholars here and there and help them see a new view of things. But to get the Party to change what is taught in the schools -- that was something we could not accomplish.

Nanjing was where the first treaty between the United States and China was signed. Inside a park there's a pavilion where the documents were signed and exchanged. The park is one of Nanjing's "patriotic bases." Every school child in the city, sometime during their education, will tour the patriotic base stations. At the park where the treaty with the U.S. was signed, the Party tour leaders talk about the unequal treaties. The "unequal treaty" with the U.S. was far less unequal than those with other Western powers. It offered more opportunities and partnership to China in the 19<sup>th</sup> century than the treaties signed with the other imperial powers. Still, at the patriotic base, the United States is grouped with all of them. This is all part of the problem of "narrative" that U.S. Public Diplomacy encounters.

When I wrote the paper on religion in the U.S., I was trying to challenge the Chinese narrative on religion. When you organize American studies conferences, you're trying to challenge or perhaps chip away at the narrative. The narrative is so strong, and it has been taught so thoroughly, however, that whatever headway you make in the face of the narrative is highly vulnerable to any shock in U.S.-China relations. The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade provided that kind of shock, and all the old feelings of distrust re-emerged, multiplied by the outrage and

anger.

In the aftermath of the bombing, Chinese scholars that I knew appeared on television to help explain what was going on to viewers. Even though I knew these scholars to be thoughtful, knowledgeable, friends of the United States, and perhaps even “liberal” in the Chinese context, when they were faced by outraged Chinese opinion, they said things that conformed to the Party’s narrative instead of what they knew in their own mind to be the circumstances.

*Q: There was a scandal involving the President while you were in China.*

BISHOP: Yes. Paul Blackburn and I both happened to be working in our two offices in Yiban one Saturday morning when the Monica Lewinski news first broke.

*Q: As embarrassing as it comes.*

BISHOP: Yes! We realized even at the time of the first report that this might become Watergate all over again -- a major crisis that would engulf the Presidency. As things unfolded over the weeks and months, our worst prognosis alas proved justified.

*Q: Actually it boiled down to a congressional coup.*

BISHOP: That's one way to look at it ...

*Q: The president --*

BISHOP: Well, it was possible that it would go away, but at the same time we realized this could be really big, really big. I remember that on the following Monday we had our regular tight staff meeting of PAS Americans. One of our AIOs had been hiking in the woods that weekend and hadn't heard the news. She asked, “What’s this? What are you talking about?” And Paul said, “We may be on the edge of a major constitutional crisis.”

When Paul and I talked about it on Saturday, though, we sensed that it could have an effect not just in Washington but also on the Embassy. I told Paul, “OK, here's the only solution for the President.” This is a joke, a public affairs strategy joke, you understand. “He should drive immediately to Lynchburg. He should go to Sunday services at Jerry Falwell's congregation.”

*Q: A very conservative Christian ...*

BISHOP: Yes, head of the Moral Majority. “Go to Jerry Falwell’s church, and when in an Evangelical way Falwell asks, 'anyone who would like to repent should come forward,' the President should walk down the aisle, fall on his knees, and confess.” That would clear the air of any denials. And it would also split the religious right into two groups -- the group that wouldn't forgive him, and the group that would say “oh, he’s seen the light. If he can repent, we must be Christian and forgive him.” End of joke.

Still, as things turned out, it would have been good advice -- good from the public affairs angle

(admit wrongdoing right away, don't think you can hide something), and good from the political angle!

*Q: Before we leave Monica Lewinski, what did you do? I mean, how did you play it?*

BISHOP: As the crisis unfolded, Chinese officialdom was completely nonplussed. What on earth was going on? So much ado about nothing! Don't these Americans have odd hangups?

Of course, some Embassy officers were also nonplussed, and I'd say the reactions at the Embassy paralleled what Americans were thinking at home. Those Americans at the Embassy who were more politically liberal downplayed the crisis and the President's infidelity, and those who were more conservative were dismayed. In China, however, those among us who were critical of the President's behavior could hardly say so. This is because the Foreign Service always defaults to supporting an administration, and defaults to downplaying political earthquakes.

As the scandal unfolded, I came to a conclusion about Public Diplomacy. When an individual officer is convinced, on any issue, he or she argues and advocates. When an officer doubts, or lacks conviction, she just explains.

There was plenty to explain without taking sides in the U.S. domestic battle. As in, here are the provisions in the Constitution about impeachment. Here's the precedent of Andrew Johnson. Here is how hearings work. A special prosecutor can do this, and can't do that. Did you know the House impeaches, the Senate tries? Here's what the managers do. And so on. It was a good opportunity to acquaint the Chinese with parts of American governance they weren't familiar with.

Said again, when Americans are overseas as diplomats, we don't show our own Democrat or Republican preferences to foreigners. We always speak on behalf of the administration. If you have personal misgivings about a policy, the way you get around them is to say, well, let me explain: this side says this; that side says that. In this way you don't play your own hand.

Another example: If the Chinese asked you about the many Americans who criticized the religious right – saying it had run amok in criticizing the President – the right way to handle the question is to explain -- that there's economic America, political America, and there's religious America as well. So in many ways I think our response was simply to explain.

I recall explaining the impeachment process to one Chinese contact, who had picked up on the idea that impeachment was way disproportionate to the events. I still remember using a phrase I had heard in the U.S. commentary -- that the President's transgressions “hadn't risen to the level of impeachment.” As soon as the words were out of my mouth, I felt a twinge of disgust at what I had just said. I felt like a shill from the easy temporizing.

You asked a short question. I'm afraid the answer was too long. I'd say we just explained what was happening.

*Q: I think you wanted to mention consolidation.*

BISHOP: Yes, the consolidation between USIA and State happened during my first tour in Beijing.

It had been talked about for years and years, but every time the talk waxed, it waned, it seemed to go away. I sense that most USIA people overseas had heard “wolf” cried so many times, we didn't think it was going to happen. But indeed it did.

My view of it -- an uninformed view because I was overseas, not seeing the inside game in Washington -- is that Jesse Helms had some burrs under his saddle about foreign policy and foreign aid. There were three independent federal agencies that were also involved in foreign policy -- USIA, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and USAID. His deepest rancor was for USAID. That's the scalp he wanted. But USAID was blessed at that time with a very vigorous and outspoken director, Brian Atwood. And USIA was in the hands of Joe Duffey. I don't think he understood the stakes.

First, ACDA was tossed into State. That was the first play. And then it came down to USIA or USAID. I still think that Jesse Helms wanted USAID, but the administration tossed the USIA bone to the howling pack. That's why USIA was folded into State, and USAID remained an independent agency.

*Q: I've talked to people who served under Duffey in Washington.*

BISHOP: And ...

*Q: And first place, said one, he was weak. And two, that he really wasn't very interested in the job or anything. I mean, you know, I mean he comes across as --*

BISHOP: I can't say that I have any insight into Director Duffey's thinking, but I've heard the same. He didn't grasp the threat to USIA, and many thought he was too passive as it unfolded.

*Q: Well then, how did this affect you in Beijing?*

BISHOP: On September 30, 1999, we were USIA employees. On October 1, we belonged to State.

One effect was on a PAO's annual evaluations. In USIA, each PAO received two ER's, one from the Ambassador, and one from the USIA area director.

*Q: ER -- efficiency report.*

BISHOP: Efficiency report? Evaluation report? A PAO had two reports in the file every year, one from the Ambassador about how you were achieving the Mission's goals, and one from the USIA area director saying how you were managing the post (the area director was in a position to be able to compare posts) and working on the administration's objectives.

After consolidation, there was no longer an area director. The Public Diplomacy Office Directors who inherited the rump of the old area offices no longer had any input to evaluations, and they had no standing when promotion panels convened.

In the new dispensation, the PAO's single reporting official was at post, and it was no longer the Ambassador. The annual evaluation was signed by the DCM with the Ambassador as reviewer. The effect of this was that PAO's came much more firmly under the Ambassador's guidance as communicated by the DCM. PAO's also had less direct access to the Ambassador than before.

Similarly, a Branch Public Affairs Officer just became a Consulate's Public Affairs Officer. Their evaluations were now written by their Consul General instead of by the Deputy Public Affairs Officer. This weakened the ability of a Country PAO to organize a unified countrywide Public Diplomacy program.

My own observation was that when they gained direct supervision of the PAO and Public Diplomacy programs, DCMs and Ambassadors got way more interested and more controlling. They wanted, for instance, to approve ever U.S. speaker that came to China. In general, their preference was that no one could be invited who was not a 100 percent advocate of the administration's policy. They felt they could name individual contacts to be International Visitors. They were much more explicit about it than they had been earlier.

On September 30, we had a USIA Executive Officer for USIS China. Our Executive Officer in China was Vince Raimondi, one of the best. September 30 was his last day in our building. He was immediately moved over to the Embassy's Management section in the Erban compound. We no longer had our own dedicated management person. In the Management section, Vince was given three portfolios. He was additionally given, as I recall, oversight of communications and the medical unit. On October 1, then, we had one third of Vince's time, not full time.

And ... though it wasn't an issue in Beijing, all over the world DCMs who had small cars were happy to take over the PAO's larger cars. That transfer of the cars became such an issue -- things were a little crazy.

So, consolidation affected our daily operations in many ways. As I said, Paul Blackburn had one third of an Executive Officer available to help us from the Management Section, but there was no real diminishment of the administrative burden on a PAO. Several of our "admin" FSNs were "crosswalked" into the Management Section. The work still needed to be done, and the nearest officer with some management experience was the Deputy Public Affairs Officer, meaning me. I know from talking to my counterparts in New Delhi and Seoul and Tokyo -- we DPAOs felt like we had been hit by a train as consolidation wrenched us into assuming so much administrative work.

The consolidation had another particular effect on me. Looking ahead to my transfer in the summer of 2000, the last USIA assignment panel, meeting in July of 1999, named me to be the Country PAO in Kuala Lumpur. That was considered to be the real plum among PAO assignments for a Class One officer in the East Asia and Pacific area. Kuala Lumpur was often described as a country club assignment.

Then, about three weeks later, the last USIA promotion panel promoted six officers to the Senior Foreign Service, and I was one. I went from being an FS-1 to be an FE-OC, a Counselor. This eventually set in motion my next assignment in Nigeria.

*Q: OK, so we'll pick this up the next time when you're off to Nigeria.*

BISHOP: Nigeria, 2000 to 2002.

*Q: Today is the March 8, 2011, with Don Bishop. As you left, whither China?*

BISHOP: Oh, whither China?

The Chinese are a wonderfully likeable people. We often focus on differences between Americans and others, but I found there are some deep symmetries between our culture and theirs. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, much of the fellow feeling, the mutual attraction, had been communicated, both ways, by the missionaries and by the early exchanges. It was given additional impetus by the Second World War.

They are direct and frank, even more than we are. They value education like we do. They work hard, like Americans do. So I believe that the cultural compatibility of China and the United States can provide a good basis for the relationship. However, that cultural attraction ran up against the views of the new PRC Government in 1949, and during the Korean War we became bitter enemies. During the Korean War the PRC government was fighting us, and at the same time they were vilifying us among China's people, going on and on about American imperialism, and cooking up falsehoods about germ warfare.

After 1979, when Deng Xiaoping decided on the opening policy, there was potentially an opportunity to restore the cooperation and friendship between China and the United States. There's a magnetic attraction between the two cultures. Our two economies complement one another. The huge volume of trade shows there's an economic attraction as well. But the Chinese Communist Party, is ever anxious to sustain its power. Party leaders understood well enough that the Party's corruption and its many other shortcomings undermine its standing among ordinary Chinese. The CCP always finds it useful to keep stoking Chinese nationalism. The Party's brand of Chinese nationalism still draws heavily on the historical narrative of Chinese victimization and the role of the predatory Yankees that the party developed and propagated before and after 1949.

All this means that a closer long term relationship between China and the United States depends on allowing the cultural and economic attraction to get us through the political differences. The obstacle to that is the Communist Party.

Among Chinese institutions, moreover, the institution that is most heavily ideologized, and the most isolated from the rest of Chinese society and from the world, is the People's Liberation Army, the PLA.

Remember that, formally, the PLA is not China's army, it's the Chinese Communist Party's army.

Remember too that the PLA is the Chinese institution that has been receiving budget increases of 10 percent or more every year. Remember that it's a black box, meaning we don't know much about its internal dynamics. The PLA's political officers keep it ideologically pure. And the PLA holds in its heart the desire to make China a power that can challenge the United States. And anyone who has served in the Defense Attaché Office in Beijing will testify that the Chinese refuse, or slow down, or strangle every confidence-building initiative that DOD proposes -- refuse the open hand, so to speak.

So who knows where China's future will go? Its direction depends in large part on more liberalization in knowledge and culture, more room for faith to give Chinese a moral anchor, and it depends on the eventual unraveling of that Party narrative of Chinese history.

*Q: Well, one thinks of how the Japanese Military got Japan into deep trouble --*

BISHOP: Yes, it certainly did. That's right, though you've understated it. Militarized Japan brutalized and agonized half the world.

*Q: Well, you know, I've talked to people who served in Poland before the system there collapsed. And they said that, you know, for the last 10 years of communist rule they felt that there are probably maybe three, maybe four dedicated Marxists in Poland. How stands Marxism in China? We're talking about when you left there.*

BISHOP: Whether it was my first or my second tour, you could find officials who were pretty well schooled in Marxism. They knew their doctrines because they had received pretty hard line Marxist-Leninist-Maoist indoctrination early in their careers. They could still recite it.

For China's ordinary people, though, the hold of that ideology had long since disappeared. There were legacy attitudes that remained -- a nostalgia for the equality Chairman Mao espoused, the distrust of foreigners, the feeling of victimization. There was legacy disinformation, of which the charge of germ warfare in Korea was one. But ordinary people no longer cited socialism and communism as motivating principles.

The Party -- that's five percent of the Chinese population -- has made a deal with the rest of the Chinese people. It's an unwritten deal, an unspoken deal. It's that so long as we, the Party, deliver economic development, better jobs, more money, a better life, then don't challenge us. So far they're still able to deliver.

Underlying that crude deal is a judgment about human nature -- that people respond to economic stimuli. This is, of course, economic determinism, which we can say is another legacy of Marxism. The Party and the Chinese people agree on a system of governance based on economic self-interest.

The first thing to say is that I'm signed on with Michael Novak, George W. Bush, and increasingly President Obama that the desire for democracy and self-government is in the human

heart. This means that China, in the long run, has to somehow, like Taiwan did in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, let go of the commanding Party-State system. There must be more room for China's people to feel the sense of empowerment and dignity that comes with self-government, with democratization.

And there's another thing to say about the economic determinism that underlies the Party's deal with the Chinese people. My view of human nature is that while economics is an important factor in any society, and people indeed have economic needs that have a certain priority in life, there are other yearnings in the human heart beyond economics, beyond materialism, beyond consumerism, beyond money. There are yearnings for justice, and for knowledge of God, and for meaning in life. The Party is not providing these nonmaterial goods.

Thanks for giving me some time to assert some convictions.

*Q: Well, we'll check on this in a decade's time.*

**G. EUGENE MARTIN**  
**Deputy Chief of Mission**  
**Beijing (1999-2000)**

*A Specialist in Chinese Affairs and a speaker of Chinese, Mr. Martin spent the major part of his career dealing with matters relating to China, both in Washington and abroad. His overseas assignments included Hong Kong, Taipei, Huangzhou (formerly Canton), Beijing, Manila and Rangoon. His Washington assignments also concerned China and the Far East. Mr. Martin was born in Indiana of Missionary parents and was raised in the US. and India. He is a graduate of Kalamazoo College and Syracuse University. Mr. Martin was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 1999.*

*Q: What happened in 1999 when you left Manila for the second time?*

MARTIN: After 33 years in the Foreign Service and without an ambassadorship in sight, I decide it was time to retire and do something different. I left Manila in early July, moved back into our house in Washington, took the transition course at FSI, and began to look for new opportunities.

*Q: But then you got called again.*

MARTIN: I guess opportunity found me. As soon as I got back to Washington that July, Steve Schlaikjer, the country director for Chinese-Mongolian Affairs, called and asked if I'd be willing to go to Beijing as DCM. I said I was about to retire, and I thought it a little late to change plans at that point. In typical Chinese fashion, where one asks three times to determine if a refusal is genuine or just polite, he kept after they me. The third time, the ambassador designate, Admiral Joseph Prueher, who had been the Navy Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), called and

urged me to come join him. Initially he said for three years, but since I had retired and the Department would not return me to the promotion track, I agreed to go for one year until they found somebody else. I insisted on being returned to the Foreign Service rather than going on TDY status so my wife could join me. So I was sworn back into the FS (oddly, in front of a poster of Moscow's Red Square) and resumed my career, minus promotability and extra retirement credit.

*Q. When you went to China in 1999, what was the situation, both internally in China and then in Sino-American relations.*

MARTIN: It was a rather turbulent time. Exchange visits by Presidents Clinton and Jiang Zemin in 1998 seemed to move Sino-American relations to a more positive level. Then Premier Zhu Rongji's spring 1999 visit to Washington fell apart when the Administration was unwilling (or unable) to conclude a permanent normal trade relations agreement at the last minute. This was followed a few weeks later by the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade. No Chinese has been willing to accept U.S. explanations of mistaken targeting. The resulting anger among Chinese students and the government's need to permit managed demonstrations against the U.S. chancery further strained relations. Added to these frictions was Washington's insistence on pushing its annual resolution in the Human Rights Commission; nagging trade disputes and periodic complaints about the Chinese government's lack of control over proliferation activities of its supposed private companies.

On the positive side, by November, the 13-year effort to reach an agreement with China on its accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) was finally successful. The WTO agreement helped dissipate some of the earlier tensions which, between May and November, caused Sino-American relations to be very frosty. The fact that Beijing was still willing and able to make the many concessions to reach the trade agreement shows how eager the government was to join the WTO.

Jim Sasser, who had been the ambassador during the previous three years, had left shortly after the May demonstrations over the Belgrade bombing (which the embassy called the "rock concert"), and DCM Bill McCahill was chargé for most of six months. Bill had been in Beijing over three years and was exhausted from his direct engagement in the WTO talks as well as the post-Belgrade tensions. I believe Washington was eager to find ways to improve relations. I think that's why Joe Prueher was picked. It was decided that it would be useful for him to go out and to try to establish a good, firm relationship with the Chinese. He had established a good relationship with the People's Liberation Army when he was the CINCPAC commander.

Prueher did not seek the job. I think he agreed to do it because he realized that he probably was the only one who would or could be confirmed by the Senate. I think a career Foreign Service person could not have been confirmed by the Senate, particularly given Senator Helms views. Joe made a great effort to make sure he touched all the bases on the Hill when he was having his consultations before his hearings. The hearings went well and he was confirmed without difficulty. His military background and apolitical stance helped.

*Q: Did you go out together?*

MARTIN: No. I went out early. In fact, I was on leave in Michigan when he called me and asked if I would work with him. When he agreed to my proposal to go for only one year, I came back to Washington, did some quick consultations during the month of November, and went out the end of November, 1999.

Being recalled to the FS was an interesting event as this was still a rather new phenomenon in the State Department. Not many people are recalled. I knew that Tom Pickering had been recalled after he had resigned or had retired, and I figured, "Well, if it's good enough for Tom, it's good enough for me!" So I said I wanted to be recalled into full active duty and not go out on TDY or as a WAE (when-actually-employed) because I wanted to take my family with me. It took some negotiation but as they were eager to get somebody out there to work with a first time political ambassador, the Department was willing to give me pretty much anything I wanted. We had already made family plans for Thanksgiving and Christmas plans but I agreed to go out in November after Thanksgiving, relieve Bill McCahill, be there until the ambassador arrived in December, and then come back for Christmas break to pack up and return with my wife in January.

I arrived in Beijing the end of November and Bill McCahill turned the embassy over to me about the first of December. Ambassador Prueher arrived on the ninth. The Chinese seemed eager to have a U.S. ambassador after nearly six months so arranged for President Jiang Zemin to receive his credentials after only a few days. The credential ceremony was in the Great Hall of the People and followed by a rather lengthy sit-down discussion of bilateral relations in a small anteroom. The warm reception Ambassador Prueher received indicated the importance the Chinese attached to the relationship and their desire to move ahead and to have a good bilateral relations with the United States.

*Q: Why did the Chinese turn the accidental bombing of their embassy in Belgrade into such a big thing, allowing mobs to get out and scream and yell. It would seem to be counterproductive. We were abject in our apologies as the bombing was a horrible mistake.*

MARTIN: It's part of the psyche of our relationship. The leadership, I think, realized this, but the initial reaction was really a visceral one. The problem is that they still are not sure what our motives are. They read what is said in Congress and in the press. They see people attacking China on human rights issues. They learn of U.S. military planning which focuses on China as a growing strategic threat. They believe the U.S. sees China as a future competitor if not threat that we need to keep down or prevent from reestablishing itself as a world power and as an equal among nations. China's political system and experience leads the government and Party to see these disparate issues as part of a big, master U.S. plan to contain China politically and economically if not strategically with the ultimate goal of changing their communist system.

This gets into the whole question of international equality and China's role in the world, China's rightful place in the world. I believe it is all part of the Chinese psyche that for the last 200 years they have been kept down by the West, first by invasions, encroachments, and extraterritoriality. They still have this sense of humiliation, of being picked upon; and so when something like the Belgrade bombing happens, the initial reaction is to see it as an intentional act by the U.S. to

humble China.

We said, “But it was a terrible mistake! It was a targeting error. We thought it was a different building. We didn’t realize it was the Chinese embassy. Etc. Etc.”

And they answered, “That can’t be true! You can’t make a mistake! You’re the world’s only remaining superpower. You’re the one with all the technological advantages. Your bombs are all guided so go where they are directed. You don’t make these mistakes.”

My effort to try to explain that during the Gulf War most of the casualties on the American side were self inflicted, that friendly fire killed a lot of the Americans who died during the war. But it didn’t cut any ice. And there’s also a rising sense of nationalism in China.

*Q: So the Chinese played the nationalistic card.*

MARTIN: Yes. I think the government was discomfited because of the visceral reaction by the younger people particularly, who saw this as an out and out U.S. purposeful action because China had not been supportive of U.S. efforts in Kosovo. China opposed our use of NATO rather than the UN to legitimize our engagement and bombings. The government felt that it had to let the people, students particularly, demonstrate over the embassy bombing. I don’t think they expected the demonstrations would go as far as they did. People told me, when I was there subsequently, that the government felt it had no choice. If it did not allow the students to demonstrate in a controlled manner, including throwing rocks and bricks at the outside of the embassy, students could have demonstrated against the government for not supporting Chinese interests. I think that this was their quid pro quo - they allowed groups of students to come in a controlled manner. Colleagues of mine who were there said police at the barricade at the end of the block let in groups of 50 or a 100 students at a time to protest and throw bricks at the embassy, then move on. The police served like ushers in a movie theater, keep one crowd out until the show is over by the first group. They move offstage, and the next group moves on. But after two or three days of venting, the government clamped down and banned further protests. During those two or three days, they actually bused people in. The police and the security forces maintained control of who was demonstrating, but they allowed them to demonstrate. They really tore up the embassy. The picture of Jim Sasser in the shattered doorway certainly showed the damage.

*Q: Did this demonstration, and the trashing of the embassy have an effect on embassy personnel, souring their view of relations with China?*

MARTIN: Yes, it soured many of them! Those who left in the summer were the lucky ones. Many of those who had to stay another two or three years became quite cynical and did not enjoy it much. That was part of my effort, to try to rebuild morale in the embassy, to help them see that it was a staged venting of Chinese nationalistic fervor wasn’t against them personally.

The important thing to remember is what you saw in the U.S. press and what you saw on the embassy building itself was localized. It was all within about a two-block area. Outside of that, people were not affected. U.S. businesses went on as usual; embassy staff, American and

Chinese, came and went without much trouble. The bombing did come up in conversations regularly. When taxi drivers or shopkeepers learned you were American, they would say what a terrible thing we had done, why was the U.S. anti-China, etc. This continued throughout the year that I was there.

*Q: I'm thinking more towards the 2001 EP-3 incident, but I remember seeing a cartoon showing an American looking rather exasperated at a small, little Chinese, like a schoolboy, and says, "All right. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Now why don't you grow up," or something like that. But I mean because in the second case, it was obviously an error on the part of the Chinese. This wasn't on your watch, but it does signify sort of a feeling that there are people that no matter what you do they'll always be looking for signs of 'Do you love me,' 'Do you hate me.'*

MARTIN: They take offense quickly. Partly it's the sense that the foreigner might be trying to harass them, or suppress them, or take advantage of them. This comes again from the 200 years experience they've had with the West, from the early 1800s. As I tell my class here, there is a well-instituted sense of humiliation in China. They carry this Humiliation 101 to the  $n^{\text{th}}$  degree. They teach it from preschool on up - that China's situation is caused by foreigners, it's only because China was weak and not strong, and it's only the Communist Party, which is able to give China back its rightful place in the world. When this mantra is drummed into students throughout their education, people will react in that way. I think the Internet is increasing information flow, and giving people access to information from other than the Party. As China opens up to the world, the Party's controls are beginning to break down. But the foundation of humiliation has been laid and will continue to influence Chinese perceptions for quite a while.

*Q: What happened to business and cultural relations?*

MARTIN: Business relations basically went on without much interruption. There were a couple days when American businessmen laid low; they didn't go out; they didn't have any major visits by home office people. But very quickly it was made clear by their Chinese interlocutors that they were not held responsible, that the U.S. government was held responsible. And as usual, the way the Chinese play it, the Chinese and American people are friends, there's no problem between the peoples of the two countries, and businesses can continue because it's beneficial to both sides. It's just on the governmental level. This is the typical traditional Chinese view - that if it wasn't for the government, we'd all get along wonderfully!

*Q: What were you seeing in terms of changes in Chinese society in the three years you were away?*

MARTIN: They had become much more open. The access to the Internet and the access to information from any number of international sources was much greater. The other thing I would mention is that I was in Guangzhou before, and I came back and went to Beijing. Beijing is very much of a capital city. Guangzhou is perhaps like San Francisco, whereas Beijing is Washington, and bureaucratic, and is more formal and official than Guangzhou. The Cantonese people tend to be less interested in politics and more interested in business, money, and getting ahead. It is a very different environment and impacts the embassy's perspective and also how the embassy and the Chinese officialdom interact. However, generally my impression in those three years was that

China was continuing to develop and open up rapidly.

There's a lot more of what I call personal space for people. It's not individual rights, but individual space perhaps is a better term. People talk more freely. They didn't feel as confined or as restricted in what they said. Taxi drivers, of course, like anyplace else in the world, were great interlocutors, and they were willing to talk about just about anything, and what a bunch of bums were running the country, and so forth. Shopkeepers would complain about the situation, people on the street that you'd meet, even the academics that you met in official receptions, delegations and conferences were much more open about criticisms of how China was changing. Many of them were still cautious in terms of criticizing the leadership directly or criticizing the system, but they were always trying to make the point that we are moving, we are progressing, but we need to continue to make reforms and changes, particularly on the economics side. The problem is that economic reforms have gone about as far as they can go without becoming politically sensitive. This is what we're seeing now, as the economic situation becomes increasingly difficult for state owned enterprise workers thrown out of work by bankrupt or corrupt firms or farmers protesting illegal taxes and having land taken from them by corrupt officials.

*Q: As you arrived, you had an embassy which still was shaken by the demonstrations. It's not a lot of fun to have not just stones thrown at you, but to feel that the government's behind it. What does that do to you relationship with contacts, friendships and other Chinese interlocutors? How do you go about restoring morale?*

MARTIN: The approach I took was to try to develop more of a community in the embassy. The embassy's staff was quite diverse. Some of them, of course, were the China cadre, who has learned Chinese, had spent much, if not all, of their career on China. They love China, they know the culture, they know the language, they have friends, and so forth. These people understood the situation better; they know that it's a transient, not a personal thing against them, that it's something that is done for political necessity. The other side of the embassy were people who didn't really know China - who are not there because it's China, but because it's an assignment.

This was more difficult group of people to help. These were the people who were alienated, people who felt threatened, people who felt it was more than they could take. Trying to work with people who may not have known much about China and the causes of events - the communicators, the office management specialists, the admin officers, even consular officers - was difficult. These were the people I tried to spend some time with to try to get them to understand the situation.

*Q: Could you get them out of the American community to learn more about the "real China"?*

MARTIN: I wonder what the "real" China is anymore. The country is changing so fast. Beijing is light years apart from rural China which one can find just a few miles outside the rapidly expanding urban area. But one has to be motivated and interested in seeing and learning about the different aspects of the country. And after being attacked by screaming mobs, that is hard to encourage.

The difficulty of the Chinese language is a real barrier. If an employee does not speak or read

Chinese, or is unable or afraid to use basic Mandarin, he or she feels very isolated. "Compounditis" or cabin fever builds up and people are reluctant to go out of the Embassy community. Fortunately, unlike in the early years, Beijing has become quite a cosmopolitan city with a lot of things people can do outside the diplomatic circle. They can go to restaurants, the theater, to movies, go bowling. The embassy had few recreational facilities besides a small swimming pool and happy hour at the Marine House on Friday nights. But people had established a bowling league, for which one didn't have to have the language. A British hiking club organized walks in the countryside, on the Great Wall which appealed to some. The Beijing expatriate community had grown to probably 100,000 or more foreigners by the time I was there, and so one could have a lot of contact with Australians, Brits, or other Westerners. There were also numerous restaurants, bars, and night clubs to frequent, everything from New York delis to Aussie bars to Middle Eastern restaurants with belly dancing performances. All it took was a willingness to get out and explore what was available.

My wife worked with the Community Liaison Officer (CLO) to foster an active spouses club which engaged family members in activities - tours, shopping trips, discussions. Spouses often felt even more isolated while employees when to work. When we arrived, most of the staff lived in apartments in Chinese Foreign Ministry run housing compounds for diplomats. While the Embassy administrative section provided maintenance, furniture, and support, all diplomats were lumped together so you never knew which country your neighbor may be from. Housing became one of Joe Prueher and my major endeavors.

*Q: How did you find your contacts with the Chinese authorities? Were you coming down from this certain high because of the World Trade Organization negotiations?*

MARTIN: Yes. I think the WTO agreement was an excellent ramp up to Joe and my assignment. By the time I got there, everybody was feeling much better because of that agreement. We felt that we had a chance to get back on track of reestablishing relations. We still had the ongoing negotiations over compensation for the Belgrade bombing mistake. The State Department Legal Advisor and others came in and out, a couple times in the first few months, negotiating over what was going to be paid to repay for the damage that we caused at the embassy.

*Q: And how about the victims?*

MARTIN: The victims had been paid off very early. The families of the people who were killed in the attack were paid very promptly. I think by June or July that check had already been delivered. This was the compensation for damage to the embassy itself, which I think in the end came out to 28 million dollars. The problem was more on our end, I think, because everybody who was responsible, or irresponsible, insisted that the State Department pay for it, rather than DOD, or CIA, or whoever mistakenly target the Chinese Embassy. State had to go through a Congressional budget process and get an extra line item in the budget. Congressional views of China influenced this, as in, "we're not going to pay anything to the Chinese Communists, etc." Eventually things worked out but the negotiations were pretty arduous. Several times when the delegation was there, they went on all night. The final agreement was reached, I think, at four-thirty in the morning after having gone for several days almost straight through.

When I arrived, things did seem a little bit more on the up. Bill McCahill turned the Mission over to me on a Thursday evening, saying said, “Okay. It’s all yours! You take it from here.” The next morning the Foreign Ministry called saying they wanted Chargé McCahill to come in for a demarche. Bill says, “It’s all yours! I’m out of here!” So I went over for my first meeting. My interlocutor was Yang Jiechi, (subsequently the Chinese ambassador to Washington and in 2007, Foreign Minister). We had known each other when he was the DCM in Washington and I was on the China desk. We had not seen each other for several years so he welcomed me warmly. Then we sat down, and he launched into a tough statement on Taiwan about how we were not living up to the three communiqués, encouraging Taiwan independence, etc. After I agreed to report his message to Washington, we stood up, he welcomed me to Beijing and escorted me to the door. I felt like I was right back in the swing of things.

*Q: Speaking about these three communiqués, were we living up to what we said, and were the Chinese living up to what they said?*

MARTIN: I think you have to look at the political situation at the time of those communiqués - the time that Kissinger and Nixon made the agreement on the Shanghai Communiqué and the subsequent ones. The recent to-do over what Kissinger agreed to, and what he said about Taiwan; the differing interpretations by the PRC and the U.S. which have come out in the press recently, all put different spins on the communiqués. At the time, I think there was less attention paid to Taiwan and Taiwan’s future than there was to the importance of doing something that would keep the Soviet Union off balance. That was the main goal, both for China and for the United States. We saw our interest as being parallel in that regard, and would have been happy to have Taiwan left out. The Chinese insisted on having something said about Taiwan. We agreed to it, but in subsequent years, I think that we’ve taken an extremely loose and liberal interpretation of what we agreed to.

Have the Chinese lived up to it? I think the Chinese have continued to push the best they can. They continued to insist that they reserved the right to use force against Taiwan if it doesn’t go their way. I think they’re very frustrated by the fact that they thought that the communiqués were going to start the process that would eventually force, or persuade (perhaps the better way) Taiwan to come back to the fold. But it hasn’t happened, and Taiwan has become democratic now, which makes it much more difficult for us to pressure them to do anything.

*Q: Were you getting from any of your Chinese counterparts or other contacts an understanding of the fact that Taiwan really has become a different country, and it’d be very difficult to meld them together?*

MARTIN: I’m not sure they understand that. I don’t think they understand the politics of Taiwan. They don’t understand the democratic forces that have become very active in Taiwan. I think the shock of the Democratic Progressive Party, the DPP, actually winning the election in 2000 was really a shock to them. All their experts on Taiwan had predicted that he would not win, and when he did, the shock reverberated throughout the government. I think many so-called Taiwan experts in Beijing had to go through some self-criticism sessions after Chen Shui-bian won in 2000.

*Q: Was this partly a problem of the Chinese embassy in Washington and other scholars reporting back what they thought their superiors wanted to hear?*

MARTIN: I think it's partly that, but it's also partly that they just don't have the concept of what the democratic process is. Since the DPP won in 2000, the PRC has invited several senior Kuomintang Party (the nationalist party, the KMT) leaders, to visit China, ostensibly to visit their family homes, to meet with officials. It's all part of the united front policies, which the Communist Party used at various stages in the past. But they don't really understand by doing that, that they're not really making a big difference in terms of public opinion in Taiwan. Once someone described it to me as the Chinese think that they are the gorgeous bride, and they can't understand why the Taiwanese don't want to marry them. The Taiwanese look at them, and say, "Boy, that's a pretty ugly person, and we don't want to get linked up with them in any way!" I think that there's a very different concept.

*Q: Did you see the cadre's families, the kids from the upper crusts of society, beginning to move into authoritative positions?*

MARTIN: They're called princelings, and that's controversial, because several of the newer generation of leaders in China are sons or daughters of former high officials. I think that it's controversial because some of these people are corrupt, they're into special favors, and they're the elite. There's an increasing criticism in Chinese society, which is now more open and more critical with more information, particularly on the Internet and in chat rooms, about the special advantages these sons and daughters of the high officials have. More of these people are moving into private sector businesses rather than into government. They are involved in entrepreneurial startups of private companies, the high tech, the Internet, the IT (Information Technology) sector of society.

The other thing that you find is that they're much more worldly. They certainly know much more about the world than their parents or their peers who never left China know, because they've studied overseas, they've traveled overseas, they're much more aware of China's weaknesses and China's lack of development. They're also, I think, much more nationalistic. Even though they've lived overseas and learned about the United States and other countries, that doesn't necessarily mean they're friendlier to the United States or that they're particularly more democratic. What they see, or what their reaction is, is that China needs to strengthen itself more to be able to compete on an equal basis with the rest of the world, not necessarily on military terms.

*Q: In our exchange programs, were we trying to break away from getting the princelings to the United States and trying to reach down for equal opportunity and diversity? Could we do that, or was it too controlled by the Chinese?*

MARTIN: It is controlled. My experience in Guangzhou was that a lot of the people that we wanted to send to the States could not get permission to go. The usual excuse was that they're too busy; or that their offices needed them, they couldn't let them go; etc. They weren't politically correct. The answer was often "We will decide who you can send to the States," and their candidate would usually be the office director, the bureau chief, or the Party cadre who

wanted a trip to the States, and were happy to take our largesse and go to the States. These were not the people we wanted.

We've had some success in breaking out of this limited universe of people. We seek out academics, students, business people, people from the provincial centers rather than from the capital. This is somewhat successful, but it's still limited in terms of the scope of the people that we could get and we could reach.

*Q: This was an internal and external thing. You were out there when we were moving USIS and making it public diplomacy. How is this working within the embassy, did you feel?*

MARTIN: I think it has been a difficult integration. There was a lot of resistance and trepidation within USIA which wasn't quite sure what this was all going to mean. Would they be totally subsumed in the State Department? What would be their role? Would their programs would have to be rearranged with different priorities? I think there has been some of that as they became integrated. The ambassador had a particular agenda that he wanted to carry out, and getting USIS in Beijing to do what he wanted them to do was sometimes a little bit more difficult than I think it should have been, partly because they had their own priorities and inertia. They had their traditional programs and focuses that they thought were important, having done them for years - and the ambassador had a different focus.

*Q: Could we talk a bit about the ambassador, and when he arrived, and what his goals were, and how he operated?*

MARTIN: Admiral Joseph Prueher was my first political ambassador, but I must say, he was a good one to work with because when he arrived, he made it clear that he did not know a lot about China. He realized that he had to depend upon the career people and the people who had experience in China, and would draw upon them as much as he could. And he did. He depended on and used effectively his political and economic officers, and worked well with other staff.

He was also shocked - and that's not putting it too strongly - by the level of support and the facilities that the embassy, or the State Department, provides an ambassador. Of course he was coming from being a four-star admiral at the Pacific Command, where he had myriad minions working for him at his beck and call, who would stand up, salute and say, "Yes, sir," to whatever he asked. It was a little difficult coming in and realizing that there was little in terms of support and little in terms of adequate personnel to be able to do the job that he thought was necessary. We in the State Department have long felt that, but we usually put our shoulder to the wheel and muddle through the best we can.

I think his biggest shock was that the communications system within the embassy was so antiquated that he had no way of communicating with anybody. The unclassified, the classified, the e-mail, everything was totally separated, and security requirements in China are even more rigorous than almost anyplace else in the world because of security concerns. So one office cannot talk to the other electronically. It's very difficult to operate, and I think he was frustrated by that. He was also frustrated by the lack of resources the administration section had to be able to do what was necessary.

The present chancery building in Beijing was a pit. It was the old Pakistani embassy that we took over when they moved out. It was an old antiquated building, not much has been done to it, and after what the staff called the “rock concert” in May, it was even worse condition. All the windows had been broken, and FBO (Overseas Building Operations) replaced the glass, but refused to replace the wooden frames through which the winter winds howled and whistled. So the creature comforts of working in the embassy were really quite limited. The ambassador was quite shocked by that. Coming from a naval tradition where everything was painted and shipshape, it was quite a shock!

The Embassy in Beijing traditionally had a hard time getting bidders on its positions. While the language was a factor, a larger issue was the terrible housing. The pioneer China-hand who volunteered for Beijing during the 1972-79 U.S. Liaison Office (USLO) period did not mind the hardships and isolation because of the adventure and excitement of being in on the beginnings of a new relationship after over 20 years of no relations. But by the time I arrived in 1999, the bad housing was a major obstacle to getting good people and their families. Joe Prueher saw that immediately and decided to make that a priority of his tenure. In good Navy tradition, Joe was keenly aware of the importance of good morale and the need for the commander to work to improve it in any way possible.

Fortunately, the Foreign Ministry, which ran the diplomatic housing compounds through the Diplomatic Services Bureau (DSB), was beginning to realize the growing expatriate community could not be squeezed into the old, tired compounds. Initially, all diplomats, journalists, international organization representatives, and businessmen had to live in the compounds. The apartment buildings were poorly maintained, the standards of cleanliness and responsibility varied greatly between families from the West and those from the Third World. While the Embassy's General Services office tried to hold onto specific apartments so new generations of officers could move in and GSO upgrades maintained, the Embassy did not have much influence if DSB wanted to shift people around.

Joe and I first ascertained the Foreign Ministry would agree to have U.S. Embassy personnel find housing outside the DSB compounds. Then we had to persuade the Department, particularly the Foreign Buildings Operations (FBO) office to support and fund finding new, and more expensive, housing. One way Joe built his leverage was to insist that every CODEL and official visitor be taken to an Embassy apartment to see the squalor in which our families had to live. It was eye opening to Members of Congress as well as Department officials who had never previously seen the conditions. We tended to take the visitors to the worst compounds where the dark, dingy stairways smelled of mold and urine, the elevators either didn't work or were frightening to use, the apartment kitchens were dirty and cramped, and glass from windows often fell out onto children's playgrounds below. The conduit closets for pipes, sewers, electrical cables, which ran from the top to bottom of the buildings, were called "roach runs" by the residents since insects and vermin had easy access to kitchens and bathrooms. We had the Embassy doctor describe the health problems caused by the living conditions and family members described the trials of living in what was comparable to tenement housing in U.S. cities.

Our campaign was successful and Embassy personnel were given the opportunity to move into commercial housing which was being built. Some moved into new apartment blocks managed by Hong Kong companies. Others opted to move out of the increasingly polluted city to Western style houses in suburban gated villages with grass, swimming pools and bike riding areas. Others chose apartments attached to upscale hotels for foreigners. I guess about 90% of the staff in the Embassy when I arrived moved out of DSB housing and morale soared. Others preferred to stay where they were, because they were due for transfer in a few months and didn't want to move twice, or because they wanted to stay close to the Embassy and downtown. Giving individuals a choice and a selection of housing greatly reduced complaints and helped with recruitment.

Housing was only one aspect of a number of property issues I focused on during my year in Beijing. As mentioned above, the chancery building had been the Pakistani chancery and little major renovation had been done when the U.S. moved in in the early 1980s. After the front of the building was trashed by the post-Belgrade bombing demonstrations in May 1999, FBO decided to renovate the entire building while building a new annex on the back for additional office space. Offices and hallways were stripped to the bare brick and new electrical, plumbing and communications lines installed. The work also gave us a chance to inspect the security conditions in the building.

We were reminded of being in an ancient city one day when a skeleton and old artifacts were found during the excavation for the annex. We called in the Chinese Antiquities Bureau who told us the area of the First Diplomatic Area where we were had been outside the city walls until recently and had been used as a burial ground. Based on their records and the artifacts found in the grave, they estimated the skeleton dated from around the early Ming Dynasty (14th or 15th century AD). I made the mistake of allowing the inspectors from the Antiquities Bureau "borrow" the artifacts from the grave as we never saw them again. I had hoped to put them in a glass display case in the lobby of the chancery.

The Beijing Embassy property consisted of three compounds in the First Diplomatic Area just off Jianguomen Wai (outside the Jian Guo gate), the eastern extension of Chang An Lu which runs through Tiananmen. The first, which was originally the entire USLO office building and residence for the USLO Chief (including George H.W. Bush), is now the ambassador's residence and Public Diplomacy offices. The 2nd compound contains the Administrative and Consular Sections. Across the street, the 3rd compound is the chancery and Marine house. Planning for a new chancery had been underway for several years, with several different plans being proposed and abandoned. When I arrived, the plan under consideration was to tear down the existing chancery, take over the Bulgarian property next door and build a new building on both sites. Neither Joe nor I liked that idea as the Embassy would have to operate out of temporary quarters for a lengthy period, and the Embassy would still have to operate from three separate compounds, a communications, logistics and security problem.

During one of FBO's frequent visits to discuss the new chancery, the Chinese agreed to give us a large tract of land in the 3rd diplomatic area in Liang Ma He, further out from the center of Beijing, to which many diplomatic missions were moving. As is always the case, however, China is a stickler for equal reciprocity and the MFA was not happy about what the State Department was offering for the new Chinese embassy in Washington. We had a long series of negotiations

with the diplomatic property office of the MFA, generally amicable but tough. I felt accomplished that we were able to reach an agreement before I left in September. The Department offered the Chinese two lots in the International Diplomatic area off Van Ness Avenue which the MFA accepted unhappily. The U.S. received a large lot which is big enough to build a chancery, ambassador's residence, Marine House, and separate Admin and Consular building, all in one contiguous area. We thought we received a good deal.

I left shortly after the property deal was reached so missed the lengthy negotiations over the construction details. After the disastrous construction of the new U.S. chancery in Moscow a few years ago, the Department was gun shy about another embassy in a communist country. It insisted on a hard and fast agreement that every construction worker, all building materials, and every item to be placed in the chancery had to be imported from the U.S. in secure containers and guarded constantly. Needless to say, the Beijing embassy will probably be one of the most expensive ever, second only to the new U.S. Embassy in Baghdad. The Chinese of course insisted on the same privileges, so their chancery site in Washington looks like an imported Chinese construction site with workers' dormitories, Chinese cranes, Chinese security personnel on site, etc. The new chanceries are scheduled to be completed and open in July 2008, shortly before the Olympics. Could be a chaotic time.

*Q: What did Ambassador Prueher bring with him in his attaché case as far as what he wanted to accomplish?*

MARTIN: As I said, he was apolitical, he said he did not seek the job. But he was willing to serve, and his commitment was he would stay two years. He saw himself as a bridge between the old Clinton administration, and the new administration after the 2000 election. He saw himself as someone who could try to help reestablish cordial and useful relations between China and the United States by working on various contacts. He had three major points that he made frequently to the Chinese: 1) that he did not seek the job, 2) that he was not looking for any other onward U.S. government job, and 3) that he would tell it the way he saw it, and he did that. He was frank and outspoken, diplomatically and courteously of course, but he said what he thought, and he said what was necessary. And I think that was appreciated by the Chinese, and it was certainly appreciated by the staff in the embassy. He was able to get everyone to support his goal of reestablishing the relationship on an even keel. He believed his experience in the military and his contacts with the Chinese military (he had visited China several times as CINCPAC) would be helpful in moving the relationship forward.

*Q: You mentioned in public diplomacy he had a different thrust than our people on the ground had. What was that?*

MARTIN: I think the difference was that he was much more focused on public diplomacy, the selling of our policies and perspectives. He wanted USIS to get out and make sure that we communicated with as broad an audience as possible in China on what U.S. policies were, to try to deflect criticisms, misinterpretations, or misunderstandings of U.S. policy. More traditional USIS programs on cultural and educational exchanges, international visitors, Fulbright programs, and so forth should be a lower priority. He agreed these were all important programs but thought the top priorities should be getting out and selling U.S. policy. He was also looking for a good

speechwriter who could craft his speeches and remarks the way he wanted. It took awhile but one of the USIS officers did a good job in that regard.

*Q: At the time you were there, did you feel we were getting a good representation of our side in the media and the press?*

MARTIN: Minimal. It had increased over the years., from nothing previously. In terms of percentage increases, it was quite significant, but still, it's very low compared to most other countries. Getting our views out was difficult, getting the papers to publish what we sent them, getting the media to cover things that we thought were important was very difficult. The Chinese government keeps very close control over the information flow, and so it was difficult for us to get our points out. The ambassador did a good deal of speaking, he traveled around the country as much as he could, he met with people and tried to get the word out as best he could, but it was difficult.

*Q: How did the ambassador, and you, and others find the Chinese university system because often this is the place where the students get out of control. I mean there are some places where you almost can't, if you're an American, go to them at all.*

MARTIN: For many years, you could not! The embassy officials for years were not allowed into the campuses except under very tight scrutiny and control.

*Q: Did you get any feel for what the universities were doing? I mean vis-à-vis modernizing China, and our relations, and all.*

MARTIN: Some, not a lot, frankly. I did not have a chance to get out there. I went to Beijing University several times. I gave speeches there a couple times. The ambassador was able to go there. But again, one always got the sense that it was a handpicked audience. It wasn't just a bulletin board sign on the door, saying "U.S. ambassador's going to speak. You all come." It was pretty much decided by the university, by the Party secretary as to who was going to attend. Often it was just faculty, graduate students, or teaching assistants rather than Joe Blow the student. Our contacts with students were limited even though the ambassador and the rest of us would to make an effort to get to know the students, get to meet the students at least, try to talk to them on an informal basis.

Fortunately, there are many Americans attached to the Chinese universities, either as students or as English teachers. My experience in Guangzhou was that many Americans were teaching English to Chinese university students all over the country, providing a good window, on American perceptions, institutions, and philosophy; exchanging information with the Chinese.

*Q: You mentioned the Internet a couple times. Could you explain what it was and how you saw its impact and its use in China during this period?*

MARTIN: You have to remember that until the Internet came along, the Chinese government, the Communist Party in that sense, was the sole source of information in China. The average Chinese citizen could not subscribe to any foreign media, whether western or Asian. The Party

controlled all print and broadcast media. Some foreign newspapers and magazines were available in the hotels for the foreigners, but you couldn't buy them on a newsstand. Obviously, foreigners would leave their copies, and I'm sure these would circulate in the Chinese community. But again, I'm sure also if the Party people found them, they would be confiscated and destroyed. So the flow of information was very tightly controlled by the Party.

The Internet has opened a window, which makes it easier for the average person to get access to what is happening outside the country. On the Belgrade bombing situation, people knew within a couple of days that President Clinton had called Jiang Zemin and had apologized profusely for the mistake. This was not revealed in the internal Chinese press for weeks, if not months. I'm not even sure it was ever really revealed. So people were able to get information which their own government did not tell them. Same thing with the EP-3 situation - the initial government reaction was to the story from the military in Hainan Island that the U.S. reconnaissance plane had run into the Chinese fighter. Joe Prueher, was able to tell the senior leaders in the foreign ministry that could not have happened that way because he was a pilot, he was an aviator. So he knew exactly what an EP-3 can do, and the fact that it's moving much slower than a jet fighter coming alongside of it. If the EP-3 had turned, as they said, into the fighter, it would have missed it because the fighter would have been long past before it could have hit. In any case, the Chinese went with what they heard from their military sources down in Hainan, went public with that, and demanded compensation, and apologies based on the accident being the U.S.' fault.

It was the Internet that helped people learn what really happened in both of these incident cases. In general they know much more of what's going on, even though a lot of the sites are blocked. The government does control the Internet. It does limit what people can get. The government says they're trying to prevent pornography and hostile information.

*Q: Is it easy to block their Internet ?*

MARTIN: It is fairly easy to block the Internet in China. My home computer in Beijing was very slow logging on and getting onto various Internet sites. I could, but it took a long while, and certain ones I couldn't get - Washington Post, New York Times -

*Q: You couldn't get those?*

MARTIN: You could not get those. But the Chinese are a brilliant people, and the people who are into computers and the Internet have no problem finding cutouts and various other servers that they can access in a roundabout way to pick up what they need.

*Q: Was there at all a "Samizdat" (self-published underground Press of dissidents in the Soviet Union) type of publication? This was the self-publishing thing that went on during the Stalin time, or the Soviet era time, where it was called Self-Published, which often mimeographed sheets, you know, got circulated around. Was this -*

MARTIN: There is some of that. There's also now more and more of that on the Internet. They have both the chat rooms and use sort of the private publications that people pass around within the Internet system.

*Q: Did they have Internet cafés?*

MARTIN: Yes, they do. They're very tightly controlled as the government is able to control what portals they can access or what sites they can access. But the growth of the Internet has been phenomenal, and I think in the last 10 years it's growing exponentially, and people predict in the next 10 years the Chinese will be by far the largest Internet users in the world. In fact, they talk about Chinese replacing English as the most common Internet language. Even though the spoken dialects - Cantonese, Fujianese and Mandarin - may be different, and everybody understands and studies Mandarin, the characters are the same, so it's a universal script.

*Q: What about with the computer has this simplified putting the ideographs on computer, or is English still a lot better?*

MARTIN: They've got a pretty good system for the ideographs, for the characters. They can be put on the system quite easily. There's a tremendous amount of information on the Chinese internet. One of our colleagues in the embassy was very active in terms of both monitoring and reading what was on the Internet, as well as putting out some of our documents on the Internet. He probably reached far more people than all our speeches, press releases or public events. And the Embassy website was well known for it became a target for attack whenever the U.S. said or did something which was seen as anti-China.

*Q: Yes. I would think...it hadn't occurred to me before, but you'd almost need Internet officers, don't you? I mean this is all over the world now.*

MARTIN: That's right. USIS was also active online but this one particular officer, who was almost bilingual in Chinese and Japanese, was able to really access, translate, and put out on the Internet information that he developed himself. He was a great source of information as to what was going on. After the Belgrade bombing, our embassy home-page was bombarded by the Chinese Internet users with all sorts of scurrilous comments, threats, and emotional messages back and forth. If we hadn't been able to access all that, we wouldn't know what the public sentiment was. The hostility toward the U.S. and nationalistic feeling was quite striking.

*Q: What about trade opportunities? I always think of the book that came out in the '30s called Oil for the Lamps of China, and the idea was always "what a market China was going to be...." I remember some man who was really very interested because he sold caskets and he thought of those millions of Chinese dying every year.*

MARTIN: The old saying, of course, is the British term: that if every Chinese person wore his shirt an inch longer, the mills of Manchester would be running forever! Well, the market is there, but it's not there. I mean there is a market as the Chinese standard of living goes up. As they get more disposable income, which many of them have never had, there is a market for Western things. But it is not an infinite market because 1) you've got Chinese companies that also produce goods, some of which are still competitive and good, particularly the more private sector goods. 2) You've also got competition from other companies - Japanese, Koreans, Southeast Asians, what have you - who have also invested and produce in China. But 3) you've got a

limited middle class. When people look at China, they look at 1.3 billion people, and think, “Wow! This is a great potential market!” But of that 1.3 billion people, probably 900 million to a billion probably don’t have much in the way of disposable income. You’re talking about two to three hundred million people, which is not an insignificant market, but it’s not a billion!

People are moving up the economic ladder and are potentially good customers. Previously foreign products were considered to be better because they were more reliable, safer, probably what they were supposed to be, whether shampoo, breakfast cereal, or computers. But now the Chinese have moved upscale very quickly. Part of perhaps the nationalistic vent is that people now say, “You ought to buy Chinese. Don’t buy American,” or “Don’t buy Japanese.” The Japanese have always had a problem in China, particularly this last century, particularly because of their encroachments into China, their colonialism, and imperialism. Back in the ’20s, after the Treaty of Versailles awarded German territories in the Shandong Peninsula to the Japanese, the Chinese instituted a boycott of Japanese products. This was one of the first nationalistic movements in China and caused a lot of friction, perhaps even provoking a more militant Japanese policy toward China. This has happened over the years since then. Recently, when Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi visited the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo for the war dead, the Chinese internet lit up calling for a boycott of Japanese products. Many American companies invest in China anticipating a major growth in the domestic market but may find the market limited by competition with Chinese companies that appeal to consumers' nationalistic sentiments.

*Q: Were we monitoring the new class of the Chinese millionaires? Every once in a while you are reminded of the old hundred flowers campaign (during the mid-1950s) which suddenly had their heads chopped off. Was there a feeling that the excesses of this class might bring the wrath down upon them?*

MARTIN: Many of the most egregious excesses have been restricted lately, apparently mainly by the wealthy themselves out of self interest. Many are worried about periodic anti-corruption campaigns since many of these people did get their money through corruption -- personal contacts, payoff, or bribery of officials. There is an increasing concern that corruption may be the straw that breaks China’s back, because it’s rampant, just everywhere. A vice mayor in Shenyang, in the Northeast, was recently reported to have squandered something like 20 to 30 million dollars gambling in Macau. At the same time, you have the workers in the state-owned enterprises out on the street, without a pension, without any kind of a social safety net. It is a serious social, economic and ultimately, political problem.

Rural areas have been in recession, if not depression, for the last four or five years; and bankrupt state-owned enterprises are kept alive only by the banking system providing them loans, which nobody expects to be repaid. But the rural population is dispersed enough that it’s somewhat more manageable. When the proletariat lines up on the street with 30,000 people demonstrating, that becomes a political problem.

*Q: Yes. What was your impression during this 1999 – 2000 period of the Central Government, its ability to deal with the horrendous problems of this huge state?*

MARTIN: It's an immense challenge. They were trying to do the best they could. Zhu Rongji, the premier at the time, had some very good ideas, but I'm not sure he was able to really succeed in all of his goals. Part of the problem is, as I said earlier, the economic reforms have gone about as far as they can without a political reform. Some movement on the political side of things is needed before economic dislocations can be adequately addressed. It is unclear whether or not the government, whether the Party's willing to do that. There is hope that the Party may transmogrify into something like a democratic socialist party in Eastern Europe, in which managers administrators are allowed to make decisions in a more democratic manner, or less authoritarian manner.

Even though technically China has a strong, centralized national government, provincial governments have a great deal of power and influence. The amount of money they send forward in terms of revenue collection, in terms of taxes, is minuscule compared to most other countries. The Central Government only gets somewhere between 20 and 25 percent of the total revenue taken in the country. So they don't have a lot of resources with which to operate. As I mentioned above when talking about my tour in Guangzhou, the Guangdong provincial government finds all sorts of ways to raise money, but they don't call any of them taxes. They're fees, tolls, surcharges, or what have you. They don't call them taxes because by law they have a certain percentage of taxes they have to remit to the Central Government. This is true of all the other provinces and municipalities. The central government tries to keep all the regional and local officials working in the same direction but it is a challenge.

*Q: Did you see any potential schism developing in China, including even a breaking away between say the coastal region and the interior or north-south?*

MARTIN: There are many regional divisions in the country - east and west, particularly the far west, the Muslim and minority areas of Tibet, Xinjiang. The minority areas feel alienated, separated from China. They don't want to belong to China, don't feel that they are Chinese in many ways, both ethnically, or racially, and certainly culturally. That is why Beijing is so adamant about maintaining its control of Tibet and Xinjiang, because they are afraid that if they let one go, they will all drift away. Another reason why they're so adamant about Taiwan is if they give Taiwan any kind of autonomy or independence, then why not Tibet, why not Xinjiang, why not inner Mongolia, etc.

As I noted while in Guangzhou, there are also many divisions between the north and south. Guangdong has traditionally been more progressive, outward looking, and integrated with the global economy than most of China. Similarly, migrants from Fujian province have gone abroad for centuries, mostly to Southeast Asia, so they are more outwardly oriented. Hong Kong has had a major impact on much of south China because of the spread of manufacturing, investment and people across the border. We called it the "Hong Kongization" of South China. But now it is Shanghai's turn to attract foreign investment and wealth, spreading development all up and down the Yangtze River basin.

As to a possible breakup of the country, my usual answer is that the sense of a unitary China is psychologically so powerful that most Chinese will do anything to keep the country together. I think that's why Taiwan remains such a big psychological issue. The sense of China's coming

back together as a unitary nation, or a culture (because the idea of nationhood is a recent concept in terms of Chinese thought processes), is very strong, stronger than centrifugal forces pulling regions apart.

*Q: We in the Foreign Service have watched these things over the years and called things wrong a number of times. We often believe the devil we know and deal with will always be the same. The idea of the Soviet Union breaking up did not. make any sense to many officers. Are there others who've been through your experiences who were looking at it differently?*

MARTIN: I'm sure there are! This is my own personal estimate at this point. But, once can always say "it depends." Depending on how things develop, whether or not the government and Party is able to address these major economic and social issues, will determine whether their country is able to make a go of it. I don't see China splitting apart into different political entities but can see regions the country becoming much less cohesive than now. I believe the Central Government will still be able to maintain control through the police, security services and military.

Don't forget the Soviet Union was a forced empire of disparate nations and peoples who resented Moscow's rule and broke away as soon as the center eased up its control mechanisms. Beijing has studied the Soviet collapse carefully and is determined to avoid the same mistakes.

But again, the Chinese have a great fear of *luan* (chaos or confusion), because they've gone through that over the last hundred years. They realize how terrible things were before 1949: civil war, foreign invasions, foreign encroachments, China being picked apart by foreign powers. I think the Chinese want to try to do everything they can to avoid that. I think even the people who don't like the government, people who don't like the Communist Party, are going to make every effort to try to avoid that situation in the future. Many people have told me, "It's a bad situation. We don't like the government. We don't like the situation here now. But life is better now than it has been for the last 150 years!" It's hard to argue with that! And the Communist Party of course constantly reminds people that it was the one that ended foreign interference and is rebuilding China's status in the world. It uses De Gaulle's line "*Après moi, le deluge*" to emphasize that without the CCP, the country would revert to its pre-1949 chaos.

*Q: What about the Communist Party? Are there more than 10 people who still believe in real Marxism? If you have a political system based on a doctrine, an ideology, you have to teach the doctrine. If no one still believes in it, it is an awful lot of waste of time, an awful lot of people get bored. Were they beginning to come up with another configuration, or was the government still spouting the old terms and teaching the old Marxism in the universities?*

MARTIN: They still do, yes! Marxism courses are still required. The Communist Party school for cadre in Beijing runs all the party officials from the entire country through a required six-month course at certain stages of their career, sort of like training in the Foreign Service. Marxism, Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and recent revelations such as Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" are still required study. My impression is that most people don't listen, don't pay much attention, and don't find it applicable to their life or work these days.

But the Party has adapted to changing times. At the anniversary of the Communist Party

founding on July 1 few years ago, Jiang Zemin, , opened Party membership to the private sector, to entrepreneurs. What kind of a Communist Party is it that allows capitalist entrepreneurs to join the party? It is a party that realizes that their hold on power is based upon their being able to provide the goods to the people, to continue to improve the economy, to continue to improve the standard of living of the people. The goal is to at least give everybody the sense that things are getting better, that they too have an opportunity to improve their life in the future. This is totally different from the traditional Chinese view that the good times were during the golden age of Confucius.

The communist perspective of course is that historical development is inevitable and society moves from feudalism to capitalism to socialism and eventually communism. Now the line is that things are getting better, the future is going to be better, China's going to reestablish itself as a strong power, that China's going to become one of the leading cultural civilizations of the world, back to where they were before. This is their goal, to resume their global position. And I think all Chinese, of all political persuasions, identify with that goal. The question is whether it going to be accomplished by the Communist Party? I think most people think not, at least as the Party is presently configured. It is going to have to transmogrify somehow.

*Q: Was the Party's recruiting business people to get people with a business viewpoint into the seats of power or to make sure they did not become a separate political force?*

MARTIN: I think the Party realized it needed to co-opt the growing entrepreneurial sector to ensure it maintained control over a key sector of the economy. And the entrepreneurs were flattered to be a part of the power elite, partly because many had been successful because of connections with bureaucrats and cadres and partly because they saw it as a means of preserving their status. Broadening Party membership to the entrepreneurs was one of the three "represents" of Jiang Zemin who recognized that getting the new private sector to support the Party would help advance the CCP's efforts to provide economic benefits to people and thus remain in power. Ideologically, the doctrinal changes have required contorted rationalizations but the Party has always been able to find the necessary flexibility.

I see two problem areas. Younger Party members are frustrated with the old rigid procedures and doctrines of the party. While they are happy to be in the seat of power, many realize the growing economic inequalities are destabilizing. They are also questioning why greater political choice cannot be given once economic options and changes have been instituted? But how do you reform politically without losing power? I think these are the dilemmas they face, and they haven't resolved.

*Q: While you were there, did you see concern about China absorbing Hong Kong and then ruining it all? But it sounds almost like Hong Kong is absorbing China.*

MARTIN: I left Guangzhou in 1996, a year before Hong Kong reverted to Chinese sovereignty and returned to Beijing a little over two years after. I was in Hong Kong on June 30, 1997 for the turn over ceremony and had followed developments thereafter. The transition went well and fears of Chinese suppression of Hong Kong's freedoms did not occur. By the time I was in Beijing, the issue did not come up in our bilateral relations.

Hong Kong continued to dominate south China's economy as manufacturing moved out of Hong Kong into Guangdong province. As the Cantonese populated both sides of the border, the interactions were very natural.

*Q: Is there a Shanghai way of doing things, and a Hong Kong way, or a Guangzhou way of doing things, or not?*

MARTIN: There are differences, yes, of course. I think that there are different approaches and that they don't like each other very much. The Cantonese are active in terms of trading abroad, whereas the Shanghaiese tend to be more involved in the economic power structure within China, in terms of banking, finance, and infrastructure.

I noted above during our discussion of my tour in Guangzhou that at that time I did not feel the four consulates were very well integrated into the overall mission. I did not mind being left alone then but when Joe Prueher and I arrived in Beijing, we wanted to keep the consulates informed of what we were doing. I wanted to set up a secure phone line to each of the Consuls General so I could have a weekly if not more frequent conference call. But we found that the secure communication system could not handle it. So I started a weekly informal message to the CGs and we invited them to Beijing for quarterly coordination meetings. Joe also made it a point to visit each of the consulates as did I.

Each consulate had its own unique character and challenges. Guangzhou took the least attention, perhaps because I was more familiar with the situation and since the CG had worked as my consular chief.

Shenyang became a problem when fumes permeated the residence apartments next to the office building, making consulate personnel sick and frightened of long term health issues. We evacuated the building and put everyone into a western style hotel while we had tests conducted on the apartment building. When no satisfactory cause was determined, we decided to move the staff into new housing which alleviated concerns and improved morale in that isolated hardship post.

Chengdu was a small post responsible for nearly 60% of the land area of China (including all of Tibet and Xinjiang). Generally it was a relaxed and efficient post which had moved into new office and residential quarters. Ambassador Prueher and I had to resolve a serious internal staff problem, however, which took considerable time and care to manage emotional issues. I appreciated Joe's firm but fair approach and his insistence that he make the difficult decisions.

The Shanghai consulate at times assumes the character of its host city, which considers itself China's leading metropolitan and financial center of China. With a large American business presence and frequent visitors, we occasionally had to reiterate that consulates are subordinate to the Embassy.

Through Joe and my periodic visits and frequent communications, I believe we were able to create a sense of partnership and cooperation with the consulates.

*Q: What about the cultural side - movies, films, TV. All of us have seen these magnificent movies that have come out of China. I'm sure these have gone through quite a filter; but still, they seem much franker than before.*

MARTIN: They are very frank now, and the social issues they deal with are really quite amazing to me. That is one of the major things I saw when I returned after an absence of three years. Films are discussing more social issues - urban alienation, divorce, the environment. Traditional neighborhoods are being bulldozed, and replaced by high rise apartments being like the urban renewal tenements in Chicago. The changes in people's lives are being well expressed in the movies and relates to what people are going through.

*Q: What about the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)?*

MARTIN: China is moving out of a totalitarian system or a totalitarian structure of government. Chairman Mao could do what he wanted, and everybody followed him. Deng Xiaoping for the most part could as well but generally consulted a group of contemporaries called "the elders." The third generation (Jiang Zemin) had less total personal control. It's much more of a collegial leadership at the top. The fourth generation now in power, is even less authoritarian. Now it more a matter of the leaders placing their supporters in key positions in order to carry out the their policies. Not unlike a new U.S. administration putting its political appointees in key jobs.

This kind of a system builds interest groups. There are factions or different interest groups within the CCP as well as out in the public. Leaders now have to listen to public opinion which previously either didn't exist or nobody dared express opinions other than what the party told them to express.

I consider the PLA (People's Liberation Army) just another big interest group, a powerful one; and they sit at the highest ranks of the government! So they have interests which often do not fit well with the way the rest of society is developing. The PLA, despite being a "people' army" has in recent years been basically separated from society. Traditionally, most of the military have come from rural areas, most are not well educated. PLA modernization aims to upgrade the caliber and education level of recruits, especially officers. They want high tech people, college graduates. Much of the increased military budget is going to higher pay to draw a better quality recruit. The PLA is not having an easy time as pay is still low for university graduates and it's a rough life. Most people coming out of the university, if they have any smarts, don't want to go into the army. As the army modernizes, and gives higher priority to the navy and air force, it needs technically competent personnel to operate more sophisticated weapons systems. As the country modernizes and becomes more international in its outlook and policies, the military is fighting to maintain its political clout. It is important to remember the PLA is the combat arm of the Communist Party and not a national army under the government structure. During World War II and the civil war, the Red Army was key to the survival of the Party. The PLA maintain its central political role until Deng began his economic reforms and the PLA had to take 4th place in the modernizations. But it was recalled to keep the CCP in power in 1989 during the Tiananmen incident. Now the Party focuses on maintaining its power by providing economic development and rising living standards, not a role the PLA can play.

However, as China assumes a larger regional, and increasingly, global, role, the PLA argues it has greater responsibilities to protect and advance China's interests. And there is always Taiwan, the PLA's (and CCP's) number one objective. To be able to fulfill its missions, the PLA argues for, and generally wins, increased budgetary support to purchase and develop sophisticated weapons systems, improve training, and recruit better educated personnel. They carefully study U.S. war fighting techniques in the Gulf War, Kosovo, now in Afghanistan and Iraq, and realize how far behind they are technologically and doctrinally.

*Q: Yes. The PLA was predicated on mass armies, and we've gone high tech, and mass armies are more of an encumbrance than a help.*

MARTIN: Absolutely! They see this, and realize that they're falling further and further behind. They're buying Sovremenny (Russian built class guided missile destroyers) destroyer-cruisers from Russia, airplanes from Russia, and developing their naval and air capabilities. A critical weak point is their defense industry. They have had 50 years to develop their military industry but continue to have problems in producing high grade metallurgy needed for modern weapons systems. They don't have the capability to build a Sovremenny destroyer yet themselves. They don't have the capability of building a Sukhoi fighter on their own. They tried to put it together in kit form. They tried to reverse engineer one. But their defense industries are not yet sophisticated enough to produce their own modern weapons systems that are required in today's world.

*Q: Did you get a feel that there's an intellectual ferment going on, a realization that maybe a relatively small, high-tech military would be better?*

MARTIN: They're trying to do that. They've downsized considerably. They used to have something like four million soldiers in the PLA. They've downsized to two million something now, and they're cutting even more. A lot of these people have been shifted over into what they call the People's Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary police force. Technically they are off the PLA rolls onto the PAP rolls but the PLA and PAP have close links.

Their goal is to transform the people's army into more of a high tech, more of a sophisticated, modern army rather than a mass army. They've gotten away, certainly, from the idea of people's war in which you had massive frontal assaults.

*Q: Yes. What about all these, I mean again, we're talking about this 1999-2000 period, these factories, and the corruption, and all. I mean the PLA seemed to be very much into its own state as far as a very lucrative one, and more like a Mafia organization than anything else.*

MARTIN: As we discussed earlier, Deng Xiaoping's allowing the PLA to make up for minimal budget support in the early 1980s by getting into commercial endeavors ended up weakening and corrupting the military. Jiang Zemin ordered the PLA out of business and increased their defense budget significantly. In recent years, PLA budget increases have averaged around 17 percent although U.S. analysts believe that's probably only a percentage of the PLA's total budget.

*Q: As the PLA downsized, do they have a problem with a huge officer corps as in the Soviet*

*Union?*

MARTIN: I think the PLA faced a similar problem but cut back on their officer corps as well. They've watched Russia pretty closely as to what Russia's been going through, trying to avoid the same mistakes. One problem the PLA is encountering is a lack of a strong non-commissioned officer corps, which many consider the backbone of the U.S. armed services. Without a deep bench of sergeants and petty officers, it is difficult for officers to maintain communication and command over enlisted soldiers.

*Q: When you left in late 2000, did you see China, then or in the near future, being a particular menace or threat to the United States?*

MARTIN: I don't think so. I see China increasing its influence around its borders - Southeast and Central Asia - but don't see that it will necessarily threaten our vital interests. Southeast Asian nations are well aware of this 600-pound gorilla in their neighborhood, and they would just as soon have somebody else around to deflect the focus of China. There is strong support for the U.S. to remain actively engaged in the region. However, the countries don't want to have to choose sides. They don't want to have to say, "We will side with the U.S. against China," or "We'll side with China against the U.S." because they want to have as good relations with both sides as possible.

China, at the same time I think, wants to have as calm and peaceful of a relationship with its neighbors as well as us, to be able to continue its economic development, and resolve its internal, domestic, economic, and increasingly political problems. And I think, hopefully, this will give everybody a chance to keep calm and continue to develop and maintain good relationships without a dustup.

*Q: Outside of the always difficult issue of Taiwan, do you see any potential of China wanting other areas, being aggressive anywhere else?*

MARTIN: China traditionally has not been an expansionist power although, depending on the strength of the dynasty, they have expanded, or contracted their control over border areas in Central Asia. I believe China's present borders, based on the furthest reach of the Qing Dynasty, probably are beyond what they should be. They could give autonomy to Tibet within the Chinese framework; and I think Tibet would be just as happy to have an autonomous relationship with the rest of China as long as they could preserve their unique culture. But Beijing is afraid that if it give any space at all, the minority areas would all just spin out of control, and drift off.

*Q: Yes. Did South Korea and North play any role while you were there?*

MARTIN: Yes. Kim Jong Il came to visit once when I was in Beijing. It was interesting to talk to my Foreign Ministry interlocutors about their impressions of Kim. They were surprised as well about how sophisticated he was, how much he knew about computers, and how he was well clued in on what was happening in China and the rest of the world. He's probably one of the few in North Korea that has a computer with Internet access, and so forth. He's also not the flake that many people in the U.S. make him out to be.

Korea was very much on people's minds. China has good relations with South Korea which has complicated relations with the DPRK. They are somewhat discomfited by North Korea and not quite sure how to handle Pyongyang. They feel they have an obligation, for their own interest, to try to help North Korea in its transition into a more normal country, which will be difficult.

*Q: Were they as concerned as we are about the hard versus soft landing of North Korea?*

MARTIN: They don't want a collapse of North Korea 1) because they anticipate hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of North Koreans flooding across the Yalu River into Manchuria, where somewhere around 300,000 ethnic Koreans already live, some of them who've been there for generations. 2) They're also concerned about what that would do to South Korea, and 3) they're concerned what a united Korean peninsula would mean for their own security interests, particularly if it's allied to the United States. I think they are uncertain how to handle all these issues.

I think the South Koreans don't want it to collapse either. They see what happened with East Germany, and this would be, you know, ten times or a hundred times worse.

*Q: How did you feel relations between China and our Congress were? Did members of Congress come over to see things personally?*

MARTIN: Congressional views of China were diverse but the most outspoken were the negative ones. Joe Prueher was very good at was making the rounds on the Hill. He, in fact, came out, and he thought after his confirmation that he might have been able to get a slight window of opportunity to even get Jesse Helms to come out to China, which would have been a real coup. Helms never did, of course. But there was an opportunity, I think, to try to bring more people out. Jim Sasser was good at bringing his former colleagues from the Senate out to China to visit, and we strongly urged members of Congress to come as often and as voluminously as possible. We said, "You may not change your mind, but come out and see it for yourself. Don't rely upon second or third hand interest groups to tell you what's happening in China. You need to see it." Most members who came out were absolutely surprised with what they saw because this was totally different from what they expected to find in China. We had, I think, almost every cabinet secretary in the administration come to China at one point or another during the one year I was there. So we had many delegations, many business people, some for talks, others just to see what was going on. I think it was very useful.

We have a lot of things going on with China in terms of all parts of the government that are involved one way or the other. What you hear about in terms of the political friction is only a small percentage of our bilateral relationships, many of which go on without much interruption despite the political ups and downs. We have a lot of scientific exchanges with technical delegations going back and forth.

*Q: You talk about exchanges. You know, I can understand what would come from our science and tech side. What were we getting from them?*

MARTIN: Medical, health research, medical research processes, environmental studies. We're exchanging views, perhaps more from our side going to China to try to help them with some of their environmental degradation, which is very severe. There are a lot of science and technological areas in which we're working together - computer translation facilities in terms of linguistics, working on various agricultural resources, drought problems, again, environmentally related. Right now Beijing is under a dust cloud, usual spring dust storms, that make it so you can barely see across the street from the thickness of the dust. Everything is painted orange in color.

But you know, there are a lot of areas in which we have a lot of exchanges back and forth, and it's quite productive.

*Q: How were Sino-Russian relations when you were in Beijing?*

MARTIN: They seemed to be fairly good. Putin and Jiang exchanged visits. They had pretty much regularized their contacts. Part of it, in my view, was to still play the three-cornered game of keeping contacts with the Russians so it didn't look as though U.S.-China relations were the only game in town.

*Q: And we're not even playing that game anymore!*

MARTIN: We don't play that game anymore.

*Q: Tell me about your involvement in the Taiwan issue during your tour in Beijing in 1999-2000.*

MARTIN: I was in Beijing during a momentous time in Sino-US-Taiwan relations. Taiwan was coming up for another round of presidential elections in early March of 2000, and the PRC was getting exercised about this. The previous election, in 1996, when Lee Teng-hui was elected, was the cause for a great deal of friction in our relationship, and the cause of PLA military exercises in the Taiwan Strait.

In the 2000 election, Chen Shui-bian was running on the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) ticket; James Soong on the People's First Party, the split off faction from the KMT; and Lien Chan, the KMT candidate. Lee Teng-hui could not run because of term limits, and so there was a great deal of uncertainty as to who was going to win among these three because the three-way contest was probably going to result in a minority candidate getting elected. The Chinese were very concerned about this because they saw the DPP and Chen Shui-bian as advocating a pro-independence policy, which was, in fact, one of the planks on the DPP's political platform for years.

Early in the year we spent a lot of time talking with Chinese officials and scholars about the election, giving our views about what was happening in Taiwan, and essentially cautioning them not to do anything rash. However, China continued to ratchet up the rhetoric through January and February. The third week of February a high level interagency delegation came from Washington, led by Deputy Secretary Strobe Talbott, with representatives from the Defense Department and other agencies, which gave it a rather high profile. They spent two or three days

in Beijing having various senior level discussions with various elements in the Chinese government. Their message was to keep it cool, not to get excited about the Taiwan election, that U.S. policy had not changed, and that the election in Taiwan was something that Beijing should take handle with a great deal of caution.

The delegation left, I think, on Friday afternoon. The ambassador left to go back to Washington on Saturday because he had previously scheduled consultations and discussions on the Hill. On Monday morning, the Chinese issued their White Paper on Taiwan, which contained for the first time what we came to describe as the third “if.” Previously, Beijing had said that they would use force or military action against Taiwan if Taiwan declared independence. The second “if” was if a foreign country, unnamed, but obviously directed at us, occupied Taiwan or established military relationships with Taiwan. Now they added a third “if,” which was that if Taiwan did not begin negotiations for reunification with the mainland under their “one China” policy. This third “if” caused a great stir all around the world, particularly in Washington.

There was a great deal of concern as to why they issued the paper two or three days after the Talbott delegation had been there without any hint of their plan during the 3 days of talks. Was this a slap in the face of the U.S.? Was it a deliberate attempt to embarrass us? Was it an attempt to try to influence the Taiwan elections, which was probably the case? And so there was a considerable amount of discussion among analysts as to what this all meant.

We quickly engaged in damage control. We made a number of official representations and held a number of discussions with Chinese leaders, indicating that we didn’t think this was very helpful, and urging that they continue to be calm and cautious in their response.

A couple weeks later, on March 18, 2000, Taiwan held its elections and sure enough, Chen Shui-bian won the presidency. For the first time, the KMT, the Kuomintang Party, was out of power in Taiwan. The Nationalist party Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek created in the 1910s had been defeated by democratic elections. or teens, and ’20s. This was a momentous change politically in Taiwan. The Chinese authorities in Beijing were absolutely shocked. They were totally nonplused in terms of what to do now. It is important to remember that the KMT (Kuomintang Party) and the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) were sister parties. They were both established as Leninist parties by the Kuomintang back in the ’20s. The relationship was such that they knew and understood each other since they both came from the same roots. But in recent years, as Taiwan became more democratic, particularly as Taiwanese (as opposed to transplanted mainlanders) assumed greater leadership within the Kuomintang, Beijing increasingly did not understand the political dynamic in Taiwan. So when Chen Shui-bian was elected, the PRC was absolutely astounded. They really had no idea how to react on this.

Fortunately, I think because of their being so shocked and uncertain, they didn’t do much. I don’t give much of the credit to us for telling them to play it cool, although I think that did help. Essentially I think they reassembled their Taiwan experts to sort out 1) what went wrong, 2) why the experts had not predicted Chen’s election, and 3) what they could do about it. Eventually, in April, what they finally came up with was a wait-and-see attitude, to see what Chen Shui-bian did. Obviously if he declared independence or if he started making noises along those lines, they would have to take strong action. But they would wait and see what he did. I think that was a

good policy on their part as it reduced tensions and fears of peremptory action. With periodic spikes in rhetoric, Beijing has essentially continued their wait and see policy since then.

*Q: What was your reaction and your embassy's reaction to the third "if"? Did you see it as a power play by one part of the Chinese government over another?*

MARTIN: We had a lot of debates as to whether this was a PLA forcing the hand, whether this was a cleared document, whether this was something that the Foreign Ministry had not cleared. The Foreign Ministry had been the hosts for the Talbott delegation, and although the delegation had met with the PLA and Defense Ministry, it was essentially a Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) show. The question we all discussed at great length was whether the MFA had been cut out of the decision? Was this a power play by the PLA and others in the state council, vis-à-vis Taiwan? I think the final conclusion, after a great deal of discussion, and talking to Foreign Ministry and PLA contacts was that it was a well cleared, inter-ministerial document which had been vetted throughout the government, and reflected a united PRC policy.

Why they came out at that particular juncture, why they thought that this was necessary, is unclear. My view is that they were frustrated that Taiwan was not going in the right direction, that they had to lay down this additional condition, this warning that their patience was not infinite.

*Q: Had there been any Taiwan politicians talking to Communist Party members in China or elsewhere?*

MARTIN: The problem was they had not had a dialog. Ever since Lee Teng-hui, the president of Taiwan, had 1) gone to the States, and 2) been reelected, Beijing had turned off the dialog. The PRC had refused to continue what looked like a pretty good start back in 1992 when they had unofficial talks between the two unofficial organizations that had been set up on either side for cross strait dialog, and that looked as though it was going pretty well. But after '95, this was turned off on the Chinese side and not restarted. We constantly encouraged them to reopen the dialog, to find ways in which they could reestablish talks, reestablish connections, reestablish communications because there were a lot of issues that needed to be resolved. But this was not done at that point. It has been subsequently, although it's not on the formal level.

*Q: Yes. It seems like the Chinese government makes these statements, and then, I mean they're, you know, crying, "Wolf! Wolf!" but most of the time, they're ones that really everybody knows, at least in the short term, aren't going to happen.*

MARTIN: Well, you don't know that, I mean in a sense, because they've continued their missile buildup in Fujian Province and in the provinces that are facing Taiwan. They have been rattling the sword, if you will, at least in the PLA press and the PLA media, about Taiwan saying that, you know, their patience is not infinite, that they can't wait forever, that they need to restart the talks. After Chen Shui-bian got elected, they waited a while to see what he would do, but then they continued to emphasize the need for "one country, two systems" for Taiwan to recognize "one China." Fortunately, I think Chen has been very cautious in his public statements and in his actions. He has repeatedly indicated a willingness to talk to the mainland, to have discussions

with them, but he insists 1) on an equal basis, and 2) without the Chinese precondition of recognizing “one China,” that Taiwan is part of “one China.” Because of the way Beijing has defined it, “one China” means Beijing is the capital and Taiwan is a subordinate entity. It’s not a province perhaps, but a subordinate entity under Beijing.

*Q: You were a chargé when the third “if” came out. How were you received when you talked to officials?*

MARTIN: They would reiterate their policy line, which followed what the White Paper had said, that this was their government policy, that they were concerned about Taiwan. They wanted to make sure that everybody understood their position. We reiterated our point that it was not helpful because it threw down the gauntlet. This added threat to use force was also destabilizing because of its vagueness in timing (how long a wait for Taiwan to unify was too long?).

Also in March of 2000, the National People’s Congress was holding its annual sessions in Beijing. Many people will remember the picture of Premier Zhu Rongji with his finger pointed in the air, shrilly saying that, the Taiwan situation is very dangerous, and in the forthcoming election the Taiwan people need to think carefully about who they’re going to elect, etc. I think this was another blatant effort by Beijing to try to influence the elections in Taiwan. Once again, as it had been in the previous election, it backfired. Some believe it may have helped split the election returns three ways. Chen Shui-bian won only by about 39 percent of the vote, James Soong came in second with about 37, and the KMT candidate came in much lower, around 23 percent. Chen was elected president, but the KMT retained majority control of the Legislative Yuan. Chen has had a difficult time getting any of his program or legislative agenda through.

*Q: Why was the KMT doing so well in the legislative assembly?*

MARTIN: Basically local politics. They had the local election system pretty well sewn up, either through patronage, corruption, name recognition. Being the beneficiaries of the party in power for so long, they had a large war chest in the party coffers, and they were able to essentially spread the wealth around during elections, for roads, public services, etc.

But that is how democracy works. One of the things that Chen has been trying to do since he was elected is to have electoral reform, to changes in the system by mandating better accounting, and more transparency in the electoral process. With democracy, if you don’t have transparency, but have a dominant political party which has run everything for the last 50 some years, you’ve have a lot of networks and interests which can affect election results.

*Q: Going back to Mainland China, did you see any seeds of democracy developing there?*

MARTIN: I think there are indications of it. They have the much touted village elections, which they started at the lowest level, the village level. The township is the lowest level of governmental authority. The village, which is under the township, is perhaps equivalent to a neighborhood or community of several tens of houses. In the village elections, the government allows people who are not party members to run for election as village chiefs. In many cases party members still get elected. In other cases non-party members are. There’s been a lot of

foreign interest and attention to these elections. Former-President Jimmy Carter has been an observer; the Carter Center's been involved in monitoring and studying this process. I think it's a good step forward, but it has not moved very far. The National People's Congress pass a law to expand village level elections with the unstated suggestion that they might be elevated to the township or higher level eventually. It's a start, but it's got a long way to go as it is still below the bottom rung of the governmental bureaucratic structure. Often, if the non-party member is elected, he or she is then persuaded become party members. The elections thus become sort of an entry level test for the Party. People elected by their peers as being competent, uncorrupted, good leaders are attractive to the CCP.

*Q: I think we touched on this before. Did you have the feeling the party, the ideology, was gone?*

MARTIN: There's not much ideology left in the party. They still have the rhetoric. They still have their study sessions. President Jiang has come out with a campaign called the Three Represents, and everybody's trying to decide what this really means. It's his way to sort of follow in the tradition of Chairman Mao's thought, that he was a great ideologue and a great philosopher. But Jiang is not. Jiang is an engineer, and he's trying to come up with, you know, kind of a political mantra or political campaign, which can represent his ideology. It's not taken very seriously. Everybody has to study it in the party, but basically what the party is doing is finding ways to stay in power, and the way to stay in power is to continue the economic benefits to the people.

*Q: I notice you're talking about the three "ifs" and the three this, and the seven those. Just as aside, I imagine in the embassy, there must have been jokes in the corridor along the lines of, "Oh, God, here is Martin with his four others and six formers...."*

MARTIN: The four yes'es, three no's; the six do's, and four don'ts; and the one up, and two downs. There are lots of jokes around, within the China cadre about this. The Chinese themselves are rather inured to all this because they always have threes of this, fours of that, pluses and minuses, and so forth. But it's all part of the rhetoric that they've gone through for the last 50 years. And the numeration is just a short hand for longer campaign slogans used so even the most illiterate farmer can remember it. While foreigners may think the terminology humorous, the political campaigns can be deadly serious for Chinese. Much more so during Chairman Mao's day when people were killed or exiled during the incessant campaigns, but anyone in a government or Party position has to go along with the campaign de jour or risk his job.

*Q: You'd been in and out of this for a while. Do you have any comments on the China hands, the ones like yourself and others who are coming around? Can you characterize them? I'm talking about the State Department and others who are dealing with China. Are they cynics? Are they optimistic? Do you have any feel for the thought process, including your own?*

MARTIN: I think one cannot generalize on a diverse cohort across a broad time spectrum. Am I a cynic, or am I an optimist, or a pessimist? It depends on what day of the week you ask because it does vary. One's attitude and mood has its ups and downs, often influenced by the vagaries of our relations with China.

Those of us who spent our careers studying or trying to learn about China, trying to understand China, realize the complexities of the country, realize the complexities of our relationship, and it's very difficult to make generalizations. It's dangerous to make generalizations. As Stapleton Roy, the former ambassador, has put it, which I think sums it up - predictions are very difficult, particularly about the future - and so you have to be very cautious in how you predict things. But if I have to generalize, my sense, is that over the last 20-25 years, China has gone through a tremendous period of change, a dramatic transition, both economically, under the economic reforms that were started by the former paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, and socially. But the social changes have not kept up with the economic changes. Now you have serious problems in the state-owned enterprise sector, the state sector of the economy, which basically is bankrupt. People are being thrown out of work, being thrown out on the street with no safety net after having been in the "birth-to-death" cocoon where the work unit took care of all one's personal needs. Lacking any national social safety net - unemployment insurance, social security, pension system, health benefits - millions are left on their own. These social problems quickly become political problems. The dramatic rise in public protests and demonstrations is the result. The government sees and understands the problems but has not been able to solve them.

I think most of us who have dealt with China hope that the problems can be resolved peacefully and equitably. If they are not, the internal dislocations, strife, and friction will be tremendous, and the repercussions, certainly in the region and probably around the world, are going to affect all of us. There are optimists and pessimists. People are all across the board. The important thing to remember is that just because people know about China, have studied China, perhaps have an inkling of understanding about China, it doesn't necessarily mean that they are any more in favor of what the government is doing. Knowledge does not result in endorsement. Those of us who have lived and worked in China are probably among the strongest opponents and critics of the communist system for we see the weaknesses, the brutality and unfairness of the system which perpetuates and exacerbates the problems. At the same time, we recognize and credit the CCP and government for the successes it has had -- economic development, rising standards of living for hundreds of millions, greater choices and opportunities for individuals. We try to report events as we see them, and I think generally report it in a fair and unbiased way.

*Q: I've talked to many Soviet hands and many saw the Soviet Union as a potential if not present enemy. Their efforts within the United States have been to play China as an enemy given the PRC's buildup of its military force. So there are elements within the United States who look on China as being not only a trade rival, but a huge, looming military and political rival. Was this a feeling that permeates the China hand corps, of seeing it as the enemy?*

MARTIN: I go back to the old saying, "Your position is determined by who issues you the paycheck. If you're with the Defense Department, your job is to look out to the future and think about potential rivals, potential competitors strategically, militarily. In the State Department, I think we look at it more in terms of how can we resolve this diplomatically, how can we work out an understanding or a relationship with China which will prevent us from becoming military competitors or rivals.

I think that the important thing is that we try to work both sides of the issue; to maintain our

preparedness militarily, but also work with China to try to prevent a zero sum game in which one side wins and the other loses. We can't lead them, but encourage them to see the rationale of moving in directions which will prevent them becoming a military competitor. I believe most FSOs support opening China for trade and encouraging China entering the WTO despite all the problems and difficulties that's going to cause. Educational exchanges, having people come to the States to study, can increase Chinese understanding of our society, what our system is like. Perhaps some of this will rub off, and moderate Chinese policies.

The option is having China develop on its own, as we saw back in the '50s and '60s, when they were contained and isolated. That didn't turn out very well. The Great Leap Forward and subsequently the Cultural Revolution almost tore the country apart. China supported all sorts of insurgencies and conflicts with their neighbors. I think that's not something that we want to see in the future. Nor would we benefit if China falls apart and civil war breaks out between regions or ethnic minorities. An unstable, insecure China would cause far greater chaos in the region and world than what we see today.

*Q: What about China's policies towards Central Asia, places like Kyrgyzstan on the border of China? With four and a half million people, they are a little bit nervous about having China with its billion and a half population next door. Did there seem to be much of an outward thrust towards those places, or concern about them?*

MARTIN: When I was in Beijing, no, because the U.S. was not focused on Central Asia at the time. But China was attentive because of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the new independent status of all these Central Asian countries. Beijing well understood the need to worry about what these weak, struggling nations would do. Historically, Central Asia was the area from which most of China's troubles came. The nomadic peoples were constantly pressing against the settled areas of the border lands. And, in certain periods, non-Han invaders, including the Mongols, conquered and ruled China. Currently, Beijing is concerned about ties between minorities in Xinjiang Province of Western China -- Uighurs, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Tajiks - and their tribal counterparts across the border in Central Asia. And the growth of fundamental Islam and groups willing to use terrorism to advance political goals adds to China's concerns. At the same time, Beijing is eager to establish good working relations with the governments of Central Asian countries, for political, economic (mainly energy) and security reasons.

*Q: So it's not as though China was casting greedy eyes towards the others.*

MARTIN: There's no indication the Chinese, at this point, have any ambitions to expand their borders westward. They have enough problems managing the Xinjiang Autonomous Region. At the same time, there are economic issues, over which they want influence, particularly oil and gas resources as well as minerals. Since 9/11, the increased U.S. presence in the region as part of our war on terrorism is of greater concern to China. Many in Beijing see U.S. military forces on their western borders as just the final brick in the containment wall that we are building around China. You talk about people in this country seeing China as a future military or security threat. The Chinese look at our policies, look at where we are, and they see us increasing our presence all around China, and they begin to wonder, "Who's the threat? Are we a threat to the U.S. or is the U.S. a threat to us?"

It's a mirror perception. They are concerned about what our policies are, and they often, as we used to say, put two and two together and get five and a half or six. Many Chinese perceive a grand orchestrated U.S. strategy by the U.S. to contain or keep China down from its rightful place in the world. They see our trade and military policies, our diplomatic initiatives as being manipulated and controlled by a master hand in the White House or someplace. These are the perceptions that we need to address in our bilateral relations.

*Q: While you were there, did India come up? It's going to surpass China in population soon, and it's had a completely different experience. With all its problems, it is a democracy, and things are moving there. Was China looking over its shoulder at India?*

MARTIN: I think the Chinese are paying more attention to India now. They've always had their alliance relationship with Pakistan because Pakistan was the only one that supported China's policies around the world. They saw India as a potential and a growing rival, both in geopolitical terms as well as a potential threat to their control over Tibet and the Himalayan regions. They also see democratic India as an alternative model for the third world, which China always sees itself as. They keep saying that they don't want to be a leader of the third world. They're just one of the gang. But they do see their system and their ways of doing things as an example for other underdeveloped countries. And China's successful economic development is quite a selling point.

*Q: India's restrictive trade practices, which are finally being removed, are in a way has almost an advantage over the Chinese, because they have many aspects of the Western world.*

MARTIN: Right. They have an underlying foundation of the British common law system, which the British left them. They have more of a rule of law than China has. But I think the countries are very different in many ways. The chaotic nature of Indian politics and society makes Chinese blanch. And Indians looking at China see it potentially as a hostile power. In reality, if you look at geopolitical relationships, the Himalayans are a wonderful barrier! Not much gets through there! There are a few passes, but it's not a broad boulevard in which you're going to send lots of goods, people, or troops back and forth. There are certain areas in which they rub up against each other, and there's friction, but it's not the north German plain.

The WTO angle is interesting. India, of course, was quite concerned about China joining WTO, mainly from a competitive point of view. The end of textile quotas in 2005 made other textile producers, Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, concerned that there's going to be a great sucking sound as China took all the textile markets around the world by being the low cost producer. While it has not reached that extent, China and India are essentially economic competitors.

*Q: Yes. Are there any other areas we should cover?*

MARTIN: I want to mention about PNTR, about WTO.

*Q: Yes.*

MARTIN: The conclusion of 13 years of Sino-U.S. negotiations on China's entry into the WTO

in November 1999, just before I got to Beijing, led directly into one of the main issues on our plate during my year tour. That was getting Congress to pass a bill giving China Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) status. Once China entered the WTO, the old Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading status became illegal. So the annual congressional debate over China's human rights behavior warranted renewal of China's MFN, renamed Normal Trading Relations (NTR) status. Congressional critics of China and human rights groups' used the annual debate to castigate Beijing's poor performance although Administration advocacy always assembled enough votes to renew NTR.

For several months in the spring of 2000, beginning around the time of the Taiwan election, we launched a concerted effort in conjunction with the administration in Washington to convince Congress to pass the Permanent Normal Trade Relations bill. Commerce Secretary William M. Daley was the point man in D.C., coordinating the efforts of other Cabinet secretaries and departments. He and Agriculture Secretary Daniel Glickman were to organize congressional delegations to China, to talk to the Chinese, determine Chinese perspectives, and learn how the Chinese were going to implement the WTO agreement to which they had agreed.

That spring was a contentious time in our relations. The Cox report on China's nuclear espionage highlighted the Wen Ho-lee case in Los Alamos in which Wen was accused of selling warhead secrets to the Chinese. Perhaps to mollify human rights critics, the administration decided to again submit a proposal to examine China's human rights record at the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) annual meeting. All these things came together along with the Taiwan elections in the first half of 2000, making it a tense time in our relationships, and a very busy embassy.

The PNTR campaign went well and in the end, obviously, Congress did pass the legislation. Secretary Daley and Secretary Glickman were unable to get very many members of Congress who were willing to come out to China at that point, I think for domestic political reasons more than anything else. Many Members felt it was not politically wise to be seen traveling to China for whatever reason, so we only had a couple congressmen that came out with Glickman. But I think it was a useful campaign, and the legislation passed by a larger majority than we expected.

Passage of PNTR in the late summer removed a big thorn from our bilateral relationship. I believe our public, transparent campaign impressed the Chinese and began a period of improved relations after more than a year of tension and problems. But those of us working in China get used to undulations Chinese-U.S. relations and we expect improvements to be followed by new issues. And the next spring we had the EP-3 incident.

*Q: How about the Olympics? Does that come up during your time?*

MARTIN: The Olympics was after my time. Obviously, they were very much in the throws of preparing their case. The Olympic committees came for visits, Beijing was being spruced up with grass plantings to make it all look cleaner, etc.

We had visits by almost every cabinet member in the U.S. government during the time I was there. I think only the Secretary of Labor, who kept planning to come, but never could quite get

away, was the only one that didn't come. Two that came in the summertime were Secretary of State Albright and Secretary Cohen of Defense. Quite a contrast between the two - the Secretary of State now travels in a much more imperial fashion than others, and the contrast between Secretary Albright's visit and Secretary Cohen's visit was quite dramatic. For Albright's visit, nearly all normal Embassy functions were sidelined as the Secretariat had to be staffed 24 hours a day, site officers had to dedicate themselves to each site and event, and the ambassador and I were on call if not involved most of the time. Two weeks later, Secretary Cohen came in, on a USAF airplane, as she did, but accomplished his visit with hardly a ripple or disruption other than perhaps the Defense Attaché office. Cohen's visit was much lower key with minimal storm and stress.

*Q: This does raise a point. Secretary Albright had a reputation within the Foreign Service that was not a warm, cozy relationship. Part of it was because of the feeling that she was somewhat cut off, and public relations, particularly the people around her, were more important than the substance. Did you have that feeling or concern?*

MARTIN: I think in many ways this was similar to other secretaries we've had, where the secretary tends to have his or her own circle of advisors and staff, and people that she or he trusts and works with. My experience, having served under secretaries, is that the morale, efficiency, and effectiveness of the State Department is best when the secretary draws upon the expertise and the resources of the department and the Foreign Service. When they isolate themselves, and use their own coterie of advisors and their own staff, and don't let the professionals in, you have bad morale, more security leaks, and you don't have very good foreign policies.

*Q: Describing the American-Chinese relationship, it's a little bit like dealing with a jealous spouse or partner who is always looking behind comments and actions for hidden meaning. It makes for a very stormy relationship.*

MARTIN: Yes, you could use that analogy, or you could say it shows a basic lack of trust between two parties. One often doesn't quite know why the other side is doing something. You don't know what they're going to do next, and you're not sure of your relationship with them. Whether it's a marriage, or a bilateral relationship, it's a matter of history and past actions. One of the things those of us who study and work in China try to do is to look at the total picture - history, culture, perceptions, relationships - and try to figure out why they're doing these things. They don't do them just for fun or because they want to be mean to us. They do them for historical, psychological, internal, domestic, political reasons. The important thing now, looking at China's reaction to events, in addition to all those mentioned above, is to remember China is changing so rapidly. It is not the totalitarian country it used to be. It's not a dictatorship run by Mao, who could do what he wanted, no matter how crazy it was, and no one dared object. Now there are interest groups in China, different factions, different sectors, that all have a strong voice in the councils of government, and they make their views known. In WTO relationships, how do you implement the WTO agreements that they've had? You've got a lot of people in different ministries who are going to drag their heels as best they can because it's their ox that's going to be gored. Premier Zhu Rongji came under heavy pressure from the Agriculture Ministry after he signed the WTO agreement which gave many concessions on agricultural imports. That would never have happened twenty or thirty years ago. Everyone doesn't just salute and go along with

the leader's decision anymore.

*Q: One last question. There was a nuclear spy episode in the United States. That happened during your time there.*

MARTIN: Yes. Wen Ho-lee, the Chinese-American scientist in Los Alamos.

*Q: Obviously, both the United States and the Chinese are going to be looking at each other in not completely overt ways. Was Chinese spying in the United States, from your perspective, a problem in our bilateral relationship?*

MARTIN: It certainly is an irritant. Both government know both sides seek to obtain classified information of the other. It's an irritant mainly because they do it. We do it to them; they do it to us. It's a very different kind of spying than what we're used to, at least according to movies and the historical record in terms of the Soviet Union or the Eastern Europeans. You don't have people in trench coats making secret drops or handoffs, and this sort of thing. That may be part of it but the Chinese methodology is like a giant vacuum cleaner. They just suck up everything that they can get, and they have the resources to do it. Thousands of Chinese students are in the U.S., some of which undoubtedly work for or report to the Ministry of State Security. There are growing numbers of travelers, visiting officials, as well as hundreds if not thousands of people sitting at computer terminals in China on the Internet, picking up every little piece of information they can about a long list of topics. And eventually, little by little, the missing pieces of the puzzle, or unknown fact, can be reassembled. There is an enormous amount of information in public domain in this country and other countries around the world on just about everything, from strategic issues to weapons systems, to economic data, to commercially sensitive data, etc. So do the Chinese on us? They do it through agents, but they also do it through Chinese students, scientists, travelers, officials who are encouraged to look for information of specific topics while in the U.S. and then debriefed on their return. It can be as simple as, "What did you learn in the States?" They are able to learn a lot as we have a lot to offer.

*Q: But can they do anything with all the information they suck up?*

MARTIN: Too much information is a problem for all of us. Sorting it out and knowing what is useful and what is not is a challenge. But the Chinese are patient and have a wealth of resources devoted to it. We just need to ensure we don't make it easier for them.

To sum up my Foreign Service career, I would say it has been fascinating to be a witness to the dramatic changes in Asia over the past 40 years. By spending most of my time on China and Southeast Asia, I think I had some of the most interesting and rewarding assignments. The great aspect of being involved with China is that it is a fascinating country to study. As the Chinese say, "You can study until you're old, you can learn until you're old, but there's still a large percentage that you'll never know." So I often describe myself not as an expert but as a mere student of China.

I left Beijing the end of September 2000 and re-retired, but remained connected to the Department as a contractor, chairing the area studies course for China and Northeast Asia.

**HAROLD W. GEISEL**  
**Chief, Negotiating Team with Chinese for Embassy construction in  
Washington and Beijing (2001)**

*Ambassador Harold W. Geisel was born in Illinois in 1947. He received his BA from Johns Hopkins and his MBA from the University of Virginia. After entering the Foreign service in 1971, he was posted in Brussels, Oslo, Bern, Bamako, Durban, Rome, Bonn and Moscow and served as Ambassador to Mauritius. He was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy on June 30, 2006*

*Q: Were the Soviets, Chinese messing around there?*

GEISEL: A bit. I mean, I think in memory of the good old days. They had the biggest embassies, both the Russians and the Chinese. Someone put a bug under the ambassador's cocktail table once in the office and I think we ended up assuming it was the Russians. We caught one of the Embassy laborers trying to retrieve it when we broke it but he just ran away. To sum up, I would say life there for all the embassies was pretty desultory.

*Q: Well tell me, what-*

GEISEL: If you were to ask me what was the issue that took more of my time than anything else, it was finding a way to rebuild securely the Moscow embassy, the new embassy. I suppose that's one of the reasons I was recruited out of Moscow. I went to a lot of meetings and these were meetings at the highest levels, including the director of Central Intelligence. Moose and I were taken out to the National Security Agency, NSA, at Fort Meade and given what they claimed was a very, very special briefing on their concerns and we were told about all sort of ways that we wouldn't believe that we could be listened to if we weren't careful. Afterwards they said to us, you know, we hope you understand you have been shown the crown jewels. When Moose and I were alone I said well, I think actually we were shown the crown princess's jewels. It took up a lot of my time and ultimately of course we did come up with a concept. Actually we'd been selling it to the Hill and to the intelligence community earlier under the first Bush administration; it was called Top Hat. What you had was the compromised portion of the building, you know, where we found bugs in the rebar and everything else; the compromised part of the building would have unclassified activities and local employees only and then we would build a barrier, I forgot how the actually did it, I know at one time we were talking about glass bricks but I don't think it ended up with them because I don't think glass bricks could have supported it. Then we would have the classified part where everything, the bricks, the mortar the concrete, you name it, came from the States. This was very useful to my later negotiations with the Chinese over how to build an embassy in Beijing. There wasn't a grain of sand that didn't come in in what was essentially a diplomatic bag to build the secure part of the embassy.

Then there was the usual crisis after crisis, no money and all of that. There I take my hat off to Moose because money was so tight in '93 that USIA actually didn't take two junior officer

classes. Moose, even though we were tight for money, you know, we stopped all senior performance pay. We took those two USIA classes of people who'd been hired by USIA and we brought them into State. We were very worried about money all the time.

*Q: We'll get to. That's the, yes.*

GEISEL: But the first thing that's interesting was that when I did this roving all over Africa, I went to Mauritius at least twice as a roving administrative officer, fixing the post up. They didn't really need much fixing up because they had some superb FSNs. But in any event when I went to Mauritius 16 years earlier, it was a pretty poor place. The first time I went, which would have been probably 1980, it was the damndest thing. There was a line four miles long waiting to get into the U.S. Embassy. The reason was that someone had spread a rumor that the U.S. Embassy would give unlimited immigration visas to the United States and it was actually picked up by the Mauritius Broadcasting Corporation. In those days it was such a poor place that they had a department of emigration to encourage people to leave the island and this famous Swedish social scientist, well I guess he was an economist of sorts, named Malthus, who was sort of full of it, hatched up this theory that was based on Mauritius. The theory was that eventually people in countries with a high birth rate would overwhelm the land and they would starve and Mauritius was what he had in mind.

So when I got there the first time it was lovely but poor. And they did something though that was very smart in between when I went there in 1980 and I came back in 1996. What they did was when Maggie Thatcher agreed to turn back Hong Kong to the Chinese then, I don't remember if it was the finance minister or the prime minister, went off to Hong Kong with a suitcase full of Mauritius passports and he told the rich Chinese that he met no, you can't buy Mauritian citizenship but, if you invest in Mauritius, you can become a Mauritian citizen. And some very, very rich Chinese built textile factories. By the time I got to Mauritius, it's the damndest thing, here it is a tropical island, and they were the world's number two manufacturer of sweaters. The tallest building in 1980 was Rogers House, the American embassy was on that fourth floor. When I came back they had quasi skyscrapers 30 stories tall and it was an island that was so prosperous that they rated its living standards with Spain or Portugal or even Ireland. I think Ireland was an exaggeration but Spain or Portugal was probably true. It was capitalistic and democratic and everyone adored it by the time I came back.

Now if White House Personnel would have had its act together, I never would have gotten it and I note that I have since been followed by two real estate gazillionaires, one Democratic and then one Republican and Mauritius will probably never go career again. The way it used to work was that there was an informal agreement between State and White House Personnel that there were two embassies; there was Mauritius and there was Seychelles and one would go career and the other would go political. But what the White House didn't realize is that, first of all, the political appointee to Seychelles had died and, secondly, we were closing our embassy in Seychelles because the US Air Force had decided to close its tracking station on the main island of Seychelles. By the time the White House had figured this out, the president had long since put a checkmark by my name and my name had been submitted to the Senate for my three countries.

*Q: Well how British and how sort of residual French was it?*

GEISEL: Well it was more, in many ways it was more, culturally, residually French than British but governmentally it was much more British. When the British came in the Napoleonic wars and overthrew the French, just as luck would have it, they had a very reasonable minded army of occupation and very high class people who were much more interested in playing polo and horse racing than oppressing the French who really could have used a bit of oppression because they were pretty arrogant. They let the French planters do their thing and in return the French planters left the British alone as far as government was concerned but the French kept their slaves much longer than they should have and they blackmailed the British into buying them out when they finally insisted on freeing the slaves. But the majority population group was Indian Hindus who came originally as cane cutters but there were about 17 or 18 percent Indian Muslims who were originally Gujaratis and traders who sold to the Indians. Mauritius actually was named after a Dutch prince because the Dutch discovered it, slaughtered all the Dodo birds because that's the only place the Dodo ever was and didn't think they could do anything else and left. The French came later in the, let's say that would have been the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, and grew sugar. They imported slaves. The slaves didn't like cutting cane and ultimately were replaced by Indian coolies when the slaves were freed. I use the word coolies because that's what they were called. There were, I think, it must have been about 25, 30 percent of the island were what were called Creoles, which were the descendants of the slaves who, by the late 20<sup>th</sup> century, were thoroughly mixed but they were the largest bunch of Christians on the island. The island even had an old Catholic Cardinal so you really had an incredible mixture of cultures with the Muslim culture, the Hindu culture, the Creole culture; then you had the French planters who dominated business, along with the Chinese. The French were about one percent of the population but they lived a very nice life by and two percent of the island were the Chinese, who also had come earlier as coolies but who were brilliant businessmen and were called the Jews of Mauritius because there were no Jews on Mauritius except for me and maybe 10 or 12 other people. In the second World War the British had deported a couple lots of Jews who had shown up in Palestine on some rinky boats and they had sent them to a fortress, a prison fortress in Mauritius and enough of them died that I would always say, not counting the tourists, there were far more dead Jews on Mauritius than live.

*Q: Was there a problem or was Mauritius prosperous enough so that there wasn't a problem that happens in so many places exploiting workers and all that?*

GEISEL: Good question. Well of course remember we didn't really have any facilities on the island; we had agents on the island. All the manufacturing on the island was either textiles or sugar. The Mauritians actually on textiles had rudiments of what I would have to call a labor inspection service. They were pretty good about checking the factories for safe working conditions. For sugar it was not an issue because everybody, one way or another, knew the prime minister and other people so you really did not treat people badly. Look, it's not a wonderful life to cut sugarcane, it's a hell of a life but it was all mechanized really. In fact, that was the one brand the Mauritians, I mean, the average Mauritian thought it was French, didn't even know it was American that had the whole island sewed up and that was Caterpillar. The machine that was used to do the work digging up the cane and getting rid of all the boulders because it was all volcanic was the Caterpillar and they used to refer to it not as an excavator but they would say, a Caterpillar. Most of the generators were Caterpillars too. They really understood how to export.

When I was in Mauritius, there was literally a severe labor shortage in the textile factories and they had to import Chinese textile workers from the mainland and you could say they were exploited because they worked terribly hard hours but, relatively speaking they were well paid and it was clear, because I spoke to the Chinese ambassador about it, these people wanted to work. They wanted to work outrageous hours, they were virtually all young single women who wanted to make money and go back to China with a pocket full of bucks.

*Q: Talk a bit about the Chinese as negotiators.*

GEISEL: They are tough as nails. They actually have for their government people a negotiating school and I sure wish we had something like that. No one is allowed to go on their teams until they've been to the negotiating school. So the name of the game is, first of all, no one talks except the leader of the delegation. But with us, the leader of the delegation sometimes can hardly get a word in edgewise what with all the different agencies. I'm exaggerating but I have reason to exaggerate because this is a bad point where we were weak. The name of the game is to see who is the real head of the Chinese delegation or if the real head is even on the delegation because the other thing you know is the delegation is empowered to do nothing except listen and attempt to get you to give concessions. The Chinese specialty is sitting under the tree just patiently waiting for fruit to drop.

*Q: Well now, by this time, we're talking about 2001, 2, 3, had we learned to keep our fruit from dropping?*

GEISEL: Oh, pretty much so. It was, oh, we didn't give them anything. We didn't give them anything that we didn't want to give them, I should say. We had our plan and we stuck to it. The issues began and ended with security and the Chinese, and we went back and forth with concrete batch plants and zoning and all sorts of stuff but it all, it was going to rise and fall on whether we could be certain that we could control our shipments every moment from the time they left the United States, or they left where they were pouched until they got to Beijing and to our controlled site. We would get all sorts of deals and everything fell into place except the security elements and that's when we had to leave. Our ambassador in China gave us great advice.

*Q: What's his name?*

GEISEL: Randt, Clark Randt is his name. He has lived in Hong Kong for many years, he's an attorney and he speaks Mandarin Chinese. He said to us, you'll never get this through unless you walk away from the table at least once and go home. He was right. We actually had to walk away from the table twice, go home once, and then the Chinese called us back. The Chinese foreign ministry did not have control, it was their security people. The Chinese foreign ministry, I think, wanted to build a new embassy which they needed as badly as we needed. A new one.

*Q: Well did you have the feeling that the Chinese security people really wanted to compromise, in other words, to stick their stuff in or was this just a matter of-*

GEISEL: They didn't want to have a new embassy. They didn't give a damn about their people

in Washington. You know, our current, soon to be former, thank God, embassy had so many areas where it could be compromised, even though we tried and tried and tried, it was such a God awful mess and I think they were just as happy as pigs in manure with us in that place. Finally, I think what may have pushed them over was that President Bush the elder was to have dinner with the prime minister, no, with the president of China and Ambassador Randt got him to mention this to the president of China and I think that may have been what pushed the deal through.

*Q: Just looking at this, I'm sure...*

GEISEL: This is a serious business and occasionally various elements in an embassy like Beijing or Moscow have got very sensitive stuff and I'm sure the same is true for the Russians and Chinese here in Washington.

**LAWRENCE DUNHAM**  
**Office of Foreign Missions (OFM): Assistant Chief of Protocol**  
**Washington, DC (2001-2005)**

*Mr. Dunham was born and raised on Nantucket Island, Massachusetts and was educated at Catholic University and George Mason University School of Law. After working briefly in the United States Customs Service in Washington, DC, he joined the Department of State's Office of Protocol in 1983. He worked in the Office of Foreign Missions as Diplomatic and Consular Liaison until 2001, at which time he was appointed Assistant Chief of Protocol, serving in that capacity until 2005. Mr. Dunham was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2007.*

*Q: One last question. Did you get involved in the Chinese embassy which was put up in a big apartment building on Connecticut Avenue? They were building over by Van Ness and that area. Did that hit you at all, or did the Chinese get involved?*

DUNHAM: I was not involved. The Office of Foreign Missions and the Office of Overseas Buildings were the lead offices in that case. The reason was that the U.S. government had to negotiate with the Chinese government as to where we would locate our embassy in Beijing. In the process of negotiation we needed to be able to offer space to the Chinese here in Washington. The only involvement I had, was when the negotiations were complete there was a treaty signing arrangement at the State Department between the State Department and the Chinese government. I was involved in that. By the way, the building is going up. They have made a lot of progress. I think they plan to be in there within the year.

*Q: Speaking of the Chinese, the Chinese are renowned for their protocol and all that. Did you find in dealing with them you had to be on your toes protocolwise?*

DUNHAM: Yes, although I didn't get too involved in visits with them. My other colleagues were responsible for that. I do recall a couple of occasions where they were really rather formal

about something. I will tell you about one because it was rather interesting. I won't go into detail about what happened, but there was something that occurred involving a Chinese diplomat. Because of it the Chinese decided to come in and make a presentation to us at the State Department. I agreed to receive the embassy representative. She was probably a counselor. She came in and spoke at length. She actually read a document to me. So I took notes. Then we concluded the meeting. As she was leaving, I said, "I wonder if it would be possible for you to leave me with a copy of the document that you read. It would be very helpful," and it was in English. She said to me, "I don't know if I can leave it with you because I was only told to come in and read it to you." So I asked, "Could you inquire?" She said, "Yes, I will inquire and I will call you back." Later in the day she called me back. She said, "I have been told I can't give you the document, but I will be happy to read it to you again."

There is one other thing I wanted to talk to you about. It is a relatively esoteric area, but it is interesting. Most of the time is routine but in a couple of cases it did become an issue. One of the areas for which the Diplomatic Liaison Division of Protocol had responsibility was handling the Agrément requests for foreign ambassadors coming to the United States.

*Q: You might explain what an Agrément is.*

DUNHAM: The Agrément process is described in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. There is a specific provision in the Vienna Convention that addresses it. But it has been a practice in international relations generally since time immemorial. Essentially it involves seeking the advance approval of the receiving state before a foreign ambassador is sent there. In cases where a foreign diplomat is sent to a country to represent it, he or she gets a visa and they travel there and are registered with the host country once they arrive. But in the case of ambassadors, the host country is queried in advance as to whether or not they would accept a particular individual as ambassador. The formal term for the process is Agrément, which is the French word for Agreement. In 99.9% of the cases this is a routine procedure. The sending state would send a written request, although it doesn't have to be written. It can be oral. But they send a request stating that so and so is being appointed to be our ambassador to your country. Is he or she acceptable to you? With the request they attach a biography (a CV of the individual). In the U.S., the paperwork is received in the State Department and generally it is reviewed by the desk. It might be vetted elsewhere in the U.S. government just to make sure nobody has any reason to disapprove the request. Once everything appears to be in order, the office of protocol will respond to the foreign government either with a diplomatic note or a cable indicating the person is acceptable to the U.S. government and saying we should be advised when they are preparing to travel to the U.S. because we have a procedure for greeting new ambassadors on their arrival in the U.S. In most cases this is done routinely within a few weeks of the Agrément request. However there were a couple of cases over the years where we weren't able to do that. I remember in one case there was a person who was proposed to be an ambassador. In the process of reviewing the Agrément it turned out the individual had been accused of some very serious human rights violations in his country. We made a determination that we would not accept him, and we did contact the government and advise that this person was not acceptable. These requests are handled confidentially. We don't want to embarrass the government and we don't want to embarrass the individual. Only a few people are involved in the process. All of the paperwork involved is treated as confidential. In one case, however, the matter did become

public. This was a very interesting case.

**DONALD M. BISHOP**  
**Public Affairs Officer**  
**Beijing (2002-2006)**

*Donald Bishop was born in Tennessee in 1945. He received his BA from Trinity College and his MA from Ohio State. He joined the Foreign Service in 1979. His overseas posts include Hong Kong; Seoul and Taegu, Korea; Dhaka, Beijing, Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria; and Kabul, Afghanistan. Mr. Bishop was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2010.*

*Q: All right. Today is the 15<sup>th</sup> of March, 2011, the Ides of March, with Don Bishop. I believe we're headed to China, you for the second time. You were there from when to when?*

BISHOP: I had left China in 2000. That first tour in Beijing had been as Deputy Public Affairs Officer. I went to Nigeria from 2000 to 2002. While I was in Lagos, my old boss Paul Blackburn gave me a call. When he finished as PAO in China he had become the Office Director of EAP/PPD. He asked me if I would like to be PAO to China.

The dream of every USIA officer was to run one of the big programs. I had thought about pivoting my career, to give me a shot at becoming an Ambassador by first being a DCM or a Consul General, but I was a little too senior to make the turn. So I agreed to accept Paul's offer. Lloyd Neighbors had replaced Paul as PAO in Beijing, and his tour ran until the summer of 2003. Paul called me in early 2001. There would be a year to fill between my departing Nigeria in 2002 and beginning work as PAO in Beijing in 2003.

That's how I was given one of those rare chances to go into language refresher for a year. Jemma and I left Nigeria in the late summer of 2002, spent some time in the U.S., and then went out to Beijing.

Once upon a time, all FSOs went to Taipei for their second year of training in Mandarin, but by 2002 the Foreign Service Institute and the Embassy had built up a parallel program in Beijing. The Chinese Language and Area Studies School in Taipei did not close, and even today it trains a goodly share of America's China hands. But there were a number of good reasons to add a Beijing option, which better suited many officers and their families as they sequenced their moves. I didn't think I needed to go to Taiwan again, and skipping another move was a plus.

I spent the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003 at the Beijing Education Institute. I crossed town every day and had pretty much five hours of one-on-one in Chinese. It was a very good language experience, and the year gave me a break from the usual work and policy stresses. I needed it after Nigeria. Also, I was reading more on China -- and meeting more and different people -- than if I had gone directly to the PAO job.

I can conjure from the memory many riveting stories of language study, but let me just tell one that offers a glimpse on how things are organized in China. In my previous time in Beijing, I had never had a chance to visit the tomb of Matteo Ricci, the awesome Jesuit who did so much to bring Christianity to China. For many years “the authorities” didn't allow many visitors to his tomb. But with China now so much more “open,” I asked about it. The tomb turned out to be only a walk from the Beijing Education Institute, it was now possible to arrange visits. The teachers set aside an afternoon for all of the Embassy students to walk over. This gave us a chance to work on our vocabularies and expressions on history and religion, after all, and enjoy an afternoon in the University of Plein Air.

In the center of the Beijing Party School -- not the Central Party School, but the Party School for the Beijing municipality -- by the way, the Party Schools had all been renamed, in English, “Administrative Colleges” -- was a small grove of steles, traditional Chinese stone tomb markers. This is where dozens of Catholic priests were buried, Chinese priests included.

As we reached the gate of the Beijing Party School, the guard made a telephone call, and soon we were joined by a professor from the Party School to be our guide. He introduced himself as the Vice President of the Matteo Ricci Study Society.

What was this? A professor at the Party School had to be a member of the Chinese Communist Party. Members of the Party must be atheists.

He was an agreeable fellow, taking us over to the tombs and giving us a historical explanation of Ricci and the early Catholic missionaries. Then he offered some words of evaluation. Chinese appreciate some of Ricci's teachings, he told us. For instance, in a feudal society with polygamy and concubinage, Ricci's teaching that a man should only have one wife ... “anticipated the Marriage Law of the PRC enacted in 1950”! We Americans looked at one another -- this was quite a new take on things!

Chinese welcomed the scientific knowledge of the Jesuits and other missionaries, our guide said, but Chinese were not really attracted to Ricci's religion. For instance, Christians teach that between his death and his resurrection, Jesus “descended into hell.” I was quickly turning over memories from catechism class to try and figure out what he was telling us.

He was evidently referring to the phrase in the Apostles' Creed, and to an interpretation of doctrine that derived from the phrase. The Christian teaching, he told us, was that before Christ, everyone who had died resided in hell, and it was Christ's descent that released Adam and Eve and other righteous souls into heaven. Chinese could never accept this, the professor said, because that would mean Confucius had been in hell, something inconceivable.

He continued with some other nickel-and-dime, cartoonish arguments against the existence of God, drawn right from the pages of *Krokodil* and *Manhua*, I thought.

So, what we were seeing on our visit to the Party School and Ricci's tomb was how the Party assured that no one could visit without hearing the Party's interpretation of historical events. And since there was a national Matteo Ricci Study Society, firmly under Party vigilance, no one else

in China could try to develop Ricci studies without the Party's assent. This is how Party organizations keep scholarly thought within bounds, by crowding out independent scholarship and initiatives.

In any case, I finished up the language refresher and began work as Country Public Affairs Officer, succeeding Lloyd Neighbors, in the early summer of 2003. I was PAO for three years.

*Q: What changes had taken place since you left China in 2000?*

BISHOP: Let's talk about the post first. One big change was that after years of negotiation with the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Services Bureau, American families no longer had to live in the Diplomatic compounds. We were put in an apartment tower that belonged to the China World Hotel.

Another was that the Embassy could hire employees directly, and those employees could be FSNs, not members of the Diplomatic Services Bureau assigned to the American Embassy. Our longtime DSBs were given the chance to convert to FSN status. Some did, some didn't. We began to advertise positions as they came open. Individuals could now apply freely, and we were able to choose some very fine Chinese employees and train them up to our standards. When I became PAO, I allocated more of our Public Diplomacy money, for instance, to send our employees for programs in the U.S., and to send some to nearby embassies like Seoul or Tokyo to see how things were done in Public Affairs Sections there.

The consolidation – folding USIS into the State Department – had worked some major changes too. I'm sorry to talk organization and administration when foreign policy has more sizzle, but we should reflect a little bit about the progress of consolidation by 2003.

Enough time had passed that the initial frictions were over or should be over. I had been the DPAO in Beijing as USIA finished up, and now I was PAO under the State Department four years later. The organization was about the same size, and we had the same amount of money. But it's worth pausing to note what had changed.

As I mentioned previously, we lost our Executive Officer in 1999. Much of the work previously done by the USIS Executive Officer had shifted to the Deputy Public Affairs Officer. I had felt that immediately when I had been the DPAO. It had usually been the Exec, for instance, who represented USIS on the housing committee, the awards committee, and at most ICAAS meetings. The DPAO now picked up the full load of meetings. Executive officers had written the grants, now that job had passed to the DPAO.

In 1999, though, I could still call the individual who had been the USIS Executive Officer, now sitting in the Management Section with many more responsibilities, and ask for guidance and help. When I arrived as PAO in 2003, I asked the Management Counselor which one of his deputies had the PAS account? He was surprised by my question because they no longer had that arrangement. I knew that meant that the DPAO had an even heavier management load.

Another large change was that George Beasley's and Paul Blackburn's wonderful structuring of

PAS – with everyone reporting to the DPAO as operating officer – had been ended by my predecessor while I was away.

As I arrived, I also learned that there was no longer to be a Deputy Public Affairs Officer. My predecessor as PAO had traded in the position for an additional Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer. This meant that many of the administrative burdens, originally handled by the Executive Officer, then by the Deputy Public Affairs Officer, would now shift to the PAO. This was partly because only the PAO had enough experience with the organization and money issues. Without a Deputy on the staff, I could not restore the better arrangement that had made the Public Affairs Section so effective under George Beasley and Paul Blackburn.

When I had been DPAO under Paul Blackburn, I supervised the Information Officer, the Cultural Affairs Officer, the Information Resources Officer, the four branches, and the Executive Officer. I was acting as a chief of staff, the operating guy. How about this as a parallel? Paul was the Petraeus, I was the Odierno. Freed from the day-to-day supervisory responsibilities and all the program implementation except when he wanted to put his personal stamp on a program, Paul was able to conceptualize things, strategize, work the ambassador, cajole members of the Country Team, and so on.

Coming back in 2003, then, I found that the PAO's time was once again taken up with day-to-day duties. I felt like I had had two assignments as DPAO. I had all the administrative work when I was DPAO, and I had it again as PAO. There was a cost to eliminating the DPAO position. It diminished the time I had available for conceptualization, strategizing, and dealing with the Ambassador, DCM, and other members of the Country Team. I confess that I deeply resented the organizational change. DPAO positions were eliminated in other countries, too, and in every case the PAO felt the same effect. Small administrative changes can have outsize effects.

When I was in Abuja, the DCM's OMS was new to the Foreign Service, Llywelyn Graeme. I suggested he bid on the position as OMS in PAS in Beijing, and happily he got the assignment. I was under such administrative pressure that I had to ask Llywelyn to take on some of the paperwork and be more involved with the Print Shop and administrative FSNs than had been the case for the OMS in the past. On the whole, this worked well for me, but not every FSO in PAS was happy with dealing with an OMS in that role. This minor friction was one more way in which decisions made in Washington made things at posts more difficult.

One more change unfolding from consolidation, number two. The former BPAOs were now Consulate PAOs in Shanghai, Shenyang, Chengdu, and Guangzhou. They were now supervised and evaluated by their Consuls General. Of course there was still the ordinary programmatic communication between PAS, the mother ship, in Beijing and the Consulate PAOs, but their priorities were being set by their CGs. The PAO, then, didn't have the same ability to unify the country program as before. Different CGs, from experience or feel or what they had seen somewhere else, used their Public Diplomacy people and resources differently.

A third change I would note is that consolidation had already worked a change in mentality among the Public Diplomacy Officers in the Foreign Service. Let me use a commercial parallel. USIA officers had thought of themselves as members of a law firm or a public relations firm that

was hired by a corporation. State was like AT&T, USIA was like Hill and Knowlton, advising on international public affairs and organizing programs.

The individual members of this “firm,” USIA, even as they were working on the Ambassador's or the nation's priorities, all knew their futures were in the firm. They could be partners. They could run overseas offices. They had public visibility, standing, and acclaim in foreign capitals. They had a discipline -- public diplomacy and public affairs -- that focused on the media and opinion and on programs to change opinions and establish a favorable standing for the brand. That meant they had a profession, a focus, a body of professional reading. Public Diplomacy was your bread and butter. Public Diplomacy was what you had to master. Mastery and competence led to advancement.

After consolidation, we stopped being members of a public affairs firm that worked for the Embassy. We became House Counsel. In the private sector, the top of that ladder is to become General Counsel in a corporation. The members of the Legal Department at a company are all attorneys, but they are much more focused on doing the bidding of upper management. They narrow their professional reading and competence to the part of the law that concerns the company. And only rarely, exceedingly rarely, will a General Counsel ever become head of the company.

My commercial analogy only goes so far, but think it over. After consolidation, the self-image of Public Diplomacy officers and their incentives began to change. There was a new career psychology that came with being in the Department of State. The PAO was only one of the Embassy's counselors. The independent brand and standing of “USIS” was now history, and the Public Diplomacy officers became much more anonymous, blending into the Embassy staff.

At the same time, it was now possible for Public Diplomacy officers to become senior leaders in the State Department. If good Public Diplomacy officers aspired to become an Ambassador or even a Consul General, however, they needed to get out of public diplomacy, probably when they were an FS-2, maybe as an FS-1, and begin checking off the boxes -- deputy Office Director, Office Director, then perhaps DCM in some modest place so they could become DCM in a bigger place. They then might become a DAS. That's the sequence that gives a State officer a shot at higher management and the coveted title of Ambassador. I began to notice that this new calculus was affecting the career choices of our most promising Public Diplomacy officers.

There was another change that had taken place while I was away. You'll recall I've mentioned USIA's three phase communication model -- Issues, Audiences, Programs. The primary tool in developing and tracking the middle step, audience, was the Distribution and Records System, the DRS. USIA had developed its own software that was launched a little before I entered the Agency in 1979, and with many updates it was still the software being used by posts in 1999.

To speak frankly, the DRS completely collapsed with consolidation. No one in State picked up the responsibility. The software was never updated. In Beijing as at other posts around the world, we fell back on the old “cuff lists,” individual rolodexes on the desks of Americans and FSNs. Posts in their desperation began to use commercial software like Outlook or Goldmine, but no one undertook to decide on a single product that would be used at every Embassy.

These software programs could handle “distribution,” but they did not provide the tailored quarterly overview reports to PAOs to use in overall post management. No one in Washington took responsibility for solving the problems of non-Roman alphabets and character systems. Once network security became such a large issue for the Department, posts could not on their own elect to use a commercial program that might be in use by, say, AmCham companies locally. They all had to be approved by the network security people, and the security review of Public Diplomacy software never seemed to have a high priority.

The result of these dysfunctions was that Public Diplomacy lost the unified approach to “audience” that once was the pride of many strong posts. I knew we needed a new model DRS, but it was a problem we could not solve on our own.

Another thing that was different after consolidation was that the old Country Public Affairs Plan had disappeared, and now we were integrated into the Mission Strategic Plan. The Department's strategic planning has gone through several iterations -- MPP, MSP, MSRP.

My generation of USIA officers had been taught, “We don't do culture, we do policy.” In USIA, we were not going to win promotion by being Foreign Service impresarios bringing clog dancers and drama groups. I did my share of performing arts programs during my career, and “events” could play a useful role in some places at some times to build our nation's standing, but the heart of the work we were supposed to do was build up public affairs support for WTO accession, missiles in Germany, the Doha Round, votes in the United Nations, and so on. As I said, “we don't do culture, we do policy.”

The Mission Strategic Planning process in State at first seemed to favor that view of Public Diplomacy. If the mission decided its number one priority is A, and number two is B, the planning process should lead the Public Affairs Section to give extra focus, extra push, extra horsepower to these Mission goals in the plan. The PAO should bring to bear as many different programs as possible on the top priority Mission objectives. When I explained this to David Sedney one time, he said, “I'm hearing you say there are no Public Diplomacy goals per se, but only Public Diplomacy support for the Mission's other goals.”

That Plan's listing of an Embassy's goals, or the administration's goals, however, left out all the standing programs, mostly on the Cultural Affairs side, Fulbright, speakers, libraries, English teaching. There were bread and butter for Public Affairs Sections. Where did they fit?

In the revised iterations of mission planning, therefore, the Department allowed an extra Public Diplomacy objective in the plan under the rubric of “mutual understanding” or “foundation of trust.” This free-floating add-on Public Diplomacy objective was conceptually sound, but it let officers just run the usual repertoire of programs -- rather than think carefully about what the policy goals the programs are supposed to serve.

My own focus had been to “lean” as many of the Public Diplomacy programs in the direction of MPP themes as was possible, but I'm not sure this was a common practice by PAOs. For instance, we knew that rule of law in China could be one of the first steps towards respect for

human rights and democratization. So I leaned PAS programs toward the rule of law when I was DPAO. A goodly, some might say disproportionate, share of speakers were on rule of law topics, in front of legal audiences. A goodly share of the Fulbrighters that we sent to the States were law professors. A goodly share of book translations were American law textbooks. The idea here was to lean a post's different Public Diplomacy programs in a policy direction.

The Department adopted the Mission Program Plan process in the final years of USIA, and the Agency was an organization that carried with it certain convictions and practices about how to advance ideas. But the way the MPP worked out after consolidation was to make conducting exchanges or English teaching or cultural programs a Mission goal, but not necessarily tied to a policy effort.

After consolidation, PAOs became more vulnerable to various bright ideas coming from Ambassadors and DCMs. They wanted "events." They wanted "publicity." They wanted to meet authors and poets and musicians. USAID programs with their long timelines, in the hands of implementing partners, didn't yield many opportunities for them to bring "gifts" when they made visits. They increasingly looked to Public Affairs Sections to allow them to play the role of Lord or Lady Bountiful.

This has been a bit discursive, but I wanted to mention that when I arrived as PAO in China, many organizational changes had already taken place that affected Public Diplomacy. The most severe was that more and more of the management load had to be carried by the PAO, and there was an opportunity cost to this, forfeiting good strategizing and working with the Ambassador.

*Q: In the White House, say, the equivalent of a public affairs officer usually sits in on the president's council and is, to some extent -- not an alter-ego, but is very familiar with the president's thinking.*

BISHOP: Agreed. But remember that under the new dispensation PAOs no longer had a direct report to the Ambassador. A PAO's reporting official was now the DCM.

*Q: So there were changes in the organization that had occurred since you left China in 2000. What about the U.S. policy posture with China?*

BISHOP: As for policy, during my first tour from 1997 to 2000 we were all very much implementing President Clinton's policy of engagement. Originally, the word "engagement" threw the Chinese for a loop. They didn't know whether we were trying to get married, or to engage them in battle. Eventually they understood our meaning. What we were interested in was more contact, more Chinese participation in the international order, and eventually more collaboration on the issues. At that time, the largest issue in this comprehensive policy of "engagement" was China's accession to the World Trade Organization.

When I arrived for my second tour, from 2003 to 2006, I could feel there was a changed emphasis, and temperatures seemed a few degrees higher. The increase in the trade deficit made our trade discussions sharper, as did the question of exchange rates. We spent a lot of time trying to build up the military-to-military relationship. We spent time on human rights, as always.

There were the Six Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. Compared to my first tour in Beijing, the number of visitors from Congress and the administration had increased. For three years we had constant CODELS, except for a pause in the closing months of the 2004 Presidential election campaign, along with visitors at the cabinet level.

And in the wake of 9/11 we had the new agenda on terrorism. Here there was an overlap between our interests and the Chinese interests. They weren't particularly eager to help us out with terrorism in the Middle East, with weapons of mass destruction in Iran or Iraq, or on Afghanistan. But they were worried that a terrorism motivated by Islam might infect Muslims in western China, out in Xinjiang province especially. Whenever Chinese minorities asked for more autonomy or more respect, the Han Chinese leadership often treated it as separatism or "splitism."

*Q: Who was the ambassador?*

BISHOP: Ambassador Clark T. Randt, Jr. Ultimately he served as Ambassador for nearly eight years. There was talk that he was President Bush's roommate at Yale. I heard him explain many times, however, that he was one of President Bush's fraternity brothers.

Some people could spin that in a way that made Ambassador Randt out to be an unqualified political appointee who got the job based on friendship with the President. But Ambassador Randt had learned Chinese in the Air Force, and after he was discharged he had gotten his law degree and become a China trade lawyer in Hong Kong. He was well qualified for the job.

When Ambassador Randt was at the Department for some consultations, and I was in Washington from Nigeria, I had a chance to meet him. I expected a short meeting, a courtesy call, but the planned 15-minute meeting lasted about 45 minutes. He told me all the things that were wrong with the Public Affairs Section. When I went for my in-call in Beijing, he again took 45 minutes and made the points again.

He was dissatisfied with some things. For instance, when he had reached post as the new Ambassador, he met the Information Officer, who gave the Ambassador a review of his work. The IO had used the word "clients" in his review. I assume he meant "stakeholders" or "contacts" like international journalists, Chinese journalists, think tank scholars, but he had said "clients." That had really hit Ambassador Randt wrong. He told me what he told the IO: PAS had only one client, the Ambassador.

*Q: I don't quite get the --*

BISHOP: Well, Ambassador Randt was using "client" in a business sense. A company that hires a public relations firm or a law firm is the client.

*Q: Right. And instead of saying who are our targets.*

BISHOP: Yes. It was an unfortunate choice of word, but it stayed with Ambassador Randt. And I might add that the officer in question, one of our best Public Diplomacy officers with a rare 4/4

in Chinese, resigned from the Foreign Service a year after he left China.

There were other things Ambassador Randt didn't like about PAS. My predecessor as PAO, Lloyd Neighbors, had been able to maintain a good personal relationship, but I sensed Lloyd also felt the Ambassador's unhappiness with the Public Affairs Section.

When Ambassador Randt arrived, he found that the Information Officer routinely set up briefing sessions, on background, between American journalists and Embassy political and economic officers. This was and is a routine practice at most American embassies. A few times, though, the officers wandered off script, and the Ambassador would learn that an American Embassy source had said this or that. He often learned it when he received a call from Washington asking what's going on. The Ambassador wanted more control over backgrounding, and every backgrounder required his personal approval in advance. This reduced the number of off-script remarks, but it reduced backgrounding too.

The Ambassador was doing me a favor by being straight in explaining his feelings. He told me that we had one of the very largest sections in the Embassy, but for the number of people we had, and the money we had to spend, PAS was not contributing much. He didn't see us making a large impact. He wasn't sure the Embassy needed such a large Public Affairs Section, given its small role. This rather puzzled me, but of course I could only say, "Got it, sir. Right."

*Q: Yes.*

BISHOP: I was nodding at what he said, indicating that I heard him. But I was turning things over in my mind. The size of the Public Affairs Section organization in 2003 was the same as it had been in 1992. We had a few additional FSNs and some locally hired Americans, but there had been no increase in the number of American FSOs in all those years.

Every few years, USIA had conducted regular reviews of how resources were distributed between posts and geographic areas. After 1989, these reviews were the bane of the European area since Europe was receding in foreign policy importance. Based on Cold War priorities, the European area and its posts traditionally had plenty of people and plenty of money running large programs. In the 90s, after the Cold War had ended, USIA always seemed to find that it was Europe that was "fat."

Hearing the Ambassador's concerns, I recalled that USIA had conducted one of its major reviews as the Cold War ended and our foreign policy priorities began to shift. They had done it very carefully for every country. What's the population? The GNP? How many television and radio stations does the country have? How many universities? How many students has the country sent to the U.S.? How many newspapers in the capital? The number of university graduates? The volume of trade? Do we have an alliance? Are there U.S. forces based in the country? And so on.

USIA had been very careful and thorough about coming up with a kind of algorithm that matched resources to foreign policy needs. Out of that process in 1991, China got, I recalled, 18 Americans, 13 in Beijing and five at the four consulates, making China one of the largest posts.

Now it was 2003. We still had the same number of American officers. But consider all the same metrics. There were way more Chinese newspapers, and they were big and fat and slick because of newspaper liberalization. There were more journalists. The Chinese had, since 1992, invested billions in higher education, and in 2003 there were many more universities -- new, large, comprehensive universities all over the country. Every university hoped that a faculty member could receive a Fulbright grant. All hoped they could get International Visitors and U.S. Speakers and help with English teaching. They wanted more and more of what the Public Affairs Section had. So did the media. Bilateral trade and business ties had exploded. We had new bilateral agendas and senior dialogs on trade, economics, the environment and health, and defense. PAS was supporting many times more visits by Administration principals in 2004 than had been the case in 1992.

By every measure, then, the Public Affairs Section in Beijing was way under resourced. As important as money is, it was not the dearest resource. The most important resource is people. American officers are very dear in the Foreign Service. We had no more in 2003 than we had in 1992.

There was more in the Ambassador's views on PAS. As PAO in Beijing, I was a new Minister-Counselor. I learned from the DCM that, in the Ambassador's view, my rank was too high. He believed section chiefs should be "hungry FS-1s" who would work and work to be promoted into the Senior Foreign Service. Their ambition would make them responsive to every Presidential and Ambassadorial priority.

So to be told by the Ambassador that PAS was too generously staffed, that he didn't see us pulling our weight when we had no more people than in 1992, and that PAS leadership was too senior, I couldn't quite square that. But of course, I saluted and said what I had to say. What do you do? You have to go ahead with what you've got. It was clear to me that the Ambassador had formed an impression of PAS soon after he arrived, alas, and it was fixed in his mind.

*Q: And I think the thing that struck me as being someone who has sat in on a lot of country team meetings as a chief of a consular section, how important the public affairs side was. But it was under the old system and maybe --*

BISHOP: Of course I attended Country Team meetings in Beijing, but the group had become so large that there were no real discussions or deliberations in those meetings. When I arrived, another member of the Country Team told me how meetings should go. When it came for my two-minute report, I should always look the Ambassador in the eye. Address only him. Be sure to show proper deference. Don't ever surprise the Ambassador, meaning the Country Team was not the place to give him a first brief on something.

Like you, I sat in on CT meetings over many years with many Ambassadors. The place where it worked wonderfully was Bangladesh. The Embassy hummed under Ambassador Merrill, partly because he was a very good manager of the meeting, partly because he also held a few "tight" country team meetings during the week, and partly because the Country Team in Dhaka was not large.

In China, though, new agencies were joining the Country Team, and the table was getting quite crowded. For instance, the different parts of the new Department of Homeland Security -- ICE, CBP -- joined the Country Team. Commerce and Treasury reinforced the Embassy with political appointees who sat at the CT table. The meetings got to be quite large, which meant that briefs and discussions necessarily became short.

Except for the Country Team meeting, many agencies might only be scheduled for a 30 minute meeting with the DCM, rather than the Ambassador, once or twice a month, to go over what they were doing.

It happened that I usually sat next to the Department of Agriculture's rep -- the Minister-Counselor for Agricultural Affairs -- at Country Team meetings. He was irritated with the lack of front office attention to what his people were doing. His "face time" was a having a biweekly 30-minute meeting with the DCM, and meeting the Ambassador in a group with the senior Economic and Commercial officers. In these group sessions he was the last to be called on, usually when the other two had used up almost all of the meeting. So when it came time for his two minutes at the Country Team meeting, he insisted on giving full readouts on all FAS activities, undeterred by the expected time limit, taking no notice of the nervous non-verbals coming from the Ambassador and the DCM. He was going to report on what he did! Maurice House -- I liked him for it.

If there were important meetings at the Embassy that might focus on a particular human rights case, or how to develop the mil-to-mil relationship, or the Six Party Talks, rarely was PAS asked to join. I got a window on those things during some short stints as Acting DCM, when the DCM was on leave and they rotated section chiefs to his desk. I got to be DCM a few times for a few days or a few weeks. Otherwise, Public Diplomacy wasn't at the conference table.

The most frequent PAS access to the Ambassador was not at the Country Team meeting but at the morning press brief. Ambassador Randt preferred an oral briefing to a written summary. The Americans and the FSNs in the PAS Information Unit came in well before the rest of the Embassy opened. They read the early editions, scanned the web pages, and they had watched broadcasts overnight. They ran Lexis-Nexis searches for the latest articles on China.

The Ambassador was not particularly focused on the Chinese media. What he needed to know was what the American and international media were saying, because it was their stories that might prompt a telephone call from Washington. Every morning there might be 25 or 50 important stories on China in the *Washington Post*, *New York Times*, the *Wall Street Journal*, the McClatchy group, Scripps Howard, Reuters, Associated Press, BBC, and so on. At the morning press brief, the IO or an AIO read out the first paragraph of a news report or editorial and then handed a copy of each story to the Ambassador, one by one.

This was expensive, in time and money both. We were spending a quarter million dollars a year on the Lexis-Nexis searches for the Ambassador's morning briefings, half of IIP's budget for internet searches. Fortunately, the bills went to IIP, not to us.

I was surprised how much the addition of this comprehensive daily press briefing to the list of

PAS taskings affected our whole organization. It required a huge amount of hands-on time by the IO and the AIOs that then couldn't be used for other purposes. Ambassador Randt let me know that I was also expected to attend. Missing the briefings, he told me, would indicate that I was not giving my complete personal support to the Ambassador and the President of the United States. As a 110 percent ardent supporter of President Bush and his agenda, this really stung me. Not to mention that it meant the middle of every morning of every day was unavailable for other meetings or activities.

I'm sure that those who looked over the Ambassador's schedule, seeing the time allocated for the press briefing, thought PAS had more "face time" than other sections. Usually, however, those briefings were scheduled for half an hour, and depending on the size of the day's take, the time was rushed. All the focus was on the news. There might be an opportunity for me to take a minute at the end to ask the Ambassador for some brief on-the-spot guidance on a program or an issue or a speech.

In three years, I only recall two or three proper sit-downs with the Ambassador to talk about Public Affairs strategies or Public Diplomacy. We were responsive when asked, but I can't say we were proactive. Yes, we needed the Ambassador's nod for most initiatives, but I just don't recall many meetings.

*Q: Every ambassador has their own way.*

BISHOP: Of course.

*Q: But public affairs, of course, is probably the major tool of getting something across.*

BISHOP: Yes.

*Q: Political reporters don't do that particularly. It's eliminating probably the major strategic tool that you have to operate in the country.*

BISHOP: It's right that at the Embassy in China while I was there, Public Diplomacy was "not there for the takeoff," to use half of the famous phrase from Edward R. Murrow. This was not only the case for Public Diplomacy, though. The long term trend in American foreign policy making has been to have the policy debates in Washington and look to Embassies simply as platforms to organize visits to foreign capitals for Washington principals, or to be implementers. As Henry Kissinger told Nick Platt, the job of the Foreign Service is to tend the "nuts and bolts."

I recently met some people who were on the NSC during my second China tour, and hearing them discuss China issues, I realized how valuable it would have been for me to hear their perspective at the time. In conversation with them, I gathered that the Ambassador's voice was heard in Washington, and they were aware of the Embassy's point of view. But none of this was shared with me as PAO.

In any case, few in the Embassy, not just PAS, were "there for the takeoff." I wasn't at decision making meetings because decisions weren't made in Beijing. They were made in Washington.

The job of the Public Affairs Section was to deliver the Washington messages. Here I'm being frank, describing "what is" rather than what "ought to be" or "shouldn't ought to be."

As for smaller issues, like the release of a human rights prisoner, or getting China to respect a WTO provision, they were worked with the Chinese by the Ambassador and by the Economic and Political sections. This was the inside game, conducted behind the scenes without publicity. When the Chinese leadership made this kind of decision, it was unlikely to be criticized by the Chinese media, so the lack of involvement by PAS was not fatal. If we received a press query, the IO and AIOs just read out Washington's guidance.

*Q: Tell me more about the Ambassador and human rights.*

BISHOP: The Ambassador was always keen to urge China to release human rights activists that had been jailed. It was one of his admirable commitments. A common critique on Capitol Hill of U.S. human rights advocacy in China was that it was always on the list of bilateral issues to be discussed, but it was usually discussed last, giving the impression that trade or security issues, say, were actually more important. Ambassador Randt's speeches had quite a different pattern. No matter what the bilateral topic, he began with a review of human rights cases, making the point that the Chinese government had violated its own laws to detain individuals. During his years at the Embassy he had the satisfaction of seeing many of those cases resolved. Whenever that happened, he added another case to the list in his next speech.

*Q: What was your impression of the press or to use the broad term, the media? Not just American, but the media core in Beijing.*

BISHOP: In our minds we made the ordinary distinction between the Chinese media, the American media, and the internationals. We can talk about the Chinese media first.

At a Chinese press conference with one of their officials, all the Chinese journalists knew they must allow the reporter from *People's Daily – Renmin Ribao* -- to ask the first question. *People's Daily* is newspaper of the Communist Party of China. It was known to all that *People's Daily* and Xinhua, the New China News Agency, would report the story in the way the Party intended. One could say the two would write stories that reflected the Party line. I cannot help but add the *People's Daily* reporters wore their newspaper's preeminence on their sleeves. They were quite full of themselves, when in reality they were hacks.

At press conferences, other Chinese journalists would ask questions, and they might give the appearance of being fractious or assertive, bold or sassy, or make out like they were Sam Donaldsons or Nina Totenbergs speaking truth to power -- American power, that is -- but this didn't, in the end, show in the news articles they wrote. The Party's control of, or bounding of, journalism was evident.

At the same time, all the new media were strongly competitive, anxious for circulation, profits, and influence. They could show some of this in their graphics, the splashy color, the new sections on style or cooking or sports, but as for news, the journalists knew that ordinary people wanted more than the correct stories, aligned with the Party line, that *People's Daily* or Xinhua

delivered.

Our Embassy colleagues who pored over news and editorial copy in the fashion of true China watchers could begin to see differences in the editorial postures of different newspapers. And they noticed that on different issues the newspapers and magazines could turn the volume up or down. If *People's Daily* or Xinhua were critical of the United States on this or that issue (and this was very much a default position), other newspapers did not formally cross any redlines by making the criticism sharper. This was a downside, an unintended consequence, perhaps, of the Party's template reliance on nationalism as one of its sources of legitimacy. I'm not in close touch with Chinese news and views now, but I gather that this trend toward stories colored by more nationalism has become even more prominent since I left China.

All that said, if truth be told, we spent more time responding to the American media than we did the Chinese. That was because Washington read the American media, and we could expect a telephone call from Washington if there was a troublesome story. I suppose there were a dozen American journalists that PAS dealt with most frequently -- *The Washington Post*, *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, McClatchy, Scripps Howard, Associated Press, the three networks, CNN, and so on. Reuters was usually included on our list as an honorary American organization. Influential British publications like *The Economist*, along with the BBC, had easy access to the Embassy too. We treated the Australians well.

We didn't give much access or attention to others from Europe, or from India, though the sudden prominence of al-Jazeera, and its generally straight news reporting on China, was noticed. The Japanese and Korean media were in Beijing in large numbers, and more, many more, would parachute in for each session of the Six Party Talks, but we didn't do much with them. We rarely accepted their requests for backgrounders, for instance.

*Q: You mentioned that there were frequent visits by CODELs, members of the President's cabinet, and agency heads. How did this affect your press work?*

BISHOP: As I mentioned, the number of visits by Washington VIPs was much greater than it had been during my first tour. President Bush had passed the word that members of the Cabinet should get busy with China. That concentrated their minds on thinking about what their Departments might do in China to thicken the relationship. I believe the whole Cabinet came to China while I was there, and some Secretaries made many visits.

The Mission standard was to give cabinet secretaries the full court press. All of them held press conferences, and most sat down for television interviews with one of the American networks, to let the American people know they were involved in China. PAS provided a site officer at each stop on their itinerary, and a riding Public Diplomacy Officer in the motorcade. We didn't have enough AIOs for all these roles, so I had to shanghai ACAOs and the *Jiaoliu* editor -- Charlene Fu had been a reporter for the Associated Press -- to join the media support for a cabinet visit. This took them away from their jobs, not just for the one or two days of the visit, but for the many interminable countdown meetings.

The press conferences, interviews, photo ops, and pull asides yielded a tremendous amount of

coverage -- in the U.S., in China, and around the world. Of course television anchors have to trim big stories down to a few sentences or paragraphs, but volume adds up, and we were helping Administration newsmakers in a big way.

The down side was that the Information Unit had mostly become a press office. The other tasks in the Information Unit portfolio -- publishing *Jiaoliu*, tending the Distribution and Record System database, keeping up with and supporting the Voice of America and Radio Free Asia, developing our web presence, and so on -- slowed down, so great were the day in and day out of media work. I quite admired how the IO, Sheila Paskman, gritted it out. She and I both realized, however, that other important tasks were being postponed.

I was very impressed with the Director of the Federal Aviation Administration, Marion Blakey. The FAA needed a close relationship with China because of the increase in flights between the U.S. and China, and for aviation safety, air routes, and crash investigations. Chinese companies were producing components for aircraft manufactured by Boeing and Airbus, and they were beginning to sell their own aircraft, which would eventually require FAA certification. This is a pretty serious agenda.

Administrator Blakey and the Chinese Minister of Aviation met several times. This is an example of how the U.S.-China relationship was developing in one area largely away from the public eye. It's also an example of lean staffing. The FAA had one staffer in Beijing, Joe Tymcyswm, and how he did so much of the legwork was a wonder to behold. His prep work would be cemented by a Blakey visit.

The Chinese Minister of Aviation had noticed that when American visitors arrived in Beijing they were usually jetlagged, and a lot of important business was delayed waiting for them to recover. The Minister arranged things so that the FAA Administrator would travel from the airport to the Summer Palace, which is on a lake. He would walk her around the lake, and with the interpreters they would begin to discuss the issues in an animated professional way. This gave her a break after the flight, got her into the fresh air, postponed the reckoning with jet lag, showed her something of China's heritage, previewed some of the issues that would be on the agenda when they sat down at a conference table, and built a personal relationship. I always highlighted this kind of cooperation when I spoke to groups in China.

The Coast Guard is one of the five armed forces, the uniformed services, but it doesn't belong to DOD. It had for many years been part of the Department of the Treasury, but it had been placed under the Department of Transportation, and it's part of Homeland Security now.

Because it wasn't part of the Department of Defense, it was treated differently than the other four services by the Chinese. When the Coast Guard came to China, the Embassy didn't deal with the PLA but with the various departments of waterways and fisheries and weather.

The Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Tom Collins, came for an official visit while I was PAO. I reminded him "I have seen you before" when we met, mentioning that I had watched, "seen," the Coast Guard cadets all march onto the Trinity football field when we were both studying in Connecticut.

Joining him during the visits with him to the storm center and the maritime offices were quite fascinating. Like the visits of the FAA Administrator, this kind of visit that brought together specialists showed the promise of U.S.-China relations seen from the working level.

*Q: You also mentioned growing numbers of CODELs.*

BISHOP: More CODELs meant more work.

Some were from the House, some from the Senate. Some had a dozen members, others just one. Some members had become China experts from many visits, others were dipping their toes in China for the first time.

The visitors with long experience on China issues got quite substantive meetings, and, as always, they could be more frank with the Chinese about the atmospherics in Washington. We at the Embassy were the good cops, the Congressional visitors could be the bad cops.

For the newcomers, we had to mix in visits to the Great Wall and some shopping. We also had a steady stream of STAFFDELS, usually from the professional staffs of committees focused on foreign policy, defense, and appropriations.

*Q: Do you have anything to share about visits by President Bush, meaning the media angle?*

BISHOP: Here's a particular memory. Whenever we had a visit by President Bush, I noticed the advance teams spent an inordinate amount of time on events and settings.

I would say they were responding to the growing need for more visibility in advancing a Presidential agenda and the President's standing. The same was true for Secretary Rice. If I count satisfying public affairs events, Secretary Rice's visit to the ice rink at the China World Hotel -- remember she had been a figure skater when she was a teenager -- was a fine moment. It didn't just happen. It required a lot of work.

Earlier, media preparations for a Presidential event might focus on where the President would stand, or what would be in the background of each shot. During the Bush administration, the advance teams spent hours and hours designing and purchasing, locally, big screened backdrops for Presidential statements. They could cost several thousand dollars, not only for the design work but also for the rush job with a local vendor. Someone on our staff had to join the effort, of course, one more demand on the staff.

Yes, there were some lighter moments. I entered one hotel conference room fifteen minutes ahead of the President to get a final look at the preps for one of his statements, and I found that his press lead and our AIO had placed the President's podium in front of a new, gorgeous, huge backdrop of a red Chinese gate with brass fasteners. They had been working on this for days. It cost \$7000 as I recall -- \$7000 for a backdrop for a 15-minute event.

It was three panels, actually, set up so that the President could enter from just off center. When

the time came, the President walked out from between the panels, stepped up to the podium, and expertly delivered his statement. Then, unmindful that he had entered from the rear, he walked to some double doors to his right. Except that they were locked. It was a short embarrassment, he made a joke, and then an aide appeared from the rear and helped him leave.

Of course, that scene was what made the world's news reports, along with a lot of snarky commentary about clueless Bush, no exit strategy, and so on. All those cheap shots I so hate. You win some, you lose some.

*Q: I would like to ask, for your office, who monitored, or how important was the Internet?*

BISHOP: By 2004 the internet had, indeed, become an important method of communication in China. In 2005 our Embassy web page was receiving about three million hits per month. The vast majority of visitors were searching the website's pages about visas.

If we speak of "monitoring" the internet, the FSNs who prepared the daily media summary reports for Washington gradually learned to look at Chinese newspaper web pages rather than the hard copy of the newspaper. Looking at the websites of television stations helped with covering what was said on the airwaves. If your question means, however, were we reading blogs, or following web conversations, the answer is no. That would have required a dedicated staff we didn't have.

During my first tour in Beijing, we had a USIA Foreign Service specialist, Janet Reid, who managed all our own IT functions. Janet's position was one that was absorbed by State, and her replacement did not work at PAS. We can say that her transfer was another self-inflicted wound of consolidation, and we lost our dedicated IT specialist just as the internet was opening up so many opportunities.

During my second tour as PAO, PAS had one local-hire American, Sommer Austin, who worked on the Embassy's website. She had two FSNs who combined some of the lower level "system management" tasks with maintaining the website. This was our own internet presence.

Sommer managed the transition from a unique American Embassy Beijing website to one that conformed to the worldwide same-look "branding" templates that were mandated by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. She managed the parallel loading of materials in English and Chinese. She worked up some pages unique to Beijing, like a page on our book translation program. She updated the consular web pages. The Department had mandated that each Embassy have only one web page, and that it be managed by PAS. This was doctrinally correct, but it was, so to speak, an "unfunded mandate" since we received no more people or money to manage this.

Charlotte Beers was very keen, from her private sector experience, on branding. This meant more than simply having a brand like "Cool Britannia." It also meant that a company's products and its web presence should be unified visually, which meant every Embassy's website should look the same, and URLs should have the same format, as in "london.usembassy.gov" or "beijing.usembassy.gov."

An internet issue that preoccupied us was the “Great Chinese firewall,” the Chinese government's ability to shut down access to certain foreign websites. RFA's website was one. We did not want to be among the sites that was vulnerable to being turned off by the Chinese.

If our website was on “state.gov” or “usembassy.gov,” however, it would be relatively easy for the Chinese government to restrict access. At post, therefore, we wanted to keep the website inside the firewall, so we ran our own site at “org.cn.” What appeared on “state.gov” was a mirror site. That arrangement took time to manage.

Doing all this, I'm sure Sommer and her FSNs were wrung out at the end of each day.

A website is, in a way, a “passive” web presence. Companies and organizations and NGOs now know they need to reach out into the net, drawing netizens into conversations, friending, sending out regular messages to individuals by email. We weren't there. We were still in the old mode, as in, if we put our stuff on our website, they will come. We knew this was a weakness, but every time the Information Unit focused on it, then another cabinet visit was announced, which tied up everyone for weeks. To ride the wave of change on the internet, we simply needed more people.

This is one more reason the Ambassador's perception that PAS wasn't pulling its weight was wrong. In 1992, when the size of the American staff was set, the internet had no impact on public opinion or Public Diplomacy. More than a decade later, its presence revolutionized private sector communication, and the private sector added more and more people to deal with it.

In Public Diplomacy at posts in the field, in contrast, the internet was something extra that we were just supposed to accomplish in our abundant spare time, presto-chango, wave the magic wand. This was plain and simple stupid, and I'm getting hot under the collar just talking about it. It provides an example of how Washington can think a big thought -- we need to do more on the internet -- yet fail to consider what burdens that places on posts, and fail to consider providing more resources.

Compared to many other Embassies, however, our website was strong in Chinese, not just English. This was partly the fruit of now having a Washington File in Chinese. There was a steady flow of translations coming out of Washington. A hat tip to Bob Holden in IIP. At our end, we also spent a lot of money for outside translations, especially for *Jiaoliu* magazine, and we made sure the material was available on our Chinese language webpages. That's where we were. Compared to any self-respecting American corporation that was doing business in China, though, we probably looked pretty pathetic.

Since you've got me going on this, let me say some more. During my whole last decade in the Foreign Service, I was struck, distressed, dumbfounded by the absurd distance between needs and means. In China, the economy grew and grew, and the universities grew and grew, and newspapers grew and grew, and broadcasting grew and grew, and the internet exploded, and the means, the resources, that we needed to respond were never provided to us.

The example that really brought this home to me was the NBA, the National Basketball

Association. They sensed the potential of a huge market, and huge profits, in China, especially after Yao Ming began to play with the Rockets.

*Q: The basketball phenom ...*

BISHOP: Yes, the tall, handsome Chinese basketball star, and great national hero.

The NBA decided that one way to increase their viewership, which meant also meant Chinese buying more T-shirts and the televising of games that provided a platform for more advertising, was to arrange some exhibition games in China, with Yao Ming on the court. They chose Shanghai and Beijing as the venues, two games in each city. They rented huge basketball stadiums. I went to one of the games in Beijing. It was done wonderfully. I could see the impact. Everyone in the stadium was charged up about the NBA, and I think to some degree they had good thoughts about American-Chinese friendship, and worldwide sport, and so on.

In order to stage these four games in China, the NBA sent 185 people to manage things -- TV people, video people, tickets people, interpreters, and so on. One corporation, the NBA, for three weeks of activity in China, sent 185 people.

I was Uncle Sam's public affairs account manager in China. I operated all year round. I had the diplomatic portfolio, the trade portfolio, the education portfolio, the commercial portfolio, the human rights portfolio, the terrorism portfolio, the Six Party Talks portfolio, and on and on. I had 18 Americans and about 60 FSNs in five offices. We are supposed to make the Chinese love us and agree with us on all our positions? We're supposed to make some headway with this absurdly small amount of resources, in people and money? We're simply not serious.

We did our damndest, we did some good things, but my mind was being fried by this difference between needs and means.

OK, I've said it. Let me get hold of myself. Restore my diplomatic sangfroid. Forgive this "poor poor pitiful me" moment.

We received frequent reminders from Washington about the Government Performance Results Act (GPRA, or "Gip-ra"), with its emphasis on measuring outcomes. The great minds in Public Diplomacy in Washington hadn't figured out how to measure Public Diplomacy's effects, but they rightly realized that at least that they needed a comprehensive record of activities, large and small, at posts. They set up the RESULTS database to maintain the information. It was routinely sieved for reports and Congressional testimony.

This system may or may not have worked in different countries, but it really worked in China because I put a lot of emphasis on it. No matter how much was going on, the officer in charge of a program had to file the short report to Washington the day it happened, or the day afterward. We were the shining stars back in Washington.

*Q: Well, this is something new to me. These reports, who was looking at these things?*

BISHOP: Who was looking at them? It's a pretty good question.

*Q: You know, sounds like a proliferation of paperwork or digital work.*

BISHOP: We were doing it by email by that time.

Although the reports went into a big database, they were seen by people in the various Public Diplomacy offices in Washington, and they became the talk of staff meetings and daily spot reports to principals. A report that involved a Fulbrighter in China, for instance, was seen by ECA and also by EAP. So it created buzz, with occasional feedback that “the Assistant Secretary was pleased to hear you had done this or that,” which gave some extra incentive to our officers for filing the reports early and well. No one asked for my opinion about the overall worth of the reports and the database, but I decided we should do things zealously, not to be tardy or churlish in our response.

Looking at my list of the issues, there were the Six Party Talks. I wish that I could unveil the talks and give you the whole, unvarnished, down and dirty inside story ...

*Q: Tell us what the Six Party Talks were about.*

BISHOP: The Six Parties are North Korea, South Korea, Russia, China, Japan, and the United States. These are six countries that have a focus on the Korean peninsula and the North Korean nuclear program. The talks were aimed to persuade North Korea to give up its nuclear program. Even now, the North Koreans haven't done so. The talks haven't born fruit.

I wish I could give you all the inside dope, but when Chris Hill would walk in with the American delegation to join the other five delegations at one of the many meetings in Beijing, the doors closed and we public affairs people were outside the room handling the media horde. When I say “we,” I’m generously including myself, but the heavy lifting was done by Sheila Paskman and the Information Unit.

My one insight to share on Six Party Talks is that when Chris Hill became the chief American delegate, I noticed that he had a different view of using the media than his predecessors, different from practically everybody else in the U.S. government. For most American delegation leaders, meeting the press was an obligatory burden after a meeting. Foreign Service people are pretty well practiced at learning how to say nothing when speaking to the media: “it was a constructive meeting,” or, “yes, we really clarified each other’s positions,” or “I think there’s a way forward if ...” Nonetheless, meeting the press is regarded as something you had to do, and it was generally dreaded.

Chris Hill had a view that encounters with the press, even pull-asides, detouring before or after a session to talk to the media off the hotel lobby, were a tool in the negotiations. He often talked about “feints” in what he said to the journalists. He might say to us, “Oh, did you notice, I just fainted there.”

Now, I’m not in a position to really say how effective he was at that, but I did notice that he was

serious and calculating in thinking about the media. I kind of liked it. He regarded meetings with the media as part of shaping or staging individual sessions of the Talks.

All of this meant work for PAS. Even encounters between Chris Hill and journalists that were portrayed as short impromptu chats walking in and out of meetings required planning and setup on our part.

Here it was possible to also see in microcosm the large changes that had taken place in Public Diplomacy over the years. In the 1960s, say, when communication between Washington and posts was much more spare, American Embassy spokesmen (I suppose they were mostly men, then) were well known media personalities in the host country. In the 21st century, the Spokesperson did more planning and setup of venues than standing behind a microphone. The actual policy words were spoken by visiting Washington principals like Chris Hill. Once, Embassy spokesmen did their own backgrounding for the American press. Now, the spokesperson would set up individual meetings with Embassy experts.

*Q: What did the Chinese think of North Korea and the “Kim dynasty”?*

BISHOP: China and North Korea have this emotional tie that goes back to the Korean War -- blood brothers on the battlefield, lips and teeth. The PRC drew on these themes when it propagandized its own population during the Korean War. One of the problems with Chinese narratives, however, is that they they're hard to turn off. Even now, the Chinese must genuflect to those memories, at least in public.

My sense is that the Chinese officials who must deal with North Korea have had abundant opportunity to see their intransigence up close, and it has not led to more fondness. Though it has been insufficient, the Chinese have been vexed enough to occasionally twist the North Koreans' arms, as when they cut off the fuel supply to North Korea for a few days. They don't do it openly, but they do things to cramp the North Koreans.

When the Chinese look at a failing regime in North Korea, there's the possibility of an implosion, and a half dozen scenarios of how it might happen. All the scenarios result in refugees across the border with China's northeast. Surely the Chinese could contain the refugee flows in camps, and I can't imagine there's not some kind of plan for that. Even so, they regard a refugee crisis as destabilizing, and they don't want to go down that path. Also, the likely outcomes of a North Korean implosion would bring Korean unification with the South in charge. The Chinese like the idea of a North Korean buffer between China and the power of South Korea and its ally the United States.

So the Chinese do enough, from year to year and month to month, to contain North Korean excesses without doing anything fundamental to change the equation. Of course the only thing that can fundamentally change the equation is regime change in North Korea, and that makes the Chinese nervous.

*Q: If you look at the many programs managed by Public Affairs Sections, from working with the media to education and exchanges, what were you focused on?*

BISHOP: When we had our discussion about my first tour in Beijing, as Deputy Public Affairs Officer, I mentioned that I was keen to “lean” all our programs in the direction of high priority bilateral goals. In my second tour, I continued with that emphasis on “leaning,” and I think I was able to run things in a way that increased the number of programs. “Lean” and increase the numbers, both.

I've always been keen to have things counted, and each time I was PAO I had my staff count the number of programs that had been conducted in the past few years. Some were easy to count -- how many Fulbrighters went to the States? How many International Visitors? How many press conferences did we arrange? This counting, baseline counting perhaps, allowed us then to think about expanding the number of programs. This was also valuable when I wrote each officer's annual evaluation, and, to be frank, when I provided information for my own ER.

I copied out some figures before I came here. For the 2004-2005 evaluation year, print and web editors ran our materials -- meaning press releases, op-eds, backgrounders, materials on the U.S., excerpts from testimony in Washington -- 3800 times. The count had been 200 in 2000. Here, our outreach work ran parallel to the increasing demand for materials by China's expanding media sector. Still, this was a pretty good rise, not just in quantity, but in quality too. Chinese readers got more of their views from our sources, quoting Administration officials. The circulation for each issue of *Jiaoliu* magazine was about 18,000.

International Visitors increased by one fourth to 100. We doubled the number of Chinese Fulbrighters in a single year, including 20 of the new Fulbright Language Teaching Assistants. We counted 468 presentations by 150 speakers. We sent journalists and film crews from several Chinese stations to the U.S. to produce programs under the Television Cooperative program run by the Foreign Press Center. Among the topics they covered were AIDS, genetically modified organisms, protecting the environment, and enterprise. The television co-ops were a very fine tool, since programs produced by a station in one province eventually were circulated for broadcast in other provinces, too.

All this was running at a pretty fast pace.

One of our largest efforts in China was the International Visitor program. In most countries, it's up to PAS to find IV nominees who speak English so that they can join group programs with Visitors from other nations too -- programs for journalists, or economics professors, or city planners, or women leaders, for instance. The problem with the group programs is that you have to find English speakers.

From the first days of the program in China, there were so few people who could speak English that USIA and then the Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs had organized single-person programs for China. We were sending 90-some IVs a year, and almost all were tailored one-person programs with escort interpreters. One of the finest officers in Public Diplomacy, Ruth Kurzbauer, had this portfolio, and I marveled at how she bore up under the workload.

The extraordinary dedication of IV resources to China meant that we should really know our

stuff when providing input to Washington for each visitor. There are a couple of angles to this.

For instance, we sent many women on programs that addressed women's rights. Looking over reports from previous programs, I saw that ECA and the program agencies were organizing rather predictable programs. The IV would arrive in Washington. For three or four days they got the standard tour of federalism, separation of powers, and so on. When they began their tailored schedule and their individual appointments, they would meet a woman Member of Congress. They would visit the National Organization for Women and other women's organizations working women's issues. What got my attention was that the visitors were always being sent to meet people at Emily's List. It's a women's organization, for sure, but it is political, and partisan. It provides money to pro-choice Democratic women candidates.

This struck me wrong several ways. First, we were sending our Visitors to a partisan organization with no parallel visit to a Republican group. Second, we were telling Chinese women that women in the United States are all unified on a certain view of women's issues, the NOW view, and they are all pro-choice. I was bothered by this approach because it implicitly supported the reliance on abortion in China's family planning, which we criticized every year in the Human Rights Reports.

I insisted very strongly that Chinese women IVs had to see the full range of American women's organizations. For instance, Concerned Women for America has a larger membership than NOW, and it's pro-life. I found it curious that NOW had somehow become the designated organization to represent American women. I was fine with Chinese women meeting pro-choice American women's organizations, but I insisted that they must meet pro-life women as well.

When I looked at the programs that had been organized for Chinese specialists on the environment, I noticed something similar. The usual template program was to send them to visit the EPA in Washington, and then in Denver, say, they would visit the EPA regional office. Or they would visit the Bureau of Land Reclamation in Washington and the local office in Boise.

What was missing was care for the environment in the private sector. Vast tracts of American forest belong to Georgia-Pacific and Weyerhaeuser, for instance. The corporations are very active in conservation and environmental protection, so much so that you can tell from aerial photos that the private forests and ranges are better tended than the public lands. So I insisted that our Chinese IVs must visit corporations -- and state governments too. My intention was to give the Chinese a much more balanced view of the United States, to reinforce lessons in federalism, and to see corporate responsibility in a markets and enterprise economy.

Here's another example. One IV was a professor of economics. This young department chair, nominated by a consulate, had received his Ph.D. from a Chinese university. I sensed that this professor still lived in a world of central planning, and I wanted the IV program to give him a totally new feel for the American markets and enterprise economy.

At the time, China was transitioning government employees, Party members, and those working for state-owned enterprises out of government-owned housing. They were privatizing unit-owned apartments, allowing employees to purchase ownership on favorable rates. This meant

that the new owners could sell or rent out the properties in the future, so the change in favor of ownership must be matched by changes in banking and lending.

I knew from reports on past IVs that the programmers would send the IV, during the initial week in Washington, to the Federal Reserve and maybe the FDIC and Treasury. I wrote out a different plan, telling Washington to take him to a local real estate company to witness a house closing. He would see private property, transfer of property, prices, loans, mortgage insurance, the termite inspection, title insurance, and so on. I wanted him to have a consumer's view of the economy before he visited the big institutions -- a view from the bottom up, so to speak, rather than a look down from the Federal Reserve. I thought the visitor needed this because of China's own system of central economic planning and controls.

I followed up with Ruth and with Washington after the professor returned. When asked, the real estate agent thought it better not to have him sit through a real closing. What they arranged was for six or eight people in the office to gather at the table. One played the seller, another the realtor, a third the banker, and so on. Our visitor was the buyer. They went through all the forms, and answered all his questions for a few hours.

He was asked, which loan are you choosing? Thirty year fixed, 15 year fixed, an ARM? Do you want to pay closing costs? How many points will you pay? And so on.

The IV was surprised by the choices. He had lived his whole life in an economy where all things are made uniform, where the government decides, not the consumer. He had had no idea about the role of consumer choice, competition, consumer protections, and so on.

One more focus to mention. I mentioned the impact of 9/11 in China, and Chinese worries about separatism among the Muslim minorities in China's west. I asked all our ACAOs to organize some programs in the West, and Darrell Jenks moved out smartly. Darrell, EAP/PD area director Peter Kovach, and I opened this effort with a series of programs in Ningxia and Xinjiang provinces. The Foreign Affairs Offices were made nervous by our approach, so they didn't schedule us for any large presentations, but we met with scholars that they invited to round tables, and I would say the response by the scholars to our low key approach, discussing areas of U.S.-Chinese cooperation, was quite positive. Out west they hadn't heard much about cooperation at all. We also were able to meet Muslim leaders for good conversations.

*Q: How about performing arts programs, high culture, so to speak? USIA had been famous for cultural presentations like Louis Armstrong.*

BISHOP: You'll recall during Hong Kong portion of this series of interviews that I had mentioned Isaac Stern's visit to China in 1979 -- and later Charlton Heston's visit to China to direct *The Caine Mutiny Court Martial*. Those programs had made a large impact, and my take on things is that performing arts programs are particularly useful when a given bilateral relationship needs an initial shot of adrenaline, or when two countries that have been estranged establish a new relationship. No doubt when North Korea opens, a few strategic performing arts programs will be important. Those programs in China had illustrated that principle.

When I was in Beijing, though, it wasn't necessary for Uncle Sam to sponsor those performing arts exchanges. There were plenty of privately arranged performances. I recall attending wonderful performances with Chinese and American musicians playing Stradivarius violins brought from the U.S. The performances on the instruments were part of the sales strategy by houses that bought and sold the violins. Winston Marsalis came to Beijing as part of a promotion of his albums by Sony. My point is that the growth of the economic and cultural relationship had taken on a power of its own, so our Public Diplomacy priorities could focus elsewhere.

Even so, we organized some small scale performing arts programs. In my first tour, Kevin Maynor's musical interpretations of Paul Robeson were well received. When I was PAO, the folk singer Abby Washburn came to China under our auspices for a number of performances with Bela Fleck. She sang some songs in Mandarin. And a young Fulbrighter, Caitrin McKiernan, produced the play *Passages of Dr. Martin Luther King*.

Let me mention a few more Public Diplomacy focus areas.

The tighter scrutiny of visa applications all around the world also affected our work in Public Diplomacy. The need for every single applicant to be interviewed put enormous pressures on the consular section. In PAS, as single manager of the Embassy's website, we had to greatly expand the consular pages, and they needed frequent updating. We had to deal with criticism of the new system of advance appointments for visa interviews, and complaints about the FAQ telephone line. The major issue, though, was that the number of visas that were given to Chinese to study in the United States had decreased after 9/11.

*Q: Why was that? Because just it was time or because we were doing a better job of --*

BISHOP: Before 9/11, a Chinese applicant for a student visa primarily had to overcome an issuing consular officer's doubt about the applicant's return to China, meaning that after receiving an American degree, would the applicant return? As you know, refusal rates change, with chiefs of consular sections and/or individual officers and/or the inspectors judging that too many or too few visas are being issued.

There were always worries that some Chinese applicants in specialized scientific fields were seeking to learn technologies with military applications, and as the Russians and Chinese increased their efforts to obtain U.S. technology, the reviews became more thorough, and applicants had to wait many weeks or sometimes months for clearances.

I would say, though, that the decrease in visas to Chinese students stemmed primarily from more thorough security reviews, which often delayed issuance beyond the beginning of a school term. Once a few applicants were refused visas, fewer applicants applied to U.S. universities for fear of wasting time and money or losing face. There was a chilling effect of lower issuance rates. Once things begin to chill, there are more refusals to applicants who shouldn't receive a visa, yes, but the chill affected many other students who might have received a visa. The numbers cascaded downward.

When American student visa issuances sagged, the other English-speaking countries -- the U.K.,

Australia, New Zealand, even South Africa -- surged their efforts to attract Chinese students. In any case, whether we were too strict, or whether our competitors were attracting more students, in PAS we had to develop a response, a public affairs campaign to reverse the trend.

Reversing the decline required the Consular Section to play a role. They had to make Washington comfortable with the idea that the Embassy in Beijing was going to be giving visas to more Chinese students instead of being quite so cautious and strict. They had to work through some of the security issues that were causing long delays in the issues of visas. They had to tweak the visa interview appointment system so that student visa applicants could be seen earlier.

Our role in PAS was to let Chinese students know that American colleges and universities were ready to admit Chinese students, and that the door was also open at the Embassy.

This was work. There was the face-to-face work with students and their faculty advisors at the universities, talking things up. Both CAO Rob Laing and I hosted or were guests for web chats. We gave some office space at the ACEE to Frank Mok, who worked for the Institute for International Education as a student counselor.

I sensed we needed a written “anchor” for this effort, a speech with the right pitch and the right details that could be widely circulated. I ended up writing it myself, and Darrell Jenks, the ACEE Director, gathered a good crowd of students and educators at the ACEE to hear it. Once delivered, we translated it, and we put it on the web and could point to it whenever needed. This speech was picked up and loaded on dozens of Chinese websites, so great was the interest in U.S. student visas. It's still there. One Chinese magazine said it was the definitive speech on American education, the welcome for Chinese students, and visas. I included some useful advice on the visa interview.

American universities seem very expensive to Chinese, even if they're going to a fairly low cost state university. The tuition is so large, compared to Chinese living standards, that there was talk that American universities were making a profit off the Chinese students. New Zealand language institutes had become infamous for their focus on profits, so Chinese students were suspicious that all foreign universities, American schools included, wanted to gouge them. So in the speech I talked about this directly.

I explained that whatever Chinese students spend, their funds are being matched, either by the state legislature or by the endowments of the private universities. This is because the total cost of a year of education is much higher than the amount that students pay. A Chinese student, even paying out-of-state tuition, might be paying 30 or 50 cents for a dollar's worth of education. Even now, there are still comments and buzz about that speech.

And the numbers of applications, and visas issued, began to rise again.

*Q: How about the return rate?*

BISHOP: The return rate also went up, though I don't think that was necessarily our doing.

*Q: Got to be the economy.*

BISHOP: Yes. There are more opportunities for graduates in China. They return because they know their MBA from an American university is a primo credential to get a good job back home.

*Q: It's interesting. I dealt for a long time with Yugoslavia. Students who went to the United States on Fulbrights or on exchanges -- the university faculties were not at all responsive to them because these were old farts who didn't want their way of tenure or anything else changing. The younger people full of bright ideas would be relegated to the lowest ranks. Was this true in China too?*

BISHOP: I think that many of the Chinese returnees would tell the same story. Those who returned in the 80s and 90s commonly ran into just what you described. Heads of departments or senior professors who had earned degrees overseas had earned them from the Soviet Union. There were many economics professors with Soviet degrees, for instance. What did they know about economics, trade, commerce, business? Nothing useful for China's future. So the scholars who returned from the U.S. met more than ordinary university politics. There was an ideological hangover as well. And who are these young whippersnappers, anyway?

This was moderated over time by the enormous expansion of Chinese higher education. It solved some of the problems by creating new positions. In time the older generation of professors had to retire. And gradually university administrators knew they had to build quality faculties, which meant those with foreign degrees.

*Q: In dealing with universities or other institutions, did anyone take a look at Marxism? Or had this become sort of ancient history?*

BISHOP: It's not ancient history because every high school and university must offer certain courses in Marxism, Leninism, and Deng Xiaoping thought. My conversations with Chinese students led me to understand, though, that they just endure these classes. They sit through them. They nod and pretend to be awake. But in fact, just like other parts of the ideological posture of the Party and the state, these things are largely disregarded.

The courses are required for graduation because the Party doesn't want to give up its position as guiding the ideology of the country. Another factor that explains the lingering influence of Marxism is that the universities and policy institutes may have dozens of scholars on their rolls, and some (the older scholars, the lazy ones, or those whose background was in the PLA or the Party) coast along on their old learning, unwilling to question the premises they had been taught.

I was quite struck by this academic inertia of rest at a conference on Taiwan issues organized by one of the universities. Of course, Taiwan is a hot-button issue, and among the scholars were some who were quite sophisticated in their understanding of how changes in Taiwan, democratic changes, need to be factored into the PRC's approach to the island. To hear their nuanced papers, however, you had to listen to many others by their colleagues who rotely repeated all the old lines, complete with the oddly stressed voices of Communist indoctrination.

A program like the one we organized for the economics professor from Heilongjiang University was partly to challenge the whole concept of central planning, and to demonstrate that the old ideologies and habits were inadequate for China's future.

Younger Chinese academics in the leading universities were conscious that Marxism and Communism didn't provide good guidance for China's future. I was asked to speak at a conference at People's University on just war theory. As the Chinese government thought through its responses to Kosovo, 9/11, Iraq, and Afghanistan, they realized that Mao's ideological framework -- wars of imperialism, bad, people's war, good -- didn't provide much useful guidance in a rather complex world. So the university had organized a conference to examine just war theory. They weren't ready to endorse it, but they grasped that they needed to understand it, and that it might help broaden their thinking.

I hadn't been given much notice about the conference, and not many details. I put together my presentation on just war thinking mostly from memory, recalling my study of Thomas Aquinas and teaching at the Air Force Academy.

I discovered that the Chinese university had invited an international affairs professor from a prominent U.S. university to anchor the conference. Much of his way-too-long paper criticized several U.S. administrations for their unjust wars. I found that I was the paper presenter that gave them a plain vanilla description of the criteria for just wars, and defended the war on terrorism as just.

*Q: Here and there you have mentioned the People's Liberation Army, the Chinese military. Did it figure in your Public Diplomacy?*

BISHOP: It has been a U.S. goal -- a DOD goal, a State goal, a White House goal -- the same goal in Republican and in Democratic administrations -- to develop the military-to-military relationship with China, to build trust.

The PLA -- and here "People's Liberation Army" includes the Navy and the Air Force -- is the most separate and most ideologized of China's institutions. Remember too that the PLA is not the nation's army, it's the Party's army. Soldiers swear oaths to the Party, not the Constitution.

The PLA has an elaborate system of foreign affairs offices. Foreigners who deal with the PLA officers who staff these offices refer to them, informally, as the "barbarian handlers." The English-speaking barbarian handlers, who studied the language at their own separate military academy in Luoyang, are very smooth. These men and women are the ones who meet foreigners, set up schedules, arrange the meetings, sit with the Americans at banquets, and so on. Only highly reliable officers get these jobs.

Successive DATTs were frustrated by this need to move everything through the Foreign Affairs Offices. They wanted to build communication, knowledge, and trust with warfighters, with field commanders. It was abundantly clear from their actions, if not their words, that the Chinese didn't want this to happen. Meeting a commander or the head of a staff section, or visiting a base or unit, was very hard to arrange. Again, the PLA is sealed off in most ways. To meet the

incessant foreign demands to see the PLA in the field, the Chinese had a show roster of ships and bases, and Potemkin commandos would perform martial arts for the foreign visitors.

*Q: It's been pointed out in numerous articles that the PLA is one of China's most conservative institutions ...*

BISHOP: Yes.

*Q: ... and one that views the United States as a potential enemy.*

BISHOP: Yes again.

*Q: If you're in the military you've got to have an enemy. You've got to have a big enemy so you can get more money. We could even say we are doing this with China ourselves, like we did with the Soviets, painting them as much more powerful as they probably were. Were you able to insert yourself in military-to-military things?*

BISHOP: For the record, I'm not bought into that line of thinking – that the U.S. armed forces conjure up or exaggerate threats so that they can receive more resources – so I won't take that bait right now.

When you used the word “conservative,” I think your meaning has been the same as when I've used the word “ideologized.” And conservative Chinese ideology is left.

Dealing with different ideologies, you're always wrestling with words. I think you understand, though, what I mean when I say the PLA is ideologized and isolated. They live on their bases. The officers are Party members. They have their own schools. Units have political officers to indoctrinate all personnel. The PLA has certainly taken to heart the narrative in which the United States remains an imperial power that wants to keep China down, and that the U.S. is China's number one future enemy. This suspicion is a backdrop to every mil-to-mil initiative.

There have now been decades of American efforts, led by all the Secretaries of Defense and all the Commanders of the Pacific Command, to build trust and relationships with the PLA. The results have all been limited -- by how the Chinese historical narrative of victimization frames their suspicions, by Communist doctrine, because of the PLA's institutional isolation, by how the Foreign Affairs Offices handle American delegations.

Although it became a larger issue after my time as PAO in Beijing, the active Chinese military program to penetrate the servers of U.S. government agencies and American corporations was beginning to be noticed. I wasn't privy to any classified discussions of this, so I'm speaking of what was in the news. The Chinese denials of military involvement -- that any penetrations or cyber raids against U.S. targets were done elsewhere, or were executed by patriotic hackers independent of the government -- were just not credible.

As for Public Diplomacy and the PLA, I have always believed that Public Diplomacy can be helpful in building mil-to-mil relations -- by arranging better and more far-reaching media

coverage of mil-to-mil events, and by using Public Diplomacy's writ to deal with educational institutions to open military academies and professional military education to Embassy-sponsored programs.

It's always the case, however, that the Defense Attaches in American Embassies all around the world are possessive about contacts with local militaries. Is a ship making a port call? The colonel says, "Don't worry, Mr. Ambassador, we'll take care of everything." Is there a group of American officers from one of the war colleges visiting? "Don't worry, Mr. Ambassador. They'll stop by and shake hands with you, but since they belong to me I'll set up the rest of their schedule."

There are generally two ways that PAS can be part of the large effort. One is with the local media. When EUCOM deployed people to train Nigerian peacekeepers or clear unexploded ordnance, an active public affairs posture, organized and led by PAS, arranging for the American military people to meet the journalists, was a great confidence builder.

There were these opportunities in China too. Once or twice a year, for instance, an American naval vessel would visit Shanghai or Qingdao or Zhanjiang in the south. As always, the Attaché said, "Don't worry, Mr. Ambassador, leave it to us." The Attaché's team would meet with the PLA's foreign affairs handlers to go over the visit. When they got to the bottom of their checklist they raised the question of media coverage, and the PLA team said, "Don't worry. We'll take care of that." And our team would say, "Great, one less worry for us."

Done this way, who would show up to cover the event? It would be the Chinese equivalent of Armed Forces Network, CCTV-5, the military channel. There might be visuals of the ship at the dock, but the words of the story were always spoken by the Chinese military journalist.

I always took the position that if a ship came to Shanghai or Qingdao or Zhanjiang, that city's local media and that city's bureau chiefs from the national media should be invited to events. I regularly deployed Wendy Lyle, our scrappy Consulate Public Affairs Officer in Guangzhou, to handle these ship visits. Wendy immigrated to the U.S. from Taiwan, and she knew how to get results by being assertive in a Chinese way.

Wendy would show up with the DATT advance team when the ship arrived, and when the PLA handlers said "Oh no, no, no, we've already arranged the media coverage," she might just say, "I've got them here! They're in the bus! They're ready to come in the gate! Of course you're going to let them cover the ship." This gave the Foreign Affairs officers real heartburn, but often the PRC senior officers were so amused by this Chinese-American woman and her assertive ways, they let the press come in for the events. Your ordinary province-level journalist was quite wowed by a U.S. Navy ship, and the papers ran lots of photos and stories.

So, PAS could advance the mil-to-mil agenda by playing its "media" card.

Another way was to use our role as the Embassy lead in education and exchanges to approach military schools. "You're educators. Well, we're educators too. We do Fulbrights, we do speakers, we do seminars, and we do it at every university in China. Your military academy is a

university. Couldn't we bring by a speaker to talk to your faculty about ...”

This proved a tougher nut to crack. We'll talk about the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II in a few minutes, but I was, I believe, the first Embassy speaker at the Academy of Military Sciences. We succeeded in getting them to agree to allow Charles Hawkins of the HERO Library to speak there too. So we were slowly prying open the door to the PLA's senior schools.

There was one more way to use Public Affairs to help with the mil-to-mil relationship. Each Ministry has an associated policy institute, a think tank. They were open to having U.S. speakers, joining seminars, and so on. We programmed speakers, for instance, at one of the Ministry of Defense think tanks, the Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS).

Darrell Jenks, as ACAO and Director of the ACEE, ran our speakers program, and he grasped what I hoped PAS could do with the PLA. He and his staff always approached MND institutions for our speaker programs. It took some time for him to work through their initial misgivings, but once they had accepted a speaker and met Darrell, who spoke wizard Chinese, they were pleased to have the chance to meet more Americans.

By the way, Darrell was doing the same things at the Central Party School and the provincial Party Schools, though they were now called “Administrative Colleges” in English.

*Q: What did you talk about?*

BISHOP: We should back up a little bit. I began as PAO in 2003. The sixtieth anniversary of V-J Day would be 2005. I asked around the Embassy if there were anyone thinking ahead to the anniversary, and the DATT recalled that he had recently seen a draft Pacific Command plan. When I read it, I realized the PACOM intended to organize or support observances in Hawaii, the Philippines, Guam, Australia, and even Palau. There was no mention of China in the plan.

I asked the DATT if his office intended to do anything. In effect he told me they would have no time. Like us, they were overwhelmed by visitors and by all their many different taskings from around DOD. He let me know they would be happy to attend an event if the Chinese organized something, and maybe attend a dinner or two, but they were in no position to organize anything from the Embassy side.

I sensed that the sixtieth anniversary could provide an opportunity -- to use the story of U.S.-China cooperation during the war to put a dent in the Party's narrative that the U.S. was always trying to keep China down. Not to mention that the Flying Tigers, the Doolittle Raid, the Hump route, the Burma Road -- all were great and compelling stories that needed re-telling in China.

*Q: Stilwell and --*

BISHOP: Vinegar Joe, yes.

I discovered that after years of ignoring the role of China's allies in its war against Japan, the

Chinese were beginning to offer recognition. For instance, when the USAF Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base wanted to add a stone runway roller to their exhibit on the Hump Airlift, the Chinese found a roller in good condition on the side of a runway in Yunnan Province, where it had sat, unused, for 60 years. There was a large ceremony in Kunming to present the roller to the U.S. My former USAF Academy colleague and fellow Trinity College alumnus, Brigadier General Jon Reynolds, came out for the ceremony as the Museum's representative. I got to give the big speech. There were six of us Americans on the stage, and when an elderly Kunming resident who had worked on the runways as a boy came on stage, we all gave him a salute. He was sincerely abashed by the salute and by the thunderous applause. A nice moment.

We had all noticed that in the front row in the audience was an elderly Chinese woman jauntily wearing a beret, and she came forward to see us as soon as the ceremony ended. She was Rita Wong, who had worked as a Chinese nurse at the U.S. Army hospital in Yuannanyi. It was a rather fine occasion, and she had bought old photos of herself in her nurse's uniform.

She kept repeating a name, "Lieutenant Colonel Herbert Bush." He had been the hospital commander. After the ceremony back in Beijing, I spent some time with Google hoping to track down Dr. Bush. He had passed away, but I found his son, also a physician, in Connecticut. Rita was too old to make the trip, but her family flew to Connecticut to meet the son and place flowers on Lieutenant Colonel Bush's grave. Another nice moment.

One more memory of the gathering in Kunming. Another old gentleman told the story that his father owned a silk shop, and many of the American GIs visited the shop to buy silk to take home to mothers, wives, and sweethearts. Indeed they had helped the son with his English, and they had invited him to the base to see a musical play. The elderly Chinese thought a moment ... "what was the name of that tune?" I said, "Oklahoma!", and he clapped his hands with delight. Yes, he had seen the USO production of Oklahoma! This was an interesting story of the longevity of memories of cultural events.

In addition to the stone roller donation, the Chinese were finally inviting a few veterans groups -- Russian, American, British, French -- to China. They found a partner in the Sino-American Aviation Heritage Foundation, of which Jeff Greene was the sparkplug, idea man, and tour leader.

There were still a few of China's "united front" organizations that looked back to World War II. For instance, the people who had been at Yan'an with Chairman Mao when they were young, who had dealt with the Dixie Mission, there were still a few of them around. They had their own little society. These united front groups would be given some money on occasions such as this. They were inviting, for instance, the family of people like Evans Carlson, the Marine Raider who had ...

*Q: Gung-ho.*

BISHOP: ... been in China before the war. Yes, Randolph Scott played him in the film. He passed away many years ago, but his granddaughter was invited to come, and to bring with her some people who were also interested in China.

Learning of these Chinese invitations, we began our own planning. We wanted to do more than join or attend events that China was organizing. We should also go on the initiative, organizing some events in Beijing, Kunming, and Chongqing. We organized seminars using our own money. IIP provided the historian Ronald Spector as a speaker. We attached ourselves to Chinese events too, and protocol at their events required them to allow us to speak. We focused on the war for about a year and a half.

We frequently used three documentary films that had been made in World War II. We took the Frank Capra film in the "Why We Fight" series, "The Battle of China," and had it subtitled in Chinese. We did the same with "China Crisis" about the Flying Tigers and "Stilwell Road" about the war in Burma. That Captain Ronald Reagan was the film's narrator added a nice touch. We didn't do a careless subtitling. We transcribed the full texts of the narrations and had them properly translated.

We showed two of those films at the Diaoyutai State Guesthouse. There weren't any active duty PLA who attended, but among the four or five hundred who gathered to watch the film, many were retired from the PLA, generals included. Most were younger, but in the large crowd were a few old enough to remember the war. As the films ran, we could hear people saying, "Woww, I didn't know." "Stilwell!" "Flying Tigers, ooohh!" And "gosh, the Road." There's some great, wonderful footage in those films, which conveyed at first hand America in the war, and Americans losing their lives for China.

There was a woman in her 70s in front of me, and when the films ended, I asked her what she had thought. She had been a child during the war. She said, "no one has told this story for years."

Darrell Jenks and ACAO Jeff Loree showed the films to many groups, and the reactions were always positive. The films still had dramatic punch.

From Jeff Greene I learned that the combat cameraman who had made "China Crisis," Hal Geer, was living in California, still active at the age of 94. We brought him over, and he attended a public premiere of his great documentary at the National Library. After the film was shown, the Q&A could have gone on for hours.

We were on a roll with the films. Our conferences were successful too. With the mayor of Chongqing (old "Chungking") and the governor of Sichuan Province, we had the first dinner in General Stilwell's conference room in Chongqing since the war. I detached two Hump fliers from Jeff Greene's group to join the dinner, and the applause they received was quite sincere.

I gave plenty of talks, but I realized we needed something more substantive and long-lived, so I reincarnated myself as a historian for a short period of time, and I wrote a long paper that outlined American participation in the war in China. It was the first paper in a volume published by the Chinese government's World War II History Research Group.

As 2005 ended, I had a really good feeling that we had succeeded in reawakening the memories of Chinese and American cooperation during the war, putting one dent in the Chinese narrative

of the war.

*Q: Nobody called me to talk about my experience of watching HMS Belfast bombard Chinese positions off Chodo Island in North Korea.*

BISHOP: *(Laughter)* Stuart, that's the wrong war! I was working on recalling the time when we were working with China, not fighting China! *(Laughter)*

If it helps, I've been on the decks of the HMS Belfast. It's docked in London on the Thames, a museum ship.

*Q: Were there any attempts to, you know, get the veterans of the Korean War on both sides to get together?*

BISHOP: Well, there wasn't anything that I was doing. I do recall that some of the World War II veterans who came out had been in the Korean War also, and Jeff Greene had helped some American aviators from the Korean War meet Chinese pilots. But in 2005, I was focused on World War II.

While we're discussing the Korean war, though, Ha Jin, the professor of English at Boston University, wrote *War Trash* which won the PEN Faulkner Award in 2005. It's about the Chinese prisoners in South Korea during the war. It's quite a stirring book. I read it in Beijing.

Just after reading the book, I happened to be sitting at a table at a conference next to one of the very well known CCTV talking heads, and the Korean War came up. His father had been in the Korean War, had been a prisoner of war, and was one of those who, at Panmunjom, chose for China instead of Taiwan, I learned. His father went through the years of hardship as a result of what the Party did to the former POWs after they returned.

It was more than he could stand, my CCTV friend told me, when the soldiers who had chosen to go to Taiwan came back to see their families 30 years later. They were honored by their high schools and given the red carpet treatment because they were rich. The loyal prisoners who had come back to China and had been dumped on. He was bitter about it. His father's story paralleled Ha Jin's novel.

*Q: Oh, absolutely.*

BISHOP: The World War II observances and events were quite satisfying. I got to see lots of China. In Weifang in Shandong Province, I met many of the men and women, then children, who had been in the Weihsien internment camp during the war with Eric Liddell and Art Hummel.

*Q: The Eric Liddell who was in the movie Chariots of Fire, and the future Ambassador to China, Art Hummel?*

BISHOP: Yes. And it led me to read *Shantung Compound* by Langdon Gilkey, one of the most profound books to come out of the war. He had been held in the Weihsien camp too.

I gave one speech in Kunming that made everybody sit up straight. Seated in the center of a large outdoor square was a group of American CBI veterans and their wives, in their 70s and 80s. The city's and the province's leadership had turned out to greet them, and in the Chinese fashion they were giving a series of speeches of welcome. Behind the veterans, in ranks, were high school students, policemen and policewomen, members of the People's Armed Police, and PLA soldiers.

When it came time for me to speak as the Embassy representative, I called on each of the groups in ranks to "listen to what I say!" The officials in line behind me definitely looked my way. "Look at these men. They have had long lives after the war. They have had careers. They have raised families. They have never forgotten China. Their experience here made them better men and better Americans." Words to this effect.

"They took care of their comrades who had setbacks after the war." And, "they voted in every election." "This is how they loved their country, by being good citizens."

I was listening to the interpreter and watching his non-verbals. Mention of an election was skating at the edge. But of course, I backed away with reassuring talk about U.S.-China friendship, about Chinese airline pilots learning flight safety from a Boeing subsidiary in Kunming. The interpreter and the officials behind me relaxed a little, but they had gotten my message about democracy. It was one of my better moments.

I'm reminded that one of the things we did to mark the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II was publish a special issue of *Jiaoliu* magazine. Editor Charlene Fu, a local hire American, outdid herself on the issue. She had also put together the theme issue on religion in the United States.

I can't mention *Jiaoliu* without mentioning, however, the end of the magazine. After the end of USIA's magazines in the 1990s, we were still publishing *Jiaoliu* as a one-country post publication using our own money. China with *Jiaoliu* and India with *Span* were the last two posts able to sustain single-country magazines.

Both magazines depended on locally hired editors. When the Department ended the flexibility given to posts to hire Americans locally, at an American salary, in favor of a single "Locally Engaged Staff" status that meant Americans could only be hired at FSN salaries, they grandfathered incumbent Local Hire Americans for five years. Charlene Fu was one of those affected. As the end of her five years approached, we worked with personnel to keep her on without a salary cut, to no avail. Without her, the magazine came to an end. The Bureau of Human Resources wanted to standardize hiring options and simplify things. Their one-size-fits-all ruling that ended Local Hire Americans had a toll in ending a significant publication.

*Q: We haven't come to Iraq and all that, or --*

BISHOP: Let me think. The initial American responses after 9/11 had taken place while I was in Nigeria. The overthrow of the Taliban also took place while I was in Africa. The invasion of Iraq

and the taking of Baghdad were in the first half of 2003, when I was in my language refresher. At that time, the focus of American diplomacy was to assure that China did not veto any of the U.N. Security Council resolutions that would give us freedom of action.

One of the fundamental anchors of China's foreign policy is the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. Our arguments about Saddam Hussein -- he is a pretty nasty character and look what he's done to his own people -- never struck any chords in Chinese officialdom. The Embassy was always demarching the Chinese on this or that, and the Chinese surely sensed that they didn't want to challenge us on Iraq, but in the Public Affairs Section we weren't spending a lot of time defending the war.

As the "GWOT" unfolded, the Chinese found our focus on terrorism had some advantages for them. China's population included non-Han Muslims in Xinjiang province, and they could increase their control over Xinjiang's people under the terrorism rubric. They also liked our preoccupation with Iraq and Afghanistan, which give them more space to maneuver in other parts of the world.

*Q: Did the fact that the Chinese were essentially bankrolling our trade with them, did that come up?*

BISHOP: The direct answer is that all of us in the Embassy well understood that China's foreign currency reserves were rising and rising. And of course we realized that they were parking those reserves by buying up our Treasury notes. But while I was there, China's reserves, and ownership of our debt, were seen through the lenses of trade deficit reduction and exchange rates. We were focused -- and visiting members of Congress like Senator Schumer were focused -- on the unfairness of their pegging the yuan to the dollar so that there was never any adjustment in rates in response to the imbalance in trade.

I'd say that we weren't focused on how the level of debt might hazard the strength of our own domestic economy. That was something that became evident in 2010 and 2011, after the rapid increase in the deficit and in the amount of debt owned by China as the Administration responded to the economic crisis.

*Q: Were there any events that you had to respond to? Any particular events during this time or?*

BISHOP: In my first tour in Beijing there had been the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. I am not thinking that there was any big event like the Olympics that hit us. The pleasure of organizing the Public Diplomacy for the 2008 Olympics in Beijing fell to my successor, Don Q. Washington.

*Q: Or the plane collision at --*

BISHOP: Oh, no. The collision between the Chinese fighter and the U.S. P-3 Orion had happened before I arrived. The people who dealt with it were still at the Embassy and talking about it, but I had missed the event. I did, though, pay attention to how China portrayed the event.

The collision and its aftermath were quite instructive. The Chinese were lying through their teeth when they said the Orion maneuvered in order to hit the Chinese fighter. The two planes had collided because of the wild acrobatics by the Chinese pilot. Samuel Hymes said fighter pilots could be divided into two groups, the “sanes” and the “crazies.” The Chinese pilot was obviously a crazy. Rolling around the Orion at high speed, he miscalculated. He thought he would give the American crew a good scare, but instead he clipped the radome and the wing. The Chinese fighter was lost, and the pilot died. The Orion, thanks to an amazing feat of airmanship by the pilot, managed to land on Hainan Island.

The Chinese propaganda machine went into high gear. They propagated a dishonest account of the maneuvers of the two aircraft. And, in their own domestic propaganda, they also decided to portray pilot Wang Wei as brave, the best pilot that had ever flown the skies, a zealous and selfless member of the party, an exemplar for all Chinese to follow. Demonstrating this, they said that when his wife had become pregnant, the couple had had a chat, and they decided that it was not the right time in his flying career for them to have a child. So they had decided to go ahead and abort the child.

You can guess that this rather staggered me -- that a career, or perhaps the greater glory of China, justified an abortion. This was bad enough.

As I thought about it, though, the same story line told me that the Chinese who wrote out this narrative for domestic consumption had no idea for how this would be heard around the world. It reflected the isolation of the PLA. They played to a domestic audience without being aware of how controversial and heart-rending an abortion would be regarded in the United States. They didn't realize that the story that they told to their own soldiers and their own people about his great virtues would come across quite differently when it was read overseas.

Anyway, the P-3 incident was before my time.

*Q: I've heard that the Chinese are becoming quite active in their own Public Diplomacy. Did you see this?*

BISHOP: My counterpart in the Chinese Government was the Minister for the State Council Information Office. China's public diplomacy belonged to this Minister, Zhao Qizheng, who had a winning personality. We got to know each other when we worked together on World War II V+60 programs.

Right after I arrived, I went to the State Council for my initial call on Minister Zhao. We drove to the main entrance of his office building. I was greeted at the car by members of his staff, and they escorted me down the halls and up the elevator to the reception room near his office.

They made small talk all the way. They gave me a quick introduction to the SCIO, mentioning how it had been formed in the early 1990s. Sensing the need for China to build up its own public diplomacy, they told me, they had done a serious study of how other governments organized their information, public affairs, public diplomacy, and cultural affairs -- that bundle of different

activities. The model they most admired was the U.S. Information Agency. USIA had it all down right, they told me.

When they organized the State Council Information Office, then, they largely organized it on USIA lines. Just as when USIA had been formed in the 1950s, they pulled in a mix of people, some from the Foreign Ministry, some from the PLA, a few journalists, a few cultural experts, so that the mix of people they had in the SCIO paralleled the kind of people we had in USIA.

I was feeling pretty good about the conversation, and then they said, “Of course we have heard that USIA has become part of the State Department.”

That was no secret, so I said, “yes.”

And ... they exchanged knowing glances and chuckled out loud. They were laughing, diplomatically. As if they knew how we had taken a focused, high morale Public Diplomacy organization -- one that combined “information,” public affairs and the spokesman function, with “culture,” education and exchanges – and moved it all into the State Department. They knew that if the State Council Information Office became part of the Foreign Ministry, they would soon be pulled into the Foreign Ministry’s own culture and its own sense of priorities.

As I went in to meet the Minister, just an ordinary introductory call, I couldn't shake off their laughter. They knew what USIA had been, what it had done, and they thought, these unpredictable Americans. They had a winner in USIA, and they moved it into the State Department.

*Q: Did you get any idea of what the Chinese were doing in Washington at the Embassy?*

BISHOP: As far as their Embassy in Washington was concerned, the answer is no. You could, however, see that China’s new public diplomacy was pulsing with the resources of money and people. Minister Zhao was doing quite a good job. China's Confucius Institutes, for instance, are equivalent to an American Corner or in some cases a USIS center. They launched those while I was in China.

For us to have a library or a permanent program space in China, we would have to run a full gamut of permissions from every part of the Party and government in China. The U.S.-China consular agreement was an obstacle. It provided for an American office in only five Chinese cities. When someone in Washington had the bright idea of American Presence Posts, the Chinese asked in Washington whether they would be allowed to open presence posts in American cities, and of course the Department’s answer was no. So the Chinese nixed American presence posts unless the consular agreement were re-opened. No one was willing to take on that porcupine.

But for the Confucius Institutes, the Chinese just called up University of Wherever and asked, “Confucian Institute, would you like to have one? If so, we can provide you with this and that.” Their public diplomacy has free rein in the United States. Ours was bounded, kept within certain bounds by Chinese Government.

They now have hundreds of journalists who work for PRC government or Party media in the U.S. Their only counterparts are two VOA correspondents in China. The Chinese never granted permission for more.

Our Center in Beijing, the American Center for Education Exchange (ACEE) had a library, and our English teaching officer, the IIE rep, and university admissions materials were there. It was, however, in the wrong part of the city, in the east on the Second Ring Road, though all the university students, the traditional Public Diplomacy audience of convenience, were in campuses in the west of the city. It would take a student a long time to get over to the ACEE from Peking University, and in the years I was there, the trip became longer and longer as the city became larger and more congested. In 2003 I could make the trip in 40 minutes in a taxi or Embassy car. (Travel options for students were slower.) By 2006 it took well more than an hour. In any case, we were inconveniently situated because the Chinese had decreed years before that diplomatic establishments could only be in the northeast quadrant of the city. It wasn't just us, it affected all the other embassies too. The Chinese had succeeded in bottling us up by allowing us to only be in certain places.

We could take a speaker out to a university, but that was not the same as having a library or center. Given the traffic, a single talk by a speaker at a university required us to set aside a whole afternoon or a whole morning.

China Central Television, CCTV, had several channels. One was CCTV-9 in English. You can see it here on cable in many areas. It's really slick. Someone who has been to China can watch a program and know what they have omitted, what they have gauzed over, but for most viewers, their presentation of programs and therefore of images of China, visions of China, is very good, and very well thought out. The State Council Information Office was working to expand reception of CCTV-9 around the world. It was clear that China was enlarging its public diplomacy presence around the world, and it's even clearer now.

If China reforms, their greater public diplomacy presence will be OK. But if the Chinese turn in troublesome directions, then their public diplomacy will be troublesome too.

For instance, American college students who go to the Confucius Centers are likely to absorb the notion that Taiwan is some kind of illegitimate hangover from the Chinese civil war, and that it really does belong to China. Even among the young Americans that I met studying language in Beijing, you could tell from their conversations that they were taking in the PRC view of Taiwan, partly because they had not been to the island to see things for themselves. China's public diplomacy would, of course, propagate the PRC's view of Taiwan as illegitimate.

*Q: What was your wife doing while you were in Beijing?*

BISHOP: Both during our first and second tours, Jemma was a Consular Associate. She worked in American Citizen Services, handling virtually everything -- lost passports, notarizations, reports of birth, voting, taxes, letters rogatory, disputes with local vendors, indigent Americans, "free to marry" certificates, and so on.

There were some high profile cases while she was in charge -- an American severely injured in Qinghai province, and Americans detained by North Korea. The cases involving North Korea usually involved the Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang. Sweden is the protecting power for Americans in North Korea. When a North Korean woman successfully deceived the Chinese guards and came into the Embassy, it was Jemma who was the interpreter during the several days it took to arrange for her to leave China.

*Q: How did you find social life in China?*

BISHOP: Although it's changed some over the years, it's harder to make Chinese friends in China than it was in Taiwan. Taiwan is sophisticated, educated, trading. In Taiwan, it's easy to have Chinese friends, and they are friends.

In China, it wasn't the same. There was always the anxiety that Americans have ulterior motives, and also that being too friendly with Americans might get me in trouble. Chinese you met in the course of your work rarely became friends. You might see certain individuals frequently -- at a Ministry, an institute, or a university -- and you could become friendly in a business way, but it didn't extend to being friendly in a personal way. So that's one thing to say.

That said, Beijing has become a great city to live in -- public events, museums, shopping, all kinds of restaurants, and sights to see -- so it's a very attractive assignment.

And when the China hands get together, the eyes water at the memory of the food.

Jemma and I continued to visit the Panjiayuan market on many Saturday mornings, and we began visiting furniture dealers on the outskirts of the city. That was one form of our recreation.

*Q: Well, then you left there when?*

BISHOP: Jemma and I left China in the summer of '06. And what remains before we can wrap up, then, is my going to the Pentagon and then finally Afghanistan.

*Today is the 21<sup>st</sup> of March, beginning of spring 2011 with Don Bishop. And Don, where are we now?*

*Q: This is probably a good place for an end of tour view. Whither China? I mean its relationship with the U.S., and its own future.*

BISHOP: Here's one man's sense of things.

Underlying China's economic advance in the world is a narrative. The narrative explains that China lost the preeminence it once possessed in the 1500s, 1600s, and 1700s because of the foreign imperialism of which America had been a part. China's 20th and 21st century advance, then, is only China resuming its place in the world. It's a success story, yes, but Chinese have mixed emotions about the resumption. On one hand they are gratified by China's economic

recovery and prosperity. On the other hand, they haven't let go of some grudges, and the memories lead some to want to get even.

I've read enough Chinese history to know that imperialism was a factor in China's years of agony, usually counted from the Opium Wars. But it was hardly the only factor, and indeed a stronger case can be made that China's own domestic dysfunctions during the Qing dynasty contributed more. The Chinese narrative largely ignores this.

This narrative of restoration, and getting even, has been woven into the Communist Party's own narrative about Chinese history and class. So the answer to "whither China?" largely depends on how that narrative is shaped for the future.

I don't see, either on their part, or on our part, any serious attempt to change that narrative. It's clear that substantial fruits of China's growing economic power -- their holding of so much of our debt -- is financing their outsized, year after year investment of money in the PLA, the most closed and ideologized institution in Chinese society. This is going to create tension and friction for some time. All this means that China will continue to pose large challenges to our foreign policy.

*Q: Do you see any potential areas of conflict? I don't necessarily mean armed conflict, but conflict with the West, or with the United States.*

BISHOP: My schooling in international relations included the concept that the relationship between any two nations can be placed on spectrum of conflict, a continuum, a line between peace and war. This applies even to the relationship between the U.S. and Canada. We would place our relationship with Canada way over toward the "peace" side of the spectrum, but we have our conflict over timber exports and border trade, and there are Canadian columnists who worry about Canada being overwhelmed by its gigantic neighbor to the south.

During the Cold War, one could argue that there was "peace" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union because we did not fight one another, but who can doubt that our relationship would be marked closer to the "war" end of the spectrum -- Cold War.

Between the U.S. and China, yes, we have a "peaceful" relationship, and many areas of common interest and cooperation, but a clear look shows many conflicts too. Their intelligence services, without doubt, have launched a concerted campaign to steal our technology. It troubles me too that the Chinese have opened a cyber campaign against us. This is war behind the curtain, war that they have begun, not us.

If we speak of conflict in the geopolitical sense, the first contested area is likely to be what the Chinese call the "near seas." China wants these waters to be recognized as its maritime sphere of influence -- the Sea of Japan, all the waters along the chain of islands that we call the Pacific littoral, and then way deep down into the South China Sea to cover its island and resource claims.

We believe that anywhere outside of a country's twelve mile limit we have a complete carte

blanche, a blank check, to move our power in and out. Set aside for a moment that with only 280 ships, our naval power is much diminished. Chinese zero-sum thinking about their naval domain means there are likely to be a lot of frictions over the near seas as they challenge any deployment of American power. I think their long range ambitions extend farther east into the Pacific, certainly to Guam and perhaps as far as Hawaii, believing that large Pacific areas should be acknowledged as their maritime sphere of influence.

It's not the rise of Chinese naval power, by itself, that is worrying. If China applied its growing blue water Navy to constructive use, fighting pirates in the Straits of Malacca or the Indian Ocean, getting their citizens out of Libya, sending Chinese ships and units to help neighboring countries deal with earthquakes, and so on, I'm comfortable with that. That would be win-win.

I fear, however, that the Chinese don't see it that way. Deep inside they think that -- as their power develops, ours must recede. And I think that's one of the differences in vision -- asymmetries in our visions, perhaps -- that needs to be worked through. That's why we need more dialog with China's military planners and strategic thinkers, and why it's so frustrating that China refuses our mil-to-mil proposals that would build trust.

Since a war -- a real war -- with China is unthinkable, we're going to have to do this largely with diplomacy and non-aggressive use of our military power. And our Public Diplomacy always needs to help the Chinese change their narrative.

*Q: How do you see China itself? I mean looking at China, first off there's the problem of the population, far too many -- probably not enough females. But also how to keep them occupied. Plus, the fact that it is big and there's a tendency to move towards the equivalent to warlordism. And the ideology is kind of gone out of the mix, but --*

BISHOP: This is several questions wrapped together.

You know from our previous conversations that I've never signed on to the concept of "overpopulation," and I believe the one-child policy violates human rights.

The Chinese, moreover, have not yet been willing to face all the issues that stem from their demographic trends. I was one of the first in the Embassy to begin talking about the imbalance between boys and girls, in our own conversations, and with Chinese. I found that Chinese were not generally aware of how large the imbalance had become. The Party, using its control of the media, doesn't admit to problems until they have figured out how to say the Party is righting the problem.

The Party has a dilemma on public discussion of population issues. They have stridently persevered in their population control policies despite public hatred of the controls, so now they can't allow discussion of the adverse social consequences of the policy, lest that discredit the entire system of Party control over Chinese society. I also found out that Chinese didn't much like to have a foreigner talk to them about it.

If each new birth cohort has from 15 to 20 percent more boys than girls, China is well into

uncharted demographic, social, economic, and political territory. The full force of this imbalance has not hit China yet. Many in the unbalanced year groups are still young.

The reaction of many Chinese I talked to about the imbalance was to laugh it off. One official smilingly conjectured that girls in Taiwan would find men from the Mainland more attractive, helping reduce the imbalance. He was sitting next to me at a large banquet, so I couldn't stand up and shout out loud what a fool he was.

I suppose a sharp economist would say the official was looking for a solution that relied on "imports" of women. I'm not aware that young women in Taiwan are eager to move to the Mainland to redress the gender imbalance, and the numbers don't work out anyway, but indeed there is an "import" factor at work. There are already reports of kidnapping of girls from the near counties of Vietnam, Laos, and Burma. It has been reported that the most hazardous place for a young woman escaping from North Korea is the first five miles into China after crossing the river. It's not the threat of being caught by the police that is the hazard, it's the gangs that prey on the North Korean refugees. They let the men go, but the women are kidnapped and then sold to farmers in remote villages. (If you can't imagine that women are really sold in China, look at the photos in Nick Kristoff's and Sheryl WuDunn's book.) In any case, there aren't enough nearby extra women to supply the Chinese imbalance.

When I think about this, I think of some historic parallels. After the Chinese Exclusion Act became law in 1882, the Chinese railroad workers and cooks and laundrymen in the American west couldn't bring wives to join them. The Chinese communities in the west had real gender imbalances, too many men, too few women. Some of the old literary stereotypes, the prejudiced stereotypes, of the Chinatowns -- opium smoking, gambling, giant queue-wearing Chinese immigrants in the United States prone to drink, wielding their cleavers in any quarrel -- were rooted in the fact that the men in the culturally isolated Chinese communities in Wyoming and other areas didn't have wives to pull them into family life. So could that happen on a large scale in China?

The Party and the government know that high rates of employment are necessary for China's social stability. Especially if there's an oversupply of men, China has to provide jobs for the coming birth cohorts. That's why the Party focuses so much on the implicit deal that's been made with China's people. The Party will provide economic growth, jobs, and livelihoods as long as you, the people, don't challenge our authority and our leadership.

For years, people in the Embassy have been saying the high Chinese economic growth rates don't seem sustainable in the long run. How long can a country grow at 10 percent a year, year after year? Continued high growth has been partly attributed to the presence of large labor pools among the rural population, millions and millions of villagers willing to migrate to the cities and factories. Even though wages in Shenzhen are low, and Chinese migrants work in what we would call sweatshops, life is better there than in the villages.

There's some evidence, though, that those rural labor pools are drying up, and China can no longer rely on cheap labor for its comparative advantage. I myself am not predicting any imminent turnaround to China's economic prospects, but there are adverse trends. No doubt

China's leaders lose some sleep over this. They want China to continue to grow because it is economic growth that propels its national power and enables the growth in its military power. But they lose sleep over the prospect of social instability if growth slows and unemployment rises. Social instability could undermine the “legitimacy” of the Chinese Communist Party.

As for the possibility of a new warlord era, I believe that there's a big difference between now and the 1920s and 1930s when warlordism was a factor in Chinese politics. There have been several decades of national mobilization since then. The mobilization has strengthened national identity and feeling. There was the nationalism driven into China by the Second World War, and you have all the mobilization that took place after 1949. It is now firmly fixed in the Chinese mind that China is one nation with one future and one destiny. The social power of Chinese unity is so great that I can't see a regionalized future, a warlord future, for China. This is not to say that minority peoples, in China's west, for instance, do not want more autonomy or even independence, but for Han Chinese, 91 percent of the population, I don't see warlordism as a prospect.

*Q: Did you get any feel for -- I don't know, don't want to be pejorative in this -- but the lack of innovation within the Chinese economic side?*

BISHOP: Well, it was commonly observed that although Taiwan is a fully trading nation, its contributions in the economic chain tend to be at the lower end because Taiwan had not developed its own brands. Perhaps Acer was the first of the Taiwan brands to be known in the international market.

The Chinese can also reference the example of South Korea. Their path to development relied heavily on the conglomerates, the *chaebol*, which had pluses and minuses. Taiwan with its small and medium enterprises had a higher per capital GNP than South Korea for many years, but South Korea has now pulled ahead. The Korean companies -- Samsung, LG, Hyundai -- have created well known brands, which are now their own factor in Korea's prosperity.

The PRC realizes that being an assembler or a provider of components for products that other companies design and sell under their own brands is not giving China a full share of the wealth that might come to them. So there's an effort to develop their own brands. That's just starting. They would like to increase the share of their export earnings that comes from branding, not just producing.

As for the general question of innovation, there are Chinese businessmen who make millions by copying and selling our software and other products. There's plenty of money to be made by reverse engineering. The Amcham always counseled new American firms entering China to guard the “crown jewels” of their processes, or their trade secrets, or else they will be stolen. You can take this as a lack of innovation if you want to. I frame this rather in terms of the great distance between the power of foreign brands, products, and organization, and China's. The money to be made by “copying” or theft is too great a temptation, both for the businesses and for the local governments that collect tax revenue from the Chinese companies that engage in these predatory practices.

There's another reason to hesitate about saying the Chinese as deficient in innovation. They are pioneers in some fields. In applied agricultural science, my sense is that they are quite innovative, and there will be major Chinese contributions to increasing the world's food supply. And although it's taking place behind the curtain, my guess is that the PLA and Chinese companies are leaders in certain, shall we say, troublesome software applications.

*Q: My guess is that we could talk about China for several more hours, but it's probably time to wrap up your assignment.*

BISHOP: Yes, China is a large topic. I'm conscious that this interview format shorts nuance and complexity. The large questions you have asked have no short answers, only long ones, and America's China hands produce long and thoughtful papers on every one. They argue all of them at seminars. Those who read these interviews may think I'm being shallow and glib. I could write out the same opinions with lengthy qualifiers and numerous footnotes, but that would take away some of the frankness I've been aiming for.

I'm being more frank than diplomatic. I'm well aware that a diplomatic career makes one very careful in word and speech, and when speaking with our foreign counterparts we particularly choose our words. If any Chinese ever get to reading these transcripts, they may feel an edge on what I've said. If they conclude that I was uninformed on this or that topic, or that I jumped to unwarranted conclusions, I'm OK with that, and I look forward to more conversations. If they conclude, though, that there's any hostility, any anti-Chinese feeling, in what I've said, they are mistaken.

Over the years I have developed a great respect and affection for China, and the entire aim of American policy must be to keep our countries at peace, so that we can in time join together in solving the world's problems. Over the years I've come to the conclusion that there is a natural affinity between American and Chinese cultures. Both of us are frank and blunt. They respect education as we do. They work as hard as we do, and the Chinese traits of business and enterprise that so awed the world in the early twentieth century are once again earning the world's respect.

I will be frank, though, that I think China was badly wounded in the twentieth century, by the death throes of the Qing dynasty, by its civil war, by the long war with Japan, and by Communism, and it still carries the scars, one of which is a reflexive suspicion of American motives. I wish it were not so.

Some of my leadership of Public Diplomacy in China supported the efforts by American administrations to bring China back into the international order as a constructive player -- things we did to support WTO initiatives, protect IPR, and so on. There was much wailing and gnashing of teeth when we pressed the Chinese on WTO, for instance, but I believe Chinese now see the benefits that flowed from their accession. Some were efforts to help China in its own acknowledged task of establishing the rule of law. Some were to recall earlier periods of cooperation between China and the U.S.

And some challenged the Chinese Communist Party's curbs on their own people -- human rights,

religious liberty, and an end to population control, for instance. If reading this offends some Chinese gatekeepers, I am confident there are others in China who hope for the same changes as I do. Chinese officials fear *luan* (chaos) if China democratizes. I think they are wrong. They disrespect the energy, patriotism, and good sense of their own people.

**DAVID J. KRAMER**  
**Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor**  
**Washington, DC (2008-2009)**

*David Kramer was born in Malden, Massachusetts in 1964. He attended Tufts (BA in Soviet Studies and political science) and Harvard (MA in Soviet Studies). He was Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human rights and Labor 2008-2009. Mr. Kramer was interviewed by Charles Stuart Kennedy in 2011.*

KRAMER: DRL is Democracy and Human Rights and Labor, so the old HR Bureau. I was assistant secretary so I was responsible for running the bureau. I did a good bit of traveling then. I had less than a year to do what I wanted to do so I had to cram a lot in in a very short period of time. I led the resumption of the human rights dialogue with the Chinese. I went to Beijing in May of 2008. On that same trip I went to Hanoi, did the same with the Vietnamese, traveled to the Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, went to Ethiopia twice because of the situation there, traveled to Nigeria and the DRC, and also Guatemala, Mexico, Pakistan and India, a lot of places.

*Q: OK. Let's take this time. Your time is basically limited. You traveled around. Where did you find you had a focus?*

KRAMER: I spent a lot of time on China, resuming the human rights dialogue with China was very important and then the fall, after the May dialogue was also very important. I am disappointed at what little we accomplished frankly but I did spend a lot of time on that.

*Q: What was the situation at that time with China?*

KRAMER: Remember they were hosting the Beijing Olympics in August, 2008? George Bush had decided quite a while before he was going to attend and I think in retrospect we did not use the president's decision to go to the Olympics enough as a point of leverage to try to get the Chinese to concede on some human rights issues and release political prisoners at a minimum. China was certainly a major focus.

*Q: Was this the president's decision to go to China? This was a political move.*

KRAMER: The Chinese wanted him to go. The president was interested in sports. My first day on the job as assistant secretary in the Department of Human Rights and Labor, the president just coincidentally was coming over to the State Department for a briefing on three issues and one of them was about democracy and human rights. So my first day on the job I briefed the president

of the United States. That's a pretty interesting way to start.

The issue of the Olympics came up and we talked about that and he asked me whether I thought he should go. I said that he should as long as we used his decision to go as a point of leverage and he agreed with that but at the end of the day we didn't succeed in doing that. There was a lot of focus on China.

*Q: Were we doing much in the way of dialoging with the Chinese on human rights or was it there wasn't much conversation going on?*

KRAMER: Well, the dialogue had been suspended in 2002 by one of my predecessors, Lorne Craner. It didn't resume until 2008. The dialogue, I think it is fair to say, and there is about to be another one with my successor this week with the Chinese is probably not the way to advance human rights issues with the Chinese. It is a way instead in fact for them to stovepipe and marginalize the issues outside of normal channels of interaction. I think we really have to rethink the situation with the Chinese.

*Q: Is it with the Chinese as it is with the Orient, face comes up. Actually, it is true in every country but it seems to be more important. Is it that if we push the Chinese publicly then they are not going to give? Is it possible to deal sort of around?*

KRAMER: I think it has to be a combination of public and private. I think private has to be strong but you need a public element to it. I understand the saving face quality or need but at the end of the day, you also have to let people inside China know that you are pushing on these issues. I don't think we did enough on that.

*Q: You left there?*

KRAMER: January, 2009 with the change in the administrations

**BEATRICE CAMP  
Consul General  
Shanghai (2008-2011)**

*Beatrice Camp was born in Montgomery, Alabama in 1950. She has a BA from Oberlin College and joined USIA in 1983. Her overseas assignments included Beijing, Bangkok, Stockholm, Budapest, Chiang Mai, And Shanghai. Her brother, Donald Camp, and husband, David Summers, are also Foreign Service Officers. Mrs. Camp was interviewed by Mark Tauber in 2016.*

CAMP: From Chiang Mai we returned to Washington for a year to rebuild the Chinese language skills we had worked so hard to acquire 25 years earlier. I had an option of studying in Taiwan but wanted to be back in DC for family reasons. Being in Washington also gave me a chance to sit in on meetings focused on trying to figure out how to handle our participation in the Shanghai

Expo.

First some background on the dysfunctional way that we handle world's fairs in the modern era. Once upon a time the United States was an enthusiastic participant in international expos; we hosted a number of memorable fairs in the U.S. as well until 1984. In the old days USIA had a large exhibits office with an expo unit that designed and managed our overseas pavilions. USIA officers were assigned to work at the pavilions; for example, Bill Lenderking had a foreign service assignment as protocol officer at the 1970 Osaka fair.

Congress dealt a blow to this process when it decided to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for participation in international expos. USIA cobbled together various sources of private funding for a few more world's fairs before being folded into the State Department in 1999. At that point, the responsibility for U.S. participation in international expos was handed to ECA (Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs).

With no extra money or staff coming with the expo mandate, ECA has been reluctant to dive in ever since they got stuck with it. The department tried and failed to create a U.S. pavilion at the 2000 Hannover fair, then succeeded with Toyota money in Aichi, Japan five years later. Now the Chinese were putting on heavy pressure to make sure we had a presence in Shanghai in 2010.

The internal tension revolves around the fact that ECA doesn't want to participate and the regional bureau very much wants to. As the Consul General-designate in Shanghai, I knew that a decision for or against U.S. participation would have a huge impact on our relationship. I thought it was necessary to participate and figured we would eventually sign on. The question was when.

My nightmare scenario was a long-delayed decision, with Washington finally waking up in January 2010, demanding to know why we were snubbing China's big party. So I was glad to see that things were already in motion, with ECA issuing a request for proposal (RFP) in late 2006 for organizations to bid on the exclusive right to manage, design, fundraise, build, and demolish the USA pavilion.

*Q: Was there a budget for it?*

CAMP: No. The RFP does not come with any money.

*Q: It would just be giving the official U.S. Government seal of approval to a particular agency or company?*

CAMP: The chosen partner is responsible for the fundraising, as well as the design and management – even though all of this has to be approved by the State Department

ECA's 2006 RFP received two bids. The ECA panel liked the bid that came from the guy who had worked on the 2005 Aichi Expo, Doug West; he had experience. Unfortunately, West ended up withdrawing his proposal after deciding the fundraising would be too difficult. (The RFP estimated the cost "to range between \$75 million to \$100 million". The budget was later lowered to \$60 million.)

The other bid, from a cultural attractions company called BHL, proposed asking Congress for the money, which ECA considered a no-no; the bid also failed to address other requirements laid out in the RFP. At the point where I attended my first expo discussion in fall 2007, ECA had sent BHL several letters asking for additional clarification; everyone realized this couldn't go on forever; a decision had to be made. Finally, ECA judged the proposal "not viable."

Although that seemed to be the end of the road, the ECA-led committee continued to look for ways to enable U.S. participation. An attempt to get the Commerce Department involved, a perennial move by State pointing out that world's fairs are really closer to trade fairs, failed. In spring 2008 ECA received three additional proposals; although BHL cried foul, ECA ruled it was okay because the RFP remained open.

*Q: Interesting.*

CAMP: The unorthodox process led to BHL's accusations that the system was rigged against them. They saw themselves as "the last ones standing", they believed they should have won the bid. This grievance, kept alive by a member of the BHL team, continued long past the Expo, generating much of the bad publicity that plagues the USA Pavilion's reputation to this day.

Complicating the situation even more, one of the partners in this new bid was married to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Commerce Department. The aggrieved group claimed conflict of interest; this accusation lasted throughout the Expo and years beyond. As of a few years ago, the BHL partisan was still filing Freedom of Information requests and still writing nasty articles alleging a conspiracy.

*Q: Holy cow.*

CAMP: But all that was still in the future. I was delighted that chances for a pavilion were still alive and enjoyed seeing the Hollywood-style presentation of one of the new bidders to EAP (Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs) DAS Glyn Davies; the two representatives of Shanghai Expo 2010, flipped through story boards with gauzy comments such as "the architect won't be Frank Gehry, but it will be someone like Frank Gehry..." They got the nod.

At last we had a private-sector partner to work with, called Shanghai Expo 2010 Inc. It was led by Ellen Eliasoph, a lawyer with long China experience married to Ira Kasoff in Commerce, and Nick Winslow, whose background was in theme parks. Their original proposal focused on sports, in a bid to get money from the NBA. That didn't work.

*Q: The expo itself was meant to be just sort of a cultural event or was it also designed to present participants' manufacturers or services or so on?*

CAMP: When world's fairs first started in 1851, much of the focus was on countries presenting their industrial progress. Over time they became more cultural, more about nation branding, more future oriented. But all national pavilions have some commercial component.

Shanghai's theme was "Better City, Better Life", an urban focus. In addition to national pavilions, Shanghai had city pavilions and corporate pavilions; the Expo was huge and broke previous world's fair records, including number of companies participating and number of visitors.

While this slow drama was unfolding in Washington, the Chinese were pressuring us to participate. ECA's go-ahead to Nick and Ellen's proposal included an initial requirement that all the money be raised before we could sign the participation contract with the Shanghai Expo organization. This was later modified to \$15 million, which still proved a high hurdle. (When the Milan Expo came around five years later, the Department set the requirement at \$5 million.)

My first year at post we lurched through a series of cliff hangers as Nick and Ellen attempted to raise money and we enlisted AmCham Shanghai's help. After the sports theme fell through, Nick and Ellen came up with a different script. This new scenario was based in 2030, focused on a Chinese woman who visited the 2010 Expo as a young girl thinking about all the progress made in the two decades since. Kind of dumb.

The third and final design took visitors through several different theaters, ending with a 4D movie about a little girl who looks out at a vacant lot, dreams of creating a beautiful garden, and mobilizes her diverse community to realize her dream. While I ended up lukewarm on some parts of the pavilion, I thought the garden production was beautifully done, whimsical and effective. The 8-minute production conveyed a very American message about grassroots involvement and caring for our environment.

Meanwhile the consulate was getting a lot of flak for lack of progress, with the disgruntled BHL advocate predicting failure to anyone who would listen. Once a month AmCham hosted an evening for its members to get a briefing from and ask questions of the Consul General; these monthly sessions started to feel like a pummeling.

Meanwhile the Chinese authorities were summoning me to meetings, asking for an official decision as to whether the U.S. was going to participate. They couldn't fathom our weird way of going about creating a national pavilion.

You may recall that George Bush attended the Beijing Olympics despite calls from human rights advocates to stay away. I kept thinking it would have been a lot easier for us if the Chinese had taken advantage of his visit to extract a promise of U.S. participation in the Shanghai Expo. I don't know why Hu Jintao didn't ask him then; somehow the Chinese leadership let that opportunity slip. But when Hillary Clinton became Secretary of State and paid her first trip was to China, the pressure was on.

*Q: When did you arrive in Shanghai?*

CAMP: I was scheduled to arrive right after the 2008 Olympics; my predecessor Ken Jarrett wanted to stay through that event. However, my departure from DC was delayed ten days for lack of a visa. Although I had applied in July, the Chinese government had yet to approve my visa in time for my scheduled departure over a month later. David and I had packed out and

moved into a hotel; every two days I rebooked our flight. To this day I don't know what the problem was, although Joe Donavan, who was headed to Hong Kong as Consul General, faced a similar situation.

After a week of delays I went to a meeting at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce about the Expo, knowing that an official from the Chinese embassy would be there. "Oh," she said, "you don't have your visa?" That ended the impasse. It was odd, and probably a good reminder that not everything that happens in China has a logical reason.

We finally arrived in early September. I became the first woman to head a U.S. Consulate in China. My welcome reception was on the day in 2008 that all the banks crashed.

*Q: Oh my gosh.*

CAMP: Our invitees that day included the rep from AIG, who shook my hand saying, "I work for the government now too." (On Sept 16, 2008, the U.S. government took control of American International Group Inc. as the Fed negotiated a deal to lend up to \$85 billion to the insurer, giving the USG a 79.9% equity stake in the company.) The *Wall Street Journal* reporter showed up late for the reception; I was surprised he even had time to come.

Another seminal event during my first month was the melamine-tainted milk scandal, which killed a number of infants and sickened many more, estimated at 300,000. The corruption that led to this tragedy was instructive. Somewhere along the supply chain, perhaps starting with the farmers, milk was watered down to increase the volume. Because the reduced protein content of the watered down milk brought a lower price from the big milk companies, farmers and middle men added melamine to increase the protein content and the price.

Not only was this a tragic scandal that revealed terrifying corruption in the food supply, it also caused a run on all kinds of foreign milk powder. The resulting shortage affected our consulate staff as well. One of our management officers returning from Beijing by car made several stops to buy milk powder for concerned consulate parents.

During my first call on the city government, basically a friendly chat during which they let me know they'd been doing their research by talking about my journalist background and making a flattering comparison to Edgar Snow, the vice mayor asked me what Americans thought of China. I responded that I had watched the Beijing Olympics while still in U.S. and that the opening ceremonies had really impressed American viewers. This drew a big smile from the vice mayor. But, I continued, without really thinking, Americans were horrified by stories about babies dying because big Chinese companies had adulterated milk with melamine. Seeing his face fall made me realize that wasn't the most diplomatic thing to say, but it was probably effective in conveying both the positive and negative stories that reach the U.S.

Six months later I was shocked when melamine-tainted milk powder re-appeared on the market, after it was supposedly all destroyed. Considering that a high ranking official was executed for the first scandal, whoever put it back in circulation must have been confident that he could get away with it. Another worrisome sign of corruption in the system.

*Q: Wow, interesting. How about official visitors?*

CAMP: Soon after Hillary Clinton was appointed Secretary of State she traveled to Beijing; her early visit was considered a sign of the importance of the U.S.-China relationship. Reportedly this was also when she first heard about the Shanghai Expo, and the U.S. failure to sign on – which made us wonder what happened to the cables we had been sending the Department on this subject. The Chinese leadership let the Secretary know this was a priority for them, an important second act on the world stage after the Beijing Olympics. She responded with a hands-on role in fund raising, setting up the Office of Global Partnership Initiatives (S/GPI) to solicit corporate contributions.

Although Clinton wasn't coming to Shanghai on that first visit, an event we were planning at the consulate almost threw a wrench in the works. My colleagues and I had decided to host a 200th birthday party for Abraham Lincoln. Lincoln is popular in China; former President Jiang Zemin was known for quoting from the Gettysburg Address, which he had studied as a middle-school student learning English. And of course Lincoln provided us an opening to talk about “government of the people, by the people, for the people”.

With our preparations well under way, including gathering Lincoln pennies from consulate kids' piggy banks and planning a menu of Kentucky Burgoo, I got a Saturday call from the DCM asking me what the hell we were doing. Relevant authorities in Beijing had heard about our Lincoln reception, considered it suspicious, and were threatening to derail the Secretary's upcoming visit.

*Q: Wow.*

CAMP: I couldn't believe that Lincoln's birthday could cause such anguish, but this was China and our logic was not always their logic. On Monday I was called in by local authorities, who read me a prepared statement. The only clue to all this was a question from my phone call with the DCM, who asked me whether we had invited Liu Xiaobo, a Chinese dissident then under detention. The following year he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, which was strongly denounced by China. No, we didn't invite him, I said, besides, he's in jail.

When I got to the office and checked the list, I saw that we did have an invitee named Lu Xiaobo. Now in Chinese characters those names wouldn't have been confused at all; the only explanation was that somebody had provided the authorities with the English version of the guest list, leading to the mistaken conclusion that we were doing something subversive. The result was that half our guests didn't make it; they were likely told not to come or were blocked from getting to the consulate, so we had a much truncated event. It was another one of those occasions where you are left in the dark, analyzing in vain what lesson our Chinese counterparts were trying to send.

*Q: Right, exactly. How would you even have imagined before the event that this could be the reason? It's such a small detail on your guest list.*

CAMP: For sure, if the mix-up in names was even the reason. In fact, we had invited some dissidents with the intention of making a statement – a quiet one - about democracy and human rights. As a public diplomacy officer this was second nature; talking about Abraham Lincoln offered a good way to approach civil rights, human rights, how a society changes. But it wasn't as subversive as the Chinese chose to take it.

*Q: Interesting. You mentioned being the first woman to head a U.S. consulate in China. What were the ramifications of that?*

CAMP: It was somewhat humbling to find myself number 34 in a line of American Consuls General dating back to the 1860s; their imposing portraits lined the consulate entrance hall. This pantheon of male predecessors included the nephew of Abraham Lincoln's Secretary of State William Seward.

While I appreciated the honor of breaking this particular glass ceiling, the real question was why it hadn't happened earlier. And in any case, I was not alone in the Shanghai diplomatic corps. Among the 65-plus resident Consuls General I could usually count five to six other women; we organized an informal lunch group.

Still, being a female CG was useful leverage to promote women's issues and American diversity. We took advantage of this status in a couple of ways, starting with hosting an annual International Women's Day (IWD) lunch at the consulate. I found it ironic that I had first learned about this occasion in Beijing in the early 1980s. While International Women's Day was barely recognized in the U.S. at that time, women in China were given a half day off on March 8 and I joined other female diplomats at a reception in the Great Hall of the People hosted by Zhou Enlai's widow, Deng Yingchao.

Twenty-five years later IWD had become a non-political be-nice-to-women day in China while the U.S. had reclaimed its standing as the originator of this event in 1909. We marked the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary at the consulate with a lunch for female artists, writers, and activists, taking as our theme the "Bread and Roses" message of the early U.S. labor movement. I hosted similar March 8 lunches all three years, with government officials one year and NGOs the next.

My final year, with the Shanghai Expo behind us, we launched a series of talks at universities on women's "challenges and achievements" in the United States. Audiences, mostly female, were very receptive, asking follow-up questions that revealed their own concerns. With presentations at six universities, this topic proved an effective way to reach students that didn't overly alarm the authorities.

*Q: What else were you involved with?*

CAMP: Shanghai was the fourth largest visa issuing post in the world, we had a huge U.S. business community. A number of U.S. state and city governments had rep offices in Shanghai and both NYU and Duke established branch campuses while I was there.

We hosted lots of official visitors; practically everybody who went to Beijing wanted to come to

Shanghai as well. Our main consulate location was in a beautiful old mansion on Huaihai Lu. We opened there in 1980 after a 30-year hiatus following the Communists taking power; the U.S. had a consulate in Shanghai for nearly 100 years before 1950.

We started to outgrow the mansion in the early 1990s and by 2008 had offices scattered in three locations. Public Affairs, Consular, Foreign Commercial Service (FCS), and the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) were located at the Ritz Carlton, the Portman Building, which also housed the Marines.

The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) joined us in 2010, as FDA established its first overseas offices amidst growing concern about contaminated food (including pet food items) and pharmaceuticals entering the U.S. from abroad. A Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representative based in Shanghai kept tabs on the development of a Chinese-manufactured jet, a step-by-step testing process required in order for the FAA to give approval for a new plane's use in the U.S. We also had reps from the Department of Homeland Security monitoring container security at the port of Shanghai.

The Environmental Protection Agency, while it didn't have an office in China, was working closely with the Shanghai EPA on air quality monitoring.

And as an example of the kind of scientific cooperation that was going on, our district included the Hefei Institute of Plasma Physics in the Chinese Academy of Sciences, which was working with the Energy Department's [Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory](#) on fusion reaction. Given our export controls regime, I was surprised to learn about the collaborative research being done by these high level research institutions. All the more depressing then to hear the head of the Hefei lab, who had studied at Princeton, describe his problems getting a visa to attend a scientific conference in the U.S. There was nothing we could do to speed up the process, as his background required a special review in Washington.

A number of U.S. businesses were operating research and development facilities in Shanghai, including one run by GE where we regularly took visitors.

*Q: You must have had a very large level of management issues. Were the USG offices managed with a common general services office (GSO) or was each agency separately responsible?*

CAMP: Under ICASS (International Cooperative Administrative Support Services), every USG agency at the consulate had to sign on to certain core services and then opt in or out on other services, such as the motor pool. Our management office helped find office space for each of these agencies, all of whom needed a waiver to be located outside the consulate grounds.

Among the non-State agencies, Commerce and Ag were the largest and worked most closely with the consulate. FCS Shanghai had five commercial officers, an exceptionally large presence that testified to the importance of Shanghai for U.S. businesses.

*Q: Remarkable.*

CAMP: FAS Shanghai had two foreign agricultural officers, running what Ag calls an agricultural trade office. Although we have a trade deficit with China, our Ag attaché frequently reminded us that we have a trade surplus in agricultural goods. They buy corn. They buy soybeans.

*Q: Pork if I remember right.*

CAMP: Pork, yes. In fact, China actually bought the company - Smithfield - after I left.

The American business community was enormous. As Shanghai AmCham membership grew, I was asked to present a plaque to the 4,000<sup>th</sup> member. Remarkable, considering that less than 30 years earlier a single lonely American business man showed up at the newly opened consulate seeking an invitation to the diplomatic happy hour, according to Don Anderson, who re-opened the U.S. consulate in 1980 after a 30-year hiatus.

The way Don told the story, he and one secretary were first located in the Jinjiang Hotel, where they had established a Friday afternoon happy hour with the Brits and the Australians. One Friday an American showed up saying "I've just arrived, I'm an American businessman, I don't know anybody, can I come to the happy hour?" I was told that the AmCham actually started in the living room of the consul general, now the main reception room in the consulate office building.

One of the perks for AmCham members was a monthly meeting with the Consul General, during which I would review various developments and then answer questions. These often focused on American Citizen Services issues, such as visas, hospitals, schools, or dealing with the Chinese bureaucracy. The Expo, and concern over whether the U.S. would participate, started to overwhelm this question time and make it much more contentious.

We were also blessed with a large number of entry level officers, a result of Shanghai's status as the fourth largest visa issuing post in the world. Many were outstanding officers; a number are now already on their second China assignments. Despite the heavy visa load we did a pretty good job of rotating them into other sections of the consulate. During the six months of the Expo they provided invaluable help with our constant stream of visitors.

*Q: Now as junior officers did they interview in Chinese? Typically, junior officers only get six months of language.*

CAMP: They all received Chinese language training, usually one year. We also had our own training program at post, to make sure they got the visa interview language that FSI didn't always provide. I enjoyed working with them and knowing that they were the core of our future China cadre.

*Q: And while a consular officer has a relatively limited number of questions and a relatively limited kind of conversation the individual on the other side could start talking about anything.*

CAMP: And not all applicants spoke standard Mandarin. Visa officers would sometimes have to

call on our local employees for help. Some new officers came in with Chinese skills under the Critical Needs Language Program, which provides extra points for Mandarin. Ironically, many of the people who entered the foreign service with good Chinese language skills were blocked by Diplomatic Security (DS) from serving in the country.

I saw several frustrating cases in which a first tour officer was assigned to China and then disapproved by DS. Having relatives in China was generally a game-stopper, because of blackmail and conflict of interest concerns. The problem was a lack of consistency. My predecessor Ken Jarrett was married to a woman who was born and raised in Shanghai and had relatives there, yet Ken managed to make a whole career in China. It was hard to know what DS would approve and what they wouldn't, which naturally provoked anger and frustration.

We had some terrific officers, with lots of China experience. One of the joys of being in China was continued growth in staff and resources, something I had not experienced at previous posts. Staffing cuts are more often the norm at other places during my career.

Personnel issues are never far away, however. One involved our campaign for a deputy CG position; it didn't make sense that every embassy, no matter how small, has a DCM, while a consulate with 70 direct hire Americans doesn't. I was grateful that my predecessor had worked out a sort of unofficial deputy position, which I tried to get formalized. I succeeded in getting an informal recommendation for the position into the 2010 inspection report, but EAP/EX was opposed and nothing changed.

*Q: Very interesting.*

CAMP: Another position that diverged from the description on the bid list was our Nanjing Presence Post officer. American Presence Posts (APPs) are usually one-officer posts, doing primarily commercial work.

*Q: Yes. Totally unclassified.*

CAMP: As embassies have gotten larger, more sclerotic, and more fortress-like, the idea of a lean diplomatic presence outside the capital was very attractive. The model was first used in France, which still hosts the bulk of these APPs; given security concerns, however, they haven't proved easy to establish.

At the height of their appeal, the department decided to assign an officer to set up an APP in Nanjing, an important educational and commercial city a few hours drive from Shanghai. (New high speed trains have since reduced the travel time to 67 minutes.) After the position was filled, the Chinese said no to having an officer resident in Nanjing. Unless we established an official post, they wouldn't allow us to put a diplomat there.

*Q: And this was simply because they were very officious in general or was it a reciprocity issue?*

CAMP: Partly reciprocity. Under a 1981 agreement, both governments were allowed five consulates in the other country. The Chinese had opened their five - New York, Chicago, San

Francisco, LA and Houston - while we had only four. Shanghai and Guangzhou were our first, in 1979 and 1980. We opened Shenyang and Chengdu about four years later. A U.S. consulate in Wuhan was to be our fifth but we never moved ahead, covering central China from Beijing instead.

*Q: Do you know the reason?*

CAMP: Money mainly. And the embassy conducted a survey to show that visa demand in the area was low, and could easily be handled Beijing. This didn't make sense to us in Shanghai, where we were struggling to keep up with visa applications. The department finally took a half-step in 2007, following the APP model by sending retired USIA officer Wendy Lyle to Wuhan. Wendy was famous in China for her English language teaching program on VOA; she reported that taxi drivers recognized her voice from the years of radio broadcasts

*Q: Oh so it did open.*

CAMP: We officially opened the consulate in November 2008, nearly a year after Wendy arrived. Even once Wuhan had the status of consulate, Wendy worked alone, out of an apartment. This ad hoc arrangement went on through several officer rotations, with Wuhan authorities regularly hectoring the resident American that their first priority for the consulate was to issue visas. It was several more years before we added staff; as of 2016 the consulate still wasn't processing visas however.

But back to Nanjing, a post there wasn't part of the 1981 five-consulate bargain, plus the Chinese authorities refused to accredit a diplomat to a facility that lacked diplomatic status. The officer assigned, Chris Wurzel, stayed in Shanghai, heading an office of one that we grandly named the Outreach Unit.

Embassy Beijing was emphasizing outreach to other cities – still calling them APPs even though no one resided in the designated cities. We came up with a slightly different approach in Shanghai, where we created a team for each of our three provinces, with the Outreach Unit Chief in overall charge. The team leaders were political or econ officers; we included commercial and consular officers as well, and gave our entry level officers a chance to travel and work with experienced officers in various cones.

When I visited one of the three provincial capitals in our district I would introduce the team leader by noting that if we had a consulate in Anhui (or Nanjing or Hangzhou), this officer would be the Consul General. The provincial officials liked the sound of that, and liked having a designated contact point at Consulate Shanghai. Although this was not the way the Nanjing position was described on the bid list, I was happy with our adaptation. You manage with the personnel system that you get, explaining to bidders that the job isn't necessarily what the HR system puts on paper.

*Q: Yes.*

CAMP: As for the Expo, we finally got ECA to modify the requirement they'd set to raise the

entire amount before we could sign a participation agreement, an impossible task. (The original budget was \$80 million, later revised down to \$60 million.) By mid-2009 the private sector partner had raised \$15 million, allowing us to sign the participation contract in July 2009.

*Q: One year away.*

CAMP: Less than a year before the opening. We were reported to be the last country to sign out of 185. Although I recall Malta signed after we did, our long procrastination consolidated a reputation for the U.S. being late, a meme that persisted through the next big world's fair in Milan.

Another big, if late, step was Secretary Clinton's appointment of Jose Villarreal as our Commissioner General, an unpaid position that oversees the national effort. Jose initially struck us as a counter-intuitive choice for China – he was a Hispanic lawyer from Texas with no China experience.

We soon realized how lucky we were with this brilliant choice. Jose was closely connected to the Clintons and proved a great fundraiser as well as a great manager – and an all-round mensch. Although a prominent Chinese-American had seemed a more likely choice, it might have put us in the cross fires of the divisions in that community. We did work with the Committee of 100, which includes such figures as I.M Pei and Maya Lin.

Also key to our efforts was Hillary Clinton's new Global Partnerships Initiative (S/GPI) office in Washington, first headed by Elizabeth Bagley and then by Kris Balderston. Kris spent probably 99 percent of his time on the Shanghai Expo.

*Q: Absolutely believable with only one year out.*

CAMP: Finally some companies started coming in with \$5 million contributions. On July 1, 2009, the day Jose became Commissioner General, Pepsi announced a \$5 million sponsorship at a press conference in Beijing led by Indra Nooyi, the head of Pepsi. We were on our way. What I didn't realize at that point was that Pepsi's money had put us in the middle of the cola wars.

*Q: Oh no.*

CAMP: Five years later something similar happened in Milan. Coke turned us down at both Expos; they chose to build their own separate Coca-Cola pavilions in both Shanghai and Milan, at much greater cost than a \$5 million donation to the USA Pavilion. In Shanghai I think they spent \$40-\$50 million on their pavilion; they also contributed to the overall Expo, becoming the exclusive supplier of soft drinks at the expo. GM and Cisco built their own corporate pavilions as well, which took them off the board as contributors for us.

When Hillary Clinton accompanied President Obama to Shanghai in November 2009, we arranged a press event with her at the pavilion building site, which was a muddy mess in the rain. In our efforts to make it look colorful, we hung up big Pepsi banners, raising the ire of Coke, which had exclusive rights inside the Expo - except at the USA Pavilion.

Later, during the Expo, a Coke rep complained to us that the USA Pavilion was the only place in the entire Expo where you couldn't buy a Coke. That's really a shame, we agreed, adding to ourselves: you should have thought of that. They could have built their own pavilion AND given us money; instead we were strictly a Pepsi products place.

*Q: So just to clarify you were getting good turnout of companies but not necessarily donations for the USA pavilion specifically.*

CAMP: Pepsi sponsored our pavilion to the tune of \$5 million. Although the three U.S. corporations that funded their own pavilions did not contribute to us, other major companies did; we ended up with 60 sponsors at different value levels, with several at the \$5 million mark.

*Q: That is remarkable in the two-year period, and particularly in the last year, to reach your goal.*

CAMP: It was a squeaker; we had to stay optimistic in public – especially in my monthly AmCham remarks – but concerns about meeting the goal were always a dark cloud over our heads. Another complication was TARP (Troubled Asset Relief Program); we couldn't take money from any company that was receiving TARP funds after the 2008 economic collapse. I have a vivid memory of the April 2010 press conference when Citi Group pledged \$5 million, immediately after getting out from under TARP. That put us over the top two weeks before the pavilion opened.

We were all cheering. Of course by that time the pavilion was mostly built but the budget also included expenses for running the pavilion during the six-month expo.

*Q: Absolutely. And all kinds of unanticipated expenses too.*

CAMP: Especially because the later you start the more expensive everything becomes as well.

*Q: Of course.*

CAMP: Aside from fundraising, we had many other hurdles, sometimes created by folks in the department who were trying to parse the law restricting the use of appropriated funds for world's fairs. Given those restrictions, and the sometimes strict interpretation in Washington, I was ecstatic when the department lawyers approved our proposal to double hat our Public Affairs Officer, Tom Cooney, as Deputy Commissioner General.

Tom was invaluable to the success of our effort, along with another PD officer, Alys Spensley. After finishing her CAO assignment in Shanghai, Alys stayed on a Y tour (one year temporary) to serve as the Consulate Expo Liaison Officer, or CELO, a title we made up. I don't think either Tom or Alys took a day off for the entire six months of the Expo; the work was relentless.

Five years later when I was helping coordinate the Milan Expo, Consulate Milan had to make do with a single person handling what Tom and Alys juggled in Shanghai. They worked their butts

off; it was the two of them who really made it happen because they kept on top of everything, including liaison with the Expo bureau, the private sector partner, the Commissioner General, our business supporters, VIP visits, the whole shebang.

One major component of our pavilion, probably the most popular, was the Student Ambassador program. These 160 young Americans fluent in Chinese were following in the footsteps of the former USIA Russian Guides Program, although we were the first to call them student ambassadors. The program was managed by the University of Southern California, which did the selection from Mandarin speaking applicants. Some spoke other forms of Chinese as well – Cantonese, Shanghainese, Sichuanese – a nice unexpected bonus.

*Q: These were all students at USC?*

CAMP: No; USC had the contract to select them with the stipulation that the students come from as many different states and universities as possible.

*Q: Okay. And these youth ambassadors received a stipend?*

CAMP: They got housing and some food money and a stipend. The 160 students were divided into two groups of 80 who served for three months, half of the Expo. Overall they were excellent, although dealing with a large cohort of 20-year-olds takes hands-on management.

Before, during, and even after the Expo we were under a lot of criticism, much of it coming from a man named Bob Jacobson; he represented the BHL group whose proposal ECA had judged non-viable. Jacobson took every opportunity to attack the pavilion, charging that the U.S. was late, the pavilion was ugly, the cost was too high. My personal favorite was a blog in which Tom Cooney was described as my “henchman”; Tom was less amused.

Jacobson’s smack talk was echoed by a freelance journalist in Shanghai, Adam Minter; the two of them would bounce accusations back and forth, citing each other. We felt constantly under siege.

Given this concern, it didn’t help when one of the incoming student ambassadors blogged before arrival that the pre-Expo training arranged by USC was a joke; he called the reading list junior high-level. I insisted on bringing them for a briefing at the consulate in the hope that our historic building, the flag, and the picture of the president, would impress upon these kids their role in representing the United States to an expected 6 million visitors. We set up a panel of embassy officers, which I kicked off by drawing parallels with the Russian guides in USIA exhibition days, many of whom went on to join the foreign service. I emphasized that they were part of a great tradition and they had to take it seriously.

I pointed out that for anyone interested in a Foreign Service career, this was a wonderful gateway and noted that the Russian guide program had produced at least four ambassadors. As it turned out, they were less impressed by the career potential than by the story of former guide Tom Robertson (later ambassador) who met his wife through his guide service. That got their attention – the romantic aspect - although in fact a number of the Shanghai students have already gone on

to State Department careers.

I think that helped a bit; overall the experience was great; they were stars at the pavilion. But any time you're dealing with that many young people in a foreign country you're bound to have problems.

*Q: And they're not U.S. Government employees and they don't know the State Department corporate culture and so on and so on.*

CAMP: Five years later some of these same problems cropped up at the Milan Expo. Nevertheless it's a great program, with the students contributing creativity and enthusiasm to our participation. In Shanghai, where we had very long lines to enter the pavilion, the students would walk down the queue and talk to people. Many of the Chinese visitors had never met an American in person before; they were thrilled to make the acquaintance of one speaking fluent Chinese. Hillary Clinton gives a shout-out to the student ambassadors in her book Hard Choices. They were terrific.

*Q: That's worth its weight in gold.*

CAMP: They played crucial roles in staffing our pavilion. After standing in line for as much as two hours, visitors would rush in through the turnstiles, relieved to be inside at last; our good air conditioning also helped. As they gathered in the intro theater, a student ambassador standing on a soap box would warm up the crowd: "Anybody here from Guangzhou?" It had the feel of an American football game; people would yell back answers. "Anybody here from Sichuan?" Sometimes the students would use Cantonese or Sichuanese as well as Mandarin. They also told corny jokes, puns, such as "*shenme ma bu neng qi*?" – "what horse can't be ridden?" The answer, *Ao ba ma*, was a pun on Obama's name in Chinese, which includes the character for horse.

The pavilion itself was set up as a series of theaters. The first room featured videos with different Americans, including celebrities such as Michelle Kwan and Kobe Bryant as well as ordinary people, trying to say welcome in Chinese. Our critics made fun of this - is this how we introduce America? But the Chinese visitors liked it.

*Q: Who made the movie?*

CAMP: Our private sector partner contracted with a company called BRC to do the videos; they also created the show for the GM pavilion in Shanghai and, five years later, the EU pavilion in Milan. They're now part of the U.S. team for the Astana Expo in 2017.

The second theater featured feel-good corporate messages mixed in with children saying things such as "if we all help in little ways, it becomes big ways..." That was my least favorite segment; I still cringe at hearing those sappy sentiments so many times.

The high point of that second theater was a video message from President Obama, which generated a lot of people trying to take selfies with the screen. The final, and to my mind best,

presentation was a 4D video called “The Garden”, about a little girl who mobilizes her community to turn a vacant lot into a garden. The message was subtly subversive in a society where most decisions are made at the top, and the visitors loved the 4D thunder and rain. Many brought umbrellas that they opened at the right time, Rocky Horror Show-style.

*Q: As long as it worked...*

CAMP: “The Garden” definitely grabbed viewers; I think it worked well. And overall, Chinese reactions to our pavilion were good – we asked Fudan University to survey visitors – and the Chinese press was very positive. Americans were less enthusiastic. When asked for her reaction, Clinton famously, and unfortunately, responded with a flat “it’s fine”.

The shows were just one aspect of our participation. We had a VIP room for important visitors, including many Chinese and foreign government officials as well as top sponsors. Depending on contribution levels, sponsors had the right to use the upstairs area of the pavilion for events. For example, GE, which featured its healthcare division, had a banquet for hospital directors. Walmart used the space for environmental programs with students.

The Foreign Agricultural Service celebrated American Food Day by passing out California almonds to people waiting in line - that was very popular. FAS also hosted a dinner at the pavilion, where I sat with all the nut people - the pistachios, the almonds.

*Q: Does China grow nuts?*

CAMP: Not much, which makes it a good market for us. The FAS presence in Shanghai is an Agricultural Trade Office, which promotes U.S. agricultural products in China. There were many commercial aspects to our Expo presence; the Commerce Department was involved as well. In fact, then-Commerce Secretary (later Ambassador to China) Gary Locke presided at our groundbreaking ceremony in 2009.

On the U.S. side, most Americans were totally unaware of the Shanghai Expo, or our official presence. The New York Times correspondent based in Shanghai told me that once the U.S. agreed to participate, the story was no longer of interest to his editors.

The Times considered it newsworthy only if we snubbed the Chinese by staying out. Once we said yes, the story was dead. Most Americans had no idea this world’s fair was going on in Shanghai. And yet, over six months the Expo attracted a record 73 million visitors. Our USA Pavilion drew 7.3 million, 10 percent of all visitors. Despite those staggering figures, most Americans didn’t know about it and most of the State Department didn’t either.

*Q: Very true.*

CAMP: I was fascinated to see references to the Expo turn up in several of the Clinton emails released in 2015. Her role in helping fundraise became part of the larger criticism of her wooing big corporations. One of the releases showed an email chain that started with PAO Tom Cooney forwarding a negative blog by freelance journalist Adam Minter to Commissioner General Jose

Villarreal, who sent it to Cheryl Mills. Mills sent it to the Secretary, whose comment is redacted. I'd love to know what she responded.

*Q: How long was the Expo?*

CAMP: Six months. May 1 to October 31, 2010.

It opened with great ceremony and a tremendous fireworks display. That was preceded by a soft opening, during which we received a visit from President Hu Jintao, who took pictures with the student ambassadors. I was pleased when Wang Qishan, who chaired the economic dialogue with the U.S., drew Hu's attention to the display highlighting U.S. corporations who were our sponsors. That was a story worth repeating to our corporate partners.

Hillary Clinton, who gave remarks at the building site in 2009, came back during the Expo. We also hosted three other cabinet level officers, plus members of Congress, top CEOs, mayors, and governors. When Mayor Daley brought a trade delegation, we surrounded him with all the Chicago-area student ambassadors wearing Chicago t-shirts. Governor Schwarzenegger needed no extra hype from us; he was mobbed everywhere. From local officials to mayors to governors, they all took advantage of their Expo visits to promote commercial ties with China.

In advance of Secretary Clinton's visit, which was to include a banquet at the USA Pavilion, her staff asked us to recommend other pavilions for her to visit. Our pavilion was located with other western hemisphere countries, making Mexico or Canada good possibilities. Or why not combine India and Pakistan? Or Turkey and Greece? What a great opportunity to make a diplomatic gesture with a 15-minute visit.

To evaluate these possibilities we sent officers around incognito, like secret shoppers. to check out which pavilions might work best logistically as well as politically. As we did this, other pavilion directors were catching on that something might be up, resulting in calls from their Consuls General asking whether they should alert their Ambassadors to be present.

*Q: Wonderful.*

CAMP: This exercise became a headache as the visit grew closer with no decision from the Secretary's staff. When her plane landed in Shanghai, we still didn't know what she would do between the morning visits to the USA and China pavilions and the evening banquet. We remained in suspense through lunch, which was hosted by the Mayor of Shanghai. The upshot was no visits; she got in the car and returned to the hotel. We did find out that our various recommendations had been read, however, as staffers who stayed behind asked us to arrange afternoon visits for them.

*Q: It seems to be just her modus operandi.*

CAMP: Indra Nooyi, other CEOs, and a number of other people came to the banquet. We had to close the pavilion for half a day in order to stage the dinner there.

Leaving aside the Expo, there was lots more going on in Shanghai during my three years. President Obama's 2009 visit, the H1N1 epidemic, trade issues, U.S. universities establishing campuses in Shanghai, the 30<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the reopening of the consulate, extended outreach to provincial officials, a huge visa load, and double digit annual growth in demand for American citizen services.

President Obama made his first visit to China in November 2009; Shanghai was his first stop in the country, which ended up causing some problems. The Chinese would have preferred he start in Beijing.

*Q: I'm sure.*

CAMP: They wanted it to echo Reagan's visit in 1984 or Clinton's visit in 1998. Both went to Beijing before coming to Shanghai, where both addressed students at Fudan University.

The Obama White House plan mandated a town hall meeting, the type of event they knew and liked from the campaign. They envisioned a town hall in Shanghai with the President alone on the stage. The Chinese, however, wanted him to speak at Fudan University, and they wanted him to be introduced by the university president.

The concept of a town hall meeting, with the President speaking directly to the people, didn't sit well with the Chinese. We had arguments over every aspect of the White House plan. Where the event would take place. The height of the platform. Who would do the introduction. What podium to use. The guest list. We finally settled on the Museum of Science and Technology.

The White House insisted on a student audience and we at the consulate had a list of specific students we wanted included. However our local Chinese contacts said they couldn't find these people – "You know there are a lot of people named Wang in China." "But we gave you the email addresses," we retorted.

It was a fight every step of the way, with the Chinese always insisting "this is the way we did it in 1998". I don't know whether they actually kept good records or they were bluffing. In any case, it was clear that our side didn't have reliable accounts of past visit procedures. The Chinese were withholding access pins for the hotel where the President would be staying; during a meeting a few days before the POTUS arrival we declared we weren't leaving until they handed over the pins.

Obama landed at Shanghai's Pudong Airport at night in the driving rain. Although the poor visibility deprived us of the sight of Air Force One landing at Shanghai, the money shot was Obama walking down the steps from the plane carrying his own umbrella.

The photo went viral; it was seen as a telling contrast to Chinese officials who usually have someone holding an umbrella for them. Everybody else on the plane must have come down the backstairs because he was all by himself, which made for a stunning image. My own rain-soaked image was less appealing, as I realized when the President reached me in the receiving line. "I should give you my umbrella," he said, which, although sweet, made me painfully aware I

looked like a drowned rat.

After the President's motorcade drove off, I went back into the terminal to wait for the Secretary's plane, which arrived close to midnight. She was scheduled to visit the Expo site early the next day, which meant, of course that we had to get out there even earlier. Media had to be in place by 6:00 a.m., at a cold, muddy building site with no shelter available from the rain.

The Secretary went in her own car, accompanied only by her assistant Huma Abedin, giving us no chance to brief her about the Expo. I was in the van with the Commissioner General, Jose Villarreal, who got a phone call telling him that the Secretary would carry her own umbrella. That was our cue to follow suit, aided by a stash of 20 umbrellas we found in the van. It's times like this that you really appreciate great staff who had thought of such details.

At the site, Clinton gave a rousing speech, proclaiming we would have a great pavilion, even if she had to "build it myself, brick by brick". As late as it was, only five months before opening day, Clinton's strong support and enthusiasm were key to our eventual fundraising success.

After the Expo event with the Secretary, we rejoined the President for a meet and greet with consulate staff and an elaborate lunch hosted by the Mayor of Shanghai. In best Chinese banquet style, the food for every dish was shaped into a picture, such as a palm tree or a panda. We each had menus embroidered double sided on small Chinese screens to take home as souvenirs.

*Q: Wow.*

CAMP: The formal meeting between the President and the Mayor came before the lunch. Ambassador Huntsman was there and the White House staff. Now less than two hours before the town hall meeting, we still hadn't received Chinese agreement on using the White House podium. So when I received a phone call from the DCM during the presidential meeting, I answered it, despite recognizing this was a huge no-no. Although I limited myself to monosyllabic responses as the DCM explained the podium compromise, the White House staffer taking notes kept glaring at me. I felt my career melting away.

The DCM told me the stand-off was resolved by a Chinese promise to broadcast the President's speech if we used their podium, rather than the one that came on Air Force One. The embassy accepted the compromise and we used the Chinese podium. They did not broadcast the speech.

Our partial comeback, later, was to print pamphlets of the speech. With Obama on the cover, these became very popular giveaways, much sought out by students during our university visits.

*Q: That's a brilliant alternative.*

CAMP: In another compromise, the president of Fudan University gave a short introduction standing beside Obama, then left the stage. Ambassador Huntsman, who speaks Mandarin and had taken the time to learn a bit of Shanghai dialect, whispered in the President's ear and the President greeted everybody in Shanghai dialect.

*Q: Holy cow.*

CAMP: Huntsman sat down, leaving Obama alone on the platform (the height of which we had also had to negotiate), as per the White House scenario. The student questions following the President's remarks were innocuous, but we'd arranged also to take questions that came in online. That turned out to be very clever.

Huntsman, who was reading the online questions, picked one about China's "great firewall" censorship. This question provided the President the opportunity to talk about the free flow of information and gave the event some substance. Of course the international press picked up the story that the students that we wanted invited were not allowed in. They used words such as "docile" and "handpicked" to describe the audience, but overall the event and the coverage were positive. And then the President flew off to Beijing for the rest of the visit.

*Q: Did you ever find out why they decided to go to Shanghai first?*

CAMP: Given the way the White House handled it they might have wanted to emphasize people-to-people diplomacy over the more formal kind. Or maybe they wanted him to have a day to adjust before meeting the leaders in Beijing.

*Q: It could easily have been simply the route, the timing for the president's sleep, who knows.*

CAMP: It probably made sense to get on the ground and have a softer start before Obama met for the first time with Hu Jintao. I don't remember the issue being discussed when I flew to Beijing for the initial embassy prep meeting about the upcoming visit.

When we first heard that President Obama was coming to China, I was acutely aware that my last presidential visit in China was Reagan's in 1984. That 25-year-old experience seemed so ancient that I was reluctant to cite it. My hesitation evaporated when Ambassador Huntsman led off that first planning meeting in Beijing by talking about being a young staffer on the 1984 Reagan visit, which immediately put me on familiar ground. I never had the nerve to ask Huntsman if he was the neophyte staffer who bragged about putting all his files on his newly acquired laptop computer, which then got fried when plugged into the 220 current in Beijing.

*Q: Amazing.*

CAMP: Given how many disputes we had with the Chinese, and their interest in precedents from earlier visits, we did a lessons learned cable from the trip. Obama's been back to China since and I have no idea whether our 2009 lessons were put to any use, but journalists seem to have longer memories. When Obama was reportedly snubbed by the Chinese after landing in Hangzhou for the September 2016 G20 meeting, one story noted "it was reminiscent of the rough treatment he received on his first trip to China, in 2009. Then the Chinese refused to broadcast on state television a town-hall-style meeting; packed the hall with Communist Party loyalists; and censored an interview he gave to a Chinese publication. At the time, many viewed the treatment as a metaphor for a rising power flexing its muscles with a young president from a superpower in decline."

*Q: Of course the problem with lessons learned is that every president does it differently.*

CAMP: But the thing with the Chinese is that they use supposed precedents to push for their desired outcome.

*Q: I see what you mean.*

CAMP: While some of the details seem like one-time-only arrangements, I can imagine future Chinese officials arguing “in 2009 we used our podium” or “in 2009 we didn’t broadcast the President’s speech.” Will my successor or his successor be able to respond “yes, but you double crossed us on the broadcast”? Is that now in the records at the embassy or the consulate? I’m sure there are people who remember, but you know how the past slips from our consciousness.

*Q: yes, yes.*

CAMP: And speaking of history, one of our most memorable events involved the return to China of the ashes of John Leighton Stuart, who was the U.S. Ambassador in Nanjing when relations were broken in 1949. Born in China, the son of missionaries, and founder of Yenching University, Stuart was our last Ambassador on the Mainland until 1979, 30 years after his departure.

Stuart’s name is well-known in China, thanks to a famous essay by Mao Zedong read by school children titled: “Farewell, Leighton Stuart!”, basically saying good riddance to Stuart’s departure.

I received an email from Pat Kennedy, Under Secretary for Management, informing me that the ashes were being shipped in the classified pouch from Washington. (This alert did not spare me a moment of confusion when our communicator informed me later, “I have the Ambassador in the vault.”)

The back story was that Stuart, who died in 1962, had asked that his remains be buried in China alongside his wife’s grave at Yenching University, now the site of Beijing University.

The effort to have Stuart’s remains interred in China was led initially by his long-time assistant, Philip Fugh, followed by Philip’s son John Fugh. John Fugh, the first U.S. general of Asian descent, finally reached a break through after a meeting with Politburo member and later president of China Xi Jinping, who had been party boss in Zhejiang Province 2002-2007. While a Beijing burial was out of the question – and Mrs. Stuart’s grave had long since been obliterated – Gen Fugh obtained permission for burial in Hangzhou, capital of Zhejiang Province and Stuart’s birthplace.

Most of this I learned in the van taking me, my husband, General Fugh, and his wife June Fugh to Hangzhou, along with the box containing Ambassador Stuart’s ashes. Along the way we also learned that the very companionable June Fugh, who seemed oddly familiar to us, was the sister of longtime broadcaster Connie Chung, with her own fascinating family tale.

Ambassador Randt flew from Beijing to Hangzhou for the interment, which took place at a new official cemetery outside of the city.

At Stuart's gravesite we were startled to hear from somewhere behind us "Amazing Grace" followed by the "Star Spangled Banner"; a group of elderly Yenching grads revealed after the ceremony that they had hidden a tape recorder in the bushes, figuring correctly that the Hangzhou *waiban* (Foreign Affairs Office) would not provide any musical accompaniment.

Like Pearl Buck's home in Zhenjiang, the childhood home of the once-reviled John Leighton Stuart has now been turned into a museum. It is even marked on Hangzhou tourist maps.

As a side note, we noticed nearby the grave of the Chinese fighter pilot, Lt. Cdr. Wang Wei, who died after colliding with an American EP-3 in 2001. The American crew members were forced to make an emergency landing on Hainan; Wang Wei's body was never found. We had no way of knowing whether the Chinese decision to place Ambassador Stuart near a military officer honored as "Guardian of Territorial Airspace and Waters" was coincidental or not.

*Q: And that was during your first year as Consul General.*

CAMP: Ambassador Stuart's ashes, the President's visit, our Lincoln's birthday confrontation, and the H1N1 outbreak were all during my first year. The visit and event schedule intensified once the Expo opened in May 2010, giving me the opportunity to greet not only President Hu Jintao but probably every provincial party secretary in the country. With military relations frozen because of PRC anger over arms sales to Taiwan, our Expo pavilion was one of the few USG sites visited by high ranking Chinese military officials. Although they frequently wouldn't identify themselves – "sorry, I don't have a card" - we would ask them to sign the guestbook and sometimes then we would see who it was.

Among many notable Chinese visitors, the prize was probably Bo Xilai, the Chongqing party secretary who was later jailed for corruption along with his wife. In 2010 he was a hot ticket for the dinners that AmCham Shanghai arranged during the Expo for members to rub shoulders with notable provincial officials or heads of American corporations.

The AmCham dinner card for Bo Xilai filled up quickly; Chongqing was a prime business growth location and Bo Xilai was seen as an up-and-comer in the party hierarchy. We invited the acting Consul General in Chengdu; Chongqing was in his district and he was more than willing to fly to Shanghai for the chance to meet the party secretary.

After agreeing to a pre-dinner small group meeting with Bo, we spotted a conflict on the weekly pavilion visitor list. Bo Xilai, along with his playboy son Bo Guagua, was scheduled to visit the pavilion at the same time as the dinner. AmCham notified us that the Mayor of Chongqing would be at the dinner instead and we discussed how to deploy our forces. We agreed that I would attend the dinner and preceding meeting with the Mayor, while my deputy, Chris Wurzel, would greet Bo at the pavilion.

On the gossip level, Bo's Oxford and Harvard-educated son was also of interest, thanks to his well-earned reputation as a playboy. After joking that he was probably going to the USA Pavilion to pick up girls, we found out, sure enough, he knew one of the student ambassadors. They chatted downstairs while Chris Wurzel talked with his dad upstairs in the VIP room.

Our Expo pavilion also provided the opportunity to greet a lot of American and international VIPs. I spent one Sunday afternoon waiting for Singapore Prime Minister Emeritus Lee Kuan Yew to show up, only to have him bail after visiting the Singapore and China pavilions. We were third on his list and it was too much for a man in his 80s.

Having served in Thailand, I was particularly excited at the chance to receive Crown Princess Sirindhorn. I wrote to friends in Thailand asking for the correct way to welcome her in the royal language, *Rajasap*, used with Thai royalty. My efforts were in vain. Princess Sirindhorn walked in with her entourage, dressed in her famously informal way in a plaid shirt with a camera around her neck, stuck out her hand, and said in common Thai "*mai dai jer gen ma nan leaw*", meaning "I haven't seen you in a long time." I was charmed.

*Q: Wow.*

CAMP: The pavilion had a VIP entry allowing visitors to not only skip the lines but to join the show at various points, depending on how much time they had. It was very efficient. Princess Sirindhorn wanted the whole experience, so we started in the orientation theater with videos of Americans trying to say welcome in Chinese. The Princess, who studies Chinese, stood beside me repeating in Chinese, "*huanying dao meiguo guan*", "welcome to the U.S. pavilion." And I'm thinking how amazing to have the Crown Princess of Thailand welcoming visitors to our pavilion.

Official American visitors, in addition to Hillary Clinton, included three other cabinet level officers – Commerce, EPA, and Transportation.

*Q: Now just a very quick question on the other Americans. In organizing them for their visit did they do other things to promote other U.S. Government agenda items or were they just basically there to show the flag?*

CAMP: Most of them either came from or went to Beijing, so they had other agendas as well. We took Transportation Secretary LaHood to the GM pavilion, which featured a show with driverless cars; they gave him a ride in one of the prototype cars, which delighted both the Secretary and GM. Secretary Locke, who led our groundbreaking in 2009, has in-laws in Shanghai. He came during the Expo as well, then slipped away to have noodles with his relatives.

*Q: My goodness.*

CAMP: We also hosted a bunch of mayors and ten governors, including several that ran for president in 2012 such as Mitch Daniels from Indiana, Tim Pawlenty of Minnesota, Rick Perry of Texas. Schwarzenegger was a big draw; we were a little worried how to manage a press

conference with him at the Expo, among such big crowds. Before assuring everyone “I’ll be back”, he made the bold statement that California would host the next Expo. We all scoffed, knowing we haven’t hosted an Expo in the U.S. since 1984. (The Bay Area did give it a try the following year with no success.)

We also received a lot of business people, such as Indra Nooyi of Pepsi and Jeff Immelt of GE and lots of celebrities, including Robert De Niro, Quincy Jones, and Halle Berry.

*Q: The reason that I asked, although you got 7.3 million visitors, it was hard to measure the value. With all of these VIPs, there must have been opportunities to derive extra value.*

CAMP: From the Chinese point of view, the Expo and our participation brought all these people to Shanghai who might not have come otherwise. After visiting the Expo, Schwarzenegger rode one of the new high speed trains and talked about building one in California; for the Chinese this was great stuff. Locke, of course, was promoting U.S. business, as was the Transportation Secretary.

EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) Administrator Lisa Jackson opened an “Air Now International” exhibit at the Expo, a project that we had been working with the Shanghai EPA for some time to measure pollution levels. Shanghai was the first city to promise to make public their pollution levels; it was an important piece of bilateral cooperation.

Mayor Daley came with a Chicago trade delegation, as did other local government officials. There were also diplomatic benefits; our people come and show respect and the Chinese get to show off what they’re doing. I could cite public diplomacy, commercial diplomacy, government-to-government contacts, business, educational, scientific, cultural, the whole gamut. I’m sure our entry level officers will never forget their experiences as control officers for these VIPs.

*Q: Yes, that’s experience you can’t buy. That’s fantastic.*

CAMP: We also had a number of congressional delegations, CODELs. I’ll never forget the visit of my Virginia congressman, Jim Moran. I was pleased he accepted my standard invitation to visit the consular section – something not many CODELs did. I had arranged for a young officer to brief on our whole visa operation. In the middle of his description of the process Jim Moran interrupted to say “what I don’t understand is why you’re making all of these great Chinese graduate students go back to China. Why don’t we just keep them in the United States?” We were all stunned. The officer valiantly pointed out that Congress makes the laws, we just carry them out.

Shanghai always attracted a lot of visitors but Expo supercharged the schedule.

Another major event that engulfed us was the spring 2009 H1N1 outbreak. China’s experience with SARS a few years earlier had left it scarred in terms of quarantines and transparency; having been criticized for initially hiding the extent of the SARS epidemic, the government went all out on H1N1. The first appearance of what was also known as swine flu was sourced to a flight from Mexico. China immediately halted all flights to Mexico and started quarantining

people. They installed heat detectors at the airport that everybody had to walk through for fever detection.

Monitors boarded airplanes right after landing. People in white hazmat suits walked down the aisles waving temperature monitors at passengers' heads. Advice circulated to pop a Tylenol an hour before landing, to avoid recording any kind of elevated temperature. If the authorities detected somebody with a fever they would quarantine not only that person but whoever was sitting around him.

*Q: Good lord.*

CAMP: Arriving passengers with temperatures were taken to ad hoc quarantine locations, many of which were old hotels at the edge of the city. Our American Citizen Services section was extremely busy. I became involved with one case in which a five-year-old girl was quarantined without her mother. When I contacted the authorities to say that this was a problem, they reassured me that they'd given her a cell phone so it was okay; she could talk to her mother whenever she wanted.

We couldn't tell them not to quarantine people but we pushed for rapid notification of all Americans detained. At one point, the parents of one of our consular officers flew in and were about to get quarantined; as duty officer, their son received the notification and convinced the authorities to sequester them in his apartment.

*Q: Wow. That's okay.*

CAMP: On another occasion the Mayor of New Orleans was quarantined; we managed to get him out in a couple days on condition that he leave the country immediately. Of course we had to keep this achievement quiet; if we could spring a VIP, why couldn't we get everyone out? It was a difficult time but eventually the epidemic waned.

*Q: This really is breathtaking.*

CAMP: There always is so much going on in China. I was eager to commemorate the thirtieth anniversary of the reestablishment of the consulate in 1980, but with the anniversary falling in 2010 just before the Expo opened our resources and time were limited. I settled for collecting stories from former consuls general and others, which is now on the ADST website as "Shanghai Stories". We also created a timeline, a trifold pamphlet, marking different events such as KFC opening in Shanghai along with tracing the increase in visas from 100 in 1980 to 100,000 by 2007, an astonishing growth trend.

*Q: How large was your staff to do this or did you contract out for a lot of this?*

CAMP: We had 65 direct hire officers when I arrived and 70 when I left three years later. Soon after, the Department started the limited career appointment professional associates program, bringing in people for five year contracts who speak Chinese to help with the ever-growing visa load. At one point we were so backed up we staged a special Saturday work day with all hands

on deck; I spent the morning pasting visas into passports.

I was particularly sensitive to student visas from my stint eight years earlier as head of educational advising services in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. As I mentioned earlier, I was impressed when the visa chief came from Beijing to the NAFSA conference, the National Association of Foreign Student Advisors. Knowing that the universities were furious over frequent visa denials or delays for the Chinese students they had accepted, I thought his attendance was both necessary and courageous.

By the time I was assigned to Shanghai, the area covered by our consulate was affluent enough that we were issuing to the majority of visa applicants, a positive story that we worked to get out. But we were still hampered by being able to issue only one-year visas, which was reciprocity for the Chinese refusing to give longer visas. That logjam has finally been broken with a mutual consular agreement on longer visas, which means applicants won't have to keep applying every year and our work load will go down.

*Q: Right.*

CAMP: Although we had good, creative visa officers who tried everything, our physical space was limited. For a while the only solutions were longer hours or more effectively snaking the line through the visa section. Our consular section was in a shopping mall, with no additional space available. Shanghai has been on the books for a new consulate for a number of years with land acquisition the major problem, a problem that is getting worse as the city grows and land values skyrocket. Although we had bought land in the Hongqiao area in 1992, the department determined it was too small.

I had a number of discussions with the municipal government about this with no resolution, although they strung us along with the possibility that post-Expo development of the fair site would include a new diplomatic enclave afterwards. On Ambassador Huntsman's last visit to Shanghai in 2011 he raised the issue with the party secretary, who promised to look into it.

*Q: How long was Huntsman ambassador?*

CAMP: Sandy Randt was in the job until the day of Obama's inauguration, January 20, 2009. Obama's nomination several months later of Huntsman, a Republican former governor of Utah, came as a surprise.

Huntsman stayed two years, leaving in April 2011 to run for President. I liked Huntsman, his interest in China and his facility with languages; he was an excellent communicator. In Nanjing I watched in admiration as he told the party secretary that we could make special arrangements to boost commercial relations with Nanjing, because it was such an important city and trade with Jiangsu province was crucial. I could see the party secretary melting in Huntsman's hands, he was so good at this.

In addition, Huntsman had an adopted daughter from China, named Grace. Grace was 10 years old at that point; she'd been adopted from the city of Yangzhou, in Jiangsu province. Huntsman

did a wonderful job of using this personal connection to great advantage: “We have strong ties with China, we have strong commercial ties, strong political ties and ties of the heart. My daughter was born in China and it’s very important to me”. It was fabulous stuff.

After the visit to Nanjing, Ambassador and Mrs. Huntsman wanted to go on to Yangzhou with Grace to visit the orphanage. I called in re-enforcements from our press office as Huntsman’s comments sparked increased media interest and I worried about the effect on a 10-year-old girl.

It turned out beautifully. On the bus to Yangzhou, I could hear Mary Kay Huntsman saying to her husband: “Remember, Jon? Remember when we came here 10 years ago?” I was near tears, just eavesdropping. The orphanage put on a big welcome, band and all. Grace was calm and composed as her father answered most of the questions. It was really a lovely event. He does well.

*Q: Just a question about all the events that you’re doing that require a fair amount of on the ground management. Even small things that go wrong on the ground can ruin something; was that an issue for you? Were you able to keep things moving smoothly?*

CAMP: It helps that the Chinese are very good at this; they’re not going to screw up. And our provincial outreach efforts meant that we knew key people in each of the provinces. Not necessarily each of the cities but we did a good job of getting around. I had visited Yangzhou on one of my first trips as Consul General to speak at the 70<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Pearl Buck receiving the Noble Prize for literature. Buck lived in Yangzhou as a child, a fact the city embraced as she moved from persona non grata to celebrity in the China lexicon.

My speech-prep research included asking my teenage niece, herself adopted from China, whether she had heard of “The Good Earth”. I don’t think Pearl Buck is widely read in U.S. schools these days.

*Q: We read it in eighth grade, in 1973, but I think you’re right. At this point it’s gone.*

CAMP: It’s ironic. Pearl Buck was not welcome in China for many years; the PRC denied her a visa soon after Nixon’s visit so she never got to return to China. Then thirty-plus years after her death when she was back in favor there, Americans had lost interest.

The academics at the conference craved reassurance that Buck was still important to Americans. Thanks to checking with my niece I could say that “The Good Earth” was on school reading lists, which is what they wanted to hear.

Because of that event I had a basic grounding in Yangzhou, most crucially their local food specialties – Yangzhou is considered one of the culinary centers of China. The city’s gardens are also well-known; the new China Garden to be built at the National Arboretum in Washington is based on a Yangzhou model. So when I went with Huntsman I had some previous exposure to draw on.

We had contacts in all the cities and, most of the time, if we were meeting with the party

secretary or other high official, the local government took charge of the arrangements. They decide who sits where at meetings and the obligatory banquet, which the city hosts. That's one of the times when knowing the local specialties pays off. We didn't have to worry about any of that stuff.

It gets complicated when we propose something that the Chinese authorities don't want. Towards the end of my time in Shanghai, we and our counterparts throughout the U.S. mission were reporting problems arranging and completing some of our programs, mainly cultural events. We all experienced an increase in "*bu fāngbiàn*" ("it's not convenient") responses from the Chinese side. Beijing Public Affairs had set up a whole dance tour around the country; the night before a scheduled performance we were told it wasn't convenient for them to perform. Embassy Beijing asked us to keep track of and report every *bu fāngbiàn* incident.

We didn't know why the Chinese were suddenly discouraging cultural performances, but our collective responses showed just how widespread this was. The embassy used these statistics to discuss the matter with the Ministry of Culture, although I don't know that they ever figured out what was going on. It seemed odd to be quashing cultural programs when the country was opening a new museum every three days.

*Q: Wow.*

CAMP: Cultural centers as well. Shanghai is a city of over 25 million people divided into 16 districts; not only was the municipal government opening cultural centers, individual city districts were as well. I was invited to the opening of such a center in Jiading that featured the Moscow State Symphony for the inaugural concert. At intermission I was approached by a Chinese cultural impresario who wanted my help in recruiting performing groups coming. They had all these new halls they needed to fill.

*Q: Wow.*

CAMP: This situation came to mind five years later when we met a group of Chinese impresarios in Bulgaria who were traveling around Eastern Europe auditioning groups to perform in China. We watched an audition with folk dancers, singers, even comedians. So despite this odd *bu fāngbiàn* period, there was great interest in U.S. and other performing groups.

*Q: This is a huge undertaking, always managing large events. And that the Expo worked out for us has to hurt less.*

CAMP: Of course the Chinese very much wanted us to take part in the Expo. They pressured us, threatened us, told us that had saved a prime spot for us; the rumor was that if we didn't participate they'd put a McDonald's on the site reserved for the U.S. There was a lot of pressure.

Around the beginning of 2011, Huntsman began to be talked about as a presidential candidate for 2012. This created the awkward image of a Republican ambassador to China preparing to run against his boss, the Democratic incumbent. As the story built, Huntsman resigned effective

April 2011.

During the Ambassador's final week in China, he came to Shanghai to deliver the 6<sup>th</sup> annual Barnett-Oksenberg lecture sponsored by the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, followed by a dinner at the consulate. But the event that loomed largest for him was a Harley motorcycle ride through Shanghai. He's a big Harley Davidson fan; when he left the governorship in Utah he rode away from the governor's mansion on a Harley.

*Q: Yes, I vaguely remember that. But is Harley popular in China?*

CAMP: Harley Davidson is the only American-made motorcycle. There was a Harley enthusiast group connected to AmCham that arranged this, although special permission was required to ride through the city. Concerned about how this would be received, I called Beijing to ask the Ambassador's staff how important this event was for him on a scale of one to ten. Twelve, I was told.

Ambassador Huntsman spoke at the AmCham Shanghai breakfast, wearing his riding boots with a suit jacket, then changed into his biker jacket and joined the Harley group at the back door of the Waldorf. They took off for a 20-30 minute ride that was due to end at the Portman Ritz Carlton, where our Public Affairs section is located and where both Presidents Bush and Obama stayed.

After seeing off the bikers, the head of AmCham and I went by car directly to the Portman so we'd be in place to greet the Ambassador and his motorcycle gang. Although we thought we had a ten-minute lead, almost immediately we heard the vroom, vroom of Harley engines. The city authorities, whom we had not notified for fear of getting denied, had turned all the stoplights to green, making the ride much faster than expected. Our Regional Security Officer reported that the police remonstrated with him later about not being informed of our plans. Their complaint was so politely delivered that we felt bad, but it was one of those occasions when is it better to do it than to ask permission.

*Q: Sounds like the police got word very late.*

CAMP: Or maybe got into hot water with their superiors. I don't know at what point they figured out this was going to happen. In fact, some kind of permit was needed for the ride so it wasn't completely unknown. But we at the consulate had not notified the Shanghai police that Ambassador Huntsman was going to participate.

In any case, Huntsman got his motorcycle ride. I was glad I had nixed a proposal that the group ride into the consulate compound; I didn't like the image of the motorcycles pouring through our gates. Some months later our Information Officer went to social media training in Beijing that analyzed Chinese perceptions of the U.S., as seen through various social media channels. A picture of Huntsman on a bicycle drew positive comments while a picture of Huntsman on the motorcycle evoked very negative reaction.

It was a classic public affairs example of what you want to be seen doing and what you don't

want to be seen doing.

*Q: When I started doing social media and we had to count the number of hits we cautioned the ambassador against overexposure. But you can't debase the coinage with social media; every day is fine. There is no bottom to the desire for the ambassador to do something that's appealing.*

CAMP: Yes. Smelling the flowers, kissing the babies, riding a bicycle.

*Q: Right. There's no bottom to the hunger for ambassadors doing fun things that anybody might do.*

CAMP: Which is why we have all those embassy videos of people eating food or singing holiday songs.

*Q: Absolutely.*

CAMP: One other Huntsman story that became an incident occurred as part of the Jasmine Spring, Chinese protests in 2011 that drew inspiration from events in Tunisia that led to the Arab Spring. On the heels of the Arab Spring, we got word of silent protests being planned in Shanghai and Beijing. In Shanghai we decided to send a political officer to blend into the crowd and quietly observe.

In Beijing, for whatever reason, Ambassador Huntsman with his son and his bodyguard went to the McDonald's on Wangfujing in the center of the city, where the protest was. He was caught on video, with a bystander (likely the man wasn't simply a bystander) challenging him as to what he was doing there and saying he was interfering. It didn't help that Huntsman was wearing a leather jacket with an American flag on the sleeve. When the Chinese made a big deal of his presence there, Huntsman said he was just out with his family, getting ice cream at McDonald's on a Sunday outing. But that's where the protest was, so there were lots of sensitivities and a fair amount of criticism on social media.

Huntsman left China in April 2011 to run for president. David and I departed that summer.

*Q: So you were there from 2008 to 2011. And there was never a possibility to extend?*

CAMP: I asked just for the record and was told, no, we don't extend people in these jobs. I'd been told that in Chiang Mai as well.

*Q: And what did your husband do while you were in Shanghai?*

CAMP: David speaks good Mandarin, better than mine. He's terrific with languages and even learned enough Shanghai slang to cause jaws to drop. Twice a year he went back to the U.S. to manage the bed and breakfast in Idaho he bought after retiring, but most of the time he was with me in Shanghai. At one point he got interested in places named in Chinese Tang dynasty poems.

*Q: Oh interesting.*

CAMP: The idea started when we visited Suzhou, a classic town on the Grand Canal. A Tang dynasty poet named Zhang Ji wrote a famous poem there called “Night Mooring at Maple Bridge”. The poem evokes the scene: the moon, maple trees, a fisherman’s light, the sound of the temple bell at midnight. You can still visit Maple Bridge and see a monument to the poet.

That experience inspired David to look for other Tang poems about places that still exist, wondering how many of these there might be. As he started to collect more and more, traveling to the sites, he began to imagine a book that was a combination poetry collection, travel guide, and language study book.

*Q: Lovely.*

CAMP: He put it all together with photos of each place, the poem in Chinese characters and in Pinyin Romanization, a word-by-word translation, his own translation of the poem, and a description about how to get there and what the place was like. He planned to do 50 but ended up with 60 poems. If we’d had another year in Shanghai he probably would have collected 20 more.

*Q: A literary travel guide of China!*

CAMP: Not only was it fun for David, it was great for me when I could quote bits of these poems in speeches and at banquets. That was always a crowd pleaser; I only wish I’d done a better job on my memorization.

I also benefited by accompanying David on several of his poetry-seeking trips, which was a lot different from traveling as Consul General. Thanks to David we went to the birthplace of a famous poet named Du Fu in Gongyi, to the tomb of Bai Juyi in Longmen, and to Dunhuang, a fabulous historical site along the Silk Road at the edge of the desert.

On our return from Dunhuang, we rode an over-crowded train that reminded us of our first time in China 1983-85, long before the fancy bullet trains of today. Even booking in advance we couldn’t get seats, so we took little folding stools to sit in the aisle. Other passengers, hunched shoulder to shoulder, seized the opportunity to talk to the first foreigners they had ever met. In a typical fashion we were long familiar with, they asked how old we were, how much money we made, that kind of personal question. So going in search of poetry was a rewarding way to travel.

*Q: Absolutely.*

CAMP: David also traveled on a textile tour organized by a friend of ours, Li Lundin, the Taiwan-born wife of retired Foreign Service officer, John Lundin. Now living in Hawaii, Li led a group from the Honolulu Museum focused on textiles of Southwest China where they visited villages and hill tribes that produced distinctive textiles and other crafts. He took advantage of opportunities to see parts of China that I didn’t.

*Q: The textiles, would they be silk or wool or-?*

CAMP: Cotton mainly. We're talking folk textiles, not the grand robes of emperors. Having lived in northern Thailand we were familiar with some of the hill tribes in that area, many of whom spread across the borders in Laos, Burma, and southwest China. In fact, the Dai minority of China speak a version of Thai. Yunnan province has a national ethnic minorities park tourists can visit where Thai new year, Songkran, with its marvelous water throwing festival, is celebrated twice a day, every day of the year. Tourists can rent a bowl and clothing for 10 RMB to join in the water throwing. It's tourist-corny fun.

**SHANGHAI STORIES**  
**30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the U.S. Consulate in Shanghai**  
**Beatrice Camp, Editor**

**Don Anderson, Consul General (1980-1983)**

When we first arrived we were all housed at the Jinjiang Hotel. I had a suite which doubled as our social gathering place, and Roz Fishman, my secretary, also had a suite which doubled as the Consul General's office. We had a practice of gathering at the end of the day for "Happy Hour". On one evening there was a knock on the door and I answered it. A man was there, and he said "I represent McDonnell-Douglas and I'm the only American businessman resident in Shanghai. Could I come in for a drink? "

**David Hess, Branch PAO (1980-?)**

On April 24, 1980, US efforts to rescue our Foreign Service colleagues held hostage in Iran failed. On Friday, May 2, we received word from the Public Security Bureau that on Saturday there would be a large-scale demonstration against the United States held in front of the Consulate General. CG Don Anderson was out of town.

Saturday morning, Joe Borich and I assembled at the consulate. Public Security assured us that we would be safe, and to make us feel better, parked about two companies of armored Public Security troops behind the old American school, which at that time was a naval research lab.

At about 11 o'clock, we spotted the mob coming down Urumqi across Nanjing. There appeared to be about 5000 people. On closer inspection, we noticed that there were four Middle Eastern students in front carrying a banner "USA Hands-Off Iran!" The other 4996 demonstrators were apparently just curious Chinese who followed along to see what was going on.

We kept the gate closed, but one of the four real demonstrators called out demanding to see the Consul General so that he could present their demands directly to him. We shouted back that the CG was out of town. He lowered his standards and said any American would do. We told him we were closed and to come back Monday.

They never came back.

**Thomas Biddick, Consular, later Political Officer (1980-1982)**

I served as Consul in 1980-82 and was one of the original Shanghai crew along with CG Don Anderson, Joe Borich, Tom Lauer, Dave Hess (USIA), Roz Fishman and Chips Carpenter. I opened the consular section and then moved to political when Steve Schlaikjer arrived to head consular.

In those early days, I was the only consular officer and handled nonimmigrant visas as well as ACS, including some interesting citizenship cases involving Americans who had survived the decades of revolution and separation. Our local employees were all assigned by the Waiban.

It was my honor to be the first on the scene in January 1980, followed shortly thereafter by CG Don Anderson, Joe Borich, Dave Hess, Tom Lauer and several others with their spouses and families. We initially stayed in the Jin Jiang Hotel and enjoyed the amenities of the club across the street (the old Cercle Sportif from French Concession days), including a massive indoor swimming pool, bowling alley and ballroom where a gala celebration was held to mark the New Year. The consular corps consisted of the Polish, Japanese, French and U.S. consulates. Resident Americans were few but well-acquainted with the consulate, including some old-timers from “pre-Liberation” days, a few students and teachers and the folks from Nike and Pan Am. We would ride out to Fudan University in the consulate pick-up for softball games. Visitors from the U.S. included the singer John Denver, who stayed with Don and Blanche Anderson at the residence and entertained us at a private party there. I also remember a visit by former president Carter during that period (1981) and of course the CODELs such as that headed by Senator Howard Baker who visited the PLA submarine base at Wusong.

Change was in the air with the Dengist reforms underway and there were social tensions brewing in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. Security was sketchy in those days. While riding my bike to work, I was passed a note (in Chinese) informing me of a threat from a disgruntled Wenzhou NIV applicant. Later a person fitting that description was caught by local guard trying to make a run into the consulate compound. And then there was the morning when the CG discovered a young fellow hiding in a downstairs bathroom. He apparently had scaled the wall but didn’t do any harm.

**Steve Schlaikjer, Consular Officer (1980-1982)**

We have a couple of 1981-82 vintage group photos of the Shanghai Clippers softball team (sponsored and coached by Pan Am), including some with visiting pitcher-songwriter John Denver.

The event Tom Biddick recalls was a major impromptu city-wide demonstration after midnight on 19 November 1981 following the China national men’s soccer team defeat of Saudi Arabia (that futbol powerhouse) 2-0 in a World Cup final round qualifying match broadcast live from Kuala Lumpur. The event left a deep impression on me.

China’s hopes were high that it would represent Asia-Oceania in Madrid in 1982 in its first time competing, post-Liberation, for the World Cup. The government, including government

controlled press, at first encouraged the spontaneous demonstrations of patriotic fervor that crowds in Shanghai and elsewhere had exhibited in an earlier 3-0 victory against Kuwait. But late-night street parades continued after the great defeat of Kuwait (with clanging gongs, drums, shouted slogans” Zhongguo Jiayou, Zhongguo Wansui, Zhongguo Diyi”, etc.), troubling the sleep of party leaders (not to mention, literally, that of the US Consul General and his wife), and the Party propaganda organs ordered in various ways subtle and direct that, while patriotism was wonderful, there would be no more demonstrating “next time” after the upcoming KL match with the Saudis.

Watching the game on TV in Biddick’s Huaihai Gongyu flat, Joe Borich, Tom Biddick and I (and Tom Lauer?) were intrigued to hear, even before the final whistle blew, fireworks popping off in the distance in a 360 degree arc. We could feel the city, around midnight, stirring and levitating. We got up, too, went with our bikes onto Huaihai Road, and followed the curb-to-curb flow of pedestrians and bicyclists left (eastward), towards People’s Square (the old Racetrack opposite the Park Hotel). I got separated from my colleagues after a pair of young Shanghai men (stage-whispering back at me occasionally: “Ni zhidao, Zhongguo meiyou ziyou, Zhongguomeiyou ziyou”) beat a path through fellow demonstrators to let me, the loudly-announced “Meiguo Lingshiguan” guy -- now walking my big former Taipei Police Department black-framed bike -- proceed like Jesus on Palm Sunday. I stage-whispered back: “hey, Deng Xiaoping’s not so bad, don’t say China has no freedom.” I kept flashing two-to-zero hand signs and yelled “er bi yi” a lot, smiling, hoping to keep the conversation limited to sports.

We never got quite as far as People’s Park, as the flow turned into a flood that dammed up around Sichuan Lu, with city buses mired in the crowd like caterpillars in honey. Ten thousand Shanghailanders (including the trio of rather obvious Consulate General staffers) stood, stock-still, eerily quiet, waiting to see what would happen. To me it seemed people were looking around to see if anyone would step forward to lead this movement. Not long after this pause, however, the Gong An decided enough was enough, formed into battle lines, and charged the crowd near me, wielding cattle-prod-like night sticks. The charged charge sent a wave of demonstrators away from the center of the thoroughfare, and it (they) broke over me. Pressed to the hard pavement, my bicycle sprocket cutting a digital arc in one calf, the soft steel frame bent in a V around me, I heard a pile of what felt like ten panicking Shanghailanders collectively scream above me. I thought: “what a really stupid and embarrassing way to die, suffocated by a bunch of demonstrators who broke at the first sign of trouble!” In the end a couple of helpful bystanders (plainclothes police??) took me to a local Gong An paichusuo, where dozens of police were being mustered out into the night from their barracks. After a bemused look at my consular ID card and a few polite perfunctory questions about what in the world was I doing out on a night like this, the desk sergeant sent me home in a small PSB truck, my bent bike stuck in the rear cargo space.

Tom Biddick’s first-hand political report of the soccer demo the next day was a model of Foreign Service on-the-scene reporting. As I recall, he included the thought that the students, workers, and sports fans of Shanghai sensed that a social-political movement might have started that night, but the crowd lacked leadership or, frankly, any obvious common goal. Plus ca change?

China got beat in a later game by Kuwait and did not go to Madrid in the end. But hopes were

raised.

### **Tom Lauer (1980-1982?)**

I can't add much to the description of the great demonstration. I do recall that by 10 or 11 p.m. phalanxes of young men on bicycles continued to move toward the square chanting "Zhongguo-Zhongguo" in low and defiant tones. They were angry.

I do have an anecdote about the presence or lack thereof, of foreigners in the city at that time. Shortly after my family arrived (wife, daughter and two boys -- all young and blond), we went to the zoo. When we went into the building that housed the great apes we saw, not surprisingly, great apes and about 150 Chinese, most with families. Within seconds all of the Chinese had their backs to the apes and were staring, maybe in disbelief, at the five blond-haired, Chinese speaking space aliens.

### **Tess Johnston, (1981-1986 and 1989-1996)**

I served here -- unique in the Foreign Service, I was later told -- for a total of 12 years: Sept. 1981 - Sept. 1986, then Sept 1989 - Oct. 1, 1996. (Surely that must be a record?)

This description of Tess' first assignment in Shanghai is excerpted with permission from *Permanently Temporary: From Berlin to Shanghai in Half a Century* by Tess Johnston, published 2010 by Old China Hand Press.

We were a total of seven, five Officers on the second floor behind locked doors, the remaining two, the consular and the administrative officer, in the downstairs offices. Every day as I walked up the curving oaken staircase and passed the stained-glass windows I marveled at the master craftsmen who had built this gracious villa.

Our offices were located in a series of former bedrooms stretching on either side of a broad corridor. My office, plus the files, and later the massive main frame of our first computer, was on the enclosed second floor terrace with broad windows looking out on the garden. The CG's office was located in a larger bedroom and he and his wife lived next door, "over the shop" so to say. Their living room and bedroom were, respectively, the former master bedroom and en suite dressing room, and their kitchen was on the far end of my office's terrace; we were separated by a heavy door from which the CG would emerge each morning. It was a compact but quite pleasant arrangement all around.

Unless we had special permission, we were allowed to drive our cars only within the 25-kilometer radius of Greater Shanghai. There were police-manned roadblocks on all roads to check inward and outward movement and a foreigner's car would be turned back if it did not have the proper papers. Thus trips to the two most famous two scenic cities nearby, Hangzhou and Suzhou, were allowed only by special permission.

### **Stan Brooks, Consul General (1983-1987)**

Our work with Fudan University would be another Shanghai story well worth telling. A treasured memory is of Dr. Xie attending our showing of Amadeus.

From the Reagan visit, something you and/or Mary overheard at Fudan right after his 30(?) -minute speech. As everyone was leaving the auditorium, one young woman, who obviously didn't understand the function of the two conspicuous teleprompters the president had used, said to another student something like: "Isn't it amazing! Such an old man, and he memorized that whole speech!"

And I remember well our session with the endearing old painters, one in his nineties, the other in his late eighties as I recall. I've forgotten their names, but see them still in my mind's eye. And I still hear the younger one saying, with reference to his elder, "Wo buguo zhi shi yige xiao xuesheng."

One of the photos I sent to Shanghai is of Richard Pontius introducing a performance by Shanghai Music Conservatory students at the consulate. Richard told me about asking a student at the conservatory why is it that the Germans call their country the Fatherland, and you Chinese call yours the Motherland. The student instantly replied, "Never mind, America is Disneyland!"

A sign of the times. My alma mater the University of Wyoming has exchange programs running with Shanghai University and Shanghai Normal.

It was a small, happy and very productive post that I inherited from Don Anderson and it remained so as new challenges arose during my service there.

The only inspection in the four years resulted in a letter from Secretary Shultz announcing that Shanghai was one of the ten top posts worldwide in that cycle. In the exit interview with the inspectors, I pointed out two key facts that made my job easy: people knew their jobs and did them well with little guidance; and their teamwork was superb.

The most concentrated test was President Reagan's visit. Our performance was recognized in a group Superior Honor Award.

There are two more documents I'm happy to cite. One is Tess Johnston's Foreign Service Secretary of the Year Award. The other is the accreditation of the reopened Shanghai American School. This was obtained by my wife Claire after she took over as principal.

My general impression from those years is of visitors, visitors, visitors. Taxing but fun. Ambassador Hummel noted we were successfully handling almost the same volume of visitors as the embassy with its much bigger staff.

I expect that your archival research can turn up, inter alios, all the CODELs, the Reagan visit and pre-advances and advance, and Secretary Shultz's second visit (with Mrs. Shultz). As well as some or all of the following for whom Claire and I gave receptions or dinners.

Chicago Mayor Washington and party, San Francisco Mayor Feinstein, Mrs. Jay Rockefeller

with children, Katharine Graham and party, Boston Children's Hospital Open Heart Surgery Team, San Francisco Opera Company, Brooklyn Museum Art Exhibit and various U.S. athletic teams.

Finally, here are a few more memories.

- holding monthly meetings with the small but growing American business community (there was no Consulate General).
- attending the rollout of the first MD-80.
- addressing a large Consulate General meeting in Hong Kong. The talk included some speculation on the future economic roles of Hong Kong and Shanghai respectively.
- hosting with Claire big Fourth of July picnics in the consulate garden. A good many Americans from around the consular district and beyond attended.
- going out on the streets to observe the big student demonstrations in December 1986-January 1987.
- attending as dean of the corps, with Claire, the reception aboard the royal yacht hosted by Queen Elizabeth.
- hiking alone for several days in the Huang Shan. No other foreigners, and few Chinese!

To read about the consulate today, and to remember how back then all personnel fit in the present main office building, is to be reminded of how much growth happened after the mid-eighties.

Re the re-establishment of Shanghai American School: Bonnie Wisnewski when we arrived was running a school in the servants quarters in the backyard of the compound using correspondence courses. Claire (Brooks) often went back to help. In December 1983, Bonnie and her husband were leaving for the states and Bonnie asked if Claire would cover the school while she was gone. The Wisnewskis didn't come back, and with the parents' consent, Claire stayed in the job until we left in 1987. As principal Claire along with the teachers decided to develop curricula for the school. Also in the second year Claire felt the school should be accredited and contacted the Western Association of Accreditation in California. In under two years the process was completed. And she started a Kindergarten and a small Nursery school.

Note: Photos contributed by the Brookses include:

- A copy of the White House photo, original size, of President Reagan, the Hummels and me at Shanghai Airport.
- A copy of a photo, enlarged to the same size, of Mayor Jiang Zemin pointing to something at an art exhibition. I'm standing beside him. The original likely came from the Waiban so archival research may identify the occasion.
- Three standard size prints of scenes at a Shanghai American School field day, an annual event held in the consulate garden. In the photo of four kids at the start of a sack race, note what "sacks" were being used.

### **Winter of 1986-1987**

Charlie Sylvester succeeded me in 1987. Larry Robinson, a strong political officer who served with both Charlie and me, did some fine reporting on the student demonstrations the winter of 1986-87. Here is another account of the demonstration from someone else who was an observer

on the scene: “See the reference below from the NYT. As I recall, the demonstrations were also sparked by an incident during a concert at a campus in Shanghai when the police beat many students. These were almost certainly the largest demonstrations in Shanghai since the Cultural Revolution, and they foreshadowed what was to happen in 1989.

My enduring memory is of the demonstrations which took place right at the end of December were of tens of thousands of people in front of the Shanghai Municipal Government building chanting “Jiang Zemin, chu lai,” and of the newspaper headline several days into the incident which paralyzed Shanghai: *Xinminwanbao*: “New Hairy Boy Found in Sichuan”. I have always found that hilarious, and telling.

From the *New York Times*: “Those demonstrations in December 1986 and the beginning of January 1987 attracted tens of thousands of students and were starting to draw support from workers when the Government cracked down and imposed a campaign against “bourgeois liberalization,” like Western democratic influences.”

### **Kent Wiedemann (1983-1986)**

Many of us saw US presidential visits, which speaks to Shanghai’s importance, and surely provided a lot of fun for us. Stan Brooks was Consulate General then (1983) and I was his deputy. Reagan’s speech at Fudan University, in which he recommended a belief in God, left a lasting impression. White House advance was irate when I informed them that the Jinjiang Hotel, where the president and party would be lodged, refused to remove its flagpole so the president’s helo might land there in an emergency. The Jinjiang won that one, and I include a copy of the rules posted at the entrance to its club as a reminder of its poor attitude then.

### **Lloyd Neighbors, Branch Public Affairs Officer (1983-1986)**

#### **“Searching for Shanghai”**

An American historian once said, “The past is another country.” In the case of Shanghai 2010 vs. 1980 the past might as well be another galaxy. For those familiar only with the neon, chromium and glass of Shanghai today, let me take you back to when I first arrived there in August 1983. At that time I had studied Chinese literature and history since 1965, married into a Chinese family and lived in Taiwan and Hong Kong for seven years. But this was my first visit to the Mainland, and I was psyched.

Then came the reality. My family and I passed through immigration and walked over to the luggage pick-up area. There were no conveyor belts, just great heaps of luggage piled in the middle of the floor. I scrambled through the piles, finally found our suitcases and then walked out into the sultry Shanghai night. Our car glided through the dark, silent streets -- dim, decaying buildings on both sides, French sycamores leaning out over the road. Car lights flashed on and off, lighting up the scurrying, morose masses of Shanghai like a flash of lightning on a dark night.

“Why don’t you turn the car lights on?” I asked our driver.

“It’s against the law. You might blind the other drivers.”

So, you just flashed your lights when you suspected someone or something was in your way.

Shortly we arrived at the Park Hotel with its dimly lit rooms and a shower that reeked of chlorine, evoking memories of high school swimming class. It took the local contractors three months to paint our three-bedroom apartment at the previously elegant Huaihai Apartments, so we were sentenced to one month at the Park and another two months at the Donghu Guest House. Soon we learned the importance of Elephant Glue Paper, a low-tech but efficient way of catching mice.

At that time Chinese companies were just beginning to develop products for the international market, and they still had problems with the English names for them. In addition to the aforementioned Elephant Glue, they had another glue made from donkey and mule hooves. This was known as Genuine, Blood-nourished Ass Glue. Pharmacies also sold Atomic Pile Busters, which might have been an antidote for the previous product. Taiwan merchants, already with a degree of market savvy, were selling a diet drink known as Slim Tea. The Mainland version was, less euphoniously, Cut Fat Tea. My favorite, however, was the package of sticky-rice dumplings filled with black sesame paste, known as Acme Glue Balls -- perhaps used to ensnare Wile E. Coyote.

The Park Hotel, despite its deficiencies was a great place to learn about Shanghai. It was located on Nanjing Road, in the heart of the city’s still limited commercial district. Soon we learned that Shanghainese don’t rush down the streets like their Hong Kong kinsmen. There’s no room for that on the sidewalk, so they just mosey along. In those days the only big stories in the city were located along Nanjing Road, and on the weekend these were invaded by desperate shoppers from outside the city. The Number One Department Store, for example, hosted over 300,000 customers every Sunday.

One evening shortly after my arrival I learned just how crowded Shanghai could be. I had attended an official dinner just off Nanjing Road and come out to wait for my car. What I didn’t realize was that a parade had just passed by and the crowds were only beginning to disperse. The sidewalks and the streets were packed with people. No way my car could get through. I would have to walk. I pushed my way through the crowd and turned onto a side street. It was full as well, but I decided to move ahead anyway. But after ten feet or so I could go no further. I tried to turn back, but people were already crowding in behind me. Gridlock -- with people, not cars. I stood there in a mild state of panic for 15 minutes, unable to move. Now that’s a crowd.

Moving to the Donghu Guest House was an upgrade for us. It was a beautiful, though shabby old house that had once belonged to Du Yuesheng, the underworld overlord who in the 1930s and 40s ran drug and prostitution rings and helped Chiang Kai-shek take control of the city. Our next-door neighbor was Ed Shaughnessy, a University of Chicago grad student who was later to become one of the world’s leading experts on Chinese bronze inscriptions and Chou dynasty archeology. Ed was from the Indiana Jones School of Archeology, always wearing a rakish fedora and a beautiful leatherjacket. He was not only flamboyant but brilliant as well. He spent long hours at the Shanghai Museum working closely with their leading experts on the classical

bronzes. When he finished his three-month stint at the Museum, he drafted a long report for the Director, in elegant Chinese, a feat that still impresses me to these 30-years later.

Winter in Shanghai was also a revelation. Shanghai is not quite as cold as Washington, DC, but it is damp and does get below freezing at times. That was tolerable for westerners who had heat in their offices and apartments. But Chinese citizens did not. One friend who worked at the Shanghai Music Conservatory told me, "Last night I left a glass of water in the practice room. This morning there was ice in it. Can you imagine how students play under these conditions?"

Wu Gongzhan, the cultural assistant at the Consulate, also commented on the cold. "I grew up in Shanghai. Every winter I got chilblains from exposure to the cold. My hands would swell up and the skin began to peel off. But when I was 16, during the Cultural Revolution, I was sent down to the countryside, all the way to the Siberian border. It was 30-below-zero there, but our houses were heated. No more chilblains."

More than the inconvenience, more than the crowds, more than the cold, Shanghai makes me think of food. Just after the Cultural Revolution ended, the city of Shanghai, with a population of 12 million, had only 200 restaurants. Good food was considered counter-revolutionary, a bourgeois affectation. "Put some more sand in my rice, please. That's the way we comrades like it." By 1983, however, this attitude was beginning to change. A number of good restaurants were popping up, though trying a new one was always a risky endeavor.

One day my family and I had been wandering around the city for some time and were desperate to find a restaurant. The only one around was a "Qing Zhen Guan," ("Clear and Pure Restaurant"), a Muslim dumpling shop. There wasn't much clear or pure about the place, but we didn't have a choice. So we went in. The restaurant was about to close for an afternoon break, but the manager grudgingly let us in and sat us at a table that was strewn with the residue -- bones and all -- of a previous feast. The waiter, a cigarette hanging from his lips, a filthy wet rag in his hand, strode over and began to sweep the table clean, raking all the bones onto the floor.

"Don't worry," he said, "Someone will clean that up."

At that, a young girl appeared from the kitchen, snow shovel in hand. Quickly she began scooping up the detritus on the floor and cheerfully throwing it out the window.

"A trade opportunity," I thought. "A snow shovel for every restaurant in China."

Despite such experiences, we soon found some excellent restaurants in Shanghai. And we wound up haunting those places. My eight-year-old son Mark quickly became an aficionado. His favorite dish was "babao ya," (eight-treasure duck), stuffed with rice and mushrooms and all sorts of other goodies. One day when he and his sister were studying Chinese with their tutor, Mrs. Du, Mark said, "I love babao ya."

"Oh, then I'll make you some," replied Mrs. Du.

Mrs. Du was an elderly woman, in her mid-sixties, well-educated, but living in poverty, as did

almost everyone in Shanghai at that time. Inviting an American family to her apartment was just not done. But she did it anyway. And we went to her tiny, efficiency apartment. Somehow, with only the most primitive kitchen utensils, and at great cost, she managed to prepare a sumptuous banquet, including Mark's beloved duck.

This kind of experience made Shanghai a wonderful place to live, despite the inconvenience, the shabbiness, the crowds, and the cold. Even under great hardship, Shanghainese remained optimistic. They were funny and smart and incredibly diligent. They befriended me at some risk to themselves, for dealing with an American diplomat was not a circumspect thing to do at that time. But Mrs. Du and others like her made my life and work in Shanghai rewarding. U.S. Government programs touched many of these people and changed their lives for the better. Following are a few more tales about my friends in that great city.

Muriel Hoopes (note: her name appears on the invite list for the April 1980 reception) "You have committed an expatriating act."

When I first met Muriel Hoopes in Shanghai in 1983, she was in her 80's, still energetic, but worn by time and travail, more travail than most of us meet in several lifetimes. She was silver-haired, wrinkled, stooped, but with a strong sense of self and a keen wit.

Though born in New York City, Mrs. Hoopes had lived in China for more than 50 years. In the 1920's she lost her American citizenship, and now in 1983 the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai was helping her get it back and that's a story worth telling.

I had met Mrs. Hoopes at a Consulate General party and now I was visiting her at home -- along with Peter Rose, a Smith College sociology professor, who came to Shanghai as a guest speaker for the Department of State. I had told him some of Mrs. Hoopes story. He wanted to hear more.

With that in mind, we went to visit Mrs. Hoopes on a cold fall evening. Mrs. Hoopes lived in a third-story, walk-up apartment in a battered old building that hadn't seen much repair since 1949 and the beginnings of Communist rule in China. This was true of almost all the apartments in Shanghai at that time. In Churchill's famous phrase, this was truly "an equal sharing of misery" for most of the population of Shanghai.

We climbed the dank stairs to Mrs. Hoopes' apartment. She greeted us at the door, and we had our first glimpse of her Spartan cell, a single room with a bed, several rock-hard chairs and a 40-watt bulb dangling from the ceiling. The kitchen was down the hall, shared by other families on her floor. The toilet: a chamber pot. In the 1980's, many apartments in Shanghai had no flush toilets. Night soil collectors made their rounds early every morning. In those days apartments did not have heat. Shanghai was south of the Yangtze River, and therefore, in the eyes of the central government, did not need heating -- even though the temperature occasionally dropped below freezing. Mrs. Hoopes served tea and we gratefully clasped the mug with both hands to warm our frigid hands.

Professor Rose had written a number of articles on immigration and emigration in the United States and wanted to learn more about Mrs. Hoopes' experience. Here is the tale she told:

In the early 1920's I was working as a nurse in New York City. One day on the subway I lost my balance and stepped on the foot of a young Asian man standing next to me. I apologized profusely.

With apologies out of the way, my curiosity got the better of me. "Are you from Japan?" I asked.

Immediately the man drew back with a wounded look on his face.

"Of course not. I'm Chinese. Don't you know about the 14 demands the Japanese made on China as part of the Treaty of Versailles negotiations? Why don't we go out for lunch this weekend and I'll explain it to you."

We met for lunch. I discovered that Wang was studying engineering at Columbia on a scholarship from the Chinese YMCA. This young man from China fascinated me. We fell in love, got engaged and planned to move to China after Wang completed his degree.

Several years later we did marry and make preparations to go to Shanghai. In San Francisco we lined up for immigration procedures prior to embarkation. The immigration officer looked at my passport. He glared at me and said,

"You won't be needing this passport anymore. By marrying a Chinese, you have committed an expatriating act. You are no longer an American citizen."

This was shocking news, but unfortunately true. The Asian Exclusion Act of 1924 clearly stated that any American marrying an Asian alien lost his/her citizenship.

Wang and I then hurried over to the Chinese embassy where I was issued travel documents. I left for China the next day and have never been back to the United States.

After Mr. Wang and Mrs. Hoopes reached China, he went to work with the YMCA, which was an active, vibrant organization at that time. Mrs. Hoopes taught English at Hujiang, a private liberal arts college in Shanghai founded by the Baptist Church. They did well, raising a family during the difficult, but for them tolerable, period of Nationalist rule and the Civil War.

With the founding of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949, however, their situation took a turn for the worse. As part of an effort to boost the authority of the Communist Party, Chairman Mao turned to a virulent nationalism. In these circumstances Mr. Wang was doomed by his American degree and his American wife. It didn't matter that Mrs. Hoopes was no longer legally an American. She and her family were still tainted by her long-since severed links with the United States.

What was a bad situation after 1949 became even worse in 1965 with the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, a time of national psychosis for China. Mr. Wang was arrested (who knows on what charges). Mrs. Hoopes was not sent to prison, but was held in isolation (house arrest) at the college where she had been a teacher.

In 1983, after the opening of the U.S. Consulate General in Shanghai, the Consular Section reached out to American citizens in the area and to others who might have claim to such status. By this time Mrs. Hoopes' children had grown up and found a place in Chinese society. Mrs. Hoopes applied for a reinstatement of her citizenship. This was approved and not long afterwards, she made her first trip to the United States in more than 60 years. Unfortunately, her health was not good and she died not long after her return.

### **Much Ado about Music in Nanjing**

Without music life would be a mistake – Nietzsche

When I first arrived in Shanghai in 1983, the Chinese government had just launched a campaign to combat so-called “spiritual pollution” (jingshen wuran), pernicious cultural influences that were supposedly sapping the strength of the revolution. And, according to Chinese security authorities, much of the problem stemmed from foreign, particularly American, sources. One internal security document at the time warned that foreign diplomats would try to seduce Chinese citizens by inviting them to cultural events at the embassy. Then they would “drag them underwater and get them to reveal national secrets.”

Under such circumstances, cultural programming was difficult. Our opportunities to speak to the public, especially university students, were limited. Thus I was surprised in the spring of 1984 to receive an invitation to speak to students at Nanjing University. Authorities at the university were nervous about what I might say, so I suggested as a topic “American Folk Music.” The topic seemed harmless enough, so the powers that be gave their approval. What they didn't get at the time was that the theme American Folk Music allowed me to speak freely about American history, religion, protest movements, freedom of speech, unionization -- all topics that would never be discussed in a Chinese classroom at that time. What's more, music appeals to the emotions, and that's how you change minds, not through rational argument.

In those days the level of English of Chinese university students was relatively poor. They could read well but had little experience listening to spoken English. Thus I planned to speak in Chinese and have the students listen to recorded songs in English that represented the breadth of American folk music. To help the students understand what they were hearing, I prepared lyric sheets so they could read along while they listened. The organizers told me about 100 students would attend the lecture, so I prepared 150 copies of the lyrics just to be safe. But when I walked into the crowded lecture hall with 150 copies of the lyrics in hand, I knew I was in trouble. At least 300 students crowded the hall, standing-room-only.

I immediately asked two students if they would help me pass out the lecture materials. Then I picked up the microphone and announced, “For today's lecture I have prepared handouts, lyric sheets for the songs you will hear. Unfortunately, I don't have enough copies for everyone. Would you please share these with the person sitting next to you?”

As soon as I said the word “share,” everyone in the room stood up and stormed the front of the room, surrounding my two student assistants. They began shoving and fighting. Papers flew through the air. Several students fell to the floor; another knocked over my microphone and broke it.

At first I was shocked by this behavior. Then, I thought, “Wow, I’m like Mick Jagger. They really want to hear what I have to say.”

I had just learned my first lesson in the economics of scarcity. In 1983, Chinese university students rarely met foreigners, particularly Americans, and even more particularly, American diplomats. So my lecture at the university was a big deal. What’s more, I was going to talk about American music, a previously forbidden topic. To have a copy of the lyrics -- what could be better? Sharing was not an option.

Twenty years later, I was in Beijing at a dinner for artists and cultural promoters. A tall, well-dressed young man approached me and said, “Mr. Neighbors, you may not remember, but I met you in Nanjing in 1984. I was the student who arranged for you to speak about American music at the university. When the officials heard about the lecture, they were quite upset. I got scolded severely. But we all enjoyed the program very much, so it was worth the trouble.”

#### **Also from that time: October 1984 -- Delegation of American Writers**

(note from Bea Camp: at the time that Lloyd Neighbors was Branch PAO and Stan Brooks was CG, my husband David Summers and I managed joint two-week TDY stints in Shanghai from our embassy jobs in Beijing. I remember a meeting between US and Chinese writers, at which Gary Snyder proclaimed that the true oppressed of the earth are the grass and the trees. The *LA Times* wrote about this trip, which in addition to Snyder included Allen Ginsberg, Norman Cousins, William Gass. Francine du Plessix Gray, William Least Half-Moon, Maxine Hong Kingston, Toni Morrison, and Leslie Mormon Silko.

#### **“Nine Writers on the Eve of a China Adventure” by Elizabeth Mehren, Times Staff Writer**

Twice in a single evening last week, Maxine Hong Kingston’s mother telephoned her, obviously quite frantic. “When you get there,” she told her novelist daughter in the first conversation, “keep your mouth shut.” Soon, mother and daughter were back on the phone. “You know,” Kingston’s mother said, “some of that stuff you wrote was very anti-communist.” Yes, the author of the widely hailed “China Men” and “The Warrior Woman” agreed, some of that stuff was definitely very anti-communist. “Well,” said her mother, “tell them you didn’t mean it.”

#### **Ira Kasoff, Commercial Officer (1985-1987 and 2004-2007)**

I was the second Department of Commerce officer posted to Shanghai, following the path-breaker, Genny Dean. I decided to keep our office in the little guard house where Genny had set it up - just inside the grounds, at the corner of Huai Hai and Ulumuchi Roads. It was tiny and unheated, but it was ours (everyone else was in the “big house” next to us). We had a small reception area where our two local staff sat, an even smaller meeting room that could seat two or three guests (as long as they weren’t too big), and a small office for me, the lone commercial officer (compare this to the large staff and the sumptuous offices in the Portman that the commercial section enjoys today). We were quite busy, as American business people were beginning to discover Shanghai, but doing business in China in those days was definitely not for the faint of heart. We turned often for help to two “private sector” Chinese friends, the legendary T.C. Tao, who had set up the first non-governmental consulting business in China, and the

lawyer Richard Hsu, who was still active in Shanghai the last time I was there. It was a challenging job, but never dull, and under the enlightened leadership of CG Stan Brooks, and with great colleagues like Richard Boucher, Lloyd Neighbors, Keith Powell, Larry Robinson et al., it was one of the great experiences of my life.

I should also mention two of my proudest achievements from that time: first, and undoubtedly most important, establishing weekly Sunday afternoon football games on the consulate grounds. In addition to facing mundane challenges like organizing the players, finding a football, etc, we had to persuade the divine Claire Brooks to allow us to use the lawn for the game (a decision she later came to regret, given the damage we did each week), arrange with security to let the non-USG players onto the grounds every Sunday, etc. But the game became a fixture for the ex-pat community, and was a great morale-booster, particularly for hard-core sports-addicts like me. The other accomplishment was helping to found, with a small group of American businessmen, the Shanghai Consulate General, which was not unlike the founding of the Communist Party in 1921. I organized a small group (including Norman Givant, Ernie DeBellis of Foxboro, and a few others) in secret underground meetings, until the day we felt confident enough to announce its establishment. This duty fell to me, and I paid a call on the head of SMERT (the unfortunate English name for the Shanghai Foreign Economic and Trade Relations Committee). I discussed several items of business with him, and then casually said something like, “oh, and I’ve helped the business community form a chamber of commerce,” before moving on to another topic. He did not seem fazed by this, and we took this to be a tacit go-ahead. As readers undoubtedly know, the Shanghai Consulate General has grown to be the largest American chamber outside of North America, with some 4,000 members the last time I checked. Though I think they are still not officially recognized...

### **Keith Powell, Consular Section Chief (1985-1987)**

I served in Shanghai with Consul General Stan Brooks. He was a fine gentleman and his wife, Claire, a wonderful lady who did a lot to support the nascent American School and the expat community. A few incidents stand out in my mind from that time.

Elves: The consular section (all two officers and five FSNs) was located on the ground floor of the old house. We took in visa applications, sent in name-checks on every one, waited 15 working days for a response, then issued if no response. We had stacks of passports backed up for the slow name-check process. The Consul General lived upstairs in the Residence part of the house. Several mornings I came in and found stacks of passports moved and the data entry having been completed. It turned out that the Consul General’s wife (who helped us out TDY on a couple of occasions) had come down in the night and took stacks of passports to complete the data entry. Before I left we took her out for a consular section lunch and I gave her a certificate as a Consular Elf (ala the Elves and the Shoemaker story.)

The Million-Dollar Bar-B-Q: It is apparently gone now. But around the time I arrived, Corning Glass was finishing a joint venture building for some kind of glass firing facility in the Shanghai area. They had leftover special kiln-quality firing bricks from the project and they used them, at the suggestion of the Admin and Commercial Officers, to build a bar-b-q in the consulate backyard...over near the Green House (now the cafeteria.) It was, I suspect, the only bar-b-q that

was certified up to like a million degrees of heat.

TGIF: We used to alternate TGIFs with the Australians who were then located across the street. One day the news spread through the community...they had imported a Container Load of Fosters Beer for their office lounge! It took the Aussies (with a little help from the rest of us) one month to go through the entire container!

American School: They opened the American School on the consulate grounds in what had been the garage (previously the stables, later the cafeteria, later the consular section, now...GSO?) They started a separate kindergarten in what had been the Greenhouse (now the cafeteria.) It started, Little House on the Prairie style, with, I think, 10 students 1-8. Kindergarten had like 15 children (including mine). The school received a donation from Northwest, McDonald-Douglas and other businesses and ordered a big wooden jungle gym set up. We had a weekend "barn raising" with the families bringing food, cooking on the bar-b-q (see above) and putting up this huge wooden climbing structure. (No idea when it came down.)

### **Gregorie W. Bujac, Diplomatic Security officer (1986-1987)**

Comments on efforts to secure property for a new consulate.

In 1986-7, I was the DS representative with Ambassador Salgo on a trip to visit prospective new compound sites. He was working on property issues in China, Eastern Europe and the USSR. OBO, then FBO had come up with a "cookie cutter" design for consulate compounds in China (Offices, CGR and Staff Residences.) Shenyang had been completed, Chengdu was almost done, but, Guangzhou and Shanghai did not have any property identified by the Chinese to pursue a new compound. Guangzhou moved into the "Esso Tower" next to the White Swan Hotel and that was that until the current effort. Shanghai on the other hand was in the midst of major new construction all over town. Since it was contemplated that adequate property could not be obtained in the near term, the suggestion was made that the Consulate General could easily be accommodated (Offices and Residences) in the new "Portman" project. The idea didn't have legs and for better or worse we stayed in the current location. In those days we also renovated a space on the compound for consular services. All in all it was a tight fit for everything.

### **Charles Sylvester, Consul General (1987-1989)**

Former CG Sylvester died February 7, 2010, just as we were beginning this project. An obituary in the *Washington Post* March 5, 2010 reported that while serving in Shanghai, "Mr. Sylvester enjoyed showing visitors the photographs of previous Shanghai consuls general on the paneled stairway wall leading to the Sylvester living quarters. He noted that the long line of men with old-fashioned beards and hairstyles were often beneficiaries of the spoils system. "They tell me that every one of them in the 19th century was indictable," he said....

### **Frank "Pat" Wardlaw, Consul General (1989-1992)**

I arrived immediately after Tiananmen, shortly after dependents and non-essential personnel had been evacuated, and the political situation remained fraught for the next three years. The

Shanghai leadership found it convenient to use us as a confidential conduit and as a public partner in a “normal” relationship. Indeed the partnership sometimes took a concrete form as I played tennis and bridge on several occasions with Zhu Rongji, then Shanghai Mayor, and Wu Bangguo, then Party Secretary. Given the tensions inspired by Tiananmen, this ambivalent relationship could have been problematic, but I was blessed both with unfailing professional support by a strong front office in Beijing (Ambassadors Lilley and Roy and DCM Pascoe) and two crackerjack reporting officers in the Consulate (Jon Aloisi and John Norris). And there were other positive notes. I enjoyed a series of capable consular officers, who bore with good humor the pressures of the unending visa line; the best secretary I worked within the Foreign Service, Tess Johnston; and a very sensible and helpful senior Chinese employee, Xu Bailing. (Note: Sadly, Xu Bailing died a few years ago.)

Living and working arrangements were somewhat less ideal in those days. Eva and I lived on the second floor of the Consulate, and while the ten-foot commute from breakfast table to office desk was nice, there was a certain lack of privacy. The absence of Marine guards, despite the wide range of our official activities in a difficult environment, compounded the problem in multitudinous ways. On one notable occasion a demented interloper managed to scale the walls, dodge the motion sensors and make it to the door of our apartment, where he tried to persuade Eva to open the door. (I was out, but she resisted his offer of diversion.)

In addition to serving as security officer-in-residence, I did occasional duty as guide. At the behest of my Japanese colleague one Sunday, I toured the Consulate with the then Chairman of Toyota. Mr. Toyoda, it seems, had been conceived in our residence back in the pre-war years when the Toyoda's had been textile barons centered in Shanghai. His aged mother had returned to Japan for his birth, and had never seen Shanghai again, but now she had dispatched him to take pictures for her of the old family home. Mr. Toyoda was accompanied by a staff photographer, but either as an emergency backup or as a gesture of filial piety, he carefully snapped everything himself with a little pocket camera. I can only recall two visible reactions. He was delighted to note that our motor pool in those days was, with the exception of the CG's Chevy, exclusively Toyota. The little rock garden in back brought him to a full stop. “It's so...” Here he paused and gave a little shudder. “It's so Chinese.”

### **Nora Sun, Commercial Officer (1989-1991)**

My tour at the Consulate was during September, 1989 till December, 1991. The climate at the time was somewhat tense right after the June 4 incident. The only action at the Consulate seemed to be in my section -- Commercial Section!! We were the only ones with visitors and the local government was extremely receptive to any requests of meeting we made. The whole Consulate was rather quiet with no Congressional or Administration visitors -- very low key, except our section!

### **Tess Johnston (1989-1996)**

In her autobiography Tess describes returning to Shanghai in September 1989 in the wake of diplomatic and business departures following the June events at Tiananmen. Excerpted with permission from *Permanently Temporary: From Berlin to Shanghai in Half a Century* by Tess

Johnston, published 2010 by Old China Hand Press.

The Consulate was down to a skeleton staff and this left a big vacuum at a time when the reporting requirements were heavy and every hand was needed to get the reports back to Washington....

After my three year absence the city appeared to me virtually unchanged. There were a few new buildings on the road from the airport and one or two hotels. The five-star Portman Hotel was still under construction downtown, but work on it had now halted....

The hotels had previously been the main gathering places for foreigners and as housing had been in short supply, many had lived in them. Now the lobbies were eerily empty and restaurant waiters stood by to serve guests who never came.

### **Jerome Ogden, Consul General (1992-1994)**

My tenure in Shanghai coincided with Shanghai's big push to become the "locomotive" ("dragon head" in Chinese) for the Yangtze River Basin, so a lot of infrastructure projects took off in that period, many with American technology. I participated in the ceremonies to open the first subway, the first stock market, the first elevated highway, the first fiber-optic international telecommunications link, the new water treatment plants, electrical grid modernization, etc.

In 1975, when I first visited Shanghai while at USLO Peking, the trip from Hongqiao airport to the city was mostly through farmland and low-rise hovels until you got to Jiaotong University, not far from the Huai Hai Consulate General office. So Shanghai's growth is a source of wonderment to me every time I go back

### **Pam Slutz, Political Officer (1991-1994)**

Pam (Su Peiqiu) was the Political Officer (vice Jon Aloisi), then chief of the Pol/Econ Section and DCG (vice John Norris), and finally acting CG (from May-October 1994, between Ogden and Borich). Her husband Ron Deutch (Du Rongjian), was the Management Officer.

We were fortunate to have been in Shanghai to witness first-hand the landmark economic, physical and political changes that took place during the early 1990s. Our first week (June 1991), we went to the top of the Jinjiang Hotel -- to see the lights of Shanghai. There were none! The city literally rolled up the sidewalks at 1800 hours: no night life, no street lights. We had to shop in the Friendship Store and use FECs. There were a few getihu (hole-in-the wall but private) eateries and small shops -- including the "black market" which wound around in the alleys in the former French quarter on Sundays. But these small entrepreneurs were constantly harassed by the local authorities. There was no traffic to speak of because no one had cars or motorcycles; everyone -- even we -- rode bicycles. There were no bridges over the Huangpu, only the tunnel (dangerous noxious fumes) or the ferry. Pudong was just fields. Getting to Fudan University was a long trip! And our friends at Fudan and other think tanks were nervous about meeting with us. Many dissidents were still in jail in the aftermath of Tiananmen. In short, Shanghai was a slum, milked dry by Beijing of all the revenues derived from its manufacturing/industry, and kept on a

very short political and economic leash.

We had to hire our domestic and Embassy staff through DSB, and live in housing provided by DSB. As Pat Wardlaw has noted in his own contribution, we were blessed, nonetheless, to have Xu Bailing. Ron and I visited with him in Shanghai shortly before his death.

And then over Xin Nian in 1992, Deng Xiaoping went on his famous Nan Xun and said something to the effect that “it does not matter what color the cat is as long as it catches the mice.” In other words, it was OK to be a capitalist: “socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.” And the lights went on in Shanghai! Shanghai went into a building and spending spree. Diane Long, then President of the AMCHAM, did a fantastic job of “door knocking” and attracting American companies. American Fortune 500 companies CEOs (GE, etc.) came to Shanghai eager to invest. McDonnell-Douglas began a second assembly line to meet demands from China Eastern and other regional airlines, and the local Volkswagen assembly plant went into overdrive.

Secretary of Commerce Brown visited in September 1994, (I believe) the first Cabinet-level visitor to Shanghai in many years. Overseas Chinese (read: those whose families fled Shanghai to Hong Kong and Taiwan in 1949) were encouraged to return and to invest. Many were given back their property (for example, the former gangster Du Yuesheng). Overnight, huge blocks of slum housing were cleared (razed to the ground) and people and their possessions moved to the “suburbs” where there were no schools, no transport, no shops. New high-rises with shiny glass windows and neon lights went up. In short order, thousands of people were moved to make way for two new bridges over the Huangpu. Buildings started to go up in Pudong. Migrant laborers, free to travel, left the rural areas and flooded into Shanghai in large numbers. Traffic snarled. Construction on the subway began.

Tess Johnston (and Deke Erh) spearheaded the attempt to preserve as much as possible of the old Shanghai -- especially its unique Art Deco architecture. But it was an uphill battle. I still recall going with Tess to the site of one building (once owned by an American shipping company) that was being gutted -- to try to preserve the mosaic wall panel in the foyer. Too late, it lay in pieces on the floor.

Most of the Tiananmen-era dissidents were released -- only to be re-detained in the wake of the “Most Favored Nation” decision in May 1993 when US economic interests trumped our human rights concerns. Then when the US and other governments agreed to issue visas (and grant political asylum) to many of these dissidents and their families, the Chinese government issued them passports...and they left. I must have provided INS with affidavits for nearly a dozen individuals and their families -- most of whom have settled in Flushing, New York and have become LPRs. Congress released its hold on ASHA funding for the American Center at Fudan University.

We were among the first wave of Consulate staff to move out of “DSB housing” and into a very nice (albeit tiny) apartment in the Shanghai Center high rise apartment complex adjacent to the hotel (which was then part of the Shangri-la chain). For the first time, we were able to hire (and fire) our own domestic -- and Consulate -- staff without having to go through DSB. We began

traveling by private car beyond the 25-mile limit -- to Nanjing, Yixing, Hangzhou, Suzhou. I was “permitted” to join a tour to Tibet in 1993, organized by expats residing in Shanghai. Unfortunately, in 1994, the same Shanghai FAO denied us permission to join the tour to Tibet and decided, after some deliberation, to ground us -- no more self-driving by private car to Yixing to buy clay pots! Some policies changed more slowly than others...

### **Ronald Deutch, Administrative Officer (1991-1994)**

When the MSG detachment went fully active -- 1992 -- we secured the original front door facing the street and made the entrance at the garden side. We removed the original metal doors and had a set of heavy wooden doors constructed to look like the wooden doors on the street side. I also oversaw construction of the portico at the garden entrance.

Either RSO David Kidd or Russell (Dal) Polson could likely confirm the exact date the secure entrance went “live”. We continued to use the old entrance but only for large rep events. I also oversaw renovations to the consular section and putting in a new secure pedestrian entrance at the street entrance.

I was usually in trouble with the DSB because I typically never got permission but just did it and then begged forgiveness.

### **Joe Borich, Consul General (1994-1997), previously posted at consulate 1980-1982 as Economic Officer**

It was the spring of 1997 when Newt Gingrich, who was then Speaker of the House, arrived in Shanghai on Easter Sunday morning. He was scheduled to depart for Beijing that evening, but he was mine for the day.

Since it was Easter he wanted to go to church. On our way to the Protestant non-denominational church on Hengshan Road Newt made more than a few references to the “rampant religious persecution” in China that he’d heard and about. I allowed as how there was such persecution in some parts of China, but that it was nowhere near as widespread or systemic as he apparently believed. He was more than a bit surprised to find that there were easily over 1,000 Chinese in or outside of the church (there were too many worshippers for all of them to fit inside). We sat through an unremarkable Easter service (except, of course, for the fact it was all in Chinese) and then went on to our other events for the day, including a lunch with Mayor Xu Kuangdi and an early evening reception with Consulate General.

I took Newt to the airport after the reception and bade him farewell. Upon returning home I decided to give my mother a call, it now being Easter Sunday morning in South Dakota where she lived. Now, there are two things you need to know about my mother: 1) she was a devout Catholic (though quite ecumenical in her view on religion) and 2) she was a devout Democrat. (Somewhere along the way I lost my zeal for both of her passions.) Having wished her a happy Easter, I started the conversation as follows:

(Me) “Mom, guess what? I went to church on Easter Sunday this morning for the first time in 25

years.”

(Mom) “Saints be praised”!!

(Me) “With Newt Gingrich.”

(Mom) after a pause of about 30 seconds: “I’ll continue to pray for you, Son.”

### **Robert Wang, Pol-Econ Officer (1994-1997)**

I was head of econ-pol section for all three years and deputy CG to Joe Borich for the last year.

I recall there were about 20-25 American officers and staff (not including family) but may be a bit off. Non-State agencies included: FCS and Agriculture and USIS. We had loads of visitors, including: VP Gore, SecState Christopher and about a dozen CODELS each year. POTUS (Clinton) did not come until 1998 (although I went back to Shanghai from Singapore to help out). Notable CODELS included: Newt Gingrich, Sam Nunn, William Cohen (I think he came as Senator rather than Defense Secretary when I was there)

Particular memories: I attended the opening of the first MacDonald’s (on Huaihai road?), the first ring road (which opened on Oct 1, 1994 and apparently only had one usable entry/exit so the entourage had to make a full circle since it couldn’t get off the road otherwise...but it opened “on time!”), the Oriental Pearl TV Tower (where we took countless visitors) and the various trade zones in Pudong....not to mention the first Paulaner (next to the consulate) and Malone’s (next to the Portman).

Knowing that Joe Borich highlighted the Gingrich visit, I would highlight the visit of the USS Fort McHenry to Shanghai (1995). This was one of the first ship visits to Shanghai and we were told (by the Commander when we boarded the ship) that all of our sailors were instructed to be on their best behavior. But just in case, the sailors were asked to go ashore at least in pairs (sort of like when the first Chinese diplomats came to the States). The consulate set up tours and activities for the sailors, and the ship held a great reception on board for AmCits as well as some in the diplomatic community.

### **Raymond F. Burghardt, Consul General (1997-1999)**

A major event during my time in Shanghai (1997-99) was the three-day visit by President Clinton. I have photos and even a copy of the unclassified scene-setter we sent.

The 1998 Clinton visit to Shanghai may have been the longest ever made by a sitting president to a constituent post. It was enormously complex. In addition to separate POTUS and FLOTUS motorcades, at times there also were separate motorcades and programs for Secretary Albright and Commerce Secretary Daley. In addition to Tom, we hired many other colorful people as TDY assistants. One memorable addition was my old friend Curt Perry, whom I recruited to handle all the Air Force 1 arrangements since he was a pilot who knew a lot about places and also spoke Chinese. I’m sure Curt’s professional background generated considerable interest on

the part of Deputy Director Yang and the MSS. There were later some allegations that I had brought Curt on board as “The CG’s Drinking Buddy,” but these were calumnious allegations.

Nora Sun writes: “CG Burghardt rounded me up for that well documented 1998 Clinton trip as well.”

### **Anthony Sariti, Branch Public Affairs Officer (1997-?)**

For me the Clinton visit was most memorable. Many of my “war stories” of that visit (like the comments of my WH liaison who, as he boarded the bus for the airport at the hotel, told me the visit was good but that there had been “too much substance”) would probably not be appropriate for publication. I attach photos of two (unopened) boxes of Clinton M&Ms that were handed out to selected consulate officers.

I arranged for President Clinton to visit an “Internet Cafe,” something quite new in Shanghai at the time. Naturally, when we got there, the owner had stacked the place with the sons and daughters of friends and relatives, but still it made a very presentable “event” in tune with a modernizing China and policy of openness. As the President entered, he was immediately ushered to a table around which had gathered four or five young men, peering intently into their windows on the world. (Happily, the Chinese had unblocked the White House site for the day.)

The President engaged each of the web surfers in animated conversation. It was a great “photo op,” and the cameras were rolling. I had positioned myself on the side of the room next to two young girls who were also ostensibly busy traveling the information highway, but who nonetheless kept stealing glances over their shoulders at the president. After about 10 minutes or so, the President got up and started to leave. The disappointment in the girls’ faces at not having had the chance to talk with the President was all too obvious to me, and so I decided to “make their day.” As the President stood up and started to retrace his steps back to the waiting limo, I caught his attention in true Sam Donaldson style: “Mr. President,” I said, “I think there are two young ladies here who would like to talk with you.” That did it. The President, without saying a word to me, pivoted sharply and made his way over to the small table. Sitting down, he began to talk in his easy and friendly way to the female surfers in the room. As I translated for the President, he asked them what they were doing, and they proudly showed him the sites they were working with...women’s fashion pages! Traditional cultural roles still held sway then, but these girls were not taking a back seat as far as technology was concerned. I often think of that day and am sure that at least two women in China will be telling their children and their children’s children of the day they met US President Bill Clinton at the Internet Cafe.

### **Jerry Ogden, Consul General (1992 – 1994)**

Re the Clinton visit, my friend Tao Wei of (GM) Youth Limousine tells the story of a crisis when the presidential limousine wouldn’t start and the secret service wouldn’t let any outsiders near it to try to fix it. Mr. Tao says someone in the consulate finally vouched for him and he was reluctantly allowed to check under the hood of the limo, which he managed to repair just in time. Someone who was actually there may recall the emergency and the facts more precisely...

**Robert D. Griffiths, Pol-Econ Chief (1997-2000)**

The 1998 visit of President Clinton was a huge undertaking. The President of course was the main focus, but the First Lady also had her separate schedule, as did Secretary of State Albright. In addition, there were several other cabinet secretaries and a group of six senators. And then there was Chelsea Clinton, who also had her separate schedule. I had a large matrix of where all the different groups were at every hour over the course of the three-day visit, and at one point we had six different motorcades in motion (the motorcade from the airport included 88 vehicles), a nightmare for Chinese security, even if they had not felt the need to control every event down to the last casual patron or bystander.

**Anthony Sariti** tells a behind the scenes story of the Internet Café.

During a tour of the then-new Shanghai library, it was also a tad puzzling that as President Clinton and his group walked through the facility -- which we had insisted remain open to the public -- not a single person bothered to even look up from his newspaper or book as the President walked by! I guess resources for control ran out, however, when we got to the stock exchange. There again, the place was open for business as usual, but this time apparently the people really were stock brokers and when the President walked onto the floor and began shaking hands, the place turned into near bedlam as people were falling over themselves to shake the President's hand. It was an electrifying moment as the enthusiasm that these young entrepreneurial types had for the U.S. President was clearly evident. In mind, that image was the highlight of the POTUS Shanghai visit in 1998.

Another, more sober event, was after the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. While the consulate did not sustain the damage that the Embassy did, after the crowds were disbursed from the streets that Saturday evening, we required a massive clean-up to deal with the garbage and debris that had been flung over the wall. Tensions were so high that the Embassy decided to not hold a formal 4th of July reception in Beijing, but left it up to the consulates whether to go ahead. In Shanghai, we did, in a modest but dignified affair that included the singing of the respective national anthems by Chinese and American soloists from the consulate community. To everyone's relief, the entire consular corps and all the appropriate Shanghai officials showed up, and we congratulated ourselves on how "Shanghai is different" and how we all wanted relations to get back on track quickly. After all, "The Emperor is far away." Sorry I don't have, or rather cannot readily find, any graphics to recall the event.

SAS moved to Zhudi from the 3rd Girls Middle School in the summer of 1997. Initially, the entire school met in a temporary facility a few blocks away while the current campus was under construction. Beginning in 1998-99, parts of the school began moving to the present Puxi campus as buildings were completed. I believe that the entire "Puxi" school was on the present campus by 2000. The Pudong campus was under construction in the fall of 1997 and classes began on that campus the 1998-99 school year.

**More on the Clinton visit from Tess Johnston, who served at the consulate 1981-1986 and again 1989-96 and is now retired in Shanghai.**

Excerpted with permission from *Permanently Temporary: From Berlin to Shanghai in Half a Century* by Tess Johnston, published 2010 by Old China Hand Press.

... one of the perks of my Shanghai Tours was that over the years I was privileged to meet numerous VIPs and a few U.S. presidents (Reagan, Carter, Bushes I and II and, most recently, Obama). The highlight for me was the visit in July 1998 of President and Mrs. Clinton, along with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. For that I served as site control officer for the Ohel Rachel Synagogue, where Mrs. Clinton, Chelsea, and Mme. Albright paid a brief official visit. President Clinton, however, went elsewhere and I only got to meet him at the traditional “Meet and Greet” held earlier for the Consulate’s personnel.

On that occasion, held in the hotel where the Presidential party was staying, the Ambassador spoke briefly, I lingered on the back row, far from the podium, as I had been up most of the night manning the Control Room and was weary and ruffled. Imagine my surprise to hear the Ambassador mention my name as he handed the President and Mme. Albright copies of two of our books as their official Consulate gifts. The Ambassador then stated that I was famous in the Foreign Service for being the only officer to ever curtail a tour in Paris -- and that to go to a hardship post which Shanghai then was).

I had a greater surprise when President Clinton called out, “Where is she, where is Tess?” Everyone looked around as I raised my hand, smiling modestly, I hoped. The Ambassador asked if I would come forward, but the President simply said, “Get up here!” -- Which I did, with alacrity, trying to smooth out my messy hair as I made my way forward through the crowd. He shook my hand, smiling and exuding the charm for which he was, and still is, famous; he then called for the official White House photographer to take a photo of me presenting the book to him and Mme. Albright.

### **Ohel Rachel Synagogue - notes from Bea Camp, Robert Griffiths and Tom Biddick**

**Bea Camp:** In 2009 Rabbi Greenberg came to the Consulate to thank us for past (and present and future) efforts on behalf of the Ohel Rachel Synagogue during the past ten years. He presented the consulate with a plaque “In honor of the important role in conserving the light of the historic Ohel Rachel Synagogue. Built in 1921. Celebrating 10 years of the revival of Ohel Rachel, 1999-2009” [Editor’s note: the synagogue was opened in 1920, but not consecrated until January 1921] During the Expo in 2010 the synagogue was opened for Friday and Saturday services, but reverted to its only occasionally open status when the Expo closed. When I attended the 2010 Hanukkah celebration, I was again the recipient of effusive thanks for the consulate role over the years.

**Robert Griffiths:** In what must have been 1997, I got my first look at the Ohel Rachel Synagogue. Rabbi Schneier was visiting from New York and I joined CG Burghardt and others to accompany him to the site. The building was being used as a warehouse of sorts, and, after searching for an open door, we had to climb over several dusty rolls of carpet to get inside. The Rabbi had been there before and had something to show us. Making our way to one end of the very unkept building, he finally pulled back a curtain to reveal what had been the original Holy of Holies. An inscription in Hebrew was clearly visible engraved in the wall. From then on, the

Jewish community, with assistance from the consulate, steadily worked with the Shanghai authorities to restore the building and, it was hoped, return it to the community for its original purpose. Despite the pressure of the upcoming Presidential visit, the authorities were unwilling to allow the building to be used again as a synagogue, but did clean up the building for the visit and by the following year refurbished for use as a museum. On occasion, the Jewish community received permission to use the facility for celebrations of Jewish holidays.

**Thomas Biddick:** Robert Griffiths' notes on the Ohel Rachel Synagogue bring to mind some further recollections of the Clinton visit to Shanghai in 1998, which likely was one of the more challenging episodes in the 30 year history of the consulate. Robert and CG Ray Burghardt headed the operation, which involved separate programs and motorcades for the President and First Lady. Ray, Robert and the consulate staff got caught in the middle of a series of disputes between the White House advance team on one hand and the Shanghai Waiban on the other. (Details to be provided in someone's memoirs).

To handle the complexities of the advance work, the consulate staff was augmented by TDY and locally-hired Americans. I was hired on contract as FLOTUS control officer, working with a capable group of event officers including Mike Michalek, Bob Wang, Beth Duncan and Tess Johnston. The Waiban was highly suspicious of my involvement as a Chinese-speaking consulate spouse who seemingly appeared out of nowhere. Meanwhile, the FLOTUS advance team was planning a human rights initiative centered on the First Lady's speech. Needless to say, this came to the attention of responsible persons of departments concerned on the Chinese side.

During the course of the visit, while the President was participating in a discussion at the Shanghai Library, the Waiban demanded a copy of our guest list for the First Lady's speech. Apparently they were concerned about the possibility of invitations being issued to human rights activists or other suspicious persons. It was decided that I would return to the consulate immediately to produce such a guest list. Once I was back in our safe haven on Huaihai Zhong Lu, a Waiban vehicle appeared at the entrance. From that point, I received a phone call every five or 10 minutes from Xu Bailing, relaying the Waiban's impatience. An exercise in creative writing was required, since we had distributed the tickets to the First Lady's speech in blocks to several organizations and did not actually have a guest list. After I produced this work of fiction, it was delivered to the waiting Waiban car and I then managed to rejoin the FLOTUS motorcade, my paranoia now in overdrive. Meanwhile, the streets were empty in the entire inner city of Shanghai as the People's Armed Police and other security forces enforced a security blockade.

The First Lady's speech was delivered without incident and the entire visit was deemed a success. But those of us directly involved took awhile to recover from the experience.

### **1999 Demonstration**

Excerpted with permission from *Permanently Temporary: From Berlin to Shanghai in Half a Century* by Tess Johnston, published 2010 by Old China Hand Press.

In May of 1999 I was reading on the balcony of my lane house when I heard the sound of shouts and excited male voices not too far away. As the road behind my flat led to the Shanghai

Stadium I though perhaps it was a Shanghai victory in a soccer game. That usually caused a riotous reaction. After the last major victory a friend had been down on the Bund when a massive and overjoyed crowd of fans swept through in waves of delirium. The crowd was so dense and the pressure so great that my friend propped his bicycle up against a sturdy light pole at the curb and then placed himself behind it for protection against the surge of the crowd. When they had finally swept past, his heavy bicycle was bent into a curve.

The crowd noise continued and indeed got louder, so I went in and turned on the telly to see what on earth it might be. It was then that I learned of our disastrous bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade. The crowd that I was hearing was at the front of my lane: It was Chinese students, enraged, screaming and chucking rocks and ink bombs at our Consulate, which lay just across the fence. Of course I had to see what was going on so I headed down my lane toward the street.

Now everyone in my lane knew that I was an American and somehow connected with the Consulate -- trust me, the Chinese always know everything about you -- and I was the only foreigner living in the lane. As I walked along all my neighbors were talking excitedly and several walked toward me. Uh-oh, I thought, are they going to berate me, spit on me, who knows what? I braced myself. What did they say? They told me please not to go out onto the street because it was very dangerous for me to show my Western face out there! I may have been an Ugly American but I was their Ugly American and they did not want me to come to harm. That's China for you!

I thanked them and said I would be careful, that I was just going to peep out the lane to see how big the crowd was. When I got to the head of the lane I saw a whole line of armed police blocking off our entrance to keep the milling students out. They did not want me to go out either, but I talked my way through and lingered around the fringes of the crowd. They were obviously angry but somehow they did not seem that angry; they did not appear to be out for blood. I came back home and watched on TV as the events unfolded at the Embassy and at our consulates all over China. Chengdu got the worst of it. Their perimeter walls were breached and the CG's residence was attacked; luckily they were shaken up but not hurt, but it was a scary scene.

The next day I called a friend in the Consulate where he and some of the staff were still holed up. I told him that if the hostility spilled over into my lane I was going to crawl out my window, onto the roof and then drop down on their side of the fence into the Consulate garden. He laughed and said, no, no, if things got worse over on his side they would climb the fence over onto my roof and drop down into my flat. Either way, it was nice that we were all going to be in the soup together.

I think the protest went on for another day or so, but the students had to get back to classes, and the motorists and pedestrians got tired of the street being cordoned off, so things sort of simmered down, then returned to more-or-less normal. Our Consulate's Chinese char force cleaned off the façade of the main building, threw out the rocks and trash, and the staff probably updated our emergency action plan yet again. Then they go back down to business -- probably lots of reporting business. Another day in the Foreign Service life. I only wished that I could have been on the inside looking out instead of the outside looking in.

**Doug Spelman, Consul General (2002-2005)**

In June 2005 we arrived home from a short trip to find that two North Koreans, two days earlier, had jumped our wall -- by climbing a tree outside -- into the compound. Thus began the most intense two weeks of my tenure, and for the whole Consulate. The story ended well, as we sent the two refugees off via Singapore to South Korea. But getting to that point involved non-stop negotiation and coordination with the Shanghai authorities, especially the Foreign Affairs Office and the police, the South Korean Consulate, several airlines, the Embassy, and through the Embassy with the MFA and UN High Commissioner for Refugees Beijing office. Most harrowing was the very complicated efforts to arrange an x-ray screening for tuberculosis for the two refugees. The Department initially forbade us to let the Shanghai police take them out of the compound to a hospital (for fear they would repatriate them), but then relented. But by that time we had arranged for a portable X-ray machine, and did the screening "in-house." They tested negative! Since we kept a twenty-four hour watch on our "guests," the entire Consulate staff rose magnificently to the challenge. Quite a time, but ultimately a small success for a better life for the visitors.

**Ken Jarrett, Consul General (2005-2008)**

No presidential visits during my three years. But we did host the Special Olympics and held a reception on the Consulate lawn -- together with professional wrestlers. Michelle Kwan was there too.

**Beatrice Camp, Consul General (2008-2011)**

My interest in pursuing this consulate history project was sparked by DPO Simon Schuchat showing me the original invitation list and guest book from Don Anderson's April 1980 reception that marked the official opening of the consulate. But I was also inspired by events during my first months that indicated an interesting change in official post-1949 Chinese hostility to two old China hands: author Pearl Buck and Yenching University founder/U.S. Ambassador John Leighton Stuart. In September 2008 I traveled to Zhenjiang for a conference on Pearl Buck and the opening of a museum in the house where she grew up; ironically, Chinese scholars now fear that Buck is being forgotten in the U.S. just as she is being rediscovered in China.

In November 2008 I accompanied Ambassador Randt to Hangzhou for the interment of the ashes of John Leighton Stuart, who was the U.S. ambassador in Nanjing when relations were broken in 1949. Mao later wrote an essay titled: *Farewell, Leighton Stuart!*, basically saying "good riddance" to Stuart's departure. General John Fugh, whose father had vowed to fulfill Stuart's wish to be buried in China, credited the Hangzhou burial to the intervention of then-Zhejiang Party Secretary Xi Jinping. At the gravesite we were surprised to hear "Amazing Grace" followed by the "Star Spangled Banner"; a group of elderly Yenching grads confessed they had hidden a tape recorder in the bushes, figuring that the Hangzhou waiban would not provide any musical accompaniment. Like Buck's home in Zhenjiang, the childhood home of the once-reviled John Leighton Stuart has now been made into a museum that tourists can visit.

Given this seeming willingness to go with the ebb and flow of history, we were taken aback when our consulate reception in honor of Abraham Lincoln's 200th birthday ran afoul of Chinese sensitivities. The day before the event the authorities called me in to ask that we cancel the event. Although we went ahead, half of our guests didn't manage to join us. We had lots of leftover birthday cake as well as food for thought.

Meanwhile, the consulate kept growing and official visitors kept coming. President Obama's November 2009 visit to China started in Shanghai, where he held a memorable Town Hall meeting with students -- every step of which involved hard bargaining. Former President Carter came in January 2009 to help us commemorate the 30th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations; he returned the following year for the Expo. Secretary Clinton visited twice.

But it was our efforts to ensure meaningful U.S. participation in the Shanghai Expo, the largest world's fair in history, that dominated most of 2009 and 2010. Despite heavy odds -- a late start, no government funding, a recession, and critics who thought they could do a better job -- Hillary Clinton's personal commitment to the project in 2009 made it work. From May through October 2010, seven million Chinese got a first-hand look at the U.S. via a visit to the USA Pavilion at Shanghai Expo 2010. President Hu Jintao came during the soft opening in April, followed in May by the Secretaries of Transportation, Commerce, and State. Madeleine Albright led the delegation for our National Day. My colleagues and I had the fun of greeting thousands of VIP visitors, including Arnold Schwarzenegger, Robert DeNiro, Rafael Nadal, and Crown Princess Sirindhorn of Thailand, as well over a third of the Politburo.

No story of modern Shanghai is complete without marveling over infrastructure developments. During these three years the Bund underwent a complete renovation, the Peace Hotel re-opened, the Shanghai World Financial Center was inaugurated as the (then) second tallest building in the world, and the subway system became the longest in the world. Most important for consulate employees was the opening of subway line 10 in April 2010, giving our folks living in Hongqiao a direct line between their homes and the Shanghai Library, a block from the consulate. The "Hongqiao Hub" now connects high speed trains, a new air terminal, and subways, all converging near the old airport. Train travel to Nanjing takes 73 minutes; Hangzhou in 45 minutes by train.

*End of reader*